r'
a . , , . THE TIDE TURNS
--
IN THE EAST MARK HEALY
.
For m j son, Bmjamin
CONTENTS -7
The Origins oftbe Battle The~ppoaring~mnmanders
13 13
TheWtthe^^^^
14
r n ~ A r I n l P S
-
'BeC%nkaPmry L&w& The Soviet Atany
%7
E7
'Thebman%aw
The Battle afK&
17
20 23
OkwJuiwmdTh.SOvletPburs 'Ihe%aDcb
f7
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Z9 31
T H E ORIGINS OF T H E BATTLE It was with the onset of the 'rpsputit8~'- the p m thaw &at prrslys the return of spring m Rusak in mid-Mnreh of 1943 that the die for the p a t battle of Kursk was nn.The rising temperatures turned rivers, now being fed by the h w i n g snow, inm unbridgeable IS and the roads inm quagmires, impsable to man and machine alike. For the SS Panzer Corps,the cutting edge of the Guman counrnaffmive in the Ukraine, my
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ationawhicharueq,haveamajorimpactonthei unfol*d*. For Nazi Gtrmuly and Soviet Russia, the war inthe~nwhad~8~oimofsasi~.~ab inevitable CWof and the Red Army, in be decisive in d
mtheE.snm ndMmnonhmrdsbeyond&Igaodfloundmd a profwnd manner, m mah.lrinamamideuansformedintoaseaof mnflin between the Ms and mud and in the fpfe of rapidly hardening Soviet Europe.
resistance. While the exhausted G e n m and
Alllcd
~rorrn, in'
After two summer campaigns Gammy had
Swiet armies took a d v u l m of the temporpry lull not d in destmying the Sosiet Army. imposed on dmn by nature, m nst and refit &r Indeed, by the spring of 1943 there was s Wit the pmdiious exntiom of the winter, phning
llrrept~nceamong
wns already under way ss to how the war in Russia G e n d
many senior ofRcerq m the
Sam and in the Osthcci thm it
WY
wns m be prosecuted m e the O N K of ~ the wanner w e a h . As the phnnhg stsffs of STAVKA and
OKH pondered the possiiitieq their deliberations were governed by a number of consider-
acmmmodation airh Germany. For t h So* ~ Union, hpving weathered the great and nearly f a d U0 stnm of l!%l and 1942. ~h sudva.! longer in doubt. ~ n a b to ~ iMthe decisive vimw over the Wehrmacht in southern Russia dur splin had m desperately desirrd in the winter ampaign of 1942/3. the prioriv ofsoviet sbww for the 1943 summer d m became that of the desmnion of the capaciiy 2 tJu Wehnuacht m d t h d the leasina offensive m w u of the Red ~rm~.Funhe~mrnither&pwnstJmcany douh that the southern a m o r wns the major theme of decision for the whole of the Fastern Front. In mither the N h e r n nor C m d s s t o n . w m sucb hmmant militsry. vdifkd and nowmic matters & eonnotion % . ; as they pored over 7
THE ORIGINS OF THE BAlTLE
the situation maps of Southern Russia, it is hardly surprising that the gaze of German and Russian alike should become fuated on the great salient to the north of Kharkov and centred on the ancient city of K u d . Projecting from the Soviet into the German lines like a Iist, and with a frontage of same 250 miles but a mere 70 miles across its base, this mrssive feature, with a total land area roughly half V
~
~
.
I
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IGnmm expcrtkh mobile openm hit the oycfumrded~wict --on the 8.aChntld', UI.tkd di-dy m tiwdUddcof
m n Hidorhacis
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M n a r ( a . . ~ g r s r i o o h t Immhir~1)mmrndof r&Swlu.k.Uawdm ArmyGmmpSautbio &&&Mnrh w 1944. 1943,M d then me tbe @",dc~) rrAmd-erdMoo* died m t h e m ~ n
the sue of England, very quickly came to dominate the plans of STAVM and the OKH. T o the Germans and Russians alike, the great salient, so pregnant with military possibilities, became the focus of effort and intentions whose climax was to lead to one of the greatest battles of the Second World War and whose outcome was to seal the fate of Hitler's 'thousand-year Reich'. Even as Generalfeldmarschall von Manstein's counter-stroke aminst the over-extended Soviet forces racing far the River Dnieper was beginning in late February of 1943, tentative discussionshad already .bemn - concerningthe s h a ~ ofe the summer campaign. It was apparent, however, that the options being considered by Hider, OKH and von Manstein w& far less ambitious in scam than in previous years. Although by the onset of the thaw the German offensive had inflicted a maior defeat on the Soviets and had given back to the ~ ~ r m a n s , if only temporarily, the initiative in the south, nothing could disguise the fact that at Stahgrad and in the subsequent drive westwards fmm the Volga, the Red Army had inflicted grievous losses on the Wehrmacht. It was the reality of some
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twenty-six divisions wiped from the German Army order of battle between January and March 1943 that gave form and shape to the strategic deliberations concerning the forthcoming summer campaign Suength ;elurns indieareithat hy March the .inn). war short of 470,000 men in the East alone, while the fihwre for all theatres revealed that the Feldheer wa;7~,000 men below establishment. ln January 1943 a call from OKW for 800,000 men to be found for service in the Wehrmacht nened only half that f w r e , and it was symptomatic of the relative dedine in Germany's manpower strength that many of these were drafted from the vital war industries. In addition, the panzer divisions, the main offensive weapon of the German Army and the instrument ofvictory in the years of expansion, was in a deplorable state. By the end of the winter of 1943 barely 600 machines were available for service in the eighteen panzer divisions operating along the whole of the Eastern Front. Unless there were a radical overhaul of the panzer arm and a siunificantincrease in its size and effectiveness. the ~ e h r m a c h in t Russia would be overwhelmed by the flood of Soviet armour issuing frob the m a t tank factories beyond the Urals. To address this vital task, Hitler recalled General Heinz Guderian in Febmaq 1943 and appointed him 'Inspector-General of Armoured Troops'; his brief being the fundamental overhaul and revamping of the panzer arm. At a Fiihrer Conference on 9 March Guderian argued that Germany should forego any sbategic offensive on the Eastern Front in 1943, in favour of building 4GsrdHcbu
e the bc~rv-dlrin~.
up' the strength of the pznzer divisions. For Guderian it was axiomatic that the rehabilitation of the panzer arm and the creation of a strong and effective armoured reserve were essential if Germany's longer-term survival both on the Eastern Front and in the West, were to be ensured. Adoption of such a policy would enable the German Army to resume the offensive in 1944, with armoured units D ~ O D ~ equioved ~IY for the rask. '1.0 achieve this end i; wa; miiit;iy d!sirablr that the German Army adopr a policy of strategic defence in the E p t thmughout 1943. Herein lay the quandary for he,&nnnna Politically, Hider needed a p e a t milirnrJr a y m reassure his allies, s a n e of *frolll b d I q begun to believe that they had W.'& hone. Furthermore, a defensive pwnoc we& scarcely induce Turkey to enter the wak on the side of the Axis powers, a political objective of high priority for Hitler. Nor was the doctrine of strategic defence as simple in practice as it appeared desirable in theory. The great loss of manpower during the winter campaign, precluded the possibility of a passive, static defence; there were simply not enough d i i i o n s avaiIable for the task. How then, was the German Army to nspond to the growing power of the Red h y , and dm summer offensive it was assmdtbPt S i d h muld launch as swn as he was ready? It m$ mn Manstein's view thai Germany's only &aiitm in the East lay in the concept of an 'elastic' defence that exploited to the full the tactical expertise of German command staffs and the undoubted fighting qualities of the uwps. Above all, it would depend on employing to the full their repeatedly demonstrated ex~ertisein mobile ooerahons. This would entail 'dealing the enemy blows of a localized nature which would sap his strength to a decisive de@e - fint and foremost through losses in prisoners'. Von Manstein's proviso, howwer, was that the t h e available to Germany to deliver such blows against the Red Army was very short. Offensive action would need to be t&n quickly, before Soviet military strength became overwhelming. In addition, the anticipated collapse of the Axis position in Tunisia, would be followed s h o e thereafter by an AUied invasion of southern Europe. With the bulk of the Wehrmacht
THE ORIGINSOFTHE B A m E
serving in Russia, it would be to the already hard pressed Ostheer, that Hitler would turn for divisions to counter such landings. Time was therefore of the essence. At best Germany had only a few months, following the return of the dry weather in the East, to inflict a major defeat an the Red Army, before the presence of a large Allied force on the E u m ~ e a nmainland laced a dead hand on aperationsbn the Eastern &nt. Bv mid-March the decision had, in principle, been made. Rejecting other possibilities, Hitler determined that as soon as the weather was suitable he would launch Operation 'Citadel', a combined attack on the Kursk salient by Army Groups Centre and South. In a classic pincer operation, the salient would be eliminated and the enemy force therein extinguished. Much, it was assumed, would flow from this success. The destruction of Soviet units, particularly armour, would seriously disrupt the coming Soviet summer offensive and the prisoners netted would be removed to Germany as slave labour for the war economy. Such a rapid victory would also go far, Hitler believed. in demonstratinn to waverine allies that Germany 'could still win the war andVcause Turkey finally to declare for the Axis. In the wake of the ;uccesbful offensive, the front line would be straightened, allowing for a more economical use of divisions in defence. Those released would form a reserve which could be deployed, if needed, to respond to the Allied landings in southern Europe. Furthermore, a rapidly executed attack would conserve the strength of the valuable pamer units and preserve them for future use. On 15 April the rationale and design for 'Citadel' was set forth in Operation Order No. 6. No one reading the document could be in any doubt that it was imperative for the operation to succeed, but success would depend owrapid execution. The fact that this rapidiry was not achieved - delay after delay, as spring moved into the high summer of 1943 - has too frequently been laid at Hider's door, the assumption being that he was the arbiter of the events that were about to unfold. But the fact is that the ruin of 'Citadel' had already been ensured by decisions taken in Moscow many months before the panzers finally rolled across their start3nes in July. 10
For the Russians, the clearest indications that the Germans intended to launch an early offensive, came with the thaw in March. The de&oyment of strong enemy forces, particularly panzer and motorized infantry units at the northern and southern necks of the Kursk salient, pointed to a Gennan intention to eliminate it by a concentric attack. In this a~vreciationof German intentions. Stalin received overwhelming verification through reports from 'Lucy', the Swiss-based Soviet aaent. who had access on an almost daily basis t i the deliberations of the German High Command (OKW). Thus, by early April Stalin had knowledge of the substance of Hider's Operation Order No. 6 ('Citadel'). Printed on the 15th, only thirteen cavies of the document were made available. and thise for the eyes ofsenior commanders only.'The substance of 'Lucy's' Intellixence was further canfnmed by an independent source when, at the end of March, the British forwarded via their Miitan, Mission in Moscow information concerning ~ e i m a noffensive intentions against the Kursk salient. The Russians were not told, however, that the information came from the reading and interpretation of Luftwaffe 'Enigma' transmissions by the Ultra team at Bletchley Park in England. In early April Marshal Zhukov submitted to Stalin a major report based on information obtained from a wide-ranging reconnaissance of German dispositions and reserves initiated by the General Staff at the end of March. As a preface to his recommendations he identified the rationale for a German offensive against the Kursk salient, in terms very similar to those used by the Germans themselves, but concluded that there was little paint in the Red Army pre-empting the German offensive with one of its own. Rather, Zhukov concluded, 'it will be better if we wear the enemy out in defensive action, destroy his tanks, and then, taking in fresh reserves, by going over to an all-out offensive, we will finish off the enemy's main grouping'. This then was the thrust of the case presented to Stalin at the major STAVKA conference on the evening of 12 April. Accordimg to Zhukov, 'Stalin listened as never before' and, by the end of the conference, the essential strategic decision that would determine the outcome of
.
'Citadel' had been taken. Shelving the STAVKA d a n for the offensive that Hitler and his generals L d been so right in as sum in^ the ~ u s s ~ had ns intended to launch, Stalin acceded to the case argued by Zhukov and the Front commanders, that the German offensive should be met and gmund dawn in a debierately defensive battle, with the
Kunk & ; ru w'e.imph.m-che i-o~h~anra
desmction of the German amour being the primary aim. As the orders flowedfrom STAVKA to tra"sform the K m k salient into one immense fomess, there were few among the Soviet generals who doubted that in the ferocious and cruel battle to come, the decisive moment of the war against Nazi Gennany, had at last arrived.
THE ORIGINS OFME BATTLE
T H E OPPOSING COMMANDERS
The Soviet Commanders
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In the wake of Stdingrad an enormous surge of mnfdence swept the Soviet h y . Notwithstanding the reverse at Khprlrw in Mnrch, there was a very strong sense that not 0 4 had the tide w e d against the Gennan invader, but that mctmy was now certain. Such confidence was clearly manifest in the decision m engage the Geman Army in a deliierately defensive hanle. By no means the least important factor in this resurgence of confidence was the emergence of a tiff ofsenior ofkers, a new military elite, who had proven themselvs in warfare. Foremost amongst these was Georgi S. Zhukov. ommoted m Marshal of the Swiet Union in ~anu&1943, who could claim an unbroken series of victories to his credit, datina from the defeat of the Japanese Kwgntuq AG at K h a b Gol in 1939. Ha- bested the Gemans at LzLeningnd and in fmnt of Moscow in 1941 and at Stdingrad in 1942,he now intended to do the same at Kursk. A taskmaster, he had an eye for military talent and and under his hltelage a number of asp* pmmising g e n d , some to serve at Kursk, npidly rose m the fore. Of these, the most d&cant for our purposes were the troika of VaNtin, Rokoswdq and Konev. All three had panicipated in the heavy fighting in southern R u s h in 1942. Like Stnlin, Zhukw had a pvtiollsrly high regard for the talenfs of Vamtin. He it was d o fordhl~armed the case for f%ing 'down the Gamm offinsivi, in m'ms that later would be much srrrrr extensively msoned bv Zhukav M. kbkhwkv was one d those k e birds in the Red kmy,.t senior olXcerwhohadsunivedthrapsYanNKVD during the purges. He WM & a d in 1940inthewlLeof~ pious some teeth!
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mted by Stalin, who ordered his release. Seriously wounded during the Moscow munter-offensive, he did not return m active service until September 1942 when he assumed cammand of the Don Front. Iran Kono, Pgpohaed to rcllamsad rh StMilitary Dis& infisrc4W3, (3,rrrliro I
veteran of the first two years of the war. After KursL, early in 1944, Vatutin was killed by Uki*nian nationalists; the other two were promoted, eventually becoming Marshals of the Soviet Union. It was against these 'new' men that the Genasn Army would pit some its ablest 'sons'.
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The G+rman Commanders &@foremost r m a n soldier involved in 'Citadel' yae Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, regarded by many as t h one ~ of greatest saategists of the w r . His credentials in armoured warfare were impeccable, having masterminded the plan for the
'. In July
1943 he was commander of
1942. Although the genesis of his own proposals to Hifler &.the conduct ofthe summer campaign and was inspired by his own victory in the cnunterofinsive at Kharkov, he became increasingly sceptical of its success, as delay followed delay. Nevertheless, he was not as forthright as was Guderian in opposing the scheme, being as the latter observed, never at his best when faced by Hider. tits prmer in his labours on the southern M. of the salient was Hermann Hoth, com&r of Fourth Panzrr Army, a rcspunribility t h t he assumed in June 1942 and was to hold until dismissed bv Hider in November 1943. A hiuhl) - . experienced W k commander, having his own Panzer Gmop during 'Barbamssa', he took part in many of the great encirclement banles of 1941. Shartng many of yon Manstein's doubts about 'Citadel', be nevenheless devoted much care to nurimtzing its chances of success, given the &cumstances. Ostens~blythe commander of the northern q@ w the salient, Field Marshal Giinther von amlr a back seat role to his subordinate, WsMw Model, commanding general of Ninth Amy. This was ns much a reflection of hii lack of enthusiasm for the pffensive as it was of Wtker's f&t in Model, though von Kluge's ambi+&ue
when it m e m openly,epressing his doubts led to his position bemg reBprdcd ns IWO-fad. Model's rix had b a n pdigiow. A divisional
m n r m n d c r U m e ~ o f ' ~ ' , ~ e x p e r k in defensive watfare and his pro-Nazi stance bmught him m Hider's attention. In a v c y real wnse 'Gadel' bssme Model's baa*. His commn demud for more urnour led to delay &r delay is the sacngth of the Soviet defences became apparent While Model's own seength did inerruie, it was in h e end mote than m t e r bhadbymeSovindefmsive~tiws, whicham rm a seslc n m r before experienced.
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II
THE OPWSING COMMANDER
ORDER OF BATTLE GERMAN FORCES, I JULY 1943
T H E OPPOSING ARMIES
I
ARMY GROUP CENTRE: Fie14 m h . 1 von Klup.
