Keeping in touch with Pragma-Dialectics
Keeping in touch with Pragma-Dialectics In honor of Frans H. van Eemeren Edit...
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Keeping in touch with Pragma-Dialectics
Keeping in touch with Pragma-Dialectics In honor of Frans H. van Eemeren Edited by
Eveline Feteris Bart Garssen Francisca Snoeck Henkemans University of Amsterdam
John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdamâ•›/â•›Philadelphia
8
TM
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Keeping in touch with pragma-dialectics : in honor of Frans H. Van Eemeren / edited by Eveline Feteris, Bart Garssen, Francisca Snoeck Henkemans. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Persuasion (Rhetoric) 2. Discourse analysis. I. Eemeren, F. H. van (Frans Hendrik), 1946- II. Feteris, Eveline. III. Garssen, Bart. IV. Snoeck Henkemans, Francisca. P301.5.P47K44â•…â•… 2011 401'.45--dc22 isbn 978 90 272 1181 1 (hb; alk. paper) isbn 978 90 272 8703 8 (Eb)
2011001048
© 2011 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa
Table of contents Introduction Eveline Feteris, Bart Garssen & Francisca Snoeck Henkemans
1
Maneuvering strategically with dissociation in a political interview Corina Andone & Anca Gâţă
5
Strategic maneuvering in critical reactions to pragmatic argumentation: The case of Henry Porter contra Tony Blair Marianne Doury, Ton van Haaften & Francisca Snoeck Henkemans Figurative analogy in political argumentation Bart Garssen & Manfred Kienpointner Strategic maneuvering with visual arguments in political cartoons: A pragma-dialectical analysis of the use of topoi that are based on common cultural heritage Eveline Feteris, Leo Groarke & José Plug Anecdotes and arguments Trudy Govier & Henrike Jansen Pragma-dialectical analysis of rhetorical texts: The case of Barack Obama in Cairo Dima Mohammed & David Zarefsky
21 39
59 75
89
Amplification in strategic maneuvering Jeanne Fahnestock & Yvon Tonnard
103
Breast cancer screening: A case in point Peter J. Schulz & Bert Meuffels
117
A doctor’s ethos enhancing maneuvers in medical consultation G. Thomas Goodnight & Roosmaryn Pilgram
135
“Try the smarter way”: On the claimed efficacy of advertised medicines Lotte van Poppel & Sara Rubinelli
153
Argument analysis in large-scale deliberation Mark Aakhus & Marcin Lewiński
165
Keeping in touch with Pragma-Dialectics
The pragma-dialectical account of argument schemes David Hitchcock & Jean Wagemans
185
The analysis of the strategic function of presentational techniques M.A. van Rees & E. Rigotti
207
Handling counterarguments: The intersection of pragma-dialectical normative concerns and practical persuasive success Daniel J. O’Keefe & Bilal Amjarso
221
On combining pragma-dialectics with Critical Discourse Analysis Constanza Ihnen & John E. Richardson
231
Formal dialectical systems and their uses in the study of argumentation Erik C.W. Krabbe & Douglas N. Walton
245
The pragma-dialectical approach to circularity in argumentation Jan Albert van Laar & David M. Godden
265
Index
281
Introduction Eveline Feteris, Bart Garssen & Francisca Snoeck Henkemans Keeping in touch with pragma-dialectics contains 17 contributions written for Frans van Eemeren on the occasion of his retirement. Each contribution is written by a team of authors that consists of a combination of a pragma-dialectician and one or two researchers with a different background in the field of argumentation. With this volume we wish to honor our friend, colleague, and supervisor. In the 1970’s, together with Rob Grootendorst, Frans van Eemeren developed a dialectical theory of argumentation in which insights from philosophy and pragmatics were integrated. In 1982 Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst defended their doctoral thesis, which was published two years later, in 1984, in English as Speech acts in argumentative discussions. A theoretical model for the analysis of discussions directed towards solving conflicts of opinion. In this study, the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation was first delineated and defended. This much praised theory distinguished itself from other approaches to argumentation by its programmatic character, its well-considerateness and scope. It has proved to be an important source of inspiration to researchers from all over the world and for generations of (Ph.D.)-students. By taking the normative framework and the theoretical instruments from pragma-dialectics as a starting point for the study of argumentative phenomena in institutional contexts such as the law, and by cooperating with researchers from other disciplines, the field of application of pragma-dialectics was further broadened. In the late 1990’s, Frans van Eemeren created an extension to the pragmadialectical theory of argumentation by adding the concept of ‘strategic maneuvering’. Together with Peter Houtlosser, he integrated a rhetorical approach within the pragma-dialectical framework, thus bridging the gap between rhetoric and dialectics. With this integrated pragma-dialectical theory as a starting point, a series of interconnected Ph.D.-projects on strategic maneuvering in institutional contexts such as politics, medicine and internet discussion web forums was started. Sadly, Peter Houtlosser died in 2007 at the age of 51. Frans van Eemeren then completed the monograph they had planned to write together, Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse (published in 2010), alone.
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Eveline Feteris, Bart Garssen & Francisca Snoeck Henkemans
Since the publication of his dissertation, Frans, usually in combination with other members of the Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric or with international colleagues, has published over 400 books and articles, of which some key publications are the Handbook of argumentation theory that he published in 1987 with Rob Grootendorst and Tjark Kruiger; Argumentation communication and fallacies in 1992 with Rob Grootendorst; Reconstructing argumentative discourse in 1993 with Rob Grootendorst, Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs; Fundamentals of argumentation theory in 1996 with Rob Grootendorst, Francisca Snoeck Henkemans and a large team of international scholars; A Systematic theory of argumentation in 2004 with Rob Grootendorst; in 2007, together with Peter Houtlosser and Francisca Snoeck Henkemans the book Argumentative indicators in discourse; in 2009 together with Bart Garssen and Bert Meuffels Fallacies and judgments of reasonableness, and in 2010 the aforementioned Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse. Frans’ work has received numerous awards and has been translated into many languages (Armenian, Chinese, French, Italian, Japanese, Spanish and Russian, among others). It is not only by the quality and impact of his academic work that Frans has shaped the field of argumentation theory in important ways, but also by his organizational qualities and his talent for bringing together people from different backgrounds within the study of argumentation. Since 1986, Frans, together with Rob Grootendorst (until Rob’s untimely death in 2000), Tony Blair and Charles Willard, has organized the four-yearly international conference on argumentation (the ‘Olympics’ of argumentation theory) in Amsterdam. The seventh of these conferences was held last year, in June 2010. The ‘ISSA’- conferences have brought together an ever-growing number of argumentation scholars from all over the world and have become the most important academic meeting place for those working within the field of argumentation theory. Frans has also founded the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA) and the International Learned Institute for Argumentation Studies (ILIAS). Furthermore, Frans is co-founder and editor of Argumentation, the leading journal in the field as well as editor of the Argumentation Library book series published by Springer and the Argumentation in Context series published by Benjamins. Frans received ample international recognition of his academic work. He is a Distinguished Scholar of the National Communication Association of the United States and he was invited by Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois to be the Van Zelst Visiting Professor in the academic year 2006–2007. Thanks to Frans a very fruitful cooperation has been developed between the Department of Communication at the University of Lugano and our department at the University of Amsterdam. Our research groups join up for a lively and
Introduction
inspiring colloquium each year. Frans also co-organized the highly successful Argupolis program funded by the Swiss Science Foundation. For his efforts and dedication to the development of argumentation theory, the University of Lugano appointed him as doctor honoris causa. Since his appointment as full professor of Speech Communication in 1984, Frans has supervised around 40 doctoral theses in a critical, lucid, and above all caring way. He has not only taught inspiring and much appreciated courses to graduate and undergraduate students in Amsterdam, but also given lectures and courses on argumentation all over the world. Some of his former students have later become his colleagues and have had the opportunity of working together with Frans on a number of projects. For each of them this has been a privilege not only because there was so much to learn from Frans, but also because of Frans’ never ending enthusiasm about working together with other people on a publication, and his real interest in and in many cases friendship with the people he worked with. Hopefully, some of the results of our training will be visible in the contributions we present here. In this volume various aspects of the extended pragma-dialectical theory are addressed. One of the themes of this volume is the role of argumentation in institutional contexts. Several teams of authors dedicate their contribution to the strategic maneuvering in institutional contexts such as politics, medicine and internet forums. In the different contributions on strategic maneuvering in institutional contexts the authors combine a theoretical exposé about the role of strategic maneuvering in a particular context with an analysis of examples in which the theoretical claims are exemplified. In the contributions that are dealing with the political domain, authors pay attention to different forms of political argumentation and various aspects of the strategic maneuvering in different arenas of political argumentation. Corina Andone and Anca Gata concentrate on dissociation as confrontational strategic maneuvering in a political interview with special attention for the technique of dissociation; Marianne Doury, Ton van Haaften and Francisca Snoeck Henkemans discuss the strategic maneuvering in the presentation of critical reactions to pragmatic argumentation in the context of the political debate between Henry Porter and Tony Blair; Bart Garssen and Manfred Kienpointner pay attention to strategic maneuvering with figurative analogies in Austrian and Dutch political settings; Eveline Feteris, Leo Groarke and José Plug analyze the strategic maneuvering in editorial political cartoons in newspapers; Trudy Govier and Henrike Jansen discuss the use of anecdotal arguments in political speeches as a persuasive technique; Dima Mohammed and David Zarefsky apply the pragma-dialectical approach to an analysis of rhetorical argumentation in a speech by Barack Obama in Cairo;
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Eveline Feteris, Bart Garssen & Francisca Snoeck Henkemans
Jeanne Fahnestock and Yvon Tonnard give an analysis of the use of the rhetorical technique of amplification as a presentation device in strategic maneuvering in political speeches. In the contributions dealing with the medical domain, different aspects of the role of argumentation in medical communication are addressed. Bert Meuffels and Peter Schulz compare two different forms of argumentation, statistical argumentation and anecdotal argumentation, in information brochures regarding breast cancer; Tom Goodnight and Roosmaryn Pilgram develop a pragma-dialectical approach to medical argumentation; Lotte van Poppel and Sara Rubinelli pay attention to the argumentative techniques used to convince people of the efficacy of medicines in advertisements for prescription drugs from a pragma-dialectical perspective. With respect to internet discussions, Mark Aakhus and Marcin Lewińksi develop a pragma-dialectical approach of large-scale argument in deliberation online. Attention to general aspects of argumentation theory and strategic maneuvering is paid in two contributions: David Hitchcock and Jean Wagemans identify some problems with the pragma-dialectical account of argument schemes and try to solve these problems by way of a revision of the pragma-dialectical typology, and Agnès van Rees and Eddo Rigotti give an analysis of the strategic function of presentational techniques, and in particular dissociation, in argumentation. Another theme is the comparison of pragma-dialectical insights with insights from other approaches to argumentation, often also accompanied by a proposal for an integration of the different insights in the analysis and evaluation of argumentation and strategic maneuvering. Bilal Amjarso and Daniel O’Keefe compare the results of a pragma-dialectical analysis of the use of counterarguments with findings of empirical studies on the persuasiveness of mentioning counterarguments and refuting them; Constanza Ihnen and John Richardson develop a proposal for an integration of insights from critical discourse analysis in pragma-dialectics; Erik Krabbe and Douglas Walton discuss formal dialectical systems and comment on their uses in the study of argumentation. David Godden and Jan Albert van Laar pay attention to circularity (question begging) in argumentation and compare the pragma-dialectical approach with different other approaches. Although Frans is officially going to retire as of April 1, 2011, we know that in reality that can never happen. Frans and all of us cannot do otherwise but keep in touch with pragma-dialectics.
Maneuvering strategically with dissociation in a political interview Corina Andone & Anca Gâţă 1.â•… Introduction In a BBC political interview on Politics Show dating from December 9, 2007, Jon Sopel interviewed Alan Duncan, then Shadow Foreign Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform in Britain. The discussion concerns the use of nuclear energy: Jon Sopel: And on nuclear, the government says that obviously has to be part of the mix. Are you on that page as well. Alan Duncan: Our policy is absolutely clear and it’s again, very similar, we want approval for sites and designs. We want a proper carbon price, we want honesty about costs, with no subsidy. Get on with the decision to do something with the waste, again, David Cameron said that this week, and I think the government has been a bit slow on working out what to do with nuclear waste. So then people can invest and I think probably they will.
At this point, Sopel accuses the politician of being inconsistent with regard to the use of nuclear energy: Jon Sopel: You were rather more skeptical the last time I spoke to you when you were on this programme – we can just have a listen to what you said the last time. [quoting Duncan:] ‘we think that the nuclear power sector, should be there as a last resort in many respects. We want to explore every conceivable method of generating electricity before we go to nuclear’ Alan Duncan: so fluent. Jon Sopel: Yes. But you were completely different, you were very skeptical there. It has to be the last option, now you’re saying, we’re on the same page as the government and yes, let’s get on with it.
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Corina Andone & Anca Gâţă
According to the interviewer, in a previous interview on the same topic Duncan has been of the opinion that nuclear energy is not a solution to the problem of energy sources, yet in the current interview the politician seems to assert exactly the opposite. In response to Sopel’s accusation of inconsistency, Duncan replies as follows: Alan Duncan: I think what’s important with nuclear is to explain the policy. I think it’s unhelpful to get hooked on two words and I think the policy as it has always been is exactly as I’ve just explained.1
In his response, Duncan makes use of an argumentative technique which Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) termed dissociation. This technique2 serves to distinguish between two notions that are being derived from a notion originally considered as a conceptual unity, in this particular case the notion of NUCLEAR ENERGY. Each of the two derived notions contains some part of the original notion. In the case at hand, one of the notions concerns the practical aspects of the use of nuclear energy (among which, ways of dealing with nuclear waste), the other one concerns aspects related to the policy of resorting to nuclear energy. Duncan seems to suggest that as far as the policy is concerned, his position has remained unchanged. In fact, his original standpoint concerned – as mentioned in his reply – an entirely different matter, namely the practical consequences of using nuclear energy (the government has been a bit slow on working out what to do with nuclear waste), which means that the alleged inconsistency is only apparent, and that in fact it does not exist. Argumentative exchanges in which an interviewer confronts a politician with an accusation of inconsistency are common in a political interview. In their contributions to the exchange, the participants can be seen as attempting to balance two distinct concerns: being reasonable with winning the discussion. In a pragmadialectical perspective to argumentation, this attempt is termed strategic maneuvering to refer to the arguers’ effort to maneuver between making a reasonable contribution to the discussion and trying to do so in one’s favor (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002). For instance, the interviewer who expresses criticism by means of an accusation of inconsistency makes an attempt at critically testing the politician’s standpoint and may do so by backing up his accusation with facts which cannot be denied. In answer to that, the politician more often than not tries to respond to criticism while making an attempt at resolving the inconsistency. In this contribution, we concentrate on the way in which a politician, acting as the protagonist in a discussion, maneuvers strategically with dissociation when he is accused of an inconsistency by an interviewer acting as the antagonist.3
Maneuvering strategically with dissociation in a political interview
More precisely, we are dealing with explaining the strategic function which a politician’s discourse can achieve in the argumentative confrontation of a political interview in response to an interviewer’s charge of inconsistency. Our contribution is organized along the following lines. First, we discuss the argumentative technique of dissociation that comes as a response to criticism advanced in the confrontation stage of a critical discussion. Second, we try to clarify the institutional preconditions imposed by the characteristics of the activity type of a political interview on confrontational strategic maneuvering. Finally, the analysis of an example is provided in which a politician responds to an accusation of inconsistency that is aimed at excluding him from the discussion. Taking into account the possibilities offered by dissociation to respond to criticism and the institutional constraints imposed on them, the example is analyzed to indicate the strategic function of the dissociation. 2.â•… Dissociation in an argumentative confrontation Dissociation is a discourse technique introduced in studies on argumentation to account for cases when a speaker reorders and rearranges existing notional content (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, vol. II: 550–609). This necessarily leads to building new notional content which may have a shorter or a longer life. The reordering starts from an existing notion N0 from which a new notion N is being built up. N0, considered as a unitary notion, and generally accepted as such, is referred to by a specific linguistic expression, or initial term, E0. The new notion N will be in its turn referred to by a linguistic expression E, more or less related to E0. One example of dissociation – among many others – referred to in the New Rhetoric is – more or less – the following: from the notion of LAW (N0) termed by the linguistic expression law (E0), a new notion N is dissociated, corresponding to a notional content which includes, among others, the notional aspect of (rational) INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW (N), termed as spirit of the law (E). Thus, by the first term of the dissociation, law, corresponding to N0, a speaker would point in a specific argumentative context, to the stable, fixed character of law, as it is retrievable in the text of the law. By the second term of the dissociation, corresponding to the newly built notion N, the speaker would point to (acting in conformity with the) purpose for which a law was devised, its spirit. A proposal such as We should proceed according to the law in its spirit works in a particular context as an implicit dissociation by pointing simultaneously and in an implicit way to: (1) a new starting point in the argumentative context, provided by the set of notional aspects N introduced by the linguistic expression the law in its spirit,
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Corina Andone & Anca Gâţă
(2) the argumentative value of N, (3) the normative character of N, and (4) a specific way of action (according to the spirit). The same is true of the notion TEXT OF THE LAW (N′) dissociated from LAW to show that a particular situation is not covered by the letter of the law, yet it is conceivable – from the legal point of view – through an interpretation of the law, so it is nevertheless in the spirit of the law. In the case of this dissociation, a particular ruling may be argued for in court by contending that it obeys or conforms to the spirit of the law – or, on the contrary, to its letter, depending on each specific circumstance. In the confrontation stage of a critical discussion, the reordering of the notional content is often appealed to by a protagonist in response to an antagonist’s criticism4 pointing out that the standpoint currently advanced is incompatible or inconsistent with a standpoint advanced earlier (van Rees 2009). The protagonist employs dissociation to resolve the perceived incompatibility by advancing one of the two possible moves that may come as a response to criticism in the confrontation stage: (a) he maintains the standpoint or (b) he retracts the standpoint at issue by accepting that there is an inconsistency (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984). By employing dissociation to give one of the two possible responses to criticism, the protagonist distinguishes between acceptable and unacceptable aspects of N0, and maintains one set of aspects to build up a notion N that is assigned a new linguistic denominator E. More precisely, the protagonist carries out three moves which can be analytically distinguished: (a) he makes a distinction among the various aspects of a notion, (b) he makes a concession with respect to some of the aspects by indicating their acceptance, and (c) he negates some other aspects of the initial notion by indicating their non-acceptance.5 The conceded aspects are maintained in N, while the non-accepted aspects are implicitly declared to be encapsulated into N0, or what is left of it, as not conforming to what the protagonist intended to convey with his words. Throughout this contribution, we will consider that three fundamental dialectical moves may be identified analytically as the most important characteristics of dissociation: a distinction, a concession and a negation. These moves may be considered and viewed as the main constitutive elements, or components, of this argumentative technique. Any of these three components can be implicit or explicit. In the example illustrating the beginning of this introductory section, in replying to Sopel’s accusation of inconsistency, Duncan implicitly distinguishes between simply asserting the policy with respect to nuclear energy and explaining it by providing specific lines of action. This introduces a new starting point in the discussion, in which the notion of EXPLAINING THE POLICY is given argumentative value and endowed with normative character (this is what one/the government should do: explain the policy). In other words, saying We want to explore every conceivable method of generating electricity before we go to nuclear should
Maneuvering strategically with dissociation in a political interview
not be read and interpreted as We do not support nuclear energy, but We support nuclear energy as all the other energy resources and will go to it after we have tried them all. In principle, an analyst may expect that a speaker interested in having her viewpoint accepted on the merits explicitly distinguishes, concedes or denies something, while a speaker interested in the effectiveness of his speech and in getting his standpoint accepted by an audience as large as possible may wish to conceal the technique of dissociation in at least one of these dialectical moves for fear it might seriously damage the previous conceptual and argumentative construction. Then, it is perhaps important to note that implicitness may become the rule in various contexts because of the clash between negation and concession, which both lie at the basis of this argumentative technique. This clash may cause inconsistency, since a former verbal presentation of a concept, or the linguistic expression assigned to a notion, is associated with a new notion, resembling more or less the initial one and created as such while the dissociation takes place.6 In the example mentioned before about the letter and the spirit of law, two new notions have resulted from the old notion LAW, by means of two dissociations. The term – and the corresponding notion – spirit of the law may be valued positively in an argumentative context in which one of the parties would plead for the need of an interpretation of the law, while the letter of the law could be the notion valued negatively. In such cases the two notions may be presented antithetically.7 One of the most important characteristics of dissociation is that the old notion and the new notion(s) are valued positively or negatively in the context, aiming at obtaining a persuasive effect. 3.â•… I nstitutional preconditions for confrontational strategic maneuvering in a political interview Our treatment of dissociation as a confrontational strategic maneuver is situated in the activity type of a political interview. The conventions characterizing this activity type influence the way in which the arguers perform their moves by imposing constraints and opening up opportunities for maneuvering (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2005).8 For instance, the interviewer is constrained to question the politician on matters of (major) public importance, and he turns this into an opportunity to choose matters which pose difficulties for the politician. For an analysis of the politician’s confrontational strategic maneuver that takes into account the institutional influence, the conventions that characterize the initial situation and the starting points of a political interview are particularly important.9 Some of these conventions are codified rules set by the organizations monitoring
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 Corina Andone & Anca Gâţă
the broadcasters’ activity. In this paper, all references to codified rules concern general working principles applicable to the public and commercial broadcasters in the United Kingdom in general and more specifically to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Other rules remain implicit, but are of equal influence on the arguers’ contributions as the codified rules.10 The initial situation11 in a political interview is triggered by controversial decisions, plans or actions of a politician that are important for the general audience listening, reading or watching the interview. A disagreement between an interviewer and a politician emerges through a question-answer exchange concerning the matters of political controversy selected by the interviewer (Clayman & Heritage 2002). The topics of discussion in such exchanges, chosen solely by the interviewer, are debatable matters of “newsworthy character” and political controversy (Clayman & Heritage 2002:â•›61). The controversial matters of political or major political importance are the subject of all argumentative exchanges in a political interview. With regard to the issues that are discussed, the politician is in favor of a positive evaluation of his words or actions, while the interviewer raises doubts concerning this evaluation and, more often than not, goes further than expressing mere doubt by suggesting a negative evaluation of the politician’s words or actions. In addition to the preconditions created for the topics at the centre of the disagreement between the interviewer and the politician, the conventions of a political interview regulate the type of difference of opinion that is at issue. In the simplest case, the interviewer initiates a non-mixed discussion: he asks the politician to advance standpoints which he puts to the critical test in an attempt at holding the politician to account or raises doubts concerning the acceptability of standpoints previously put forward by the politician. A mixed discussion can be reconstructed when the interviewer does not merely cast doubt on the standpoint advanced by the politician, but expresses also an attitude with regard to a decision or stance of the politician. Another mixed case occurs when the interviewer expresses an attitude in relation to an issue, to which the politician responds by advancing doubt accompanied by the expression of an opposite standpoint. It is often asserted that what in pragma-dialectical terms can be reconstructed as a mixed discussion cannot arise in a political interview. Clayman and Heritage are of the opinion that due to their restriction to acts of asking questions, interviewers “cannot […] express opinions, or argue with, debate, or criticize the interviewees’ positions (2002:â•›98).” The authors stipulate that, because the interviewers should maintain an impartial stance, they should “(i) avoid the assertion of opinions on their own behalf and (ii) refrain from direct or overt affiliation with (or disaffiliation from) the expressed statements of the interviewees” (2002:â•›126). However, codified rules applicable in the United Kingdom do not suggest this. They make
Maneuvering strategically with dissociation in a political interview 
it clear that “impartiality” should be interpreted as part of the expression “due impartiality,” in which “impartiality” means “not favoring one side over another” and “due” points to being “adequate to the subject and nature of the programme” (Section 5.9)12 Closely connected with the principle of “due impartiality” is the fact that more often than not the interviewer criticizes the politician’s standpoint and expresses an opposite standpoint by acting as the devil’s advocate.13 While the politician tries to give a positive account of his words, actions and decisions, the interviewer suggests by expressing an opposite standpoint a negative evaluation of the performance of the politician. The material and procedural starting points of a political interview are also preconditioned by the broadcasting conventions. The Broadcasting Code restricts the content of the controversial matters to those that are not an infringement of privacy, unless warranted, where “warranted” refers to the case in which “the public interest outweighs the right to privacy” (Rule 8.1), such as in the case of matters that concern public health or safety. A further restriction is imposed by the Royal Charter14 stipulating that the interviewer “formulate questions that “carefully and appropriately assess the views of licence fee payers”15 (Article 23, par. c). Likewise, editorial guidelines regulating the content of programmes on politics and public policy prescribe that “arrangements must not prevent the programme asking questions that our audiences would reasonably expect to hear.” Not only do the requirements set by these documents explain why the interviewer plays the role of the devil’s advocate, they show also that the question-answer procedure gains institutional significance only if the participants are oriented towards an audience. There is no point in trying to hold the politician to account through an argumentative exchange if there is no mutual commitment to do so for the benefit of the audience. As explained earlier, the discussion format in a political interview is an exchange between the interviewer’s questions and the politician’s answers, with the latter enjoying the right to advance rhetorical questions. This format determines a clear assignment of the discussion roles and of the division of the burden of proof. The politician acts as the protagonist of a standpoint which he has to justify or refute if challenged by the interviewer. When doing so, he is expected to give an account of his words or actions; otherwise he may be held to account for evasion. The politician may also challenge the interviewer to defend a standpoint in two situations: (a) the politician denies or disagrees with the statements prefacing the interviewer’s questions for being “contentious statements of opinion rather than merely relevant background information,” and (b) the politician attacks the interviewer’s conduct or the broadcasting organization which he represents (Clayman & Heritage 2002:â•›140). Due to time constraints, the interviewer has to
 Corina Andone & Anca Gâţă
argue his case briefly in order to leave enough time to the politician to offer an extensive account.16 Finally, it is the interviewer who decides when to bring the discussion about a certain issue to a close based on the pre-specified time limits and his own judgment as to when the politician has provided an account of his words or actions. Quite often, when the politician does not provide an account, the interviewer repeats the same question until the politician has given an answer. 4.â•… Dissociation at work – a sample analysis To illustrate how a politician can maneuver strategically with dissociation in a political interview, we have selected the following excerpt from the BBC programme Politics Show. It is part of an interview between Jon Sopel and Yvette Cooper MP, Work and Pensions Secretary, transmitted on June 28, 2009. Jon Sopel: We’ve seen a briefing paper on some of what is being talked about and about the need to create green jobs in the economy and then you take Vestas who build wind turbines on the Isle of Wight, their factory closed in April and the company said it was because of falling demand and bureaucratic red tape and not enough support from government. Yvette Cooper: Well individual companies will always raise particular issues but I think we have actually done a lot to support both investment in green technologies, particularly through investing in the science base, but also through changing the regulatory framework, so that that does make it easier for companies who are investing in green power, because of course you’ve got to have that shift to renewables, shift to low carbon technologies, so I think there is a lot of investment going in to those areas. Clearly, people will always want us to do more and you know, that’s the direction we want to move in. (Our italics)
In the political interview from which this fragment has been excerpted the discussion roles follow the conventional division: the politician acts as the protagonist who advances standpoints and supports them, while the journalist acts as the antagonist who constantly challenges them from the position of the devil’s advocate. In the excerpt just quoted, the issue at the centre of the discussion between Sopel and Cooper relates to the policy of the government to take an environmentfriendly approach. In relation to this issue, Cooper, acting as a representative of the government, can be said to take the position that the government supports green jobs.17
Maneuvering strategically with dissociation in a political interview 
Original discourse
Argumentative reconstruction
a briefing paper on some of what is being talked about and about the need to create green jobs in the economy … … Vestas who build wind turbines on the Isle of Wight, their factory closed in April and the company said it was because of falling demand and bureaucratic red tape and not enough support from government …
(Government/Yvette Cooper/Protagonist) Standpoint: The government supports green jobs (Jon Soppel reporting the public standpoint) Opposite Standpoint: The government does not support green jobs Evidence (argument from example): Vestas wind turbines factory closed in April Causes (among others): Bureaucratic obstacles have prevented factory activity The government did not provide support for factory activity
Cooper’s standpoint is maintained throughout the fragment and can be reconstructed from the narrow context: (a) it is evoked indirectly by Sopel (the need to create green jobs in the economy as an issue positively dealt with by the government), and (b) it is partly made explicit by Cooper in the reply in which she maintains her standpoint (we have actually done a lot to support…; there is a lot of investment going in to those areas…). Cooper’s maintained standpoint comes as a reaction to Sopel’s criticism according to which the government is not complying with the announced policy (supporting green jobs). The criticism is expressed implicitly by means of an accusation of inconsistency which is made by advancing the opposite standpoint: The government is saying that green jobs are supported, but particular facts show that they are not. The interviewer’s opposite standpoint is supported with the example of the company Vestas, which created green jobs, but was not supported by the government (They closed and said it was – among others – because of lack of government support). In his standpoint, the interviewer points out an inconsistency between Cooper’s standpoint and her actions – as a member or representative of the government (and indirectly the government’s actions): while she has said and maintains that p, she acts as if she is committed to non p. As explained in the previous section, the interviewer’s questioning is aimed at holding the politician to account for her words and actions. Sopel tries to do so by maneuvering strategically between a reasonable move – putting Cooper’s standpoint to the test – and a move in favor of his own standpoint – making it a difficult task for her to answer. Sopel raises the accusation of inconsistency based on reported information (the company said it was because of … and not enough support from government) and not on the basis of personal perceptions, feelings, assumptions or inferences. This allows him to place the accusation of inconsistency outside any suspicion of subjectivity or partiality on his side. In response,
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Cooper has to handle Sopel’s attack regarding the inconsistent words and actions while at the same time maintaining the standpoint advanced initially. Cooper’s response is the main element discussed in the present contribution as an instance of strategic maneuvering through dissociation. Cooper’s response consists in a move of (implicitly) maintaining the standpoint. She does this by seemingly providing arguments in favor of this standpoint. The argumentation may be reconstructed as such: The government has supported green jobs since it has supported investment in green technologies and has changed the regulatory framework [of green technologies; our addition]. In fact, the verbal presentation of these arguments is the occasion for Cooper to introduce a dissociation between supporting green jobs by specific help for a particular company in need (Vestas), which was not the government’s strategy, and supporting green jobs by investing in basic and essential, strategic areas: … we have actually done a lot to support both investment in green technologies, particularly through investing in the science base, but also through changing the regulatory framework …; there is a lot of investment going in to those areas …
This strategic maneuver allows the politician to maintain the initial standpoint by showing that in a sense the standpoint can be conceived of as untenable and may be exposed to criticism while in the other it can hold strongly. The strategic move will consist in Cooper defending the initial standpoint and not in directly refuting the opposite standpoint advanced by the interviewer. The move allows her in front of the audience to the political interview to maintain her initial standpoint and provide verifiable evidence to defend this standpoint. She calls to the audience’s expectations, who may find it acceptable that the government provides funds for the science base and acts to regulate the green activity framework. In this way, on the dialectical level, Cooper can show that the accusation of inconsistency does not hold, that the interviewer’s standpoint can be criticized or is acceptable only with respect to the particular Vestas situation, while the initial standpoint can be maintained. The dissociation displays the protagonist’s perspective, on one side, on the government’s action, which is equivalent to a newly created notion in the given setting, that of POLICY-ORIENTED SUPPORT, which is the support provided by the government, and, on the other side, on the action envisaged by the interviewer, presumably voicing and echoing the standpoint of the other party (opposition, public, etc.), and centered around the (old) very general notion of SUPPORT, equivalent to something like UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT. The dissociations made by the politician are enumerated below under A and B. The three analytically distinguished moves (distinction, concession, and negation – see Section 2 above) involved in the dissociations are marked by (i), (ii) and (iii):
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A. Dissociating between specific support and the general approach i. (Implicit) Distinction The fact that individual companies may need support is distinct from the government’s overall preoccupation with creating green jobs. ii. (Implicit) Negation Various situations cannot be equally and unconditionally supported. iii. Concession We provided specific support by investing in the science base and contributing to changing the regulatory framework. B. Dissociating between present (less efficient) support and programmatic future (hopefully more efficient) approach i. (Semi-Explicit) Distinction What we are doing now (less) is different from what we are planning to do (more). ii. (Implicit) Negation All particular situations cannot be unconditionally supported at this time. iii. (Implicit) Concession In the future we will do more of what people expect us to.
The two dissociations A and B in the enumeration just made are built upon the philosophical pairs individual – universal (or particular – general) and present – future. The analysis can be modified to show that the philosophical pair is that of practice – theory, or practical action – strategic/political action. In this latter case, the dissociation would call upon treating the notion of SUPPORT in the initial standpoint as working as a matter of policy and applying to general actions or to various strategic priorities, such as the investments in science base and in regulatory framework, while the practice would direct attention towards support to each and every green company, ensuring unconditional support for each of them – which would prove indeed unsuccessful as long as there is no specific policy with respect to this. In fact, rhetorical invention plays its part in building up the new notion N of (POLICY-ORIENTED) SUPPORT. In this context, the public and the interviewer-antagonist are playing an important role since they are supposed to fill in N with new notional aspects. SUPPORT in the sense of N0 is seen – as both the antagonist and the protagonist perceive it – as UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT. On the contrary, the dissociation made by the protagonist allows excluding from the initial notion the notional aspect of UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT. This leaves the new notion N – which could be termed in the same way as the old one – more abstract, as applying to more general, essential, strategic issues. It is as if one were saying: Real support is not support granted unconditionally to individual companies on various occasions; real support is support granted for policy establishment.
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The two notions thus become antithetic, although this is not obvious at first sight. Yet it is conceivable that attention directed unconditionally to problematic aspects in the area of green companies at this point in time hinders the government from applying a more general and comprehensive policy of creating green jobs. More importantly, the argumentative activity type considered in the given setting – a politician’s interview by a journalist – is in some respect staged according to the various rules and preconditions mentioned earlier. In this context, the mechanism of dissociation is the occasion for a politician to reshape his initial discourse so as to avoid being considered to speak or to act inconsistently with what he previously said or did. Since the interviewer is playing the devil’s advocate and constantly challenges the politician by quoting his own older words or those of the party he represents, it may be the case that various assertions taken out of the initial context make the speaker appear inconsistent with her former (verbal) behavior. Dissociation allows Cooper not only to restate the initial standpoint but also to change the initial starting points of the discussion as far as this is convenient for the purpose of the interview. 5.â•… Conclusion In this contribution, we have shown that dissociation may be an excellent means which a politician can employ in a political interview to his advantage. The analysis of the argumentative exchange between Sopel and Cooper has illustrated that dissociation can be strategically employed – as it is by Cooper – to adapt to the audience and to deal with an issue at stake in a particular way, by bringing about a change in the starting points of the discussion and thus directing the audience attention to this change rather than to the central aspects of the issue. The institutional constraint to carry out a move that is directed at the audience is turned into an opportunity to move the audience into a positive perception of her words and actions. Unlike the negative image suggested by Sopel’s accusation of inconsistency, Cooper strategically brings to light a positive perspective of the government, portrayed as concerned with essential issues such as the establishment of an environment-friendly policy. By antithesis, Cooper discards minor preoccupations leading to unconditional support and particular concerns with individual companies facing difficulties and in need of support, and insists upon the fundamental measures to be applied and steps to be taken in order to “really” create green jobs. Most often – as is the case in the analyzed excerpt – the antithesis in the dissociation is not obvious, it stays implicit – although it is strongly presupposed: the positive and the negative valuing, respectively, of the two notions is the antithesis-funding dissociation. This is also the main reason for which dissociation can be successfully
Maneuvering strategically with dissociation in a political interview 
used (by either party) to turn the tables to her own favor. The interviewer’s criticism that the government does not offer the proclaimed support for green jobs as seen in the case of Vestas is turned by Cooper into a compliment for her. By dissociation, the politician shows that real support is not support granted to individual companies unconditionally, but it is granted for policy establishment.
Notes 1.â•… All examples in this study are presented as transcribed on the BBC website. For our purpose, a transcription that guarantees readability is sufficient. 2.â•… For a detailed account of dissociation, see van Rees (2009). 3.â•… For an account of the roles of protagonist and antagonist which participants play in a critical discussion, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984). 4.â•… The criticism may be expressed by means of the analytically relevant move of doubt or the analytically relevant move of advancing an opposite standpoint (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984). We prefer to refer to a criticism, because the distinction between the various ways of putting forward criticism does not have consequences for the use of dissociation. 5.â•… For a more detailed presentation of these moves as constitutive of dissociation, see Gâţă (2007, 2009). Anca Gâţă’s contribution to this paper is based on previous research on dissociation. This research was made possible due to the logistic support of the University of Amsterdam and the financial support of the project PN II-PCE-ID1209/2007 coordinated at Dunărea de Jos University of Galaţi, Romania. 6.â•… We are grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for relevant and informed comments on the structure of the study and on the examples used to illustrate the concept of dissociation. 7.â•… In many cases only one new notion is created, as in the prototypical case of expressions with the adjectives real, true, and their derivatives (e.g. true love, the truly needy; see also Zarefsky et al. 1984). 8.â•… We view a political interview as an activity type in which argumentation is vital to the exchange (Fetzer & Weizman 2006; Johansson 2006; Fetzer 2007). More often than not the interviewer employs argumentation to argue for a negative evaluation of the politician’s performance, and the politician makes use of argumentation to justify his words or actions (Andone 2009). 9.â•… Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2005) distinguish four empirical counterparts of the four stages of a critical discussion: the initial situation, the starting points, the argumentative means and the outcome. 10.â•… The conventions described here are relevant to the accountability procedure developing in a political interview: the interviewer holds a politician to account for his words or actions and the politician provides an account that justifies his performance. Informing the public or entertaining it are also pursued in a political interview, but we are interested only in
 Corina Andone & Anca Gâţă the conventions that regulate argumentative exchanges. In such exchanges, argumentation is always advanced to hold to account (in the case of the interviewer) or to give an account (in the case of the politician) of the politician’s words or actions. 11.â•… The initial situation of the argumentative activity type of a political interview is not the same as the ‘opening’ of a political interview, described in purely structural terms (Clayman & Heritage 2002). The opening is described as comprising a headline – through which the topic of the discussion is introduced – a background – which gives details about the context – and a lead-in – where the politician is introduced to the public. Unlike the opening, the initial situation, corresponding to the confrontation stage of a critical discussion, is described from a functional argumentative perspective. A characterization of the initial situation makes clear how the difference of opinion is defined. 12.â•… It is explicitly specified that “presenters and reporters […], and chairs of discussion programmes may express their own views on matters of political […] controversy or matters relating to current public policy” (Section 5.9). Nevertheless, Rule 5.9 makes clear that “presenters must not use the advantage of regular appearances to promote their views in a way that compromises the requirement of due impartiality.” In addition, Section 5.10 conditions the expression of a personal view to be “clearly signaled to the audience at the outset.” 13.â•… Section 5.9 of the Broadcasting Code states that alternative viewpoints should be made known to give impartiality its due. 14.â•… The full title of the current Royal Charter is “the Royal Charter for the continuance of the British Broadcasting Corporation” and dates from September 19, 2006. 15.â•… A licence fee payer “is not to be taken literally but includes […] any […] person in the UK who watches, listens to or uses any BBC service, or may do so or wish to do so in the future” (Article 57, Royal Charter). 16.â•… Heritage and Greatbatch (1991:â•›102) point out that the extended turns of the politicians are an institutional characteristic of a political interview. 17.â•… This standpoint is from the start in line with many global policy concerns and political actions. With no direct connection with the issue under discussion in the present study, the standpoint ensures a positive ethos for the politician advancing and/or defending it and the party this politician represents, as well as a smooth background – or starting point – for any political discussion in the given setting.
References ***(2006). An Agreement Between Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport and the British Broadcasting Corporation. Â�Â�Â�2006. UK: Department for Culture, Media and Sport. http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/about/how_we_govern/charter_and_agreement/index.shtml ***(2006). The Royal Charter for the continuance of the British Broadcasting Corporation. TSO: Department for Culture, Media and Sport. http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/about/how_ we_govern/charter_and_agreement/index.shtml
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***(2008). The Ofcom Broadcasting Code 2008. www.ofcom.org.uk. Andone, C. (2009). Confrontational strategic manoeuvring in a political interview: A pragmadialectical analysis of a response to an accusation of inconsistency. Studies in Communication Sciences 9 (2): 43–58. Clayman, S. & Heritage, J. (2002). The News Interview. Journalists and Public Figures on the Air. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Eemeren, F.H. van & Houtlosser, P. (2002). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse: Maintaining a delicate balance. In: F.H. van Eemeren & P. Houtlosser (Eds.), Dialectic and rhetoric. The warp and woof of argumentation analysis (pp. 131–159), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. Eemeren, F.H. van & Houtlosser, P. (2005). Theoretical construction and argumentative reality: An analytic model of critical discussion and conventionalized types of argumentative reality. In: D. Hitchcock (Ed.), The uses of argument: Proceedings of a conference at McMaster University, 18 – 21 May 2005 (pp. 75–84), Hamilton. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (1984). Speech acts in argumentative discussions. A theoretical model for the analysis of discussions directed towards solving conflicts of opinion. Dordrecht: Foris Publications. Fetzer, A. (2007). Well if that had been true, that would have been perfectly reasonable. Appeals to reasonableness in political interviews. Journal of Pragmatics 39 (8): 1342–1359. Fetzer, A. & Weizman, E. (2006). Political discourse as mediated and public discourse. Journal of Pragmatics 38 (2): 143–153. Gâţă, A. (2007). Dissociation as a way of strategic manoeuvring. In: F.H. van Eemeren & al. (Eds.), Proceedings of the 6th conference of the international society for the study of argumentation, June 27–30 (pp. 441–448), Sic Sat. Gâţă, A. (2009). La dissociation argumentative: composantes, mise en discours et ajustement stratégique. In: V. Atayan & D. Pirazzini (Eds.), Rhethos, vol.1: Argumentation: théorie – langue – discours, Actes de la section Argumentation du XXX. Congrès des Romanistes allemands, Vienne, septembre 2007 (pp. 3–18), Peter Lang. Heritage, J.& Greatbatch, D. (1991). On the institutional character of institutional talk: The case of news interviews. In: D. Boden & D.H. Zimmerman (Eds.), Talk and social structure. Studies in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (pp. 93–137), Polity Press. Johansson, M. (2006). Constructing objects of discourse in the broadcast political interview. Journal of Pragmatics 38 (2): 216–229. Perelman, C. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1958). La nouvelle rhétorique. Traité de l’↜argumentation, 2 vol. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Rees, A.M. van (2009). Dissociation in argumentative discussions. A pragma-dialectical perspective. Amsterdam: Springer. Zarefsky, D., Tutzauer, F.E., & Miller-Tutzauer, C. (1984). Reagan’s safety net for the truly needy: The rhetorical use of definition. Communication Studies 35 (2): 113–119.
Strategic maneuvering in critical reactions to pragmatic argumentation The case of Henry Porter contra Tony Blair Marianne Doury, Ton van Haaften & Francisca Snoeck Henkemans 1.â•… Introduction When criticizing an opponent’s argumentation, arguers are going through a particular dialectical testing procedure: they are supposed to put forward criticisms that are relevant for the type of argumentation that they are reacting to (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992:â•›98). The opponent who has made use of a particular argument, can be held committed to deal with the criticisms that are relevant for this type of argumentation. The critical questions pertaining to a particular type of argumentation can therefore be regarded as a collection of stock issues for the defense and attack of this type of argumentation. They make it possible to give a specification of the topical potential that an antagonist can choose from when responding critically to an argument used by his opponent. Within this topical potential, there is, of course, still room for different types of choices by the antagonist. He still has to decide which points he should raise in his critical reaction, and which points are better left unaddressed. The latter for instance because they may be harder to defend should this be required, or because they might not be acceptable to an audience functioning as a third party. The antagonist also has to decide whether to anticipate possible counterarguments against his criticisms. Should he make some concessions, or try to refute potential counterarguments in advance? Another type of choice concerns not so much the content, but the presentation of the criticism. How can the use of specific presentational devices make the criticism seem as convincing as possible? Making choices such as the abovementioned can be seen as a form of ‘strategic maneuvering’. According to van Eemeren (2010), by making advantageous choices from the topical potential, adapting to audience demand and choosing an effective presentation, arguers attempt to achieve a balance between their dialectical aim of resolving a dispute in a reasonable way and their rhetorical aim of resolving the dispute to their advantage. Applied to the process of criticizing an opponent’s
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argumentation, this means that the antagonist may on the one hand be assumed to undertake an attempt at critically testing the argumentation in a reasonable way, and on the other hand may be expected to do so in such a way that the chances that his criticisms will be decisive are as large as possible. In this contribution, we shall make use of a particular case study to discuss the antagonist’s strategic maneuvering when critically reacting to a pragmatic argument put forward by the protagonist. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992:â•›97,â•›102) characterize pragmatic or “instrumental” argumentation as an argumentation scheme that is based on a causal relationship, in which the standpoint recommends a particular course of action (or advises against it) and the argumentation mentions favorable effects or consequences (or unfavorable effects). First, we shall present an overview of the relevant critical reactions to pragmatic argumentation and will discuss how these critical reactions may be identified in argumentative discourse by making use of words and expressions with an indicative function in the analysis. Next, we shall give an analysis of a critique of a series of measures taken by the Blair government that had been defended by means of pragmatic argumentation. In our analysis we shall make it clear that the topical choices made by the critical opponent, the way in which he attempts to take the values and opinions of the audience into account and the choices he has made in the presentation of his criticisms can be seen as a form of strategic maneuvering. 2.â•… Pragmatic argumentation and criticism According to the pragma-dialectical classification, pragmatic argumentation is a subtype of argumentation based on a causal relationship. Garssen gives the following description of this type of argumentation: The standpoint recommends a particular method (plan, policy) […] and this recommendation is supported in the argumentation by pointing to the results of the course of action. A reasonable case for the standpoint that the course of action involved is recommendable is made by showing that the course of action automatically leads to a favourable or desirable situation. Pragmatic argumentation can also be used to condemn a course of action by pointing to the unfavourable or undesirable consequences of that course of action in the argumentation (1997:â•›21, our transl.)
The argumentation scheme underlying the “positive variant” of pragmatic argumentation, in which a course of action is recommended, can be described as follows: Standpoint: Act X is desirable Because: Act X leads to consequence Y And: Consequence Y is desirable
(Feteris 2002:â•›355)
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In the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation schemes, the main reason for distinguishing between different types of argumentation is that for each type a different method of evaluation is required (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992:â•›98). In order to check the soundness of a particular argument, it must be subjected to a specific dialectical testing procedure in which certain critical reactions are relevant, and others are not. Garssen (1997:â•›22) mentions a number of critical questions which can be raised when evaluating a pragmatic argument.1 Taking his list of questions as a starting point, we have formulated the following critical questions for the type of pragmatic argument in which a course of action is recommended: 1. Will the course of action that is proposed indeed achieve the desirable consequence? 2. Is that which is presented in the argumentation as the consequence in fact desirable? 3. Does following the course of action have disadvantages that outweigh the advantages aimed for with the action? 4. Are there better ways of achieving the desirable consequence? Hirschman (1991) suggests a number of further refinements concerning some of these critical questions. When an opponent claims that the course of action does not achieve the desirable consequence (question 1), this can be according to him either because he thinks the action is futile, or because he believes the action will lead to consequences contrary to the initially targeted goal. With respect to critical question 3, Hirschman distinguishes two types of criticism: the perversity thesis (the drawbacks attached to the measure under discussion clearly outdo the benefits that one may expect to follow from the action), and the jeopardy thesis (the measure under discussion might endanger some precious benefits).2 In addition to the question about the causal relation itself (critical question 1) and about the desirability of the consequence or result (critical question 2), there are a number of extra critical questions for pragmatic argumentation which have to do with the fact that this type of argument is most often used in a context in which a decision has to be made about the course of action that is going to be followed. This is a context that is typical for policy making and it is therefore not surprising that there is a close connection between the critical questions that a protagonist can be held committed to deal with when he has used a pragmatic argument and the stock-issues that proponents of a new policy in academic debate are obliged to defend. In order to have a prima facie case, the proponents should, according to the stock-issue approach, in the first place, provide support for the fact that there are
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problems in the status quo that are significant and that therefore there is a need for change (Ehninger & Brockriede 1978:â•›162). This issue corresponds with the second critical question for pragmatic argumentation: if there is nothing wrong with the present situation, changing it to achieve the result is not desirable.3 In the second place, the proponents of the new policy should present a convincing case for the fact that the proposed policy will solve the problems without significant disadvantages.This amounts to defending a number of different issues: the efficacy of the proposed policy (critical question 1 for pragmatic argumentation) and the efficiency (critical question 4 for pragmatic argumentation). In addition, the proponents should make it clear that the benefits of the policy outweigh the costs (critical question 3 for pragmatic argumentation). Finally, they should show that the policy is practicable (i.e. feasible and allowable).4 Ordinary language users can use different types of expressions to echo the critical questions for pragmatic argumentation. Some examples of such expressions presented in van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007:â•› 177–186) are: Critical question 1 X is not effective X is counterproductive X will not work Critical question 2 Is Y really what we want? Is (achieving) Y really necessary? Critical question 3 X is out of proportion/the end does not justify the means (taking a sledgehammer to crack a walnut) With X you go from bad to worse X has undesirable consequences/side-effects Critical question 4 There are better ways to achieve Y There are several ways to accomplish Y There are alternative ways to accomplish Y
The expressions listed above give a more or less explicit indication of the type of criticism that is being raised. There are, however, various other, more implicit ways of making it clear that a certain type of criticism is at issue. To give an example: in order to make it clear that the consequence of a measure that has been proposed is not desirable, arguers can present subordinate argumentation. Such a
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subordinate argument is in its turn, a pragmatic argument, since the undesirability of the result is made clear by pointing at the negative consequences it will have (Feteris 2002:â•›357). Expressions which are indicative of pragmatic argumentation, can therefore also be a sign that the second critical question for pragmatic argumentation is being addressed. According to van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007) such expressions include: –â•fi verbs emphasizing the result of a process (“to destroy”, “to increase”, “to disrupt”) –â•fi references to the inevitability of the occurrence of the result after the cause (“guarantees”, “inevitably”) –â•fi expressions referring to a result (“results in”, “consequently”) (164–177) Some of these expressions, for instance “X destroys Y”, make it clear that a negative result will be produced. Other expressions need to be combined with a negative event or state of affairs in order to be able to function as support for the undesirability of a certain result, and thus as an indication that the second critical question is at stake.
3.â•… S trategic maneuvering in critical responses to pragmatic argumentation: A case study When entering into a discussion with the protagonist of a certain policy defended by pragmatic argumentation, an antagonist who is attacking the policy may be taken to maneuver strategically in advancing his criticisms. With respect to making a selection from the topical potential in the argumentation stage of the discussion, the antagonist needs to decide (1) which critical questions it would be advantageous for him to raise; and (2) which possible defenses of the protagonist against those criticisms he had better anticipate and try to deal with in advance. With respect to audience adaptation, the antagonist should decide which values and facts that may be considered to belong to the common starting points of the audience he should take into account in his critical reactions. Finally, the antagonist should also make use of those presentational devices that are appropriate for his purposes, that is, those ways of presenting that make his criticisms seem reasonable and conclusive at the same time. In what follows we will illustrate the antagonist’s strategic choices by discussing a specific case in which a policy defended by means of pragmatic argumentation is being criticized by an opponent. The case we propose to use is the “Great Debate
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on Britain’s liberties”, an e-mail debate between Henry Porter and Tony Blair which was published in the Observer on Sunday April 23, 2006, nine months after the London metro bombings. In the months preceding this publication, Henry Porter, a novelist and political columnist for the Observer, had written a series of articles in the Observer criticizing what he saw as a sustained government assault on fundamental freedoms. He attacked a range of measures, including legislation on identity cards, new police powers and anti-terror laws. These measures were defended by the British government chiefly by means of pragmatic argumentation: the measures were necessary to overcome the threats of terrorism and to reduce organized crime and antisocial behavior. Porter’s critique generated a huge response from the public, and in 2006, Tony Blair suggested an e-mail debate with Porter, which was subsequently published in the Observer. In view of the topic of this paper – critical reactions to pragmatic argumentation – we will concentrate on Porter’s first contribution to the e-mail debate in which he criticizes the measures taken by the government by attacking the pragmatic argumentation that has been put forward in their support.5 Porter’s first e-mail runs as follows.6 From: Henry Porter To: Tony Blair Re: Liberty Dear Prime Minister, 1.â•… Nine years ago, as I watched you arrive at the South Bank on the night when you became Prime Minister, I would never have imagined that I’d come to view you as a serious threat to British democracy. But regrettably I have. Either by accident or design, your “modernizing” Labour government has steadily attacked our rights and freedoms, eroding the Rule of Law and profoundly altering the relationship between authority and the people. 2.â•… Successive laws passed by New Labour have pared down our liberty at an astonishing rate. The right to trial by jury, the right to silence, the right not to be punished until a court has decided that the law has been broken, the right to demonstrate and protest, the presumption of innocence, the right to private communication, the right to travel without surveillance and the details of that journey being retained – all have been curtailed by your legislation. 3.â•… While hearsay has become admissible in court, free speech is being patrolled by officious use of public order laws. In Parliament Square we now see people parading with blank placards to make the point that they are not allowed to demonstrate within one kilometre of the Square under the new Serious Organised Crime and Police Act (SOCPA). And this in the land once called the Mother of Parliaments. 4.â•… For a democrat, this is all profoundly troubling. I hope that you believe you are acting in good faith; that you are simply motivated by the need to respond to the threats of terrorism and organised crime and the nuisance of anti-social behaviour, but I wonder if you have any idea of the cumulative effect of the 15 or so bills which have incrementally removed or compromised our liberties.
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5.â•… Forgive me, Prime Minister, if I say that the country has faced far greater threats under many of your predecessors and they did not go in for this wholesale assault on the Rule of Law. One of the results of your modernising zeal is that while the state has become invisibly more authoritarian, we all to some extent have become suspects. Under the SOCPA, a person can be arrested for any offence – even dropping litter. Before charges are laid he is fingerprinted, photographed and required to provide a sample of his DNA for indefinite retention by the police database. 6.â•… That says a lot about the state’s attitude to the individual’s innocence before he has been tried, but even more about the state’s odd sense of entitlement to the essence of each person. Defenders of this practice say it is justified if a single murderer is prosecuted. With the same reasoning you would ban the use of cars if it saved a single life claimed in road accidents. 7.â•… Reasoning is so often the problem with laws hurried through to show that the government is doing something in response to yesterday’s headlines. The reasons for the ID card scheme are serially given as a means to combat terrorism, benefit fraud, illegal immigration and identity theft. You will agree the ID card could not have stopped the British bombers of 7 July last year. 8.â•… Government figures estimate benefit fraud due to identity theft at between £20–£50m per annum, a fraction of the LSE’s low cost estimate for the scheme of £10bn. There is no ID system in the world that cannot be breached by determined gangs. And illegal immigrants? Well, a card might make their lives more difficult but it won’t stop people-smuggling. 9.â•… Set against these “benefits” are the cost to the tax payer (how many schools or hospitals would £10bn buy?) and the implications of the total surveillance of people’s lives, the details of which will be retained in the National Identity Register database for the inspection of joined-up authority. I have nothing to hide, but I fear this scheme beyond any of your measures, for it is the dream of every authoritarian government to be able to monitor its citizens around the clock. 10.â•… Just as harassment, anti-social behaviour and terrorism laws have been used to limit free speech and protest, so the ID card scheme will come to control the life of this country in ways that we can barely imagine. I conclude that this is its primary purpose and that your government has shamelessly used the fear of terrorism and the loathing of scroungers and illegal immigrants to attain this goal of total supervision. 11.â•… I could be persuaded to put a more benevolent interpretation on so much of what you have done, if it weren’t for the fact that parallel to the assault on liberty has been your move against Parliament in favour of giving the Executive more arbitrary powers. You say that you respect Parliament, that you answered more questions than your predecessors and that you are the first Prime Minister to appear before a select committee, but in other ways you seem thoroughly hostile to the idea of scrutiny by elected representatives. 12.â•… The Civil Contingency Act, presented as modernising emergency powers for the age of terrorism, allows ministers in an emergency, which they only have
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to believe is about to occur, to make practically any provision without reference to parliament. The Inquiries Act, in effect, allows ministers to scrutinise their own behaviour, while the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill proposed an extension of law by ministerial decree. There has been a government retreat – or “clarification” – on this. I pray it is real. 13.â•… It is possible that many of your measures have been subject to a law of unintended consequences. That is also my deepest concern. Whatever your motives today, it is clear that by ignoring the ancient traditions of the unwritten British constitution you have provided all the laws that a hard-line leader would need to drive this country into dictatorship. You have offered us a trade-off between freedom and security: I fear we will lose both. Yours sincerely, Henry Porter
3.1â•… Porters’ selection of the topical potential In his evaluation of the Blair-government’s pragmatic argumentation, Porter chooses to focus on the third critical question: does following the course of action have disadvantages that outweigh the advantages aimed for with the action? This becomes apparent in the first paragraph, in which Porter sums up the heavily weighing disadvantageous consequences of the policies which have been introduced by the Blair-government. These policy changes have resulted in a weakening of the Rule of Law, and in an altered relationship between authority and the people, as a consequence of which the rights and freedoms of the citizen have been attacked and curtailed.7 Porter elaborates this criticism in paragraphs 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12 and 13 of his e-mail. In paragraphs 2 and 3, the central thesis of the first paragraph that the measures of the Labour government have had undesirable consequences is supported by concrete cases. In paragraph 4, Porter again indicates the disadvantages of the policy change which he believes – as a democrat – outweigh the possible advantages, in particular when the cumulative effect of the measures is taken into account. In paragraph 5, Porter claims that the policy change affects all British citizens severely, in the sense that they “all to some extent have become suspects”. In paragraph 6, Porter explicitly considers the balance of the advantages and disadvantages of Blair’s policy. He also anticipates the objection that the undesirable consequences are acceptable if they lead to the prosecution of a single murderer, that the end justifies the means, so to speak. Porter tries to refute this objection with an argumentation based on a comparison relation. In paragraph 9, Porter again explicitly casts doubt on whether the advantages of the policy change outweigh the disadvantages of the ID card scheme (high costs and invasion of the citizens’
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privacy). In paragraph 10, Porter rounds off his argument concerning the restriction of the rights and freedoms of the citizens with a tentative conclusion (limiting the citizens’ rights and freedom has been the government’s primary purpose). In paragraph 12, he points out that the consequences of the Civil Contingency act are very radical and undesirable. In the last paragraph, 13, he again warns against the great dangers of the Blair-government’s propositions, and implicitly makes it clear that the possible advantages of the legislation do not outweigh the disadvantages. Although the focus is clearly on critical question 3, this does not mean that Porter pays no attention at all to the other critical questions which matter in the evaluation of pragmatic argumentation. He definitely does so, but in a relatively limited, and often very implicit way. He pays some attention to the second critical question: is that which is presented in the argumentation as the consequence in fact desirable? In paragraph 4, Porter seems to recognize that the problem which the Blair-government wants to challenge, the threats of terrorism and organised crime and the nuisance of anti-social behaviour, does exist, and in doing so, also seems to recognize that the objectives which the Blair-government aims for with its legislation, are desirable. In this sense, this critical question is being positively answered by him. In paragraphs 7 and 8, Porter pays some attention to the first critical question, by questioning the efficacy of the measure of introducing the ID card: this legislation will not have the positive consequences assumed by Blair.8 The fourth critical question Are there better ways of achieving the desirable consequence?, only comes up very implicitly in the first sentence of paragraph 5: the country has faced far greater threats under many of your predecessors and they did not go in for this wholesale assault on the Rule of Law. With this remark, Porter not only indicates that the measures are out of proportion, but also implies that the policy proposed by Blair is not the best way to solve the problems.9 A separate point of interest in Porter’s e-mail forms his suggestion that the disadvantageous consequences of the policy identified by him, are in fact the real but hidden motives of the Blair-government for implementing the policy, contrary to the reasons advanced officially. Porter thus suggests that the unintended negative consequences of the measures are not unintended at all. Whether we are dealing with a hard accusation here cannot be concluded from the text, because Porter is rather ambiguous about this issue. In paragraph 1, he leaves open the question of whether the Blair-government has really deliberately pursued the disadvantageous consequences of its policy or whether these are a coincidental product of it (‘by accident or design’). In paragraph 4 as well, he suggests that the Blair-government has possibly acted in good faith. But in paragraph 10, Porter suddenly concludes that the restriction of the civil rights and freedom are not just unintended consequences, but must definitely have been the government’s
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real objective. In paragraph 13, on the other hand, Porter again seems to suggest that the Blair-government’s measures may have been subjected to the law of unintended consequences. In his selection of the topical potential, Porter has thus chosen to pay particular attention to the third critical question. From the point of view of strategic maneuvering, this choice seems sensible, because it allows him to elaborate on all the negative consequences of the policies concerned. It is precisely with respect to this main point of his argument that he explicitly anticipates possible counterarguments in paragraph 6. Considering the circumstances at the time this debate took place, it would have been unwise to explicitly pose the question of whether terrorism, organised crime and anti-social behaviour are indeed a problem (the second critical question). It is also understandable that Porter does not elaborate on alternative solutions for the problem (the fourth critical question) since these do not seem so readily available.10 It is only with respect to the ID card scheme, that Porter pays explicit attention to the question of whether the measures of the Blair-government will have the desired consequences, the first critical question. Because this is a very important issue in evaluating pragmatic argumentation, it is of strategic importance to pay some attention to it. Porter’s choice to deal with it just in relation to this specific measure seems to be to his advantage, since it is much easier to argue that this measure will not be efficacious, than to show that the Blair-government’s policies in general fail in this respect. Moreover, the ID card scheme affects all citizens. With his choice from the critical questions to be addressed Porter moves of course within the boundaries of reasonableness. It is not unreasonable to criticise a policy change and the arguments in favour of it on the basis of the fact that the disadvantages outweigh the advantages. Porter’s suggestion that the Blair-government introduced these policy changes for other reasons than it openly claims, on the other hand, is more questionable. It appears that we are dealing here with an ad hominem fallacy. Since Porter at some times emphatically affirms that the government has deliberately aimed to achieve the (negative) consequences, and at other moments keeps open the possibility that the policy consequences were unintended, he makes it impossible to establish what his position exactly is. He can therefore also be accused of committing a fallacy of ambiguity. 3.2â•… Porter’s adaptation to the audience As is often the case in political discussions, the audience to which protagonist and antagonist direct themselves, has a complex composition. At first sight, the e-mail debate between Porter and Blair can be interpreted as a discussion in which
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they both try to convince each other. But they do in fact conduct this debate for a public audience, and thus may be taken to primarily want to convince the public. The audience they adapt to is therefore in the first place the audience of readers. Porter presumably tries to take this audience into account firstly by not explicitly belittling the fear for terrorism and organised crime, nor the irritation over antisocial behaviour, in order not to lose the sympathy of the public.11 Also, when criticising the Blair-government, he refers to a number of other specific values and fears, presumably to win the sympathy of the audience and play on their feelings. The most important fears and values seem to be: a. The fear of the curtailing of civil rights and freedom, and of the increase of the power of the state; Porter tries to sketch a very negative image of what will happen in these respects as a result of the proposed measures. This gloomy scenario sketch can be seen as a fear appeal. b. The pride of the long democratic tradition in Great-Britain; Porter tries to suggest that Blair ruins this beautiful tradition. c. The public lack of trust in politicians with respect to their motives for policy acts and their integrity or competence in particular; Porter tries to create doubts as to the honesty of the Blair-government, or to suggest that the government is incompetent, because it does not oversee the disadvantageous consequences of its own policy. d. A general sense of proportionality, and the fact that there should be good reasons to transform the status quo; Porter tries to take advantage of the general feeling that the measures of the Blair-government do not match the problems to be solved in any way. e. The aversion against the waste of tax money; Porter tries to capitalize on this by indicating that the measures of the Blair-government with respect to the ID card scheme have cost much money without this resulting in the desired effects. Money, moreover, that could have been spent on important matters such as hospitals and schools. Porter’s adaptation to his opponent is quite different in nature. It is clear from the text that Porter does not try to make Blair benevolent towards his opinions or to create some common ground between Blair and himself. On the contrary, Porter polarizes as much as possible between the points of view of the Blair-government and his own points of view. In this way Porter forces Blair to go on the defensive. Blair, in his subsequent e-mail, recognizes this tactic and responds to it in the very first sentence: “Frankly it’s difficult to know where to start, given the mishmash of misunderstanding, gross exaggeration and things that are just plain wrong.” Porter’s suggestion that the Blair-government introduced these policy changes for other reasons than it openly claims is another example of his polarizing technique.
 Marianne Doury, Ton van Haaften & Francisca Snoeck Henkemans
Because of Porter’s ambiguous presentation of this allegation, however, he makes it difficult for Blair to react to it. 3.3â•… Porter’s use of presentational devices Porter’s presentation is aimed at ensuring that the reader can conclude from his e-mail that his criticism of the Blair-government’s policies is reasonable and to the point. To make clear that his criticisms are indeed relevant he frequently uses indicators of causal and especially pragmatic argumentation, and often even indicates explicitly which critical question he is addressing. Consider the following examples, in which the indicators are printed in bold: –â•fi (…) but I wonder if you have any idea of the cumulative effect of the 15 or so bills which have incrementally removed or compromised our liberties. (paragraph 4) –â•fi One of the results of your modernising zeal is that while the state has become invisibly more authoritarian, we all to some extent have become suspects. (paragraph 5) –â•fi You will agree the ID card could not have stopped the British bombers of 7 July last year. (paragraph 7) –â•fi Set against these “benefits” are the cost to the tax payer (how many schools or hospitals would £10bn buy?) and the implications of the total surveillance of people’s lives (…). (paragraph 9) –â•fi (…) so the ID card scheme will come to control the life of this country (…). (paragraph 10) –â•fi (…) that many of your measures have been subject to a law of unintended consequences. (paragraph 13) Porter also has to take care that his verbal presentation only highlights those values and facts that may be considered to belong to the common starting points of the audience. For this reason, Porter does not explicitly question the seriousness of problems as terrorism, organised crime and anti-social behaviour, but does so only implicitly, by downplaying them as much as possible in his verbal presentation. It is, for instance, remarkable that in paragraph 4, Porter speaks only of “threats” posed by terrorism, while he characterizes the undesirable consequences of Blair’s policy in paragraph 1 as “a serious threat”; that in paragraph 5 he suggests by the use of the phrase “far greater threats”, that we should not exaggerate the problem Blair seeks to solve; and that in paragraph 9 he adds quotation marks to the word “benefits”. Porter emphasizes those points of view he assumes that he shares with his audience. First the fear for a restriction of civil rights and freedom, and the increase of the power of the state (a); consider the following examples:
Strategic maneuvering in critical reactions to pragmatic argumentation 
–â•fi (…) has steadily attacked our rights and freedoms, eroding the Rule of Law and profoundly altering the relationship between authority and the people. (paragraph 1) –â•fi Successive laws passed by New Labour have pared down our liberty at an astonishing rate. (paragraph 2) –â•fi the total surveillance of people’s lives, the details of which will be retained in the National Identity Register database for the inspection of joined-up authority. I have nothing to hide, but I fear this scheme beyond any of your measures, for it is the dream of every authoritarian government to be able to monitor its citizens around the clock. (paragraph 9) –â•fi (…) you have provided all the laws that a hard-line leader would need to drive this country into dictatorship. You have offered us a trade-off between freedom and security: I fear we will lose both. (paragraph 13) In the examples above Porter explicitly uses the word “fear” several times and he sketches, by the very choice of his words and by the amount of examples that he gives, a very negative and frightening picture of the disadvantageous consequences of the Blair-government. In doing so, Porter makes clear to his readers that these consequences can affect every citizen, also the ordinary, law-abiding man in the street, who has nothing to hide. In this sense he attempts to touch his readers personally. Porter also tries to suggest that the Blair-government soils the long democratic tradition in England, and thereby the pride of the nation (b). Consider the following examples: –â•fi (…) your “modernizing” Labour government (…). (paragraph 1) –â•fi Successive laws passed by New Labour have pared down our liberty at an astonishing rate. (paragraph 2) –â•fi (…) all have been curtailed by your legislation. (paragraph 2) –â•fi And this in the land once called the Mother of Parliaments. (paragraph 3) –â•fi (…) that by ignoring the ancient traditions of the unwritten British constitution (…) (paragraph 13) In his choice of words, Porter attempts furthermore to discredit the honesty or the competence of the Blair-government, and by doing so, makes use of his audience’s mistrust of politicians when it comes to their integrity and competence (c). Consider – among others – the following examples: –â•fi Either by accident or design, your “modernizing” Labour government has steadily attacked our rights and freedoms, eroding the Rule of Law and profoundly altering the relationship between authority and the people. (paragraph 1)
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–â•fi For a democrat, this is all profoundly troubling. I hope that you believe you are acting in good faith; that you are simply motivated by the need to respond to the threats of terrorism and organised crime and the nuisance of anti-social behaviour, but I wonder if you have any idea of the cumulative effect of the 15 or so bills which have incrementally removed or compromised our liberties. (paragraph 4) –â•fi That says a lot about the state's attitude to the individual’s innocence before he has been tried, but even more about the state’s odd sense of entitlement to the essence of each person. (paragraph 6) –â•fi Reasoning is so often the problem with laws hurried through to show that the government is doing something in response to yesterday’s headlines. (paragraph 7) –â•fi for it is the dream of every authoritarian government to be able to monitor its citizens around the clock. (paragraph 9) By his wording, Porter also creates an opposition between the government and the people; he tries to picture the Blair-government as an enemy of the people. He does so by frequently using “fighting” terminology: “attacked”, “pared down”, “curtailed”, “assault”, “combat”, “surveillance”, “supervision”, “hostile”, “a hard-line leader”, “to drive”, “dictatorship” etcetera. Another way of suggesting that there are two opposed camps is the frequent use by Porter of the inclusive “we”, with which he refers to the unity between the readers and himself against the “you” designating Blair and his government. At the same time, Porter also attempts to give the impression that he is not prejudiced against Blair and that he is willing – despite all the counterevidence – to believe in Blair’s good intentions. For instance in paragraph 1 (but also in 4, 12 and 13): –â•fi (…) I would never have imagined that I’d come to view you as a serious threat to British democracy. But regrettably I have. That Porter attempts to capitalize on a general sense of proportionality by means of his formulations, and the fact that there should be good reasons to transform the status quo (d), is shown by the following examples: –â•fi the country has faced far greater threats under many of your predecessors and they did not go in for this wholesale assault on the Rule of Law. (paragraph 5) –â•fi Defenders of this practice say it is justified if a single murderer is prosecuted. With the same reasoning you would ban the use of cars if it saved a single life claimed in road accidents. (paragraph 6)
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–â•fi You have offered us a trade-off between freedom and security: I fear we will loose both. (paragraph 13) Finally, Porter tries to activate the audience’s aversion against the waste of tax money (e) by the following phrases: –â•fi Government figures estimate benefit fraud due to identity theft at between £20–£50m per annum, a fraction of the LSE’s low cost estimate for the scheme of £10bn. (paragraph 8) –â•fi Set against these “benefits” are the cost to the tax payer (how many schools or hospitals would £10bn buy?) (paragraph 9) In connection with the foregoing characteristics of the verbal presentation in Porter’s e-mail, one more aspect is remarkable: his abundant use of intensifying expressions (both adjectives and adverbs), especially when describing the negative consequences of the Blair-government’s measures: “serious”, “regrettably”, “steadily”, “profoundly”, “astonishing”, “odd”, “total”, “beyond any”, “barely”, “shamelessly”, “total”, etcetera. 4.â•… Discussion Our analysis of Porter’s e-mail has shown that in his critical reaction to the pragmatic argumentation of the Blair-government, Porter concentrates on the third critical question. The way he tries to adapt to his audience and his choice of presentational devices are closely connected to this topical choice: he strategically only refers to those values and fears that may convince his audience of the fact that the disadvantages of the proposed measures largely outweigh the advantages and uses presentational devices which emphasize the disastrousness of the consequences.12 The analysis of Porter’s contribution to the debate thus provides insight into how arguers may strategically maneuver in an attempt to enhance the rhetorical effectiveness of their criticisms directed at an adversary’s pragmatic argument. Examining the reactions which follow the use of a specific argumentation scheme is a precious resource for argumentation study. It gives access to the norms on which arguers rely when assessing and contesting their opponent’s arguments. Our analysis of the Blair-Porter debate confirms the interest of such an approach. The analysis has also made clear that language users engaged in a debate on political issues may put forward criticisms which are not included in the list of critical questions. Our analysis of Porter’s criticism of Blair’s measures shows how questions regarding intentionality may arise in the critical reactions to pragmatic argumentation. Porter raises a set of questions in an attempt to assess
 Marianne Doury, Ton van Haaften & Francisca Snoeck Henkemans
the desirability of the action: “Is the officially proclaimed end really pursued by the arguer who has put forward the pragmatic argument?” “Does he not in reality obey a hidden agenda?” The identification of a mismatch between the overt end and the actual end may serve as a way of disqualifying the means, even if the action under discussion is considered as an efficient way of achieving the “official” goal.13 The relation between the pragmatic argument scheme and intentions should not come as a surprise. Pragmatic argument is different from other arguments based on causality in that it concerns human actions and as such relates to the explicit or attributed intentions of those who employ this argument scheme in their discourse. It is therefore understandable that in criticizing pragmatic argumentation ordinary language users seek to expose the hidden intentions of the proponent of a certain course of action.14 Criticisms concerning the hidden intentions of politicians proposing a certain course of action are perhaps even regarded as more relevant in the present-day political context that is characterized by the transformation from ideological politics into the personalization of politics. According to Kampf (2009), this transformation has made the credibility and trustworthiness of public figures and organizations crucial issues: “in the politics of trust, public figures and institutions are monitored routinely by journalists and media technologies and are forced to survive credibility tests” (Kampf 2009:â•›2259).
