CAMPAIGN • 218
MAGINOT LINE 1940 Battles on the French Frontier
M ROMANYCH & M RUPP
ILLUSTRATED BY JOHN WHITE Series editors Marcus Cowper and Nikolai Bogdanovic
First published in Great Britain in 2010 by Osprey Publishing, Midland House, West Way, Botley, Oxford OX2 0PH, UK 44-02 23rd St, Suite 219, Long Island City, NY 11101, USA E-mail:
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors wish to thank the following people who were instrumental to the genesis, research, and writing of this book. To Herrn Gerhard Hauke who took Martin on his first trip to the Maginot Line in 1987 and Thomas Bertram who joined Martin on many subsequent trips to the Line, both above and below ground. Their inspiration and support sparked Martin’s long interest in the Maginot Line. To Scott Stopher who introduced the authors to each other, starting them on the path that led to this book. To Clayton Donnell, who gave the authors the idea and impetus to write a book for Osprey Publishing, and Karl Klusewitz and Patrick Osborn who enlightened Marc on the possibilities of using research material available at the US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). To Michael Constandy, a consummate researcher, who guided our archival research at NARA. And finally, to Marc’s wife, Jackie Scott, for her encouragement and suggestions that helped us overcome many of the trials and tribulations that plague authors.
A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
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Bataillon de chars de combat
IR
Infanterie-Regiment
RAMF
Régiment d’artillerie mobile de forteresse
RAP
Régiment d’artillerie de position
RI
Régiment d'infanterie
RIC
Régiment d'infanterie coloniale
RIF
Régiment d'infanterie de forteresse
RMIC
Régiment de mitrailleurs d'infanterie coloniale
RMIF
Régiment de mitrailleurs d'infanterie de forteresse
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CONTENTS INTRODUCTION
5
CHRONOLOGY
6
ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN
8
OPPOSING COMMANDERS French commanders
12
German commanders
OPPOSING ARMIES The French Army
The Wehrmacht
15 Orders of battle
OPPOSING PLANS French
27
German
THE CAMPAIGN
31
Fall Gelb: the opening moves Overrun of the Ardennes defences The capture of Fort La Ferté Battle for the Maubeuge fortifications Fall Rot: the invasion of France Envelopment of the Metz region Operation Tiger: breakthrough in the Sarre Widening the breakthrough Attacks in northern Alsace Operation Kleiner Bär: assault across the Rhine
AFTERMATH
91
THE BATTLEFIELDS TODAY
93
FURTHER READING
94
INDEX
95
Flandres Lille Escaut Maubeuge Ardennes Montmedy
Crusnes Thionville Boulay Faulquemont
Bas-Rhin Colmar Mulhouse Altkrich
25
25
50
75km
50 miles
1 German operations against the Maginot Line
Maginot Line fortified sectors
Maginot Line defences – heavily fortified Maginot Line defences – weaker sections
Advance of German Army – Fall Rot
ine Se
1
Paris
West Wall German front 5 June Advance of German Army – Fall Gelb
Envelopment of the Metz region Breakthrough in the Sarre Attacks in Northern Alsace Assault across the Rhine
Amiens
FRANCE
Billotte
1
XXXXX
XXXX
Lille
2
1
XXXX
3 4
9
3
Reims
XXXX
Maubeuge
Aisne
e
Ma rn
bre
5
Sam
Brussels
BELG
XXXX
6
Sedan
Verdun
2
Ardennes Fo r e s t
4
3
8
Nancy
XXXX
10
Besson
3
XXXX
5 11
Colmar XXXX
18
17
14
7
XXXX
Strasbourg
6
C
SWITZERLAND
Karlsruhe
Leeb
N
Mainz
XXXXX
XXXX
Freiburg
Basel
7
16
XXXXX
15
XXXX
13
XXXX
2
Koblenz
Rundstedt
A
XXXXX
GERMANY
ALSACE
5
Mulhouse Belfort
8
1
Bitche
12
Saarbrücken
X XX XX
XXXXX
Epinal
16
Remnants of French Forces
Prételat
2
Köln
XXXX
Trier
12
XXXX
XXXXX
4
Metz
9
LORRAINE
XXXX
Thionville
7
Longwy
4
Kleist
Luxembourg (City)
Bock
B
XXXXX
X XX XX
XXXX
LUXEMBOURG
Fall Gelb 10 May – 4 June
Fall Rot 5–25 June
2
1
Namur
Liege
Aachen
6
lle
0
me
BEF
1
XXXX
se
0
4. 5. 6. 7.
Som
Overrun of the Ardennes defences Capture of Fort La Ferté Battle for the Maubeuge fortifications
Fall Rot:
1. 2. 3.
Fall Gelb:
15. 16. 17. 18.
Rhine defences:
12. Rohrbach 13. Vosges 14. Haguenau
Région fortifiée de Lauter:
11. Sarre
Sarre Gap:
7. 8. 9. 10.
Région fortifiée de Metz:
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
7
se
Belgian border defences:
XXXX
Oi
XXXX
XXXXX
BELGIUM
e us Me
Mo
Vo sg es
Dunkirk Encirclement
ine
Mo u nt ai ns
X
Rh
XX XX
Dunkirk
Overview of the campaign, 10 May–25 June 1940
INTRODUCTION In May and June 1940, Germany won a lightning victory in Western Europe, defeating the Allied armies in less than six weeks. Although never decisively engaged in combat, the Maginot Line was central to how both France and Germany prepared for and conducted the campaign. France’s strategy and war plan were built on the idea that the Maginot Line would provide a secure front along the Franco-German border, as well as a base for Allied forces to counter the Wehrmacht offensive through Belgium. To this end, the French Army built fortifications along its northern frontier for ten years, first in Alsace and Lorraine and later along the Belgian border. However, as time and resources ran out, significant portions of the frontier were left weakly fortified, especially in the Ardennes sector. It was a mistake that played into German hands. For its part, the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) understood that to invade France and defeat the French Army, it had to breach the Maginot fortifications. Before the invasion the Wehrmacht committed significant resources to preparations for attack on permanent fortifications. Then, during the campaign, the Germans attacked the Maginot Line in ten separate corps and division level operations. All told, one-third of the Wehrmacht’s divisions took part in operations against the Maginot Line. The Wehrmacht conducted its campaign in two phases: Fall Gelb (Plan Yellow), the invasion of the Low Countries and Northern France, and Fall Rot (Plan Red), the invasion of France proper. During Fall Gelb, the Wehrmacht struck the Allied armies at their weakest point – the hinge between the mobile forces in central Belgium and the strong permanent fortifications of the Maginot Line in northern Lorraine. With overwhelming combat power, the Panzer formations overran French forces at Sedan and split the Allied front in two. The Panzers then bypassed the remaining fortifications along the Belgian border, which were systematically reduced by infantry and combat engineers. Fall Gelb ended after German forces encircled Allied forces in Belgium and forced their evacuation at Dunkirk. Several weeks later during Fall Rot, as Panzer formations plunged deep into central France, the Wehrmacht attacked the Maginot Line in Alsace and Lorraine. In battles reminiscent of World War I, infantry supported by heavy artillery conducted large-scale offensives in the Sarre and Upper Rhine regions that divided and isolated the strongest sections of the Maginot Line. These operations resulted in some of the heaviest fighting of the campaign. But, overshadowed by the French Army’s collapse and subsequent surrender, these battles are forgotten by history. 5
CHRONOLOGY 1939 3 September
Britain and France declare war on Germany.
7–30 September
French Groupe d’armées 2 invades German Saarland.
16–24 October
German Armeeoberkommando (AOK) 1 counterattacks in the Saarland.
1940 10 May
Fall Gelb, the German offensive in the west begins.
12–15 May
Heeresgruppe C conducts diversionary attacks against the Maginot Line in northern Alsace and Lorraine.
13–15 May
Panzergruppe Kleist pierces the border defences at Sedan and Monthermé.
16–17 May
German AOK 4 overruns border defences east of Maubeuge.
17–19 May
71. Infanterie-Division captures Fort La Ferté.
18–24 May
German VIII Armeekorps (AK) seizes fortifications in the Maubeuge area.
20 May
Heeresgruppe A reaches the Channel, isolating Allied forces in Belgium.
22–26 May
German VIII and XXVII AK seize fortifications in the Escaut sector.
27 May to 3 June Allied forces evacuate the Dunkirk pocket.
6
5 June
Fall Rot, German invasion of France begins.
12–13 June
French 18e Corps d’armée abandons fortresses Chesnois, Thonnelle and Vélosnes.
14 June
Infantry divisions of Heeresgruppe B enter Paris.
14–15 June
Operation Tiger. German AOK 1 breaks through defences in the Sarre Gap.
15–18 June
Operation Kleiner Bär. German AOK 7 conducts an assault crossing of the Rhine River.
17 June
XIX AK (mot.) reaches the Swiss border, encircling 500,000 French soldiers in Alsace and Lorraine, 20,000 of them in the Maginot Line.
19 June
The 215. Infanterie-Division pierces the Maginot Line in the Vosges Mountains.
20–21 June
The 167. Infanterie-Division seizes forts Bambesch and Kerfent, but fails to take Fort Einseling.
20 June
The 246. Infanterie-Division unsuccessfully attacks fortifications in the Haguenau area.
21 June
The 161. Infanterie-Division unsuccessfully attacks Fortress Fermont and Fort Ferme-Chappy.
21 June
Heeresgruppe C orders a halt to any further infantry assaults against the Maginot Line.
21–24 June
The 262. Infanterie-Division captures forts Haut-Poirier and Welschhof.
22 June
The German 95. Infanterie-Division fails to force Fortress Michelsberg to surrender.
22 June
Armistice is signed (to take effect on 25 June).
22–25 June
French Groupe d’armées 2 surrenders in the Vosges Mountains.
25 June
Hostilities formally end.
27 June to 4 July
Last Maginot Line fortress troops surrender and leave their fortifications.
7
ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN The French Government built the Maginot Line in the 1930s to guard against a German invasion. Its purpose was to halt a German attack long enough for the French Army to mobilize and then to serve as a base for a counteroffensive. Construction was a massive undertaking that occurred in several distinct cycles prompted by changes in the diplomatic situation between France and Germany. The first and strongest sections of the Maginot Line were built in northern Alsace and Lorraine from 1930 to 1936. Two lines of permanent fortifications were constructed along the German border, one from Longuyon to the Sarre Valley and another from the city of Bitche to the Rhine River. Designated as the Régions fortifiées de Metz and de la Lauter respectively, these heavily fortified fronts were designed to stop a direct attack from Germany into Alsace and Lorraine. In between the Régions fortifiées de Metz and de la Lauter, a 50km (31-mile) stretch known as the Sarre Gap was left unfortified because the neighbouring Saarland area of Germany was still under French control. Concurrently, several lines of concrete casemates were built along the Rhine River from the Haguenau area south to the Swiss border. These, the Rhine defences, were designed to secure eastern Alsace from a cross-Rhine attack. Because Belgium, an ally, was also building fortifications along its border with Germany, the French Army left the Franco-Belgian frontier unfortified except for two short lines of casemates constructed in the Raismes Forest near Valenciennes and the Mormal Forest near Maubeuge. These defences were meant to provide ‘security positions’ for French forces in case of a German invasion of Belgium.
These two large artillery blocks of Fortress Simserhof, Block 6 (left) with three rapid-fire 75mm guns and Block 4 (right) with a 135mm howitzer, were typical of the firepower and protection built into the fortifications of northern Alsace and Lorraine. In the foreground is a row of anti-tank obstacles. (M. Romanych)
8
A second cycle of fortification construction occurred from 1936 to 1939 in response to Germany’s reoccupation of the Saarland and Belgium’s declaration of neutrality. The French Army lengthened the Régions fortifiées de Metz and de la Lauter by building a new line of permanent fortifications west of Metz from Longuyon to Montmédy and another on the left flank of the Région fortifiée de la Lauter from the Bitche area to Sarreguemines. In addition, a line of casemates was built across the Sarre Gap. Finally, a series of forts and casemates were constructed north of Maubeuge to block an invasion from Belgium. Intended to be as extensive as the fortifications of the first construction cycle, budgetary constraints forced the French Army to scale back or delay construction of these later fortifications. The consequence of this patchwork approach was significant. Despite years of construction, France’s prepared defences along the frontier from Switzerland to the English Channel still had gaps and weak sectors. Opposite the Maginot Line was Germany’s West Wall, a fortified zone of small blockhouses armed with machine guns and light anti-tank guns. Begun in 1936 after German soldiers reoccupied the Rhineland, the West Wall’s purpose was to deter French aggression and, failing that, delay the attack. By 1939, defences of the West Wall were far from complete, although one of the strongest sections was in the Saarbrücken area opposite the Maginot Line’s weak Sarre Gap. In late August 1939, the Wehrmacht manned the West Wall with token forces while the bulk of the army massed against Poland. Along the French border were 19 divisions of Heeresgruppe C, many of which were secondand third-line reserve units with limited artillery, transport and training. Anticipating German military action, France alerted its armed forces and began manning the Maginot Line. Then, in response to Germany’s invasion of Poland, France ordered a general mobilization and, with Britain, declared war on 3 September. Three days later, the French Army had 57 divisions in northern France, and the Maginot Line was declared ready for action. However, the fortress troops were ordered to avoid incidents with the Wehrmacht and forbidden to open fire without permission from the sector commander. Even so, the line effectively served its purpose by providing a base for the French Army to mass forces for an offensive. On 7 September, in a purely political move, French forces commanded by Général d’armée Gaston Prételat moved into German Saarland. Eleven divisions crossed the border near Saarbrücken along a 35km (22-mile) front. Cautiously advancing, French reconnaissance units followed by infantry and mechanized forces encountered negligible opposition. Opposing the French were ten infantry divisions of the German AOK 1 commanded by Generaloberst Erwin von Witzleben. Despite the large number of forces involved, heavy combat did not occur. Lacking the strength to stop the invading French force, Gen.Obst. von Witzleben engaged the French in a delaying action as his army pulled back to the West Wall. French casualties – reported as 77 soldiers – were light. Unaware of its overwhelming force advantage and lacking clear offensive objectives, the French Army did not press the attack. By 12 September, the offensive peaked and then stagnated in the face of stiffening German resistance. Ordered to take defensive positions before the West Wall, the divisions of Groupe d’armées 2 had advanced less than ten kilometres (six miles) into Germany, occupying about 200 square kilometres (77 square miles) of territory and 20 villages. 9
LEFT Remains of a French tracked vehicle destroyed by a German mine during the Saar offensive in September 1939. Most French casualties during the operation were due to mines and booby traps emplaced by withdrawing German forces. (NARA) RIGHT Commander of the French 4e Armée, Général Réquin, inspects the construction of a trench in the Sarre region. To their own detriment, French field units spent too much time building defences instead of training. (M. Romanych)
Anticipating a German counteroffensive once Poland was defeated, the French Grand Quartier Général (GQG) ordered Groupe d’armées 2 to withdraw on 30 September. As the French divisions moved behind the Maginot Line, the German AOK 1, now reinforced by several first-line infantry divisions, attacked. From 16 to 24 October, in a series of local actions, AOK 1 pushed the French covering force back across the border, retook most lost German territory and even occupied a small portion of French territory. The Maginot Line deterred further cross-border offensive action. The termination of the Sarre operation ended France’s only offensive of the war. Most combat action had taken place beyond the range of the Maginot Line’s fortress artillery in the narrow strip of land between the border and the West Wall. Thus, the Maginot Line played only a supporting role. With the cessation of AOK 1’s counteroffensive, the Phoney War (in French, drôle de guerre; in German, Sitzkrieg) began. The French Army quickly settled into a defensive posture. Along the frontier a final period of fortification construction occurred. As more French and British forces moved into position along the frontier, engineer and troop units hastily built concrete blockhouses and field fortifications to supplement and extend existing defences. Even along the strongest sections of the Maginot Line, fortress crews added more blockhouses, barbed-wire entanglements, and anti-tank obstacles. In some places secondary defensive lines were constructed to add depth. This last push to fortify the border came at the expense of needed unit training which lagged behind that of the Wehrmacht. Both sides evacuated civilians from border areas. In the case of the French, a wide swath of territory termed the zone rouge (red zone) was evacuated in front and immediately behind the Maginot Line along the German border from Thionville to Alsace. This was done to protect the civilians from battle and to make military operations easier, especially in built-up areas. Ultimately, an estimated 764,000 French civilians were evacuated. 10
Although fighting during the Phoney War was limited to skirmishes and artillery duels, the propaganda war between the Allies and Germans was very active. German propaganda banners such as this one were a common sight along the Franco-German border and Rhine River. (M. Romanych)
As the campaign in Poland concluded, German forces moved to the western front and began preparing for offensive action. The most active part of the front was along the area between the Maginot Line and the West Wall. Both armies engaged in active patrolling, occasional artillery duels, intelligence gathering, and propaganda operations. German aerial reconnaissance systematically photographed the Maginot fortifications. Small-unit skirmishes were frequent, but there was no significant combat action. French losses during the eight months of the Phoney War were reportedly 98 officers and 1,750 soldiers. The Wehrmacht’s primary operation was a deception that portrayed preparations for offensive operations in the Sarre Gap and upper Rhine near the Swiss border. The purpose of the deception was to keep French divisions in Alsace and Lorraine away from the planned main attack through the Ardennes. Deceptive measures included false radio traffic, fake headquarters, routing of units redeploying from Poland through Saarbrücken and upper Rhine areas, and disinformation provided by German agents to French and Swiss intelligence. Crews of the Maginot Line saw limited combat action during the Phoney War. After the Saar offensive, the fortresses were ordered not to fire artillery without provocation and to limit shelling to ten rounds in order to avoid German retaliation. The artillery occasionally supported forward infantry units or engaged targets of opportunity such as German patrols and any other observed activity. In January, the restriction was relaxed, allowing fortresses to fire artillery against significant-sized targets. For most fortress crews these engagements were their first opportunity to use the artillery. Not surprisingly, a few teething problems with the weapons, ammunition and turret support systems were discovered and quickly corrected. Otherwise, the fortress troops, as well as the rest of the French Army, continued to dig in and wait for the German attack. For their part, the Germans tried to keep the French calm by restricting patrolling and artillery fire. 11
OPPOSING COMMANDERS Veterans of World War I dominated the general officer corps of both the French and German armies. However, each group drew different lessons from their wartime experiences. Most French generals were deeply rooted in past doctrines and practices, while the German generals included many innovators looking for new ways to conduct war.
FRENCH COMMANDERS
The strongest fortifications of the Maginot Line were under the command of Gén. Prételat, commander of Groupe d’armées 2. By the time of the major German offensives against the Maginot Line in the Sarre and Rhine regions most of Groupe d’armées 2 had withdrawn, leaving the defence of the frontier to the fortress troops. (NARA)
12
The French chain of command was overly complicated and cumbersome. French forces had two commanders – Général d’armée Maurice Gamelin and Général d’armée Alphonse Georges. As Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, Gamelin retained all authority, but delegated the responsibility for operations of the field army to Georges. The result was two competing headquarters with overlapping roles. Aggravating the situation was Gamelin’s and Georges’ dislike for each other, a lack of radio communications between both headquarters and the field forces, and each commander’s habit of commanding far from the front. Général Gamelin was responsible for the planning, organization and readiness of the entire French Army. As the army’s chief since 1935, he oversaw completion of the Maginot Line defences, the modernization programme and the development of France’s military strategy. Surprisingly, even though he was a brigade and divisional commander during World War I and a corps commander in the 1920s, Gamelin was more of a staff officer than a commander. Cautious, reserved and uncomfortable around troops, he secluded himself at his headquarters in the Château de Vincennes near Paris, far away from current events that might disturb him. Général Georges was a completely opposite personality to Gamelin. Outgoing and candid, Georges was a no-nonsense soldier and leader. He was expected by many to become head of the French Army in 1935. However, Gamelin was selected instead because either (depending on the source) Prime Minister Edouard Daladier thought Georges was too right wing in his political views, or Georges’ health was too precarious, having never fully recovered from wounds received during an assassination attempt against the king of Yugoslavia in Marseilles in 1934. Under Georges were three army group commanders – Générals d’armée Gaston Billotte (Groupe d’armées 1 located along the Belgian border), AndréGaston Prételat (Groupe d’armées 2 in Alsace and Lorraine), and Antoine
Besson (Groupe d’armées 3 in southern Alsace and along the Swiss border). Général Billotte was similar in demeanour to Gén. Georges. At the start of the war, Gamelin selected him to command Groupe d’armées 1 because he was the army’s most offensive-minded field general officer and a primary proponent of French armoured divisions. Therefore, placing Billotte in command over France’s primary mechanized force made sense. When Billotte was injured in a car accident on 21 May 1940 (dying two days later), he was replaced by Général d’armée Georges Blanchard. Most forces in Alsace and Lorraine, including the main fortresses of the Maginot Line, were under the command of Gén. Prételat. At 55 years old, he was young by French general officer standards. He was also very experienced at higher-level command, having commanded Groupe d’armées 2 well before the start of the war and during the Saar offensive in September 1939. By May 1940, Prételat’s command included three field armies and most of the Maginot Line fortress troops. Général Besson was also an experienced field commander, having commanded a regiment during World War I, and a brigade, division and army in the 1920s and 1930s. In October 1939, he took command of Groupe d’armées 3 on the extreme right flank of the north-east front in the Colmar and Mulhouse region of the Upper Rhine. There, he played a minor role in the battle for France.