I
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Blh ARMI: CoIGen W e 1
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Nevertheless a total of 23 infantry divisions were earmarked forthe offensive. Hider's continued commiment to 'Citadel' The lull in operations prior to the launch of Yliudel' on 5 July, allowed the German forces was ultimately gmunded in his conviction that the m a r k e d for the oneration to achieve a lwel of pRparedness never before seen on the Eastern Front. But there were weaknesses in the order of vfi&eduldproduad 10 hule which were to have a significant impact on ,a-mnrqumrrof the Wc6rmrbt's the conduct of the operation. The most important of these lay in the decline '-Nsiatbe ~ d Y r u p r i o r T - 3 4 dprig-rrr ofthe number of available infantry divisions and a nndKv-l . . u ~ b w snd-&hetth.titvu d u c t i o n in their respective manpower strengths. orw&mws: ahe bciolldmdm-~ Tbe losses of the winter had resulted in infantry h d c r v r s a p e m d m mm;rscb,i@de divisions being reduced from nine to six battalions. l*arsm Bs 1943 the 17,734men ofthe 1939 establishment b s d e t i d d . ~ r v r s d ~gaithpmblcmaio I& been reduced N, 12,772 Dcspi~ctheir bvcatcr umourrd,vldsrmsduid dcdn*cm&huvsm firepower, thir rhortag 01 infantq was to lead a, mmiocdfw a~e*cPmabmwcrr ahe liopr. Duarr units being reuuired to take uonn them- -,1 ~ . , . i . , ~ d ~ ~ l i r d,~ mundedv~ -&es tasks t i e preserve of the infanby. umoursrloryruy. The T h e German Army
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ARMY GROUPSOUW F \ M Marshe%van Mansbin
ARMY DEIACHMENT KEMPF:
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THEOPPOSING ARMIES
1
THEGERPIAN ARMY
E-'W, an h h m ~ afthc 'Gmsdcutsehland'
D i ~ 0 s0 a Y ~ e s f i ~ in the initid German h c e s r K u r s k . Ofnote is the disrinm'n YiD'mff band on the "ghf s l e w and the mmollnmmcd
rbeer weight and momentum of the panzer divi- 73 machines. The stmngest panzer units in the dons must carry the Germans to victory. Indeed, battle were the three Waffen SS panzer grenadier
1
a d e l ' wimessed the greatest assembly of Gerrmn armow ever deployed for an offensive on arb a limited front. Just two years before, Hitler bd deployed 3,332 tanks to invade the Soviet Union along a total frontage of 930 miles. Far 'Citadel' he would deploy 2,700 panzers and =ult guns along a front just sixty miles wide and, fa the rust time since 'Barbarossa', the German h v would be fielding tanks suoerior to those of the Red Amy. By dinthprodigibus efforts on the puduction lines and by ruthlessly denuding other sectors, 63 per cent of all the 'battleworthy' pmzers available on the Eastern Front were rlbcated to von Manstein and von Kluge. In ddition to the 1,850 panzen, there were 533 =ult guns and 200 obsolete panzen serving with the divisions. These machines were disuibuted mrong sixteen panzer and panzer grenadier divih, and three assault gun brigades. In theory a 1943 panzer division had a nominal smmgth of 15,600 men with h m 150 to 200 machines, organized into a tan!i regiment of two a three battalions, a panzer grenadier brigade, an a e r y regiment and diiional support units. In practice, however, there was great variation in divisional size and strength. At Kurslq the average aclual strength of Army p a w divbias was just
divisions of 11 SS Panzer Corps, and the CLite Army panzer grenadier division 'Grossdeutschland'. On 5 July 'Leibstandarte Adolf Hitter', 'Das Reich' and 'Totenkopf each deployed on average 131 panzers and 35 assault guns with 'Grossdeutschland' deploying 160 panzen and 35 erarult guns. The bulk of the panzers at K u d were late model Panzer 111s and Panzer Ns, but it wm the triumvirate of T i m 1 and Panther tanks and the Ferdinand self-iropelled gun that Hider looked to secure victory at Kursk. The Tiger had already acquired a formidable reputation on the Eastern front. Apart from the three Waffen SS divisions and 'Grossdeutschland', which had their own Tiger companies, all other ta& of this type were issued to the specially formed heavy tank battalions. These were allocated at m y or corps level, and were sent to serve with other units as needs arose. The Panther was an unknown quantity, although much was expected of it. Designed in response m the superior T-34 and KV-1, it was to restore technical superiority to the P ~ ~ I X I I W in the East. On paper it could counter all known Soviet amour, but it was being committed to battle mo early. Impatient to have this new vehicle for the offensive, Hider ignored Guderian's protestations that it was being deployed before the It
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THELUFTWAFFE
THE OPPOIINGAWIES
technical problems anending its inucduction had been ironed out, but the stait date of the offensive was delayed to ensure the Panther's employment. By 5 July suf6cient Panthers were available to equip 1st Battalion 'Grossdwtschland' and two more Amy barnlions which together fonned 10 P a w r Btigade with ZOO of the tgpe on men@. Some Panthers were also in operation with the Waffen SS divisions. A design of great potential, at Kursk it was prove a disappointment A similar tale of unrealbed exyectations attended the debut of the Jagdpanzer Ferdinand wmmined to action with Ninth Army. Outwardly irppressive, mounting a powerful 8 . 8 ~ 1gun, the ntachine was nevertheless castigated by Guderian as being excessively complex in design and for bdne devoid of even one machine-mn for closein defence. Ninety were issued to the two barnlions orgpnized as Jagdpanzer Regiment 656. The w e d e s s assault gun. being cheaoer and easier to manufacture than-a tank, & de&oyed in growing numbers. Althawh designed for infanny sumort, by 1943 it wa.- se&g principally as a&bnk destroyer. A total of 533 of them were integrated into the p m e r divisions and independent assault gun brigades. Alongside them appeared a range of ather vehicles, some of which were a h making their combat ddhut at Kursk. One of thase was the 'Bmmnb'lr', a havily armoured assault infantry gun mounted on a Paneer IV chassis and sparting a 15.cm howitzer. S*tg-six of these were issued to Stormpauzerabteilung 216 aftached to Model's Ninth Army. The 'Nashorn', mount@ the PaK 43/1 (I.171) 8 . h gun, and the 'Hummel' and
Wespe' self-propelled guns wete also employed in large numbers for the first time.
The LuftwafFe To suowtt this minhtv armowed a the ~uftwa'ffehad asseibied 1,800 air&&, representing some two-thirds of all aircraft available in the ea&. In support of Ninth Amry Lufttlone 4, had allocated 1st Luftwaffe Air Division, while the whole of Lnfttloae 6 was available to suppat the southern thrwt. 0 4 the crowded airfields around Or?& Belgorod and Kharkov were grouped the Heidel He I1 1s and J d e r sJu 88s of KGs 3,27 and 55; fighter units were drawn fmJGs 3,51, 52 and 54, flying Focke-Wulf Fw 190A-5s and Messerschmin Bf I09G-6s. Although the Sariet Air force had made great strides, the L u f M e still held the edge, both in the qualifyof its fighters and the exyertise of its pilots. Of pardeular imcnmnce. was the fust deoloment en nrarrc. of th; Schlachtgeschwader unk flying Far 190s and Henscbel Hs 129s. 'Ciradel' also saw the last widespread use of the S - W in the clsssic dive-bomber role. ,
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Tlger I 2501d1. I2 Flam 16old1 1201d1 75AG
1AGs. 3901d1 U)dd.lFh-m 35Aa.12 dd' 14 F1om 35A&,7dd' WAG* I old' 35AG%801d1
Weight in Action
b
R
~Pmd"rn" .
I
the PMZcrUI ended Anyat 1943.
~~
m.tzbmd. A8 w'th the
. ..
'Swrm-r 'BrummW' (Grinly Bay): 64 m m ewloyed fm the first tim s Ku& by 216th Rnrsr (Swrm) bmlmn. 'Only Inad 2nd &-la of rRAbr 505 mllakle at the o n a d'ciudel'. 3rd C o m p y n n m m i n e d u h l 8July. AG &k Gun. AT SeK-proplled mti-tank weapon*. m m n t eirher 7.5m RK 40 n In M d e r 11. IIi a the 8.8cm RK 43/l m n e d an the Gw lllllV 'Hornine'nuwd during'Ciude1'. Flom F l u n t h m n r Rnrer IllAd'M'. Obr Obrelntlon Of the Tpcr r R W Vs. IVs md Ilk employed orr.ng'Cudel'. 5. 110 md 80 rupnrrk wn mmmW 18dchlmuenL In dl. 60 n m .
INFANTRY GUNS AND HEAVY ARTILLERY Weigkd Shell
W
7th R Dir 46 41 19th R D l v 48 22 &It Gun Brigrder: m.393.905 XXlV R n r v C o p (Army Gmup South RHem for ,ciudel) SthSSR 20 11 6AGgl5old Gmn Div l3rd R Div 40 21 llold
38dd' 16dd' 17dd1 mold1 430ld1 2501d1
ynr.
Army Gmyr South F m i h P m e r lmry 3rd R Div 33 il r h R D i v 48 'GD'RGmnDir 141W
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smslkraiacmemtthsria ~nrtringcouldnot accommodate the long-
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f
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deal uith Sa*ietnrmaur. lbeModclMillusmRd hem S.h m . ..carried .. .the -.. V6llsndsehuneosnd wns cquippedfordeep
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lessons that even now were still being assimilated. But a growing sense of professionalism was pervading the army, that was of itself to have a omfound imoact on the result of the corninn b a d e P~~litical slogans were eschewed a5 bring no substirule for knuwledae of the 'an of uxr'. It was certainly no longer &e case that the Germans could depict the Red Army as merely a rabble of uniformedpeasants. Upsurge in morale was matched by the increasing size and strength of the m y : As the Germans wrestled with the problem of declining
T h e Soviet Army
ven as the German Army began its numerical and tive dedme, the Soviet Amv was evolvinn an organization totally unlike that uf even a before. The re-introduction of uniform in'a, the designating of certain units as 'Guards' tions in the Tsarist fashion, imparted to the Army a sense of its awn destiny that had found psychological benefitr to its collective + m e of purpose. During the fust two years of F a r e they had received harsh and terrible
F
I
-
- .
ORDER OF BAlTLE: SOVIET FORCES, I JULY 1943 BTILlN I
STAVKA I
S1avka R e p ~ n l m I m Iw 8.W 01 KursL: M m n h l Zhukov n d H.M*v a s ~ b n ~ y
I
ram A m : U - O m RommeM tam AW: uaen mmv m m ~ m y :U.GM a m i n 6SnAmy: U-OnB W EQmAmy:Ltmsn ChnnyaboW h d ~ ~ l U~- a mmR ~D ~: I ~ tlM1Alrkmy: U M m M Rudr*o
m:
mG u m u a mm e w WIQU~TU* *my: ~ t ~ ~eo tnm l s w m~ny: ~+a~n~ronrnsnlo ~ A W L: ! - Q ~RFW M W :LIGm M O M I V m u * : c.I.Q.~ (ioryunor
38th Amr U O n Moshbr*o I O ~ A W : u.o.~~ s h b w ~ct~m ~rmy: h U-GenKmbr 6th B U M 8 &my: LtGsn ChWW 71b~ua3s&my:~ t . ~ . n % u r n w
2ndAkArmy: AkMWU W a W
THE X l n E T A W l l
manpower, Soviet Army numbers had never been higher. At the beginning of July a total of 16,442,000 offcen and men were under arms. While equipment levels were impressively high they could also be misleading. Of the 9,918 tanks in service, nearly one-thud were light tanks, of dubious value on the modem battlefield. In artillery, more than 50 per cent of the 103,085 guns and mortars were the less effective 7.6cm and 8.2c?1 calibres. Both areas were to see major shifts towards the production of large numbers of technically superior weapons. Soviet tank production had been ruthlessly restricted to a few models since the beginning of the war. Updating designs, such as that of the T-34, had been deliberately avoided so as to maintain continuity and hence volume of output. But rumours of new German designs and the capture ofthe fust Tiger in December 1942 shook up the Commissariat for Tank Production. The decision to revamp the T-34 with a new, 8.5cm gun was initiated, but the model was t w late to see senice at Kursk. The new SU-85 tank destroyer was also t w late for the batrle. The hastily developed SU-152 was employed, in limited numbers but with devastating effect. Nevertheless
the Soviet Army won the tank battles at Kursk even though, for the fust time since 1941, the Germans were fielding qualitatively superior machines. But the greatest U e r of German armour and vwps was the Soviets' 'Queen of the battlefield', the artillery, deployed in unprecedented numbers during the battle. Anti-tank guns were organized into brigades;as were the howitzers of 152mm and
II
ASSAULT GUNS1 TANK DESTROYERS Ar-r
~eS&mwhOtz
(fmnd ride) WMmm
Gun (mph) 7,km Suk 40 u48
Sped
Weight
I
(tons)
25
23.9
I I
203mm cakire. In late 1942 sixteen of the twentysu arallem dmions were oreanized as 'breakthrough &ions' deploying i n unprecedented 356 m s in their firine line. Other wrmutltions on &e mass fire theme, such as m e 'artillery breakthrough corps' and the Katyusha divisions, were introduced. In mobility and in the air the Soviet Army a h began m see significant changes. The influx of 183,OW Lend Lease lorries by mid-1943 went some way to imparting mobility m some of the major units but demand always outsaipped supply. In the air new fighters such as the Yakovlev Yak-9D and the Lavochkin La-SFN began to appear in large numbers, as did the improved
.
I I, I
'
I I
.
..
FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
Ilyushin Il-2m3 mounting a 37mm &-tank w o n that was to d so much havoc amongst German -our during the bade. In terms of quality and quantity the LuftwafTe was fmding matters more difficult in the air on the Fastem front, to the unhappiness of the gmund units. Whereas there is a s w n g sense that the Wehrmacht had not perceived this fundamental and continuing qualitative change in the Soviet Army by the beginning of 'Citadel', they were always conscious of Soviet quantitative superiority. While in many areits the Soviet h y had yet to match the sophistication of the WeIumach5 them is no doubting that h e Red Army of 1943 tns 8 very different animal fmmtha ofJune 1941.
II
I
BOMBERS
TANKS A m r
MainGun
(fd
Speed (mph)
dde)
ANTI-TANK GUNS weight ~f ~ = k ~netnt~m Shell (lb) Velocity ((pr) A dH
KwKM U48
PuaDl VAurf IMV45mm 7.5071 D Panher P-erVI AudETyer
GROUND-ATTACK A N D DIVE-BOMBER AIRCRAFT
Y
KwK4l VIP
IW160mm
a h
Phx
23
spd (nph)
KwK36 U56
hriet
T-34 Model 47164mm 76.2mm 43 F-34 KV-I Model 75i7Smm 7 6 h AI
Sowlet
6-34
I
4.5m Mode142 1.09'
ISW
5.7cm Model
4,100
3.8'
5hrm lr SWm lWmm at SMm
'indioa. weigh oftuynen-cwod mmunilion.
(Ib)
Ganu, J U ~ W ~ J U V D~i ~ 4 m 3.960 HMd*llbl25% 253 29,530 llQ'
31 35
CdlM (k)
'm
I
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(mi1.s)
rpd (nph)
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RuU. (h*l)
h**t 373 547
w m n p b p d at M m tho IU d l rmd*riha%P*IO3rmmh.6dc4abema$ &h+ ~ 3 or7 P-3i w m k =T,I 11-tn3 dm d
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W(AS
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-
THE WPOIMGAWUES
-
1 PLANS AND PREPARATIONS
+tbca1943
~~~~'
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I '1 ,
It was not until 1 July that Hitler told his senior Eastern Front commanders that he intended to hunch 'Citadel' on the 5th. The die was now irrevocably cast, yet throughout the months of vacillation and delay, despite irrefutable evidence that the Soviets had transformed the salient into an enormous defensive bastion, no substantive anempt had been made to alter the plans for the offensive. Although the design for 'Citadel' remained as set forth in Operation Order No. 6, the conditions and rationale that had given rise to the OKH plan in April had long ceased to have any validity. Only in the build-up of the immense German forces, over and above those originally envisaged as being necessary for 'Citadel', was there anv sumstion that account had been taken of" t k e &tion Despite the strenuous and ingenious attempts they employed to disguise their intentions. the build-uo of German forces on each side of the neck of the' Kursk salient was on such a scale that it was impossible for the enemy not to know what was coming. Strategic surprise was dead. Within twenty-four hours of the conference at the Wolfsschanze, Stalin was able (courtesy of intelligence from 'Lucy') to inform the commanders of the Voronezh, Cenual and Steppe Fronts that the Germans yould go over to the offensive between 3 and 6 July. AU the Germans could hope for now was that they could achieve tactical surprise in terms of chwsing the time, place and main weight of the attack, and the method to be emvloved. . .
The German Ptans The OKH plan for 'Citadel' prmided for a concenuic attack by units of Anny Groups Centre and South against Kursk. The aims of the offensive were simply stated to sul off the Kursk salient along the line v - K u r s k -
-
Belgomd and bring to battle and destroy the very strong Soviet forces therein. By July the forces thought adequate to achieve this end had been assembled. The final disposition of Gennan units and their specific attack abjmives on the eve of the offensive were as follows. UNB of Army Group G U ~ , Ninth Armv. were to break t h r o d thc $& defenrcs albng a line k w e e n th; Kwk-(kd highway and railway and then drive southwards to Kursk. In addition OKH had tasked Ninth Army uith pushing the fmnt line eastwards as far as .\laloarkhanaclsk, to establish continuirv with the right wing i f Second Panzer Army. TO achieve these objectives Ninth &my had been allocated V Corps Headquarters with fiWeen infantry divisions and seven panzer and panzer grenadier divisions. The units of Army Group South earmarked for 'Citadel' were divided between Fourth Pnnzer Army and Army Detachment 'KempP. Hemurm Hath, commander of Fourrh Panzer Army, had been allocated 'Grossdeutschhnd' Division, I1 SS Panzer Corps, five panzer divisions, 10 Panzer (Panther) Brigade and two infantry divisions, making it the most powerful armoured formation ever assembled for an offensive under a single commander in the history of the German Army. This immense phalanx of armour was tasked with crashing thmugh the Soviet defences along a thirty-mile front, between Belgorod and Gertsovka, and driving a wedge through to the town of Obovan and thence to Kursk. A viaorous flank cover for the thrust by ~ a u r t h~anzer'irm~would be provided by the units of Army Detachment 'KempP. Driving northwards, they would meet units of Ninth Army, at a point to the ,east of Kursk, in order to establish the new front line. This secondq attack, between Belgorod and Koracha, was to be launched an a front of just fifteen miles. Total forces allocated to Army
PLANS AND PREPAR4llONS
-
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~lsadtmllmmtbcMukLU, tb#tsslatenstbeaummw urrdscaitbPnnrerUIs inm t b S f i 1 d ofl943tbc Germnos were ofim~sdted'Golisdr' where they were them s t i l t m p b y i y l6e c d y demolitionunit. M c d Puuer~withtbesbort w i p b u p ~ , t h i s s d dcmsndmdearapntb Ibr tbc Fedmnds. The LOEm pm, cvco thou& m&ed yehide was Lunched'. u n d e r d o D h ~ ~ ~ h l l s o a h m M tbeywLrr w l m w d d e d p . 'b.& worthy'. (M.Jaugi~) 4Gmcrsl d h c r Tmopa WcmsrKmpPs tbmaorpsbulthr r n d t ruk ds-dmg tbs e s s m nmk d * c nortb4mo~IlSS P a w CO'PB..~~ hqpcned mall them@ Gumnofb."mdMa inmlvcd h the omadys, hisplmednnof .dslwcTslloSab&in tbef- oftbrpowaful smiet dcfmms nod tbe difficuh&his p u u w didaims cnmuntunl east of me Rivrraooce (B~~~deurrYv)
Group South constituted V Corps Headquarters with nine panzer and panzer grenadier divisions, and eight infantry divisions. ' For some months before 'Citadel' the Lnftwaffe had been raiding Soviet airfields, railways, roads and troop concentrations within the salient, and in 'strategic' attacks on industrial targets beyond the U d s . On the tactical level, an inteaal " and crucial element in thc succcu of thr ground offcnrive was the requirement that the I.ufmalTe secure air superior@ over the battlefield. This was essential, not only to prevent the panzer columns being attacked from the air, but also to give protection to the now very vulnerable 'Shlkagruppen'. The latter had a very important role in the battle. functionina as flvine a~tillew.to compensate the ~ermans' shoAg: in tha;&n. The deployment of the specialized gound attack units n marre for the first time was also expected to make a significant contribution to the success of the offensive. As the German formations moved to their start positions on the hvo nights preceding the attack, their respective dispositions revealed much about the different approaches, taken by Model and von Manstein, to the task of cracking the formidable Soviet defences. Ninth Army was drawn up in a deeply echeloned formation along a frontage of fom miles. The offensive would open with an attack by nine infantry divisions with their awn organic assault gun units, but supported by only one panzer division. Model had decided to hold the bulk of his amour in reserve until the infantry had prized open the defences, whereupon the panzers would be released rn drive through the gaps, hlm the Swiet flanks and thrust to the rear. Von Manstein, on the other hand, had decided that his weakness in infantry precluded this approach. His trump card was the 700 panzers available to Fourth Panzer Amy, which he was determined to employ from the outset, en mme, as a P a w d n l or armoured wedae the - aminst Soviet defences. '1'0 ensure the nccesrar) critical mass, the hreakthrough \ectors for the assault had hesn rrduccd to 2.G3.3 kilometres per dMrion with an allocation of thirty to forty tanks per kilometre of front. He believed that such a concentration of armour would rapidly take the
German forces through the enemy defence lines and allow the panzer divisions to take on the Soviet armoured reserves in the open country beyond. To maintain the necessaly momentum, the tank crews were ordered not to stop and recover damaged ranks. The crews in these tanks were m maintain lire from static positions. Such an order, in the tight of the density of the Soviet anti-tank defences, was a death warrant. Von Manstein's expectations were not realized because of the great marhiel superiority of the Red Army and the strength of the Soviet defences in the K m k salient, the immensity of which had no parallel in history.