Notes 1.â•… These critical questions can be raised in order to establish whether the pragmatic argumentation scheme has been used correctly. A preliminary question is whether the choice of argumentation scheme is appropriate (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992:â•›160). This may depend on the context. Feteris (2002:â•›350), for instance, points out that according to a deontological or moralist approach, pragmatic argumentation on its own can never constitute a sound defence for a moral or legal decision. 2.â•… Gosselin (1995) suggests that another way of questioning an action’s unintended consequences consists in presenting the action as a first step in an inescapable series of measures. This first step may be deemed acceptable (one may even admit that it might lead to the desired effect). But even so, it is discarded as inexorably leading to the adoption of other definitely unacceptable measures. Such reasoning constitutes a slippery slope argument. 3.â•… A change might also be desirable in a situation that was not experienced as problematic, but which may nonetheless be improved by a specific measure (for example, by the introduction of some new technological device). Nonetheless, in hindsight, the situation as it was can then be seen as less than ideal. 4.â•… In pragma-dialectics, this issue is not included in the critical questions. The reason for this may be that the arguer’s commitment to the fact that the policy he proposes should be practicable already follows from his having made a proposal: a felicity condition for proposals
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is that the speaker should believe that it is possible to put the proposal into practice. There are other authors, however, such as Schellens (1984:â•›172) who do incorporate this issue as a separate critical question for the evaluation of pragmatic argumentation. Other critical questions that are not included in the standard pragma-dialectical critical questions list may be seen as superfluous for similar reasons, for example: “Has the result not already been realized?”; “Will the result not happen to be so in any case, whatever we will do?” 5.â•… In our analysis we are primarily interested in Porter’s role as antagonist of the standpoint and the arguments put forward by the government. It could be argued that in his first e-mail Porter also takes the role of protagonist of the standpoint ‘Blair’s government is a threat to British democracy’. According to us, however, this proposition is advanced as part of the critical testing of the standpoint and arguments of the government by Porter and therefore has the function of a substandpoint in Porter’s critical reaction: Porter is against the measures proposed by the Blair government because they are a threat to British democracy. 6.â•… We have numbered the paragraphs so that we can refer to them easily. 7.â•… In terms of Hirschman’s (1991) types of critical reactions, Porter puts forward the “jeopardy thesis” here. 8.â•… In terms of Hirschman’s (1991) types of critical reactions, Porter puts forward the “futility thesis” here. 9.â•… Porter also seems to indicate several times that what the Blair-government proposes is not practicable, in the sense of not allowable, viz. undemocratic (see paragraph 4) and in contradiction with the long British parliamentary tradition (see paragraph 3). In this contribution, we assume that the question as to the practicability does not belong to the standard critical questions belonging to pragmatic argumentation (see endnote 3). 10.â•… Porter does, however, suggest that alternative ways of handling the problems would have been possible by mentioning the fact that previous governments have had to deal with harder issues without changing the Rule of Law. 11.â•… According to Marr, compulsory ID cards would probably not have passed through Parliament had it not been for the terrorist threat (2007, p. 582). He thinks that Tony Blair was right on the numbers when he claimed that most British people agreed that the government should take drastic measures to deal with the threat of terrorism (p. 584). 12.â•… Porter’s emphatic tone also fits his polarizing tactic towards the Blair-government and Blair personally (see paragraph 3.2. above) 13.â•… The pragmatic argument’s promoter whose sincerity has been contested often makes explicit his intentions, which he presents as the cause (Pacherie 2003), or the primary reason (Davidson 1963) of his action: in a subsequent mail, Blair makes his intentions explicit: “But again, the reason we are acting is not a desire to be dictatorial but a genuine desire to protect our way of life from those who would destroy it.” 14.â•… Introducing the notion of intention in the description of the critical reactions to pragmatic argument does not propose a “psychological turn” in the theoretical perspective we wish to adopt in the study of argumentation. Such a decision merely seeks to reflect the association made by the arguers themselves between the assessment of an action, notably with regard to its consequences, and the assessment of the intention behind this action (Dumais 1975).
 Marianne Doury, Ton van Haaften & Francisca Snoeck Henkemans
References Davidson, D. (1963). Actions, reasons, and causes. Journal of Philosophy 60, 1963. Dumais, A. (1975). Le motif: un problème d’interprétation sociologique. Archives des Sciences Sociales des Religions 40, 21–29. Eemeren, F.H. van (2010). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse. Extending the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Eemeren, F.H. van & Grootendorst, R.(1992). Argumentation, communication and fallacies. Erlbaum: New York. Eemeren, F.H. van, Houtlosser, P. & Snoeck Henkemans, A.F. (2007). Argumentative indicators in discourse. A pragma-dialectical study. Dordrecht: Springer. Ehninger, D. and W. Brockriede (1978). Decision by debate. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co. Feteris, E.T. (2002). A pragma-dialectical approach of the analysis and evaluation of pragmatic argumentation in a legal context. Argumentation 16 (3), 349–367. Garssen, B. (1997). Argumentatieschema’s in pragma-dialectisch perspectief. Een theoretisch en empirisch onderzoek. [Argument schemes in a pragma-dialectical perspective. A theoretical and empirical examination]. Ph.D. dissertation Amsterdam: Ifott. Gosselin, A. (1995). La rhétorique des conséquences non prévues. Les idéologies et l’↜électeur rationnel. Hermès 17–18, 301–319. Hirschman, Albert O. (1991). The rhetoric of reaction. perversity, futility, jeopardy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Kampf, Z. (2009). Public (non-)apologies: The discourse of minimizing responsibility. Journal of Pragmatics, 2257–2270. Marr, A. (2007). A history of modern Britain. London: Pan Books. Pacherie, E. (2003). La dynamique des intentions. Dialogue XLII, 3, 447–480. Schellens, P.J. (1984). Redelijke argumenten. Een onderzoek naar normen voor kritische lezers [Reasonable argument. An investigation into norms for critical readers]. Ph.D. dissertation Utrecht. Foris: Utrecht.
Figurative analogy in political argumentation Bart Garssen & Manfred Kienpointner 1.â•… Introduction Metaphors are used frequently in political discourse. Sometimes they function as the basis for arguments: these arguments are generally known as figurative analogies. We are interested in strategic maneuvering with figurative analogies in a political context. This is a first attempt to describe the role of figurative analogies in maneuvering strategically with the “topical potential”, which is one of the three aspects of strategic maneuvering distinguished within the extended theory of pragma-dialectics (cf. van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2006:â•›383; cf. also van Eemeren 2008, 2010:â•›93–96). More specifically, we would like to know what kind of comparisons politicians make when they use a figurative analogy. In order to provide some theoretical background for this analysis, in Section 2 we first shall discuss a small selection of traditional and more recent approaches within argumentation theory. Next we discuss the evaluation of arguments from figurative analogies, which often have been denied the status of serious argumentation. Argumentation scholars such as Lumer (1990:â•›288) complained that arguments from analogy were given a place as a rational means of argumentation by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1983). Lumer even generally classified arguments from analogy as fallacies (cf. Lumer 2000:â•›414). However, in many approaches figurative analogies are regarded as reasonable forms of defence (cf. Kienpointner 1992:â•›392; Mengel 1995:â•›13; Woods 2004:â•›253; Juthe 2005:â•›15; Garssen 2007:â•›133; Langsdorf 2007:â•›853; Walton et al. 2008:â•›44). In the Section 3 we describe the actual use of the figurative analogy in a political context by way of an analysis of a series of examples taken from political discourse in Austria and the Netherlands.1 2.â•… The structure of figurative analogies We distinguish between “straightforward”, “direct”, “trivial” or “same-domain” analogies as one subtype of argumentation by comparison and “figurative”, “a
 Bart Garssen & Manfred Kienpointner
priori”, “indirect”, “non-trivial” or “different-domain” analogies as another subtype of argumentation by comparison (cf. Toulmin et al. 1984:â•›217; Schellens 1985:â•›203; Govier 1987:â•›58; Coenen 2002:â•›2; Juthe 2005:â•›5; Garssen 2009:â•›133; Doury 2009:â•›144). This distinction relies on the fact that in straightforward analogies entities from the same sphere or domain of reality are compared, for example, “the economy of European country A” versus “the economy of European country B”), whereas figurative analogies compare entities from (entirely) different domains of reality, such as “European countries with high rates of immigration” on the one hand versus “sinking ships” on the other hand. The approaches we are going to discuss differ in the way they use “analogy” either as a generic term for both straightforward and figurative analogies (e.g. Coenen 2002; Walton et al. 2008) or in a more specific way as a synonym of “figurative analogy” (e.g. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca). Secondly, we wish to distinguish analogies and metaphors. Although it could be argued that all metaphors implicitly rely on analogies and often function as condensed arguments from analogy (“une analogie condensée”, cf. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1983:â•›535; Coenen 2002:â•›97), not all metaphors are used as or are indicators of arguments from figurative analogies (on indicators for figurative analogies cf. Snoeck Henkemans 2003; van Eemeren et al. 2007; Doury 2009). Therefore, utterances containing metaphors can only be classified as arguments from figurative analogies if they are used as argumentative utterances and the speaker wants to prove a controversial standpoint by making a comparison based on relevant similarities between entities from different domains of reality. Ever since Aristotle’s explanation of metaphor as an analogy between two pairs of concepts (e.g. “old age: life = evening: day”; cf. Aristotle poet. 1457b; rhet. 1410b) the basic structure of analogy has been reconstructed as “C: D = A: B” or variations of this structure (cf. Coenen 2002:â•›109) Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1983:â•›501) call the better known (often concrete) terms C and D the “phoros” (“phore”) of an analogy, and the less well known (often abstract) terms A and B the “theme” (“theme”) of an analogy. They call an analogy adequate when the phoros is able to focus attention on those properties of the theme which are considered to be of prime importance (“Une analogie semble en effet adéquate quand le phore met en evidence des caractères du theme estimés primordiaux” 1983:â•›523). They also insist on the fact that there is a semantic interaction between the phoros and the theme of an analogy, which influences the meaning and the value of the terms of an analogy (1983:â•›508–512). Furthermore, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca consider arguments from analogy an unstable means of argumentation (1983:â•›527), which has to be critically tested later on; however, they also contend that no theory of argumentation can be
Figurative analogy in political argumentation 
complete without giving analogy a place as an element of proof (1983:â•›500). As far as the structure of analogies is concerned, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1983:â•›501) illustrate the basic or prototypical four-term structure of an analogy taken from Aristotle’s Metaphysics (II, 993b):
PHOROS C
:
THEME D
=
A
:
B
les yeux des : la lumière du jour =
l’intelligence :
les choses les plus
chauve-souris
de notre âme
naturellement évidentes
the intelligence :
the things which are by
the eyes of bats: daylight
=
of the human soul nature the most evident Figure 1.╇ The four term structure of an analogy
Analogies can be simpler or more complex than the prototypical four-term structure. Variations of this basic idea can be analogies with only three terms, for example, “B: A = C: B”. An illustrative example would be Heraclitus’ saying “In the sight of the divinity man is as puerile as a child is in the sight of a man”, that is, “man: divinity” = child: man” (cf. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1983:â•›505). Another example of a three-term analogy with the structure “C: D = A: D” is provided by Coenen (2002:â•›97), for example, “Prison: freedom = marriage: freedom”. More complex are analogies involving a six-term structure “C: D: E = R: S. T” (cf. Coenen 2002:â•›195): “Marriage: spouse1: spouse2 = prison: prison officer: prisoner”. The strength of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca’s approach is the rich variety of empirical examples they discuss and their insistence on the importance of the many possible semantic relationships between phoros and theme. However, they provide only a partial analysis of the structure of arguments from analogy: The prototypical constellation “C: D = A: B” is only a part of an argument scheme that represents arguments from analogy. Moreover, they do not provide any evaluative criteria. Woods (2004:â•›257), too, considers analogy as a form of argument which has to be taken seriously. He considers analogy to be a kind of meta-argumentation: “Arguments from analogy are arguments by parity of reason, so-called. They are arguments about arguments, meta-arguments”, which can be used if two persons are getting nowhere in their discussion, having arrived at a “standoff ”
 Bart Garssen & Manfred Kienpointner
(Woods 2004:â•›259. More specifically, this is what Woods has to say about the basic structure of an analogical argument (2004:â•›257–258): 1. Argument A possesses a deep structure whose logical form provides that the premises of A bear relation R to its conclusion. 2. Argument B shares with A the same deep structure. 3. Therefore, B possesses a deep structure whose logical form provides that its premises likewise bear R to its conclusion. 4. Hence, B is an analogue of A. A and B are good or bad arguments, by parity of reasoning, so-called.
Furthermore, Woods argues that the underlying deep structure common to both A and B guarantees the topical relevance of the analogues: “Analogues are required to be topically relevant to one another, and they are” (2004:â•›267). The strength of Wood’s approach is his attempt to provide a clear structural basis for arguments from analogy (for other explicit reconstructions of such arguments cf. Kienpointner 1992:â•›385; Garssen 1997:â•›14–17; Coenen 2002:â•›170 and Juthe 2005:â•›11) and his insight that one function of arguments from analogy is their potential to overcome a standoff in a discussion. He also gives a specific example for a logical form which could underlie both argument A and the analogue B, namely, Modus ponens (Woods 2004:â•›267). However, it remains unclear how logical form alone can guarantee the topical relevance of analogical arguments, given the fact that their similarity and difference can hardly be judged without taking into account the semantics of the extra-logical terms within the analogues. In the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory the figurative analogy is approached in a slightly different way. This is because the normal critical questions that go with comparison argumentation do not fit the figurative analogy (Garssen 2009). In pragma-dialectics, comparison argumentation is considered a specific argument scheme along with causal argumentation and symptomatic argumentation. The argument schemes are part of a dialectical testing procedure in which the antagonist and protagonist establish whether a premise supports a standpoint in an adequate way. Central to an argument scheme is the argumentative principle that enables a unique way of ‘transferring’ the acceptability from the premise to the standpoint. Using one of these argumentative principles involves invoking a special testing procedure in which certain critical questions that are systematically related to the argumentative principle are relevant. The fact that each argument scheme comes with a unique testing procedure that is different from the procedures that go with other schemes is the rationale to distinguish between these three principles and thus to distinguish between the three main types of argument schemes. For each of the main types, a number of variants can be distinguished in each of which the argumentative principle is used in a specific way.
Figurative analogy in political argumentation 
According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992:â•›97), in argumentation based on a comparison relation the argumentation is presented “as if there were a resemblance, an agreement, a likeness a parallel, a correspondence or some other kind of similarity between that which is stated in the argument and that which is stated in the standpoint”. This type of argumentation can be characterized in the following way: Y is true of X because: Y is true of Z, Z is comparable to X. and:
There are at least two variants of comparison argumentation that are organized according this general argument scheme and in which the principle of analogy is used. The first of these variants is comparison argumentation based on the extrapolation of characteristics. Here a comparison is made between the actual characteristics of one thing, person or situation and the actual characteristics of another thing, person or situation. In this type of comparison argumentation the argumentative principle of analogy is used by extrapolating a property from a list of commonalities. In the argumentation itself these similarities are not expressed, but they come about in the critical testing procedure that may follow advancing comparison argumentation. A typical characteristic of this type of comparison argumentation is that both the standpoint and premise are descriptive in nature: in both propositions a state of affairs is expressed. In the second variant of comparison argumentation the principle of analogy is combined with principle of consistency. This variant is based on the idea of consistent behavior: if one acts in a certain way in one situation, he should act accordingly in a situation that is similar in relevant respects. The figurative analogy that is based on a metaphorical relation should be treated in a different way. The figurative analogy involves the use of a metaphor and should be seen as an instance of indirect language use. This means that it is still to be regarded as a serious type of argumentation but not as a variant of comparison argumentation (Garssen 2009). Walton et al. (2008) take arguments from analogy seriously as well. They consider them “an extremely important and fundamental species of argumentation” (2008:â•›43). They also offer an explicit argument scheme. We here quote the more specific form of the two reconstructed schemes which they explicitly present (Walton et al. 2008:â•›58): Argument from Analogy: Version 2 Major Premise: Generally, case C1 is similar to C2. Relevant Similarity Premise: The similarity between C1 and C2 observed so far is relevant to the further similarity that is in question. Minor Premise: Proposition A is true (false) in case C1. Conclusion: Proposition A is true (false) in case C2.
 Bart Garssen & Manfred Kienpointner
They also provide a positive and a negative scheme for practical arguments involving analogies (Walton et al. 2008:â•›74), which we here present as one argument scheme: Positive/negative Scheme for Practical Argument from Analogy: The right/wrong thing to do in S1 was to carry out A. S2 is similar to S1. Therefore the right/wrong thing to do in S2 is carry out A.
Walton et al. (2008:â•›61) insist that “argument from analogy is best seen as a defeasible argument scheme that is inherently weak and subject to failure, but that can still be reasonable if used properly to support a conclusion”. What does it mean to “be reasonable if used properly”? In their conclusions in their chapter on arguments from analogy, Walton et al. (2008:â•›83) claim that in spite of their inherent weakness, arguments form analogy can shift the burden of proof, if they are used – as is often the case in everyday reasoning – together with other types of argument, such as arguments from expert opinion or appeals to witness testimony. They also provide a list of critical questions for testing arguments from analogy (cf. Walton et al. 2008:â•›62, referring to the first scheme presented above): Critical Questions for Arguments from Analogy CQ1: Is A true (false) in C1? CQ2: Are C1 and C2 similar, in the respects cited? CQ3: Are there important differences (dissimilarities) between C1 and C2? CQ4: Is there some other case C3 that is similar to C1 except that A is false (true) in C3?
The strength of the approach of Walton et al. is, first of all, its high standard of explicitness. Moreover, the set of critical questions provided for the evaluation of arguments from analogy, and the insistence on the relevance of the respective similarity between Case 1 and Case 2 are important elaborations. However, quite a few problems remain. The argument schemes and critical questions established by Walton et al. do not distinguish straightforward and figurative analogy systematically, so the following question remains open: (1) In which way can arguments from comparison (i.e. straightforward/same-domain analogies) be distinguished from arguments from figurative analogy (i.e. different-domain analogies) within the reconstructed argument schemes? And there are further problems, for example: (2) What is the precise meaning of “relevant similarity”? This is especially important because relevant similarity is mentioned as an essential condition for the plausibility of arguments from figurative analogy also in other approaches (cf. Woods 2004). And finally: (3) What are the main strategic uses and functions of arguments from figurative analogy in fields of argumentation such as political discourse?
Figurative analogy in political argumentation 
In a way, the following argument schemes try to summarize and elaborate the attempts to describe the structure of arguments from figurative analogy discussed above (note that Proposition A and Proposition A′ are distinguished in the scheme below, because in the case of figurative analogies A and A′ are not identical: AFA 1: Argument from Figurative Analogy, descriptive version: Major Premise: Generally, case C1 is similar to C2 and C1 and C2 belong to (totally) different domains of reality. Relevant Similarity Premise: The similarity between C1 and C2 observed so far is relevant. Minor Premise: Proposition A is true (false) in case C1. Conclusion: Proposition A′ is true (false) in case C2. AFA 2: Argument from Figurative Analogy, normative version: Major Premise: Generally, case C1 is similar to C2 and C1 and C2 belong to (totally) different domains of reality. Relevant Similarity Premise: The similarity between C1 and C2 observed so far is relevant. Minor Premise: To do A is right (wrong) in case C1. Conclusion: To do A′ is right (wrong) in case C2. A few remarks should further clarify some problems connected with this reconstruction. As to the “relevant similarity premise”, all arguments from figurative analogies face the fundamental dilemma that Case C1 and Case C2 are supposed to be neither too similar (cf. 1., below) nor too different (cf. Section 2, below) from each other: 1. Case C1 and Case C2 are too similar to each other. In this case, the figurative analogy becomes a straightforward analogy or direct comparison. But this makes arguments which are intended as a figurative analogy, but rely on comparisons between entities belonging to the same domain of reality, slightly ridiculous (cf. Wood’s (2004:â•›273) funny example “Verdi is the Puccini of music”). 2. Case C1 and Case C2 have little or almost nothing to do which other. Therefore, in this case there are very few, if any, similarities between Case1 and Case2, which causes the danger of the figurative analogy’s becoming a false analogy (where “apples are compared to oranges”). But the strong differences between C1 and C2, their belonging to different domains of reality, paradoxically are at the same time a decisive advantage of arguments from figurative analogy,
 Bart Garssen & Manfred Kienpointner
because they enlarge the “semantic space of argumentation” considerably; they can offer unexpected solutions to a disagreement blocking the discussion, and hence are one of the most creative devices of argumentation (cf. Langsdorf 2007:â•›854: “analogical thinking – particularly as carried out in analogical argumentation … seeks to comprehend the complexity of matters”). In our opinion, only a detailed analysis of a relatively large number of authentic empirical case studies and examples can contribute to a clarification of the difficult notion “relevant similarity” (cf. Section 2, below). This should also have consequences for the list of critical questions cited above. The existence of fundamental differences between C1 and C2 is obvious with figurative analogies. So the respective critical question “CQ3: Are there important differences (dissimilarities) between C1 and C2?” given by Walton et al. (2008) has to be reformulated: Critical Questions for Argument from Analogy CQ1: Is A true (false)/right/wrong in C1? CQ2: Are C1 and C2 similar, in the respects cited? CQ3: Are the important differences (dissimilarities) between C1 and C2 too overwhelming for allowing a conclusion which crosses the different domains of reality to which C1 and C2 belong, thus allowing a conclusion that C1 and C2 are analogically equivalent? CQ4: Is there some other case C3 that is similar to C1 except that A′ is false (true)/to do A′ is wrong (right) in C3?
In a similar way, only the detailed analysis of empirical data can clarify how figurative analogies are strategically used and which functions they actually have in everyday argumentation. Among these uses and functions of figurative analogies, the following types can be distinguished: Figurative analogies can be used as creative means of “opening the argumentative space” (“creative function”), as means of shifting the burden of proof by chosing highly persuasive types of “phoros” (“persuasive function”), as pedagogical devices for illustrating and clarifying complicated issues (“didactic function”), as ironical “reductio ad absurdum” (“refutative function”) or as provocative attacks at the opponents (“competitive function”) etc. 3.â•… F igurative analogies within the political discourse of Austria and The Netherlands According to Van Eemeren, topical selection ‘has to do with the viewpoint, angle or perspective from which the arguer selects the argumentative move or moves he
Figurative analogy in political argumentation 
makes in strategic maneuvering (2010:â•›96). In the confrontation stage a speaker chooses the standpoint that he can defend best and in the opening stage he will choose material starting points that will serve as good premises for the argumentation. “In the argumentation stage, each party that acts as a protagonist chooses, starting from the status topoi associated with the type of standpoint at issue, a strategic “line of defense” involving a selection form the available potential of arguments that suits that party best in the dialectical situation at hand.” The topical selection in the argumentation stage involves both the type of argument (the argument scheme) but also the contents of the premises that are used in the argument. Although the question about the reasons for a speaker to choose the figurative analogy is very important, we focus on the choice of the content of the analogy: what phoros is chosen when using the figurative analogy? Generally speaking, for a figurative analogy to be effective, the phoros has to be vivid and easy to grasp. The nature and special characteristics of the phoros may be connected with the type of standpoint that is at issue. The state of affairs mentioned in the premise should be well known. This means that in an effective figurative analogy the phoros is be familiar to the audience. This is why one frequently encounters figurative analogies based on ordinary events, things from daily life and generally well-known phenomena like the weather. In addition, figurative analogies with a phoros taken from recent news events also occur frequently. The phoros may also refer to an imaginary situation (instead of a real state of affairs). In this cause the situation in the phoros should be depicted in a very vivid way, so that the audience directly understands what is meant. This imaginary situation should be simple and without unknown elements. Secondly, the phoros should be acceptable without further ado: no checking of the acceptability of the claim should be necessary. This means that for refuting the argument, the opponent has to show that the comparison does not hold.2 In many cases the phoros consists of plain facts that are acceptable for most members of the audience. Sometimes because it was a news fact (‘last month some islands where flooded because of a tsunami’), sometimes the phoros is a truism (‘one cannot change the weather’). In some cases the phoros is a bit more ‘specialized’ and directed at a special kind of audience. The audiences in activity types in the political domain (the political interview, the political party speech and the parliamentary debate) are general. This means that politicians will tend to choose a phoros that is generally known. The phoros is therefore of a very general kind, referring to day-to-day situations, or news events. Only an empirical analysis can reveal the richness of possible semantic relationships holding between the correlations of terms in a figurative analogy (phoros: C: D, and theme: A: B) and the resulting strengths or weaknesses of arguments from figurative analogy. In the following, we will analyse a few case studies taken
 Bart Garssen & Manfred Kienpointner
from our corpus of authentic utterances containing figurative analogies. In fact this explorative study is based on two corpora. The first corpus consists of argumentative texts within Austrian print media (editorials, critical comments, interviews, letters to the editor) and protocols of parliamentary discourse.3 The second corpus consists of protocols of Dutch parliamentary debate. In our analysis two questions are important: (1) What are the most important and most frequent phoros-domains involved in the formation of figurative analogies, and how are they related to the theme-domain in order to be topically relevant (cf. the “Relevant Similarity Premise” within the argument schemes AFA 1 and AFA 2, presented in Section 2)? (2) In which way does the topical selection of the phoros enhance the strategic functions of figurative analogies? As to the domains of reality, to which theme and phoros of the figurative analogies belong, we would like to deal with the Austrian data in some more detail in order to reveal their overall distribution. At the most general level, one can ask how often the theme expression refers to abstract entities and, conversely, how often the phoros expression refers to concrete entities. This is not a trivial matter because some expressions are difficult to classify as concrete or abstract concepts, for instance, those referring to political parties, which can be conceptualized as groups of persons (concrete) or as complex social institutions (abstract) according to the specific context within which these expressions are used. All in all, in the Austrian data (a corpus of 100 figurative analogies), 38 instances have an abstract theme (e.g. “economic recession”, “the international financial system”) and a concrete phoros (e.g. “a steep slope going downwards”, “an old, damaged roof ”), 56 instances a concrete theme (e.g. “banks”, “members of minority parties in the parliament”) and a concrete phoros (e.g. “cathedrals”, “dwarfs”), and 6 instances cannot be clearly classified: Table 1.╇ Theme and phoros in figurative analogies in the Austrian corpus Theme Abstract Concrete Unclear Cases
38 56 6
Phoros 38% 56% 6%
Concrete Concrete Unclear Cases
38 56 6
38% 56% 6%
This result might be astonishing, as one would expect to have much more analogies with an abstract theme and a concrete phoros, because figurative analogies quite often have the strategic function to make complex, difficult concepts more easily to understand or memorize (the illustrative or didactic function of analogies, cf. below). But even the instances of a concrete theme and a concrete
Figurative analogy in political argumentation 
phoros clearly show that it is always the phoros that is more familiar and accessible as far as common sense is concerned. In our first case study, an editorial written by the Austrian journalist Manfred Perterer for the Austrian newspaper “Salzburger Nachrichten” deals with the mass media policy of the leading politicians of the ruling government coalition in Austria, Werner Faymann (SPÖ, i.e. Austrian Social Democrats’ Party, the Social Democrats) and Josef Pröll (ÖVP, i.e. Austrian People’s Party, the Conservatives). This policy is severely criticized. More specifically, Perterer accuses the government parties of frequently placing expensive advertisements in Austrian newspapers, with the alleged secondary goal to increase the willingness of these newspapers to publish articles with friendly comments about the government. In order to fully expose this alleged strategy of the government not only as illicit, immoral or unjustified, but also as self-destructive or even suicidal, the author selects a phoros from the domain of drug addiction: “The relationship between a government (= C) and its paid advertisements in the print media (= D) is like the relationship between a drug addict (= A) and his/her drugs” (=B)). The strategic advantage of this figurative analogy over a direct comparison is the ‘super-evidence’ of the phoros: There is no doubt that drug addicts behave in a self-destructive and, ultimately, suicidal way. Moreover, whereas direct comparisons of politicians with morally dubious persons or even criminals have unfortunately become quite common and expectable, the figurative comparison (“Politicians are similar to drug addicts”) is quite surprising and, hence, efficient for attracting the attention of the audience (thus serving at the same time another goal of strategic maneuvering, namely, adaptation to audience demand; cf. van Eemeren 2010:â•›94 on the co-presence of topical choice, adaptation to audience demand and presentational devices in every argumentative move):
(1) Die Regierung ist mit dieser Strategie nicht gut beraten. Gekaufter Jubel hält nie lang. Wie im Drogenrausch muss die Dosis ständig erhöht werden, um dieselbe Wirkung zu erzielen wie am Anfang der Sucht. Am Ende haben Faymann und Pröll dann nicht nur unser aller Steuergeld verloren, sondern auch ihre (Salzburger Nachrichten, 28.11.2009, p. 1) Glaubwürdigkeit.
“The government is misguided with this strategy. Bought cheers never last for a long time. As is the case if you are high, you have to increase the dose in order to achieve the same effect as during the beginning of the addiction. In the end Faymann and Pröll will have lost not only the tax money of all of us, but also their credibility.”
Applying our set of critical questions to this example, we can easily see that it is indeed wrong to do A (= “to use ever increasing quantities of the drug in order to
 Bart Garssen & Manfred Kienpointner
achieve the same desired result”; cf. CQ1, above), and that there are similarities between A and A′ (= “to finance ever more expensive media advertisements in order to achieve the same desired result”; cf. CQ2, above), namely, that there are detrimental effects both in Case 1 and in Case 2. The alleged similarity is the following one: “High advertisements costs which constantly increase are detrimental to the budget of the government coalition” is similar to “High doses of drugs which constantly increase are detrimental to the body of the drug addict”. However, there are many different kinds of detrimental effects of actions, not all of which are equally detrimental or equally difficult to stop. Therefore, as far as the critical evaluation of this figurative analogy is concerned, the critical question concerning the Relevant Similarity Premise (that is, CQ3: “Are the important differences (dissimilarities) between C1 and C2 too overwhelming for allowing a conclusion which crosses the different domains of reality to which C1 and C2 belong, thus allowing a conclusion that C1 and C2 are analogically equivalent?”) reveals that there are probably too many differences between politicians and drug addicts. This prevents the alleged different-domain similarity between potentially self-destructive mass media policies implemented by government coalitions and potentially self-destructive drug abuse by drug addicts to be categorized as a relevantly similar relationship. Furthermore, the figurative analogy is not mitigated by expressions such as “in a way”, “somehow” etc., which would make it a bit less vulnerable to criticism. However, the figurative analogy is not the only or not even the main argument brought forward by Perterer, who uses a series of causal arguments to point out negative effects of the government’s media policy, for example, the waste of millions of Euros for these advertisements, the unequal distribution of these advertisements between Austrian tabloid media and Austrian quality newspapers and magazines, the morally dubious image created by a government ‘buying’ the applause of tabloid media (on such “pragmatic arguments”/“arguments from negative consequences” cf. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1983:â•›358; Schellens 1985:â•›153–161; Kienpointner 1992:â•›340–341; Garssen 1997:â•›21–22; Walton et al. 2008:â•›332–333). As the argument from figurative analogy only supplements this list of causal arguments, it could be justified as a weak, defeasible additional argument, which together with the others could shift the burden of proof. Having looked at one specific example, we now turn back to the more general question: What types of more specific domains of theme and phoros can be observed in political discourse? In this respect, the Austrian data show the following distribution: The themes mostly refer, as is to be expected for political discourse, to states, counties, (members of) governments, members of parliaments, (members of) political parties and their various activities. The most frequent phoros-expressions refer to the following domains: (1) People of widely
Figurative analogy in political argumentation 
differing ages, ethnic and social origins, and to their professions and activities (e.g. babies, adult women, coloured people, Red Indians, mentally handicapped people; emperors, kings, chieftains, trustees, legal guardians, jokers, hunters, prostitutes, execution squads, torturers, murderers etc.); (2) artefacts (e.g. chess pawns, carrier rockets, warheads, sheet anchors, money boxes, time bombs, etc.) (3) animals (dogs, wolves, snakes, cocks, hens, capons, queen bees, ants, rabbits, mice etc.) and acts/activities (battle, war, suicide, soccer, Russian roulette, egg dance, notice, pay rise etc.). Among these, the category “people” stands out. It occurs in approximately 27% of all instances, followed by the categories “artefacts” (20%) and “animals” (15%). All in all, the phoros-types come from everyday situations and common sense concepts, well known to all recipients of political discourse or at least the vast majority of them. This, of course, is strategically useful both for the creative and the persuasive function of figurative analogies. In our second case study, a passage from an editorial of the Austrian Greenpeace magazine ACT, we can see another strategic background for the selection of the phoros. Its chief editor Roman Kellner argues that the critical situation created by climate change forces Greenpeace to form coalitions with other NGOs and social, political and religious groups holding similar positions, such as members of the Catholic church or the Austrian trade union (ÖGB), in order to fight climate change more efficiently and to prevent its catastrophic effects. This causal argument could again be reconstructed as an instance of the pragmatic argument, a type of causal argument relying on the positive or negative effects of an action: If an action has more or more important positive effects, it should be done; if it has more or more important negative effects, it should not be done. After a series of such pragmatic arguments, Kellner formulates a figurative analogy which in a way recapitulates and enhances these causal arguments:
(2) Ob man in Zusammenhang mit dem drohenden Klimakollaps nun die Schöpfungsverantwortung betont oder das drohende soziale Leid – in jedem Fall gilt es rasch zu handeln. Aus diesem Grund versucht Greenpeace, vermehrt Kooperationen einzugehen und breite Allianzen zu bilden. Denn welchen Hintergrund wir auch immer haben, wir sitzen alle im selben Boot. Und dieses (ACT 4, 2009, 3) Boot droht zu sinken.
“Whether you insist on the responsibility for the creation or on the imminent social suffering in relation with the threatening collapse of the climate – in each case you have to act quickly. That is why Greenpeace increasingly tries to enter cooperations and to build broad alliances. For whatever background we have, we are all sitting in the same boat. And this boat is in danger of sinking.”
As in example (1), then, the figurative analogy is used as an additional argument. In example (2), it brings further support for Kellner’s thesis, namely, that Greenpeace
 Bart Garssen & Manfred Kienpointner
is right in looking for cooperation. Moreover, as in (1), the choice of this particular figurative analogy serves a persuasive purpose, namely, to make it crystal clear that the ecological situation of mankind has become very dangerous. Furthermore, the highly complex factors underlying climate change and other disturbing ecological problems are efficiently simplified for a broad audience by this figurative analogy. In this way, he makes this complexity more easy to understand for a broad audience of non-experts (as it is very easy to see that a sinking boat is indeed a horrible danger for those persons sitting in it; cf. CQ1) and thus efficiently implements the didactic function of figurative analogies. Furthermore, at the same time Kellner also adapts to audience demands, using another type of strategic maneuvering. As to CQ3, it is a fact that the scientific mainstream is convinced that climate change is going on and will lead to potentially catastrophic effects (pace a few outsiders among the experts; cf. IPCC 2007, involving more than 500 lead authors and 2000 expert reviewers, who predict the following developments, among other alarming observations): “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level” (quoted according to the following IPCC homepage; visited last time on August 11, 2010; cf. http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/spms1.html). This makes it plausible to conclude that the comparison of the highly dangerous changes of the earth’s climate and their effects for its inhabitants and the enormous dangers of a sinking boat and their effects for the persons sitting in it are relevantly similar. That is, unlike in example (1), the dangers inherent in climate change are not too exaggerated to prevent the figurative comparison with the sinking boat from pointing out a relevant similarity. Kellner’s figurative analogy is, therefore, a plausible argument, especially taken together with the accompanying pragmatic arguments. The last case study dealing with Austrian data illustrates still other functions of figurative analogies, and nicely illustrates strategic phoros selection as a way to implement these functions. Quite often, figurative analogies are used hyperbolically, that is, the propositions stated in the phoros are used to strengthen attacks against the political opponent and to damage the opponent’s image. In this case, figurative analogies have a “competitive” function and at the same time are in danger of becoming a fallacy, that is, a kind of strategic maneuvering which derails (more specifically, a fallacious ad hominem-attack). But only the context can decide whether provocative analogies can be justified at least partially by the facts and in this way remain weak and defeasible arguments, which are, however, plausible to a certain degree, or whether provocative analogies indeed become fallacious instances of ad hominem-attacks.
Figurative analogy in political argumentation 
In the following example, taken from an editorial written by Josef Bruckmoser in the Austrian newspaper “Salzburger Nachrichten”, the author severely criticises the lack of courage of the ruling coalition in the Austrian county of Salzburg, the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the Conservatives (ÖVP), who promised unpopular, but necessary budget cuts after the global economic crisis of 2008–2009, such as an austerity package with a zero pay rise for Salzburg’s officials. However, later on the government decided to increase the accumulation of debt and to spend a special crisis package of 75 millions of Euro. This is ridiculed by Bruckmoser with the following figurative analogy (“SPÖ + ÖVP in Salzburg’s government (= C): promises of budget cuts (= D) = a mountain (= A): giving birth to a mouse (= B)):
(3) Vollmundig hatten SPÖ und ÖVP ein unpopuläres Personalsparpaket im Landesdienst angekündigt, mit Nulllohnrunde und Aussetzen der automatischen Gehaltsvorrückung für zwei Jahre. Am Ende kreiste der Berg und gebar (Salzburger Nachrichten, 13.2.2010, p. 1) eine Maus.
“Boastfully, SPÖ and ÖVP had announced an unpopular austerity package for county officials, with zero pay rise and a two years’ stop for the automatic biennial pay rise for officials. In the end the mountain was in labour and gave birth to a mouse.”
As an efficient presentational device (cf. van Eemeren 2010:â•›118–122) for the formulation of the phoros, Bruckmoser uses the German proverb Der Berg kreißte und gebar eine Maus (lit. “The mountain was in labour and gave birth to a mouse”, that is, “Much Ado about Nothing”; Greek and Latin versions of this proverb already occurred in Aesop’s fables and in Horace’s Ars poetica, line 139: Parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus). Even if one agrees that the resulting figurative analogy is clearly exaggerated and at the same time a (mildly) satirical attack against the “positive face” (in the sense of Brown & Levinson 1987:â•›61) of the respective politicians, the facts provided by Bruckmoser show that Salzburg’s government did indeed (much) less than it had promised to do as far as budget cuts are concerned. So how is this particular argument from figurative analogy to be judged? There is no doubt that the ‘semantic distance’ between theme and phoros is particularly large in example (3). Differently from the phoroi used in examples (1) and (2), where it is at least theoretically possible that entities from the theme domain ‘cross the border’ to the phoros domain and become entities this domain (e.g. politicians could become drug addicts and human inhabitants of the planet earth could become people sitting in a sinking boat), laws of nature preclude that human beings become mountains in labor as imagined in example (3)). So this figurative analogy cannot be – and maybe is not intended to be – taken seriously. Otherwise, it would not survive criticism according to the CQ3.
 Bart Garssen & Manfred Kienpointner
An argument based on a non-serious use of a figurative analogy, however, cannot be judged according to the same standards as a serious instance of this type of argument, as in examples (1) and (2). Moreover, Bruckmoser adduces further arguments why the government should and could have done much more as far as budget cuts are concerned. Finally, his attack against the politicians is not formulated in an overly aggressive way (coming close to strategic competitive moves within the dialogue type “quarrel”, without actually being a wholly eristic strategy; cf. Walton 1992:â•›22). Therefore, all in all it has some plausibility to underline the weak similarity of “The government coalition in Salzburg had promised rigorous budget cuts (= C): In the end, the government coalition in Salzburg nevertheless spent a lot of additional money (= D)” to “The mountain had been in labour (= A): In the end, the mountain gave birth to a mouse (= B)”). While being a very weak argument in itself, this figurative analogy could still add some additional strength to the other arguments brought forward by Bruckmoser. The Dutch corpus consists of a random selection of written protocols of Dutch Parliamentary Debate from 1995 till 2010. In total, a number of 29 figurative analogies was found. In all cases the comparison was part of an argumentative attempt; metaphoric expressions that could not be reconstructed as argumentative were not taken into consideration. The standpoints were both normative (condemning a certain type of action; ‘the government is thinking too much in terms of a free market’) and descriptive (‘the market is untrustworthy’; one cannot change the economy overnight). In 9 cases the analogy consisted of an abstract theme and a concrete phoros, while in 20 cases the theme was concrete and the phoros was concrete as well. Table 2.╇ Theme and phoros in figurative analogies in the sample from Dutch Parliament Theme Abstract Concrete
9 20
Phoros 31% 69%
Concrete Concrete
9 20
31% 69%
The percentages follow the Austrian data nicely. In all cases the phoros was a concrete, vivid and easy to grasp situation. Surprisingly there was not so much variation in topics that were chosen: in almost all cases politicians referred to everyday themes like, the weather, sports and house hold tasks. Hardly ever they referred to news events. This seems to happen a lot more in other type of types of activity such as newspaper interviews or party speeches. In relatively many cases (8) the politician referred to the weather or the climate. Sometimes these are used in normative standpoints about the fact that people
Figurative analogy in political argumentation 
should not want to change things that cannot be changed. In other cases this phoros is used to defend a normative standpoint about the fact that certain things are naturally linked (a system based on a free market economy inevitably implies an unequal distribution of wealth). In a plenary debate held on 21 September, 1995 Mr. Marijnissen of the socialist party (who clearly favours the use of the figurative analogy) criticizes the cabinet’s plans to have more free market in the era of health care. He claims that there some people who can afford will receive high quality care, while others have to deal with long waiting lists and low quality facilities.
(4) The government keeps on telling us that the free market system is good, but that we should to keep the disadvantages at bay. This is just like saying: we want clouds, but no rain. (Het kabinet mag dan wel zeggen: wij zijn voor marktwerking, maar wij willen de nadelen beperken. Ik vind dat net zoiets als zeggen: wij willen wel wolken, maar geen regen.)
The weather analogy is almost always used to stress that some things are inevitable or cannot be changed. In this case Marijnissen chooses the weather analogy to imply that what the government wants is not possible because the disadvantages are as inescapable as some natural phenomena (everybody understands right away that you cannot have clouds and no rain). The obviousness of the weather metaphor is transferred to the standpoint. No one would deny what is claimed in the phoros. The sport analogy is also used frequently (5). Sport is a useful topic because so many people in the audience like watching sport and know the rules. In most sport analogies the politician involved defended the usefulness or necessity of rules. In a debate (April 23, 1997) about members of the Dutch Lower House having additional functions Marijnissen (Socialist Party) reacts as follows to a politician who is against making special regulations for members of the Lower House:
(5) I was afraid of that. Mr. chairman! This is a very peculiar opinion. It is just like two football teams are playing a match and the one team says: we have norms of our own. How is the referee to judge who is right? There are certain rules in football and there should be – to my opinion – also certain rules for doing your job as member of parliament in a decent way. (Daar was ik al bang voor. Mijnheer de voorzitter! Ik vind het een rare opvatting. Het is net zoiets als wanneer twee elftallen tegen elkaar aan het voetballen zijn en het ene elftal zegt: wij houden er eigen normen op na. Hoe moet de scheidsrechter dan ooit toetsen? Er zijn bepaalde regels in het voetbalspel en zo zijn er, naar mijn idee, ook regels vast te leggen voor het fatsoenlijk uitoefenen van je functie als volksvertegenwoordiger.)
 Bart Garssen & Manfred Kienpointner
This analogy is clearly used to simplify the problem by comparing it to something well known and obvious: the necessity of rules in sport (or a game), something that nobody would deny. Again, by making this kind of analogy the speaker implies that the obviousness of the situation in the phoros also counts for the (political) situation in the theme. In Dutch parliament, the figurative analogy was hardly ever used as the only means of defence for a particular standpoint. Another striking phenomenon was that in reactions to the argumentation, other politicians hardly ever reacted to the figurative analogy, while they would react to accompanying arguments based on other argument schemes. This is an indication that the figurative analogy is not dismissed right away as a defective form of argument.
4.â•… Conclusion There seem to different views on the figurative analogy in the various approaches to argumentation. However, what is clear is that the figurative analogy should be seen as real attempts at defending a standpoint and cannot be dismissed as fallacious. Politicians use the argument based on a figurative analogy not very frequently, but when they do they make sure that the comparison is made with easy to understand, simple and straightforward situations, preferably taken out of real life. Moreover, in political discourse in Austria and The Netherlands, figurative analogies rarely are used as the only argument supporting or attacking a controversial thesis. Most of the time, they are used as an additional argument. Finally, as far as the differing strategic functions of figurative analogies in political argumentation are concerned, at least in our case studies the persuasive functions seem to dominate.
Notes 1.â•… Due to limits of space, we can only pick out a few Dutch and Austrian examples from this corpus for detailed case studies. 2.â•… This is one the reasons the figurative analogy can be effective. When the arguer who advances argumentation in this way is attacked, he can reply that this is of course not a straightforward analogy but that the comparison only holds in abstracto. 3.â•… Occasionally, further examples were taken also from other types of argumentative texts, such as advertisements.
Figurative analogy in political argumentation 
References Aristotle (1965). Poetics. Ed. by R. Kassel. Oxford: Clarendon. Aristotle (1991). On Rhetoric. Transl. by G.A. Kennedy. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. Brown, & Levinson, St. (1987): Politeness. Some Universals in Language Usage. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. Coenen, H.G. (2002). Analogie und Metapher. Berlin: de Gruyter. Doury, M. (2009). Argument Schemes Typology in Practice: The Case of Comparative Arguments. In F.H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen (Eds.), Pondering on Problems of Argumentation (pp. 141–155). New York: Springer. Eemeren, F.H. van (Ed.) (2008). Special Issue: Strategic Maneuvering in Institutional Contexts. Dedicated to Peter Houtlosser (1956–2008). Argumentation, 22 (3). Eemeren, F.H. van (2010). Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse: Extending the Pragma-dialectical Theory of Argumentation. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Eemeren, F.H. van & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A Systematic Theory of Argumentation. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. Eemeren, F.H. van & Houtlosser, P. (2002). Strategic Maneuvering with the Burden of Proof. In F.H. van Eemeren (Ed.), Advances in Pragma-Dialectics (pp. 13–28). Amsterdam: SicSat. Eemeren, F.H. van & Houtlosser, P. (2006). Strategic Maneuvering: A Synthetic Recapitulation. In F.H. van Eemeren & P. Houtlosser (Eds.), Special Issue: Perspectives on Strategic Maneuvering. Argumentation 20 (4), 381–392. Eemeren, F.H. van Houtlosser, P. & Snoeck Henkemans, A.F. (2007). Argumentative Indicators in Discourse. A Pragma-Dialectical Study. Dordrecht: Springer. Garssen, B. (1997). Argumentatieschema’s in pragma-dialectisch perspectief. Een theoretisch en empirisch onderzoek. Amsterdam: IFOTT. Garssen, B. (2009). Comparing the Incomparable: Figurative Analogies in a Dialectical Testing Procedure. In F.H. van Eemeren and B. Garssen (Eds.), Pondering on Problems of argumentation (pp. 133–140), Dordrecht: Springer. Govier, T. (1987). Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation. Dordrecht: Foris. IPCC (2007). Climate Change 2007 Synthesis Report. [Core Writing Team: Pachauri, R.K & Reisinger, A. (Eds.)]. Geneva: Intercontinental Panel on Climate Change. Juthe, A. (2005). Argument by Analogy. Argumentation 19 (1), 1–27. Kienpointner, M. (1992). Alltagslogik. Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog. Langsdorf, L. (2007). Changing our Minds: On the Value of Analogies for Extending Similitude. In F.H. van Eemeren et al. (Eds.), Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 853–857), Amsterdam: SicSat. Lumer, Chr. (1990). Praktische Argumentationstheorie. Braunschweig: Vieweg. Lumer, Chr. (2000). Reductionism in Fallacy Theory. Argumentation 14 (4), 405–423. Mengel, P. (1995). Analogien als Argumente. Frankfurt/M.: Lang. Perelman, Ch., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1983). Traité de l’argumentation. Bruxelles: Editions de l’université de Bruxelles. Schellens, P.J. (1985). Redelijke argumenten. Utrecht: ICG Printing. Snoeck Henkemans, A.F. (2003). Indicators of Analogy Argumentation. In F.H. van Eemeren et al. (Eds.): Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 969–973), Amsterdam: SicSat. Toulmin, S.E., R. Rieke & A. Janik (1984). An Introduction to Reasoning. New York: Macmillan.
 Bart Garssen & Manfred Kienpointner Walton, D.N. (1992). The Place of Emotion in Argument. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State Univ. Press. Walton, D.N., Reed, Chr. & Macagno, F. (2008). Argumentation Schemes. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. Woods, J. (2004). The Death of Argument. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Strategic maneuvering with visual arguments in political cartoons A pragma-dialectical analysis of the use of topoi that are based on common cultural heritage Eveline Feteris, Leo Groarke & José Plug 1.â•… Introduction In political cartoons, cartoonists try to convince the reader to share their view on a particular political situation.1 This attempt to convince the reader is based on the assumption that the cartoonist and the reader share certain common starting points, or topoi, that form the basis of an interpretational framework for the reconstruction of the intended meaning of the cartoon. The cartoonist assumes that there is a shared view with respect to a particular (representative of a) political party. Based on this assumption the cartoonist selects a particular image from the common cultural heritage that can be used to depict a particular politician in such a way that the audience understands which person and which aspects of his behaviour or policy in a particular political situation the cartoonist refers to and what his critical stance is with respect to this behaviour. A crucial element of the cartoon is the indirect criticism that is conveyed with regard to the behaviour of politicians or other public officials. To express this critique in an indirect way, the cartoonist makes a selection from the topoi that can be considered as representations of the common cultural background of the intended audience so that the critical stance with respect to the behaviour of the politician that is conveyed by the image will be understood and appreciated by the audience. One form of topoi often used in political cartoons are literary or cultural allusions in the form of images of a fictitious or mythical character that are taken from cultural sources such as legends, folklore, literature or media that the general public is familiar with.2 According to Medhurst and Desousa (1981, 201) the function of the use of topoi in political cartoons is that the meaning of the cartoon can be derived from the interaction of the political commonplace it employs with an allusion to an identifiable fiction. To decode the cartoon, the reader must be familiar with the literary or cultural source to which the cartoon refers. For argumentation theorists who are interested in forms of strategic maneuvering with argumentation in different contexts, the way in which cartoonists use
 Eveline Feteris, Leo Groarke & José Plug
images taken from common cultural sources constitutes a compelling research topic. An analysis of the strategic maneuvering with such images demonstrates the cartoonists’ awareness of their audience when making a choice from the topical potential of persuasive means to convince an audience of a critical standpoint with respect to the behaviour of certain politicians or other public officials. In this contribution we consider political cartoons as a form of indirect argumentation which is advanced as support for a standpoint in the context of a critical discussion aimed at the resolution of a dispute. In Groarke’s (2002) vein we envisage visual images (often in combination with text) in political cartoons as an indirect speech act that functions as a visual argument that is advanced as a means for defending a standpoint in the context of a critical discussion. When a political cartoon is considered as an argument and as such as a contribution to a critical discussion, we can apply the concepts and tools of the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory for the analysis and evaluation of the cartoon. From the pragma-dialectical perspective, in his attempt to convince the reader of a particular standpoint with respect to a particular political situation, a cartoonist maneuvers strategically. In terms of van Eemeren (2010) and van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2006, 2007) this implies that he will try to reconcile both dialectical and rhetorical goals, the dialectical goal being the resolution of the difference of opinion in a reasonable way and the rhetorical goal making t he strongest possible choice form any set of dialectically relevant moves those that may convince his prospective audience best. In order to establish which choices the cartoonist has made to attain his dialectical goals it is necessary to establish the cartoonist’s standpoint and argumentation, so that it becomes possible to determine which arguments form part of the commitments of the cartoonist. When it has been established what the argumentation exactly consists of, it can be established which choices the cartoonist has made from the dialectically relevant options to reach his rhetorical goals. To this end, it must be established which choices the cartoonist has made from the topical potential of dialectically relevant options, which stylistic devices he has used and how he has adapted his choices from the topical potential and stylistic devices to audience demand. For the analysis of the strategic maneuvering with respect to the selection from the topical potential this implies that we will specify which choices the cartoonist has made from the topical potential of visual metaphors that are based on certain cultural topoi to represent the object he wants to criticize and which aspects of the criticized object he has chosen to represent. For the selection of stylistic devices we specify which visual means the cartoonist has chosen to represent the contested characteristics of his target of criticism. For these choices we also specify how they can be explained from the perspective of audience demand.
Strategic maneuvering with visual arguments in political cartoons 
We will proceed as follows. First, in 2, we will sketch a pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation in political cartoons in which we will specify how a political cartoon can be analyzed as a contribution to a critical discussion. Then, in 3, we will present an exemplary analysis of the use of topoi taken from cultural sources in the strategic maneuvering in political cartoons with respect to the selection of arguments from the topical potential. 2.â•… A pragma-dialectical approach of argumentation in political cartoons 2.1â•… The political cartoon as contribution to a critical discussion To be able to develop a tool for the analysis of strategic maneuvering with cultural topoi in political cartoons, it is necessary to establish the specific characteristics of the institutional context in which the political cartoon occurs in terms of a critical discussion.3 The institutional context in which a political cartoon occurs can be considered as a specific form of a critical discussion in which the cartoonist advances a negative standpoint with regard to a particular political situation or public policy in which he criticizes the politician’s or public official’s behaviour. The cartoon can be considered as a support for this negative standpoint in which the cartoonist accounts for the elements of the behaviour that he criticizes. The elements of the behaviour that are criticized are represented by the different elements of the cartoon. The standpoint and arguments are not advanced in an explicit way by verbal means but rather by visual means.4 In this way, the cartoon forms part of a critical discussion in which the cartoonist defends his negative standpoint against the potential criticism of his audience. From a pragma-dialectical perspective, the different stages of a critical discussion in which the cartoon functions are represented in a specific way. The confrontation stage, in which the difference of opinion is put on the agenda, is represented by the standpoint that the behaviour of a politician or public official in a particular political situation should be evaluated negatively. A cartoonist should always take into account hat this standpoint is not shared in advance by the audience of the newspaper but may be met with potential doubt of this audience. The opening stage in which the division of roles is established and in which the participants reach agreement concerning common starting points is represented implicitly. The cartoonist assumes the role of protagonist who defends his standpoint by putting forward argumentation. In his argumentation he presupposes the existence of certain common starting points that are formed by common cultural background information shared by the cartoonist, the newspaper and the readers of the newspaper. Part of this common cultural background knowledge consists of certain topoi taken from cultural sources. Furthermore the common starting
 Eveline Feteris, Leo Groarke & José Plug
points consist of the norms that are used to evaluate the behaviour of the politician or the public official in a negative way, consisting of certain values, value hierarchies etc. that may relate to the political (left-wing or right-wing) persuasion of the newspaper. The argumentation stage in which the protagonist defends his standpoint by means of argumentation against the critical reactions of the antagonist is represented by the argumentation underlying the cartoon. The cartoonist defends his critical standpoint by referring to certain aspects of the politician’s or public official’s behaviour by means of certain visual elements. The visual elements represent the aspects of the behaviour and evaluate them in a negative way. This negative evaluation is expressed indirectly by the choice of the (elements of the) image and by a certain way of drawing them. By selecting certain aspects of the politician’s behaviour that are represented in the form of certain elements of the cartoon the cartoonist selects certain arguments from the topical potential that serve his rhetorical aims. By drawing them in a particular way he chooses certain stylistic devices to evaluate certain aspects of the behaviour in a negative way. In selecting certain aspects and in choosing certain stylistic devices, the cartoonist adapts to the audience demand of the audience of the newspaper. The selection from the topical potential and the stylistic devices that are adapted to audience demand can be considered as the way in which the cartoonist maneuvers strategically to convince the audience of the newspaper of the acceptability of his standpoint. The concluding stage in which the result of the discussion is established is represented by the implicit (one-sided) conclusion of the cartoonist that he has defended his standpoint successfully against relevant forms of potential doubt. 2.2â•… The reconstruction of the argumentation underlying political cartoons Against the background of the institutional characteristics of the discussion context in which a political cartoon occurs, the next step is to establish what the argumentation in a political cartoon exactly consists of. It should be established how the argumentation can be reconstructed on the basis of the way the cartoonist has “formulated” his message by using certain commonly shared background information and visual means. Groarke (2002) formulates some starting points for a pragma-dialectical approach of interpreting visual arguments. Groarke (2002, 245 ff.) considers cartoons as indirect speech acts that function as visual arguments. In interpreting and assessing visual arguments in his view the principles of communication as formulated by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) apply. According to the first principle, visual arguments are, if taken literally, absurd or contradictory and should be interpreted in a non-literal way, for it is only in this way that they can constitute a comprehensible contribution to a discussion. According to the second principle
Strategic maneuvering with visual arguments in political cartoons 
argumentative images should be interpreted in a way that makes sense of the major visual and verbal elements they contain. According to the third principle we must interpret argumentative images in a way that makes sense from the perspective of the social, critical, political and aesthetic discourse in which the image is located. In determining the intended meaning of a cartoon, which often contains a visual metaphor, it must be established to which standpoint and to which arguments the cartoonist has committed himself. In our view, the argumentation in political cartoons is based on a complex argumentation that can be reconstructed in its basic form as consisting of symptomatic argumentation on the level of the main argumentation. On the level of the sub argumentation, this argumentation is supported with argumentation that is underlying the visual metaphor in which the negative characteristics of the situation that constitutes the “target” of the metaphor are viewed in terms of or compared with the negative characteristics of the “source” of the metaphor.5 In diagram 1 we give a schematic representation of this complex argumentation: 1. The behaviour X of politician P in situation S must be evaluated negatively6 1.1a The behaviour X of politician P has characteristics Y1, Y2 etc. 1.1a.1a the behaviour X of P is like a Z 1.1a.1b Z has characteristics Y1, Y2 etc. 1.1b The characteristics Y1, Y2 etc. of the behaviour X of politician P in situation S must be evaluated negatively 1.1b.1 Characteristics Y1, Y2 etc. conflict with common starting points Diagram 1.╇
The argumentation in bold printed is a reconstruction of the message that is conveyed indirectly by the elements of the cartoon. On the basis of the reconstruction of this argumentation the implicit main argumentation in defence of the implicit negative standpoint can be reconstructed. In this reconstruction of the arguments the dialectical commitments of the arguer are made explicit. The arguer has committed himself to the arguments underlying the argumentation which implies that they can be submitted to criticism and that in order to resolve the difference of opinion, the arguer must be capable of answering the relevant critical questions that can be asked by a critical antagonist. For our purposes the reconstruction of the argumentation underlying the cartoons serves as a basis for explaining which choices the cartoonist has made in his strategic maneuvering when selecting certain cultural topoi to indirectly convey his critical message. For the analysis of the use of the selection of the cultural sources used to criticize the behaviour or policy of the politician we will focus on the strategic choice of the cultural image to represent the “source” of the metaphor Z and the way in which the cartoonist represents certain characteristics Y1, Y2 etc. of Z as negative characteristics that are transferred to the “target” X.
 Eveline Feteris, Leo Groarke & José Plug
3.â•… A nalysis of strategic maneuvering with cultural images in political cartoons In what follows we shall analyze strategic maneuvering with cultural images in political cartoons. The aim of this analysis is to establish which choices the cartoonist has made from the topical potential of cultural images to represent certain aspects of the behaviour or the policy of the politician(s) to adapt to audience demand. We have selected some examples that clearly illustrate the way in which cartoonists use images taken from certain cultural sources that are known and appreciated by the intended audience. By using an image from a cultural source a cartoonist profits from the topical potential the image carries in transferring a negative evaluation of certain aspects of the behaviour of the object of the image of the “source domain” to the politician who is the “target domain”. In this way a cartoonist can maneuver strategically by expressing in an indirect way a negative evaluation of the behaviour of a public official or politician. 3.1â•… S trategic maneuvering with the image of↜ “The Ass in the Lion’s skin” from Aesop
THE ASS IN THE LION’S SKIN (vide old fable) Example 1.╇
Strategic maneuvering with visual arguments in political cartoons 
Cartoon 1 is a cartoon by Sir John Tenniel (who is the famous illustrator of Aesop’s fables and Alice in Wonderland), published in Punch magazine circa 1884.7 The flag on the bugle indicates that the cartoon is a comment on the War Party, a popular movement which advocated a bellicose attitude towards Russia and other powers at the end of the nineteenth century. As the reference at the bottom of the illustration underscores, Tenniel dismisses the War Party by casting them in the role of the ass in a traditional Aesop’s fable called “The Ass in the Lion’s Skin”. According to the fable, an ass frightened the other animals by putting on a lion’s skin and pretending he was to be a lion. This worked until he came across the fox, who heard him braying and said “You seemed to be a lion until you open your mouth. As soon as I heard you braying, it was obvious you were an ass”. Visually, Tenniel’s cartoon declares that the War Party is not the grand or frightening political movement it pretends to be. The donkey intent on braying, the bugle, and the hot air bellowing from the ass’s mouth suggest that the War Party is nothing more than noise and hot air, not a significant source of real strength and power. The image of the lion is a traditional means of portraying Great Britain. In this case the image of the ass in the lion’s skin is a metaphor for the War Party (as indicated in the banner of the bugle). The noise the War party makes is depicted by means of the bugle and the hot air that is coming from the ass’s mouth. The choice to depict the War Party as an ass in a lion’s skin is to convey the notion that the lion is not a real lion but an ass who is wearing a lion’s skin. By using this image Sir John Tenniel tries to convince the readers of Punch (a readership consisting of higher educated readers in general, also consisting of politicians and decision makers) not to take the behaviour of the British War Party seriously because Great Britain is no longer the greatest empire in the world, as it pretended to be. The cartoon appeared during the “Great Game” the period 1813 to 1907 with tensions between Britain and Russia. Russia wanted to expand to the south to obtain warm water ports in the Indian Ocean. This led to conflicts between Russia and Britain over Afghanistan and Persia. Britain wanted to prevent the expansion of Russia. The cartoon appeared in the period of the crisis surrounding the Panjdeh incident when the two powers were on the brink of war. In 1885 the British had to give in. When we interpret the cartoon as an attempt to convince the audience of the fact that the views expressed by the representatives of the War Party are not to be taken seriously we can reconstruct the complex indirect speech act conveyed by the cartoon in terms of an indirect standpoint and a complex indirect argumentation in support of this standpoint as in Diagram 2.
 Eveline Feteris, Leo Groarke & José Plug
1. The behaviour of Great Britain in scaring Russia (X) as promoted by the War Party (P) in the “Great Game” (S) should not be taken seriously 1.1a The behaviour of Great Britain (X) as promoted by the War Party (P) who erroneously envisages Great Britain still as a power of importance and frightens other countries but does not take into consideration that Great Britain cannot materialize its threats against Russia (Y) 1.1a.1a The behaviour of Great Britain as promoted by the War Party (P) that consists of frightening someone else (x1) while it is not capable of materializing its threats (x2) is like the behaviour of the ass in the fable “The Ass in Lion’s Skin” of Aesop (Z) 1.1a.1b The Ass in the Lion’s Skin (Z) frightens other animals by pretending that he is a Lion (Y1), but does not have the necessary qualities of a Lion so that he betrays himself when he is required to perform the behaviour that he is pretending to be capable of (Y2) 1.1b The behaviour of Great Britain (X) as promoted by the War Party (P) in the Great War (S) who erroneously envisages Great Britain still as a power of importance and frightens other countries but does not take into consideration that Great Britain cannot materialize its threats against Russia (Y) should not be taken seriously 1.1b.1 Characteristic Y (Yn) conflicts with common starting points. A political party may be expected to be realistic on the (im) possibilities of the nation (and should not make a fool of itself) Diagram 2.╇ Reconstruction of the argumentation underlying the cartoon of the Ass in the Lion’s Skin
From a dialectical perspective the contribution of Tenniel consists of the standpoint 1 and the argumentation (1.1a) and (1.1b) as reconstructed in Diagram 2. From this perspective, if Tenniel would be capable of answering the relevant critical questions with respect to the argumentation, his contribution to the discussion would be sufficient to reach the dialectical goal of resolving the discussion in a reasonable way. However, Tenniel also wants to convince the readers of Punch in an effective way and for this reason he has made a particular selection from the topical potential of dialectically relevant moves and from the way of presenting the selected moves. The strategic maneuvering in this example consists of a particular choice from the topical potential: the choice of attacking the standpoint of the “War Party” by characterizing this party as a participant to the discussion who should not be taken serious because its contributions to the discussion are not realistic in light of the real power of the British Empire. Tenniel chooses not to express his standpoint and the supporting argumentation in an explicit and direct way. To amuse and convince his audience, as a topos he chooses the metaphor of the Ass in the Lion’s
Strategic maneuvering with visual arguments in political cartoons 
Skin from Aesop’s fable to characterize those aspects of the behaviour of the War Party that serve his rhetorical goal to criticize this behaviour in an effective way. This metaphor allows him to concentrate on a negative evaluation of certain characteristics of the behaviour (Y1 and Y2) that are easy to criticize and to abstract from certain characteristics of the behaviour that are less easy to criticize. Furthermore the metaphor allows him to convey his arguments in an indirect way so that the critique becomes less overt. Finally the visual expression of the metaphor allows him to show his skills in amusing the audience by giving them a “puzzle” that they can solve by reconstructing the intended message on the basis of the verbal and visual hints provided by the cartoon. The selection of the metaphor taken from Aesop’s fable serves his rhetorical aim because he knows that his readers are familiar with the content and message of the fable and will understand the critique conveyed by the comparison. Furthermore the selection of the visual form serves his rhetorical aims of both pleasing the audience and confirming his own ethos because his audience will recognize the picture and will know that he is the illustrator of Aesop’s fables and Alice in Wonderland. The strategic maneuvering implies that Tenniel chooses to leave the main argumentation implicit and presents only the subordinative argumentation in an indirect way (and therefore also in an implicit way) by means of the visual metaphor. The choice of the topical potential of the fable and the stylistic means of representing the elements of this fable are adapted to the audience demand of the readers of Punch who are well-educated and well-informed readers who do not agree with the views of the War Party. They may be expected to be capable of reconstructing the indirect meaning conveyed by the images taken from the fable because they are familiar with the symbols used by the cartoonist. 3.2â•… Strategic maneuvering with the image of “the March of Progress” The visual metaphor that the meaning of a political cartoon may depend on, can, in principle, refer to any fable, story, theory, or idea that can be depicted visually. It can, however, also refer to a visualization of a cultural or scientific source that is even better known than the (details) of the source itself. A good example that can illustrate this phenomenon is “The March to Progress,” a famous, and subsequently infamous, depiction of the evolution of man that compressed 25 million years of human evolution in a series of 15 human figures marching in a parade from left to right. The illustration, originally called “The Road to Homo Sapiens”, was drawn by Rudolph Zallinger, who was commissioned to produce it for a popular Time-Life Book entitled Early Man (1965). A condensed, simplified version of the illustration of the evolution from monkey to man, is included as Example 2 below. As the image gained popularity, it acquired the name “March of Progress”, in view of its implicit suggestion that this evolutionary chain was a chain of progress
 Eveline Feteris, Leo Groarke & José Plug
stretching from more primitive species to those that are wiser, more capable and advanced (more “sapiens”).
Example 2.╇
The popularity of this image has served as an inspiration for political cartoonists, who exploit visual metaphors to make the points they want to make.8 The example below is a cartoon by Andrew Toos which functions as a comment on the structure of professorial employment in the university. “Part-time”, “associate” and “tenured” status are thus presented as different species, suggesting that there is, in academic employment, a “march of progress” as one moves from the one to the other. In the United States of America, the United Kingdom and many other countries, universities have tried to balance their books and deal with the financial crisis by drastically increasing their reliance on part-time professors. The Tooscartoon obviously advocates a negative evaluation of this policy; it raises questions about a very stratified system of employment which is characterized by large differences in status and pay.9
Example 3.╇
The argumentation structure underlying the Toos-cartoon, in which the relation between the indirect standpoint and the indirect complex argumentation is reconstructed, can be schematized as follows.
Strategic maneuvering with visual arguments in political cartoons 
1. The policy regarding the structure of professorial employment in the university (X) must be evaluated negatively 1.1a The policy regarding the structure of professorial employment in the university (X) should be characterized as being not up to standard (or underdeveloped, or primitive). 1.1a.1a With regard to the development of payment and status of part-timers and associates in the university the policy (X) is like the very first stages in the March of progress (Z) 1.1a.1b the very first stages in the March of progress (Z) can be characterized as a primitive stage in the evolution. 1.1b A structure of professorial employment in the university that is primitive must be evaluated negatively 1.1b.1 The situation with regard to the structure of professorial employment in the university should not be lagging behind the structure of employment in other sectors (or the evolution of modern western society as a whole).
If the protagonist, Andrew Toos, would only have had the ambition to provide a dialectically adequate contribution to a discussion on the structure of employment in universities, standpoint 1 and the arguments (1.1a) and (1.1b) would, in principle, have sufficed. However, in order to convince and amuse his audience and to live up to the conventionalized communicative practice of political cartooning, he makes use of a visual metaphor. In this case, the protagonist does not employ a visual metaphor that has directly been derived from topoi, such as stories, theories, proverbs etc. that can be considered as being part of the common cultural background, but he makes use of an existing visual representation of a metaphor that is well known. When the cartoonist uses such a well-known visualization of a metaphor, it may be expected that he alters the original image in order to be able to maneuver strategically. Since the known visual metaphor has already a conventionalised meaning that may be “neutral”, the representation of it in the cartoon at hand should be adapted to the actual situation in order to express a critical stance towards the actual situation. Although the known visualisation of the metaphor may be transformed in different ways, the original still needs to be recognizable in order to be able to take advantage of its conventionalized meaning. In altering a standard metaphor, the cartoonist may employ the following transformations: addition, deletion, substitution and permutation. When making use of addition, the known visualization of the metaphor is supplemented with elements that are relevant to the standpoint that is defended in the cartoon. If the original metaphor is transformed by making use of deletion, elements of the visualization of the original metaphor that are not in line with the standpoint that is defended are omitted. In a transformation that exploits substitution, elements from
 Eveline Feteris, Leo Groarke & José Plug
the original visual metaphor are replaced (re-designed) with elements that express (in an attractive way) the argumentative function the metaphor has in the justification of the standpoint regarding the topic that is under discussion. In permutation, elements of the original visual metaphor are rearranged or ordered differently (relocated); by expressing a distortion of the “normal” or “regular” order and elucidating their argumentative function. In example (3), the cartoonist, Andrew Toos, transformed the original visualization of a metaphor by means of substitution: the figures in the original image that express the earlier stages of evolution in the March of Progress have been replaced by figures, a part-timer and an associate, that have characteristics of figures of the earlier stages (inferior species) as well as of the final stage (human beings) in the March of progress. The strategic maneuvering that takes place manifests itself in the topical choice: the deviation of the known March of Progress indicates that the cartoonist is of the opinion that something is wrong with regard to the normal (and preferred) course of (social) progress. The presentational devices to depict the two types of employees that do not (yet) have a position as “full professor” are carefully chosen: the part-timers are the most inferior species, which is visualized by the fact that they do not have the appearance of a ‘normal’ human being: they do not walk upright and they do not wear shoes or clothes, let alone a suit. Nor are the associates entirely human: although they do wear clothes, they do not wear shoes. Both are contrasted by a “full professor”, who is depicted as a human being. The cartoon below provides us with an example of the way in which the cartoonist may maneuver strategically by employing a transformation of the original visualization of the “March of Progress” that depends on addition. The example (4) is a political cartoon from USA Today (March 16, 2010, p. 11A) which exploits the commitment to science and progress implicit in the original “March of Progress”. It is a comment on an attempt by the Texas Board of Education to change state textbooks so that evolution is not presented as established fact, but as one of two competing theories of our origins, the other being creationism, the notion that human beings didn’t evolve from other animals, but were created by an intelligent entity or God. In this cartoon, the cartoonist, Scott Stantis, presents the “March of Progress” as a march out of primordial waters to increasingly complex forms of life that culminate in someone who looks like a teacher carrying a book. With regard to the series (sequence) of figures that represent the different stages in progress, it may be noticed that a figure that represents the Texas Board of Education, is added. The Texas Board of Education is presented as a step backwards to a more primitive, more violent proto-human. Here the key point is made by a double
Strategic maneuvering with visual arguments in political cartoons 
entendre; the Board’s “Halt!” halting two things at once: the attempt to teach with evolutionary textbooks and, coincidentally, the march of progress which accompanies it. This produces an argumentation which might be summarized as: The Texas Board of Education is wrong to halt the use of textbooks that present evolution as fact (standpoint), for the attempt to stop such teaching is a retrograde attempt to stop progress.
