SUPPLEMENTS TO
NOVUM TESTAMENTUM C.K. B - ~ T TDurham , - F! BORGEX, Trondheim ,JK. E m o n , Leeds - H.J. DE JONGE; Leiden A;J. M.~I~HEKBE, New- Haven 1M.J. J. MENKEN,Utrecht - J. Svm SIRING~Z, Amsterdam Exicuhue Edilors
M.M. NIITCFIELL, Chicago & D.P. MOESSNER, Dubuque
VOLUME C
LOGOS AND LAW IN THE LETTER O FJAMES The Law o f Nature, the Law o f h'Ioses, and the Law o f Freedom
BRILL LEIDEN . BOSTON . KOLN 200 1
This book is printed on acid-free paper
Library of Conpress Catalo$ng-in-Publication Data ,Jackson-hIcCabe, hlvtt 11. Logos and law in the letter of James : the lam, oC nature, the iasz. of h~Ioses; and the law, of rreedom / by Mau A. Jackon-McCabe. cm. - (Supplements to Nobum Testanlenlum, ISSN 0 167p. 9732 ; \; 100) Rcvision or
Die Deutsehe Bibliotbek - CIP-Einbeitsadabme Tackson-McCabe. Matt A.: Logos and law in the letter of,James : the law of nature: the law- of Moscs, and the law of freedom / by Man A. "lackson-IVlcCabe.. L c i d e n : Boston; Koln : Brill, 2000 (Supplementsto Novurn rcstarnenrwn ;VoI. 100) Zud. : Chicago, Univ., Diss., 1998 ISBN 9W411994-9
ISSN 0167-9732 ISBN 90 04 11994 9
0 Copyright 2001 b~ Koninklike BrillMLaden, The Metherlandi 411 @h& reserutd. Nipart oJ thirpublicalwn my be ~qoduced,tranrlnted, ,tostored in a retrieuol g~ten~, w transmiled in o&rn o r b nry rneanr, electronic, rnechanial,photocopying, marding 07 oth&e, wifhoutpribr perrnirsionjorn thepublirha
Authorization top/iohcop/lit- for intvnal mpnsonal use irgranied 6y Bdlpmuided that the approp&te,fier arepaid directh lo The Copyright Clearame C e n f . 222 RosewoodDi~e,Szite 910 Danvnr MA 01923, UU. Eeei are iztject to chonge. PRINl-ED LN THE N E T H E R U I E
For A. J. and Jermy
CONTENTS
Abbreviations .............................................................................. Acknow-ledgmcnts ... ....................... ...................................... ........ Introduction
........................................................................
I. IMPLANTED LOCOS IN THE INTERPRETATION O F JAMES Jcwish Composition and Stoic I ~ g s.................................... Christian Composition and Logos as Gospcl ...................... The Thcsis of a Superficial Stoic Influence .................... The Rejcctiou of Stoic Influence .................................... Ludwig's Wort als Gesetz The Problem and the T 11. LAW AS IMPLANTED LOGOS: CICERO AND THE STOICS ON NATURAL LAW ..............................
Natural Law as Human Reason ...................................... The Development of Human Reason The Stoic Doctrine of Implanted Preconceptions ..............
oi~eiwoqand the Implanted Preconccptions .................. Epictctus on Implantcd Concepts .................................... Excursus: Belier in the Gods as Epqurog ........................ Conclusions Natural Law as "Implanted Reason" .................................. Implanted Preconceptions, Human Rcason, and Natural Law Natural Law as Ralw inrita as My05 of thc De hgibus
111. THE LAW OF MOSES, THE TEACHING OF JESVS, AND NATURAL LAW ........................................ Philo of Alexandria .............................................................. Philo and the Stoics The Sagc as Ekyuxog v6po5
.................................... Human Nature and Jewish Law .................................... Conclusion: Torah as Natural Law in 4 Maccabefls ...... Thc Apostolic Constitutions The Question of a Non-Christian Prayer Collection .... Thc Implanted Law and the Law of Moses ................ Implanted Law as Human Reason ................................ Conclusion: Implanted Law in the Apostolic Conrtitutionr Law and Lop-os The Second A p o l o ~of Justin Martyr ................................
N. THE IMPLANTED LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM Implanted Logor and the Perfect Law of Freedom .......... The Law of Frcedom The Perfect Law The Royal Law Conclusion: Jam The Law of Freedom and thc Torah .............................. Acts of Partiality in 2:l-13 Partiality, Love of Neighbor, and the "Whole Law" .... The Aqpment of 2:8-11 The Law of Frcedorn and the Torah ............................ Implanted Lqgos in Light of the Torah and ,Judgment .... V . LOGOS AND DESIRE ........................................................ Human Desire and the Logos of Truth .............................. Acquiring "Good Gifts" ..................................................
CONTENTS
DI
Desire and thc Gifts of God in 4:l-6 ...................... Desire and the Gifts of God in 1:13-18 .................. Thc Two Ways and the Wandering Children
Enduring Tcmptation
, . nelpaopoq m James .......................................................... Birth by Logos ...................................................................... Logos and Desire as "Two Ways" ......................................
Conclusion .................................................................................
241
Bibliography ...............................................................................
255
......................................................
265
Index of Modcrn Authors ..........................................................
279
Indcx of Ancient Literaturc
ABBREVIATIONS
, a
Anchor Biblc Anchor Bible Dictionay Amencan Journal of phi lo lo^ The Ante-Aqcene Fathers A.fstieg und Niedergang der romicchen Welt R. H. Charles (ed.), Apocypha and Pseudepigapha of the Old Testament Anglican Tleolopical Revim ATR BA Biblical Archaeologist W. Bauer, W . F. Arndt, F. W. GiIII+ch,and F. W. Danker, BAGD Creek-English Lexicon of the Nem Teslamenl F. Blass, A. Debrunncr and R. W. Funk, A Greek Grammar BDF of the N m Testament B c i ~ a g ezur historischen Theologie BHT Bib Biblica Brown Judaic Studies BJS BWANT Beitr'dge zur Wissenschaft vom Nten und Ncueu Testament BZNW Bcihcfte zur ~' Catholic Biblical Quarterij CBQ Commentairc du Nouvcau Testament CNT Corpus scriptorum christianorum orientalium CSCO Etudcs bibliques Ebib Forschung zur Bibel FB Die Griechischcn chrisllichcn Schriftsteller GCS Handbuch zum Neuen Testament HNT HR Histo?y of Rel@oonr HTKNT Hcrdcrs theologischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testamcnt Harvard Tleological Review H7R Hebrem Union College Annual HUG4 Hermencutische Untcrsuchungen zur Thcologie HUT Intcrprctation: A Biblc Commentary for Teaching and IBC Prcaching International Critical Commcntary ICC Journal of Biblical Literature JBL
ABD AJP ANF MLRW AP07
Jounzal o f j m i s h Studies Journal oS Rel@on Jaumal for lhe S t u b o f Jndairm Journal for h e Study of the New Testament, Supplement Series KEKNT Kriiisch-Exegeticher Komnlentar iiber das Neue Loch Classical Library LCL Liddell-Scott-Jones, Greek-EnglzSh Lexicon LSJ ~LlonatsschniJicr Geschichle und Wirsenschaft des Judentums M G W MNTC hloffatt New Testament Commentary J. 1.' Migne (ed.), Patrolopiae cursus completttzu. Series Graeca MPG Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies NHMS The New International Commentary on the New Testament NICNT The New International Greek Testamcnt Commentary NIGTC Noz'um Testamenturn Nou T NovTSup Nowm Testamentum, Snpplcmcnts New Revised Standard Version NRSV Das Neue Testament Deutsch NTD flew Testament Studifis ms OTKNT Okumenischer Taschenhuchkommentar zum Neuen Testament J . H. Charlesworth (cd.), The Old Testament Pseudepkapha O7P Pseudepigrapha Veteris Testamenti graece PVTG Reallexikon J%?Ant& und Chrktenturn RA C Revue biblique RB Revue des sciences relgeuses ReuScRel Religionsgeschichtlichc Versnche und Vorarhciten RGW Rivista biblica RzvxtB Sources bibliques SB Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers SBLSP Stuttgartcr Bibelstudicn SBS Symbolae osloenses SO Studia 7heologica ST H. von A m i i (cd.), Sloicornrn uekrum Fragmenla SVF Studia in Veteris Tcstamenti pseudepigrapha SVTP m f l G. Kittel and G. Friedrich (eds.), 7hmlogical Dictiona?y of the New Testament 'Theologische Studien und Kritiken TSK Texte und Untersuchungen TU 7heologziche Zeitschni TZ
WBC
Word Biblical Commentary W7J Westmimter 7heolo&al Journal I W N T Wissenschaftlichc Untersuchungen zum Neucn Tcsmament z&chn$i j5r katholische Theologie zeitschn? j5r die neutestamenlliche W ~ ~ s e n s c h a ~
zfl
Concerning R$erences to the Ancient Sources Where possible, abbreviations for ancient literature given in the Society or Biblical Literature Handbook have been followed. For other ancient works, the abbreviations list of 7 0 A T has been used as a pide, though some have bccn slightly modified. References to SVF are to volume and entry number unlcss explicitly idcntiiied otherwise.
This study is a revised version of a dissertation submitted to the Department of New Testament and Early Christian Literature at thc University of Chicago in December, 1998. Its publication gives me an opportunity to cxpress, once again, my gratitude to my teachers. Hans Dietcr Betz, Adela Yarbro Collins, Arthur J. Droge, John J . Collins, and the late Arthur W. H. Adkins have provided not only invaluable guidance and encouragement, but models of excellence in scholarship that I can only hope to have approximated in thesc pages. I would also like to thank David Moessner and the Editorial Board of Supplements to Nouum Tatamenturn for puhlishing this study. I am especially grateful for thc very insighcul criticisms and suggcstions of their anonymous reviewers. I have followed them whcrcvcr possible, and thc rcsult is a substantially improved manuscript. Many thanks are also due to Zeba Crook, who proofread the entire manuscript and, with the help of Nicholas Jesson and Kelly Quinn, compiled the indices. Their help was made possible by a generous grant from the Niagara University Research Council, for which I am most grateful. It goes without saying, of course, that all remaining problems are my own responsibility. Finally, and always, I would like to thank A. J. for her patience and constant encouragcmcnt, and Jeremy for giving his daddy perspcctivc on thc whole project. The dedication of this study to them is a small symbol of their important role in its completion.
INTRODUCTION
The Letter ofJames ranks among ihc most cni,matic n-orks of car]?; Christian literature. One searches critical scholarship in vain for an?; consensus on fundamental questions regarding its place in emerging Christianity-. Roughly equal numbers of scholars argue that it rcpresents an authentic work of James, the brothcr of Jesus, as argue that it is pscudonymous;' that it was writtcn in Palestine, as chat it was written from thc diaspora; that it is to be included among the earliest works of the New Testament, as that it is among the latest. Some, moreover, have argued that thc Letter of James has no placc in carly Christianity; that it was originally a Jcwish work only subscquently "christianizcd" by the insertion of references to Jesus Christ, who is in fact explicitly rncntioncd only twice (Jas 1:l; 2:lj. As thcre is no certain attestation or James prior to the third century,' the historian is dependent above all on evidencc internal to thc work itself for locating it within early Judaism or Christianity. The evidence, howcver, is frustratingly scanty. The address of the letter to "the twclve tribes who are in the diaspora" has suggested to some that it was cornposed in Jerusalem, and thus no later than the mid-60's CE. How-ever, the possibility that a pscudonymous author has assumed the guise of James of Jerusalem, and the fact that Jas I : I must in any case bc understood as a highly symbolic address,? renders this supposition most uncertain. Other elcments of the letter which have often becn taken as indications of its provenance, such as the author's good Greek diction or the reference to the carly and late rains in Jas 5:7, must be considered equally t e n u ~ u s . ~ I Ovcr the history or the discussion, one also finds, though less frequcnlly, susgeslions that the author is James thc son of Zehedec, or somp othenvise unknown,Jamcs. For references see M. Dibelius, James A Comrnmtq on ihe Ep:pirtle oJ3arna ( I lth ed., rcv. 13. Greeven; Hermencia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988) 51-52. AU reftrcnces to I)it,elius's cornmcntaly in the prescnt work cile this edition, unless otherwise noted. Throughout this stud): I >
2
INTRODUCTION
Somewhat morc promising are indications of the rhetorical situation envisioned in the lctter. Of particular impo~tancein this regard is James's relation to Paul. This issue, however, is quite controvcrsial in its omn right. Interpreters ar
' C. T. Bachrnan, cd., Lulhc'r '>Ibid.; 35.
362. Ihid.. 35. 396.
W2rh (l'hiladelphia: hluhlenbcrg, 1967) 33. 396.
Since he heard that Christians placc great weight on faith in Chris& he thought, "\\'sit a moment! I'll oppose them and urge works alone." This he did. He wrote not a word about the suffering and rcsurrection of Christ; although this is what all the apostles preached about." As emerges quite clcarly from thcse remarks, Luther's evaluation of ,James and its place in carly Christianity was determined in large measure by two related assumptions: first, thcre was somc csscntial messaze, or "gospel," that w-as common to "all the apostles"; and sccond, this essential message underlies "all the genuine sacred books." This model for imagining Christian origins is at lcast as old as competing Christian claims of originary orthodoxy over against divergent, decadent heresy. As a hermcneutical approach to the Ncw Tcstament canon, one sees a critical step in this direction already in Irenaeus's view that thc "Son of God.," through Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, "has given us the Gospel under four aspects."" Indeed, the assumption that a singlc such cssence-often, as with Irenaeus and Luther, spoken of in terms of "the Gospel"--underlies each of thc various writings of the New Testamcnt is reflccted in the very formulation and arrangement of the canon itself." Such an essentialist approach to early Christianity is, at least for the historian, quite problematic." Simply put, the historian has "neithcr a theorctical basis nor an empirical warrant" for assuming the persistence of any given trait, ovcr time, which might be taken to constitute the "cssence" of Christianity.'2 And while historical criticism, as Harry Gamblc has rightly observed, "has traditionally disregarded the canon as irrelevant for the interpretation of individual documents,"'~heinfluence of this long-standing paradigm on the modern critical study of Christian origins and the New Testament This suggestion wzu reportedly made in the Summer or Fall or 1542; see Luther'r Work 54. 424. " A. H. 3.1 1.8. This approach to the gospels is correlaled with the later use of. the titles "Gospel according to" by H. Y. Gamble (7% flew Teifnmenl Canon: Iti M & q and Meaning [Guides to Biblical Scholarship, NT Series; Philadelphia: Fortress, 19851 35; cf 76j. See Crmbie, Nem 7 2 f h m t Canon, 73-82. " The appropriateness or this model for the theolo$an is another mattcr, hut onc that need not he addressed for h e purposes of the present study. On the problem of using an essentialist (monothetic) paradigm for the classification or historical phenomena, see the very important essay ofJ. %. Smith; "knces and Neighbors: Somc Contoun of Early Judaism," Imaginirig Reigon: From Babylon lo Jonwtom (Chicago and Inndon: Universiry or Chicago Press, 1982) 1 1 8 . The phrase "neither a theoretical basis nor an empirical warrant" is taken from p. 4 . 7 h e .A'm 'Tlament Canon, 80.
''
"
4
INTRODUCTION
should not be undcrestimated. In fact, though perhaps not as ovcrtly so, such an approach continues to inform critical scholarship on the Letter of James. This is now-hcrc more evident than in the interpretation of "the implanted logos" (b Epguro5 h6yog) which, according to thc author of Janies, "is able to save your souls." "That the gospel, if obeyed, is able to save a person's self [cf. qruh]," writes one interpreter of Jas 1:21, "is certainly a truism of the N[ewj T[estament]."" This assumption regarding the centrality of "the gospel" in early Christian or, in this commentator's terms, "New Testament" s o t e r i o l o ~manifests itself no less definitively, if more subtly, in the comparisons which various interpreters have formulated to illuminate the meaning ofJames's "implanted logo^.."^" Arnold Meyer and M:E. Boismard, who argued for the non-Christian origin of James as a whole (so Meyer) or at least of Jas 1: 17-2 1 (so Boismard), adduced passages, respectively, from Ciccro's De L&bus and the Apostolic Conrtitutiom in support of the thesis that the association of "implanted logos" with a perfect law in James results from a dependencc on the Stoic equation of human reason with natural law. With the rejection of these scholars' more general views regarding the non-Christian origu of James or of this passage, however, has come a (usually tacit) rejection of their interprctation of its logos. Regardless of their views regarding the philosophical origin of this expression, those scholars who do identify James as a Christian work have generally ignored the rclevant passages from Cicero or the Apostolic Cons&itutiom, and emphasized, rather, the similarities between thc language used in connection with the logos inJames and the treatment of "the Gospel" elsewhere in the New Testament. Thus, for example, Martin Dibelius, who reasoned from James's description of the "implanted logos" as that "which is able to save your souls" that, regardless of the expression's philosophical provenance, James's logos must bc interpreted as "the James is a Christian work, it is 'saving' word--hence, the gospel."'"f evidently reasoned, then thc lopns which, according to its author, "savcs" must be that which is the unique possession of Christians, the essence of Christianity; in a word, "the Gospel." Such reasoning finds par-
"' P. H. Davids, 7 l e EpEtIe of James A Cornmentav on he Geek Text (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdman's, 1982) 95. I'. For what ~ollows,see the detailed discussion bclow in Chapter One. 'Qibelius, Jamer, 113 (emphasis mine).
titularly vivid expression in Martin Klcin's recent interpretation of the A6yos hhq0eiaq of Jas 1:18 "Mit B e ~ u gauf Gott," Klein writes, sind es vor allem zwei 'Wortc', die so bezeichnet werden kijnnen: die Tora und die chIlsdichc Verkiindigung. D a es rich nun b& Jakobusbrief um ein chrirtliches Schreiben handell, wird nuch mit d m 'Wort der Wahrheit' in ivendeiner Form die chrirtluche Verkiind
One suspects that the "riddle of James," which has become almost proverbial sincc the publication of Meyer's Dur &Isel des Jacobusblifis, rcsults as much from the inadcquacy of the interprctivc paradigms brought to the work as from the ambiguities in the text itself; that it is a consequence, particularly, of treating the category "Christian" as though it connoted some essential and static slne qua non. Whatever Lbc case, it is the guiding assumption of this study hat neither the simple classification of the Letter of James as "Christian" nor its presencc in the New Testamcnt canon provide a sufficient basis on which to formulate conclusions regarding its understanding of what constitutes the "word of truth" or the means for "salvation." In fact, while I do classify Jamcs as a Christian work, I will argue that it is precisely comparison with Cicero's De Legibus, the Apostolu Comtitutions~ and othcr works whose authors draw on the Stoic theory of natural law, which best illuminates its correlation of b Epqu~oqMyoq with a law that is both "perfect" and "of freedom." The fabric of James's soteriological thought has been woven from Jewish, Christian and Greek philosophical discourse. The demonstration of this claim, the elucidation of its significance for understanding the religious thought of the Letter of James more broadly, and its implications for the historian's attempt to locatc this work within the early Christian movement, will bc taken up in the pages which follow.
" Martin Klein, " E n vollkommener Wkk": VolU;ommmheit, Gexelc und Gericht ali theob@r~heh e n des Jokobuh?ieJitx (BWANT 139 Stuttprt, etc.: Kohlhammcr, 1995) 131, emphasis mine. Klein considers the usual description of this "prodamation" as "the gospel" to be problematic inasmuch as the latter term most often rcfcrs specifically to Jesus's death and resurrection, which are scarcely mentioned in James (ibid). Note at the samc time, however, his comparison oC James's "law of frecdam"--precisely inasmuch as it is "identical" with the Myog drhqOeiag-Gth Paulinc concepts: "Es [sc. the 'law of ireedom'l umgeift also auch die Funktionen, die bei Paulus das Evang-elium von ,Jesus Christus und die Gabe des heiii~enGeistes innehaben" (Chid.; 144).
CHAPTER ONE
IMPLANTED LOGOS IN THE INTERPRETIITION OF.JAMES
Among the carliest extant interpretations of "the implanted logos" (b kwqvroq ?&yo<)described in the Letter of James as that "which is able to save your souls" (Jas 1:21) is that of an anonymous Grcek excgete whosc explanation is preserved, with some minor variations, in the Greek commentaries attributed to Oecumenius and Theophylactus.' The implanted logos, according to this interpreter, is human reason: it is that which makcs us "rational" (hoytxoi). It is associated, morcover, particularly with the gcneral human ability to distinguish "the better and the worsc" (TOG fi~h~iovog xai TOG x~ipovog).~ A quite similar interprctation, though onc at least not obviously dependcut upon that of Oecumenius and Theophylactus, is found in the commentary of the 12th century Syriac excgete Dionysius bar Salibi. He too cx-plained this phrasc with reference lo the human ability, "implanted" in our naturc by God, to make cthical distinctions: in natura enim immit Deus, ut amet bona et odio habeat mala.Vn addition, Dionysius identilied the implanted logos itself as "natural law-" (legem nnturalm); the "perfect law of Geedom" ofJas 1:25 is thus
' It is dillicult to date this interpretation in any precise way. The Oecumcnius in question was bishop of Thessaly in the loth centuly, and 'Thcophylactus was an 11th centuly exegete; hut M. Dibelius, at least, expresses doubts regarding these attributions, and dates the commentaries (or at least their contents) to "the i\nncicnt Church," i.e., prior to the Middle Ages (Jarus, 262). The accuracy of these attributions, in any case, matten little for our purposes. It is most doubtful that the intelpretation of Jas 1:21 which concerns us here was the original contribution of cither one: as both seem to have bcen above all collectors of prior comments. For the sake of convenience I will refer to the compilers or thesc commentaries simply as Oecumenius and Theophylactus. Oecumenius: MPG 119. 468; Theophylactus: MPG 125. 1145. I. Sedlacek, U ' o n y i t u bar Snlini in Apocabpyprim, A r t u el EpLtl~kuC a t l i o l i ~ u(CSCO, Scriptores Syri 2/101; Rome: de Luigi, 1910) 91; throughout this study I depend on Srdlacek's Latin translation of Dionysius's Syriac. 'rhat the natura in question is in fact human nature is ckar from the prior paraphrase or 1:21; excipib ue?burn in& lum nohiroe noilrae (ibid., 9lf); as well as From his comment on 1:25, quotcd immediately below.
8
CHAPTER ONE
a "law which God from the beginning placcd in human nature" (legem quam Deus ab iniho posuit naturae humanae).' \.\Me it has generally been agreed by critical scholars that the author of James does equate the implanted logos with the "pcrfect law- of freedom," and though it has often bccn noted that his association of law and freedom finds precedents particularly in the Stoic sources; thc interpretation of Jamcs's logos in light of Stoic conccpts of human reason and natural law as found in these ancient comrncntaries has found few advocates.' It has long been noted that the term Epqvzos does not always cany its usual connotation of "innate" or "inborn";" and the vast majority of James's intcrpretcrs havc argued that the context in which the term is used in this work militates against reading it in this sense.' This, in turn, is thought to preclude any substantive Stoic influence on ~ a k e s ' suse of the phrase Epqvzog h6yo5. Thus, when mentioned at all, thc interpretation of James's logos offcrcd in these ancient commentaries is viewed as little morc than an odd relic of past interpretation, and one that mcrits no serious con~ideration.~ Martin Dibelius, whosc interpretation of this passage "bid On the use of the term "natural law" in connection with Stoicism, see the opening remarks of Chapter Two. O n the relation of these early comrnentarics to the Stoic understanding of human reason and natural law, see Chapter 'lhree, under the heading "Early Interpretation of James 1:21." W a c the analogous discussion of thc possibilities for translating tbis term hy those attempting to reconstruct Chrysippus's doctrine of implanted preconceptions (hpqu~oxrrpohilylerd, on which see below, Chapter Two. The term Epqurog, despite D m which omits the the presence of a cross reference for it, is not discussed in 7 promised entry on the t c m q h ; see 7nN72. 537. The most extensive discussion of the term seems to bc that of H. Hcisen, flo~ouae hypolheier inte@etmdoeepirlolaeJocobi (Bremen: 1739), which is cited by Horl, Ropes and Adamson. This work rcmains unavailable to me. A notable exception is F. J. A. Hort, 7 h e Ejirtie of St. 3amer: 7he Greek Text d~ Introduction, Commmta~u far aj Chapln IV, Vent 7, and Additional Noks (Inndon: MacMillan, 1909) 37-38. Hart argued that the author of,James wodd not have used the term fpqurog, the proper meaning of which is "inborn" or "cong-eniul," to describe the "outward message of the Gospel": " M e could never have used in that sense a word which everyone who knew Greek would of necessity understand in the opposite sense." A similar interpretation, though one argued more broadly from the context ofJames 1, is offered by A. T. Cadoux, n2e 7hoqht ofS1. J a m s (London: Clarke & Co., 1944) 19-24. Neither author, howevcr, emphasizes Stoic usage in particular. Those who argue for the Jewish authorship of James havc argued along similar lincs; sce on this below. SOJ. E. Huthcr, Kntisch exegelick Handhuch i b n dm BneJder Jokobus (KEKN?'> 3d ed.; Giittingcn: Vandenhoeck 8- Ruprecht, 1870) 8 4 cf. the later edition of the Meyrr commentary by W. Beyschlag, Dm Brig' des Jacobur (KEKNT, 6th ed.; Getting-en: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1897) 83. See morc recently the summary
'
I M P L N T E D 1,OGOS IN JAMES
9
rcmained essentially unchanged from the publication of the first cdition of his commentary m 1921 to the final cdition rcvised by Hcinrich Grccvcn in 1964, formulatcs this position with admirable concision: if hvrpuro<were to mean "innate, natural" here. . . then in accordance with Stoic concepts one would have to think of that portion of the cosmic Reason which is innate in every human being? In fact, Oec, Thcoph and Dionysius bar Salibi havc interpreted it in just this way. Yet it would hardly be said of reason that it is able to save soulsan expression which here quite clearly must bc understood eschatologically. In addition, the transition.. . to the theme "hearing and doing'' [in Jas 1:22-251 precludes a reference to reason and demands a reference to the word, indeed, the "saving" word-hence, the gospel.'" That is to say, while the Stoics would scarcely say that human rcason can be "heard and done"" o r "save s o ~ l s , " 'such ~ cxprcssions are uscd of "the Gospcl" in the early Christian literature. James's dismissal by F. MuRner: 'WJUSTIN.. . spricht "on dem 'dem Sesamtcn Menschengzschiecht eingcpflanrzten I.og-oskeim'; in der altkirchlichen Auslegung von Jak 1.21 wurde teiiweisr mil diesem Gedanken uoericrt. so von OKUMEMUS. THEOPHYLACT und DIONYSKJS. inoch daran &kt J& sicher nickl" (Dmj'nkob;rb7if L3d ed.; HTKNT 13/1; Freiburg; etc.: Herder, 19751 102 n. 2, italics mine). CF. I,. T . Johnson, 77ze Letter ofjarnrr-A am Trmlotion unUi Inhoduchon md Cornmnrlov (AB 37a: New York. NY: Douhiedav. 1995) 202: "Rather oddlv. Oecumenius and ~h&phylactt& it to mean the &lity id discern betwecn tha; hhich is better and that which is worse." ' Dibelius refers at this point to A. Banhnffcr: Epiklel und dar Neue Tatorned ( R G W 10:,~~~ Gieflen: Tooclmann., l91li~97., on, which see immediateiv below. ' O Diheius, Jarnw, 113; c i the first edition of this commentary, Der Brig des Jakobur (KEKNT, 7th ed.; Gbtcing-en: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1921) 107--8. Cf. the similar fomuiations of the problem by J. B. Adamson, 7he Epktle fjirrnez (NICNT; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1976; rcpr. 1984) 98-99; Ilavids, Epislle ofj'nmes, 95; R. P. Martin, Jamef (WBC 48; Waco, TX: Word, 1988) 49; and most recently M. Tsuji, GIaube zwkchm Volkornrnenhe2t und Vmeltkhung. E& Lintmmchung rur lilerarischen Gtstalf und rur inhaltlichen Kohiirenr d a "iokobiubtitfir 2.93: . iWUNT , ?'"bingcn: Mohr [Siebeck], 1997) 108 n. 58. " Cf Adamson? Epirtle OiJamei, 98; Davids, Epirtle @,Tam, 95; Martin, .7amnme~, 49; see also S. Laws, A Commentav on tlu Epirtle OJJomes (Black's; Inndon: Black, 1980) 82. " Cf I. H. Roots. A Critical and Exe~eticclCommentam on the Ebirtle o f Sf. ?arm (ICC; ~ Z n h u r S h'I': & T Clark, 1991 [="1916]) 172; also Laws, Ejirlle $Jam;, 82; C. H. Felder, "Wisdom, Law and Social Concern in the Epistle ofJarnesn (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1982) 74; F.Manns, "Une tradition liturgique juive sousjaccntc 6 Jacques 1,21h," RmScRei 62 (1988) 85; Davjds, Epirtla ofJamw, 95. The description oC&ppuiogh6T0yog as that which "saves souls" receivcs particular emphasis in this context by Klein, who argues, in addition, that reading Jas 1:21 dong the lines ofJustin's adaptation of the Stoic Logor would make sense only "in cine Missionspredigt, abcr nicht in die Gemeindeunterwcisungen" (Ein inollkomrnrnrr Werk, 135)Justin and the author ofJames, however, make quite different use of chis Stoic idea; cC. the discussion of Justin in Chaptcr Three with that of James in Chaptcrs Four and Five; and especially in the Conclusion.
10
CHhPTER ONE
command to "rcccive" the implanted logos is even more frcqucntly emphasized in this connection: such a command, it is argued, excludes undcrstanding this logos as something "innate"; and this is taken to precludc intcrprcting it along Stoic lines.13 Moreover, it has olien bccn pointed out that the expression Gixoka~rbv h6yov (cf. Jas 1:21, 6itao8~ rbv Epqurov h6yov) is found in a number of Christian works, typically with recerence to "the Gospel."" Finally, the refcrence in Jas 1:18 to the fact that God "gdvc birth to us by means of a logos of truth (h6yo ahq8eia5)" has itself been an important-and indeed, [or some, decisiveconsidcration in the interpretation of Jas 1:21:'" not only is the phrase Zyoq &hq8eia<used in other Christian works with explicit rererence to "the Gospel" (cf Col 1 5 , Eph 1:13 and 2 Tim 2:15), but the verse as a w-hole recalls the common Christian notion of "re-birth" or "new creation."" In short, as Adolf Bonhoffer l 3 SO Huther, Kniiich exegetkche.~Handbuch, 84; Adamson, Epistle .Jfurnes, 98T. and esp. idem, Jofanur ?he Man and hir M w s q e (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989) 397; Davids, Epirtle o/Jmeamer, 95; Martin, Jones, 49. C t Further J. B. Mayor, 7hr Epir11e o/ St. Jamerr 'I& Creek Text m'th Inhodu~tim,files, ~ornrnen&and Further Studies in ihe Epirlle @St. Jnrner (3d ed.; London: MacMillan, 1913; repr. Classical Commenlary Library; Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1954) 69; Ropes, St. Jofanrer, 172; J . Chain", L'Ep&e de Saint Jacques (2d ed.; EBib; Paris: Gabalda, 1927) 29C J. Moffatt, 7hr &nol Epirller J a m , Peto andJudar (MNTC; London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1928) 25; J. Marry, L'Epilre dej'ncguer. Efu& cn'liguc (Paris: Alcan, 1935) 53; Johnson, Let& ofJanas, 202; P. Perkins, F k l and Second Pdm, James, nndj'ude (IBC; Louisville: John Knox, 1995) 104. l4 Dibelius, Jornt~, 114; H. Windisch, Dze htholirchen B r i j (3d ed.; HNT 15; l'"bingen: Mohr [Sicbeck], 1951) 11; Laws, Epirlle ofj'anas, 82; F. Vouga, L'Epihe de Saint j'ncquer (CNT, d.s. 13a; Geneva: Labor el Fides, 1984) 63; Johnson, Letter o f ? a m . 202.
6;
(+th ed; fjie 13eiliG ~ c h ; i f tde8 ~ ; u e nTeslamentes 9; Bonn: ~ k s t e i n 1932) , 24Chaine: L'Epihe de j'acquei, 30; Muflner, Derj'aiiobwbeel; 102; J. Cantinat, Ler Epibe.r de S&l j'ncque?. ct de Sainf Ju& (SB; Paris: Gabalda, 1973) 104; Adamson, Epistle of James, 99 and n. 10; Johnson, Letto oJj'amer, 202. Dibelius rejected this particular line of argument: $"en his literary assessment 01James, he lelt thal "one cannot rely upan such ecdence lmm other sayings" ( J a r , 113, n. 30). He in any event interand the hbquio~%yo< wilh relerencr to "the pspel." preted both the %yo< drhqe~ia< ' V t is to be noted, lhougb, that the interpretation of Jas 1:lR remains controvenial. A variety a1 aulhors doubt whether it refers to a n m creation at all; see F. Spiita (Der BneJde~j'okobus [Gottinge": Vandenhaeck & Ruprecht, 1896) 45 47; Hart, ?he Epistle o/ St j ' m w , 3 1-35; G. H. Rendall, ?he Epirtle o/ J e m and Judaic ChristianiQ (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1927) 63-65; C.-M. Edsman, 'cSchBplen\iUe und Geburt ,Jac I 18. Eine Studic zur altchrisllichen Kosmologie;" ZNW 38 (1939) 11-44 (though cc Tm, "Scheplung und IVicdurgeburr: Nochmals Jac I:18," Spin'tus et Vm.h [Eutin: Ozolin, 19531 43-55); L. E. Elliott-Binnr, ‘Tames 7.18: Creation or Redemphony , A S 3 (1957) 148-61; 0. J. F. Seitz, ‘:James and
I~lPI~.4NTELlLOGOS IN JAMES
11
put it in his Epiktet und das Jfme Testament, though the appearancc of the term &qti.ro
There have been two notable exccptions to this gcncral rule or disallowing- substantive Stoic influencc on James's conccpt of logos. Arnold Meycr, in 1930, and M. E. Boismard, in 1957, each argued that James's referencc to 6 kpqti.io5 Myog is to be understood in light or the equation of human reason and natural law madc by ancient Greek philosophers. It is interesting, and likely indicative of the status of the early commentaries in critical scholarship on James, that neither author citcs Oecumenius, Theophylactus, or Dionysius bar Salibi in this context. In [act, there arc no indications that Eoismard was at all influenced by the earlier work of Meyer. It is all the more striking, then, that in both cases, this interpretation of Jamcs's logos is accompanied by doubts regarding the classification of James-or at lcast of a hypothesized source behind Jas 1:17-21as a Christian work.lR
the Law," S?udio E~anpelimII (ed. F. L. Cross; TU 87; Be+: Akademie Verlag, 1964) 486; H. Frankemalle, Der B7ieJdes j'okohlo (2 vols.; O1'KNT 17; Giitenloh: G"tersloher; Wiinburg: Echter Verlag, 1994) I. 297-305; Tsuji, Glade, 68-69. Ep&l und das Xsue Teilarnmt, 97. Bonhhffer referred particularly to the Stoic doctrine of implanted preconceptions (Bp~u.rorirpoh6yr~rg)in this connection. Interestingly, when discussing in another context the controversial problem of Chrysippus's undcrslanding of this doctrine, BonhafFefer a r y e d that the term Lpqurog could only mean "inborn." See dm, Epic& und die Slon: Untermchuqm e u stoirchm Philosophie (Stuttgart: Enke 1890; repr. Stutigart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag [Giinther Holzboog], 1968) 192f, and further Chapter Two, under the heading "The Implanted Preconceptions and Human Reason." '* Spitta also ar,vcd that James's logox was innate in connection with his argument for the non-Christian origin of Jamcs. He did not, however, emphasize Stoic influence in this connection. See De7 Be/ des Jakobu.r, 4.9 -52. Different again is L. Massebieau, "L'Epitre de Jacques: est-eUc l'ozuvre d'un Chri.tien?" RHR 32 (1895) 249-83. While arguing that James was not originally a Christian composition, Massebieau nonetheless interpreted the "impbanling" of hgos in James as part of a ''nc\v ciration."
"
In line with his broader thesis that a Jewish Grundrchrift underlies our present Letter of James, Meyer argued that the "law of freedom" mentioned in Jas 1:25 and 2.12 is none other than "das ATliche Gesetz."'' Pointing out that James's association of law and "freedom," as well as its description as "pcrfect" and "royal," could be understood apart from any peculiarly Christian ideas simply in terms of a merger of Jewish and Greek philosophical thought," Meyer argucd that the equation or thc "law of freedom" with implanted logos in James 1 is also to be understood in this light. Greek phiosophers, and particularly the Stoics, he observed, had long since identified true law with 6pOb5 ?&yo<, "right reason.'' Cicero, in fact, had defined law as ratio summa imita in natura, and "therefore h6yoq Eptpu.io5."" Citing 4 Maccabees and the writings of Philo, he pointed out that it was not uncommon for Jewish authors of this period to view the Torah in light of the Stoic theory of law. Such authors, he argued, imagined that it was the Jewish people in particular who had been entrusted with natural law.22In a context such as this, then, a philo-
'' A. Meyer, Das Riitsel drs Jacohushriefer (BZNM' 10; GieBen: Tapelmann, 1930) 156; cf 149-50. Meyer apparently follows Dibelius's analysis of Jas 2:s-12, which is the key passage for i d e n w n g James's law. According to Dihelius, Jamrs understands the love command not as "the chief commandment," hut as "one commandment alongside others'' (DoB q d e s J o k o b u s [1921] 133; J a m , 142); c t Riit.rel, 149-50. Dihelius himself, however, had a w e d that James's use of the phrase "law offieedom" was "a clcar indication that in his ritual and moral injunctions the author does not have the Mosaic Law in mind at all" ( j ' m e s , 18; Dm BrieJ des Jakobvj [I9211 16), but rather "the gospel" conceived as a new Christian law (,jmei, 119; Do Br&fdesJakobus 119211 112-13). Meyer (Rirtsel, 151rn. 7), though, rightly pointed out the tension between Dibelius's view that the love command in James is "one command alongside others" rather than "the c h i d commandment," and his subsequent remark that James's law "is a Christian law, and consequently it is not obeyed by being ever so careful in tiny matters, hut rather by fulfilling the F e a t commandment of love"; c t Dihelius, J a m s , 142 with 144 (= Do Brief da Jnkobu L192.11 133 and 135). The problem of the relationship of the "law of freedom" to the Torah on the one hand, and to the lovc command on the other, is treated in detail in Chapter Four. Rirtjel, 150-55. lbid., 156, with reference to Cicero, De Leg. 1.18. Meyer also refers in this connection to Justin's use of the term Epquiogto describe the "seed" of reason [hbyogj w-hich is implanted in all human beings, hut does not make the significance of the passage for thc interpretation of James explicit (R&tl, 156 n. 7). '$ Cf Meyer, Riitnl, 158: "Gott hat in diescn Menschen [sc. Israel] cine andere vollkommene Natur erzeugt, dd3 sie recht lehen und handeln krinnen-drde Philo sagen." It is, however, most doubtful that Philo thought the Jewish people were or a different "nature" than others; Tor Philo, rather, Israel's distinction resides priepitome or the marily in the sagcs of its history, and in the fact that Moses-the
"
IMPLANTED LOCOS IN JAMES
13
sophical term like Zpqu~oqh6yoq would have taken on the more spccialized sense of the Jcwish national law.'" Jas 1:18, therefore, whcre it is said that God "gave birth to us by means of a logos of truth," is to be interpreted metaphorically with reference to the fact that God, by giving Israel this law, bestowed upon them a "unique distinction before all his other creatures": "All othcr crcaturcs are children of God throush the creation; Israel is the first fruits through the 1a~.."?4 A littlc more than a quarter of a century later, and apparently independently of Mcyer, an analogous line of interpretation was .~~ that the oft-noted similariadvanced by M.-E. B o i ~ m a r d Arguing tics between 1 Peter and the Letter of James are to be explained in terns of their common dependence on an ancient baptismal liturgy,2"
sage-left his people a written expression or natural law. See further an Philo's understanding- of natural law below, Chaptcr Three. " Ibid., 157. " See Riitxd 157-59: "Es handelt sich also auch 1.18 um cine Zeugung durch das Gesetz; das ist ein bildlicher Ausdriick dafur, daR Gott den zwhlf Stammen durch das Gesetz einen einzigartigen Vorzug vor all seinen andern Geschhpfen gzschenkt hat. . . A l e anderen Geschhpfe sind Kinder Gottes durch die Schepfung, Israel ist Erstling durch das Grseb." '' M.-E. Boismard, ''the liturgic baptismale dans la Prima Petri: 11.-Son InRuence sur 1'Epitre de Jacques," RB 64 (1957) 161-83. Boismard docs not cite Meyei's study, and in fact seems entirely unaware of the relevant passase from Cicero's De L e , b u . "'he "liturgy" upon which these-and sevcral other N T wadc;.re understood by Boismard to depend is not so much a written text it ''un certain sch6me commun" which was "sujet A de nornhreuses variations.. . . O n ne peut donc parler d'une liturgie haprismale chretienne primitive, mais d'un certain namhre de fbrmes paralleles de ccue liturgie, qui auront influenck I PeIr., Jac Paul ou Jean" ("Unc liturgie," 180). Boisrnard's account of the relationship between 1 Pcter and James is in fact quite complex. He argues, for example, that 1 Pet l:6-9 (and Rom 5:3-5) depends "more or less directly" on Jas 1:12-which is to say, upon the source which is supposed to underlie this verse-while Jas 1:2-4, on the other hand, depends on 1 Pet 1:6-7 (and Rom 5:3-5); see "Une liturgie," 162-67. This source analysis is in any u s e less than persuasive. Boismard's literary understanding ofJames as a collection of disparate and merely artificially linked materials, while not uncommon, is highly questionable. Regardless, his interest in establishing literary links between James and I Peter often leads him to overlook the argumentative structure of particular units of the former; cf, e.g., his treatment of Jas 1:19-20 ("Une liturgie," 170) with the analysis of these verses presented below in Chapter Four. The several similarities heheen James and 1 Pcter are indeed intriguing, but they admit of a number of possible explanations, none of which. at least thus far, has been persuasively argued to the exclusion or the others. At any rate, it is more the relation of the thought of these two works than their literary relationship that is of concern in the present study. Sce rurther on the former issue below, Chapter Four, undcr the heading "Implanted Logor in light of the Torah and Jud~mcnt."
1 4.
CHAPTER ONE
Boismard idcntified "thc primitivc 'core"' of that portion of it supposedly found in Jas 1:17-21 and 1 Pet 1:22-2:2 as a divine birth "par l'effet de la Parole de Dieu."?' Nonetheless, Boismard felt that an "essential theological difference which separates 1 Peter from James" was cvident in these works' divergent conceptions of this " w ~ r d . " ~ ~ V h ithat l c of I Petcr is quitc clcarly "la prtdication t.vanstlique," in James it is the law-indced, the Mosaic law rather than a ncw Christian one.'Woting- "the philosophical tone of the entire fragment" of Jas 1:17-2 1,30 Boismard, like Meyer, argued that thc association of the law of Moses with the implanted logos reflects "thc themes of Jewish propaganda" which, in dcpcndence on Stoic thought, "emphasized the links bctween Mosaic law and the law of human reason." [Tlhesc were not two differentlaws, but one and the same law expressed in two successivc [oms, in the form of natural law first, the h6yoyog EplpuTO<, then in thc form of Mosaic law, the My02 ypanr6<.J1
In suppo~tof this view, Boismard cited a passage from the Apostolic Comlilulionr whcre such a distinction bctwccn an Ewlpuros and a ypanzb~ v6po~is in fact evident:?' 0 Almighty God, eternal one, Master of the whole universe, Creator and President of everything, [bid., 168. 172. 'Y Ibid., 170-71. Boismard's identification of the law of freedom a% the Mosaic law is based primarily on his understanding of Jas 2:8-11. He docs not, however, present a detailed analysis of this passage, hut apparently depends on the exposition of F. Spitta; note the repeated references to the former in &id, 171. Note that Boismard suggesu that Jas 2 - 1 3 also depends io some degree on ihc primitive baptismal ritual, curiously, though, the question of the "law of freedom" [cf. 1:25 and 2:12!] is not explicitly raised in this connection; see ibid., 175--77. "" Citing Jas 1:17, where the author refers to the unchangeableness of God; cf. Boismard's reference to the similar idea found in the Apostolic Conrlilutionf, on which see below and esp. note 33. ' Boismard, "Une liturgie," 172: "ce n'ktaient pas deux lois difikrentes, mais une seule et meme loi exprimke sous deux formes successives, sous f u m e de loi naturelie d'ahord; le h6yog &pqurog,puis sous forme dc Loi mosaique, le h670g ypam6g." ' Note that thc Ewqu~agv 6 p g of the Aforlolic Comtilutioru, though specifically as found in A C 8.12 (which Boismard does not mention), had already been correlated with Oecumenius's interpretation of Jas 1:21 hy Huther (Kntiich exegetirches Handbuch, 84), and echoed in a later edition of the Meyer cornmentar). by Bcyschlag (Der Brief des Jacobq 83). Both commentators, hoxyever, mentioned this passage only lo dismiss it summarily as irrelevant for the interpretation of James. 2'
'"Ibd.,
the one who showed forth man as a (micro-)cosrn of the cosmos through Christ, and w-ho gave an implanted and written law (v6pov . . . kpqu~ov~ uypambv) i to him, so that he might Live lawfdly as a rational being (&s Xoioylr6vj . . ."" Quite unlikc 1 Peter, therefore, where "it 1s a qucstion of a rebirth by thc Word o r God contamed in the apostolic kerygma," in Jas 1:18 "it is not a qucstion of rebirth" at all. Much like Meyer, rather, Boismard argucd that for James (or at least James's source)3i it is the Jewish people who have been born once and for all when God e v e them the law, that law which was itself only the written expression o f the law inscribed in the very nature of the human being. That way, the Jewish people were indeed the "first fruits of the crcatures" of God.3" Perhaps influenced by his acceptance of Goodenough's theory regarding the non-Christian Jewish origin of the prayers from the Apostolzc Conrhtutions, Boismard concludcd that though James itself is a Jewish Christian work, the source which undcrlies Jas 1: 17-2 1 is likely "a pre-Christian form of thc baptismal liturgy."3G
33 AC 8.9.8. I cite the translation of D. R Darnel, "Hellenistic Synagogal Praym," 0TP 2.689 (Prayer I I), who however underlines the words "through Christ" as a
later Christian insertion; cf. Boismard's French manslation in "Une liturgie," 172 11. 1. Boisrnard also cites in this connection AC 8.15.7K where God is described as " h e one who does not admit change; the onc who by nature is unchangeable" (trans. Darnell; cf. Jaz 1:17), as well as 7.26.3, wherc it is said that God "implantt (xa~upGimou~) la loi dans nos irnes." Curiously, however, he does not refcr to the long prayer at 8.12.6-27, which gives the fullest account of this law and its relation to the law of Moses. See further on these prayers below, Chapter Three. '' See immediately below, with note 36. "Une liturgic," 172: "Dans Jac., il n'est pas question de renaissance; c'est le peuple juif qui a i.t& enfami une fois pour toutes lorsque Dieu lui a donni. la Loi, cette Loi qui n'itait elle-mEme que l'expression tcrite de la loi inscrite dans la naturc mEme de l'hommc. Par I$, le peuple juif itait bien les xprtrnices des cr&turess de Dieu (1,18)." Note that o n this interpretation, the hbyag drhqOda5 must be taken ~vithrefcrcnce to the written law eivcn to the Tewish ~ e o u l ein narticular ithc v6po5 ypaiir65) rather than to the & ~ ~ u . rhh05 o g which is +en to dU humanity. '"Ibid, 172 and n. 1. There seems to be a ccrlain equivocation on the question of the source, however, as he later describes it as 'Suivi ou foiternent judtiisante" ("Une liturgie," 175). Cf his appraisd of James itscE "c'est un icrit j u d b c h r t tien; Cmani d'un auteur, ou d'un milieu de penste, pour qui la Loi mosaique rcslaii la seule norme devant rixler les activitts morales de I'hommc" (ibid, 171).
''
' .
16
CHAPTER ONE
The analyses of James's "implanted logos" offered by Meyer and Boismard havc had littlc discernible impact on subsequent scholarship. 7'he vast majority of James's intcrprcters have rejcctcd these scholars' respective theses rcgarding the non-Christian orign of the letter as a wholc or of this passage in particular. And this afirmation of the Christian origin of James has resulted in a wholesale rejection of thcir interpretation of its logos. To be sure, the earlier argumcnts rcgarding the "un-Stoic" lanpagc used in connection with James's logos are rcpcatedly cited. However, what Boismard and Mcycr had, in eKect, suggested, was a more sophisticated model for apprchcnding thc meaning of logos in James: a model that allows for traditions of diverse origins to be simultaneously at work in thc text; a model that allows for the possibility of a creative fusion of Jewish and Greek philosophical traditions. One finds little or nothing in thc way of attempts to reckon with this model by subsequent scholars who posit a Christian origin for James. The possibility that an analogous fusion might bc at work if James is a Christian composition has simply not bcen considered. Conscqucntly, the relevant passages from Cicero and thc Apostolic Conrtituitutions adduced by Meyer and Boismard-much l i e the interpretations offered in the ancient commentariesarc rarely cven mentioned by subsequent interpreters, let alonc seriously examined as potentially rclevant for clarifying James's concept of l~gos.~'
" Worlo published subsequenL to the appearance of these studies that neglect Lo mcntion the relevant passages from Cicero's Dt h$w and (in the case of those published after Boismard's study) the Apoiloli Constituhom in connection with the intcrprclatiun of Jas 1:21 include M. hleincrtz and W. Vrede, D i e katholiichm BGefe, 25; Cadoux, The ?hou,fhl ofst. Jarnix, 19-24; F. Hauck, Die Bnefe des Jakobua Perms, J u d u und Johonne~ (6th ed.; N T D 10; Grittinsen: Vandenhocck & Ruprecht, 1953) 12; E. C. Blackman, 7he EpEpiille ofJames Inlroduchon and Commmlay (Torch Biblc Commentaries; London: SCM, 1957) 62-64; L. Simon, Une ethique de la Sqeise: Cornmentoire de l'Epitre de Jacguei (Geneva: Labor et Fidcs, 1961) 96~-100;J. Scbneider, Dk 8Gf des ,j&>bxr, Petno, Judas u d Johanner Die katholiichn BGji (9th ed.; Nm 10; Grirtingen: Vandenhoeck fir Ruprecht, 1961) 12; B. Reickc, 7718 Epiillei ,$James, I'rier, andJude Inhodu6lion, T~amlalionond.,\'otej (AB 37; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964) 19-25; Dibelius, J a m s , 112-14; F.. M . Sidcbotom, JJude end 2 Pdm (Century Biblc, New Edition; Greenwood, SC: Attic; 1967) 34-35; W. Schragc; "Der ,Jakobusbrief3" in H. Bdz and W. Schragc, Die '"Katholiichn~" BrieJe: Be Beeji des Jakobu, /'~m,fohan/mnnes und J z d u (11th cd.; W D 10; Getlingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprccht, 1973) 21-22; MuRner, Dm Jakobu~beef; 9 8 103: Adamson, E{,iitle of Jurna, 81-82, 9 8 1 0 0 idem, Jamrr: 77m Man m d izis !Messagee 397-99, 4 1 1 15; Laws;
The Thesis
oJ a Supepelficial Stoic Injluence
4 t most, one finds in such studies the suggestion that the use oC the phrase E~qvpu.ro< htryoq in Jamcs represents an entirely superficial employment of philosophical lanpage to couch a patently Christian notion. Dibelius, for example, wondered aloud "\%-lielherthis usag-c cmplo?-ed by Ja[me]s is not somewhat influenced by philosophical concepts
EpLlh . J J m e i , 81 85: Davids. Epklle cf,7ame.r, 95; Felder. "TViisdom. Law and Social Concern," 7 2 ~ 7 %\V. Papkes. ildressaten, Situolkn urid Fom~dm J h h u ~ h & J i ~ (SBS 125/126 Sruttgan: Vcrlag Katholisches Rihrlwerk, 1986) 136-56, cap. 146-5 I; Martin; ,7arnes2 49; Frmkemiillc; Dc Bnc/ des Jnkobui, 1.329-35; Perkins, First nnd Second Peter, ,7arr~rr, and,7udel 103-5; Johnson, 7be I ~ l ! mui,j'nrnes, 202.; Tsyji, Gla'laubr;
Inx -~~
1%
-~~
Therc are some rninor exceptions. \Vhcrcas in the first edition oS R. Leconte's brief comrnen~~ary on Jamcs; published beibrc thc appearance oS Boismard's cssay. the iprpurog Myog was intcrprcted with rererence to Jas 1:18 as "la Parole de Sdut clui a procure la regCni.ration du fidtle," in the second edition, citing Boismard and several passages f k m the Apostolic Comliluliol~r,he comments "or pour le judaisme hell~nisdque~ la Loi contenue dans I'Ecriture passail pour &ireinscrite dans la nature mEme de I'hommz." The implications of this revision for Leconle's understanding of Jamcs's loEoi arc not altogether clear; ho\vcvcr; as hc conlinues to interpret J-ns 1:18 with rcfcrcncc to a "new birth.'' Cr. 1x1 Epz^h~.rCnth,,liyur.s dr Soiril Jacyuei, Sainl Jude et Saint I ' k e (Paris: Lcs Editions du Cerf, 1953) 30 and notc d, 74th Le.s E p i l ~ e ~ Catholiqum (2d ed., 1961) 34-35 and noLc S. ,I. Cantinat's IXJEpit~esde Soin1 3acquei el de Sainl J d e similarly interacts ~xplicidy w l h Boismard's interpretation of. James's loxox. Oddly, however, the Apodolic Comtilzlionr (and Cicero's De &,@bus) receive no mcnlion; sce Lei Epilrts, 95 97 and 102-106. CS. in this respcct R. Fabris, I 4 g 8 delln L i h d in Giucomo (Supplementi d RivistB R; Brcscia: Paidcia, I977), on which see hrlow. R. R. Ward cited Mcyer's thcsk (though not, explicitly, Dt I q . I . 18) in connccLion with Dibelius's suggestion that James's phrase Elrrprnog My05 may have hcen influenced by Stoic lanpage, hut rejects the idea. While citing Justin's similar phrase as the "closest apparent parallel," and noting in addition A C 8.12.8, as well as passages rrom Procopius oS G z a and Mcthodius (on the latter oS which see below, Chapter Three), Ward dismisses their explanatory utility Tor Jamcs. In [act, Ward ultimately concludes that "no satisSacLory linguistic parallels are auailuble" which clarify the meaning of Jamcs's hpvurag %yo<. See "l'hc Communal Concern of the Epistle ofJames" (Ph.1). diss., Harvard University, 19661 127-34, as well as thc "Summary" at the beginning of his study. Cicero, De Leg 1.18, is mentioned in connection with ,Ids 1 2 1 by Windisch (Die kaltulkchen DM, l I). as well as by Vouga (L'Epilrr de Sainl Jacques, 63) and Klein (Ein uol1hrnmene.r W h 135 n. 90). Klein also refcrs in this connet:tion to A C 733.3; whcrc. thc author s-peah oShpvu.rogyviuotg, hut not to thoa: passages from this work which treat the hprpu~ogv6pog(ihid, n. 91). Klein in any case ronsiden 1)euteronomy 30; not thc Stoic sources; ro hc thc model behind James's notion of a n hprpurog h6yoyo5; even while conceding that the lattcr does reflect a l b e i t entirely superficiallyStoic terminolog\. (ibid., 136-37). None oS thcse authors in any case discusses thr passage in question at length, as each rcjccG ihc idea that substantive Stoic influence underlies Jas 1:21; see Curther on this helow.
18
CHAPTER ONE
regarding 'seminal reason' (h6yog C S K E ~ ~ ~ . ~but I K ~the ~ )question ";'~ was for him in any case of no real consequence for the interpretation of the lcttcr. Gi\-en his literary assessment of Jamcs as a "trcasury" of earlier traditions linked only supcrfrcially to onc not only did he conclude that it, in any event: " h a no 'lheology:" but he positcd in addition that, in the case of such paraenetic collections, "it is not a h a y s possible lo deduce ?om adopted concepts the intellectual environment ofthe aulhor who appropCates tl~em.'''~Indeed, for Dibelius the possible Stoic provenance of this term was riot even particularly significant for the interpretation of the phrase in its immediale context: "[elvcn if 'the implanted word' @pqu.rogh6yog) in 1:21 should actually prove to be an ccho of Stoic terminolog," he wrote, "the cxpression as Ja[mc]s used it had obviously already been given a ncw meaning by thc Christians."" Citing scvcral Christian texts w-hich usc the term gpqv.rog wiih no connotations of something "innate," Dibelius suggcstcd that Jamcs, as with his command to "rcceive" this word, was "probably rollowing an existing Christian usage"; and this, already, had re-defined the (possibly) Stoic expression in a manner wholly at odds with its ori@nal meaning."' In short, even if the phrase Epqurog Myog is to be considered one which has "a technical usagc in the 'world'," it is at most one "whose actual meaning is either not understood or only half-understood by Jalme]s."4" Interpreted along these lines, the qucstion of the origns of this cxpression is purely academic. Thus, strikinzly, the possible Stoic derivation of the phrase gpqviog h6yo5 is not even mentioned by Finally, the &w~u.ro< vAlro
113 (= Der BritJdrs,j'akobw /1921] 108); citing Ram. 1:2; Y:9 and Tgn.; Epk. l7:2. Ihid.; 35 (= Der B h f des ,7akohio j192ij 34).
""
IMPL.LNTEU
LOGOS IN JAMES
19
Dibclius whcn he then proceeds to argnc that the phrase "law of frccdomn-which the author equates uith b Zpquroq hhyog-must bc understood in lighc of Stoic concepts." Thc notion that Jamcs (or his "tradition") has taken a Stoic phrase, drained it of its philosophical significance, and filled it with an entire1)new meaning has been advocated in various forms by a handful or scholars.+' Given this approach, it is not surprising that, even among these authors, thc passages cited by hfcycr and Boismard are relegated to footnotcs and parentheses, if mcntioncd at all.'" Rcfcrring inter alia to Cicero's summa ratio insita in nutura, Justin's Epqurov anippa roc h6you, and the Epquzoq yvGoq of the Aposlolic Conslitutions, but emphasizing that the author of James describes his Epquroq hiryoq as that which "saves souls," Klein, for example, puts it this way: "So mag man zwar in der VVortmahl stoisch-philosophischen Einflun konstatieren, in der Sache ist die Vorstellung vom Myoq a ~ t e p p a ~ ~fur ~trg das Verstandnis der Stcllc [Jas 1:21] aber wenig hilrrcich."" That is to say, given the divergences between the languagc uscd in connection with the Epquzoq h6yo5in the Lcttcr ofJames and that found in the Stoic sources, one is dealing at most with a superficial connection existing sheerly at the terminological level. Any Curther comparison between James and those w-orks that are substantively inRucnccd by Stoicism, thererore, would not prove illuminating. Regardless of thc provcnancc of the phrase, James's use of it is in any cvent "ganz ungricchisch und ~ n s t o i s c h . "Thus ~ ~ even when inclined to see Stoic influence in James's conccpt of a "law of freedom," such scholars, l i e Dibelius before them, do not correlate this with James's equation of the "law of frccdom" with Epquzog hiryo~.""
See Dihclius's cxcursus on "The Perfect Law or Frccdom" in Jamei, 116-20. Vouga, L'Eppilre de Salnl Jacques, 63; Felder, "\Visdom, Law and Social Conr:em," 73-74,; Frankcmiille, Der BrieJda ,7akobu~,1. 329; 'l'syji, Ghube, 108 n. 58; cf: ~Marty,L'Epihr de Joyua, 53; Cantinat, La Epitres, 96 and 104-5. See further the comment of R. Fahris mcntioned bclow in note 84. i W ~ t that e neithcr Cicero nor the Afio.~tolicComlil3ionr is even mentioned in this connection by Dihclius-Greeven. Laws, Fr'rankemiille or Tsuji. " Klein, Ein inwllkornmenei Werk, 135; emphasis minc. Klcin, in Tact, identifies Deuteronomy 30 as the "Schl~ssci" Tor interpreting Jas 1:21; suggesting that the author ofJames simply couches a deuteronomistic notion in philosophical languagc; sce Ein vollkommenes We7k. 136-37. '30 Fmktmiille, Der Brie/du,7akobu; 1. 329; cT. Bonhniitr, Epiclzl und das~Vcuo 7e.rtamenl; 97. ' " 0 ; pafiicicularly strikingly, Klein. Ein ino1komrnnzt.x Werk; 152: "So durfte dic Redr vom h6T005 i!ilrTupuro;Icalich ihren U i s p r u n ~in der dcutcronomistischen Theologie
'' Windisch, Die kothnliichen B G j , I I; I.aus,Epirtle ofjhmei, 83-84.;
'The Rqection
of
Stoic Injuence
More often one h d s interpreters dispensing with the Stoic cvidence altogether. In this case, James's notion of a "saving" Epqupu.roqh6yo5 is explained by comparison with the use of $anting imager); in early Christian missionary contexts, as for example in 1 Cor 3:6-8 (cf. qupuz&o)"" and, above all, in the synoptic par;xble of the sower (Mark 4:3-20 pars.; cf. meipo)."' Along these lines, ofle also finds comparisons with I Peter's description of "the word (bfipa)which was announccd to you as the gospel" as an imperishable "seed" (~xopck),or with the ~ a manner reminiscent of Boismard, use of seed imagery in 1 J ~ h n . 'In in fact, some have argued that a common tradition underlies Jas 1:18, 21 and 1 Pet 1:22-2:2-a tradition associatcd, perhaps, with bapti~m.'~ Here, though, the tradition is considered to be a Christian one, and Boismard's detection of a difference between 1 Peter and James has generally been disregarded." Indeed, MuRner considers the supposed baptismal Sitz im Leben of Jas 1: 18, 2 1 itself to be decisive for the interpretation of both the hiryoq ahqOeia5 and 6 Cpqupu.roq h6yoq as "d[ie] urapostolischen Paradosis," that is, as "the Gospel."" des Alien Testaments haben, wahrend die Spur d e s v 6 &htu8~pia< ~ ~ chcr zu giechischem Denken, besonders zu dem der Stoa fiihrt"; cf. ibid., 136-37. Cf. also Vouga, L'Epihe de Saint J q u e r , 65-66. "t' should he pointed out in this connection that the i c m iprpvrog derives not from iprpu?&o, but from ipgho; sre, e.g., Ropes, St. James, 172. Of course, this does not o i itsell preclude comparison of Jas 1:21 with 1 Cor 3 : 6 8 . j' Beyschlag, Der Briefdei J m b u r , 83; Mayor, Ejktle o f s t . James, 68 6 9 ; Meinertz and Vredc, Die katholischen BGfe, 251 Hauck, Die Bn&, 12; Reicke, 7 h e Epi~llesof James, Peter, m d M e , 21; M a n e r , D m JakobusbGfe, 102 and n. 2; Adamson, Epktle @ J a m , 81; Davids, Ejktle $Jamex, 95; Martin, J a m , 4 9 cT. Cantinat, Ler Ejitres, 1 0 5 Sre also F. ivlanns, "Une tradition liturgique," 87--89, who locates the roots of this terminology, as well as the "seed" imag-ery of 1 John and I Peter, inJewish litur~icalusage; cf in this respect Fabris, Legge, on whom see below. 1 Pet 1:22-25 (cf. 1 Pet 1:23: hkoyou jGv.io< 0eoG lcai fiivoviog); 1 John 3:9. See Beyschlag, D e BriPj dex Jmobus, 83; Moffatt, 7he Gmml Epislles, 24; Manns, "Une vaditiun liturgique," 8 9 d Hauck, Uie B G j , 11; also Cantinat, Lm EpfLres, 105. j3 See esp. Popkes, Adrerxaten, 136-56; MuBner, Dm JakoburbGJ 95-97 and 101-3; Schrage, "Der Jakobusbrief," 21; Adamson, James: 77ze Man and HG Msap-e, 397; Hoppe, Dm lheolo@che H i n f e ~ p n ddesJakobusbriefe~(2d ed.; FB 28; Wiirzburg: Echter, 1985) 94. See also Fabris, Legge, on which see immediately below. Others are more reticent regarding the baptismal connection; sec in this respect Davids, Epistle oJ Jarnu, 93; also Laws, Epklle ifjmiames; 18-20. Boismard's study is often overiookcd altogether. Note, however, the works of Cantinat and 1.econie discussed above in note 37, and the study of Fabris discussed immediately below. 'j MuRner, DeJrJohub7ieJ 95c 102. Note that neither the Aflostolic Comliulwnr nor Cicero's De L q i b u iF mentioned in this connection. CC Schmgc: "Der Jakobusbricf," 2 1.
"
'
I M P W I T E D LOGOS IN JAMES
21
It is this line of interpretation which is advanced in Rinaldo Fabris's h g e dell0 Liberta in Giucomo. Fabris's intensive study of the issuc presents by far the most direct and sustained challenge to the interprctation of Mcycr and Boismard to date. With an eye both to these scholars and to those, like Dibelius, who find Stoic influence behind ,James's association of law and freedom, Fabris formulates the problem in terms of a choice between interpreting James in light of an "ambientc biblico, giudaico" or an "ambientc g~eco-ellenistico,"j"and finds dccisivcly in favor of the former. He concedes, of course, that one does see analogies in the Greek, and particularly Stoic, sources h6yog and for the varboth for James's equation of law with k~~+~pu.rog ious epithets given to the law in James.'' The crux of his argument, though, is that the context in which such phrases are used in James is "tipicamente biblico e giudaico," and that one must therefore look exclusively to Jewish literature for the ultimate source and mcaning of such expressions.jR The phrasc k?pqv.rogh6yog is of particular interest to Fabris since it dominates the immediate context in which the "perfect law which is of freedom" is first mentioned, that is, Jas 1:19-27.i' Indccd, he considers the interpretation of this phrase to be the decisive factor in determining the significance of the expression "law of freedom" for Jarnes.Gn Fabris observes that the former phrase was read in line with Stoic concepts already in the commentaries of Oecumenius and Theophylactus. Against such an interpretation, however, he argnes that only limited analogies to James's phrase are found in the Greek literature; there are no expressions precisely parallel to it6' While -
-
... ..~
'' See b g e ,
13? 31 and parim. Note that throughout Fabris's study, thc cxpression "hiblico," which is used in opposition to "preco," "ellenistico" and "stoico," includes not only the Jewish scriptures, but the Nrw Testament as well; see, e.g., his treatment of thc phrase ?&yogcihqtleiag, on which see immediately below. 'This peculiar dichotomy cffectivcly excludcs the possibility of hellcnistic influence on any works later included Mithin the Christian canon. Ibid, 33-48. '"ce esp. his ch. 3, "11 contcsto della degge di lilsertia: il suo carattcre biblico e gnidaico" (hge,53 -81), noting particularly the concluding comments on p. 81. Ibid, 55-53. Ibid., 113: "lnfdtti il Myog, che ha il potere di salvdre le anime 1,21 . . . P la elegge perfeta. . . . Percii, la compiensione di questa formula di lac. 1,21 t decisiva per chiarire il significato delia degg-e della libertia." C t ibid., 27: "Si deve natare chc questa esspressione di Giacomo 1;21 P dccisiva per tutti gli autoti, assicme all'altra S;&yog drhqtleiag; di lac. 1,18, per determinarc la natura e il significato deila rleggc dclla lihertia." "I See L , e ; 43: "Pcri, nella letteratura e nei documenti greci non si trova la
''
"
22
CHAPTER ONE
veI); strictly speaking accurate, this claim is nonetheless quite misleading inasmuch as Fahris curiously neglects to mention, hcrc or elsewhere in his lengthy monograph, Cicero's dcfinition of law in terms of ratio insita, the Ppqvroq v6poq of the Apostolic Comtitulions, or the Ppqvrov m Q p a h6you of Justin-and this despite his interaction with both Meycr and Boismard." Indeed, the similar phrases to which he refers in this connection are, apparently, only the Stoic hbyoq and 6pObq h6y05.~~ expressions &v6thOero~ As mentioned above, Fahris argues in any case that it is the context in which the phrase is used in James w-hich is decisive: thc trcatment of the kpquroq h6yoq in James is "biblico e giudaico," not Greek or Stoic." The usual observations and arguments are made in this connection: the ascription of "saving" powcr to this logosis particularly reminiscent of early Christian literature? the thcmc of "hearing and doing" is typical of Jewish and Christian works;" the kpqvroq h6yoq is to be identified with the h6yoq 6hqOeiaq of 1:18, which is itself understood not only to refer "dccisamcntc ad un contesto hihlico-gi~daico,"~'but to he a clear reference to "the gospel";" Jas 1:18 and 1:21, which are "perfectly parallel" to 1 Peter 1:22& rcflcct Therefore, Fabris concludes, one must ancient baptismal paraene~is.~~ attempt in the first place to locate precedents for the phrase Ppquroq h6yoq in the biblical literat~rc;~" and this precedent, he argues, is found in Jeremiah's expectation that God would place his law within the human heart in the eschatological era." More specifically, Fahris fi~mula&o< EpTuro5, come in lac. 1,21; dovc cssa rivela un caraterrc stereotipo e fisso"; see further 43f and 46. "' See Leece. - . 42-44: cf. 26r. as well as his extensive interaction with Boismard's interpretation ofJas 1:21 on pp. 142-46. "1 See Fahris, Legt, 43. " Ibid., 59. " Ibid, 62, 148. " I6i& 63-64. '' Ibid.; 62, citing Jewish works such W( Ps 118:43 and TGnd 3:1, as well as Col 1:5; ED^ 1:13 and 2 Tim 2:15. " 9 e e the discussion orJas 1:18 in Leg#, 134-42; esp. 138-40. I' Ibid., 191; cT. 59-62 and his anticipation of this line of a r p m e n t already on In54 "-
''
Ibid? 113: "Dato il carattere biblico e giudaico del contesto nel qu& cssa [sc. the Connulaic expression ibrpvroSh6yo5] i- inserita? 6 indispensabile esaminare in quale misura questo concerto della qarola impiantata,, lrova un riscontro in quelI'ambicnte." Ibid., 116, 130, 148~49;see further 113-21. This passage from Jeremiah had already been adduced in this connection by a number of other authors; for a list see T e e l 24 n. 46, and note in addition Cantinat, I A Epz^trex3 ~ 105.
"
I?+PIANTEU
LOGO.$
m JAMES
23
argues that James's &pqu.ios h6yo5 is the law of love as the internalizcd "messia~claw"; the equivalent, in essence, of what Paul conceivcs in terms of the holy spiri~.~'
hfartina L u d ~ i g ' srecent Wort ah Gesetz reprcscnts another sustained attempt to interpret the Lettcr of Jamcs as a Christian work, and its logos without recourse to Greek philosophical sources. At the same time, this study differs significantly from those discussed above in that its fundamental aim is in fact to overturn the usual "gospel" interpretation ofJames's logos. It is Ludwig's contention that James's equation of law and logos is rooted in a Jcwish "nomistic word theology" which first surfaces in works of the deuteronomistic school. Primarily on the basis of this thesis, Ludwig argucs that James's logos is not "the Gospel," but the Torah.'" If thcrc is promise in Ludwig's ability to conceive of James as a Christian work without immediately concluding that "thc Gospel" must be its central soteriological category," the form w-hich her argument takes, unfortunately, is less than persuasive.'" Among the chief problems is the apparent formulation of h e question in terms of a strict dichotomy between "Jewish" and "Hcllenistic" preccdents for Jarncs's concept of logos. Givcn the overall aim of Ludwig's study, hcr use of thesc categories as mutually exclusi\~eis less explicit than with Fabris. For example, her emphasis on thc ,Jewish preccdents ~~ for James's use of exprcssions likc 6 i x o p a t .rbv . . . ? ~ 6 y o v ,"hearing
"
See I ~ g e ,133 8 1 . C t with respect to this latter comparison Wein, EIn uollkomrnene~ Wwk; 158--59; Curther J. A. Kirk, "The Meaning oC Wisdom in Jamcs: Examination of a Hypothesis," ATS 16 (1969--70) 24-38. '3 See, e.g., the summary of thc argument as round in Wort a11 Ceietz, 169: "Bestimmte Formulierungcn aus Jak 1,12-25 sind . . . zufriedenstellcnd aus jiidischnomistischer Tradition zu crklBren. Danach scheint es mir e n ~ e s m ,d d der Jak in 1.18.21-23 mil Myog nicht das Evangclium, die christliche Lehre o.d. bczeichnet, sondern &as $dische Gesetz." Inteipretation ofJas 2 : R l l is presented as being of scconda~yimponance: it is discussed dong with other rclcvant passag-es found oubide ofJames I only in order to provide "ein vollstdndig-ercs Bild der jlidiscii gepr*gten Theolo~iedcs Jak" (Ibid, 171; c f 1 7 1 75). 'I See in chis connection also Tsuji, Claube, 1 0 8 115, who relics in large -emure on Ludwig. ' S c e my review in,7BL 115 (1996) 372 75. I have drawn freely on porlions nf lhis review for what follow~s. PVort ah Gr.retz. 159 6 1 .
''
24
CHAPTER ONE
and doing,"" and h6yo5 & h q O ~ i a ~is' ~not meant to rcfute Stoic influencc on James's concept or logos, but to show that such usages can be undcrstood apart rrom comparison with Christian trcatments of "the Gospel." A similar aim underlies the compilation of Jewish texts that use agrarian irnagcry to spcak of thc internalization of the law in order to explain Jamcs's description of thc logos as ~pvu.ioq.'" In short, Ludwig rejects the possibility of Greek philosophical influence on James's conccpt of logos, but the rejection is tacit-a function, apparcntly, of hcr thesis that Jamcs rclies on a j'&h tradition or equating law and logos. Ludwig's treatment of Philo's analogous equation of law and logos is especially suggestive in this respcct. Philo's extcnsive reliance upon Greek philosophy, according to Ludwig, renders any similarity between his language and the "Jewish Word-tcrminology" "only a c ~ i d e n t a l . " ~ ~ In fact, analysis of Phitlo's writings suggcsts that "the taking up or thc nomistic Jcwish Word theology is apparcntly not to be expected in authors heavily intluenced by HeUenism."" Conversely, it would sccm, one ought not expect Jamcs-which according to Ludwig k influcnccd by this Jewish tradition-to exhibit significant hellenistic influence. And in fact, the possibility that James's understanding of these terms has also been influenced by Grcek philosophical ihought is entirely overlooked in Ludwig's study. The interpretation ofJames's Epqu.ioq h 6 y o ~offcred by Meyer, Boismard and in the early commentaries of Oecumenius, Theophylactus and Dionysius is passed over in silence? as are the often discussed Stoic precedcnts for thc work's repeated association of law and freedom.
Whcther by rejecting Stoic influencc outright or by positing an entirely supcficial acloption of Stoic terminology to convey a patcntly Christian Ibid, 164-67. Ihid., 151-57. ' V W r t air Ge~elz,162-64. Cf. Ward: "Communal Concern," 130-33; Klein, Eia vollkomrnenes We&, 136-37; Tsuji, Glade, 109. OD Ibid.. 86. " Ihid., 194. " Note that Ludwig dues rercr to the Apo~iolic Con~liluhnnrwhen discussing thr expression Bpgviag h6yoq; biir shc gives no indication that its phrasc Elrrpuiog v 6 p g may be in any way indebted to Stoic rhoughr. It is cited, rather, primarily because "
jH
it "sounds like a clarification of Jas 1:21"
($2; 164.).
IMPLANTE.D .D.OGOS IN JAMES
25
meaning, thosc interpreters who view, James as a Christian composition have uniformly rcjccted the proposition that its notion of a "saving logos" might be illuminated by compa~isouwith texts irformed by Greck philosophical tradition. The relcvant passages cited by Meyer and Boismard, l i e the commentaries of Oecumenius, Thcophylactus and Dionysius bar Salibi, are scarcely deemed worthy of mention, let alonc substantivc discussion. When cited, the passages are quickly dismissed as irrelevant to the interpretation ofJames. The striking coincidence of terminologi in this rather diverse series or work has not led to thcir collection and systematic study. Such a hasty dismissal of evidence, coupled with the fact that the two authors who do detect substantive Stoic influcncc do so Mhie doubting the Christian origin of, at least, this portion of James, suggests that this state of affairs is symptomatic of a wider set of assumptions regarding the centrality of "thc Gospel" in early Christian-or, pcrhaps more to the point, "Ncw Testamentn--sotcriology.If it is taken to be a "truism of the Ncw Testamcnt" that the gospel savcs; if it is nndcrstood that the "logos of truth" in a Christian work must naturally refer to "the Christian message"; then it is scarcely snrprising that the philosophical notion of a logos innate in the human animal would be seen as relevant to James only if it was originally a non-Christian work." In any event, scholarship's consistent failure to reckon with the possibility that James's correlation of law and logos--even if it is a rcpresent a creativc fusion of tradiChristian composition-might tions of diverse origins is problcrnatic. Despitc thc formulation of the problcm in the works of Fahris and Ludwig, it does not immediately follow from James's use of typically Jewish or Christian expressions in association with gyquzog %yo5 that the lattcr phrase itself was coined cntircly apart from Greck philosophical influence. As Dibclius and othcrs have recognized, it is quitc possible that an exprcssion of philosophical provenance is simply used in James alongside cxpressions ofJewish or Christian origin.@At the same timc, against Dibelius
" Sce the further discussion of this prohlcrn in the Introduction. "'Note; in Fact, the apparent concession in Fahris, Lege? 81. HavinS concluded regarding the contcxt in which James's "law of freedom" occurs that "non solo il complesso dcllc nozioni, ma anchc il loro rapport0 si s p i c e esclusivarnentc &a luce della tradirionc biblica e giudaica," Fabris goes on to write that the prescncc oC"(al1cune sorni$ianzc estcrne di vocahulario con I'arnbientc grcco" does not alter the fact that the "caranere biblico e guidaico" ofJames excludcs "l'ambiente greco c atoico come matrice delle nozioni di Giacorno." Rather, "a1 massirno possono
26
CIIAPTEK ONE
and others, it does not immediately follow from the fact that James speaks of Epgv~osh6yo5 in a manner uncharacteristic of Stoic discussions of human reason that the original meaning of the phrase is entirely irrelevant to James. Such facile conclusions bcspcak a much too simplistic approach to the very complex problem of thc merger of Jemish, Christian and Grcck tradition in the early Christian literature. A numbcr of ancient Jewish and Christian works sought to incorporate Stoic concepts into religious traditions with which they were not originally associated, and this inevitably resulted in the adaptation and modification of the philosophical ideas. If the treatment of Epqv~ogh6yo5 in the Letter of James is not typical of Stoicism, ncither is its Christian author a typical Stoic. The question, howcver, remains. Is the expression Epqupuros Myog in fact of Greek philosophical provenance? And if so, to what extent are its original connotations significant for understanding the religious thought of the Letter of James? In what follows, I will show that thc phrasc Epqv.ro5 h6yog was in fact coincd in philosophical circles, in connection with thc Stoic theory that human reason comprises a divinely given "natural" law. More spccifically, the theorctical background of the phrase lies in the Stoic correlation of the inchoatc logos with which humans arc that is, born with "implanted preconceptions" (Tpcpu~otnpoh~'pq~q), with the human animal's innate disposition to form concepts like "good" and "bad" (Chapter Two). We shall see, further, that as thc Stoic theory of law was adapted by various Jewish and Christian authors, it was, naturally, variously modified to accommodate aspects of these authors' thought which were alien to Stoicism. Most common is ihe identification of some a vcrbody of instruction--the Torah or thc tcaching of Jesus-as bal expression of this innate natural law (Chapter Threc). It is my contcntion that the Letter of James, with its correlation of implanted logos with the "perfect" law, a "law of freedom," presents another example of the Christian adaptation of this philosophical conception of law. Those aspects of James's treatment of Epquzo~My05 which diverge from the discussion of human reason in the Stoic sources
suffra,pre I'ipo~esidi uno usunsione ntalnialr da park di Gimorno drllo tcminolo,@a p a , per6 con un i@$calmnuooo e d2um nel conleiro alluah della lellnd' (emphasis mine). Fabris does not rcfer specifically to b Fwquro5 h6Yog in this connection, but cf. 33-48, esp.
12 44.
rcsult from thc fact that Jamcs has incorporated the Stoic concept into a set of religious and historical comictions which derive from Jewish and Christian tradition rathcr than Stoic philosophy. In James it is assumed that the Torah represents a written expression of the implanted logos that all human beings posscss by nature; and it is expected that the god who authored this law d l executc an cschatological judgment in accord with it at the parotlsia of Jesus Christ (Chapter Four). Accordingly, logos and its opposite, human desire, are prcscntcd as the two "\vaysn upon ~ h i c honc can travel toward this jud,ment: the latter is characterized by "deception," manifests itsclf in "sin," and leads to eschatological "death," \+-hide the lormer is characterized by "truth," manifests itselr in "good works" (Epya), and "saves souls" from deaih (Chapter Five). Thc sotcriology of the Letter ofJames, in short, has been woven from strands of tradition that derive from Jewish, Christian and Greek philosophical discourse. The implications of this analysis for attempts to locate the Lcttcr of ,James within early Christianity, and particularly in relation to Paul, will be discussed at the close of the study.
CHAPTER TWO
LAW AS IMPLANTED LOGOS: CICERO AND THE STOICS O N NATURAL MI'V
It wdl have been obsclved from the preceding chaptcr that a rather remarkable coincidence of terminology exists between Dionysius bar Salibi's commentary on the Letter of Jamcs, Cicero's De Lepibus, and the Apostolic Conrtitulions. In each work the tern "implanted" (Epvuzoq, insita) is used, in the course of a discussion of natural law, to describe either that law itself or the "reason" (hbyoq, ratio) ~ 6 t hwhich it is identified. Further instances of this terminology can be adduced; for example, the "implantcd natural law" (Epvvzog vualxbq vb~oq) treated by Methodius, or "the seed of the logos implantcd in every , race of humans" (16 Epquzov n a v ~yi & ~ tavOphnwv anhppa ~ o iMyou) that Justin correlatcs with the "natural law" manifested by and in Jesus Christ. Finally, one might also cite that text which Dionysius bar Salibi was interpreting, and which is the central concern of this study: the Letter of Jamcs itself correlatcs "implanted hgos" with a law that is both "perfect" and "of freedom." It is the purpose of this chapter to show that the recurrence of this terminology is not, in fact, mere coincidence. The similar language found in these othcmise widely disparate works is to be explained in terms of their common dependence on the Stoic theory of law. In order to demonstrate this point, it will be necessary to delve somewhat deeply into this important, but sqrismgly neglected, aspect of Stoic Before turning to an examination of the evidence, though, a couplc of introductory remark., arc in order. I P. A. Vandcr Waerdt describes the "derailed consideratian" of the problcm presented in his recent dissertation a "never previously anernpied"; see "The Stoic Thl'heor) of Natural 1 . a ~ " (l'11.D. diss., PrinceLon University, 1989) 5. CT. the earlier studies of H. Koester, "NOMOZ OVZEUE The Concept of Natural Law in Greek Thought," Reiiqions in AntiquiIy: i7soy.s in Memoy of Enuvl Randall Goodnoqh (ed. J. Neusner; Leiden: Brill, 1970) 521-41; G. Watson, "The Natural Law and Stoicism," problem.^ in Shicinn (ed. A. A. Long; Inndon: Athlone Press, 1971), 216- 38; R. Horsley, "The Law of Nature in Philo and Ciccro," HZR 71 (1978) 55-59; G. Striker, "Origins of thc Concept of Natural Law," Roceedingr of lhe Bo~tonA ~ e i Colloquium in An&t Philo~opb 2 (ed. J. j. Clear).; New Yo& University Press of
Law was a subject to which the Stoic philosophers devoted a significant amount of attention. Treatises on the subjcct arc associated with the most important names in thc carly movement: Zeno, Clcanthcs and Chrysippus all w-rote works entirlcd On Law or On Laws,as did Sphaerus and Diogencs of Babylox2 Unfortunately thcsc ~ o r k are s entirely lost to us, with the exception of a couple ofimportaut fra-pents from Chrysippus's On Law. In fact, Cicero's De L e 8 . b ~ is by far thc most extensive treatment of natural law that has been preserved from antiquity. The use of this treatise for reconstructing the early Stoic theory, however, is complicated by the fact that Cicero's primary sourcc may have becn Antiochus of Ascalon, a philosopher who had left the skeptical Academy to form his own breakaway "Old Academy," and whose thought represcntcd a blend of Stoic and Platonic element^.^ Accordingly, while it is clear by all accounts that the thcory of law presented by Cicero is essentially the Stoic theory: a number of authors havc variously identified this or that dctail of Cicero's account as departures from Stoicism. This question will in fact impinge on our discussion precisely at its most
America, 1987) 79-94. O n Cicero's De Legibur in parlicular L. P. Kenter, M Tullius Cicero, De L r . b u s A cornmmlav on book I (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1972); S. Benardete, "Cicero's De Legbus I: Its Plan and Intention;" A3P 108 (1987) 295-309. Note also those studies published since the appearance of Vander Waerdt's dissertation: G. Striker, "FoUoMmg Nature: A Study in Stoic F,thics," Oxford Sludier in Ancienl Pt~iloiophy9 (1991) 1-73, esp. 35- 50; P. Mitsis, "Natural Law and Natural Right in Post-Aristotelian Philosophy. The Sloics and their Critics," ANRW 2.36.7 (1994) 4812-50; J. G. DeFilippo and P. T. bfitsis, "Socrates and Sloic Natural Law," nLe Somatic Mouemnzl (ed. P. A. Vander M'aerdt; Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1994) 252-71. See also Vander CVaerdt's o m m o x recent studics: "Philosophical Influence on Roman Jurisprudence? .l%lheCase o f Stoicism and Natural I.aw," M R W 2.36.7 (1994) 4851-4900; "Zeno's Republic and the Origins of Natural Law," % Socrntic Moumenl, 272 308. * See the index in SVF 4, p. 100, under v 6 ~ 0 c . The most recent and sustained argument Tor this position is that of P. A. Vander Wacrdt, "The Stoic Theory of Natural Law"; see also idnn, "Philosophicd Influe~ce on Roman Jurisprudence." For a sketch of the earlier discussion of the question sec L. P. Kenter. Ile I~ribw.9 10. A rood introduction to Antiochus of Ascalon is found in J. ill on, ?he ~ i d d Phbnirtr: i i 0 B.C. to A.D 220 (Ithaca: Comell Univcrsiq Press, 1977) 52 106. ' This point will becomc clear over the course of this chapter, and is a1 any rate not disputed in thc secondav literature. Vander Waerdt's approach is properly cautious: "Cicero's account provides a check against which to evaluate the evidence that does survive from the early Stoa. but not a starting point for our enquiry" ("The Stoic Theory of Natural Law," 30). Nonetheless, he finds sipificant cantinuity from Zeno la Cicero (&id; 28)pand this despite his strenuous ar-prnent ilia1 Ciccro's source was Antiochus of Ascalon. ~~~~~~
~
~~
~ 4 w AS
IMPLANTED LOGOS
31
critical juncture: the analysis of Ciccro's trcatment of thc Stoic docnpohilv~~<) as it pertains trine of "implanted prcconccptions" (&~quzol to his theory of natural law. Ultimately, resolution of the issue will have little bearing on our present concern, which is simply to identify the theoretical basis for Ciccro's definition of law in terms of "implanted rcason." For our purposes, it matters little whcther this basis is properly Stoic or Antiochan. Noncthclcss, for the sake of clarity, and because the Stoic thcory is of intcrcst in its own right, the question will mcrit somc attention. It wdl in any case bc argued that this aspcct of Ciccro's theory is essentially consistent with that of Chrysippus. A word too, finally, should be said regarding thc use of thc term "natural law" in connection with Stoicism. While the significant steps the Stoics took in the direction of a theory of natural law must be counted among their most cnduring and influential legacies, the precisc naturc of their contribution has becn a mattcr of somc dcbatc. It has often been noted that the tcrms "law of naturc" or "natural law" do not occur in the extant Stoic sources prior to Cicero and Phiio,' and at least onc scholar has concluded that in Stoicism "the real concern of thc truly wise man was the positive correlation of reason and nature (hbyog and rpGn~g),whercas thc relation of law conand nature was still seen as an irrcconcilablc antithcsis.""his clusion, however, is the result of a rather misleading emphasis on thc actual tcrms "law of nature" or "natural l a w n p a restriction which is problcrnatic from the start given our cxtrcmcly fragmentary knowledge of the writings of thc carly Stoics.' As wc shall see, Koester, e.g., takes this observation as his starting point in "NOMOZ OYZERF; scc furthcr on this thc rollowing note. See also Vander Waerdt, "The Stoic Theory oENatural Law," 9 ~ ~ 1and 0 81 86. "oestcr, "NOMOZ OYZERZ," 527. Koester argues that the dissolution of the Greek antithesis between v6pog and rpSoy is achieved only when Greek ideas are wedded to a Jewish emphasis on thc law o r Moses. In Philo's writings, he arpes; "[tlhe new antithesis has now become that or lhc 'law or nature' and the numerous laws o r men." Something resembling this latter antilhesis; however, is already evidcni in Zeno's Republic, on which sec hclow. Moreover, such a thesis F d s lo account for Cicero's use o r similar terminolog, as was pointed out hy K. Horsley in "The Law- of Nature in Phio and Cicero," 35-59. It is indced noteworthy that such terms are not in cvidmce for thc carlicst Sroics. O n the other hand, the absence 01 this term in the extant f r a a p m t s of Zeno-fragments which do not; it is to he noted, include even a single scrap of his On Law-scarcely warrants Koester's assurance that it is "quite certain that Zeno never used this term [sc. natural law]"; see "NOMOZ OYZERZ," 529. Cf. in this respect Ciccro; De.hli. Dm7 1.36. who sprakr exp1ir:itly oiZeno's vicw of the nalurdk
'
32
CHAPTER TWO
it is clear that the Stoics did, at least, define law, in terms of a logos that was "positively correlated" with nature. And in fact, Chrysippus himself had spoken of law as ~ G G E L .. . ~ ap$i O~GEI." For these reasons it seems to me that the terms "natural law" and n the law with which the "law of nature" are a fair d e ~ i ~ p a t i oof Stoics were conccrncd whethcr or not they themselves ever used phrases like v6p05 qG0ewg or v6po5 qva1~65,and I will not, therefore, avoid them. That being- said, how-ever, it should be emphasized that thc Stoic "law," unlike the natural law-s of most later thinkers, is not to be undcrstood as an inviolable set of precepts that admit of codification. Not only is there no record of any attempt at a written formulation of this law in the early sources, but the theoretical principles that provide the basis for Stoic ethics in general, and the Stoic theory of law in particular, make such an attempt highly improbable from the start."
Fundamental to thc Stoic theory of law was the identification of law and logos. Given the statc of the evidence, it is possible to trace this formal identification with ccrtainty only as far as Chrysippus; it is, howcvcr, rather difficult to believc that it was not already central to Zeno's notion of law as well.'" Plutarch reports that in his Republic, Zeno had envisioned a state in which all human beings wcrc fellowlex. While it is of course possible that Cicero himself has read this phrasc into Zeno (or his source for Zeno's thought), thc state of our sources prohibits such sweeping assessments as Kocster offers here.