The Swiet Plans By the end of May the Soviet strategy for the summer campaign and the preparations to meet the German offensive were complete. Having mound down the German amour in the defences of the salient, the Vnnmrzh, (:mrrsl, Steppe 3n.I Bqansk Fronts togcthur uith the right aing ofthe South-\Vest and the left uinu" of the \Vest Fronts were to go over to the counter-offensive. In the north and south, other Fronts acting in concert would also launch offensives, to pin dawn Geman forces as the major Soviet effort unfolded in the westwards drive to the Dnieper. The Russians thought that the primary German blow would fall on the north-eastern sector of the salient. Rokossovskv. therefore. had massed the mat" arength of h s Central Front along a 50mile mrtch, straddltng what he th~~ught wnuld be the e his five . German thrust lin; to Kursk. ~ h r e of armies, 70th, 13th and 48th, were deployed to cover this sector. As 13th Armv was expected to bear the brunt of the German a k k , ~okossovsky had deployed 60 per cent of his d l e r y brigades and 33 per cent of his armour to support its operations. To the rear, 2nd Tank Army was deployed as the echelon reserve, and in general reserve he could call on a cavalrv, corns. two tank corps and several tank destroyer units. To provide air cover and suvport, STAVKA had allocated 16th Air Amy. This concentration of forces gave Rokossovsky 2.1 superiority in adlely and 7.6 superiority in armour. In the south, VaNtin's
.
P U N S AND PREPAMMI
L
Tipr 1. The T i p ' illusantsdhm belongs m thehdSSPnnzu OTP~~adierDivisi~ 'h Rdch: Thefourten Tiprsnvnihbkmthe div(sion for 'Cimfd' farmed the 8th m p m y ofIhePnnzerRe~enr nod d d beidmtiAed by the W t e m o m e ' m the
~ d t h '13'plsndirls e the h i d ~ h i d e o f f i u r i n thefirplamm. The spceinlKursks@ e m p l o d by 'hRdch' ofshori.onmlbumith two wtiaplbnn dove ia e~m'edoothe1dtgk-b. The Purksofthe 19th PMIerDivisim nm'ed thcs~mernnrkimburin
'
8
command a 2.1 superiority in artillery, in Prmour he was a little weaker than the German forces opposing him. &,ring the course of the coming battle, however, it would become apparent that he had diluted his smngth by spreading his forces over too wide a frontage. This would 'aid' the Germans in allowing them to achieve a much deeper penetration in the south of the salient than was achieved by Ninth Army. Nevertheless, to his rear, lay a complete reselve Front, on which he muld call, mustering forces equal to one German panzer and three infantry corps plus smaller units. Designated the Steppe Front, and commanded by General Konev, this was the largest strategic reserve assembled by STAVK.4 throughout the war, and its availability would ensure the German defeat. This huge force amounted to no fewer than 6ve infantry armies, one tank army, one air army and six, including two armoured, reserve corps. In theory, it functioned as a screening force to block roy German drive eastward should 'Citadel', in qite of everything, succeed. ZhuLov, however, was more than confident that such an eventuality was unlikely, and that his principle objective - the destruction of the German armour - would be accomplished amidst the labyrinthine defence system of the salient itself
I
The Swiet Defences Following the decision of 12 April, the Soviet h y began to mobilize the civilian population to helo o&ve the defences. Bv the- ind of the montd more than 105,000 ci&s were at work that figure ririnx to 300,000 bv lune. The obiect oftheir labours was the c o n s k t i o n of a seriei of defences designed specifically to embroil, channel and 'bleed white' the mass of armour that the Germans were expected to deploy. Under the guidance of army engineers, z 'belt' of baudion fie and suppon pns%ions, anti-tank 'resistance points' and mines linked by an extensive trench system was established. 8.5- a n t i - h f t guns and 12.2cm and 15.2cm howians suppmed by 1 2 . 0 ~ heavy ~ 1 mortars were emplaced in heavily camouflaged circular fke pasitim to bring rapid and very heavy fke to bear on the expeaed axes of the German advance. &i-mk .%lfaea was
.
Voronezh Front was also able to deploy fwe armies, one tank army and an air fleet. He had deployed the bulk of his farces to cover the sectors he believed most likely to be attacked by von Manstein's forces, those corresponding to the ceqtre and left of his 60-mile front. On the right he had deployed 6th Guards Army in echelon, to cover the approaches to Oboyan. From his bow-
ledge of h c OKH plan he assumed that the main weight of h e German offensive would be dong thicaxis, it being the shortest routem Kursk. On the left he had deployed 7th Guards Army. To their rear was 1st Tank Army, tasked with covering the OboymKursk approach. Front reserves included three corps, 35th Guards Rifle Divisioa and 5th Guards Tank C a p . While VatuIin could
.
centred on the 'resistance points', each containing an average of three to fwe 7.6cm anti-tank guns, hoops equipped with anti-tank rifles and mortars, and sections of machine-gunners and sappers. These were laid out in chequer-board style, each strongpoint supporting another. The troops in these 'bunkers' had been given extensive training to deal with the panzers. ln areas of particular vulnerabilitv. ..UD to twehre anti-tank guns. . maneed as 'pakfronts', were emplaced in web-camouflaged positions from which they muld level fie, m ntarrt, against German armour, channelled towards them by carefully laid minefidds. In totsl, the Soviets poured in more than 20,000 guar nld mortars, 6,000 anti-tank guns and 920 PErtpbBr rodret batteries, to suppat the defences of thc 6oml, and Vamnezh Fronts. During the qwhg the Red Army had laid more than 40,000 mines over the entire salient, in fields of wheat and sunflowers which, by high summer, rendered their presence invisible. The density of the minefields, particularly between the strongpoints, was remarkably high, with anti-tank mines averaging 2,400 per mile and anti-personnel mines 2,700 per mile. Trenches l i g the strongpoints were dug on a vast scale with a total length for thwe in the d e n t approaching 3,100 miles. The depth of these defences was eight defensive belts with a total depth of mkdy 110 miles. These were reinforced to thdr rear, bg the Steppe Front and a futther defensive belt lay beyond that, covering the east bank of the River Don. But the Soviets certainly had no intention of receiving the German onslaught passively. Within the defences on each of the 'fronts', an army of several armoured corps was so disposed as to be able to counter-attack the German forces once their axes of advance became clear. The immensity of the preparations and the scale of the forces being de~lovedleft the soldiers of each side in no doubt ti the signif~canceof the coming battle. Even Hitler, who was prepared to gamble all on this one throw though the very thought of it 'turned my stomach', said as much in his personal message to his soldiers: 'This day you are to take part in an offensive of such importance that the whole future of the war may depend on its outcome.'
.
numbers o f s i d t . The Petlwkm~h.?.8 vm trRatilc .Sovie, dr~e-. homkr, uaaonrofthe mdn rypra employed for
Gemm firnotlinews m ~u~cNlathilnov prnblems thrnu&uur the hcrtlrtl. (NosostiJ
Ninth Army's offensive n c e i o s r h h-trzmd ~~m~~~~~ ~
F m t . The (irrmnox
sufimds m d r d i d r i o n r ! 1.beets duy&mpa&
to the
..-.r --.. -. St&,&. It ws far this mason &at
lh-
S r u k ~ p p uvm a 111 play such no imporno
~ - , . ~ ~ ~ ~1
Forewarned that the Germans would go over to the offensive, between 3 and 6 July, Rokossovsky and Vatutin put their Fronts on f i alert. In an atmosphere of high tension the soldiers stood to their weapons. Ammunition stocks were checked, weapons examined, maps pored over. For the last time, oficers took their men through the methods learnt for stalking the panzers. L i e a litany, the weak points of the Tiger were recited. Khmshchev's demand that they be known as well as the 'Lord's Praver was once known'. was more than adequately .fultlled. The heightened sense of anticipation was rendered the more uncomfortable by the heavy, sultry heat which hung like a pall over the whole region, relieved only by the warm rain of a summer thunderstorm. The past few davs had seen intense aerial activity as bdth the Luitwaffe and Soviet Aiu Force bombed airfields and hit each other's lines of sunnlv and communication. All the signs pointed to imminence of the German offensive. As the hours ticked by, the two Front commanders demanded every iota of Intelligence that might indicate when precisely the Germans would attack. 'Lucy' had been unable to specify the exact hour of the start of 'Citadel', so a heightened vigilance was now being exercised by the front-line units, who had been warned to lwk especially for mine clearing parties operating in no-man's land.
5 July: Ninth Army/CenPal Front Late in the evenina - of 4 -Tulv.Rokossavskv obtained what he needed. A patml had come across a team of German sappers clearing a Soviet minefield. the one orisoner taken said Under intem&tion " much about the German preparations for the offensive and revealed that it would bezh at 0330 hours the following morning. ~okoss;Rshlgave orders for the artillery, mortsnand Katgusha units
in 13th Army sector to open fire on the German positions, which they did at 0220 hours. To the still assembling German units, this completely unexpected humcane of Soviet fire raised the disturbing possibility that the barrage was the orelude to a ore-emotive S&t o f f d c . For mare than half an hour &e Soiiet gansnngad across the German lines, causing mnsiduabk disruption in the assembly posifio& and detaykg the Germans' attack far ai hour. At 0430 the German d e r y opened up against the Soviet positions and by 0500 the forward observers of 13th Army reported heavy attacks against their front, supported by panzers and assault guns. Overhead, Stukas peeled off, plummeting earthward with sirens screaming, to drop their bombs an the known Russian defensive positions. By 0530 the German infantry had been commined along the 25-mile front of 13th Army and the right wing of 70th Army. Within an hour the strength of the Soviet defences had become apparent and the battle had already begun to assume the features that would characterize its savage course during the next nine days. The infantry, crossing open ground, were continually bombarded with artillery and mortars and subjected to intense small-arms fue from dug-in Soviet infantry. Attempts to use dead ground or the tall rye as cover resulted in casualties from the liberally sown anti-personnel mines. Losses began to mount steeply as the German troops finally made the first line of Soviet trenches only to find that their artiUery had not been successfu1"mdestmying the enemy infantry; savage hand-tohand fightingensued. After a day-long suuggle the German 258th Infantxy Division, tasked with breaking thmunh m the Kursk-Owl hizhwav. had groundto a halt in the face of this uipa&lleled resistance, as had the 7th Infantry Division. ,,
I
I Greater success attended those infantry divisions that attacked with panzer support and these were concentrated on the 10-mile section of the front that corresponded to the main thrust line of Ninth Armv. Of the sf oanzer divisions available to Model, only the 20th, bas committed in the first wave of the attack. Engineers had to clear lanes through the minefield;befare its panzers could begin the assault. The f i t trench lines were breached and bv 0900 the division's oanzer Mark 111s and Ns w& deploying behveen the villages of Gnilets and Bobrik. Information from a prixlner that suggested a weak link in the Soviet defences led the divisional commander, Generalvon Kessel, to order an attack on the village of Bobrik. Assisted by a heavy barrage from its divisional vdlkry and air support, 20th Panaer Division rolled up the Y
AThc 05car've o f Model's Ninth m,5-11 J d y 1943Forsix days the ~s~emblcdmightof Gdmd Grocrsl Madel's Ninthhvlv~atbm @osr thidsfcnrr b c r ofthe Smicr hin the n d o f h e d e n t L'&e hi# eampm'ot m the ticod
R&ossmdryhsd CmCenanrpdhiSfmres doma wmmuch
wnuisrpderaLIbythc ",-s.#,erafma *&1c m him, which nmar b
thcmisrakmpucrp~ mUitmtbcGvm~ nanbsn &"st th.t wer tbc s ~ o f t h two. c N&ek.r, afterah dsyadbimrand f m ' w . -bat the o
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'.-ddbYJdy.
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Gumslu were illprcpurd m m p o n d m the ~'yeSwietoffeo.ivc
f
AAtKumkZmh Panrer aki.iaa nodotham wm .b*m employ their a m mpdcpnnrsrdcyin t b r f m ofthe 'Hummd: 7 E i s ~ - p ~ e d 15.0cmsfH18houirru ~
~~
~~~~~
~
wbsnoeded Many 'H-d'unirsbed amched P-r Us, oov obnlsn~atds, cquippd with radio9 .s eammmd wbides. IBundem6ivl
V P s n z e r k p m p III ~ AusfMs, with their khunin'side m u r , of 20th PamerDidsion deployfar battk. The tbin 5mourpm'dcdn limited 'smnd OR'
~
inaduddudngthc m v r s c o f l ~ ~ c ofthe hepnfuus leave wide swathes m the rys and mntfields, so mud a f c m ofrhhremrd+ fmtItwna.moqdru
-
I ,.
fro... ,2lst Rifle Regiment. In seizing Mdk, the Germans had d e d the defensive posi(ions of 15th Rifle D i v k n and bad .dvmccd some threemiles into the Soviet wsitions. The Germans were under incessant air attack frmn16thAirAnnywhichwasvilrnoushreh.lkGnrmo I&.I air mpwi&iy over the btlleficld. On the right of 2 h h Pnnzer, 6th Infanby Division had gone into acdon at 0620 and luddnustdongthedeyoftheOhSomethree han lam 1%and 2nd Genpanies of H a y P a h w Bamlion 505. eauiwed with T k Is and amched m 6th lnfinuy'&srun, movei Foiwud. Advandna rapidly, the two 'lilrer raiments d a tmycd a defe-n of ~ 1 3 4 &d s anti-aali guasbefm ploughingintotheopen flankof676th Rifle Regiment. By midday Major Sawant's T i r s had tpLen the village of Bu* tbmhbg to unhinge the left win# of 81sl Rifle Lh&+ which was dmdy tmda prrrsurr fmm 292nd DivLdon of General Hnrpe's XLI P m r Corps. This Soviet division had been fighting a savqx battle dtmughout the motning. P a m m i o m of soviet pwitimr in &is samr of 13th Atmy lud brm achieved by the Ferdinands of Jogrfp.nar 4 !
h i l u n g 653. While th dnrbmem of F d nand, ~ p r a i n gwith 292od hfmuy DhrLion succeeded in driving straight through the defence lines of 81st Rifle Division to Alcuundmvh,their s-rs was more apparemthan & ~ehind chm heSovietinhn~dcdthe~rolrinnthe German inhmq,~nowdenuded of armour-support, to fight for every yard. Throu&out the day, as prrrsurr mamad on 13thAray,Soviet~laidahUthcl.6,000 mines w h i c h d e d the auacks by the Gennan
amour and brought about the destruction of at least 100 nrmour& vehicles. In tbe btc lftemooD mmw of thc Gemvn 86th InGnw Divirim lud &ed tbe awLins of Ponyi & the ancm npnL of the main German thrust, 216th and 78th InfPnuy Divisions of General F m W s l(WI Corps bad lamchd a heavy umck agaitut tbe dcfmded mad junction of Warlrhmgetalr. Here also, a detachment of Ferdiiands were employed with thdr srrochted Yioliuh' demolition vehides. AIthgb tbe Germua nracded in poetndn#the outer defensivezone, tbe '&R 129th h o u r e d Brippde launched a successful
PCIIIZERAMYIAWY
DETACHMENT 'KEMFFNORONW FRONT
~.~ . ~~~
~
~
Abby- W&@larurtmnna. mmilleeandwm
in &dc&th~q
M m md - h m t m
r
reserves took place, in order to prepare for the great armoured conhntation expected on 6July. r m ~
&mwd",v.lwivin.
drstodm,,'*. ~ 8 ~ drct..cnrow.O
l
h Fourth ; Panzer ~ Anw/Army Dewbmat
pnn;ajm&Ortim#*WbektEnlkd&
~
~
f
rmlr
&*t"mmf'.Enmabed
end of the f i t day the divisions of XLW and XLI P m e r Corps had pushed same four to six miles into the fust Soviet defensive belt, but at great mst. Although suspected, the suengtb and depth of she Soviet defences had come as a revelation to the Germans. Indeed, the main defence ume remained intsct to a depth of between four and six miles and was, as evening fell, being rapidly &forced. As the finhtine continued. RokossoMkv deduced thal a odd woid deploy &e bulk of hi; amour in the Buryrki and Bobrik area where the b c ~,w =wundinz of the R u s s h 15th Rille Division offired an opening fa the Gumnns to exploit. This would then place the main we+& of their h o t line in the d i i o n of OBbmtka. reThroughout the and deployment and re ~
~~~~~
~~~-
'Kempf/ Voronah Front
Vamtin had alreadv decided that the German offensive was imminent, following the advance of ' the whole of Fourtb Panzer Atmy on the afternoon of the previous day to a new position that allowed them to place artillery observers overlooking the Soviet defences. As on the Central Front, interrogntion of prisoners in the early hours of the 5th had elicited sufficient information to persuade Vamtin to order 6th and 7th Guards Armies at 0230 to laose off their own 6W-gun barrage, to disru~tthe assembling Guman units. At 0330 hot& the German a d e r y replied wilh s uemendous barrage along the entire front of Fourth P a r Army. OITicial reports later stated that the . Germans fired more s h ; ~ sin this bamge than they had throughout the entire Polish and French campaignscombined. As the first reports came in from Chistyakw's 6th Goads, the numbers of L u f d e aircraft a
THEBATTLE OF KURSK
ThmYybouttlrnight
S O V @ ~ ~ GUARDS RIFLE
OfVJdY, Gcmw
" t p m e m denrlanes in thr havn Soviet
Cherkasskoye
L h
L
The asglvlt by ~de~tsc6LMd'm.& body-i,,stOSWhm. Attlrhepointoffhe thrust tlr YiD' T y r Fompnoy
FOURTH PANZERARMYIARfiY DETACHMENT'KEMWNORONEZHF
sup@ b y m N* Mark UI* Pmthas m d ar9aultmscffCC(Bn k.EhintbsSovietliaes io hont ofa"-kpraL~ys. These h e s ue dcnrPd in bmpr6bstingbythC -entllCmzt&er
W
bs~~byo9lbfbc ~ a ~ i n f m a f 0 f the Tothcriybtof ~ ~ ~ ~ ' 1 P.ozsrdi,,.simr b& mm& the SmSet -'&I fl3.p 16 dcrsdKd h m 11th panrrrmndon defene liaes. to "I, the -,ern
*.
