Korean Nationalism Betrayed

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KOREAN NATIONALISM BETRAYED

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KOREAN NATIONALISM BETRAYED

by

SEO JOONG-SEOK Sungkyunkwan University

Translated by

HAN DO-HYUN & PANKAJ MOHAN Academy of Korean Studies

University of Sydney

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KOREAN NATIONALISM BETRAYED by Seo Joong-Seok Translated by Han Do-Hyun & Pankaj Mohan Original Korean edition published 2004 by Sungkyunkwan University Press, Seoul, Republic of Korea English edition first published 2007 by GLOBAL ORIENTAL LTD PO Box 219 Folkestone Kent CT20 2WP UK www.globaloriental.co.uk © Global Oriental Ltd 2007 ISBN 978-1-905246-48-9 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A CIP catalogue entry for this book is available from the British Library

This book is published with the support of the Korea Literature Translation Institute (KLTI) for the project ‘Books from Korea, 2005’

Set in 8.5/10.5 pt Stone Serif by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Manchester Printed and bound in England by Athenaeum Press, Gateshead, Tyne & Wear

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‘The time will come when a mountain will look truly as a mountain, the sky as the sky, a tree as a tree, a beast as a beast and a human as a human.’ – From a poem by Mun Ik-Hwan

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Contents

Preface to the English Edition Acknowledgements Introduction 1. Historical Understanding in the Era of Unification

xi xiii xv 1

The 15 June Shock – North Korea, a Forbidden Land

1

One More Forbidden Land: South Korea

4

From the History of Common Heritage to the History of Division: Understanding Pre-modern and Modern History in North and South, the Understanding of Ancient and Medieval History in North and South Korea and the Question of Modern and Contemporary History

7

Historical Understanding in the Era of Division

9

Historical Understanding in the Era of Unification

13

Beyond Polarization: the Search for the Middle Course

18

2. National Question and State in Korea: Focusing on the Bourgeois Class and the Ruling Elite

22

The Deficiency of Korea’s Bourgeois Class: Cracks in Nationalism and Modernization

22

National Question and Nationalism in Semi-Colonial and Colonial Era

26

Nation and State in the Period of the American Military Government and the National Division

35

Conclusion

50

3. The System of National Division Why is the System of National Division Problematic?

55 55

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Korean Nationalism Betrayed Factors for the Formation and Consolidation of the System of Divided Korea

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The Basic Elements of the System of the National Division – Theory of the Central Government in North and South Korea

68

Strategies for Overcoming the System of National Division

??

4. Form of Existence and Structural Character of Pro-Japanese Collaborators

89

The Meaning of Japanese Collaborators in Korean History

89

Pro-Japanese Collaborators Prior to the March First Movement

93

Pro-Japanese Collaborators After the March First Movement

98

The Structure of the Reproduction of Pro-Japanese Collaborators after the Liberation

103

5. Right-Wing Nationalism and the National United Front in South Korea in the Post-Liberation Era

107

The Difficulty of the Evaluation of Political Figures in the Immediate Post-liberation Era

107

The Scope of Rightist Nationalism and the Conceptual Problem

108

Changes of Right-Wing Nationalist Parties and Organizations in Various Periods: Focusing on the Response of the National United Front

112

The Path of Right-Wing Nationalism

117

Evaluation of Right-Wing Nationalism

122

6. Rhee Syngman’s Theory of Unification by Northward Advance

129

Major Political Campaigns and Fabrication of Symbolism

129

Rhee Syngman’s Theory of Unification through Northward Advance before the Outbreak of the Korean War

131

The Development of Die-Hard Anti-Communist Unification through the Northward Advance Movement

137

Structure and Character of the Theory of Unification through Northward Advance

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Die-Hard Anti-Communist Unification through Northward Advance and National Autonomy

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Contents

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Anti-Communism and Ultra-Rightist Dictators

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Conclusion: Unification Movement for Blocking Unification Movement

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7. Structural Crisis in North and South Korea and the Path of Korean Nationalism

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The Impending General Crisis in North and South Korea

192

The Regime of National Division, Lack of National Consciousness and Morality

194

Establishing Self-identity and Searching for a New National Community

201

Concluding Remarks

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APPENDIX. The Teaching of Contemporary Korean History for National Unity

213

Importance of the Teaching of Contemporary Korean History

213

Education on Modern Korean History in North and South Korea

216

Teaching of Contemporary Korean History for Unification: Unification Debate and Unification Movement for Dismantling the System of National Division

220

Teaching of Contemporary Korean History for National Unity: Towards Reconciliation and Understanding and Search for Common Ground

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Overcoming Historical Amnesia

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Index

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Author’s Preface to the English Edition

T

he publication of Korean Nationalism Betrayed is at once a great honour and a source of some concern and apprehension. I am concerned because the book seeks to accomplish the daunting task of helping Western readers navigate their way through the uncharted terrain of contemporary Korean history. Korea first came to the attention of the outside world because of the Korean War (1950-53), while in subsequent years such events as Korea’s economic growth, the despatch of Korean troops to Vietnam, the 1988 Seoul Olympics, and more recently the 2002 World Cup that was co-hosted by Korea and Japan, generated considerable interest in the country by the West. This growing Western interest in Korea, however, has not been matched by the publication of authoritative works on Korean history and culture in English – and works on contemporary Korean history in English are even more difficult to find. In the post-liberation era, Korea was saddled with the repressive regimes of Syngman Rhee (1948-1960) and his successors, Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo-hwan who seized power through military coups. The period was also marked by intensely bitter conflict in inter-Korea relations and the brutal suppression of the popular aspiration for democratic politics. It was not until June 1987, when the nation was engulfed by a powerful wave of protest against the authoritarian political structure, that the military junta yielded to the popular demand for a transparent political process. Needless to say, it was impossible for historians to study the contemporary history of Korea in the overpoweringly repressive political climate of the first four decades of the post-liberation era, and indeed, it was only after June 1987 that a group of young historians began to examine issues in contemporary Korean history with rigour and earnestness. My concern in presenting this book to Western readers stems from the fact that contemporary Korean history is still in its infancy – even in Korea. I hope, nonetheless, that this book provides Western readers with an insight into the national question in contemporary Korea, the subject which its various chapters deal with. After the onset of the modern era, the term ‘nation’ gained wide currency in Korea. Korean people used the term to articulate their resistance to the invasion of imperialist Japan, to forge a collective national identity and to preserve their national honour and self-esteem. The term became popular

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amongst the Korean people because of other reasons also. Compared to other ethnic groups, Koreans had lived within a stable territory for over a millennium and had developed a unified and centralized political structure. However, in the post-colonial period, Korea was caught in the vortex of Cold War antagonism between the US and the Soviet Union and was arbitrarily divided by these two powers. Soon thereafter, the Korean War broke out. And despite the fervent aspiration of the Korean people for national reunification, the US transformed South Korea into its frontline base, and its authoritarian rulers, Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee, pledged unswerving loyalty to the US. They consolidated the anti-communist political structure of the country and helped the US confront communism across Asia. Under the brutally repressive Yusin political structure, the campaign of anti-communist indoctrination became particularly intense. The Korean people became infected with the virus of rabid anti-communism, although they remained steadfast in their adherence to the nation and national reunification. In recent years, a debate has developed between scholars who identify nationalism with statism on the one hand, and those who insist on a clear distinction between nationalism and statism. In this book, I have made a clear and articulate distinction between nationalism and (anti-communist) statism, and have sought to explain the process of evolution and the variable nature of the phenomenon from the perspective of an historian. On the sixtieth anniversary of national liberation, South Korea established its position as one of the leading industrialized nations of the world, a nation which was also soundly equipped with a democratic political structure. Ushering in the new millennium, the South Korean government also took the laudable step of setting up a Truth Commission to conduct an investigation into the massacre of civilians during the time of the Korean War. These new developments have further stimulated and enriched the study of contemporary Korean history. I am grateful to Professor Do-Hyun Han and Dr Pankaj Mohan for undertaking the translation of this difficult text. Dr Mohan is one of my former classmates at the graduate school of Seoul National University in the 1980s. I also wish to express my sincere thanks to the Korean Literature Translation Institute for sponsoring this work of translation. Joong-Seok Seo Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul 26 August 2007

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Acknowledgements

W

e would like to express our sincere gratitude to the Korea Literature Research Foundation for sponsoring the translation of this important and insightful book on nationalism in contemporary Korea and to Global Oriental Limited for agreeing to publish it. In the course of preparing the final manuscript we incurred the debt of Darrell Dorrington and Daniel Creech who proof-read our translation with meticulous care. Daniel Creech also helped the project by producing a rough draft of approximately twenty pages of translation from the fifth chapter of this book as part of his honours work in Korean studies. Han Do-Hyun & Pankaj Mohan Spring 2007

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Introduction

I

loved such words as fatherland, patriotism, compatriots and nation. I was full of respect for those who made sacrifices for the liberation of their motherland. I was really fond of Kwon Jeongsaeng, in whose children’s tales I could feel and experience warm, neighbourly love for the sick and the poor, the lowly and the lost. I liked the characters Pierre Bezukhov and Andrew Bolkonski in Leo Tolstoy’s (1828–1910) War and Peace. I was also fond of the highly patriotic character of the novel La Chartreuse de Parme (1839) by Stendhal (1783–1842). I did not, however, like the state of Rhee Syngman or that of Park Chung Hee. I felt nothing but shame and humiliation. But there was also a time when I felt stirred and restless, just like the young boy in Stendhal’s La Chartreuse de Parme. This was in March-April 1960 when I was a primary school student in the fifth or the sixth grade. Later, in June 1987 when the democracy movement broke out, I felt really proud. I thought of those who braved untold ordeals in foreign lands, fighting for the liberation of their motherland. And I also imagined how they might have felt when they returned home after liberation either in South or North Korea just to find themselves under constant surveillance and even subject to imprisonment. Harsh indeed was the destiny of nationalist heroes in post-liberation Korea. Neutral nationalists or those who advocated negotiation between North and South Korea were such national heroes who died unsung and unlamented. During Japanese colonial rule, their nation lived in their hearts, but it is indeed ironic that after independence there was no nation to which they could offer their hearts. They grieved at the ‘patriotism’ or the rhetoric of ‘nation’, on which Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee harped. Even in their death they would have become restless souls roaming the wilderness. In my lectures I often say that the power structures of North and South Korea are unparalleled in the world. I also often think about the question as to why such polarized political structure originated and survived in South and North Korea. Both South and North Korea share the same tradition of a homogeneous nation, and yet it is also woefully true that the Korean peninsula remains the last bastion of Cold War consciousness. The two rival regimes continue to harbour unrelenting hostility towards each other and are bent on destroying the other. ‘National character’ may be partly responsible for this rare phenomenon, but national character per se does not fully explain the reality. Moreover, the Korean nation is not so pitiful that the ‘national

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character’ would make the two regimes forsake other options in favour of the path of unrelenting antagonism. This book embodies my thoughts on these issues, and seeks to deal with such questions as the structure and salient features, and the historical process of the origin and development of ultra-right anti-communism. It is basically a collection of my articles on this theme that I published in the recent past. However, I needed to revise some of them in the light of recent developments.

I often ponder over the question why I do not fall into the category of trendy or mainstream thinkers. In the late 1980s or early 1990s when revolutionary theories were in vogue, I sided with neutralist historians and emphasized the theory of left-right cooperation, but to no avail. When I discussed the value of liberal democracy in the context of the Democracy Movement of June 1987, I was accused of showing my ‘true colours’, as if I had worn the cloak of socialism in the past just for the sake of convenience. When Eastern Europe collapsed and I felt that it was appropriate to discuss socialism, I was criticized for ‘blowing with the wind’. But soon thereafter, socialism became so stale that hardly any scholar was willing to talk about the role of socialism in Korea’s liberation movement. Indeed, I was amazed at the supersonic speed with which Korean society changes. So in the changed circumstances I was once again labelled a radical and was cut off from the mainstream ideology of society. At that time, the word ‘globalization’ was on everyone’s lips and ‘post-modernism’ also became quite popular. It is true of the term ‘nationalism’, which I mainly discuss in this book. In the late 1990s, these scholars became critics of nationalism, but their criticism was indeed targeted at the phantom of nationalism because their definition of nationalism was amorphous and vague. I invariably thought they went too far. From this trend, I came to the view that history has repeated itself. Thus, it seemed that I was behind the times. However, I still think that the mainstream scholars follow the new theories without enough selfreflection and critical appraisal. When I give lectures, I ask those present to explain the meaning of liberal democracy, but I seldom find anyone who can explain it well. Nowadays, many people write about nationalism as if the term nationalism could be defined in any manner one pleases. Is it possible to conduct any academic research without a clear definition even though the term could be applied in a variety of contexts? Although criticism against nationalism has appeared a lot like dam water, I have never met any of them who have made a serious study of the ultra-rightist anti-communist regime. What is worse, it seems to me that some of them have no real grasp of contemporary Korean history. It is simply unacceptable that they should dress up their unsystematic conceptions, emotional judgement, superficial knowledge and disjointed pieces of information with academic references and language. In this book, I emphasize that the ultra-rightist forces in South Korea are not nationalists, but can be defined as toadies dependent on foreign power and that nationalism has not been able to exist as a force or social trend since the

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Introduction

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Korean War. It is well known that the pro-Japanese collaborators had significent influence on almost every aspect of life, including politics and academia. It is not an overstatement to say that the National Security Law has basically controlled nationalistic thinking. Even though, up to the 1980s, most people in Korea wanted national unification it has been difficult to discuss national unification except during the period of the April Revolution. It goes without saying that it has been almost impossible to establish a unification movement. Most progressive people, including progressive intellectuals, youth and students, who emphasized national unification and independence, were imprisoned or kept under police surveillance after the Military Coup. Up to the 1970s, South Korea seemed to be full of praise for American power when it was not easy to find the spirit of independence. America in Korea was considered a forbidden sanctuary where criticism was not tolerated. It is clear that Korean nationalism was oppressed in Korea from the fact that it was considered a taboo to teach and study the contemporary history of Korea. Originally, I thought it would be a good idea to give the title of Naked Anti-Communism to this book. I wanted to clearly reveal the face of the ultrarightist anti-communist which has dominated South Korea for almost a half century. This work is also concerned with defining the relationship between anti-communism and pro-Japanese collaborators. As is well expressed in the case of the anti-national and pro-Japanese collaboration law and the related events, anti-communism is a counter ideology of pro-Japanese collaborators against nationalism. Without the existence of pro-Japanese collaborators, it would be impossible to understand the fact that such an extreme anticommunism was imposed upon the Korean people. Although in other countries statism is one (extreme or violent) face of nationalism like fascism, statism in South Korea is in conflict or confronted with nationalism but has affinity with the ideology of the Cold War. Some people may say that anticommunist statism could be defined as anti-communist nationalism, and that there could be some kind of nationalism emerging from the soup of proJapanese collaborators, Rhee Syngman’s nationalism, Park Chung Hee’s nationalism and even anti-national nationalism. However, do each of them have to insist on their own specific definitions of nationalism? I treasure greatly the spirit or attitude of reconciliation and cooperation. In Chapter 5: ‘Right Wing Nationalism and the National United Front in South Korea in the Post-Liberation Era’, I discuss the possibility that cooperation between right and left may enable Koreans to be flexible, engender the spirit of collaboration and which in turn would encourage an open and fair approach to co-existence and mutual living which Koreans are so often accused of lacking. This topic is repeatedly emphasized in this book including Chapter 1: ‘Historical Understanding in the Era of Unification’. In contemporary Korean history, expectation and disillusionment have often been experienced. In the meantime, Korean society has changed a lot since the democratization movements took root in the 1980s. Thus we have seen reform and democratization under the governments of Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun, all of which could be seen to react against the earlier ultra-rightist anti-communist regime attempting to change

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Korean history into the direction of the right. This conversion and change of direction is very difficult to achieve; this given the thirty-five years of unprecedented Japanese policies of assimilation and the making of royal (imperial) subjects, as well as twelve years of Rhee Syngman, eighteen years of Park Chung Hee, eight years of Chun Doo Hwan and the new military regime. The period is so long and so extremely ultra-rightist fascist that inevitably, its negative impact is enormous. However, as young people in their twenties and thirties of whom more than 60% wanted to leave Korea after the financial crisis shouted ‘Oh, matchless Korea’, there were somewhat different sides of the history, which makes redressing the imbalances of history more difficult. For the time being, false accusations by ultra-rightist forces and zigzags as far as reform and democratization are concerned will continue. In this book, most criticism is directed against the rulers of the ultrarightist anti-communist regimes. I criticize South Korea more than North Korea: The contemporary history of South Korea is not the author’s area of specialization. However, I do so because of my belief that the most urgent thing is to change South Korea into a humanitarian society and following the change of South Korean society we have to initiate the change of North Korea. How can I explain the chaotic state of South Korea and change South Korea if we cannot analyse and criticize the power and ideology of ultrarightist anti-communism? In contemporary Korea, there are many serious issues: nation, national consciousness, the national division, anti-communism, statism, ultra-rightism, the Cold War, pro-Japanese people and ideology. So I began with an easier topic in Chapter 1. Since Chapters 2 and 3 are more complex, the reader may choose the easier chapters first such as Chapter 6: ‘Rhee Syngman’s Theory of Unification by Northward Advance’. Although I tried to avoid repetition in editing the chapters, there is still some, for which I ask the reader’s forbearance. I would like thank the Sungkyunkwan University Press for publishing this book after publishing my earlier work, Contemporary Leaders of a Tragedy. I am most grateful to the editor, Deulpul (wild grass), who carefully read the draft and sent me his comments. February 2003 Seo Joong-Seok

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Historical Understanding in the Era of Unification

THE 15 JUNE SHOCK – NORTH KOREA, A FORBIDDEN LAND

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he inter-Korea summit meeting, held on 15 June 2000, was a moving experience for Korean people all over the world. This event also proved to be a huge shock to the people of South Korea. The appearance of Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the National Defence Commission and the streets of Pyongyang provided a sharp contrast to the image that the people in South Korea had formed of the North through decades of anti-communist education. Chairman Kim Jong Il appeared to be an ordinary person. To the majority of people in South Korea this was an extremely surprising and also shocking phenomenon. The monocratic political structure which had been built around the ‘Great Leader’ and such related rhetoric as ‘Honourable General’, are doubtless hard to accept, but the warm hospitality, remarkable wit and the range and richness of the discussion dispelled many deep-seated prejudices in the minds of the South Korean people about Chairman Kim Jong Il. During the summit, he projected himself as a deserving head of state, comparable to any of his counterparts in the world community. The follow-up measures to the June summit were also landmark events. The moving human drama of the reunion of separated families touched the deep recesses of people’s hearts. The ground-breaking ceremony for the reconnection of the Seoul-Sinuiju railway line also represented a moment of monumental historical significance. Interestingly, however, the president of South Korea’s main opposition party, generally acknowledged at the time as the most formidable contender in the next presidential election, was conspicuous by his absence on this occasion. When the inter-Korean dialogue started gaining momentum and mutual relations began improving at an amazingly rapid pace, voices of resentment in South Korea became increasingly loud and assertive. People from different strata of Korean society joined the chorus of complaint. Some said that the speed with which reconciliation was being attempted was too fast and counselled moderation. Some noted that the huge amount of money being

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siphoned to North Korea would deal a shattering blow to the South Korean economy. Yi Cheol-seung, an ultra-rightist student politician at the time of liberation and leader of the opposition party during the Yushin order, observed that Kim Dae-joong’s edifice of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation was being built on the graveyard of national security. He further noted that the inter-Korean relations at the time tilted so decisively in favour of North Korea that he was reminded of the Korean War when North Korea drove South Korea into a corner, with its troops chased as far south as the Nakdong river.1 This eloquently illustrates the sense of frustration and discomfort that the ultra-rightists felt at the summit. One wonders how people like Yi Cheol-seung (Yi Chol-sung) or the advocates of the ‘go-slow’ theory felt when the US Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, visited Pyongyang or when she announced in a joint communiqué that President Clinton might visit North Korea to ‘decorate’ the tail-end of his eight-year tenure at the White House. Some critics doubtless raised valid points. It was noted that President Kim was neglecting domestic politics and paying too much attention to interKorean relations. Some observed that President Kim was attempting to deflect public attention from the mess of internal politics by strategizing North Korean policies. It was also pointed out that the neglect of the national economy was a fatal error, because of the simple reason that if the South Korean economy was in shambles, the structure of inter-Korean relations, built at a huge cost, would fall like a house of cards. Furthermore, in the light of the fact that the formidable forces from the various strata of Korean society that had wielded privilege and power for half a century had made Kim DaeJoong’s North Korea policy a target of scorn and apprehension, it was imperative that inter-Korean relations be transparent. The criticism that South Korea’s reconciliation policies towards North Korea are often unplanned and unsystematic has some merit. While pursuing policies of reconciliation towards its northern counterpart, South Korea made efforts to appease and curry favour with the rightist forces in Japan. This attitude towards Japan was not based on mutual benefit, nor did it uphold national autonomy. It was also pointed out that policies in relation to inter-Korean relations lacked planning, and were frequently volatile and subject to fluctuations. Furthermore, a bold neo-liberal agenda encompassing not only the economy but such other areas as culture and education was in contradiction to the spirit and objective of reconciliation which the policy had set out to achieve. The advocates of the ‘go-slow’ theory or the so-called ‘moderationists’, however, criticized the 15 June summit for different reasons. Looking at it, as they did, from an ‘internalized’ Cold War perspective, they felt a sense of alarm and apprehension. They naturally found fault with the smooth process of inter-Korean relations, which the summit represented, and tried their best to sabotage and derail the whole process of dialogue. With the benefit of hindsight, one feels constrained to observe with a sense of shock and disbelief that prior to 15 June 2000 South and North had never held any summit meeting. It is also most deplorable that the reunion of dispersed families took place only once before in the history of divided

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Korea. The fact that all the routes between North and South Korea remained severed for over half a century and that the restoration of rail links became possible only after the 15 June summit is more a matter of shame than joy. The advocates of the ‘go-slow’ theory failed to realize that the credit for rapid changes in inter-Korean relations and North Korea’s relations with the United States goes primarily to the bold initiatives of Kim Jong Il. These developments cannot be attributed to President Kim Dae-Joong’s ‘overspeed’. After the 15 June summit, popular demands for revamping the content of education about North Korea became increasingly strident. It was pointed out that people in South Korea were shocked at the June summit, because they were fed with incorrect information about North Korea. The media was correct to point out that the existing anti-communist education constituted a grave error. For instance, under the Yushin regime order, the teachers’ guide book for the anti-communism curriculum in primary, secondary and high schools contained the following information under the heading ‘Unification Policy of the Puppet North Korean Regime’: The Puppet North harbours the heretical, anti-national objective of communization (or absorption by force) and has obliterated national consciousness – it has relentlessly pursued the policy of negating national consciousness, negating and distorting Korea’s traditions and history, and destroying the native pattern of living and the intrinsic sentiments of the lives of the Korean people.2 Obviously, the authors did not write this out of atrocious ignorance of the cultural policies of North Korea. Let us take one more example. If one compiles a list of some of the wonders of the twentieth century in Korea, the South Korean theory of ‘fake Kim Il-Sung’ has to be at the top. In the latter half of the twentieth century, an era marked by intense Cold War antagonism, South Korean people were administered the mandatory dose of anticommunism. And bizarre as it may sound, the highlight of anti-communist education was the theory that the North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung was just a fake who had usurped the name and reputation of the real Kim Il-Sung. The theory itself constituted one of the great ‘wonders’, but greater wonder still was the fact that until the 1980s almost all South Koreans were so naïve and gullible as to accept this theory as an historical orthodoxy. It is also remarkable that Korean schools sought to project Kim Il Sung as Mr Evil, a bloodsucking monster with horns on his head. People in the South, nourished on an anti-communist education, believed that North Korea was not a land of compatriots but an eerie land with strange inhabitants. Soon after the 15 June summit a Korean teacher penned his thoughts as follows: As a teacher of long standing, I have numerous regrets and remorse, but the one that stands out amongst them is my participation in anti-communist teaching. My consciousness was nurtured on the teaching that the North Korean puppet was a monster. On bulletin boards in the school corridor I saw North Koreans portrayed as demons, as red

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Korean Nationalism Betrayed commies with the claws of a wild beast. In my music class I sang at the top of my voice the song ‘I will attack and rip apart the last of my enemies’. I taught Morality as an optional course for students, basing my lessons on the teacher’s guidebook, underpinned with uncompromising anti-communism – the national policy at the time. Those were the days when I faithfully carried out the propaganda and silently watched the mutilation and distortion of historical reality . . .3

Two points constituted the linchpin of the Yushin propaganda (against North Korea) – first, North Korea as a belligerent war-monger, always looking for an opportunity to invade South Korea, and second, the dynastic succession of Kim Jong Il. In elaborating the latter point, an attempt was made to distinguish Kim Jong Il’s succession from that of Chiang Ching-Kuo (Jiang Jingguo) in Taiwan and portray the power base of Kim as an aberration. The people of South Korea, therefore, knew Kim Jong Il only as a movie buff and sex maniac, lacking even basic skills in leadership. They believed that he assumed power only through dynastic succession, and that such an anomaly could occur only in the rogue state, the kingdom of evil, that is North Korea. But strangely enough, the press image of Kim Jong Il on 15 June and the following day contradicted all that the people had been taught about him. He looked like a real leader on the TV screen. People could also see that, quite unlike their own country, Pyongyang had preserved its traditional heritage and innate cultural aura. They also saw that the people of Pyongyang looked just like them in appearance. Extremely unicellular and standardized information about North Korea, grounded in falsehood and distortion, rendered the citizens of South Korea completely incapable of even making informed criticism about the country. They could just watch the TV screen in a state of shock and disbelief. In their naivety, South Korean people could not catch both sides of Kim Jong Il or North Korea. They just saw Kim Jong Il on the screen and did not see the other side of Kim Jong Il who played a key role theoretically and practically in building ‘the country of Juche’ or ‘the monocratic system’. Similarly, they could not relate the clean and beautiful streets of Pyongyang to its seamy side of the suffering humanity – the impoverished and chronically malnourished masses. But when they watched the television, they felt confused, as the images beamed by media spotlight clashed with their one-dimensional, homogenized views of North Korea. It was apparent that they found it difficult to form a clear perspective on the complexity of the situation. The people were just excited, too excited indeed to realize that the country needed both reconciliation and caution but not criticism. ONE MORE FORBIDDEN LAND: SOUTH KOREA The people of South Korea are woefully ignorant about North Korea, but they have an equally distorted and false understanding of their own country. One may cite the Park Chung Hee syndrome which surfaced in the wake of the IMF bail-out (or Asian Financial Crisis of 1997) to illustrate this point. Park

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Chung Hee has parallels in Franco of Spain and Chiang Kai-Shek of Taiwan. These two leaders share the notoriety of Park in terms of the fascist nature of their regimes, but there are areas of sharp contrast also. Park Chung Hee crated chaebol as the engine of economic growth, while Franco and Chiang focused on small and medium-sized enterprises. They were also not as dependent on foreign powers as Park Chung Hee, although Taiwan was arguably more self-reliant than Spain. There were marked differences also in terms of close collaboration between politics and the national economy. Unlike Park, Franco kept these two spheres apart, and even Chiang departed from his earlier practices after moving to Taiwan, and sought to keep these two areas separate. Park was indisputably the most corrupt politician of the trio. If we scrutinize their personal morality, we are also struck by the image of sharp contrast. The personal life of Chiang was decidedly less austere and more blemished than that of Franco, but after he moved to Taiwan he was generally free from scandals. And yet, unlike South Korea, Spain and Taiwan dumped these leaders into the dustbin of history, and their legacy of authoritarianism survives only as a nightmare in the political history of their respective countries. They are reminders of a past which future generations must be spared at any cost. The Park Chung Hee syndrome, as a reflection of the historical consciousness of the Korean people, is both shameful and frightening. The fact that not only the privileged class but the other strata of Korean society also identify themselves with this syndrome suggests that in addition to regional passion, the nation needs to deal with and set aright the past in relation to the Yushin regime and the new military regimes of Park’s successors [Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo – the translator]. The financial crisis is itself a by-product of the Park Chung Hee administration, but it is one of the ironies of history that the crisis generated the Park Chung Hee syndrome. One may explain this syndrome by citing two facts. First, Korean people are sympathetic, not hostile, towards strong, fascist government and the supreme guiding principle of modernization. And second, Korean people are either ignorant or have warped notions about Park Chung Hee’s rule. It was basically the National Security Law (NSL) that formed North and South Korea into forbidden lands. The NSL applied to those who spoke the truth about North Korea and possessed materials about North Korea, even pictures of Mt Geumgang and the streets of Pyongyang. In short, this draconian law permitted only negative propaganda about North Korea that suited the interests of an ultra-right anti-communist system. One was not permitted to know about North Korea or to teach or transmit any information about North Korea. This was equally true with regard to South Korea. The far-reaching arm of this dreaded law extended to anyone who was in possession of materials about the period of liberation and its aftermath, read critical and progressive books, watched movies with a content of revolution and struggle, or sang songs that expressed one’s aspiration for freedom or liberation. Under this dreaded law one was liable to imprisonment on a charge of criticizing not only the United States but also the ultra-right anti-communist dictators. Until the 1980s, it was dangerous to call those who betrayed their

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country during the colonial rule ‘pro-Japanese collaborators’. It was also problematic under the provisions of the law to know the reality of the first three years of Korean history after liberation, 1945–48, or to examine the history of South Korea after liberation. People were allowed to know nothing except the things that the ultra-right anti-communist ruling elite wanted them to know. In August 2000, when the reunion of separated families took place, there were people with family ties in North Korea who did not know whether their parents were alive or dead. For decades people in South Korea did not make any enquiries about the whereabouts or ascertain the well-being of their relatives in the North because they were afraid of reprisals which the revelation of their North Korean connections might have brought. Some people concealed the fact of their separated relatives even to their own offspring. It is remarkable that in 1988, when a journalist of the monthly magazine ‘Mal’ (Speech), the first one to report the National Guidance League (Bodo yonmaengwon ) massacre, asked people whether they had heard of the incident, as much as eighty percent of his interviewees knew nothing of it. There were also very few people who knew the Chinese character for the words ‘Podo yeonmaengwon’.4 Indeed, there was one interviewee whose father was executed on a charge of involvement in the National Guidance League, and yet he only came to know about the exact circumstances of his father’s death when he read a related report in 1989 in the Hankyoreh newspaper.5 A series of genocides took place in South Korea during the Korean War, first in Jeju (Cheju) and subsequently in Sancheong, Geochang, Hampyeong and Namwon, and although there were many who witnessed the massacres and knew the relevant facts, they did not dare open their mouths. They were mortally afraid to utter a word of criticism against the anti-communist dictators who ruled their country with an iron fist in the post-liberation era. There are indeed few races in the world, as fervid in their desire for unification as Koreans. Nonetheless, the Korean government, except for the brief period of the April 1960 Revolution, brutally crushed all campaigns for unification until 1988. The Park era was particularly brutal in its repression of the popular aspiration for unification. People were not allowed to even utter the word ‘unification’. Jo Bong-Am (Cho Pong-am) and the Progressive Party proposed the principle of peaceful unification, but the Progressive party was soon dissolved and Jo Bong-Am was sent to the gallows by the Rhee Syngman regime. Even in the 1960s, prior to the promulgation of the Yushin order, Seo Min-Ho (So Min-ho), a member of the National Assembly, and Yi Young-hui, a journalist, were imprisoned for either advocating inter-Korean exchange or writing a report which was judged by the authorities to be potentially obstructive to the maintenance of adversarial relations between the two Koreas. These individuals committed the crime of easing conflict and tension in inter-Korea relations and upholding the principle of nationalism. Anticommunism was, after all, the national agenda. All nations that were once subject to colonial rule emphasize the study of modern and contemporary history. North Korea realized the significance of modern and contemporary history,6 but South Korea, on the contrary,

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framed a curriculum that ignored this field. In South Korea, knowledge was a disease and ‘ignorance was the medicine’. It was a bizarre society in which intellectuals did not consider ignorance about modern and contemporary history as odd. This was equally true amongst those engaged in the study of the social sciences whose epistemological structure is predicated on the core discipline of modern and contemporary history. Even progressive scholars were little different. It is clear that under these circumstances there was no substance or specificity in either the historical understanding of the era of division or the historical understanding of the era of unification. The fact that South Korea forbade even a casual allusion to the term ‘historical understanding’ illustrates this grim reality. FROM THE HISTORY OF A COMMON HERITAGE TO THE HISTORY OF DIVISION: UNDERSTANDING PRE-MODERN HISTORY AND MODERN HISTORY IN NORTH AND SOUTH In the opening paragraph of his book Joseon Minjokeui Jillo (The Road for the Korean Nation) the Marxist historian Baek Nam-Un (Paek Nam-un) asserted that very few nations in the world were as homogeneous as Korea. Korean people share the same cultural tradition, language, historical bloodline and common political organization. Indeed, both North and South Korea consider the ancient and medieval history of their country as shared legacies. Such a shared historical legacy, rare in world history, is further reinforced by the memory of developing a homogeneous nation for over a millennium. This process of building a homogenous racial community can be traced to the Goryeo (Koryo) period when the territory became stable and ‘centralized monarchical state’ defined the political system. Because of this common historical experience, no particular kingdom from the past was canonized as the source of the dynastic lineage. Newly established dynasties doubtless emphasized particular kingdoms from the past for winning political legitimacy, but it was not the same as the contemporary concerns of North Korea, which claims to be a successor of Go Joseon (Ko Choson), Goguryeo (Koguryo) and Barhae (Parhae), and South Korea, which professes to have inherited the mantle of Samhan (the three Han tribal leagues), Baekje (Paekche) and Silla (Shilla). Historians of North and South Korea do not share the same historiographical approaches, and for that matter, historians of South Korea are not uniform in their perspectives. The historians of South and North Korea are, however, unanimous that Korean history before 1945 is not the history of either North or South Korea but the history of all the people across the 38th parallel. It is also remarkable that historians of both North and South Korea can sit down together at a table and engage in a constructive debate on the history of Korea up to the 1919 March First Movement. One can cite several instances of even mutual admiration of the ideas and arguments. This point is equally applicable to prehistory and ancient history, the fields in which the historians of North and South Korea are noted for formulating their dialectic and dichotomous ‘orthodoxies’. 7

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After the 1970s, North Korea paid immense attention to ancient history, particularly the study of the paleolithic age. North Korean scholars trace modern Koreans directly to the ‘Primitive Koreans’ who are believed to have originated during the primitive human stage of the paleolithic age, and assumed shape in the late paleolithic period through a natural process of evolution and development. This theory is in sharp conflict with the one held by South Korean scholars, which views Tunguistic tribes as the matrix of the Korean race and suggests that the Korean race was formed in the bronze age with a wave of migration of people belonging to Tunguistic stock. Some South Korean scholars have openly acknowledged the strength and sophistication of North Korean scholarship in this field.8 It is interesting to note that in the future academic exchanges between scholars of the divided halves, archaeology will assume greater significance than any other discipline. Archaeologists from both North and South Korea are waiting eagerly for the day when they will be able to examine and study the materials found by their counterparts. This is because the field of archaeology has less possibility of being tainted with ideological interference than even the history of the Three Kingdoms or the history of Barhae.9 The tomb of Dangun, which was ‘excavated’ by North Koreans, is of course an exception. Studies in the history of Go Joseon illustrate how divergent the historical understanding and approaches of North and South Korean scholars are.10 Nonetheless, the North Korean position on the beginning of Go Joseon, solidly supported by archaeological research, is apparently far more compelling and convincing, as has been noted by some scholars, than that of South Korean historians.11 Furthermore, it is a common knowledge amongst historians that Kim Seok-Hyeong (Kim Sok-hyong, 1915–96) challenged the accepted wisdom, enlivened the historical debate about Korea-Japan relations and defined a new frontier of inquiry in the field. This is not to suggest, however, that his proposition of ‘Samhan states colonies or branch-states on the Japanese archipelago’ is not problematic.12 The research of another distinguished North Korean scholar, Pak Si-Hyeong (Pak Si-Hyong, 1910–2001) on the history of Barhae is also worthy of note. South Korean scholars do not always agree with his findings, but he is universally acclaimed by them for his pioneering works on Barhae, commencing with his paper ‘For research on Barhae’, published in the journal Ryeoksa gwahak (Historical Science) in 1962.13 It is obvious that in pre-modern history, and even in the fields of prehistory and ancient history, characterized by wide divergence of theoretical positions, scholars of the two Koreas can sit comfortably across the table to engage in a serious academic discussion. However, in the period after the March First Movement, any meaningful dialogue becomes difficult because of vast differences in historical understanding. Even scholars in South Korea are sharply divided over such issues as the national liberation movement or the independence movement, socialism, the first three years after liberation (1945–48), the history of South Korea and the history of North Korea. It is difficult to bridge the difference of opinion because many scholars write with a specific ideological agenda or take untenable positions in complete

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disregard of the historical truth. One finds this tendency widespread amongst the conservative scholars of South Korea and the scholars of North Korea. It does not imply that it is easy to find aspects of commonality and convergence between the progressive scholars of South Korea and the North Korean historians. According to North Korean historiography, ‘the Korean people inaugurated a new history of Korea when their great beloved leader Kim Il Sung trod the path of revolution and became the helmsman of the Korean revolution’.14 After the monocratic political structure (centred on Kim Il-Sung) was established, the historical narrative of modern and contemporary Korea became unitary and conclusively homogenized. The glaring disparity in the historical understanding of North and South Korea is evident in the fact that the history curriculum of South Korean middle and high schools excludes the history of North Korea, and only ideological education about North Korea is offered, primarily in books on morality and ethics. As for North Korea, its publications such as Joseon Jeonsa (A Comprehensive History of Korea) provide extremely fragmentary and selective information about the history of South Korea after the Liberation. It is apparent that the understanding of contemporary history in North and South Korea has hardly any grounds for commonality or convergence. Nonetheless, for the normalization of inter-Korea relations it is essential that differences in historical understanding are narrowed. This is doubtless a Herculean task, but also a necessary one. In order to achieve this objective it is important that we form a clear perspective of the historical understanding in the era of division. HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING IN THE ERA OF DIVISION The most representative example of the historical understanding in the era of division is the legitimacy theory. Both governments maintain that they are the sole legitimate government of the entire Korean nation. They describe their rival as a puppet regime or a clique of puppets. In describing the other as a clique of puppets – an act in which South Korea has engaged with greater brazenness – both regimes stake their claims of sovereignty over the territory of the other. The word ‘invasion’ is also deeply imprinted on the historical understanding in the era of division. If we probe deeper into the logic underpinning the appellation of ‘puppet regime’, it becomes clear that the two regimes do not consider the conquest or occupation of the rival territory through war as an invasion. But such an argument, put forward by the two competing regimes, is not based on concrete evidence. The claim that the Rhee Syngman regime was the sole government of the entire Korean peninsula was based largely on two pieces of evidence. The first was the United Nations resolution. Rhee Syngman said in the National Assembly in 1954, a year after the armistice was signed, that as part of the unification policy, holding an election in North Korea, where the UN commission did not gain access and could not hold an election under its supervision (in 1948), was the national mission of the Republic of Korea and was in conformity with several United Nations resolutions. At the same time, he

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said that holding elections in both Koreas contradicted the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations and impinged on the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea.15 However, if we look carefully at the relevant records we find that the UN General Assembly, in its resolution of 12 December 1948, stated that ‘This was the only such government in Korea’, meaning that it was the only ‘lawful government having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea’ ‘. . . where the Temporary Commission was able to hold an election under its supervision’. Moreover, the United Nations passed resolutions to hold elections over the entire Korean peninsula, and never did any of its declarations indicate that this election would be held only in North Korea.16 The constitution of the Republic of Korea was further evidence adduced to substantiate the claim. The fourth clause of the constitution stated that ‘the territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands’. However, this clause is merely a reflection of the general precept and principle that Korea should have only one nationstate because of its long historical experience of developing as a homogeneous nation. If this had not been the case, independent members of the National Assembly would have vehemently opposed it for the same reason they opposed the National Security Law. And as strange as it may sound, until its amendment in 1972, the North Korean constitution contained clause 103 to the effect that the capital of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was Seoul. Apparently, this, too, articulated the common understanding that there should be only one government on the Korean peninsula. Be that as it may, the government interpreted this clause to suit its own narrow interests. It relied on the United Nations resolution in order to gain political support for its agenda, and legally it invoked the constitution, having identified the National Security Law with it. These were the two political and legal pillars on which the government sought to substantiate its claim of legitimacy and sustain its status as a representative government. Kim Ku did not recognize Rhee Syngman’s claim of direct ideological continuity between the 10 May election and the Provisional Government, formed after the March First Movement.17 Rhee could have derived political legitimacy by punishing the pro-Japanese collaborators who committed antinational activities. His failure to do so violated the spirit of the March First Movement and the Provisional Government. Furthermore, Rhee Syngman’s theory of ‘Unification by Northward Advance’ or Park Chung Hee’s ‘construction-first theory’ suppressed and crushed the unification movement and dealt a mortal blow to the interKorean dialogue and exchanges. At the same time, these regimes stoked the flame of tension in a deliberate bid to create the so-called ‘structure of division’. They obviously maintained their grip on power by consolidating national division. These realities are in sharp contradiction with the oftrepeated rhetoric of central government or the representative government of the entire Korean peninsula. South Korea’s political legitimacy was inalienably tied with the NSL. Even before the cold war rivalry between the two superpowers intensified, the Korean peninsula experienced deep antagonism between the left and right

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camps. And, as has been noted earlier, despite the collapse of the Cold War structure on the global level in the late eighties and early nineties, the Korean peninsula continues to be in the grip of Cold War antagonism. Cold War ideology is too formidable a force in Korea to disappear in the near future. Historical understanding in the age of division was governed by Cold War ideology, and all the Korean people were its prisoners, albeit not in equal measure. Cold War ideology was closely linked with political legitimacy and found expression in North Korea in the forms of proletarian dictatorship and Juche thought that served as a linchpin of the state’s monocratic system. Its influence on the question of unification is evident in the theory of the democratic base. In South Korea, Cold War ideology was synonymous with anti-communist ideology, and the state used violence to enforce it. The NSL was used as the legal arm of the government to protect the state ideology of ultra-right anti-communism. Interestingly, pro-Japanese collaborators – particularly the pro-Japanese police – were at the vanguard of the state violence, unleashed through the NSL. The character of ultra-right anti-communist ideology was initially shaped by anti-communist campaigns that Japan launched in Korea in the last phase of colonial rule. During the Rhee Syngman period in the post-liberation era, Korea was dependent on the USA, and during the subsequent Park Chung Hee period, on both the USA and Japan. The country was deeply steeped in toadyism, traditionally known as the policy of ‘serving the great’. It is obvious that the ultra-right anticommunist ideology underpinning the regimes of Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee had little or no bearing on the theoretical premise of a legitimate nation-state. For this reason also, the state needed a national policy. This national policy became a holy cow, a sacrosanct ideology, never to be criticized or disobeyed. Brutal force was marshalled to buttress the state ideology, but when the physical force at the command of the government became weak, the national policy also become impotent in a corresponding measure. Although every government invariably emphasizes its legitimacy and authority, in divided lands this issue assumes additional intensity. The question of legitimacy in South Korea assumed unique characteristics in that the government used brutal force to make people accept it. An ideological position or act that did not accord with the national policy was considered a heresy, and was therefore crushed and eliminated from society. Obviously the question of legitimacy in Korea became rigid in character. One may discern in it the too much influence of myeongbun, part of the traditional Confucian value-system denoting prestige and obligations relative to one’s name or title. Myeongbun has dominated the Korean psyche since the late Joseon period. It is obvious that both Koreas failed to form a modern self or modern human consciousness. The failure of North Korea could be attributed to the application and enforcement of the theory of Juche in a mechanical way, in disregard or exclusion of the real world. South Korea’s failure stemmed from its moral and material vulnerability. Polarized notions of legitimacy, Cold War ideology and dichotomous national policies led to the phenomenon of what may be called ‘division-based statism’. It is the same as militarist or fascist statism and

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should not be confused with the principles of nationalism. Division-based statism was based on the binary construction of a ‘sacrosanct self’ versus an ’evil other’. This polarized worldview created the conviction that the other side was to be destroyed ‘even by dropping a nuclear bomb’, as Rhee Syngman once remarked. Statism ceaselessly stoked the flame of hatred and hostility against the other. The other side was not considered to be human, much less a part of the same race. The opposite side was indeed projected as a demon, too fearful even to look at. But it needs to be remembered that while Cold War ideology and national policy were packaged as sacred, the reality was vastly different. Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee would not have survived had there been no division. They made the maximum use of division for shoring up their authority. These macabre policies took a heavy toll on national consciousness and human consciousness. Value-systems and social consciousness also became muddled and muddied. Many forces and factors, including the competing claims of sole legitimacy, Cold War ideology and the national policy of ultra-right anti-communist ideology, shaped the historical understanding in the era of division. History of the ‘other’ was either excluded from the ‘national history’, as happened in South Korea, or was presented selectively and discriminately, as North Korea did. North Korea refused to recognize the autonomy of South Korea’s history.18 In fact, both North and South Korea are equally guilty of presenting their own versions and visions of history of divided Korea as an authentic history of contemporary Korea. Historical understanding of the divided era was governed by the need to adjust to the historical understanding delineated above and division-based statism. Unlike its Southern counterpart, the North Korean regime actively debated the question of unification, as is evident in the term ‘overriding principle of unification’. But the rhetoric hardly matched the reality. The rhetoric of national unification was used to win political legitimacy, but it is remarkable that it was beset with self-contradiction. In the North Korean lexicon, sometimes, ‘fatherland’ did not denote the entire Korean peninsula, but only the state that was built on the North Korean territory.19 We may illustrate this point by citing from North Korean texts. North Korean publications often note that ‘On 15 August, the Korean people were liberated by the great Soviet army’.20 There is even a more explicit example in which the expression ‘Korean people’ denotes only North Korean people: ‘The contemporary history of the Korean people is nothing but the history of the realization of Juche thought under the guidance of the Great Leader Kim Il Sung.’21 South Korea is equally guilty of such parochial usages. The expression ‘national’ in South Korea was employed to designate anti-communists, although it was amorphous enough for the common people to interpret it to mean the entire Korean Nation or people of both North and South Korea. This point finds illustration in the following example: 1.

We renew our national awakening to repel the invasion of any foreign power, including communist forces.22

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By emphasizing and teaching about their brutal acts, we need to consolidate our inextinguishable national sentiments against the puppet North Korea and strengthen our anti-communist spirit.23

The sole emphasis on Silla amongst the three ancient kingdoms by some officials during the Park Chung Hee administration is another example of the historical understanding of division-based statism. Similarly, the perspective of division-based statism is evident in North Korean historical writings in the form of the exaggerated prominence that they have accorded to the ancient kingdoms of Goguryeo and Barhae.24 HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING IN THE ERA OF UNIFICATION I have already suggested what the character of historical understanding in the era of unification should be. Above all, it needs to overcome the limitations of division-based statist historical understanding. Although the national mission is not a serious problem today, Cold War and anti-communist ideologies continue to linger in the minds of the Korean people to varying degrees. A mind-set which is centred on the theory of legitimacy has also not relaxed its grip on popular consciousness on the Korean peninsula, although it must be noted in all fairness that its influence today is more pronounced amongst the ruling elite or privileged class than the ordinary people. The most urgent task for overcoming division-based statism and creating a new framework of broad-based historical understanding that can match the mood of the era of unification is the abrogation of the National Security Law (NSL). This is crucial for carrying out dispassionate and objective research and imparting fact-based education in the fields of modern and contemporary history. The forces opposed to the abolition of the NSL are those who are immersed neck-deep in Cold War and anti-communist ideologies, and who seek to adhere perpetually to division-based statism. They fear that the collapse of the ‘ideological structure’ would inevitably result in the end of the privileges they enjoyed under the structure of the divided states. The NSL in the South, as Juche ideology in the North, contributed immensely to the undermining and emasculation of the creativity of the Korean people. It is due to the influence of the NSL that a large number of Koreans today find solace in the retrogressive and vulgar Park Chung Hee syndrome. The cultural world created by the NSL also has a close bearing on the low level of understanding amongst Korean people about their history and culture and their indiscriminate addiction to foreign popular culture. One may cite the career of Jang Jun-Ha (Chang Jun-ha) in the postliberation era to illustrate the sharp dichotomy that exists between the division-based historical understanding and the unification-oriented historical understanding. Jang was an editor of the magazine Sasanggye (The World of Thought). He used the magazine as a conduit of advanced ideas from the West, and in 1965 when Park Chung Hee sought to normalize relations with Japan he was in the forefront of a spirited and unrelenting struggle against negotiations for a Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty. These two major

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highlights of his career do not necessarily suggest that he had liberated himself from the fetters of division-based historical understanding. Until the 1960s he subscribed to anti-communist views in relation to the question of unification, and was sceptical about the relevance of an open discussion of the issue in the public sphere.25 But when he came under the influence of the 4 July Joint Declaration, he resolutely joined the democratic forces. As a result, he decisively parted ways with Song Jin-U (Song Chin-u) and the line of division that he had hitherto pursued. He made a positive re-evaluation of the significance of Yeo Un-Hyeong (Yo Un-Hyong) and his Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence. He also realized the significance of Kim Ku, whom he had once known and worked with. In the 1960s, Song Geon-Ho mounted a counter-attack, claiming that the April Revolution had undermined Syngmanism (the ideology of Rhee Syngman), which had dominated South Korea since the establishment of separate regimes, and led to the revival of Kimkuism (the ideology of Kim Ku, aka Baekbom). Jang Jun-ha made the following observation about the Kim Ku line in one of his diary entries: The Kim Ku line presents a classic picture of the true path of our nation, and shows us the true form that reconciliation between the two Koreas must assume. The dignity and pride of the unification movement gave the nation a sense of confidence. He was the first to challenge the Cold War structure of ideological polarity and set out the task for Korea’s national struggle, which is significant in world history. This text is important not only because it is here that we first come across the term ‘system of national division’ but also because it formulates a plan and framework that may enable us to overcome division-based statism. To quote further: Democratization of the political system – the repressive political system today has given institutional consummation to the division in this ideologically polarized era. It is difficult to transcend the internalized structure of division without first addressing this issue. Non-democratic elements of the law underpinning the system need to be reformed in conformity with the democratic and nationalist spirit. Division-based education, ideology, culture and value-systems need to be revised to point towards unification. All values must be grounded in unification, and division-based thoughts and acts need to be viewed as antinational.26 After the death of Jang Jun-ha, Kang Man-Gil carried forward his legacy. He continued the quest for unification-oriented historical consciousness which was characterized by the spirit of understanding and reconciliation and was capable of overcoming division-based historical understanding of conflict, confrontation and hatred. Kang Man-Gil argued that the structure of division compelled every member of the nation to take a definite position,

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and made it difficult thereby for researchers of history to uphold their commitment to dispassionate objectivity. He criticized those historians who were divorced from contemporary concerns and who found comfort in the world of the past. He emphasized the significance of a nationalist theory that was oriented towards unification and the project of setting aright the history of the era of division. He argued that the new approach must ensure that it covered the historical role of all the constituent elements of the nation. He further noted that the subjectivity of history was to be grounded in ‘minjung’, or the masses.27 In the early 1980s, when Professor Kang was dismissed from his position in Korea University by the military rulers of the time, he wrote two important works Hanguk Geundaesa (The Modern History of Korea) and Hanguk Hyeondaesa (The Contemporary History of Korea).28 In the latter book, he viewed the ‘Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence’ as the starting point of the national unification movement. This analysis was naturally at odds with those who could not see beyond the statism of the divided era. This prompted me to organize a symposium at the time in which Kang Man-Gil, Jeong Chang-Nyeol (Chong Chang-Nyol) and Shin Yong-Ha participated. The proceedings of the symposium were published in the monthly magazine Shin Dong A under the title ‘How to Write about Korea’s Modern and Contemporary History’ (Shin Dong A, September 1984). The attempt by Korean historians to overcome the statism of the divided era commenced in the 1980s at the hands of young scholars. This new approach came to be known as ‘minjung historiography’. A survey history of Korea, entitled Hanguk Minjungsa I, II (The History of Korean Minjung, volumes 1 and 2), published in 1986 in two volumes, was confiscated under the NSL. This book was markedly different from other general surveys of Korean history in that it was written from the perspective of the masses or common people. Its chapters on Park Chung Hee are noteworthy for their inclusion of such sections as ‘the Rise of Military Dictatorship and the Development of Dependent Capitalism’ and ‘the Yushin Order and the Growth of the Minjung Movement’. Subsequent to The History of Korean Minjung, a book entitled Hanguksa gangui (Lectures on Korean History) was published in 1989. Its introduction contained acerbic criticism of the limitations of the existing approach pursued by established academic historians. Minjung historians emphasized the reinterpretation of history (with the masses as the focal subject) based on scientific revolution (byeonhyeok) theory. Even the common people were critical of the statism of the divided era, and tried to seize every opportunity that arose meanwhile for expanding the process of inter-Korean understanding and reconciliation. The fiftieth anniversary of liberation was one such occasion. I earnestly wished that the year would witness a reduction, if not an end, of antagonism, derived from Cold War ideology, and that people in Seoul and Pyongyang would celebrate the year jointly in a spirit of harmony. But from the very outset of 1995, an ultra-rightist newspaper at the forefront of the upheavals and controversies, started a campaign to rehabilitate Rhee Syngman. Its intention was most audacious. In 1998, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the divided states, I once again expressed an ardent desire to

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celebrate the year meaningfully. But the year saw the serialization of Park Chung Hee propaganda in an ultra-rightist newspaper, as if it had been waiting for this opportune moment. It is important to remember that unification will be realized when both Koreas engage in a process of regular dialogue in the spirit of understanding, reconciliation and cooperation and accept each other on the basis of complete mutual understanding. The task of unification demands that people sublate or break away from their preoccupation with the negative aspects of the other half and exude confidence that a unified Korea will be a happier and better Korea. Unification will doubtless pave the way for the alleviation of conflict and human suffering. Such an historical understanding, oriented towards unification, must be underpinned with the undiluted spirit of ‘seeking truth from facts’. The study of modern and contemporary history is crucially significant to the unification-oriented historical understanding. The spirit of ‘seeking truth from facts’ is more relevant to the study of modern and contemporary history than any other period. The Korean War constitutes one of the most contentious questions that Cold War ideology or statism in the divided era has confronted. We need to examine and understand this question in a spirit of ‘seeking truth from facts’. We need to reorient our conception and adjust our perspective. For instance, the Korean War is referred to in South Korea as the ‘25 June War’, a term inappropriate for the Korean War. This is not to suggest that the date, the 25 June, on which the Korean War broke out is not important. The term is inappropriate because it is not inclusive enough to capture the range of inter-Korean conflicts and skirmishes that occurred before this date. This term also undermines the critical role that the United States and China played in the war and worse still, it invokes the memory of ‘Let’s Never Forget 25 June’, a cliché of Korea’s anti-communist education for several decades. The responsibility for the Korean War also needs to be analysed with dispassionate objectivity. It is remarkable that the Rhee Syngman government and the United States were caught unawares when the war broke out, and their crushing defeat in the initial phase led to its subsequent expansion. One also needs to emphasize the point that the enormous human casualties of the war could have been avoided, had the Rhee Syngman administration and the United States been prepared for this possibility. One must not forget also that the massacre of citizens, the most appalling outcome of the war, was presented in a grossly distorted form during the Park Chung Hee administration. These facts have to be taught truthfully, and are to be taken as valuable historical lessons.29 The Theory of Unification through Northward Advance, which implied a military conquest of North Korea, also has to be reassessed from the perspective of the entire Korean nation (and not through the ideological lens of either North or South Korea). It is important that North and South Korea transcend their past of polarized worldviews, build a relationship of mutual complementarity and search for a path of moderation and symbiosis. If we look at the history of South and North Korea we will discover several examples of their extreme positions. Depending on the flow of events and the world situation, these two states

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tended to tilt decisively to one side. South and North Korea followed bipolar trajectories that were characterized by ultra-right anti-communism and Juche thought respectively. In South Korea, studies of modern and contemporary history were almost non-existent, while in North Korea, the contemporaneity of historical concern was overly emphasized. The terms ‘independence movement’, employed by some South Korean historians, and ‘national liberation movement’, used by their Northern counterparts, need to find a common meeting ground. The South places an exaggerated emphasis on globalization and neo-liberalism, while the North is woefully isolated from the international community. The polarized positions of North and South Korea are evident even in their approaches towards nationalism. As is amply illustrated by the appellation ‘Land of Juche’, North Korea considers autonomy or self-reliance as crucially important, and socialist patriotism and the primacy of nation as its core ideals. By the same token, South Korea was extreme until recently in its adherence to the dominant principle of anti-communism and anti-North Korea. In South Korea, pro-Japanese collaborators occupied key positions and deference to Washington formed the kernel of national policy. The Park Chung Hee administration, in particular, tailored itself to suit the US policy in East Asia and initiated a series of measures that included the conclusion of the Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty of 1965, the dispatch of troops to Vietnam, the formation of a triangular US-Japan-Korea security bloc and a structure of mutual cooperation. The foreign dependence of the Korean economy had also deepened during this period. The ultra-rightist Japanese forces, which played a seminal role in the continental invasion at the end of the Japanese colonial rule, became pro-South Korean and lent active support to the Park administration. There was no place in Park’s hegemonic modernist discourse for a life of sharing and togetherness. Instead, his policies made the people ‘scatter like sands’, to borrow the apt expression of Ham Seok-heon (Ham Sok-hon). Middle-of-the-road nationalists and reformists became almost extinct after Park seized power through a coup d’état. The student movement, or a small number of intellectuals, emphasized nationalism, but overall it was only statism, coated with superficial and fractured anti-Japanese sentiment, that appeared during the period as a well-choreographed charade of nationalism. It was merely one of the diverse forms of dependent fascism. It needs to be remembered in this context that North Korean nationalism, while excessive and effusive, is not really meaningful. It is deficient in its relevance to the norms of modern international relations, and is far removed from democracy. It also lacks flexibility and is chauvinistic in nature. The North Korean principle of Korea-first is too obsolete to be valid in the Southern part. As noted earlier, the aspects associated with North Korea’s legitimacy may be viewed as distorted nationalism. I have emphasized elsewhere how the Chinese practice of ‘postponing contentious issues and seeking aspects of convergence’ is relevant to unificationoriented historical understanding.30 The Chinese use this expression when they encounter a difficult position or predicament. Whether it is modern history or contemporary history, we need to set contentious issues aside for the

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time being and approach those issues first on which historians of both North and South Korea may seek common ground. The attitude of ‘thinking about the other’s position by changing sides’ is also equally valuable. In the 1990s, South Korea put forward proposals for the reunion of dispersed families, making much noise about North Korea’s obstructionist attitude. One must, however, recall that until the 1970s it was North Korea that mostly put forward such proposals. Before the Korean Broadasting System initiated a programme in the mid-1980s to locate family members separated in the two Koreas, the South Korean government adopted an inhuman and cold-blooded position in relation to this issue because of fear that it might dilute its anti-communist ideology and stance. The government did not organize reunions of even those separated family members who lived in the South Korean territory. Koreans, whether of progressive or conservative persuasion, are almost unrivalled in the world in their propensity to fight over trivial differences of opinion and in assuming a stand of unwavering and uncompromising tenacity. However, it is also important to emphasize the point in historical understanding that soon after the 15 June summit, the US Secretary of Defence rushed to Seoul, China and Russia displayed an added warmth towards South Korea, while Japan felt ruffled and rattled. This is related to Korea’s geopolitical significance, a point already stressed by the proponents of the Left-Right Coalition soon after liberation.31 Such events as the National United Front movement during the period of the anti-Japanese struggle, the Left-Right Coalition movement after liberation and the InterKorean negotiation that aimed to resolve the national question through dialogue and without outside interference carry immense significance in the field of historical understanding. BEYOND POLARIZATION – THE SEARCH FOR A MIDDLE COURSE As is evident from the Kim Jong Il shock which people in South Korea received during the 15 June summit, or from the Park Chung Hee syndrome, the Korean people are ignorant and highly biased about North and South Korea. Let alone having any historical understanding, their level of historical consciousness is abysmally low. In South Korea, the sole legitimacy of division-based statism was emphasized under the protection of the NSL. Ultra-rightist ideology or Cold War ideology was the national policy, a fact that mirrors the standard and character of South Korean society. Under these circumstances, the Yushin order, the most virulent form of division-based statism, emerged to wreak havoc. These realities defined and determined the parameters of historical understanding. In South Korea the level of democracy and civil society, and the level of the understanding of one’s own society and culture, may be viewed as a barometer that may indicate the dawn of the age of inter-Korean understanding, reconciliation and cooperation. This also constitutes the basic dynamic force to form an historical understanding oriented towards unification. An understanding of the modern and contemporary history of North and South Korea may serve as a foundation and may also facilitate this

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process. The study and teaching of the modern and contemporary history of Korea, based solely on the principle of ‘seeking truth from facts’, is an indispensable element for the construction of a democratic society and the enhancement of the level of understanding of one’s society and culture. Historical understanding is just another side of the same coin. The pursuit of reconciliation and understanding, the avoidance of extremes and the exploration of a middle course, all of which are premised on the spirit of coexistence and symbiosis in historical understanding, may carry immense significance. In other words, North and South Korea need to think about the other side by changing positions. The attitude of postponing contentious issues and seeking areas of mutual convergence may be helpful in our quest for reconciliation and understanding, avoiding extremes and pursuing the middle course. It is difficult to conjecture where the South Korean economy and society are heading. As for North Korea, it was once widely believed that it would collapse if it adhered to its isolationist policy, and that if it opened the door, it would meet the same fate. But North Korea displayed a degree of flexibility in its policies in the wake of the 15 June Summit, a difficult decision indeed for the regime to take. There may be many ups and downs in the future, but all the democratic forces must strive harder to propel inter-Korean relations in a desirable direction. NOTES 1 2

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The Choson Ilbo (Joseon Daily), 7 October 2000 Mungyobu (Ministry of Education), Cho Jung Godeunghakgyo Gyosayong Sasang Gyoyuk (Bangong Gyoyuk) Jidojaryojip (Primary, Middle and High School Teachers’ Resource Manual for Ideological [anti-communist] Education), Vol. 1 Seoul: Minstry of Education, the Republic of Korea, 1975, p. 182 The Hankyoreh sinmun, 26 August 2000. Also see an article entitled ‘Unification Education of Cold War Education?’ In The Hankyoreh sinmun, 19 September 2000 Kim Tae-Gwang, ‘The Largest Slaughter of Common People in post-Liberation Korea: “Bodo yeonmaeng (National Guidance League)” Incident’, Mal (Speech) December 1988, p. 26. Kim Taegwang, ‘Continued Report on “Bodo yeonmaeng” (National Guidance League) Incident’, Mal, February 1989, p. 46 Accoring to Jeon Yeongnyul, coverage of modern period in eighteen out of the total thirty-three volumes (Vol. 16–33) of Joseonjeonsa (a comprehensive history of Korea) represents an endeavour of monumental significance and a milestone in the scholarship of modern Korean history. See his article ‘Yeoksa gwahaki geoleo on Jarangchan sasipnyeon’ (The Proud Forty Years of Historical Science), Yeoksa gwahak (Historical Science), 3 1988; and Yi Byeong-Cheon, edited, Bukhan Hakgyeui Hanguk Geundaesa Nonjaeng (Debate on Modern Korean History by North Korean Scholars), Cangjakgwabipyeongsa (Creation and Criticism) Publishers, Seoul, 1989, p. 306

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Korean Nationalism Betrayed In North Korea, scholars have interpreted Korean history in different ways in different periods, following the changing political emphases of the times. For instance, the ‘orthodoxy’ of North Korea’s historical scholarship in the 1950s did not remain unchanged in the 1970s and 1980s. Nonetheless, North Korean historical scholarship of a particular period (e.g. 1950s) shows a common framework of inquiry and similar thread of argument. South Korean historical scholarship is, however, marked by sharp divergences and dichotomies in theories about Korean history, not only modern, but also early and medieval. Yi Seon-Bok, ‘Minjok Danhyeolseong Giwonnon Geomto’ (An examination of the Root of the Theory of Korea’s Racial Homogeneity), In Bukhaneui Hanguk Godaesa Yeongu Donghyang (Trends in North Korea’s Research on Early Korean history), Yeoksahakhoe publishers, 1990 Gwon O-Young, ‘Wonsisidaeui Insikchyegye’ (The Framework of Understanding the Prehistoric Age), In Bukhaneui Hanguksa Insik I (North Korea’s Understanding of Korean History, Vol. 1) Hangilsa, Seoul, 1990, p. 48 Yi Sun-Geun, ‘Gojoseonui Seongnipkwa Sahoi Seonggyeok’ (The Establishment of Old Joseon and its Social Character), In Bukhaneui Hanguksa Insik I (North Korea’s Understanding of Korean History, Vol. 1) Hangilsa, Seoul, 1990, p. 100 Noh Tae-Don, ‘Gojoseonkwa Samgukui Yeoksae daehan Yeongu Donghyang’ (Trends in Research on Old Joseon and the Three Kingdoms Period), In Bukhani Boneun Uri Yeoksa (Korean History Through the North Korean Eyes), Eulyu munhwasa Publishers, 1989; also see the article by Yi Sun-Geun in footnote 10. Noh Tae-Don, ibid, p. 86; Gang Bong-Ryong, ‘Godae Hanil Gwangyesa’ (KoreaJapan Relations in Ancient Times), In Bukhaneui Hanguksa Insik I (North Korea’s Understanding of Korean History, Vol. 1) Hangilsa, Seoul, 1990, p. 177–178 Song Gi-Ho, ‘Bukhanui Barhaesa, Tongil Sillasa Yeongu’ (North Korean Studies on the History of Barhae and the Unified Silla period), In Bukhaneui Hanguk Godaesa Yeongu Donghyang (Trends in North Korea’s Research on Early Korean history), Yeoksahakhoe publishers, 1990. Sahoe Gwahakwon Ryeoksa Yeonguso (Institute of Historical Research, The Academy of Social Sciences) edited and compiled, Joseon Jeonsa 16 (The Comprehensive History of Korea, vol.16), Pyongyang:Gwahak,baekgwasajeon Chulpansa Publishers, 1981 (Reprint) Gukhoi Sokgirok( Minutes of the National Assembly), 19th Session, Vol. 76, 11 November 1954 For a detailed discussion see my book, Hanguk Hyeondae Minjokundongsa Yeongu, 2 (A Study on the National Movement in Contemporary Korea, Vol. 2), Yeoksabipyeongsa Publishers, 1996, pp. 185–193 The Kyunghyang sinmun (Newspaper), June 8, 1948 Gang Seong-Cheol, ‘Hanguk Jeonjaeng Yeongu’ (Studies on the Korean War), In Nambukhan Yeoksa Insik Bigyo Gangeui. Geunhyeondae pyeon (Lectures on the Comparative Understanding of Korean History in North and South Korea: Modern and Contemporary periods). Ilsongjeong Publishers, 1989, p. 356 See the quoted excerpt in the paper in footnote 18, pp. 354, 356 Sahoi Gwahakwon Ryeoksa Yeonguso (Institute of Historical Research, The Academy of Social Sciences), Joseon tongsa II (The Comprehensive History of Korea, Vol. II), 1958, p. 287

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Kim Han-Gil, Hyeondae Joseon Yeoksa (The Contemporary History of Korea), 1983, p. 12 Mungyobu, op.cit, p. 163 Ibid p. 169 Noh Tae-Don, ‘Bukhan Hakgyeui Samguksidaeui Yeongu Donghyang’ (Trends in Research on the Three Kingdoms Period), In Bukhaneui Hanguk Godaesa Yeongu Donghyang ((Trends in Researches on the Early Korean history by North Korean Scholars), p. 101; and Kim Yeong-Ha, ‘Hugi Sillawa Barhaeui Seongnip’ (The Establishment of Later Silla and Parhae), In Bukhaneui Hanguksa Insik (North Korea’s Understanding of Korean History) Vol. 1, p. 213 See my paper, ‘Bundan Cheje Tapae Mom Deonjin Jang Jun-Ha (Jang Jun-Ha and his dedicated Effort in overcoming the Structure of National Division’, Yeoksa Bipyeong (Historical Review), autumn 1997. Jang Jun-Ha, ‘Minjoktongil Jeollyakui Hyundangye’ (A Draft on the Current Stage of the Strategy of national Unification), Minjokjueuijaeui gil (The Path of Nationalists), Sasang Publisher, 1985, pp. 45–48 Kang Man-gil, ‘Bundansidae Sahakui Seonggyeok’ (The Character of the Historical Studies in the Era of National Division), In Bundansidaeeui Yeoksa Insik (Historical Understanding in the Era of National Division), Changjakgwa Bipyeongsa Publisher, 1978, pp. 15–16, 22, 24 Published in English as A History of Contemporary Korea, Folkestone, Global Oriental, 2006. See my book, Jo Bong-Am gwa 1950 nyeondae (Jo Bong-Am and the 1950s), Vol. II, revised edition, 2000. See my essay ‘Minjok Tonghapeul Uihan Hanguk Hyundaesa Gyoyuk’ (Teaching of Contemporary Korean History for the National Unification), Minjoktongil Nonjib (Papers on National Unification), Vol. 13, Gyeongsang National University, 1997 See my book, Hanguk Hyeondae Minjokundongsa Yeongu (A Study on the National Movement in Contemporary Korea), Vol. 2, Yeoksabipyeongsa Publishers, 1991, pp. 389–390.