W D g . Laert. 7.128. 'Chis distinction is cchocd by Arius Didymus, who characterizcs b hhoyog as rpGoet v 6 b o ~(SVF 2.528). 'To this extent, Vander MTaerdt's claim that "the early scholarchs avoid the term nornox phuseos hecause it is a singularly inappropriate term to describc their theory" would seem to g-o beyond the evidence; that such a term is "a singularly inappropriate" description of the Stoic theory is in any casc questionable as, indeed, the tide a f Vander Waerdt's dissertation itself suggests. See "The Stoic Theory of Natural Law," 10. 71%is is a r ~ v e dat lengh in Vander IVacrdt, "The Stoic Theory of Natural Law"; see csp. pp. 89-99. See further B. Inwood, "Commentary on Striker," Noceeding of the Bo~tonArea Colloquium in Anclenl Philoroph~2; 95-101. For a dilierent view see Minis, "Natural Law and Natural Right in Post-Aristotelian Philosophy," 48 12-50. "' So also M. E. Reesor? 7Xe Political 7 h e o y o f t h r Old and Mddle Sloa (New York: J. J. Augustin; 1951) 9--10; Vander \Vaerdt, "The Stoic Theory of Natural Iaw," 38 and 123-134. CC. also the comment of Cicero (De flal. Deoetir 1.36) that "Zeno bclicvcd the natural law ro be divine, and that its function is to command what k risht and ro forbid the opposite," with the most cornmonly attested Stoic dchition of lax*.; on which see immediately below.
'
LAW AS IMPLA8TED LOGOS
33
citizens, a n d i n which t h e d i i r e n t local systcms of justice (i6io~5 ~ L K U ~ O were L ~ ) replaccd b y the "uni\~crsal law" (xo~vbs v6~0<)."Plutarch does n o t dcscribe this universal law furthcr; b u t >\here the "world city" is discussed i n latcr literature, its ''Ian-" or "constitotion" is regularly identified as logos.'2 I n fact, the identification of t h e univcrsal law with logos is apparently assumed already b y Cleanthes, w h o equates neglcct of the former with ignorance of the latter in his
Hymn lo Zeus: For you [Zeus] have so welded into one all t h i n s good and bad h a t they all share in a single e\,crlasting reason ( Z ~ o v ) It . is shunned and neglected by the bad among mortal men, the wretched, who ever yearn Tor the possession of goods yet neither see nor hear god's univenal law ( 8 ~ 0 ~otvbv 5 v6pov) by obeying which they could lead a good life in partnership with intelligence.'" I n any cvent, the idcntjfication was made explicit a t least by Chrysippus, a s is clear rrom Diogenes 1,aertlus's report that h e had characterizcd t h e universal law (b v6p05 b ~ 0 1 ~ 6 as 5 ) "right reason which pervades all things" (6 6p0b5 Xhyog, 6t& akv.vrwv ~ ~ x ~ w E v o ~ ) . ' " Firmly i n place i n o u r latcr sourccs for Stoic philosophy, this identification of law a n d logos is in fact fundamental to a well-attcsted Stoic definition of ldw." Accoldi~dingto Stohacus, the Stoics
" Plutarch, Alex Fort. Ee. 329A-B (= SVF 1.262). Plutarch's report that Zenn said all people werc citizens should be read in light of 13iog. Laert. 7.32-33, where it is reported that Zeno held that only the virtuous were to be considered citizens of the univcnd politcia, while the non-virtuous wcrc "aliens" and "enemies." lt is most reasonable to conclude that Zeno held that all human beings have thr pofmha1 Lo be citizens owing to their possession oT l o p , though only those who petfcct their reason, and so live in accord with the cosmic law, actually are such. Cf. in this respect Philo's limitation of the term "world citizcn" to the B~vuxot"&KO,, on which see below, Chapter Three. " Sce, e.g., Ciceru De Leg. 1.23. CT. the remark of Arius Didymus that p d s and humans "are members of a community because of their participation in reason, which is natural law" (q60~t"6~05);ror text and translation scc A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, ?he IIellenkhc Philosophms, (2 "01s.; Cambridge: Cambridge Univerrity Press, 1987) 567L (= SVF 2.528). Cf. in addition the use of such tcrminolo~yby Philo and in the Apoxtlollc Consfihlions, on which see below, Chapter 'llrce. See furthcr the works of Reesor and Vander Wacrdt cited above in note 10. A rantalizing fra~rncntfrom Heraclitus sccms to su~gcstthaL he may have been an important precursor a, the Stoics in this respcc~;Tor text, translation and comlr with ao Iinlroduc&n and mentary see G. S. Kirk, He?-nclitus: The C m l c F ~ q ~ n z Edited Commentq (Cambridge: Cambride;e University Press. 1954) 48-56; see more genc r d y A. A. Long, "Heraclitus and Stoicism," Philosophia 5/6 (1975-76) 133-56. l 3 The translation is that of Long and Scdey, 7 h e Hellenktlc Philorophmx, I .326f ' Diog. Laert. 7.88; all translations of Diog-enes IaerLius are taken Trom LCL unlcss athenvise noted. '" h1. SSchorield writes that "the proposition that law is simply right reason
34
CHAPTER TWO
say that the law is good, being right reason commanding, on one hand, that which ought to be done, and forbidding, on the othcr, that which ought not be done.'" This definition is echoed elsewhere by Stobaeus, and is found ~ i c h minor variations in the works of a number or othcr authors, includins Cicero, Philo, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Clement of Alexandria." The fact that this definition is so widespread and never attributed to any particular philosopher suggests chat it was rather standard Stoic farc. All of its elements, moreover, are at least present in thc writings of Chrysippus, who not only, as we have seen, identified law as "right reason" (6pObg h6yoq), but also wrote the following in the opening of his On Law: Law is king of all things human and divine. Law must preside ovcr what is honourable and base, as ruler and as ,guide, and thus be ihe standard of right and wrong, prescribing to animah whose nature is political what t h y should do, aadfirohibiting tllernjorn what t h y should no1 do ( ~ a i ~ i u v~ ( l o enohr~~lcbiv t @ov n p o o r a ~ z t ~ b pi" v &v notqriov, drnayvpeu.rtxbv 6k &v oi, no~q.iiov)."'
~ V a t u r a lI*rw ar C o ~ m i cLogos
The Stoics closely associated thc logos which is law with God. Cicero, ror example, reports that "Zeno believed the natural law to he divine."'Vhis association at timcs took the form of out-and-out identification. According to Cicero, Chrysippus "idcnfies Jupiter with the mighty law, everlasting and eternal, which is our guidc of life and instrnctress in Again, Diogencs Laertius reports Chry-
employed in prescribing what should be done and forbidding what should not be done is a securely Stoic and indccd Chrysippean thesis"; see The Slok sea of the CX (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 68-69. Note further the attribution of a quite similar definition to Zcno by Cicero in De flal. Deoz 1.36: "Zeno's view is that the law of nature is divine, and lhat its function is to command what is right and to forbid h e opposite" (&to outem. . . naluruh lqqm dininam u.se cemel, eamgue uim o b t i m re& inperantem prohibentnnyue conlrario). All translations of Cicero's works: unless otherwise noted, are takcn from LCL. '"VF 3.613: rbv re v6pov oaou6piov Eivai Qaal, Myov bpebv iivia npooiaicrt~bv pi" 6" U Y O L ~ dTl~z O a yV~,p ~ u n ~6kb hv v 06 notqrhov. " See SVF 3.614; Cicero, De Le8. 1.18-19; 1.42 2.81 2.10; cf. D)e R*. 33; Philo, Jos. 29; h e m . Porn. 55; )Wig. Abr 130; see further SVF 2.1003; 3.332. SVF 3.3141 the translation is that of Long and Sedlcy, The Ifelloristic Philr,.rophm, 1.432 (§67R), with my emphasis. 'I De .hkt Deor 1.36. "' Llr ;\.hl. Dror 1.40: Idmgue [sc. Chlysippus; cT 1.391 etkm le@r perpehrne el mlc-
35
LAW A S IIVIPLANTED LOCOS
sippus's \leu, that "thc law common to all thins, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things. . . is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is."2' On the other hand, the Stoics wcrc apparently equally comfortable using language that indicated Thus that God and the law were not, strictly speaking, id~ntical.~? God is strictly identical with neithcr "universal reason" (~otvbqh6yoq) nor law in Cleanthes's Hymn to Zeus." A passage lrom lJlutarch might evidence a similar distinction on the part of Chrysippus, who also, according to Cicero, could idcntify the Brad Inwood: in fact, has made the plausible suggestion that the Stoic (or at least Chrysippus's) "universal law" should be interpreted specifically as the will (po6hqcr~q)-that is, the rational impulse (bpfifi) ---of Zeus, on the basis of the Stoic psychology of action.'Thc fluidity of the Stoic usaxe in this respect is perhaps to be understood in light of their similarly fluid use of the term "g~d."'~ The association of law with thc reason of God is also round in Ciccro's De Legiazlr. In 2.86 Cicero attributes to the "uuiscst men" (sap2"tirsimomm) the view that "the ultimate and primal Law is the mind of God, whose reason directs all things either by compulsion or re~traint."~'This law, hc explains, is "coeval" (aequalis) with God, nae vim, y u r quasi dux uitm el mqistm offiiorum d,Iovm d i d axe, cited according to TCL. Cf. Diog. Laen. 7.134 where rbv 8 ~ 6 vis identified with rbv G y o v ; and note
further the introduction to Chrysippus's On low; where it is said that " I m is king of all things human and divine" (SVF 3.314). Iliog. Laert. 7.88: b v6fio5 b icorv6~;8anep hariv b 6 ~ 0 6 5Myog, GL& zirvzov
"
k p ~ 6 p w o
Gv ~Ati, ( ilca6qyep6v~rob.rq 4~ riuv Bvrov
" k a i n s t Horsley, "Law of Nature,"
&ormiaeog 6v.r~.
42, who finds the tendency of Philo and Cicero to distinguish God from law- as the "most significant" of all the indications of Platonic influence on thc Stoic ideas of thcse authors. 23 See SVF 1.537 (= Stobaeus, 6 1 . 1.25.3-27.4), noting esp. the following clauses: ZEi (pb& dlpmyh, Y ~ ~ Of i hUw z i r v ~ uICUPEPY~V . . . ICCITEUBGYEY X O L Y ~ Vhbyov, C5 St& rrdluiwv cpa~?P. '* Plurarch, St. Rep. 1050D; thc extent to which the phrase ibv roD A~bgGyov . . . lcui vbfiov lcai G i q v r u i np6votuv represents Chrysippus's own words, however, is not immediatcly clear. Brad lnw-ood, E l h i and H u m n AclGn in Earb Sloicim (Oxford: Clarcndon Press: I 985) lOir and 160. See further on this immediatcly below. Cf in this respec1 Philo op$: 3. '"ce, Tor examplc, the Epicurean clitique of Stoic theology rcported by Cicero in De h'at. Deor 1.36-41; see further Long and Scdley, lh HtlhiilG Phih~,@heri, 1.323-33. D D 1~ 2 ~ .2.8. I diverge rrom the transladon of the LCL only in reading p&npen.. . et uliimam as descriptive or l q m illam rather than the rnentnn d& cf. in this respect 2.10, cited below, where the law,: in a similar context, is described a vern el princepr.
"
"
36
CHAPTER TWO
"for the divine mind cannot exist without rcason, and divinc reason cannot but have this power to establish right and ~ ~ r o n g . "Thus, ~" before human beings ever began to codify laws, this "eternal law" (legem sempitonam) was in effect: For reason did exist, derived from the nature of the universe, urging men to right conduct and diverting them from wrong-doing, and this ' ~ when reason did not first become Law when it was written d o ~ n , but it first came into existence; and it came into existence simultaneously with the divine mind.3u Cicero then offers a version of thc standard Stoic definition of law which identifies thc "right rcason" in question more closely: "Wherefore the true and primal law, applied to command and prohibition, is h e right reason of supreme J~piter."~' These passages from De Legibu 2 occur in the context of a recap of the main points of De Legibus 1, which itself provides the theoretical basis for the De h g i b u as a whole."' It is therefore not surprising that thc association of the law with the divine ratio emerges clearly in book one as well, especially in connection with Cicero's argument that the common possession of reason (and therefore right rcason) by the gods and humanity cntails the common possession of law as well-a series of inferences that leads ultimately to the familiar Stoic thesis of the citizenship of gods and human beings in thc cosmic ~ivitax.'~
flatural Lam er Human R e o n Just as logos, according to the Stoics, is both a divinc, cosmic forcc and a particular charactcristic of the human animal, so too could the law comprised by this logos be conceived as both permeating the cosmos and intcrnal to the human individual. Whiie explicit testimony is lacking in the extant early fragments: the Stoic espousal of
'"Ibid, 2.10. '"Note that Cicero's own attempt lo write up a law based on chis "natural
law" seems rather a1 odds with the early Stoic theory; see on this point above. In this respect, though, his projecl is not unlike later Jewish and Christian auemprs to find verhal expressions of this iaw- in L'leir own traditions of insvuction; scc further on this Chapters Three and Pour. ' O De L e , 2.10.
" Ibid " Sce the comments of Cicero " Be I q . 1-23.
in De Les 2.8, and those of Quintus in 2.9.
LAW AS IMPLAWE3D LOGOS
37
this latter view is nonetheless certain, at least from the timc of Chrysippus. Suggestive in the first place is the fact that where the undoubtedly early Stoic concept of the human animal as citizen of thc World City appears in later sources, it is consistently emphasized that the human's status as citizen ow-es to his or her share of the logos which constitutes the law of the Co~mopolis.~'The most decisive evidence, however, comes from the sphere of the Stoic psychology of action. We have seen the specification of the law's function as "commanding that which is to be done and forbidding that which is not to be done" appcars repeatedly in the Stoic sources. It is attributed to Zeno, quoted from Chrysippus's On Law, and is part of the standard Stoic definition of law found in a diverse body of ancient literature. It is therecore of great interest that Chrysippus understood these functions to be intimately bound up with the workings of the human logos as well. AU animal action, according to the Stoics, originates ultimately with "impulse" (6pwfi).15 Each impulse is itself prompted by a parnamely a "hormetic preticular type of "presentation" (qav~aoia), sentation," which "indicates to the animal the presence of something of interest to it, something which will contribute to its health, wellbeing, pleasure, the fulMmcnt or its individual nature, e t ~ . " 'In ~ the case or the mature human animal, the logos functions to provide a propositional content to the hometic (and other) presentations that he or she expericnccs, and rational human action is caused by the impulse which results from assent to the proposition accompanying a given hormetic pre~entation.~'Inwood makes the quite plausible
above, note 12. the summary of thc Stoic doctrine of impulse which follows I rely on see eso. h o o d ' s vew illuminatine" study. ' . Ethic5 and Human Action in Early Stoic&. pp. 47-53 on impulse as the cause of action. See further h n g and sL-dlcy, j h e Helknirlic Philosophos, 1.346-54, who offer translations of some or the basic evidence d o n s with comments. '"nwood, Elhicr and Human Achon: 56. ib Cherniss points out (Plularch. Mo~alia [LCI.. Cambridge, MA: H m a r d University Press, 1976; repr. 19931, 4.51-52 note c), the term bppfi: as is so common in Stoic schemes oC classification, seems to havc heen used both in a more ~ e n c r a lway (i.e.: to desipatc that movement or the soul which is gznerative aC action) and with a more specific n.Ccren1 (i.e., as one species of thc Cormer? namely that directcd toward somethins desired). The latter is to be contrasted with anothsr species of the more general 6pp6, namely the blpop~fi, which is directed away from something rejected. See lurther the deuiled discussion of the Stoic teminology in Inwood, Ethic1 and H u m n Action, 224-42. Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.86; where the l o p is said to supervene "as the crafrsman
'"ce
" For
"
conjecture that the Stoics would have held that an imperatival clause accompanies the hormetic presentation in addition to the propositional clause that accompanies all presentations.'8 For example, if a thirsty woman experiences thc presentation of a glass or icc water u not only upon on a hot day, her drinking that water ~ i depend her assent to the proposition "it is appropriate for me to drink this icc water," but hcr obedience to the impcrativc "drink the icc water!" that her logos would issue subsequent to her asscnt to the dorenlentioncd proposition. In short, rational human action is the result of one's obedience to the imperatival commands issued by one's own logos in response to hormetic pre>er~~acions. Thus Chrysippus defincd a human animal's impulse (bpy~)--impulse, that is, in the stricter a6r@roii not~iv,and &qoph as h6yo5 sense3"--as h6yo5 npoora~rt~bq &?~CL~O~EVTIK~~.~~
This description of the human logos as npoara~rt~6q" and &nayopeu r ~ ~ is 6 5r.&er s a n s in light of the widely attested Stoic definition of v6yo5 as hboq 6p0bq npooraxrticbq yiv &v noqrkov, & n a y o p ~ v r ~ ~ b 5 6 i ij, 06 xoqrLov. It is highly significant, thereforc, that the definitions of human bpy6 and &qopyG given above were in fact taken by l'lutarch from Chrysippus's treatise On Law, a work which had uscd the terms of impulse," as "a more perfect leadership" in action. (The translation oS the-latter phrase [ ~ e k t o ~ i p anvp o o ~ a a i a v ] is ukcn Gom LCL; for
" " "
39
LAW AS IkPL4NTED LOGOS
npou.ia~71~6v and hliayopenru~6v to describe the runctions of law in its opening lincs."' Inwood quite reasonably conclndcs that this treatise must have been a work setting out in detail the relation of man to the will of Zeus.. . In doing this hc [sc. Chrysippus] seems to have developed a theory of the similarity of the mind of man and of sod, and of the consequent need or a man to assimilate his will to that of god? A man's correct actions (htmthtm.atu) are the result or his impulses, obedience to commands to himselr which are at the same lime thc commands of the Law of Nature, the will of Zeus!+ The fact that Chrysippus concerned himself with thc topic of "impulse" in his trcatise On Law, and that he moreover used the same terms to describe the functioning of human reason and natural Pan, in h i s work, make it quite d i c u l t to escape thc conclusion that the identification of law with thc logos of the sagc was an important clcment of his ihcoq- of law:'5 Several explicit statcments of the idcntification of the law of naturc with human reason are in fact found in Cicero's De Lqibus, alongside its identification with the rcason of God. In 2.8 Ciccro writes that that Law which the sods havc given to the human race has been justly praised; for it is the reason and mind of the sage applied to command and prohibition.'" This definition is obviously reminiscent of what wc have found to have been a common Stoic dcfmition of law. As in 2.10, it is altered only by a more prccise identification of the ratio in question; this h e , however, Cicero spcciiies that it is particularly the reason of the sage. T h e parallel bctween 2.8 and 2.10 is madc explicit in 2.1 1. T h e text is c o m p t but the sense is clcar in any case: Therefore, just as that divine mind is the supreme Law, so, when [reason] is perfected in man, [that also is Law; and this perfccted reason exists] in the mind of the wise man."
12
Plutarch, St Rep. 1037% cf SVI; 3.314.
" h o o d cites in lhis conneclion Cicera, I)e .Nal. Deor
2.58.
Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 108. '' Note also that Plularch's critique of Chrysippus's On 1- in St. Rep. 1038A seems to assume that Chrysippus had made this identification. "" De 128 2.81 I have altered the translation or LCI. only in rendering ralio meniqut ~npimfisas "ihe rraFon and mind or the s q e " rather than "or a i r i w lrm&er." I' De 14. 2.1 1; I cite thc LCL transladon; which follows thc conjectural emendation or Vahlen.
40
CWER
TWO
The identilication of law with thc ratio of the sage, as was the case with its equation w-ith the ratio of God, is also clear from Book Onc. It emerges most clearly in De kg. 1.18-19, where Cicero attributes to "thc most learned men" (doctissimis uiris) the view that Law is highest reason implanted in nature (mmma ratio inrita in natu~a) which commands what ought to be done and forbids the opposite. This reason, when strengthened and perfected in the human mind, is law. And so they believe that Law is intrlligencc, whose natural funcdon it is to command right conduct and forbid wrongdoing. . . [Law] is the mind and reason of the sage . . .'"
It is clcar from the subsequcnt reference to the mms ratioque pmdentis and the preceding mention of the homink menr that Cicero's primary concern here is human reason. O n the other hand, the general equation of law with "intelligence" (prudmtiam) which naturally commands and prohibits might bc spoken with reference to God or humanity:' and at least one author has in fact interpreted the initial definition of law as summa ratio insita in nahcra with referencc to thc divine reason which penrades the cosmos.50As this is precisely the definition which is of central concern to the present study, it requires closer examination. Which mtio in particular does Cicero havc in mind here? Is a Greek h6pg Epqu~og,as Meyer suggested, in Fact to hc scen behind Cicero's Latin ratio insita? Is thcrc any particular significance to the use of the t e r n "implanted" in this conncction?
I begin with the observation that the Stoic identification of natural law with human reason implies a developmental aspect to their theo ~ of y law. According to the Stoics, the human animal is born with only a potential logos, and cannot be properly described as "rational" until around the agc of seven, at which time thc logos hccomes
" De Les. 1 .la-19: la e ~ ralio t summa in& in noturq quoe iubet ea, quoe fanendo runt, prohibelque conhark. eadem mlio cum #st in bornink menta cmjimata el confkdq lex eit. itaqu arbilranlur pmdmliam e m kqm, cuiu ea uk iil, ut recte f a n e iubeat, t ~ t e tdelinpune. . . ea eil enim nalurnr uk. en m m rahboue ,hudentir. . . I have slirhltv " , altered the LCI. translation. Cf also Lle b ~ . 1.23. Cf De h ~2.10: . "For the dibine mind cannot exist without reason; and divinc reason cannotbut have the power to establish right and wrong." "" Kenlcr, De Legibu, 81f
.
''
LAW .4S IMPLhWED LOGOS
41
"completcd from the preconceptions" (;K rGv npohfiyr~ovouwhqpoG&a~).i' This maturation at around sevcn years of age is to be sharply distinguished from the ultimate perfection of the logos attained only by thc sage. Unlike the formcr, which occurs quite naturally and independently of any intentionality in every human individual, the larter occurs only through Feat intellectual cffort, and is in fact rarely, if ever, achieved."' This initial maturation rill be discussed more fully below. At present I wish only to emphasize that, inasmuch as it is the perfected reason (6p8b5 h6yo5) which is identified by the Stoics as natural law, there is necessarily a dcvelopmental aspect in thc theory. While cxplicit evidence for early Stoic discussion of this natural consequence of their identification of natural law with human reason is lacking in the extant fragments, such a developmental aspect is in fact quite explicit in Ciccro's De Le9;bus. The thought bchind the corrupt passage from 2.10, where Cicero apparently identifies the law as reason "when it is perfectcd in the human being" (cum in homine est perjcta), and which thus exists particularly in "the mind or thc sage" (in mente sapientis), is spelled out more clearly in I. 18. He begins by stating, as his initial definition of law, an obvious variant of the common Stoic definition discussed above: lez est ratio svmma insita in natura, quae iubet ea, quae facienda sunt, prohibetque conharia. He then proceeds to clarify: "this reason, mhm strengthened and completed in the human mind, is law."" This statement obviously assumes a time when the ratio was less than "strengthcncd and "complcted," and this is precisely what one would expcct given the Stoic account of the dcvclopment of the human reason. The particular developmental process which informs Cicero's De Legibm is stated more fully in 1.26-27. Having secured thc premise of the providcntial governance of thc universe (1.21) and the kinship of humans with God (1.22-25), Cicero rehearses a litany of tbc gifts that divine Naturc has bestowed upon humans as a result of this family tie. Includcd among these are not only the senses, which scrve as one's "attcndants and messengers," but also the disclosure
" SW 2.83; on the Stoic doctrinc of pre~onccption~see bplow. " See 1 . o ~and~ Scdiey, 7h Helbniil2c Philosoflhers, 1.381 (961N). '' De Leg. I .la: eodnn ratio cum eft in horninc mmte coy7nnalrr el cor$&to,
l a rsl. As was thc case in ihe citation of this passagc above, I havc altered the transladon 01 LCI.; the cmpiiasis in the translation, too; has been added.
42
C H ~ T E R TWO
of "vague conceptions of the most important things" (remm plurimamm obscurar . . . zntelligmtiar) which provide, "as it w-erc, the foundations of knowledge" (quaijindamenta quaedam sbentiae)." Ciccro continues, describing the further development of these "obscurc conccptions" into the ratio itself Rut, whcrcas God has begotten and equipped the human being, desiring it to he the chief of all created things, it should now be evident, without going into all the details, that nature herself-by herself(ipsam p m pee naturam) goes a stcp farther; for, ~vithno guide to point thc way, she starts with those things whose character she has learned through the rudimentary and inchoate conceptions, and henelf--by henelfstrengthens and perfects the faculty of reason (ex prima et inchoata intellkenentia gnwa co@ouit, conJimat ipsa per se rationem et p@ci~.j'
As Kentcr has recognized, De Leg. 1.26-27 is to be understood in lisht of the Stoic vicw, mentioned above, that the human logos matures to the point where it can be described as properly "rational" as the rcsult of a natural proccss involving prcconccptions (npohfiyr~t~)."" According to Cicero, then, thc maturc human ratio--and ultimately, ideally, the "right reason" that is natural law-develops directly out these "obscure conccptions." Moreover, it is clear from Ciccro's depiction of these "foundations or knowledge" as a divine endowment of the same order as the scnses and the human form that hc understands thcm to be innate in thc human animal.j7 In fact, the Stoics did speak of a certain category of preconception which they described as &pqupu?og,and it is undoubtedly this class of preconccption that Cicero here has in mind. Thus for Cicero the potential ratio with which humans are born is intimately associatcd with the ".~mplantedpreconceptions" (&II+IVTO~ npohilyr~y):human reason in the proper sense of the term dcvelops naturally and directly out of them.'' The fact that this developmcntal scheme is assumed in the initial
"Iile 128 1.26; translation mine. The LCL translation of inlell@entias as "meanin,& fails to b r i n ~out the connection with the Stoic doctrine of conception and in Cicero, see Marin 0. T.is~u, Etude s u ~lo preconception; on this use of intell&tia Inqw de la Philosophre Morale cher Cicbon (Paris: Sociitk #Edition *I.es Belles Lettresa, 1930) 114 and 126. O n the textual problem here see Kenter, De +bus. 11 1-1 12; the intenrion is suficiontly dear for our purposes in any case. " De Leg 1.27; Ihc translation is based on the LCL. " Kenter, De L q i b u r . 111-12.
Ibid '"te further on this point below. j '
LAW AS IMPLANTED LOCOS
43
account of natural law, where law is defined as ratio ksita (cf: Myoq &pqupu.rog),requircs closer attention. There is, however, an important preliminary issue which must first be sorted out. The Stoic doctrine of "implantcd preconceptions" has been the subject of no small debate, and it has been suggested bymorc than one author that Cicero's belief that these are prcscnt in human individuals from birth represents a platonizing interpretation of the Stoic position."Vt \?;ill bc necessary to bring somc clarity to the Stoic theory, and thus to Cicero's rclation to it, before proceeding further. Thcsc questions are of obvious importance Tor h e more general issuc of the prima~ysource for the De Legibus and its relation to the carly Stoics. More importantly for our present purposes, this analysis d l greatly illuminate thc rccuning use or the term "implanted" to describe the human logos or the natural law it comprises in thc ancient litcrature.
Thc debate surrounding the Stoic doctrine of "implantcd preconxpohfi~+~xg) concerns, specihcally, the early Stoic ceptions" (Epqu~o~ understanding of their origin."' Both Chrysippus and Epictetus used the term Epqurog to dcscribe human preconceptions of basic ethical catcgories such as good and bad. It is clear by all accounts that Epictetus, in a manner reminiscent of Cicero, uscd this term to convey that these preconceptions arc in some sensc "inborn" in the human animal. There has been wide disagreement, however, regarding Chrysippus's use of the term and its rclation to that of Epictetus. In what follows, therefore, it will he necessary to reconstruct Chrysippus's doctrine as far as possible without reference to the evidencc of Epictetus. "'p
-.g., Kenter, De l ~ g b u . ,112. 7 h e most extensive discussions are those of A. BonhofFer, Epi6t.d und die Ston Unler~uchun~m rur iloischen Philoiophie (Stuttgarl: Enke 1890; repr., Stuttgart-Bad Cannslatt: Friedrich Frornrnann Verlag [G"nther Holzhoog~,1968) 187-222; F. H. Sandbach, "Ennoia and Prolepsis in the Stoic T h e o ~ yof Knowledge," Clm.&l (2.~11tcJp 24 (1930) 44751; reprinted with supplemcnlaq, notes in K ~ ~ b in l mStoinjm~ 22-37; and M. Pohlenz, Grundfra~en dw iloischen PhilosophG (Ahhandlungen dcr Gesellschaft der JVisiissenschaften zu GBttingen 3 / 2 6 Gbuingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1940; reprinted in Sloicljrn, jcd. Leonardo Tarin; Greek & Roman P i ~ i l o s o ~38; h ~Ncw York Br Inndon: Garland, 19871) 82-103.
'
44
CHAPTER TWO
The Problem T h e basic contours of thc Stoic doctrine of conception and preconception are reported by- Aetius: When man is born, he has thc commandir~gpart of his soul like a sheet of paper seniceable for writing upon. On this he inscribes each one of his conccpts (61&vo~iuv). " The first method of inscription is . perceiving something, e.g. through the senses (61&.iba i o e i o ~ o v ) For white, they have a memoly (pvjpqv) of it when it has departed. And when many memories of a similar kind have arisen: then we say we have experience (hpze~piav).Experience is the mass of similar presentations (qavraoriuv). H e continues: Of conceptions, some come about naturally in the aforesaid ways and undesignedly, hut others through our instruction and attention. The latter are called "conceptions" only, the former are dso called "prcconceptions" (tiuv 6k &vo~iuvai pkv rpuotx65 yivovzal xarh rob5 eipllp~voug rp6xou; xai d r v t n t ~ ~ p i zaqi ,6h 36r 6 i f i l ~ z h p a 56t6amahiag xai & t p ~ k i a 5 . a & r ap~ b o%vEwolal ~ a h O i v z apbvov, t k x ~ i v a6k l ~Ciizpoh$IyEl5). Reason (b %yo5), for which we are called rational (hoy~roi),is said to be completed from our preconceptions ( i . riuv ~ zpoh$y~wvoupxhrlpoG&a~) over the lirst seven years of life."'
Preconception (np6hqgi;) is thus a type of conception (kvota). T h e term Evvo~ais used both in this more general sense, as the gcnus of which preconception is a species, as well as in a morc restricted scnsc to denote a particular species of conception which contrasts with the preconception."' According t o Actius, the distinction between preconceptions and conceptions in this strict sense is one of origin: zpohfi~y~t; arise "naturally" whereas Evvoxa~in the strict sense refcr to thosc concepts which result from conscious intellectual eff~rtort."~ Thus preconccption can fairly be described as one's initial conception of somethirlg, which is as such rather U-defincd and in need of further refinement.64 Both thc natural origin of preconceptions
'' SVF 2.83; the translalion
is that of Sandbach, "Ennoia," 25L
" Pohlenz (Mjqpesr84) , speaks of “his im engercn Sinne" and as "OberbcgrifP "Bonh6Kcr's limitation of the preconceptions to the "erhischen und &thetischchen BegTiRc," (e.g. Epictet und die Sha, 191, 193) and the concept of God (Epiclet und dG Sloa: 218-22), as well as his identification of them with the korvai i'vvo~a~ have been well refuted by Sandbach; see "Ennoia;" 26f and 23 25; &o Pohlem, Cmdjqm? 84-85. Both result from his confusion of npohfiyr~qin gcneral with the ibrpurot npohfiIyek;. See furher on this below. " CCf Sandbach, "Ennoia," 25: "This; then, is one distinguishing mark of thc
LAW AS I M P U W E S LOCOS
45
and the rathcr general character of thcir content are apparently reflected in Chrysippus's definition of np6hqvt~as &vote vuottdl iuiv ~u66hou." It is the prccise meaning of this "natural" acquisition of thc preconceptions that has bccn at thc center of the scholarly debate regarding the Stoic doctrinc of np6hqyrt~.At least onc scnsc is clear enough from Aetius's own report: preconceptions result from the "natural" tendency of thc commanding faculty to organize sensual expericnce, even becore an individual has bccome properly rational." It has long been notcd, howrevcr, that while Aetius speaks of the "aforesaid ways" (plural) in which prcconceptions can arise, hc indicates only one such way, namely, by means of sensual experience." It is therefore generally agreed that behind Aetius's account lies some source that had described more fully the "natural" and "undesigned" acquisition of preconceptions, and that something approximating such a source is presenred by Diogcnes Laertiu~:'~
Of things conceived ( r b voouwivov), some have been conceived by ~ b y resemblance, some by direct experience (xarh n ~ p i n r w o t v )some analogy, some by transposition, some by composition, some by contrariety. . . and some things are conceived b y inference, l i e propositions and space; and something just and good ( 6 i r a ~ 6 vTI rai 6~yafJi.v) is conceived naturally (gvotriu<); and by privation, for instance a man without hands."
prcconception; it is an undeveloped conception, as opposed to the thought-out definition"; further Pohlenz, h n d j q e n , 83-84. The technical term for this refinement seems to have been Sl&pBpwo~<;the evidence far this term comes primarily from Epictetus, but cf: Diog Laen. 7.199. Scc furthcr Bonhdffer, Epirtel und die Stoa, 188-90. DDg. Laert. 7.54, ciiing from the tint book of Chrysippus's nepi A&you. On the translation of this rather difficult phrase, see Sandbach, "Ennoia;" 25 and 35 n. 12, who translates it as a "natural conception of the general characteristics of a thing" It has been xariously understood but seems to suggest the rather gencral (which is to say, neither precisely nor adequately defined) nature of the i n f o m a tion such a conception bears; so Sandbach, "Ennoia," 25; Pohlenz, Gnmdbqen, 89; Bonhoffer, Eflickl und die Sloa, 203-4. " Indeed the human lozo~,which is itself present at the time o f an individual's hirth only in a potential form, is "completed" by means of thcir accumulation. This; in fact, is introduced as apirrog q
"
"
"
The "dircct experiencc" which heads the list in this passagc corresponds to the conceptions acquired "by the senses" in Aetius's account, with the rest of it apparently comprising his unspecified "aforesaid ways.""' Most of thc itcms on this List represcnt "somc simple and unconscious mental operation from the data given by thc senses" similar to that described already by Aetius in his illustration of the "natural" acquisition of preconceptions." Signzcantly, howcvcr, thc only conceptions singlcd out by Diogenes Lacrtius as acquired "naturally" here are those of "something just and good." Assuming that something l i e this account lics behind the report of Actius, thererore, we have a problcm. .Ire we to understand that thc concepts of "something just and good" are the only preconceptions (i.e., qvoucul Evvouuuj on this list, or that they have a "natural" origin in a still more specialized sense than the other types of preconception? It must bc pointed out at once that if Aetius has, in fact, relied on an account such as that found in Diog. Lacrt. 7.52-53, he provides clear and strong evidence for the latter interpretation: not only does Actius characterize the acquisition or conceptions "by means of the scnscs" (6th zGv uidfiueov; cf. Diogenes u voccurring )~~ qvouxG<, but he explicitly Laertius's KUX& a ~ ~ i n ~ w o as classifies such conccptions as apohfiyreu5. This much was clear to Bonhoffer. However, guided by his thescs (ij that preconceptions concerned only conceptions in thc spheres of ethics and theology and (ii) that all preconceptions were inborn, Bonhoffer nonetheless held that only the concepts of "somcthing good" and "something just" from Diogenes Laertius's list were to be considered preconceptions. He argued that Aetius used qvut~G
' O So BonhBffei, Epiclet und die Sloo, 195; Sandhach, "Ennoia," 26; Pohlenz, 821 See further Diog-. Laen. 7.53 for the association of iiepiniootg with rir aio8qrdr. " Sandhach, "Ennoia," 26; similarly Bonhoffer, Epiclel und die Stoa, 195T See above, note 70. " Bonhdffcr; Epiclel und die Stoa, 194-96; cf. how,evrr ibid; 192, where Bonhbffer regards precisely this interpretation of the term "natural" in the conlea of the gencrai Stoic doctrine of rpuormiEvvotai as "unleugh~bar emas Gekiinsteltcs." '* Bonheffer; Epietet und die Sbo; 195.
"
LAW AS IMPLAnl7ED LOCOS
47
ification of such conceptions as apohilyetg so easily. Calling this "den zwcitcn w v n d e n Punkt d c r Stelle," h e writes:
I conrcss that I can only dispose of this obstacle by d ~ cassumption ~ kunstlose either h a t the author, with the ditision of the E v v o ~ ainto and kunrhniiss&eC has thoughtlessly considered only the rpuo~lcaii i v o r a ~ under the former so that, as in Epictetus 2.11, h e division is there.. fore an incomplete one,'. or that h e has mirtnkmly extended the term np6hqynS to such concepb to which it, at least in the stricter sense, is not suitable.'" S u c h m i s t r u s ~of thc fundamental evidencc for t h e Stoic doctrine or zp6hqytg which Aetius's account provides was rightly questioned b y Sandbach." He showcd that Bonhoffcr's limitation of thc preconceptions to concepts in the areas of ethics and theology was in a n y casc m i s g ~ i d e d . ' H ~ c pointed out further that if o n e assumes that some, a t least, of the preconccptions werc held t o originate from empirical experience rather than being inborn in h u m a n s a n assumption warranted even a p a r t from t h e evidence of Aetius7'- -the r e p o m of Aetius a n d Diogenes Laertius a r e actually quitc complementary: The two passages together give a perfectly consistent account of a preconception as the first conception of a thing, amvcd at without spccia1 mental attention, and derived either directly o r by some simple unconscious mental opcration from the data given by ihc senses!" S u c h mental operations as a r e described b y Diogcncs I a e r t i u s a r e simple enough, as Bonhoffer h i s c l f recognized, to warrant their characterization a s "naturallyYYarising. T h e conccptions of "somcthing $.' See further Bonhnffer,EpCclet und dG Stoo, 194 on this supposition 01an incomplete classification. Bonhnffer's bclier that thcrc was a "third category" 01conception results from his mistaken limitation of the tcrm rrp6hqyrr5 to the & & q u ~ o ~ npoh
just and good" must thus be undcrstood to arise "nalurally" in a more specialized sense than is the case with the other prcc~nccptions.~~ 1jThat,thcn, is the nature of this more "natural" origin? Sandbach was n-ell aware that Chqsippus himself, in a manner which recalls xpohily1~15 ~ this passagc from Diogcnes Lacrtius: had spoken of k p q v ~ o of and "bad.nv~ He rightly rejected, however, Bonhoffcr's asscrtion that twquro5 could mean nothing other than inborn, citing , interseveral examplcs to the contrar)i.""n fact, Sandbach a r ~ p e d to pret &wqusogas "inborn" is "contrary to all the other e\.idence, and in particular inconsistcnt with thc image of the soul at birth as a sheet of paper ready to bc inscribed with conceptions.""" He citcd in addition the follouing passagc from Ciccro, which rcports that the Stoics understood the concept of the Good to be arrived at by means or "analogy": Now notions or things are produced in the mind when something has bccome known eithcr by experience or combination of ideas or analo,q- or logical inrerenee. The fourth and last method in this list is the one that has given us thc conception of the Good. Thc mind ascends by infcrcnce from thc things in accordance with naturc till finally it amves at the notion of the Good!" In fact, hc argued, thc especially "natural" origin of the concept of "something good" is itself clarified by this report. While all preconceptions are by definition "naturally" acquired, the origin of our concept of the Good results, in the words of the Stoic spokesman Cato, from thc fact that "the mind ascends by infcrcncc from the things in accordance with nature till finally it arrives at the notion of Good."n6 That is to say, Sandbach argues, "we recognise the good through the force of its own nature."" Bonhoffer's contention that this pas-
"
~Sadhac:h, "~nnoia," 28; so also Pohlenr, Crun@agen; 88-89. Cf. Bonhoffcr, EpIctrt und die Sloa, 1921 "I Sandbach, "Ennoia," 28, apparently refcning to Aetius, Plac 4.1 1, who describes the i'lveu6vricav in this \w. cicero, De fin. 3.33;'cf. Sandhach, "Ennoia," 28-29. Ciceio, Lle Fin. 3.33: a6 i i 7 r h u quae mnl iecundurr~naluram rvcendit onimur colhlime ~dirinir,turn ad nohonem buni p m a i t . Sandbach, "Ennoia," 29. In the appendix to the rcprint of this article, Sandbach n:\ises this position, stating that the "nature" concerned with the term ~ U G L K & < "must be that of the man who forms the conrcpt, not that of the concept itscli" ("Ennoia," 33). However; he gives nc indication of how, i C a i all; hc understands this revisian to elli.cl his overall thcsis o l the origin of the ethical pn:conceptions in empirical experience. See Surthcr helow.
" " "'
sage referred to a conception of the Good------7chich is to say an Evvota in the strict sense as opposed to a more hazy np6hqynq of something good --is for Sandbach "unconvincing in itself," and in any case "impossible" in light of a passage from Scncca where a similar account is presented in the context of a discussion of the initial occurrencc of the concept of the Good."" Finally, Sandbach also downplajs the eiidcncc from Diogcnes Laer~iusby charactcrizing rhc entire sentence "something just and good is conceived naturally'' as being, in any case, "a kind of postscript to the original list" added only because "the good, though conceived 'by analo~).',was not covered by any of h e examplcs given" elsew-here in Diogcncs Iaertius's source."" For Sandbach, then, there can be no question of innate preconcepiions in early Stoici~m.~' In the end, holiever, he round it "dimcult," despitc his own arguments to the contrary, "to feel confident that Chrysippus did not mean 'inhorn' when he wrote the word [sc. %pqu~ o t ] . " He thus settled upon thc rather unsatisfying conclusion that Chrysippus's use of this term as "only a temporary aberration."" Ultimately, therefore, Sandbach merely replaced BonhoKer's mistrust of the evidence of Aetius with similar m i s g ~ n g sregarding evidence from Chrysippus himsclf. Moreovcr, while Sandbach is undoubtedly correct in pointing out that at least some preeonccptions are acquired only through sensual experiencc, his argument that the concept of the Good is also ultimately derived From sensual experience fails to convince. It is not altogether clear that Bonhoffer's detection of a subtle diierence betwccn Diog. Laert. 7.53 and De Fin. 3.33, whereby the latter passage concerns a well defined Evvota rather than a np6hqyy, is "impossible" in light oi" thc evidence or Seneca, as Sandbach maintains. Indccd, Sandbach relegated to his endnotes
Sandbach ("Ennoiu," 29) relen to Scneca, Ep. 120, the topic 01which is "how w c j n l acquire the knowlcdg: or that which is p o d and that which is honorable" (guurnodo ad noi pirrra boni hone.stigur nolitia ponenil]; the translation is citcd according thf I.CL; with emphasis added. AU lranslations or Scneca, unless othrrwise indicated, are taken rrom LCL. Ci: Bonhbfler's treatment 01this passage in Lpktrt urid die Stoa; 2 15-1 6. "' Sandhach, "Ennoia," 29. ""andhach YEnnoiu." 29E) seems to attribute their orcscncc in Euictelus to thr "syncretism or the lint rmtury," at which timc "Platonism gux7c a, Stoicism a heliel. in inhorn co~iceptions." '" Sandbach, "Ennaia," 28. J. M. Rist: in contrast, iras no compunciion about reading Chrysippus as intending "ingrained rathcr lhbn "inborn" ("l'hr Ctitcrion or Truth," Stoic 1'hilo.ropb [Camhridgc: Cambridge Univcrsily Press. 1969; rcpr. 19901 134).
50
CHhPTEK TWO
mcntion of Scncca's additional assertion that while knowledgc of thc Good is arrived at by- mcans of analogy, Nature herself "has @\-en us the seeds of knowledgc."'" In addition, Sandbach's contention that thc notion of innatc preconceptions contradicts Actius's charactcrization of the commanding faculty at birth as a "shect of papyrus serviceable for ~ l i t i n gupon" is an overly hasty and rather superficial dismissal of BonhoKer's position. Bonhoffcr, in fact, had suggested that thc "implantcd preconceptions," like the logos itself, arc prcsent a t birth only in "spermatic"-vhich is to say, potcntial-form, and Sandbach nowhcrc answers this particular argument."" The possibility thercforc remains open thal certain preconceptions, namely those of the cthical sphere, are in some sense inborn in individual humans. But is this in fact thc case? And if so, how did thc Stoics cxplain their existence? It is Max Pohlenz who introduces thc key evidence for the solution to this problcm. Having rejected, with Sandbach, Bonhoffer's contention that Chrysippus's use of the tcrm Epqu~o5was in itseK decisive, Pohlenz nonetheless citcd a previously neglected passage from Plutarch in which Chrysippus is criticized For his supposed contradiction of the "common conception^":^' and this [offensc against common conceptions on the part of Ch~ysippus occurs] too in matters concerning good things and evil and objecs or choice and avoidance and things congenial and repugnant (oiiceiwv T E K U ~drhho~piwv), the clarity of which ought to be more manifest than that of things hot and cold and white and black, since the mental images of these are incidental to h e scnse-pcrccptions entering from V ybp E€,wOiv e i o ~ vai qaviaoiat .iaiq aioO~oeotv without ( ~ K E ~ V Wlliv 6neto66tot) whereas the former are generated intrinsically from the prin~ cip~6v76" iv i f i i v obp~pu.iov&EL niv ciples within us (.iaG.ra 6' i . z6v yiv~o~v).u'
"'
Seneca, Ep. 120.4, which continues: "some say drat wc mercly happened upon this know-ledge; hut it is unbelievable that a vision of viituc could have presented itself to anyone by mere chance" (&idam aiunt no^ in noMnrn indkse, quod est innedihih, virluui ah& rpe& m e m occucurirse); translated according to I.CI.. For Sandhachs intcrprevation of thc "sccds of knowledge," see "Ennoia," 36 n. 23, and fufihcr below. "'Bonhuffrr, Kpipictet und die Sloa; 1941 Pohlenr, Giundpqm, 89. It is not nccesaary iu enter into thc vcxcd question of lcorvai wvorar here since they arc not simply identical with Epvuror npoAil~e~5~ as BonhbKer had beiievcd, nor with the npoA
"
"
H e r c t h e ethically oriented conccpts a r e said to arise directly &K TGV & p ~ G vof the h u m a n individual, a n d a r c o n this basis explicitly distinguishcd from thosc orignating "externally“ bj- means of thc senses."" T h c usc of the t e r n o6wqu~oqt o dcscribe the "internal" origin of ethical nolions such a s good a n d b a d , etc., is, moreover, strikingly reminiscent of Chrysippus's referencc t o thc E p q u ~ ox ~p o h + + ~ e yof wood a n d bad." a T h e theoretical basis for t h c claim of the "internal': origin of h u m a n ethical categories: Pohlcnz a r ~ p e d ,is the Stoic doctrine of oirceioolg." T h e Stoics h a d argued that the first scnsation that a n y given animal cxpericnces is o n e of self-awareness:
. . . as soon as an animal is horn it perceives itself.. . the first thing that animals perceive is their own parts.. . both that they have them and for what purposc they have them. . ." Morcovcr, i h animal's first impulse (+
n p h v bp&), say the Stoics, is to sclfpreservation, because nature at thc outset endears it to itself (oilce~oiiml5 @g qboewg hn' hpl(ild, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his work On Ends: his words are; "The dearest thing (npiurov O~KE?OV) to every animal is its o m constitution ( d o ~ a o t v and ) its C O ~ S C ~ O U S ~ C S S thcrcof"; for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living thing from itsclr or that she should leave ihc crcaturc she has made without either estrangerncnt from or afFection for i u own constitution
"'Cf. further Comm. .,\'ot. 1058F: drq' &v /sc. iGv aio0ilization 2; Denmark: Aarhus University Prcss. 1990). "" Citcd from Long and Sedley, nre Helhirlic P ~ ; ~ O Z O ~1.317 / M &(557C).
52
CHAPTER TWO
(067~ y&p dlhko~p~iUoat ei~bqqv aGrb [a6?@]~ r <@ov; b o6re noitfioaoav uGr6, &fir'hhhorptiuoa~p4~'oixetbat). We arc forced then to conclude that nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself joi~etiUomnpbq kaur6); for so it comes to rcpel all that is injurious (rh Phhnrovra) and gve free access to all that is sen.iceablc or akin to it (rh oi~eia). ""'
In a nutshell, the Stoics argued that the primary drive of all animals (including humans) is that touard the preservation of self. Providential Nature, moreover, endows all animals both -4th an awareness of their own "constitution" (050ra~t<),and with a natural tendency to evaluate their experience subjcctively, distinguishing those things w-hich are hclpful (zh oireia) from thosc which arc harmful (rb P G n rovra; r b hhh6rp~a)to that con~titution.'~' Thus, Pohlenz argued, our ethical concepts form a special category of prcconception inasmuch as thcy alone ultimately originate from something inborn in the human animal rather than from empirical experience. Curiously, however, Pohlenz did not offer an explicit response to Sandbach's contrary account of their origin.ln2 Consequently, when Sandbach added a supplementary note to the 1971 reprint of his "Ennoia and ProlEpsis in thc Stoic Theory of Knowledge," he offercd only one significant revision to his prior account: he conceded that his explanation of the "natural" origin of thc concepts of "something just" and "something good" was "inadequate and unsatisfactory," and stated that the "nature" in question "must be that of the man who forms the concept, not that of the concept itself."'n3 However, Sandbach gave no indication that his general thesis regarding the origin of these conceptions was any less secure as a result of Pohlenz's study. In fact, he remained rather cool to the latter's thesis:
-....... . "' "' iog. Laert. 7.85. "" Ci.Pohlenz, CNndjqm, p. 90: "Die Oikeiosis hewirkt also, d d das Lebewesen die AuRendinge nicht nur ohjektiv wahmimmt, sondern zu seincm cigegenen Ich in Beziehung setzt und subjektiv als niitzlich oder schidlich wertet. Den WerunaBsub liden unsre eigene Natur und das, was ihr gcmBR ist und sie forden." Pohlenz only interacts specifically with Sandbach to endorse the latter's rejection of hoth Bonhaffei's limitation of the preconceptions to matters or ethics and theology, and his identification of them with the "common conceptions." See (;ncndfqm, 85 and n. 1. Sandbach, "Ennoia," 33. Notc, however, that he gives no indication that this revision is indebted to the work of Pohlenz. -
'"
L4W AS IMPLANTED LOCOS
53
I see no reason why this account [from Pohlenz] should not have been welcomed by a Stoic, but also no evidence of its connexion with &pvv.iol iipohfiyet5. In any case Pohlenz makes no claim that it is relevant to the way in which the concept of 'just' is
Indeed, such a renolvned scholar of Stoicism as J. I\&. Rist could continuc after the publication of Pohlenz's work to cite Sandbach's "mastcrly article" as a successful refutation of the notion that thc early Stoa cspoused beliefs in "innate" precouccptions similar to thosc found in Epictctus. "There is no other 'evidcncc' in thc Old Stoic writers for a theory of any kind of 'inborn' belief," he writcs; "thcir philosophy needs no such beliefs and should not bc saddled with them."'05 In what follow-s, therefore, I shall re-examine the cvidencc citcd by Sandhach from Cicero and Seneca with a view, specifically, to the respective theses of Sandbach and Pohlenz. Is Sandbach's assertion that there is "no evidence" to connect the "implanted preconceptions" to oi~eiworqa fair assessment? Does his own reconstruction account for the evidence in a more satisfactory manner?
C k o and Seneca on the Concept of the Good The importance of oi~eiwoyto Stoic philosophy in general is clear from the complaint of Plutarch that "in every hook of physics, yes and of morals too," Chlysippus repeatedly writes "ad nauseam that from the moment of birth we have a natural congeniality to ourselves, to our members, and to our own offspring" (&< oixeto6peBa npbq aG.rob< ebBb< yev6pevor ~ a.ihi wkpq ~ a.r&i E~yova.ih &av.iG~)."~ This doctrine, in fact, provided the starting point for all of Stoic ethics, as is clear from a variety of One such source is the summary of Stoic ethics in the third book of Cicero's De Finibw whence, it will be recalled, comcs thc account of the origin of thc concept of the Good that is so central to Sandbach's
"Ennoia," 34. J. M. Rist, "The Criterion of Truth," 134 with notes 3-4. '"Vlutarch; St. Kep. 1038B. lo' See on this, in addition lo the works mentioned above in note 98; A. A. L o n ~ ,"'I'he Logical Basis of Stoic Ethics," P r o ~ e e d i q i of the Arirlolelian Sonip 71 (1970/71) 85-104; Long and Scdley, 7 h a Hellenirlic Philoxophm~, 1.350-54. Inwood ( E 2 h i ~and ~ Human Aclion, 194) cornmenls that "Chrysippus wanted lo make p o d his point abour orientation [LC.: oireiwor51 because his entire system of ethics would be rounded on it." 1""
lo'
54
CHAPTER TWO
refutation of the idea of "inborn" ethical preconccptions in early Stoicism. It is with this passage, thcrcfore, that I shall bcgin.lO" It will bc recalled that Sandbach argued that Bonhoffer's thesis of Lhc inborn origin of thc concept of "good" stood in clear contradiction to the position of Ciccro's Stoic spokcsman Cato, who attributed its origin to a process of analogy. Sandbach rcjccted Bonhoffer's contention that, since Cicero's Cato focused upon the Good where Diogenes Lacrtius spoke only of something good, the former was concerned specifically with the origin of a fully developed Evvo~arathcr than a r r p o h ~ ~ 1 5 . " ' ~ c s pits i t edismissal by Sandbach, however, Bonhoffcr's obsen~ation,as wc shall see, is quite to the point. Cicero's Cato, in his remarks regarding "analogy" in De Finibu 3, is concerned with our acquisition of the conccpt of the Good in thc strict Stoic sense of the term. The ultimate origin of thc human ability to conceptualize the distinction between "good" and "bad" is another matter altogether. It is important first of all to bear in mind the broader philosophical context in which the summary of De Finibzu 3 was written, namely, in that of a sharp disagreement regarding thc question of the naturc of the Goal, or Highest Good."' Cato, as Ciccro's Stoic representative, argues that the Highest Good consists of virtuc alone. He rejects, therefore, the Platonic and Peripatetic view that "bodily advantages" such as health, strength, etc., contributc anything toward the Goal,"' and for this reason rejects, too, the classification of such things as "goods" at all. Thus, for example, his treatment of health: "We deem health to be d e s e ~ n gof a certain value but we do not place it among the good^.""^ The Highest Good, which is to say virtuc or honeslum, is in fact the sole good.lI3 In effect, the Stoic Cato makes a tcchnical distinction between bonum, or the Good in the strict Stoic scnsc as virtue alonc, and aestimabile, or "the valuable," I"" Cf Pohlena's treatment of this passage in G m n d j p , 86- 92, and csp. 90-92; see also Engheq-Pedersen's analysis in chapters 3 and 4 or his 7 h e Sloic 7 h e v ofoikrioii,. ' " V ~ e eabove, pp. 48-49. "'I See esp. Dr Fin. 3.22-31, 41 48, and the critiquc of the Stoic position in De Finibu % ssec furthcr 5.15-23? which greatly illurninatcs the dispute. Cicero's r)e Finihus as a whole intends to present, with subsequent critiques, the positions of the Epicureans; Stoics; and h l i o c h u s of Rscdon on this question. De Fin. 3.41-40. "' De Fin. 3.44: Ahm qui ualiludinm aertimahone aligua dipam iudicarnus n e g u earn l n m n in honir ponimw, I have slightly dtcred the LCL translation. Scc c.g. De Fin. 3.21, where Ciccro's Cato spcals of honextum, guod iolzm in
"'
"'
bonk ducitu~.
LAW AS IMPLANTED LOCOS
55
under which fall those bodily advantages classiiicd as "good" by the Plaionists, Peripatetics, and more generally in common parlance."' This distinction is scrupulously observed throughout Cato's summary, and will in fact provide one of thc chief points of Cicero's subsequent critique."j Secondly, we must understand De Fin. 3.33, thc spccific passagc to which Sandbach referred, in the context of the larger account o i the development or the notion of thc Good presented in De Finibw 3. Significantly, the conccpt of the Valuable, as the prima diirisio, is said to occur to thc human individual berore that of the Good.""t represents a conceptualization of the distinction that is made natuthe disrally by all animals according to the doctrine of oi~eiwm~q: tinction between those things that arc "deserving of choice" because in accord with nature, and their opposites, which are thus called thc Non-valuable (inmstimabile)."' The formation of the concept of thc Valuable is thus the inevitable result of the combination of, first, the innatc tendcncy of all animals to distinguish those things which are beneficial to their constitutions rrom those that are harmful, and second, the particularly human posscssion or logos, the natural tendency of which is to organize expericnce into concepts. In the dcvclopment that rcsults ultimately in the rormation of the concept of the Good, therefore, the formation of the concept of the Valuable is second only to the practical recognition of that which is valuable, an ability which is innate in all animal^."^ In contrast, Cato reports that the rccognition of "that which can trub be said to be g o o d (quod vere bonum posd dici) is a subsequent devel~prnent."~
"' One senses nonetheless a certain tension in this distinction owing to the fict that the Good, a s a concept, is a derivative of the Valuable. Thus while the Good is on one hand "supremely valuable" (plzrimi oeslimandur~),it is nonetheless f l e r e n t from the Valuable (which is itself neither sogood nor evil) in kind rather than dgrte; sec De Fin. 3.34. See further Pohlenz's references to analogous Stoic evidencc in &n@rugen, 94. "' See, e.g., De Fin. 4.56-61. Cicero here takes the characterisdcaily Antiochan view, apparently originally espoused by Carneadcs (see De Fin. 3.41), that h e Stoics differ on this issue from the Peripatetics and Platonisu, only in terminology, not in substance; d'De FvL. 4.3-5 and 2 1 23. "" De En. 3.20.
"' Ibid. See De Fk. 3.16 and 3.20. "'De Fin. 3.20; emphasis mine.
O n the concept of thc Good as a later dcvclopmcnt rciadve to that of the Valuable, scc further 3.21-22.
56
C~~WER TWO
Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature jea quae sunt secundvm ilaturam); but as soon as he has understanding (intell&entiarr),or rather becomcs capable or "conception" (notionern)--in Stoic phrascoloa- Evva~a-- and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony h a t governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony Tar more highly than all the hings for which he ori$ndly felt an fiection: and by exercise of inlelligence arid reason infers the conclusion (copilione et rallone col1es.t) thai herein resides the Chief Good of man: h e thing t h a ~is praisewonhy and desirable {or ils own sake jsunrrnurn illud hominzs per sc laurlandum el expelendurn bonum) . . ."" Cato spcaks in this instance of thc first recognition oC the Highest Good (snmmnm bonum); thcre is howc\rer, as w-e havc seen, only onc bonum in his systcm, and that is the virtuc which comprises the G o d . Ilbneslurn, he continues, is "thai Good which is thc End to which all clsc is a means" and which "alone is counted among the goods.""' It is striking that Ciccro's Cato associates the later dcveloprnent of the conccpt of h e Good ~ 7 i t hthc ability t o form & v o ~ a ~That . this term is uscd in its strict sensc is clear from the Collowing considerations. T h c formation of the conccpt of thc Valuable, according to Cato's scheme, had already occurred several stagcs prior to thc formation of that of thc Good; thus the stipulation that the Good can be arrived at only with the ability to Sorm Evvo~atwould make little sense if he simply meant the gcncral tcndcncy of the rational animal to Corm (prc-)conceptions from cxpericncc. More impoitantly, thc ability to f i r m preconceptions occurs quite early in human dcvclopment, and in any casc well bcfore one is capable of the type of rational inquiry requisite, according t o Cato, for recognition of the Good.i22Cicero's Cato associates the ability to form E v v o ~ awith ~ the possession oC intell~q%tia,which, as is clear from the context, is characterized by a capacity for rational examination and inquiry (co~itione el ratione). T h c formation of conccpts by this intellectual mcans is, as we have seen, thc mark of Evvora~in thc strict scnsc, not irpohfiry~q. We are now in a position to evaluate properly the noticc concerning the origin of the concept oC the Good in De fin. 3.33 to which Sandbach reCerred in his refutation of Bonhiiffer. The characterization of thc nolitia bani as having ariscn "from the things in
,-
"" 3.21. "' Jle upFir!. *tn. 3.21: iri honum
quo omnia ~6mendnr u n l . . . pod solurri in honii ducitur; I havc sli~hilydicred the LCL rranslaiion. SVF 2.83.
"'
L4W AS IMPLLWi3ZD LOGOS
57
accordance M-ithnature" by mcans of "analog*" (collatione rationis) is to be interpreted in light of the fuller exposition found in 3.20-21 r~hichhas just been examined. Thc "analo,c$' madc from "the things in accordance with nature" to which he here refers, as is clear from 3.20-21, is not a simplc mental process like those which occur automatically and result in the formation of prcconccptions in the prerational stagcs of early childhood. On the contrary, it requires a propcrly rational mind and thc ability to form Evvoiai in the strict sense of the term. Wlorcovcr, the "conception" that Cicero's Cato has in mind, as Bonhoffcr had already rccognizcd, is not of thc hazy and ill-defined varicty that characterizes preconception, but is in fact a conccption of that which is good in the Stoic sense, as opposed to that which is merely "valuable." Cato's concern hcrc, that is, is the manner in which onc arrives at the conccpt of that which the Stoic considcrs thc Good; and this notion, he reports, is attained by means of a rational analovlvledgi:~" thus obscuring thc connec~i<,nwith the Stoic doct+nc or conceptiorr. CT., ho~vever~ Ciccro's use of this term, on which sce Lisp; Elude cur la Larguc. 114. IT'
"'Kp. I2j
Et. 120.1. :3.
"''I'hc
hulk of thc lcucr is in Fact ronccmcd with the further stimulus award
58
CIt4PTEK TWO
Scncca procecds to describe how one anives at a notion of the (Stoic) Good in a manner that is once again reminisccnt of D e Finibus 3: our school of philosophy hold that honesturn and bonurn have been comprehended by means of analogy (per analogia) . . . Now what this "analogy" is, I shall explain. We understood what bodily health was: and from this basis we deduced the existence or a certain mental health also. \lre knew, too: bodily strength, and from this basis we inferrcd the existence of mental sturdiness."' As in D e Fin. 3.21 and 33, the notion of the Good is arrived at by analogy from those things that benefit the body, which is to say, by analogy from the concept of the ~ l i l e . " ~Scncca does not pursue the question of the origin of this latter concept furthcr. H c docs, howcvcr, make reference to "sccds" of the knowlcdgc of the Good which havc bccn given to the human animal directly from Naturc hersclf: Nature could not teach us this [sc. the boni honestique notitia] directly; she has gven us the seeds of knowledge, but not knowledge itself (smma nobk scientiae didit, sointiam non dedit). Some say that we merely happcned upon this knowledze; hut it is unbelievable that a vision of virtue could have presentcd itself to anyone by mere chance.""
A similar reference is found in Ep. 108, whcrc oncc again Nature is dcpictcd as the giver of thesc "sccds" to all of humanity: It is easy to rouse a listener so that he will crave righteousness; for Nature has gven the foundations and the seed of virtue ( j 5 n d a m t a semmque uirtuturn) to us all.':"' Sandbach intcrprctcd these "seeds" as a reference to "thc facts observed" &om which, apparently, the analogy to the Good is madc."' I n Ep. 121, however, Scncca discusses a t p e of knowledge given by Naturc in a more direct way, and which stands in clear contrast to knowledge gained from empirical experience: "The teachings of expethe formation of this concepliori which a r c s from thc obsewance of the deeds of great individuals; but the fact that one should find oncself in admiration of such deeds presupposes, as Pohlcnz recognized (Cn~ndjqm,86-88), a prior evaluative disposition lo distinguish good from had. "' Ej. 120.4, 5; 1 lmve altered the 1.CL translation only in retaining the l a t i n terms honesturn and bonurn. "" Cf. the partial list of things considered "useful" a1 Ep. 120.23, which includes wcalth, possessions, status: and physical strength. li'
'"" I:"
Eh. 120.4. r -~~
Seneca. Ep. 108.8 Sandbach; "Ennoia," 36 n. 23.
L4m'
AS IhlIPLANED LOGOS
59
riencc are slow and irreplar; but whatcvcr Nature communicates belongs equally to everyone, and comes immediately."'" It is clear from thc widcr contcxt of Ep. 121, morcover, that the knowledge @,en directly by Nature rather than won from cmpirical cxpcricncc is rooted in an animal's natural desire for well-being. It results, in other words, from oireiwcsy. Indeed, Nature is said to have "communicated nothing [to animals] except the duty of taking care of thcmselves and the skill to do so.""' Thc "sceds" of the knowledge of the Good, therefore, result ultimately from the human animal's innate tendency to recognize that which is beneficial for itself. O ~ K E ~ W U Land S
the Implanted Preconceptions
Given this analysis of the accounts of the origin of the concept of the Good by Cicero and Sencca, Sandbach's claim that there is "no evidence" to link the Epqu~otnpohfiyretg to oir~iwatgis scarcely an accuratc assessment. His own account, in any case, fails to convince. It is in fact precisely oireiumtg which both Cicero and Seneca locate at the beginning of the development which, by way of analogy from the antecedcnt conccpt of the Valuable, results finally in our conccpt of the (truly) Good. Our ethical concepts, therefore, arc not cntirely thc products of empirical expcricncc, as Pohlcnz well recognized: Empirical expcricnce is indispensable [for thc rormation of the concepts of "beneficial" and "good"], but the primary cause lies in the nature of the hoyticbv <@ov, in which the predisposition for the formation of thc cthical concepts is c~ntaincd.'~' Such an origin gives the ethically oricntcd preconceptions a unique standing among other preconceptions. It is thus quite understandable that Diogenes Lacrtius has singled out the concept of "something
'"
Smnuca, Ep. 121.20: El lardunr e ~ ett i,nrium, p o d urw docek picquid n o l m lradil, et aeguole ornnzh& est rt stohm. '""bid.; cf: Ep. 121.23: Hoec [natural nihil ma@ qyuam tuielarn sui el e i u perihrn trad&; the emphasis in the translation is mine. Note also that Seneca characterizes the initial stage of this natural self-understanding in terms reminiscent of preconceptions: one's constitution is initially understood r r m . . . el iurnrnalinl el ob~cure.Cf. in this resoect De Finibu 5. on which scc bch~w. 13+ Pohlcnz; CmnaJ?qm, 92: "Die Ernpirie ist dahci unentbehrlich, aber die prirnBre Ursachc l i r g in dcr Natur des hoyrrbv <@ov; in dcr dic: Z n l a ~ ezur Bildung der sittlichen Begriffe enthalten ist."
60
CHAPTER TWO
good," even among the other prcconccptions, as bcing "naturally" acquired. And thus, too, does Plutarch distinguish concepts such as "wKite" and "warm" from those of ethical categories l i e "good" and "bad," or oi~e?ogand &hZzp~og--this latter pair being technical terms in the doctrine of o t ~ e i ~ o ~ g ' ~ ~the - - obasis n of the latter's oGkrpvzoq yiv~otg.'"%iven the centrality of oireiwotg to thc philosophy of Chrysippus in general, it is undoubtedly in this context that his characterization of the preconceptions of good and bad in particular as P~lcpuzotxpohfi~+~e~g is to be understood. T h e link between the "implanted preconceptions" and oireioxs15 is confirmed by a Surther examination oS the "seeds" of knowledge or ~ i r t u cto which Seneca rcfcrs, and which, as we have seen, are undentood to have been given to human beings from Nature by means of o i ~ ~ i w a y . "This ' imagery of "seeds," as well as the analogous image of "sparks," of knowledge or virtue is also found repeatedly in Cicero's works. In one such passagc, the "seeds" or "sparks" of knowledge and virtue arc said to be "innate" (innata) in the human animal: Now if at our birth nature had granted us the ability to discern her,'"" as she truly is, wih insight and knowledgc, and under her excellent guidance to complete the course of Me, therc would certainly have been no occasion for anyonc to need methodical instruction [i.c., philosophy]: as it is, she gives to us tiny sparks (pamulos @kulo.r), which we, being quickly corrnpted by had morals and opinions, extinguish, so that the light of naturc ncvcr appears. For inborn in our constitutions are the seeds of virtue, which, if they were pemittcd to grow, would lead us by nature itself to happiness of life (Sunt enzm ingenieniis noshir snnina znnata uirlutum, yuae xz adolescme liceret, ipsa nos ad bedam ita am^^^ natura pmduceret); as things are, however, as soon as we come into h e light of day.. . we at once find ourselves in a world of iniquity amid a medley of wrong beliefs.. . we become infected with deceptions so varied that truth gives place to unreality and the voice of nature to fvred prep~ssessions.'~" Cf Diog. Iaert. 7.85. "Vlutarch, Comrn. .Nol. 1070C. I"' For a general discussion of thz use or "seed" terminoloa-, see Pohlcnz, Gmndjqen, 9 5 9 9 . O n the intimate relationship between o i ~ ~ i o o>irtue, ~ g , and the knowledge of "naturc." see esu. De Finin.4.25 and 5.41. Whilc these uassaees come from Antiochan rather than Stoic sources, the assumed agreement between the Stoics and Antiochus on the crucial point in the Former passage is to he noted. '"" The beala vila is another expression for the "Goal," or "highest good"; see, 2.9., De Fin. 5.12. I"" 'ID 3.2f; I have altered the I C L translation only to bring out more clearly [he imager) or thc "seeds" and "sparks." 13'
.
-
LAW AS IMPLANTED
61
LOGOS
In another passage it becomcs clear that these "sccds" arc themselves nothing othcr than the implanted preconceptions:
. . . the highest and noblest part of man's nalurc she [sc. dixine Narure] neglected. It is true she bestowed an intellect capable of rcceixing every virtuc, and implanted in it a1 birth and ivithout instruction embryonic notions of the loftiest ideas (ingenuilque sine dochina nolilias pamar r m m maximamm), laying the foundation of its education, and introducing among its endowments the elementary constituents, so to speak, of virtue (lamquam elemenla virtutis). But virtue itself she initiated-and nothing more (.red 2irluh @am inchomit; nihil ampliw)."' The elemenla uirlutis arc here quite clearly idcntified as the "little concepts" (notitius paruus) that Naturc has "implanted" (ingenuil) in the human mind, and these "rudiments of virtue" are referred to elsewhere in this work as the "sceds" and "sparks" of vistuc."' While Antiochan rather than properly Stoic in orientation, this passage nonetheless has sipificant points of contact with our Stoic sources. Thc idea that Nature only gives thc individual the beginnings of thc knowledge of virtue is by now familiar Gom Seneca, as wcll as from 70 3.2.143Moreover, as the passage continues, the Antiochan Piso emphasizes that the devclopment of these "rudiments" into full fledged virtu and honesta ought to be the numbcr one priority in life.'" This sentimcnt, as we shall soon see, recalls in a striking manner Epictctns's conviction that the refinement and proper application of the &wqu~ o Evvota~ t is the central task of the philosophical education, and likely reflects Chrysippus's own emphasis. Sandbach also objected that Pohlenz had made no attcmpt to show- the relevance of O ~ K E ~ W Gfor ~ S the formation of the notion of "something just," which is singled out by Diogcnes Laertius alongside that of "something good" as "naturally" arising. The details of the Stoic treatment of the origin of justice are notoriously difficult to rcconstruct, and a discussion of the problems would lcad us much too far from our present What is clcar in any case is "" De Fi". 5.59. The I.CL rendering of the h a l clause as "but or virtue itself she merely gave ihe germ and no more" correctly r e ~ o ~ p i z ethe s connection or this passage with thc "seed" lerminolo~ythat appears elsewhere in De Knibur 5. I have nonethclcss given a more literal rendering here, while otherwise following LCL.
De Fin. 5.18, 43.
'"'Cf. also ile I q . 1.30 and 33, on which see rurther below. De Fiz. 5.60. '" See on this question esp. Engbbcrg-Pedersen, -fis Stoic 7heo7y uJO&iosis, ''I
Inwood. "Comments on Professor Gdrg-ernanns' Paper," 190 99; "Oikei6sis," 121 32.
122-261
Pernbroke,
that the Stoics did in fact locate the origins or justice in oi~eiwatg: "thc folloxvers of Zcno," l'orphyq- says quite explicitly, "make oi~eiwtq the beginning o S j ~ s t i c c . " ' ~ ~ h o uthe g h details arc rathcr obscure, it is most probable h a t thc Stoics placed ihc natural affection or parents for their o f f s p r i n g a n affcction which was said to be providentially guaranteed by oix~<wo~5--atthe center of their account of justicc."' It is not insi~pificant,therefore, that Cicero describes this parcntal afficction, too, as being "implantcd" by N a t ~ r c . ' " ~ Finally, it is to bc pointed out against Sandbach that givcn thc doctrine of o i ~ e i o a y ,thcrc is no contradiction bcnvcen the Stoic theory of "innate preconceptions" and their characterization of thc commanding faculty at birth as a tabula m a . The human indixidual is born not with cthical conceptions per se, but rathcr, givcn its status as a "rational animal," with an innate predisposition to form ihese concepts.14"Indecd, the practical abiity to recognize that which is, gcncrally speaking, "good" and "bad" for oncsclf, according to thc Stoics, is not limited to the rational animal, but characteristic oS all animals regardless of their ability to abstract from expericncc formal concepts of "good" and "bad." Nature gives to the rational animal the "seeds of knowlcdgc," but not knowledge itself.
Epictelw on Implanted Concepts Sandbach criticized BonhoKer for taking Epictetus as his starting point for reconslructing thc carly Sto~cdoctrine or preconception. Ile argued that one ought rathcr examinc first thc evidence for the carly Sroa and thcn read Epictetus to dctermine the extcnt of the
"" Porphyry, Ahrt. 3.19 (= SW I. 197): 4" 6h o i ~ ~ i m uo p~~vi l vT ~ O N 6ucuro&vll~ ~L oi drnb Zfivmvoq; on the question of ihe precise rclcrenl o r "the fi~llowersof Zeno," see the comments of Pembroke, "O'ikeiAsis," 122. li7 It is scarcely accidental that Chlysippus's espousal of the natural origins of parents' aifertion for their orspring emerges from a fia,pent fiom the first book or his On Justice preserved in Plutarch, St. Rep. 1038R; see further DL'.drat. I h 7 . 2.12829; De Fin. 3.62. " ' 9 e 0// 1.12: nalum . . . igmeralque in pirnLl p~mipuurngundarn ornorm in r o c yui pmcreati runt. Cicero speaks here or the human animal in particular, whose afitction for its offspring, however, differs only in degree from that of other animal species; cf. Dr C$ I . I I. See further De Fix 5.66. 'I" Cf: Pohlcnz, Gmiundfiqm; 92: "Bei der Geburt sind die Regriffc lrciiich noch nicht rorhanden. Dic Secie deichr der tabula rasa, und es gibt in ihr keinc Begriff?, weder firtige noch unrcrdgc. .4ngrboren ist abcr dcm Lebewesen nach sciner seclischen Suuklur durch die Oikeiosis die Teiidcnz und dic Fshigkcit; zu dcn Dingen irie zu sic11 selbst wcrtcnd Stellung zu nchmcn."
agreement."" From a mcthodolo$cal point of vicw: Sandbach's critique is a sound one; I have thcrcforc had little recourse to the evidence of Epictetus in the preceding account of the Stoic doctrine of implanted prcconccptions. Turning now lo Epictctus, hoxievcr, what cmerges is an account that is in fact quite consistent ~viththat of the early Stoa. Epictetus says the folloh-ing: ~c come into beine; (ij~opev)\\lthout any innaic concept ( ( ~ 6 0 &YOLUV)'~' ~1
of a right-angled triangle, or of a half-tone musical inten-al, but by a ~ ~ certain systematic mcihod of instruction (Br ~ w o gT E X V L napahilqewgj we are taught the meaning or each of these things. . . But, on the other hand, who has come into being (ihilhu8sv) without an innatc concept ( k p ~ u r o vk v v o ~ n v jof what is good and evil, honourablc and base, appropriate and inappropriate, and happiness, and of what is proper and falls to our lot; and what we ought LO do and what we ought not to do?'= The contrast between concepts achieved by intellectual labor and those achieved "naturally" is familiar from Actius as the distinction between concepts in h e strict scnsc (i8vvo~ag and prcconccptions (npohfiyreq), rcspcctivcly; and that Epictetus considers these "natural concepts" to bc prcconccptions is in fact clear from the ~ o n t e x t . " ~ As Sandbach has pointed out, Epictetus elsewhere uses the term np6hqyry with rererence to several conccptions which, by any account, must be understood, at least in the context of Stoicism, to dcrivc from empirical e x p c r i ~ n c c . ' In ~ ~ one lecture, for example, he discusses preconceptions of musicians, carpenters and other artisans, as well as of philosophers, to make a point that onc needs to question and refine one's preconceptions in order to arrive at a more adcquatc undcrstanding of their subject matter.'"" In the passage cited
"" Sandbach, "Ennoia," 22
23.
yGoet Evvarrxv as "innate concept" anticipatcs thc subsequent (and syonymous) Epquiov kvvoiav. CL Justin App 6.3, who dcscrihes thc namr "God" as an Eplpurog .rfi qlioei . r i v &v8p&awv 655a. (On the idea of an innat? belief in God, see brliw.) I"' /)zsi. 2.1 1.2C The 1.CJ. caprures the scnsc oS the rathcr elliptical ijmp~vand ih
Thc LCL's translation oS the phrase
- ..
I,+<, ",,*,,A ..... .. . ..,. .
'"'Ij)Zr.r.
2.1 1.4, 10; l l
"'
1.8.6 10. Cl. the discussion of thr rrp6hqyry of tiic Cynic's np&ypa at
"'Sandbach, "Ennoia," 27. &J.
64
CHAPTER TWO
at the beginning of this section, though: Epictetus uses the phrase mliae~ h v o ~ asynonymously with Zpqwog h v o ~ a ,which in the context clearly implies an innate concept: as even Sandbach recognized: "it must be admitted that when we come to examine Epictetus he can hardy be interpreted othcnvise than as belieling in 'inborn' prcconccptions.""Wnce again, these "implanted preconceptions" concern ethical concepts in pa~ticular:whilc wc do not "comc w i t h the concepts of music theory- and geometry-, ~ v cdo comc already having preconceptions concerning ethical categories. He proceeds to explain, in similar terms, the fact that everyone, educated or not, makes ethical evaluations: "The reason ror this is that we come as iC already taught by nature certain things in this arca."'" The attribution of such know-ledge to nature's own instruction rccalls Scncca's discussion or the "seeds of knowledge" gained by means of oixeiw~~q, and the similar passages from Cicero discussed above. And whiie there is no explicit evidence that Epictctus understood the Zp~puro~ Zvvota~ to result from oi~eiway(w-hich docs not receivc extensive treatment in his extant lectures in any case),'"" the connection is noncthclcss quite likely: not only are they present from birth, but they comprisc cthical conccpts in p a r t i c ~ l a r . ' ~ ~ While all humans are thus born with cthical preconccptions, Epictetus stresses that these, as such, arc not sufficient to ensurc the c o ~ c c assessment t of one's experiences in t c m s of "good" and "bad." There lics the whole question, and there opinion (ocqillotg) comes in. For men start with thcsc principles upon which they arc agreed, but thcn, because they make unsuitable application (i~uppoyilg)of thcm,
set into disputes.'"" Diii. 3.22. The idea that such prcconc~ptionsrequire refinemen1 clearly reflens the technical Stoic distinction hchvepn np6hqy~gand Evva~u.This emphasis on ihc: impottance of developing thc former into the lauer is in Tact quitc characteristic of Epictetus, particularly in the ethical sphcrc. Sec on this immediately below. ' " S m d b a c h , "Ennoia," 29. "' Diir. 2.11.6: to5rou 6' u k ~ o vrb ijre~vij6q riv&6nb $5 ~ 6 a e wlcarlr ~ ~ b rvh o " iiaxep 6~6r6uy~ivoug; translalion minc. 15"l'hat o i ~ e i w o rwas ~ nom:thcless important 'or Epictetus is clear, k,r examplc, lrom Uiss. 1.19.1 1-15, \rhere it is understood to be fundamental to all human beha\ior. Cf" Sandbacb, "Ennoia," 24f. Indeed, note esp. that whcn Epictetus asserts ~ particular preconin Uirs. 1.22.1 that npolifiy~qxorvui nira~vdrv0pijlrotg ~ i o i vthe ceptions he has in mind arc those o r r b dtyu06v and .rb 6~~a~6v-precisclythose singled out as being acquin:d rpuailciug in Diog. Lacrt. i . 5 3 . "'" Uzrs. 2.11.8; cT 1.22.1-~8. For llle corrup:ing influence of opinion on this process, cl. Ciccro, 'TL) 3.2, cluoted aL7orn.
Epictetus, therefore, places this all important problem of "application" at the center of his notion of the true education: I'\hat then, does it mean, to be getting an education? I t means learning how to apply (Ecpapp6tav) the natural preconceptions ( ~ u o n c b g npohijymg) to particular cases: cach to the other in conformity n i h nature, and: furthe< to make thc distinc~ion,that some things are under our control ~vhilrothers arc not under our control."" I,\'hilc all preconccptions arc acquired "naturally;" so that the term quul~cigin the phrase ~ u ( T ~ K &T
-
'"
1.22.9-10; cf. 1.2.6. That which is undcr thc control o f rhe human is assrnt (ouwar&O~or<)to impressions (cpaviaoial); see a b o ~ ~nole : , 37. Epictctus rerers to this most onen as "use of impressions" JXpiio~g~ a v r a o i u i v )or something similar; see c.g. &I. 1.1.7; 1.12.34; 2.19.32; and Fnrg. 4. I"' So also Polilenz; Giundjaapen, 85: Epictetus "isi im wes~ntlirhcnrlur an ihncn [.sr preconceptirms or the ethical sphcrc] inlzrzssicri." Note also the use of thc phrase QGOZL i v v o t a to denote spccificaliy the &&muro~i v v a t a t in 2.1 1.2; and see further, in addition, n. 159 abovc. ' I ' f i r . 1.2'2.1 1. '" Scc X i . 2.17; and LT esp. 2.17.1-3 \vith 2.17.29-40. '"' 1Ar.s. 4.1.42: ioGro y i p 2oir ri, a i i ~ a vroig &v%p&norg rr&v.v.rwvrGv ~ a i c 6 v ;ri, rbc . 1 '
ripoh
'"
DLiz.2.11.10.
See on this process esp. the whole of Din.2.17, which is entitlcd: 7615 icpappooti-ov .r&g npohfive~gm i 5 irri phpoug; sec further ihe discussion of Ronh6Ri.r; Epicipl.
189-92.
66
C H W r E R TWO
progess, "for it is impossible to get a man to begin to learn that " ' ~ ~ thus repndiatcd "opinion" which hc thinks he k n o ~ ~ - s . Having (oiqots), one can begin honest cnquiry into the preconceptions with the goal of establishing a standard (~uvwv)which is higher than mere "opinion" for their practical applicati~n.'~"ndeed, thc establishment of this "standard" is itself the generative problem and continiv &s.r-rlv;~ntaxizreotlat uing task of philosophy: rui .rb q t h o ~ o ~ eroGrb rui Pe~a~oiiv .robs ravbva~."" Whilc Epictetus's classification of the diffcrent types of conccption is consistcnt with that of the early Stoics, thc ccntralicy of the ~ p q v r o ~ Evvota-rl to thc achiex-emcnt of moral progress in his cthical system goes beyond anything explicitly attestcd in the scant extant cvidence for the latter. Howcver, given the Stoic understanding of rational human action as caused by thc impulse resulting from assent to the propositional content of a given hormetic presentation, it would sccm that an accurate conception of "the good" would be ahsolutcly crucial for virtuous action for them as well. So, for example, a man's acceptance of some public ofice will depend upon his asscnt to the proposition "it is good for mc to accept this ofice." Such asscnt will obviously presuppose some conception of what is "good" and what is not, on the basis of which the man will either give or withhold his assent to the proposition. If his conception of the good is incorrect, his asscnt to such a proposition may well-though not necessarilyissue in an impulse toward improper action;'" conversely, the only way to ensure virtuous action would sccm to he the possession of an accurate conception of the Good. That Chrysippus did, in fact, place is a similar emphasis on the devclopment of the Epqurot npoh+p+re~g sugsested by Diogenes Laertius's grouping of several serics of Chrysippus's treatiscs as works concerning .rjv Gthptlpoo~vrGv jtltrGv ivvo~Gv."~ Further evidence for the centrality of the k8pqvzotxpohfiyre-rl~
'"
Bsr. 2.17.1; cf. 2.17.39f and 2.22.175. 2.1 1.17c a good examplc of this process is round in f i r . 1.22.1 1 16; where the queslion concerns the application of the term "gorrd" to lhosc things that are not under our control. Cf. also Din. 1.28.28; where Epictetus rcfim more gcnerally to tile preconceptions as the "standards" people usc for judging good and evil. Dim 2.1 1.24; cf 2.1 1.13 1 4 . "I According to the Stoics, one can act "appropriately" in spite of his or her misrakcn understand in^ of the Good; thus the Stoic distinction betwren "appropriate" and "right" action, on which scc I a n - and Sedlcy, 7 h r Hellmi~lziI'hiIosoptm~~1.359-68. "' Dios. Laerl. 7.199C cf rhe comments of Pohlenz; C7undf;qen. 84 n. 1. Notc also Plularch's citation of Chq-rippus's v h : ~ that "physicd speculalion (755murit+ 8ewpiaG is to be undertaken far no other purpose than for the discrimination of good and evil" (St. Rep. 1035D); cf with this Epictetus; Dim. 1.22.1 1, cited abom:. .J""'
""
LAW AS II\PWTED
LOCOS
67
to thc early Stoic understanding of moral dex-elopmcnt might also bc seen in rhcir rolc in the moral philosophy of htiochus of Ascalon which, as has already been pointed out, is quite similar to that found in Epictetus. It is thus most likely that in this respect too: Epictctus's discussion of the ethical preconccptions simply reflects earlier Stoic teaching."'
Excursus: Belief in the Gdr as Ewquroq For the sake of completeness, and because the qucstion will impinge to some dcgrcc on our discussion of Justin Martyr in the following chapter, thc description of a supposed universal human bclief in a god or gods as &pquro~ or its Latin equivalents in scveral ancient philosophical works also warrants some attention. Dio Chrysostom, in the oration cntitled "The Olympic Discourse, or On the First Conception of God," describes the origin of the human bclicf in the divine as follows: Of man's bclicf in the deity ( e g . . . nepi rb OE?OV 665q5) and his assumption that there is a god we wcrc maintaining that the fountain-hcad, as wc may say, or source, was that idca which is innate in all mankind jifiv kvqurov binaotv irvOp¬g Eiiivo~av)and comes into being as the result of thc actual facts and the tmth . . . bcing, one may almost say, a common and general endowment of rational bcin~gs( 0 ~ ~ .it6 r6o ~~v i v rai Fqpooiav TO< hoy~~oG yhvou5)."" Similarly, Justin Martyr charactcrizcs the concept of "god" as "a bclicf implanted in thc nature of human beings" (Epqu~ogT$ qGoe~ r6v &v8p6nwvF6E,a)."That this position was characteristic of at lcast some Stoics scems clear from a quite similar assertion made by Balbus, the Stoic spokesman of Cicero's De flatura Deorum: "For innate in everyone, and as it were engraved upon the soul, is a belief in the existence of the g o d s . " " ~ h u s Seneca, too, writes:
"'
Note further that Epk:tclus's (and Antiochus's!) seneral emphasis on the proper rrfincmeni 01 our ethical notions is quit,: compalihle with Inwood's reconstruction of Chrysippus's leaching on "cxccssive impulse," esp. as this relates to an individual's ethical conceptions; see Elkics and Human Aclion, 155~~65: esp. 162-65. n i o Chrysosiom, 12.39; cf 12.27. Translations of Dio are taken from LCL unless othcwisc noicd.
"'App. "" De
6.3. Dwe. 2.12: omnibu enim innalum est el in nnim,~q u a i imulptum r.r.re deor; translalion mine. C t the Epicurean position as described at Lle Nal. Deor. 1.44: "For the belicf in the gods has nor becn esrablished by authority, custom or law_ bur rcsls on the unanimous and abiding consensus of mankind their cxistencc is therefore
. . . we infer that the gods exist, for this reason, among others-that there is implanted (insilo)in everyone an idea concerning deity (de du opinio), and there is no people so rar beyond the reach of laws and customs that i t docs not believe at least in gods of some sort."' Scncca characterizes the Stoic position regarding the inrita opinio of the divine as one argumcnt among others for the truth of the existence of the gods. T h c problem of thc existence of thc gods w-as ihe first division of Stoic thcolog).,"" and that thcrc were indced a variety of argumcnts made in this connection is clcar from thc second book of Cicero's De Nah~raDeomm. Cicero's rcfcrcnce to this particular argument in De flat. Deor. 2.12 occurs at thc conclusion of thc first series of argumcnts presented by Balbo, and rrfcrs back, apparcntly, to thc consemu omnium argument discussed in 2.5: Nothing but thc presence in our minds of a firmly grasped concept of the deity could account [or the stability and permanence of our belief (opinio) in him, a belief which is only strengthened by the passage of the ages and grows more deeply rooted with each successive generation of mankind. . . The years obliterate the inventions of the imagination, but coniirm the judgments of nature. When, howevcr, Cicero rehearses Cleanthcs's explanation of this consensus in 2.13-15, therc is no hint of a conviction regarding any innate bclier in thc existence of the gods found among its four causes.""n fact, this ar-gumen1 is mentioned ncither in the context of Ciccro's rehearsal of the arguments of Zeno, Clcanlhes or Chrysippus,'"hor is it, for that matter, ascribcd to any other particular phiiosophcr. Indeed, it is not discussed furthcr by Balbus, and goes without mention in the Academic critique of Stoic theology presented in book three.'"' It would thus sccm that this argument had a necessaly inference, since we possess an implanted-or better, an innatc-notion of them (y~,,niarn imlm e o m uel polius ir~nafciog,iliom ltahemu.rr; I have slighily altercd thc LCL translation. Cf: De Fin. 4.4 for a similar juxtaposition of the tcnns msltn a i d innoio. Ep. I 17.6. ""or thc divisions of Stoic ~ h e o l o gsee ~ De JMoV~L I h r . 2.3. "" Cleanihcs is said to have a r p c d fi-om divination: the beneficence of h e universe, the awc inspired by the display ofnaturc's power as instanced, e.g., in storms, earthqu&cs, etc.l and ahove d l the orderliness of the hravens. IH" For the particular arguments o f Zeno see De ~ V a l .Dror. ?.?Off; a n Cleanthcs. 2.13 15; on Chrysippus, 2.16-19. I X ' Cotta's critiquc 01' the m m m omniurn argument is 1imiti.d to ihe ibllowing cornmcnt: "Then is anybody contern that questions of such rnamenr should he decidcd by the belief (opinion? of the tbolish? and particularly yourselves, who say
LAW AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
69
at best a margnal place in the sourcc of Cicero's De JVatura Deoruq and this might suggcst that it was in fact a later development in Stoic theology182Assuming, homvcvcr, that it was a viable Stoic position at least by the time of Ciccro, we might fairly inquire as to its philosophical basis: in what sense, given the constraints of Stoicism, might this beliei be described as Ekqu~og? In De Leg. 1.24, Cicero writes that humans alone have a notitia dei and attributes this fact to the unique kinship (apatio) that humans have with the gods. This kinship resides in the human possession of the rational soul which, unlike the "fiagile and perishable" clcmcnts of the human animal derived from the mortal sphere, was "implanted by God."'" The human possession of ratio is for Ciccro crucial for the rormation of the notitia hi, but not simply bccausc it is requisite for concept formation in general. The possession of the ratio, according to Cicero, necessanb en~ailsrecognition of its ultimate sourcc, and thus a belicf in the existence of the gods:I8' "Thus it is clcar that man recognizes God because, in a way, he remcmbcrs and recognizcs the source kom w-hich he ~prang."'~'Thc reference to memory in this latter explanation, however, has a curiously Platonic ring to it, and it is possible, as Kcnter has suggested, that Ciccro has here mergcd "Platonic elemcnts wilh thc doctrine of thc S t ~ a . ' ' ' ~ ~ Seemingly more congenial to Stoicism, on the othcr hand, is the account provided by Dio Chrysostom. Uio, as wc have seen, argued that the ultimate source of thc concept of God w7a3an Ekqurog anaotv drvOphnotg inivo~awhich, unlike the conceptions of God that come from poets and lawgivers, arises "naturally without a mortal teacher
that all the fooiish are mad?" (De flit L)eor. 3.1 1) l ' h c argument had already bccn dcalt with from a somewhat dirkrent angle in die context of Coua's critique of Epicurus; d De fla. h r 1.62 64. "" Bonhnffcr, Epickl znd die Stna, 219, is rclucvant to attrihute such an argument to Zeno and Clcanthes, but assumes irs presence at least in the theology of Chqsippus. I"' Ile 1%. 1.24: nrrinrurn ern inperalum o deo. That Cicero ha? in mind here specir~callythe rntionol soul is dear from the fact that h e Stoics held thc human to hc unique among other mortal animals owing to its possession of reason; not soul, which latter; on the contrary, charartcrizes ail animals by definition; see on this I.ong and Scdey, 7 7 ~ eHellmirtic Philosophrri, 313 23; funher Inwood; Efhicr md Hurnari Action, 21-26. CT in this conncclion LJe 1%. 1.23 with Cicenfs reference to thc "divine" elemrnt in humans at l l c kg. 1.59. IX., So Pohlcnz, commendng on this passage: "Auch die Gotteserkenntnis n,urzelt also in der Struktur unsrer Physis" (Cfindfiqm; 100j. la' De Idg. 1.25, Kcntcr, De I ~ x i b u ,105.