GERMAN COMMANDERS The chain of command for the campaign in the west was Adolf Hitler, Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch (Commander-in-Chief of the Army), then the three army group commanders who commanded the operational forces – Generaloberst Gerd von Rundstedt (Heeresgruppe A), Generaloberst Fedor von Bock (Heeresgruppe B), and Generaloberst Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb (Heeresgruppe C). Based on their World War I experience, these generals and many of their subordinates doubted a quick war could be won against France. They thought Fall Gelb could be defeated easily by either a stout defence by French forces entrenched along the border or a counteroffensive by forces behind the Maginot Line. The commander of Heeresgruppe A, Gen.Obst. von Rundstedt was the Wehrmacht’s senior officer in terms of length of service. He was brought out of retirement in April 1939 to plan the invasion of Poland and command Heeresgruppe Süd. Afterwards, he and his staff moved west to plan the French campaign and lead the main attack. Rundstedt’s subordinate commanders were Generaloberst Gunther von Kluge (AOK 4) and Generaloberst Wilhelm List (AOK 12), General der Infanterie Ernst Busch (AOK 16), and General der Kavallerie Ewald von Kleist (Panzergruppe Kleist), all with combat experience from the Polish campaign. Assigned to Heeresgruppe A were two energetic and innovative officers who would ultimately embody the blitzkrieg concept – General der Panzertruppe Heinz Guderian, the Wehrmacht’s Panzer expert and XIX AK (mot.) commander, and Generalmajor Erwin Rommel, commander of the 7. Panzer-Division. Heeresgruppe A also had many exceptional division commanders and staff officers who became group commanders later in the war. All except Busch were well suited to mobile operations as envisioned by the German invasion plan. 13
An authority on defensive warfare, Gen.Obst. Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb was the ideal officer to defend Germany’s western frontier during the invasion of Poland and then direct two major offensives against the Maginot Line during the invasion of France. (M. Romanych)
14
General Busch was an ardent supporter of the Nazi Party who achieved rapid promotion once Hitler came to power. Although his performance in Poland as a corps commander was undistinguished, Busch’s political stance gained him command of the newly formed AOK 16 in October 1940. Fortuitously for Busch, his chief of staff was Generalleutnant Walter Model, a tactically competent dynamo who became the driving force behind AOK 16 operations. The senior commanders of Heeresgruppe C – Gen.Obst. von Leeb and his two subordinate army commanders, Generaloberst Erwin von Witzleben (AOK 1 stationed opposite the strongest parts of the Maginot Line), and Generaloberst Friedrich Dollmann (AOK 7 located along the Rhine River) – were in direct contrast to the commanders of Heeresgruppe A. As a group, they were neither among Hitler’s favourites nor part of the developing Panzer general elite. All three sat out the invasion of Poland, assigned to defend Germany’s western front from French attack. As a result they lacked recent combat experience and first-hand knowledge of modern mechanized forces. They were though, assigned responsibility for two planned major offensives against the Maginot Line. A capable leader, Gen.Obst. von Leeb was out of favour with Hitler because of his anti-Nazi attitude and religious convictions. Among the army group commanders, Leeb was the only strong objector to the invasion in the west, but for moral rather than operational grounds. Retired in 1938 when commanders considered hostile to the Nazis were removed, Leeb was reactivated in July of the same year and given command of AOK 12 during the occupation of the Sudetenland. Afterwards, he retired again from active duty, only to be called back a second time in the summer of 1939 to command Heeresgruppe C. Generaloberst von Witzleben was anti-Nazi. In the mid-1930s, Witzleben became an active opponent of Adolf Hitler. On 1 September 1939, he took command of AOK 1, which was defending the frontier opposite the Maginot Line. With minimal forces, Witzleben stopped France’s abortive Saar offensive and then conducted a counterattack that took back most of the French territorial gains. During the Phoney War, he remained an active member of the anti-Hitler resistance. Generaloberst Dollmann was an undistinguished leader with no higherlevel command experience. He served without special distinction in World War I and never had a field command at division or corps level. Good at sensing and adapting to political currents, Dollmann was promoted because of his relations with Nazi party officials rather than on his military ability. On 25 August 1939, Gen.Obst. Dollmann took command of AOK 7, which was manning the West Wall along the Rhine River.
OPPOSING ARMIES On the eve of the German invasion, the Allies had a quantitative advantage over the Wehrmacht. The combined strength of the French, British, Belgian and Dutch armies was some four million soldiers organized into 151 divisions. The Wehrmacht had about three million soldiers assigned to 135 divisions positioned along the western front. The Allies also had a numerical superiority in armoured vehicles, artillery and aircraft. To make up for its inferiority in soldiers and weapon systems, the Wehrmacht depended on superior training and command and control to provide a decisive tactical edge. Before May 1940, the Wehrmacht actively trained its commanders and units for combat. Particular emphasis was given to river-crossing operations and attack of fortified positions. After difficulties in Poland, command and control were decentralized to make officers and units more responsive and flexible. Subordinate commanders were expected to move forwards to make decisions and communicate orders more rapidly than possible from a command post in the rear. Moreover, the Germans fielded a wide variety of radios for ground and air forces. The result was the Germans’ ability to adapt quickly and exploit changing battlefield situations.
Sited on high ground, fortress artillery such as this armoured 75mm turret of Fortress Metrich had good fields of fire and a high rate of fire, but also a short range (11,900m) that was easily outranged by German heavy artillery. (M. Romanych)
15
In contrast, the French Army moved to the frontier and stagnated. Instead of combat training many units built blockhouses and field fortifications. Despite the lessons of the Polish campaign, the GQG still emphasized World War I concepts of defence and firepower. The army’s fatal weakness was its slow, centralized command system that could not keep pace with battle events and gave little initiative to subordinate commanders. All orders to the army were issued by Gén. Maurice Gamelin, Army Commander-in-Chief, yet because his headquarters lacked radio, he had to rely on the civilian telephone network or dispatch riders. Typically, 48 hours were needed to pass orders to the divisions. Oddly, the Maginot Line, and not the mobile units, possessed the best communications equipment.
THE FRENCH ARMY In May 1940, most of the French Army was in defensive positions along the north-east frontier. Ninety-three divisions manned the front with 11 divisions in general reserve. The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) brought additional forces to the fight with nine divisions in the Lille area and one, the 51st (Highland) Division stationed on the Maginot Line east of Metz. Operationally, the French north-east front was divided into the field army and the fortress troops. Field forces were organized into three groupes d’armées (army groups). Groupe d’armées 1, commanded by Gén. Billotte, was located along the Belgian border. The strongest army group, it had four armies and the BEF, as well as most of the French mechanized force. Général Huntziger’s 2e Armée, the least capable army in Groupe d’armées 1, was the link between the strong mobile forces of Groupe d’armées 1 and strongest fortifications of the Maginot Line in Alsace and Lorraine. Further east, was Groupe d’armées 2 with three armies and the Régions fortifiées de Metz and de la Lauter under the command of Gén. Prételat. In southern Alsace, Groupe d’armées 3 commanded by Gén. Besson included a short section of casemates along the Rhine River in the Colmar and Mulhouse areas, as well as several infantry divisions along the Swiss border. The quality of French divisions was variable, ranging from excellent for active units to poor for reserve units. Mechanized and fortress troops were considered elite units in terms of training, equipment and morale. Reserve divisions were composed of older reservists with less training and World War I equipment and accounted for almost 50 per cent of the field divisions. Fortytwo reserve divisions were stationed along the north-east front, half of which reinforced the Maginot Line in Alsace and Lorraine.
The Maginot Line In May 1940, the Maginot Line was not a continuous fortified front. In terms of strength and organization, it consisted of several distinct fortification lines. First and foremost were the strong first construction cycle fortifications of the Régions fortifiées de Metz and de la Lauter (the so-called Maginot Line proper). Then there were the second cycle constructions added to extend the two régions fortifiées (fortified regions). Next in defensive strength were the casemate lines of the Rhine defences and Sarre Gap. Finally, the weakest section of the Maginot Line was the defence built along the Belgian border from Montmédy west to the English Channel, of which only those built in the Raismes and Mormal forests and north of Maubeuge had any true defensive 16
value. The remainder of the Belgian border was protected by a series of ad hoc concrete blockhouses and fortifications field built by engineer and infantry units. The strongest feature of the Maginot Line was the ouvrage (fortified work or position.) There were two basic types of ouvrages – large fortified works (gros ouvrages), or fortresses, and small fortified works (petits ouvrages), or forts. The primary difference between a fortress and a fort was size and armament. Fortresses were two to three times the size of forts and were equipped with artillery – 75mm guns and 135mm howitzers, many mounted in retractable, rotating armoured turrets. Twenty-two fortresses were built in the Régions fortifiées de Metz and de la Lauter, as well as in the Montmédy sector. Depending on terrain, fortresses were located approximately every 15km (nine miles) in order to provide overlapping artillery fires. Along the strongest sections of the Régions fortifiées de Metz and de la Lauter, German forces could be engaged by the artillery of two or more fortresses. Forts were equipped with infantry weapons – machine guns, 37mm or 47mm anti-tank guns and 81mm mortars. These weapons provided local defence for the fort and adjacent sections of the defensive line. Thirty-six forts were built in the Régions fortifiées de Metz and de la Lauter, the extensions to the fortified regions and around Maubeuge. Many forts were planned as fortresses but scaled back because of budget cuts. Fortresses and forts typically had several combat blocks and entrance blocks interconnected by a network of underground galleries. The galleries and underground portions of the blocks contained the facilities needed to sustain the weapons systems and crew for up to 30 days: command posts, power stations, crew quarters, kitchens, ammunition magazines and workshops. The typical fortress had between six and twelve blocks and a crew size between 500 and 1,000 soldiers, although the largest fortresses – Hackenberg and Hochwald had 21 and 28 blocks respectively – and crews of more than 1,000 soldiers. Forts had between one and four blocks and a crew of 100 to 200 soldiers. Augmenting the fortresses and forts were more than 100 interval casemates (casemates d’intervalles). These casemates were large, one- or twostorey, reinforced concrete structures. In two-storey casements, the lower level was below ground and contained the power generators, ammunition stores and crew quarters. The upper floor, at ground level, contained multiple firing chambers (rooms) armed with twin 7.5mm machine guns, and 37mm or 47mm anti-tank guns. These weapons were sited into interlocking fields of
LEFT Interval casemates filled the gaps between the Maginot forts and fortresses. With limited fields of observation and firepower, casemates like this one in Secteur fortifié de Rohrbach were vulnerable to ground assault unless artillery support was provided by a nearby fortress or interval artillery unit. (M. Romanych) RIGHT Imposing belts of anti-tank obstacles such as these rows of steel rails near Bitche ran along much of the French border with Germany and Luxembourg. Attacking German troops had first to breach these obstacles before assaulting the fortifications. (M. Romanych)
17
Casemates of the Rhine River defences were built directly on the bank of the Rhine. Lightly armed, the casemates needed supporting interval infantry and artillery to oppose a German river crossing successfully. This casemate was photographed using optics from the German side of the river in early 1940. (M. Romanych)
fire with adjacent fortified works. One-storey casemates had these same features, but often on a smaller scale. Casemates typically had one or more armoured cupolas for observation and self-defence. Crew size was about 15 to 30 soldiers. Casemates were designed to operate independently, but required artillery support from nearby fortresses or field artillery to withstand a determined assault. Fortresses, forts and interval casemates were linked together by belts of anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles that fronted the fortification line and surrounded most major fortified works. Combat blocks and interval casemates were sited to provide mutually supporting fire and to cover the obstacle belts. Generally, the anti-tank obstacles were six rows of steel rails set vertically in the ground. The anti-personnel obstacles were belts of dense barbed-wire entanglements up to five metres (16ft) wide. Anti-tank and barbed-wire barriers blocked roads through the obstacles. A variety of other defensive structures – advanced posts, blocking positions along main roads and shelters for local infantry reserves – increased the depth of defences into a ten-kilometre-wide (six-mile) zone. In practical terms, only those sections of the Maginot Line with artillery fortresses were impregnable to Wehrmacht attack in 1940. Elsewhere – the second construction cycle extensions to the régions fortifiées and the casemates of the Rhine defences and Sarre Gap – lacked the density of fortifications and artillery to withstand a deliberate German attack. The Sarre Gap defences were particularly weak, consisting of little more than two lines of unfinished casemates reinforced with field fortifications. The Rhine defences were unique, consisting of two and sometimes three parallel lines of casemates sited to enhance the natural barrier of the Rhine River. In comparison with the fortifications built in Alsace and Lorraine, those along the Belgian border were austere. These fortifications were a loose line of ad hoc field fortifications suited primarily to local defence. Most of these fortifications were built by infantry and engineer units during the Phoney War. 18
Armament was limited to machine guns and small-calibre anti-tank guns. Only the second-cycle defences north of Maubeuge were of any real defensive value. Even so, none of the border defences could withstand a determined German attack, unless reinforced by infantry and artillery of the field army. By far the weakest fortifications were in the Ardennes region near the town of Sedan. This oversight was perplexing considering that Sedan was astride a classic invasion route and was once one of the most fortified places in France. But in 1940, the strong fortifications of the Maginot Line proper ended 25km (16 miles) short of Sedan leaving only a weak line of blockhouses to fill the gap. This weakness in the border defences was known to both the OKH and GQG and is where the Panzers attacked on the third day of the invasion.
The fortress troops The Maginot Line was organized into secteurs fortifiés (fortified sectors) manned by régiments d’infanterie de forteresse (fortress infantry regiments, RIF) and fortress artillery regiments. These regiments augmented by engineer, signal and medical troops formed the crews of the fortresses, forts, casemates and blockhouses. In the Metz and Lauter areas, the sectors were grouped into regions fortifiées, each of which was equivalent to an army corps. In May 1940 there were 43 RIFs manning the fortifications of the northeast frontier. A typical regiment had about 3,400 soldiers, sergeants, and officers organized into three battalions. Suited for static operations, RIFs were equipped with heavy infantry weapons such as machine guns, anti-tank guns and mortars, but lacked mobility. Two types of fortress artillery regiments were assigned to the Maginot Line, régiments d’artillerie de position (RAP), which were static artillery units, and régiments d’artillerie mobile de forteresse (RAMF), which consisted of mobile artillery. Soldiers of the RAPs manned the artillery turrets, blocks and casemates and provided interval artillery to fill gaps between each of the artillery fires of the fortresses. In general, one regiment was assigned to each secteur fortifié, although there were variations based on the importance of the sector. About a third of the Maginot Line’s artillery was under fortification in either casemates or turrets. The interval artillery was important because its artillery had longer range than that of the fortresses. The RAMFs were assigned to the Régions fortifiées de Metz and de la Lauter to provide mobile artillery that could reinforce the RAPs. In May 1940, there were 11 RAPs and nine RAMFs equipped with artillery pieces ranging from 75mm to 370mm, many of which were of World War I vintage or earlier. In terms of manpower, the fortress units were equivalent to approximately 15 field divisions.
Interval troops Before the war, only fortress troops garrisoned the Maginot Line. However, after mobilization the GQG realized that fortress units could not adequately occupy the space between the major fortifications. In December 1939, the Maginot Line was reinforced with field divisions, designated as ‘interval troops’ because they reinforced the intervals between the fortified works. The purpose of these units was to provide continuity and depth to the defence and mobile forces for counterattack. The result was a dramatic increase in troops stationed along the Maginot Line proper. On 10 May 1940, 24 infantry divisions were stationed from Montmédy to the Swiss border. 19
Prior to the war, fortress troops and the field army were under separate command. However, during the Sarre offensive, conflicts arose between the two chains of command. To solve this problem, the fortress troops were reorganized and placed under the command of the field army. The régions fortifiées were dissolved and reorganized into the two corps of fortress troops, the 42e Corps d’armée de forteresse in Metz and the 43e Corps d’armée de forteresse in Lauter. Units positioned opposite the Ardennes region between Sedan and Maubeuge, and along the Swiss border, became the 41e and 44e Corps d’armée de forteresse respectively. Five secteurs fortifiés – selected because no offensive action was anticipated – were converted to divisions d’infanterie de forteresse (fortress infantry divisions, or DIF) numbered 101 through 105. The remaining secteurs fortifiés were unchanged. This unified command structure was employed until mid-June 1940 when interval units withdrew from the fortifications in the Metz and Lauter regions. At that time, the senior fortress commanders assumed command of the secteurs fortifiés, just in time to defend against the attack of Heeresgruppe C.
THE WEHRMACHT In the spring of 1940, the Wehrmacht was semi-modern. On one hand, it had 16 well-trained and equipped Panzer and motorized divisions. On the other, the infantry had many second- and third-rate divisions. Only the best infantry divisions (i.e., those raised in the first wave) were suited to offensive action. Divisions that were mobilized later were deficient in organization, combat experience, personnel, equipment and training. For the invasion in the west, 135 divisions were allocated to three army groups (Heeresgruppen) lettered A, B and C, and the OKH reserve. To the north, opposite Holland and northern Belgium was Heeresgruppe B commanded by Gen.Obst. von Bock with two armies totalling 29 divisions. In the centre, opposite central Belgium, was Heeresgruppe A commanded by Gen.Obst. von Rundstedt. As the campaign’s main effort, it had 45 divisions organized into four armies, one of which was Panzergruppe Kleist. To the south, along the Franco-German border was Heeresgruppe C commanded by Gen.Obst. von Leeb. In general, the best divisions were assigned to Heeresgruppe A, then Heeresgruppe B. With 16 divisions, most of which were reserve units with inferior equipment, Heeresgruppe C was by far the weakest army group. The infantry regiment was the foundation for operations. However, infantry alone could rarely seize permanent fortifications. A successful attack required reinforcement by combat engineers equipped with explosives and sometimes flame-throwers, supported by heavy artillery and dive-bombers. Organic to infantry regiments of first-wave infantry divisions were 37mm anti-tank guns, 50mm and 80mm mortars, and 75mm and 150mm infantry guns, all which had limited effectiveness against reinforced concrete and armoured cupolas. Heavier firepower came from the divisional artillery regiment, which possessed 105mm and possibly 150mm howitzers. The regiments of better-equipped divisions also had organic 20mm or 37mm anti-aircraft guns, or Flak (German abbreviation for Flugabwehrkanone), which were well suited to suppressive fire against fortifications. In most cases, infantry regiments of divisions created in 1939 and later – typically, those that attacked the Maginot Line proper – were without many of these weapons. These units had only older-model or smaller-calibre artillery, such as 105mm howitzers, and no anti-aircraft guns. 20
For more firepower, infantry regiments were reinforced by artillery from corps or higher headquarters. Army corps had heavy artillery up to 210mm, but even these pieces were not sufficient to destroy the main Maginot fortifications, which were designed to withstand indirect fire up to 400mm. However, the 210mm howitzer could suppress the turrets and cupolas of the fortresses and destroy smaller blockhouses and shelters. Against the rear and sides of the Maginot Line combat blocks and casemates, direct fire from 105mm and 150mm artillery pieces was moderately effective. To defeat the fortresses of the Maginot Line, the OKH thought it needed siege artillery. In the mid-1930s as the Maginot Line proper reached completion, the development and production of siege artillery was ordered. Two weapon systems designed specifically with the Maginot Line in mind were the 600mm Mörser Karl (Gerät 040) heavy self-propelled mortars and the 800mm K (E), or ‘schwere Gustav’ (Heavy Gustav) railway guns, both of which were not ready in time for the French campaign. Yet, at the time of the offensive in the west, the Wehrmacht had longrange railway artillery ranging from 150mm to 280mm calibre, one 420mm Krupp howitzer (Gamma) reassembled from World War I era parts, as well as several 305mm howitzers and a World War I-vintage 420mm howitzer from Skoda in Czechoslovakia. A new addition was the German 355mm howitzer M1 built by Rheinmetall that had a longer range than the older 420mm howitzer. These siege artillery pieces were allocated to all three army groups, but initially weighted to Heeresgruppe B, which was planned to encounter the Belgian fortifications in the first days of the campaign. Later, this artillery was used against the Maginot Line.