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National Question and State in Korea: Focusing on the Bourgeois Class and the Ruling Elite

THE DEFICIENCY OF KOREA’S BOURGEOIS CLASS: CRACKS IN NATIONALISM AND MODERNIZATION

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t is difficult to form a systematic understanding of modern Korean history because of its complexity and intricacy, derived primarily from concerns of the national question. Indeed, the truth about the large part of modern and contemporary history remains shrouded in mystery and obscurity, as relevant research is often based on a superficial understanding, evoking more heat than light. Contemporary Korean history is a particularly fertile ground for confusion, because it is inextricably entangled with the issues of nationalism and modernity, the core of modern and contemporary history. Although no theory about nation or nationalism is universally valid,1 Korean history presents its own unique dilemma. It is because several important issues in the modern and contemporary history of Korea have not yet been studied in depth. Furthermore, scholars of modern and contemporary history have carried out their research without referring to past scholarship in the field and asserted their subjective positions, leading to immense confusion. The question of the Korean nation appears to be so complex also because the linkages between the history of pre-modern Korea and that of modern Korea have not been properly analysed or demonstrated in a coordinated way. The formation of the Korean nation can be traced to hoary antiquity, but progressing through to the Goryeo and Joseon periods the definite contour of the Korean nation was shaped. The three ancient states of Goguryeo, Paekche and Silla emerged after absorbing various tribal states. Later, when Silla erased Baekje and Goguryeo from the map of the Korean peninsula, leading to the establishment of the Unified Silla period and the emergence of the state of Barhae (on the ruins of Goguryeo), the process of the formation of a homogeneous state began to unfold. The centralized political structure of the Unified Silla state became the most significant conduit to

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articulate the incipient form of homogeneity. A uniform linguistic and cultural community also developed in the pre-modern era to keep pace with the social developments. This led to the demarcation of a well-defined and stable border for the Korean state in the early Joseon period. These conditions, leading to the formation of a centralized state, also became a reservoir from which national consciousness and nationalism could be drawn in the period of the transition of the nation to modernity. However, the modern and contemporary realities created difficulties in developing a modern nation and modern nation-state based on the legacy of the shared past. The Joseon dynasty’s transition to modernity, based primarily on internal development commencing from its latter half, was doubtless propelled by the onrush of capitalism, which expanded on a global scale in the latenineteenth century. The modern civilization that flowed into Korea was inseparably linked with the invasion of the capitalist powers. The ruling elite of Korea, living in an age of the disintegration of medieval social structures and the attendant dynastic decline, was too weak to rise up either to the external or internal challenges which the country confronted. Korea was, therefore, not able to accommodate Western civilization with an independent spirit or demonstrate an ability for judicious selection, based on the historical experiences of the nation. In other words, Western civilization rode on the wave of the invasion of the aggressive capitalist powers which the local elites could not surmount. Korea made a rapid transition to modernity under the aggressive capitalist powers, leading to its reduction to a semi-colony in 1905 and a colony in 1910 of Japanese imperialism. This was the first time in history that the country had been enslaved by a foreign power. The colonization of Korea was not only completely different in character from the premodern conquests of foreign lands by aggressive military forces, but it also represented a unique event in colonial history. It is to be remembered that Korea fell prey to Japan, the sole non-white imperialist power. Korea’s trajectory of political and capitalist development under Japanese imperialism was essentially different from other imperialist powers, because Japan initiated a unique and highly aggressive policy of annihilation of national consciousness, encapsulated in the policy of assimilation and kominka (transformation of colonial peoples into loyal subjects of the Japanese emperor). The Japanese colonial policies in Korea aimed to suppress all political activities and subjected all the people, including the peasants, to rapacious exploitation.2 After the Japanese imperialist machinery collapsed in 1945, Korea was occupied by the forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1948, when two governments were established on the Korean peninsula, an unprecedented event since the peninsula unification of 668, the nation entered a different phase. This era was marked by the suppression of nationalism in a different way from what the nation had experienced during the Japanese colonial rule. Unlike the nationalism of the Japanese colonial period that aimed to construct a nation-state, nationalism in the era of division was underpinned with the vision of dismantling the structure of division, constructing a unified nation-state and upholding thereby the spirit of national autonomy. But because of the defining features of the structure of division – an ultra-right

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anti-communist structure and the National Security Law system in the South – nationalism could not perform its proper function. It was amalgamated with statism and anti-communist ideology and became basically destructive in character. The Korean War (1950–53), which aimed to build a unified government, was a civil war which lead to the widespread slaughter and destruction of the Korean people. It was also an international war in which twenty countries, the two Superpowers included, fought on the Korean peninsula on behalf of either South or North Korea. After the war, the dividing line across the 38th parallel did not disappear from the map of the Korean peninsula; on the contrary, it consolidated and internalized the structure of national division. Although both the North and South Korean governments claimed to belong to the same race, they became ever more uncompromising and relentless in their antagonism. Indeed, the ruling elites of both South and North exploited the division to create and maintain two polarized states and societies. In discussing the national question and the question of modernization, one confronts the pivotal issue of the character of Korea’s ruling class and the incipient bourgeois class. During the period of the disintegration of medieval society, Korea fell prey to the invasion of the capitalist powers of the world, leading to its colonial occupation by Japan. Under these circumstances it was difficult for the ruling class to play a significant role in providing leadership to the state and society after 1876 when the door of Korea was forced ajar to the outside world. The ruling class of the Joseon dynasty was cognisant of the decline of the power and the armed strength of the nation, it was, nonetheless, concerned with the aggrandisement of its personal authority and privileges. The modern bourgeois class had not yet properly formed, and neither the highly feudalistic propertied class nor the nascent bourgeoisie was able to assert its authority because of the problematic character of wealth and financial fragility in relation to capital. As is apparent, the weak and amorphous bourgeois class felt compelled to explore in its own way the path of capitalist development. It is also apparent that due to the above-noted character of the ruling class, it granted many concessions to the aggressive foreign powers and was dependent on them in many ways. The majority of the propertied and the bourgeois classes, integrated within the power relations, were not different from the ruling elites. During the Japanese colonial period this development process assumed specificity and substance. The autonomous and bourgeois development of Korea was closely tied to the colonial structure and became one of the cogs in its apparatus. Even in the post-liberation era, capital and political authority forged a mutuality of interest, and both of them also became highly dependent on foreign powers. In the latter half of the nineteenth century when Korea’s status had already been reduced to that of a semi-colony, the ruling and bourgeois classes invited foreign troops to crush the anti-foreign resistance which was being waged by the common masses, as is evident in a range of events, including the Military Mutiny of 1882, the Gabo Peasant Uprising of 1894 and the subsequent Righteous Army Movement. Korea’s ruling and bourgeois classes also lived within the protective shield provided

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by foreign powers. After its liberation, Korea stood at the forefront of Cold War rivalry, leading to the deployment of US troops on its soil. It is obvious that for the ruling elite or the bourgeois class in the modern history of Korea, with some exceptions, modernization was at odds with nationalism. In the context of Western Europe, the development of capitalism, based on a regional division of labour, led to the formation of national economies and the emergence of nation-states. The bourgeoisie played a pivotal role in the formation of modern politics, society and culture. It is also remarkable that the processes of the formation of modern society and the development of nationalism overlap in many aspects. A similar situation prevailed in the non-aligned countries. In many countries of the so-called Third World, nationalism and modernization were not dichotomous; on the contrary, nationalism was mobilized to achieve rapid modernization and the development of a nation-state. The quest for modernization by Korea’s ruling elite and bourgeois class presents a contrasting picture in that their vision of modernization was either incompatible or in sharp conflict with the mood of resurgent nationalism in the country. This was true during the period of Japanese colonialism and even in the post-liberation era when the ruling elite used modernization to crush the popular aspiration for democracy. It is also worthy of note that the ruling elite and the bourgeois class of Korea failed to conceive modernization as a comprehensive and inclusive historical process. The Korean experience of modernization was divorced from political modernization and was mostly confined to industrialization and the import of new learning and new culture which the project of industrialization required as a pre-condition. In other words, it was a narrowly defined Japanization, Americanization or West Europeanization. It differed from what intellectuals in Central and Eastern Europe aspired to achieve. Their attempt to achieve the Anglicization, Francoization and West Europeanization of their societies ran apace with their initiation of the radical transformation and anti-feudal reform of their societies.3 Narrowly conceived modernization is also different from anti-imperialist national liberation, the establishment of an independent state or a realization of bourgeois democracy. It was a reactionary or conservative modernization, as is evident in the fact that the ruling elite of Korea tried to maintain its feudal land ownership or privileges. The ruling elite and bourgeois mainstream integrated modernization within the matrix of its own power-relations, and used it to advance its own class interests and agenda. The attempt by the ruling class and bourgeoisie in Korea to separate modernization from nationalism represented in essence its separation from the common people. Indeed, the common people were alienated from modernization. The weak and oppressed nations and the spirit of nationalism in the Third World discovered in the common people an inexhaustible reservoir of resources to resist the seemingly irresistible might of the capitalist powers, and propelled their societies on the path of ceaseless transformation by mobilizing these common masses.4 In the Korean context, however, the ruling class and the bourgeoisie allied themselves with the foreign powers and sided with them in oppressing the commoners who stood at the vanguard of resistance against the invading foreign powers. They also attempted in many

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ways to distort and mould the development of Korea into a bourgeois and authoritarian structure. The bourgeoisie and the ruling class mostly stood in sharp opposition to the force of nationalism. They sometimes used the rhetoric of nationalism to dupe and manipulate the common masses, and this explains why the content and character of the modernization they initiated corresponded with the rhetoric of nationalism. One may adopt a range of approaches to understand such issues as the national question, national consciousness, nationalism and the nation-state in Korean history. In this short chapter I will discuss the character of the important above-mentioned issues and outline their relationship with the ruling and bourgeois classes, the leading force behind the process of modernization=capitalism and industrialization. The following section deals with the first half of the twentieth century, the era of semi-colonial and colonial occupation which lasted until 1945, and the third section covers the post-liberation period of national division, characterized by military regimes in South Korea. I need to issue a caveat that there were exceptions to the general phenomenon of dichotomy between modernization and nationalism, however. It is apparent that for the ruling elites these were mutually dichotomous phenomena, but there were also exceptions. For instance, An Chang-ho believed in the supremacy of modernization, but he was also a nationalist. One must also understand that effusive or distorted nationalism, as is evident in Iran or North Korea, is as dangerous as the ‘ModernizationFirst’ theory. It is also necessary to examine from diverse angles Mohammad Anwar al-Sadat (1918–81) and the succeeding Egyptian regimes who abandoned the legacy of Nasser, the symbol of Arab nationalism, and adopted a policy of alliance with the US and of appeasement with Israel with the object of achieving material prosperity. Research on the modern and contemporary history of Korea has yet to attain a desired maturity and my own scholarship also has its limitations. Therefore, I have merely attempted to discuss a few moot points of controversy about the character of the national question, national consciousness, nationalism and the nation-state in Korean history. THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND NATIONALISM IN THE SEMI-COLONIAL AND COLONIAL ERA

The Period of Japanese ‘Protectorate’ After the conclusion of the 1905 Protectorate Treaty, the most pressing task facing the nation was to overthrow the shackles of its semi-colonial condition and launch a movement to regain its national sovereignty. However, Korea’s incipient bourgeois class, with an apparent bourgeois character, tended to be unsympathetic to the anti-Japanese resistance movement. They abandoned the path of struggle against foreign invaders and chose to engage in such self-strengthening movements as the new enterprise movement, along with the new education movement, which they believed to be the basis of the new industrial culture they sought to foster and promote. While these

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ventures were pursued under the protection and patronage of foreign powers, they were still largely labelled as ‘patriotic’. These initiatives were part of a new campaign that emphasized the cultivation of economic strength and the development of capitalist modernization. In fact, the strains of antiimperialism were too faint or warped in these campaigns. National consciousness or the notion of a nation-state was also blurred or weak in the minds of these champions of the ‘self-strengthening movement’. In contrast, the Righteous Army Movement possessed a strong spirit of independence and a consciousness of the need to repel the invading forces of Japan and other imperialist powers. The Righteous Army Movement was under the strong influence of a pre-modern consciousness and lacked an understanding of modernist transformation. They stood at the opposite end of those who espoused modernization. In sum, both groups lacked a definite or distinct consciousness of a nation or state. One group committed itself to the modernization movement, seeking to accommodate new culture and new civilization and emphasizing modern enterprises and industries. The other group was hostile towards the cause of enlightenment and waged violent anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist resistance. Generally, the enlightenment faction and the bourgeois class came under the overpowering spell of the material civilization of Japan and the West even prior to equipping themselves with modern nationalist consciousness or a consciousness of state. This may, perhaps, be a reflection of their class interest. The bourgeois class of the late-nineteenth century shared the notions of the imperialist powers in relation to nation and state, and even demonstrated a limited ideological unity with the imperialist forces. An understanding of the leaders of the bourgeois modernization movement in the waning years of the Joseon dynasty is important in that it sheds significant light on the attitude of the bourgeois class towards both the imperialist threat and the resistance of the common masses to the imperialist invasion of the country. It is remarkable that Yu Gil-jun, Yun Chi-ho, Rhee Syngman and An Chang-ho, who played leading roles in the bourgeois modernization movement in the colonial and post-liberation eras, were Christians. It is also interesting to note that they came under the strong influence of Japan and of missionaries from the West, which apparently influenced their perception and attitude towards imperialism. The leaders of the bourgeois modernization movement considered the West as their archetypal model and they largely considered the West and Christianity as synonymous. In the newspaper ‘Independent’, the West (and especially the US) was described as ‘the strongest, the wealthiest, the most civilized, the most enlightened country, as well as the land where people obeyed the Gospel of the Lord’.5 Yun Chi-ho, who was president of the Independence Club and editor of the Independent newspaper, once remarked that Christianity was the salvation and hope of Korea and regarded the Christianization and even Japanization of Korea as an occasion of great blessing.6 An Chang-ho wrote that if Korea converted to Christianity, it would have no enemy in the world. He contended that it was because numerous countries (in the West) believed in Christianity.7 Rhee Syngman’s writing

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offers the most eloquent testimony of the influence of Christianity on Korea’s bourgeois reformers. He wrote: If our country is to stand firm and if we need to rescue the destiny of the country from the present state of rampant chaos and corruption, Christianity has to serve as its foundation. Nothing would be of any avail if Christianity is not adopted as the spiritual basis of the nation. Even if we acquire new knowledge of the West or diversify our diplomatic linkages or consolidate the hands of our sovereign, the nation would not reap any substantial benefit.8 Rhee Syngman or Yun Chi-ho did not regard the invasion of aggressive imperialist powers as invasion. Rhee believed that establishing diplomatic relations with foreign countries was conducive to the interests of the nation9 and warned that regarding foreigners as enemies was a most dangerous notion.10 He also noted that all the treaties concluded with Japan needed to be honoured.11 It is also worthy of note that one of the four guiding principles of Gwanmin gongdonghoe (the Joint Official and People Society) chaired by Yun chi-ho, forbade its members to use offensive words against foreigners and foreign powers and exhorted them to respect the various treaties that Korea had previously signed with foreign powers.12 They also sought protection from imperialist powers. In 1882, when the Military Mutiny broke out, Yun Chi-ho and Yu Gil-jun who were in Japan at the time, requested the Japanese government to dispatch its troops to Korea to crush the riot. Later he wrote in the ‘Independent’, the paper published by the Independence Club, that without the intervention of foreign (i.e. Japanese) troops Seoul would haven fallen to the Tonghak forces, and that it was indeed very fortunate that they were deployed on Korean soil.13 An Chang-ho also contended that under the present circumstances the destiny of the country could be entrusted to the strongest power in the world.14 In his many passionate and patriotic speeches he asked his countrymen to arise from their long slumber of lethargy, but it is interesting to note that he never uttered a word of criticism against Japan’s imperialist invasion of Korea, nor did he exhort his countrymen to resist the so-called Protection Treaty that Japan imposed on Korea in 1905, a major stepping-stone to the colonization of the country.15 The Korea Self-Strengthening Society, headed by Yun Chi-ho, the Independence Club, which may justifiably be viewed as its successor, or other self-strengthening and enlightenment organizations did not wage any struggles against Japan’s imperialist aggression or its symbol, the Office of the Resident General. On the contrary, these organizations looked forward to receiving the protection and patronage of the colonial authorities, and indeed, avoided or abandoned the option of resistance against the imperialist presence in Korea. They concentrated their energy on the cultivation of strength and enlightenment. It is apparent that the theory of trusteeship, proposed by Rhee Syngman, did not appear in the post-liberation era for the first time. In its inchoate form it had already been formulated in the late Joseon dynasty.

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It is obvious that when one is favourably disposed towards imperialist nations and Christianity, an invasion does not appear to be an invasion and heteronomous modernization or modernization initiated by imperialist powers, does not appear to be an unhealthy development. This argument was further extended when An Chang-ho wrote that a nation which qualified to be independent was independent and a nation deserving enslavement was an enslaved nation. It is to be recalled that when Korea was occupied and the honour and dignity of the Korean people was being brutally crushed under the military boots of Japan, he energetically launched enlightenment and modernization movements. Such views lent credence to the contention of Japanese imperialism that Korea became a Japanese colony because of its own faults and failings.16 It is also important to note that the repudiation of any form of resistance to the invading forces was only a natural corollary of this logic.17 This explains why a substantial number of the members of the selfstrengthening and enlightenment societies resented ‘righteous armies’ so vehemently. It also explains why the Independence Club forcefully argued that crushing the ‘righteous army’ forces was the most pressing task, urged the ‘righteous army’ members to surrender and appealed to Japan to extinguish this menace.18 As a leader of the Independence Club, Yun Chi-ho once remarked that the common people were just idiots.19 Indeed, the leaders of bourgeois modernization generally looked down on the common people, as well as on the history and culture of their country. Their attitude towards their own country and people matched well the theory which Japan put forward in justification of its invasion of Korea and what Japanese historians in the service of the state wrote to perpetuate colonial stereotypes of Korea. This worldview found a partial expression in the theory of Korea’s inability to be an independent nation. The leaders of the bourgeois modernization movement considered ‘strength’ to be the essence of material civilization, and self-strengthening projects as the most effective conduit of national power and modernity. Social Darwinism, which had immense ideological impact on the global expansion of imperialism, was the cornerstone of the worldview held by Korea’s bourgeois champions of the modernization-first doctrine. And as noted earlier, they were also influenced by the views and vision of Korea held by Christian missionaries. Their views and attitudes towards the national question and their understanding of the state and the nation need to be placed within the broader contemporary circumstances of the nation. In other words, their class character needs to be understood within the framework of the contemporary realities. The nation doubtless required at the time self-strengthening and enlightenment movements, which included a range of projects, such as new enterprises and new education. One also needs to acknowledge that the spread of new ideas, new education and new ethics, aimed at renovating the state, society and individuals, assumed a progressive character. It is not easy to explain this character as it requires detailed discussion, but suffice it to say that like modern ideas these movements were capable of developing a national consciousness and a consciousness of the state.

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Nationalist movements in the waning years of the Joseon dynasty were waged mostly by the righteous army and a few enlightenment activists such as Shin Chae-Ho. The Confucian leaders of the Righteous Army Movement were strongly exclusive in their attitude towards foreign ideas and were hostile towards the enlightenment movement.20 They voiced serious concerns over those who adhered to a ‘modernization-first’ position. Shin Chae-Ho, for instance, stridently attacked their concepts of nation and state. He said that most of the esteemed patriots of the country, such as Min Young-Hwan, Choe Ik-Hyeon, Yi Jun, Yi Gang-Nyeon and An Jung-Geun, received a traditional education. He further pointed out that the products of the modern education had arguably much poorer credentials as patriots compared to those from the old education background.21 Shin’s criticism clearly articulates the areas of conflict and contradiction between nationalism and modernization. According to Shin Chae-Ho, true education fostered a spirit of the nation and nationalism and promoted a civilizing process. He laid particular emphasis on the aesthetic dimension of the country such as folk traditions, customs and language as the significant components of a good education. He viewed equality and liberty as the cornerstone of human civilization, and emphasized the need to make such subjects as the national economy and national politics compulsory in the school curriculum.22 It is apparent that Shin’s commitment towards the development of a modern nation state or people’s state was firm. One needs to scrutinize further the meaning of the people’s state which Shin formulated at a time when the reality appeared to contradict the notion of popular sovereignty which underpinned the theory because of the establishment of the Office of the Japanese Resident General and the impending colonization of the country. But it is indeed remarkable that the leading cadre of the New People’s Society shared such a vision and aspiration. Ju SiGyeong’s energetic campaign for the promotion of Hangeul, the Korean alphabet, also deserves to be noted as an important milestone in the formation of a modern citizenry.

The Period of Japanese Colonial Rule The colonial administration was arguably the most formidable impediment to the formation of a modern nation and the development of a modern nation-state. Political oppression and the policies of racial assimilation and kominka involving the suppression and denial of Korean history, Korean language, Korean tradition and the consciousness of the Korean people, exerted immense influence on the national question and nationalism. Korea’s national consciousness, which can be traced to the latter half of the nineteenth century, was fused with the anti-Japanese sentiments of resistance and independence and led to the emergence of a stronger sense of national consciousness and nationalism. In the first decade of the Japanese colonial rule in Korea (1910–45), national consciousness was strong amongst Korean migrants and Korea’s freedom fighters abroad, but subsequent to the outbreak of the March First Movement in 1919 it swept through the people on the Korean peninsula. In the 1920s when the passion for education reached

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a high tide, modern ideas and modern culture acquired an unprecedented momentum, leading to their spread across the peninsula. This period witnessed the rise of numerous social movements, including a peasant movement, a labour movement, a women’s movement and a movement for the liberation of baekjeong (outcasts). It is obvious that these social movements were now underpinned by a modern humanitarian consciousness. Newspapers and magazines also, notwithstanding their own limitations, contributed to the spread of the new culture movement and social movements. The March First Movement, a truly national movement, represented the strong aspiration of the Korean people for a nation-state and demonstrated to the world their will to construct it. The loud cry of ‘Long Live Independence’ led to an expansion not only of national consciousness, but also the related consciousness of the self and of humanity. Subsequent to the March First Movement, the national liberation movement both inside and outside Korea gained unprecedented popular appeal and grew both in quality and power. The fact that the national liberation movement integrated within its matrix anti-feudal democratic and social movements suggests that the cause of the national movement was now championed by the awakened masses and that their mode of participation differed from that of the righteous army. National consciousness and nationalism expanded considerably under these circumstances. The Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai formulated the political system of democratic republicanism. Korean nationalists active in Manchuria or the heartland of China also demonstrated their faith in the ideas of a progressive democratic republican system, a republican system of people’s democracy and an anti-feudal, democratic, anti-imperialist nationstate. At various points of time during the colonial period, communists inside Korea put forward the ideas of a democratic people’s republic, a revolutionary people’s republic and a workers’ soviet. In contrast, during the period of Japanese occupation, the leaders of the bourgeois modernization invariably oscillated between two polarized actions – supporting the colonial authorities and upholding the just cause of the nation. Thus, although they tended to mostly reconcile to reality, they displayed both nationalist and anti-nationalist traits, depending on the changes of the colonial rule. During the Japanese colonial rule, these reformists publicized their theory of the impossibility of independence and of the need for self-strengthening to serve as the foundation of a freedom which was to be achieved at some future date. They also criticized any attempt at direct confrontation with Japan to win independence as a futile exercise. At the end of the First World War, the demand for self-determination became strident in many parts of the world, leading to the enhancement of national consciousness. When these ideas and ideological trends spread amongst overseas Koreans in the United States, An Chang-Ho published an article criticizing freedom struggles as a vain and impossible ideal and as an indulgence in idle imagination. He argued that Koreans were not qualified to be independent and advised the members of Heungsadan (The Corps for the

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Advancement of Scholars) to concentrate on the development of industry and education.23 Subsequent to this, Rhee Syngman put forward his proposal of trusteeship.24 The theories of the impossibility of independence and the undesirability of independence were formulated by Yun Chi-Ho in the aftermath of the March First Movement. These theories reached their culmination in the 1930s when the cultural and religious leaders of Korea lent unstinted support to Japan’s assimilationist policies, which included a spirited campaign for turning the Korean people into loyal subjects of the Japanese emperor and spreading the claim that the Korean and Japanese peoples shared the same ancestral root. The reforminsts’ positions on the national question and nationalism are revealed in an essay entitled ‘On the Reconstruction of the Korean National Character’ by Yi Gwang-Su (Yi Kwangsu) and in various campaigns to achieve national self-strengthening and national autonomy.25 The reformists undoubtedly possessed considerable anti-Japanese consciousness and nationalist consciousness, but because of the harshness of the colonial rule and the extreme fragility of their material base, they could not set up any political organization to strive for independence. They kept vacillating between the two extremes of upholding nationalism and capitulating to the colonial authorities. They deferred the goal of independence to a distant future, and while they raised the banner of national self-strengthening, new education and new life, they did not evince any interest in the problem of the landlord system. Their rural reform or rural development movement contained only one agenda item – that of anti-smoking. They usually compromised with the colonial authorities. Nevertheless, a section of medium and small-scale landlords and some members of the petit bourgeois class possessed intense nationalist consciousness. These participated enthusiastically in the anti-Japanese resistance movement, and in the late 1920s they organized the Singanhoe (New Korea Society) in collaboration with the socialists. It also deserves to be noted that in the early 1930s, when the militarist fascism had yet to reach its zenith and the darkness had not yet deepened, An Jae-Hong assembled a group of like-minded individuals to launch a Korean Studies Movement26 and Yi Geuk-Ro and other scholars of the Korean language launched a movement for the preservation and systematization of the Korean language. In the 1920s, the movement to spread literacy through evening schools and other campaigns for the removal of illiteracy expanded. The effort to preserve and promote Korean culture also continued unabated, although not on a large scale. The nationalists who did not yield to the pressure of the colonial authorities, along with freedom fighters overseas from a bourgeois background, deserve to be praised as the most representative forces of bourgeois nationalism. It is important in this context to understand and analyse various controversies on nationalism between the socialists and the reformists. Korea’s national liberation struggle, even within the context of bourgeois nationalism, assumed a socialist hue.27 Korea’s socialists were equally intense nationalists, although they criticized bourgeois nationalism and emphasized class struggle. They also forged a working alliance or a procedural alliance with the

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nationalists. They joined forces with the nationalists, organized the 10 June Independence Movement, and subsequently organized the Singanhoe (New Korea Society), the largest organization to serve as a conduit of nationalist aspiration in the country. The available evidence clearly demonstrates that no organization in Korea was as relentless and uncompromising in resisting Japan as the Korean Communist Party.28 Socialists were constantly faced with the danger of imprisonment, but this threat did not deter their revolutionary ardour. However, from 1928–29 onwards, when the theory of proletarian hegemony was emphasized, class lines became increasingly rigid. Furthermore, after the declaration of the December Thesis, which laid down the guidelines for indiscriminate struggle against the nationalists, the Korean Communist Party in Korea began displaying hostility towards the agenda and activities of the bourgeois reformists. They considered leftist nationalists as even more dangerous. Ironically, however, such a rigid approach29 made them myopic and narrow in dealing with the national question, and they were often criticized as ‘lackeys of anti-national foreign powers’. This led to the incorporation of general bourgeois individuals into the orbit of the nationalists and the attendant enhancement of their national prestige. When Korea was liberated in 1945, these developments proved to be immensely influential in shaping the political course of the nation. In contrast, Yi Gwang-Su, known as the apostle of the new culture and modernization movements, put forward his theory of the ‘harm of independence’ in the 1910s and in the 1920s he wrote on the inherent weakness and inferiority of the Korean nation and Korean people. He was supported and guided by high-ranking officials of the colonial administration in composing an essay, entitled ‘On the Reconstruction of the Korean National Character’. In this essay Yi Gwang-Su emphasized the need to redress the deficiency of the Korean national character, accumulating national strength and desisting from the struggle for freedom. He launched a self-strengthening and a national self-autonomy movement which fell within the legal boundaries set by imperialist Japan. It is also interesting to note that he condemned Singanhoe as a group of goblins. Yi Gwang-su, the ideologue of the reform movement and the self-proclaimed ‘incarnation of nationalism’, criticized the socialists as ‘half-baked Marxists, possessing slavish thoughts’. He argued that despite the fact that the nation was an eternal entity, there were many who abused the term.30 It is ironical that he used the expression ‘true national criminals’ to describe such people. It needs to be remembered, however, that Yi Gwang-Su’s views held immense appeal amongst his contemporaries. The common people were not impressed so much with his criticism of national consciousness as a means to paralyse class consciousness, or his denunciation of nationalism, but with his view that ‘the nation was an eternal entity’. In other words, it was his privileging of the nation over class that struck a chord with his audience. During the dark and suffocating atmosphere of colonial rule, no other word held as much appeal and attraction as the word ‘nation’. In the post-liberation era, Rhee Syngman and the Korean Democratic Party used similar forceful arguments to attack the Communist Party of Korea and

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the South Korean Workers’ Party. The charges and counter-charges levelled by the socialists and reformists on each other on the issue of nationalism or each other’s nationalist credentials gives us an insight into the contemporary prejudices and distorted views of nationalism. Starting from the late 1930s, Korea experienced the greatest trauma and danger to its survival since the nation came into existence. The kominka movement and the ideological campaign of the racial unity of Korea and Japan, aimed at annihilating national consciousness and was supported and patronized by most of the bourgeois class and a section of the socialists. Most of the bourgeois reformists praised the Japanese war of invasion and exhorted the Korean people to join the army under the banner of the Red Sun. They also helped recruit students into the Japanese army. A point to note in this context is that the ‘modernization-first’ theory was embedded in the support for the kominka movement and the praise for war and military fascism. Some people have sought to defend the reformists’ participation in Japan’s militarist war of invasion and their anti-national activities by arguing that they were either coerced or had no option but to support it in order to protect their property and their positions.31 These words of defence may have some merit, but they reflect only part of the truth. One may also point out that engagement in anti-national activities in order to protect one’s personal property or position was not a new phenomenon, but almost a perennial scenario since the late nineteenth century. In truth, this forms a part of the pattern of their class character, amply evident in a range of capitalist modernization programmes, the most representative being ‘the movement for the inculcation of national capability or strength to win independence’. It is obvious that the criminal and anti-nationalist act of supporting the Japanese war of invasion was closely related to the basic character of the reformists and their agenda. As noted earlier, these reformists were under the influence of the social Darwinist doctrine of the ‘survival of the fittest’ and believed in the doctrine of ‘might is right’ in relations amongst races or states.32 In their opinion the weak had to yield to the strong.33 These supporters of Japan’s fascist war and worshippers of brutal strength themselves could potentially become fascists. Their vision of modernization could accommodate nothing except industrialization. They paid only lip-service to the concept of human rights and liberty, or the importation of the Western legal system. It is also interesting that their fascism was not grounded in intense, expansionist nationalism, but in Japan’s assimilationist policies of kominka and of the racial unity of the two nations. It also bears ample testament to their isolation from their own historical and cultural tradition and the common people. After liberation, when the reformists assumed power, their long-held ideology manifested itself in ultra-right fascism, wreaking havoc on the common masses and betraying the nation. The theory of the assimilation of the two races was an extreme ideological stance34 which was intolerant towards communism and it is hardly surprising that after liberation they became the architects of anti-communist fascism.35 The reformists’ support for the kominka and of the assimilation of the two races sheds significant light on their perception of the nation and national

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consciousness. They considered the Korean nation to be inferior and the Korean masses to be idiotic barbarians. Their weak national consciousness lay suppressed under their ‘modernization-first’ theory. As has been noted earlier, a range of theories about the inferiority of the nation or the need for Korea to merge with Japan were inspired primarily by their belief that it was impossible for Korea to win independence and fight for freedom and that this was a vain and harmful exercise. Their complete reliance on foreign powers after liberation was also not a surprising development, whose seed can be traced to their activities in the pre-liberation era. After liberation such major reformists as Yi Gwang-su and Yun Chi-ho, who had taken an active part in anti-national activities and had served as the puppets of the colonial authorities, came up with the most preposterous argument that they had acted in this manner for the sake of the nation or for saving the country. This surprising leap of logic is essentially similar to the argument put forward by those who campaigned for separate regimes in the post-liberation era or those who espoused extreme anti-communism. The enthusiastic participation of some Koreans in the Japanese campaign to annihilate national consciousness was one of the factors contributing to the political turmoil in the post-liberation era. It also impacted heavily on the campaign to establish two separate regimes across the 38th parallel. The military fascism which was forged and perfected during the colonial era was also responsible for the emergence of ultra-right anti-communism in South Korea. But it is also worthy of note that some middle and small bourgeois individuals and landlords suffered with the common masses under the iron boot of the military fascists and emerged as the true symbols of the antiJapanese nationalist resistance. Such leaders as An Jae-Hong and Kim ByeongNo never collaborated with the Japanese. Instead, they waited for an opportune moment. It is also noteworthy that it was during this period of Japanese militarism that several scholars of the Korean language were imprisoned on the charge of preserving national consciousness. NATION AND STATE IN THE PERIOD OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND THE NATIONAL DIVISION

The Period of the American Military Government The Korean people could not build a nation-state and develop it until the liberation of the country from Japan. To build the nation-state, many reforms were necessary, amongst which land reform and the punishment of proJapanese traitors were the most urgent. The establishment of the nation-state, however, was not accomplished after Liberation because Soviet Russia occupied the North of the Korean peninsula and the USA the South, along the dividing line of the 38th parallel. These two powers occupied the regions not only in order to disarm the Japanese army, but also to realize their national interests on the Korean peninsula. Thus, the 38th parallel could be seen not just as a temporary demarcation line but the permanent border of these two countries. Moreover, Soviet Russia and the USA expected either a socialist or

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capitalist state to be established on the Korean peninsula to serve their interests as either the leader of socialism or capitalism. The Leftists proposed a progressive social transformation and the establishment of a people’s government, while the Rightists proposed gradual or bourgeois reform. The former yearned for a people’s republic and the latter, a democratic republic. At this juncture, the question of the nation faced a crisis, amply evident in the political situation, the power relations of the political forces and the severe conflicts of the Rightists and Leftists in both the South and the North. The collusion of Korea’s main political forces with foreign powers and a delay in the punishment of the pro-Japanese traitors led to the marginalization of nationalism and the national question. The severe confrontation of the leftists and rightists aggravated this situation. For the extremist groups, their class interests and identity were their first priority – at any cost. Even though the forced implementation of the Japanese assimilation policy of eradicating Korean national consciousness was still fresh in the minds of Koreans and the great delight of liberation swept even those Koreans who considered themselves to be ‘Japanese’ under the campaign of ‘Becoming the Japanese Emperor’s Loyal Subjects’, the space for nationalists on the peninsula remained constricted. Moreover, it was very difficult for the national consciousness to be ‘normalized’, not to mention expanded or deepened. In the post-liberation era the People’s Committee or the Leftists emerged in South Korea as a far more powerful force than the Rightists, making it difficult for the Korean Democratic Party or the Rhee Syngman group to consolidate their power without the active patronage of the Rightists and the oppression of the Leftists by the American Military Government. The American Military Government ignored the Korean people’s burning desire for national revolution by adopting a policy of preserving the status quo and maintaining the government organs of the former Japanese imperialist administration. Moreover, despite the obvious capacity for self-government displayed by the voluntary and independent activities of the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence, the American Military Government ruled the South directly in stark contrast to the policy of the MacArthur Headquarters in Japan. By assuming that the pro-Japanese Koreans who had successfully worked for Japan would also serve the American Military Government well, the American Military Government gave important positions to former policemen, bureaucrats and military personnel who had served Japanese imperialism. This policy of maintaining the status quo, direct rule and the appointment of pro-Japanese traitors to important positions enabled the extreme Right to revive and to emerge as a major political force. The American Military Government was an active patron and protector of extreme Rightists such as Rhee Syngman and the Korean Democratic Party which were largely based on the pro-Japanese traitors. In addition, as mentioned above, since the open door policy Korea’s modernist leaders mostly hailed from the ranks of the pro-Japanese forces and Christians, these leaders naturally became pro-American after Liberation. In addition, because of the political situation in the post-liberation era, they became totally dependent

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upon America. Their reliance on the US was clearly evident in a political address delivered by Song Jin-U, the first Secretary General of the Korean Democratic Party. It was also clearly articulated in Rhee Syngman’s special speech, delivered on the occasion of the new government on 15 August 1948. In this address, President Rhee proclaimed that America helped Korea in the cause of justice and humanism and in the promotion of world peace and friendship without any imperialist purpose or self-interest.36 Rhee Syngman frequently called for the withdrawal of the Soviet Russian Army, but opposed a similar call to the US Army. In dealing with pro-Japanese traitors, the utmost caution should have been taken: only those who had committed extreme pro-Japanese treacherous acts or who were cardinal pro-Japanese criminals should have been punished and those forced to engage in pro-Japanese activities under unavoidable circumstances should have been allowed to serve the new country with their technical and administrative skills, after some re-education or sanctions. In building a new country after Liberation and modernizing the country, it was necessary to take advantage of their professional abilities. Nevertheless, in building the new nation-state, it was inevitable that pro-Japanese crimes be placed on trial in order to establish an official discipline in the new nation. Despite the necessity of punishing these pro-Japanese crimes, the Korean Democratic Party hesitated to punish pro-Japanese criminals because the party was composed of reformist groups and others such as Jang Deok-Su (Chang Tok-su) who had actively worked for the invading Japanese imperialists and actively participated in the campaign of ‘Becoming the Japanese Emperor’s Loyal Subjects’. Moreover, the Korean Democratic Party represented the interests of the bourgeois and landlords. Since he lacked a political base in Korea, Rhee Syngman actively welcomed those who had committed pro-Japanese crimes. Although the policy of the American Military Government formed the backbone of the policy of punishing the pro-Japanese traitors, a combination of the interests of the Korean Democratic Party and Rhee Syngman on the one hand and the Communist Party’s highly strategic use of the issue of punishment of pro-Japanese traitors on the other worked together to delay the trial of the pro-Japanese traitors. Korea thus lost the opportunity to establish a clear national spirit and public discipline. In the meantime, the pro-Japanese forces coalesced into extreme Rightist camps such as the Korean Democratic Party and Rhee Syngman group. Their attitude towards the question of the nation also became clear: their policy was to distort the true national consciousness. The most crucial and telling moment in this ploy was the movement against the UN Trusteeship at the end of 1945. It is clear that the movement against the UN Trusteeship denoted the nationalism of the Rightists, but wore a façade of the quest for independence and nationalism. However, it became unambiguously clear after the establishment of the divided states on the peninsula that the extreme Right lacked any concept or ideology of nationalism except that it held a vague notion of a blood-oriented ethno-nationalism, encapsulated in the myth of Dangun as the progenitor of the Korean nation. The movement against the UN Trusteeship became both a campaign against Soviet Russia and communism,

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and at the same time it served as a campaign to support the exiled Korean Provisional Government in Chongqing in a way that it threatened the realization of the agreements of the Moscow Conference attended by the Foreign Ministers of the US, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.37 The fundamental content of the agreements was to establish the Korean Provisional Government as soon as possible. This resolution was the sole international agreement on solving the Korean question. As we shall see later, an anticommunist nationalism which accepted only anti-communists as members of the nation, along with an ultra-right anti-communism, surfaced in its incipient form in the course of the movement against the UN Trusteeship. It stemmed and stunted any legitimate rise of nationalism and solidified the national division. The ultra-rightist nationalism was even more extreme than the ethno-nationalism, which held that ‘blood’ was ‘above ideology’. Thus, while the movement against the UN Trusteeship was the backbone of the rightist nationalism, the intention or goal of the movement had another dimension that differed considerably from this rightist nationalism. The movement against the UN Trusteeship was geared to the agenda to establish a separate nation on the peninsula. That is why the movement against the UN Trusteeship remained spirited until the Korean question was transferred to the UN – in other words, until the time of the establishment of the separate governments on the peninsula. The rightist forces replaced the work of punishing the pro-Japanese traitors with that of punishing those who supported the UN Trusteeship.38 Punishment of the pro-Japanese traitors was a major task for the nation. While pro-Japanese individuals were considered to be national traitors or those who betrayed the national interest prior to the beginning of the movement against the UN Trusteeship, the supporters of the UN Trusteeship were suddenly labelled as the national traitors in the fight against the UN Trusteeship. Pro-Japanese people actively participated in this fight. For them, instead of nationalism or national consciousness, antiTrusteeship itself was the only goal and value – until the Korean question was transferred to the UN and the national division became a concrete reality. As General Hodge, the US Department of State and the American Head Representative of the US-Soviet Joint Commission, repeatedly pointed out, the anti-Trusteeship activists did not consider how formidable an obstacle the anti-Trusteeship movement could pose to building the nation-state.39 In addition, the national independent spirit of the Rightists, which was much emphasized in the anti-Trusteeship movement, coexisted with pro-American sentiments and a dependence on foreign powers. The independent spirit of the nation was interpreted differently. For Kim Ku and his Korean Independence Party it meant lending support to the Korean Provisional Government (of Chongqing), while for Rhee Syngman and the Korean Democratic Party it meant the establishment of the separate government. In other words, the national independent spirit of the anti-Trusteeship campaign often meant the exclusion not only of leftists but the centre-right nationalists who opposed or criticized their political lines as well. Following the anti-Trusteeship movement at the end of 1945, Rhee Syngman and The Korean Democratic Party emphasized that while the

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Communist Party was a national traitor which hindered national independence and voluntarily accepted a slave status to foreign powers, they themselves were patriots who demanded immediate independence.40 The extreme rightists used this black and white logic to stress that the object of punishment was not the pro-Japanese but the leftists who supported the Moscow Conference agreements of the Foreign Ministers of the three countries. Thus, the Communist Party – including even the center-left nationalists – was defined as the obstacle to national unification. Even the request to punish the pro-Japanese collaborators was labelled as an obstacle to ‘unification’!41 These rightists considered the intensification of anti-communist and antitrusteeship struggles as a key to the solution of the national question. Rhee Syngman and the Korean Democratic Party tried to solve the national question through anti-communist and anti-trusteeship policies and regarded the movement for a separate government and their anti-communist and anti-Trusteeship policies as the two sides of the same coin. Their appeal for ‘self-determination’ and ‘immediate independence’ were in fact calls for ‘separate independence’ and ‘immediate division’. Although the division of the nation was a fatal blow to the Korean people – no less a blow than the colonial domination – and they knew that they could never have contemplated dividing the nation since Korea had been a single nation which had not been divided since the Late Three Kingdom period, the ultra-rightists and pro-Japanese forces chose the road of national division. When the Truman doctrine was announced, Rhee Syngman welcomed it by stating that the doctrine was a ray of hope and a bright light for the Korean people, and sought to exploit it to legitimize his agenda of a separate government.42 The Korean Democratic Party even condemned Kim Ku as ‘a gentleman of the Kremlin Palace’ as soon as Kim Ku suggested negotiations between South and North with a view to preventing the tragedy of national division. Indeed, Kim Ku was different from the centrist forces, and cooperated with Rhee Syngman and the Korea Democratic Party until Rhee pursued the agenda of the separate government.43

The Period of Divided Korea Since separate governments were established in South and North, the dominant ideology in the South has been that of anti-communism. This ideological situation in South Korea is different from the general situation of other Third World countries. It took time for anti-communist ideology to take root and act as a totalitarian ideology. Anti-communist ideology was introduced in South Korea initially through the movement for defence against communism at the end of Japanese imperialism. In the post-independence era such events as the anti-Trusteeship movement of 1945, the anti-communist and anti-trusteeship movement after 1945, the legislation for punishing national traitors, the communist factional activities incident in the National Assembly, the Korean War and the military coup of 16 May contributed towards its consolidation. The movement for defence against communism which was developed as part of the military fascism of Japanese imperialism, involved all people

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under the call for full mobilization. It is remarkable that pro-Japanese forces and some reformists participated in the movement for defence against communism. Although indoctrination in anti-communist ideology exerted some influence on the masses, its influence was limited because the socialist movements in colonial Korea were considered to be national liberation struggles. The anti-communism and anti-Trusteeship movement from the end of 1945 onwards had a major influence on the masses who did not agree with leftist ideology. Above all, it became an ideology of the masses, which the ultraright could mobilize. Since most people opposed the division of the nation prior to the establishment of the separate governments in the South and North, the anti-communism and anti-trusteeship movement, which inherited the political inclination and orientation of the establishment of separate governments, faced limitation. However, the situation changed after June 1949. In that month, the Rhee Syngman government launched an attack (known as the June Attack). The ultra-rightist forces dealt a heavy blow to the junior lawmakers who demanded the punishment of pro-Japanese traitors and seized the initiative in a bid to introduce the law for punishing national traitors. The junior members of the National Assembly made a great effort to realize the farmers’ interests in the process of legislating the Farmland Reform Act and demanded the withdrawal of the American army from South Korea. In the June offensive, the Rhee Syngman government’s police attacked the Special Commission on Anti-National Traitors. The Rhee government concocted the communist faction incident among the lawmakers as well, and in the meantime, Kim Ku was assassinated. The police attack on the Special Commission on Anti-National Traitors, the fabricated communist faction incident in the national assembly and the assassination of Kim Ku carry immense historical significance in modern Korean history in that they contributed to the establishment of the ultraright anti-communist regime. The Rhee government got rid of the progressive junior lawmakers and condemned the request for punishment of the pro-Japanese traitors, the proposal for easing the South/North confrontation and of national reunification as ‘anti-state’ and ‘unpatriotic’. This atmosphere was demonstrated in a number of incidents. The surviving junior lawmakers kept their silence out of a fear for their safety or joined the Democratic Nationalist Party (an offshoot of the Korean Democratic Party). An Du-Hwi (An Tu-hui), the self-confessed assassin of Kim Ku, openly argued that murdering Kim Ku whom he regarded as an enemy of the state, would benefit the country. However, the election of 30 May 1950 was another serious challenge to the ultra-rightist regime. In the election of 30 May 1950, the ultra-right, including the Rhee government, condemned the centre nationalists and the protagonists of SouthNorth Reconciliation as pro-communists. The ultra-rightists appealed to the people not to vote for the centre nationalists and advocates of South/North Reconciliation. The Rhee government unleashed a reign of terror on them by mobilizing its police force and youth organizations. What is worse, the Rhee government threw some candidates, including Jang Geon-Sang, into prison. Despite these aggressive policies, a considerable number of well-known

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nationalists were elected and most senior members of the Democratic Nationalist Party and the Daehan (Great Korean) National Party who supported Rhee Syngman were defeated in the election by the largest margin in the country. Jo So-Ang gained victory over Jo Byeong-Ok, the champion of the ultra-rightists. This clearly testified to the popularity of those who had devoted their entire lives to the cause of nation. Even Jang Geon-Sang (Chang Kon-sang), who was in prison during the election, was elected by a huge margin in Busan. However, the Korean War which broke out right after the election, narrowed the nationalists’ scope and consolidated the foundation for the ultra-right anti-communist regime. In the early period of the war, centrist politicians and nationalists, including Kim Gyu-Sik, were taken to North Korea by force. Because of the fratricidal war and mass killings of the National Guidance League (Bodo Yeon-maeng) and the massacres of dangerous characters [i.e. leftists – translator], people who were able to display good common sense and a critical attitude found it difficult to play an active role in South Korea. Worse still, as the importance of foreign aid increased for the Korean economy, the material base for nationalism became much weaker. Instead, students and citizens in South Korea were mobilized in anti-communist campaigns under the slogans of crushing communism, overthrowing North Korea, and achieving national unification. Thus, in South Korea, the regime of total mobilization for anti-communism was established. However it was not until the Military Coup of 16 May that the anticommunist ideology was internalized in people’s minds. The military forces destroyed the revolutionary movements of April 1960 and further consolidated the regime of ultra-right anti-communism. The Park Chung-Hee regime first seized power under the slogan of anticommunism. It exhibited some semblance of nationalism, which was influenced by the political atmosphere of the April Revolution and various other political experiences. The successful economic development under the Park regime elevated the pride of the Korean nation, and under the Yushin system, the emphasis on the importance of ‘nationalism’ or education in the ‘national identity’ played some part in the nation’s education in nationalism. However, the Park regime could be truly called the regime of divided states because it contributed to the consolidation of the national division more systematically than the Rhee regime. In addition, the Park regime consistently maintained a non-independent attitude towards foreign powers such as Japan and the USA. And under the Park regime, statism or more specifically ‘anti-communist statism’, which was largely in conflict with nationalism, was established more firmly with the assistance of the National Security Law and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency Act. Contrary to its promise, the Park regime retained key personnel from the Rhee government and kept the Republican Party and the government under the domination of the military. Thus, the new military officers along with the former Japanese officers who, as guardians of the ‘Empire’, pledged their loyalty to the ‘Emperor’, seized the reins of the government. Many proJapanese bureaucrats and some Liberal Party members participated in this military government. In practice, technocrats who were trained in the

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USA and adhered to the American worldview were dominant. In contrast, the nationalists and progressive leaders, who were called the camp of Revolutionary Renovation and who had initiated unification movements during the April Revolution by criticizing the political regime of ultra-rightist anti-communism, were condemned by the military government as ‘antistate criminals, guilty of anti-state crimes’. The military government punished them by introducing ‘Special Law for Punishing Special Crimes’. On the basis of this retroactive law, the government placed them in prison. And even after their release those politicians and activist students were kept under the tight control of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and were always under the threat of death. The true face of anti-communist statism appeared to have been clearly revealed. The leaders of the Military Coup destroyed all local autonomy and reorganized the agricultural cooperatives along with the Korean Confederation of Labour Unions, the Association of Teachers and the Professional Associations. The military government robbed these organizations of their autonomy and independence. On this foundation, the military government conducted a vigorous anti-communist and anti-North Korean education campaign. The Korean Central Intelligence Agency, which was created by military intelligence officers, wielded absolute power to control the lives of the people and oppress them. The military government introduced the Anti-Communist Law and made the National Security Law more draconian. In contrast to its anti-communist education campaign and strong advocacy of the modernization of the country, the Park regime failed to pay due attention to the work of promoting national culture. The regime also showed no interest in research and education on the history of modern Korea, an endeavour of immense relevance to nationalism and national culture. The headquarters of the colonial government in Seoul was used as the central offices of the new Korean Government. The military government also evinced no interest in organizing commemorative events for Liberation. On the contrary, the government incessantly emphasized the threat of invasion from North Korea and staged ideological campaigns against the North. To deal with the criticism of the lack of cultural policy, the military government built the Academy of Korean Studies [literally, The Research Institute of Korean Spiritual Culture – the translator] at the end of the Yushin period. It was evident from the choice of the first President of the Academy, a scholar who had served both the Japanese colonial government and the Rhee government, that this institution was meant to serve the military government through spreading ideological education. The Park regime’s independence was undermined because of the humiliating treaty with Japan signed under conditions lacking transparency and integrity. It enjoyed ‘a back-scratching alliance’ with ‘pro-Korean’ and ultra-right militarist forces in Japan that had invaded both Korea and China. By signing this humiliating treaty with Japan and dispatching the Korean army to South Vietnam, the Park regime maintained a honeymoon relationship with the USA and stood at the forefront of the process of consolidating the Cold War through its total obedience to the logic of the ideological confrontation between Soviet Russia and the USA.

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The exacting ideology of the Cold War and the regime of ultra-right anticommunism intimidated not only democracy but also nationalism throughout the nation, and distorted the national consciousness. Putting aside the debate over whether there can be any basic doctrine of the state in modern society, the basic doctrine of South Korea was neither nationalism nor democracy, but only anti-communism. Anti-communism was an absolute value that stood out as paramount and unquestionable. Under this anti-communist regime, the dominant class were the pro-Japanese and pro-Americans and the backbone that sustained this ultra-right anti-communist regime was the USA. Under the ultra-right anti-communist regime, the ultra-rightists (or the ruling elites) were allowed freedom, but even opposition parties, professing ultra-right ideology, were not immune to the wrath of the government. As mentioned above, even the existence of rightist nationalism, such as that espoused by the forces of the South and North Reconciliation or the Centrists, was threatened following the Korean War. While pro-American and pro-Western progressive political forces did appear after the Korean War, even these were severely persecuted and their existence endangered. The National Security Law severely punished even overseas Koreans, whether from Germany or Japan, who visited North Korea, itself a part of the Korean peninsula. It also resolutely condemned those who promoted unification movements or called for reconciliation between North and South Korea. From research and education on the history of modern Korea, we can clearly see just how severely the National Security and Anti-Communist Laws controlled people’s thoughts and wreaked havoc on the nation’s cultural and intellectual life. Korean society was far from an exemplar of the truth that modern man was born of a self-awareness of his or her contemporary society. Any criticism of or opposition to the USA was persecuted with the same vigour that witchcraft had been in the late Middle Ages in Europe. What is worse, with the rise of this extreme ‘statism’, the antagonism between South and North Korea seriously increased. People on the peninsula forgot that the other half existed, with the result that the South Korean people considered only South Korea to be Korea and the North did likewise. People on the Korean peninsula seemed to have forgotten that they lived in a divided country. The ultraright ideology was so powerful that people in South Korea believed that there were no human beings, only extraterrestrials, in North Korea. Thus, ultraright anti-communism overshadowed Korean nationalism and stymied national consciousness. As can be seen from the fact that the Rhee Syngman administration, the Park Chung-Hee regime and the Chun Doo-Hwan regime are all called military dictatorships, ultra-right anti-nationalism is a fascist authoritarianism and is in sharp contradiction of liberal democracy. Nevertheless, the Korean style of ultra-right anti-communist dictatorship possessed its own defining feature of emphasizing democracy or liberal democracy and, indeed, partially practising it in certain institutions and promulgating and publicising it through the education system. We need to observe this double character of Korean ultra-right fascism in a dynamic way, and thus it is necessary to

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analyse how the relationship between Korean fascism and the population changed through democratic struggle and the development of citizenship. For example, the election of 15 March 1960 was a prelude to the collapse of the Rhee Syngman regime. Similarly, the election of 12 December 1978, in which the opposition party was victorious over the ruling party by a 1% margin, was a prelude to the breakdown of the Park Chung-Hee regime and its Yushin dictatorship. The general election of 12 February 1985 signalled the end of the Chun Doo-Hwan regime. It is interesting to note that the general election of 26 April 1988 was a partial embodiment of the spirit of the June Democratic Movement and was different in character from the presidential election of 1987. In addition to the above-mentioned incident, it is remarkable that democracy movements or nationalist sentiments arose suddenly in response to certain political situations such as those existing during the period immediately following the national liberation in 1945, the period of the April Revolution or the Seoul Spring of 1980. The popular base of the ultra-right anticommunist political system was so weak that the rulers were unable to allow freedom, democracy and nationalism to develop continuously.44 While appearing strong, the ultra-right anti-communist political system was in fact extremely fragile. Because of its weakness, the regime controlled the population tightly and severely oppressed any dissent. The Rhee regime mobilized people under its campaign of Unification by Northward Advance, which placed South Korea on a quasi-war footing, and it executed Jo Bong-Am out of a fear of his peaceful unification campaign.45 Subsequently, the Park ChungHee government, which toughened the ultra-right anti-communist policies of the previous administration, prohibited any discussion on national unification or exchanges between South and North Korea. With its draconian policies to deal with democratic movements, the South Korean government increasingly revealed its oppressive and authoritarian character. The Revitalization was introduced by demolishing the political atmosphere of unification achieved by the democratic movements of 1971 and the joint communiqué of 4 July 1972, and Chun Doo-Hwan assumed power by suppressing the Seoul Spring of 1980. Because of the extremely fluid political environment, it at times seemed as if there were two diametrically opposed nations co-existing within the ultra-right anti-communist political system: one nation of ultra-right anti-communism and another of democracy and unification. The political dynamic changed through democratic struggle and political incidents. In this chapter, I have not dealt with the question of the nation and nationalism during the period of the April Revolution because this topic is not directly related to the issue of the nationalism of the dominant class. The April Revolution brought a ray of hope for democracy and nationalism in South Korea. As is well known, anti-American and unification movements were very active during the period of the April Revolution and, while we may discuss these movements from diverse points of view, we can define them as the antithesis of the Rhee Syngman government. After the military coup of 16 May, intellectuals, students, and some politicians resumed movements for nationalism. They staged protests and

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demonstrations over issues such as the Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty and American soldiers’ crimes in Korea. In the 1970s, anti-Park regime movements also developed. These movements can be characterized as opposing the dictatorship or the Revitalization regime. In these movements, intellectuals, especially young people, organized diverse activities for revitalizing the traditional cultures of Korea, such as mask dances. It is remarkable that, since the 1960s, nationalist historical studies struggled successfully to overcome the tradition of colonialism in both history and literature and that works of nationalism and realism were developed successfully in literature. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the main concern of intellectual works was the search for ‘the minjung’ or ‘the common people’. If not all intellectuals, dissidents were very active in the research and development of national culture. Their activities made Koreans realize the autonomous and internal development of Korean history. In the 1980s, the democratization and anti-American independence movements were united under the name of nationalism and democracy and challenged the ultraright anti-communist regime directly. We must discuss those cases where the ultra-right anti-communist governments politically exploited the anti-Japanese sentiments of the people, which was closely related to the nationalist spirit or national consciousness of Koreans. Under the Rhee government, the Korean Government initiated many large-scale and long-lived anti-Japanese movements. Even in the 1970s and 1980s, a number of anti-Japanese movements broke out over the issue of Japanese history textbooks, but the distortion in Korean history textbooks was not discussed at the time. In sharp contrast to the experience of the 1970s and 1980s, the Rhee government itself led the anti-Japanese movements. On the one hand, the anti-Japanese movements under the Rhee government were developed as part of an anti-communist policy to counter the Japanese approach to North Korea and communist China. On the other hand, although the Rhee government was a pro-Japanese government that was unwilling to eliminate the influence of Japanese colonialism and many independence fighters were persecuted, people harboured strong anti-Japanese sentiments despite the fact they were not transmitted through the tradition of antiJapanese independence movements. In addition, the fact that the Japanese government was not willing to accept Korea’s legitimate requests in the process of the Normalization Treaty fuelled anti-Japanese movements in Korea. Thus we must understand the diverse aspects of nationalism and anti-communism in Korea in a dynamic way. This is also true of Kim Jong-Pil’s ‘national democracy’. Kim Jong-Pil exchanged the so-called ‘Ohira-Kim memo’, which refers to the secretive deal he made with Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira in Japan in 1962, paving the way for the KoreaJapan Normalization Treaty. President Park maintained the theory of ‘national democracy’ by establishing statues of national heroes all over the country, an adroit attempt indeed to manipulate ethno-symbolism, demonstrating that the Park regime was an embodiment of dependence and imitation. In order to make a proper appraisal of the character of the Park regime, we need to take into account a range of issues, including its relations with

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Japan or the USA, or its response and reaction to the questions of national unification, national consciousness and its statism. In addition, when we evaluate ‘Yushin nationalism’ (or Park Chung-Hee’s nationalism), which includes changes in the textbook policy from a government approval system to a government-designated textbook system and the establishment of the Academy of Korean Studies with an emphasis on educating in national history, we should not only analyse his efforts in the manipulation of symbols for the security of his own government, but also critically evaluate the real content of his Yushin nationalism. We should do this by studying the characteristics of the power elites of the Yushin government and that of the technocrats, the relation between nationalism and the Yushin elite, the Yushin power elite’s understanding of Korean modern history, and the writings about North Korea and the military governments which were written by the rightist scholars of the Academy of Korean Studies. While modern education contributed to the development of national consciousness and nationalism in the late-Joseon dynasty and the Japanese colonial period, the development of universal education and the rapid spread of literacy under the Rhee Syngman government further promoted that nationalism. In a sense, it was the Rhee government that introduced education of Korean history. Although the content of Korea’s historical education was influenced by Japanese colonialism, learning about one’s own national history is inseparably related to the development of modern citizenship and national consciousness. Considering that the Rhee government was proJapanese and hindered the implementation of the Special Law for Punishing Anti-national Crimes, it is ironical, but an important step forward that it introduced material on the historical anti-Japanese independence movements in the official history textbooks in order to establish the national identity. The content of this education, however, left much to be desired. This education about the independence movements contributed to a strengthening of the national identity and enabled the nation-state to develop. Nor should we confine ourselves to a discussion of the strengthening of the national identity in the field of history education alone. During the Rhee Syngman regime, the government, the Liberal Party, the Democratic Party and the Progressive Party all invariably emphasized the importance of an independent economy and all proposed diverse development policies. Jang Myeon’s government placed the highest priority on economic development. As the domestic and international factors worked together for Korea’s economic development, the successful economic growth of Korea was conspicuous from the mid 1960s onwards and reached a climax in the late 1980s with the economic booms which resulted from such positive factors as low interest rates, the weak US dollar and low oil prices. The dreams of those who had placed the highest priority on modernization, from the time of the late Joseon dynasty, was realized in the 1980s. However, a distinction should be made between dependent development in colonial and semi-colonial times and that which was achieved as an independent country. The vision of modernization of Park and the succeeding military government of the 1980s was simply confined to industrialization. Korean industrialization itself was simply

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vulgar developmentalism without the human face or the ethics of capitalism. It was carried out by pro-Japanese and pro-American groups under an ultraright anti-communist regime or a one-man dictatorship that was antagonistic towards democracy and nationalism. Pro-Japanese and pro-American groups energetically pursued economic development and succeeded in the nexus between world capitalism and American world policy. The economy became overly dependent on both foreign markets and the chaebol system in which business people played pivotal roles. Most entrepreneurs were condemned as comprador capitalists, anti-nationalist and illegal profiteers. While the chaebol economy was itself possible because of the sacrifice of democracy, nationalism and the working people, it contributed to the economic independence of South Korea to some extent and strengthened the characteristics of the national economy of the South. Moreover, demand for democracy and the attendant national dignity became strident because of this economic success. Thus, despite the severe oppression by the ultra-rightist regime in the 1980s, democracy began to take root in South Korea following the June Struggle of 1987. The June struggle was possible because of the economic growth. The general public accepted even the anti-American independence movements and the campaigns for correctly understanding North Korea. Based on these domestic and international changes, people began to take a new approach towards unification that differed from that of the past. The rapid growth of the South Korean economy and a new orientation and enhancement in national consciousness significantly altered the fulcrum of relationship between South Korea and the USA as well. The relationship during the Rhee government was more like that of colonial times or heavily dependent on America, despite the fact that the Rhee government did not always follow American directions and had many conflicts with the White House. In terms of its degree of independence from the USA, the Park government stood mid-way between the Rhee and Chun regimes and that of later governments. Historically, the Park regime represented a ‘middle age’ in the history of the ultra-right anti-communist regimes. While Chun appeared to be most docile to the USA, he was able to maintain a modicum of ‘independence’ from the White House based on his economic successes. The Rho Tae-Woo government, meanwhile, was no different to its predecessors in terms of basic worldview, but it nevertheless announced a brave proposal for national unification and displayed at least partially ‘independent’ attitudes in foreign policy, which also differed greatly from preceding governments. Economic growth also had some negative effects on Korean nationalism. However, even leftist intellectuals, who were impressed by Korea’s economic success and the social transformation of the socialist bloc nations, placed the highest value on economic growth. They resembled the modernization theorists of the late-Joseon dynasty and colonial periods. There are some scholars who place highest priority on economic growth and speak highly of colonial modernization, along with President Park’s drive for economic modernization. This view is a slightly modified version of modernization theorists who have argued that Korea achieved modernization under Japanese colonialism and that rapid economic development was

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possible under the ultra-right anti-communist regime.46 In addition, they maintained that colonial modernization and Park’s modernization were connected and appeared to legitimize both the Japanese colonization and the ultra-right anti-communist regime. They obviously disregarded an essential aspect of colonial modernity. Their research ignored such questions as to how Japanese imperialism hindered Korea’s anti-feudal modernization efforts and destroyed Korean national development in a range of areas, including politics, society and culture. In short, they failed to gain an insightful understanding of the meaning of Japanese colonial domination and of the impact of growth of Japanese colonialism on the national division, the Korean War, and the pro-Japanese ultra-right anti-communist regime. They also lacked a balanced perspective of the Park government. The ‘growth first’ camp negated the existence of the national question which doubtless forms an important component of the history of modern Korea. Some propose that South Korea absorb North Korea or delay national unification. What is worse, they argue that national unification is not necessary, and based on the argument, they take a hard-line approach towards North Korea. Finally, I will discuss whether Korea is ‘one nation but two states’ or ‘two nations and two states’. First of all, although we have three examples of divided countries, namely Germany, China and Vietnam, Korea is very different from Germany and China in terms of its historical context, the causes of the national division and its ethnic composition. For Germany, the nation and the state existed separately throughout history. Thus German nationalism is quite different to that of France or England. The cause of the national division in Germany is also different to that in Korea. China differs from Korea in terms of ethnic composition: in Taiwan, the minority Taiwanese demand independence. And while the Vietnamese situation is similar to that of Korea, Vietnam has many ethnic groups. One more thing I would add is that the general perception of the nation and the state in Korea has greatly changed from the 1950s to the 1980s. In the 1950s, people did not believe that the country was divided – or they failed to grasp the meaning of the national division. Most people thought that the division was temporary and that national unification would come soon after the withdrawal of the USA and Soviet Russia. At the time, since there was not a strong feeling of difference between the South Korean and North Korean peoples and they needed each other in economic life, the people on both sides of the divide genuinely wanted national unification. In addition, many families that were separated and divided into South and North also yearned for national unification. However, in the 1970s and 1980s, perspectives on the national question changed markedly. If we consider the effusive outpouring of joy for national unification that followed the announcement of the joint communiqué of 4 July, it would seem that the desire to establish the nation-state was a national instinct. However, many people still thought there was no hope of national unification. This reality should be discussed when we talk about the characteristics of the state. In the beginning, the concept of the state was confused and unsystematic, only to grow into a more comprehensive and mature system over time. As the

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economic status of Korea improved and Korea’s bargaining power increased, the concept of the state also matured. This later perception differed greatly from that which existed during the period of the Rhee government. Incidentally, North and South Korea did not recognize each other as governments but instead called each other puppet governments. The relations between South and North Korea was so distorted that it was a violation of the National Security Law to recognize the other as a legitimate partner or even to hold any meeting with any citizen of North Korea. On the one hand, South Korea’s anti-communist unification policy and North Korea’s theory of the liberation of South Korea were fundamentally based on the concept of ‘one nation but two states’. In a sense, the theory of one nation but two states was realized in the effort to form single united sports teams between South and North Korea. On the other hand, meanwhile, the ideology of Juche in North Korea and ultra-right anti-communism in South Korea pointed strongly at the concept of two states and two nations, a far cry from the image which their argument of one nation and one state otherwise presented. In addition, the historical fact of the existence of the two separate regimes on the Korean peninsula contributed, in the long term, to the consolidation of the concept of two nations and two states. From the beginning of the modern era, many countries in Asia and Europe made efforts and struggled to build the nation-state. While some countries like Germany and Austria eschewed unification based on their history and culture, in most cases individual nations sought to build a single nation-state. Since Korea had had a single ethnicity and had been a centralized state for a long time, it would appear to have favoured the formation of a single nationstate. Although some extremist ideologies and political systems distorted Korean nationalism in the recent past and the desire for national unification has recently changed due to the influence of German unification and the long history of the separate independent development of South and North Korea, the wish for a single nation state is still strong in Korea. Most people do not believe that the current divided system of South and North Korea is so permanent as to form a system of two nations and two states. Although South and North Korea have had their own economies since the 1940s, very few people have believed or now think that South and North Korea cannot be integrated into one single economic unit. The state already has a long history of continuous existence and both South and North Korea still share this view. Although some forces on the peninsula are trying to consolidate the divided political system, it would be generally accepted that Korea could survive in the long term by becoming a single nation-state. Few people in modern states exhibit an overwhelming conviction that they belong to one nation. The case of the Korean people is unique. Koreans either in the South or in the North believe that all Koreans on the peninsula belong to the same nation. Although South and North Korea apparently constitute two nations and two states, the consciousness of the Korean people bears testimony to the fact that the current system of a divided country is an incomplete or transitory system of one nation but two states, moving steadily towards the goal of one nation and one state.

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In this chapter, I have discussed the national question, nationalist consciousness and nationalism in relation to the orientation of the bourgeois or dominant class who placed top priority on economic modernization. Recently, the relationship between the national question and the economic modernization of the bourgeois or dominant class appears to have changed. Since the democratization struggles of June 1987, South Korea and the world have changed a lot. Unification movements and the campaign for correctly understanding North Korea have developed on a large scale. Negotiations and meetings between South and North Korea at the governmental level have improved considerably. Some South Korean companies have also commenced cautious investment in North Korea, their intentions, however, are suspect. It is not always possible to be optimistic about the improvement in the South-North relationship because of the huge difference in the respective political systems. In South Korea especially, anti-communist ideology has long been imposed on people’s consciousness and has been internalized by the people of South Korea. In addition, in South Korea there are serious obstacles such as a materialistic social consciousness of developmentalism and a distortion or paralysis of spiritual culture. And although South Korea has changed greatly in the areas of defence, unification and diplomacy, its activities are still constrained by the USA. In general, the character of Korean democracy and nationalism is becoming progressive with an unprecedented rapidity. Civil and democratic consciousness is on the right track, even though there may be some temporary setbacks. South Korea is currently experiencing major adjustment. It is clear that South Korea is changing from an ultra-right anti-communist regime to a liberal democratic system. Due to the legacy of the past, the progressive forces do not form the majority and the dominant conservative groups are still so strong and they constantly try to seek opportunities to reverse the course by mobilizing political parties, the mass media, and anti-communist organizations. Nonetheless, the tide of democratization, since the June democratization struggles, has become a raging torrent. In the field of social reform, because of the lack of any powerful organizations or groups for social reform due to the legacy of the past, the government acts as a leader. Since people accept social reform, it will continue despite the expectation of some setbacks. Several presidents have paid a visit to the 19 April cemetery, praised the Gwangju Uprising (Kwangju Rebellion), and expressed their government’s respect for and willingness to learn from the tradition of the April Revolution and the June Democratization Struggle. In addition, they have defined the incidents of 16 May and 12 December as military coups. Since the April Revolution, the Gwangju Uprising and the June Democratization Struggles were a total negation of the ultra-right anti-communist regimes and a climax of the democratization and anti-American independence movements, their announcements succinctly demonstrate that the dominant class that this chapter has described must change its attitude towards the national question.

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Finally, I would add one more thing. The topic which I have discussed here should be looked at from a historical perspective and in three distinct phases: the early period from the 1950s to 1980s, the mid-term period from the 1990s to the current stage (in which the relation between South and North has been changing rapidly), and the eventual period of unification, even if we do not know when that national unification will be established and in what form. NOTES 1

2

3

4 5 6

7

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9 10

11 12 13 14

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Anthony D. Smith, ‘Nationalism and Classical Sociological Theory’, British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 34 (March 1983). C.f. The author used the translated Korean version, Minjok Munjewa Mareukeusjueuja (National Question and Marxists), edited by Im Ji-Hyun (translated volume), Hangyore Publishers, 1986, p. 26. See the initial section of the first chapter of my book Hanguk Hyeondae Minjok Undong Yeongu (A Study on the National Movement in Contemporary Korea) which deals with the character of the Japanese colonial rule in Korea and the national question. Tom Nairn, ‘Modern Janus’, New Left Review, No. 94 (November 1975). The author used Im Ji-Hyun’s Korean translation, Im Ji-Hyun, op.cit., p. 263. Tom Nairn, in Im Ji-Hyun, op.cit., pp. 265, 268 Dongnip Sinmun (The Independent), 26 January 1897 Yu Young-Ryeol, Gaehwagieui Yun Chi-ho Yeongu (On Yun Chi-Ho of the Enlightenment Period), Hangilsa, 1985 pp. 84–85 Guksapyeonchan Wiwonhoe (National history Compilation Committee), Hanguk Dongnip Undongsa (A History of Korea’s Independence Movement), Vol. 1, pp. 1016–1017 Rhee Syngman, Dongnip Jeongsin (The Spirit of Independence), Hwalmunsa, 1946 (Reprint of original 1910 edition), pp. 341–342 Ibid. p. 31 Ibid. pp. 42, 179, 304 [Translator’s note: One needs to be reminded here that the treaties Korea had signed with foreign powers in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries were unequal treaties.] Ibid. pp. 266–267 Dongnip Sinmun (The Independent), 1 November 1898 Dongnip Sinmun (The Independent), 14 April 1899 National history Compilation Committee, Hanguk Dongnip undongsa (A History of Korea’s Independence Movement) 1, pp. 1016–1017 See the speech by An Chang-Ho, published in the magazine Seo-U (Western Friends) on 1 June 1907. He praised Japan’s imposition of the protectorate treaty on Korea as ‘of apparent benefit for Korea’. He distinguished Japan from the Western imperialist powers and did not brand Japan as an invader. One is reminded here of Iljinhoe (Advancement Society) in this context, Although the character of this organization was different, it adduced the same rationale when it petitioned to Japan to annex Korea and radiate the blessings of the Japanese throne on the Korean soil. Rhee Syngman in his The Spirit of Independence expressed the same sense of admiration for Japan for its

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18 19 20

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Korean Nationalism Betrayed benevolence towards Korea. See my article, ‘Hanmal Iljechimyakhaui Jabonjuui Geundaehwaronui Songgyeok’ (The Character of the Theory of Capitalist Modernization in late Joseon and Japanese Colonial Era), In Hanguk Genun-hyeondaesaeui Minjok Munje Yeongu (A Study of the National Question in the Modern and Contemporary History of Korea), Jisiksaneopsa Publishers, 1989, p. 104 I have discussed their relationship with missionaries in my book, Ibid., pp. 108–111 Ibid., p. 96 Yu Yeong-Ryeol, op. cit., p. 200. Yu In-Seok believed that the reformists or the champions of enlightenment movement lacked a sense of their independent identity. See Pak Seong-Su, ‘Uibyeongjeonjaengui Sinbunuisik’ (Consciousness about Status in the Righteous Army Movement). Hanguk Sahak (Korean Historiography), p. 27. Shin Chae-Ho, ‘Singyoyuk gwa Aeguk’ (New Education and Patriotism) In Danjae Shin Chae-Ho Ginyeomsaeobhoe (The Association for Commemorating Danjae Shin Chae-Ho) ed., Danjae Shin Chae-Ho Jeonjib (The Complete Works of Danjae Shin Chae-ho), Vol. 2, Hyeongseol Publishers, p. 131 Shin Chae-Ho, ‘Yisib Segi Singukmin’ (New Citizens of the Twentieth Century), Daehan Maeil Sinbo (Daehan Daily), 22 February to 3 March 1910. In Danjae Shin Chae-Ho Jeonjib (The Complete Works of Danjae Shin Chae-ho), a supplement volume. See my article quoted in footnote 18, pp. 119–120. After the March First Movement An Chang-Ho was active as a leader of the Korean independence movement overseas, and inside Korea Yi Gwang-su formed an organization named Suyang Donguhoe (Character-building Friends Society). They served as channels to articulate and organize the self-strengthening movement. See my article ‘Yun Chi-Ho – Geundaehwajisangjuuiwa Hwangminhwa Undong’ (Yun Chi-ho – Modernization-first and Kominka Movement), Hanguk Geunhyeondasa, 2, 1993. When Korea was engulfed in the wave of the March First Movement Yun Chi-Ho wrote an article entitled ‘Lament of the Korean People’ in which he gave three reasons for the impossibility of realizing the dream of independence. See a book by Pak Chan-Seung, ‘Hanguk Geundae Jeongchisasangsa Yeongu’ (A Study of the Moden Political Thought in Korea), Yeoksa Bipyeongsa Publishers, 1992 and my book Hanguk Hyeondae Minjok Undongsa Yeongu (A Study of the National Movements in Modern Korea). See Han Yeong-U, ‘An Jae-hong-ui Sinminjokjuui wa Sahak’ (Neo-Nationalism of An Jaehong and History), Hanguk Dongrip Undongsa Yeongu (The Journal of the Korean Independence Movement), Vol. 1, 1981 Handokdang (The Korean Independence Party) of Kim Ku was similar. For an understanding of the socialist character of the national liberation struggle, see my paper, ‘Sahoejuuijadeului Minjokgwan-gwa Gyegeup-gwan’ (Korean Socialists’ Concept of Nation and Class), In Hanguk Geunhyeondae-ui minjok munje yeongu (A Study of the National Question in the Modern and Contemporary History of Korea), Jisiksanneopsa Publishers, 1989.

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See the slogan and various documents of the first Korean Communist Party, prepared at the time of the outbreak of the 10 June Independence Movement; ‘Joseon Gongsandang Seoneon’ (Declaration of the Korean Communist Party), published in vol. 7 of Bulggot (Flame), a mouthpiece of the third Korean Communist Party; ‘Gukje Gongsandange Bogohagi Uihan Gungnae Jeongse’ (Korea’s Political Situation: A report prepared for the Comintern), and ‘Minjok Haebangundong Nongang’(On the National Liberation Movements) in March 1928 See the third section of the first chapter of my book, Hyeondae Hanguk Minjok Undong yeongu (A Study on the National Movement in Modern Korea). In this section I have dealt with the background of the line taken by the Korean Communist Party and South Korean Workers’ Party and the bourgeois revolutionary line of Korean communists. Socialists did not distinguish nationalism from reformism in the past as well. Yi Gwang-su, ‘Joseon Minjokui 3 Gichosaeop’ (The Three Basic Tasks for the Korean Nation), Donggwang (Eastern Light), February 1932. Im Jong-Guk, however, believes that more than half of the pro-Japanese collaborators were not the victims of coercion but willing and ardent supporters of fascist Japan. See his book, Chinil Nonseol Jeonjib (A Collected Volume of ProJapanese Writings), Silcheonmunhaksa, 1987, p. 24 Yu Young-Ryeol, op. cit., 81 Ibid p. 247 Yun Chi-Ho, ‘Naeseonilche-e daehan Naui Sosin’ (My Views on the Unity of Japan and Korea), In Im Jong-guk, Chinil Nonseol Jeonjib (A Collected Volume of Pro-Japanese Writings), Silcheon munhaksa, 1987, p. 214 The intelligence report of the American Military Government in Korea made it clear that communism was the only alternative of the dictatorial regime of Rhee Syngman. See my book, Hyeondae Hanguk Minjok Undong Yeongu (A Study on the National Movement in Contemporary Korea), p. 544. Rhee Syngman seemed to have been consistent in his argument that Korea had to choose between Ultra-Right Fascism and Communism Yang U-Jeong (ed.), 1948. Yi Seungman Daetongnyeong Dongnip Noseonui Seungni (Victory of Rhee Syngman’s Line for Independence). Seoul: Dongnip Jeongsin Bogeuphoe Chulpanbu (Publishing Company for Promoting the Spirit of Independence), pp. 276–277. For details, see Seo Joong-Seok op.cit., Chapter 3, ‘Moskeuba Samsang Hoeui Gyeolui-wa Jwauikui Daeeung’ (The Accords of the Foreign Ministers of The US, Great Britain and the Soviet Union and the responses of the Rightists and the Leftists to the Accords). Since the leftist groups, including the Communist Party, supported the Agreements of the Foreign Ministers of the three countries as a way of solving the national question, it is not correct to say that support for the Agreements was support for the UN Trusteeship. However, it is clear that the Communist Party cannot be totally exempt from blame. Seo Joong-Seok, op. cit., especially, pp. 513–514. The Communist Party also mobilized the logic of dichotomy by defining the leftists as democratic forces and labelling the rightists as anti-democratic or fascist anti-nationalist forces.

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42 43

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Korean Nationalism Betrayed Just after the election of the members of the Constituent Assembly, Rhee Syngman opposed the demand for the punishment of pro-Japanese people for which the joint forces of the left and the right such as Kim Gyu-Sik or Yeo Un-Hyeong called. Rhee Syngman announced that to raise the issue of the punishment of pro-Japanese individuals would merely disturb society and thereby only obstruct national unification (Yang U-Jeong ed., op. cit, p. 140). Yi Gwang-Su and Yun Chi-Ho proffered similar arguments after Liberation. Yang U-Jeong (ed.), op. cit., p. 159. Seo Joong-Seok, op.cit., p. 548. After the Cold War developed fully in 1947, the division of Korea became an inevitable consequence of the dominating logic of international politics. However, the two attitudes were quite different in terms of dealing with the national question: one accepted the division of the nation as unavoidable, whereas the other staged a campaign for a separate government without any efforts to establish a unified nation-state and in fact opposed any effort to build a unified nation-state. Seo Joong-Seok, ‘Sawol Hyeokmyeong Undonggiui Banmi Tongil Undong-gwa Minjok Haebangnon’ (Anti-American and Unification Movements during the period of the April Revolution), Yeoksa Bipyeong (Historical Review), Autumn 1991. Seo Joong-Seok, ‘Jobongam, Jinbodang-ui Jinboseong-gwa Jeongchijeok Giban’ (Progressiveness and Political Basis of Jo Bong-Am and his Progressive Party), Yeoksa Bipyeong (Historical Review), Autumn 1992. Since the Park regime was just a variant of the Rhee government and an enlarged version of Rhee’s ultra-right anti-communist regime, it is ironic to criticize the Rhee government and at the same time to praise the modernization policy of Park’s government. The important thing to understand is the historical context in which the modernization policies were unsuccessful in the period of the Rhee government yet how these same modernization policies were successful during Chun Doo-Hwan’s military government.

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The System of National Division

WHY IS THE SYSTEM OF NATIONAL DIVISION PROBLEMATIC?

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n his book Joseon Minjokui Jillo (The Road for the Korean Nation), Baek Nam-Un suggested his policy for building the nation-state based on the cooperation of leftists and rightists. He wrote that the Korean nation, composed of a homogeneous society (ethnicity), was quite unique in world history. This argument is in some sense non-Marxist. As he argued, Korea had enjoyed the status of single nationhood for a long time. During the colonial period and in the immediate post-liberation era Korea emphasized the importance of blood as an element of the nation. This stress on blood relations became much more pronounced around the 1950s in South Korea, whereas it did not occur in North Korea until after the 1980s.1 In this way, Korea emphasized the fact that the Korean nation originated from a single ancestor, Dangun, and promoted blood nationalism or Dan-Gun-centred nationalism. This ethno-nationalism played an important role in the formation and development of modern national consciousness. But, to what extent did the people of the South or North consider their respective ‘other’ as part of their nation in the period prior to the inter-Korea summit meeting – especially in the 1970s and 1980s? In reality, while it may be true that most people saw their counterparts in the South or North as no less friendly than people from any other nation, they also viewed their counterparts in the South or North as aliens or monsters, too horrendous to confront. The aspiration for national unification was very strong among the Korean people.2 Since Koreans had lived together as one nation on the peninsula for a long time, the national division of the post-war period appeared to the Korean people as the most abnormal political development. They also believed that the divided halves would eventually reunite. The people on the peninsula ardently and desperately yearned for national unification during the early period of the national division because of serious economic hardship caused by the division.3 The need for national reunification also became acute as the number of separated family members increased markedly following the Korean War.