'"
and mystagoguc, without de~eption."'~' More precisely, the belicf in h e divine arises as a rcsult of bt-o factors:'88 "becausc of the kinship ( c u ~ l h v e ~ uwhich ) [God] has to them [sc. humanity] and the many evidenccs o r thc tr~th."'~"The latter "evidcnccs" arc those providcd by natural phcnomena: the orderliness of thc astral movements, the abundance of benefits rcceived from nature, ctc.'"' Thc former refcrence to thc "kinship" bch+-ccn human beings and thc gods, on thc other hand, recalls the account of Cicero discussed abovc. It has bccn sug~estcd,in fact, that Ciccro and Dio herc draw upon a common source, pcrhaps Posidonius, for thcir understanding of an innate conccpt of God."' Dio's explanation of thc sipiicancc o r this "kinship" for our conccpt of god, howcvcr, is rather diiferent from that of Cicero:
. . . the feelings of the human race towards thcir first and immortal parent, whom we who have a share in the heritage of Hcllas call narp@v Aia, develop step by step along with those which men have toward their mortal and human parcnts. For in truth the goodwill and desire to serve which the offspring feel toward their parents is. . . present in thcm, untaught, as a gift of nature and as a result of acts of kindness since that received (dmb @<rp60eoSlcai 4 5 ~bEpyeoia566i6a~zogbxdlp~e~), which has been bcgoaen straightaway from birth loves and cherishes dlvztrpthoijvro5 ~ ~ adlv.it~~paxE60vzog): i so in return (ioijywvqeivzo5 ~ 6 6 % far as it may, that which begat and nourishes and loves i t . . .Ig2
I X ' Dio Chrysostom 12.27: yrvopfvq r a ~ & ipho~vilveu 8vq.roS 6rSaorhhou ~ a i puorayoyoO ~wpi5hxbq5. I have altered the (protestantizing) translation or LCL,
which reads "without the aid of human tcacher and free from the deceit of any cxpoundina pries^," and read xai wuorayoyolj with h e u 8vq.roij SdaorMou rather than with ppi5 &n6.1q5. I"" So also Pohlcnz, Cnmdf;qm,102. ""' Dio Chrysostom 12.27; my translation. Note the textual problem hcrp. 6th is to be preferred to i6jhou since the suhsequenr explanation of the
LAW AS IMPLAN'SEO I.OC0S
71
The key elcment of this discussion is the parallel cxpenences one has vis9-vis one's mortal and one's divine parent. A child's goodwill toward its mortal parents is 'hatural"; it is an "untaught" response to the love (s)hc experienccs from his or her parent. This lattcr love of a parcnt for its oKspring, on the other hand, is itself>according g , was pointed to Chrysippus, providentially guaranteed by o i ~ ~ i o o las out in connection with our discussion of the "natural" orign of the concept of "something just."'"VVhilc Dio, to bc sure, cites the parents' kindness toward their child as a crucial factor hcrc, his language suggests that the whole reciprocal relationship is in effect guaranteed by naturc.'"' One might compare in this respect the assertion of Ciccro's Stoic Balbo that thc newhorn child "untaught and by nature's guidance" sccks its mother's brcast."Thus Loo could we understand l'hilo's claim that one's "desire for @n and c o u n t 4 may be said to bc born and grow with each of us and is a part of our nature as much as or cvcn more than the parts which unite to make the w h o l ~ . " ' ~ ~ Whatever the case, our initial bclief in God, the "iirst and immortal parcnt," arises ultimately as a rcsult of this same dynamic according to Dio.lg' Indecd, the "Grst breast" that feeds the child is that of "the earth, its real mothcr": it is the air which "after breathing into it and quickening it, at once awakcns it by a nourishment morc liquid than milk and enables it to emit a cry."'!'8 Humans, according
"" '"'
t'lutarcii, Sl. Rep. 10388; see above pp. 6lf. Cf. the pmols adduced hy the Stoics from Naturr for thc natural social tcndcncy of humans in, e.g., De .Not Deor. 2.128-29 and ile Fin. 3.63. CT further thc apparently common Stoic discussion or non-human animals which scern "naturally" to cooperate; esp. the sca pen discussed in De Nbt Umc 2.123-124 and Philo, ile Anirml. 60 and 93. Cf: with this position Arislode's ~ i c wcited , by Inwood ("Comments;" 198) that "the thing produccd is o h i o n to its source . . . but to the product the source is nothing, or lpss important'' (such "products" including human children). p the evidcncc This passagc from Dio Chrysostom may in fact fill a crucial g ~ in for the Stoic dortrinc of social 0 i K ~ i ~ (filt; l < COT example, by Pcmbrok roikeiosis,"' 124q) by emphasizing precisely thc newborn child's io\~efor its parcnis. De 8aL. Deox 2.128. "'I' A61 63: hv [ouyy~v6v rai nqrpi60~] b i r 6 0 o ~h r b m o .ip6rrov r ~ v hrmv&qrar rai ouvqGh.iat icai pirhhov io b fiirov ~ 56" j v o p i v o v ~ e p 6 vrmpniqure; translated according to LCL. CT De Fin. 5.65, wherc Cicero traccs onc's alIecdon for; amoiig others, one's farnil) arrd fellow citizens; a, "the fact that rl~ildreriare loved hy their parents." "" Note esp. tht: description or God as irponbxop in 12.29 and nu?p@ov h i a in 12.42. " W i o Chrysosrom 12.30 31.
'"
72
CHIWTER TWO
to Dio, are thus unable to feel anything other than wonder and lovc for the deity'" In fact, Dio can speak rather loosely of a similar recognition and honor toward God evcn on the par1 or plants and non-rational animals w-hich, unlike humans, are of course incapable or formulating Cvvo~atat all.'" Thc scant nature of our cbidencc surrounding thc Stoic position on the origin of thc human bclief in the gods prohibits the drawing of any decisive conclusions. It is noteworthy, however, that what evidence thcrc is leads us back once again to the doctrine or o i ~ e i o o ~ ~ . Thus the description of thc human belief in thc deity, by at least somc later Stoics, as &pqvpu.roqwould seem to providc still furlher confirmation or Pohlcnz's general contention that the impla~ltcd preconceptions must be understood in light of the Stoic doctrine of oi~eioo~g.
The Stoics distinguished two types of conccpts. Concepts (&vomt) in the strict scnsc of thc term arc the result of conscious intellectual effort and begin to be formcd only when one has achieved an inioccur "nattial statc of rational maturity. Preconceptions (xpohily1~15) urally," that is, from simple mcntal processes which do not rcquire conscious intcllectual labor, and bcgin to form, apparently, almost immediately. While empirical expericncc is necessary for thc fonnation of all concepts according to the Stoics, fundamental ethical concepts such as "good" and " b a d form a special class of preconception, called implanted preconceptions (!pqvpu.ro~ npohfiyIetd. These derive ultimately from the tendcncy, innate in all animals, to subjectively cvaluatc experience in terms of that which is bencficial for oneself and that which is harmful. Humans are not born with cthical conceptions per se; nonetheless, as rational animals in whom conccpts naturally be@ to form almost immediately, they are predisposed to thc formation of thcse conceptions regardlesr of the nature of their experiences.'"' The imagery of "sparks" and especially "sccds" of knowledge or virtuc is often uscd to describe this potcntial and inevitable
'"
DD Chrysostorn 12.32.
Dio Chiysoslom 12.35. An actual hpqurog 665a or 5liivo~aof God, of counc, is nevertheless the peculiar endowment o f t h e ralionol animd, see 12.27 and 12.39. "" The same cannot be said; for cxmple, of die canccpts of "while" and "blach". lhus drc distinction reponed by Plutarch a1 Comm. hht. 1070C. 'O"
ethical knowledge with which humans are naturally endowcd. In what was perhaps a later development in Stoic theology, a posited universal human belief in the deity w-as also explained with reference to this dynamic, and itself described as Epquzog. Our interest in thc rolc of the implanted prcconccptions in Cicero's thcoq- of natural la>\; has led us into a rather long digression, but thc matter is one of great impolt for our present study. This Stoic doctrine is an important piece in the puzzle of the recumng use of the term "implanted" to describe either human rcason or the natural la>\- it comprises in a rangc of ancient literature. In order to clarify this point, let us nows rcturn to Cicero's definition of law- in tcrms of "implanted reason."
Implanted Preconceptions, Human Reason, and Natural Law It is Cicero's view that divine Nature endows individual human bcinps with certain "obscure conccpts" in order to providc them with the "foundations of knowledge." While it is sometimes supposed that this vicw represents a platonizing intcrprcration of the Stoic doctrine of preconception, we have found that this is not a necessary conclusion. The Stoics themselves a r p e d that a certain class of prcconception was different from all other conccpts in that they arise not simply from empirical experience, but, ultimately, from the inborn sclf-awarcncss and self-love guaranteed by o i ~ e i o ~ l gThere . is thus no reason to suppose that Ciccro deviates from Stoic theory in locating the divine e n d o m c n t of these preconccptions at the beginning of the dcvclopmcnt of human reason, and ultimately too, therefore, of "right rcason" or natural law,."" In fact, this position is best understood in light of Chrysippus's own view of human reason. We have seen that human rcason, for the Stoics, is the product of development. Existing only in a potential form in ncwbom humans, it rcachcs an initial state of maturity only around the age of seven, w-hcn it is "completed out of the prcconccptions" (;K riuv rrpohfi~q~wv ~~pzh11poGaOa~).'~' This lattcr statement
""
As I will s u ~ ~ c h<:low; st platonic influencc on Cicero's understanding of thc Flr9vpurot npahilW~lS themsrlvcs is in Caci likely; nonrthch:ss, lhcir rolc iri lhc theory or natural law as presented by him is intelligible quite apart tiom such influencc.
'"'S W 2.83.
74
CK4PTER TWO
must be xiewed in light of Chrysippus's understanding of logos as an "asscmblage" of concepts and prcconceptions.Y04Humans arc not properly "rational'-which is to say, one's logos is not a logos in the proper sense of the tern-until a sufficicnt complerncnt of preconceptions has been formed to allow for the higher thousht processes which result in concepts in thc strict scnse of the term.?" It is only at this point that one bcgns to apprehend one's rational nature and, chus, that onc can begin to form a concept of the (Stoic) G o ~ d . ~ " " Nature takes the human animal this far; henceforth it is the responsibility of the individual to cultivate his or hcr logos into thc "right reason" of thc sage, which is natural law. Prior to this initial maturation one has only a potential logos: an assemblage, it is to bc inferred, of preconceptions alone. As Kcnter recognizes, it is this Stoic theory that underlies the description of the maturation of hnman reason in De Leg. 1 1.26&27.207 The maturation of the ratio is here describcd as a natural proccssit is effected by "Nature herself'-and the explanation of the completion of the ratio as arising from "obscure" and "insufficient" concepts rather obviously recalls Actius's report chat the logos is "completed out of the preconceptions." In fact, Cicero's description of thcse "obscure concepts" as "the foundations of knowledge" is quite rcminiscent of his description, elsewhere, of the implanted preconceptions as the "seeds" or "sparks" of knowledge or virtue."18 According to Cicero, then, the first stage in the developmental process which results in mature hnman reason is the divine endowment of "implanted preconceptions." Unfortunately, there is no explicit evidence among the early Stoic fragments for this association of the potential reason with which humans are born and the Epqvroi npohfiyrey. On thc other hand, givcn Chrysippus's definition of logos 'O' SVF2.841: b v o ~ i r v.if ~ ~ v w iccrinpohilyr~ov v ii8pa~ofia.See rurther Lnwood, EOik and Human Adion: 72-74; "assemblage" is his translation. "I5 l i is not altogether clear, howcver, how the Stoics envisioned the ability to
exercise higher orders of thought to result from the formation of a cermin number of preconceptions in the human mind. See Pohlenz, CrundJqen, 92: "Erst wenn der Logos sich vollcndet hat, kann daraus der klare Begrir werden, daR das wahrhaft Gute das isi. was unsrer Naiur als Aoyr~bvc@ov enrspricht." See further on this the discussion orDe Finibus 3 abovc. Kenter, De Id,bur, 118, with further parallels. " ' W E De Fi". 5.59, comparing esp. the r a m plurimamm ob.rcuru nec salG.. . intell&mLinr or De Leg 1.26 with the noliliu pamm r a m moximmn iieaied there, and described clscwhere in De Fhibus as the "secds" or "sparks" viriue (e.g., 5.18). CT furthcr tllc "sparks" of v i m e discussed in De I A ~ .1.33.
'"
'"'
L4W AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
75
as an "asscmblage" of concepts and preconceptions, it sccms a rather small step to describe the "spermatic" logos with which humans are born as an assemblage, as it w-ere, of "implanted prcconcepfions." Thus just as virtue is a disposition of the ratio, so too could thc implantcd preconceptions themselves bc described as thc "sccds" or "sparks" ofvirtuc. In fact, as we shall see in thc following chapter, the Apostolic Comtitutiom, under clear influence of thc Stoic theory of law, undcrstands the natural law given to the human animal at its creation to be comprised by the "seeds of divine knowlcdgcX-knowledge which it refers to clscwhere as "implanted knowledge" (&wpu.rogyvhoq). Similarly, there is no cxplicit evidcnce in our scanty sources for thc early Stoics that this theory of the development of the human logos was discussed in connection with natural law. It is howcvcr rather difficult to believe that Chrysippus, at least, had not understood and reckoned with this rather obvious implication of his idcntification of that law which is q 6 o e ~~ a~4i 0Bko~1with the logos of the sage. As will become clcar in the subscqucnt chapter, the incorporation of the Stoic doctrine of implantcd preconceptions into a theory of natural law was, in any case, certainly not Cicero's own innovation. A number of ancient works, none of which can plausibly be l i k e d directly to Cicero's De &,bus, share this theoretical approach to natural law. What is more, it is precisely here that one finds the rccurriug terminology that is thc ccntral concern of this chapter: thc description of natural law or, as in De Leg. 18, thc logos which comprises it, as "implanted."
Natural l a w as ratio insita Cicero's statement in De hg. 1.27 that Nature "strengthens" (confirmat) and "completes" (p@cit) the ratio echocs De Lepl 1.18, whcrc law is defined as "reason, whcn it is strengthened and completed in the As human mind" (ratio cum est in hominis m t e conjirmata et c~~echz).~'' we have seen, however, thc natural maturation referred to in 1.27 rcsults, according to Stoic theory, in a ratio that is "complete" only insofar as it has bccome capablc of rationality in thc proper sense of the term. It is not yet the "right reason," characteristic of the sage alonc, that is natural law. In fact, Ciccro explicitly and repeatedly states that law is the m m and ratio of the sage in particular, including
'" De Q,o.
1.18; translation mine
76
CHAPTER TWO
once immediately following this definition of law as ratio. . . co@nnata et conJckz.""Similarly, Cicero specifies on several occasions that law is not simply reason (ratio), but @ht reason (recta ratio) in particular."' Finally, law is associatcd with both virtue and the highcst good: [I]t is undoubtcdl truc h a t to live in accordance with nature is the highcst good. That signifies the enjoyment of a life of duc measure based upon virtue, or following nature and living according to her law, so to speak; in other words, to sparc no effort, so far as in us lies, to accomplish what nature demands; among these demands being her wish that we live by virtue as our
Certainly wisdom, virtue, and attainment of the highest good do not accompany the natural maturation of the ratio! Thus while De Leg 1.26-27 conccrns the initial stage of maturation which occurs naturally in the development of human reason, 1.18-19 deals with the final perfection of human reason in the mind of the sage."" Whatever the case, thc developmental aspect of the Stoic theory of natural law is clearly in view when Cicero writes, in 1.18, that "the same reason, when it is strengthened and completed in the human mind, is law." This identification obviously assumes a time when reason was less than "strong" and "complete." What is more, the use of the demonstrative pronoun eada ("the same") here specifies that the reason in question is that of the previous sentence: the ratio which becomes law when "completed in the human mind," that is, is the ~atiosumma im'ta in natura. Does this, then, imply that the phrase "implanted reason" refers particularly to the potential, spermatic reason with which Nature endows the human animal? At least one author has interpreted the phrase otherwise. Kentcr, in his commentary on De Lepibvs I, explains it, rather, with reference to thc cosmic logos which pervades universal nature.2" This
De 1~g.1.1.19; cT. 2.8 and 2.1 1. De Leg. 1.23: 1.33: 1.42: ct De fib. 3.33. and further Lle Leu 2.10 "'De hi.1 - 5 6 cf fkher'1.18, wh&e law is identified with p&lia; and 1.60; where pmdmlia is described, in the context of a discussion of the happiness which accompanies the hig-hest good, as a virtu of the mind's eye in "selccdng the good and rcjccting the opposite." 21" ga st Vander IVaerdt, 7he Stoic 7 h e o r ~~ X a l u r a Lmu, l who argues that Ciccm: depending upon Antiochus of Ascalon, has consciously altered the Stoic theory so as to identify nalurd law with the reason or the averagc human adult. This argument is most dubious in light of sevcrd indications lo the contrary mentioned in this paragraph. "'I So Kenter, De I.e@bw~~ 81f.
"'
An
LAW AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
77
interpretation suggests itself primarily in light of De Lep. 2.8-1 1, where Cicero prcsents a summary or the theoretical position he had outlined in book one. Here, Cicero emphasizes the idcntification of natural lam- with the ratio or mens of both God and the human sage, and Quintus remarks that Cicero has "touched on this subject scveral times before.""' Given chc fundamental importance of this dual idcntification to Cicero's gcneral thcory of law, one might expect that he would include refercnces to both the ratio dzuina and thc ratio hominis in his initial account of thc law in 1.18-19. If so, reference to the fonncr could bc found only in the phrase summa ralio im-te in natltra. The phrase ln.cita in natura would in this case bc comparablc to Chrysippus's characterization or b v6po5 b ~ 0 1 ~ 6as5 b 6pBb5 *05; 61& nixvzwv h p x 6 p ~ o ~ . The 2 1 G use of the demonstrative pronoun m d m in the following sentence might thus serve to emphasize the gods' and the human animals' common possession of "this samc reasonaa point argned in detail in De Leg. 1.2Iff. This line of interpretation, however, is most doubtful. It is to be observed in the first place that thc term natura appears often in the De hgibw, and by no mcans always with refcrcnce to universal nature. In at least one othcr passage, in fact, it is clear from the context that the term is used specifically with reference to human nature, despite the absence of the limiting gcuitive hominis."' The immediate context of De Leg. 1.17-19, too, indicatcs quite clearly that the natura in question is to be interpreted specifically with reference to human nature. De hg. 1.18-19 as a whole is introduced as an inquiry into the "origins of justice" (iun\. principia), and thc account of law-
"' De Lez. 2.8-11.
2 ' ~ i o g Iaert. . 7.88; cf. Hymn lo .Zeui (SVF 1.537, p. 122, lines 8ff), where Cleanthes speaks of the rotvbv liiryov, 65 6rb irdrv~ovmoii@. See De Leg. 1.27: "But, whereas God has begotten and equippcd m a n . . . it should nor" he evident that nature. alone and unaided, coes - a steD farher;. for.. with 110 guide to point the way, she starts with those things whose character she has learned through the rudimenta~ybeginnings of intelligence, and, alone and unaided, strengthens and pedects the faculty of reason." Note esp. that Cicero passes to this contrast between God and nature after having juat used the two interchangeably; see 1.26-27. CT further the use of "nature" in 1.33-a passage which is, however, apparently corrupt; see on this Kenter De LegLbus, 132-33. Cicero's fluid use of thc term "nature" is not at all peculiar i n this respect; see Long, "The Ingicd Basis of Stoic Ethics," on the wide use of the term qbaq by the Stoics generally, and further the discussion of Phila's use of the term in E. R. Goodenough, By Ikht, LighShl: The Mystic Gorpel oJHeIlmis&JudaIrm. (New Haven: Yalc University Press, 1935) 49-54. See also in this connection Engberg-Pcdersen's provocative argument for the i n ~ ~ o r t a n cofe human, as opposed to divine, nature in Stoic philosophy more gencrzrlly in 77Le Stoic 3heoly oJ Oikeiork.
"'
78
CHAPTER TWO
which it includes is itself offered with this aim in mind."" It is important to note, thcrefore, that Cicero has asserted, just prior to this account, that thc "nature of justice.. . must bc sought for in human nature.""The importance of human naturc in particular for Cicero's overall point, in fact; bccomes quite clear at the concl~ision of his initial account of law at 1.18-19: Now if this lpreceding account of ia\v] is correct, as I think it to be in general, thcn the origin of Justice is to be found iii Law: for Law is a natural/orce; il i: the mlnd and reawn g t h e sage> the standard by which Jnsticc and Injustice arc measured."" Justice, that is, is "natural" inasmuch as it derives from law; and the law, in turn, is natural to the extent that it is identical to the rcason gibe sage. Indccd, it is to be noted that- -excluding, of coursc, the possibility of the defiition in question-1.18-~19 contains not a single reference to the idcntification of the law with thc divine ratio. Nor does Ciccro's argulncnt at this point depend upon this identification. Ciccro, in fact, docs not attempt to secure his interlocutors' concession that the cosmic ratio will be relevant to their discussion at all until 1.21. As far as I have notcd, in fact, Cicero elsewhere uses the term insila only with reference to the naturc or animus of the human being."' In fact, thc term appcars in Cicero's works in conjunction with themes and idcas associated particularly with thc k ~ ~ ~ u . r o t ?rpoh+qe~g:it is used as a description of in connection with o i ~ ~ i m oand t ~ ,even ~ ~ ~in direct connection with the Stoic doctrine De IZ8. 1.18. "e IZE. I. l i : naturn enim k l i r explicando nvbir ert eoqze ah horninis repenlendn nalura; 1 havc altered the translation of LCL only in addins emphasis, and in rendering hnminis noturo as "human nature" rather than the more gender-specific "nature of man." De Leg. 1.19: quod ri iia reek dicitur, ut mihi quidm~p h m q u e oideli solet, o lep ducendurn ext im2 ezmdiurn; ea esl enim noturoe uii, ea m rahoque prudmfe, een iu+ otque iniuriae re& 1 have altered the translation or LCL only in the addition of the emphasis and in rendering prudentis as "of the sage" rather than "or the intelligent man." Regarding the lauer, it scems to me rather clear in the context of the De L @ h u that it is the Stoic identification of the law with the reason of the sagc that Cicero has in mind here; cf. Kenter, De IZg&r, 88. "' Cf. TD. 1.57; 1.26-27; De 0fl3.32; De f l i t . Deor l . l i ; De Fk. 1.31; 4.4; 1% Sexla Roscio Arne& 5%; Topica 31; Again~tVma 2.48, 139, 177; 1% M u ~ m30; Brulw 2 13; Axainrt A r o 15; Ro Cluentiu 4,. "' Ri, .Murena 30. "" CT 1311 Srxto Roscio ilnierino 53; where a fathcr's love fin his child is described as i n s i t ~ mwith ~ the Stoic doctrine of social oixeioa~g.One might aLso mention in this connection Cicero's description of his lovc for Rome as such in V m Z.139,
""
LAW AS IAIPL.4VrED LOGOS
79
of ~onception.''~Whiie there is thus good precedent for Cicero's use of the term imita in connection with human naturc, and even in connection with the Epqu.io~rrpohfiryeq, its use in connection ~ i t h divine nature would be quite peculiar."" Indeed, when: in another work, Ciccro wishes to convey the notion of the omniprcscnce o i the oera lex, he chooses a phrase more directly reminiscent of Chvsippus's: d f i a in ornne~."~ If, then, the nalui-a into which rcason has been "implanted" according to De Leg. 1.18 is thus human nature,"' the phrase ratzo insita would seem to bc used with particular rcfcrcnce to the initial endow mcnt of reason in its potential, lcss-than-completc state. In [act, Cicero's use of the term insita in this connection, recalling as it docs the Grcck Epquroq, is quite striking given the foundational role played by thc Epqu.iot rrpoh$yrey in his theory or law-. The perfected human reason which is identified with natural law is, in its initial form, comprised of "implanted preconceptions." Cicero's usage, it would seem, simply applies the technical dcscription of the inchoate preconceptions with which one can compare 1)e Fix. 5.65 66. See runher the report in De Fin. 1.31 that some Epicureans had expanded upon Epicurus's doctrine of the Goal, which was rooted in the belief that humans from birth naturally seek plcasure and avoid pain, by arguing that this judgment resa not only with the scnscs, hut is nalnralem el imitam in ar~imiinoil7ir; such a position is perhaps to h r understood as thc adaptation of Stoic ideas Tor the support of Epicurean ethics. "* 711 1.57; [email protected]. Note d s o the description of all human beings' notions (cognikones) of the gods as inritu . . . uel p a k u innolm in De ~VaNal.Deor. I .44, which admittedly, however, is given in an account oC Epicurean theology; cf. though the use of the identical phrase by Cicero in De Fin. 4.4. in connection with a report of a Platonic/Peripatetic view concerning the universal desire lor knowledge on the part of human beings. Kentcr cites sevcral passages to demonstrate the synonymirq of kit?and innoto, all of which rcfcr to thc nature or nnimu of the human being; he does not, howevrr, comment upon thc possible significance of this fact for the interpretation of the account of law at De I A ~ .1.18. Sec Kcnter, De I@bru, 82. ""p. 3.33; cf. Chrysippus's 6rh n6v.iov i . p ~ 6 f i ~ v o(Diog. < Laert. 7.88) and Cleanthes's GI& xdrvrov ~poti@ ( S F 1,537; p. 122, lines 8m. I1 is noteworthy that cvcn in this passagc thc cosmic ratlo manifest= itself in human bcings in thcir experience of thcir own naturc. Thus when Cicero describes this l m further as nahirae ronpen.r, it bccomes clcar that the natura that he has in mind at thc \-cry lcast includes the notirra hominiq for "jwlhocver does not submit to it [sc. the "true law"] is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and for this \,cry reason will sufkr the worst penalties, even if he cscapes what is commonly considered punishment"; the transladon is an adaptation of that of LCL. CF. in this respect Dionysius bar Saiihi's paraphrasu and explanation or the kp~puto<Myo
"'
""'
80
CHAPTER
TWO
as "implantcd" dircctly to the "spcrmatic" rcason which the lattcr comprise."" In fact, thc number of othcr ancient works which cxhibit similar terminology in analogous contexts confirms this interpretation. Thcsc works %ill be considercd in detail in the follorving chapters, but thc most striking instances can at leas1 be mentioned hcrc. In the Apostolic Comtitutiom, too, God's initial $ft of a natural law to thc human animal is equated with an endowment of "thc seeds of dirinc knov-ledge," also called "implanted knorvlcdgc" (Epqurog yvGotg), whilc thc law itsclf is described as an Epquio5 v6po5. Similarly, the incomplete logos posscsscd by all humans is dcscribed by Justin as thc Epqu.rov .roc h h o v d p p a (cf. ~ r o p h ) ,while thc tcaching oS Christ, who brings this logos to perfection, is "right reason" or natural law. It is prccisely this theorelical understanding of law, in fact, that Dionysius ~ the Letter bar Sahbi brings to his explanation of the Epqu.ro5 h h o of of Jamcs: it is intcrpreted with rcfcrence LO the abihty to makc cthical distinctions,"' "implanted" in human nature by God, and idcntificd further with "natural law." In sum, Cicero's definition oS law as ratio summa imita in nahrra is to bc understood in light of the Stoic correlation of the potential rcason given to humans by nature with an inilial endoumcnt of Epqu.rot r p o h f i y r ~ q . Moreover, givcn thc analogous dcscriplions of either human reason or the natural law it comprises as "implanted" in a variety of ancicnt works, it is clear that the phrasc ratio invita was not Ciccro's own idiosyncratic coinage. This latter point is all
'"CS. further in this connection Lle I q . 1:24: "For when the naturc oS man is examined, ihe thcory is usually advanced.. . [that] a time came which was suitable fix sowing the seed oS h e human race (smndi g m i r hominir). And when this secd was scattered and s o w over the earth (yuod rparsunr in lmu, alque rotum), it was granted the divine gift oS ihc soul.. . . the soul was implanted (e.r.re ingmvotum) in us by God." I have alicrcd the LCI. translation only by rendering inperoturrr so as to make the continualion of the "sowing" melaphor morc cxp1k:it. See further on this passage above, n. 183. While one might object that the usc of the term mmma to descrihc this ~otiois problematic ibr this interpretation, it is perhaps more significant h a t ihc tarm most ofien used in the common Stoic definition presented here to dcscribc perfected rea son-namely recta ratio (cS. 6p8b5 %yo<); cf. De Leg. 1.23; 1.33; 1.42; 2.10; DL'Rq. 3.33 i s avoided. Summa, unlikr recta, might be taken simply ~ 6 t hreference to thc divine nature oS thc rolio rather than speciSying its "right" or "peticrt" statc. 'l'hr Sormcr point is in fact made elsewhere in thc Lle L@hu.\; scr 1.23; with \vhic:h cumparc 1..59. CS. Surthrr Justin, Apj. 3.3: ~ r f ~ o u ~ orrep&ar~xoC roC Odou h6you, on which sre bcb\r.; Chapter Three. "'I C f on this point, too; the commentaries oS Oecumenius and l'hcuphylactus.
the more significant for our purposes given Cicero's h e a ~ ydependencc upon somc Greek sourcc or sources for the theory of law espoused in his De Legibw. It is sale to conclude, that is, that Ciccro's source had defined natural law in terms of h6yo5 Ep~+~u.ro<. The author of this sourcc is impossible to identify M-ithany certainty: and the question is, fortunatclj-, not crucial for the present study. The probIcm is nonetheless of interest in its ohvn right: and mcriu at lcast brief consideration.
In general it is fair to say that Ciccro was not a particularly o r i ~ . nal philosopher. By his o m admission, his philosophical w-ritiugs were intended primarily to bring Greek ideas to the Roman world. His De Legibus, at least with respect to the theory of law presented in its first book, is no exception."" Ciccro is in fact quite explicit about his use of sources in this trcatisc, p&icularly with respect to his trcatmcnt of the central issnc of the natural origins of law and justice.'" His dependence in this matter is so great that the Epicurean Alticus, the primary interlocutor of h e De hgibus, quips sarcastically: And, of coursc, you havc lost your independcncc in discussion, or clsc you are the kind of man not to follow your own judpcnt in a debate, but meekly to accept the authority of other~C'~~
Cicero assures Atticus that such facile acceptance of prior intellectual authority is not his usual procedure, but is in this case prompted by the profound importance of his subject matter and his desire for a secure theoretical foundation for his It cannot be doubted that the sourcc for thc theory of natural law used in book one of the De h g i b u , like thosc of Ciccro's other
"" On
the intendon of Cicero's philosophical writingq sce
D8
Fin. 1.1-12; Ile
Nal. Deor 1.1 14.; TD 1.1-8; Amd K 5f. Cicero's attempt to use the Stoic lheory uf law as a f<~undutk~n fir a concrctc body or legislation in the De Lcgibui; howcvcr, ir almost certainly original, at lcast in its Roman context; see or, this immeNote, ~ . though, the similar Jcwisll and Chrisiian moves discussed in diately h c l o ~ ~
the f"llowing chapten. '" 118 CAE. 1.18; 1.36. r" De Lq. 1.36. y'l
De Leg 1-37.
82
CHAPTER
nvo
philosophical works, was Greck. This is clear first of all from his comments regarding the lack of prior Roman concern for questions of legal theory as opposed to those regarding legal minutiae."" A further indication lics in the et~mologyof the Grcck term vCIpo5 gvcn in 1.19, to which Ciccro adds his own Latin cty-mology of lew. O n the other hand, there has been some question as to which Greck author, prcciscly, providcd Cicero's main source."" Several scholars have a r p e d that Cicero's source was not a proper Stoic, but rather ,4ntiochus of' Ascalon, a personal acquaintancc of Ciccro and founder of the breakaway "Old ,4cadcmyn whose philosophy is treated by Cicero in both thc De Finibw and the A~ademica."~ This philosopher is best known for his hclicf in the csscntial a,wrccmcnt of the Platonists, Peripatetics and the Stoics; his philosophy, accordingly, prescnted something of a synthesis of the thought of' these three schools. In fact, Cicero interacts explicitly with Antiochus in De Leg. 1.54, when Atticus recognizes that Cicero's vicw on the dispute concerning the Good agrees substantially with that of Antiochus."' Whcthcr agreement in this matter implies a dependencc on Antiochus throughout the De Legibus, howcvcr, is far from clear. Other indications of Antiochan influence citcd in support of this idea are suggestive, but not dccisivc."Wcrtainly, one can at lcast say that thc usc of Antiochus would have been consistent with Ciccro's hope to win approval for his theory of law from the "Old Academy," the I'eripatetics and the Stoics-among whom he, like Antiochus, fmds essential agreement.':jY Evcn if Antiochus was Cicero's primary source, however, it is by no means clear that one should thereby reckon with a radical altcration of the Stoic theory of law in the De IRgibus. Ciccro himself elsewhere writes of Antiochus of Ascalon that "had he made very -
'" "' "" "' ""
Iile leg 1.14. See further Vander TVacrdt, "Philosophical Inlluence on Roman Jurisprudence," 4867-70. For a sketch of the positions: scc Kentcr, De Le@bw, 9 10. So most recently Horslcy, "'Ihe 1,aw of Nature"; Vander Waerdt, "'l'he Stoic T h e o ~ yor Natural Law." De Leg. 1.54,; note however Cicero's hesitation: m i [sc. ihtiochus] larim gc admliar in omnibui necne mor uidero. Especially those citcd by Horsiey, "The Law 01Nature in Philo and Cicero," 42-50; sec further the discussion immediately hclow. "'"e L.s 1.37-39. The view regarding the essential agccmcnt of thcse schools on thc question of thr summum bonum, howcvrr, apparently gocs back to Carneades, and is to this extent consistent with Cicero's skeptical lean in,^; see De En. 3.11. For Antiochus's dependencc upon Carneades in this matter see ile Fin. 5.16.
LAW' AS IILIPL4WD LOGOS
83
fcw modifications," he would have becn "a perfectly genuinc Stoic."'"' On the face of it, thcn, thc qucstion would ihus seem in any case to be at most one of "modifications" of the Stoic ~heory.'~' The substantive question, that is, is this: even if i\ntiochus was thc primary sourcc for this work, in what way: if any, does his theor), of la\,represent a dcparturc from thc Stoic thcory? In its basic outlines, at least, the iheory of natural law presented in the De Legbw is unquestionably Stoic. As we havc scen, its ccntral points have clear precedents in our sourccs Tor the early Stoics. Cicero takcs thc Stoic identification of law with human reason as the point of dcparturc for his theory, and in fact rcpeateay offers variants of a common Stoic definition of law as "right rcason applied to commanding and The ratio in question, for Cicero as for thc Stoics, is both the cosmic ratio of God and human reason. The notion that gods and humans arc mcmbcrs of a common state in virtue of their similar possession of reason is also clcarly Stoic in origin.243So too, the developmental aspect of Cicero's thcory of law draws upon the Stoic account of human reason and its dcvclopmcnt; and it is rather difficult to imagine that Chrysippus had altogether overlooked thc implications of thc latter for his identification of natural law with the logos of the sagc. In Tact, even if one should grant the supposed indications of Antiochan influence found by Horsely and Vander Waerdt, these represent only minor modifications of thc Stoic theo'y-albeit, in the case of Vandcr Wacrdt, a slight modication with far-rcaching implications. For Vander Waerdt the most consequential changc effected by Antiochus was the ascription of "appropriate actions" ( ~ a 0 i ~ o v . rrather a) than "right actions" (xa.rop0&pa.ma)to natural law: "a simple technical modification, though one rnotivatcd by fundamental revisions in Stoic psychology."244Horsley, on the other hand, finds two significant divergences from Stoicism in Cicero's a c c ~ u n t . ~ ~ '
'" Acad. N.132.
'*' Thus Dillon (73e Middle Plolonirls, 80-81), who finds it "very likely that the discussion of Natural Law in Cicero De Lepibur I is basically Antiochan," nonetheless noinls out that "none of this is orieinal lo Antiochus."
,
,
the sage in parlicular; see abovc n. 213. and the discussion to which it is appended. 1-Iarsiey, "Thc Law of Naturc in Philo and Cicero," 1 0 42. A lhird point
'""
84
CHAFTER
TWO
The first is Cicero's predilection for phrases l i e "divine mind" or "mind of God." While perhaps suggestive of platonic influence, this does not, in and of itself, represent a significant alteration of the Stoic the~ry.~'%orsley's second point, and that which he finds to be thc "most significant" indication of non-Stoic influence, is the fact that Ciccro "clearly distinguish[cs] God from the law," whcreas "Stoic doctrine had identified God with law as well as with reason."'" As was pointed out earlier in this chapter, how-ever, strict identification docs not appear to have been thc carly Stoics' only valid option for On the describing the relationship behveen God and law- or other hand, the consistency with which this distinction is maintained in the De Legibur, along with Cicero's predilection for describing God as "lawgiver," might suggest platonic influence-especially givcn that both tendencies are also characteristic of the more obviously platonizing Phi10.~" Be that as it may, one cannot in any case fairly speak of a substantivc departure from the original Stoic thcory. Potentially more consequential for the present study are indications of platonic influence in connection with Cicero's understandWhile, as we havc seen, it is ing of the implanted precon~cptions.~~" not the casc that Cicero's notion that these are present from birth owes to platonic influence, such influence might nevertheless bc seen in both his referenccs to memory in this connection and his apparent view that humans have implanted preconceptions which extend beyond the sphere of ethics and belief in the dcity. Thc Stoics, we only those conhavc seen, included among the Epqvpurot apohfiyr~~g q: all one's ethical concepts, cepts whose origin lies in o i ~ e i o ~ t above though apparently for some (later?) Stoics, at Icast, also a belief in God. Cicero, on the other hand, speaks of thc "obscure notions of many things" ( r e mplurimamm obscurar intellz&en&) which Divinc Nature gives to the human animal.25' This statement would seem to suggcst made by Horsiey concerning thc frequent use of the term B ~ a p 6applies ~ not to Cicero, hut to Phiio, who, Horsley argues, also depends upon Antiochus. O n Philo's theory o f law and ils relation to that of Cicero, see Chapter Three. In Fact Horsley himself recopizes that there is some evidence for a similar use of the term v a 5 ~amons the early Stoics; see "The Taw of Nature in Philo and Cicero," 41 ii. 1.5. 1 6 2 , 42. Sce ahovc, under the heading "Natural Law a s Cosmic Logos." 'I" Horsle?;; "Thc Law of Nature in Philo and Ciccro;" 42. "" See Kenter, Ile Il@bu;ll2: further l'ohlenz, Cmndjqen; 97-99. "' Cicero; De Iaq. 1.26.
"'
'"
LAW AS IMPLANTED
LOCOS
85
preconceptions from a wide range of topics hcyond thosc discussed in this connection by the Stoics, and Cicero in fact speaks elsewhere in D e hgibus 1 or "shadowy conccpts, as it wcre, of eue?ythiqf2 which the individual human "from thc start has formed in soul and mind."'"l That platonic influence is in fact at work here is suzested b)- an interesting passage in the T z c u l a n Disputatiom, whcre Cicero discusses the platonic theory of anamnesis using Stoic sounding terminology: in no other way was it possible for us to posscss from childhood such a number of important idcas, implanted and as it were impressed on our souls and called E v v o ~ a(imitas ~ et quasi conignutar in aniv~isnotiones, qua! Evvata~ uocant), unless the soul, bcforc it cntcrcd the body, had been active in acquiring kno~ledge.~"~ This passage is somewhat reminiscent of D e Leg. 1.25, where Cicero explains why it is lhal all human socicties evidence somc bclicf in a deity: "Thus it is clear that man recognizes God because, in a way, hc remembers and rccognizcs the source from which he sprang." Interestingly, a synthesis of the Stoic "concepts" and the Platonic "ideas" was also apparently effected by Antiochus of A~calon.'~'This may provide further evidence ror Cicero's dcpcndcncc upon Antiochus for his presentation or natural law, though the presence of similar idcas in Ciccro's othcr works has led at least one scholar to conclude that Cicero has effected this merger Whatever the case, the importancc of this innovation for Ciccro's general theory or law is negligible. Cicero's primary interest in the implantcd preconceptions, both in 1.26 and in 1.59, is in any case cthical. Thus, rcfcrring hack to 1.26-27, Cicero writes that those inchoate concepts (inchoatae intelligentiae) to which I have referred, which are imprinted in our souls (in animu inpnmuntur), are imprinted 'j2 De Lq 1.59: fi'7tLipiLi 7e7um omnium gzmi adumbratar intellqqmtias animo a6 men* concejent 'llle translation and cmplrasis are mine. It is perhaps possible to inteipret p~incipioin 1.59 more loosely and, thererore, to take the rererence more generally to the "natural" formation of preconceplions which occurs even before an individual is properly rational, and thus to all preconceptions rather than the Ewrpu~a~ zpahfiyretg in particular. Note, however, the preceding reCcrencc to "how nobly equipped by Nature (s)hc [sc. the human individualj entered life," which recA rather suonrlv -, thc massarc concenline " the divine endowment of the o b s c u ~ aintrllizmhar in 1.26 cf. Kenter, De h ~ i b r r i ;235. 'iV1l1.57; I have deviated from the LCL only in rendering- iruilm as "implanted;'
rather than "innate." '"4 Dillon, 7he Middle Plalonbts. 91-96. 7"' Sa Pohlen~,CrundJnpm, 99.
86
CHAPTER TWO
in all souls alike. . . In fact, there is no human being of any race who. if he finds a guidc, cannot attain to .rinue."" So too, in 1.59: after speaking of "shadowy concepts, as it were, of cveqthing" which form "from the start" in the human mind, Ciccro goes on to explain how thc development of thcsc concepts leads ultimately to a conception of the summunl b o n ~ m . ~ ~ ' In sum, givcn the several indications of platonic influence in the first book of his De Legibus, it is quite possible that Ciccro depends upon Antiochus of Ascalon for his theory of law. However, it is by no means clear that his general thcory differs substantially from that of thc Stoics. The instances of platonic influence perhaps add some distinctive color to the Stoic theory, but they do not alter it in any substantial way. Thc theoretical foundation that allowcd for Ciccro's definition of law as "implantcd reason" is wholly Stoic in origin. The question of Ciccro's source in any case matters little for our present purposes. By the first ccntury BCE at the latest, law had bccn defined in terms of Gyos Epqu.ro5 in connection with the Stoic theory of natural law. This is suggested not only by Cicero's cxplicit attribution of this definition to prior (Greek) authority,258but, as we shall see in the following chapters, by thc similar language found in the Apostolic Conslitukons, in works of Justin Martyr and Methodius, in early commentaries on the Letter of James and, in fact, in the Letter of James itself.
""e
Lrp
1.30; 1 have slightly allcred rhe 1.Ct. translation
"' De L "~ P1.59-60. 'j"
1.c.; to "the most learned men"; see De
Lq. 1.18
CH.%PTER THKEE
THE IA\\r O F MOSES, THE 1'EACHING O F JESUS; AND NA'KJR4L LZ\V
Among the enduring effects of Alexander the Great's incursions into the East was a vast and multi-faceted interplay or Greek and ,Jel+ish culture.' Despite the rhetoric generated in response to the Hellenistic recorm or Jerusalem and, especially, Antiochus Epiphancs's subsequent attcmpt to suppress traditionalJewish piety altogether, the Jews of this age w-crc not faced with a choice between "Judaism" and "Hellenism." Hellenization was simply a ract.' What conrronted the ,Jews or the Hellenistic and Early Roman periods was rather the challenge or producing a synthesis of Greek and Jewish ways that would yet prcscrvc a distinctivcly,Jewish identity amid the international Hcllcnistic culture.' The literary and other remains of the Jews of the Hellenistic age reveal a wide range of responses to this challengc. One strategy, the impact or which would continue to bc felt in subsequent centuries, particularly as Christian theology dcvcloped, involved the Jewish appropriation of Greek philosophical tradition! A number of Jewish intellectuals round the rigor and insights or Creek philosophical discourse compelling. Rcjcction of their own rcligious heritage in ravor of one or another school of philosophy, however, was scarcely the only option. O n the contrary, what one finds in the extant literature arc various attempts to bring the two tradlons
' See csp. V. *l'cherikover, Hellrriilic C2Uilkalion and ihe.7ews (trans. S. Applpplcbaum; Philadelphia: Jewish Puhliration Society oS America, 1959; reprinled with a preSace by J. J . Collins, Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1999); M. Hun& S;iaim and I l e l h m r i Shdiex in f i r Encounler in Palestine dun%, the Ear& H r l h i s t i ~I'e6od ( 2 m~ls.in one; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981). Sec S . J . D. Cohcn, From he Maccabees lo ihe Mirhnoh (Libran. of Early Christianity; I'hiiadclphia: Wcstminster; 1389) 31 45; also M. Hengel in collaboration with C. Markschics, 7 h e ''Hehisohon'' ufS;iaea in ihe Fird Cenlu? @f& C f i l (wans.J. Bowden; Philadrlphia: Trinity Press International; 1989). ' ,\s Cohen well points out, the challenge was scarcely a new one: "Evcn in preexilic times the Israelites had to derermine the cxtent to which thcy could draw on the riches aS dlc cul~uresamong which they lived" (From Uie ~Mnccohersli, ihr ~Miihnoh,38). I SccJ.J. Collins; Behnem A h x i andJe7e7usaiem:,j'mirh I d m h p in the Hellnirtic I h p o r a (Ncu, York Crossroad, 1983j 175 91.
together; to locate points of contact from which one could fom-ard claims of compatibility. Inevitably, these cndcavors led not only to new interpretations of Judaism, but to distinctit-e treatments or Greek philosophical ideas as well. Given the importance or traditions of Mosaic legislation to Second Temple Judaism in general, it is not surprising that the Stoic concept of a divinely ordained law provided one such point or contact. From at least the first ccntuq- of the Common Era, some Jewish thinkers claimed that their nation's law, revealed to Moscs by the creator of the world, was in act a written expression of the Stoics' natural law. Analogous claims w-ould continue to be forwarded by Christians, who, howcvcr, more often assertcd that it was rather the tcaching of Jesus which gave verbal expression to natural law.' In either case, what resulted were diverse presentations of thc concept of natural law that diverged variously and significantly from the theory as originally conceived. Two common and fundamental divergences arc notcw-orthy at the outset. ?'he very notion, first of all, that the "right reason" which comprises natural law can find definitive verbal expression in some set of ethical directives sccms to have been quite alien to the original Stoic idea." Second, and perhaps more important, is the fact that the origin of this law was no longer associated with the immanent deity of the Stoics. The author of this law was now the transcendent god whose past interaction with humanity, and with the descendants of Abraham in particular, is recorded in the Jewish scriptures, and whose future activity, at least in much of the Christian literature, would include an eschatological judgment. In short, what one finds in this literature arc recognizably Stoic ideas associated with concepts and discussed in terms which arc utterly foreign to Stoicism. This phenomenon greatly illuminates the treatment of the implanted logos in the Letter of James, and an examination of selected examples will be instructive. In addition, analysis of several works which speak particularly of an "implanted" law or logos in this context will confirm the findings of the preceding chapter.
'
Scc, howcver, hclow in this chapter on the Apostolic Conrhtutions. and the follo\*ing chapter on the I.etter of,James. "ee the introductory cornmcnls in Chapter Two; above. Note at the sarnc time, ho\veuer, that Cicero is also moving in this dircclion.
MOSES, JESUS; AND NATUW
L&\V
89
The ~vritingsof Philo of Alexandria prcscnt the most well-known and obvious example of the Jewish appropriation of the Stoic thcory of natural law. Pbiio's recurring use of patently Stoic terms and concepts leaves his indcbtcdness to Stoicism beyond doubt. Philo, howevcr, is no Stoic. His general philosophical oricntation is morc Wtiddlc Platonic than Stoic,' and his discussion of natural law: in particular, shows strains of iVco-Pythagoreanism. Moreover, in Philo's writings, these various philosophical concepts have been filtcrcd through a fundamental conviction that thc writings of "Moses" represent an unparalleled expression of philosophical truth, of thc "right rcason" that the Stoics considcrcd natural law. The end result is a quite distinctive treatment of thc concept of natural law: one clearly rooted in, but also significantly different from, thc carly Stoic thcory. Philo and the Stoks The Stoic correlation or law and "right reason" is fundamental in Philo's writings8 On morc than one occasion, hc offcrs a vcrsion of what wc havc sccn to have been a standard Stoic dcfinition of lawas logos in its function of commanding and prohibiting? Moreover, his comment at one point that "knowledge of the things we ought to do and of the things we ought not" (&ntor.ilpqv. . . &v .ie FEYZOLEYV IcaL &v pfi) is the special property of the "rcasonablc part" (pip05 hoync6v) of the human soul,'0 suggcsts that he, l i e Chrysippus and Ciccro, used this definition of law- in conjunction with a more general account of the workings of the human logos-albeit with a view of the soul that is quite at odds with the monistic psychology of the early Stoics." For thc Stoics, this dcfinition concerned 1ogo.i both as
' J. Dillon,
n i e ~MiddkPlalonlrli, 139-83.
" Philo equates law specifically with 6pObg h6yog in Of,$ 143, Eh.142, Prob. Lib. 4 6 - 4 7 ?and AE. 51; but his terminology is in general rather fluid. As Goodenough poirlls out, "the word bp06g is frequently omitted and h6yo~alone put in rormulac where we know 6p8bg h6yog must havc been understood by both Philo and his readcr" (By G h t , Lkhl The ~MysLical Gospel ofHellmii1ic ,7udaism [New Haven: Ydc Univcrsiq- Prcss, 19551 56). " See j'0.r. 29; I&. Poen. 55: [email protected] 150. 'I' I4f. All. 1.70. All translations of Philo's writings, unlcss othenvise noted, are taken irom the LCT.. " CT. Plularch; SL. Rep. 1037K d s o Cicero; Ile Irg 10. On tllc various divisions
90
CHAPTER T H ~ E
a divine principle that pervades the cosmos as law of the World City, and as the reason of the human sagc, thc citizen of the Cosmopolis. This basic conceptual framework, patently Stoic, surfaces repeatedly in Philo's works.12 A particularly striking example is found in the treatise On Joseph, whcrc the notion of the world as a "Great City" is directly linkcd to the Stoic definition of law: For this world is the Megalopolis and it is fumishcd vith onc constitution and one law: the 1080s of naturc is that which commands what onc must do, and that which prohibits what one must nor do.'" The prernisc of a World City governed by logos is most prominent, however, in his On the Creation of the World. Herc wc find, not surprisingly, that citizenship in Philo's City, as with that of the Stoics, is limited to rational bcings; to beings, that is, whose "constitution" is also comprised by logos. This includcs in thc first placc, again analogously with the Stoics, a constituency of divine beings: thc hoyt~ai ~ abetat i qbo&tg,such as the incorporeals and lhe stars, are citizens, with God himself as a p ~ w v@ j p~yahox6hew~.'~ It also includes, of coursc, thc human being. More precisely, it is specifically the s a g e that is, thc one whose constitution is defined by @ht rcason-who is the world citizen.'Vhis becomcs quite explicit as Phio cxplains Adam's status as "world citizen": Now since every well-ordered State has a constitution, the citizen of the world cnjoyed of ncccssity the same constitution as did the whole of thc soul espoused by Philo, see further Dillon; 'The Mddlle l'latonirtr, 174-76. A further hint of Philo's awareness or the implications of the Stoic psychology of action for natural law might also he seen in O,b$ 3, where he associates the universal law with "the will orNa1ure'' (rb poGhqwani5~6oewg).Cf the use o r h e samc phrase a1 Epictetus, Ench. 26 and SVF 3.180, and further the discussion or Inwood; Ethici and Human AclC>n,107-8. This passagc from I'hilo, in fact, would seem to provide furlher confirmation of Inwood's suggestion that the Stoics understood the law in this w-ay. O n the Cosmic City see 1bIos. 2.51; Dec. 53; Spec. Leg. 1.34; Ron. [rag. 2.39; ?OJ. 29-31: 69. O n the "world citizen" see Sbec. Leu 2.45: Miur A t 59: Sonn.
.
.
. .
. .
..
.
~.
06 ao~q?iav;translation mine. "' Of,$ 143-144 cf. LJt 1 ~ g .1.23 and SVF2.528. On God as "mler" of this City, sce Dec. 53, with which cT Spec. Le2. 1.34, where humans are said to infer from the order of the "Great City" or thc w r l d a iye@&v.Philo's pod; however, is OF count distinct from the logm; sec Dillon, The ~WddlePhlonuLi, 15.i-58.
" See Diog. Lnerl.
7.33; cf. Cicero, De Leg. 1.23.
MOSES, JESUS. AXD N.4TURAL LW
91
world: and this constitution is the right reason of nature (b r i g cp6aewg bp0bg X6yog), more properly called an "ordinance", or "dispensation": sccing it is a dirinc law. . ."' This description of Adam, in ract, assumes his idealization as "in body and soul, surpassing all that now are and all that have been bcforc us," since God created him not from a material pattern, but p6vw. . . r@kauroC i,y@." Thus whiie all humans, by viltuc of their possession of logos, have the potential to live in accord mith right reason and thus become world citizens,'" it is "the man who observes the law" who is "constituted thereby a loyal citizen of the world (roc vopipou &vFpbg ~bflbg6 ~ ~ ~0 o5~ ~ o ~ o h i rregulating ou), his doings by the purposc and will of Nature ( ~ Bobhqka b f i g q6oeo~),in accordance with which the entire world itself also is administered."'"n fact, the only other figure explicitly identilied by Phiio as a "world cilizen" is Moses, thc paradi,m of the sage and lawgiver of the Jews.20
7 h e Law of Nulure and the Law of Moses If Phiio's indebtedness to the Stoics for his understanding of law is thus clear, his divergences from them are no less so. The most obvious of thcsc can bc correlated with his fnndamcntal orientation toward Judaism. It is, undoubtedly, in no small part due to his
"' Op$ 143: h e i Sh x%aa nbh~g~ijvopocEXEL rcokreiav, rivayicaioq mvhParv~r@ raaporrohiq ~pi(o0arrrohtreiq fi ~ aaGpxag i b r6apag. a i i q 66 Earrv b q g q6aew< bp0bg h6~0y,65 rmpror6pq rhilaer irpoaovopdrj~~at 0~ap6y,v6pog 0cTog ijv . . .; I have altered the LCL translation of b rijg q b a ~ o gbp0bg Myog as "nature's right relation" to mdke the reference to "right reason" morc explicit. Note also in this connection Abr 31; wherc Philo states that the "kin" of the sagc are other virtuous people rather than those to whom he is tied by blood. " Op$ 139-40; I have altered the translation of the I.CI. only to avoid thc impression that Philo's lanpagc in 1.40 is gender specific. '* CL, e.g., Abr. 5 where Moses is said to have included narratives concerning the patriarchs in his law so that "thosc who wish to live in accordance with the laws as they now stand have no difficult Yak: secing that the first generations before any at dl or the particular statutes was set in writing lollowed thc unwritten law with perfect c a s e . . ." "I Ibid.; rf. Mos. 1.157 whcre it is specifically b arrouSaio5 who is icoaponohiq5. "' E.g., Mos. 1.156; ConJ 1 . i ~ 106; cL also h o d Omn. 1406. l i b . 44. O n Philo's idcalkation 01Moses, see esp. ICIo.s 2.192 and Ebr 94; further Gaodenough, By Lkhl, Lkhl; I80 231. Winston characterizes Moses as Phila's "super sage'' (Ia,goi and Myrtical %loo in Philo o / A l m d r i a [Cincinnati: Hebrew Union Co1leg-e Press, 19853 41). By the svmc tokcn; onc can salely assumc that Abraham: lsaac andJacob were also considcrcd to he such given their status as as kpcpu~o~ v b p o ~ .Sce on this concept heloxv, with note 36.
92
CHAPTER THREE
assumption of thc Jewish god, for example, that he inclincs away from the immanent Stoic deity and views the logos in relation to a transccndcnt, more platonic, g-od." Of more direct relevance to thc present study is his corc conviction that the "right reason" which the Stoics equated with truc law finds written cxprcssion in a law that Moses gave to thc Jewish pcople. In the opcning- of his On the Creation, Philo lauds Moses's decision to preface his laws with an account of thc w-orld's creation. By doing so: says l'hilo, Moses indicated h a t "the w-orld is in harmony with the Law, and the Law with the world."" Indeed, Moses thus implied that the one who obscn~cshis law "regulat[cs] his doings by the purpose and will of Nature (xb po.Shqpa (pljo~mq), in accordaucc with which the entirc world itself also is adrninistercd." It is precisely this one, thereforc, who is the "world citizen."'" If Moses's law is thus in harmony with the logos that structures the cosmos, it can also bc seen, from another vantage point, as a written expression of the logos of the human sag-e. 0 1 1 one hand, to be sure, l'hilo considcrs the "right rcason" of the sag-e to stand over against all "lifeless" (&ym~o~) writtcn laws:24 right rcason is an infallihlc law engraved not by this mortal or that and, therefore, perishable as he, nor on any parchment or slabs, and, therecore, soulless as they, but by immorwl nature on the immortal mind, nevcr to perish.25
Nonetheless, the "sacred books" of Moses's law, says Philo, are "likencsscs and copies of the patterns cnshrined in the soul, as also are the law-s set before us in these books, which shew so clearly thc said virtues."'"hat is to say, thc commands of the law- of Moses are,
"
O n Philo's 10x0s see esp. IVinston, Iagos and iMyrIical Theoloa; also Dillon; 7he ~ K d d l ePlahlontr; 158-61. " OPzJ 3: ioij ~ 6 o p o u i@ v6pq ~ u.roc i v6wau r+ ic6apy ouv+Sov.rog.
" I6a. " On the "Higher Law" in Philo see Goodcnough, 4 Lkht, &hi, 48-71; also J. W. Manens, "Philo and the 'Higher' Law," SRlSP 30 (1991) 309-22. '"Quod Omn. h h . Lib. 46: v6pog SQ uyrmSilg b 6pObg h6yog; OGX bzb r o t S~ivog6
r o t SEivog, 0q.io0 lp0upr6g, ?v ~upitGiotgfi orilhurg, iiyru~ogdr~&atg, hhh'im' drOuvkrou q b a e y iiq8uprag ?v dr0avdrrcp Stavoiq rurrwOei<. O n the immoml nature of the human Stkvoru; see Opl/ 135.
'"
Mos. 2.1 1 ; i.e., the Four virtues chiefly rccluired for legislation, ail of which Moses alone possessed. Those especially crucial for thc task of legislation are ~b q~hdrvOpwrrov,rb qQoSiru~ov,rb qrhdryaOov, and i b ptoon6vqpav (2.9). Note that Moses's trainer in ?he quest for virtue was i v iuvr$ hoytopbg, and his single goal
MOSES, JESUS; AVD NA17iK4L LAW
93
so to speak, "copies" (615 a v ~ i ~ b v w vof) the "originals" (&< Ei.v &pxe&ou5); copics, that is, of the "men who lived good and blarneless lives, whose virtues stand permanently enshrined in the most holy scriptures . . . for in thcsc men we have laws cndowed with life and reason (gpyruxot ~ ah oi y t ~ o i v 6 p o t ) . " In ~ ~ short, ~\-hilcnot, strictly speaking, identical to the "highcr law," the law of the Jcws stands in contrast to the u y o x o t v6pot of all other peoplc~''~as a \vritrcn copy or the Epyrvxot v6po1, the sages found particularly in Israel's past: Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and, above all, Moses himself.?" Tile Sage as Zpqmxog v6pog
Phiio's notion that the truc law is the right reason of the sagc-though obviously not his view that the Jewish patriarchs provide modcls of the sage!--is clearly rooted in the Stoic thcoly of law. One of his most characteristic expressions of this idca, the description of the sage as E p q ~ ~ x ov6po5, q however, is not typical of Stoicism. As several scholars havc pointed out, this terminology seems in fact to havc bccn dcrivcd from Neo-Pythagorean, not Stoic, philosophy."'
was "the right rieason of nalure" ( ~ b v6p0bv q j rpGaeq Myov), which alonc is the hcginning and tint of the virtucs" (~Mor1.48; dl Ahr 6).
" Abc 3-6; cf. Ahr 275-76; '"'l'hough '"right reason" is
Krl. 194; Mos. 1.162. understood to be the "ibuntain head of all other nqA ~ v ~ & o Lin~ Quod ) Omn. h b . Lib. 47, it is nonetheless assumed laws" (zoi5 B h h o ~ throughout Philo's writ in,^ that Moscs's law alonc presene the perfect written expres sion of natural law. Cf. in this respect Justin's comparison; lo be discussed below, of ihe "natural law" promulgated by Jesus G t h "thc laws or mcn"; Justin's conlparison, though, assumes a developmental-historical undcrsranding of the Abyoj which would have been alien to Philo. Enos, Enoch and Noah, the first lrio of patriarchs discussed by Philo, are of a lesser siature and are not callcd Epyu~otvt)pot.SO too Joseph, even in the more positive portrayal given him in De Jorepho, nonetheless represents, a s rcohunlc6<, an "addition" to thc natural polity of the World City and is Tor lhis reaton never callcd &pym~ag v6pog. Thus while Philo writcs at Jor 148 that "thc riohundg lakes a sccond place to the king," he makes it clear clsewhcrc lhat it is lhc king who is i ~ r p u ~vbwog oj (Moi. 2.4); scc further below. On Philo's ambivalent portrayal or Joseph, see E. R. Goodenough, The Polilia Philo ,j'u.daeus i+arhct and ?heov (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938) 2 1 3 3 , 4 6 6 3 . '*" See most fully E. R. Goodenough, "Thc Political Philosophy of Heilenistic Kingship," Yale C h i c a l Sludim 1 (1928) 5 5 102; also G. F. Chesnut, "The Ruler and thc Logos in Neopythaporean, Middlc Platonic; and Late Stoic Polilical Philosophy," AIVRW 2.16.2 (1978) 1310-1332. 'The closest unalopc in thc Sloic sources is fi,und in Sencca, Ep. 92, on which see Chcsnut, " ' h e Ruler and the Lops,'' 1324-26.
'"
~
94
CHAPTER THREE
Stobaeus has presemed the fragments of several Neo-Pythagorcan ireatises o n the subject of kingship i n which the king ( p a ~ t h ~ 6 qas ), opposed to the tyrant (shpavvog), is characterized as & k v v ~ ov6koq." g Thai Phiio's use of this t e r n bears somc rclation to this tradition is sufficiently clear from the fact that his fullest trcatmcnt of it occurs precisely in connection with a discussion of the king (paolhdg). It is a king's duty to command what is right and Corbid what is wrong. But to command what should bc done and lo forhid what should not bc done is the peculiar function of law; so that it follows at once that the king is a living law and the law a just king."' W h a t cmcrges from this passage, i n fact, is a remarkable synthesis of Stoic a n d Neo-Pythagorean concepts. Philo, i n a m a n n e r unparalleled i n the Neo-Pythagorean fragments, clarifies the sense in which t h e king c a n b e vicwed as a n Epqruxo~v 6 ~ o qb y appealing to t h e Stoic definition of law: h e is such inasmuch as h e shares the law's "peculiar function" of commanding what is t o b c d o n e a n d forbidding w h a t is not. Philo's "king," moreover, is n o t simply t h e literal (albeit idealized) m o n a r c h of the Neo-Pythagorean fragments. T h e "king" of P h i o ' s writings, l i e t h a t of thc Stoics, is such simply by virtue of his status as sage, regardless of his possession of a n actual dominion:" no one of thc foolish (is) a kina even though he should be master of
all the land and sea, but only the wise and God-loving man, even d he is without the equipment and resources through which he may obtain power wth violence and forcc.ja
" The passagcs arc conveniently collected in Goodenough's "The Polilical Philosophy of Hellcnistic Kingship." 3' M 0 3 2.4: PaouZ~iZ ~ O U T ~ K IEI IP O ~ T & T I E L YB ~ p j ~ l a&liayop~G~~v i ti I*;1~ p l inp6cia. tq 6i r6v npuukrfwv lcai dmay6pmor
MOSES. JESUS,
AND NATUK4L LAMI-
95
Analogously with thc offices of pilot, physician, or musician, kingship, for Philo, resides in the mastev of the "ccrtain kingly art'' (~ixvq71s p a o t h t d l ) ; it does not dcpcnd on possession of the tools of the trade.'Vhc titlcs sagc, king and gpyruxog v6po5, in sho~n,simply cxpress different aspccts of the same basic character type. And here again, characteristically, it is the "sages" of Moses's "sacred booksnw-hcthcr literal kings or not-who cmbody thc type.""
Conclusion: Philo un Natural Law Thc prcsence of decidedly Stoic terms and concepts in Philo's treatmcnt of natural law is quite clear. Thc dcfinition of law as logos commanding and prohibiting; thc idcntification of thc logos in qucstion as bolh that which structures the cosmos and that of the human sage; the notions of "World City" and "world ci&enn; the identification of thc sage and the king; all these elements of Philo's writings arc patcntly Stoic. His presentation of thcsc ideas, how.ever, is scarcely typical of the Stoics in cvcry rcspcct. Phio's treatment of these Stoic ideas is informed by his dcpcndence on other traditions of discoursc, whether Middle Platonic, Neo-Pythagorean, or Jewish, which are in any casc alien to Stoicism. The result is a quite distinctive presenration of thc Stoic correlation of logos and law.
Like the writings of Phiio, 4 Maccabees abounds with terms and concepts derived from Grcek philosophy. Its stated thcme of rcason's
" Sec Suriher Goodcnough,
I'oliticr, 91 93. ' O n Adam as "king," see Op$ 148. O n hloscs as h p y ~ ~ o q v 6 ~see 0 gMos. 1 .I 62, and further ~Mos. 1.158. Moses's role as king is the subject or the whole of book one of the 123 ofMoies, see esp. 1.334. Abraham is described as "king" in QG 44.6 and, along with Isaac andJacob, as hppqogv6pog in Abr. 3%6. Notc also thal the multi-book work tlrat had discussed him, Isaac andJacob was givcn the dtematc title On Ihe Uniulilten Lows, a designation intended to characterize the patriarchs themsclvcs, as is clcar from Abr 3-6 and 276; on the cquation of "unwritten law" and "animate law" in Philo, see Martens, "Philo and the 'Higher' 1.aw." Also sipificant in this connection, finally, is the fact that Joseph, as the type of the rroLrnrb< who takes "second place to thr king," is characterized neither as kin^" nor as Epyru~ogvbpog dcspite his more literal rule; see Joi. 1 4 8 Goodenough observes that lhe,Josuph of the UeJoiepho_"as a politician analogous u~ the Roman mler of Egypt; is a highly admirable being, almoil one o i the v6pat E p y u ~ o t ,tilough distinctly k~werthan thc patriarchs" ("Phikl's Exposition of the Law and his De V i a .\loses," H'rI3 26 119331 116; emphasis minc).
96
CHAPTER
THREE
supremaw over the passions is indecd a "highly philosophical" (1:1, vthooorp&~a.iov)one." To be sure, neither the depth of the author's philosophical knowlcdgc nor thc particular school of philosophy to which he is most indebted are as clear as is thc case with Philo; but a substantial measure of Stoic influence is recognizcd on all accounts."" Most commonly cited in thc latter connection are his association of (right)""eason with frccdom and kingship,'' his definition of wisdom:' his notion of the unity of humankind? as wcll as his position on the equality of sins?"
"'
ATA. Dupont-Sommer recognizes, this opening charactcrizaiion 01the them? from the vely start "donne, en quelque sorte, ie ton: l'oratcur cst un philosophe, et c'cst $ des philosophes qu' il entend s'adressei' (I2 O_uotGhe Liwe ~ieih1ahabits: Introduclion, Tmduction et floles [Paris: Lihrairc h c i c n n e Honort Champion, 19391 88). "' See R. Renehan: "Thc Grcck Philosophic Background of Fourth h.laccahees," H ~ i r t i r c i i l iMureurr~firPhilololo@ 115 (1972) 223-~38,esp. 223 26 for a brier summaly or thc scholarly discussion; and 233-38 on Stoic influence in p d c u i a r . Kenehan su~gestslhat 4 1l4accahers is directly dependent upon Posidonius. Sce further DupontSornrner, 12 (Luomkne I i m d a ~l/lachabie~, 55f; H . Anderson, "4 1Wacr:ahees: A New Translation and Introduction," 077 2.538; U. Breirenstein, Beobachlunyn iu Spradre, Slzl ulut C e d a n h p t des Vtirln~&fakkabiinbuc/rr (2d ed; Basel and Stuttgan: Schwabc & Co. Verlag, 1978) I59 61; H.-J. Klauck, 4 ~Mnkkabiirrbuch(,JSHRZ 3.6; Giitcnloh: Gcrd Mokm, 1989) 665 6 6 ; D. A. deSilva, 4 iMaccahees (Guides to Apocrypha and Pseudcpigrapha; Shctlield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998) 13, 51b75. Evcn hl. Hadas, who arsues that the author is a Platonist, concedes that hr also "knrw Stoicism, of course, and at many points uses Stoic language and echoes Stoic views" (The Third and Fourth Book "/,Maccabee.r [New York: Harper & Bros., 19531 1I6 118, csp. 117 n. 57). Note that hoytop65 connotes nut simply "rcason" in 4 Maccabrei, but morc specificdy v o G ~pair 6pOoG h6you rrporrpiuv ibv aoqiag $iav (4 Macc 1:15); scc on this funher bclow. 4 Macc 14.:2; see Dupont-Somrner, I1 Q u a h h e Liiirr de.s Machahke.~,.56 and 137; Hudas, 'The 'Third and Fou~thB o o k $Maccabees, 21 5; Brcitc:nstein, Beohnrhtuqen, 160; Klauck, 4 Mokka6=vhuch, 740. See further on kinphip 223, where thr one who lives by the iaw is said to "reign over a kingdom," and 7: 10, where Eleacar is rhetorically addressed hy the author as p&are ! d a o ~ K i .See further on rrecdom 5:38 and 13:2. 'I 4 Macc 1:16:, "Wisdom.. . is kno~lcdgcor things divine and human, and tiicir causes." See DuPont-Sommcr, Le Quut&s Livrr der &fachabieses;31 35; Hadas, 7 h r 77Lird and Fourth Book ofMaccahee.r~ 149; G. 'iV E. Nickelsburg, Jmistt i.ilmhire Beh1,8en the B i b b and Ute ~Mirhnoh (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987) 224; Breitenstein; Reobnchtu%~en, 159; P. L. Redditt, "The Conccpt of J ~ , ~ OinS Fourth hluccahees," C B Q 45 (1983) 260. Notc; ho\vever; the caveat o f Renehan, ~ 7 h opoints out that this definiiion was a "philosophical commonplace": "l'he extant evidence suggcsts Lhat, even ir this definition of aoqia is Stoic in ori~in,nevertheless . . . it did not rc& an exclurWeb Stoic definition" ("The Greek Philosophic Background," 228,229). *' 4 lWocc 1213; see Dupont-Sommer, Le Quatri2rne Lime dei ,Vfac/mhke.r, 56; Hadas, The 'Thi7d m d F<,i,urU~B o o k "f~Macmbeex,208; Klauck, 4 ~Vfakkabarrhuch~ 73. ~Vlncc519-21: "you must not rcrarard it as a minor sin for us to eat unclean rood minor sins arc just as wrighty as Ereat sins, fir in each case rhc law is
'' "
ILIOSES. JESUS.
AND VAlTRAL 1-4W
97
If a familiarity with and respcct for Greek philosophy in general and Stoicism in particular on the part of its author is thus ob\;ious; one of the underlying concerns of 4 Maccabees is noncthclcss thc challengc such thinking might posc to traditional Jc~vishpiety. Hoxv can thc Jew who acccpts the Cundamental prcmises of Grcck philosophy continuc to affirm the validity and importancc oC observing pcculiarly Jewish customs? Thc issue emergcs with particular clarity as the matyrdom of thc agcd Eleazar duling the perscculion of Antiochus is recounted. In 4 iMaccabees, the story is rccast to include an intcllcctual cxchange between Antiochus and thc "philosopher" Elcazar." In an attempt to persuade Eleazar to eat pork in a symbolic act of apostasy, Antiochus ofFcrs a critique of Judaism from the perspectivc of the "enlightencd" Grcek:'" Thc critique, in short, is that "thc religion of the Jews" (ijlouGaiwv Bpqoreia) is not really a philosophy at all, and a "nonscnsical" philosophy at best (5:7, 11). Two specilic chargcs arc lcveled: that adhcrence to Judaism is not reasonablc (5:ll; cf. 5:22); and that the Jewish law is out of step with natnrc (5:8-9).'" despised." For a comparison with thc rcle\,ant Stoic idea, see Dupont-Sornrner, I8 Quet&u Lire des A4nchabiei, 55, 107, nn. 19 21; also Br~.iienstein,Henhorht>mngms159. According to Hadas, 4 ililoccabeei "signifiranlly diverges" Srom ihe Stoics in this matter by rctai~iinga distinction between minor and great sins, though it is not altogether clcar whether he heiicvcs ihis to hc a c o r ~ ( i o udivergcncc; see 7 7 ~7hird and Fourlh Boob ,f~Maccabr*s, 172f. n. 21, and notc Surther p. 173, n. 23. Redditt is more explirit: "thc author seems to distance himsell slightly fiom thc Stoic notion that ail errors are everywhere alikc in severity" ("The Concept of flt~rnoi" 254). Renciran, with whom, at lcast an this matter, T am in substantial agreemcnl, remarks that "I myselrcannot comprehend how the clear statcmerit in verse 20 can bc construed a anything but general agreement (iritended or not) with the Stoic tcaching"; scc "The Greek Philosophic Rack&~ound~" 230, and Surther 229-31. 'The author's point, d t c r d l , is that dl sins are ullirnately eyiialb scrious. Cf. deSilva, 4 Mnccabea, 106-7. " 4 M o r ~ n h ~5;r . ~ci' 2 Macc 6: 18 31, upon which 4 rMaccoheri most likely depends ( ~ ~ d a s ; nzrd our^^ Book , ~ , M O C L ~ ~ 9 ~U 2 4~ 5 ; 4 "ilakkobnni,~ch654 5 7 ; dt:Silva; 4 ~Maccnbeu, 28 29). 2 Maccabees neithcr places Antiochus at thc scene nor describes E l c z a r as a "philosopher"; with rpspccl to the latter, d: 4 ~Wacc5:i, 21; 7:7, 9, 21; and 5 4 in some manuscripts; also R:l, on the seven brothers. " 4 .Ma.lacc 6:21 22. H a d a ~characterizes Antiochus's criticpc as Sorwarded "on the basis of the Stoic philosophy which he [sc. .4ntiochusj assumcs Eleazar r~llolvs'~ ('The 77iird B t'o'ou~thHooh oJMaccabee.rl 170, n. 7); ci' Klauck, 4 ,MoWilhachuci~,710. Notc. pace Hadas, chat this assumption on the part of Anuochus is accurulc; see below. "" These overlapping points arc supplemented by two liinhcr a r p m e n w which arc not, however, directcd againstJudaism per re: EL:irzar's capitulation in lllis matter would be the expedient cuune olvrtion (56;10-12); and findly; even if Eica~ar's piety should have some divinc sanction, his vansgression would he mitigated by Lhc ficr rhat it was commito:d under compulsion (5:13).
e
98
CHAPTER THREE
The author finds his solution to this challcngc in the Stoic concept of a natural law. O n thc lips of Eleazar and throughout 4 ~Maccabees, the claim is dcvcloped that the Torah accords with both "right reason" and human naturc. Human Reason and Jewish
h i
It is clcar fiom both Antiochus's critiquc and Elcazar's rebuttal that the underlying claim of Eleazar-~-and thc aulhor of 4 iWaccabees -is that adherence to thc Torah is to be vicwcd not only as the "philosophy" of the Jews, but a philosophy that is supremely rational. Having first explained the necessity of fidclity to that law undcr m y circumstances," Elcazar begns to spcak of life according to law as "our philosophy," correctly perceiving the basic thrust of Antiochus's argument: "You mock at our philosophy as though our living undcr it were contrary to rea~on."~%e dcfends the reasonableness of his "philosophy" by asserting that the law trains its adhcrents in the virtucs and, conversely, teachcs control of thc passions: [our philosophy] teaches us temperance so that we are in control of all our pleasures and desires;'" and it gives us a thoroug-h training in courage so that we willingly endure all hardship; and it tcaches us justice so that whatever our diKerent attitudes may be we retain a sense of balance; and it instructs us in piety so that we most highly reverence thc only living God. Thercrore, we do not eat unclcan rood. . .j" With Eleazar's claim that observance ofthe Jcwish law leads to virtuc and control of "plcasures and desires," we are immcdiately reminded of the author's central thesis: that reason should bc master of the passions.i' The Torah, that is, functions vis-a-vis the passions and
~
" 4 A4acc 5:16 a$*
21; cf Anliochus's argument in 5:13. 114m 522: ] ~ k u & j e r 66 < hpGv t$v cp3oooqiav Gmep 06 per& ~6hoy~oriag iv $~obvuov.AU translations of 4 Maccobeei, unless othciluise indicalcd, arc taken
Anderson, "4 Maccabees." early Stoics would not, or course; have spokcn in terms PI' "contml" or the passions, but rather in terms or their elirninalion; sce further Long and Sedley, 77~EIellmisk~Philoiophni; 1.410-23. It is to be obsen,ed i n this connecdon that the undcrsmding or h c pa3aions in 4 1Wacca6w is more in line with that of I'osidonius and other detractors of the monistic psycho lo^). of the carlier Stoics; see, cg., 4 ~ l l o c c3:5 and 221. See further Kenehan, "'l'he Greek Philosophic B a c k ~ o u n d , " 226-27; deSilva, 4 ~Vnccabeei,52-54. from
'" The
Macc 52'1-25. For the association oTpleasurc and desire with the passions, sce the author's discussion of thc latter in 120-29. " 4
"
MOSES. JESUS. .LYE NATUR.41,
L.W.
99
the \irtucs precisely as docs human rcason." In fact, he claims, just as the creator gave humanity an intellect as its "sacred -guide," so too did he give a la$\: to the intellect; thus, he says rcith a distinctly o in accord with this law "shall reign Stoic ring, the one ~ h livcs o\.cr a kingdom that is tcmperatc and j u s ~and good and bra\.c."'" 'ihc "divine la\v" protects reason in its strugglc to maintain dominance ovcr rhc passions;'' reason, in fact; dominates the passions precisely "throush the law" ( 6 t h 7 b v ~ 6 ~ o v ) . "T'he " correlation of rcason b hoytap65 to and law is such that ihc author can simply pass from ~. b v6pos as though thc two arc simply synonymous."' Indecd, Exod 20:17 can be cited as proor of reason's ability to domina~ethe passions: "Surcly, thcn, since thc Law tells us not to covet (p$ i x t O u p ~ i v ) , I should the much more readily pcrsuade you that rcason has thc powcr to control the dcsires (76v i~atOup~Gv)."" The relationship between human reason and the Torah is spelled out systematically in 1:15-17, where hoytup65 is delincd. hoylow65, I suggest, is intellect sclccting with rizht mason (voiiq p n & bpOoC Myou npo.rtpi3v) the life of wisdom. Wisdom, I submit, is know-Iedge of things divine and human, and of their causes And chis wisdom, 1 assume, is the culture \vc acquire rrorn the Law ($TOG v6wou x a ~ S e i a )throush which wc learn thc thins oi G o d rcvcrcntly and the things of mcn to our worldly advantagc.j8
In 4 Maccabees's usage, thcrcfore, b y t o p 6 5 denotes not rncrely "reason," but particularly thc "right rcason" that amounts to wisdom j ' O n the rclation between the passions, rhe virtues and reason, sce csp. 4 i%cc 1:2 4, 6, 13-30. Notc that the verb tipa~iw,used in 5:22 in connection with the Jewish philosophy's instruction in the domination of the pleasures and dcsires, is used routinely in 4 Maccabee~ in connection with reason's control of die passions; e des Machabies, 1701, under rpari-o, see the indcx of Dupont-Sommcr (Le ~ u t r G m Lime for... rekrenccs. " 4 M o c r 2:25: lcaf3' 8" rro;ir.reu6w~vo5 Pao~heGoerPuorheiav ohqpavb .re r a t Sutiaiuv rai i ~ a O $ vlcui drv6peiuv; cf Diog. I.acrt. 7.122. 4 M m 11:27. .'' 4 Mu6 28; 14. Conversely, it is "through rreuson" (St& .rbv h o y ~ o ~ 6 that v ) one is broughl under the rule of law (29). ~. de.7 ej,Mnchabiexei;38, 94; n. 10; ' " Notcd also by Duponr-Sornmzrl I* Qualriime Hadas, 'fie T/%rd&? Fourth Hooh ofMaccnheer; 154? n. 1% Breitcnstein. Beobachtungert; 171; .. Anderson, "4. Maccabees," 546, [rote h. " I i W u c 2:ii. 'This reasoninc is to be undcrs~oodin light of 4 ~Mocc 5:26, on which see below. "' Anderson's translurion ofva6< pe.ri hp8oii h6you xpo.ir~iivin 1:l5 as "the mind making a deiibemte choice" is rather intcrpreuv~,and cluile obscures thc Stoic connection. Hadas's (7he 7llird and Fourth H,~ok\ ofhfaccabrt,r; 149) and Redditt's r T h r Concrpt of ~V,mo.i," 25Xj translildorr "corrca judgment," is morc appropriaic; but still hils LO makc the Stoic refi:rcnce explicit.
"'
100
CHAPTER TIIKEE
and virtuc.'%d this wisdom is nothing other than that which is taught in thc Torah." The upshot of this string of definitions is that obsen~anccof the law is, by definition: life in accord w:ih "right reas0n):6~~~..an association which is by now quite familiar from thc Stoic sources. It is no doubt this core conviction that has givcn rise to thc authois choicc of Jews martyrcd during thc persecution of Antiochus as the chief cxempla of his formal thesis that "pious reason is absolute master of the passions." Moreover, it is in this light that his peculiar and characteristic phrasc "pious reason" is itself to be understood."' Like "right reason" itself, ultimately, piety too in 4 Maccabees consists "einzig und allein in Geset~es~ehorsarn."~"hc treatise, that is, is not merely concerned with the ability of reason to master thc passions; its intcrcst lies, more preciscly, in the mastcry of the passions by right reason spec$calb as itfinds expression in the T~rah."~
Human Nature and Jewiih Law The other criticism of Judaism raised by Antiochus in his attcmpl to persuade Eleazar to eat pork is more immediately to the point: "Why should you abhor eating the excellent meat of this animal which nature has freely bestow-ed on us?. . . it is wrong to spurn nature's good gifts."" This providential and anthropocentric understanding of the existence of the pig eehocs the Stoic vicw of the
'"As opposcd to the "weak reason" (ibv iro8svfi hoyrap6v) of those who do not "with d l their heart make piety their first concern," and who are lhus unablc to master thcir passions; sec 4 Macc 7:17-23. "" Note that the law, like wisdom itself, is also said to concern thing both divine and human ( 1 :16-1 7). CCf Heidand, "hoyi
" " "
.
MOSES; JESUS; AND N.4-I.
1-4W
101
relation of h u m a n t o non-human creation, a n d is in ract reminiscent of a sentiment found in Ciccro's De Legibu: . . . Naturc has latishly yielded such a wealth of things adapted to man's convenience and use that what she produces seems intended as a gifi to us . . . and this is true . . . also of the animals: Tor it is clear that some of tllem havc been created to be man's slaves, some to supply him w i ~ htheir producls, and others to scwe as his rood.""
Eleazar counters the point raised b y hntiochus n i t h his om-n argum e n t from providence: BelieGng that God established the law, wre know that the creator o r the world, in giving us the law, conforms it to our nature ( ~ a q5oxv ~ h CpTv oupniia8~Tvalro8er6v b zoC r 6 o ~ o nxzio.nl<). H e has commanded us to eat whatever will he wcU suited to our souls (ih pkv oi~ero8qo6peva fiwiuv~ai~ ynXai<),and has forbidden us to eat rood that is the reverse."' Eleazar, i n short, a r p e s that it follows from t h e premises that (i) G o d is crcator of t h e world; (ii) God is the legislator o r Jewish law; a n d (iii) God is concerned for humanity, that t h e law G o d has legislated takes the nature of the h u m a n being into account. T h e dietary restrictions contained in that law, therefore, must b e considered as i n step with h u m a n nature."Thus thc Torah as presented in 4 Maccabees
' 9 e rig. 1.25; cf. DLNd. Deor. 1.37; Phido Op$ 77; scc lurher the rrfcrent:cs Litcd by Kcnter (l)e I&~lis, 1LO), who describes illis passage from Ciccro as "specifically St,,ir. ,..,.. ."
" 4 M m c 5%.
"' C t de Silua, 4 h'mcabees, 134. Redditt, "'L'hc Concept ofNoms," 256f. argues that lcarir lpSorv hcrc relcrs to l p b o ~as~ h e general world order rather than human nature in particular. Agdinst this, however, are the fi,llowing considerations. Fint, Chlysippus himself uscd this same phrasc to denote human as wcll as cosmic nature whcn s~cdkineof "life in accord with nature" IDior. laert. 7.89) Second. such a , ~, use of thc tcrm would be uniquc among its cighl lotai appearances in 4 iWaccabees. (Axainst Rcdditl [ i b d , 2561, 5:8f dearly uses "nature," in a manncr reminiscent of ihe Stoics, with rercrcnce to the deiiy as thc givcvcr or gilts, not primarily "a structure in harmony with which men ought to live.") 'Third, and most importantly, it is clear From 5 2 6 that the aulhor regards biblical law in a n y case as enactcd with thc nirturc or the human hcing in mind: God "has commanded us to to eat whutever d l he well suited to our souls and has lorbidden us to eat tllc reverse"; in [act: thc specific association of the law with .rb phv airerwOqo6wmu iphv .rmi
102
CHAPTER THREE
can fairly be described as natural law-though, perhaps likc the early Stoics themselves, the author never actually uses this tcrm. Dupont-Sommer sax: in this equation of the law of Moses with the law of nature a concept similar to that found in Philo, and one rooted ultimately in the Stoic theory of law.""or Hadas, howcvcr, Eleazar's assertion that the lau- of Moscs corresponds to the nature of the human being is not, as it has been taken to he, a mechanical synrhesis of Judaism and Stoicism; but rarher an affirmationof the one (thc Law as divinely ordained) and a refutation of the other. hiIan is not to bring- himself into harmony with an impersonal natural law; rather has the Law itself been designed Lo conform to and senre the nature of man, who is paramount, as the dietary replations prove.70 Hadas thus understood Eleazar's response to Antiochus's argument regarding the relation betwecn Jewish law and nature to consist in h can. . . not the point that "the Stoic principle [of lifc ~ a z ~pbo~v] be invoked as an argument to disregard thc dietary prescriptions of thc law" since such prescriptions "are not necessarily in accord with thc Stoic principle of living according to nature" to begin with." Andcrson echoes Hadas's scntiment rcgardiig the differcnce betwcen Eleazar and the Stoics: Whereas the Stoic thought of nature's sovereiLqtyand man's need to adapt himself to nature's gif& and demands, the (,Jewish)thought here is of the sovereignty of the creator God who gaciously confers on man the Law that is adapted to man's needs and nature, the dietary regulations, for instance, being given to man as morally purify~ng.'~ At least in the formulation gvcn by Anderson, this contrast between the Stoic and Jewish understanding of law is based upon a rathcr transparently apologetic comparison of the "grace" centcred JudacoChristian tradition with its Greco-Roman counterpart. In any case, the contrast is rootcd in a fundamental misapprehension of the Stoic understanding of the goal as life K ~ T &qGo~v.From the timc or Chrysippus, thc 1 ~ 6 ~ 1in5 accord with which one was to livc was understood at least as much with rcspcct to human nature as to
" Dupont-Sommer, La Quatrike Idre dei ~VIahnhiu,39-40; cT dcSiiva, 4 Mnircabees, 109; cf. 134. '" Hadas, ?he n i r d and Fo;our/h Biiokr of~\.lnccohce~; 174 n. 25. " (bid.; n. 26. " Anderson, "1hla~cabces~''p. 5.50, note g.
MOSES. JESUS, -4w NATURAL
LAW
103
cosmic N a t ~ r e . ~Thc ' Stoic reasoning in this matter is in fact quite analogous to that of Eleazar, depending as it does upon a belief in a providential creator. Given divine providence, the Stoics argucd, it is unlikely that when creating an animal nature should esrrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or eirbS q v ainb affection for its own consulution (oijre yhp drhho?p~uioa~ (ah<@) .rb <@ov. OGTE rrorfioaoav aG~6;pfir' drhhorp~iuoa~ pvllr' oire~iwa~). We are forced then to concludc that nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself (oi~e~uioar x p b ~Eau~6);for so it comes to repel all that is injurious (ih phdrrrrov?a) and @ve free access to all that is seniceable or akin to it (rh oireiaj." In fact, this doctrinc of O~KE~WUIS, as we have seen, provided the starting point for aU of Stoic ethics by ensuring that all animals, human and non-human, naturally strive to livc K ~ T &qhutv, that is, in accord with their own natures. It is therecorc quite striking that Eleazar alludes to this Stoic doctrine when countering Antiochus's charge that thc Jewish law is out of step with naturc: God, being both creator and lawgver, "has commandcd us to eat whatcver will $p&v 'cay5 yfvxai~),and bc well suited to our souls ('c& oi~rto811~6p~va has forbidden us to cat food that is the rcvcrse" (526)"
ConclvJion: Torah as ~vaturalLaw in 4 Maccabees 4 Maccabees opens with an exhortation to "give earnest attention to philosophy," which is itself describcd as an "indispensable branch of knowledgc."'~f indispensable, howcvcr, Greek philosophy is noncthcless secondary in importancc to this work, the primary concern of which is to promote observance of thc Torah. As David deSilva has put it: "the author uses Grcck rhetorical forms and philosophical idcas in order to make being Jcwish in a thoroughly Hcllcnized world both tenable and sen~ible."'~The divinely ordained natural law is not, as for the Stoics, defined as "right reason"; rather, "right reason"
" Diog. 1.aert.
of & o . ~ i ~ panim.
'"Diog.
7.89. See rurther cm this point Engberg-Pedeiscn, '7% Sloic %oy
Iacrt. 7.85.
