LACAN AND LEVI-STRAUSS OR THE RETURN TO FRE UD (195 1- 1957)
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LACAN AND LEVI-STRAUSS OR THE RETURN TO FRE UD (195 1- 1957)
LACAN AND LEVI-STRAUSS OR THE RETURN TO FREUD (1951-1957)
Markos Zafiropoulos Translated by j ohn Holl and
Published in 2010 by Karnac Books Ltd 118 Finchley Road london NW3 SHT Copyright© 2010 by Markos Zafiropoulos Originally published as Lacau et Levi-S/muss o11le reto11r i1 Freud, 1951-1957 Presses Universitaires de France 2003
Liberti • £galiti • Fraterniti
REPUBLIQUE FRAN<;AISE Titis book is supported by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as part of the Burgess programme run by the Cultural Department of the French Embassy in london. www.frenchbool
ISBN-13: 978-1-85575-726-4 Typeset by Vikatan Publishing Solutions (P) Ltd., Chennai, India Printed in TK
CON TEN TS
NOTE TO THE READER AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
vii
INTRODUCTION
• The young Lacan
1
CHAPTER ONE
The transcendence of the imaginary by the symbolic or the m irror s tage and the symbolic fw1ction • Freud's technique, transference from Lacan to Freud, and the post-Freudians' resistance to Freud • The effectiveness of symbols: From Arma Freud to Claude Levi-Strauss • From the mirror stage to the inverted bouquet
17
20 45 57
CHAPTER TWO
The subject receives from the Other his own message in an inverted fonn: An investigation • Presentation on Transference (1951) • "The Freudian Thing or the Meaning of the Retum to Freud in Psychoanalysis" v
93
97 107
• 1953 • The Rome Report: "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis" or testifying to a pass (September 1953)
117
129
CHAPTER THREE
The name of the father, psychosis and phobia • From the Rat Man to little Hans: The question of the Name-of-the-Father • The institutional forms of the zero value • Object Relations: Book IV of the Seminar, 1956--1957
157 158 165 174
CONCLUSION
• • • •
The d oxa: Its ideals and the repression of Levi-Strauss Louis Althusser's point of view The essential: Lacan's point of view Thanks to Levi-Strauss
193 199 205 206
POSTLUDE
• Making the world incomplete • The lack in the other
211
• The sublime excommunicant
212 214 216
BIBLIOGRAPHY
219
INDEX
225
• Lacan as a critic o f Levi-Strauss
NO TE TO THE READER AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
To Claude Levi-Strauss
First, I would like to express my gratitude to Claude Levi-Strauss, who gave generously of his time to read this manuscript, the very publication of which was in question. LaC/In and Levi-Strauss is not only an attempt to make. a new contribution to the archaeology of Lacan's thought. It is also an analysis of his return to Freud and seeks to show what the movement that has changed the history of psychoanalysis owes to Levi-Strauss. I wanted to lead people to see the importance of this debt, which has, to a large extent, been repressed in psychoanalysis, although it has played a significant role in the metamorphosis of our field. Accepting that a large element of what we have inherited from Lacan comes to us from Levi-Strauss leads us not so much to honour a debt, but simply to recognize it; in doing so, we can progress in our analysis of a filiation that a number of psychoanalysts depend on in their analysis of the symptom, w hether in its individual or collective forms. The "imaginary filiations", as Louis Althusser called them, have little to recommend them from this point of view. Yet what
vii
VII I
NOTE TO THE READER A ND AC KNO\NLED CEME NTS
really cond itions the symbolic effectiveness of recognizing this debt is surely that it has been welcomed by the one to w hom we owe it; and this is all the more striking since he had not even been aware of how much we owe him. When he had finished reading the manuscript of this book, Claude Levi-Strauss wrote to me that "Thanks to your numerous quotations, I have read more of Lacan than I had ever done before." He also wrote that "I do think that I influenced him, since he himself said so several times, in texts that I had been unaware of and which you made available to me." If we cite these lines of a private correspondence, it is not to abuse a confidence and to make coercive interpretations of works that can spea k for themselves; on the contrary, it is to reduce and clarify the field of interpretations. Levi-Strauss' words do not testify he has finally seen that there is an agreement between his work and Lacan's thought, s ince Lacan, in his own words, "remains hermetic" to him; rather, he is notifying us that he has received the message, which has made him aware, for the first time, of the place that his work occupies in Lacan's thought and psychoanalysis. Yet once more, we need to be precise: to recognize this is neither to approve nor to disapprove of it. Although there needs to be a d istinction between recognition and scientific evaluation, these words illustrate rather well the formula that, as we shall see, links the two men's work in a counterpoint that is familiar to Lacan and is not foreign to the ear of Levi-Strauss: "The sender receives his own message from the receiver in an inverted form." I thank Alain Delrieu for the very attentive reading that he gave to this manuscript. Any reader of this book will profit from keeping in mind his own work, Levi-Strauss, lecteur de Freud ( 1999). I also thank Claudine Gttitton and Rene Sarfati, as well as everyone who helped me in the final editing of this manuscript.
I N TR O D UC TIO N
So, what's tire use of commmtary? Yes, what's the use of it. Hmueuer, this "what's the use" is already superfluous; whether we judge it barren or dangerous, tire necessity of repeating mn irr uo way escape us. Maurice Blanc hot, De Kafka a Kafka Commenting orr a text is like doing an analysis Jacques l acan, Seminar I
The young Lacan In my previous work (2001), Lacnn et /es sciences sociales: le declilr du pere 1938-1953', I showed that: 1.
Very early, Lacan elaborates an anthropology that is d istinct from Freud's.
l11is text, l..acfw aJid lite Social Sdtmces: Tlte Decline of tlrt, Fntlrer, has not been translated
1
into English.
1
2 2. 3.
LACAN A N D l ~Vl- STRi\USS O R THE RETURN TO FREU D ( 195 1-1957)
His early anthropological references are to Durkheim. The s tate of the family gro up, its composition, its social integration, and the social value of its head, the father, d etermine, according to the Lacan of this period, the symptomatic avatars, and even the stntctural catastrophes of a subjective maturatio n that would develop under the primacy of three complexes: the weaning complex, the intrusion complex and the Oedipus complex.
Let us develop certain points quickly: 1.
2.
3.
In this perspective, the weaning complex d ominates the first six months of the subject's life; it is organized by the "maternal in1ago", and is required fo r the survival of the child, whose mo tor skills are still uncoordinated. Its body is a jumble of bits and pieces, and it experiences anxiety because of this state. The intntsion complex-from six to 18 months--which is dominated by the imago of the counterpart (the brother), offers the subject the unifying image of his own body. This image comes from the other, can be seen in the mirror, and becomes the basis of an ideal image of himself: his ideal ego. This is the solution to the weaning complex. This intrusion complex is characterized both by a jubilatio n experienced by the. subject w hen, in the mirror, he finally perceives himself as a wlity, and a lso by a morbid aspect: the danger of narcissistic fascination, from w hich the Oedipus complex would allow him to escape. The Oedipus complex is dominated by the paternal imago-by this image of the "stranger" in the family- wllich is s upposed finally to introduce the subject to alterity, the ego ideal, and social exchange.
Lacan wrote in 1938 that w hen the subject is brought u p in a family tha t is incomplete- tha t has no father -s/ he is likely to stagnate in the imagin ary on the level of "libid inal struc ture",
that is, in terms of the libidinal investment of the body, but also o n the level of "menta l stmcture", in the sense that this has in the myth of Narcissus, as an indica tion of dea th. The latter is
I N TROD U CTION
3
an insu fficiency of life from which the world derived either the specular reflection, to which the image of the d ouble is centra l, or the illusion of the image. We s hall see that this world contains no O thers (pp. 44-45). The world without a father is a world w ithout Others. "The clinic shows that a group that is incomplete in this way can easily produce psychoses, and it is here that we find most of the folies i1 deux" (p. 49). Psychoses proliferate in the morbid atmosphere of a fatherless world, as do numerous pathologies that can be categorized in terms of the moment of fixation; fixation prevents the normative d evelopment mentioned above, which would lead the subject from the weaning to the intrusion complex, w ith a culmination in the Oedipal solution. Hence: 1.
When there is a fixation on the weaning com plex, which is domina ted by the maternal im ago and her mortifying sed uction, w hat is dominant is the "d eath instinct'' (or abandomnent in the mother), which threatens to appear as: the mental anorexic's hunger strike certain drug addicts' slow oral poisoning of themselves the gastric neurotics' "famine diet" non-violent suicides.
2.
When there is a fixation on the intrusion complex, which is dominated by the imago of the cow1terpart, there is a proliferation of psychoses,folies adeux, homosexual object choices, varieties of sexual fetishism, or hypochond riacal neuroses.
Lacan presents several versions of the Oedipus complex. a) The Oedipus complex "in a good condition", w hich was dominant before the "Viem1ese crisis": the idealizing of the father is supposed to be s ufficient to remove the subject from the morbid attachment to the mother. b) The Oedipus complex that was contemporary w ith the psychological crisis of children in fin de siec/e Vienna: according to Lacan, they inherited a paternal imago that was in decl ine; this decline involved a first degradation of the complex and
4
LACAN AND l ~Vl -S T R i\ U SS OR TH E RETU RN TO FREU D ( 19 5 1- 195 7)
led to an excessive attaclunent to the mother, which was not compensated for by an idealization of the paternal figure; hence the emergence of the "fin de siec/e neuroses" (obsessional neurosis, hysteria, etc.) and the discovery of the complex by Sigmund Freud, "a son of the Jewish patriarchy", as well as the invention of psychoanalysis (Lacan, 1938). c) The 1938 version of the Oedipus complex, whicl1 was characterized by an aggravation of the father's deficiency and sense of humiliation, and the correlative emergence of the "great contemporary neurosis", as d iagnosed by Lacan: its kernel was a character neurosis and it expressed itself in the neuroses of failure and destiny and in certain suicides. d) This 1938 version anticipates Lacan's formulations of 19502, w hich are even more sombre. Since the decline of the paternal in1ago is even more pronounced-and thus further degrades the Oedipus complex- the families' capacities to produce identifications are weakened. The latter leaves the sons in the grip of the "character kernel" of their neuroses, and- in an even more painful way-of the social and clinical morbidness of the psychopathies. According to the theory that Lacan held between 1938 and 1950, the symptom depends on what he would finally call "the social conditions of Oedipalism" (1950, p. 111). These cond itions constitute the axis of a theory of s ubjective maturation that turns mainly around the paternal imago, an inlago whose structuring value is directly correlated to the social value of the actual father and the social integration of the family itself. Lacan's distance from Freud
This theoretical position is not Freudian, since for Freud, the value of the unconscious father is not open to debate and the Oedipus complex is universal. Yet Lacan, throughout this period-and even w hen
::Jacques Lacan and Marcel Cenacl A Theoretical Introduction to the Functions of Psychoanalysis in Criminology. In; B. Fink (Trans.), l crits: Tire First Complete Edition in E11glish New York: Norton, 2006, pp. 102-122.
I N TROD U CTION
5
he was already a skilled psychoanalyst-disagreed w ith Freud o n a series of crucial doctrinal points: the wliversality of the Oed ipus complex, the primacy of the father in the castration co mplex and thus in the fo rmation of the law, the Freudian theo ry of primary narcissism, the formation of the super-ego and the ego ideal, etc. On the other hand, by borrowing from the sociology of Durkheim 3 and Marcel Mauss, from American ethnologists (Malinowski', Bened ict5, Mead6) and also from several post-Freud ians, most notably Melanie Klein7, as well as the work of Henri Wallon• and Louis Bolk, Lacan sought solutions to what did not satisfy !lim in Freud's work. During tllis period, he retho ught the nlirror stage• and invented bo th
' Emile Durkheim (185S-1917) was one o f the founders o f French sociology and the hea d of a school of tl1ought. Sta rting in 1897, his d isciples p ublished the ir work in L mznee sociologique, the journal of his school, whose influence on French sociology was, and to some extent remains, considerable. In 1906, Durkheim was named the chair o f the Sciences of Education at the Sorbonne, and his nephew, Marcel Mauss, taught at the t role pratique des lmutes i tudes. _. Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942) was an ethnologist and one of the founders o f functionalism. His research on sexual behaviour was highly innovative. He worked especially on the Melanesians of the Trobriand Islands. See especially Sex and Repressioll i11 Savage Society (20())). ' Ruth Fulton Benedict (1887-1948) came to ethnology a fter studying English literature and was an assistant to Franz Boas. Her origina1ity \ovas to consider cultures to have a specific and large-scale personality. • Margaret Mead (1901-1978). A student of Boas and Benedict, she convinced Boas to allow her to work with adolescents in Samoa. She made several joumeys to Polynesia, which provided her with the material for several works that \\'ere very critical of the ideals of her counh-y, the United States. 'Melanie Klein (1882- 1%0) was an English psychoanalyst who was born in Vienna to a Polish jewish fa ther and Slovak jewish mo ther. The family set itself up in Budapest, where she became a member of the Psych oana lytic Society in 1919. Analysed fi rst by Sandor Ferenczi, she moved to Berlin and undertook a second analysis with Karl Abraham. Later she moved to London. Her work constitutes a major conh·ibution to child a nalysis a nd produced the Klein school of object relations theory. "Henri WalJon (1879- 1962). Henri Walton entered the £cole uormnle supirieurel where he prepared for the aggregation in philosophy. Becoming a d octor of medicine in 1908, he served as a military physician during the war and acquired neurological
experience, which enabled him lo interpret his observations of children. He became director o f studies at the l cole pratique rles lmutes i tudes, then a pro fessor at the Collfge de Fra11ce, where he heJd the chair in child psychology and education. • Lacan, "The Mirror Stage as Forma tive o f the I Function" (Ecrits, 1950, p p. 75-81).
6
LACAN A N D l ~Vl- STRi\USS O R THE RETU RN TO FREU D ( 19 5 1- 195 7)
a theory of the social conditions of Oedipalism10 and a completely new conception of the super-ego. All these inventions enabled him to analyse the clinical avatars of the human being's subjection to the law; also, more fundamentally, they helped him resolve the anthropological enigma of the transition from nature to culture." If, from 1938 to 1950, Lacan kept his d istance from certain significant aspects of Freudian theory, that does not mean that he was not Freudian. His research aimed at resolving what seemed to him to be the "crucial problems of psychoanalysis"": problems not only of the individual clinic but also of the clinic of the social. In undertaking researcl1 that sought to throw light on both social formations--and even the emergence of history- and the individual subject's unconscious formations, Lacan's epistemology was perfectly Freudian . In order to be completely clear, let me repeat that from 1938 to 1950, Lacan was thoroughly Freudian in terms of the origin and sources of his method, even if he was not always so in his relation to a series of concepts, about which he had the honesty to say that he disagreed with Freud. It is a fact that Lacan, during his "Durkheimian period", promoted a socio-historical relativism concerning subjective stntcturing, which went against Freud's universalism; it is also the case that he worked- against a backgrotmd of general indifference to his thought on the part of both psychoanalysts and ethnologists-to throw light on the most crucial anthropological enigma: tl1at of the transition from nature to culture. Certain commentators on my previous work have claimed tl1at I was promoting a "sociological" reading of Lacan, w hile others were disturbed by tl1e discussion of the intellectual gap that separated Lacan, during his Durkheimian period, from Freud. Others, finally, were shocked by the idea tl1at the d iagnosis of the humiliated father had sources not only in sociology but in the works of Charles Maurras and Paul Claude!; they were disturbed by the idea that Lacan did not object to calling on a political and religious father who was incompatible with the Freudian etllic. The project of analysing
10
See "A Theoretical Introduction to the Functions of Psyd1oanalysis m Criminology". 11 See Lacmr et les sciences socialt!S, pp. 18 ff. " This was tl1e title of book XII of tl1e seminar (1965, unpublished).
I N TRODUCTION
7
these theoretical sources involves the development of a critical archaeology of Lacan's work; it involves showing what both his anthropology and his clinical research owed to the social scientists of his time and evaluating and then rejecting the elements of his research that are now obsolete. I m ust therefore repeat: •
•
•
Yes, Durkheim' s theory of the contraction of the family and its clinical corollary, the decline of the paternal im ago, are scientifically obsolete. Yes, it is necessary to understand the law of the contraction of the family- which Durkheim invented in 1892 at the age of 34-if one is to understand the theory that Lacan developed, at the age of 37, concerning the decline of the paternal imago, the degradation of the Oedipus complex and the consequent d iscovery of psychoanalysis, and the stmcturing of the neurosis. Durkheim's work is also crucial for comprehending Lacan's development between 1938 and 1950. Yes, it is necessary to understand the research of the Cambridge School, as well as the research that confirmed it both historically and etlm o logically, in order to detacl1 ourselves fro m what must be called the infantile theory of the decline of the father, a theory that has handicapped the analysis of everything it was s u pposed to account fo r. "
• ~ A modem ized
version o f this obsolete theory is expressed in a series o f very differ-
ent, but equally catastrophic, diagnoses made by certain clinicians who have followed certain essayists in almost compulsively mapping out a general "desymboJization" that supposedly characterizes post-modemity. What these authors have not seen is that the societies in question have been producing modem mythologies, which have been analysed by the specialists in these mytl1ologies. See for example, the work o f Bertrand Mf.heus t and Denis Duclos on the particularly rich production of myths
in the United States, the homeland of post-modemity. It would also be profitable to consult the multidisciplinary analyses of myths first produced at a conference of the Centre national de In reclrerclre scieutifique in November 2002 and collected in Zafi ropoulos, M., et Assoun, P.-L., L' Antl~ropologie psyc/mnalylique, 2002. If it is really understood that the theory of Ihe d ecline of Ihe father is itself a myth-one not reserved to Western societies- we \oVOtild not be surprised that it is precisely those who experience it most intensely-or those who believe it most sincerely- who are the least able to take stock of it as a myth. Enclosed within their myth, they are blind to the vigour and the power of the endless number of fonns
8
• • •
LACAN AND l ~Vl-STRi\USS OR TH E RETU RN TO FREUD ( 195 1- 195 7)
Yes, in 1950, Lacan abandons the reference to Durkheim and his own theory of the paternal imago and its decline. No, we can no longer use this theory to account for the discovery of psychoanalysis or modern malaise. Yes, until 1950, Lacan di verged signi ficantly from Freud on a series of concepts; yes, not to want-or to be able-to see this gap is to prohibit oneself from w1derstanding what constitutes the source of his research and w hat distinguishes his texts from Freud's and his desire as a psychoanalyst from Freud's own.
taken by the symbolic function in Weste rn societies. l11is function is changeable and polymorphous, but that does not mean that it has deserted our world, except tor the neighbourhoods o f post-modemists, who are in a good loca.tion for perceiving what is missing for everyone e lse. As for the idea tha t this d esymbolization of the world can be obsen red from an alysts' o ffices, we ca nnot go along with it, since our own analytic p ractice has e nd lessly shown us the currency o f the Freudian d iscovery. See Markos Zafiropoulos, in Assoun, P.-L, & Zafiropoulos, M. (Eds.) (2001). Les solutions socia/es de l'iHcousdtml,. Indeed, we find it difficu lt to see how psyd1oanalysts could make precise d iagnoses ot subjects whose psyd lic economy would prohibit any an alysis. It seems more heuristic to ' "'ork on the social evolution o f symbolic forms and on the effects of the differential subjectivizing o f these forms-forms of the Other. In our opinion, it is better to do this than to repeat endlessly that, not content with having deserted heaven, the Other is now deserting the world. \¥hat is in question here is a sort o f ritual for reinforcing the belief in the underlying d isappearance ot something that can take various forms: the pa temal fu nction, rituals, myths. Indeed, we would say nothing against this myth it it had not led too often to an erroneous socio-d inical orientation. Finall}~ we shall see at th e end of this work that what ensu res the success o f this myth-or of this obsolete sociological thesis-in the Laca nian psychoana lytic field is nothing o ther than La.can's choice to deprive this commun ity ot the 1964 semina r on the Nnmes-of-tlte·Fntlrer, in which he had intended to an alyse what "in Freud, was never ana lysed ". He continues by saying tha t "[ had read1ed p recisely this point when, by a strange coincidence, I was put into the position of having to give up my seminar." "What I had to say on the Names-of-the-Father had no otl1er pu rpose, in fact, than to put in question the origin, to d iscove r by what privilege Freud 's desire was able to find the entrance in to the field o f experience he designates as the unconscious. " It is absolutely essen tial tha t we should go back to this origin if we wish to p ut analysis on its teet" Qacques l acan, Tire Four Frmrlnment.nl Concepts of Psyclzoarmlysis, p. 12). At the moment of his e xcommunication, Lacan volunta rily left a hole in the (Freud ian) a nalysis of the origin of psyd1oanalysis, a nd consequently, he left the door open to the eternal retum of the myth of the d ecline of the fa ther, which he had himself used in 1938 in order to account for the origin of psychoanalysis. Since he d id not put psyd1oanalysis "on its feet" in 1964, it is not surprising that \oVe still some times find it standing on its head.
I N TROD U CTION
9
Finally, it is to forbid oneself from seeing the most powerhol mainsprings of his rettm1 to the texts of the dead father of psychoanalysis. If, out of transferential piety, we imagine that Lacan was always Freudian, how can we accotmt for the epistemological constraints that led to his return to Freud? The return to Freud
I have mentioned the gaps between Lacan's and Freud's texts precisely in order to throw light on the paths by w hich he returned to Freud and to avoid any d irect use of the notion that Lacan, in rejecting some of Freud's ideas, repressed them. I am avoiding the latter notion, even if the analytic register requires us to think of the return (of the repressed) as the repressed itself. Was Lacan's return to Freud determined by the elements of the father's speech that had, until then, been repressed by his heirs? This is what we shall see. To make of this re ttorn a simple instittotional issue would be to show a sociological blindness that is best avoided; I do not advise anyone to read Lacan in ignorance of his anthropological guides, whether they are Durkheim from 1938 to 1950 or Levi-Strauss, whose influence on the relttrn to Freud first became central in 1951. Concerning the notion of the father, the central idea of psychoanalysis, I showed briefly in my earlier work w hat Lacan's uwention of the Name-of-the-Father owed to Levi-Strauss. Now I shall re-examine, not every element of Lacan's work that is u1fluenced by Levi-Strauss, but the aspects of the ret urn to Freud that cmm ot be understood without seeu1g the transference of knowledge from anthropology to psychoanalysis. Can I refer to transference in this context? Yes, for this relttrn to Freud is, first, a s ubjective rectification of Lacan's relation to knowledge, and especially to Freud's knowledge. My research will investigate the period of Lacan's return to Freud, after his Durkhein1ian period. I have already shown how, until that time, he had d isagreed
with Freud about various issues, and especially about the father. Now, I shall examine the rectification of Lacm1's transferential relation to Freud, a rectification that I shall consider as the most
10
LACA N AN D LEVI-STRAU S S OR THE RETURN TO FREU D ( 195 1- 1957>
important cause of this retu rn; I shall also examine the element of transference to Levi-Strauss. The thesis of this work is simple: Lacan ret urns to Freud by means of Levi-Strauss. My intention is not to examine whether this return was well-founded, but simply- and this is already a lot-to retrace his itinerary and to draw up a theoretical map of it. Method
I have chosen to structure the analysis of Lacan's return to Freud by recalling, first of all, how, from the beginning of his seminar, he placed himself at the heart of the analytic experience; in his first seminar, he examined Freud's technical papers", thus demonstrating a strong concern for the clink. Since my readers are not necessarily familiar with psychoanalytic thought, w henever I discuss Lacan's disagreement with the post-Freudians about the direction of the treatment, I shall present the passages from Freud that Lacan conunented upon before giving my own read ing of the seminar. In this way, the reader will be able to make his/ her own judgement inunediately. Tilis is an important point, for if Lacan's return to Freud is, first of all, ]lis own, it was also tmdertaken by the French analysts who had followed ]lis critical reading of both Freud and the works of various Anglo-American analysts. Among the latter were Otto Fenid1el", Alma Freud 16, and Allllie Reich17, whose work was concerned with the crucial
" I shall retain the numbering of Lacan's seminars used in their published versions, despite an awareness tha t he gave seminars before 1953-1954. In 1975, Lacan himself chose to publish the seminar on Freud's technical papers, as edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, as Book 1of the seminar. " Otto Fenichel (1897-1948). Bom in Vienna, he became involved in psych oanalysis in 1918, undertaking a first analysis with Paul Fedem and then a second with Sandor Rado in Berlin. Participating in the Freudian left, he tried, despite the anivalofNazism, to maintain his Marxist and psychoanalytic activities. He fin ally left for the United States, where his work became a crucial reference for American psychoanalysts. 16 Anna Freud (1895-1982). Born in Vienna, Anna Freud was Freud's sixth d1ild. Analysed by her own fa ther, she devoted herself, first of all, to child analysis, but also published Freud's works, d irecled the new Vienna Psychoanalytic Institute and finally set herself up, especially in opposition to Melanie Klein, as the guardian of Freudian orthodoxy. She moved to london in 1938 with the rest of the Freud family. "Annie Reich (1902-1971). Bom in VIenna to a jewish family, Annie Reich was the daughter ot a feminist activist. After studying medicinel she became interested in
IN TRODU C TIO N
11
question of resistance and whose theoretical conception of the ego determined how they treated this agency in transference. Should the analystally him/herself with the ego or should it be considered, instead, as the seat of illusion and repression? What is resistance to analysis? What resists? What teclmique and what authority should be marshalled in order to ensure the progress of the treatment? Freud had discussed all these questions in his own work, but they were re-thought by the postFreudians and Lacan examined their deviations in his seminar. From this poin t of view, Lacan's position in relation to Freud must be seen clearly; his understand ing of his own distance from Freud-which is a sign of his honesty-enables him to analyse how far the other post-Freudians had moved away from Freud and how heterodox they had become. As a consequence, his commentary and his analysis of Freud's texts became tmbearable, as we shall see, to many of his peers; for this reason, after 1953, he was no longer welcome in the h1temational Psychoanalytic Association, which finally expelled hin1 in 1964. Lacan's research is thus related to certain institutional conditions and group effects, but it is also necessary to understand how Lacan understood his own responses to the institutional situation during the period that began in 1953. h1 that year, La can was separated from the lPA and took part in forming the Societe fran~aise de psychanalyse (French Psychoanalytic Society). What led to his theoretical inventions was not a q uest for power and a wish to dominate the French analytic scene, its institutions, and its sources of income. Lacan always in terp reted his relations to institutions--here, his exclusion by the lPA-in terms of the logic of the same "toolbox" that had allowed him to locate hin1self in analytic experience. This is the case for both 1953 and 1964. Therefore I shall examine how the events of 1964 can retroactively shed light on those of 1953.