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Since Korean people have long harboured a strong desire for national reunification, it would be natural to expect that they would be actively engaged in discussions on national reunification or on unification movements. The reality, however, has not matched this expectation. In the 1950s, unification movements or discussions on peaceful national unification occurred only during the presidential elections, such as those held on 15 May 1956 and in January 1958. In 1958, the Progressive Party and Jo Bong-Am4 initiated the debate which led to the persecution of the Progressive Party. Apart from these events, throughout the 1950s the government mobilized students and the masses for the ‘campaign for national unification by absorbing North Korea’.5 This campaign only contributed to the consolidation of the national division. In the 1960s, thanks to the April Revolution, people started to discuss peaceful unification and to initiate unification movements from the second half of 1960. However, the Military coup crushed these unification movements.6 During his rule, Park Chung-Hee spoke endlessly of the nation. However, during his eighteen years’rule, it was virtually impossible for people to talk about national unification, let alone unification movements. Not until 1988, the year following the June Democratization Struggle, did the national unification movements spring into life.7 Then, just as the people’s desire for national unification was on the ascendancy and they thought that national unification would come soon, the unification movements were oppressed by the ultra-right anti-communist forces and the system of national North–South division was reinforced. Ironically, as doubts about the necessity for national unification gained wide credence, the unification movements became more active because of the changes in the domestic and international situations. Ever since Kang Man-Gil discussed the ways and means of overcoming the national division in his book Bundansidae-ui Yeoksainsik (Towards A Historical Understanding of the Period of National Division, Changjak-gwa Bipyeong Publisher, 1978), the relevant debate has continued unabated. Recently, people have defined the present as the period of national unification and engaged fervently in debating, defining and articulating the national interest in relation to the question of unification.8 After Kang Man-Gil used the term ‘the system of national division’, it has gained wide currency.9 But few have clearly defined the meaning of the system of national division and analysed the characteristics of the system by focusing on the system itself.10 When we think about the national division of Korea, we find that it is wellentrenched both in terms of extent and scope when compared to Germany or China-Taiwan. Germany was originally not a centralized state and its history as a united country was very short. Thus, even during the period of national division, the desire for a single Germany was not strong. In addition, relations between the Allied Nations and Germany were vastly different from their relations with Korea and the unification of Germany appeared unrealistic. However, even in the 1950s, when East and West Germany were in conflict with one another, there were mutual exchanges between the two in the field of religion and other areas.11 What is more, during the term of Prime Minister Ludwig Erhard (1897–1977), flexible Ostpolitik was

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implemented. In the late 1960s, following the era of the great coalition (1966–69) when Kurt Georg Kiesinger and Willy Brandt (1913–92) formed a coalition government, West Germany implemented new Ostpolitik.12 Because of the new Ostpolitik, the political, cultural and economic exchanges between West and East Germany were very active and mutual visits between East and West Germany increased significantly. Thus, people in West and East Germany knew a lot about each other although they lived under different systems of government, which is quite different from South and North Korea. More importantly, the standards of welfare, politics and the economy of West Germany were much higher than those of South or North Korea.13 It is not necessary to describe how the South-North relationship and internal conditions of the two Koreas differ from those of Taiwan and China. The economic, cultural and personnel exchanges between China and Taiwan are vastly different from those of South and North Korea. In a word, the division of Korea is unique. My understanding of the phenomenon of national division is as follows: national division comprises a unique system where each divided country appears to be one nation, yet the mutual relations between the two sides are so singular that it is hard to find another similar relationship either between two parts of the same country or two different nations. In the case of Korea, the government of one side labels the other as a puppet government, lacking political legitimacy, while defining it at the same time as an enemy nation or a special target of hostility. It is not easy to find a similar example in the international relations of any country. Overpowered by unrelenting hostility the two governments discouraged in the past all mutual contact, meetings and exchanges, including those in the cultural and sport arenas. The two governments used brutal force even to suppress those shades of opinion which were viewed as inhering in the possibility of stimulating mutual exchanges between the South and North. The governments of the two states reinforced the national division so strongly that abnormal relations between the two became an accepted norm. In this way, the two ‘governments’ responded to each other with strong hostility and blocked any exchanges or meetings between them for long time. With this severing of relations, anti-communist campaigns in the South reinforced and solidified the national division. Thus, because of the long history of the national division, the politics, economy, society and culture of the two countries are not only hugely different but also mutually antagonistic. Meanwhile, the rulers and the dominant class exploited people’s desire for national unification as well as the South/North conflicts for their political purposes. By relying on the other’s existence, the rulers of each side reinforced their power and firmly established a regime of hostility and confrontation towards each other. Because of this system of national division, the people in the divided society do not see those from the other society as a component of the same nation and feel uncomfortable to think of them as compatriots. Thus, the inhabitants of a divided nation are content with the politics, society, economy and culture of the divided nation. In a word, people inhabiting a divided state become oblivious about the task of establishing a unified nation-state and consider the half nation as the

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whole. The attitude towards the other is very contradictory in so far as it differs dramatically from that towards other countries. In short, the two sides unleash mutual hostilities and attempt to negate the existence of the other. The national division itself was introduced by the Cold War politics of the USA and Soviet Russia. The social groups who support the division have, however, used the consciousness of the Cold War to reinforce the regime of the divided nation. Their consciousness is completely swamped by the logic of the Cold War. While they lack independence and are at times servile, they are rigid in their hostility against the citizens of their own nation. Those who supported the national division thought that they could maintain and develop their social interest through this national division and that national unification would threaten their interest. Based on this assumption, they tried their best to distort the truth and impede the path of unification. Indeed, they raised many obstacles in the fields of politics, economy, society and culture in a desperate bid to prevent national unification. One of the most important of these obstacles was to thwart internal development in diverse areas and to be servile to foreign powers. In contrast to this, an over-emphasis on self-sufficiency can also lead to the perpetuation of the national division if the policy of self-sufficiency is combined with other factors. Under a divided country, the concepts of state, nation, patriotism and nationalism are distorted, misused and abused. Only those ideologies or doctrines that support the national division thrive and serve as the moral compass of humanity. Under these conditions the real truth is not only rejected but becomes a punishable offence. The typical pattern of the divided regime can be found in the governments of Rhee Syngman and Park ChungHee, in the ultra-right anti-communist new military and National Security Law and in the monocratic political structure of Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong Il. In most instances, this system was clearly articulated in an oppressive and authoritarian regime. The divided regime saps the humanity of the society and starves it of civic consciousness and elements on which a civil society is built. In the final analysis, it is a monolithic and one-dimensional society, devoid of pluralism and creative culture and plagued with mental powerlessness, spiritual poverty and moral decay. In this chapter, I will first discuss the forces and factors that have contributed significantly to the establishment and consolidation of the system of a divided country. To this end, I will begin with the period before separate governments were established in the South and North. In this period, the roles of the USA and Soviet Russia will be discussed, along with the activities and policies of the Korean political forces which played a major role in establishing the system of a divided country. Although we can identify the basic structure and preliminary forms of the system of a divided country in the period of the Military Government of the USA and Soviet Russia, the seeds of the system of national division did not develop into a system until the establishment of separate governments in the South and North. In the latter part of this chapter, I will discuss the theory of the central government of the South and North which played a pivotal role in forming, maintaining, and reinforcing the system of a divided country.14 Based on this

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theory of the central government, adopted in both South and North Korea, the two hostile regimes defined each other as puppet governments and the territory of the other government was viewed as a lost land (under illegal occupation). Although this theory is to some extent relevant to the desire to establish a unified nation-state, with its statist orientation, it nevertheless contributed substantially to the formation and reinforcement of the system of national division. In South Korea, this theory was also used as a basis to enact the National Security Law. Under the National Security Law, any exchanges, meetings or mutual visits across the 38th parallel were made criminal offences. In the North, the theory of the democratic base was another aspect of the theory of the central government. This theory found manifestation in the doctrine of the socialist unification of a divided Korea and was politically exploited as a tool for supporting the government in the North as well as in the South. FACTORS LEADING TO THE FORMATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE SYSTEM OF DIVIDED KOREA

Orientation towards National Division before the Establishment of the Separate Governments Although most Koreans had never imagined that their country would be divided, the military division of the peninsula by the USA and Soviet Russia along the 38th parallel meant that it would be difficult for Koreans to establish a unified nation-state in the future. If the only purpose of their occupation was to disarm the Japanese army on the peninsula, the American army did not have to rush to Korea from distant Okinawa. Since physical occupation was a secure tool to protect their national interest, the armies of the two powers quickly entered Korea and used all means in an attempt to establish political systems which would serve their respective political interests. For this reason, the possibility of a national division following the occupation of the Korean peninsula by the two powers was real. However, since the two powers did not initially intend to establish separate governments on the Korean peninsula and, in fact, promised to form a single Korean government with their mutual cooperation, Koreans were potentially able to play some role in establishing a unified nation-state. If the Korean question could have been resolved through negotiation between the USA and the Soviet Union, then Koreans would have understood that they could realize their national interest within the limits set by these two superpowers. Thus, anti-Soviet or anti-American movements that denied the legitimacy of the other side was also instrumental in bringing about national division. In order to establish a unified nation-state, Koreans should have developed both pro-Russia and pro-American policies whilst maintaining their independence towards the two powers, and the rightists and leftists should have cooperated with each other. However, the USA and Soviet Russia had no intention of allowing Korea to align itself with its opposite camp and each sought to mould Korea in a pattern that conformed to their respective

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national interests. Obviously, Korea was capable of establishing its own unified nation-state based on cooperation between the USA and Soviet Russia and the criticism, therefore, that the policies pursued by the American and Russian military governments in Korea constituted their strategies to establish a divided country on the peninsula is not quite convincing. However, by appointing former colonial bureaucrats or pro-Japanese individuals to important positions, the American Military Government laid a foundation-stone for the creation of a divided Korea. It is worthy of note that even the Rhee Syngman government was obliged to introduce a special law to punish the pro-Japanese traitors because it was necessary to punish them in order to build the nation-state. Contrary to expectations, however, they were able to grasp political power and exert a greater influence on Korean society, economy and culture than they had previously been able. As their power became linked to the Cold War, the conditions for establishing a unified nation-state deteriorated markedly and the national division of Korea was unavoidable.15 This was true in so far as the pro-Japanese collaborators formed the major part of those political groups and organizations that campaigned for the establishment of a separate country in the south. In addition, responsibility for the national division can be attributed to the decision makers in the American Military Government who implemented hostile anti-Russian policies with an ultra-right political orientation and opposed the policies of the Department of State on the Korean Question because of their anti-Russian orientation. This attitude was clear in the telegram of 20 November 1945, sent by William R. Langdon, acting political adviser to the American Military Government, to the Secretary of State. As Bruce Cummings has noted,16 the top officials of the American Military Government, deeply steeped in Ultra-Right ideology, conspired to create national division by forming an Administrative Commission and seeking to expand the jurisdiction of the commission to include North Korea. The American Military Government planned to eventually convert this commission into the government. Soviet Russia, the counterpart of the American Military Government, could not accept this plan. It is possible to analyse the attitudes towards the Moscow Accords, signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the US, Great Britain and the Soviet Union on 28 December 1945, in diverse ways. The Moscow accords constituted the only answer to the Korean Question on which the Allied Countries reached a concrete agreement. The Moscow accords stipulated a four-power trusteeship and a Soviet-US Joint Commission to work for the construction of a unified provisional government in Korea. Therefore, anti-Trusteeship campaigns with an anti-communist and anti-Russian orientation, intended to lend support to the Korean Provisional Government in Chongqing, obviously were serious impediments to the task of establishing a real provisional government. The officials of the American Military Government, police and former pro-Japanese collaborators actively participated in this antiTrusteeship campaign. The campaign leaders condemned their opponents as national traitors. Thus, the anti-Trusteeship movement intensified the division of the nation. Although we must stress that the campaigns were the

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expression of a desire for immediate independence, they contributed towards the division of the nation in that they transformed pro-Japanese traitors into patriots and unconditionally opposed the Moscow accords.17 After Liberation, fully-fledged anti-communist campaigns sprang from the antiTrusteeship campaigns and the anti-Trusteeship campaigns were exploited as one of the most important tools by those individuals who were striving to establish a separate and divided country on the peninsula. In the north, Land Reform was implemented around the time of the meeting of the Joint Committee of the USA and Soviet Russia. Although this Land Reform aimed to strengthen the support base for social revolution and to call for an equally progressive land reform in the South, it was also partly responsible for national division. At the time, many thought that in building an independent nation-state, it would be necessary to punish the proJapanese traitors and to implement land reform. However the land reform, implemented in the North in March 1946 rendered a united national front futile because, during the land reform, landlords lost their land without compensation and were forced to leave their homes and settle elsewhere.18 Obviously, the reform was really like a class revolution which destroyed the class-based power of the landlords and the bourgeoisie. Those landlords who escaped from the North to the South became the vanguard of the anticommunist forces. In addition, because of the radical land reform in the North, the rightists were very wary of the government in the North. Thus, the land reform in the North turned out to be an obstacle to the establishment of the nation-state. Since it had a socialist orientation, the land reform made it almost impossible to subsequently build the nation-state. After all, the basic prerequisite of construction of a unified nation-state in Korea was a compromise between the USA and Soviet Russia and negotiation between the left and the right forces.19 It is easy to see that the campaign for a separate government by Rhee Syngman and the pro-Japanese group provided a context and favourable climate for the division of the nation. However, it is necessary to analyse the material base and orientation of the campaign in relation to the characteristics of the bourgeoisie, the role of the pro-Japanese traitors, the reliance on foreign powers and ultra-right fascism. Incidentally, since the communist government in the north strongly opposed the national division and advocated national unification, it is not easy to ascertain whether or not its theory of the democratic base contributed to the division of the nation or not. The theory involved a process of phased unification but owing to its strong socialist orientation it ran counter to the required ‘flexible’ approach, emphasizing co-existence and cooperation of the Left and Right in the nation-building process. As was clear in the Five Principles of the National Front in July 1946, this theory provided a framework for building an exclusive government. With the passage of time it became clear people’s faith in the theory of the ‘democratic base’ made the task of peaceful unification an impossible one. Moreover, since under this theory people neglected the Joint Committee of the USA and Soviet Russia and supported Stalin’s exclusive influence in the North, its orientation towards national division became much clearer.20

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The campaigns for anti-Trusteeship and a separate government led by the landlords and the bourgeoisie put the USA in a difficult position, leading to the forging of Soviet-US cooperation. Obviously, the campaigns became a basis for building a separate government. Furthermore, the campaigns made it difficult for Koreans to build a provisional government based on a grand national coalition of the Korean people and without any interference of foreign powers. Indeed, the campaigns facilitated national division. The main cause of this division, however, was the confrontation between the USA and Soviet Russia. The full-scale development of the Cold War converted the 38th parallel into a line of confrontation between the two camps. If the Cold War had defined the basic structure of a divided Korea then the Korean people could have been forced to accept the national division after attempted unification movements or they could have attempted to weaken the Cold War regime. However, some individuals lent extremely strong support to one side of the forces of the Cold War with the sole purpose of implementing their class interests which contributed to the development of the unique characteristics of the division of the Korean nation. Even the socialists cannot be excused from this judgement. When the Joint Committee of the USA and Soviet Russia failed because of the full-scale development of the Cold War and the Korean question was referred to the UN, at the behest of the USA, the socialists in the North ceased all efforts at building even a left-oriented provisional government and ignored such initiatives as the Joint North–South Talk Among Political Leaders in the autumn of 1947 where the centrist politicians called for the prevention of the division of the nation. In November 1947, socialists in the North began preparatory work on writing a constitution which would lend legal legitimacy to the political system in the North under the name of the Constitution of All Korea.21 In this way the socialists in the North actually admitted the division of the nation and generally accepted the logic of the Cold War. FACTORS IN THE FORMATION, SUPPORT AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE NATIONAL DIVISION AFTER THE DIVISION

The National Security Law System One scholar has argued that the National Security Law (NSL) was a ‘legalization of the national division’.22 According to him, the NSL provided a context for the establishment of an anti-communist regime and to ostracize and isolate all those who supported national unification. The NSL forced people to think that North Korea was a lost territory of South Korea and that there was only a puppet government in the North. Any cultural exchange or communication with an individual or organization in North Korea was punishable under the law. The government announced that such contact was a tacit endorsement of the status of North Korea as an equal to its southern counterpart and therefore, an act that helped the enemy. The NSL punished not only the leftists but also progressive nationalists and progressive politicians. The far-reaching arms of the NSL extended even to some ultra-rightists.

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Politicians belonging to the Democratic Party were also not spared the havoc that the NSL wreaked. Anyone who could threaten or shake the status quo of the national division was punished by the National Security Law without exception.23 Although it is important to analyse the process of the introduction of the NSL it is also necessary to discuss what role the NSL played in reinforcing the national division in the contemporary history of South Korea. Some of the relevant nodal points in the post-liberation history of South Korea are: the period of the Rhee government, the Military Coup of 16 May and the attendant formation of the military government, the period of the Yushin (Revitalization) System, and the period of the new military government in the early and mid-1980s. The scope and power of the National Security Law was beyond the provision of the Constitution and other laws in South Korea. It has, therefore, ruined liberal democracy and acted as a mechanism for supporting the ultra-right anti-communist regime which was a clear expression of the national division.

America’s Policies towards Korea Along with Soviet Russia, the USA occupied Korea and consolidated the national division. In addition, from the beginning of the military occupation, the USA implemented a policy of maintaining the status quo which opposed the national revolution.24 The USA laid the foundation of antiSovietism and anti-communism. It is also remarkable that the American Military Government played a substantial role in establishing the basic structure of the system of Korea’s national division by appointing pro-Japanese traitors to important positions and lending full support to them.25 After the establishment of separate governments in the South and North, the USA modified its policies of maintaining the status quo into policies which reflected the Cold War and made great efforts to consolidate the national division and foster and strengthen South Korea as an anti-communist state. To this end the USA, as the main supporter of South Korea, suppressed any policies or acts which would undermine or interfere with the reality of the 38th parallel. The USA strongly supported the military or fascist government which stood at the forefront of the anti-Communist camp, and was stridently anti-communist and anti-North Korean. For example, the USA helped Rhee Syngman get re-elected as President by encouraging the Rhee government to revise certain articles of the Constitution. This happened in the midst of the political turmoil of the Korean War when the government headquarters had shifted to Busan.26 Subsequent to the Korean War when the government of Rhee Syngman framed Jo Bong-Am of the Progressive Party and sentenced him to death, the USA failed to be proactive in saving his life. The US government knew full well that charges against Jo were flimsy, if not fictitious.27 Even after the fraudulent election of 15 March 1960, the USA supported the Rhee government right up to the eve of the April Revolution. Furthermore, the USA was also uneasy about the revolutionary situation after the April Revolution. It supported the Military Coup of 16 May28 and its patronage was crucial to the strengthening of Park Chung Hee’s power

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and to the stabilization of the political power of the new military governments. Apart from military support, the USA also mobilized economic aid and cultural help to consolidate the system of national division in the 1950s and 1960s.29 The role of the USA was especially strong in the conclusion of the Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty, the dispatch of the Korean army to South Vietnam, and ‘the economic development’.30 We also need to familiarize ourselves with the role the US played in consolidating the system of national division as well as providing the ultra-right anti-communist forces with material support. The USA accepted the military coup of 12 December 1979 as an inevitable reality and later it supported the Martial Law decree of 17 May 1980 and the bloody and brutal suppression of the resistance of Gwangju people, it contributed to the establishment of a new military government.31 Chun Doo-Hwan, it needs to be remembered, was the first foreign head of state whom President Ronald Reagan (1981–89) accepted in the White House as his guest of honour, and subsequently lent Chun his full support. However, it should also be noted that America’s policies of anticommunism and national division differed in some ways from those of Rhee and Park and the new military governments.

Anti-communism Anti-communism and the National Security Law are two sides of the same coin. They acted as the main structure in forming, supporting and strengthening the system of national division. It could be said that the ultra-right anti-communist system was synonymous with the National Security Law. However, since the ultra-right anti-communist system differs from the National Security Law in its scope, it is necessary to discuss anti-communism itself in relation to the system of national division. First of all, we should look at the historical origin of anti-communism in the 1930s, its role in the campaign for creating the Emperor’s Loyal Subjects, and in the divide and rule policy of Japanese imperialism. In addition, we need to analyse the roles that anti-communist ideology played in the political development of Korea during and after the post-liberation period.32 As described above, anti-communism under the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was to some extent shaped by the antiTrusteeship campaigns which in turn were triggered by false and irresponsible reports about the Moscow accords of December 1945, circulated by the mass media. At this juncture of history, anti-communism coalesced with the forces campaigning for establishing a separate government. The anticommunist system took advantage of the events surrounding the attack on the Special Commission for the Investigation of National Traitors, the communist fraction incident in the National Assembly, the assassination of Kim Ku, the formation of the National Guidance League since June 1949 and the National Security Law.33 Thus, in understanding the national division, it is important to find what kind of factors caused anti-communism to take deep root in South Korea during the American Military Government and following the Korean War and how different was anti-communism before and after the Korean War.

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It is necessary to be mindful of the fact that anti-communism, whether under Japanese colonial rule or the American Military Government, did not arise out of liberal democracy, but had ultra-rightist characteristics which were the antithesis of liberal democracy. It is also necessary to bear in mind the fact that anti-communism in Korea invariably developed as a part of global anti-communism. Extreme anti-communism in South Korea received the support of the international anti-communist camp, notably the USA, and was characterized by the exclusion of centrists, nationalists and liberals. For extreme anti-communists or those who followed its ultra-right orientation were considered to constitute the nation, while others who criticized or opposed extreme anti-communism were condemned as ‘un-patriotic’ or ‘anti-national’. Thus, extreme anti-communism in South Korea became anticommunist nationalism.34 Anti-communism can be divided into three phases following the Korean War. First, in the 1950s, anti-communism developed on the basis of the theory of ‘National Unification by Northward Advance’. Second, anti-communism reached its climax with the extreme anti-communist education and policies practised from the Military Coup of 16 May to the Yushin (Revitalization) period. During this period, many progressive nationalists were arrested, the National Security Law was strengthened and the Anticommunist Law was introduced. The Korean Central Intelligence Agency was also established. In addition, the material and political bases for anticommunism were reinforced by the conclusion of the Korea-Japan Treaty and the dispatch of the Korean army to South Vietnam. Third, although anticommunism was virulent in its oppression,35 as was the case during the Yushin period of Park Chung Hee, it could not but be softened or moderated because of the challenges posed by the nationalist movements and the collapse of the Cold War regime internationally.

Political Changes in South and North Korea Since the national division, important and almost simultaneous political changes took place in the South and North. These changes have normally contributed to the strengthening of the national division. In the South, the establishment of the ultra-right anti-communist system has been vigorously pushed forward and the national division has been increasingly strengthened since June 1949. Many political incidents have contributed to this development: the Rhee Syngman government’s ‘discovery’ of a communist cell in the National Assembly, the collapse of the Special Investigation Commission on the Anti-national Traitors, the assassination of Kim Ku, the formation of the National Guidance League, the strengthening of the neighbourhood watch organization, and the policy of National Unification by North Advance. During the same period a series of important political developments occurred in North Korea. For example, the South Korean Worker’s Party and North Korean Worker’s Party merged to form the Korean Worker’s Party and the Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland was also established. North Korea also dispatched armed guerillas to South Korea and intensified its political offensive against South Korea. It seems incontrovertibly true that

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the North displayed a strong interest in achieving national unification through armed struggle. In the late 1950s, progressive political leaders were severely persecuted, especially due to the perceived threat from the Progressive Party and the Workers Democratic Party. Because of this oppression, only ultra-right anticommunists could participate in politics. The Neighbourhood Watch against Communism was also reorganized and the National Security Law was revised to make it more powerful and draconian. These changes facilitated the consolidation of Rhee Syngman’s political power and its oligarchy.36 During this time political leaders in North Korea of Chinese or Russian background were purged and political power was concentrated in Kim Il-Sung’s hands. Largescale agricultural cooperatives were introduced and completed across North Korea. Cheollima (Flying Horse) Campaigns were also launched and, finally, North Korean-style socialism was accomplished.37 In 1972, President Park launched the Yushin constitution in the South and a constitution was introduced in the North to support a political system with monocratic leadership.38 In the 1980s, new military governments were established in the South. And in the North the Kim Jong Il regime was established. In the South, political change occurred through political conflict and rupture; in the North, these changes showed continuity. Thus, politics in the South were dynamic while in the North they became rigid. As described above, South and North Korea experienced major political changes at similar junctures. In general, these changes contributed to the strengthening of the ultra-rightist communist regime in the South and North Korean socialism in the North. Thus, they intensified the differences between South and North Korea and aggravated the mutual confrontation between the two. The Yushin regime and the monocratic regime can especially be defined as the climax of the national division in that the former inculcated rabid anti-communism in the minds of its people and the latter did so with Juche ideology and thereby they excluded the other from the whole nation. In some instances, political changes on either side occurred as a direct reaction or the result of the mutual influence. But in general, political changes were brought about by the internal logic of the political forces of the two regimes. In addition, international factors also played a significant role. For example, North Korean political changes after the summer of 1949 were accomplished as a result of the establishment of regulations and laws and were related to North Korea’s urgent task of national unification. The direct factors responsible for the outbreak of the Korean War were the establishment of the Peoples’ Republic of China and the withdrawal of the American forces from South Korea. As for the monumental political changes of the Yushin structure in South Korea in 1972, they occurred as a result of several related events, including the experience of the anti-Japanese guerilla warfare, the primacy of military defence, increased economic hardship, and the international relations on the peninsula. These factors all influenced the establishment of the monocratic political structure of 1966–67,39 and the subsequent political changes in North Korea were translated into constitutional change by the Congress of the Korean Worker’s Party of 1970. In a word, political changes in

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North Korea seemed a continuous rather than ruptured progression. However, the Yushin regime in South Korea was a cataclysmic event. The regime was fundamentally dependent on Park’s personality and his dictatorship.40 The conclusion of the Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty, the dispatch of Korean soldiers to South Vietnam and the strong support of the USA and Japan contributed to the development of Park’s authoritarianism in the late 1960s. The concentration of power in the hands of a single leader, the deepening of dependent development and the centralization of the national economy into Chaebols together played important roles in the creation of the Yushin regime. The defining moment for the establishment of the Yushin regime was the presidential election of 1971. Nevertheless, we should also note that North Korea’s hostile policies towards South Korea to some extent contributed to the development of the Yushin regime and the strengthening of the anti-communist orientation of the South.41

Unification Policies Pro-Japanese collaborators, supporters of a separate government and ultraright anti-communists could not but masquerade themselves as supporters of national unification, because they were aware of the strong appeal of this goal amongst people. However, until the 1970s their slogans of national unification were mostly intended to hinder the movements for national unification or to reinforce the national division. Throughout the 1950s, the Rhee Syngman government staged many demonstrations in favour of ‘northward national unification’ by mobilizing the masses and students and urging them to hold rallies for this cause. Superficially, it appeared as if the Rhee Syngman government’s priority was national unification. However, while some of the participants in these campaigns really wanted national unification, the bukjintongil or national unification by northward advance was totally unrealistic. Even the Rhee government was not ready to wage a war for northward unification. The basic goal of the unification policies of the Rhee government was to create authoritarian rule by prohibiting progressive policies and proposals for unification and South-North exchanges, by planting and strengthening hatred and hostile sentiments against communism in people’s minds, and by making attempts to uproot progressive or even centre rightist forces. Stated differently, the unification policies of the Rhee government can be defined as those of consolidating the national division with a succession of campaigns for a separate government and by strengthening the system of ultra-right anticommunism, and thereby supporting and perpetuating the established interests of the dominant class under a single dictator. This is clear from the fact that pro-Japanese collaborators were very active in the Unification by Northward Advance campaigns just as they had been in the campaigns against UN Trusteeship.42 Although the national division developed a strong base because of the campaigns for northward unification, it was impossible to propose Unification by Northward Advance after the April Revolution. The military government of the 16 May coup espoused the agenda of ‘development-first’ rather than unification. This argument contributed to the intensification of national division after the Military Coup of 16 May. The structure of national

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division was further consolidated when Park Chung-Hee was elected by a very slim margin. He used malicious propaganda to inflame regional conflict and exploit it to serve his myopic goals. Park violated the joint communiqué of 4 July and used the people’s desire for national unification for his own political purposes. He also introduced the Yushin system under the guise of political security for national unification. Under the Yushin system, Park Chung-Hee severely increased the tension of the South-North relationship and flooded the minds and hearts of people with extreme anti-communism. Even policies which actively pursued national unification could contribute to consolidating the national division, depending on the situation vis-à-vis the Cold War, the South-North relationship or the international power relations surrounding the Korean peninsula. This is especially true of the Korean War. It is also true of the hostile policies and military-oriented policies of North Korea in the 1960s. Radical unification movements were also capable of contributing to reinforcing the national division by provoking the ultra-rightist anti-communist forces or being used for them.

Direction of the Understanding of Korean History History education can be a tool for consolidating the national division. History education may contribute to reinforcing the national division if the teaching hours on Korean contemporary history are reduced or it is taught from a very biased perspective. Government’s tight control on research on Korean contemporary history or on the activities of pro-Japanese collaborators also produce this effect. On the issue of historical legitimacy and the understanding of contemporary Korean history after the 1 March Independence Movement, there is a huge gap between North and South Korea. As long as this gap is not bridged, the national division will not disappear from people’s consciousness. THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE SYSTEM OF THE NATIONAL DIVISION – THE THEORY OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH

The Theory of the Central Government before the Establishment of the Separate Governments in the South and North According to the Resolution of the Interim Committee of the UN, South Korea was able to establish its government through the election in the South. On 11 June 1948, a few days after the establishment of the government, the Constitutional Assembly sent its message to the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK): The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea is established on the basis of the (UN) Resolution, adopted on 14 November 1947, that is, clause 3, article 2 of the First Panel Commission: After the election, Korea has to open the National Assembly, to organize the national government, and to inform the Korean Commission of the UN of the organization of the government.43

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It needs to be remembered that the above extract is tainted with distortion. The Resolution of the UN of 14 November 1947 was to organize the Korean government through a general election of the whole of Korea. However, the UNTCOK which was organized in accordance with this resolution could not enter North Korea. After serious debates on whether the UN Interim Committee could change the resolution of the General Assembly and the UN might contribute to the national division, on 26 February 1948 the Interim Committee adopted a resolution to the effect that the election might be conducted only in the area accessible to the UNTOC, i.e. South Korea. The USA was behind this move. The American Military Government held the election on 10 May 1948 and elected 198 members of the National Assembly and left 100 seats for the prospective members of the National Assembly in the North. In Jeju Island the election could not be held because of riots. Since the Constitutional Assembly was established according to the Resolution of the UN, it is natural for the National Assembly to announce the message for Korean people in the North: ‘The Constitutional Assembly wants Korean people in the North to elect true representatives of the people through the general election in a free environment and to send them to the National Assembly.’44 However, after establishing the government, South Korea organized propaganda which was very different from what was stated. Its unification policies, issued after the Korean War, were also far distant from the original statement. The general election of 10 May faced much opposition. The Workers Party of South Korea obstructed the election process by appealing for a halt to the election for establishing a separate government. The Korean Independence Party, which was a major rightist party with its origins in the national independence movement, pronounced that it opposed the election of 10 May and would not participate in the election. In addition, other centrist parties also declared that they would not participate in the election.45 The public was in general doubtful about the election, which was to be held only in the South. A survey of 2 April showed that 91% of the respondents were forced to register as a voter, with only 9% registering themselves voluntarily.46 Because of such a climate of apathy, the American Military Government felt compelled to coerce adults, aged twenty-one and above to register as a voter.47 The onus for the lower rate of participation in the election also falls on the shoulder of the Rhee Syngman and the Korean Democratic Party, which actively participated in the election. They did not have any intention of broadening the base of support for the new government by exhorting the Korean Independence Party and other centrist leaders to participate in the election. In early April 1948, the National Society for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence(NSRRKI) announced that the voters should see through the identity, evil desire and wicked designs of the centrist candidates.48 In mid-April, it condemned the centrist candidates as profiteering scoundrels, political brokers and national traitors, and called upon voters to fight against them.49 During Japanese colonialism and the American Military Government, the groups who wanted a separate government had strong exclusionist tendencies and suffered from narrow-mindedness. Their attitude

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appeared again in the election of 10 May and then became the backbone of ultra-rightist anti-communism.50 Although the Constitutional Assembly was organized according to the resolution of the UN, the question of the legitimacy of the state cannot be discussed separately from the issue of the national liberation movements. Concerning the question of the legitimacy of the state, the Constitution says in the preface: ‘We, the people of Korea, proud of a resplendent history and traditions dating from time immemorial, upholding the cause of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea born of the March First Independence Movement of 1919.’ As far as this issue is concerned, when Rhee Syngman discussed the draft of the Constitution, he said that the new government was a legitimate successor of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea.51 But Kim Ku had a different opinion. He criticized the decision made at the UN Interim Committee on 26 February 1948. The decision stipulated that the election would be held only in the South. Kim Ku criticized this decision. According to Kim Ku, first, the decision was to put Korea under one country-Trusteeship with the cooperation of the UN. Second, it was to internationally legalize the 38th parallel the USA and the Soviet Russia drew. Third, it would make Koreans kill each other.52 Even after the election of 10 May, he said that the call of the hour was not to build two separate governments in the South and North, but to unite and drive out the Soviet and the US army from the Korean peninsula. He also exhorted people to build a liberal democratic and unified independent government based on the national unification of South and North.53 When he was asked about Rhee Syngman’s statement that the new government was a legitimate successor of the Korean Provisional Government, Kim Ku answered: ‘I think that the new government in its current form of the National Assembly has no legitimate claim as a successor of the Provisional Government.’54 Kim Ku was Chairman of the Provisional Government of Korea. Since returning to Korea in November 1945, he tried his best to convert the Provisional Government of Korea into the new government. His comments on Rhee Syngman’s government, established after the 10 May election, doubtless undermined the claim that it carried forward the tradition of the provisional government. The existence of many top-ranking pro-Japanese collaborators in the new government also made it a target of criticism. On 15 May, i.e. prior to the establishment of the Constitutional Assembly, Rhee Syngman announced that he would inaugurate the new government according to the plan.55 Three days later, the Coalition of Patriotic Associations, in which groups for the establishment of the separate government participated, passed the resolution to build the Executive Committee for Establishing the Central Government.56 It also launched a campaign for a pledge that they would act in concert with Rhee Syngman in the National Assembly.57 It is not clear whether the theory of the Central Government at that time was the same as the theory of the only legitimate government that was put forward at a later date. It may be said that the theory of the only legitimate government was realized with the recognition of the Republic of Korea by the UN after the establishment of the government and was consolidated

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in the 1950s. Meanwhile, on 15 August 1948 when the new government was inaugurated, Kim Ku decided to launch a movement for unification and independence with renewed resolve and courage. At the time, the Workers Party of South Korea also announced that it would make all efforts to establish a unified Central Government.58 In the north, in close cooperation with the Soviet Military Government, the authorities attempted to seek legitimacy of the new government directly from the Joint Meeting of the Leaders of Political Parties and Associations of North and South Korea and from the ‘general election’, claimed to have taken place throughout Korea. The national liberation movement or the implementation of the Moscow Accords was also tied up to certain extent with the question of legitimacy. Although North Korea argued that it held the Joint Meeting of the Leaders of Political Parties and Associations of all Korea from 19 to 23 April 1948 in Pyongyang (prior to the UN-supervised election in the South on 10 May), and that the meeting was aimed at opposing the national division and establishing the unified government, one cannot take these words at their face value. The argument was flawed on various counts. First, the authorities in the north pointed out the necessity of the Constitution in November 1947 and made a draft of the Constitution in December 1947 in order to cope with the new political developments. It is to be remembered that when the USA transferred the Korean Question to the UN, national division loomed large on the horizon. In other words, as a response to the political development in the South, North Korea made the draft to establish its own government, independent of the cooperation or negotiation with unification-oriented rightist forces. Furthermore, on 8 February 1948, the People’s Army was created in the North. Although one may interpret this development as part of North Korea’s aggressive unification policy, it is clear that the creation of the People’s Army represented North Korea’s resolve to establish its own separate government. At the fourth meeting of the People’s Congress, held on 6 and 7 February 1948, the draft of the Constitution was submitted. ‘All people’s discussion’ on the draft was conducted from 11 February to 25 April, which should be understood as a part of numerous measures North Korea took for establishing a separate government. In the south, after the Korean Question was transferred to the UN, people under the initiative of centrist political forces called for the Joint North–South Talks of Political Leaders. Subsequently, in early February 1948 they decided to hold the meeting of four Kims – Kim Ku and Kim Gyu-Sik from the South and Kim Il-Sung and Kim Du-Bong from the north. In contrast, the authorities in the North did not propose the Joint Meeting of Political Parties and Associations of North and South Korea until 25 March 1948. At that time, it was already decided to hold the election of 10 May. It is remarkable that there was a clear difference between the Joint Meeting of 19–23 April in Pyongyang and the South and North Negotiation or the Meeting of Key Political Figures of South and North, held from 26 to 30 of April. In the former meeting, only leftist resolutions were announced. Kim

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Il-Sung, Pak Heon-Yeong and Baek Nam-Un submitted a political report and Hong Myeong-Hui read ‘The Resolution on the Political Situation of Korea’. In this meeting, Kim Ku spoke just once, to utter a word of greeting. Kim GyuSik excused himself from the meeting under the pretext of illness. However, the Joint Statement of Political Parties and Associations of North and South Korea of 30 April which was announced in the name of the Associations of the Leaders of Political Parties and Social Associations of North and South Korea after the meeting of the four Kims and the Joint Meeting of the Leaders of Political Parties and Social Associations of North and South Korea had plans for the national unification based on the Left-Right Coalition.59 But, on 28 and 29 April, which synchronized with the dates of the latter meeting, the authority in the North convened the special meeting of the People’s Congress and passed the original draft of the Constitution which was recognized by the Constitutional Committee. This vividly shows the intention of North Korea.60 Although the second Joint Meeting of the Leaders of Political Parties and Social Associations of North and South Korea was convened from 29 June to 5 July in Pyongyang, Kim Ku, Kim Gyu-Sik and other centre-right nationalists did not participate in it. They made the following criticism: ‘despite the differences of time, region and the method, there is no difference in terms of the intention to build a separate country in one half of the peninsula’.61 In addition, the second joint meeting adopted a resolution to build ‘the Central Government’, which was different from the proposal for the national unification announced in the Joint Statement of 30 April in the name of the Associations of the Leaders of Political Parties and Social Associations of North and South Korea. At this second meeting, participants condemned the National Assembly of South Korea and the ‘puppet’ South Korean government that was formed on its basis as illegal bodies, and noted that American Imperialists intended to convert South Korea into America’s colony and military base. It became obvious that North Korea would reject the South Korean government and the National Assembly of South Korea. The thesis of a ‘puppet government’ was proposed for the first time at this meeting. From this period onwards South and North Korea defined each other as a puppet government of the world powers, rejected each other and did not recognize each other as a partner for exchange or negotiation. The thesis of a puppet government most clearly and eloquently defines the parameter of inter-Korea relations. The meeting passed another resolution to constitute the Supreme Council of People’s Congress and establish the Central Government of Korea through a general election and composed of representatives from all over Korea.62 They held the election for selecting representatives of the Supreme Council of the People’s Congress through direct elections in the North and through underground and indirect elections in the South. According to them, in the general election that was held from 15 July in South Korea, 1,800 candidates were elected. 1,080 out of 1,800 candidates were selected as delegates. Among 1,080 delegates, 1,002 persons participated in the Congress of South Korean People’s Representatives, convened from 23 to 25 August in

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Haeju for electing Representatives of South Korea to the Supreme Council of the People’s Congress. Finally, they elected 360 South Korean Representatives. In the North, they held an election on 25 August in which 212 Representatives out of 227 candidates were elected. According to the Election Report, read at the meeting, held from 23 to 25 August in Haeju, any citizen, aged twenty or above, was eligible to vote. This was a year lower than what South had decided for its own general election. The report said that the election in North Korea achieved a participation rate of 77.48%, as 6,732,407 out of the total registered voters of 8,681,746 cast their ballot. Such a high participation rate is clearly an exaggeration.63

On the ‘Theory of Central Government’ after the Establishment of Two Separate Regimes The Rhee Syngman administration used the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion of 19 October 1948 as an opportunity to strengthen the anti-communist structure in the South. In a presidential decree he indignantly noted that even female students were involved in the rebellion in the most vicious manner. He ordered that every man, woman and even small child involved in the incident be investigated, and all the treacherous elements summarily executed. He further ordered all the people to obey unquestioningly any decree that the government might promulgate.64 In the Yeosu-Suncheon area any one who was accused of participating in the rebellion was summarily put to death. At the time, Prosecutor Pak Chan-Gil who was outspoken in his criticism of the police brutality and flagrant violation of human rights incurred the wrath of the government. He, along with nineteen other people, was implicated in the left-inspired conspiracy against the government and executed by the police without trial.65 This incident clearly reveals the ultra-rightist character of the regime. In the same year, the mass massacre of citizens of Jeju island began in November and continued until early the following year. A large majority of people amongst approximately 30,000 victims of the 3 April Insurgency lost their lives – not in the early phase of the insurgency during the period of the US military administration, but during this period.66 The Korean Democratic Party and Rhee Syngman used the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion as a convenient pretext for enacting the National Security Law. Since the bill to promulgate the NSL was tabled against the background of brazen police excesses and irregularity, forces opposed to it waged a spirited resistance.67 The law was, nonetheless, promulgated on 1 December 1948. The government also used the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion to strike at the forces loyal to Kim Ku. The government falsely claimed that some supporters of Kim Ku, including Choe Neung-Jin, who spearheaded the anti-Rhee Syngman campaign and was arrested during the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion, were in cooperation with the South and North Korean Workers Party. The government also issued a preposterous statement that they were arrested immediately before they were to launch a coup d’état in a bid to overthrow the Republic of Korea government and install a communist government led by a politician they admired. It was also announced that the Yeosu-Suncheon rebellion was incited by some followers of these key conspirators.68 On

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3 November 1948, at the headquarters of the Seoul Police, many participants in the North–South talks, including Eom Hang-Seop, a close associate of Kim Ku, were arrested. Already, on 15 September the government had rebuked Kim Ku and Kim Gyu-Sik for sending a letter to the UN conference in Paris in which they had requested the UN to hold general elections in both North and South Korea. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his speech on 8 October, warned of police action against those who sought to destabilize the structure of the Republic of Korea. The government spokesman also made a statement on 11 October that only government representatives were entitled to negotiate with the United Nations.69 The National Security Law began gaining status as a legitimate law when the United Nations recognized the government of the Republic of Korea. On 12 December 1948, the United Nations passed a resolution that exercised tremendous influence on the government of the Republic of Korea. On this day, in a resolution concerning the recognition of the Republic of Korea and the withdrawal of foreign armies from Korea, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) declared: ‘There has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea), having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such government in Korea’. In the same resolution UNGA also recommended that ‘the occupying countries withdraw their forces from Korea within the earliest period possible’.70 It is remarkable that the government of the Republic of Korea chose to emphasize the phrase ‘the only such government in Korea’ and shaped the pattern of inter-Korea relations on its basis. The government’s convenient interpretation of this phrase from the UNGA resolution also became closely tied with the National Security Law system. Particularly in the 1950s, the phrase underpinned and justified the pledges that the government and the National Assembly made time and again to drive out communists from the North and hold elections north of the 38th parallel on the basis of the ROK constitution and ROK’s sovereignty over the entire Korean peninsula The National Assembly passed several resolutions to this effect, and it was on this basis that Rhee Syngman set out his theory of bukjintongil or ‘Unification through Northward Advance’. It is also remarkable that this text was invoked even subsequently when Rhee Syngman initiated a relentless anti-communist campaign in a bid to facilitate constitutional amendment to ensure his uninterrupted grip on power. This incident is known as ‘sasa oip’, denoting fraudulent manipulation of the constitutional provision.71 In the resolution concerning the agenda of Korean unification the National Assembly declared

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that ‘it was the national mission of the Republic of Korea, a part of the nation’s unification policy to hold a general election in North Korea where the UN mandate to hold a general election under the supervision of the UNTCOK was not honoured’. The resolution further noted that the holding of elections in both South and North Korea contradicted the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly and impinged on the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea. The text continued: The national policy of the Republic of Korea forming part of the agenda for unification is to hold an election under the supervision of the United Nations in the North Korean region after all the communist troops are withdrawn and thereby to expand to that region the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea. In fact, the United Nations passed resolutions to hold elections throughout the Korean peninsula, and never did any of its resolutions indicate that elections would be held only in North Korea. Besides, holding elections throughout Korea did not at all contradict the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly. In order to understand this, an important question as to what the UNGA meant by ‘this is the only such government in Korea’ needs to be addressed in greater detail and depth. The fact that the entire Korean peninsula forms the territory of the Republic of Korea is enshrined in the Constitution. The fourth clause of the Constitution clearly states that ‘the territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands’. This can be interpreted to mean that there should exist only one nation-state and not two divided states on the Korean peninsula. It is obvious that this constitutional provision denoted a prescriptive norm of Korea’s future nation-state. It is for this reason that in debates in the Constituent Assembly even highly nationalistic members of the Constituent Assembly were almost unanimous on this point, although they differed on many other issues.72 As for the North Korean Constitution, promulgated in 1948, it does not contain any clause in relation to territory. It is unlikely that the omission of a clause on territory was a deliberate act. It could well be that the architects of North Korean constitution did not feel the necessity of stating what was obvious. This point becomes clear when we look at clause 103 of the first North Korean constitution which designated Seoul as the capital of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.73 It is indeed interesting that in explaining inter-Korea relations to the United Nations or other countries the Korean government invariably used this phrase about ‘only such government’ from the UNGA resolution, although the meaning in which the UN used it was not the same as the ROK government interpreted it. On 17 November, the National Assembly, in a resolution concerning the establishment of the Republic of Korea sent to the UN, declared: The establishment of the National Assembly and the government of the Republic of Korea, pursuant to the resolution of the UNGA passed on

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We need to take notice of the expression ‘consensus’. The United States also planned to request the UN to recognize the Republic of Korea as the government of the entire Korean peninsula, as indicated in the resolution passed by the National Assembly on 14 November 1948. However, due to opposition from the UK and Canada, its allies, the US had to abandon the claim that the government of the Republic of Korea had jurisdiction over the entire Korean peninsula, and the UNGA resolution couched its recognition of ROK government in a carefully chosen phrase ‘this is the only such government in Korea’. On 21 November 1948, the United Nations Security Council unanimously rejected a proposal to invite representatives from North Korea to deliberations on the Korean question, and on 6 December a motion about the legitimacy of the North Korean government was also rejected by many votes. The motion originally contained a recommendation to the effect that foreign troops be withdrawn from the Korean peninsula within ninety days, but this was easily rephrased as ‘as early as practicable’. It is important to remember that the UN Security Council emphasized the point that the government of the Republic of Korea ruled only half of the Korean peninsula, and did not recognize its claim of representing the entire Korean peninsula.75 The United Nations resolution on Korea, passed on 12 December 1948, was not concerned merely with the recognition of the government of the Republic of Korea, as is generally known in the country, but was also concerned with the withdrawal of foreign troops. This is apparent even in the name of the ‘Resolution concerning the recognition of the Republic of Korea and withdrawal of foreign troops.’ One needs to keep in mind the fact that the resolution recommended ‘withdrawal of foreign troops as early as practicable’. It is also important to note that the UNGA resolution also stipulated that ‘as a means to the full accomplishment of the objectives set forth in the resolution of 14 November 1947, a commission on Korea be established’. The resolution further emphasized the need for the Commission to ‘lend its good offices to bring about the unification of Korea and the integration of all Korean security forces in accordance with the principles laid down by the General Assembly’, and instructed that the Commission proceeds to Korea ‘within thirty days of the adoption of the resolution’.76 The original document makes it abundantly clear that the UNGA did not dispatch the Commission on Korea in order to divide the country. No doubt a government was already in existence in South Korea, and the United Nations had recognized it, but the UN also realized that the initiatives for unification needed to be continued. The UN Commission on Korea, however, met with formidable obstacles from the very beginning. North Korea was inaccessible to the Commission, as was the case with its predecessor, the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. The unrelenting opposition of Rhee Syngman’s

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government was also an important factor for the Commission’s inability to make contacts with North Korea. On 18 February 1949, Rhee Syngman made it abundantly clear that his government ‘would not accept any initiative for unification that superseded the objectives of the establishment of the government of the Republic of Korea’. He further noted that negotiation with the puppet regime of North Korea amounted to the tacit recognition of the North Korean Government, and therefore not permissible under any circumstances.77 As is clear from the instance of West Germany or the actual activities of the government of the Republic of Korea after the 1970s, it was desirable to have some kind of channel for contact and negotiation between the two Koreas. This could have been achieved even in the absence of crossrecognition of the divided states and positive attitude towards each other. The declaration of Rhee Syngman, noted above, testifies unambiguously to his exclusionist and defensive position, his unbending will to reject any contact with North Korea and thereby consolidate the Cold War structure. Early in the same year, when the Commission sought approval from Rhee Syngman’s government to contact North Korea through Soviet Union, the government harshly censured the Commission’s attempt of ‘direct contact with the Puppet North Korean regime and its leaders’.78 The government also blocked the Commission’s proposal to contact Kim Ku or Kim Gyu-Sik, the key people with whom it wanted to negotiate the Korean question. Social organizations also found it extremely difficult to contact the UN Commission. On 18 January 1949, the the government spokesman emphasized in one of his statements that the advocacy of dialogue with North Korea and allusion to North Korean administration was an example of logical contradiction and inconsistency. He pointed out that the government of the Republic of Korea was the sole government with jurisdiction over both South and North Korea, and that the North Korean administration, not recognized by the United Nations, could not be considered as a partner at a negotiating table. He made it clear that there could be no North–South dialogue. The spokesman warned the citizens against using expression such as the North Korean administration or North–South negotiation and dialogue.79 The activities of the United Nations Commission were hotly debated even in the National Assembly. When Shabas, Director of Public Information of the UN Commission, announced in March 1949 that he would meet North Korean leaders in his personal capacity, Yun Chi-Yeong (Yun Chi-yong), Minister of Internal Affairs, criticized him, saying that meeting with the key leaders of North Korea was the same as meeting with the traitors and enemies of the Republic of Korea. He opposed Shabas’ plan, and observed that it was within the right of the Republic of Korea to retake the land, currently under illegal occupation (of the North Korean administration). He emphatically stated that there could be no peaceful unification. Yun also criticized a journalist who was reported to have asked Shabas what he thought about (the possibility of) North Korea attacking South Korea and vice versa. Minister Yun criticized the reporter for putting up a question that implied recognition of the sovereignty of North Korea, and stated the government’s resolve to ban such expressions. An independent assemblyman retorted that if peaceful

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unification was possible, what else could one desire. Noh Il-Hwan, another independent lawmaker, called Minister Yun’s statement the worst kind of sophistry.80 However, when the National Security Law system became entrenched due to hard-line policies of the government, manifested in a series of related incidents such as the reign of terror unleashed by police, assassination of Kim Ku and the incident of a ‘communist fraction’ in the National Assembly, the intention of the Commission to play a mediating role clashed head-on with Shin Ik-Hui, Speaker of the National Assembly and leaders of other organizations.81 Meanwhile North Korea convened the Joint Meeting of the Leaders of Political Parties and Social Associations of North and South Korea in Pyongyang from 29 June to 5 July 1948, an event that provides us with a glimpse of the North Korean worldview. At the meeting the South Korean government was described as a puppet regime and a resolution was passed to establish a central government. The Supreme People’s Congress adopted the constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 8 September 1948 and on 9 September, the cabinet was formed. The Supreme People’s Congress described the newly formed government as the sole, true, peoplebased supreme legislative body of Korea.82 On this day, premier Kim Il Sung called the South Korean government a unilateral puppet government and his own regime as the central government of Korea based on the unanimous will of the entire Korean people in the North and South.83 It is clear that North Korea adopted an exclusivist and myopic approach after the establishment of the regime. In addition to its exclusive political culture and myopia, North Korea displayed several other anomalies which need to be understood. When North Korea approached Kim Ku and Kim Gyu-Sik, it sought to impose on them its own unification policy and tried to exploit them to serve its political purposes. North Korea did not intend to formulate any inclusive policy proposals which could reflect the views of Kim Ku and Kim Gyu-Sik. Instead, it wanted Kim Ku and Kim Gyu-Sik to blindly toe its lines and lend its agenda some legitimacy. Kim Ku and Kim Gyu-Sik, however, took an independent position. They also very resolutely purged their organizations of any member who joined North Korean associations or government organizations. They maintained this policy in order to pursue their unification movement in an environment where they could coexist with the ultra-right anti-communists. Furthermore, Kim Ku and Kim Gyu-Sik did not support the establishment of the Democratic Front for National Unification. On 25 June, the day of its establishment, Heo Heon strongly criticized Kim Ku and Kim Gyu-Sik for ‘not adhering to a single item of the resolution to which they agreed in the Joint Meeting of Political Parties and Associations of North and South Korea last year.’ He further declared that ‘Kim Ku and Kim Gyu-Sik had opposed Rhee Syngman not because of Rhee Syngman’s treacherous acts, as they alleged, but because they wanted to seize power from him.’84 It was not the two Kims but the socialists who violated the agreements of the South and North Negotiation or the Meeting of Key Political Figures of the South and North of April 1948. Despite the fact that its communiqué, or The

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Joint Statement of The Political Parties and Associations of North and South Korea of 30 April, stipulated that the South and North establish a unified provisional government by holding an All Korea Political Meeting under the auspices of all Political Parties after the withdrawal of the Soviet and US Armies, the North established its own government without abiding by the resolution and without holding political meetings which were also open to rightist parties. On top of that, the socialists condemned Kim Ku and Kim Gyu-Sik as ‘those blinded by the lure of political power and position’. This condemnation by the socialists clearly showed their political naivety and self-righteousness. The socialists in colonial Korea, especially local communists, were accustomed to a range of ideological currents and were quite inclusive and flexible in their approach. The situation, however, changed after the liberation from Japan. They forged a close alliance with Soviet Russia and became very narrow-minded and dogmatic in establishing a united national front. They worked solely for the socialist camp under the Cold War regime and did not take a flexible approach in establishing a united national front. Unlike Mao Zedong or the Chinese Communist Party, they did not have the capacity to work with such nationalists as Kim Ku or moderate nationalists such as Yeo Un-Hyeong and Kim Gyu-Sik. In this light, we can understand why Pak Heon-Yeong condemned Jo Bong-Am, Kim Seong-Suk, Jo Dong-O and Jang Geon-Sang (Chang Kon-sang) as spies on the payroll of American imperialism in his article entitled ‘The Current Situation in South Korea and the Task of Patriotic Parties and Associations’ (Rodong Sinmun 14 January 1950).85 STRATEGIES FOR OVERCOMING THE SYSTEM OF NATIONAL DIVISION So far, I have examined the policies and activities that caused the national division. In addition, I discussed the factors which contributed to the creation and consolidation of the system of national division. Finally, I analysed the early characteristics of the ‘Theory of the Central Government’, the most crucial factor in the reinforcement of the system of national division. Although the situation has recently improved, the continued existence of the National Security Law, the lingering mutual hostility between South and North Korea, and the absence of any substantial economic linkages and mutual visits between South and North, demonstrate that the system of national division on the Korean peninsula represents a most tragic case and an unparalleled phenomenon in the world. This characteristic of the national division of Korea is evident in the fact that despite the strong aspiration for national unification there were, with a few exceptions, no serious unification movements until the mid-1980s. Despite the pervasive popular aspiration for unification, the system of national division has struck deep roots and is a formidable force on the Korean peninsula, because the dominant groups of the two Koreas lack strong spiritual and material strength. Since the late Joseon dynasty, the pioneers of capitalist modernization lacked strong material foundations and were weak in political independence and ideological self-reliance. They maintained their political and social power or sought their material welfare mostly by

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relying on foreign powers or invading forces. The socialist forces also could not build strong political or material foundations due to the unrelenting political oppression and economic exploitation of Japanese imperialism. Nonetheless, they grew up very rapidly in colonial Korea. The partisan exclusiveness of the dominant forces of the two Koreas was basically derived from the weakness of their class capacities. This can be analysed from various standpoints. In my opinion myeongbunnon or Confucian moralism, which guided the thought pattern of the Korean elites in the Joseon dynasty, displayed a similar exclusiveness for the same reason. The system of national division can be explained to a large extent through research on topics such as the pro-Japanese collaborators, the Yushin regime, or the monocratic political system. Although some pro-Japanese elements who betrayed their nation by collaborating with Japanese imperialism rediscovered their national consciousness after the Liberation, they became instrumental in establishing a separate government on the Korean peninsula and constituted the main force in the ultra-right anti-communist campaign after the establishment of the South Korean government. To understand the system of national division, various points such as the economic and cultural aspects of the South and North, their cultural and spiritual attitudes and their lifestyles should be analysed. When studying the system of national division, it is almost impossible to adopt an objective approach because any research on the system of national division cannot be independent of ideological influence. Objective or dispassionate research will be possible only after the unification forces or democratic nationalist forces overcome the consciousness of national division. Simple unification is not an adequate precondition for a completely objective historical approach. Another obstacle to studying the system of national division is the fact that events may influence the research questions and conclusion. A good example is to be found in studies on the Korean War which demonstrates that efforts for national reunification have brought about a reinforcement of the national division and in this case, cause and effect are not entirely separate. Similarly, we may say that the facts or truth relating to the national division will be clearer after more time has passed. In South Korea, there is abundant data available for research on the national division, however, only a portion of this is utilized. In the North, meanwhile, it seems that access to research data itself is impossible. As has already been pointed out, neither in the North nor in the South, can any research on the national division ever be free of ideological influences. However, since we do not know even the basic facts well, it is necessary to uncover as many facts as possible and evaluate them with the spirit of silsagusi or ‘seeking the truth through studying the facts’. Generally speaking, the intellectual criteria for the objective study of the national division will include issues such as democracy, patriotism, the basic norms of the modern nation state, freedom of thought, human rights and the values of modern society based on civic ethics. These values have historically been in contradiction with the ideology of the national division and pro-Japanese collaboration.

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Little research on South Korea as part of the system of national division has been undertaken in South Korea, which shows that there has been little study on the modern history of Korea. In contrast, on the subject of North Korea, where there is much less data than on South Korea, some studies have been completed on topics such as the Juche ideology and the different culture in the North. In other words, the South Korean Government has suppressed research on the history of South Korea and supported research on North Korea to pursue its anti-communist policies. Although some research reveals that South Korean culture has diverged substantially from the original Korean culture, most studies see the phenomena just as ‘change’ rather than the ‘development of a different culture’ in the South. This dualistic approach demonstrates the biased perspectives which have been adopted in South Korea. It would be superfluous to reiterate that we need more comprehensive research on the system of national division both in South and North Korea. Together with research on the system of national division, we should also actively launch movements to overcome the system of national division. In the introductory section of this chapter I argued that the system of national division has served an extremely authoritarian government and a controlled society in which civil society has been aborted and people live isolated lives. The movement to overcome the national division is so closely related to democratization movements that it is a movement to establish ‘a communitarian society’ based on civic spirit and love for one’s neighbours. In other words, it can be a movement in which we establish self-identity and spiritual self-reliance and become an equal member of the global society without being swamped by the currents of globalization. NOTES 1

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Yi Jong-Seok. ‘Juche sasang-gwa Minjokjuui: geu Yeongwanseong-e gwanhan Yeongu’ (Juche Ideology and Nationalism: Research on its mutual relationship), Hyeondae Bukhansahoe-ui Ihae (Understanding Contemporary North Korea). Yeoksabipyeongsa Publishers, 1995, PPp. 118–120. Although twenty years had passed since the national division and any discussion on national reunification was suppressed, a social survey done by the Office of National Unification in 1969 showed that 90.6% believed that ‘national unification should be pursued’. Only 6.2% of the respondents said that the current state of divided Korea would be better than that of reunification. Another question to the timing of reunification was also given. 39.5% of the respondents answered that the reunification would be achieved in ten years and only 19.5% of the respondents believed that ‘national unification was impossible’, and the remainder ‘did not know’. The Chosun Ilbo, 20 February 1970. (The percentage is corrected by the translator based on the news article.) Jo Bong-Am argued that the economy constituted the secondary reason for national unification and that the primary reason was the fact that Korean people belonged to the same nation. Jo Bong-Am. ‘Pyeonghwatongilui Gil’ (The Road to Peaceful Reunification), Jinbodang (The Progressive Party),

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Korean Nationalism Betrayed Jiyangsa Publisher, 1985, pp. 68–69. Economic reasons were also emphasized during the April Revolution. See Seo Joong-Seok, ‘Sawol Hyeokmyeong Undonggiui Banmi Tongil Undong-gwa Minjok Haebangnon’ (Anti-American and Unification Movements during the period of the April Revolution), Yeoksa Bipyeong (Historical Review), autumn 1991. Seo Joong-Seok. 1995. ‘Jinbodang Yeongu: Jo Bong-Am, Jinbodangui Pyeonghwatongilnon-eul Jungsimeuro’ (A Study on the Progressive Party – focusing on the theory of peaceful unification of Jo Bong-Am and The Progressive Party), Guksagwan Nonchong (Journal of Kuksagwan), Vol. 66, 1995. Seo Joong-Seok. ‘Yiseungmangwa Bukjintongil’ (Rhee Syngman and His Theory of National Unification), Yeoksa Bipyeong (Historical Review), Summer 1995. Hong Seok-Ryul. ‘Sawol Minjuhangjaenggi Jungniphwa Tongilnon’ (Neutralization and Unification Theories during the April Democratization Struggles), Yeoksawa Hyeonsil (History and Reality), Vol. 10. 1993; Seo JoongSeok, op.cit. 1991. Seo Joong-Seok. ‘Hanguk Jeonjaenghu Tongilsasangui Jeongaewa Minjokgongdongcheui Mosaek’ (The Development of Unification Theories and Search for the National Community after the Korean War), Bundan Osipnyeongwa Tongilsidaeui Gwaje (The National Division of Fifty Years and Tasks for the National Unification). Yeoksa Bipyeong Sa Publisher, 1995. In 1995, Yeoksa Munje Yeonguso (The Institute of History Problems) published Bundan Osipnyeongwa Tongilsidaeui Gwaje (The National Division of Fifty Years and Tasks for the National Unification) marking the fiftieth anniversary of Korea’s Liberation. Baik Nak-Cheong. ‘Bundancheje-ui Insikeul wihayeo’ (For Understanding the System of National Division), Bundancheje Byeonhyeok-ui Gongbugil (The Road to Study for Transforming the System of National Division). Changjak gwa Bipyeongsa Publisher, 1994, pp. 13–16. For literature on the system of national division, besides Baik Nak-Cheong, see Yi Jong-O, ‘Bundangwa Tongileul Dasi Saenggakhaebomyeo’ (Revisiting National Division and Unification), Changjak-gwa Bipyeong (Journal of Creation and Criticism), Summer 1993 and Son Ho-Cheol, ‘Bundanchejeronui Bipanjeok Gochal’ (Critical Review on the Theories of the System of National Division), Changjak-gwa Bipyeong (Journal of Creation and Criticism), Summer 1994. Yi Sam-Yeol. 1984. ‘Dokil Gyohoe-wa Tongil Munje’ (Churches in Germany and the Question of Unification), Bundanhyeonsil-gwa Tongilmunje (Reality of Divided Korea and Unification Movements). Minjungsa Publisher, 1984, p. 280. Yeo In-Gon. 1994. ‘Jeongchi, Oegyo bunya’ (Politics and Diplomacy), Bundan Geukbok-ui Gyeongheom-gwa Hanbando Tongil 1– Dokilpyeon (The Experiences of Reunification and Korean Unification 1 – the Case of Germany). Hanul Publisher, 1994, p. 24. Hwang Byeong-Deok, ‘Sahoe, Gyoyuk, Hwangyeong’ (Society, Education, Environment), Bundan Geukbok-ui Gyeongheom-gwa Hanbando Tongil 1– Dokilpyeon (The Experiences of Reunification and Korean Unification 1 – the Case of Germany). Hanul Publisher, 1994.

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This section is a revision of the author’s previous work: ‘Namgwa Bukui Jungang Jeongburongwa Gukgabonbeopcheje’ (The Theory of the Central Government of South and North and the System of the National Security Law), Hanguk Hyeondae Minjokundong Yeongu (A Study on the National Movement in Contemporary Korea), Vol. 2. Yeoksa Bipyeongsa Publisher, 1996, chapter 2. When the work Hanguk Hyeondae Minjokundong Yeongu (A Study on the National Movement in Contemporary Korea) was about to be published, I included this piece. Although there is much in common between this section and the book chapter, this section itself is so essential to my discussion that I include it in this chapter. Seo Joong-Seok. Hanguk Hyeondae Minjokundong Yeongu (A Study on the National Movement in Contemporary Korea). Yeoksa Bipyeongsa Publisher 1991. pp. 263–4. B. Cummings. 1981. The Origins of the Korean War (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press), p. 186. Seo Joong-Seok. Ibid. pp. 306–17. Kim, Han-Gil. Hyeondae Joseon Yeoksa (Contemporary Korean History). Pyongyang: Sahoegwahakwon Yeoksa Yeonguso (The Institute of History, the Academy of Social Sciences), 1983. (Reprinted, 1988, Seoul: Ilsongjeong, p. 190). For the Land Reform in North Korea, see Yi Ju-Cheol. ‘1946 nyeon Bukhan-ui Tojigaehyeok-e daehan Yeongu’ (A Study on the Land Reform of 1948 in North Korea), Unpublished MA Thesis. Korea University, 1989; Kim Seong-Bo. ‘Bukhan-ui Tojigaehyeokgwa Nongchon Gyecheung Guseongbyeonhwa’ (The Land Reform and Change of Social Classes in North Korea), Dongbang Hakji (Asian Studies Review). Vol. 87, 1995. One scholar argued that Soviet Russia was not so supportive of the revitalization of the Joint Committee of the USA and Soviet Russia after the failure of the first meeting and implemented policies to build a state in the north, including the election of a people’s committee. According to his analysis, Soviet Russia took the road of the establishment of a separate government (Kim Seong-Bo). ‘Soryeon-ui Daehanjeongchaek-gwa Bukhan-eseoui Bundanjilseo Hyeongseong’ (Russia’s Korean Policies and the Formation of the Divided and Separate Government in the north), Bundan Osipnyeongwa Tongilsidaeui Gwaje (The National Division of Fifty Years and Tasks for the National Unification). Yeoksa Bipyeongsa Publisher, 1995, pp. 90–91. For the process of making the constitution, see Yoon Gyeong-Seop, ‘1948 nyeon Bukhan Heonbeop-ui Jejeongbaegyeong-gwa geu Seongnip’ (Background to the Making of the Constitution of North Korea in 1948 and its Establishment), MA Thesis. Department of History, Seongkyunkwan University, 1996. Pak Won-Sun. Gukgaboanbeop Yeongu (A Study on the National Security Law) Vol. 1, Yeoksa Bipyeongsa Publisher. 1989, p. 100. For the abuse of the National Security Law before the 6th Republic, see Pak Won-Sun. Gukgaboanbeop Yeongu (A Study on the National Security Law), Vol. 2, Yeoksa Bipyeongsa Publisher, 1992. Choe Jang-Jip, Jeong Hae-Gu. ‘Haebang palnyeonsa-ui Chongchejeok Insik’ (Comprehensive Understanding of the Eight Years after the Liberation),

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Korean Nationalism Betrayed Haebang Jeonhusa-ui Insik (Understanding the history of pre- and postLiberation in Korea). Hangilsa Publisher. 1989. For arguments that the USA bears more responsibility in the national division than Soviet Russia, see ‘Daetoron, Migukgwa Hanbando, 1945–1995’ (Big debates, the USA and the Korean peninsula, 1945–1995), Yeoksa Bipyeong (Historical Review), Winter 1995, pp. 82–86. Heo Jeong, ‘Naeileul Wihan Jeungeon’ (Witness for Tomorrow), Saemteo, 1979, p. 184; Yu Chi-Song. Haegong Sin Ik-Hui Ildaegi (Haegong Shin Ik-Hui’s Life History). Haegong Sinikhui Seonsaeng Ginyeomhoe (Association for Commemorating Mr Shin Ik-Hui), 1984, pp. 627–8. Jeong Tae-Yeong. ‘Jobongam Sahyeong, Migukeun Oe Chimmuk-eul Jikyeotna (Jeungeon)’ (Witness: Why was the USA silent at the execution of Jo Bong-Am), Yeoksa Bipyeong (Historical Review), winter 1990; Pak Tae-Gyun. Jobongam Yeongu (A Study on Jo Bong-Am). Changjakgwa Bipyeongsa Publisher, 1995, pp. 374–389. Yeo Hyeon-Deok. ‘Jangmyeon Jeonggwon-ui Bunggoe-wa Miguk-ui Yeokhal’ (The Collapse of the Jang Myeon government and the Role of the USA), Yeoksa Bipyeong (Historical Review), summer 1992. Kim Jeong-Hyeon. ‘60 nyeondae Geundaehwa noseon: Miguk-ui Munhwa jegukjuui-wa Hanguk Jisikin’ (Modernization Theories in the 1960s: American Cultural Imperialism and Korean Intellectuals), Yeoksa Bipyeong (Historical Review), summer 1991. Seo Joong-Seok. ‘Bakjeonggwon-ui Daeiljase-wa Pahaengjeok Hanilgwangye’ (The Attitude of the Park Government towards Japan and the Distorted Relationship of Korea and Japan), Yeoksa Bipyeong (Historical Review), spring 1995. Yi Sam-Seong. ‘Gwangju Haksal, Miguk, Singunbu-ui Hyeopjo-wa Gongmo’ (Gwangju Massacre, the Co-Conspiracy and Cooperation of the USA and the military government), Yeoksa Bipyeong (Historical Review), autumn 1996. Jeong Yeong-Tae. ‘Iljemal Migunjeonggi Bangong Ideologi-ui Hyeongseong’ (The Formation of Anti-Communist Ideology in late Japanese Imperialism and the American Military Government), Yeoksa Bipyeong (Historical Review). Spring 1992. For information of the anti-communist system during this period, see Seo Joong-Seok. 1995. ‘Jeongbu Suriphu Bangongcheje Hwaknipgwajeong-e daehan Yeongu’ (A Study on the Process of the Establishment of the Anti-communist System since the founding of the Republic of Korea), Hanguksa Yeongu (Korean History Studies), Vol. 90. Jo Bong-Am. ‘Uri-ui Dangmyeon Gwaeop’ (Our pressing tasks), Jobongam-gwa Jinbodang (Jo Bong-Am and the Progressive Party). Hangilsa Publisher, 1991, pp. 490–503. From the case of the arrest of a congressman, it is clear how oppressive anticommunism was in the mid-1980s. The congressman was arrested because he argued that the most important policy for South Korea was democracy or unification rather than anti-communism. Seo Joong-Seok, ‘Yiseungman-gwa Bukjintongil’ (Rhee Syngman and his National Unification Theory), Yeoksa Bipyeong (Historical Review), Summer 1995. pp. 156–160.

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Suh Dong-Man. ‘Bukjoseon-eseoui Sahoejuuicheje Seongnip, 1945–1961’ (The Establishment of the Socialist System in North Korea, 1945–1961), unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, International Relations Major, Institute of Advanced Studies for Culture, University of Tokyo, 1995, Chaps 4 and 5. Yi Jong-Seok, ‘Nambukhan Dokjaecheje-ui Seongnip-gwa Bundangujo – Namhan yusincheje-wa Bukhan Yuilcheje-ui Bigyo’ (Establishment of Dictatorship in South and North Korea and the Structure of the National Division – the South Korean Yunshin Regime and the North Korean Political System of the Single Leader), Bundan osipnyeon-gwa Tongilsidae-ui Gwaje (The National Division of Fifty Years and the Tasks for National Unification), Yeoksa Bipyeongsa Publisher, 1995. Kim Yeon-Cheol. ‘Bukhan-ui 1960 nyeondae Gyeongjegukbang Byeongjinnoseon-e gwanhan Yeongu’ (A Study on the Policies of Economy and Defence Together in the 1960s in North Korea), MA thesis, Department of Politics and International Politics, Seongkyunkwan University, 1991. The basic structure of Park’s militaristic fascism was formed when he served in the Japanese army as an officer during the Japanese Armed Occupation Period. Yi Jong-Seok emphasizes this point. Yi Jong-Seok, ibid. pp. 158–9. Seo Joong-Seok. Op. cit. 135–146. Gukhoe Minuiwon Samucheo (Executive Office of The Lower House of the National Assembly), Gukhoe Sipnyeonji (The History of the National Assembly for the last ten years), Gukhoe Minuiwon Samucheo (Executive Office of the Lower House of the National Assembly), 1958, Appendix, p. 10. Gukhoe Minuiwon Samucheo (Executive Office of The Lower House of the National Assembly), Ibid. Appendix, p. 11. As of mid-March, the Korean Democratic Party actively participated in the election of May 10. Other parties such as the South Korean Worker’s Party, the People’s Republic Party, the Working People Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Democratic Independence Party, the People’s Alliance, the Working Mass Party, the Independent Working Party, the Democratic Korean Independence Party, the New Progressive Party, the Korean Independence Party, the Youth Friendship Party, the Patriotic Party opposed the election. The Saehan Sinbo 2–6, late March 1948, p. 9. The Kyunghyang Sinmun, 13 April 1948; The Seoul Sinmun, 13 April 1948. For the forced voter registration, see Kim Deuk-Jung, ‘Jeheongukhoe-ui Guseonggwajeong-gwa Seonggyeok’ (The Process of the Organization of the Constitutional Assembly and the Characteristics of the Constitutional Assembly), MA Thesis, Department of History, Seongkyunkwan University, 1993. p. 44–50. The Donga Ilbo, 8 April 1948. The Kyunghyang Sinmun, 16 April 1948. When the three junior members of the Constitutional Assembly including Yi Mun-Won were arrested and a proposal for releasing them was submitted to the National Assembly, Kim Jun-Yeon of the Korea Democratic Party and the Democratic Nationalist Party protested. They argued that the proposal was absurd and it amounted to the repudiation or rejection of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea. He argued that he and his party drove back

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Korean Nationalism Betrayed the Joint Commission of the USA and the Soviet Russia and defeated the centrists and proponents of South and North negotiation and thereby established the Republic of Korea with their blood. Gukhoesokgirok (The Minutes of the National Assembly), 3–1, 23 May 1949. The Seoul Sinmun, 8 June 1948; The Chosun Ilbo, 8 June 1948. Eom Hang-Seop ed., Gimgu Juseok Choegeuneollonjip (Recent public announcements of Chairman Kim Ku). Samil Press, 1948, p. 24. The Seoul Sinmun, 25 June 1948; The Chosun Ilbo, 25 June 1948. The Seoul Sinmun, 8 June 1948; The Chosun Ilbo, 8 June 1948. The Donga Ilbo, 16 May 1948; The Chosun Ilbo, 16 May 1948. The Kyunghyang Sinmun, 20 May 1948; The Chosun Ilbo, 20 May 1948. The Chosun Ilbo, 25 May 1948. The Chosun Ilbo, 16 May 1948; The Donga Ilbo, 16 May 1948. Do Jin-Sun, ‘1945–48nyeon Uik-ui Donghyang-gwa Minjoktongiljeongbu Suripundong’ (Activities of Rightists and the Movements for Building the Unified Government from 1945 to 1948), Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Korean History, Seoul National University, 1993. Yoo Gyeong-Seop. Ibid. Chapter 3. Eom Hang-Seop ed., Op. Cit. pp. 47–48. Joseon Jungang Tongsinsa (The Chosun Central News Agency). Joseon Jungang Yeongam (The Almanac by The Chosun Jung-Ang). Pyongyang: Joseon Jungang Tongsinsa, 1950. For the process of the election of the Supreme Council of the People’s Congress, see Yi Shin-Cheol, ‘Joguktongil Minjujuuijeonseon Yeongu’ (A Study on the Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland), MA thesis, Department of History, Seongkyunkwan University, 1995. Rhee Syngman, ‘Bulsunbaereul Cheoljeohi Jegeo, Banyeoksasang Bangji Beopnyeong Junbi’ (Eradicating the subversive elements and preparing for the laws against rebellious thoughts). 5 November 1948, Daetongnyeong Yiseungman Baksa Damhwajip (Collection of President Rhee Syngman’s Speeches). Gongbocheo (Public Relations Office), 1953, p. 8. Speech of Minister of Justice, Kwon. Gukhoesokgirok (The Minutes of The National Assembly). Vol 5, No.13., 4 December 1949. Kim Chang-Hu. 1993. ‘1948nyeon 4,3 hangjaeng, Bonggi-wa Haksal-ui Jeonmo’ (The Real Situation of the 3 April Rebellion of 1948 and the Massacre), Yeoksa Bipyeong (Historical Review). Spring 1993. pp. 155–159. Since during this period the command of the Army belonged to the US Army, the US is to a large extent responsible for the civilian massacre in Jeju Island. ‘Saseol, Gukgaboanbeop-eul Baegyeokham’ (Editorial: Opposing the National Security Law), The Chosun Ilbo. 14 November 1948. For the details, see Seo Joong-Seok (1995), pp. 433–435. The Joint Weekly Analysis of The USA Embassy in Korea, Nr. ZGBI 2174, WEEKA Nr. 52, 24 December 1948. (Jeong Yong-Wook ed., Juhan Miguk Daesagwan Jugan Bogoseo: Joint WeekA reprinted by Youngjin Munhwa Publishers, 1993, Vol. 2, pp. 380–381). Jeong Il-Hyeong (ed.). Yuen-gwa Hanguk Munje (The UN and the Korean Question). Sinmyeong Munhwa Publisher, 1961, pp. 8–9.