"~.So also Breirenstein; Beohnchtunp,
160; Klauck; I Makkahikrhuch, 713. 'V M a c c 1:l- 2. 1 render .r$ ~Qoooqiamore genetirally lhan Anderson's "lo my pk~ilosophicalexpositioii;" cT. the RSV. 4 ~Vfaccahw.I I . drSilva ~ r o x i d r sa nice discussion of the social and cullural set tin^ of thc work in his chapter 2, esp. pp. 43 46.
"
104
CHAP'I'ER THREE
is itself ultimately defined with reference to divine Ian:-indeed, the law or the Jews. The ideal life which Greck philosophers in gcncral characterized as virtue, and which the Stoics in particular conceived in terms of natural law is, according to 4 ,Maccabees, prescribed in the Torah. Indeed, it is remarkable that appeal is made to the Torah's status as natural law particularly in connection with its proscription of pork: Jewish law does not correspond to natural law merely inasmuch as it reflects the Greck virtues, but in its lesslation or peculiarly Jewish customs as M-ell.;' Thus can it be said that "the children of the Ilebrew-s alone arc in\.incible in defense of virtue."'" The fact that Greek philosophical concepts are used in 4 Maccabees in the service of this larger Jewish agenda si,@cantly impacts the terms of their presentation. \Vc have already discussed the author's oft-noted predilection for the phrase "pious rcason"; scarcely typical or the Stoic sources, this expression is apparently thc coinage of an author intcrcstcd in subordinating- rcason to the Torah. DupontSommer has notcd, too, the consistent usc of the term hoyro&6q rathcr than the more typically Stoic h6yoq or 6pf3bs h6yoq." Certainly not owing to his lack of familiarity with the latter,"' it is quite possible that the author consciously avoids the more usual Stoic terms in ordcr to distance himself from cert.ain aspects of Stoicism which hc iinds distasteful. In particular, he may havc considered thcsc terms to be too suggestive of a divine principle immanent in thc world;
"' Note, against Hadas ('fit 7kird end Fourth Book uJ~Moiinhres, 174 n. 25) and Klauck (4 MokkohrMbu~h~713); that the interpreulion of the Jrwish diet*rresuictions in 4 Maccabees d i f i r s significantly from that of 7 h e Ixtter of A~irteai. In 4 Mnccabees, the dieuly prescriptions are nol rnercly a symbolic, iT noncthcless ncccssaly; component oS.Tewish law; rathcr they correspond to thr actual nature of the human hcing. CC. Dupont-Sommcr; Id Qualrihe Lime des Mac/mbie.$>40-41 l'houxh one might reasonably condudc that the author of 4 rhIaccohrri, if y dl people; not merely Jews, should thus pressed, would argue fir the c o n ~ l l a ~that live in accord with l'orah, therc is no such "evangelistic" dimension to illis work. His primaly concern is to rorrnulate a dcficnse ofJewish customs in the face of dic challenge poscd hy heilenislic philosophicdl conceptions; arguments for a suhsecjucnt proposition regarding obedience by non-Jews are apparently beyond thr scope of his conccrn: and are in any rase not explicitly rormulaled in 4 iMaccahee~. ' " 3 Quahzime Liwe der M a c h a h i e ~ 39-40. ~ "' Indeed hayro&&
''
MOSES,
JESUS,
hW NXlVRAL LAW
105
notably, just as hoy~up6qsuggests human intellcctual acti\lty in particular, there is in fact no hint of anything analogous to thc cosmic dimcnsion of the Stoic thcory of law or l(~go.rin 4 ~VIaccabees."' It must not he o\,erlooked, finally, that the ~i~pificancc of tlic Torah is not in any case limited to its status as natural law in 4 Maccabees. Nongsidc this more uni\rersalistic riotion lics a distinct interest in the Torah's sipificance \is-&\is the covenant xvhich rhc creator rnadc nith Israel in particular.""Shc account of the ex-ents surrounding the persccution or Antiochus, in fact, has a positively deutcronomistic flavor. The pcacc the Jcws enjoyed prior to thc pcrsccution was due to "their ohsen-ance of the Law," and it wasJason's "disregard for the Law" which provoked the wrath of "Divine Justicc" and the risc of the "arrogant and temhle" Antiochus, the instruThe peacc w-as restorcd only through the faithment of vengean~e.~' Cdncss of Eleazar and the anonymous mother and her scvcn sons, w-ho "revived thc observance of the Law in their land and repulsed In 4 Maccabees, the Stoic notion of natural their enemics' ~iege."~" law walks hand in hand with the Jewish notion of covcnanial nornism.""
Given the common synthesis of Grcck and Jewish traditions evidcnt in the early Christian literature in general, it is not surprising that Christian authors, too, attempted to incorporate the Stoic theory of natural law into their own religious thought. The Apostolic Cor~rlitululions provides an example that is of special interest Tor our purposes for two reasons. First or all, this work describes the natural law comprised by human reason as an "implantcd law'' (k&qvro5v6pog), and does so particularly from the same theoretical viewpoint that led to an analogous usage in the Greek source of Ciccro's De Legbus: the "implantcd law" is correlated with an innate endowment or "seeds of divine knowledge" (rir ulrhpkara rii5 Oeoyvooiag), also called ~~p
~
CT Ihwnshend. "The Fourth Book of Maccabees,'' 666 deSilva; 'IMaccaber.~;54. U' See deSilva, 153 37. "I 4 .WUC 3:20; 4:15 22. " 4 Mace 18:4. ''5 similar .4 lension hetween universalistic and covcnanial notions oC lire law is found in Sirach; see 1,. G. Pcrdue, IUirdom and C~eation: 77ic 7heologv OJ Wizdom Lilerature (Nashdle: Abingdon, 1994) 284-8.5. H"
"implanted knowledge," which consist particularly in the abiiity to distin~pishcthical contraries. This work h u s provides important confirmation of the interpretation of Ciccro's use of thc phrase "implanted reason" offered in the preceding chapter. Secondly, the Christian redactor of the ripostolic Conslilulions, likc Philo and the author of 4 r\/laccabees-and, as will bc argued in the following chapter, like the author of the Letter of Jamcs---finds a written cxpression of natural law in the law of Moses. Thc passages that are most critical for our purposes, however, have often been considered as Jewish (i.e., non-Christian) in origin. A few words must be said, hereforc, regarding the source problem surrounding these passagcs before wc analyze the presentation of the "implanted law" in the Apostolic Constitutionr.
ne
Question
of
a &ion-Christian Prayer Collection
The Apostolic Conrtilutions is a fourth century compilation and reediting of earlier w-orks, only some of which are otherwise extant today. Books 1-6 rely heavily on the Didaxcalia, whiie portions of books 7 and 8 draw on the Didache and the Apostolic 7rndition of Hippolytus." The bulk of the passages that are of interest LO us appear in books 7 and 8 in a collection of praycrs or unknown origin. It has been widely agreed, since late in the 19th century, that some or all of these praycrs were not originally Christian, but rathcr Jewish prayers slightly rc-touched by a Christian hand."" Evidence cited for the non-Christian origin of these praycrs is of thrcc kinds: similarities to known Jewish prayers; the presence, more generally, ofJewish ideas and themes; and traces of Christian rcdaction. Kaufmann Kohler, the h s t scholar to Forward such a thesis, concluded from a comparison of A C 7.33-38 with the Hebrew Seven Benedictions that the former represents a Christian version of the latter."g Wilhclm Bousset, apparently unaware of the work of Kohler,
"' See D. A. Ficnsy, I+"yoiAlleged to he ,7e1hh. An Exominohon " f l h Co:onstilulioner Aposloloruni (BJS 65; Chico; CA: Scholars Press, 1985) 19-41; wiih h i s references to previous r.escarch further R. H. Cunnolly, Didarcolia Apostolo~xi: ' f i e Syriac fir.sion 7:mlaled m d Accompanied @ I/E Vmna Ialin F ~ ~ m r n t rW, i h an Inhoduchon and Arofer (Oxford: Clarcndon Press, 1929) xx xxi. "' For a history of the discussion see 17icnsy, Prayers Allexed to he ,7eiuoh, 1-1 7. "" K. Kohlei, "Ueber dic UrsprLingc und Grundformcn dcr q-nagogalcn 1.iturgie. Eine Studie," ,I/fGPw 337 (1893) 441 .il; 489-97; idem, "Thc Origin and Composition o f t h e Eighicen Bencdirhons with a Translation of ihc Corresponding Esscne Prayers in ilie i\posioIii Constitutions," NIJC/l I (1924.) 410-25; repr. in ConlehuliDm In the
MOSES. JESUS, .ANE NATURAL LAM,
107
began his argument for the non-Christian orign of some of the prayers of AC 7 and 8 with a narrower comparison of AC 7.35 to the Hebrew Kedusha."" He then proceeded to point out the clear Christian redaction of the Sabbath prayer at AC 7.36."' In light of h e precedent set by these two rather ob\ious instances of Christian redaction clustered together in A C 7, he went on to examine 7.37, 7.38, 7.34, and 7.33 more liberally, arguing primarily from thc prcsence of Jcw<sh features and the lack of distinctively Christian ones, and came ultimately to a conclusion quite similar to that of Kohler: "the entire prayer collection in thc Con.rhlutiolrs 7.33-38 is borrowed from the He observed further the striking points of contact shared by 7.34 and the long prayer at 8.12: a r p i n g that the two prayers represented distinct redactions of the same Jewish original.""aving established the non-Christian origin of this core of prayers, Bousset went on to a r p e a hit more cautiously for the similar origin of still more praycrs from AC 7 and 8, based on both the presence of Jewish ideas and similarities in thought among the E. R. Goodenough worked to clarify the thcpraycrs them~elves."~ ological tendency in the prayers and, finding it at work in other sections of books 7 and 8, expanded the list of passages coUcctcd by Bousset still further.'"
SimtjFc Sludy of J m k h fiL;tur, (cd. J . J. Petuchowski; New York: Ktav, 1970) 52-90. T h i s linc of argument has recently been developed by David Fiensy, who cxplicilly enumcratcs the points of contact that Kokler, apparently, felt were seK-evident. Fiensy, however, rightly abandons Kohler's ascription of the orignal prayers to "Essenes." See f'qnx Alleged to be j'ewkh, 129-34, 228- 31. W. Bousset, "Einc jiidische Gebetssammlung im siebenten Buch der apostolischen Konstitutionen," J ~ u c / L ~ ~ Luon /LI~ dn ~ K?n&lizhm GerelkchaJi dn W i i r m s c h ~ ru i G f t i n p : Philolo@~h-hkton'rcheKlmie [1915] 438-85; repr. in idrm, Rel@onsgerchkhfliche Sfudim Aufzdlre zur [email protected]& des HelhkfU~hm.5a'L;tullns (ed. A. F. Verheulc; NovTSup 50; Leiden: E. J . Brill, 1979) 231-86; all references arc to the reprinted edition. O n AC 7.35, see pp. 231~38.Note that Bousset makcs no reference to Kohler, nor is he awarc of the similarities of AC 7.33 38 to the Seven Benedirtians; cf Fiensy, Raynx Allepd lo be J&h, 1. Bousset, "Eine jiidische Gebetssammluns," 238 4 1 . I 'Ibd., 265: "Und so ware den" nachgewiesen, daR die game Gehrtssammlung in den Konstitutionen VI1 33-38 der Synagog-e entlehnt ist"; see pp. 241-65; noting also his interesting comparison of AC 7.38 with a prayer form described hy Philo at S'ec. Lrp 1.21 1 on pp. 243s. "" Eine j"dische Gebetssammlung." 244-259. "" Ibid.; 265-82. 9' Goodenough ( 8 Qh1, ~ &ktht. 3306-36) who was also apparently unaware 01 Kohlcr's work, expanded Boussel's collection to includc also 7.26.1-3, 8.16.3; and 8.40.2-4; he funher included 8.6.5-8 and 8.41.2-5 whcrcas Bousset sugsesred only 8.6.5 and 8.41.4 5 .
'
108
CHAPTER TI-IKEE
The argument that A C 7.33-38 as a whole represents a Christian version of a Jewish prayer collection, especially in the form given it by Fiensy, is compelling. Fiensy demonstrates that the prayers in this section of the Apostolic Constitutions share not only similarities in order and content, but also a degree of verbal equivalence to the Hcbrcw Seven Benedictions. The argument from the rather obvious Christian redaction of the Sabbath prayer at 7.36 is likewise impressive, and can be taken as a confirmation of the hypothesis regarding 7.33~-38. Arguments based solely on the presence of Jewish ideas or the lack of distinctively Christian ones, however, arc much less pcrsuasive. The former arguments are dubious from the start given the broad interaction with Jewish traditions on the part of Christians in general, while the latter suffer from the circularity that rcsults from the systematic excision of those distinctively Christian features that are present in the prayers as later additions." Indeed, as Fiensy has pointed out, at least onc of the "Jewish" elements of the prayers enumerated by Bousset is in fact characteristic of the Christian compilcr's own redactional work."' It is precisely this failure to takc into account thc redactional tendencies of the compiler of the Apostolic Conslitutions, as evidenced in his use of known sources, that is most problematic for the work of Bousset and Goodenough." Such evidence is particularly important with respect to our present concern: the correlation of the Mosaic law with a law of nature innate in the human animal. Examination of the redactor's handling of Didmalia with an eye to this theme is quite instructive. Characteristic of the Didascalia, the primary source for the first six books of the Apostolic Conslilutions, is the notion that biblical law actually consists of two separate bodies of legislation:" the law properly ' In this connection one might note with Fiensy (figerr Alleged lo beJewirh, 14.8) that the caution that had characterized the work of Bousset in identifjing originally Jewish prayers bcyond 7.33-38 and 8.12 was entirely lost on Goodenough, who thought that Bousset's "fine methodology" had establiihed with certainty thc Jewish origin or all of these prayers; see By Lkht, I,%hl, 306, 336. I 'Fiensy: Ifgers Albped to be J&h, 136f, referring lo the assembling of lisrs or heroes from Tsrael's past. ?'he introduction of this type of evidence into the discussion or the prayers is the chief contribution of Fiensy. A redactional analysis of AC 7.33 has also recendy been o f i r e d by P. W. van der Horn, in a paper presented at the 1997 mceting of the SocieQ r f l Biblical Literature entitlcd "The Jewish Prayers in the Apostolic Constilutions." 1 am graterul to Prof. van der H o n t for giving me a copy of this papcr, and was gratified to find that we arc in substantial a p e r n e n t on several key issucs in the interpretation of the prayers. '"' See the discussion of Co~inolly,Didc.rcolia, Ivii-lxix. N l translations of the
MOSES, JESUS.
AND NATURAL LAW
109
and thc so called, which is essentially the ten c~mmandrnents,'~~ deuterork, which consists primarily or thc codes concerning templc sacrificc and purity."" The latter, given to Israel only as a punishment for their idolatry at Sinai in the first placc, is believed to have been "abolishcd" hy Christ. The rormcr, on the othcr hand, is "renewed and fdfdcd and affirmed" by Christ."" Indeed, the la>y properly so callcd "is life to them that kccp it.""" It is thus the bishop's duty "before all" to "be a good discriminator between the Law and thc Second Lcgi~lation."'~~ This distinction within the Mosaic law is repeated in the first six books of the Apostolic Comlitutionr, whcre the compiler draws on the Didascalia. At the same timc, howevcr, several significant changcs arc introduced. First of' all, thc redactor show-s himself to hc rather squeamish regarding the absolute abolition or the deutmosic whiie he preserves a number of the Didmalia's statements that Christ took away its commands, he repeatedly add? tbc stipulation "though not all of them.nlo" His understanding of thc original purpose of the deuterosis, similarly, is substantially less negative: God is now said to givc Israel the laws regarding sacrifice and purity not simply as punishment, but to hclp them return "to that law which is sown by [God] into V v6pov rbv bz' kpoC @i the naturc of all human beings" ( ~ K E ~ V O.rbv Didmcnlia are those of Connolly, and are cited according the pagc numben of' his volume. 1 havc also depended upon Connolly's edition of the Latin fmgments of this work. Translations of the Aporlrilic Constitutions are my nwn unless otherwise noted, though for passages from hooks 7 and 8 I have drawn liberally upon the translations of D. R. Darnell ("Hellenistic Synago~alPrayers," O P , 677-97), Ficnsy (Boyerr Alleged to be Jeiosh, 43-127), and Goodenough (By Ikht, %ILL, 306-36); see also the translation in U F 7.391-508. Fur both thc Didnrcalia and the Apostolic Constitzhanr I rely on the cdition of F. X. Funk; DLiarcalia el Constituhioner Apostolorom (Paderhorn: Schoenin~h,1905), largc sections or which are reprinted by Fiensy. The L d h characteristically spcaks of decal~~ps et iudza; the Syriac is consistently rendered by Connolly irs "ten words and judg-ments" (Connolly, Didmcalia, 14f and esp. 218f). Connolly (ibid., lxvii) understands these '>udgments" to rcfcr to the legislatiun +en a1 Exod 21 23. Notably, thc decalogue's Sabbath commandment is interoreted bv h e author of the Didmmlin as a "woe of the (final) rest." and is thus :or to he observed by Christians; see con no^^, Llidmcolk, 2 3 3 ~ ~ 3cf8 190 92. Cf. the lists of the hpes or laws covered by the deuterosir in Connollv, .. Didascnlia, 218, 222, and 252. This approach to biblical law is not uncommon in early Christian literature; cf., e.g., Ptolemy's Letter to Floro; Irenaeus, A. H. 4.14. 15; Ps.-Clem. Rer. 1.35-39 and more generally H. Bietenhard, "Deutcrosis," KAC 3 (1957) 842-49. ""S~ce esp. Connolly, Lhdmcalk, 218-230; see furthcr his General Index under "law" and "Deuterosu." On the law as "lilt." sce ibid.. 228. "'* Ibid.; 34.. I":' CT. A(: 1.6: si rui 66 ilndrvrov; r:f 6.22.1 and 6.22.5: ~i~ u i i(&vta.
'""
'A
'" '"
..
110
CHAPTER THREE
(pba~t ~ a ~ a B h q 8 i &atv v ~ a & V ~ ~ C ~ ZOOnI the ~ ) .whole, ' ~ ' ~ one can fairly say that thc redactor has a much more positive appraisal of the Torah-d not simply- the ten cornmandmcnts-than does his sourcc. In fact, the L\-holcnotion of a deulerosir ncvcr surfaces at all in books scven and cight, when tbc redactor relies on other sources."" On the other hand: the compiler's rcdactional additions to the Diduscalia in book? 1--6 do include several aspects of the treatment or the law found in hooks 7-8. That which the Didascalk considers the "law" propcrly so called is rcpeatcdly identified as "natural law'' ((puat~bc v6~0<).'~" Similarly, the patriarchs arc described as habins bccn "movcd by natural law from thems~lves";'"~ and this la\%-is in fact said to be "sown" by God "into the nature of all human beings.""" These redactional clements clearly anticipatc the fuller discussion of that law variously dcscribcd as Cp(puroq or quatc6< in hooks 7 and 8. The arguments of Bousset and Goodcnough rcgarding the nonChristian origin of additional prayers from books 7 and 8 are considerably weakencd whcn such characteristic concerns of thc compilcr of the Apostolic Conrhtutioas are taken into account. Indeed, Goodcnoush
"'"
AC 6.20.10. Tllc fact that the law/dateroiir dichotomy that is so prominent in hooks 1 6 has bccn cntirely left behind in hooks 7-8 is nutcworthy. T h c only possible d u sion to this doctrine in the latter hooks comcs at 7.1.3, where Didache's 'iuay of lii"c" is called i p u a ~ d while , the "way of death" is called "additional" ( h e i a a ~ ~ o g ) . However, though on rhc face of it, the contrasting usc of these two terms would secm to recall the compiler's treatment of the Uiducalids Ia~v/druleroriidichotomy (cf. AC 1.6.7-10 and 2.35.1), even this reference is quite problematic. For while thc "way of lire"--which is to say the "natural" way-is said lo be the way 'hbich the la*, also declares (7.2.1: ~ abinv iiuq [sc. 6 bSbg r i joi<j: ~ iiv rai b N6po5 GtayopeS~~), the "way of dcath" is said to come not from God or Moses, as the dm/mo.~irclearly docs, but from the "adversary" (7.1.3: fk fn$ouhii< roc 6Xhocpiou; lo'
cf 6.20, esp. 6.20.61 1). Compare in this connection the compiler's characlcristic qualification of the Diduculia's bclief in Christ's abolition of the entire deu&o.\ii (an which see immediatelv helow). Certainlv he would not wish to a K m that some elernens or the "way death' are still binding for Christians! Moreover, when h e "way of death" is described at 7.14, thcre is no hint of the rypes of practices characteristic of the deuteroris; it is characterized, rather, simply by behaviors oppositc to the "way of life." AC 1.6.8; 6.20.1 11; 6.22.5: 6.23.1; cE 6.12.13 where the Noachidc comrnai~ds are described as "natural law." Sce in addition the redaclional references to cervain behaviors that are "contrary to nature," c.g., cemin h r m s of sexual activity (AC 6.[28].1; 7.2.10j or not divorcing an adulterous wifc (AC 6.lii.4). "'I AC 6.20.4: quorx@6h v6bq x~vq8kvzagdrq' iaviGv. AC 6.20.10: h~~?^rvov rbv v6bov rbv iin' fpoc ~5 ipGaer ~araphqOkv-raiiixo~v 6v8p&xor5; the synrax here is dificult, but the intrntion is clear enough from the context of 6.20 and the thouxht or thc Lbnrlilulinni as a whole. See further bck~w.
of
"'" ''"
hIOSES. JESUS,
>\-w N.4nJR41,
I.h\V
111
understood the conception of a natural lax\- both innate in the human animal and written in the law or h'loscs to be one of the priman indications that the prayer collcction orignatcd in the context ofthc Jewish "Mystcn-" which hc found at~estcdabo1.e all in the writings of Philo of iVexandria."' So important \\-as this clcmenr, in fact: that among the additions Goodenough made to Boussct's delineation oT the collcction \\?as AC 7.26.1-3, ~ \ h i c hrefers to the fact that God "so\vcd a law into the souls" of all human beings."' This statement, ho\vc~cr,is a rcdactional addition LO marcrial rake11from the I)idact~a fact of which Goodcnough was apparently unaware: and which considerably complicates his hypothesis."" Good~nough~ moreover, reckoned neither with the references to the "natural law" which occur repeatedly as redactional elements in hooks 1-6; nor with the compiler's characteristic reluctance to endorse the LXdascalia's stark rejection oS the deulerosis."" As noted above, Fiensy observed an analogous problem in the case or Boussei's singling out of the lists of Jewish hcrocs as dis(incti\~elyJewish elements of the prayers Sound in AC 7-8. In sum, the redactor's clear interest in the association of biblical law with the law of nature, especially when coupled with his tendency to asscmblc lists of heroes from Jewish history, seriously compromises the arpments oKered by Bousset and Goodcnough Sor the non-Christian origin or many of these prayers. \Wile AC 7.33 38, at least, almost certainly represents a Christian version of an orignally non-Christian ,Jcv.ish praycr collcction, much of what Boussel
"'
Goodcnough, I$ I,@ht, light, 348 80. \\'hat Goodenough saw as the chief indieasily understood as cations of tllc Jcwish "h4ysteq3 in thcse prayers arc jusl thc simplc incorporation or Greck philosaphical idcas inlo Jewish or Christian thought. O n r should hc careful not to confuse the two; us thc Jewish (or Christian) adoption of Greek phik,sophicd ideas-regardless o i onr's evaluation or Philo's philosophical and reliSious o r i e n ~ a t i o n i s ,in and or its~lf;by no mrans nccessarily suggestive or a "bfystery"; cf in this respect the discussion of 4 Maccnhee,~,abovc. AC i.26.3: v6pm icaie~p6~euaag i v rcriq ylu~aigjpiuv. Goodenough, By Lkht, f,@htht. 3331 see Fi'icnsy; hqux Alled lo he ,7ewiih: 22. "I Moreover. among the Greck philosophical terms \rhich surface repeatedly in ihese prayers and u:hich suggesied to Goodcnaugh the Jcwish blysicry are several that are also characteristic of the author's redaction. Regarding xp6vo~a(found in thc prayers at AC 7.33.2; 7.34.5: 7.38.101 7.39.2: 8.12.8, 30), Fiensy reports thal "In c:vcry case where thr word occurs irr r\C, whcrc \re can compare thc :\C: with its sourcc. the word has come fiom h e compiler"; scc Prqmr .4llezed lo he ,7riiisii2 169; and thc passagcs lisled on p. 204 n. 18. An evilmination of lire term hoyrrb~,parricularly a s cicv:riplive of human as opposed i o non-human animals, yields similar results jihid, 174. noting the passazcs lisled on p. 201 n. 28).
"' "'
and Goodenough found to bc most distinctively "Jewish" about thcsc and the other prayers or AC 5-8 are in fact redactional elements characteristic of the Christian compiler oS the rl~oslolicComtitutions."" It is possible, of course, that the redactor has taken over this association or h e la>\-of Moses with an innate natural law from an earlier prayer collection which was itselr edited and incorporated into his larger work."" One might find support Tor such a hypothesis in the ract that a common source apparently underlies 7.34 and 8.12, thc latter of which prcsents thc fullest account of this natural la~v."' Certainly he got the idca from somewhere: it would seem rather improbable that this fourth century cornpilcr has comc up with the notion entirely on his own, especially since thc incorporation of Stoic ideas into conccptions of biblical law had long been accomplishcd. Without Further investigation, howcver, it can be assumed neither that such a source existed, nor, if it did, that it was not itself a Christian work. The prominence of this idea among thc compiler's redactional interests in any case warrants caution; it is clcar in any event that thc ideas most characteristic or such a supposed source were also characteristic or the redactor of the Apostolic Constitutions himself."" Ultimately, whether thcse ideas come From a s o u r c e a n d whether that source, furthcr, was Christian or not---matters little for the present investigation. The philosophical concepts and terminology pre-
"' So also Fiensy, Prnym Alleged to be Jmirlt, 143-44. "" van dcr Horst, who wrcstles witb a similar problem
in tbe recurring phrase "God of Abraham, Isaac a d Jacob," formulates the dilficulties in formulating such hypotheses quite well: ". . . the formula 'God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob' which has such a close parallel in Avolh h a t it is generally taken to bc part of the oripinal Jewish prayer, was also imerhd huice into oflie? lexli 6y our compiler (VII 26,3 and VITI 40,3)! It could thus be argued that this orm mu la is from the compiler's hand as well, bul in view of the parallel in Avolh it secms better not to do that. But h e mauer does demonstrate painfully how diflicult it is to separate tradition from redac lion and how many uncerrainties remain." " ' This problem is desening or more attention than can he given it in the prcsent context. Neither does Fieiensy go into this irsue in detail; but it is interesting that he finds the best oarallels for such an nnderlvine ~~, oraver . in Christian sources: see Pmye7~A l l q d lo be Jewish, I37 40. "WCT. van der IIorst, "The Jewish Prayers," who commenrs on d C 7.33.3 as Collows: ". . . the inleweninc words, 'bv imoianted knowlcdee and natural iudprnent , a s well as tbrough the teachin- or thc'l.a\;', reflect recurrik motifs in thc AC The
".
.
words 'implanted' (Epvvrog)and 'natural' (quotic6<1belong to the compiler's favouritcs in connection with the irnplanlcd law and natural kno=rledgc, and bis rrnphasis on the value of the teaching(s) or thc Law recurs throughout the AC"
MOSES, JESUS; IU~C N:ITIJR&I.
I.AW
113
date his work in any case, and the prccedent for their incorporation into a theory of the Mosaic lax\- had heen established lor centuries. \\'hatever his source for them, ho\ve\-er; the Christian redactor has made these ideas his own. ' f i e Implankd La& and the Lam d ~ l f o s e s
Scholarship on the praycrs in hooks 7 and 8 of the rlpo.rl~~lic Consti~utions has been rather limited. I,\'ha~studies havc been done have focused primarily on the question or their possible Jewish orisin: especially in connection with the larger problem of the dependence of the early Christians upon Jewish liturgical forms.llW. R. Goodenough, as far as I ha\x been able to determine, remains thc only scholar who has undertaken a detailed discussion of the rclisgious thought of these prayers.lZ0As interesting as such a study misht prove to be, a full examination of the thought of the prayers would be oul or place here, taking us much too far afield from our present concern. 1 d l focus my attention, rather, on the more apposite issue of the "implanted law" and its relation to the law of Moses. As we have seen, in the first six books of the Apostolic Cunstztutiuns, the compiler incorporated thc idea of a "natural law" which was "sown" by God into all humanity into the understanding or the Mosaic law- he took over from the Didascalia. He associated the natural law particularly with what the latter considered the true law as opposed to the prescriptions of the deutemis. This notion of a natural law internal to thc human being is articulated in more detail in books 7 and 8. The fullest treatment appears in the hymn of praise to God at 8.12.6-27, which cites in turn God's unique naturc (8.12.6-7), his role as providential creator (8.12.7-IS), his special concern for the human animal in general and the descendants of Abraham-variously called "Hebrews" or "Israelites"--in particular (8.12.19-26), culminating in a final praise of God to be pronounced
see .~crisy,P7qc.sAllqed
lo be ,7a,ish; 1-1 0. Goodenough. By k h l , LkheiL1, ch. XI, "'l'hc Mystic liturgy"; scc csp. 336758. Firnsy limits his discussion of' thc "theology" of the prayprs to his reconstruction of the Jrlhish snurcr lying hchind 7.3338, and thus does not deal with the ipquros virpo~.His treatmrnt in any case consists simply af a paragraph each on the topics "God," "Man_'' ''Angeis~'' "Eschatology," and "The Number Seven;" and all iold covers less d ~ a ntwo Cull p a p ; see I'rqni Alleged lo be Jewish. 231C. rt!,
""
111
CHAPTER THREE
by "all the people" together w i t h the a n g c l i c h o s t s (8.12.27; cC. Isa 6:3)."' Thc creation o f ' t h c h u m a n being, narrated in 8.12.16-- 18, is d e s c r i b e d as follows: A n d no1 only did you create rhc ~vorld:but you also m a d c ihc world ciuzcn (ibv ~oaponoliinjv)v i t h i n it, declaring h i m to bc the ornamcnr ' you said to your Sophia;":' "Lct of the world ( ~ 6 a p o u~ h a p o v ) . ' ~For us makc m a n according to o u r image a n d according to o u r iikcncss, a n d lct then1 rule ovcr the iish of thc sca, a n d the birds o r the air.'""" Thcreforr you m a d e hirn out of a n immortal soul a n d a dissoluble body, thc former out of that which is not. a n d the lartcr out of tllc four clcmcnts."' i l n d you gave t o him, wiih respect to his soul, raability to distinguish piety tional discernment (16" hoyrlcilv G~dryvoo~vj, i 6t&~pta1v),[and] ohsen.ation of just a n d impiety (&i)aqPeia<~ aaaePeiu< i iiaparilp~larv);a n d with respect to thc a n d unjust ( 6 l ~ a i o u~ a66iicau body, you granted thc five ~ e n s c s ' ~a "n d progressive motion."' F o r you, .Almighty God, through Christ,'2R planrcd a paradisc i n E d e n in thc
"' Goodenough (By k h t , I.iqh1, 331) considcrrd this prayer "our best guide to the theology and philosopiiy" of the praycrs. li' The p h r a s ~r6o&au icbopov is found several times in thr prayers (cT 7.34.6 8.9.8), and can he i&lren either with referenre to the human as "microcosm" (so I)amcll, "Hellenistic S y m v ~ o y ePrayers;" 692; 679; note c) or as the "ornament of world" (so Goodcnough, 8j L@1, L&htht. 334; Firnsy, f i g s Allqed eed Be Jmolih, 65; n. 21) with somc justificatiori. Tllc three translators I have just mentioned, wilile naturally Favoring one or the otller, all seem to recognize both possibilities. Thc idea that thc human beine " is a "microcosm" of ihc univcrse is itself common cnourh in Hcllcnistir thought and is possible here as well, pcrhaps referring to ihc crearion of thc human body out aS ihc four elernerits and its soul out of the stulTof thr divine; Fi'icnsy, however, points out that this concept is lrsually denoted wilh another tcrm (14oy67.r Alleged lo be ,~mirh,65 n. 21). In Favor o f the translation as "omamcnt of the world;" on the other hand, is the fict that the creaiion of this "rational animal, the ciil~cnof h e Cosmos;" is undcntood to be tllu very "goal of creation" (AC 7.34.6). ?fi 03 aoqia: Darnell translates this dlriivc instrumentally, thus "by your Wisdom"; it secms possible, howemr, that this is to hc n:ud in light or God's words "Let U( makc man;" which Philo also though1 required explanation (see Of$ 72-75). Goodcnough (By Ikht, L@l, 322) and Fi'icnsy, (l'qe7.r Allqed lo be ,Jmiii<,103) trainlatc it as I have. LXX Gen 1:26. "' C t Cicero, De Leg. 1.21: "For while the other elemcnts oS which man ronsists were derived from what is mom!, and arc il~erefixcfragile and perishahlp, the soul was generated in us I)? God"; scc furihcr Philo. Ofig.' 1 3 . O n tiic phrase 6~ rolj &6lilvto<; S ~ CGoodcnough, I$ L&hl, J.@ht, 36-47, "" Cf. Cicero; Ole k ~ 1.26 . who similarly pairs ihc gifi 01. the scnscs with tliat of the implanted prrcoiic~ptions~ but considrrs the ibrmer as enduwmrnts of thc mind, not thr body. On the signiricancr or the implanted p~~econce~tions Tor this passvgc fiom the Afio.rli,lic Conslilulioni; see helo\r. T ~ & Y E ? ~ ~ ~ T I K $IC~YIJOLV; Y ihc translatiorl is Goodenough's. "" Ftb XptaxoD is olcouec helirverl to hc an inn:q,olation o r an altcralion o l a n <>i91b1F~khS.~ou hy proponens rdrl~r\icw ii~aithis prayer \va_r not origin& Christian.
"'
"'
"'
MOSES, JESUS. AND N.4TURrlL JAIV
115
east,"" sowing all sons of edible plants, in order;'"' and into ii; as if into an extravagant homc, you led him; and in making him'"' you have given him an implanted law ( v 6 ~ o vEfiqurov): so that from within himself joY~oOevrai n a p ' Pauio?l), hc should have thr sccds or di~inr knowlcdgc (?Ex o n h p p a r a .ri5 Beoyvooiag). Thc mcntion of the implanted la\>-recalls the redactional reference, in AC 6.20, to the law sown by God into the nahnre of all human beings. Later in this praycr it is called simply "the natural law;' (8.12.253 a phrasc wc havc also round to bc characteristic of thc author's redaction in books 1-6. This implanted law is mentioned scvcral other times in connection with the creation or the human animal in books 7-8. \27e have already seen one such instance in a redactional insertion into matcrial taken over from thc Didache in book 7, whcrc God is said to have "crcatcd thc world and the t h i n s in it through him [sc. 'II~GoGTOG rra1F6g GOU], and planted a law in our souls."'"' Again; in a pctitionaly prayer using language quite similar to that or the two prcvious passages, it is said that God the g , gave it both creator "raised up the human as ~60fiov~ 6 ~ f i o and an irnplantcd and a written law.""' Finally, a reference to the "implanted knowledge" @yrpurogyvui~y)given to each human by God, being, as it is, reminiscent of 8.12.17-18, and coupled with "natural judgment" and "exhortation of the law," is also to bc understood in connection with the giving or the irnplantcd law.'"' Like the "natural law" of AC 1-6, the implanted law of books 7-8 is also understood to havc a written form: the law which God
"" Cf
W(
Gen 2:8.
"" r6obq; translated according a, Darnell. "' lc& z@ norcTv: translated according to Goodcnough
and Ficnsy. CE Darncll: "Indeed, you have given him an implanted law to do" (emphasis minc). AC 7.26.3: o b Si.oxora nirv.rorp&rop, b Oebg r6v Ghwv, Blcrroa~rbv rbopov rai & I i v ah%@61' aG.roC, icui v6pov ra~elpGreuoagi v r a i c y r u ~ a i ipiv; 5 cl: also the redactional material in 6.20.10. I" AAC 8.9.8: llav.roxp&rop Oek ai&v~,vre;S i o n o ~ ariuv Ehov, i c ~ i o r ar a i irpG.ravr r6v rrcivrwv, 6 rbv ilveporrov x6opau rbopav drva6ei~ug6tb Xp~o.roCrai vbpav Sobs a h @ Zl"purov rai ypazi6v. AC 7.33.3; cf. the "natural j u d p e n t " and " seeds of divine knowledge" which comprise the implanted law in 8.12.17-18. Tile phrase ir q g ioi, v6pou brroqovijo~o~; iitcrdy rendered "'Eorn the answer of die law;" or perhaps, reading a n ohjcctivc genitive, "by their rcsponse to the la\*." (so Damell, "I-Iellenistic Synogogal Prayrrs," 67R), is difficult. 'l'herc sccms lo he general agreement. however, that it is to he read in relation to the exhortations of the written law as opposcd la the Bplpu.ro~ yviwrg contained in the narural la\\.. So Ficiensy, R"ym.r A11epd ti, h e 3 m i / t ; 51, n. 17; Goodenough; Ry I,&hLhl; J.khht. 34% Darnell. "Hellenistic Synogagal Prayers," 675.
"'
116
CH.~PTER THREE
gavc t o t h c h u m a n is a vbpov Epgu~ov~ ayparr~bv."' i T h e relationship between thesc two forms o i the la%-is also clariiicd in the long prayer in 8.12: But when men corrupird the natural laxu (zbv rpuatxbv v6wov): at times considering the creauon to bc mere chancc,'"And at times honoring it more than they oughtht:comparing"' it to you, the God of the univcrsc, you did not a l l o ~ ih e m to go astray: but rather raised up your holy senrant Moses, through whom you gave the written law as an aid to the natural one (xpb~pofi8e~av.roc qua~lco5ibv ypanibv v6pov 666wxu<);and you showed the creation to be your 1.-ark, and exposed the pol):theislic error (+v . . . noAG0eov nh&v.vllv)."" T h c notion that t h e writtcn Mosaic law was givcn i n order t o "help" thc natural law is also Found in a redactional alteration of a passage from t h e Didascalia a t AC 6.19.2, b u t thcrc thc "help" comes, owing t o t h e source material, specifically i n t h e r o r m of the ten comm a n d m e n t s rather than t h e v\rhole of biblical l a ~ f . " W o t a b l y , there is n o hint of such a limitation in 8.12. As pointed out above, o n e finds n o t even t h e vaguest allusion to t h e Didascalia's characteristic division or biblical law into thc "law" proper a n d the deulerosis anywhere in books 7 a n d 8. I n fact, a s was also previously noted, the rcdactor rcgards t h e laws regarding sacrifice a n d purity themselves to have bccn a form o r aid: they were given t o correct a polytheistic error,14" in thc hopcs that Isracl would return "to that law which is v vbpov sown b y [God] into the nature of all h u m a n bcings" ( k ~ t v o zbv zbv bn' ipoG -cfi GEL ~ a z a P X q 0 i v z an 2 ~ 1 v& V ~ ~ ~ & OTIh~i s) . confusing statc of affairs serves only to underline t h e problem of thc relation-
""AC 8.9.8. "" u6.r6pa~av,rendered hy
Fiensy as "an accidcni." Goodenough interprels it as "selr-caused_" and Damcll as "happening without causc." The proper translation would sccm to dcpcnd upon ihc relation of this "error" to that menlioncd suhsequcnriy (liktming God to the world), and the determination of the particular philosophical theolo~ywhich the author combats. The present translalion sugsesis ihc Epicureans might he in view. See helow note 154 for a similar passage from Philo. '"' auv.rari6vrwv: so Damell and Fiensy; Goadenough renders it "made it ihe equivalent of thee." "" ilC 38.12.25. "" AC 6.1 9.2: S~SWKEY v6p0v &zhoGvcis BofiO~tav .roc rpuaumO, raOap6v, ~ o ~ ~ r o v Eytov: iv Cj lcui .ib TStov iivopu &-(mrfO~~o; .r&e~ov, drvelrheur~, Sfra hoyiwv nhGpq . . .; c i Ihdmcnlia 6.15 li" AC 6.20.10: aohuOfou nhdrvq~;cf 8.12.25: i j v rrohG8eov nhdrvqv. NoLe, hmvrver. that thc "nolvtheislic cnor" of 6.20., riven the conlexl. concerns Israel's , . ,, worship of Baal; while chat or 8.12 alludes to Grezk philosophiral doctrine.
+
MOSES, JESUS, L ,N D NATUK4L LAW
117
ship bctrieen the understanding of the law of Moscs found in books 1 6 , which relies on the Didarcalia, and that found in book 7-8, which is more indicative of the compiler's own thought, whether dcrivcd from a prior source or not.'"' Suficicnt1)- clcar in any case is the fact that the redactor, similarly to Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees. undcrstands hloscs's law, howc\,cr precisely interpreted, to bc a written form of thc implanted law given by God to all human beings.
Implanted Laio as Human Reason The ilposlolic Constitutzun.? association of biblical la\&-with a natural lax57 innate in thc human animal, as for both 4 ~Mucabeesand Philo, is ultimatcly rooted in thc Stoic philosophy of law. 11 number of points of contact at thc level of dctail were pointcd out already in the footnotes to thc translation of 8.12.16-18 givcn above. A further hint of such influence is found in a redactional passase from book 6 whcrc, in connection with a discussion of the natural law, thc compiler, again like both the author of 4 ~Mucabeesand Philo, intcracts with a decidcdly Stoic idea in his assertion that God "made laws to cut out not thc natural passions [themsclvcs], but rather their excess."'" Stoic influence cmcrges most clcarly, however, in the praycrs of books 7 and 8. The account of the crcation of thc human animal found in the long prayer of 8.12 begins with thc description of the hurnan as "world citizcn" ( A C 8.12.16, ~oopoxohiqq),a title repeated in scveral of thc prayers. This dcscription of thc human animal is by now quite familiar from our carlier discussions of the Stoics and Philo: the human is a "world citizen" by viltue of his or hcr possession of logos which, in its ideal form as "right reason," constitutes the law of the grcat Cosmic City. That the usc of this designation in the Apostolic Constzlutionr, too, bcspeaks a similar set of assumptio~lscannot be doubted. In two of the thrcc passages whcrc thc title ' ' ~ ~ o r l d citizen" appears, it occurs in apposition to thc characterization of
"' 'l'his is clcar rmrn the fact that the redactor repeatedly attempts to intcgate inlo books 1-6 the natural law theoly which he prcscnts most fully in book 7 8; while, conversely, the luw/dmleroir distinction, so prornincnt in boobs 1 6 as a rcsull of his dependence upon thc Uinmcalia, is m,l a1 all incorporated into books 7-0. $6 i .LJ.L: > c , < &TE 6 i rir 9 v o u n&@q ~ im&ierv &olraOiqnlow; &M& .rilv roijxov drpmpiav. l'his svilicrnent is only i n t e l l i ~ h l cas a rciection of ihe early Stoic undcrswnding of the vassions.
118
CHAPTER THREE
the human as "the rational animal" ( ~ hoyt~bv b jGov).'"Vt is in fact emphasized rcpcatedly throughout the Af~ostolicCorutitutions, and particularly in books 7 and 8, that the human animal is hoyu~6v."' Thus when it is stated in the third passasc containing this title that one \\-ho wishcs to be initiated into the g o u p must first understand, among other things; "why ihe human being was appointed world citizcn" as well as "his/hcr own nature, of what sort it is," it is almost ccrtainly the casc that thc "naturc" intended here is the rational human nature.''' T h c connection is further attcstcd by the repeated characterization, in thcsc samc passages, of thc human as ~6opou ~6opog,an ambiguous titlc that sccms in any case to be rclatcd to the human animal's rational naturc."" Thc compiler ncvcr states categorically that the implanted law is to be identificd with the human logos. Perhaps owing to the centrality of Moscs's law to his purpose, he speaks dircctly or an Epqurog v6pog rathcr than or an Epqu.ro~h6yog which is v6poq, as in the source of Ciccro's De Legibw and the 1,cttcr of James. It is nonethclcss quite clear that he understands the relationship betwccn the two as being of the most intimatc order; indecd, so much is already sugg-estcd by his characterization of the human animal as "world citizen." Moreovcr, the close association of human rcason with both the implanted and the Mosaic law becomcs quite explicit when it said that God "raised up thc human [to bc] the ~bopou ~6opogthrough Christ, and gavc to it an implanted and written lawso that it might live lawfully, as a rational [animal]" ( ~ uv6pov i 6oGq a6.r+ Epqvpurov K a i ypan~bvnpbq .rb cfiv a6.rbv &O&~p&g &g hop~6v).Given to the human both as ,an innate endowmcnt and, later, in writtcn form, God's law, as in 4 Maccabees, provides thc definitive guidelines for thc rational life. The phrase iug hoync6v, moreover, must bc seen li" d C 7.34.6; 8.4.1.4. It is noteworthy, too; that this latter description recalls the philosophical definitions ofiivflporrog as "a rational rnonal animal"; cT in this connection esp. 8.41.4, where the human animal is further dcfined as B v q ~ 6 5 , thus echoing even more clearly thc Stoic definition. 88' r*orreferences see Fiensy, / + ~ m All@ lo be j'ewirit; 204, n. 28. Note, however,
that whilc Fiensy does not indicate that any of the rcScrences in books I 6 apply the term specifically to a "special characteristic oS man," this is clearly the implication in several oS thcsc passages (see esp. 2.19.2 6.lO.c 6.11.7). It is noteworthy that this designation is particularly prominent in the prayers of book 7 and 8. "' AC 7.39.2 a a r 6 ~ u i o 8 o .. . &' S 1coobmohi1q5 b Ptv8ponog x a r f a q . kmytvw o r i ~ wmjv iau.ro5 ipborv, diary ~?z&EI. I" AC 7.34.61 0.9.8; 8.12.16. S f e furthcr al3ove; note 122.
in light of the repeated description of the human as "the rational animal": the la\\- is given so that humans might livc "as rational beings," xvhich is to say in accord with their own nature, the deiinitivc feature olcrhich is reason.'" Thus the repeated use of the term "natural la\\-" ( V V U I K ~ <~ 6 ~ 0 5 ) . l'hc relationship-indeed, the implicit identification - of the implantcd law with human reason is also apparent from the association of the former with "seeds of divinc knoxb-ledge." In the long prayer of 8.12: the implantcd law is said to have bccn @\;en to Adam, the first rational animal, "in order that rrom his own scli he should l~avethe seeds of divine knowlcdge" (rk on0p~arariiq 0~oyvwoiagj.~"~ Elscwhcrc such "kno~:ledgc" (yvGoy) is itself described as "implantcd" (Ppvv705 yv6oq); and this "implanted knowledge" is closcly associated b o ~ h with law and with the gift of "natural judgment" (qvau+6iq ~ p i o ~ w q ) $ven by God to each human individual."' The ~i~pificancc of the latter is clariIicd more fully in the prayer of 8.12: And you gave to jhc world ciiizcn], with rcspcct to the soul, rational ability to dis~in~guish piety and imdiscernment hjv Xoy~.;1v G~ciyvmo~v),
K U dlo~PEia~ ~ ~L&KPIOIV), obsen~ationof just and unjust piety (E~OEPE~CIS (6u~aiou~ a&6iicov i iinpa6lpqorv). . .'"I
"Rational discernmcnt" or "natural judgment," then, specifically concerns the ability to distinguish ethical contraries-precisely the sort of knowledge that the Stoics discussed under the rnbric of "implantcd preconccptions." It is particularly noteworthy, then, that the rcfcrcnce to the "sccds of divinc knowledge" here echoes the imagcly used by both Cicero and Scncca to describe nothing other than these same implanted prcconccptions. Moreover, the specilic catcqxies oC knowledge singled out in 8.12.17~justiccand piety (cf. bclief in the deityare both explicitly associated with oi~ciworqin the Stoic ~ o u r c c s . ' ~ ~ ": Cf: A(: 7.39.2, where an undersianding 01 onr's "mni nature," of one's slatus as "world citizen," and of "thc j u d ~ m e n iseats of diffcrcnl lcgisiadon" arc rill rrquircd or lhz initiutc. The rhird clernznt of this triad is jiencra-lly undcrs~oodas a ri.fi:rcilce lo the innatc and wrinen la\$,; src GoodenoughSh; By I.@ttt, L(qh1; 327; n. I I I; 350: and Fiensy, U-iiyerr ANepd lo be ,j'rr~,is/t; 115. "' A(: 8.12.18. 3 4,) A(,' 7.33.3. On ihe phiasc hr rfic mD v b ~ o u i i n ~ ~ o v f i o e osee g , almvr notc 1'34.
A(: 8.12.li. Ser the discussioii or rhr rrrigris 01. thc concept oljusiicc anrl o i belief in the drily in Chaprcr 'livr,. Ttic emphasis on piety here should also bc &wed in rclation lo drc prayrr'r accounl o l thc corruption of d ~ cnatural law; scc AC 8.12.25. I.'"
"'
120
CHAPTER THREE
A furthcr correspondencc between the treatment of the "seeds of knowledge" in thc Apostolic Comtilukons and the Stoic implanted preconceptions can also be seen in conncction with the themc of the conuption of this divine endo\\ment. As we ha\-e seen, Ciccro repcatedly emphasizcs the inevitable corruption or these "seeds" and "sparks" of virtue and knowlcdge which results from mistaken human opinion and immoral behavior." It is in conncction with this themc that the author or thc praycr, rathcr clcvcrly, finds a suitable entree for the introduction of Moscs's law into the Stoic theory: thc implanted law, which in the Apostolic Constilutions is comprised of "seeds of divine kno\vledge," similarly gave way to the corruption caused by crrant human beliefs, and was thus supplemented by God with the written law of Moses. It is noteworthy, noncthclcss, that whcrcas Ciccro thinks chicfly of mistaken conceptions of the good in this regard, thc concern of the AportDlic Conrlihlhonr Lies first and loremost with improper conceptions of the relation of the dcity to the world: But whcn men corrupted the natural law, at times considering the crcauon to he mere chance (a6r6pa~av),and at timcs honoring it more than they ought, comparing it to you, the God of the universe, you did not allow them to go astray, hut rathcr raised up your holy servant Moscs, through whom you gave the written law as an aid to the natural law. . This notion that the law of Moscs was given to correct mistaken notions of God's relation to the world is reminiscent of a similar sentiment found in Philo's On the Creation ofthe i%~ld,where "Moses's" vicw of .this relationship is contrasted with that of those w-ho hold "the world in admiration rathcr than the Makcr of the world. . . whiie with impious falsehood they postulate in God a vast inactivity."'" Here, howcvcr, the Apostolic Comtltutionr sccms to havc integratcd critiques of the theology and cosmolog of thc Grceks into thc familiar Stoic thcme of thc corruption of the "seeds of knowledge." lC it is thus clear that the "seeds of divine knowledge" and "implanted knowledge" of the Apostolic Comtihltionr arc to bc understood in light of the Stoic doctrine of implantcd preconceptions, then this in turn confirms what has alrcady emcrg-cd from a number of othcr con"'
See; e.g., TD 3.14; De I q . 1.47.
"' AC 8.12.25. "' Phik~;Opii:7; see further Gaodcnough; BJ Q h l , Q h t : 349-50.
Dilk~nr e a k this complaint with refcrencc to h r i s ~ o ~ and l e the Peripatetics ( 7 h e ~VIGfdleI'laioniili. 157).
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL LAW-
121
siderations: the implanted la\+-is nothing other than human reason. According to Cicero: thc implanted preconceptions comprise the initial divine endowment that eventually develops first into the mature human ratio, and ultimately, idcally, into the recta ratio which is itself natural la\n. It is therefore quitc s&ng that in thc Apostolic Comtiutiom, the gift of the implantcd law and that of the "seeds of divine know-1edge" are onc and the same: "And when you [sc. God] made him: you gavc to him an implanted law (v6~ovEpvu~ov)so that from his own self he should have thc sccds or divine knowledge."'" The explanation, particularly in light of the many other points of contact with Stoicism in this praycr, is clear: the author has taken over the Stoic identification of natural law w+th human reason and utilizcd it, as had Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees bcforc him, in order to depict the law of Moses as a written expression of natural law.
Conclusion: Implanted Law in the Apostolic Constitutions Thc Apostolic Comtituliom exhibits an adaptation of the Stoic theory of law that is broadly similar to what is found in 4 Maccabees and the writings of Phiio. Oncc again, the dcity associated with this law is identificd as the god of the Jewish scriptures: the god who also appointcd Abraham "heir of the world," delivered his descendants from E m t and led them to victory over the Canaanites, and who has promised a resurrection of the dead.I5%nd once again, accordingly, the claim is made that the law this god gave to Israel through Moses is a writtcu expression of natural law. 0 5 thc Apostolic Conrtitulions Goodenongh felt that the Epvuro5 ~ 6 ~ of was "obviously a verbal variant of Philo's v6po5 Ep~xo5."'"' "Literally," he wrote, "the two terms exprcss the same notion from slightly different anglcs. The Law could be said to havc bccn 'implanted' within the Patriarchs, or they themselves could be regarded as that Law become animate."'jR This evaluation is accurate only in a vcly general sense and rcquircs signscant refinement. While Phiio's use of the term Epyruxo~v6pog is clearly informed by his depcndcnce on the Stoic identification of thc logos of thc sage as natural law, the tcrm itself derives from the Neo-Pythagorcan theory of kingship, as
lib
Scc esp. AC 8.12.20--26.
li'
Goodcnough, By Lighl, Lkht: 325
"" Ibid. n.
98.
122
CHAPTER THREE
Goodenough himself pointed out. The expression "implantcd law;" on the other hand, comes directly out of the Stoic thcory itself. More precisely, it is rooted in the t h e o ~that the "right reason" which compriscs natural law develops out of an initial divine cndo~mcnt of "implanted prcconccptions." The Evgu.roq v6poq of the Apo.rtolic Comtitulions thus finds its closcst analognc not in the ~ 6 ~ Zpyru~og 05 of Philo, but in the definition of law in t c m s of ratio insita in Ciccro's 1)e Legbus, where the implanted prcconccptions are similarly locatcd at the beginning of thc developmental process that leads ultimaiely, ideally, to natural l a ~ v . ' ~ "
Taken together, Cicero's De Legibw and the Aposlolic Cnstitulions provide strong evidence that the implantcd prcconceptions played an important role in the Stoic identification of human reason as natural law-a dimension of the theory that was in all probability in place at least from the timc of Chrysippus."" It is therefore quite striking that both works usc the term "implanted not only with refcrcncc to the preconceptions, but as dcscriptive or the inchoate logos or law itself that is comprised of these "seeds ol" knowledge." The recurrence of this terminology is all the more striking given the similar correlation of "the implanted logos" and a "pcrfcct law" in the Letter of James. In fact, thc use of analogous terminology in a number or other carly Christian works that dcal with natural law revcals that this usagc w-as morc widespread than might iniually appear to be thc case. The rcmaindcr of this chapter will establish this point by bricfly examining several such works. Along the way, wc shall continue to note how the incorporation of this Stoic concept into worldviews alien to Stoicism influences the terms of its presentation.
'"" Horsley ("The Ldw of Naturc in Philo and Ciccro"), in arguing t h a ~Cicero and Philo rely on ihc same source-namely Antiochus of ,\scali>n-for d~cirtheory of law, docs not take the origin of Philo's characterisdc tcrm v 6 ~ o ;Ebvu~o; into account. His thesis appearz all the morc tenuous when ihc -4po~lolicConslilulion~ an: hnmght into ihc comparison: rnorc rcmarhhle similarities cxist, it sccms io me; hctween Ciccro and the Apo.stollc Comlitukons than between Cirero and Philo. I"" Chiysippus defined law as the logor of the sage, ihc lops as a "colleci,n of concpptions and preronceplions;" and worked wiih a doctrine of implanted pieconccpiions. It scems raihcr improbahl~that he \z,ould not have himself recognked the irnporl of this assonmcnt of docrrines for liis tbcory of la,,..
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL
123
77ze Second t l p o l o a - gj'ustin LV1arpi I n t h e Second Apolopy of Justin Martyr, the term Zpqvrog is used both in conncction with the Stoic doctrine of implanted prcconccptions a n d t o describe t h e less-than-complete 1op-u.r c o m m o n to all h u m a n beings.'" T h e t e r m appears m i c e i n conncction with Justin's wellknown Logos theory'"' I n App 13.2, Justin expresses his wish t o b e considcrcd only as a Christian despite his l'latonic background not because the teachin~gsof Plato are dXcrcnr from those of Chlisr; but because they are not in all respects similar, as neilher are those or thc othcrs, the Stoics, and poets, and historians.'"" H e procccds to explain this partial a ~ c e m e n of t Greek a n d Christian thought: For cach man [among those just mentioned] spoke well in proportion to his share of the divine spermatic 1080s (pkpous roc oneppartrolj O~iou Myou), seeing what was related to i t . . . For all the writcrs w-ere able to scc realities darkly by means of the implanted seed of the io~oswhich was in them (8th xi15 Evobcq< iprpGrou rolj %you 07top?~~).'~~ I n contrast to t h e m c r c "sccd" or the d l n c logos possessed b y such earlier grcat thinkcrs, the Christians have access to the complctc logos b y virtue of their knowledge of t h c teaching of Christ, w h o was himself its full embodiment. This contrast is m a d c cxplicit clscwhere as Justin attributes the past pcrsecutions of philosophcrs a n d t h e present Christian pcrsccution to the samc demonic source: And those of the Stoic schootsince, so far as their moral teaching (xbv fiOucbv %yo") went, they were admirable, as were also thc poets in somc panicnlars, on account of the seed of reason implanted in every race o r men (8th rb Cprpurov xnvri y i v e ~iLvepuinwv oxippa TOG
I" 1 follow throughout thc rccenl Greek edition by M. Marcovich, IuLini Marptis Aflologim pro Chelianis (Berlin and New York: de Gruyler, 1994). All translations, unlcss otherwise noted, are taken from iL?/K vol. 1. '" For an cxccllent account of this lileory, including thc history of its inlerpretation, scc R. Hoite, "Logas Spermatikos. Christianity and rlncicnt Philosophy according to St. Justin's .Apologies," ST 12 (1958) 109 6 8 . Note also, how-evcr, the recent attempt hy kt. J. Edw~rds(':Justin's Logos and the Word of God;" Journnl of Early Chlutizn Studies 3 Ll99.5] 216-80) to downplay the imponance of Greek thought Tor Justin's doctrine. On thr rclativc importance of this theory fOr Justin's nation of the similzrides between Christian and Greek thought, see Drogc, H o w or ~ M o i e ~49 , 72, esp. 65-72. I"' App. 13.2. "* App. 13.3, 5. 1 have slightly modified the translation of /LATI.:
h6yau)-werc, ~ v cknow, hated and put to death. . . For, as we inhmated, the devils havc alway-s cffcctcd, that all thosc who in any casc are zealous to l i x according to logos ( ~ n ~hOyov l r P1o3v) and shun vice, bc hated. And it is uo wonder if ihe dexils arc proved to causc those to hc much worse hated w:ho liw not according to a part only od' thc spermatic logos, hut by the kno~vlcdgcand contemplation of the ~vl~olc 1080s;\+kkh is Christ ( rarix onep*anxoii h6you p i p o ~ .drhhir x u i & .riiv 703 n a v ~ h6you; b~ 6 irn~ Xp~oroG).'"" In both of these passages, thc application of thc tcrm "implantcd" (Epquro5) to the logo,^ itscl+morc precisely, to thc "sccd" of the logos-~ is analogous to its use in the llpostolic Colzstitutiolzs and in Ciccro's De L g i b w . Strikingly, Justin uscs the term particularly with rcfercuce to the divinc, yet incomplete, hgos that is implanted in all human beingdm H e emphasizes this incomplete statc, moreover, by means of thc "seed" (mop&, nipp pa) metaphor that wc havc found to be commonly associated with the implanted preconceptions in thc writings of Cicero, Scncca, and thc Apostolic Constitutions. The developmental process that such language implies in thcse lattcr works, howcvcr, has undergone a radical alteration in the context ofJustin's prescntation: the process by which the logos is completed has been removed from the sphere of individual human dcvclopment and projected onto the stagc of history. Maturation, so to speak, comes not through an individual's own intellectual cffort, but only as thc logos is fully rcvcalcd in the person and teaching or Jesus Christ. Thc result is a starkly pcssimistic view of the possibilities or human achievement apart from Christianity. A lire governed by right reason is positively impossible without C h r i ~ t . " ~ It is likely that Justin's use of thc term "implanted" in this connection is informed by an aw-arcness of thc intimatc relationship between the potential logos with which humans arc born and the implanted preconceptions.'"': The evidence, however, is Iimitcd. In addition to his usc of the "seed" imagery in this connection, it is noteworthy
'" '" I"'
Apfi 8.1-3. The translacion of AMF has bccn sli~htlymodified. CCf in this respect Cicero's ~ a l i osumma in.& On the other hand. Justin's ren>arkdblcclaim that certain grcat men of thr
past like Socrates; Hcraclitus and Abraham were Christians is likely also to he undentaod in this context: the l o p with which they lived in accord was indeed Christ rile divine lops. Nonetheless, they did not have access to its cornpiere reveladon. which hccamc available only with the historical appearance of Christ. So Ax, Holte, "I.ogos Spcmarikos;" 136 4.0; who cornparesJustin with Cicero in this rcspcct.
MOSES, JESUS, 4ND N A T U R U LAW
125
that the type of knou:lcdgc associated with the "implanted seed of the logos" is characteristic oi' preconception according to rhc Stoics: thc possession of this "partial" logos allowed pre-Christian thinkers to see r a &a, but only "dimly" j&p~6pG5).'"That Justin \\-as in fact acquainted with the Stoic doctrine of "natural conceptions" is clear from his Dialogue with T i p h o , whcrc he associates humankind's universal knowledge of "that which is always and universally j u s ~ ,as well as all righteousness," with s&<~ U G I K &
"'
"'
..
126
CHAPTER THREE
share of the logos that all humans possess, while the latter are said to rcsult from the meddling of wicked angels who "appointed laws conformable to their own wickedness.""' This problem, says Justin: is overcornc only with the appcarancc of Christ, mho, as "right rcason," resolves the confusion that cxists between the various "laws of mcn" by sho>\ing that "not all opinions nor all doctrines arc good, but that some arc evil, rvhilc others are good.""'' If Christ is himsclf "right rcason:" Justin can also dcscribe his of thc common teaching as such. In fact, given Justin's kno>%-ledge Stoic definition of law in terms of "right reason" in its function of commanding and prohibiting,"' it is not surprising that he identifies Christ's teaching furthcr with natural law. This emerges most clcarly from an anccdote in Second A p o l o ~2, mherc Justin relates the story of a woman who, habing abandoned her former dissolute life when "she came to a knowlcdge of thc teachings of Christ" tried to convince her husband to do the same. Haling introduced hi,too, to these teachings, she warncd him that "therc shall bc punishment in eternal lire inflicted upon thosc who do not live temperately and ~ & 6pOoG conformably to right rcason" (rot; 06 owtppbvw; ~ ap i ~ h6yov ptoGutv).""ustin informs us, however, that her husband, undauntcd, continued in his pursuit of those pleasures which arc "contrary to the law of naturc" (nap&~ b v6j;q b o ~ o gvbpov), so that the woman was compelled to divorce him."' The phrases "teaching of Christ" (FtGciypara Xp~aroG),"right reason" (6p0b; h6yo;), and "the law of o g are essentially intcrehangcable here. Thus nature" (b rfi; ~ G a ~ vbpog) can we understand Justin's repeated description of Christ as "thc lawgiver," or even of Christ himsclf as the "new Justin's Christ in this respect bcars a limitcd rcscmblance to Phiio's Moses: ~~~
"' App.
9.3-4; cf. App. 13.3, 5; 8.1; 9.
''' App. 9.3-4. "' C t his rcrercnce in App.
7.7 LO "those men everywhere who have madc laws and philosophized according to right reason, by their prescribing to do some things and refrairi from others" (oi nuv~u;loG~raihM y o v .rbv 6p0bv v o p o 8 e ~ o u vr u~i ~ ~ ~r;ioooqfipiloav~eg Sv0pwrrot i~TOG 6 ~ u ~ o p d e r&Se t v &fv xp&t.r?etv,r 6 v 6 ~ 6f &iieX~oOat). Indecd; it would seem here that the commonness or lhis definition has lcd Justin to a momentary lapse, as he attributes lo non-Christians the rorrnulation or laws and philosophy according to @ht reason! In fact the only nvo refcrcnces to the opObg h67og in the Apolo,.r arp made in =sociation with v 6 ~ 0 g ;sec in addition to App. i.7, also App 2 1 5 ; 9.3-5; d rurthcr Ulnl. 141.1. App. 2 . 1 ~ 2 . App. 2.3f "8 see ; e.g., Llki 12.2; 18.3; d Dki. 43.1.
MOSES. JESUS. AND NATURAL L T
127
as "right rcason," hc both embodied and gave verbal exprcssion to the la%\-of nature. In sum. Justin, in a manncr analogous to Cicero and the author of the Apostolic Comtijutions, conceives of the initial eudowmcnt of thc lops given to all of humanity as an "implanted seed." It is likely- that Justin was himself aware that the roots of this tcrrninolog lie in the Stoic doctrine of impiantcd prcconceptions; his use of such capressions is in any casc clcarly to be understood in light of this doctrinc. Nonetheless, like the other authors cxamincd in this chapter, and in a more radical fashion, Justin adaptcd the Stoic thcory of natural law to accommodate a sct of religious and historical convictions alien to Stoicism. All humans, he claimed, have always received an "implanted secd" ofthe 1ogo.r; life in accord ~ 4 t h"right reason," and thus natural law, however, became possible only compantivcly recently, with the appearance in history of Jesus Christ. This theory allows Justin to cxplain thc partial overlap between the law of nature and thc laws of various nations, w-hile at the same time securing possession of the whole natural law for Christians alonc. Morcovcr, Justin integrates this philosophical theory into a worldvicw that includcs wicked angels and fiery eschatological punishment for "those who do not live tcmpcratcly and conformably to right reason." 1r such clcmcnts of Justin's thcology highlisht the fact that he cannot simply be classified as a Stoic, it is no lcss clcar that conccpts of Stoic origin form a signikant cornponcnt of his religious thousht.
Methodius A fragment from a work of Methodius prcscrved in thc Pananon of Epiphanius provides an analogous instance of such an adaptation."" Intcrprcting Paul's discussion of his experience of inner confict in Rom 7:14-25, Methodius explains: there are two kinds of thoughts (XoyrapGv) in us. The one kind arises from the desire (rb p b drxb ifis inthpiag) which lurks in thc body, and ~~~
""
The excerpt, from a work in which Mciiiodius critiques 0ligc.en's \iew or the rcsurrectioii, is quite cxtcnsive. cornprisin~/'en. 4.64.12 62. 'l'hc pirriicular passage which is most signilicant [or our present purposcs is Pan. (1.64.60-62. 1 citc liie Grcck text as hund in K. Hall; Ep@/unius @nrornius iind I'maGn): vol. 2: I'ann&n Ham 34-64 ( G C S Leipzig: Hcinlichs, 1922). All translations, unlpss othenvisr notcd, arr tilkcn f?om F. \Villiams; 'The heananin of Epiphahnnius of S o l m i x Rooki I1 and 111 (Sectr 4i-80. Ile Ed<)(NHMS 3K 1.cidcn: BliU, 1994).
128
CHAPTER THREE
has been caused. . . by the inspiration of the marcrial spirit. The other has come from our regard for the commandment, which we received to have as an innate natural law (tb Fh drnb TOG K ~ T &rilv iv~ohilv.6" gpqurov ih&/3olmw Zpni lcui qw~lcbvv6pov); and which urges and restores our thoughts to the good. Hence ~ v e"delight" [cf Rom 7221 in the law of God in our minds jt?j pfv vopo0eoiv TOG 0~05)-this is \+-hatthe 'inner man" means-but with the desire that dwells in the flesh (riv ivo~roiioavi n ~ h p i a v6,T$ oapri) we delight in the law of the dmil (t?j Fh vopo0eoiqr roG Ftaj36hauj. For the law which "warreth and opposeth thc law of G o d [cf. Rom i:22]-that is, which opposes our impulse to the good (75 zpbg~bdryaObv bppfi);the desire of our mind, is the law which is forever fostering lustful; material diversions to la~:llessncss,and is nothing but a temptation to pleasures (nav~irnaolnpbg iFovhg liv Ph~t~lc6$).""' T h e "commandment" which Mcthodius identifies as thc "implantcd . . . lcai qv~ucbvv6pov) is apparently God's and natural law" (Epcq~~ov command to Adam and Eve not to eat from the tree of thc knowledge of good and ~ v i l . ' ~Adam ' and Eve had lived briefly in freedom from irrational desire (&Loyo5in~&~ia)-which, "with the enticing ay leads to a lack of self distractions of pleasures ( i h ~ r i ~ 48ovGv)," contl-01 ( & ~ p a ~ i a ) ' ~ ' - - - awerc n d thus free from sin''' and dcath.Ia4 With an eye to R o m 7:7F12, however, he writes thal they were "infected with desire" after God's commandment to them that they not cat of the tree of knowlcd,oe; "for once the commandmcnt had been given, the devil got his opportunity to produce desirc (il i d l u p i a ) in me through the commandment."'" T h c result was that the "natural law within us" (6 iv $p?v quo~xb5~ 6 ~ 0 was 5 ) wcakened "from its dcfeat by the desirc ( i z ~ h ~ iin a )our bodies";'"Qhus God scnt his Son to condemn sin to destruction, so that "the requirement of the law of nature would be fulficd."'87 T h e "gospel" ( ~ b -~
-
p~~
IX"
I'm.
60.5-6. I have Alered thc lranslation of Williams only by translating
P~&!~o&Evmore literally than his "wc have hecn given," and by renrlerinbr q . . . vopofleoin roc SraB6hou as "the law of the de~il"in order to hling out the pard. . . 66) >villi mj vo~o8~aiq 706 ~ E O V . lelism (cf: "" Note the imporlance of this "commandment" for his gpncral exposition of Rom 7:12; scc Pan. 4.50.2K esp. 4.50.4-5. IX' I'an. 4.5.5.2 3. IH' I'm. 4.50.5; cf. 4.60.1. '"I For Methodius's account o f thc origin of dealh see csp. Pan. 4.28-34; also 4.56.4-5. In'Pen. 4.56.1; d Rom 7:8. h~lethodiusidcntifjrs P~aiil'spcrsonilied "sin" with the devil; scc Pan. 4.56.5. '" P m 4.62.11. I"' Pan. 4.62.1 I: rb Gucaiopa roc rpuo~rol, v6pou iihqpo8b;cf. Rom 8:3 4 and fiirllici f'on. 4.62.10.
MOSES, JESUS. A P NKI'URAL
ww
129
~liayyaiov),as "the law of the Spirit of life" (cf. Rom 8:2), "is diRcrent From the other laws and was meant to foster obedience and the forgiveness of sins through its preachins"; it has "entirclj- conquered thc sin which rules the Nonetheless, "Christ did not come to announce the remaking or transformation of human nature into some other: but its change into its original nature before its fall (8 3v it hp~iiqapb ioC ~ I C K E O when E ~ V ) it, \&-asimmostal."'"' There arc several obvious and si~pificanrdifferences bct\vcen hIethodius's "implanted natural law" and the Stoic \iew of natural law, ow4ng above all to the rormer's dcpcndence upon Paul and thc myth of the fall from the book or Genesis. In the first place, the precise relationship belwccn human reason and natural law is not altogether clear: while the human was rrom the start created as thc "rational image" ( ~ ayahka b ib hoyucbv) of Cod,'" the natural law: was "impIantcd only when God commanded Adam and Eve not to cat from thc tree or knowledge. Moreover, given the role of the serpent in Gcncsis 3, blcthodius introduces a demonic dimension to the Stoic opposition of reason and human desire: the latter, standing opposed to the law of God, represcnts the law of "the devil" (b Gthpoho5; cf. b novqpbq). In fact, in his attempt to make sense of Rom 7:23, hlethodius speaks of the existence of thrcc laws: thc "law of the mind"-God's law--which corresponds to ib F~qviovi v fipiv hya86v; that of the devil, which is "at war with the law of the mind" (cf. Rom 7:23); and "the law of sin which dwells in the members," and "which corresponds to the sin that has become habitual in the flesh because of its lust ( ~ ~ iaiCJupia5).""" 75 With a stark view of the possibilities for human existence apart from Christianity reminiscent of Justin, Methodius believes that as a result of the transgression of Adam and Eve, fulfillment of the "requirement of the natural law" was impossible before the appearance of Jesus Christ, the son of Cod, in the flesh.'" 2Ioreover, as with Justin, transgression of the
Pan. 4.62.13; cr. Rom %3-4. Pan. 1.41.6. "" Pan. 1.27.8. See further Pan. 4.26.1 27.4 on lhe creation of thc human heing, whom hIclhodius; like the author of thc prayers from ihe Apostolic Cortslilulions. t r m s b ic&o~o< roc icbopou (Pan. 4.27.8). "" Pan. 4.61.1 3. ' l q ~ d e e d ,according to Mcthodius, even arier thr appearance of Christ it is still impossible to fulfill rhc la\\, of ndturc prior to tile dissolution thal comes with death. 'fhis point, too; scrms to result from his dcpcndcnce upon Romans; see csp. Pan. 4.36.4-5: cT 4.56.10-i9.6. '"'I
I""
law of nature is given profound cschatological consequences: there will be a judgment by God "according to works and according to T& Epya ~ axa%& i T& ix~.rqG~G~aol.ra),'"" and those who pursuits" ( x a ~ & choose evil \ d l face punishment."" Despite the differences, however, the influencc of the Stoic vicw of law on Methodius's interpretation of Romans and the myth of significant in this respect for our the fall is unmistakabl~.'~9Iost present purposcs is of coursc the notion of an "implanted natural law," givcn by God to Adam and Eve, which functions in opposition to human dcsire (b10upia) and thc pleasures (aifiFovai). Mcthodius, notably, makes no explicit mention or implanted prcconceptions or "seeds" or "sparks" of knowlcdge in this connection; still, several aspects of the fragment might suggest that he was, nonetheless, aw-are of this dimension of thc theory. Both his description of virtue as o i ~ ~and i a his reference to the wicked thoughts which first plagued humanity aftcr the transgression of Adam and Eve as hoytopuiv &vouceiavwould seem to suggest his familiariq wirh the Stoic doctrine of oixeiooy.'" Similarly, his passing rel'erencc to the fact that "it is plain that thc better and thc worse (76 piv bih~tovr b 61: xeipov) are with'in ourselves" might well be understood in this c ~ n n e c t i o n ; ' ~ ~ the language is in fact quite reminiscent or that used by Occumenius and Theophylactus as thcy interpret the implanted logos ofJas 1:21.'" Finally, it is tempting to suppose that it is precisely Methodius's aw-arcness of the connection betwcen these theories that underlies his somewhat unexpectcd correlation of the "implanting" of this law not with the creation of the human per se, but spccifically with God's command regarding the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Whatever thc extent of his familiarity with the details of the original thcoiy, howcver, Methodius's dependence on this philosophical tradition is plain.
'"
See e.g. Pan. 4.36.4-5. "n addition to evidence cited in this paragraph, sce esp. the account or thr creation in Pan. 4.26 27. in which God is said to have "broueht all into beine in p o d order like a great city, and re-Wated it<@h6yq7' (4.26.1), a well a his description of h e human being as b x6ogog toD r6ogau (4.27.8). '''c' Pen. 4.58.9 4.60.2. I!" Pan. 4.61.4. Sce above, Chapter One, and funher immediately beloxz..
-
'"
-
MOSES,
JESUS, AND
NATURAL LAW
131
Of particular interest to the present investigation are the interpretations of the phrase Ppquro5 h6yoq in early Christian commentaries on thc Letter ofJames. Jamcs itself bill be discussed in detail in the following chapters. Leaving aside for the moment thc question of its precise relationship to this philosophical tradition, it is noteworthy in any case that thc Grcek catenae of Oecumenius and Thcophylactus prescn-c an intcrpretation of Jas 1:21 which clearly assumes the theory at work in Cicero's De Legiius and the Apostolic Comtitzltionr. Theophylactus interprets ihc phrase as follows: "hc [sc. James] calls 'implantcd logos' that o\&g to which we have bccome rational, ablc to distinguish the better and the worse" ( ~ ~ q v 6i ~ oh6yov v x&T rbv, xa0' 6v hopxoi y~y6vap~v, G ~ a x p ~ r TOG ~ ~ o$eh.riovoq i xai TOG ~eipovog).'" Thc samc interpretation, with some minor variations, is offered by Occumenius: ijKqu.rov h6yov xahe?, rbv 6IaxpIrlKbv TOG $~hriovoqxai .roG xeipovo~. Ka0' 6 xai h o y ~ ~kap~v o i K a l h~~CIp~fJa.2~" Clearly these two works are drawing upon some common prior source20'whose author was aware of thc Greek philosophical tradition that has been reconstructed in the previous pages of this study. The "implanted logos" of Jas 1:21 is identified as human reason and, especially strikingly, associated particularly with the ability to distinguish ethical contraries-precisely, that is, the ability the Stoics attributed to o i ~ e i o a yand associatcd with the implanted preconccptions. Still morc impressivc in this respect is the intcrpretation of the 12th century exegete Dionysius bar Salibi. Commenting upon the clause FitaoBe ~ b v&qu.rov h6yov in Jas 1:2 1, Dionysius first paraphrases, and then explains: "Reccive the word implanted in our nature." That is, he refcrs to natural law; for God implanted it into [our] nature, in ordcr that it should love good things and have an aversion to bad things (exczpiia verburn insiturn nahlroe nos@% h.8. lepm naluralern innuit. In natura enlm lnreruit Dm, ut amet bona et odio habeat mala).2"2
"" MPG '"I
125. I 14.5. MPG 11'3. 468. Sec above. C h a ~ t e rOne. eso. nole I
132
CHAPTER THREE
Dionysius, therefore, without comment or apology, simply identifies b Eptpu~ogh6yog as a rcferencc to natural law."' Moreover, similarly to the exegete whose interpretation of Jas 1:21 is preserved in the commcntaries of Occumenius and Theophylactus, hc associates this law with thc human tendency, "inserted" or "implanted" by God in nal~ra,~"'to love good things and be aversc to bad ones. Dionysius's combined association of the irnplantcd logos, natural law, and the ability to distinguish ethical contraries is immediately intelligible in light of Ciccro's De hgibw and the Apo.stolic Comlilutions. It is clear that he, like thc cxegete follou-ed by Oecumenius and Theophylactus, is interpreting Jas 1:21 in light of this apparently well-known philosophical tradition.
The purpose of this chapter has been twofold. Analysis of divcrse Jcwish and Christian adaptations of the Stoic theory of law has provided us with a model for apprehending those aspects of thc treatment of the implanted logos in the Letter of Jamcs which arc not typical of the Stoic sources. All of the works examined in this chaptcr clcarly draw on thc Stoic theory that human reason compriscs a natural law. The authors of thesc works, however, arc not Stoics. In each case, Stoic terms and concepts arc fused with ideas that are cntirely alien to Stoicism, and this, inevitably, has impacted their treatmcnt. Similar in their corrclation of human reason and natural law, these works nonetheless differ both from the early Stoics and from one another in the details and language of their presentation. In thc second placc, this chapter has examined several w-orks that use the t e r n "implanted" (Bpqv~og,inritum) to describe either reason itself or the law it comprises in order to confirm the findings of thc p~~evious chapter. The rccurrencc of this terminology in such otherwise disparate works admit of only one conclusion: each draws on a philosophical tradition that identifies human reason as natural law;
"" '""
Cf. his comments on "the perrect law of freedom" in Jas 125, which he also, not surprisingly, takes to be natural law-. Note ihe absence of the limiting genitive horninis; and rf in this rrspect Ciccro De L q 1.18: summa ratio 1m.h in nnhira. As in this passage from Ciccro, it is nonetheless clear that it is specifically humon nature that 1)ionysius has in mind hcre: cT. his paraphrase of ipqvro< h6~0yogas uerburn imitum naturae nosme.
MOSES,
JESUS,i~1)NATURAL
LAW
133
that correlated the inchoate logos with which humans arc born with implanted preconceptions; and which, accordingly, described either thc logor or natural law itself as "implanted." The tcrminolog- of each of these works, in other \vords, is rooted in the Stoic theory of natural law;. The repeated appearance of this t e r m i n o l o ~in works as dierent in date, provenance and rcli@ous and philosophical orientation as Ciccro's De I~gibw(and its Greek source), the Apostolic Constitutionr, Justin's Second A p o l o ~and the Methodius fragment suggest that this coinage was in ract rather widespread. Indeed, the theory was apparently common enough that both Dionysius bar Salibi and the Greek excsete whose work is prcscrved by Oecumenius and Theophylactus, with little apology or explanation, simply rcad the Epqvpu.roq h6yo5 of Jas 1:21 in light of it. And this, as wc shall see in the follo~lng chaptcrs, is precisely how it should bc rcad.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE IMPLANTED LOGOS AiiD THE LAIV OF FREEDOM
According to Stoic thcory, the inchoate logos with which humans are born, and which in its perfect form as "right reason" is natural la\-, consists in an endowmcnt of implanted preconccptions (Ewqvzo~ rrpohfiyiey). As is plain from the various works cxamincd in the pl-cvious chapters, the term "implantcd" came to be used of the logos or nahlrd law ilsclf in this conncction by at lcast the first century B.C.E. The Letter of James, which equates "thc implanted logos" (b Epqv.ro5 hbyog) with a "perfect law," "the law of freedom" (12-25; cf. 2:12), providcs another example of this usage. Whiie dependencc on the Stoics has often been cited in conncction with James's association of law and frcedom, his correlation of the "law of frcedom" with the implanted logos has rcceived much less attcntion in this respect.' For those majority who have (rightly) read James as a Christian composition, the notion of a logos which "saves souls" has scemed a rather obvious reference to the Christian Gospel; thc Stoics, on the othcr hand, scarcely spoke of human reason in this way, nor as something which could be "hcard and donc" or "rcceived." According to this line of interpretation, then, comparison with the Stoic sourccs is essentially irrelevant Lor understanding James's "implanted logos": the way that James talks about this logos, it is said, indicates that he is, at thc vcry most, parroting a Stoic term that he eithcr wholly misunderstands or has filled with an cntirely new- meaning. Such merenccs bctweell James and thc Stoic sources arc indeed quite si&cant. But the facilc that conclusion the author of James eilher does not dcpend on Stoic thought at all, or that he at most uses a philosophical term with a sense cntirely different from ils original usage, betrays a much too simplistic approach to the complcx problem of h e mcrgcr of Jewish, Greek and Christian traditions in the early Christian literature. Justin differs quite significantly from Ciccro -
'
On pas1 inlerprelatinn ofJas 1:21, sce Chapter Onc
136
C
I
~ FOUR R
and the Stoics with respect to his claim that, while all humans are endowed with an "implanted seed of the logos," life in accord with "right rcason" and thus "natural law" bccamc possible only after thc l i e and death of Jcsus of Nazarcth in first ccntury Palestinc. His dependeucc on Stoic concepts is patcnt nonetheless; nor is it by any means obvious that this divergcnce results from his failure to "undcrstand" the Stoic theory as originally conceived. As seen in thc previous chaptcr, such differences arc not the exception in works that fusc Stoic concepts with ideas alien to Stoicism, but the rule. James's language of "hearing and doing" thc logos is in fact quite instructive in this respect. This pair Iinds a certain analogue in the common Greek pairing of word and deed, speech and action.' Use of the phrase "logos-docr" (rrotqril~Zyou) in this context, howcver, is hardly typical of the Stoics. Indced, as has oftcn been observcd, this phrase would most likely conjure up images of an orator or poet in classical Greek usage. James's use ofnogo to denote a carrying out it is thus in thc of logos in the sensc of obedicnce is a ~cmitism;~ Jewish and Christian literature that one finds thc "word and deed" theme expressed in terms of "hearing and doing." Thc pair is often used, in fact, particularly with refercncc to the law, as by Paul: "it is not the hearers of the law (oi Clxpoa~aiv6pou)who are righteous in God's sight, hut the doers of the law (oi notqxai vtrpou) who will be justified."' Similarly, James himself elsewhere speaks directly of rather than, as in 1:22, the "docr" the "doer of law-" (notq~i
' of his mint has often been made in the commentaries:. see, e.e.. R o,~ e s..St "7ames..
175; Dibclius, J m e q 114; Johnson, Lelln ,fJarne.r2 206; also Ludwig, Wirl ali Ceseli, 164. Sec further the folloMin~note. " Rom 2:13. For rurthcr insmnces of "hearing and doing;" see, e.g.; W( Deut 30:8-20: Ezek 33:30 32: Sir 3:l: Matt 7:24-27 oar. Luke fi:46-49: further Rones. St ~ m e i 174 : 75; ~abri's,Me863-64; Klein, i?,n ~ollkommeneslb'& 1211 .' Jas 4 1 1 ; cT 1 Macc 2:6i: .rob
. '
LOCOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
137
that law is informed by Jew-ish and Christian tradition. As in the works examined in the previous chapter, the di\;ine law- conceived by the Stoics, according to James; was legislated by the creator or the Jewish scriptures, the only w e "law7givcr" (4:12).' And if James assumes that this logos can be "heard-and, in somc sense, "received (cf. 1:21, 68$aoO~)-this suggests only that he, like other Jewish and Christian authors who adapted the Stoic theory of natural law for their own purposes, understands it, though intcrnal to the human individual, to have some external form as well." The extent of James's familiarity with the niceties of the philoo < is sophical theories which gavc rise to phrases l i e b Z p ~ ~ z h6705 less clear than is the casc with the Aposlolic Constitutions, Justin, or evcn Mcthodius. He makes no mention of implanted preconceptions in this connection, nor is there any explicit indication that he uses the expression to denote specifically a potential lopo.r."lhat he has, nonetheless, at least a gcncral grasp of the term's original significance is immediately clear from the fact that he, too, associates it precisely with divinc l a w - a law, indeed, that is "pcrfcct" and "of freedom."" Onc cannot simply conclude from the author's use of "un-Stoic" language in this connection, therefore, that he wholly misunderstands the original significance of the cxpression, much less that hc is not ultimately indcbtcd to the philosophers in this rcspcct at all."
'
Jas 4:12: E?< i o n v [b] vopa0iqg. As has often been notcd, it is not always possible to tell whether the author or.James is referring to God or Jcsus Chrisi, esp. when he simply uses the title kSpm< as, e.g., in 5:7-8, 14, 15. l'hat thc "lawgiver" in question- is God rather than Jesus Christ is clear, however, from the allusion @ Jas 4 1 2 ( ~ ii< a ~ t v[b] vopo0iq5) to Deut 6:4 (W(:kSpto< 0eb5 ipGv lojp~og~ i 5 i a u v ) ; cL rurther in this respect Jas 2:lY: d X ~ O I S ~ E I BTI < ~ i i5m ~ vb 8 ~ 6 5 icahGg , no&<. Sec furthcr Ropes, Sl. Jamex, 275; Dibclius, Jamei, 229; Johnson? Let& ,Jam, 294; and Klein, Ein uollkornrrrmes We* 163-65, who righdy correlates God's role as "lawgiver" with the "implanting" of thc h~o.s.In k t , as w i l l he argued below, the "law of tieedom" is nothing other than thc law which God himscif, according to the Jewish scriptures, gavc through Moses. The command 6icao0e rbv ipqurov h6yav is equally difficult on any interprctation of the lagor. IVhether conceived as something inhorn in all humans or inserted later in only a specific group, it is nonetheless already "implanted" and thus the apparcnt contradiction. See further on this problcm below, under the heading "Tmplanted lugor in lisht of thc Torah and Jud.pcnt.'' " Note, however, that mere possession of this l o ~ o scnsures neithcr that one lives in accord with it nor, suhsequcndy, "salvation." See immediately below, under the heading "Implanted Ia,ps and rhe Perfcct Ldw oTFreedom." we shall see in the following chapter. moreover, this 10x0s functions particularly in opposition to human desire (int0upia) and the pleasures (aijgovai). " Of coursc, whethcr the author's acquaintance with this expression was mediated
'"
This is as true of his notion that the implanted logos '\a\-es souls" as it is of liis assumption that it can be "heard and donc." In fact, in a passage which is, incidentally, rcminisccnr of James in several rcspccts, Philo writes similarly of the imporrancc of the dominance of reason over that part of thc soul which is the seat of anger: "For , the scat of anger (6 then is thc soul saved (fi ~ u x f ~i ~ [ E T U L ) \\-hen Bup6q) is steered by reason (Gnb hbyou) as by a charioteer.. .'""uch language of "saving souls" docs not seem to have been ty~icalof thc Stoics; on the othcr hand, ncither can Philo, nor especially the eschatologically oriented author of Jarncs: be isirly described as typical Stoics. T o bc sure, it is by no means clear that "saving souls" means the samc thing in Philo's Allqoncal Inlerg~elalionas it does in thc Letter orJames; but what this example from Philo does show is that thc usc of such language docs not necessarily result from "misunderstanding" or a usc of philosophical concepts with a meaning entirely unrclatcd to their original scnsc. The interesting question, in any evenl, is how a conccpt of "saving souls" came to bc associatcd by Philo and- more importantly for our purposes-byJames, with a Stoic concept of 1080s. And if, on the race of it, James's cschalological oricntation secms more incompatible with Stoicism than Philo's mysticism, one need only recall that the Christians Justin and Mcthodius both thought eschatological punishment awaitcd those who did not live in accord with natural law. The Letter of James is indebted to chc Stoics for its equation of "the implanted logos" with a perfect law. The elements of James's prcscntation of this concept that differ from thc Stoics, though, are just as illuminative of its role in his reliSious imasnation as arc the similarities. Spccial attention must thcrcforc be given to scveral qucstions that arise with the observation of apparcnt dirrerenccs betwecn 11 or Christian sources who drew on the Greek philosophrrs or rcsults Cram a dircct dependence upon the works o r Grcck philosophers tl~emselvesis purely a maltcr o r spcculauon. l'he ultimate proucnancr of the conccpt of an implanted l o p s w h i h ieprescnts the perfect law is in any case Greek plliiosophy. Similar qucstions ran be raised with respect to liic other usages of ihc lcttcr which are typical 01. Greco-Roman literature, e.g.. lllc mctaphors of llie hridlr and ihe rudder in ,James 3. " kc. Ail. 3.137: r6re y&p iyu"(il ~ ~ , < E T u LK, t a v ~ ab iOufibg jv~o;ll)83 6x6 h6~ou; my translalion. ('lhc I.CT. transladon of Coison, by rcndcring b 8ukLg jvtom0fj Giib %you as "whcn thr arat of anger ha? received rcaxm as its clrariorrer," mnigh-hrin thc prescnt contcxi givc thc false impression thal this passage is also similar to ,Jamca irith rcspect to llic 1ato.r'~expression 6 i S a o O e .rbv Efirpu~uvhb.,ov.) For discussion o r Lq. .4lL 3.1 1 1 37 sre lhek,\r pp. 2Olr and 2271'
LOGOS .4ND THE? LAW OF FREEDOM
139
Jamcs's understanding of the implanted l o p i and Stoic discussions of human reason. If the notion that il can bc "heard" and, in some sense, "rccciveed" assumes that it has some external form, what docs the author consider this lattcr to bc3 What: that is: is thc rcfcrcnt of thc "perfect la%\-of freedom"? In what scnse is the implanted logos understood to be that "which is able to save your souls"? \\'hat, fnrther, is the relation of this logos to ihe "lugus oT truth'' by which "God gave birth to us" according to 1:18? \irhcn, and in \4:hom, does Jamcs imaginc the Pprpvro~Zyog to havc bccn "implanted"? The relationship bctwcen ihc implanted logo.? and thc "logos of t r u t h hill be takcn up in Chapter Five. Thc present chapter rocus on ,James's correlation of the implanted 1qyo.i with thc "perfect law of Creedom." After a closer examination of this correlation itsclf, it will bc argued chat James, like Phio, 4 Maccabees and ihe Apostolic Comliluliom, finds a written expression of the implanted logos in the 'Torah.