The excommunication
Let us jump ahead ten years. At the end of his seminar on anxiety (Seminar X, 1962-1963), Lacan distinguishes between the gaze and
psychoanalysis and married Wilhelm Reich. She lived in Prague u ntil 1938, tl1en emigrated to the United States and became a member o f the New York Psychoanalytical Society.
12
LACA N AN D LEVI-STRAU SS OR THE RETURN TO FREU D ( 195 1- 1957>
the father's voice, and then mmotmces that the seminar of 1964 wiU be devoted to the theme of the Names-of-the-Father. Then, in 1964, he was excluded from the IPA. What d id he do? Did he simply continue and affinn his legitimacy as a psychoanalyst and the value of his teaching for the training of analysts? No, he publicly raised the question of w hether he is authorized to transmit psychoanalysis and decides to d iscuss the "fundamentals of psychoanalysis" rather than the Names-of-the-Father (Semi11nr XI, p. 1). He does so because he has to assume responsibility for his "exconunwucation" and goes back to the fw1damental conceptsthe w1conscious, repetition, transference, the d rive- in order to ask a question that is unavoidable for him: How can a psychoanalyst, whose teaching has been proscribed by Freud's own association, be authorized to teach the foundations of psychom1alysis and to train analysts? Deprived of the group's guarantee md forbidden to trm1Smit his teaching, Lacan carmot continue without going back to what the group, in giving its guarantee, had assumed that it had resolved: the delicate question of the conditim1S that enable the analyst to practise. In this situation, Lacan does not avoid the problem and asks the only good questim1S, those that could not escape a serious person in tlus situation: What is the analyst's desire? What must there be in the analyst's desire for it to operate in a correct way? (Semiunr XI, p. 9). In 1964, tlus return to tl1e fundamental concepts concerns the principles-the texts and Freud's founding desire . It confirms tl1at Lacm1's way of responding to the separation from the analytic institution is to turn to the "monuments" of the founder's speech-the fundamental concepts-and to question less Ius own institu tional position than Ius relation to Freud's speech and desire. Instead of denying that he has been excommunicated, he takes w hat has happened to him into account and responds by working publicly on Freudian concepts and tl1e analyst's desire. Let me be even more explicit: in 1964, Lacan occupies the place of the person who has been excluded (he says "exconunwucated ", " proscribed"). He thus incarnates for the group the object that is not in the right place: the object (a), the object that he has just been theorizing.
I NTRO D UCTION
13
The spl itting of 1953
Let us return now to 1953, where we begin the second part of our research; this moment has the same epistemological logic as the crisis of 1964. In 1953, Lacan locates himself both clinically and in relation to the group by means of a new version of the mirror stage: the experiment of the inverted bouquet. In this optical montage, the subject can only see his image if he is suitably placed or named by the O ther of the symbolic fw1ction. Let us say that this O ther is the father. The 1953 separation from the IPA d id not trigger the same kind of response as the excommun ication of 1964, since Lacan had actually started his return to Freud in 1951; furthermore, he had himself indicated that it was because of this ret urn that he had become unbearable to the Societe psycl•analytique de Pnris (Paris Psychoanalytic Society, SPP). No longer seeing his image in the mirror of the IPA, he maintains his analysis of and with the s peech of the founding father in order to understand his distance from it, to rectify his position, and to guide both his own generation and his students in a return to Freud. This was his position within the Societe fran fnise de psychnnnlyse (French Psychoanalytic Society, SFP), which he wanted to bring back into the IPA . In analysing his d is tance from Freud, he also analyses the d eviations of Freud's Anglo-American heirs, in all the d iversity of their practice and theories, a fragmentation of their professional bod y that hard ly conformed to Freud's desire. If we apply the theory of the inverted vase, which I shall present later, we can say that this fragmentation, whicl1 has been recognized by the heirs themselves, testifies to their own d istance from-or repression of-Freud's speech; accord ing to Lacan's perspective and the optical model, this explains the lack of clarity of their clinical work. What would distinguish the French situ ation from what prevailed in the English-speaking cow1tries is that no one w ho lived in the latter tried to reveal what motivated the variability and lack of clarity of their analytic practices; these are the marks of the catastrophic repression that characterize their relation to the speecl1 and desire of the founder of psychoanalysis. What d istinguishes 1953 from 1964-apart from the stylistic differences of these returns, which indicate different theoretical presuppositions--is that in 1953, Lacan had not given up trying to
14
LACA N AN D LEVI-STRAU SS OR THE RETURN TO FREU D ( 195 1- 1957>
be a part of the IPA, just as he had not yet ceased to believe that the image of the (professional) body of Freud's heirs could achieve a new wholeness. Therefore, from 1953 to 1963, at the hospi tal of SainteAnne, he gave a seminar that was "addressed to psycho-analysts" (Seminar XI, p. 1). Starting in 1964, the Ecole normale superieure (ENS) and the Ecole des hnutes etudes en sciences socinles (EHESS) provided the framework for the seminar, which he no longer addressed only to psychoanalysts, since he had given up believing in the unified image of an analytic group in the IPA. Lacan and Levi-Strauss
On 15 Jan ua ry 1964, Lacan began his seminar, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycl10analysis, in the position of someone w ho has been excommtmicated, but also at a point of intersection between the teaching of philosophy (ENS) and the social sciences (EHESS). Claude Levi-Strauss was present at this inaugural session. Can we see his presence as a confirmation that Lacan is speaking to a wider audience and of the persistence of the bond between the two men that had been forged in 1949? Perhaps. In any case, and despite the fact that Levi-Strauss attended Lacan's seminar only once, his resea rch had held a crucial place for Lacan since 1949, and Lacan's first return to Freud- d uring the 1950s--crumot be understood without relating it to the texts of Levi-Strauss. They provided Lacan w ith a style for read ing Freud's work-the style of the return to Freud and the return to Freud's desire- at a point of acute crisis, both theoretical and institu tional, for psychoanalysis. Lacan was hoping to effect a metamorphosis of psychoanalysis. In the second part of this book, we shall see how, in the series of texts that accompanied the first seminar of 1953-1954-Presentntion on Transference (Ecrits, pp. 176-185), Tl1e Neurotic's Individual Myth (1953), the Rome Report (Ecrits, pp. 197-268), etc. -Levi-Strauss' work infiltrates Lacan's research, especially w hen the latter concerns the theory of the w1conscious subject, as well as his read ings of Freud's case histories: Dora, the Rat Man, etc. Then, in the third part, I shall
examine Lacan's final readings of the case histories and his structuralist accow1ts of the psychoses (Seminar Ill) and phobia (Seminar IV). Such advances would have been unthinkable w ithout both his interest in Levi-Strauss' texts and the invention of the theory of the
I NTRO D UCTION
15
Na me-of-the-Father; in my opinion, his fonnulations concerning the latter also owe a great debt to Levi-Strauss. I shall examine the clinical scope of this theory. At the end of the third part, I shall have finished this instalment of my continuing research on Lacan and the social sciences. This research seeks to provide the reader w ith a way to w1derstand La can' s work and the sources of his thought, which he often does not make explicit. In order to make my conclusions clear, I shall proceed by commenting on the movement of Lacan's research and what is at stake in it for psycl1oanalysis; I shall also show w hat this movement owes to the social sciences.
Situating THIS research By failing to recognize lacan's Durkheimian stage, readers have not been able to see the logic that made his return to Freud necessary in 1951, especially in relation to the cmcial question of the father. Thus many conunentaries on lacan's return to Freud begin by considering only the texts written after 1950, all of which date from the return itself. Likewise, readers who are unaware of Durkheim's influence on Lacan will not see what is behind the abandonment of all references to the father of French sociology, in favour of levi-Strauss. These two insufficiencies are cmmected and, even today, the influence of the social sciences on psychoanalysis is largely neglected, as is the fact that both Freud and Lacan treated psycl1oanalysis precisely ns a social science. If my work seeks to lift this epistemological repression, it is in order to bring to light both the " forgotten" part of the symbolic network of the texts that precede lacan's return-a part without which this return cmmot be understood-and the cause of the return. To do so will enable us to get our bearings in the "Freudim1 thing". If we really wm1t to understand the return to Freud, we must follow what lacm1 said in 1957, the final year of the period that we are analysing in this book (1951-1957):
[It) would be absurd to isolate our field completely and to refuse to see what, in it, is not analogous but directly connected, in gear, with a reality that is accessible to us in other disciplines, other human sciences. Establishing these connections seems to
16
LACA N AN D LEVI-STRAU S S OR THE RETURN TO FREU D ( 195 1- 1957>
me to be indispensable if we are to situate our field and even simply to re-find ourselves in it (Seminar IV). In the conclusion of this work, by following Althusser, I shall interpret the repression of Levi-Strauss' importance by readers of Lacan. These readers proffer to us a doxn that idealizes Lacan's philosophical references excessively; one of the effects of the latter is to "set aside"-in the sense of a Verdriingung the contribution of the social sciences to Lacan's teaching, his speech and his desire.
CHAPTER ON E
The transcendence of the imaginary by the symbolic or the mirror stage and the symboli c function
s we shall see later, we can agree with Lacan that his return to Freud was publicly inaugurated by his Presentation on Transference, which was given at the congress of Romancespeaking psychoanalysts in 1951, while he was s till a member of the SPP and the IPA. This presentation is the first of the readings that Lacan will give of Freud's case histories between 1951 and 1957. Here he examines the case of Dora, the young Viennese woman of 18, who was divided between her perception of herself- which was on the male side- and her place as a woman, which she owed to the automatism of the symbolic fw1ction that determined the group to which she belonged. In d iscussing this case, Lacan immediately stresses the epistemological axis that orients his return to Freud. He does so in order to account for the way in which the subject is d ivided between the imaginary register, which fotmds her first identifications-those of the mirror stage-and the symbolic. In the latter register, Lacan locates the Oedipus complex and, more generally, the symbolic hmction, which he borrows from Frencl1 anthropology and which includes this complex. This epistemological axis, in1aginary-symbolic, is to a large extent co-extensive with the one that had oriented his research 17
A
18
LACAN AN D l~V1·STRAUSS O R THE RETU RN TO FREUD ( 195 1- 1957>
during his Durkheimian period, when he raised the father to the level of a familial operator, one who was able to extract the child from the imaginary captu re; through his intervention, the child ceases to be grasped by the matemal imago (the weaning complex) and then by the brother (the intmsion complex). During the retum to Freud, w hat goes beyond and organizes the in1aginary register are the mles of the symbolic function, rather than the actual father. In discussing the structuring of the tmconscious subjectand th us of its symptoms-Lacan now rejects Durkheim's laws and adopts, instead, the laws of speech and language, w here the symbolic organization of societies, and thus of the family, is located; he adopts them in a structural form that had been completely recast by Claude Levi-Strauss who, since his return to France from the United States, and since his 1947 thesis, The Elementary Structures of Kinship, had thoroughly tumed the social sciences upside do\Vll. We can consider the return to Freud as a moment of mutation or of metaphor, one that, in terms of Lacan's clinic, made Levi-Strauss' version of the mles of the symbolic ftmction prevail over Durkheim's version of family life. This is precisely the subject of our research: Lacan's theoretical presuppositions, the consequences that they had on his return to Freud, and the metamorphosis of Lacan's work. As we shall see, it is in his return to Freud that Lacan situates the cause- in the strong sense of the term-of the painful experiences that led him, on 16 June 1953, to resign from his position as president of the SPP. As early as 1951, Lacan claims that something in Freud's speech, by returning in his own mouth, aroused the fear of the other practitioners: Whereas Freud assumed responsibility for showing us that there are illnesses that speak (tuilike Hesiod, for whom the illnesses sent by Zeus come over men in silence) and for making us hear the truth of what they say, it seems that this truth inspires more fear in the practitioners who perpetuate this technique as its relation to a historical moment and an institutional crisis becomes clearer (Presen/aliOif 0 11 Transference, p. 177).
Despite this sense of isolation, which would soon make his very existence itself w1bearable to the group, Lacan continued his reading of Freud's text w ithin the framework of the SPP w1til his resignation in 1953.
THE TRA NSCENDENCE OF THE IMAGINARY
19
Next, at Sa inte-Anne, in the department of his friend Jean Delay••, Lacan would contin ue " in o p position to everyone" his return to Freud by a nalysing Freud's technical papers. It is w ith this seminar that we shall begin to analyse Lacan's work, since the sessions of 1953-1954 were published in 1975 as Book I of the seminar, under a title that has been translated into English as Freud's Technical Papers. We shall respect Lacan's wish to count this as the first of his 24 seminars, even if, as we have said, his return to Freud dates from 1951. We are going to begin the first part of o ur project by reading Seminar I, which Lacan began in a utumn 1953, after his resignatio n from the SPP: after the test that made him, in his own words, a psychoanalyst who was endowed w ith a "kind of faith" . This faith was based particularly on the fact that "I know better and better what it is mine to say about an experience w hich I have only these last years been able to recognize and solely thereby to master." Because of this, he has become "a man more convinced of his duties and his d estiny" ,.. It is in a state of certainty that Lacan begins his new read ings of Freud's texts. Thus Lacan, w hose technique had led him to be thrown out of Freud's association, chose to continue his work by giving a commentary on Freud's papers on technique, a commentary that led him to the heart of the psychoanalytic clinic, and which had provided the "coord inates" of his offence and the motives for the accusations brought aga inst him. We are now going to see what this reading of Freud's technical papers owes to a renewal of the questioning that had begtm with his "d iscovery" of the mirror stage (1936). He will now examine how the structuring of the tmconscious subject takes place at the conjtmction between the imaginary and the symbolic. What is new for La can is not such q uestioning itself, but rather his response to the radical changes brought abo ut by the use of the symbolic function, which he had just encountered in the recent work of Levi-Strauss. Returning to Freud's " Jean Delay (1907-1987), a French psychian·ist and student of Pierre Janet. He was
ana.lysed by Edouard Pichon, a friend ot Jacques Lacan's. He became a member of
the Acndrmie frnnrnise in 1959 .1nd was the pre-eminent representative of the postwar school of biological psychiatry. He was the author of Tile Youth of A11rlr<' Girle. Lacan
commented on this work in Serifs, pp. 623-644. '" h1 Letter to Rudolph Loewenstein.l In : Te/evisio11/A CIJnlle11ge to fire PsyciJomrnlytic Eslnblislllllmt, pp. 64, 65. We shall examine tl1is lette r in the second part of this book.
20
LACAN AND l~V1·STRAUSS O R THE RETURN TO FREUD ( 195 1- 1957>
teclmical papers, Lacan will show what both Freud's tecluuque and the tmconscious formations--
Freud and resistance In the lecture given to the College of Physicians in Vierma on 12 December 1904 and entitled On Psychotherapy, Freud dissolves the common confusion between psychoanalytic technique and hypnotic suggestion by d istinguislung their relation to resistance. Suggestion conceals from us all insight into the play of mental forces; it does not permit us, for example, to recognize the resisl11nce with which the patient clings to his disease and thus even fights against his own recovery; yet it is this phenomenon of resistance which aloue (my emphasis) makes it possible to understand his behaviour in daily life." Freud·s abandonment of hypnotic suggestion, far from being the product of a "liberal or libertarian affect" as Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen suggests in The Freudian Subject, was actually motivated by the fact
~ jacques
lacan, Freud's Pnperson Tecllnique, 1953-1954.
"Sigmund Freud, Ou Psycllotl~empy, 1904, p. 261 .
THE TRA NSCENDENCE OF THE IMAGINARY
21
that hypnotic s uggestion prevented him from seeing resistance, "which alone makes it possible to understand [the patient's ] behaviour in daily life". Freud did not refuse suggestion (only) because of ethical objections to the hypnotic method; he rejected it on scientific grounds because it was teclmically incompatible with the exploration of resistance. The second lecture, The Future Prospects of Psycl•o-ann./ytic Therapy, dates from 1910 and was intended for a different public: those who attended the second psychoanalytic congress in Nuremberg. In this lecture, Freud says that analysts have made cons iderable progress in understanding their patients' unconscious and are therefore better able now to confront resistance. Analysts are no longer content simply to urge the patient to pursue his free associations, since they now provide "the intellectual help w hich makes it easier for him to overco1ne the resistances between conscious and unconsciotts 1122 • The knowledge acquired in the course of analytic experience makes treating patients easier. Freud now seeks to bring out the "structure of the neuroses", since such knowledge will make it easier to foil the patients' resistance. Lifting this resistance is not only a part of Freud's strategy in treating each individual patient; it is also c01mected with a knowledge of the structural organization of the neuroses, whicl1, w hen taken into account in transference, will enable w hat is opposed to the progress of the analysis to be weakened, even if it is precisely by having defeated the resistance appearing in each individual treatment that the common s tructure of the neuroses- and their modalities-can appear. In other words, the case-by-case approach allows us to ream the general character of the psychic structures-or complexes- and this systematic knowledge, in tum, helps the analyst in treating each ind ividual case. " ... Our work is aimed d irectly at finding out and overcoming the 'resistances', and we can justifiably rely on the complexes coming to light without difficulty as soon as the resistances have been recognized and removed" (Future Prospects, p. 144). Once the screen of resistance has been removed, the kernel of
the experience should be isolated. Yet not all the resistances have the
~ Sigmund
Freud, TI1e Future Prospects of Psycho-an alytic Therapy, 1910, p. 142.
22
LAC AN AN D l~V1·STRAUSS O R THE RETU RN TO FREUD ( 195 1- 19 57>
same cha racter; in noting this, Freud asks his colleagues to classify them and to see the way in which, for men, "the most important resistances in the treahnent seem to be derived from the fathercomplex and to express themselves in fear of the father [and] in defiance of the father" (Future Prospects, p. 144). Thus Freud goes back to the question of how to treat the father-complex. The father-complex: The moto r of resistance
Situating the father-complex as one of the specific motors of resistance to ana lysis, Freud asks w hat authority is necessary to defeat this obstacle. In other words, Freud wonders what kind of authority the analyst should have in order to vanquish the resistances linked to the father-complex, especially if this authority is not that of suggestion. Before answering this question, Freud defines the scope of what must be defeated: "Only very few civilized people are capable of existing without reliance on others or are even capable of coming to an independent opinion. You cmmot exaggerate the in tensity of people's inner lack of resolution and craving for authority" (Future Prospects, p. 146). There are no illusions in this diagnosis. The need for authority always seeks a way to be satisfied, and it motivates the resistancesjust as it does repression- that are required by the father's heirs: the social authorities whose power of suggestion hobbles analytic efforts. According to these lines, the father-complex and the need for authority are the main motors of resistance; they thus foreshadow the later texts of Freudian anthropology, such as The Future of nn Illusion and Civilisation nnd its Disrontents23; particularly in the latter work, Freud shows that the nostalgia for the father is a source of dependency m1d is the decisive mainspring of illusions, which are always more or less religious and whim impede the progress of truth. The need fo r authority, the power of truth, the analyst's choice
In 1910, in relation to the father-complex, which feeds the resistance to psychoanalysis on the levels of both the individual case and the social, Freud says that the analyst must increase his authority.
Both texts are found in Sigmund Freud, The S/mrrlarrl Edition of the Complete Psyc/rologiml Works of Sigrrrrmd Frerrd Vol XXI.
~
THE TRA NSCEND ENCE OF THE IMAG IN ARY
23
What is to be expected in this situation? First, there will be a long wait, for from the perspective of the social authorities, psychoanalysts are subject to two charges: • •
They are accused of d amaging ideals by destroying illusions By showing how the social order is responsible for neuroses, they are protesting against it.
It is not obvious that there can be an alliance with the social authori-
ties. Nevertheless, Freud assures us that "The harshest truths are heard and recognized at last, after the interests they have injured and the emotions they have roused have exhausted their fury" (Future Prospects, p . 147). "We must be able to wait" (Future Prospects, p. 148), and it would be easier to treat patients if an alysts' authority were less contested socially; the resistances would not be backed up by collective illusions, and truth could emerge more easily. Freud's prophecy ai ms far beyond the clinic of the individual case, s ince it suggests that s uch trea tment would be facilitated if the social authorities gave up their virulent attitude toward s psychoanalysis; the social progress of truth, in tu rn, would weaken both theca uses and the morbid mainsprings of the neuroses. Freud sketches out for his companions the scope of his analytic project and what could be expected if unconscious tntth were brought to light collectively: "The s uccess which the treatment can have with the individual must occur equally with the comm unity. Sick people w ill not be able to let their various neuroses become known-thei r anxious over-tenderness which is meant to conceal their hatred , their agoraphobia which tells of disappointed ambition, their obsessive actions which represent self-reproaches for evil intentions and preca utions aga inst them-if all their re latives and every s tranger from whom they w ish to concea l their mental processes know the genera l meaning of s uch symptoms, and if they themselves know that in the manifestations of their illness they a re producing nothing tha t other people crumot instantly interpret. The effect, however, will not be limited to the conceal-
ment of the symptoms which, incidentally, it is often impossible to carry out; for this necessity for concea lment d estroys the use of being ill. Disclosure of the secret w ill have attacked, a t its most sensitive point, the 'aetiological equation' from w hich neuroses arise" (Future Prospects, p . 148- 9).
24
LACAN AND l~V1·STRAUSS OR THE RETURN TO FREUD ( 195 1- 19 57>
We see once again that Freud's ambition does not lie in a clinic of the ind ividual case, but aims instead at the masses; Lacan reaffirms this to his disciples, in order that, in the days before their second congress, they will not forget this part of their collective adventure. What should we retain from this? First, that to reach the goal-the "aetiological equation" of the neuroses-Freud is not really counting on reinforcing the institutional authority of psychoanalysis or on obtaining more social recognition; instead, he is betting that the secret that motivates neuroses will come out into the open and that illusions will be weakened. He is also wagering that the resistances that, especially in men, come from the father-complex, will be weakened. The power that Freud cotmts on to reach the heart of the neuroses is less that of an institution than of truth . The question of the collective, once again, is not so much an extension of his clinical practice, but is instead active in the very aetiology of the neuroses; therefore, illusions, the suggestions made by the powers that be, and the chronic need for authority are met with in the analyst's office as well as in the rest of the social field. TI1e year in which Freud made these statements, 1910, was crucial in the history of the analytic movement. On 30 March of that year, Freud, along with Sandor Ferenczi'"' had fotmded the first international Freudian association (the lnternntionale psyclroannlytisclte Vereinigrmg). TI1is group would keep this name untill936, when it became the IPA. If it is necessary to choose between the authority of truth and that of the analytic institution, the Freudian perspective would choose the symbolic power of tmconscious tmth, w hich alone is able to reduce both neuroses and the collective sense of discontent. In these texts, the psychoanalytic institution is a secondary base of analytic power. The true master of the Freuclian orientation is the tmconscious text and the tmth that lies in the symptom: "We must not forget that the analytic relationship is based on a love of truth-that is, on a recognition of reality- and that it precludes any kind of sham or deceit.""
" Sandor Ferenczi (1873-1933). He was bom in Hungary into a family of emigran t Polish Jews. Analysed by Freud, he devoted himself to the psychoanalytic cause. Witl1 Freud, he founded the ln temational Psychoan alytic Association in 1910 an d cre.1ted the Budapest Psychoanalytic Society in 1912. Amember o f the secret commiltee beginning in 1913, he participated in directing the Freudian movement. In 1919, he started to try to reform psychoanalytic technique and invented the uactive technique" before retuming to the theory ot trauma. He was Freud's favourite disciple. ~ Sigmund Freud, Analysis Terminable and Interminable, 1937, p. 248.
THE TRA NSCEND ENCE OF THE IMAG IN ARY
25
At this point, I have said enough to make it possible to see why Lacan, in his return to Freud, and particularly in his seminar that addressed Freud's papers on technique in 1953-4 (Seminar /), struggles with the outcome of resistance, the resistan ce that, if progress is to occur, forces the analyst to choose w hich authority to rely on; it must be the authority of the ego or of truth. Two paths, two lines: according to Lacan, the practitioner who seeks to use the register of the ego to go beyond the resistances is departing from Freud's desire; s/ he leads the analysis into an impasse by ensuring that it w ill s tagnate in the imaginary. Now, it is precisely by deciphering the symbolic envelope of the symptom that Freud's desire can operate. Yet for Lacan in 1953, who is Freud? Lacan's transference to Freud
TI1e inauguration of the return to Freud coincides w ith the begilming of the ulStitutional splittu1g that would lead Lacan-as we shall see later-to leave the analytic association that Freud fow1ded in 1910. We need to exami11e w hat he says about his relation to Freud duru1g this period and what makes Freud's speech authoritative for him, w hile also asking: What, for him, gives its authority to the Freudian discovery? In the Freudian field, one of the names for authority is the superego. In the first session of the seminar (that of 18 November 1953, w hich ended on 7 July 1954), La can mentions the super-ego ill order to rethil1k it by linking it, not-as he had done from 1938 to 1950-to the first imagu1ary identifications of the mirror stage26, but to language: The super-ego is a law deprived of meaning, but one which nevertheless only sustains itself by language. If I say you tum to the right, it's to allow the other to bring his language into !me with mine. l think of what goes through his head when I speak to him. This attempt to find an agreement constitutes the communication specific to language. This you is so fundamental that it arises before consciousness. Censorship, for example, which is intentional, nevertheless comes into action before con-
See discussion in Lac:an et les sciences sociales o f the root image, good form and the Lacanian super-e-go.
;,i
26
LACAN AND l~V1·STRAUSS OR THE RETURN TO FREUD ( 195 1- 19 57>
sdousness, functioning with vigilance. You is not a signal, but a reference to the other- it is order and love" (Semi11nr /, p. 3). This recasting of the super-ego makes it an operator of order and love that is prior to consciousness; it situates its efficacy in the register of language. We shall not be surprised to read, in the second session of the seminar, that Lacan admires Freud's texts. This declaration indicates that he is ready to harmonize his language with Freud's: "If we are under the impression that we are here to stand back in admiration of the Freudian texts and marvel at them, we will certainly be well satisfied" (Sernil'lar /, p. 9). Admiring and marvelling at the father's speech, he says in The Neurotic's Individual Myth, that "one must have confidence in him" (p. 407). Lacan th us situates Freud's authority in a problematic zone that goes from the super-ego to the ego ideal. To be both more general and more precise, at the same time that he is commenting on Freud's texts, Lacan is also questioning and discreetly analysing his transference to Freud. He examines his transference from the start, not only by indicating for his students what the Freudian theory of authority is- the super-ego-but also by d iscussing his own relation to Freudian authority. Admiration, marvel, !ntst, order, love. Next, and by beginning to analyse the other post-Freudians' teclmical options, he is also starting to lay bare their relations to Freud. In this first year of the seminar, Lacan clarifies the place of his return to Freud in the analytic field and also situates himself in relation to his psychoanalytic "brothers". His return to Freud is thus characterized by a double concern: • •
With Freud's foundational texts, which he comments on . \Nith the texts of his contemporaries, the post-Freudians, whose work he measures in terms of both Freud's doctrine and his desire.