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Gukhoesokgirok (The Minutes of the National Assembly), Vol. 19, No.76, 11 November 1954. (This incident of sasa oip amendment is: President Rhee is believed to have coerced the speaker of the National Assembly to announce that in calculating a two thirds-majority, .4 was to be dropped and only 0.5 and above was to be rounded up to the next number, with the implication that the motion of constitutional amendment was declared to have passed, even though it was short of one vote – translators’ note). Only one lawmaker, Kim Gyo-Hyeon, asked about the definition of the territory. Concerning his question, a legislation specialist, Yu Jin-O (Yu Chin-o) answered: ‘By defining that the constitution covers not only the South of 38th parallel but the entire Korean peninsula, it shows that the notion of the country is established on the basis of the entire Korean territory including the South of 38th parallel.’ Gukhoesokgirok (The Minutes of the National Assembly), Vol.1, No.18, 26 June 1949. For the entire contents of the Constitution of North Korea, see Joseon Jungang Tongsinsa (The Chosun Central News Agency, 1949), ibid., pp. 1–12. Minuiwon samucheo (Executive Office of The Lower House of the National Assembly), ibid. Appendix p. 12. James Irving Matry. The Reluctant Crusade – American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941–1950. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985, pp. 176–178 (Ku DaeYeol trans. Hanbandoui bundangwa miguk. Eulyu Munhwasa, 1989, pp. 212–214). Jeong Il-Hyeong (ed.), op. cit. pp. 10–11. Oemubu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Hanguk Oegyo Samsimnyeon 1948–1978 (Thirty Years of Korean Diplomacy, 1948–1978). Oemubu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 1979, pp. 63–64. Ibid., pp. 63–64. Yi Geon-Hyeok. ‘Sinhanwi-wa Nambuk Tongil’ (The New Korean Commission and the National Unification), Sincheonji (The New Heaven and Earth), February 1949. pp. 8–9. Gukhoesokgirok (The Minutes of the National Assembly), Vol. 2, No.51, 11 March 1949 and No.54, 15 March 1949. The UN Commission on Korea proposed the National Unification Policies as follows: 1) The Commission is ready to support any kind of North and South talks to discuss the methods of the Korean national unification and its possibility, 2) The Commission helps the North and South trade develop from its initial stage to the normal stage, 3) The Commission asks North and South Korea to stop the vicious propaganda against each other which may have immensely negative impacts on the path of the national reunification. Sin IkHui argued that this proposal is pro-communist and South Korea may request the withdrawal of the UN Commission on Korea. Yun Chi-Yeong, Kim JunYeon, Hong Seong-Ha, etc. supported Sin Ik-Hui’s argument and suggested that the National Assembly should take due action against the proposal of the UN Commission. Gukhoesokgirok (The Minutes of the National Assembly), Vol. 4, No.8, 12 July 1947. Joseon Jungang Tongsinsa (The Chosun Central News Agency, 1950), op. cit., p. 56.

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Korean Nationalism Betrayed Ibid., pp. 44–45. Kim Nam-Sik (ed). Namnodang Yeongu Jaryojip (Research Materials on The South Korean Workers Party). Vol. 1. Seoul: Korea University Press, 1974, p. 474. Jogukui tongil doknipeul wihan joguk tongil minjujuui jeonseonui munheonjip (Documents on the Unification and Independence of the Fatherland Published by the Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland). Joseon Rodongdang (The Korean Worker’s Party) Publisher, 1951, p. 118.

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4

The Form of Existence and Structural Character of Pro-Japanese Collaborators

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THE MEANING OF PRO-JAPANESE COLLABORATORS IN THE CONTEXT OF KOREAN HISTORY

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n the tumultuous history of modern Korea, pro-Japanese forces served as an internal source of discord and disruption within the nation. In the period when Korea needed to develop a modern society and a modern nation-state, it was reduced to a semi-colony and colony, and in 1945, when the Japanese colonial rule came to an end, the nation experienced the tragedy of division and the establishment of two hostile regimes across the 38th parallel. Mutual antagonism between the two Koreas was so intense that either side failed even to recognize the other as part of the same race or nation, even as human beings. Historically, Korea had not been occupied by a foreign power and it was able to pursue for over a millennium an independent and autonomous path of political development, leading to the formation of a homogeneous nationstate. Obviously the colonization of Korea in the modern era and its partition along ideological lines in the contemporary period, primarily resulted from the nation’s integration within the capitalist world system and the subordination of Korea’s national interest to the designs of imperialist powers which were bent on slicing the world up into their separate spheres of influence and maintaining the balance of power. Pro-Japanese collaborators facilitated the process of imperialist aggression in Korea and the reduction of its status to that of a semi-colony and colony. They also paved the path for the establishment of two hostile regimes and contributed to the preservation of the structure of divided states. It is apparent that the imperialist forces or the major powers of the world served as an external factor of disruption, while pro-Japanese collaborators constituted the internal force of division in the modern history of Korea. In the Korean context the term ‘pro-Japanese collaborators’ does not indicate those who hold positive views about Japan or are fond of Japanese

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culture. It applies to national traitors who engaged in anti-national activities by helping the enemy and betraying their nation. The Korean people’s hostility towards Japan may be traced to the late sixteenth century when Hideyoshi launched a massive invasion of Korea. Obviously, Korea’s deepseated resentment of Japan is not a modern phenomenon, but has deeper roots. In the modern era the aggressive policies of imperialist Japan led to the enslavement of the Korean people. It was natural, therefore, that any individual or organization whom the people viewed as having served Japan’s imperialist interests in Korea was stigmatized as a ‘pro-Japanese collaborator’. This is confirmed in the trial of anti-national traitors under the 1948 antinational law, which was held immediately after the inauguration of the Presidency of Rhee Syngman – at which stage even common people used this terminology. For instance, pro-Japanese collaborators were defined in the Banminja Daegongpangi or the Full Records of the Trials of National Traitors as those who impeded the future progress of the nation and sold out their own people. However, we may have to recognize that among those ‘collaborators’ there are some pioneering leaders like the people of the early Enlightenment group who wanted to modernize Korea with the support of Japan. From the evaluation that pro-Japanese collaborators are the national traitors who sold out the country to Japan it is inferred that pro-Japanese collaborators stood in the anti-national line as the driving forces of national division. Generally speaking, the national division arises when countries are invaded by capitalist powers in modern society or in the transitional period to modern society. It is true that capitalist or imperialist invasion entails the rise of collaborators who cooperate with the invaders. In the case of Korea, they are called pro-Japanese traitors. Korea faced the crisis of national division as it entered modern society. The historical background and structural causes of the formation of collaborators with the invaders could be explained as follows. When Korea was invaded by capitalist powers, the pre-modern order of the Joseon dynasty was collapsing but modern national consciousness or the modern nation-state was not formed. Since they could not actively cope with the revolutionary zeal of the dominant class, the court and bureaucrats could not help but rely on foreign powers in order to protect their interests against the possible modern and revolutionary change. The middle class were so sensitive and responsive to the social changes that they could easily become proJapanese collaborators. On top of that, since the class which led modernization did not have independent political power and economic capability, it sought capitalist development by relying on imperialist powers. Under these circumstances, appeared people promoting ‘modernization-first’ who put the issue of national independence in the distant future and sought their material development with the support and protection of the invaders. If pro-Japanese Koreans had engaged in anti-national activities only during the colonial rule in order to pursue material and capitalist development, the issue of collaboration would not have assumed any significance except by way of a shameful legacy from the past. The collaborators significantly influenced the course of the contemporary history of Korea, however,

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because they emerged as a powerful political force after liberation and left their stamp on every aspect of Korean society. Some of their major roles will be summarized below. First, pro-Japanese collaborators were not purged at the time of liberation. Instead, they were elevated to the higher echelons of Korea’s new ruling class. They became the fulcrum of authority and assumed powerful positions in the social, cultural and economic life of the nation. Second, pro-Japanese collaborators led the campaign for separate government in the aftermath of the nation’s liberation and formed the core internal factor for national division. As sturdy pillars of the movement for separate regimes on the peninsula, they oppressed the common people with their ultra-right anti-communist ideology and attempted to impose on them their anti-democratic, fascist and anti-unification agenda. Indeed, they struck at the very root of the democratic development of South Korea. Third, even in the post-liberation era, they championed the cause of dependent capitalism under their ‘modernization-first’ doctrine. The Chaebeol or business conglomerates were envisioned as the engine of dependent capitalism. Their vision for the nation, premised on the huge suffering and sacrifices of the common people and built on the corrupted symbiotic relationship between political and business groups, was indivisibly bound to ultra-right dictatorship. They were not even able to put forward a positive and healthy set of values in the economic realm. Their ‘modernization-first’ or ‘growth-first’ motto was devoid of capitalist ethics. This vulgar capitalism promoted an unhealthy trend in Korean society, because what mattered most was the goal of making money, which justified their means, either fair or foul. It is necessary to take a look at the relationship between pro-Japanese and pro-US collaborators. The pro-Japanese collaborators are generally also proUS. Even prior to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War they tended to be hostile towards Russia, and during the period of Korea’s semi-colonial and colonial occupation by Japan, they rejected all forms of resistance against Japanese imperialism. They concentrated their energy on the drive for their ‘modernization through self-strengthening’ movement. From the outset they were opposed to the socialist movement, and in the post-colonial era particularly, they became the flag-bearers of the ultra-right anti-communist ideology. One may cite a number of reasons to substantiate the point that proJapanese and pro-US forces were like two sides of the same coin. First, in the era prior to 1905, the role of American missionaries, on whom pro-American forces in Korea relied for support and guidance, and the official US policy on Korea were not necessarily incompatible with the Japanese policy of imperialist aggression in Korea. Indeed, the United States gave its consent to and assisted in the process of Japan’s colonial occupation of Korea in the twentieth century. The two nations also appear to have forged a complementary relationship. Ito Hirobumi, the Resident General of Korea, once remarked that the US missionaries presided over the sacred or spiritual domain, while the Office of the Resident General governed the profane or mundane aspects of the lives of the Korean people. This statement about the

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role division testifies to the relationship of mutual interdependence between the US and Japan with regard to their strategies and policies in Korea. Second, when the Unites States occupied Korea in 1945, it did not dismantle the colonial institutions; on the contrary, it attempted from the outset to suppress radical movements and maintain the status quo by preserving the old colonial structure. Third, the pro-Japanese and pro-US forces were primarily the propertied class and were mostly educated overseas. On the whole, they were heavily influenced by a West-centred Christian worldview. Now I will focus on the parameters of the pro-Japanese collaborators. With regard to the scope of the pro-Japanese forces, it is important to remember that not all pro-Japanese collaborators deserve to be purged or punished, because many Koreans were coerced into cooperating with the Japanese imperialist forces and did not betray the national cause in any true sense. The problem of identifying pro-Japanese collaborators arose in the postliberation era when the nation realized the need to purge such forces. The proposal to purge these collaborators was put forward in September-October 1945, and the campaign gained further momentum when the American Military Government decided to retain these collaborators in their old positions in various government departments and the police force in order to suppress the left. Except for the Korean Democratic Party and the Gungmindang (The Nationalist Party), a broad spectrum of political parties, youth and student organizations supported the proposal to purge these collaborators. The Korean Communist Party was particularly enthusiastic in its support for the proposal. The Left and Progressive Right reached a consensus on regulations governing the scope of the Anti-National Traitors Law in a meeting to form the Democratic National Front, held in mid-February 1946. Furthermore, when ‘the National Traitors Law’ was enacted in 1948, its first clauses pertained to the crime of pro-Japanese collaboration. The purview of the purge in the 1948 National Traitors Law and the Democratic National Front extended only to those who had collaborated with the Japanese and betrayed the national interest. The scope was, however, not concretely specified. The law was also vague in relation to those Koreans who had joined the Japanese army during the colonial period. However, in March 1947, when the bill for the punishment of National Traitors and Profiteers was tabled in the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, the purge of pro-Japanese collaborators became a distinct possibility. Although the bill also dealt with the problem of profiteers, its clauses in relation to collaborators help us define their scope. The bill enumerated as collaborators all the public officials who had worked under the umbrella of the Governor-General, including village chiefs and ward chiefs and those associated with vicious pro-Japanese groups, and sought to deprive them of their civil rights. The scope of the collaborators included oppressive cadres or ordinary employees in such areas of economic activity as companies, firms, farms, forestry, fishing harbours or mines who exploited the common people either to benefit themselves or the colonial authorities. The bill defined those people in the media or in various cultural, educational and religious organizations and institutions as collaborators who

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had promoted the imperialist policy of assimilation through sabotaging nationalist struggles and endorsing Japan’s kominka (transformation of Koreans into the loyal subjects of the Japanese emperor) campaign and the spurious theory of the intrinsic unity of the Korean and Japanese races. The inclusion of those Koreans who had married Japanese nationals is, however, a stretch. Those slated for imprisonment of various lengths were unscrupulous officials and their underlings who were guilty of oppressing and torturing revolutionary freedom-fighters. It is interesting that the original bill also contained a clause on war crimes, although in its amended version this clause was dropped. The bill sought to define all officers and some notorious soldiers in the Japanese army who had served the imperialist interest of Japan and wreaked havoc on their own people as well as those of the allied nations in the Second World War as collaborators. The bill doubtless provides a clear understanding of the groups which may be classified as collaborators, but there are other groups which may be defined as collaborators as well. It deserves to be noted in this context that the ideologues of the reconstruction of the Korean national character and the other ‘cultural nationalists’ who led the self-strengthening movement, apolitical cultural movements or movements for national autonomy in the 1920s under the aegis of the colonial authorities, also became unabashed collaborators in the 1930s. Their acts during this era and later, during the Pacific War, fall under the scope of the purge as defined by the bill. It is also important to remember that at least some streams of the cultural nationalist movement in the 1920s may also be defined as anti-national in character. But in this case we need to make a clear distinction between those who danced to the tune of colonial authorities and at their behest unfurled the flag of the selfstrengthening movement on the one hand, and those who did not realize that their participation in the cultural movement would dilute the strength of the nationalist political struggle and benefit the colonial administration on the other. The latter needs to be excluded from the scope of collaboration. When we analyse the character of the ruling structure of imperialist Japan, we find that the propertied class and the landlord class of colonial Korea definitely deserve to be labelled as collaborators. The middle-ranking bourgeoisie or the middle-ranking landlord class, however, displayed a duality or ambivalence. As is evident in the examples of the majority of the early Enlightenment Party cadres and part of the cadres of the later Enlightenment Party, there were also pro-Japanese forces who considered Japan to be a model of modernity and wished to mould Korea on the Japanese pattern – not to assist the process of the imperialist expansion of Japan but to propel Korea along the path of modernization. PRO-JAPANESE COLLABORATORS PRIOR TO THE MARCH FIRST MOVEMENT The early crop of pro-Japanese collaborators emerged when the Korean economy was articulated within the fold of world capitalism. Pro-Japanese

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forces emerged in Korea in the process of the country’s transition to modernity. As Japan coerced Korea to sign an unequal treaty and open its ports to trade, they appeared at the treaty ports. The groups which became the target of the most vehement opprobrium of the common masses during the period were the Enlightenment faction and the Enlightenment Party. However, the Enlightenment Party which ignited the 1884 (Gapsin) coup was essentially different from the later Enlightenment Party. The former Enlightenment Party was doubtless suspicious of the common masses and attempted to lord it over them. It also relied heavily on Japan to launch the 1884 coup. But unlike the champions of the later Enlightenment Party, the leaders of the coup did not act under Japanese pressure, nor did they realize that their agenda and activities might facilitate the imperialist aggression of Japan. Nonetheless, the 1884 coup led to the rapid emergence of aggressive foreign powers on the political stage of Korea, and in the eyes of the common masses (minjung) both the former and later Enlightenment factions were equally guilty of national betrayal. Two streams of Korean intellectuals played a crucial role in shaping the pro-Japanese forces and forming a pro-Japanese officials group that helped Japan build its colonial structure. These were Japan-trained students and those who had studied new branches of knowledge, including Japanese, and had acquired technical skills in Korea’s modern schools. The first large-scale group of sixty-two students, known as the ‘Gentlemen’s Sightseeing Tour’, was dispatched to Japan by the government of the Joseon dynasty in 1882 to acquire knowledge about the new cultural and material institutions of Japan and to gain first-hand information about the political developments in that country. At the time, Yu Gil-Jun, Yu Jeong-Ju, Yun Chi-Ho and Gam Ryang-Han, who had crossed to Japan as part of the retinue of Eo Yun-Jung, decided to stay in Japan for a longer period to study. It is important to note that the scholar-officials of this group, the most trusted members of the Enlightenment Party, took part in the 1884 Gapsin Coup. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the number of students in Japan registered a sharp increase. Some 200 students went to Japan at the government’s expense in 1896, and this number increased even further after the Russo-Japanese War. Between 1904 and 1909, about 100–250 students travelled to Japan every year. This number, however, dwindled to 50–80 per year between 1909 and 1914. Most of the Korean students in Japan supported the Japanese policy towards Korea, and at times they even served as the vanguard of Japan’s imperialist interest in Korea. Japanese imperialism and Japan-trained Koreans forged a commonality of interest, because Japan also needed these Japanese-speaking and Japan-centric Koreans to staff lower positions in the colonial government. Pro-Japanese collaborators emerged as an organized entity after the SinoJapanese War. After Japan defeated Qing China, it began to take concrete measures to integrate the pro-Japanese forces in Korea into its ideological fold. Japan’s removal of Daewongun from the political stage and its manipulation of the political process of the Joseon court, resulting in the formation of a pro-Japanese cabinet with Pak Yeong-Hyo as Prime Minister, illustrates

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this point. Power was now transferred to the Japan Party, also known as the Progressive or Enlightenment Party, which introduced a series of reforms at the behest of Japan. In 1905, when the Protectorate Treaty was concluded, Korea was reduced to a semi-colony of Japan. In 1907, when Japan coerced King Gojong to abdicate and imposed a treaty of seven clauses on Korea, the country became a de facto colony. The character of the pro-Japanese collaborators during this period is difficult to define. Iljinhoe, or the Advancement Society, established in 1904, was arguably the most vicious spearhead of the Japanese imperialist forces, but in the beginning it also launched self-strengthening and enlightenment movements. Historians have often described Iljinhoe’s early activities as patriotic in character, aimed at the restoration of national sovereignty. This point needs to be carefully analysed. No doubt a number of the participants of the self-strengthening and enlightenment movements either opposed or rejected Japan. Nevertheless, they were also generally hostile towards the righteous army that launched armed resistance against the imperialist Japanese forces, demonstrating their lukewarm attitude or apathy towards the anti-imperialist struggle. As a natural consequence of this attitude, they were swept up in the wave of Japan’s intensely aggressive policy towards Korea. Despite the fact that Korea was already a semi-colony in 1905, and its complete colonization was a foregone conclusion, they eschewed all forms of direct resistance against the aggressive Japanese forces and launched a self-strengthening movement. They concentrated their energy on the promotion of ‘new’ education and on a ‘new’ industry and enterprise movement. The self-strengthening movement was a patently ineffective means for the recovery of the nation’s sovereignty. Furthermore, the basic tenets of the self-strengthening movement were ideologically incompatible with the theory of Korea as a protectorate state of Japan, which had been propounded by Ito Hirobumi, the architect of 1905 Protectorate Treaty. Subsequently, when the two forces, namely the anti-imperialist independence movement and the pro-US and pro-Japan modernization campaign, became sharply polarized, the so-called champions of modernity continued to raise the banner of new education and modern industry and enterprises under the protection of the imperialist forces. Although modernity and independence were mutually dichotomous goals in the period when Korea was faced with the danger of imminent colonization, the champions of modernity argued that their self-strengthening campaign was aimed at recovering national sovereignty. They believed that independence or national sovereignty could be achieved in the distant future, and that the nation needed to concentrate on the immediate goal of self-strengthening which could serve as a firm foundation for the envisioned independence. The national self-strengthening movement undoubtedly included antiJapanese forces, most notably those associated with the newspaper Daehan Maeil Sinbo (Daehan Daily News) or Sinminhoe (New People’s Association). These groups rebutted the Japanese argument that Korea’s status as a protectorate state of Japan would ensure its welfare, and emphatically voiced the concerns of the Korean people. However, the leaders and influential members

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of other organizations and associations such as the Korea Self-Strengthening Association or the Korea Association were essentially pro-Japanese in character. Most of their leaders also pursued selfish interests and competed with the Advancement Society to achieve modernization on the Japanese model and to the obvious benefit of Japan. If we look at the character of the Advancement Society and its relationship with the national self-strengthening movement, we find that its cadres were derived from either the Independence Club or Donghak. Indeed, most of its members were farmers who followed the Donghak sect. These members of the Advancement Society wore short hair and Western dress, which shows that they were more enthusiastic about reform and enlightenment than any other like-minded organization of the time. They advocated the protection of people’s rights to life and property and attacked vicious and venal officials in every nook and corner of the country. The principles of the Advancement Society stated explicitly that under the guidance of its ally, Japan, it aimed to lead the country on the path of enlightenment and to maintain its independence. It is apparent that the autonomy or independence of the nation formed the core of the principles of the Advancement Society. The society also emphasized through public speeches and lectures the need to promote agriculture, commerce and industry. It also founded several educational institutions in the country and sent students to Japan for higher study. However, the worldview of the Advancement Society, like that of the other contemporary self-strengthening organizations, was consistently constrained by its loyalty to Japan, rendering its status in the final analysis as a lap-dog of Japanese imperialism. For this reason it became a target of the wrath of the Righteous Army and had to organize its own self-defence corp. It is interesting that the majority of the self-strengthening and enlightenment organizations maintained the same line of argument, even after Japan made Korea its protectorate and a semi-colony in 1905 and a full-fledged colony in 1910. They never confronted Japan or resisted its imperialist expansion. They put forward a seemingly contradictory logic that their new industry and enlightenment movement, which enjoyed the full support of the colonial authorities, would pave the way for eventual independence. Indeed, it was the Social Darwinist doctrine of the ‘survival of the fittest’ that inspired the Advancement Society to petition Japan to occupy Korea, resulting in an act that eventually led to its own demise. Although the influence of Social Darwinism apparently constrained the society’s ability to resist imperialism, it does not fully explain its rationale for launching self-strengthening and enlightenment movements. The Advancement Society’s class-character and its relationship with the contemporary power relations are other important factors that need to be taken into account. As mentioned earlier, high officials of the state, newly-promoted officials, middle-ranking professionals and secondary sons of yangban officials (and many individuals assumed several of these identities simultaneously) were mostly concerned with the maintenance of power and privileges and were primarily motivated by selfish considerations. As intellectuals or small and medium-rank landlords, their sense of struggle was weak. The bourgeois class,

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in particular, which had assumed multiple personalities during this period pursued the capitalistic development of the nation under the patronage of capitalistic imperialism. As an historical background to these two forces and factors one may cite two points. First, the medieval society was disintegrating and the old dynastic order was crumbling without an alternative order to replace it. Second, the consciousness of a modern nation or a modern state was at an embryonic stage, and worse still, it was being eroded and undermined by the influential doctrine of the ‘protectorate state’ promoted by Japanese imperialism and by the evangelical gospels of American missionaries. In the first phase of the colonial rule from 1910 to 1919, Japan did not show any interest in nurturing pro-Japanese forces. This poses a sharp contrast with the policies adopted by Japan prior to 1910 and subsequent to the March First Movement of 1919. As is widely known, Japan created the front organization Iljinhoe (Advancement Society), offered it complete support and manipulated it, along with other self-strengthening organizations, after the conclusion of the 1905 Protectorate treaty to advance its goal of imperialist expansion and consolidation. However, soon after the occupation of Korea in 1910, Japan disbanded these forces and absorbed them into its various colonial administrative organs or cultivated them as landlords or the propertied class. They thus became faithful propagandists for the Japanese policy of assimilation and engaged in the task of Japanizing the Korean consciousness. The military character of the regime during the first decade of the colonial period doubtless restricted the range of their enlightenment campaign. They were able to pursue these campaigns only in a very limited way during this period. The colonial administration maintained the imperial house of Korea as the ‘Royal Yi House’, gave the members of royalty and high officials of the Joseon dynasty titles and positions. They were also appointed as members of the Privy Council. At the time of annexation, Japan promised to retain the majority of Korean officials in the service of the Joseon dynasty, but out of thirteen provinces only six had Korean governors in 1911. Japanese nationals were brought in to take up cabinet positions and the directorships of various government departments and bureaux. Koreans were appointed district magistrates in 317 districts, although this number dropped to 218 in 1914, because of the need for these officials to coordinate official business with lower officials in the district who knew only Korean. It is also interesting that district magistrates during this period were mostly from a middle-ranking professional (jungin) background. During the colonial period, job opportunities for Koreans were open mostly in the gendarmerie and police forces which served as a bulwark of the colonial administration in Korea. As many as 4,747 Koreans worked as auxiliary gendarmerie in 1919, but in this year, due to the outbreak of the March First Movement, Japan also decided to transform its gendarmerie system into a police force. Some Korean members of the police force were elevated to administrative positions, but the destiny of most Koreans was confined to the rank of an ordinary policeman. The number of Korean policemen in 1919 was 3,339. In the 1910s when Japan initiated its ambitious land survey as an

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instrument of the exploitation of the Korean people, the administrative machinery at its lower level was manned mostly by Koreans. Many Koreans who worked for the land survey became lower officials after passing the examination for lower civil officials. PRO-JAPANESE COLLABORATORS AFTER THE MARCH FIRST MOVEMENT Together with the March First Movement, which dealt a powerful blow to Japanese colonial rule, the spread of democratic ideas all over the world and the development of Japanese capitalism during the First World War compelled Japan to modify its administrative strategies and style in Korea. The ‘military rule’ of the initial phase of the colonial period was now replaced by a so-called ‘cultural rule’, which was basically the policy of sowing the seeds of national division and of ‘divide and rule’. Western imperialist powers also used the policy of ‘divide and rule’ in many parts of the world in order to impede and dilute the process of political unity. Unlike India or South East Asia, which were divided internally along ethnic or religious lines, Korea was ethnically homogeneous and its religious foundation was too weak to serve as an instrument of national discord. Japan continued unleashing unrelenting repression on freedom fighters and exploiting and oppressing the common masses, but it now modified its policy towards the social elites of Korea by appeasing them and transforming them into a citadel of colonial rule. The nation was now torn along class lines where the social elite was locked into a head-on collision with the ordinary masses. This policy found concrete expression in the ‘cultural policy’ which was intended to cultivate the pro-Japanese forces in Korea. The reformists or cultural nationalists of the 1920s were docile servants of their colonial masters who unfolded their programmes of reform within the parameters set by the Japanese authorities. Saito Makoto, the newly appointed governor-general in the post-March First era and the architect of the ‘cultural rule’ policy, adopted a set of measures in order to counter and dilute the strength of the nationalist movement and to nurture the pro-Japanese forces. The countermeasures included the following provisions: 1. The infiltration of pro-Japanese elements into various echelons of Korean society such as the aristocracy, Confucian literati, rich entrepreneurs, educationists and religious figures and integrating them into various proJapanese organizations and associations, representing different social classes and professions. 2. The establishment of a Headquarters for Korean Buddhism in Seoul and the appointment of pro-Japanese elements as the heads of their administrative organs under the revised Temple Law – with a view to using religion as a conduit to articulate imperialist interests. 3. Providing assistance and facilities in various forms to Christian organizations in order to nurture pro-Japanese sentiments in the hearts of young Christians and nurture them as supporters of the Japanese empire. 4. Providing assistance to an interested population to Japanize the consciousness of young pupils in the name of ‘talent-nurturing education’.

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5. Recruiting unemployed yangban Confucian scholars in propagandarelated jobs or as constables. 6. Influencing rich Korean industrialists with the theory of the common ancestry of the Korean and Japanese peoples and intensifying their classbased conflict and contradiction with workers and peasants through industrial or tenancy-related disputes. 7. Encouraging and rendering assistance to interested parties in Korea to form Korea-Japan friendship associations such as the Ethical Reform Association and the Promotion Society to Guide the Rural Population and promote a policy of racial assimilation and rewarding them with the right to pasture and wood-cutting on a limited scale in state-owned forests; rewarding people who demonstrated an absolute loyalty towards Japan with an official position in the government. Saito also promised to eliminate the practice of discriminatory wages between Korean and Japanese employees with the same qualification and appoint people to government positions on the basis of merit. Nonetheless, the proportion of Korean employees in the lower rungs of the Japanese colonial bureaucracy both in the capital and the provinces never exceeded 40%, even in the 1930s. This ratio of approximately 40% remained virtually static from the inception of the colonial rule in the 1910s. The total number of Korean employees, including contract employees and ordinary employees, was 8,437 in 1918, amounting to 39.5% of all positions. Although there were 14,771 Koreans working for the colonial state seven years later, in 1925, the proportional representation of this number was just 35.6%. Japan also changed its gendarmerie system of military police into a formal police system in 1919. At this time, 280 Koreans held the position of sub-inspector of police and about 7,000 that of constable. Japan’s policy of ‘divide and rule’ aimed at the consolidation of its colonial authority and found an unambiguous expression in its policy of appeasement towards the Korean bourgeoisie. High tenancy rentals and the dismantling of tenancy rights served as the bulwark of the colonial landlord system which Japan constructed. This system was strengthened with the conclusion of the land survey and became instrumental in the formation of various Landlord Associations. The Korea Agricultural Association served as the backbone of the colonial administration in rural areas. Japan also won the support of the Korean bourgeoisie, which was eager to propel the nation on the path of rapid capitalist development, by bestowing various favours and modifying its earlier policies in order to offer them support and protection. As mentioned earlier, Japan formulated a strategy of opposition to the nationalist movement in order to appease the upper classes and weaken the momentum of Korean nationalism. Japan also abolished the Company Law so that a tiny minority of affluent Koreans were able to establish their industries with partial financial assistance from the colonial government. Japan adopted a dual policy of repression and concession towards the Korean bourgeoisie. It allowed comprador capitalists, landlords and bourgeoisie to publish newspapers. Provincial and local councils were also reformed so as to allow these groups representation in an advisory capacity.

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The government also allowed Koreans representation on the Privy Council. Governor-General Saito personally met such influential Koreans of the day as Pak Yeong-Hyo, Song Jin-U, Kim Seong-Su and Jang Deok-su (Chang Doksu) on several occasions. As has been noted earlier, the advocates of the enlightenment movement adopted the ambivalent approach of what may be described as ‘hunting with the hounds and running with the hare’ in relation to the national question. They stated to the common people that their ideology and movement were aimed at the advancement of the nation but, in reality, they sought to seize hegemony in the national movements. And, with regard to the colonial authorities, they adopted the position of deferring independence to a future date and engaging presently in the task of nurturing skills and reinvigorating and reconstructing the nation. Obviously, the enlightenment movement was not only conciliatory in its essential character but also dependent on the support and protection of the colonial authorities, which reduced its status to an integral constituent of the colonial ruling structure. The major forms in which reformism was manifested included the Campaign for the Reconstruction of the Korean National Character, the Cultural Movement and the Cultivation of National Capability Movement. The last named movement bore a considerable similarity to the selfstrengthening movement launched in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The most representative ideologues of reformism were Yi Gwang-Su, Choe Rin and Choe Nam-Seon. They capitulated to the colonial rule of Japan. Yi Gwang-Su emphasized the intrinsic inferiority of the Korean race and the impossibility of the dream of an independent Korea. He sharply criticized the independence movement and exhorted the Korean people to cooperate with the colonial authorities. The doctrines of Choe Nam-Seon were founded on his scholarship in the field of Korean history. He argued that the Korean race lacked an ability to win independence, torn as it was with factionalism. Choe Rin was instrumental in disintegrating Cheondogyo (the reincarnation of Donghak) and, along with Song Jin-u and others, he championed the national autonomy movement. In an editorial column in the Dong-a Daily (Dong-a Ilbo), published on 1 January 1924, Yi Gwang-Su also echoed an identical view about the need for autonomy. The cultural nationalists may have succeeded in duping some people with the argument that their theory of the reconstruction of the Korean national character or the movement for the cultivation of national capability did not enjoy the blessing of the colonial authorities and that they were intended to ensure a better future for the nation. But as far as their campaign for the autonomy of Korea within the imperialist structure of Japan was concerned, the role of the colonial authorities in its genesis and their support in its promotion was too obvious to be camouflaged with pretentious rhetoric. This point was emphatically noted by An Jae-Hong. After Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, leading to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese and Pacific wars, the number of pro-Japanese collaborators increased sharply. People with a higher education appeared more inclined to

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become Japanese. During this period the anti-national acts of collaborators assumed such vicious forms that the survival of the identity of the Korean nation was now seriously threatened. Numerous collaborators became the flag-bearers of Japan’s extremely virulent policy of Japanization which was introduced during the last phase of colonial rule. They sang songs of praise for Japan’s militarist war of invasion and urged their compatriots to march onto the battlefield. Many eminent Korean religious figures and cultural icons supported Japan’s policy of annihilating the identity of the Korean race and urged Korean youth to join the army and fight shoulder to shoulder with the Japanese. It is interesting that the vast majority of these so-called leaders of the Korean nation were also reformists in the 1920s and 1930s. Some scholars have suggested that the reformists were primarily nationalists until the early 1930s, and only during the last phase of the colonial rule did they turn into national traitors. It is, however, more reasonable to think that had they loved their compatriots and their hearts pulsated with nationalist feelings, they would not have turned into annihilators of their own nation and race in the space of a few years. There are, however, exceptions to this rule – such as Cha Jae-Jeong, who had an unblemished record as a nationalist in the 1920s but became a collaborator in the 1930s. Cha was one of the leaders of the Gwangju Student movement in 1929 and was also active in the socialist movement. Such representative figures from the ranks of the reformists as Yun Chi-Ho, Choe Rin, Yi Gwang-Su, Choe Nam-Seon, Jang Deok-Su, Kim Yeon-Su and Kim Hwal-Ran were consistently unenthusiastic about the anti-imperialist struggle and subscribed to the Japanese propaganda about ‘benevolent’ aggression. They pursued their reformist activities with the consent of and through compromise with the colonial authorities and within the parameters set by these authorities. The lives and works of both Yun Chi-Ho and Yi Gwang-Su are fine examples of this point, although the latter illustrates it more aptly. Yi Gwang-Su2 was the most passionate supporter of Japan’s assimilation policy. A section of literary figures in Korea have sought to defend Yi by arguing that he compromised with the Japanese imperialists only in the last years of the colonial rule and that in the process he jeopardized even his literary fame. But Yi Gwang-Su himself did not believe that his ideas underwent any metamorphosis. When Yi wrote his essay on national reconstruction or assumed the Japanese pseudonym of Koyama Mitaro for his literary and cultural activities, he maintained that he was upholding the nationalist cause. In reality, however, except for the period between late 1918 and 1920, Yi never displayed any nationalist inclination. At the age of ten he joined the Advancement Society (known at the time as the Progressive Society), and subsequently taught in a school founded by the Advancement Society. Later, he studied in Japan on a scholarship provided by this society. While in Japan he contributed frequently to the magazine Hakjigwang (The Brilliance of Learning), a magazine run by overseas Korean students. Furthermore, his numerous early writings (continuing up to 1918), which were published in Maeil Sinbo, were characterized by an anti-nationalist tenor. These articles may be described as a prelude to his later essay on the reconstruction of the

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Korean national character. His activities after his return from Shanghai in 1921, meanwhile, have already been discussed and do not deserve to be repeated or reiterated here. It is obvious that a large number of reformists who engaged in collaborationist activities knew how to go with the changing times. It is important to remember that the reason why the print media in the 1920s carried antiJapanese articles is because during this period nationalists and socialists chose the media for their professional careers. The reformists did not write anti-Japanese articles after the Manchurian Incident of 1931, and when Japan attacked China they praised the Japanese aggression as ‘a sacred war’. They also wrote articles endorsing the policy of assimilation. If newspapers and magazines had not been closed down during the Pacific War, they would certainly have written prolifically and imaginatively in praise of the war. It is also remarkable that along with the pro-Japanese forces, US-educated Koreans and Christians participated in large numbers in Japan’s virulent policy to eradicate the Korean race through such campaigns as the forced change of Korean names into Japanese ones, the ban on the use of the Korean language, learning the Japanese national spirit, the mandatory worship at Shinto shrines, the performance of obeisance in the direction of the Japanese emperor and kominka. They joined organizations such as the Patriotic Thought League and Patriotic War Front Corp, but they also organized general meetings, lectures and discussions to denounce Britain and the USA. For example, the names of several eminent Christian leaders, including Pak Hui-Do, Jang Deok-Su, Baek Nak-Jun, Sin Heung-u, Jeon Pil-Sun, Yi YongSeol, Jeong Chun-Su, Jeong In-Gwa, Yang Ju-Sam, Yun Chi-Yeong and Pak InDeok, appear on the attendance list of meetings to denounce the allied powers. Some may have been coerced to join Japan’s war efforts, but there were quite a number of people who supported the Japanese war of aggression passionately and unstintingly of their own volition. It seems ironic that Westernized Koreans came out in brazen support of fascist Japan, but one needs to understand that some of them were appreciative of fascist Japan even prior to the outbreak of the Manchurian crisis in 1931, as was Yi GwangSu. Some of them were also Christians, but like their many contemporaries in the West, they possessed a spirit that was primarily suited to a fascist ruling structure or absolute monarchical rule. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that they showed affinity for and not apathy towards Japan at a time when it threatened most seriously the racial annihilation of Koreans during its colonial rule. It can be seen as an extension of this same innate spirit that, in the post-liberation era, these reformists bolstered the ultra-right authoritarian regime of Rhee Syngman or the military dictatorship of Park Chung-Hee as their linchpin. From the late-nineteenth century the reformists either belonged to the privileged and propertied class or wished to join these ranks, and therefore they could conceive only of the cultivation of national strength in the form of a capitalist modernization movement. Their support of the Japanese policy of assimilation is part of the same pattern. It is obvious that they ardently supported imperialist Japan not because their reservoir of nationalist ardour was depleted, but because the reservoir was almost dry from the

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very outset. This was a natural culmination of the value-system which they inherited as part of their class character and of their modernization-first vision which did not take into account the national question. In the 1930s, a new group of enthusiastic pro-Japanese collaborators emerged. The graduates of colleges or universities found collaboration to be the most convenient instrument for promotion and success in the various government departments in which they were employed. In the 1930s, the number of successful Korean candidates in the higher civil service examination also increased sharply. From 1933 to 1943, the last year of the civil service examination, 133 candidates were successful. They were quickly promoted during the colonial period and occupied elevated offices in the government. After the liberation of Korea, they were further promoted, emerging as powerful officials and politicians under the American Military Government and the Rhee Syngman and Park Chung-Hee governments. Those who were in the forefront of Japan’s assimilation campaign held important positions in various walks of life, including politics, the economy, society and culture, in the post-liberation era. Those who had passed the higher civil service examination in the colonial era rose to political prominence and the graduates of the Japanese military school and officers of the Manchurian army became elites in the South Korean army. These top military officers formed the axis of power after the 1961 military coup d’état. Korea had established its own military school in the late Joseon period, but it was forcibly closed down by Japan in 1909. Its students were sent to Japan’s Central Youth Army School and the Japanese Military Academy. Some of these students were given a commissioned rank in the Japanese army, but their number was few until 1920. In the 1930s, however, when the Manchurian Incident occurred and Japan’s war of imperialist expansion commenced, many Koreans were admitted into Japan’s elite military schools, including the Manchurian Military Officers’ College. Korea’s military officers in the post-liberation era such as Jeong Il-Gwon, Yi Ju-Il and Yi Han-Rim Park Chung-Hee were trained in Japanese army schools and were admitted into the Japanese Military Academy as model students because of their demonstrated record of loyalty towards the Japanese emperor. THE STRUCTURE OF THE REPRODUCTION OF PRO-JAPANESE COLLABORATORS AFTER THE LIBERATION In January 1949, during the purge of pro-Japanese collaborators under the National Traitors Law of 1948, one observer noted his feelings as follows: We have been waiting for this day with great eagerness, the day of reckoning and the punishment of these traitors who perpetrated heinous atrocities on us and scoffed at us. Our anger at these traitors cannot be expressed in words. Even the mountains and streams of Korea, the green grass in the Korean leas and lawns and the patches of cloud sailing quietly across the sky harbour deep resentment against them. The three years of the American Military Government had made these traitors

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conceited rather than remorseful. Equipped with an inexhaustible arsenal of excuses and pretensions, they strutted the streets with brazen shamelessness. But the ominous clouds are now clearing, and the national traitors who oppressed with viciousness and violence are in our hands to face judgement for their sins. The investigation committe was doomed to failure from the very outset, given the difficulties it encountered. This is evident in the statement of Yi Byeong about his experiences as Head of the Investigation Section One: Pro-Japanese collaborators have learned all kinds of bad habits, evil skills, bad thoughts, and vicious intelligence and they are so ill-hearted that they could not belong to the category of human beings. They look down upon brethren as unworthy wild plants and relentlessly torture them. They are accustomed to lying, bribery and terror. When they became policemen, they instigated all kinds of violence among the police. When they became bureaucrats, they developed an atmosphere of corruption. If they became businessmen, they destroyed the public good by seeking illegal profits. If they became politicians, they caused political disorder by always slandering people. Without destroying the pro-Japanese collaborators, the Korean nation cannot have a promising future. [From ‘Banminja-ui simjeong’ (Heart of National Traitors), Sincheonji (New Heaven and Earth), April 1949.] The evil survival skill of these pro-Japanese collaborators, to which Yi Byeong-Yong referred above, were nothing but the time-tested ability to survive. After the liberation of Korea they ingratiated themselves with the American Military Government, and under their patronage occupied important positions in the bureaucracy, politics, culture, media, economy and business and contaminated these spheres with their insidious influence. Later, they became the pillars of the Rhee Syngman government. They formulated the ideology of rabid anti-communism in order to counterbalance the forceful plea for their punishment which was put forward by the nationalists. The Special Commission for the Investigation of National Traitors became defunct due to the fierce opposition of Rhee Syngman who was propped up by a pro-Japanese police force. The National Traitors Law also became null and void. The pro-Japanese collaborators had struck such deep roots in the power structure and were so firmly supported by Rhee Syngman that the National Traitors Law of 1948 could not be effectively applied to them. The nation lost a golden opportunity to set history aright. This failure to purge the nation of its pro-Japanese collaborators led to the emergence of the dominant ideology of ultra-right anti-communism. This became the state ideology and it marshalled all the instruments of violence to enforce it. This process testified to the fact that the structure for the rehabilitation of the proJapanese collaborators was now firmly established – consolidated by the two pillars of the system of national division and the extreme anti-communist

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ideology. Extreme rightist anti-communism and the system of national division were an inseparable unity. It was only within the structure of a divided regime that pro-Japanese collaborators could explore their own ways and means of survival because the establishment of a unified nation-state on the Korean peninsula was premised on the purge of pro-Japanese collaborators and an assertion of the Korean national identity. In other words, the establishment of an independent state involved a thorough exorcism of the colonial legacy which in turn required a purge of all collaborators. The joy of liberation, however, was tempered by the bitterness of national division along the 38th parallel. Japan was now replaced by the US and the USSR as the hegemonic powers on the Korean peninsula. From the outset of its occupation, the US made it clear that it aimed to maintain the status quo and that it was opposed to a national revolution. To this end it reinstated Korean officials who had faithfully served their Japanese masters and re-employed the much-hated pro-Japanese police force. The American Military Government decided to utilize their services because they had worked as powerful pillars of Japanese imperialism and were viewed as malleable and opportunistic enough to easily transfer their loyalty to their new American masters. These collaborators relied on US power to advance their goal of national division and campaigned for the establishment of a separate regime in South Korea. The campaign for a separate government became wedded to an ultra-right anti-communist ideology at the end of 1945 through the anti-trusteeship movement. If we leave aside the American Military Government, the Left constituted the most dominant political force in South Korea in the period immediately after liberation. South Korea’s Right-wing was mostly dominated by pro-Japanese reformists who had earned the wrath of the common masses because of their collaborationist acts during the colonial period. The trusteeship issue, however, changed the dynamics of political development. The issue of trusteeship was used as an opportunity to divide the nation. Before the trusteeship movement was launched, collaborators were ostracized as national traitors and were the popular targets of purges and punishment, but in the course of this movement the nationalist forces who supported trusteeship were castigated by the rightist groups (including many collaborationists) in the anti-trusteeship camp as national traitors, and the pro-Japanese collaborators in the anti-trusteeship camp arrogated to themselves the coveted nationalist credential. From this point onwards the issue of collaboration was suppressed and subsumed by the overriding national agenda of anti-communism which was set by the rightist forces. This was exactly what Yi Gwang-Su suggested in his book My Confessions. The fusion of the system of national division with ultra-right anti-communism was further consolidated during the Korean War, and in the process the collaborators were presented with a firm framework for their own reproduction. One may summarize the historical character of pro-Japanese collaborators, rooted firmly in the system of national division and anti-communist ideology, in the following manner:

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First, the Pro-Japanese collaborators used anti-communism as an instrument to conceal and camouflage their anti-national acts and to ensure the longevity of the ultra-right anti-communist dictatorship. Essentially, the collaborators were unscrupulous opportunists who served the authoritarian regime of Rhee Syngman and Park Chung-Hee’s dictatorship with equal loyalty. Second, the rise of collaborators on the political stage of post-liberation Korea led to the collapse of the national spirit and the ‘vision’. The nation lost its moral compass and became deeply embroiled in corruption and selfishness, which became the basic norm of Korean society. Third, the character of pro-Japanese collaborators contributed to the erosion of values which give substance and specificity to human life, and established a model of modernization-first economic development which had no place for the question of humanity. Fourth, collaborators formed a structure of complete reliance on foreign powers, particularly Japan and the United States, in political, economic, social and cultural arenas, dismantling thereby Korea’s national identity. NOTES 1

2

This chapter lacks footnotes as it is adapted from a public lecture delivered by the author. The middle character ‘Gwang’ in his name means brightness, but some people use a different homophonic character, meaning crazy as a mark of their revulsion for him.

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Right-Wing Nationalism and the National United Front in Postliberation South Korea

DIFFICULTY IN THE EVALUATION OF POLITICAL FIGURES IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-LIBERATION ERA

A

fter the liberation of Korea in August 1945, political parties and political organizations mushroomed in South Korea. It is, however, difficult to analyse the character of either these organizations or the political figures active during this period. Political parties of both leftist and rightist persuasions equally articulated national and social agendas for the post-liberation era. During this period, political parties were not polarized along ideological lines, but comprised people of diverse political views who had coalesced under a certain umbrella out of respect for the political leaders associated with it. This explains why the character of political parties, organizations and leaders was so amorphous and vague. In the post-liberation era, political figures used terms and concepts such as bourgeois democratic revolution, democracy, nationalism, national united front and people’s democracy either in an abstract way or in ways that suited them. Furthermore, political leaders and organizations during this period were virulent in their attacks on their adversaries, and in so doing they were not so much motivated by ideological divergence as consideration of personal loss or gain. It is also remarkable that they did not hesitate in whitewashing their own blots or justifying themselves in the most blatant way. Under these circumstances, anti-democratic forces reinvented themselves as democratic forces and anti-nationalist forces often projected themselves as intensely nationalistic forces. The second section of this chapter, therefore, covers the scope of rightwing nationalism and the notion of nationalism and the National United Front. In the third section, I will discuss the question as to the ways in which right-wing nationalist parties and organizations changed in three distinct phases: the period of Left-Right conflict (September 1945 to May 1946), the

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period of the movement for Left-Right coalition (May 1946 to December 1946) and the period of the centralist line (January 1947 to May 1948). In the fourth section, I attempt to understand the trajectory of right-wing nationalism, focusing on such salient issues as the logic of participation in Left-Right coalition and attitudes towards progressive reforms, as well as towards the issue of pro-Japanese collaborators. The conclusion seeks to provide a critical assessment of right-wing nationalism and the National United Front. In this chapter, I have laid special emphasis on the fact that the character of both the left wing and the right wing changed considerably when they participated in the Left-Right coalition. When right-wing nationalists did not join the coalition, they were at best half-hearted in their response to such burning issues of the times as land reform and the punishment of proJapanese collaborators. However, they were extremely enthusiastic in their response to these issues during the period of their participation in the LeftRight coalition. This chapter discusses the point in detail. Left-Right coalition requires flexibility, the spirit of compromise and the attitude of co-existence and symbiosis. It is said that the Korean people lack those characteristics. It is apparent that the attitude and spirit of coalition is too important to be overemphasized. PROBLEM OF THE SCOPE AND NOTION OF RIGHT-WING NATIONALISM Before discussing the scope of the concept of right-wing nationalism, it seems necessary to clarify that even left-wing political parties and organizations included many leaders who were indeed as conservative as those in the right wing. There is a danger in drawing a demarcation line between Left and Right abstractly and arbitrarily on the basis of the degree of progressive character, because a section of right-wing individuals within the People’s Party, the New People’s Party, and the Working People’s Party were as conservative as rightwing nationalists. Furthermore, in the post-liberation era, the ideological orientation of political leaders in South Korea was subject to varying degrees of fluctuation. As noted earlier, people did not join left or right-wing organizations on the basis of their compatibility with their own views or their classcharacter. If we examine the social standing or career of political leaders in the left-wing parties in the post-liberation era, we are struck by the fact that many of them were advocates of right-wing ideology during the colonial period. The opposite is also true. For example, a leader who once held topranking positions in the Korean Democratic Party changed sides to become Vice-President of the New People’s Party. One may also cite the example of Jeong No-Sik, who became a cadre of the South Korean Workers’ Party, or of Heo Heon, the committee chairman of the South Korean Worker’s Party whom the Korean Democratic Party sought to woo in the post-liberation era. It seems doubtful that Heo Heon belonged to any left-wing organizations during the Japanese colonial period. It is obvious that it is not easy to make a clear distinction between the Left and Right Wings in the immediate postliberation era. Right-wing nationalist leaders discussed in this chapter refer

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to those who were associated with political parties or organizations generally branded as right-wing at the time. There were doubtless people in the left wing who combined a strong sense of nationalism with class-consciousness, and there were also people on the right wing, the so-called Nationalist camp, who did not have any nationalist credentials. It was possibly because of the existence of universalists in the right wing that pro-Japanese collaborators, national traitors and the running dogs of the Japanese imperialists came to dominate its ranks in the postliberation era. Calling such people nationalists is an insult to one’s intelligence, as it is in the case of those who colluded with the Japanese authorities and helped foreign powers in spreading their sinister tentacles on the Korean peninsula during the post-liberation era. Similarly, those who opposed the establishment of a nation-state and helped the process of national division cannot be called nationalists. Nationalism as a concrete entity manifests itself in diverse forms and is basically premised on the consciousness of a modern nation. It prioritizes or emphasizes the nation or national consciousness, not class-consciousness or universalism. The class question, therefore, becomes either subordinate or secondary to the question of nation. Obviously, nationalism can be viewed as an expression of common sentiment or movement to form a common national community bound by love for compatriots or nationalist feeling and to develop it as a unified or independent state.1 Apparently, the primary tactic of nationalists during a period of colonial occupation was to struggle for national independence. Furthermore, in the Third World, once the victim of imperialist aggression, nationalism generally assumed the character of anti-imperialism. However, one needs to remember that even in the Third World, nationalism often became a hegemonic ideology of the ruling elite and degenerated into an instrument of authoritarianism. Conservatives used the concept of nationalism as a façade for their class interests and evinced concern for anti-feudal democratic reforms. Nationalism became a casualty of their myopic vision and bigotry. It is apparent that people with the following qualification can be viewed as meeting the criteria of nationalism in the context of post-liberation Korea. First, those who waged anti-Japanese struggle or resisted Japan’s policy of assimilation, or even those who were coerced and compelled to help Japan – an act they performed unwillingly and half-heartedly – but who held aloft the banner of national dignity in the post-liberation era. Second, those who waged a campaign for the punishment of pro-Japanese collaborators and for barring them from engaging in political activities, and third, those who participated in the movement for land reform and various democratic reforms. The third category of nationalist criteria requires further elaboration and expansion. During the Japanese colonial period, the main conduit of exploitation was the system of colonial landholding, with the masses as the main target of this instrument of oppression. For this reason, peasants and workers were basically anti-Japanese and resisted the colonial rule. For them, liberation from colonialism meant emancipation from the colonial landholding system, gruellingly harsh living conditions and unjust labour laws.

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This explains why the nationalism of the anti-Japanese freedom fighters in Korea, like that of their counterparts in other developing countries, mostly assumed a popular, mass-based character. After liberation, feudal landlords and monopoly capitalists were generally considered as anti-nationalist forces, and it is remarkable that almost all the political parties and social organizations lent support in varying degrees and at least superficially to the causes of land reform and democratic reform. The fourth category of nationalists includes those who opposed the establishment of separate regimes and campaigned for the construction of a unified nation-state. Nationalists in this category supported the formation of the National United front. Amongst right-wing nationalists, the representative of the Right camp in the first Left-Right Coalition Committee possessed all four of the abovementioned qualifications. Centrist Right political parties and organizations also apparently met all the four criteria. However, Kim Ku and the Korean Independence Party possessed strong credentials as freedom-fighters, but with regard to the second and fourth yardsticks, they do not seem to have had clear, unambiguous credentials until 1947. Rhee Syngman, along with the Korean Democratic Party (particularly the later Korean Democratic Party) were overly dependent on foreign powers and were patronized by proJapanese collaborators, who served as their power base. Overall, Rhee lacked all the four qualifications, and particularly after liberation, he stood in sharp contrast to the ideas and assumptions implicit in the fourth criterion of nationalism. The political forces of Rhee Syngman and the Korean Democratic Party and the political force of Kim Ku were classified at the time as ultra-rightists. This provides a clue to the character of the ultra-right during the colonial period and in the subsequent era of liberation. It is also necessary to define the concept of the National United front. The National United Front is sometimes confused with the other forms of united fronts, which were different both in objectives and content. The latter includes revolutionary united fronts or the similar Lower United Front, antifascist united fronts and the Popular fronts or Unified Labour fronts after the seventh Comintern period. These fronts belong to the Left bloc and are different from the National United Front. The Central People’s Committee of the Korean People’s Republic that emerged immediately after liberation expected the right wing to participate, but it was a ruse to basically represent a system of the united Left or the Left bloc, run chiefly by the Reconstructed Korean Communist Party and the Korean Independence League. The Democratic National Front, established in February 1946, drew primarily on the patronage of its three allied Left parties, but it enlisted the support of left-wing social and cultural organizations with a broad mass base. It possessed a strong character of the left-wing united front, but later it became just an affiliated organization of the South Korean Workers’ Party. The later Left-Right Coalition Committee (reorganized in 1947), the Democratic Independent Front (January 1947), the Committee to Discuss the Current Political Situation (July 1947), the Joint Conference of Political Parties and Associations to Deal with the US-Soviet Joint Commission (May

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1947), the Forum of Political Parties (November 1947) and the National Independence League (December 1947) all possessed the character of centrist right-wing leagues or centrist right-wing united fronts. Moreover, the Emergency National Council and the Representative Democratic Council basically possessed the character of right-wing leagues or rightist united fronts. Organizations centred on the leadership of Rhee Syngman, including the Central Council for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence, the National Society for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence, the Headquarters of the National Unification (June 1946) and the Conference of the National Representatives (July 1947), can be categorized as ultra-right in character. This is also true of organizations led by Kim Ku or those affiliated with the Korean Democratic Party such as the Anti-Trusteeship Commission for the Struggle for Independence (January 1947), the People’s Assembly (February 1947), the State Council of the Korean Provisional Government (after reorganization in March 1947) or the Council for the Establishment of the Interim Government (March 1947), which was led by the Korean Democratic Party. Organizations which represented unity or cooperation of the Left and Right were few in number: The Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence, the State Council of the Korean Provisional Government (from its return home until February 1946), the four-party conference and the five-party conference (January 1946), the First Left-Right Coalition Committee (July 1946), the Meeting of the Representatives of All Korean Political Parties and Social Organizations and North–South negotiation (April 1948). The Lower United Front proposed by the Korean Communist Party contains elements of vagueness and outlandish ideas. Some people used the Lower United Front to mean the Workers-Peasants Alliance without explaining what relationship it had with the Workers United front. In particular, the Lower United Front, which was used by the Comintern in the sixth conference and in subsequent years, represented an idea of waging relentless struggle against the upper class elite of the Socialist Democratic Party and the need to form a united front with labour unions and the lower working class population. Apparently, it was during the common struggle waged by the National Council of Korean Labour Unions (Jeon Pyeong) and the General Federation of Korea Labour (Daehan no chong) in the early phase of the September General Strike that the Lower United Front appeared. The massbase of the Korean Communist Party and the South Korean Worker’s Party were primarily affiliated with ideological coherence and commonality, and therefore it seems to be inappropriate to call these organizations the Lower United Front. The National United Front brings to mind the coalition of the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party in China, but in the Korean context it indicates the formation of temporary joint fronts to achieve the pressing task of building a nation-state. In this coalition, political forces with different class interests and political lines participated both during the colonial period and in the post-colonial era. It also covers the formation of the temporary front for constructing an interim government in accordance with the Moscow

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Conference of three foreign ministers in December 1945, or the building of an independent state as envisioned by the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence in the post-liberation era. It is to be remembered that both Leftists and Rightists mobilized their organizations and the mass-based organizations or people under their influence to join the front. In these temporary fronts, not all Rightist and Leftists were included. CHANGES OF RIGHT-WING NATIONALIST PARTIES AND ORGANIZATIONS IN VARIOUS PERIODS; FOCUSING ON THE RESPONSE TO THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT

The Period of the Left-Right Schism (September 1945–May 1946) The Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (hereafter CPKI) disintegrated in the period between the end of August and the beginning of September 1945, as word spread of the arrival of the US military. The rightwing faction broke away from the CPKI and joined forces with Song Jin-U and his followers to launch a movement dedicated to bringing in the Korean Provisional Government in Chongqing. The left-wing faction also disassociated itself from the CPKI to found the People’s Republic. South Korea thus faced a schism. The rift between Right and Left should be divided into separate stages. The first stage lasted from September 1945 until the end of the year; the second stage lasted from the end of 1945 until the period of deadlock in the US-Soviet Joint Commission. For the sake of convenience, the initial stage will be referred to as the former schism and the following stage referred to as the latter schism. During the former schism, the predominantly powerful left faction generally supported the People’s Republic, while the Right conversely insisted on bringing in the Korean Provisional Government in Chongqing. The Left became dominant during this period because of the impact on the Korean mind of anti-Japanese resistance fighters in the period of the Japanese occupation. These were either socialists or nationalist socialists. They also embodied and represented the national revolutionary ardour and aspirations of the common people in the aftermath of liberation. At this time, both the Left and Right applied their strength to consolidating their own power base and were not really interested in building a National United Front. The Left’s agenda was to win grass-roots support by strengthening such mass-based organizations as the National League of Peasant Unions, the National Council of Korean Labour Union, the Youth League and the Korean Women’s League. This initiative took precedence over the formation of a National United Front. In the Right’s case, the proJapanese faction had reappeared through the active efforts of the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK). This faction rapidly gained strength by infiltrating the organizational structure of USAMGIK and the police force; it also utilized the American military to repatriate predominantly right-wing Korean nationalists from overseas. The Right planned to seize political power through these initiatives.

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The first Left-Right United Front appeared to take shape immediately after the dissolution of the Committee for the Preparation of National Independence, which occurred at the beginning of the latter period of the schism. Representatives met from four political parties – the Korean Democratic Party, the National Party, the Communist Party and the People’s Party – and on 7 January 1946 they reached an agreement on the main points of the issue of establishing a provisional government (the Four-Party Communiqué). However, because of the problem of legitimacy of the Korean Provisional Government in Chongqing and the anti-Soviet and anti-communist political fallout from the anti-trusteeship movement, the Four-Party Communiqué immediately became invalid. A five-party conference was subsequently held, but in February the right wing split into the Emergency National Council and the Representative Democratic Council and the left wing became the Democratic National Front. Inevitably, the Korean Provisional Government in Chongqing, in which the Left and Right had coexisted, finally broke into various factions because its Left factions joined the Democratic National Front. The Communist Party and the National United Front claimed that the Right wing represented a camp of reactionaries, forces that were not only anti-democratic but also anti-national. They also claimed that the Korean Democratic Party was a reactionary force which was dominated by reactionary landowners, that the National Party was a subsidiary organization of the Korean Democratic Party, and that the Emergency National Council and the Representative Democratic Council were anti-democratic.2 These arguments were extremely political evaluations. They also argued that the Korean Democratic Party was in the grip of those affiliated with the Dong-A Ilbo – i.e. a group of politicians associated with this newspaper. The Korean Democratic Party was a locus of reformist forces, represented the interests of landowners and the bourgeoisie and was hostile towards the National United Front. Indeed, the Korean Democratic Party wished to destroy the front. However, a sizeable number of individuals in the Korean Democratic Party were nationalistically inclined, including members of the Kim Byeong-No faction, the Won Se-Hun/Pak Myeong-Han faction, the Jo Heon-Yeong/Kim MuSam/Kim Yak-Su faction. These leaders were generally positive or sympathetic towards the formation of the National United Front; Kim Byeong-No in particular was an advocate of immediate land reform and insisted on the confiscation of land from landlord, without compensation.3 Almost all of these political figures left the Korean Democratic Party after the promulgation of the Seven Principles of Left-Right Coalition. This included Choe Dong-Ho, vice-president of the Emergency National Council, and the Chief Civil Administrator of the South Korean interim government, An Jae-Hong. Members of the party leadership were either members of the pro-coalition faction or were sympathetic to the campaign for the cause of the national coalition government. This was also true of the Representative Democratic Council, of which Kim Gyu-Sik was the acting chairman. The inclusiveness and flexibility of the Left, which was in the vanguard of the National United Front, could have induced significant change in the structure of the Right.

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The Period of the Left-Right Coalition Movement (May 1946–December 1946) The period of the Left-Right Coalition can be divided into two stages: the preparatory stage of the Left-Right Coalition and the stage of the crippled Coalition. The pro-coalition factions in the Left displayed a positive attitude towards the Left-Right Coalition movement from the time that the US-Soviet Joint Commission in May 1946 reached a stalemate. This was a consequence of the acute sense of national crisis that derived from the realization that the deadlock in the Joint US-Soviet Commission might render the task of building a nation-state impossible. The support rendered by USAMGIK to the Left-Right Coalition also made it difficult for Rhee Syngman, the Korean Democratic Party and Kim Ku to stand openly in opposition to the Coalition. It also made the Right-wing nationalists acquire some degree of confidence vis-à-vis the Left. Previously, the pro-coalition factions on the Right had not been particularly forthcoming in their support for a coalition, primarily because of the utter weakness of the Right and its realization of the pressing need to strengthen itself. There was also dissent within the right-wing; nonetheless, the Representative Democratic Council and the Emergency National Council still managed to select representatives for the coalition. The Left also selected representatives from the ranks of the Democratic National Front. Obviously, the Left-Right Coalition Committee’s representatives from both sides can thus be seen to have represented the Left and Right both in name and in actual fact. Kim Gyu-Sik, Won Se-Hun and Kim Bung-Jun were selected and appointed from the Representative Democratic Council and Choe Dong-O and An Jae-Hong from the Emergency National Council. These five were in the vanguard of the National United Front movement or the National Cooperative Movement throughout the colonial period from within Manchuria and China as well from inside Korea. The Left-Right coalition movement started to assume concrete shape towards the end of May 1946. Following initial preparations, the first meeting of the Left-Right Coalition Committee was held on 25 July 1946. However, conditions deteriorated immediately thereafter. On 27 July, the Democratic National Front presented its Five Principles. These Five Principles stipulated a rejection of compromise with the Right as a basic precondition and were premised on new strategies that the Korean Communist Party had adopted in a meeting of the top cadres that was convened after Pak Heon-Yeong returned from Pyongyang. It was naturally difficult for the Right to accept these principles.4 At this point, the Right announced eight basic principles that lacked the provisions for excluding pro-Japanese collaborators from the interim government and contained no clear statement regarding a land reform bill. This demonstrated the priorities and ideological preferences of the Right.5 Thereafter, meetings of the commission were repeatedly postponed, with Yo Un-Hyeong, who had been appointed by the Democratic National Front, as the only representative of the Left attending the meeting, thereby paralysing the endeavour. The general strike in September and the October

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Insurrection caused further difficulties for the Coalition and created a condition of extreme hostility between the two sides. However, the coalition movement continued even in this feeble form, and after Yo Un-Hyeong returned from Pyongyang, the Seven Principles were announced.6 Depending on how they were used, the Seven Principles, which were announced on 7 October, were open to exploitation by the Left. Demands that the composition of the interim government be in accordance with the resolution of the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of Three Countries and that the US-Soviet Joint Commission be immediately reconvened were potentially favourable to the Left. But most importantly, the clauses relating to land reform and the resolution of the problem of proJapanese elements were doubtless open to exploitation by the Left. Kim GyuSik and An Jae-Hong issued a statement immediately after the announcement of the Seven Principles that explained the Right’s exclusion of such pressing questions of social and political import as land reform and the punishment of pro-Japanese collaborators. However, the Korean Democratic Party immediately opposed the Seven Principles; Rhee Syngman opposed the principles after initially taking a vague position, while Kim Ku initially supported the principles but later questioned even the legitimacy of the Coalition Committee. The agreement on the Seven Principles of Right-Left Coalition was related to the intention of the US to reconvene the US-Soviet Joint Commission. Due to the conflict brought on by this agreement, large numbers of nationalists withdrew from the Korean Democratic Party. It is significant that from this point onwards, the centre-right faction constituted an independent political force. From 23 October 1946, the paralysed Left-Right Coalition Committee was active to some extent through the Korean-American joint talks, which lasted for a month. The Coalition Committee organized a conference to investigate the reasons for the October insurrection and to take measures to deal with the resultant crisis. The crucial issue raised in these talks pertained to the forceful demand to retrench the pro-Japanese collaborators who held such key positions in the police force such as the Commissioner who headed the Korean National Police, Jo Byeong-Ok, and the Chief Commisioner of the metropolitan police force, Jang Taek-Sang. Ultimately, Hodge’s attitude was non-committal and the issue fizzled out as a result. The conference also debated the problems of the police, pro-Japanese collaborators among Korean officials in the American Military Government, politically biased interpreters in the American Military Government, and the corruption of the Korean officials. Hodge was unable to avoid ‘promising’ the appointment of patriots and an end to the politicization of the police force and the abuse of political power.7 The paralysed Left-Right Coalition Committee ended its life after it failed to merge the South Korean Worker’s Party and the Socialist Worker’s Party and Yeo Un-Hyeong subsequently announced his retirement from political life. Although the Committee continued for another year, and during this time the names of left-wingers such as Yeo Un-Hyeong continued to be raised in discussion, but in actuality the centre-right faction became the core and

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the centrist political movement unfolded. It is thus necessary to distinguish this from the original form of the Left-Right Coalition. THE CENTRIST (MODERATE) LINE PERIOD (JANUARY 1947–MAY 1948) The period of the centrist line can be understood as three distinct stages. The initial stage of the period lasted until July and August of 1947, when Yeo UnHyeong was assassinated and the US-Soviet Joint Commission became deadlocked. The second stage commenced when the UN assumed jurisdiction over the Korean problem and lasted until the inauguration of the National Independence League. The final stage encompasses the North–South negotiations following Kim Ku’s’s alliance with the centrist faction in late January 1948. During the period of the schism, the right-wing pro-coalition faction worked together with the extreme Right to strengthen the right wing as a whole. The right-wing pro-coalition movement represented the entire Right in its campaign for coalition, but in 1947 was separated from the political forces of the Rhee Syngman faction, the Korean Democratic Party and the Kim Ku faction. An Jae-Hong provided the following explanation for this situation in an editorial in the Hanseong Ilbo (Daily) on 1 January 1947: ‘In spite of the apparent disintegration of both the left and right camps into numerous factions, in actuality factionalist camps centred on certain political icons are giving way to an organization of an ideologically-oriented revolutionary party.’ (Icons refer to Kim Ku and Rhee Syngman.) The centre faction assumed the chairmanship of the Constituent Assembly with the support of USAMGIK (with Kim Gyu-Sik as chairman and Choe Dong-O and Yun Gi-Seop as vice-chairmen) and commanded a large majority among the government-appointed assembly members. An Jae-Hong was also appointed chief civil administrator of the interim government. From this point onwards, the centre was confronted directly by extreme right forces. At his first press conference after being installed as chairman of the legislative assembly, Kim Gyu-Sik frankly stated that ‘It is particularly necessary to create special legal provisions dealing with pro-Japanese national traitors, similar to the punishment of war criminals by the Allied Powers’, and he insisted that a bill for the punishment of pro-Japanese national traitors be presented to the House. The centrist faction became the dominant force in the legislative assembly and, risking furious opposition from the extreme Right, it passed a bill for the punishment of pro-Japanese national traitors.8 Kim Gyu-Sik, Yeo Un-Hyeong and An Jae-Hong forcefully demanded the dismissal of Jo ByeongOk, commissioner of police, and launched a spirited campaign for the purge of pro-Japanese elements in the police force. The centre faction synchronized its activities at times even with the South Korean Worker’s Party and insisted on the exclusion of pro-Japanese collaborators from the interim government which was to be formed by the US- Soviet Joint Commission. It also demanded that paper organizations created by the Korean Democratic Party be denied access to the US-Soviet Joint Commission. The centrist faction, through the five-party conference and the meeting of various political parties and the National Independence League, was gener-

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ally critical of the transfer of the Korean question to the UN. And, as the Soviet Union alternatively proposed the immediate withdrawal of US and Soviet military forces instead of transferring the Korean Question to the UN, the centrist faction demanded that a conference of the political leaders of the North and South be convened. On 20 December 1947, the National Independence League, headed by Kim Gyu-Sik, was formed by fifteen political parties and twenty-five social associations and individuals from the predominantly moderate centrist faction. The League denounced the creation of a society of either monopoly capitalism or proletarian classes and insisted on building a democratic society with Korean characteristics while also calling for a meeting of representatives of the political organizations of the North and South to be held. In January 1948, with the entry of the members of the UN Temporary Commission on Korea into the country, the division of the Korean peninsula was no longer a distant possibility. At the end of the same month, when Kim Ku joined forces with the centrist line, the centrist political forces led by the National Independence League proposed a conference of Four Kims from North and South Korea. Later, on 25 March, when the North also proposed a joint conference of representatives of political parties and social organizations from the North and South on 25 March, the centrist faction vehemently opposed the establishment of a separate government in South Korea and headed North in order to explore a possible alternative. Almost all of the centrist faction was opposed to the idea of separate governments. The South Korean political parties that were opposed to separate elections and the establishment of separate governments participated in the summit of representatives of social organizations and political parties from all Korea. Kim Ku and Kim Gyu-Sik strongly demanded that the North initiate North–South negotiations (a conference of the leading figures of the North and South) and, along with Kim Il Sung and Kim Du-Bong, they sought to devise a plan to establish a unified government. THE PATH OF RIGHT-WING NATIONALISM

The Logic of Participation in the Right-Left Coalition As had been the case during the period of Japanese occupation, the only person who provided a conceptual framework for the discourse on national cooperation or the logic of the Left-Right coalition from the right-wing position was An Jae-Hong. After June and July of 1946, An Jae-Hong promoted the logic of the coalition in his capacity as a member of the Representative Democratic Council and of the Korean Independence Party. He also made use of the Hanseong Ilbo (Daily) to carry out similar activities. According to An JaeHong, the coalition was intended to meet the political imperative of forming a unified provisional government in accordance with the reality of Korea’s political situation. The reason for the urgent need for the Left-Right coalition was the necessity to quickly form a provisional government so as to ensure that the task of national construction would continue unimpeded.9 An Jae-

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Hong demanded the resumption of the US-Soviet Joint Commission and the realization of the Left-Right coalition; a provisional government was to be organized in any case through the US-Soviet Joint Commission, according to the decision of the Moscow Conference of the three foreign ministers. Only then could the task of national independence take place, he maintained. An Jae-Hong also believed that the dynamic relationship between the Right and Left and the international relations of the two factions required a coalition. It was for this reason that he had strongly emphasized the necessity of a National United Front ever since the period of the Japanese occupation. Whether in the colonial period or the post-liberation period, he believed that it would be impossible for either the Left or Right to create an independent state without the help of the other and he thus promoted the idea that nationalists and communists would necessarily have to engage with each other in some form.10 He also thought that for both sides, the questions of North–South relations and international politics were entangled. On the occasion of his first meeting with Kim Ku, who had just returned to Korea, towards the end of November 1945, An Jae-Hong noted: ‘If we take domestic relations with North Korea and international relations with the Soviet Union into account, it becomes clear that adopting a course of cooperation with the Left is the correct thing to do.’ In his judgement, if communists seized power, the resultant violent social revolution would lead to a civil war, while if conservative nationalists seized power they would side with the interests of capitalists and land-owners and undoubtedly form a fascist government. Furthermore, the interests of North and South Korea were inalienably tied with those of the Soviet Union and the US respectively, making the divided states susceptible to the danger of ideological subordination to the great powers. He thus judged that it was necessary to build an independent state through the united efforts of the Korean people as a whole, since the nation was placed in a delicate and complex position vis-à-vis international politics.11 He declared that a US-Soviet compromise might be possible, although only mutual withdrawal could be achieved, as unilateral withdrawal was hard to imagine.12 In one of his statements, An Jae-Hong also underscored the importance of the coalition in breaking the power of the extreme Right. He made a prominent statement through the Jungang Bangsong (the central broadcasting network) on 19 July 1946, saying that ‘the Left-Right coalition does not by any means constrain only the growing influence of the extreme Left, but also it will immediately eradicate the expanding tendrils of the extreme Right’.13 This was surprising, as he later advocated strengthening the Right by any means in order to oppose the powerful left wing; in order to achieve this objective, he also suppressed internal voices of dissent and opposition within the National Party and was instrumental in its merger with the Korean Independence Party. However, the centre-right faction was worried by the fascist character of the extreme Right and its activities aimed at establishing separate governments. The centre-right faction stated frankly that it was necessary to advance the Left-Right coalition in order to restrain this tendency. The Left was incapable of adequately responding to these developments in

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the centre-right faction because of its internal factionalism and ultra-leftist class line. An Jae-Hong stated that failure to realize the Left-Right coalition would lead to a catastrophe of fratricidal bloodshed. However, in arguing that the coalition was necessary to prevent this, he did not confine his admonition to the extreme Left but went further and strongly criticized the extreme Right (this criticism was mainly based on an analysis of Rhee Syngman’s position on establishing a separate government and the decisions of the extreme Right). He wrote as follows: Now, if Korea does not immediately form a unified government through appropriate and legitimate cooperation, our fatherland will again face a severe crisis. One side is biased towards the extreme Left, while the other side is clandestinely building a reactionary force and leaning towards the extreme Right by exploiting the patriotic movement. This gives us reason to fear the certain bloodshed of a civil war in the near future.14

Attitudes to Land Reform and Progressive Reform Unlike other countries, in Korea the issue of nationalizing important industries was not an explosive issue with the potential to ignite the conflicts that usually surround class antagonism or progressive reform. This was because almost all major industrial facilities were owned by the Japanese colonial government or Japanese individuals. As a result, the National Party announced that major industries in four sectors – clothing, food, housing and transport – and the defence industry would generally be brought under state management, while other heavy and light industries, trade and finance would be left to private enterprise.15 The Korean Democratic Party also advocated the maintenance of state management of the principal large-scale factories as well as mines, railways and the rest of the important transportation services, communications facilities, media and financial apparatus, as well as control of the production, distribution and trade of the necessities of life. Overseas right-wing forces made similar statements regarding such nationalization of key industries. The Representative Democratic Council and the Emergency National Council also endorsed direct state management or some form of state control over large-scale industry and mines. State control over important industries was thus asserted universally in the immediate post-liberation period – as had been the case during the period of Japanese occupation – and this policy was evidently not derived from the influence of socialist forces. However, the land reform question was different. Not only were Korean landlords numerous, but the material and class-based foundation of the right-wing nationalists included medium- and small-scale landlords. An Jae-Hong insisted that in order to achieve smooth and universal liberation from the fate of unjust subordination and exploitation, Korea should not under any circumstances develop a system of capitalist class dictatorship. He advocated a new democracy and new nationalism based on the symbiotic equality of the whole nation and mutual prosperity,16 but this position was also a façade to conceal opposition to land reform. An Jae-Hong recognized

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that ‘conservative nationalists’ protected the profits of powerful capitalist families and landowners.17 He also knew that the colonial landlord system Korea received from Japanese colonialism could be defined as the extremely abusive landownership.18 However, by saying that the circumstances in Korea were extremely different from conditions in advanced states in which land was monopolized by a small number of powerful landlords, An Jae-Hong emphatically declared: ‘There is no reason to cause massive bloodshed by carrying out land reform.’19 However, his own acknowledgement of the potential for bloodshed indicates that he was already well aware of the seriousness of the land issue. His approach to land reform was half-hearted because of his allegiance to the right wing. In line with the National Party’s land policy, An Jae-Hong asserted that although the state accepted the nationalization of land as a principle, ‘hereditary land ownership’ conformed to the natural state of human nature, and that hasty implementation of land reform would, on the contrary, damage the interests of peasants and farmers.20 The National Party’s deputy leader Myeong Je-Se clearly explained that ‘Our party’s land policy asserts that landlords and independent farmers should preserve the present situation.’21 An Jae-Hong’s attitude to land reform during the Japanese occupation was also half-hearted. In August 1946, Kim Bung-Jun delivered a speech through the Jungang Bangsong (central broadcasting network) in which he identified the need to ‘sweep away the whole of the old system and the institution of monopolistic capitalism and construct a mass-based economic regime of cooperation on production, sale, consumption and finance, based on equality of opportunity and equality of life’. Kim Bung-Jun’s statement was radical by the standards of the pro-coalition faction of the domestic right wing within Korea,22 but right-wing nationalists overseas (particularly those based in Manchuria) were even more radical. The Korean Revolutionary Party, which was led by Choe Dong-O and based in Manchuria, stipulated in its declaration on the Korean revolution (the exact date of which is unknown) that the Korean revolution should be a democratic revolution waged by workers and farmers, and it set out an anti-capitalist, anti-landlord position. It also called for the confiscation of large landholdings without compensation. In a Korean Revolutionary Declaration issued around 1937, it stipulated that ownership of all land should be vested in the peasantry.23 Kim Bung-Jun’s New Korean Democratic Party, which had been formed by those disaffected with Kim Ku’s provisional government in Chongqing, insisted on the nationalization of land through state purchase in its 1945 policy of basic principles.24 The extreme right Korean Independence Party also accepted the principle of immediate nationalization of land after liberation, but presented a vague policy that guaranteed existing private ownership of land by law.25 It is remarkable that the Korean Revolutionary Party, which had been inaugurated as the party of the national grand unity, argued in 1935 that land should be nationalized and distributed to the peasantry.26 In 1945, under the leadership of Kim Gyu-Sik, it emphasized the formation of the National United front and outlined the construction of a new democratic republic based on four great principles

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derived from the party – national freedom, political freedom, economic freedom and ideological freedom – but it did not put forward any concrete policy on land reform27 because land reform was too contentious an issue to be included while forming the National United front. In March 1946, the Right found itself in a precarious position when North Korea implemented a bold land reform programme. It thus felt challenged to put forward its own proposal on the subject. According to the general principles of the provisional policy announced by the Representative Democratic Council on 18 March 1946, land would be redistributed from large-scale landholders and appropriate compensation would be made. Taxes from redistributed land would repay this cost over the long term. The distinctive features of this policy were the payment of compensation for the confiscated land and the long-term repayment of the cost of compensation from the redistributed land. However, in line with the development of the Left-Right coalition movement, a major change was evident in the land policy of the right-wing coalitionists. In July 1946, An Jae-Hong delivered a speech through the Jungang Bangsong (central broadcasting network) about the political significance of the coalition that included a reference to the decisive action of the land policy – the appropriate redistribution of land to the peasantry. After the announcement of the seven principles, he displayed a more positive attitude, stating: Land reform has undeniably been an important matter since the country’s foundation. At the time of the establishment of the Yi dynasty, the complicated land system of the Goryeo dynasty was revised and the monopoly of the powerful landed gentry was crushed. The question of land redistribution set the political scene. There is no need to discuss the historical imperative for land reform at length.28 Won Se-Hun claimed that the Korean Democratic Party’s plan for compensated distribution closely resembled the policy of the stabilization of owner-farmers during the Japanese occupation. Immediately following the announcement of the seven principles of Right-Left coalition, Won Se-Hun attacked the Korean Democratic Party and withdrew from it.29 Kim ByeongNo issued a white paper in which he pointed out that nationalization without compensation should be a principle of the land policy. However, the paper also stated that landlords should be adequately compensated such that they could enjoy a standard of living equal to the rest of the population.30 He also condemned the Korean Democratic Party’s criticism of the seven principles.