:3 Soviet front line
a
10th PamerBrigsde, quipped with tk new Rcothu tmk, b&s its s h m supported by ~ 8 d ~ u ~ a n d ' FvsiL'er Repiment. Almost immediate5 itruns inm an u m e p t Sovier minefield. Infsntryl066cs mount s s w e r s b m e boacd down and heaw Siietanti-tsnk and d e ' y fire concpnrmtes o* the s m d e d brigade. Engineers m e f o d GEK& 10 m clear mines. me lett Ringofthe thrust by XLVIII P-er Corps is G E R ~ G D this halted. Panthers 200 Panthers rem'eve~dnre then shifted m w i s t the main badv of
.
4
Viu~g~, and the fiw sum'ving Soviet f o m s am
withdrawn.
fl IlthP~~~ccDirisio+ GROSS-
HOERNLEIN ffl Tipers
L e d by the sen& G E R ~ X L C ~ D ofths dcfinrrs and the Smiet resiamrr, hdta wcU short ofthe blidge VON oEr the firpsei, irs KNOBELSDORFF intended objeetiw for tk opening day o f ~e offenslive.
1 T H E ASSAULT ON CHERKASSKOYE , b Y m b u r r Corps on 5 July 1943, as seen from the south 39
THE WTrlEOF KUFSK
supparting the advancing Fourth P p n w Amy clearly indicated that a major plank in the Soviet plan had gone awry. An attempt by 2nd Air Army m destroy LuJiwaIle aimaft on their airMds around Khsrkov only moments before they were due m take off was forestalled when a Freya longrange radar stDfion registered the m a s k incoming air strike. The Fw 190s and Bf 109s of JGs 3 and 52 were scrambled at the very last minute and managed to catch the Russian air armada short of the bases. In what was to be the largest air battle ofthe w, a huge ma6e involving more than 500 lircrafi began. Russian losses, though not grievous, were sufficient to give the Luftwatle air superiorityoverthe battlefield during the first day of the offensive. More than 2,000 sorties were flown on the 5th in support of Fourth Pnnzu Amy. At 0400 Fourth Panzer Army went over m the offensive along the entire thirty miles of its front between B e l g o d and Gertsovka. The p a r s rumbled over the mths throub the minefields that the sappers had ;pent most of the night clearing. Ln all, the 700 tvlLr and assault guns of nvo p a c t ATbmuqLtmzt t h e 5 s t &of* mr"%d"e tbc 0"AZSWh.ddC
aupdm~owtlrc
swtbern ucmroftbr asl(cnt.lldtb.9 .tld~thsr-d-buppart &mf?-.Mcmsaneli
Smictpositims d t b imputlity 'This-
a
fortbcS& whose a.-,qetsluenbyaodtbo
paMunits of tbe s h r o * ~ .
LXrecadbyLMe p u n d e o a e tbeac dim-bombm-..
6th'~uardsA m y in-the hope of destroyin; it and driving through the Soviet defences by the end of the day. such expectations quickly hkke doam in the face of the sheer s d e of the Soviet defences and as a consequence of other factors beyond the contml of the planning staffs.
The key m the success of General Otto von Knobelsdorffs XLVllI P a r Corps, in breaking through the Soviet defences on each side of Rutovo and executing a swift advance m the south bank of the Pena, was the massive concentration of power that by with 10 P p n w Brigade, equipped with the new Panther. On p p e r these 200 machines gave the P p n w Cnps m uqnrcedented concentration In the wake of the 'Decker' moved off immediately ran into a many of the vehicles. cate themselves set o
Cherkasskoye, the initial objective of the o f f 6 and a key paition in the fuat Soviet defence line on this p m of the front, more than 36 Panthers lay immobile. The Russians brought down intense artillery fue on the stationsly tanks and on the engineers who went into the minefields m c l a r oaths for thme Panthers not too badhe damaaed k d able to eatricate themselves. In th; mean&ne the infanw, who bad been waiting for the Panther support, had atracked the Soviet &ions, only to be thrown back with heavy casualties. While the thrust of the Panther Brigade was stalled for several hours, ' G r c d e u d b d d l lth P a r D i m on tbe CBlp' attacking towards Chcrl.astqe i matio- quickly broke inm the Saris line and bv 0915 were on thc village. TO hold thisvital pcsitkm thc Guards Rifle Divisim was reinfaced by two regiments ofanti-tank guns and a vicious battle for conwl of the position raged throughout the day. Bv late afternoon the Russians had withdrawn, l & n g thevillage in German hands. On the exueme left of the Corps, 3rd P a n a r Division had li!fmise fought against emem& strong Soviet resistance offered by 71st Ritle Division. Supported by SNLrP, he parQd and infantry of 332nd Division puahed db& through the Soviet de s w n r resistance all the 3rd Panzer D i i o n had k-ackdhe R k r & having wneuated some six miles inm the Soviet lines.-& dusk fell, the blue crayon on the situation map in Knobelsdorffs headquarters showed that his Panzer Corps had effected a substantial breach . in the Soviet defences. Even so, compared to the timeable prepared by Hoth, the Corps was very short of its stated objectives. As elsewhere, the formidable nature of the defences and the tensdous and domed resistance of the Soviet soam had taken ah& to^ of the GCMOM. . While adhering m (he OKH plan for 'Citadel'. which required ~ounhPanzet -Amy m link up with Ninth Army, Hoth had decided dut before this could come about i t d d be necessary m deal with the Soviet reserves, amounting m several armoured corps, to the south-east of K d . Forther m the north-east lay Rormistmv's 5th *I
Von Manstein's Assault on the Voronezh Front, 5-14July 1943
I
dcrcrtrr&e8,tbesbecr d c and depth ofthese a d the tLdrydt& Rvrriso ddcwkn uortnl v . - r y w a i ~ born , io Onlo d d c d m d mun*dmen.&thcmd dfhcb d c
a
RmkbmmbSmicthok rmenbvpdaanmS0
THE BAlTti OF KUPSK
Guards Tank Armv which formed part of the STAVKA reserve. 1; seemed highly &ely that any blind adherence to the OKH plan would offer these forces a superb oppormmty to attack the flank of Fourth Panzer Army as it swung towards Oboyan and bined battle with 1st Tank Army, which had been placed there byVatub specifically to block the advancing Germans. Assumg that this a;as indeed the Soviet intention, Hoth reckoned that the only direction fmm whlcb the reserve armoured units and 5th Guards Tank Army could approach the flank of Fourth Panzer Army would be via the town of Prokhorwka. He therefore decided that as soon as the Soviet defence lines had been breached, he would Nm all his offensive formations towards the north-east, and in so doing confound Soviet expeaations and defeat the reserve armour in the vicinity of PmWomka He would then wheel again towards Oboyan and from there drive through m K d to link up with Model's forces.
panzer divisions until after Kursk, they were >ormidably equipped with armour for the coming offensive, disposing of same 340 tanks and 195 self-propelled guns of all types. All three divisions deployed their own Tiger regiments. Conscious of the elite status of these units, the Soviets had emplaced before their line of advance vely deeply echeloned fo&ications mupied by the tmops of the experienced 52nd Guards Rifle division and 375thR1fledivision. Mwlng forward at 0400, having traversed the minefields that had been cleared by the combat engmeers, the three divisions deployed into the well-rehearsed Pnnxerknl. At the point of the wedge were the Tigers, these bemg fladed by Panthers (in Das Reich) and the lighter, Mark lII and IV medium tanks and assauh guns, with the lnfanag following behind, either in uacked carriers or on foot. The divisions broke through the first line of defences comparatively quickly despite encountering large numbers of Soviet tanks, but, as elsewhere, once the initial gains had been made,
It was this plan that accounted for the disposition ofll SS Panzer C o p s on 5 July. The three panzer grenadier divisions, 'Leibstandane Adolf Hider', 'Das Reich' and 'Totenkopf, were deployed in a ade el echelon to the right, ready for the push iowards Prokhormka. .4lth;ugh notdesignated f d
PMEV&.%~~~ Tmnkopflosd
I
l n h a a y a ~m-be l gMCntinbsMmt, & r d m a m h m & c ~ m i c t &cywoulddi-unrm b t d e f m c e h e a SJ*. d c ~ v o u r m c m y ~
zdm4y2
hrminn. m n. i . i. h. m .~ . . ... . .r. . . . . . tbcson'etlioe WM
*tbeT4rCnmd
manltyns fk-wver. m,mdaurrhiv~ -------.
-
THE WlTLEOF KURSK
1 StsoddiasuewasrTor
whiebsswthe
Sariet & c r e w s # t K m k uvrs thcsln.-#my or b 1 d rnyersLlrs*cur in Figure
intmduetion s t y l e d insi@a .nd new 'grnnsstiorks'or blouse w'dl stsod-UP mUsrsndshou1dPr-
1.2. 'IheRedArmy unolovcdnrmvwanurin
, --- ...
I1SS PANZERW R f 5
I
the formidable defences with innumerable antitank positions, minefields and ferocious artillery barrages slowed down the ad\ance. By the end of the da\.. however. II SS Panzcr Corns had hmkcn h u i h the anti-tank barriers and' artillery positions of SZnd Guards D i i o n and had penetrated some twenty kilomems into the defensive Zone. On the right wing of the Corps, in the hding light of the summer evening, assault d s of SS
-
1943 uniform b->
mmparatively rapid p
the Soviet lines was brought about by a remarkable cumbination of concenuated tirepower on the ground and vely close air support. Without doubt the 41 l'i~ersavailable to the Corps on the 5th endowed ;he P a m k i l of the SS ~ a n z e rCorps with great destructive power. Overhead. relavs of mound-atlack aircraft blasted a m k d o r &r the &ancing SS divisim. In the forefront of the Gennan air strikes was a number of Ju 87Gs equipped with 37mm twin cannon, under the command of the famous pilot Hans Rudel. Apan from the ubiquitous Stuka, Fw 190s dropped SD-I and SD-2 high-fragmentation bombs on the Soviet defences along the line of march, wreabng havoc among the anti-tank gun ,-,
e
and d e t y crews. In addition, Hs 12% sta& with a belly-mounted 30mm mmm ahet up Soviet amour and d e y posi!ims. In this way the very heady fortified Soviet villages d&nzov, Gremuchi, Bykovo, Kozma-Dempnwka and Voznesenski all hi in^ llonn the line d march of the SS Panzer c&; fell r&ively quickly to the mmbined air and gmuud assault The virmal air superiority enjoyed by the Luftwaffe over the southern pan of the salient was a high price for the Soviets to pay for the failure of thelr preemotive strike on the German air bases earlier in the'day. As dusk fell, the SS Panzer Corps was well p h d to exploit its hut the Corps' losses had been heavy, the 'Leiitandarte' alone losing some 97 killed and 5Wwounded. Along the endre length af Fourth P a n m Army's from the going had been very hatd, but the (3umans had mawzed to split 6th Guards Army's fmnt in IWO pG. It looked as though ~0th'; plan, notwithstanding the slower than anticiited rate of advance, muld still he carried out. ~~~
~
~~~~~~
~~~
ms,
Army Deflchment 'KempP
As the first day of 'Citadd' drew to a close, h e only real cause for concern on the German side lay in the slow pmgress being made by the units of Anny Detachment 'Kempf. W im h e psnzer divisions and 48 Tigers of schwwe Panm Abteilung 503, the Panzer Corps, its flvlL screened by the infantry divisions of the 'Raus' Special A& Corps,was to penemte the Soviet defences in the direction of Korochn as rapidly as poslle. Here it would engage and defeat the Soviet armoured reserves that had been identified by aerial reconnaissnnce and whkh Hn6 q c c t e d would strike at the right flank of the &awing SS P a m Corps. Hsving achieved &is & m e , III Panzer Corps was to wheel m the narh-wes~and be in position to d t the &mL of RormLtmr's 5th Guuds Tank Army when $@&&nitg the was Cpqw in the vicinity therefore of the easeme. If to Hoth's timetable, an cm$ tLe Sovie defence lines was vib@ Soviets were to conspire tb In femeious Wting, I&
Guards Atmy held the German armour and supporting infamy to positions very close to the Donets river cmssings. To strengthen Shumilm and foil the German breakout, Vatutin dispatched three more rine divisions to ewer any possiMe G m advance in the direction ofKomcha. As darkness fell, exhausted men on both sides caught what sleep fhey muld. It was clear that by theend of the first day of Operation 'Citadel1, the Germans had h d y made the essential moves that would govern the fom and mwse of the remainder ofthe battle. ~~~~~~~
~
~
~
~
-9JuIy:Ninth By the early h o w o completed the repreparation for the resumptloa of offensive. The 18th Guards Rifle Divkbm W been sent to strengthen the defence of Maloarkw s k ,with 3rd Tank Corps stationed to the south ofPonyk The 17th Guards Rifle Corps was moved to bolster 13th Army's defensive wne, and to Mser the antiapated German thmst ttnwd. Olkhovatta he had stationed 19th Tank Corps to the west and 16th Tank Corps to the ncdwaS & of the town. The 16th Tank Gwps am& in the early morning of tBb 6d1,*SsW 100 T-34s and T-70 light tar&. Hi&%+mted some two miles, the S w i e t f e r c e m e back by 2nd Panzer Division, which had 'just w d on the batdefield. Deployed alongside the Parue Ns and supporting assault guns were the T i of schwere Panzer Abteilung 505, now atached to 2nd Ponzer Division. By mid-moming the sun was beating down from a cloudless sky on the patchwork of rye and w h a fields that dominated this sector of the front. P d m of GWIUII m o m , painted sand-yellow broken up by shocks of red-brown and grrxn, could be seen by the Swiets moving forwprd and rrunoewring into formation. Audible even above the ucophoy of d e r y fire now sweeping the batdefield was the distinctive howl of tJx Gaman 'Nebehverfer', whose launch was sceompmied by a sea of l h u and huge smoke plumes which h ' b e d peat arcs a m the sky b e b x plunging into the Soviet lines. Salvo after salvo PIY YO^ forth as the German 49 .C-
m
THE B A T E OF KUMK
Air 8 " i k by llY
On9.hdyllteGamoo
G z P . ~
50&bGmmdler
Re#imcntrwpwrted byn hpndfufefFwdiWmi
VON KLUGE
z'~3"J4""finsll mAlthoqgbtb=cu.M. frmrtlinelupnsehnlmi pasilionbyms~of 9Jz& the W eh m MiCtedrrryhigh
ar tbc
F S N ~ ~ ~ C B
(irrmaormao
Railway lim m Kunk
s w a 2 TANl~ RODIN
The &man Z9Znd k&wWDiviaion #ekes mC oortbrtbrtb pnrr of the da& and cmbsnlmcnt on Sjuly. This division is joined by 86th a d 78th I&Divisi- who Pvwout Soviet -'ti in and
'\ Hill 253 3
mmli the villa&?. On 7Jdy smw elpmcne of 9th and 18th Paor~aorrDivisions artsdP m 'but nur inm Soviet
m i d c w fim horn .ItiU"-yand dug-in &. Ouuhead11-Zm3 M
t
ti&*
tnlres place. me
wter mmr, the besehml, tbc ~ r s t s t i o and n the mnsrlwsy station bthe focus of Grrmno a d
Soviet effirts. It is the
oamre o f tbc fishmy hec mnt es"J.9 Paryn'the mk of the ' S r s l h p d of Kvdl
P~cgpnadieeDivisii", his last meme u n i ~m the smack on the night of 10Al July. By fhia rime Z9Znd Idan- Division has &en bled white. Although by 1Zjuly the G e m a s hold tbc bulk of Prmm'. the Sovier ~CFCIIEC is & stmog that they never effect their deaimd bmskthrnugh.