:-; Here we find the same logic of the patemal function that Lacan developed in his lecture, Tlte Neurotic's llrdividunl Mytlt, \·vhere he says "Freudian theory stressed in the existence of the father a function which is at once a function of speech and a function of love," before adding,"And one must have confidence in" Freud, that is, must reintrOOuce death and the dead father as the crucial operators in analytic experience, for wan t of which it would stagnate in the d ual register (pp. 423, 407).
THE TRA NSC ENDENCE O F THE IMAGINARY
27
Al though Lacan shows his admiration for Freud the author, he has more reservations about Freud's institutional use of his a uthority in the analytic movement: It is the long-sufferi ng side of his personality, the feeling he has of the necessity of authority, which in his case is not without a certain fundamental deprecia tion of what anyone who has something to communica te or teach can expect from those who listen to and follow him. ln many a place we come across a measure of profound contempt for the manner in which these things are made use of and understood. As you will see, l even believe that one finds in him a very specific disparagement of the human raw material made available to him by the society in which he lived. Undoubtedly this is what allows us to catch a glimpse of why Freud, in contrns/ to what happens in his writings (my emphasis), mobilised the full weight of his authority so as to assure, so he believed, the future of analysis. He both excluded all manner of doctrinal dissensions-quite real dissensions- which emerged, and at the sa me time was qui te imperious as to what could be organised around him as the means for the transmission of his teaching (Seminar/, p. 10). Whereas his writing was weighted down less by his authority, Freud, within the institution, was excl usive and imperative, and he depreciated those who surrounded him; he was suspicious about how his texts were read and applied and about how his disciples were using his teaching. Lacan does not confuse Freud's research w ith the effects of transmission; on this second point, Freud had recourse to his own authority. Lacan returns to Freud by reading his texts and authorizes himself to do so by means of Freud's distrust of his disciples, who were not able to handle Freud's doctrine. Lacan's d iagnosis is in harmony with the distrust imputed to Freud and he claims that this gives him the authority to return to Freud's texts--which he does . To be even more precise, Lacan inaugurates his seminar orr and by Freud's teclmical writings by seeking to throw light on both Freud's relation to authority and other analysts' relations to his work, just as
28
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he indicates discreetly the character of his own relation to Freud's authority. He reads Freud in the context of a transference to him, which he then analyses obliquely, throughout the seminar. If we w ish to understand the progression of the seminar and, first of all, Lacan's reading of Freud's papers on technique, we must try to see the transferential relation with Freud that underlies this work. Freud's epistemology requires that we reveal Lacan's transference in order to understand his work better; it can seem unreasonable, however, to consider that Lacan, in his return to Freud, occupies a sort of position as Freud's ana lysand and that his seminar is nothing more than the text of his analysis w ith Freud. Yet it is Lacan himself who designates the proximity between commenting on a text and the analytic experience, which aims at rendering intelligible what is not immediately so: That is why the method of textual commentary proves itself fruitful. Commenting on a text is like doing an analysis. How many times have I said to those under my supervision, when they say to me-l had the impression he me1111t this or that-that one of the things we must guard most against is to understand too much, to understand more than what is in the discourse of the subject. To interpret and to imagine one understands are not at all the same things. It is precisely the opposite. l would go as far as to say that it is on the basis of a kind of refusal of understanding that we push open the door to analytic w1derstanding (Seminar I, p. 73). Here, Lacan gives us one of the keys for interpreting his seminar and with it, we can try to read his seminar as the text of his analysis with Freud, even if this can seem bizarre. In doing so, we need to be careful to remain within Lacan's own epistemological logic and not to use this approach as the basis for some sort of novelistic history or psychological account of Lacan's relation to Freud. "Commenting on a text is like doing an analysis." Our research project is to read what cotmects Lacan's research to the social sciences of his time and to show how his research includes the truths of these disciplines;
THE TRA NSCENDENCE OF THE IMAGINARY
29
this can be done by sit uating the seminar as a kind of analysis w ith Freud. If his seminar and its accompanying texts show the major effects of his analysis with Freud, and thus his "conversion" into a Freudian analyst, then they are the equivalents of the work that he would later expect of those w ho had finished their analyses and were in a position to teach analytic theory: the Analysts of his School (AE, nnnlyste de /'ecole). In other words, Lacan's seminar is the text of his pass.28 If we remember that his 1967 text on analytic training recommends "extracting" the analyst's authority "from fiction" (p. 13)-in my opinion, the hypnotic or fantasmatic type that is to be found in "A Child is Being Beaten"-we shall not be surprised that Lacan approaches the question of the analyst's authority and resistance in 1953. Lacan does so because, in pursuing something like an analysis with Freud, he has to situate himself in relation to the latter's institutional and textual authority. To sununarize our subject and our position as reader, we can say that Lacan's reading of Freud- as made explicit in the seminarneeds to be re-examined by emphasiz ing what he says about his own transference to Freud and w hat the text shows about his desire as analyst. The text also indicates something about his judgement- or interp retation---of his colleagues' theoretical and teclmical choices and their own-transferential -relations to Freud and his teaching. By testifying publicly about his return to Freud in his seminar, Lacan is evaluating his desire as analyst, just as he judges the desires of the other post-Freudians, by measuring them against Freud. :s~ On the sensitive point of the pass, see Jacques Lacan,
"Proposition of9 October 1967 on the Psych oanalyst of the School," A11alysis 6 (1995): 1- 13. It "commenting on a text is like doing an analysis" we cannot be blind to the fact that by commenting on Lacan's text, we are, in tum, placed in the position of being a sort of analys..1nd of Lacan's. \Vhat "sort" this is needs to be clarified, but there seems to be a community of readers who share this view. See, for example, Erik Porgel Les noms du pen, clrez Jacques Lacan: pouctuations et problbuatiques (Eres, 1997). Porge says that "In trying to folJow Lacan's joumey, it seems to us that we are writing a unrmtive iH such a way that the narrative itself is Ute place of the mcowzter tlmt is in question iu lite narrative, and this is what defines a psyd\oanalysis" (p. 22). Porge notes next that,
with this statement, he is approaching a definition of analysis that Lacan gave in the session of 1July, 1959 of his seminar, HLe desir et son interpn;tatiou (Seminar VI, Desire and Its Inte rpretation)" (unpublished).
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The Post-Freudians' resistance to Freud Defence of the ego and resistance
In the 1950s, a consensus seemed to exist in the analytic field: if resistance in analytic experience is not equivalent to the system of ego defence, there is a sort of elective affinity between the notions of ego defence-including repression- and of the resistance to psychoanalysis, since this resistance supposedly uses the same mecl1anisms as the ego's defence.29 For this reason, everyone understood the importance of the notion of resistance in Freud's work as well as in Freudian technique. This question is also present in La can's seminar and according to several participants-including a certain Monsieur Z. (we do not know why he has lost his identity in the published version of the seminar); according to him, it was Freud's authoritarian personality that motivated the d iscovery of the notion of resistance, because Freud could not bear it when his patients resisted his treatment. Unlike Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, who argued that Freud's liberal feelings led to the d iscovery of resistances, M. Z. thinks that it can be explained by Freud's authoritarianism. Lacan disagrees with M. Z. and argues that Freud was much less authoritarian than his teachers-such as Charcot, for example--and that it is precisely because he gave up suggestion and hypnosis that he discovered resis tance, both as an obstacle to the analytic work and as a way to gain access to the process of repression. In other words, according to Lacan, resistance appeared to Freud when it no longer quite functioned; when it had already become degraded, as we would say in order to rem ain within the logic of Lacan's epistemology"'. Yet what must be w1derstood is that according to Lacan, Freud did not sit uate the d rama of resistance between the analyst's and the analysand's egos in the hie et 111mc of the session, as some of his inheritors seem to have been willing to do. Lacan comments in these terms on Margaret Little's article on cow1ter-transference.
See the articles UResistance" and uoetence .Mechanisms" in Jean Laplanche and ). B. Pon talis, The Language of Psyclroanalysis, pp. 394-397, 109-111. "' On the Lacanian epistemology ot discovery throug h degradation, see Lacnn et les sciences sodnles. ::0.
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How does [the analyst] act? What are the implications of what he does? For the authors in question, for Margaret Little, nothing else matters but the recognition by the subject, hie et mmc, of the intentions of his discourse. And his intentions only ever have value in their implications hie et nunc, in the immediate exchange. The subject may well describe himself taking on the grocer or the hairdresser-in fact, he is bawling out the person he's talking to, that is to say the analyst. There is some truth in that (Seminar /, p. 30). The analyst here believes himself authorised to offer what l will call an interpretation from ego to ego, or from equa l to equa l-allow me the play on words-in other words, an interpretation whose foundation and mechanism cannot in any way be distinguished from that of projection (Seminar I, p. 32). It is best to abstain from offering this interpretation of the defence, which I will call from ego to ego, whatever value it may eventually have. In the interpretation of defences, there should always be at least a third term (Seminar/, p. 33). Thus the analysis of resis tances organizes-but in a way that misses the point- the activity of Anglo-American analysts, who interpret the s peech of their analysands in terms of what is happening in the session and of the dual relation between ana lysand and analyst. Aimie Reich, Arma Freud, Fenichel and the others consider the ego as the individual operator that would be both the ana lyst's only interlocutor and also as wha t defends itself aga inst interpreta tions; it slows down the p rocess of awakening to consciousness. This is the source of Anna Freud's interest in the defence mechanisms and the title of her book, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense (1936). The Freud ian imperative to weaken resistance led Anglo-American analysts to put too m uch of an accent on the place of the ego in the treatment and therefore on the influence of their own person, thus ma king the experience an imaginary enclosure, where two egos
would battle each other.' 1 Apart from the "fort\mate" case in which "'The resistance of the ego, like the logical necessity of analysing this obstacle, is indicated in these terms by Anna Freud: ''111e patient transgresses the fundamental rule
32
LACAN AND l~V1·STRAUSS OR THE RETURN TO FREUD ( 19 5 1- 19 57>
the ego makes common cause with the analyst, Aru;a Freud distinguishes two attitudes of the ego in regard to the analyst: The ego is antagonistic to the ru;alysis, in that it is unreliable and biased in its self-observation .... Finally, the ego is itself the object of analysis, in that the defensive operations in which it is perpetually engaged are carried on w;consciously .... Since it is the aim of the ru;alytic method to enable ideational representatives of repressed instincts to enter consciousness ... the ego's defensive operations against such representatives automatically assume the character of active resistance to analysis. And since, further, the analyst uses his perso11nl influence (my emphasis) to secure the observance of the fundamental rule which enables such ideas to emerge in the patient's free associations, the defense set up by the ego against the instincts takes the form of direct opposition to the analyst himself (pp. 22-31). The bond wi th the practitioner therefore leads back into this logic; the defence against the drive and w hat is at stake in the treatment play their roles within a transferential duality in which the analyst must use. the influence of his person . Now, as La can reminds us,Freud-asearly as in his Studieso11 Hysteria (which Didier Anzieu" outlined in the sessions of Lacan's seminar on 20 and 27 January 1954), and then in his metapsychological essays--indicates "that the strength of the resistance is inversely of analysis, or, as we say, he puts up 'resistances.' l11is means that the inroad o f the id into the ego has g iven place to a counterattack by the ego upon the id. Theobsenrer's attention is now diverted from the associations to the resistance, i.e. from the content of the id to the activity of the ego" (p. 14). ~ Didier Anzieu (1923-1999) received his agregatiou in philosophy in 1948, moved towa rd psychology and became a teacher (assistant) at ~1e Sorbonne in 1951. The son of Marguerite Anzieu, who was the original ot "Aimee", whose case Lacan presented in his medical thesis "De In psyclwse paranotnque dnus ses rapports avec In persomwlitf' ("On paranoiac psychosis in its relation to personality"). He undertook a first analysis with Lacan which he ended in 1953. He joined the Societi frauraise de psycltmralyse in which he worked until1963, the date ,;t which he helped set up the As:;ocinlio/1 de 1»y· clranalyse de France (APF) and separated from Lacan. A specialist in the psychoanalytic theory of groups, he published numerous works on literary creation (Pascal, Beckett) and on artistic creation (B..1con).
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proportional to one's d istance from the repressed centre" (Seminar I, p. 22). Resistance would therefore grow "the closer the subject comes to a discourse which would be the ultimate one, the right one, but one which he absolutely refuses" (Seminar /, p. 22). It is finally a "succession of phonemes" (Seminar/, p. 22) tha t is refused because it threa tens to reveal the "mystery", tha t is, the unconscious truth of which the ana lysa nd wants to know nothing. Resista nce, more than being the fact of opposition in the dual relationoftransference, would find a place in the field of language, and it is when the patient's d iscourse begins to speak in a genuine way that resistance manifests itself. This is almost a paraphrase of the Freud of Studies on Hysteria, who presented the psychic material of this neurosis as an edi fice s tructured accord ing to the logic of a kernel of traumatic memories enveloped by other memories or memory s trata; all of these are classified according to the set of themes constituting the kernel, w hich both s tructures and is s tructured by symptomatic formations. Let us listen to Freud: It was as though we were examining a dossier that had been kept in good order .... I have described such groupings of simi-
lar memories into collections arranged in linear sequences (like a file of documents, a packet, etc.) as constituting 'themes'. These themes exhibit a second kind of arrangement. Each of them is-1 can not express it in any other way- stratified concentrically round the pathogenic nucleus. It is not hard to say what produces this stratification, what diminishing or increasing magnitude is the basis of this arrangement. The contents of each particular stratum are characterized by an equal degree of resistance, and that degree increases in proportion as the strata are nearer to the nucleus .... The deeper we go the more difficult it becomes for the emerging memories to be recognized, till near the nucleus we come upon memories which the patient disavows even in reproducing them." Here, Lacan is certainly following d irectly in Freud's path. ~ Joseph
Breuer and Sigmund Freud, Studies ou Hysteria, pp 288-289.
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Resistance and d iscourse
order to know where it is happening loti rase passe), what the material, biological foundation is, Freud quite straightforwardly takes the discourse to be a reality in its own right, a reality which is there, a sheaf, a bundle of proofs .... The notion of a material support of speech, singled out as such, was not yet available to Freud. Today, he would have taken the succession of phonemes which make up a part of the subject's discourse as the basis of his metaphor. He would say that one encounters greater and greater resistance the closer the subject comes to a discourse which would be the ultimate one, the right one, but which he absolutely refuses (Seminar /, p. 22). [n
Lacan's reading of Freud th us radicalizes the way in which d iscourse as such is taken into account." Lacan is led by the objectthe unconscious and translation as a mistmnslation, according to the Freud of 1896--to use the metaphor of linguistics. And it is by approaching the pathogenic kemel of signification that resistance is experienced. From that point on, the analysis of d iscourse has had to find its place in analytic experience; it must obv iously go beyond analyses in biological tenns, but also go beyond Anglo-American ego analysis. For Lacan, w hat resists is not the ego of the patient, which the person of the analyst must influence, but the statement [e11once) of a d iscourse that is in close proximity w ith unconscious truth. The tmconscious or its formations are thus conceived as the set of phonemes that must be sought through the analysand's s peech. It is precisely because the talking cure is homogeneous with the repressed material (phonemes) that it can be effective. According to Lacan, the subject of the repressed- the subject of the unconscious- is therefore to be brought forth through speech and this
~
Whereas as early as the Jetter to Fliess of 6 December 1896, Freud, in d etaching himself (at least in part) from the language of the physiology of nerves- as tl1e trans-
lator of this letter notes-
Wil/re/m Fliess, 1887-1904, p. 208.
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requires that the unconscious be "thought" as a set of signifiers; the intersections of these signifiers must be followed, for they leadbeyond the ego that is present in the here and now- to the heart of the repressed signifiers. Analytic experience that follows this path goes beyond the fascinations of the ego and mobil izes the history of the subject and of his/her group. Therefore, what is in question here is the unconscious position of the subject w ho is loca ted in a symbolic situation and not the individual reduced to the limits of his/her ego. Th us, at the same level in the logic of analysis, we find symbolic systems of language, discourse, and social exchange in which the subject has always been situ ated, and to w hich his/her symptoms testify; these symptoms supply us w ith the ultimate d iscourse of his unconscious truth and of the historic sit uations that have engendered it.
Consider [the subject] ilt its singullrrity, what does that mean? That means essentially that, for him, the interest, the essence, the basis, the dimension proper to analysis is the reintegration by the subject of his history right up to the furthermost perceptible limits, that is to say into a dimension that goes well bet;ond lite limits of the individual (my emphasis) .... What reveals this dimension is the accent that Freud puts in each case on those points that it is essential to overcome by means of the technique and which are what I will call the bearings [situations] of the history (Seminar I, p. 12). What is to be worked on in analysis is not the hie et nuttc of transference, but "past time", not as an historian's investigation would understand it, but in the sense that it requires an analysis of the labour of historical reconstruction made by the subject in relation to his/her historical bearings. When we return to the origin of the Freudian experience- when I say origin, I do not mean historical origin but point-source .... What matters is what he reconstructs of it. Can you see where this is all leading to? It leads, within Freud's own conception, to an idea that what is involved is a reading, a qualified and skilled !raJ1Slation of the cryptogram representing what the subject is conscious of at the moment ... of himself
36
LAC AN AN D l~V1·STRAUSS O R THE RETU RN TO FREUD ( 195 1- 1957>
and of everything else, that is to say of the whole of his system (Seminar/, pp. 13-14). Analysis progresses by following the threads of speech, by reading and translating the cryptogram ("something written in secret characters", according to U ttn') represented by w hat the subject possesses of his system- his archives. Lacan, as a reader of Freud, therefore describes the (unconscious) subject as resembling a cryptogram that must be read and translated. The closer the reading of this cryptogram approaches to the "unconscious treasure," the stronger the resistance becomes. Let me emphasize that reading and translation are terms connected with work on the letter and come from Freud himself. 1/Ve can also see that the "unconscious" is situated in tenns of an historical reconstruction of the past and of a system of rewriting the subject: a rewriting of her / himself and of the situations in which s/ he is placed (see Fliess Letters, pp. 207- 215). In opposition to the Anglo-American versions of analysis, which give the ego a key position, Lacan highlights both the discovery of the systems of rewriting historical situations and the deciphering of the phonemic groups that has led to them. Likewise, in reading Freud, he "reinvents" the status of the analyst as both translator and reader of the linguistic intersections from which unconscious subjectivity and its troubles can be deduced: Can one claim that, in our discourse, right now, the ego is the master of everything that these words harbour? The symbolic system is extraordinarily intricate, marked as it is by this Verscii/ungeniieit, property of criss-crossing, which the translation of the papers on teclmique has rendered as complexity, which is, and how, much too weak. Verscii/rmgeniieit designates linguistic criss-crossing (Seminar/, pp. 53-54). For Lacan, the source of authority in analytic experience is therefore not the analyst's influence, which would aim at diminishing the patient's hostility, but rather the linguistic capacities of a practitioner
who is able to read the signifiers-the phonemes-of the symptom. Let us recall that as early as the Rome Report- which we shall ana lyse in detaii- Lacan stated clearly that the symptom is organized in terms of signifiers and that Freud reads it in these terms:
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A symptom here is the signifier of a signified that has been repressed from the subject's consciousness .... It was by deciphering this speech that Freud rediscovered the first language of symbols, still alive in the sufferings of civilized man (Das Unbehngen in der Kultur (Civilization nud Its Discontents]). Hieroglyphics of hysteria, blazons of phobia, and labyrinths of Zwangsneurose (obsessional neurosis] (Ecrits, p. 232). What the analyst must therefore know is not how to red uce resistance by intimidating or seducing the analysand, or by pushing him/ her to an ego identification; instead, s/ he must translate and read what the subject says, for the solution to the unconscious rebus of the cryptogram is not to be fotmd in the goodwill of the patient's ego, which is always overwhelmed by the meaning of the words that lead to the heart of this cryptogram. For the Freudian orientation, as Lacan recalls, the subject is that of a symbolic system that must be reconstmcted; it is also the subject of historic situations that are to be deciphered in the cryptogram, which encloses the set of phonemes that forms the kernel of the truth of repressed d esire, which is what most resists unveiling. Resistance to analysis emanates from this kernel of phonemes and if one lets it speak, it has some chance of emerging into consciousness. In the present case, the analyst's authoritarian use of suggestion to make the ego pass from the patient's into the analyst's camp carmot bring this phonemic set to light.
Second stage Lacan also recalls Freud's refusal of suggestion on another occasion in his seminar: on 10 February 1954, after he had asked Jean Hyppolite" to give a commentary on Freud's 1925 article, Die Vemeinung [translated under the title "Negation"], a text that opened up the myth of the genesis of language for the subject. Before the analysis of this text, which Hyppolite translates into French as "dtilufgntion", rather than the more customary term, "negation", Lacan reminds the
~ jean Hyppolite (1907- 1968), a philosophe r and Hegel specialist, the French translator of Tht, Phenomenology of Spirit. He was the professor o f, among others, Jean l.aplanche and Michel Foucault.
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audience of the help that Hyppolite had given, for a brief moment, several sessions earlier to another participant (Monsieur Z.), w ho had explained the discovery of resistance by referring to Freud's authoritarian character. Lacan remembers that what was at issue, if you remember, was to find out what was Freud's basic, intentional attitude with respect to the patient, when he claimed to have substituted the analysis of resistances by speech for the subjugation that operates through suggestion or through hypnosis. I showed myself to be extremely guarded on the question of knowing if there were at this point signs of combativeness in Freud, indeed of domil1ation, vestiges of an ambitious style which we might see betrayed in his youth (Semi11nr l, p. 56). By returning to this point a second time, Lacan shows how important it is for him. Hyppolite then d istances himself from Monsieur Z. What foUows is the philosopher's exp osition of the subjective genesis of language, a development that is judiciously entitled, il1 the published version of the seminar, "Discourse analysis and ego analysis". Lacan reminds his listeners that one must choose between the rigorous deciphering of signifiers and the analysis of the ego. This choice has essential implications on the level of the relation with the other both in groups and the treatment. And this is w hat il1terests Lacan. A nna Freud's fault
Thus it is rather curious to notice that the seminar progresses through a critica l analysis of a text by Alma Freud, a text that recounts a part of a treatment in w hich she placed herself il1 an impasse by "approach [ing] the material from the perspective of the d ual relation between the patient and herself" (Seminar I, p. 64). For Lacan, "She should have d istinguished between the d ual il1terpretation, in which the analyst enters il1to an ego to ego rivalry with the analysand, and the interpretation w hich moves forward in the direction of the symbolic structuril1g of the s ubject, w hich is to be located beyond the present structure of this ego" (Semina.r I, p . 65). Actu aUy, A1m a Freud "confesses" il1 her text that she had permitted herself
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to become entangled with the analytic situation to the point that it allows the emergence in the patient of the memory of "her [dead] father, whom she had loved dearly" (Mechanisms of Defense, p. 37; quoted in Seminar I, p. 64), in Anna Freud's own words. The s ituation was unblocked, if we are to believe Am1a Freud, by reintroducing the father in the narrative of the analysand's history, but also-let us add- in the transference: in the analytic situation between the two rival daughters, Arma Freud and her patient. This reintroduction of the dead father into Freudian experience is--let me repeat this- Lacan's very project- the return to and of Freud-and, from this perspective, he even emphasizes the limitations of Freud's own daughter's practice. To focus our attention on a fault concerning the dead father in the daughter's practice may seem to the reader to be a mere detail in relation to the importance of the theoretical continents that have been approached, but in this case, we are following Freudian epistemology for this example places the analyst on the trail of the "thing itself". If we follow the paths of the transference from Freud to Lacan, lacan's critical reminder of the fault that leads the daughter astray becomes part of the way that he expresses his own transference to Freud. This, at least, is my hypothesis: reintroducing the dead father involves reintroducing not the father's person, but rather his symbolic value, his speech, and his desire: those of Freud the analyst. The reminder of the dead father
In the seminar, lacan reads and listens to Atma Freud. Arma Freud writes that "Historically this mode of defense by means of ridicule and scorn was explained by her identification of herself with her dead father, who used to try to train the little girl in self-control by making mocking remarks w hen she gave way to some emotional outburst. The method had become stereotyped through her memory of her father, w hom she had loved dearly" (Mechanisms of Defense, p. 37; quoted in Seminar I, p. 64}. 36 lacan adds that Am1a Freud interpreted the patient's aggressiveness toward her as a reproduction, in transference, of the s ituation that the patient had experienced earlier. Anna Freud's analysis of this case can be found in Tlte Ego nnd tlu.' Meclmnisms of Defense, pp. 35-38.
!0>
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LACAN AND l~V1·STRAUSS OR THE RETURN TO FREUD ( 195 1- 19 57>
He judges that while this is not false, it leaves out what has stntctured the situation historically and has passed into the tmconscious. According to Lacan, reintroducing the identification with the dead father allows the treatment to progress because it opens up a point of view on the subject's tmconscious structure and its symbolic organization; this reintroduction constitutes ipso facto the way out of this stagnation in the dual register of the imaginary." What is at stake, then, Lacan says, is know ing what kind of consent opens the pact and allows the analysis to progress. From the first encounter, the analyst is responsible for resistance, for if he engages the patient in a dual relation, he ensures the renewal of repression. In such a case, the pact would not be Freudian. If, on the other hand, the analyst takes Freud's desire upon himself, he will commit himself to a read ing of the unconscious material of which he himself knows nothing, since "we are ignorant of the symbolic constellation dwelling in the subject's unconscious" (Seminar /, p. 65). It is this symbolic cons tellation, Lacan concludes, that forms what is at stake in these "s tructured, organised, complex situ ations. Freud gave us the first model of it, its standard, in the Oedipus complex" (Seminar/, p. 65). Alm a Freud, in forgetting the place of the dead father when she directs the treatment, appears, from this perspective, to have made a double mistake (which is really only one): • •
s:
A mistake against the progress of her patient's analysis because it does not provide the key to her Oedipal organization A mistake against her own father, for as analyst and as daughter, she is forgetting, on this occasion, to "harmonize her language with his own ", according to the logic required by the super-ego, which Lacan had mentioned earlier and according to which the "you"-
Anna Freud writes, "As the analysis went deeper, however, we found that these
afte<:ts (contempt and ridicule! did not represent a transference reaction in the true sense ot the term and \Vere not connected with the analytic situation at all" (Meclmllisms of Defense, p. 36; quoted in Seminar I, p. 64). Tims she indicates herself the Jimit of a dual conception o f transference, whidl she knew how to go beyond in practice, leaving L.1can to take the trouble to bring out its technical ulesson".