Siege artillery proved ineffective against the Maginot fortresses, which were specifically designed to withstand bombardment from artillery up to 420mm in calibre. Here, the only Czech Skoda 420mm howitzer remaining from World War I is emplaced near Oberotterbach from where it shelled Fortress Schoenenbourg. (M. Romanych)
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ORDERS OF BATTLE French order of battle Fortress and interval units, 10 May 1940
Army group
Army
Interval unit
Fortress unit
Groupe d’armées 1
7e Armée
Secteur fortifié de Flandres: I Groupe (-)/161e RAP
British Expeditionary Force
Secteur fortifié de Lille: No assigned fortress troops
1ère Armée
Secteur fortifié d’Escaut: 54e RIF, I Groupe (-)/161e RAP
Secteur fortifié de Maubeuge: 101e Division d’infanterie de forteresse (84e RIF, 87e RIF, II & III Groupe/161e RAP)
9e Armée
2e Armée
Groupe d’armées 2
3e Armée
4e Armée
5e Armée
22
Secteur fortifié d’Ardennes: 41e Corps d’armée de forteresse, 102e Division d’infanterie de forteresse (42e DBMC, 52e DBMC, 148e RIF, 160e RAP)
10e Corps d’armée 55e Division d’infanterie 3e Division d’infanterie Nord Africaine
Secteur fortifié de Montmédy (Sedan to Mouzon): 136e RIF, 147e RIF
18e Corps d’armée 3e Division d’infanterie coloniale 41e Division d’infanterie
Secteur fortifié de Montmédy (Montmédy to Marville): 155e RIF, 132e RIF, 99e RAMF, I Groupe/169e RAP
24e Corps d’armée 51e Division d’infanterie 58e Division d’infanterie 20e Division d’infanterie
Secteur fortifié de la Crusnes: 42e Corps d’armée de forteresse (128e RIF, 139e RIF, 149e RIF, 46e RAMF, I Groupe/152e RAP)
Corps d’armée coloniale 56e Division d’infanterie 2e Division d’Infanterie British 51st (Highland) Division
Secteur fortifié de Thionville: 164e RIF, 167e RIF, 168e RIF, 169e RIF, 70e RAMF, 151e RAP
6e Corps d’armée 42e Division d’infanterie 26e Division d’infanterie
Secteur fortifié de Boulay: 160e RIF, 161e RIF, 162e RIF, 164e RIF, 23e RAMF, 153e RAP
9e Corps d’armée 47e Division d’infanterie 11e Division d’infanterie
Secteur fortifié de Faulquemont: 146e RIF, 156e RIF, 163e RAP
20e Corps d’armée 82e Division d’infanterie Alpine 52e Division d’infanterie
Secteur fortifié de la Sarre: 41e RMIC, 51e RMIC, 133e RIF, 69e RMIF, 82e RMIF, 174e RMIF, 49e RAMF, 166e RAP
8e Corps d’armée 24e Division d’infanterie 31e Division d’infanterie
Secteur fortifié de Rohrbach: 133e RIF, 153e RIF, 166e RIF, 59e RAMF, 150e RAP
Army group
Groupe d’armées 3
Army
8e Armée
Interval unit
Fortress unit
30e Division d’infanterie
Secteur fortifié des Vosges: 43e Corps d’armée de forteresse (37e RIF, 154e RIF, 156e RIF, 165e RIF, 60e RAMF, 168e RAP)
12e Corps d’armée 70e Division d’infanterie 16e Division d’infanterie
Secteur fortifié de Haguenau: 22e RIF, 23e RIF, 68e RIF, 70e RIF, 79e RIF, 69e RAMF, 156e RAP
17e Corps d’armée 62e Division d’infanterie
Secteur fortifié du Bas-Rhin: 103e Division d’infanterie de forteresse (34e RIF, 172e RIF, 237e RI, 155e RAP)
13e Corps d’armée 54e Division d’infanterie
Secteur fortifié de Colmar: 104e Division d’infanterie de forteresse (28e RIF, 42e RIF, 242e RI, I Groupe/170e RAP)
Secteur fortifié de Mulhouse: 105e Division d’infanterie de forteresse (10e RIF, II Groupe/159e RAP)
44e Corps d’armée de forteresse 67e Division d’infanterie
Secteur fortifié d’Altkirch: 12e RIF, 171e RIF, III & IV Groupe/159e RAP
Fortress and interval units, 5 June 1940
Army group
Army
Interval unit
Fortress unit
Groupe d’armées 2
2e Armée
18e Corps d’armée 3e Division d’infanterie coloniale 3e Division d’infanterie Nord Africaine 41e Division d’infanterie
Secteur fortifié de Montmédy (Montmédy to Marville): 155e RIF, 132e RIF, 99e RAMF, I Groupe/169e RAP
3e Armée
42e Corps d’armée de forteresse 20e Division d’infanterie 51e Division d’infanterie 58e Division d’infanterie
Secteur fortifié de la Crusnes: 128e RIF, 139e RIF, 149e RIF, 46e RAMF, I Groupe/152e RAP
6e Corps d’armée 26e Division d’infanterie 56e Division d’infanterie
Secteur fortifié de Thionville: 164e RIF, 167e RIF, 168e RIF, 169e RIF, 70e RAMF, 151e RAP
Secteur fortifié de Boulay: 160e RIF, 161e RIF, 162e RIF, 164e RIF, 23e RAMF, 153e RAP
20e Corps d’armée
52e Division d’infanterie 1ère Division de grenadiers Polonais
Secteur fortifié de Faulquemont: 146e RIF, 156e RIF, 163e RAP
Secteur fortifié de la Sarre: 41e RMIC, 51e RMIC, 133e RIF, 69e RMIF, 82e RMIF, 174e RMIF, 49e RAMF, 166e RAP
5e Armée
43e Corps d’armée de forteresse 30e Division d’infanterie
Secteur fortifié de Rohrbach: 133e RIF, 153e RIF, 166e RIF, 59e RAMF, 150e RAP
Secteur fortifié des Vosges: 37e RIF, 154e RIF, 156e RIF, 165e RIF, 60e RAMF, 168e RAP
23
Army group
Army
8e Armée
Interval unit
Fortress unit
12e Corps d’armée 70e Division d’Infanterie
Secteur fortifié de Haguenau: 22e RIF, 23e RIF, 68e RIF, 70e RIF, 79e RIF, 69e RAMF, 156e RAP
62e Division d’infanterie
Secteur fortifié du Bas-Rhin: 103e Division d’infanterie de forteresse (34e RIF, 172e RIF, 237e RI, 155e RAP)
13e Corps d’armée 54e Division d’infanterie
Secteur fortifié de Colmar: 104e Division d’infanterie de forteresse (28e RIF, 42e RIF, 242e RI, I Groupe/170e RAP)
Secteur fortifié de Mulhouse: 105e Division d’infanterie de forteresse (10e RIF, II Groupe/159e RAP)
44e Corps d’armée de forteresse 67e Division d’infanterie
Secteur fortifié d’Altkirch: 12e RIF, 171e RIF, III & IV Groupe/159e RAP
German order of battle Forces engaged in combat against the Maginot Line, 10 May to 4 June 1940 (Fall Gelb):
Army group
Army
Corps
Division
Location of combat action
Heeresgruppe B
AOK 6
XXVII AK
253. Infanterie-Division 217. Infanterie-Division 269. Infanterie-Division
Escaut
Heeresgruppe A
AOK 4
VIII AK
8. Infanterie-Division 28. Infanterie-Division
Maubeuge
XV AK (mot.)
5. Panzer-Division 7. Panzer-Division
Panzergruppe Kleist
AOK 16
24
Solre-le-Château
II AK
12. Infanterie-Division 32. Infanterie-Division
Trélon and Anor
XXXXI AK (mot.)
6. Panzer- Division 8. Panzer- Division
Monthermé and Nouzonville
XIX AK (mot.)
1. Panzer-Division 2. Panzer-Division 10. Panzer- Division
Sedan
VII AK
36. Infanterie-Division 68. Infanterie-Division 71. Infanterie-Division
La Ferté
XIII AK
15. Infanterie-Division 17. Infanterie-Division
Montmédy to Longwy
XXIII AK
34. Infanterie-Division 58. Infanterie-Division 73. Infanterie-Division 76. Infanterie-Division
Longwy to Moselle
Army group
Heeresgruppe C
Army
AOK 1
AOK 7
Corps
Division
Location of combat action
XXXVI AK
169. Infanterie-Division 183. Infanterie-Division 212. Infanterie-Division
Longwy
XXX AK
79. Infanterie-Division 93. Infanterie-Division 95. Infanterie-Division
Sarre
XII AK
60. Infanterie-Division 75. Infanterie-Division 258. Infanterie-Division
Sarre (Operation Fackel)
XXIV AK
252. Infanterie-Division 257. Infanterie-Division 268. Infanterie-Division 262. Infanterie-Division
Sarre, Rohrbach and Vosges
XXXVII AK
215. Infanterie-Division 246. Infanterie-Division
Vosges and Haguenau
XXV AK
555. Infanterie-Division 557. Infanterie-Division
Bas Rhin
Höheres Kommando XXXIII
554. Infanterie-Division 556. Infanterie-Division
Colmar and Mulhouse
Forces engaged in combat against the Maginot Line, 5–25 June 1940 (Fall Rot)
Army group
Army
Corps
Division
Location of combat action
Heeresgruppe A
AOK 16
Höheres Kommando XXXI
161. Infanterie-Division 162. Infanterie-Division 183. Infanterie-Division
Crusnes and Thionville
Heeresgruppe C
AOK 1
Höheres Kommando XXXXV
95. Infanterie-Division 167. Infanterie-Division
Boulay and Faulquemont
XXX AK
79. Infanterie-Division 93. Infanterie-Division 258. Infanterie-Division
Sarre (Operation Tiger)
XII AK
75. Infanterie-Division 268. Infanterie-Division
Sarre (Operation Tiger)
XXIV AK
60. Infanterie-Division 252. Infanterie-Division
Sarre (Operation Tiger)
Höheres Kommando XXXVII
215. Infanterie-Division 246. Infanterie-Division 257. Infanterie-Division 262. Infanterie-Division
Sarre, Rohrbach, Vosges, and Haguenau
25
Army group
Army
Corps
Division
Location of combat action
AOK 7
XXV AK
555. Infanterie-Division 557. Infanterie-Division
Colmar (Operation Kleiner Bär)
XXVII AK
218. Infanterie-Division 221. Infanterie-Division 239. Infanterie-Division
Colmar (Operation Kleiner Bär)
Höheres Kommando XXXIII
554. Infanterie-Division 556. Infanterie-Division
Colmar (Operation Kleiner Bär)
The weapon that proved most devastating to fortifications was the 88mm gun. Designed as a dual-purpose, anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapon, the 88’s high-velocity gun was very effective against the armoured turrets and cupolas and reinforced concrete structures of permanent fortifications. Without the 88mm gun, German assaults against the Maginot Line would have been much more costly. The anti-aircraft version was distributed to Luftwaffe Flak regiments (22 88mm guns each) and Army independent anti-aircraft battalions (12 88mm guns each). The anti-tank version was allocated to schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilungen (heavy anti-tank battalions). During Fall Gelb, the preponderance of 88mm guns were assigned to Heeresgruppe A and B, which were each allocated a Flakkorps (anti-aircraft corps) of three regiments. Furthermore, two schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilungen – 8 and 525 – were assigned to Heeresgruppe A. Heeresgruppe C had only a few Luftwaffe 88mm Flak batteries. However, during Fall Rot several additional Luftwaffe anti-aircraft batteries and schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 525 were reassigned to support Heeresgruppe C’s attacks against the Maginot Line. Air support to the infantry was primarily provided by Ju 87 Stuka aircraft assigned to two Luftflotte (air fleets) formed for the campaign. Luftflotte 2 (IV, VIII Fliegerkorps, II Flakkorps) supported Heeresgruppe B while Luftflotte 3 (I, II, V Fliegerkorps, I Flakkorps) supported both Heeresgruppe A and C. Together, Luftflotte 2 and 3 had three Stuka-Geschwader (divebomber wings) totalling some 360 Ju 87s. As the campaign progressed, the dive-bombers were allocated as needed to support ground operations. Most attacks against the Maginot line were supported by Stukas, which when carrying 500kg bombs were devastating against the open positions of interval artillery, but generally ineffective against concrete fortifications.
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OPPOSING PLANS The Maginot Line figured prominently in both French and German operational plans. The French plan relied on the Maginot Line proper to secure the right wing of the front while mobile forces of the left wing advanced in Belgium. For its part, OKH believed attacks against the line would end in a stalemate.
FRENCH The GQG expected the Germans to attack with a variant of the Schlieffen Plan used in World War I. To counter the German offensive, Gén. Gamelin devised the Dyle plan. In this plan, Groupe d’armées 1 was to vacate its border fortifications and move forwards and engage advancing German forces in central Belgium. Meanwhile, Groupes d’armées 1 and 2 would remain static, holding the Maginot Line along the German frontier and, in the case of Groupe d’armées 3, be prepared to oppose a German attack through Switzerland. The Maginot Line supported the Dyle plan by securing the Franco-German frontier while the army’s best divisions massed on the left flank under the Groupe d’armées 1. To the detriment of the plan, the French Army distributed the field army evenly along the north-east front. In spite of the security provided by the Maginot Line proper and the Rhine River, more than half the French field divisions were located away from the Allied main effort, directly contradicting the idea that the Maginot fortifications would conserve manpower. The French Army’s defensive posture affected the entire French strategy. At no time was an invasion of Germany intended. Large-scale offensive action was left as a vague possibility to be considered once Groupe d’armées 1 stopped the German invading force. In addition, no cross-border attacks were planned for the 20 field divisions of Groupes d’armées 2 and 3 When the 1ère Armée advanced into Belgium, the fortifications on the Belgian border did not lose their purpose. Eight fortress regiments, equivalent in strength to two field divisions, remained in place to provide a line of defence for Groupe d’armées 1 to reoccupy if operations in Belgium failed. Had Groupe d’armées 1 remained in its fortifications, the German main attack would have advanced straight into an entrenched defence, possibly changing the outcome of the campaign. The linchpin of the Dyle plan was at Sedan. West and north of the city was the mobile wing of Groupe d’armées 1. To the east were the powerful fortifications of the Maginot Line proper. Because the German main effort 27
French gunners at Fortress Hackenberg training on a 75mm gun. Surrounded by artillery rounds (45 in the crate on the left and 600 in the racks on the right), four soldiers operate the gun while two soldiers prepare the rounds for firing. The section sergeant, standing on the left, supervises the crew. (NARA)
was not expected in the Ardennes, Sedan was defended only by a couple of infantry divisions belonging to the 2e and 9e Armées. This oversight ignored Sedan’s importance and was a miscalculation that played right into the German plan. Without adequate reserves or fortifications to stiffen the French defence, the German Heeresgruppe A was able to achieve overwhelming combat power as it emerged from the Ardennes Forest.
GERMAN Planning for Fall Gelb began in October 1939 upon conclusion of the Polish campaign. The final version of the plan was issued in late February 1940. During the planning process, the OKH considered two large-scale offensives against the Maginot Line proper. Fall Grün was a plan for an attack in the Sarre region by 51 infantry divisions and a combination of six Panzer and motorized divisions, supported by 22 infantry divisions crossing the Rhine River in the Strasbourg and Colmar areas. Another plan, Fall Braun, called for an attack across the Rhine by 44 infantry divisions supported by a secondary attack in the Sarre region. As the Fall Gelb plan matured, the OKH placed the weight of the offensive at the centre of the front and these two offensive options were scaled back to smaller operations. The final plan avoided the Allies’ two main strengths – the mobile forces in Belgium and fortresses of the Maginot Line in Alsace and Lorraine. In the north, the mission of Heeresgruppe B, with 29 divisions, was to defeat the Dutch Army in Holland and, more importantly, draw French and British forces into central Belgium. In the centre, Heeresgruppe A with 45 divisions was the main effort. Spearheaded by Panzer forces of AOK 4 and 12, the army group was to advance through the Ardennes and break through the Allied front at Sedan and Dinant. Heeresgruppe A’s attack was to fall upon the weakest part of the entire Allied front; sectors held mainly by second-rate reserve divisions of the French 2e and 9e Armées. After the 28
The Wehrmacht trained its infantry and combat engineers to attack fortifications by using mock blockhouses or West Wall bunkers such as this one near Saarbrücken. Here, the German soldiers are using shallow craters and an armoured cupola for cover as they conduct the assault. (NARA)
breakthrough, Heeresgruppe A was to advance to the Channel coast and isolate the Allied forces in Belgium and northern France. The OKH thought the greatest threat to Heeresgruppe A came from the western wing of the Maginot Line proper. It foresaw a possibility that French forces from the Région fortifiée de Metz might counterattack into the left flank of Heeresgruppe A. Armeeoberkommando 16 was assigned the mission of protecting Heeresgruppe A’s southern flank from such an attack. Positioned opposite the main Maginot fortifications, Heeresgruppe C was ordered to hold French forces in the Maginot Line proper away from Heeresgruppe A’s attack and to defend against a French attack into the Saarland. With 16 divisions, Heeresgruppe C’s strength was weak. In contrast, the French Groupes d’armées 2 and 3 opposite Heeresgruppe C had 46 divisions. An important element of Fall Gelb was two deception operations. One was conducted by Heeresgruppe B to draw Allied armies north into Belgium, the other by Heeresgruppe C to fix divisions of the French Groupe d’armées 2 along the German border. For Heeresgruppe C, this required a series of limited attacks into northern Alsace and Lorraine. 29
The OKH knew that in order to defeat France, the Wehrmacht had to breach the French fortified positions somewhere along the Belgian border or in Alsace and Lorraine. It also understood the difficulty of attacking the fortifications and prepared well in advance of Fall Gelb. For years, German intelligence actively collected information on the Maginot Line and after the occupation of Czechoslovakia the Wehrmacht studied Czech fortifications that were modelled after the Maginot Line. Then, during the lead-up to the invasion, tactics were tested and trained on mock blockhouses located on training areas in Germany. To attack permanent fortifications, the Wehrmacht developed tactics based on combat groups of infantry and combat engineers, supported by artillery and dive-bombers. Typically, the attack was preceded by a concentrated aerial and artillery bombardment. The purpose of the bombardment was to destroy obstacles and minefields and crater the area so the assault troops would have cover and firing positions. Artillery fires then shifted and added smoke rounds to isolate adjacent fortified works and neutralize enemy artillery by counterbattery fire. Under the protection of this bombardment the assault team would move in. Anti-tank guns also covered the advance of the assault team by direct fire against the fortification’s embrasures. Once close enough, the infantry occupied the terrain immediately surrounding the fortification and fired on the embrasures with rifles and machine guns. Meanwhile, engineers armed with explosives and flame-throwers moved forwards to attack weak points such as embrasures, cupolas, turrets and doors. This method was used during several attacks against the Maginot Line. On 31 May as Fall Gelb concluded, the OKH issued the order for Fall Rot, the invasion of France. The order called for Heeresgruppe A, again the main effort, to attack south-eastwards towards Reims and beyond, enveloping the French forces in Alsace and Lorraine. Heeresgruppe B to the west was assigned a supporting attack in the direction of Rouen and Le Havre. Heeresgruppe C, again in a supporting role, conducted attacks to break through the Maginot Line in the Sarre River Valley and Upper Rhine. As envisioned by the primary architect of the German campaign plan, Generalleutnant Erich von Manstein, the offensive into France proper forced the French Army into ‘a battle in the rear of the Maginot Line with the fronts reversed’. Under these circumstances, the Maginot Line would fight its greatest battles.
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THE CAMPAIGN
FALL GELB: THE OPENING MOVES On the morning of 10 May, the Wehrmacht launched its offensive. In response, the French Groupe d’armées 1 moved from its entrenched positions along the Belgian border to the Dyle Line. Left behind was a skeletal force of fortress units manning the border fortifications from Sedan and Lille. Further east, along the Meuse River, the French 55e Division d’infanterie and 102e Division d’infanterie forteresse remained in place, holding the front line between the mobile forces of Groupe d’armées 1 and the defences of the Maginot Line proper. Within hours of the invasion, the French 2e and 3e Armées moved a cavalry screen consisting of the 2e, 3e, and 5e Divisions de cavalerie légère (light cavalry divisions) into Luxembourg and Belgium opposite the Maginot Line. The light cavalry divisions quickly made contact with the southern flank of Guderian’s XIX AK (mot.) and the infantry of AOK 16, but after several engagements withdrew back towards France. Unable to reinforce the light cavalry divisions with infantry and artillery, Géns. Billotte and Prételat missed an opportunity to disrupt Heeresgruppe A’s advance through the Ardennes. As Heeresgruppe A headed west, AOK 16’s XXIII AK marched into southern Luxembourg taking up defensive positions along the French border from the Moselle River to Longwy. XIII AK followed and progressively extended the front further towards Montmédy. Anticipating a French counteroffensive from the western wing of the Maginot Line, AOK 16’s infantry divisions aggressively pushed French units away from the border and seized key defensive terrain. A key victory for AOK 16 was the battle for the Longwy salient. Located near where the Luxembourg, Belgian and French borders met, the salient with its field fortifications and blockhouses provided a base for the French Groupe d’armées 2 to launch an attack into the flank of Guderian’s XIX AK (mot.). On May 12, XIII AK attacked positions manned by the French 51e and 58e Divisions d’infanterie. After a day of heavy combat, the French infantry withdrew on 13 May under the cover of artillery from Fortresses Fermont and Latiremont, ending the second possibility of a French counteroffensive into the flank of Heeresgruppe A. From 12 to 15 May, Heeresgruppe C’s AOK I conducted a series of feints to fix French interval troops in place along the Franco-German border. From the Moselle River to the Vosges Mountains, XXX, XII and XXIV AK crossed the border and attacked French advanced posts. All but one feint consisted of battalion-sized infantry actions supported by heavy artillery. When attacked, 31
A PzKpfw I of the 1. PanzerDivision passes Blockhouse Bellevue west of Sedan. Manning weak and unfinished fortifications, the poorly trained and equipped French 55e Division d’infanterie could not stand up to the speed and firepower of Guderian’s XIX AK (mot.). (M. Romanych)
32
French units resisted stubbornly and then withdrew under the cover of the fortress artillery. From the German perspective, the feints were successful, except for two attacks by XXX AK east of Metz that resulted in about 100 German dead. The largest feint, Operation Fackel, was a three-division offensive conducted by XII AK in the Sarre region. Supported by heavy artillery, including long-range railway guns, the offensive began on 12 May with an intense 15-minute artillery barrage. Achieving complete surprise, the 258., 60. and 75. Infanterie-Divisionen quickly advanced against light resistance from the French 11e Division d’infanterie and 82e Division d’infanterie Algérienne, taking all objectives within four hours. However, several bypassed French strongpoints fought valiantly until reduced by follow-on units, which, in one case took three days. In response, Groupe d’armées 2 withdrew all its forward troops from the border to positions just forward of the Maginot Line. By 15 May, AOK 1 ended the attacks and combat action settled into skirmishes and occasional artillery fire. In total, according to AOK 1, 380 German soldiers were killed between 12 and 15 May, and approximately 1,350 French prisoners were taken. French losses are unknown. Several commanders in Groupe d’armées 2 thought AOK 1’s attacks were indicators of an impending offensive into northern Alsace and Lorraine; however, Gén. Prételat saw the action for what it was – limited attacks designed to attract French attention. However, feeling the pressure of the German attacks, Gén. Prételat held his 36 field divisions in place on the Maginot Line proper. Not until the sixth day of the invasion, 15 May, did any divisions of Groupe d’armées 2 move west towards Sedan. By then it was too little, too late; German Panzers had broken through at Sedan.