The Problem of the Resolution of the Issue of Pro-Japanese Collaborators Pro-Japanese collaborators constituted the greatest weakness of the right wing. This explains why the rightists could neither lead nor play an important role in the resolution of the question of collaboration, which was crucial to the task of national independence in the post-liberation era.

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An Jae-Hong put forward his theory of dasari or ‘livelihood for all’ (everyone living together) and gave a clarion call for new nationalism and new democracy. He did not, however, explain the inter-relationship or relevance of his ideas with the question of pro-Japanese collaboration, the most pressing national task in the post-liberation era. On the contrary, he tried his best to blunt the edge of this issue and ‘protect’ the collaborators. He argued that the pro-Japanese collaborators were part of the Korean nation, and if they were not guilty of extraordinary crimes, they should not be branded as national traitors and their life and property should not be threatened under any circumstances. He appealed to the people to rise above sectarian, classbased differences and contribute towards the achievement of national goals through cooperation and unity.31 He also noted that it was sheer foolhardiness to believe that pro-Japanese collaborators had joined the bandwagon of opposition to trusteeship. Indeed, he attempted to whitewash the collaborationist question by pointing out that even though pro-Japanese collaborators joined the anti-Trusteeship Campaign, one needed to accept this phenomenon as an expression of the development of national ethics.32 But the issue of collaboration came inevitably to the table when the political forces on the Left and Right explored the possibility of forging a coalition. Rightists agreed to discuss the issue of collaborators because it was an essential precondition for forging coalition with the leftists, and they also realized that it was important to constrain the power of ultra-rightists. An Jae-Hong, whose early stance on the question was vague and amorphous, as articulated in his national broadcast in July 1946, became an unambiguous supporter of the purge of collaborators after the Seven Principles of Coalition were signed in July. He said that this issue was too grave to be swept under the carpet, and that the nation needed to confront it and deal with it. He also said that the recruitment of collaborators in the military administration in a large number was responsible for the outbreak of October Uprising, and that they were the dregs of the nation and the target of universal hatred and opprobrium.33 Kim Gyu-Sik and other overseas Coalitionists were stronger in their support of the purge of collaborators. This question was vigorously debated in the Korea-US Dialogue, held from late October to the end of November 1946. Even in 1947, Kim Gyu-Sik strongly argued for the punishment of collaborators, got a relevant bill for their purge passed in the Constituent Assembly and struggled with USAMGIK for the implementation of the law. When the second US-Soviet Joint Commission was convened, Kim Gyu-Sik drew the nation’s attention to his remark that pro-Japanese collaborators should not be allowed to join the interim government. It is also remarkable that some Centrist political parties opposed the participation of the Korean Democratic Party (which had collaborators as its core members) in the proceedings of the US-Soviet Joint Commission.34 EVALUATION OF RIGHT-WING NATIONALISM From August 1945 until May 1948, in the post-liberation political climate of South Korea, the right-wing nationalist forces which were aligned with the

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National United Front were not so weak. Although during the period of the schism between the Left and Right immediately after liberation, they failed to carry out any independent activities, yet, at certain times during the LeftRight coalition period, they received even more prominence in the major media than either Rhee Syngman or Kim Ku’s Korean Democratic Party. This point was proven when Kim Seong-Su and Jang Deok-Su, top leaders of the Korean Democratic Party, were elected to the Constituent Assembly from Seoul. The right-wing nationalist forces strongly criticized the two candidates because of their career of pro-Japanese collaboration and ultimately General Hodge was forced to revoke their candidature. The right-wing nationalists fought against the extreme Right to take political control, either through the interim Constituent Assembly or through the formation of a centrist organization or a coalition of political parties. The right-wing nationalists were also locked in conflict with the extreme Right over issues such as the handling of pro-Japanese elements in the police force and the American Military Government, the issue of pro-Japanese collaborators in the Constituent Assembly, the process of legislating the reform bills, the exclusion of pro-Japanese elements from the interim government which was planned to be constituted under the auspices of the US-Soviet Joint Commission and criticism of the anti-trusteeship campaign. When jurisdiction over the Korean question was transferred to the UN, they opposed the establishment of separate elections and separate governments; they also demanded that a conference of leaders from the North and South be convened and attempted to resolve the national question without foreign interference. In February 1948, the right-wing nationalists formally proposed a South–North conference of the four Kims to North Korea and they participated in North–South negotiations. The right-wing nationalists incorporated the political force associated with the Korean provisional government in Chongqing and centred on Kim Ku, and as a result, the scope of their activities and influence can be judged to have been greater. The reason why the right-wing nationalists were able to compete with the extreme Right was because they received support from USAMGIK, although the Korean Democratic Party and pro-Japanese forces enjoyed much larger support from the American Military Government after May and June 1946. They also enjoyed excellent reputations as nationalists and had attained some level of influence over the masses. However, the crucial precondition for the right-wing nationalists’ capacity to act lay elsewhere. Although the mass in Korea were still unable to completely cast off their feudal mentality, their anti-Japanese sentiment was strong and they yearned for the construction of an independent nation-state. It was difficult for them to tolerate or accept the idea of separate governments. Extreme right groups had formed over time in South Korea from the stable power base provided by the structure of the US military, pro-Japanese supporters or collaborators in central and regional police forces and the influence of rich individuals. However, they were unable to gain support from the masses. The general populace respected and had great affection for such exiled independence leaders as the key figures of the Korean provisional government in Chongqing and those

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who had been imprisoned for their anti-Japanese struggle. They hoped that collaborators would be punished and that land reform would be achieved, and they supported the Left-Right coalition movement and the North–South negotiations. This was the foundation of the power of the leaders of the rightwing nationalist camp. However, these leaders were unable to sustain a strong cohesive force and repeatedly joined and split from the movement, making it impossible for them to acquire stable mass organization. The right-wing nationalists were not always weaker than the extreme Right and were able to compete with the extreme Right in the Constituent Assembly, which was a stronghold of the extreme Right. This was demonstrated by the passage of the bill for the punishment of collaborators and national traitors in the Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, the extreme Right was unable to gain the support of the masses while separate elections were carried out. Of the 198 candidates elected to parliament in the election of 10 May 1948, only 29 came from the Korean Democratic Party and 55 members were elected from the National Society for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence (Dokchok gukminhoe). In contrast, there were 85 independents. Most of the right-wing nationalists who participated in the North–South negotiations had boycotted the 10 May election – those who had weaker nationalist credentials stood for election as independents. It is noteworthy that these nationalists were able to overcome strong opposition from the government under Rhee Syngman and pass the pro-Japanese traitor law. Furthermore, despite the opposition of the Korean Democratic Party, the land reform bill was passed. A more surprising situation developed from the second election of members of the National Assembly which was held on 30 May 1950. The large majority of right-wing nationalists who had boycotted the 10 May election participated on this occasion – of the total 210 parliamentary seats available, the Democratic National Party which combined the Korean Democratic Party and Shin Ik-Hui only took 24 seats and the pro-Rhee Great Korean National Party also took only 24 seats. In contrast, independents took as many as 126 seats. Jo So-Ang, An Jae-Hong, Yun Gi-Seop, Won Se-Hun, Jang Geon-Sang and Jo Bong-Am were all elected, threatening the extreme right anti-communist faction headed by Rhee Syngman. The Korean War was historically significant in two respects. First, it destroyed most nationalist forces, including those elements of the general population that had nationalist tendencies, thereby saving Rhee Syngman’s leadership, which was based on the support of pro-Japanese elements and relied on foreign influence. Second, it consolidated the division of the country into an unassailable political edifice. If the Korean War had not broken out, nationalist forces would have continued to play a political role and it is possible that South Korean history and the system of the national division would have been considerably different. It should again be stressed that nationalist forces, which drew support from the patriotic or nationalist masses, acquired considerable political power and carried out political activities in the pre-war period in a manner quite unlike the situation after the war. This point deserves attention.

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When we look at the character and activities of the right-wing nationalists, the following points would appear to be pertinent. When right-wing nationalists worked together with the extreme Right, their conservative tendencies were strong, but when they participated in the coalition movement, it will be noticed that they gradually assumed a progressive demeanour. This is demonstrated to some extent by the right-wing nationalist ideologue An Jae-Hong, who put forward the theory of dasari or ‘livelihood for all’, encapsulating his concept of national coexistence and expressing his new nationalism and new democracy, which represented an ideology of opposition to, or sabotage of, the demands for land reform and the settlement of the issue of pro-Japanese collaborators during the period of the Left-Right division. However, during the coalition period, his philosophy assumed a new meaning, emphasizing the realization of coexistence through the implementation of these policies. He now believed that it would be necessary to carry out land reform in the initial stage of building an egalitarian society based on the ideal of harmony and the peaceful co-existence of all people.35 So why did participation in the coalition movement cause the right-wing nationalists to become progressive? One of the reasons for this may be that participation in the coalition forced them to accede to at least some of the demands of the Left, but it was also because they were more progressive than the extreme Right and their nationalist characteristics were stronger. Their separation from and opposition to the extreme Right strengthened these traits. When considering their work to build a nation-state under the contemporary international and domestic conditions of post-liberation Korea and to achieve progressive reform, it is impossible to draw any other conclusion than that there was an even greater need for the left wing to show considerable patience towards the right-wing nationalist group. The right-wing nationalists perceived a strong threat from the fascism of the extreme Right. This was shown in a broadcast made by An Jae-Hong in July 1946 during the coalition period, and it became further evident from the Korean-American conference which was held in the autumn of that year and from the Constituent Assembly election and the by-election in Seoul and Gangwon province. The strengthening of the right-wing nationalists corresponded to a weakening and attenuation of the extreme Right. This point must be emphasized in relation to issues such as the structure of USAMGIK and the problem of the organization of the police force. If nationalists had infiltrated the bastions of the extreme Right and Jo Byeong-Ok and Jang TaekSang had been rendered powerless, the efforts of the national unification forces would have been strengthened. It should be noted that the strong opposition of the centrist faction under Kim Gyu-Sik made it impossible not to carry out the final Constituent Assembly election in the Seoul region again and Kim Seong-Su and Jang Deok-Su, two of the leaders of the Korean Democratic Party, suffered a crippling defeat, dealing a blow to the extreme Right. Furthermore, in comparison with the Korean Democratic Party and Rhee Syngman, the right-wing nationalists were far less zealously anti-communist. Kim Ku was originally an anti-communist on the extreme Right and during

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the Japanese colonial period Kim Gyu-Sik, who operated from the Left, was opposed to communist dictatorship. At that time, An Jae-Hong also insisted that a dictatorship of the proletariat was wrong. However, the leaders of the centrist faction seriously considered forming a united government with the Left, and large numbers of right-wing nationalists participated in the SouthNorth negotiations. Unfortunately, the right-wing nationalists were not united, and their fighting spirit was weak. Not only were they not equipped with a mass organizational base, but they were also unable to be positive about land reform or the elimination of pro-Japanese collaborators after liberation because of the character and shortcomings of the right-wing. Thus, looking back on the history of the Japanese colonial occupation in the context of the National United Front, even accounting for the circumstances in Korea after liberation, it cannot be denied that the Left was charged with a more important role. Because of the centre faction’s absences from the National United Front due to their ambivalence, it was necessary for the Left to show even more flexibility and make significant compromises in order to integrate the centrists into the National United Front. In particular, it needed to demonstrate its autonomy from the Soviet Union, but the Korean Communist Party or the South Korean Worker’s Party were unable to do this. Thus, the Left also bears a heavy responsibility for the tragedy of national division. NOTES 1

2

3

4

The bourgeoisie formed the primary class-basis of nationalism in Europe, but a petty bourgeois class broadened into the middle class (especially the lower middle class) and was integrated within the state as a fourth status group. As a result, the core basis was replaced by the common people. In the Third World, the core foundation of nationalism was not uniform, but in circumstances in which bourgeoisie was weak and assumed comprador, anti-national characteristics, it was comprised of the petty bourgeoisie, peasants, workers and sections of the bourgeoisie that resisted foreign forces. In the Third World, as is testified in the case of Iran and the Arab world (especially post-Khomeini Iran), the common people formed the core of anti-imperialist nationalism. Minjujuui Minjokseonseon Seonjeonbu (Propaganda Department of the Democratic National Front), Minjujuui Minjokjeonseon Gyeolseongdaehoe Uisarok (Record of the Assembly for the Formation of the Democratic National Front), Joseon Jeongpansa Publishers, 1946, p. 63; Minjujuui Minjokjeonseon (Democratic National Front), Joseon Haebang Yeonbo (A Yearbook of the Korean Liberation), Munu-in seogwan, 1946, pp. 105–109 Ko Sim-Baek, Gakdang gakpaui inmulgi (Biographical Sketches of Figures in Various Parties and Political Factions), Minsim Publisher, November 1945, p. 41 Pak Heon-Yeong issued his five-point principles after he returned from North Korea, facing opposition from Yeo Un-Hyeong. He emphasized the need to institute land reform without paying compensation, completely eliminate pro-fascist, reactionary elements, immediate transfer of government from

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7 8

9

10

11

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13

14

15

16

17

18

19

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USAMGIK to the people’s committee and opposition to the formation of a constitutional assembly to draft the constitution. When the Left formulated its five-point principles, the Right presented its principles in eight clauses on 29 July. It is interesting that the land problem, emphasized by the Left, was not included in the agenda. It stated that the problem of the pro-Japanese collaborators and national traitors would be addressed through the promulgation of a special law immediately after the establishment of the interim government. It further noted that their purge was not necessary before the establishment of the interim government. The seven principles include the establishment of interim government through Left-Right coalition in accordance with the Moscow accords; reconvention of US-Soviet Joint Commission; implementation of land reform by seizing land with compensation and distributing it free of cost; purge of proJapanese collaborators through proper legislature; efforts for the release of political prisoners; submission of agenda by the Coalition Committee about the power and administration of the legislative body; guarantee of freedom in the country and attempt to seek a middle ground of compromise between the polarized positions of the Left and the Right. Hanseong Ilbo (Daily), 6 December 1946 Hanseong Ilbo (Daily), 22 December 1947. [In the original book in Korean, the year was written as 1943 – the translator.] An Jae-Hong, Jwauhapjakui jeongchijeok evievi (The Political Significance of Left-Right Coalition), Seoul Central Broadcasting, 17 July 1946, cited in Minse An Jae-Hong seonjip 2 (Select Works of An Jae-Hong, 2), Jisiksaneopsa, 1983, p. 192 An Jae-Hong, Baekbom jeongchi tujaengsa (History of the Political struggle of Baekbom (Kim Ku)), Minse An Jae-Hong seonjip 2, pp. 436–437 An Jae-Hong, Jungangdangeuroseoui geonguk inyeom (Guiding Ideology of the Foundation of the State as Envisioned by the Central Party), Seoul Central Broadcasting, end of January 1946, Minse An Jae-Hong seonjip 2, pp. 84–85 An Jae-Hong, Bantakgwa minjokjeok jiseong (Anti-Trusteeship and National Intellectuals), Minse An Jae-Hong seonjip 2, pp. p. 181–182 An Jae-Hong, Minjokwigi tagaeui illo (Overcoming the National Crisis), Minse An Jae-Hong seonjip 2, p. 137 An Jae-Hong, Jwauhapjakui jeongchijeok evievi (The Political Significance of LeftRight Coalition), Seoul Jungang Bangsong (Seoul Central Broadcasting), 17 July 1946, Minse An Jae-Hong seonjip 2, p. 132 An Jae-Hong, Sinminjokjuuiwa sinminjujuui (New Nationalism and New Democracy), Minse An Jae-Hong seonjip 2, p. 71 Minjujui Minjokjeonseon (Democratic National Front) ed., Joseon Haebang Yeonbo (A Yearbook of the Korean Liberation), p. 214 An Jae-Hong, Jung-angdangeuroseoui geonguk i-nyeom (Guiding Ideology of the Foundation of the State as Envisioned by the Central Party), op. cit. p. 84 Seo Joong-Seok, Hanguk hyeondae minjok undong yeongu (A Study on the Nationalist Movement in Contemporary Korea), Yeoksa Bipyeongsa, 1991, p. 47–54 Hanseong Ilbo (Daily), 15 April 1946

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21 22

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24 25 26 27

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An Jae-Hong, Sinminjokjuuiwa sinminjujuui (New Nationalism and New Democracy), op. cit. p. 69–70 Hanseong Ilbo (Daily), 18 March 1946 Jeong Si-U, Dokripgwa jwauhapjak (Independence and Left-Right coalition], Samuisa, 1946, p. 2 Guksapyeonchanwiwonhoe (National Institute of Korean History), Hanguk dokrip undongsa jaryo 3 (Material on the History of Korean Independence Movement 3), 1960, p. 459–461,467 Ibid., p. 538 For a full account, see Seo Joong-Seok, op. cit. p. 186–191 Ibid., p. 164 Minjujui Minjokjeonseon (Democratic National Front), Joseon Haebang Yeonbo [(A Yearbook of the Korean Liberation), p. 155–156 An Jae-Hong, Hapjakgwa geonguknoseon (Coalition and the Line of National Construction), op. cit. p. 155. An Jae-Hong emphasized the need to distribute land to peasants, noting that land reform was the most important task the nation faced, and the distribution of land should not be misinterpreted as the agenda of communists. Hanseong Ilbo (Daily), 10 October 1946 Hanseong Ilbo (Daily), 13 October 1946 Hanseong Ilbo (Daily), 20 March 1946 Hanseong Ilbo (Daily), 2 April 1946 Hanseong Ilbo (Daily), 10 October 1946 For a full account, see Seo Joong-Seok, op. cit. p. 578–586 Hanseong Ilbo (Daily), 27 October 1946

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Rhee Syngman’s Theory of Unification by Northward Advance

MAJOR POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS AND THE FABRICATION OF SYMBOLISM

T

he campaign for myeolgong bukjin tongil (Die-Hard Anti-Communist Unification through Northward Advance) was a typical political phenomenon and an intense expression of Rhee Syngman’s ‘Anti-Communist Politics,’ which had been developed in the 1950s through demonstrations and rallies where students and the masses were mobilized. His campaign for bukjin tongil (Unification through Northward Advance) was not just one of his many policies; it was more than that. It was one of his typical mass mobilization policies. It was also his basic or core policy. His theory of unification was more than a unification policy or unification campaign. It played a most crucial role in buttressing and strengthening his political power in the 1950s. The role was similar to that which the Korean Central Intelligence Agency played in the 1960s and 1970s in protecting Park’s political power and reinforcing the ultra-right anti-communist regime. It is therefore crucial that we analyse the character of Rhee’s Unification through Northward Advance. Rhee’s political behaviour and ideology were vividly reflected in his unification theory. In a word, the Theory of Unification through Northward Advance was the key to Rhee’s political power. In the 1950s, the issue of national reunification was emphasized more strongly than in the later periods. It also subsumed or engaged other important policies. The significance of Jo Bong-Am’s Theory of Peaceful Unification in short contrasted with Rhee’s Theory of Unification through Northward Advance and Extermination of the Communists and went far beyond a unification policy. It contained the hope and ideals of Jo Bong-Am and his Progressive Party for freedom, democracy and modernity, and was also inseparably tied to social democracy. In Korea, the issue of national reunification involved more than just unification itself because democracy and the national question were inseparable. The aspiration for national reunification also became much stronger after the Korean War. The national division was such a recent phenomenon that people felt the national division to be

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unacceptable. Many families were separated across the South-North divide. People harboured the hope that something good would occur when national unification came. For this reason, all political groups, whether they were for or against national unification, exploited the issue of national reunification in their political campaigns. Thus, ironically, even those who opposed national reunification and worked for consolidating the national division staged campaigns for reunification. What is worse, some political groups exploited the issue of national reunification in order to reinforce the anticommunist dictatorship and to force people to endure impoverishment. In this chapter I will first discuss the Theory of Unification through Northward Advance as it was developed before the Korean War, keeping in mind the fact that the theory underwent change before and after the war. I will especially focus on the relevance of Rhee’s Theory of Unification through Northward Advance to his unification policies and proposals and examine in what ways it was related to his political power and to his ultra-right anticommunist regime. The question of the meaning of Rhee’s Theory of Unification through Northward Advance for his unification policies and proposals will be addressed by discussing whether his theory aimed to maintain or transform the status quo, what kind of relationship the theory had to other unification policies and whether the theory was realistic. As to the second issue, I will discuss what kind of roles his unification theory played in the strategy of the ultra-right anti-communist regime and why Rhee Syngman developed his unification theory through mass mobilization. In addressing this point, I will also discuss the relationship between the ‘wartime regime’ and the ‘leader’ of the ‘wartime regime,’ which were both central to the campaigns of Unification through Northward Advance. This is related to the question of whether his unification theory was mobilized for his domestic politics, for his North Korea policy or for his foreign policies. In addition, since the issue of the relationship between his unification theory and his power (or his ultra-right anti-communist regime) is related to how he managed the loss of political effectiveness of his unification theory, I also place a great deal of weight on analysing his management of this situation. In addition, I discuss whether his unification theory was for the benefit of the nation or simply a product of the Cold War, whether it was self-sustaining or dependent on foreign powers, and what kind of people were the protagonists of the Unification through Northward Advance (i.e. the leaders of the Liberal Party and the government). The meaning and political purpose of Rhee’s unification theory can be more clearly understood through a comparative study of Rhee’s Theory of Unification through Northward Advance and Jo Bong-Am’s Theory of Peaceful Unification. In light of the crushing calamity and fratricidal tragedy of the Korean War, the Theory of Peaceful Unification or campaigns for ending the war could have been more persuasive than that of Unification through Northward Advance which haunted the impoverished masses with the endless spectre of war. Nevertheless, since the armistice agreement was about to be signed, the campaign for Northward Advance Unification

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through the Extermination of the Communists was savagely executed. The proposal for Peaceful Unification was not revealed to the public until Korea held elections for President and Vice President in May 1956. Thus, an analysis of this contrasting political development is of great significance. In this chapter, however, I have not attempted a comparative analysis of Rhee’s Unification through Northward Advance with that of Jo Bong-Am’s Theory of Peaceful Unification. RHEE SYNGMAN’S THEORY OF UNIFICATION THROUGH NORTHWARD ADVANCE BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE KOREAN WAR When the separate governments were established in the South and North, all Koreans except a very small number of people who occupied a special status wanted national reunification even though they could not help but accept the national division which had resulted from the global confrontation between the Soviet Union and the USA. Although Rhee Syngman staged a campaign for establishing a separate government in the South, he was nevertheless forced to respond to the question of national reunification after he was elected President. Let us then first see how his theory of unification developed, from the election of 10 May to the end of 1948. On 26 May, just before the opening of the Constitutional Assembly, Rhee Syngman announced his views on the people’s livelihoods, the organization of his new cabinet, and national reunification. In this statement, on the issue of national reunification, he said: ‘It is difficult to talk about. It will be decided by the development of world politics.’1 When he delivered his congratulatory speech at the opening of the National Assembly on 31 May, he invoked the Christian God but not the question of national reunification. After he was elected President by the National Assembly, journalists asked him about his policy of national reunification. At the time, he gave a vague answer: ‘We will send a delegation to the general assembly of the United Nations in Paris and must make efforts.’2 On 24 July, on the occasion of an inaugural ceremony for President and Vice President, he said: ‘The communists in the North should recant en masse and work in concert with us to achieve national reunification in a peaceful way.’ It would be difficult to construe this statement as a unification policy. Nor did President Rhee announce any unification policies on 15 August, the day of the establishment of the Republic of Korea. It was on 12 December, the closing day of the First Session of the Constitutional Assembly, that he specifically mentioned his unification policy. It was after the UN recognized the establishment of the Republic of Korea. In the address he said: ‘We will conduct a free election in the North, in consultation with the UN, and thereby fill about 100 reserved seats for lawmakers from North Korea.’3 What is worth noting here is that the South Korean government was to be in charge of the elections in the North. This argument is in the same vein as statements that in the North there would be an election ‘under the Constitution of the Republic of Korea’ or ‘under the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea’. This statement is an alternative expression for the Theory

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of Unification through Northward Advance of the 1950s. His intention became clearer when he added the following sentence: ‘At the same time, our government will appoint governors to each province in the North.’ This attitude is quite different from the 11 June declaration made by the Constitutional Assembly to the people in the North, which reads as follows: ‘We hope that our fellow countrymen in the North will conduct a general election in a free environment based on the resolution of the UN and then send true representatives of the people to the Constitutional Assembly.’ Rhee’s statement above on unification is the origin of the Theory of Unification through Northward Advance. He was influenced by the recognition of the Republic of Korea by the UN. However, his statement carried a mere declaratory meaning at the time, nor could it be considered a unification policy. Why, then, did Rhee Syngman avoid mentioning national reunification when he should have mentioned it – from the election of 10 May to December 1948? It is obvious to all that he worked to establish a separate government in the South and not for national reunification. In fact, he was afraid that the Korean people may be interested in national reunification and he oppressed the unification movement in Korea. He kept an especially watchful eye on the unification movements of Kim Ku and Kim Gyu-Sik. He tried to prevent these individuals from launching unification movements. For Rhee Syngman, it was important to preserve his government in the South. He believed that the Soviet Union and the USA could not achieve compromise, nor did he wish them to. Thus, he was reticent to mention unification policies, even though he had been elected President. Moreover, since he opposed the UN proposal of general elections in the South and North, he could not propose it, even if the National Assembly decided to accept the general election. In this situation, he could suggest nothing but Unification through Northward Advance as a unification policy – but the political atmosphere was not ready for this. In addition, there is a high probability that he had not yet fully formulated his ideas on national reunification. It seems that he was forced to develop a view on national reunification under political pressure. Rhee Syngman seldom talked about national reunification, even in the first half of 1949 which was ‘the heyday of junior lawmakers’. However, he could not maintain a policy of guarded silence on the subject forever. According to Robert T. Oliver, Rhee’s political adviser, Rhee Syngman sent a long note to Jang Myeon, the Korean Minister to the USA, and to himself (Oliver) on 12 February 1949. In the note, Rhee Syngman implied the possibility of a Northward Advance, albeit in a guarded manner. He said in the note:4 We are told not to go beyond the limit of the parallel and that if the communists come over the line we should not pursue them over to the other side. How can we defend our lives and homes without resisting the enemies? If we are allowed to do it, we can go over and punish the subversive elements and establish order and peace in no time. We are almost determined to follow the dictates of our conscience and go ahead with our own plan regardless of what our American friends may do or say.

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In the first half of 1949, Rhee Syngman displayed an interest in strengthening the anti-communist system in Asia. The system aimed at further strengthening the Cold War regime which was developing globally and could not help but reinforce the system of the national division as well as the ideological confrontation between East and West. When the NATO agreement was signed in early 1949, Rhee Syngman emphasized even more vehemently the necessity of the Pacific Alliance. In early April, he told US President Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) that he sincerely desired a Pacific Alliance in which the US played a similar role to that which it played in NATO. On 6 July, when he met Chiang Kai-Shek, retired President of China, he discussed how to fight a communist invasion in Asia.5

‘Wonsan or Pyongyang Can Be Captured in a Day’ When the Democratic National Front was established in June 1949 and it aggressively advocated peaceful unification, Rhee Syngman simply replied that unification should be achieved through elections held under the supervision of the UN. When he delivered his commemorative address on the occasion of the first anniversary of his Presidential inauguration, he avoided any specific mention of his unification policy. Instead, he used such vague phrases as: ‘Concerning national unification, we are waiting for the time when we may solve the problem according to the political situation in the world. We wait not because we are not strong enough, but because the international political situation will become favourable to us soon – but only if we are united.’ On this occasion it was Shin Seong-Mo, Minister of Defence, who dragged out the Theory of Unification through Northward Advance. On 17 July, at the training camp of the Korean Youth Corps (Daehan Cheongyeondan), he made a major speech in which he declared: ‘The National Army is awaiting an order from the President and is confident in completely occupying Pyongyang or Wonsan in a day if the order is given.’6 Although Shin defended himself by saying that he was misunderstood, his address is worthy of note because it demonstrates the character of the Theory of Unification through Northward Advance as it had developed before the Korean War. In early September, Mr Shin made quite an extravagant speech in which he said that he was simply waiting for the right time and that he was ready to attack the North. Before September 1949, the only official policy for national reunification was the message to the UN which was adopted at the general meeting of the National Assembly. In the message of 27 September, the Korean National Assembly asked the general meeting of the UN to abolish the 38th parallel and to draft special measures for national reunification. As a unification policy this request was vague, but prior to this the government or the National Assembly had no systematic policy for national reunification – in fact, they probably had no unification policies at all. Rhee’s Theory of Unification through Northward Advance became clearer on 30 September. On that day, he emphasized the theory and at the same time detailed it emphatically in a letter to Robert T. Oliver. Some documents which included this argument were captured by the North Korean Army

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during the Korean War. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov (1890–1986), submitted the documents to the UN as evidence of a northward invasion. In the letter, Rhee Syngman had said: I feel strongly that now is the most psychological moment when we should take an aggressive measure and join with our loyal Communist army in the North to clean up the rest of them in Pyongyang. We will drive some of Kim Il-Sung’s men to the mountain region, where we will gradually starve them out. Then our line of defence must be strengthened along the Tumen and Yalu Rivers. . . . Our people are clamouring for it. Our people in the North want us to do it now, but we are doing everything we can to quieten them down, and it is a mighty difficult task. I want you to express this situation very clearly and convincingly, and show a copy to Ambassador Chang [Jang Myeon – the author] and Ambassador Chough [Jo ByeongOk – the author]. . . . Convince the American statesmen and the general public and let them quietly agree that we go ahead and carry out our programme, and to give us all the material backing that we need. The longer we drag along, the harder it will be . . .7 On 7 October, in his meeting with Joseph L. Jones, vice-president of the United Press, he said: ‘I am sure that we can capture Pyongyang in three days. It would be much easier to defend the border line of Manchuria and Korea than that of the 38th parallel.’ In addition, he said that he was keeping his ambition under control because of America’s warnings and that he expected the Korean Question to be solved with world affairs. He expressed this opinion in late October, and again when he met Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964) in Tokyo in early November. But at this time there was no policy which could be construed as an official policy for national reunification. Although authorities occasionally expressed their opinions depending on the situations, the Unification through Northward Advance was still not the official policy of the South Korean government. This fact can be confirmed in Envoy Jo Byeong-Ok’s letter to the general meeting of the UN,8 in the press conference of Premier Yi Beom-Seok,9 and in the statement of the National Assembly Speaker Shin Ik-Hui.10 On 26 November 1949, President Rhee suggested that North Korea dissolve its political power in order to facilitate the conduct of free elections in the South and North.11 On 6 April 1950, before the Korean War broke out, he suggested that North Korea elect lawmakers in proportion to its population, under the supervision of the UN, and send the elected members to attend the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea. At the same time, he announced that he would forgive the crimes of Kim Il-Sung and Pak HeonYeong and welcome them. Many scholars believed that, before the outbreak of the Korean War, the unification policy of Rhee Syngman and his government was, in fact the

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Theory of Unification through Northward Advance. On the basis of this understanding, they discussed Rhee’s Theory of unification. However, as I have pointed out above, in contrast to the 1950s, the Rhee government did not officially or systematically propound Unification through Northward Advance, and Rhee himself mentioned it only occasionally. At this time, while the Korean Independence Party, centrist political forces and junior lawmakers advocated democratic and peaceful unification, the Rhee government and the Korean Democratic Party, who wanted to maintain the status quo, did not have any comprehensive policy for national reunification. Their only policy was that North Korea should conduct a general election under the supervision of the UN and send the 100 elected lawmakers to the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea.

Why Did He Advocate Unification through Northward Advance in the Second Half of 1949? Rhee Syngman advocated the Theory of Unification through Northward Advance intensively in late September and October 1949. This was related to the political situation at the time. In September and October 1949, the communist offensive increased in intensity. In September, the Democratic Front for National Unification initiated a peace offensive by asking both South and North to conduct a general election throughout Korea. In the meantime, the South Korean Worker’s Party organized demonstrations in many places throughout South Korea and intensified its guerilla activities in the South. In addition, the Workers Party of South Korea spread the rumour that the People’s Army would enter Seoul. In response to these attacks, Rhee Syngman could no longer avoid the issue of national reunification. On top of this, since Kim Ku, a symbol of the unification movements, had been killed and Rhee had debilitated the strength of the junior lawmakers through the ‘communist fraction’ incident, he needed to suggest an alternative unification policy. His only option was Unification through Northward Advance. The theory was simply a reaction to the communist offensive in the second half of 1949. In addition, he was able to advocate Unification through Northward Advance because the junior lawmakers who could have opposed the policy had disappeared, and the centrist forces and the Korean independence Party had become much weaker after the assassination of Kim Ku. The Theory of Unification through Northward Advance at this time, however, was defensive, passive, and lacked credibility and credence. When compared to the level of preparation in both South and North Korea, the theory could easily be identified as a bluff. There were frequent military conflicts along the 38th parallel and guerillas often mounted offensives in the mountain areas. President Rhee yearned for America’s involvement in these conflicts but it was impractical. His theory of unification could not even comfort the people of South Korea and it could certainly exert no influence on North Korea – as evinced in the documents President Kim Young-Sam received from President Yeltsin during Kim’s visit to Russia. At the time, North Korea believed it could easily accomplish its goal if America did not interfere. North Korea was also encouraged by the fact that the Chinese

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Communist Party had defeated Guomindang (Kuo Min Tang) or the Chinese Nationalist Party, and established the People’s Republic of China on 1 October 1949. It was inevitable, therefore, that the Theory of Unification through Northward Advance lost its momentum in 1950 when the communist offensive for unification also ‘diminished’. Professor Yi Ho-Jae argued that Rhee Syngman’s policy of military unification was an erroneous and unhealthy one.12 He showed that the American government and citizens considered Rhee Syngman a ‘trouble-maker’ and ‘war-monger’. According to him, because of Rhee’s police state, dictatorship and corruption, the American government and citizens felt as if they were supporting yet another hopeless case like Chiang Kai-Shek. Professor Yi’s remark can be found in Rhee’s political adviser Robert T. Oliver’s answer to Rhee’s letter of 30 September 1949. He sternly warned Rhee Syngman, saying that the chief of American military advisers, General William L. Roberts, would stop all supplies completely if South Korea violated the mutual agreement between America and the ROK by strengthening its army to attack North Korea beyond the 38th parallel, even in a limited way. He answered Rhee’s letter of 30 September in the following manner: ‘It is very evident to us here that any such attack now, or even to talk of such an attack now, is only to lose American official and public support and will weaken our position among other nations.’13 Despite the fact that during this period Korea desperately needed a military build-up, Rhee Syngman had earned the suspicion of America because of his Theory of Unification through Northward Advance. As a result of this suspicion, the US supply of armaments was so limited as not to be able to maintain the strength of the Korean army equal to that of the police force. In short, Rhee Syngman was unable to win the US’s unqualified support. Even more seriously, he also neglected his duty to strengthen the Korean army. For this he should be criticized. In appointing senior military officers, he failed to assign the appropriate persons to the right posts. One typical example was his placement of Shin Seong-Mo in the post of Minister of Defence. Shin Seong-Mo was not qualified for the post; his nickname was Minister ‘Yes, Sir’ and the Minister of Tears. Discipline in the Korean army was lax, insufficient training was given to soldiers and the morale of the army was very low. Although he said, ‘I do think May and June are the months of crisis and something may happen in May or June’, he neglected to build up the military. When the Korean War broke out, he announced that South Korea was winning the war. Despite US Ambassador John Muccio’s opposition to Rhee’s escape from Seoul, from 25 June when the Korean War broke out he continued to insist on it. Finally, at 3 am on 27 June, he left Seoul without letting the cabinet members, military leaders or the National Assembly leaders know. Rhee was the first of the key persons to escape from Seoul. In Daejeon, beginning at 10 pm on 27 June, he sent false messages on three or four occasions via radio broadcast saying: ‘Since the Korean National Army is launching strong counterattacks against the enemy, all citizens should be calm and not be disturbed.’ This message was his first to his citizens after the outbreak of the war at a time when people were anxiously waiting for a message about

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the situation from their government. At dawn the next day, the footbridge over the Han River was blown up and Seoul’s citizens lost even their ability to cross the Han River. 14 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DIE-HARD ANTI-COMMUNIST UNIFICATION THROUGH NORTHWARD ADVANCE MOVEMENT

Political Character of the Campaign of Die-Hard Anti-Communist Unification through Northward Advance during the Armistice Talks During the Korean War, the North Korean People’s Army could have captured the entire Korean peninsula but for the interference of the US army. There was also the possibility that South Korea could have achieved Unification through Northward Advance. Although the plan was aborted because of the involvement of the Chinese Army, it seemed to some people that Unification through Northward Advance could be achieved during the war. However, Rhee Syngman mobilized people for the campaign for the Unification through Northward Advance at the end of the war. His gesture was partly a reflection of the North Korean refugees’ desire for reunification, but in essence it was a result of his political manipulation which was in turn deeply rooted in his political designs. It is important to remember that Rhee Syngman mobilized students and citizens for his campaign for Northward Advance Unification, not during the war but at the end of the war. He announced several times that the UN Army should continue its northward advance to the border between Manchuria and Korea along the Yalu and Tumen Rivers and that communism and democracy could not co-exist. He strongly opposed the armistice talks by saying that the talks would simply destroy the authority of democratic countries. In April 1952, there was a ‘National Rally for Opposing an Armistice without Unification’. However, at the end of 1952 there was no systematic or large-scale campaign for Unification through Northward Advance. This remained the case until March 1953. On 1 January 1953, Rhee Syngman wrote, ‘Unification through Northward Advance’ as his New Year calligraphy. He repeatedly made it clear that he intended to achieve Unification through Northward Advance. In February of that year, students in Busan also staged a rally for Unification through Northward Advance. On 31 March 1953, President Rhee again declared himself opposed to the armistice. After his declaration, a ‘struggle committee’ was established in April and it staged a campaign under the slogan, ‘Oppose the Armistice if there is no Unification’. The committee consisted of various political parties and civil organizations in South Korea. From that time to the end of the 1950s, the campaign for Die-Hard Anti-Communist Unification through Northward Advance continued. Massive Protest rallies calling for Unification through Northward Advance were staged continuously from April 1953 onwards and it is remarkable that these rallies were different in character from those launched when the Commander-in-Chief of the 8th US Army, James A. Vanfleet, left Korea, or when General Maxwell D. Taylor took office

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as Commander-in-Chief of the 8th US Army and when General Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969) visited Korea. From April 1953, new rallies for Unification through Northward Advance continued to be staged. While the rallies continued, on 21 April the National Assembly passed a resolution on unification through Northward Advance. A few days later, Rhee Syngman made a special declaration that he would never accept the Armistice without Unification. On the following day, in front of the Central Government Office Building, a massive rally for Northward Advance was held. From 20 April to 12 May there were nationwide rallies for Opposing the Armistice; 7,500 of these were organized by ‘citizens’ and 540 by local councils, with the total number of participants reaching about eight million and the total number of declarations topping 1,500.15 Massive rallies were also staged on several occasions in June. 25 June was celebrated as the Day of Unification Through Northward Advance and the public meeting held on this occasion was attended by President Rhee Syngman, Premier Paek Du-Jin, all Cabinet members and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Why did these massive rallies for Unification through Northward Advance occur just when the Armistice Agreement was about to be signed? At the time, it was impossible to block the Armistice Agreement, even though it might be possible to postpone its signing through such shock measures as the release of anti-communist prisoners of the war. Thus the rallies were unable to influence the Armistice Agreement itself. After July 1951, President Rhee Syngman was more interested in amending the constitution to enable the direct election of the President than in the progress of the war. On 15 August of that year, he made a special declaration in which he called for the establishment of a new political party. After this declaration, and with the full support of the government, Yi Beom-Seok organized the Liberal Party, based on his youth corps. In January 1952, Rhee’s constitutional amendment proposal was rejected by the National Assembly with 19 approving and 143 against. These incidents demonstrated where Rhee Syngman’s political interest lay during this period. He engineered the Busan political incident because of his desire for political power. The Busan political incident resulted in the selective amendment of the constitution, an act which severely violated the constitution and other related laws. In light of these political developments, it was difficult for him to mobilize the population for anything other than a Unification Campaign through Northward Advance. However, after 5 August 1952 when Rhee Syngman was re-elected president through direct election, the unification movements were short-lived and sporadic. It is conceivable that he actively launched the movement precisely at the time of the signing of the Armistice Agreement because he was afraid that the Armistice Agreement would jeopardize the opportunity. Thus, he might have relied on mass mobilization as a last resort. However, if the movement did in fact exert any limited influence on the process of signing the agreement, Rhee Syngman must have concealed his political goals in the campaigns. One of these goals was to strengthen the Korean Army and the US-Korea Mutual Defence Agreement in order to guarantee Korea’s security.

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A Biological Change Occurs in Korea The campaigns for Unification through Northward Advance had other political goals at the time. The Korean War affected both the South and North profoundly. One result was that in the South, the forces for peaceful unification or the centrist nationalists were debilitated and the leftist forces incapacitated. The neutralization of the leftist forces also resulted in the incapacitation of people who supported the leftist forces. Besides the massacre of National Guidance League members, many key people of the left and right died miserable deaths and the surviving left and centrist forces and people related to them, kept their silence from fear of ‘rampant and unrelenting retaliation’. Although the ultra-right forces did not change their character from what it had been in the past, they became even more violent and dictatorial. The Korean War forced the Korean people to suppress any peace movements or any movements for ending the war. Unlike wars in other areas of the world, there was virtually no space for peace movements in Korea.16 This was not because the ultra-right anti-communist forces fought desperately for national reunification. During the two years of stalemate in which see-saw battles raged along the future armistice line, a one-sided victory was impossible. Nor was it because people did not want peace at this time when the ravages of war continued to create appalling conditions for the people on both sides. Rather, it was because only the ultra-right anti-communist forces could speak out during the war and this was a direct result of Rhee Syngman’s political ambitions. Under these conditions, anyone who advocated peace or armistice could be labelled an opponent of unification. The war which North Korea initiated for national reunification also became another war which the South attempted to usurp for its own vision of national reunification. Before the war, Rhee Syngman virtually neglected the issue of national reunification and made efforts to strengthen his ultra-right anti-communist regime in the South. He did not make preparations for the looming war. When the war broke out, he was so irresponsible that he fled Seoul. Because of his irresponsible actions, he drove the citizens of Seoul and the centrist politicians into the arms of death. In addition, ordinary people who could not flee Seoul were persecuted for having ‘stayed behind’. On top of this, in the spring of 1952, when the war was at its height, he created a political crisis in Busan for the purpose of extending his political power. He finally engineered the passing of a selective amendment to the constitution for his own political purposes. To this end and with complete disregard for the war which was continuing, he declared martial law in Busan and threw many lawmakers into prison, labelling them members of the international communist party. Despite all this, because of the mass mobilizations for the campaigns for Unification through Northward Advance which he engineered, Rhee Syngman was praised as a hero, or an apostle for national reunification. Although the progressive nationalists did not agree, people tended to think that Rhee Syngman displayed a sincere desire for national reunification through his campaigns for Unification through Northward Advance. In the course of the mass mobilizations, a crowd psychology was formed and this

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psychology became intermingled with a crisis consciousness. The crowd psychology and crisis consciousness worked to reinforce the anti-communist spirit and to establish an anti-communist ideology, which resulted in the call for the Korean nation to be united under Rhee Syngman who was the embodiment of anti-communism. This was made possible by massacres by the army and the police, fratricidal attacks and guilt-by-association, which appeared during the war and created an atmosphere of silence and submission, of fear and hopelessness. The political scientist Yun Cheon-Ju has argued that the campaigns for opposing the Armistice could be considered national movements which brought about a biological change in the Republic of Korea.17 His observation has merit. Rhee Syngman was able to muster enough lawmakers for his political purposes when junior lawmakers, including Tae Wan-Seon, joined the Liberal Party on 1 April 1953. Tae was accompanied by ten other lawmakers, including Pak Jeong-Geun. In addition, Paek Du-Jin was finally approved as Premier on 21 April 1953 after the candidate Yi Yun-Yeong was rejected by 35 in favour and 128 against on 17 October 1952. Another candidate for premier, Yi Gap-Seong, was also rejected on 20 November and there was no premier for the next five months. All this occurred in April 1953, at a time when the campaigns for opposing the Armistice talks were actively launched. However, the fact that the Liberal Party became stronger because of the antiArmistice campaigns, was a minor matter. Because the lawmakers joined the Liberal Party at the beginning of the anti-Armistice campaigns, it is difficult to say for certain that Rhee Syngman’s political base was firmly established by these anti-Armistice campaigns. The reason why the lawmakers joined the Liberal Party was because they could become eligible for election in the general election for the House in 1954. Some lawmakers thought it necessary to be nominated by the Liberal Party in order to ensure their election. However, whilst the Liberal Party was the majority party in the National Assembly, it was not united and sometimes did not follow Rhee Syngman – in fact it often opposed Rhee’s government. In other words, Rhee’s political base in the National Assembly was yet to be consolidated. In August 1953, when the campaign for Unification through Northward Advance decreased in intensity, the representatives of the sixteen UN member countries who joined the Korean War requested the peaceful unification of Korea – a complete rebuff to the South Korean government’s policy. In the joint resolution, the representatives confirmed that ‘The goal of the UN is still to establish a united democratic Korea by peaceful means under the principle of representative government and to completely restore peace in the region.’18 On 23 November of that year, President Rhee also announced that ‘1) The principle of unification is to fill the reserved seats of the National Assembly through a general election in the North, however 2) if the North Korean people accept it, I will accept a general election across Korea as a whole.’ This announcement shows that his theory of Unification through Northward Advance was not yet set in concrete, but had some flexibility. In light of this point, the campaigns for Unification through Northward Advance launched during the Armistice Meeting held an epochal meaning

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for the process of the solid development of his theory of Northward Advance Unification. The mature form of his theory of unification did not appear until the new amendment of the Constitution in 1954.

Retreat of the Northward Unification Campaign – the Political Talks in Geneva In 1954, the Theory of Unification through Northward Advance and the Theory of National Security were to be mobilized to amend the constitution so that President Rhee could eliminate the constitutional clause of single term presidential tenure and ensure his continuance in the office until death. However, these campaigns faced one stumbling block and that was the Armistice Agreement. Although South Korea was the most important party in the War, President Rhee Syngman did not sign the agreement and because of his actions, South Korea could not play its due role in dealing with disputes over the armistice line or signing the peace or non-aggression pact. Rhee Syngman could, however, enjoy a degree of freedom to launch a campaign to abolish the Armistice Agreement, even though such action could lead to accusations of irresponsibility. The 60th clause of the Armistice Agreement stipulated that each commander-in-chief recommend that the two governments hold political talks at a high level to discuss the withdrawal of foreign armies, the peaceful solution of the Korean Question and other problems. The US also insisted that South Korea join these talks. Thus, Rhee Syngman’s government was forced to attend these post-war UN peace talks which potentially hindered his campaign for Unification through Northward Advance. Rhee Syngman strongly opposed holding the peace talks. After difficult negotiations, the US agreed that South Korea could maintain an army of 720,000 personnel and the USKorea Mutual Defence Agreement was signed on 1 October 1953. The international meeting for discussing the Korean Question, however, had not yet been held. This meeting was finally convened in Geneva on 26 April 1954 after many complications. The US was not serious about the meeting and Rhee Syngman himself found the meeting highly unacceptable. On 19 April, in his declaration accepting the invitation, he announced: The true reason for our attending the meeting in Geneva is that we obey the spirit of cooperation with the US, our great friend and ally. We sincerely hope that when this talk results in failure, the US will finally and decisively realize that it is useless and dangerous to negotiate with communists. Since Rhee Syngman’s intention was expressed in this manner, the Korean delegation of ten, with Minister of Foreign Affairs Byun Yeong-Tae as its head and Oliver as its adviser, assumed a passive attitude throughout the meeting. Minister of Foreign Affairs Byun Yeong-Tae emphasized that since South Korea had already conducted elections on four occasions and would have another on 20 May, and since all these elections were conducted under strict and direct supervision by the UN, the question of Korea’s unification could

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be solved only if the communist North agreed that the UN Commission could supervise the whole of North Korea.19 In other words, he argued that the problem would be solved only if North Korea conducted an election. He also criticized the North Korean proposal to establish an All-Korea Commission with the same number of representatives from the South and North. He said that the Commission meant a coalition legislature, which was a strategy to exterminate the National Assembly and the government of the Republic of Korea. His statement implied that the Republic of Korea could not be dissolved. Nevertheless, the sixteen UN countries which had participated in the Korean War recommended that the Republic of Korea be dissolved and that a general election be conducted throughout Korea under the supervision of the UN for the establishment of a new unified government. Since this proposal would be rejected by North Korea, the US advised South Korea to accept it. However, Rhee Syngman rejected the proposal. Thus, Minister of Foreign Affairs Byun Young-Tae was forced to meet both the demands of the sixteen UN countries and of Rhee Syngman. To this end, Byun announced a declaration of 14 Articles, the most important items being: 1) A free election conducted under the supervision of the UN according to the previous resolutions of the UN so that a unified and democratic Korea could be created, 2) A free election conducted in the north where free elections had not been able to be conducted until now. This election would also be conducted in the south, according to the procedures stipulated by the Constitution of the Republic of Korea. Meanwhile, the sixteen UN countries which had participated in the Korean War made a separate announcement at the Geneva talks. The main content of their announcement included ‘True free elections for electing lawmakers who can represent all Koreans in proportion to the population should be conducted under the supervision of the UN so that a unified and independent democratic Korea can be created.’ This declaration was in line with the joint resolution of the sixteen UN countries on political meetings, which was adopted at the special general meeting of the UN on 17 August 1953, immediately following the end of the Korean War. This resolution declared: ‘The General Meeting of the UN confirms that the goal of the UN still lies in establishing a unified and democratic independent Korea as a representative government by peaceful means and in restoring peace in the region.’ The declaration was also in line with repeated resolutions of General Meetings of the UN on the question of the unification of Korea in the 1950s and 1960s. The UN resolutions demanded peaceful unification and were clearly in conflict with the Unification through Northward Advance proclaimed by the South Korean government. The declaration of 14 Articles announced by Minister of Foreign Affairs Byun Yeong-Tae was not acceptable to the ultra-right anti-communists. However, advocates of peaceful unification, including Jo Bong-Am, were able to exploit Byun’s declaration, albeit in an unsatisfactory manner, to support their movements for peaceful unification. In addition, since the Geneva talks themselves were held to end the Korean War and to create the conditions for

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bringing peace to the Korean peninsula they held great promise for the advocates of peaceful unification. In fact, the 14 Articles declaration was soon abandoned by the Korean government. The government was well aware of the far-reaching influence of the declaration and it could not permit the ultra-right atmosphere to be relaxed even for a moment. On 14 July 1954, when he made a Prime Ministerial speech, Byun clearly announced that since the Armistice Agreement had become completely meaningless, the Korean government was no longer bound by the agreement and that his government opposed any future meetings with communists. He further stated that the whole purpose of education would be to enhance the Spirit of Die-Hard Anti-Communism. In addition, he emphasized that the only solution for the Korean nation was to destroy communist China, dissolve communist North Korea and achieve unification through die-hard anti-communism. On 28 July, just before the amendment of the constitution, Rhee Syngman addressed a joint meeting of the US Senate and House. In his address, he agitated for a Third World War: We do not have much time left. In a few years, the Soviet Union will have various new military means to destroy the US. We have to take action immediately. So, where can we begin? It is in the Far East . . . The Republic of Korea has provided you with twenty armed divisions and will provide you with enough people for another twenty divisions . . . Again, I tell you clearly that to succeed in attacking communist China the US air force and navy are required but not a single infantryman is needed . . . [The intervention of the Soviet Union – Author] is an excellent opportunity for the free world . . . because it offers a legitimate opportunity to the US to destroy the centres of production in the Soviet Union before it can produce H-bombs en masse. On 2 October 1954, the National Assembly passed the following resolution: ‘The national policy is to conduct an election in North Korea under the supervision of the UN, after the withdrawal of the communists, and to establish the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea in the North.’

New Amendment to the Constitution and the Campaign for Unification through Northward Advance It has been understood that the distorted amendment to the constitution – or the so-called ‘amendment by rounding off the number of lawmakers’ – resulted from Rhee Syngman’s overly ambitious and unscrupulous strategy to secure his lifetime presidency. Although this understanding is not wrong, the relationship between the amendment by rounding off, the consolidation of the ultra-right anti-communist regime and the Theory of Unification through Northward Advance should be analysed so as to clarify the historical character of the ‘amendment by rounding off’. In the history of contemporary Korea, centralization and reinforcement of political power has always been related to the consolidation of anti-communist regimes, which was clearly demonstrated in the ‘Constitutional Amendment by Rounding-off’.

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For the Constitutional Amendment by Rounding-Off, the pro-Japanese bureaucrats who joined the Liberal Party played an important role; they were unconditionally loyal to Rhee Syngman. Rhee Syngman consolidated his absolute power through reinforcing the ultra-right anti-communist regime by competing for the loyalty of the pro-Japanese bureaucrats. And the backbone of his ultra-right anti-communist regime was unification through northward advance. The outline of the bill for the new constitutional amendment was revealed in March 1954, before the opening of the Geneva talks. It is not certain when President Rhee Syngman began to lobby for the removal of the constitutional article which limited the number of terms to which a serving president could be reappointed. He undoubtedly did not dare to attempt even a selective amendment of the constitution, since he was forced to resort to something akin to a military coup to finally amend the constitution to allow the direct election of the president by the people. President Rhee Syngman encouraged a high level of interest in the election of the House in May 1954.20 In March 1954, there appeared a campaign for a new constitutional amendment permitting the lifetime presidency of the first president and a recall system for lawmakers. Rhee’s followers visited individual lawmakers’ homes to get signatures for the submission of the amendment.21 In the meantime, the prospectus for the Constitutional Amendment was disclosed. The prospectus comprised five articles, of which the most cynical was to allow the First President to become a lifetime president. On 6 April, he published a statement saying that all candidates in his party should agree to the Constitutional Amendment being proposed. For the first time, in the general election of 20 May 1954, the system of party nomination was introduced; Liberal Party candidates were nominated in return for their agreement with the prospective Constitutional Amendment. Nominated Liberal Party candidates signed a pledge confirming that ‘1) They would be totally loyal to the direction of the Party Chairman and to the Party policies, 2) Once elected, they would vote for the prospective Constitutional Amendment to be submitted by the Liberal Party.’ The pledge was officially certified by the general affairs bureau of the party and was delivered to each candidate. President Rhee Syngman strictly forbade anyone from running for the Assembly who used the name Citizens’ Association, Women’s Association, Trade Union, or Farmers’ Association. With the slogan ‘there can be no independent candidates in party politics’, he kept an eye on any independent candidates who were more competitive than the nominated candidates of the Democratic National Party (Minguk dang). In the election of 20 May 1954 for the third session of the National Assembly, independent lawmakers won 47.9%, the Liberal Party 36.8% and the Democratic National Party 7.9% of the total poll. However, the composition of lawmakers elected was different: of a total of 203 lawmakers, independent lawmakers totalled 67 (33.4%), Liberal Party lawmakers 114 (56.2%) and Democratic National Party lawmakers only 15. Some lawmakers were reelected. The newly elected members of the National Assembly totaled 160, re-elected members 36, and members re-elected for a third term 7. In this

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election, many former pro-Japanese bureaucrats and lawyers, including Han Hui-Seok and Jang Gyeong-Geun, were elected. The fact that the Liberal Party won a landslide victory, that many members were newly elected and that there were a number of former pro-Japanese bureaucrats, foreshadowed the advent of a rubber stamp assembly which was loyal to Rhee Syngman and the cadres of the Liberal Party. This tradition of rubber stamp assemblies lasted until the 1980s in Korea. After the victory in the third session of the National Assembly, the Liberal Party won independent lawmakers over to the party, enabling it to reach the quorum necessary for the Constitutional Amendment. Very soon thereafter, twenty independent lawmakers, including Kim Du-Hwan, joined the Liberal Party, bringing the number of Liberal Party members in the Assembly to more than 130. In mid June, this number increased to 136, which was more than the quorum needed for a Constitutional Amendment. Thus, as one journalist observed, the opposition party ‘started to fruitlessly fight against the despotism of the majority party whose power of numbers made it audacious and outrageous’. Although the Liberal Party accounted for two-thirds of the lawmakers and loyalist pro-Japanese bureaucrats were appointed as party cadres, the Liberal Party did not behave as President Rhee Syngman would have wished. Even though the appointment of Premier Byun Yeong-Tae was approved by the National Assembly by an overwhelming majority, the appointment of the new cabinet members was rejected on 2 July with 98 in favour and 74 against – of the 191 votes – insufficient to reach the quorum of 102 votes. The requirement for the approval of cabinet members had been newly introduced by the selective Constitutional Amendment and this was the first vote for cabinet members since that change. It was even more shocking that the rejection occurred after all the newly appointed cabinet members had participated in the appointment ceremony for the president and after President Rhee Syngman had sent a special message to the Liberal Party urging it to vote for the newly appointed cabinet members. All the cabinet members had to resign and domestic politics became extremely tense. The Liberal Party and the government were at a complete loss. An even more difficult situation arose because of the bill for the Constitutional Amendment. Before President Rhee left for the US, cadres from the central offices of the Liberal Party demanded that the bill for the Constitutional Amendment be publicly notified on 25 July. However, those who managed the party’s lawmakers’ affairs advised a cautious approach, with the result that the amendment bill was not publicly notified by 25 July as expected. There was a high probability that the amendment bill would be rejected, thanks to the complaints of lawmakers about the recall of their colleagues as well as the abolition of a confidence vote for cabinet members. In America, President Rhee delivered a series of extremely hard-line addresses asking the US for a decisive war. On 28 July, when he gave an address to a joint sitting of the Senate and the House, he asked the US to immediately ‘take action’ in the Far East. Then on 31 August, as he announced that the Armistice Agreement had become futile, he asked the US

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to cooperate with Korea’s policy to expel the two communist states Czechoslovakia and Poland from the Committee on Armistice Supervision. Two days later he again reiterated his call for unification through military means. At the same time, in Gunsan, Korea, there was an attack on the residence of the Supervisory Committee of the Neutral Countries. So, why did President Rhee deliver such hard-line speeches in the US? First, it seems that by exploiting his historic visit to the US, he wanted to be accepted as a world-class die-hard anti-communist fighter. Second, he was targeting Korea’s domestic politics. He wanted to show how resolute he was in his call for Unification through Northward Advance. He also wanted to show that he was an internationally recognized anti-communist fighter and at the same time create a favourable environment for the passage of the Constitutional Amendment Bill. He could guarantee the passage of the bill for the direct election of the president by the people by imprisoning lawmakers and threatening to dissolve the assembly. Meanwhile, he could also win adequate support from the lawmakers in the National Assembly by releasing anti-communist prisoners of war and by organizing massive rallies opposing the Armistice talks. Despite all this, the fate of the Constitutional Amendment was still uncertain. Because some Liberal Party lawmakers who had pledged to vote for the Constitutional Amendment and other lawmakers who were only recently won over to the party were ambivalent about the validity of the amendment, it was not possible to finalize the Amendment Bill. On 25 June 1954, Rhee called on the people to ‘drive out the invaders’. This was his sole proposal for Unification through Northward Advance. We must be mindful of the fact that his speech was reasonably restrained, being as it was a first commemorative address and falling on the first anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. At that time, although the Liberal Party was the majority party with two thirds of the total seats in the assembly and the party was normally loyal to him, Rhee was not sure about the attitude of his party’s lawmakers towards the Amendment Bill. In early August, while Rhee Syngman delivered a series of extremely hard-line speeches, the Liberal Party agreed on the final draft of the Amendment Bill, of which the most important clause was to allow only the first president to be re-appointed for life. The draft was passed by the Liberal Party within fifteen days of President Rhee’s return to Korea. Prior to his return to Korea, President Rhee delivered a speech in Chicago in which he again emphasized the need for a decisive war against China and expressed his sincere desire for Unification through Northward Advance. However, his rhetoric softened when he delivered a special speech on the commemoration day of Korea’s Liberation, even though he called for a northward advance to the Yalu River. His reticence probably stemmed from the news that the US would withdraw some of its army from South Korea. This news surfaced just after President Rhee returned to Korea. The US responded to Rhee’s extreme hard-line speeches in a very negative way – except for his suggestion of the withdrawal of the Supervisory Committee of the Neutral Countries. Eventually, the news about the withdrawal of part of the American army reached Korea and on the night of 18 August, the National Assembly

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held a meeting and unanimously passed a resolution opposing the partial withdrawal of the UN Army.

The Authority and Credibility of the Allegation of the New Delhi Secret Meeting On 6 September, the Liberal Party submitted the Amendment Bill which 135 lawmakers, including Yi Gi-Bung, had signed and on 8 September the Amendment Bill was officially endorsed. Its major clauses were 1) to abolish the restriction on the number of times a first president could be reappointed, 2) to discontinue the practice of appointing a premier, and the collective responsibility of cabinet members. Through these measures, the power of presidential government was boosted. Other important clauses of the Amendment Bill included the introduction of direct election via ballot and the transformation of the economy into a free market economy. Although the bill was required to be placed on the agenda of the National Assembly within thirty days of its public notification, this was not done by the cadres of the Liberal Party. The period expired on 7 October. Even though they tried to win the approval of their lawmakers, by the end of October they still could not put the Amendment Bill on the agenda because of internal conflicts unrelated to the amendment. The situation then became surreal; while the Liberal Party instigated delaying tactics, the opposition parties demanded a speedy decision on the Amendment Bill. Public opinion was not in favour of the Amendment Bill and the article which allowed the first president to enjoy unlimited reappointment faced especially strong criticism.22 Because the National Assembly was not able to make any progress on the Amendment Bill, President Rhee published a comment on the issue of the Constitutional Amendment on 19 October. In his comment, he emphasized that the most important element of the Amendment Bill was the referendum by saying that ‘The Soviet Union plans to occupy the Korean peninsula and Communist China aims to occupy North Korea and further occupy South Korea’, and ‘Japan aims to annex Korea again with the help of pro-Japanese Koreans and anti-government officials.’ Thus, in his address he condemned everyone who was opposed to the referendum on national security issues as having no concern for the independence of their country, but seeking financial or political help from foreign countries so as to undermine national sovereignty. This was a veiled threat to those who opposed the Amendment Bill. In the light of the President’s special comment, the cadres’ meeting of the Liberal Party burned their bridges by promising to resign en masse after the passage of the Amendment Bill. As an inducement, President Rhee invited all lawmakers in the party to the Presidential Mansion. Despite all these efforts, the Amendment Bill had still not been placed on the agenda by the end of October. Then, at this critical juncture, ‘the incident of the secret meeting in New Delhi’ occurred. This incident was more influential than the extreme hard-line will for unification which President Rhee displayed in the US, or the threatening comments of 19 October. In late October, as chair of public relations of the Democratic National Party, Ham Sang-Hun, who was the long-term chair of public relations for

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the Korean Democratic Party, published a special comment entitled ‘An announcement to all members of the Democratic National Party.’ The comment was considered an important national policy issue and was urgently placed on the agenda of the party meeting on 29 October. In his comment, Ham Sang-Hun declared: ‘Although our party had experienced the defection of Won Se-Hun and Kim Yak-Su as well as the incident of the communist fraction of Noh Il-Hwan and Kim Ok-Ju, this time we have a more critical incident: it is the infiltration of a Third Force into our party.’ He then continued to claim that this infiltrating Third Force planned to establish a new neutral government by cooperating with some members of the Democratic National Party and by excluding both Kim Il-Sung’s government and Rhee Syngman’s government. He also claimed to have heard that the Chairman of the National Assembly, Shin Ik-Hui, had met Jo So-Ang from North Korea on his way back from attending the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II and that they had discussed the South-North Unification issues in secret. He further asserted that Shin Ik-Hui had met Jo So-Ang’s secret messenger Oh Gyeong-Sim in March 1954. The news that, through secret communication with Shin Ik-Hui, President of the Democratic National Party, the Third Forces planned to establish a neutral government by excluding both Kim Il-Sung and Rhee Syngman, was shocking. According to the announcement, as part of the plan, Shin Ik-Hui and Jo So-Ang met in New Delhi and he also subsequently met a secret messenger sent by Jo So-Ang. The ultra-right anti-communist forces, meanwhile, were more fearful of the Third Forces inside Korea than those outside Korea. The history of this fear dates back to the pre-war period. Proposals or Campaigns for Neutral Unification outside Korea were so ineffective that Rhee Syngman and the ultra-right forces cared little about them. In fact, Rhee Syngman and his political followers were able to exploit the existence of the Third Forces outside Korea in their campaigns for anti-communist Unification through Northward Advance. However, those Third Forces which actually inflitrated Korea could not be underestimated. Even though Gal Bong-Geun, Director of Public Relations, announced that South Korea would reject the Third Forces, these forces apparently had no tangible existence until the outbreak of the incident of the secret meeting in New Dehli. In 1952, the term ‘Third Forces’ became an idiom referring to Jo Bong-Am. When Jo tried to build a new political party the mass media reported that he intended to gather together the Third Forces. In one book the author specifically described Jo Bong-Am as ‘Third Force Jo Bong-Am’. When in March 1954 Jo wrote his excellent statement entitled ‘Our current task’, which can be considered the Third Forces’ declaration regarding the general election, the size of the Third Forces was very small. When the National Assembly discussed the issue of the secret meeting in New Delhi, Jo Bong-Am was criticized along with Shin Ik-Hui. Lawmakers attacked them, claiming that the Third Forces would represent a serious cancer in the body politic of Korea and that its proponents and patrons inside Korea were anti-national elements. They specifically highlighted the fact that Shin Ik-Hui had attempted to form a Democracy League with Jo Bong-Am. When the Third Forces entered the

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political arena as an organized political force after the autumn of 1955, it proved that the ultra-right anti-communist fear of the Third Forces was far from groundless. From the congressional testimony of Kim Dong-Seong, the former vice Chairman of the National Assemby who had traveled with Shin Ik-Hui, it became clear that the accusation of a secret meeting in New Delhi was absurd and groundless and Ham Sang-Hun was expelled from the Democratic National Party. The accusation of the secret meeting in New Dehli was the child of the conflict between Shin Ik-Hui, Chairman of the Democratic National Party, and Jo Byeong-Ok and Kim Jun-Yeon. Although the accusation died very quickly, the Liberal Party did not fail to capitalize on this ‘huge gift’ which had been delivered to it unexpectedly. The accusation of the New Delhi secret meeting played a critical role in creating conditions favourable to the passage of the Constitutional Amendment. In the new political environment which had been created by the so-called secret meeting in New Delhi, the Rhee government mobilized people to strongly reject neutral unification and the Third Forces (including Jo Bong-Am). By connecting the referendum to Unification through Northward Advance and a general election in North Korea under ROK law, the Rhee government also condemned the opposing lawmakers as sympathizers of the Third Forces. In early November the mass media had already pointed out that Ham Sang-Hun’s announcement had caused opposition party members to desert the line of battle and that it would contribute to the creation of conditions favourable to the Constitutional Amendment 1) by watering down the internal struggles of the Liberal Party, 2) by changing the passive lawmakers into active loyalists, and 3) by arousing public opinion to favour the referendum in the name of a struggle against the conspiracy of the communists.23 In addition, the referendum was partially supported by the unsourced news that the general meeting of the UN would conduct a general election for the establishment of a unified Korea under the supervision of a Joint Commission of the UK and Canada.