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Alm a Freud forgets the reference to Freud's desire, which indicates for all analysts the path to the unconscious symbolic structures. Lacan picks up on the forgetting of the dead father in Alma's technique less to criticize her for a lack of daughterly piety (she has forgotten the patient's dead father and her own) than for her offence against the father of psychoanalysis himself and his speech, in which we "must have confidence", as he had s tated some months previously (Myth, p. 407). Freud should be trusted because he was the one w ho placed death and the father's symbolic function- whid1 is "a function of speech and ... love"- at the heart of analytic experience (Myth, p. 423). In forgetting both the analysand's father and her own, A1m a Freud reduces the treatment to a d ual rivalry, thus prohibiting her patient any access to the symbolic forms that organize the unconscious, among the most im portant of w hich is the Oed ipus complex. By this criticism of Freud's daughter's clinical practice, Lacan brings us back to the dead father, his desire as analyst, his texts, his teclmique, his discovery, and in this sense, he presents himself as the most faithful "son"; the one who forgets neither the dead father nor the Oedipus complex. He is the one who does not forget Freud's desire, even if- as we have seen- Lacan does not share Freud's universalist point of view concerning the Oedipus complex. Indeed, in 1953, the Oedipus complex remains "the model, the standard", accord ing to Lacan, of a symbolic schema that had not yet been developed sufficiently, even if it is ftmdamental for any "symbolic realisation by the subject, of the id, of the w1conscious- which is a self [soi-merue] and not a set of unorganised drives" (Seminar /, p . 67). In other words, Lacan reaffirms, the unconscious is organized symbolically and the Oedipal myth's capacity for structuring is considerable-as is shown by his conunentary on a clinical case presentation by Melanie Klein'"-but what is important for him is the symbolic fw1ction incarnated by the Oedipal myth, more than its realization in this myth . From this point of view, Lacan maintains his reservations about Freud's conception of the Oedipus complex as lU'Iiversal.
~ Semi11nr I, pp. 67-68. In tl1is session of 17 February
1954, Mile Gt'linier g ives an exposition of the case of little Dick, whid l Melanie Klein analyses in ''The Importance of Symbol-Formation in tl1e Developm ent of the Ego'' (In Love, Guill, mrrl Re[lllrnfiou, n11rl Other Works, 1921-1 945, pp. 219-232).
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LACAN AND l~V1·STRAUSS OR THE RETURN TO FREUD ( 195 1- 1957>
From the Oedipus complex to the triad of the imaginary, symbolic and real
For Lacan, what cow1ts is the symbolic integration of the subject and the Oedipus complex is only a key to this. It really is the key- a very elementary key. I have already pointed out to you that there most probably was a whole bunch of keys. One day perhaps I will give you a lecture on what we gain in this respect from the myths of primitive peoples- ] wouldn't say inferior, because they aren't inferior, then know much more than we do. When we stud y a mythology, for example one that might perhaps appear with respect to a Sudanese population, we discover that for them the Oedipus complex is just a rather thin joke. It is a very tiny detail within an immense myth. The myth allows the cataloguing of a set of relations between subjects of a wealth and complexity besides which the Oedipus complex seems only to be so abridged an edition that in the end it cannot always be used. But no matter. Us analysts have been satisfied with it up to now. Certainly, one does try to elaborate it a bit, but it is all rather tin1id. One always feels terribly tangled up because one doesn't distinguish easily between the imaginary, symbolic and real (Seminar l, p. 86).
If Lacan, in Book I of the seminar, reminds us of the speech of the dead father and the requirements of the symbolic, he ind icates that the Oedipus com plex, as Freud describes it, is o nly one means of organization within a much vaster system, and that it is necessary to look less for the universality of the complex than for its form: that of the symbolic ftmction and of its order. We no te that Lacan speaks here of symbolic situations and indicates clearly the passage to the three orders of the imaginary, symbolic, and real . If Lacan th us recognizes the dead father, his speech and his place as the key to the Freudian orientation, it is to do even better and to go beyond the crucial but no t universal figure of Oedipus, by means of the symbolic fwKtion, which he promotes in the field of psychoanalysis, and which is universal. For Lacan, the Oedipus complex is a symbolic situation. From the subject's family situation, as Lacan defined it from 1938 to 1950, and the "social conditions of Oedipalism" to the
TH E T RANSC ENDENCE O F THE IMAGINARY
43
new imperative of recognizing- if analysis is to progress-the situation that the subject occupies in the symbolic order, there is a rupture that should be emphasized once again: "Nothing other than this is at stake in analysis-recognising what hmction the subject takes on in the order of the symbolic relations which covers the entire field of h uman relations, and whose initial ceU is the Oedipus complex, where the assumption of sex is d ecided " (Seminar/, p. 67). The Oedipus complex : A symbol ic remai nder
To speak in anthropological terms, according to which the change in the constitution of the subject is a hmction of socia l changes, I would say that, for Lacan, the subject of the Oedipus complex or the modern subject is, in 1953-1954, less the effect of a family core (the Lacanian and Durkheimian theory of 1938), than the effect of a mythic core. This core, indeed, is rather pale in relation to other symbolic systems, such as those of the Sudan, which Lacan mentions."' "" l11is unspecified ethnological reference is probably to the research of Marcel Griaule, who a year late r, on the evening of 15 l\•1arch 1955, would give a lecture to which Lacan listened, a nd which he commented on the next day in the following \vay: "What did you get out o f M. Griaule's lecture yesterday evening? "M. Griaule made a rapid allusion to the Islamisa.tion of an importan t segment of the populations of the Sudan, to the fact tha t the latter continue to function with a symbolic register while belonging to a style o f re ligious credo clearly d issonant with this system. Their d emand on this level is manifested in a very precise manne r, tor instance, when they ask to be taug ht Arabic, because Arabic is the language of the Ko ran. That's a tradition \·vhicl"' goes a long way back, is very much alive ... . You mustn' t get the impression that Sudanese civilisation doesn't d esenre its name .. .. The conditions in which these people Jive may at first sight seem rather harsh, rath er precarious from the point o f view of comfort a nd of civilisation, but they seem nonetheless to receive very powerful s upport in the symbolic function, isolated as s uch. It has taken a long time for us to be capable ot e nte ring in to communication with them. TI1ere's an analogy here with our position vis-il-vis the s ubject" (Seminar II, p. 161). Lacan indicates that the ethnologist's research e mphasizes the power of the symbolic function that is the focus o f the research er's work, but this function also seems to isolate the population of the Sudan from other social formations, such as those tha t produce ethnologists. It is as if, from the point ot view of the masses, a civilization awaiting its analyst rejoiced at the foreignness of the cryptogram. An ethnological a na lyst s hould put aside Western identifications in order to recog-
nize the work of the symt>olic function at the heart of Sudanese civilization, just as an ana.lyst must set aside an adh erence to his ego in order to d ecipher the symbolic intersection that inh·oduces us to the analysand's s ubjective structures of in telligibility. .Marcel Griaule (1898-1956) was the p recursor in France of a new method of in vestigation founded on observing ethnological systems an d analysing the "indigenous"
44
LACAN AN D l~V1·S T RAU SS O R THE RETU RN TO FREUD ( 195 1- 1957>
At this moment, the hmction of the Oedip us complex is, for him, a "simple" symbolic situation that is present in mod emity. It is neither universal nor mythically rich. The subject of the unconscious is therefore Jess a subject of the Oedipus complex than of mythic systems. The w1conscious subject is the subject of the symbolic system as a whole, and this is why he returns to Freud wi th the help of the social sciences and the works of Levi-Strauss. If the seminar is the public inauguration of his return to Freud and if Lacan calls upon psychoanalysts to identify their d esire with that of the founder- a desire that he deciphers in Freud's writings and not through what he knows about his biographyLacan a lso gauges, as we have seen, the d is tance that separates Freud's doctrine from the formula tions of other analysts. Yet we can see that Lacan himself, in 1953-1954, on the cntcial point of the Oedipus complex, does not always take the same position tha t Fre ud does, since he continues to reject universa lism in favour of the symbolic function, upon which the structuring of the subject of the unconscious depends. Lacan borrows this notion o f symbolic function from French ethnology, and especially from the work of Ma rcel Mauss, to whom Lacan begins to refer in 1950-as I have shown"". In this text, Lacan re-examined the clinic of psychopaths wi th the notions of fragmented symbol ism and comp Jete symbolism suggested by Marcel Mauss. Yet as far as the more general symbolic function is concerned, it is, instead, the reading of Levi-Strauss' introduction to the posthumous ed ition of Mauss' Sociologic et antltropologie"1 that is cntcial for Lacan. This text is crucial, first, because, as I shall argue, Lacan d iscovers in it the theoretical operator that he will transform into the Name-of-the-Father; it is also important because it is here that Levi-Strauss effects a dazzling reversal of the problematic of Marcel Mauss, w ho had sought in vain to provide a sociological theory of symbolism. Levi-Strauss, on the other hand, concl udes that "It is
representa tions that account for them. His chosen ground \Vas mainly that of the
Dogons of the Niger ~nd. The holder of the first d1air in ethnology at the Sorl>onne, he was also an adviser to the French Union from its foundation in 1946. ..., ln Lncau et les scieuct>s sociales, pp. 95-146, I discussed the article by lacan and cenac, "A Theoreticallntroduction to the Functions of Psychoanalysis in Criminology#. u Claude Levi-Strauss, Jutroduction lo tile Work of Marcel Mauss 1950.
THE TRA NSCEND ENCE OF THE IMAG IN ARY
45
obvious that what is needed is a symbolic origin of society" (Mauss Introduction, p. 21). By recognizing the primacy of the symbolic function over societies, Levi-Strauss opens the way to a new anthropology, one that is "a system of interpretation accotmting for the aspects of all modes of behaviour simultaneously, physical, physiological, psychical, and sociological" (Mauss Introduction, p. 26). On this point, it should be noted that according to Levi-Strauss, interpretation can only be proven by the mind : So it really is tnte that, in one sense, any psychological phenomenon is a sociological phenomenon; that the mental is identified with the social. But on the other hand, in a different sense, it is all quite the reverse: the proof of the social carmot be other than mental; to put it another way, we can never be sure of having reached the meaning and the function of an institution, if we are not in a position to relive its impact on an individual consciousness (Mauss Introduction, p. 28). What makes "the mental and the social ... one and the same"? (Mauss Introduction, p. 21). Nothing other than the symbolic origin of both of them, or rather the power of induction of the "effectiveness of symbols"'', as developed by Levi-Strauss in his article of 1949, the importance of w hich Lacan saw irmn ediately. It is this article that we are now going to examine, for in it is to be found a theory of resistance, , and the trea tment; in short, it is a "paper on technique", which we need to know in ord er to be able to understand La can's reading of Freud's ted mical writings. II. The effectiveness of symbols: From Anna Freud to Claude Levi-Strauss
Tl1e Effectiveness of Symbols is the first of Levi-Strauss' texts to which Lacan refers; Lacan cites his work for the first time by referring to it in his presentation at the Sixteenth International Congress of Psychoanalysis in Zurich on 17 July 1949, a presentation entitled "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in
Claude Levi-Strauss, "L'efficacite symbo1ique," 1950, Rerme d'flistoire des reUgions, pp. 5-27. Available in Eng lish in Structural Aulllropology, 1977, pp. 186-205.
c
46
LACAN AN D l~V1·STRAUSS O R THE RETU RN TO FREUD ( 195 1- 1957>
Psychoanalytic Exp erience (Ecri/s, pp. 75-81). Claude Levi-Strauss had introduced the notion of the effectiveness of symbols several months before Lacan's lecture on the mirror stage. Lacan uses this notion by read ing the experience of the mirror in a somewhat mysterious way: "Indeed, for imagos-w hose veiled faces we analysts see emerge in our d aily experience and in tlte penumbra of symbolic effectiveness (my empltasis)-the specular image seems to be the threshold of the visible world, if we take into accow1t the mirrored disposition of the imago of one's own body in hallucinations and dreams, w hether it involves one's individual features, or even one's infirmities or object projections; or if we take note of the role of the mirror apparatus in the appearance of doubles, in w hich psychical realities manifest themselves that are, moreover, heterogeneous" (Ecrits, p. 77). In the seminar of 1953-1954, Lacan will throw light on this new use of "The Effectiveness of Symbols", or rather of its "pen umbra", which envelops the imagos at the threshold of the world; this seminar proposes a new version of the mirror stage that harmonizes it- as we shall see- with the optical d evice that Freud developed in Tl1e Interpretation of Dreams" but also with Levi-Strauss' account of the symbolic h mction. First, before coming to Freud, let us see how, in this article, Levi-Strauss develops a theory of the treatment that pivots entirely on the symbolic axis; according to him, this d istingu ishes the shaman's treatment from medical treatment, but also allies the former with Freudian experience. The treatment according to Levi-Strauss
Levi-Strauss notes that med ical treatment in the West separates the objective cause of the illness-bacteria, for example--from the patient's s ubjective world, while the shaman d oes not make this opposition. This is what, according to him, allows this treatment to succeed , s ince the cause of the illness-the monster- remains, accord ing to this paradigm, a part of the same symbolic material as the sick person's subjective representations. In this way, symbolic practice gains a grip on the cause .
.._, Signnmd Freud, The Iuterprelntiou of Drenms, in The Standard EditioH of the Complete Psyclrologicnl Works of Sigmund Freud Vol. IV arrd 1', Iran. james Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1953).
THE TRA NSCENDENCE OF THE IMAGINARY
47
Illness: A relation between signifier and signified
Levi-Strauss a rgues that The relationship between monster and disease is intemal to his mind, whether conscious or unconscious; it is a reJation between symbol and thing symbolized, or, to use the terminology of linguists, between signifier and signified (my emphasis). The shaman provides the sick woman with a language, by means of which unexpressed, and otherwise inexpressible, psychic states can be immedia tely expressed . And it is the transition to this verbal expression ... which induces the release of the physiological process, that is, the reorganization, in a favourable direction, of the process to which the sick woman is subjected."' He thus makes it explicit that the shaman's interpre tation is a recasting of the subject's symbolic universe, and he already refers, a t the begimling of 1949 (as Lacan wiU do, but much later) to the work o f lin gu ists in order to situate this interpretation within the register of the signifier.•• Yet if Levi-Strauss distinguishes the sham an's interpretation from Weste rn medical treahnent, he also like ns it to analytic expe rience: In both cases, the purpose is to bring to a conscious level conflicts and resistances which have remained unconscious, owing either to their repression by other psychological forces or-in case of childbirth-to their own specific nature, which is not psychic but organic or even simply mechanical. In both cases also, the conflicts and resistances are resolved, not because of the knowledge, real or alleged, which the sick woman progressively acquires of them, but because this knowledge makes possible a specific experience, in the course of which conflicts ma terialize in an order and on a level permitting their free development
.u
Claude Levi-Strauss, Structuml Anthropology, 1958, Claire Jacobson and Brooke
Grundfest S<:hoepf (Trm1S.). Trm1Siation altered. Levi-Strauss' translators rendered the words "signifimzt" and "signifte", which are usually translated as "signifier-'' and "signified", as "sign" and umeaning" (frmrs/11tor's uole.) " l acan, indeed, states in 1953 in the Rome Report that "A symptom ... the signifier o f a s ig nified that has been repressed" (Ecrits, p . 232).
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LACAN AND l~V1·STRAUSS OR THE RETURN TO FREUD ( 195 1- 1957>
and leading to their resolution. This vital experience is called abreaction itr psychoanalysis. We know that its precondition is the unprovoked intervention of the analyst, who appears in the conflicts of the patient through a double trmrsferetrce (my emphasis) mechanism, as a flesh-and-blood protagonist and in relation to whom the patient can restore and clarify an initial situation which has remained tmexpressed or unformulated . All these characteristics can be found in the shamanistic cure (Structural Anthropology, p. 198). Thus, according to Levi-Strauss, resistance is lifted in transference by an interpretation whose signifiers will reorganize the patient's symbolic universe. How can we give a more general definition of Lacan's conceptio n o f analysis in his return to Freud, a conceptio n based o n his reading o f both Freud and U.vi-Strauss? The importance of the notio ns of language, resistance, and interp reting through signifiers is explicit in Levi-Strauss' text, which must be taken as cntcial to Lacan's research . Levi-Strauss does not, however, confuse the shaman's treatment with psychoanalysis. Let us continue reading Levi-Stra uss' article: All of these characteristics can be found in the shamanistic cure. Here, too, it is a matter of provoking an experience; as this experience becomes structured, regulatory mechanisms beyond the subject's control are spontaneously set in motion and lead to an orderly functioning. The shaman plays the same d ual role as the psychoanalyst. A prerequisite role-that of listener for the psychoanalyst and of orator for the shaman~stablishes a direct relationship with the patient's conscious and an indirect relationship with his unconscious .... The patient suffering from neurosis eliminates an individ11al myth (my emphasis) by facing a "real" psychoanalyst; the native woman in childbed overcomes a true organic disorder by identifying with a 'mythically transmuted' shaman.
The parallelismdoes not exclude certain differences .... Actually the shamanistic cure seems to be the exact counterpart to the psychoanalytic cure, but with an inversion of all the elements. Both cures aim at inducing an experience, and both succeed by
THE TRA NSCENDENCE OF THE IMAGINARY
49
recreating a myth which the patient has to relive. But in one case, the patient constructs an individual myth with elements drawn from his past; in the other case, the patient receives from the outside a social myth which does not correspond to a former personal state (Structurnl Alffhropology, pp. 198-199). The notion of the neurotic's individual myth, which Lacan w ill begin to use in 1953, appears in Levi-Strauss in 1949 as a symbolic formation w hose position in analytic experience is the reverse of that of the social myth, which the sick person receives in the sham an's treatment. Yet because interpretation in the two typ es of treatment is cut from the same symbolic doth as the symptom, it is effective in both cases. Next, Levi-Stra uss reads Ma rguerite Sechehaye's account of her treatmen t of a schizophren ic.' 6 He claims that "It is the effectiveness of symbols whid1 guarantees the harmonious parallel development of m yth and ac tion .... In the schizophrenic cure, the hea ler performs the actions and the patient prod uces his myth; in the sha manis tic cure the healer s upplies the myth and the pa tient performs the actions" (p . 201). Opera tions-interpretations, manipulations-and mythic formations thus function together in both shamanism and analysis, accord ing to Lev i-Stra uss, but they are distrib uted in a reversed fashion between doctor and pa tient accord ing to the type of practice. According to Levi-Strauss, in the analytic treatment of schizophrenia, it is up to the patient to prod uce this m yth, and therefore this production becomes a crucial type of s ubjective progress. This formulation also anticipates, as we shall see in the third part, Lacan's later discussions of symbolic constructions that stand in for the failed paternal function, constn•ctions tha t motiva te the organization of phobias or the prod uction of d elusions. Levi-Strauss adds that manipulating symbols can also mod ify the organism. What is specific about symbolic effectiveness is that its in ductive property allows interrelations between the d ifferent
~
Marguerite 5echehaye (1887- 1964), a Swiss psychoanalyst who specialized in
schizophrenia and based her method on "symbolic realiz.. "'ltion". She published
journal d'wre schizop!Jrt!ne; auto-observatiou d'wze sclzizoplzrhte pendant le traitemmt psyc/wtlrerapique (1950).
50
LAC AN AN D l~V1·STRAUSS O R THE RETU RN TO FREUD ( 195 1- 1957>
materials and stages of the living being. With both shamanism and anaJysis..
It would be a matter ... of stimulating an organic transformation which would consist essentially in a structural reorganization, by inducing the patient intensively to live out a myth~ither perceived or created by him-whose structure would be, at the unconscious level, analogous to the structure whose genesis is sought precisely in this "inductive property", by which formally homologous structures, built out of different materials at different levels of life-organic processes, unconscious mind, rational thought-are related to one another (Structurnl Arrthropology, p. 201). Symbolic effectiveness can be deduced from the homology between structures that organize the living being and this principle of induction cormects them with each other. This is the source not only of the power of symbolic interp retation of every symbolic manipulation and symbolic invention, but also of the scientific weight that, surprisingly, he gives to Rimbaud's ideal. "Poetic metaphor provides a familiar example of this inductive process, but as a rule it does not transcend the LUKonscious level. Thus we note the significance of Rimbaud's intu ition that metaphor can change the world" (Structurnl Anthropology, pp. 201-202). This inductive value gives power and s tat us to symbolic effectiveness and enables psychoanalytic interpreta tion to be rethought; it revises the symbolic organiza tion from which the subject and its symptoms are deduced, and also gives us a model for thinking the organic modifica tions that can be d educed from a symbolic event. It can also help us rethink the opposi te movement, from the organism to the symbolic. U.vi-Strauss confirms the heuristic value of bringing the organic and the symbolic closer together and the speci ficity of the shamanistic and analytic interpreta tion and calls for a new reversa l in psychoana lysis. This reversal is d ialectical and aims a t a decisive point: the fundamental concept of the
"unconscious": The comparison with psychoanalysis has allowed us to shed ligh t on some aspects of shamanistic curing. Conversely,
THE TRANSC ENDENCE O F THE IMAGINARY
51
it is not improbable that the stud y of shamanism may one day serve to elucidate obscure points of Freudian theory. We are thinking specifically of the concepts of myth and the unconscious.
We saw that the only difference between the two methods that would outlive the discovery of a physiological substratum of neurosis concerns the origin of the myth, which in the one case is recovered as an individual tmrsury (my emplrnsis) and in the other case is received from collective tradition (Structuml Arrthropology, p. 202)." Levi-Strauss is the refore aiming a t a genuine theory o f the un conscious and its fo rmations, a theory that w ill cla rify th e sta tus of the myth and the symptom as a tre asury. What d oes this treasury consist o f? Situated in the Other of structure, and the re fo re to be fo und in the n e urotic, it is the treasury of the signifier" as Lacan w ill la ter ca ll it. Whom, then, is U .v i-Stra uss addressing in this text? He is addressing both e tlmologists and ps ychoanalysts, since with his next ste p, he push es aside the resistance o f analysts who would object to his theory by a rguing fo r the real histo ry o f the traumas e ncounte red by their patients. But we should ask ourselves whether the therapeutic value of the cure depends on the actual character of remembered si tuations, o r whether the trauma tizi ng power of those situa tions stems from the fact tha t a t the moment when they appear, the subject experiences them immed ia tely as living myth. By this we mean tha t the traumatizing power of any si tuation can not result from its intrinsic features b ut must, rather, result from the capacity of certain events, appearing within an appropria te psychological, historical, and socia l context, to induce an e motiona l crysta llization which is
Translation altered. I have rendered Levi-Strauss' word, ''tresor'' as "h·easury," instead o f as "possession", whidl was Jacobson's and Grundfest Schoepf's original ~
translation. "' "This other is essentially a symbolic place. The Other is precisely a p lace of the treasury/ let us say of the phrases, even of the received ideas without which the joke cannot take on its value and its scope." Lacan, l.J! semiuaire livrr V: les formations de l'inconscient, pp. 116-117.
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mou lded by a pre-existing structure. In rela tion to the event or anecdote, these structures- or, more accurately, these structural laws-are truly atemporal .... These structures as an aggrega te form what we call the unconscious (Structurnl Anthropology, p. 202). Lacan was obviously convinced by this argument, s ince on 24 May I961-more than ten years later- he repeated very precisely LeviStrauss' distinction between myth and trauma, w hich the theory of the unconscious depends on. What does Lacan say in 1961? Myths are developed figures that can be brought back, not to language, but to the implication of a subject caught up in language-and to complicate the matter, in the play of speech. From the subject's relations with any signifier whatsoever, ligures develop with points of intersection, which are, for example, those that I tried to depict in the graph .... This figure, this graph, these reference points, and also attention to the facts allow us to reconcile the (my emphasis) true function of what trauma is with our experience of development. Isn't trauma simply something that erupts at a moment, and breaks up a structure that has been imagined to be total, since this is what certain people have used the notion of narcissism for? Trauma is that certain events come to be situated at a certain place in this structure. And in occupying it, they take on the signifying value that is attached to it in a particular subject. This is what gives an event a traumatic value. This is the reason for our interest in returning to the experience of myth." This return will allow Lacan in 1961 to put into a new perspective a series of historically interlocked myths that have, he thinks, presided over the unconscious fates of people in the West and have provided symbolic coordinates for their symptoms: Oedipus, Hamlet, then CJaudel's Co(afontaine trilogy, a work that is dominated by the h umiliated father. In Lncan et les sciences sociales, I presented the humiliated father as a d egraded figure of the paternal hmction, "" Jacques Lacan, Le seminaire livre VJJJ : le transfert. p. 380.
THE TRA NSC END ENCE O F THE IMAG IN ARY
53
a figure of the paternal fw1ction, a figure that gives rise to the "great contemporary neurosis," that Lacan had diagnosed in 1938. With The Effectiveness of Symbols, Levi-Strauss produces a stmcturalist definition of the unconscious, one that for both him and Lacan goes beyond anything related to a psychological definition of the unconscious and of what is ineffable in it. In relation to this definition, Levi-Strauss examines what he has learned from Freud and gives a radical critique of it."' Let us now move to the end of the ar ticle in order to see how Lacan will reread Freud by means of Levi-Strauss' own criticisms. These passages w ill help us understand w hat methodological tools the latter 's work has provided him with on a crucial point: the theory of the unconscious. Levi-Strauss' unconscious and Freud's: The social and the individual
To get a sense of how Levi-Strauss' theory of the unconscious served Lacan as a tool for reading Freud, we must grasp how the former rejects what he sees as ineffable in Freud's theory, in order to substitute for it the rules of the symbolic function as an operator for producing the w1eonscious. First, let us listen to Lev i-Strauss as he defines the unconscious in 1949: The unconscious ceases to be the ultimate haven of individual peculiarities-the repository of a unique history which makes each of us an irreplaceable being. It is reducible to a functionthe symbolic function, which no doubt is specifically human, and which is carried out according to the same laws among aU men, and actually corresponds to the aggregate of these laws (pp. 202- 203). Lacan, four years later, confirms that Nothing other than this is at stake in analysis- recognising what function the subject takes on in the order of the symbolic
On this point, see Alain Delrieu, U vi-Slrauss, leeleur de Freud: le droit, l'inceste, le pt!re ef /'eclrange des femmes (1999).