Example 4.╇
One final example of a transformation of the original visualisation of the “March of Progress” by means of deletion can be found in a cartoon that was analysed by Shelly (2001). This cartoon by Mike Peters was published in 1980 in the Dayton Daily News and criticises the position of women in modern society. In the cartoon the known visualization of the “March of Progress” is presented in the upper panel of the cartoon by means of a parallel row of cleaning ladies in the lower panel of the cartoon. The women in the lower panel do not change and remain on all fours throughout. Apart from Shelly’s thorough analysis of details in the cartoon (2001, 92), it may be observed that the deletion of the known stages (and the repetition of a picture of just one of the stages) indicate that there is no progress whatsoever. This contrast with the explicit depicted ‘regular’ order of progress underpins the critical stance towards the position of women; by means of deletion of elements of the original visualization the cartoonist substantiates the standpoint ‘the position of women should be evaluated negatively’.
 Eveline Feteris, Leo Groarke & José Plug
4.â•… Conclusion With this analysis of the strategic maneuvering in political cartoons we set out to make a first step into describing how the extended pragma-dialectical theory as developed by van Eemeren (2010) and van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2006, 2007) can be applied to the analysis of visual argumentation. We hope to have demonstrated that a pragma-dialectical analysis of the strategic maneuvering in political cartoons may serve as a tool that may serve to establish how cartoonists operate argumentatively when conveying their critical view with respect to the behaviour of a politician or other public official. We have argued that a political cartoon can be analysed in terms of contributions to a critical discussion, consisting of a series of indirect speech acts expressing an indirect standpoint and indirect argumentation by visual means. We have demonstrated how the pragma-dialectical conceptual framework can be used for reconstructing the negative standpoint and the argumentation conveyed by means of the cartoon as contributions to a critical discussion with the aim of making explicit the dialectical commitments of the cartoonist. At the same time, we have demonstrated how the extended pragma-dialectical theory can be used as a conceptual framework for analysing the strategic maneuvering involved in the message that is conveyed indirectly by means of the cartoon. We have described how cartoonists make use of topoi based on a common cultural heritage as the “source” domain of the visual metaphor that is adopted in the cartoon. We have argued that the strategic maneuvering implies that the negative evaluation of certain characteristics of this source domain are indirectly transferred to the characteristics of the “target” domain of the metaphor, the characteristics of the politician or public official that is criticized by the cartoonist. We have analyzed the choices the cartoonists make in their selection of a particular cultural topos as a form of strategic maneuvering in which he adapts his choice of the topical potential and the stylistic devices used in the cartoon to the audience demand of the readers of the newspaper.
Notes 1.â•… Political cartoons are a form of editorial cartoon. Wikipedia suggests that “most (editorial cartoons) use visual metaphors and caricatures to explain complicated political situations, and thus sum up a current event with a humorous picture.” Nicholas Garland (cartoonist of the Daily Telegraph), cited by Plumb (2004, 432) describes the force of an editorial cartoon as being derived from the ‘vehicle itself which, besides the caricature, requires some or all of a mixture of caricature, metaphor, distortion, surrealisms, deliberate misunderstanding and mockery’.
Strategic maneuvering with visual arguments in political cartoons 
2.â•… See Medhurst and Desousa (1981, 200–201). 3.â•… See Medhurst and Desousa (1981, 232–233) who contend that the cartoonist participates in the ethos attributed to the part of the newspaper reserved for serious discussion of public policy. In their view the aim of the cartoonist is to be effective as a graphic reinforcer, clarifier and debater of public policy. 4.â•… Often the cartoon also contains verbal elements that serve as a ‘clue’ to enable the reader to identify the politician or public official. However, the critique with respect to the behaviour of the politician or public official is indirectly conveyed by visual means. 5.â•… For a discussion on the notions ‘target’ and ‘source’ of a metaphor see Forceville (1996), Schilperoord and Maes (2009). For a discussion of the analysis of verbal metaphors in an argumentative context see Garssen (2009). 6.â•… Depending on the context, the qualification ‘negatively’ may be formulated more specific (see the discussion of the examples in Section 3). 7.â•… In 1865 Sir John Tenniel (1820–1914) illustrated the first edition of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. In 1848 he illustrated Aesop’s Fables, 100 drawings. 8.â•… Shelley (1996, 2001) analyzed the original as well as variations of the March of Progress image as a visual argument proceeding through ‘rhetorical’ and ‘demonstrative’ modes of visual logic. These variations show that each mode of visual logic can be altered or isolated in support of new conclusions. Furthermore, the March can be included in a visual ‘frame’ to produce new arguments, much as a verbal argument can be made a component of a new and larger argument. 9.â•… In the context of debates about this issue, the cartoon has sometimes functioned as an argument, which might be summarized as: Part-timers deserve better working conditions and higher status in the university, as they are treated as though they were a greatly inferior species of the professor species. In this context, it is the visual analogy to the March of Progress that makes these points.
References Birdsell, D. & Groarke, L. (1996). Toward a theory of visual argument. Argumentation and advocacy, 33, 1–10. Black, M. (1979). More about metaphor. In A. Ortony (Ed.), Metaphor and thought (pp. 19–43). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Blair, J. Anthony (1996). The possibility and actuality of visual arguments, Argumentation and Advocacy 33 (1), 23–39. Eemeren, F.H. van (2010). Strategic manoeuvering in argumentative discourse. Extending the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Eemeren, F.H. van & R. Grootendorst (1992). Argumentation, communication, and fallacies. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Eemeren, F.H. van & R. Grootendorst (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation. The pragma-dialectical approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 Eveline Feteris, Leo Groarke & José Plug Eemeren, F.H. van & Houtlosser, P. (2006). Strategic maneuvering: A synthetic recapitulation. Argumentation, 20 (4) 377–380. Eemeren, F.H. van & Houtlosser, P. (2007). Seizing the occasion: Parameters for analysing ways of strategic manoeuvring. In F.H. van Eemeren, J.A. Blair, Ch. A. Willard, B. Garssen (eds.), Proceedings of the sixth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 375–381). Amsterdam: SicSat. Forceville, C. (1996). Pictorial metaphor in advertising. London: Routledge. Garssen, B.J. (2009). Comparing the incomparable: Figurative analogies in a dialectical testing procedure. In F.H. van Eemeren & B.J. Garssen (Eds.), Pondering onproblems of argumentation. Twenty essays on theoretical issues (pp. 133–140). Dordrecht: Springer. Groarke, L. (1998). Logic, art and argument. Informal Logic 18 (2&3) 105–129. Groarke, L. (2002). Towards a pragma-dialectics of visual argument. In F.H. van Eemeren (Ed.) Advances in Pragma-dialectics (pp. 137–152). Amsterdam: SicSat. Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Medhurst, M.J. & DeSousa, M.A. (1981). Political Cartoons as a rhetorical form: A Taxonomy of Graphic Discourse. Communication Monographs. 48 (3) 197–236. Schilperoord, J. & Maes, A. (2009). Visual metaphoric conceptualization in editorial cartoons. In C. Forceville & E. Urios-Aparisi (Eds.), Multimodal Metaphor. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Searle, J.R. (1979). Expression and meaning. Studies in the theory of speech acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shelley, C. (1996). Rhetorical and demonstrative modes of visual argument: Looking at images of human evolution, Argumentation and Advocacy 33 (2) 53–68. Shelley, C. (2001). Aspects of visual argument: A study of the March of Progress. Informal Logic 2 85–96. Walton, D., Macagno, F. & Reed, C. (2008). The death of argument. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Anecdotes and arguments Trudy Govier & Henrike Jansen 1.â•… Introduction Christopher Oldenburg and Michael Leff have questioned standard logical commentary on anecdotal arguments, saying that anecdotes can play a more positive role in arguments.* They seek to consider the anecdote as a “strategy available to arguers that may be understood as something more interesting and useful than its typical treatment as evidence supporting a generalization” (2009:â•›4). What role can anecdotes play in good arguments? This topic is often discussed in a restricted way, where the notion of “anecdotal arguments” is introduced, and it is said that such arguments are weak because they necessarily involve generalizing from a single case to all or many cases, as in the fallacy of hasty generalization. Questioning logical tradition on the matter, Oldenburg and Leff regard the anecdote as a kind of “rhetorical synecdoche” in which an individual narrative is used to invite the hearer or reader to grasp the whole of some subject through an insight that is more inclusive and engaging than anything a generalized proposition could provide (4). Oldenburg and Leff consider in detail two arguments from recent American electoral politics. On their view, both George W. Bush and Senator Hilary Clinton succeeded in lending credibility to conclusions by effective narrative anecdotes. From their analyses they conclude that anecdotes “may perform important rhetorical and dialectical tasks” and that an anecdote “can and sometimes does act in a rationally acceptable manner” and therefore “should have a more respectable place in argumentation theory” (8). The questions raised by Oldenburg and Leff are of great interest. Obviously significant for argumentation theory and political discourse, they point us to a number of broader epistemological themes including testimony; particulars and universals; credibility; narration and argumentation; and argument evaluation. It is this last topic which will be our main focus here. We explore it from our different backgrounds in informal logic and pragma-dialectics. 2.â•… An anecdote as told by Bush The example from George W. Bush was contained in his response to a question put to him in the 2004 presidential debates by moderator Jim Lehrer. Lehrer asked
 Trudy Govier & Henrike Jansen
“Has the war in Iraq been worth the cost of American lives – 1052 as of today?” and Bush responded as follows: You know, every life is precious. Every life matters. You know, my hardest – the hardest part of the job is to know that I committed the troops in harm’s way and then do the best I can to provide comfort for the loved ones who lost a son or a daughter or a husband or wife. You know, I think about Missy Johnson. She’s a fantastic lady I met in Charlotte, North Carolina. She and her son Bryan, they came to see me. Her husband PJ got killed. He’d been in Afghanistan, went to Iraq. You know, it’s hard work to try to love her as best as I can, knowing full well that the decision I made caused her loved one to be in harm’s way. I told her after we prayed and teared up and laughed some that I thought her husband’s sacrifice was noble and worthy. Because I understand the stakes of this war on terror. I understand that we must find Al Qaida wherever they hide. We must deal with threats before they fully materialize. And Saddam Hussein was a threat, and that we must spread liberty because in the long run, the way to defeat hatred and tyranny and oppression is to spread freedom. Missy understood that. That’s what she told me her husband understood. So you say, “Was it worth it?” Every life is precious. That’s what distinguishes us from the enemy. Everybody matters. But I think it’s worth it, Jim. (Cited by Oldenburg & Leff 2009:â•›1)
Oldenburg and Leff note that this narrative invites a general estimation of Bush’s character through his tale of a single encounter. They make many astute comments about Bush’s use of the anecdote, seeing it as showing how individuals can seem to represent a whole. The husband’s sacrifice of life appears as a ‘representative’ memorial for 1052 soldiers who had died; Missy is the ‘representative’ for the bereaved families, and Bush’s self-representation is the representative of how he deals with the families of the fallen (4–5).1 Oldenburg and Leff then seem to endorse a positive assessment of the anecdote regarded as an argument. They state that Bush was making an “ethotic argument” that “lends credibility” to “conclusions that are being drawn” (6; our italics). What the conclusions are is not made fully explicit by Oldenburg and Leff. But given the context and granting their interpretation, the conclusions would appear to be (a) Bush is the sort of person who can effectively offer emotional support to the widow of a fallen soldier and (b) the war in Iraq was worth its cost in American lives.2 Judging by this analysis, we cannot follow the authors in granting this anecdote a positive evaluation from a logically normative point of view. In an anecdotal argument, as that notion is standardly defined and understood, one moves from an individual narrative to a general conclusion. Leff and Oldenburg say that an anecdote may be considered as something more interesting and useful than its typical treatment as evidence supporting a generalization (4). This is a fruitful point with positive implications for the rhetorical estimation of such an argument.
Anecdotes and arguments 
But it does not have such implications with regard to logical estimation because we are asked to shift from acceptance of a particular narrative to a general claim about the world in a way that cannot satisfy logical standards of argument cogency. With regard to Bush’s conclusion (a) a person’s self-praising narrative about what he did once can hardly provide a reliable general guide to his general character, even if one grants that his tale is true. And in any event, Lehrer’s original question was not about Bush’s character or about the widows he might be able to console, either in particular or in general. It was about (b), whether the Iraq war was worth its cost in American lives. With regard to this claim, the anecdote about Bush and Missy Johnson appears both evasive and inadequate. It is evasive since it diverts attention from Lehrer’s question. And it is inadequate because no individual narrative about the attitudes of a bereaved person and her husband could demonstrate the general claim that the broad and costly effort of a war was justified. Leff and Oldenburg seek to bridge the logical gap by analysing the anecdote as a kind of rhetorical synecdoche that offers a substantive rather than a statistical representation. That is, in an anecdote, the speaker or writer tells a story that invites the hearer or reader to grasp the whole of some subject through “an insight that is more inclusive and engaging than anything a generalized proposition could provide” (4). This notion of representation by synecdoche points to an ancient and deep philosophical issue, taking us right back to discussions of universals and particulars in the ancient philosophies of Plato and Aristotle.3 Can one grasp a universal by considering a particular? Verbally and rhetorically, a part can be used to represent a whole. For example, if we say “all hands on deck,” we use the word “hand” to refer to a person. If we say “Berlin requests The Hague to deliver key documents,” we use the names of capital cities to the governments of Germany and Holland. In such examples of synecdoche, a part may be said to represent a whole, in the sense that it provides, verbally, a way of referring to that whole. However, Oldenburg and Leff ’s analysis based on synecdoche is somewhat different, and far more ambitious and controversial. There is no representativeness in any sense connected to proper inductive logic. No individual can be reliably known to logically represent a broader variable population with regard to emotional state, health, political attitudes to war and taxation, and other such matters. Even if Missy Johnson’s husband believed the war in Iraq was being fought to defend liberty and struggle against a wicked dictator and the forces of Al Qaida, and even if he and his wife both believed that such efforts would succeed in the long run, that would provide no reliable evidence about the attitudes of most or all American soldiers who fought in Iraq. Their attitudes cannot be known to represent the attitudes of others. In assessing inductive argument based on sampling, one always needs to ask whether the sample is representative of the population. To derive more general conclusions from anecdotes about one or
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a very few individuals, we need representativeness in that sense. An individual is representative of a population if that individual is typical of it, or known to be similar to most or all other individuals in the population in every respect relevant to the conclusion. If a population P were known to be absolutely uniform with reference to some characteristic, c, then considering just one member of P with regard to c would be sufficient to support a universal claim about P. But such a condition is rarely satisfied for human psychological states and certainly not satisfied with regard to the opinions of the persons cited in Bush’s example.4 So when Oldenburg and Leff claim that the anecdote as they conceive it can link the audience’s perception of an arguer and his or her claims in a “holistic insight that reaches beyond the possibilities of propositional argument”, the claim is problematic. One might accept it from a rhetorical point of view, but it is quite another matter to concede that the conclusions Bush was trying are logically supported and that anecdotes can in this sense sometimes “act in a rationally acceptable manner” (8; our italics). The italicized elements in this last claim seem epistemically important, but are most unclear. One may have feelings and impressions distinct from propositions or claims articulated in an argument and such feelings may be difficult to verbally articulate. But that is not to say that they can somehow provide insight that would buttress a generalization from a singular case, so as to make an anecdotal argument legitimate. According to Oldenburg and Leff, “the anecdote’s representational and persuasive power” consists in its power “to work the space between induction and narration” (7; our italics). But what is this space? Anecdotes seem to be much closer to narrative than to induction.5 In a narrative, there is a kind of form of telling how things happened, and often a message may be extracted from the end. A general conclusion may be inferred, but only a conclusion about existence or possibility. For instance, if a man with an artificial hip recounts how he was held up for an hour at airport security in Chicago, he is telling an anecdote about his own experiences. This anecdote will have the narrative form of telling events that happened to him in an order “beginning, middle, end.” If the point is to demonstrate that slightly disabled people can experience this sort of thing in airport security in the United States, the anecdote will be logically sufficient. It will not show that every slightly disabled person will experience such things at every U.S. airport, or even that most such persons will experience it at the Chicago airport, or that this man is likely to experience it on a future occasion.6 Oldenburg and Leff ’s claim that the narrative lends credibility to the conclusions drawn is a claim that does not fit well with their many other astute comments about anecdote and their discussion of the examples they consider. The explanation for its anomalous status in their account lies in a crucial ambiguity with regard to the central notion of credibility. Premises X may lend credibility to
Anecdotes and arguments 
conclusion Y in that they make Y more likely to be believed, due to various features such as interest, narrative comprehensibility, vividness, emotional appeal, and the engaging character of the person recounting such premises. They may tend to be persuasive in this sense, which is tied to likely audience reception.7 The problem is that “credibility” also has an epistemically normative sense tied to worthiness to be believed. Relevant evidence in support of a claim may render that claim more worthy of belief and in this sense more credible. Thus credibility may be understood either as persuasive or as epistemic. It is obviously possible for premises X to make conclusion Y more believable, persuasively, without making it more worthy of belief, logically. This, we suggest, is what is happening with the Bush anecdote. It is effective but does not suffice to logically demonstrate either a general claim about Bush’s character or a general claim about the value of the war on Iraq. 2.1â•… The anecdote’s function Nevertheless Oldenburg and Leff draw attention to the important question of what legitimate functions anecdotes may play in argumentation. This matter cannot be resolved simply by falling back on the traditional definition of anecdotal argument according to which an anecdote can provide only slight support for a generalization. If an argument is anecdotal in this common sense of seeking to establish a general claim on the basis of some particular narrative, then it necessarily fails to meet standards of logical cogency. But the possibility of anecdotes serving other functions within argument remains open. Rhetorically, anecdotes may serve to draw interest, focus our attention, suggest hypotheses, serve as clarifying illustrations of general themes granted in advance, or remind us of general points already established. Logically, they can be used to show that something exists or that it is possible and they can provide counter-examples, sufficing to refute generalizations. So, when Oldenburg and Leff claim that the anecdote should have a “more respectable place” in argumentation theory, we welcome that reminder and do not disagree. In order to grasp an anecdote’s function in a particular case, we want to propose that the whole argumentative context should be taken into account. In our view, only then its logical and dialectical quality can be assessed. By context we mean the standpoint that is at stake8 and the place that the anecdote has in relation to the other argumentative elements put forward by the arguer. When we take a closer look at what Bush’s argument actually consists in, we find that the standpoint or conclusion that Bush defends is that the war in Iraq has been worth the cost of 1052 American lives. The immediate support for this standpoint is the anecdote, and if we understand the argument this way, it fails. But there is in the case other argumentation that could more relevantly support Bush’s standpoint.
 Trudy Govier & Henrike Jansen
According to this argumentation, it is the fight against Al Qaida terrorism that justifies the sacrificed lives of all these soldiers. The relation between the standpoint, the anecdote and the other argumentation is schematically depicted in the following argumentation structure based on the pragma-dialectical method of schematizing argumentation (see van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: Chapter 7): 1. The war in Iraq has been worth it [it = the cost of American lives 1052 as of today]
1.1a E.g. the cost of the live of PJ Johnson was noble and worthy
1.1b His widow understood that
1.1b.1 So she told me … (anecdote)
1.1a.1a We must find Al Qaida wherever they hide
1.1a.1a.1 This is a war on terror
1.1a.1b We must deal with threats before they fully materialize
1.1a.1c Saddam Hussein was a threat
1.1a.1d We must spread liberty
1.1a.1d.1 In the long run the way to defeat hatred and tyranny and oppression is to spread freedom
1.1a.1e PJ Johnson understood reasons a–d
1.1a.1e.1 His widow told me so
The argumentation that appeals to the fight against terrorism, consists of 1.1a.1a–1.1a.1d and sub-argumentation. These reasons can support the standpoint on their own; they do not need the in-between-step of the lost life of PJ Johnson. This means that from a logical or dialectical perspective, Bush’s anecdote would not have to be fallacious per se; we cannot just dismiss his answer to Lehrer as a hasty generalization. It seems to be the case that, in the context of other elements
Anecdotes and arguments 
that make up Bush’s answer, this anecdote can be interpreted as having an illustrative or exemplifying function. It illustrates Bush’s general point that every sacrificed live is justified, a point that is argued for with reference to the threat of Al Qaida and the need to retain freedom. (Of course that claim is, itself, highly controversial.) One could even say that the anecdote does indeed have a representative function. However if we were to allow this, it would not be in the sense that Oldenburg and Leff attributed to it, which was by way of synecdoche in which the particular can represent the universal. It would be on the slightly different grounds that this lost life is typical of all lost lives from the perspective of the worthy fight against terrorism. If we presume that context, we could say that all lost lives are sacrificed for the same purpose and thus that any lost life would serve as a typical example of all the lost lives needed in order to retain our freedom. After all, the whole population of lost lives in Iraq is absolutely uniform with respect to the characteristic that theses lives serve the fight against terrorism, if one allows Bush’s problematic assumptions about Al Qaida presence in Iraq prior to the U.S. invasion of 2003. There is arguably some sense in which the lost life of PJ Johnson could be regarded as representative of all the lives lost in the Iraq war. But to see it this way requires taking a special perspective on the matter, and a perspective that does not require us to generalize from the opinions of the dead soldier and his widow, as would be implied by Oldenburg and Leff ’s account. What this possibility indicates is that the assessment of an anecdote’s quality depends on an analysis of its function within the whole range of arguments that an arguer presents for his or her standpoint. Bush’s anecdote is a kind of softener for his other somewhat more relevant points. It seems to be used to divert attention from these other reasons, which were weak. Whether the U.S. goal in Iraq was “to spread liberty” and whether waging a war to do so could plausibly be supposed to “defeat hatred” are contestable at best. Before the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, there was no involvement of Al Qaida in Iraq. There was plenty of evidence to that effect at the time Bush used this anecdote, and it had appeared in many public discussions. Totally ignoring the discussion about these facts and using the anecdote in order to portray people (Missy Johnson) as understanding Bush’s reasons is tendentious and misleading. It is tendentious, because the word “understanding” here is a success word, presuming the point of view to be argued. And it is misleading, because the reference to Missy Johnson as the widow of a soldier suggests her status as an authority as to the value of the war, which, of course, she is not. Having said this, we are right back where Oldenburg and Leff started: as for the analysis of Bush’s argument, rhetoric seems to offer the most suitable theory. Although we do not agree with Oldenburg and Leff ’s normative conclusions about anecdotes as providing rational means to logically support a view, we do endorse
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their analysis when it comes to rhetoric and persuasiveness. In what follows, we would like to even strengthen it from the perspective of strategic maneuvering. 2.2â•… Bush’s anecdote as a strategic maneuver In strategic maneuvering an arguer can make use of the rhetorical space within the boundaries of the dialectical rules (van Eemeren 2010). The first is that the discussants can make a strategic selection from the reasons that can be used to support a conclusion; the second is that they can adapt to the audience’s good sense and preferences; and the third is that they can present their reasons in an opportune formulation (presentational device). These three factors of strategic maneuvering come together in Bush’s anecdote. To start with: the anecdote is a specific choice from the topical possibilities Bush has. This choice makes it possible to exploit advantages of audience demand and presentation. The anecdote addresses audience demand because in the anecdote Bush can present himself as someone who is a responsible person. The anecdote presents him as a man who is not afraid of taking a hard decision: “knowing full well that the decision I made caused her [Missy Johnson] loved one to be in harm’s way”. It also suggests that Bush is not afraid to talk to the victims of decisions he has made. And finally the anecdote makes him appear as a Christian (who is supposed to be responsible): “we prayed”. Furthermore, the anecdote enables Bush to make the same concession to Lehrer and the audience twice. The common place “every life is precious” was of course implicitly presupposed in Lehrer’s question. By conceding this point, Bush gives it the status of a generally accepted starting point, and in doing so he establishes common ground with the audience. The concession forms both the beginning and the end of Bush’s answer, and its repetition gives more weight to it. First, in doing so Bush stresses that he is concerned about every life (which is even more emphasized when it is followed by “that’s what distinguishes us from the enemy” and “everybody matters”). Second, the repetition of the phrase “every life is precious” after having told the anecdote gives more weight to Bush’s standpoint. Due to the anecdote the phrase “every life” is materialized in the person of PJ Johnson. It is the anecdote about this man that gives a face to Bush’s concern. The anecdote also enables Bush to present himself as a professional President. In telling the anecdote he uses the phrase “I understand” twice: “ … I understand the stakes of this war on terror” and “I understand that we must fight Al Qaida …”. This specific formulation suggests that Bush’s reasons for the war against Iraq are not just an opinion held by Bush. They are presented as facts of an objective world, facts that just have to be learned (some kind of Platonic idea: the truth is out there, we just have to see and understand it). In using these words, Bush gives his argumentation an appearance of objectivity. But the anecdote does more.
Anecdotes and arguments 
In addition to Bush’s own “understanding”, the anecdote about Missy Johnson attributes understanding also to her (“Missy understood that”) and to her husband (“That’s what she told me her husband understood”). This lends (rhetorical) credibility to Bush’s argumentation, because now the people who are the most unlikely to subscribe Bush’s view that lives should be sacrificed, are presented as holding the same viewpoint. Given all considerations presented in this second section, we cannot agree with Oldenburg and Leff ’s rather positive normative assessment of Bush’s comments when we are evaluating from a logical perspective. Rhetorically speaking, Bush may have performed a highly successful maneuver with his response to Lehrer’s question. As Oldenburg and Leff have shown, the example is interesting in its own right, important, and brilliantly suited to exploring the rhetoric of anecdote. The analysis as strategic maneuver has also shown that its choice has opened up all sorts of possibilities with regard to audience demand and verbal presentation. But rhetorical and strategic effects do not render normative credibility to general claims about the value of the war in Iraq, or the capacity of George W. Bush for empathy. Both from a logical and a pragma-dialectical point of view, a single anecdote about a widow’s opinion about the war cannot be taken as a sound support for the conclusion that the war in Iraq has been worth the cost of 1052 lives. We are reminded here that an anecdote can have more functions in argumentation over and above those of leading into a hasty generalization. Some other functions can be perfectly in agreement with logical and dialectical standards. But they can be fallacious as well; the assessment depends on the context. The soundness of Bush’s anecdote can be questioned because it diverts attention from Bush’s other poor argumentation. But even if we were to judge Bush’s anecdote as a sound dialectical move because of its role as a lead-in to his more general claims about the war on terror, it would remain true that the anecdote did not provide sufficient support for a general conclusion. 3.â•… Three anecdotes as told by Hilary Clinton The example from Hilary Clinton was taken from her speech to the Democratic National Convention in 2008, in which she endorsed Barack Obama’s candidacy and urged her followers to campaign for him. Clinton said the following: I will always remember that single mother who had adopted two kids with autism. She didn’t have any health insurance; and she discovered that she had cancer. But she greeted me, her bald head, painted with my name on it, and asked me to fight for health care for her and her children. I will always remember the young man, in a Marine Corps t-shirt who waited months for medical care, and he said to me,
 Trudy Govier & Henrike Jansen
“Take care of my buddies. A lot of them are still over there.” And then, “Will you please take care of me.” And I will always remember that young boy who told me his mom worked for minimum wage, that her employer had cut her hours. He said he just didn’t know what his family was going to do. (Cited by Oldenburg and Leff 2009: 2)
According to Oldenburg and Leff, Clinton listed specific policy issues and then referred back to her story of these three moving encounters, stating that she and Obama alike had sought to stand up for those who had been invisible for eight long years under the George W. Bush presidency; accordingly, her supporters should switch their support to Obama: Most of all I ran to stand up for all those who have been invisible to their government for eight long years. Those are the reasons I ran for President, and those are the reasons I support Barack Obama for President. I want you to ask yourselves: Were you in this campaign just for me? Or were you in it for that young Marine and others like him? Were you in it for that mom struggling with cancer while raising her kids? Were you in it for the young boy and his mom surviving on the minimum wage? Were you in it for all the people in this country who feel invisible? (Cited by Oldenburg and Leff 2009: 2)
Oldenburg and Leff regard Clinton’s anecdotes as playing a key role in articulating her stance. They comment “each of the anecdotes unobtrusively reinforces the idea of collaborative effort and the need to maintain concern for the other and not just for oneself. The mother with cancer seeks help for her children; the Marine’s first request comes out of concern for his buddies, and the young boy fears for his whole family. So also, in effect, does Clinton ask her followers to restrain their personal sentiments and needs and to work for others who need help – and Obama, in an important sense, is one of those others …” (2009: 7). But the fact that some three extraordinarily needy Americans would welcome government health care is not evidence of attitudes among the population at large.9 Although verbally efficient and on many occasions rhetorically beautiful, synecdoche cannot achieve representativeness in any sense tied to the correct logic of generalizing from particulars. If one should need further support for this claim, it can be seen in the fact that anecdotes with quite different messages can be told on either side of a general claim. (One American without health care may tell of his suffering and need for government assistance while another might pride himself on managing alone and tell a moving anecdote about how he had managed to cope.) At this point, the issue of rhetoric and logic raises its head again, as we can see when we consider the word “reinforces.” To say that premise X reinforces claim Y may mean something rhetorical – that X is persuasive with regard to Y. But it may also state that X reinforces Y in the normative sense of providing further supportive evidence
Anecdotes and arguments 
for it. We suggest that the former is true and the latter is false. There is an ambiguity in the notion of reinforcing, an ambiguity quite analogous to the ambiguity we saw earlier in the notion of credibility. Nevertheless, it would appear that also Clinton’s anecdote has another function than lending support to a conclusion all by itself. She was basically arguing that she and Obama had similar concerns and policies and that on this basis her supporters should now support him. This can be shown when the argumentation is schematized in an argumentation structure: 1. I recommend you to vote for Obama
1.1a The reasons I ran for President are the reasons I support Barack Obama
1.1b You endorse those reasons
1.1b.1 You were not just in it for me
1.1b.1.1a You were in it for all the people in this country who feel invisible
1.1b.1.1b These people are … [anecdotes]
The anecdote is placed at a sub-sub-level at which it supports the normative substandpoint that the audience thinks the reasons why both Clinton and Obama run for President are good reasons (the audience endorse those reasons). The sharing of policies serves as a good reason for transferring one’s support, and that reason is not dependent on anecdotal evidence. Though Clinton’s anecdotes are moving and highly memorable, her narratives are illustrative of an obvious point, which most and probably all persons at a Democratic Party convention would acknowledge: many poor Americans were struggling because they had no health care. The argument is essentially this: “there are highly needy people (as illustrated by these three cases); these people and their needs have been badly served by the
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Bush administration: Obama and I both seek to help them; therefore if you supported me, you should now support him.” On this analysis given, it would appear that Clinton paid attention to issues, and gave a relevant reason for her supporters to support Obama. The anecdotes are moving and vividly introduce her claims, but the argument for her stance is not based on them. 4.â•… Conclusion Anecdotal arguments are bound to be logically and dialectically inadequate if, as is usual, we define them as asking the audience to shift from acceptance of a particular narrative to a general claim about the world. Such a shift cannot be justified according to logical standards of argument cogency. In the examples from Bush and Clinton, Oldenburg and Leff described individuals as representative of broader phenomena. We contend that, interpreted logically, that judgment is simply too charitable. It may be acceptable if we were to interpret it with reference to rhetoric or persuasion, as meaning only that narratives about these particular individuals were employed to allude or make reference to broader themes. In this sense we can allow that in the Bush example, Missy Johnson’s dead husband represents all the American soldiers killed in Iraq, Missy herself represents all the bereaved family members of these soldiers; and Bush, consoling Missy, represents how we can be sympathetic with all the families of all the bereaved. The problem is the representing in this rhetorical sense does not show representativeness in any logical sense. The individuals mentioned cannot reliably represent (that is, be typical of) a broader variable population with regard to emotional state, political attitudes, and the like. Perhaps Missy Johnson’s husband believed the war in Iraq was being fought to defend liberty and so on, and perhaps he did truly believe that such efforts would succeed in the long run. But even if those claims were true, the logical gap between particular and general would remain. Shifting to Clinton’s narrative, the fact that some three extraordinarily needy Americans would welcome government health care is not evidence of attitudes among the population at large. Although verbally efficient and on some occasions rhetorically beautiful, synecdoche cannot achieve representativeness in any sense tied to the logic of generalizing from particulars. On this point, we depart from Oldenburg and Leff. We therefore do not agree with their positive normative evaluation of the anecdotes presented by George W. Bush and by Hilary Clinton. But we acknowledge the broader question that their paper has raised, namely the question what other (legitimate) functions anecdotes may have in argumentation. After all, some such functions can entirely be within the bounds of correct argumentation. Anecdotes may serve to draw interest, focus our attention, suggest hypotheses, or remind us
Anecdotes and arguments 
of general points already established. Anecdotes can be used to show that something exists or that it is possible, and they can provide counter-examples, serving to refute generalizations. In this chapter, we have shown that the Bush and Clinton anecdotes served as illustrations of claims that were already established by other grounds. With regard to Bush’s anecdote, its ethotic and distractive effects derail its contribution. In contrast, Hilary Clinton’s anecdotes are more relevant, since they serve to illustrate a general claim that would have been accepted by the audience to which she was speaking.
Notes *╇ We are sorry to have to note here that Michael Leff passed away in 2010, during the period when this paper was written. 1.â•… The caution quotes are inserted by us. The reasons for them will be apparent later. 2.â•… As non-Americans we note that the practice of discussing such costs only in American lives is highly offensive; nevertheless it is standard and was a feature of the question posed to President George W. Bush. 3.â•… Synecdoche as relevant to reasoning from parts to wholes is briefly discussed in Govier (2008). 4.â•… Sample representativeness is discussed in Govier (2010:â•›260–264 and 275–280). 5.â•… The same response was made by Tone Kvernbekk at the OSSA Conference. 6.â•… Our example. For that matter, one might insist that general principles are presupposed in a narrative, rather than demonstrated, both with regard to explanation and with regard to argument. But even granting for the moment that there might be such a thing as narrative argument, problems about the capacity of the particular narrative in the anecdote to represent many persons in a general conclusion still arise. Now if a particular narrative could be re-told in general terms, and if we grant that there is such a thing as narrative argument, then a general conclusion might be extracted from that narrative argument. But note that by this time, we have incorporated two highly significant conditions. And in the end, we would not have a legitimate anecdotal argument. 7.â•… Nevertheless, the issue of whether an anecdotal argument is effective indeed, is an empirical one. Experimental research as carried out by Hoeken and Hustinx (2009) suggests that they are not very persuasive, at least not when compared to other types of arguments, e.g. statistical arguments. In our view, however, the fact that in these studies anecdotal arguments are studied as single arguments and do not take the argumentative context into account, make them unreliable with regard to conclusions about the anecdotes used by Bush and Clinton. 8.â•… E.g. the type of standpoint determines whether an anecdotal argument is a symptomatic or an analogical argument (see van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans 2007:â•›190–191).
 Trudy Govier & Henrike Jansen 9.â•… The disturbing accounts of vociferous objections at town hall meetings in the United States during August, 2009, provide evidence for this claim – which would, on the face of it, seem rather surprising.
References Eemeren, F.H. van (2010). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse. Extending the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (1992). Argumentation, communication and fallacies. A pragma-dialectical perspective. Hillsdale, New Jersey etc.: Lawrence Erlbaum. Eemeren, F.H. van, Houtlosser, P. & Snoeck Henkemans, A.F. (2007). Argumentative indicators in discourse. A pragma-dialectical study. Dordrecht: Springer. Garssen, B. (1997). Argumentatieschema’s in pragma-dialectisch perspectief. Een theoretisch en empirisch onderzoek. Dordrecht: Foris Publications. Govier, T. (2010). A practical study of argument. Seventh Edition. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/ Cengage. Govier, T. (2008). Duets, cartoons, and tragedies: Struggles with the fallacy of composition. In: van Eemeren, F. & B. Garssen (Eds.): Pondering on problems of argumentation. Amsterdam: Springer. Hoeken, H. & Hustinx, L. (2009). When is statistical evidence superior to anecdotal evidence in supporting probability claims? The role of argument type. Human Communication Research 35, 491–510. Oldenburg, C. & Leff, M. (2009). Argument by anecdote. In: J. Ritola (Ed.), Argument cultures: Proceedings of OSSA 09, CD-ROM (pp. 1–8), Windsor ON: OSSA.
Pragma-dialectical analysis of rhetorical texts The case of Barack Obama in Cairo Dima Mohammed & David Zarefsky 1.â•… The analytical problem Over the course of thirty years, Frans van Eemeren and his colleagues have articulated the pragma-dialectical perspective on argumentation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004). The most comprehensive extant theory of argumentation, pragma-dialectics accounts for situations in which people seek to resolve disagreements through reasoned discourse, beginning with commitments they share (Walton & Krabbe 1995) and working toward a mutually satisfactory conclusion. It does so first by reconstructing ordinary-language statements into a dialectical structure that clarifies the relationships between standpoints an arguer defends and the challenges to those standpoints, as well as the relationship between an arguer’s principal and supporting standpoints. Pragma-dialectics then evaluates the moves in the argumentative encounter by reference to the rules that should govern a critical discussion. A critical discussion is not an empirical case of argumentation but a normative ideal, although its norms are endorsed in large measure by actual arguers. Pragma-dialectics examines interactive arguments, those in which (usually) two arguers advance, defend, and challenge standpoints in a sequential fashion, through which their moves can be identified and scrutinized. And the analysis assumes that the arguers’ goal is to resolve disagreements in a reasoned manner. Neither of these assumptions, of course, is a universal characteristic of argumentation. Some arguments have persuasion of another arguer as the principal goal, whereas others seek to test hypotheses, to discover one’s own beliefs, to advance or to undermine a personal relationship, to impress another person with one’s own reasoning ability, or even to argue for arguing’s own sake. Likewise, many arguments are not sequential in nature. They may be embodied in a written text, public speech, or visual artifact that the audience takes in all at once, so that the argument as presented is fully developed and in final form. Moreover, whereas in a dialogue the participants function consecutively as arguer and as audience, in many situations these roles are far more specialized. Audience members may receive the
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argument and evaluate it as a whole, without contributing – at least directly – to its production. Whereas the commitments of dialogue partners either are known in advance or can be probed through the steps in the exchange, in many situations an audience’s commitments can only be assumed or guessed at. Since audiences are seldom homogeneous, different members may have different starting points; it is difficult to know what the commitments of a heterogeneous audience are. And to make matters even more complicated, an arguer often addresses multiple audiences simultaneously. A member of parliament, for example, may direct his or her comments nominally to the presiding officer and his or her colleagues while actually intending them for the member’s constituents who will read them in the newspaper or hear them on television. Or a president or prime minister might deliver to a domestic audience a message that really is intended to alert other nations to a change in its foreign policy. Whether the argument should be evaluated in relation to the addressed or to the intended audience is often unclear. These difficulties and others are sometimes cited as weaknesses in the pragmadialectics project. But it is not appropriate to indict the approach for failing to accomplish what it never set out to do in the first place. Nor is it the case, for that matter, that pragma-dialectics has been confined exclusively to dialogue encounters. Interesting analyses have been conducted, for example, of arguments in newspaper advertisements (advertorials), of parliamentary debates, and of formal speeches (van Eemeren & Garssen 2009; van Eemeren & Houtlosser 1999). It may be the case that while the dialogue is the paradigm case of argument within this framework, aspects of pragma-dialectics may have wider reach and applicability than its designers had in mind initially. The more recent introduction of strategic maneuvering into the pragma-dialectical perspective enhances this possibility (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002; van Eemeren 2010). That is the proposition we wish to examine in this contribution. Specifically, we wish to explore the applicability of pragma-dialectics to rhetorical argumentation by analyzing a prototypical example of what is considered a rhetorical text using the pragma-dialectical concept of strategic maneuvering. The significance of applying pragma-dialectical approaches to rhetorical texts is that it calls into question the long-standing opposition between dialectic and rhetoric. The goal of the former often is thought to be belief; of the latter, action. Dialectic is about truth whereas rhetoric is about persuasion. Dialectic involves questions and answers; rhetoric, a discursive presentation. In dialectic, communication and influence are bidirectional; in rhetoric, they proceed only from the speaker to the audience. In recent years, however, more attention has been given to the similarities between dialectic and rhetoric as audience-based, nonformal modes of reasoning. This perspective is enhanced by demonstrating that an analytical method intended for one may also be of use for the other.
Pragma-dialectical analysis of rhetorical texts 
Rhetorical scholars sometimes are accused of dwelling entirely in individual case studies, so it perhaps is appropriate that we explore the applicability of pragma-dialectics to rhetoric by considering a specific case. We have selected for this purpose U.S. President Barack Obama’s speech at Cairo University in June 2009. It is a complex rhetorical event involving multiple messages and audiences. If pragma-dialectics can help to account for a message this complex, then a fortiori it should be able to do so for simpler cases.
2.â•… The case study: Obama in Cairo, June 2009 During his campaign for the presidency, Obama had maintained that among the many unfortunate consequences of the conduct of the war on terror and especially of the war in Iraq was the fraying of relationships between the United States and the Muslim world. Too many Americans, he believed, stereotyped all Muslims as radical fanatics, and too many Muslims held dangerously stereotypical views of all Americans. As a result, it was difficult to achieve even the minimal level of understanding and trust on which national and global security depended. To focus attention to this problem, Obama pledged that if elected, he would deliver a major speech in a Muslim nation during his first year in office. The purpose of the speech would be to call attention to the question of the U.S. relationship with the Muslim world and to put specific issues on the agenda for public discussion. After extensive deliberation, the white House selected Cairo as the venue. As it happened, the speech was one of several that Obama delivered overseas during 2009 in which he tried to recalibrate the role of the U.S. in the world. He consistently emphasized partnerships rather than hierarchies and called for multilateral rather than unilateral actions. He acknowledged past mistakes on the part of the United States even as he pointed to mistakes by others. He frequently identified the interests of the American people with those of people in other lands and argued that the common interests of humanity transcended the differences among peoples (Zarefsky Forthcoming). The Cairo speech fits clearly within this pattern (Obama 2009). Titled “Remarks by the President on a New Beginning,” the speech acknowledges that “the relationship between Islam and the West includes centuries of coexistence and cooperation,” but goes on to identify as sources of current tension the legacy of colonialism, the Cold War, and “the sweeping change brought by modernity and globalization.” Terrorists exploited these tensions on September 11, 2001, breeding reciprocal fear and mistrust. Consequently, he warns, we should not expect too much of a single speech, but we must commit to make a new start,
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in the “belief that the interests we share as human beings are far more powerful than the forces that drive us apart.” Accordingly, Obama pays homage to the constructive role of Islam in U.S. culture and history and proclaims it his duty “to fight against negative stereotypes of Islam wherever they appear.” But this proclamation immediately creates a reciprocal obligation: “Just as Muslims do not fit a crude stereotype, America is not the crude stereotype of a self-interested empire.” He takes pride in a series of American achievements and especially in the freedoms America affords to everyone, including Muslims. He concludes that “America holds within her the truth that regardless of race, religion, or station in life, all of us share common aspirations – to live in peace and security; to get an education and to work with dignity; to love our families, our communities, and our God.” These, Obama asserts, are universal aspirations. Moreover, in the interconnected world of the 21st century, we are all affected by events in distant lands. Policymaking, therefore, should proceed from the premises of common humanity and global interdependence rather than from the history of antagonistic nations, tribes, and religions “subjugating one another in pursuit of their own interests”. Obama then applies this perspective to a series of issues that “we must finally confront together”: violent extremism in all its forms; the relationships among Israelis, Palestinians, and the Arab world; halting the spread of nuclear weapons and reducing the world’s nuclear stockpiles; the promotion of the democracy around the world; religious freedom, women’s rights and economic development and opportunity. Within each of these topics Obama articulates the view of the U.S. and universalizes it by deriving it from principles he maintains apply to all people. Thus American beliefs and aspirations are contained within broader frameworks to which all people should resonate. Together we should move to address these common concerns, guided by the words of the Holy Bible, the Talmud, and the Koran. In an echo of Lyndon Johnson, Obama asserted, “We have the power to make the world we seek, but only if we have the courage to make a new beginning.” And in an echo of John F. Kennedy’s Inaugural Address, he admonished his listeners that “God’s vision…must be our work here on Earth”. 3.â•… Analysis The summary of the speech above is the foundation for our pragma-dialectical analysis. In order, we shall highlight the audiences and their commitments, reconstruct the arguments to reveal the standpoints and their relationships and discuss the strategic function of particular argumentative moves using the concept of strategic maneuvering.
Pragma-dialectical analysis of rhetorical texts 
3.1â•… Audiences and their commitments Conducting a pragma-dialectical analysis of a rhetorical text requires imagining the audience as a dialogue partner with the speaker. The audience’s cognitive processing of the message and response to it are treated as if they were moves in a dialogue, and the audience is envisioned as if it were a single person (Walton 2007). But as van Eemeren (2010:â•›109–110) acknowledges, audiences are seldom homogeneous, they are rather often “composite”, consisting of heterogeneous groups of people who differ in their backgrounds and positions.1 When an argumentative text addresses a composite audience, the situation is viewed as if the arguer were in dialogue simultaneously with multiple different interlocutors. The rhetor must be able, in effect, to imagine the entirety of the dialogue in advance, crafting the message as if it were anticipating the dialogue moves of the audience and seeking to influence the audience’s final judgments. Obama’s audience in the Cairo speech was clearly composite. The speech’s formal audience was the “Muslim world”, to which Obama referred as if it were a homogeneous entity. Most of his discussion, however, is specific to Arab Muslims, or even more particularly to Muslims of the Middle East. There is no mention of the concerns of Northern African Muslims or of the Pashtun rebellion in Pakistan and Afghanistan, for example. It appears that Obama wants his audience to be seen more broadly than the specific issues he raises would suggest. Another audience, most likely, is domestic. U.S. Muslims had been largely ignored during the 2008 election campaign. Obama did not set foot into a mosque, and he treated the false rumor that he himself was a Muslim as a “smear”. Yet Obama did not wish to alienate U.S. Muslims. The emphasis throughout his career and campaign was to define the U.S. political community as inclusive rather than exclusive. He did not wish to alienate any religious or ethnic community or to place it outside the mainstream. Meanwhile, many Americans not of the Muslim faith held views of Muslims that were overly influenced by the radical Islam professed by the terrorists of September 11, 2001. There was evidence of increased prejudice and discrimination against Muslims. This too was unacceptable to Obama, both because it was morally unjustified and because it ran counter to his goal of emphasizing the pluralism of the American community. It was necessary therefore to “coach” many Americans to see their Muslim neighbors in a more constructive light. Yet a third audience for Obama was other nations of the world. These included especially Israelis, who saw themselves to be constantly under a security threat but whose violent relationship with the Palestinians threatened to undercut the ability of the U.S. to be both a strong supporter of Israel and an honest broker for peace in the region. The audience also included nations of Western Europe who
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were encountering an increased Muslim population in ways less constructive than Obama would wish. Each of these audiences began with different assumptions and commitments, but Obama saw a common flaw in them: they were stereotypical. They generalized to large populations from unrepresentative cases and were overdetermined in their assumptions about the viewpoints and motivations of their adversaries. What they lacked was the willingness to acknowledge that they might be wrong, the openness to alternative viewpoints, the ability to empathize with others of different views, and the preference for the pragmatic over the ideological. These were the commitments that Obama would seek to change, but he would be unable to succeed if he did not at least implicitly acknowledge them and make them the starting points for his discourse. In seeking to modify or reverse these commitments, Obama took advantage of other commitments that he attributed to his audiences: frustration with the stalemated state of affairs, willingness to challenge assumptions, refusal to be perceived as closed-minded, and willingness to extend to the new U.S. president a large degree of goodwill. 3.2â•… Reconstructing the discourse: Standpoint analysis As the title of the speech suggests, Obama makes a case for new beginnings in the relationship between the U.S. and the Muslims around the world. He argues that it is time for new beginnings between the U.S. and the Muslim world and supports this main standpoint by means of arguments that relate to the seven issues that are currently sources of tension: extremism; the relationships among Israelis, Palestinians, and the Arab world; nuclear weapons, democracy; religious freedom, women’s rights and modernity. He seeks a partnership based on mutual interests and mutual respect between the U.S. and Muslims. As he draws the guidelines of his administration’s Middle East policy in relation to each of these issues, Obama points out characteristics of the current relationship that make the situation not satisfactory, he acknowledges the challenges facing the partnership he promotes as an alternative and asserts that this partnership is feasible in spite of these challenges. He also sketches the advantages that would be gained from it, mainly the resolution of the problems source of tension and getting closer to the world the U.S. and the Muslims seek. Obama’s argumentation in support of his main standpoint follows the following structure:
1. It is time for new beginnings between the U.S. and the Muslim world 1.1 The current relationship between the U.S. and Muslims is not satisfactory 1.2a A partnership based on mutual interests and mutual respect between the U.S. and Muslims will be fruitful 1.2b A partnership based on mutual interests and mutual respect between the U.S. and Muslims is feasible in spite of the challenges
Pragma-dialectical analysis of rhetorical texts 
The argument about the current relationship can support the standpoint independently of the other two arguments. After all, it is enough that one accepts that the current relationship is not satisfactory in order to accept that it is time for new beginnings between the U.S. and the Muslim world. While taken together the arguments about the fruitfulness and the feasibility of a partnership based on mutual interests and mutual respect can provide independent support for the standpoint, none of them can provide independent support for the standpoint on its own. The two arguments need to be taken together. In order to accept that it is time for a new relationship between the U.S. and the Muslim world one needs to accept both that the new relationship proposed is feasible and that it is fruitful. Each of the three main arguments above is further supported by sub-arguments that relate to the seven issues source of tension. In supporting the sub-standpoint that the current relationship between the U.S. and Muslims is not satisfactory, Obama argues that
1.1 The current relationship between the U.S. and Muslims is not satisfactory 1.1.1 The current relationship is not satisfactory in what concerns the confrontation of violent extremism 1.1.2 The current relationship is not satisfactory in what concerns addressing the situation between Israelis, Palestinians and the Arab world 1.1.3 The current relationship is not satisfactory in what concerns addressing the rights and responsibilities of nations on nuclear weapons 1.1.4 The current relationship is not satisfactory in what concerns realizing the promise of democracy 1.1.5 The current relationship is not satisfactory in addressing the issue of religious freedom 1.1.6 The current relationship is not satisfactory in addressing women’s rights 1.1.7 The current relationship is not satisfactory in what concerns benefiting from economic development and opportunity
Each of the sub-arguments can, on its own, provide enough support for the substandpoint and therefore warrant the main standpoint. For example, if one accepts that the current relationship is not satisfactory in what concerns addressing the issue of religious freedom, one accepts that the current relationship between the U.S. and Muslims is not satisfactory and therefore accepts that it is time for new beginnings between the U.S. and the Muslim world. Similarly, in supporting the sub-standpoint that a partnership based on mutual interests and mutual respect between the U.S. and Muslims will be fruitful, Obama presents arguments that are related to the seven problematic issues and each of which can support the sub-standpoint independently. Obama argues that
1.2a A partnership based on mutual interests and mutual respect between the U.S. and Muslims will be fruitful
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1.2a.1 A partnership will be fruitful for confronting violent extremism 1.2a.2 A partnership will be fruitful for addressing the situation between Israelis, Palestinians and the Arab world 1.2a.3 A partnership will be fruitful for addressing the rights and responsibilities of nations on nuclear weapons 1.2a.4 A partnership will be fruitful for realizing the promise of democracy 1.2a.5 A partnership will be fruitful for addressing the issue of religious freedom 1.2a.6 A partnership will be fruitful for achieving equality for women 1.2a.7 A partnership will be fruitful for benefiting from economic development and opportunity
And in supporting the sub-standpoint that a partnership based on mutual interests and mutual respect between the U.S. and Muslims is feasible in spite of the challenges, he argues that
1.2b A partnership based on mutual interests and mutual respect between the U.S. and Muslims is feasible in spite of the challenges 1.2b.1 A partnership in confronting violent extremism is feasible in spite of the challenges 1.2b.2 A partnership in addressing the situation between Israelis, Palestinians and the Arab world is feasible in spite of the challenges 1.2b.3 A partnership in addressing the rights and responsibilities of nations on nuclear weapons is feasible in spite of the challenges 1.2b.4 A partnership in realizing the promise of democracy is feasible in spite of the challenges 1.2b.5 A partnership in addressing the issue of religious freedom is feasible in spite of the challenges 1.2b.6 A partnership in achieving equality for women is feasible in spite of the challenges 1.2b.7 A partnership in benefiting from economic development and opportunity is feasible in spite of the challenges
The reconstruction of Obama’s argumentation demonstrates how skillfully the speech is crafted to appeal to a variety of audiences. The resort to multiple argumentation,2 as van Eemeren (2010:â•›110) observes, is a strategic choice when addressing a composite audience. Acceptance of either sub-standpoint (1.1) (the current relationship between the U.S. and the Muslim world is not satisfactory) or sub-standpoints (1.2a) and (1.2b) (a partnership based on mutual interests and mutual respect between the U.S. and the Muslims is both fruitful and feasible in spite of the challenges) would be sufficient to warrant the acceptance of the main standpoint (it is time for new beginnings between the U.S. and the Muslim world). Furthermore, acceptance of the line of arguments that relates to any of the issues addressed would be sufficient to warrant the standpoint. Consequently,
Pragma-dialectical analysis of rhetorical texts 
different segments of Obama’s complex audience could reason via different paths to acceptance of the same main standpoint. For example, while someone who is concerned about the relationship between Israelis and Palestinians will be convinced that is time for new beginnings between the U.S. and the Muslim world because he accepts that the current relationship is not satisfactory in what concerns addressing the situation between Israelis, Palestinians and the Arab world, someone else, who is concerned about nuclear ambitions might be convinced of the same standpoint because he accepts that a partnership based on mutual interests and mutual respect will be fruitful for addressing the rights and responsibilities of nations on nuclear weapons and that such a partnership is feasible in spite of the challenges. For Obama, every step in the argument is important – not because it is logically necessary in order to secure standpoint 1, but because it elucidates a different aspect of the U.S. relationship with the Muslim world. In the speech, Obama announces his administration’s position regarding matters of the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and argues in support of these positions. In the next section, we shall show how it is especially when Obama argues in support of his administration’s policies that the complexity of the audience addressed becomes apparent. 3.3â•… Strategic maneuvering When van Eemeren and Houtlosser introduced the concept of strategic maneuvering, they greatly enhanced the potential for application of pragma-dialectics to rhetorical discourse. Strategic maneuvering recognizes that the parties to an argument not only want to resolve the disagreement but to resolve it in their favor. While meeting their dialectical obligations – to respond to the other party, to carry the argument forward, and so on – they can make choices which will strengthen or weaken their chances of prevailing. The major concern of rhetorical discourse is persuasion, influencing an audience to accept the standpoint put forward. Therefore, rhetoric reflects the results of numerous strategic judgments; strategic maneuvering is essential to it. Without necessarily meaning to be exhaustive, van Eemeren and Houtlosser identify three general parameters for strategic maneuvering: arguers maneuver in their topical selection, audience adaptation, and presentational devices. Each of the parameters is evident in Obama’s Cairo speech. The following analysis will focus on the arguments that relate to the relationship between Israelis, Palestinians and the Arab world as examples of those strategic maneuvers that help Obama to defend his administration’s foreign policy while sustaining the standpoint that it is time for new beginnings between the U.S. and the Muslim world. While the overall structure of Obama’s speech (as discussed in the previous section) sheds light on how the standpoint that it is time for new beginnings
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between the U.S. and Muslims is defended, a closer analysis of the argumentation in the speech reveals that Obama is also defending the terms of the partnership he promotes as a new beginning between the U.S and Muslims. He does so mainly by defending the positions of the U.S. administration as terms of this partnership. Given that disagreement over the standpoint that calls for new beginnings is in fact quite unlikely (after all, Muslims around the world are already convinced that it is time for new beginnings between them and the U.S.), it is not surprising that defending the controversial terms of the partnership promoted is more important for Obama than defending the already accepted claim that it is time for new beginnings. In many parts of his speech, the arguments that Obama advances support implicit standpoints in which certain positions of his administration are advocated. These arguments usually defend the position by asserting that such a position would make the promoted partnership feasible and/or fruitful. For example, in what concerns the relationship between Israelis, Palestinians and the Arab world, Obama announces that the U.S. considers legitimate the aspirations of both people in states of their own. In supporting this position, he argues that such a position is instrumental for achieving peace between Israelis and Palestinians. The choice of this line of argument to defend the administration’s position is a clear case of a strategic topical selection. Unlike other arguments that could justify the position that it is necessary to recognize the legitimacy of the aspirations of both people in states of their own, the argument about peace has the highest chance of success. This is the case, especially in view of the composite audience that the speech addresses. Unlike the argument about peace, other lines of defense would not be successful in convincing a group in the audience without alienating the other. For example, an argument that supports the administration’s position by asserting the necessity to recognize the Palestinians’ right to return to the lands out of which they were driven in 1948 would have been very appealing to an audience of Palestinians but not without alienating an audience of Israelis. An audience of Palestinians considers the recognition of the right of return necessary for a fair resolution to the Palestinian Israeli conflict and would have accepted Obama’s position about recognizing the aspirations of both people had this position been supported by this argument. However, an audience of Israelis sees the Palestinians’ right of return as a threat to the Jewish nature of their state and are most likely to reject the position announced had it been supported by an argument that recognizes the Palestinians’ right of return. In a similar way, an argument about the necessity of accepting the facts on the ground would have appealed to Israelis but alienated Palestinians. Israelis, whose expanded state has become a fact on the ground, are more likely to accept the position than the Palestinians whose aspiration in a state of their own is often threatened by the facts on the ground imposed by Israel. Unlike the
Pragma-dialectical analysis of rhetorical texts 
argument about the recognition of the Palestinians’ right of return and that of the necessity of accepting facts on the ground, the argument that recognizing the aspirations of both Palestinians and Israelis is instrumental for achieving peace between the two people appeals to both audiences. The argument about peace between Palestinians and Israelis does not only justify a key position that the Obama administration adopts in what concerns the Israeli Palestinian conflict. The argument about peace plays a role also in supporting the sub-standpoint that asserts the fruitfulness of the partnership promoted for addressing the situation between Israelis, Palestinians and the Arab world, and it lends support to the main standpoint that calls for new beginnings between the U.S. and Muslims consequently. By presenting the recognition of the right of both Israelis and Palestinians in states of their own as a term of the partnership promoted, Obama argues that the partnership will be fruitful for addressing the situation between Israelis, Palestinians and the Arab world (1.2a.2) because the U.S. position as part of it, namely that the U.S. recognizes the legitimacy of the aspirations of both Palestinians and Israelis, is instrumental for achieving peace between the two people. A further examination of the strategic maneuvers Obama employs in defending his administration’s positions reveals the complexity of the audience he addresses. Some of these maneuvers cannot be seen as strategic unless audiences other than the one addressed by standpoint (1) are also taken into account. While some positions, such as the situation for the Palestinian people is intolerable and the United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements, are clearly effective in convincing Middle Eastern Muslims that the partnership that the U.S. is proposing is fruitful, other positions, such as the bond between the U.S. and Israel is unbreakable and Palestinians must abandon violence before negotiations can begin, do not seem to be effective with this particular audience. Arguments about the intolerability of the situation for the Palestinians and the illegitimacy of continued settlements draw from the commitments of the audience of Middle Eastern Muslims. By relying on them in his line of defense, Obama maneuvers strategically by adapting to this particular audience. Arguments that defend a strong bond between the U.S. and Israel and call for the necessity for Palestinians to abandon violence draw from commitments that cannot be considered to be assumed by an audience of Middle Eastern Muslims. In fact, the positions advocated in these arguments will most probably be counterproductive in addressing Muslims especially because they rely on the commitments of an audience of Israelis. Taking into account this group of the audience, the choice becomes a clear case of strategic maneuvering by adapting to the audience demand: the argument is strategically adapted to appeal to an audience of Israelis in an effort to gain at least their acquiescence to the standpoints that appeal to Muslims.
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Furthermore, taking the audience of Israelis into account is necessary to reveal the strategic maneuver in refering to the acts of Palestinians as violence. This choice of presentational device cannot be a strategic choice if Obama is attempting to convince Muslims around the world to join the partnership he promotes. Obama is certainly aware that the majority of Muslims, especially Middle Eastern Muslims, view the acts of Palestinians to which he refers as acts of legitimate resistance against the Israeli military occupation of Palestinian lands. This choice of the term used to present the acts of Palestinians alienates this audience and makes less convincing to them the argument that the partnership promoted is fruitful. The choice of term is however very opportune if an audience of Israelis is the target. Obama’s choice reassures this audience that he is faithful to their concerns about security. This reassurance might be necessary for Obama not to alienate the Israelis who see some of his other positions to reflect an unprecedented affinity with Palestinians’ aspirations. They need to have some of their own commitments recognized by Obama as real, especially if Obama wishes to reconcile them to making significant concessions to the Palestinians. While convincing Muslims that it is time for new beginnings in their relationship with the U.S. is important in Obama’s speech, the defense of the terms of these new beginnings is often more important. Despite the fact that the argument structure is multiple, the convincingness of the general standpoint may depend on the details of the cases to which it is linked. As the analysis of Obama’s strategic maneuvering above shows, as Obama defends the terms of this relationship, he does not only address the audience of Muslims which is immediately involved in the new relationship, but he also addresses an audience of Israelis, who will be affected by this new relationship and who will be less likely to resist change if they find the proposed terms of the relationship acceptable. Given that the speech was considered by many as an announcement of the new administration’s foreign policy towards the Middle East, it becomes evident that Obama cannot but address this audience too. 4.â•… Conclusion As the above analysis indicates, Barack Obama’s June 4, 2009 speech at Cairo University can be analyzed using the approach and tools of pragma-dialectics. Doing so reconstructs the logic of Obama’s argument and helps to make clear how he deals with the need to address multiple audiences simultaneously. This is not to suggest that pragma-dialectics is necessarily the best tool to use for analyzing Obama’s speech. Like any analytical instrument, it emphasizes certain features of the text and obscures others. Nor does every aspect of pragmadialectics lend itself well to this analysis. For example, mapping the sequences of
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dialogue moves is not practical in a situation without overt dialogue and when all the audience moves are attributed to it in advance by the arguer. Still, demonstrating the applicability of pragma-dialectical analysis to rhetorical argumentation is hardly trivial. As this example indicates, focusing on commitments (analogous to the opening stage in a dialogue) identifies the different starting points that members of a heterogeneous audience bring to the speech and makes clear the necessity for the speaker to respond in the same speech to these differing commitments. The emphasis on reconstructing argumentative discourse into the standpoint and the support for it makes very clear the interrelationship among sub-standpoints and whether the burden of proof is made easier or more difficult by the pattern by which the standpoint is justified. And the emphasis on strategic maneuvering highlights the delicacy of the situation and the importance of very specific choices of topic selection, presentational choice, and response to audience demand in order to be able to resolve the dispute in the arguer’s own favor. In short, then, applying pragma-dialectics to rhetorical argumentation suggests that an analytical framework Frans van Eemeren and his colleagues developed for argumentation modeled on the critical discussion may in fact be broadly applicable to argumentation in general.
Notes 1.â•… Within what counts as a composite audience, van Eemeren makes a distinction between mixed audiences, in which the audience is heterogeneous with respect to the starting points of its members, and multiple audiences, in which the audience is heterogeneous with respect to the positions its members adopt (2010, p. 110). 2.â•… In their textbook, van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Snoeck Henkemans distinguish among three argument structures: multiple, coordinative, and subordinative arguments (van Eemeren et al., 2002: pp. 63–78). Multiple arguments contribute to the standpoint independently of one another. Therefore, there are many points of possible connection. This structure is especially attractive to Obama, because it provides a heterogeneous audience with many different routes to acceptance of the standpoint. The analysis makes clear why this is a good choice under the circumstances.
References Eemeren, F.H. van. (2010). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Garssen, B.J. (2009). Strategic maneuvering with argument schemes in the European parliament. Proceedings of the OSSA conference 2009 [CD-ROM]. Windsor, ON: University of Windsor.
 Dima Mohammed & David Zarefsky Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation. The pragma-dialectical approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Eemeren, F.H. van, Grootendorst, R. & Snoeck Henkemans A.F. (2002). Argumentation: Analysis, evaluation, presentation. Mahwah, NJ: Lauwrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Houtlosser, P. (1999). William the Silent’s argumentative discourse. In F.H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J.A. Blair & C.A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the Fourth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 168–171). Amsterdam: Sic Sat. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Houtlosser, P. (2002). And always the twain shall meet. In F.H. van Eemeren & P. Houtlosser (Eds.), Dialectic and rhetoric: The warp and woof of argumentation analysis (pp. 3–11). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. Obama, B. (2009). “Remarks by the President on a New Beginning.” Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks_by_the_President_at_Cairo_ University _6_04_09. Walton, D.N. (2007). Media argumentation: Dialectic, persuasion, and rhetoric. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. Walton, D.N., & Krabbe, E.C.W. (1995). Commitment in dialogue: Basic concepts of interpersonal reasoning. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press. Zarefsky, D. (forthcoming). The Obama phenomenon and the discourse of American foreign policy. In J.R. Mercieca & J. Vaughn (Eds.), Obama’s burden. College Station, TX: Texas A&M Univ. Press.
Amplification in strategic maneuvering Jeanne Fahnestock & Yvon Tonnard 1.â•… Introduction The pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, first established in the early 1980s by Frans H. van Eemeren and his colleague Rob Grootendorst (1984, 2004), has maintained a constant program of refinement and research over the intervening decades. With a growing body of committed scholars, it has perfected its theorizing and tested its concepts through case studies and empirical research. In the last twelve years, Frans van Eemeren and Peter Houtlosser extended the pragmadialectical project to include the concept of strategic maneuvering (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 1999, 2002; van Eemeren 2010). Generally defined as the arguer’s strategies for making the best individual case, strategic maneuvering exists in tension with the dialectical goals of conforming to a standard of reasonableness and resolving an issue in dispute “on the merits”. The motivation for this extension was and is the desire to make the theory more accurate as an analytical tool. In developing the concept of strategic maneuvering, pragma-dialectical theorists naturally turned to rhetorical history, theory and criticism to enrich their systematic attention to argumentation. As van Eemeren explains, “Aiming for the inclusion of rhetorical insight into a dialectical approach to argumentation, as I emphatically do in the examination of strategic maneuvering, means making an effort to bridge the gap and to create a basis for fruitful collaboration” (2010:â•›92). While in its current project, pragma-dialectics is building bridges to the rhetorical tradition, the purpose of this paper is to do some bridge building from the other side since there is much to gain from synergy among methods of studying argumentation. There are of course complications to this bridge building because of differences between the rhetorical tradition, which is ancient, complex, and primarily pedagogical, and the pragma-dialectical model, which is recent, rigorous, and primarily analytical in its methods though ameliorative in its goals. Pragmadialectics originates in speech act theory, and it views the resolution of differences as the goal of engaging in argument in the first place. Its default model is dialogic exchange, and even monologic argument is recast as dialogue (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004:â•›2).1 On its side, rhetoric offers over two thousand years of reflection on persuasive discourse in texts adapted to different cultural needs.
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This tradition does offer many versions of key concepts, though the observations about argument and language in the rhetorical tradition have regularities across its history. Bridges between pragma-dialectics and rhetoric are certainly worth building, and van Eemeren and his colleagues have made the task easier by being exceptionally non-parochial in their approach to studying argumentation. They have drawn on and acknowledged the work of philosophers, discourse analysts, communication scholars, sociologists, as well as rhetoricians, and in publications such as the 1996 handbook Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory they have provided valuable overviews of the intellectual terrain, across national, disciplinary and even historical boundaries, and have helped to create an international community of scholars studying argumentation. 2.â•… Presentational devices in strategic maneuvering Van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s concept of strategic maneuvering, incorporating rhetorical insights, has three “inseparable” aspects: “…in trying to be effective, an arguer naturally summons the best available arguments, considers their acceptability with the audience addressed, and tries to present or frame them in the best way possible given the outcome desired” (van Eemeren 2010:â•›98–99). While argument choice and audience accommodation are dimensions in the selection of a rhetorical strategy, linguistic devices are the points of their realization and hence of their retrieval in analysis. Among presentational devices, the figures of speech have often been identified in the rhetorical tradition as vehicles for particular lines of argument or for pragmatic adjustments between arguer and audience (Fahnestock 1999). Pragma-dialecticians have offered several case studies examining presentational devices from the rhetorical tradition. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser examined conciliatio, defined as using an opponent’s premise in one’s favor (2002), and Snoeck Henkemans published a careful study of praeteritio, the arguer’s simultaneous denial and avowal of material detrimental to an opponent (2009). However the presentational devices important in strategic maneuvering need not be limited to the explicit devices named in a catalog of figures (Fahnestock 2009). As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca pointed out in The New Rhetoric, the language choices at an arguer’s disposal to enhance effectiveness can include virtually any language element, from the choice of a subject-verb pair to the rhythm imposed on a sequence of sentences (1969). Aware of the power of seemingly non-exceptional language, the pragma-dialecticians have also studied ordinary language devices (e.g. van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans 2007). Among the insights on “presentational devices” available in rhetorical stylistics, one group of methods is worth the attention of pragma-dialecticians. That category
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is amplification. Advice on amplificatio (Greek auxesis) appears in manuals and texts throughout the history of rhetoric, from Aristotle through the early modern period, and into the late eighteenth century. Rhetorical amplification has to do with increasing the profile of a line of argument to make it more psychologically salient to the audience and more conceptually important in the overall case. These goals are achieved either through language choices that increase the importance of an element or that simply make it fill more space. The following sections offer a clarifying example of amplificatio in action and then a review of the doctrine of amplification in the rhetorical tradition. More recent examples of Ronald Reagan and the Dutch politician Geert Wilders are also analyzed to explain the challenges and potential benefits of incorporating rhetorical insights on amplification in the pragma-dialectical model. 3.â•… Amplification in the rhetorical tradition A passage displaying rhetorical amplification comes from a work of popularized science, A Brief Survey of Physical and Fossil Geology, written in 1839 by F.J. Francis. In the Introduction, Francis included the following “appreciation” of forces of geological upheaval such as earthquakes and floods. [T]o the very convulsions and changes attendant upon these several metaÂ� morphoses, must be ascribed, directly or indirectly, the cheering and gladdening aspect which the face of nature now wears; that to them we owe the wild sublimity of the mountain range, with its ravines, its precipices, and its craggy rocks; that the rushing torrent, now rolling its deep and lucid streams in the form of a majestic and resistless river, or flowing in countless rivulets through the bosom of the earth; the peaceful lake, the undulating hill, the outstretched valley, may be traced to their instrumentality; and that, in short, to them we are indebted for all that endless variety of external scenery, that profuse diversity of soils and strata which beautify and adorn the world; which are indispensable to the wants of all living beings, and promote in an especial manner the comforts and conveniences of mankind. (qtd. in Higham 22)
This passage offers an argument, typical for its time, praising the science of geology by praising its object of study, the geological processes of erosion, flooding, and earthquake, on the grounds that they create the beauty of nature and satisfy the needs of all living beings, especially humans. This text belongs in a larger cultural battle to defend geologic processes with an implicit “design” argument: since these processes clearly lead to good things, as this argument claims, they were therefore intended by God as part of his divinely ordered plan. To merely state this argument, however, everything from “that to them we owe” down to “adorn the world”
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is superfluous. Before this passage, the claim is made that geological processes create the “cheering face of nature”; after it, the further premise is offered that these features are indispensible to life. In between is an unnecessary listing of natural features, expressed in language borrowed from conventional, nineteenth-century landscape description. What is the purpose of this lengthy insertion? Is it a violation of a relevance rule (the Gricean maxim of quantity) since the reader is surely being told more than is needed to make the point? In pragma-dialectical terms, does this passage violate a critical discussion rule? In rhetorical theory, Francis’ defense of geology would be categorized as an epideictic argument, a speech in praise or blame as Aristotle defined it, and the particular passage quoted would be labeled an example of amplification. Its purpose is to keep a point before the audience, making it more important by giving it more “space” in the text and, it is assumed, in the reader’s consciousness. Francis’ defense was first delivered as a speech to a group dedicated to the advancement of science, and then added as a preface to his textbook. It is unlikely that listeners to his speech and readers of his popular textbook disagreed in any way with his praise of geology. They were, instead, in the position that many audiences are in when they absorb an argument that is intended not to change their minds or to help them reach a decision on a debated point, but that aims instead to “increase their adherence”, in the words of The New Rhetoric, to a thesis that they already agree with (1969:â•›4). A great deal of argumentation is addressed to the already convinced to strengthen their convictions. Such amplification as a dimension of argument effectiveness has a long history in the rhetorical tradition. Aristotle mentions heightening under the topic of “Magnitude” [megethos]: “[F]or all use diminution and amplification when deliberating and when praising or blaming and when prosecuting or defending themselves” (Aristotle 1991:â•›173). Magnitude here means importance. Amplification in the sense of heightening also has a distinct place in the Rhetorica ad Herennium, in Cicero’s De Oratore and in Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria where the concept receives a new specificity. Quintilian, for example, mentions five basic tactics for making an element more important. The first three are obvious: word substitution (e.g. calling a scratch a wound), creating a rising series (e.g. from ancestors to the present) and creating a comparison (e.g. a person to an eagle). The fourth, heightening by inference, is a bit unusual. In Quintilian’s example taken from Cicero, pointing out that a drunken Marc Antony had a strong and sturdy body leads the audience to infer how much wine he must have consumed to become as drunk as he was in the Senate. Quintilian’s fifth tactic, sheer accumulation or saying more, was the single most important method of amplification for Erasmus in On Copia of Words and Things, the most influential pedagogical manual in early modern Europe. The ability to
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elaborate on a subject became a cultural standard and the mark of the educated person. In Book II of On Copia, Erasmus first shows word-based tactics of amplification leading to his own tour de force demonstration of over a hundred ways of saying “Your letter delighted me very much”. In Book II he uses subject-based methods, recommending, for example, that generalizations be “unrolled” through lengthy lists of particulars or that premises and comparisons (his own preference) be multiplied. Amplification from the classical tradition onward was noted under advice on invention and style, but it was also assigned a structural role as part of the internal arrangement of an argument. Here the key device is the epicheireme, defined in both the Rhetorica ad Herennium (Book II) and in Cicero’s De Inventione as a multi-part module delivering a single line of argument. In the Ad Herennium’s version, the epicheireme begins with a claim followed by a reason and then by support for that reason. Next comes a unit of embellishment that can be quite lengthy, and finally the claim itself is repeated. The passage quoted from Francis’ work has the structure of such an epicheireme. In the somewhat different model of a fivepart epicheireme that appears in the De Inventione (1976:â•›100–103), a major and minor premise each receives amplification and the claim concludes the structure. Still another type of amplification comes from the Hermogenic corpus, the set of five texts attributed to Hermogenes, a prolific second century CE rhetor. One of these, On Invention, teaches fledgling rhetors a four-deep inventional method to elaborate a single line of argument; a claim is supported by epicheiremes that are in turn elaborated with ergasia that can be furthered delivered forcefully through enthymemes.2 On Invention provides an example of this branching argument structure from Demosthenes’ arguments over whether the Athenians should build a canal through the Chersonese during their campaign against Philip of Macedon. A refutation of this claim would be that “it is troublesome to dig through the Chersonese” which, the text explains, could be supported from the act itself (digging a canal is troublesome), from the persons involved (Athenians are unfamiliar with excavation), from the place (it is far from home), and from the occasion (it is troublesome in time of war). A “lysis”, or refutation, would run these arguments in reverse: It is not troublesome to dig through the Chersonese, for it is easy to dig a canal, the place is in Athenian territory and everything is easy to Athenians (Kennedy 2005:â•›93). The arguments at this level are called epicheiremes. The text then recommends that an amplification, or to use its term, an ergasia of just one of these lines of argument could be added from examples, or from an opposite, or from comparisons, including comparisons from the lesser, greater or equal (99). Thus the argument that building a canal is easy (not troublesome) would be supported in turn by the ergasia, in this case an example, that “the king of Persians once dug a canal through Athos when in need”. This level of support could be
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clinched with yet another device, here called an enthymeme, that amounts to a striking summative phrase: “Yet he [the king of the Persians] dug through a mountain while we shall dig through earth” (103). Overall, the advice in Hermogenes’ On Invention calls for a claim supported by lines of argument derived from the topics; one of these could be selected for further development through examples, comparisons or opposites, and then one of these in turn could be selected for an emphatic, summative restatement. The net effect of this branching elaboration – claim, epicheireme, ergasia, enthymeme – is an amplified argument. In pragma-dialectical terms an argument exhibiting this kind of embedding would be labeled as displaying subordinative structures, and mapping arguments of this embedded kind is a well-known routine in the critical thinking/informal logic tradition. But the optional character of this kind of expansion and its relation to specific kinds of support and stylistic embellishment is dramatically on display in the rhetorical tradition.