Voting on the Constitutional Amendment in an Atmosphere of Terror As hard-line speeches dominated the meetings of the National Assembly, various resolutions, also full of extremely hard-line expressions, were passed successively. On 4 November, the ‘Resolution on Rejecting the South-North Negotiation and the Neutralization of Korea’ which had been submitted as an urgent motion, was passed, and on 6 November the National Assembly announced the ‘National Policy on National Reunification’. On 11 November, the National Assembly adopted a resolution on Korean unification. The resolution stated that, ‘The policy of Korean unification is to conduct an election in North Korea where it had not been possible to conduct an election under the supervision of the UN. This is the national policy of Korea and a repeated resolution of the UN.’ It also stated that it would be in contravention of the UN resolution and a violation of the sovereignty of Korea if a general election were to be conducted throughout Korea. The resolution emphasized the national policy of Korea: ‘The only solution for

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Korean Unification is to expand the sovereignty of Korea in North Korea through an election supervised by the UN after all communist soldiers are withdrawn from North Korea.’ This resolution completely contradicted the UN resolution of 11 December of the same year which stated: ‘The goal of the UN is to establish a democratic and unified Korea through peaceful means.’ While hard-line speeches were being delivered and resolutions were being passed in the National Assembly, people were also being mobilized. Members of the local councils came to Seoul to submit their resolution one after another: ‘The Constitutional Amendment Bill which all the people want should be passed by the National Assembly.’ Wall newspapers in the name of the Headquarters of the Die-Hard Anti-Communist War were produced whose propaganda, proclaimed ‘Traitor Kim Sang-Don [a lawmaker who opposed Rhee Syngman – the author] should be banished to North Korea, otherwise he will be killed by a bomb’ and ‘The Democratic National Party is a traitor.’ Riding in cars, they scattered hundreds of thousands of handbills to citizens during the day. In late November, Won Yong-Deok, Commander-in-Chief of the Military Police, made an announcement through the Public Relations Bureau stating that ‘The representatives of the enemy states on the Supervisory Committee on the Armistice should leave Korea within one week or we will take decisive measures against them.’ On 24 November, about one hundred thousand students from 170 middle and high schools gathered together in the Seoul Stadium to hold a student rally for the protection of national sovereignty. The Constitutional Amendment Bill was placed on the agenda on 20 November and was rejected by one vote. Although it was announced that the Amendment Bill had been rejected, the government (which had no rights in relation to the vote) rather than the National Assembly, maintained that the Amendment Bill had been passed. On 28 November, the Director of the Public Relations Bureau explained the principle of rounding off in mathematics and announced that the Amendment Bill had been passed because of the principle of rounding off. The central office of the Liberal Party also announced that the Amendment Bill had been passed. While the opposition parties walked out en masse from the meeting hall, on 29 November the Liberal Party ‘passed’ a controversial motion, ‘Passing the motion to repeal the rejection of the Constitutional Amendment Bill’. Thus President Rhee Syngman was able to become a lifetime president through the Amendment by Rounding-Off, which was clearly unconstitutional. Although some lawmakers deserted the Liberal Party because of the amendment, the Liberal Party had enough lawmakers to remain the majority party. President Rhee put the foundation for his dictatorship through the selective Constitutional Amendment and his Party became the majority party through their Campaigns Opposing the Armistice Agreement. However, even at that time lawmakers were not always loyal to Rhee and his power was far from secure. Only after the Amendment by Rounding-Off did the Liberal Party become the tool of his political power. Although there was some uncertainty, the National Assembly bowed to the will of Rhee Syngman. Now most cadres of the Liberal Party were appointed from the former pro-Japanese camp. It was only after more than six years that Rhee

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Syngman was able to command absolute political power. In 1954, when Rhee Syngman was advocating Unification through Northward Advance in an extremely hard-line tone, Korean society was extremely anti-communist. In that year, Rhee Syngman tried more to be an outstanding leader or father to the nation than the embodiment of anticommunism; in summer he imposed a so-called ‘simplified’ han’gul spelling and in late autumn he advocated the purification of Buddhist circles. However, his absolute power failed to secure a firm foundation. Because of the Amendment by Rounding-Off, which enabled him to gain absolute power, urban citizens felt alienated from Rhee and his government. It was difficult for urban citizens to accept such an obscurantist policy as the Amendment by Rounding-Off; the more highly educated were concentrated in the cities and Korea was experiencing rapid urbanization. When urban citizens in such big cities as Seoul resisted Rhee’s obscurantist policies and believed them to be the source of misgovernment, corruption and unemployment, the weakness of Rhee Syngman’s political power became manifest as it had done before the Amendment by Rounding-Off and during the Korean War. The Amendment by Rounding-Off proved a fatal blow to his morality. Because of the controversy over the Amendment by Rounding-Off and the New Delhi Secret Meeting accusations, the Democratic National Party became dispirited. It was felt that relevant people in the Democratic National Party should take responsibility for the alleged immorality of the fabricated New Delhi Secret Meeting incident. Since this fabrication also contributed to the Amendment-by-Rounding-Off result, the party should have taken its responsibility seriously. Moreover, the fact that Jo Byeong-Ok, a very skilful politician, played a certain role in the false accusation, it meant that the Party had betrayed the people. However, as time passed, the Amendment by RoundingOff presented the Democratic National Party with an opportunity. By exploiting the political situation which desperately demanded a coalition of all opposition parties against Rhee Syngman, the ultra-right anti-communist forces of the Democratic National Party (which had been responsible for the false accusation of the New Delhi Secret Meeting) was resurrected. Unlike in the past, the Democratic National Party paradoxically became a relentless fighter against dictatorship, even though it excluded Jo Bong-Am in its coalition despite the hopes of the people for a coalition of all opposition parties. Rhee Syngman and the ultra-right anti-communist forces took precautions against the forces for peaceful unification. Thus, when the false accusation of the alleged New Delhi Secret Meeting emerged, Rhee Syngman and his followers both inside and outside the National Assembly worked hard to smash the peaceful unification or nationalist forces – partly for the purpose of consolidating his own policy of the Unification through Northward Advance and partly to block the possible resurgence of the nationalist forces. Jo Bong-Am was forced to retire from politics because of ultra-right terrorism and he was not able to run in the general election of 1954. Nevertheless, he later rose again as a political figure, thanks to a grand coalition movement of all opposition parties opposed to Rhee Syngman’s dictatorship. Based on this move-

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ment, progressive forces appeared in Korean politics for the first time since the Korean War and thanks to the rise of the progressive forces, the Theory of Peaceful Unification became too influential to be ignored.

Decline of the Campaign for Unification through Northward Advance Although in the first half of 1955 there were some political disturbances because the Headquarters of the Military Police had planted some procommunist documents in some lawmakers’ offices, the campaigns for diehard anti-communist Unification through Northward Advance calmed down significantly. Rather, an anti-Japanese campaign which was part of, or allied with, the anti-communist movement continued. Rhee Syngman’s antiJapanese movements found resonance with the people’s anti-Japanese sentiments and weakened or unsettled the resistance or opposition to his anti-unification policies and the pro-Japanese colour of the Liberal Party and his government. In addition, his anti-Japanese initiatives paradoxically made him appear to be an anti-Japanese nationalist at the same time as his Unification through Northward Advance policies enabled him to pose as a leader of the anti-communist unification movements. Generally speaking, the anti-Japanese movement from 1954 to the end of the 1950s functioned as a part of Rhee’s anti-communist policies. The Japanese Government did not act in concert with Rhee Syngman’s government with respect to its anti-communist polices. Especially when it faced economic difficulties after the end of the Korean War boom, the Hayatoma Cabinet, which began in December 1954, approached the Soviet Union and China and tried to establish diplomatic relations through the Fishery Agreement under the slogan of a separation between the economy and politics. President Rhee Syngman announced that he would consider Japan as an enemy state if Japan had any mutual exchanges with North Korea24 and, in a national anti-communist rally, condemned the Hayatoma Cabinet as a traitor to the free world.25 In addition, while claiming that new militarists in Japan were cooperating with the armed forces of the communist nations26 and that Japan, in cooperation with North Korea, was planning to occupy South Korea,27 he heightened the crisis consciousness in society and mobilized students and citizens in anti-Japanese rallies. From August 1955, as part of the Campaigns for Unification through Northward Advance, fierce and long-lasting movements for driving the Armistice Supervisory Committee of the Neutral Countries out of Korea were staged. On 1 August 1955, the South Korean government announced the issue of a special note asking the Armistice Supervisory Committee of the Neutral Countries to leave Korea. The note read: ‘We hereby take all necessary measures to recover our sovereignty in our land below the 38th parallel’ and ‘we are ready to win back important territory (including Gaeseong and Ongjin) in order to strengthen our security’. It was unusual that, while Rhee Syngman repeatedly cried out for the recovery of lost territory by Unification through Northward Advance, after the Armistice Agreement the South Korea Government officially announced its instigation of direct action, including military action. Of course it was impossible to take any real measures to

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recover Gaeseong and Ongjin and it did not undertake any direct action to this end. This announcement aimed at demonstrating the intention of the government to take real action rather than mouth mere slogans for Unification through Northward Advance and indicated that there would be a mass mobilization for an anti-communist campaign. It was reported that from 6 to 12 August more than one million people participated in rallies for the withdrawal of the Armistice Supervisory Committee of the Neutral Countries from Korea. On 13 August, which was the government’s deadline for the withdrawal of the Supervisory Committee, by announcing the immediate abrogation of the Armistice Agreement and confirming his commitment to Unification through Northward Advance, President Rhee asked the people to continue to struggle for the withdrawal of the Armistice Supervisory Committee of the Neutral Countries and for the whole nation to participate as one in the rallies in a non-violent way. On 20 August it was reported that the number of participants in the demonstrations had reached four million. Despite conflicts with the US Army, the demonstrations continued until December. On 10 December, President Rhee asked the people to cease the demonstrations temporarily. Thus the campaigns for the withdrawal of the Armistice Supervisory Committee of the Neutral Countries ceased from 9 December. The campaigns for the withdrawal of the Armistice Supervisory Committee of the Neutral Countries lasted for a lengthy 125 days from 12 August to 9 December – as long as the Rallies against the Repatriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea. It is not certain why the Rhee government had staged such lengthy campaigns for the withdrawal of the Armistice Supervisory Committee of the Neutral Countries. It seems that the main purpose was to enhance anti-communist awareness and to maintain a wartime atmosphere. Moreover, the Democratic Party was born at this time and the movement for the creation of the Progressive Party also began. It is not certain whether the campaigns targeted these political developments. Since the campaigns helped to turn public attention on one person, namely Rhee Syngman, one of the main purposes was undoubtedly to influence the election of the president and vice president of 1956 in favour of Rhee Syngman. In 1956, there were no mass demonstrations for Unification through Northward Advance. Instead, there were many government-backed rallies which ‘begged’ Rhee Syngman not to give up his candidacy. In the demonstrations, even ‘cows and horses’ were mobilized to show that everyone supported Rhee Syngman’s candidacy. In the election of 15 May 1956, Presidential candidate Rhee Syngman redoubled his efforts to condemn Jo Bong-Am as a collaborator of the communists and Shin Ik-Hui as pro-Japanese, rather than project himself by demonstrating his will for Unification through Northward Advance. However, his efforts failed to impress the voters. The people of South Korea, especially those living in large cities, demonstrated their apathy towards Rhee Syngman’s iron rule, and their alienation from Rhee’s government and the Liberal Party was obvious. The myth of Rhee Syngman, or the ultra-right oppression, began to crumble.

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From the point of view of vote count, presidential candidate Rhee Syngman was virtually defeated and vice presidential candidate Yi Gi-Bung was really defeated. The result was a shocking failure for the Liberal Party. Generally speaking, the effect of the Northward Advance Unification Campaigns was on the wane. Because Rhee Syngman overused hard-line expressions and gestures, he was no longer able to find effective materials and found it difficult to continue to mobilize the masses. In contrast, during the election for president and vice president, thanks to Jo Bong-Am and the Progress Party, the theory of peaceful unification publicly emerged for the first time since the outbreak of the Korean War. In his New Year Address of 1 January 1957, Rhee allotted two-thirds of his speech to anti-communism and Northward Advance Unification, with the rest being dedicated to the issue of the Korean army. The address did not contain any economic or social policies of his government, which added to the jejune and dull character of his address. Even in the section on Northward Advance Unification he did not make any specific remark. He simply stated: ‘I believe our people and army together will advance to the North some day – and we are indeed prepared to do so.’ This address hinted at the fact that his government would have to rely on terrorism and fraudulent elections to sustain its power as it became more and more rigid and oligarchic. On 11 January 1957, the National Assembly adopted two resolutions. One of these was so strange that it was without precedent while the other was a message to the President of the USA, the Senate President and the House Speaker concerning the Armistice Agreement. In this message, the National Assembly emphasized that the Armistice Agreement was invalid and that Korea would therefore exercise its sovereignty. On the same day, another message was sent to the Congress of the USA and the General Secretary of the UN. In this message, the National Assembly directly criticized the American government by saying: ‘In the proposal your delegation sent to the Political Committee of the UN, your delegation suggested a general election for all Korea. We are afraid that this suggestion will regrettably result in violating the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea and damaging the authority of the UN in Korea.’ This criticism showed that the advocates of Northward Advance Unification had become more rigid since the sixteen countries of the UN at the Geneva Talks had clearly requested a general election across all Korea in their joint declaration – and the UN resolution for Korean Unification, which had been adopted in the UN under the initiative of America, also proposed a general election in both Koreas under the supervision of the UN.

The Theory of Unification through Northward Advance is Abandoned by All In September of that year, a change in the unification policy in the National Assembly occurred. Up to that time lawmakers, albeit against their better judgement, were forced to consent to passing the unification policy as advocated by the ultra-right anti-communist forces. However in September 1957, in order to secure a unanimous passage, the Liberal Party agreed to a new unification policy which can be seen as a moderated and modified version of the

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unification policy of President Rhee and the Liberal Party. In other words, in September 1957 the National Assembly passed a resolution which was to be sent to the General Secretary of the UN in the name of Yi Gi-Bung, Chairman of the National Assembly. The resolution demanded that 1) the Chinese army be immediately and unconditionally withdrawn from North Korea, and 2) that free elections under the supervision of the UN be conducted, with the seats determined in proportion to the population, and that North Korea be subsequently united with the Republic of Korea. Ever since the Korean War, President Rhee and the ultra-right forces, including the Liberal Party and the Democratic National Party, had advocated Die-Hard Anti-Communist Unification through Northward Advance – unification which implied the annexation of North Korea and bringing it under the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea. Only at the Geneva Talks did the South Korean delegation hesitantly suggest that free elections in North Korea be conducted under the supervision of the UN and that elections in South Korea be conducted according to the laws of the Republic of Korea. In the light of this process, the resolution of 17 September 1957 was quite different from the message of 11 January 1957 which had been sent to the US Congress and the General Secretary of the UN. The message of 11 January clearly demanded that the Chinese Army be withdrawn, that elections be conducted only in North Korea under UN supervision and at the initiative of the Republic of Korea and that subsequently, the elected lawmakers from North Korea fill the 100 reserved seats in the National Assembly. Another challenge to Unification through Northward Advance came from the Democratic Party. Although the Democratic Party tried to avoid the issue of national unification in the beginning and, before October 1957, assumed an ambiguous attitude towards unification policies under the slogan of ‘fight and peace’,28 it announced an ‘epoch-making new policy’ at the National Convention of the Democratic Party on 18 October 1957. This policy called for ‘a general election across all Korea under the supervision of the UN’ and was continuously advocated by the Republic of Korea until the early 1970s. The party policy was announced in the name of Jo Byeong-Ok, Chairperson of the Supreme Council of the party. In the section on Foreign Policy Change, in its introduction to its current policies the party maintained that it had ‘now established an invincible policy for national reunification’. In its new policy, the Democratic Party suggested that ‘the South and North create a unified country through a free general election across all Korea under the supervision of the UN and that the elected National Assembly then draft a constitution for establishing a unified government in Korea’. While the Democratic Party, mindful of the US, introduced this new policy, it tried to keep it under wraps. In terms of timing, the party introduced the new policy after it had recognized that Unification through Northward Advance had lost its appeal and influence among the people. On 7 November 1957, while criticizing Unification through Northward Advance as severely as Jo Bong-Am did, twenty-five lawmakers including Kim Su-Seon, an independent, submitted another unification policy to President Rhee Syngman. The policy was much more progressive than that of the Democratic Party and similar to that

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of the Progressive Party. The policy was announced as ‘A Question about the National Reunification Policy’, which caused a furore in the National Assembly. Although it appeared as if the call for Unification through Northward Advance was still powerful, society itself was changing. In July 1958, Rhee Syngman issued an official statement saying that abiding by the Armistice Agreement was an expression of powerlessness, that the Armistice Agreements should be abolished and that it was necessary to demonstrate a readiness to launch a counter-attack against the communists. The Liberal Party insisted on Unification through Northward Advance and that the general election be conducted only in North Korea under the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea. On 27 November 1958, a spokesman for the government announced that ‘Our policy is that after all communists withdraw or are expelled from North Korea, a free election should be conducted in North Korea under the Constitution and current laws of the Republic of Korea.’ Challenging this announcement, a newspaper editorial argued that it would be unthinkable for the communists to voluntarily withdraw from North Korea and that the government itself knew very well why its Northward Advance had not been implemented.29 The Theory of Unification through Northward Advance could no longer stand. In April 1959, Yang Yu-Chan, ROK Ambassador to the US, suggested that a general election under the supervision of the UN should be conducted in both South and North Korea in the following spring in order to unify Korea. His statement created a great stir in Korea. In the election of president and vice president on 15 March 1960, presidential candidate Rhee Syngman, who had left no stone unturned to project himself as the incarnation of unification through his Theory of Unification through Northward Advance, did not even raise the issue of unification in his policy proposals. Then, after the April Revolution, the slogan of Northward Advance Unification which had echoed all over the country vanished completely as an historic relic and disappeared as if it had never existed. STRUCTURE AND CHARACTER OF THE THEORY OF UNIFICATION THROUGH NORTHWARD ADVANCE

Structure Throughout the 1950s, the campaign for Unification through Northward Advance blanketed the whole of South Korea. Sometimes rallies were staged sporadically, depending on other related issues, and sometimes only at a number of places and for a short period, such as when General Eisenhower visited Korea. However, some rallies lasted for three to five months, such as the Protests against the Armistice Talks and Demonstrations for the Expulsion of the Supervisory Committee of Neutral Countries. The Rallies for Northward Advance Unification were very frequently held on anniversary days or event weeks such as Independence Day on 15 August, 1 March, Rhee Syngman’s Birthday or the week for Vigilance against Communist Spies.

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Many were mobilized for these rallies, including the members of the Federation of Korean Trade Unions, citizens and government officials. Among them students, and especially middle and high school students, were most often mobilized with the leaders of The Student Defence Corps in the vanguard. Students were even mobilized during their class hours. Indeed, for students, rallies became routine – like an extra-curricular activity – and during the rallies, teachers were required to serve as marshals, guiding their students. If anyone criticized the totalitarian or bureaucratic mobilization for these rallies they were severely persecuted by the government or other ‘patriotic associations’. One such incident involved the persecution of an individual because of his writing. On 13 September 1955, in the midst of demonstrations for the Withdrawal of the Supervisory Committee of Neutral Countries, Choe Seok-Jae, the chief editor of the Daegu Maeil Newspaper, wrote an article entitled ‘Do not use students as a tool’. On the following day, because of his article, Choe received a threatening letter from The Gyeongbuk Headquarters for the Expulsion of the Armistice Supervisory Committee of Neutral Countries. In the afternoon of that day, 14 September, a group of young people attacked the newspaper offices. The cadres of the Gyeongbuk Headquarters of the National Conference, the Inspection Division Head of the Liberal Party and the Investigation Section Staff of the Gyeongbuk Police Department coordinated the attack. As a result of the attack, many employees of the Daegu Maeil were injured and some facilities of the company, including printing machines were smashed. The Chief-editor, Choe SeokJae, was imprisoned on a charge of violation of the anti-communist law. During the investigation into this attack, a senior policeman was quoted as saying, ‘Terror in broad daylight is not considered to be terror’. At the National Assembly, Choe Chang-Seob, head of the National Assembly’s Investigation Team on the Incident and a Liberal Party lawmaker went so far as to say that he would like to award ‘an order to those young people who did such good things as attacking the newspaper because the newspaper had committed an act of terror against the nation and the country’. At the time, the Gyeongbuk Federation of Patriotic Associations and the Gyeongbuk Headquarters of the Liberal Party continued to distribute threatening leaflets. Similar leaflets were scattered in Seoul as well. This incident clearly shows that the Rhee government would brook no criticism of its northward Unification or student mobilization. Thus, it was extremely difficult to make any attempt to censor the government’s practice of mass mobilization or to criticize the Northward Unification Campaigns. Another propaganda bill which was distributed on 18 September 1955 under the title, ‘An announcement to Citizens, Publishers, Lawyers, Artists, and other Intellectuals’ reveals the situation with great succinctness: Finally, Chief Editor Choe Seok-Jae of the pro-enemy newspaper, Daegu Maeil, was captured at noon on 17 September. His pro-enemy activities are too horrible. His inconceivable crimes have been exposed. Thus, anyone who sympathizes with him or campaigns for him with

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words, writings, or consolatory visitations will be considered to be pro-enemy – a person like Choe Seok-Chae. We hereby give advance warning to these individuals that our Federation of Patriotic Associations will not tolerate them.30 Slogans for Northward Advance Unification were displayed on schools, buildings and walls, together with anti-communist and anti-Japanese slogans. Even elementary school pupils shouted the slogans as they received close-order training. There were several different meanings to the slogan of Northward Advance Unification by the government and the National Assembly. The government seldom mentioned that it would wage a war for Northward Advance Unification, but in its statement of 1 August 1957, the government most resolutely expressed its willingness to embark on a war for national unification. This statement was a declaration on the recovery of lost territory below the 38th parallel. However, even in this statement, the government only said that it was, ‘ready to recover these important areas [Gaeseong and Ongjin – the author]’ but failed to say that it was ready to take action to effect this recovery. It was also unclear what kind of preparations the government had made. Although in the rallies for Unification through Northward Advance, the government and National Assembly broadcast threatening messages to the effect that there would be another Korean War, deep down inside they were asking the US and the UN to allow them to do this. At the Anniversary Address on the Liberation of Korea on 15 August 1954, President Rhee Syngman stated: ‘Our only hope is that, cooperatively, we can drive out the enemy as far as the Yalu River. If the UN does not cooperate with this plan, I want the UN to allow us to take action independent of the UN.’ Even in this address he continued: ‘Please understand that I do not ask the UN to allow me to provoke a war today or tomorrow.’ On his eightieth birthday President Rhee said: ‘If only our great allies allowed us to attack North Korea, we would not hesitate to do so immediately – without ambiguity.’ It seemed that his Theory of Unification through Northward Advance had been ‘ambiguous’ up to this time. In his New Year Address of 1957 he also expressed an ambiguous attitude about what he would do for Unification through Northward Advance: ‘I believe the day will come when our nation and soldiers in concert attack North Korea and we are prepared for that day.’ In the resolution to oppose the partial withdrawal of the UN Army in August 1954, he again displayed an unclear attitude: ‘The US government should give assistance to the Korean army, air force and navy so that the Republic of Korea may take independent action to repel the communist party from Korea’s territory.’ In order to understand his unification theory, it is also important to know that he emphasized the confrontation between the free world and communism as an extension of his Northward Advance Unification – although it would be a part of his international anti-communism. In his address at the joint meeting of the Senate and House on 28 July 1954 when he visited the USA, the war he demanded was more than just a South-North Korean war – which could be viewed simply as a local war. When he said, ‘We should take

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immediate action’, he meant the war in the Far East, the war against communist China, the war against the Soviet Union, or even the ‘Third World War’. In late August, at the welcoming rally for his return from the US, which was organized by the National Federation of Patriotic Associations, he emphasized the necessity of the anti-communist war and the inevitability of a nuclear attack against communist countries by saying: ‘An appeasement policy towards communism would result in more miserable sacrifice. Only atomic bombs will defeat the communists.’ This statement could be interpreted to mean that he looked forward to a Third World War and to winning a victory by using atomic bombs. On 18 July, in his interview with an American media outlet, he said he supported the withdrawal of foreign armies and demanded: ‘If you [Americans] do not want to launch a war against the communists, allow us to wage it independently.’ In this interview he announced that, for the free world, he would not hesitate to wage a proxy war against communists. This statement was in the same vein as his statement about the necessity of the anti-communist crusade two years earlier. As a part of the crusade, he made the lofty remark that he would do his best to help defend Taiwan and that he was ready to send the armed forces to the Vietnam War.31

The Relationship with Other Unification Theories I will analyse the logic of the Theory of Unification through Northward Advance by focusing on its intention. An analysis of the logic of the unification theory requires that we investigate whether or not the Theory of Northward Advance Unification was actually a unification theory or a policy for suppressing discussion on unification. In addition, the analysis includes a discussion of whether the Campaigns for Northward Advance Unification were campaigns to dissolve the national division by overcoming the status quo or to strengthen the national division. It would appear that the Theory of Northward Advance Unification primarily sought national unification and that no other movements for national unification were more enthusiastic in overcoming the status quo. However, this interpretation is not true. The Theory of Northward Advance Unification is unique in that it demanded a wartime environment and exhibited an allergic reaction to all other policies for national unification. The latter point deserves closer attention. The Theory of Unification through Northward Advance would precipitate a state of war. Because the theory demanded immediate northward Advance, it could precipitate a war at any time. Coincidentally, the advocates of the theory promoted Northward Advance Unification so as to maintain a state of war and constantly emphasized their position that the present environment equated to a state of war. Opposition to the Armistice, Immediate Abolition of the Armistice Agreement, Withdrawal of the Supervisory Committee of Neutral Countries and other issues were viewed as excellent materials for mobilization in order to precipitate a state of war. Just before the Constitutional Amendment by Rounding-Off, President Rhee

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claimed that the Soviet Union and Communist China were about to invade South Korea and that Japan had tried to annex Korea again, which gave rise to a crisis consciousness. He also emphasized opposition to Japan in combination with Northward Advance Unification so that he could heighten the people’s sense of crisis by reminding them of the Japanese invasion. However, as time progressed, his ability to manoeuvre and manipulate the situation to create a war hysteria decreased and peace-time socio-cultural factors began to appear. In a state of war or crisis, people are required to unite under a leader who manages the situation. Furthermore, where a state of ceaseless tension exists, a unique community akin to a military camp can be formed. In this situation, anyone who opposes either the war or the leader must be ostracized from this ‘wartime community’. Moreover, as with the end of Japanese imperialism, anyone who opposes the war and proposes peace is condemned as a traitor and threatened with terror. Under an ultra-right wartime regime or dangerous situation, while the logic or argument of the situation may appear completely unfounded to reasonable people, it is strictly prohibited to point out its absurdity; thus, the truth remains hidden. The atmosphere of terror, which is perpetuated by seemingly endless mobilization campaigns and war slogans, oppresses the poverty-stricken population who yearn for peace and rest. I will now discuss the relationship between the Northward Advance Unification theory and other unification theories. The ultra-right anticommunist forces coerced people into accepting that only die-hard anticommunist unification through military means was patriotic and loyal to the nation. This Northward Advance Unification excluded other unification theories. There were two types of exclusion. One type meant that it became impossible for people to propose any policies which differed from the statements of the leader who declared that Korea was in a state of war, or that Korea should wage a war. The other type of exclusion was expressed in the fact that even though the North Korean government actually existed, that existence was negated by an arbitrary interpretation of the UN Resolution on the Korean Question such that it made it unnecessary for people to hold dialogue, communicate or negotiate with the North Korean government. Because of this negation, other unification theories were unable to survive. As a result, any discussions on national unification were suppressed by the advocates of Northward Advance Unification. As the Northward Advance Unification campaigns gathered strength, besides discussions on national unification, even criticism of excessive mass mobilization campaigns was disallowed. Suffice it to recall that the Daegu Maeil was attacked and its editor Choe Seok-Chae imprisoned. When the Theory of Unification through Neutralization was discussed abroad in the 1950s, advocates of the Northward Advance Unification sternly maintained that any discussion would be unacceptable and that the government would reject the ‘Third Forces’. Since the Third Forces meant the centrist forces, this statement showed that the government would not accept anything other than ultra-right anti-communism. And in the ‘Resolution on

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the Rejection of Neutralization and South-North Negotiation’ of 4 November 1954, the National Assembly clearly announced: ‘In dealing with the Korean question, neither South-North negotiation nor neutralization can be accepted. Those policies are simply part of communist world strategies and thus we resolutely reject them.’ Thus, the policies of Kim Ku and Kim GyuSik were unable to exist in South Korea. In the 1950s, after the Korean War, any political force, including the Progressive Party, could not propose SouthNorth exchange or unification through neutralization. Even at the end of 1955, when the Preparatory Committee for Establishing the Progressive Party was created, the progressive forces found it difficult to promote peaceful unification. At that time, even Jo Bong-Am refrained from using the word peaceful unification, using instead ambiguous expressions such as ‘political victory’. It is also remarkable that in writing the draft of its party policies, the Preparatory Committee refrained from using the term ‘peaceful method’, opting instead for ‘democratic method’, because of the fear of a backlash from the government. It was really difficult to use the term peaceful unification when the government was advocating unification through northward advance. Thus, not until the election of president and vice president on 15 May 1956, when the political atmosphere was more open, was Jo Bong-Am, the presidential candidate for the Progressive Party, able to use the expression peaceful unification and Shin Ik-Hui, presidential candidate for the Democratic Party, able to criticize the absurdity of the Theory of Unification through Northward Advance. However, even on 11 April, during the earlier stages of the election campaigns, Rhee Syngman, presidential candidate for the Liberal Party, harshly criticized Shin Ik-Hui and Jo Bong-Am saying: ‘They foolishly say that, if they take power, they will live amicably with Japan or achieve national unification in cooperation with the Communist Party. This would mean revisiting the horrible sin of betraying the nation which occurred fifty years ago [i.e. the 1905 Korea-Japan Treaty – author].’ In his local campaign of early May, Rhee Syngman even warned proJo Bong Am and pro-Shin Ik-Hui citizens by saying that their support for them was tantamount to selling off the country. He further remarked that these traitors wished to take power in cooperation with North Korea and Japan and were exploiting the opportunity of an election in this free nation to advance their sinister goals. After the election of president and vice president on 15 May, President Rhee Syngman declared: ‘The result of this election shows that there are many people who support communism or commit pro-Japanese acts.’32 About four million voters who voted for either Jo BongAm or Shin Ik-Hui could be deemed to belong to this category of people and they were condemned by Rhee Syngman. The Progressive Party incident clearly showed how the advocates of Northward Advance Unification dealt with other unification theories. The ultra-right anti-communist forces terrorized the Progressive Party which advocated peaceful unification. The mass media and other politicians, both of the ruling party and the opposition parties, kept silent about this terror. When the Progressive Party held foundation meetings in the provinces after the establishment of their Party, suspicious individuals who were egged

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on by the police disturbed the meetings and terrorized participants. Thus inaugural meetings at the provincial level could not be held peaceably. At the inaugural meeting in Jeolla Province, in particular, the houses of two party members were attacked and their wives stabbed repeatedly with a dagger – both incidents occurring simultaneously. All cadres of the Progressive Party were detained on the charge of promoting peaceful unification. The government revoked the registration of the Progressive Party without a court order and executed Jo Bong-Am on the grounds that he promoted peaceful unification and was a North Korean spy. In the National Meeting of October 1957, the Democratic Party adopted a new unification policy and announced that it would create a Unified National Assembly through a general election under the supervision of the UN. It also announced that it would have the unified National Assembly establish a unified Korean Government by legislating a constitution. However, the contents of this unification policy changed in a more conservative direction just before the general election of May 1958. In the election promises of May 1958, the Democratic Party said that the all-Korean general election should be supervised by UN member-states but exclude any communist countries. In addition, it said that its unification policy was the same as that which Byun Yeong-Tae, Minister of Foreign Affairs, had suggested in the Geneva Talks of 1954 and that the general election should be conducted in the South ‘according to the Constitution of the Republic of Korea’. It went on to say that ‘the current Constitution of the Republic of Korea would be valid until it is revised by the National Assembly of all Korea’. Although it had called for the legislation of a Constitution in October 1957, it now called for ‘revision’. That is, the Democratic Party returned to a pre-October 1957 position. This change resulted from the charge that the unification policy of the Democratic Party was the same as that of the Progressive Party and that the legislation of the constitution in the Unified National Assembly meant a negation of the Republic of Korea and the destruction of the constitution of the Republic of Korea. The unification policies of the Democratic Party were unexpectedly and harshly criticized just before the incident of the National Security Law. This was because the Liberal Party highlighted the fact that there were pro-communist elements in the Democratic Party as a preemptive attack so that the National Security Law could be passed in the National Assembly. This attack against the Democratic Party showed just how difficult it was to promote other unification theories apart from Unification through Northward Advance.

Opposing Co-existence in order to consolidate the Status Quo The characteristics of the Northward Advance Unification theory were well expressed in the relationship of this theory to the issue of co-existence, which was one measure as to whether the theory could be for the national unification or not. I have already discussed how Rhee’s Theory of Unification through Northward Advance was an extension of his theory of separate governments and how it resulted inevitably from his ultra-right conservatism and his resolute attitude towards communism. The Korean War led more

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people to believe that, in dealing with North Korea or the Communist Party, apart from negotiation there is only confrontation. This ‘confrontation consciousness’ became more intense as the violent gale of McCarthyism blew strongly and John Foster Dulles (1888–1959), Secretary of State, implemented his hard-line Soviet policies. Rhee Syngman appeared to be the most radical anti-communist in the world in the 1950s. This anti-communist attitude reached a peak in July 1954 when he visited the USA. He urged the US to immediately wage a war in the Far East, a decisive war against China and the Soviet Union. At the end of the 1950s, when there were some signs of East-West reconciliation, including the summit of the USA and the Soviet Union, he announced: ‘The USA should avoid any negotiations or summit meetings with the Soviet Union or its satellite countries, not only for its own security but also for the solidarity of the free world. The suggestion of any negotiations or summit meetings by the Soviet Union is an integral part of its strategy for conquering the world.’33 An incident at Seoul National University in the summer of 1955 shows how violently the South Korean government opposed the co-existence of the West and East. Whilst discussing world affairs in an auditorium at Seoul National University, Yi Dong-Hwa argued that it was imperative that the US and Soviet blocs forged a relationship of peaceful co-existence. For this statement he was tried and imprisoned. Moreover, we can learn about the ultra-right anticommunist perspective on ‘co-existence’ from the fact that the ultraright anti-communists condemned opponents of Rhee’s Constitutional Amendment as advocates of co-existence with the communists. Rhee Syngman’s radical uncompromising attitude towards co-existence was not aimed at solving the national problem or raising the level of national autonomy but instead was an extreme representation of the logic of confrontation between the communist and capitalist camps. Next to Park Chung Hee, Rhee could be said to be the most loyal adherent to the logic of confrontation between the two polarized camps, going beyond the national interest. In mid 1949, before the outbreak of the Korean War, Rhee was greatly interested in creating Pacific Alliances for the international anticommunist camp. He also volunteered to send troops to Vietnam and participate in solving the Taiwanese question, because of his interest in and support for international anti-communism. The most important reason why he opposed Japan was because he felt that Japan was not a true anticommunist state but assumed a compromising stance towards North Korea and China. He was also sceptical about NATO because some member countries allowed the communist party to be active in their polity. Rhee Syngman’s government criticized India, not out of national interest but for international anti-communist reasons. The reason why he condemned the Asia-Africa Conference as a communist-initiated conference had nothing to do with the national interest, but rather his international anti-communist ideology. He opposed the co-existence of West and East so as not to inhibit his ultraright anti-communist regime in any way and to maintain the status quo. In this sense, his statements about separate government and his theory of Unification through Northward Advance were all in harmony with his oppo-

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sition to co-existence. Paradoxically, his opposition to peaceful co-existence was directed at maintaining the hostile co-existence or the status quo. As Professor Jin Deok-Gyu appropriately remarked,34 Rhee’s Theory of Unification through Northward Advance was not articulated in order to enhance national integration but to entrench Korea’s dependence on the free world. In other words, he emphasized the maintenance of the status quo more than national unification. Using another example, I will show that Rhee’s opposition to co-existence was actually a policy for the consolidation of the status quo of hostility and antagonism rather than a theory of co-existence for relaxing or mitigating tension or conflict. When North Korea suggested the All-Korean Committee as the agency for national unification under the proviso that half the members of the committee be drawn from South Korea and the other half from North Korea, Byun Yeong-Tae, Minister of Foreign Affairs, rejected the proposal on the basis that the committee would be transformed into an indoctrination agency. Byun Yeong-Tae’s statement shows that an exaggerated defeatism or unease underlay the extreme confrontation between South and North Korea. This consciousness of excessive defeatism or unease was reflected in the argument that after the withdrawal of the communists from North Korea, a free election should be conducted in the North under the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea – or that the election should only be conducted in North Korea according to the laws of the Republic of Korea. The South Korean Government assumed that if the election was conducted under the communist regime, the 100 elected people would all come from the Communist Party and that in the South some pro-communist people might be elected. The ultra-right anti-communists thought that the all-Korea general election would certainly shake the system of the national division – or more specifically, it would threaten the regime of ultra-right anticommunism under the leadership of Rhee Syngman. When Anthony Eden (1897–1977), British Foreign Secretary, suggested that the general election should be conducted at the same time in the South and the North and that the Supervisory Committee should be composed of countries which both the South and North would accept (i.e. neutral countries which had not participated in the Korean War), Minister of Foreign Affairs Byun stridently rejected his proposal for the above reasons. The key point of Unification through Northward Advance was to prevent any changes which could shake the reality of the national division or the regime of ultra-right anti-communism under the leadership of Rhee Syngman. Therefore, even though it was clear that North Korea would not accept an all-Korea general election, in order to win absolute victory, the South Korean government suggested that the general election should only be conducted in the North according to the laws of the Republic of Korea or under the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea. It is interesting that Rhee Syngman condemned the theory of peaceful unification or any criticism of his Northward Advance Unification as a policy of co-existence. Jo Byeong-Ok also maintained that since a few unreasonable politicians spoke about the possibility of peaceful co-existence, all people should be armed with a strong spirit to destroy this false dream of theirs.35

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Jo Bong-Am’s theory of political method or peaceful unification was viewed by the ultra-right anti-communists as a policy which threatened their regime of ultra-right anti-communism or even the national division.

The Possibility of National Unification through Northward Advance Unification When the campaigns for Northward Advance Unification were first fiercely and protractedly conducted during the rallies to oppose the Armistice Agreement, the crowd in the rallies shouted: ‘Northward Advance without the support of the US.’ However, at the time the Korean Army was not ready for a Northward Advance without the US.36 Putting aside the issue of command rights or command capacity, since Korea relied completely on the US in terms of military resources, including bullets and petrol, and the US was committed to the implementation of the Armistice Agreement, it was not realistic for South Korea to conduct battles without the support of the US. Even if the Korean Army was attacked and had the right of command, it was not easy for South Korea to perform military operations without the support of the US. That is why Jo Byeong-Ok claimed that a rush-to-the-North without the help of the US would be suicide. President Rhee’s strong opposition to the Armistice Agreement was conducive to the signing of the Mutual Defence Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the USA and boosting the strength of the Korean Army to 700,000. However, the Korea-US Mutual Defence Treaty, signed on 1 October 1953, instead rendered the Northward Advance Unification impossible. The first article of the agreement reads: The Parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any Party towards the United Nations. Unlike NATO, the Korea-US Mutual Defence Agreement does not guarantee the automatic involvement of the US in future crises in Korea and in fact partially restricts Korea’s sovereignty. In addition, the increase in the army made economic construction difficult. Moreover, since the soldiers were trained under appalling conditions, their morale was very low.37 For the sake of the reconstruction of the country, the size of the army had to be reduced.38 Thus, despite Rhee’s consistent objection, the number of armed personnel was reduced from 700,000 to 600,000. In July 1954, when he visited the US, President Rhee Syngman pleaded in favour of an immediate war, including a war against the Soviet Union. At that time he said that only immediate action would guarantee victory over communism. He also called for a war on China. However, President Eisenhower answered unequivocally that he did not know anybody who would support such an action as reopening a war.39 The New York Times also

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severely criticised Rhee Syngman’s congressional address as an ‘unhappy address’.40 His address to Congress dampened US support for Korea and greatly undermined the American Government’s confidence in Rhee Syngman.41 Within less than three days of his return to Korea, the issue of the withdrawal of the American troops was raised. The US-Korea meeting of November 1954 was also concluded as the US had requested. The US maintained that economically its aid to Korea should be connected to the reconstruction of Japan and that Korea should avoid the use of military force. After this meeting the mass media in fact reported that Northward Advance Unification was impossible. The Korean government’s most active Northward Advance Unification policy was encapsulated in its declaration on the recovery of lost territory below the 38th parallel on 1 August 1955. In this declaration, the Korean Government announced that it would initiate measures so as to make the communists withdraw from Gaesong, Ongjin and the northern section of the Han River. Although based on this announcement the Ministry of Defence held a meeting of top military leaders and discussed how to recover the lost territory below the 38th parallel, the military leaders decided to stage ‘a national campaign’. On the day following this announcement, Secretary of State Dulles announced that the US would not support the military action of the Republic of Korea. Advocates of Northward Advance Unification were not able to suggest how they could go about achieving their unification. The only thing they could say was that they had to grasp the opportunity whenever it presented itself. Such an opportunity might be the outbreak of a war or the outbreak of the Third World War. Logically thinking, we may conclude that the advocates of the Northward Advance Unification sincerely wished for the outbreak of a war or the outbreak of the Third World War. However, it was clear that North Korea could not start another war independent of the Soviet Union or China. A war could occur only if China was willing to join it or if the Soviet Union was ready to start a Third World War. As far as the possibility of unification was concerned, the Theory of Unification through Northward Advance remained unrealistic. President Rhee Syngman also recognized this point. At an interview with United Press on 13 August 1957, he said that it was difficult to know how to achieve national unification.42 In his historic address on the banks of the Han River on 3 May 1956, Shin Ik-Hui, Presidential candidate for the Democratic Party said: The government argues that without any further consideration, either this evening or tomorrow morning it will advance to the North and wave the South Korean national flag on the summit of Mt Baekdu . . . This statement is nonsense and irresponsible. It does not carry any substantial meaning and is an absurd noise . . . One journalist expressed his frustration and hopelessness about national unification in the 1950s amidst the echoes of Northward Advance Unification:

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While the people’s long-cherished wish for national unification results in despair and resignation as if it were an eternal dream without any possibility of fulfilment, it seems that no-one tries to carefully examine any realistic policies on national unification . . . Everybody realizes that national unification or national salvation through unification is a national mission awaiting accomplishment; however people remain silent or avoid discussing any realistic methods for unification and are simply fatalistic in their gestures. In this situation, I feel that national unification will never come. Thus, I run up against a wall of despair . . . Without any substantial negotiations or realistic policies, the government merely repeats continuously the slogan of Unification through Northward Advance.43 Professor Yi Ho-Jae concluded that Rhee Syngman’s foreign policies pursued Unification through Northward Advance by opposing the improvement of the South-North relationship and that this resulted in the policy for national division becoming the de facto policy. Based on this conclusion, Professor Yi argued: ‘Rhee Syngman’s Theory of Unification is criticized as a theory for national division or a theory of “two Koreas”, just like his theory of a separate government.’ I will now discuss two questions which relate to the policy of northward advance. In the 1960s and 1970s, especially under the Yushin Regime, the government incessantly emphasized the possible invasion of South Korea by North Korea. However, in the 1950s the government did not mention such an invasion except for the purpose of heightening the crisis consciousness during the Constitutional Amendment debate when the government emphasized the possibility of an invasion of South Korea by North Korea, Japan and China. There must have been some political reason for the fact that the government avoided raising the question of a possible invasion of South Korea by North Korea in the 1950s. It seemed that most people did not believe in another imminent war because the disastrous Korean War had ended only a few years earlier and a new war could not help but escalate into an international war. Although he thought that emphasizing a possible North Korean invasion would help strengthen his ultra-right dictatorial regime as Park Chung Hee had, it would be difficult for Rhee Syngman to mobilize the discourse of a North Korean invasion because he was mobilizing the Theory of Unification through Northward Advance for a higher political purpose. Provoking a war was not considered negative by the advocates of Northward Advance Unification, but as ‘a holy war.’ The full political meaning of the term ‘invasion’ will be discussed later to explain how both Park Chung-Hee and Rhee Syngman used the term in relation to their policies towards North Korea. Another issue in relation to Rhee Syngman’s Theory of Unification through Northward Advance that requires elucidation is whether it targeted North Korea or not. Although some records show that the leaders of the Soviet Union or China were wary of Rhee Syngman’s bellicosity, no records have been found to prove that North Korea did consider Rhee Syngman’s Theory of

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Unification through Northward Advance a real threat. While there might be some records indicating that North Korea was worried over Rhee Syngman’s unification theory, it should be understood that Rhee Syngman’s persistent call for northward advance was but another expression of his incapacity to provoke a war. If there were a war in Korea, it would be a surprise attack like the Korean War, not a war proclaimed in advance. Thus, North Korea did not consider the Theory of Northward Advance Unification to be a threat. This North Korean attitude is well evidenced by the fact that the North signed the DPRK-Soviet Union Friendly Cooperation and Mutual Help Agreement in 1961 after the slogan of Northward Advance Unification disappeared in South Korea. The reason why this agreement was signed at that time was because missiles were deployed in South Korea in the 1950s while a tripartite anti-communist alliance was formed in 1960 via a New Security Agreement with Japan and the USA, the Chinese army withdrew and the Sino-Russian conflict intensified. Judging by these facts, Rhee Syngman’s unification theory did not target North Korea but rather domestic politics in South Korea. DIE-HARD ANTI-COMMUNIST UNIFICATION THROUGH NORTHWARD ADVANCE AND NATIONAL AUTONOMY

Advocates of Northward Advance Unification and their Spirit of Autonomy As described above, advocates of Northward Advance Unification gave priority to the logic of confrontation between the communist and capitalist camps over the principle of autonomy. It was difficult to maintain a spirit of autonomy in the midst of the campaigns for Unification through Northward Advance. When he announced that he would help Taiwan or that he was totally prepared to send troops to Vietnam for the cause of freedom in Asia, Rhee did not discuss the issue with Taiwan or Vietnam at all. His suggestions were intended for the American leadership. His offer simply went unheeded because the USA considered it unworthy of discussion. At his address to the joint meeting of the Senate and the House in July 1956 when he visited the USA, Rhee Syngman suggested that he would ‘provide’ the Korean Army to the US. Although we can guess the intention of the message when his government said that Korea would provide Jinhae as a navy base for the US Navy,44 this message violated the principle of national autonomy because the offer was not submitted to the National Assembly for approval or agreement. At the start of the Korean War, the Korean Government transferred its right of command to the US and thereby a wide area of Korea became part of the area of operations of the US Army. Thus, the sovereignty of Korea was violated, which should have led to debate. The issue of the transfer of the right of command should have been discussed at the National Assembly even after the government transferred it to the US. Because of the transfer, all foreigners who visited Korea had to gain permission for their entry from the Headquarters of the US Army, which remained in force until the first half of 1955. The exit and re-entry of Koreans was also controlled. The management

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of Busan and Incheon Ports, communications and rail operations were also controlled by the US Army. Although it was inevitable that the US was constantly asked for military aid, there were unilateral and comprehensive articles which restricted the sovereignty of Korea. Article 4 of the Korea-US Mutual Defence Agreement read: ‘Based on the mutual agreement, the Republic of Korea allows the army, the navy and the air forces of the USA to be deployed in the territory of the Republic of Korea and the USA accepts the offer.’ Sometimes, the expression of gratitude by the Korean government to the USA was excessive. One example is Rhee Syngman’s statement: ‘The Korean youth who General James A. Vanfleet trained are the strongest anticommunist army in the Far East. General Van is the father of the Korean Army. I ask you to come back to Korea to train more Korean youth.’45 Although there were no statues of Korean patriots or great men, a magnificent statue of General MacArthur was erected at the anti-communist halls in Incheon and Seoul and an association of promoters for a statute of General Vanfleet was organized. Whenever the commander-in-chief of the UN or the 8th US Army left or arrived in Korea, or US VIPs visited Korea, all were received as national guests.46 Although Korea’s diplomatic relations were dominated by the US and relations with other countries were influenced by the foreign policy perspective of the US,47 an excessive anti-communism rendered Korean diplomacy inflexible. Even though Japan was heavily responsible for the situation, the Korean Government exploited the Korea-Japan relationship for its own political purposes. The Korean Government was excessively sensitive to Japanese approaches to North Korea or China. When he gave an address at the tenth anniversary of the UN Charter, Foreign Minister Byun Yeong-Tae argued that ‘communists should be expelled from the UN’. As a diplomat, he forgot how the UN was born and how he should contribute to the enhancement of world peace through the UN. His arguments showed that he attended the UN meeting in the same frame of mind as if he were attending a rally for anticommunism. This incident typified the level of Korean diplomacy at the time. Acting Foreign Minister Jo Jeong-Hwan, who succeeded Minister Byun, had an even more hard-nosed attitude. When at the deliberation over the budget in 1955 lawmaker Kim Dal-Ho asked whether the UN was a procommunist or anti-communist organization, acting Minister Jo answered that the UN was an ‘anti-communist organization’ – but he immediately retracted this response. When he retracted his response, lawmakers laughed at him.48 This episode would be unthinkable in another country. Minister Jo held the office of minister from 1955 to 1959, including a period as acting minister. But there was another incident which was more farcical than the argument that the UN was an anti-communist organization. When the UK lifted the embargo against North Korea, which had been applied since 1950, there was a debate in South Korea. Although the UK said it would implement strict regulations, even after it lifted the embargo, the Korean government was afraid that the UK might sell military equipment to North Korea. Lawmaker Yun Chi-Yeong reminded the House that he had asked the government to declare

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war on India and said: ‘We must say that we will bravely fight against the UK to the last man, covered in blood.’ To this statement Foreign Minister Jo replied: ‘If commercial ships go in and out of North Korea, will the South Korean government block them? We should prevent the ships from entering North Korea and be prepared to fight the UK by mobilizing all our national strength.’ Although this irresponsible and irrational answer was immediately retracted, it clearly showed the mentality of the ultra-right anticommunists.49

The Irresponsibility of Advocates of Northward Advance Unification and their Opportunistic Attitude While on the one hand the advocates of Northward Advance Unification lacked a spirit of autonomy and self-confidence, on the other hand they were also irresponsible. President Rhee Syngman’s statement of 1955 that he would take all necessary measures to aid Taiwan’s defence or that he was ready to send armed forces to Vietnam cannot escape the criticism that, given the political situation in Korea, the statement was an irresponsible one for a president. No doubt, because it considered the statement irresponsible, the US ignored his proposal. It was also irresponsible of him to urge a war in the Far East – a war on China or the Soviet Union. As we have seen above, Foreign Minister Byun displayed his irresponsibility by saying that communist countries should be expelled from the UN. And Foreign Minister Jo also expressed his irresponsibility by mistakenly stating that the UN was an anti-communist organization and by saying that the country should be ready to even go to war against the UK to prevent trade between the UK and North Korea. These leaders lost their minds and absolved themselves from their responsibility as top leaders of the country. Rhee Syngman showed his ignorance by saying that the Soviet Union was planning to conquer the Korean peninsula, that China intended to occupy South Korea after absorbing North Korea and that communists were conspiring to hand over a unified Korea to the Soviet Union or China. While these statements might seem minimally plausible, he also made the unthinkable statement that Japan was planning to annex Korea by using a number of pro-Japanese Koreans and dissidents. He also claimed that the number of militarists in Japan had increased and that they planned to annex Korea – in cooperation with communist China.50 Another typical example which demonstrated the irresponsibility or insincerity of the ultra-right forces was the resolutions passed by the National Assembly to the effect that a general election in North Korea should be conducted after the withdrawal of communists from the North (11 November 1954) or that the UN should conduct a general election in North Korea after the disarmament of the North Korean Army (8 October 1955). In addition, the grounds on which many resolutions of the National Assembly were based were problematic. For example, Jo Byeong-Ok’s explanation that the general meeting of the UN had decided that Korean unification should be pursued under the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea and that the general meeting of the UN had instructed North Korea to elect 100

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lawmakers through a general election under the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea,51 was a distortion and contrary to the true facts. However, this distorted statement was used by the National Assembly, the government and the mass media as a basis for Northward Advance Unification. The reason why the government revoked the registration of the Progressive Party also followed this same logic. Oh Jae-Gyeong, Director of Public Relations, pointed out the reason for the revocation. He obstinately argued that the unification policy of the Progressive Party violated both Korean law and the UN Resolution. According to him, the UN Resolution in Geneva of 1954 allegedly stipulated that Korea’s unification should be conducted under the supervision of the UN in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Korea.52 But this was not true. When Foreign Minister Byun proposed Korean unification in Geneva he did not use the term ‘in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Korea’, but simply referred to a ‘general election in North Korea under the supervision of the UN.’ In addition, the UN never used the expression (or any similar expression) of ‘in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Korea.’ Truthfully speaking, the unification policy of the Progressive Party was much closer to the UN’s resolution than the government’s policy. In fact, the Korean Government and the National Assembly were seen as problematic by both the UN and the US. For example, the Korean Government and the National Assembly publicly demanded the abolition of the Armistice Agreement and adopted a resolution to this effect. The resolution might have been acceptable to advocates of Northward Advance Unification. One senior government official’s public expression was also unreasonable because he publicly stated that the Korean Government could ignore the Korea-US Mutual Defence Agreement in order to achieve Unification through Northward Advance.53 His statement was harmful to Korea’s image in international politics and potentially aggravated public opinion in the US. But President Rhee Syngman went even further. At the welcoming rally for his visit to the US, he announced that ‘atomic bombs are the only way to defeat communists’.54 In Busan, the temporary capital of the Republic of Korea during the Korean War, the advocates of war were considered to be patriots and those opposed to war traitors. However, writers in the 1950s pointed out that advocates of the war ‘. . . did not send their own sons to war, but only the sons of others. Moreover, they were more interested in making money by exploiting the opportunity [which the war presented]’.55 Generally speaking, power elites and wealthy people mobilized their influence in order to avoid sending their sons to the war, or sent them to safe areas if they had to. Colleges were used as escape routes for those who wanted to be exempted from military conscription; thus colleges were not called ivory towers but cynically ‘cow-bone’ towers. The term ‘cow-bone’ referred to the fact that their parents were prepared to sell their cows in order to finance their children’s university education. Most soldiers came from poor and ordinary farming families. During the era of the Liberal Party, social background, money and bribes were considered a cure-all. Injustice, corruption, immorality and unlawfulness were rampant; values were turned upside down and darkness prevailed in society.

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Flatterers, careerists and profiteers occupied important positions in the government, the Liberal Party and other organizations – including Defence Minister Shin Seong-Mo. For example, Jo Jeong-Hwan, who was Foreign Minister for a long time, sent a congratulatory message to President Rhee Syngman on the occasion of his eighty-second birthday on 26 March 1957, which read (in part): In admiring and praising Your esteemed person, there are many terms which might describe your great achievement. Some say you are a young pioneer of the Korean Revolution, a comet of the Korean independence movement, father of the country and the sun of the nation; others say You are a great patriot, an anti-communist symbol, a great world leader, a giant of democracy, a fighter for justice or a prophet to the world. These praises pour down from all over the world.56

Advocates of Northward Advance Unification and the Pro-Japanese The general election of 20 May 1954 was to decide whether Rhee Syngman could be a lifetime President or not. On 6 April, about a month before the election, Rhee published a special comment: Since people have recently been confused about who is pro-Japanese and who is not, I would like to explain this again. What I am saying is that the criterion for pro-Japanese collaboration is not what an individual did during the period of Japanese colonialism but whether that individual expresses in action and words what he or she will do from now on, regardless of what he or she did. For example, despite the fact that he had been a senior official and worked hard for Japanese colonialism, if a person has achieved something great enough to compensate for his past conduct and is forgiven by everybody because of this new achievement, I will accept him as a patriotic citizen without questioning his past wrongs. This comment means that, if somebody who had been a vicious colonial policeman was loyal to Rhee Syngman, he could be viewed as a patriot. On the other hand, if a person had participated in independence movements but had different opinions to Rhee Syngman, he could be condemned as proJapanese. In other words, if someone like Shin Ik-Hui, in the campaign for the election of the president and vice president of 1956, emphasized the necessity for the normalization of relations between Korea and Japan, he would be condemned as a ‘pro-Japanese’. In the same way, anybody who participated in the Unification Movement or Neutralization Movement would be condemned as a traitor or a tool of Japanese Imperialism. This constituted the birth of a central principle of Rhee Syngman’s nationalism or ultra-right anti-communism. Following his return to Korea after Liberation, the political basis of Rhee Syngman was the pro-Japanese forces. After the creation of the Republic of Korea, it was pro-Japanese policemen who helped maintain Rhee Syngman’s

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political power. However, in the formative phase of the Liberal Party, very few pro-Japanese individuals held senior positions within the party. The abovenoted special communiqué of President Rhee implied that he would appoint former pro-Japanese individuals as high officials in the government and as senior cadres in the Party. Thanks to Rhee Syngman, pro-Japanese elements could parade as patriots.57 Through them, Rhee Syngman could organize his party and government, assured of their personal loyalty to him and to his plans of amending the constitution and consolidating his despotism. This demonstrated his lust for power. His loyal followers assumed the responsibility for staging the campaigns for Northward Advance Unification and reinforcing the ultra-right anti-communist regime. Rhee Syngman secured a stable majority in the National Assembly after the general election of 20 May 1954. In this election, Liberal Party members were elected in large numbers. After the election, many independent lawmakers also joined the Liberal Party. Thus, the number of lawmakers hailing from the Liberal Party swelled to over two-thirds of the total seats in the National Assembly, which was above the quorum required for the Constitutional Amendment. Jang Gyeong-Geun and Han Hee-Seok, who made the transition to lawmakers from their positions as government officials during this election,58 were pro-Japanese collaborators during the Japanese Occupation. They and Yi Jae-Hak became core cadres of the Liberal Party under Yi GiBung after the general election of 20 May. Also, around the time of the Constitutional Amendment by Rounding-Off, Yi Jae-Hak, Han Hui-Seok, Jang Gyeong-Geun, In Tae-Sik and Yi Ik-Hong, who had been pro-Japanese during the era of Japanese imperialism, became mainstream Liberal Party members. Backed up by Yi Gi-Bung, they oppressed and intimidated those who formed a minority within the party and took over the reins of the party until the fall of Rhee Syngman. As Professor Pak Dong-Seo has stated, pro-Japanese bureaucrats lacked national consciousness. On the contrary, they were corrupt and elitist, and ruled over people as Rhee Syngman’s private soldiers with absolute loyalty. Pro-Japanese bureaucrats also commanded the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the Ministry of Justice. In cooperation with the hardliners of the Liberal Party, the bureaucrats in these ministries organized neighbourhood associations for political mobilization and oppressed nationalists and progressive forces, including the Progressive Party. Moreover, they also enforced the passage of a reform plan for the National Security Law. At the election of 1960, almost all the key cadres of the Liberal Party except Yi Gi-Bung were pro-Japanese and most ministers and vice ministers were also pro-Japanese. Most senior officials of the Ministry of Interior Affairs who were responsible for conducting the election were pro-Japanese. These individuals committed the crime of violating the constitution and conspired to rebel as described in the National Security Law. In order to prolong the one-man rule of Rhee Syngman, together with their own political power, they conducted the illegitimate election of 15 March 1960 by illegally mobilizing a range of government agencies and by suffocating liberal democracy, even if liberal democracy had been no more than an empty shell. This rigged election was

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a violation of the constitution and a crime of subversion of the state as defined in the National Security Law. Thus, the first regime of ultra-right anticommunism and the National Security Law which relied on the campaigns for Unification through Northward Advance dug its own grave and disappeared from the Korean political stage. ANTI-COMMUNISM AND THE ULTRA-RIGHT DICTATORSHIP

Anti-communism and Prolonged One Man Rule In Korea, the reinforcement of the regime of ultra-right anti-communism led to the strengthening of ultra-right anti-communist power. Likewise, the weakening of the ultra-right anti-communist regime resulted in the enfeeblement of ultra-right anti-communist power. Obviously, the stiffening of the ultra-right anti-communist regime was closely connected to the hardening of ultra-right anti-communist power. Korea was ruled by a regime of ultra-right anti-communism for about forty years from the outbreak of the Korean War to the Democratization Struggle of June 1987, except for the period of the April Revolution of 1960. During this period, Korea was under the yoke of the regimes of Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee and the new military governments. In the post-Rhee era of ultra-rightist anti-communist rule, Park Chung Hee and the new military rulers institutionalized the regime of ultra-right anti-communism and developed a systematic regime of ultra-right anti-communism by combining oppressive state apparatuses such as the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, the Anti-Communist Law, guilt-by-association and the ideological education system of schools and the mass media. Of these, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency played the most important role. In contrast to Park Chung Hee and the new military governments, a well organized regime of oppressive and ideological state apparatuses did not exist during the ten years of Rhee Syngman’s dictatorship. Instead, Rhee’s regime relied on the campaigns for Die-Hard AntiCommunist Unification through Northward Advance along with brutal oppressive forces operating under an atmosphere of terrorism which was closely related to the miserable experience of the Korean War, including massacre. Thus, Rhee’s die-hard anti-communism and its campaign were so violent and crude that it was easily exposed to hatred and criticism by the population. There were also some synergies between Rhee Syngman’s political power and Die-Hard Anti-Communist Unification through Northward Advance. First, when the campaign of Northward Advance Unification was influential in society, Rhee Syngman secured a majority in the National Assembly and achieved the Constitutional Amendment which ‘legitimized’ his protracted rule, thus making his political power even stronger. In contrast, when the campaign lost both its vitality and mobilization capacity, despite its protestations and because it could not provide a strong absolute power base for Rhee Syngman, Rhee Syngman and his followers sought alternative methods for strengthening his political power such as oppressing the movements for

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peaceful unification or tightening up the National Security Law. Second, besides mobilizing the first method – such as the campaign for Unification through Northward Advance – for the purpose of strengthening his political power, he utilized the slogan of anti-communism and fabricated communist incidents such as the so-called ‘International Communist Party’ incident. In a broad sense, his anti-communism was connected to the campaign of Unification through Northward Advance. In addition, Rhee Syngman mobilized diverse strategies to reinforce his autocratic power of ultra-right anticommunism by exploiting a government-fabricated public opinion or through anti-Japanese rallies. In this section, I will discuss in chronological order how he attempted to use anti-communism to maintain and strengthen his autocratic power. When some centrist individuals ran for the general election of 10 May 1948, Rhee Syngman emphasized that their conspiracy must be foiled. In the election of 30 May 1950, he condemned the centrists as sympathizers or spies of the South Korean Worker’s Party and asked citizens not to vote for them. After the Busan Political Turmoil of 1952, whenever there was the possibility of a change in the power structure, he resorted to fear-mongering about communists, or employed catchy slogans of unification, using them as tools for his own political power. The Busan Political Turmoil began when the Constitutional Amendment Bill was rejected by a vote of 19 in favour to 142 against on 18 January 1952. The main content of the bill was to elect the president through a direct vote by the people. This bill was put forward by Rhee Syngman because he found it almost impossible to be elected president by the National Assembly. The turmoil reached a peak when martial law was announced on 25 May 1952 and about fifty lawmakers were arrested by the Military Police the following day. Among them, about ten lawmakers including Gwak Sang-Hun, Yim Hong-Sun and Kim Ui-Jun, were implicated in the incident of the International Communist Party and held captive until the vote for the Selective Amendment of the Constitution was cast. The government’s claim against these politicians was groundless as Gwak Sang-Hun had always stood at the head of the campaign for ultra-right anti-communism and both Yim Hong-Sun and Kim UiJun had become senior cadres of the Liberal Party later. Several days after the Busan Political Turmoil, the government announced the ‘incident of The National Guidance Committee for Renovating the Korean Government’ which was said to be related to the International Communist Party. According to the government’s announcement, Seonu Jong-Won, Chief Secretary of Premier Jang Myeon, along with lawmaker Jeong Heon-Ju and Eom Sang-Seop, had organized a secret association called The National Guidance Committee for Renovating the Korean Government. The group was accused of mustering centrist parties in order to bring Jang Myeon forward as the presidential candidate in the next election and to have him win the presidency. He was also said to have conspired to assassinate key government officials, including Rhee Syngman. The government announced that Seonu Jong-Won had imported one billion Korean won from the Communist Party through Japan. The incident was reported to be aimed at overthrowing Rhee’s

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government. The government deemed it a heinous crime not because of their having received money from the communist party – Seonu Jong-Won and Eom Sang-Seop were well-known prosecutors who, with Oh Je-Du and Jo JeCheon, specialized in prosecuting ‘communists’. Other accused lawmakers were also anti-communists. According to the government’s announcement, however, they either believed in or sympathized with the ideology of communism. Moreover, they were said to have planned to establish a Peaceful Coalition Cabinet of North and South Korea by mustering centrist parties and creating a Free People’s Party. This incident was fabricated by Rhee Syngman to persecute his political rivals who opposed his Theory of Unification Northward Advance. The incident also had the effect of issuing a stern warning to advocates of peaceful unification or to potential coalitions of centrist parties. With this in mind, it should be remembered that there was an effort to create a new party under Jo Bong-Am before the incident of the National Guidance Committee for Renovating the Korean Government. When the UN Commission on Korea sent a protest letter on 28 May to President Rhee Syngman because many lawmakers had been taken by the police or imprisoned, Rhee Syngman explained in his letter of response of 2 June that it had been revealed that some lawmakers conspired with communists to unify Korea through peace talks and that a few of them confessed that they had received some discretionary funds for their operations from the Communist Party. But he also went beyond this groundless and fabulous explanation: after the incident, he repeatedly raised this incident and audaciously included his letter in reply in a collection of his speeches and comments. As mentioned above, for the general election of 20 May 1954, he bestowed his party’s nomination on those who agreed with the Constitutional Amendment for abolishing the limitation of his reappointment. He released several communiqués on the prospective general election and threatened voters by mentioning the incident of the international communist party during the Busan Political Turmoil. In other words, he repeatedly regaled voters with the fabulous and groundless story, noting that there were politicians who secretly communicated with the Communist Party and were conspiring to unify Korea with the communists in the North. According to President Rhee, they planned to do this after selecting their own president by blocking the Constitutional Amendment, an aim they planned to achieve by buying off lawmakers.59 In the general election of May 1954, the police intervened in various ways, including threatening voters; and with the help of the police, the Liberal Party won a landslide victory. From this election to the Constitutional Amendment by Rounding-off, Rhee Syngman staged campaigns to exclude Third Forces or pacifists by emphasizing Unification through Northward Advance. As we have observed above, during these campaigns, he intimidated lawmakers by mobilizing an oppressive atmosphere of ultra-right anti-communism. When international opinion turned against him after the Constitutional Amendment by Rounding-Off, he attacked the theory of coexistence by saying that it was a unification policy of cooperation with communists. He even threatened that, if anyone argued that the extreme position of the Korean government strained the country’s relationship with the US

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further or that Korea could be ostracized from the free world because of its extremism, they would be severely punished. Moreover, he insisted on a bizarre theory of Unification through Northward Advance, saying: ‘Even if we were not able to receive foreign aid and could not have cars, gas or petroleum, we would push our unification policy forward, just eating the grain God has given us.’60 Even after the incident of the so-called New Delhi Secret Meeting and the Constitutional Amendment by Rounding-off, there were many incidents which stigmatized and punished individuals as ‘Commies’ as well as many mass rallies for Northward Advance Unification. In the month after the incident of the New Delhi Secret Meeting, the Commander-in-Chief of the Military Police, Won Yong-deok, who experienced difficulty because his title was not officially listed in the government regulations, had his followers plant pro-communist postero in the private homes of opposition lawmakers. This incident was a hot issue in Korean politics up until March or April 1955. For more than four months, from August to December, there were campaigns to recover the lost territory below the 38th parallel and for the expulsion of the Supervisory Committee of the Neutral Countries. Moreover, in 1956, the year of the election of president and vice president, there were constant mobilization campaigns of government-fabricated public opinion for Rhee Syngman’s repeat candidacy for the presidency.

Anti-communism and the Terminal Symptoms of Rhee’s government The election of president and vice president on 15 May 1956 was marked by the denunciation of the Progressive Party as ‘Commies’ by Rhee Syngman and the Liberal Party. It was very difficult for the candidates of the opposition parties to mount election campaigns. However, even the Liberal Party’s presidential candidate, not to mention its vice presidential candidate, could be determined as being defeated if the number of votes obtained, the counting of votes and voting were analysed. During the 1956 elections for president and vice president, the Theory of Peaceful Unification entered the political domain. In contrast to the rise of the peaceful unification campaigns, the Theory of Unification through Northward Advance was unable to identify good resources and it tired people with its drawn-out and excessive campaigns. Eventually, the Theory of Unification through Northward Advance came to lose its appeal and was not strong enough to reinforce Rhee’s political base. Despite the fact that the Theory of Unification through Northward Advance was losing its effectiveness and Rhee Syngman and his party were losing the support of the people as shown in the 1956 election, Rhee Syngman and his party still wanted to further strengthen their political power. To this purpose they resorted to even more preposterous methods. At the press conference following the election of 15 May, Rhee stated: ‘The results of the past election show that many people support pro-Japanese or pro-communist individuals.’ At the conference he failed to show any remorse for his political policies, nor did he give any hint that he would reform those policies. Instead, he hinted that he would suppress the will of the people as it had been expressed in the election. He clearly expressed his intention by

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appointing Yi Ik-Hong as Minister of Interior Affairs and Kim Jong-Won as Director of the Public Security Bureau. Yi Ik-Hong had been the chief of a police station during the period of Japanese colonialism and Kim Jong-Won was notorious for his brutal butchering of people during incidents in the Yeosu and Suncheon areas. Although he appointed a sizeable number of proJapanese individuals to his cabinet, President Rhee had not appointed former chiefs of police stations under Japanese colonialism to his cabinet before. Thus, the appointment of Yi Ik-Hong was unusual. Kim Jong-Won was sentenced to death at a court-martial because he obstructed the parliamentary investigation of the Geochang Massacre by arranging for spurious communist guerillas to attack the investigation team. Mr Kim was released early on the special orders of President Rhee and became the chief of various police stations around the country and the battle commander-in-chief for the south and west regions. He was awarded the Taegeuk Order of Military Merit for his suppression of meetings of the opposition parties during his tenure as chief of Jeonnam Province’s police. In less than three months after the election of the president and vice president on 15 May, elections for positions in provincial governments were held under the supervision of Minister Yi Ik-Hong and Director Kim of the Public Security Bureau. This election took place in the most fraudulent manner. The government tried its best to impede the lawmakers of opposition parties from registering as candidates. The opposition candidates also asked the government to expand the opportunity for candidate registration, but their request was refused. For the first time in the history of Korea’s constitution, lawmakers staged demonstrations. At their rallies, the Minister of Interior Affairs and the Director of the Public Safety Bureau took the lead in oppressing them by force, including assaulting lawmaker Kim Seon-Tae, whom they detained. While it won a sweeping victory in the countryside, the Liberal Party had difficulties in nominating candidates in Seoul. Thus, in Seoul the Democratic Party won a landslide victory. An editorial in one newspaper commented on the situation in the following manner: ‘The Liberal Party is accustomed to insisting that what is not in fact is and it supports its insistency by using oppressive power. It seems that the party is now in a bind.’61 The newspaper also ran as the title of its editorial on the inauguration of the president and vice president on 15 August 1956 the following headline: ‘Listen to the voice of the people – political corruption, public opinion, the death of democracy and the people’s sovereignty.’ When it attempted to achieve absolute political power through fraudulent elections, the Rhee government’s conscience atrophied. It developed new fraudulent election methods, including ballot switching. In August 1957, as part of its efforts in the general election of 1958, the Liberal Party contrived to indiscriminately win village leaders over to its side and to appoint its loyal followers to responsible positions in irrigation cooperatives, industrial associations and companies and to make the senior staff of state enterprises and public organizations its loyal members. When a recall election was held because of the incidence of fraud in the original election, election malpractice because as brazen as the notoriously rigged election of 15 March 1960.

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The serious despotism of the Rhee government and the Liberal Party was well demonstrated in the oppression of Vice President Jang Myeon, who had been elected after his nomination by the Democratic Party. The government and Liberal Party attacked Vice President Jang’s interview with the foreign press on 15 August. In the National Assembly, a resolution containing a message which warned Vice President Jang against his dissident behaviour was adopted by the Liberal Party lawmakers alone on 27 September. On the following day, whilst attending a national conference of the Democratic Party, Vice President Jang was shot by an unidentified person. Senior officials of the Ministry of Interior Affairs and of the Liberal Party, including Minister of Interior Affairs Yi and Director of the Public Safety Bureau Kim, were involved in the shooting. At this time, the government revitalized the National Neighbourhood Associations which had emerged from the Patriotic Neighbourhood Associations at the end of Japanese colonialism. In 1949, the government tried to strengthen the National Neighbourhood Associations and the National Conference. Based on a decision by Cabinet on 12 April 1957, the National Neighbourhood Associations received a huge funding boost from the government and their steering committees at the provincial, city, county and sub-county levels included the regular police and secret security police. Moreover, the associations were expected to hold more than one meeting a month at the neighbourhood level. People were asked to forward all petitions through these associations. Using these associations, the police collected relevant information, analysed the political orientation of government officials and kept an eye on the ideological orientation of students. In July 1957, there was a mass confiscation of so-called subversive publications. The government announced that anyone who held any subversive publications would be defined as a propagandist for communism and be thoroughly investigated under the charge of violating the National Security Law. This campaign clearly showed Rhee’s political intention, especially when Kim Sam-Gyu’s Korea Today and History of Socialism were announced as subversive publications. Kim Sam-Gyu supported neutral unification. At this time, a wave of mass oppression of progressive forces broke out. Not only was the Progressive Party, but many others were also suppressed. In November 1957, Pak Jeong-Ho, who was allegedly the chief of the Political Operation Team in South Korea, was captured. According to newspaper articles, Pak Jeong-Ho provided the unification committee of the progressive forces with huge amounts of money and Jang Geon-Sang, the former Vice President of the Working People’s Party, also received a large amount of money from him. Some newspapers featured this incident repeatedly. In December, Jang Geon-Sang and another ten people were prosecuted on the charge of revitalizing the Working People’s Party made illegal by the government by gathering together progressive opposition forces under the leadership of Jang Geon-Sang. Kim Seong-Suk, who had been a Cabinet member in the Korean Provisional Government in Chongqing and a senior staff member of the Working People’s Party, was also prosecuted. Following this incident, the staff of the Progressive Party were seized one by one in January 1958.

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Fifteen people, including Jang Geon-Sang, who were prosecuted on the charge of rebuilding the Working People’s Party, were judged not guilty. However six among them, including Kim Seong-Suk, were tried again on another charge. According to this new charge, they had ‘supported peaceful unification and . . . pursued the attainment of this goal by forming a preparatory committee for national unification with the Progressive Party.’ In August 1958, the High Court dismissed the public action against these six people, including Jang Geon-Sang and Kim Seong-Suk. The court ruled that ‘there is no evidence that progressive movements of today are instigated by North Korean communists’.62 The immediate purpose of the oppression of nationalists and progressive forces from the second half of 1957 to early 1958 was to obstruct their participation in the forth-coming election of the house. In addition, the government wanted to stop the spread of peaceful unification campaigns by oppressing the Progressive Party and Working People’s Party. Its goal was also related to its pursuit of victory in the election of the president and vice president in 1960. But the government and the ruling party could not relax just yet. They believed they needed much stronger institutional measures. Before its major oppression of the progressive forces, the government worked for the revision of the National Security Law. Minister of Interior Affairs Yi Geun-Sik said the goal of the revision was to severely punish the advocates of peaceful unification, a programme which violated national sovereignty.63 Possibly because of the general election, the call for the revision of the National Security Law fell temporarily silent, but during the election of the House in May 1958, a few measures which were potentially conducive to the revision of the National Security Law were announced by the government. First, with the May 1958 election of the House looming, the prosecutor’s office said that it would keep a close watch on individuals on a surveillance list which they kept and enforce more strict controls on anti-state activities. Second, during the election of 2 May, the Liberal Party announced that the unification policy of the Democratic Party was unacceptable and that it was an anti-state policy. However, even these two issues failed to attract attention. An amendment bill to the National Security Law resurfaced one month later, following the general election. The amendment bill was drafted by the Ministry of Justice and the Prosecution. The main clauses of the amendment were: 1) a planned crime should be punished as a committed crime; 2) those convicted would be disqualified from holding a much wider range of offices than stipulated in the existing laws. They could not become state officials nor work for educational agencies or the mass media; 3) that a new system such as the suspension of prosecution should be introduced; 4) the period of detention should be extended from thirty to forty days and the prohibition of lawyer visits should be possible; 5) the judicial police’s investigation record could be adopted as evidence. Most of these clauses potentially violated the basic principles of the criminal code. The amendment bill, which was composed of a preface, forty-two clauses and two additional clauses, was submitted to the National Assembly on 9 August after it had been adopted

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by a cabinet decision on 5 August. Some clauses of the amendment bill were extremely problematic because it expanded the definition of a spy from that of gathering information on military secrets to collecting materials for enemies; it violated Clause 9, Article 3 of the constitution by denying a criminal suspect contact with his lawyer and it adopted the judicial police’s record as judicial evidence. However, before early November this amendment bill also failed to attract much attention. Although it contained insidiously harsh clauses which violated basic principles of the criminal code, the ultra-right anti-communists welcomed the amendment bill because it could be easily mobilized to oppress the progressive forces or socalled pro-communist forces, as shown in the incident of the persecution of the Progressive Party., It was not until mid-November that debate over the National Security Law became heated. On 7 November, a senior staff member of the Liberal Party and Minister of Justice, Hong Jin-Gi, agreed to withdraw the original amendment bill and to submit a new one. The content of this new bill became public knowledge around mid-November. In this new bill, the definition of a national secret was expanded from political or military to economic, social and cultural secrets. The new amendment bill also declared that a planned plot could be punished as an executed crime and that the period of custody could be extended from thirty to forty days. It also stipulated that the investigation record of police be adopted as evidence and that the prosecutor could make an immediate appeal against a review of the legality of a confinement or a decision on the granting of bail. It also adopted a system of suspended prosecution. The new amendment also carried special clauses on the mass media.64 These clauses stipulated that those who knew only about their right to freedom and worked together with the press to weaken the government or damage national sovereignty by fabricating rumours or stirring up ordinary people should be severely punished.65 This new amendment was submitted to the National Assembly on 18 November. The new amendment bill faced strong criticism and opposition from civic groups, law circles, opposition parties and the press. During the term of the Rhee government, as long as it displayed an anti-communist attitude, the press enjoyed considerable freedom. Frequently, some print media which sided with the opposition parties, mounted severe criticism on the Liberal Party. Through these opposition media, citizens attacked the Liberal Party and Rhee Syngman’s government. It is not an overstatement to say that the weak opposition party, or quasi-opposition party, was only able to work, thanks to the press. Rhee Syngman and senior staff of the Liberal Party believed that the press played an important role in defeating the Liberal Party in the 1956 election for president and vice president. Thus, they thought that for victory in the 1960 election of president and vice president, it was essential to gag the press. Because of this need, the new amendment bill was prepared. All the press, except for the Seoul Sinmun (newspaper) which sided with the ruling party, strongly opposed the new amendment bill. They pressured the opportunistic Democratic Party to fight hard against the Liberal Party, which gave rise to the incident of the National Security Law.