OVERRUN OF THE ARDENNES DEFENCES On 13 May, Heeresgruppe A’s XIX and XXXXI AK (mot.) attacked French positions along the Meuse River near Sedan and Monthermé. Both Panzer corps achieved absolute surprise against the French 2e Armée. Defending at Sedan was the 10e Corps d’armée’s 55e Division d’infanterie, a second-line reserve division with three regiments – the 295e and 331e RI, and 147e RIF. The backbone of the division’s defence was nine large concrete blockhouses manned by the 147e RIF reinforced by small concrete blockhouses, earthworks and barbed-wire entanglements positioned along the south bank of the Meuse River. Believing permanent defences would compensate for shortcomings in training and equipment, the divisional commander emphasized the construction of fortifications rather than training. However, because the 10e Corps d’armée commander’s priority of construction went to defences further east along the Chiers River, most blockhouses at Sedan were unfinished and lacking in armament. These two opposing decisions left the 55e Division d’infanterie completely unprepared for battle. Four hours of aerial bombing against the 55e Division d’infanterie’s principal defensive line and rear areas preceded the German attack. Despite its overwhelming intensity, the aerial bombardment neither significantly damaged the hardened defensive positions nor caused many casualties – few blockhouses and artillery positions received direct hits and only 56 casualties were reported by the 55e Division d’infanterie. But the bombing was psychologically devastating, rendering the division incapable of mounting a coherent defence. The battle was an infantry and artillery action. Late in the day, infantry and combat engineer assault teams of the 1., 2. and 10. Panzer-Divisionen crossed the Meuse River under the cover of Panzers, 37mm anti-tank guns, field howitzers and 88mm Flak guns firing over open sights. French artillery fire temporarily disrupted the river-crossing operations, but once across the river German assault teams quickly took the French defensive line. Although there were several instances of fierce close combat, most French troops broke and fled from their positions. By midnight, the battle was decided and Guderian’s Panzers were crossing the Meuse.
French prisoners of war march past Blockhouse Paquis-desCailles, which overlooked the crossing site of the 2. PanzerDivision west of Sedan. The blockhouse was heavily damaged by direct fire from Panzers and anti-aircraft guns directed at the blockhouse’s vision slit. (M. Romanych)
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Sa
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mb
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10 miles
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Rethel
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53
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Monthermé
102
Rocroi
61
XXX
Phillipeville
1
XX
Givet
XX
Nouzonville
18
XX
5
XX
2
3
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71
18
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58
Longwy
XX
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XXIII
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XX
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XXX
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Bastogne
29
XX
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XVII
XXX
Casemate line Blockhouse line Fortress Fort
m
French movements, 15–16 May
German advance, 13–14 May German advance, 15–16 May
German front line, 12 May German front line, 14 May German front line, 16 May
Longuyon 51
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Meuse
CharlevilleMézières
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Hirson
Anor
Trélon
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Solre-le-Château
Bo ies e ill gn rs lma e B Sa Maubeuge La
ts
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Overrun of the Ardennes defences, 12–16 May 1940
The light defences of the 84e RIF were no match for the 7. Panzer-Division. This photograph from the Rommel collection at the US National Archives shows a section of fortifications near Solre-leChâteau: a narrow anti-tank ditch backed up by three rows of barbed-wire entanglements with a small concrete blockhouse in the distance. (NARA)
Further north, the 6. and 8. Panzer-Divisionen of Reinhardt’s XXXXI AK (mot.) crossed the Meuse at Monthermé and Nouzonville against regular troops of the 102e Division d’infanterie forteresse. Here too, the defences were weak and incomplete; however, in contrast to the 55e Division d’infanterie, the well-trained troops of 102e Division d’infanterie forteresse fought tenaciously, conducting a stubborn defence that delayed the Panzers’ advance for two days. Finally, on 15 May, Reinhardt’s XXXXI AK (mot.) broke out of its bridgehead and overran the remainder of the 102e Division d’infanterie forteresse and units of the 41e Corps d’armée de forteresse, which lacked the transport needed to withdraw from the Meuse River. Meanwhile, during the night of 12–13 May, the 5. and 7. Panzer-Divisionen of Hoth’s XV AK (mot.) crossed the Meuse in Belgium near Dinant, pierced the French line held by the 2e and 11e Corps d’armée, and then rapidly advanced to the French border east of Maubeuge. Entrenched along the border were troops of the 101e Division d’infanterie forteresse’s 84e RIF, who stayed behind when the 1ère and 9e Armées advanced into Belgium. The 84e RIF, equipped with machine guns and light anti-tank guns, was occupying two lines of blockhouses, each spaced about 1,000m (3,280ft) apart. In between the blockhouses were anti-tank ditches and belts of barbed wire backed up by earthworks for the interval troops. But now, lacking infantry and artillery, the 84e RIF’s defence lacked the density and depth needed to face an attack by mechanized forces of XV AK (mot.) On 16 May, in a daring night attack, Rommel’s 7. Panzer-Division penetrated the border defences near Solre-le-Château and overran the remnants of the French 2e and 11e Corps d’armée, which were retreating to a new defensive line along the Sambre River. The 84e RIF offered considerable resistance, but was overwhelmed by the Panzers’ speed and firepower. In a series of short actions, French blockhouses were engaged by infantry and engineer assaults with satchel charges and flame-throwers, while tanks and artillery fired directly into the fortifications’ embrasures. The next day the breakthrough was widened by the 5. Panzer-Division which was trailing the 7. Panzer-Division, and by the 12. and 32. Infanterie-Divisionen of II AK, which had crossed the border to the south at Trélon and Anor. Ironically, in 1934 a major Maginot Line fortress was planned for this area, but was never built because of budget cuts. 35
French defences between Montmédy and Maubeuge were now overrun and the French front was split in two. Through the breach, three Panzer corps of Heeresgruppe A headed westwards. The Allied armies in Belgium were retreating towards Dunkirk and Lille. The French 2e Armée, mauled at Sedan, was attempting to establish a new line from Montmédy to the Aisne River with a few divisions from Groupes d’armées 2 and 3. On the west shoulder of the German breakthrough was Secteur fortifié de Maubeuge; on the east shoulder was the last fort of the Maginot Line proper – La Ferté. An opportunity existed for French forces to regroup and launch a counteroffensive into the flanks of Heeresgruppe A using either Maubeuge or La Ferté as a base. However, unable to match the pace of the German operations, the GQG and the French Army could not react in a timely manner.
THE CAPTURE OF FORT LA FERTÉ As Guderian’s XIX AK (mot.) crossed the Meuse River, AOK 16’s VII AK moved in between Montmédy and Sedan blocking any possible French counterattack towards Sedan and pushing forward elements of the 2e Armée back to their fortification line along the Chiers River. In response, on 14 May, the commander of the 2e Armée, Gén. Huntziger, ordered the 3e Division d’infanterie Nord Africaine (North African infantry division) and 136e RIF to abandon the Chiers River line and establish positions further south. This withdrawal facilitated VII AK’s advance, but more importantly, exposed Fort La Ferté to attack. The next day, VII AK’s three infantry divisions crossed the Chiers River and turned the open flank of the Maginot Line proper. The 71. Infanterie-Division marched on La Ferté with orders to seize the fort, while the 36. and 68. Infanterie-Divisionen advanced west and south to cover the 71. Infanterie-Division’s attack. Fort La Ferté (known to the Germans as Panzerwerk 505) was 20km (12 miles) from Sedan on a prominent hill overlooking the Chiers River. From its position, the fort dominated the surrounding area and blocked the Chiers River Valley, which was an important route of advance for AOK 16. The blockhouse line now abandoned by the 3e Division d’infanterie Nord Africaine was to the west of Fort La Ferté. In the immediate vicinity of the fort were elements of the 3e Division d’infanterie coloniale (colonial infantry division) occupying the village of Villy and two hills – Hill 226 and 311 – that overlooked the fort. Villy was heavily fortified with numerous concrete bunkers and fighting positions. East of La Ferté were a dozen large interval casemates, the closest of which was Casemate Margut. Even further east, beyond the line of casemates, were one small fort and two fortresses of Secteur fortifié de Montmédy. As the left anchor of Maginot Line proper, Fort La Ferté had surprisingly inadequate defences. Originally planned to have three large blocks integrated into a single defensive work, during construction the fort was cut back to two combat blocks (designated Blocks 1 and 2) connected by a narrow underground tunnel. This redesign left the fort’s crew with no way to enter or exit the fort safely when under fire. Nor was the fort well armed. Block 1 had a 47mm anti-tank gun and two twin 7.5mm machine guns fixed in a field of fire to cover the eastern flank of the fort. Block 2 was equipped with the fort’s primary firepower: a retractable armoured turret armed with two 25mm guns and four 7.5mm machine guns (known as an arme mixte or AM turret). For 36
TOP The avenue of approach to Fort La Ferté used by the German assault force as viewed from the fort. In the distance is the village of Villy. Combat engineers from Pionier-Bataillon 171 followed the anti-tank obstacle belt to the fort, breached the line of barbed-wire entanglements (visible in the centre of the photograph), and then, using craters from the artillery bombardment for cover, approached Block 2. In the foreground are Block 2’s armoured cupola and turret (partially visible in the lower left corner of the photograph). (NARA) BOTTOM French Char B1bis ‘Charente’ of the 41e BCC, was put out of action near Olizy during the French attack to relieve Fort La Ferté. Two crewmembers were killed and three captured. The Germans captured the tank itself intact. (M. Romanych)
observation and close-in defence, both blocks had several fixed armoured cupolas armed with machine guns and 25mm guns sited in interlocking fields of fire. The entire fort was surrounded by barbed-wire entanglements and fronted by steel anti-tank rails that stretched across the entire sector. To withstand a deliberate attack, Fort La Ferté required artillery support from either a nearby fortress or interval troops. The closest fortress artillery was Fortress Chesnois’, 75mm turret. However, because La Ferté was located at the limit of the guns’ maximum effective range, Chesnois’ artillery could hit the area east of the fort, but not the west side now exposed to the German 71. Infanterie-Division. Recognizing the need for additional artillery, the French Army built two artillery blockhouses adjacent to the fort. Each was armed with a 75mm field gun sited to fire to the east and west flanks of the fort. The crew of Fort La Ferté consisted of three officers, 15 non-commissioned officers and 89 soldiers of the 155e RIF, under the command of Lieutenant Maurice Bourguignon. The adjacent artillery blockhouses were manned by soldiers of the 169e RAP, who were not under the command of Lt. Bourguignon. Defending Villy and the area west of La Ferté was yet a third command, the 23e RIC, reinforced by machine-gun sections from the 37
GERMAN UNITS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Infanterie-Regiment 194 III. Bataillon, Infanterie-Regiment 191 I. Bataillon, Infanterie-Regiment 191 II. Bataillon, Infanterie-Regiment 211 III. Bataillon, Infanterie-Regiment 211 Pionier-Bataillon 171 with two companies from II./IR 221
4
5
2
3 MALANDRY 3 HILL 226
5 HILL 311 C 8
OLIZY-SUR-CHIERS E F
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EVENTS 1 Midday, 16 June: the Germans start the battle with a diversionary attack near the town of Margut and artillery shelling of the town of Villy and Fort La Ferté.
6
LUCIEN XXX
18
2 Afternoon, 16 June: the German advance on Villy is stopped by anti-tank and machine-gun fire from French infantry in hardened strongpoints.
DOYEN
3 Afternoon, 16 June: in a hard fight, German infantry dislodge French infantry from Hill 226. 4 1000–1300hrs, 17 June: two more attacks by German infantry fail to take Villy. Now exhausted, III./IR 191 is replaced by newly arrived II./IR 211. 5 1700hrs, 17 June: German infantry attack a dug-in French infantry company on Hill 311. After several hours of artillery fire and close combat, the French withdraw. 6 Morning and afternoon, 18 June: German infantry reinforced by combat engineers take Villy after an entire day of close combat. 7 1800–2400hrs, 18 June: after an artillery barrage on Fort La Ferté, a detachment of German combat engineers with two companies of infantry assault and seize Fort La Ferté. Infantry from Hill 226 support by blocking approaches to the fort.
8 Evening, 18 June: a counterattack by a battalion of French infantry supported by six Char B1bis tanks fails to retake Hill 311. 9 Evening, 18 June: a battalion of French infantry supported by seven Char B1bis tanks attempts to relieve Fort La Ferté and recapture Villy. The advance is stopped by German artillery fire. 10 Early hours, 19 June: the crew of Fort La Ferté is killed by toxic fumes and smoke inside the fort .
BATTLE FOR FORT LA FERTÉ: 16–19 MAY 1940 In a three-day battle, the German 71. Infanterie-Division attacks and seizes the westernmost fortification of the Maginot Line proper. 38
B
Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 1km/1093yds
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FRENCH UNITS A One company of I Bataillon, 23e Regiment d’infanterie coloniale and a machine-gun section of 155e Régiment d‘infanterie de forteresse B Remainder of I Batallion, 23e Regiment d’infanterie coloniale C One company of III Bataillon, 23e Regiment d’infanterie coloniale D Crew of Fort La Ferté (soldiers of 155e Régiment d’infanterie de forteresse) E III Batallion, 119e Régiment d’infanterie with tanks of the 41e Bataillon de chars de combat F I Batallion, 119e Régiment d’infanterie with tanks of the 41e Bataillon de chars de combat
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Fort La Ferté’s destroyed AM turret. German combat engineers first detonated a 40kg explosive charge on the left side of the turret. When it failed to disable the turret, the engineers used a second charge to blow open the turret’s left weapon embrasure. A third explosive charge shoved through the embrasure detonated ammunition inside the fort. The resulting explosion then blew the turret off its base. (M. Romanych)
155e RIF. Each of these elements – the crew of Fort La Ferté, the soldiers of the 169e RAP and the 23e RIC – operated independently under the control of the 18e Corps d’armée. The battle for La Ferté lasted three days. Conducting the attack were Infanterie-Regimenter (IR) 191 and 211 of the 71. Infanterie-Division supported by the divisional engineer battalion and approximately 250 artillery pieces from both the division and corps artillery. Allocated to the attack were three 210mm howitzer battalions (18 guns), one 150mm battalion (eight or 12 guns), three 100mm battalions (36 guns), six heavy field artillery battalions (72 150mm guns), nine light field artillery battalions (108 105mm howitzers), and an 88mm Flak battery of four guns. This grouping of artillery produced the most concentrated bombardment of any Maginot fort during the campaign. On 16 May, the 71. Infanterie-Division moved south from the Chiers River with the objective of seizing Hill 226, one kilometre west of Fort La Ferté, and the village of Villy as jumping-off points for the attack on the fort. Artillery shelling of Villy and La Ferté began the attack as IR 194 conducted a diversion east of La Ferté near the town of Margut. Then, the main attack conducted by IR 191 came from the north-west. The III. Bataillon attacked to seize Villy but was halted by machine-gun and anti-tank fire from the French infantry entrenched in the town. About a kilometre to the south, I. Battalion attacked and, after hard fighting, seized Hill 226 from a battalion of the 23e RIC. This action isolated the village of Villy. The next day, 17 May, the 71. Infanterie-Division continued the attack. After a concentrated artillery barrage on Villy, III./IR 191 attacked and again failed to seize the village. After regrouping and another artillery barrage, the battalion attacked for the third time, but sustained such high losses that it had to be replaced by the II./IR 211 which had just arrived in the sector. Further south, the 71. Infanterie-Division had more success. The III./IR 211 attacked Hill 311 (two kilometres south of Fort La Ferté) defended by a dug-in infantry company from the 23e RIC. Artillery fire and close combat left both sides with heavy losses and no clear control of the hill until early the next morning when the French troops withdrew. At the same time their crews abandoned the two artillery blockhouses adjacent to La Ferté. These two withdrawals left the fort isolated and vulnerable to attack. 40
Block 2 of Fort La Ferté after its capture by the 71. InfanterieDivision. Three wooden crosses mark a mass grave for members of the fort’s crew. The text on the middle cross reads ‘Here rest unknown French soldiers.’ On the façade of the block are pockmarks from the German artillery barrage. (NARA)
On the third day, 18 May, II./IR 211 reinforced by a company of PionierBataillon 171 finally took Villy. In hard combat, the German engineers and infantry reduced French strongpoints with grenades and explosives. After holding out for almost 72 hours, the troops of the 23e RIC were finally overwhelmed by late afternoon. The village was left in ruins and the 71. Infanterie-Division was now set for the attack on La Ferté. The action at Fort La Ferté was a textbook example of a German assault against a fortified position. At 1800hrs, the three battalions of 210mm howitzers pounded Fort La Ferté with a 30-minute barrage while 150mm howitzers shelled the obstacle belt surrounding the fort. The barrage blew gaps in the barbed-wire entanglements and heavily cratered the ground. The projectiles ploughed furrows up to nine metres (30ft) long and four metres (12ft) deep, turning the area around the fort into a moonscape reminiscent of Verdun’s Fort Douaumont in 1916. Despite the intensity of the barrage, the fort itself remained undamaged, although the AM turret was jammed in a raised firing position and could no longer rotate. Under the cover of the barrage, an infantry and combat engineer assault detachment from Pionier-Bataillon 171, reinforced by part of II./IR 211 advanced from Villy to the heights of Fort La Ferté. Meanwhile, infantry from IR 191 and 211 closed in on the fort from the west and south, occupying the two abandoned artillery blockhouses. As the Germans advanced on La Ferté, the French 6e Division d’infanterie attempted to relieve the fort. Two battalions of 119e RI supported by 13 Char B1bis tanks of the 41e Bataillon de chars de combat (tank battalion, or BCC) attacked German positions on Hill 311 and advanced on La Ferté. Both attacks failed. French troops got within a kilometre of the fort but were halted after several tanks were put out of action and German artillery inflicted high casualties. By 1900hrs, German assault troops were in position near Fort La Ferté. The artillery shifted fire to adjacent fortified works and began counterbattery fire. Smoke shells were included in the artillery fire to blind Casemate Margut and nearby French observation points. As a result, throughout the attack Fortress Chesnois’s artillery fired heavy but ineffective support. 41
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THE ASSAULT ON FORT LA FERTÉ, 18 MAY 1940 (pp. 42–43) The capture of Fort La Ferté was a textbook assault on a fortified position. The attack began with a concentrated artillery barrage that blew gaps in the fort’s obstacle belts and cratered the ground around the fort (1). Despite its intensity, the barrage did not seriously damage the fort, although its primary weapon – an AM turret – was jammed in a raised firing position, facing to the rear of the fort. As the artillery barrage lifted, a detachment of German combat engineers led by Oberleutnant Alfred Germer, carefully approached Block 2 as 88mm Flak provided suppressive fire against the fort’s armoured cupolas and turret. Using craters for cover, the Germer’s engineers worked their way to the top of the block and began systematically putting the cupolas out of action with explosive charges. After the first cupola was disabled (2), the engineers detonated 40kg of explosive charges against the side of the turret. Although the explosion was tremendous, it failed to destroy the turret. Next, a six-kilogram charge was used to blow open one of the turret’s weapons embrasures; followed by a nine-kilogram charge shoved through the opening, into the interior of turret.
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The explosion from that charge, along with secondary detonation of ammunition inside the block, ripped the turret off its base and lifted it into the air (3). The turret then crashed back on its base and landed canted to one side. The engineers then threw several more explosive and smoke charges into the opening at the base of the turret, as well as the block’s other armoured cupolas, starting several fires inside the combat block. Smoke from fires caused the French commander, Lieutenant Bourguignon, to order the fort’s crew to seek shelter far below ground in the connecting corridor between Blocks 1 and 2. Shortly thereafter, once night fell, OBLt. Germer’s detachment attacked the fort’s other combat block in a similar manner, disabling its five armoured cupolas and setting a fire inside Block 1. Refusing to surrender, all 105 members of La Ferté’s crew perished, asphyxiated by fumes from the fires raging in the upper stories of the fort’s two combat blocks. German casualties were few. For his leadership during the attack, OBLt. Germer, was awarded the Knight’s Cross.
The 88mm Flak guns, emplaced about two kilometres (one mile) away, opened fire on the cupolas and turret of Block 2. The fire was ineffective because the guns were too far away and could not penetrate the armour of the cupolas and turret, although a lucky hit on a cupola embrasure killed three French crewmen. When the 88mm Flak guns ceased firing, the assault detachment attacked Block 2. In about 10 minutes, the combat engineers systematically destroyed the block’s armoured cupolas and AM turret using explosive charges and hand grenades. The explosive charges also set fire to the interior of the block, causing the crew to seek refuge below ground in the connecting corridor. Above ground, defensive fire from Block 1 kept the German assault detachment from approaching it. At 2100hrs, a 30-minute artillery barrage was fired on the block and, in the dark, the assault detachment attacked and, using the same tactics, destroyed its four armoured cupolas. The assault detachment then blasted the weapon embrasure apart with explosives and set fire to the interior of the block. Deep inside the fort, Lt. Bourguignon and his crew waited for the order to abandon the fort. Fires were now raging inside both combat blocks and the ventilation system was unable to cope with the smoke and fumes. Knowing that the fight was lost, Lt. Bourguignon repeatedly asked for authorization to leave the fort; however, the commander of the 3e Division d’infanterie coloniale, who did not understand the gravity of the situation, refused his requests. By the next morning, the entire crew had perished of asphyxiation. Fort La Ferté was the first Maginot Line fort to fall to the Germans. Its loss stunned the GQG and the French Army. No one imagined that German forces could capture a Maginot Line fort so easily. Even though the battle for La Ferté was not crucial to the success of the campaign, for the Germans it was a big psychological victory.