4.â•… Cases of amplification The amplifying passage in Francis’ work comes from a nineteenth-century text and could represent an outmoded style. Yet this type of epicheireme is still very much in use. In 1987, Ronald Reagan delivered a speech before the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, a speech that included the famous invitation to Soviet Prime Minister Gorbachev to “Tear down this wall”. The overall speech served Reagan’s campaign for a missile defense in Europe, but its immediate occasion was the 700th anniversary of the city of Berlin. Reagan celebrated the city as follows: In West Germany and here in Berlin, there took place an economic miracle, the Wirtschaftswunder. Adenauer, Erhard, Reuter, and other leaders understood the practical importance of liberty – that just as truth can flourish only when the journalist is given freedom of speech, so prosperity can come about only when the farmer and businessman enjoy economic freedom. The German leaders reduced tariffs, expanded free trade, lowered taxes. From 1950 to 1960 alone, the standard of living in West Germany and Berlin doubled. Where four decades ago there was rubble, today in West Berlin there is the greatest industrial output of any city in Germany – busy office blocks, fine homes and apartments, proud avenues, and the spreading lawns of parkland. Where a city’s culture seemed to have been destroyed, today there are two great universities, orchestras and an opera, countless theatres, and museums. Where there was want, today there’s abundance – food, clothing, automobiles – the wonderful goods of the Ku’damm. From devastation, from utter ruin, you Berliners have, in freedom, rebuilt a city that once again ranks as one of the greatest on earth. (Reagan 1987)
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This section of Reagan’s speech provides an arguable account of the success of the West Germany economy as well as an illustration of how rhetorical amplification works. To paraphrase, Reagan’s first paragraph credits Germany’s economic miracle to its leaders who “reduced tariffs, expanded free trade, lowered taxes” because they understood the practical importance of liberty. The final sentence of the first paragraph then repeats the initial claim, but does so by translating the “economic miracle” into specifics: “From 1950 to 1960 alone, the standard of living in West Germany and Berlin doubled.” The second paragraph, however, is a detachable module of amplification. This notion of a separate section that concentrates the amplification in a kind of “riff ” on a line of support matches the Rhetorica ad Herennium’s formal definition of the fourth part of five-part epicheireme, described above. Having offered a causal account of the post war success of Germany’s economy, Reagan now focuses on West Berlin’s prosperity, a point that is not likely at issue for the audience of West Berliners standing before him. The internal construction of this paragraph of amplification follows in many ways the Hermogenic advice to expand through embedded ergasia. There are three manifestations of Berlin’s prosperity in industry, culture and material goods; each is highlighted by the recurrence of sentences opening with Where. And each in turn is followed by exactly four specific instances, e.g. food, clothing, automobiles, the goods of the Ku’Damm. Another recent example of amplifying can be found in one of the parliamentary speeches of the controversial Dutch politician Geert Wilders. The issue that occupies his Party for Freedom most is what he calls the ‘Islamisation’ of the Netherlands. In the General Debate of 2008, Wilders delivered a first term speech in which he explains that Holland now consists of two ‘Hollands’, the one of Prime Minister Balkenende with its multicultural ideals and the one of Wilders’ Party for Freedom, consisting of the people who pay the price for these ideals. The amplifying passage comes from a part of the speech in which Wilders attempts to show that the leftist part of the political establishment, in particular the Labor Party (PvdA), is not concerned with the costs of Islamisation. “Chairman. We could have been swimming in money and instead of doing that we follow the leftist’s dream to get half the Islamic world to the Netherlands. The more voting cattle for the leftist church, the better. […] But chairman, who is paying the bill, who is paying that 100 billion? Those are the people who built up Holland, those are the people who work hard, the people who save up properly, who pay their taxes as they should, the common Dutchman who is not getting things for free: Henk and Ingrid are paying for Mohammed and Fatima.”
This excerpt illustrates how rhetorical amplification works in a speech delivered within the context of Parliament. Just as in Reagan’s passage, the tactic used by
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Wilders can be identified as an epicheireme as it is used in the Rhetorica ad Herennium. In the first sentence Wilders puts forward a claim followed by a reason. A paraphrase of the sentence would be: Muslim immigration should be stopped, because it is a leftist ideal that is costing “us” too much money. This concept is amplified within the sentence by means of two hyperbolic expressions that create a comparison between something “desirable”, namely being very rich, and something “undesirable”, which is living together with half a billion Muslims in a small country such as Holland. This way of amplifying corresponds with two of the tactics described by Quintilian for making an element more important. The amplification is established by using a comparison that aggrandizes the difference that exists between Wilder’s standpoint and the Labor party’s standpoint and by substituting the original phrases with stronger words (“rich” is substituted with “swimming in money”, “Muslim immigration” with “bringing half the Islamic world to the Netherlands”). The initial claim that Muslim immigration should be stopped because it is a leftist ideal that is costing us too much money is then supported by two arguments. The argument that the leftist party needs the immigrants as voting cattle supports the part that Muslim immigration is a leftist ideal; the argument that it is the hardworking Dutchman who is paying the price for the Muslim immigration can be viewed as support for the part that Muslim immigration is costing us too much money. The line of reasoning is that Muslim immigration is too expensive for the people paying the price, because these people work hard, but they are not at all rich. The first argument is amplified, again, by substituting the original phrases by stronger words (“Muslim immigrants” is substituted by “voting cattle”, the “leftist parties” is substituted by the “leftist church”). The second argument is put forward by means of an accumulation of sentences all having the same syntactic structure and making the same point: every sentence starts with (an implicit) “those are the people” (or “that is” in the last part) and it sums up different good characteristics of the people paying the price for the Muslim immigration. This amplifying tactic is what Quintilian described as “sheer accumulation” and it corresponds with the fourth part of the five-part epicheireme in the Rhetorica ad Herennium; it is a quite lengthy unit of embellishment. The final sentence seems to repeat the whole line of argument by means of the figure metonymy. In this sentence, Wilders uses names which are prototypical for a group to refer to the group as a whole; “Mohammed and Fatima” refers to the group of Muslims and “Henk and Ingrid” to the group of hardworking non-Muslims. As it appears from this formulation, the people referred to by “us” in the initial claim are not just Dutchmen, but hardworking non-Islamic Dutchmen. In the last sentence, the initial claim is, thus, further refined as “getting Muslims to the Netherlands costs us, the hardworking non-Islamic Dutchmen, too much money”. With the closing
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sentence, Wilders completes the branching elaboration of the epicheireme with an enthymeme – due to the metonymy it is a striking summative phrase that amplifies the argumentation. The examples of amplification show how a figure of speech described within classical rhetoric is still used within current political speeches. The question to be answered is what argumentative function amplification has in a discourse that can be characterized as not really serving the aim of convincing an audience that has a different opinion. Just as Reagan’s focus on West Berlin’s prosperity was not likely at issue for the audience of West Berliners standing before him, Wilders’ emphasis on the common people paying the price of the Muslim immigration is a point that is not likely to be at issue for his primary audience in the General Debate, his potential electorate.3 A second problem in determining the argumentative purpose of amplification is that, by means of this figure of speech, the listener is being told more than is needed to make the point. The often lengthy interpolation established by the ergasia seems especially superfluous for the argumentation. The passage in Reagan’s second paragraph (“Where four decades…Ku’damm”) seems to be entirely “detachable” as does Wilders’ passage that describes the common Dutchman in different ways. The use of these amplifying modules could be viewed as violating the Gricean maxim of quantity that points to redundancy in speech acts. In practice, though, it is very common that such a maxim (or principle of language use) is ignored or violated (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004:â•›76). In assuming that the speakers have not abandoned the cooperative principle altogether, it must be possible to reconstruct the communicative act as serving a communicative purpose in the discourse. The extended pragma-dialectical theory is of help in making such a reconstruction and explaining what strategic function these seemingly redundant amplifying modules can have in argumentative discourse addressed at an audience that seems already convinced. In the remainder of this paper, the excerpt from Wilders is analyzed in order to show what that function could be. 5.â•… Amplification as an aspect of strategic maneuvering As explained in the previous section, the amplifying modules are often part of a multi-part figure of speech (epicheireme) that is compiled of a claim followed by a reason, a lengthy formulated support for the reason, and a repetition of the initial claim. Since the amplifying modules all serve the purpose of putting forward a claim on a particular issue (as a standpoint or as support for the standpoint), they should be viewed as analytically relevant to the argumentative discussion; a move is considered analytically relevant when it is potentially constructive in resolving
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the difference of opinion on the merits in one of the various discussion stages (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004:â•›24–26). The fact that the epicheireme shows some redundancy means that, within the analytic overview (which is an outline of the analytically relevant moves), the figure will be “transformed” into one standpoint and one argument (or sub-standpoint – depending on whether the argument is confronted with doubt).4 The analysis is meant to show how the actual formulation of what is relevant can be explained as an attempt to steer the discussion towards the outcome most preferred by the speaker. Thus, in order to explain the function of amplification in the passage of Wilders, it should first be clear what outcome Wilders is aiming for. In pragma-dialectics a discourse is argumentative when its aim is to overcome some other party’s real or projected doubt regarding a standpoint. In the excerpt, however, Wilders’ aim seems to be to establish disagreement with his opponent on the issue of stopping Islamisation rather than to overcome possible doubt. His utterance emphasizes that the difference of opinion between his party and the Labor party on the issue of stopping Islamisation is huge: even though the Labor party has not (yet) addressed the issue in this debate, Wilders in effect claims that the party does not want to stop Islamisation. The two arguments put forward to support the claim also add to the disagreement. The Labor party will never agree with Wilders that Muslim immigration should be stopped because the party needs the immigrants as voting cattle, or because it is costing the hardworking nonIslamic Dutchman money. Since the arguments are obviously potential points of disagreement, they can be considered sub-standpoints. But why would Wilders aim for disagreement? As a representative of the people, Wilders’ primary aim in the debate is to show his potential electorate that, in contrast to other politicians, he is the one who represents their interests best. To accomplish that aim, establishing disagreement with the political opponent is a helpful tool; it might be a way to overcome the electorate’s possible doubt on which party will solve a particular problem best. If the potential voter has no doubts regarding the matter at issue – which is the case for at least a part of Wilders’ electorate – dealing with projected doubt might be a way to reinforce the voters’ sense of being right. The fact that a politician aims for disagreement with the political opponent for electoral reasons does not mean though, that it is not his aim to resolve the parliamentary discussion with the opponent. From a pragma-dialectical perspective, establishing a point of disagreement has to be viewed as part of the confrontation stage of a critical discussion. The aim of this stage is to bring to light that there is a standpoint that meets with doubt (van Eemeren 2010:â•›10). Claiming that there is disagreement, even when the opponent has not yet put forward his doubt or opposite standpoint, is not by definition at odds with this aim. Think, for example, of the situation in which the political opponent, for electoral reasons, tries to mask
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that there is a difference of opinion. In that case, claiming that the parties disagree is a way to externalize the difference of opinion that, in fact, exists between the parties. Since Wilders’ utterance can be explained as an attempt to show that his Party for Freedom and the Labor party disagree on the matter of Muslim immigration, it can be analyzed as a confrontational mode of strategic maneuvering.5 He attempts to polarize the parties’ positions with regard to the issue of stopping the Islamisation in order to establish an outcome of the confrontation stage that serves his electoral (or rhetorical) aims best.6 This outcome is a difference of opinion that involves contrasting standpoints, or in pragma-dialectial terms a mixed difference of opinion. As will become clear in the analysis, amplification can be viewed as a presentational aspect of the maneuver of polarizing aimed at accomplishing the result of a mixed difference of opinion in a way that is (or seems to be) reasonable. In the first sentence, Wilders amplifies the contrast between his party’s standpoint and that of the Labor party by saying that the Labor party wants “to get half the Islamic world to the Netherlands” and that we could have been “swimming in money” if the Labor party were to be stopped from doing this. “Swimming in money” is a clichéd metaphor used to exaggerate that Muslim immigration costs a lot of money; “getting half the Islamic world to the Netherlands” is an exaggerated way of saying that the Labor party is not dealing with Muslim immigration. A presentational choice that is of importance in this sentence is the active verb that is used to formulate the proposition of the Labor party’s standpoint. Wilders claims that the party is intentionally promoting Muslim immigration, since it is getting the Islamic people here (as potential voting cattle). The contrast between the standpoints of both parties becomes more prominent now that Wilders’ standpoint to stop Islamisation is contrasted with an active Islamisation policy: Wilders tries to stop what the Labor party is actively attempting to realize. What is striking about the exaggerations is that they are obviously not true: it would never be possible to get more than half a billion Muslims to the Netherlands and stopping the immigrants from coming to the Netherlands does not yield enough money to make everybody extremely rich. This also applies to the first sub-standpoint: it is obviously not true that self-preservation would be the only reason for a party to support immigration (as if, for example, reasons of humanity would not exist). The problem with such polarizing formulations is that they can be judged as holding the opponent accountable to a standpoint he does not hold. The advantage of formulating the (sub-)standpoints in this exaggerated way is that they merely suggest that the Labor party’s point of view on stopping Islamisation is the opposite of Wilders’ point of view. If Wilders were to be accused of wrongly ascribing a standpoint to his opponent, he could always say that “obviously, his remark should not be taken that literally”. When it is not precisely clear what the ascribed standpoints
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amount to (since their meaning is not expressed literally), it is less clear whether Wilders’ utterance frustrates the resolution process. The sub-standpoint that it is the common Dutchman who is paying for Muslim immigration is formulated by amplifying their decency when it comes to money: they work hard, save up properly, pay their taxes as they should and do not get things for free. The argumentative function of this formulation can best be explained when taken together with the concluding sentence that “Henk and Ingrid are paying for Mohammed and Fatima”. The figure of metonymy generalizes the non-Muslims (Henk and Ingrid) as a group of decent hard working Dutch people and the Muslims (Mohammed and Fatima) as profiteers. Dividing the electorate into two separate groups helps Wilders to polarize the debate with his political opponent because the Labor party takes both groups as its potential electorate. The problem with this formulation is that it could be judged as an insulting or even discriminating utterance. In Parliament, the available topical potential is restricted in this sense: parliamentarians are not allowed to use offensive language or to urge others to act illegally. A politician’s strategic maneuvering can therefore be expected to handle the restricted topical potential. Wilders’ utterance can be explained as such an attempt because he is not literally expressing that all Muslims are profiteers. The figure of metonymy avoids literally putting forward the proposition that non-Muslims are paying for all Muslim immigrants, and by emphasizing that the hardworking people are such decent people, he avoids saying that the Muslims are not such decent people. Presenting the insult in such a veiled way might help to give the impression that Wilders’ standpoints are not that offensive. 6.â•… Conclusion Amplification can occur in any of the four stages of a critical discussion and conceivably in any of the current clusters of activity types. As shown in this contribution, it is also likely to occur in many cases where argumentation is addressed to those who already agree for the purpose of strengthening existing agreements. The analysis of Wilders’ example shows how amplification is used to strengthen his electorate in the idea that it is Wilders and not the Labor party who handles the problem of Muslim immigration best. Though such a way of arguing is far from the critical discussion of an explicitly debated point, it constitutes a large territory in argumentative reality that can be accounted for in extended pragmadialectical theory. The theory has developed and refined the three aspects of strategic maneuvering within the framework of a critical discussion to account for the actual appearance of argumentation. Within that framework, amplification can be viewed as a linguistic means that delivers the arguer’s topical choice and responds to
Amplification in strategic maneuvering 
audience demand with the aim of realizing the discussion outcome most preferred by the speaker in a way he assumes reasonable.
Notes 1.â•… Those seeking synergy between pragma-dialectics and rhetoric must be aware of pragmadialectic’s unique analytical categories. For example, it uses a taxonomy of argument schemes (causal, symptomatic, comparative; 2010, 13) unlike the lengthier but less systematic list of topoi in the rhetorical tradition and it discusses arrangement in terms of discussion stages as opposed to the parts of the oration outlined in rhetorical manuals. 2.â•… While according to Aristotle’s rhetorical system, every premise/conclusion pair is called an enthymeme, the Byzantine rhetorical tradition maintained distinct labels for premise/ conclusion pairs at different “depths” of support. 3.â•… As indicated by van Eemeren, strategic maneuvering in a communicative activity type that makes use of deliberation (such as a parliamentary debate) is in the first place dictated by each party’s mission to reach his primary audience of listeners and watchers via a critical exchange with the secondary audience consisting of their actual interlocutors (2010:â•›154). 4.â•… Before an argumentative discourse or text can be analyzed and evaluated systematically, it is first necessary to reconstruct the relevant parts of the speech event analytically as parts of a critical discussion. In order to conduct such a reconstruction four different transformations are distinguished: deletion, addition, substitution and permutation. In the reconstruction, redundant information is “transformed” by deletion and substitution. All repetitions of exactly the same message in a different formulation are ignored (deletion) and represented by a single standard formulation (substitution) (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004:â•›100–110). Although it might be the case that the figure of an epicheireme provides redundant information that should be deleted in the reconstruction, this is not by definition the case. For each individual case, different transformations might be needed that lead to a different reconstruction. 5.â•… At first sight, it seems that an epicheireme should be analyzed as part of the argumentation stage, since it is a line of reasoning in which a claim is supported by arguments. This analysis nonetheless considers the arguments as part of the confrontation stage, for they can also be reconstructed as sub-standpoints in the discussion with the political opponent. Such an analysis makes it possible to explain how amplification can contribute to steer the discussion towards a mixed difference of opinion. However, in case the analyst wants to explain, for example, how amplification affects the relation between the standpoint and the arguments a different approach is needed. In that case, the arguments should be analyzed as part of the argumentation stage. 6.â•… Polarizing refers to the “neutral” meaning of the act of forming two separate groups with opposite opinions. What seems to be one group (or a lot of different groups), should – according to the one that polarizes – be divided into two groups. In politics, the aim of dominating the political opponent is often included in the definition. Polarizing is then used to refer to behavior that separates groups with the aim of prevailing their own interests, opinions, norms and values over those of the political opponent.
 Jeanne Fahnestock & Yvon Tonnard
References Aristotle (1991). On rhetoric: A theory of civic discourse (G.A. Kennedy, Trans.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cicero (1976). De inventione; De optimo genere oratorum, Topica. (H.M. Hubbell, Trans.) Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [Cicero] (1981). De ratione dicendi (Rhetorica ad Herennium) (H. Caplan, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Eemeren, F.H. van (2010). Strategic Maneuvering in argumentative discourse. An extended pragma-dialectical theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (1984). Speech acts in argumentative discussions: A theoretical model for the analysis of discussions directed towards solving conflicts of opinion. Berlin: De Gruyter. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A Systematic theory of argumentation: The pragma-dialectical approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Eemeren, F.H. van, Grootendorst, R. & Snoeck Henkemans, A.F. (1996). Fundamentals of argumentation theory: A handbook of historical backgrounds and contemporary developments. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Houtlosser, P. (1999). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative Discourse. Discourse Studies 1, 479–497. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Houtlosser, P. (2002). Strategic maneuvering: Maintaining a delicate balance. In F.H. van Eemeren & P. Houtlosser (Eds.), Dialectic and rhetoric: The warp and woof of argumentation analysis (pp. 131–159). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. Eemeren, F.H. van, Houtlosser, P. & Snoeck Henkemans, A.F. (2007). Argumentative indicators in discourse: A pragma-dialectical study. Dordrecht: Springer. Erasmus (1963). On copia of words and ideas. (D.B. King & H.D. Rix, Trans). Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press. Fahnestock, J. (1999). Rhetorical figures in science. New York: Oxford University Press. Fahnestock, J. (2009). Quid pro nobis. Rhetorical stylistics for argument analysis. In F.H. van Eemeren (Ed.), Examining argumentation in context: Fifteen studies on strategic maneuvering (pp. 191–220). Dordrecht: Springer. Higham, N. (1963). A very scientific gentleman: The major achievements of Henry Clifton Sorby. Oxford: Pergamon Press. Kennedy, G.A., Trans. (2005). Invention and method: Two rhetorical treatises from the Hermogenic corpus. Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature. Perelman, Ch. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969). The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation (J. Wilkinson & P. Weaver, Trans.). Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press. Quintilian (1920). Institutio Oratoria (Vols 1–4) (H.E. Butler, Trans). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Reagan, R. (1987). Remarks at the Brandenburg Gate, West Berlin. http://www.ronaldreagan. com/sp_11.html. Snoeck Henkemans, A.F. (2009). The use of praeteritio in strategic maneuvering. In F.H. van Eemeren (Ed.), Examining argumentation in context: Fifteen studies on strategic maneuvering (pp. 241–257). Dordrecht: Springer.
Breast cancer screening A case in point Peter J. Schulz & Bert Meuffels 1.â•… Introduction In a lot of empirical studies the persuasiveness of ‘statistical evidence’ was compared with ‘anecdotal evidence’. Following Rieke & Sillars (1984:â•›92), ‘anecdotal evidence’ can be seen as specific case or example (or exemplar, as they are sometimes called) that is adduced as an argument in favor of a standpoint, whereas ‘statistical evidence’ consists of a numerical summary of a large number of cases that are put forward to support a standpoint. In a meta-analysis of 19 experiments, Baesler & Burgoon (1994) found that anecdotal evidence was superior in 13 studies; the reverse trend was shown in 2 investigations, and in the remaining 4 experiments no difference in persuasiveness was found. However, on the basis of a new meta-analysis Allen & Preiss concluded that statistical evidence was more persuasive than anecdotal evidence (Allen & Preiss 1997). O’Keefe (2002:â•›29), commenting on these meta-analyses, noticed that there are enormous differences in effect size between the various studies and rightly concludes that much is unknown about the conditions and mechanisms responsible for all these differences. It is our contention that at least part of this deficiency in knowledge can be attributed to the design of these studies, in which an explicit, systematic argumentational-theoretical perspective is lacking. As a consequence, it is often not clear how the independent variable in studies comparing statistical with anecdotal evidence is to be interpreted in argumentational terms. In the absence of any precise information about the argumentational implications of the compared types of evidence, it is difficult to judge whether the contrast to be tested is implemented in a methodologically appropriate way. In the empirical studies to be reported here, which also compare the persuasiveness of statistical with anecdotal evidence, the approach is slightly different: in an illustrative way we want to show the benefit of the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992) as a starting point for the construction and characterization of the persuasive messages and as a frame of reference for the interpretation of the post-experimental responses.
 Peter J. Schulz & Bert Meuffels
Another problem, making a strict comparison between the various studies difficult, has to do with differences between the studies with respect to their ecological validity: in the messages presented to the subjects, sometimes fictitious topics are addressed that are hardly appealing, having no consequences for the personal life of the subjects regardless of whether they accept or reject the position advocated in the message. In the empirical studies to be reported here, we will deal with a realistic issue in which the involvement of our female subjects will certainly be high: breast cancer. 2.â•… Breast cancer in Holland Breast cancer is the most common type of cancer for women, and the fifth most common cause of cancer-related deaths in the world. In the Netherlands, 1 out of 8 women will get breast cancer at some point in her life. Every year, 3500 Dutch women die from breast cancer. To decrease the number of deaths from breast cancer, in 1990, the Dutch government introduced the National Screening Program for Breast Cancer, for which all women between 50 and 75 years of age receive an invitation every other year. Participation in the screening program is voluntary and for free; every year 80% of all invited women (which amounts to 800.000 women) accept the offer. 1.5% of all screened women are redirected to a hospital for further investigation, and about half of them are tested positively for a form of breast cancer. Since the introduction of the nation-wide screening program, the number of deaths caused by breast cancer declined by 23.5%, a significant decline for women between 55 and 74 years of age. Indeed, 75% of Dutch women who get breast cancer are above 50. Even though the probability of getting breast cancer begins to increase at the age of 40, the Dutch government is not willing to lower the threshold age for invitations to screening from 50 to 40 years; neither is it willing to increase the upper limit above 75 years of age, despite the efforts of various pressure groups.1 The potential disadvantages of mammographic screenings are unnecessary anxiety and morbidity related to the diagnostic work up, false positive and false negative screening examinations, overdiagnosis, economic costs and the exposure to radiation. Due to the activities of, among others, the Pink Ribbon Foundation, the awareness of breast cancer with all its frightening and far-reaching consequences is widespread. The mass media in Holland pay a lot of attention to breast cancer, especially in the month of October, since 2003 proclaimed as the ‘month of breast cancer’. Undoubtedly then, Dutch women’s awareness of and interest in this issue is high, as is their involvement.
Breast cancer screening 
3.â•… Reconstructing health communication leaflets as implicit dialogues In the health communication leaflets we constructed, we tried to persuade women to take part in the National Screening Program when they were aged between 50 and 75 years, and at the same time we tried to convince them that the threshold age of 50 was correctly set as starting age: they should not go for a mammography below 50, at least not without well-founded reasons (like heredity). Taking a pragma-dialectic perspective, a monological text such as a health communication leaflet propagating a certain course of action supported by arguments can be reconstructed as an implicit dialogue between the health campaigner who is attributed the role of protagonist and the target audience taking up the role of ‘silent’ antagonist – even though there is no ‘actual’ party present that explicitly ‘voices’ doubt regarding the advocated standpoint or explicitly represents a countering viewpoint. This reconstruction enables us to apply the whole pragma-dialectical terminological and analytical apparatus to the construction and description of the experimental messages in an unequivocal manner. Moreover, it explains why the messages are argumentatively constructed as they are. For example, the type of discussion between the health communication campaigner and the targeted audience in the messages can be considered as a ‘mixed dispute’. In an implicit dialogue it is not clear what kind of objections the addressee could raise (doubt or an opposing standpoint). The type and kind of arguments that are adduced to support the standpoint depend on what objections the campaigner anticipates: dialectically speaking the two kinds of reaction (doubt or criticism) require different lines of defense. By adducing only (multiple) pro-argumentation, the protagonist (i.e. the health communication campaigner) assumes that the audience will only have doubts, if any, regarding his advocated standpoint. Starting from that assumption, the protagonist may advance only positive arguments supporting his position. However, if the protagonist assumes that the audience not only will have doubts, but also an opposite standpoint for which the audience has good reasons (i.e. counterarguments), then those reasons have to be countered. The standpoints that are at issue here, are of a special type: they are both inciting standpoints. In pragmadialectics three types of standpoints are distinguished according to the nature of the propositions expressed in the standpoints: descriptive, evaluative and inciting. In descriptive propositions, facts or events are described, in evaluative propositions a judgment of facts or events is expressed, and in inciting propositions a certain course of action is recommended. These differences have implications for the nature of the arguments put forward in support for a certain standpoint. For example, the combination of a descriptive standpoint and an evaluative argument always leads to an inapplicable argument scheme (called argumentum ad consequentiam).
 Peter J. Schulz & Bert Meuffels
The first standpoint (go when >â•›50) is a positive, the second one (don’t go <â•›50) is a negative standpoint. As for the argumentation structure (i.e. the specific way in which the several arguments are combined to form the defense of the standpoint), both standpoints are defended by means of multiple argumentation (consisting of more than one alternative defense) and by subordinative argumentation (with arguments supporting arguments). At a micro-structure level (the level of argument schemes), both standpoints are defended by pragmatic argumentation, the subtype of causal argumentation in which the argument refers to an effect of what is mentioned in the standpoint. This is typically the case when the standpoint recommends a certain course of action respectively advises against a certain course of action and the argumentation consists in summing up the favorable respectively unfavorable consequences of adopting that course of action (respectively not adopting that action). The favorable consequences of the first inciting, positive standpoint (go when >â•›50) and the second inciting, negative standpoint (don’t go when <â•›50) are ‘backed up’ by argumentation, in the form of either statistical or anecdotal ‘evidence’. 4.â•… Research question Our research question is: Assuming that the argumentative structure of the messages in which the two types of evidence are implemented is kept under control, what kind of argumentative support is more persuasive: statistical or anecdotal support? Although it is certainly not a primary aim of normative argumentation theories such as pragma-dialectics to make specific predictions concerning the relative persuasiveness of concrete messages, starting from a pragma-dialectical, pre-theoretical point of view our explorative research question could be transformed in a testable prediction regarding expected differences in persuasiveness between statistical and anecdotal evidence. Both types of evidence are evaluated by means of the same type of critical questions. For at a micro-structure level, both kinds of arguments involve the same pragma-dialectical type of argument scheme (i.e. the specific way the argument and standpoint being defended are linked together): symptomatic argumentation. In argumentation based on a symptomatic relation, a standpoint is defended by citing in the argument a certain sign, symptom, or distinguishing mark of what is claimed in the standpoint (“John is brave because he is British”). The general argument scheme for the symptomatic relation is: (1) Y is true of X, because (2) Z is true of Y, and (3) Z is symptomatic of Y. The most important critical questions to ask about argumentation based on a symptomatic relation are: (a) Aren’t there also other non-Y’s that have the characteristic of Z? (b) Aren’t there also other Y’s
Breast cancer screening 
that do not have the characteristic Z? (Van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002:â•›96–98). A specific case of argumentation based on a symptomatic relation is argumentation by example (as is the case for both statistical and anecdotal evidence): then a generalization is made, or a rule is introduced, by presenting a specific case (anecdotal evidence) or a number of separate cases (statistical evidence) as indicative of something general. In the case of argumentation by example the critical questions become more specific: It has to be established whether the case (or cases) mentioned as example are indeed representative, and whether they are sufficient to justify the generalization. Assuming that – other things being equal – the targeted audiences of persuasive messages apply the pertinent critical questions in a reasonable way, it is to be expected that in the normal course of events statistical evidence will be judged as more persuasive. 5.â•… Experiment 1: Anecdotal versus statistical presentation Experiment 1 compared one message using anecdotal evidence and four different messages using different versions of statistical evidence. The focus of the analysis is on the comparison between anecdotal and statistical evidence. 5.1â•… Method 5.1.1â•… Material The material consisted of five versions of a health communication leaflet in which the two standpoints regarding breast cancer screening were defended: (1) women above 50 years of age should have a mammogram made biannually (2) women below 50 years of age should not go for a breast scan, at least not under normal circumstances. Each version consisted of 5 short paragraphs: in the first paragraph the problem of breast cancer and the resulting mortality rate is explained. By far, breast cancer is the most common type of cancer. Among women it is even the number 1 cause of death. In Holland 12.5 % of the women get breast cancer. Almost 29% of these women die, especially in the age group between 50 and 75. Looking at all female breast cancer patients, it turns out that 25 % of these women are younger than 50 and 75% older than 50.
In the second paragraph the first standpoint is explicitly presented (i.e. “women are recommended” etc), and subsequently defended by pragmatic argumentation that in turn is defended by subordinative argumentation: In order to reduce the risk of death resulting from breast cancer, women between 50 and 75 years old are recommended to take a mammography (an X-ray of
 Peter J. Schulz & Bert Meuffels
the breasts) every two years. By taking such a mammography the risk to die in consequence of breast cancer can be reduced by 20%, as is shown by research conducted in 2006 by Goetzsche and Nielsen – two scientists working for the Cochrane Collaboration, one of the most famous research institutions in the world. A timely diagnosis enhances the chances of survival: five years after the first diagnosis 80% of the women with breast cancer are still alive.
In the third paragraph the second standpoint is explicitly formulated, and once again defended by pragmatic argumentation, supported again by other arguments (i.e. lower risk, false alarms, extensive follow-ups): For women younger than 50 the risk of breast cancer is much smaller; therefore they shouldn’t take a mammography without well-founded reasons. Although breast screening via mammography is usually quite reliable, it sometimes happens that such a scan leads to a wrong diagnosis. 3 to 7 % of the women who have taken a mammography are wrongly told that they probably have breast cancer. But finally, after extensive follow-up investigations, it appears that they haven’t breast cancer at all.
The fourth paragraph is meant to reduce possible fears concerning the mammographic test method (after all: X-radiation) and to reassure the women that the prevailing scan is safe: If we want to detect breast cancer in women older than 50 at a timely stage, then mammography is the most appropriate and safest test method. Moreover, in case of the vast majority of the women who took a mammography no suspicious or malignant deviations are found.
And in the last paragraph the two standpoints are repeated again, backed up by an argument of authority: the National Health Council. The National Health Council advises all women above 50 to take a mammography every other year, regardless of the circumstances. Women below 50 are advised to take a mammography only if there are well-founded reasons for it, like a congenital disposition to breast cancer or sudden deviations in the breasts.
This text (henceforth version 1), in which ‘statistical information’ in the form of percentages is put forward as an argument for (arguments for) the acceptability of a standpoint, is used as starting point for the construction of four other persuasive texts, as identical as possible. In version 2 (statistical presentation-numbers) all the percentages mentioned in version 1 were replaced by absolute numbers, in version 3 (statistical-visual presentation; percentages) the percentual age distribution of patients with breast cancer was also visually presented (in the form of a histogram, one for women above 50, one for women below 50) as well as the percentage of false alarms, in version 4 (statistical-visual presentation; numbers)
Breast cancer screening 
the percentages in version 3 were once again replaced by absolute numbers and, as was the case in version 3, visually elucidated, while in version 5 (anecdotal presentation) an exemplar was introduced, replacing the whole paragraph 3 by the concrete history of a 45 year old (hypothetical) woman who told a story about the unpleasant and terrifying experiences of one of her friends (age below 50) who had decided to go for a scan. Purposely no attempt was made to measure a priori, before conducting the experiment, the ‘strength’ or the cogency of the pragmatic argumentation and all the other arguments in justifying the acceptability of each of the two standpoints, for example by letting a particular group of subjects rate the strength of arguments as is often done in persuasion research. Apart from the ad hoc character of such evaluative ratings, from an objective perspective the arguments mentioned in the five texts are precisely those that were used by the National Health Council in the eighties advising the Dutch government to introduce and finance the National Screening Program for Breast Cancer among women between 50 and 75 – for just that reason these arguments are ‘by definition’ valid and cogent. 5.1.2â•… Participants/Procedure 200 women took part in the experiment. Their age ranged from 20 to 76, with an average of 44. They were recruited in a supermarket or on a train. Each participant was contacted individually by female interviewers and assigned randomly to one of the five versions. After filling in an a pre-experimental booklet with general questions about background variables (like age, level of education etc.) they were asked to read the experimental text. Subsequently they had to fill in several questions (seven-point Likert scales) pertaining to, among others, the quality of the arguments in the text and the acceptance of each of the two standpoints. 5.2â•… Results Regarding the quality of the adduced arguments to go for a scan above 50 (see Table 1, top line), it is evident that our participants were quite positive: the average rating per version reached almost the absolute maximum of the scale (=7). Looking also at the size of the standard deviations, it is clear that the data in Table 1 point to the presence of a ceiling effect. No wonder that no statistical significant differences can be observed between the five text versions (F(4,195) <â•›1). But, quite in contrast with this rather surprising finding, when the participants had to answer the corresponding question “According to my opinion, the arguments that are adduced in the text for women below 50 not to go for a scan are persuasive”, they were rather neutral (M = 4.27; sd = 1.57). No statistically significant differences could be found between the five versions (F(4,195) = 2.34 (p >â•›.06), although there was a tendency for the anecdotal presentation to be more persuasive.
 Peter J. Schulz & Bert Meuffels
Table 1.╇ Ratings of the perceived persuasiveness of the adduced arguments to go for a scan for women older than 50 (>╛50) and not to go for a scan for women younger than 50(<╛50), per version (version 1 = statistical presentation-percentages; version 2 = statistical presentation-numbers; version 3 = statistical-visual presentation, percentages; version 4: statistical-visual presentation, numbers; version 5 = anecdotal presentation) (1 = absolutely not persuasive; 7 = absolutely persuasive)
>â•›50 <â•›50
version 1
version 2
version 3
version 4
version 5
6.20 (.65) 3.98 (1.42)
6.30 (.91) 4.20 (1.52)
6.18 (.81) 3.90 (1.57)
6.15 (.83) 4.43 (1.60)
6.35 (.95) 4.83 (1.62)
A similar pattern in the data could be found in the responses to the question: “According to my opinion, women above 50 (resp. below 50) should follow the advice of the National Health Council” (see Table 2). Once again, a ceiling effect could be found in the acceptance of the standpoint that women above 50 should go for a scan (M = 6.43; sd = .73), while the corresponding claim for women below 50 not to go was accepted as often as not (M = 4.61; sd = 1.67). In line with the ceiling effect, no differences could be found between the text versions concerning the advice for women above 50 (F(4,195) = 2.17; p >â•›.07); when the advice referred to women below 50, anecdotal presentation was more successful than the other four (F(4,195) = 5.64; p <â•›0.001; a posteriori test: t(195) = 3.18; p <â•›.002). Table 2.╇ Ratings of the acceptance of the standpoint to go for a scan for women older than 50 (>â•›50) and not to go for a scan for women younger than 50 (<â•›50), per version (1 = absolutely not accept; 7 = absolutely accept)
>â•›50 <â•›50
version 1
version 2
version 3
version 4
version 5
6.30 (.65) 4.10 (1.41)
6.45 (.81) 4.78 (1.70)
6.43 (.64) 4.20 (1.74)
6.28 (.82) 4.38 (1.76)
6.70 (.69) 5.58 (1.32)
From a methodological point of view, however, a replication is necessary in view of interpretation problems regarding the relative superiority of anecdotal over statistical presentation. At this point an explanation is premature because there is a confounding factor that was unwittingly introduced when adding the exemplar to the basic text (version 1). This is the text with the exemplar, replacing the whole paragraph 3 of version 1: Karin Verbiest (45) considered taking a mammography: “I was plagued by a lot of worries. Although there is no incidence of breast cancer among my family, nowadays you are confronted with many frightening stories about breast cancer; so I wanted to have a medical examination anyway.
Breast cancer screening 
I told this to a close friend of mine, but she definitely discouraged me from doing this. A few months ago she herself had taken a mammography. After the examination, her family doctor told her that the photographs didn’t look good and that followup investigations were necessary. She had a very bad time and anxiously awaited the outcome of the test. But in the end nothing turned out be wrong: that was the final conclusion of all the medical investigations, it was just a “false alarm”. According to my family doctor this happens once in a while when women younger than 50 have taken a mammography: in the case of these young women the mammography at times results in a false alarm, while in the long run in fact it becomes clear that nothing is really wrong. This won’t happen to me! I shall not take a mammography before 50, without any good reason. It’s shocking to worry so much while in reality nothing is wrong. Of course I will still examine my breasts for possible deviations, but I have decided only to go to my family doctor if there are really good reasons for it.”
In the exemplar the consequences of a false alarm are explicitly spelled out (in contrast with version 1 in which the consequences of a false positive outcome are left implicit) resulting in more explicit arguments (concerns, tension) that are adduced in favor of the standpoint. As a consequence, from an argumentational point of view the two types of presentation (statistical versus anecdotal) are not strictly comparable anymore. This confounding is avoided in experiment 2 and 3.
6.â•… Experiment 2: Anecdotal presentation and framing A second experiment compared anecdotal evidence framed in terms of gains with similar evidence framed in terms of losses, focusing on the advice to women below 50 not to go for a scan. Anecdotal evidence was communicated via 8 exemplars (each subject reading just one exemplar). In half of them the desirable consequences of not taking a mammography before 50 were emphasized (called: ‘gain-framing’), while – conversely – in the other half the undesirable consequences of taking a scan before 50 were stressed (called: ‘loss-framing’). When the undesirable consequences of certain behaviors are strongly emphasized and anxiety is aroused, then fear appeal is operating. A lot of empirical research is conducted regarding the effects of the difference in ‘wording’ (framing), especially in the field of health communication, but the results are not unequivocal (O’Keefe & Jensen 2007). Moreover, different theories lead to different predictions about what type of framing is the most effective. According to the insights of Salovey et al. (2002), taking part in mammographic screening can be considered as risky behavior: each time a woman
 Peter J. Schulz & Bert Meuffels
goes for a scan, she is running after all the risk to be confronted with a deviation – and in that case loss-framing would be the most effective way to persuade women to participate in the screening. In line with this are the predictions derived from the theoretical insights of Levin et al. (1998). According to these authors, taking a mammography can be considered as behavior that is performed in order to reach a certain goal: detection of breast cancer. Indeed, from an empirical study of Banks et al. (1995, in: Krishnamurthy et al. 2001) it was obvious that loss-framed messages in which women were encouraged to take a scan, were more persuasive than gain-framed messages. In this research, however, women below 50 are not advised to take a scan, but – on the contrary – they are discouraged to take a scan. The focus is not on the detection of breast cancer, but on behavior to prevent or avoid undesirable consequences like false positives or detrimental effects of radiation. In this case gain-framing would be the most effective, according to Salovey et al. However, according to Levin et al. loss-framing would be the most effective in this case too, because the propagated behavior can equally well be considered as a type of ‘goal framing’. On the basis of the meta-analysis of O’Keefe & Jensen (2007) it is even plausible to predict that no differences in persuasive effect will be found between gain- or loss-framed messages. 6.1â•… Method 6.1.1â•… The material In the 8 messages only one standpoint (not to go <â•›50) was explicitly propagated, the other standpoint (go >â•›50) was implicitly presented. In comparison with the previous experiment, this time more arguments were adduced to support the explicit standpoint (1) in the case of young women, the risk of developing breast cancer is not that high (2) young women have a more ‘condensed’ breast tissue (with consequences: X-ray photos are more difficult to assess, so the chances of a false alarm are much higher than for older women) (3) taking a mammography hurts (4) possible detrimental effects of X-rays for younger women (their breast texture has a higher sensitivity for radiation, and: young women have a higher life expectancy, leading to a higher risk of disadvantageous effects). Here is an example of gain framing: Breast cancer is the most frequent type of cancer among women in the Netherlands: 1 out of 9 women will get breast cancer in her life. That is frightening, but luckily the chances of survival for women with breast cancer are pretty high nowadays. This has to do with the effective treatment methods and the early detection. To detect breast cancer in an early stage, women in the age of 50–75 are invited every other year to take a mammography (an X-ray of the breasts), for free.
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But why only women above the age of 50? Younger women can get breast cancer too, can’t they? Sure, but in the case of young women chances are not that high. Apart from that, younger women have usually ‘more condensed’ breast tissue compared with women after the menopause. As a consequence, the photos of the breasts are more difficult to assess whether there are deviations or not. Therefore, women below 50 are strongly advised against taking a mammography if there are no wellfounded reasons for it. Some time ago Joke Vissers (age 46) felt a strange, little nodule in her breast. Of course, she was at once terribly worried, and right the same day she decided to see her family doctor. “I expected that I had to take a mammography. I was rather reluctant to do that, because a friend of mine told me that it fairly hurts. And apart from that: all that endless waiting for the result, just terrible! But luckily it turned out that I didn’t have to take a mammography. The doctor asked me a few questions, such as whether breast cancer is running in my family. At the end he decided that having a mammogram was not necessary. He reassured me that the little nodule was simply a greasy swelling, and that taking a scan would only lead to pain and needless uncertainty. I was so happy that the doctor told me that nothing was really wrong! After all, he is at home in these matters, so I am set at ease. And I am happy that I have to wait till I am 50 for taking a mammography”. Indeed, a very sensible choice of Joke. When women below 50 take a mammography, the outcome is never absolutely reliable. An additional reason is that the chances of a ‘false alarm’ are pretty high: this means that a scan at times seems to indicate that something is looking totally wrong, while after subsequent examinations it turns out that everything is fine. As a consequence, many young women are needlessly left in uncertainty for a long period of time. Finally, the potential harmfulness of X-radiation may not be forgotten, especially in the case of younger women whose breast texture is more sensitive to radiation. So, trust the judgment of your doctor, and act like Joke: don’t go for a scan if there are no good reasons for that!
6.2â•… Results The age of the 160 female participants ranged from 30 to 70, with an average of 48 (sd = 10). The (assessed) quality of the adduced arguments was measured by two (Likert type) scales, one asking for the credibility, the other for the convincingness of the arguments (alpha = .93).
 Peter J. Schulz & Bert Meuffels
Table 3.╇ Ratings of the perceived persuasiveness of the adduced arguments not to go for a scan for women younger than 50, per frame (1 = absolutely not persuasive; 7 = absolutely persuasive) Gain frame
Loss frame
4.02 (2.07)
4.47 (1.78)
From Table 3 one can infer that the participants are fairly neutral in their judgment of the persuasiveness of the adduced arguments (M = 4.25; sd = 1.94), as was the case in experiment 1; no reliable differences could be found between the two types of frame (F(1,159) = 2.20; p >╛.14). In agreement with the outcome of experiment 1, women were once again quite willing to accept the advice for women above 50 (a ceiling-effect a second time), but not for women below 50 (Table 4). Table 4.╇ Ratings of the acceptance of the standpoint to go for a scan for women older than 50 (>╛50) and not to go for a scan for women younger than 50 (<╛50), per frame (1 = absolutely not accept; 7 = absolutely accept)
>â•›50 <â•›50
Gain frame
Loss frame
6.56 (1.17) 3.78 (2.06)
6.42 (1.45) 3.93 (1.85)
7.â•… Experiment 3: Statistical presentation and framing To be able to compare the anecdotal presentation with a statistical one (without any confounding of explicitness of the anecdotal evidence as in experiment 1), we replicated experiment 2; the 8 exemplars (either gain-framed or loss-framed) were replaced by a ‘pale’ description: The exemplar in experiment 2 (starting with “Some time ago Joke Vissers” (…etc) till “Indeed, a very sensible choice of Joke”) for example was replaced by the following text: At times women below 50 nevertheless suspect that they have breast cancer, for example because they have detected a little nodule in their breasts. In this case it is wise to go the doctor. He shall ask then if heredity factors are playing a part. If not, then he will presumably discourage taking a mammography. Besides that, he will of course examine the breasts; most of the time it simply appears to be a greasy swelling. Moreover, the majority of the women who ever took a mammography don’t like this examination at all because it is rather painful
Breast cancer screening 
and irritating. That is because the breasts are flattened out between two plates of glass. So it is good not to suffer any superfluous pain if the doctor thinks it is not necessary to take a mammography.
160 women (age ranging from 29 to 79, with an average of 44 (sd = 13)) participated in this altered replication. The results of this experiment are consistent with those of our previous research: once again the persuasiveness ratings of the arguments (alpha = .85) did not differ in a statistically significant sense between gain-framed messages (M = 3.87; sd = 1.66) and loss-framed messages (M = 4.38; sd = 1.75) (F(1,159) = 3.53; p >â•›.06). Moreover, our participants judged the persuasiveness as rather neutral. And once again, they fully accept the advice for women above 50, but not – at least not to that extent – for women below 50 (see Table 5). Table 5.╇ Ratings of the acceptance of the standpoint to go for a scan for women older than 50 (>â•›50) and not to go for a scan for women younger than 50 (<â•›50), per frame (1 = absolutely not accept; 7 = absolutely accept)
>â•›50 <â•›50
Gain frame
Loss frame
6.16 (1.57) 3.65 (2.18)
6.13 (1.52) 3.95 (2.09)
8.â•… A comparison between statistical and anecdotal presentation Which of the two presentation modes is more persuasive, an anecdotal presentation or a statistical one? The data of the two independently conducted experiments 2 and 3 were simultaneously analysed (via a repeated measurement analysis, with ‘presentation’ and ‘framing’ as between-subject factors, and argumentative quality, acceptance of the standpoint to go >â•›50 and acceptance of the standpoint not to go <â•›50 as levels of a within-subject factor). No statistical significant differences between anecdotal and statistical presentation could be found (F(1,316) = 2.47; p >â•›.117). Moreover, neither the factor ‘framing’ (F(1,316) = 2.12; p >â•›.147) nor the interaction between presentation and framing (F(1,316) <â•›1) appeared to be significant. 9.â•… Post-experimental responses Our experimental variations did not produce any effects. Neither did anecdotal evidence make more or less persuasive arguments than statistical evidence, nor did
 Peter J. Schulz & Bert Meuffels
loss framing make messages more or less persuasive than gain framing. Type of evidence and type of framing just did not matter in conveying the two crucial messages related to mammography and breast cancer: Women above 50 should go to mammography every two years as invited; and women under 50 are better off if they do not have breast screening on a routine basis. But an interesting and stimulating difference between the two messages emerged. The attempts to persuade women to take part in the National Screening Programme for Breast Cancer when they were at least 50 years old simply turned out to be superfluous – from the observed ceiling effect one may infer that the female participants were already convinced of that anyway. There is just no room left for changing pre-existing attitudes and beliefs. The attempts to discourage women to take a mammography below the age of 50, however, simply appeared to be futile and were rather unsuccessful in our experiments. Under certain conditions people resist all attempts to persuade them, a fact that has been known for a long time. The key variable here is (ego-) ‘involvement’ (Sherif & Cantril 1947). In case of our topic (breast and breast cancer), the issues raised in the persuasive messages undoubtedly aroused a high level of involvement among our female participants, evoking those values that are presumed to be aspects of the self-concept (the ego, the “self-picture – intimately felt and cherished” (Sherif et al. 1965:â•›vi)), that is to say: values that are especially important and enduring. The messages about breast cancer touched the participants’ basic values central to their ego, and fundamental to their feminine (sexual) identity. Given the importance of ego-involvement, it is likewise conceivable that our subjects rated the arguments in the messages advocating a position consonant with their basic values as credible and convincing, while the arguments supporting a position discrepant with their ego were judged as rather weak, no matter how cogent (in an objective sense) these are. So, for our female participants a kind of restructuring and re-interpretation of the messages was needed to cope with the discrepant information in order to maintain their original position. A semistructured interview with 30 women after the implementation of experiment 2 and 3 tried to shed light on how our participants tackled this problem. To prevent ad hoc coding, pragma-dialectics again was used as a tool for interpreting the responses. In order to be persuasive, argumentation has to meet certain criteria. An argument can only be sound if the reasoning behind it is valid (or can be made valid by making implicit reasoning explicit). Some interviewees, however, reject the whole message completely (“it’s unreasonable”), because “the source is highly biased and the message is extremely one-sided: only the disadvantages for younger women
Breast cancer screening 
taking a mammography are spelled out, while the advantages are kept secret”. In pragma-dialectical terms: according to these women the (preâ•‚)conditions for a critical discussion are violated, and the message is accordingly judged as absolutely non-persuasive. The other responses of the interviewees could be fit into the pragma-dialectical taxonomy of argumentation schemes. In the messages the standpoint not to go <â•›50 is defended by pragmatic argumentation: (1) Y is true of X, because (2) Z is true of X, and: Z leads to Y. To assess whether this argumentation is conclusive, the relevant critical questions have to be answered satisfactorily: (1) Does Z always lead to Y ? (2) Is Y really (un)favourable?. Some interviewees answer the first critical question about the causal relationship between, for example, radiation and a higher likelihood of getting cancer in the negative: “That argument about radiation… well, I don’t think it is valid. If the starting age was lowered to 40, those women would get 5 doses of radiation more than what they would get if they started at 50. And nowadays the doses are small, very small; so I really don’t think the risk increases substantially”. Another woman, attacking the same causal relation: “Yeah, radiation is harmful, if you would start earlier you have a higher risk to get cancer. Okay, okay, fine, but in my opinion there is no scientific proof for that, so…”. Other interviewees do not question the causal chain between Z (radiation) and Y (cancer), but answer the second critical question (about the unfavorableness of the consequences of, for example, false positives) negatively: “And those false positive outcomes, well, I really think that people will put up with all these follow-up examinations if they can get certainty” or “The doctor can err herself; I want to have absolute certainty in a stage as early as possible, even if all the follow-up examinations are a nuisance”. In sum, ego-involvement challenges the persuasiveness of the adduced arguments. Women want to have certainty: what are the trouble and the temporary fear after a false positive test and the dangers of a false negative test against living one’s life with an undetected and possibly life-threatening tumor in one’s breast? They are quite willing to put up with all the negative consequences of false alarms, but at the same time are quite insensitive to arguments in terms of extra costs, possible harmful long-term effects of radiation or to the fact that no method to detect breast cancer produces absolutely certain results. In line with these beliefs and convictions are the subjects’ responses to the (Likert type) statement posed in experiment 2 and 3: “I am of the opinion that I myself must be given the opportunity to decide if I go for a scan, regardless of the negative advice of the doctor in the information leaflet” (M = 5.71; sd = 1.71 in experiment 2; M = 6.12; sd = 1.36 in experiment 3). As one of the interviewed women typically declared: “I want to be ‘boss in my own breasts!’”.
 Peter J. Schulz & Bert Meuffels
Note 1.â•… Research has shown that there is ‘no significant reduction in breast cancer mortality in women offered annual screening between the ages of 40 and 48 years’ (Moss et. al. 2006). The main reason why screening does not help to reduce the mortality rate in women below 50 is that most women at that age have not gone through menopause yet. Before menopause the breast tissue is a lot denser than after. The high density of the tissue makes it hard to judge the radiographs correctly. This results in wrong conclusions (false positives or false negatives): real tumours are missed, and normal tissue is mistaken for a tumour. This causes unnecessary anxiety for healthy women who have to go through painful follow-up research, while women with cancer are erroneously set at ease. Another reason why the government does not want to lower the starting age for screening is that the radiation used to do the mammography is damaging and can itself increase the chance of getting cancer. Furthermore, lowering the starting age to, for example, 40 years entails a great deal of expenses, and it can be asked whether the benefits compensate for the costs: because the chances of breast cancer for younger women are smaller, the screening is less effective. Women above 75 are also excluded from taking part in the National Screening Programme because chances are low that women above 75 will die due to breast cancer: the rate of growth of a tumour above 75 is relatively low. Moreover, according to the government having a mammography would be too aggravating for elder women.
References Allen, M., & Preiss, R.W. (1997). Comparing the persuasiveness of narrative and statistical evidence using meta-analysis. Communication Research Reports 17, 331–336. Baesler, E.J., & Burgoon, J.K. (1994). The temporal effects of story and statistical evidence. Communication Research 21, 582–602. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (1992). Argumentation, communication and fallacies. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. & Snoeck Henkemans, A.F. (2002). Argumentation: analysis, evaluation, presentation. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Krishnamurthy, P., Carter, P. & Blair, E. (2001). Attribute framing and goal framing effects in health decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 85, 382–399. Levin, I.P., Schneider, S.L. & Gaeth, G.J. (1998). All frames are not created equal: A typology and critical analysis of framing effects. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 76, 149–188. Moss, S.M. et al. (2006). Effect of Mammographic Screening from Age 40 Years on Breast Cancer Mortality at 10 Years’ Follow-up; a Randomized Controlled Trial. The Lancet 368, 2053–2060. O’Keefe, D.J. (2002). Persuasion. Theory and research (2nd ed.). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. O’Keefe, D.J. & Jensen, J.D. (2007). The relative persuasiveness of gain-framed and loss-framed messages for encouraging disease prevention behaviors: a meta-analytic review. Journal of Health Communication 12, 623–644. Rieke, R.D., & Sillars, M.O. (1984). Argumentation and the decision making process (2nd Ed.). New York: Harper Collins.
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Salovey, P., Schneider, T.R. & Apanovitch, A.M. (2002). Message framing in the prevention and early detection of illness. In: J.P. Dillard & M. Pfau (Eds.), The persuasion handbook: Theory and practice (pp.391–406). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Sherif, M., & Cantril, H. (1947). The psychology of ego involvements: Social attitudes and identification. New York: Wiley. Sherif, C.W., Sherif, M., & Nebergall, R.E. (1965). Attitude and attitude change: The social judgment-involvement approach. Philadelphia: Saunders.
A doctor’s ethos enhancing maneuvers in medical consultation G. Thomas Goodnight & Roosmaryn Pilgram 1.â•… Introduction Central to medical consultations are a patient’s health related concerns and a doctor’s medical advice, grounded in an expert diagnosis and prognosis regarding such issues. Especially when naming a condition and offering views that can be expected to have a significant impact on the patient, a doctor might assume the patient to be hesitant to accept medical claims without discussion. Thus, argumentation may come to play an important role in medical consultation. A doctor may attempt to overcome hesitance by presenting reasons to accept certain claims for identifying conditions and taking action. For instance, a doctor who advises a patient to change his diet drastically might attempt to make such advice acceptable by arguing “Your cholesterol level is too high”. The context of a medical consultation does not just enable the doctor to present expert reasons; it also influences the manner in which a conversation with a client is held. Medical consultation is a regulated institutionalized communicative practice that is conducted in a limited amount of time. The health related concerns that are central to such a consultation may be routine or of vital importance to the patient, rendering the discussion of such a concern potentially consequence laden. Furthermore, the doctor and patient typically differ in the amount of specialized knowledge and experience each possesses about a class of health related problems. Finally, doctors have access to special resources and procedures that may be recommended and offered to the client. As a result of these characteristics, a doctor’s contribution to argumentative discourse in medical consultations typically differs significantly from those in, for example, informal argumentative exchanges; yet, each party in such a discussion exchanges reasons and offers points of view. Due to a medical consultation’s limited time and the fact that the doctor can be considered an authority on the patient’s health, a doctor might decide to enhance his/her ethos to support (an) important claim(s). After all, the patient has acknowledged the doctor’s authority on medical knowledge by requesting a medical consultation, so it could be efficacious for a doctor to bring scientific authority into play by offering support of a medical claim in ways that matter and are meaningful
 G. Thomas Goodnight & Roosmaryn Pilgram
to a patient. If successful, such argumentation may increase the trust or confidence in the specific claims while affirming the overall credibility of the relationship. In our contribution, we will examine, by means of the extended pragma-dialectical theory, how a doctor’s ethos may be enhanced in a medical consultation. To provide a detailed examination of ethos in what may be regarded as an expert-client exchange, we shall analyze examples of routine medical consultations taken from Dutch practice.1 Although we do not think that ethos in the Netherlands plays a significantly different role than in consultative practices in other countries, we will provide a description of health care in the Netherlands to do justice to the context of the consultations in our examples. Then, we will give an argumentative characterization of medical consultation, followed by the analysis of two ways in which a doctor could perform ethos enhancing maneuvers in medical consultation. 2.â•… Health care in the Netherlands The Dutch health care system is strongly oriented towards primary care (Campbell, Mendive & Timmermans 2004:â•›66). In the Netherlands, residents are typically registered with a General Practitioner (GP), who administers primary care. GPs act as “guides” or “coordinators” of healthcare; they diagnose patients and decide whether to treat the patients themselves or refer them to medical specialists. Without a referral by a GP, a patient cannot consult a medical specialist. GPs consequently act as “gatekeepers” to Dutch secondary care (Kroneman, van der Zee & Groot 2009:â•›26; and Wensing et al. 2004:â•›354). In the Netherlands, healthcare is considered a social right and patients are free to choose their GP. Everyone who pays income tax in the Netherlands is obliged to take out a standard package of essential health care insurance for themselves and, if applicable, their partner and children (Health Insurance Act 2006, §2.1). Private health insurance companies offer this standard package, which includes medical care by GPs, medical specialists and midwives, hospital care, medication, rehabilitation, dental care for patients younger than 22, mental healthcare and necessary medical care abroad (Ministry of Health, Welfare & Sport 2010b). Private health insurance companies are obliged to accept every applicant for the standard health insurance package, irrespective of age, gender or state of health (Health Insurance Act, 2006, §2.2). Insurance companies offer similar standard insurance packages, but additional services and the costs for the package may differ. To make the standard package affordable to all, residents who earn less than a fixed minimum are entitled to health care allowance (Ministry of Health, Welfare & Sport 2010a).
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In 2008, 76.1% of all residents in the Netherlands consulted a GP at least once (CBS 2010). On average, each patient requested 3.8 consultations (CBS 2010). During these consultations, the GP does not only have to provide a patient with a diagnosis, prognosis and/or medical advice, but the legal doctrine of informed consent also requires the GP to fully inform patients about the reasons for the diagnosis, prognosis or advised treatment option(s), alternative treatment option(s) and consequences of refraining from treatment altogether (see, for relevant legislation, Law on the medical treatment agreement, 1995, Art. 448). Since there are approximately 2,500 patients per full-time GP,2 this means that Dutch GPs need to conduct their consultations efficiently. The average consultation in 2001 indeed took just under ten minutes (see duration consultation for a GP with 2,500 patients in van den Berg, 2004:â•›321). GPs in other countries are confronted with a similar situation. For example, a British full-time GP cared for an average of 1,807 patients, who consulted the GP 5 times a year in 1997 (Campbell, Mendive & Timmermans 2004:â•›65). During these consultations, the GP has to diagnose and/ or advise the patient as well as provide all relevant information about the diagnosis and/or medical advice (see, for relevant case law, Smith vs. Tunbridge Wells HA, 1994; and Pearce vs. United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust 1998).
3.â•… Argumentative discourse in medical consultation To fulfill the requirement of obtaining the patient’s informed consent, a GP – or, indeed, doctors in general – might present arguments in support of medical advice (Goodnight 2006:â•›78–79; Pilgram 2009:â•›154; and Schulz & Rubinelli 2008:â•›427). A doctor, then, does not just provide information about the medical claims, but also tries to render the advice acceptable by providing reasons for its truth, likelihood, and/or trustworthiness. Adequate doctor-patient communication is positively related to the quality of health outcomes, patient’s adherence to treatment regimes, and satisfaction of both doctor and patient (see Brown, Stewart & Ryan 2003:â•›141–155; and Deveugele et al. 2005:â•›265). Schulz and Rubinelli (2006 n.p.) argue that presenting argumentation can contribute to adequate doctor-patient communication. They indeed argue that “it is probably not an exaggeration to claim that argumentation is actually the only instrument at a doctor’s disposal that makes a reasoned compliance of the patient possible, where the patient takes a certain course of action advised by a doctor because s/he has understood and believes in the inner motivation behind it.”
 G. Thomas Goodnight & Roosmaryn Pilgram
The context of a medical consultation affects the way in which the doctor can argue in support of medical and health claims. Medical consultation can be seen as an institutionalized communicative practice that occurs only in assigned places (such as hospitals and general practices) and is regulated by institutions (such as departments of health and medical professional associations). Moreover, such consultation is conducted in a more or less conventionalized fashion. The doctor generally starts out by asking after the health of the patient, the patient responds to this question by discussing his/her health related concerns and, in so doing, requests the doctor’s view of this problem, the doctor then examines the patient and, based on this examination, advises the patient (Pilgram 2009:â•›157). Following Heath (1986), ten Have (1991:â•›139) summarizes this organization of medical consultation by regarding it to normally consist of complaint presentation, verbal and physical examination, diagnosis, treatment, prescription and/or advice. The process is often iterative with the doctor ordering further testing, attending to indexes of information, and bringing trained specialists into the discussion as well. Annual check ups follow routine procedures. Some medical consultations, however, concern issues of vital importance to the patient and can be highly emotional. During such a consultation, the doctor characteristically tries to minimize a patient’s anxiety or uncertainty by delivering advice in a reassuring exchange. Tuckett et al. (1985:â•›7) state that the doctor “is likely to give information to the patient not only about what he [or she] suffers, but at the same time about how it came about, what is to blame, what will happen, and what should be done.” The way in which the doctor takes into account the patient’s anxiety and uncertainty may affect the doctor’s argumentation. Additionally, the doctor and patient typically differ in the amounts of knowledge and experience they possess about the health related problem that the consultation is about. The patient may know something of a family’s health, the history of his/her own experiences, and the bodily changes leading to concern. The doctor stands as an authority on the human body’s underlying medical mechanisms and the available treatments for it. The characteristic reasoning task for a doctor is how best to select and adapt such specialized knowledge to a case at hand by informing the choice of a patient. It is the doctor’s medical authority that makes the patient seek the doctor’s advice. In situations where there are several possible causes and diagnoses, questions of further testing, and competing risks and benefits to treatment, a doctor may advance arguments by making a strong case for a single diagnosis and recommendation or, alternatively, by balancing reasons for and against conclusions. During the consultation, the balanced use of authority typically results in the doctor taking upon himself the role of discussion leader (Pilgram 2009:â•›159). The duty to evaluate the claims and accept or reject the conclusion of the argument rests with the patient who may ask
A doctor’s ethos enhancing maneuvers in medical consultation 
questions, test conflict advice, or work to extend the support or implications of the arguments offered.
4.â•… Ethos enhancing strategic maneuvers in medical consultation A doctor’s authority on medical problems can come into play when the doctor presents arguments in support of (parts of) his/her medical advice. Case 1 is an example of a medical consultation in which a doctor deploys authority in support of his advice. In this consultation, a Dutch pediatrician discusses the diet of a little boy who suffers from asthma with the patient’s mother and father. Case 1 Excerpt of a medical consultation between a pediatrician (D), the mother (M) and father (F) of a child patient (C) who suffers from asthma (obtained from a database compiled by the Netherlands Institute for Health Services Research, transcription and translation by RP, original conversation in grey) 1. D: By the way, I have to say that, about his, about what he eats, I’m not really concerned to be honest. (Ik moet trouwens zeggen, over zijn, over wat hij eet maak ik me niet zoveel zorgen eerlijk gezegd.) 2. M: No. (Nee.) 3. D: Look, I can imagine that, as mother and as father, you are concerned, but if I look at the way he’s grown. Well, one of those things you need for growing well is eating well… (Kijk, ik kan me voorstellen dat als moeder en als vader je je zorgen maakt, maar als ik kijk naar hoe hij gegroeid is. Nou één van die dingen die je nodig hebt om goed te groeien, is goed te eten…) 4. M: Yeah. (Ja.) 5. D: So he has had, he has had a sufficient amount in the past few months, so… (Dus hij heeft, de afgelopen maanden heeft hij genoeg gehad, dus…) 6. F: Yeah. (Ja.) 7. D: In that respect, it isn’t the most necessary thing for me to say: well, you have to eat. A little [incomprehensible]. (Wat dat betreft is het ook niet het meest noodzakelijke vanuit mij om te zeggen: nou, je moet eten. Een beetje [onverstaandbaar].)
 G. Thomas Goodnight & Roosmaryn Pilgram
[…] 18. M: No, but yeah, things are sometimes being said about it and in the end you also think like: what should I do here? Right? One says this. The other that. And then you also think like: (Nee, maar ja hè, er wordt wel eens wat over gezegd en op het laatst denk je ook van: wat doe ik hier nou? Hè? De één zegt dit. De ander dat. En dan denk je ook van:) 19. D: It’s also good to come here then. (Dan is het ook goed om hier te komen.) 20. M: “I’ve had enough”. You just don’t know what you have to do in the end. (“Ik ben het nou zat.” Je weet op het laatst niet meer wat je moet.) 21. D: No, that, I can imagine that and, erm, well, if you encounter problems with that again, just say “I’ve been to the pediatrician”… (Nee dat, dat kan ik me voorstellen en, uhm, nou, als u daar weer problemen mee heeft, zeg maar gewoon “Ik ben naar de kinderarts geweest”…) 22. C: Eeweeeeeeeeee. (Iewieeeeieeeee.) 23. D: I’ve studied for it, which is the case. And, erm, he said… (Ik heb daarvoor geleerd, dat is ook zo. En, uhm, die heeft gezegd…) 24. C: Pfoof. (Pfoef.) 25. D: “We do that this way” and … (“Dat doen we zo” en…) 26. M: Just stop that [to child]. (Hou jij [kind] eens even op.) 27. D: And [incomprehensible] with evidence: he’s growing just perfectly, which is the most important issue. (En [onverstaanbaar] met bewijs: hij groeit gewoon perfect, dat is het belangrijkste.) 28. C: Pfoof, lelelelele. (Pfoef, lèlèlèlèlè.) 29. D: Haha, little tyke. (Haha, mooi kereltje.) The doctor in Case 1 makes an explicit claim not to be “concerned” about what the little boy eats (turn 1). The maneuver is an enthymeme, which is an argument with a missing part to be supplied by the patient’s parents. The doctor appears to be offering for agreement a key premise to the parents, namely: if I am not concerned about the boy’s diet, then neither should you. He thereby indirectly draws upon his authority on medical knowledge. Expressing empathy, the doctor admits
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that it is natural for parents to have anxiety (turn 3), but dietary restriction is not a good direction in which to go; rather, the common sense claim would find that “good food” is necessary to “grow well” (turns 3 & 5). The mother seems to agree with the doctor’s conclusion (turn 18), but nonetheless continues by expressing doubt about the doctor’s advice; the general views or advice she has obtained on diet and asthma have been conflicting (turns18 & 20). The doctor affirms that, in such a case, it is good to come to the doctor (turn 19) because he has in fact studied such questions of diet (turn 23). By explicitly referring to his medical authority, the doctor maneuvers not only to allay the uncertainties of the mother over diet, but to give her a reason to resist the lay advice she has been receiving. In rhetoric, the (indirect and direct) emphasis on authority is found in ethos or an argument that says, “Believe me because I am the sort of person whose word you can believe” (Halloran 1982:â•›60). Traditionally, ethos is explained as a form of proof useful in a persuasive effort to gain audience belief through the demonstration of competence, good will and good moral character. Since the audience knows the reputation a speaker brings to a speech, conclusions becomes accepted on the grounds of authority. Aristotle reminds us of another dimension, however, for this concept. According to Aristotle (Rhetorica, I2-1356a), the art of rhetoric is “the power to observe the persuasiveness of which any particular admits”. He distinguishes between artistic (entechnoi pisteis) and inartistic proofs (atechnoi pisteis). The former are the verbal persuasive moves that the orator can perform based on the data available to him, while the latter are the raw data themselves. Within the artistic proofs, Aristotle (Rhetorica, I2-1356a) furthermore distinguishes between appeals to ethos, pathos and logos: an orator could respectively provide character appeals, emotional appeals and examples or enthymemes in support of his claim(s). Of these artistic proofs, Aristotle (Rhetorica, I2-1356a) is of the opinion that an appeal to ethos “contains almost the strongest proof of all”. An orator can perform such an appeal in three distinct ways: he can stress his common sense (phronesis), virtue (arete) or goodwill (eunoia). In other words, when making an argument, a speaker puts his/her ethos on the line by making reasons offered open to a judgment by the audience of the “fair and trustworthy” qualities of the argument (Aristotle, Rhetoric, 14, 64). If successful, ethos will encourage confidence because the audience finds itself thinking along the lines brought to attention and into focus by the speaker – even though individuals may not have the time or expertise needed for a lengthy, wide-ranging discussion. In contemporary expert-client argumentative exchange, experts involve clients in collaborative thinking in such a way so as to build confidence in a client’s capacity to appraise information and trust in reasoning through to judgments over choices that have to be made.