:. 5-12July I
R
q c n from the south-east 5,
6 9 ) U L Y NINTH ARMYICENTMLFROMT
THE BATRE OF KURSK
barrage swept the defences ahead of the advancing ppnzers. In reply, the Soviets unleashed their massed Katpsba batteries to augment the gun barrage which now descended on the infanhy following the advancingpanzer wedges. From the German positions it could be seen through the heat haze that the horizon was dominated by a low ridge, centred on W 274 and the village of Olkhovatka. Model was convinced that its possession was the key that would unlock the Soviet defences and open the way for Ninth Army to drive on Kursk. Rokossovshi. , eauallv . . aware of the siwficance ui the p<,sition, had diiposed his furcen, panicdarly his armour, to tak account uf German intentia,ns, and to block any attempt to reach and take the nmn. In fact, r w n befinre '(:itadel' was launched, the strategic ribmifirancc of Olkho,acka had hcen appreciated,and the v ~ u n db c l ~ c c nSuhorovka and the hilL\, that is, i n a heading apprmimating to Model's main thrust line, bad been repeatedly turned over by the civilians and traops preparing the defences. The Germans were, in effect, about to launch their attack against one of the strongest and most sophisticated sections ofthe main defensive belt. As the German advance began, the panzers dedoved in their characteristic wedge in form & ~ & of a hundred tanks or mare. The Tigers, exploiting their heavy armour and fxepower, fhrust
APnnzcc~snodlVsof LndP-erDirision &phying fm the snnnpt mfom theSoviet dcfLnmsin thedimdon ofolkbvptk~M e st& bad me T i y s of
~
sdwmPsl1lcrsbteiI~~ 505atLhcpOioG thepat majority of& on Nintb ~ s h o n t w m h i d
UhnodlVs. (Bunded)
ahead and seized the village of Soborovka. The Germans now began to feed more and more amour an to the battlefield, with 9th Panzer Division deploying alongside the other panzer divisions between the villages of Soborovka and P e w e Ponyri. By midday the Germans had no fewer than 1,000 tanks in action along the 6-mile front between the two villages and were supported by more than 3,000guns and mortars. Against this massive force the Soviets deployed as many ta& and assault guns of their awn. The Germans attempted to advance against this mass of Soviet armour, composed almost entirely of T-34s, whiie at the same time contending with the extremely complex and extensive defences. The point of the German assault was provided by the remaining Tigers of Abteilung 505, but even their thick armour and powerful 8.8cm guns proved of little avail. The carefully prepared anti-tank 'resistance points' now came into their own. Penned in the defence zones, the Tigers and Panzer Ns were
ml-d in .upportofModel'a a m & 00 6J*. With these
p-
wspons me Ormt1111a, Eke the Ruasi- with Ibcir 'Katyus6n'
beh-
rnulddeUvera
THE BATTLEOF KUWK
point for produce and machinery for the collective farms in the vicinity. For six days this ramshackle village became the focal point of immense efforts by both sides. The Germans hoped that by committing strong m o u r e d forces the settlement could be taken, which would allow the panzers to break into the open counby beyond the village, and then roll up the Soviet defence lines. The Soviets
the main axis. This analysis in no way ignored the ferocity of the fighting elsewhere, as for example the days-long contest for the agricultural village of Ponyri and Hill 253.5. The fighting for this small settlement was likened by Germans and Russians aWre to a miniature 'Stalingrad'. Lying along the railway running from Orel to Kursk, its local importance was as a collection and disuibution bAnhn&p.nofthe
,-*.,
S6vietpl.n far the amdoct Of tht battle
:.!;*
k
y
~
rrquid.m.-actdby
dispatched by dug-in T-34% ' Pakfmnts' or the numerous anti-tank rifles firing from superbly camoullaged positions. Others fell prey to mines or to infantrymen who, having let the tanks pass, rose fmm thelr uenches and lobbed their 'Molotov' cocktails on to the engine decks of the panzers and assault guns. German infanhy following behind the tanks were cut down by machine-gun or mortars. Ennre infanby units melted away in the fiery furnace. Shturmovtks and Stukas attacked ground targets ceaselessly. Time and again the tanks of 2nd and 9th Panzer attacked, were repulsed, regrouped and were thrown forward again, only to be repulsed yet again. By evening, when the fighting had abated, the offensive power of the two Tiger regiments had been shattered. Numerous T~gersand other tanks lay destmyed or abandoned in the Swiet lines, mute testimony to the effectiveness of the defence system and the tenacity of the defenders. Tlus German failure was compounded by the repulse of a funher attempt by XXlII Corps to storm Maloarkhangelsk. As darkness fell many panzer crews, who had not slept for two days, dropped from their machines to snatch what sleep they could, obhvious of the starshells that lit up the darkness, and the staccato rattle of machine-guns, signifying the savage fire fights that continued tluoughout the night as the
'.-id;mithe
desrmetim ofnumbem dTigem nr s ~ d i n d i e . t i o nthat thc
pmisans.q&athc GamM h a s of nmmmimd~ledhgrn the h t A rusnined -Dsim ofsttnalr M the *&9dd -pmt~tooly deeaoyrdnpstdedof materiel, but .lsotied d a m 1numbem of GamM-aoopsin~tipmis'n sweep.Hue. mrrs swmrimg-in d n e v Puty membw ia hkiry ~lnrr..neventrnt
Gernu~shsdlosttht battle. EyllightfnUon 6 July the tro baadona of
German infanby clashed with Soviet tad-hunting teams amidst the wench systems. On 7 and 8 July Model tried again, but this time committing his forces on a wider front than on the previous day. In the wake of the G e m assault on the 6th, Rohsswsky, to suengthen his reserves, had pulled in units from the relatively quiescent sectors of the line cwered by 60th and 65th Armies. The former had to surrender a division that was rapidly shifted, lock, stock and barrel, to support 13th Amy, and 65th Amy lost two tankregiments. All Soviet armour in the line was ordered to dig in and leave only their turrets showing. Soviet t a d losses had been high, particularly to the Tigers, whose 8.8cm gun eas$ out-ranged the 7.62cm main gun of the T-34, when engaged in the longer-range fue fights. As the German attacks unfolded on the 7th, the Soviets proceeded from the assumption that the OEhxatka senor was still
KV-I Model 1941. Only
bnrs fbc ~ m t a l g p u r
msZ05ofthcSavict
'lh~)ly-mofOFmbu:
moksusedrtKunkwur durrdprhesviea,Kunk m ~ t h c m * m y o f t h e w - I . MMy err desaoyedsrlo.7gnyc by t h e p s ofthe Wrn .od P M h .muample
69JULY NINTHARMYICENTRALFRONT
THE BATTLE OFKURSK
4uy"shin u-Zm.3~m.4 with 37- -00 em&ndtheir(iumm m u n a o s m b v s ~
&-&dlui&samt& On 7Jdythc paozera o f 9 6 h e r Dilin'on a ~ subjmled e m p d o 1 1 ~ d s b s f i n ~ they ns foubhttheirlvny thmlyh the defence. &fom so-a
Panvr'. me Sovies
salient feahues. From 6 to 9 July a see-saw struggle for control of the schoolhouse, tractor depot, railway station and water tower, took place. As elsewhere, German massed tank attacks impaled themselves upon the minefields and were shattered by the massed f i e from T-34s, anti-tank guns and tank-hunting units with their anti-tank rifles and 'Molotov' cocktails. On the 9th the Germans attacked again, using half-a-dozen Ferdinand SP guns as fire support, in a bid to take
Hill 253.5, to the immediate north-east of the village. The Russians were certainly right in their perception that Okhovatka was still Model's principal m e t . Notwithstanding the losses of the 6th, he proceeded to reorganize his u ~ t and s on the 7th was again ready ta send in his panzers and infanuy to effect the breakthrough. The determination to achieve this objective, can be measured by the very rapid re-deployment of nearly 50
VA Gmnm, l0.5em lcFHI8/31Errwlhe .mmM(donnumbcr smdnrrdyrnpmbsahdinmlhebrc& m wlvwddylirr
f m o ~ d s m i o t g " M w a i d l ~ e d d
4bBy 9J+Mcsm,811c m uin the vlllyr OfPmyri had w'medsedsomc ofthe mostsnnylc~~ofthc enl* hak.On tbstdntc six 'Fednmds'were deploynl m nssnvltHiU ZU.3 It wns hoped tbst theirhc.qmmo"rwuld rnkelbemthmu&the Swiet dcfurms uoanth.4 and e d e their scsump~yiryinfmtym mll up the Soviet p o p i t i ~ am . e defmcea provcdmo mugit, however, cvso far the Fcrdhsnds. In the -d ofthis sequence of p h o w h s s Ferdiomd hnrjustdemns~~mioc sndh.sstsmdm bum. (~J.usie)
were determined to prevent this and fed in strong reserves to bolster their position. Units of 292nd lnfanuy division had captured the railway embankment and the northern part of the village on the opening day of the offensive, but by the 6th the struggle lor control of h e settlemcnr wa.. wickingin large numbers ofGerman units. To support 292nd Infantry Division's endeavour to storm the remainder of the village, Model fed in 9th and 18th Panzer Divisions and 86th Infantry ~
56
~
Division. The Swiets reciprocated in kind, feedin8 in more artillery, mortars and howitzers. As in the approaches to bllhovatka, many of the tanks were dug in to bolster the already formidable defences around the settlement. On the 7th a German arrach hy come 300 parvers clvhed headi,n with [he '1'-34s of 16th and 19th Tank Corns. In Ponyri itself, ferocious hand-to-hand f k g took place with heavy fire support from tanks, artillery and SP guns, as both sides contested the ~
~
~~~
~~
nalinv~muhytbc mm ofModlI's am& 7J+nm& 'darkened the bcsuo'w w t qumtitiu ofsmoke mcd the piT. CompIcmmling this mnlinud barrqe WLR the bombbyshorn L*sndSai5ffi F 0 m &-cmIt (suodw&) a0
-
b r cent of Luftflorte 4's nircrair from the southern pan of the salient, to suppon Ninth Army's drive. By 0900 the Soviets could see the of Gemun armour and their anendant armoured personnel carriers, deploying for the anack. Model's assumption was that the sheer weight of the German armoured fia must in the end breah through and in the fallacy of rhat assumption lay the key to the Red Army's victory on this battlefield. Although the Soviets were experiencing frighdul losses from a concentration of firepower never before experienced, the defences were fullilliog the purpose for which they were designed. Each German attack was sucking in more and more amour, to replace the shattmed and blackened hulks that now littered and marked the G e m advance. Despite the damage the Germans were inflicting on the defenders, the central task of 'bleeding white' the Germnn armour was beingrealized. . As the a d e r y and L u M e bombarded the defences, the attack resolved itself into two thrusts: 2nd and 20th Panzer Divisions heading for Samodurovh-Teploye-Molotychi and, farther to the east, 18th and 19th Panzer Divisions brineing pt&ure to bear an Olkhovatka once akin: Although Rokosswsky had reinforced these positions, the addition of von Saucken's 4th P m r Division to the towards Samodumvka saw the Soviet line f i crack along that axis, when 58
ARmwMuk ills&
pnrmcdqembro.
-uoa%uckm'4th
~DMdmprpvc hLbcdm Swalumvhin. bid m
~ t b u L k b r S m * c
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some 300 panzers, massed on a very narrow frontage, f i y crashed through the Soviet positions. The following day the Germans maintained the pressure, deploying four panzer divisions supported by 6th Infanay Division along the entire length of a 10-mile line sfretching from Samodurovka to P e w Ponyri. Fourth P m r Division was now launched alongside 2nd and 20th Panzer Divisions against the Swiet defences around Teploye. During the next three dnys a seesaw battle for conml of the village raged, both sides feeding in large numbers of tanks and infanay with powerful air support and d e r y . Even the Tigers of Abteilung 505's third regiment were unable to penetrate the defences. Although the Germans finally took the village, the three anenmts to storm the heirhts bevond were thrown back by ferocious resistance. P m r attach wilted in the hurricane of d e w he called down won them. A few miles m the east, in fmnt of dkhwatka, repeated attacks against the Soviet lines finally broke the anti-tank defences, allowing the
-
+
.
.
Appucntfm the unoaivs w d e n SSphom amhiye rovcriy
I
I
'cihulcl'
is the wide variation in uniforms wom by the mps e the bstue. Fipm ZdcpietpmSS-schurrc; &" ,% , "? ,BDth a f a i * rn'cdofthe S p p - n ~ f t b c bdk of the l1'nkn SSsr Kwh.
-F
I depicts s ~ c i t c r oftheSS-KaMUrrie Division, which wrs not ore8~11tarKtuak: he weus b smock s n d ~ t i r r r M o m b~mmJ endwedin Lbc b.tue.
I
THE B A T M OF KURSK
German forces to push forward to the slopes ofthe escarpment. Repeated attacks against the defences dug into the slopes, and sited on top of Hill 274, once more proved a drain on the German assault forces. Amid a desolation of gutted German and Soviet tanks, shattered anti-tank positions and the dead of both sides, 6th Infantry Division attacked the slopes of Hill 274 on the afternoon of 9 July. In a ferocious assault, the German infantry threw themselves agaiart the Soviet trench lines cut into the lower slopes of the escarpment, but were brought to a halt in the welter of trenches, barbed wire and mines, and forced to withdraw under incessant adlery firc and local counter-anacls by Soviet infantr). As at Teploye, this surge marked the high tide of the German advance in the northern sector of the salient Although the next .few days wquld see renewed attempts to break through, the wrack of shattered panzm marking Ninth Army's advance bore mute testament to the fact that the momentum of Model's offensive was already beginning to decay. 6-9 July:I1 SS Panzer Corps and XLVm Panzer Cmps
Ln the evening of 5 lulv, Vatutin realized that the Germans had-made-la&r inruads than had been expected. 'l'hc greatest threat was emerging in the sector of I1 SS Panzcr Corn. which br nichtfall had penetrated the first l i e bf defence&dVstood poised to tackle the second line at dawn. While the progress made by XLVIII Panzer Carps had been less serious, their conjunchbn with the SS Panzer Colps was petceived by Vatutin as poring a grave threat to the integrity of 6th Guards Army's fmnt, and the need to bring up reserves to cover the amroaches to Obovan was now seen to be verv necessary. Indeed, the sirustion was considered serious that Stalin had to tell Rokossovskv that he was diverting 27th Army, eartier promis;d to the Central Front,southwards to reinforce those other uaits that Vatutin was re-deploying to cover the Oboyan axis. Katukov's 1st Tank Army, with its MO tanks, was therefore ordered south wether with 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps into the rear of Chistyakov's 6th Guards Army. When Vatutin pmposed using the T-34s and the few KV-1s of
so
60
Katukav's Tank Army to counter-attack Fourth Panzer Army the following morning, a heated debate ensued, Katukovpointing out that too m y Soviet tanh were already being destroyed at long range by the guns of the Tigers and Panthers. It was therefore decided that the tank would be dug in, as had been done on the Central From, with only their w e t s showing, to block any German advance on Oboyan. In the early hours of the 6th the P a m ofthe SS Panzer Corps twlr on ammunition and fuel and prepared to resume the offensive. 'Leibstandarte' and 'Das Reich' h t northward. the Tigers of both divisions at the point, a toral o i 120 tanks advancing along the Belgurod-Oboyan road. In the ncinin of Yakovlevo. 'Leibstandane' clashed with tde tank of 1st L o u r e d Guards Brigade and a fierce battle developed. 'On separate slopes, some 1,000 metres apart, the forces faced one another like figures on a chess-beard, tlying to influence fate, m e by move, in their own favour. AU the Tigers fired. The combat escalated into an entasy of roaring engines. The humans who directed and serviced them had to be ah;very calm, they aimed rapidly, they loaded rapidly, they gave orders quickly. They rolled ahead a few metres, pulled left, pulled right, manoeuvred to escape the enemy crosshairs and bring the enemy into their own fire. We counted the torches of enemy tanks which would never again fire on German soldiers. After one hour, twelve T-348 were in flames. The other thirty curved wildly back and farth, Rring as rapidly as their barrels would delivet. they aimed well, but our armour was very strong. We no longer twitched when a steely finger knocked on our walk. We wiped the flakes of intedor paint from our faces loadedaain. aimed fired ' ~ i t h ' c l o s eair suppm the Gearmour mshed throunh the Soviet defences and bv 1100 had overmn issth ~ u a r d s~ i ~e*.ht e and breached the defensive barrier covering the Belgamd-Kursk highway. At midday 'Der Fiihrer' Regiment of SS 'Reich' seized the village of LurhLi. The censeqwna of this audacious mup & mas# was the opening of a huge gap in the defences of Chirtyakov's Sixth Guards Army through which Hausser promptly pushed his
-.-- --.----
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able m luc Me Icq-
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F
&9lULY: I1 SSPANZERCORPSANDXLVIII PANZERCORPS
THE BATTLEOF KUWK
4 The s
h e ofthe pnnrrr d M o m on 7Jdy rn suppomd by Wesp' bnmties dthcmohilc divisionel d q . As&ornoelled -kededed-
Tigez T Jrd SS Ir during Y:ir*deI'. 'l>r h e r (imonrlicr Divirinn mmpnn) rommrommdcr~s 'Z8leoYopf'drplnyda mmpnn.v ofrdtecn Twr
'1% u ~ desCnrted.100' s with thra8ther'ligcr.
,u.)mn~ thr ,randerd threr-di& ~ n d ~ . . .'1'0rrnnk~,~f '-w m ' e d tbr rprrinlKursk
msrlinp illu8mrr.d; ,hi9 uwalmrmp1,o)rd h~ thr 6th h e r D i t i a i n o d m ' q t h r nffmrAr.
nnd&emwdsmbes wy effectivevehicle. Appmabrsnly MU Wesps'mproduad 6om 1942""rillW. @".TdesmM"J.