Jas l:19b contains a three-part admonition: "let cach person bc quick to hear, slow to speak, and slow lo anger."" Each of the elements of this admonition is elaborated over 1:20-27, and the phrasc "implanted logo?' occurs as its last clement, "slow to anger" (Bpa6tg cip6v), is being explained." '"l'he exact admonition of 1:19b is not? to my knowledge, attcsted elsewvherc in ancient litcrarurr. Cf however thc remarkably similar grouping of peech; hearing and anger in the advice regarding the "bat wxy to excerckc authority" in Lucidn Dmwn. 51: 'A6pyrliog, Emq, rat bhiya p i v hahiuv, rrohhir 62 drrobov. This would seem to suggest thatJamcs is at least following a traditional association 01the threc:, whether or not he has himscW lorrnulatcd thr particular admonition of 1:19h. l4 On 1:19-27 as structured aroond the saying of 1:19h, sce Dihelius, 3mzer. 108-23, esp. 108-9 cf. Fahris, Leg<#: 55-36. Notc, however, that I disagree with Dibelius in several points of detail, the most important of which, in lhis context, concerns 1:21 itself. 'L'he contrast o l i v npahq.it in 1 2 1 with the 6pyii of 1:20, particularly considering thc use of 816 to join these verses, seems to me to indicatc that 1:21 is to he viewed primarily as part of the elaboration of h e theme "slow to anger"; thus, to paraphrase: "anger doesn't produce righteousness; thercii~re,set asidc all evil and rcceive the implanted logo^ with humility." Dibelius, whilc rccogn i ~ i n gthe contrast hetwcen "angcrcr"and "humility," nonetheless views this v e n t as a part of the elaboration of slow^ to hear," albeit us "the transition lo that theme" ( i b d , 112; rf. 108 9). So also Fahris, who consequently considers rhe author's use of thc strong conjunction St6 to be somewhat less than appropiate: "I1 vrrso 21 prcscnm u n a nuova esig-enza, come conse~pguenza,616; di qucllo che prccede. anche se il nesso causalc con il verso 20 scmbra spropordonato" (hgee. 56).
140
CHAFER
FOUR
For human anger (Apyil) does not \vork G o d s rightcousncss. Tilerefore, semng aside all filth and e\il excess (nep~aaeiavK U K ~ U ~receive )," ~6th humility ihe implanted 1qg-o.r (rbv Ep~u.iov)rbyov) which is ablc to s a ~ c your souls (190-2 l).lb 'This logos, howevcr, also receives emphasis in t h e immediately suhsequenL elaboration of the admonition's first elcrncnt: "quick to hear" (.ra;lbq ~ i ~b 5 &roGoat), which consists of a contrast bctwccn t w o q p e s of "hearer" (irrpoadlq) o f the logos: And (66)" become ln80~-docrs and not merely hearers who deceive themselves. For if someone is a lnzo~-hearerand not a doer, this one is like a man who looks at the face or his birth in a mirror; for h c looks at himself a n d departs, and immediately rorscls whal son hc is (bxoia~qv)."' But the onc who looks into the peri'ect law which is of rreedom a n d remairis becomes not a forgetful hearer but a deed-doer; this one will he blessed in his or her doing (122--25).
The expression "logos-doer" w i t h this sense, as m e n t i o n e d above, is a scmitism, and such a pairing of "hcaring" a n d "doing" is i n fact c o m m o n i n Jewish a n d Christian ethical instruction. I n this instance, t h e n e e d to "bccomc logos-docrs a n d n o t merely hearcrs" is explained b y likening the latter *e of h e a r c r t o o n e w h o looks i n t o a mirror, a n d contrasting his o r her behavior i n this respect to that w h i c h is typical o f t h c
'j Cf Johnson, I ~ l l r r $Jam, 201: "excess of evil"; Ropcs, Sf.j'mner, 171: "'cxrrpscent wickedness', 'supcduity of naughtinesss'; Dibelius, Jam% "profuse wickedness"; NRSV: "rank growth of wickedness." On the options for translating irepiaaeia in particular see csp. Mayor, EflirIleuiS1. J a m ? , 67-68. 1 take the phrdsc nep~ooeiav rariag as a genitive of quality on the model of drxpoa& izihqopaviq (Jas 1:25), rpt.iai S ~ a h a y ~ a pnovqpiuv i,~ (2:4) and, perhaps, 6 ic60pog r f ~drSxiag (3:6),& rrpau~ ~ a olq in a ~(5:13) and $ dfi re5 rria~eog(515); see funher BDF $165. In this casc: desi,iru~-which, as w e shall sspe, i s the opposite or logos, which is associalcd with impurity (d: 121, bunapia) in 4:8 (in contrast to "humilily"!) and elsewhere; and which is linked with [?&I rardr in l:13-would he thought oC in [ e m s of an "cxcess" or "rank growth." Cf. in this respect esp. 4 Macc 1:29; also AC 6.23.2; further Inwood, Ethic1 and Human Aclion in Ear& SloiLim, ch. 3, esp. 155-73. '" On iv zpa6.nlr~us modifying 6i
LOCOS AW THF l h M T OF FWEDOI\I
141
James's mirror metaphor has bccn subject to a number of different, and often very exacting, interprct;ltions." It has bccn argued variously that he intends to liken the la\\- to a mirror," to set up a contrast between thc la\+-and a mirror," or that he intcnds no such comparison or contrast at In addition, great significance is often attached to the use of difkrcnt verbs or "sccing" in 1:23-24 (~aravoiw)and 1:25 (liapadlirw) in the senice of one or another or thcsc interpretations." The least likely by rar of the three seneral positions regarding the relationship between thc law and the mirror is that which finds a contrast between them. It is clear from the elaboration as a M-hoic that the selS-dcccption characteristic of the "mere hcarcrs" (122) lies not in their attention to some deficient logos, but in their overestimation of "hearing," and subseclucnt failure to respond appropriately to, the ltqos which "saves souls" (cf. 1:21). That is to say, the distinction bet\veen the "mere hcarer" and the "doer" lics not in the object of, but rather in thc actions subsequent to, their respectivc "hearing." Thus the self-deception: the Sorrncr does indeed "hear" that "which is able to savc souls," but "blessedness" consists in "doiq" (lio~+sq),not mcscly "hea~ing."'"?'he sudden (and subtle) injection
rxclusivivc drvfip for the purposes af this simile (1:23). &v$p was perhaps choscn over biv8pwrro< For the sake of a vivid illustration: cf howcvcr the use of &v$p also in 1:8; 12 and 3:2. "' See alrcady the critical comments of Dibelius on this matter in Jarne.~, 115. Thc most rrcent and, to my knc,wledge, most cxlensivr treiltment is that of L. 'T. Johnson, "'lhe mirror oTRememhrance (Jamcs 1:22-25)," CBQ5O (1988) 632-45. So, e.S.; mayor, St. James, 72; Johnson, "Mirror." So also apparently lbpcs: who obsemes that l'hilo, in El. Cont. 10 578, "compares the law (6 vobo8enia) to a mirmr Tor the rational soul (6 hoyucil WX$), in a manner which rccdls Jamrs's figure" (St. Jamei, 176). Ropcs, ho\yever, does not interpret the implanted luxox as human rcason; his point, upparcndy, is rather that hod, writers consider the la\\, lo be a mirror o r the soul. So I.aws, Ejistlr o/j'ameq 85-86. '3 SO Dibelius, ,Tamer, 1 15; Blackman, Eoirtle o/,7anres. 64. "'Thus Laws, &ho argues that thc author intcnds to srt up a contrast betwrcn the i0go.s and a mirror, suggcsls that rrapamjmw suggcsts a mere gllancc wllile ica~avoho SUgECSls a more careful consideradon; the author thus implies that just a quick look in the logox is suficient, while cven closc study of thc image in the fir infciior literal mirror is Futile (Eppiitle oiJainmei, 86). It is indicativc o r the conrusion surrounding the meaning oC this simile that Johnson, who argues that lhc author intcnds lo like11 the lo~osto a mirror, argues precisely thc opposite: that napamjrr~wsusgcsts a more stcady '*re" r+,l~ilemrravoio crlnnores a more transitory "noticing" or ''fleeting glance"! See Johnson; Letter oJJames, 207 9. On thc signilicance of the usc 01these different terms. see below, note 30. '"Cf Dibclius, ,7ornes; 114: "Merely hcaring is equiualcnt la seltldcception so lonx as one h~:licues that even then the \vord can still 'save'."
"
"'
142
CHAPTER FOUR
of a distinction between thc objects of thc rcspcctive hearers' attcntion would only sewc to distract one from what is clearly the root issue: thc implanted logos os\-hich is "able to save your souls" must not only be "heard," but "done" as \z-ell. On the other hand, it is quite possible: indccd probable, that thc simile implies that the author understood thc law to function in some sense as a mirror.'Yhis 1%-ouldin fact be consistent with the use of mirror imagery by Greco-Roman moralists, as Johnson has sho\\~n,'' whilc Dibclius's vicw that the mirror appears in this passage mcrcly as a result of a popular correspondence between mirrors and forgetting finds litde support in the ancient literature." Nonetheless, h e remarkable divergence in the interpretation of this passage resulls precisely from the fact that this particular comparison is in any case not pursued. Rather, the only comparison that is explicit in the text is that drawn between the logos-hearer who is not also a doer and one who looks into a mirror. Thc comparison itself, morcovcr, is formulated specifically on the basis of thrcc actions shared by these two cypes: the mere hearer is like a man w-ho looks at his face in a mirror inasmuch as (s)hc too [i] looks at him/hcrseK, [i] depal~s,
' V o t e in this cast the peculiar use of the phrase ~b iip6oonov f i g ywioeog aCroC lo describe that which is seen in the mirror. Assuming such a comparison is at ~ simply connote the "natural" face seen in a mirror (as work, q~Y N ~ O E O might o p p o s ~ dto thc psychic reality reflected in the law of freedom]; so, e.g., ,Johnson, "Mirror of Rernhrance," fi34. However, given the author's notion that "God p v c birth (drrrenjllam) to us" by means of logos a birih which hc has jusr mtntioned in 1:18 -it might be taken morc literally as "the face of onc's birth," and thus ar an allusion to the Cact that the law reflects the l p i that was was involvcd in "our" birth. Cf. in this rcspect Hort, Epiille of St. Jm:39: "The y f \ l ~ o ~is< his birth slrictly, in antirhcsis to his iatcr deg-encracy; hut the Fnce is the invisible face, the reflcxion of God's image in humanity"; cf. Sidebottom, Jarus, Jude and 2 Pelpr, 35. Note also in this conncction Jas 3:9: rob< drvOpSrroug zoLg r a g ' b p o i o a ~ vOeoC yqov6ra<. If this is in fact the c a e , then bnoiog qv (Jas 124) would most likcly refer to the nature of thc human being as h o p i ; cf. in this casa AC 7.39.2: "Let him [sc. the one who is to be traptized] Learn the order of a distinguished creation, the sequencc of providence.. . why the world came to bc and why man was appointed a world citizen. Let him understand his own nature, or what sort it is (firty~voarf.rom)v Eau~oiigGotv: oYa irg hnbp~er)";see further on this yassage p 1 18, above. Note also in this conncction Philo; Vzt. Cont. 78, where the law ($ vapoOeoiaj is said to represent a mirror for the rational soul fi boy+ yunijl. Sce Johnson, "IVlirror," 636-41. "' C t Dihelius, jlmes; 11.5 with n. 115. Ludwig ar.gues that the tlicrne of "hrgethlness" in connection with thc la^; is to hc understood in light of the Jewish literature in particular (Lfiwt ak Gerrtz, 168 4 9 ) .
"
LOCOS .bw THE ~1~OF F R E ~ O ~ I
143
and [iii] immediately forgets what (s)he has sccn (1:24).'!' Wlcthcr or not the use of a verb or "looking in 1:25 implies a continuation of the mirror s i m i l e a n d thus a further, if only implicit: likening of the hearer \*.ha is a "doer," too, to one ~v-llolooks into a mirror-~~ it is precisely these three actions which protide the basis for ihc comparison that is the chief concern of ihe passage: that of ihe "mere hearcr" and the "doer." The looking, departing:. and Jqethng of the mere hearer (1:24) arc inevitably to be compared with the lookingng remaining, and not forgetti% of the doer (1:25).'" 'Shough that which one has "heard" and not forsotten in 1:25 is understood to be that which \$-as "seen" in the "perrect la\\- of rrccdom," the elaboration as a whole, as pointed out above, assumes that both types or "hearer" in fact "hcar" ihc same logos. The crucial difference between the "mere hcarer" and the "hearcr" who is also a "doer" lies in their actions subsequent to "hearing," not in the object of their perception. The force of the comparison thus indicates that "hearing ihc logos" and "looking into the perfect law of freedom" are equivalent actions. Indeed, it is through constant attention to the perfect law of freedom that one becomes a "logos-doer."" 11s has been recognized by the majority of James's interpreters, "'"o tet csp. the use ofybp in 1:24 the mrrc hearer "is likc a man looking at rhc kce of his binh [or: naturai fare] in a mirrur. /or hr l o o k at himscli and deparls and imrncdiately forgets . . ." (I translate all irf the verbspcrliict and aorist~ o l 1:21 wirh the prescnt a n the understanding that thcy dl lunction cssei~ciallyas gnomic: aorists; see BDF 9344; cf. hlullner, Der7aliobluhlieJ; 105 n. 8. Ropcs's virw that the perliect dmeAfiAu0m is used "becausr of reference lo a lasting state" /see St. Jmec 176-771 seems ro mc weak in light of the fact that thc real "lasting state" with which the author is concerned is that of fi,rgctfulness. 'Shc perfect is perhaps uscd above dl for the sake or euphony [cT. drireAfiAu0~vwith hneA&0erol>as Uibclius sug~csls[,Jams, 115 n. 411.) In liact, the usc of a verh of "looking" ar the beginning of 1:25 may be intcndcd abovc ail to makc the corn~arisonin tcrms o l chis series of rhrec aclioirs all thc rnorr explicit; cC the somewhat different vicw or Dihelius. Jamjame~, I 16. It sllould also he notrd; however, tlrat thc "law of reedo om" is in fact a written law (scc on this point below), and to this cxtent the use of a vcrb of "looking" is quite natural. In rhis connection, I find quite interesting a suggcsrion made hy H. D. Bet/, in a seminar onJames at tllc University or Chicug~,,that rrapamirrrw (lit.; "stoop," "bend ovci') ,nigh1 sug;grst a rcading posturc. One shouid not in airy casc, witii,Jolinson, sec in n a p a m i i i r w a ionhmt with rcrravohw: the latter docs no1 generally connote a "hilsty glanre" hut. on thr o , n i r q ; "rontemplation" or considered rellection; scc the entrics ror lcaravohw i n RAGD and 1,SJ. " In 1:25, the ideal typc is described as a riouli$< ~?pyov;bur clearly no1 i n dis~iiiction a, thc "h,~ordoer." 0 1 1 thr rclation of "doing" IoLT,.~ to "doing" :pya, scr Chapter F i x ; under thr licadirrg ''l~,~qo.r and hr~a."
"
144
CHAPTER FOUR
rcgardlcss of their divergent intcrprctations of the relationship assumed to exist hcisvccn the logos and the mirror, thc casc with which the author moves from logos to la>\-in 1:21-25 indicates that "implanted logo?' and "pedect la\\- of frcedom" arc functionally cquident tcrms." As has been argued at lcngth in the prexlous two chapters, this equation of implantcd logos and law is rooted in Stoic philosophy. IVMe James, dcspite thc interpretations of Thcophylactus, Occumenius and Dionysius bar Salibi, makes no mention of anything analogous to implanted prcconceptions in this conncction, the similarity of his equation of law and E ~ q u ~ o%yo5 g to Cicero's definition or natural law in terms of ratio in&, the association of human rcason with an E~qupurogv6pog in the Apostolic Constitutions, the relationship bchvccn natural law and an Bpqmpu.ro5mop&70% X6you assumed by Justin Martyr, and the Epqv~ogq u ~ u ~ v6po5 b g of Methodius, can scarcely be dismissed as mcrc coincidence. James has not, alone among thesc authors, rormulated this cquation entirely apart rrom Stoic influcncc. Thc undcrstanding of law in thc Letter of James, as in thcse diverse works, has been inrormed by the Stoic theory of natural law. Jamcs's peculiarly lavish description of the law as onc that is both "perfect" and "of frccdom" is striking in this conncction.'" Onc finds limited analogies for thcsc individual epithets in other ancicnt litcraturc, hut their combination hcre is extraordinary, and creates a quite emphatic effcct." Both, morcovcr, arc bcst understood in light of the correlation of this law with b Epqupuro5 h6yo5.
" In fact; many authors speak in t c m s of identity in this connection: sce, e.g., Kiihl: LXe Stellung der Jokobub7ieJ1, 18-26; Ropes, St j'ame~, 173; Dibelius, J m r s , 116; Blackman, Epictle &james, 67; MuRncr; Der Jhbuihriei; 107; Fabris, Lem, 154 , de Saint ,7acques, 65; Ludwig, Wort all and pmim; Martin, .james, 51; V o u ~ L'Epftw Ge~ttz,18 and pasim; Klein, Ein i,ollkommene~ Werk, 135-14. 152 53; 'Ksyji, Glaube. 108 10. Others are morc reticcnt in this respect, but posit a "cry close reladon between the law of frccdorn and the implanted logor nonellielcss. See, e.g., Cadoux, 'The Though OJ St. Jomer, 74-76; Laws, Epiille "/Jamex, 79; Hoppr, f i r U~olo~~.rche H i n t m p n 4 94-95; Johnson, Ixtter of Jamex, 214. hIy aim view is closer lo these latter authors: thc 'iprrfcct law or freedom" represents a written expression of the implanted iogoi; while the two are thus functionally equivalent, they arc not; strictly speaking; identical. See Funher on this below. " Jas 1 :25; v6bov rChetov tbv ~ $ fh~u0epiu~; 5 cf: 2 1 % v6bog fku8epia5. " For a su~gestionregarding h e rhetorical context in which James's emphatic glorification of the law is to be undcntood, see the conduding clraprcr of this study.
LOCOS AND THZ LAM' OF FRF.F.OOhl
The Law
145
oJ Freedom
-4s has often bccn pointed out, thc conccm for "freedom," both in
itself and in connection with law, are characteristically Greek, and typical of the Stoics in particular, whose paradox that "only the sage is free" was well known in antiquity." Fabris \%-aswell awarc of thc Greek and cspccially Stoic precedents for Jamcs's association of lax\and Gecdom.'" Nonethclcss, on thc basis of thc prcscncc or clearly Jewish and Christian traditions in the contcxt in 1%-hich the expl-cssion "law of freedom" is found in James, hc concluded that it was neccssary to explain the expression entircly without rccounc to thc Grcck sources." The logic of this conclusion, howcvcr, is quite problematic. As has been pointed out in our discussion of the implanted lopos itself: such an interpretation fails to account lor thc possihiity that thc thousht of ,James, likc that of many other Christian authors of his period, represents a fusion of Hellenistic, Jcwish and Christian concepts. Fabris's attcmpt to explain the rcpcated usc of the expression "law of frccdom" in Jamcs "on the basis or some supposedly pure OT and Jewish background" is not persuasive in any casc."'The primary "freedom" treated in the Hebrew scripturcs is that social statc
"> For a discussion of the development oT the Grcek concept o f frecdom, see M. Pohlenz, F~eedomin Getk I$ md l h q h t : n 2 a IfZrtqv ofnn Idrd(Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel; New York: The Humanities Press, 1966); H. Schlier, "&GBepog, xrh.," l D A T 2.487-96; H. D. Betz, I'ouli Concept ?f Freedom in the Conlexl of H e l h i r & niscurrionr about the I'o.csibilil7ei of Human F~eedom(Protocol of thc 26th Colloquy of
the Ccnter Tor Hermcneutical Studies in Ilellenistic and Modem Culture; Berkeley: The Center Tor Herrneneuticd Studies in Hellenistic and Modem Culture, 1977); F. S. Joncs, "Freedom," AHL) 2.855-59. For the Stoic interest in and undcrstanding of freedom, sce esp. Diog. Laert. 7.121 and 7.32-33; Ciccro, Paradoxo St<,k,icomm 5; Epictetus, firs. 4.1; Philo, hey Good Man ii Free; further Schlier, " i h ~ 6 ~ e ~ o g , " 493 96; and Dihelius, James, 116-17. Fabris, Idgee 3 3 ~ 1 2 . a i See ch. 3 of Fabris, Legee, and esp. p. HI: "E precisamentc questo carattere biblico c giudaico del cuntesto delle formule di Giacomo che esclude I'ambiente g e c o c stoico come matricc delle nozioni di Giaromo." Fabris leaves himsclf some flexibility rvhcn he goes on to asscn that thc "somigliimzc esterne" between ihe Ianwage ofJamcs and thc G r e ~ ksources w,ouid allow at most the hpothesis that the author of,James has infused Greek terminolo~gwith an entin:ly ncw meaning-. His openncss to this possihiity is somewhat puzzling inasmuch as hc elsewhere rndkcs the rncthodologiral point that a determination of the origin of an expression is decisive for its interpretation (see: e.g., ixgre; 13, 32). Hc does not in any case seem to take this possibility seriously, ar it is not discussed funher. See firthcr on Fabris above, Chilptcr One. "',Jones; "l~rcedom,"858; cxpliciily a~ainstFabris.
'"
opposed to literal slavery:'!' and the use of the term iheu0epia and its cognates in the LXX;"' as \\-ell as the usage in later Jewish literature:' is largely consistent in this respect. It is not likely accidental, therefore, that one b e ~ n sto find a clcar and explicit interest in frcedom as an abstract value in Jewish thought only- from the Hasmonean and early Roman periods: in 1 and 2 Maccabees;" in the writings of l'hilo and Joscph~s;~%nthe coins minted during the revolts Srom Rome;" perhaps in the eschatological expectations oS 4
'VCf thc rommcnts of Joncs; "Fn:cdorn;" 855. nearly always uscd in thc E X with rcfcrence to a social sraie of individuals, whether with reference to nohility (e.g., I Kgdrns li:2.5; 3 Kgdms 20:8, 1I; 2 Esdr 23:l i ) or; most often, in opposition to literal sl2rvel). (e.g._ Exod 212. 5, 26, 27; Le\, 19:20 Dcut 15:12, 13, 18; 21:11). It is telling iri this connection that, in contrast to the usual Format ibr rnrrics in 77lhT7Schlicr's arucle on L-h~60epa<, rrh. does not even include a section on the Jewish litcralure; scc ~ D J ' I
'"ihev8epio. is
2.4877502. '' A:M. Ucnis, Concordance Crccquc des Psriidipipphei d'ilncim Terhmmt (Louvainla-Neuve: Univcrsiti catholique de Lauvain, 1987) contains only twelve entries ibr cognates ot.&u8epia, sevcn of which occur in the Tt.shmmli of lhe Twelve Polnarchi; three in thr l d t r ofAriilcoJ, and one each in the Tt.shrnml "/Abraham (Recension A) and d ~ eApoca&p.re rf Sed~oct~. Again, the majority of thesc occur in connection xridl the social institution of slavcly or literal captivity ( 7 Jud 21:i; % ,"/aph. 1:1& % Joz. 1 5 ; 13:h; 141; % Abr A 197; Ej. A d 27; 37); thou& cf thc use of h h 8 i p t o S in Ep. Aisl. 246. O n % Jud 4.3, see the immediately fi,llowing note;
LOGOS 4\10 THE LAW OF FKEEDO~I
147
Ez1.a and thc Te,itaments g t h e Tiilelz!e Palriarchs;'%nd, finall!;: in a few passagcs from the rabbinic literaturc."' Fahris's conclusion chat "[ill rapport0 tra leggc c liheni non i. . . . un fatto isolato nell'ambicntc hihlico c giudaico, ma una struttura portank" based on thc myth of thc Exodus is in any case considerahl?-
Simon bar Kosibil, I'rincc of Israel," Kancl sug~cstst h a ~"ihc majorin- oTthe Rabbis opposed the claim of Simon to he sn-icd 'Prince of Ism$' . . . as n.~:llas the =sumption hcld by Rabbi Akiba that Simon >*.as thu redeemer of lsract therrfore in ihc second yaar of the revolt rhe tcrminolom con tlrc coins was changed ro claim only political frcedom' (ibid. 62). A similar inrrrprctauon is otfcrcd by Y. Meshorer; Anci"L1 ,7r&ih C i i k q e . T701. I I H m d lhe Grml reattirmugh Bar Cochba ( l h x Hills, P I ' .Amphora, 1982) 122 23; 150-52. If such a linc of argument as these authors propose is in fact corrrct, it lclls quite stn,ngl,- against k'ilhris's contention that "Treedom" and divine redemprion go hand in h e hand in ancicnt Jewish thought! 'See 7 B ~ L10:s . (b) which, however, is dearly fiom a Chrislian hand: "and the l a r d will first of all judgc Israel for thcir \rrongs toward him, Tor they did not believe God arrived in Hesh [as] liberator" ( k t n a p a ~ ~ v & p w esbv o v fv o a p r i & ~ u 8 ~ p o r f iOGK v f n i o ~ ~ u o a vriled ) ; according to Af. de Jonge; at ai., 'The 'leilonmk o f l/te Tweloelue I'ohin~c/u: A Crilicol Edition OJthe Greek ?ex1 ( P W G I; Lcidcn: Brill, 1978). R. H. Charles bracketed the entire clause as an inlerpoladon, and lhc kcy trrm f h ~ u 8 ~ ~ w rwhich j v , apparently occurs only in ms. 11; was placed in thc marsin oT his critical edition; scc 'The G e e k Vc.siiim " f l l z Trrlornenli oflhe Twelue Pommarchr. Edztedfiom Nine ..ISS iqpelhe~with the VarianLr of I/* Armenian md Slmonic Verdons and Sane Hehra, F r ~ r n m I(repr. ~ ed.; Oxford: Oxfbrd Univrrsily Prrss; HHicsheim: Georg Olms V e r l a g s b u c h h n g 1960) 229. H. C. Kee, who generally fbllows the edition or Charlrs, omits the clause altogether ("Testaments or the Twclvr Patriarchs," Vff1.828). CT also 4 Ezra 13:25-26, where it is said ~ i l h e rthat the hlcssiah (so thr Latin), or God through the Messiah (so most versions; cf. 13:29), "will liberate his [sc. God's] creation" (liberabit ~reoturomruarr~). This is echoed in 1329, with God as its subject even in ihc Latin, and with human beings in particular m its oljecl: "Behold, the days are coming when the Most High will bc@n to deliver those who are on the carth (pando innpiel Allirizir~us l i b m eos yui s u p c h a m runO;' (the translation is bascd on that of M. E. Stone, Fou~thEzra. A Cornmcntuy on Uie Book ojFuurth Ezra [Hermcneia; Minneapolis: Forkess, 19901 392; 1 cite thc Lalin text as found in A. F. J. Klijn, Der lafanische Text der Apohbpxe des Ena [TU 131; Berlin: Akademie V e r l a ~ ,19831). See further 7:96 98, wherc those who havc "kcpl ihe ways of the Most H i ~ h , "after their death but berore they reach their final hcavenly destination, will "see the straits and great toil from which they have been delivered (akwsturn el plenum quo liberali runt), and thr spaciousness (spalzosum) which lhey arc to r r r ~ i v rand enjoy in immortality" (the translation is again based on Stone. 4 E z m , 237). Stone ~ o i n t sout that this passag-e is to be understood in light of the discussion of the "narrow road" which lcads la the inharitance in 4 Ezra 7:3-13 (did., 244); thal is; what they arc "delivercd" or "liberattrd'; fiom is the excecdimgly diff~cultjourney toward Israel's "porlion." Cf: further 4 Ezra 7:IOI. Note too, tinally, Ajoc. Sedr. 8:12 (= 8:10 in S. Agourides, ".4pocaIypsc or Sedrach," Vff1.611)~wherc thu scer requests God to "frec the human being &om punishmcnt" ( U ~ u 8 h ~ o o orbv v i i ~ 8 ~ m o&v rblraa~v),i.c., esp. eschatok~gicdpunishmciit; the Greek tcxt is cilcd according to 0. \Valil. Apocn~psis.';sdroe. rlpoca~#.ri~ Sedrach. K i o Beah E i d m (PVTG 41 1.eiduri: B~ill; 1977). '" Scc Fabris; Ixge, 84 ~ 1 0 3 ,113-21, 130 31.
<+
148
CFL4PlXK FOUR
o~crdraw.n.~' i\s Joncs has pointed out; "[tlhough the rcdcrnption of Isracl from slavcry- in Egypt is citcd in support for the manumission of Hebrew slaves in thc 7th year (Dcut l5:l5), the OT docs not develop a theology of freedom on thc basis of thc Exodus."'" In fact, the interpretation of the Exodus under the rubric of "freedom" is first e\idcnt in thc writings of Philo and Josephus.'"n any event, xrhilc the association of law and freedom (or disobedience and slaver)) is occasionally made in the rabbinic litcraturc,"" a direct link bctwccn the h . 0 in a manner comparable to James's "la><-of freedom" is rarely found elscwhcrc in thc Jewish sources." T o bc surc: given the combination of thc Grcck interest in Geedom and thc dynamics of covenautal thought, the ingredients for the formulation of a direct conneclion bctwcen obedience io thc law and frcedom were in placc by the hellenistic pcriod; howcvcr, thcrc is Iittlc ex.1dencc to support thc thesis that this was a widespread Jewish scntiment---kt alone one that cmcrgcd entirely apart rrom Greek influence."' It is thcrcforc striking that Philo and thc author of 4 Maccabees, each of whom am clearly indcbied to the Stoic understanding of law,
'' Ida#, 113. Cf: the similar judgment resarding Ekbris in Klein, Ein invlLtiirnmenes Werk, 140 n. 120. Note that evcn with respect to the key evidence provided by the interpretation a[ F.xod 3 2 1 6 (according to which nnn j"enpavcd'] is $"en ~ h c alternative vocalization nnn ~freedom'l);the rabbis disagreed r e p d i n g the si,qtilicance 01the "Treedom" in question, i.e., whether i t was hcst undcntood with relcrcncc to the exile, the arlgcl 01death, or s a t i n g ; see L e p , 84. Ivloreover, thc inrcrprelation of this passagc in m. Xuol 6:2 has no clear connection to the Exodus myth, md sccms, in F.dr.t, to tenvision an individual rather than a corporate fieedom; cl. Jones; "Frc:reedom," 856; who describes this passag-e as "[mluch closer to the Stoic u n d a n t a n d i n ~a[ (internal) fieedom." "Jones, "Freedom," 855; pcrhaps with a n eye to Fabris: cT hae:37-98. Ig Scc above note 43. Sce Fabris, I ~ g e ,84 103, and Further 113 21. Scc also, howcver: note 47 above. :' Certainly, givcn thc circumstances in which thc blaccabean revolt arose, the desired "freedom" w a largely that Lo live and worship in accord with Jewish law; see; e.g., 2 Macc 2:22; r f 1 hlacc 2:6-13; I5:i. 'Ihis, however. is quite different rrom the nodon that the la\*. itscll guarantees freedom. Johnson a r p c s that "the idea [apparently, "that obedience to Lhc law renders a punon Cree"] is vides spread enough . . . to make any direct dcpcndcnce on Stoic idcas [on thc part of the author ofJames1 unnecessary" (hlb
"
LOCOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOA~
149
both explicitly associate the law with frecdom.'Vor thc Stoics, i h ~ v 8 ~ p was i a defined in tcrms or "living as one ~ishcs:""' xrhich is to say, to he subject neither to hindrance (~whijout)nor compulsion [&vvay~&~a~)," and thus, in a word, to bc the sole mastcr of ones e P GSuch frccdom is impossible if onc longs for things ivhich are not cntirely under his or her o1m control, because one thcrcby rcndcrs oneself subject to hindrance or compulsion." If, on the other hand, one conforms one's will and aims entirely to thosc or God: e\~erylhing\\-ill of necessity happen as onc wishes; therefore, onc \\-ill by dcfinition be free. Thus Epictetus: But 1 have ncvcr been hindcrcd (hroh68qv) in the exercise of my will; nor have 1 ever been been subjected to compulsion (ilvay&o&v) against my \ill. And how is h i s possible? I have submitted my impulse (&o$ mjv bpptv)"' unto God. . . I-Ic wills h a t I should choose (oppiiirv) something; it is my will too. Hc wills that I should aim for jbp&yso8a~)"" something. it is my \ill too. Hc wills that 1 should gct something, it is my wish too. He does not will it; I do not wish itFo True frccdom, therefore, "is not acquired by satisfying yourself with what you desire, but by destroying your desire" ( 0 6 . .. i ~ ~ h q p h o ~ ~ .rGv i ~ t 0 v ~ o v ~ i v. w . .v&hhh & V ~ ~ K E U6jq ? i~t0vpiaq)."Indeed, desire and the other passions are h e ultimate source of the soul's slavery. In the words of Phiio, "if the soul is driven by desire (iat0vpiaq), or enticcd by pleasure (ilFov+5), or diverted from its course by rear Cf. the discussion of these work by Fahris; LL,ge, 37-42. Epictrtus, Di,:,. 4.1.1: &Xr68cp6ictetus,J h . 4.1.175.
(~6Pcp),or shrunken by- grief ( X G q ) : o r hclplcss in thc , ~ pof anger j b p f i ~ ) , it cnslaves itself and makes him whosc soul it is a slave to a host of masters.""' Freedom consists, rather, in obcdiencc to God.'> SpccificaUy, says Philo; this entails li\ing in accord with "right reason," the true dix4ne law:
just as tvith cities, those which lie under an oligarchy or tyranny suffer enslavement, becausc they have crucl and sevcrc mastcrs, who keep them in subjection under their slv-a?, while those which have laws to care for and protcct them arc free: so; tool with mcn. Those in whom anger ( 6 p ~ or ) desire (hnt8upia) or any other passion (TI Eihho a(r805), or; again: any insidious vice ( ~ a ~ iholds a ) sway; are entircly enslaved, whilc all whose life is replated by la>.\;are free (6001 G i ~ E T &v6pou < 6 o ~ vh;6 8 e p o r ) . And right reason is an infillible law (v6po5 6h &yrn6$5 b 6pfJb5 %yo<) engraved . . . by immoral nature on the immo~lalmind, never to perish. So, one may well wonder at the shorr-sightedncss of those who. . . deny that right rcason, which is the lountainhcad of all other law, can impart frecdom to the wise, who obey dl that it prcscribes or forbids."' Thus, too, can the author of 4 Maccabeer cxtol the reasoning faculties ( h o y t o ~ o i )of the seven brothers as "freest of the Cree" (6h~vOkpov kX&v8epoi.ra.rot) in light of their ability to overcomc their passions and remain faithful to the law, despite thc torturcs of hntiochus Epiphancs." T o be sure, the fact that James shows no interest in "freedom" apart from his obvious desire to associate it with law prohibits onc from drawing any dccisivc conclusions regarding his understanding of the concept, o r evcn how-, precisely, he conceived of its relation to law."' O n the other hand, that hc describes as v6bo5 k h ~ v 8 e p i a g --
"'Philo; h o d Onin. b o b . Lib.
159; cT 17-18; see further Cicero, Pa~adoxicaStoicomni 5; pasin. ":' CT Seneca, De Vzta Beafa 15.7: dro parere liherm r ~ l ;Curther Epictaus, Dir,. 4.1.91-1 LO. " Philo here &der to the associaton oTlaw and freedom round in Greek political thought: see on this Schlier, "3.&0epog;" 488-92. "'Philo, (Luod Omn. Bob. Iib. 45-47 (with a clear allusion to the Stoic defmition oC law); d: 62. Sce &YO Epictetus, a . 7 . 4.1.158, where Diogenes is said to he kee bccause hc did not consider his body to be his own; because hc needed nothing (o66fv Siopar), and becausc "the law- (b v6pog), and nothing clse, is evulything" to him. "V Mace 14:Z; cT in this respect Philo's discussion of Zeno the Elcatic and Anaxarchus (sce above note 57); and further Epicictus; Iliss. 1.1.90, 172. On the pardcl use of the phrase pao~hlov~ a a i h ~ r & e pino this ~ connection in 4 iWuccahees. scc immediately below. " Conversely, thc author speaks of "slavcn." only in a posiiivc sense. when describing himsclf (or his litcraq, persona) as 8eoC lcai icupiou 'IllooG X~p~oroG Soiihag (Jas 1:l). Presumably; hu understancls such slave^" Lo he anything but opposcd to Eh~uOepia.
LOCOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
151
precisely that law which he equates with thc implantcd logos is scarcely coincidental,"%nd is at the vcr); least suggestiv-e of his understanding of the tcrm. In fact, thc logos of James, as we shall see in the follolring chapter, functions abovc all in opposition to dcsirc ( ~ n t 0 u ~ i a j and the pleasurcs (ai$8ovai); indccd, James's admonitior~sto "receix-en thc implantcd logos arid to bccome a "logos-doer'' b>- ,$ving constant attention to the "law of frcedom" come on the heels of an a r ~ q mcnt that human individuals: not God, are rcsponsiblc for temptation, and is couplcd, further, with a chargc to la); asidc all vice ( ~ a ~ i a jand , " anger (hpyil) in particular."' TYhat is clear in any case is that the author is obviously eager to associate the law with "freedom"; and his equation of it with "the implantcd logos" is a movc that immediately \>-arrants this association."
'"
So also the lihmklii hx of Trrnacus (A. 11 4.34.4) which, though identifcd with "thc word or God, prra<:hed by the aposiics," includcs thc "iralural precepts" which \liere ah kilio in&. . . horniniblu; these, according to Irenacus, were given to Israel in the kmn of die decaIo,pc, and brought to fulfillment by Christ (A. (1 4.15.1; see further 4.16). Note also the connecrion assurned betwrcn frrcdorn ancl rationality in, e.g., A. H. 1.1.3;c t 4.2.4. At thr samc time, however; the "freedom" which is characterisiic of this "law" is opposed to the "slavery" which characterizes l l ~ eremainder ofJcrvish Iiacv (e.g.; -4. EL 4.9.1-2; 4.23.4), which was imposed, at l<:as~ in pan. as a result of Israel's proclivities toward idolatry (A. H 4.14 15); this poicmicai use of thp conccpl o l "tieedom" is somewhat reminiscent of Gal 421-5:l. See further on Irena<:us's notion of natural law W. R. Schoedel, "'lbc Appral to Nature in Graeco-Roman and Early Christian 'I'houghl" (Ph. D. diss.; University of Chicago, 1963) 435-43. Note in this conncclion Davids's fi,mulation of the problem of the "law oC freedom" in James: ". . . unlcss one finds specific Stoic concepts (such as natural law or pasionless life) [in James] il is morc likciy that hr Lsc. lhc author of Jamc;i is still within a Jewish Christian world" (Ejislh qf,j'arnr.s, 99). In fact? the author of ,James not only draws on the Stoic equation of law and Bpcpurog %yo<, hut undcrstands this h6yog to function abovc all in opposition to inrrlhpia and ai i6ovai; on this latter point: sce Chapter Fivc. \4'hatcvcr thr casr, llavids's assumption of a sharp dichotomy bct\%,centhe concept of h:cdom in th? 'yewish Clrislian world" and in Gicek thought is prohlrmutic. ',n On the meaning oflcaria herc, see the remarks oS,Johnson, isffe7 qfJamei, 201. Cf. in this resprct Philo, Quod Omn. Prob. Lib. 45 17, cited abovr. (On the relation oS,Jas 121 to 1:20 and 1: 13-18, see belo~r.)CT lile comment of Rcidie, 77ze fi:pislla ,[Jamex, Pay, ondj-ude, 23-24: "[The expression 'law of libeny'] may have hcen inspircd by the Stoic: ideal of Srccdom, according to \vhicli men ought to strive fir indcpcndence f.rom cvcr). passion of the soul, such as anger; fear, etr. I'rcedom of this kind is of int~resthere sincr in vss. 19 2 1 the author adn~onishes his readers to shun wralh and all cbil passions." It is of coiirrc possible that thr aullror's intcrcst in "freedom" works on inoir than onc Level; cl: in this respcct Ircnacus's libe7lntis Irx and above note 6il. This possihlily is at least implicitly rccognizrd, fir examplr; by Dibelius, who intrrprets James's "labr of freedom" in ligh~or both S~oicconrcpts and a supposed fic<:dorn iiom "the hurdcn of ritualism" on the pan of Chrisiians \\.ho ibund, in the leaching
'"
"
Similarly, whir a certain analogy for James's description of his law as "perfect" is found in LXX Ps 18:s (b v6p05 TOG ~upiou&pw!~05)," the epithet &hc~og,too, is best understood in light of thc equation of thc law with the implanted logos.'The apologetic comparison with other (imperfect) laws which this description implies is characteristic of ancient treatments of natural lax+-. Zeno himself, in his Republic, had cnxisioned a statc in ~ ~ h i cthe h diffcrcnt local systems of justice (iFiot5 Sucaio~~) wcre replaced by the ~ o t v vbp05.'~ b~ Similarly, Philo contrasts "right rcason" with thc laws of Solon and Lycurgus: it is "engravcd not by this mortal or that and, d~ereforc:perishable as hc, nor on parchment or slabs, and, therecore, soullcss as they, bul by immortal nature on the immortal mind, never to perish." It is, in short, an "infallible" or "trustworthy" law (v6po5&yr~v6fi5).'Justin, too, contrasts the conflicting human laws (~oC5~6poug.iGv ?vv0p&wv), each of which contains some mix of propcr and impropcr elements, to the "right reason" of Christ, which dispelled the confusion engendcred by this diversity by prescnfing thc true law, thc law of nat~rc.'~ In fact, thc theme of perfection emerges clsewherc in Jamcs particularly in association with hgos and the resistance of dcsire. The "pcrfect man" (zkheto5 kvv.ilp) is identificd explicitly as one who does not stumble i v ?&yq (3:2)--a phrase which surely intcnds a reference to speech, but speech, marc specifically, in its relation to the implanted l q s . The definition of such a ~kh~105 as one who is able to "bridle of Jesus, "a new- law"; see Jnrnei, 116- 20. On the author's interest in freedom, see the Conclusion of this study. CL MT Ps 19:8: an'm. Cf furdlcr the similar description of the law of the Jews, owing to its supposed divine origin, as "pure" or "without contamination" (drdpaiav) in @. AN.1. 3 1. Note, however, that in this latter passase ihe law is also described as "most philosophical" (p~hooorpwrhpav);cC in this respect the presenration or the lab*.of Moses in 4 ,Muccubees as the "philosophy" of the Jews (see above, Chapter Three). While Ps.-Ariaeas, unlike the author of the latter work, stops short of identifying Jewish law with natural law, it is tkic implication of the work as a w h o l e a n d of this passage in particular-that it represents the Jewish "philosophy," and one which ranks among thc best or the Greek philosophies, not least owing to its divine origin. " In m,hat follo\\,s I assume the discussion of pclfection round in the following chapter. undcr the heading "rfhe~a<." '" .. SVF 1.262; on this passage see further above, pp. 32C " Q~wdO m n . Prob. Lib. 46; the translation of riyrm6$<5 a. "iniallibl~." is Colson's. Notc that despite Philo's disparaging reference to "parchment" and "slabs" herc; ihc equation af rhc law of Moses with nalural law is nonetheless assumcd throughoiit his writings; scc, e.g., Op$ 3, and above, Chapter Three. '<' App. 9 . 3 ~ 4 .
"
LOGOS AND TFXE L4W OF FREEDOM
153
his whole body" (Jas 3:2) is in fact reminiscent of the complete sellmastery which: for the Stoic: comprises the true freedom of the sage. And \+-hie the failure to rcsist the rcmptation of dcsirc (ht0vpia) results in "sin," thc endurance of such temptation-and thus the "doing" of logos--~-issaid to manifcst itselfin a "perfect deed" (sihe~ov Epyov)."
A word should also be said in this connection regarding the use of the phrase "royal law" ( ~ 6 ~paorhuc65) 0% in Jas 2:s. The problcm of thc significance of the epithet "royal" hcrc is complicated by the fact that, ultimately, it is not entirely clear whether it is used to describe "the wholc law" (cf 2:10), that is, the "perlect law of freedom," or to dcscribc Lev 19:18 in particular. If, as is morc likely, the former is the case,'" it is noteworthy that this association, too, has good Greek and Stoic p r c c ~ d e n t s . ~ W particular l interest in the prcscnt context is 4 Macc 14:2, where thc reasoning faculties (hopopoi) of the seven brothcrs, whose dominance oS the passions is such that chcy can resist the tortures ordered by the "tyrant" (not !3ao~heCq! cf. 4 Macc 5:1, 14, 27) Antiochus and thus avoid apostasy from the law, are lauded as both iheu8ipwv ihev8eph~u~ot ("Geest of the free") and Paothiwv paothu~hzepot("more royal than kings"). One might note further in this connection Phio's view that the sage w i l l "hold that nothing is more royal than virtue ( ~ ~ ~ I ~ I K & E P 066iv OV &p&~ij<)," and will thus "not Scar the orders of others whom thcy rcg-ard as subordinates"; litcral kings, on thc other hand, arc "morc often in the position of the sheep than of the shepherd" since they are caught Understood in this light, "in the snares of pleasure" (n&~a~gfi6ovfi~)."" the law oL James would be described as "royal" inasmuch as obcdicnce
" Jas 1:2-4; cE 1:13 15, and furthcr 1%: it is through cconsvant attention lo the "pedect law'' that one bccornes a "decd-doer." Ser furthcr on this poinl Chapter F i x , undrr the hcvding "Lopoi and Lip'' 'V am inclined to agrcc with scholars such as Rapes, nibrlius; liahris, R'achob and Johnson--against those Iikc Kiihl, Hort, MuRncr, 1 . a ~ and ~ 1,udwig-that thc v6pog baothu~6
""hilo,
b o d Omn. I'roh.
154 and 3 1
154
CHAPTER FOUR
to it renders one "kingly," just as obcdicncc to the "perfect law of frcedom" rendcrs one "perfect" and "free." At the same time, there is likely some connection bctween the description of the law as royal God promised in 2:8 and the refcrencc to thc "kingdom" (!3a~theia) "to those w-ho love him" in 2:5.01 The two, howcver, are not mutually exclusive options; indced, the adjcctive may havc bcen attractive to thc author precisely because it works on more than one levcl.8' ~onclu.&n:James and the Stoics on Law The understanding of law, in the Lettcr ofJamcs is indcbted to Stoic philosophy. James's use of the terms "implanted logos" and law as functional equivaletlts derives from the Stoic identification of human rcason as a divinely given natural law. His lavish description of this law as onc that is both 'perfcct" and "of frccdom" is also best understood in light of the Stoics. Like the various works cxarnined in the previous chapter, however, James's presentation of these philosophical idcas is also informed by his adhcrence to traditions and historical convictions alicn to Stoicism; ideas and beliefs with which the Stoic understanding of the logosinnatc in each human individual was not originally associatcd. This is cvidcnt particularly where the author speaks of the implanted logos wiwich language that is more typical of Jewish and Christian than Stoic literature. Jamcs's notions that this logos can be "heard and, in some sense, "received" in particular suggest that he, likc the Jewish and Christian authors cxamined in the previous chapter, assumes that this logos has some external, verbal form. How does he conceive of that f o m ? What is the "perfect law which is of frccdom"?
Thc "perfect law of frccdom" that James corclatcs with thc implanted logos in 1:21-25 is referrcd to with a more abbreviated expression in 2:12, where the "brothcrs and sistcrs" are warned that thcy should
"' Cf. Johnson, I~ttcrof3omes. 230. Note especially in this connection that thc phrase .rai$ dryarriuorv a6r6v2 used hcre to desikmate those to whom thc kingdom was promised, is a formulaic expression lypicdly used inJewish literalure with re[erencc to those who are faithful to God's law. See helow, p. 166. Cf in this respect thr author's use of the expression "law or Freedom,'' on which see, in this connection; thc Conclusion of this study.
"'
L O C ~ SANE
THE LAW OF FREEDOM
I55
"speak (hah&?.ie)and act ( ~ O L E ~ T Eas ) those about to bc judgcd by the law of frccdom" (8th v6wou ih&u0rpia5).The references to speech and particularly "doing" in connection \%iththe law of freedom in this admonition ccho the general treatment of thcsc thcmcs in 1:19-26.8' In 2:12, however, the author has a spccific type of speech and action in mind: the warning appears at the conclusion of an extended admonition against "acts of partiality" (2:l-13). In fact, thc warning of 2:12 comes right on the heels of an arpmcnt intended ion the law (25-1 to prove that sho~vingpartiality is a t r a n ~ ~ ~ e s sof If, thcn, this warning is lo makc any sense in its context, the "law of freedom" by which the "brothers and sistcrs" will ultimately be judged must be the samc law which cxcludcs acts of partiality. Jas 2:8-11 thus emcrgcs as a critical passage for determining which law, precisely, is rcfcrrcd to as the "pcrfcct law of freedom"; indeed, as thc only passage in the entirc work in which thc author explicitly idcntifies commands includcd in this law, it is the critical passage in this respecta5 Despite Dibclius's claim that "in his ritual and moral injunctions the author docs not have the Mosaic law in mind at all," but rather Christianity itself "as a new law," it is clear from thc outset that the "perfect law of freedom" bcars some significant rclation to the Torah?' The love command is quoted in 2:s with specific reference to its rilv ypaqfiv). Similarly, the fact that context within thc Torah (~a'ch the LXX order is followed when reference is made to the law's commands regarding murder and adultery suggests that here, too, it is The difficulty in using the same English term to translate irotfw and its cognates idiomatically throughout the letter should not obscure the Tact that the same Greek verh is being used in 2:12 as in 1:22-25. The conncclion belween 212 and James 1 is dsa recognized, e.g., by Ropes, St. ,Tamer, 201. See Curther below. "j Both Dibelius and Fabris view Jas 127, where the author defines characteristics of "pure and undclilcd religion," as hcing significant in this respect as well; see Dibelius, Jmw, 116; and Fabris, Leg#,64-66, 73, 160-65 (though cf. further 176). However, while Jas 1 2 7 is undoubtedly revealing of issues which are especiaUy important to the author, it docs no1 address thc qucstion of the precise commands which the law of freedom contains in the same way as does J a s 2:s 12. Dibclius, Jamer, 18 and 1 1 9 see Turther 116-20. Dibclius fclt that both the expression "law of frcedom" and the author's silence on matters such a circumcision, diet and the Sabbath were d~risivein this respect. He describes thc content of this "new law-" as '3esus's words as wcU as the ethics which drvcloped from them or were contained in his words" (ibid., 119). Notc also, however: that Uibelius himsell elsewhere suggcsrs that "core" of' the "new Christian law" was "the ethical teaching oT the oldJewish law" (ihid, 143).
"
"
156
CHAPTER FOLTX
particularly the scriptural commands which arc The precise relation of thc "law of freedom" to the Torah, ho~l-cvcr,is obscured by several factors. First, it is not immediately clear if it is specifically a scriptural command that is at stake in conncction with thc main concern of the passage, acts of partialit)?. Thc Torah does contain several such prohibitions (1,ev 19:15; Dcut 16:19; cf. Deut 1:16-~17), but some interpreters remaill skeptical as to whethcr James intcnds a rcfcrcnce lo the biblical command in particular as opposed to some more gcncral prohibition or partiality: as found elsewhere in traditional Christian instruction."" Second, the lovc command mentioned in Jas 2:8, of course, receives special emphasis in a number of Christian works as a (or cven thc) central command of Jewish law. Thus a number of excgetes have argucd that, while the author does have a scriptural prohibition in mind in 2:l-~13, the argumcnt of 22-1 1 assumes that showing partiality is a transgression not simply because it is prohibited by the Torah, but, more specifically, becausc it is cxcluded by thc love command." According to Lukc Tinlothy Johnson, for example, the author of Jamcs rcgards the Torah (and the Jewish scriptures generally) as something which only lays out concrete examples of what the "law of love" requircs.""valuation
''
D. Deppe, nLe Sayings (f.7es10 in tht Epixlle gjemes (Chelsea: MI: BookcraTters, 1989) 35-36 W. H. Wachob, "'The Rich in Faith' and 'the Poor in Spirit': Thc socio-rhetorical function of a saying ofJesus in the epistle ofJames" (1'h.D. Diss., Emory University, 1993) 213 23, 273-79. LXX I k u t 5:17 18 rcvcrses tilt MT order of these two commands; IXX Exod 20:13-15 likewiscs places the adultery command berore that concerning murder, and in addition placcs thr prohibition or stealine hetwcen them. To bc sure. the author or Tames's usc oflrfi . . oius . ihc aor. sub. fir these commands is di~ere'ntfrom hoth L k X Exod 20:13, 15 and Deut 5:17 18; hut cf Mack 10:19 par. Lukc 18:20. C. Bun:hard seems to consider it to he equally plausible that this prohibition is mcrdv D a r t of the nebulous mass ofaaraenedc material available to exlv Christians ("~ichstekliehegebot, Dckalog und ~ e s e win Jah 2; 8-1 I," I)ir ~ e b r n i i h eBibel and ihre rwe@che NucIgeichichte: FesLich7iJifi~RoyRtndtorfrurn 65. Geburt~tqled. E. Blum et al.; Neukirchen-Viuym: Neukrchener, 19901 27); I>avids coiisidcrs an explicit reference to a biblical command by James to he no more than "an attracli\~eh p o t h esis" (Jamex, 115). Dihelius, on the other hand, sees the influcncc of Lev 19:15 a s thc rcsult of the author's dependence upon a supposed '~ewishparaenesis which dealt with paniality in lllc context of its treatment of lovc on the basis of Idev 19" (Jarnri, 142); in this rcspect he neirrs the later position of I.. T. Jolmson, "Thc Use of l.cviticus 19 in tlic Letter oFJamcs;" ,JRL 101 (1982) 391-401. "" See in ,qeatcst derail Wachob, "Rich in Faith," 197-223, esp. 198 212. "" See esp. Johnson, "The Usc of I.e\iticus 19."Johnson's understanding of the author ofJamcs's approach to thc I'orah is a l s o WCII illustrated in idem, "hlirior of Rembrancc," 641-45. Note in this conncction that Johnson apparcndy considers
LOGOS AND THE U W OF FKEEDOhl
157
of the author's understanding oS the rclation of "love of ncighhor" to the partiality command on one hand, and to "the whole law" (2:lO) on the other: arc thus critical for determining his gencral approach to thc Torah. Third: the lcttcr is silent on issues such as diet, ritual purification, the calendar and circumcision. Gi\-en lhis silence, one can do little more than spcculatc on their role in the author's view oS la\% and the conclusions one draxvs from this silence will likely depcnd as much or more upon one's understanding of the placc of such Jewish practices in c m e r ~ n gChristianity in gencral as upon intcrpretation of Jamcs itself. Noncthclcss, given the importancc of these matters in the formation of g~oupswithin thc Christian movement, this question deserves at least some attention. These thrcc issues will be dcalt with in turn. Acbr
oJ Partial@
in 2 1 - 13
,Jas 2:l-13, as a coherent argument against the practice of partiality, represents a discrete section within James." In 2:l the audicncc is instructed not to "have ihc faith" of Jesus Christ togcther "with What "partiality" entails is acts of partiality" (iv xpotrwnohqpyria~g).~ the author of James to havc understood thc Jc\visli scriptures in gcncrd (however precisely his "canon" may or may not havc bcen delined) to represent thc "law or rreedom": of the several "models for imitation" which he rinds in Jamrs, only onc (Abraham) is actually found in thc Torah (contrast Rahab, Elijah and Job); sec csp. "Mirror or Rcmbrance;" 641-42. "' 'lhus: e.g., does Dibelius refcr to it as "A Treatisc on Parlialiiy" (James, 124); c f Chninc, Soin1 Jaquei, 39: "Ne fiirc pas acception dc pcrsonnnes"; I-Iauck, Die KirchenhGji, 14-16: "Kcine Verachtung dcr Armen"; Mullner, D m Jakohlohnel; 114: "Penonenkult und kommende Gericht"; Cantinat, Lei EpSesr, 119: "Ri-pn~hationde la partialit?'; Fahris, I q p , 66 (cf. 165): "l'arencsi contro il favoritismo"; Davids; Ejistle oJJamex, 105: "No Partiality is Allowahlr." Sce SurtIler Burchard, "Nichstcnliehcgcbot," 520K and esp. the recent analyses of 2:l 13 in light 01ancient rhetoric by Wachob ('LThe Rich in Faith") and D. F. \Vatson (.James 2 in Light of GreroRoman Schemes of Argumentation," .NrS 39 jl993] 94-121, esp. 102 108). While ,Johnson reco.pizcs that Jas 2:s 13 "is not in the least a transition to another topic tlrarl that pursued in 2:l-7" "/,7ornw; 235); he nonetheless prrsents James 2 as "a single argument" made up or three discrcte sections: 2 - 7 1 8-13; 14-26 (ihid. 218 19). Johnson is certainly corrcct to emphasize the averarching unity ofJamcs 2 (sce on this dso Watson, 'yames 2;" and lurther bclow, the Conclusion of this study); howevci, his separation of thc chapter into thrcc scclions ,gives the impression that 23-13 and 2:l 7 are no morc dusely related ro each othcr than they are to 214-26, while in Tact Iliey form, togcther, a s i n ~ l rurpmcnt against the practice of partiality. See further on this helow. ' W n the precis? torre oS the phrase 6" rrpooozahqpiricrrg as "a dcsignalion or accompanying circum~tancc~" sce Dihelius, Jnrnt.~, 126 n. 9. For the phrase EZELV nioi~g.cC Jas 2:14, ID.
158
CHAPTER FOUR
illustrated in an example, framed as an accusator)i rhctorical question, which contrasts the deference show-n to a w-ealthy man with the disrespectful treatment or a poor man as both enter a "synagogue" (2:2-4, uuvaywy;l)."%ter a further series of rhctorical qucstions intended to revcal that such behavior disre~ardsboth thc precedent set by God's treatment of the poor (2:5b-~6a) and the audience's ow-n social experience at the hands of the wealthy (2:6b, 7), the author proceeds to argue more formally that such behavior is a transgression of the law ( 2 - 1 1, esp. 2:9)?' In 22-9, showing partiality and thus transgressing the law are juxtaposed with fullidling the "royal law" by loving one's neighbor as oneself. The love command is quoted from the W(, and cited with specific reference to its scriptural context (2:8, ~a.iZx6lv ypaqfiv). It is therefore striking that within the Torah, just prior to the command regarding love of neighbor (Lev 19:18), one r i d s a prohibition of partiality (Lev 19:15): You shall not render an unjust jud-pent: you shall not be partial to the poor (LXX: 06 X6pyn ap6ownov niw~oij),or defcr to the great: with justice you shall judge your neighbor.
A number of interpreters have thus concluded that the argument from the law in 2:8-11 is made with the prohibition of partiality as found in the Torah in mind." The citation of the love command specifically as "scripture" would thus serve to point to ihe written context of Lev 19:18, where one also finds an injunction against partiality. 13 Against; e.g-., Spiua, Der BGJ dei Jakobu, 61 n. 3, thr image of these two ''ping into" jeioi.p~a&ate i ~ )the o u v a y d and thcn heing- seated suggests that thc term is used of the meeting place of the assembly rather than the assembly iself; (Cf the use of i d ~ o i with a the latter meaning in Jas 5:14.) The author's use or this term is interesting given other aspects of the work which seem to suggest a self-understanding which is not formulated over-against 'yudaisrn," e.g., ihc address o i the leuer lo "the twelve tribes," on which see [he preliminary remark in M. A. Jackson-McCabe, "A Txtter to the Twelve Tribes in the Diaspora: Wisdom and 'Apocdptic' Eschatology in James" (SBLSP 35 [1996]) 510-15. It is, however, by no means decisive in this respect: as Dihelius points out: even Marcionite Christians could use ouvaywyi)as a term of scifrrferencc, whether with respect to their mceting place or the community itself; see Dihelius, jarner; 132-31. 'U C f . Burchard, "Nichstenliehegehot," 524E "Spmche und Sache wechseln [in 2:8-111. Stam rlictorischen Fragcn Argumentation mit wenn und weii, allgcrneine moralische Urtcile auf Grund von N o m e n statt Kennzeichen v ~ mPersonen.pppen." "i Spitw, Dn Bmfdrn3akobzr, 66-69; Ropes, St James, 19% hluOner, Dn Jakobub&A 124; Laws, Epirth o/Jarnn; 114; Ludwig, Wort als Ceielz, 172; Johnson, "Thc Use of L e ~ i f c u s19?" 393; idem; latier @James, 231: cT Martin; James, 64: 68; and Klein, Ein :ino/lkommm~~ei Wnk. 148 n. 171.
LOGOS rZND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
159
This much is in fact confirmed by a comparison of the author's illustration of "acts of partiality" in 2:2-3 with other ancient treatments of the theme. Immediately follow?ng the initial admonition against such acts in 2:1, thc author offers a n example of thc type o i behavior he has in mind in order to explain the relevance of this cxhortation for his audience: hly brothers and sisters, do not hold the fiith of our glorious Lord Jesus Christ" with acts or partiality (iv npoowxohqwvia~g).For if into your synagogue should come a man with gold rings and brilliant clothes, and at the same time a poor man in filthy clothes should enter, but you look to the one wearing the brilliant clothes and you say, "you sit here, in an honored place" (~orhiug),"' while to the poor man you say, 'yon stand there" or "sit beneath my footstool", have you not made distinctions among yourscl~es"~ and becomc judges who reason evilly?gq 'I" O n the somewhat awkward TOG kupiou i p 6 v 'Iqaoi! Xpraioi! 6 5 6b&, see esp. Dihelius, James, 126-2% more recently, Wachoh, "The Rich in Faith," 148-59. "' Ropes sought to account for this adverb by hypothesizing a conversational use of this term analogous to the English "picase" (Sl. Jarne~, 190). Regardless of any such convention, its primary effect in J m c s is to contrast the "honor" shown to the rich man in the seat giviven him with the "dishonor" shown to the poor man; notc in this respect 2:6a: by acting in this way, the addressees have "dishonored c ~ m q b v ) . Cf. Wachoh, "The Rich in Faith," 167, the poor" (ii& Sh t j r ~ p & a arbv 190-92. It is also likely that the much discussed invitation to the poor man to sit 6x6 .ib inon66tov pox ("under my li~otstool")in 2 : 3 is to be regarded less as rralistic diai~~pgue than as an hyperbole w-hich makes the point regarding the humiliation of the poor man painfully clear; cf. the use of the image or the foolstool in IXX Ps 109:l (= Ps 110:l). CT Ward, "Communal Concern," 94t O n the problcms in the interpretation of06 S~elcpi&lrei.v fau~oi5,see Dibelius, j'nmer, 1 3 6 ~ ~ 3and 7 , further R. B. Ward, "Partiality in thc Assembly: Jarncs 2:2- 4," HTR 62 (1969) 87-97. Some have found the use of6rukpivea8a~in 1:6 to he decisive, and thus translate the clause in light of the theme of division within individual human beings which is so promincm in the letter (ct, e.g., the fi~pgure of the Siyruxog in 1:8, 4 8 ) ; so, e.g., h.l;iyor, Epiille oJ St. James, 85: "Are you not divided in yourselves?, i.e., guilty of StvuXia." In fact, Dibelius's objection to this, viz., that the example of 2 2 - 3 does not concern a wavering between "the world" and God (j'ajomes, 136-37), scems to me to be quite off the mark: such a courting of the rich to the dishonor of thc poor might be taken to signiry prcciscly that lack of faith in the providence of God against which the author rails in James 1 and 41-6 (see the discussion of these passages hclow, in Chapter Fivr). At the same time, however, given the association of parrialily with '?udhpentn and making unjust distinctions between people on the basis of their social status, it seems likely that the connotation of 'Sudging" or "making distinctions" is foremast on the author's mind. Mitton suggcsts that thc author plays on both scnscs of thc verb (Epirlle oJJarr~es. 84); cf in this respcct thc author's use of6~aAoyrap6vin 2 4 , on which see the foilowing notc. '" 'l'he characterization of those who she\*, paniality ar those with " c d *reasonings" (6~aAoyrowiuviiovqp6v) is noteworthy, for; as ivc have seen, thc law which
160
C I ~ ~ P T E RFOUR
This example, as definitive of the typc of behavior that the author has in mind, is rundamental to the elaboration as a whole: it is an example of the "partiality" (npoownohqpyrin) that, he . i d argue, rcnders one a transgressor of the law.'"" The nominal and vcrbal forms of npoowcohqpyria, not exldent prior to their occurrence in several Christian works of the first and second centuries, arc compound forms or the expression np6ownov hakp&ve~v,with this, in turn, bcing a rather literal translation of thc Hebrew D':g NO^.'^' As uscd in the Hcbrew Biblc and LXX, thesc expressions do not necessarily carry a negative connota~ion.'"~ Such a connotation is frequent, how-ever, in judicial contexts, often implyIt is this ing particularly-as in Lev 19:15---a subversion ofju~tice.'~' negativc usage which bccomes most prominent in later Jewish and Christian literature, w-hethcr or not the tcrm is associated with a fornial judicial setting.'"" In conformity to this later usage, npoowuohqpyryria carries a clcarly ncgative connotation in Jas 2:l-13. Here it is flatly statcd that faith is not to be held & npooonohqpyriaq (2:1), and that thosc who act in this way "work sin, bcing convicted by the law as transgressors" (2:9). Typical, too, is the application of thc conccpt particularly to the disparate treatment of peoplc on the basis of their socio-economic standing;'"' and the characterization or those who act in this manncr as '~udges," moreover, recalls thc common judicial associations of the term'"" such pcrrplc thereby transgress (see 2:8-12) is itself equated wilh b hpquiog %yo<. 'Therc may in fact be a pun at work here, for 6mhoy~av65, as Ward points out ("l'artiality:" 94 n. 52), can also have the more technical legal scnse o f "verdict"; see RAGII, 61ahoyrap65 81. The audience would thus bc characterized both as judges \iurliriai language herc. it is doubtful that he har a formal judicial s c n i n ~in mind see funhcr on this helow, note 118
'" '" ""
-
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
161
The use of the term with reference particularly to disparatc seating arrangements, on the other hand, is not midesprcad. .4nalogics are found, however, in the rabbinic litcraturc.'"' R. R. LVard has pointcd out that rabbinic intcrpretation of the instructions for judgng outlined in the Torah included, in a manner similar to Jas 2:2-4, thc fomulation of hpothetical examples to illustrate partiality"" In one tradition of interpretation, a rich and a poor person are charactcrizcd, as in James, by means of an extravagant contrast of their clothing: How do we know that, if two comc to court. one clothed in rags and the o~herin fine raiment worth a hundred manehs, the:- should say to him [sc. h c rich man], "Either dress like him, or dress him like you?""'" The proof-text citcd in this connection is Exod 23:7, but the words w-hich arc to hc spoken to thc rich man in such a situation arc clsewhere attributed to R. Ishmael in conncction with thc intcrpretation of Dcut 16:19, one of the biblical injunctions against partiality."" Thc similar contrast in the dcscriptions of thc clothing of thc rich and poor man in James and this rabbinic tradition is, of itsclf, not particularly rcmarkable: such stylized dcscriptions of thc rich and the poor arc not uncommon in ancient litcrature gencrally."' More striking, however, is the tradition of intcrpretation which reads the hiblical injunctions against partiality particularly as prohibiting judges from inviting a rich litigant to sit while forcing a poor onc to remain standing. In one passage, this tradition is connected with the interprctation of Deut 1:17 and attributed to R. Meir: "I7 Ropes (St. Jmei, 190-91) has pointed to similar examples from the Didmcalia Apoilolomrn 12 (= Apodoli~Conslihltioni 2.58) and some later Christian church orden; perhaps the oldcst of these is the Ethiopic Stnhltcr OJ the Apo~tI#x,wherc insuuclions arc given to a preshytcr regarding- thc reception of wealthy or poor peoplc who come into a Christian gathering. It is possible, as Dihclius (James, l34f n. 62) arid Mullncr (Der Jahbusbr$ 118f n. 5) assurnc, that surh instrucliuns depend upon Tames, though Ropes and Ward ("Communal Concern:" 81 n. 4,) are skeptical. ,James is in m y case more similar ta the rabbinic examples than to these; see on this beloxzr, esp. notc 116. Ward, "Partiality," 89 91. For ,what ibllows 1 dcpend upon Wiud's findings. Note. however. that his ~ r i r n a wconccrn is to identify the social situation envisioned in J ~ 22--4, S not to csiablish 'the author's interest 'in the biblical command concerning partiality in particular. '"' h. Shrbu. 31a, as cited by Ward, "l'artiahty," 89f. "" \Vard. "Pardalitv." ,, 89.. rcfcrring to Deul. R... Shohtim V . 6 "' Sec H. D. Bck. L & n uon Sam"& und dm Nme 7 e s l a m ~ I ~ l ~ ~ n . ~ g ~ ~urid~ / U ~ h l t i ~ i u Paraneliiche I'arolhlm. Eirt B d r q rum COT,!^ Htllmisticum J!'O/\ 'ooi7esiammh(1'U 76; Berlin: iUademie Vcrlag, 1961) 1 9 7 9 8 . Note also the close verbal similarities between Jas 2:2 3 and PhiIo.7os. 105: "Then they put on him a bright and clean raimcrll instrvd of his Tithy prison clothes'' ( h i burc&q< l i a p ~ p l r vfafi~ilradrvit6066vreg).
'"'
<
162
CHAFTER FOUR
Rabbi hleir used to say: \\hy does the verse say: Ye shall hear the small and great alike (Deut 1:1?)? So that one of the liti~qntsshall not be kept standing and the other sit. . ."' This vadition is elsewhere presentcd as a saying handed down by R. Judah, and mcntioned in corinection with the inte~pretationof LC\. 1Y:lj: thcy may R. Judah said, 1 heard that if they please to seat the sit. What is forbidden? One shall not stand and the other sit."" Ward also points to addiuonal passages in which the interpretation regarding standing and sitting and that regarding clothing arc found sidc by side."' As is clcar from thcsc passages, the formulation of cxamples illustrating parrialily as manifest in disparate seating arrangerncnts madc for rich and poor was an element of an oral tradition of interpretation of the Torah's partiality cornmands.""t is thereforc quite striking h a t the author of James, too, goes on to condemn those '3udgcs" who express partiality in this way as transgressors of thc law; this point, in fact, will constitute the climax or his admonition against partiality."%orcover, his specific reference to thc written context or the love command in this connection, as he contrasts its fultillmcnt to showing partiality in 2:8--9, serves to point the readcr toward a scction of thc scriptural law in which partiality is expressly prohibited (Lev 19:15; cf. Lev 19:18)-a passagc, in fact, which thc rabbis interpreted by means of examples quite similar to his own.
"'
Ybol R. Nal. 1:10, as cited by Ward, "Partiality," 90. Note that a prohibition of partiality immediatcly precedcs the command to "hear t l ~ csmall and grcat .tSikcZ' in Deut 1 : l i (LXX: obr krrryvhog np6omov 6" rpioer). S@rc, Kedoihim Perek 4:4 cited by Ward, "Panialily," 90, who identifies the R. Judah in question as hen El'ai. Sec Ward, "Partidity;" 90. "> 'lhe fint ceruin attcstation of this tradition of intcrpretation comes in the third generation of Tanndites (i.e., ca. 130-60 CE); notc, howcver, ihat R. Judah may himselr he passing on earlier wadition (cr. "I heard . . For tile dates of R.Juda11 and R. Meir, scc H. I.. Strack and G. Stembcrger: lnhoduclion tn lhe 'Talmud and 1Mid7arii~(2d printing, with emendations and updates; Minnrapolis: Fortress, 1996)75 i i . "I' Bath with resprct to its rcfi
"' "'
."I.
LOGOS ILND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
163
Thc pcculiar similarity betwcen Jas 2:l-13 and these rabbinic passages, as Ward rccognizcd, is best cxplaincd in terms of a common dependencc upon a shared tradition of biblical interpretation."' IVhcther the author or James; like thc rabbis: presupposcs a formal judicial setting, or, as is more likcly, a more general liturdcal one,"" h e admonition of 2:l-13 is made particularly with the biblical prohibition of partiality in mind. Among all of the instruction given in the Letter oCJamcs, then, thc only commands explicitly attributed to the "la\\- of freedom" are all rrom the Torah. It is
"' Note also that the author of James, like R. l l e i r and R. Judah, is concerned specifically xvith gking preferential trcatmcni to ihe rich over against thc poor, whilr Lev 1 9 : I j addresses defcrcrice ia the powcriul (6uviroq<) 07 poor (ntoxb<j. Ward does not explurc thc question of thc genetic relationship bctwcen Ja\ 2:2-3 and illis rabbinic exeg~ticaltradition in detail; for iris interests lir clscwherc; and indced, therc is little in the way oC cvidence ro discuss beyond the similarirics themselves. Notc, howcver, his comment thai "It is possiblc thai the author [ofJames], informrd by judicial madition: romposed the example with relative freedom . . . Nevertheless, thc rilrmal similarity hefivccn the examplc in James and the rabbinic in.truciions do nor allow us to speak simply of'iree composition"' (Ward, "Pardaliry," 97 n. 38); d. "Communal Conccni," 97: Jaa 2:2 3 is "intormrd hy judicial tradition." 'lU It is the thesis of V'ard that tile examplc of Jas 2:2-4, like thc similar examplcs in the rabbinic literamre, assurnes a formal judicial set tin^, and he ha? won a si,pificant following in this respect; scc, c.g., Davids, Efiirllefljarne~,105-1 1; Martin, ,7m/ames, 61-64; and Wachob, "The Rich in Faith," 166 69, and further his Nth chapter, "The Social and Cultural Teuturc ofJames 2:l-13." 11 scerns more likely to me, hawever, that the author ofJames applies this tradition of legal inierpretation, originally associated particularly with filrrnai judicial proceedings, to the more gcncral ancient practice of expressing social status through seatins arrungcments in puhlic or private gatherin~s.'l'hat is to say, Wachob both correctly idcntifics the stasis of 2:lb13 as one of definition ("The Rirh in Faith," 365-71) and rightly ernphasircs that the argument is to bc undentood in light of ancient patronage ( i b d , esp. 383-94); but in my view what the author aucmpls to do is to prescnt the commonplace ancient practice of rcflccting disparate social staius through seatmercly in formal judiing arrangements in puhlic (or semi-puhlic) gatherinp-not cial hcarings under the mhric of "partiality" and "unjust jud+n~." I would suggest; in short, that the author ofJamcs applies a traditional intelpretation of Lcv 19:15, which saw partiality as be in^ rcflccted particukrly in disparate seating arrangcmenls givm to thr wealthy and poor in tbrmal judicial proceedings, to a situation which be finds current in Christian assemhlics, in which thc wcalthy are giwn the seats oC honor by virme of their wealth and/or pavonage. When thc "brothers and sisren" cngagc in such practices, hc argues: thcy have become "unjust judgcs," and thus transgressors against the biblical prohibition of partialiry. Vicwed from this persperiivc, Jas 2 1 13 appean as a quite radical critique of a system of patronage which \ a s largcly taken lor granted in the ancient Mediterranean world. Sce furiher t h ~rcccnt study by J . S. Kloppenborg, "Status und Woi1lt2tigkeit hri Paulus und Jakobus," Cbn Jesu rum Ckehi.r: C / ~ ~ l o l o @ r ~Studien. hr F8rgabefir Paul Hoginann rum G5. G ~ b u ~ t i (cd. t q R. 1-Ioppe and U. Busse; R%N\\! 95; Berlin and New York: dc Cruyter, 1998) 127-54. I m grateful to Prot Kloppcnborg for pprovidjng me with a copy of this article.
lhcreforc quite clear that the author assumcs, at the very least, a close relationship bct\veen the scriptural la\\- and the law of freedom-and thus between the Torah and the implanted logos. Indeed: his juxtaposition of lox~ingone's neighbor "according lo the scripture" (rarh f i v ypaqfiv; cf. Lev 9:18) and showing partiality (cf. Lev 19:15) assumes the written context of these commands within this law.""l'his casts strong doubt upon lhe "new law" interprctation of thc law of freedom, at least as formulated by- Dibclius. What begins to emerge as a more likely possibility is rather a particular intcrpretation of the Torah itself."" In this connection, the import of the reference lo Lev 19:18 in Jas 2:8 bccomcs crucial. Johnson, for cxamplc, has recently a r ~ p c dthat this command represents the central command of the law in James's view, with the rest of the Torah s e ~ n primarily g as a privileged pool of examples that illustrate the ways in which it is to be concrctcly observed."' Does James in fact interpret the lan~entirely lhrough the lens of the love command? Is showing partiality wrong particularly because it is a trans,gression of thc love command, or simply because it is prohibited in h e Torah?
"" O n the significance of this juxtaposition, as well a the e i pfvrot . . . ~i 65 construction which makes it clcar, see helow. Cf. Ropcs's ~ i c whased , anJames's description or his law as one which is "perfect" and "of libcriy," that "he conceived of Christianity as a law, including and f d l i i g the old one." Ropes goes on to speak of a "ncw law" in this conncrtion ( S t Jamm, 178-79). Ropes elsewhere speak or this law- as " t h ~Jewish law as understood hy Christians" (ibid., 167); with "lhe tcn commandmenis and odlcr precepts of the 0. 'T." holding "a chief place.. . however much they may or may not be supplemented by odlcr teaching and by Christian interpretation" (Sl. Jcmes, 30). On this latter descriplion: at least, the scnsc in which this represenls a "new law" is Rapes hims~lfapparenlly recognized, as suggested by his not immedialely clearuse of sanitaly pips with the phrase "new law." Mter ail; divergent interprevations uT tllc Torah were an important Factor in thc rurmJiion orjcwish groups, hut one docs not normally speak of the "new law," Tor cxumple, of the Dead Sca Sect, thc Sadducees or the Pharisees. "' See above, note 90. See esp. "Thc Use oC Leviticus 19;" 400 (emphasis his): "keepins the law of lovc involves obsen4ng thc commnndmmts explicated by the Decalogue (2:ll) and Lev 1912 18 in thcir entirety.. . Breaking thc proliibition against partiality is hrcaking the law of lorn, for that prohibition is one of i s explicatioiis." Sce also Wachoh, "The Rich in Faith;" 268-69: ''[Lev 19:15] is not simply a prccepr from the \+,rillen law hut a rhetorical judgment that is bascd on the scripture recited in Jas 2:s. Lhu written summary of thc whole law. Hence thc injunction a-gains1 panialily in 1.e~ 1915 is cffcctivcly reinterpreted by our aulhor as the opposile of 'lobing one's neigiibor as oneself;."
""
LOGOS AND THE L4W OF FREEDOM
ParlialiQ> L o d e
of
165
N&hhor, and the "1.Wzole Laio"
Love of ncighbor, of course, rcccivcs special emphasis in a number of carly Christian works. Of particular intcrest in connection lvith Jas 2:8-11 are lhosc instances in which LC\; 19:18 is accorded somc special status specifically among thc other commands of the laxi."' Love of ncighbor, paired with love of God (Dent 65): is so clevated in each of the synoptic gospels. In Luke, Jcsus agrccs when a legal expert sinsles out these two commands from all that is "written in the law" as the particular requircmcnts for inheriting "eternal life" (Luke 10:25 - 28). Conversely, &Lark tells of a scribc's approval w-hen Jesus ranks Dcut 6:4-5 and Lev 19:18 as first and second, rcspeclively, of all the commandments; and whcn the scribe then suggests that these two are morc important than demands of thc sacrificial cult in particular, Jcsus declares that he is "not far from the kingdom of G o d (Mark 12:28-34). The Jesus ofMatthe~7similarly names Ueul 6:5 as "the
"'
.As opposcd, [or example, to the g ~ n e r a lcrnphasis on love found in thc Johanninc epislles, where no explicit connertiun to scriptural law is made. "' I follow the text as rendered in the 26th edition oC Nesde-Nand, flouurn Tezhrrimturn Gi-aece; note, however, that 6105 is omitted in some mss. In the context of Gaiatians, t h ~force OF this statcmcnt seerns to me to hc: mom: pointed than the NRSV translarion orn~nh$pwiaras "is surnmcd up" suggests: Paul implies not merely that love of neighbor is an apt summaly or the law; but that loving one's neighbor ir in Cact equi\mlcnl to rullillin "the \$-hole law." CT. Rom 133: 6 . . . &yazGv rbv &epav vbpov rrenhilpoxsv; and runher the nuanced discussion in H. D. Bck, Galalim: A (;bmnmhly (in Peul'i Lelltr lo the Church6 in Chlalia (Hermencia; Philudclphia: Fortress, 1979) 274-76. This; pcrhaps, represenis anothcr significant difference bet\vcen Paul arid Matthew's Jesus, lor it is not at all rlcar tilat the iauer would a p e that his summary has this implication.
"'
166
CHAPTER FOUR
Thc formulation of such summaries was not a peculiarly Christian phenomenon; nor, as the passages from Mark and Lukc examincd above alrcady suggcst, was the placement of emphasis particularly on love of God and/or love of one's fellow human being in this connection. Love of God, w,hile not, to my knowledge, explicitly cited as a summary of the law, is routinely used in Jewish literature as a shorlhand expression for living in accord with the law."' In fact, the repeatcd references in James to the eschalological rewards promised by God "to thosc who love him" (1:12; 2 5 : .rots &yanGow a6rbv) echoes a common designation of those who maintain thc covenant by keeping God's commands, and to whom God will therefore remain faithful. Such usage is found already in thc dccaloguc's prohibition of idolatry as found in Exod 20:5-6 and Deut 5:9-10: "I the Lord your God am a jealous God, punishing children for the iniquity- of parents, to the third and fourth generation of those who reject mc, but showing steadcast love to the thousandth generation of thosc who love me (W(:zoiq dryanGoiv pe) and keep my commandments."'26 The precise phrase zoi5 dryanoiotv a6.rbv itself, in fact, is found repeatedly in such context^.'^' Paul's notion that "the entirc law" is fdfilled through lovc oC neighbor, on the other hand, might be compared with Hillel's reported view: "What is hateful to you, do not to your neighbor: that is the whole law (;i'il~mln? 53 K';r V), while the rcst is commentary thercof."lZ8More similar to the synoptics in this respect, finally, is Philo's division of Moses's law under the two great headings (repihta) of duty to God (zb npbq Oebv), specified as e60iB~taand bot6qq, and to one's fcllow human being (zb rrpbq &vOphnovq), specified as qtLavOpwnia and ~ I K ~ I O O "each V~, of them splitting up into multiform branches, all highly laud""ce Ludwig Wort als Geseti, 144-50, esp. 144--46. Note, however, that some of the passages discussed by Ludwig are not entirely to the point; a number of them; for example, speak of love of the commands themselves rather than love of God in the form of obedience lo the command5 of his law (e.g. Ps 119:47, 48, 127, 159, 166-68). '" Cf. Deut 30:16, 20. 12' Ileut 7:9; 2 Esdr 11.5 (= Neh 15); P rr SOL 14:l-2; cf further LXX Dan 9:4, where ihc object of the phrase is second-person, being directly addressed to God. b. Shabb. 31a; the translation is that of H. Freedman, ShabbaUir Hrbrm-Eqlich Edition g/ h B-ahylonim Talmud ( 2 "01s.; London; Jerusalem; New York: Soncino, 1972). Scc further I. A h d a m s , Studk.~in I'haluaisrr~ and i h Cmpels. Firit md Sectmd S'.a (repr. in Librar). of Biblical Studies; ed. 13. M. Orlinsky with a prolepmenun by M. S. Enslin; New York: Ktav, 1967 [= 191 7-19241) 1. 18 29; I cite the Hebrew as found on p. 23.
LOGUS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
165
able."'2g Thus for Phio the first table of the dccaloguc concerns z& iephza~aand the second I& npbs av0poinovg 6 i ~ a t a , ' " b i t hthese two tables, in turn, prescnting tile "genera" or "headings" under wl~ich the "spccial 1aw.s" which make up the rcmaindcr of the la\- can be cla~sificd.'~' Such summaries, moreover, functioned differently for different authors. IVhie figures such as Hie1 or Philo might havc bcen inclined to a ~ q e ewith Paul that "the [commandrncnts] 'you shall not commit adultery', 'you shall not kill', 'you shall not steal', 'you shall not covet', and any othcr commandmcnt is summed up (&va~~qapa;latoGrat) in this word, 'you will love your ncighbor as yoursclf,"' it is by no mcans clear that thcy would have given unqualificd assent to Paul's subscquent incerence"' that "one who loves another has fulfilled (nenhfipw~~v) the law" (Rom 135-9), that "love is thcrcforc the fulfilling of law" (Rom 13:lO). T o thc cxtent that Paul's vicw of the summarizing function of the love command is advanced with an cyc to his more gcncral position on the importance of circumcision, ~ t c . , Hillcl ' ~ ~ and Philo would surely havc chafed at the claim. Philo clsewhere rails against so-called "extreme allcgorists" who, having rccopized (correctly, according to Phiio!) the symbolic nature of thc laws, neglect their litcral sense and thus their observance "as though And if the "whole law" was thcy had become disembodied s~uls."'~' for Hillel only "commentary" on his vcrsion of the golden rule, it was a "commentary" whose details nonetheless dcmanded careful attention and exacting intcrpretation--tasks to which hc, in large measurc, dcvoted his life. The identification of basic principles in
""
Lle Spec. Leg 2.63. Cf. in this respect the double command "1.uvc thc Lord and your neighhor" in 7 In. 5:2, which Collows on a still more general instruction to "keep the law of God" (5:l); here, however, it is not explicitly said that love of God and of neighbor are understood to sum up "keeping the law of God." Given the questions surrounding the literary histoiy of thc Tfihmmb generally, it is not altogrthcr dear in any case whcther this ccmsliwtes non-Christian evidence. "" Dt Jilec. 1Ofi;cf the superscript to De Speciolihui Lepibur. Note also Philo's explanation in De Dec. 107 of thc fact that the hCth commandmcnt, despite this schema, concerns honoring one's parcnts. "' De Spec. 1%. 1.1: r&yivq . . . 16"i v i i 6 ~ ~ ~ 6 p CI o vD;e Dec. 175: + ~ ~ & h u .~ a . . riuv i v E ~ ~ ~ E I V ~ I L W Y . I"' Notc csp. that Rom 13:9, with its post-positive ydrp, is presented as an explanation of 13:Xh-a io@cd connection which the NRSV quitc obscures. It is noleworrhy that Paul mentions the sumrnarizin~function or the love command onlv in Galatians and Romans., i.e.., in those letters in which hc was most preoccupied with the qucstion orJewish customs. '" Philo, ,lf@ Abr 89-93.
"'
168
C H . ~ E RFOUR
tcrms of which the law of Moses could be summarized was made by these figures with heuristic, not reductionistic, intentions. The reference in Jas 2:8 to fulfilling "the royal law according to the scripture, 'you will lovc your ncighbor as yourself"' is undouhtedly to be understood in light of thc emphasis placed on love of one's Fellow human beings in the Jewish and Christian literature, and more particularly on the emphasis placed on J,cv 19:18 by early Christians. Comparison of James with this literature, however, requires attention to two distinct questions. Does the author of James understand the love command to be a summary of the Torah? And if so, what are the implications of this fact ror his understanding of the other commands which this law contain^?'^" In Jas 2:8-9, loving one's ncighbor and showing partiality are conbasted by means of an &iGVTOL . . . &i6P construction: E i ~ ~ T v6pov O L TE~E?TE p a a l h t ~ b v~ a r +v & ypa(Pilv & y a ~ T a~ nhqaiov Y~ ~ ~ a o v &; oeaur6vv,K&; ~OLE?TE. e i 6h npoowrrohqpnr~ira,b p p r i a v ipyix<e&~ E h ~ n 6 p ~ v bnh or v6pov w; napafiix~at.'"~
These verses are critical for understanding the author's view of the love command vis-i-vis the law as a whole and its other commands. Isolated from thcir context, however, they can and havc been takcn to support a variety of interpretations. Thcrc are two chicf ambiguities which complicate interpretation. First, it is unclear whether the "royal law" refers to the whole of the "law of freedom" or to Lev 19:18 in particular.'" Second, and more important for our purposes, is the relation of the condition of 2:8 to that of 2:9: taken by themselves, these verses can be construed either as a statement of opposite or of simultaneous conditions. Thus while thc majorih/ of interpreters have argued that the author juxtaposes loving one's neighbor and showing partiality because he views the latter as a transgression of thc love command,'" a number of scholars have understood .
~
"'.She
~
~
~
-
p
mere categorization ofJames as a Christian writing is not, of course, sufficient grounds for concluding that he would havc been more similar to Paul than to Philo or Hillel with respect to his understanding of the implications of such a summary for the other commands of the law. As is clear from a variety of sources (including Galatians and Romans themselves), Paul's stance on the question of the law was anything hut ubiquitous in early Christianity. '% For the textual situation as regards 2:8-9, see R. Nand el al., Nouurn 7estammlurn CIoeclim. Fdzo Critics ~ M o i o rIVr Calholic Lethr. Imtallmml I:Jomr (Sruttgart: Deutsch~ Bihel~esellschaft, 1997) 1. 31-32. I" For a sampling of advocares of cach position see Klcin, Ei" uolhrnmmrr Wed, 147 with natcs 157 and 158. "'Thus the vast majority ofintcipreters, whether or not they consider thc author
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
169
him to be arguing that those who show partiality, even if they love thcir ncighbor, arc transgressors of the law nonetheless."" Given these ambiguities, the author's view of the relation of the lovc command to the biblical prohibition of partiality and, by implication, to the "whole law," can only bc determined in conjunction with an analysis of thc larger argumcnt from the law presented in 2:8-11.
The argument of 28-11 However one interprets 22-9, it is clear that 2:10-11 is meant to explain the charge that thosc who show partiality are "convicted by thc law as transgrcssors."'1° Immediately aftcr this latter chargc, the author states a more general principle w-hich justifics it: "for (yhp) whoever keeps the whole law (Ghov ~ b vvbyov), but stumbles in one As wc [respect], has become liable for all of it (nckvzov Evo~og)."'~' have sccn, phrases analogous to James's Ghov zbv vbyov are used in connection with summaries of the law by Paul (Gal 5:14, b rrkg vbyog) and HiUel (6. St~abb.31a, i1513 nllnn h), whiie prcciscly thc sarnc phrase is found in at least some manuscripts of Matthew (Matt 22:40, 6hog b vbyog), whether with rcfercnce to loving one's neighbor as oneself (Paul), the golden rule (Hillel), or a combination of Deut 6:5 and Lev 19:18 (Matthew). It is therefore striking that if--as is clearly the c a s e t h e second half of the complcx condition of 2:10 (stumbling in one respect) refers back to the condition of 2:9 (showing partiality), the first half of thc complex condition of 2:10 (keeping "the whole law") corresponds to the condition of 2:8 (fulfilling thc "royal law" according to Lev 19:18). In short: fulfilling "thc royal law according to the scripture 'you will love your neighbor as yourself"' in Jas 2:8-9 corresponds with keeping "the whole law" in Jas 2:10.'42 This correspondcncc is not likely to be coincidental. O n the IRV 19:15 in mtnd. See in most detail the recent analvsis of Wachoh. "The Rich in Faith," 197-212. So Spiua, Der BrieJdeiJakobus, 66-69; Kiihl, Dit. Slellung desJaiakobr~ibriefei,4 I I; Ludwig; Worl nli Cfielz, 171 75. Note cso. the reocated use oivdro , in 2:10 and 2:11: cC Wachob. "The Rich in Faith," 21i-23. ' '*I For the sense of~iidrvrwv Evo~o see~ Ropes, St. Jarner, 200: "This is a rhetorical way of saying that he is a transgressor oC 'the law as a whole' ( r r a p a p i r q ~v6pou, v. 11); not of all the precepts in it." Nonetheless, note in this connection that while the neuter i v i cannot rekr ta an implied (feminine) fv~ohfi,it is clear from the context of 2 8 ~ 1 1 ~ - a npaicicularly d rrom 2:l 1, which is intended to explain 2:10 (note aeain the usc ofrbo)-that thc author here thinks of "onc" and "all" of the taw's ,, commands. See the graphic drpiction of this structural paml1r:l below, on p. 172. to have
'"
.