BATTLE FOR THE MAUBEUGE FORTIFICATIONS Heeresgruppe A bypassed French fortifications in the Maubeuge and Lille areas until, on 16 and 17 May, infantry divisions of AOK 4 crossed the border and advanced on the city of Maubeuge. Surviving forces of the French 1ère and 9e Armées, in full retreat before the German advance, withdrew further west and established a new defensive line along the Sambre River and in Maubeuge. The 101e Division infanterie forteresse also withdrew over the river to the forts north of the city, leaving behind a company of fortress infantry to occupy four casemates south of the river. French plans in the 1930s called for construction of five major fortresses in the Maubeuge region. Ironically, two of the planned fortresses, if built, would have blocked part of Heeresgruppe A’s advance to the Channel. However, because of budget constraints, the fortresses were scaled back to a line of four small forts and seven interval casemates located north and east of the city of Maubeuge. Even so, Secteur fortifié de Maubeuge was the most heavily fortified area west of Sedan. The Maginot forts – Boussois, La Salmagne, Bersillies and Sarts – were built on the foundations of old 19th-century forts. Three of the forts had two combat blocks connected by underground tunnel. Primary armament was either an AM turret like that at Fort La Ferté (armed with two 25mm guns and four 7.5mm machine guns) or a different type of AM turret armed with a 25mm gun, a twin machine gun and a 50mm mortar (known as an arme mixte et 45
Fort Boussois fell on 11 May after five days’ bombardment and two ground assaults. This combat block – Block 2 – was put out of action by German combat engineers using explosive charges to destroy the weapons and ventilation system. (M. Romanych)
mortier de 50mm or AMmo50 turret). Either way, the turrets were sited to fire to the front and flanks of the forts. In addition there were 47mm anti-tank guns and twin 7.5mm machine guns for flanking fire along the fortification line’s obstacle belt. Each fort was surrounded by barbed-wire entanglements and a dry moat from the old 19th-century fort. The crew of each fort numbered around 100 soldiers. Fort Boussois, the largest fort and cornerstone of the French defence, was an exception. Built to block the main road from Belgium into Maubeuge, it had an additional combat block, a second armoured turret (an AMmo50) and a crew of 200. Reinforcing the forts were interval casemates, four of which – Héronfontaine, Rocq, Bois-de-Marpent Nord and Sud – had AMmo50 turrets. Linking the forts and casemates was an obstacle line with anti-tank ditches and belts of barbed wire. The Sambre River, which ran through the centre of the sector, split the defensive line into two sections. North of the river were the four forts and three interval casemates. South of the river were four casemates, three of which had AM turrets. South-west of Maubeuge was the sector’s other main fortification, a ninekilometre (six-mile) line of 13 casemates in the Mormal Forest built as a security position (position de sécurité) for field divisions of the French 1ère Armée. The remainder of the sector was protected by a thin line of blockhouses built by the French 1ère and 9e Armées along the Belgian border during the Phoney War. These blockhouses were armed with light anti-tank and machine guns. Armeeoberkommando 4 overran a large section of this line when it crossed the border on 17 May. Manning the fortifications of Secteur fortifié de Maubeuge were two regiments (five battalions) of the 101e Division d’infanterie forteresse. On the eastern side of the sector, the 84e RIF bore the brunt of the German attack. The division’s other regiment, the 87e RIF, manned fortifications in the western half of the sector. In support were several batteries of 120mm and 155mm guns of the 161e RAP. Seizure of Maubeuge was assigned to AOK 4’s VIII AK. After crossing the border, the corps split its forces to envelop the city and the fortification line. The 8. Infanterie-Division marched south of Maubeuge, crossed the Sambre River near Hautmont and advanced on the border fortifications west of the city. The 28. Infanterie-Division approached the city from the south-east and surrounded Casemates Ostergnies, Bois-de-Marpent Sud and Nord, and Rocq south of the Sambre. In preparation for the reduction of the fortifications, VIII AK’s 150mm 46
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Immediately after the French surrendered Fort Boussois, Generalleutnant Hans von Obstfelder, commander of the 28. Infanterie-Division, awarded Iron Crosses to 15 members of the assault team. Here, two of the awardees rest next to one of the fort’s combat blocks. (M. Romanych)
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and 210mm howitzers began shelling the French forts and casemates as Stukas bombed positions of the French 161e RAP. In a surprise move, lead elements of the division, along with part of the 5. Panzer-Division, crossed the Sambre River, entered Maubeuge and seized the old Vauban fortress in the city centre. To the south, AOK 4’s XV AK (mot.), crossed the Sambre and attacked into the Mormal Forest and seized several casemates. There, in the forest, a fierce four-day battle erupted between German and French mechanized and infantry divisions that ended with the destruction of two French divisions. On 19 May the 28. Infanterie-Division attacked and captured casemates Ostergnies, Bois-de-Marpent Sud and Nord, and Rocq. Taking advantage of a design flaw in which the turret guns could not fire behind the casemates, IR 83 employed artillery in direct fire against the rear of the French casemates. Firing at close range, German 37mm anti-tank guns and 88mm Flak struck the openings – entrances, weapons’ embrasures and ventilation apertures – and sometimes penetrated to the interior. By late in the day, with their weapons and ventilation systems demolished by German artillery, one after another the casemate crews of the 84e RIF surrendered. With all defences south of the Sambre River now in German hands, the 28. Infanterie-Division advanced north of the river and came under fire from Forts La Salmagne and Boussois. In return, Stukas and the 28. Infanterie-Division’s artillery bombarded Boussois and the other forts, but damage was minor. Meanwhile, west of Maubeuge, the 8. Infanterie-Division attacked and seized the border fortifications in and around the town of Bavai on 20 May, cutting Maubeuge and the 101e Division d’infanterie forteresse from the rest of the French 1ère Armée. Attacking from the rear of the fortification line, German field howitzers fired armour-piercing shells at ranges between 400 and 900m (1,312 and 2,953ft) into the embrasures of the blockhouses. Many crews from the 87e RIF put up heroic resistance before succumbing to the German attack. Maubeuge was cleared of French units on 21 May, setting the stage for the reduction of the forts north of the city, which were still intact despite several days of bombardment by 100mm, 150mm and 210mm artillery, as well as Stukas. That night, the Germans attacked both ends of the fortification line. On the eastern side, IR 49 reinforced by a company of combat engineers attacked Fort Boussois. In support were two 88mm guns, two 105mm field howitzers and six 37mm anti-tank guns emplaced 750m (2,460ft) west of the fort. The attack began with a 15-minute bombardment of the fort’s weapon embrasures and cupolas. However, in the fading evening light the artillery missed its target and when German troops moved forwards for the assault, fire from the fort’s AM and AMmo50 turrets stopped the attack. After nightfall the German assault groups attacked again. This time they breached the barbedwire entanglements and surrounded the fort’s combat blocks. Then, in a twist of fate, Boussois’s crew fired a red flare to signal nearby Fort La Salmagne to provide defensive fire. By coincidence, the red flare was also the signal for German artillery to lay suppressive fire on the fort. With German artillery exploding among the assault troops, the attack failed and the Germans retreated. However, the French abandoned nearby Casemate L’Epinette, leaving Fort Boussois isolated. Meanwhile, on the western side of the fortification line, an attack by the 8. Infanterie-Division on Casemate Héronfontaine also failed.
Fort Sarts’s armoured turret lost a shooting match with German Flak guns. At least 16 88mm impacts are visible on the turret. One of the rounds hit the right-side embrasure, disabling the weapons, and killing a crewmember. With the turret out of action, the fort’s fall was inevitable. (M. Romanych)
The next morning, 22 May, IR 49 resumed the attack on Fort Boussois. First, Stukas dropped eighteen 500kg bombs with no effect. Then, the artillery opened fire against the fort’s cupolas, embrasures and turrets. In daylight the bombardment was accurate, penetrating the wall of Block 1 and causing the fort’s crew to retract both turrets for protection. Under the cover of the artillery fire, German combat engineers and infantry moved forwards through gaps in the barbed wire and rushed the forts’ three combat blocks before the crew raised the turrets and opened fire. German combat engineers quickly disabled both the AM and AMmo50 turrets by dropping explosive charges down openings to the ventilation shafts. Within an hour, Boussois’s weapons and ventilation system were out of action. Defenceless and with toxic fumes building inside the fort, the crew held out to around noon and then surrendered by placing a white flag through one of Block 3’s weapon embrasures. After five days of stubborn resistance, Fort Boussois finally fell. Oberleutnant Langenstrass of PionierBataillon 28 was awarded the Knight’s Cross for the attack, which resulted in 186 French prisoners with only minor casualties among the Germans. That afternoon, a battalion from IR 49 attacked nearby Fort La Salmagne. At close range, 105mm howitzers shelled the rear of the fort, quickly destroying the weapon embrasures. The bombardment was especially damaging to Block 1, which was evacuated by its crew. Dust and smoke rounds blinded the fort’s crew as the combat engineers and infantry cut through the barbed-wire entanglements and climbed onto the fort’s two combat blocks. According to one report, combat engineers used axes to disable the barrels of light machine guns protruding from the armoured cupolas, but failed to put Block 1’s AM turret out of action with a three-kilogram charge. Even so, trapped inside the fort with German soldiers swarming on top of the combat blocks, the crew of 156 men surrendered that evening. On 23 May, only the western part of the fortified line remained in French hands. Forts Bersillies and Sarts and Casemates Crèvecoeur and Héronfontaine had withstood several days of shelling and Stuka bombing. That morning, German artillery firing from a few hundred metres heavily damaged Bersillies’ combat blocks, particularly Block 2. An assault by combat engineers and infantry from IR 83 quickly reached the top of the block, and by mid-morning the fort’s crew surrendered along with the soldiers manning nearby Casemate Crèvecoeur. At the same time, IR 83 attacked Fort Sarts and Casemate Héronfontaine. As elsewhere, indirect fire and aerial bombing had a negligible effect, but direct artillery fire heavily damaged the weapon embrasures. At a range of 500m (1,640ft), several 88mm Flak guns fired at Sarts’s armoured cupolas and AM turret. As the turret returned fire it was hit 49
A German assault team watches smoke pour out of Casemate Héronfontaine, not knowing that the French crew had abandoned it the night before. Unable to take the casemate by ground assault, the 28. Infanterie-Division destroyed it by artillery fire. (M. Rupp)
more than a dozen times. Then one 88mm round hit an embrasure, pushing the entire weapons mount with 25mm gun and machine guns into the turret, and killing a crewmember. With the turret out of action, a close assault by combat engineers covered by 37mm anti-tank and 20mm Flak guns, finished the job by dropping charges into the fort’s ventilation shafts. Demoralized, the French crew surrendered at 1100hrs. At Héronfontaine, after several assaults against the casemate failed, German artillery bombarded it into a smoking ruin. As at Fort Sarts, Héronfontaine’s AMmo50 turret fired back and in return was struck several times by 88mm rounds. After nightfall the crew abandoned the casemate. The next day, German combat engineers attacked again, detonating charges on the turret’s embrasures and dropping grenades inside before realizing that the casemate was empty. For nearly a week, the French 101e Division d’infanterie forteresse held out against superior odds. Isolated, the fortress crews surrendered only after German artillery and combat engineers destroyed their heavy weapons. Despite the destructive power of close-range direct fire artillery, close combat was still necessary to capture the forts. Surprisingly, both sides suffered few casualties and not all soldiers of the 101e Division d’infanterie forteresse were captured. Remnants of the 84e RIF escaped into the Dunkirk pocket and were evacuated to Great Britain, while part of the 87e RIF was captured several weeks later in the Normandy region. As the fight for Maubeuge ended, VIII AK moved west to Secteur fortifié Escaut, which now anchored the south-east corner of the Dunkirk pocket. The Escaut fortifications were a 30km (19-mile) line of blockhouses running parallel to the Belgian border. The ends of the blockhouse line were anchored by several large blockhouses grouped around Fort Eth in the south and Fort Maulde in the north. Fort Eth had two blocks, one of which had an AM turret. Nearby, Casemate Jeanlain was integrated into Fort Eth’s defences. Fort Maulde was more like a strongpoint than a typical Maginot fort. It was a group of three artillery casemates, two armed with 75mm guns and one with a 155mm gun, and a large observation casemate, all built on a pre-World War I fort. In the vicinity were six other casemates, numerous blockhouses, and anti-tank and barbed-wire obstacles. Further back from the border was the Raismes Forest position de sécurité with its 12 casemates. The 54e RIF and a group of the 161e RAP manned the Escaut fortifications. Also in the sector were several divisions of the French 1ère Armée, which had been pushed into the pocket by the advance of Heeresgruppe B. 50
At Fort Eth, the devastating effect of high-velocity 88mm fire was aptly demonstrated when guns firing at close range blasted huge chunks of steel out of two armoured cupolas on Block 1. The sides of this cupola were 300mm thick. (M. Rupp)
Opposite the fortification line was VIII AK in the south and Heeresgruppe B’s XXVII AK in the centre and north. For four days, from 22 to 25 May, the forts and casemates were softened up by German artillery as Heeresgruppen A and B pushed into the pocket. At Fort Eth, two 88mm guns, firing at close range, heavily damaged Block 2 and nearby Casemate Jeanlain. When an 88mm gun moved within Jeanlain’s field of fire, several crew members were killed and the gun abandoned. Fort Maulde endured several days of indirect heavy artillery fire, including two 305mm Skoda howitzers of schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 641, which, despite several close hits, did not cause significant damage. Fort Maulde fought back by firing on the German artillery and nearby troop movements. On 26 May, the 28. Infanterie-Division’s IR 7, supported by combat engineers from Pionier-Bataillon 28, assaulted Fort Eth and the adjacent casemates. Artillery firing as close as 400m (1,312ft) at the rear and southern flank of the fort reduced Block 2 to a ruin and destroyed most of the fort’s weapons. Rounds from the 88mm guns were particularly devastating, tearing apart two armoured cupolas of Block 1. Under the cover of 37mm anti-tank guns, the assault groups quickly reached the top of the fort and, in an attack similar to that at Fort La Ferté, the combat engineers disabled the AM turret and remaining cupolas, killing one French soldier. With the fort too damaged to continue the fight, Eth’s commander ordered the crew to evacuate to Casemate Jeanlain through a connecting underground passage. However, its situation was no better and the 160 soldiers surrendered soon thereafter. On the north side of the Escaut fortification line, the 253. Infanterie-Division attacked Fort Maulde. Infantry closed in, capturing nearby casemates, but were unable to take the fort itself. As the situation deteriorated, the French commander ordered the crew to destroy its weapons and evacuate the fort that night. The next day, 27 May, a German patrol found the fort empty. 51
In the centre, XXVII AK’s 269. Infanterie-Division, supported by the 217. Infanterie-Division, attacked and seized the blockhouse line in three days of hard fighting against the fortress troops and units of the French 4e Corps d’armée. Infantry supported by field howitzers blasted the blockhouses one by one. French troops resisted until ordered to evacuate the sector and withdraw to Lille. The stubborn defence of French fortress troops and field divisions in the Escaut sector slowed the advance of several German divisions, providing additional time for Allied troops to organize the evacuation at Dunkirk. By the end of May, 17 days after the start of the German invasion, all fortifications from Montmédy to the Channel were in the hands of the Wehrmacht. Yet, the hardest fight for the Maginot Line was yet to come.
FALL ROT: THE INVASION OF FRANCE Fall Rot was the second half of the Wehrmacht’s campaign. After the battles in Flanders and Belgium ended, Heeresgruppen A and B were ordered to attack into central France and destroy the French Army. The primary threat to German operations was a counteroffensive by French forces in Alsace and Lorraine. To neutralize the threat, Heeresgruppe A ordered Guderian’s XIX AK (mot.) to advance to the Swiss border and trap French forces in the Vosges Mountains while AOK 16 flanked the remaining sections of the Maginot Line and seized the fortress cities of Verdun, Toul and Metz. Heeresgruppe C, again in a supporting role, was ordered to conduct a series of attacks against the Maginot Line proper. The French Army, greatly weakened by its defeat in Belgium and northern France, was now under the command of Général d’armée Maxime Weygand who, on 20 May, took over after Gén. Gamelin was dismissed. Général Weygand formed a new front under Groupes d’armées 3 and 4 along the Somme and Aisne rivers – the so-called Weygand Line. At the beginning of June, almost half of Groupe d’armées 2 moved from Alsace and Lorraine to the Weygand Line, reducing the number of divisions supporting the Maginot Line proper to 15. Opposite Groupe d’armées 2, were 20 divisions of Heeresgruppe C. Heeresgruppe B went on the offensive on 5 June, followed by Heeresgruppe A on 9 June. After several days of hard fighting, both army groups broke through the Weygand Line. With the collapse of the front, the French 2e Armée (now under Groupe d’armées 2) withdrew south to establish a position on the Marne River, exposing the Maginot Line proper to German attack from the west. Foreseeing the threat posed by this situation, Gén. Prételat ordered the 3e, 4e and 5e Armées to conduct a phased withdrawal from the Maginot fortifications, commencing the night of 13/14 June. First, interval troops and artillery would pull out while the fortified works would remain manned to halt any German advance. Then, after destroying weapons and equipment, the crews would evacuate the fortresses on 18 June and join the withdrawing army. During the withdrawal, command of the secteurs fortifiés passed from field army commanders to the senior fortress commanders. However, the French plan unravelled the night of 12/13 June, when the fortress troops of the 2e Armée – the 132e and 155e RIFs and 169e RAP – left the westernmost sector of the Maginot Line one day early, abandoning a 30km (19-mile) stretch of Secteur fortifié de Montmédy with its two fortresses (Chesnois and Vélosnes) and one fort (Thonnelle) to AOK 16. 52
After the armistice, a German soldier (left) and French soldier (right) inspect Fortress Fermont’s armoured 75mm turret, which was hit by a round from a 305mm Skoda howitzer. In the centre of the photograph is an armoured cupola for close-in defence of the block, partially exposed by a hit from another 305mm shell. (M. Romanych)
ENVELOPMENT OF THE METZ REGION Secteur fortifié de la Crusnes was now the Maginot Line’s western flank. Its three fortresses and four forts formed a formidable defensive front, but with Gén. Prételat’s withdrawal order, only crews from the 128e, 139e, 149e RIFs and 152e RAP were left to man the fortifications. On the extreme left of the sector near the city of Longuyon, was Fort Ferme-Chappy, a small fort with two combat blocks and a single machine-gun turret. Like Fort La Ferté, FermeChappy was too weak to serve as an anchor for the fortification line. However, unlike La Ferté, Ferme-Chappy and the surrounding area were well within artillery range of nearby Fortress Fermont’s and Latiremont’s 75mm guns. On 14 June, AOK 16 moved forwards in the wake of the French 2e Armée’s retreat. Its VII and XXXVI AK advanced south along the Meuse River to Verdun and Toul, while Höheres Kommando XXXI (a corps headquarters for rear-area or static troops) enveloped the western half of the Région fortifiée de Metz. Three days later, on the 17th, XXXVI AK’s 169. Infanterie-Division entered Metz, and, in conjunction with divisions of Heeresgruppe C’s AOK 1 advancing out of the Sarre region, encircled French troops in the fortifications. Rather than surrender, the fortress commanders decided to stay and fight. As divisions of Höheres Kommando XXXI flanked the Maginot Line, Fortress Fermont harassed them with artillery fire. A large artillery fortress with a crew of 572 soldiers, Fermont had two entrance blocks and seven combat blocks, including two artillery blocks armed with five 75mm guns. In response to Fermont’s artillery fire, the 183. Infanterie-Division, now behind Fermont, shelled the fortress with 88mm Flak to cover the movement of the 162. Infanterie-Division over the Chiers River near Longuyon on 17 June. At a range of 6,000m (19,685ft), two 88mm guns of Flak-Abteilung 394 repeatedly fired at Block 4, the fortress’s primary artillery combat block. Fermont’s crew did not return fire because it could not see the Flak’s position on the reverse slope of a hill. After four hours and 160 rounds (i.e., one round every minute and a half), the 88mm rounds blasted a one-metre (three-feet) hole in Block 4’s wall. One round actually landed inside the block, but surprisingly did not cause serious damage or any casualties. Unaware that their fires were about to destroy the block, the Flak crews ceased firing. That night, Fermont’s crew repaired the breach in the wall with iron plates and concrete, and the block’s three 75mm guns were back in action. 53
VII
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Casemate line Blockhouse line Fortress Fort (with date of capture)
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Luxembourg City
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15km
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Merzig
German advance, 21–25 June
German advance, 11–17 June German advance, 18–21 June
German front line, 10 June German front line, 17 June German front line, 21 June
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169
Envelopment of the Metz region, 10–21 June 1940
The next day, the newly arrived 161. Infanterie-Division relieved the 183. Infanterie-Division, which then marched east to Thionville. Believing that the fortress troops in the Crusnes sector had low morale, the divisional commander – Generalleutnant Hermann Wilck – ordered an attack to seize Fortress Fermont and Fort Ferme-Chappy. He assigned the attack to IR 371 with support from combat engineers and two battalions of 105mm field howitzers from the divisional artillery regiment. The regiment’s I. Bataillon was tasked to take Fortress Fermont while III. Bataillon attacked Fort Ferme-Chappy. With less than a day to prepare, the result was an ill-conceived, hasty attack. The attack began at 0500hrs on 21 June with a two-hour artillery bombardment, including three 210mm howitzers and two 305mm Skoda howitzers of schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 641, which fired more than 75 rounds. However, the siege artillery had no effect other than to suppress Fermont’s counterbattery fire during the bombardment. Even a 305mm round that struck Fermont’s 75mm turret caused no damage. During the artillery bombardment, four infantry companies from I. and III./IR 371, reinforced with combat engineers and 47mm anti-tank guns, advanced on the rear of Fermont and Ferme-Chappy. One infantry company was held in reserve. When the heavy artillery bombardment ended, 105mm field howitzers of the divisional artillery regiment began suppressive fire on the combat blocks and intermediate positions to cover the infantry’s advance. The first engagement occurred around 0630hrs as one of IR 371’s infantry companies approached Fermont’s two entrance blocks. The troops moved in for the assault, but were held at bay by machine-gun fire from the personnel entrance block and nearby interval Casemate Bois-de-Beuveille. During the fight, a round from a German 47mm anti-tank gun penetrated a cupola embrasure on Fermont’s personnel entrance block, killing a soldier inside. Then, Fermont’s 81mm mortar turret opened fire on the area around the two entrance blocks, pinning the German troops and ending the engagement. Meanwhile, another company of infantry advanced on Fermont’s seven combat blocks. Bypassing the Puxieux observatory, which did not present a threat, the troops assaulted but failed to seize the nearby Casemate Puxieux. However, a small group of infantry and combat engineers continued on past Casemate Puxieux towards Fermont’s combat blocks and managed to breach its belt of barbed-wire entanglements. However, once inside the barbed wire, the group was caught in machine-gun crossfire from several of the combat blocks and could advance no further. Unable to take Casemate Puxieux or any of Fermont’s entrance or combat blocks, I. Bataillon’s attack bogged down and then finally broke when 75mm guns from Fortress Latiremont shelled the German positions and forced the assault troops to retreat.