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A doctor’s rationale for enhancing ethos can be examined by means of the extended pragma-dialectical theory (van Eemeren 2010; and van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 1999, 2000; 2002a and 2002b). At the heart of this theory lies the notion of strategic maneuvering. According to the extended pragma-dialectical theory, a discussion party always aims at obtaining the dialectical goal of reasonably resolving a difference of opinion in his/her discussion contribution. In this contribution, the discussion party simultaneously aims at obtaining the rhetorical goal of resolving this difference of opinion in a way that is favorable to his/her own position in the discussion – thereby focusing on key reasons for deciding, within the limited time and knowledge available. A discussion party attempts to achieve these goals by maneuvering strategically. The overall institutional objective that the doctor can be said to pursue in argumentative discourse in medical consultation is to convince the patient of appropriate medical advice. This goal results from the doctor’s aim to resolve the standing of opinion with the patient in favor of actions the profession has certified as doing no harm and probably useful interventions, while recognizing the institutional constraints of the medical consultation. The limited amount of time in which a medical consultation is conducted and the legal requirement of obtaining the patient’s informed consent are incentives for the doctor to try to obtain the patient’s concordance to his/her medical advice in a dialectically sound and rhetorically efficient manner. The overall dialectical goal that the doctor can be said to pursue in argumentative discourse in medical consultation is to reasonably resolve the difference of opinion with the patient over the standing of a patient’s health concerns and an expert, medical point of view. Argumentative engagements in medical consultation typically arise from an initial lack of concordance between the doctor and patient as to the standing of a health issue. At elementary level, the argument is made that a health concern can be identified and treated as a medical problem with reasonable chance of success. Once identified and reasonably argued, a patient may question or even disagree with a prognosis or diagnosis, of course, continuing the discussion. The overall rhetorical goal that the doctor can be said to pursue is to use time wisely through reasonably presenting choices that are relevant, comparable, and available to a patient in order to obtain the patient’s consent as to the risks and benefits of choices available or agreement about a certain treatment. Although the patient’s consent to or agreement with the doctor’s medical advice does not necessarily lead to the patient’s actual compliance with this advice, it constitutes a prerequisite for compliance and is therefore important to obtain. A doctor may rely upon authority by arguing for one course of action that is preferred. A more engaging consultation requires that time be spent explaining available choices in ways that strengthen the patient’s ability to come to an informed decision after
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weighing the variety of risks, alternatives, and outcomes supported and criticized by the doctor. Strategic maneuvering calls attention to how key claims are made to matter by the doctor in constructing a meaningful discussion with the patient. A doctor’s ethos enhancing maneuvers in medical consultation can, consequently, be regarded as the result of (1) the pursuit of dialectical goals of reasonably resolving the difference of opinion about the patient’s health related problem and (2) the rhetorical goals of enhancing a patient’s capacity to decide and pursue the needed course of action. To determine how ethos enhancing maneuvers by the doctor contribute to the pursuits of these goals, we shall continue with the analysis of such maneuvers in concrete cases of argumentative discourse in medical consultation. 5.â•… A doctor’s ethos enhancing maneuvers to built trust and stress expertise How can a doctor’s ethos enhancing maneuvers in medical consultation contribute to the pursuit of dialectical and rhetorical goals? Ethos enhancing maneuvers seem to contribute primarily to a discussion party’s attempt to resolve efficaciously uncertainty or differences in a way that builds confidence and trust among parties, a rhetorical goal. By means of a strategic maneuver that strengthens ethos, the discussion party presents the starting point that s/he can be trusted so as to build confidence. In terms of the standard pragma-dialectical theory, the maneuver hence contributes to the openings stage of the argumentative discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004:â•›59–61). This indeed corresponds with the traditional distinction between ethos and logos (Aristotle Rhetorica, I2-1356a). A maneuver by which a discussion party’s ethos is enhanced affects the persuasiveness of a party’s discussion contributions, but does not necessarily contribute specifics to the strictly rational resolution of a dispute, the discussion party’s dialectical goal. The use of an appeal to authority alone risks substituting prestige gaining compliance for committed understanding and informed agreement. Even so, a discussion party’s ethos enhancing maneuver does not necessarily frustrate or hinder the reasonable resolution of a difference of opinion. For the critical evaluation of some discussion topics, specialized knowledge might be required. Yet, an audience does not always possess such knowledge. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992:â•›136) point out that “We all regularly have to accept certain things on the authority of experts; it could not be otherwise.” From a pragmadialectical perspective, an ethos enhancing maneuver may be regarded as sound when the exchange of opinions is performed in a manner that is responsive to the discussion topic and context potentials, fitting to the understanding of the parties engaged, and supportive of expanded communicative competence. The starting
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points that are contributed to the discussion’s opening stage by means of an ethos enhancing maneuver can, in fact, be used as propositions in arguments, which are presented in the argumentation stage of the argumentative discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004:â•›61). The maneuver could, therefore, further the reasonable resolution of a difference of opinion. Case 2 provides an example of a medical consultation in which the doctor’s ethos enhancing maneuver can be reconstructed as primarily advancing his rhetorical aim of efficiently resolving the dispute in a way that enhances the possibility of informed agreement. In this consultation, a Dutch GP discusses the treatment of a patient’s bad knee. Case 2 Excerpt of a medical consultation between a general practitioner (D) and a patient (P) who suffers from a bad knee (obtained from the database compiled by the Netherlands Institute for Health Services Research, transcription and translation by RP, original conversation in grey) 1. D: And physiotherapy takes time. (En fysiotherapie kost tijd.) 2. P: Yes, that’s exactly it [the problem]. (Ja, dat is ‘t hem [het probleem] nu juist.) 3. D: But Anne, you still remember that if you don’t have time for it, then you have to ask yourself some questions. And now you’re ill again. (Maar Anne, jij herinnert je nog dat als je er geen tijd meer voor hebt, dan moet je wat vragen aan jezelf stellen. En nu ben je weer ziek.) 4. P: Of course I do take time. Sometimes. (Natuurlijk neem ik wel tijd. Soms.) 5. D: Sometimes. (Soms.) 6. P: Sometimes it’s just not possible. (Soms kan ‘t gewoon niet.) 7. D: Well, no, I actually do understand that, the situation that you’re in now. I just very clearly indicate like: carrying on can strain it at a certain moment. Yeah, and you don’t want to have that. Do you understand? [As in: “Right?”] And that could also be nasty. (Nou, nee, ik snap dat best wel, de situatie waarin je nu zit. Ik geef alleen heel duidelijk aan van: doorsjouwen kan ook de zaak forceren op een gegeven moment. Ja, en daar kom je niet graag mee thuis. Snap je? En dat zou ook vervelend zijn.) 8. P: Yeah. (Ja.)
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At the start of the argumentative discussion in Case 2, the doctor reminds the patient that physiotherapy for the knee takes time (turn 1). The patient reacts to the doctor’s reminder by pointing out that the fact that physiotherapy takes time is exactly the problem that she has with this treatment (turn 2). Subsequently, the doctor moves to make the claim: “If you don’t have time for it [physiotherapy], then you have to ask yourself some questions”, particularly because the patient appears “ill again” to the doctor (turn 3). The patient equivocates in response, claiming that she does “take time” but only “sometimes” (turn 4). The doctor indicates that just taking time sometimes is not enough (turn 5), but the patient stands her ground; she is of the opinion that it is sometimes just not possible to take more time (turn 6). To counter the patient’s position, the doctor presents the pragmatic argument that, although he understands where the patient is coming from, the patient cannot carry on without physiotherapy; that could have nasty consequences (turn 7). After the doctor presented this pragmatic argumentation, the patient agrees with him (turn 8). The doctor’s understanding, as expressed when he presents the pragmatic argument in turn 7, can be reconstructed as an ethos enhancing maneuver. By expressing his understanding, the doctor shows that he is a considerate discussion party. Such maneuvering can be regarded as a way to (re)establish the patient’s trust in the doctor or, in terms of the extended pragma-dialectical theory, as a way to adapt to audience demand (van Eemeren, 2010:â•›94). A medical consultation is characterized by cooperative face-to-face conversational interaction. The doctor’s disagreement with the patient’s stance on physiotherapy might, therefore, come across as impolite. By expressing understanding, the doctor attempts to mitigate the threat that the disagreement poses to the patient’s positive face. According to Brown and Levinson (1987:â•›62), a person’s “positive face” can be defined as “the want of every member that his [or her] wants be desirable to at least some others”. By presenting the ethos enhancing maneuver, the doctor recognizes the patient “wants to be desirable”: he chooses to express his understanding, rather than address other issues. Pragma-dialectically speaking, the doctor makes an opportune selection from the topical potential available to him (van Eemeren, 2010:â•›95). The idea that the doctor presents his ethos enhancing maneuver to mitigate the threat that his disagreement with the patient poses to the patient’s positive face is indeed supported by the doctor’s use of the pragmatic marker “actually” [or the Dutch “best wel”] (in his utterance “I actually do understand that, the situation that you’re in now” [“Ik snap dat best wel, de situatie waarin je nu zit”], turn 7). Andersen (1984:â•›73) points out that “the pragmatic marker actually has a strong flavour of meaning equivalent to ‘contrary to what you might expect’ or ‘strange as it may seem’↜”. The doctor’s use of “actually” indicates that, contrary to what the patient might expect based on the doctor’s disagreement with the patient’s stance
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on physiotherapy, the doctor does understand why the patient does not always take the necessary time for the recovery of her knee. In terms of strategic maneuvering, the doctor uses presentational devices to indicate that he is aware that his contributions could come across as impolite, but should not be understood as such (van Eemeren, 2010:â•›94). So, the doctor in Case 2 adapts to audience demand by his ethos enhancing maneuver to (re)establish the patient’s trust in him. The doctor does so by selecting to express his understanding from the available topical potential and using presentational devices to mitigate the potentially perceived impoliteness of his discussion contributions. In other words, the doctor enhances his ethos by simultaneously making expedient use of the three aspects in his strategic maneuvers. The doctor can be regarded to aim at enhancing the patient’s capacity to pursue the needed course of action (taking time for physiotherapy). His ethos enhancing maneuver in Case 2 can be reconstructed as a strategic move that contributes to the doctor’s pursuit of his rhetorical goal. The maneuver does not necessarily affect the reasonable resolution of the difference of opinion between the doctor and patient. Simply trusting a doctor does, pragma-dialectically speaking, not contribute to the critical testing procedure of the medical advice, it just contributes to the discussion’s opening stage. The doctor’s ethos enhancing maneuver does not frustrate or hinder the critical testing procedure either- the doctor does not seem to violate any of the pragma-dialectical discussion rules by performing the maneuver (see, on the pragma-dialectical discussion rules, van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004:â•›135–157 and 190–196). The doctor’s ethos enhancing strategy could, hence, be regarded as “dialectically neutral”. An example of a doctor’s ethos enhancing maneuver that can be reconstructed as positively contributing to the pursuit of the doctor’s rhetorical goal as well as his/her dialectical goal can be found in Case 3. In this consultation, a Dutch pediatrician discusses an additional blood test with the mother of a little girl with behavioral and developmental problems. Case 3 Excerpt of an argumentative discussion between a pediatrician (D) and the mother (M) of a child patient with behavioral and developmental problems (obtained from the database compiled by the Netherlands Institute for Health Services Research, transcription and translation by RP, original conversation in grey) 1. D: There’s, yeah, there’s a very small indication [that there is an anomaly] in that [the child’s] digestion, but they [the lab] say we can only determine or see that if we do an additional blood test. (Er is, ja, er is een hele kleine aanwijzing [dat er een afwijking is] in die stofwisseling [van het kind], maar ze [het lab] zeggen we kunnen
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dat alleen maar bepalen of bekijken als we nog een aanvullend bloedonderzoek doen.) 2. M: But that, that it wouldn’t function well or, or, how do I erm … (Maar dat, dat het niet goed zou werken of, of, hoe moet ik dat uhm…) 3. D: Roughly speaking, erm, you have to think about that. That there’s a small mistake somewhere there in the digestion which, erm, could explain the problems. But, I’ve got to say, I think it’s but a straw. I don’t think like “Oh, now, that’s fantastic; we’ve found something and, erm, we can work with that”. I’m like “Well, yeah, it’s a straw” and I’m like, well, god, if you do such a test and so you’ve already done those steps, and if they [the lab] advise that – it’s a good bunch that checks that – then I’d be tempted to do that in any case. (Grofweg, uhm, moet u daaraan denken. Dat er ergens in die stofwisseling een klein foutje zou schuilen waardoor, uhm, de problemen te verklaren valt. Maar ik moet zeggen, ik vind het ook maar een strohalmpje hoor. Ik heb niet zo van “Oh, nou dat is fantastisch; we hebben iets gevonden en, uhm, daar kunnen we mee uit de voeten”. Ik heb zoiets van “Nou, tja, het is een strohalm” en ik heb zoiets van, nou ja, god, als je zo’n onderzoek doet en je hebt dus al van die stappen gedaan, en als ze [het lab] dat adviseren – het is wel een hele goeie club die dat nakijkt – dan zal ikzelf de neiging hebben om dat in ieder geval te doen.) In Case 3, the doctor implicitly puts forward the standpoint that the mother should let her daughter undergo an additional blood test. The doctor asserts that the lab can only determine whether there is an anomaly in the child’s digestion if they perform an additional blood test (turn 1) and the doctor subsequently expresses her agreement with this assertion by stating “I’d be tempted to do that in any case” (turn 3). In support of her standpoint, the doctor argues that the mother has already taken steps and could just as well let her child undergo the additional blood test, especially because the lab people are competent at performing such tests. By presenting these reasons, it appears that the doctor assumes that the mother is hesitant to adopt her advice – otherwise there would be no need for the presented argumentation. The mother neither confirms nor rejects this assumption in the excerpt. The doctor’s statement that she would be tempted to let the patient undergo the additional blood test herself can be reconstructed as an ethos enhancing maneuver. By this conversational maneuver, the doctor identifies herself with the mother, indirectly showing that she is a compassionate (and therefore trustworthy) discussion party. Similar to the ethos enhancing strategy in Case 2, this maneuver by the doctor in Case 3 can enhance the mother’s willingness to pursue the needed course of action (letting her daughter undergo the additional blood test).
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Simultaneously, the ethos enhancing argumentation in the present case indicates the doctor’s credibility. By emphasizing that she would herself let the lab perform an additional blood test for the patient, the doctor implies that she has done everything in her professional capacity to correctly diagnose the patient (only information from a third party can now help making the diagnosis). The doctor thereby indicates that there is no reason for the mother to doubt the doctor’s expertise and the way the doctor has consulted so far, making clear an additional reason in support of her advice to let the patient undergo the blood test. Simultaneously, the expertise that can be inferred from the doctor’s ethos enhancing maneuver can again augment the mother’s trust in the doctor. So, the ethos enhancing maneuver in Case 3 can be reconstructed as advancing both the doctor’s rhetorical and dialectical goals. The doctor uses presentational devices in such a way that she indirectly adapts to the patient’s demand by selecting to present herself as a compassionate discussion party as well as a professionally credible authority from the topical potential available to her. The doctor’s conveyed compassion could advance the pursuit of her rhetorical goal; the doctor’s expressed concerns could enhance the mother’s trust in the doctor’s advice and, thereby, her willingness to let her daughter undergo an additional blood test. The doctor’s conveyed professional expertise appears to advance the pursuit of both her rhetorical and her dialectical goals; the doctor’s expertise provides a basis for enhancing the doctor’s trustworthiness as well as an argument in support of letting the lab perform the additional blood test. 6.â•… Conclusion In medical consultation, argumentation may play an important role. A patient’s health related issues, and the doctor’s medical advice, are central to such a consultation. A patient’s uncertainty or hesitance about such advice could be addressed and perhaps overcome by the doctor when providing information about the patient’s health problems and argumentation in support of relevant claims and advocated or evaluated treatment options. The context of the medical consultation affects the manner in which the doctor and patient discuss health related issues. A doctor has to conduct the medical consultation in an efficient and efficacious manner. During a consultation, a doctor might not only have to provide the patient with a diagnosis, prognosis and/or medical advice, but also has to inform fully the patient about the reasons for the diagnosis, prognosis or advised treatment option(s), alternative treatment option(s) and consequences of refraining from treatment. This can be particularly complicated given that the doctor’s medical claims about the patient’s health related
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issues might have a big impact on the patient and are, therefore, potentially consequence laden. As the participants in a medical consultation characteristically differ in the amount of knowledge they possess about, and experiences they have with, the health issues in question, dialectical attention to testing claims and rhetorical adaptation to establishing confidence are necessary in a doctor’s contributions to argumentative discourse in medical consultation. As a result of these characteristics of medical consultation, a doctor can be regarded to pursue (1) the dialectical goal of reasonably resolving the difference of opinion about the patient’s health related problem and the prudence of medical advice in discussion contributions, while simultaneously aiming to obtain (2) the rhetorical goal of enhancing a patient’s capacity to reach an informed, prudent decision about the options at issue. To simultaneously pursue these goals, the doctor maneuvers strategically in the argumentative discourse. Some of the doctor’s strategic maneuvers can be expected to further the doctor’s aim to obtain his/her dialectical and rhetorical goals through enhancing ethos. In this contribution, we showed that a doctor could enhance ethos by stressing expertise and (thereby) building the patient’s trust in the doctor. Based on the analysis of examples of a doctor’s ethos enhancing maneuvers taken from Dutch medical practice, we argue that a doctor could advance the pursuit of a rhetorical goal by building trust (through demonstrating characteristics such as compassion). These maneuvers need not be fallacious; they could be “dialectically neutral” or contribute to the pursuit of the doctor’s dialectical goal of working toward a shared reasoned understanding with the patient in the interest of crafting an informed agreement. Based on our analysis of a doctor’s ethos enhancing maneuvers as strategic maneuvers that can soundly contribute to the resolution of a difference of opinion in medical consultation, the specific soundness conditions for such maneuvers can be specified. These conditions can be used to provide a context sensitive evaluation of a doctor’s ethos enhancing maneuvers. Moreover, they can function as a starting point for formulating guidelines for the way in which medical professionals should conduct argumentative discussions in medical consultations.
Notes 1.â•… We used excerpts from consultations that were follow-up meetings between the doctor and the patient – or, in case of a pediatric consult, between the doctor and a representative of the patient. The consultations did not deal with emergencies or life-threatening situations. 2.â•… In 2005, for instance, an average of 2,529 patients registered per GP (see Kroneman, van der Zee & Groot, 2009:â•›26).
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Literature Andersen, G. (2001). Pragmatic markers and sociolinguistic variation. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. Aristotle. On rhetoric: A theory of civic discourse. Trans. George A. Kennedy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. Aristotle. The art of rhetoric [Rhetorica]. Trans. Lawson-Tancred, H.C. (2004). London: Penguin Books Ltd. Berg, M. van den (2004). Drukke praktijken, minder tijd voor patiënten? [Busy practices, less time for patients?]. Huisarts & Wetenschap 47(7), 321. Brown, J.B., M. Stewart & B.L. Ryan (2003). Outcomes of patient-provider interaction. In: T.L. Thompson, A.M. Dorsey, K.I. Miller & R. Parrott (Eds.), Handbook of health communication. (pp. 141–162, Ch. 7), Mahwah/London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Brown, P.& C.S. Levinson (1987). Politeness: Some universals in language use. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Campbell, J.L., J. Mendive & A. Timmermans (2004). Primary care and general practice in Europe: West and south. In: R. Jones, N. Britten, L. Culpepper, D. Gass, R. Grol, D. Mant, & C. Silagy (Eds.), Oxford textbook of primary medical care.1(2.6). CBS (2010). Door huisarts geregistreerde contacten; leeftijd en geslacht [By GP registered contacts; age and gender]. Retreived from http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?DM=SLNL&P A=80191ned&D1=0,4&D2=0&D3=21–26&D4=0&D5=a&HDR=G3,G1,G4&STB=T,G2& VW=T on 15 July 2010. Deveugele, M., A. Derese, S. De Maesschalck, S. Willems, M. Van Driel & J. De Maeseneer (2005). Teaching communication skills to medical students, a challenge in the curriculum? Patient Education and Counseling 58, 265–270. Eemeren, F.H. van (2010). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. Eemeren, F.H. van & R. Grootendorst (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation: A pragmadialectical approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Eemeren, F.H. van & P. Houtlosser (1999). Strategic manoeuvring in argumentative discourse. Discourse Studies, 1(4), 479–497. Eemeren, F.H. van & P. Houtlosser (2000). Rhetorical analysis within a pragma-dialectical framework: The case of J. Reynolds. Argumentation 14(3), 293–305. Eemeren, F.H. van & P. Houtlosser (2002a). Strategic maneuvering win argumentative discourse: Maintaining a delicate balance. In: F.H. van Eemeren & P. Houtlosser (Eds.), Dialectic and rhetoric: The warp and woof of argumentation analysis. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic (pp. 131–159). Eemeren, F.H. van & P. Houtlosser (2002b). Strategic maneuvering with the burden of proof. In: F.H. van Eemeren (Ed.), Advances in pragma-dialectics. Amsterdam: Sic Sat (pp.13–38). Goodnight, G.T. (2006). When reasons matter most: Pragma-dialectics and the problem of informed consent. In: P. Houtlosser, & A. van Rees (Eds.), Considering pragma-dialectics (pp. 75–85, Ch. 7), Mahwah/London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Halloran, M.S. (1982). Aristotle’s concept of ethos, or if not his somebody else’s. Rhetoric Review 1(1), 58–63. Have, P. ten (1991). Talk and institution: A reconsideration of the “asymmetry” of doctor-patient interaction. In: D. Boden, & D.H. Zimmerman (Eds.), Talk in social structure: Studies in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (pp. 138–163, Ch. 6), Cambridge: Polity Press.
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Health Insurance Act (2006). Zorgverzekeringswet (Zvw). Retrieved from http://www.st-ab.nl/ wetzvw.htm on 15 July 2010. Heath, C. (1986). Body movement and speech in medical interaction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kroneman, M., J. van der Zee & W. Groot (2009). Income development of General Practitioners in eight European countries from 1975 to 2005. BMC Health Services Research 9(26). Law on the medical treatment agreement (1995). Wet op de geneeskundige behandelingsovereenkomst. Retrieved from http://www.hulpgids.nl/index.php?mid=153&content=87 on 15 July 2010. Ministry of Health, Welfare & Sport (2010a). Vraag en antwoord: Wat is zorgtoeslag? [Question and answer: What is health care allowance?]. Retrieved from http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ onderwerpen/zorgverzekering/vraag-en-antwoord/wat-is-zorgtoeslag.html#voorwaardenzorgtoeslag on 15 July 2010. Ministry of Health, Welfare & Sport (2010b). Vraag en antwoord: Wat zit er in het basispakket van de zorgverzekering? [Question and answer: What is included in the standard health insurance package?]. Retrieved from http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/ vragen-en-antwoorden/wat-zit-er-in-het-basispakket-van-de-zorgverzekering.html on 15 July 2010. Pilgram, R. (2009). Argumentation in doctor-patient interaction: Medical consultation as a pragma-dialectical communicative activity type. Studies in Communication Sciences 9(2), 153–169. Schulz, P.J. & S. Rubinelli (2006). Healthy arguments for literacy in health. Paper presented at the 2006 Spring Symposia of the American Association for Artificial Intelligence. Retrieved from http://www.aaai.org/Papers/Symposia/Spring/2006/SS-06-01/SS06-01-014.pdf on 15 July 2010. Schulz, P.J. & S. Rubinelli (2008). Arguing ‘for’ the patient: Informed consent and strategic maneuvring in doctor-patient interaction. Healthy arguments for literacy in health. Argumentation 22, 423–432. Tuckett, D., M. Boulton, C. Olson & A. Williams (1985). Meeting between experts: An approach to sharing ideas in medical consultations. London/New York: Tavistock Publications. Wensing, M., R. Baker, J. Szecsenyi & R. Grol (2004). Impact of national health care systems on patient evaluations of general practice in Europe. Health Policy 68, 353–357.
“Try the smarter way” On the claimed efficacy of advertised medicines Lotte van Poppel & Sara Rubinelli 1.â•… Introduction A striking feature of health communication that is often overlooked is its essentially argumentative dimension. Patients and consumers are exposed to information they must not only understand, but also to argumentation they must evaluate critically in order to form decisions on how to act (Rubinelli & Schulz 2006). To make this possible, patients need to receive the right amount of information and of the right kind so that they are able to make their own choices deliberately and based on sufficient knowledge (Schulz & Nakamoto 2005). Where argumentation is provided by experts, however, this evaluation issue becomes problematic. While healthcare experts are legally bound to disclose certain information to patients (e.g. about the benefits and the risks of certain treatments), in supporting their advice argumentatively they might be driven by a rhetorical goal of persuasion that makes – for personal, institutional or marketing reasons – reaching patients’ agreement and compliance with their advice the ultimate objective. Whenever the goal of persuasion prevails, patients’ right of autonomous decision-making risks being compromised. This risk can become even greater considering that patients, on average, lack the scientific knowledge and the expertise required to disentangle normatively dubious arguments (Schulz & Rubinelli 2008). This contribution discusses one instance of this risk by focusing on the advertising of prescription medicines to patients (the so-called Direct-To-Consumer Advertising, henceforth DTCA) by pharmaceutical companies. This type of advertising through traditional media is currently allowed only in the United States and New Zealand (Donohue et al. 2007). However, there is strenuous lobbying in many countries and in the European Parliament to relax national restrictions on it (Meek 2007). Despite not being legal in Europe, DTCA is spreading via the internet (Orizio et al. 2009). The debate over the benefits and risks of DTCA is significant. Those who support DTCA argue that medicine advertising is a form of public health education
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that ultimately results in the improved health status of the population. Detractors of DTCA see it as being exclusively driven by a profit motive, and they argue that it encourages excessive, unnecessary and potentially dangerous use of prescription medicines (Calfee 2007; Frosch et al. 2010). The evidence is that sales after DTCA are increasing. The US General Accounting Office estimates that 8.5 million consumers annually request and receive from their physician a prescription for a particular drug in response to seeing an advert (Gellad & Lyles 2007). The persuasiveness of DTCA leads to questions concerning the nature of the information that it provides. As shown in previous research (Rubinelli et al. 2008 and 2006; Rubinelli 2005), DTCA argues around the main standpoint “Ask your doctor about X” (where X stands for the name of the medicine advertised), which is legally bound to appear in the main text of each advert. Since the medicines advertised typically have competitors, it is less evident why patients should enquire for that specific medicine and not for a similar one. Thus, the main section of each advert contains arguments in support of the superiority of the medicine advertised comparing to the others available on the market (Rubinelli 2005). The aim of this contribution is to verify to what extent DTCA provides enough information to adequately evaluate the efficacy of the medicines advertised. To do so we will rely on pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984, 1992, 2004) as the analytical framework for the assessment of potentially fallacious moves. Our analysis will be performed in three stages: firstly, we will justify our choice of pragma-dialectics; secondly, we will explain what “enough information” means, as the basis for the identification of eventual fallacious moves; thirdly, we will analyze two adverts that represent a case in point for our claims. In the discussion section of the paper, we will focus on the conceptual and political implications of our study. In particular, we will show how the study of DTCA through pragma-dialectics can enrich evaluative frameworks of advert quality that are currently at disposal of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the institutional body that is in charge of the regulation of DTCA.1 2.â•… Assessing the quality of argumentation in advertising The evaluative literature on the quality of advertising is rich in consumer research. Yet, the study of argument quality in advertising has been largely neglected in this field (McGuire 2000). Petty and Cacioppo (1986) mentioned the concept of “argument quality” in discussing the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM). However, as claimed by O’Keefe and Jackson (1995), their analysis of this concept is vague. Generally speaking, it is not clear which dimensions have to be taken
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into consideration for evaluating the quality of arguments. We agree with Areni and Lutz (1988) and Boller et al. (1990) that the conceptual meaning of argument quality is mainly based on the argumentative structure contained in the persuasive message. Yet, most theories used in consumer research for assessing the structures of arguments in advertising are too restrictive to capture many of the devices used in verbal arguments in advertising and leave out the analysis of crucial aspects of argumentation (Deighton 1985). The pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984, 2004) offers a method to conduct a thorough analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse. Argumentation is seen as an attempt to solve or prevent a difference of opinion by putting the acceptability of a standpoint that is in doubt to the test. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 2004) formulated an ideal model of a critical discussion with ten discussion rules and argue that a true resolution of a dispute can only be achieved when all contributions are in accordance with the code of conduct. In practice, arguers will not only try to solve the dispute, but will also strive for rhetorical success. According to pragma-dialectics, when rhetorical considerations take the upper hand and one of the discussion rules is violated, the so-called strategic manoeuvring derails, and the move is considered to be fallacious (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002 and 2005). Pragma-dialectics helps to assess whether DTCA is not too much steered by rhetorical considerations and whether these adverts still facilitate patients in evaluating the argumentation concerning the efficacy of a medicine. 3.â•… R equirements for the quality of argumentation on the effects of medicines As we shall show below, central to DTCA are claims concerning the efficacy of the advertised medicines in the perspective of supporting the validity of the claim “Ask your doctor about X”. The type of argumentation in which one points at the (beneficial) effects of something in order to justify a prescriptive claim such as “Do X”, is called pragmatic argumentation.2 By relying on pragma-dialectical rule 8, we can verify whether the argument schemes on which the argument given in support of this pragmatic argumentation is based have been correctly applied. Rule 8 commands that standpoints can only be regarded as conclusively defended if they are defended by argumentation based on appropriate argument schemes which are correctly applied (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004:â•›194). For an argument scheme to be correctly applied, it must fulfill certain correctness conditions that correspond with particular critical questions belonging to the used
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scheme (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992:â•›162). In order to thoroughly evaluate pragmatic argumentation, one must ask the following critical questions: 1. Is the mentioned effect (Y) really so desirable? 2. Will what is presented as the cause (Z) indeed lead to what is presented as the desirable effect (Y)? 3. Are there any other factors that need to be present together with what is presented as the cause (Z) to achieve the mentioned desirable effect (Y)? 4. Does the mentioned cause (Z) not have any serious undesirable side effects? 5. Could the mentioned effect (Y) be achieved more easily by way of another measure? (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992:â•›102; Garssen 1997:â•›22) These questions represent the criticism the other party might have in response to pragmatic argumentation. The better an arguer anticipates these critical questions, the greater the chance that the difference of opinion is resolved reasonably. Questions 1 and 4 concern the desirability of the effects of the medicines and the answer, in dealing with people affected by a health condition and with medicines that are expected to treat that condition, seems to be self-evident. Our analysis below will, however, focus on how the advert deals with questions 2, 3 and 5 that refer to the efficacy of the drug. More specifically, if we ask ourselves what type of information should be provided in order to inform patients about the efficacy of a medicine, the answer is straightforward. By definition, the efficacy of a medicine is the capacity that the medicine has to produce a certain/desired benefit (e.g. relief from seasonal allergy). This issue is dealt with in critical question 2: this question deals with the assumed causal relation between using the drug AND getting better (A). Ideally, patients should receive an indication of the percentage of people who take the medicine and get better. Indeed, it makes a difference in terms of efficacy whether a drug works for 30%, 50% or for 90% of patients. Disclosure of the percentage of success reveals, as the other side of the coin, the percentage of patients who use the drug BUT do not get better (B) which is, clearly, another important aspect to consider in order to build appropriate expectations. Critical question 3 in fact points at the possibility that some people take the medicine but don’t get better (B) because some other condition for effective use of the drug is not fulfilled (e.g. that the patient should adhere to some special diet). In the context of drug advertisements, critical question 5 refers to possible alternative measures to get the desired effect that the advertised drug supposedly produces. Patients would need to consider that there are people who do not use this drug/but use other drugs and get better as well (C). As the literature underlines,
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for patients and consumers to be informed, they need access to reports comparing the efficacies of drugs for the same condition to each other (European Medicine Agency 2009). It follows from here that, when assessing the efficacy of medicines, patients would need to consider the percentage of people who do not use the drug advertised but still get better because they use other drugs and, of course, of people who use other drugs and do not get better (D). By analyzing two adverts found in recent U.S. magazines, we shall explain how advertisers manoeuvre with their pragmatic argumentation in such a way that these critical questions seem to be answered satisfactorily. 4.â•… The analysis For the analysis of instances of strategic manoeuvering in DTCA we selected two adverts that were published between 2002 and 2007 in the U.S. women’s magazine Good Housekeeping. The magazine is one of the top ten best selling magazines in the United States and offers articles and advice on food, health, family, home and products. We analyzed adverts for very diverse products: namely Remdex, a drug to fight colds and BenzaClin, a drug to treat acne. 4.1â•… Remdex Remdex is a drug in tablets that is meant to reduce the effects of a cold. In the advert the consumer is encouraged to use Remdex with the prescriptive claim “Take Remdex at the first sign of a cold”. This claim can be considered as the standpoint that the advertiser is trying to defend. In smaller print the standpoint is reformulated as “Before you try anything else, try the smarter way to fight colds”, which is defended with the pragmatic argument that “New Remdex is clinically shown to reduce the severity and duration of a cold by helping your immune system attack the germs that can cause colds”. Other arguments in support of the standpoint are that Remdex is a “safe and natural formulation” that “comes in easy-to-swallow tablets”. The underlying argumentation structure can be reconstructed as follows:
1. Before you try anything else, try Remdex, the smarter way to fight colds. 1.1a New Remdex reduces the severity and duration of a cold by helping your immune system attack the germs that can cause colds. 1.1a.1 This is clinically shown. 1.1b Remdex is a safe and natural formulation. 1.1c Remdex comes in easy-to-swallow tablets.
The standpoint implies that using Remdex is a better way to take on colds than using any other method or drug (A against C). In this way, the advertiser anticipates
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critical question 5 about better alternatives to the proposed action. But the implied claim that Remdex is a better drug than others is not supported with further arguments. The advertiser can get away with this, because he does not explicitly state that Remdex is a smarter way than using some other drug, just that it is a smarter way, which may include, for example, smarter than taking no drug at all. With this maneuver, the advertiser strategically avoids claiming something that is probably not true (namely that Remdex is a smarter choice than another, competing drug), while still implying such a claim. He does not have the burden of proof for the claim that Remdex is a smarter choice than a competing drug against colds, though he still indirectly conveys this message. Even though the advertiser does not have the burden of proof for the strong, implied claim, a consumer with doubts will expect the advertiser to justify, in accordance with discussion rule 2 (the burden of proof rule), why Remdex is a smarter way than an alternative measure. As a matter of fact the advertiser presents the claim as self-evident, thereby evading any burden of proof. The main argument is the pragmatic argument in (1.1a) that is supposed to show the efficacy of the drug in fighting colds. The claim that Remdex “reduces the severity and duration of a cold”, is supported by the argument that this is “clinically shown”. As the advert does not present any specific data on the success rate of Remdex, consumers may conclude on the basis of this argument that the drug always reduces the severity and duration of a cold, which is very unlikely. With the vague statement that the efficacy of Remdex is “clinically shown”, the advertiser does not provide the necessary information to answer critical question 2 (Will the drug indeed lead to the desirable effect?) satisfactorily. By exploiting the vagueness of his statement, the advertiser lets consumers focus on the benefits of using the drug (A) while ignoring the possibility that the drug does not produce the desired effect (B). A maneuver in which the arguer abuses vagueness to improve his own position in the discussion, is considered as a violation of rule 10, the language use rule. Argument (1.1b) addresses consumers’ potential doubts concerning the safety of the product and the way the drug is to be used. The argument can be regarded as a maneuver to anticipate critical question 4 that refers to undesirable side-effects of the drug. Stating that the drug is “safe and natural” implies that at least no serious side-effects are to be expected, but even so, they can not be excluded. 4.2â•… BenzaClin In the advert for BenzaClin, a prescription acne drug, an attempt is made to convince the consumer to “See your doctor about prescription BenzaClin”. The argumentation structure can be reconstructed as follows:
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1. See your doctor about prescription BenzaClin. 1.1 If you use BenzaClin, you can face the world again. 1.1.1 BenzaClin effectively and gently treats blackheads, whiteheads, and pimples associated with acne. 1.2 You will not find this combination of two proven acne fighters (benzoyl peroxide and clindamycin) in cosmetics or over-the-counter products. 1.3 It can easily be applied under makeup. 1.4 BenzaClin is the no.1 prescribed topical gel for acne.
The sentence that attracts the most attention in this advert is the question: “Can’t face your adult acne anymore?”. With this maneuver, the advertiser appeals to consumers who consider their acne as a serious problem and who need a solution for it. In the next line, the advert presents this solution: “See your doctor about prescription BenzaClin and face the world again”. This statement includes the pragmatic argument that using BenzaClin has the desirable effect that one can “face the world again”. The pragmatic argument is supported by the subordinate argument that “BenzaClin effectively and gently treats blackheads, whiteheads, and pimples associated with acne”, but no data are given to support this claim. Information on the possible negative side-effects is provided at the bottom of the advert. Argument (1.2) constitutes a maneuver to anticipate critical question 5 (Could the mentioned effect be achieved more easily by way of another measure?), as it implies that BenzaClin is better than (over-the-counter) alternatives (A against C). However, the fact that “You will not find this combination of two proven acne fighters (benzoyl peroxide and clindamycin) in cosmetics or over-thecounter products” does not mean that this combination works better than overthe-counter drugs that do not have these ingredients nor that it works better than other prescription drugs. Argument (1.4) is problematic as well. By arguing that “BenzaClin is the no.1 prescribed topical gel for acne”, it is suggested that just the fact that a drug is prescribed makes the drug superior over other drugs, but that does not need to be the case: doctors may have other considerations besides a drug’s efficacy to prescribe one brand instead of another. Moreover, the statement only refers to the no. 1 topical gel: there could be other superior products which just come in a different substance, lotion, for instance. On top of that, it is unclear who actually prescribes the product that much, thus making it hard to verify the claim. In this case, the advertiser potentially violates the argumentation scheme rule (rule 8) as he relies on the number of doctors who prescribe BenzaClin to justify the standpoint that the consumer should ask for the drug as well. The vagueness in several formulations, such as “face the world again”, “↜‘no. 1 prescribed topical gel’,↜” and “You will not find this combination etc.” might be considered violations of the language use rule (rule 10). Taken literally, these arguments do not seem to
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be relevant for the standpoint at issue, so consumers will take the statements in a much broader sense. The advert thus prompts much stronger claims than the advertiser can actually account for. 5.â•… Discussion The American Medical Association, whose constituency has traditionally opposed prescription drug advertising to consumers, issued a statement that concluded: “If used appropriately, direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising has the potential to increase patient awareness about treatment options and enhance patient-physician communication” (AMA 2000). One of the main reasons for these optimistic views on DTCA is that this type of advertising, differently from that of other products, is regulated by the FDA (Stolberg 2000). This institution must review all DTC advertising to ensure that it adheres to certain guidelines. The review process can be summarized as follows: drugs that are marketed must first prove to be safe and effective. Either before or at the start of a campaign advertisers must submit advertising materials for inspection. The review process takes approximately four weeks. Consumer-directed advertisers who do not adhere to the guidelines receive letters from the FDA that contain a description of any violations and instruction on how the advertisements can be corrected. Every pharmaceutical company that has received a letter has to cease dissemination of the advertisement and has to make necessary changes in order to continue running the message (Sheehan 2003; GAO 2006). The most important aspect for marketing appropriately is the communication of efficacy concerns – our focus in this contribution. For the FDA it is important that in DTCA the efficacy of drugs is not overstated. In the letters that the FDA sends, there are specific complaints on the efficacy: in particular, a drug must not be portrayed as better or more effective than has been demonstrated by substantial evidence or substantial clinical experience. Advertisers must not provide “overstated benefits”, “unsubstantiated claims”, or suggest “drug has broader usage”. For the FDA it is crucial to detach in DTCA potentially misleading information on the efficacy of a certain drug. If we look, however, at the sort of mistakes that they find in these adverts (the review letters by the FDA are public, and can be found online) we clearly see that the FDA only criticizes that information which is misleading because, in terms of the clinical data available from trials, it is unsupported. An example of this is an advert for Crestor (a drug for lowering cholesterol – the ad has now been withdrawn from the market). The FDA requested AstraZeneca
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(the maker of Crestor) to immediately cease this promotional dissemination, due to misleading superiority claims – in particular, we read in the letter that: “The presentation is a misleading comparison because it relies solely on data that are not relevant to comparisons of the drugs such as most common doses or starting dose. Specifically, the comparison with Lipitor (a similar drug) is misleading because it suggests that Crestor is superior to Lipitor when in fact none of the approved doses of Crestor was significantly superior to 80mg of Lipitor in the trial studies”.
We have shown in the analysis above that the use of unsupported claims is not the whole story. It is possible to mislead an audience by making an absolute of the success of the defense, evading the burden of proof, choosing an inappropriate argument scheme and misusing unclearness. 6.â•… Conclusion Our study attempted to underline potential flaws in the delivery of information about the efficacy of medicines advertised directly to consumers. The analysis has been performed by using the conceptual framework of pragma-dialectics. The main problem that has emerged is that, going back to paragraph 3, DTCA presents arguments that support A (the link between the use of the drug and the improvement of the condition), while shadowing B (the unsuccessfulness of the drug) or C (the possibility that other drugs can help). These arguments often violate essential aspects of a critical discussion. Most importantly, these are all aspects that should be crucial for the FDA, but are currently unexplored.
Notes 1.â•… In our analysis we will specifically focus on the information presented in the front-page of these adverts that, given its location and style in the ads, is the first source for attitude formation. More detailed clinical information is given in the brief-summary in the back page of the adverts. But brief summaries are proven to be unreadable. Moreover, these pages do not seem to impact the processing of the contents of the ads (Hochhauser 2002). 2.â•… Pragmatic argumentation also has a negative variant that is used to convince the other party not to perform a particular action (for example ‘Do not smoke’) because of the negative consequences of that action (‘Smoking increases the chance of lung cancer’) (see Schellens 1985; Feteris 2002). Since drug advertisements will always be aimed at convincing consumers to buy or ask their physician for a particular product because of the positive consequences, we will only focus on the positive form of pragmatic argumentation here.
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References AMA (2000). The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association. Direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs. Food and Drug Law Journal 55, 119–124. Areni, C. & Lutz, R. (1998). The role of argument quality in the Elaboration Likelihood Model. Advances in Consumer Research 15(1), 197–203. Areni, C. (2002). The proposition-probability model of argument structure and message acceptance. Journal of Consumer Research 29(2), 168–187. Boller, G., Swasy, J. & Munch, J. (1990). Conceptualizing argument quality via argument structure. Advances in Consumer Research 17(1), 321–328. Calfee, J. (2007). An assessment of direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs. Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics 82, 357–360. Deighton, J. (1985). Rhetorical strategies in advertising. Advances in Consumer Research 12, 432–436. Donohue, J. Cevasco, M. & Rosenthal, M. (2007). A decade of direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs. The New England Journal of Medicine 357(7), 673–681. Eemeren, F.H. van & Grootendorst, R. (1984). Speech acts in argumentative discussions: A theoretical model for the analysis of discussions directed towards solving conflicts of opinion. Berlin/Dordrecht: De Gruyter/Floris. Eemeren, F.H. van & Grootendorst, R. (1992). Argumentation, communication and fallacies: A pragma-dialectical perspective. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum. Eemeren, F.H. van & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Eemeren, F.H. van & Houtlosser, P. (2002). Strategic manoeuvring. Maintaining a delicate balance. In F.H. van Eemeren & P. Houtlosser (Eds.), Dialectic and rhetoric: the warp and woof of argumentation analysis. (pp. 131–160). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Eemeren, F.H. van & Houtlosser, P. (2005). Theoretical construction and argumentative reality: An analytic model of critical discussion and conventionalised types of argumentative activity. In D. Hitchcock (Ed.), The Uses of argument: Proceedings of a conference at McMaster University. (pp. 75–84). Hamilton, Ontario: Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. European Medicine Agency (2009). Information on benefit-risk of medicine: patients’, consumers’ and healthcare professionals’ expectations. Available at: http://www.emea.europa.eu/docs/ en_GB/document_library/Other/2009/12/WC500018433.pdf (last access 10 October 2010). Feteris, E.T. (2002). A pragma-dialectical approach to the analysis and evaluation of pragmatic argumentation in a legal context. Argumentation 16(3), 349–367. Frosch, D.L., Grande, D., Tarn, D.M. & Kravitz, R.L. (2010). A decade of controversy. balancing policy with evidence in the regulation of prescription drug advertising. American Journal of Public Health 100 (1), 24–33. GAO-07-54 (2006). Prescription Drugs: Improvements Needed in FDA’s Oversight of Direct toConsumer Advertising (November 16, 2006). Garssen, B.J. (1997). Argumentatieschema’s in pragma-dialectisch perspectief. Een theoretisch en empirisch onderzoek. Dordrecht: ICG Printing b.v. Gellad, Z. & Lyles, K. (2007). Direct-to-consumer advertising of pharmaceuticals. The American Journal of Medicine 120(6), 475–480. Hochhauser, M. (2002). Which prescription for the illegible and unreadable DTC brief summary – major surgery or euthanasia? Managed Care Quarterly 10, 6–10.
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McGuire, W.J. (2000). Standing on the shoulders of ancients: consumer research, persuasion, and figurative language. Journal of Consumer Research 27, 292–295. McQuarrie, E.F. & Mick, D. (1996). Figures of rhetoric in advertising language. Journal of Consumer Research 22(4), 424–435. Meek, C. (2007). Direct-to-consumer advertising debated in the United States and European Union. Canadian Medical Association Journal 176: doi: 10.1503/cmaj.070483. O’Keefe, D. & Jackson, S. (1995). Argument quality and persuasive effects: a review of current approaches. In S. Jackson, Argumentation and values: Proceedings of the ninth Alta conference on argumentation (pp. 88–92). Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association. Orizio, G., Schulz, P., Domenighini, S., Bressanelli, M., Rubinelli, S., Caimi, L. & Gelatti, U. (2009). Online consultations in cyberpharmacies: completeness and patient safety. Telemedicine and e-Health 15 (10), 1022–1025. Petty, R. & Cacioppo, J. (1986). Communication and persuasion: central and peripheral routes to attitude change. New York: Springer-Verlag. Rubinelli, S. (2005). Ask your doctor. Argumentation in advertising of prescription medicaments. Studies in Communication Sciences. Special issue on Health Literacy, 5 (2),75–98. Rubinelli, S., Nakamoto, K., Schulz, P.J. & de Saussure, L. (2006). What are we to think about consumer advertising? A case-study in the field of misinterpreted argumentation. Studies in Communication Sciences 6 (3), 337–348. Rubinelli, S. & Schulz, P.J. (2006). Let me tell you why! When argumentation in doctor-patient interaction makes a difference. Argumentation 20 (3), 353–375. Rubinelli, S., Nakamoto, K. & Schulz, P.J. (2008). The rabbit in the hat: dubious argumentation and the persuasive effects of Direct-To-Consumer Advertising of prescription medicines. Communication & Medicine 5(1), 49–58. Schellens, P.J. (1985). Redelijke argumenten. Een onderzoek naar normen voor kritische lezers. Dordrecht: Foris. Schulz, P.J. & Nakamoto, K. (Eds.) (2005). Enhancing health literacy through communication. Special issue of studies in Communication Sciences 5. Schulz, P.J. & Rubinelli, S. (2008). Arguing ‘for’ the patient. Informed consent and strategic maneuvering in doctor-patient interaction. Argumentation 22 (3), 423–432. Sheehan, K.B. (2003). Balancing acts: an analysis of Food and Drug Administration letters about direct-to-consumer advertising violations. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 22, 159–169. Stolberg, S.G. (2000). Ads that Circumvent Doctors: Want a New Drug? Plenty to Choose From on TV, New York Times, January 23, 2000.
Argument analysis in large-scale deliberation Mark Aakhus & Marcin Lewiński 1.â•… Introduction Among the great many insights that the pragma-dialectical theory – developed by Frans van Eemeren with Rob Grootendorst, Peter Houtlosser, and other collaborators from Amsterdam – has provided to the study of argumentation, the idea that ordinary argumentation is an inherently contextual activity belongs to the most prominent ones. Indeed, it lies at the very heart of the pragma-dialectical theory: in accordance with the meta-theoretical principle of functionalization, argumentation is approached in pragma-dialectics as a ‘language usage process’, that is, a ‘purposive verbal activity’ taking place in various contexts of interaction (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984:â•›7). In this way, pragma-dialectics supersedes the traditional view of argumentation as a constellation of statements (arguments) supporting a thesis (conclusion) and focuses on the ways the process of argumentation is organized in different contexts, and on the kinds of products these contextual processes are likely to engender. Importantly, pragma-dialectics distinguishes between ideal argumentation conceptualized as part of a theoretically devised, regulated dialectical interaction (a critical discussion), and actual argumentation understood as a verbal practice situated in various types of communicative activity (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2005; van Eemeren, Houtlosser, Ihnen & Lewiński 2010; see also van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs 1993). Recently, van Eemeren stressed that the analysis and evaluation of actual contextualized argumentative interactions in different domains of communication should be one of the central areas of study within argumentation theory (van Eemeren 2010: Ch. 5). Thanks to approaching argumentation as both a process and a product of contextualized interaction, the pragma-dialectical perspective allows for a whole new range of research questions relevant to argumentation theory to be addressed. Among such questions are: What is the impact of contextual conditions on the shape of argumentation processes and on the quality of the products of argumentation? Who controls the process of argumentation (arguers themselves, third parties, or impersonal institutional rules and conditions)? How to regulate the process to achieve the preferred product (i.e. reasonable, convincing arguments)? These issues have been investigated in research carried out both by
 Mark Aakhus & Marcin Lewiński
the pragma-dialecticians of the Amsterdam school (see papers collected in van Eemeren 2009) and other scholars who work within the theoretically close framework of ‘normative pragmatics’ (see Aakhus 2003; Jackson & Jacobs 1980; Jacobs 1999; Jacobs & Aakhus 2002; Jacobs & Jackson 1982; Weger & Aakhus 2003). Despite some theoretical and methodological differences (see Jacobs & Jackson 2006), pragma-dialectics and normative pragmatics converge in many crucial research questions and theoretical starting points (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs 1993). Our goal in this contribution is to further the study of contextualized argumentation by considering the role of pragma-dialectics for understanding the sphere of large-scale deliberation enabled through technological mediation such as seen in online fora. Large-scale deliberation (LSD), that is, argumentative discussion taking place among a large number of active participants and aimed, more or less directly, at making publicly acceptable decisions is not an entirely new phenomenon, as it was known in public assemblies as early as in ancient Greece. Yet, thanks to the recent developments in information and communication technologies (ICT) which allow for many-to-many communication, LSD has become an increasingly popular and important context for public argumentation that requires close scholarly attention. In this contribution, we consider two general questions regarding LSD as especially pertinent: (1) what new insights can pragma-dialectics and normative pragmatics provide into analyzing and evaluating large-scale argumentation in computer-mediated deliberative activities; (2) what important consequences can study of such new argumentative activities have for a pragma-dialectical view of argumentation? In order to address these questions, we describe, in section two below, the context of computer-mediated LSD, in relation to a classical account of deliberation given by Aristotle. In section three, we point to a perpetual problem of public deliberation typically identified as a trade-off between the competing demands for open participation and for high quality argument. In section four, we offer some key argumentative grounds for analyzing LSD and then in section five illustrate how trade-offs of deliberation can be more precisely grasped as a dialectical tradeoff resolved through design choices implemented in various formats for computermediated LSD. Reconstructing such trade-offs makes possible better grounds for critique and redesign. Finally, in section six, we turn to some key complications and challenges that argument analysis of LSD poses for argumentation theory, and pragma-dialectics in particular. In this way, we endeavor to open up large scale deliberation facilitated through new media for argumentative analysis that affords an important opportunity to advance argumentation theory to deal with argument in technological contexts while also informing emerging issues for deliberative democracy and information technology and systems design.
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2.â•… Large-scale deliberation: Current practice and classic theory Across many arenas of contemporary life many innovative uses of information and communication technology (ICT) attempt to cultivate the potential of deliberation for decision-making. In government and governing, there are efforts such as the United States federal government’s open government initiative (www. whitehouse.gov/open) that uses various means to involve citizens in developing ideas through brainstorming and voting that are available for use by federal agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (www.openepa.ideascale. com/) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (www.opennrc.ideascale.com/). In the civic sector, there are efforts such as the Road to Copenhagen (www. roadtocopenhagen.org/participate.htm) that use a discussion forum and a wiki with the aim of involving people the world over in influencing the climate negotiation. In business, there is an open innovation movement where discussion forums and voting among customers, vendors, and suppliers is used to determine courses of action to be taken by a company in the offering of products and services, such as Dell Computer Corporation’s IDEASTORM or Procter & Gamble’s Connect+Develop program, or in shaping the company’s social and environmental engagement, such as Starbuck’s V2V program or Pepsi’s Refresh project. In science, there are large-scale collaborative research enterprises supported through ICT and also citizen science projects (e.g. Nevada Test Site’s Community Environmental Monitoring Program) that involve their participants in governing the scientific enterprise and at times its interface with public decision-making. These are just some examples of recent attempts to incorporate, what will be referred to here as, large-scale deliberation (LSD) into decision-making. The interest in cultivating deliberative practice through ICTs has spawned a proliferation of large-scale deliberation formats that requires resurrecting a meaning of deliberation, found as early as Aristotle, that lays dormant. Conventional contemporary usage of deliberation usually refers to contexts of interpersonal (one-to-one), mass (one-to-many), or small group (few-to-few) communication, but ICTs have given rise to forms of deliberation that are instead many-tomany communication. The classical account of collective deliberation is given by Aristotle (Rhetoric, Book I).1 For Aristotle, collective deliberation belongs to the domain of politics and is a communicative practice in which members of a deliberative assembly decide together on the most expedient course of collective action.2 Deliberation necessarily takes place by means of public reasoning (which Aristotle characterized as ‘deliberative rhetoric’), since arguments for and against various courses of future action are advanced and assessed by the deliberating public (see Nieuwenberg 2004).3 Moreover, even though actually only ‘a small subset of the political community’ of ancient polis actively argues in the process
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of deliberation (Yack 2006:â•›427), in principle every member of the assembly has a chance of shifting his role from a mere listener to a public speaker. Therefore, deliberation presupposes many-to-many communication: it is neither mere public speaking of an orator against the crowd of silent listeners (as ‘epideictic rhetoric’ is) nor a neat dialogical exchange in which two opposing parties take turns to argue their case – whether against a third party adjudicator (as in ‘forensic rhetoric’) or between themselves (as in dialectics). This newly realized ancient form of manyto-many deliberation through the design and implementation of ICTs raises important issues for cultivating deliberative practice. The interest in public deliberation has been revived in contemporary philosophy, political theory and argumentation theory to such an extent that, according to a received view, it has led to ‘the deliberative turn in democratic theory’ (Dryzek, 2000).4 In the normative account of many ‘deliberative theorists,’ deliberation has been characterized as a mode of public argumentation, characterized by freedom of access, equality of participants and, notably, high quality of critical argumentative exchanges (Benhabib 1996; Bohman & Rehg 1998; Gutmann & Thompson 1996) that can occur in places other than officially sanctioned venues of decisionmaking. According to Habermas (1989/1962), whose ideas largely inspired deliberative theorists, public deliberation takes place not only in institutionalized state assemblies, but in the whole range of forums belonging to ‘the public sphere’: from salons and coffeehouses, to various civic associations and clubs, to newspapers and other ‘media of the public sphere.’5 Since Habermas’ (1989/1962) critique of the capacity of traditional mass media to serve as such forums coincided, especially in the English-speaking world, with the rise of computer-mediated communication, many have turned to studying the Internet as the new medium for public deliberation (see, e.g. Dalhberg 2001; Graham & Witschge 2003; Hauben & Hauben 1997; Janssen & Kies 2005; Linaa Jensen 2003; Wilhelm 2000; Wright & Street 2007). It has been disputed in such studies whether ‘the virtual public sphere’ has offered new possibilities for reasonable deliberation, or rather new disappointments. One way or another, it seems to be a commonplace that the Internet marks a new transformation of the public sphere by offering a wide array of venues for large-scale deliberative activities. Crucial to the possibility of exercising public deliberation are thus forums which allow for rational and critical deliberative exchanges that include all those who have interest in the outcome. Although the technological applications for large-scale deliberation vary, as do the aims of providing for large-scale deliberation, what these efforts, such as highlighted above, hold in common are decisions about the features of interaction necessary to support many-to-many deliberation. This includes, for example, the kinds of contributions to be made, when certain
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kinds of contributions are preferred, the role participants take up in making contributions, and so on. These design choices are evident in the technological features of deliberation-support applications such as discussion threading, voting procedures, identity indicators, topic categories and so on. Whether made reflectively or not, these design choices are essentially hypotheses about how to orchestrate interactivity so that it achieves, in the circumstances at hand, communication approximating the ideals of deliberation (or at least so it would seem). There has been increasing theoretical interest in the possibilities ICT afford deliberative democracy but what remains less clear is how to respond to the proliferation of LSD across the many arenas of human activity, including politics, government, business, and science, and the expanded capacity for designing and implementing venues for deliberation. As Hilbert (2009) points out, the use of ICT has digitized both the information and the communication involved in deliberation and yet the possibilities for deliberation realized through digitization is only beginning to be comprehended. Ongoing work in information engineering, visualization, and the semantic web, for instance, portend even more change in the very ways deliberation is supported and carried out. The problems in responding to these changes lie at the level of our given institutions and theories which often still presuppose ideas about deliberation as interpersonal or mass communication tied to old media. The adoption of technology for purposes of communication makes explicit aspects of communication that otherwise often go unnoticed or that have been actively ignored (Katz & Aakhus, 2001). Thus, ICTs should be seen as disruptive information system innovation in the context of deliberation because the adoption of ICTs for deliberation by organizations and communities necessarily goes beyond technological implementation to involve adjusting or developing norms and social structures for deliberative practice (e.g. Lyytinen & Rose 2003a, 2003b). The challenge ICTs and the prospects of many-to-many deliberation pose for practice and theory about deliberation calls for a critical assessment of extant assumptions about the way deliberative communication works and how it ought to work so that our descriptive and normative theories are better suited to the era of convergence between ICT and deliberative practice. Indeed, an important overarching question is when are such practices democratic or deliberative. Central to such considerations is the recognition that proliferation of LSD points not only to the increased opportunities for argument in deliberation but also to the increased efforts to design the capacity for deliberation and affordances for argument. What is at stake is an argument governance problem: how does regulation of the conditions of the process of argumentation, and the process itself, affect the quality of arguments as products?
 Mark Aakhus & Marcin Lewiński
3.â•… The classic puzzle of deliberation As has been argued by deliberation theorists, public democratic deliberation is vulnerable to a certain tension, or trade-off, inherent to democratic procedures at large: On the one hand, democratic decisions should ideally ‘result from the free and unconstrained public deliberation of all about matters of common concern’ (Benhabib 1994:â•›26). That is to say that in order to be legitimate, deliberative activities should allow for a large-scale participation of those who may be affected by their results. On the other hand, the goal of democratic procedures is to yield ‘a better and more enlightened decision than conclusions reached by some other procedure,’ a goal reached if a decision is an outcome of a process of accountable and reasonable public argumentation that most faithfully articulates the common good (or advantage) of those involved (Benhabib 1994:â•›29–30). The classic puzzle of deliberation, thus, is a trade-off between the quantity (of participants allowed to express opinions, arguments and criticisms) and quality (of arguments advanced and decisions reached in the process of deliberation). In short, what is at stake is a trade-off or hiatus between legitimacy and rationality of public deliberation (Benhabib 1994:â•›30). For political theorists who propagate the idea of deliberative democracy, the solution to the classic problem rests in ‘the rationality intrinsic to [the] anonymous yet intelligible rules, procedures and practices’ of ideal democratic deliberation (Benhabib 1994:â•›28).6 Such rules and procedures should guarantee basic conditions for legitimate large-scale deliberation, such as equality and symmetry among all participants, as well as freedom in voicing and criticizing opinions.7 Additionally, procedures should support ‘the process of articulating good reasons in a public context’ (Benhabib 1994:â•›32), that eventuates in reasonable public decisions. In this way, political theorists draw attention to the importance of argument in public deliberation. At the same time, they predominantly do not examine the discursive dimension of argumentation.8 Therefore, crucial questions – What exactly are ‘good reasons’? What is argumentative rationality? – remain largely unanswered, and so is the question of how the classic puzzle of deliberation is actually solved in ordinary deliberative activities. Moreover, these questions seem to remain deliberately unanswered – theorists of deliberation are primarily preoccupied with the broad socio-political conditions for argumentation, rather than argumentation itself, because such are the goals and limits of the theoretical framework they develop: ‘Procedures can neither dictate outcomes, nor can they define the quality of the reasons advanced in argumentation nor can they control the quality of the reasoning and rules of logic and inference used by participants. Procedural models of rationality are underdetermined’ (Benhabib 1994:â•›33).
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In order to overcome the practical limitations of abstract ‘models of rationality,’ some political theorists have focused instead on the study of various institutional ‘discursive designs’ for argumentation in political domain (Dryzek 1987; Hendriks 2006). Such designs are understood as concrete deliberative procedures implemented under given institutional conditions, for example, international conflict resolution, mediation, regulatory negotiation, citizens’ jury and deliberative poll (Ibidem). Different computer-mediated formats for large-scale deliberation have also been analyzed as such designs (see Wright & Street 2007).9 However useful, these attempts to understand actual practices of deliberation still lack an account of how the relationship between designs for deliberation and the quality of argumentation – and, thus an account of how the classic puzzle of deliberation is resolved in terms of argumentation. What theories of deliberative democracy offer argumentation theorists for consideration is thus a clear recognition of the puzzle of deliberation: various actual deliberative activities reveal a serious tension or trade-off between the demands for open participation and standards of reasonable argumentation. Moreover, in an attempt to theoretically reconcile these two necessary elements of good deliberation, political theorists stipulate some higher-order conditions surrounding deliberation, such as open access to public forums for discussion, equality of participants, freedom from coercion, and readiness to have things decided on the basis of ‘the forceless force of the better argument’ (Dryzek 2000:â•›70). Finally, political theorists draw attention to the details of design of particular forms of deliberation. Despite such contributions to the study of deliberation, general models of deliberative rationality and particular models of discursive designs have yet to take account of the argumentative details of deliberation including the specific affordances and constraints for deliberation embodied in ICTs. There is a need for a form of deliberation analysis that attends closely to these matters. 4.â•… Argumentative grounds for analyzing large-scale deliberation Within argumentation theory normative pragmatics, and pragma-dialectics in particular, provides the theoretical grounds and analytic concepts to address the need for an argumentative analysis of LSD. In the first place, pragma-dialectics provides a normative procedural model of argumentative reasonableness that posits a method for better achieving the possibility of good reasons – the critical discussion. Pragma-dialectics does this by articulating an ideal dialectical procedure specified in 15 basic rules that define the proper exchange of speech acts
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required to achieve a rational resolution of differences of opinion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984, 2004). The ideal model of critical discussion offers an account for understanding argument in any kind of communicative activity such as deliberation and thus fills a void left in the ideal models of deliberation proposed by political theorists. The quality of deliberation can be judged in terms of how well the argumentation meets the standards of the critical discussion model. Departures from the critical discussion model suggest potential problems for the quality of deliberation and opportunities for improving deliberation by improving the quality of the moves and counter moves of the participants.10 In the second place, as mentioned in the introduction to this contribution, pragma-dialectics draws attention to the contextual conditions of argumentative interactions taking place in various argumentative activity types (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2005; van Eemeren, Houtlosser, Ihnen & Lewiński 2010). Particular attention in pragma-dialectics has been given to the ways in which speakers reconcile the gap between the ideal, dialectical expectations for reasonable argument and the practical demands of rhetorical situations through strategic maneuvering (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 1999, 2000). The basic idea is that different argumentative activity types – through their rules and conventions – create opportunities and impose restrictions on the ways strategic maneuvers by individual actors can be successfully performed in a given activity. In normative pragmatics, analogous concerns have been raised under the concept of ‘argumentation designs’ (Aakhus 2002; Aakhus & Jackson 2005; Jackson 1998; de Moor & Aakhus 2006). However, rather than emphasizing the trade-offs for rationality made in the message designs that strategically maneuver to create argument in less than ideal conditions, the proponents of normative pragmatics shifted the emphasis to design choices about interaction and their trade-offs for the argumentative reasonableness of the communicative activity participants were undertaking. For instance, close analysis of the dispute-mediator practices of questioning and summarizing revealed that variations in performing these practices fostered different kinds of dialogues for managing disagreement among disputing parties (Jacobs & Aakhus 2002). Each dialogue treated the argumentative potential of what was said differently and thus generated different ways of reasoning through the conflicted circumstances and grounds for resolving differences. Implicit in the practices of the mediators and the conduct of the dialogue were assumptions about activity and the constraints for interaction necessary to jointly achieve some end – that is, matters of activity such as acceptable speech acts, sequences of speech acts, principles for rejecting commitments, and so on. These normative pragmatic insights were extended as a design-stance toward communication for addressing the institutionalization of communication practice
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in ICTs and other aspects of the human built environment (Aakhus & Jackson 2005). For example, whereas much attention across communication and technology studies had been given to what happens in different technological communication environments (e.g. telephone, email, threaded discussion, chat), not enough attention was being given to the ways that these technologies offered designs for communication. By examining ICTs in terms of their affordances and constraints for communication activity, it was possible to see what ICTs presuppose about how communication works and how it ought to work (Aakhus & Jackson 2005). Indeed, any design for communication makes choices about matters of communicative interaction such as what kinds of turns should be taken or how turns should be related to each other and so on. Even though these choices are not always, or even often, reflective, the choices reveal differing implicit rationales about how interaction should be organized to enable parties to collectively do things together such as deliberate (Aakhus 2002; de Moor & Aakhus 2006). Thus, it is possible to reconstruct practice for organizing communication activity from the affordances and constraints for interaction present in any ICT (or other institutionalized format for communication). Political theory and argumentation theory share a crucial recognition that the study of LSD should focus on the design of particular forums for deliberation, notably computer-mediated forums. However, since the conceptual framework of political theory provides a rather limited insight into the matters of argumentative interaction, key challenges that LSD poses to the reasonableness of deliberative discourse remain underexplored. By contrast, the concepts and tools developed in argumentation theory allow for a critical engagement with the challenges LSD presents to the exercise of deliberation: pragma-dialectical theory provides a normative basis for reconstructing and evaluating arguments and a design stance within normative pragmatics provides theoretical basis for articulating the practices and technologies for shaping interaction and for analyzing the rationality of various communication designs. 5.â•… Classic puzzle of deliberation as a dialectical trade-off From an argumentative perspective, the classic puzzle of deliberation can be understood in terms of various dialectical trade-offs in procedural designs for deliberation. We understand a dialectical trade-off as a predicament of arguers in actual communicative activities that amounts to a situation in which they face a demand for observing two (or more) dialectical norms that are difficult if not nearly impossible to be simultaneously observed in concrete circumstances.
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Such a trade-off may arise since dialectical models of argumentation – such as a critical discussion – comprise rules that are in principle reconcilable in the ideal circumstances presupposed by the model, but may conflict in less than ideal circumstances. That is to say that a dialectical trade-off occurs between rules of reasonable argumentation in actual circumstances. In this sense, dialectical trade-offs are different from the predicament grasped in the notion of strategic maneuvering according to which ordinary arguers face a conflict of demands between, on the one hand, obeying dialectical rules of reasonable argumentation and, on the other hand, making use of rhetorical devices that facilitate successful persuasion. Moreover, the study of strategic maneuvering has focused on the achievements and limitations of actors trying to solve the conflict of demands for themselves in rhetorical situation. The point that we want to argue for here is that dialectical trade-offs are not exclusively problems to be solved through individual choices of arguers, but they are also dilemmas inherent to the procedural designs of various argumentative activity types. Because computer-mediated formats for large-scale deliberation are explicitly designed through technological choices, they draw out particular attention to the ways interaction is mediated. Every argumentation design for LSD has a certain – stronger or weaker – preference structure built into it. Such structure makes some options for solving the choice-dilemma related to a given dialectical trade-off more likely to be followed by arguers involved in an activity designed in a particular way. To illustrate in more detail how dialectical trade-offs are dealt with in various designs for online deliberation, we focus on one such trade-off that in an important way instantiates the classic puzzle of deliberation. Employing the pragmadialectical model of critical discussion, one can more precisely grasp the basic tension between freedom of access and quality of argumentation in the following fashion: Of special interest in this discussion are two first order rules: the rule that every participant in a discussion must have full and free opportunity to raise objections, and the rule that every participant must stand ready to defend any statement in his or her commitment set. (Jackson 1998:â•›189)
In other words, from the perspective of the pragma-dialectical account, forums for argumentation should be open and free, thus allowing unlimited critical testing of opinions. On the other hand, the forum should provide means to regulate the burden of proof in a way that produces a reasonable outcome, i.e. a resolution of the initial difference of opinion on the merits. Different designs of online fora for public deliberation offer different theories and associated practices for managing the burden of proof in an argumentative discussion among arguers. In this way,
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different fora offer distinct solutions to the problem of how to manage the dialectical trade-off between the openness and quality of deliberation. On one end of the continuum of deliberative activities supported by ICT are open online fora for informal political discussion, such as Usenet newsgroups or Web-forums accessible through Google Groups (Lewiński 2010). Such fora are loosely regulated by a minimal design that specifies only some rudimentary aspects of interaction: exchanges of messages (similar to e-mails) should develop along topically or chronologically organized threads, in accordance with some general rules of the netiquette, and the more specific rules of a given forum, which regulate issues such as the topical scope of discussions (Aakhus & Rumsey 2010). Otherwise, informal Web-forums are in principle open for all kinds of contributions from pseudonymous online discussants. From an argumentative perspective, that means that arguers can engage in both mixed and non-mixed disputes, that they can freely choose to take the role of the antagonist or the protagonist of a given opinion (or both at the same time), and that their arguments and critical reactions are not limited in terms of number, length and type. Moreover, informal online discussions are not geared towards reaching some manifestly recognized outcomes, such as a decision to follow a particular course of action, and thus in principle, they can extend indeterminately. Because of such characteristics, participants to Usenet discussions and Webforums would appear to ‘have full and free opportunity to raise objections’ (Jackson 1998:â•›189) – at least from a technological perspective. This opportunity may clash with the second rule of a critical discussion, which requires responsible management of the burden of proof. By their open design, Usenet and Web-forums enable participants to fully exercise their unconditional right to be critical, but at the same time give discussants an opportunity to evade their conditional obligation to stand up to criticisms and discharge their burden of proof. Therefore, raising objections in informal online political forums comes cheap, as it were, since the expectations for such activities dictate no positive burden of proof to someone being critical. Such forums allow participants to contribute to deliberations by exlusively advancing criticisms. An unequivocal assessment of their argumentative potential cannot easily be given, because of the way the dialectical tradeoff is solved in the design of such forums for LSD. On the one hand, persistent criticisms are not futile: even if they do not lead to establishing mutually acceptable arguments leading to a resolution of a difference of opinion between participants, they allow for an open public scrutiny and thus provide materials for consideration (by both participants and third parties). And that should be conducive to reaching the goal of informal public deliberation, that is, better critical opinion-formation (Lewiński 2010). On the other hand, open-ended, collective, and pseudonymous argumentation creates the problem of distributed, or even diluted,
 Mark Aakhus & Marcin Lewiński
responsibility: since everyone can join and leave discussion at any time, no single person can be seen as the protagonist who would be willing and able to carry the burden of proof successfully from the confrontation and opening to the point of coming to a reasonable conclusion, and thus to the point at which a difference of opinion is resolved. This becomes increaslingly important as the demand for resolving differences of opinion increases. While many ICTs created to support deliberation are rather open-ended in their support, such as the threaded-discussion systems discussed above, other ICTs offer specific kinds of support for deliberative activities. Many of these ICTs have been created to enable collectives to render choices through deliberation. The ICTs provide applications so that participants can brainstorm, vote, rank, have pro/ con argument, or reward quality contributions. These applications enable individuals to make contributions and the collective participants to monitor the contributions in particular ways. This may range from the quality of particular contributions or to means for detecting patterns of reasoning in the unfolding interaction that, were it not for the computer mediated setting, would not be detectable. The ICTs are tools for structuring interaction by constraining or affording specific argumentative roles, sequential rules, forms of discussion turns, and acceptable ways of concluding discussion that in turn enable the management of the burden of proof. In terms of argument, the ICTs, like the practices of dispute mediators described above (e.g. Jacobs & Aakhus 2002), enable particular kinds of disagreement space to emerge where argument is treated in different ways. Aakhus (2002, see also de Moor & Aakhus 2006) identified different implict models ICTs present for reconstructing argument in practical circumstances including funneling, issue-networking, and reputation management. For instance, ICTs such as group decision support systems (GDSS) provide applications that treat disagreement as a lack of collective will that can be solved through interaction aimed at generating consensus in successive rounds of brainstorming and voting that search for options with least opposition. The analysis of the ways of designing interaction that allocate the burden of proof in different types of computer-mediated forums for LSD highlights the classic problem of deliberation in concrete terms: to tackle the general tradeoff between open criticism (Usenet, Web-forums etc.) and reasonable progress towards an expedient course of action (GDSS), different designs highlight different argumentative values (more criticism vs. more burden of proof). Hence, the classic problem of deliberation as it may present itself in any practical circumstance, is a problem of communication design. Design is both an object of critique and innovation in the way it resolves the challenges posed by LSD. Normative models of argumentation, such as critical discussion, aid in identifying challenges such as the management of the burden of proof and in further specifying shortcomings of interaction that can negatively affect the quality of the
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public argumentation. While a normative pragmatics can aid in specifying a range of potential problems for deliberation by using the pragma-dialectical model, it is also an approach for articulating and assessing the solutions to problems of LSD, such as those described in the previous paragraphs, evident in designs for communication. Apart from the management of the burden of proof, the management of disagreement in general is crucially affected by different designs. 6.â•… A nalysis of large-scale deliberation as a challenge to argumentation theory The critical discussion model central to pragma-dialectics is an idealization built on the assumption that discussion is undertaken by two parties who are responsible for the content (product) and the process of their interaction. The context of many-to many deliberation reveals that responsibility for the interaction is delegated, at least in part, to the technological service that enables distributed interaction. The technological service takes on some of the responsibility for the conduct of the deliberation along the lines of other kinds of third parties, like dispute mediators or meeting facilitators, whose role is not to contribute content but instead to give shape to the dialogue among the parties to the deliberation (Aakhus & Benovitz 2008, 2009). Even so, it is clear that the structuring actions of the third-parties is implicated in the content, direction, and outcomes of interaction (Aakhus 2003; Jacobs & Aakhus 2002). Understanding the nature of the influence of the delegation of responsibility for interaction is important for deliberative theory and practice since it is a most disconcerting source of influence over deliberation (see Benhabib; Habermas). The design stance in normative pragmatics has addressed these issues to some degree by examining the role of dispute mediator neutrality (Jacobs 2002) and “transparency work” in computer supported facilitation (Aakhus 2004). What ICTs draw attention to is the problem of argumentative governance in deliberation – that is, deliberative activity not just as a matter of advancing and responding to positions taken up by participants but as a simultaneous act of co-creating and sustaining a deliberative dialogue. The study of metacommunication necessary to creating and sustaining communicative activity, like deliberation, seems to be underdeveloped within pragma-dialectics. What the normative model of critical discussion does point to is the need for antecedent dialogue (in the opening stage) that sets the parameters for the subsequent argumentation. Indeed, such opening stage of an argumentative discussion can in actual activities be spread over the whole event, and thus includes ongoing negotiations among arguers on how to proceed, yet the examination of such meta-communicative strategies is far from advanced.