4 u n a 8 j e the b& TonnkopPfouodit4f
~ - @ d . - . ~
yMdfartheotberow SS divisions ~a they &ad n d , s sirnustion bro&,t sbwtbythe6dh"eof ArmvDebschment ' K e i p e m keep up with the h r r oribinsy. plaoned. The rra.dtyn b.mU01 of the divwoo -in PedPedon -#id"
tkmwcnmtb-&nhwrd. m d Pmkbornvk. on the bc. ( B u o d c d v ) 4 K d &ed thcl~at Lime that SovietC"h"ers in snynumbcn were EsprurrdbytheGnrm-. AcmdiqmGmm so"*& by the Lime Hider d d o f f '€iit.dfon I3 Julymm 34,000 Soviet d d i r s luue esptiws d h y Omup south. In &snrr with the mi&d M ' d c hid doanforthe~fisivcin Ap* m y ofthme shmintbbpimrremrr mkmrnGmmynrel.~ bbmx @ ( ~ u n d e d v J
panzers and motorized infantry. By the end of 6 July SS Panzer Corps was firmly ensconced in the Soviet second defence line. However, the failure of 'Kempfs forces on the right wing of I1 SS Panzer Corps to advance in parallel, as had been planned, had exposed the flank of the Corps as it moved north, and Hausser had to leave behind mobile units, as substitutes for his lack of infantry units, to counter the very frequent Soviet infanm attacks. Indeed, the shonage of infantry units now began to make itself generally felt; by the evening of the 6th more than 30 per cent of von ans stein's total armour was being used to defend the flanks. As late as 8 July 'Totenkopf found itself acting as flank guard for the remainder of the Corps, and tied down by infanny attacks which by now had been reinforced with armour. In response to the German advance S T A F A dispatched 2nd and 10th Tank Corps to the Prokhororlu area and at 2300 issued or&n for the re-deplo)mcnt of 5th (iuards Tank Arm! from iLc leaguer positions as part of the reserve Steppe Front. For Rohnistrw, the order entailed forcemarching all his armour and supporting units 190 miles so as to re-assemble for action in the vicinity of Prokhorovka by 9 July. Although the Germans appeared to be making substantial h d s into the Soviet defences, there cnuld be no doubting that
it was at substantial cost. The 'Leibstandarte' war diary for the 6th admitted to 84 dead and 384 wounded. On the evening of the 6th Vatutin told Stalin by telephone that some 332 German tanks had been destroyed on Chistyakw's sector where 6th Guards, although being pushed back, had fought off twelve German anacks in the course of the day; Shumnw's 7th Guards having killed at least 10.000 of the enemv. As on the Central Front, the Germans were inflicting heavy casualties on the Red Army units, but these could he absorbed in the longe;term; more importantly, the defensive suategy was succeeding in its primary task - the atnition of German armour. Stalin reiterated that the primary task of Vatutin's forces was to continue to wear the Germans down; the situation was not yet ripe for the planned counteroffensive. The 7th of lulv was a dav of maior develonmrnri along th; &ole of Fo'unh Paker .Arm).'* front. In the mist-shrouded daun 'Leibstandane' and 'Reich' Divisions resumed their driving anack north-west towards Oboyan. On XLVlU Panzer Corps' front, a major thrust by massed German armour began shortly after 0400 when some 464 tanks of 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions, in conjunction with 'Grossdeutschland', attacked 3rd Mechanized and 31st Armoured Corps of Katu-
T H E BATTLEOF KURSK
kov's 1st Guards Tank Army. The previous day and much of the night of the 6th had seen all the Corps' units engaged in ferocious fighting as they assauited the dug-in T-34s, anti-tank guns and flame-throwers that constituted the formidable second line of defence. With panzen and assault guns in support, the infantry cleared paths through the minefields and fought their way hand-to-hand into the enemy's positions. The contestants grappled with one another across ground transformed into a morass by intermittent thunderstorms which flooded the numerous small streams bisecting the terrain. At fmt light on the 7th the German armour of XLVIIl Panzer Corns sumorted bv heaw artillerv resumed its advance, attacking the Soviet positions between Svrtsevo and Yakovlevo. Dubrova was rapidJy taken. Heavy German pressure now ruptured the front of the remaining units of 6th Guards Army which began a disorderly reueat. As the day advanced, however, the Soviets called in air support and the advancing German armour was dive-bombed heavilv. Soviet tanks also aweared in greater numbers, taking advantage of the loss of German air superioritv. Nevertheless, the Gennan pressure beg& to build and the Soviet forces were pushed back to Syrtswo, the last strongpoint mardine the defence line before Obovan. 11th banzer bivision had already thrust to the north of the village and now lay astride the Belgorod-Kursk road to the east. In the teeth of extremely stubborn resistance 'Gmssdeutschland' managed to storm the h i an each side of Syrtsevo, but an attempt to seize the village by frontal assault ground to a halt as the panzers, including Panthers,,blundered into minefields and were shot up by the strong anti-tank gun defences. Even so, the Soviet position was becoming precarious, Major General Popiel later observing that in his view 7 July was one ofthe hardest days in the Battle of Kursk. The achievement of XLVllI Panzer Corps on the 7th July was compounded by the success of I1 SS P-r Corps. The latter's initial objective was the village of Teterevino, where aerial reconnaissance had reported the presence of Soviet armour in suength. Preceded by ground-attack aircraft (Meyefs Henschels and Druschel's FockeWulfs), the SS armour thrust towards Teterwino.
. ..
..
Breaking through the outer defences, the panzers encountered the main defence lines before the settlement. A savage fire fight began between the armour and the emplaced anti-tank guns, a d e r y and T-34s; the snuggle against 29th Anti-tank Brigade lasted all afternoon. Through the gaps torn open by the Tigers an assault group stormed the village, capturing the command post and the entire staff of a d e brigade. The fall of Teterwino and the subsequent drive by elements of 'Leibstandarte' and 'Totenkopf towards Greznaye enabled the Waffen SS to break into the last Soviet defence lines in front of the River Psel. Other SS units wheeled north-east, and snuck out towards Prokhorovka. In the wake of the advancing units came the SS Feldpolizei, rounding up listless prisoners and herding them to the rear in a scene reminiscent of the previous years of the Russian campaign, when such signs presaged an imminent Soviet collapse. 6th Guards Army's front was now in tatters, and there was a very real prospect that the Germans would, after all, succeed in reaching Oboyan. Soviet oositions throuehout the whole of the " south of the salient were now under threat. In the face of this due situation VaNtin and Khrushchev issued the categorical order: 'On no account must the Germans break through to Oboyan.' Continual German pressure against the entire extent of 6th Guards' front saw even those Soviet units dispatched to plug the gaps melt away in the ferocity of the fighting. During a meeting later that evening at First Tank Army Headquarters, it became clear that the Soviets had found the heavy armour and firepower of the panzen, particularly the Tiger, operating in concert with the almost continual air support of the Schlachtgruppen, a potent and difficult combination to defeat. Nwertheless, Khrushchev, speaking with his full authority as Military Council Member, addressed the assembled commanders in unequivocal terms: 'The next two or thee days will be terrible. Either we hold out or the Germans take Kursk. They are staking everything an this one card. For them it is a matter of life or death. We must see to it that they break their necks!' A rash of orders now emanated from Vatutin. Most of the armour and artillery of Moskaknko's 40th Army was fed into
,A 'hrsReieh'Pmthsr 'ommdere@& to the 0th- nlm@de m mainrh fofotion sa thcgmovc semss the a p steppe. It under these cimmmmt,rratbrt& Panthm, sa "ith the Tim, muld u w t m s d m u m
-
VMute a n d ~ ~ n ' o u s l Two bmt-outn'n'lims bsvef.Ucnmthcyrsd the S S h c r Cmps' T i m . On therirbtis s. SU-122 which w& dcbimedearr.ti.Uyfm dirrcttimsupponof infhnuyortmk f m t i o n s . Howeverpits PCIfWmslrcein the anti-
mkmlewspoor, itr HEATWgh-Ex@& Anti-T4)rnundpmving s dissppinmeor. Tbc SwictSmkhodnnys Usfnowlcr or SUsen'es of
the line to support 1st Tank and 6th Guards Armies. Two counter-snacks were ordered for the 8th, to be directed against Founh Panzer Army to relieve pressure on the units covering the approaches to Oboyan. AU through the night the orders flowed and the divisions and armour redeployed in preparation for the next day's operations. At dawn on 8 July the Germans resumed their push with 'Grossdeutwhland' h s t i n g to take Syrtsevo. An attack by Soviet 40th Anny was weathered. In the late morning some forty T-34s of General Krivoshein's I11 Mechvlized Corps sorded from Syrtsevo in a desperate bid to stop the Gennan advance, hut ma acm the guns of the In the Tiger company of.-'
armoured, Nncdrssaclfpm@Icdyrr1*e~ modeUedm the au-&id
Germs.
S-paehlmeo (aehaehaehaehlf yrs), firstenmuntemdim
1941.011theMira T-34 Mdd 1943,,pmb.bly pmduenlstZ.mdnr.l83, the Unl mk works at N mT d ,
(Bunde-hiv)
battle that followed ten T-34s were destroyed and the s u ~ v o r rapidly s vacated the battlefield as the German armour moved f o m r d . Around the fortified town the defenders began to waver, at which units of 'Grossdeutschland' and 3rd Panzer Division drove forward to take advantage of the growing confusion and panic. Shortly after noon the town fell and the Soviet forces pulled back across the River Pena. A rapid fallow-up by the divisional reconnaissance battalion, supported by an assault gun battalion, pushed f o m r d to the t o m of Verkhopenye. The significance of this town lay in its bridge across the Pena which the Soviets were determined to hold. A major tank sortie of at least forty T-34s and M-3s was launched against the German units. The battle
raged far three hours, the German assault guns mounting for 35 Soviet ta& by lateafternoon. To the south, history of a different sort wus being made. Very late in the evening of 7 July, the wmmander of Soviet 2nd Guards Tank Corps was d a d m assemble an armowed force with ieQnay suppon and strike westwards, from i s p i t i o n iu the woods, amund the dhge of ~ c h w oIts. task was to assault the deep flank ofthe SS Panze~Corps, with a view to cumhg off M.
its supply mute. Quite by chance, aa this completely unsuspected Soviet unit was emerging fram woodland and deploying for atrack with infamq in support, it was spotted by Haupbnann Meyer who was lesdina a fliht of Heaschel Hs 129s in a routine rec6nnnGance of the a m . The H-hels dwaatated the T-34s TMItheit 30mmcpnnon. Fw 19% of Battle Formation ' b h e l ' flew in support, dropping anti-pemoonel bombs on the infantry. Within gn h~ shmtred T-3C
ARMY DETACHMENT'KEMW
THE BATTLE OF KUNK
d~s&yedineludin~n oumbuafLcndLa~M1 h.Inmt.lrbcUniai Sans supplied the Soviet Union with 1,386 1Kla. ntia~wnrnotsrd populsrm'thSon'et &em who &edit 'a pvcfor-n hthem' became ofim w l n u l b i l i ~ m OumMfim~dits tplldcncy m bum e&Jy ma bit. ( B u ~ d e a d v )
h m thousands of shells and bombs that were Qlodinz simultaneouslv.' Lieutenant-General &gunsky commented: %wards the evening of $July, one regiment had only ten tanks left. The 6 n t brigade had to withdraw to another s t o r . Our tank regiment was no longer able to h d its position. Communications to the battalions was interrupted and we were running out of amour-piercing shells. Also, there were many rounded. One would think we were on an island in the midst of a sea of fre. It was senseless to stay in this sector any longer. We had to make our way to the main forces of the brigade.' In the early morning of 9 July Hoth launched m attack with more than 500 tanks along a 10mile front between Verkhopenye and Solatino. Deploying in wedges of between sixty and a hundred panzers, with the inevitable Tigers at the point, the Gennans launched themselves once more against the armour of 1st Tank Army and the rinemen of 6th Guards. By late evening the Germans had at great cost succeeded in pushing the Soviet line back to within just twelve miles of Oboyan. German losses, however, had been very were; the Soviets estimating that this effort had cost them some 230 tanks and assault guns destroyed and nearly 11,000 men killed. 'Grossdeutschland' had barely 100 tanks fully operational. In the late afternoon of 9 July Hoth began a regrouping of his farces as the emphasis of Fourth Panzer Army's assault shifted northeastward from Oboyan. towards Prokhorovka. Moves were afoot that would lead within a few days to the clash,of two mighty bodies of amour, in what was to became 'the greatest tank battle in history'. Army Detachment 'Kempf
littered the battlefield. It was the fvst time in the history of warfare that a tank formation had been destroyed solely from the air. Throughout this day and the 9th, Fourth Pa-r Army launched successive attacks against the approaches to Oboyan. Mighty a m u r e d fists pounded and battered 1st Tank and 6th Guards Armies which, by the afternoon of the 8th, were 68
receiving reinforcements from the STAWA reserve. '. ferocious, unparalleled tank battles ensued on the flats of the steppe, ap hills, in gorges, gullies and ravines, and in settlements . . The scope of the battle was beyond all imagination Hundreds of panzen, field guns and planes were turned into heaps of scrap metal. The sun could barely be seen through the haze of smog
..
.
k u g h o u t 5 July 111 Panzer Corps and 'Raus' Special Attack Corps had suuggled through the 3mile-deep minefield and the strong defensive mrLs between the River Donets and the railway, but the b$k of the amour did not cross the river until nightfall. This fmt day had seen ememely heavy fighting, Shumilm's 7th Guards Army Wdin~ground only grudgiugiy. Throughout the i b b t the divisnsr oi>m.Pamet Caps were
deployed with 6th Panzer to the rear of 7th Panzer Division. At dawn on 6 Tulv 19th Panzer Division supported by the main body of 168th Infantry Division advanced aeainst the firmly entrenched heights to the no&-east of ~el&rod. Severe fighting took place here for the next three days with the G e m s maintaining heavy pressure on the Soviet forces, but it was only when 6th and 19th Panzer Divisions, acting in concert, broke through in the direction ofMeWthwo that the Red Amy units were finally dislodged from the Belgorod heights. The deployment of the German amour was chapcterized by great fluidity, d ~ sional boundaries being shifted 1M1 subsumed where necessary to allow an effeuive nespons~to the immensely powerful and very d l - c u n o u flaged Soviet units on the ridge; while deep in the minefield 6th and 19th Panzer Divisions actually managed to encircle and destroy two Soviet rifle divisions. The previous day had seen General Breith, the commander of 111 Panzer Corps, come to a , decision of some significance, when he abandoned the original plan to drive east and seize Karocha. The Soviet defences lying to the east ofthe Donets and blocking the axis of advance towards the mwn were too powerful. Breith decided not to expend time and effort to break them, given the very critical timetable that Hoth had imposed on the movements of the Corps armour. If I11 Panzer Corps was to be in place to assail the southern flank of the Soviet amoured IeseNe when it clashed with Fourth Panzer Amy in the vicinity of Prokhorovka, it was necessary to .devote all the efforts of the Corps to that end. Breith therefor6 ordered 7th Panzer Division to wheel north to support the drive of 6th Panzer Division, to whom he gave the central task of breaking through the Soviet defences and driving as hard as possible towards Prokhorovka. As the axis of advance of the entire Corps shifted northwards, the formerly defending Soviet units, began a series of smng attacks all along the extending eastern flank of 111 Psnzer Corps. To the south of the main a h c ~ the flank was held in a series of blocking actions by 106th and 320th Infanny Divisions, which executed great damage against the mops of the Volchansk Group as they tried to break into the 69
THE BATW OF KURIK
rear of the Gennan fmnt. As the battle proceeded, 71h Panzer found mcu increasingly &tioning as a d i e fLol,guard, m i n g the drive nonhaudr of 6th P ~ M Division. I Even thowh success was now attending the l ~ l of s HI p s e r Corps as it moved north, it was still, on PJuly, embroiled in fighting in the M e t defena lines. In the aknmn, while Hoth was regmuping the f o m of Fourth Pnnzer Armv in marPtion for his h t towards ~rokho&, the idvance units of RomMmv's 5th Guud's Tank Army was already moving inm its assembly positions m the no&vest ofthe man.
10Ju@ Ninth h y / C e n t d Fnmt
AlOtbTdCap.'sT-
anl1o.clmbothddt-s.
34s aorr used by G t a d Kmkov, emmmdcrd
The %++err were
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'
Althoul Gumpl forces bad continued to assail ~onyi'huoughout9 July, the failure of the assault on Tcolove and the Olkhovatka hduhts on the 8th c a d hiodd to s e n d the dav. - m u o i n ~his forces. He intendei m nmcL a@n on ;he-10th md bad already moved fomrd 10m Panzer Grenadier and 31st lnfantrg Divisions to support the mntinuing assault on Pony?i. These divisions were his last m e units, and their d u a l
-
.u.fD. Wadel'
-r
thedrd.fortbcd
dtheddbmrobtbc htbrr,h i m
pn,amdtbedrmgp ~ L * r M o d d D .
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would mean that he had no forcea available in Ihe event of an cmergcnq. While them mny h e been some in Ni& Amy d o still thought it powilc lo brearh the Sovin lines with one last cfforl, the tone of the telephone conversation between Zbukov and Staiin emly on 9 July was such that qjwendy the Soviets were ILrdyconvinced that the Gennvls no longer bad the resources to achieve their objective. It was decided that the Bryan& F m t and the left wing of the Western Fmm d d hunch an attack on the German fmes in the Orel Bulge on 12 July to force the Germans to draw off forces fiem N i t h Army. Central Front d d then begin its w counteroffensive in the h of cashier the Gamrn fi,rces O I T b e~ i o ~my ~ bad ri;M m orpniu their own defences. Although R o k o s o d y 4ized that his amps would hnve to face n few mom W of Gmun fury, it was peecpted that muld be the last. desoerate, flailing attemut of an Army that was in tealib already de6ated. Under a leaden sky, in wind and driving rain, the final Germna attempt m break through m K d from the nonh began. Once again the objective was the Olkhmda heights. Preceded by
\
-4
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4 Nor the kpat d t h c
I
problem &c+qModcl that the Soviet Air
Fmosbdbem w y suerrssfulinmack&tbc aupplylinee afNinth Amy, m o m b u , *
amm#LwhmfFGauppmt E v a M e his fid
s&pt m b d lhmu#, rhcdcf-inhntd OLWlowlksrp.under wymr tbclltb,Lhe O r r n w d i ~ i k h d wueb.*dim"dlyh o b ~ s u p p h 'u e s~ -cpucna d t h c Soviet rircBoIt (Nrnti)
' .
r
a tremendous artillery barrage and massed air support from Stukas and Heinkel He I l Is, the 300 panzers of 2nd and 4th Panzer Divisions deployed to assault the last Soviet defences strung along the ridge. On the bare plateau before the Soviet positions were the same minefields and other defensive obstacles with which the German soldiers had become so painfully familiar during the previous five days. The infantry, on foot on this occasion, were rapidly left behind by the panzers and found themselves exposed on terrain devoid of any natural cover. Here they fell prey to the dug-in Soviet infantry, massed artillery fue and air attack. Losses began to mount rapidly. Many panzers were destroyed by T-34s, either dug-in or hnctioning as mobile fire points. Others repeatedly turned back to give their infantry cover and support, but were destroyed by anti-tank gunners sited invisibb in the cornfields. Although some loeal successes were attained, by evening the attack 72
had shot its bolt and Model ordered Ninth Army over to the defensive, except at Ponyri. In a little over six days Model had lost more than 400 tanks and 50,000 men to effect a penetration that nowhere exceeded more than fifteen kiiometres.