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When the lawmakers of the opposition parties left the Assembly for lunch on 19 December, the new amendment bill was passed by the judiciary committee in three minutes. On 24 December, the government dispatched three hundred armed police to the National Assembly Hall to remove the lawmakers of the opposition parties who were engaged in a sit-in. After they were removed from the National Assembly Hall, the new amendment bill of the National Security Law was passed, along with an amendment bill for the Local Autonomy Act. This latter bill stipulated that the mayors of cities, towns and sub-counties would be appointed, not elected. The passage of the new amendment bill to the National Security Law caused a political disturbance in Korea and the so-called ‘24 incident’ [referring to 24 December, the day that the new amendment bill was passed – the translator] began. With the passage of these two amendments, the government and the Liberal Party aimed to establish Rhee’s absolute power by rendering the ultra-right Democratic Party (sometimes called the semi-ruling party) powerless and by winning a landslide victory in the 1960 election of the president and vice president. Behind this political incident, the hard-liners of the Liberal Party and former pro-Japanese individuals played key roles. In addition, President Rhee Syngman refused to re-appoint as many as thirteen judges who were critical of the government, a move which shocked the legal circles. Based on the new National Security Law, the government also discontinued the publication of the newspaper Kyunghyang Sinmun (30 April 1959) which supported Vice President Jang Myeon. Moreover, Chairman of the Progressive Party, Jo Bong-Am, who was nicknamed the ‘politician who sails against unfavourable winds’ for his struggle against the Cold War regime, was executed on a scaffold at the Seodaemun Prison on 31 July 1959. Thus far, I have analysed the tripartite relationship between the theory of Northward Advance Unification, the ultra-rightist regime and the political power of Rhee Syngman. Although the campaigns for Northward Advance Unification and the oppression of the movement for peaceful unification aimed to reinforce the ultra-right anti-communist regime, to consolidate the national division and to bring about a South-North confrontation, all of these also carried the clear objective of strengthening Rhee Syngman’s political power. The coalitions or back-scratching alliances of the ultra-right anticommunist regime were, as was Rhee Syngman’s political power, based on oppression and in no way consented to by the people. Rhee Syngman’s anticommunism did not comprise any logical base for gaining the consent of the people. Instead, it lacked truthfulness or any public benefit and was based on an obscurantist policy. It thus relied on hired gangsters.66 Professor Kim Seong-Sik criticized Rhee Syngman’s nationalism by saying that his nationalism was uniquely non-traditionalist as its school curriculum did not teach Korean culture, nor did it include lessons on the struggle against the Japanese. According to Professor Kim, Rhee Syngman defined nationalism as words and deeds that acknowledged his political policies and supported and strengthened his grip on power. Professor Kim maintained that a society which lost its tradition would result in a society for the privileged classes, a

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society of self-righteousness and an autocratic society. He pointed out that self-righteous and autocratic nationalism is characterized by intolerance.67 Rhee Syngman’s nationalism, he argued, was ultra-right anti-communism and by no stretch of imagination could it be viewed as nationalism. His analysis clearly shows the private or personal characteristics of ultra-right anti-communism and of Rhee Syngman’s political power. CONCLUSION: UNIFICATION MOVEMENT FOR BLOCKING ANY UNIFICATION MOVEMENT The goal of the Northward Advance Unification campaign was not to overcome the status quo regarding unification and to weaken the confrontation between the South and the North, but to consolidate the status quo by intensifying the North–South tension and increase the confrontation. Although it may be called a policy of co-existence because it tried to maintain the status quo, the characteristics of this co-existence differed greatly from that of advocates of co-existence who argued for decreasing or solving the confrontation or conflict. In addition, the Northward Advance Unification campaign denied all forms of peaceful unification such as an All-Korean general election under the supervision of the UN and blocked or suppressed any exchange or talks between South and North; in fact it suppressed any hope of national unification. Therefore, the campaign for Northward Advance Unification was a unification campaign which aimed to block any true unification campaign. The campaign for Northward Advance Unification began when no possibility of national unification existed. It was executed as a mass mobilization campaign and began at a time when the negotiation for an armistice had been almost finalized. The stronger the campaign became, the less the US was willing to support Rhee Syngman’s government. Clause 1 of the Korea-US Mutual Defence Agreement clearly emphasized the strategy of solving the South-North division through peaceful unification. Clause 1 was written at the initiative of the US which opposed Rhee Syngman’s Northward Advance Unification. Thus, the campaign for Northward Advance Unification did not begin with the premise of the possibility of national unification. On the contrary, it began on the premise of an advocacy for war against the communist world and on the assumption of Korea’s full dependence on the free world, especially on the US. On this point, the Theory of Unification through Northward Advance did not take a position of nationalism but of extreme anti-communism. In fact, it was an extreme expression of the confrontation between the capitalist and socialist worlds. It was an expression of an anticommunist crusade or anti-communist internationalism. It was dependent on foreign powers, not independent – as was clearly demonstrated by the fact that most advocates of the theory were former pro-Japanese figures. Although the Theory of No Negotiation with North Korea was convincing in the beginning and the Theory of Unification through Northward Advance was appealing to people who had escaped from North Korea, the theories were not rational and their advocates lacked any sense of responsibility. In

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addition, under the campaign of Northward Advance Unification, the mass mobilizations, which resembled the mass mobilizations under Japanese colonialism, led by and large to the exhaustion of national resources and a waste of human resources. In reality, the campaign for Northward Advance Unification was a political campaign, not a unification campaign. It was aimed at the domestic audience, not the international or North Korean audiences. For this reason, the campaign continued despite its contradictions with the UN resolution or America’s Korea policy. Under the campaign, the war-time regime was strengthened and the nation was urged to follow a single leader and any person who opposed this leader was condemned as an anti-nationalist force. Thus, the campaign was a powerful tool for maintaining Rhee Syngman’s political power and a major instrument for reinforcing the anti-communist ideology of the 1950s. The regime of state mass mobilization or the campaign of Northward Advance Unification was the flip-side of the ‘state of government officials’ or the ‘police state’ which the free world called Rhee’s government. Although the regime was crude, it was initially partly effective. However, as the May 1956 election for the president and vice president became a dividing point, the Theory of Unification through Northward Advance lost its effectiveness. Irregularities, corruption, misgovernment, the lack of ability of the Rhee government and the lack of resources for mass mobilization all contributed to the demise of its effectiveness. In addition, the rise of peaceful unification theories and the people’s antipathy to the mass mobilizations also led to a decrease in the effectiveness of the campaign. In this environment, even the ultra-right anti-communist Democratic Party came to emphasize a policy of peaceful unification under the supervision of the UN. The less effective the campaign for Northward Advance Unification became, the more rigid and unreasonable were the policies that Rhee Syngman and the Liberal Party pursued. In the final analysis, both the Rhee Syngman regime and the Liberal Party collapsed and the Theory of Unification through Northward Advance disappeared with their collapse. The direct cause of the fall of the Rhee Syngman regime was a fraudulent election and his Theory of Unification through Northward Advance became an historic relic and had to be transformed if it was o re-emerge. Rhee Syngman’s Theory of Unification through Northward Advance was similar to his theory of diplomacy under Japanese colonialism and his theory of separate government in the post-liberation period. In the closing days of the Korean Empire, Rhee Syngman did not consider the invasions of imperialist powers to be an invasion and in his The Spirit of Independence he argued that Japan even upheld and supported Koreans by launching a war.68 Under Japanese colonialism, he criticized all independent anti-Japanese struggles, whether they were armed struggles, gallant and heroic hand-grenade throwing, or popular struggles. In contrast, he joined in diplomatic efforts several times, relying on the favour of the imperialist powers. In addition, he led the petition for mandatory rule, which could hardly be considered an independent movement. Wherever he went, division and conflict arose in the Korean independence movement.

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In the post-liberation period, he staged a campaign for the establishment of a separate government without making any effort to unify the nation or to establish an independent nation-state. Instead, imbued with an impatient Cold War consciousness, he excluded even the centre-rightists and relied on former pro-Japanese elements. Thus, by maximizing the Left-Right conflict, he emphasized the establishment of a separate government in the South. The national division itself resulted not from Rhee Syngman, but from the division of the Korean peninsula by the US and USSR. However, it was difficult to accept Rhee Syngman’s theory of separate government. He was far too dependent on foreign powers in terms of his political support groups and his political behaviour. Before the outbreak of the Korean War, he did not make any effort to prevent the war or to prepare for the war; he just repeated his baseless theory of Northward Advance Unification. When the Korean War broke out, he was first to flee from Seoul, without informing any of the lawmakers or his cabinet members of his escape. And in Busan, the temporary Korean capital during the war, he precipitated the Busan Political Turmoil in order to secure his reappointment. Although people once said that Rhee Syngman was a fool in the domestic political arena but a genius in terms of foreign policy during the Liberal Party’s rule, his irrational anti-Japanese campaigns and his Theory of Unification through Northward Advance isolated Korea diplomatically. Although the diplomatic tension with the USA was complicated, Korea also experienced diplomatic tension with most countries, including the UK and Japan. Only Taiwan and South Vietnam were friendly to the Republic of Korea. In the free world, Rhee was known as a person who could dare to act unreasonably at any time. His negative image led to the negative reputation of Korea in the eyes of people all around the world. One foreign journalist even concluded that hoping for democracy in Korea would be more like wishing for roses to bloom in a garbage can. This negative comment amounted to the stigmatization of all Koreans as barbarians. So, what about the legacy of Rhee Syngman’s campaign for Northward Advance Unification? Rhee’s campaign planted crude anti-communist ideology in Korea and influenced some students who were sensitive to outside teachings. In the 1950s, Korea was full of low-grade American culture, along with a low grade Japanese culture which carried semi-feudal legacies. In this situation, students were indoctrinated with the ideology of the die-hard anticommunist campaign of Northward Advance Unification and they became accustomed to seeing the world in black and white. In addition, since Rhee Syngman utilized people for his own political purposes in an obscurantist policy and he lacked consensual political support, he demonstrated ultrarightist political behaviour, violating the rule of law. Accustomed to this political atmosphere, the ruling elite as well as some young students learned the attitudes of indiscriminate aggression towards, and the exclusion of, anyone who had a different opinion. The most important cause of this ultra-right aggressive political culture was the collapse of social norms and values. In the 1950s, Rhee Syngman was worshiped as the apostle of anti-Japanese nationalism, the sole revolutionary

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and independence fighter and the incarnation of national unification. In contrast, nationalists, including independence fighters, lived wretched lives under threat of persecution, oppression and surveillance by the Rhee government. As the anti-collaboration law lost its power, former pro-Japanese figures enjoyed privileges in various fields throughout society. In these circumstances, people who were accustomed to crude anti-communist ideology based on a combination of anti-communism, political power and proJapanese sentiments could not help but experience a reversal of normal values or hold to a perverted sense of history. Since they had learned that justice, honesty and sincerity had failed and that the opposite values prevailed in society, these individuals came to accept the negative values and see the world in black and white. Moreover, they were accustomed to accepting ‘white’ as ‘black’ and vice versa. Although the Rhee Syngman regime collapsed by the time of the April Revolution of 1960 and the spirit of the Revolution of April 1960 survived the Military Coup of 16 May, ultra-right uncompromising individuals continued to enjoy privileges as the ruling elite in a manner equal to that of the 1950s. This is especially true of the period when they ruled the country as the dominant class during the Yushin regime and the new military rule of the 1980s. Even though the high wave of democratization and national independence has brought many changes since the democratization struggle of June 1987, some obstinate conservatives still try to obstruct the advance of national development by mobilizing the past – for example, by staging a campaign to revive Rhee Syngman during the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of Korea’s Liberation. These stubborn conservatives continue to impede the development of democracy and the reconciliation of South and North Korea today. NOTES 1

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Yang U-Jeong (ed.), Yiseungman Daetongnyeong Doknipnoseon-ui Seungni (Victory of Rhee Syngman’s Line for Independence). Seoul: Doknip Jeongsin Bogeuphoe (Publishing Company for Promoting the Spirit of Independence), 1948, p. 243. Ibid., p. 255. Gukhoesokgirok ( Stenograph of the National Assembly) ‘je 1 hoe Pyehoesik’ (The Closing Ceremony of the First Session of the Constitutional Assembly), 18 December 1948. Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942–1960: A Personal Narrative, Seoul:Panmun Book Company Ltd, pp. 222–223. Pak Il-Young (trans.) Yisungmanbirok (A Secret Memoir of Rhee Syngman), Hanguk Munhwa Chulpansa, 1982, pp. 300–301 [The page numbers are wrong, it should be 303–304 . . . the translator]. At the same time, in February 1949, Rhee Syngman told US Military Minister Kenneth C. Royall that he wished to advance into the North as soon as possible, after the reinforcement of the Korean Army and supply of military equipment and arms. Hong Seok-Ryul, ‘Yiseungman Jeonggwon-ui Bukjintongilnon-gwa

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Naengjeon Oegyojeongchaek’ (Rhee Syngman’s Theory of Unification through Northward Advance and Cold War Diplomacy), Hanguksa Yeongu (Journal Of Korean History) 85, p. 139). Yi Ho-Jae. Hanguk Oegyojeongchaek-ui Isang-gwa Hyeonsil (Ideals and Reality of Korean Foreign Policies). Beobmunsa, 1969, pp. 264–266. Weekly Report of the US Embassy to Korea, DTG 220900Z JOINT WEEKA 6, p. 8, 23 July 1949, (Jeong Yong-Wook ed., Juhan Miguk Daesagwan Jugan Bogoseo, Joint WeekA, reprinted by Youngjin Munhwa Publishers, 1993, Vol. 3, p. 47). Oliver, op. cit, pp. 251–252, (Pak Il-Young trans., pp. 336–338). In the letter, while he assumes that it is impossible for the two different worlds to be reunited through compromise, he says that unification can be achieved if the UN asks the Soviet Union to force North Korea to conduct free elections in the North. Chosun Ilbo, 6 October 1949. In relation to Rhee’s announcement of military unification of 7 November, Yi Beom-Seok replied, ‘The President said he would work in concert with world peace . . . We will do our best for world peace. Ultimately, we have no alternative.’ Chosun Ilbo, 8 November 1949. Shin Ik-Hui thought it would be okay for North Korea to elect one hundred lawmakers and fill the vacant seats with them (Shin Ik-Hui, Prospects for National Reunification, Minseong, 1949, p. 510). In February 1950, he announced that the UN Commission on Korea would conduct the election based on the election laws of the Republic of Korea. Kyunghyang Shinmun, 21 February 1950. Noh Jung-Seon ed., Minjok-gwa Tongil (Nation and Unification). Sagyejeol, 1985, p. 282. Yi Ho-Jae, op.cit., pp. 308–311. Oliver, op.cit.,pp. 253–257 (Pak Il-Young, trans., pp. 339–344). Jo Byung-Ok. ‘Yidaetongnyeong-gge Deurineun Na-ui Gonggaejang’ (My open letter to President Rhee Syngman), Minjujuui-wa Na (Democracy and I). Yeongsin Munhwasa, 1959, p. 246; Joongang Ilbosa ed., Minjok-ui Jeungeon (Witness of the Nation) 1, Eulyu Munhwasa, 1972, p. 168. Chosun Ilbo, 31 May 1953. There were some private and sporadic peace movements. See Pak Jin-Mok, Mincho (Grassroots People). Woneum Chulpansa, 1983; Yi Il-Gu, Hyeonsungan Jeongchimunje Sosajeon (A Little Dictionary of Current Political Affairs), Gukjesinmunsa, 1960, pp. 63–64. Yun Cheon-Ju. 1962. Hanguk Jeongchichegye Seoseol (A Study on the Political System in Korea). Munundang, 1962, pp. 346–348. Noh Jung-Seon, op. cit., p. 314. Byun Young-Tae. ‘Jeneba Hoedam-eseoui jesamcha Seongmyeong’ (The Third Announcement in the Geneva Talks) (May 11, 1954), Na-ui Joguk (My Country). Jayu Chulpansa, 1956, p. 404. Yun Cheon-Ju said that Sygnman Rhee showed great interest in the election by publishing his remark eleven times between 11 March and 17 May 1954 (Yun Cheon-Ju, op.cit., p. 356). This compares favourably with Park Chung-Hee’s leadership of the election campaign throughout South Korea by using patronage to his political advantage and expelling all pro-Kim Jong-Pil cadres from the Democratic Republican Party.

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Dong-A Ilbo. 20 March 1954. According to a survey by The Hanguk Ilbo on the Amendment Bill, the results of the referendum on the critical issue of National Security were 28.5% in favour and 63.7% against; on the abolition of the premiership, 28.8% were in favour and 63.7% against; on the question of allowing the first president to enjoy limitless reappointment, 16.9% were in favour to 78.8% against (Hanguk Ilbo, 11 October 1954). Hanguk Ilbo, 3 November 1954; Kyunghyang Sinmun, 3 November 1954. Hanguk Ilbo, 13 April 1955. Hanguk Ilbo, 31 May 1955. Hanguk Ilbo, 26 June 1955. Hanguk Ilbo, 26 November 1955. Seo Joong-Seok, ‘Minjudang, Minjudang Jeongbu-ui Jeongchiinyeom’ (Political Ideology of the Democratic Party and its Government), Hanguk Jeongchiui Jibaeideologi-wa Daehangideologi (Hegemonic and Counter-hegemonic Ideologies in Korean Politics). Yoksa bipyeongsa, 1994, pp. 145–147. Chosun Ilbo, ‘Saseol: Jeongbu-wa Jayudang-ui Tongilbangan-eul Bogo’ (Editorial: On the Unification Policies of the Government and the Liberal Party), Chosun Ilbo, 30 November 1958. Choe Seok-Chae, Simin-ui Hangjang (Disobedient Charter of Ordinary People). Beomjosa, 1956, p. 278. Hanguk Ilbo, 26 March 1955. Chosun Ilbo, 27 May 1957 (evening). Rhee Syngman, ‘Deolles Migukmujanggwan-ui Daejunggongjeongchaek-e Daehayeo’ (On the China Policy of Dulles, Secretary of the State), (23 February 1958). Gongbosil (Office of Public Relations) ed., Iseungmanbaksa Damhwajip (Speeches by President Rhee Syngman), vol. 3 (1959), p. 103. In September, seven months after this announcement, Russian Prime Minister Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev (1894–1971) paid an historic visit to the USA (the Summit of the USSR and the USA at Camp David on 25 September). Jin Deok-Kyu, ‘Iseungman sidae-ui Gwollyeokgujo-ui Ihae’ (Understanding the Power Structure of the Rhee Syngman Era), 1950nyeondae-ui Insik (Understanding of the 1950s). Hangilsa, 1981, p. 17. In this article, Jo Byung-Ok slandered centrist intellectuals who were taken to North Korea during the Korean War by saying that they collaborated with communists or voluntarily entered North Korea. Like other ultra-right anticommunists, he condemned advocates of negotiations between the South and North as sympathizers of communism. Jo Byung-Ok, ‘Minju 10nyeon-ui Sichaek’ (Policies for the Last Ten Years of Democracy), Minjujui-wa Na (Democracy and I). Yeongsin Munhwasa, 1959, p. 175. The Weekly Reports of the USA Embassy to the Republic of Korea, Nr. DIP 540, Joint WeekA 26, 26 June 1953, (Jeong Yong-Wook ed., Juhan Miguk Daesagwan Jugan Bogoseo,(Joint WeekA, reprinted by Youngjin Munhwa Publishers, 1993, Vol. 4, p. 332). In August 1954, Won Yong-Seok, Director of the Office of Planning, reported that the budget for a soldier’s daily food ration was just 29 hwan (Korean dollar) and he demanded that the budget for the minimum daily food ration

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for a soldier should be 100 hwan. Gukhoesokgirok (Stenograph of the National Assembly), the 19th session, vol. 30, 16 August 1954. The Weekly Reports of the USA Embassy to the Republic of Korea, 28 July 1957, (Jeong Yong-Wook ed., Juhan Miguk Daesagwan Jugan Bogoseo,(Joint WeekA, reprinted by Youngjin Munhwa Publishers, 1993, Vol. 7, p. 164). Hanguk Ilbo, 3 August 1954. Hanguk Ilbo, 6 August 1954. Although he received thirty three rounds of applause during his speech to Congress, it was not right for the President of a country to deliver such an address. It was said that he realized his mistake and that he confided to Oliver: ‘Dr Oliver, the speech I gave to the Congress is the worst mistake I ever made in my life.’ (Oliver, op. cit., p. 450, Pak Il-Young, trans., p. 578). The US Embassy wrote that the remark by Syngman Rhee was the first one in which Syngman Rhee publicly acknowledged ‘it is difficult to know what to do’. The Weekly Reports of the USA Embassy to the Republic of Korea (JOINT WEEKA), Nr. 160730Z, 18 August 1957, (Jeong Yong-Wook ed., Juhan Miguk Daesagwan Jugan Bogoseo, Joint WeekA, reprinted by Youngjin Munhwa Publishers, 1993, Vol.7, p. 182–183). The translator has changed the date from 19 August into 18 by reading the original. It seems that the author made a mistake in reading the date – the translator. Choe Seok-Jae, op. cit, pp. 13–14. This was written on 26 February, before the election of the president and vice president on 15 May 1956. President Truman reacted with indifference to this offer, as is evident in the fact that he did not even bother to send a reply (Yi Ho-Jae, op. cit., p. 262). Sinmunhakhoe (The Association of Journalism Studies). Hanguk-ui Baekseo (The White Paper on Korea), 1957, p. 92. In 1956, when Secretary of State Dulles visited Korea, several hundred VIPs, including key people of the three powers (administration, legislation and judiciary), the brains of the armed forces, diplomatic delegations from foreign countries, officials of the US Embassy in Seoul, generals of the American Army in Korea and Jo Byung-Ok, turned out to welcome him. He reviewed the honour guards. On the streets from Yeouido to the Presidential Office, several hundreds of thousands of citizens, including students, welcomed him with the national flags of the two countries and placards in their hands (Hanguk Ilbo, 18 March 1956). As of February 1957, although Yi Myo-Muk was the Korean Minister to the UK and Yi Su-Yeong was the Korean Minister to France, they were just figureheads. Besides the Korean Embassy to the USA, Korea only had the Korean Mission to the UN, the Korean Legation to the Philippines and the Korean Mission to Japan. ‘Burok Gukjeonggamsabogoseo Oemuwiwonhoe’ (Appendix: Diplomacy Committee of the Parliamentary Inspection Report), Gukhoesokgirok (Stenograph of the National Assembly), 23rd session, Vol. 19, 4 February 1957. Hanguk Ilbo, 6 January 1957. Gukhoegongnon (The Public Opinion of the National Assembly), Inaugural issue, June 1957, pp. 98–102. Hanguk Ilbo, 21 October 1954; 26 June 1955; Chosun Ilbo, 4 May 1956 (evening).

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Jo Byung-Ok’s speech, Gukhoesokgirok (Stenograph of the National Assembly), 19th session, Vol. 70, 4 November 1954. Gwon Dae-Bok ed., op.cit., p. 64. In this announcement the Director of Public Relations stated: ‘Second, senior staff of the Progressive Party have always maintained contacts with North Korean spies, secret envoys and agents of subversive activities which the North Korean communists have sent. Third, the Progressive Party has tried to enable secret members and sympathizers of the Communist Party to be elected as lawmakers in order to destroy the Republic of Korea.’ This was a false accusation which was proven in the court trial. Speech by Defence Minister Son Won-Il. Gukhoesokgirok (Stenograph of the National Assembly), 19th session, Vol. 24, 15 July 1954. Hanguk Ilbo, 29 August 1954. Pak Jin-Mok. Op. cit., p. 172. Oemubu (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Jo Oemujanggwan Yeonseol mit Seongmyeongjip (Collection of Speeches and Comments by Minister of Foreign Affairs Jo), p. 18. After this announcement, an article was published in the magazine which argued that Yi Gwang-Su’s cooperation with the Japanese colonial policy of creating Emperor’s Loyal Subjects was not a pro-Japanese action but a struggle for national independence. See Sin Nak-Hyeon, ‘Chunwon Igwangsu-neun Gwayeon Chinilpayeotna’ (Was Chunwon Yi Gwang-Su a pro-Japanese traitor), Sintaeyang (The New Sun), June 1954. Pak Yong-Man. Gyeongmudaebihwa (Untold Stories of the Presidential House). Samguk Munhwasa, 1965, p. 289. Rhee Syngman. ‘Gaeheonjogeonbu-ro Ibhubokehara’ (Let them run for the election with some conditions, 6 April 1954); ‘Minuiwonseongeo-e gwanhayeo’ (On the election of the House, 12 May 1954). Gongbosil (Office of Public Relations). Daetongnyeong Iseungmanbaksa Damhwajip (Collection of Dr Rhee Syngman’s Speeches and Comments), Vol. 2, 1956, p. 16, p. 28). Rhee Syngman. 1954. ‘Doknipjayujeongsin-eul Seonyanghara, Seondongjeok Eondong-eun Jungbeol-ro Daseuril Teo, Gongjonjuui Baegyeok-eul Cheonmyeong’ (Enhance the Spirit of Independence and Freedom, Seditious Speech will be severely Punished and Policies of Co-existence between the West and the East should be rejected), 8 December 1954. Ibid., pp. 53–54. ‘Saseol, 8,8 Jibangseogeo-ga Uimihaneun Geot, – Gwollyeok-e Jitbalpin Seongeo-ui Danpyeon’ (Editorial: The Meaning of the Local Election of August 8 – Snapshots of the Election Trampled by the Power), Hanguk Ilbo, 10 August 1956. Chosun Ilbo, 14 August 1958 (evening). Chosun Ilbo, 23 November 1957. Pak Won-Sun. Gukgaboanbeop Yeongu ( A Study of the National Security Law) Vol. 1. Yeoksa Bipyeongsa, 1989, pp. 153–159, 231–238. Article 17, clause 5 in the new National Security Law stipulated: ‘If anybody disturbs people or benefits the enemy by publicly and knowingly recounting or spreading false facts, or by spreading or telling something which intentionally distorts the facts, he or she will be imprisoned for not more than five years.’ And Article 22 stipulates that if anybody publicly defames the constitutional

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organs, that person shall be imprisoned for not more than ten years. According to the article, the constitutional organs refer to the President, the Speaker of the National Assembly and the Chief Justice. Hong I-Seob. Hanguksa-ui Bangbeop (Research Method for Korean History). Tamgudang, 1981, p. 363. Kim Seong-Sik. ‘Hangukjeok Minjokjuui’ (Korean Nationalism), Sasanggye (The World of Thought). September 1958, pp. 56–62. Rhee Syngman. Doknipjeongsin (The Spirit of Independence), Hwalmunsa, 1946, p. 263.

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7

Structural Crisis in North and South Korea and the Path of Korean Nationalism

THE IMPENDING GENERAL CRISIS IN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA

S

ince the mid 1990s, the word globalization or segyehwa has been in vogue, but its meaning has not always been clear. In 1997, just before the presidential election, the Asian financial crisis struck Korea and the Korean Government asked the IMF to bail it out. In the meantime, from just one or two years before the financial crisis in the South, it was repeatedly reported that a great famine was sweeping North Korea and that a large number of people had starved to death. According to the rumours, North Korea was like an African nation in East Asia. It was difficult to imagine when the two Koreas might be able to extricate themselves from their economic crises. In the case of South Korea, the problem of the financial crisis was closely related to over-dependence on foreign countries, a perennial feature indeed of modern Korea. As it opened its ports to outsiders, Korea became the site of confrontation between China and Japan. For the first half of the twentieth century, Korea was an economic colony, dependent on Japan. Although the situation could have been different with national unification, it would appear that South Korea, as a divided country, could not have survived even one day without the aid of the USA. While Park Chung Hee over-emphasized an export-oriented development strategy in the 1970s and 1980s, the Korean economy was so dependent on trade that in terms of the ratio of trade to GNP, Korea came to belong to the group of countries with the highest scores. In addition, like the Latin American countries, Korea was seriously troubled by an excessive foreign debt. Nevertheless, since 1986, thanks to the Three Low Prices (low dollar exchange rate, low interest rates and low oil prices) in the international market Korea achieved its economic growth. Korean people spent money recklessly and were then faced with the financial crisis. The problem is that the crisis in South and North Korea is not only an economic one, but also a general crisis which has accumulated historically.

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Crisis in North & South Korea and the Path of Korean Nationalism 193 Although the direct causes of the food crisis in North Korea include the sudden collapse of the socialist camp and the successive floods, the bureaucracy of the socialist system, the inflexibility of the socialist economy, the North Korean version of the socialist system such as the Identity or Juche Ideology and the theory of the monocratic leader are also responsible for the crisis in North Korea. Thus, the crisis in North Korea is not only a political and economic phenomenon but also an ideological and cultural phenomenon. The crisis of South Korea is also a cultural or value crisis. Its roots can be traced to the economic policy established by the Park Chung Hee regime and it is a result of the corrupt nexus between political and business circles. Unethical conglomerates that expand their businesses as an octopus spreads its arms are not just an economic phenomenon, but a spiritual and mental phenomenon which itself reflects the distorted value system as well. The Korean people, who have focused on the goal not on the process, have not worked methodically but have taken it easy and done a slapdash job with temporary measures. Nor has this attitude resulted from poverty. It is a spiritual phenomenon. The most dangerous spiritual phenomenon is probably an exaggerated egoism. This excessive egoism has meant that living together or the consideration of neighbours or the nation is considered foolish. In Korean society ends justify the means, and in the pursuit of their self-interest people do not hesitate to use ignoble means, and exploit their regional ties or school connections. In this sense, all Koreans can be seen as prisoners of Park Chung Hee’s developmentalist ideology. Reversed common values, widespread egoism and weak community spirit are directly related to the weak and distorted national consciousness. Although there is no country in which the word ‘nation’ is discussed as much as in Korea, I wonder how correctly the word nation is used and how well it is understood. The warped nature of modern Korean history is testified by the fact that pro-Japanese collaborators exploited the 1946 campaign against the UN Trusteeship and projected themselves as the champions of nationalism. During the national division, anyone who supported anti-communism could be instantly transformed from a pro-Japanese collaborator, a dictator, a corrupt official or a political profiteer into a nationalist. Since this situation has persisted, the concept of the nation or nationalism has been mistakenly identified with anti-communist statism or anti-communist nationalism. Although there was a strong demand for the punishment of pro-Japanese traitors in the post-liberation period so that the spirit of the nation might stand firm and social discipline could be established, former pro-Japanese policemen who hid themselves in the early post-liberation period regained their power due to the US policy of utilizing former pro-Japanese policemen and maintaining the status quo. And when the campaign against the UN Trusteeship began at the end of December 1949 with the deliberate misinformation that the ‘USSR had suggested the UN Trusteeship’, many pro-Japanese policemen and pro-Japanese officials actively participated in the campaign against the UN Trusteeship. This campaign was combined with an antiRussian and anti-communist campaign, as well as with support for the Korean Provisional Government in Chongqing. The pro-Japanese individuals who

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actively participated in the anti-Trusteeship campaign condemned as traitors those who supported the Moscow Accords on the Korean question and instead considered themselves patriots because they were leading the anti-Trusteeship campaign. Although the anti-Trusteeship campaign needs to be lauded and the unconditional support for the Moscow Accords on the Korean question was problematic, the anti-Trusteeship campaign of Rhee Syngman, the Korean Democratic Party and the pro-Japanese was neither aimed at nor led to the establishment of a unified nation-state, but the establishment of a separate government in the South.1 It is difficult to understand the fact that the group who maintained a back-scratching alliance with pro-Japanese figures and worked for a separate government called themselves ‘nationalists’. Moreover, under the regime of the Cold War, the thesis of the East-West divide, the ideology of national division and the logic of depending on foreign powers were understood as nationalism. At various points of time, these arguments were mobilized in the name of the nation. Of course, the current spiritual and cultural problems of distorted national consciousness and excessive egoism are also related to the fact that those who used to talk about liberal democracy actually destroyed liberal democracy, and those who consolidated the national division and prohibited South Koreans from considering North Korean residents to be of the same nation or fellow human beings monopolized the campaign for national unification. In this chapter, I will discuss the spiritual and cultural crisis by analysing the Korean characteristics of the Cold War regime and of ultra-right anticommunism and the issue of pro-Japanese collaboration. In addition, based on this discussion, I would like to consider how to establish the identity of the nation in the national crisis and how to establish a new community, even though the solution might remain at an elementary level. THE REGIME OF NATIONAL DIVISION, LACK OF NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND MORALITY

The Cold War Regime and Ultra-right Anti-communism Jang Jun-Ha stated in The Way of a Nationalist: To the best of my judgement, the national division for the past quarter century was not only [a result of] a difference in ideology and social systems, but the division or destruction of individuals’ lives and the disorganization or destruction of the self. All the national power in both the South and North is almost exhausted because of mutual animosity and destruction.2 Jang’s remark reminds us that Korea is not simply a divided country. He talks about a regime of national division. The fact that such an extreme division has existed in Korea means that the Cold War considerably influenced the political developments in Korea. While Koreans have a strong consciousness of Korea’s status as a nation with a single ethnicity and have had

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Crisis in North & South Korea and the Path of Korean Nationalism 195 a strong desire to overcome the national division, the East-West logic has apparently overwhelmed this national consciousness. This East-West logic has reinforced the national division. The regime of the national division has come down with schizophrenia, as Jang Jun-Ha observes above. The regime of the national division was established as the Cold War intensified and was supported with the logic of the East-West divide. In an article he wrote in the 1960s, Song Geon-Ho considered Korea as the battleground of ‘Syngman-ism’ versus ‘Kim Ku-ism.’ He explained that while the former tried to justify itself by jumping on the Cold War bandwagon, the latter placed the nation above the Cold War. According to his analysis, because of the autocracy inherent in Syngman-ism, intellectuals in South Korea were dispirited and experienced a type of spiritual exile. The more established the intellectuals were, the more they avoided reality or kept silent. An easy-going attitude, combined with conformism, was prevalent in society.3 Rhee Syngman emphasized that the world was a stage for the war between the communist camp and the free world and that the two forces could never co-exist. In his opinion, the communist camp was evil incarnate and the free world the epitome of goodness. This argument led to the logic that the USSR, as evil incarnate, and the USA, the epitome of goodness, should confront each other. In Rhee Syngman ’s logic, it was difficult – if not impossible – for small countries to find autonomous or independent means of survival; their only option being complete dependence on one of the superpowers. His attitude was articulated succinctly in the following conversation with the US Secretary of Defence Frank Jr. Pace and General Matthew B. Ridgway: If by sacrificing Korea I could strengthen the US position, I would do so – because so long as the United States holds its position of leadership among nations, Korea can one day be revived. But if the influence of the United States should decline, the free world would have no hope.4 Park Chung Hee was not different from Rhee Syngman in his adherence to the logic of the Cold War and the East-West camps. As the USA sought to establish a trilateral security system comprising the USA, Japan and Korea under its own hegemony after the signing of the US-Japan New Security Agreement, normalization talks between Japan and Korea were instigated under the guidance of the USA. The mortgage of national dignity led to the revival of ‘Baekbeom-ism’, to use the term of Song Geon-ho, and students and other opinion-makers in society opposed the Japan-Korea Treaty. The regime of Park Chung-hee rushed to sign the humiliating treaty. At that time, Park Chung Hee was preoccupied with the economy because of his lack of political legitimacy whilst faithfully following America’s North East Asian policy. Korea was the second country after the USA to send a large contingent of soldiers to South Vietnam. In sending the troops, Park Chung Hee not only relied on the economic benefits of the military participation (Park Chung Hee’s capitalism is thus called parasite capitalism because of its lack of ethics), but he also followed America’s foreign policy in the name of the

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‘anti-communist crusade’, as Rhee Syngman had termed it in the 1950s.5 Because of Park’s cooperation with the USA, the collective security regime of Korea, the USA and Japan was established and Park’s regime enjoyed a honeymoon period with the USA. However, this honeymoon led to an intensification of the confrontation between South and North Korea, thoughtless attacks on the South by the North, and the reinforcement of the Juche ideology and the system of the single leader or monocratic regime in the North. In domestic politics, the logic of the bipolarized East-West camps was expressed in the form of an ultra-right anti-communist regime. This regime consolidated the national division and was revitalized by the intense confrontation and escalating tension between the two Koreas. Apart from the period of the April Revolution, despite their hopes for national unification, the people were not allowed to discuss national unification until the Democratization Struggles of June 1987. The government did not want a lessening of the tension between the South and North which would doubtless have ensued had dialogue been opened on the subject of national unification. The advocates of the Theory of Unification through Northward Advance believed that they could provoke a war with the full support of the USA (except for the deployment of the US army) without the danger of precipitating a Third World War. This logic strengthened Rhee Syngman’s political power and the ultra-right anti-communist regime. At the same time, it increased the animosity of South Koreans towards North Korea and had the effect of freezing any discussions on national unification or the effects of anti-unification. Anyone who advocated exchange between the South and the North was punished by Park Chung Hee. For example, those nationalists who emphasized national autonomy and unification during the period of the April Revolution were punished immediately following the Military coup of 16 May. Moreover, Hwang Yong-Ju, the President of MBC, and lawmaker Seo Min-Ho of the Democratic Socialist Party were imprisoned in the name of ‘development-first’. The ultra-right anti-communist regime was also responsible for the difficulty of separated family members in South and North Korea to meet each other, unlike the situation in West and East Germany or China and Taiwan. When Shin Geum-Dan, a North Korean athlete, dramatically met her father from South Korea at the Tokyo Olympics, many people were moved to tears. Numerous lawmakers in South Korea subsequently suggested that a meeting place be established for separated family members at Panmunjeom. However, because of the opposition from the Park regime, the proposal was not heeded. Since the front line of combat changed repeatedly between south and north during the Korean War, many families were scattered all over Korea because of repeated evacuations. Although there may be complicated political issues around the reunion of separated families, it is a sad commentary on the national politics indeed that there were no opportunities for separated families to meet with their family members in the 1950s and 1960s when they could still vividly remember the faces of their relatives. In addition, the ultra-right anti-communist regime made Korean society fearful and the subject of constant surveillance. A five-volume report, ‘The Story of the 3 April Incident’ published by Jeonyewon Publishers 1994–98 and

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Crisis in North & South Korea and the Path of Korean Nationalism 197 written by the special project team of the 3 April Incident Investigation for the Jemin Ilbo (daily), has vividly described the scenes of massacre in its 2,500 pages. Moreover, in July and August 1950, the members of the National Guidance League were slaughtered in many places throughout South Korea, including Pyeongtaek and Anseong. Some sources estimate that the number of victims exceeded 200,000. While agreeing that the number could be this high, I would estimate that the number of victims from the National Guidance League would far outnumber the victims of the 3 April Incident in Jeju.6 When the North Korean People’s Army arrived in the areas where members of the National Guidance League had been killed, their surviving family members wreaked revenge on the police or the members of the Youth Association, hired by the government for massacring their loved ones. They killed the guilty police and thugs from the Youth Association, as well as their families, although the number of victims was not as high as that of the National Guidance League. There was also mutual slaughter between the Left and Right when the People’s Army repaired to the North after the successful landing at Incheon. From October 1950 to February 1951, the 11th division of the South Korean Army, which was responsible for cleaning up the communist guerillas, killed many civilians in the counties of Namwon, Hampyeong, Sunchang, Imsil, Hamyang, Sancheong and Geochang.7 The numerous massacres, civilian or otherwise, along with the physical and mental torture which Korean people experienced since the Korean War, filled them with awe and fear and enabled the anti-communist ideology to function powerfully. President Park specifically and repeatedly highlighted massacres committed by the communists. Civilian massacres, starting from the 3 April incident in Jeju Island, whether committed by the North or the South, also played a significant role in sustaining the Yushin regime and reinforcing the ideology of opposition to North Korea. In addition, under the system of guiltby-association, the South Korean government controlled the family members of massacre victims or of those who moved to North Korea during the Korean War – all in order to reinforce the ideology of opposition to North Korea. These individuals, along with dissidents, were put on a surveillance list and a close watch was kept on them by the thought-control department within the police force (during the 1950s) and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (during the 1960s and 1970s). The government, through its intelligence agencies, played a crucial role in reinforcing the anti-North Korean ideology, especially under the Park regime. The ultra-right anti-communist regime was also strengthened by cultivating an environment of ignorance. Stating a fact about North Korea or possessing a photo of the North could be considered an offence under the Anti-Communist Law or National Security Law. In other words, people were not allowed to be inquisitive or knowledgeable about North Korea and were forced to accept the knowledge dished out to them by the government. This situation was true in the North as well. Under the influence of the anti-North Korean ideology, research or education on modern Korea, including the national liberation movements, the question of pro-Japanese activities, the development of ultra-right anti-communism and the history of democracy,

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were not conducted. Nor did this situation improve markedly, even after the Democratization Struggles in June 1987. Under these conditions, anticommunist education was conducted extensively. Before the Democratization Struggles of June 1987, people in South Korea, under the influence of anticommunism and the anti-North Korean ideology, shouted for joy and broke into rapturous applause when the North Korean team was defeated at a JapanNorth Korea match and the audience was reported to have wished that an object would fall from the sky on North Korea and inflict grave damage. This pathological attitude sadly resulted from the establishment of anti-communist nationalism and an anti-communist national consciousness. One college student in the 1980s questioned this sad reality in the following manner: It is said that ‘ideology is thicker than blood’. How can we then comprehend the weird fact that anti-communist ideology, which was introduced several decades ago, has overwhelmed the national consciousness that we have fostered as a single ethnic group over several thousands of years?8 Although his modernization policy itself weakened and distorted the national consciousness by intensifying regional conflicts and the rural and urban divide, and reinforced region-based selfishness, Park Chung Hee intensified the regional conflict between Gyeongsang and Jeolla Provinces in order to enhance his chance of being elected President. Even at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of twenty-first century, the conflict between the two regions is so strong that people find the co-existence of two different nations in Korea to be an inescapable reality. In addition to his distortion of the national consciousness, Park orchestrated the Yushin Coup d’Etat by exploiting the people’s desire for national reunification and the Joint Communiqué of July 1972. After the Yushin Coup, Park discarded the Joint Communiqué like toilet paper. In this way, he exploited regional conflicts between Jeolla and Gyeongsang Provinces, as well as the national North– South division, for his own political purposes. To rationalize his policy, he emphasized his one peculiar version of the ‘nation’, ‘Korean nationalism’, and ‘Education with Korean Identity’, by adopting totalitarian methodology. It should be remembered that radio and television reached into all homes in Korea in the 1970s. Park’s political education contributed significantly to the distortion of the national consciousness and nationalism.

The Question of the Purge of Pro-Japanese Traitors: Anti-communism Overwhelms Nationalism. After Liberation, the purging of the pro-Japanese traitors and land reform were considered the most important tasks in the establishment of the nation-state. It was understood that it was necessary to purge pro-Japanese traitors at any price in order to establish the discipline of the state and the spirit of the nation. It was believed that without a purge of the pro-Japanese traitors, it would be impossible to develop patriotism and fraternal love. In other words, as long as anti-national traitors shamelessly occupied high government

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Crisis in North & South Korea and the Path of Korean Nationalism 199 positions, the government could not ask people to sacrifice themselves for the country. In addition, it was necessary to purge the nation of pro-Japanese national traitors in order to develop a democratic state. It was understood that since it would be difficult to establish a democratic society without removing militaristic fascism, it was inevitable that those traitors who had collaborated with the Japanese militaristic fascists be removed. Just as the French government had punished the French Nazi collaborators in order to eliminate fascism and enable the French people to become citizens imbued with fraternal love, Korea too should have followed suit with its pro-Japanese elements. There were many pro-Japanese elements in the ranks of the followers of the Korean ultra-right anti-communist dictatorship. A purge of pro-Japanese elements was necessary in order to prevent national division and for the establishment of a unified nation-state. It was also necessary for the establishment of a benevolent society, free of corruption and injustice. The notorious pro-Japanese elements dared to do anything to achieve their ends, and by fair means or foul. Unconditional loyalty to the dictator, corruption and the oppression of the people were also a part of their modus operandi. Corruption under the American Military Government and the Rhee Syngman regime, the fraudulent election of 15 March and the corruption of the Park Chung Hee regime were all related to the existence of the pro-Japanese national traitors. Thus, purging these elements was a pressing need in the task of creating a good society based on a desirable value system. It is common knowledge, however, that pro-Japanese individuals were not punished, even after the establishment of the Republic of Korea. On 6 June 1949, the police, directed by the chief of the Central District Police Station in Seoul, attacked the Special Committee on Pro-Japanese National Traitors, and in that same month there was the incident of the so-called communist cell in the National Assembly and the assassination of Kim Ku. Thus, the issue of the purge of pro-Japanese elements was simply smothered. It was easy to predict the fact that the issue would be suppressed. Since pro-Japanese individuals held important positions in Korea in many fields, it was only possible to purge them in a revolutionary situation like the post-liberation hiatus. The American Military Government, however, relied on pro-Japanese elements. Generally speaking, pro-Japanese individuals enjoyed enhanced status during the period of US occupation in comparison to their position under Japanese colonialism. Moreover, many of them formed the backbone of the Rhee Syngman regime. They inserted their evil hands into all fields and spread their ideology of self-interest throughout Korean society.9 Needless to say, the survival ideology of these pro-Japanese people has been anti-communism. They had repeatedly learned this lesson from the Japanese militaristic fascists during both the Sino-Japanese War and the Second World War. Article One of the Office Routine Instructions for Special High Police that was utilized during the Japanese colonial period states that the main task of the special police is to oppress diverse social movements which threaten social order and destroy the basic principle of the state.10 Imperial Japan joined the Axis Powers of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, launched massive anti-

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communist campaigns and staged anti-American and anti-British campaigns. The anti-communism of the pro-Japanese national traitors, including the pro-Japanese police, was still powerful even under the American Military Government. They even seized and tortured anti-Japanese independence fighters, including Kim Won-Bong who was the leader of the Uiyeoldan, or Terror Brigade for Righteous Martyrs. When the Constitutional Assembly introduced its Special Act on the Punishment of Anti-National People, pro-Japanese collaborators spread handbills en masse in the National Assembly Hall and central Seoul. The handbills declared: ‘1) The President is the ultimate sanctity of the nation, obey him unconditionally, 2) Destroy the Special Act on the Punishment of Anti-National People which divides the nation, and 3) Those who ask the nation to mete out punishment in the name of purging the nation of antinational activities are a tool of communism.’ On 23 September 1948, when the National Assembly introduced the Special Act, anti-communist and savethe-nation campaigns were staged extensively with the participation of senior government officials. This led to an upsurge in anti-communism and opposition to the Special Act throughout Korean society. During the trial of an anti-national individual, Yi Jong-Hyeong, a notorious pro-Japanese figure, argued that ‘No anti-communist will be punished in the Republic of Korea. How can this court – not Kim Il Sung’s court – punish me?’11 At the trial of Kim Ku’s assassin, the anti-communists and pro-Japanese went even further. An Du-Hui, the assassin, argued shamelessly: ‘I made up my mind that it would be better to kill Mr Kim Ku for the sake of the country.’ His defence lawyer unhesitatingly argued: ‘The action of the accused deserves to be praised in the Republic of Korea.’ Handbills were posted on telegraph poles and the walls of the buildings surrounding the court, saying: ‘Release An DuHui, patriot and pillar of the Republic of Korea.’12 Moreover, former members of the Special High Police during Japanese colonialism shamelessly occupied VIP seats at the anniversary ceremony for 1 March Independence or Korean Liberation of 15 August and read commemorative addresses.13 In contrast, former independence fighters were persecuted yet lived humble lives in villages composed of shanties, including Haebangchon or Liberation Village. The children of patriotic martyrs even became doormen for former pro-Japanese figures. Given these conditions and the rise of the new international order in North East Asia, Park Chung Hee took power through a military coup. He had been honoured at a military officer training school in Manchuria and the military academy in Japan and as a ‘pillar of the Japanese Emperor’ and a ‘Special Japanese’, and participated in suppressing the anti-Japanese forces in Manchuria. Although same-blood consciousness and anti-Japan sentiments had been cornerstones for the formation of national consciousness and nationalism in Korea, now the ‘Japanese Emperor’s’ military officer had become president of the country. With the lunching of Park Chung Hee’s military coup, those nationalistic and progressive individuals who had survived the ultra-right anti-communist regime and participated in the April Revolution were arrested and punished. Youth and students who had grown up in the revolutionary atmosphere of

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Crisis in North & South Korea and the Path of Korean Nationalism 201 the April Revolution were also caught and punished. Surprisingly, Park Chung Hee’s Japanese counterparts in Japanese diplomatic circles, or the so-called leading pro-South Korean Japanese who were well-informed about Korea, were actually former militarists or invaders of Korea, including Mr Kishi who was a Class A war criminal at the Tokyo Tribunal.14 There was a saying at the time that Korea, which had been awash with low grade Yankee culture in the 1950s, was now, in the 1960s, swamped by low grade Japanese culture. Indeed, it was not possible for normal moral standards and good common sense to take root in a society where pro-Japanese elements walked around indifferently and patriots and independence fighters were forced to watch their every move. In this society, honest and hard-working people were despised and the voice of truth and justice was stifled. The society was full of scammers and swindlers who, by fair means or foul, pursued their own interest even if it meant risking their neighbours’ welfare. Ham Seok-Heon said in 1971, when the Park regime faced another critical moment: Today, our nation is clearly a nation that is terrified. This situation resulted from the fact that we see non-life as life and non-death as death. The value of life has been degraded. We have lost our will for independence, our self-respect and our pride. Thus, people have only one thought – that of escaping from their situation.15 Along with the problems of excessive egoism and a blasé attitude, it is necessary to discuss the pathology of the concept of ‘equalization’ that dominates Korean society. The colonial occupation by Japan, along with various revolutionary situations, land reform and the Korean War, made Korea a ‘level’ or egalitarian society with surprising speed. Because of this equalitarian spirit, the motivation to succeed and educational aspirations increased rapidly – this was very conducive to the rise of a labour force of high quality, which in turn led to the economic development of Korea in the 1960s–80s. However, egalitarianism has not been accompanied in Korean society by a civic spirit and the mechanism of check and balance in the exercise of power, but by limitless egoism, irresponsibility and a lack of transparency. Stated differently, it was an unhealthy equalitarianism derived from the distorted nature of modern Korean history. Before the advent of the financial crisis of 1997, Korean society was able to achieve a record level of development through hard work and diligence. However, an unhealthy egalitarianism and other ethical weaknesses have prevented Korea from advancing to a higher stage of development. ESTABLISHING SELF-IDENTITY AND SEARCHING FOR A NEW NATIONAL COMMUNITY

Understanding and Love for One’s Own Society Modernity in the West may be understood as a process of the formation of a modern human, which means the process of the establishment of one’s own

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identity. But Korea still abounds with people who lack a sense of individuality and whose feet are not firmly planted into the Korean soil. They just blow with the wind. Unlike Europe, East Asian countries achieved rapid industrialization without undergoing the proper process of modern human revolution or social and political revolution. Korea and Japan in particular may be appropriately branded as ‘economic animals’ or ‘worshippers of the Goddess of Wealth’, as they regarded economic growth as the epitome of their value system and the spearhead of modernization. Along with such a process, the Korean people were trained by an overarching authoritarian political structure to immerse themselves in mobilized politics or, propagandist politics. One is reminded here of the protagonist Ah Q, in the famous work The True Story of Ah Q by the Chinese author Lu Xun, who wanders aimlessly, yells and shouts, makes a nuisance of himself and is, in short, a man who has lost his self-respect, his individuality and his identity. After Daewongun assumed power, the modern and contemporary history of Korea seems to have undergone a transformation every decade, and on all these occasions, people talked about the crisis. People also talked about the crisis of identity. It seems obvious that though the Japanese or the Chinese people have preserved their identity, the Korean case appears to be quite ambivalent. Historian Shin Chae-Ho was very concerned and anguished about this problem all through his life. He believed that the modern world dominated by imperialism was like a powerful wave, threatening to engulf the weak and oppressed countries, and he wondered whether it was possible for Korea under these adverse circumstances to maintain its identity and integrity. It may not be an exaggeration to say that the Korean people lost their individuality, the most crucial requirement of a modern society. One may cite numerous examples of the loss of their culture and history. There are not many people who can persuasively argue that Korean culture possesses its own originality and uniqueness in ways that are not peripheral extensions of either Chinese or Japanese culture. Most Koreans possess a sketchy, partial and emotionally charged understanding of Korean history, and very few possess a balanced perspective of modern Korean history that is grounded in truth and dispassionate objectivity. For example, very few Koreans will be able to answer questions such as why the official Korean name of South Korea includes ‘Han’ and that of North Korea ‘Joseon’, or why, unlike other socialist countries, North Korea’s official name includes ‘Democratic’. Very few Koreans will also be able to tell you who composed the National Anthem of Korea, when it was composed and what it means exactly. People often say that the Korean people have lost their hometowns, but it is also remarkable that very few Koreans are knowledgeable about the culture of their hometowns. I once had an opportunity to orally examine three students from the famous historical city of Andong who sought admission into my university’s undergraduate programme. I asked them to name a few prominent people from Andong noted for their significant contribution to the nation in modern times. Only one student could come up with a single name. No one remembered Yi Sang-Ryong, who was a minister in the

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Crisis in North & South Korea and the Path of Korean Nationalism 203 Shanghai provisional government, or Kim Dong-Sam, who led an antiJapanese guerilla force and was known as ‘the Tiger of Manchuria’. As Gregory Henderson (1922–88) explains in his book The Vortex of Korean Politics, Korea’s political whirlwind occurred on a tremendously large scale in the process of industrialization, leading to the rise of Seoul as the centre of every activity and the attendant devastation of the provinces, especially villages. The Saemaul (‘New Village’) movement is also responsible for the levelling of provincial towns or villages and the loss of their individualities. The gradual erosion and disappearance of local autonomy over a period of thirty years is also to blame for this phenomenon. If spiritual and material culture form a harmonious whole, society does not usually experience a rupture or internal fissure. The problem of the East Asian economy today is not simply an economic problem. It has been correctly pointed out that it is a reflection of an integrated crisis or civilizational crisis derived from spiritual problems and the immaturity of civil society. If we look at China at a superficial level, we are struck by its rapid economic rise. However, we need to understand that the common citizens of China do not really live in the high-rise buildings that decorate the skyline of Chinese cities. These are reserved for the Chinese who control China’s material world. China, Japan and Korea need to alter their attitude towards ‘Others’. As Benedetto Croce (1862–1952) once remarked, without an understanding of the pulsating, living and breathing contemporaneous history, it is impossible to fix the future direction of a country. In other words, without understanding or reflecting on one’s history and culture, one indeed finds it difficult to determine the coordinates of the future of one’s nation. Ignorance or distorted understanding of modern and contemporary history is tantamount to the loss of modern and contemporary history. Ignorance of one’s culture is the same as the loss of one’s self or identity. When Korea celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of its independence, the country needed to reflect on its history of the past half century with a sense of maturity and reshape its relations with its immediate neighbours, especially North Korea, which has been constantly bedevilled by conflict and animosity. Unfortunately, North Koreans still conjure up the image of extraterrestrial beings in the minds of South Koreans. It was on the foundation of such cool-headed, dispassionate introspection that the nation could have taken a future path different from the one it traversed in the past. One also expected such a fresh perspective from the nation because it had grown wiser and stronger in the last fifty years, and meanwhile the Cold War structure also collapsed around the world. The nation needed to muster up enough courage and resilience of spirit to confront the dark and vexatious aspects of its past. However, during 2003, a section of the Korean media led a campaign to rehabilitate Rhee Syngman and attempted to hastily restore the gloomy and agonizing past. The nation did not organize any meaningful event that could appropriately match the dignity and solemnity of the day. It really was a pity that the nation commemorated the day with such nonchalance, the day that brought with it the memory of fifty difficult and arduous years.

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The year 1995, marking the fiftieth anniversary of national liberation, was apparently a time of affluence in South Korea. Nevertheless, in 1998, the year marking the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of separate governments in North and South Korea, both North and South Korea were in the midst of a crisis. It may well have been for this reason that the vested interests could remember nothing but the catch-phrase ‘the Second NationBuilding’ (The Kim Dae Jung government launched the campaign from 1998 to 2002 – the translator). There was no discussion over the question of whether the expression ‘nation-building’ was appropriate or whether it should be called the ‘establishment of the government of divided regimes’. The nation needs to come to terms with the unfortunate legacies of the past. The 10 May general election, held for the first time in an independent Korea in an atmosphere of fear and apprehension, is the first such event that comes to mind. The nation also needed to deal with such events as the mass slaughter of people, unprecedented in Korean history, and known as the 3 April Jeju massacre. In short, the nation needed to come to grips with the important milestones in the history of South and North Korea and with the forces and factors that led to national division. Since the contemporary history of Korea was neither studied nor taught in South Korea until recently, the Korean people did not have a clue as to when exactly the government was established or whether the expression ‘nation-building’ was an apt one. The fiftieth anniversary of the liberation should have been celebrated as a day of reckoning and soul-searching. There is a Korean saying, ‘knowledge is a disease and ignorance a medicine’. The Korean people lived in a state of blissful ignorance of contemporary Korean history and ignored such important themes of modern Korea as the national liberation movement, which is directly linked with the issue of the Korean national identity, the problem of pro-Japanese collaborators, the national division and inter-Korean relations, debate on unification and the history of the unification movement and the ultra-right anti-communist structure and the history of democratic resistance. If the nation does not transform its existing attitude towards life, its values and norms and its way of thinking, it will be difficult to conclusively resolve the after-effects of the financial crisis that still linger. The crisis may be temporarily over, but the fundamental malaise has not yet been uprooted. The Korean people have looked for a temporary remedy, a patchwork of solutions, every time they have confronted a crisis in the last fifty years. In order to overcome confusion and drift, it is important to understand the pulsating and breathing history of modern and contemporary Korea and to acquire an insight into our indigenous heritage. Native or indigenous heritage does not merely denote native culture and tradition. What matters more is the task of applying and adapting them to our modern society in a creative way so as to further enrich Korean culture.

Towards Constructing a National Community National consciousness is inseparable from the love of one’s neighbours or fraternal love formed through the relationships of living a life of togetherness

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Crisis in North & South Korea and the Path of Korean Nationalism 205 and subscribing to the fundamental principles of equality and freedom. National unification denotes the formation of a single community on the Korean peninsula on the foundation of such a national consciousness. The reason why national unification is necessary is the same as why living together is necessary. National unification is inextricably bound with cultural identity that covers politics, society and economy. We need to remember in this context the observation of Jang Jun-Ha. In Jang’s view, differences in ideology and regime are merely apparent manifestations of national division. Its broader implications include the division and destruction of one’s life and the devastation and disintegration of one’s self. Writing at about the same time, Ham Seok-Heon argued that anti-communist education had made the Korean people sick. In an article written in 1971, Ham attributed the prevalent social chaos to the division of Korea and contended that just as a person with a fatal wound could not work or study until the wound was healed, so it was with Korea as well.16 We must be mindful of the constriction and distortion of our historical understanding or historical consciousness that has resulted from the national division of the country into South and North. In one sense, contemporary Koreans, because of their consciousness of the Cold War, have a more shallow understanding of their history than their countrymen of the eighteenth century. They also have a more myopic perspective and perception of reality than the Koreans of the Japanese colonial period. Of course, the current situation differs from the period when Park Chung Hee exploited Korea’s division so unscrupulously that Korea became afflicted with a grave malady. Even though the Cold War era is over, Korean society is still in the grip of Cold War ideology. Indeed, the ideology of the Cold War was the product of the Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee regimes whose legitimacy was based on the national division. As is evident in the inhumane way of thinking that even now governs the question of national unification and North–South exchanges, it is not easy for the Korean people to heal the wounds caused by this national division. This means that it will be very difficult for Koreans to establish their own personal identity until they overcome the constraints imposed by the ideology of national division and evolve a new pattern of relationships that is substantially different from that of the late-twentieth century. The road to national unification is one of self-reflection, of the formation of one’s own culture and of the establishment of one’s self-identity. It is not easy today to give a simple answer to the question of why national unification is necessary. Until the 1960s, economic issues were cited as the reason for national unification. However, the contemporary debate on this issue will invariably involve a different parameter of understanding. There is no doubt that to some extent, North Korea will play a complementary role in solving such problems of South Korean society as the narrowness of the market, the shortage of labour and the lack of natural resources. However, if we take a long-term perspective, we realize that it is undoubtedly necessary to combine the diverse resources of the South and North, but it is also desirable that economic cooperation is combined with cultural exchanges. Before 1945, Korea represented a single cultural community that had existed for

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thousands of years, and even today, people across the 38th parallel use the same language. Since the circulation of culture requires a certain critical mass, just as a market or capital does, it is important that a single cultural community comprising both South and North be formed in the face of the current foreign cultural deluge. What is important in this age of globalization is to establish and maintain proper relationships with neighbouring states, especially neighbouring big powers such as Japan, China, Russia and the US. Immediately after the liberation of Korea from Japan, Yeo Un-Hyeong regarded it as crucial that the nation-state be built on the foundation of a united front or through the cooperation of the forces on both Left and Right. One of the reasons for this was Korea’s relationship with neighbouring states. Yeo believed that sandwiched as Korea was between southern and northern forces, it could use its independent capability as a leverage to overcome the international constraints imposed by its geopolitical reality and thereby turn its geopolitical weakness into strength. It was the only way Korea could assert its own independent identity and make the world heed its voice. Yeo Un-Hyeong further pointed out that this would enable Korea to muster support from various democratic countries (including both socialist and capitalist countries).17 As Yi Jae-Ho argued, only competitive, multilateral diplomacy with a broad array of nations could maximize Korea’s national interests. In this context, it is very important to consider whether the confrontational relationship between the divided halves or their fusion as a single community would be conducive to the national interests in relation to the maintenance of diversified economic and cultural linkages with China, stretching from the Yalu and Tumen rivers and the Yellow Sea, or the relationship with the US or Russia. This point will be clearer if we are reminded of how neighbouring powers have exploited the national division of Korea for their own ends. For example, we might consider how Japanese people maintain that, in terms of economic, cultural, political and military issues, it would be desirable for South Korea to be incorporated into the Japanese sphere (or the US-Japanese sphere), called the oceanic sphere or southern sphere, and for North Korea to be integrated within the Chinese sphere (or the Sino-Russian sphere), called the continental18 or northern sphere. This would mean the complete and permanent division of Korea. National unification should be understood as a relationship and a process, not as something that is contingent on good or bad policies. This process of national unification has to be measured by the climate of mutual understanding. Here one may profitably cite the examples of German Unification and China-Taiwan relations. Although I do not want to suggest that these examples are ideal, the fact that these relations were underpinned with mutual understanding is worthy of note. In 1989, when the Berlin wall collapsed, progressive intellectuals, government officials, opposition leaders and ultra-right-wing forces in Korea predicted that North Korea would collapse in the near future and even stated emphatically that the national unification of Korea would be accomplished in 1995. At the time I was quite shocked to hear these predictions and statements.

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Crisis in North & South Korea and the Path of Korean Nationalism 207 How could people think in such a way? In my opinion, these people were neither familiar with the relationship between East and West Germany nor with the reality of inter-Korean relations. During the coalition government (1966–69) of Kurt Georg Kiesinger, West Germany actively pursued progressive policies towards East Germany. It is also remarkable that when Willy Brandt was the chancellor of West Germany from 1969 to 1974, he devised his famous Eastward Policy (Ostpolitik) that led to a rapid and widespread development of human and material exchanges between East and West Germany. In the second half of the 1980s, most people in East Germany watched West German TV programmes. West Germany is one of the most advanced countries in the world and has a well-developed liberal democracy. It boasts a highly developed social welfare programme for its people. Civic virtue in West Germany is also quite advanced. The situation with respect to East and West Germany is quite different from that of South and North Korea. In addition, the social and economic situation in South Korea has nothing in common with West Germany. Considering these disparities, It is hard to comprehend the conclusion of some scholars that what happened to Germany would happen on the Korean peninsula. One more thing that needs to be taken into account is the difference in international relations between Germany on the one hand and the Korean peninsula on the other. In the case of Germany, Mikhail Gorbachev (1931– ) helped strengthen the process of unification, while the neighbouring countries of Korea such as China, the US and Japan are not supportive of the unification of Korea. More importantly, when one takes into account the specific reality of over half a century of uncompromising hostility between the two Koreas, it becomes obvious that North–South relations are quite unique and very different from the case of East and West Germany or China and Taiwan. Needless to say, rapid unification of Korea is neither a viable option nor a desirable one. Worse still, we cannot raise the question of national unification when we consider a range of issues confronting South Korea, including regional conflicts within the South itself and the substandard leadership of the power elite, of the intellectuals and of the affluent in South Korea. Regional conflicts between the eastern and western regions of South Korea are so serious that some argue that the interests of South Korea would be better served by bifurcating it into two independent republics of East and West. The road to reunification is one of mutual understanding and an expanding process of mutual recognition of the necessity of living together. We need to think of a third way in relation to this point. Those engaged steadfastly and strenuously in the process of national reunification and the formation of a national community have emphasized that the Korean people ought to maximize the greatest common good by taking the positive points from both South and North Korea and getting rid of their negative points. These efforts represent the convergence approach, which is definitely the third way. However, we are not yet in a position to talk about a third way. Given the current social and economic situation in Korea, a third way seems to be farfetched or an improbable task. Even the basic welfare of citizens in South

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Korea is not guaranteed. The entire structure of Korea’s education system is in a poor state. It is uncertain whether or not the capitalist conglomerates can be successfully restructured and their financial architecture rendered robust. What is worse, Korean society and its business leaders have defined labour movements as pro-communist and thereby suppressed the rights of the labouring class. Even in contemporary society, Korea’s labour relations are still influenced by a legacy of disdain for manual labour and the tradition of ‘putting the government above the people’. The serious malady of the Korean body politic resulting from the ultra-right anti-communist dictatorship is too obvious to be stated. There are too many things to be done before we begin talking about a third way. However, since it is imperative that we pave a path to reunification, notwithstanding all these hardships, we must search for better worldviews and values for national reunification. In the darkest hour, as history testifies, the forces for the realization of the ideals of mankind gain momentum. In this context we need to turn our attention to the third way explored by those who fought for national liberation during the colonial period, along with those who engaged in the construction of a unified nation after liberation and those who attempted to uphold the ideals of unification and autonomy during the era of division. Yi Sang-Jae, the president of Singanhoe (the New Korea Society) during the colonial period, is believed to have remarked that ‘nationalism is the source of socialism, and socialism constitutes the mainstream of nationalism’.19 Most nationalist movements in this period had some socialist orientations. Even the Korean Independence Party, which may be classified among the ultra-right-wing forces, advocated a three equalities programme (samgyunjueui) including economic equality. The National Independence League, an organization of centrist nationalists established in December 1947 under the leadership of Kim Gyu-Sik, made the following proclamation: ‘In contemporary Korea, it is impossible to establish either a government of monopoly capitalists or of the proletariat, but possible only to establish a Korean-style democracy to conform with Korea’s social realities.’20 The Constitution of the Republic of Korea, passed by the Constitutional Assembly, also demonstrates a socialist orientation in its economy-related articles. We can confirm this trend among the activists for national reunification who have sought a third way. Yi Jong-Ryul, who played an important role as a theorist for national reunification during the April Revolution, emphasized that Korea, in its international relations and foreign policy, should not side with NATO nor tie itself to the Warsaw Pact, but follow the Bandung system. He argued that Korea should have a capitalist, democratic and national revolution with social welfare for the poor and a middle class orientation. Jang Jun-Ha consistently defined national reunification as the people’s affairs and proposed a third way which could take useful lessons from Third World countries or from the social system of Israel. Reverend Mun Ik-Hwan appealed to South and North Korea to revise their developmental model. He appealed to the North to revise its socialist path by combining equality with freedom and asked the South to modify its trajectory of

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Crisis in North & South Korea and the Path of Korean Nationalism 209 development by aiming for an egalitarian distribution of wealth, opportunity and freedom. The following remark of Jo Bong-Am, which he made in the 1950s, is highly relevant even today: Our nation, which has experienced the evils of both capitalism and socialism for about half a century, has pondered more deeply than any other nation not only the future path of our nation but also of all other nations in the world. It has thought about a range of questions as to how mankind can be emancipated from the shackles of monopoly capitalism and communism and be led to the enjoyment of complete freedom and happiness. Can there be a society where individuality and freedom are respected and people can live in peace and comfort, free from exploitation by other human beings? Can there be a society where there is no war and all human beings love each other on the basis of equality?21 CONCLUDING REMARKS Apart from the nationalist trends which emerged among centrist nationalists, progressive intellectuals, youth and student movements, or some minor nationalist waves, which were stimulated during certain incidents or events, Korea, where anti-communist ideology has overwhelmed nationalism, has not experienced movements or waves worthy of the name nationalist since its liberation from Japan. As clearly demonstrated in the ideology of the Great Dangun, there have often been regressive ideologies or anti-Japanese national sentiments, whereas the tasks of modern nationalism such as independence, national reunification and national liberation have been ignored. The relationship with Japan, which has profound bearing on Korea’s national consciousness, national sentiment, regressive ideology and nationalism, will continue to exert immense influence on Korea’s national questions, national consciousness, national sentiment and nationalism. Indeed, it is the statist ideology of the divided country disguised as nationalism. It is also incontrovertibly true that the issue of Korea’s relations with Japan is riddled with distortion and deeply entrenched prejudices. Korean people often think in an ethnocentric manner.22 What is worse, a considerable number of Koreans have internalized negative and positive attitudes or both admiration and hatred for Japan. This dualistic internalization has led Koreans to maintain a double standard in relation to the Korea-Japan relationship. This double standard is clearly evident in the evaluation of the late Park Chung Hee. In addition, because of this double standard, it is difficult to satisfactorily solve the Japan issue in Korea. In contrast to Germany, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party government has still not confronted the evil past of the Pacific War. On the contrary, it maintains a continuity with the government of pre-war Japan. As the existence of the Yasukuni Shrine demonstrates and former Prime Minister Nakasone’s proud speech further confirms, Japan’s LDP government emphasizes the fact that Japan should instil pride in its students by teaching them that their war

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of aggression, including the Japanese invasion of Korea, was part of Japan’s glorious history. Japan argued that under the banner of ‘De-Asianization’, Japan simply shed its Asian-ness off to successfully become an equal of the West. In addition, Japan considered other Asians as barbarians or inferior races. Only when it needed to exploit Asia militarily or economically, or when it was necessary to fight against the West, has Japan remembered the slogan of Asian solidarity, co-prosperity or ‘living together’ in a contemporary sense. Whilst North Korea’s experimental launching of a missile, its monumental crisis of famine notwithstanding, is a serious problem, the reaction that it evoked in Japan is very disturbing considering the fact that Japan, with its unquestioned military superiority over North Korea, displayed such hyper-sensitivity to the issue that it whipped up militarist and statist hysteria, thus threatening peace and cooperation in Asia. The path to a good relationship with Japan can be achieved only through the continuous and sincere cooperation of conscientious and progressive forces in East Asia, including Korea, China and Japan. The constraints of national division and the failure of the nation to purge pro-Japanese collaborators, the polarized structure of the Cold War and the ultra-right anti-communist institutions may be cited as some of the major causes of South Korea’s faint national consciousness and the very dim flame of its nationalism. They are also inseparably intertwined with either the absence of or the distortion and decline of traditional values. From a cultural and spiritual point of view the national consciousness of South Korea could be likened to that of the colonial period. National defence and security, closely related with national integrity and independence, were compromised due to the strong US influence. Even capital, technology and the market were overly dependent on foreign countries. Globalization has further accelerated the process of the marginalization and subordination of Korean culture. Not to mention primary, middle or high schools, even the universities are beset with problems. The commodification of already substandard education, being promoted by the government and university authorities from above and the student masses from below, has further undermined the weakness and vulnerability of Korean universities and of Korean culture as a whole. Thanks to globalization, private English-language institutes have witnessed a spectacular increase in student enrolment, and the US and other countries are now also flooded with Korean students. It is the march of Ah Qs – a ridiculous development in Korean society. In the dark days of the Yushin regime, aspects of traditional Korean culture such as the mask-dance and pungmul (folk performances) were revived, thus enriching the minjung (lower class people) culture and creating a new university culture. During the same period a new national culture and national economy and a new historiography underpinned with the vision of unification were forged in the furnace of resistance against the Yushin structure. Thousands of young students defied the ban on university students to work in factories, and joined industrial workers or rural peasants and instilled new energy and passion into student movements, labour movements, peasant

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Crisis in North & South Korea and the Path of Korean Nationalism 211 movements, social movements of the deprived and down-trodden masses, civic movements, education movements and environment movements. The entire landscape of resistance was aglow with a new spirit – an unprecedented development in Korean history. Korean society today is caught in a web of confusion about the correct attitude towards life. In order to form a new community on the foundation of a firm national identity and a love for one’s neighbours it is important to look back at the 1970s and 1980s and to think what one needs to do in one’s own field of endeavour. It is also important to remember that until the country eliminates the vestiges of ultra-right anticommunist ideology, understands the hollowness of the Park Chung-hee syndrome and lives within the cocoon of nonchalance and selfishness, it would be difficult to overcome the crisis that it currently faces. When the nation faces its past history squarely, with courage and moral conviction and has built a strong foundation of a balanced understanding of the modern and contemporary history, the world Mun Ik-hwan dreamt of will emerge. ‘It will be a world in which a mountain will truly look like a mountain, the sky like the sky, a tree like a tree, a beast like a beast and a human like a human.’ NOTES 1

2

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Seo Joong-Seok. ‘Moskeuba samsanghoeui Gyeolui-wa Bantak imjeongchudae Undong’ (The Resolution of the Foreign Ministers of the Three Countries in Moscow and the campaign for supporting the Korean Provisional Government in Chongqing), Hanguk Hyeondae Minjokundong Yeongu (A Study on the National Movement in Contemporary Korea), Yeoksa Bipyeongsa, 1991, Chap. 3, Section 1. Jang Jun-Ha. ‘Minjokjuuija-ui Gil’ (The Way of A Nationalist), Minjokjuuija-ui Gil (The Way of A Nationalist). Sasangsa, 1988, p. 55. Song Geon-Ho. ‘Hanguk Jisikinnon’ (On Korean Intellectuals), Minjokjiseong-ui Tamgu (Understanding National Intellectuals), Changjak kwa Bipyeongsa, 1975, pp. 52–54. Oliver,p. 380. (Pak Il-Young trans., p. 490, this page should be p. 489 – the translator). Hong Seok-Ryul. ‘1953–1961nyeon Tongilnonui-ui Jeongae-wa Seonggyeok’ (Development and Characteristics of Unification Discourses from 1953–1961), unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Seoul National University, 1997, pp. 30–32. Regarding the massacre of the members of the National Guidance League, the most detailed description can be found in Ulbujitneun Wonhon (Spirits Howling with Chagrin, (Busan Maeil, 1991). This document was a result of research conducted by the Hangdo Ilbo (daily) in Busan (later known as the Busan Maeil). In addition, see Kim Tae-Gwang, ‘Haebanghu Choedae-ui Yangminchamgeuk Bodoyeonmaeng sageon’ (The Incident of The National Guidance League: The Most Tragic Civilian Massacre Since the Liberation of Korea), Mal (Speech), December 1988; Han Ji-Hui, ‘1949–50nyeon Gungminbodoyeonmaeng Gyeolseong-ui Jeongchijeok Seonggyeok’ (Political Character of Organizing the National Guidance League in 1949–1950), Sukmyeong Historical Research Vol. 2, 1996.