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Furthermore, it is clear from the discussion in this contribution that argumentation theory is largely a normative enterprise aimed at stipulating how argumentation should proceed, rather than at describing how argumentation actually proceeds. The crux of the normative enterprise in argumentation theory lies in providing conceptual and analytic tools that allow for distinguishing good arguments from fallacious ones in actual discourse. In this respect pragma-dialectics stands out among other approaches to argumentation, since it provides a comprehensive account of fallacies in argumentative discourse (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992; van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2003). One of the assumptions of the pragmadialectical theory is that fallacy judgments are in the end always contextual (van Eemeren, Houtlosser, Ihnen & Lewiński 2010). That means, in the first place, that contextual considerations are indispensable in a pragmatic reconstruction of actual discourse, and, in the second place, that argumentative activity types may provide certain specific soundness criteria for the application of the general rules of a critical discussion. Accordingly, pragma-dialectics provides well-developed tools for both reconstructing and evaluating individual arguments in ordinary activities of argumentation. Moreover, pragma-dialectics serves well as a framework for reconstructing salient argumentative features of various communicative activities (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2005). What pragma-dialectics does not as of now provide is a consistent idea on how to evaluate entire activity types in terms of their suitability to support forms of argumentation that approximate the ideal model of critical discussion. One has to agree that it seems rather awkward to speak of ‘fallacious procedures’ for argumentation or even ‘fallacious activity types.’ At the same time, it seems reasonable to distinguish between activity types (or designs) that are conducive and obstructive to realizing reasonable forms of argumentative interaction (such as those stipulated in the critical discussion model). One of the possible future ways of developing pragma-dialectics is to complement the reconstruction of various argumentative activity types with their well-justified evaluation. That is to say that the basic question of the current pragma-dialectical study of activity types – what kind of constraints does a given activity type impose on argumentative exchanges? – can be complemented by the question: are these constraints helpful or disruptive in realizing reasonable forms of public argumentation? A partial answer to this question has already been given within the normative pragmatics, but certainly more work is to be done. 7.â•… Conclusion The aim of our contribution has been to consider the role of pragma-dialectics and normative pragmatics for understanding the technological mediation of↜large-scale
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deliberation. Two questions have been especially pertinent: (1) what new insights can pragma-dialectics provide into analyzing and evaluating large-scale argument in computer-mediated deliberative activities; (2) what important consequences can study of such new argumentative activities have for a pragma-dialectical view of argument? We answered these questions by arguing that the proliferation of large-scale deliberation (LSD) is neither interpersonal (one-to-one) communication nor mass (one-to-many) communication but is instead many-to-many communication where deliberation is actually more in line with Aristotle’s assumptions about how deliberation is conducted. We pointed out how many-to-many deliberation highlights problems of argumentative governance as designs for deliberation entail interventions that bear responsibility for the dialectical quality of the communication. Thus, argumentative analysis must consider how designs for argumentative interaction afford and constrain interaction. There is a need for argument analysis to go beyond the strategic maneuvering of individual speakers to consider how gaps between normatively valued forms of communication and practical circumstances at hand are resolved through designs for deliberative interaction. Such work, inspired in part by pragma-dialectical analysis, has begun but more needs to be done to address the expanded capacity to design and deliver deliberative fora and to address the recurring classic puzzles of deliberation.
Notes 1.â•… Aristotle distinguished collective deliberation from individual deliberation, which amounts to interior monological reasoning aimed at selecting best practical means to reach a given goal. 2.â•… It is disputed whether the end of deliberation in Aristotle’s account should be defined as taking action, making decision to act, or rather forming opinions about which decision to support (see Yack 2006:â•›419–420). On any interpretation, what is ultimately at stake is the choice of the course of action that is most advantageous to the deliberating parties. Similar concerns are raised in contemporary study of deliberation: Fraser (1990), for one, distinguishes between ‘strong publics,’ such as parliaments, which serve ‘as a locus of public deliberation culminating in legally binding decisions’ and ‘weak publics,’ active in various nongovernmental forums for political discourse, ‘whose deliberative practice consists exclusively in opinion-formation and does not also encompass decision-making.’ 3.â•… One of the consequences of the public accountability of deliberation is that: ‘People who try to persuade us to do something that serves their own rather than the common advantage will have to find a way of portraying what is good for them as good for the other members of the community as well’ (Yack 2006:â•›422). 4.â•… See Nieuwenberg (2004) and Yack (2006) for a comparison of Aristotelian approach with contemporary theories of deliberation.
 Mark Aakhus & Marcin Lewiński 5.â•… In the shortest definition, the public sphere is ‘a sphere that mediates between society and state, in which the public organizes itself as the bearer of public opinion’ (Habermas, 1974/1964:â•›50). 6.â•… Another well-known solution is Rousseau’s ideal ‘legislator,’ or some other third-party adjudicator, that guarantees certain standards of reason. The danger of such a solution is the ‘authoritarian nightmare’ in which decisions are exclusively taken by the third party without much concern for the opinions and reasons of ‘the people’ (Benhabib, 1994). 7.â•… As well as certain predispositions of deliberators, such as the conviction that ‘decision making procedures and institutions must be seen to be fair even when they do not serve one’s interests’ (Benhabib 1994:â•›46, n. 2). Conditions for reasonable public deliberation described by political theorists are in many respects similar to the ‘third- and second-order conditions’ for a critical discussion stipulated in pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs 1993:â•›30–34). 8.â•… See, however, Rehg, McBurney & Parsons (2005). 9.â•… Rehg, McBurney & Parsons (2005) use the term ‘argumentation systems.’ 10.â•… In pragma-dialectics, deliberation is thus not an ideal model of dispute; rather, it is one of actual communicative activities in which argumentation plays a vital role.
References Aakhus, M. (2002). Modeling reconstruction in groupware technology. In F.H. van Eemeren (Ed.), Advances in pragma-dialectics (pp. 121–136). Amsterdam: SicSat. Aakhus, M. (2003). Neither naïve nor critical reconstruction: Dispute mediators, impasse, and the design of argumentation. Argumentation 17, 265–290. Aakhus, M. (2004). Understanding the socio-technical gap: A case of GDSS Facilitation. In G. Goldkuhl, M. Lind, & S. Cronholm (Eds.), Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on action in language, organisations, and information systems (pp. 137–148). Linköping, Sweden: Research Network VITS. Aakhus, M., & Greenfeld-Benovitz, M. (2008). Argument reconstruction and socio-technical facilitation of large scale argumentation. In P.J. Ågerfalk, H. Delugach, & M. Lind (Eds.), Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on the Pragmatic Web: Innovating the Interactive Society, ICPW ‘08, vol. 363 (pp. 77–81). New York: ACM. Aakhus, M., & Greenfeld-Benovitz, M. (2009, October). Global deliberation? Understanding the potential of the Internet through online argumentation tools. Presented at the annual conference of Association of Internet Researchers, Milwaukee, WI. Aakhus, M., & Jackson, S. (2005). Technology, interaction, and design. In K. Fitch & R. Sanders (Eds.), Handbook of language and social interaction (pp. 411–436). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Aakhus, M., & Rumsey, E. (2010). Crafting supportive communication online: A communication design analysis of conflict in an online support group. Journal of Applied Communication Research 38(1), 65–84. Aristotle (1991). On rhetoric. In G.A. Kennedy, Aristotle. On rhetoric: A theory of civic discourse (pp. 23–282). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Benhabib, S. (1994). Deliberative rationality and models of democratic legitimacy. Constellations 1(1), 26–52. Benhabib, S. (Ed.) (1996). Democracy and difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Bohman, J., & Rehg, W. (Eds.) (1998). Deliberative democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Dahlberg, L. (2001). Computer-mediated communication and the public sphere: A critical analysis. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 7(1), available online: http://jcmc. indiana.edu/vol7/issue1/dahlberg.html. Dryzek, J.S. (1987). Discursive designs: Critical theory and political institutions. American Journal of Political Science 31(3), 656–679. Dryzek, J.S. (2000). Deliberative democracy and beyond: Liberals, critics, contestations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Eemeren, F.H. van. (Ed.) (2009). Examining argumentation in context: Fifteen studies on strategic maneuvering. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Eemeren, F.H. van. (2010). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse: Extending the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (1984). Speech acts in argumentative discussions: A theoretical model for the analysis of discussions directed towards solving conflicts of opinion. Dordrecht/Berlin: Foris/Walter de Gruyter. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (1992). Argumentation, communication, and fallacies: A pragma-dialectical perspective. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation: The pragma-dialectical approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Eemeren, F.H. van, Grootendorst, R., Jackson, S., & Jacobs, S. (1993). Reconstructing argumentative discourse. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Houtlosser, P. (1999). Strategic manoeuvring in argumentative discourse. Discourse Studies 1(4), 479–497. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Houtlosser, P. (2000). Rhetorical analysis within a pragma-dialectical framework. The case of R.J. Reynolds. Argumentation 14(3), 293–305. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Houtlosser, P. (2003). Fallacies as derailments of strategic maneuvering: The argumentum ad verecundiam, a case in point. In F.H. van Eemeren, J.A. Blair, C.A. Willard & A.F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Proceedings of the fifth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 289–292). Amsterdam: SicSat. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Houtlosser, P. (2005). Theoretical construction and argumentative reality: An analytic model of critical discussion and conventionalised types of argumentative activity. In D. Hitchcock (Ed.), The uses of argument: Proceedings of a conference at McMaster University, 18–21 May 2005 (pp. 75–84). Hamilton. Eemeren, F.H. van, Houtlosser, P., Ihnen, C., & Lewiński, M. (2010). Contextual considerations in the evaluation of argumentation. In C. Reed & C. Tindale (Eds.), Dialectics, dialogue and argumentation: An examination of Douglas Walton’s theories of reasoning and argument (pp. 115–132). London: College Publications. Fraser, N. (1990). Rethinking the public sphere: A contribution to the critique of actually existing democracy. Social Text 25/26, 56–80. (Original work published 1992.) Graham, T. & Witschge, T. (2003). In search of online deliberation: Towards a new method for examining the quality of online discussions. Communications 28, 173–204. Gutmann, A., & Thompson, D. (1996). Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
 Mark Aakhus & Marcin Lewiński Habermas, J. (1974). The public sphere: An encyclopedia article (S. Lennox & F. Lennox, transl.). New German Critique 3, 49–55. (Original work published 1964.) Habermas, J. (1989). The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society (T. Burger, transl.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Original work published 1962.) Hauben, M., & Hauben, R. (1997). Netizens: On the history and impact of Usenet and the Internet. Los Alamitos, CA: IEEE Computer Society. Hendriks, C.M. (2006). Integrated deliberation: Reconciling civil society’s dual role in deliberative democracy. Political Studies 54, 486–508. Hilbert (2009). The maturing concept of e-democracy: From e-voting and online consultations to democratic value out of jumbled online chatter. Journal of Information Technology and Politics 6, 87–110. Jackson, S. (1998). Disputation by design. Argumentation 12(2), 183–198. Jackson, S., & Jacobs, S. (1980). Structure of conversational argument: Pragmatic bases for the enthymeme. Quarterly Journal of Speech 66, 251–265. Jacobs, S. (1999). Argumentation as normative pragmatics. In F.H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J.A. Blair & C.A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the fourth ISSA conference on argumentation (pp. 397–403). Amsterdam: SicSat. Jacobs, S. (2002). Maintaining neutrality in dispute mediation: Managing disagreement while managing not to disagree. Journal of Pragmatics 34, 1403–1426. Jacobs, S., & Aakhus, M. (2002). What mediators do with words: Implementing three models of rational discussion in dispute mediation. Conflict Resolution Quarterly 20(2), 177–203. Jacobs, S., & Jackson, S. (1982). Conversational argument: A discourse analytic approach. In J.R. Cox & C.A. Willard (Eds.), Advances in argumentation theory and research (pp. 205–237). Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press. Jacobs, S., & Jackson, S. (2006). Derailments of argumentation: It takes two to tango. In P. Houtlosser & M.A. van Rees (Eds.), Considering pragma-dialectics (pp. 121–133). Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Janssen, D., & Kies, R. (2005). Online forums and deliberative democracy. Acta Politica 40, 317–335. Lewiński, M. (2010). Internet political discussion forums as an argumentative activity type. A pragma-dialectical analysis of online forms of strategic manoeuvring with critical reactions. Amsterdam: SicSat. Linaa Jensen, J. (2003). Public spheres on the Internet: Anarchic or government-sponsored – a comparison. Scandinavian Political Studies 26(4), 349–374. Lyytinen, K., & Rose, M.G. (2003a). Disruptive information system innovation: The case of Internet computing. Information Systems Journal 13(4), 301–330. Lyytinen, K., & Rose, M.G. (2003b). The disruptive nature of information technology innovations: The Case of Internet computing in systems development organizations. MIS Quarterly 27(4), 557–595. Katz, J. & Aakhus, M. (2001). Perpetual contact: Mobile communication, private talk, public performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Moor, A. de, & Aakhus, M. (2006). Argumentation support: From technologies to tools. Communications of the ACM 49(3), 93–98. Nieuwenburg, P. (2004). Learning to deliberate: Aristotle on truthfulness and public deliberation. Political Theory 32(4), 449–467.
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Rehg, W., McBurney, P., & Parsons, S. (2005). Computer decision-support systems for public argumentation: Assessing deliberative legitimacy. AI & Society 19(3), 203–229. Weger, Jr., H., & Aakhus, M. (2003). Arguing in internet chat rooms: Argumentative adaptations to chat room design and some consequences for public deliberation at a distance. Argumentation and Advocacy 40, 23–38. Wilhelm, A.G. (2000). Democracy in the Digital Age: Challenges to political life in cyberspace. New York: Routledge. Wright, S., & Street, J. (2007). Democracy, deliberation and design: the case of online discussion forums. New Media & Society 9(5), 849–869. Yack, B. (2006). Rhetoric and public reasoning: An Aristotelian understanding of political deliberation. Political Theory 34(4), 417–438.
The pragma-dialectical account of argument schemes David Hitchcock & Jean Wagemans 1.â•… Introduction In its simplest form, argumentation consists of a statement (the “argument”) put forward by a speaker or writer (the “arguer”) in support of another statement (the “standpoint”). The arguer may be assumed to make an attempt to overcome the anticipated initial reluctance of the addressee to accept the standpoint by putting forward an argument that he will accept. In this sense, one could say that the arguer makes an attempt to transfer the acceptability of the argument to that of the standpoint. Within the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, the notion “argument scheme” is defined as an abstract framework that expresses the way in which this transfer of acceptability takes place. The notion plays a pivotal role in the pragmadialectical analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse. In the analysis, argument schemes are used to reconstruct the elements of the argumentation that remained implicit. In the evaluation, the argument schemes and the critical questions associated with these schemes are used to assess the appropriateness and correctness of the arguer’s attempt to transfer the acceptability of the argument to that of the standpoint. In this contribution, we scrutinize the pragma-dialectical account of argument schemes. We provide an overview of the pragma-dialectical account, identify some problems with it, and propose a revision that addresses those problems.1 2.â•… The pragma-dialectical typology In the introduction to the most recent iteration of the standard version of the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004:â•›4) characterize an argument scheme as an abstract frame that expresses the justificatory principle employed by the arguer “in order to promote a transfer of acceptability from the explicit premise to the standpoint.” On the basis
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of the kind of relationship between argument and standpoint that the arguer tries to establish, they distinguish three main types of schemes: “symptomatic argumentation”, “argumentation based on a comparison”, and “causal argumentation”. In the introduction to the extended version of the theory that incorporates the concept of strategic maneuvering, van Eemeren (2010:â•›12) repeats this typology. Both introductions cite van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992:â•›94–102) as the source where the typology is explained. Below, we will first summarize the three main types of argument schemes that make up the pragma-dialectical typology. We will reconstruct the examples given in the source just mentioned by making use of the abstract schemes and associated critical questions presented in Garssen (1997), van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans (2002), van Eemeren and Snoeck Henkemans (2006), and van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007). Next, we will briefly summarize the pragma-dialectical account of “variants” and “sub-types” of the three main types of argument schemes. Finally, we summarize the pragma-dialectical account of the use of argument schemes in evaluating argumentation. In our reconstruction, we use the linguistic concepts of a referent and a predicate. When one applies these concepts to a sentence (or to the proposition expressed by a sentence), one analyzes the sentence (or proposition) as attributing some property to some object. The referent is the object to which the property is attributed. The predicate is the part of the sentence that attributes the property. For example, one can analyze the sentence “Caesar crossed the Rubicon” as attributing the property of crossing the Rubicon to Caesar, in which case Caesar (the future Roman emperor) is the referent and the verb phrase “crossed the Rubicon” is the predicate. One can also analyze the same sentence as attributing to the Rubicon (a river in Italy) the property of being crossed by Caesar, a property signified by the predicate “was crossed by Caesar”. It is controversial whether all sentences can be analyzed as attributing a property to a referent. According to the pragmadialectical typology of argument schemes, however, in argumentation of the three main types the propositional content of both the argument and the standpoint can be analyzed in this way. 2.1â•… The main types The first main type that is distinguished within the pragma-dialectical typology of argument schemes is “symptomatic argumentation”. In this case, the argument and the standpoint have a common referent (X), but different predicates. The property attributed to the referent in the argument (Z) is put forward as being a symptom of the property attributed to it in the standpoint (Y). Thus, in the example “As Daniel is an American, he is sure to be concerned about the costs,”
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the observed property of being an American is taken to be a symptom of the claimed property of being concerned about costs. In the following reconstruction, the argument (1.1′) expresses the symptomatic relationship between the two properties.2
1 Daniel (X) is concerned about the costs (Y). 1.1 Daniel (X) is an American (Z). 1.1′ Being an American (Z) goes characteristically together with being concerned about the costs (Y).3
There are three critical questions associated with this scheme. Formulated in abstract terms, these questions are (1) “Is (characteristic) Y indeed typical of (property) Z?”;4 (2) “Is (characteristic) Y not also typical of something else (Z′)?”;5 (3) “Are there any other properties (Y′) that X needs to have in order to be able to ascribe (characteristic) Y to X?”6 The second main type is “argumentation based on a comparison”. In this case, the argument and the standpoint have a common predicate (Y), but different referents. The acceptability is transferred in virtue of the similarity of the referent of the argument (Z) to the referent of the standpoint (X). Thus, in the example “It’s not at all necessary to give James 10 dollars allowance, because his brother always got just 5 dollars a week,”7 the similarity between James and his brother with respect to the sum needed for their weekly allowance functions as the justificatory principle for the transfer of acceptability from the argument to the standpoint.
1 James (X) does not need 10 dollars a week (Y). 1.1 James’s brother (Z) did not need 10 dollars a week (Y).8 1.1′ James (X) is similar to James’s brother (Z) with respect to the sum needed for their weekly allowance.9
The critical questions associated with this scheme are (1) “Are the things that are compared actually comparable?”; (2) “Are there enough relevant similarities between the things that are compared?”; (3) “Are there any relevant differences between the things that are compared?”10 The third and last main type distinguished within pragma-dialectics is “causal argumentation”. As in symptomatic argumentation, the argument and the standpoint involved in causal argumentation have a common referent (X). In causal argumentation, the acceptability of the argument is transferred to that of the standpoint in virtue of the assumption that the predicate of the argument signifies a cause (Z) and the predicate of the standpoint signifies its effect (Y). Thus, in the example “Because Tom has been drinking an excessive amount of whiskey, he must have a terrible headache,” the justificatory principle underlying the transfer of acceptability is that of a causal relation between drinking alcohol and having a headache.
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1 Tom (X) has a terrible headache (Y). 1.1 Tom (X) has been drinking an excessive amount of whiskey (Z). 1.1′ Drinking an excessive amount of whiskey (Z) leads to having a terrible headache (Y).
The critical questions associated with this scheme are (1) “Does the established cause, in fact, lead to the mentioned result?”; (2) “Are there any other factors that must be present together with the proposed cause to create the mentioned result?”; and (3) “Could the proposed result be caused by something else as well?”11 2.2â•… Variants and sub-types With respect to symptomatic argumentation and causal argumentation, a distinction can be made between two “variants” of the schemes presented above (Garssen, 1997:â•›8–9, 19–20; van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992:â•›97; van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans: 2002:â•›98 and 101; van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans 2007:â•›154, 164–165). In the first variant, which we have just presented, the symptom or cause is mentioned in the argument and the signified property or effect is mentioned in the standpoint. In the second variant, the signified property or effect is mentioned in the argument and the symptom or cause is mentioned in the standpoint. In the case of the second variant of symptomatic argumentation, where the argumentation goes from signified property to symptom rather than from symptom to signified property, van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007:â•›154–155) appear to envisage the same unexpressed premise and the same critical questions as for the first variant. In the case of the second variant of causal argumentation, the second critical question is deemed irrelevant (2007:â•›165). Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992:â•›97) mention in a brief paragraph a number of sub-types of each argument scheme. Argumentation based on a symptomatic relation, here called a relation of concomitance, includes “argumentation presenting something as an inherent quality” and “argumentation presenting something as a characteristic part of something more general”. Argumentation based on a relation of analogy includes “making a comparison”, “giving an example” and “referring to a model”. Argumentation based on a causal relation includes “argumentation pointing to the consequences of a course of action”, “argumentation presenting something as a means to a certain end”, and “argumentation emphasizing the nobility of the goal in order to justify the means”. Garssen (1997) distinguishes several sub-types of argument schemes, some of which are also mentioned in van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans (2002:â•›98, 101–102) and van Eemeren and Snoeck Henkemans (2006:â•›98, 100, 101–102). He considers “argumentation from authority”, “argumentation from example”, and “argumentation based on meaning or definition” to be sub-types of
The pragma-dialectical account of argument schemes 
symptomatic argumentation; “analogy argumentation” and “argumentation based on the principle of fairness” to be sub-types of argumentation based on a comparison; and “pragmatic argumentation” to be a sub-type of causal argumentation. For each of these sub-types, Garssen offers specifications of the general critical questions that apply to the main type at issue and, in some cases, also what he calls “preliminary questions”. The latter questions especially apply to the sub-types. From van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007), the following list of sub-types can be inferred. “Argumentation from example” is a sub-type of symptomatic argumentation; “argumentation based on a figurative comparison (analogy),” “argumentation based on the rule of justice,” and “argumentation based on the reciprocity principle” are sub-types of argumentation based on a comparison; “pragmatic argumentation” is a sub-type of causal argumentation. The authors remark (140, 155, 166) that the sub-types sometimes require adaptation or supplementation of the critical questions associated with the main type, and they provide the revised questions. 2.3â•… Evaluating the use of argument schemes Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992:â•›158–168) distinguish two evaluative questions about the use of argument schemes: 1. Is it appropriate to use a given argument scheme to defend a given standpoint? 2. If it is appropriate, is the argument scheme used correctly? In general, the use of an argument scheme to defend a standpoint is appropriate when the standpoint concerns a sort of proposition which that scheme fits; Garssen (2001:â•›91) adds the condition that the participants agree to application of the scheme. For example, if the standpoint concerns a course of action, the scheme that refutes the standpoint on the basis of its undesirable consequences is appropriate, but if the standpoint concerns a descriptive proposition that is a hypothesis under scientific investigation, the use of this scheme is inappropriate. An appropriate scheme is used correctly when the critical questions associated with the scheme can be answered in a satisfactory way. For example, argumentation from analogy is appropriate for any kind of proposition, but its correct use depends on the comparison being really justified and not overridden by crucial differences. The dual requirement that an argument scheme be both appropriate and correctly used gives rise to two sorts of fallacies: 1. Using an inappropriate argument scheme 2. Using an appropriate argument scheme incorrectly
 David Hitchcock & Jean Wagemans
As examples of using an inappropriate argument scheme, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992:â•›212–215) cite rejection of a descriptive standpoint because of its undesired consequences (argumentum ad consequentiam) and presenting a standpoint as right because everybody says it is right (argumentum ad populum) or because an authority says it is right (argumentum ad verecundiam). In the latter two cases, the mistake consists in appealing to popular approval or authoritative endorsement when the standpoint at issue is not appropriately justified by popularity or expertise respectively. As examples of using an appropriate argument scheme incorrectly, the authors cite using the argument scheme of concomitance incorrectly by generalizing on the basis of observations that are unrepresentative or insufficient (biased sample or hasty generalization), failing to fulfill the conditions of the scheme for analogy for a correct comparison (false analogy), using the argument scheme of causality incorrectly by inferring a causal relation from the mere observation that one event takes place after another (post hoc ergo propter hoc) or by erroneously suggesting that taking a proposed course of action will have effects that go from bad to worse (slippery slope). The discussion of these fallacies, as well as of the two dimensions of the evaluation of the use of argument schemes, often relates to sub-types of argument schemes rather than to one of the three main types of symptomatic, similarity and causal argumentation. For example, the mistake of using unrepresentative or insufficient examples to justify a generalization is peculiar to argumentation from example. 3.â•… Problems In this section, we identify some problems with the present pragma-dialectical formulation of argument schemes and their conditions of appropriateness and correct use. In the following section, we propose a revision that addresses these problems. Van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Kruiger (1978:â•›215–218; 1984a and 1987: 254–257) offer a multi-faceted critique of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s list of “argumentative schemes”. Their critique presupposes a number of desiderata for a satisfactory typology of argument schemes. We begin by considering how well the pragma-dialectical typology meets the desiderata implicit in the first three of their criticisms. We then propose two desiderata for the critical questions associated with argument schemes in a typology, and consider how well the pragma-dialectical account meets these desiderata. Finally we raise a question about the status of the “preliminary questions” that Garssen (1997) and van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007) formulate for some sub-types of argumentation.
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3.1â•… Ordering principle of the typology The division among the schemes should be based on a single ordering principle. Although we are aware of no explicit statement of the ordering principle on which the pragma-dialectical typology is based, it is clear from inspection of the three abstract schemes that all argumentation fitting an argument scheme is assumed to have a common element shared between argument and standpoint, a common element at the place of the variable “X” in the schemes for symptomatic and causal argumentation and at the place of the variable “Y” in the scheme for argumentation based on a comparison. The difference between the three main types of argument schemes is indicated in the unexpressed premise of each abstract scheme. That difference lies in the nature of the relationship (actual or claimed) between the rest of the argument and the rest of the standpoint: being a symptom of, being similar to, being a cause of. Thus the ordering principle for the pragma-dialectical typology of argument schemes is the nature of the (actual or claimed) relationship between the non-common part of the argument and the non-common part of the standpoint. It is not so clear what is the ordering principle for the division of each main type into its sub-types and variants. 3.2â•… Exhaustiveness of the types The list of types of schemes should be exhaustive. It is not obvious that every legitimate attempt to transfer acceptance from an argument to a standpoint involves one of three relations of an element of the argument to a (non-overlapping) element of the standpoint: being a symptom, being similar, being a cause. Garssen (1997:â•›246) has argued that there is no need to amend or expand the pragma-dialectical typoÂ� logy of argument schemes, on the ground that the pragma-dialectical typology incorporates (in some cases as variants or sub-types) all the argument schemes appearing in seven different lists: those of McBurney and Mills (1964), Freeley (1993), Brockriede and Ehninger (1960), Hastings (1962), Schellens (1985), Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958, 1969), Kienpointner (1992). However, many of the variants and sub-types recognized in the most recent versions of the pragma-dialectical typology (i.e. in Garssen 1997; van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans 2002; and van Eemeren, Houtlosser, and Snoeck Henkemans 2007) are not in fact species of the three main types of argument schemes. For example, pragmatic argumentation supports a recommendation that a particular method, plan or policy be adopted with the argument that its adoption would have desirable consequences, or supports the opposite recommendation with the argument that adoption of the contemplated course of action would have undesirable consequences (Garssen 1997:â•›21; English translation in van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans 2007:â•›166). Van Eemeren, Grootendorst and
 David Hitchcock & Jean Wagemans
Snoeck Henkemans (2002:â•›101) give the following example: “Doctors should go back to wearing white jackets, because this will create distance (and it is a good thing to have distance between the doctor and the patient).” In the example the clause in parentheses is the unexpressed premise supplied by the analyst to indicate the way in which acceptability is transferred from the argument to the standpoint. The word “this” in the argument indicates anaphorically the common element between argument and standpoint: doctors wearing white jackets again. The non-common elements are the predicates “will create distance [sc. between doctor and patient – DH and JW]” (in the argument) and “should be the case” (in the standpoint). The relationship of the non-common element in the argument (creating distance between doctor and patient) to the non-common element in the standpoint (deserving implementation) is not a relationship of cause to effect (or of effect to cause), but a relationship of an effect to a prescription, conveyed by the unexpressed premise that the postulated effect is a good thing. The fact that pragmatic argumentation is not a species of causal argumentation is evident from the fact that the critical questions proposed for pragmatic argumentation exclude one critical question relevant to causal argumentation: “Could the proposed result be caused by something else as well?” (Garssen 1997:â•›20–22; English translation in van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans 2007:â•›165–166). In fact, if we focus on the questions that concern the transfer of acceptability from argument to standpoint (rather than the acceptability of the argument), there is no overlap between the set of critical questions specific to the cause-to-effect argument scheme (or to the variant effect-to-cause argument scheme) and the set specific to the pragmatic argument schemes. The relation of cause to effect in pragmatic argumentation is not a relation of an element of the argument to an element of the standpoint, as in the example of argumentation from having drunk too much whiskey to having a terrible headache, but is rather a relation of one element of the argument (the course of action under consideration) to another element of the argument (its consequences). In the example, it is the relation postulated in the argument between doctors wearing white jackets again and distance between doctor and patient. 3.3â•… Mutual exclusiveness of the types The list of co-ordinate types of schemes should be mutually exclusive, so that no argumentation can be an instance of two co-ordinate schemes in the list in the same respect.12 The pragma-dialectical distinction between symptomatic, comparison and causal argumentation appears first in Dutch in (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Kruiger 1984b: 137–141) and then in English in (van Eemeren and Kruiger 1987:â•›72–74). In the latter work, the authors use one simple artificial example of
The pragma-dialectical account of argument schemes 
each type of argumentation to make the case that the corresponding schemata are different and have different “critical questions” derived from the criteria for the soundness of argumentation of the given type. The argument is compelling, but the subsequent addition of variants and sub-types to the original three main types raises a doubt about the mutual exclusiveness of symptomatic argumentation and causal argumentation. In particular, argumentation from an effect to its cause, although classified as a variant of causal argumentation, can also be classified as a sub-type of symptomatic argumentation. If one defends the standpoint that someone has an infection by means of the argument that the person has a fever, is that causal argumentation or symptomatic argumentation? In fact, it is both, because fever is both an effect of infection (since infection is its usual cause) and a symptom of infection. Someone might suggest (as did a referee) that the difficulty in classifying an argumentation from having a fever to having an infection is a problem of application, that the text being analyzed is determinately either effect to cause argumentation or symptomatic argumentation, and not both, and that its classification simply requires sensitivity to indicators in the text and context. But this suggestion flies in the face of the fact that the linking premise is typically unexpressed. Both effect-to-cause argumentation and symptomatic argumentation are expressed in the form: “Y is true of X because Z is true of X.” The proposition that Z is true of X is presented as accepted, or worthy of acceptance. If Z is (always or typically) caused by Y, then the text will typically leave the analyst free to attribute to argumentation of this form either the unexpressed premise “Z is a symptom of Y” or the unexpressed premise “Z is caused by Y”. Even argumentation from cause to effect can be regarded as symptomatic argumentation, as when someone defends the standpoint that it will probably rain soon on the basis that there are dark black clouds massing in the portion of the sky from which weather usually comes. The dark black clouds are both a cause and a symptom of impending rain. On the other hand, symptomatic argumentation cannot be reduced to causal argumentation, since some symptomatic argumentation is neither argumentation from effect to cause nor argumentation from cause to effect, but is rather argumentation from one effect to another effect of a common cause. 3.4â•… Relation between critical questions of a main type and of a sub-type We now add a fourth desideratum for a satisfactory typology of argument schemes: The critical questions specific to a main type of argumentation should be among the critical questions specific to each of its sub-types, either explicitly or in the form of a specification. By critical questions specific to a type or sub-type of argumentation, we mean those questions that concern the relationship between argument and standpoint (meaning by the relationship the way in which acceptability is
 David Hitchcock & Jean Wagemans
transferred from argument to standpoint) rather than those that concern the acceptability of the argument. For example, if argumentation from example is a sub-type of symptomatic argumentation, then all the critical questions that require satisfactory answers for acceptability to be transferred in symptomatic argumentation from the argument to the standpoint must require satisfactory answers in the case of argumentation from example – just because argumentation from example is a kind of symptomatic argumentation. The contrapositive follows logically: If not all the critical questions of one type of argumentation require satisfactory answers for acceptability transfer in the case of a second type of argumentation, then the second type of argumentation is not a sub-type of the first type. What we would expect, in fact, is that a sub-type has all the critical questions of its genus, and more besides. In the current pragma-dialectical typology, however, some critical questions associated with a main type of argumentation are not among the critical questions associated with an alleged sub-type, even implicitly. One such case is that of pragmatic argumentation. As mentioned before, this sub-type does not fit the initial characterization of causal argumentation, which is the main type under which it is classified. As a result, the critical questions associated with this main type (in either the cause-to-effect variant or the effect-to-cause variant) are not applicable; for a careful discussion of the critical questions appropriate to pragmatic argumentation, see (Ihnen Jory 2011). Another case where a critical question of a main type is not applicable to its alleged sub-type is argumentation from example, which Garssen (1997) and van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007) both classify as a kind of symptomatic argumentation. In generalizations from one or more examples, the critical question whether Z is symptomatic of Y, which is common to all schemes for symptomatic argumentation, simply does not apply. In fact, argumentation from example is better classified as a kind of argumentation based on a similarity relation (between the instance or instances described in the argument and the other instances in the class to which the standpoint generalizes). Thus, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992:â•›97) were more correct in classifying argumentation from example as argumentation based on a relation of analogy. 3.5â•… Relevance and completeness of the critical questions A fifth desideratum concerns the critical questions associated with each scheme. The overall theoretical framework for evaluating instances of argument schemes is that the scheme should be appropriate to the standpoint being defended and should be correctly used, where correct use consists in satisfactory answers to the
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scheme’s associated critical questions. Therefore, any appropriate application of a given scheme should be correctly used if the answers to all the questions are satisfactory and should be incorrectly used if the answer to any of the questions is unsatisfactory. Ideally, a list of critical questions should be justified by showing that it meets the just-mentioned italicized conditions. Unfortunately, the desirable justifications are lacking. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the conditions are met by the first two critical questions associated with symptomatic argumentation. Critical question (1), “Is (characteristic) Y indeed typical of (property) Z?”, appears to invert the status of Y (the attribute of X in the standpoint) and Z (the attribute of X in the argument), given that the unexpressed premise takes Z to go characteristically together with Y. It is not clear whether a positive answer to the question is to be taken as implying that whatever has observed property Z typically also has property Y or that whatever has property Y typically also has observed property Z (or both). In fact, since the inference in symptomatic argumentation is from an observed property Z to an inferred property Y, it is irrelevant to the transfer of acceptability whether what has property Y also has property Z. What counts is whether what has property Z also (generally) has property Y. For example, possession of a diamond ring with a perfect 2-carat diamond is a symptom of being wealthy, even though few wealthy people (we might suppose) possess a diamond ring with a perfect 2-carat diamond. The relevant critical question is whether people owning a ring with a perfect 2-carat diamond are wealthy, not whether wealthy people own a ring with a perfect 2-carat diamond. (The variant of critical question (1) in the textbook presentations of symptomatic argumentation, “Aren’t there also other non-Y’s that have the characteristic Z?” (van Eemeren and Snoeck Henkemans 2002:â•›98; 2006:â•›81) is quite unambiguous, and is relevant, in that a positive answer implies that the transfer of acceptability is subject to rebuttal, unless one or more further characteristics Z’ are attributed to X that together with Z belong only to Y’s.) Critical question (2), “Is (characteristic) Y not also typical of something else (Z′)?”, can be interpreted in two different ways. On one interpretation, it is the question whether Y has other symptoms in addition to Z. On the other interpretation, it is the question whether Y has other symptoms instead of Z. On either interpretation, the question is irrelevant to whether the argument scheme is correctly used. For the first interpretation, as the question whether Y has other symptoms in addition to Z, take the argumentation “She has morning sickness (Z), so she must be pregnant (Y).” Morning sickness is indeed symptomatic of pregnancy, in that most women of childbearing age who have morning sickness are pregnant. Pregnancy has other symptoms, cessation of menstruation (Z′) for example, but the fact that pregnancy has symptoms other than morning sickness does not show
 David Hitchcock & Jean Wagemans
that the scheme for symptomatic argumentation is incorrectly used when the standpoint that a certain woman is pregnant is defended by the argument that she has morning sickness. A given Y can have as many symptoms as one likes. If one of the symptoms is a given Z, then it is correct to defend the standpoint that Y is true of something by pointing out that Z is true of something, provided that the symptom Z typically reflects condition Y and there is no evidence that the “something” is untypical in being a Z that is not a Y. The second interpretation corresponds to the second critical question in the textbook formulation: “Aren’t there also other Y’s that do not have the characteristic Z?” (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans 2002:â•›98; van Eemeren & Snoeck Henkemans 2007:â•›81). To see that this question is irrelevant, consider the same example from the perspective that not all pregnant women have morning sickness. That fact provides no basis for thinking that is incorrect to defend the standpoint that a given woman is pregnant by the argument that she has morning sickness. The fact that other pregnant women do not have morning sickness is beside the point. It is possible that there has been an inadvertent transposition of “Y” and “Z” in the formulation of the first two critical questions for symptomatic argumentation by Garssen (1997:â•›9) and van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007:â•›155). Garssen (1997:â•›9) has the critical questions immediately following the variant symptomatic argument scheme in which Z is attributed to some referent X in the standpoint on the basis of an argument that Y is true of X, with the unexpressed premise that Y is symptomatic of Z. This unexpressed premise is indeed correct if the inference is from Y to Z, and the critical questions make more sense in that context. But both writers put forward the same unexpressed premise and the same critical questions for both variants of symptomatic argumentation. That is a mistake. In argumentation from a symptom Y to a property Z, the unexpressed premise is that whatever has symptom Y generally has property Z, and the critical question is whether a thing manifesting symptom Y can lack property Z. In reverse argumentation from a property Z to an expected symptom Y, the unexpressed premise is that whatever has property Z generally manifests symptom Y, and the critical question is whether a thing with property Z can fail to manifest symptom Y. There are symptom-property combinations that satisfy the first unexpressed premise but not the second (e.g. morning sickness and pregnancy), as well as symptom-property combinations that satisfy the second unexpressed premise but not the first (e.g. headache and concussion). On the other hand, critical question (3) “Are there any other properties (Y′) that X needs to have in order to be able to ascribe (characteristic) Y to X?” is important for determining whether acceptability is transferred from argument to standpoint, since in some cases symptoms are ambiguous and further information is needed to resolve the ambiguity, e.g. in medical diagnosis.
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3.6â•… Status of the preliminary questions for some sub-types Finally, it is unclear whether or not the “preliminary questions” that have to be asked in order to assess the correct use of some sub-types pertain to the unexpressed premise or pertain to another part of the reconstructed argumentation. If they do pertain to the unexpressed premise, they coincide with the critical question(s) associated with the type at issue. For instance, in the case of argumentation based on the rule of justice, the preliminary question to be asked is: “Should people in the same situation be treated equally in this case?” Since this question pertains to the unexpressed premise “X is similar to Z”, it could also be interpreted as a specification of the critical question “Are there enough relevant similarities between the things that are compared?” instead of as a question that precedes it. 4.â•… A proposed revision In this section, we propose an approach to solving the problems presented in the preceding section. The approach rests on a formalization of the pragma-dialectical account of argument schemes (Wagemans 2008; 2011). The formalization takes as a starting point that standpoints and arguments are attitudes towards propositions that contain a referent and a predicate. If we look at the pragma-dialectical argument schemes from a high level of abstraction, we can see that they fall into two main types. One type attributes a predicate to some referent on the basis of another predicate attributed to the same referent. Its general form is as follows:
1 1.1
Y is true of X Z is true of X
Any argumentation of this form requires for validity that Y is true of whatever Z is true of. In other words, whatever is Z is Y. This general principle may hold only for the most part or in typical cases, rather than strictly universally; in such cases, the argumentation is not deductively valid even when the principle is made explicit as an unexpressed premise:
1.1′
Generally, whatever is Z is Y.
Further, the scope of the principle may be limited to a sub-class to which X belongs:
1.1′
Generally, any W that is Z is Y (and X is a W).
We may call argument schemes of this general type predicate-transfer schemes, since they transfer the acceptability of the argument to the standpoint by changing the predicate applied to one and the same referent.
 David Hitchcock & Jean Wagemans
The second main type attributes a predicate to some referent on the basis that the same predicate is attributed to some other referent. The general form of this second main type is as follows:
1 1.1
Y is true of X Y is true of Z
Any argumentation of this form would require for its validity that whatever is true of Z is also true of X. In other words, X has the same attributes as Z. As with the first main type, such a principle may hold only in typical cases or as a generality, in which case the principle would be stated in a qualified form as an unexpressed premise:
1.1′
Generally, whatever is true of Z is also true of X.
A principle of this form usually holds only for a restricted range of predicates, which would need to be made explicit:
1.1′ Generally, whatever value of variable V belongs to Z also belongs to X (and Y is a value of variable V).
We may call argument schemes of this type referent-transfer schemes, since they transfer the acceptability of the argument to the standpoint by changing the referent to which one and the same predicate is applied. All the main types, variants and sub-types of argument schemes recognized so far in the pragma-dialectical approach can be placed under one of these two “super-types”. The pragma-dialectical schemes differ from one another in the nature of the relationship in the unexpressed premise. We list in Table 1 the argument schemes recognized so far in the pragma-dialectical typology that are in fact sub-types of predicate-transfer argumentation, with a suggestion of the unexpressed premise characteristic of each sub-type. There may be other sub-types of predicate-transfer schemes. Their common structure provides a basis for judging whether a proposed list of critical questions is adequate. The critical questions must be such that satisfactory answers to all of them will establish the generic principle that generally any W that is Z is Y and that X is a W. We list in Table 2 four types of argumentation recognized in the pragma-dialectical typology that are in fact sub-types of referent-transfer argumentation, with a suggestion of the unexpressed premise corresponding to each sub-type. Here too the common structure, in this case referent transfer, provides a basis for judging whether a proposed list of critical questions is adequate: satisfactory answers to all the questions must establish the generic principle that whatever value of variable V belongs to Z also belongs to X and that Y is a value of variable V.
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Table 1.╇ Sub-types of sign argumentation Name of sub-type
Unexpressed premiss
symptomatic argumentation argumentation from authority
Z is a symptom of Y being uttered by authority A (=Z) is generally an indication of being true or acceptable (=Y) Z means/is by definition Y Z generally causes Y Z generally has Y as a causal factor having desirable/undesirable consequences C (=Z) is generally a reason for doing/refraining from doing something (=Y) being a means to end E (=Z) is generally a reason for doing something (=Y) contributing to a noble goal G (=Z) is generally a reason for doing something (=Y)
argumentation from meaning/definition argumentation from cause to effect argumentation from effect to cause pragmatic argumentation (positive/negative) argumentation from being a means to an end argumentation from the nobility of a goal
Table 2.╇ Sub-types of similarity argumentation Name of sub-type
Unexpressed premiss
argumentation based on an analogy
X is similar to Z (in respects relevant to the variable V of which Y is a value) X should be treated in a similar way as Z (in respects relevant to the variable V of which Y is a value) X should do for the other member of the pair (X, Z) whatever Z has done for the other member of the pair (X,Z) (in respects relevant to the variable V of which Y is a value) other members of a class C (=X) have the same value of the variable V of which Y is a value as do the observed members of C (=Z)
argumentation based on the principle of fairness/the rule of justice argumentation based on the reciprocity principle argumentation from example
More research needs to be done to refine the formulation of the unexpressed premise for each of these sub-types, to articulate and justify the critical questions relevant to each sub-type, and to expand the two lists. We consider the recent work of Ihnen Jory (2011) on pragmatic argumentation to be a model of the sort of research that is required. We sketch here an argument that all argument schemes capable of correct use are either predicate-transfer or referent-transfer schemes. In the first place, a correct transfer of acceptability from an argument to a standpoint requires a common topic, which may be implicit in the syntax, as for example when a commonality of time is implicit in verbal tenses. For, if there is no common topic, the acceptability status of the standpoint can vary independently from that of the argument, so that there can be no principle in virtue of which acceptability is transferred from
 David Hitchcock & Jean Wagemans
argument to standpoint. Secondly, this common topic can always, we conjecture, be expressed either as a verb phrase that is the grammatical predicate of the propositions contained in the argument and standpoint or as a noun phrase that is the grammatical subject of the propositions in the argument and standpoint.13 This conjecture can be tested empirically, by considering examples, and is supported by the fact that all the main types, variants and sub-types recognized in the current pragma-dialectical typology can be analyzed as having a common topic that is either the grammatical predicate or the grammatical referent of the propositions in the argument and standpoint. Further, according to Garssen (1997:â•›246), there are many conceptual overlaps between the pragma-dialectical typology and those of other typologies of argument schemes; in most cases, he reports, the argument schemes in other typologies correspond well to a main type, variant or subtype of argument scheme recognized in the pragma-dialectical typology. Garssen reviewed the typologies of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958, 1969), Hastings (1962), McBurney and Mills (1964), Schellens (1985), Kienpointner (1992) and Freeley (1993). Garssen does not consider the typology of Walton (1996) and did his research too early to take account of the “user’s compendium” of 60 argument schemes, many with variants, by Walton, Reed and Macagno (2008:â•›308–346). The schemes in this compendium often include several premises, but, if one focuses on the operative premise which is usually explicit in instances of the schemes, one finds the theoretically required topical overlap in every scheme and one can reconstruct the common topic as either the grammatical predicate or the grammatical referent of the propositions in the operative premise and the standpoint. Thus applicable and correct ways of transferring acceptability from an argument to a standpoint divide into two main types: (1) predicate transfer, in which possession of a property by a referent is sufficient to justify a claim that the same referent possesses a different property; and (2) referent transfer, in which possession of a property by a referent is sufficient to justify a claim that a different referent possesses the same property. In a broad sense, all transfer of acceptability by predicate transfer is sign argumentation, since the referent’s possession of the property attributed in the argument is a sign (indication) that it possesses the property attributed in the standpoint. In a correspondingly broad sense, all transfer of acceptability by referent transfer is similarity argumentation, since the transfer of the same property from one referent to another presupposes some other similarity between the two referents that justifies the transfer. One could thus use more everyday terminology for the main division, and call it a division into sign argument schemes and similarity argument schemes. One may question however whether this main division, even with the labels “sign argumentation” and “similarity argumentation”, is recognizable by ordinary language users. That is an empirical question, for which a well-designed study
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should provide an answer. However, we would recommend that analysts of argumentation use the sub-types of argumentation (rather than our main types) to classify argumentation, state its unexpressed premise and raise the appropriate critical questions. Users should be trained to recognize symptomatic argumentation, cause-to-effect argumentation, pragmatic argumentation, means-end argumentation, and so forth; and to formulate the unexpressed premise and raise the critical questions specific to the sub-type – rather than to recognize the genus of sign argumentation to which they belong. Similarly with similarity argumentation, where training should be focused on recognizing such sub-types as argumentation from analogy and argumentation from example, as well as on supplying their unexpressed premise and raising their specific critical questions. Finally, we comment on the “preliminary questions” that Garssen (1997) proposed for some sub-types of argumentation. An examination of the questions proposed shows that they fall under two types of questions that can be raised about an argument: Is the propositional content acceptable? Does the argument have sufficient justificatory force? Since these two types of questions are already accommodated in the pragma-dialectical account, we see no need to add a third kind of question. 5.â•… Summary We have given an overview of the present state of the pragma-dialectical typology of argument schemes, identified some problems with this typology, and proposed a revision that addresses them. Our revision identifies as a necessary condition for an argument scheme to transfer acceptability from an argument to a standpoint that the argument and standpoint have a common element. We argue by inductive generalization from the argument schemes recognized in pragma-dialectics and by other theoreticians of argument schemes that this common element can be analyzed as either the referent or the predicate of the propositional content of the argument and standpoint. Thus there is a principled division of potentially correct argument schemes into predicate-transfer schemes where the referent is common and referent-transfer schemes where the predicate is common. We propose to use the term “sign argumentation” for predicate-transfer argumentation, on the basis that in a broad sense the property attributed to the referent in the argument is being presented as an indication of the presence of the property attributed to the same referent in the standpoint. We propose to use the term “similarity argumentation” for referent-transfer argumentation, on the ground that attributing a property to one referent on the basis of its possession by another must be grounded on a similarity between the two referents. For each of these
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two main types, we propose a generic principle needed if argumentation of a given scheme is to transfer acceptability from an argument to a standpoint. The two generic principles thus provide a framework for the theoretical justification of the critical questions associated with sub-types of sign argument schemes and comparison argument schemes. We doubt however that one can sub-divide sign argumentation into mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive co-ordinate species. To handle the possibility that two sub-types of sign argumentation may not be mutually exclusive, we propose explicit recognition of this possibility, especially with respect to the overlap between symptomatic argumentation and argumentation from effect to cause. To handle the possibility that the identified co-ordinate sub-types may not be jointly exhaustive of their type, we propose explicit recognition that some argumentation may belong to a main type without fitting into any of its currently identified sub-types. We claim that our typology preserves the important condition that the critical questions for a sub-type include all the critical questions of its super-type. We also acknowledge that sub-types can be divided into sub-sub-types, and so on without limit. Practical considerations will determine the extent to which it is useful to make further divisions.
Notes 1.â•… We thank two anonymous referees for their perceptive and helpful comments on a previous version of this contribution. 2.â•… An apostrophe indicates that the premiss concerned, which is usually unexpressed, connects the argument and the standpoint defended by it (Van Eemeren 2010:â•›48, n. 44). 3.â•… Van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007:â•›155) have the unexpressed premise “Z goes characteristically together with Y”. The textbooks have the unexpressed premise: “Z is symptomatic of Y” (van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans, 2002:â•›97; van Eemeren and Snoeck Henkemans, 2006:â•›81). This formulation probably corrects an earlier formulation with the converse unexpressed premiss (van Eemeren & Kruiger 1987:â•›73). 4.â•… See van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007:â•›155). The textbooks have instead the question: “Aren’t there also other non-Y’s that have the characteristic Z?” (van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans 2002:â•›98; van Eemeren and Snoeck Henkemans 2006:â•›81). 5.â•… The textbooks have instead the question: “Aren’t there also other Y’s that do not have the characteristic Z?” (van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans 2002:â•›98; van Eemeren and Snoeck Henkemans 2006:â•›81).
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6.â•… Instead of Z’ and Y, van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007) have Y’ and Z, which is obviously a mistake. The mistake reflects the formulation by Garssen (1997:â•›9), which may refer to a variant scheme in which Z is attributed to X on the basis of Y. The third critical question is missing from the textbook formulations (van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans, 2002:â•›98; van Eemeren and Snoeck Henkemans, 2006:â•›81). 7.â•… We take this example from van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans (2002:â•›99); the third Dutch edition of this textbook has a similar example (van Eemeren and Snoeck Henkemans 2006:â•›82). Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992:â•›97) use the example: “The method I propose worked last year (and this problem is similar to the one we had last year), so it will work again.” Superficially, the argument and the standpoint in this example have the same referent, namely the method proposed by the speaker. But in our view, van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans (2002:â•›99) and van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007:â•›138) are correct in taking all argumentation based on a comparison to fit the scheme: “Y is true of X because Y is true of Z and Z is comparable to X”, where the common element is the predicate Y. The clue to a correct analysis of the example lies in the unexpressed premiss supplied in parentheses in the quotation. This unexpressed premiss refers to two problems, the one under discussion and the one last year. What is common to the argument and the standpoint is the property of being tractable by the method proposed. They differ with respect to the problems so tractable, the one last year (in the argument) and the one now (in the standpoint). The two problems are the referents, to which the common property of being tractable by the proposed method is attributed. 8.â•… The implicit common predicate “does/did not need 10 dollars a week” (Y) needs to be inferred from the predicate “always got just 5 dollars a week” in the argument, recognizing that someone who gets 5 dollars a week allowance is not getting 10 dollars a week allowance. 9.â•… Van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans (2002:â•›99) formulate the similarity relation as follows: “And the one child should be treated just as the other.” 10.â•… We take the list of critical questions from van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007:â•›139). Van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans (2002:â•›99) and van Eemeren and Snoeck Henkemans (2006:â•›83) propose just one critical question, “Are there any significant differences between Z and X?”, but describe it as “the most important critical question to ask”, thus implying that there are other critical questions. 11.â•… The textbooks only have the first question, adding the third question when the cause is mentioned in the standpoint and the effect in the argument (van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans 2002:â•›101; van Eemeren and Snoeck Henkemans 2006:â•›84). 12.â•… Our statement of the desideratum adds two qualifications to the principle implicit in the 1978 critique of the typology of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. The first added qualification, that the types be co-ordinate, is added to accommodate that fact that, if there is a division of main types into sub-types, then an argumentation that is an instance of a sub-type will also be an instance of the main type to which it belongs. The second added qualification, that the argumentation instantiates two schemes in the same respect, is added to allow for cases where a single argumentation instantiates two mutually exclusive argumentation schemes in different respects. For example, a scientific paper might conclude that a certain drug is an effective treatment for a given disease on the basis that patients in a double-blind clinical trial who got
 David Hitchcock & Jean Wagemans the drug were more likely to survive than patients who got something else instead. The argumentation involves simultaneously an inference from correlation to cause and a generalization from the patients in the trial to all people with the disease. Thus it is an instance of two argumentation schemes, but in different respects, since inferring from correlation to cause is a different type of reasoning than generalizing from a sample to the universe from which it is taken. The fact that one and the same argumentation can be viewed as instantiating both schemes in different respects does not imply that there is an argumentation that can be viewed as instantiating both schemes in the same respect. And indeed the very description of the two schemes shows that such a simultaneous instantiation in the same respect is impossible. 13.â•… For grammatical reasons, the common topic cannot be the referent in one proposition and the predicate in the other. Further, if there is to be an actual transfer of acceptability, there must be some difference between the argument and the standpoint; in other words, the common topic cannot consist in the whole propositional content of each, or the argumentation would involve fallacious circular reasoning of the form “p because p”.
References Brockriede, W., & Ehninger, D. (1960). Toulmin on argument: An interpretation and application. Quarterly Journal of Speech 46, 44–53. Eemeren, F.H. van (2010). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse: Extending the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (1992). Argumentation, communication and fallacies. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation: The pragmadialectical approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Eemeren, F.H. van, Grootendorst, R., & Kruiger, T. (1978). Argumentatietheorie [Theory of argumentation]. Utrecht: Spectrum. Eemeren, F.H. van, Grootendorst, R., & Kruiger, T. (1984a). The study of argumentation. New York: Irvington. Eemeren, F.H. van, Grootendorst, R., & Kruiger, T. (1984b). Argumenteren [Argumentation]. Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff. Eemeren, F.H. van, Grootendorst, R., & Kruiger, T. (1987). Handbook of argumentation theory: A critical survey of classical backgrounds and modern studies. Dordrecht: Foris. Eemeren, F.H. van, Grootendorst, R., & Snoeck Henkemans, A.F. (2002). Argumentation: Analysis, evaluation, presentation. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Eemeren, F.H. van, Houtlosser, P., & Snoeck Henkemans, A.F. (2007). Argumentative indicators in discourse: A pragma-dialectical study. Dordrecht: Springer. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Kruiger, T. (1987). Identifying argumentation schemes. In F.H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J.A. Blair & C.A. Willard (Eds.), Argumentation: perspectives and approaches; Proceedings of the conference on argumentation 1986 (pp. 70–81). Dordrecht: Foris. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Snoeck Henkemans, A.F. (2006). Argumentatie: Inleiding in het analyseren, beoordelen en houden van betogen [Argumentation: Introduction to the analysis, evaluation and production of argumentation]. 3rd edition. Groningen/Houten: Wolters-Noordhoff.
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Freeley, A.J. (1993). Argumentation and debate: Critical thinking for reasoned decision making (8th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Garssen, B.J. (1997). Argumentatieschema’s in pragma-dialectisch perspectief: Een theoretisch en empirisch onderzoek [Argumentation schemes in a pragma-dialectical perspective: A theoretical and empirical study]. Amsterdam: IFOTT. Garssen, B.J. (2001). Argument schemes. In F.H. van Eemeren (Ed.), Crucial concepts in argumentation theory (pp. 81–99). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Hastings, A.C. (1962). A reformulation of the modes of reasoning in argumentation. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Northwestern University, Evanston, IL. Ihnen Jory, C. (2011). Evaluating pragmatic argumentation: A pragma-dialectical perspective. In F.H. van Eemeren, B.J. Garssen, D. Godden & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the Seventh Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation. Amsterdam: Sic Sat. CD-ROM. Kienpointner, M. (1992). Alltagslogik: Struktur und Funktion von Argumentationsmustern [Everyday logic: Structure and function of argumentation patterns]. Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Frommann Holzboog. McBurney, J.H., & Mills, G.E. (1964). Argumentation and debate: Techniques of a free society. New York: Macmillan. Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1958). La nouvelle rhétorique: Traité de l’argumentation [The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation]. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969). The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation (J. Wilkinson & P. Weaver, Trans.). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. [Translation of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958]. Schellens, P.J. (1985). Redelijke argumenten: Een onderzoek naar normen voor kritische lezers [Reasonable argumentation: A study of norms for a critical reader]. Dordrecht: Foris. Wagemans, J.H.M. (2008). De relatie tussen argumentatieschema’s en topen [The relation between argumentation schemes and topoi]. Paper presented at the VIOT 2008 conference at the Free University, Amsterdam. Wagemans, J.H.M. (2011). Argumentation schemes, topoi, and laws of logic. In F.H. van Eemeren, B.J. Garssen, D. Godden & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the Seventh Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation. Amsterdam: Sic Sat. CD-ROM. Walton, D. (1996). Argumentation schemes for presumptive reasoning. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Walton, D., Reed, C., & Macagno, F. (2008). Argumentation schemes. New York: Cambridge University Press.
The analysis of the strategic function of presentational techniques M.A. van Rees & E. Rigotti 1.â•… Introduction “Signifier, pour un énoncé, c’est orienter”, “diriger le discours dans une certaine direction”.1 These words of Anscombre and Ducrot, quoted by van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2009:â•›7), are the starting point for the present article. In general, presentational techniques, having to do with phrasing something in a particular way, have as a strategic function that they present something in a certain light, thus defining the situation in a particular way, one that is suitable for the rhetorical aims that the speaker aims to attain. Presentational choices derive this strategic meaning from a background of alternative choices that might have been made. Calling protesters not demonstrators, but rioters, for instance, is an attempt to bias the audience against them. Calling something one thing, rather than another, also is involved in dissociation.2 A speaker, dissociating real sponsors from opportunist sponsors, and using the former designation for a particular patron of the sports, biases the reader in favor of this particular patron and contrasts him favorably with the latter kind, that possesses the more unfavorable characteristics, implied to be not applicable to the former. Dissociation, then, also is a prime presentational instrument for strategic maneuvering. As van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2009:â•›19) contend, when analyzing the strategic function of a piece of maneuvering in argumentative discourse, one thing that we have to take into account, alongside with a number of other considerations, is the situational demands to which the maneuvering has to respond, that is, the actual state of affairs in the discourse, as it is reflected in the commitment sets of the arguers and audiences that define the argumentative situation. In this contribution, we intend to do two things: (1) To give a characterization of the strategic function of presentational techniques in general; (2) To show that the analysis of the strategic potential of presentational techniques, as exemplified by the argumentative technique of dissociation, provides a case in point of van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s contention: In order to get a more precise understanding of the
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way in which the definition of the situation achieved by dissociation functions strategically, we must take into account the situational demands that the dissociation is intended to meet. 2.â•… The strategic function of presentational techniques In order to explain the role of presentational techniques, we shall first concisely sketch their position within the extended framework of pragma-dialectics, characterized by the notion of strategic maneuvering. The aim of reconciling the dialectical goal of critically resolving a difference of opinion with the rhetorical goal of effective and persuasive argumentation brings to the fore the strategic function of the addressee of the argumentative interaction that is identified as the audience. As the arguer aims to enhance his position visà-vis the audience, the two other poles of strategic maneuvering, topical potential and presentational techniques, are not only intended to make the most expedient choice among the available topics and among the available stylistic devices respectively, but they are both also intended to adapt these choices to the actual audience demand. Thus, both are teleologically ruled by the search of maximum expediency in relation to the image of the audience activated by the arguer. However, a relevant difference emerges between the two, enabling us to better specify the role of presentational techniques with regard to topical potential. We observe that the topical choices made at the different stages, even though they are also directed at the arguer’s image of the audience and are therefore functional to audience persuasion, determine the substance or structure of an argument by specifying issues and standpoints, by focusing, within the common ground, on the appropriate premises and procedures, by adopting the most effective arguments. Presentational techniques, on the other hand, which pertain “to the communicative means that are used in presenting the argumentative moves” (van Eemeren 2010), intervene more “on the surface” as different strategies for communicatively “dressing” the topical selections. In other words, presentational techniques do not affect the argumentative organization of discourse emerging in the analytic overview, but determine the ways it should be rendered in order to maximize its effectiveness and its compliance with the presumed audience demand. Not by chance, presentational techniques are “deleted” or substituted in the analytic overview, as this is devoted to eliciting the dialectical organization of the discourse. The crucial role played by the notion of audience in strategic maneuvering requires a closer consideration of the context, mainly in order to identify the relevant audience to which the arguer is properly expected to orient his strategy. In relation to the three domains (eide) of rhetoric that he identifies – deliberative, juridical and epideictic – Aristotle specifies in his Rhetoric (1358a 36, 1358b 8) the
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notion of audience as assembly member, judge and spectator, respectively. The audience, which, indeed, can be identified only in relation to the context, is defined in all cases as the telos or pragmatic point of reference at which argumentation is aimed and by which argumentation strategies are determined. The different nature of the decisions involved is relevant for argumentation strategies. Assembly members and judges are recognized as having a stronger pragmatic impact: They are in charge of making decisions (they are kritai, i.e. deciders) about the future and the past respectively, while the audience of an epideictic discourse, in the role of spectator, has to evaluate (krino) the quality of individuals and deeds. The different role attributed by Aristotle to assembly members and judges on the one hand and to spectators on the other hand may be well explained by the different level of the decision that is involved and of the social reality (in the sense of Searle 1995) that is affected by the interaction: In the first case the institutional social sphere is also modified, while in the second case only the cognitive and attitudinal spheres are affected. In all argumentation contexts, the most relevant audience coincides with the subject (individual or group) on which the outcome of a communicative interaction mainly depends.3 The identification of the audience as a constitutive point of reference of strategic maneuvering is consistent with the pragmatic nature of argumentation: It is reasonable for the arguer to center his persuasive efforts on that factor of the interaction, whose will is decisive for the desired results of the interaction.4 Presentational techniques are those linguistic and, more in general, semiotic tools that are available to strategic maneuvering, as alternative ways of communicatively implementing the strategically oriented choices within the topical potential that have been made at the different stages. This communicative implementation is in turn strategically oriented as it aims at strengthening the effectiveness of argumentation: “When speaking of making presentational choices in strategic maneuvering I am referring to utilizing the pragmatic room for presentational variation to steer the discourse toward the achievement of certain communicative and interactional effects” (van Eemeren 2010:â•›119). We may characterize the function of presentational techniques, then, as tools through which the arguer can enhance his position (his argumentative force) especially in relation to the audience. At this point, an elementary but crucial question arises: How do presentational techniques produce their rhetorical effects or by what mechanisms can they rhetorically enhance the arguer’s position? Without claiming to answer this question systematically, we might attempt to outline the major classes of presentational techniques and to describe some of the effects produced by them. Once again, reviewing the rhetorical tradition shows to be useful: Three out of five of partes orationis,5 in the sense of the phases through which the elaboration of each component of a rhetorical-argumentative intervention was
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meant to be executed, were centered on presentational techniques. Indeed, beyond inventio, that might rather plausibly be identified with topical potential, and memoria (memorization technique), that was bound to the typically oral performance of argumentative discourse, all the other phases by nature have presentational implications: Dispositio (arrangement) aims at choosing for each constituent the order of elements that should maximize the desired effect; elocutio (wording and phrasing) activates the widest class of presentational techniques, ranging from the selection of words (in their proper or metaphorical use), to the choice of denotative phrases and syntactic constructions; actio (performance) designs the oral performance of the argumentative discourse by selecting among different styles of pronunciation and different non-verbal body language signals. The three partes orationis mentioned represent a system of rhetorical tasks which suggests a first typology of presentational techniques. In the following some examples are given for the first two partes, and their possible effects are signaled. The choice among different arrangements allows various rhetorical exploitations. Here we focus on the mutual disposition of the standpoint and the related arguments as it is treated by Aristotle in the first chapter of the eighth book of Topics: “For the concealment of your conclusion, you should establish by previous reasonings the premises (…) you should not state the conclusions, but establish them by reasoning all at the same time at a later stage … You should keep the answerer as far as possible from the original proposition” (Topica 156a 7–23). What is suggested here by Aristotle is the reversal of the sequence that would result from simply reproducing the order of the first three stages of critical discussion.6 This would not be admitted in many types of context, but it cannot be considered as representing in general a derailment, as Arthur Schopenhauer (1896) seems to believe in his largely negative and pessimistic interpretation of rhetoric (see Stratagem IV): “In this way you conceal your game until you have obtained all the admissions that are necessary … It is a trick which needs no illustration”. Indeed, it may represent an insincere behavior of the arguer who disguises his very intention, as well as a strategy aimed to prevent the antagonist from a prejudiced attitude against the standpoint. Numerous and different presentational techniques pertain to elocutio (wording and phrasing). They may in general be characterized as linguistic strategies exploiting the alternatives offered by a language not only to represent, but also to frame a situation. These alternatives are related to the choice of words (in their proper or metaphorical use), employed in describing and in denoting entities and states of affairs and to the selection of syntactic constructions. We present a few examples. In order to denote a particular individual in a specific situation, any number of denotative phrases can be used, provided that the features activated by the adopted denoting phrase allow the addressee
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to univocally identify the individual. Thus the protagonist of the renowned Aeschylus’ trilogy Oresteia may be mentioned as Orestes, his mother’s killer, Electra’s or Iphigenia’s brother, Clytemnestra’s son, his father’s avenger, Pylades’ friend, Oresteia’s protagonist etc. Now, the choice is not irrelevant because of the different implications of the activated features: As opposed to neutral denotations like Orestes and Oresteia’s protagonist, his mother’s killer entails a manifestly negative evaluation, while his father’s avenger sounded (see Aristotle, Rhetoric 1405b 20–24), at least in the cultural context of the trilogy, wholly positive. Both these denoting phrases show a complex semantic nature, in which, beside the descriptive features used to identify the situation, a positive or negative emotional meaning is associated (Rigotti & Rocci 2006; Stevenson 1938).7 A rather intriguing semantic mechanism ensures a remarkable degree of effectiveness: The entailed evaluation is not stated, but exhibited, almost publicly experienced. Not being immediately imputable nor refutable it somehow manages to impose itself. According to Stevenson’s evaluation the number of such magic words possibly reaches several hundreds: Words like culture, democracy, natural, extremist, equality, terrorism etc. surely deserve to be listed in this class. But the semantic system is relentlessly evolving: Words like organic and interactive may well be considered newcomers and, throughout the last century, some evaluative antonyms, like fat and skinny exchanged their emotional meanings. It goes without saying that such words often play the role of arguments in favor or against standpoints in deliberative and epideictic argumentation. Some apparently neutral words, designating different cultural, political, or ideological qualities, acquire different emotional status in relation to the different communities within which they may be used: Words like communist and lobbyist might be plausible examples. But, in fact, the choice of even the most ordinary words may play significant argumentative roles in favor or against a standpoint. Naming a person called upon as an advisor after an accident of dubious nature my cousin, rather than renowned expert of criminal law, may be useful to reframe the situation by removing the impression of guilt awareness and enhancing the opposite image of an involuntary accident (Jacobs 2008). Even though the effects produced by these word choices do not constitute explicit (and, thus, attackable) argumentative moves, they frame the concerned state of affairs in such a way that the arguer’s position is protected from possible attacks induced by alternative choices. While in the considered case the operated word choice allows to “rule” the argumentative interaction by monitoring and limiting it, in other cases the choice of words may create forms of micro-argumentation that can be developed or kept at the margins of the discourse. For instance, in Those irresponsible people were driving at 200 km/per hour, the noun phrase those irresponsible people represents the standpoint and were driving at 200 km/per hour is the related argument, that is, the reason why such people should be said to be
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irresponsible. Instead, a statement like Two clandestine immigrants knocked down a man on a bicycle, that might well figure as headline in numerous European newspapers, is made available, thanks to the word choice in the noun phrase two clandestine immigrants, as premise of stereotypical arguments that may be developed or kept implicit with an insinuating effect. Indeed, if other features were chosen, like young inexpert drivers, this possibility of rhetorical exploitation would be lost. The metaphorical use of words offers an inexhaustible goldmine of rhetorical effects: Beyond their communicative functions (like conceptual enrichment, clarification, mediation between different cognitive domains etc.), metaphors often show to be argumentatively relevant. If a tender offer is named an attempt at stealing our company, the unreasonably low price of the offer is emphasized and exploited to enhance an argument against the acceptance.8 By presenting a political social crisis as an illness, correcting measures may be invoked and urgently enacted like therapies and operations, and job “cuts” may be presented as unavoidable amputations. The border between rhetorical exploitation and dialectic ploy is often hard to establish: An expedient perception or reading of the situation later may be used as a premise. When, in the current financial crisis, people involved in failures and even responsible for them, designate this crisis as a natural calamity, if not “an act of God”, surely, the seriousness of the situation is rhetorically emphasized, but an argumentative derailment (violation of rule 6 of critical discussion9) is implied as well, because, by implicitly denying the nature of action, the responsibility is also discharged (Rigotti 2008) and the guilty become victims. Not rarely metaphors are translated into arguments from analogy: With regard to the issue “whether Michigan, as well as the car companies, should get assistance”, the standpoint, obviously in favor of assistance, was supported by the argument: “The state is being hit by an economic hurricane just as New Orleans was hit by a natural hurricane” (Ingrassia 2008; see also Rigotti & Palmieri 2010). Alternative syntactic constructions show also to be possibly effective presentational techniques. In this respect, we limit ourselves to mention the choice of different syntactic constructions aiming at managing the saliency of every component of argumentative discourse and the use of noun phrases and other presuppositional constructions (see also Greco 2003) for creating an effect of “taken for granted”, which, though often wholly legitimate, may also be exploited in the fallacy of many-questions. 3.â•… The argumentative situation and the strategic function of dissociation Calling something one thing, rather than another, also is involved in dissociation. In this section we focus on dissociation as a presentational technique. The rhetorical
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effectiveness of this technique, just like that of other presentational techniques, as discussed in the previous section, depends to a large degree on the way it plays up to the audience and its assumptions. In this section, we will show that, in order to understand the strategic function of dissociation, we must take into account the various situational demands it is intended to meet. When analyzing this strategic function of dissociation, several aspects of the argumentative situation, that is, the actual state of affairs in the discourse, as it is reflected in the assumptions that arguer and audience may be held to be committed to, emerge as relevant. First of all, the dissociation can be seen by arguer and audience to respond to certain assertions present in the commitment store of these participants in the argumentative situation. Secondly, there may be evidence for these assertions known to both arguer and audience, that the dissociation needs to deal with. And, finally, part and parcel of the commitment store of the participants are the value judgments that arguer and audience sustain with regard to these assertions and that the dissociation plays upon. 3.1â•… Dissociation as opposition Dissociation inherently reacts to something in the argumentative situation: It is always used in opposition to a particular viewpoint that the audience may be assumed to be aware of. This viewpoint can be one that, in actual fact or presumably, has been voiced by others, or one that has been voiced by the speaker himself on an earlier occasion. An example of the former is the case of Maria Montessori’s granddaughter, who defended her grandmother against an accusation of being vain with the dissociation “She loved beautiful clothes, but was not vain”. In an interview, the granddaughter was presented by the interviewers with the standing opinion that Maria Montessori was vain and ambitious. This accusation of vanity, then, is the viewpoint, explicitly invoked and placed in the commitment store of the participants in the communicative situation by the interviewers, to which Renilde Montessori reacts with her dissociation of physical and mental vanity. She denies that her grandmother was vain in the core, mental, sense, and thus tries to effect a change in the commitment stores of all who can hear or read her words. Another example is provided by the case of a spokesman of Dutch National Rail, reacting to a letter to the editor from a chief conductor, in which the latter, in spite of what he calls a “ban on public speaking”, told about a number of abuses in the company. The spokesman for National Rail denies that there is a ban on public speaking for personnel, “it is merely an agreement that personnel encounter the press through public relations officers appointed for that task”. Here, again, there is present in the communicative situation an explicit statement, which the
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speaker explicitly addresses with his dissociation. Again, the speaker denies that this statement holds water, thus trying to effect a change in the commitment store of his audience. Dissociation also typically is used in the context of an earlier statement of the speaker him- or herself, or of a point of view which the speaker earlier openly subscribed to. An example is the defense that former Dutch Traffic Minister Jorritsma gave of her proposal to once again adapt the allowable noise levels for Schiphol airport. Parliament was of the opinion that adaptation comes down to tolerating that the standards are exceeded, and that no longer was an option. Jorritsma counters by contesting: “The Cabinet will not revert once again to a policy of tolerance. That was once, but never again, we said then. But tolerating is something quite different from anticipating a change of law which everybody thinks should be put into effect.” The Minister, then, explicitly refers to a point of view to which she earlier subscribed (“never again, we said then”), thus emphasizing that the fact that she subscribed to it belongs to the commitment store of all participants in the communicative situation. With her dissociation she does not deny that she took this viewpoint, but she does deny that her present point of view would clash with that earlier commitment; the dissociation enables her to maintain that her present view is about something quite different. Thus the commitment store of the audience is altered, this time by adding another point of view. The same thing happens in the case of former Minister Jan Pronk, who had called Prime Minister Balkenende a liar for the way in which he had led the country into participating in the war in Iraq. He was severely criticized for this accusation, not least by members of his own Labor Party. Subsequently, he expressed his regret and admitted that he had been guilty of mixing up political criticism with personal qualifications: “Employing a lie in politics doesn’t make you a liar” he acknowledged. His earlier statement thus explicitly is placed into the commitment store of the participants in the communicative situation. By means of the dissociation, however, Pronk is able to distance himself from this statement, as far as the personal qualification is concerned, all the while maintaining that the Prime Minister had lied, though now merely [sic] in the sense of employing a political lie. Thus, dissociation occurs in the context of and responds to a statement which is part of the commitment store of the participants in the argumentative situation. Its strategic function is to change or add onto this commitment store in a direction that the arguer prefers. 3.2â•… Dissociation as a way of denying the undeniable Not only is there in the argumentative situation a statement which the arguer attempts to distance himself from by means of dissociation, often there also is some
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piece of factual information or other kind of evidence which makes it difficult, if not impossible, to do so. By means of dissociation the arguer can give a different twist to this evidence, thus removing the obstacle to his aim. A simple hypothetical example would be when someone would want to deny that something which looked obviously green, was green. He might employ a dissociation like: “It is optically green, but technically it is not”, thus giving a particular interpretation of the fact of that the object did look green, and demoting it to something of marginal importance. An example from real life is provided by Dutch soccer player Jonk, who, in an interview being confronted with the undeniable fact that he had left an excellent Dutch club for a mediocre British club in which he had to play way below his level, denied the interviewer’s logical conclusion that he must regret his move. In order to do so, he employed a dissociation between feeling regret and merely finding something “too bad”. Thus he could deny feeling regret, admitting merely to finding it “too bad”. The case of Minister Jorritsma, cited in the previous section, also provides an example. After all, as everybody concerned knew, adapting the noise levels for Schiphol airport was exactly what in previous cases of adaptation was called tolerating. So it was very hard to maintain that adapting them once again was not tolerating. The dissociation between tolerating and anticipating on a change of law that everyone is in favor of, however, did the job. A final example is provided by former US President Clinton, who had to defend himself against the accusation that he had had sexual relations with aid Monica Lewinsky, especially in the light of the fact that, earlier, he had adamantly maintained that he had not. By the time he appeared before the Grand Jury to defend against charges of perjury, there was hard evidence to the contrary; his semen was found on one of Ms. Lewinsky’s dresses. As a way out of the quandary he found himself in, Clinton introduced a dissociation regarding the notion “sexual relationship”, in which he placed activities like having oral sex outside this notion. For the aspects split off from what he considered to be the core notion of sexual relationship, Clinton introduced a new term: While denying that he had had sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky, he admitted to having had “inappropriate intimate contact” with her. This enabled him to maintain that he had not had a sexual relationship with Lewinsky, as he had testified before, in spite of the bare evidence to the contrary before him. Thus, the strategic function of dissociation also is to deal with the presence in the commitment store of the participants of hard and fast evidence which makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to change the viewpoints of the audience. Dissociation is an argumentative technique that is eminently suitable to changing the light in which this evidence is seen, and to thus force a way out of the quandary in which it places the speaker. At the same time, it allows the speaker to show that he has taken note of the evidence, and thus to meet the audience half-way.