i
6
Army Group SouthA'oronezh Fmnt Although throughout 10 July XLVIll Panzer Corps maintained heavy pressure agdinst the remnant of Chistyakov's 6th Guards Army and a depleted 1st Tank Army covering the approach to Oboyan, in Hoth's wider scheme of things the purpose of this operation was to distract Soviet attention, and mask the disengagement of the SS Panzer Corps which, after a rapid regrouping, would shift the axis of its attack to the north-east and Prokhormka. Notwithstanding the very heavy fighting between the divisions of XLVlII Panzer Corps and the Soviet forces to the west, Vatutin
ARMY GROUPSOUTWVORONW FRONT
had already surmised HoWs intentions. STAVKA had informed him that X X N Panzer Corns, the Army Group reserve for the battle and comprising SS ' W h g ' and 10th Panzer Divisions, was already under orders to move north from Kharkov in preparation for operations. S S 'Totenkopf, now completely disengaged from its flan% cover dunes, had been moved a w s s the rear of 'Leibstandarte' and 'Reich' and stationed on the left of the SS Panzer Corps. Late in the afternoon of 10 July, Third Battalion, First Panzer Grenadier Regiment of 'Totenkopf cleared the last remaining Soviet bunkers in its assembly area, crossed the River Psel and established a small bridgehead on the northern bank. Despite intense Soviet fue and effotts to dislodee them. the men of 'Totenkonf pushed forwardand by late evening had secured the village of Krasny Oktabyr. The significance of this move lay in the fact that the Getmans had managed to breach the last defensive barrier covering the advance to KursL. With the cmssing secured, and heavy bridging equipment being thrown across the Psel, the option of wheeling north into the rear of the Soviet positions on 11 July was now possible. By nightfall, although depleted and certainly weakened as a consequence of five days of very heavy fighting, ,the resupplied
and regrouped SS divisions were nevertheless able ro deploy nearly 600 tanks and assault guns for the coming attack. The very narrow sector of the German attack, amounting m no more than six miles at its widest point, allowed Hausser to deploy nearly 160 panzers and assault guns per mile, an immense concentration of offensive power. It was this phalanx of armour and the sheer ferocity of the SS assault, allied to a genuine threat posed by 'Kempfs' forces approaching from the south, that was to delay Vatutin's own plans far a counteroffensive. Initially to have been launched on the IZth, this was to hme involved ZhadodE 5 6 Guards Army and Rotmistmv's 5th Guards Tank Amy attacking m the south-west f m Pmk-
rdZnd VSccnbmin
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hocovka in cconjunction with the reinforced 1st Tank and 6th and 7th Guards Armies in a series of concentric blow designed to encircle the German forces in the salient. Dntingthe eady afternoon of 10 July Vatutin received the information that Hill 244.8, on the mad to Oboyan, had been seiaed by llth Panzw Division. The storming of this position was to mnrk the northernmost point of the G e m &nsive in the south of the d e n t , and was the climax of a most eventful day for %VIA Pamu Corps. Having repaired the damaged bridge at Verkophenye and c o m c t e d another bridge able to take tracked vehicles during the night of 9/10 July, 3rd Panzer Division was able to emss the Pena in the early morning and mpidly assail the units of the Soviet I11 Mechanized Corps M the Betezwka heights. With 332nd Infantry Division advancinl from the south, resimnce collapsed. By the end of the 1lth the bend of the Pena had been cleared and the German line pushed M e r to the west. Nevertheless, as the main axis of the German push shifted from Oboyan to Rdrhorwka and more Soviet unib emend the line, XL\nII P a m C o w found its& once mare up against strong, reinforced defences and vely frequent counterormcIrs. Apart from 6 d local ahances, the line on thi6 sector of Fourth Panzer Awy's &ONwas to lgmpin as it smod on llth July, until the Ej;cmranwithdrawal began some days later.
To;DcbCrs*visaba)
Not the least sijrnificant of the evenb that occurred on h e 10th;althou~hsome thousands of miles from the battlefield in the L?;raine,was the Allied landinn in Sicilv. With 160.000 British and American troops ashblg in the fust wavee that which the G e m generals had fearedand against which von Manstein had constantly wamed had now come to pass. While the OKW situation report phlegmatically recorded the event, it also announced the continuation of Operation 'Citadel'. It was obvious, however, that it would not be very long before the consGquences of Operation 'Husky' would have an impact on the offensive in Russia.
11Juh.: Ninth Artny/Central Front Early on Sunday 11 July, Amy Group South .launched its great atfa& toward8 PmLhmovka. In this complex operation, the attack by Atmy Gmup
Sou& poninst the Vmonuh Fmnt waa to miodde Z h u L o v , f a b y t h e t i w t h e ~ F m n t ~ S d PsnzCr with mother attempt by Mdel's Amy to launched its o f f e ngrbat brenl; through the Soviet lines in the Olkhovatka AmyintheenrlybolPsof12Jdy,theseGqwnn sector, but here hopes nerc to mnab unibwouldstillbeonthenwchmtheirnrx lmflml~d. Henyr probing aarrka by Soviet positions. FmeesinSd~Annv'~satorofthe~ bulge and to the rear of N& Amy put a brake on Model's dam. Conrinuina tht'ounhout the day To the south of I1 SS Pnnacr Cnps the t h m and in ~trengtht i r ~ p m b i n g s n n e d e r r l y t h e ~ r o f a m a j o r -r divisions of Amy Detachment 'KempP, Soviet offensive. but von Klua had no reserves supported by assault gun brigades md the T i with which to &pond, all ha& been committed of schwere h e r Abteihmg 503, began their to nctinn with Ninth Amy. H is forces nnenlrrady drive northward a first light on 11J*. OnIy the stretched very thidy thmughout the Orel a g e dav before these units hnd still been enmeshed in and he had linle ~ h o but k to ordn parem and t& Soviet defence zone, but on the 10th 'Kanpf motmized inthtq divisiaar eonhrnrds from had suaeeded in crrshina through the last line Nmth Amy to deal with W conUnpq. Ey between Melikhovo and-the S k y e station. at last, the j d d r y R o l m s p o v s b . b e w t o r e E t s e ~ t b D t Break@ out into optn -by 6nnis a u l d he obcffegdi " " " fmm oanza divisions then oroaded to assault the positions to the huth of Pmkhomvka with Model's assault formatbar in bam dOllbovl&. ~ m i n such success tbat the resistance facing ID Pnnzer
wowini
.
rc-a
1
IIgP~RCO~ORONWFRONTII1JULY:METIN EATTLE K OFPROWROVKA
THE EATtLE ff KURSK
' I
I L-
1
I
C o r n collaosed. As dusk fell on the 11th. some 300'panzei and assault guns were app&ching Pmkhomvka from the south. USS Panzer C o r p s N m e z h Front Shody efter I11 Panzer Corps began its drive northwards, the SS Panzer Carps began its own advance towards Prokhomvka. The 600 ta& and asault guns of the Waffen SS crashed into the Soviet screening forces in front of the town.
Overhead the Lthvaffe flew endless sorties thmughout the day and late into the night. The ferocity and power of this attack w r o n g - f a d the assembling Soviet forces detailed to begin their own counter-offensive on the 12th. Throughout the day the Waffen SS panzers brought very heavy pressure to bear in frant of the town. LieutenantGeneral Rotmishw, whose 5th Guards Tank Amy and attached 2nd TvlL and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, was moving into its assembly area, how he and Vasilwsky had encountered the advancing Germans. 'Although it was toward evening, the bombings by German aircraft did not stop. Riding in a jeep, we crossed a grwe and saw the buildings of a state farm on the right Ahead of us, about one half mile away, dozens of ts& were moving along the mad. Vasilevslry ordered the driver to pull up at the edge of the road and, looking at me sternly, asked me in an unexpectedly sharp voice, for he was usually wen tempered, 'General Rormistrw, what's happening? Why are the tanks moving ahead of time?" I looked through my binoculars. "They are G e m tanls." 'Then they may deprive of us of our foothold and, what's more, they may capture Pmkhomvka."' An immediate counter-attack by two armoured brigades restored the situation. By the end of the day Rotmistrov's a& and the riflemen of Zhadov's 5th Guards, who had come inm the banle suaight off the march, had by dint of very heavy defensive fighting held off the German armour. Despite this temporary reprieve the Soviets were clearly facing a situation of great potential danger. To wait until 1st T d and 6th Guards Armies were f d y reinforced and Zhadov's 5th Guards h y was properly deployed before opening the counter-offensive against Hausser's SS divisions would allow time for KempPs 300 tanks and assault guns to reach Prokhomvka. With a mass of German armour totalling nearly 900 machines bearing down on fie town from the west and the south, the entire Soviet position could UnIavel, with diisastmus results. Valutin therefore ordered Rotmisuov to prep= for an immediate counter-attack on the SS Panzcr C m p for 12July. In addition, 11th and 12th Meehnniztd BrigDdes of 5th Mechanized G d Cgp mgether with 26th Amoured B++ Caps,and ,,,',$ .'
*&&
92nd Guards Rifle Division, were ordered to counter-anack and block at all costs the funher advance of I11 Panzer C o p , while the bulk of 5th Guards Tank Amy launched its own heavy attack on Hausser's SS diiions the following morning. Throughout the short and dismal night the t a d crews on both sides laboured to load and refuel their machines for the great trial of strengththat layahead.
!
12July: T h e Tank Banle ofProkhomvlra The sound of tank engines wuming up could be heard long before d m . A low, ahnost tangible throbbing could be sensed, sipiIjing the prarece of two immense bodies of armour, soon to clash in the greatest armowed conliontatirm in histmy. As the morning light broke across the landscap, visibility was obscured by local showers falling fmm a sky of leaden clouds, driven by a cold eastern wind. Periodically the sun would break through, a l l k g the observer a clearer perspective, to scan the lie of the land in what was dearly a very constricted arena of combat. For the commanders of the SS Panzer Corps, standing in the turrets of their tanks, a panoramic sweep of the battlefield would have shown its northern boundary firmly anchored by the winding nibon of the River Psel. Swinging south-east the view would have taken in a traditional, slightly rolling steppe landscape characteristic of the Upper Donets valley, with fields of rye and wheat broken here and there by the small, cultivated plots of collective farmers, by hedges and the odd wooded copse. Farther to the east and barely three miles away lay the agricdtud town of Pmkhomvka, its tall grain silo standing proud against the skyline. The southernmost boundary of the banlefield, only four miles from the Psel, was fued by the cutting of the Kursk-Belgarod raihvay, for to its immedim south the land beame hilly and broken up by mounds and ravines, rendering it unsuitable for large-scale tank warfare. Rotmistrov had set up his command post on a small hill south-west of Prokhomvka from where he could observe the unfolding battle. It opened with the appearance of large numbers of Luftwaffe aircraft bombing the Soviet positions. In the wdie 77
'
.
,
I
Il SS PANZER CORPWORONEZHFRONTIIZJULY:THE TANK.WTLE OF PROYHOROVU
Westher cloudy and Wndy with hav rain l o m r r md m i a n a l hhunder in . h e m and e d y c w i q
S O V m 5 GUARDS
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Sbedy&fim W O the Lufrwsminmsivcry bombs identilied Soviet P ' ~ ~ D M ~ O the Vidnityof Pmkhomk* T b s h t echelon ofGerman armour &#ins its .dwne.bmfmml
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Pnnm-gmn~dier D i ~ i s i u n r o w and urc-lensrra "ronnkoprd+ym s rouuda tbc epp-hi,,~ nphl u e d m forms627 Gcnnan tanka Thr m'th T@m st thepint, rapidityoftbsirdvana tls& by ~krApo.~po.r ie d~tibemte:itiatha IUa and Ns.Tbs Sovietinmtionm dn'ye Gsm- mme vnd.r inm themidst orthe h l y Son'son't GumM armour th&by bombadmeof fmm h c i w the &a of d e w and Kslpshs the lmg~r-mngeyns in hnmn'ra d i c h in the
tlv Tirrr is
T H E T A N K BATTLE FOR
,
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I 2 July 1943, as seen from the south-east 78
clps6es
I
SborUy k f f f noon 'TotenkopPie ~ssailaildby fwosovict m r p ~ and faced on@ the defeosivc ins f m ' o n s bank th#t lasts thmughomt the 12th; irleses mmy men and
thmthmZout the dsy and
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SS Pme-adier
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Tkmu&ut
the day2
Division 'DmReicb'b en-d in very huruy A&* m'th u Guards Tank C o r n and its advane is asvsrJy limited by thesaict nmrour. By the utd ofthe
dsxfisahw ~ n ' 3 n " ~ C Y C IU I
d h e s falls, Me Soviets
ssfimnte lasass ao both sides duriw the p a t mk bade st
PmWlomkn m d a9 m y as 7WmnJlinn. 79
1
of the nirrrnR the 6rst mnss of Geman amour, some 200 anb, could be seen moving in from the north-west. SS' 'Totenkopf, its ~ikrsto the fore nod flanked by the lighter Mark N s and IUa advamxd m a tiebt wed& formation followed by the mh of'leibkndan;' and 'Das keich'. Ar awmdmately 0830 h e Soviet lines erupted as a bpm& h e d is-rniaufc A e r y pnd down on the &mun defence% As the front line diuppePred in a hurricane of fire and smoke, the 500 tanks of Rotmiswov's 5th G w d s Tank Amy's f o d echelon broke cover and nmleracd towards the &awing nvllaoehe of puvns and rrrnult p w . A d y d u s of the quali-
tative advantage of the Tigers and Panthers over their own T-34s Rormipwov hpd ordered his tank commanders m the by driving hell for leadm at the advancing German amour so as
dose
.mn e e the G c m n advantaaes in aun ran* and armour. While deploying a &eri& %&airy of just under 900 mh lo H a d 6 600, the ~ n m uf-l could adequpply mnpamc by the technical superiority of its Tigers and Panthers. Indeed, not d of Rormismnr's mh w a x T-36. Of the t d number of tanks deployed by 5th Guards at Rothon~ka,only 501 were T-34% M4 were light T-70sand 35 British-supplied Churchill Ills. Each corps of the Tank Army h d a
SU-76s but Rohniswov had none of The shells fired from very short distances tore large holes in the amour of the Tigers. Ammu-
It picked out the and blinded the elonat full speed erman mops. The
nition exploded inside them, and turrets weighing many tons were flung yards away.' By 0900 the bulk of the a m o k of both sides wm already engaged and the fighting degenentsd into one
t m advan-
with the shattered remains of gutted armour. vulnerable Thick, black oily smoke from destroyed t d s atkit sides. drifted across the battlefield and made gunnery 81
.he Soviet offensive Against the Ore1 Bulge, 12 July to 18 August 1943
1
T-34Mdd1943. n e rnartnurnuousMct mmkemplqedslK ars the T-34. H-YU, .U mammirhe 76.2mmprr5 wtu'eh plurd &em dikdwmta@sgsiau
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T-34Modd 1943s.
-
IllULY THETANK BAlTlE OF PROKHOROVM
diIlicult for both sides. There were more thDn a few instances of Soviet tank mews dehierateiy ramming German amour, the resulting debnation and concussion being felt across the battlefield as ammunirion and fuil exploded in a huge fireball. (herhead thc fighters 01 both sides wme their deadly dance, to desmy one another, and large numbers of ground-attack aircraft dipped low over the battlefield to strafe enemy amour and supportinginfantry. On the left npnk of the S S P m e r Corps, TotenkopP was involved in some of the most vicious fightingof the day. Having advanced early, the buk of its amour was engaged in a ferocious tire fight, when shortly after mid-morning it encounteked a large formation of Soviet reserve amour. Wheeling. advancing. smnnine m fire and f i on the m&e, the I&& ';lasied at one another at point-blank range. Armour, rent asunder by internal ea~losions-andventing sheets of f h e , rained shards of metal all m n the battlefield. Shortlybefore midday the Soviets committed a further two corps from the reserve and 'TotenkopI' was assailed by 31% Guards Tank and 33rd Guards Rifle Corps, and forced on to the defensive. But the division held and prevented the Soviet amour breaking through the blocking position established by the troops, though at a wst
that by the evening of 14July amounted to more than 50 per cent of the d i n ' s men and equipment. Throuehout the early afternoon the SS P a n z . C a p r m&tained the pressure, but at great cost 'Das Reich' found i a ability lo advance hampered bv reoeated attach tmm the tank^. of 2nd duards corps thmugh the gap that existed between its rieht npnk and the advancina 111Pnnzer Corns. Tim; and again the p h e r s ; Tigers and other m o u r were pinned down when formations of T-34sand T-70slaunched themschiea at the SS division. As the c o l d comest continued, it was becoming dear to Hoth, wa, pitsmt on the battlefield with 'Der Fiihrer' Regiment of 'Reieh', and Rormistmv, observing events from his cornmand w s t that the matter could be bv the arrival'of rhe pamers of Breith's Caps. Ak&h a surprise mu# & w i n un the night of 11/12 July had ;nabled ihe ~ e r m a &to s& a bridge &r the Donee at Rzhavets, they were unable during the course ofthe afternoon ofthe 12th m peneuate the defences established by the Soviet units dispatched m block their advance. By the time I11 Panzer Corps had got through the Soviet screen on the following day the crisis had passed. A last surge, by the 'regrouped' 'LcibstandDne' and 'Reich', directed at breaking 18th Tank Corps m
-
THE B A W OF KURSK
IIJULYTHETANKBATTLEOF PROKHOROVKA
the west of Pmkhomvka, was met bv the commit- bOwmti'an 'Rumanmen1 of the find re\ener from the second echelon ~ J C V ' :ncso*r-t of 5th Guards 'rank Army. In a repeat of the clashes ofthe morninr. 10th Mechanized and 24th ~ r m u . th.