Fortress Fermont’s massive artillery casemate was nearly destroyed by 88mm Flak guns on 17 June (the penetration was left of the middle embrasure). However, as seen here, shelling by 105mm field howitzers during the 161. Infanterie-Division´s ground assault inflicted only superficial damage to the block’s façade. (M. Rupp)
At Fort Ferme-Chappy the results were similar. Two infantry companies of III. Bataillon seized blockhouses adjacent to the fort under the cover of supporting 105mm artillery fire. Using nearby farm buildings and French trenches for cover, German troops came within 30m (98ft) of the fort, were stopped by machine-gun fire and then shelled by artillery from Fermont. Unable to continue the assault, the German troops withdrew. After eight hours of combat, the Wehrmacht’s only ground assault on a Maginot Line fortress ended in failure. German losses were reported as 46 dead and 251 wounded. Two French soldiers were killed (one at Fermont and one at Ferme-Chappy) and several wounded. Later in the day, Fermont’s commander, Capitaine Aubert, allowed German troops to recover their wounded and dead under a flag of truce. Despite its failure, the 161. Infanterie-Division planned a second attack for that evening along with an attack against nearby Fortress Latiremont for the next day. However, both attacks were cancelled when Gen.Obst. von Leeb ordered his subordinate armies to halt infantry actions against French fortifications because taking Maginot fortifications was no longer a priority worth sustaining additional casualties. For the next three days until the armistice on 25 June, the 161. and 183. Infanterie-Divisionen continued to apply pressure on the fortress line north of the Moselle River, cutting telephone lines between the fortifications, patrolling with infantry, firing on fortified works with antitank guns and sporadically shelling French positions with indirect artillery. In return, the fortresses fired artillery salvoes up to, and even after, the cessation of hostilities to expend ammunition stocks and inflict casualties on the Germans.
OPERATION TIGER: BREAKTHROUGH IN THE SARRE As AOK 16 enveloped the west side of the Région fortifiée de Metz, Heeresgruppe C conducted a series of attacks into Alsace and Lorraine. Its first and largest offensive was Operation Tiger conducted by AOK 1 in the Sarre Gap. The purpose of the operation was to prevent the French Groupe d’armées 2 from establishing positions in the Vosges Mountains and to shorten the supply lines of Heeresgruppen A and B. Since the end of Operation Fackel on 15 May, the Sarre front had remained quiet. Then on 6 June, AOK 1 moved forwards to the French lines and began actively patrolling and registering heavy artillery. In response, French units withdrew to their main defensive line and harassed German positions with artillery fire. On 10 June, AOK 1 moved forwards again and seized French forward posts. It became obvious that an attack was imminent. French forces in the Sarre region were greatly reduced from those assigned there at the start of the campaign. In late May and the first part of June, the 4e Armée followed by the rest of Groupe d’armées 2 withdrew, leaving only a skeletal force of fortress and interval troops to hold back German forces. Operation Tiger began just as the last French troops were preparing to withdraw. Defending the Sarre Gap was the French 20e Corps d’armée, under Général Hubert, which assumed command of the front when the 4e Armée departed the Maginot Line. Manning the defences, from west to east, were the 69e, 82e and 174e Régiments mitrailleurs d’infanterie forteresse (RMIF) and the 41e and 51e Régiments mitrailleurs d’infanterie coloniale (RMIC). These five infantry regiments were armed with extra machine guns and had a great deal of firepower. Behind the main line of defence, in reserve, were the 56
52e Division d’infanterie and 1ère Division de grenadiers Polonais (Polish infantry division). Artillery support consisted of about 100 guns ranging in calibre from 75mm to 155mm belonging to various divisional artillery batteries, and a 305mm railway artillery battery for long-range fire. The French regiments occupied prepared positions along the Nied, Moderbach and Sarre rivers. Their defences resembled a World War I trench line, consisting of concrete blockhouses and timber shelters connected by trenches and fronted by anti-tank ditches, rows of steel rails, belts of barbed wire and minefields. Central to the defence were inundations where the rivers were dammed to create flood zones to block and canalize German movement. The depth of the defences varied, ranging from one thin line of blockhouses behind the flood zones, to multiple lines of blockhouses up to two kilometres (one mile) deep between the flood zones. At various points along the front were strongpoints of concrete blockhouses, field fortifications and anti-tank obstacles. Forward of the main fortification line were advanced posts. These were ‘wave breakers’ sited to prevent German observation of the main positions. The backbone of the defence was 25 large concrete casemates that could withstand bombardment by heavy artillery. These casemates were armed with 47mm or 65mm anti-tank guns and heavy machine guns. Additionally, several artillery blockhouses and ground-mounted machine-gun turrets could provide flanking fire into likely avenues of advance. The Germans, who frequently flew aerial reconnaissance over the front, knew most French positions. For the offensive, AOK 1 greatly outnumbered the French. It had three corps with seven infantry divisions – XXX AK (79., 93. and 258. InfanterieDivisionen), XII AK (75. and 268. Infanterie-Divisionen) and XXIV AK (60. and 252. Infanterie-Divisionen), and a four-division reserve (168., 197., 198. and 257. Infanterie-Divisionen). To assemble this force, AOK 1 thinned its flanks. The west flank opposite the main fortifications in the Metz region was reduced to two divisions – the 95. and 167. Infanterie-Divisionen under Höheres Kommando XXXXV. The 80km (50-mile) east flank, opposite the fortifications of the Lauter region, was left to the 215., 246. and 262. Infanterie-Divisionen under Höheres Kommando XXXVII. Furthermore, combat engineers, reconnaissance, and artillery units were stripped from the flank and reserve divisions and allocated to the seven attacking divisions. Armeeoberkommando 1 massed about 1,000 artillery pieces in the largest artillery concentration of the French campaign. As in World War I, the light and medium artillery was distributed evenly along the front: XXX AK with 78 batteries, XII AK with 74 batteries, and XXIV AK with 63 batteries. For longrange fire AOK 1 had three 150mm batteries and eight railway gun batteries and, for reducing fortified positions, it had schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 800 with its 355mm Rheinmetall howitzer and two 420mm howitzers. Although on paper the number of artillery pieces was impressive, the quality was mixed because many were of World War I vintage, best suited for area barrages. Few were capable of hitting and penetrating a concrete bunker. For bunker-busting, AOK 1 had only 16 88mm guns – 12 Luftwaffe Flak and four anti-tank guns from schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 525 – organized into combat groups that included 20mm Flak and 37mm anti-tank guns. There were also the self-propelled assault guns of Sturmbatterie 665, which were assigned to XXIV AK. Air support was provided by V Fliegerkorps, which had, among others, Ju 87 Stukas, He 111, Do 17 and Me 110 aircraft, as well as the new Ju 88 dive-bomber. However, many sorties were assigned to strategic targets such 57
FRENCH UNITS Fort Ferme-Chappy (manned by crew from 149e Régiment d’infanterie de forteresse): J Block 1 (entrance block) K Block 2 (machine-gun turret) Fortress Fermont (manned by crew from 149e Régiment d’infanterie de forteresse and 152e Régiment d’artillerie de position) A Block 1 (75mm gun turret) B Block 2 (machine-gun turret) C Block 3 (observatory) D Block 4 (75mm howitzer casemate) E Block 5 (81mm mortar turret) F Block 6 (machine-gun turret) G Block 7 (infantry casemate) H Personnel entrance block I Munitions entrance block
FORT FERME-CHAPPY
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1 0500hrs: the attack opens with the bombardment of Fortress Fermont and Fort Ferme-Chappy by heavy and siege artillery. 2 During the bombardment, four infantry companies reinforced with combat engineers advance on the rear of Fermont and Ferme-Chappy. One company remains in reserve.
161
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3 0630hrs: German troops seize several unoccupied blockhouses and surround Fermont’s two entrance blocks.
KAUPISCH
4 The crew of Casemate Bois-de-Beuveille fires on German troops. In response, two German assault teams mount an unsuccessful assault against the casemate. 5 0700hrs: when the heavy artillery bombardment ends, field howitzers shell French positions to cover final approach of the infantry. 6 The crew of Fermont’s personnel entrance and German infantry exchange fire until Fermont’s 81mm mortar turret intervenes and forces the Germans troops to withdraw. 7 German troops seize several unoccupied blockhouses, bypass Observatory Puxieux, and then unsuccessfully attempt to capture Casemate Puxieux.
8 German troops seize blockhouses and buildings near Fort Ferme-Chappy and then assault the fort. 9 Machine-gun fire from Ferme-Chappy’s machine-gun turret and artillery fire from Fermont suppress German troops. 10 Mid-afternoon: an assault team breaches Fermont’s protective barbed-wire belt, but is stopped by French machine-gun fire. The attack ends when Fortress Latiremont’s artillery shells German positions around Fermont.
INFANTRY ATTACK AT FORTRESS FERMONT: 21 JUNE 1940 In the only ground attack against a major Maginot Line fortress, the German 161. Infanterie-Division supported by siege artillery fails to take Fortress Fermont and nearby Fort Ferme-Chappy. 58
Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 500m/547yds
REVÉMONT
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GERMAN UNITS 1 9. Kompanie, III. Bataillon, Infanterie-Regiment 371 2 11. Kompanie, III. Bataillon, Infanterie-Regiment 371 3 II. Abteilung, Artillerie-Regiment 241 4 2. Kompanie, I. Bataillon, Infanterie-Regiment 371 5 I. Abteilung, Artillerie-Regiment 241 6 3. Kompanie, I. Bataillon, Infanterie-Regiment 371 7 1. Kompanie, I. Bataillon, Infanterie-Regiment 371
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LEFT The defences of Secteur fortifié de la Sarre depended on flood zones to channel the German attack into prepared defensive areas. Unfortunately for the French defenders, the spring of 1940 was dry and water levels were much lower than anticipated. (M. Romanych) RIGHT The German 420mm Krupp howitzer (Gamma) firing a one-ton shell. The last of its kind from World War I, the Gamma howitzer was used by schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 800 to shell French positions in Secteur fortifié de la Sarre in support of the 75. InfanterieDivision’s attack against positions of the 174e RMIF. (M. Rupp)
60
as towns, barracks and long-range and railway artillery, and not to direct support of the infantry. Armeeoberkommando 1’s offensive began on 14 June, the same day Paris fell. The night before the attack German divisions moved forwards during a hard rainstorm. The French detected the movement and fired a counter preparation barrage, but it had no great effect other than to add to the misery of the German troops. At 0730hrs, German artillery fired a fierce 90-minute barrage followed by dive-bomber attacks from V Fliegerkorps. However, the bombardment was ineffective. Heavy fog covered most of the battlefield, forcing German artillery to fire blind. Few French positions were destroyed and no blockhouses or casemates were put out of action. As a result, when the barrage ended, German infantry advanced into nearly intact French defences. German counterbattery fire was more effective, though enough French artillery survived to inflict major casualties on the attacking troops. The main attack was carried out by XXX and XII AK on the western side of the Sarre Gap. The XXIV AK conducted a secondary attack in the centre and east side among the flood zones of the Sarre and Albe rivers. The 93. Infanterie-Division, supported by the 258. Infanterie-Division, led XXX AK’s attack. The 79. Infanterie-Division was in reserve. The 93. Infanterie-Division’s two lead infantry regiments – IR 271 and 272 – faced defences manned by the French 82e RMIF. The division’s objectives were the large French strongpoint at Barst-Cappel and the main blockhouse line in front of the village of Valette. At Barst, the attack by IR 271 did not go as intended. The preparatory barrage destroyed the town but missed French defences, resulting in several hours of hard and time-consuming street fighting. Meanwhile, IR 272’s attack against the French strongpoint on Cappel achieved quick success. French blockhouses on the hillside were in plain sight of German artillery observers and easily suppressed by supporting field and anti-tank guns as infantry went in for the assault. Losing ten dead, 64 wounded and four missing, the regiment took the position and captured 150 French prisoners. But when IR 271 and 272 crossed the road south of Barst-Cappel, the 93. Infanterie-Division’s attack broke down under intense fire from the French main blockhouse line. Without the two supporting
88mm anti-tank guns (one broke down and the other was damaged in combat) or combat engineers, who were pinned by flanking fire from a nearby artillery casemate, the German infantry could not destroy the 82e RMIF’s blockhouses. Then, a flight of German dive-bombers mistakenly bombed a captured blockhouse occupied by soldiers of IR 271. With the attack stalled and casualties mounting, the commander of the 93. InfanterieDivision called off the attack before achieving his objectives. The 258. Infanterie-Division’s attack also failed. Here too, the artillery preparation missed the 69e RMIF’s positions along the Nied River and the Grossberg strongpoint east of Biding. Nevertheless, the 258. InfanterieDivision’s IR 458 and 479 went forwards to attack. West of Biding, IR 458 attempted to cross the Nied, but the operation turned into a costly disaster. Assault troops were caught in deadly crossfire between several blockhouses, as well as flanking fire from the Grossberg strongpoint. Then direct fire from a French artillery casemate equipped with a rapid-firing 75mm field gun destroyed several of the regiment’s anti-tank and field guns and its bridging equipment. Without supporting artillery and bridging, the assault troops could not get across the river. By late afternoon IR 479 finally seized the Grossberg strongpoint, but because of heavy casualties and lost time, the 258. Infanterie-Division’s commander halted the river crossing and a follow-on attack against Biding was cancelled. The defence of the 69e RMIF had held. In XII AK’s sector, the 268. Infanterie-Division conducted the main attack near the village of Hoste. The division’s two infantry regiments – IR 488 and 499 – reinforced by Pionier-Bataillon 51 (which saw previous combat at Fort Eben-Emael) – attacked positions held by two battalions of the 174e RMIF. West of Hoste, IR 488 assaulted the Langstwald, a forest fortified with blockhouses and small ground-mounted tank turrets equipped with heavy machine guns. As elsewhere, the artillery bombardment did not destroy French defences. Despite several attempts by infantry and combat engineers to take the woods, French machine-gun and heavy artillery fire stopped the regiment. Meanwhile, IR 499 bogged down between two artificial lakes in a narrow strip
Fighting in Secteur fortifié de la Sarre left many villages in ruins. Here, on 14 June, fires rage in Sarralbe after Stukas bombed the city, while in the distance smoke rises all along the front from the German artillery barrage. (M. Rupp)
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Operation Tiger, 14–16 June 1940
of land covered with barbed-wire entanglements and the overlapping fires of four blockhouses. In difficult fighting, the regiment finally broke through by mid-afternoon after 88mm anti-tank guns destroyed the French blockhouses. Then, in the most successful penetration of French defences of the day, IR 499 advanced, took the nearby village of Hoste and by nightfall occupied a forest south of the lakes, capturing about 350 prisoners of the 174e RMIF. On XII AK’s east flank, a supporting attack by the 75. Infanterie-Division across the Moderbach River to seize positions of the 174e RMIF in the Kalmerich Forest met with mixed results. Infanterie-Regiment 222’s advance through a flood zone east of the Kalmerich Forest was easily stopped by machine-gun fire from French blockhouses located behind the flooded area. Meanwhile, IR 125’s attack over the Moderbach River into the Kalmerich Forest succeeded. Firing over open sights, German 88mm and 105mm artillery penetrated the front wall of the main blockhouse located in front of the forest, killing 11 of the defenders and opening a gap in the French defences. German assault teams then crossed the river, entered the forest through the gap, and attacked remaining French positions from the rear. By afternoon the forest was cleared and 130 soldiers of the 174e RMIF were taken prisoner. On the other side of the Sarre Gap, between Puttelange and Sarralbe, XXIV AK’s 60. and 252. Infanterie-Divisionen attacked three entrenched battalions of the 41e and 51e RMICs. Canalized by several large flood zones along the Moderbach and Albe rivers, the main attack occurred south of Holving where the Moderbach was only ten metres (33ft) wide. However, on the opposite side of the river was a dense forest, the Buschhubelwald, defended by the 51e RMIC. The attacks of the 60. and 252. Infanterie-Divisionen were doomed from the start. As elsewhere, the artillery preparation missed its targets in the morning fog. Then, because of poor roads, Sturmbatterie 665’s Sturmgeschütz IIIs did not arrive in position in time for the attack, leaving only two 88mm Flak and several 75mm infantry guns to support the attacking infantry. When these guns were knocked out within the first hour of battle by French machinegun and artillery fire, the assaulting infantry and combat engineers were left on their own. Without artillery, the 60. Infanterie-Division failed to take French positions at Remering and, more importantly, the Holving strongpoint, which was the key to the French defence. In fierce combat, 100 soldiers of PionierBataillon 195 (detached from the 95. Infanterie-Division) attacked one and a half companies of the 41e RMIC. Outnumbered and outgunned, the Germans managed to penetrate the position twice, but were forced to withdraw each
LEFT Fighting for the French strongpoints was fierce. Here a German soldier of the 93. Infanterie-Division, with rifle and bayonet at the ready, stands at the still-smoking entrance of a blockhouse located on the west side of the Cappel strongpoint. Facing to the rear of the position, the soldier’s attention is focused on a nearby French position. (M. Rupp) RIGHT German casualties during Operation Tiger were heavy. Here three German soldiers were killed by a French artillery shell while taking cover in the ditch besides the road from Cappel to Hoste. (M. Rupp)
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LEFT French Casemate MC30, east of the Kalmerich Forest, was bombarded by German artillery pieces ranging from a 37mm anti-tank gun to a near miss by a 420mm shell. Soldiers manning the casemate and three nearby smaller blockhouses successfully fought off several German attacks, surrendering only when surrounded and attacked from the rear. (M. Romanych) RIGHT The scene of intense fighting, these two machine-gun turrets in the Holving strongpoint were captured by German troops only after the French 41e RMIC abandoned the position in the early morning hours of 15 June. Both turrets survived the preparatory barrage and the rear turret was knocked out only after receiving a direct hit from an anti-tank gun. (M. Romanych)
Soldiers of the 252. InfanterieDivision near Sarralbe pose in front of a French blockhouse, which was put out of action by direct fire from a 75mm gun. (M. Romanych)
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time. With the Holving strongpoint intact, the 60. Infanterie-Division’s attack into the Buschhubelwald collapsed under the weight of French flanking fire before it even reached the Moderbach River. Nevertheless, hidden by the morning fog, part of the 252. Infanterie-Division’s IR 461 managed to cross the river and enter the forest, where it found itself cut off from the rest of the division. In response, the French 41e RMIC and elements of the 1ère Division de grenadiers Polonais counterattacked and pushed the Germans out of the woods, killing and capturing all but four of the German soldiers. The XXIV AK’s only success of the day was a secondary attack by the 252. Infanterie-Division. Positions of the 51e RMIC north of Sarralbe and a strongpoint on a hill known as the ‘Knop’ were taken easily by IR 472 after the artillery preparation destroyed several French positions. As night fell on 14 June, Gen.Obst. von Witzleben considered ending AOK 1’s offensive. Despite inferior numbers and firepower, French resistance was much greater than anticipated. Casualties were high and the first day’s objectives were not achieved. Although the strongpoints at Biding, Barst and Cappel had fallen, the main French defensive line was unbroken except for two penetrations – one in the 75. Infanterie-Division sector at Kalmerich and one at Hoste by the 268. Infanterie-Division. Furthermore, there was no reason to believe the next day’s combat would be any different. Then fate interceded. German soldiers occupying the Kalmerich Forest captured a withdrawal order from the commander of II/174e RMIF to his companies. The captured order was passed on to higher headquarters where it helped to convince Gen.Obst. von Witzleben to continue the offensive the next day.
During the night, the French regiments withdrew from the main defensive line southward past the secondary defensive line between Gros–Tenquin and Sarre–Union occupied by units of the French 52e Division d’infanterie and 1ère Division de grenadiers Polonais. The next morning, the German XXX, VII and XXIV AK quickly overcame the French rearguard and by mid-morning came in contact with the 52e Division d’infanterie and 1ère Division de grenadiers Polonais. Both divisions held the German advance and then that night, disengaged and withdrew south. Witzleben’s AOK 1 had successfully separated the heavily fortified Metz and Lauter regions. After two days of combat, approximately 1,200 German and French soldiers lay dead on the battlefield.