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3.3â•… Dissociation as values-utilizing It is not only statements or facts in the commitment store of the participants which the dissociation reacts to. Dissociation also addresses values about the states of affairs that are presented in these statements and facts. In fact, in order to be rhetorically successful, these values, also present in the commitment store, must be addressed and played up to. Looking once more at the Montessori example, we can see how this works. In the first place, the predicate “vain” most likely is considered by the participants in the argumentative situation as a negative valuation: To call someone vain is regarded, not as a compliment, but as an accusation. This makes it necessary for the speaker, who wishes to place Montessori in a positive light, to do something about this qualification. In the second place, and even more importantly, it is necessary that the qualification that the speaker tries to establish in its place, has a less damaging ring. So, if the dissociation that she employs to get rid of the accusation of vanity is to be successful, the new qualification, a love of beautiful clothes, must be affiliated with a positive evaluation in the eyes of the participants in the argumentative situation. The same mechanism is at work in the National Rail and Schiphol examples. A ban on public speaking undoubtedly is regarded by the participants as something undesirable; an agreement to meet the press through a public relations officer, the speaker hopes, may sound somewhat less damaging. Tolerance has become a bad thing in the political debate round the Schiphol noise levels, as the minister herself asserts; anticipating on a change of law which everyone desires, cannot be but valued positively. The Pronk example is somewhat more ambiguous. Calling someone a liar is not paying them a compliment in any situation, but in this case the offense was particularly sensitive because of the fact that the prime minister’s Christian Democratic Party was a coalition partner of the Labor Party that Pronk tried to become leader of. So the need to change this negatively valued qualification was all the more urgent. However, replacing it with the qualification of employing political lies seems only marginally better. No wonder, that both within and outside the Labor Party people were not amused with Pronk’s apology. The revaluation in the examples just discussed is performed in one particular direction: The new term brings about an attenuation with regard to the old term. A bad label is replaced by one that is (supposedly) less damaging. Of course, as the case may be, attenuation can also be applied in cases where the speaker wishes to oppose a positive qualification, then replacing a positive label with one that is less flattering. An example is provided by the following fragment from a television debate in which Dutch movie producer Matthijs van Heijningen, in opposition to
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a claim of Dutch movie director Ate de Jong, defends the standpoint that he has not lost his passion: dJ: I think that Matthijs’s flame has subsided (…) vH: well [Follows mention of four movies he is producing at that moment – MAvR]…. no certainly not, no no just just dJ: yes but I have the feeling that Matthijs does this because he is a producer and is supposed to do something again, not because he really wants to do that specific production
Passion, in the eyes of both participants, is a desirable quality. De Jong, however, wants to establish that van Heijningen does not possess this quality. He uses a dissociation to attenuate: Van Heijningen does not possess real passion, making movies because he really wants to, but something which most likely is deemed less desirable by all concerned: the mere simile of passion, that is, making movies out of a sense of obligation. The direction of the value-shift also can be reversed. Dissociation cannot only be used to attenuate, but also to intensify or amplify. An example can be found in the advertising slogan that was the basis of a long-standing advertizing campaign for a well-known Dutch brand of beer: “There’s beer, and there’s Grolsch”. What you drink, when you drink Grolsch, is not the inferior rubbish that is not the real stuff; it is what the real, adult beer drinker drinks. The same pattern was used in an advertisement for bungalow parks: “There’s cabins and there’s vacation homes; there’s a swimming pool and there’s the Aqua Mundo; there’s playing grounds and there’s the Discovery Bay; there’s help and there’s service: There’s bungalow parks and there’s Center Parks”. Center Parks, in this ad, is portrayed as not just your plain, ordinary, boring everyday bungalow park; The reader is led to think that it is the true vacation experience. The ad plays up to the comparative values that the reader is supposed to entertain about cabins versus vacation homes etc. In these examples, then, the revaluation comes down to amplification or intensification. This same amplification we find in every case in which the dissociation replaces an ordinary qualification with a designation that we have to do with the real thing. Advertizing a magazine, for instance, with the recommendation that it covers the lives of “the real stars” (and, by implication, not of the make-believe stars that other magazines make it their business to portray), intensifies the positive valuation that readers supposedly attach to reading about stars. And, of course, here, too, the intensification can, as the case may be, also concern a quality that is considered undesirable: Saying that someone is not just acting against the law, but that he is behaving like a real criminal would be an example. Thus, in all cases, whether we have to do with attenuation or amplification, and whether these processes are applied to positively or negatively valued characteristics,
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dissociation, building upon the values presumed to be held by the participants in the argumentative situation, tries to shift the extant valuation of the audience into one more to the liking of the arguer. 4.â•… Conclusion In this contribution, we took a closer look at the strategic function of presentational techniques. In the first part, we contended that presentational techniques do not affect the argumentative organization of discourse emerging in the analytic overview, but determine the ways the discourse is rendered in order to maximize its effectiveness in relation to presumed audience demand. Emphasizing the central importance of the audience in strategic maneuvering, we characterized the function of presentational techniques as tools through which the arguer can enhance his position in relation to the audience. Finally, we illustrated how presentational techniques may be employed in various partes orationis. Subsequently, focusing on one particular presentational technique, namely that of dissociation, we explained in more detail the importance of compliance with presumed audience demand, by showing how, in accordance with van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s (2009) injunctions, the strategic function of a piece of strategic maneuvering can only be understood if we recognize how it meets the demands of the argumentative situation. What assertions in the commitment store of the participants does the dissociation respond to, what factual and other evidence, also in the commitment store of the participants, does it need to deal with, and what values presumably held by the participants does it need to play up to, in order to be successful – these are the questions that we need to answer if we want to understand the strategic potential of dissociation. These observations with regard to the analysis of the strategic function of dissociation again point to the importance of the audience as a constitutive point of reference for strategic maneuvering. With this contribution we hope to have payed a small tribute to the deep and lasting influence that the work of Frans van Eemeren has had on our own. His work provides the inspiration, as well as the substrate which made it possible for our own insights to come to fruition.
Notes 1.â•… “To carry meaning, for an utterance, is to orient”, “to direct the discourse into a certain direction”. 2.â•… Dissociation as an argumentative technique was first discussed by Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca (1969). An extensive treatment can be found in Van Rees (2009).
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3.â•… The notion of primary audience (see van Eemeren 2010, Chapter 4 and, in particular, Section 4.4) as the audience “the arguer considers the more important to reach” may be made more explicit if importance is ascribed to the role of the decider whose judgment is decisive. Analogously, in a “triadic argument” the relevance of the third party is justified by the fact that its “verdict may in certain cases even be the more important one”. 4.â•… This notion of audience, which is related to the role of decider in the ongoing interaction, may be connected with the well-known notion of stakeholder in studies devoted to communication in economic and financial domains (Freeman 1984; Mitchell et al. 1997; Ilia & Lurati 2006). Stakeholders are defined as people carrying an interest in the concerned interaction, whose impact on the situation may be more or less direct, however, always relevant. 5.â•… In fact, the term partes orationis covers one grammatical and two rhetorical notions: in grammar it refers to parts of speech or classes of lexicon; in rhetoric the term designates both the different constituents of a rhetorical discourse, (exordium, narratio, divisio etc.) and the phases through which each component is elaborated. This last notion is referred to in this paper. For the first rhetorical notion and its comparison with the stages of critical discussion see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1994). 6.â•… In the controversy opposing universalists and localists in the study of argumentative traditions, some scholars assign as typical to the Chinese argumentative tradition the strategy suggested in the cited passage by Aristotle and curiously characterize it as inductive (Rocci 2006). 7.â•… See for the role of emotions in argumentation Plantin (2004) and for a concise overview Cigada (2008:â•›13–35). 8.â•… This argumentation was used by the Board of directors of Cadbury when opposing a tender offer by Kraft, and can be found in several other cases of corporate takeovers (cf. Palmieri: 2008). 9.â•… ‘A party may not falsely present a premise as an accepted starting point nor deny a premise representing an accepted starting point’ (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992:â•›209). In the perspective of the AMT, the premise falsely presented as an accepted starting point coincides with the endoxon “Detroit crisis belongs like Katrina to the event class of hurricanes, or acts of God (non imputableness, seriousness, need of major support…)” (Rigotti & Palmieri 2010; Rigotti and Greco-Morasso, forthcoming).
References Aristotle (1959). Aristotelis ars rhetorica. W.D. Ross (Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Aristotle (2004). Topica. Edited and translated by E.S. Forster. Harvard: Harvard University Press. Cigada, S. (2008). Les émotions dans le discours de la construction européenne. Milan: UCSC. Eemeren, F.H. van (2010). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse. Extending the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Eemeren, F.H. van & Grootendorst, R. (1992). Argumentation, communication and fallacies. Hillsdale, New Jersey: LEA.
 M.A. van Rees & E. Rigotti Eemeren, F.H. van & Grootendorst, R. (1994). Analyzing argumentative discourse. In F.H. van Eemeren & R. Grootendorst (Eds.) Studies in pragma-dialectics (pp. 145–464). Amsterdam: Sic Sat. Eemeren, F.H. van & Houtlosser, P. (2009). Strategic maneuvering: Examining argumentation in context. In F.H. van Eemeren (Ed.), Examining argumentation in context. Fifteen studies on strategic maneuvering (pp. 1–24). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Eemeren, F.H. van, Grootendorst, R., Jackson, S. & Jacobs, C.S. (1993). Reconstructing argumentative discourse. Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press. Freeman, R.E. (1984). Strategic management: a stakeholder approach. Boston, MA: Pitman. Greco, S. (2003). When presupposing becomes dangerous. How the procedure of presuppositional accommodation can be exploited in manipulative discourses. Studies in Communication Sciences 3(2), 217–234. Ilia, L. & Lurati, F. (2006). Stakeholder perspectives on organizational identity: searching for a relationship approach. Corporate Reputation Review 8(4), 293–304. Ingrassia, P. (2008).The auto makers are already bankrupt. The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 21. Jacobs, C.S. (2008). Deception, fraud, misinformation, and other forms of verbal manipulation in American advertising and politics: Some underlying pragmatic principles. Paper presented at the VALS-ASLA Tagung, Changing societies: methodological challenges for applied linguistics, Lugano, USI, 8 February 2008. Mitchell, R.K., Agle, B.R. & Wood, D.J. (1997). Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. Academy of Management Review. 22 (4), 853–886. Palmieri, R. (2008). Reconstructing argumentative interactions in M&A offers. Studies in Communication Sciences 8(2), 279–302. Perelman, Ch. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969). The new rhetoric. A treatise on argumentation. Notre Dame/London: University of Notre Dame Press. Plantin, C. (2004). On the inseparability of emotion and reason in argumentation. In E. Weigand (Ed.), Emotion in dialogic interaction (pp. 265–276). Amsterdam: Benjamins. Rees, M.A. van (2009). Dissociation in argumentative discussions. A pragma-dialectical perspective. Dordrecht: Springer. Rigotti, E. (2008). Locus a causa finali. L’Analisi Linguistica e Letteraria. XVI (2), 559–576. Rigotti, E. & Palmieri, R. (2010). Analyzing and evaluating complex argumentation in an economicfinancial context. In: C. Reed & C.W. Tindale (Eds.), Dialectics, dialogue and argumentation. An examination of Douglas Walton’s theories of reasoning and argument (pp. 85–99). London: College Publications. Rigotti, E. & Greco-Morasso, S. (forthcoming). Comparing the Argumentum Model of Topics to other contemporary approaches to argument schemes: the procedural and material components. Rigotti, E. & Rocci, A. (2006). Towards a definition of communication context. Studies in Communication Sciences, 6 (2), 155–180. Rocci, A. (2006). Pragmatic inference and argumentation in intercultural communication. Intercultural Pragmatics, 3 (4), 409–442. Searle, J. (1995). The construction of social reality. New York: The Free Press. Schopenhauer, A. (1896). The art of controversy. Translated by T. Bailey Saunders. London: Swan. Stevenson, Ch. L. (1938). Persuasive definitions. Mind. New Series 47 (187), 331–350.
Handling counterarguments The intersection of pragma-dialectical normative concerns and practical persuasive success Daniel J. O’Keefe & Bilal Amjarso In the pragma-dialectical ideal model of critical discussion, two parties aim to resolve a difference of opinion about the acceptability of one or more standpoints by subjecting the standpoint(s) to “critical testing” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984:â•›16). The critical testing of standpoints is a rule-governed procedure that aims to guarantee that the resolution will proceed in a reasonable way (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004:â•›56–57). A difference of opinion arises when one party (the protagonist) advances a standpoint and another party (the antagonist) challenges it with doubt (van Â�Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992:â•›16). Such difference of opinion is called “nonmixed” in pragma-dialectics. A difference of opinion can become more complex when a party who at first only had doubt about the standpoint comes to adopt an opposite standpoint towards it. The dispute becomes then “mixed.” In this type of dispute each party assumes the role of protagonist with regard to his or her own standpoint and the role of antagonist with regard to the other party’s standpoint (van Eemeren, Houtlosser, & Snoeck Henkemans 2007:â•›21–22). The rule-governed procedure of critical discussion defines clearly the obligations that each party has towards his or her own standpoint and the other party’s standpoint, and specifies when a party can be said to have defended a standpoint successfully and when a party challenging it can be said to have attacked the standpoint successfully (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004:â•›136–157). The purpose of our contribution is to juxtapose a pragma-dialectical normative analysis of how, in the context of an argumentative exchange, counterarguments should be handled and the findings of empirical studies examining the relative persuasiveness of different ways of handling counterarguments. Our hope is that this will illuminate a portion of the murky intersection of normative questions about proper argumentative practice and descriptive questions about effective means of persuasion. Because in this contribution we are concerned with how protagonists should deal with possible counterarguments to their standpoints, our focus will be the obligations and actions of the protagonist rather than those of the antagonist.
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1.â•… Th e pragma-dialectical normative analysis of handling counterarguments From a pragma-dialectical point of view, a party who advances a standpoint adopts a positive or negative attitude towards a certain proposition and thereby assumes an obligation to defend it if the antagonist challenges the protagonist to do so (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992:â•›14–15). This obligation is a pragmatic consequence of the arguer’s commitment to the acceptability of the proffered standpoint (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002:â•›17). The obligation to defend the standpoint requires, inevitably, defending the standpoint against counterarguments. The normative obligation of an arguer to be responsive to counterarguments is implicit in, for example, the second of the ten commandments: “Discussants who advance a standpoint may not refuse to defend this standpoint when requested to do so” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004:â•›191). This general pragma-dialectical “obligation to defend” has been expressed in a variety of ways. Consider, as another example, this characterization: “The language user challenged by the other language user to defend the point of view that he has advanced … is always obligated to accept the challenge” (“Rule 5” in van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984:â•›160). However expressed, it is apparent that from a pragmadialectical point of view, normatively sound advocacy of a standpoint requires, inter alia, defending that standpoint against counterarguments. To amplify: A counterargument against a standpoint is an argument in which a reason is stated why the standpoint should not be accepted. In other words, a counterargument is an argument that might be brought forward as a possible defense of an opposite standpoint (Snoeck Henkemans 1992:â•›131). By defining counterarguments in this way, it becomes possible to distinguish a counterargument from other common forms of criticisms, such as expressions of doubt and counter-standpoints (or opposite standpoints). A counterargument is more complex than an expression of doubt because it involves a commitment to a proposition (the reason); it is more complex than a counter-standpoint because it involves the giving of a reason and hence presupposes the arguer’s commitment to a counter-standpoint. One way in which arguers might react to counterarguments is simply to acknowledge them. In view of the protagonist’s goal of subjecting standpoints to critical testing, acknowledging the existence of a counterargument might seem to be a desirable and constructive argumentative behaviour. Acknowledging the presence of a possible counterargument without showing how one intends to overcome this counterargument, however, does not obviously provide a reasonable defence of the standpoint. In order for the protagonist to defend the standpoint successfully, the other party should eventually retract the opposing standpoint, and in order for this to happen, this party’s argument (i.e. the counterargument)
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will have to be undermined. This brings us to the second type of reaction that the protagonist has available, namely, refutation.1 To refute a counterargument and so get the other party to withdraw it, the protagonist will need to attack either the acceptability of the counterargument’s propositional content or its force of refutation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004:â•›151). (The force of refutation of the counterargument with regard to the standpoint amounts to its force of justification with regard to the opposite standpoint.) In both cases, some aspect of the counterargument becomes the subject of a sub-discussion in which the protagonist (taking the role of antagonist in the sub-discussion) tries to refute that aspect of the counterargument in question by bringing forward an opposing counterargument. This opposing counterargument amounts to an argument for not accepting the original counterargument that is the focus of the sub-discussion. To undermine the counterargument’s propositional content, the protagonist must devise arguments showing why the counterargument is not acceptable. In colloquial terms, this amounts to showing how the counterargument is untrue. Imagine, for example, that an advocate defending the standpoint that a particular economic policy measure should be adopted encounters a counterargument to the effect that the proposed policy would increase unemployment. The advocate might reply, “That’s not so. The economist who made that assertion relied on an outdated economic model.” To attack the force of refutation of the counterargument, the protagonist must devise arguments showing why the counterargument is an irrelevant or insufficient attack on the standpoint (Snoeck Henkemans 1992:â•›149). As Snoeck Â�Henkemans (1992) explains, an arguer who pursues this track may even acknowledge the counterargument’s propositional content as acceptable, but nevertheless defuse the counterargument by undermining the force of its refutation. For example, a criminal defense attorney defending the standpoint that the attorney’s client is innocent might say, “It’s true that my client has been convicted of a similar crime in the past, but that is not relevant evidence in the current case.” When an arguer attempts to deflect a counterargument by questioning its force of refutation, if the other party (the one forwarding the counterargument) is not prepared to accept the arguer’s standpoint, then the other party must either abandon that counterargument – and so face the task of providing a new one – or defend the counterargument against the charge that it is irrelevant or insufficient. To sum up, for a successful defense of a standpoint in the context of a critical argumentative exchange, the arguer must deal with the counterargument successfully. Ignoring the counterargument, acknowledging it without engaging it, or Â�trying to overwhelm it by presenting arguments supporting the standpoint will not suffice.
 Daniel J. O’Keefe & Bilal Amjarso
2.â•… S ocial-scientific research findings concerning handling counterarguments For over 80 years, experimental social-scientific research has addressed Â�questions of what makes for more and less effective persuasive messages. One specific Â�question that has received continuing research attention is how persuaders should handle potential opposing arguments (counterarguments, that is, arguments that run counter to the advocate’s proposed view). The fundamental question a persuader faces is whether to discuss the opposing arguments at all. One possibility is to ignore opposing arguments, to not acknowledge or mention them at all. A persuader would thus offer only supportive (constructive) arguments, that is, arguments supporting the advocated view. Alternatively, a persuader might explicitly introduce and discuss counterarguments, rather than avoiding them. In persuasion research, this basic contrast – ignoring versus discussing opposing arguments – has commonly been characterized as the difference between a “one-sided” message (which presents supporting arguments but ignores opposing ones) and a “two-sided” message (which discusses both Â�supporting and opposing arguments). This question has been investigated empirically, in experiments comparing the persuasiveness of one-sided and two-sided messages. Indeed, over 100 such studies have been conducted, providing an especially extensive research basis. A variety of theoretical analyses have driven this research, but a common expectation has been that discussing opposing arguments will enhance persuasiveness, if not generally then at least for certain sorts of audiences (e.g. Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield 1949:â•›201–227). It has become apparent, however, that there is no general difference in persuasiveness between one- and two-sided appeals. More carefully put, a meta-analytic review by O’Keefe (1999) reported that across 107 studies, there was not a statistically significant difference between the persuasiveness of one-sided messages and that of two-sided messages; expressed as a correlation, the average difference was very nearly literally zero (mean r = -.001). (The most comprehensive review remains that of O’Keefe 1999. For some more selective reviews, see Allen 1998; Crowley & Hoyer 1994; Eisend 2006, 2007.) Moreover, this null effect also obtains under conditions thought to be conducive to finding a persuasive advantage for one or another message-sidedness form; the effect does not appear to vary depending on whether the audience is well-educated, on whether the audience has counterarguments readily available, or on whether the audience initially agrees or disagrees with the advocated view. (For suggestions that such factors might moderate the effect of one- and two-sided messages, see, e.g., Chu 1967; Hass & Linder 1972; Hovland et al. 1949). In short, there is no difference in persuasiveness between
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one-sided and two-sided messages, even in circumstances when one might suppose such differences would obtain. But a rather different picture emerges if one distinguishes two varieties of twosided messages – that is, two different ways in which an advocate might discuss opposing arguments. In what has come to be called a “refutational” two-sided message, there is an effort at refuting counterarguments; that is, the persuader questions the truth or relevance of some opposing arguments. By contrast, a “nonrefutational” two-sided message acknowledges opposing arguments without attempting to directly refute them; the persuader might suggest that the supporting arguments outweigh the opposing ones, but the persuader does not try to refute those opposing arguments directly. (This contrast was first clearly articulated by Jackson & Allen 1987.) Refutational two-sided messages are significantly more persuasive than their one-sided counterparts; expressed as a correlation, the average difference in persuasiveness (across 42 studies) corresponds to a correlation of 08. By contrast, nonrefutational two-sided messages are significantly less persuasive than onesided messages; the average difference (across 65 studies) corresponds to a correlation of -.05 (O’Keefe 1999). That is, refuting opposing arguments generally makes messages more persuasive (compared to ignoring opposing arguments), but acknowledging opposing arguments without refuting them generally makes messages less persuasive. There are, as one might expect, some further complexities in this picture (see O’Keefe 1999:â•›236–239, for some discussion), but for our purposes these may safely be bypassed. 3.â•… C onvergences and divergences in normative and descriptive analyses of handling counterarguments We turn now to a consideration of how a pragma-dialectical analysis of an advocate’s treatment of counterarguments aligns with the empirical findings concerning the relative persuasiveness of messages that do and do not discuss opposing arguments (two-sided and one-sided messages, respectively). The broad motivating question is whether normatively-proper argumentative conduct, as suggested by a pragma-dialectical approach, is inconsistent with practical persuasive success, as indicated by the empirical results in hand. Put differently: Is an advocate’s desire to be effective in persuading necessarily at odds with normatively-proper advocacy conduct? There is rather heartening harmony between the normative directives of pragma-dialectics concerning counterarguments and the practical desires of advocates to be persuasive. Actively engaging and refuting opposing arguments
 Daniel J. O’Keefe & Bilal Amjarso
(i.e. using a refutational two-sided message) – a procedural obligation specified by the pragma-dialectical approach – enhances persuasive success. That is, to ignore counterarguments is both normatively dubious and rhetorically ineffective. But there is an interesting complexity to be folded into this discussion, one arising from pragma-dialectics having come to address the role that persuasive aims have in shaping argumentative conduct. This “extended version of the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2009:â•›2) aims to refine the pragma-dialectical reconstruction of argumentation by taking into account advocates’ strategic concerns. Because “engaging in argumentative discourse always means being at the same time out for critical reasonableness and artful effectiveness,” pragma-dialectics found it useful to incorporate the concept of “strategic maneuvering” – “the continual efforts made in principle by all parties in argumentative discourse to reconcile their simultaneous pursuit of rhetorical aims of effectiveness with maintaining dialectical standards of reasonableness” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2009:â•›4–5). The particular aspect of this elaboration of pragma-dialectics to which we wish to draw attention is that reconciling rhetorical and dialectical goals will sometimes involve an advocate’s display of reasonableness. Displays of reasonableness can serve at once to make manifest the advocate’s congruence with normative dialectical standards and – precisely because the advocate appears to be being reasonable – to enhance the advocate’s persuasiveness. That is, part of what might make a strategic maneuver rhetorically effective is that it displays dialectical reasonableness. To put the matter the other way around, advocates who do not appear to be conducting themselves in normatively-appropriate ways may find their persuasive success correspondingly impaired. This, it might be supposed, can serve as some constraint on argumentative conduct. Because advocates will not want to be perceived as acting in underhanded or devious ways, they will presumably be at some pains to ensure that their conduct observably conforms to appropriate dialectical standards. Reasoning in this fashion, an advocate might quite naturally suppose that one way in which to seem to be a reasonable person is to acknowledge some weaknesses in one’s views. “If I admit that my proposal has some drawbacks and so is not perfect,” it might be thought, “this will make me seem even-handed and reasonable – and that will make me more persuasive!” This display of reasonableness need not be what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969:â•›169) called a “feint,” a rhetorical ploy aimed at swaying the audience into thinking that the arguer is an objective thinker; it can be a genuine attempt at making explicit a weakness in the argumentation that a reasonable party may be expected to voice. So, for example, an advocate of a public
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policy might acknowledge that the advocated course of action has some drawbacks (“yes, this urban renovation project will displace some residents”) – while of course also offering supporting arguments aimed at making it clear that, on balance, the recommended action is desirable. The complexity that arises is this. Nonrefutational two-sided messages – Â�messages that acknowledge but do not refute opposing arguments – are significantly less persuasive than one-sided messages. That is to say, an apparent display of reasonableness – the acknowledgement, without refutation or challenge, of opposing arguments – is generally likely to make a message less persuasive than if the message had offered only supporting arguments (i.e. had been a one-sided message). In short, trying to appear to be reasonable, which might be thought to boost persuasive effectiveness, can actually impair persuasive success. Notably, however, nothing in pragma-dialectics appears to mandate nonrefutational acknowledgement of opposing arguments. Nonrefutational mention of counterarguments does not discharge the advocate’s responsibility to react to criticism and hence does not seem to satisfy any normative pragma-dialectical standard. So at least with respect to this one particular aspect of argumentative conduct, only genuine adherence to pragma-dialectical normative standards – defending one’s standpoint against objections – yields any rhetorical advantage. A superficial attempt at seeming reasonable, by acknowledging but not engaging objections, makes advocates rhetorically less successful than if they had simply ignored the opposing arguments. Thus an advocate’s desire to be effective in persuading is perfectly congruent with authentically normatively-proper advocacy conduct, but is at odds with only-seemingly proper advocacy. 4.â•… Conclusion We have here explored one narrow aspect of a very broad question, namely, whether normatively-proper advocacy conduct is inconsistent with practical persuasive success. With respect to how advocates handle counterarguments, it seems clear that true observation of pragma-dialectical standards (engaging and refuting objections) is not only not inconsistent with rhetorical effectiveness, such adherence actually enhances persuasiveness. But a shallow effort at seeming reasonable (acknowledging but not engaging counterarguments) yields no such advantage, and indeed diminishes effectiveness. It should be apparent that none of this could have been seen clearly without the conceptual apparatus afforded by the pragma-dialectical approach. We
 Daniel J. O’Keefe & Bilal Amjarso
hope that our analysis of this one small corner of argumentation illustrates the continuing vitality of the framework that Frans van Eemeren and his colleagues have articulated.
Note 1.â•… Strictly speaking, once the antagonist is committed to a counterargument, he or she has assumed the role of protagonist to an opposite standpoint (so that there are two protagonists). To avoid confusion, we refer to this party as ‘the other party’.
References Allen, M. (1998). Comparing the persuasive effectiveness one- and two-sided message. In M. Allen & R. W. Preiss (Eds.), Persuasion: Advances through meta-analysis (pp. 87–98). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. Chu, G.C. (1967). Prior familiarity, perceived bias, and one-sided versus two-sided communications. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 3, 243–254. Crowley, A.E. & Hoyer, W.D. (1994). An integrative framework for understanding two-sided persuasion. Journal of Consumer Research, 20, 561–574. Eemeren, F.H. van & Grootendorst, R. (1984). Speech acts in argumentative discussions: A theoretical model for the analysis of discussions directed towards solving conflicts of opinion. Dordrecht/Cinnaminson: Foris. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (1992). Argumentation, communication, and fallacies. A pragma-dialectical perspective. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Eemeren, F.H. van & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation. The pragmadialectical approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Eemeren, F.H. van & Houtlosser, P. (2002). Strategic manoeuvring with the burden of proof. In F. H. van Eemeren (Ed.), Advances in pragma-dialectics (pp. 13–28). Amsterdam: Sic Sat. Eemeren, F.H. van & Hourlosser, P. (2009). Strategic maneuvering: Examining argumentation in context. In F. H. van Eemeren (Ed.), Examining argumentation in context: Fifteen studies on strategic maneuvering (pp. 1–24). Dordrecht: Springer. Eemeren, F.H. van, Houtlosser, P. & Snoeck Henkemans, A.F. (2007). Argumentative indicators in discourse. A pragma-dialectical study. Dordrecht: Springer. Eisend, M. (2006). Two-sided advertising: A meta-analysis. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 23, 187–198. Eisend, M. (2007). Understanding two-sided persuasion: An empirical assessment of theoretical approaches. Psychology and Marketing, 24, 615–640. Hass, R.G. & Linder, D.E. (1972). Counterargument availability and the effects of message structure on persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 23, 219–233. Hovland, C.I., Lumsdaine, A.A., & Sheffield, F.D. (1949). Experiments on mass communication. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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Jackson, S. & Allen, M. (1987, May). Meta-analysis of the effectiveness of one-sided and twosided argumentation. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, Montreal. O’Keefe, D.J. (1999). How to handle opposing arguments in persuasive messages: A meta-Â� analytic review of the effects of one-sided and two-sided messages. Communication Yearbook, 22, 209–249. Perelman, Ch. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969). The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation (J. Wilkinson & P. Weaver, Trans.). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Snoeck Henkemans, A.F. (1992). Analysing complex argumentation. The reconstruction of multiple and coordinatively compound argumentation in a critical discussion. Amsterdam: Sic Sat.
On combining pragma-dialectics with Critical Discourse Analysis Constanza Ihnen & John E. Richardson 1.â•… Introduction Recently, an academic ‘front’ has been opened between Critical Discourse Â�Analysis (CDA) and more ‘orthodox’ argumentation scholarship. Specifically, in a keynote conference address, Žagar (2009) argued that the work of some Critical Discourse Analysts not only misuses but misunderstands certain key concepts of classical rhetorical theory – in particular topoi – and permanently blots its analytic copy book through a fundamental disconnect between the analytic and political goals of CDA. From a different, though not wholly unrelated argumentative tack, Ieţcu-Fairclough (2010:â•›2) argued that the Discourse Historical Approach to CDA applies the notion of topos “in ways which do not seem to correspond” to the way it is defined in classical rhetoric. Instead, her own critical analysis of public and political discourse (cf. Fairclough & Ieţcu-Fairclough, forthcoming) favors “an approach that draws on the highly technical and rigorous analytical apparatus of argumentation theory in order to engage in argument reconstruction and analysis” (Ieţcu-Fairclough 2010:â•›3). However, she is quite clear that she now feels “the pragma-dialectical model is not sufficient” for such a task, since “Public debate and deliberation do not easily fit the CD [critical discussion] model” (Ibid.). In more detail, she argues that while critical discussion “ends ideally in consensus, politics is not a realm where consensus is always possible or desirable”. Ignoring the fact that the resolution of a difference of opinion is not the same as achieving consensus, Ieţcu-Fairclough (2010) argues this is not always possible because there are “differences of opinion that have to be left in peace and have to coexist peacefully without agreement, without attempting to reduce one view to another”; similarly, resolution is not always desirable because “practical reasoning in the political public sphere occurs against a background of value pluralism, as well as a plurality of goals, and there are typically good arguments on both sides of a debate” (Ibid.). Finally, Forchtner and Tominc (forthcoming) argue against the use of pragma-dialectics in the Discourse Historic Approach to CDA since, to do so, entails an incommensurable “epistemological conflict” between the Critical
 Constanza Ihnen & John E. Richardson
Theory (Habermas) of the Discourse Historic Approach and Critical Rationalism of the pragma-dialectical theory. In sum, there is a growing body of work that asserts a basic incompatibility between CDA and pragma-dialectics. In contrast, we consider this putative divide between CDA on the one hand and argumentation – and in particular, pragmadialectical theory – on the other to be both mistaken and undesirable. Indeed, in this contribution we argue that pragma-dialectics can play a significant role in a CDA research agenda. We develop our argument in two steps. First, we outline the similarities and differences between these approaches. Since the readership can be expected to be more or less familiar with the pragma-dialectical theory but not necessarily with CDA, we start with a brief introduction to the latter. Following this, we specify the benefits of combining the two perspectives. 2.â•… Two approaches to (argumentative) discourse The principal theoretical and analytic foci of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) remain the relationships between text and context. Like most other approaches to discourse analysis, CDA is interested in examining “what and how language communicates when it is used purposefully in particular instances and contexts” (Cameron 2001:â•›13). We assume that language is a social practice that, like all practices, is dialectically related to the contexts of its use. In other words, “speaking and writing always represent, produce and reproduce attitudes, beliefs, opinions and ideologies” (Heer & Wodak 2008:â•›10) and, in so doing, language use contributes to the production and reproduction of social realities. Despite its name, CDA is not a singular method of analysis. Rather, it is a perspective on critical scholarship, aimed at analyzing the ways that individuals and social groups use language. Critical discourse analysts focus “on social problems, and especially the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of power abuse or domination” (van Dijk 2001:â•›96). Hence, “CDA sees itself as politically involved research with an emancipatory requirement: it seeks to have an effect on social practice and social relationships” (Titscher et al. 2000:â•›147), particularly relationships of disempowerment, dominance, prejudice and/or discrimination. Given the variance of approaches to CDA – or, more broadly still, of Critical Discourse Studies – inevitably, any account of what CDA is will be partial. Here, we discuss Ruth Wodak’s Discourse Historical Approach to discourse analysis (see Reisigl & Wodak 2001, 2009; Richardson & Wodak 2009a, 2009b; Wodak, 2009), since this is currently the only significant approach that, from inception, has built argumentation formally into its analytic framework.1 The Discourse Â�Historical Approach (DHA) aims to integrate and triangulate knowledge about historical
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sources and the background of the social and political fields within which discursive events are embedded. Such an aim is based on the principle that a text only creates sense when its manifest and latent meanings (implicature, presupposition, allusion and so on) are read in context. Thus, context, contextualization and recontextualisation need to be taken seriously in analysis – aspects of textual sense-Â� making that are often signaled and accomplished through intertextual relations. No text is ever isolated in space and time as many studies illustrate; thus, intertextuality is inherently part and parcel of meaning making in context (see van Dijk 2008a). The Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) uses four ‘levels of context’ as heuristics to locate discursive practices, strategies and texts in a specific socio-political context. First, the immediate, language or text internal co-text, which take into account issues such as textual coherence, cohesion, and “the local interactive processes of negotiation” (Reisigl & Wodak 2001:â•›41), such as turn-taking, question/ answer and so on. Further, following Billig et al. (1988), we argue that texts are multi-vocal – they present more than one view, or are based on “ideological dilemmas”, tensions and inconsistencies which should be drawn out in analysis. Second, there are the intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between utterances, texts, genres and discourses. This level of context takes into account the history and intertextual references of terms and concepts used, or the ways that a concept is mentioned, discussed or argued about, in different texts and in different genres. For example: in what ways has immigration been discussed historically? Does this differ between genres or between argumentative activity types? These intertextual and interdiscursive relationships can, and should, be examined in terms of both continuities and discontinuities with the current period. Third, there are the social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific ‘context of situation’. Accordingly, if the object of analysis is a party Â�election leaflet, this would need to be contextualized as a party election leaflet – that is, a text produced at a particular time, by a particular organization according to a particular set of discursive criteria. Fourth, we take into account the broader socio-political and historical contexts within which the discursive practices are embedded. This fourth level of context is ‘history’ as it is conventionally understood – the broad stories of the complex interactions of people, organizations, institutions and ideas. Such a consideration is based on the principle that discourse is “situated in, shaped by and constructive of circumstances that are more than and different to language” (Anthonissen 2003:â•›297). Therefore, these social, political and historical contexts need to be brought back into analysis. These four layers enable researchers to better situate and analyze the meanings of discourse and how they relate to context. In addition, the DHA seeks to identify the effect of particular discursive strategies which may serve to represent an individual or a group either positively or negatively (see Reisigl & Wodak 2009). Specifically, the DHA offers five types of
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discursive strategies which underpin the inclusion/exclusion of self/other, and the constructions of identities. ‘Strategy’ in this sense generally refers to a (more or less accurate and more or less intentional) plan of practices, including discursive practices, adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal. First, there are referential, or nomination, strategies, by which social actors are named and, in so doing, discursively represented and positioned as, for example, part of in-groups and/or out-groups. This can be achieved through a number of more or less explicit membership categorization devices, from open nomination through to metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche. Second, social actors as individuals, group members or groups as a whole, are linguistically characterized through predications. These predicational strategies may, for example, be realized as evaluative attributions of negative and positive traits in the linguistic form of implicit or explicit predicates and so aim at labeling social actors, processes, things (etc.), in a more or less positive or negative manner. Third, there are argumentation strategies and here Reisigl and Wodak (2001) place particular emphasis on topoi, through which positive and negative attributions are often justified. Typically, topoi in prejudicial or discriminatory discourse are employed to justify the exclusion of migrants through quasi-rational arguments such as ‘they are a burden for the society’, ‘they cost too much’, ‘their culture is too different’, and so forth (see Krżyzanowski & Wodak 2008; Reisigl & Wodak 2001; Wodak and van Dijk 2000). Analyzing a text/discourse’s argumentation strategies also requires analysts to examine the argumentative potential of visual elements (Richardson 2008). Indeed, given both legal constraints and salient social taboos against overtly stated racist argumentation in party politics, prejudicial arguments are usually not spelt out explicitly, and can rely on certain pictorial elements in advancing a coherent standpoint (Richardson & Wodak 2009a). Fourth, one may focus on strategies of perspectivation, framing or discourse representation. Through framing, speakers express their involvement in discourse, and position their point of view in the reporting, description, narration or quotation of relevant events or utterances. Fifth, there are strategies of intensification and mitigation, both of which help to qualify and modify the epistemic status of a proposition by intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of utterances. These strategies can be an important aspect of the presentation inasmuch as they operate upon it by either sharpening it or toning it down. The DHA to critical discourse analysis thus contextualizes text and talk in relation to other discourses, social and institutional reference points, as well as socio-political and historical contexts and events. Pragma-dialectics shares with CDA an interest in describing (argumentative) discourse and in carrying out these descriptions from a pragmatic point of view. The pragmatic principle, for instance, that the meaning of a (fragment of)
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discourse is linked to the context of its use is not only basic to CDA but also to pragma-dialectics. Not surprisingly then, a pragma-dialectical analysis also falls back on empirical warrants that go beyond the discourse itself. Typical sources used to analyze argumentative discourse in pragma-dialectics are insights concerning conventional structures and strategies of discourse and ethnographic evidence relating to the specific context of activity type in which a discourse is embedded. Likewise, the broader socio-political and historical context of the discourse plays a significant role in the analysis of implicit and indirect speech acts such as unexpressed premises (van Eemeren et al. 1993; van Eemeren 2010). Connected to this pragmatic orientation to discourse is the shared assumption that language is a goal-oriented activity, taking place amid a set of contextual constraints, and that speakers want their utterances not only to be understood but also accepted. This common view of discourse may explain another broad area of agreement between the two perspectives: their interest in studying the strategic dimension of (argumentative) discourse. In pragma-dialectics, the speaker’s quest for effectiveness is studied from the point of view of ‘strategic maneuvering’ and in the Discourse Historic Approach under the more general concept of the ‘discursive strategy’. Interestingly, it is not only in the description of (argumentative) discourse that these perspectives on discourse meet. Pragma-dialectics and CDA also converge in their interest to carry out some sort of ‘evaluation’ or ‘critique’ of discourse. In pragma-dialectics, argumentative discourse is evaluated from the point of view of the ideal model of a critical discussion, which specifies the stages and rules instrumental to the rational resolution of a difference of opinion. An argumentative move that violates any of these rules is negatively evaluated as ‘unreasonable’ or ‘fallacious’, because it obstructs the rational resolution of the dispute. In CDA, analysts are interested not just in describing how social reality is represented in the discourse but also in labeling and characterizing certain representations as being ‘unacceptable’ or ‘unreasonable’, because they play a role in (re)creating relations of inequality and disempowerment. Such a characterization, of what is communicated in discourse, is clearly also evaluative in nature.2 Approaches to CDA that draw on argumentation theory also employ ideal models of communicative interaction in the critical analysis of discourse. Indeed, analysts working from the Discourse Historical Approach have used pragma-dialectics, including the model of a critical discussion, as part of their critical analysis of linguistic strategies of argumentation (Reisigl & Wodak 2001). However, discourse evaluation, from a CDA perspective, usually means more than assessing dialectical reasonableness.3 In line with van Dijk’s (2008b:â•›823) suggestion that CDA should address “the lack of theory about the norms and principals of its own critical activity”, recently, certain scholars within CDA have become a little more engaged with the
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task of Â�providing an explicit, and more coherent, theoretical justification for the Â�normative judgments at the heart of critique.4 Such work remains in its developing stages, meaning that more effort will be required before normative critique can be rescued from its current ghettoized location in political and moral philosophy (Sayer 2006). However, we can identify two promising theoretical approaches: adapting and applying Habermas’ notion of deliberative discourse (cf. Forchtner, forthcoming; Forchtner and Tominc, forthcoming); and Sayer’s anti-reductionist, objectivist, stance on social suffering. There are, of course, also some striking differences between pragma-dialectics and CDA. The first and, perhaps, most obvious contrast relates to the type of discourse activity each is concerned with. CDA is not specifically and primarily interested in argumentation. A CDA perspective can be applied to any type of discourse, and to any element of a discourse, no matter whether its function is argumentative, informative or explanatory. Pragma-dialectics, in contrast, deals exclusively with argumentative discourse and, hence, with moves that have an argumentative function. There is, moreover, a fundamental difference as regards their methods of Â�analysis. On the one hand, CDA does not have a singular methodology, but draws on insights and applies categories from a variety of sources. Linguistics is one of them, of course, but also political theory, political philosophy, sociology, and history. Indeed Sayer (2006:â•›63) argues that “CDA can never be a self-contained activity”, and necessarily needs to draw on “specific scholarly knowledge regarding the issues addressed in the discourse in question” (see also Wodak 2001). On the other hand, pragma-dialectics has a method of analysis of its own. This method consists in carrying out a ‘normative reconstruction’ of discourse. The point of such a reconstruction is to recover from a sequence of pragmatically organized speech acts a set of argumentatively relevant moves to which the standards and categories of the ideal model for a critical discussion apply and represent them in an analytic overview (van Eemeren et al. 1993). The overview specifies the type of dispute, the propositions that make up the substance of the standpoints and arguments, the starting points of the discussion, the type of argument schemes used in each single argument, and the way in which those arguments relate to one another.5 Different also is the focus of analysis. What is relevant to CDA might not be relevant to pragma-dialectics, and vice versa, and different perspectives on relevance are likely to result in different descriptions of one and the same discourse. CDA typically describes texts from the point of view of a specific social problem (e.g. discrimination against Muslims) and concentrates on the discursive manifestation of power abuse and axes of domination in relation to that problem (e.g. the
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representation of the Muslim veil in news media).6 A pragma-dialectical Â�analysis focuses, in contrast, on argumentatively relevant moves, that is, moves that can play a (positive or negative) role in a critical discussion. These argumentative moves can relate to any subject matter. There is also a subtle difference concerning the relation between the analysis of discourse, on the one hand, and the evaluation or critique, on the other, in each of these approaches. In pragma-dialectics, analysis and evaluation are worked out independently and the outcome of each of these processes is presented separately. In CDA, in contrast, the results of the analysis – an examination of discourse processes in their widest sense – and the critique of the discourse are often presented simultaneously. The strategic dimension of discourse is analyzed differently as well. As mentioned earlier, central to the pragma-dialectical approach is the concept of strategic maneuvering. The notion is premised on the pragma-dialectical assumption that “engaging in argumentative discourse always means being at the same time out for critical reasonableness and artful effectiveness” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2009:â•›4). Strategic maneuvering aims to influence the result of a particular dialectical stage to one’s own advantage, through choosing from the topical potential available at this stage, by adapting argumentative moves to those most agreeable to an audience and through the purposive choice of presentational devices including, but not exclusively, the various figures and tropes of classical (rhetorical and dialectic) argumentation theory. However, the specific choices that arguers make in their strategic maneuvering can nevertheless be treated as non-obligatory structures, meaning we should regard their inclusion pragmatically, showing how and in what respects the use of particular maneuvers can be explained by the particular opportunities afforded by a certain dialectical stage (see also Perelman and Â�Olbrechts-Tyteca 2000:â•›168). This characterization of strategic maneuvering already points to some important contrasts with CDA: CDA is not solely concerned with argumentative strategies, and even when the strategy under study is argumentative, the analyst does not necessarily explain those strategies by reference to the dialectical framework of a critical discussion.7 Finally, there are also significant differences concerning the evaluation of the discourse. Pragma-dialectics aims at identifying fallacious argumentative moves – moves that obstruct the rational resolution of a difference of opinion. To this end the analyst checks whether the moves comply with the rules of a critical discussion. In CDA, the main concern is to link linguistic analysis with social analysis, examining the relations between text and context in general and specifically between discourse (language in use) and social, political and economic disempowerment.
 Constanza Ihnen & John E. Richardson
3.â•… Prospects for a dialogue between pragma-dialectics and CDA Before specifying in which ways CDA might benefit from a pragma-dialectical approach, it is important to set out clearly the limits of a pragma-dialectical contribution. Pragma-dialectics, being a theory of argumentation, can be relevant to a critical discourse analysis only as regards the argumentative dimension of the discourse under study. Thus, a discourse may comprise statements, presuppositions, and implicatures, for instance, which are extremely interesting from a CDA perspective but that would not be taken up by a pragma-dialectical reconstruction because they are not argumentatively (i.e. dialectically) relevant. Having said this, we think pragma-dialectics can contribute to a critical analysis of argumentative discourse in at least three respects.8 First of all, pragmadialectics offers a theoretical apparatus to establish what is communicated in argumentative discourse. The attribution of a large number of implicit elements in argumentative discourse – propositional commitments, functional relations, structural organization and overall coherence of argumentative discourse – can only be properly justified by reference to some set of expectations regarding the way argumentation should proceed. This is precisely what pragma-dialectics provides. Argument schemes provide a theoretical grounding to reconstruct implicit premises and standpoints, and to identify the type of justificatory relation between arguments and standpoints (Atkin & Richardson 2007). Likewise, the different types of argumentation structures distinguished in pragma-dialectics –Â� subordinative, coordinative and multiple – supply a theoretically motivated tool to describe the relation between the arguments used in the justification of one and the same standpoint. In short, we consider that the pragma-dialectical methods of analysis can provide a theoretical and systematic grounding to the interpretivedescriptive claims of CDA. And this, in turn, can prevent charges against CDA of interpretive bias – that is, of forcing an ideologically motivated reading upon a text.9 This contribution at the level of analysis should not be underestimated, since any appropriate social critique of discourse presupposes an adequate description. Secondly, we would like to point at the potential of strategic maneuvering for enriching the strategic analysis of DHA. This applies not only to the analysis of DHA’s ‘argumentation strategies’ (topoi) but also to the study of strategies pertaining to argumentative moves that go beyond the speech act of argumentation such as framing a difference of opinion in an advantageous way at the confrontation stage or presenting starting points at the opening stage as if they were matters of “fact”. Moreover, we believe that CDA can benefit from the pragma-dialectical methods for evaluating argumentative discourse. In our view, a social critique of discourse should not consist simply in a juxtaposition of the ideas conveyed in a discourse and the points of view expressed by the critical discourse analyst on
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social reality. Rather, the critique should involve a justification – a justification that takes due account of the arguments advanced in the discourse under analysis. We think that the pragma-dialectical instruments for evaluation – critical discussion rules and critical questions in particular – can play an important role in such justificatory process. 4.â•… Towards an integrated approach to argumentation analysis Concretely, we propose to conceive of critique as a process in which the critical discourse analyst assesses the soundness of argumentative moves from a critical discussion perspective. To do justice to the emancipatory interests of CDA, however, the evaluation of the author’s argumentation should go beyond the question of whether this stands up to the criticism actually advanced by the real opponent or the criticism projected by arguers themselves. The evaluative process should allow the analyst to put forward criticisms that have not been taken into account by the real or projected parties to the dispute. In other words, we think that the critical discourse analyst should have the right to engage as if another party to the dispute, who assumes (at least) the role of antagonist to the viewpoints expressed by the author.10 In doing so, the analyst will necessarily rely, explicitly or implicitly, on some normative political model or ideas. In this way, critical discourse analysts can systematically justify their critique that a certain discourse is biased (in the sense of being based on ignorance or a partial understanding of social reality) or ideologically objectionable (since it contributes to suffering or hinders interpersonal flourishing, cf. Sayer 2006), by arguing against the acceptability of the premises, or the relevance and sufficiency of the arguments adduced. In addition, the standards for a critical discussion could help in the identification of prejudice and relations of dominance at discursive levels that go beyond the process of advancing arguments. For instance, a pragma-Â� dialectical evaluation might bring to view interactional drawbacks such as restricting the other party’s freedom of action at the confrontation stage (violation of rule 1). If the opponent is a member of some disempowered social group this Â�fallacy could point to the (re)creation of social inequality in discourse. Also, treating a mixed dispute in terms of a non-mixed difference of opinion (violation of rule 2) could be a way of neglecting the existence of other, contradictory and nondominant discourses in the public sphere. We believe that our proposal does justice to the principles lying at the basis of each of these approaches: dialectical reasonableness, on the one hand, and a political commitment to those who suffer the most, on the other. Dialectical reasonableness is preserved so long as we require the analyst to show that the viewpoints
 Constanza Ihnen & John E. Richardson
expressed in the discourse are unacceptable because they do not stand to a critical test. At the same time, the socio-political drive of CDA is upheld by allowing the analyst to take an active role in the (implicit or explicit) discussion presupposed by the discourse under consideration. In exercising this right, the analyst can bring to the discussion criticisms of the argumentation that are not taken up by the author and dominant discourses in the public domain.11
Notes 1.â•… This is not to suggest that other approaches to CDA are not interested in analyzing argumentative discourse. In an early programmatic article, van Dijk (1993) states that ‘critical discourse analysts want to know what structures, strategies or other properties of text, talk, verbal interaction or communicative events play a role’ in relations of social dominance, later listing ‘topics, local meanings, style and rhetoric’ as candidate examples of such structures, strategies or other properties of text and talk. Similarly Fairclough (1996:â•›286) argues that analysis of a particular discursive event requires an ‘orientation to how it reworks the social resource of the existing order of discourse; but it also includes the concerns of stylistic, pragmatic and rhetorical analysis’. Fairclough (2003) draws briefly on Toulmin’s work in discussing ‘dialogical’ and ‘monological’ arguments, though has moved away from argumentation towards a more fluid notion of construal in his recent Dialectical-Relational Approach (Fairclough 2009). As a rule, the methods of discourse analysis used in CDA cannot be prescribed in advance, since their selection depends mainly on specific research questions. That said, the DHA is the only approach that explicitly, and consistently, cites argumentation as a key discourse strategy, hence our focus on this approach in this chapter. 2.â•… This is, by the way, key to the distinction between ‘critical discourse analysis’ on the one hand, and ‘discourse analysis’, on the other. The latter is solely concerned with the description and interpretation of discourse. 3.â•… Though, as we detail below, CDA can nonetheless integrate pragma-dialectical analysis into a wider socio-political critique. 4.â•… Cf. the day conference Critique: An interdisciplinary conference on ‘being critical’ held at Loughborough University, 26th June 2009. 5.â•… To be sure, there is a partial overlap between pragma-dialectics and CDA as regards the use of (socio)linguistic sources in the analysis. Still, there is a crucial difference in that the model for a critical discussion specifies what to look for in the discourse and provides a framework to systematically interpret, place and organize relevant empirical data. 6.â•… That said, a further point is worth stressing: CDA does not – or at least, should not – render every negative representation of someone pertaining to a disempowered social group as, in and of itself, illegitimate (i.e. racist, sexist, anti-Muslim, etc.). A critical discourse analysis must distinguish between legitimate criticism of (people who happen to be), for instance, Muslims, and illegitimate (in other words, prejudiced or racist) attacks. For an elaboration of this view, see Richardson (2006).
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7.â•… Though see Richardson (2001) and Ieţcu-Fairclough (2008), who incorporate a strategic maneuvering approach in their analyses. 8.â•… Due to space limitations we will only examine ways that pragma-dialectics can contribute to CDA. However, CDA can also contribute to pragma-dialectics, for example by uncovering modes, or ‘species’, of argumentative practice where strategies of unequal power relationships are enacted. In relation to the DHA in particular, the four ‘levels of context’ used to locate practices, strategies and texts in a specific contexts could be very useful in refining analysis of argument activity types. 9.â•… Schegloff (1997), for instance, considers CDA descriptions problematic because he regards the analyst’s interpretation as one based on ideological commitment rather than an analytic perspective. 10.â•… A critical discourse analyst can – and probably will – assume also the role of protagonist of the opposite standpoint. In addition, s/he may assume at the level of a sub-dispute the standpoint that the argumentation is insufficient and advance objections to the protagonist’s argumentation to justify his/her criticism. 11.â•… On the face of it, it might seem that the critical discourse analysts’ vested interest in discovering an author’s argumentative missteps jeopardizes the principle of dialectical reasonableness. We think, however, that this is too hasty a conclusion. It is true that analysts will have an interest in ‘winning’ the dispute, but not less than any antagonist to a difference of opinion. In line with the notion of strategic maneuvering, we believe that the analysts’ rhetorical goals may, but need not, be in conflict with their dialectical aims.
References Anthonissen, C. (2003). Interaction between visual and verbal communication: changing Â�patterns in the printed media. In G. Weiss & R. Wodak (Eds.), Critical Discourse Analysis: Theory and interdisciplinarity (pp. 297–311). Houndmills: Palgrave. Atkin, A. & Richardson, J.E. (2007). Arguing about Muslims: (Un)Reasonable argumentation in letters to the editor. Text and Talk, 27(1): 1–25. Billig M., Condor, S., Edwards, D., Gane, M., Middleton, D. & Radley, A.R. (1988). Ideological Dilemmas. London: Sage Publications. Cameron, D. (2001). Working with spoken discourse. London: Sage. Dijk, T.A. van (1993). Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis. Discourse and Society, 4(2): 249–283. Dijk, T.A. van (2001). Multidisciplinary CDA: a plea for diversity. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (pp. 95–120). London: Sage. Dijk, T.A. van (2008a). Discourse and context. A Sociocognitive approach. Cambridge: Â�Cambridge University Press. Dijk, T.A. van (2008b). Critical Discourse Analysis and nominalization. Discourse & Society, 19(6), 821–828. Eemeren, F.H. van (2010). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse: Extending the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
 Constanza Ihnen & John E. Richardson Eemeren, F.H. van, Grootendorst, R., Jackson, S., & Jacobs, S. (1993). Reconstructing argumentative discourse. Tuscaloosa/London: The University of Alabama Press. Eemeren, F.H. van & Houtlosser, P. (2009). Strategic maneuvering: Examining argumentation in context. In F.H. van Eemeren (Ed.), Examining argumentation in context: Fifteen studies on strategic maneuvering (pp.1–24). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Fairclough, N. (1996). Rhetoric and Critical Discourse Analysis: A Reply to Titus Ensink, T. & Christoph Sauer. Current Issues in Language & Society 3(3): 286–289. Fairclough, N. (2003). Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research. London: Routledge. Fairclough, N. (2009). A dialectical-relational approach to critical discourse analysis in social research, in R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (Second edition) (pp.162–186). London: Sage. Fairclough, N. and Ieţcu-Fairclough I. (forthcoming). Argumentation theory in CDA: Analyzing Practical Reasoning in Political Discourse. In R. de Cillia, H. Gruber, M. Krzyzanowski & F. Menz (Eds.), Discourse-politics-identity. Vienna: Stauffenburg Verlag. Forchtner, B. (forthcoming). Critique, the discourse-historical approach, and the Frankfurt School. Forchtner, B. & Tominc, A. (forthcoming). Critique in the discourse-historical Approach: Between Habermas’ critical theory and Popper’s critical rationalism. Heer, H. & Wodak, R. (2008). Introduction: Collective memory, national narratives and the politics of the past. In H. Heer, W. Manoschek, A. Pollak & R. Wodak (Eds.), The Discursive construction of history: Remembering the Wehrmacht’s war of annihilation (pp.1–13). Basingstoke: Palgrave. Ieţcu-Fairclough, I. (2008). Legitimation and strategic maneuvering in the political field. Argumentation, 22: 399–417. Ieţcu-Fairclough, I. (2010). Argumentation and CDA, presentation at Language, Ideology, Politics Workshop, Lancaster University 27 January 2010. Krżyzanowski, M. & Wodak, R. (2008). The politics of exclusion. Debating migration in Austria. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Perelman, Ch. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969). The New Rhetoric. A treatise on argumentation. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dam Press, 2000. Reisigl, M. & Wodak, R. (2001). Discourse and discrimination. Rhetorics of racism and antisemitism. London: Routledge. Reisigl, M. & Wodak, R. (2009). The discourse-historical approach. In R. Wodak & Meyer. M. (Eds.), Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (2nd edition) (pp. 87–121). London: Sage. Richardson, J.E. (2001). ‘Now is the time to put an end to all this’: Argumentative discourse theory and letters to the editor. Discourse and Society, 12(2): 143–168. Richardson, J.E. (2006). On delineating ‘reasonable’ and ‘unreasonable’ criticisms of Muslims. Fifth Estate Online, August 2006. Richardson, J.E. (2008). ‘Our England’: discourses of ‘race’ and class in party election leaflets. Social Semiotics, 18(3), 321–336. Richardson, J.E. & R. Wodak (2009a). The impact of visual racism: Visual arguments in political leaflets of Austrian and British far-right parties. Controversia 6(2): 45–77. Richardson, J.E. & Wodak, R. (2009b). Recontextualising fascist ideologies of the past: rightwing discourses on employment and nativism in Austria and the United Kingdom. Critical Discourse Studies, 6(4): 251–267.
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Sayer, A. (2006). Language and significance – or the importance of import: Implications for critical discourse analysis. Journal of Language and Politics, 5(3): 449–471. Schegloff, E.A. (1997). Whose text? Whose context? Discourse & Society, 8(2): 165–187. Titscher, S., Meyer, M., Wodak, R., & Vetter, E. (2000). Methods of text and discourse analysis. London: Sage. Wodak, R. (2001). What CDA is about. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (pp.1–13). London: Sage. Wodak, R. (2009). The discourse of politics in action: Politics as usual. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Wodak, R. & Dijk, T. A van (Eds.) (2000). Racism at the top. Klagenfurt: Drava. Žagar, I.Z. (2009). The use of topoi in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Keynote Lecture, 2nd International conference on political linguistics, University of Łódź, Poland, 17–19 Â�September 2009.
Formal dialectical systems and their uses in the study of argumentation Erik C.W. Krabbe & Douglas N. Walton 1.â•… Introduction Formal dialectic and pragma-dialectics are usually conceived as two related, but distinct, approaches to the theory of argumentation, both sharing the characteristics of a dialectical approach where they emphasize the importance of a procedure of discussion or dialogue but distinct in their degree of formality as well as in their use, or lack of use, of speech-act theory. But the two are not on the same footing: Pragma-dialectics presents us with a complete and coherent research program, comprising a philosophical, a theoretical, an analytical, an empirical and a practical component; within formal dialectic, on the other hand, there is no pretension to present such a program. Rather “formal dialectic” denotes a family concept covering variously related theoretical contributions with different kinds and degrees of formality. Also, knowledge about formal dialectic and its potential to contribute to the theory of argumentation is not as widespread as in the case of pragmadialectics. In fact, the name “formal dialectic” (or “formal dialectics”) is better known than what it stands for. We, therefore, thought it worthwhile to revisit in this contribution the idea of a formal dialectical system and to comment on its use for the study of argumentation. We shall presently introduce and discuss two examples of formal dialectical systems (Section 2), and investigate how such systems can be useful for argumentation studies (Sections 3 and 4). But first we must briefly elucidate our use of the terms “dialectic” and “formal,” as well as the term “formal dialectical system” itself. First, dialectic: this term has numerous meanings among philosophers (Hall 1967), ranging from formal logic to the development of society.1 We want, Â�however, to stick to the core meaning of “conversation,” either the practice of conversation or some theory of conversation. As an adjective, “dialectic” or “dialectical” denotes a relationship to such practices or theories. There must be at least two parties, but being argumentative is not a necessary component of a dialectical practice, even though we shall be mainly concerned with conversations in which arguments may indeed be expected to occur. Following Hamblin (1970:â•›256), we would include
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as a dialectical system “a dialogue consisting of interchange of statements about the weather.” Second, formal: again many meanings are attached to the terms “form” and “formal,” so that dialectic can be formal in a number of senses. Three distinct senses of formal were pointed out by Barth (Barth & Krabbe 1982:â•›14–19), and two more by Krabbe (1982:â•›3). The first sense (formal1) refers to Platonic forms and need not be considered here. The second sense (formal2) refers to linguistic forms: a formal dialectical system would be a system in which the locutions are rigorously determined by grammatical rules and in which rules of procedure are laid down with reference to the linguistic forms of these locutions. The third sense (formal3) refers to regulated or regimented procedures. The fourth sense (formal4) refers to a priori ways of setting up the rules of a system of formal dialectic. The fifth sense (formal5) refers to dialectical systems that are “purely logical,” i.e. that do not provide for any material move. Material moves are those moves that depend on the meaning of some non-logical term (Krabbe 1982:â•›4; Barth & Krabbe 1982:â•›04–112), and thus depend not only on linguistic form, but also on facts or interpretations. Formal5 moves do not have this kind of dependency. The fourth sense of formal arises from Hamblin’s distinction (1970:â•›256) between formal and descriptive dialectic. In descriptive dialectic, rules are examined that operate in actual discussions, like parliamentary debates and legal crossexaminations. The formal (formal4) approach, in contrast, “consists in the setting up of simple systems of precise but not necessarily realistic rules,” and studying the properties of such systems. The example provided by Hamblin’s central system (1970:â•›265–270), outlined below, is a good illustration. Clearly the formal4 approach needs to be complemented by an empirical approach, which examines how people actually argue in legal trials, parliamentary debates, and in all kinds of familiar situations where dialogues occur. Third, formal dialectical system: basically, any system of conversational rules that is in some sense formal might be called a formal dialectical system. However, the way we understand formal dialectical system implies that here formal must be taken in the sense of formal3, though usually formal dialectical systems are also formal in some of the other senses (with the exception of formal1). Formally, therefore, there are eight possibilities, which are realized according to whether a given formal (formal3) dialectical system is defined with reference to linguistic forms (formal2) or not, is descriptive or not (formal4), and allows material moves or not (formal5). Theoretically, these three issues are independent of one another, though some combinations are more familiar than others. The examples we shall put forward in the next section are formal in all senses (except formal1). Â�Material dialectical systems are not formal5 (and not formal1), but formal in other respects (formal2, formal3, and formal4). The pragma-dialectical model of critical Â�discussion is formal3 and formal4 but not formal in other respects.
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According to the formal dialectical approach to argumentation someÂ� dialectical systems may indeed throw light on issues in the theory of argumentation. Generally, the formal dialectical approach sees argumentation as an exchange of moves between two parties who are engaged in a kind of regulated conversation, and the argumentative moves are judged in light of formal dialectical rules for that kind of conversation. A system of formal dialectical rules needs to be defined in a clear and rigorous way, so that it can function as a precise model of a given kind of conversational exchange and so that a given sequence of exchanges can be Â�evaluated as to whether it conforms to its procedure. 2.â•… Examples By the time Hamblin introduced the term “formal dialectic” (1970) Paul Â�Lorenzen and his collaborators were already involved in the construction of formal dialectical systems for more than ten years. Only, these were not called “systems of formal dialectic(s),”2 but dialogue games (Dialogspiele; Lorenzen & Lorenz 1978). As we shall see, there are indeed great differences between the Hamblin and the Lorenzen kind of formal dialectic; but both kinds are involved in the “setting up of simple systems of precise but not necessarily realistic rules, and the plotting of the properties of the dialogues that might be played out in accordance with them,” to quote Hamblin’s characterization of the formal approach to the study of dialectical systems (1970:â•›256). We shall set forth and discuss an example of a system of each kind, starting with Hamblin’s well known “Why–Because system with questions” (1970:â•›265–275), also known as “System H.” As a system of the Lorenzen type we have chosen CND (Constructive-NOT Dialectics) from Barth & Krabbe (1982: Ch. III and Ch IV, 90, 91). In both cases we shall assume the same underlying language, namely a language of “propositional logic,” with logical constants for “if … then” (→), “not” (¬), “and” (∧), and “or” (∨).3 We shall assume that A, B, C, …, R are elementary propositional symbols of the language, but use S, T, U, …, X as variables for possibly complex propositional formulas (called “statements” by Hamblin). When quoting rules of these systems, we shall sometimes add comment in brackets. 2.1â•… System H A Hamblin game of dialectic requires a set of players or participants – in the typical, and simplest case, as in System H, there are just two, and they are called “White” and “Black.” “White moves first, but the system is otherwise Â�symmetrical between them” (Hamblin 1970:â•›265). Besides an underlying language, there is also an underlying logic in the form of axioms, which “occupy a privileged position,” and primitive definitions. Hamblin does not give an example of either of these, but for axioms one may think of common logical axioms such as the formula A→(B∨A), since
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he tells us that the formula ¬A→(B∨¬A) is a Â�substitution-instance of an axiom (268, Comment (11)). Primitive definitions ground equivalences. For instance, a well-known definition of → stipulates that for all formulas S, T the formula S→T be definitionally equivalent to ¬S∨T. The equivalence extends also to formulas such that one of them contains a constituent that is replaced by a definitional equivalent to obtain the other (as ¬A→(A→B) and ¬A→(¬A∨B), (268, Comment (10)). There are rules of three kinds: (i) those that were later called locution rules, which determine the locutions that can be formed on the basis of the underlying language, and thus restrict the kinds of move that can occur in the game. Then there is (ii) a set of structural rules (also called “dialogue rules”), which define the preconditions and the postconditions of each kind of move, i.e. in what circumstances moves are permitted or required, and in what order they may or must occur. (Hamblin, rather confusingly, calls them “syntactical rules.”) Further there are (iii) commitment rules, which regulate at each stage the contents of the commitment store of each player – a set of propositional formulas (sometimes also containing challenges or arguments) attached to each player, either initially or in virtue of a move made. For example, if a player asserts a particular statement at some appropriate juncture of the game, that statement is inserted into her commitment store. Generally, statements can be deleted from a commitment store, as well as inserted into it, but axioms are indelibly contained in the commitment stores of both Black and White from the beginning. The following list given by Hamblin may be read as constituting his set of locution rules (1970:â•›265): i. ‘Statement S’ or, in certain special cases, ‘Statements S, T’. ii. ‘No commitment S, T, …, X’, for any number of statements, S, T, …, X (one or more). iii. ‘Question S, T, …, X?’, for any number of statements (one or more). [The direct answers to the question are given by the list S, T, …, X. Since a question may be supposed to have at least two direct answers, “two or more” would be neater than “one or more.”] iv. ‘Why S?’, for any statement S other than a substitution-instance of an axiom. [Hamblin thinks of a why-question as a challenge or request made to the respondent to provide a justification (an argument) for the statement queried. In other words, the respondent is expected to provide some premises (presumably ones that the challenger is committed to already, or can be brought to concede at future moves), and the statement queried by the whyquestion is supposed to be a conclusion implied by these premises (according to the axioms or logical rules for inferences in the system). Notice that “Why S?” is ungrammatical in case S is a substitution-instance of an axiom. Another
Formal dialectical systems and their uses in the study of argumentation 
way to stipulate that such formulas cannot be challenged would be to have a structural rule to that effect.] v. ‘Resolve S’. [Such a resolution demand is thought of as referring to a the situation where one’s interlocutor is committed to both S and ¬S, asking him to withdraw either.] Notice that no locution of H is equal to a formula of the underlying language. One cannot put forward just a propositional formula S. In some other Hamblin–type systems and in the Lorenzen games, however, this is possible. But what is typical for all these games is that though the grammar for the underlying language is recursive, the adding of the illocutionary operators (such as “Statement” and “Question”) is not. A question, for instance, cannot contain a question as a proper part. The structural rules are the following (1970:â•›266): S1╇Each speaker contributes one locution at a time, except that a ‘No commitment’ locution may accompany a ‘Why’ one. [This rule describes how moves in the game may be built up from locutions. It is presumed that the participants move alternately.] S2╇ ‘Question S, T, …, X?’ must be followed by a. ‘Statement ¬(S∨T∨…∨X)’ [A denial of the presupposition of the question.] or b. ‘No commitment S∨T∨…∨X’ [A withdrawal of the presupposition of the question.] or c. ‘Statement S’ or ‘Statement T’ or –––––––– or ‘Statement X’ [A direct answer to the question.] or d. ‘No commitment S, T, …, X’ [Withdrawal of each direct answer to the question, leaving commitment to the presupposition intact.] S3╇ ‘Why S?’ must be followed by a. ‘Statement ¬S’ [A denial of the presupposition of the challenge.] or b. ‘No commitment S’ [A withdrawal of the presupposition of the challenge.] or c. ‘Statement T’ where T is equivalent to S by primitive definition. [Such an argument by primitive definition is one kind of argument that may be offered for S.] or d. ‘Statement T, T→S’ for any T. [Modus Ponens is the only other kind of argument for S available within the system.] S4╇ ‘Statements S, T’ may not be used except as in 3(d).