:u
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LACAN AND l~V1·STRAUSS OR THE RETURN TO FREUD ( 195 1- 19 57>
relations which covers the entire field of human relations (Seminar I, p. 67), and
Consider [tile snbject] in its singuU!rity, what does that mean? That means essentially that, for him, the interest, the essence, the basis, the dimension proper to analysis is the reintegration by the subject of his history right up to the furthermost perceptible limits, that is to say into a dimension that goes well beyond the limits of the individual .... What reveals this dimension is the accent that Freud puts in each case on those points that it is essential to overcome by means of the technique and which are wha t I will call the bearings [situations] of the history (Seminar /, p. 12). In the Lacan of 1953-1954 and the Levi-Strauss of 1949, th e unconscious goes beyond the history of the indiv idual. It is the symbolic structures that organize the un conscious formations an d provide a traumatic character, if necessary, to the situations that the individual en cow1ters. Levi-Strauss then indicates tha t, in approachin g the inscriptio n and the deciph ering of each life, one must be able to distinguish the place wh ere events have been deposited in a sort of dictionary, a d ictionary wh ich is n o t the unconscious, but w hich maintains w ith the latte r the same sort of relation that vocabulary has with the laws o f d iscourse. [I]t will probably be necessary to re-establish a more marked distinction between the unconscious and the preconscious than has been customary in psychology. For the unconscious, as a reservoir of recollections and in1ages amassed in the course of a lifetime, is merely an aspect of memory. While pereru1ial in character, the preconscious a lso has limitations, since the term refers to the fact that even thoug h memories are preserved they are not always available to the individual. The unconscious, on the other hand, is a lways empty-or more accurately, it is as alien to mental images as is the stomach to the foods which pass through it. As the organ of a specific function, the unconscious
THE TRA NSCEND ENCE OF THE IMAG IN ARY
55
merely imposes structural Jaws upon inarticulated elements which originate elsewhere-impulses, emotions, representations, and memories. We might say, therefore, that the preconscious is the individual lexicon where each of us accumulates the vocabulary of his personal history, but that this vocabulary becomes significant, for us and for others, only to the extent that the unconscious structures it according to its laws and thus transforms it into language (discourse) (Structural Arrthropologtj, p. 203).
On this point, Levi-Strauss is very clear and asks that the subject's symptomatic particularities be analysed according to unconscious laws, w hich have shaped the even ts of his/her life into the form of a discourse o r has made them into symptoms. Since these Jaws are the same for all individuals and in all instances where the unconscious p ursued its activity, the problem which arose in the preceding paragraph can easily be resolved. The vocabulary matters less than the structure. Whether the myth is re-created by the individual or borrowed from tradition, it derives its sources-individual or collective (between which interpenetrations and exchanges constantly occur)-only from the stock of representations with which it operates. But the structure remains the same, and through it the symbolic function is fulfilled. If we add that these structures are not only the same for everyone and for all areas to which the function applies, but that they are few in number, we shall tmderstand why the world of symbolism is infinitely varied in content, but always limited in its laws. There are many languages, but very few structural laws which are valid for all languages. A compilation of known tales and myths would fill an imposing number of volumes. But they can be reduced to a small number of simple types if we abstract, from among the diversity of characters, a few elementary fwlctions. As for the complexes-those individual mythsthey also correspond to a few simple types, which mould the fluid multiplicity of cases. Since the shaman does not psychoanalyse his pa tient, we may conclude that the remembrance of things past, considered
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by some the key to psychoanalytic therapy, is only one expression (whose value and results are hardly negligible) of a more fundamental method, which must be defined without considering the individual or collective genesis of the myth. For the myth form takes precedence over the content of the narrative. This is, at any rate, what the analysis of a native text seems to have taught us. But also, from another perspective, we know that any myth represents a quest for the remembrance of things past. The modern version of shamanistic technique called psychoanalysis thus derives its specific characteristics from the fact that in industrial civilization there is no longer any room for mythical time, except within man himself. From this observation, psychoanalysis can d raw confirmation of its validity, as well as hope of strengthening its theoretical foundations and understanding better the reasons of its effectiveness, by comparing its methods and goals with those of its precursors, the shamans and sorcerers (pp. 203-204). Accord ing to this logic, neurosis is to be interpreted as a mythical formation. Because of the prevalence of socially shared symbolic organizations, and in order to respond to the d ifficulties encountered in the particularities of his history and in his mythical, symbolic inscription, the s ubject produces symptoms and complexes. A neurosis has a mythica l s tructure for it is nothing other than an individual version of the difficulties that the s ubject encounters in his own symbolic situatio n. Therefore Levi-Strauss sees the neuroses as so many individual myths, w hich are strictly complementary to the socially shared mytl1ic organizatio ns. In 1953, Lacan endorses tl'lis perspective by describing obsessional neurosis as "The Neuro tic's Individ ual Myth".Is it really necessary to emphasize everything that, in Levi-Strauss' essential text of 1949, will reappear in Lacan's rereading of Freud? In Ius return to Freud, Lacan takes up various aspects of Levi-Strauss' theory of the symbolic fw1ction in order to resolve a question that he found very difficult during that period: How are the imaginary, symbolic, and real related to each other? What concerns us in tl'lis questio n is the turn from the imaginary to the symbolic registers. If the 1949 lecture on the "Mirror Stage" had already mentioned the mysterious presence of the " penumbra of symbolic
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effectiveness" that envelops the specular image at the threshold of the visible world, it is precisely this penumbra that Lacan is now seeking to lift. He wants to throw light on the ways in which the subject is structured by the quilting beh'/een the imaginary of the mirror s tage- the visible- and the effectiveness of the symbolic ftmction, which Levi-Strauss has emphasized. In 1953, Lacan is no longer satisfied that his theory of the mirror s tage can account for the subject's primal identifications, and he undertakes a theoretical revision fow1ded on Levi-Strauss' concept of symbolic effectiveness. If his return to Freud is a transferential rectification concerning Freud's desire, his theoretical revision involves the introduction of a ne.w version of the mirror stage, one that excludes neither the dead father of psychoanalysis nor his speech: neither the totem nor the symbolic father towards whom he is now returning. This new emphasis requires-and enables-the m irror experience to be transformed into the inverted bouquet, which he will now explain. It is necessary to understand that this transformation is a theoretical revision that is based on Levi-Strauss' Tl1e Effectiveness of Symbols; this text infiltrates Lacan's transferential rectification, even if it is precisely by adopting the notion of the symbolic ftmction tha t he can maintain the distance between his handling of the Oedipus complex and Freud's. The experiment of the inverted vase is a new version of the mirror stage and we have seen w hat is at s take in the latter in my earlier work: nothing less than a rethinking of the origin of subjective structuring and of the movement from nature to culture. This shows that Lacan continues his dialogue w ith Levi-Strauss as weU as w ith anthropology, at the point where it deals wi th the enigma of enigmas.
Ill. From the mirror stage to the inverted bouquet From the mirror stage to the bouquet: Lacan, Freud and Levi-Strauss
From the s tart, Lacan retums to Freud by examining both what is beyond and what falls short of the Oed ipus complex, and reads the structuring fw1ction of the Oedipal myth in terms of the knotting of the imaginary, symbolic and real. In other words, subjective
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maturation is no t only to be perceived in fine in a ttaining the Oedipal operation, but more generally in the kno tting of which the Oedipus complex actualizes o ne possibility. Without these three systems to guide ourselves by, it would be impossible to understand anything of the Freudian technique and experience (Seminar /, p. 73). [T)he whole problem is that of the juncture of the symbolic and of the imaginary in the constitution of the real (Seminar I, p. 74). Lacan explains that he has "concocted a little model for you, a substitute for the mirror-s tage" (Seminar I, p. 74), and which his readers now know as the inverted bouquet. This new model aims to cla rify tl1e solution that Lacan had been providing, since 1936, with the mirror s tage, to what he saw as a shortcoming in Freud's theory o f the earliest identifications (see Lncan et les sciences wciales). 1n doing so, he was seeking to clarify the "root identification"-the Lacanian super-ego, which is formed before the ego-and thus to throw more light o n the mirror s tage; this is also the moment when the anthropological e nigma o f the transition from nature to culture becomes real. The constitution o f the subject of the unconscious is thus no longer to be grasped, for Lacan, by means o f the mirror stage or the Oedipus complex; instead, it is to be a pproached in tenns o f both tl1e mirror s tage as "reread" with Levi-Strauss' symbolic functio n and a new optical device that Lacan borrows from the Freud of The
Interpretation of Drmms. Now that we have read Levi-Strauss' The Effectiveness of Symbols, we a re going to study the way in which Lacan returns to the psychoanalytic clinic and uses the insights gained there and from The Interpretation of Drmms to refo rmulate his mirror stage in terms o f the o ptical schema. Let us remember first that in The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud compares the instrume nt used in psychic productions to a sort of complicated manuscript or camera. In the session o f 24 February 1954, Lacan says: To clarify things a little for you, I've concocted a little model for you, a substitute for the mirror-stage .... Optics could also have its say. At this point l find I'm not in disagreement witl1 the tradition established by the master- more than one of you must have
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noticed in the Trnunuleutung, in the chapter "The psychology of the dream-process", the famous schema into which Freud inserts the entire proceedings of the unconscious .... I will read it to you as it is to be found in the Trnunufeutung (Seminar l, pp. 74-75). After begiiming to quote Freud's text, Lacan adds his own comments and then continues his citation:
What is presented to us in these words is the idea of psychiml locality-what is at issue here is precisely the field of psychical reality, that is to say of everything which takes place between perception and the motor consciousness of the ego. l shall entirely disregard the fact that the mmtal apparntns with which we are here concemed is also known to us in the form of an anatomical preparation, and I shall carefully avoid the temptation to determine psychical locJtlity in any anatomical fashion. I shall remain upon psychologiml ground, and I propose simply to follow the suggestion tlrat we should picture tire instrument which carries out our mental functions as resembling a compound microscope or a photographic apparatus, or something of the kind. On that basis, psychicallomlity will correspond to a point inside the apparatus at which one of the preliminary stages of an image comes into being (Seminar/, p. 75). He seeks a better way of representing his understanding of how unconscious s ubjectivity is constituted, while also continuing to criticize the tmiversalism of the Oed ipus complex; with the optical schema, he is able to achieve both these o bjectives ii1 a way that includes the power of the Oedipus complex to stntcture the subject by knot ting the three orders together. He thus uses the authority of The lnterpre/atiou of Dreams to construct the new schema of the inverted vase (Seminar/, pp. 76, 77, 78). He mentions optics: For there to be an optics, for each given point in real space, there must be one point and one corresponding point only in another space, which is the imaginary space. This is the fundamental structural hypothesis .... without it one cannot write even one equation, nor symbolise anything (Seminar l, p. 76).
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The real, imaginary and symbolic are articula ted. "For there to be an optics" -certainly, but what must be there in order for there to be a subject? Let us look at the schema:
The experiment of the inverted bouquet TI1e image of the vase in the inverted bouquet51 is equivalent to the image of the body in the mi rror in the mirror s tage. By distinguishing the image of the vase, from the real of the flowers, the optical model depicts the advent of the ego in the imaginary register, while the real of the objects of d esire is distinguished from the imaginary, even if in the mirror, the object and the body image are joined. In other words, this device allows us to situate what pertains to the ego and what does not. Well then, Jet us say that the image of the body, if we locate it in our schema, is like the imaginary vase which contains the bouquet of real flowers. That's how we can portray for ourselves the subject of the time before the birth of tire ego (my emphasis) and the appearance of the latter (Seminar /, p. 79). Lacan, while resolutely dismissing any d evelopmental psychology, claims that the subject is prior to the ego; through this new device, he can take up not only the question of the primal identification, the "root identification"-which I studied in my earlier work-or the question "'' On the optical mcxlel of the person's ideals.. see Jacques-AJain Miller, "Commentary on tl1e Graphs", Ecrits, pp. 859-861.
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of the appearance of the envelope of the ego, which dialectically includes the real; he also indicates that this dialectic operates on condition that the eye, which looks, is sit uated in the right place. The imaginary and the real symbolize each other through an inside-outside relation that calls for the symbolic's discriminating function to be maintained. In this device, the eye symbolizes the subject and in order for the knotting to be done correctly, the eye must be well situated. The position of eye, and thus of the subject, "is essentially characterised by its place in the symbolic world, in other words in the world of speech" (Seminar /, p. 80). According to this logic, a fortunate "Development only takes place in so far as the subject integrates himself into the symbolic system, acts within it, asserts himself in it through the use of genuine speech" (Seminar /, p. 86). In this schema, Lacan, following Freud, uses the laws of optics to suggest a new model of psychic structuring, and the knotting of the three registers depends on the way that the eye is positioned in it. In the same way, whether or not the subject finds himself in the dialectic of inside/outside, which knots the imaginary to the real-the image of the body to the real of desires or the drive-depends on the position that the subject is given in the symbolic. If Lacan inherits the reference to the laws of optics from Freud, the power of the symbolic ftmction comes from Levi-Strauss; this, in clinical terms, is not unimportant, for when the dialectic fails, the subject does not distinguish what is his own from what is not. We could say, then, that there is no correct way for the ego to arise, and this is because of a failure of the subject's position in the symbolic. Because of this, all one's clinical attention should be directed to this subjective position, even, and perhaps especially, when a subject articulates only a few words, as is the case of little Robert, which was presented in Lacan's seminar by one of his students, Rosine Lefort. Robert seems knotted to speech only in w hat he does not " know how to say": "Madame! TI1e wolf!" Before seeing how Rosine Lefort uses the optical model, let us note that Lacan is careful to apply it, in the first place, to an analysis of the position that he and his students occupy in the analytic movement. The right d istance from the m irror and from Freud
We need to remember that Lacan has just profited from Freud's authorization to move from Wallon's experiment on the mirror stage
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to that of the inverted bouquet'', indicating in particular that the root image can arise only if the eye is the right d istance from the mirror. The eye is the metaphor for the subject. Lacan makes the aim of his commentary explicit to his listeners: the course of our dialogue, you have been able to get acquainted with the ambition which rules our commentary [i.e., 011r analysis] namely that of reconsidering the fundamental texts of the analytic experience. The moving spirit of our excavation is the following idea- whatever in an experience is always best seen is at some remove. So it is not surprising that it should be here aud now (my emphasis) that we are led, in order to understand the analytic experience, to begin again with what is implied by its most immediate given, namely the symbolic function, or what in our vocabulary is exactly the same thingthe function of speech. We rediscover this, the central domain of analytic experience, signalled throughout Freud's oeuvre, never named, but signalled at every step. l don' t think I am pushing it when l say that that is what can be immediately translated, almost algebraically, from any Freudian text. And this translation yields the solution of a number of antinomies which become apparent in Freud with that honesty which ensures that any given one of his texts is never closed, as if the whole of the system were in it" (Seminar I, p. 89). [n
It is one thing to authorize himself, through Freud, to develop an opti-
cal experiment as a "metaphor" of subjective structuring, and then to transmit it to his s tudents for a clinical presentation. Lacan goes further, however, since he clarifies for his listeners where they are, and even where he himself is; he does so by applying the experiment of the inverted bouquet to the analytic movement. Lacan argues that he is situ ated at the right d istance from Freud, at the exact point wheretuuike the Anglo-American disciples-he can translate Freud's text and give the solution to the contradictions that Freud, in his honesty, did not cover up. His transferential position is at the right distance On the experiment by Henri Bouasse, see joel Dor, IutroductioH to the RmdiHg of Lncan: Tile Uncon scious Struc/urerl Uke a Language (1997).
le
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from Freud, and he can therefore do the work of an analyst on themtranslate them-in order to bring out Freud's contrad ictions, which are symptoms that he transmitted within psychoanalysis and which remain active even within analysts' clinical activity. The analysis is thus itself turned inside-out: Lacan's commentary becomes Freud's analysis with Lacan. Yet the question of the desire that is to be imputed to Freud as an individual is of little importance here; what is in question, instead, is the desire of the analyst, who was incarnated by Freud and to which Lacan seeks to return. More than Freud's or Lacan's own particular desires, w hat Lacan is elucidating is the desire of the analyst. If Lacan must, as a preliminary, be in the right place in his relation to Freud in order to be able to translate Freud's symptomatic contrad ictions, a second condition for making progress in this project is Freud's own honesty, which must be complete if the system that explains the symptom is adequate. And the completeness of the system is nothing other than that of the symbolic system itself. Thus, the key to Freud's contradictions is, accord ing to Lacan, the symbolic function: the hmction of speech and its laws. Lacan is both Freudian and Uvi-Straussian. The w rong distance and stagnation in the imaginary
Why is Lacan located at the right distance from Freud? Because he is not located at the wrong distance; for example, he is not in the place of A1ma Freud, w ho "forgets": 1. 2.
The dead father or her own father, and Freud's desire as analyst and the Freudian d iscovery, which demonstrate that the dead father is the key for w1derstanding the symbolic fw1ction as sucl1.
To forget this is to forget Freud and the symbolic hmction in analytic exp erience. By reintroducing the function of death and the dead father in analytic experience, Lacan shows that he is located at the right distance from Freud, the d istance where he can decipher the
contradictions of Freud's speech, and both find the key- the symbolic fw1ction- and remind analysts of their duty to handle the function of speech appropriately in analytic exp erience. He is calling upon analysts to remember the dead father 's desire and the right
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"Freudian" use of Freud's s peech and of speech in general, as the analytic ideal and the rule of the super-ego. Yet in order to be able to make this good use, there must be a suitable conception of the function of speech, w hich "is exactly the same thing" as the symbolic function, as Lacan in dicates (Semi11nr I, p. 89). If he can give its true value to this function, w hich is d irectly in Freud's orientation, it is thanks to the work of Levi-Strauss and French anthropology. This enables Lacan, as we shall see, even in the most clinical moments, to mobilize the place of speech in a symbolic system rather than to flatten the interpretation onto the regis ter of the family, as he had once done, before the change in his approach. It is necessary, Lacan insists, to go back to the drawing board with the Freudian experience in order to understand it; he must start again with the symbolic function and with speech. Let us see how this pays off: 1. 2.
In clinical experience with Robert On the level of the change from the mirror stage to the inverted vase; this is a radical theoretical change, since the mirror stage of 1936-1949 was the theory of an imaginary capture without speech; the inverted vase, on the other hand, combines the mirror stage wi th Levi-Strauss' theory of the symbolic function in order to establish a link between the imaginary and the symbolic in the very first moments of subjective matu ration .
Let us start with Robert, whose case shows us what happens w hen this symbolic function does not place the subject in a position in which he can see his own image: when this function is exercised in a degraded way. The wolf: The mother or the totem?
After clarifying his transferential relation to Freud, Lacan gives the floor to Rosine Lefort to discuss the Robert case, a case that ar ticulates the deficiency of the ego from which the child suffers, in terms of the
logic of the inverted vase. Then there is a short dialogue between Lacan and Jean Hyppolite concerning the scope of the word "wolf". Rosine Lefort seems to understand the figure of the wolf as the heir of the devouring maternal imago. Far from giving credit to this
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idea, Lacan re-situates the wolf's place in the symbolic system and reorganizes the reading of the case on this basis: "Nat mally the wolf raises all the problems of symbolism: it isn't a hmction wi th a limit, since we are forced to search out its origin in a general symbolisation" (Serninar I, p. 101). Lacan tums away from a reading that places too much focus on the "family complexes" and makes the wolf into the imago of the "devouring mother". Instead, he emphasizes its place in the general symbolic system: its anthropological place as a totem. Let us listen to Lacan: Why the wolf? We are not particularly familiar, in this part of the world, with this character. The fact that it is the wolf who is chosen to produce these effects ties us straight away to a broader function on the mythical, folkloric, religious, primitive plane. The world is part of a complete filiation, which connects up with secret societies, with everything that implies in the way of initiation, either in the adoption of a totem (my emphasis) or in the identification with a character (Semiunr I, p. 101). From the "devouring mother" to the question of the totem: we see how Lacan opens the s ituation up to an analytic interpretation of the wolf, the concern with the dead father, the social bond and the symbolic function as such. Lacan's rectification moves the interpretation of the "wolf" from the matemal imago to the dead father; he claims that the subject identifies with it, in a sort of "sacred" ritual over w hich this anthropological figure of the wolf looms. The wolf, then, is nothing other than a version of the ideal or of the Freudian super-ego. Lacan indicates that he still has to clarify and d istinguish between these two instances of subjective stmcturing. Totem, super-ego and ego ideal in transference
The super-ego is constraining and the ego-ideal exalting. These are things that one tends to gloss over, because we move from one term to the other as if the two were synonymous. It is a
question which is worth pursuing in relation to the transference relationship. When one looks for the basis of therapeutic action, one says that the subject identifies the analyst with his ego-ideal or on the contrary with his super-ego, and, in the same text one
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substitutes one for the other in accordance with the unfolding of the demonstration, without really explaining what the difference is. Certainly I will be led to examine the question of the superego. l should say from the start that, if we don' t limit ourselves to a blind, mythical usage of this term, this key-word, this idol, the super-ego is essentially located within the symbolic plane of speech, in contrast to the ego-ideal. The s uper-ego is an imperative. As is indicated by common sense and by the uses to which it is put, it is consonant with the register and the idea of the law, that is to say with the totality of the system of language, in so far [as) it defines the situation of man as such, that is to say in so far as he is not just a biological individual" (Seminar/, p. 102). In this clinical fragment, the wolf as a core of speech incarnates the function of language, which " ties [the child) to th e commun ity o f mankind" (Seminar/, p. 103). This "summary o f a law", according to Lacan, aUov.rs, in treating a child, an "extraordinary elaboration, brought to a close by this touching self-baptism, w hen he utters his own Christian name. At that point we come to the fw1damental relation, in its most reduced form, o f man to language. It is extraordin arily moving" (Semiruzr /, p. 103). Lacan's emotion highlights the en ormous scope that he g ives to th e child's only speech . This speech is the totemic expressio n of a law of the s uper-ego that enable the child to christen hin1self. By doing so, the s ubject experiences the surface o f his body and makes his ego appear in a wa y that may be unstable, but which is n evertheless effective. It is the most reduced, and th erefore the most va luable, fragment of the treasury o f signifiers that allows the subject to be bound- in the quasi-religious sense o f the term- to the human corrunw1ity. Lacan thus turns away from interpreting the anim a l in terms of the devouring mother in order to remind his studen t of the a lmost sacred wealth of the to temic core o f speech that animates the subject. What must be understood is the fruitfulness of the totem: the wa y in which the fath er functions in the analytic practice with the "Wolf Child", as well as in the analyst's transferential relation w ith Fre ud himself. 1Ne can n ow see the direction in which Lacan is moving in this seminar. Solidly anch ored by the symbolic function, which h e
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owes to the anthropologists, Lacan begins a double movement of analysing 1. 2.
Analytic teclmique, and The transference to Freud, or rather, the way in which Freud's flaws explain how analytic practice has gone astray.
Along with Lacan-and with the. paternal function clearly in mindwe must find the right d istance from Freud if we are to produce analysts who w ill be able to let themselves be guided by the dead father's desire; such analysts will need to be capable of undoing his symptoms and his contradictions, and to admit the crucial position of the symbolic function and of speech in constituting the subject in transference. Not to find this right distance in relation to Freud is to have a blurred vision and to go astray in the register of the imaginary- the register of d uality and its impasses-w hich governs Anglo-American practice. Not to take the. right d istance is to be unable to see the Freudian heritage, its rules from the super-ego, its ideals, its totem: Freud. It is, consequently, to stagnate in the imaginary. Analysis progresses through the fullness of the Freudian lesson, but it progresses thanks to the anthropological depth of the symbolic function, w hich Lacan takes from Levi-Strauss and w hich enables him to use the paternal hmction to analyse cases. It enables him to displace the interpretation of the wolf from an emphasis on its maternal voraciousness to an analysis of totemic paternity and what the latter can produce. He returns to Freud. From the bouquet to the thing or the invention of the ego
In the treahnent, the child's handling of the totem of the dead father-the wolf- makes his ego, the s urface of his body and his body's psychic image appear. And d isappear. His pa rticular position in the symbolic does not make him absent to the totem, but he entertains an alternative relation to it, one that is badly situated, and w hich impedes his development and that of his ego, which
appears to him at the time of his self-christening. This is why the symbolic hmction is interesting, as are optics and the return to the dead father of psychoanalysis. This return can also be seen as a sort of self-christening, not only for Lacan but for his followers, who no
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longer derive their authori ty as analysts from the group that they had just left. Lacan ret urns thus to his Freudian heritage. " Freud had already constructed something similar, and quite speci fically pointed out to us in the Traumdeutrmg and the Abriss53 that the psychic agencies should (my emphasis) be conceived of on the basis of imaginary phenomena" (Seminar I, p. 144). It is necessary to tntst Freud, he repeats, accentuating the register of theoretical "duty". Before contin uing the analysis of Lacan's reading of Freud, let us stop for a moment to emphasize how the analysis of the child's self-christening shows Lacan's extraordinary clinical precision; here he is rethinking his theory of both the super-ego and the ego ideal, since defects in both these agencies seriously affect the way that the subject can-<>r cmmot- perceive his ego, from w hich he projects himself imaginarily. Six years later, brought by clinical experience to the very origin of humanization, Lacan will point out that the ego ideal and the super-ego are born in the same primal moment of subjective structuring. " How can we conceive of the concrete origins of the ego ideal? ... these origins cmmot be separated from those of the super-ego, for while they are distinct from the latter's, they are coup led to it," as Lacan says on 7 June 1961 (Seminar Vlll, pp. 406, 409). In order to see oneself in the right position in the mirror, the relation to the totem- the dead father, the super-ego, and the ego idealm ust be internalized. How CaJl we understand the s tability of the psychic function that allows us to perceive the ego if we do not see what transfers the symbolic function from the outside to the inside? In 1961, in his seminar, Transference, Lacan examines this question of the movement from outside to inside by using the Freudian notion of the introjection of the super-ego-and even of the ego ideal, s ince Freud does not make a s trong distinction between the two terms. He does so through the solution of the totem meal, w hich fixes the totem in the body of the brothers (Totem and Taboo) after the m urder of the father, or in that of the sons (after each Oedipus complex). Then he will advance a second Freudian solution . Let tts follow its sequence: "The notion of an interior is a crucial topological function in analytic thought, since even introjection refers to it" (Seminar Vlll, p. 408), Lacan first assures us, and then
~ Sigmund Freud, An Outlin e of Psycho-Analysis, 1964, 141-208.