.
"'
170
CHAPTER FOUR
contrary, it strongly suggests that the author is aware of thc usc of Lcv 19:18 as a summary of "the wholc law." The reference to thc "royal law" in this connection supports this conclusion whether it describes the love command in particular or, morc likely, "thc whole law":'"3 if the "royal law" connotes "the wholc law," 2:8 apparently rcfcrs to "fulfilling thc wholc law" by loving one's neighbor as oncself; and if the "royal law" refers spccifically to the lovc command, this lavish desctiplion denotes its special importancc rclative to the law's other commands. Either way, the verse clearly indicatcs that 1,cv 19:lS is accorded some special status among the other commands of the law-; and given the corresponding reference to keeping "the whole law" in 2:10, it can safely be concluded from the argumcnt of 22-11 that the author is aware of the use of "love of ncighbor" as a summary of "the wholc law." On the other hand, given this correspondcncc between 2:8 and 2:10a, and 2:9 and 2:10b-c, respectively, 2:8-9 are clearly to be understood, like 210, as positing simultaneous rather than opposite conditions. That is, dcspite the allusion to the love command's summary function, thc author formulates a condition in which one both (i) "keeps the whole law," that is, by loving one's neighbor as oneself and (ii) "stumbles in one respect," that is, hy showing partiality. l'he result is rathcr paradoxicalkas, indced, is 2:10 itsclf.'" NonetheIcss, the subsequent explanation of 2:10 confirms that this is in fact the case; for the defense of 2:10 in 2:11 also assumes a condition in which one command is kcpt while another is broken. The warrant for 2:10 is presented as follows: q q ,~ c a ip . ) r p v ~ h q qc. i 6k 06 ~ O L X E ~ E Yw, E G ~ t q b yirp ~ i r r h v . ~ r o ~ ~ d~Trrcv
66, y&oyovctc
rrapaphzqq ~ ( l p o u . ' ~ . ~
The first haK of this versc idcntifies the basis Tor the general principle that "stumbling in one rcspcct" rcndcrs onc "liable for the law as a wholc" (2:10). Citing, by way of cxample, two additional com-
'*'
'"
See above, note 78.
The condition envisioned in Jus 2:10, in which one "keeps the whole law" while [ailing with respect to one o i its elements is, strictly speaking, impossible. According lo Johnson, "jilt must he that someone l r i a lo keep the wholc law; since the condition or not kecping each par1 shows that the translalion 'whoever keeps the whok: law' is impossihle" (Lrlin "/Jaiame.r2 222). This lamer view, hoi\~ever, rails to recopizc the imny of the passagc, on which sce bciow. I" The only substanrive variant in this verse is the n:placement oSrrapa&kq< wilh drnoordrrq5 in P" and A.
LOGOS
m
THE LAW OF FKEEDOM
171
mands (murder and adultery), the author grounds this p~inciplein thc various commands' common source, whether conceived as the lam- or the lawgiver hirn~clf.'~%e thcn proceeds, in the latter half of the vcrsc, to formulate a condition parallel to that of 2:10 using thcsc ncwly introduced commands. A condition, that is, of simultaneous obedience to the adultery command and disobedience to the murder command is posited in order to demonstratc more forcefully the specific claim that such a condition results in one's status as a transgrcssor of the law-: no onc, it is assumed, would deny that a murdcrer who has not committed adultery is any lcss a law-breaker!Ii' The entire argumcnt of 2:lO-11, thcn, is predicated on the assumption of a condition of simultaneous obedience and disobedience which renders onc a transgressor of thc law. The argument moves from specific commands (love of ncighbor and partiality in 2:8-9), to thc statement of a general principle (2:10), and back to specific commands (adultery and murdcr in 2:11) in order to support the claim that showing partialiyeven, paradoxically, if one "kccps thc wholc law-" by loving one's neighboyrenders one a transgrcssor of the law. The correspondences between the two conditional statcments of 2:8-9 and the complex conditions of 2:10 and 2.1 1 are in fact quite ~triking:"~ While the author of James elsewhere refrrs to sclipture itself as "speaking" (cf. 2:23; 4:5, 6) the aorist forms seem to suggest that it is the "lawgiver" (cT 412) that is thc implied subject; so MuUner, DrJakobusb7iei; 125; Laws, Epirlle o f J a m ~ , 114; Davids, Ep:piit(e of Jams, 117; Burchard, "N;icI~stenlicbegchot," 519; Johnson, Leller oJ,7am, 232; Wachoh, "The Rich in Faith," 218f. In contrast to the position argued here; namely, that the principle of 2:10 is b a e d upon the common origin of all the commands, Fabris contends that the author argues that "stumbling in one respect" is to become liable Tor "the whole" precisely inasmuch as the latter is summed up in the command of love of neighbor. This argument, however, as Fahris himself acknowledges (Lege, 172), is simply not in the text. Fahris's interpretation is rather a function or the problematic assumption of a single "New Testament" view of the love command which he hrings to the text: "Questo precetto dell'amore del prossirno, secondo la tradizione parenetica del N.T., non i. solo il pi" importante di tutti, ma 6 la sintesi ed il campimento di tuttc le prescrizioni della legge" (ibid., 171). Laws, who finds this section or James "curiously inept" since murder and adultery wcrc "so gcnerdiy accepted that assent to them would hardly be seen to entail assent to the Jewish Law and everything contained in it" (Epklle of,7amei, 113), has missed the point of 2:I l h entirely. The argument is effective precisely because these commands were "so generally accepted"! I"' Note Further that, as \Vachob points out ("The Rich in Faith," 219: 222) the conditional sutements of 2:8-9 and 2:11 are both prcsent simple conditionals, while 2:10--a thc gcncral principle which undergirds both the judgment of 2:8-9 and 2:1 I-is formulated as a conditional relative sentence w-hich runctions as a ruture more vivid condition (sce on this latter point ibid., 214f).
"'
172
v6pov .ieh&lrePaotht~bv ~ a r z&j v ypatpjv . dryanjo~lqrbv nhqoiov oou w5 oeavr6v;
CHAPTEK FOUR
Ghov rbv v6pov r11~jql
oG pot~eGetq
Givcn the fact that the juxtaposition of fulfilling the royal law according to Lev 19:18 with breaking the partiality command of Lev 19:15 in 2:8-9 corresponds to that of keeping "the wholc law" with "stumbling in one rcspcct" in 2:lO; and given, further, that both the general principlc w-hich forms thc basis for the judgment of 2:9 and the demonstration of the viability of that principle in 2:11 assumc a condition of simultaneous obedience and disobedicncc; it can only bc concluded that 2:8-9, too, are intended as positing simultaneous rather than formally opposite conditions.'"' Thc upshot of this analysis is that James assumes, at lcast for the sakc of aqpment, the use of the love command as a summary of "the whole law." Nonetheless, he presents for consideration a situation in w-hich the love command is kcpt while another of the law's commands-namely, that prohibiting partialiv-is broken; and he concludes that the subject of such a condition is a "transgrcssor of the law" despite his or hcr attention to thc summarizing command of Lev 19:18.'"' The citation of thc lattcr specifically within its writ-
'4%gainst Wachob, it i s scarcely an "immediate inference" from the simple juutaposirion of 2:s and 2:9 that showing partiality is a n offense against the love command (The Rich in Faith,'; 208). On this logic, one might also assert that it is an "immediate infercnce" from 2 : l l that committing murder is an offense against the adultery prohibition. "O To be sure, the author's primary concern Iics with socio-economic mattcrr rather than with legislation resarding diet or ritual purity; sec on thk below: under the heading "The Law of Freedom and the Torah." Nonerhcless, it is clear From the loge of thc argument presented in 2:8 11 that he considers the love command,
LOCOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
173
ten context is quite effective in this respect.'" Unlike Paul, for example, who refers to love of ncighbor more generally as a "word" which summarizcs thc whole law (Gal 5:14; Rom 13:9), the lovc command is citcd explicitly rarlr r+v y p a ~ j v :the command to love one's neighbor in Lev 19:18 is thus presented as onc (albeit one important) command alongside others-including the prohibition of pa~tiality (cf. Lcv 19:15!)-within the writtcn law. In fact, thc apparent tension between obeying a command that summarizes "the whole law" w-hie at thc samc time brcaking another command of that law is captured pcrfcctly in the paradoxical statement of 2:10. Obcying "the wholc law-" whiie stumbling with respcct to one of its commands is, strictly speaking, impossible. However, when 2:10 is viewed as a more general restatement of 2:8-9, thc paradox is somewhat mitigated: keeping the "whole law," in this context, is actually a rcference to obcying a particular command of regardless of its summarizing function, to be one command among others within the Torah. Already in 1905, Kiihl characterized the &lure or exegetes to recognize this Tact as "cine der merhviirdigsten Erscheinungcn in der Geschichte der Exegese." His attempt to account for this is quite telling: "lch h n mir das nur aus der begreifiichen Scheu crkl2ren, innerholb des neum 7estammte.s unlnr/rixlliche Anrc/~auungmvon dem Wene des Gesetzes fir den Christen and "on der Kedcutung des Licbesgebotes im Zusammenhangc mil der liragc nach der ErfiUung drs Gesetzes konsvaticren zu mussen" (h Ste11uq dei JakobusbnEfes, 10; emphasis added). It is likely that such a general notion that "love of neighbor" lies at the very heart of. Christianity is responsible Tar the tension, observed alrcady by Mcyer (Riikl, 149 and n . 6), in Dibeiius's assessment of the understanding of the love command in James: on one hand, it "is not considered in our passage to be thc chicf commandment, in the sense of the famous saying or Jesus," but is rather "one commandment alongside others" (though, it is to bc notcd, within a new Christian law; not the "old" Jewish one); at thc same time, huwcver, this "Christian law," as o ChGkm low, "is not obeyed by being cvcr so careful in tiny maucrs, but rather by rulfilling the great commandment of lovc" (Dibeiius, 3ome.r; 142, 14.4.)! Note also that Dibeiius hirnsclf describes the author's remarkably hostile statements regarding "the rich" as "sub-Christian" (unlerchristlichez);sce James, 49 (= Der Bnejdes Johr,bw, 49). In this connection, it is hardly coincidental that Spitta (Der Bri$ des Jakobur, 66-69) and Meyer (%&el, 149-50)-each of whom understood James to have origa r p c d that its author did not coninally bcen a non-Christian Jewish writing-both one's neighbor to be tantamount to fullillinc sider lovine u u - "the whole law." The fact that these competing interpretations can be correlated with opposing general dassifications ofJamcs as "Christian" or 'Jcwish" suggests that the issue hcre is not simply the text of James: c q u d y critical fur interpretation are the assumptions regarding the nature of "Christianity" and its relation to ':Judaismn which one brings to the text. 'j' IT the "royal law" does in Tact rerer to the "whole law" as suggested ahove, then 2:8 is to be understood as an ironic statemcnt of the v i m that one can fuKi the "whole law" simply by loving one's neighbor-an irony which emerges in any casp in 210. See further on the ironic aspects of this passage immediately below.
174
CHAPTER FOUR
the law, namely, Lev 19:18. The paradoxical quality remains noncthcless, lending, indccd, a rather derisive tone to the argnment: there is an unmistakable irony in the author's allusion in 2:10 to kceping "the whole law" by fulfilling the love command givcn his largcr point that one can love one's ncighbor as oneself and yet still be exposed by thc law as a transgressor."' IVhile awarc of the use of "love of neighbor" as a sumrnav of "the w-hole law," the author himself is at best wary of this summary, at least to the extent that it might lead one to neglect other spccific points of the law-. Regardless of its possible summarizing function, "loving one's neighbor as oneself" is not, without further ado, simply equivalent to fulfilling the whole law in the Letter of James. From a structural point of vicw, the primary diKercncc bctwccn 2:8-9 and the conditionals of 2:10 and 2.1 1 is that while the latter two prescnt single, complex conditional statements, 2:8-9 consists of two formally distinct conditions. Jas 2:8, that is, contains its own no1~i.r~). Evcn this difference, though, apodosis: "you do well" (rahiu~ strongly supports interpreting 2:8-9 as prcsenting simultaneous conditions, and reading a certain irony in the author's treatment of the lovc command as a summary of "the whole law." For this same "commendation," differing only in number, appears with an unmistakable sarcasm in the immediately following---and closcly rclatcdMdiscussion of n i o ~ qand :pya: you who "believe that 'God is one'," the author says, "do well" (xahG5 not~i5);but no more so than the demons who also believe this "and shudder" (2:19)! It is particularly striking that while this "commendation" is given in Jas 2:8 to those who "love their neighbor" in accord with Lcv 19:18, it is dircctcd in 2:19 to those who believe that "God is one," a passage which echoes thc Shema as found in Dcut 6:4--9: & K O ~ E , 'I~paqh.K6ptoq b 8ebg il@Gv Kbp~oqE[< ho11v . . . (LXX Dent 6:4).'j4
'" 'mat is; the author grants [or the s a k e of argumcnt the daim of his imagined audience that they have observcd the commandment in which "thc whole law" is fullilled by loving their neighbor as themselves. Nonetheless, he argucs, they are ilill lawbreakers if they disregard other commands of the law; e.g., Lev 19:15. In shorr, while granting that love of neighbor mighl serve in some sense as a summary of "thc wholc law;" the author pointedly critiques the notion that one actually fulfills the whole law simply by loving onc's ncighbor as oneseK Put in thc terms of the distinction drawn above on pp. 167f. the author concedcs thc heuris tic use of ihis summar). while rjecting the reductionistic one. See on this point the concluding chppter of ihis study. 'jl Dibelius? James, 159; Cantinat, 1.a Epilm de Saint ,7acqum et de Sainl J d ,1.17; Da\ids. Epglk o/jirrnex; 125; Martin, James, 8 9 cT. Johnson, I& oi,7ames3 24~0.
"'
LOGOS AND TIIE LAW OF FREF.DOM
175
Lev 19:18 and this passage from Deuteronomy, \\-hich follow-s the statcmcnt that "God is one" with an injunction to love him (Deut 6:5), are of course precisely those t\vo passages singlcd out in thc synoptic gospels as the t ~ , omost important passages of the la^-.'^^ Though seldom notcd in the commentaries,'" this correspondence bctcrccn Jas 2:8 and 2:19 goes a long way toward clarifying the author's interest in the lov-e command in 2:8%11. Given the cmphasis placed on love of neighbor particularly in connection with summaries of the law in Je~vishand especially Christian literature, it is no more ncccssary to suppose that the reference LO Lcv 19:18 in 2:8 implies that some "opponents" have defended behaving in the manner described in 2:2-3 by claiming that thcy had thereby sought to "love" the wealthy man''' any more than it is necessary to assumc that 2:19 reflccts a situation in which some actual interlocutor has appealed to his bclief that "God is one" to defend his extraordinarily callous treatment of the poor as narratcd in 2:15-16. Nor is it the case that the author wishes to dcny thc importance or Lev 19:18 or Deut 6:4K, or evcn thc possibility that they might, together or scparatcly, rcprcsent in some sense an adequate summation of that which is requircd for "lie" or entrance into the "kingdom.""" Rather, the author singles out Lev 19:18 in 2:8 and alludes to Deut 6:4K in 2:19 because he is concerned that an eschatological conlidcncc bascd on attcntion to thcsc s n c r a l principles might lead to neglect of other elcments of thc law- which are, ultimately, of equal importance.'"Vaith that "God is one" is crucial,'"' hut cannot, of itself,
"'
Sce esp. Mark 12:29-30, which includes Deut 6:4 in its citation; Matthew and Luke both omit Deut 6:4 in this conncclion, and cite the command to love God in I k u t 6:5 immediately. '"" This is apparently a consequence of thc failure to rccognizc thc inmy in thc author's treatment oS Lev 19:18 in 28-1 1. Indeed; where the repetition of the ; in 2:8 and 2 1 9 is noted at all hy those who a r ~ p ethat clause ~ahiugn o t ~ i r e-eig showing partiality is a transgession oS the lave command, it is generally only to point out that the phrase is used ironically in the latter, hut not in the former! See Mayor, EpirtIe ,f St. ,7ames, 9 I ; also Johnson, Let& oJBmi, 231 ~.;j So; e.g., Spitta, Der Bnejdes 3nkr,hu.r, 66 6 9 ; Kiihl, Die Skllun~,4 1I; Ropes, St. Jams, 197. 'jX The repeated designation or those for whom God's promises of "life" (1:12; cC Luke 10:25 28) and "kingdom" (2:5; cf. I2.lark l2:28-34) will be fiilfillrd a\ "lhose who lout him" would scem to suggcst that he himself linds "lovr of God," at lcast, to hc: an apt summav. Sce above p. 166 on the use or this phrase in other literaturc. 'l'hc issuc in 22-1 1 is not, howcvcr, merely one or compering surnmarics. "" iU1 commands, afier all, comc [?om Cod cT. Jas 2 1 0 11. Cf. Kiihl, Die Strilun,q, 10E Ropes, St. ,7arne~~ 197. Note that the aurhor himself rlsr\+-hcre invokes this hclicf indccd; likely Dcut
""
176
CHAPTER FOUR
"savc" (cf. 2:14); so too, those who "love their ncighbor" do well, but this, of itseK, does not ensure that they will not ultimately be "convicted by the law as transgressors" (2:lO). Summary or not, merely to love one's ncighbor is not neccssarily to "keep the wholc law." Attention to this command alone, therefore, is not sufficicnt grounds for confidence in the face of a coming judgment which will be executed by the standard of thc whole "law- of freedom" (2:12, 61ix v6kou khmOepia5), and one which will bc, potentially, "merciless" (2:13).
The Law
of Freedom
and the Torah
That it is the Torah which the author of James describes as the "pcrfcct law of freedom" emerges with clarity from his argument that those who show partiality are transgressors of thc law (Jas 2:8-11). All four of the commands explicitly idcntified as elements oS the law in this p a s s a g c a n d indccd, in the letter as a wholeare commands of the Torah. He follow-s the IXX order when citing, as words of the law or of God the "lawgiver" (cf. 4:12), the prohibitions of murdcr and adultery; and he draws upon a tradition of legal interpretation associated with thc biblical prohibition of partiality in order to providc an cxamplc of the t p e of behavior he feels Lev 19:15 excludes. More tellingly still, his refercnccs to love of ncighbor and partiality in 2:s-9 assume the written context of these commands within the Torah: aware that "love of neighbor" is used as a summary of "thc whole law," the author effectively locates this command within its scriptural context, thus identifying it as one command alongside others within a larger body of law-and particularly alongside that which prohibits partiality, his chief concern. Obediencc to each of these commands is equally important given the fact that both stem from the same source, whether conceived as the law or, which is the implication in any case, the lawgiver h i i self. Regardless of its summarizing function, therefore, adherencc to the love command alone will not suffice for success at the eschatological judgmcnt, for this judgment will be executed by the lawgiver in accordance with the whole of the "law of freedom" (2:12; cf. 4:12). Scriptural law--that is, the various bodics of legislation that were gathered togethcr and idcntificd as a law given by God through
6:4ff i t s e l f ~ h e narguing Tor the necessity of "doing" rather than 'judging'' the law (412): sic hanv [b] vafio8iq< rui rp& b 6uv6pwo5 oGoa~mi dmohiaa~.
LOCOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
177
Moses-was (and is), of course, subject to a variety of interprctations. Differing interpretations of this law- were one important faclor, albeit among others, in thc formation of distinct Jemish and Christian groups."" Onc cannot, thererore, make facilc conclusions regarding thc author's interpretation of particular aspects of this body of lcgislation based simply on his gcncral allegiance to it. Indeed, of the four commands of this law that he explicitly cites, thc only ones to which he devotes any cxtcnded attention are the prohibition of partiality and the love command. Interestingly, both in connection with the former and in the statemcnt of his general lcgal principle that "whoever keeps the whole law but stumbles in one respcct has become liable for all" (2:10), onc finds similarities to rabbinic tradition.'" One ought not, howcver, draw any sweeping conclusions from these isolatcd examplcs. Little more than his adhcrencc to this gcnera1 principlc, his rclatcd insistence that obedience to the love command does not of itself constitute kecping "the whole law," and his particular interest in social and cconomic matters'" can be determined regarding his general approach to the Torah. The distinction bctwccn the written body of lcgislation and its intcrprctation at thc hands of diierent individuals or groups takes on a particular importance with respcct to those aspects of Jewish law whose interpretation proved most divisive in early Christianity, that is, the legislation concerning the cult, purity, dict, the calendar, and circumcision. Thc author's silence with respcct to thcsc aspects of thc law would seem to indicate, at least, that they are not among his foremost concerns.'" On the other hand, there is little in the letter which suggests that he rcjected these parts of the law- outright. Ih' See, e.g., E. P. Sanders, j'udaimz: Kaclice and Hel$ 63 HCE-66 CE (London: SCM; Philadelphia: Trinity P ~ s Intcmational, s 1992) 13-29 and Part 111: "Groups and Parties." Sanders's omission of, e.g., the Jerusalem Christians from this discussion is perhaps indicative of a more general-- and quite problematicscholarly tendency to view thc terms "Christianity" and 'Judaism" as convastive categories even Mithin the earliest pcriod of the rormer's emergence. I"' On the author's treatment of partiality, see ahove pp. 161% on the basic legal principle of 2:10, see the passages assembled by Dihelius; j'arnei; 144. Interestingly; some (beginning with Augustine) have also pointed out the similarity between J a 5 2:10 and the Stoic principle of the unity of virtue; see esp. M. O'Rourke Royle, "'lhc Stoic Paradox orJames 2:10," JTS 31 (1985) 6 1 1 1 7 . "" See furthur on this immediately helow. I" It is not at all clcar, for example? to what extcnt thc command "purify (rorOapioar~)hands," coupled ~ 6 t hthat to "sancti$- (&piviaa~~) hearts" in Jas 4% is meant literally. What is clear in any case is that the only "impurity" for which the author shows any explicit concern is that which results from the pursuit of onc's
178
CHAPTER FOUR
His basic legal principle that stumbling \lith respect to even one command of the law rendcrs onc a "Iabv-breakcr" is formulatcd with no such stipulation. Ile sho11-s no interest in thc allegorical intcrpretation employed to this end, for example, in Epirlle gBarnabar; nor is anything analogous to a deuterosir thcoq- clearly at work in his letter.'" \\'bile his description or the l a ~ ras both "pcrfcct" and "or frccdom" has often been takcn as an indication that these aspects of the la\$-were no longer binding,'"" wve have already seen examples of Jewish authors who, also inlluenccd by the Stoic concept of Ian., could describe thc Torah similarly quite apart from any such V ~ C M . . ' The ~ ~ mere Fact that thc author of Jamcs \\,as Christian, of coursc, is hardly decisive in this respect. There was no single ''Christian" position on such mattcrs, and it is by no mcans clear that those who held a more conscrvativc position with rcspcct to thcm could not themselves have made apologetic usc of thc Stoic iheory. Thc author's obvious intercst in associating the law with "frccdom" (ih~vfkpia), in fact, can just as casily bc cxplaincd as a rcaction to Paul's polemdesires or the failurc to control onc's tongue. Thus do the commands of 4 8 , givcn to "sinncm" and Giyru~o~, respectively; follow thc chargc that such people's p u ~ ~ u i f ofhe pbuures makes rhem enemies of God and, ronversely; constitutes "friendship with the world" (41-6); scc Chapter Fivr under thr heading "Desirc and thc Gifts of Gad in 41-6,'' and on James's understanding- of the 6 i y u ~ o gin piuticular under the heading "bL5lchqpog." Note, too; that it is the " t o n ~ u r "ahove all else which leads to impurity; on this notion, see Chapter Five under the heading "dhetas." It is in light of this association o l "impurity" with "the world" and "the tongue" that one should understand the author's definition of "pure and underded religion" ( 8 p q a ~ e i uratlap& rai dr~iav~og) us krrping oncsclf "unstained (60iQov) from the world" (1:27); note, in k t , that this follou.s immediately upon thc siatcmcnt that the religion (8pqoreia) oC onc who tails to "bridle" one's tonguc is "usclcss" (1:26). On the use of purity languagc in James. see further see S ~ i t z '3amcs , and the Law," 4x1-R? "'" .k is the rasc, e.g., with Trenaeus (see above, note 6X), who also, incidentally, interpreted certain aspecur oFJewish law cillcgc>riccilly(A. 11. 4.1 1 . 4 4.14.3). Sec lurk e r on h e d e u k r o i ~theory the discussion of the Aposfok Comlilulllulim in Cliapter Thrcc. I"" So_ most recently, Tsuji. Glaube, 110-1.5. CCT Ropes; $1. 7arne.r; 178: "there is no ground ibr the common ufimation that this phrase irnpiics a sublimated, spiritualised vicw of the Jcwisll law; which, it is said, would h a w heen impossible lor a faithful Jew." Koprs; howevrr, assumes thvt "[tJtlc usc of the phrase by a Christian implies that h r conceivrd Christianity as a law; including and fulfilling (411. 5") dlc old one." I find no evidrnce in,Jamcs, however; thvt thc author had any conccpt of an "old" law, nor that he conccivcd o l "Christianih" as a "new'' law wllicii as; presumably. in ihe conception orRopcs (cl. p. lig)-st<~od over against the law coC ':Judaism"; cT KiL-in; Ein incl/h~mmen~,s IVeik. 137. It is in any rase problemadc to draw conclusions regarding a givcn rarly author's view of the Ian. purely on thc hasis of his/hcr stiltus a s a "Christian."
'"
1.OGO.S AND THE LAW OF FREEUOM
179
ical association of it with "slavery""'" as on thc assumption that the communities for xvhich he v-rotc: as a "liberated Diaspora Judaism," "no longer had to bear thc burden of rilualism."'"~ndeed,the view of the love command against which thc author argucs in 2:8-11 is particularly reminiscent of Paul's peculiar notion that, since '")-ou shall not commit adultery', 'you shall not murdcr' (01' ~OLXEGUEI<, 06 q o v ~ G o e y ;cf. Jas 2:ll!); 'you shall not stcall, 'you shall not cox-ct'; and any other command is summed up ( & v a ~ & q a h a l o C ~in a ~ 'you ) shall love your neighbor as yoursclf'," it is the case that "the one who loves another has fnlfillcd the law" (Rom 13:8-9)."" hloreover, thc immcdiatcly following, and closely related section 2:14-26, dcspite the protestations of some scholars: is almost certainly to be undcrstood in light of Paul's notion of salvation by faith apart from works."' 'To be sure, the author's silcncc on the law's commands in such areas as purity, dict and the calendar is signilkant, and all the more so if he docs intend to interact with Paul, whosc association of the law with slavery rather than freedom, whosc principle of "faith apart from works," and whose view of thc lovc command, were all formulated cspecially with such issues in mind. It is in fact clear from thc lcttcr as a whole, and particularly from 2:l-13 and 2:14-26 thcmsclves, that thc author of James is concerned above all with social and economic issues. To the extent that he docs interact with Paul, then, it cannot be doubted that his primary concern regarding a pauline formulation such as n i a z ~ gxwpiq &pywv is i s possible implications for Christian attention to socio-cconomic matters rather than adherence to the legislation regarding dict, thc calendar, or circumcision by Jewish or non-Jewish Christians."' While it might fairly I" Le., as apposed to 6hm'Jepia; see fsp. Gal 4:21k5:1, and further thc Condusio~l to this study. "'I Dibelius, Jornn, 119. Cf. Ludwig, Wort olr Ge.retz: 184 87. "' Against, most recently, ?'. Pcnner, T?u Epislle ofJames and E~chatolqyr.Re-reading m Animt Chriitian IxtW (,JSNI'Sup 121; Shefield: Shefield Academic Press, 1996) 47 74; and Johnson; Leller o f J m e x , on m~hichscc my review inJR 78 (1998) 102 1. O n this point, see rurthcr the Canclusion of this study. Cf. in this respcct the very early caricature of Paul's thought, reportcd by Paul himself in Rom 38: "Lcl us do evil so that good may come." It is by no means clcvr that r&rari rrfcr spccificdy to the "evils" of disregard fbr circumcision or Jemrish dietary customs. \Vhatevcr might ha\,e been the understanding of the law of those who rorrnulated this caricature, the critique assumes a much more generalized understandirig of Paul's theok,$~ical principles or at lcast a concern regarding the implications or his basic principles k,r Christian ethics in general.
"" "'
180
CHAPTER FOUR
be concluded from his silence on these matters that the author of James was not among thosc who insisted on thc necessity of circumcision for non-Jewish adhcrcnts to the Christian movement, the question of whcthcr he advocated the continuation of such practices by j'ewirh members of thc movement is more dimcult to answer in light of the following considcrations. The dcbatc rcgarding thc obscwance of Jewish customs by nonJcnish Christians in which Paul was embroiled scems to have arisen in connection ~ 6 t ha speciiic circumstance within the Christian movement: the increasing number of non-Jewish adherents to the movement gavc risc to questions regarding (i) the conditions which should govern interaction bctwcen Jewish and non-Jewish adhcrcnts, particularly in the social context of shared meals; and, perhaps as a consequence, (ii) the extent to which non-Jewish group membcrs should live according to Jewish customs."' The nature of this problem admits of a variety of solutions. At one pole is a position of complctc adherence, evcn by non-Jews, to (somc intcrprctation of) thc law; so, apparently, the so-callcd "falsc brothers" of Gal 2:4 and thc "Pharisaic Christians" in the narrative of Acts 15:1, 5. At the other pole, no restrictions whatsoever were incumbcnt on non-Jews, whether or not Christian Jews themselves continued to live by them; so, apparently, Paul himself, and perhaps Petcr before the incident at Antioch (Gal 2:lI-12). In bctwccn these two poles one can conceive of more moderate positions, such as no shared meals between Jemish and non-Jewish Christians unless some degree of non-Jewish observance obtained, at lcast in the context of common meals; so,
"'
Such a generative context is reflected in Galatians 2; d Acis 10 11 and 15, wherc Peter's (reluctant) decision to share a meal with nongews prompts a debate about circumcision, resulting in a "decree" from Jamcs and the Jerusalem church on thc requirements for non-Jews in this respect. The issues behind the controversy in Antioch recounted by Paul in Galatians 2 are notoriously murky; it seems rather dear, however, that the issue was related to Jewish dietary restrictions. IT h i s is true, it appears that the simple connection o r eaiing and circumcision made by thc author o i 1.uke-Actdespite the impression lert Crom reading Galatians, in which Paul recounts this incident before launching into an argument against the practice of circumcision-- reflects a non-JeGsh perspective on the issues: a Jewish concern for biblical purity regulations is viewed more simplistically as u Jewish reluctance to eat with those who aren't circumcised. See, however, E. P. Sanden, ':Jewish Association with Gentilcs and Galatians 211-14," Conversation Continuer: SIudk.i in Paul and John in Honor o/ J. Louis .War& (ed. R. T. Fonna and B. R. Gavcnta; Nashville: Abingdon. 1990) 170 -88, who tends toward the view that no spccific law \*ras ar issue in h t i o c h . with thc conflict resultins rathcr CrorornJamcs's more general concern for "Peter's reputation" if hc consorted too clr~scly~ too oiicn; with nonlJews.
ne
LOGOS AND THE IAW OF FREEDOM
181
it would scem, the "mcn from James," and ultimately, apparently; virtually all of the Christian Jews in Antioch after their arrival (Gal 2:12-13)."' In [act: the evidcncc from thc first centuries or the movement indicates that no one position was agrecd upon by all intcrestcd partics, Acts 15 and 16:4 notwithstanding. While the bulk of the extant early Christian literaturc--prcscrved by latcr "orthodox" copyists!--reflects a more liberal position, it is clcar rrom the scattered rcports of a numbcr of early authors that Christians continued to disagrcc on such matters. Though thc dctails of such reports arc oftcn confuscd, it cannot be doubted that somc Christians continued to assume the importancc of observance of Jewish customs well beyond the first century."" In a particularly interesting passage from the Dialope with Typho, in fact, Justin distinguishes between two types of such Christians: those who obscrvc Jewish customs and would further "compel those Gentilcs who believe in Christ to livc in all respects according to thc law given by Moses, or choose not to associate so intimately with them," and those w-ho continue to obscrvc thc law thcmsclves, but who do not rcquirc non-Jewish mcmbcrs of thc movemcnt to do the same."" There is in any case little reason to suppose that the religious concerns oT those Christians who assumed the enduring validity of the Torah as law-regardless of their position on the matter of nonJcwish observancc-revolved around the cult, purity, circumcision or diet. The fact that our primary evidence for such Christians are passages from Paul's letters which deal specifically with disagreements It is by no means clear from this passage that all of the Christian Jcws in h t i o c h suddenly decided that the nun-observant gentile Christians there could no longcr be considered members of the movement. More likely, the issue was simply one of the implications of their non-ohscwance Tor the interaction ofJews and nonJews in the contcxt o r shared meals. Note also the "mediating" positions onJewish dictary restrictions reflected in Acls 15:28-29, as wcli as in Did 6:2-3: "For if thou canst bear the whole yoke of thc Lord, thou wilt he pcrfcct, but if thou canst not, do what thou canst. And concerning rood, hear what though canst, hut keep strictly from that which is offered to idols, for it is the wmnhip of dead gods." Note that even Paul proved to be somewhat squeamish on the subject of rood that had been involved in sacrifices to other gods (I Cor 10:14 22; though cf. 8:1 1 3 ) . See, e.g.; h e discussion of G. Strecker, "On the Problem of,Jewish Christianity," in W. Bauer, Orhodoq and Ifereg in F~rlieitCh
"'
182
CI-LWTER
FOUR
on these issues has almost certainly distorted our picture of their religious motivations."' In fact, there are sevcral indications that social and economic issues were paramount for at least some such Christians. Paul himself rcports that h e very leaders in Jerusalem whose misgivings regarding eating vith non;Jews ~souldlatcr infuriate him initially (and quite possibly continuall>-)""madc only onc stipulation regarding Paul's quest to secure non-Jelvish adherents to the movement: they asked "only" that they "remember the poor" (Gal 2: 10, ~ClvovrGv nrwxGv 'iva pvq~ove.5wpev),resulting in Paul's on-going collcction for Jcrusalem from his non:Jcwish churchcs (Gal 2:lOj."" Such a socio-economic. intcrcst is of course round throughout the synoptic gospels, and is particularly prominent in thc synoptic sayings source, where oi arwxoi-as, perhaps, among the Jerusalcm Christians (cf. Gal 2:10; Rom 15:25)-~-~sccms to be used as a selfdesignation for mcmbcrs of thc movement.""' Such a selr-designation
"' llihclius's interpretation of the I.euzr of Jarncs, c.g.; seems to be irifomcd by an approach to early Christianity wrhich assumes only two basic f i ~ m sof the mouement for which "the break with Judaism was not accomplished in thc radical fashion with which wc arc familiar from thc Pauline T.ettersn (Jamex, i 19; with specilic reference to the g n u p I've numbered [i]): (i) a "liberated Diaspora Judaism," in which Christians "were no longer bound to the leuer of the Old Testament" and thus "no longer had to bear thc burden of ritualism" (22);and (ii) "the advocates of a strict ritualistic praxis" characterized as a "hidebound Jcwish-Christian piety," of ~ , h i c hJames the brother o f Jesus and "thc pcoplc from Jamcs" of Galatians 2 are taken to be representative (ibid.? 17). " V ~ a u laccuses Peter (and, by implication; apparently ever). uthcr ChristianJew at Anliocil except himn:lfi) of refusing lo cat with non-Jews after "certain people from James" arrived (Gal 2:11 13)~-which, of count, implies that these latter &o had mispjvings ahout eating with non-Jews, at least under the circumstances obtaining at Antioch. The extent to which those "certain people from James" attempted to rorce non-Jews into living in accord with Jewish customs, however, is by no means clear. Note particularly that Paui's characterizadon of Peter as "compelling the gentiles to live like Jcws (iov6oi;c~~v)"is not obviously based on anything more than his withdrawal from common meals. It is not clear, that is, whether the issue in Antioch was onc of gentile participation in thc movemcnt per re, or the extent of the participation in thp movemcnt hy non-observant adhcrcnts. "" Notc that the (evidently) uncircumcised 'Fitus (cf G d 2:Q!)was himself engagcd in this collrrtion according to 2 Cor 8:16, 23. '"' J. S. Kloppenborg, The Formahon cf 0, Tr"~Pcto7ierin Ancienl Chnilkrt lli
1.OCO.S 4ND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
183
is also evident centuries later, notably, on the part of a group of Christians notorious ror thcir continued adherence to the Torah; h e "Ebioniies:" ~houghour scant evidence Tor this group obscures the extent to which this name reflected thcir chief concerns.'"' It is worth noting, too, that what little evidence we have: apart rrom Paul, for those Christians who continued to live by Jewish customs also sussests a particular emphasis on social rclations. Thus the cultic instruction preserved in Maithclr's sermon, lor example, assumes participation in the Jenish cult, but subordinates it to social concerns: "Thcrefore, when you bring y-our gift-offering (to be placed) on the altar, and therc you remember that your brother has something against you, lcavc your gift therc in front of the altar, and first go and become reconciled with your brother, and then come (back) and offer your gift.""" One can also comparc in this respect the following "woe" proclaimed against the Pharisees (and scribes, according to Matthew) in the synoptic sayings source:'"" Luke 11:42: But woe to you Pharisees! for you tithe mint and rue and every hcrb, and ncslect the justicc and love or God; these patter] you ought to have done, without neglecting thc others. where it crncrgcs with a vehemence rivalled only by 1 b:nach and thc Leticr of Tames among thc ancient Jcwish and Christian lilerature; ser G. W. E. Nk:kclsburg; "Riches, the Rich and God'sJudgmeni in 1 Enoch 92 1 0 5 and the Gospel .4ccording to Luke," .,VS 25 (1979) 3 2 4 ~ 4 4 .The parahle of Lazarus and the rich man, iir cxample, preserved only in Luke, envisions a posi-rnonem re\,ersal in M-hich a wcalthy man is punished in Hades, apparently fbr no other crime than living in luxuly whilc ignoring h e poor man laying at his gate. l b c impovcrisl~edLazarus, on the othcr hand. rcceives camfbrt "wiih Abraham" after his dcath (Luke 1619 31; note esp. 16:2.5). It is of particular inten:st in thc presenr connection that this story assumes an interpretation oC "Moses and thc prophets" according to which the problematic nature of such bchaviar should bc pcrieciiy clear (Luke 1629-31). Nowbly2 such sorio-economic interests are associated in the second book of l.uke's work particularly with the Christians at Jerusalem, who arc also portrayed as rontinuing in lhcir adherence to Jrwish religious practices and who are. irideed? as a ,TOUP, "zrabus fur thc law" (Acts 2:44. +7; 432-5:l 1; cf. 21:20). 'I" Scc, cg., ihc rcccnt and concisc survey of rhe evidence in S. Goranson, "Ebionitcs," ABD 2.260 61; Further Kcck; "The Poor hmonx rhr Saints inJcwish Clrristianity and d ~ u m r m ; "55 66. Mau 523-24; cired according to the translalion or 13. I). Beo, 7 h e Smnon on tiie ~VfountA Commentaly on the Smton on #w 'Mounl, includiq lihe S m o n on the /'lam fibfatO~m 5 3 727 and Luke 6 2 0 - 4 9 ) (Ilermcncia; Ptiiladelphia: Fortress, 1995) 198; ser fiirther Betz's cornments in ihid, 222 26. Citcd according lo the translation oF,J. S. Kloppcnhorg, Q,l'amllcii $nop.sir, Cnlicnl .~\i,lr., & Cor~rnrdanct.(Foundarions & Face&; Sonoma, Cr\: Polcbridge; 1988) 113.
""
""
184
CHAPTER FOUR
Matt 23:23: Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for you tithe mint and dill and cumin, and leave aside weightier matters of the law, justice and mercy and fiithfuluess; these Dattcr] you ought to have done, without leaping aside the others. James's concern with socio-economic issues, too, is of course patent. "Pure religion" is boiled down to an active concern for "widows and orphans" and avoiding thc impurity of "thc w-orld" (Jas 1:27)."' Whiie arguing for the necessity or&pyain addition to rrio~rg,he formulates as an examplc the callous treatment of "a brother or sistcr" who "is naked and lacking daily food" (2:15-16). Similarly, his admonition against acts of partiality, the crowning point of which warns that it is a transgression of the law by which pcople will ultimately be judged, is concerned specifically with dishonoring the poor while honoring the rich sheerly on the basis of wealth (2:2-4, 6). Interestingly, he, too, apparently uses "the poor" as a seK-designation:18j it is specifically "the poor" (oi a~wxoi)whom God "chose" (h(e%(azo) to be "rich in faith" and "inheriton of the kingdom which he promised to those who love h i m (2:5).IR6On thc other hand, he assumes a pattern of behavior on the part of "the rich" (oi xhoGoro~)which involvcs oppression, legal suits and blasphemy (2:6-7). Thcsc rich, the author warns with a searing irony, can expect a "day of slaughter" for which their luxurious living is "fattening them" (5:l-6). The author of James ultimately expects an eschatological reversal which will remedy the present circumstances: the humble will bc exalted and the rich humiliated (,Jas 1: 12; cf. 5: I).'" This, apparently, will be cffected at the parom'a of Jesus Christ."'
'" '"
O n "impurity" in James, scc above, note 164. So, e.g., I>ihelius,Jamer, 44: '3a[me]s can express his sympathy with the poor with SO lirtle reserve because for him being poor and hcing Christian were coincidental concepts, not only by virtue aC his archaizing dependence on the literamre [sc. the Jewish literature dealing with "the poor"], hut also by virtue of his own personal conviction." More prcciscly, oirrrwxoirG ~6apq1,i.e., "poor in the eyes of thc world." Notc thc subsenucnt descriotion of them as nhauoia~i v i i i o ~ ~int :actualitv, the", are "rich" in the sense which mauers most. This somewhat peculiar phracr is undoublcdly ro bc understood in lisht of the author's negative portrayal of "the world as ~unddmcntally opposed to God (44.1, and a source or impurity, the avoidance of which gets at the ver)r heart of his understanding- oS iriic rcligion (1:27). Sec funher on "the world" inJames, L. T. Johnson, "Friendship with the World/Friendship with God: A Study of Discipleship in James," Diicipleihip in the N m Taiammt (ed. with an introduction by F. F. Segoxla; Philadelphia: Fonress: 1985) 166-03. CCf Luke 16: 19-3 1, on which scc ah?x,e, note 180. See Jas 5:7: 9; noting especially the 06" that joins 5:7 to .5:6. O n lhc ''pamu-
'"
'" ""
LOGOS AND THE L ~ WOF FREEDOM
185
T o point out such similarities, of course, is nor necessarily to arguc that thc Lettcr of James originated among Jerusalem Christians or among second century Ehionites, much less that it represents an authentic wsiting of James the brolhcr of Jesus.'" It is only to point out that the qucstion of its author's position rcgarding mattcrs of diet, purity, cult and circumcision is much more complex than is oftcn thought to he the casc. Even iT. as is most likely, the author's position regarding the relation of the lovc command to the "wholc law-" and his discussion of niazq and :pya in Jas 2:14-26 are to be understood in light of pauline formulations, it is not clear what conclusions are to be drawn from the fact that hc docs not feel compelled to lay out his o m position on those aspects of the Torah which most rankled Paul. While this, along with his characteristic emphasis on socio-cconomic concerns, surely does indicate what aspccts of the law mattered most to him, he is apparently not altogethcr different in this respcct from a number of Christians who thcrnselves continued to follow Jewish customs. Such Christians could and did hold a variety of positions regarding issues like diet and circumcision; and somc, at least, w-hilc continuing to livc in accord with Jewish customs themselves, did not require such of non~ews.'" In short, firm conclusions rcgarding the position of the author on such matters require morc information r c p d i n g h i and his intcndcd audience than we currcntly possess. While it is clear that James's law is thc Torah, the question of his interpretation of those aspects of it which legislate matters such as purity, dict, circumcision and thc calendar must remain open.'" -
~
..
ria o r the Lord" in James, sec Jackson-McCabe, ''A Letter to the ~I'welveTribes," 509-10; Johnson, Letter of Jamps, 3313 14. Such questions are difficult, perhaps impossible, to answer with any d e ~ c c of certainty given the paucity of information in James regarding its ori@n, not to mention thc meagcr cvidence for the "historicalJarnes," the Jcmsalem church, and the Ehionites. '"" Cf., e . ~ . ,Acts 21:17-26: the prohlcm is that Paul reachesJemr who live among non-Jews not to live in accord with the law. CCT Wachoh, "The Rich in Faiih," 291 n. 94: "\%%atever the author may or may not have thought about the so-called cultic ordinances of the law, marten like circumcision and dietary ordinances: we do not know." Note that while Wachoh refers to Scitz, 'yames and the I.aw," in this connection, Scitz himselr is inciincd to the view h a t the "law or freedom," though representing "the 'old' law" to hc sure, means "only thc dccrilogue tog-ether with such erhical precepts a love or neighbar"; the author of James "simply ignores" issues af diet and cimmcision when using ihe expression "the whole law." See 'Tames and h e Law;" 484-8.5.
'"
'"
186
CHAPTER FOUR
Thc cxprcssion Epqu.rog h6yo5 was coined as a term for human reason by Grcck philosophers, particularly in conncction nith the Stoic theory that human reason comprises a dixincly given natural lav internal to the human animal. That the author ofJames speaks of "the implanted logos" in 1:21 with at least a general ~ p s pof its original significance is clear from the fact that he equales it with a "perfect law of freedom." Si\pificantly, however: he also speaks of this logos in ways which are not typical of Stoic tradition. In a manner rcminiscent, rather, ofJcwlsh and Christian literature, he considers it to be something which can (and must) bc both "hcard" and "done," which "is able to save your souls," and which can, in some scnsc: be "rcccivcd." These differences rcflect the [act h a t in James, as in the other Jcwlsh and Christian writings examined in thc previous chapter, the Stoic concept of law has been fused with a set of religious and historical convictions alicn to Stoicism. Given the obvious indications or the author's dependcncc upon Jewish and Christian traditions throughout the lettcr, such differences are hardly surprising. Nor are they by any means insignificant: the aspects of thc treatment of the implanted logos in James which divcrge from its trcatment in Greek philosophical discussion are just as illuminative of the author's understanding of it and its role in his religous thought as thc rcspects in which it is similar to thcm. Of particular importance in this respect is the facl h a t thc auihor of James, again like Philo, Justin, and the authors of 4 Maccabees and thc Apostolic Conr%itutz~m, assumes that this lops has an external, vcrbal form. The "perfect law of freedom" is in fact the Torah, however precisely interpreted by the author. It is in light of this idcntification that James's peculiar notion that thc logos can be "hcard" and "done" is to be understood; for while scarcely typical of Stoic discussions of natural law., such a pairing or "hearing and doinf is not uncommon in Jewish discussions of the Torah. In a manner which recalls Romans 2:13, the author ofJames insists that one must not only hc a "hearer" of the logos, but a "doer" of it as well. Mcrcly to "hear" it is to "deceive (~apa-ho~1j6ywo1) oncsclf." for it is prethat one d l bccome "blessed" cisely "through doing'' (b3 EO~;~OEL) (1:22, 25). One becomcs such a "logos-doer" through constant attcntion to [he "pcrfcct law of freedom," which is to say: to thc Torah.
I,OCOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
187
Jamcs's emphasis on bccoming a "doer" of the la\\- (cf 412)and ihus of the lap-os-acquircs a particular urgency in light of thc cschatological dimension of thc letter. Thc palnusia of Jesus Christ will cntail jud,mcnt (5:8-9), executed in accord with the law by the diline la\.\rgiver himseE and it %illbc, potentially: "mcrcilcss" (2:12-13; 4:12). Aware of the idea that ''Iovc of neishbor" represents a summary of "the 'ivholc ia.c\-," he cautions against an eschatological confidcncc based on attention to ihis one general command: summary or not, Lev 19:18 is still onc command among many within the law; transgressing any of thc others, even if onc "lo\res one's neighbor," can still render onc liable to judgment."' In a manner rcminisccnt of his carlicr warning regarding thc sclf-deception of thosc who do not "do" the lop-as, he thus admonishcs thc "brothers and sisters" to speak and "do" (rrotei~e;more idiomatically: "act") "as those about to be judgcd by means of the law of freedom" (2:12).'"' This cxpcctation of an eschatological judgment by the law gocs a long way toward clarifying thc author's dcscription of thc implanted lap-or as that "which is able to savc ( ~ b vGvv&p~vov o6oat) your souls" (1:21). Indeed, it is in his capacity as "lawgiver and
'"'
This is not to say drat James envisions a judgment that \\ill of ncccssity procccd = a woodcn accounting of one's vans~essionsof the law. Jas 2:13, in fact, points to a n "cscape clause": showing mercy to others will mpan receiving mercy a t the judgment. A similar notion is h u n d both in the Matthean parable of the unmerciful servant (Matt 18:23-35), and csp. in Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai's reported response to a companion's grief at thc dcsvuclion of the temple, and thus of the mechanism Tor Israel's atonement: "Do not grieve. M'e trave another atonemem as elrectivc as this. And what it is? It is acts of lo\ingkindncss: as it is said: 'I desire mcrcy and not sacrifice"' (Xbol R. .Nat 6; cited as found in A. F. Segd, hbeccn'.~ Chiidrnr Judoirm m d Cimitiaioni& in Uie Roman World [Cambridge, M A : Haward University Press, 19861 131). In James; this notion can be correlated particularly with the author's emphatic concern for thc socially and economically disadvantaged; see esp. 1:27; 2 1 1 3 ; 215-16; 5:l-6. Intcrcstingly, he does nor simply equate such a concern with the general nodon of "love of neighbor." His notion that mcrcy "boasts ovcr judgment," more specifically, is m bc understood in light of thc clitiqur, implicit in J a 2:l-13: n i a social system in which tokcns of honor are , ~ t c d on the hasis of wcalth and/or patronage. The ar-pment of 2:13 does not assume hy courting (or rewardthat one who "shows parriality" as dcfirled in 2:2-+perhaps ing) a awealthy pavon by granting him, rathcr dian a b e g ~ a r ,an lionorable seat in thc synagogue is violating the command of "love of neighbor." The argument, rather, is that ihcy arc violating the partiality command by acting as "unjust judges" of thc rich and poor. Again; despitc h i \*.dlincss regard in^ the use of thc l ~ v ccommand as a summ a of~ thc law, his cmptrasis lies above all on socio-cconomk: issucs. Scc above all the cunstnral of "pure rcligon'' as concern for widows and oiphans in 1:27.
'"
188
CHAPTER FOUR
judge'' that James's god himself is described as one "who is ablc to save" (b 6uv6k~vo5otSoa~)--and to destroy (4:12).'"" Somewhat more difficult to intcrprct is the author's notion that the implantcd logos can in somc scnsc be "received." I must insist at the outset that the command 6iSaoBe rbv Ewqurov hhyov (121) is equally problematic on any interpretation of thc logos. Thc essential difficulty of the passage is the fact that thc author commands his audience to "receive" something that is alrcady "implanted." Whcther, therefore, thc logos is understood to have been so "implanted" in all humans from the time when God created them, or only more recently in a sclect g o u p of peoplc who consciously sought it, the apparent contradiction remains. Of itself, therefore, this command no more excludcs interpreting James's kpquxo~hhyoq in light of Stoic ideas, as has frequently been argued,'" than it excludes reading it in light of an already implantcd "gospel." It is obvious in any case that the command iv nPa6xllxt 6itaooe rbv Eyquxov Myov is not intcnded to connote a "reception" analogous to the initial "implanting" of the l~gos.'~"ven beyond the clcar assumption in 1:21 that the logos is alrcady "implanted" in those who arc to "rcceive" it, it emerges from the letter as a wholc that the author aims to induce in his intended audience something- more appropriately characterized as "repentance" than as " c o n v e r ~ i o n . " ~ ~ ~ It is plain from 1:22-25 in particular that James assumes an audi-
'""lhe
soteriological signilicanc~of the logr~rinthc religious thousht of,ramcs
d l be takcn up more fully in thc tbllowing chapter.
'" Sce Chapter One. '"' C t Ilihelius, >ma,
114. See esp. the condusion of the leLtcr, =,here the concern is that any who have "\vandered from the truth" (cf: 1:18, A6yo~drhqOeiag) be "turned back" (519-20). See also 4:l 10; where the author rcminds his audience that thcir frirndship with the world is incornpatihle with thcir (presumably desired!) friendship with God; points out that they are acting as "adulteresses" and as though "scripture speak in vain"; and ultimately urges a posture o r repcntancc upon them ( 4 7 10). In this respect, Johnson's use or the t c m "canvcrsion" in connection with the aim of the lcttcr as a whole, and ~ l t hthat of this latter srction in particular. is not parricularly helpful. Such a description apparently rrsults from his classilication of the \+,or6 as "protreptic"; cr. csp. Ixlter oJJamri, 16-24 with his descriplion of 313-4:10 as a "Call to Convemk,nn ($id.; 267). Rc.qrdless or the merits of this gcnerir dassificdlion (on which see esp. the discussion of I'Liachob; "Rich in Faith," 98-122), it is clear rrom lhc lcncr as a whole that the author prcsupposcs that his intended audience already has somr manner of "fiith" (cT Klein, Ein in!,~l&ornrnrne~ We*, 47). '1'0 this extent, "ronversiori" secms an inappropriarr p a r a d i p fnr characterizing the rhetorical aim of the le~tcr. "I'
LOGOS .LID THE LAW OF FKEEDOM
189
encc xvhosc currcnt "hearing" of the logos is such that they mig-ht be dcceived regarding its implications for their cschatolo~calstatus. Given the context or 1:21 within thc claboration of thc admonition to be "slow to anger," thc cmphasis of the command sccms to lie palticularly on thc manner in which this logosis "received'-namel>-; "with meekness" (iv r r p a 6 ~ r t )sincc , anger (6py;l) "docs not produce God's righteousness" (l:20)--rather than with thc "receiving" per ~ e . " ~ Thc "rccciving" itself. that is, is simply assumed, much as the "hearing" of the logos is assumed in 1:22-25. Thc "rccei\ingn of logos in 1:21 must in any case be understood morc on the a n a l 0 9 of thc "hearing" or 1:22-25 than thc "implanting" of 1:21; and F i ~ o ~ a t c a n in fact bc used with a scnsc of "gjve ear to," or "hear.""" Indccd: so understood, thc transition &om 1:21 to the discussion of "hcaring and doing" in 1:22-25 appears all thc morc natural: "receive the implanted logos with humility. . . and (Fi)'""' bccomc logos-docrs, and not rncrely hearers who dcccive themselves." On thc othcr hand, a numbcr of authors have sought to account for James's peculiar command to "receive" something which is already
""
Notc in this connection esp. the usc or616 to join 1 2 0 to 121: 'knger does not efi'ect the righteousness of G o d . . . rhercfi,rc.. . rcceive the implanted loxo~with humility." Note also in this connection that whereas thc (implid) command to "lay aside ail 12th" is paired with that to receive thp logor with humiliv in 1:21: thc call lo "cleanse hands" and "purify heartsn--which f"llows a discussion of thc origins of social strifc (cf 6 h ) is paired with an injunction to "humble oneselt" h e f i x God in 43-9. See further on this latter passag Chapter Five; under the heading "llesirc and the Gifts of God in 4:1 6." '"" Sce I.SJ, Gixomr, $1.3: "simply, lo * h e ear lo, hear"; cf: also $1.2: "of mental reception, take, accept without complaint." Again, tlie author o r Jamcs certainly assumes that his audience, on at least some lcvcl, "accepts" tllc log,,.~:thus the probIcm oS "seK-deception" (122). What concerns him is a pc:rceivingZ or "hearing;" in other words, is not sufficient; but must he accompanied by a particular type of h e h a ~ i o rwhich can he charactrrizcd as "humility" and which consists in "doing"; cf: in this case 2:14-26, and esp. : 1 3 ; 6etF,&~oir ~ $ rahflg 5 &va~~irpalpfg rh ipya aGraTi i,v ~ i r p a ; ~oalpiag, ~r and firthcr thc discussion in Chapter Five under thr heading "Lo,qoi and E
'"
190
CHAP'IXK FOUK
"implantes' by a r p i n g that the author is drawing on a fixed early Christian expression, F&e&at .ibv h6yov.'"' Such expressions are found particularly in Acts and the pauline letters, and rcfcr consistently to an initial acceptance of the Christian proclamation, the Since the author of James cannot in any case be using thc phrasc with rcfcrcnce LO an initial acceptance of the logos (i.e., the "implanting" itself), such interpreters apparently understand h i to bc using an cxpression which connotes "con\~ersion" with reference to an ongoing "acceptancc" of the now (i.c., post-conversion) implanted logos.'"" lndecd, it is often noted that James had just rcferred, in 1:18, to the fact that God "gave birth to us by means of a logos of truth (%yo drhqOeia<)so that we are a sort of 'first fruits' of his creatures." Not only is this verse as a wholc reminiscent of the notion, found in a variety of early Christian works, that membcrs of the movcrnent have bccn "reborn" or have expcricnccd a "ncw creation," but the phrase hClyo< &hq8&ia$is itself used with clear reference to "the gospel" in sevcral pauline letters.'"' Now it must be pointed out at once that James's Epqurog Myo< is first and foremost a law--indeed, an internal law w-hich finds written expression in the Torah-and not a "gospel" in the usual sense However, one might of that term as a narrative pr~clamation.~"~
'"' See Chapter One. '" Note em. the use of this exoression with
reference to a Dast "receotion" or
-
.
word but as what really is, God's wokd. . ."; Acts d:14, "Now when the apostles at Jerusalem heard that Samaria had accepted ( 6 i 6 ~ m a t )the word of God. . ." (with reference to Acts 8:4-13); Acts I l:1, "Now the apostles and thc believers who were in Judea heard that the Gentiles had also accepted (3icavro) the word of God. . ." [with reference LO the conversion of Cornelius and his household in Acts 10). Cf. further Luke 8:13, where aapaSixovrar (cf. Mark 4:16, happ&v.vouo~v; but also 420, napa6ixov.rar) is used in the explanation of the parable of the sower. Note that Dibelius suggcsts that the clause "rcceive the word" was a fixed expression used "simply as a periphrasis for the Christian life," despite thc fact that all of the examplcs he cites in support of such a usage employ the phrase with respect lo an initial acceptance of the "word"; see Jomer. 114. Cf Muflner, Lln JakobuibniL 101: "Nehmt das euch bei der Taufc einst eingepflanzte Won wirklich, in allcr Konsequen~und vor allern i v n p a 6 q i a~n . . ." For this line of argument see Chapter One; ior a discussion of the evidence, see Chapter Five, esp. pp. 193-95. "I5 O n Paul's use of the tern "gospel" as a shorthand expression For his soterioiogical narrative, see M. M. Mitchell, "Rhetorical Shorthand in Paulinc A r e mentation: Thc Functions of 'thc Gospel' in the Corinthian Correspondcnce," &$el in Paui Studies in Corinlhinnr, (;hlntianr and R o m a n ~ j , tRKichard "M bngenrcker (ed. L. A.
""
LOGOS .~NDTHE I.AW OF FREEDOM
191
compare in this respect 1 Pet 1:23-25, where a notion of the "\vord" (hbyoq, p.ilpa) as proclaimed "gospel" seems to be mcrged with a more mystical conception of an "imperishablc s c e d (mop&rp8apr;l) through and which which Christians have been "reborn" (irvay~ycvvqpivo~), cntails a ccrtain type of b e h a \ i ~ r . ~ ~ \ rnotion l that some "rebirth has been expcricnccd by individual mcmbcrs or thc Christian movement as a result of thc inscrtion into them of some divine substance, the possession of which carries ethical consequences, is of course not uncommon in the early Christian literature. One thinks immediately of the "spirit" of the pauline corpus and of Acts, or thc spirit/logos of the johanninc epistles."" One might a r p c : thcrefore, that James simply conceives of an analosous divine substance in Stoic terms, as Ep'pu.roq Myoq: a logos, that is, which is "implanted" by God in a select group of people in connection with a new creation rathcr than in all human beings at thc initial creation,'"%nd whose associatcd ethic-quite unlike, however, thc johanninc and cspccially pauline epistles-is understood to coincide with the Torah. Onc might think in this connection or the prophecy or Jer 3 1:3 1-35 (= LXX J c r 38:31-34), w-here the deity promises a future era for Israel in which "I will put my law within them, and I will write it on their hearts." Fabris, in Tact, has a r p c d that the author of Jamcs assumes that this prophccy has been fulfilled particularly among his own group ("the twelvc tribcs"), which is living in "the last days" (5:3).'"' and P. Richardson; JSN'I'Sup 108; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994) 63 88. Notc also thvt it is the "word" of the Christian proclamation which is "received" in thr various passages o i Acts: cf. Acts 8:14 with 83; and Acts 11:l with Acts 10, esp. 10:36~-43. "Wf. I)ihelius, Jamex, 105 n. 185, noting, however, that Dibelius rjects the idea that ,James has any s u d l mystical notion in mind. The t g c s of behaviors which are to characterize such "ncwhoms" in I Puler are dcsclihcd collectively as i b hay,& 66ohav yirha. Thc t c m hoyt~bvis surcly intended to play on the "word" (1:25: p i k a ; 1:23: h6yo~)throush which thpy have heen horn, and thus to indicate that the "milk" upon which they are to f'ced is to he hoyu~6vin the sense or "appropriate to thvt iqgos." It is noteworthy, however, that both this term and thc dcscription of the logos as an "impcrishablc seed" are reminiscent or the logo.sof runtcmporaqphilosophical discussion. See, e.g., the comparisons drawn by Fabris, hge; ch. 6. 'OH Note in this connection that the logosconccpt of the johannine epistles seems to he inrormcd by the L.ogos myth fbund in thc opening of the Fourth Gospel, or at least something vrry ciosely approximating it. Sce csp. I John 1:l 4_ and Turthcr R. Schnackenhurg, 7 h e ,7ohannule Epirlles. Inlroduclion and Contrnenkq (New York: Crossroad, 1992) 49~69,esp. 50: "One may say that the opening or the lcuer [sc. 1 John] presumes the Gospcl Prologue or tkle Logos hymn ernhcdded in it." "IY See on Fabris abovc, Chaptcr Onc. Note, howcver. that he understands thc law in question to bc a ncw "messianic law" rathcr than the Torah.
JCMS
""
192
CHAPTER FOLX
This line of interpretation, however, is most doubtful. While James does contain allusions to several scriptural prophecies,'" Jer 313-35 and the other passages cited by Fabris in this conncction are not among them. Morc importantly, though the tcrm Zpqu.io< alone is not a decisive indication that the logos of Jamcs is "innate," thc more spccific concept of an Epqupuro5hClyoSor vbpoq consislenlly denotes somcthing given to all people at God's inilia1 creation of humanity elscwhere in the ancient litcrature, including the Christian litcrature. Justin's adaptation of the Stoic concept of law is particularly significant in this respect; ror while he held that "right rcason" or "natural law'' became available to humanity only after thc earthly appearance of Jcsus Christ, he nonetheless spoke of thc "implantcd seed or the logos," specifically with refercncc to that portion of thc natural law that all humans have always possessed. Without somc clear indication that thc author of James conceived of Epqu.io5 hiryog ditrerently in this respect, then, one should bc most hesitant to assume that such a re-definition has taken place. In fact, the author's rererence to God's "giving birth" to "us" by means or the "logos of truth"which logos, we shall see shortly, is to bc identificd with "the implantcd logos"-gives no such indication that what is imagined is a re-birth. Indeed, in thc context of Jas 1:13-1 8, this statement is best understood with referencc to God's initial crcation of all humanity. Examination of Jas 1:13-18 in the following chapter wiu shed light not only on this issue, but will further illuminate, more generally, how logos functions in the religious thought ofJamcs.
""
C i esp.,Jas 1:lO-I1 with LXX 1sa 40:6b-8, andJas 5:5 with I X X J e r 1 2 3 ; see further D. Deppe, The Soyinzi o/,7txlu2 4 2 49.
LOGOS AND DESIRE
A few lines prior to the mention of the implanted logos in Jas 121, rcferencc is made to a "logos or truth" (h6yo5 &h$eiag) through which God "pave birth to us, so that we arc a sort of 'first fruits' of his creatures" (Jas 1:18). This statement has becn seen by some interprcters as providing decisive confirmation that the lopos that, accordinp to James, "saves souls" is in fact "thc Gospel.':' The cxpression My05 hhqoeia5 is round in several other works of the Christian canon, differing only in case or in the use of a definite article:' 2 Cor 6:7 (hbyq irhq0eiag), Col 1:5 (T@ hbyq riiq &hq8eia5j, Eph 1:13 (rbv hiryov hhn0eiag) and 2 Tim 2:15 (rbv h6yov rig &hq0eiaqj.Colossians and Ephesians use this phrase with explicit rcferencc to "the Gospcl" (rb ~6ayyiX~ov), and such an identification is also clearly implied in 2 Timothy.'Joseph Mayor conclndcd from this collection of passages that the phrase h6y05 ahq0eia5 was "a uox technica of early Christianity,"' but this conclusion overstates the evidence. It is to bc noted in the first place that all of the latter rererences appear in pauline or pseudo-pauline writings; one should be cautious in making generalizing conclusions regarding "early
+
'
See Chapter One. No Sreut weight should be placed on the lack or the definite artide in irlcntihime . . drXn0eiac . .oC ,.Tas 1: 18. As will be arwcd below. and ' u the refcrent or the h6roc as \
e<
194
CHAPTER FRT.
Christianity" on the basis of evidcncc found in this limited corpus. Indeed, analogous phrases do occur in other Jewish and Christian literature with different meanings.' Even within the pauline literature itself, in fact, the extcnt to which we are dealing with a univocal "technical term" is far from clear. That Paul ~ ~ s the c s phrasc in 2 Cor 6:7-its only occurrence in the undoubted letters of Paulwith refcrcnce to the gospel is by no means obvious. Found among a list of attributes that, Paul says, characterize his ministry (including, among othcr things, thc fact that he has acted with kindness, patience and "genuine love"), the phrasc might well be understood more generally as connoting "truthful spcech."Woreover, thc association of b %yo< @5 drhqOeiag with "the gospel" in both Colossians and Ephesians falsely inflates the evidcnce for the iixity of this exprcssion, for in this case the similarity is most likely to he explained by literary depeudencc, not independent attcstation of a paulinc, much less an early Christian, "technical term."' The strong impression that this assembly of passages might at first create is significantly tcrnpered through thesc considerations, and Spitta had already pointed to W( Ps 118:4.3, a passage which is ofien under76; also Johnson, LeI& @ma, 198. stood with refcrxnce to thc lax,; see Laws, Jm, Particularly interesting for our purposes is Clemcnt of Alexandria, Slrorn 1.13; wherc the phrase is used in connection with a concept somewhat rerninisccnt ofJustin's l o p 1 theory: "Since, therefore, truth ( 4drhq8ciy) ~ is one . . . jusi the Bacrhanitcs tore asunder h e limbs of Penthcus, so rhc sects both o r barbarian and HeUcnic philon~phyhave done with truth; and each vaunts as the whole truth (rjv drhfi8e~av) h c portion which has fallen to its lot. But all, in my opinion, are illuminated by thc dawn of light. Let all, therefore, both Greeks and harhurians, who have aspired aftcr the truth (~drhq0aD5)-hoth those who possess nor a little, and thosc who havc any portion-produce whatever they have or the word of truth 605 e q drhq8eiag %you)" (text in MPG 0.753-~56; translation in AVF 2.313). CT. also 1 Ghd 3:l; Oda Sol. 8:8; Philo: Somn. 1.23. " So the NRSV. Such a morc general claim of honest and straighttbward specch would; or course, include Paul's preaching of "the gospel"; thc question, h o w m r , is whether the phrase h6yo5 drhqOeia5 referred only and specifically to the latter. Note in this connection Paul's need to address the Corinthians' evident dissatisiaclion with his apparently vacillating travel plans (2 Cor 1:15-2:17); sec esp. 2 Cor 1:l8, 6 L6yo5ipiuv b npbg bpkg o 6 Eoirv ~ vai ~ a05. i Cf in this respect rhe usc of the phrase 2v h67015 drAqOeiag with a more gencral reference to speech in Pri. SOL 16:10; see rurthcr the %yo" drhq0eiag a i W( Ps I l8:43, in which, too; iherc is some ambiguity. It should not be rorgottcn, in this conneciion; that thc phrase h6yog drhq8eiag does not appear elscwhcrc in any of the undisputed letters oC I'a'aul. For a concisc sketch of the prohicm of the relation of Ephcsiuns to Cok,ssians~ sue R. Schnackcnburg, E,bhe.riam: A Commmtn~(Edinburgh: TKS Clark, 199I) 30 33. Note also 'l'suji's suggestion that the v c v fact chat the "word of vuth;' is explicitly idcntificd as "the gospel" in ihcse works suggcsts that the two wcrr: not ob\
LOGOS AND DESIRE
195
Mayor's conclusion has in fact found few adherent^.^ Most interpreters have rightly concluded that the securest guide for identi@ing thc particular referent of the "lop-os of truh" of Jas 1:18 is ihc context in which the phrase occurs in James itself.' This discussion has centered largc1)- on the question or xvherher the divine "birthing" mentioned in 1:18 is to be interpreted with reference to the creation or humanity in general or to a new creation or Christians in particular, and it has bccn charactcrizcd by significant di~ageement.'~ T o be sure, the issue or when, and with respect to whom, the "birth" of 1 :I8 is imagined to have occurred is an important considcration in the identilication and interpretation of James's "1ogo.r or truth." Equally important, however, is the qucstion of its relation to thc implanted logos and, more generally, its role in the religious thought or thc letter. This latter question, in particular, has received surprisingly little attention. The primary concern of this chapter, then, is to elucidate thc function of the logo.r, to which James refers variously as "lopos of truth" or "the implanted logos,"" in the thought of James. We shall scc that this logos, like its counterparts in the works examined previously in this study, functions primarily in opposition
" As far as I have noted, J. B. Adamson is done among recent authors in his affirmation of Mayor's view; sce James: T h e M a n and His Message, 33Y. Cf. the significantly watered-down version of lhis thesis in Davids, Epirtle ofJ,mer, 89: "in the m . .. while never becoming a univocaiiy technical tern, ihr rrnrd of truth does frequently mean the gospel." "ee esp. Dibclius, Jomer, 103-107; and most recently thc treatment of the pmblem in Ludwig, Wort als Ge,.relc, 151-57; Johnson, Letto ofJame.s, 197f and 205; and Klein, Ein uolkornmene~ W d , 129 34. "I 'lhose arguing Tor a reference to the original creation of humanity in general include Spitta, Dm Briefdes,7akobzs, 45 47; Hork, Epu%le yTSt. ,7amm; 31-35; Rendall, 17,e Epistle of S t J o m a and Judaic Chrklianip, 63-65; Edsrnan, "Sch"pfenvi1ie und Ccbuit Jac l l a " (though cf. idem, "SchopfunS und Wiedergeburr: Nochmals Jac. 1:18"); Cadoux, 77~7houzhL o f S t ,7arnes, 19 24; Elliott-Binns, ':James 1.18: Creation or Redemption?"; Frankemiillc, Der B+dnJakobu, 1.297 305; Tsuji, Ghube, 68-69. Ar-ping for a relerence to a ncw creation of Christians arc Ropcs, SL. Jarnei, 163-60 (though seemingly with some hcsitation); Dibciius, ,Jami, 103-107; Chaine, L'/
to human desire (LtOupia) and the pleasures (ai i$ovai). Oncc again, howc~jcr,Jamcs's presentation of this characteristic philosophical opposition of logos and desire is significantly impacted by his adherence to J C I Z ~ S ~and Christian ideas. In Jamcs, this pair functions in thc context of a worldkiew in which opposing supernatural bcings, God and the Devil, vic to influence human behavior, and in which judgmcnt by the divinc lawgiver looms. Logos and desire, in short, function as thc two mutually exclusi\~e"ways" by which one might iravcl toward this eschatological judgmcni. "Implanted" at God's creation of the human being, James's logos is thc common possession of humanity in general; it is not, in other words, "the Gospcl."
It is widely recognized that Jas 1:13-18 represcnts a discretc argumentative section in Jamcs, the central concern of which is statcd in I:13a: "no onc who is tempted (netpa<6p~vo~)'Vs to say 'I am tcmptcd (ne~phcopa~) by God."'ls The author insists that God, unlike
"
'lhe root x ~ t p a c -can con~xotchoth "temptationn arising rrom within and "tzsts" arising from without. Dibelius, who sought to drive a wedge between I:?-4, 1:12, and 1:13-15 in h e service of his thesis that the various sayings and sections of James were simply strung together on thc bvsis of catchword connections, argued that while this root is clearly used with the h r m e r sense in 1:13-14, it is used with the latter sense in I:?-4 and 1:12. According to Dibelius, then, the link betwcen 1:12 and 1:13 is merely a superficial catchword connection (Jams, 69-71). To draw such a hard distinction betwcen the "externai" and "internal" aspects of thp term, howcver, is misleading, particularly in the contcxt of James; see further on this bclow. 1 ha>^ been unablc to locate an English tern which adequately reflects both dimensions of the Greek, and thus often leave the term untranslated in what k~Uows. l 3 See, e.g., the heading for this scction choscn by llihelius: "The source af tcmptutions" (,7amer, 90); cf Chaine: "Origine de la 'Tenration" (L'Epat de Saint Jccques, 18); Marty: "Origcnc humaine de toutc tentation" (I:EpClre deJ~zcques, 30); IVindisch: "Die 'Versuchung' zum Xosen kommt aus uns selbst, alles Gutc kommt von Gott" (& k a h h c h t n B+, 8); Sidebottom: "God's Innocmce" (,7m, j;dr and 2 Pe&, 30); MuRner: "Die Thcodizcc" (DmJ a k o b u h ~ 86); cT also Wein, Ein inollkommmei W v k ; 39. A numher of scholars, emphasi~ingthe connection hciwren 1:12 and 1:13 which Dihclius denied (see thc preceding notej, consider this section to begin at 1:12: so Rcicke, 7he Epislles, 16-17; Laws, Epirtle ~ . 7 a m e s ,66-78; Davids, &pi& oJJomzs, 79-83; Perkins, First m d Second Petv, Jan~er and Jude, IOO~lOl;cf: Martin, ,Jamex, 28 35. ;is will hccome clear in this chapter, I agree that therc is an important connecdon hetween 1:12 and 1:13. Nonetheless, I would emphasize that I:]?, echoing much of the lankpage or 1:2-4; Corms, with the latter, something of an inclusro a n ~ u n dthe difficult 1:5 8 and 1:S-11. See helow, note 95; rurther Ropcs, Sl. Jamr~, I 5 0 Dihelius. yams. 69-71, 88:Johnson; Idler OJJamer, 189; and st<: the comments of Klein, Ein inu1lhme.s I'Verk, 43 4..5; 82-85.
LOGOS AND DESIRE
197
humans, has nothing whatsoever to do with netpa~p6c:he ncither experiences it himself nor docs he cause others to expcricnce it." It is rathcr, according to James, an individual's own desire which is Thc experience is described in terms the truc source ofnr~paoyb~." of both abduction and seduction: "each pcrson is tcmptcd by his or her own desire, being dragged off (itEh~6pwoq)and seduced (6ehea(6p~vog)b y them]" (1:14)." The imagery or seduction in particular is developed as the author personifies thc principles in order to describe vividly the results of giving in to desire: "then desirc (fi ixtOupia), having conceived, bears sin; and sin (il &pap&), when it reaches maturity, gives birth to death (OClva.rov)" (1:15). The explanation of the origin orxetpaopbqin 1:13-15, therefore, serves not only to exculpate God from the human expcricnce of temptation, but from sin and, particularly remarkably, "dcath" as well." Conversely, " Jas 1: 13h: b y6.p 8eb5 d m ~ i p a a ~ o 6o.r~~ g K ~ K ~nerp&je~ V, 6k aG.ibg oGSCva. C)n the translation of drrreipaoiog, see esp. Mayor; Epii11e oi St. James, 51 - 53; on the phiblsophical characicr of the term scc Klein, Ein inuollkommr W 4 86. The claim 01. Tas 1:13h is quitc remarkable. Notc in the first placc irs apparent convadicdon of the Jewish scriptures, indced, of a passagc to which the author of-James will later refcr: cf. Jas 2:21 with WOL Gen 22: 1-13 (esp. 22: I, b O P ~ Gi i i e i p a t ~ vrbv ABpaaN). Onc might d s o contrast it with the Lord's Prayer, Matt 6:13 (cf Luke ll:4.; Did 82): kai N$ ilia~v&qgiwCg ~ i ~ n e t p a o w 6 von ; which see further Betz, 7 k e Smrin on lhe ~Vlount,405 13. According to Johnson (Irttm ofjbnze~, 203), in k t , Jas 1.13 rxercised the early interpreters of Jamcs even morc than irs apparcnt contradiction of Paul in 214-26. Dibelius explains Jarnes's claim with rererrncc to a wider trend toward dissociating God with human failings in thc Jewish thought of thc Hellenistic period (Jams, 9 0 4 I). He cites, tbr cxample, ,jubike.x's account of Abraham's sacriiice of Isaac the most intcnse, perhaps, in Ahraham's scries or "trials"-in which Mastcma is identifi~das thc ultimate inspiralion ibr this pardcular test (17:16; cf. 17:9, 12); nonetheless, in ,juhi[ees it is still God who does the actual "lesting-" in this case, as, apparently, in the earlicr "tests": scc Sub. 17:17-18 and 18:lK !%'hatever the case, thc rcrnarkabie position ofJames on this matter is likely lo bc correlated morc specifically with his view that zetpaawb5, by deiinition, is causcd by desire (hn8ubiaj: this lvttcr is understood to be entircly opposed to God's will (see helaw): and is therefore, apparently, wholly alicn to God's naturc; thus tool then, is Z E I P U ~ ~ ~ ~ . T h e problem of thc origin of desire itself, on thc other hand, is not addressed. '" Note that rinb rijg i6iag is positioned so that it can modify both r r e r p & < ~ ~and a t i ~ e h ~ 6 p e v omgi Scheu<6pvag. As 1)ibclius points out, thc rt-rb S ~ h e i r j e ~ while v, "found elsewhere in the New Testament only in 2 Petr 2:14; 18, is frequently used by Philo precisely in connection with desire" (James, 93). Further, Mayor cites a numbcr of passaxes from hellenistic moralists like l'hihik,; Epictetus and Pluiarch in which this term, a5 in J ~ 1:13; s is "combined with Hhko or its c o g natcs" (S1. ,ja/ameq 54). " An allusion to Genesis 3 at this point inJames has often been noted. Cf. also; howevcr~\Vis 1 : 1 2 1 6 2:23-24; the death in queslion herc is not death oC body: but 01. soul ( 3 : l 4). Similarly, thc author of James is conccmcd less with natural death than uilh eschatological dcadi: even the "righteous" arc subject to "death"
''
198
CHAPTER FM
it placcs responsibility for cscaping this deadly progression squarely and emphatically upon the shoulders of each human individual: the cntirc sequence is set in motion by- a gigiven person's oxin desirc.18 Thc rcferences to the logos of truth by means of which God "savc birth to us" in Jas 1:16-18 and, subscqucntly, to "the implanted logos which is ablc to savc your souls" in 1:19-27, follow this account of thc origin of x&~paopClg,sin and death in human desirc in 1:14 15. Uncorcring the logic of the connection behieen 1:14-15 and 1: 16-18 and, further, between 1: 13-18 as a whole and 1:19-27, greatly illuminates thc role of the logos in thc thought of James. The significance of 1: 16-1 8 within the largcr argument of 1:13-18 is typically construed as follows." The admonition of 1:16, p~ zrrhav&&e, is translated "do not be deceived," and the "deception" in question is h to the position that the author has rejected, understood ~ i i reference i.c., that God is the ultimate source of xetpaop6q: sin and dcath." Jas 1:17 is then intcrpretcd as a tcrse-and incornplcte-arsumcnt in support of the contrary vicw: from thc premises (i) all good things come from God and (ii) God does not change, the author cxpects the reader to infcr that no evil comes 6om God. The reference to the fact that God "gave birth to us by means of a logos of truth," on this interpretation, is taken to offer further proof of premise (i) by hishlighting God's greatest act of bencficence, whethcr understood as his crcation of humanity in general, his gift of salvation to Christians, or sornc combination of t h c ~ e . ~ ' p
~
~
-
~
in the mundane sense; sce esp. 5:6 (with which c f IVis 2:12 20); on the other hand, those who endure, surcly including those such as "the righteous" of 5 5 , are nonetheless promised "life" (1 :12). Note also in this respect ,Jaq1:21: b iwvuias Myoq is able < to save rbg p ~ b bwGv. '* Jas 1:14: gxuorog. . . l i e ~ p h c e r a ~ b r rril< b i6iag izliiBupia<. " S ~ e ec.g., , Spitra, DrB&fdex,jnki,hus. 39-47; Ropes, St.Jmnes, 158-68; Dibciius, Jamer, 70, 99-107; Chaine, 1,'Epih & Sainl Jacques, 18-27; Cantinat, I2r Epihes, 89-9% Laws, Eppiille uJ3omes. 7 2 ~ 7 8 ;Davids, EpirtIe of,j'arr~er, 85-YO; Perkins, Fzrrl md Second Peter, James, md Jude, 100-103. So also, zpparenlly Klcin; cL Ei~in"& komrnmes Wwk, 44, 87N38; 129, 158. Cf. further Jleicke, 7he Efiiitlrsofjhmes. Peh, and ,jude; 16-18, and MuOner, Der ,j'akobuhe5 89-97, neilhcr of whom, however, emphasize chat 1:18 is a proof of God's goodness. MuRner's wanslation of ilnhvEo8e as "IaRt euch nicht verfuhren" ~ m u l d seem Lo relate this verse back to 1:14 15; d: his comment on 1:14: "Die Be$crde is1 cine vcrf%hrrrische, unheimliche hlacht" (Perjhkobwhrid 88). Hoxvever, neither Lhis spccific connection nor the more gcncral image of Vt$ihrnrg are developed in his discussion of 1:16 itsclf which is rather interpn:ted ~7ithreference to a mistaken idea (ci. 1:13) t h a ~God is the cause o i l i e ~ p a o p o iand sin (;bid; 90). " E.g., Johnson; I ~ t t euJjhrner, ~ 197: "God's rreation o i humans is taken LO be the great demonstration of thc conviction that he is the source of all good $f&";
'"
LOGOS AND DESIW.
199
This interpretation is qucstionable for a number of reasons. It is to be noted: first of all, that 1:18 has curiously little forcc if it functions merely to bolster the rather mundanc prcmise that God is the sourcc of good things. Certainly the more novel of thc two prcmiscs-~-~ and indeed, the less sclf-evident Gom the Jc~zish scripturcs-is that regarding thc unchanging naturc of God." Mort importantly: as evcn the advocates of this intcrprctation are forced to conccdc, "the cxplicit negation which ~ : o u l dbe particularly important after \x 13R" on his reading, namely, that God is not responsible for e\,il: "remains strangely uncxpressed" in 1:16-18.Y%ggravating this problem furthcr is thc fact that thc argument assumcd to be at work hcrc is in any case invalid: it does not follon- from the propositions (i) that God is the sourcc of all good things and (i) that God docs not change, that God is not also ihc source of bad things." In fact, judging from Jas 1:17, which states that every (nixoa,nkv) good and perfect gft-not " a n y good and pcrfcct gifts-comes from God,'Qhe "deception" against which the author warns here would seem first and foremost to concern ihc source of good things, not the
cC Klcin, Fin uollkon~mme~ Werk, 66C O n the various vicws of the precise refercncc of h c "birih'; ofJas 1:18, ser Chapter One and ahom: note 10. 22 Note, e.g., h a t Philo Celt compelled to clarify this point when commendng on Gen fi:5-i in Dew Illimul. 21 2 2 : "Perhaps some of those who arc: carcless inquirers (lit.: "thc uncxamined"; TGVdrve{~iiLarov) will suppose that the hwgivcr is hinting that the Creator repentcd of the creation of men when He beheld thrir impicty, and that this was thc reason why I-Ie wished to dcstroy the whole race. 'lbose who think thus may be surf that they make the sins of thcse men aC old time seem light and trivial through the vastness of h e i r own godlcssncss. For what greater impi~ty could lllcre be than to suppose that the Unchangeabic changcs ( ~ b vii~penzov rpinea8at)?" It is noteworthy, too, pcriiaps, thar while one finds hints of it in thr ,Jewish litcraturc prior to the Hellenistic period (e.g.; Ma1 3:6), thc nolion that God is unchanging hccomes emphasized in Jcwish and Christian literatun: cspccially a s a result of Grcck philosophical inHuence. "' Dibelius, ,7ames, 99. l'picalllly; Dibelius himself assumes that this deficiency in the supposed are;ument results from the author's combination here or two distinct "sdyings" for his own novel purpose; cT. also in this rcspect FIauck, Die Kirchmbn(e (1949), 1 I; Klein, Ein inul1kom~nmr.r Wnk, 87 n. 2i5; and drcady Ropcs, S1. James. 159. l'his, ho\*ever, is hardly a n adequatc explanation: if onc grants (as Dibelius and t h e s ~others do) tirat the author is in fact t ~ y i nto~ make a point hcrc, dic oddity of his choice to icavc that point uncxpressed remains whether hc has drawn upon a n earlirr source or not. CL Davidr, Epjlzdle "/,7ame~,88: "[,\ccording to 1:17; God] actually sends all p o d things and, since hc is uncllan@ng; could never scnd evil. But one notices that the a r p m e n t could hc morc dircct and clear." This was natcd already by Hort (Epirlle o i S t Iamimei, 27) and Mayor (Epistle ,$ St. 3~rne.r~ 56). ' S e e Ropes; Efiirlle "fS1. ,7arnq 158; Dibeiius; ,jamei; 99 n. 151
''
200
CHAPTER FIVE
origin of evil.'h The connection of 1:16-18 to 1:13-15 must thercforc be rc-assessed. We will do w-ell to begin by attcmpting to understand James's concern that his audience not be deceived regarding the fact that all good things come from God.
Acgui@
"Good G@"
The characterization of God as the source of "gifts" is among the most prominent of James's properly theological conceptions," and is closely linked to his understanding of prayer. The letter itself is largely framed by the treatment of thcsc interrelated themes. In 1 5 , the author writes of "the god who gives to all without reserve and withi ilvet6ijov.ioq), out reproach" (TOG FtGClvroq 8eoG nticitv axhGq ~ apj instructing anyone who "lacks wisdom" to ask (ai~eixw)God, "and it will be given to him or her." Dcspite God's giving nature, however, his granting of such requests is not so automatic as this simple statement might suggest: the author immediately goes on to warn that one must, more specifically, "ask with faith, not at all doubtotherwise onc caning" (1:6, ai.rei.rw&hi v niozet pq6b 6ta~ptv6~&voq), not expect to "receivc anything- from the Lord" (1:7). This theme is revisited at the letter's end. In 5: 13--16, the author emphasizes the importance of praycr in the case of misfortune and sickness, directly linking the healing- of sickness to "the faithful prayer" (or: "thc prayer of faith"; cf. fi e6xfi Gq rriozew<). He then offers further encouragement in this rcspect by illuslrating the power of such prayer with the example of Elijah, "a human bcing like us" who nonethelcss withheld and subsequently restored rainfall through, it is assumed, his p~ayers.'~ God's role as giver of gifts, the importance of asking God, and, more specifically, the importance of asking God in the proper manner also figurc prominently in 4:l-6. Analysis of this scction greatly ilSu?a
Tu be sure, the question of the origin of c v i t o r more accurately, the ulti-
, mate source of, and thus responsibility for thc human cxpcrience o r l i e ~ ~ a o p 6 <sin and d e a t h i s the basic concern of 1:13~18.On the relation of 1:16-17 to this largcr point, however, see below. So Johnson, writing of the concept of God in James: "Above d l . . . it is James' characterization of God as gift-giver that is most imponant" (Letter ofjarne.~;86). As has onen been noted, the view of God as gift-giver is typically hellenistic; see thc passages listed: e.g., in Davids, Epktle oJSornq 86, and Johnson; I~ttler(James, 195. This emphasis also accords well with the author's characteristic concern for economic issues. '"Jas 5:16b-18 cT 1 K i n 9 17:l and 18:42, ncither of which reports anything about Elijah prayiry. regarding the rain.
"
minates the connection between James's concern to locate the ongin of temptation, sin and death in desire in 1:13-15 and his reference to birth by means of logos in 1:18.
Des%e and the Gtj& of God in 4.1-6 Jas 4:l-6'"egins as the author locates the origins of social strifc (z6hepot and p k a ~ in ) "thc pleasures that war in your members.""" Thc proper punctuation of the lines rollowing this in Jas 4:2 is notoriously difficult and has been the subjcct of much discussion. It is most likely, however, h a t the vcrsc is to be understood as an explanation or the claim of 4:1, depicting killing as a result of frustrated desire, and--most tellingly-"battling and warring" as a result of a jcalous striving for that which one does not posscss. Thus: Whence come wars and whence come battles (7768~a 6 b p o ~KUL z 6 8 ~ v p&xa~)among you? Is it not from within, out of your own pleasures h a t wage war among your members (kr 16v fi8ov6v bp6v v6v oorpa~evopivmv iv roi~ p i h e o ~ vbp6v)? You desire and you do no1 have, [so] you idu; and you are jealous and you arc not able to obtain [that which you are jealous of], [so] you battle and war ( p ~ i ~ m 8 e rnaoik p e i ? ~ ) . " The logic here is quite similar to that which underlies Philo's discussion of the importance of reason dominating anger in a passage mcntioncd at the beginning of the previous chapter. When pleasure (+ fi8ovfi) has the materials it needs to produce it, it haunts the belly and the parts below it. But when it is at a loss for these materials, it occupics the breast (~badlril&l)where wrath (b 8upbq) is; for lovers of pleasure (oi . . . qthfi8ovo~)when deprived of their pleasures (.r& +&viuv) grow bitter and angry (&pyi
'9 The relation of 4:l 6 to what precedes and follows it is dcbatcd. Tpically, 4:lFlO or 4 : 1 1 2 is rcgarded as a discret~section; ho~vever,as Johnson points out, 4:l-10 is cl<>sclyrelated to 3:13 1 8 (':James 3:13-410 and the E$os nEPl @QONOY," NbuT 25 (1983) 327-47). Jas 4:l-6 can in any case be examined as an arsurneniative unit which concerns the propcr and improper ways of attempting to acquire things; as will become clear shortly. Jas 4 1 ; for the sense in which & rot< pfheatv is meant, cT esp. the dcscrip tion of the tongue as the small "member" ( 3 5 , pihag) "among our membcrs" (3:6, i v t o i ~piheatv fibGv). " So &o hlayor, Ejirtlc of SL. Jmes, 134-37; Ropes, St j'nmer, 254; Johnson, Ipnpr of " "iomei., 277:, cf the NRSV. Dibelius's orimarv ohicction aeainst this readins is its Failure to account for the apparent harshness of the charse 'i/ou kill" (Jan~es,217); hut see now, however, Johnson's excellent study Tames 3:13-410 and the 7>pos REPI QQONOY:" and further bclow note 34. &. All. 3.114 Philo will go on say that "the soul is saved" only when rcason (h6yq) dominates b h p 6 < ( h ,All. ~ 3.137).
'"
.