zy-,
- -..-. -..--,.-.....- .-- . Although fierce fighting continued for the rest of the day and onl) died dourn at nightiall, the Soviets had succeeded in stopping the German attack. As Rounism observed: 'More than 700 tanks were put out of action on both sides in the bade. Dead bodies, destroyed tanks, crushed runs
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a d numerous shell craters dotted the battlefield. There was not a single blade of grass to be seen; mly burnt, black and smouldering eanh throughmt the entire depth of our amck - up to eight miles.' In this most aptly named Pmkhmoskoe peboishche (Slaughter at Prelrbmort.), more than
50 per cent of 5th Guards Tank Army was destroyed, but for the Germans the losses were proportionately far greater. A total of 300 panzers including many Tigers lay abandoned an the battlefield, together with 88 guns and 300 m c h . Mast had been destroyed, hut even those that 87
nomaUy would have been m e r e d and put back prqmsed that he and von Kluge relaunch the into service were last to the Germans, because the offensive,leaving some divisions of Ninth Army in battlefield remained in Soviet hands. Althoueh the place to tie doran Soviet units. But it was n u t few &ys(13 m 1.5 J U I ~ )w o u ~sn r & ~ d Kluge, now having m contend with a large-de &or6 by the SS Prnvr Chm m amente some Soviet offensive launched in the early hours of 12 ~ c c c sA r t ofthe ruins of th; 1 2 6 they were at July which had already mnde deep i d inm beat reaidud attempts to inflict tiuther heavy losses second Puuer Anny's f m f who tindly aakd ontheSoviet.rmwr.anddrmatleu~oomeof the h e nf'Citrdel'. He d e d Model's forces m Soviet ~ountcr-offensive contest the gnnving Soviet offensive threat, and he the tKm of he in this secmr. In reality, by the 13th Hoth, Hausser stated that he would not be able m resume the and von Manstein knew that 'Citadel' had been offensive@nsx the Cmbd Fmat The rmst that vrm Mulacin damrt from Hider was the abandoned. ampvmix that H d be dowed m continue his amcb, so as at lest to inflict a panid defeat on 13July: The W o h c h a n z e the Soviets. But in the decision m wopcod the Hitkr was admiuing rh.t 'Cipdel' was The day after Rokhomvka, von MYlndn and nn off&, Kluge received ordm m repon m Hider at his beyond m a y and that the Gcmws had, bs8duuanm in Em h a * . It was clew fmm the indeed, sustained a decisive defeat. &r's demeanour that the situation in Italy had him very rattled. The rquiremem for divisions m pmaer Ganuny's rout&m llank led m lia .nnouoecmcnt tlut he intended m rurpend 'Citadel'; the divisions he needed could only be found among those engaged in in Russia. Funhemme there uns Broaing d c m oi a Swin build-up oppodw ~ h t h,&my and F i PDIlZCr A& defendii the Donets basin. Von Manstein nrgued that victory in the south was within reach, and
THE AFTERMATH
The great prize for the Soviet Union in defeating the Germans at Kunk was the gaining of the strategic initiative. After Kursk there were no further German offensives in the East. From the launching of the counter-offensives that eliminated the limited gains the Germans had made in the salient by the end ofJuly, the Soviets sustained an advance against the Wehrmacht that did not end until the Red Flag was hoisted over the Rekhstag, in Berlin, in May 1945. There can be no doubting the fact that the German Anny inflicted very heavy losses on the Red Army during 'Citadel'; Soviet tank shength after the battle was down by 50 per cent. Set against the balance sheet of strategic gains and losses, they were the price that Stalin and Zhukov were prepared and expected to pay for the deshuction of the German armoured forces. Soviet estimates of German losses are far higher than those given by German sources. While this is not surprising, given that each side had its own axe to grind, the Germans did acknowledge the fact that their losses at Kursk had a decisive impact on the outcome of the war in the East. As the war in
the East was the decisive theatre of operations in the European War as a whole, it follows that at Kursk the Germans sustained the defeat that lost them the war. Since the battle there has been a tendency for Kunk to be explained away as a German defeat rather than a Soviet victory. While this view can be accounted for partly by the manner in which 'cold war'perceptians have influenced historical judgements, it is nevertheless a demeaning and false analysis. In all the factors that determined the outcome of the battle the Soviets held the whip hand. It was they who dictated the battlefield and the nature and form of the battle. While it is true that mistakes were made during the course of the battle - they admit as much themselves in postwar accounts - the Red Army was nevertheless moving very quickly up the learning curve. In the end, the most pertinent observation concerningthe outcome of 'die Blutmiihle von Belgorod' was that made by Hoth to von Manstein: 'The Russians have learnt a lot s i n ~ e1941. They are no longer peasants with simple minds. They have learnt the art ofwar from us.'
CHRONOLOGY 15 April Top secret Operation Order No. 6 detailing oudine for Operation 'Citadel' auth22 June 1941 Hitler launches Operation 'Bar- orized by Hider; states earliest date for the offensive as 3 May 1943. barossa', the invasion of the Soviet Union. 5 December The Red Army launches its great April-July Hitler repeatedly delays launch date for 'Citadel'. counter-offensive in front ofMascow. June 1942 'Case Blue', the German summer 12 May Axis forces in Tunisia surrender. offensive, begins in southern Russia. 19 August German S*th Anny ordered ur Battle of Kursk 5 July Operation 'Citadel' begins. In the north and, capture Stalingrad. 23 November Soviets surround Sixth Army in south of the salient German forces make very small gains in the face of massive Soviet resistance and Stalingrad. 31 January 1943: Sixth Army surrenders at strong defences. No operational objectives laid down before bank opens are realized. Stalingrad. 7-10 July Ntnth Amy: Model's main effort 8 February Soviets retake Kursk. directed at seizure of the settlement and heights of 16 February Red army retakes Kharkov. 17/18 February Hider visits von Manstein's Olkhavotka. Immensely powerful German forces headquarters at Zapamzhye; tentative discussions batter at Soviet defence lines inflicting, but also concerning coming summer campaign; gives go- taking, very high casualties and losses. Assault on village of Ponyri likened to a miniature 'Stalinahead for Manstein's counter-offensive. 22 February Von Manstein launches German grad'. Model unable to mate decisive breakcounter-offensive between Rivers Dnieper and through to Kursk. Early on %, Sfalin orders Zhukov to launch offensive against Orel Bulge on Donets. the 12th. 4th P a m Anny: On the left, XLVIlI 15 March I1 SS Panzer Corps retakes Kharkov. 18 March Germans recapture Belgorod. Von Panzer Corps manages to seize crossing over Pena Manstein's proposal to continue advance on Kursk by 9th. On the loth, 'Grossdeutschland' seizes from the south and effect an encirclement of H i 244.8, most northerly point taken on advance Soviet forces in the region in conjunction with towards Kursk. S S Panzer Corps having fought its Anny Group Centre quashed by the refusal ofvon way through Soviet defence lines regroups on 10 Kluge to co-operate in the operation. Further July in order to direct attack against Prokhorovka. German offensive action called offin face of Swiet Soviet reserve forces fmm Steppe Front moving in strength towards same place. Anny Drrnchmmt resistance and the onset afthaw. 8 April Zhukm ~ubmitrkey. . plannina document to .Kempj By 9th these farces have at last managed to s t a h in which he sets out reasons For containing penetrate Soviet forces screening advance northGerman summer offensive in a d&miwbattle; key wards. Heavy fighting as detachment moves north towards Prokhorovka. aim is destruction of the G e m pmwr force. 12 April Stalin reluctantly accedes to desire by 10July AUies land in Sicily. Zhukov and other senior c o d to fight 11-12 July Ntnth Amy: Model commits his last Germans in defensive M e ; adas p out to reserve to attack on Ponyri on 10/l lth. Indications fortify Kursk salient to reoeise GamanafTcnsive. of major Soviet offensive against Orel bulge forces Events leading m the Battle of Knmk
91
A GUIDETO FURTHER READING
Kluge to draw off German units from Ninth Army. Offensive by Ninth Army to all intents over. 4th PanzerAnny: On Ilth, SS Panzer Corps begins drive on Prokhorovka. The 12th sees one of the largest tank battles ever fought as SS Panzer corps clashes with 5 Guards and 5 Guards Tank Amy at Prokhorovka. Some 700 German and Soviet tanks destroyed. Anny Detachment Kmpf Soviet pressure prevents Kempf joining Hoth on battlefield at Prokhorovka.
13 July Hitler calls off 'Citadel'. Massive Soviet offensive against Orel Bulge.
WARGAMING KURSK
Aftermath 17July Hider orders SS Panzer Corps out of the front. Soviets begin offensives on Army Group South right flank. 23 August Soviets retake Kharkov. 7 September Germans begin evacuation of the Ukraine.
Kursk is certainly a battle that catches the wargamer's imagination. The sheer size of the forces involved. the unorecedented concentrations of armoured and air forces, the resources invested in minefields and fortifications and, not least, the appreciation on both sides that the clash would be of decisive importance for the future course of the war - all contribute to the sense of doom-laden drama evoked by the name, Kursk. Yet, although much spoken of, Kursk is rarely wargamed. 1n-common k t h many other decisive battles (Leipzig, Genysburg, El Alamein) Kursk was a 'slogging match' between evenly balanced opponents; there was little scope far sweeping manoeuvre in this grinding battle of amition. W a r m e r s seem m be amacted bv the idea of a gam; about Kursk but to lose heartonce they look at the battle a little more closely In fact, however, there is plenty to stimulate i d challenge the wargamer. In this section, let us examine where the drama really lies and how it can be reflected in games. Essentially the excitement of Kursk lies in the time-pressure facing the Germans. For the last time they are able to assemble the great buk of their striking power in Russia, trained, equipped and prepared to a standard they will never see again. They possess immense strength, far more than they will have in 1944, but every battle will wear thsm down. Their opponents have gained rastly in numbers since New Year 1943, but many units lack the skill and experience possessed by their Wehrmacht counterparts. The question is whether the superbly skilled German military machine a n break into open country m fight a mobile war before the burgeoning hut largely inexperienced Russian reserves can strvlgle it within the confines of the fortitied mnes around the Kursk salient. In wvgpmes the German should always be driving his force to make a final
A GUIDE TO FURTHER R E A D I N G
Kursk is not one of the best documented battles Koltunov, Colonel G. A. Kunk: The Clash of Annour. Purnell's History of the Second World of the Second World War notwithstanding its War, 1966 significancein relation to its outcome. Manstein, Erich "on. Lasr Yirrorics. Methuen & Co Ltd., 1958; Arms & Armour Press, 1982 Carell. Paul. SmrchedEanh. George " Hamat, & Co Piekalkienicz, Janusz. Operation 'Citadel: Costello, ~ t b .1970 , 19x7 Clark, Alan. Barbamsra. Hutchinson & Co, 1965 Erickson, John. 7he R o d to Berlm. Weidenfeld & Ziemke, Earl F. Stalingrad to BmIin - Thr German D&at in theEast. Dorset, 1968 Nicholson, 1983 -Tukes.. Geoffrev. Kurrk: The Clash of Armour. Purnell's H ~ ~ OofI Y the Second world War: Battle Book No 7,1968
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effort while the Russian agonizes about whether or how to commit his local reserve.
Perhaps for some of the reasons outlined earlier, Kursk is treated thinly by bmrdgame m u f a c turers. Back in 1971. Avllan Hill's P a d t i & . a tactical Eastern ~ m ngame t using tad plamons bn 250 metre hexes, contained a scenario based on the tank battle at Pmkhomka. This was supplemented by the 'roll your own' market with a larger m e comnrisine scenario-snecific terrain mans &d counters &the full order of battle. ~ l t h o u i h hi& popular when it fust appeared, PanurbIia lafks-zny- fonn of command -and control mechanism and possesses some very odd visibility rules (which are, however, easily amended). The attritional nature of Rokhorovka is reflected, as is the limited scope for surprise and manoewe. At about the same time the Amelinn boardgame company SPI pmduccd Kurrt, a game about the enore battlc in the salient usingdi!isi~mal-lcvel counters and tums lastingsweralbays. The game is now out of print but is the only boardgame, I know of that covers the whole battle. It is more successful at portraying the set-piece Gennan assaults than the mobile battles that followed but does illustrate the scale of the operations and the growing power ofthe Red Army. Apart from these games, Kursk normally features as a scenario in most of the strategic level Eastern Front boardgames, such as Avalon Hill's Rurrion Campaign. There is much to recommend this approach as the Kursk battle can be seen in its pmpcr context One can argue that the Battle of Kursk began during the spring of 1943 as Army Groups North and Centre conducted tactical withdrawals and thinned out their lines m provide troops for 'Citadel'. For their part, the Russians 93
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WARGAMING THE BATRE OF KUPSK
saw the blunting of the German attach m July merely as a preludep, their own summer offensives. Timing was an Important governing factor the success of offensives on both sides, each seeking to calculate how far the other had committed its reserves before launching their own blow. A shategic game enables these elements to be introduced. One problem that greatly reduces the value of boardgames as a simulation, however, is their open nature. In any game it is clearly difficult to achieve surprise or create uncertainty if all the units are deployed in full new of both players. This can be overcome by the use of one or more umpires and maps.
1 1I I
I 1 / '
In a typlcal tabletop or boardgame the two players .: admlnlster the ndes Ihemsehea while playing the game. If more people are available, however, a game can be designed in which the players can concentrate on the command decisions while an umpire deals with the rules. In this wav the 'fox of wa? can be recreated rather more convinc&ly than is normally the case with a two-player game. There can be moments when the action slow, as the umpires huddle, but there can also be momenu of very great tension, not to say panic! The basis of the umpire-moderated game, and indeed of most wargames between 1824 and 1960, is the Mop Kricprpicl. In this type of game the players, or player teams, o m p y separate rooms while one or more umpires act as go-betweens. As the name implies, the action is carried out on maps marked with chinagraph pencils, but if they have time the umpires may find it more convenient to use a modern tertain with markers. It can be easier to move solid models around than to keep scrubbing out chinagraph pencil markings or to compute lines of sight, and to weigh up terrain factors on a three-dimensional display rather'than on a map. It is therefore q ~ t possible e that with this technique the players will be using maps, as the real cwunvlders did, while the umpires will be manipulating something.that lwks very We a tabletop vprgame.
Scenarios for this type of game are numerous, but Army Group Centre's offensive in the Orel salient would be fascinating. Can General Model brealr through north ofKursk before 61st and 11th Guards Armies attack it from the north? Should they attack early to relieve the pressure on their comrades in the Kursk salient or should thev wait and attack when Model is fu$ committed? Fourth Panzer Army's offensive would be a classic mapuame. Moves would be dailv. and the action would be resolved at divisional or 6hgade level. The later, and smaller, mobile battles around Kharkov also offer a great deal of interest. T h e Phone-In Wargame Organizing the personnel for a multi-player game can be difficult. People have to get together on the same evening, possibly from widely spread locations. There can be other logistic difficulties in providing accommodation, f w d and so on. These inconveniences can be eased because it is not actually necessary for all the people to get together in the same place; d that is necessaq is that they are able to communicate with each other. urine a map game the umpires communicate constantl; with the players, sometimes by written message, but for the most part their communications will be' verbal and delivered during a visit to the player concerned. If each participant has an identical map with a grid system, then reference to any point on it can be made without the necessity for a visit. If players and umpires are connected by telephone they can pass all the messages they want while distanced from each other by the width of a corridor, a county - or even a continent. The phone-in wargame is very simple but highly effective. About two weeks before the gamG contact the participants and arrange a date for the event. Devise a scenario and issue maps and briefings. AUow the players enough time to send in a written plan to you so that you can set up your map, and just before the game issue updated intelligence assessments to each player. Then the game can proceed with phone calls in a sequence: 1. Get Orders from attackers, 2. Get Orders from defenders, adjudicate corn-, bats, etc., ....
feedback to attackers and get fresh orders, models will be needed for the supply columns, ~ do not often appear e feedback to defenders and get fresh engineers and other U N that in other wargames. A little care is required in , a limit on the duration of each call. This devising the scenario. If there is to be a major players to keep orders short and saves German attack the chances are that it will make some progress; the game will then be about the does require that each Russian counter-attack so the able needs to be sive use of his telephone deep enough m accommodate it. The Russian play on the evening that forces should be kept off the table until they are spotted by the Germans. An historical example of this type of battle is to be f w d in General van Menenthin's h p k P m W.In the opening stages of the attack XLVm h r Corpq with te conversations would make the game 'Gmasdeur~chlsnd'. 3rd and 11th P w e r d a M e Russian rifie division, but expensive. This is not acmally the siom a rence to telephone charge rates will the dussianr throw h mechanized and unk corps - unless players are acmdy located o n s ~ ~ ~ d . y s t o s t o p d m n . W h o d l ~ i v not to aUow the game to bog r Berlin. The cost could, in any ny, Iir& h is im+t down, even though the real b a t h did! The game ng d l the participants. should be a tense one for the commanders as they try to achieve objectives against time pressures. Tabletop Games Keep the pace of the game high by having is not, at fust ghnne, the ideal way relatively few moves and bringing in dilferent battles on the great open spaces of events to keep up the tension - rainstorms, air mnt. For one thing, commanders at attach, fresh mops, etc., so that the commanders els considered in this bod generally always have a fresh problem to deal wifh. A different scenario might t q to depict 8 attle fmm maps &er than by seeing rifle division in defence nlarWI tk Bbk. on the ground; for another, a tabletop R& None ofthe Russian forces are placed &table excevt mlwsix The Germnns, with a ~IBPJ ferce, must locate as m a n y ~ ~minefields, b , etc., as possibk by pamlling, local atad;s, aerial reconnaissance, prisoner interrogation, raids and so on, to a time limit. Once this is up they must plan their big offensive. The defender must try to outguess the attacker and deploy his scanty reserves in the right place - once the offensive gets going it may be difficult for him to move units around under heavy air and artillery bombardment. An umpire is needed for this fascinating for games using 1:3W intelligence game, but it is possible to have a twobe a lot of vehicles player game by not playing the defending side. An umpire could draw up a defensive layout and reactions, which he would then disdose according unit wed on either side. We might use one to the attacker's moves against it. In some games for each platoon, company ar battery, which the umvire could run the Russian side entirely the game much more manageable, b s e the Russian army was relatively stereoe need to remember that at most levels typed in the conduct of its attach. Some readers
w-
W*IUM6THEMHuUKmSK
m y be fmniliar with the 'me player-one umph'
technique from the boardgame MTO Division Cenarslln. AtbirdgCo.rp~-O.tbe d i k baclcs chvrtniPric of the July-August period. The Russian player might stm at the end
ofthemblewithaskclch~udalsacf~ dK him a choice of mutes m his objective. The buman player receives a more detsiled and rcuntcrmp~asnnlkrImc,rirbramc
pmcrgendimd-tdyluudafewpnl;r He will 6rw b e m find which mute(s) the attacker b using before deploying his friar
Theaecmrrrminblddenlmrillauedbytbe ~ ~ s l l g & l a c d ~ u d
pamd rn dd.y lhc Russians for as long as posdble.
In recent yurs a number of wprgune clubs have combined their resowcs m run my Lac q
-n~ mm aa uo dt ha- re 6E-1ut ay ma mF mmpnmt hi cniepbo rr rPn. ~~ I a Gcroun corps / Russian army level whh fourman team playing commander, operation%inleUilpnaudhgisb*l&caim.A~*wl omtmadtamaCnrmaum)./Russhhwu *nlbu done its ba m mntml pmceedinp via a syltrrn of intercoms. Thw game# require I IM of thaed-mrvcprriftbrybymberun
& thev.will need m work as a headquarters mm. X k prrsarc d an MYI ' b u k f r r d -thnmn*bcaaammudyamodificr
mbeippl*dmadicmllbut~beseenmthe hces of the 'enemy' on the other side of the haUl Sueceus nn or@ be achieved if tclolp mlpahc m e m s e l v a m ~ h t b r o f b l f ~ u d ~hruccohacntordcramuemrdinuethe mMie#of dl their units - and those of their colleagues.