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he indicates the first Freud ian solution: "the introjection--after the murder-of an imperative, interdictive, essentially conflictual object" (Seminar VIII, p. 410), which is modified , by narcissistic investment, into the internalized ego ideal. By being introjected, it enters- this is a first Freudian themethe sphere which would only be interior; it is thereby made sufficiently narcissistic, and perhaps becomes the object of libidinal investment for the subject. And it is easier to make oneself loved by the ego ideal than by the object that was, at one moment, its original" (Seminar Vlll, p. 411). Th us Lacan indicates Freud's first solution. The second solution is also Freudian: Prior to even a first step toward the Oedipal situation, there is a first identification with the father as such. Did the father trot around in his head? Freud allows the subject to take a first step in identifying with the father, and he develops a terminological refinement here by calling it exquisit Jtulrrnlich, "exquisitely manly" (Semirrar V/ll, p. 416). Disappointed by the mother, the s ubject returns to this primal identification through a regression. These two identifications-primordial and regressive- w ith the father, derive from a process that is prior to the Oedipus complex and which makes one of the object's traits into a sign (not into a signifier) that comes from the O ther; it occurs on the optic plane and comes from the one whom the subject turns to in the mirror in order to be sure of who he is. And of what he is for the O ther. It is necessary to look at oneself from the viewpoint of the O ther in order to be able to recognize oneself after having been recognized. This point is tl1e I of the ego ideal, as Lacan explains. It is w hat tl1e chi ld misses when he w ishes to be recognized. We must conceive of gaze of the Other as being interiorised by a sign. That is enough. £in einziger lug. There is no need for a whole field of organization and a massive introjection. This point I of the single trait, this sign of ru1 assent to the Other, of the choice of love, on which the subject can work, is there somewhere, and is dealt with in the sequence of the mirror-play. It is
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enough for the subject to coincide with it in his relation with the Other for this little sign, this einziger Zug to be a t his disposal. One has to make a radical distinction between the ego ideal and the ideal ego. The first is a symbolic introjection, whereas the second is an imaginary projection (Semiunr V111, p. 418). TI1e instability o f the projection o f the image of his own ego-the ideal ego-for the Wolf Child results from a defect in symbolic introjectionthe ego ideal~ince for some reason, his s ubjectivity d id no t coincide with the O ther of symbolic recognition. As a consequence, the child's christening can only be self-proclaimed , a self-dtristening: unstab le, s ubject to th e s uper-ego, and w ithout a fixed cmm ection with his own in1age. We shall n ote both the enormo us clinical scope of th e case an d also its effects on the seminar, for if it is fntitful to refer to Seminar vm in order to un derstand this fragment of Seminar I, it is in Seminar I that Lacan indicates that the q uestion of th e super-ego is worth being asked in cmmection with the transferential relation. Six years later, in the seminar on transference, he will examine th is question by referring once again to th e theory of the inverted vase. Wh a t can be sa id about the seminar of 1953-1954? Accord ing to Lacan in this seminar, the c linical analysis shows that: 1.
2.
3.
A theory o f the regis te r o f the image---or o f the imaginary-is necessary in Freudian exp e rie nce, for what this ch ild suffers from is the lac k of an im age of himself, the lack o f an ego" The image of the ego can emerge and be stabilized o nly if the s ubject has a t his d isposal a positio n from which he can project a lovable-
These conclusions enable us to understand an imp o rtant aspect o f the laws that govern th e s ubject's psychic functioning: these laws, which d efine the p lace that s/ he takes in th e symbolic and
~
Here, Lacan follO\VS Freud's own logic; he recalJs in his seminar that Freud" ... den(ies] the psyd1otk access to the imaginary. And since in general Freud knows wh..1t he is saying, we will have to find a means o f fiUing in what he meant on this topic" (Seminar/, p. 116).
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the imaginary and condition her/his link to the real, derive from optics- the image- and from the symbolic (totem, super-ego, ego ideal). For this reason, we need a new version of the mirror stagethe inverted vase- which is authorized by Freud and w hich is in consonance w ith Levi-Strauss' theory of the symbolic function.
From nature to culture: From the mirror stage to the inverted bouquet What has changed between the period of 1938-1950 and the first year of the seminar? What has changed is that the Wolf Child brings us, in 1954, to the origins of humanization-the jtmcture of nature and culturewhich, previously, had been explained by the mirror stage without any reference to the symbolic ftmction. In the text of 1938, Lacan had promoted the Father as absolute Other who introd uces the alterity that is necessary to resolve the intrusion complex, which itself had provided the solution to the weaning complex. For want of the "Father", the child remained trapped, according to these formulations, in the image of his own brother, and even of the terrible imago of the mother. According to Lacan, this imaginary capture provided the basis of the super-ego, where the mother plays a role that was stronger than the father's, who had had this ftmction for a longer time. The imaginary, but unconscious power of the super-ego was cotmterbalanced by that of the ego ideal, w here the father was more powerful than the mother. By maturing in this way, the subject could reach a sexually and socially adjusted s ubjective position . Despite this, we remember that on the collective level, the father's social d ecline was reputed to impede the good fw1ctioning of the Oedipus complex, and therefore the happy development of the sons of modernity, who were left in the grip of the "character" neuroses. In 1950, Lacan used this theory again by making the decline of the father and, more generally, family circumstances, the conditions for the degrading of the Oedipus complex and of the s uper-ego. This final degradation allowed Lacan, as he said, to invent the "Lacanian" super-ego, w hich he d istinguished from the Freudian super-ego in the following ways: 1.
It was quite precocious and appeared well before the Oed ipus
complex, since it found its coordinates in the biological d isarray of prematuration .
72
2.
3.
LAC AN AN D l~V1·STRAUSS O R THE RETU RN TO FREUD ( 195 1- 1957>
It d epended on the social cond itions of the fa mily.
hence his clinic of character neuroses and of the neurotic character, which Lacan developed in 1950 ("The Functions of Psychoanalysis in Criminology"), but also that of the super-ego, whether bearable or not, and that of the passage to the act as the psychopath's attempt at a solution. It p ut the clinician on the trail of acts that expressed, according to Mauss' terminology, a fragmented symbolism, w hich was opposed to the complete symbolism of the ordinary structuring of s ubjectivity.
In 1950, Lacan had already grasped the notion of a symbolism divided- particularly in Mauss-into the categories of complete and fragmentary, and had used this notion to account for the clinic of psychopaths and the super-ego; we remember that what was necessary for a successful symbolization or for the exit from the imaginary prison was a metamorphosis of the brother into the father, which would be brought about by the Oed ipal drama. What changes in Lacan's retun1 to Freud is that he now uses the symbolic fw1ction in relation to a ver y early s tage of subjective stmcturing and he gives the super-ego a symbolic stat us that has its roots in the symbolic exchanges that preceded even the birth of the subject. Now, the s uper-ego becomes a symbolic function that comes from the Other of culture; it is a symbolic fonnation, and indeed, a linguistic formation that determines the child's situation in relation to the symbolic system as it had existed before his birth . The d ifficulties that the subject inherits no longer derive from his "worth" or his faults; they depend on what was played out in his social group before he came into the world: the father's unsettled debt, etc. The subject's symptoms are thus d ecided even before his birth. As for the relation between the super-ego and the ego ideal, let us recall that, according to Lacan, the dialectic of introjection enables the subject to turn from the super-ego to the ego ideal. From this idealized point, the s ubject can see himself: he can project an image of
his bod y- the typical ideal ego, When this point does not exist, the subject does not see himself, and this is the case of the Wolf Child; this boy, w ho has not achieved symbolic s tability and whose egoimage has failed, discovers in his self-christening the presence of a totemic figure-the wolf- which is still active and which binds him
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to the human community. The wolf can do so despite the fact that the ego ideal has not come into existence and the (projective) image of the ego has not been stabilized. It is very moving to see this happen. This case history not only enables us to understand the subjective position of a being who can see himself solely by the movements of alternative projections; it also shows us how this being, who is stagnating pathetically at the threshold of culture, discovers, through his self-christening, w hat ordinary subjective maturation is. The child's deed is poignant because it is doomed to vanish repeated ly. It is therefore through a child who has no image of himself, a child without an ego, that Lacan intends to provide a new solution to the anthropological enigma; he knots the faceless son to the totemic father at the conjunction of nature and culture and of the human and language. This knot ting is valid for everyone, whether the subject knows it or not, and analysts must be able to recognize it in the primal figure of the super-ego, which Lacan now situates in the symbolic register of speech. If we remember how Lacan had sought, in "The Mirror Stage" and "The Function of Psychoanalysis in Crim inology" to resolve the enigma of how a human animal becomes a human being, we can understand that to encounter this transforma tion in the selfchris tening of an egoless child touches him deeply. Does he t urn this lost and blind little boy into an Oedipus, the appropriate hero for analysts? Let us say that the Wolf C hild testifies to the persistence of the symbolic effectiveness that subjects him to language, even if only its "most reduced" form is available to him. Yet d oes this ch ild 's response provide an answer for Lacan? On 30 March 1955, d uring the second year of the sem inar, Lacan s tates s pecifically that the question that has motivated his resea rch in these two semina rs is: '"W!tat is the subject?', in so far as it is, technically speaking, in the Freud ian sense of the word, the unconscious subject, and by way of that, essentially the subject who s peaks" (Serninar 11, p . 175). Can we not see then that although the child may not be the brother of Oed ipus, he is perfectly emblematic of the subject w ho has fallen short of the ego. Without an ego, without an image of himself, the Wolf C hild , the son of the totem leads us toward the subject in its pure state: a simple function of the sym bolic system. What is in question in such a case is very much the subject of the unconscious, the s ingular subject of a history that he must
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integrate into analytic experience up to a d imension that goes far beyond individual limits, for it is a matter of " the aggregate of his symptom" which is archived in the symbolic tangles of his symptomatic cryptograms.;; Incarnating the Freudian figure of subjectivity, the egoless child demonstrates-to his own misfortw1e-that the weaker the imaginary projection is, the more isolated is the symbolic function from which the unconscious subject proceeds. Thus, it is s triking to see that, while returning to the texts of the dead father of psychoanalysis, Jacques Lacan encounters the son of the totem in terms of the pathetic case of a child who has no in1age of himself. This empty-eyed child is a function of the symbolic system that has engendered him and he shows, at best, that the truth of his being is to be the son of the symbolic function itself. Freud's desire incarnates the figure of the dead father for the analytic field; it can be returned to only through the desire of his sons, if they are able to maintain a distance from the projections of the ego, projections that handicap the ability to incarnate the founder's desire. By not allowing hin1self to be dazzled by the imaginary and thus diverted from his course, Lacan returns to the speech of the dead father; he sees himself as being subjected to all the symbolic that has preceded hin1, just as he precedes all the other analysts and, on the level of the treatment, the sons' being in the world. Yet even Lacan cmmot understand this laying bare of Freudim1 subjectivity as the effect of the symbolic fw1ction without also understm1ding what the symbolic function is, m1d understm1ding its effectiveness and that of speech, which are "exactly the same thing" (Seminar l, p. 89). This is the reason for his theoretical alliance w ith French anthropology and the very early reference to the effectiveness of symbols in 1949 ("The Mirror Stage"). This alliance differs from the mirror stage because it recognizes that the very origin of being in the world depends not on an in1aginarized super-ego, but a symbolic super-ego that is prior to the ego and gives a "symbolic circumstance" to the s ubject's being; this circumstm1ce decides by a formative introjection of the ego ideal whether or not the being wilt be able to see the image of his body: his ego. This primal subject of
the primal subjection is the subject of language; it is the "strangers"
~ See
Seminar II, pp. 175-187.
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who- whether he wants it or not and knows it or not-engender his unconscious desire. These strangers include the father, his speech, his voice, but also all the symbolic exchanges that preced e the subject's coming into the world; in short, the symbolic organization from which his life comes and to which he remains indebted.56 This symbolic organization is the O ther, w hich has finally been designated as the place of the symbolic effectiveness that was mysteriously mentioned in 1949. The subject's desire proceeds from this symbolic O ther and yet, by perceiving his ego projectively, it is, first, in the mirror of his ego--or in the unage of his brother-that he believes that he can locate his own wishes. This is why the specular unage casts a shadow over the symbolic hmction, at the threshold of the visible world, and why there is a sort of penumbra that is then ii1habited by symbolic effectiveness. This is the major metamorphosis effected by Lacan's return to Freud: shining a light into this primal penumbra, he makes a rad ical separation between the ego and the subject of the unconscious. Lacan could not have begun this return without Levi-Strauss. The transition from the mirror stage to the experiment of the inverted vase. can now be shown as what it really is: an illustration of this metamorphosis. In this experiment, Lacan now knots the in'lagu1ary register of an optical machii1ery- used this time by Freud rather than Wallon-to the symbolic function, whose effectiveness was brought out by Levi-Strauss. What is u'\ question u'\ Lacan's research? He is seeking to become better acquainted with the desire of the analyst, which tries to throw light on an analysand's desire. This is, indeed, the desire of the analyst, but is it Lacan's desire or Freud's? It is Lacan's desire in that- as we have seen- he is on the track of Freud's own desire, and Levi-Strauss' research has led him to decipher this desire in tenns of the symbolic. Yet, at this moment of the seminar, it is not d ear to w hom one can attribute the desire that comes from the Other. Is it the desire of the subject? The desire of the Other? Lacan's desire? Freud's d esire? The best way to learn how to attribute desire will be to read Freud's texts; in them, we can locate the symbolic mark- the accent of tmth-that allows hun to
~ On the
anthropology o f d ebt, see Ma rcel Ma uss (1922), The Gift: Tire Form and Reason
for Excllnnge in Archnic Societies.
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attribute d esire in his interpretations of the d ream image. To do so is to address the traces and formations of the unconscious. This is the analyst's task.
The return to Freud with Levi-Strauss Freud's dream or attributing desire
By means of Freud's optical mod el, lacan has authorized himself to construct the model of the inverted vase: "Freud had already constructed something similar, and quite specifically pointed out to us in the Traumdeutung and the Abriss that the psychic agencies should be conceived of on the basis of imaginary phenomena" (Seminar I, p. 144). Here, Freud's schema is no longer taken up only in terms of a logic of anticipation, w hich would authorize lacan's recourse to the optical model; it now designates for Lacan the imaginary order on the basis of which the psychic agencies must be conceived. What was merely the example of Freud becomes the thing itself. Psychoanalytic epistemology is respected. In relying on Freud's text, lacan encounters an imperative in it: the psychic agencies are to be conceived in terms of the imaginary. Lacan thus rereads the experiment of the bouquet alongside that of the mirror, but he also rereads Hegel's theme of the imaginary register of desire along with Freud's self-analysis; w hat these rereadings show us is how the image in the d ream, in being made opaque, indicates the place of the libidinal investment of the imaginary, w here the ego comes to represent itself through the other. On 7 Aprill954, after a remark by Hyppolite, lacan s tates: l shouldn't begin by reminding you of the fundamental Hegelian theme-man's desire is the desire of the other. That is exactly what is made plain in the model by the plane mirror. That is also where we again come upon jacques Lacan's classical mirror phase (Semin11r /, p. 146). Lacan explains: Desire is first grasped in the other, and in the most confused form .... The subject originally locates and recognises desire through the intermediary, not only of his own image, but of the
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body of his fellow being. It's exactly at that moment that the human being's consciousness, in the form of consciousness of self, distinguishes itself. It is in so far as he recognises his desire in the body of the other that the exchange takes place. It is in so far as his desire has gone over to the other side that he assimilates himself to the body of the other and recognises himself as body (Seminar l, p. 147). When the body of the other is perceived as complete- another child at the breast, for example-the subject feels that he has been made incomplete and experiences a push of desire to reach the total body form that he sees. This leads both to the fundamental register of aggressiveness, which was presented in 1938 as the fraternal intrusion complex, and to the Hegelian formula; the latter emphasizes the conhtsion in "identities" in specular desire and the mortal impasse of this alienation in the brother. Yet does this imaginary capturing of desi re constitute all of desire? The libido always goes through an imaginary stage, as Lacan indicates, and here we find the projective logic of desire at work in dreams. In order to establish the certainty of the alienation that leads the subject's desire to appear in the other, Lacan tums to Freud's text, "A Meta psychological Supplement to the Theory of Drearns." 57 Fran~ois Perrier" presents this text and says that he is perp lexed by Freud's judgement that "the principal protagonist is always the sleeper'' (Serninar l, p. 152). Why not, indeed, simply endorse the d ream's manifest presentation, which attributes to those who are close to the sleeper a set of roles that, according to Freud, should always be referred to the d reamer 's desire? Lacan answers by saying that "The h trther we get the more we see how inspired these initial approaches towards the meaning of the dream and its scenario actually were" (Seminar I, p. 152). In one of his dreams, Freud recognizes his own ambition, which he projects onto a colleague. Lacan ~ Sigmund
Freud, A Meta psychological Sup plemen t to the Theory of Dreams, 1957, pp. 217- 235. ~ Fran~ois Perrier (1922-1990), a French psychiatrist a nd psychoanalyst. An alysed by laca n, he participated in the SFP, and then in the Freudian School of Paris (EFP), which he left in 1969 beca use of a dispute ove r the pass. He helped crea te the French Language Psycho.."'lnalytic Organization (Organisation psyclumnlytique de langue frm rraise, OPLF), which is also called the Fo urth Group.
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reaffirms Freud's genius, thus reconfirming his own transferential position. In analysing Freud's sense of certainty, Lacan makes a remark about a term that Freud uses to situate the person w ho plays the main role in the dream: the Viermese word, "agnosieren". This could seem to be an tminteresting detail, but it is not, for we must always follow the epistemology of the detail. Lacan moves forward in his commentary by selecting a word-a signifier-precisely because it throws light on how desire, in its imaginary aspect, is attributed; it is as if this word gave both the text and Freud's own self-analysis not only its Viem1ese accent, but also its accent of w1eonscious truth. According to Lacan, an expression from the language of Freud's childhood imposes itself on his pen at the very moment w hen he must leave no d oubt about whom to at tribute the dreamer's desire to. And let us repeat, this is not just any term, since it refers to the recognition of the person : "agnosieren", in the Viennese dialect, means "recognized". At the moment when the subject of the dream's d esire must be recognized, what imposes itself on Freud is Vie1m ese speech. Indeed, it is interesting, the significance of the Viennese milieu. In this connection, Freud gives us a very deep sense of his relation with the fraternalcharacter, with this friend-enemy, who he says is a character absolutely fundamental to his existencethere must always be someone masked by this sort of Gegenbild. But, at the same time, it is with this character as go-between, embodied by his colleague from the laboratory ... through the intermediary of ... his acts, of his feelings, that Freud projects, brings to life in this dream what is its latent desire, namely the claims of his own aggression, of his own ambition .... It is right at the heart of the dream's consciousness, more exactly at the heart of the mirage of the dream that we have to search, in the person who plays the leading role, for the sleeper's own person. But the point is that, it is not the sleeper, it is the other (Seminar I, pp. 152-153). To comment on a text is like doing an analysis. The past history, the lived history, of the subject, which we try to get at in our practice ... [w ]e can only get at it ... through the
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adult's childish language .... In magisterial fashion, Ferenczi saw the importance of this question-what is it in an analysis which makes the child within the adult participate? There is no doubt about the answer-whatever is verbalised in an irruptive fashion (Semi11nr I, p. 219). Lacan analyses Freud's text by picking up on the accent of tmth that breaks into the German text through the language of Freud's childhood. Why does this word provide us with the accent of truth? Why does this symptom of Freud's make him certain that he is recognizing his own des ire in the dream? The dream, according to Freud, is an unconscious formation that is always to be taken as a realization of an infantile desire; it is not surprising, therefore, that the symbolic universe of Freud's childhood breaks into his text in order to account for and to fonnulate the desire of that period of his life-which motivated the dream- in the language of that period. And this goes beyond Freud, since this linguistic symptom shows his unconscious activity, even while he is analysing the dream. It is as if Freud's self-analysis were adjusted so well to its object-the unconscious- that it placed an element of the unconscious right under our noses. Following the trail of Freud's desire, Lacan isolates the symptomatic trait and situates its symbolic place in order to show how Freud's self-analysis allowed him to attribute all the roles in the dream to the dreamer's des ire, to Freud's desire. Lacan also shows that what is in question in this particular case is the Freudian paradigm of the way in w hich unconscious desire is attributed. Thus, in order to be able to situate the dialectic of d esire, one should neither doubt Freud's suggestions, as Fran~ois Perrier did, nor allow oneself to be blinded by the invasion of the other's image. lacan contin ues: l talked to you about the exchange that takes place between the
subject's image and the image of the other in so far as it is libidinalised, narcissised, in the imaginary situation. By the same token, in the same way as in animals, certain parts of the world are rendered opaque and become fascinating, it too is rendered thus. We have the capacity to ngrwsieren in the dream the sleeper's own person in a pure state. The power of understanding of the subject is expanded in proportion. On the contrary, in
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the waking state, a t least if he hasn't read the Trmmrdeuturrg, he won't be able to perceive in its sufficiency those bodily sensations capable of telling him, while he is sleeping, about something intemal, something coenaesthetic. It is precisely in so far as the libidinal obscuring in the dream is on the other side of the mirror, that his body is, not felt any the less, but perceived better, understood by the subject. Do you grasp the mechanism here? In the waking state, the body of the other is reflected back to the subject, he thus fails to recognise lots of things about himself. That the ego is a capacity to fail to recognise [mecorrnaissance] is the very foundation of the technique of analysis. This goes a very long way. As far as structuring, organisation and by the same token scotomisation-here, I am happy enough to use the term~1nd all manner of things, which are so ma ny pieces of information which can be passed from ourselves to ourselves-a special game which reflects back to us our corporeality, tha t corporeality which also has an alien origin. Even as far as- Tireylrave eyes ilr order rrol to see (Seminar I, pp. 153-154). The o ptical experiment is no lo nger being used as a metaphor for the way in w hich the s ubject is s tructured; what is in question, instead, is to grasp how desire is stntctured, first of all, in the imaginary register. This analysis of Freud's own analysis of d reams allows Lacan to show his liste ners the mechanism of the mirror that leads the dreamer- through the other- to discover what mo tivates his own pe rson, which has been projected into the other. In other words, with his eyes closed, the d reame r has access to the image o f his body through the other who has been recognized (agnosieren). In the dream-on the scene of the w1conscious-the d rea me r 's body is represented very purely in the in1age of the other; once awake, however, we are dazzled or distracted by the o ther's in1age and are therefore less able to perceive w hat is happening to us. Let us summarize. For Lacan: 1.
2.
The psychic agencies must now be conceived in the imaginary register Freud says this and must be trusted
THE TRA NSCENDENCE OF THE IMAGINARY
3.
4.
81
He must be followed word fo r word- and the word, in this case, is Viennese; we must follow the trail o f his symbolic universe in order to follow his d esire as analyst The place o f his colleague, which Freud analyses in his d rea m is the same thing: it is the place o f the other in the d ream. This other is o n! y a mask fo r the internal process of the dreamer's w1conscious desire.
Th us, the d esire of the d ream uses the o ther's body. There is a sort o f d ialectic be tween the ego and the other, but this d ialectic pertains to the register o f language and of the symbolic: the ope rations o f d isplacement or of condensation in the d rea m. Lacan then offers a punctuatio n: " [W ]hat makes up the d ream is something which we must look fo r, and which truly belongs to the unconscious" (Seminar I, p. 155). The register of the in1aginary d ialectic of d esire-between the ego and the o ther- must not be confused with the compositio n o f the unconscio us, whose rules come from the symbolic because the human being, very early o n, is subjected to langu age and the symbolic relation. The subject becomes aware of his desire in the other, through the intermediary of the image of the other which offers him the semblance of his own mastery .... But there's no escaping the fact that he's a human being, born in a state of impotence, and, very early on, words, language were what he used to call with, ru1d a most miserable call it was, when his food depended on his screams. This primitive mothering has already been related to his states of dependency. But really that is no reason to hide the fact that, no less early, this relation to the other is named, and is so by the subject. That a nrune, however confused it may be, designates a specific person, is exactly what makes up the transition to the human state. If one has to define the moment at which man becomes human, we can say that it is the moment when, however little it be, he enters in to the symbolic relation. As I've already e mphasised, the symbolic relation is eternal. And not simply because effectively there must always be three people- it is eternal because the symbol introduces a third party, an element of mediation, which brings the two actors
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into each other's presence, leads them on to another plane, and changes them (Seminar I, p. 155). Lacan insists on the way that language goes beyond the imaginary dialectic and he indicates the way in which the symbolic is cmmected to the imaginary; these ideas allow him, next, to formulate a way of directing the treatment by using these reference points. So, the dialectic of the ego and the other is transcended, is placed on a higher plane, in relation to the other, solely through the function of language, in so far as it is more or less identical, and at all events is fundamentally linked up with what we should call the rule, or better still, the law. At each instant of its in tervention, this law creates something new. Every situation is transformed by its intervention, whatever it is, except when we talk to no purpose (Seminar I, pp. 156-157). Language can transcend the d ialectic of the ego if speech is full. "Here we are, introduced to this elementary level where language immediately adheres to our first experiences. Because it is a vi tal necessity which makes of man's environment a symbolic one" (Semil'lnr I, p. 157). The h uman environment depends on the prematuration of the species, and no longer on the family group and the mother 's care, as it had in his ea rlier work. Lacan has gone beyond the epistemology of his formulations of 1938 or of the mirror stage. The symbolic function is now situated at the very origin of subjective s tructuring. The transcendence of the ego and the symbolic system of the symptom
Let us ret urn to the optical experiment: my little model, in order to conceive of the incidence of the symbolic relation, all you have to do is assume that it is the introduction of linguistic relations which produces the swings of the mirror, which will offer the subject, in the other, in the absolute other, the various aspects of his desire. There is a cotmection between the imaginary dimension and the symbolic system, so long as the history of the subject is inscribed in it .... [n
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All human beings share in the universe of symbols. They are included in it and submit to it, much more than they constitute it. They are much more its supports than its agents. It is as a function of the symbols, of the symbolic constitution of his history, that those variations are produced in which the subject is open to taking on the variable, broken, fragmented, sometimes even unconstituted and regressive, images of himself (Seminar I, pp. 157-158). The subject thus sees himself in a series of images that depend on the symbolic circumstances of his history. The absence of the selfimage characterizes certain subjective positions, as shown by the Wolf Child, who also demonstrates by his self-christening that, even in that situation, the image could make a transitory appearance. If there is a diachronic determination of the self-im age, there is also a synchronic determination, through which the s ubject can perceive himself in a p lace w here he had not seen himself earlier, and w here he will no longer see himself later. Conversely, the stability of the image of the ego depends on the stability of the symbolic relations that regulate it, and the first of these relations is language. The result of this is that a d eregulated use. of language-Freud's idea of free association-sets aside the ordinary s tanda rds that regulate his speech; free association allows the subject to perceive, in his transference, all the in1ages of his ego, w hich he had not known previously. For the subject, the uncoupling of his relation to the other causes the image of the ego to fluctuate, to shimmer, to oscillate, renders it complete and incomplete. So that he can recognise all the stages of his desire, all the objects which have given consistency, nourishment and body to this image, he has to receive it in its completeness, to which he has never had access. Through the successive identifications and revivals, the subject must constitute the history of his ego (Semit~ar I, pp. 181-182). If this maximal narcissistic projection of the s ubject- w hich leads to transference love- results from the lifting of the ordinary rules
to which speech is bound and confirms the subordination of the image to language, we will be right to cmmect certain absences of the images of the ego with certain "holes in mem ory" that characterize the subject's narrative. For example, an ea rly traumatic scene
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that breaches the subject's imaginary register will be repressed some time later, when the subject has been introd uced sufficiently into the register of language and can read its sexual significatio n. Rather than integrate this scene, he prefers to give up the fragments of discourse that would give meaning to it. At this specific moment, something of the subject's becomes detached in the very symbolic world that he is engaged in integrating. From then on, it will no longer be something belonging to the subject. The subject will no longer speak it, will no longer integrate it. Nevertheless, it will remain there, somewhere, spoken, if one can put it this way, by something the subject does not control. In other words, there is no essential difference between this moment in the analysis which l have described to you, and the intermediary moment, between the stamp and the symbolic repression. There is just one difference, which is that at that particular moment, there is no one there to give him his cue. Repression begins, having constituted its original nucleus. Now there is a central point around which symptoms, successive repressions, and by the same token-since repression and the return of the repressed are the same thing-the return of the repressed will later be organised (Seminar l, p. 191). This trauma is in the register of sight: what corresponds to the imaginary breech in the symbolic is repression, and w hat is repressed returns in the symptom. Since this is the case, it is the symbolic register that inherits the mark of the s pecular trauma. The symptom incarnates the insistence of a speech that has been "muzzled " and is " latent in the subject's symptoms" and which the analyst must " release" (Serninar /, p. 185). The pain of the eyes--a s pecular trauma-is inscribed in the symbolic register of the symptom, and there is thus a movement from imaginary to symbolic. Lacan also demonstrates that the o pposite movement can occur: an injury in the
symbolic can have a mysterious correspondence on the level of the image of the bod y, which breaks down . In this cmmection, he mentions an Islamic analysand, whose symptoms are related to "the use of the hand" (Seminar /, p. 196).