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For the massacres committed by the 11th division, see Ulbujitneun Wonhon (Spirits Howling with Chagrin, Busan Maeil, 1991); Kim Sam-Ung, Haebanghu Yangminhaksalsa (A History of Civilian Massacres Since Liberation), Garamgihoek, 1996; Noh Min-Yeong and Kang Hee-Seong, Geochang Yangminhaksal (Civilian Massacre in Geochang County), Onnuri. 1988. Han Gang-Ha. ‘A A Minjokjaju-wa Tongil-ui Geunaliyeo’(Ah, Ah, Waiting for the Day of National Independence and Unification!), Minjokiyeo, Tongiliyeo (Nation, Unification). Pulbit, 1987, p. 15. See ‘Saseol, Banminjokbunja Cheodan-gwa Jeongbu-ui Chaekim’ (Editorial: Purge of Pro-Japanese People and the Responsibility of the Government), Chosun Ilbo, 20 August 1948. Ogino Fujio. Tokko Keisatsu Taiseishi (A History of the Special High Police). Tokyo: Sarata Publisher, 1984, p. 245. Kim Yeong-Jin ed., Banminja Deagongpangi (Records of Public Trials on AntiNational People). Hanpung Publisher, 1949, pp. 184–186. Oh So-Baek, ‘Baekbeom Salhaebeom Anduhui Gongpan’ (The Public Trial of An Du-Hee, Kim Ku’s Assassin), Urineun Ireoke Salatda (We Have Lived In This Way), Gwanghwamun Publisher, 1962, pp. 106–113. Choe Seok-Chae, Seomin-ui Hangjang (Disobedient Charter of Ordinary People). Beomjosa, 1956, pp. 180–182. For more detailed information on pro-Korean individuals in Japanese political circles, see Seo Joong-Seok, ‘Bakjeonggwon-ui Daeiljase-wa Pahaengjeok Hanilgwangye’ (The Attitude of Park’s Regime towards Japan and the Unequal Korea-Japan Relationship) Yeoksa Bipyeong (Historical Review), Spring 1995, pp. 50–51. Ham Seok-Heon. ‘Minjoktongil-ui Gil’ (The Road to National Unification), Ssial-ui Sori (The Voice of People), September 1979), In Minjoktongil-ui Gil (The Road to National Unification). Hangilsa Publisher, 1984, p. 15. Ibid., p. 17. Yeo Un-Hyeong. ‘Geongukgwaeob-edaehan Sagyeon’ (My views on building the nation state), Dongnip Sinbo (Independence News), 18 October 1946. Erroneously noted as oceanic in the original Korean text. ‘Saseol’ (Editorial), Chosun Ilbo 1 April 1928. Hanseong Ilbo. 21 December 1947. Jo Bong-Am. ‘Naegabon Naeoejeongguk’ (Domestic and Foreign Affairs which I observed), Jobongam-gwa Jinbodang (Jo Bong-Am and the Progressive Party). Hangil-sa. 1991. p. 517. For example, even in the case of the history textbooks issue, we should not only criticize the Japanese distortion of Korean history, but reflect on how Korean history textbooks teach modern Korean history. Unfortunately, this balanced view is not to be found among Korean intellectuals.

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APPENDIX

The Teaching of Contemporary Korean History for National Unity

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TEACHING OF CONTEMPORARY KOREAN HISTORY

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istory and the cultural environment, along with language and lineage are important elements in the formation of a nation. Furthermore, the Korean nation is characterized by strong homogeneity, due to the fact that its history unfolded within a stable frontier over a long period of time. While many ethnic groups have migrated and many peoples have lived with a mix of ethnic groups, in the Korean case, most Koreans have lived on the Korean peninsula since the late seventh century when Shilla unified the country, albeit incompletely. This sense of unity was further strengthened under Goryeo, which unified the Later Three Kingdoms, and under the centralized state of Joseon, which succeeded Goryeo. The Yalu and Tumen Rivers were generally regarded as the borders of Korea’s territory. In this context, prior to the Japanese colonial era, Korea had developed a strong homogenous state in a centralized form, and it was naturally assumed to have maintained a unified state. Until recently, national unification was regarded as a natural common objective, to be pursued with the highest priority. Unless there was unification, Korea would not be able to overcome its crippled condition resulting from its distorted history and evolve into a normal state. Needless to say, the history of the national liberation movement, even the history of the pre-historic period constitutes the common legacy of the people of both North and South Korea. For this reason, the shared legacy of Korean culture, tradition and history has served the important function of linking the North and South, since it constitutes a shared heritage. In the era of unification, when North and South will engage in mutual exchanges, history would have to play the most fundamental role in this process. History, along with language, will have a primary role in facilitating dialogue – probably more so than other disciplines. This explains why historians from the two divided Koreas gather together more frequently in international

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conferences, although it must be noted that those academic conferences have been held outside Korea, mostly in Japan and China. Compared to the relations between East and West Germany before unification, or between present-day China and Taiwan, there are relatively fewer exchanges between South and North Korea. In the German case, after the Brandt government and the Socialist Democratic Party initiated ‘the Eastward Policy (Ostpolitik) in 1969, exchanges in personnel and materials were actively promoted. China-Taiwan relations were extremely hostile until the 1970s, but after 1978 they improved, as a result of the positive policies of the Chinese government. Nowadays, there are no real restrictions on mutual interaction between China and Taiwan. In the case of Korea, internationally the Cold War is over, but the extreme anti-communists in South Korea are still unrelentingly antagonistic towards the North, and impede any exchange or communication between the two Koreas. In recent times, the field of history research and teaching has witnessed more exchanges than in other areas, but these exchanges are still limited. The importance of the teaching of modern Korean history is not confined to the facilitation of academic dialogue, but beyond that it has far-reaching implication for national unity. The reason for this is that, unlike the history of other periods, modern history is directly related to the understanding of present and future developments. Croche said that ‘All true history is contemporary history’. He did not simply mean that contemporary history is important; his implied meaning is that only a concern for the living present inspires us to study past facts, and thus history satisfies our present interests only if the past is blended with the living present. Generally, contemporary history is aligned with present interests, and particularly in the Korean context, the unique trajectory of its contemporary historical development has rendered the contemporary history even more significant to the present concerns. With the advent of modern society, Korea was colonized for the first time in its history. More importantly, it was Japan, a neighbouring country and the only non-white imperialist nation, that occupied Korea. Of the regions occupied after the end of the Second World War, only Korea was divided between the occupation zones of the US, the leader of the capitalist bloc, and the Soviet Union, the leader of the socialist bloc. Korea was divided for the first time in its history due to the international environment of Cold War politics which engulfed the nation, together with internal conflict.1 It was a territorial division as well as a division between capitalism and communism. As was to be expected, the Korean War, which broke out straight after the division, had the characteristics of both a civil and an international war. In South Korea, an extreme anti-communist system has been maintained for about forty years, a rare phenomenon in the world in terms of both degree and duration. Meanwhile, in the North, a monocratic political system based on the Juche ideology controlled the society, again a situation which was quite unique. As is obvious contemporary Korean history has meandered along its own unique path, and as the ‘present interest’ of overcoming these anomalies and developing a unified nation are undoubtedly important tasks, the

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The Teaching of Contemporary Korean History for National Unity 215 significance of teaching and research in contemporary Korean history can hardly be overemphasized. The importance of teaching contemporary Korean history is also to be found in the fact that South and North have biased understanding of each other. Although several other perspectives, such as the nationalist historiography and the Marxist approach have a certain amount of influence in South Korea, the mainstream was the conservative and anti-communist perspective until the 1970s.2 In contrast, the historiographies of a few areas where South and North can understand each other’s research are in pre-modern Korean history. This possibility of mutual acceptance may be true of even modern history prior to the March First Independence Movement. On top of that, North Korea’s research on ancient Korea can be accepted by South Korea’s historians who adopt the nationalist historiography. For example, South Korean scholars may accept, albeit partially, North Korean scholars’ theses that the Korean nation has maintained a single nationhood dating back to an ancient prototype of Koreans who were born independent of other ethnic groups and that Gojoseon (ancient Chosun) established a unified kingdom in the eighth or seventh century BC on the Liaodong peninsula, and its territory was expanded into the Luanhe River. (It runs from the Mongolian Plateau through Hebei Province in China to the Yellow Sea – the translator.) In addition, South Korean scholars have agreed with the achievements of North Korean scholars, led by Kim Seok-Hyeong, who criticized so-called imna ilbonbu or ‘an alleged Japanese colony in old Korea’. Kim Seok-Hyeong and his colleagues refuted the theory of imna ilbonbu by their research on the history of international relations between Korea and Japan in ancient times.3 Except for the issue of the royal tomb of Dangun, South and North historians develop productive discussion and cooperation in the research of archaeology and ancient Korean history. This may be true of modern history prior to the March First Independence Movement even though conferences of scholars have had hot debates between North and South Korean historians. Unfortunately, it would be very difficult to find this prospect in the research on contemporary Korea or on the national liberation movements. As I described above, there is fundamental disagreement in the understanding and interpretation of contemporary Korean history in North and South Korea. As Scholars in the North and South may be so sensitive to the identity and legitimacy of government, they may stick to an ideology of legitimacy of the government, instead of seeking historical truth and facts. If we cannot overcome this defect, it would be very difficult to find the road to national unification. Because of this difficulty, we again find the importance of teaching contemporary Korea. I want to suggest the approach of jonigudong [cun yi qiu tong in Chinese – the translator] or ‘postponing contentious issues and seeking aspects of convergence’ as the approach for teaching contemporary Korean history with a view to achieving national unification. What this means is that North and South Korean scholars would be better off beginning with dialogue on the themes on which they can draw mutually acceptable conclusions, before approaching topics on which they have fundamentally different views.

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First of all, we must focus on the fact that modern Korean history displays a greater degree of bias in South Korea. Since research into contemporary history began in the 1980s and 1990s, the progressive nationalist scholars and the ultra-right anti-communist ideologues have looked at contemporary history in completely different ways. This phenomenon, however, was already present in the period immediately following the liberation of Korea from Japan. On the day of liberation (15 August 1945), if the Left-Right coalition-based Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence had not been established, confusion would not have been the only problem – there would have been criticism of the questioning of the existence of the Korean nation’s independent capacity and what was envisaged for national liberation. Yet, the Korean Democratic Party slandered the efforts of the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence to solve the problem of public order as delusional and welcomed the fact that the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence could not succeed in taking over newspaper companies and broadcasting stations from Japan. Furthermore, they slanderously complained to key members of the Chongqing provisional government such as Kim Ku on 14 September 1945 that ‘the Japanese Government-General tried to establish a pro-Japanese government through Yeo Un-Hyeong’.4 Moreover, when Kim Ku suggested a North–South Inter-Korean leadership conference for 26 January 1948 to discuss ways of achieving national unification, the Korean Association, with the Korean Democratic Party at its heart, claimed: ‘This argument by Kim Ku is identical to the argument of the representative of the Soviet Union in the UN General Assembly, and after this, Kim Ku cannot be seen as a leader of Korea but a worshipper of the Kremlin.’5 The ultra-right anti-communists praised the movement of a separate government led by Rhee Syngman and the Korean Democratic Party as that of a legitimate nationalist acting in conformity with the true spirit of Korean history, and criticized the efforts to establish a nation-state or unified nation by such leaders as Kim Gyu-Sik and other Centrist Nationalists or of Kim Ku and the Korea Independence Party as puppets in the hands of foreign powers, opportunistic and wicked. From the vantage point of this extended logic, the ultra-right anticommunists rationalized the dictatorship of Rhee Syngman and Park ChungHee and evaluated the 16 May coup d’état and the Yusin coup d’état as acts of national salvation. In addition, while masking their past act of collaboration with colonial authorities and their lack of independence, they sought to undermine the significance of such milestones in Korea’s democratization movement as the April Revolution, the Gwangju Democratization Struggle and the Democratization Struggle of June 1987 by calling them ‘riots’. In South Korea, it seems that it is not easy to close the gap of understanding in modern history between extreme anti-communist ideologues and progressive nationalist scholars. Extreme anti-communists think that the

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The Teaching of Contemporary Korean History for National Unity 217 weakening of their theories will lead to a weakening of their social position. And because social position is based on these principles, it gives the impression that frameworks and methods of objective debate are originally blocked from the outset. It is important to point out that research and teaching of contemporary Korean history commenced in the 1980s. As mentioned earlier, the specificity of Korea’s modern history requires that teaching and research in this field be carried out intensively, but because of the uniqueness of Korea’s modern and contemporary history, the extreme anti-communist ruling elites of Korea created an oppressively suffocating environment for historical scholarship. Scholarship on the recent past based on rigorous scientific inquiry and the spirit of dispassionate objectivity and the attendant empowerment of historical scholarship would adversely affect their ability to continue in power, and ultimately cause their ultimate political demise. But under the present trends of globalization, dominated by the paradigm of monopoly capitalism and production-first policy, the ultra-right may gain strength in terms of the advantage of power and capital by insisting on the maintenance of the separate governments, or by seeking to rationalise and legitimize the authoritarian regimes of Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee. Nevertheless, there must be an attempt to hold a dialogue with the ultra-right anti-communists, and explore the areas of convergence in the narrow space of conflicting interests. The important point here is the attitude towards facts and the truth. Furthermore, if we look at the teaching of modern Korean history in North and South Korea, we notice that South Korea, in fact, has barely had any modern Korean history education, while the North has placed great emphasis on modern Korean history education. The reason why modern Korean history education was not properly delivered in the South can be seen as mirroring the situation there vis-à-vis research on modern Korean history.6 The political character of despotic governments in South Korea was in sharp contradiction of liberal democracy, and yet they projected themselves as its true custodians. Such a glaring dichotomy reduced the quality of modern Korean history education to the level of the regime’s standard propaganda. In contrast, there is a strong emphasis on modern Korean history in North Korea which cannot be explained away as the normal emphasis on education of socialist nations on the history of their regimes to emphasize their autonomous and independent identities. North Korea’s emphasis on contemporary history strengthened after the monocratic political system based on the Juche ideology was established. Among the thirty-three volumes of the ‘Complete History of Korea’, published in North Korea at the beginning of the 1980s, volumes from the sixteenth onwards deal with modern Korean history. If we consider the fact that the volumes on modern Korean history start from 1926 when the ‘Down with Imperialism’ League was formed, we may know that the modern edition has been over-emphasized. North Korea’s education on contemporary history and the history of the Korean Worker’s Party are also emphasized and applied in the workforce. It appears that people in South Korea have mostly the stereotypical view of the North which they acquire mainly through an anti-communist education.

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Also, while residents in North Korea have a cult-like view of their regime and its monocratic political system, they have an extremely distorted knowledge about the regime in the South as well. South and North Korea have displayed the most intense conflict in their relationship relative to the Cold War of any region in the world, and this is directly reflected in their respective education on the modern history of Korea. While it is true that this intense conflict has been effected by the Korean War, it also needs to be noted that among leading forces, the ideological confrontation between the South and North had developed in a similar manner before 25 June 1950, as it did in the period after that time. Rhee Syngman insisted on his ‘One People Principle’ dictum that ‘One has to choose between the two options of either allowing oneself to fall into the trap of false propaganda and become a subordinated country or a slave of another country; or defeating the Communist Party and enable the democratic nations to enjoy freedom and prosperity.’7 It is obvious that Rhee Syngman’s vision of the nation was founded on the Cold War logic of the bipolarized world. He castigated Korean communists as those who preferred to be slaves by sacrificing their country, their families and their lives. South Korea’s die-hard anti-communists also insisted that communists were national traitors who blindly followed the orders of the Kremlin.8 The government of South Korea defined the government of North Korea as a ‘puppet’, while the government of North Korea similarly claimed South Korea to be a puppet from the time their government was established. This occurred when the cabinet was formed on 9 September 1948, and the North Korean Supremacy Meeting declared on 10 September that they were the ‘solitary, true, people-based and supreme legal legislative organ of Korea’.9 Additionally, on that day Prime Minister of the cabinet, Kim Il Sung, condemned the ‘South Korean national traitors, under the thumb of imperialist powers’, for having ‘massacred, arrested and detained patriots’ and called the government of South Korea a ‘puppet government’. Furthermore, he insisted that his government was a unified ‘central Korean government’, established by the consensus of the citizens of both South and North Korea.10 The theory of the central government which is emphasized in education in the modern history of South and North Korea is related to the theory of the legitimacy and the legal succession of the government.11 The National Security Law (including the Anti-Communist Law) must be considered and related to the theory of central government in South Korea. Following the Democratization Struggle of June 1987 and the Workers’ Struggles in July, August and September of 1987, the unification movement developed momentum in 1988, with Christian organizations and student movement groups at its core. Simultaneously, a campaign was launched to understand North Korea. However, education on unification was virtually impossible because even the dissemination of supposedly true facts about North Korea was severely punishable under the National Security Law until the eve of the Democratization Struggle in June 1987. For this reason, for nearly fifty years after the division, most South Koreans believed that Kim Il-Sung’s anti-Japanese armed struggle was a complete

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The Teaching of Contemporary Korean History for National Unity 219 forgery. It was even difficult to publish photographs of the Heven Lake at Mt Baekdu, Mt Geumgang, Mt Myohyang, Eulmildae and the Daedong River which had been taken in North Korea, and the mere possession of these images made a person suspicious in the eyes of the regime. It goes without saying that reading North Korean history textbooks, not to mention reading professional academic magazines, was strictly controlled. The theory of the central government contradicts certain aspects of the 4 July Joint Communiqué of 1972 between South and North Korea and it also violates President Park Chung Hee’s 23 June Declaration of 1973 which mainly focused on the problem of the simultaneous entry of the South and North into the United Nations. On 17 September 1991, South and North Korea joined the United Nations together and in December 1991, a written agreement between South and North Korea on harmony and non-aggression as well as mutual exchange and cooperation or the so-called ‘Inter-Korean Basic Agreement’ was signed. Thus, the relationship between South and North Korea was defined as a special relationship which had been provisionally formed in the quest for unification. Both sides agreed that even though they acknowledged the other party’s reality as a state, they did not approve of their counterpart as a country. Recognition and respect and nonintervention in the domestic affairs of the other party were assured. The National Security Law contradicts the 4 July Joint Communiqué of cooperation, along with written agreements between the North and South. Therefore, the legal profession continues to insist that the National Security Law be abolished and that the teaching of modern Korean history for national unity will not be easy as long as that law exists. The legitimacy of the government or authority and the benchmark of morality must be grounded in rational and objective definition similar to the one that applies to democracy and nationalism. If the current situation does not change, then the differences in contemporary history education between North and South Korea will not be narrowed. Huge divergence of opinion exists between historians of South and North Korea on a range of issues in relation to the modern and contemporary history of Korea. Even those scholars of South Korea who see the Juche ideology in a positive light will probably find it difficult to accept the historiographical vision of North Korean scholars. Differences of historical viewpoints or approaches exist amongst South Korean historians also, which must be respected. For the same reason, scholars in South Korea need to demonstrate some flexibility in approaching North Korean historical scholarship. The problem is that there are numerous bones of contention which South Korean scholars find difficult to accept. The starting point for contemporary history in North Korea, for example, appears to confound common sense. After several years of joint discussion and debate, North Korea made it clear in a general discussion of an academic conference in 1961 that the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of various stages in the developments of the mode of production would be used to determine the periodization of Korean history. It was also stated hat the starting point of contemporary Korean history which corresponded to the socialist mode of

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production commenced after liberation in 1945, while the modern history of Korea began with the development of a capitalist society.12 However, as North Korea became a country of Juche or Self-reliance, they asserted that the origin of the ‘Down with Imperialism’ League in 1926, ‘a momentous event which gave rise to both the Korean Communist Movement and the Korean revolution’, marked the beginning of contemporary Korean history.13 Recently, they have set the year of Kim Jung-Il’s birth as the first year of Juche, and have adopted it as a reign year. The teaching of contemporary Korean history in South and North Korea shows distinct differences, but it is very important that people continue to strive towards the realization of unification-oriented education of contemporary history. This would ultimately depend on the soundness of research on contemporary Korean history. When studies on contemporary Korean history are based on the theory of ‘seeking truth from facts’ and inspired by an all-encompassing national vision, the rigidity of ultra-right anticommunists in the South or Juche-based ideological structure in the North would definitely be somewhat relaxed. Educators, media personnel, intellectuals and religious figures would gradually absorb this body of objective and sound research and transmit it to the common people. TEACHING OF CONTEMPORARY KOREAN HISTORY FOR UNIFICATION: UNIFICATION DEBATE AND UNIFICATION MOVEMENT FOR DISMANTLING THE SYSTEM OF NATIONAL DIVISION The teaching of contemporary Korean history will play a pivotal role in the education, intended for the construction of democratic society and the achievement of national unification. Students should be given a balanced and accurate understanding of the issues and themes related to the construction of a democratic society. They should be taught how the governments of Rhee Syngman and the succeeding military junta of Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo-Hwan acted in the most authoritarian ways and how they brutally suppressed the basic principles of liberal democracy and human rights. Teaching of these issues should take into account the cognitive level of students. Such topics as the 12 December coup d’état, staged by Chun DooHwan and Roh Tae-Woo, the 17 May coup d’état and the trials on the Gwangju massacre needed to be taught with such visual aids as the relevant video footage. Furthermore, the democratic struggle of March-April 1960, struggle against the Yushin regime of Park Chung Hee, and the democracy movement of the 1980s including the Democratization Struggle of June 1987, workers’ struggle of July-September 1987, and a campaign against disinformation and negative propaganda about North Korea need to be given proper coverage in the curriculum. The teaching of contemporary Korean history should aim primarily to dismantle the regime of national division. In the case of East and West Germany and that of China and Taiwan, there were several side-effects of division in the form of cultural heterogeneity and pathological phenomena, but in the Korean context, division became a systematic phenomenon. It

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The Teaching of Contemporary Korean History for National Unity 221 was internalized and already in the beginning of 1970s the expression ‘system of division’ was used. Baek Nak-Cheong evinced deep interest in the system of national division in the 1990s, but Jang Jun-Ha was one of the first intellectuals to write on this issue with insight. He was deeply moved by the 4 July Joint Communiqué of North and South Korea. He said that if the joint communiqué, along with the Red Cross meeting, are the first meaningful steps in the direction of peaceful unification, the human suffering of the nation will be alleviated, the history of destruction and distortion will be set aright and a new chapter will be opened.14 Jang Jun-Ha’s diagnosis of the cancerous effect of the national division was closely related to his understanding of the Park Chung Hee administration. He believed that no politician exploited national division more unscrupulously than Park. In economic construction and distribution of power Park openly adopted the policy of intense regional discrimination. In the 1971 presidential election, when Kim Dae-Jung’s surging popularity became too formidable a challenge for him, he managed to win by garnering the votes from his native Gyeongsang province. Subsequently, when he realized that his hold over power could not be ensured by ballots, he used the popular aspiration embodied in the 4 July Joint Communiqué as a scapegoat and staged a coup d’état. The Yushin regime used North Korea (the real or imagined threat from the North) as a pretext for its survival and abandoned the 4 July Joint Communiqué as toilet paper.15 According to Jang Jun-ha, the nation existed because the embers of national unification movement did not die out. Looking at the nodal points in this campaign for unification, we find that Yeo Un-Hyeong viewed Left-Right coalition as the path of a national unity, Kim Ku trod the path of North–South negotiation and Jang Jun-Ha strived for dismantling the system of national division. Jang’s original views about the structure of division approximated those of conservative forces, and there were many areas of convergence between his understanding of the contemporary history and that of advocates of two separate governments on the peninsula. However, as he launched a movement for national unification based on autonomy and peace, his understanding of contemporary Korean history underwent huge transformation. Earlier he was anti-USSR and pro-US, but in his writings after the 4 July Communiqué he wrote that the deployment of foreign forces on the Korean peninsula in the aftermath of liberation did not indicate just military occupation. It also meant political occupation. He pointed out that the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence was established to achieve real liberation of the masses from the foreign powers, but unfortunately such politicians as Song Jin-U and his followers did not support it because of their background as landlords and pro-Japanese collaborators, integrated deeply within the colonial regime. Their opposition to the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence revealed their moral bankruptcy, typical of their social and political background.16 Although a large majority of the Korean people earnestly aspired for reunification, the regime had closed all the avenues for reunion, whether the

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reunion of dispersed families in North and South Korea or dispersed families within South Korea. A movement for national unification was also not launched until 1970s. Teaching about the unification movement will be helpful not only in providing an understanding of the contemporary Korean history, but also on the form of unification that the nation needed to achieve in the future. Progressive proponents of the national reunification such as Jo Bong-Am, Yi Jong-Ryul, Ham Seok-Heon, Jang Jun-Ha, Mun Ik-Hwan, Kang Man-Gil, Baek Gi-Hwan, Baek Nak-Cheong, suggest policies of national unification that differ from the ones proposed by both the North and the South. These proponents of national reunification made it clear that the national reunification movement and the democratization movement are closely related. In the presidential and vice presidential election of 1956, Jo Bong-Am, who proposed peaceful reunification through democratic measures, strongly criticized the situation of South Korea in which mass movements, criticism of the government, and even legal activities were all condemned as anti-state activities.17 Mun Ik-Hwan maintained that there was no freedom for unification movements under the dictatorship supported by foreign powers. According to him, democratization is the resurrection of people and national reunification is that of the nation.18 Proponents of the national unification like Jo Bong-Am cherished minjung (people). They held that without trusting minjung or staging minjung-based unification movements, it would be difficult to fight against the ultra-rightist anti-communist regime and to lead the national unification movement. Jo Bong-Am maintained that minjung knew everything. He said: ‘We never doubt that minjung are wise.’19 Jang Jun-Ha also argued the real national forces for national reconciliation and peaceful unification were minjung. He believed, ‘the national unification depends on minjung only’.20 Ham Seok-Heon who appealed to the awakening of minjung published the magazine ssial-ui sori (Voice of People) in the 1970s. According to his argument, since the national unification was not a political question but a social question, minjung should be the subject of national reunification so that not the unification of political powers, but that of the nation, might be achieved.21 The theories of national unification privileging minjung mostly criticized both of the dominant forces of the South and North. The unified country they dreamed of was different from the existing one either in the North or in the South. For example, Mun Ik-Hwan suggested a theory of the neutralization as a method of national unification.22 In the policy of the neutralization, a new world would be created from measures that the North modified its omnipotent ideology of equality so as to accept some elements of freedom, and by the same token, the South would modify its omnipotent ideology of freedom so at to accept some elements of equality. According to Ham Seok-Heon, because the national unification meant that all the established privileges such as power, wealth, force and education should be negated and society should be reorganized, the true national unification could be achieved only through revolution in which all minjung should be involved.23

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The Teaching of Contemporary Korean History for National Unity 223 TEACHING OF CONTEMPORARY KOREAN HISTORY FOR NATIONAL UNITY: TOWARDS RECONCILIATION AND UNDERSTANDING AND SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND Nothing is better for education for national reunification than exchanges between the South and North, but it is good for this to be accompanied by a national festival. This is because a national festival could affirm the unified nature of the South and North, which lived as a single entity even when they were oppressed by foreign powers before the liberation from Japan. It is not hard to imagine the significance of such festivals as a cohesive force which have been celebrated in foreign countries for centuries to commemorate the day of independence or revolution. There are also religious festivals, national or folk festivals and traditional festivals of individual cities. We may classify national festivals into two broad categories. One of these incorporates the formalities that meaningfully commemorate important moments in which our nation was reborn, such as the 1894 Gabo Peasant War, the 1 March Movement, the 15 August Liberation, the April Revolution and the Democratization Struggle of June 1987. These events have advanced the life of the people or represent the days of victory in the fight against the forces of oppression and subordination. Modern Korean history has unfolded along a uniquely thorny path of ceaseless struggle to reclaim freedom and democracy, but in spite of this, a large number of Korean people have not in fact been positive and forthcoming in commemorating these events. The fight to build a new society is never won with a single victory. It is achieved through continual effort and arduous struggle. Until now the commemorative events to mark the struggle, victory and liberation of the Korean people have merely been formal ceremonies. The struggle for national liberation can play a key role in the regeneration and assertion of the Korean national identity. If the nation meaningfully commemorates the national struggle, people may get an opportunity to reflect on such issues as to why liberation, gained at such a high price, has ended up as national division. Retrospection and reflection on the past will definitely make Korean society healthier and much more cohesive as a community. National festivals have an indivisible relationship with folkways and traditions. They represent the common memory of shared identity, unity and of the experience of having lived as one people for a long time. The preservation and excavation of traditional culture is equally precious. Our cultural assets were not realized only by the South, and neither were they made solely by the North. Cultural assets such as Haein temple and Mt Myohyang belong to all Koreans of the South and North. The cultural assets of Korea are in shambles, as is testified by the buildings of Gyeongbok palace and the forts and traditional government offices in the provinces. Japanese colonial rule is responsible for the damage and disrepair, but Koreans are also to blame. Korean people must reflect whether they have been diligent in looking after the various objects and artefacts which they have inherited from their forefathers. Koreans who have studied in Europe and America, know well the

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history and traditions of the country in which they studied, but there are not many who know the history and culture of their own country, and the majority of Koreans are unaware of the cultural assets of their native place. As a result, they are unable to explain to foreigners how our history and culture are different from China and Japan, how they were formed or what meaning they hold as part of the Korean tradition. National festivals of both categories – commemorative days and folk festivals – are useful in the consolidation of national reconciliation and understanding. It is generally agreed that the teaching of contemporary history should be intended to strengthen reconciliation and understanding between the people of North and South Korea. Nevertheless, there is something that most tend to ignore – reconciliation and understanding can only be achieved if we draw on the rich resources of truth and facts. Amnesia about the past cannot be their basis. We need to understand the truth of history with the spirit of ‘seeking truth from facts’ overcoming the constraints of propaganda and distortion. It is the same with the ultra-rightist anti-communist structure and the National Security Law. By the same logic, school textbooks in South Korea need to include content about North Korea. There can be no unification without awareness of the North – it would be impossible for reunification to occur as it should – but education concerning North Korea from that period until now is distorted and remains in the realm of propaganda. Textbooks on Korean history do not really deal with the subject. In fact, the approach to the topic is identical to attitudes concerning the Korean War. From a terminological point of view, the point of whether to assent to the name ‘Korean War’ or ‘25 June War’ is problematic, but from the perspective of reunification, the name ‘Korean War’ appears to be more acceptable than ‘25 June War’. ‘The Korean War’ is the expression consistently used by the National Defence Ministry, and it connotes the simultaneously international and civil character of the war together with its continuity with the direct and indirect clashes following division. In this case, too, it conveys the truth and facts of the war appropriately. The issues of reconciliation and understanding along with the similar issues of dispersed families incorporate not only the problem of the South and North but also internal South Korean issues. Various large-scale slaughters of innocents such as the 3 April massacre on Jeju Island, the National Guidance League massacre, and the Civilian massacre in Geochang come to mind first of all. Internal reconciliation and understanding in relation to these events has a direct bearing on the realization of reconciliation and understanding between South and North. A total of 30,000 people were slaughtered in the 3 April Incident on Jeju Island, which extended from April 1948 until May and June the following year. The massacre was buried in deep silence until 1988. When the democracy movement brought about tremendous change in the political landscape of South Korea, following the Democratization Struggle in June 1987, people’s demand to investigate into this incident and rehabilitate the memory of the deceased was finally heeded. In 1989, the Joint Preparation Committee for the Memory of 3 April was formed and set up the 3 April memorial; in 1995, the Joint Memorial Service

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The Teaching of Contemporary Korean History for National Unity 225 of 3 April victims was held under the sponsorship of the Joint Preparation Committee for the Memorial Service of the forty-seventh anniversary of the Jeju 3 April Incident and the Association of the Family Members of the 3 April Civilian Victims, with the support of Jeju provincial authorities and the Jeju Provincial Assembly. Before this joint memorial service, the civilian organizations criticized each other. This was more than just an occasion of reconciliation and understanding through a joint memorial service, as it carried an additional significance in that both the provincial assembly and the provincial government rendered its complete support. The joint memorial service was also enacted in 1996 and 1997. In the meantime, in March 1993 the Jeju Provincial Assembly constituted a special commission on the Jeju massacre, and submitted a petition to the National Assembly in Seoul for establishing the special commission on the 3 April Incident. Additionally, in February 1994, the office for reporting the cases of injustice in relation to the 3 April massacre was established. Subsequently in May 1995, the Special Commission of the Jeju Provincial Assembly submitted a report entitled ‘Preliminary Report on the Victims of Jeju 3 April Massacre’. According to the report, 10,581 cases were reported (8,679 dead, 1,041 missing and 870 who disappeared after arrest). Although not reported to the Special Commission, the list of victims compiled through various witnesses and other sources stands at 3,544, making the number of confirmed casualties 14,125. Out of the reported 10,581 victims, 8,909 (84.2%) were killed by combat forces and 1,065 (10.1%) were killed by armed military squads, and the remainder being 5.7%.24 Another major massacre of innocent citizens took place in Geochang County. At Baksan Village of Sinweon prefecture 517 people were killed, amongst whom 109 were men, 183 women and 225 children. Mass slaughter occurred at two other places in Geochang: Tallyang and Cheongyeon villages. 719 people, including 388 women, were killed in the three villages of Geochang. The fate of these innocent victims represented a microcosm of contemporary Korean history. Their corpses, that lay abandoned for three years, were given proper burial at Baksan in March 1954. In March 1960, a project to erect a funerary tablet was initiated, and in November of that year it was completed. It was called Baksan Cemetery joint memorial stone. It was unfortunate that in May 1960 the chief of the prefecture at the time of the massacre (1951) was assassinated. However, within a couple of days of the launching of military coup d’état on 16 May, seventeen leading members of the association of the bereaved families (of the Geochang massacre) were arrested on the charge of forming anti-state organizations. The state engaged in the barbaric act of cutting the memorial stone with a chisel and burying it underground. It was indeed the second massacre. In February 1988, a memorial committee for the innocent victims of the Geochang massacre was formed, and in August 1989 a joint memorial service was held. In September that year a special bill for the posthumous rehabilitation of the honour of the victims of the Geochang massacre and the state compensation (for injustice) was proposed in the National Assembly under the joint signature of 165 members. A special bill for the Rehabilitation of the Victims of the Geochang

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massacre was finally passed by the National Assembly on 18 December 1995, and on 5 January 1996 it was proclaimed under Act number 5148. After the liberation of Korea, a large number of citizens were caught in the maelstrom of Left-Right conflict in both South and North Korea and lost their lives, and it is believed that the remains of tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of people, still lie scattered in the wilderness. For true reconciliation it is essential that their physical remains are collected and properly buried. The nation also needs to set up memorial projects for the victims of the bitter fratricidal struggle. Group tours of students to the historical sites of Jeju or Geochang as part of fieldwork may be conducive towards the cause of national unification. An ideal approach to the teaching of modern history is to emphasize such themes as the movement for the achievement of democracy, autonomy and unification that people launched in South Korea, and an agenda proposed for the construction of a flexible socialist system that was put forward and debated in the North. This may shed light on the current mood of North Korea, which is seeking to adopt the policies of opening and reform. Political debate in North Korea in the 1950s was diverse in its range and rich in substance. Although debate was conducted within the broad ideological parameters set by the state, it was characterized by remarkable plurality. People were relatively free to express their opinion on a wide array of issues in relation to ideology, art and academic topics.25 One may cite a conference held under the auspices of the Academy of Science, Pyongyang, in November 1956 as its ideal illustration. This conference on the transitional period and people’s democracy was an important gathering which was concerned with the official fundamental ideology, and discussed the revolutionary stage of the North Korean system. Song Ye-Jeong emerged as the most controversial theoretician in the conference for his view that the task of anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, all people’s democratic revolution in Korea required the cooperation of the entire nationalist bourgeoisie. He also said, popular sovereignty in Korea is under the guidance of the Marxist-Leninist party, but there are substantial differences between its character and that of the dictatorship of the proletariat.26 The subsequent history of North Korea demonstrates that it diverged significantly from the path it trod in the early period. It is also remarkable that Song Ye-Jeong was not the only person who displayed flexibility of approach at this time. It is obvious from the above discussion that North Korea’s understanding of the modern and contemporary history of Korea in the post-March First Movement era is sharply different from the one held in South Korea. However, there is a need to find ways to narrow the difference by finding the area of convergence and commonality, and making those the basis of teaching materials. This approach will contribute immensely to the gradual relaxation of tension and solution of the problem. The teaching of history across the ideological divide could find common ground by focusing on historical figures respected in both South and North Korea. Shin Chae-Ho and Pak EunSik are universally acknowledged in South Korea as the two most towering figures in the field of modern nationalist historiography. They are also held

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The Teaching of Contemporary Korean History for National Unity 227 in high esteem in North Korea. A North Korean scholar noted that working under the most adverse conditions of the colonial period Shin Chae-Ho and Pak Eun-Sik used their pens as tools to raise the anti-Japanese consciousness of the Korean people. In his various writings of the time, Shin Chae-Ho exhorted his countrymen to intensify their struggle against Japanese imperialist rule and win back the lost sovereignty.27 Such members of the Independence Army as Hong Beom-Do and Yang Se-Bong also evoke positive reaction in both South and North Korea. A North Korean scholar wrote about Hong Beom-Do that he was already famous as a member of the righteous army, and in 1919–1920 when he organized the Independence Army, he launched a series of attacks on the bases of the Japanese army and killed many enemies. To quote a North Korean work on Yang Se-Bong, ‘when many units of the Independence Army were being disbanded under the pressure of the invading forces of Japanese imperialists and due to internal dispute, the unit under the command of Yang Se-bong showed unflagging spirit of armed resistance against the enemy’.28 OVERCOMING HISTORICAL AMNESIA The Korean people have been showing signs of historical amnesia for quite some time. They lived in the Japanese colonial period and the post-liberation era without studying their own history. They do not know with precision and clarity such basic questions about their own history: why South Korea’s official name contains the word Han (Dae han min guk) and why North Korea calls itself Joseon; why the word Han was used in the elevated name of Dae Han Jeguk (Great Korean Empire), adopted by the Joseon dynasty in 1897; and why numerous patriotic organizations fighting for the independence of the country during the colonial period adopted the words Han, Joseon or Korea to name themselves. There are also very few Koreans who know when the Korean nation was formed or what the term liberal democracy concretely denotes. The loss of history implies an attempt to undermine one’s own history as well as the poverty of historical consciousness. Some politicians endeavoured to erase the inconvenient parts or potentially disadvantageous aspects of the nation’s freedom struggle, which amounts to the distortion of history, as it not only detracts from the significance of Korean history, but also dilutes the national identity. The Korean patriots, since the latenineteenth century, were rewarded with tragic fate of oppression and deprivation for their selfless sacrifices for the nation and their people, and perhaps, the vast masses who witnessed this saga of suffering, made the maxim ‘ignorance is bliss’ a motto of their lives. They closed their eyes to the spectacle of truth, and docilely accepted the government propaganda that blared into their ears. What the nation requires today is a new posture and attitude towards the challenges of globalization and the equally important challenge of giving a new thrust to inter-Korea relations. Distancing oneself from the hangers-on of the past who danced to the tune of their masters, the present generation is required to intervene in the national reality and understand the significance

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of contemporary Korean history. Thus, teaching the contemporary history of the North and South is indispensable. As mentioned earlier, when exchanges and interaction between South and North Korea becomes more frequent, unification will assume a new urgency. People across the 38th parallel will interact in various forms and create a conducive atmosphere for unification, and it is indeed important that the national unification is achieved only after the foundation of mutual goodwill and understanding is laid. It is also possible that the two sides will be able to reach an agreement on this issue. The reality of the Korean peninsula is different from China-Taiwan relations, allowing people from Taiwan to visit China or invest in Chinese economy freely. The younger generation of South Korea is not enthusiastic about unification, but if they get an opportunity to visit the North Korean cities of Pyongyang and Gaesong and freely interact with North Korean people, their attitude towards unification may change. If we look at inter-Korea relations and the history of North and South Korea, we realize that unification will not be smooth sailing. So long as people in North and South Korea hold mutually dichotomous understanding about their recent past, it will be difficult to create harmonious interKorea relations. The true path of national unification involves an exploration of the possibility of making people in North and South Korea understand and appreciate their contemporary history. Such strategies will merge when the nation reflects critically on the future path of the nation. NOTES 1

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The Three Kingdoms period did not represent the age of division, but the process of the establishment of early states through confederation of various tribal polities. The Later Three Kingdoms may be viewed as a divided regime, but it was a temporary division of the pre-modern society, and may, therefore, be viewed as a transitional stage preceding the age of a centralized and unified state. In this sense, its character differed from the contemporary division of the Korean peninsula. See Noh Tae-Don, ‘Haebanghu Minjokjuuisahaknon-ui Jeongae’ (The Development of Nationalist Historiography after the Liberation), Hyeondae Hanguk Sahoegwahak-gwa Sagwan (Contemporary Korean Social Sciences and Historiography), Iljogak Publisher, 1991. See Seo Joong-Seok, ‘Minjokjuuisahak Nonjaeng’ (Debates on Nationalist Historiography), Jindan Hakbo (Korean Studies Review), Vol. 80, 1995. Seo Joong-Seok, Hanguk Hyeundae Minjokundong Yeongu (A Study on the National Movement in Contemporary Korea), Yeoksabipyeong Publisher, 1991, pp. 267–268. Ibid., pp. 458–549. On the conditions constraining research on contemporary Korean history, see Seo Joong-Seok, ‘1980nyeondae ihu Jinbojeok Yeonguja-deului Namhan Hyeondaesa Yeongu-ui Donghyang-gwa Jeonmang’, Hanguk-ui Geundae-wa Geundaeseong Bipan (Critique of Korean modernity and modern times), Yeoksabipyeongsa Publisher, 1996, pp. 121–133.

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The Teaching of Contemporary Korean History for National Unity 229 7

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9 10 11

12

13

14

15

16

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19 20

21

22

Rhee Syngman, Ilminjuui Gaeseol (An Outline of One People Theory), Ilminjuui Bogeuphoe (Association for Promoting One People Theory), 1949, pp. Seo Joong-Seok, ‘Rhee Syngman Jeongbuchogi-ui Ilminjuui’ (One People Principle in the Early Period of the Rhee Syngman Regime), Jindanhakbo, Vol. 83, 1997, p. 174. Joseonjungang Tongsinsa, Joseonjungang Yeongam, 1950, p. 56. Joseonjungang Tongsinsa, Joseonjungang Yeongam, 1949, p. 45. Seo Joong-Seok, Hanguk Hyeundae Minjokundong Yeongu (A Study on the National Movement in Contemporary Korea), vol. 2, Yeoksabipyeong Publisher, 1996, specifically see chapter 2. Geunse mit Choegeunsesa Yeongusil (Department of Modern and Late Modern History), ‘Joseon Geunsesa Sigigubun Munje-e gwanhan Haksultoronhoe Chonghwa’ (Conclusions from the Academic Discussion on the Periodization of Korean Modern History), Bukhanhakgye-ui Hanguk Geundaesa Nonjaeng (Debate on Modern Korean History by North Korean Scholars), Changjakgwa Bipyeongsa Publishers, Seoul, 1989, pp. 166–167. Kim Han-Gil, Hyeondae Joseon Yeoksa (Contemporary Korean History), Ilsongjeong Publisher, 1988 (Originally, Pyongyang: The Academy of Social Sciences, 1983). See specifically section two in chapter two. Jang Jun-Ha, ‘Minjokjuuija-ui Gil’ (The Way of A Nationalist), A Jang Jun-Ha (Ah, Jang Jun-Ha), Donggwang Publisher, 1982, p. 209. Jang Jun-Ha, ‘Uri-ui Hyeonsil-gwa Sahoe Jeongui’ (Current Social Reality and Social Justice), Minjokjuuija-ui Gil (The Way of A Nationalist), Sasang, 1988, p. 61; Jang Jun-Ha, ‘Minjok Tongil Jeollyak-ui Hyeondangye’ (The current state of the national unification strategies), Minjokjuuija-ui Gil (The Way of A Nationalist), pp. 4. Jang Jun-Ha, ‘Minjok Tongil Jeollyak-ui Hyeondangye’ (The current state of the national unification strategies), Minjokjuuija-ui Gil (The Way of A Nationalist), pp. 45–47. Jo Bong-Am, ‘Uriui Dangmyeon Gwaje’ (Our Current Task), Jo Bong-Am-gwa Jinbodang (Jo Bong-Am and the Progressive Party), Hangilsa Publisher, 1991, pp. 482–503. Mun Ik-Hwan, ‘7,4 gongdong seongmyeong ihu-ui minjok munje’ (The National Question after the 4 July Communique), Jukeum-eul salja (Lit. ‘Let’s Live Death’), Hyeongseongsa Publisher, 1986, pp. 106–108; Mun Ik-Hwan, ‘Tongil Munjeinsik-ui Hyeondangye’ (The Current Stage of Understanding the National Unification), Ibid., pp. 117–118. Jo Bong-Am, op. cit., pp. 512–513. Jang Jun-Ha, ‘Minjok Tongil Jeollyak-ui Hyeondangye’ (The current state of the national unification strategies), p. 48. Ham Seok-Heon, ‘Minjok Tonghab-ui Gil’ (The Road for National Unity), Yukcheonman Minjokape Bureujitneun Malsseum (My Cry to the Nation of Six Million). Hangilsa Publisher, 1984, p. 36. Mun Ik-Hwan, ‘7,4 gongdong seongmyeong ihu-ui minjok munje’ (The National Question aft the 4 July Communique), op. cit., p. 109; Mun Ik-Hwa, ‘1 minjok 1 gukga 2 cheje’ (one nation, one country, two regimes), Mokmaeneun Gangsan Gaseum-e Gopge Sunoeumyeo (Irresistible Yearning for the

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Mountains and Rivers of the Fatherland, Embracing it in my Deep Heart), Sagyejeol Publisher, 1994, pp. 91–92. Ham Seok-Heon, ‘Minjok Tongil-ui Gil’ (The Road to National Unification), Minjok Tongil-ui Gil (The Road to National Unification), Hangilsa Publisher, 1984, p. 19. Jejudo uihoe 4.3 teukbyeol wiwonhoe (Special Commission on the 3 April Incident in Jeju Island), Jejudo 4,3 pihaeja ilcha Bogoseo (The First Report on the 3 April Incident in Jeju Island), 1995, p. 45. See also its revised version Jejudo 4,3 pihaejosa Bogoseo (The Report on the 3 April Incident in Jeju Island) published in January 1997. For the purpose of finding the truth of the 3 April Incident and recovering honours of the victims, the National Assembly of ROK introduced the Special Act on the Investigation of the 3 April Incident and Recovery of Honours of the Victims on 12 January 2000. Based on this special act, the Report of Investigation on the Truth of the April 3rd Incident in Jeju Island is published by a government commission. This report of investigation has a special meaning in that it is the first government report on civilian massacres which happened during the Korean War. Seo Dong-Man, ‘50nyeondae Bukhan-ui Jeongchigaldeung-gwa Ideologi Sanghwang’ (Political Conflicts and Ideologies in the 1950s in North Korea), Proceedings of Yeoksamunje Yeonguso (Institute of Historical Problems), Bukhansahoejuuicheje-ui Yeoksaseong-gwa Gaehyeok-ui Jeonmang (Historical Character of North Korean Socialism and the Prospect of its Reform), 24 May 1997, p. 1 of abstract collection. Song Ye-Jeong, ‘Gonghwaguk Bukbanbu-eseoui Sahoegyeongjejeok Baljeon-ui Yeoksajeok jejogeon-gwa Makseuleninjuui Iron-ui Myeotgaji Myeongjedeul-e Daehahyeo’ (On several theses of Marx-Leninist Theories and the Historical Conditions of the Socio-economic Development in North Korea), Yi ByeongCheon, edited, Bukhan Hakgyeui Hanguk Geundaesa Nonjaeng (Debate on Modern Korean History by North Korean Scholars), Changjakgwa Bipyeongsa Publishers, Seoul, 1989, p. 193. Yi Jong-Hyeon, Geundae Joseon Yeoksa (The Modern History of Korea, originally published in Pyongyang, 1984), Ilsongjeong Publisher (reprint), 1988, p. 299. Kim Han-Gil, op.cit., p. 24.

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Index

Academy of Korean Studies 42, 46 Advancement Society 95, 96, 97, 101 agricultural cooperatives 66 All Korea Political Meeting 79 alphabet 30, 151 American Military Government class interests 36 Constituent Assembly 116 direct rule 36 fascist government support 63 pro-Japanese collaborators 35–9, 112 pro-Japanese collaborators supported 123 pro-Japanese individuals, use of 36–7, 60, 63, 104–5 right-wing nationalists supported 123 An Chang-Ho 26, 27, 28, 29, 31 An Du-Hui 200 An Du-Hwi (An Tu-hui) 40 An Jae-Hong 32, 35, 100, 113, 114, 115, 116, 116, 117–20, 122, 124–6 An Jung-Geun 30 Andong 202–3 Anseong massacre 197 anti-communism dominant ideology 39 factors influencing 64–5 National Security Law 64 one man rule 174–7 paramount 43 statism 41–2 ultra-right dictatorship 174–83 Anti-Communist Law 42 anti-fascist united fronts 110 Anti-National Traitors Law 92 anti-Trusteeship campaign 37–8, 60–1, 62, 64, 105, 193–4

Anti-Trusteeship Commission for the Struggle for Independence 111 April Revolution 1960: 44, 50, 56, 63, 67, 186 archaeology 8 Armistice Supervisory Committee of the Neutral Countries 152–3, 157 Association of Teachers 42 Associations of the Leaders of Political Parties 72 Baekje 22 Baek Nam-Un (Paek Nam-un) 7, 55, 72 Baekbeom-ism 195 Bandung Conference 163 ‘Bandung’ system 208 Banminja Daegongpangi [Full Records of the Trails of National Traitors] 90 Barhae 8, 22 ‘Becoming the Japanese Emperor’s Loyal Subjects’ campaign 37 bourgeois class 22–6, 31, 126n1 Buddhism 98 bukjintongil 67, 74 Bundansidae-ui Yeoksainsik [Towards A Historical Understanding of the Period of National Division] 56 Busan 63, 169, 171 Busan political incident 1952: 138, 139, 175 Byun Yeong-Tae 143, 145, 164 Campaign for the Reconstruction of the Korean National Character 100

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Central Council for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence 111 Central People’s Committee of the Korean People’s Republic 110 Central Youth Army School 103 centrists 43, 108, 116–17, 126 Cha Jae-Jeong 101 chaebeol 91 chaebol system 47, 67 Cheondogyo 100 Chiang Ching-Kuo (Jiang Jingguo) 4 Chiang Kai-Shek 133 Choe Chang-Seob 157 Choe Dong-Ho 113 Choe Dong-O 114, 116, 120 Choe Ik-Hyeon 30 Choe Nam-Seon 100, 101 Choe Neung-Jin 73 Choe Rin 100, 101 Choe Seok-Jae 157–8, 189n43 Chollima campaigns 66 Christian organisations 98 Christianity of leaders 27, 102 Chun Doo-Hwan 5, 43–4, 64 Coalition of Patriotic Associations 70 Cold War continuation today 13 ‘division-based statism’ 11–12 ideology and political legitimacy 11 ideology survives in Korean society 205 Korea last bastion xiii-xiv national division 58, 62 Park Chung-Hee regime 42–3 ultra-right anti-communism 194–8 Colonial rule 30–5 Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence 14, 15, 30, 36, 111, 112, 113 Committee to Discuss the Current Political Situation 110–11 communist faction incident 40, 64 Conference of the National Representatives 111 Confucian moralism 80 Congress of South Korean People’s Representatives 72–3 Constituent Assembly 116, 123

Constitution of All Korea 62 Constitutional Assembly 69–70 Corps for the Advancement of Scholars (Heungsadan) 31–2 Council for the Establishment of the Interim Government 111 ‘cow-bone’ towers 171 Croce, Benedetto 203 Cultivation of National Capability movement 100 cultural crises 193 Cultural Movement 100 culture 210 Daegu Maeil 157–8 Daehan (Great Korean) Nationalist Party 41 Daehan Maeil Sinbo 95 Daejeon 136 Daewongun 94–5, 202 Dangun 55 Dangun myth 37 dasari theory 122, 125 December thesis 33 Democracy League 148 democracy resurgence from 1987: 47 Democratic Front for National Unification 78 Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland 65 Democratic Independent Front 110–11 Democratic Nation Party 40 Democratic National Front 92, 110, 113, 114, 133 Democratic National Party 41, 144, 147–8, 151 Democratic Party 63, 153, 155 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, formation 78 Democratization struggles 1987: 196, 198 ‘development first’ policy 67 Die-Hard Anti-Communist Unification through Northward Advance 129, 137–56 and see Unification through Northward Advance

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Index divided countries China 48, 57, 206 Germany 48, 56–7, 196, 206–7 typical pattern 58 Vietnam 48 Dokchok gukminhoe 124 Dong-a Ilbo 100, 113 Donghak sect 96 DPRK-Soviet Union Friendly Cooperation and Mutual Help Agreement 168 economic crises 192–4 economy 46–8 Eden, Anthony 164 education, South Korea ignorance about North Korea 3, 18 egalitarian society 201 Egypt 26 Eisenhower, Dwight D 138, 165–6 elections 1948 May 69, 124, 175 1950 May 40–1, 124, 175 1954 May 144–5, 173, 176 1956 Presidential 56, 153–4, 161, 177 1956 Provincial 178 1958 May 180 1958 Presidential 56 1960 March 173–4 1960 May 44 1960 Presidential 180 1971 Presidential 67 1978 December 44 1985 February 44 1987 Presidential 44 1988 April 44 malpractices 178 Emergency National Council 111, 113, 114, 119 Enlightenment Party early 93, 94, 95 later 93, 94 Eo Yun-Jung 94 Eom Hang-Seop 74 Eom Sang-Seop 175–6 Ethical Reform Associaiton 99 ethno-nationalism 37–8, 55 Executive Committee for Establishing the Central Government 70

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Farmland Reform Act 40 Federation of Korean Trade unions 157 ‘fight and peace’ slogan 155 Fishery Agreement 152 Five Principles (Democratic National Front) 114 Five Principles of the National Front 1946: 61 five-party conference 111, 116–17 Five-point Principles 126–7n4–5 Flying Horse campaigns 66 Forum of Political Parties 111 four great principles 120–1 four Kims meeting 71, 117 Four-Party communiqué 113 Four-Party conference 111 Fourteen articles declaration 142–3 Gabo Peasant Uprising 1894: 24 Gaeseong 152–3, 158 Gal Bong-Geun 148 Gam Ryang-Han 94 Gapsin coup 1884: 94 General Federation of Korea Labour 111 general strike 1946: 114–15 ‘Gentlemen’s Sightseeing Tour’ 94 Geochang Massacre 6, 178 Go Joseon 8 Goguryeo 22 Gojong, King 95 Gorbachev, Mikhail 207 Great Korean National Party 41, 124 Gungmindang 92 Gwak Sang-Hun 175 Gwangju student movement 101 Gwangju Uprising 50, 64 Gwanmin gongdonghoe [Joint Official and People Society] 28 Gyeongbuk Police Department 157 Gyeongsang province 198 Haebangchon 200 Hakjigwang 101 Ham Sang-Hun 147–8, 149 Ham Seok-Heon (Ham Sok-hon) 17, 201, 205 Hampyeong massacre 6

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Han Hui-Seok 145, 173 Hangeul 30 Hanguk Geundaesa [The Modern History of Korea] 15 Hanguk Hyundaesa [The Contemporary History of Korea] 15 Hanguk Minjungsa [The History of Korean Minjung] 15 Hanguksa Gangui [Lectures on Korean History] 15 Hankyoreh 6 Hanseong Ilbo 116, 117 ‘harm of independence’ theory 33 Headquarters of the National Unification 111 Henderson, Gregory 203 Heo Heon 78, 108 Heungsadan see Corps for the Advancement of Scholars Hideyoshi 90 History of Socialism 179 Hodge, General 38, 115, 123 Hong Myeong-Hui 72 Hwang Yong-Ju 196 Iljinhoe 95, 97 Incheon 169, 197 Independence Club 28, 29, 96 industrialization 46–7 inter-Korea relations see national division inter-Korea summit meeting 2000 1, 18, 19 Interim Legislative Assembly 92 ‘International communist party’ incident 175 Iran 26 Ito Hirobumi 91, 95 Jang Deok-Su (Chang Tok-Su) 37, 101, 123, 125 Jang Geon-Sang (Chang Kon-sang) 40, 41, 79, 124, 179–80 Jang Gyeong-Geun 145, 173 Jang Jun-Ha (Chang Jun-ha) 13–14, 14, 194, 205, 208 Jang Myeon 46, 132, 175, 179 Jang Taek-Sang 115, 125

Japan assimilation policy 23, 34–5, 10 loyalty to Japan policy in Korea 23 Resident General 28 resistance 32–3 supporters 35 Japan Party 95 Japanese Military Academy 103 Japanization policies 101 Jeju Island Massacre 1948–49: 6, 73, 196–7, 204 Jemin Ilbo 197 Jeolla province 162, 198 Jeong Chang-Nyeol (Chong Chang-Nyol) 15 Jeong Heon-Ju 175 Jeong Il-Gwon 103 Jeong No-Sik 108 Jeonnam Province 178 Jin Deok-Gyu 164 Jinhae 168 Jo Bong-Am (Cho Pong-Am) 44, 56, 79, 124, 142, 151, 164–5, 209 execution 6, 63, 162, 182 Jo Byeong-Ok 41, 115, 116, 125, 134, 149, 151, 155 Jo Dong-O 79 Jo Je-Cheon 176 Jo Jeong-Hwan 169, 172 Jo So-Ang 41, 124, 148 Joint Committee of the USA and Soviet Russia 61–2 Joint Conference of Political Parties to Deal with the US-Soviet Joint Commission 110–11 Joint Meeting of the Leaders of Political Parties and Associations of all Korea 71, 72 , 78 Joint North-South Talks of Political Leaders 62, 71 Joint Official and People Society 28 Jones, Joseph L 134 Joseon Jeonsa 9 Joseon Minjokui Jillo [The Road for the Korean Nation] 7, 55 Joseon period, early 23 Ju Si-Gyeong 30

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Index Juche ideology 17, 49, 66, 193 July Joint Declaration 1965 14 ‘June attack’ 1949: 40 June Democratization Struggle 1987: 33, 44, 50, 56 June Struggle 1987: 47 Jungang Bangsong 118, 120 Kang Man-Gil 14–15, 56 Kim Bung-Jun 114, 120 Kim Byeong-No 35, 121 Kim Dae Jung xv Kim Dal-Ho 169 Kim Dong-Sam 203 Kim Dong-Seong 149 Kim Du-Bong 71, 117 Kim Du-Hwan 145 Kim Gyu-Sik 41, 71, 72, 74, 78, 79, 113, 114, 115, 116, 116, 117, 120–1, 122, 125 Kim Hwal-Ran 101 Kim Il-Sung 58, 66, 71, 72, 78, 117 ‘fake’ theory 3 Kim Jong Il 1, 4, 18, 58, 66 Kim Jong-Pil 45 Kim Jong-Won 178 Kim Jun-Yeon 149 Kim Ku 10, 14, 14, 38, 39, 70–1, 71, 72, 73, 74, 78, 110, 117 assassination 40, 64, 135, 200 ultra-right organisations 1946–7: 111 Kim Ku-ism 195 Kim Ok-Ju 148 Kim Sam-Gyu 179 Kim Sang-Don 150 Kim Seok-Hyeong (Kim Sok-hyong) 8 Kim Seon-Tae 178 Kim Seong-Sik 182–3 Kim Seong-Su 123, 125 Kim Seong-Suk 79, 179–80 Kim Ui-Jun 175 Kim Won-Bong 200 Kim Yak-Su 148 Kim Yeon-Su 101 Kim Young-Sam xv, 135 Kimkuism 14 kominka 23, 30, 34

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Korea alphabet 30, 151 archaeology 8 Buddhism 98 colony of Japan 23 culture 210 language 32, 35, 102 names 102 National Anthem 202 ruling classes 24 semi-colony of Japan 23 traditional culture 45 trivial differences of opinion 18 Korea Agricultural association 99 Korea Association 96 Korea Independence Party 69 Korea Self-Strengthening Association 96 Korea Today 179 Korea-Japan friendship associations 99 Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty 13, 17, 45, 64, 67 Korea-Japan Treaty 1905: 161 Korea-US Dialogue 122 Korea-US Mutual Defence Agreement 1953: 165, 169 Korean Central Intelligence Agency 41, 42, 197 Korean Communist Party 33–4, 39, 92, 111 Korean Confederation of Labor Unions 42 Korean Democratic Party 33–4, 36, 69, 92, 110 Korean history contemporary history importance 213–15 contemporary history unknown 204 disparity in understanding 7–9 divided era 12 education on modern history in the two Koreas 216–20 ignorance of 202 legitimacy theory 9 ‘minjung histiography’ 15 national division 68 North Korea recognise significance 6–7

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overcoming historical amnesia 227–8 reconciliation need 223–7 Rhee government promotion 46 textbooks 45–6 unification relevance 220–2, 223–7 Korean Independence League 110 Korean Independence Party 38, 110, 117, 118, 120, 135, 208 Korean Nationalist Party 37, 38–9 Korean Provisional Government 38 Korean Provisional Government in Chongqing 38, 60, 112, 113, 179 Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai 31 Korean Revolutionary Party 120–1 Korean Self-Strengthening Society 28 Korean Studies Movement 32 Korean War civil war 24 Constitution revisions 63 factors leading to outbreak 66 Geneva talks 141–3 Geneva Talks 1954: 162 massacres 197 massacres and genocide 6 name of war 16 nationalists 124 radio messages from Rhee Syngman 136–7 sons avoiding war 171 Korean Women’s League 112 Korean Worker’s Party 65, 66 Korean Youth Corps 133 Korean-American joint talks 115 Koyama Mitaro 101–2 Kwon Jeongsaeng xiii Kyunghyang Sinmun 182 land reform 61, 119–21 landlord associations 99 landlord system 32 Langdon, William R 60 language 32, 35, 102 Left-Right Coalition 108, 114–16, 118–19 Left-Right Coalition Committee 110–11, 111, 114, 115–16 Left-Right Schism 112–14

Left-Right United Front 113 leftists 36 Liberal Party 140, 145, 173 Liberation, fiftieth anniversary 1995: 15–16, 204 Liberation Village 200 ‘livelihood for all’ theory 122, 125 Local Autonomy Act 182 Lower United Front 110, 111 Lu Xun 202 MacArthur, Douglas, statue 169 Maeil Sinbo 101 Mal 6 Manchurian Military Officers’ College 103 March First Movement 1919: 7, 8, 10, 30–1, 70 Martial Law decree of 17 May 64 mask dances 45, 210 McCarthyism 163 Meeting of Key Political Figures of South and North 71–2 Meeting of the Representatives of All Korean Political Parties 111 Military coup 1979: 64 Military coup of 16 May 1960: 39, 41–2, 44–5, 56, 63, 67, 186 Military mutiny 1882: 24, 28 Min Young-Hwan 30 Minjung Historiography 15 modernization 46–7 modernization and nationalism 25–6, 29 Molotov, Vyacheslav M 134 monocratic political structure 58, 66 Moscow Accords 1945: 38, 60–1, 64, 71, 111–12, 118 Mount Baekdu 166 Muccio, John 136 Mun Ik-Hwan 208, 211 My Confessions 105 myeolgong bukjin tongil see Unification through Northward Advance 129 myeongbun 11 myeongbunnon 80 Namwon massacre 6 ‘nation’ word 193

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Index National Anthem 202 national consciousness 31 National Cooperative Movement 114 National Council of Korean Labour Unions 111, 112 national division after establishment of separate governments 73–7 Central government theory 68–73 Cold War 58, 62 differences intensified 66 force of situation 79–80 Korean history 68 left-wing responsibility 126 movement towards 59–62 National Security Law 62–3 nationalism 109 objective approach difficult 80–1 overview 55–9 political changes in North and South Korea 65–7 Rhee government 67 strategies for overcoming 79–81 USA-USSR military division 59–60 national festivals 223–5 National Guidance Committee for Renovating the Korean Government incident 175 National Guidance League 41, 64, 139, 197 National Guidance League massacre 6 National Independence League 111, 116, 116–17, 208 National League of Peasant Unions 112 National Neighbourhood Associations 179 National Party 118, 119 National Policy on National Reunification 149–52 National Rally for Opposing an Armistice without Unification 137 National Security Law abrogation essential 13 anti-communism 64 anti-communist statism 41 contact across the 38th parallel offences 59 impact on society 5–6 Koreans overseas 43

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national division 62–3 political legitimacy of South Korea 10–11 pretext for enacting 73 revisions 180–1 revisions passed 182 24 [December] incident 182 National Society for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence 69, 111, 124 National Traitors Law 92, 103–4 ‘National Unification by Northward Advance’ 65 National Unification Policies 87n81 National United Front 18, 107–8, 110, 118 concept 110–11 responses to 112–17 nationalisation of industries 119 nationalism authoritarianism 109 Colonial rule 31 criteria 109–10 cultural identity 205 Dan-Gun centred 55 extreme right-wing threat 125 history teaching relevance 223–7 Korean Democratic Party 33–4 Korean War and nationalists 124 Military coup of 16 May 44–5 ‘nation’ word 193 national community construction 204–9 national division 109 ‘one nation but two states’ 48–9 overview and conclusions 209–11 privilege of nation over class 33 Rhee Syngman 33–4, 182–3 right-wing 108–12, 122–6 socialists and reformists 32–3 strong wish for single state 49 ‘two nations and two states’ 48–9 understanding own society 201–4 nationalism and modernization 25–6, 29 Nationalist Party 92 Neighbourhood Watch against Communism 66

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New Delhi ‘secret meeting’ allegations 147–9, 151, 177 New Korea Society 32, 33, 208 New Korean Democratic Party 120–1 New People’s Association 95 New People’s Party 108 New People’s Society 30 ‘New Village’ movement 203 Noh Il-Hwan 78, 148 North Korea misinformation on South Korea 4 North Korean Worker’s Party 65 October insurrection 1946: 114–15, 122 Oh Gyeong-Sim 148 Oh Jae-Gyeong 171 Oh Je-Du 176 Ohira-Kim memorandum 45 Oliver, Robert T 132, 133 On the Reconstruction of the Korean National Character 32 ‘one nation but two states’ 48–9 Ongjin 152–3, 158 ‘Oppose the Armistice if there is no Unification’ slogan 137 Ostpolitik 56–7, 207 Pace, Frank jr 195 Pacific Alliances 163 Pacific War 209–10 Paek Du-Jin 138, 140 Pak Chan-Gil 73 Pak Dong-Seo 173 Pak Heon-Yeong 72, 79, 114 Pak Jeong-Geun 140 Pak Jeong-Ho 179 Pak Si-Hyeong (Pak Si-Hyong) 8 Pak Yeong-Hyo 94–5 Panmunjeom 196 Park Chung-Hee 4–5, 103, 174, 200 Park Chung-Hee regime 41–2, 45–6 military dictatorship 43–4 supposed threat from North Korea 42 Patriotic Neighbourhood Associations 179 Patriotic Thought League 102 Patriotic War Front Corp 102

Peaceful Coalition Cabinet of North and South Korea 176 Peaceful Unification theory 129, 152, 154 People’s Army 71 People’s Assembly 111 People’s Committee 36 People’s Congress 71, 72 People’s Party 108 political parties post-war 107–8 Popular Fronts 110 press power 181 Privy Council 97, 100 pro-Japanese collaborators after liberation 103–6 after the March first movement 98–103 American Military Government support 35–8, 104–5, 112, 123 bourgeois class 96–7 bourgeoisie 99–100 classes 92, 93–4 criminal skills 104 definitions 92–3 graduates 103 historical context 89–93 identification 92 influence on Korean history 90–1 ingratiating ability 104–5 meaning of phrase 89–90 not punished 198–201 police force 97, 99 prior to March first movement 93–8 punishment bill 116 reformists 101–2 relationship with USA 91 Rhee Syngman 172–3 right wing weakness 121–2 social elite 98 students in Japan 94 summary 105–6 survival ability 104–5 Unification through Northward Advance 172–4 wartime increases 100–1 wartime support for Japan 102 Progressive Party 6, 56, 63, 66, 95, 153, 161–2, 171, 179

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Index Progressive Society 101 Promotion Society 99 Protectorate Treaty 1905: 26, 28, 95 Provisional Government of Korea 70 pungmul 210 ‘puppet government’ descriptions 49, 59, 72 Pyeongtaek massacre 197 Pyongyang 1, 4 ‘Pyongyang in three days’ 134 ‘Question about the National Reunification Policy, A’ 155–6 Reagan, Ronald 64 reconciliation complaints 1–2 concerns 2 speed 1–2 Reconstructed Korean Communist Party 110 reformists 32, 34–5, 101–2 Representative Democratic Council 111, 113, 114, 117, 119, 121 Research Institute of Korean Spiritual Culture 42 Resident General 30, 91 ‘Resolution on the Rejection of Neutralization and South-North Negotiation’ 160–1 Revolutionary Renovation camp 42 Rhee Syngman anti-Japanese movements 45 anti-Trusteeship campaign 38–9 Armistice Agreement opposed 141–3 Christian beliefs 27–8 dependence on foreign powers 110 elections 1956 153–4 fleeing from Seoul 136 foreigners favoured 28 government end 177–83 junior lawmakers attacked 40 lifetime presidency 143–9 military dictatorship 43–4 nationalism 33–4, 182–3 one man rule 174–7 opposition parties 151–2 pro-Japanese collaborators 172–3 publications confiscated 179

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rehabilitation campaign 203 separate government aims 39 Third World War 158–9 trusteeship proposals 32 ultra-right organisations 1946–7: 111 Unification through Northward Advance policy 129 US support 63 US visit and hard-line speeches 145–6 war demand 165–6 world’s most radical anti-communist 163 Rho Tae-Woo 47 Ridgway, Matthew B 195 Righteous Army Movement 24, 27, 30, 96 rightists 36 Roberts, General William L 136 Roh Moo Hyun xv Roh Tae-Woo 5 rounding-off amendment to the Constitution 143–4, 150, 151, 176–7 ‘Royal Yi House’ 97 ruling classes 24 Saemaul movement 203 Saito Makoto 98–9, 100 Sancheong massacre 6 ‘sasa oip’ see rounding off amendments to the Constitution Sasanggye [The World of Thought] 13 self-strengthening movement 95, 96 Seo Min-Ho (So Min-ho) 6, 196 Seonu Jong-Won 175–6 Seoul Sinmun 181 Seoul-Sinuiji railway 1 Seoul Spring 1980: 44 separated families 1, 2–3, 6, 18, 55, 196 ‘serving the great’ 11 Seven Principles of Left-Right coalition 113, 115, 121, 122. 127n6 Shabas 77 Shin Chae-Ho 30, 202 Shin Dong A 15

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Shin Geum-Dan 196 Shin Ik-Hui 78, 124, 134, 148–9, 166 Shin Seong-Mo 133, 136, 172 Shin Yong-Ha 15 Silla 22 silsagusi 80 Sing Jin-u 100 Singanhoe 32, 33, 208 Sinminhoe 95 Social Associations of North and South Korea 72 social Darwinism 29, 34, 96 social norms and values collapse 185–6 Socialist Worker’s Party 115 Song Geon-Ho 14, 195 Song Jin-U (Song Chin-u) 14, 37 South Korean interim government 113 South Korean Worker’s Party 34, 65, 108, 110, 111, 115, 135 Special Act on the Punishment of National Traitors 1948: 200 Special Commission for the Investigation of National Traitors 40, 64, 104 Special Law for Punishing Antinational Crimes 46 Special Law for Punishing Special Crimes 42 Spirit of Independence, The 184 State Council of the Korean Provisional Government 111 Story of the Incident, The 196–7 Student Defence Corps 157 Suncheon area killings 178 Supervisory Committee of the Neutral Countries 146, 177 Supervisory Committee on the Armistice 150 Supreme Council of People’s Congress 72–3, 78 Syngman-ism 14, 195 Tae Wan-Seon 140 Taylor, General Maxwell D 137–8 Temple Law 98 Terror Brigade for Righteous Martyrs 200

‘Third Forces’ 148–9, 176 Third World War 158–9 38th parallel 35 toadyism 11 traditional culture 45 trivial differences of opinion 18 True Story of Ah Q, The 202 Truman, Harry S 133 Truman doctrine 39 ‘two nations and two states’ 48–9 Uiyeoldan 200 ultra-right anti-communism 44 ultra-right anti-nationalism 43, 44 unification armed struggle 66 aspirations 129–30 Chinese practice 17–19 consciousness 14–15 cultural exchanges 205–6 Democratic National Front 133 ‘development first’ policy 67 engagement with opponents essential 118 history teaching relevance 220–7 mass appeal necessary 15 mutual understanding 207–8 National Policy on National Reunification 149–52 polarized approaches 16–17 policies 67–8 postponing contentious issues 17, 19 reconciliation need 223–7 seeking aspects of convergence 17, 19 Sixteen countries who joined the Korean War 140–3 strong aspirations 55–6 United Nations resolutions distorted 170–1 Unification through Neutralization 160–1 Unification through Northward Advance advocates 168–70 advocates irresponsibility 170–2 after Korean War 137–9 armistice talks 137–9

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Index before Korean War 131–5 campaign overview 183–6 campaign structure 156–9 coexistence opposed to consolidate the Status Quo 162–5 Constitution amendment by ‘rounding off’ 143–7 Constitution amendment to allow lifetime presidency 143–7 core policy of Rhee Syngman 129 decline of campaign 152–4 ‘invasion’ word 167 links to anti-communism 139–40 links to direct election of President 138 mass mobilization policy 129 meaning 130–1 North Korea not feeling threatened 167–8 origin of theory 135–7 other unification theories 159–62 practicality 165–8 pro-Japanese collaborators 172–4 rallies 138, 156 slogans 158 theory abandoned 154–6 theory advanced 133 USA suspicions of policy 136 Unified Labour Fronts 110 Unified National Assembly 162 unified Silla state 22–3 United Kingdom, North Korea embargo lifted 169–70 United Nations Commission on Korea 76–7, 87n81 United Nations Resolutions wordings and interpretation 9–10, 74–6 United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea 68–9, 76–7, 117 United Nations Trusteeship see antiTrusteeship campaign United States of America Administrative Commission 60 Korea-Japan Treaty 64 missionaries 91–2, 97 persecution of critics compared with witchcraft 43 policies towards South Korea 63–4

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pro-Japanese collaborators 91–2 Rhee Syngman support 63 South Korea relationships 47 see also American Military Government universalists 109 US-Japan New Security Agreement 195 US-Japan-Korea security bloc 17 US-Korea Mutual Defence Agreement 138, 141 US-Soviet Joint Commission on Korea 38, 114, 115, 116, 118, 122 Vanfleet, General James A 137, 169 Vietnam War, South Korea troops 64, 67, 195 Vigilance against Communists Spies week 156 Vortex of Korean politics, The 203 Way of a Nationalist, The 194 Won Se-Hun 114, 121, 124, 148 Won Yong-Deok 150, 177 Workers Democratic Party 66 Workers Party of South Korea 135 Workers-Peasants Alliance 111 Working People’s Party 108, 179–80 Yang Yu-Chan 156 Yeltsin, President 135 Yeo Un-Hyeong (Yo Un-Hyeong) 14, 79, 114, 115–16, 206 assassinated 116 Yeosu area killings 178 Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion 73 Yi Beom-Seok 134 Yi Byeong-Yong 104 Yi Cheol-Seung (Yi Chol-sung) 2 Yi Dong-Hwa 163 Yi Gang-Nyeon 30 Yi Gap-Seong 140 Yi Geuk-Ro 32 Yi Geun-Sik 180 Yi Gi-Bung 147, 154, 173 Yi Gwang-Su (Yi Kwangsu) 32, 33, 35. 100, 105 Yi Ho-Jae 136, 167 Yi Ik-Hong 178

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242 Yi Jae-Hak 173 Yi Jae-Ho 206 Yi Jong-Hyeong 200 Yi Jong-Ryul 208 Yi Ju-Il 103 Yi Jun 30 Yi Sang-Jae 208 Yi Sang-Ryong 202–3 Yi Young-hui 6 Yi Yung-Yeong 140 Yim Hong-Sun 175 Youth Associaiton 197

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Korean Nationalism Betrayed Youth League 112 Yu Gil-jun 27, 28, 94 Yu Jeong-Ju 94 Yun Cheon-Ju 140 Yun Chi-ho 27, 28, 29, 32, 35, 94, 101 Yun Chi-Yeong (Yun Chi-yong) 77, 169–70 Yun Gi-Seop 116, 124 Yushin (Revitalization) system 18, 41, 63, 66, 67–8, 210–22 Yushin coup d’etat 198