WIDENING THE BREAKTHROUGH As AOK 1 pushed south through the Sarre Gap, reconnaissance units unsuccessfully attempted to convince French troops in the Maginot fortifications to surrender. Unbeknownst to the Germans, the fortress troops were following orders to hold their positions until 17 June. In expectation of a French withdrawal, Gen.Obst. von Witzleben ordered Höheres Kommando XXXXV and XXXVII to seize the fortifications on each side of AOK 1’s breakthrough. On the western flank, General der Infanterie Kurt von Greiff’s Höheres Kommando XXXXV was assigned the mission of isolating the fortifications east of Metz in conjunction with AOK 16’s envelopment from the west. On the eastern flank, Höheres Kommando XXXVII was given the mission of flanking and isolating the left end of the Lauter region. Höheres Kommando XXXXV faced one of the strongest sections of the Maginot Line. Along a 50km (31-mile) front, from the Moselle River to the Sarre Gap, were six fortresses, 16 forts and numerous interval casemates. The northern and centre sectors had many fortresses, including one of the Maginot Line’s largest – Hackenberg – in Secteur fortifié de Boulay. Among the first fortresses built, Hackenberg represented the ideal Maginot fortress with eight kilometres (five miles) of tunnels, two entrance blocks, 19 combat blocks and a crew of 1,080 soldiers. However, as the line ran south through Secteur fortifié de Boulay into Secteur fortifié de Faulquemont, the fortifications became progressively weaker, particularly south of the Nied River where only a thin line of forts and interval casemates were located. By 15 June portions of nine fortress regiments were still in place between the Moselle River and Sarre Gap. In the north were the 167e RIF and 151e RAP of Secteur fortifié de Thionville under the command of Colonel O’Sullivan at Fortress Metrich. In the centre, were the 160e, 161e, 162e and
An artillery observation post of the 252. Infanterie-Division perched on top of the captured French central command post of the Knop strongpoint. (M. Romanych)
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LEFT In preparation for a ground assault by troops of IR 339, 88mm Flak reduced Fort Bambesch´s Block 2 to rubble. Several shells penetrated the block and detonated inside. (M. Romanych) RIGHT German 88mm Flak hit Bambesch’s cupola more than two dozen times. Three rounds penetrated the cupola. One round can be seen protruding from the side below the embrasure. (M. Romanych)
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164e RIFs, and the 153e RAP of the Boulay sector, under the command of Colonel Cochinard at Fortress Anzeling. In the Faulquemont sector were the 146e and 156e RIFs under Commandant Denoix at Fort Laudrefang. In most places the regiments could only man the main fortified works, and south of the Nied River there was no artillery except for a few 81mm mortars. Höheres Kommando XXXXV commanded two second-rate divisions – the 95. and 167. Infanterie-Divisionen – equipped with older equipment and artillery. Of the two, the 95. Infanterie-Division was better equipped and had recent combat experience. The 167. Infanterie-Division was a division in name only. Formed in November 1940, it had only two weeks of front-line experience manning defensive positions opposite the Maginot Line and had not conducted any operations above platoon level. Despite facing several powerful fortresses of the Maginot Line, no heavy siege artillery was allocated to Höheres Kommando XXXXV. The largestcalibre artillery was 150mm. Following Operation Tiger, the 355mm and 420mm howitzers of schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 800 were allocated to operations against the fortifications of the Lauter region. However, when General von Greiff observed the ineffectiveness of 150mm howitzers against Fort Teting, the southernmost fortification of Secteur fortifié de Faulquemont, he requested and received two light Flak batteries (24 20mm guns) and two heavy Flak batteries (eight 88mm guns) for the corps. The arrival of the 88mm Flak was instrumental to the defeat of the Faulquemont fortifications. Leaving several battalions of Festungsinfanterie (fortress troops) to secure the forward side of the Maginot Line, Höheres Kommando XXXXV began marching around the end of the Metz fortification line on 17 June. The 95. InfanterieDivision led the way, quickly turning the line and taking position behind the fortresses of the northern section of fortification line. The 167. Infanterie-Division followed, closing in on the rear of Secteur fortifié de Faulquemont. The backbone of the sector consisted of five forts – Kerfent, Bambesch, Einseling, Laudrefang and Teting – armed with 47mm anti-tank guns and heavy machine guns sited to cover the intervals between the forts and casemates, and machine-gun turrets positioned to fire to the front of the forts. Among the forts lay several interval casemates, but owing to withdrawal of the infantry, they were unoccupied, leaving gaps in the defensive line. Crucial to the sector’s defence were Fort Laudrefang’s four 81mm mortars, which could provide fire support over the centre of the sector. Otherwise, the Faulquemont sector was little more than a series of isolated strongpoints vulnerable to attack from the rear.
As the 167. Infanterie-Division surrounded Secteur fortifié de Faulquemont, the commander, Generalleutnant Oskar Vogl, saw an opportunity for a quick victory. On 20 June, after advance units of the 167. Infanterie-Division discovered Fort Bambesch’s southernmost combat block (Block 2) was in an exposed position, 88mm Flak shelled the block for most of the day, reducing the façade to rubble, disabling the weapons and damaging the fort’s ventilation system. With Block 2 destroyed, Bambesch now had two remaining combat blocks: Block 1, the entrance to the fort, and Block 3 with a machine-gun turret. Directly behind Bambesch was a wooded area that extended right up to the fort’s protective barbed-wire belt and limited the crew’s ability to engage troops advancing on the rear of the fort. That evening, II./IR 339 assaulted the rear of the fort using the forest for concealment. Two infantry assault teams supported by 37mm anti-tank guns attacked the heavily damaged Block 2 and the fort’s entrance (Block 1). Bambesch’s main weapon, Block 3’s machine-gun turret, could not be employed as it had suffered a mechanical failure earlier in the day. When German troops emerged from the forest and assaulted Blocks 1 and 2, they came under flanking fire from neighbouring Forts Einseling and Kerfent. The attack faltered, and the German assault teams retreated, regrouped and concentrated 37mm antitank and machine-gun fire on Bambesch’s entrance block to prepare for a second attack. As anti-tank rounds impacted on the façade of the entrance block, Bambesch’s commander, Capitaine Pastre, realized the fort was indefensible. With primary weapons out of action and air quality inside the fort growing worse, he decided to surrender. In about two hours’ time, at the cost of seven wounded (one mortally), the Germans captured the fort and its crew of 116 soldiers. Motivated by the quick victory at Fort Bambesch, Gen.Lt. Vogl ordered IR 339 to attack nearby forts Kerfent and Einseling the next day. To the north of Bambesch, Fort Kerfent was assaulted successfully by I./IR 339. Similar to Fort Bambesch, Kerfent had four combat blocks: Block 1, a machine-gun turret block; Block 2, the fort’s entrance and northern block; Block 3, the southernmost block of the fort; and Block 4, an observation block located 500m (1,640ft) east of the rest of the fort. Behind the fort was a forest that limited observation and fields of fire. Repeating the tactics used at Bambesch, at sunrise two 88mm Flak began bombarding Kerfent’s southern block (Block 3) for three hours, destroying its weapon embrasures and armoured cupolas. Then, four infantry and engineer
LEFT Fort Kerfent’s Block 2 soon after the German assault on 21 June. Rounds from 20mm Flak and 37mm anti-tank guns did little more than pockmark the facade, however the armoured cupola, visible on the top left of the block, was destroyed by an 88mm Flak gun. Painted on the block is ‘I/I.R.339’, left by soldiers of I. Bataillon, Infanterie-Regiment 339, to show that they captured the fort. (M. Rupp) RIGHT During the failed attack on Fort Einseling, the 167. Infanterie-Divsion used artillery to suppress nearby Fort Laudrefang. Here, the armoured cupola of Laudrefang’s machine-gun block, was hit more than 70 times by a 37mm anti-tank gun, killing a French soldier inside. (M. Romanych)
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assault teams supported by several 37mm anti-tank guns and a 20mm Flak emerged from the forest and assaulted the fort’s entrance block. Under intense flanking fire from Kerfent’s machine-gun turret and the neighbouring Fort Mottenberg and Casemate Mottenberg Sud, only one assault team breached Kerfent’s protective barbed-wire obstacle. As casualties mounted, the German attack lost momentum until an 88mm Flak firing from less than 100m (328ft) started blasting one of the entrance block’s cupolas. Understanding the hopelessness of the situation, Capitaine Broché ordered the fort’s surrender. The Germans took 134 prisoners at a cost of one dead and 33 wounded (three mortally, including Oberst Lichtenstern, commander of IR 339). For the action, the Knight’s Cross was awarded to Major Gollé of I./IR 339. Simultaneously, II./IR 339 attacked two interval casemates and Fort Einseling located south of Fort Bambesch. The casemates had been evacuated several days earlier, but to make them appear occupied soldiers from Fort Einseling occupied the casemates at night. The deception worked, causing the Germans to divide their artillery fire and assault teams among the casemates and the fort. When German infantry charged the three positions uphill in the open they came under fire from Fort Einseling’s machine-gun turret, flanking fire from the nearby Casemate Quatre Vents Nord (reoccupied by soldiers from Fort Laudrefang), and two of Fort Laudrefang’s four 81mm mortars. Unable to overcome the French defensive fire, the attack collapsed. German soldiers retreated in disorder, abandoning equipment and leaving behind four dead and 26 wounded. The 167. Infanterie-Division’s streak of victories had run out. That day (21 June), Heeresgruppe C’s order to a halt to all infantry assaults against the Maginot fortifications ended Höheres Kommando XXXXV’s attempt to capture any more forts by ground assault. In the Boulay sector, the 95. Infanterie-Division moved in behind the fortification line and harassed the French fortresses with artillery fire. French fortress artillery responded, but firing blindly inflicted few casualties or damage, except for one salvo that managed to hit a German command post, killing the commander of III./Artillerie-Regiment 195 and two battery commanders. On 22 June, Generalleutnant Sixt von Arnim, commander of the 95. Infanterie-Division, attempted to force Fortress Michelsberg to surrender. A medium-sized fortress, Michelsberg had five combat blocks including one 81mm mortar turret and two artillery turrets. The fortress was also well within artillery range of Fortresses Hackenberg, Mont-des-Welches and Anzeling. On the afternoon of 22 June, as 95. Infanterie-Division’s field artillery fired suppressive fire on Michelsberg, Mont-des-Welches and Anzeling, a battery of four 88mm Flak moved into firing position about 2,500m (8,202ft) behind Fortress Michelsberg. The 88mm guns fired 260 rounds at Blocks 2 and 3, the only two combat blocks readily seen from the rear of the fortress. However, because the guns fired at long range, the fire caused only superficial damage to the façade of Block 2 and scored a couple hits on the cupolas. That evening, a German officer approached Michelsberg and tried to convince the crew to surrender; however, the French commander, Commandant Pelletier, refused. Seeing that the damage done by the Flak was minimal, Gen.Lt. von Arnim postponed further shelling until closer firing positions could be found. However, the next day all Flak batteries assigned to Höheres Kommando XXXXV were reassigned to other missions, leaving the 95. Infanterie-Division without the means to continue the attack. Further combat action in the Boulay sector slowed to occasional artillery duels between the 95. Infanterie-Division and the French fortresses. 68
The other side of AOK 1’s breakthrough was held by Höheres Kommando XXXVII. The corps, with four infantry divisions, was positioned along the border opposite French fortifications of northern Alsace. Stretching from the Sarre Gap east to the Rhine, the 80km-long (50-mile) fortification line included six fortresses, five forts and more than 100 interval casemates and blockhouses, organized into three secteurs fortifiés – Rohrbach, Vosges and Haguenau. Two sections of the fortified line were particularly strong: the area around Bitche, which had one fort and three fortresses, and the area near Lembach also with one fort and three fortresses; including the Maginot Line’s largest fortress, Hochwald. The centre and flanks were less fortified. The defences between Bitche and Lembach (Secteur fortifié des Vosges) and from the Vosges Mountains to the Rhine River (Secteur fortifié de Haguenau) were little more than a single line of interval casemates. The left flank from Sarralbe to Bitche (Secteur fortifié de Rohrbach and remnants of Secteur fortifié de Sarre) was a line of casemates reinforced by three small forts. Aware of the Maginor Line’s weaknesses, Höheres Kommando XXXVII planned to divide the fortified line and isolate its strongest fortifications. First, on the western side, 262. Infanterie-Division would reduce the forts of Secteur fortifié de Rohrbach as the 257. Infanterie-Division moved behind the fortification line to cut off the region’s main fortresses in the Bitche area. Then, the 215. Infanterie-Division and 246. Infanterie-Division would break through the casemate lines in the Vosges and Haguenau sectors and isolate the fortresses near Lembach. In preparation for the attack, the 215. and 262. Infanterie-Division pressed forwards to the French main fortification line, capturing forward outposts and clearing roads of obstacles. After several sharp engagements, French advance troops withdrew into the fortifications as part of Gén. Prételat’s general retreat order. In support, French fortress artillery fired on German movements and troop concentrations, especially in the Haguenau sector where the artillery of Fortress Hochwald inflicted significant losses on the 246. Infanterie-Division. On 19 June, four days after AOK 1 broke through the Sarre, the 257. Infanterie-Division turned the western end of the fortification line and marched on Bitche. The 262. Infanterie-Division followed, enveloping the westernmost fortified works. The division left one regiment, IR 462, on the northern side of the line to secure the border while IR 482 moved south into a blocking position near Sarrebourg and IR 486 took attack positions behind fortifications of the Rohrbach sector.
LEFT On 22 June four 88mm Flak guns attached to the 95. Infanterie-Division fired on Fort Michelsberg of Secteur fortifié de Boulay in a failed attempt to convince the French garrison to surrender. Block 3, easily visible from the position of the 88s, sustained the most damage. (M. Romanych) RIGHT From Generalleutnant Edgar Theissen’s personal album, a photograph of him observing artillery fire on Fort Haut-Poirier from the heights at Kalhausen five kilometres (three miles) south-west of the fort. (M. Romanych)
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6
5
1 3
7
2 4
THE END OF FORT KERFENT, 21 JUNE 1940 (pp. 70–71) The surrender of Fort Kerfent came as a surprise to the Germans. Earlier in the day, 88mm Flak guns had reduced the fort’s Block 3 to rubble, leaving the fort with three remaining blocks: an entrance block (Block 2), a machine-gun turret block (Block 1) and an observation block (Block 4). However, when the infantry and engineer assault against the fort’s entrance block (1) broke down under intense defensive fire, it appeared that the French crew was still full of fight. Caught in crossfire from as many as ten French machine guns and three 50mm mortars, the German assault teams were pinned in the open among the fort’s barbedwire entanglements, unable to move forwards into the assault or retreat back into the woods. Supporting fire from 20mm Flak and 37mm anti-tank guns (2) was having no discernable effect other than to pockmark the façade of the entrance block. German casualties mounted and it was soon obvious that the assault was a failure. To save the situation, the German commander, Major Gollé, ordered artillery-delivered smoke to create a smokescreen to blind the machine-gun turret of Block 1 (3). Then he ordered an 88mm Flak gun (4), which had just finished emplacing on the access road to the fort, to inflict as much damage as possible on the fort’s entrance block. Opening fire at a range of less than 100m (328ft), the 88mm gun quickly
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destroyed one of the block’s armoured cupolas, blasting out several chunks of the 300mm-thick (12in.) steel and even detonating a round inside the cupola (5). The loss of the cupola left the Kerfent’s crew unable to see where the 88mm gun was emplaced. At the same time, several 20mm Flak rounds managed to penetrate one of the entrance block’s weapon’s embrasures. Combined, the impacts of the 20mm and 88mm Flak filled the interior of the entrance block with smoke and debris, forcing the French soldiers inside to abandon their positions and seek refuge in the underground part of the fort. Desperate to stop the 88mm Flak, the crew of Block 4 (some 600m away) returned fire with a 50mm mortar (6), but without observation from the soldiers of Block 2, the shelling was inaccurate and of no help to the defence of the fort. Meanwhile, the German assault troops, along with their wounded (7) withdrew from the barbed-wire obstacle into the relative safety of the woods. Understanding the seriousness of the situation – namely, if the entrance block was destroyed, the crew would be entombed in the fort – the French commander, Capitaine Broché, decided to surrender before the fort became a deathtrap for his soldiers. In a matter of minutes, the 88mm Flak gun had turned the tide of battle from disaster to victory.
Infanterie-Regiment 486 faced three forts and ten interval casemates manned by the 133e and 166e RIFs. The forts – Haut-Poirier, Welschhof and Rohrbach – were the backbone of the defence. Fort Haut-Poirier, anchoring the end of the fortification line, was the largest fort with four blocks, while Forts Welschhof and Rohrbach each had three. Other than the heavy machine guns and 25mm guns mounted in each fort’s AM turret, all other weapons were sited to defend the intervals between the forts and casemates or to provide close defence of the fortified works. Each fort had a crew size of about 170 soldiers. A major vulnerability of the forts and casemates was their exposure to attack from the rear and a lack of artillery for counterbattery fire, the closest of which was more than 15km (nine miles) away at Fortress Simserhof. Firing at extreme range, Simserhof’s 75mm guns could not cover Fort Haut-Poirier and could only reach Welschhof when the wind direction was favourable. Like elsewhere along the Maginot Line, the interval units and artillery were gone, leaving the crews of the 133e and 166e RIFs to fight on their own. For its attack, the 262. Infanterie-Division employed different tactics than the 167. Infanterie-Division did in Secteur fortifié de Faulquemont. Lacking 88mm Flak, the division commander, Generalleutenant Edgar Theissen, decided to force the French to surrender by bombarding the fortifications into submission with direct fire by field artillery. Starting from the open left flank on the Sarre, Fort Haut-Poirier was chosen as the division’s first objective. The attack began in mid-afternoon of 21 June. Firing at the rear of the fort, a battery of four 150mm howitzers and several 105mm howitzers bombarded the fort for 90 minutes, after which a reconnaissance team from IR 486 attempted to penetrate the fort’s barbed wire but was driven back by machine-gun and mortar fire resulting in one soldier’s death. Simultaneously, a feint by IR 462 on the north side of the fortification line ended with four dead when the soldiers moved into the field of fire of Welschhof’s AM turret. Soon, German artillery fire resumed and began steadily reducing the façade of Block 3. Because Haut-Poirier’s turret could not fire on the German artillery positions, the fort’s crew could do nothing except endure the shelling. Fortress Simserhof attempted to intercede by firing counterbattery salvoes, but German artillery was emplaced out of range of its 75mm guns. The bombardment finally took effect on the fort’s crew when around 1830hrs a shell penetrated the block, heavily damaging the interior, and killing three
LEFT After several hours of bombardment, a German 150mm howitzer shell penetrated the wall of Fort Haut-Poirier’s Block 3, exploded an ammunition store and killed three of the crew. Realizing the hopelessness of the situation, the crew of the fort surrendered to the 262. Infanterie-Division. (M. Romanych) RIGHT Like Fort Haut-Poirier before it, the 262. Infanterie-Division bombarded Fort Welschhof into submission with 150mm howitzers. Here, one side of Block 1 has been pounded into a heap of shattered concrete. (M. Romanych)
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of the crew. Shocked by the event, Haut-Poirier’s commander, Capitaine Gambotti, and Commandant Jolivet, commander of Secteur fortifié de la Sarre who was also in Fort Haut-Poirier, surrendered the fort and five nearby casemates at 2200hrs that evening. After capturing Haut-Poirier, the 262. Infanterie-Division paused its attack for a day to recon French positions and resupply the artillery. At Fort Rohrbach, German infantry accompanied by 37mm anti-tank guns approached and fired on the fort until Simserhof’s 75mm guns shelled the German positions. On 23 June, Gen.Lt. Theissen’s bombardment resumed, shifting to Fort Welschhof and nearby interval casemates. Again, German artillery was able to fire with impunity. Welschhof’s turret could not return fire because of terrain masking and Simserhof’s artillery could not shell German positions because the wind direction had changed, making the rounds fall short. Soon after German 150mm howitzers began firing, the crew of Casemate Ouest de Singling surrendered after one side of the casemate was destroyed. Two other nearby casemates soon followed suit after one crewmember was killed, but before suffering any significant damage. Welschhof itself held out all day, even though German 150mm howitzers blasted away the concrete and weapon embrasures of the entrance block. The next day, as shelling resumed, the crew of neighbouring Casemate Bining surrendered after one crewmember was killed. A few hours later (at 1000hrs), over the objections of his officers, Welschhof’s commander, Capitaine Lhuisset surrendered the fort. With less than 24 hours before the ceasefire, Welschhof was the last fortified work to fall to German forces. Generalleutnant Theissen’s tactics worked well. The 150mm howitzers fired 81 anti-concrete shells at Fort Haut-Poirier and 111 at Welschhof. Within 60 hours, the 262. Infanterie-Division reduced eight kilometres (five miles) of the Maginot Line, capturing two forts and nine casemates and taking more than 500 prisoners. Unconfirmed casualties were five French and six German dead.
ATTACKS IN NORTHERN ALSACE As the 257. Infanterie-Division flanked the Lauter region, the 215. InfanterieDivision attacked the weakly defended casemate line between Bitche and Lembach. A secondary mission for the division was securing the oilfields at Pechelbronn (six kilometres east of Woerth), which, at the time, were some of the few oilfields in Europe. The area selected for the attack was a section of the front located in the rugged terrain of the Vosges Mountains. This section of the Maginot Line was the weakest defended part of the Lauter region because the French engineers thought it impassable and built only a single line of casemates and blockhouses armed with machine guns. Located at the ends of the casemate line were artillery fortresses: Grand-Hohékirkel to the west and Four-à-Chaux to the east. Of the two fortresses, Four-à-Chaux was more important to the upcoming battle. Located on a high hill, Four-à-Chaux with six combat blocks could bring two 75mm guns, two 135mm howitzers and two 81mm mortars to bear on the eastern side of the casemate line. Further east was Fortress Hochwald. With 25 combat blocks, three entrance blocks, eight kilometres (five miles) of underground corridors and a garrison of 1,070 soldiers, Hochwald was double the size of most other Maginot fortresses. 74
Soldiers of the 215. InfanterieDivision pass between Blockhouse Clairière and a bomb crater. A flag draped over the blockhouse’s cupola shows that it is in German hands. (M. Romanych)
Terrain split the combat blocks of Hochwald into two groups – a western section with five combat blocks, including three 135mm howitzers and two 75mm guns that could cover part of Secteur fortifié des Vosges, and an eastern section with six combat blocks that could provide fire support to Secteur fortifié de Haguenau. The defending French 165e RIF was in a difficult situation. The departure of the interval infantry and artillery two days earlier left only the fortress troops in position. Even with artillery support from nearby fortresses, the regiment’s chances of fending off a determined attack were small. Because of hilly terrain and dense forests, neither of the artillery fortresses could directly observe the attack area. Therefore, supporting artillery fire could be expected to be heavy, but mostly ineffective. The 215. Infanterie-Division formed two attack groups on a five-kilometre (three-mile) front. On the division’s right flank was IR 380 reinforced with a company from Pionier-Bataillon 204. On the left, for the main attack, was IR 435 reinforced with two companies from Pionier-Bataillon 204. Artillery support was from the division’s own 105mm field howitzers, two groups of 150mm howitzers (around 24 guns) plus the 355mm M1 and 420mm Skoda howitzer of schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 800, which arrived after the conclusion of the Sarre attack. Also a balloon unit was available to control fires of the siege artillery. Luftwaffe support included several dive-bomber sorties and a battery of 20mm guns from Flak-Abteilung 47. A last-minute addition consisted of four 88mm anti-tank guns from schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 525. At 0630hrs on 19 June a violent two-hour artillery barrage began, followed by 30 minutes of Stuka bombing. No direct hits were scored on any casemate or blockhouse, but communication lines were cut between the French positions. Now isolated, many French crews were demoralized by the intensity of the barrage. Concealed by the smoke and dust of the bombardment, German assault teams closed on the French positions to within 200m (656ft) and emplaced 37mm anti-tank guns and 20mm Flak into firing positions without being detected. Under covering fire of the anti-tank guns, IR 380 quickly took two key blockhouses on Gunsthal Ridge in a frontal assault. Climbing onto the blockhouses’ roofs, German assault troops dropped explosive charges and hand grenades into the embrasures, putting the casemates out of action. With a gap in the defences, the infantry moved behind the casemate line to attack 75
LEFT Three members of Blockhouse Verrerie’s crew, dazed from the intensity of the German 215. Infanterie-Division’s assault, are taken prisoner. (M. Romanych) RIGHT Armoured cupolas were easy targets for German direct fire artillery. This cupola of Casemate Oberroedern-Nord in Secteur fortifié de Haguenau bears the impacts of suppressive fire from both 37mm and 88mm anti-tank guns. (M. Romanych)
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the adjacent blockhouses from the rear. Two blockhouses held out until afternoon, the crews fighting bravely until they had only handguns left for defence. By nightfall six more blockhouses surrendered to IR 380. Infanterie-Regiment 435, supported by 37mm anti-tank guns and 20mm Flak, quickly captured three blockhouses in a frontal assault. The first to fall was Blockhouse Clairière, followed by the neighbouring works – Casemate Verrerie and Blockhouse Verrerie – which were surrounded and assaulted from the rear. The crew of nearby Blockhouse Marbach put up the stiffest resistance. Well covered by artillery fire from Fortress Four-à-Chaux, it was the last to fall. The crew surrendered only after German troops managed to suppress the casemate’s return fire with a 20mm Flak and get close enough to throw grenades into the blockhouse. Throughout the battle, Fortresses Four-à-Chaux and Hochwald provided artillery support to the 165e RIF. The shelling was heavy, with Four-à-Chaux alone firing some 1,680 artillery and mortar rounds. But lacking observation of German positions, the fire was ineffective. To silence the fortress artillery, four waves of Stukas bombed Fort Lembach and fortresses Four-à-Chaux and Hochwald. The bombing was both inaccurate and ineffective, causing only minor damage to Four-à-Chaux’s Block 6. In return, both Four-à-Chaux and Hochwald used their 75mm guns in an improvised anti-aircraft mode to fire on the Stukas, also with little effect. At the end of the day, 22 casemates and blockhouses were in German hands. The 215. Infanterie-Division’s quick success allowed lead units to pass through the French line and move 25km (16 miles) into the rear. The next day (20 June), the division advanced south, taking the towns of Haguenau and Woerth, and the Pechelbronn oilfield. The 215. Infanterie-Division also established contact with 257. Infanterie-Division, encircling the fortresses in the Bitche area. German heavy artillery continued to shell Four-à-Chaux right up until the armistice, but once again, with no impact on the fortress. Between 18 and 20 June, 215. Infanterie-Division casualties were 31 killed and 108 wounded. French losses were estimated at 15 dead and 1,460 taken prisoner. To support the breakthrough in the Vosges Mountains, the 246. InfanterieDivision was ordered to attack Secteur fortifié de Haguenau. The purpose was to divert French attention away from the 215. Infanterie-Division and to create another corridor through the Maginot Line. However, the operation was ill conceived, based on Höheres Kommando XXXVII’s false belief that French fortress troops were demoralized and would give up if attacked.