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The symptom 's grasp over this body part has nothing to do with any guilty activity of childhood, as lacan indicates; instead, it points, through the bod ily image, to the fault of the father, who was suspected of theft. We know that the Koran prescribes the sacrifice of the body part that has slimed. Al though the son clearly misunderstands this law, as Lacan explau1S, the problems with the hand poil1t to a failure of inlagu1ary i11tegration, w hich can be explained by the cultural coordinates of the drama of the father. "One should not fail to recognise the symbolic appertil1ances of a subject" (Seminar I, p. 197). Somethil1g concernil1g the inlage of the body has not been integrated. In the course of analysis, as I have pointed out to you, it is when
the traumatic elements-grounded in an image which has never been integrated~raw near that holes, points of fracture appear in the unification, the synthesis, of the subject's history. l have pointed out how it is in starting from these holes that the subject can realign himself with the different symbolic determinations which make hinl a subject with a history. Well, in the same way, for every human being, everything personal which can happen to him is located in the relation to the law to which he is bound. His history is unified by the law, by his symbolic universe, which is not the same for everyone. Tradition and language diversify the reference to the subject (Semirrar l, pp. 197-198). If the son's hand i11dicates the father's wrongdoi11g, this means that the traumatic symbolic event has left a trace in the in1agi11ary register of the sufferil1g bod y. The body linage and the symbolic register are linked for better and for worse in s ubjective maturation. The trace of the fault can th us move from one register to the other through the logic of an ilwersion of the place of trauma, w hether inlagi11ary or symbolic. The symptom- u1asmuch as it is a part of analytic experience-must always be read in the domai11 of the symbolic. Repression takes place after the ilnagi11ary breach: after an inscription of the symbolic fault in the body image, We also see that ill the clinic of i11dividual cases, the subject that is in question in analysis is not the i11dividual, si11ce, however much integrity the son may have, he must nevertheless pay with his body for the father's
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unsettled debt from the preceding generation.'" Whether the effect of the trauma manifests itself in the body im age or in symbolic repression, it is useless to deal with the image in order to make the analysis progress; this is the case because the symptom, even when it finds a mark in the body image, results from a symbolic formation, either directly- through a fault in the symbolic--or ind irectly- through repression and the return of the repressed following the trauma. Thus it is necessary, if the analysis is to progress, to deal less with the dialectic between the register of the iinage and the other- the imagii1ary- than with the symbolic system of the symptom, which in every case, is the location of the return of the repressed. The hmctioning of language in structuring the subject "transcends" the dialectic of the ego and enables the sorrows that are encotmtered ii1 the scopic register to "speak" symptomatically. Such sorrows are troumatiques60, as Lacan w ill say later. The sufferings of the ego result from a cmmection with the symbolic, as Lacan assures his listeners. What, indeed, is the ego if not a sort of object, about w hich it would be too much to say that the subject maintains a relation with it. Instead, since the subject is "always already" caught up in language, it is through this inter-subjective relation with the other of language that the sufferings of the ego are to be interpreted. Such sufferings include the pain of not existing, as is the case of the Wolf Child. The regulation of the imaginary depends on something which is located in a transcendent fashion, as M. Hyppolite would put it- the transcendent on this occasion being nothing other than the symbolic connection between human beings. 1·\~\at is the symbolic connection? Dotting our i's and crossing our t's, it is the fact that socially we define ourselves with the law as go-between. It is through the exchange of symbols that we locate our different selves [mois) in relation to one
Having isolated the patemal function from the father$s person, Lac-an, ten years later, states this distinction in both a general and a precise way. "The father, the Name-of-the-father, sustains the structure ot desire with the structure ot the law-but ~
the inheritance of the father is what Kierkegaard designates for us, namel)>his sin (Seminnr XI, p. 34). "' "\'\'e invent a 'thingie' (true) to fill up a hole (lrou) in the real. Where there is no sexual relation, there is a 'troumntisme'." Jacques Lacan, Us JIOH·rlupes errenl, unpublished seminar, 19 February 1974. (fhis untranslatable pun combines the idea of the traumatic with that of the hole. Trmrslaior's uot.e.)
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another-you, you are Mannoni, and me Jacques Lacan, and we have a certain symbolic relation, which is complex, according to the different planes on which we are placed, according to whether we're together in the police station or together in this hall, or together travelling. In other words, it's the symbolic relation which defines the position of the subject as seeing (Seminar I, pp. 140-141). Robert does not see himself because of a defect of the symbolic relation with the totemic other. Can we imagine a greater pain for the ego? The child, always confronted too early w ith a traumatic scene, gives up on the memory, which always returns again through the symbolic. The symbolic relation d efines w hether the subject sees, does not see, or sees incompletely; by being burdened with a father's unpaid debt, a son must give up a part of the image of his own body. None of this is to be found in the register of the son as an individ ual, and therefore it is necessary in the treatment to follow the w hole of the symbolic system, which accounts for the troubles of the ego. The ego's sufferings and the father's fault
Treating the ego as an object leads Lacan to undertake a critique of Michael Balint's6 1 analysis of object relations in transference. Bal int indicates what this owes to the mother/ child relation, which becomes the ideal type of the primary love relation, by which an object can satisfy the subject's needs htlly. Lacan criticizes this imaginary theory of a maternal object that can complete the subject because Balint also argues that analysis aims at supporting the subject in a genital love. Such genital love is supposed to be the acme of object relations, and is characterized by the subject's ability to get off on his partner as on an object, while also satisfying the partner's subjectivity: by respecting his/ her desire. As a consequence, Lacan says, the object loses its status as object and becomes a s ubject, and nothing in Balint's theory explains how the object in primary Jove ., Michael Balint (1896-1970). Bom in Budapest, he studied medicine, then worked in Berlin while undergoing his psychoanalytic training with Karl Abraham and Hans Sad1S, and later with Ferenczi. After the \var, B.."llint set himself up in London, where, from 1948- 1961, he worked a t the Tavis tock Clinic. A s pecialis t in "narcissis tic" cases, he was interested in psychosomatic medicine a nd soug ht to apply psychoanalysis to
medical training.
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could metamorphose into a subject in geni tal love. If the ego is an object that is passed off, in the register of the image, as a subject, it must be detached from the imaginary capture that it produces in order to bring ana lysis to the heart of the symbolic relation; it is this relation that detennines the ego image, and even its absence, as the Wolf Child teaches us. [f the ego is an
imaginary function, it is not to be confused with the subject (Seminar /, p. 193). The ego acquires the status of a mirage, as the residue, it is only one element in the objectal relations of the subject .... Are we to understand that there where the id was, in A, the ego must be? That the ego must move to A [tire pla11e mirror) and, at the end of the most refined of ideal analyses, no longer be there at all? That is quite conceivable, since everything pertaining to the ego must be realised in what the subject recognises as himself (Semi11nr /, p. 195). If the first phase of analysis involves the maxin1al projection of the subject, this should not let the analysand stagnate in an im aginary mirage or in the transference love that can be inferred from it; instead, it should lead him to perceive everything in the history of his im aginary fixations that results from the s ubject's symbolic circtnnstances. Only symbolization, the reconstructed history of these circumstances and these relations, allows w hat the subject is to be recognized. The historical reconstruction of these circumstances allows the s ubject to detach himself from his fascination with his ego and to recognize what he is-and what his ego depends on-as a son or a function of the symbolic universe of language and the law, which greeted him when he came into the world. For Lacan d uring this period, the end of an analysis implies the destitution of the ego in favour of the recognition of the subject. This is what he envisages in a case in w hich the ego is missing, a case in w hich the imaginary breach is inscribed in the unconscious by deferred action and determines the formation of the symptom; the latter expresses symbolically the right of the repressed to return. This is also what he envisages when the image has been cut from the body, the condition that affects the son of the man who had not settled his debt. TI1is entire clinical perspective d emonstrates that the s ubject of
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the sympto m results from somethin g that develops in the imaginary register. This can happen by defe rred actio n, in the case of an im agina ry breach. This is a lso w hat occ urs when the iinage o f a body has been wilhtlly m isrepresented and has lost its unity; this is a morbid consequence of th e obstruction of th e rules of social exchange that govern the world o f the subject before his birth . We can admit that a fathe r's unpaid debt can be incarna ted ii1 what disrup ts a son's iinage only if we d etach o u rselves from an mdividualist conceptio n o f beii1g, which is the ego's own conception; we must s ubstitute for it a conceptio n of a s ubject that must be a pproached m its sin gularity. Analysis goes "right up to the furthermost perceptib le limits, th at is to sa y in to a d iine nsion that goes weU beyon d the !units of the ii1d ividual" (Seminar /, p. 12). How can we better show the disjunction beh,•een the s uffe rmgs o f the ego and their symbolic cause than by analysing h ow a p roblem in the use o f a hand arises from a s us p icion con cernmg the father? Does what has been sto le n h ave a hold over the body? lacan borrows here from the conception o f the symbolic h mction that Marcel Mauss elaborates m his essay o n The Gift (2002). ln listenmg to Maori law, Mauss concludes that: What imposes obligation in the present received a nd exchanged, is the fact that the thii1g received is not inactive. Even when it has been abandoned by the giver, it still possesses something of him. Through it the giver has a hold over the beneficiary just as, being its owner, through it he has a hold over the thief. This is because the tao11ga is a nimated by the hau of its forest, its native heath a nd soil. It is truly "native": the IIau follows after anyone possessing the thii1g .... In this system of ideas one clearly and logically realizes that one must give back to another person what is really part and parcel of his nature and substance, because to accept something from somebod y is to accept some part of his spiritual essence, of his soul. To retain that thing would be dangerous and mortal, not only because it would be against law and mortali ty, but also because that thing coming from the person not only mora lly, but also physically and s piritually, that essence, that food, those goods, whether movable or immovable, those women or those descendants, those rituals or those acts of communion- all exert a magical or religious hold over you (pp. 11-12).
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Whether what is in question is Maori law or a religious ntle, it is always in the name of the spirit of things-the "!tau" and the "mann" -or in the name of the dead fa ther of monotheism that the sacred regulation of social exchanges ta kes place; it is also in this name that sentences are pronounced on an offence or a crime. And nothing can depart from this. The logic of the symbolic includes the members of the family or dan in the list of debtors as weU as those who have caused the anger of the spirits that are incarnated in w hat has been stolen. In the mirror of his hand, the son perceives the s uspicion that dishonours his father. The spirit of things- the luw or the mana, or its monotheistic version, such as the dead father of Islam62- requires that a pound of flesh be taken from the father's or the family's body in order to find peace. For some reason, the law of the Koran has broken down here. The son's ign orance of it does not prevent him from being led unconsciously to settle his father's debt. The symptom resul ts from a sort of sacrifice to the dead father of Islam, even if the subject of the sacrifice continues to mis understand the law. He pays, although no punishment has been pronotmced and w ithout knowing wha t the Koran says. AU of this is unconscious. The symptom, if it is deciphered, is the only trace of the unconscious sacrifice caUed for in the subject's symbolic tmiverse. The son's symp tom should not be treated as his own sin, or even as an organic malfunction; the subject of the symptom must be conceived of as the subject of a symbolic universe whose ntles he does not necessarily know, but which weigh upon him, and do so even more ferociously when he does not know what they are. What claims its due here is the symbolic order, to which Lacan devotes the session of 25 June 1954, where he says that "In every analysis of the inter-subjective relation, w hat is essential is not what is there, what is seen. What stntctures it is what is not there" (Seminar/, p. 224). What can not be there and yet stmcture the
t.:
We knO\v that the Koran separates the divine figure from paternity. In refen ing to
the dead father of Islam, we are referring to the way in which Freud evokes the "recuperation" of the primal father by Islam and, more structurally-as we shall see laterto the theoretical operator that supports any symbolic network, whatever the name that receives "the spirit of things" -to use Levi-Strauss' words-may be.
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subject's sufferings, if not the symbolic universe, which calls for the son's sacrifice? The subject w ho is sacri ficed receives his condemnation from the other of the Koran, a text that he does not know. There is thus a sharp distinction between the subject of the unconscious- which receives its message from the symbolic Otherand the dialectic of the ego, which is not eliminated, but which is modified and transcended by the symbolic hmction, which requires its d ue. From that perspective, it is impossible to conhtse the stmcturing, the determination, the inveshnent of the ego in the imaginary register, with that of the s ubject of the unconscious, w hich is entirely constituted by the symbolic order, even if there is a cormection that subordinates the first to the second. If the schema of the son's body has been blocked, it is because he has been condenmed instead of the father. 1Ne must understand how incredibly cruel the unconscious tribunal"' is if we are to make sense of how the son's symptom is to be related to the father's fault. This can be done only by separating the son's ego from his subjectivity, and by remembering, w ith the etlm ologists, the weight of the symbolic h mction and of debt on the lineage of someone who has not honoured the-always sacredobligations of social exchange. If the experiment of the inverted bouquet allows Lacan to illustrate how tl1e imaginary is cormected to the symbolic register, he maintains clearly, in this first seminar, that the subject of the w1conscious comes from the symbolic; this s ubject is a product of language and the social structures that include the system of laws and of mythic or religious social exmange tl1at regulate his/ her cultural universe. Lacan, following H yppolite, takes as his point of departure the Hegelian fonnula that throws light on the imaginary dialectic of desire- " desire is the desire of the other"- in order to complete the experiment of the inverted bouquet. We must now end tllis compact commentary on it by accounting for subjective structuring, since we have seen that the subject's unconscious desire results from this very symbolic wliverse. The axis of the imagina ry dialectic that links the ego to the other will be complicated the following year by an axis that links the subject to the Other of the symbolic. The following "' See Markos Zatiropoulos, Tristesse dans In modem it.e : de !'ideal plmrmacologique ii Ia
clinique freudiemre de In me/nnco/ie (1996).
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graph, the L Schema, represents the relation between the imagina ry and the tmconscious.64
L Schema
If this unconscious message comes from the Other of the symbolic to the subject, in what s tate does it arrive? "In an inverted form," Lacan answers in the Rome Report, which he wrote even before the seminar that we have just studied in order to throw light on the penumbra of symbolic effectiveness a t the first moments of the primal identification. "The s ubject receives from the Other his own message in an inverted form": Lacan's readers have often commented on this formula, frequently highlighting its Hegelian tmderpimlings. For those who wou ld li ke a fuller development of the experiment of the inverted vase, we can refer tl1em to tl1e work of joel Dor65, which gives a clear exposition of it. Dor reads Lacan's return to Freud by giving a short introduction to the work of Ferdinand de Saussure and Hegel, who, in his opinion, inspired Lacan. This is all very well, but does tl'lis theory of the unconscious as an inverted message tl1at comes from tl1e Other of tl1e symbolic really derive from these sources? We mus t now examine this crucial point.
,.. Lacan, Seminar JJ, p. 243. For further commentary on the LSchema, see JacquesAlain Miller, "Commentary on U1e Graphs," Ecrifs, p. 859.
"' Joel Dor, Introduction to the Rending of Lnam: Tlte Unconscious Struclured Like n Ln11g11age (1997).
C HAPTER T WO
The subject receives from the Other his own message in an inverted form: An investigation
everal mo nths before inaugurating his seminar at Sainte-Atme, Lacan w rites in the Rome Report:
S
The form in which language expresses itself in and of itself defines subjectivity. Language says: "You will go here, and when you see this, you will tum off there." In other words, it refers to discourse about the other (discours de l'autre]. It is enveloped as such in the highest function of speech, inasmuch as speech commits its a uthor by investing its addressee with a new reality, as for example, when a subject seals his fate as a married man by saying "You are my wife." Indeed, this is the essential form from which all human speech derives more than the form at which it arrives. Hence the paradox that one of my most acute auditors believed to be an objection to my position when I first began to make my views known on analysis as dialectic; he formulated it as follows: "Huma n language would then constitute a kind of communication in which the sender receives his own message back from the receiver in inverted form." I could but adopt this
93
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objector's formulation, recognizing in it the stamp of my own thinking (Ecrits, p. 247). At the very moment when he states the formula for commwucation that would fix, for a long time, the analysis of subjectivity as an effect of the relation to the other, Lacan indicates in a remark whose epis temology is im peccable that his own statement obeys this ntle of production, since it was first made by "one of my most acute listeners", who was objecting to what he was saying. In other words, "the sender receives Ius own message back from the receiver in an inverted form" is not a formula that Lacan created himself. Instead, he took it from a listener; it is a response from the Other. It will be interesting, for this archaeology of Lacan 's thought, to d iscover who tlus exceptional objector was: "one of my most acute listeners", a figure of the Other who spoke to Lacan with the voice of his own unconscious. It is also necessary to understand tlus formula, why it was coined, and the circumstances in which it was written for the first time (spring 1953). Yet is this formula so important? Yes, for-as we have seen-in what would become tl1e first book of the seminar, Lacan was seeking to d efine a theory of the s ubject that would be compatible w ith what Freudian experience had taught hin1. Lacan's first public seminar deals w ith Freud's papers on teclmique, and it is important not to lose tl1e thread of his analysis, since the subject that he is seeking to define is tl1e subject of analytic experience. By reading Freud's most teclulical texts, he made progress in answering the question of what a subject is for, and in, analytic experience. Lacan responds to tlus question in the Rome Report: subjectivity is what is d efined by a form, a simple form. Yet this time, and unlike the answer that is elaborated in the texts of 1936-1948 on the mirror s tage, it is a form in w hich language expresses itself. In 1953, Lacan changes Ius conception of subjectivity, which is s till, however, defined as a s imple term. It is a form, but not just an y form; it is not the "prinlordial form" of the root identification of the nlirror stage, which "sit uates the agency kn own as the ego, prior to its social
determination", not this sort of "ideal-1" or this "total form of his body, by w hich the s ubject anticipates the maturation of his power in a mirage" which "is given to hinl only as a gestalt .... [The] power [pnignnnce]should be considered linked to the species" (Ecrits, p. 76).
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Far from being a gesta lt of the bod y, it is a form "in which language expresses itself", and is "essential" since "all htmlan speech derives" from it and "d efines subjectivity" (Ecrits, p. 246). In 1953, Lacan, still seeking the answer, encounters something. What can be deduced from this encounter is that subjectivity receives its definition from an operation that is now situated in the register of language- the symbolic- rather than from the bod y im age. It took Lacan 17 years- from 1936 to 1953- to alter the form that defines subjectivity; it changed from the imaginary to the symbolic, from the body image to a parad oxical expression of langu age. Although this s im ple d is placement could appear w1interesting to o ur readers, we should note the family resemblance between the two formulations. Let us reread the first formula (that of 1936-1949): For the total form of his body, by which the subject anticipates the maturation of his power in a mirage, is given to him only as a gestalt, that is, in an exteriority in which, to be sure, this form is more constitutive than constituted, but in which, above all, it appears to him as the contour of his stature that freezes it and in a symmetry that reverses it (Ecrits, p. 76). For this first moment of the elaboration, the fonn given to the subject is: 1. 2. 3.
In an exteriority More constit utive than constituted In a symmetry that reverses it.
The formal identity that defines the subject certainly does not allow the two forms to be confused with each other: one concerns what comes to the s ubject from the symbolic, while the other derives from the imaginary. One reveals what w ill give him the ideal image of his body. The other gives him the signifiers of his fate, or in anthropological terms, what is imposed symbolically, w hen his place in the network is taken into account. Yet this formal kinship must not escape us for it shows us the stamp of Lacan 's thought'6: in both cases, the "'for an overview o f Lacan's thought, see Paul-Laurent Assoun, I.Acfw (2003).
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human being receives, from what is outside himself, both his body image and the symbolic coordinates of his fate. These coordinates will or will not allow him-as we have seen with the Wolf Child-to perceive his image and to develop with a greater or lesser number of symptoms in his subjective life, as well as in his network of social exchanges. Recognizing the stamp of lacan's "thought"-a thought that my archaeology is seeking to read- in this handful of traits s upposes that I am authorized, first, to use this tenn, w hich some colleagues, who rely on lacan's later teaching, d isparage; they object that my research gives too large a place to the register of thought in the analyst. Yet without discow1ting this objection, I am going to remain faithful to a more or less chronological method. Yes, there is a recognizable thought behind the various moments of his teaching, and the fragments of the Rome Report, whose presuppositions we are examining, make it clear that the lacan of 1953 believed that his thought had a sort of "stamp". In order to understand lacan's quest for a theory of the subject that would be congruent with analytic experience, one should read "The Mirror Stage" with the Rome Report; we should consider the passage that has been cited from the latter text less as a new response to vvhat motivates Lacan's analysis than as a nevv version of the answer that he s upplied from 1936 to 1938. This answer had aimed, through the mirror stage, to "make up" for w hat is missing in Freud's doctrine of the first identifications.67 La can's new answer combines se.v eral versions of the mirror stage with what can be deduced from the objection to his method; it is necessary, however, to emphasize that it is not at just any moment that lacan can see that "Human language would ... constitute a kind of communication in w hich the sender receives his own message back from the receiver in inverted form." This formula arises from the O ther precisely "when I first began to make my views known on analysis as dialectic"; it has the value of an interpretation that can produce a change because it had been made at the right time. How long had lacan been making his views on analysis as dialectical known? What does this new formula mean? What is the relation between the mirror stage, the dialectic of ana lysis and the progress
t-7
On this point, see Lacmz et les sdmces sociales, pp. 44 tf.
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in symbolization? Is all of this not too intellectualized and does it not move too far from Freud's text, and even from the experience of the treatment? Not at all, since it is precisely in his 1951 text, Presentation on Transference that Lacan offers his colleagues a reading of a paradigmatic text from Freud's clinic, the Dora case, in which he described the treatment of the patient as a d ialectical experience. If Lacan conceives of analysis as a dialectical progression, his goal is not to " intellectualize" it to the detriment of clinical truths, because Freud's treatment of Dora was itself d ialectical. The treatment, when directed dialectically, leads us the closest to subjective truth and Lacan recalls the salutary value of Freud's orientation, which allows the message that comes from the O ther to be W1knotted in an inverted form. I. Presentation on Transference (1951) The Dora case or Freud's dialectic
Finnly ruling out any psychologizing orientation for psychoanalysis, since he criticizes its danger of objectifying the individual, Lacan suggests, in his presentation to a conference of Romance-language psychoanalysts in 1951, a conception of the Freudian experience that is characterized by a sort of dialogue; in this d ialogue, the subject is constituted by a discourse whose only law is that of tntth, which introduces a change into reality. "(P ]sychoanalysis is a dialectical experience, and this notion should prevail w hen raising the question of the nat ure of transference" (Ecrits, p. 177}; this statement is crucial for analytic tedmique. Shortly afterwards, he makes it clear what his dialectical conception of analysis means by discussing some models from Freud's ov.rn \•v ork.
[T]he case of Dora., is laid out by Freud in the form of a series of dialectical reversals .... What is involved is a scansion of structures in which truth is transmuted for the subject, structures
"' Ida Bauer (1882-1945). Freud's first great psychoanalytic case, Dora and her history remain a classic ot analytic literature. Born in Vienna into a \veil-off Jewish bourgeois famil)> she was the sister of Otto Ba uer (1881- 1938), one of the great figures o f the Aush·ian intelligentsia between the two \\'Orld wars. Her case is one of the most commented upon in the psychoanalytic literature.