"
-
202
CHAPTER FWE
In a manner reminiscent of James's preceding descriptions of "thc wisdom from above" as "peaceruY (3:17, eipqv~dl;cf 3:18) and the pleasures as 'C\arring among your members" (4:1), Philo proceeds to characterize the pursuit of such baser drives as a circumstance in which "war (x6hewo5) prevails in the soul," with reason (AO~LOF~V), which "is in us not as a combative ( ~ ~ X I F Obut V ) as a peaccful (eipqvaiov) inmate," becoming a "prisoner of war" (Lepl All. 3.1 1 i)."" In Fact, such a causal connection between pleasure (ilFovG) and angcr as is made by Philo in this passage reflects a "logic of envy" which is commonplace among the Hellenistic moralists, as Johnson has well demonstrated.'" Following precisely such a logic, James locates the origin of social strife in the human pursuit of their own pleasures (4:I, 6Fovai). More specifically, strife is thousht to result from the fact that such a pursuit is precisely thc wrong way to go about acquiring something: ixtovweire uat 06u Zxezc. . . 06u gxeze FL&zb k~ a i z e k 0 a ~6pCq (4:2). That is to say, zb aizeioOa~,not zb ixtOuw~iv,is the way to obtain something. In ract, so opposed are thc two that cven one who "asks" cannot expcct to rcccivc anything if it is the object of his or her pleasures 6t6.n U ~ K & aizeicroe, Yva iv that is requested: aizei~r~ a06i Aapp&ve~e ~aiqiFovai5 Ck5v Faxavfivqze (4:3)." Worsc than vain, the pursuit of desire is Likened to "friendship with the world," and thus "enmity with God" (4:4); indeed, it emerges subsequently that it represents a failure to "resist the Devil" (4:8)." The author thus reserves some of
33 Note also l'hdu's emohasis in this connection on rhe i m ~ o r u n c eof sneech for healing anger (I4f. All. 3.121); see further on this bclow, pp. 227f See Johnson, ':James 3:13-4:10 and the Tojox nEPI ORONOY." As Johnson , far from sumriine. shows, the charce or 4 2 . "you kill," when seen in this l i-~ h. t is On the convary, "it lie thc context perfectly, because in thc topos on envy, murLetter oJJamr, 277). In this der is regarded as a logical concomitant of envy" (dm, connection, one should particularly note Jas 5:6, where "the rich," who are the pre-eminent pleasure scckers inJames (ct;e.g., 55); are charged with having "killed (hrpov~6ca~ the ~ ) righteous"; note further the apparent echo ofJas 4 . 5 in Jas 5 5 , on which see below p. 223. 3' CE in this rcspect the author's logic in 1 :5 8: though God is dcscrihed as "thc God who rives to all." it is nonetheless the casc that the onc who oetitions God incorrcctlyushould not expect to "receive anyihing Crom h e Lord." k o t e that the author rcfers to both types of improper petilioncrs as Siyru~ot(1:R; 48); sec further on this term below. "' For a similar svnerev nemesis. sce , -. bctireen human desircs and God's anrelic u The 'Texhmmli ofhe Tweliie I'ohiachr, esp. % Reu. 4:i-l I , and Curther Johnson, ':Tames 3:13-410 and thc 7i,flui 17EPI ORONOY," 341-46.
"
.
.,
LOGOS AND DESIRE
203
his harshcst invective for those w-ho pursue their OMTI desires, addressing thcm as "adultcresses" in the idiom of the biblical prophets (4:4)." The host of exegetical problems involvcd in the intcrprctation of 45-13 have made this anothcr of the letter's most controversial passages." Thc qucstion of whether the author here introduces a ciratiou from somc no longer extant "scripture" is not likely to bc definitively resolved barring thc discover). of somc ancient work; dated earlier than James, which contains either some or all this passage.'Vortunatcly, this qucstion is morc important for the gcucral problcm of thc history of the canon than it is for the interpretation of the passage itself. More critical with respect to the latter are the V ~ and ~ the punctuation of the verscs."' subject of K ~ T ~ K ~ OinE 4:5 The neuter gender of .rb nv6pa renders its syntax ambiguous: it could bc takcn cithcr as the subject or the object ofPntnoO~?.If it is taken to be the object, James would thus be implying that his "adulterous" intended audiencc has underestimated the deity's jealousy (q06vog) for them.12 This reading, however, is most unlikely. In the first placc, that the author has chosen to cmphasizc the jcalousy of God in thc contcxt of a discussion which repeatedly treats 'Sealousy" (tijho5) as something entircly negative and opposed to God
"
See the literature cited by Johnson, I ~ t t wofJmer, 278. Only the biling irony of his (rhetorical) address to "the rich" -who, in James, are the pursucrs or dcsirc and the "friends of the w o r l d par excellmceis harsher. Cf. the rather lcss threatening address of the foolish man in Jas 2:20, which is more reminiscent of diatribe. 38 For discussion of the problems sec the commentaries; esp. Mayor, Epistle ofSt. Jamei, 140--45and Dibelius, James, 220-2.5; further S. Laws, "Does Scripture Speak in Vain? A Reconsideration ofJames IV.5," JVTS 20 (1973-74) 210-15; Johnson, 'James 3:13-410 and the Tqopoi nEP1 QQONOY," 327-32; Klein, Ein inolhmrnenes We& 111-1.5. See, however, the discussion below, with n. 59. "I The additional, texrual problem of whether this or thr intransitive ra.r+qaev is to he read here is largely inconscqucnlial for the interpretation of the passagc: whatever the case, the author would no doubt have assumed that it was God who a in the human being. made m & ~ dwell I' Dibelius raiscs the possibilty that the rhetorical question introduced in 4 5 ends with z p b ~ R ~ v o Ybut , ullimately argues that it runs through 4:5b, which is ta he understood as a citation (Jorner, 220 -23; cf. 207); cf the NRSV. Laws argues that 4 5 2 and 4:5b are to he understood as two distinct rhetorical clucstions; and suggests that the "scripture" in question is an allusion to LXX Pa 83:3 ("Does Scripture Speak in Vain?" esp. 234~-15);cf. Johnson, Letler of,j'ames, 280. 'The 26th edition of Nestle-ALand punctuates the passage with a colon after ?&EL, and extends thc question (and apparently a supposed citation) through 4 6 a . *' So, e.g.; Ropes, St Jomn, 264 -65; Dihelius,Jomei, 221; MuBner, DerJakobubrieJ 18lf This is the reading which 1 myself assumed in "A Leuer to tkle Twelvc Tribes,'' 508 n. 35.
"'
204
CHAPTER FIVE
(3:14, 16; 4 2 ) is hardly plausiblc."~Morcovcr, while the motif of God's jealousy is, of course, not uncommon in the Jewish scriptures, the tcrm @Lo< is normally uscd in such contexts in Greek translations, and never, in any event, is q86vo5 so used.'+ Indecd, "in Greek usage, phthonos is always a vice."'" In light of these observations, it is prima facie likcly that the author rather refers to the nv&pai%which resides within each of the "adulterers" among his audience. In fact, a characterization of the intendcd audience as longing for somcthing "to the point of cnvy" (npb5 qO6vov) accords quite well with thc prcccding depictions of them as peoplc who are jealous 14:2, &ioC.re; cf. 3:14, 16), who pursue desire (4:2, intChp~Tz~), and thus at most petition God with the "cvil motive" ( K ~ K G ~ )of" pleasure.48 The subsequent reference in 4 6 to the "greater gifr" (peil;ova.. . ~ h p t v ) ,moreover, would seem to imply some comparison to a "lesser" gift; and this can bc read as a comparison or that which God gives with thc satisfaction of the pleasures for which the spirits of the imagined "adulteresses" vainly long.4" I' This seems to me to be a problcm especially lor those, likc Dibclius, who T E , the autiior would thus be ascribadvocate cmending q o v ~ h n ein 4:2 to ~ ~ ' ~ J ~ Y c ~ Elor ing to God (cT 4:5, q06vov) the very behavior hc condemns in his intended audience! Note also that the author understands '>calousyX(cf 5qho6rc) to be the result of frustrated "desire" (cL iz18ufiirzz) according to 4 2 , and that God is not subject to temptation by indhfiia (cf 1:13-14). Incidentally, it might be pointed out that, ironically, the "logic of envy" which Johnson describes applies quite well to the author's understanding of his god in any case: his "resistance" of such adulterous ones, at Icast in the case of the rich, will ultimately take the form o l a brutal "day of slaughter" (cf 5:5, on which sec below)! I ' Laws, Epirtle ofj'arnes, 177-78; cf Johnson, Leller ~JJarniamei, 282, who considers thc attribution of q86vog to God to be "virtudly impossible." '"ohnson; LeItm oJJaiamer, 281, emphasis his. This nv6&cr is not andogous to the "holy spirit" refcrred to in the leuers of. Paul. but rather simnlv, thc life-zivinp human soirit: cf las 2:26. and further Laws. " ~ o k sScripture Speak in vain::' 215-13. h,Johnson rightly notes; not simply "incorrectly" ( I ~ t t m of,7arnes,278); cf esp. 1:13, where ''c\.il" (cf. rarirv) is associated with temptation by desire. Notc that the entire discussion leading up to 45-6 has dealt rvith the "envy" which resulis from the pursuit ofi$av$ see Johnson, ':James 9:13-410 and thc Topes llEPlOl3ONOY." "" See further on this phrase below, note 61. The debate over the translation of ~irptg as "giR" or "grace" owes more to comparisons of James with Paul than the logic of the passage itsclf: The followkg considerations seem to me to bc decisive in favor or translating this, with Johnson (Ixtter ofJarner. 282); as "giR." First, while the author does not show any ovcrt interest in a pauline concept of "grace" elsewhere in his work (though cf. the comments of MuRner, Der JokobubkJ: 96, and others on the use of pouhq'tJei
"'
"
.
. , "
LOGOS AND D E S I ~ .
205
It is obvious in any case that the two refcrcnces to thc fact that ) , in a quotation from Proverbs God "gives a gift" (6i6wutv ~ & p t v one and one immediately prior to that quotation, are to be understood in light of the prcccding discussion of proper and improper ways of acquiring things. The citation of Prov 3:34, which makes a distinction between the "humblc" to whom God "gives a giR" (6i6wutv ~ & p t vand ) the "arrogant" whom he "resists," is intended as proof (616 hiyet) of thc author's larger point regarding thc evil and futility of pursuing onc's own pleasurcs."" The "humble" of Prov 3:34, that is, arc interpreted by Jamcs with reference lo those who simply dcpcnd upon God for their needs; the "arrogant,"" on the other hand, are correlated with those "adulteresses" who cithcr pursuc their own pleasurcs and neglect to make requests of God,"2 or, just as bad, ask God in order that their desircs might he sated. Indeed, in the mock address of 5:l-6, the author subsequently warns "the rich" (oi nho6uto~)-whom he clscwhere contrasts with b .rane~v6< (1:9-11; cf. 4:6);who indulge themselves at the cxpense of others (5:4-5) and who, indeed, "kill" to this end (5:6, qovebcraze; cf. 42); who are, in short, the pre-cminent "arrogant"s3--that God ultimately will "resist" (drvttz&uoe.rat)them in a decisive and brutal manner."4 Jas 4:l-6 is thus followed" by a call for repentancc reminiscent of that which introduces the apostrophe to thc rich in 5 : l : those who seek to sate their own desircs are to "lamcnt and mourn and wccp" (zahatnop.iloaze ~ a nw@oaz& i ~ a ~ih a b o a z ~they ) ; are, in short, to "humble themselves" (zanetvh&lze) so that God might exalt (hyhoet) them.j6 Such "friends of the world" are to rcsist the Devil, who will thus "flcc" from them, and draw near to God, who will thus draw ncar suing one's own dcsires, Mih a "COTTC.C~" and "eitcctive" one, i.c., asking God, who has already been characterized as onc "who gives to all generously and without grumhlin~" (l:5), and f n ~ mwhom comes "every p o d @ and evcry perfect present" (1:17). CCT Johnson, ':James 3:13-410 and the TDpox nEP1 QOONOY:" 346; dm,Leller of3mimnei, 283. " For the association of986v05 and bzepqpavia, scc Johnson, ':James 3:13-410 and the Topos nEPI QOONOY," 335-36; rdmn, Idler $3ume.i; 283. C t Jas 413-15, where those who make heir own p l a n ~ p r c s u m a b l ybusiness plans (cL 413: "we will do business [i1~zop~uoirpe8al and make a prtdit") without dererring to the will of God are upbraided for their arrogance (&hcoveia). Cf. Klein, Ein vo1lkommene.r kVmk 115. .' Cf Jas 4.5 vith 5 5 , and further 1:9-I 1. Sec L. A. Schtikel, ':James .5,2 [sic] and 4,6," Bib 54 (1973) 73 76; Dmids: Eflklle ~,j'orner; 180; Johnson, k t & $James, 305; Penncr, EflUut1e @>me5 and fi~schalology, 155. 5i Note rhe use ofonv in i:7. "' C t Jas 4 9 , 10 with 5:1; see runher l:Y I I.
" " ''
206
C E L W ~ RFIVE
to them (4:7--8)." Thcy are "sinners" (&l*ap~whoi) who must cleanse thcir hands; Giyru~otwho must "purify" ( a y v i ~ a stheir ~ ) heart^.^' As thc fact lhat the subject of the clause 6tb [il ypaq+] h&et must be supplicd from 4:5 already suggcsts, thcrcfore, t11e charge that those who pursue an adulterous "friendship with thc \corld" arc acting as though "scripture spcaks in vain" is issued with Prov 3:31 in mind, whether or not it is also made with reference to some now lost \cork, cited in 4:5(--6a)."\Accordingly, it sccms to me that Jas 4 5 6 is best punctuated as rollo>\-s: Or do you think the scripture speaks in vain? The spirit which hc [i.e., God] madc to dwell in us longs to the point of en\-). (xpbg rp86vov); hut hc 1i.e.; God] gives a ,greater @fi. Therefore it says.. . What is clear in any case is that the author imagines two ways in which one can go about acquiring things. The propcr and en'ectivc way, emphasized also in the opening and closing sections of the letter, is simply to ask "the god who gives to all without rescrve and without reproach" (15); more precisely, to ask him humbly, entirely apart from any intention of sating onc's own desires. The impropcr way, conversely, is to attempt to sate onc's desires, whethcr through petitions to God or not. T o engage in the arrogant pursuit of one's own desires is to become an "enemy or God" and thus, ironically, to alienate the "gift-giver," whose gifts are reserved for the humble.
Desire and the Gzfis God in 1.13- 18 Immediately following the claim, in Jas 1:13-15, that the chain of temptation, sin and death originates with an individual's own dcsire rather than from God, James states that "cvery good gift and every
j' A s b has often been noted: these admonitions and promises r h d close analogies in thc T ~ ~ T m" l/ t si l e Twhe Patriarch sec Dibelius, Jamex, 226. jU Ct: Jas 1:8, whcrc the one who does not ask God 6" n b ?is~similarly ~ described as SiyruXog,drra~drora-ro~ i v aboarg r a i b60i5 ~ ariroG. Note rurthcr in this connection the association ofducaiaoraoia with an "earthly" and "demonic" wisdom in 3:16, while the "wisdom from above" is "in the first placc" (irp6rov) "purc" (3:17, b p i ) . "' This Latter possibility, however; secms to me LO bc an unneccss-AT hypothesis in light or the importance of Prov 2 3 4 to the passagc. While it is possible tlmt the author combines two quotations here (a coupling: one might suggest; facilitated by thc occurrence in both o r the phrasc 6iSootv ~ h p ~ vitj ,seems more likely that the question in 45, "do you think sctiprure speaks in vain," simply anticipates the 611 hiYe~\vhichintraduccs the citation of Prov 3:3+ as poinicd out, [he suhjrct of 611 hiyet must in any CASC he supplied from 4:5. Less plausible still is L~MIS'S suggcslion that the author d u d c s here to W( Ps 833 (';Does Scripture Speak in Vain?' 214f).
perfect prcscnt""" is "from abovc" (6vwO~v);i.c.: rrom God. l'hc connection between these two statements is greatb illuminated by the emphasis on God's sole as tlie souscc of good dlings t111-ougl~outdie letter, and by 4:l-6 in particular. .MI truly good things, according to James, come from God; and it is by asking him rather than pursuing one's own desircs that one can receive thcsc gifts. O n his lie\\., scripture ilselr tcachcs that God "@\-es a $St" only to the humble, while resisting those who arrogantly pursuc thcir own desircs."' Succumbing to desire, in short, represents a mistaken understanding of how (truly) good things can be obtained: one must depend humbly: simply and wholly upon God. 'She pursuit of one's own desires, lvhile enticing, \+ill ultimatcly achievc nothing good, only sin and death.
"" As has long been noted, z t o a Sbarg ciy& rai aciv Ghpqpa rfhetov forms ;r hcxameter. H. Grccuen has ar,ped, on thc supposition that ibis line must therclire be a quotation of an carlier saying, that Jas 1 : l i actually consists of two scntences: a traditionai statement and its explaration. Grecven thus paraphrases thc ver.se as follows: "'Jede Gabe ist gut, rind jedes GcscJ>cnk is1 vollkommcn'. Und warum? \Veil es von oben stammt, hcrabkommt vom Vater des Lichts . ." (':Jrde Gabr ist ~ ~ 1 ,13). ' ' Greeven, however, docs not serm to have won a ~i~gnifirant follo\ving on thk point; scc, c.g., the subsequent t~.anslatiansofMul3ncr (DerJakobusbriel; 811, Cantinat ([asEpttr~.~,30). Laws (EpIrtIe oJJan~er, i2), Johnson (Lellr ? / , 7 a r r ~ ~ , 173); see further Klein, fiGn nuIih,m,mnmzer Wkkk 6 6 6 7 . Davids suxgrsts that cven if t h ~hexameter was proverhid, it is altered in James so that "every good gift and rvcry p c r f c ~ tpresent" is now rhe subject of &&If" i m t v (EpIrtlr uf,7ames, 86). In fhct, whereas the author's intercst in establishing- that d good things come from God is readily understandable in thc context of ]:Is-18 (see immediately hclow), it is ditficult to scc ~ r h yhe shoilld suddanly reel compelled to dcfcnd l11r claim thar all "gifW are good or perfect. The significance to he accorded to the usc of two diffcrrnt phrascs in connecLion with God's bencficencc (i.e., 6 6 0 ~ 5drya&i and 6hpqpx rfherov) has also been thc subject or same discussion. Some read hcre a disiinction hchvcen the act of giving (660~5)and the @ft itsclf (6hpqpa); see Mayor, EpIrlle uf St. jarne.~, 56 58; Hurt, E$i,lle oJSl. Jame~, 28; more rccenliy,Johnson, Leller gf.7arr~ei; 195. Ropes, on the othcr hand, argued that "there is no special distinclion intended, the repetition being solcly li,r rhetorical elrect" (St. Jams, 159); sct: also 13. Greeven, "Jede Gabc is1 gut, Jak. 1,17," T z 14 (1958) 1-13; Cantinat, 18.7 fi$ihe.r; 91; id;, Epislle o/ Jamex, 86; ci: I)ibeliu.s, jams, 100. The issuc is in any r:asc not crucial for understanding the author's basic point, on which scc belaw. Note that diere is a certain tcrlsion behvecn the author's view of God and his pcrcepiion of his present economic realities: r f Jas 1:7 and 4:2-3 with thr wcaittl of thc ~ i c k c d"rich" (e.g., 5:2-3). 'Skis tension, perhaps; underlies his notion of thc "greater @li" in 4:6: the material iuxulics of "the rich'' arc not in fact [he truly good gifis; hut only llccting material possessions which ultimatcly work to h e i r disadvantag?; cf: in this conncctio~~James'suse oCphrasesnho6a~o~ hv Z
.
"
208
CHAPTER FRT
In fact, the correlation drawn behveen dcsirc and sin in 1:13-15 is also implied in 4:l-10, xvhcre those who pursue desire (cC 4 2 : irrt0upei.r~)are addressed as "sinners" (ixpap~ohoi)who nced to "clcanse their hands" (44). A connection between desire and death, too, is evident in the latter passagc, which locates thc origin or ''wars and battles" and "killing" in thc pleasures (4:l-3):' The "dealh" which is of forcmost concern in 1:14-15, however, is not that which those who pursuc desire \+ill inflict upon others; rather, it is the eschatological one which thcy themselves, or more precisely their "souls,"" will experience as a result of thcir sin." Thus does James contrast the "death" (0hva.ros) which rcsults from giving in to trexpaop65 in 1:14-15 with the "crown of life" ( ~ b vo.rOvavov 735 Swfi5) promised, in the immediatcly preceding macarism, lo those who endure zetpaop65 (1:12)."5
The Two Ways and the Wanderiq Children of God
A concern for the eschatological "death" resulting from sin also cmcrges in the lettcr's concluding instruction, which presents the association of dcccption, sin and death made in 1:13-1 6 under the rubric of a "two ways" ethic (5:19-20)" The two ways are charactcrizcd by ''truth" (il hhfi0e1a) and "deception" (trh&vq),re~pectively.~' The "sinner" (hpap.rwh65)is imagincd to bc travelling on the "way" or "path" (6865) which is characterized by "deception" (rrbivq), and which ends in death (06vazo5). This is portraycd as ahavkotla~ anb rfi5 bhq0eiag,"' a characterization which simultaneously exploits
" Johnson, in fact, understands Jas
4:2 to explain the hgic behind l:l4 15; sec Epprstle O f J m e ~ ,172. Cf. also in lhis connection Jas 5 5 , where it is said that "the rich," the pre-eminent devotees of dcsire, arc charged with "killing the righteous." " Sce 1 2 1 and 520. Note also that "the righ~eous"--who, no doubt, Mill receive "the crown or M c " c a n noncthclcss bc (and havc been!) "killed" by the enemies of God (56). "* Note that "thc rich" not only "kill" (.5:6),hut d l lhemselves soon race a "day or slaughter" for which their indulgent lifestyle has sclved to "Tauen" them (55). "" On the relation of the rrerpaop&
-
LOC(IS AND DESIFW
209
both the spalial and copitivc aspects of nhav&w: while the contrast set up bctbvcen ilixh$3e~aand nhirvq suggests that the "sinner" is "deceiued from the truth;" the portrayal of such a ouc as traveling the Mrong path and needing to be "turned back" (kn~orpivo)prcscnts him or her as haling "wandered Crom the truth.""Wne u h o turns the wandering "sinner" from the "v-ay" characterized by "deception" and back to "the truth" \\-ill, in en'ect, "cover a multitude of sins (ixpaprtiuv)" and "save his or her soul from death" ( ~ h oyruXijv ~t a6rou k~ 0av&~ou).~'~ It is difficult to render nhavq05 uz.?ib.ri5 ahq0eia5 (5:20) in English in a way which prcscmcs both its spa~ialand its co~gnitiveconnotalions. l h c translator is faced with a similar problem in Jas 1:1618 where: once again, both aspects of the term nhavirw arc operativc. Here, the god who is the source of ever)- good gift is not described simply as such, but as "the Father of Li~hts,with whom there is no nap' alteration or shadow of change" (1: 17, TOG narpbq ~oiv~+G~rwv; o l r ~Evt nupahhayil rpoG5 ixnooxiaopa)." Tl'hilc it is not immediately clear what (ir any) particular astrological phenomena the author has in mind in 1:17," the contrast betu:een the deity and the "lights" he created vis-i-vis such "changes," at least, is obvious.'" Further, the Fact that the author proceeds to point out that this
4
ir rrhdrvq< b6oii aG.rali is translaied "Tram his or her way of rrror" or "liom thr error of his or her way," thc basic idea or a " ~ - a y "characteri~edby error is clear. Cf. Johnson; LLlln $Jarnu; 337; further Dibeiius, , j a m e ~257 ~ ii. 94, who ilotcs thai "'[tla wandcr' (nhavka8ax) occurs fiequenlly in conjunction with 'way'," citin5 scveral rclcvant passages. 'I' Jus 5:20; the rctcrencc to "covering a muluiudc of sins" is an allusion to P r o i 10:12. Against Fabris, 1 2 g 8 , 69 n. 50, the "sins" which will bc "covcn:d" and thc "soul" which will thereby be "saved liom drarh" im: mosr nilrurally read as thosf of the "sinner" whose deception leads him or hcr to dcath, not as those of b imrnpiyqrag. See further ,Johnson; hfhr "f,jnmri, 330-39. '' I simply cite the icxt as given in R. Alanrl rt a/.; .!W,i,um Tritmnentuni Crm~un~. Edit2 CnIica Mokr 1V; lnstallmcnl 1, 1.13 14. O n the severe texiual problerns hcrc. scc thc discussions of Riq,i:s, St. J~lrner, 162 64; arid llibelius, ,jamex, 100 102. O n tllc imuonomirul connovations ofnapaMayil and .rpafi< cinaariati~a;scc thr commenruries and the relevant cntrics in BAGD. Thai the aulta,r lrild spcciiic astrological phenomena in mind here, hrnvevcr, must bc coiaidcrmi most doilhlli~l. Indeedl judging from the profound lextual confusion surroundins this passage; his terminology in arly casc confi,m~dedearly copyists. In lilrr; his primav intrrest herel a I will argue below. is in the (apparent) deviations fiom thc normally quite regular rnovemcnts of t h ~ hcavcnly "lights." It is therefi,rc most doubtful that onc sliuuld detect in this I i r x a special concrrn to asso~iatcGod ~*irh"li~ht"sa' opposcd LO "darkrrcss") as suggcsicd, c.g.. by Iloprs, Sf. j'arne.~; i60fi d: Xliillnrr, I l n j'ainki,burbriL 91. Irrdccd, tla: "lights" arc introduced hrre ilhoie all hrcausr of thcir asa,cirtion i\ith ciiangc. in bvhicli n:spcct thcy arc contrasted with God; rl: thr rommcnts of Dibclios. j'ame.$; 102.
'"
"
"
same "Father" also "gave birth to us'' suggests both an additional comparison bctwecn "us" and the "lights" (who arc both offspring of God), and an analogous contrast betwcen "the Father" and "us." Such a contrast between God and humans has in [act already been drawn in 1:13-15 and is, indeed, the essential point of thc arpmcnl: xrhiie humans experience ze1pa~p65, God cannot be held responsiblc for this bccausc he: urllie them, is &zeipaoso5. The implication, thcn, is that thc "changes" evident among the "lights" but not rcflective of the naturc or their "fathcr" are in somc scnsc comparable to the n e ~ p a o p o expcricnccd i by human beings but not by the god who "gavc birth" to them." Thc command which preccdes the rererencc to God as thc unchanging "Father or Lights," p~ zhavtiaOe, is particularly suggestive in this respect. Whilc the regular rnovemcnts of the astral bodics was commonly emphasized in antiquity,7" it was the perceived Gregda~itiesin
'"1.aws sfems to sense this connection as wclk "While heavenly bodies can hc scen ta change, then, either through dlcir own movement or when shadolvs are cimt upon them by the movement of olllcrs, God is hoth hirnself unchangpahle and undTccted by change in anything outside himx:lf (= in v. 13 he is both unternpted and u n t e m p t i n g ~(Eppiille @James, i4). Laws suggcsts a comparison with Philo's contrast betwcen God's unchanging naturc and the obscn~ahlemovements in tile heavens which hc created. In De Chmh. 87-90, r.g.; poinring out that "sabbatli" rncans "rest" (drv&nauaiq),and commenting upon the fact that "Moscs" oftcn cdVs the sabbath "God's sabbath," l'hilo contrasrs God and-his creation in this way: God is the "one thing among that which exists (& 1015 o6otv; c t Colson: "in thc univrisr") which rests (drvazau6p~vovj."Philo sindes out the astral bodies as the strongest case fix purposes of the contrast: even tklesc "arc not self mastering and move and revolvc r:ontinually," and can thus be said u, "sufir" while God is i i ~ p c n ~ o and < drp~~&phq.iag (De Chmb. 88, 89). Elsewhcrc Phi10 speaks of this general contrast hehuecn God and his various creations in tcrms of the latter being by nature "suhject to hccoming (iv yevho~t)and constant change" (Op$ 12; cT Leg. All. 2.33). More illuminating fir Jamcs, howcvcr, is Philo's awareness that ttic concept of "unchangeableness" can he used in another sense, in terms of which thc idcd human being can be compared, not contrasted, with the deity. Reacting to those who w,ould infer Crom Gcn 6 5 7 that "the Creator repented of the creation ofmcn when He heheid their impiety," Philo writes: For what gxaier impiety could tklere bc than to suppose that rh? Unchangeable charlgcs? Indeed some mainkin that cvcn among men vacillation of mind and judgment is not universal; for diosc who study philosophy in guilelessness and purity, it is held, gain from their kno~vledgcthis as their chic1 rcward, thar they do not change with changng circurnstanccs hut with u~iberldingstcadfasrness and firm constancy u k c in hand all that ir hehovcs them to do (Dm$. Immiit. 22). Such a on<: is deacrihcd ac b rihe~ogin $23; cS his description of Moses-and b oorp65 and b oaouSaiaq in generd~-in Gigant. 48, esp. thc commcnt thar "neither is virtue subject to movement nor thr good man to change; hur hoth are stayed on thc firm foundation of right n:ason." Cicero; e.g.; r p o n s Cleanthes's view that "uniform motion and revolu~ionof rhr hcavcns" and "the v a r i ~ dgroupings and urdcrcd beauty 01die sun; moon and
"
LOGOS AND DESIRE
21 1
thc movement of some "stars" which led to their designation as xhavii.ra~,or "wandcrcrs." Thcsc astral "11-andercrs" were the sub-
ject of a popular Jc~vish(and subsequentl>-Christian) myth, which explained the supposed ariomalies in terms of certain stars' rcbcllious deviations from the courscs v-hich wcrc laid out for them b?God. Thc carlicst rcfercncc to this myth in thc cxtant Jewish litcraturc is pcrhaps found in our present 1 Enoch,'Vn wl~ichthe I\'atchcrs are identified as "stars" \\hose do>mfall, as it wcrc, was prccipitated by their illicit desire for thc daughters of "the sons of men": "thc angcls, the childrcn of hcavcn, saw them and desired (htre06fiqaav) thcm" (1 Enoch 6:2)." In any case, thesc "\vandcring stars" became paradi<patic examples of those who disregard Gods command^'^ for later writers, many of whom do clearly identify thcm with the Watchers. Thc author of thc Letter of Jude, for example, liens a q o u p of Christian "intruders" who "defde the flcsh, rcject authority and slander the slorious ones" to thc &a.ripe
'" "
thcsc are the "wandering stars" (ho~hpegn h a v j m t ) referred to in the prophecy,"" who wandcr from the narrow road of thc commandrncnts (ai drab e g r5v ivroh5v 660: . . . nhavhpevot) into a boul~dlcssabyss of the carnal and bodily sins.. . [Bloasting that they are free: they have become slaves to sewile desires (Enttlupiov)!"
A passage rrom Theophilus's To Autohcus is also noteworthy in this connection: The disposition of the stars: too, contains a type of the arrangement and order of the rightcous and pious, and of ihosc who keep thc law and commandments of God (i5v . . . qpo6vzmv .ibv v6pov ~ a?kg i ivrohkg 8eaCj. For the brilliant and bright stars are an imitation of thc prophets, and therefore they remain fixed, not declining, nor passing from place to place. And ttlose which hold thc second place in brightness, arc lypcs of the people of the rightcous. And those, again, which changc their position, and flcc from place to place, which are also called planthey too are a typc of the men who ets (oi icai ahdrvqreg ~ahoirpevo~), have wandered from God, ahandoning- his law and commandments ( ~ 5 vdr~roo.mhvwv&v0phnwv drnb zoi, 8~0%; xazahtn6vrwv rbv v6pov ~ ar hi npoordrypaza n6ro:j."'
A r i a l passase, from the Testament offlaphtali, i n w-hich thc sons of t h e patriarch a r e urged n o t to become like S o d o m "which dcpartcd from the o r d e r of its nature" (fir15 6vGhhaT;e ~&T;rvvGoeo5 aGzfi5) is also inslructivc: Sun, moon, and stars (iih~oglcai oehfivq mi harkpeg) do not alter thcir order; thus you should not alter the Law of God (v6pov 8eo:) by the disorder of your actions. Thc gcntilcs, bccausc they have wandered astray(nhavq8&ra) and forsook the Lord, have chanxed the order, and have devoted themselves to stones and sticks: pattcming themselves after wandering spirits (me6paat i i G ~ v q ~. ).~. "Likewise the LVatchcrs dcpartcd from thc order of their nature (z6rcw qboewg airriuvj . .4I!
"" An apparent rererence to,Jude 13; see on this point M. Smith, C h m l ofAlexand a Secrel Gorpel ofMark (Cambridge, bLk Haward Univcrsily Press, 19i3) 8. "' Letter lo 7heodoru1, 1.3 7. The text and varlslation are those of M. Smith, C l m t
and&
of Airxnndria ond a Secrel Coxpel of Mark. 446 52; cL the commentary on pp. 8-10, where thc paradipadc use of thc "planets" elsewhere in Clement's writings is noted. l'hc "carnal and bodily sin" again likcly reflects an identification with the
IVarchers. Ad Au!. 2.15. 'l'hc tcxt is found in h1PG 6.10i7; the translation is that of AI'F 2.115. " So Kee; cf: H. \V. Hollander and 31.de Jongc: 'Ths 'Tt~tammLIof the Tmeine I'ntria~chc-4 Commentq (SVI'1' 8; Leiden: Brill, 1985) 306: "spirits or deceit." .l'he divergence in the two translations highlighrs once a,qiarn thr difiiculry in presewing the Greek word-play with iihdrvq and its cognates. "' 7,hiipit 3:2 5: I ha\.e slightly revised the transladon of H. C. Kee, ''Testaments
IOCOS
.4m DESIRE
213
This passage does not explicitly mention, at least as such, the 6ro.rip~q nhavfi.ra1, and indeed scems to suggest that "stars" by dcfinition "do not alter their order." Thc astronomical context, ho\vever, and particularly the analog- drawn from the \\'archers, suggests that the "wandering spirits"" afier whom "the nations" patterried thcmsclvcs are to bc uudcrstood as "wandering" astral bodies. Preciously in the Testaments, morcovcr, the IVatchers wcrc associated particularly with illicit desire, which is thus herc apparently assumed to be the undcrlying cause of their "wandering."'" Sandwiched bctwccn a claim that human temptation, sin and death stem from desire rather than God and a rcfcrcncc to the astral whose changes do not rcflcct their creator's charactcr, the "lightshts" admonition w+ nXavCd3~in Jas I :16 is to be understood in light of this common use of the astral "wandercrs" as paradigmatic examplcs of rebellion from God's law as a result of illicit dcsirc. The allusion to this myth is in fact quite apposite in the context of the author's argument in 1: 1 3 18, ~ providing a parallel example in the s e ~ c of c the point made in 1:13-15. 'l'hough God is the "father" of thc "lights," any wandering on their part rcflccts not his naturc, but represents, on the contrary, a deviation from thc path which God had marked out for them. So too, though God is our "father,"" the human cxpcrience ofne~paop6qdoes not reflect God's nature-for ut stems from each individual's own desire. hc is i x n e i p a o ~ o ~ b rather of thc Twclvc Patriarchs;" OTP 1.812, which obscures the Fact that the "naturc" in question is specifically that of the Watchen themselves. For the Greek text, see M. d r Jonge, n i e Testamentr $ the 'rmebe Palriarchr: A Critical Edition ojthe Grek Text; cf. idm, Teitamenta XI1 /'ahinchum Edited nccurding lo Cambdgt Uniuersip Iib~braly.WS ~ f I . 2 4 f i l .203a-2624 with Short flotei (PV"'G; Leiden: Brill, 1964). See further on this passage Hollander and de,Jonge, ?he TerfmnmLr rfihL' Twebt Palliurchr: A corm day^ 3 0 5 308. * See above, noic 83. Cf % Keu. .5:6. Notc also in this connection the link hettvcen thc Watchcrs and Sodom in this passagc, which is, in fact; nut uncommon; cf Judc (t7, and the comment of Hollander and dc Jonge, ?he Testarnmtr of the T w e h 1'ahiarch.r: A Commmtmy, 307-308. "' Note that while the peculiar use o r the verb drrrediqow in l:18 suxgests a maternal, rather than paternal, imaxe of God; its natural subject is the x a i p rGv q&;rrov of 1:17; cr. rurther the description of God as "the Father" in 1:27 and 3:9; the latter or whicil uscs the term a s ; clearly, in l:l7 with reCerence lo God's role as crcator: "with it [sc. the tongue] we bless the Lord and Father, and uith it we cursr thc human being.; who ucrc rnade according a, the likencss of God." As has ofen hccn pointcd out; this vcrh was likely used in !:I8 mainly n, effcct sornc manner of conrrast with sin's "birthing" (drrrolcSz~)of. "drarh" in l:l5; su: c.g.: Mayor, Epistle $St. ,7ames; 62; MuDncr, DnJakoburbrizh 93; Davids, Epirtle $Jornc~. 8% V o u , ~ ,L'Epit~e de Saint ,7acquc.r3 1.5; Johnson, Leller of,7ames; 197.
"
214
C W ~ K FIVE
God, according to James, is not the source of temptation. It is rather one's own desires that tempt one to stray from God's will and onto thc path of sin and death. The Father's ill for "us," James goes on to say-, far from tcrnpting pcoplc to pursue desire, is expressed in the fact that he "gave birth to us by means ol" a logos of truth so ~ ~as Dibelius that wc arc a sort of 'first fruits' of his c r e a t u r ~ s . "If, rightly remarks, "the divine will to probidc salvation is stressed': this strongly suggcsts that the logos of truth stands in opposition to desire, as the way which leads to "life" rather than "death." r In fact, it is in the immediately following elaboration of the admonition "let each person be quick to hear, slow to speak and slow to anger" that the author refers to "the implanted logos which is able to save your souls." That these two logooi are indeed one and thc samc cannot be doubted. As we have seen, the phrase &wquzogh6yo5 itself, l i e the refcrencc to the "birtb" by means of logos in 1:18, is an image of divine creation." More striking still is the fact that, just as the "way" of deception, sin and death in 5:19-20 corresponds to the failurc to rcsist desire in 1:14-15, so do thc two primary characteristics of the opposite way enumcratcd in thc conclusion-that is, "truth" (5:19, fi drh$3eta) and its ability to "save souls from d e a t h (cf. 520, auiaet.qrvx+v a6zoG i x Oav&zou)-correspond, respectively, to thc descriptions of logos in 1:18 and 1:21: the logos by which God "gave birth to us so that we are thc 'first fruits' of his creations" is "of t r u t h (1:18, &hqOeia5), while the implanted logos is identificd as aiuaal that "which is able to save your souls" (1:21, zbv Guvh&~ov z6.5 yru~6.5 S~iuv). i The connection of 1: 19-27 to 1: 13-18 itself further confirms that the Myog &hqBeiagand 6 Epquroq h6yog are one and the same,"' and
-
Jas 1:18; the use of quotation marks around "first fruits" is meant to reflect whai I lake to hc the deliberate empk,yment o f metaphorical language by James (note the use ofnvu). Interestingly, the same usage is found in Philo, who describes Isracl as "set apart out of the whole human race as a kind of first fruits (q &zapX$) to the Maker and Father" (Spec. Leg. 4.180). For the sense in which this birth renders "us" "first fruits" in James, see below p. 237. Dibelius, Jomer, 103; "this can be seen," he continues, 'Tram thc position or 'having willed (!JovhqOei<)." "" See further on this creation below, under the heading "Birth by Iiigoi." The identilication orhbyo~&hq8eiugand b kpqu.rog M y o is ~ widely assumed; see abovc, Chapler One. Even Dibelius, who objected in principle to interpreting 1:21 in light of 1:18 giwn his literary approach to the letter, ultimately idenlified both as "the gospel."
"" "
I.OCOS >\ND DESIRE
215
that this logos rcprcscnts the "way" contrary to dcsirc, i.e.: thc way which leads to "life." As we haw sccn, Jas 1:19-27 rcprcscnts a discrete section within thc first chapter of Jamcs: Jas l:19b presents a threc part admonition, each element of which is elaborated in 1:20--27. Its connection with 1:13-18, howcver, is clear nonetheless. Dcpcnding upon whether one takes Ya.ie as an indicative or an imperative, 1:19a refers to what has prcccded either as a rcmindcr ("you know this") or, more gcncrally, as something of which the audience should in any casc be aware ("know this!")." Whatever the case, the use of ZTE.. . Sk to introduce rhc admonition "let cach pcrson be quick to hear, slow to spcak, and slow to anger" implies that this latter represents an cthical inference drawn from what has preceded, whcthcr 1:13-18 as a whole or 1:18 in particular." It is thcrefore striking, given the recerence to thc birth oS "us" by mcans of the "logos of truth" in 1:18, that "thc implanted logos" is ccntral to the claboration of 1:19b: since human anger doesn't produce God's righteousness, it is to he received "with humility" (1:21); ihough one is to be "quick to hear," one must not merely "hear" the logos, but "do" it as we11 (1:22-23); and whilc the logos is not explicitly mentioned when the author explains being- "slow to speak" in terms of "bridling the tonguc" (1:26, ~ a h t v a y w y 6 i vy h G ~ a a v ) ,it emerges when this themc is revisited in James 3 that "bridling the tongue" is nothing other than not "stumbling" i v h6yv (3:2)-a phrase that certainly rcfers to speech, but speech particularly in its relation to the implanted logos." In short, knowledge that an individual's own desire is the ultimate source of temptation, that giving in to temptation lcads to sin and death, and, perhaps most especially, that God "gavc birth to us by means or a logos of truth," should give risc to a particular type of bchavior vis-a-vis the implanted logos which is "ablc to save souls."
Conclzlszon The rcfcrcncc to the "1ugo.os of truth" by which God "gave birth to us" is made in the context of an argumcnt that locatcs the origin of temptation, sin and dcath in human dcsirc rather than with
"'
'l'hc reading &me, while also strongly attested, is likely a later scrihal attempt to solidify the transition from 1:18 to 1:19-26. "' So also Johnson, I d & of Jmtex, 199; cf Klcin; Ein n u o l h m n e x We& 44, 133. Dibelius's characteristic rejection of any coherent conneclion between 1:lR and 1:19-26 results more rrom his gencral iiterav approach to thc lctier than lo exegesis or this particular passase; see James, 109 Sce below; pp. 224-30.
"
God. A distinction is drawn between God and humanity: Cod, unlike human beings, neither tempts nor is himself tcmptcd. The uue source of tcmptation, rather, is each individual's own desirc. Playing, as in 519-20, on both of the common connotations or ihe verb nhavho, thc author warns his audience, ,uj nhavCo8e: they are not to be "dcccivcd': by the allure of desire and &us induccd to "wander" in sin toward death. Despite its seductive aliurc, nothing that is truly good will be achieved by giving in to dcsire. "Every good gift and cvery perfect present" comcs from God. His "gifrs" are reselvcd for those that humbly depcnd upon him, >%-hide he "resists" those who arrogantly pursuc their own desircs. In the same way that any "wandering" on the part of thc astral "lights" is not reflectivc of the nature of their "Father" who created thcm, so too, God is not responsible when humans "wander" onto the path of sin and death, despitc the fact that he "gave birth" to "us." Indeed, far from tempting pcoplc to pursue desirc, God "gave birth to us" by means of lop-as; he "implantcd" within us, that is, ihe logos whose primary characteristics oS "truth" and the ability to "save souls" stand diametrically opposed to the deception and dcath of desire. Knowledge of this fact should lead onc to resist the "desire" w-hich leads to death, and "do," ratherl the logos "which is able to savc souls."
Locos
AND
ERGA
'The antithetical relationship between logos and dcsirc in Jamcs is underscored by the series of contrastive terms associated with each. They are portrayed as two "ways," wilh desire characterized above all by "dcccption" (1:16; 5:19-20, ~hdrvq)and logos by "truth" (1:18; 5:19, ahfi8e~a).Thc path of dcsire leads to "death" (1:15, 0hva.iog): while the logor is able to "savc souls" from death (1:21; cE 5:20: o60ei yrv~ilv. . . k~ Oav&.iov).Each "w-ay," morcovcr, is characterized by its own particular catcgory of behavior. ,Just as succumbing to desire results in "sin" (1:15, bpapziu; cf. 5:20, &pxprwh&v),so too docs "doing" logos producc a particular type oS action, namely an ergon: "the one who looks into the perfect law which is of freedom and remains" and thus becomcs a "l0go.r-doer" bccomes, more specifically, a noiqziq &pyou(195). AualyzingJames's emphasis on "works" from the perspective of his view of logos and desire as "two ways," in fact, sheds a good deal of light on this controversial topic.
LOGOS AND DESIKE
217
The rolc or erga as counterpart to sin within the ethical and sotcriological thought of James emerges most clearly through a comparison or 1:2-4, 12"' with 1: 14 -1 5. In Jas 1:2-4, thc author insists that the "endurance" (Grropovfi) produced (idcally) by ze1paop6g must "havc a pcrfcct work (Epyov r&etov) in order that you might be perfcct, %-hole, and lacking in nothing." The somcwhat peculiar phrasc kpyov rkhetov has been variously interpreted." Dibclius took it to be a rather pleonastic anticipation of the subsequent clause, ba ~ T rkhetot ~ abld~hqpot i iv pqrl6~vihe~rr6pwot.Thc latter, therefore, whilc "formally. . . dcpendent upon the imperative" fi G i bnopovi epyov rkhe~ovixkro, is "in thought parallel to it"; thus: "You arc that perreci work."" This intcrprctation, however, trcating 1:4 as a wholc simply as thc climactic element or a concatcnation after thc manner of Rom 5:3-5 and 1 Pet 1:6-7, uttcrly takes the teeth out of the imperative k ~ k r o . " O O e r shavc taken the phrase with reference to
"" Jas 1:12, picking up the kcy thcme or enduring nerpaolrb5, forms an inclurio with 1:2-4 (cf. esp. 1:2, nerpao$oi~with 1:12, netpaopbv; 1:3; 4, Lnopovfi(-v) with 1:12, rirrolrivet; and 1:3, Gariprov with 1:12, 66~tpog).The problem of the logical development or the intervening versesi.r., from 1 5 8 to 1 : 9 - 1 1 ~ i s among the most challenging problems in the interprrration of the lcncr, and is Dibelius's strongest casc Tor rcadingJames as a collection of disparate traditions; d the cumments of Johnson, Letter oJ Jamex, 1 7 4 ~ 7 6 Dibelius . himsclf nonetheless rccopized the resumptive character of 1:12 (James, 88). However one construes thc precise logical connection both between Jas 1 : 5 8 and l:9-I I, and between w-hat preccdcs and follows them, it should he stressed that these sections address issues which are not only of fundamental concern to the lettcr as a whole, but closely related to one another: the proper way af acquiring things (namely, rrom God through prayer [1:5-S]), and the coming eschatological reversal of the rich and humble (1:9 1I). For recent attcmpts to disccni the precise progression of thought in thcse verses, see Hoppe, iler 7heoioS;che H i n k p n d des Jakobubriefer, 11844; Klein, Ein inolhmmener V V d , 92-100; Johnson; I e t k ofJarnei, 182-84, 189-91; cf. Tsuji, Ghuhe. 64-67. '" Klein, approaching Jas 1:2-4 as a traditional p d a t i o (cf Rom 5:3-.5 and 1 Pet 1:6~7),but finding no prior use of the phrase Zpyov rhkrov in ancient literature, considers the lauer, at least, to havc bcen coined by the author of James himself (Ein u o l h m i m Werk, 54). Indeed, it is Klcin's view that this expression represenis a summation or thc overarching interest of thc author urJames: "Das 'vollkommene Wcrk' ist die Forderung, in der die venchicdcn Mahnreden des JakabusbrieTes ihr Zentrum hahen" (;hid, 12). For a discussion ofthe past inteqrctation OF the phrase, see ibid., 5 4 3 6 . q' Dihelius, Jam#& 74; emphasis his; rollowed by MuRner, L ) n Joki,hi~shri& 66f; P. J . Hartin, James and t/ls Q Sngiq.~oJJesus (,JSYrSup 47; Sheffield:JSOT Press, 1991) 85. Kcin, Ein ~ollkonlmenes PVd, 55. Dibclius, who or course emphasizes thc t r a ditional nature of this passage, reduces the significance or the imperative to tlie level or h r m , auributing the "obscurity of the cxprcssion" to "the intention of dlc author to let thc concatenation end, not with a declarative statement, hut rather with an admonition; for such is in accord with the paracnetic character of his
"
E
218
CH~PTER FIVE
the "complete" endurance that those expcriencing l i E l p u ~ ~ 6must 5 achieve; thus: "let [endurance] have its full effect."" This reading is accurate as far as it goes, but it remains too general. It too; like the prccediig one, overlooks the significance of the appearance of a command to "have an ergon" in the opening admonition oi" a work whose emphasis on the soteriological importance of oga has become incarnous. The rcfcrcncc to the "perfect ergon" that endurance is to "have" is in fact quite consistent with the trcatment of the theme of erga elsewhere in the lctter. An abstract noun is used as the subject of &XEIV & p y aagain in 2:17, though there h e subjcct is I'aich itself rather than the endurance produccd by the &sting of faith as in 1:')-4.'"' Though "faith is the nominal subject, the issue, of course; is nonetheless the significance of a person "having faith' ( l i b r t v . . . EXEIV) if (s)he does not also "havc" (Exn) erga, as is clear from 2:14.1°' James's view of the matter is well known: "faith, if it does not havc erga, is dead" (2: 17). Such a l i i ~ ~xwpiq tq Epyov, he puns, is &-epyov, "usclcss" (221; cf. 2:26): it cannot effect "righteousncss" (2:24),"" nor is it "able to save" (2:14, 6 6 v a ~ a t .. . goat). Indeed, it is clear [rom the challenge posed to the "foolish" interlocutor in 2:18 that the author undcrstands erga to be the tangible manifestation of a living faith:'"' "show me your faith apart from ergu, and I will show you, out of my erga, my faith."'"" writing" (;%mr.r, 74). Thc similarities hetween,Jas l:2 4 , Rom 5:3-5 and I Pet 1 :6 7 are indeed noteworthy; such sirnilaritics; howevcr, should serve to underline, not obscure, the peculiar use of the imperative in Jas 1:4. "30 Mayor, Eppiitlr of.% ,j'amei, 36; cC hlartin, Jamex, 16: "Let endurance yicid its complete work." 'O" On i b Garilrrov in Jas 1:4 as "the instrument or means by which a man is and proved (66~rpo~)," see Mayor, Eflistb oJSt. 3omu.s; 34-35; tested (Salcrlr(r~~~crt) more recently Klein, Eix inollkr~mmenes Wnk, 47. Klcin, Eit inooMommme~ We+ 55. ID' Indecd, with further wordplay, the author writes that in the case of Abraham's offiring of Isaac, faith "worked with" (ov-$pya) Cpya to accomplish righteousncss (2:22). It might he notcd; in light of tklc associatiori oflaith and mga withneipatip6< in 1:2-4, tlral Abraham's sacrifice 01Isaac is commonly presented as onc-and sometimes the last and greatest of a selics of "tests" cndurcd by Oiu paliiarch; see ,Tub. I El.5-lR:19, and the additional literature discussed by Dihclius; Jam<.r> 168-70. Note also that Sir 41:20 and 1 Macc 2:iZ both speak of Abraham's being found laithrui Ev rretpaop@. See furtlier on this point Klein; Ein i,ollki,mmmr~Werk, 73 71. Contrasr Jas 2:17, 26: faith irithoot works is "dead." '"I Jas 2:18 is another wzll-known crux in the intrrpretation of.James; for a convenient description of the pmblcm and its various solutions, see S. McKnight; '3amcs 2: I Da: 'She UnidendTiablu Interlocutor;" M'7.7 52 (1990) 355 61_csp. 355 59. '1.0 my mind, ir is the solution pnlposed by H. Neit~cl!"Einc alte crux intcrprcrum im ,Jakobusbrief 2; 18;" ZjVCl' 73 [I9821 286 93) and advocated hy Klein (Ein inall-
'"
""
LOGOS 4 N D DESlKE
219
A challenge quite similar to that posed to thc one \\-ha says ($he has faith in 2:18 is offcrcd to any who claim to posscss wisdom in 3: 13:"" whocver is "wise and undcrstanding'"O%s LO "she\\- (6~1cix.iw) from a good manner of lixing his or her e r p with wisdom's humility (or: "\rise humility"; cf. i v npabqrt ooqiag)." It emcrges from this passage that the two "x\.ays" which the author imagines in 5:19--20 can also be conceived as ht-o opposing "\<-isdoms": one which is "earthly" (Prriyeto<j, "psychic" (yruxtlcil) and "demonic" ( 6 a ~ wovth6qg) and onc which is "Crom abovc" (gvwO~v),t h a ~is, from God (cL 1:17). Here again, each of thcsc "wisdoms" has its o\m charactcristic sct of actions, conceived as manifcstations of one's i which, inner state. Thc jealousy and social discord (&hog ~ aPp~Oeia) and "every foul deed" (nkv qaGhov along with instability (drra~ao~aoia) npkypa), arc ihe hallmark features of "carthly" wisdom, arise from and arc rcflcctions of "your plcasurcs which fight among your members."'"' Thus one whose pursuit of pleasure reveals him or her to be a "friend or the world" and near to ihe Devil (4:4, 8) manifests, in a corresponding manner, at b e s ~a wisdom w-hich is "earthly" and "demonic." The "wisdom from above," on thc other hand, is h e ethic that corresponds to the law laid down by God, and characterizes those who arc friends of Cod."Wot surprisingly, it is associated particularly closely with "humility" (cf. 3:13: i v ~pa6.iq.i~ o~qia<)."'~ It is characterized as "peaccful" (3: 17, eipqv~dl;cf. 3: 18) rather than by discord, and by "good fruits" rather than "cvcry foul komrnenei Wnk, 77072) and othcn (sec ihid, 72 n. 18')
which is thc most satisfying.
On this interpretation, thp rebuttal of the .rrg consists only in a b rrionv EL^, and is read interrogatively; thus: "But someone will say; 'do you have kith? And 1 [will say], 'I have work. Show me your faith apart fiom works, and 1 will show my faith from my works'." It is gcnerdy agreed in any case that the "show me your faith" sentence is to bc understood as a statement in the voice o f the auillor hirnselc see McKnight, Yames 2:IXa;" 360. ''IIt is evident from thc rcprirnand not to "boast" and lie r a t & ~ i drhq0eiag g in 3:14 that the author has in mind onc who would make oncscK out to bc aolpbi icai &na.rfipov whilc not ~xhibitingproper cthicd behavior. just as he d c d s with "someone" ( n g ) who claims (?,Eyer) to have t'iith hul does not havc Fpya in 2: 14-26. 1116 For the use o f the phrase aoqbi lcai 6ziiromipov: cf esp. 1)rut 1:13; 15, where it applies to the leaders of Israel's tribes (ct: Jas !:I!). "" J a s 4 1 ; cT. esp. +2, icesz' in 3: Ifi: whvhcrc lllcre is <+hog r a i fpt@eia, thcrc is hica.raocaaia axid ngv rpaijhov rrpgypa; cf with this the lcgd principle seated in Jas 210: on which aec O'Kourke Boyle, "The Stoic Paradox of Jamcs 210." ""' Klcin: Ein in,ollkomrnene~ W k k k 151-61; cf Johnson, Letter
220
CHAPTER FIVE
deed" (3: 16-17). In short, it manifests itsclf in e7.y (3:13)-~--aterm which; interestingly, is consistently used by the author ~ i t ha positive sense of "good works" rather than its usual neutral sense of " w o r ~ . ~ ~ Thus n the challenge of 3:13: one's inner state necessarily manifests itsclf externally; it is simply not possible LO have uisdomthat is, the " ~ i s d o mfrom abovcn~---without also habing erga. In both 214-26 (esp. 218) and 3:13, then, ergu cmerg-e as thc ncccssary external mallifestations of an inner disposition thought of variously as "the wisdom from above," or a living, which is to say soteriologically cficacious, Faith. The thoug-ht is quite similar in 1:2-4."' Here thc author is concerned specifically with ae~paolr65, which is understood to be "thc testing of faith" (1:3, rb 80~ilrlov. . . 4~a i o ~ ~ w 5Such ). a test of one's faith, he suggests, is to be viewed positively, ibr it reprcscnt.5 thc opportunity to achieve the "endurance" (hno&ovfiv)w~h'ich,it is subsequently pointed out, d l lead ultirnatcly to "blcsscdncss" and "the crown of lire" (1:3; 1:12).''2 Like failh itself, however, the endurance that can result from the "testing of faith" in a situation of?retpaop6<must also "have a pcrfcct ergon"; it must "perfect w,ork" that manifest itselc that is, in a good work.""he rcsults from the endurance of aelpao&6~ contrasts with the "sin" 'loSee I:+, 25; 2:14-26; 3:13. Thus my hesitance a, rcnder this rcrm simply as "workr" or "dceds." Cf. the use of npixypa as Lhe corresponding negaij\rr generic term in 3:16, and bpapria inl e.g.. 1:15. James's consisten~lypositiuc use o f t h e term kpya is likcly to he correlated with his intercst in refuting a position that 6 n i o ~ ~ q zopi
"'
.
(hwapria) produced when one succumbs to x ~ l p a ~ p (l:l5): 6i just as the "death" to which such a failure leads contrasts with the "crown of life" received by rhc one who cndurcs (1:lj; cf. 1:12)."' The description of such an ergon as "pcrfcct" (sihe~ov), besides sewing this contrastive purpose, anticipates the consistendy positive usc or the term :pya throughout thc remainder of thc letter. In sum, an action which rcsults from the pursuit of one's own desirc---lie that t~-llichresults from tran~~qessing thc "la\%-of freedom" (2:9)- i s described as "sin" (1:13, hwupria), just as those who pursue plcasurc and travel the way of death arc "sinners" (hpaprwhoi, -ov, 4 3 ; 5:20). The one who docs erga, in contrast, is one ~vhosc constant attention to "the pcrfcct law of freedom" renders him or her not a "forgetful hcarer" of the logos that "saves souls," but a "hearer" who is also a "doer." As we have seen, whide this logos is "able to save (6uvix~movo6oat) your souls," it is only through "doing" that one becomes so "blessed" (1:25; cf. 1:12). Thus too, faith is not "ablc to save" (66varat. . . ~6csat)apart Gom erga (2:14): hith itself, like the "endurancc" which its "testing" is to produce, must "have erga" if it is to be sotcriolo~callyeffectual. For thc author of James, in short, human actions-hether "good fruits" (3:17) or "foul dccds" (3:16)---arc concrete and necessary manifestations of one's inner disposition. Erga arc inseparably linked to logoos and the "wisdom From above," just as the jealousy, strife and, more generally, "sin" which arise From desire inevitably signal thc prcscnce of that wisdom w-hich is "carthly" and "dcmonic" (3:13-18).
A contrast cmcrgcs in Jas 1:2-4, 12 and 1:14-15 between the significance of cnduring xe~paop65and that of the failure to so endure."' Endurance of any given instance of the divcrsc xe~paopoi humans face will manirest itself in a "perfect work" and will ultimately bc rcwardcd by "thc crown of life," while the failure to withstand n ~ ~ p a o p 6results 5 in "sin," and placcs one on the path toward "death." This contrast renders qucstionablc thc vicw, popular
"' Cf
Klein, E n uolikommene~Wkkk8.5. "Ct Klein, Eiz uollkommenes Wkk, 45: "V. 13 18 nirnrnt dann nicht auT V. 12 allein RCug, sondern cbenso auTV. 2 ~ ~ woiiir 4 ; auch dic jhnlichc Gcsultung spricht (Kettenreihen in V. 3r und V. 141i."
222
CHAPTER FNE
particularly in the wake of Dibelius's enormously influential commentary, that the t e r n netpaop65 is uscd in 1:2-4, 12 and 1:14-15 with entirely dficrent refcrents. Dibelius argued that "the tcmptations whose origins are discussed in 1:13-15 are not the 'trials' in 1:2 over which one is supposcd to rejoice; while thcsc must be dangers from without, 1:13-15 deals with dangers of thc inncr life"; indeed, "the seduction by the lusts in VT 13-15 has nothing whatsoever to do with the affiictions in v 12 [and 1:2-41.""' This position owes more to Dibelius's general literary evaluation of the lettcr as a "treasury" of unrelated traditions of divcrsc origins, linked at most by catchword connection, than it docs to any consistent distinction drawn between "dangers from without" and "dangers of the inncr life" in thc ancient literature. The author of 4 Maccabees, for example, considered the quite external torture suffered by the Jewish m a q s at the hands of Antiochus to be the ultimate proof of reason's dominance over the passions."' The netpaopoi of Jas 1 :2--4 are in any case said to be "diverse" (not~iho~), and thus include a rangc of expericnccs. Jas 1:13-15 speaks not to a diKerent set of (also diverse?) netpaopoi, but seeks rather to locate the ultimate cause of all the various forms ofnerpaop65 in human desire. Indeed, for the author of James it is the desire for some perceived external dcsidcratum that opcns the door to the pleasures which war within thc individual: the power of desire lics precisely in its ability to deceive one that some "good gift" can bc obtained through its pursuit."" In fact, the promise in 1:4 that thosc who endure netpaopoi will be i iv "perfect and whole, lacking in nothing" (&hetot ~ a bh6~hqpot ~ 6 e v hetn6p&vot), i far from being a redundant and platitudinous string of synonyms,"%numerates thc specific results of enduring the temptation of dcsirc as presented throughout the lcttcr. ~
~
.
""ibelius, jhmes, 71, 90;sa!, !:I%, on h e other hand, "obviously beionp to h e thcmc touched upon in 1:2-4" (did,88). Dibelius is criticized by Klein, Ein uollhmmene~ W&, 44647 and 82-85. 'I' On 4 Maccabees, see Chapter Three. CT Surther p. 150 n. 66. ""ee on this above, pp. 200~207.By way of illustration o l this conneclion between "external" circumstances and "internal" strug~les,one might imagine a situation in which a wcdthy landowner withholds the wages owed to a laborer (cf Jas 54). The resulting economic swain on the laborer might lead to a "rest of Faith" vis-i-vis God's proxidcnce, and to questions regarding the wisdom oS relying solely upon prayer Tor acquiring needed thing. Note in his connection, in Tacl, thc author's chardcte"suc concern for economic issues. ""So; in effect, Dibelius, James. 74.
LOCOS AND DF.SIRE
223
According to Dibelius, while the term bh6rhqpo5 "properly dcsignatcs the external intactness of the physical body, or some other similar concrete notion;" the author of Jamcs "quite obviously" uses it with a more abstract sense of' "blarneles~."'~"Its more usual connotation of "wholcne~s,""~how-ever, is in fact quite appropriate in the context of James. As m-c have sccn, those who give in to desire become subject to an inner division which thc author characterizes as "your passions warring within your memhers" (41). Particularly significant in this connection is his description of such people as Giwxot who must "cleanse thcir hcarts" (4:8)--presumably of the pleasures whose wars inevitably spill over into intcr-human relationships."' James's charactcristic use of the term Siyruxog, "double-soulcd," to describe those whosc faith in God's providence wavers (1:6-8), or who indulgc their warring pleasures (4:8),"' is in fact quite vivid and concrete given his assumption of a fundamental opposition between thc implantcd logos and human desire within the individual.lZ4
"" Ihid. "' See W. Foenter, 1chCpo5, mh., 'IUKr 3.766-67. "' Cf. with the demand that SivuXot "purify" ( h p i o u r ~ )their
heam (44) also (317). Notc in the description of the "wisdom from above" as "above all &pfi" addition the typical contrast between Grvuyirx on one hand and purity and wholeness in other carly Christian literature; see 0. J. F. Seirz, "Antecedents and Signification of the Term AIYYXOZ," JBL 66 (1947) 211 19. 'I'hclse characteristics or the Siyruyog are two sides or a coin: it is a lack of. faith in God's providence which opens the door to the temptation of seekrng the satisfaction of one's own desires. "I T h e origins of the conccpt of the Sivuxo5--which t c m is not found prior to James, the Shepherd ofHmar, 1 i 2 Chent and the Epirth of Barnahar are ofien sought inJewish thought, esp. in the concept of the good and evil "inclinations"; see csp. Seitz's scries of artides on the tern: "Relationship of the Shcpherd of Hema%to the Epistle of,Jarnes," JBL 63 (1944) 131-40; "Antecedents and Signification of thc 'l'em AIYYXOZ"; and "Merthoughts on the Term 'Dipsychos'," NKS 4 (1957-58) 327-341 also W. I. Wolverton, "The Double-Minded Man in the Tight of Essene Psychology," A T R 38 (1956) 166 75; cf. Tsuji, Glauhe, 102f. See against this view and in Cavavor or Greck philosophical influence: however, Ropes, Epde of St. ,7mes, 156; more recently Klein, Ein inulh~mmene, Wnk, 90-91, who, moreover, raises the possiblity that the rabbinic concept itself was influenced by Greek thought. IPnatever thc case, one can say at the very least that the concept iakcs on a dislinctly "philosophicai" coloring in,Jarnes, where ircr0u&iafunctions primdJily in oppoAbyoc. Cf. in this respect the Testmenls d l h e Twelve Pahiarctu: a sition to b &w~u?og contrast behvcen hrr%iq< and being 61zp60oirag which recails James fignrcs prominently in this work, the "two spirits" ethic of which is informed by Stoic cthics. See further H. C. Kee, "Thc Ethical Dimcnsions of thc 'l'cstaments of the XI1 as a Clue to their Provenance," ACTS 24. (1978) 259-701 and fix a broad yct concisc
Thc sense in which one who endures lietpaop65 will be "perfect" (~Lherog),on the other hand, is best undcrstood in light of 3:2, where ~ is describcd as one who is "able to the "pcrfect man" ( T ~ E L Odrvfip) bridle his whole body.""Given James's characteristic cmphasis on erga, this identification of thc . r i h ~ ~ ospecifically g as one who does riot fail with rcspcct to speech-who does not "stumble," that is, iv h6yq (3:2)-is quitc rernarkable."@In 1:4 the promise of pcrfcction dcpends on an cndurance of nelpaup65 which manifests itself in a "perfect ergon." Moreover, both this definition of thc "perfect man" in 3:2 and James's general discussion of the tongue are found precisely between two passages which insist on the critical importance of erga: 2: 14-26 and 3: 13. How, thcn, can he say that "pcrfcction" results from controlling one's speech? Bchind James's identification of the ~ i h e ~ oasg one who is perfect in speech lies an important presupposition regarding the tongue's relation to the rest of the body. 'The tongue, it is said, is "set up" ( ~ a o i u ~ a ~among a t ) our mcmbcrs (,Jas 3:6).12' The usc of xa8io.iqpt in this contcxt has at times heen considercd a curiosity, for it is a verb which often connotes the conferring of authority.lZ8Seen within thc wider context of Jamcs 3, though, the choice of this tcrm is entirely appropriate. In 3:4, this "small mernbcr" (cf. 3 5 , pucpbv bihog) among our other "members" (cf. 3:6, iv TO?< p k k a ~ vipiiv) is comparison af the two works, Johnson, 7 h e I d t n oJJaiames, 43-46; d m ; 'James 3:13-410 and the zpox UEPI QOONOY," 341-47. "' 'The thcme or perfection in James is discussed at length by P. J. du Plessis, TEAEIOZ: 'The Ida of Perclion in lht Jfm lblarnent (Kampen: Kok, 1959) 2 3 3 4 0 ; P. J . Hartin, "Call to Be Perrcct through SuiTering (,James 1,2-+). The Concept or Perrection in thc Epktlc of James and the Sermon on the Mount;" Bib 77 (1996) 477-92; and most recently by Klein, fi:in :inwllkornrnenei Werkk 54-81. Notc that Klein interprets ,Jas 3:2 in light of 1:4 (esp. 6v &qrlS~vi Aembp~var)rather than, as here, 1:4 in light of 3 2 ; see ibid., 79. ""quaiiy remarkable is the facr that the apparent oddity o f this identification in the context orJames ~ n e r a l l ygoes entirely without nolice in the commentaries. h ~ ~ e l c o mexception c in this respect is Johnson, 7 h e Letter a/ James, 256: "The use of leltios ('pcdtct') is somewhat s v x t h g . . . Can James seriously think that 'perfeclion in speech' can makc a person perfect?" "' O n the notoriously dilficult Jas 3:6? see the discussion or Dibelius, 7orne.r; 193 98. l\'hatcver iLs relalion to b r60wog ~5 dr&uciug, howcvcr, it is clear that i yh5aoa is the suhjcct of ~a€Iia?q&t. "a See the entry on ~ a 0 i a n ) pin i BAGD: doubt is expressed there regarding the correctness of the rext ofjames at this point; despite the fact that the manuscripis are quitc consistent in this respect.
LOGOS
D E S I ~
225
likened to the rudder of a ship."Wontrol of one's speech, therefore, is critical for controlling "the whole body^." Thc tongue can taint "the whole body" (3:6, fi ~nthoCoa6hov .rb &pa); thus, just as one places bridles into horses' mouths in order to lead their "\vhole body'' (3:3, 6hov ~b ~ G p a ) so , too, one who does not "stumble" iv h6yq is "able to bridle @is or her] whole hody" (3:2, Ghov ~b~Gpa).'"" The close connection assumed by the author between control of speech and control of thc whole body is rcmarkablc. Bakcr's rcccnt and quite cxtcnsivc monograph on "pcrsonal speech ethics" in James fails to locate any good precedcnts for the notion, and thus sheds little new light on this aspcct of James 3."' Thc connection, how-. ever, is quite we1 undcrstood in light of the close relationship between human rcason (h6yo5) and speech posited by the StoicslLwho of course considered the perfect sclf control envisioned here by the author of James to be cnjoycd only by those who livcd in accord with "right reason." Particularly noteworthy in this conncction is thc imagc of the hclmsman in Jas 3:4. Thc t o n p e is likened lo a ship's ruddcr, which is said to guide thc ship in accord with the bppfi of While rarc in thc carlicst the one steering it (roc ~60Gvov~o~).'" s" has often been observed, the figures of ships and rudders (3:4.) and hones and bridle (3:3) are commonplace among tIlc hellenistic moralists, and often uscd prcciscly in connection with speech; see csp. the discussion and references in Dihclius, ,7ames; 186-90, and further D. F. Watson, "The Rhetoric orJames 3:l-12 and a Classical Pattern of Argumentation," #OUT35 (1993) 58. '""as 3:2-3; cf further l:26, where the author speaks of "bridling the tongue." Klein considers the term ~ah~vaymys~v, which is found only in these passages of James in the NT: to be of Stoic origin; see Ein inuollkornrnenei Wnk, 78 and n. 224. 1 9 ' W. R. Raker, Personal S p e e r h l h i x in Uie EpGtle o f j ' m s ((WU-MI' 2/68; 'Tiibingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1995) esp. 123-38. J. L. P. Wolmanins points in the direction or Stoicism in his "The Tongue Guiding the Body: The Anthropological Prcsuppusitiom of James 3:l- 12," #eoles[amenlica 26 (1992) 523 30. However, he thinks primarily of a view of "'lhe word' as lhe steering mechanism or an audience," as expressed in Plutarch, Qu~modoodolercenr poelas 33. Noting that "[~lhispassage views 'the word' as the steering mechanism of an audience, and not the tongue as the sleering mechanism of the body, as James has it," Wolmarans concludes k a t ':James cilher misunderstood Stoic teaching in this rcgard, or, more pn~hahly,underaood it crealively" (ibid; 528). L. T.Johnson notes that "the best parallel to James' assertion concerning thc 'perrection' of someone who controls speech" is found in Philo, P o d C 88 and IM@. A6r 73, hut does not elucidate this comparison; sre "Taciturnity and 'I'mc Religion: Jamcs 1:26-~27,"Greek, Romans, and CttGlianr: Essays in f i n o r of Abraham J. Mallmhe (ed. D. L. Bdcil el aL; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990) 3 2 9 3 9 , esp. 330 n. 9; and cf. idem, Laltet o f j ' u m , 256. For discussion of these passages, see belaw. '"'This mpcct of Stoic thought desen~esfiller attention tkran can be given to it here. '4%present, 1 simply sketckl lhe direction in which a more systematic investigation might proceed. "' Note Philo's frequent use of thc lcrm ~iiBbvuin this conncction; e.g., in Ah1
226
CHAPTER FIVE
Christian literature, thc term b p p 6 is c'common in classical Greek x~~itcrs,"'~" and playcd a crucial rolc in the Stoic thcory of action. For the Stoics, bppfi denotcs the "impulse" with which all action ultimately ori*natcs, and which, in rational animals, takes thc form of vcrbal (though of course not spoken) commands issued by one's logos.'" If onc's logos is not "right" (bp86<), the commands it issues will not conform to those of the divine law-, and one's resulting actions, thereforc, will not be characterized by ~lriue.'" Thc rclation of uttcred speech to the internal spccch of the logos was considcrcd to be of thc most intimate ordcr. Philo speaks on numerous occasions of the "two-fold naturc of logos in this connection, drawing on the Stoic distinction between kv6tCr8e.rog and npovopucbq Myog.'" Thc former is located in the commanding fac) the latter in "the tongue and mouth and thc ulty (.rb f i y e p o v ~ ~ 6 vand rest of the vocal organism" ( y h 6 m a ~ a~ i. r 6 p a~ aiji6hhq nCoa qwvfiq h p y a v o ~ o t i a ) . ' " ' The rclationship between the two is conceived, in a manner reminisccnt of Jas 3:11, as one of "spring" (qr;l) and "outfiow.n 133 The two divisions of speech are such, however, that one can have strcngths with respcct to one of them, but not in thc other: "the so-callcd sophists," for example, "have shown grcat ahility in expounding themes, and yet been most evil thinkers," while others "rcason excellently, hut find speech a had interpreter of thought.""" Pcrfcction (il T E ~ E L ~ T ~according ~ ) , to Philo, dcpends "on boch divisions of logos, the reason which suggcsts the ideas with clearness (xaOapGg), and the specch which givcs unfailing (ixn.rab.roq) 70; Leg AlL 3.22% also Con/ Ling. 115, wherc the image or the helmsman, rnorcovcr, is uscd in combination with that of charioteer. See thc additional passages cited in G. Mayer, Index Philoneus (Berlin and New York: dc Gruytcr, 1974) r.u It is perhaps noteworthy dial this term is found elsewhere in the N'I' only in John 1:23, and h ~ r ein a "quotation" of Isu 40:3 (though d W( Isa 40:3). Ropes, St. James, 230; who d s o notes dial the term does not appear in James's sense in the IXX. '"I On the Stoic understanding o f . b p ~ ~ sec , B. Inwood, Ethics ard Human Adzin in Ear& Sloiml, and ahove, pp. 3 i t "" Note ihnt b i n d e e d , perhaps the key issur is thf recognition of whlrt is "good" in the true Stoic sense of the term; sec Chapter Two; and rf in this light thc discussion of 1 :I 6-17 above. In' Sec esp. Mas. 2.127 130 and ~Wiq. .4hr iO-i3. "%I.lo.r. 2.127; cf. IW@. Ahr 71, wherc G~avoiarather than rb i y e ~ o v t r 6 vis given as the realm of.iv6rdr8~~og %yo<. '" . W i n dbz i 1 ; ~MoJ. 127; see also Somn. 2.281. and also thr description of.speech as the "inierpreier" or thousht in 1W@. Abt 72. with which cf. Ciccro; l)r I<<. 30. I"" .I{@ Abf. 72; . an analogous critique or h c a,phists is found at I'ort. C 86.
'"
227
LOCOS . M I DESIRE
expression to That is to say, it is the one who manages to bring "spccch (X6yov) into harmony with intcnt (b~avoiq),and intent with dccd gpyw)': who is to be considcred T ~ X E I O ~ . ' * ~ So intimately related are rhcsc two aspects of logos that Philo elsewhere identilies control of spccch as the key for putting "the rvholc soul;' (njv 6hqv ~ u f i v )at rest. Interpreting Exod 28:30, Philo asserts that "the Sacred Word h o m i n g ho\v strons is the impulse jbppfi) of either passion: of both high spirit (8u@oG)and lust ( P a ~ S u ~ i a ~ ) : puts a curb on each of thcm, by setting over thcm reason (rbv Xbyov) as a charioteer and pilot" (Leg. All. 3.1 18). H e thus interprets the b referred to in LXX Exod 28:30 as "the orsan of "oraclc" ( ~ My~ov) speech, which is the uttered ~rord," pointirig out that thc description of it as "the oracle of judgment" shows that Moses t h i s particularly of thc spoken w-ord which is "wcll tcstcd and examined" rathcr than one simply "spoken at random."'"Having idcntificd the Urim and the Thummim as the two virtues of this word, namely clearness a n d truthfuln~ss,'~-' he goes on to discuss the importance oC controlling onc's spccch: It says, then, that the tested word, having the virtues xvhich are peculiarly its own, was enthroned upon thc breast (Aaron's namely), that is, upon the spiritcd clcmcnt (roc BGvou): that it might first of all bc guided by reason (Xbyq), and not injured by its own irrationality; in the next place by clearness, for it is not the nature of auger to be a friend of clearness. Do we not see in thosc who are enraged how not thcir understanding (ilG~avoia)only hut thcir words ( ~ 6hi l ~ ~ r a )also ~'j are full of disturbance and confusion? . . . It must be guided in thc third place by truthfulness, Tor togcther with its other faults anger has this onc also as peculiarly its own, that of lying. As a matter of expericncc, of thosc who $vc way to this passion, hardly onc spcaks the truth. . . . 7 / m e a n the antzdotes for the re& angm (to3 Oupt~o3pkpous): rearon (X6yo~);c1earne.r.r ?f .speech (maqilve~a?&ob), huth speech (uhil0e~a aG~oli).For the three are tiflually onc, since reason, accompanied by the two virtucs of truthfulness and distinctness, acts as a healer of 5 )traincd anger, that sore sickness of thc soul. . . lf high spirit (6 0 ~ ~ 6hc in this manner.. . it will not only rid itself of much fermen~,but will render the whole soul (njv SXqv lyu~fiv) gentle.""
a
I*' I*' 14''
I"' 'I1,
I'orln C 88; on thc use oC6mavoicr in this connection; see above note 138. I A ~ .All. 3.1 19. 12~.All. 3.120. For this distinction cf csp. M ~ TAbr . 71; cf: further 12~.All. 3.120K 1 2 ~All . 3.123-24, 28.
Though Philo stops short of explicitly equating control of thc tongue with control of "the whole body" (Ehov rb ~ 6 p a )his , view that truthfulncss and clarity of speech is the starting point in rendering gentle "the w-holc soul" (njv 8hqv yru~fiv)prcscnts a much closer approximation of thc thought of James than any of the othcr comparative materials which have previously been adduced in this respect. For Philo, this view is based on the Stoic distinction bemeen iv61&6e~og and npoqopucbg Myog, the latter of which is located in the tongue and the other organs of speech. If the author of James's view that one whose speech is perfcct is himself or herself ~iheuogseems, on the face of it, rather starkly at odds with both the emphasis on erga that characterizes thc letter in general14' and thc promise of perfection to the one whose endurance of nelpaopi)<manifests itself in a "perfect ergon" in 1:4 in panicular, his emphasis on speech hcre and elsewhere in the letter is readily understandablc in light of the intimate relationship between speech and the human logos posited by the Stoics. It is especially noteworthy in this connection that while "thc tongue" recurs as thc main L O ~is able to control "the whole subject of Jas 3:2-12, the T ~ ~ E who body" is idcntificd not as onc who is flawless with respect to 6 yhiiooa, but specifically as onc who doesn't "stumble" i v %yrp."8 This is in fact the only occurrence of logos in James apart from 1:18 and the subsequent treatment of the implanted logos in 1:21 and 1:22-25. It will be recalled, moreover, that these latter two refcrences each elaborate an element of the three-part admonition of 1:19, the remaining element of which, "slow to speak," is elaborated by a charge that thc apparent religiosity of one who does not "bridle the tongue" (pjxahuvaywy6v yh6ooav) is "useless" (1:26). If, then, James's interest in h e tongue is understood in light of the closc association between human reason and speech posited by the Stoics, each of thc clcmcnts of the elaboration of 1:19-27--.w-hich is itself, as we have seen, presented as an cthical inference drawn from 1: 13-1 8 (cf. 1:18, hi)yog adrq6eiag)---would thus center on the implantcd l o ~ o ~ , " ~
'"'Note esp. thc fact that immediately following this exposilion o f the t o n p c ; the true n6rpog (cT 3:1, StS&~rahog)is identified as one who has e r p . CL the usc aCnraio to connote a transgression of the law of freedom in the siatement of the gcncral legal principle in 2:10. lin Note in thk connection the view, espoused in dXerent forms by E. Miiffer ("Dcr Xusummcnhang desJakobusb"rfes," TSK 2?, [la501 163-80) and H. J. Cladder ("Die ~ Z n l q edes,Jakobusbriercs," zh728 [1904] 57-57); that the three-part admo-
LOGOS AND DESIRE
229
This would seem to provide a rather striking confirmation of this intcrprctation."" In any event, the author considcrs control of thc tongue to bc crucial, if extraordinarily difficult.'"' The tongue itself is callcd an "unstablc cvil" (&xa.i&o.ra.iovK ~ u ~ and v ) , said to bc "full of deadly poison" (3:8). Likcncd to a flame w-hich is itsclf lit from the very fircs of "Gehenna,"'"' the tonguc rcpresents a primary conduit into the human being of the very "defilement" whose avoidance stands at the heart of "truc rcligon" (1:26-27). It is that which "stains" (ontho
230
CI-IAPTF.R
FIVE
(ixra~ao~azoq in) all his o r h e r ways," a n d is thus comparable to a "wave of t h e sca being blow-n a n d tossed b y the wind" (If-8).'j5
I n contrast to the "unstable" G i w y v ~ o ~ ~should bo not expect to "receive anything from the Lord" (1:7), finally, those w h o endure n ~ t p a a p 6 q uill b e "lacking in nothing" (1:4, & p q 6 ~ v ki t ~ 6 p ~ v o O ~ n) c. e again, this statement c a n also b e applied to t h c Stoic sage. T h e phrase is particularly reminiscent of Aristotlc's discussion of t h c highest good, which h e idcntifies as "happincss" ( ~ 6 6 a ~ w o v i ainasmuch ) as it is "final" o r "pcrfect" ( r i h e ~ a )above all else, since "we always choose it for its o w n sake a n d never as a m e a n s to something clse.""" T h e "perfect" o r "final" good ( ~ ~bi h e t o vduyaOAv), h e says, "must b e a thing sufficient in itself" (a3~apxeq);a n d being self-snfficicnt, means, esscntiauy, to "be lacking nothing.""' T h e Stoics, w-ho similarly identified "being happy" as "the e n d (zkhos), for the sake of which everything is done, b u t which is n o t itself done for the sake of anything," correlated this state with virtue.''' T h u s t h e logic of C i ~ e r o : ' ~ '
. . . i i everything is happy which has nothing wanting (e omne beatum ert, cui nihil &st) . . . and if this is the peculiar mark of virtue, assurecUy all virtuous men are happy. . . But to mc, virtuous men arc supremely happy: for what is wanting (guzd mim deest) to makc lire happy for the man who reels assured of the good that is his?
'"WE Philo Gkanl. 48-51, where it is said lhat one who is subjencd to "the "by life and its fierce mysterious s t r ~ r mof the soul," itseiE "driven" (trvrxpp~liic~~a~) cares," is like one who is "in a storm or on a wave a l ihc seething sea" (nc i v X E L ~ ~ V cGGiav L fi i v KXGGOVL ICUII~IYO~LT~C OaX&~qc);such a one is contrasted with .Moses, whose stability (VT&OL<) was "stayed on the firm foundation of right reason." Cf further the use o l a similar image in M@. Abr 148, wlicre the iigure of Lot is interpreted as a type of the person whosc mind has a tendency to incline variously toward what is good and what is bad: "Ofien both tendencies are observabic in one and the same person: For some men are irresolute, facers both ways, inclining to either side like a boat tossed by winds from opposite quarters. . . with such there is nothing praiseworthy even in their t a k i n ~a turn to the better course; for it is the result not OF judgment, but of drift." "' See ACE. 1.7.1-8, esp. 4-5. 1 am indebted to an anonymous reviewer of t h i s rnanuscriot Tor the Suoolements series to Xovum Tatamenhim for this reference. "' s ~ ~ ' N E1.7.6-?,'with . the natc b in the LCL. "" See Long and Sedley, The Hellmirtic Philoxophers, 563A (= Stobaeus 2.77.16 27). "' ID 540: nutc that Cia:ro. who emrl-sslv . . notes his asrecmrnt with. amunp" othcn, Aristotle on this point, identifies honerturn as the sole good in this context, in p o d Stoic Sashion (5.44). CT Long and Sedley's comment o n lhis passage: "thc Stoics claim that a virtuous man does posscss all that he needs to fultill himself, to li\-e -ewell, to have his desires satisfied" (% fIe1lenLilic Philosoflhprs, 399).
-
IOCOS AND DE'SIRE
23 1
Thus, too, Epictetus's explanation of the "freedom" ( i h ~ 6 8 ~ ~ of ov) Diogcnes: besides thc fact that he did not considcr his body as his own, and that "the law, and nothing else; [was] everything to him]," Diogenes, he said, was in nccd of nothing."" The phrase in any case takes on a further dimension in James, xvhich couplcs a gcneral emphasis on the efficacy of prayer to thc gift-giving God with a charactcristic economic concern. The latter, in particular, suggests that this absence of want might not refer simthesc are no doubt ply to "moral and spiritual realiticsn'"'-though most critical, as is clear from the subsequent instruction that thosc who "lack" (heineza~)wisdom should rcqucst it of God.'"' In any event, given, especially, the author's insistence that all netparspoi originate with dcsirc, the promise in 1:4 that thosc who endure ne~paop6~ will "lack nothing" stands in stark contrast to 4:2-6:
Those who succumb to desire and pursue plcasurc, as we have sccn, are deceived regarding the source of good things. Thc only things achieved through succumbing to desire are sin and death; all good things come from "the God who gives to all without reserve and without rcproach," but who nonetheless "resists" those who arrogantly seek fulfillment of their own desires. It is thus ihe one who withstands thc tcmptation of desire w-ho will be "lacking in nothing."
The author of James is aware that netparspoi come in diverse (no~rihot) forms. All, however, are uliimatcly rooted in desire, which seduces CT Epict.; f i r , . 4.1.158, on the lips 01Diogencs himself: o68~vbgG f o ~ a ~ . Cf. ,Johnson; 7 h e Litter ~ , J a m f i ,1 7 9 "thc 'lacking' here has nothing to da with material realities (as . . . later in James 2: 15) hut rather moral or spiritual n:alities; 'lacking' means 'fdlling short'." Cf. Dibelius. ,Tames, i 4 n. 26; who cites in comparison the Stoic notion o f the unity of virtue. ' " W n e should not overlook in this connection thc similar confidcncc in God's providence exprcsscd in 1.uke 11:9 13 (par. Matt i:7-l I ) which rather cl~arly includes material "girts" (cf. Luke 1 1 :3!), though ccervainly not cxclusivcly so. Cf. furthcr in this respect ivlatt 6:25 34 (par. Luke 12:22-32): thc "soul" is clearly primar). (Matt 62.5; lake 12:23), hut $fts pertaining to bodily needs are nonethclcss promised as well. "'O
'"I
232
CHAPTER
~ r n
indi\iiduals into seeking to fulfill their ow-n desires rather than simply trusting in thc providence of God. ne~paopoiin general, thcrefore, represent "tests of f a i t h (13-faith, ahovc all, that God mill provide for "those who love him" (cf. 1:12; 2:5). Thc imrncdiaie result of an cxpcricnce ofnerpa~p65will bc one of ~ M Qtypes of action: sin, if one succumbs to desire, or an ergon if one successfuUy endurcs. The one who withstands such "tests," moreover, will be "whole," while the one w-ho givcs in to desire is Thc former will be perfect inascharacterized as "double-~ouled."'~ much as (s)he will bc in fdl control of his or her "whole body," while the double-souled one, like a wave blown by the wind, is "unstable in all his or her ways." And while thc latter, evcn if (s)he petitions "the God who gives to all without rcserve and without reproach," should not expect to receive anything (1:6-8), the fomcr will lack nothing. That which the one who endures netpa~p6swill ultimately "receivc" (hfipv~ral),in fact, is "the crown of life" (1:12), while the one who does not so endure will find his or her cnd in "dcath" (1:13 15). As we have secn, Jamcs emphasizcs that God, though creator of the universe and of humanity in particular, is not responsible for thcsc "trials"; their root cause is rather human desire itself.'" The power of desire lies above all in its deceptive seduction: one is led to believe that some good thing can bc obtaincd by yielding to it, though thc true result will only be sin and death. God alonc is the sourcc of good things, and he, in fact, actively "resist$" thosc who arrogantly pursue their own desircs rather than humbly depending upon hi. In fact, far from tempting people to follow- dcsire and w-andcr, dcccivcd, down the path of sin and death, God's will is expressed through thc fact that hc "gave birth to us" by means of the logos of truth: thc implanted logos that stands opposed to dcsire as the way which can "save souls" from death. The qucstion that rcmains is who, precisely, this "us" is imagined to he.
"'30 evcn thc one who asks God; if (s)he does not ask fv xio.ie~(If-8).
'"' As noted above; the quesdon o f the ori$n of desire. however; is not raised by the author.