 Erik C.W. Krabbe & Douglas N. Walton
S5╇ ‘Resolve S’ must be followed by a. ‘No commitment S’ or b. ‘No commitment¬S’ [Notice that there is no precondition given for questions, challenges, or resolution demands. This is perhaps most surprising in the case of resolution demands. Shouldn’t the other be committed to both S and ¬S before one can put forward such a demand?]
Finally, let us have a look at the commitment rules (1970:â•›266–267): C1╇‘Statement S’ places S in the speaker’s commitment store except when it is already there, and in the hearer’s commitment store unless his next locution states ¬S [or the denial of S, where the denial of S coincides with the negation ¬S of S if S is not itself a negation, but equals T if S = ¬T.4] or indicates ‘No commitment’ to S (with or without other statements); or, if the hearer’s next locution is ‘Why S?’, insertion of S in the hearer’s store is suspended but will take place as soon as the hearer explicitly or tacitly accepts the proffered reasons (see below). [The principle is that who does not protest against a statement of S of the other is taken to have agreed: he gets committed to S, unless he denies or withdraws commitment or else puts out a challenge. In the latter case he may become committed to S after all, if he ever becomes committed to the premise or premises that his opponent puts forward in defense of S. This kind of suspension of commitment is here introduced only for challenges that follow upon a statement, but we think it must have been intended to hold for all challenges. Another matter is that, since premises put forward by the other in defense of S are again statements of the other, and may again be challenged (see C2 below), this suspension clause will operate in a recursive way. Thus one’s opponent may have to construct a complex structure of argumentation to convince one of S. But then, if one becomes committed to the ultimate premises of such a construct, one also becomes committed to all the intermediate conclusions and to the final conclusion S. It’s doubtful whether Hamblin was aware of this recursive aspect of his stipulation, since nowhere does he comment on it, even though the phenomenon can be observed in his own example on p. 267.5] C2╇‘Statements S, T’ places both S and T in the speaker’s and hearer’s commitment stores under the same conditions as in C1. C3╇‘No commitment S, T, …, X’ deletes from the speaker’s commitment store any of S, T, …, X that are in it and are not axioms [or substitution-instances of axioms]. C4╇‘Question S, T, …, X?’ places the statement S∨T∨…∨X in the speaker’s store unless it is already there, and in the hearer’s store unless he replies with ‘Statement ¬(S∨T∨…∨X)’ or ‘No commitment S∨T∨…∨X’. [A question commits the speaker to its presupposition and, since who does not protest agrees, it equally commits the hearer unless the latter denies or withdraws it in his next move.]
Formal dialectical systems and their uses in the study of argumentation 
C5╇‘Why S?’ places S in the hearer’s store unless it is already there or he replies ‘Statement ¬S’ or ‘No commitment S’. [Again, who does not protest agrees.]
Hamblin presented just one example of a dialogue according to the rules of his Why–Because System with Questions, followed by a brief list of comments pertaining to particular moves in the dialogue (1970:â•›267–268). To see how these rules operate we have written out Hamblin’s example (1970:â•›267) with the corresponding changes in the commitment stores (additions are written to the right of the move that lets them come into effect, deletions are noted in brackets, our comments in italics):6 Moves 1
W: Question A, ¬A?
2
B:
3
W: Question B, ¬B?
4
B:
5
W: Statement B
6
B:
7
W: Why ¬B?
8
B:
9
10
Statement A
Statement ¬B
Statement ¬B
Statements A, A→¬B Argument 1: whenever White will become committed toA and A→¬B, she will become committed to ¬B. W: No commitment A→¬B Why A→¬B? The explicit withdrawal of A→¬B seems superfluous. B: No commitment A→¬B
White’s commitment store A∨¬A The addition of A is postponed to await White’s reply. A [deleted at move 21], B ∨¬B B White avoids becoming committed to ¬B by denial.
White suspends becoming committed to ¬B
Black’s commitment store The addition of A∨¬A is postponed to await Black’s reply. A ∨¬A, A
B∨¬B, ¬B [deleted at move 38]
Similarly, Black avoids becoming committed to B.
A→¬B [deleted at move 10]
[delete A→¬B]
 Erik C.W. Krabbe & Douglas N. Walton 11
W: Statement B According to Hamblin “White doesn’t need to reiterate B, but it does no harm.” (Comment (5))
12 13
B: Why B? W: Statements A, A→B Argument 2: whenever Black will become committed to A and A→B, he will become committed to B. B: Why A→B? W: Statements ¬A, ¬A→(A→B) Argument 3 B: No commitment ¬A→(A→B) W: Resolve A B: No commitment ¬A W: Statement ¬A B: Resolve A
14 15 16 17 18 19 20
21 22 23
24 25
26
W: No commitment A B: Why ¬A→(A→B)? W: Statement ¬A→(¬A∨B) Argument 4 (based on primitive definition) B: Why ¬A→(¬A∨B)? W: Statements ¬A→(B∨¬A), (¬A→(B∨¬A)) → (¬A→(¬A∨B)) Argument 5: Hamblin tells us that the first premise “is a substitution-instance of an axiom and cannot be further challenged” (Comment (11)). B: Question A∧C, ¬A∧C? Since Black doesn’t negate, deny, withdraw,
A→B
¬A, ¬A→(A→B) ¬A [deleted at move 18] [delete ¬A]
[delete A]
¬A A resolution demand does not avert becoming committed to ¬A again.
¬A→(¬A∨B)
¬A→(B∨¬A), (¬A→(B∨¬A)) → (¬A→(¬A∨B))
(A∧C)∨(¬A∧C), ¬A→(B∨¬A), (¬A→(B∨¬A)) →
Formal dialectical systems and their uses in the study of argumentation 
27 28 29 30
31 32 33 34 35
36 37 38
or challenge a premise, he becomes all at once committed to a number of formulas on account of arguments 5, 4, 3, and 2. W: No commitment (A∧C)∨(¬A∧C) B: Statement C W: No commitment C B: Statement C Hamblin: “This can go on forever” (Comment (13)). W: No commitment C B: Why B? W: Statements B, B→B Argument 6 B: No commitment B Why B? W: Statements B, B→B Argument 6 repeated. Hamblin: “So can this.” (Comment (14)). B: Statement B W: Resolve B B: No commitment ¬B
(¬A→(¬A∨B)), ¬A→(¬A∨B), ¬A→(A→B), A →B, B [deleted at move 34]
C
B→B [delete B] B→B
B [delete ¬B]
Figure 1.╇ Hamblin’s example of a dialogue in System H
We shall comment on System H in Sections 2.3 and 3. 2.2â•… System CND The system of constructive-NOT dialectics must be described more briefly. We cannot here quote extensively from Barth and Krabbe’s hierarchy of rules by which they try to give a motivation for the rules of that and similar systems. In the end, however these rules boil down to some simple rules for discussants, which we may summarize. There are two participants: a Proponent (P) and an Opponent (O). The initial situation is such that only P has to defend a thesis, and has to do so on the basis of a (possibly empty) set of concessions granted by O. P and O move alternately, using only one locution in each move. The locutions are of the following types: a. formulas of the underlying language for propositional logic: S b. three formulas for questions or challenges without a statement: ?, L?, R?
 Erik C.W. Krabbe & Douglas N. Walton
c. formulas for questions or challenges with a statement: (?)S d. a winning remark: ! In this game the role of Proponent is comparable with that of the questioner in Greek dialectic and the role of Opponent with that of the answerer. O challenges, and P defends, whereas P asks questions (in order to obtain more concessions) and O, who has no thesis to defend, answers. Nevertheless, the forms of statement– challenge–defense triples equal that of statement–question–answer triples. All such triples are determined by the so-called logical rules of the game (also know as Lorenzen’s strip rules for logical constants). They are here assembled in a survey (Figure 2).
Rule → Rule ¬ Rule ∨ Rule ∧ Rule El
Statement S→T
Challenge/question (?)S
Defense/answer T
¬S S∨T
(?)S ?
none S T S T none
L? R? A (or any other ? (can be used only as a elementary challenge) propositional symbol) S∧T
Figure 2.╇ Logical rules
Each dialogue (or discussion) starts with O challenging P’s initial thesis T. The logical form of T determines which row of Figure 2 applies. If T happens to be one of O’s concessions P may make a winning remark (“!”). Otherwise, P may either opt for a direct defense, that is a defense as given by Figure 2, or he may first ask some questions on account of some of O’s concessions. Again, the logical form of the concession determines which row of Figure 2 applies. When P has obtained a number of answers he may then choose a direct defense against the original challenge (or make a winning remark). The game then continues with the formula used in P’s direct defense as the new thesis: it will be the local thesis during the next bout of questioning (the next local discussion). Must O answer P’s questions? In case the question does not contain a statement, she must. But if the question does contain a statement, she has the option to challenge the statement instead (in the case of a concession ¬S this is the only option available). This challenge will then introduce a new local discussion. In any case, O must always directly react to P’s preceding move.
Formal dialectical systems and their uses in the study of argumentation 
Thus a question (?)S by P is to be understood as giving O the option of either answering the question (if possible) or else to challenge S and start a new local discussion. A challenge (?)S by O, on the other hand, is to be understood as a Â�concession S for the sake of argument. May P always put forward a winning remark? Certainly not: he may only do so if one of O’s concessions is equal to the local thesis (the initial thesis being the first local thesis) of the current local discussion. It may be that the local thesis was first challenged and later conceded, or that it happens the other way round. Once P has made a winning remark, he is the winner of the last local discussion and thereby of the discussion as a whole.7 Can O also make winning remarks? No, for O to win, P must have exhausted his possibilities of making moves. Therefore there must be rules that prevent P from pointlessly repeating himself. In fact, one rule stipulates that P may ask each question with respect to a certain concession only once in each local discussion (asking a question again in another local discussion is not always pointless), and another one stipulates that P may not repeat a former local thesis (whether in a direct defense or in a question), unless a fresh concession has made its appearance in the meantime. The latter rule happens to block circular argument in CND. The following example will hopefully suffice to get an idea of the workings of CND and may also show how much this system differs from System H. Initial situation and moves ¬A∨B (C→A)∧(C→¬B) ¬C (?)C
c1 c2 t 1
O: O: P: O:
2 3 4 5 6 7
P: ? O: ¬A P: L? O: C→A P: (?)C O: A
8 9
P: O:
10 P:
(?)A ? !
Comment initial concession initial concession initial thesis O challenges the initial thesis (t). C is now a concession. P questions the first initial concession (c1). O answers (the other option would have been B). P questions the other initial concession (c2). O answers (there is no other option). P questions the concession in move 5. O answers. A challenge of C would lead to a quick loss for O. The statement C in move 6 didn’t become a local thesis and has therefore no further role to play in the dialogue. The first local discussion continues. P questions the concession in move 3. O has no other option but to challenge the statement A in move 8, making it the local thesis of the second local discussion. Since O conceded A in move 7, P can make a winning remark and win the dialogue.
Figure 3.╇ Example of a dialogue in CND
 Erik C.W. Krabbe & Douglas N. Walton
2.3â•… Comparing the two systems Even though the systems here considered are a priori constructs (formal4) that are not meant to give an accurate description of empirical reality, they must still recognizably pertain to some real practice of conversation in order to contribute to the study of that practice. Thus one may ask what the system is about: is it about negotiation, or about persuasion, or about deliberation, or something else? For CND this question is not hard to answer: it is about the practice of trying to resolve differences of opinion (also called “conflicts of avowed opinions”) by verbal methods; i.e. the practice of persuasion dialogue. As such CND, together with a number of other systems, is proposed as an instrument of which potential discussants may avail themselves (Barth & Krabbe 1982:â•›56–57). For System H, it is harder to tell to which practice it pertains. Hamblin does not explicitly discuss this.8 One consequence of this unspecific nature of System H, is that the system becomes more complex than a system like CND. In CND all moves are concerned with one issue: should the Opponent accept the thesis or not? In System H, attempts to get the other to accept a thesis may be interspersed with arguments about unrelated matters, requests for information, and obiter dicta. Both CND and System H can be seen as models of persuasion dialogue (CND wholly, and System H partly), and therefore have both cooperative and competitive aspects (Krabbe 2009). All dialectical systems presuppose a kind of minimal cooperativeness: both parties agree to “play the game,” but beyond this CND seems less cooperative than System H. However, System H is not very cooperative either, if one thinks of how easy it is to destroy a carefully constructed argument by wanton withdrawals of commitment. So System H seems too permissive, especially where withdrawals are concerned.9 One may think that in any reasonable discussion the same rules should hold for all, but actually the concept of equity, as a kind of symmetry, that is at work here does not apply to reasonable discussion, the role of the seller being different than that of the buyer, and that of a proponent of a thesis being different than that of its opponent. Thus one can have a reasonable system for the resolution of differences of opinion that is highly asymmetrical. CND is a case in point, and so is the pragma-dialectical model of critical discussion. System H, on the contrary, is almost completely symmetrical. The only exception to symmetry is that White begins. 3.â•… A laboratory of rules What is particularly attractive in Hamblin’s approach is that instead of just Â�presenting System H (and other systems) as a fixed system, he examines, in a
Formal dialectical systems and their uses in the study of argumentation 
Â� flexible way, specific modifications of the rules or additional rules for Â�making moves (questioning moves, challenging moves, replying moves), discussing how they might work. In this way formal dialectical systems function as research tools for the study of argumentation in a “laboratory of rules.” Rather than as attempts to create a perfect model of argumentative discourse, the efforts of formal Â�dialecticians should be seen as explorations in such a laboratory context. By way of an example, let us briefly review the discussion about the fallacy of begging the question that started with Hamblin’s proposals to block circular reasoning in System H. One proposal (Hamblin 1970:â•›271, quoted below) consists of two rules (only the second of which was announced explicitly as blocking circular argument, though one needs both). Woods and Walton called them (W) and (R1) (Woods & Walton 1978: 78; 1989: 147,148), but here we shall use the names introduced by Walton (2007: 81, where the reader can find more discussion of Hamblin’s rule proposals): Why-question Rule 1: ‘Why S?’ may not be used unless S is a commitment of the hearer and not of the speaker. Why-question Rule 2: The answer to ‘Why S?’, if it is not ‘Statement ¬S’ or ‘No commitment S’, must be in terms of statements that are already commitments of both speaker and hearer.
It may be seen that in the example of Figure 1 these rules would block the circular arguments at moves 33 and 35. They also block the so-called Circle Game (Woods & Walton 1978, 1989). Moves 1 2 3 4
W: B: W: B:
Why A? Statements B, B→A Why B? Statements A, A→B
White’s commitment store B→A
Black’s commitment store A, B, B →A A→B
Figure 4.╇ The Circle Game
The Circle Game cannot occur in a dialogue that follows the rules of System H and also the two new rules. It cannot occur, even if we consider the Circle Game as a segment of a larger dialogue with other commitments than those shown. For, according to Why-question Rule 2, B must be a commitment of White’s at Black’s move 2, but according to Why-question Rule 1, B must not be a commitment of White’s at move 3. In between no retraction took place.
 Erik C.W. Krabbe & Douglas N. Walton
So far so good, but then Woods and Walton (1978, 1989) came up with a �segment of dialogue that abided by all these rules, yet might be called circular: the so-called Woods-Walton segment: Moves
n+1 W: Why A? n+2 B: Statements B, B→A Argument 1 n+3 W: Statement A n+4 B: Statement C n+5 W: No commitment B Why B? n+6 B: Statements A, A→B Argument 2 n+7 W: Statement B
White’s commitment store A→B B→A B [deleted at move n+5]
A [delete B] C
Black’s commitment store A→B B→A B A
C
B
Figure 5.╇ The Woods-Walton segment
Evidently, more laboratory work needed to be done. One puzzle is whether Black’s sequence of argumentation in the dialogue fragment should be said to be circular or not, and if the argument is circular, whether it should count as an instance of the fallacy of begging the question. If so, the next puzzle is by what rules the fallacy could be blocked. A large part of the problem appears to center on the retraction of commitments in a Hamblin type system, as there is no rule in such a system barring, or even regulating the retraction of commitments. A participant is free to make a commitment to a statement, and then to retract commitment to it, at some later point in the dialogue, with no penalty being attached to such an apparent fickleness in her position. What was especially brought out by the attempts to solve the first puzzle was the importance of a property of argumentation in dialogue called “cumulativeness” by Woods and Walton (1978, 1989). A sequence of argumentation in a dialogue is cumulative if and only if, once the proponent or the recipient of the argument has incurred commitment to a particular statement, she can never, at any future point in the sequence, retract commitment to that statement. Cumulativeness means that commitment in a dialogue, once made, is non-retractable. Generally, cumulativeness is quite a strong condition to impose on argumentation in a dialogue, but the opposite extreme, of freely allowing retraction without
Formal dialectical systems and their uses in the study of argumentation 
any restriction, is far too weak to yield the right kind of structure for modelling Â�fallacies that Hamblin was aiming towards. The second puzzle led to various further laboratory experiments (Mackenzie 1979, 1984, 1990; Woods & Walton 1982, 1989) we must forego to discuss. The main challenge was to let new rules block the fallacy without banning ways of arguing that are generally acceptable. This kind of laboratory investigation can also take place in a way that is more informal, but still inspired by the idea of a formal dialectic. We are referring to the method of profiles of dialogue (Walton 1989a, 1989b; Krabbe 1992, 2002), which studies possible sequences of moves and reasonable options in particular Â�situations without defining a system of formal dialectic. 4.â•… The pluralism of the formal dialectical approach Hamblin recognized well enough that there could be different types of dialogue, but he did not go so far as to make a systematic attempt to define or classify these different types as goal-directed structures. Since then, the literature has gone on to build formal models of different types of dialogue. Each type of dialogue has its characteristic goal (Walton & Krabbe 1995, Section 3.1). How well an argument is used in a given case must then be evaluated with respect to the type of dialogue that the theorist assigns to the speech event in which the argument occurs, and hence with respect to how well it helps to fulfill the goal of that type of dialogue. The goal of the persuasion dialogue is to resolve or clarify a conflict of opinions on some issue by airing the strongest arguments and the strongest criticisms on both sides. This requires an interesting combination of competitiveness and collaboration. The competitive motivation is there to advocate one’s own viewpoint, while fallacies like straw man, ad hominem, and so forth show that carrying this competitiveness too far is an obstacle to reaching the common goal of the dialogue. In pragma-dialectics, this problem is now studied in publications on strategic maneuvering (Van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002; Van Eemeren 2010). The goal of negotiation dialogue is to reach a settlement of a conflict of interests that both parties can live with. The goals of the inquiry, of information-Â�seeking dialogue, of deliberation, and of eristic dialogue are again different (Walton & Krabbe 1995). Each type of dialogue has a particular goal, and therefore when an argument used in a given case is to be evaluated from the perspective of a certain type of dialogue, those kinds of moves and arguments that would obstruct reaching the
 Erik C.W. Krabbe & Douglas N. Walton
goal of that type of dialogue need to be identified and normatively condemned as inappropriate. Given these facts of the situation, it is reasonable to expect a plurality of different kinds of dialogue in real discussions and argumentative exchanges, as well as a plurality of formal models that can be applied in some respects to these real discussions. The problem is one of matching up these two elements, because formal models by their nature need to be precise and comparatively simple in relation to the vague but flexible kinds of dialogues in which everyday arguments are put forward and criticized. For these reasons, the idea of having a laboratory of rules remains an extremely useful research project. In real argumentative practices we typically run into problems, for example where fallacies occur that require some precise rules of retraction. In such instances, there can be alternative rules of retraction that can be applicable. Adopting a metadialogical perspective, we often need to debate and discuss these rules to see which one should best be applicable to deal with the problem. As we saw in the case of the fallacy of begging the question, this kind of situation is typical in argumentation research, and indeed typical in all scientific research that uses abstract models. The kind of research that needs to be done is to take a problematic example, explaining the kind of problem or fallacy that needs to be dealt with, and discuss different proposals for formulating a precise rule, or set of dialogue protocols, which should be brought to bear. The pluralism in formal dialectic we support should not lead to a proliferation of formal dialectical systems, similar to all the different formal systems of deductive logic that have grown up: each rule and its alternatives need to be discussed in relation to some real problem that has arisen in argumentative practices in everyday conversation reasoning or in special contexts like legal reasoning or scientific reasoning. Current pragma-dialectical research about strategic maneuvering in specific institutional contexts, often using the method of profiles of dialogue, has much the same focus. A problem similar to that of matching a plurality of kinds of dialogues with a plurality of models has arisen in computing, where one attempts to cross over between the practices of dialogue design in multi-agent systems in artificial intelligence and models provided by formal dialectical systems. A way of reconciling these two approaches comes through the development of what Reed has called a dialogue system specification (DSS). Such a specification describes how the various components that make up all dialogue systems, the locutions, commitments, rules and so forth, may be combined into packages to form particular dialogue systems for particular uses. The user can then create a dialogue system needed for a specific kind of task quickly by picking out the rules needed from the dialogue system specification.10
Formal dialectical systems and their uses in the study of argumentation 
5.â•… Conclusion In this contribution we have explained the concept of a formal dialectical system, by presenting two well-known such systems, one of the Hamblin type and one of the Lorenzen type.11 We showed that when considering the way such systems can best be used, the idea of building what we call a laboratory of rules was crucial. In this laboratory, formal dialectical systems (and the related method of profiles of dialogue) are used as flexible instruments to try out various possibilities. The need for a plurality of dialectical systems was seen to be a consequence of the plurality of types of dialogue. Among the plurality of dialectical systems, the pragma-dialectical model of critical discussion stands out as particularly fruitful and interesting, especially since it has been applied in studies of strategic maneuvering in specific contexts. Admittedly, one does not usually think of this system as a system of formal dialectics. And indeed critical discussion is not formal in all senses; but then, one could hardly deny that it is both formal4 and formal3. This formal character may not be so evident if one just studies “the ten commandments,” though these are specific enough to present a normative view on a practice that we can recognize people engaging in on a daily basis across cultures. The formal character of critical discussion shows itself much clearer in the official system of, formerly seventeen, but now fifteen rules that constitute the discussion procedure (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004). The system may be underspecified at points, but this is a feature it shares with most formal dialectical systems. There is no formal language specified to underlie the system, but this only means it is not formal2. In fact the system is specified with enough precision to be amenable to metadialogical analysis (Krabbe 2007). At the beginning of this contribution, we stated that formal dialectic and pragma-dialectics are not on the same footing. Now we may conclude that neither are they very far apart.
Notes 1.â•… According to Robinson (1953, p. 70) “the word ‘dialectic’ had a strong tendency in Plato to mean ‘the ideal method, whatever that may be.’” 2.â•… The “s” in “dialectics” is unnecessary, and was probably introduced by Barth & Krabbe (1982). 3.â•… These symbols will be substituted for those used in the quoted passages. 4.â•… That Hamblin intended to include the possibility of dropping a negation sign, instead of adding one, is clear from his example on p. 267 (move 5 in Figure 1 below) and his Comment (1) on the same page.
 Erik C.W. Krabbe & Douglas N. Walton 5.â•… In the move after Hamblin’s Comment (11) (move 26 in Figure 1) Black asks a question instead of denying, withdrawing, or challenging one of the premises of the preceding argument; as a consequence he becomes, by complex argument, committed to B. Here Hamblin’s comment is perhaps inadequate, but not incorrect. (Earlier however, in Comment (9) (on move 21 in Figure 1) his comment is incorrect when he remarks that both parties are now “internally consistent,” whereas in fact Black is at that point committed to both A and to ¬A.) 6.â•… We present the complete example, since as far as we know it has not been fully analyzed before. 7.â•… For simplicity, we assume that discussions consist of only one chain of arguments, i.e. one series of local discussions as described above, and forego treating the option of trying out various developments within one discussion (Barth & Krabbe 1982, III.13: Thoroughgoing dialectics). 8.â•… In his (1971), however, Hamblin states for the systems described in that paper, that they are “information-oriented” (p. 137) and later refers to systems that are “not strictly Â�information-oriented” but that permit “a participant to develop an argument by securing assent to individual steps.” He then refers to System H as “an alternative argument-Â�development system using questions of the form ‘Why?’” (p. 148; see also: Walton 2007, II.10, p. 83). By these lights, System H may have been intended to pertain to conversations that are somewhat information-oriented, but not exclusively, since they include argumentation used to make the other step by step accept a point of view. 9.â•… Mackenzie (1990) proposed some rules to amend this. In our view his investigations ultimately bring to light that the Hamblin-type systems need to be supplemented by some notion of winning and losing (parts of) a dialogue. 10.â•… According to Reed (2006: 26), a dialogue system can be captured completely by specifying preconditions and postconditions of every possible locution, along with a characterization of the commitment stores of the participants. The only other thing that is needed is a list of closure rules of the dialogue system. 11.â•… Elsewhere, we have proposed an integration of two systems of these two types (Walton & Krabbe 1995, Section 4.5).
References Barth, E.M., & Krabbe, E.C.W. (1982). From axiom to dialogue: A philosophical study of logics and argumentation. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter. Eemeren, F.H. van (2010). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse: Extending the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Houtlosser, P. (2002). Strategic manoeuvring: Maintaining a delicate balance. In F.H. van Eemeren & Houtlosser P. (Eds.), Dialectic and rhetoric: The warp and woof of argumentation analysis (pp. 131–159). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation: The pragma-dialectical approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Hamblin, C.L. (1970). Fallacies. London: Methuen. Reprinted with a preface by J. Plecnik and J. Hoaglund in 1986, Newport News, VA: Vale Press. Hamblin, C.L. (1971). Mathematical models of dialogue. Theoria: A Swedish journal of Â�philosophy, 37, 130–155. Hall, R. (1967). Dialectic. In P. Edwards (Ed.), The encyclopedia of philosophy, vol. 2 (pp. 385–388). New York: Macmillan & Free Press, and London: Collier Macmillan. Krabbe, E.C.W. (1982). Studies in dialogical logic (dissertation, University of Groningen). Krabbe, E.C.W. (1992). So what? Profiles for relevance criticism in persuasion dialogues. Â�Argumentation, 6, 271–283. Krabbe, E.C.W. (2002). Profiles of dialogue as a dialectical tool. In F.H. van Eemeren (Ed.), Advances in pragma-dialectics (pp. 153–167). Amsterdam: Sic Sat, and Newport News, VA: Vale Press. Krabbe, E.C.W. (2007). Predicaments of the concluding stage. In H.V. Hansen, C.W. Tindale, J. Anthony Blair, R.H. Johnson & D.M. Godden (Eds.), Dissensus and the search for common ground (CD-ROM). Windsor, ON: OSSA (Proceedings from the Seventh Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, June 6–9, 2007, University of Windsor). Also published in: C. Dégremont, L. Keiff & H. Rückert (Eds.), Dialogues, logics and other strange things: Essays in honour of Shahid Rahman (pp. 249–261). London: College Publications (Tributes 7), 2008. Krabbe, E.C.W. (2009). Cooperation and competition in argumentative exchanges. In Â�Henrique Jales Ribeiro (Ed.), Rhetoric and argumentation in the beginning of the XXIst century (pp. 111–126). Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra. Lorenzen, P., & Lorenz, K. (1978). Dialogische Logik [Dialogical logic]. Darmstadt: Â�Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Mackenzie, J. (1979). Question-begging in non-cumulative systems. Journal of philosophical logic, 8, 117–133. Mackenzie, J. (1984). Begging the question in dialogue. Australasian journal of philosophy, 62, 174–181. Mackenzie, J. (1990). Four dialogue systems. Studia logica, 49, 567–583. Reed, C. (2006). Representing dialogic argumentation. Knowledge-Based Systems, 19, 22–31. Robinson, R. (1953). Plato’s earlier dialectic (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford UP & Clarendon Press. First ed. 1941. Walton, D.N. (1989a). Question-reply argumentation. New York: Greenwood Press. Walton, D.N. (1989b). Informal logic: A handbook for critical argumentation. Cambridge: Â�Cambridge University Press. Walton, D.N. (2007). Dialog theory for critical argumentation. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins (Controversies 5). Walton, D.N., & Krabbe, E.C.W. (1995). Commitment in dialogue: Basic concepts of interpersonal reasoning. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Woods, J., & Walton, D.N. (1978). Arresting circles in formal dialogues. Journal of philosophical logic, 7, 73–90. Reprinted in Woods & Walton, 1989, pp.143–159, notes p. 283. Woods, J., & Walton, D.N. (1982). Question-begging and cumulativeness in dialectical games. Noûs, 16, 585–606. Reprinted in Woods & Walton, 1989, pp. 253–272, notes pp. 287–288. Woods, J., & Walton D.N. (1989). Fallacies: Selected papers 1972–1982. Dordrecht & Providence, RI: Foris.
The pragma-dialectical approach to circularity in argumentation Jan Albert van Laar & David M. Godden 1.â•… Introduction If one pictures an argumentative discussion as a journey which starts from a situation where an antagonist and a protagonist disagree on whether to accept a particular standpoint, and where the desired point of arrival would be a resolution of this issue on the merits of the cases presented by both parties, then, in the ideal situation, the parties should move as directly as they are capable of towards this endpoint. Running in loops, whatever its attractions, would have to be avoided. When taking a closer look at circularity in argumentation various questions arise. What makes an argument circular? Are circular arguments fallacious? How is circularity connected to question-begging? This contribution focuses on how circularity in argumentation and question begging are dealt with in the pragma-dialectical approach (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1987, 1992a, 2004). We start from the assumption that an argument is made up of reasoning used for the purposes “of trying to resolve or deal with conflict or instability that has arisen between two parties” (Walton 1991:â•›298). In Section 2 we survey the insights and shortcomings of a variety of theoretical approaches to questionbegging circularity, which leads to a number of desiderata for a theory of circularity in argumentation. (Here we use the term ‘circularity’ in a sense which is neutral concerning any possible fallaciousness, while terms such as ‘vicious circularity’ or ‘question begging’ will connote fallaciousness.) In Section 3 we examine a number of passages in which the pragma-dialectical approach to circularity is laid out. In Section 4 we attempt to answer a few interpretative questions that these passages give rise to, arriving at a criterion for the fallacy of question begging that we think fits the pragma-dialectical account best. We conclude, in Section 5, with an assessment of the pragma-dialectical concept of the fallacy of question begging.
 Jan Albert van Laar & David M. Godden
2.â•… Theoretical overview 2.1â•… Aristotle Aristotle seems to have provided two different accounts of begging the question, one dialectical and the other logical or epistemic.1 According to the dialectical account, proposed in the Sophistical Refutations (167a 37–40, 181a 15–21) and the Topics (162b 31–163a 13), begging the question consists in violating a rule in the question-and-answer game of elenchus (refutation) by asking one’s interlocutor to directly grant the question at issue, rather than deducing it indirectly from answers (concessions) given to other questions. In the Prior Analytics (64b 28–37) by contrast, begging the question is characterized as a failure of demonstration whereby one tries to establish some conclusion on the basis of premises less certain than or equally unknown as the conclusion itself. Contemporary treatments of begging the question did not initially pursue a dialectical approach since, as Robinson (1971:â•›115–116) observed, typically arguers are not engaged in academic games but are searching after truth or rationally acceptable belief, so the charge that they are violating a rule for a game of questionand-answer seems contrived and misplaced. 2.2â•… Logical approaches Instead contemporary treatments first attempted a logical diagnostic approach. Sanford (1972:â•›197), who rejects the logical approach to begging the question, nevertheless offers an especially acute definition of it when portraying the position of Hoffman (1971). An argument begs the question if every [minimally sufficient (Sanford 1981)] conjunction of its premises from which the conclusion follows has as a conjunct a proposition identical with the conclusion. A degenerate case of such question begging is provided by an argument in which the sole premise is identical with the conclusion.
Similarly, Robinson makes his character Ted define ‘question begging argument’ as an argument that has a premise that assumes, or to be more specific: entails, the argument’s conclusion (1971:â•›113). (See Note 2 for Robinson’s view of such arguments.) We detect at least three problems with a logical approach. First, a logical approach does not seem to provide an analysis or explanation of what can go wrong with circular arguments making some of them vicious. While an argument form such as ‘A, therefore A’ is transparently circular, it is also plainly deductively
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valid. This is the first indication that if circularity turns out to be an error, it cannot be a logical error. As Woods and Walton (1975:â•›112) say “semantic virtues may, in their epistemic analogues, be unredeemable rogues.” Further, as Robinson (1971) points out, the semantic conception of begging the question, i.e. “assuming what you are trying to prove,” seems to rule out forms of deduction where the conclusion is somehow ‘contained in’ the premises.2 Thus, on the this conception, many putatively good arguments, including all entailments or at least the immediate inferences, are in danger of being classified as fallaciously question-begging even though they might be cognitively informative or dialectically useful. Seemingly, then, not all semantically circular arguments are epistemically or dialectically roguish. Thus, among the valid arguments a distinction must be made between the cogent and the viciously circular ones, and that does not seem possible on purely formal grounds. A second problem with a logical approach is that, as Sanford observes (1972:â•›197), it requires a theory, or at least a criterion, of propositional identity. Problematically, many obvious contenders are inadequate. Logical equivalence fails as a sufficient condition for fallaciousness, as it forbids not only many immediate inferences but also argument forms such as modus ponens and disjunctive syllogism (Woods & Walton 1975:â•›109, 112).3 Orthographic identity fails both as a necessary condition since it allows double-negation elimination as a non-circular form of argument (Sanford 1972:â•›197) and as a sufficient condition since equivocal terms and non-co-referential indexicals will not produce truth-functional equivalence (Sorensen 1991: 247; Sinnott-Armstrong 1999:â•›175). Woods and Walton (1975:â•›107 ff.) distinguish between the equivalence form of circular reasoning – where some premise (conjunct) is equivalent or even identical to the conclusion – and the dependence form – where “[the] conclusion is presupposed by a premiss or where some premiss actually rests on the conclusion, so that in order to accept the premiss, one need first accept the conclusion” (1975:â•›108).4 Since the dependence form of circularity involves a pragmatic, rather than a syntactic or semantic relationship between the premise and the conclusion of some argument, a third problem of logical accounts is that they seem to lack the theoretical resources to handle dependence versions of circularity. Difficulties such as these prompted many theorists to move away from purely logical attempts to characterize begging the question.5 Circularity might turn out to be a formal property of arguments, but fallacious, or vicious circularity is not (cf. Walton 1985; Wilson 1988:â•›40; Palmer 1981:â•›393, for similar views). As alternatives to formalist approaches, a variety of approaches emerged which sought to identify the fallacious elements of circular arguments among their informal – Â�typically contextual or pragmatic – features.
 Jan Albert van Laar & David M. Godden
2.3â•… Doxastic approaches First among these was the doxastic or psychological approach, where the fallaciousness of viciously circular arguments is understood to be dependent on an arguer’s beliefs and is thereby an audience-relative feature of it. As Sorensen (1996:â•›52) puts it, “To beg the question is to beg it against someone.”6 Here, what is at issue is the actual manner in which, or grounds upon which, arguers come to believe, or would come to believe, the premises and conclusion of some argument (Sanford 1972).7 Consider the disjunctive syllogism. As Woods and Walton (1975:â•›110 ff.) demonstrate, the synchronic, logical structure of this semantic implication is not equivalent to the diachronic, doxastic structure of the corresponding mental inference. Unlike an implication, the premises of an inference do not always commutate: ‘p or q, not-p, therefore q’ is truth-functionally – but not intentionally – equivalent to ‘not-p, p or q, therefore q.’ If the order of the premises in an inference reflects the order in which the information becomes available, and if the disjunctive premise is understood as implying the message that the speaker does not know which of p and q is the case, the second inference should be evaluated differently from the first. The second inference would, for example, violate Grice’s maxim of quantity (when putting forward the second premise). It would also seem to beg the question, since, given the correctness of the first premise, the second premise is only acceptable if one accepts the conclusion. Thus, as Sanford (1981:â•›148) also observes, the cogency or fallacious circularity of an argument having the form of a disjunctive syllogism seems to depend on arguer-relative facts such as the order and manner in which the arguer(s) come to believe the premises and the conclusion. Thus Sanford (1972:â•›198) defines a question begging argument as follows: An argument formulated for Smith’s benefit … begs the question either if Smith believes one of the premises only because he already believes the conclusion or if Smith would believe one of the premises only if he already believed the conclusion.
The fallaciousness of a circular argument is explained by its failure to “increase the degree of reasonable confidence which [its audience] has in the truth of the conclusion” (ibid.). A problem with doxastic approaches is that they seem to yield a relativism where the same argument can be both fallacious and not fallacious depending only on the arguer’s psychological states (Biro 1977). 2.4â•… Epistemic approaches Epistemic approaches to begging the question are based on a different pragmatic failure of circular arguments, expressed in Goldstick’s (2003:â•›130) characterization that circular arguments are “necessarily useless probatively.”
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On epistemic accounts (Biro 1977, 1984), the probative futility of viciously circular arguments is explained with reference to what Butchvarov (1970:â•›35, 89 ff.) called the “epistemic seriousness” of argument – “a feature of arguments which has to do with the relative [or comparative] knowability of premises and conclusion” (Biro 1977:â•›264). “An ‘epistemically serious argument’,” Biro writes (ibid.), “is one which leads validly from more clearly known to less clearly known truths.” A circular argument fails to be epistemically serious because its premises cannot be known independently of its conclusion. Importantly, according to Biro (1977:â•›262) the comparative knowability of claims is not a knower-relative feature of them, and does not have to do with any temporal or causal relations by which any knower actually came to accept them. Rather, the comparative knowability of some pair of claims has to do with whether, and to what degree, either of them could be known independently of the other (Biro 1977:â•›265–266). Thus, “the knowability of propositions is … to be distinguished from their being known (let alone from their being believed etc.) by this or that individual” (Biro 1977:â•›270). Instead of being relative to an arguer (or an arguer’s psychological situation), comparative knowability is relative to an arguer’s epistemic situation, understood in an objectivist way. “Comparative knowability,” Biro writes (1984:â•›243), “should be thought of as relative to an ideal reasoner, with the acuity, logical or epistemic, of actual reasoners being irrelevant.” Yet, what seems to matter in determining whether an argument is viciously circular is not how I might have come to accept some premise, but rather how I actually did. The fact that I could have come to accept a premise through some non-circular chain of reasoning does not show that I have some independent reason for accepting that premise – only that some such independent reason exists whether or not it is available to me. From a pragmatic stance, vicious circularity must be determined not on the basis of how some ideal epistemic agent in an ideal epistemic situation might have come to accept some premise, but rather how some particular and situated actual reasoner actually did support the premise, or whether there are routes for supporting this premise available in the actual doxastic or dialectic situation at hand. 2.5â•… The shift to the dialectical In comparing the doxastic and epistemic approaches, one unifying feature stands out. Both agree that question-begging is a pragmatic failure of argument to achieve certain mental purposes. Wilson (1988:â•›50) makes the turn to conversational, rather than mental purposes, writing: “The key to understanding the nature of viciously circular arguments lies in the context in which the argument occurs. … Roughly speaking, a circular argument is vicious if in the context in
 Jan Albert van Laar & David M. Godden
which it occurs it is not suited to fulfill the principal conversational purpose for which it was advanced.” Indeed while each pragmatic account differs as to how to characterize the probative function of argument, each agrees that question-begging arguments fail in their probative functions. Like the doxastic and epistemic approaches, the dialectical approach characterizes question begging arguments as arguments that fail to achieve a particular purpose. But different from the former approaches, the dialectical one conceives of this purpose in conversational terms. Walton (1994:â•›96) describes begging the question as “an inherently pragmatic failure,” and offers an approach where “The fallacy of begging the question is analyzed as a failure to fulfill one particular function of argument – the probative or ‘proving’ function – where the failure blocks the argument from fulfilling or contributing to the goals of the dialogue in which the arguer is supposed to be engaged.” Thus, the goals and other pragmatic features of an argument must be found contextually, in the conversation at hand. Yet, the epistemic approach is correct in claiming that contextual features ought not to depend on the psychological idiosyncrasies of individual arguers. In an attempt to mend the rift existing between epistemic and doxastic approaches, Ritola (2003:â•›16) suggests a view that combines the agent-dependent element found in doxastic approaches and the non-psychologistic element found in epistemic approaches: “Arguments are given in respect to some knowledge-base externalized through the process of argumentation. To propose an argument is to suggest that someone’s knowledge-base needs to be revised. In a question-begging argument, a proposition(s) [sic] that is not in our knowledge-base is inserted into it, and something is claimed to follow from it. The argument is surely valid, but it makes an unfounded revision to the knowledge-base.” An obvious way of tracking contextual commitments – both epistemic and conversational – is to view them in the context of an argumentative dialogue. Using a dialogue as a diachronic, commitment-tracking mechanism, Walton (1994:â•›127–128) presents a dialectical account of diagnosing and analyzing the occurrence of question-begging as a pragmatic failure of argument. The determination of petitio in a given case, according to this analysis, is a matter of the lines of argumentation leading into the proponent’s conclusion available to the questioner. If no lines into a premise are open that do not already presume the truth of the conclusion, then the argument cannot fulfill its proper probative function in the dialogue. For this reason, an argument that begs the question can properly be evaluated as fallacious in a given case. The question of whether an argument begs the question is, by these lights, a matter of the context of dialogue.
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2.6â•… Desiderata for theories of question-begging The foregoing considerations seem to yield the following desiderata for any viable theory of fallacious circularity. Such theories should: 1. achieve a reflective equilibrium between theory and pretheoretical intuitive judgments (understood as reflecting the ordinary usage of the terms) concerning when the fallacy is committed which accurately and reliably distinguishes fallaciously vicious from innocuous forms of circularity 2. explain the failure of viciously circular arguments as a pragmatic rather than a structural feature of argument such that a. if the purpose of argumentation is rationally resolving or dealing with conflicts or instabilities between two parties, begging the question is best understood as a conversational flaw rather than an epistemic or doxastic one 3. recognize the contextual and diachronic (or cumulative) structure of argument and inference in such a way that they a. diagnose and evaluate the fallaciousness of circularity within the context of some particular argumentative situation, by tracking the commitments and changes in commitment of the arguers involved, and b. diagnose and evaluate the fallaciousness of circularity internally with respect to the rational perspective of individual agents (the arguers/ participants),8 by providing criteria for what counts as equivalence or dependence, and by establishing the availability of justificatory routes, which accurately represent the actual positions of the participants to the argument in a way that is neither unrealistically objectivistic nor psychologistic. In what follows, we will introduce the pragma-dialectical account of question begging, offer what we hope is an acceptable set of criteria for question-begging in a pragma-dialectical fashion, and conclude by briefly noting how such an account satisfies the desiderata just articulated. 3.â•… The pragma-dialectical account of the fallacy of question-begging Van Eemeren and Grootendorst use the terms ‘begging the question’ and ‘circular argumentation’ to refer to the same fallacy.9 In line with their pragma-dialectical theory of fallacy, they deal with this fallacy as a violation of a rule for critical discussion.10 As is commonly known, the critical discussion is the pragma-dialectical
 Jan Albert van Laar & David M. Godden
specification of the procedure by which a protagonist and an antagonist, who have a difference of opinion concerning a particular proposition, attempt to resolve that difference by way of arguments so as to arrive at a result that is solely based on the merits of the protagonist’s case in favor of his standpoint and the merits of the antagonist’s case in favor of maintaining a critical stance towards that standpoint. A fallacy is a contribution by which the resolution of the dispute is hindered or even blocked (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004, Chapter 7). How does presenting a circular argumentation hinder or block the resolution process and what rule or rules prohibit such begging the question? In their account, the authors use an abstract example where the protagonist argues in favor of his standpoint “A” by way of an argument “A, therefore A”. In the event of a difference of opinion, one discussant puts forward a standpoint and the other discussant calls that standpoint into question. These discussants are therefore not in agreement on the acceptability of this standpoint. If any attempt to resolve this difference of opinion by means of a regulated discussion is to have any chance of success, it is necessary for the discussants to adopt a number of propositions accepted by both parties (rule 3) as their starting point. The initial standpoint (in this case represented by “A”) cannot, of course, form any part of the list of agreements expressing propositions that are acceptable to both parties, otherwise there would be no difference of opinion. When the fallacy of begging the question is committed, it is only natural to suppose, just as in other cases, that the discussant who in the discussion fulfills the role of protagonist will in the argumentation stage at a certain moment express a proposition that he claims can be identified as a common starting point by means of the intersubjective identification procedure. In the case of begging the question, the error that is made is that the protagonist then (intentionally or unintentionally) makes use of a proposition that, as he can know beforehand, is not to be found in the list of propositions that are acceptable to both parties, so that the intersubjective identification procedure [IIP] cannot yield a positive result.11 If this statement were to occur in the list, or if it were to be added to the list, the difference of opinion would immediately be resolved, which is not the case here. (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004:â•›176–177)
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst write that begging the question is to be connected to Rule 3 and to the so-called intersubjective identification procedure (see also 2004:â•›180). Rule 3 states, among other things, that a “discussant remains obliged to defend the standpoint as long as he does not retract it and as long as he has not successfully defended it against the other discussant on the basis of the agreed premises and discussion rules” (2004:â•›139). The intersubjective identification procedure is a method of defense by which the parties, at the protagonist’s request, determine whether a premise, attacked by the antagonist, is identical to one of the common starting points agreed on in the opening stage or should be added
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to these (2004:â•›146–7). Rule 7 provides the content of the notion of ‘successful defense’, as used in Rule 3, and shows how the intersubjective identification procedure is to be employed: a. The protagonist has successfully defended the propositional content of a complex speech act of argumentation against an attack by the antagonist if the application of the intersubjective identification procedure yields a positive result or if the propositional content is in the second instance accepted by both parties as a result of a sub-discussion in which the protagonist has successfully defended a positive sub-standpoint with regard to this propositional content. (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004:â•›147)
Thus, an argumentative defense is successful if each premise has either been shown to correspond to an agreed starting point or supported by a more or less complex reasoning such that the basic premises of that argument have been shown to correspond to an agreed starting point. So, a circular argument, when seen through, cannot be successful. In addition to their system of rules that make up the model of critical discussion, van Eemeren and Grootendorst provide ‘10 commandments’ for the proper conduct within a discussion. According to the first part of Commandment 6, “[a] party may not falsely present a premise as an accepted starting point.” Begging the question is also analyzed as a violation of this commandment (1992a:â•›151–154). 4.â•… Some issues of interpretation Given the decision to use the expressions ‘begging the question’ and ‘circular argumentation’ as synonyms, and also given the examples provided by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (see below), we do not think that they have a weak conception of question begging in mind according to which the fallacy boils down to the use of premises that happen to be unacceptable to the addressee. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst picture a particular situation, where the protagonist put forwards as a premise something that boils down to the questioned standpoint, as prototypical for the fallacy of question begging. This strongly suggests that this fallacy must be taken to occur only in cases in where a premise is unacceptable to the antagonist because it is too closely connected with the standpoint under challenge. We focus on two further issues of interpretation regarding the passages just quoted, using an abstract example, ‘A therefore A*’, where ‘A’ and ‘A*’ are assumed to be closely connected formulations and where ‘therefore’ indicates either a Â�single step of reasoning or a longer chain of reasoning. First, what is the connection between A and A*? Second, can an argument be question begging if it is not put forward with pretence of conclusiveness? After having dealt with these issues, we
 Jan Albert van Laar & David M. Godden
propose a criterion that fits in with what we consider to be a plausible interpretation of the pragma-dialectical view on the fallacy of begging the question. 4.1â•… How are A and A* to be connected? According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst, the clearest case of the fallacy of Â�begging the question is the one where a premise and the conclusion are syntactically identical (2004:â•›176), but they stress that there are less clear cases where premise and conclusion are similar enough to count as equivalent (2004:â•›181–2). Thus, the notion of question begging clearly includes the equivalence conception. The authors further make it clear that a question begging argument can also be due to the Â�occurrence of a premise that depends on the standpoint (1992a:â•›154; 1992b:â•›160). Of this dependency type they mention two kinds. The premise can preÂ�suppose the acceptance of the standpoint, such as in the argument ‘God exists, because it says so in the Bible and the Bible is the word of God.’ In addition, there can be a ‘causal interdependence’ between the premises and the conclusion: ‘How do I know he is a man of taste? Because he smokes Willem II cigars. All men of taste smoke Willem II’ (1992a: 154). Thus a question begging argument can be Â�constituted by a premise that is syntactically identical to the conclusion, or by a premise that is, in context, equivalent to the conclusion, or by a premise that presupposes the conclusion. The notion of causal interdependency is less clear, but we surmise that it points to a particular version of the notion of dependency.12 We distinguish three ways in which a premise could be said to be dependent on the conclusion, and judge only the first to constitute a case of question begging as pragma-dialectically conceived. (1) Premise A can be dependent on conclusion A* due to the circumstance that A follows from A*(possibly in conjunction with other premises, but A* being indispensable for the derivation of A) in the specific sense that the context is such that (a) there is no justification strategy available to the protagonist than to either give up or to offer A*, at some point, as part of the defense of A when the premise remains under challenge, whereas (b) A*has not (yet) been used to that very purpose (otherwise, it would be case of propositional identity or equivalence). As examples we can adduce a modified version of the Willem II example above. Suppose the protagonist argues that ‘Frans is a man of taste’ on the basis of ‘only men of taste smoke Willem II,’ it having been agreed that Frans smokes Willem II cigars. Then the context could be such that there is only one route available to the protagonist to defend the premise ‘only men of taste smoke Willem II,’ to wit the route in which he must enumerate the agreed smokers of Willem II and obtain for each of them the concession that that person is a man of taste. Among them one person is Frans: hence the premise can be supported only by adducing that ‘Frans is a man of taste.’
The pragma-dialectical approach to circularity in argumentation 
The antagonist may presume an argument to be circular in this sense, but she can easily be wrong in her estimation of the available justification routes available to the protagonist (cf. Wilson 1988:â•›41, on charges of begging the question made out of impatience). This ‘presumptive dependency’ (cf. Palmer on ‘presumptively circular arguments,’ 1981:â•›392), resembles in an important respect, but in a fully dialectical vein,13 the objectivist criterion employed by Biro and Siegel (2006), according to which the criterion for question begging does not employ any doxastic idiosyncrasies. Whether a particular persuasion strategy exists is a dialectical matter: it is up to the protagonist to show its existence by playing the strategy, when challenged to prove its existence. We assume that presumptive dependency fits in with the pragma-dialectical conception of the fallacy of question begging, because: (1) the modified Willem II example seems to exemplify it, and (2) the protagonist’s error consists in making use of a proposition that has been challenged, namely in the final parts of the extended dialogues. We reject a second and a third possible interpretation of dependency: (2) Premise A can be seen as dependent on conclusion A* due to the circumstance that A* clearly follows from A, in the specifically dialectical sense that it is clear to the participants that accepting A amounts to conceding A* as well. In such cases, the antagonist’s acceptance of A is dependent on her willingness to accept A*. (3) Premise A can depend on conclusion A* in the sense that, for some reason other than that A logically implies A* or that A presumptively depends on A*, A is unacceptable for the antagonist of A*, for instance because A is the sort of proposition that is typically criticized by people who are critical of standpoint A*. The mistakes involved are explicable by reference to Rules 3 and 7 and Commandment 6. But due to the lack of any clear circularity, we judge these latter kinds of dependency not as constituting cases of question begging in a pragma-dialectical vein. 4.2â•… Is there a requirement of conclusiveness? According to Rule 7, the protagonist is allowed to offer an argument using a premise that cannot by the intersubjective identification procedure be identified with any agreed proposition, provided that he is willing to defend this premise if challenged to do so. That makes it possible, we think, to construct an argument that is circular, but that does not make the errors analyzed with the help of Rule 3 and Rule 7 and that does not violate Commandment 6. The protagonist can offer a circular argument and add that he is prepared to argue in favor of the premises: “God exists, because it says so in the Bible and the Bible is the word of God. Let me hasten to add that I have a further argument in favor of my contention that the Bible is the word of God that does not rely on the existence of God.” The protagonist
 Jan Albert van Laar & David M. Godden
can also simply offer an argument in favor of the, yet unacceptable premise: “God exists, because it says so in the Bible and the Bible is the word of God, something my mother told me.” Circular arguments that are presented as non-conclusive or where the problematic premise receives support, do not seem to commit the fallacy of question begging. At an earlier occasion, van Eemeren and Grootendorst defined the fallacy of begging the question in the following way: “A protagonist commits this fallacy if he acts as if his standpoint has been adequately defended when, in fact, the starting point on which he relies in his defense is identical to the disputed proposition” (1992a:â•›153). This earlier definition conveys the component of conclusiveness more clearly than the more recent account quoted in Section 3. 4.3â•… Four criteria for question begging arguments Because formulations and logical connections can be complex, it is, in our view, not superfluous to make it explicit in the criteria for ‘question begging argument’ both (1) that the circularity must be clear to the participants in the sense that the antagonist, when charging the protagonist of having committed the fallacy of begging the question, must be capable of proving the appropriate connection between premise and conclusion within a sufficiently small number of steps and (2) that the antagonist did not, in the opening stage, concede something that boils down to the challenged standpoint.14 We may now formulate our criteria as follows: An argument “A therefore A*” put forward by a protagonist Prot against an antagonist Ant in a discussion D at a stage s begs the question if and only if: i. A is identical to A*, or at stage s equivalent to A*, or A presupposes the acceptability of A*, or A is at s presumptively dependent on A* and ii. this connection between A and A* is, in principle, provable in a subdiscussion by Ant against Prot within a number of moves that has been fixed in advance of the argumentation stage, and iii. A has not been conceded by Ant as a common starting point in the opening stage of D (see Note 11), and iv. ‘A therefore A*’ is presented as conclusive while there has not been an argument offered in support of A. Begging the question, in this sense, can be problematic for a resolution oriented discussion in two quite different ways. (1) If the antagonist discovers that premise A is unacceptable, the protagonist has made a superfluous and avoidable move. (2) If the antagonist does neither detect the circularity nor that premise A is unacceptable, she will be misled into accepting something that should have been Â�criticized, leading to a situation where one merit of the antagonist’s position remains under-exposed.
The pragma-dialectical approach to circularity in argumentation 
5.╅ Conclusion Section 2 concluded with the specification of a set of desiderata which we �suggest are requirements for any viable theory of fallacious circularity. We now conclude by showing how the proposed criteria for question-begging arguments, within the context of a pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, meet all of the desiderata. First, the pragma-dialectical approach, as interpreted by us, heeds the tradition of ordinary usage about the nature of the fallacy as vicious circularity, or questionbegging, by including the clear cases where a premise is identical or clearly equivalent to the conclusion, and by including at least some arguments where the premise is dependent on the conclusion. That is, the pragma-dialectical approach achieves a reflective equilibrium with our pretheoretical judgments, thereby meeting the first desideratum. Second, even though a diagnosis of circularity is to be explained by using logical terminology in some cases, and in other cases by reference to a sequence of dialogue moves, the flaw in the fallacy of begging the question is pragmatic, and specifically conversational, in nature. Third, and as a consequence of its conversational diagnosis, the pragma-dialectical approach stresses the diachronic features of question begging, by making the criteria for the fallacy make use of the commitments made and the challenges performed by the parties at the various stages of the discussion, and by reference to various discussion stages. Finally, the criterion that we propose for the pragma-dialectical conception of question begging does not make use of the beliefs of the participants, nor does it start from suppositions about the true characterization of reality, but instead it employs the public commitments and discussion moves performed or performable by the participants in a dialogue.
Acknowledgments We want to thank the two anonymous referees for a number of very useful suggestions.
Notes 1.â•… For discussions of Aristotle’s account see Woods & Walton, 1982 and Basu, 1986. 2.â•… For this reason, Robinson (1971) takes the view that it is improper to accuse someone of having put forward a question begging argument. To Sorensen’s mind (1996), Robinson denies that there exists a fallacy of begging the question, responding to it with the following rejoinder in an attempt to show Robinson’s position to be untenable: “There is a fallacy of
 Jan Albert van Laar & David M. Godden begging the question. Therefore, there is a fallacy of begging the question” (1996: 51). In our view, Robinson did not deny the existence of question begging arguments. Instead, he argued that the notion is a muddle or that accusations of question begging are improper given that Â�arguments should be evaluated solely by their soundness (premise truth and deductive validity), or both (Robinson 1971: 117). 3.â•… In these cases, two additional assumptions must be made: first, any logically equivalent substitution for the stated premises must be permitted; second, the equivalence condition must be understood not as equivalence to the conjunction of the premises, but instead as, minimally, equivalence to some premise conjunct. Using these assumptions, the inference in modus ponens is equivalent to ‘P and Q, therefore Q,’ which meets the equivalence condition of circularity just stated (Cf. Woods & Walton 1975: 112). 4.â•… Woods and Walton later (1982, p. 80 ff.) qualify the extent of this distinction with the idea that, so long as different arguments can be chained together, a case of dependence can be shown to be a case of identity occurring over several chained arguments. 5.â•… While Jacquette (1993: 321) seeks to restore the prospects of a logical approach, writing “we can never be sure that on some as yet unexplored logical continent there lurks no black swan of symbolic criteria for diagnosing, criticizing, and defending arguments against the charge of circularity,” he does so by invoking an epistemic logic containing belief and justification-related terminology. Similarly, Garbacz (2002) offers a formal account which incorporates the contextual features of belief and inference into a logic of consequence. 6.â•… Indeed, Truncellito (2004: 327) classifies question-begging as a rhetorical fallacy to be located in arguers (or, properly speaking, their argument moves) rather than arguments, where question-begging is a circular argument that is used in such a way as to be “wrong, inappropriate or unhelpful in dialectical contexts.” 7.â•… Lippert-Rasmussen (2001) also presents a doxastic account of fallacious circularity where fallaciousness depends on an addressee’s (a) second-order beliefs about what makes it reasonable for him to accept an argument’s premises, and (b) the actual grounds on which he accepts the premises of the argument. 8.â•… In order to arrive at fair and correct judgements about whether an argument is question begging in some conversational context, one needs to be sufficiently sensitive to the positions that the participants hold, develop and aspire to during their dialogue. That is why we think that a pragmatic theory of question begging should also be concerned with the internal Â�rational perspectives of the participants. 9.â•… In their view, a circularity within an argument goes against the norms for critical discussion and thus constitutes the fallacy of question begging. 10.â•… We do not here have the space to consider formal dialectical accounts (e.g. Hamblin 1970; Mackenzie 1994; Woods & Walton 1978). 11.â•… To this one might object that since the IIP allows the introduction of new information (2004: 146–7) the result could very well be positive in that A will now be added to the list. As van Eemeren says, in that case “the difference of opinion would immediately be resolved.” To exclude that case it must be assumed that the IIP (including any new information) has been applied to A with a negative result before the circular argument for A was presented.
The pragma-dialectical approach to circularity in argumentation 
12.â•… If proposition A (The Bible is the word of God) presupposes proposition B (God exists) then A can be said to be dependent on B, but not in the same sense as investigated as relevant to the example of the Willem II cigars. In the former case, B will not plausibly be put forward as a reason to convince the antagonist of the acceptability of A, the reason being that the B is connected in a similar way to the denial of A (The Bible is not the word of God). In the latter case, the dependence is argumentative in nature, and not presuppositional. Therefore, we do regard the presuppositional kind of question begging as different in kind as what van Eemeren and Grootendorst refer to as the causal kind (and which we will label ‘presumptively dependent’ below.). 13.â•… Our analysis of presumptive dependency can be seen as an elaboration of a suggestion made by Mackenzie (1994: 234). A similar idea is proposed by Walton (1991: 132). 14.â•… We surmise that in order to extend this notion to also cover arguments that defend a method of reasoning by employing that method of reasoning itself, other rules than Rule 3 and Rule 7, or Commandment 6 are needed.
References Aristotle. (1971). The complete works of Aristotle, volume 1. J. Barnes, (ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Basu, D.K. (1986). A question of begging. Informal Logic, 8, 19–26. Biro, J. (1977). Rescuing ‘begging the question.’ Metaphilosophy, 8, 257–271. Biro, J. (1984). Knowability, believability, and begging the question: A reply to Sanford. MetaÂ� philosophy, 15, 239–247. Biro, J. & H. Siegel. (2006). In defense of the objective epistemic approach to argumentation. Informal Logic, 26, 91–101. Butchvarov, P. (1970). The concept of knowledge. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Eemeren, F.H. van & R. Grootendorst (1987). Fallacies in pragma-dialectical perspective. Â�Argumentation, 1, 283–301. Eemeren, F.H. van & R. Grootendorst. (1992a). Argumentation, communication, and fallacies: A pragma-dialectical perspective. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Eemeren, F.H. van & R. Grootendorst. (1992b). De cirkelredenering. Onze Taal, 61, 159–160. Eemeren, F.H. van & R. Grootendorst. (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation: The pragmadialectical approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Garbacz, Pawel. (2002). Begging the question as a formal fallacy. Logique et Analyse, 45, 81–100. Goldstick, D. (2003). Circular reasoning. International Studies in Philosophy, 35, 129–130. Hamblin, C.L. (1970). Fallacies. London: Methuen. Hoffman, R. (1971). On begging the question at any time. Analysis, 32, 51. Jacquette, D. (1993). Logical dimensions of question-begging. American Philosophical Â�Quarterly, 30, 317–327. Lippert-Rasmussen. K. (2001). Are question-begging arguments necessarily unreasonable? Philosophical Studies, 104, 123–141. Mackenzie, J.D. (1994). Contexts of begging the question. Argumentation, 8, 227–240. Palmer, H. (1981). Do circular arguments beg the question? Philosophy, 56, 387–394.
 Jan Albert van Laar & David M. Godden Ritola, J. (2003). Begging the question: A case study. Argumentation, 17, 1–19. Robinson, R. (1971). Begging the question. Analysis, 31, 113–117. Sanford, D. (1972). Begging the question. Analysis, 32, 197–199. Sanford, D. (1981). Superfluous information, epistemic conditions and begging the question. Metaphilosophy, 12, 145–158. Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (1999). Begging the question. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77, 32–37. Sorenson, R.A. (1991). ‘P, therefore, P’ without circularity. Journal of Philosophy, 88, 245–266. Sorenson, R.A. (1996). Unbeggable questions. Analysis, 19, 51–55. Truncellito, D.A. (2004). Running in circles about begging the question. Argumentation, 18, 325–329. Walton, D. (1985). Are circular arguments necessarily vicious? American Philosophy Quarterly, 22, 263–274. Walton, D. (1991). Begging the question: Circular reasoning as a tactic in argumentation. Westport, CT: Greenwood. Walton, D. (1994). Begging the question as a pragmatic fallacy. Synthese, 100, 95–131. Wilson, K. (1988). Circular arguments. Metaphilosophy, 19, 38–52. Woods, J. & D. Walton. (1975). Petitio principii. Synthese, 34, 107–127. Woods, J. & D. Walton. (1978). Arresting circles in formal dialogues. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 7, 73–90. Woods, J. & D. Walton. (1982). The petitio: Aristotle’s five ways. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 12, 77–100.
Index
A allusion╇ 59, 233 amplification╇ 4, 103, 105–115, 217 ergasia╇ 107–109, 111 analytic overview╇ 112, 236 anecdotal evidence╇ 85, 117, 120–121, 125, 128 anecdote╇ 75 antithesis╇ 16 argument from figurative analogy╇ 50, 53 argument from straightforward comparison argument scheme╇ 36, 41–44, 47, 119–120, 155, 161, 185, 188–192, 195–196, 200–201 argumentation based on a comparison╇ 28, 43, 186–187, 189, 191, 203 argumentation by example╇ 121 argumentation design╇ 174 argumentation strategies╇ 209, 234, 238 argumentation structure╇ 120 argumentative activity type╇ 16, 18 argumentum ad hominem╇ 30, 52, 259 Aristotle╇ 40–41, 77, 105–106, 115, 141, 143, 166–167, 179, 208–211, 219, 266, 277 artificial intelligence╇ 260 attenuation╇ 216–217 audience╇ 49, 104, 219 authority╇ 26–28, 33, 81, 122, 135, 138–143, 148, 188, 190, 199 axiom╇ 248 B breast cancer╇ 4, 117–118, 121–124, 126–128, 130–132
C causal argumentation╇ 42, 120, 186–194 character appeal╇ 141 circular argument╇ 255, 257, 268–269, 273, 275, 278 classical rhetoric╇ 111, 231 commitment╇ 11, 36, 70, 174, 207, 213–216, 218, 222, 239, 241, 248–251, 256–258, 262, 270–271 commitment rules╇ 248, 250 commitment store╇ 213–216, 218, 248, 250 communication design (see argumentation designs)╇ 173, 176, 180 communicative activity types (see argumentative activity types) compliance╇ 137, 142–143, 153, 208, 218 composite audience╇ 93, 96, 98, 101 concession╇ 8–9, 14–15, 82, 254–255, 274 confrontation stage╇ 239 topical potential╇ 21, 25, 28, 30, 39, 60–62, 64, 66–67, 72, 114, 145–146, 148, 208–210, 237 constructive-not dialectics╇ 247, 253 consultation╇ 135–139, 142–146, 148–149 cooperative principle╇ 111 co-text╇ 233 counterargument╇ 222–223, 228 credibility╇ 36, 49, 75–76, 78–79, 83, 85, 127, 136, 148 critical discourse analysis╇ 4, 231–232, 234, 238, 240 critical question╇ 23–25, 28–30, 32, 35, 37, 46, 50, 131, 156,
158–159, 188, 192, 194–197, 203 critical rationalism╇ 232 critical theory╇ 231 D deliberation╇ 4, 91, 115, 165–177, 179–180, 231, 256, 259 descriptive dialectic╇ 246 diagnosis╇ 122, 135, 137–138, 142, 148, 196, 277 dialectic╇ 90 dialectical goal╇ 60, 66, 142–143, 146, 149, 208 dialectical quality╇ 79, 179 dialectical system╇ 245–246, 261 dialectical trade-off╇ 166, 173–175 dialogue system╇ 260, 262 differences of opinion╇ 172, 176, 231, 256 direct-to-consumer advertising╇ 153 discursive strategies╇ 233–234 disposition╇ 122, 210 dissociation╇ 3–9, 12, 14–17, 207–208, 212–218 doctor╇ 3, 125, 127–129, 131, 135–149, 154–155, 158–159, 192 doctor-patient communication╇ 137 E editorial cartoon╇ 72 ego-involvement╇ 130–131 electorate╇ 111–112, 114 elocution equivalence conception╇ 274 eristic dialogue╇ 259 ethos╇ 18, 67, 73, 135–136, 139, 141–149 ethotic argument╇ 76
 Index exaggeration╇ 31, 113, 137 enthymeme╇ 108, 111, 115, 140 exemplar╇ 117, 123–125, 128 expert╇ 44, 52, 135–136, 141–142, 211 expert-client exchange╇ 136 expertise╇ 141, 143, 148–149, 153, 190 F fallacy╇ 30, 52, 75, 178, 212, 239, 257–260, 265, 270–278 figure of speech╇ 111 formal dialectical rules╇ 247 formal dialectical system╇ 245–246, 261 formal dialectics╇ 245, 261 formal logic╇ 245 framing╇ 125–126, 128–130, 234, 238 G general practitioner╇ 136, 144 generalization╇ 76 group decision support systems╇ 176 H hasty generalization╇ 75, 80, 83, 190 health communication╇ 119, 121, 125, 153 hyperbole I ideologies╇ 232 implicit dialogue╇ 119 inciting standpoint╇ 119 information and communication technology╇ 167 information-seeking dialogue╇ 259 informed consent╇ 137, 142 initial thesis╇ 254–255 inquiry╇ 259 involvement╇ 81, 118, 130–131, 234 L laboratory of rules╇ 256–257, 260–261 large-scale online deliberation local discussion╇ 254–255
local thesis╇ 254–255 locution rules╇ 248 logical constants╇ 247, 254 logical rules╇ 248, 254 logical support M material dialectical system╇ 246 material moves╇ 246 maxim of quality╇ medical advice╇ 135, 137, 139, 142, 146, 148–149 medical consultation╇ 135–139, 142–145, 148–149 meta-analysis╇ 117, 126 metaphor╇ 39–40, 43, 55, 63, 65–69, 70, 72 metonymy╇ 110, 111, 114, 234 mixed dispute╇ 119, 239 monological╇ 119, 179, 240 multi-agent systems╇ 260 multiple argumentation╇ 96, 120 N narration╇ 75, 234 narrative╇ 75–78, 86 national screening program for breast cancer╇ 118, 123 negation╇ 8–9, 14–15, 250, 261, 267 negotiation dialogue╇ 259 non-refutational╇ normative pragmatics╇ 166, 171–173, 177–178 O one-sided message╇ 227 online discussion forums╇ online fora (see online discussion forums)╇ 166, 174–175 P parliamentary debate╇ 47–48, 54, 115 partes orationis╇ 209–210, 218–219 patient╇ 135–140, 142–149, 156, 160, 192 persuasion dialogue╇ 256, 259 persuasiveness╇ 4, 82, 117, 120, 124, 128–129, 131, 141, 143, 154, 221, 224–227
phoros╇ 40–41, 46–56 polarization╇ polarizing╇ 31, 37, 113, 115 political cartoon╇ 3, 59, 60–68, 72 political discourse╇ 231 political interview╇ 3, 5–7, 9–12, 14, 16–18, 47 pragmatic argumentation╇ 3, 21–26, 28–30, 32, 35–37, 120–123, 131, 145, 155–157, 161, 189, 191–192, 194, 199, 201 predicate transfer╇ 200 predicate-transfer schemes╇ 197–198, 201 presentational device╇ 53, 82, 100 presentational technique╇ 212, 218 principles of communication╇ pro-argumentation╇ 119 profiles of dialogue╇ 259–261 prognosis╇ 135, 137, 142, 148 proponent╇ 36, 253–254, 256, 258, 270 Q question-begging╇ 265, 267, 269–271, 277–278 R reasonableness╇ 2, 30, 103, 171–173, 226–227, 235, 237, 239, 241 referent transfer╇ 198, 200 referent-transfer schemes╇ 198–199, 201 refutation╇ 107, 223, 227, 266 refutational╇ 225–226 rhetoric╇ 208, 210 rhetorical goal╇ 60, 67, 142–143, 146, 148–149, 153, 208 S selection from stylistic devices╇ selection from topical potential╇ sign argumentation╇ 199–202 similarity argumentation╇ 199–201 situational demand╇ 207, 208, 213
socio-political and historical contexts╇ 233–234 stages of critical discussion╇ 210 stakeholder╇ 219 statistical evidence╇ 117, 121, 129 stock issue╇ 21, 23 strategic maneuvering╇ 1, 47, 103, 172, 259 straw man╇ 259 structural rules╇ 248–249 subordinative argumentation╇ 67, 120–121 symptomatic argumentation╇ 42, 63,
Index  120, 186–189, 193–196, 201–202 synecdoche╇ 75, 77, 81, 84, 86–87, 234
types of dialogue╇ 259, 261 typology of argument schemes╇ 186, 190–191, 193, 201
T target audience╇ 119 theme╇ 4, 40–41, 47–48, 50, 53–54, 56 topoi╇ 59, 231 topos╇ 66, 72, 231 treatment╇ 9, 75–76, 126, 137–138, 142, 144–145, 148, 160, 203, 218, 225 trust╇ 31, 36, 91, 127, 136–137, 141, 143, 145–146, 148–149 two-sided message╇ 225–226
U unexpressed premises╇ 235 usenet web-forums (see online discussion forums) V visual argumentation╇ 72 visual metaphor╇ 60, 63, 67 –70 W winning remark╇ 254–255