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that affect not only her comprehension of things, but her very position as a subject, her "objects" being a function of that position. This means that the conception of the case history is idmtiarl to the progress of the subject, that is, to the reality of the treatment (Ecrits, p. 178). According to Lacan, Freud 's dialectic, far from screening out the reality of the treatment and the emergence of subjective truth, is guided by its concern with them; it is precisely when analysts recoil from this dialectic, out o f a fear of Freud's discovery, that they objectify the subject, forever forbidd ing her access to tme speech and to subjective progress. In this connectio n, what can be said about Dora?"' When Freud first meets her, she is 18 yea rs old. According to him, Low spirits and an alteration in her character had ... become the main features of her illness. She was clearly satisfied neither with herself nor with her family; her attitude towards her father was unfriendly, and she was on very bad terms with her mother, who was bent upon d rawing her into taking a share in the work of the house" (Dora, p. 23). She had frightened her parents by writing a farewell letter in which she warned them that she wanted to d ie. When, one day, she fainted in front o f her father, he took her to Freud. Freud d iagnoses her as a case of '"petite hysterie' with the conunonest of all soma tic and mental symptoms: dyspnoia, tussis 11ervosa, aphonia, and possibly migraines together with depression, hysterical WlSociability, and a taedium vitae which was probably no t entirely gen uine" (Dora, p. 23-4). Nothing, then, was extraordinary abou t Dora's case, which Freud, however, made famous. He a rgues that "What is wanted is precisely an elucida tion o f the commonest cases and of their most frequent and typical symptoms" (Dora, p. 24), and his disciples have never stopped commenting o n this case, for better or worse. In 1951, Lacan's commentary locates itself within this psychoanalytic traditio n, which it will revolutionize. Let us ta ke a look a t this case. Dora complains to Freud that her father has abandoned
"' The reader will profit from referring to Freud's text, Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria, 1953, pp 1-122.
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her by leaving her in the hands of his mistress, Frau K., and that he has done so in order to facilitate his adulterous affair. According to Lacan, far from d isabusing the young woman of her belief, Freud takes cognizance of the circuit of exchange, but his response is free of the compassion that she had been seeking; instead, he makes "(a] first d ialectical reversal", which requires that she recognize her own part in contin uing the "disorder" about w hich she is complaining. What follows is a "development of truth", as Lacan says: Namely, that it was not on the basis of Dora's mere silence, but of her complicity and even vigilant protection, that the fiction had been able to last which allowed the relationship between the two lovers to continue. What can be seen here is not simply Dora's participation in Herr K.'s courtship of which she is the object; new light is shed on her relationship with the other partners of the quadrille by the fact tha t it is caught up in a subtle circulation of precious gifts, which serves to make up for a deficiency in sexual services. This circulation starts with her father in relation to Frau K., and then comes back to the patient through Herr K.'s consequent availability, in no way diminishing the lavish generosity which comes to her directly from the first source, by way of parallel gifts-this being the classic manner of making amends by which the bourgeois male manages to combine reparation due his lawful wedded wife with his concern for passing on an inheritance (note tha t the presence of the figure of the wife is reduced here to this lateral link in the chain of exchanges) (Ecrits, p. 179). Let us note the procedure. Freud, as Lacan argues, begins Dora's analysis w ith a first dialectical reversal-a subjective rectificationwhich leads to the birth of a tmth. We shall emphasize that this tmth is etlmological, since it is incarnated, according to Lacan, in the circuit of social exchange that governs Dora's world and assigns her a plac~as object of exchange- that she rehtses, but which remains,
nevertheless, her own. This case illustrates Lacan's subject perfectly, since it shows how Dora aids, without knowing it and thus unconsciously, the message. of the social O ther, w hich assigns her a precise place in the d1ains of social exchange.
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Freud's first d ialectical reversal makes Dora see how she accomplishes unconsciously the " mission statement" that comes to her from the other and which, once deciphered and placed in the father's mouth, would be something like the following: "You are the woman whom I exchange w ith Herr K., as quid pro quo for the woman whom he is giving to me (Frau K )." This circuit of the exchange of women, which provides Dora w ith the coord inates of her unconscious activity, could have contin ued without a snag if the yow1g woman had consented to participate in it as an object- that is, as a woman. Yet Dora objects precisely to this and rebels, Lmder the cover of a jealousy of Frau K, against her own role. This is the second d ialectical reversa l, in which Freud unmasks, beneath this jealousy, an tmconscious interest in her, an interest that, if it is to be brought to light, requires Dora's complaint to be reversed once again . This is a new development of truth, but now the truth is sullied by Freud's own prejudices, since, accord ing to Lacan, wha t motivates Dora's jealousy are not her own Oed ipal wishes, which would see Frau K as a rival, since she is the father's mistress, and an object for men who sta nd in for him: Herr K. and Freud. Instead, a correct d evelopment of tmth would have led Freud to recognize, in Dora's attaclunent to Frau K., not a jealousy that derives from identi fication, but a homosexual object investment that is decid edly pre-Oedipal. This root identification comes to her from the mirror stage and results from a primal masculinity; th is masculinity constitutes her own femininity as a mystery, and even as a symptom-and works against fate, which has assigned her a woman's place in social exchanges. What fascinates Dora about Frau K is, as Freud recognizes, "her 'adorable white body"' (Dora, p. 61) and as Lacan says, "the mystery of Dora's own ... bodily feminini ty" (Ecrits, p. 180). In other words, for Lacan, she has not been able to recognize her own femininity. To do this, "she would have to asstm1e [asswner) her own body, fa iling which she remains open to the functional fragmentation (to refer to the theoretical contribution of the mirror stage) that constitutes conversion symptoms". Now, her only means for gaining this access was via her earliest imago, which shows us that the only path open to her to the object was via the masculine partner, with whom, because of their difference in age, she was able to identify, in that
TH E SU Bj ECT RECE IVES F ROM TH E OTH ER H IS OWN MESSAG E
10 1
primordial identification through which the subject recognizes herself as I ... (Ecrits, p. 181). In writing these ellipses, Lacan invites the reader to switch to the 1949 text on the mirror stage, w hich provides the theoretical foundation of his 1951 analysis of Dora's identifications. Because she has identified, from the first moment of her life in front of the mirror, with the primal image of a male partner who is older than she is, Dora, according to Lacan: 1.
2. 3. 4.
5.
Cmmot accept her own female bod y Falls prey to the fragmentation that motivates her conversion symptoms Sees Frau K.'s body as a fascinating mystery Identifies w ith her father and th us makes Frau K. the object of her desire, since she identifies w ith the inheritors of the paternal gestalt (Herr K., Freud) Objects to the message that she receives from the social other, a message that assigns her a place a mong the women w ho are to be exchanged.
In other words, Dora's malaise can be explained entirely by the fundamental disharmony that exists between the imaginary and its identifications- that of the mirror s tage, which places her on the masculine side- and the unconscious message, which she receives from the social Other, her network, which orders her to take her place as woman in the circuit of exchange. Dora or the emblem of the feminine condition
Beyond rectifying the problems of the case, Lacan, in order to give a paradigmatic explanation of the Freudian clinic of hysteria, also connects, on the epistem ological level, two elements: 1.
2.
What he borrows from etlmologists concerning the m1alysis of the gift and exchange, and especially from Levi-Strauss' analysis of the exchange of women What he had been formulating since 1936, concerning how the mirror stage makes up for what is missing in Freud's theory of primal identifications.
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LACAN AND LEVI -STRAU SS OR T HE RETUR N TO FREU D (1 95 1- 195 7)
What is in question here is not simply a secondary clinical problem. Let me emphasize that with this text: L 2. 3. 4.
Lacan criticizes Freud's assumptions about the prevalence of the father in the Oedipus complex He treats these assumptions as Freud's resistance to the analysis He makes the analyst's biases the place of the resistance to analysis, and He shows us finally what is not only Dora's fate, but that of all the "petites hysteries", all of w hom object to the symbolic system that assigns women their place as ethnologically determined exchange objects.
Is the feminine cond ition not profound ly d ivided-and its symptoms motivated-by w hat may be a structural disharmony: on the one hand, there is a primal identi fication w ith a gestalt, which is less outside sex than generic- the root or paternal identification"'and on the other, a social fate that ordains that they take the place of the object of exchange? Lacan answers: As is true for all women, and for reasons that are at the very crux of the most elementary social exchanges (the very conditions Dora names as the grounds of her revolt), the problem of her condition is fundamentally that of accepting herself as a man's object of desire, and this is the mystery that motivates Dora's idolization of Frau K. (Ecrils, p. 181). Lacan reads Freud w ith Levi-Strauss and makes the exchange of women the place w here Dora's unconscious mission is expressed. Her primal identifications make her see herself as a man and she is guided towards a homosexual object choice that Freud cmmot understand, since he remains fixed to his theory of the Oedip us com plex.
;uSee Lncau et les sdeHces socialt.'S, where I re-examined the question of the root iden-
tification in Lacan in relation to Freud's theory of the dead father. Lacan's reading of
the Dora case does not contradict my U1esis that the root identification is a gestalt of the fatl>er, and we shall see fu rther that that with the seminar of 1956-1957, Object Relnlions (Semillllr IV), Lacan reconfirms my interpretation by indicating more generally what in the hysteric's homosexual object "choice" goes back to this primal identification with the father.
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l would say that this has to be ascribed to a bias, the very same bias that falsifies the conception of the Oedipus complex right from the outset, making him consider the predominance of the paternal figure to be natural, rather than normative-the same bias that is expressed simply in the well-known refrain, "Thread is to needle as girl is to boy" (Ecrits, p. 182). Because of his Oedipal bias, Freud misses the third d ialectical reversal, w hich would have allowed him to bring out the " imaginary mold in which all the situations orchestrated by Dora d uring her life came to be cast- a perfect illustration of the theory, yet to appear in Freud's work, of repetition automatisms. We can gauge in it w hat woman and man signify to her now" (Ecrils, p. 180). Next Lacan says that In order for her to gain access to this recognition of her feminin-
ity, she would have had to assume [assumer) her own body .... Now, her only means for gaining this access was via her earliest imago, which shows us that the only path open to her to the object was via the masculine partner, with whom, because of their difference in age, she was able to identify, in that primordial identification through which the subject recognizes herself as I ... (Ecrits, pp. 180-181). According to the Lacan of 1951, w hat Freud lacked in order to situate himself better in Dora's analysis was the theory of the mirror stage. This theory would have allowed him not to expect Dora to be dominated by late Oedipal identifications; such an expectation only shows the weight of Freud's prejudices about the father's prevalence--as object-in structuring the daughter's desire." Lacan's 1951 Presentation thus seeks both to demonstrate Freud's dialectical genius and to illustrate the clinical wealth of the Lacanian replacement, the mirror stage, which is knotted here to Levi-Strauss' theory of the exchange of women, th us making Dora's unconscious
" We can see that l.acan's epistemological charges against Freud on the question of the father is still very much present in 1951, like his concem with demonstrating the clinical richness of what had been, since 1936, his contribution to the theory of narcissism, as well as his theoretical replacement of what does not suit him in Freud's theory of the fi rst identifications.
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LACAN AND LEVI ·STRAU S.S OR THE RETURN TO FREU D (195 1- 1957)
mission understandable. On the level of directing the treatment, Lacan indicates that what psychoanalysis is concerned with-the unconscious message and the mode by w hich it is stmcturedrequires a dialectical reversal so that the symptomatic cryptogram can finally yield its tru th . For him, the dialectical conception of the treatment is not a philosophical affectation, but a response that has been adjusted to the way by which the unconscious message is produced: it is a message from which the truth can be extracted after its structure has been reversed. In this case, there is therefore no choice. Because the unconscious message arrives from the Other in an inverted form, the transferential manoeuvre inverts the terms of the symptomatic complaint and requires s ubjective rectifications; these rectifications lead the ana lysand to see what she is creating or maintaining unconsciously in her complaints. We can understand better now how this text throws light on the historical circumstances in w hich the fonnula of s ubjectivity was produced. We can see w hy, in Lacan's own words, "when I first began to make my views known on analysis as dialectic", he received from his exceptional listener the formula, "Human language would then constitute a kind of communication in which the sender receives his own message back from the receiver in inverted form" (Ecrits, p. 247). Lacan says in the Rome Report that this form is that "in which language expresses itself", the form that "in and of itself defines subjectivity. Language ... refers to d iscourse about/ from the other [discours de /'autre ]. It is enveloped as such in the highest function of speech, inasmuch as speech conunits its author by inves ting its addressee with a new reality, as for example, w hen a subject seals his fate as a married man by saying 'You are my wife"' (Ecrits, p. 246). Only the dialectical production of an antithesis can then allow the unconscious message to be re-established. This can easily be understood in the analysis of individual cases; on the level of the analysis of the masses, precisely because it is, in Freud's words, a paradigmatic case of "petite hystt!rie" and thus one of the "simplest'' and most frequent cases, it can be considered as a general analysis of the feminine condition . Presentation em Transference can thus be read as both a text on Freudian technique and a work that throws light on the experience of the treatment, but it is also--on the crucial point of femininity- a contribution to psychoanalytic anthropology: the clinic of the masses. This
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double virtue is eminently Freudian; it shows that Lacan is an orthodox Freudian and that he has produced a clinic of the individ ual case that is ipso facto a clinic of the social. Yet although it is di fficult to dispute that Lacan, in his return to Freud, follows the Freudian ethic, this should not prevent us from observing that he begins this return by commenting on Freud and uses theoretical fotmdations that are not entirely those of Freud's own work: his own research on narcissism- the mirror stage- as well as w hat he has learned about the symbolic order from French etlmology. That he treats the exchange of women as the governing principle of Dora's unconscious mission shows how crucial Levi-Strauss' research is for him; it is crucial not only in terms of his psychoanalytic anthropology, but also as a way of throwing light on Freud's paradigmatic cases. This is true of Dora in 1951 but it is also true, as we saw in our earlier work, of her masculine counterpart among Freud's cases: the Rat Man. Lacan re-examined this case at Jean Wahl's" College philosopl1ique under the title of The Neurotic's Individual Mytlt. Levi-Strauss' influence is clear here, since, as mentioned earlier, he used the term " individual myth" in 1949. Lacan returns to Freud by commenting on his cases, and does so because he wants to remain dose to the latter's clinical experience. To understand tl1is return, one must do more than fix its date or sinlply to repeat, once again, tllat Lacan returned to Freud in the 1950s. We must see tllat this return involves a commentary tllat has a specific style: tllat of a profow1d respect for Freud's ethics but also of a critical testing. Through this testing, Lacan verifies the fotmdation of Freud's theses, which he does not hesitate to develop, w hen he thinks that it is useful to do so, by relying on sources that are external to Freud's theory. If this return allows him to decipher Freud's method as analyst and to locate and use what is hidden within Freud's texts concerning every analyst's subjective mission, Lacan does not develop the elements of Freud's work tl1at seem to impede the development of truth. Lacan's project is not religious; his "return" can insist on the letter of Freud's text but it can also set aside Freud's "biases", which ~jean Wahl (1888-1974), philosopher an d poet. He had an ngrignfiou in philosophy and began to teach a t the Sorbonne in 1936. The president o f the French Philosophical Sociel)\ he also headed the College pfli/osopflique.
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LACAN AN D LEVI-STRA USS O R T HE RETUR N TO FREUD (1951- 1957)
functioned as a resistance to analysis. In other words, when Lacan encounters elements of psychoanalytic theory that he judges to be obsolete, he does not insist dogmatically on maintaining them; he never hesitates to highlight, in opposition to Freud's own resistance, the perspective of the Freudian ethic, which aimed at bringing out the truth . In rereading the Dora case, what Lacan judges to be biased is nothing less than Freud's theory of the Oedipus complex; Freud's own biases created a resistance to Dora's analysis and provoked the final transferential rupture. As a consequence, what he proposes to substitute for Freud's inadequate conception is the antagonism between a series of identifications, the model of w hich is both Dora's " root identification"- the theoretical contribution of the mirror stageand the symbolic function . He believed that the latter includes but goes beyond- both generically and clinically- the Oedipus complex in both the process that constitutes the subj ect and the unconscious messages that organize his symptoms. Lacan th us reads Freud with Freud, since he rehtses to compromise whatever helps move us towards the truth; the price for this is to "sacrifice" Freud- or his guilty blin dness-in order to find a substitu te in the work of the French etlmologists, w ho allow him to decipher the message hidden in Dora's symptoms. If Lacan can argue that Dora's symptoms can be ded uced not from the Oedipal wishes for her father, but from the message of the father, who offers his da ughter up to the network of exchange of goods- a network to which he owes a woman- it is because he has learned this not only from Levi-Strauss, but also from older etlmologists, such as Marcel Mauss. What they taught him was that a debt contracted symbolically in social excl1anges must be honoured, and that if it is not, misfortune will strike whoever has not repaid it or his allies."' He can therefore argue that Dora's misfortunes result not from unconscious Oedipal guilt, but from something that is very different: a symbolic debt that, w1consciously, is unpaid. Confronted w ith the range of these etlmological theses, and his own theory of the mirror stage, Lacan believes tl1at his return to "' We have also seen that it is the logic of this unpaid debt that informs l.acan's analysis, in the first year of his seminar, of the symptom that impeded the use of a hand by the son whose father was s us pected of theft.
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Freud must go beyond the Oedipus complex. Does Lacan make this critical commentary on Freud's text in the sa me spirit in which he retum s to Freud? To answer this question, we must: 1.
2.
Ask Lacan Read his text of 7 November 1955, "The Freudian Thing or the Meaning of the Return to Freud in Psychoanalysis" (Ecrits, pp. 334-363).
II. "The Freudian Thing or the M eaning of the Return to Freud in Psychoanalysis" From the introduction to this lecture, which was given at the Vie1ma Neuropsychiatric C linic, Lacan uses the expression " return to Freud", several times. He says, first, that he is its "herald" (Ecrits, p. 401) and indicates that he has d evoted "the past four years" to a seminar on Freud's texts that is held "every Wednesday from November to July" (Ecrits, p. 336). This lecture was given in November 1955, and thus Lacan is letting it be known that his own return to the study of Freud's texts in a seminar d ates from 1951, the year of the Presentation on Transference. This reading of Dora thus inaugurates this return. Is this a homage to hysteria? A homage to the position of truth? A respect for the diachrony of Freud's d iscovery, which was first motivated by the hysteric's experience? Certainly, but according to this clarification of 1955, it could also be said that the theoretical tmder piimings of the 1951 text-both the mirror stage and the ethnological contributions to the st udy of the symbolic fw1ction- are the scientific bases of Lacan's return to Freud, bases that are external to Freud's texts. Yet if La can d ates his "public" return-his return in the sernii1arto 1951, w hy d oes he only herald it in 1955? Because what is in question is not only his own return to Freud but,in his own terms,the act of "callii1g for" a return (see Ecrits, p. 401) and of making a slogan whose political resonance-in the sense of the politics of psychoanalysis- he has now truly accepted and w hich he is now
trying to bring to bear both collectively and internationally in the psychoanalytic field. Where better to mmounce his retu rn to Freud than Vierma, where psychoanalysis was invented? Yet if Lacan makes his " return to Freud" ii1to a slogan at this moment, he s till
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LACAN AND LEVI-STRAU SS OR T HE RETURN TO FREU D (195 1- 1957)
has to formulate what its character is and what it requires. From this double point of view, Lacan sheds light on things from the beginning of his lecture. What makes his return to Freud necessary, in his opinion, is that psychoanalysts themselves have "denied " Freud's work. The denial of Freud or the rejection of history and myths
Why this denial? Because, according to Lacan, the very people whom Freud had asked to safeguard his discovery have had to sacrifice it through the forced choice of emigration; his disciples fled Nazi persecution to the United States, which is characterized by its "cultural ahistoricism" (Ecrits, p. 335). Now the function of the psychoanalyst, as Lacan explains, "presuppose[s) history as its very principle". The analytic discipline is " the one that had reconstructed the bridge between modem man and ancient myths" (Ecrits, p. 335).u In Lacan's work, there are many ways of defining Freud's discovery and its denial. Yet we shall note that this denial, whose causes are seen as socio-historical, is related to the rejection of history and the rupture of the bridge that psychoanalysis has " reconstructed" between modern man and the universe of ancient myths. On the epistemological level, the two obviously go together, but w hat Lacan is referring to, in particular, is the Oedipal myth and its prevalence in Freud's work, as opposed to what he now calls the "preoedipal mess to w hich the analytic relationship can be reduced, according to our mod em analysts" (Ecrits, p. 339). What characterizes Lacan's return most surely is his rereading of the Oedipal path in analytic experience and, more generally, as we have seen with the Dora case, of the symbolic- where the directives of the w1conscious arise. Yet what Lacan also tells us is that this reh tm, on the collective plane, is determined by the history of psychoanalysis and the denial of Freud's texts. This return also requires the community of psychoanalysts to make use of "the antithesis constituted by the phase that has passed in the psychoanalytic movement since Freud's death" (Ecrits, p. 336).
' This is Lacan's complete sentence: "Whence stems this contradiction between the preoedipal mess, to which the analytic relationship can be reduced, according to our modern analysts, and the fact that Freud wasn't satisfied until he had reduced it to
7
the Oedipal position?" (p. 339).
THE SU Bj ECT RECE IVES FRO M TH E OTH ER H IS OWN MESSAG E
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The retu rn to Freud is thus no t, in Lacan's tenn s, "a return of the repressed" b u t rathe r: 1.
2.
A " reversal" o f w hat analysts have done since Freud's dea th (Ecrits, p. 127) A rectificatio n of the psychoanalysts' position, which would be the antithesis of their denial and its p resuppositio ns: the rejectio n o f history and mythologies.
More generally, the retum to Freud becomes a return to "Freud's meaning" (Ecrifs, p. 126), as "it is a ttested to in a body of written work of the most lucid and organic kind" (Ecrits, p. 336). All of this aims at restoring tmth to the heart of the analytic commmtity and its cllitical practice. The meaning of a return to Freud is a retum to Freud's meaning. And the meaning of what Freud said may be conveyed to anyone because, while addressed to everyone, it concerns each person. One word suffices to make this point: Freud's discovery calls truth into question, and there is no one who is not personally concerned by truth. It must seem rather odd that I should be flinging this word in your faces-a word of almost ill repute, a word banished from polite society. But isn't it inscribed in the very heart of analytic practice, since this practice is constantly rediscovering the power of truth in ourselves and our very flesh? Why, indeed, would the unconscious be more worthy of being recognized than the defenses that oppose it in the subject, so successfully that the defenses seem no less real than it? ... But I am asking where the peace that ensues in recognizing an unconscious tendency comes from if the latter is not truer than what restrained it in the conflict (Ecrits, pp. 337- 338). Analytic experie nce aims at recognizing unconscious truth and Presentation on Transference shows us that d irecting the treatment to obtain this result involves a dialectical moveme n t that must precede it; first, there is a subjective rectificatio n and then there is a d evelopme nt of the truth. The retu rn to Freud on the level o f the analytic group, wltich Lacan heralds in Vie1ma, in volves the same s teps as an analysis: a promotion
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LACAN AN D LEVI -STRAU SS O R T H E RETUR N TO FREUD (1951- 1957)
of the antithesis, a reversal of resistances on the analysts' side and subjective rectifications, and the development of tm th- that of Freud's speech or of his lucid writings-which demonstrates the onmipresence of the symbolic ftmction in relation to the tmconscious. Once the symptom's signifying structure is "deciphered, it is plain to see and shows the onmipresence for human beings of the symbolic ftmction stamped on the flesh" (Ecrits, p. 346). Th us, Lacan's return, on the level of the analytic group, is strictly equivalent to the dialectical method that he advocates in d irecting the treatment. In both cases, the d ialectical reversal of positions must lead to the recognition of truth, which is deduced from symbolic effecti veness. The subject, its symptoms and its malaise are d educed from such a function; this is done both in individual analytic treatments and in a group: in society, w hether or not it is an analyt ic society. In bringing his arguments about the group to Vie1ma, Lacan relies on ethnological knowledge and highlights subjective truth as the cause of the discontents within societies. The subjective causality of group discontents
What distinguishes a society grounded in language from an animal society, which even the ethnological standpoint allows us to see-namely, the fact that the exchange that characterizes such a society has other foundations than needs (even if it satisfies them), specifically, what has been called the gift 'as total social fact'-can then be taken much further, so far as to constitute an objection to defining this society as a collection of individuals, since the in-mixing of subjects makes it a group with a very different stntcture. This reintroduces the impact of a truth as cause from a totally different angle and requires a reappraisal of the process of causality" (Ecrils, p. 346.) Further on, he says that "If all causality evinces the subject's involvement, it will come as no surprise that every order conflict is attributed to him " (Ecrits, p. 346). Lacan applies to the analytic group what he d oes in the clinic, because he has learned from Mauss and Levi-Strauss to recognize the symbolic fw1ction as the fow1dation of societies. This ftmction:
TH E SU Bj ECT R EC EIVES FRO M TH E O TH ER H IS O W N ME SS AG E
1. 2. 3.
1 11
Governs subjectivities that have been gathered into a collective Treats subjectivi ty as the cause of conflict in the g ro up, and Design ates the subjective tmth which causes the sense o f d isconte nt that, w hether against his will or not, La can incarnated in French analysis and in the 1953 split.
Thus, it is necessary for both political and episte mological reasons, to re mind his listeners that a na ly tic intervention in the ind ividual treatme n t o r in the g ro up must ru le out a ny individualist perspective. He states tha t "The terms in which I a m posing the p roblem o f psychoanaly tic intervention make it s ufficien tly clea r, I think, that its e thics are not individualistic" (Ecrits, p . 346). Whether o r not it has been brough t together into a collective, the subject is never the ego; if a nalysts want to reach the ca use embodied in the symptoms, they m ust pay a ttention to the s ubject and its truths in both the individual t rea hnent a nd the group . If Lacan and his return to Freud a re symptoms in the psychoanalytic group, it is because, as he says, his speech incarnates the Freud ia n truths d enied by the other post-Freud ia ns. For this reason, he o ffe rs his incred ible fo rmula, "1, truth, spea k" (Ecrits, p. 340). This e n tire lecture on the re turn to Fre ud is d eveloped in terms o f the essentia l theoretical bases tha t Lacan p romotes in the readings o f Freud 's texts that ma rk his retu rn. The theoretical bases of 7955
What a re they? 1.
The d isjunction between the ego and the subject: For the subject of whom I was just speaking as the legatee of recognized truth is definitely not the ego perceptible in the more or Jess immediate data of conscious jouissnnce or the alienation of labour (Ecrits, pp. 346-347).
2.
The reminder that subjectivity is constituted by the form of inverted language, a form that is specific to the symbolic ftmction: It is not about [the subject) that you must speak to him, for he can do
this well enough himself, and in doing so, it is not even to you that he speaks. While it is to him that you must speak, it is literally about
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LACAN AN D LEVI -STRAU SS O R T H E RETUR N TO FREUD (1951- 1957)
something else-tha t is, that about some-thing other than what is at stake when he speaks of himself- which is that thing that speaks to you. Regardless of what he says, this thing will remain