1.OGO.S AND DESIRE
233
It is obvious by all accounts that James uses creation languagc in 1:18. What is disputed is whether he refers to the original creation of humanity in general, or to a new crcation, experienced only by members of his own religious movcmcnt.'" Less often realiicd is the fact that the tcrm "implanted logos" itselfhas crcation connotations as well: it refers to the logos that the deity "implanted" in human beings \when creating them. The fact that it is prcciscly this "birth" by logos which, for James, makes "us" stand apart from the rest of God's creations as "a sort of 'first fruits"'"'militates against reading it with rcfcrcnce to a general crcation through logos, w-hcthcr conccivcd on the model of Genesis 1, the cosmic logos of the Stoics, or somc merger of the two as in the first chapter of the Fourth Gospel.'"' Given the subscqucnt idcntifcation of the logos of truth of 1:18 as "the implanted logos," in fact, it can safely be assumed that the birth by logos mcniioned in 1:18 rcfcrs particularly to God's implanting of the logos within "us" when he created or bore "us." But the fundamental questions remain. What particular act of creation is envisioned hcrc? In whom, precisely, is God imagined to have implanted this logos? The notion that those who join the movement experience somc sort of new birth or new crcation charactcrizcd somc forms of early Christianity, and James's concept of a birth by logos has often been read in this light.lS8The concepts of rc-birth found in the Fourth I"' CT Dauids, Jomei, 39, commenting on 1:18: "We axrre wilh Elliou-Binns that the author intcnded some reference to creation.. . Yet is it not the casc that redcmptiun in the N'1' is o k n seen as a new creation, the creation lerminology h p i n ~used f i r effect? '""7'he modification or ''firs1 fluits" withmasignals llrat h c author himself uwuld not press this rneraphor loo far, and il,r this r c a o n should caution one against reading loo much into &zap&. C t I'hilo's usc of thc same ~xpression,describing Israel as "scl apart out of the w h o l ~human racr (.roc a b p a v r o g &vOp&rrovyfvaug) as a kind of first fruits (US dmap~fi)to the Maker and Father," simply to dcnotr lsraci's spccial status among the rest of humanity (Spec. I4q. 4.180). Contrasr, lor example, Tsuji, Ghube. 69 and 103. "*' Mayor, EppiJllr $S1. Jumei, 62 61:Dibulius. 103 107; Marly, I.'I
""
234
CHAPTER FIVE
Gospel, 1 John, 1 Peter, Colossians and Ephesians have received special emphasis in this connection. 1 John is of particular interest hcrc inasmuch as it associates being "born from God" (yeyevvqpivoq ;K roG 0eoG) with the reception of a "seed" (1 John 39, aaipka; cf. 1 Pet 1:23) conceived variously as logos or spirit, a conception which is likely to be understood in light of thc Logos myth found at the beginning of thc Fourth Gospel.'"!' This lopos/spirit is itself charachas clcar ethical teristically associated with "truth" (ah~8e~a),""and implicalions for thosc in whom it "abides": "thosc who have been born of God do not sin, bccause the seed abides in them" (3:9; cf. 5:18). As inJames, therefore, it is above all one's actions which ultimately reveal w-hether one is aligned with God or thc De\;il (3:10, 6 6ta~ohoq)."' The conccpt is in several respects similar to Paul's aveG~a:it, too, is a divine substance, posscsscd only by membcrs of a particular group, with ethical implications that can be summed up ~ ~both Paul and 1 John, moreover, with a command to " l o v ~ . " 'In this internalized fragment of the divine stands opposed to human dcsirc, and functions, more generally, in the context of a supernatural and ethical dualism which pits the Devil, desire and-particularly strikingly, in 1 John-"thc world" against God and his will for h~manity."~ Such similarities betwccn James's logos and the spirit of Paul or the spirit/logos of 1 John might be taken to suggest that the former represents a comparable divine substance possessed uniquely by Christians, only conccivcd along Stoic lines as a divine law "implantes'
Laws, Epiith gj'amer, 75-78, 82-85;Jotmson, Letter o f j ' m e i , 197 9 8 , 202, 205. See also, howcvcr, above note 10 for thosc who rcad this with reference to the original crpation of humaniry. I"" See esp. I John 1:l-4 and further Chapter Four, note 208. See further on being "horn of God" I John 229; 3:Y; 4:7; 5:1, 4; 18. Cf in the Fourth Gospel 1:13: ih: 0eoC h ~ v v + q o a v ;3:3, 7: y w v q ~ v a iivw0w; r 3 5 , 8: yeywvqpfvog ix roc av&parog; and 35: y~vv11@it iiSarog r a t nv&paiog. "" I Tohn 1:6 10: 2:3 6 . 20-21. 27:. 46:, 5:6:' cf. 2 Tohn 2:, 3 .,Tohn 3 4. 8. C? also 1 ~ o h n1:fi-iO; 2:3-6: 9-~11;and P ( i i ~ . " E.g., Gal 516-26; Rom 8:l-17. O n ''love" see, e.g., Gal 5 5 , 13-14; Rom 1 3 8 - 1 0 a i d cT the emphasis throughout 1 John. For the opposition of frrr0upia and rrv~Cpain thc thought of Paul, see again esp. Gal 516-26. Cf I John 216-17, where h n h p i a , moreover, is associated particularly with "the world'' as opposed to God; cT in this rcspect Jas 4:l 6, and further Johnson, "FGendship with the I'Vorld," 170-71. For the devil see I John 3:8-10 fb Grirpohod; c f Pau!'s oa~av%g,csp. as "tempter": 1 Cor 7 5 ; 1 Theas 3:s; cC. I Thess 2:18; 1 Cor 5:s; 2 Cor 2:11; 11:14; 127; Rom 16:20.
'" "' "'
LOGOS
IZNL)
DESIRE
235
by God in the context of a ncw creation."' O n the other hand, the use of the tcrm gpqvpu.ro
"'C f
Klein, Ein irolkommmei Wed, l143f; cf. further thc comparisons rormulated by Fabris, Legye, ch. 6; esp. 191-92 (on 1 Peter), 194-203 (on the Johanninc liters we have seen, however, Fahris denies any Stoic ature) and 203-21 1 (on Paul). A influence on Jam& understanding or /qos. Dibelius, ,jarus, 103-4; cf in this respect the apparent reason in^ of Johnson, who however stresses that "no hard and &st distinction need be drawn among creation, covenant and grace; for each builds on the other; and each is an clpression of the 'good and perrcct gifts that come dowm from above"' (Leltm ~,jciime.r,205; cf 197 98).
"'
236
CIWTER
FNE
at lcast, conceived it as having bccn "implantcd" by God in all of humanity when hc created them, thc assumed dichotomy hen$-cen "cosmological" and "soteriological" interpretations which underlies this formulation of the problem is entirely unnecessary Dihelius's exclusion of a reference to crcation in 1:18 on the basis of its sotenological implications, in other words: is unwarranted. \\%at Dibelius does correctly perccivc, ho~-evcr,is the significance of 1:17 in this connection. In this verse the author invokes God's patcrnity of the "lights" in thc senice of his larger argument that God is not responsible for the human experience ofxetpaup65, sin and dcath. Having &st drawn a distinction bch4~ccnCod and humanity vis-a-vis the cxperience of n ~ t p a o p 6(1~:13-1 5), the author procccds to draw an analogous distinction between God and the heavcnly "lights": following an admonition which plays on the description of some such stars as "wanderers" (1:16, p+?rhavixuBe),it is asserted that God, though the "father of lights," is not himself subjcct to any of thc deviations which are obscrvablc among them. Here, the image of divine paternity is clearly uscd to denote God's (original) creation of the astral "lights," and the point is that God cannot he hcld responsible for their "w-andering" dcspite the fact that hc is their "father," i.e., thcir creator. This distinction between God's paternity of thc "lights" and his responsibility for their "w-andering," following upon thc claim that God is not responsible when humans wandcr onto the path of sin and dcath, suggcsts rather strongly that a notion of God as thc creator of humanity lies behind the formulaas God's creation of tion of the larger argument of 1:13-18:""ust the "lights" does no1 entail his responsibility for the deviations in thcir movements, so too, one cannot infer from God's creation of humanity that he is responsible when thcy are temptcd to wander in sin toward death. On the contrary, the "Father of Lights," whcn "giving bih" to humanity, endowed them with logos, which is charactcrizcd by "truth" and is "able to savc soul^.""^
"" In
k t . one rnirhc find dlusions to the rnmh of the [dl of Gencsis 3 in ulas and to Gen 'i:14 18 in,Jas 1:17. CT also the association of God's status as ''Taher'' with the crcation or human beings "in the likeness of God" (~aPb@oCworv @COG) inJar 3:9, as [he author a t t e m p to cxpose the depths o f human hypocrisy: "with it [sc. thc tompe] wc hless rhc Lord and Father, and with it we cursr the human b c i n . ~who were made in the lihcness of God." 1:13 15
"'
LOGOS AND DESIEE
235
I n fact, while the author's use of the ~ . i b p a z a ("creatures," "crcations") i n 1:18 seems rather pcculiar if his intcntion is to contrast Christians to the rest of humanity w h o wcrc not so born,"" it is readily undcrstandahle w h e n the versc is r e a d wilh reference t o God's "implanting" o r lops in humanity when h e crcatcd them. T h c h u m a n possession of logos, in fact; renders humanity second onlj- t o thc gods on t h c Stoic scale of nalure."' T h u s Ciccro: that animal which we call man . . . has beer1 e r n a certain distinpi shed status (pratclara quadam condicione) by the supreme Cod who created him; for he is the only one among so many different Ends and varieties of liking beings ~ v h ohas a share in reason and rhought; while all the rest arc dcprivcd of it.''" This view of humanity's placc i n the universe, too, is the implicit assumption of o n c of Chrysippus's arguments for thc cxistence of t h e gods, as reported b y Cicero: if gods do not cxist, what can there be in h c univcrsc supcrior to man? for he alone possesses rcason, which is the most excellent thing that can exist; hut for any human being in existence to think that there is nothing in the whole world supcrior to himself would he an insanc piecc o r arrogance. . .Ic" T h c Stoics, morcovcr, conccived of t h e rest of creation primarily in t c m s of "gifts" from t h e deity t o humanity"" I n the later Jewish a n d Christian literature, these Stoic notions a r e commonly combined with the Jewish concept of humanity's "dominion" over God's othcr crcaturcs as found i n Genesis."'
"' F.lliott-Kinns considen the usc or this tcrm alone to he a "practically ronclusix" indication that the author rcScrs to creation (':James 1.18: Creation or I
230 :
CHAPTER
FIVE
In short, while the soteriological implications of thc author's reference in 1:18 to the fact that God "gavc birth to us by means of a logos of truth" arc clear, the contcxt in which this reference is made indicates that hc considcrs this logf~sto be the common possession of all humanity rather than the peculiar possession of Christians. 1Vhile comparison with other Christian literature re\-eals that the author's charactcristic supernatural and ethical dualism, as wcll as his remarkable hostility toward "the world," arc quitc at home within carly Christian thought, (here is no indication in his lcttcr that he, like Paul and the author of 1 John, considers the logos which is "able to save souls" to be the unique possession of Christians. Indeed, if the interpretation of Jas 3:2 offcrcd earlier in this chapter is correct, Jamcs's linking of thc logos to the human capacity for speech renders such an intclprctation all but impossible. In [act, viewed within the context of thc argument of 1:13-18 itseK, the birth by logos is best understood as God's creation or humanity in gcncral. Just as one cannot infer rrom God's creation or the "lights" that he is responsible when thcy deviate from thcir prescribed courses, so too, onc cannot infer from God's creation of humanity that he is responsiblc when they "wander" from the logos hc gavc to thcm as their law. Thc subsequent identification or the My05 ahq8eias of 1:18 as b Epquzos My05 is itself a strong indication that James's logos, like the Epquzov cxkppa TOG hbyou of Justin and the Bpqv~oqv6pog of Methodius and thc Apostolic ConshLuLions, is regarded as something "implanted" by God in all of humanity whcn he initially created them.
Locos AND DESIREAS "TWOWAYS" The logos that is central to the thought of James, referrcd to variously as b Epquzog hbyog or hbyog &hq8eiaq, is one imagined to havc bccn implanted in all human beings at creation. It is intimately related, in fact, to thc human capacity for speech. Its importance in James, h o ~ e v e r ,lies abovc all in the fact that it is defmitive of the
,Jas 3:i-D_ where the catalogue of the diverse t p e s of creatures and the crcation of humans (civ'dprjrroug) "in the imagc of God," both cirarly reminiscent 01Gencsis (cl. esp. Gen 1 2 - 2 8 ; also 9:2), arc understood in a very Greek manner in terms OF dirrurent "natures": a k a ?boy h P i w v i e rai n c ~ e i v 6 v ,Cpiie~6v.is rai b a h i w v vcrsus $
qboy drv'dpoxivq.
LOGOS
.4m
DESIRE
239
will of God for human bcings. It functions: in short, as dixine 1m-, in opposition to the individual's oxrn desire. If in all thcsc respects James's concept of 1ofo.r owes much to Greek philosophical, and cspcciall>-Stoic, discourse, James's treatment of ir is, noncrhclcss: also informed significantly by Jewish and Christian tradition. The Greek opposition behvem logos and desirc is here \;ie\red in terms of the "t\vo c\.ays" motif of Jewish and Christian moral exho~tation.Furthcr. this opposition, as with hlethodius; has bccn fused mith thc Jndaco-Christian opposition betwccn God and thc Devil, and is seen against an eschatological horizon that includes a parozuia of Jesus and a judgmcnt by thc divine Lawgi\,er in accord with his law. For James, human life-pa~ticularly, onc imagines, given his ihoroughly negative appraisal oS "the world-is charactcrizcd by various temptations to pursue one's own desires rather than "do" logos. 'I'hcsc temptations are construcd as "tcsts of faith'-of the Faith, particularly, that God himself will provide all good gifts for those who do his will. A sotcriologically effective faith, when tested, will mar~fest itself in eya, or good works; and as the implanted logos finds written expression in the Torah, it is through constant attcntion to this law that one becomes azotq.i$q h6you and, thcrcforc, a zouq+q Ppyou. The problem of temptation takes on a particular urgency @ven James's eschatological orientation. Both God's providcncc and the importance of endurance are cmphasizcd in the letter's opening and closing sections. Successful cndurancc of tcrnptation, for James, is nothing- Icss than a matter of life or death. Anyone who turns ihe sinner who has "wandered From the truth" back from his or her ening way "will save his or her soul from death, and covcr a multitude of sins" (5:19-20). This, one imagines, is precisely what the Letter of James was intended to do.
CONCLUSION
7hatJames meant to speak o f regeneration in 1.18 and o f the gospel in 1.21 has no sllpport but the expectation of uhat it is thought he ought to mean.. . A. T. Cadoux, 7be Thought of St. j'ames
The Letter of James identifies as that which is able to "save souls" an implanted logos that is closely associated with a perfect law of freedom. While this logos was interpretcd in light of the Stoic theory that human reason comprises a divine, natural law- by sevcral early cxegctes, the ovcnvhelming majority of James's critical readers have rejected this line of interpretation in favor of its identification as "the Gospel." This perhaps othewise uninteresting fact in the history of New Testament scholarship is symptomatic of the predominance of the essentialist approach in the critical study of early Christianity. The classification of James as a Christian work has generally been thought to lead naturally to the interpretation of its soteriologicdy central logos as that which is peculiarly and definitively Christian, "the Gospel"; substantive Stoic influence on the concept, therefore, is out of the question. Indced, when the interpretation of James's logos along Stoic lines was re-introduced in the last century by Arnold Meyer and M.-E. Boismard, it was in both cases accompanied by a hypothesis regarding the non-Christian origin of James, or at least of the passage in question. T o be sure, the submerged logic that leads from the classification of James as Christian to the interpretation of its saving k o s as "the Gospel" has been supported by explicit argumcnts against Stoic influence on James in this respect. The Stoics, it is pointed out, scarcely conceived of human reason as something that "saves souls," let alone something that can hc "heard" and "done" or "receivcd"; James's use of this languagc is more reminiscent of the Jewish and Christian sonrccs. Such arguments, however, fail to reckon with the possibility that the sort of fusion of Stoic and Jewish concepts suggcsted by Meyer and Boismard might he operative even if Jamcs is a Christian composition. The categories "Christian" and "Stoic," or
242
CONCLUSION
"Judaeo-Christian" and "Greek," rather, arc treated more as significrs of static and mutually cxclusivc realities than as heuristic tools. In its starkest formulations, the problem has becn stated as one of "Jewish" or "biblical" germs "hellenistic" influence on James's logos. At most, one finds the suggestion that a tcrm of Stoic origin has becn drained of its original mcauing and filled with an essentially Christian one. Little allowance is made for the complex inteweaving of traditions of diverse provenance that in fact charactcrizcs so much of the early Christian literature. Use of essentialist modcls for the classification of historical phenomena is inherently problematic, as Jonathan Z. Smith has well shown.' Early Christianily is not an exception. In fact, the assumption of such a model by interpreters of Jamcs has done more to obscure than to clarify its correlation of "implanted logos" with a law that is perfect and of freedom. Thc appearance of analogous terminolo9 in Cicero's De LPgibus and the Aposhlic Comtitulions, cited respectively by Meyer and Boismard, have been summarily-indeed, usually tacitly-dismissed as irrelevant for understanding Jamcs's logos when thc letter is read as a Christian composition. Examination of thcse and other works, howevcr, reveals that the tcrm "implanted" (Epquzo~,imita) is regnlarly used in the ancient literature to dcscribe either human reason or a natural law it comprises. This tcrminology has its roots in the Stoic theory that human rcason, which in its pcrfect form as "right reason" rcprcsents natural law, develops the innate out of "irnplantcd preconceptions" (kpqvzot npohfiye~<): human tendency to conceptualize moral distinctions like "good" and "bad," often described as "seeds" of know-ledge or virtuc. It was precisely in light of this theory that Dionysius bar Salibi described James's Ekqupu.ro
'
J. 7., Smith, ''Fences and Nei~hhors:Some Contours of Early Juclaism," 1-18.
CONCLUSION
243
In James, the creator of the world is the god of the Jewish scriptures, and the logos he has implanted in humanity finds written expression in the Torah, the "perfect law" he gave to the descendants of Abraham. Human desire, on the other hand, is associated, as by Methodius, with thc mythological Tempter or Jewish and Christian tradition, b 616poho5. The opposition betn-een logas and dcsire and the problem of temptation, moreover, are seen against a looming eschatological horizon, whcn this god \+dl execute a judgment in accord with his law-: "the rich" \+dlbe punished for their arrogant and oppressive hedonism, while the humble poor who resist dcsire and love God will inherit thc kingdom he has promised. If thc central feature of James's sotcriology is not a "gospcl" by which onc can be reborn, but a logos implanted by God in aU humanity at creation that finds written expression in the Torah, it is hardly necessary to conclude that thc letter was not originally a Christian composition. Given the regular correlation of interest in Israel's twclvc tribes with messianism, particularly in the literature of the early Roman period, the references to the figure of Jesus Christ are quite consistent with the lcttcr's address "to the twelve tribes who are in the diaspora," as well as with its eschatological outlook more broadly.' The incorporation of the Stoic understanding of law into this worldview is itself, in fact, quite well understood in light of the ongoing carly Christian debatcs regarding the significaucc of ihe Torah. Indccd, there is strong cvidcncc to suggest that James's treatment of the "perfect law of freedom" was drafted particularly with an eye to Paul's formulation of the problem of the law. It has been widely agreed throughout the history of critical scholarship that James, particularly in its discussion of faith and works in 2:14-26, interacts on some level with Paul, or at least with pauline slogans. This view, however, has not gone unchallenged. Luke Timothy Johnson, for example, has recently argued that, ''[qcspite the remarkable points of resemblance" between the discussions of faith and works in Paul and James, "thcy appear not to be talking with each other by way of instruction or correction."~ohnson's conclusion that See on this Jackson-McCabe, "A Letter to the Twelve Tribes," 508-15. It is thus most likely that the parousia that will signal the time of the eschatological judgment and reversal is that of "the Lord Jesus," as in most eady Christian works; see further Johnson, ?he Leller oJj'omer, 313-14. "lier o J J a m , 64. For what liollo~vs,cL my review of. Johnson's commentary in JR 78 (1998) 102-10.1.
244
CONCLUSION
"[tlhere is absolutely no reason to read this section [sc. 2:14-261 as particularly responsive to Paul"+is the function of two key propositions: first, that James, unlike Paul, "nmer connects mza to the law";' and second, that the "unusual concentration" of similar elements in these authors' respective treatments of faith and works is best explained by "the simple fact that both James and Paul w-cre first generation members of a messianic movement that defined itself in terms of if one were to F a n t Johnson's view regard'faith in Jesus'.""ven ing the early date of James, there arc weighty objections to both of these assertions. Whereas the "works" which were foremost in Paul's mind in his discussions of faith and works were &pya v6pov, Johnson emphatically insists, as others have often claimed beforc him, that the author of James " n m connects erga to the law."' It is to be noted in the first place that, even if this were true, it scarcely follows that the author of James is not interacting on somc level with Paul or pauline ideas. Indeed, among the most common views of 2:14-26 is that the author either misunderstood Paul himself, or combated an "improper" development of pauline thought? Whatever the case, the claim that erga have no connection to law in thc context of James entirely overlooks 1:25, where it is said quite explicitly that it is one who gives continual attcution to the "perfect law of frecdom" who will become Ibid., 249. Ibid., 60: emphasis his. "bid., 250. Ibid.; 60 (emphasis his); note also his emphatic repetition later on the same page: "I underline thc point: James' usage concerning 'works' is both unconnected to 'law' and is entirely consistent with the dominant N T usage concerning moral effort as an expression of convictions"; cf further pp. 30, 63, 242. CT among many others, Ropes, EpirIIe of St. James, 204$ Dibelius, J a m , 178-80; A. Lindemann, Paula im alfeiien Ct~lentum.Dm Bild des Apostdr und die Rezephrm der paulinirchm Tholopi in der fNhchtlichm Lileralur b1J Marcion ( B H T 58; Tiibingen: Mohr [Sicbeck], 1979) 241, 247, 248$ Hartin, Jarm and lhe &Sayings. 238-39; G . Luedemann, Oppoxition to Paul in 3-h ChnStianib (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989) 144-46. Klein, however, r in 2,14-26 das Gesetz nicht ewihnt, represents a welcome exception: ". . . ~ i twird aher aus dem iihrigen Bricf gcht deutlich genug hcmor, daR auch hier die Werke Zpya v 6 s i n~g (Ein uollkommenes Werk, 200). See the work listed in the immediately preceding note, and esp. Luedemann, 0,6po~itionto Paul, 145 and 287 n. 21. Lindemann reports that the view that the author apposes "cine 'entartete' paulinische Tradition" is "die in der Forschung iihcnuiegend vertretcne Annahme" (Paulus im ilkilen Chirtmtum, 243 and n. 71). Iindemann himself, however, is righdy critical of this view, a r p i n g not only that the author of James engages directly with Wul; hut that "[dler Vf des Jak hat Paulus durchaus ventanden" (did, 250); d with this last remark, however, his comment regarding the absence of the phrase &pya v6bou in James on pp. 248f. "
CONCLUSION
245
a rroq.ri5 Epyov. Johnson himself describes thc connection bctwccn Jas 2:14-26 and James 1 as "obvious," at least "for the reader uncom-
Rcgarding 1:22-25 in mitted to theories of literary fragmentati~n."~ particular, he writes that "James had [there] insisted on being 'not only a hearcr of the word' but also a doer; now, the contrast is bcm-ccn 'Caith alonc' and the doing of faith (2:18-26)."'0 Stricdy speaking, oC course, the author ncvcr writcs oC a rroqT$< nio~ewg, but only, significantly, of the noq.ril5 Epyov (1:25), hiryov (1:22-23), or v6vov (4:1 1; cf. 2: 12). In any case, the essential question for the author of James is whether one whose faith is tested will respond by giving in to desire, and thus sin, or will resist desirc and "do" logos, thus cffecting a (pcrfcct) ergon. In short, while the author never uses the phrase Bpya v6pou, all erga are nonetheless Epya h6you, which is to say, deeds that result from "doing" the &vrpu.rogh@o< that is ablc to save souls. According to Jamcs, this lop-as finds written expression in thc Torah; and thus is it said that continual attention to this "perfect law of freedom" will render one a nouqT$5 Epyou (125). It is particularly significant in this connection that James's discussion of faith and works (2:14-26) Collows immediately upon its argumcnt against partiality (2:l-13). Once again, Johnson himself emphasizes the close conncction bcm-een thesc two sections, both with respect to their common concern for the type of behavior (particularly vis-a-vis the economically disadvantaged) that ought to accompany "faith and their argumentative structure." As Johnson sees it, in fact, thc author of Jamcs "dcvelops a single argument" in these two sections ofJames 2: From beginning to end, it concerns raith and its deeds. . . In this sense, the final part of the discussion in 2:14-26 only provides the broadest formal framework for the specifics argued in 2:1-13.12
' LPttc OfJmjomes, 246. ' Ibid; 6.further his comment on
1:22, rai & p6vi"ov hrpoaxai P6youl: "the use of the adverb monon ('alone') alerts us to the exact parallel construction concerning 'taith and deeds' in 221" (ibid, 206). ' I See esp. Leller ofjhmei, 219, 246; cT also the reccnt study of D. F. Watson, ':James 2," esp. p. 9 6 'James 2 is constituted by two relatcd examples of this [GrecoRoman] elaboration pattern of ar.ymentation: 2.1-13 on the specific topic of partiality and 2.14-16 on the broader, related issue of kith and works." Significant too in this connection, ifless often noted. are the concerns for over-emphasis on Ixv 19.18 in Jas 2:l-13 and on Dcui 64rTinJas 234-26-precisely that is, the nvo pass a g s regarded as the most important commands of the law in the synaptic gospels. " f i l l e r uf,7ames, 219; thus his heading Tor James 2 as a whale as "The Deeds or Faith."
246
CONCLUSION
That is to say, the author of James follo~vshis more specific a r ~ p ment against "having the faith" of Jesus Christ'" while performing acts of partiality (cf. 2:l) with a discussion of the broader problcm of "haxing faith;' ~vhilelacking erga (cf. 2:14). If, as Johnson rightly recognizes, 2: 14-26 and 2:l-13 thus rcpresent discussions of the same basic problcm ol' faith and erga on two diffcrcnt levels," it is quite striking that the climactic argnment against showing paltiality is the fact that such acts rcpresent transgressions of the "law of freedom" by which humans will uliimately be judged (2:813). In lighc of both this connection and thc fact that James says quite explicitly that it is one who looks continually into the "perfcct law of frccdom" who will become a xoqr$q gpyou, the claim of Johnson and others that thc erga of James have nothing to do with the law is wholly untcnahle. Givcn Johnson's sensitivity to the problems which scholarship's overriding concern for the James-Paul issue has causcd for the intcrpretation of James," it is somewhat ironic that his understanding of the relationship of law and erfa in this work is scarcely understandable apart from his own interest in eliminating the tension that ihe presence of both James and thc letters of Paul within the canon poses for Christian interpreters.'% similar concern seems to underlie his claim that the "unusual concentration" of similar language in thc discussions of faith and works in James and the letters of Paul Precisely what the description of aiorrg in 2:l specifically as fi rriarrg roc nvpiau 'IqaaO Xpro.roC 6~665~75is intended to signify is not immediately clear. The issue rests largely with thc prohiem of the author's understanding of the sipificance afJesus Christ. What is clear is that the n i a ~ r gwhich i s or Foremost concern ehewhere in the letter is faith that God will himselS be faithful to those who "do" his I"
ilk&
logo1 or law. It thus seems most likely that fi niary .roc lcupiou jpGv 'IqooO XptoroD -if we are in fact dcaling with an objective rather than a subjective genitivc (lhough ssee W. Wachob, "The rich in faith;" 146-48) conccrns above all Faith that an eschatologicd reversal will right the wrongs which chvractriize the corrupt "world" at the glclorious paromin of Jesus as lord messiah, an event understood as a fuliillmcnt of ancient promises rnade by God "to thosf who love him" (cC 2:5; l:l2). '" Showing partialiry is not discussed in tcims of a n ergon. This; however, is not surprising @en the author's negative focus in 2:l 13: here he argues w i n d a "sin" (cT 2:9: z i 6E a p o o w r r o h q p i r ~ ~bi ~p ~a > p ~ i a vE ~ ~ & < E O @ E )n01/01 , an u p .On the use of &papria and Zpyov as opposiliond catcgorics in James. see pp. 2 16-2 1. See csp. Idtier "/,7amei, 58 6 4 , 11 1-16, 156; 24.5-52. '"This was already the case with Erasmus, a s Johnson himsclf seems to recognizr: "And on the issue oS faith and works, Erasmu iwmonirer: 'truly Paul [. . .j speaks of thc obsewancc of thc law OF Moses; here (,James) is concerned wilh the offices o f piety and charity'" (I&& of James, 141 [with emphasis added]).
6~66575
"
CONCLUSION
245
is best explained not by "a hypothetical pol<-crstruggle betxeen early Christian leaders" or by "a subclc [!I literary polemic," but by thc authors' similar back~qoundas "first generation members" of a movcment that "defined itselC in t c m s oC the 'faith of Jesus'."" For while it is no doubt the casc that the "ncccssar\i unity bchvccn attitude and action" emphasized in Jamcs is t~picalof ancient (and modern) moral exhortation generally:" it is equally true that thc treatment of this thcmc specifically in terms of nio.rtg and Epya-lct alonc the question of whethcr one can be considered rightcous (6ucatoGoOat) by nicistg ~ w p i gEpyovls not.'" Though Johnson characterizes the gcncral context of James's discussion of Caith and works as being "not dissimilar to thc lanpage concerning faith and deeds (erqa)" in several passagcs from 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch:"' these works share with James little more than tbc basic notion that one's actions arc important vis-Bvis one's cschatolo$cal fate. Indeed, despite Johnson's charactcrization of thc passages Gom these works as "conceming Faith and dceds (erqa)," only two of them actually pair "faith" (jdes) and "deeds" (opera) (4 Ezra 9:7; 1323) at all; only one of thesc cvcn arguably envisions some significant separation of the two ( 4 Ezra 9:7); and in no casc is thc problem of the merit of "Caith apart Crom deeds" addressed. In contrast, the author of Jamcs clearly assumes
"
h t t n rfJame.r, 2X1. Note that whcre James's literary relationships to other w o r k arc concerned, Johnson is quite crilical 01attempts to explain similarities in terms of just such a ""ape 'common propcrty 01 early Christianity"' (ibd, 67). Note particularly in this connection his pointed critique of Dibclius's asscssmcnt of the relationship ofJames to the Shepherd $Hemor: "[Dibelius's] refusd to acknowledge dcpendence in this case appears to rest as much on his presuppositions as on thc cvidence" (hlh$Jamei, 761). ' W f . 1616; 247. ' W f . csp. Jas 218, 20, 26 with Rom 328; 44-6. Note in this respect I Clem 30:3, "let us put on concord in rneckncss of spiril and continence, keeping aurselves far from all gossip and evil spcdking, and be justified by deeds, not by words (Zpyoy 6 r r a t o G ~ o t ,~ $ h6yo~g); 1 with which c l 1 Clem 324: "we who by his will have been called in Christ Jesus, are not madc rightcous ( S ~ r a ~ o b p ~ by 8 a )ourselves, or by our wisdom or understanding or picty or the decds (Epymv) which we have wrought in holincss 01hearl, but throuxh Faith (&Mb 6th 6 5 iiioreog), by which God has justificd (hS~lcaimev)all men itom the hexinning of the world." l'he fiirmcr statement r<,calls thc more general discussions of "the necessary unity between attitude and action" which Johnson characteri~esas "the fundamental assumption of all ancient moral discourse," albeit wilh ihc infusion or lkle Christian sense of. 6~raroGoOat.The latter statement, howcver, which assumcs a significant distinction henveen becoming righteous hcfilre God 6th kpyov, ctc. and 6th i i j g nbreog; clearly recalls the docuine 01justification as fi~rmulatcdhy Paul. "' Johnson; Jxlln "/j'amei, 238, citing 2 n a ~ .14:12; 21:l; 51:7 and 4 Ezra 7:77( 8:32'36 9:7; 1323.
248
CONCLUSION
the existence of the position that faith apart from works is sufficient for righteousness and eschatological salvation." At least as far as can be judged from thc extant cvidence, this position, w-hich hc repeati ~ and attacks, is edly characterizes with the tag rrics~y~ o p Epywv pcculiarly pauline." Particularly characteristic of Paul too, moreover, is another notion that the author presupposes and combats in the immediately previous and closcly rclated discussion of partiality. James's arpment that showing partiality renders one a transgressor of the law- regardless of w-hetber one "kecps the whole law" by "loving one's neighbor as oneself," as we have secn, presupposes the usc of Lev 19:18 as summary of thc "whole law." The formulation of summarics of biblical law, even vis-a-vis love of God, of one's fellow human beings, or some combination of the two, was practiced both by Christians and non-Christian Jews, and in a variety of ways. But it is Paul in particular who emerges from the extant ancient Jewish and Christian literature as an advocate of the position that the author of James seeks to defuse. While Matthew pairs Deut 6:5 and Lcv 19:18 as a summary of "the whole law-" (Matt 22:34-39; cf. Mark 12:28-34; Luke 10:25-28), Paul stands apart from the synoptics in his emphasis on Lev 19:18 alone (Gal 5:14; Rom 13:8-10).23 Morcovcr, the rcductionistic tcndcncy which most conccrns thc author of Jamcs, whiie clearly evident neithcr in Matthew nor in Hillel's summary, is among the chief services rendcrcd by the summary use of the love command in Paul's letters. T o be surc, the author of Jamcs is a w a r e and wary-of tbc spccial emphasis placcd on both Deut 6:4ff and Lev 19:18 in some Christian circles.24How-ever, the argument of Jas
It is k l y in connection with his attempt to discredit this position that James's consistcnciy positive use of the tern erga as good deeds as opposed to "sin" (rathcr than its usual morc neutral sense of "deeds," good or bad) is to be understood. Assuming the existence o f a position which holds that cga are unnccessaiy for eschatolo$cal salvation, James reacts by characterizing cga as the very mark of God's wisdom (313) and of a "living," i.e., soteriolugically efficacious, faith (2:14-26; cf. 1:2-4, 12). It seems most likely to me, in fact, that Wul formulated this distinction between righteousness by faith and righteousness by works himself. to meet a specilic problem that arose in connection with his o m activity: disputes regarding the extent to which non-Jewish members of the movcment were obliged to observe the Torah. An additional indication that the author of James enpges particularly with pauline teaching in 2:14-26 is the importance of Gen 1 5 6 to his argument; see on this below. "Notote that Hillel's use of the golden rule as summary docs not obviously refer to Lev 19:18. See above, note 1 I. and further pp. 1741
"
"
28-11 presupposes and combats specifically just such a seniiment as is found in Rom 13:8- 10; namely, that since the various commands of the lam- arc "summcd up" (tLva~eqahatbw)as "lox-c your neighbor as yourself," "love is therefore the fulfilling (nhGpofia) of law," the law."'" so that "one who loves another has fulfillcd (rr~xrrh~pw~ev) James's labish description of thc Torah as thc "pedect law of freedom," too, can bc understood as a response to Paul's statements regarding the soteriological impotence of the law. This is especially true of his repeated description of the Torah as a "law of freedom." As "frecdom" is not mentioned elscxvhcrc in the lettcr, it would seem that Jamcs's main interest in thc concept is simply to makc of it an attribute of the Torah. It is quite interesiing, then, that Paul sharply contrasts the "freedom" of those w-ho obtained thc spirit through faith in Jesus Christ with the "slavery" that charactcrizcs life under the Torah.'" This contrast is cxprcssed with particular force in Galatians, and especially in the allegory of Sarah and Hagar, where the law is in fact itsclf ultimately characterized as a "yokc of slavery" (4:21-5:l). Thus, too, are the "false brothers" in Jerusalem who apparently felt that Titus should be circumcised characterized as having "slipped in to spy on the frecdom (+ kheu8epiav) we have in us" (2:4)." Christ Jesus, so that they might enslave (~aza&ouEoouaw) Seen alongsidc his rcfutatiou of the notions of rightcousncss by faith apart from works and of fdfilling thc law simply by observing the love command, James's obvious concern to associate ihe Torah with freedomz8--the only explicit interest in freedom in the work-can be wcll undcrstood as part of a broadcr attcmpt to counter pauline positions regarding the significance of the la~.~"ar from being a
"
Cf. T.udwig, Wort ah Cesetr, 184-87; also Papkes, Adressatnr, 11618, who, however, reads Jas 2:8-11 in light of a supposed polemic a~pinstlater paulinp "lihertinists" (see below, note 29). ' T o be sure, Paul can (at least in Romans) describe the law itselr as "spiritual"--the highest compliment he could $ve it. It is; nonetheless, unable to e k c t that which Jesus Christ accomplished through his dcath and resurrection, namely, it could not liberate thc sarkic human being from its slavery to sin; indecd, it only senred h~ "increase the trespaqs." See esp. Rom 7:14-8:17, and cf 5:20-21 and 7:13. This entire line of thinking is alien to James. See further Gal 41-1 1, noting especially Paui's characterization of the Galatians ) 4:9. themselves as wanting to become "enslaved" ( & O U ~ E ~ E L Yin Note in this connection the emphatic dfen created by the use ofthe definite artclc <& before f h @ e p i a
"
'"
+
250
CONCLUSION
"yoke of slavery," the Torah, as a writtcn expression of b Epquros htryo5, is the source of "frecdom."'" In sum, in conncction with his treatment of law, the author of ,James presupposes, and seeks to refute, thc existence or at least two characteristically (indecd, perhaps peculiarly) pauline notions: that one can be considered rightcous by faith apart from works, and that one can fulfill "thc whole law'' simply by loving one's neighbor as oncsclf. Moreover, James's obvious desire to associate the law with "freedom" is quite wcll understood in light of Paul's contrary cquation of it with "slavery." The best explanation for these points of contact is the most straightfornard: thc author of James writes with an eye to undermining l'aul's position on the significance of the Torah. Notably, howcver, James is silent on thc issues that seem to have been the impetus for these pauline formulations in thc first place: the importance of circumcision, dict, etc., particularly for thc non-Jewish membcrs of thc movement. If, as pointcd out earlier, it cannot simply be concluded from this silencc that James Celt that such aspects of the Torah were no longer binding at all, it seems safe to suppose that such matters were not, at least, among his primary concerns. Indeed, whatcvcr his stance on thesc issucs, it is quite clear from the letter as a whole, and from 2 - 1 3 (esp. 2:2-3) and 2:14-26 (esp. 2:15-16) in particular, that his main concerns were economic, and above all thc treatment of the socially disadvantaged: thc "poor" (2:l-7), the naked and hungry (2:15--16),the widow and the orphan (1:27), the h i e d laborcr (5:4)? His dislike of the pauline post-pauiine Lihertinists, and is used ironically in ,James. Klein, who points out that there is no other evidence for such a group, finds it more likely that James's use of pauline concepts is not ironic; rathcr, his association of law and freedom rcsults from the identification of lhe law with thc lug05 by which they have become Christians and which they possess within themselves: "Dies gibt ihnen die MBglilichkcit und Wnk, 143544. die Freiheit, das zu tun; was dicses Wort gehietet"; see Zk ~uolikmnmene.~ Note, thoughSh; that Klein considers this logos to he the functional cquivalcnt of Paul's "spirit" (Ein volhmmmes We*, 158-59); indeed, the notion of humanity's fundamental inability to live in accord wilh the law apart from the reception of some v to he ooeradve in additional divine substance. which Klein a ~'~ a r e n l lassumes James, sounds strikingly pauline. 3" Note that Irenaeus's interest in a "law of freedom," while undoubtedly related to his familiarity with a Greek notion of natural law, is also related to his participation in thc ongoing early Christian debates regarding the significance of the Torah. Interestingly, he too is e n g a ~ e dparticularly with thc pauiine viewalheit, at least in part, via Marcion. " See also 1:9-11 i;'rich" and "hurnhle"~: 413-17 itravellinr rnerchantsl: 5:l- 6 (condemnation of "th; rich.'); and further 4:l 10; wh&h conc';.rns acquisi;ivcness.
.
notion of ~ i c i . i t 5xwpiq EWWV and his wariness regarding the placement of special emphasis upon Lev 19:18 and Deut 6:4ff, that is, seems to bc motivated less by his special intercsr in the particular issues which inspired Paul's formulation of the problem of the law than by a conccrn that such principles might lead to neglect: more gcnerally, of God's law-and particularly of those aspects of it which concern the economically- disadvantaged." In this rcspect, perhaps, James is not altogcthcr different from thosc who leveled a more gcneralizing critique of Paul by caricaturing his teaching as "let us do evil so that good may comc.""" Whether James bccame familiar with these aspects of Paul's view through oral channels alone, by dircct acccss to some collection of Paul's letters (including at least Romans and Galatians), or through the writings of later advocates of the pauline position, however, is not altogcthcr clear. While the several points of contact might suggest his familiarity with some written work or works, it is not ficult to imagine the individual points he countcrs as having bcen transmitted as pithy slogans: rightcousness is attained by rricirtg xwpi5 Epywv; love of ncighbor is the fulfillment of the law; the law is a "yoke of slavery." A somewhat stronger indication of literary dependence, perhaps, is use of the Abraham examplc in thc argumcnt of 2 1 4 -26,'"hc author is rathcr clearly concerned to interpret Gcn 155, ~ K ~ G T E V G N% 'Appa&p.i@ BEG, K U ~&h0yb&1U ~ T G ~ i 61~CXtO&vTlv, 5
Note esp., too, that while "the rich" are the arch-encmics of the letter; "the poor" are said to have been chosen to inherit the kingdom (25). Si.qiiicant too is his dcfmition or "purc religion" in terms not only of avoiding the impurity of "the world" (with which d csp. 4:l-10), but care of widows and orphans (1:27). As is clear csp. from 2:l-13, proper treaunent o r the poor is assumed by the author of James to be a duty required by ihe law. Note also in this respect his charge that the rich withhold the wages owed to the laborers who work their fields, with which cf. 1,ev 1913, and further the Jcwish literature rercrred to in Dibelius, Jmeiamer, 238. In this respect, James is somewhat reminiscent of thr story of Iazarus and the rich man in Lukc 16:19- 31, which clearly presupposes an interpreration of the law (and prophets) in which concern for the poor is both obvious and of critical importance. Rom 3:s. 'The lack of evidencc fir the broader concerns which moivated this caricature, however, or for the nature and aim of the parlicular pauline position they mocked (though -hE Torn 5:18-6:2), prohibit drawing any firm conclusions in this respect. CT. however Luedernann's discussion of this passage in Oppnrihon to Paul, 109-1 1, noting that hc also compares the caricarurization of pauline teaching in this passagc with that round in Jas 214-26 (ibid., 146). 'I Lindemann, Paulur im 6 l k r h Chrishlum; 245-47; T.uedemann, Oppoition to I'aul, 143 46; Tsuji, Ghuhe, 189-94; alntrast Penner. Epistle o f J n m e ~and Eichoiolo~;63-70.
"
"'
252
CONCLUSION
in such a way that Abraham's "righteousness" cannot bc said to proceed directly from his faith. To this end, he claims that this "scripture" was actually "fulfilled" when Abraham attempted to sacrifice I~aac;~%ndthus, too, was Abraham considered a "friend of God."36 The intcrprctation of Gen 15:6 which he seeks to disallow, of course, is precisely that offered by Paul (Rom 4:2-3; cf. Gal 3:6-9). In fact: the question which introduces the cxample of Abraham in Jamcs, 'ABpa&p b n a r i l p ilpGv 06x kt Epyov k6txat&&I. . . (2:21), is quite dircctly opposed to the thrust of-Rom 4:2, reminiscent of-and found just prior to Paul's own citation of Gen 15:6: ~i y&p ' A p p a b p kt Epyov i6tcal&&l, EXEL ~ a G m ~ &Wi' a , oir npbg 0 ~ 6 SStiu, ~ . it seems at least possiblc that Paul's apparently peculiar usc of Gen 15:6 to prove that Abraham did not become righteous it Epyov might also have become known to the author of James apart Gom a direct dependence upon roman^.^'
"
Jas 2:23: r d &hqp&@q j&l yparpi $ hiyouoa, mh.; note in this respect I X X Gen 2215-18, where it is said that God will "indeed" ( h v ) fulfill the promises first made to Abraham in Genesis 15 as a result or his willingness to sacrifice his son. Induded among- those who similarly interpret Jas 2 2 3 on the model of a prophetic ~dllment are Ropes, Epirth ufSt. James, 221; Lindemann, Pmlu im nllestM Chriihtum, 246; Johnson, Leller oJ,Tames, 243. "t' seems most likely that the ~ d which r introduces the clause rai q i h o ~Be05 &A$& coordinates with that which begins 2 2 3 ; thus: "and the scripture was fulfilled . . .; and he was called a friend of God." Dibelius's argument that thc statement regarding Abraham's rricndship with God is "isolated and meaningless" if not read as a part of thc "scripturc" being- cited is by no means persuasive (,j'ames, 164). As is clear from 4 4 , being a "friend of God" is quite important to the author or James: it is, in fact; a hnction of resisting desire and thus, conversely, maniresting the endurance of temptation in erga in this casc, Abraham's ngon or executing God's command to sacrifice his son. Notc here that Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac was often understood as one of a series of "trials" successfully completed by the patriarch, as in Jzbilm, which in fact similarly connects Abraham's "faithfulness" in the last of his tcn trials with his status as "Friend of God": "he w-as found iaithful and he was recorded as a friend of the LOW in the heavenly tablets" (Jub. 19:9; cl. 19:6-8; 17:15-18). If, then, one insists with Dibelius that ,James's dause "and he was called a friend o i God" is to bc read as part o i the "scripture" cited in 223, a reference to ,j'ubileei might bc considered as plausible a possibility as one to Gcnesis. Dibelius's canclusion that Jas 2 2 3 "is not actually a quotation, but rather. . . the sort of 'automatic' statement which is often made in dcvotiunal lang u a ~ e "in any case seems to mc to be contrary to the plain sense of the invoductory formula 5 yparpi $ Gyouaa. One cannot place too much wcight on the (admittedly intcrcstinx) fact that thc citation of Gen 1 5 5 in Jas 2:23 agrees verbatim with that of Rom 4 3 , with both diversing from WOL Gcn 1 5 5 with respect to their use of 'Abpadrw (not 'Abpa~)and the inclusion of the particle 66. With respect to the former, cf. 1 hlacc 2:52; with respect to the latter: cl. Philo, iVfu1. Nbm. 177.
''
CONCLUSION
253
James's intcraction with pauline ideas provides a sccurc basis for locating it within carly Christianity. More spec&cally, thc Lcttcr of Jamcs w7asproduced in some circle of Christians for whom the Torah remained the central expression of love of God, and thus a critical criterion for inheriting the promiscd kingdom that would be given to the "twelvc tribcs" at the parozrria of the messiah, Jesus. Its precise date and provenance, however, remain clusive. Clearly it was not writtcn prior to Paul's activity; and if it does assume some collection of Paul's lettcrs, this would likcly place it w-ell after Paul's and thus after the death of James the brother of Jesus ca. 62 CE. In fact, while thc letter's emphasis on h e Torah seems consistent with our evidence for Jesus's brother, its enlisting, to this end, of thc Stoic view of law seems more consistcnt with later dcvelopments in the Christian debates about the things considered, it seems most plausible to view- James as a pseudonymous work, written in the latc first or early second century, perhaps in . ~ any case, the Lctter of Jamcs provides imporSyria or P a l e ~ t i n e In tant, if all too rare evidence for a form of the Christian movement where soteriology centered not on rebirth through "the Gospel," but on observance of the Torah.
" ''
The early history or collections of paulinc letters, however, is quite obscure; sec Gamble, .New 7ertarnenl Canon, 35-41. Our knowledge of thc "historical James," however; is rather limited for a conaf "Terusalern in the First Two Centuries." cise trcatmcnt. see R. B. Ward., "Tames ,. AVRW 2.26.1'(1992) 779-812. "' T h e address of the letter to the "twelve tribes" is best understood in the context of the marked increase of interest in thc tribcs of Israel that b e p around the fall or the Hasmonean kingdom and apparently waned with the failure or the Bar Kochba revolt; sce Jackwn-McCabe, "A Letter to the Twelve Trihcs," 5 1 0 ~ 1 5 T . he earliest attestation of James in the Pseudo-Clementine De Vireilnle and Orig-en's works is consistent with an ea5tern provenance.
:\brahams, I. Studie~in Photisnim and the Gospeh. First and Second S e k . Edited by Harry k1. Orlinsky. Prolegomenon by blorion S. Enslin. library or Biblical Swdies. New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1967. Adamson, Jamcs B. 3ame.r: ?he Man and HG iZiessqe. Grand Rapids; 411: Eerdmans, 1.a,,d. us0 . 'The Epirtle uf James. NICN'r. Grand Rapids? MI: Eerdmans, 1976; reprint edition. 1984. Agourides, S. '>\pocaiypse of Sedrach." 07P 1; 6 0 5 13. Nand; Barbara, Kurt Nand, Gerd Mink and Klaus 'iVachtel. Non'ouum Te~tarnentuni Claecum. Editio Critlca AIaior, Vololurr~I T Catholic I ~ t t m .lnstallmnt 1: 3 o m . 2 Parts. Edited by the Institute Cor New Testament Textual Research. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaii, 1997. Anderson, H. "4 Maccabees: A Ncw Translation and Introducuon." 0 T P 2, 531 64. Baker, TVilliam R. Perronal Speech Ethics in the Epirtle oJJumes. !VlN"U 2/68. Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mahr (Paul Siebeck), 1995. Bdz, H., and W.Schragz. Die '~holGchen"Be&: Uie B.;.fe deiJokoblrr, Pdncs, Jotunner und %dm. 11th edition. NTD 10. Gb;ttineen: Vandenhoeck & Ru~rccht.1973. Bauc&am, Richard. Jude, 2 Pe&. WBC 50': Waco: Word Books, 1683. Baucr, Walter. Orthodoy and H a a y in Ea71k1 Chctionib. Second Geman edition, with addcd appendices, by Georg Strccker. Translated by a team from the Philadelphia Seminar on Christian Origins. Edited by Robcrt A. Kraft and Gerhard Krodel. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 197 1. Benardete, Seth. "Cicero's De I g b u I: Its Plan and Intention." AJI' 108 (1987) 295-309. Betz, Hans Dieter. Cfilatianr: A Comrnentaly on Paul's Letter to tile Churchher in Golath. Hermeneia. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979. . L u h Don Snmosoto und dai Neue TeftarnmL. Rel@o~~(geichichlhche und pariinelirctre I'ualielm. Ein Bnhq zum Co~plrrHdlmstinrm .No& Tekmmli. TU 76. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1961. . Paul'r Concepl of Freedom in Mie Confext ojHe1ImLtic L)iscu.riossmnr about the Posiblitier ufHumnn Freedom. Protocol aC h e 26th Colloquy of the Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modem Culture. Berkeley: The Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modcm Culture, 1977. . %ir Smnon on the Mount: A Commntaly on lhe Smton on the Momt, including the Sermon on the Plain (Matthem 5:3-7.27 nnd Luke 620-49). Edited by Adela Yarbro Collins. Hermeneia. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1995. Beyschlag, Willibald. Der B&f d p s ~ j ' a c o h . 6th edition KEKNT. Gijtiingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1897. Bietenhard, H. "Deuterosk." M C 3 (1957) 842-49. Black, Matthew, and Albert-blarie Denis. Apora@pw Henochi Liaece. Frapn~mtaP m d ebimahhmm ouac rubrrrunt Cloeco: Unn cum hisloriadm el aurlonrm iudaeonrm hellniilamm +a&mtir. P ~ T G<. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970. Black, Matthew. 77ze Book ofEnoch or I Enocil A N m , En~lGhEdition with Cornmenlay and Texniol .Notes. In consultation with James C. VandcrKam: with an appendix on the 'huonomicd' chapten by 0 . Neugebauer. SVl'P 7. kiden: E. J. Brill, 1985. Blackman: E. C. The EpGlle ufj'amer: Introduction and Cornmmtav. Torch Biblc Commentaries. London: SC41, 1957. Boismard. M.-E. "Une liturric ba~tismdedans la Prima Petri: 11-Son Influence sur 1'Eplire de ,Jacques.'. h 64'(1957) 161-83
Bonhoffer, Adolf: Epiclet und die Ston L',~ler~ilchuqenziir- rtoirchm Philrirophihir. Stuttgan: Enhe, 1890. Reprint edition: Stutgard-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Vcrlag (Giinther Holrhoog), 1968. . Ebiktet und das JV'U Testament. RGVV 10. GieRen: Tboelmann. 1911. I! 11..1., \ I I . ' I . :I , ! . I , I . .I .I ! : c I ! , .!.I I I . I : . I: ..I .. \!, .,I . , h . ! : ' I . I . . I . I , , I . . I , . :,. 1 , .W..,J 1'1.8 :z,rI. / , > , I , ,,., h 1 0 , ,l',l., , I . , . ! " , K.L: ::mI 1 1 . \\I!~.s..:I. I<$ ~U-V. ~el@~n~~excizicizl~che Sludien: A.J.itzt zur &l@mgeicliLici~~ d a Hellenirti~chen~ e z t n l t ~ ~ ; 231-86. Edited by hnthonie F. Verheulz. NovTSup 50. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1979. Buyle, Marjorie O'Rourke. "The Stoir Paradox ofJamcs 2.10.'' 2\7S 31 (1995)61 1 1 7 . Kreitenstcin, Urs. Beobat~iLluqmzu S p r u l ~ ,Slil und Gednnkmpt de.s Vwtm ~CInkkab&buch. 2d edition. Bascl und Stuttgan: Schwahc & Co. Verla~,1978. Brink, C. 0 . " O i ~ ~ i o and a ~ gOirrr6iq<: Theophrvstus and Zeno on Nature in Moral Theory." Phoonesi 1 (1955-1956) 123-45. Burchard, Christoph. "Nichstenliebegcbot, Dckalog und Geserz in Jak 2, 8-1 1." In Die Hebraircize Bibel und ihre zwa'f.che .Wal~eschichle: FrlschnJI fir R o y Rendtof ium 65 GtburLrtq, edited by Erhard Blum, Christian h.lacholz, and Ekkehard W. Ste~ernann,517-33. Ncukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchencr, 1990. Cadoux, Arthur l'emple. -Thlle n o q h l o f s t . Janrez London: Clarke & Co., 1914. Cantinat, Jean. I a Epihes de Saint Jacquei el de SaintJude. SB. Paris: Gabaida, 1973. Chaine, Joseph. L'Epitre de Saint Jacyuer. 2d ediiion. EBih. Paris: Gabaida, 1927. Charles, R. I-I. 77E Creek Vnfions o f Ihe Te~tammtrof the Tweh Patearch. Edited ?om .Mine MSS togeUtn wiUi Nie ValianLs ",theA m i a n and Slmonic Vnrions and S m e Hebrew t.iapmlr. Rcprint edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Hildesheirn: Georg Olms Verlagshuchhandlung, 1960. Chesnut, Glenn F. "The Ruler and the Logos in Neopythagorean, Middle Platonic, and Late Stoic Political Philosophy." . N K W 2.16.2 (1978) 1310-32. Cladder, H. J. "Die Anlage des Jakobusbriefes."
~~~
,
Dibelius; Marlin. James: A f;i,mmaiiia~ on the E)i.stlr oJJnmri. I I ilr edition. revised by 1Icinricli Grccven. Hcrmrneia. 'Translau:d I,\- hlicliael A. l\~illimsP1iil:idclohia: I.'~~rlress.1988. First German cdilion: I l n H r i ~ d ~ . s J a k o h u s7~11 . cdiiion. KEKhT. Giiitingcn: V-andenlroeck & Kuprecht, 1921. Ilillon; John I . 77ie .lIiddlc Plalonis1.s: 80 H.f.'. h, -4.0 220. Itliaca: Cornell Uni\-crsii) Prcss. 1977. I I r q g ~!\rtl~ur ~ ,J. fI017te~ 07 .\Io~er? Earh Cl?ri,stiar~In1m)~elali,1n" f l / ~ eHisioT (f(:u/iure. FIUI' 26. Tubingcn: J. C. B. i l o h r (Paul Sichcrk), 1'389. Dupunl-Suinrncr, n d r t . Lc @,~iiobi&ne Lime d o .lIarlinbies: Iilroduriio,~. -Ij~ul~icti011~12011 Y I .\bla. Paris: 1.ibr;rirc :\nric~me Honor? Chkrmuion. ' . 1'339. Edsman; Citrl-liartin. c'SchiipSer~~illc und Geburt J.rc 1 18. Einc Strrdic z o r airthrisrlirlicn Kosmologir." x,l.\71'38 (19'39) 11 il. . 'Schhi~litncurld \bicdrrecburr: Norlimals lac 1:IX." S#inlu.s rt Veiirii il;S Karl Edwards. >I. J. ':]usdn's ir~gosand ~lre\\:orci 01' God.'' Joiimnl (fE a r (;/z:iilwtion StudGx 3 (199.5) 261 80. Ellioli-Binns, I,. E. .:James 1.18: Crcadon or Rcdcmprion? .l%S 3 (1957) 148 61. Enghcrg-Pcderren, '1'. 'lAr Sloic 'Tbeoy o/O&io.rLi iLforal 1)n~tlopmirilm d Sono1 Inlerutiun in I.irb Stoic I'hihrii,i<~)~.Siudics i n Hcllcnistic Civilization 2. I3cnmarlk: .lar.lios University Prrss. 1990. Fahris. Rinaldo. Imce .>, drlln Iibmtd in (;iacorr~o. Sunnlcmcnli :dl RivistB 8. Brescia: paidcia; 1977. Fclder, Cain Hope. "\Visdom, I;a\v and Social Concrrn in thc Epistle CISJamcs." Ph.D riisserlalion, C:olumbia Univrrsity, 19H2. I'icnsy, D. A.. and D. R. Darrrell. "Hell~nisticSynirgogal Prayers." 077' 2; 671-97. Ficnsy, David A. Rqcr Allpd h 6e,7rWUi1: An IhmirirUion !/he ConriiiulionesAposlolomrn. Brown Judaic SLU&CS65. Chic", Cik Srholi~rsPTCSS,1985. Foerstei, Wrrncr; and Johunncs Hcrrmann. "lchiipog, ic~h."772h7' 3, 758-85. I'rankcmiillc, Hubcrl. D m B n i f dei ,7akobu.r. 2 m,lumcs. OTKNT 17. Gtitrrsloh: G"rrrsloher Vcrlagshaus; W"rzburg: Echlrr Verlag, 1994. Gamble, Harty Y. 'nuN ~ I'fi,rtament N GMII. I& !Making and ~bIcani~~,g Guidcs lo Biblical Schularship, New, 'l'estameni Series. Plliladdphia; Fo'orrn:ss 1'n:s.s; 1985. Goodenouch, Envin R. "Phiio's Emosilion or the l a w and his Ilc Viva Mosis." HIR ~ F Y ( i w 1109 25. . "'111~Political Philosophy or Hellenistic Kingship." l'ak C h n c a l Sludies 1 (1928) 5-102. . TIM I'ol,hcs of/'i~ih,7udoeur Ratlce and 77irov. NNV H m n : Yalc Univcnily Press,
..
19?R
. @ I$tt, Iiqht nie ,My.sti(h,.$pel ~ ~ ~ I ~ l ~ ~ i ~ 1 ~NCW . 7 u Hd oa i~mn Ydc .: Uiiiversiiy Press. 1935. Gorailson; Sleplien. "Ebioriiles." AH11 2; 260 G I . Grecvcn; Mcinrich. 'Jcde Gabe ist gut; Jak. 1, 17." 14 (1958) 1-13. Hadas, MOSCS. ' ~ L E' T l ~ i ~and d FourUi Books o/hlacmbeez. New York: Harper & Kros., 1953. TTardn, PatrirkJ. "Call to K r Pcrfi:ci liirough SufFcring (Jarncs 1,2 1). The Concept or Perltcrion in the Episrl~ofjiuncs and ihe Srrmon on lhc Mou~it."Bib 77 (199(i) 1 7 i 92. . Jams and ~ / L L ' S q i q i gJ-,7esin. JSMSSup 4 i . Shcffield: JSCYI' Pmss, 1!)91. Hauck. I:r. Die B e f i dei ,7akubu, i'eims~ Judm und ,7ohnrilze.r. 6th rdilion. N1'1) 10. Giirringen: Vandcnhocck & Ruprecht, 19% Heidland, Hans \Vr,ll&ng. "hayicowar; ~ih." YZ).\'I 4; 284 92. Hengc:I, hlardn. Judaiirn and Ileller~um: S1udie.s bi liicir En'ncounter in 1'ale~lini. iiu,inx l i ~ e k;arb Hellniiilir I'mioN' 2 vols in orre. Philadrlphia: Fortress, 1981 ITciigrl; hlarlin; in coilahoralion witti C:hrisroph hladiscllics. 71~~' ''fft/lienizniion'' ,J~doeniri t/.r 12irc, Cmtiiv a j m Clzi.\l. Plriladelphia: 'lrinily Prcss Irr~emational,ISlllil.
a
,f
Hollander; H. \V.; and hl. dcJungc. 77v 72ilnmmtr ojffte 7tLrhc I'aoiarilil: A C m m n l a y . S\7'1' 8. Lcidcn: E. J. Brill. 19R. Haite, Kagnar. "Logos Spcrmatikos: Christianity and r\ncicnt Philosophy according to Sr. Jusrin's .\palogics." S 7 12 (1958) 109-68. Huppe; Rudolf: llrr lheola$~he HinlerLmnd derJoliobarbnefji. 2d cdilion. I T 28. \Viirzburg: Echtcr Verlag, 1$185. Norsiey, Richard. "The Law alKaturc in Philo and Cicero." H 7 R 71 (1978; 35-59, Horsi. Pietcr W. \-an der. "The ale~virh Pravcrs in thc i\oonolic Constitutions." l'rc\cntcd at lhe 1997 annual mreliirg 01. (hc Socicty 01. biblical Litcraturc. Horr, I'. J. A. %r fi:pislle o f s t . ,70mer: ' l i l t Greek Text ruih Inlladudion, (hrnmmlny a! for ai C l z a j L ~I I I Verse 7, onddddilionnl .VO~I. Lorrdan: hlachlillan and Co. Iimiicd, 1909. Huther, J a h . Ed. Kiliich-rze~tlircl~i Hcndhurli iii,er den HrkJ dei J h b u r 3d udition. KEKNT. Gbtlingcn: Vandcnhocck 8i Ruprrrh12 1870. Inwood, Brad. "Cornmentar). on Striker." In I40credirt~1oj lhr Ho,rlon lrro C,~linijuiirnr in Ancient I'ililoropl~ 2, edited by John J. Clraq-, 95 101. New York: Unireniiy Prcss of .America, 1987. . "Commenrs on Proressur G o ~ m a n n s Paper: ' 'l'hc 'Two Forms of OiktiCris in Arius and the Stoa." In On SIoic and P&oi*lL Eli1Lci: 7hi 1firk iirAnuJ L ~ ~ ~ w ~dilcd ILu. by 1%'. 1V. Fortcnhaugh. 190-201. Ncw Bruiawick, NJ: l'ransacdon Books, 1983. . Elt~NiiLx and Ifumon Action in Earb Sfoikrn. Oxford: Clarendon Prcss, 198.5. Isaac; E. "I (E~hiopic.4pocalpsc of) Enoch." O P I_ 5 89. Jackson-hlcCabc, I\/latt A. "A I.etter to the T~vclvcTribcs in the Diaspora: \Visdom and 'Apocalyptic' Eschatolo~yin James." SHLSP 35 (1996) 5 0 1 17. . Rcl.iew oS 7 h e Letin uf Jamex A A h Tron.slat& with Inlroducliun and Cammenlay; by 1.uki: Timothy Johnson. In ,7R 78 (1998) 102-104. . Rcvicw of Wort olr Guetr. 372 7.5. -, bv , hlarlina Ludwiir. In *7HL 11.5 (1996) < ! Jobling, David. "And Have Dominion.. .: 'The Intelpretation oS Gcncs~s1; 28 in Philo Judaeus." ,757 8 (1979) 50 51. ,Joimson, Luke Timothy. "Friendship with the World/Friendship with God: A Study oT Discipleship." In Ducip/s/
\ ~ - .
~
Kirk, G. S. Fltraililiii: 'flrr Comic Frq~onztiEdited r~itlior, Iri/mriuitir,n mid Cornnzwh~~. Cambridxc: Cambridge h i \ - c n i t y P r r s . 1954. Kirk; J. A. "Ttic \Leaning of \ \ i d o m in Jitmrs: Examination of a Hypothc.;is." X 7 S 16 il969- 1970) 24-30. Klauck, Hans-Josel: 4 .lI,&nb~vhur/i. ,JSFIR% 3.6. Gij~ersloli:Gcrd 3lohn. 1989. Klciii. Rlartin. ..Kin rullhmmwci ll.i~k': loihnzmmheil. Gc,.wlz iind (;eiii/~tah llieolo,$sclir 'flzemeri dei ,7&biobii~fix. B\\\'T 7/19 (Der gimzcn Saminlung Hcft 139. S~utrgart:Verlag \V. Kohlharnrnrr. 1995. Klijn. !\. F. J . Der lalrinLiLiic ' 7 i ~ lirr l :l~ohhpi~irdes Em. 'SL 131. Berlin: .&demie Vrrlag, 1985. Kloppcnhorg, John S . O_Pa~<~lleii. $nri/,.si.s, Critical ;\bla 3 (.'ontordance. Foundarirms & Facc~s.Sonoma; CZ: I'olebridgr~ 191111. . "Status rind \\ohlr~tigkcii bei Paulus und Jilkobus." 111 T-brlije.\u.r zum (.'/irirtzfi~r: (~/~&stolog&he Sludim. Fe.rl~obr,firPaul iJgfitnnn zum (ii.( ~ d u r t s l q qcditcd ~ Ihy Kudoll. Hoppr and Ulrich Bonc, 127 51. B%h!\' 93. Berlin and Ke\z York: \\-alter dc Gruvter. 1998. ~
-
~
-
~
~~~~~~
:,-
.,~
~
~~
~
A~\iitiquityand Christianity. Philadclpiiia: Fortrcss Press, 1987. Kocstcr, t l e h u t . "NOMOZOYZEQZ: 'lhe Concept of Natural Law in Grcck 'l'hou~hi." In Kelkioni in Anliouilv E ~ >x a ~inr ;blmonno, n (o iE r a & Kilridilll G,~odmouch. e " - , edited bv Jacob Ncusncr; 521 41. Leiden: E. J. lirill, l9iO. K;,hlcr, Kdufmann. "Thc Origin and Composirion of thc Eightcen Benedictions with a 'l'rimslatic,n of tllc Corresponding Essrnr I'ri~y~rsin the Apostolic Constirutions." HUCA 1 (1924.) 410 25. Reprinted in Conl~butiomto the Sciml$c S l u b %7m>irh I.itur0, cdited hy Jakob J. I'ctuchowsky, 52 90. New York: Ktav Publishing Housc, Inc.. 1970. . "Uehrr die Urspirnge und Grundformcn dcr synagugden Liturgic. Einc Studie." M G W " 37 (18931 ~ 441 51. 489-97. , Kiihl; Ernst. Die Slelluli,q dci Jakoburbiefii r u m alttr.rlnmmtlichm (A.srtr und zu7 pnulinirclren Rec/~Ljkligu~.rk/tre. Kiinigsberg i. Pr: Verlag \,on Wilh. Koch, 1905. I.aucr; S. "Euschcs Logismos in I\' Macc." ,7JS 6 (1955) 170-71. 1.aw.s., Sc,ohi<:. A Commmtnn, ol'iarrier Black's. 1,ondon: Black. 1980. , ,on the Ebidle ' .," . "Does Scripture Speak in Vain? A Reconsideration uSJarnes IV.5." M S 20 (1973-74) 210-15. Leconte. R. 111Ebilrei Catholioues de Saint 7acriue.r.. Sairii "i d e el Soin1 I h e . Paris: Les ~ d i t i o n sdu Ceif, 1953; 2 d edition, 1961. Li~~dernanil, Andreas. Paulur i i dlleslrn Chtistrnhim: Ilas Bdd dts Ap,~.rfeLrund d k ltciefitiiin dm poulinkchen ' ~ m o l o ~ in & dmJiUl~:/~7Lillic/~en I.iltratu7e bii Marcion BH'I' 58. 'I'iibingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebcck), 1979. T.iscu, Marin 0.Etude su7 la I q u e de la W~ilorophhie~1/Ioralec h i Ciciron. Paris: Sociitt d'F.ditiun a1.e~Belles I.ettresa, I93(1. Lohse, Eduard. ''rrp60wnov, mi;.''TBA'rti; 769 81. T.one. A. A. "Herariitus and Sroicism." P/~iloroU/~ia 5/6 (1975 76) 133 56. ~,. . "The 1.ogicai Basis of Stoic Ethics." I*ri,ceedir~,qr g/ l / ~ eAriib~leliart Socieb 71 (1970-1971) 85 104. Long, A. A,, and D. N. Scdey. 7hc Hellenistic Philiiroflher.r. 2 uolurncs. Cambridge: Cambridge Uiiiucrsity Prcss, 1907. Ludwig, Martiria. I~l/i,it oh Grrels: Einine 07tinsuclrung r u m Vm.rlZndnir oon "CPir1" urid :‘( 7 m t r " in itraelitisclr-WjBdi.rihenund rieulrilamenllzchen Schnirn. Gleihieilig cin Beilrcg rur 7heologk drr ,Jdohusbtifi,r. F.un,paischc I-Iochschulschrilien 23/502. Frankfurt am >Pain: I'ercr lang, 1994. Luedemann, Gerd. Op/ioiilLon lo Paul in,7al;ir/r Ch&xliuni@. hlinneapolis: Forvess Press; .
A
.
.
1 on0
hlartcns, John \V. "Wiilo and the 'Highcr' Ld\v.-' SBl.Sl' 30 (1991) 309-22. hlarrin, Ralph 1'. James. TVBC t 8 . \\Taco; 'I'X: \\'ord. 1988. hfarcy, Jacques. /.'@flr~ de Jaquei. Etude crihqiit. Paris: ljhrairie Felix !Ucan, 1933. hlayer; Giinter. Index Philoseus. Bcrlin and Kelv York: \\-alter dc Gruyter, 19i4. I[ayor,Joseplr R. 7br Efiktlr o/St. Taniei: 77ie Cre~kText i ~ ? U iIr~trodrrction,.\ble& cornrnenh and Furlher Slud,ei iii Nte Iipiitlr $St. ,jiimui.3d zdition. London: Ilac4lillan. 1913. Rcprin~cdilion: Clasical Cornmrntaq L i b r q . Grand Ibpidc; 111: Zondcn-an, 1954. hlcKnight. Scot. 'Yarnes 2:18u: The Unidentifiable Intcrloculor." lV7j 52 (1990) 3.55-iil. hlrinenz. blur; and TVilheIm T:rede. Ilir k?tilolisr/ien Brirj. 4th cdilion. llir heiligt Schrifi des Neuen Tcstarncnis 9. Bonn: Peter Hans~ein~ 1932. Sleshorer, Ya'akov. dnrimt ,7noi.~liCoinqe. Iblrime I t Hvod the Crenl throu,~hBar Corirbo. Dix FIills; NY: Amphon Books, 1982. >[eyer; ~hiiold.L)as Ralsrl dei Joiiibusb~fii. BZh4L7 10. Giclien: Thpelrnaiin, 1930. Ilitchcll, M u r ~ a r e tM. "Rhcrorical Shorthand in Paulinc Argurne~ilaiion: 'The k'unrriuns of 'the Gospcl' in rhr Corinthian Correspondencr." In Go.$el in l'aui.. S l u d k in Corinliiimwli, G(il~&r ard Rornonrfor I
4".
Nickehburg, George W. E. J a k r h Iitmaturr Behem Ntr Bibb mtd LIe Mirimah A Ifi?h~n%ol and fitvaly Inlroduclion. Philadelphia: Forlrcss, 1981 - . "Riches, the Rich and God's Judgrnenl in I Enoch 92-105 and lhc Gospcl According lo Luke." NTS 25 (1979) 324-44. Pcmhroke. S. G. "OikciBsis." In Problrmi in S ~ O Gedited . ~ by A. A. Inng, i 14-49. London: l'hc Athlone Press, 1971. Pcnm:r, Todd. ' f i e Ejirtle . f J a m e ~ ard E.rchotologc. Re-readiq an Ancient Cirriitiun I ~ l l v . JSNI'Sup 121. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996. Perdue, I.en G. Wiidorn and Creation 7he 7heolo~gOJ WGdorn Iiteralure. Nashdlc: Ahinsdon, 1994. Perkins, Pheme. firit and Second Pein, Jmaandj'ude IBC. Louisville:,John Knox, 1995. PTefir, Crnst. "Der Zusamrncnhang des Jakobusbriefcs." 73K 23 (1850) 163-80. Philippson, R. "Das ersle Na~urgcmisse." Philolop 87 (1931 32) 4 4 5 66. Plcssis, Paul Jaharincs du. TEAEIOZ: 'fie Idea ofPcjclion in ihe J V Teskzrnnl. ~ Kampcn: Kok? 1959. Pohlenz; Max. Freedom in Greek L> md 'IhougliL 7 i ~ eEfirt07y !/an Ideal. DordrpchtHolland: D. Reidel; New York: The Hurnanilies Press, 1966. . Cmnfiqmi dm rtoiichm 1%-iloxojhie.Abhandlungcn der Gcscllschafi der \Vissenschdtcn zu Giittingcn 3/26. Ghttingen: Vandcnhocch & Ruprccht; 1940. Reprinted in Stoiiim; cditcd hy Isonardo Tarin. Grcrk and Roman Philosophy 38. Ncw York and London: Garland. 19x7 ~~. - ~ Popk~s,\\'iard. Adwrotm, ~ i t u a h nund t.i,m drs Jakohlribri&r. SHS 125/l26. Slultgarr: Verlag Katholisches Bibelwerk; 1986. Reddiu, Paul 1. "The Concept 0f~Vmnoiin Fourth Maccabees." CB(L45 (1983) 249-70. Reesor, blargaret C. 7he Political 7lztoly of lhe Old and Middle She. NCIVYolk: J. ,I. Augusliii, 1951. Rcickc; Bo. 1 7 ~ cEjliiillei "/Jornei, I>&. nnd.7ude I~llmduction 'Iian.ilati,n and .!Votes. AB 37. &rdcn City2 NY: D o ~ b l e d a y1964. ~ ~
Rendall, Grrald H. '??*Epiille $Jarurnex and Jzidaic Chriiiioni@. Cambridgc: :\l the Uni\-crsity Press. 1927. Renehan; Robcrr. '"lhr Grcek Philosophic Bac!qouild of Fourth hlarraiiccs.. Rheinii~hriA1lu.seum /CT I'lzilolqqie I l i (19i2) 223-38. Ris~;,JohnM. StoC l'l~ilosopl~.Carnhridgc: Carnlrridge Uriivcnity Press, 1969; reprint cdilion, 1990. Ropes, Jamcs Hardy. rl Ciiiirril and Exegcticol Cumrnenla~a s he E)iitle u/ Sl. , ~ n m u i . ICC. Edinburgll: T bt 1' Clark; 1916: rcpriiit edition, I99 I . Sandbach, F. H. '.Ennoia and l'rol2psis in dic Stoic T h e o n of Kno~rledge." Clarricnl Qarler!, 24 (1930) I t 51. Rcprirrtcd irirh supplerncntaty notes in Problms in Sloicunl; udiicd by A. : I Long; . 22 37. I~mdon:Thc -4thlonr Press; 1971. Sanders. E. 1.' '3cr\ish Association with Gentilrs and Galarians 2:l 1 14.'' In 77ie Coniim.sn/ion continue.^: Sludiei in I'aul and ,john in H i ~ n oo ~jJ Iauli ~blargrn. edited by Robcrt l'. Fortna and Beverly I<. Gaventa, l 70-011. Nahvilir: ~\hingdorr. 1990. . F d a i m : Praclicr and 8elic/G3 BCIC-66 CE. Idondon: SC>l; Philadelphia: Trinily Press Internationirl, 1992. Pallof fil&on. Philadelphia: Paul and Paleslivinn Judriit~rt: A Compo&an Fortress Press. 197i. "The Covenant as a Soteriological Catcgolli and tile Nature or Sdvalion in Palestinian and Hellenisdc Judaism." In ,7ms, (keekr and C/~
Smith, Morton. Clmenl ofdlexnndrin arrd a Seirrt Go.q,el ef iLfa7k Cambridge, hi\: Haward Uni\.ersitv Prcss. 1973. Smyth, Herbert !~ci;. &eekGrammnr. Rcvised by Gordon M. blessing. Cambridge: Ham-ard University Prcss; 1956. Spitu, Friedrich. Drr Bnejde~JaIah~dr Giirtingen: Vandenhoeck 8. Ruprecht, 1896. Jorephos; Luh-flcls m d d-lp<~lo~8tic Sterling_ Grcgory E. Hijloriobnop/~And Se~~Ue/;nitii,n: Hiilork~mphy.Nov'l'Sup 64. Lcidcn; New York and KDln: E. J . Brill; 1992. Stonc, hlichacl E. Fourth E Z T X I.' Gmmentav on the Book ~ f f i u r l h Ezra. I-Iemeneia. hlinneapolis: Fonress Press, 1990. Strack, H. L.; and Giintcr Stembergcr. 1,~lroduclionlo the Talmiid and 1b12rcrh. Translated and edited by hlarkus Bockmuehl. Second printingl with i:mcndations and updates. Minneapolis: Fortrcss Press, 1996. Striker; Giseia. "l~<~llowing Nature: I\ Study in Stoic Ethics." Oxford Sludia in Ancivnt Philoio,b,hy 9 (1991) 1-73. . "Ori~fins of the Conccpt of Natural In\\..''In I'roceediqf "/liu Bo.ib,r,,i Arm Glloguium in Anken1 P/~ilo.rop/ty2_ cditcd by John J. Clcary; 79 91. New York: Unimrsity Press or America, 1987. Tcherikover, Victor. Ilelhirtic Civilkotion and he Jews. Reprinted with a preface by John J. Collins. Pcabody. hi\: Hendrickson, 1999. Todd, Robert B. "The Stoic Common Notions: A Re-examination and Rcintcrpretatian." Synibolae Osloemes 1 8 (1973) 4 7 ~ 7 5 . Townshend, R. B. "The Fourth book of Maccabpes." A P O T 2: 653 ~8.5. Tsuji, Manabu. Glaube ~ ~ ~ C / I L Vr~llkorr~mrnlLYil T L und Vmeitlicliluq: Eint Unfersuchuq rur lilrrarivcheri Grstult and rur inlroltlichen Kohirenr des Jnkobush7iefr.r WUN'I' 2/93. 'l'iibing-cn: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1997. Vandcr Waerdt, Paul A. "Philosophical Influence on Roman Jurisprudence? The Case of Stoicism and Natural Law." ANRW 2.36.7 (1994) 4851 4900. . "The Stoic Theory of Natural Law." Ph.D. disserulion, Princeton Univcrsity, 1989. . "Zcno's Republic and the Origins o i Natural Law.'' In % Soma& hlouemenl, ediled by Paul A. Vvnder Waerdt, 2 7 2 308. Itbaca: CorncU Univcrsity Press, 1994. Vouga; Franqois. L'Eppihe de Saint Jacques. CNT; d.s.13a. Geneva: Iahor et Fididcs. 1984. \Vachob, Wesley Hiram. "'The Rich in P i t h ' and 'the Poor in Spirit': The SocioRhetorical Function of a Saying orJesus in the Episde of James." Ph. D. disserradon, Emory University, 1993. \\'ah12 0. Apoca&pxii Eidroe. Apoca&pxir Sedmci~. V~ioBeati Frsdrae. PVTG 1. Lciden: E. I . Brill, 1977. !.\~ard; Roy Bowcn, Jr. "'l'he Communal Concern or the Episile ofJamcs." Ph.D. dissertation, Hvrvard University, 1966. Ward, Roy Bo>ven. ':James ofJerusalem in thc First Two Centuries." ANRW 2.26.1 (1992) 779-812. . "l'artiality in the Assembly: James 2:2~4.." H'TR 62 (1969) 87-97. \\'atson, Duane F. ‘:James 2 in Light of Greco-Roman Schemes of Argumentation." .l\TS 39 (1993) 94. 121. -~ . "The Rheloric of James 3:l 1 2 and a Classical Pattern or Argumentation." . A h 7 35 11993) , , 58. !Vatson, Gerard. "Thc Natural and Stoicism." In Prohiems in S l o i k , edited by A. A. Long, 216-38. I>ondon: The Athlone Press, 1971. JVciss; Bernhard. 138 katholiichn Bhji. Textkitische Lin'nteisuchungen und Texthersklluq. 1,eipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1892. \\'illiams, Frank, ed. 7 7 Parralion ~ efEpiphaniu ofSalamk. Boukr 11 and 111 (SecLr 47-80> De Fide). NHMS 36. Lciden: E. J. Brill2 1994.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
263
JVindisch; Hans. Ih k n l l ~ o l ~ c i Brie/~. m~ 3d edition. HNl' 15. 'I'iibingen: J . C. R. Mohr (Paul Siebcck), 1951. IVinsron; David. Iazos and ;IG~licnl 7 l t e o l o g in Philo cf8hxandrin. Cinrinnati: Hebrew Union Colle~cPress; 1985. Wolrnarans; ,]. 1.. P. '"lbc Ton-pe Guiding the bod^ 'l'hc :\nthropolo$~al Presuppositions ofJames 3:l 12.." .Seo&stomrnlica 26 (1992; 523-30. IVoi\.erton; \LT. I. "The Double-hlindrd Man in tlre Light of Esscnc psycho lo^." A l R 38 (1956j 166-75.
INDEX OF ANCIEhT LITEUTURE
.\I
Jewish Bihle/Old 'l'esturnem
B. New Tcstarnent C. Apocqpha, Pseudepigraphu, and Dead Sea Scrolls
D. Philo E. Rabbinic Literature F. Apostolic Fathers
G. Orher Early Christian Literature H. Graeco-Roman Literature
Genesis 1:14-18 1:26
Leviticus 19 19:12-18 25 I 156, 158: 160, 162 64.. 169.. 172 4, 176 1.53, 158. 162, 164.: 165; 168, 169; 170;
1 Kingdoms (WOO 17:25
146
3 Kingdoms (Wo 20:8 20:11
1% 1+6
INDEX OF ANCIENT LITERATURF.
2 Chronicles 1957
160
Isaiah
10:3
Psalms 823 19:8 (IXX 18:8) I l0:l (1.m1091)
Mark
203. 206 I52 I59 22, 194 166 166 166 166 166
313-35 Ezekiel
33:50 32 Daniel 9:4 hfalvchi
INDEX OF
Galatians
Romans
Ephesians 1:13 6:9
Colossians 1:5 3:25 1 Thessalonians 1:6
2 Timothy 1:8 14 1 Corinthians 3:6-8 5:5 James
I
2 Corinthians 1:15-2:17 1:18
INDEX OF .ANCIENT L I T E R 4 T U E
INDEX OF ANCIENT LITER4'rURE
158, 170, 153, 177.
160; 172; 1.57; 193.
168, 169, 193; 221, 216 169~7.t,176; 219. 228
3:16 17 3:17 3:18 at: 1
269 220 202, 206, 219. 221; 223 202 201. 202. 219. 223
270
INDEX OF ANCIENT LITERATIRE
I Peter l:6 7
2John 2
Jude
I John 1:l-4 1:G~~IO 2:3 6
6-7 191, 234
234. 234
i
INDEX OF ANCIENT LITER4TCiRE
148
6:7 6:21 22
"~. 99, 100 99 99 99, 100 98
J (LS 3:18-19
Sirach
".
Testaments of' XU Pol@inrchc 7 Benjamin 103 ?: Cad 5:l
272
INDEX OF ANCIENT LITERATURE
\\kdom af Solomon 1.12-16 2:12-20
197 I98
Quod Ileic, r i l ImrrrubbilC
21-22 22 23 95 93, 94
92 92 90 "7
A601 de Rabbi Nhthon 1:10 6 1
162 87
Quod omnzs probu~ lrber at
17 18
21 31 44
b. Shehu'ol 31a m. Abol
h. Shabbat 31a
6:2 166, 169
274
INDEX OF ANCIENT LITERATURE
~
~
I l l , 118, 119, 142 106, 107, 109, 110, 113. 116. 117. 118
INDEX OF ANCIENT
126, 152 126
LITERATI^
275
Oecumenius MPG 119. 468
Theophyiactus MPG 125. 1145
7, 131
INDEX OF ANCIENT LITERATURE
Dio Chrysoslurn De dei copilione 67, 70, 72, 125 12.27 12.28-34. 70
2.17.39f 2.17.1 3 2.17.29 10 2.19.32
278
INDEX OF .4NCIEUT LITERATURE
Plutarch 12 Alexandri mqnijbrlunn out oi~tute 32911 R 33 Ile cornmunibus nohlilr contra rtoicos l058F 51 1070C 50, 60;72
121 121.20 121.23 Stobeus Eclo,<m 1.25.3 27.4 2.77.16 27
SVF (Slokomm aeltruni Frqqrtenh; H . \ion .knim. cd.l
Seneca I)e vita bean
15.7
150
INDEX OF MODERN AUTHORS
Abrahams, I. 166 4damson, j. B. 9; 10; 16, 20; 195 r4purides; S. 147 l a n d , R. 168, 209 .&nderson; 11. 96, '38, 99, 101, 103 .&ppdbaum; S. 07 Bachman. .' 'T. 2 Baker, W. R. 22.5 Balch, 11. I,. 225 Balz, H. 16 Bauckharn, R. 21 1 Bauer, W. 181 Benarde~e.S. 30 Bek, H. D. 143, 145, 161, 165, 102, 183, 197, 249 Beysrhlag; W 8; 10, 14; 20 Bi~tenhard,H. 109 Black, M. 2 11 Blackman, E. C. 16; 141, 144 Blum. E. 156 242 Bonhiifir, A. 10, 11, 18, 19, 43, 44, 45, 46; 47, 48, 49, 50; 52; 54; 56, 57, 62: 65, 69 Bousset, W. 106, 107; 108, 110. 111 Bovle. M. O'Rourke 177. 219 ~reilensrein,U. 96, 97, 99: 100, 103 Brink, C. 0. 51 Burchard, C. 156, 157, 158, 171 Busse. U. 163 Cadoux; A. 1'. 8, 16; 144, 19.5, 241 Cantinat. 1. 10. 17. 19. 20. 22. 1.57.
. ~
~
.
Chaine, J. 10, 157, 195, 196, 198 Charles, R. H. I47 Cherniss, H. 37 Chcsnul, G. 1.'. 93 Cladder, If. J. 228 Cleay, J . J. 29 Clcmen, C. I8 Cohen, S. J . 11. 87 Calli~s,J. J. 87, 21 1 Coison, F. H. 138; 210
Connolly. R. H. Cross, F. L. I I
106; 108; 109
Darncl1.D.R. 1 5 . 1 0 Y , l l l . l l 5 , l 1 6 Davids. P. H. 1 ; 4? 9; 10; 17, 20. 151. 156, 157, 160; 163; 171. 174,; 195; 196. 198; 199, 200, 20.5. 207; 211; 233 DeFilippo, J. G. 30 de Jongr, bl. 147, 212; 213 Denis, A,-M. 146 Dcppe. D. B. 156, 192 deSilra; D. A. 96, 97. 98, 100; 101, 102., 103., 10.5 Dibelius, M . I, ', 8; 9; 10; 12, 16_ 17, 18, 19, 21; 25, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 151, 153, 155, 156, 357; 158, 159, 161; 164, 173, 171; 177, 179, 182, 184; 188, 190, 191; 195, 196, 197, 198, 199. 201. 203. 204. 206. 207. 209. 251, 252 Diiion, J. M. 30, 03? 85, 89, 90, 92; 120 Drogc, A. J . 123 Duponl-Sommer, A. 96, 97, 99; 10'2, 104 Edsman, C.-M. 10, 195 Edwards, M. J. 123 Elliou-Binns. I.. E. 10., 195. " 233. 237 Engberg-Pedenen, T. 51, 54, 61, 77: 103 Enslin. M. S. 166 Fuhris, R. 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 136; 139, 14.4; 14.5, 146. 147; 148, 149, 153, 155, 157: 171; 191; 192, 195, 209; 233, 235 Fcider2 C. H. 9; 17, 19 I:icnsy, D. A. 106; 107; 108_ 109; 111, 112; 113_ 11'; 1151 1161 118: I I9 Foerstcr; W. 223 Forrmhaugti, \V. I\'. 51
280
INDEX OF MODERN AUTHORS
Forma, R. T. 180 Frankcmijllc, H. 11, 17; 19; 195 Freedman, H. 166 Funk, F. X. 109
Gamble, H. Y. 3, 253 Gavenia; B. R. 180 Goodenough, E. R. 1.5; 77, 89; 91; 92. 93; 9% 95; 107; 108, 109; 110. I l l > 112, 113, l I 4 > 115: l l 6 > 119, 120, 121 Goranson, S. I83 Greeven, H. 1; 9, 19, 207
arti in, P. J. 217,224; 244 Hauck, F. 16, 20: 157, 199, 233 Heidland. H. W. 100 Heisen. H. 8
Hop;, R. 20: 144: 163, 21 7 Horslcy, R. 29, 31, 35, 82, 83, 84, 122 van dcr Horst. 1.' W. 108. 112 Hort, F. J. A 8, 10, 142, 153, 195 199, 207 Huther, J. E. 8, 10, 14 Inwood, B. 32, 35, 37, 38, 39, 51, 53, 61, 67, 69, 71, 74. 90, 140. 149, 226, 237 Isaac, E . 21 1
"
,
Jobling, D. 237 .Johnson: L. T. 9, 10, 17, 136, 137, 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 148. 151.
Kancl, B. 146; 147 Keck, I.. E. 182, 183 Kee, H. C. 147, 212, 223
Kenter, I-. 1.' 30, 40; 42, 43, 69. 74; 76, 77; 78, 79, 82, 81; 85, 101, 237 Kirk. 1. A. 23. 33
Klijn, A . F: J . 117 Kloppanborg, J. S. 163; 182, 183 Kocster, H. 29, 31; 32 Kohler. K. 106. 10i Kraft, R. A. 181 Krodel, G. 181 Kiihl, E. 14.4, 153, 169, 173, 175 Lauer, S. 100 Laws, S. 9, 10, 16, 19, 20: 141, 144, 153, 158, 171, 194, 195: 196, 198, 203, 204, 206, 207, 208, 210, 234. Lcconte, R. 17, 20, 233 Lindernann, A. 244, 251, 252 I.issu2 bf. 0. 42 I.ohse, E. 160 Long, A. A. 29, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 41, 51, 53, 66, 69; 77, 98; 230 Ludwig, M. 18, 23, 24, 25, 136, 153, 158, 166, 169, 179, 195, 249 Luedernann, G. 244, 251 Luther, M. 2, 142, 144
x.
Martin, P. 9, i7, 20, 144, 158, 163, 174: 195, 196, 218 Martv. I. 10. 19. 196. 233 , , Mayor, J. R. 10, 20, 140, 141, 159, 175, 193, 195, 197, 199, 201, 203, 207.. 213.. 218.. 233 Massebieau, L. 11 McKnight, S. 218, 219 Mcincrtz, M. 10, 16, 20 Meshorer. Y. 147 Meyer; A. 4; 5, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15; 16; 17, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 40, 153. 173: 241, 242 Mitchell. 41. M. 190
INDEX OF MODELV .?TIHORS
Oldfither, \V. I.\ Oilinsky, H. 11.
149 166
Perduc, I.. G. 105 Pcrkins. P. 10. 17. 196. 1'18 ~cturhowski;J. J . '107 ' i f , . 228 P h i l i ~ ~ s o nR.. 51 " Pohlcnz, M. 38: 43, 44, 45; 46; 4.7, 48, 50; 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58; 59, 611; 61, 62? 65, 66, 69, 70; 74: 84, 8.5, 14.5, 149 Popkcs, W. 17, 20, 195, 233, 249 Redditt, P. L. 96, 97: 99, 100, 101 Reesor, M. E. 32, 33 Reickc, B. 16; 20, 151, 196; 197: 233 Renddl, G. H. 10, 195 Rcnchan. R. 96. 97. 98
28 1
Sclhragc, \V. 16; 20 Sedlarzk; 1. 7; 151 Sedley, D. N. 33, 31; 35; 37, 38; 11; 51; 53. 66; 69. 98; 230 Se,& .\I I:. I87 Segovia_ 1:. F. 181 Seiv, O . J . F. 10; 178. 185, 223 Sidehouom, E. bl. 16; 14" 195; 196 Simon; L. 16 Smilll. J. 7,. 3; 242 Srnilh, hl. 212 Srny1h> H. \V. 101 Spilta, F. 10; 11; 14; 158; 169; 173; 17.5. 195. 198 ~ t e m b e r ~ eG. r ; 162 Stone. M. E. 147 Strack, H. L. I 62
I " I . 43 'I'cherikover. V. 87 .Todd2 R. B: 50 Townshcnd, R. K. 100, 105 Tsuji,M. 9 ~ l l , 1 7 , 1 9 ~ 2 3 , 2 4 , 1 4 4 ; 178, 194, 195, 217; 223, 233, 251
Vander \'Vad;dt, 1'. A.
29, 30; 31, 32, 33, 76, 82; 83 Vcrhcuic, A. F. 107 Vouga; F. 10, 17, 19; 20, 144,213 Vredr, W. 10, 16, 20 Wachob, W. H. 153, 156, 157? 159, 160; 163, 164,, 169, 171, 172, 18.5, 188, 249 \ilahl, 0. 147 Ward. R. B. 17, 24, 159, 160; 161, 162, 163, 253 \Vatson, 1). F. 157; 225 Watson, G. 29, 215 \Yeiss. B. 10
sandkrs, E . P. i77, 180 Schlier, 13. 145, 146 Scllriackenburrr. R. 191. 194 ."
Schocdcl: \V. R. 151 Scl~ofielrl~ L1. 33 Schokel, I.. h. 20.5
TVinslon, D. 91; 92 \Volrnarans. I. I.. P. 225