The Haguenau defences were an example of an ideal Maginot Line secteur fortifié. On the west side, fortresses Hochwald and Schoenenbourg occupied commanding positions on the edge of the Vosges Mountains. The eastern part of Fortress Hochwald had six combat blocks armed with three 135mm howitzers and five 75mm guns. Nearby Fortress Schoenenbourg also had six combat blocs, two of which were equipped with 75mm gun turrets. With good observation and fields of fire, the two fortresses could cover half of the sector with fire from nine 75mm guns. The rest of the sector was a line of interval casemates that ran from Fortress Schoenenbourg to the Rhine River. The defences were organized in depth. Forward of the casemate line were two defensive lines. First, near the German border, were border guard blockhouses located on the main roads into the sector. These blockhouses, camouflaged as civilian houses, were meant to prevent surprise and delay an enemy advance. Behind the border guard blockhouses, and about five kilometres (three miles) forward of the main defensive line, were a series of platoon- and company-sized advanced posts located on key terrain such as road junctions. These strongpoints had blockhouses, field fortifications, minefields and roadblocks intended to block enemy forces long enough to allow preregistered artillery fire on the enemy formations. The main line of defence consisted of mutually supporting interval casemates armed with 37mm or 47mm anti-tank guns and twin heavy machine guns fronted by a belt of anti-tank rails, barbed-wire entanglements, and occasional anti-tank ditches. Many of the interval casemates were grouped in pairs and surrounded by barbed-wire entanglements. Immediately behind the line of casemates were hardened concrete shelters for interval infantry and several observatories for directing artillery fire. Secteur fortifié de Haguenau also had the infrastructure needed for a prolonged defence – material and ammunition depots, a narrow-gauge railway to carry supplies to the fortresses and fortified positions for long-range and railway artillery. Manning the sector were five fortress infantry regiments (22e, 23e, 68e, 70e and 79e) and the 156e RAP. Even with the withdrawal of the interval troops, the sector’s defences were formidable. The German 246. Infanterie-Division, commanded by Generalleutnant Erich Denecke, was one of the least capable divisions to attack the Maginot Line. Not only was it short of equipment, but its soldiers were either younger or older than those normally assigned to infantry units and, as a group, untrained. However, despite these deficiencies, the division was ordered into the assault. Four days before the attack, the 246. Infanterie-Division pushed forwards from the border. In heavy fighting it took French advanced posts along with some 1,000 prisoners, but suffered significant casualties, especially from 75mm gun fire by Hochwald and Schoenenbourg, which on the 15th alone fired more
Casemate Aschbach-Est was crucial to the defeat of the 246. Infanterie-Division’s attack at Hoffen and Oberroedern, having first repulsed an attack by a German assault group and then by supporting Casemate Oberroedern-Nord with its 50mm mortars. (M. Romanych)
Attacks in Alsace, 15–21 June 1940 German front line, 15 June German front line, 17 June German front line, 19 June German front line, 21 June German advance, 16–17 June German advance, 18–19 June German advance, 20–21 June
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-P W oiri els er ch (2 Ro hof 1 Ju h r ( 2 ne ba 3 ) ch Jun e) Si m Sc serh h o Ot iess f te e r c Gr biel k an dHo hé ki rk el
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Maginot casemate line Secondary defences Fortress Fort (with date of capture)
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than 5,200 rounds. On 19 June, as lead elements of the 246. Infanterie-Division approached the casemate line in the Aschbach–Oberroedern area, division officers attempted to talk French crews of the 79e RIF into surrendering. When that failed, the division conducted a hasty attack, hoping to seize several French casemates. The attack opened with 88mm anti-tank guns of schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 525 firing on the casemates’ armoured cupolas. Positioned too far away – about three kilometres (two miles) – the 88mm guns were ineffective. Then, after a brief artillery preparation, the assault teams advanced on the casemate line but were quickly repulsed by machine-gun fire from the casemates and artillery fire from fortresses Hochwald and Schoenenbourg. That night, after Stuka sorties from Kampfgeschwader 28 and siege artillery (a 355mm M1 and a 420mm howitzer) from schwere ArtillerieAbteilung 800 were allocated to Höheres Kommando XXXVII, the division planned a large-scale operation for the next day. One infantry regiment would move through the gap in the Vosges Mountains to encircle the Haguenau sector defences, while two regiments would conduct a frontal assault on the casemate line near the village of Oberroedern. The next morning, 20 June, IR 404 followed the 215. Infanterie-Division through the Vosges Gap and closed in on the rear of the French defences. This manoeuvre was a success with IR 404 capturing approximately 1,000 French soldiers. Meanwhile, IR 313 and 352 moved into position near the village of Aschbach. Each regiment fielded one attack battalion reinforced with two platoons of combat engineers. In support were 24 105mm and four 150mm guns from Artillerie-Regiment 246 and the 88mm guns of schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 525. Seven casemates near the villages of Hoffen and Oberroedern were selected for attack. The main attack was against casemates Aschbach-Ouest and Est, and Oberroedern-Nord, located north and east of Oberroedern. If seized, a sizeable gap in the casemate line would be created. However, with its place of attack in well within range of Hochwald’s and Schoenenbourg’s artillery, the 246. Infanterie-Division was destined to fail The attack began in mid-afternoon with shelling by 105mm and 150mm howitzers, followed by Stukas carrying 500kg bombs. Despite a large number of bombs dropped, the Stukas hit only Casemate Oberroedern-Nord and the nearby Hoffen shelter, which was the sector’s command post. The latter was significant because it had to be evacuated just before the German ground attack, disrupting the French command and control. Otherwise,
LEFT The cornerstones of the French defence in Secteur fortifié de Haguenau were fortresses Schoenenbourg and Hochwald. In support of the 246. Infanterie-Division’s attack, Stukas repeatedly bombed both fortresses on 20 June, but accomplished little more than churning the ground as seen here at Hochwald’s Block 1. (M. Romanych) RIGHT Despite bombardment by some 50 420mm rounds and 160 Stuka bombs, Fortress Schoenenbourg suffered only minimal damage. Here, a bomb from a Stuka has blown a huge crater next to Block 3 without damaging the block’s cupola, 75mm gun turret or the underlying concrete structure. (M. Romanych)
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LEFT An 88mm gun assigned to a Luftwaffe anti-aircraft unit takes aim at a French fortification in the Breisach area. Firing at close range, Flak crews such as this one poured deadly accurate fire on the casemates and blockhouses along the bank of the Rhine River. (M. Romanych) RIGHT German assault troops of the 239. Infanterie-Division cross the river in a motorized assault boat near Sponeck. The river was 250m (820ft) wide with a current of three metres per second. At maximum speed, an assault boat could cross the river in about 20 seconds. (M. Romanych)
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the bombardment failed to reduce the French defences or morale. During the bombardment, German assault teams advanced on the casemates using nearby ravines for cover and concealment. With the final approach, 37mm anti-tank and 88mm Flak fired on the casemates’ embrasures and cupolas. The intensity of the fire forced French crews to evacuate the cupolas and close the weapon embrasures. Several cupolas were knocked out, including one at Casemate Oberroedern-Sud, where a French soldier was decapitated when an 88mm shell penetrated its embrasure. In addition, the 88mm guns destroyed several small blockhouses that covered the ravines, killing several French soldiers. At 1800hrs, after the Stuka bombing ended, German troops emerged from the ravines and charged forwards. As the Germans reached the obstacle belt they drew heavy machine-gun fire from the casemate crews who were now back at their battle stations. All assaults were repulsed, except at Casemate Oberroedern-Nord where German infantry and engineers breached the barbed-wire entanglements and surrounded the casemate. In a desperate fight, Oberroedern-Nord’s crew held off repeated assaults with assistance from nearby Casemate Aschbach-Est. Meanwhile several waves of Stukas bombed Hochwald and Schoenenbourg to suppress their artillery. However, damage from the aerial bombing was minimal and both fortresses poured artillery fire into the Oberroedern area, pinning down the German assault formations and reinforcements. With the attack bogged down, Gen.Lt. Erich Denecke requested a new wave of divebomber attacks to cover a withdrawal. While the Stukas bombed the casemate line and Fortress Schoenenbourg, most assault teams managed to disengage and pull back into the ravines. The 246. Infanterie-Division’s operation against Secteur fortifié de Haguenau ended in failure. German losses for the period 14 to 20 June were 62 killed, ten missing and nearly 300 wounded. After the end of the 246. Infanterie-Division’s attack, German artillery continued to shell the Haguenau fortifications. The next day, 21 June, siege artillery of schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 800 took position and began shelling Fortress Schoenenbourg. During each salvo, Schoenenbourg’s crew retracted its turrets to protect against a direct hit. In between the crew raised the turrets and engaged in counterbattery fire against the German artillery. By the time of the armistice, Fortress Schoenenbourg was the most shelled fortress of the Maginot Line having been periodically shelled by artillery rounds ranging from 105mm to 420mm from 15 May onwards. Additionally, Stukas dropped approximately 160 bombs on the fortress. In return, Schoenenbourg fired 15,802 75mm rounds. For all the pounding, no significant damage was inflicted on the fortress.
OPERATION KLEINER BÄR: ASSAULT ACROSS THE RHINE On 15 June, AOK 7 launched Operation Kleiner Bär, a five-division assault crossing of the Rhine River in the Colmar area. The objective of the operation was to pierce the French Rhine defences and seize the southern passes of the Vosges Mountains for further advance to the west. Prior to the operation, AOK 7 had only four weak Stellungsdivisionen (static divisions) occupying West Wall positions on the east bank of the Rhine River under XXV AK (555. and 557. Infanterie-Divisionen) and XXXIII AK (554. and 556. InfanterieDivisionen). These divisions, created in February 1940, had older soldiers (often more than 40 years old) equipped with captured Polish weapons and lacking the normal compliment of engineers, anti-tank guns and artillery. In early June, four divisions – the 213., 218., 221. and 239. Infanterie-Divisionen – were attached to AOK 7 to spearhead Operation Kleiner Bär. Although these divisions were also untrained and none had prior combat experience, they were far more capable than the Stellungsdivisionen. At the same time, AOK 7 was reinforced with artillery and engineer units and the headquarters of XXVII AK, which was transferred from the Lille area to take command of the operation’s main effort. Finally, the newly formed 6. Gebirgs-Division (mountain division) arrived on 14 June in anticipation of combat in the Vosges Mountains. For the offensive, AOK 7 had nearly 400 divisional and corps artillery pieces reinforced by schwere Stellungs-Artillerie-Abteilung 215 with its 170mm and 240mm guns, several batteries of 240mm and 280mm railway guns, a battery of 305mm howitzers and the 355mm M1 howitzer from schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 800. Particularly significant was the assignment of ten Army and Luftwaffe heavy anti-aircraft batteries with approximately 54 88mm and Czech 83.5mm Flak guns for bunker-busting, and nine engineer battalions equipped with motorized assault boats and pontoon bridges for the river crossing. Air support was one Ju 87 Stuka-Geschwader, as well as some He 111s for strategic targets. On the French side were three entrenched fortress infantry divisions. In the north around Strasbourg was the 103e Division d’infanterie forteresse with three RIFs. In the centre near Colmar, was the 104e Division d’infanterie forteresse with two RIFs and an infantry regiment. In the south by Mulhouse, was the 105e Division d’infanterie forteresse with one RIF. Withdrawal of the 8e Armée several days earlier left the fortress divisions overextended with insufficient reserves and artillery. In every way German forces were superior to the French. The 104e Division d’infanterie forteresse, which would bear the brunt of the German offensive, was ill equipped to stop the attack. Eight battalions from the 28e RIF, 42e RIF, 242e RI and the 9e and 10e Bataillons de chasseurs
LEFT Soldiers of the 557. InfanterieDivision’s IR 633 assemble on the bank of the French side of the Rhine River near Rhinau as reinforcements are ferried across in assault boats. (M. Romanych) RIGHT Once the French side of the river was crossed, German engineers erected pontoon bridges to get additional troops and heavy equipment across the river. This bridge is in the 221. Infanterie-Division sector near Limbourg-Nord. (M. Romanych)
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THE FIGHT FOR CASEMATE OBERROEDERN-NORD, 20 JUNE 1940 (pp. 82–83) The German assault on Casemate Oberroedern-Nord was a desperate fight. During the preparatory bombardment a Stuka bomb hit the casemate’s protective ditch. The explosion breached the casemate’s exterior wall, breaking up several interior walls in the bottom level. Smoke and dust blew through the casemate and the crew panicked. Meanwhile, fire from 88mm anti-tank guns disabled two of the casemate’s armoured cupolas, hitting each more than a dozen times (1). The loss of these cupolas left the forward side of the casemate blind and defenceless. A third cupola, recessed in the casemate’s roof, was not visible to the crews of the 88s and therefore was not engaged (2). Once the 88mm guns stopped firing, German infantry and combat engineers emerged from a nearby ravine, crossed the anti-tank (3) and barbed-wire (4) obstacle belts, and infiltrated around the side and rear of the casemate. As the Germans closed in for the final assault, Oberroedern-Nord’s commander, Lieutenant Vialle rallied his soldiers who then fired every available weapon at the attackers, including a 47mm anti-tank gun, 7.5mm machine guns, hand-
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held 50mm mortars and even the commander’s revolver. When German troops moved in to breach the casemate’s armoured door and disable the weapon embrasures (5), the casemate crew used special grenade launchers (called goulottes) mounted in the walls of the casemate to drop hand grenades into the protective ditch and keep the German soldiers away. Realizing the danger of the situation, Lt. Vialle signalled the neighbouring Casemate Aschbach-Est to lob 50mm mortar rounds on Casemate Oberroedern-Nord (6). Despite the intense French defensive fire, the German soldiers made several attempts to take the casemate; but each was repulsed and the attack stalled. Meanwhile, deadly accurate fire from the twin 7.5mm machine guns of Oberroedern-Nord’s undamaged cupola blocked the arrival of German reinforcements and the route of withdrawal. Trapped, the German soldiers hunkered down in bomb craters until dive-bomber attacks against Casemate Aschbach-Est and other nearby fortified works provided cover for a hasty withdrawal.
Pyrénéens were ordered to cover a 50km front (31-mile). For artillery, the division had a single group of the 170e RAP with three batteries of 75mm field guns and a mixed battery of 120mm and 150mm howitzers, totalling 22 guns (versus some 400 German artillery pieces). Also in the sector, was the 18e BCC with 63 World War I-vintage Renault FT17 tanks. French defences were a series of casemates and fieldworks organized into two, sometimes three, lines that paralleled the Rhine River. The fortifications were clustered near likely crossing points – ferry and bridge sites – and stretched thin elsewhere. The first line of defence was located directly along the bank of the river, centred on large interval casemates built directly into the riverbank. For firepower, these casemates had machine guns and 37mm anti-tank guns sited to sweep the French side of the river, and one or two armoured cupolas for self-defence and to fire across the river. Between the casemates were smaller concrete blockhouses and field fortifications. The second defensive line consisted of a few concrete infantry shelters interspersed behind the casemates of the first defensive line. These shelters housed between ten and 30 soldiers for local counterattacks. The third line, located about two kilometres (one mile) from the river, was the main line of defence. The backbone was a series of large interval casemates built along the region’s primary north–south road. Equipped with machine guns and 47mm anti-tank guns, these casemates were sited to provide interlocking fields of fire. Each casemate also had one or more armoured cupola. In addition to the casemates, nearby villages and forested areas were fortified into strongpoints with blockhouses and fieldworks. Even though the French noted German preparatory activities and were expecting an attack, AOK 7 achieved tactical surprise when dense fog forced a postponement of the attack from daybreak (the typical time for an attack) to mid-morning. The offensive opened at 1000hrs with a ten-minute bombardment of French casemates and blockhouses opposite the crossing points. Organized into groups of four to six pieces, 88mm, 83.5mm and 20mm anti-aircraft and 37mm anti-tank guns engaged targets over open sights at ranges less than 400m (1,312ft). The 88mm Flak easily penetrated the concrete walls and armoured cupolas while 37mm anti-tank and 20mm anti-aircraft guns fired on the weapon embrasures. In a matter of minutes, most casemates and blockhouses were reduced to rubble. The violence of the artillery fire stunned French troops, many of whom abandoned the casemates and blockhouses for nearby fieldworks. At the same time, German indirect artillery fire shelled positions near the crossing points and laid smoke to conceal the crossing points. Air support was not employed because it rained for most of the day.
Luftwaffe Flak personnel supporting the 221. InfanterieDivision stand next to the still-smoking Casemate Limbourg-Nord. Soon after assault troops cleared the French defences, 88mm Flak guns were ferried over the river for employment against French third-line casemates. (M. Romanych)
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GERMAN UNITS 1 Two 88mm Flak guns from III. Abteilung, Flak-Regiment 25 2 Teams of one 83.5mm Flak gun from ArtillerieBatterie 715 and two 37mm anti-tank guns 3 Half a platoon from Pionier-Bataillon 658 4 Two platoons from Pionier-Bataillon 658 5 One platoon from 3. Kompanie, Infanterie-Regiment 622 6 One and a half platoons from 3. Kompanie, Infanterie-Regiment 622 7 5. Kompanie, Infanterie-Regiment 327
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EVENTS 1 1000hrs: teams of Flak and anti-tank guns destroy Casemate Eiswasserkopf and nearby Blockhouses G20–23. 2 1010hrs: combat engineers of the first wave cross the Rhine in assault boats and clear Casemate Eiswasserkopf, Blockhouse G20 and adjacent fieldworks. 3 1010hrs: combat engineers of the first wave cross the Rhine in assault boats and clear Blockhouses G22, G23 and G24, and fieldworks along the bank of the river. 4 Combat engineers establish a blocking position and two outposts to protect the river crossing site.
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5 Infantry of the second wave cross the river and establish a defensive position 500m (1,640ft) north-west of the crossing site. 6 Infantry with anti-tank guns cross in the third and fourth waves and establish defensive positions on the southern flank of the bridgehead. 7 Midday: engineers establish two ferry sites and erect a pontoon bridge across the Rhine River. 8 Afternoon and evening: French infantry move forwards and conduct several counterattacks along the German line.
ASSAULT ACROSS THE RHINE NEAR KUNHEIM: 15 JUNE 1940 In a textbook example of an assault river crossing, the German Pionier-Bataillon 658, reinforced with infantry, successfully crosses the Rhine River and establishes a bridgehead against minimal resistance from the French 9e Bataillon de chasseurs Pyrénéens. 86
Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 500m/547yds
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First-line casemate Concrete blockhouse Second-line casemate Third-line casemate Elements of 9e Bataillon de chasseurs Pyrénéens
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In a matter of minutes, two 88s of Flak-Regiment 25 destroyed Casemate Eiswasserkopf in the 239. Infanterie-Division’s sector, penetrating 1.8m (six feet) of reinforced concrete and collapsing the armoured cupola into the interior of the casemate. (M. Romanych)
Armeeoberkommando 7 conducted seven regiment-sized river crossings against the 104e Division d’infanterie forteresse. The main crossings were conducted by XXVII AK’s 218. Infanterie-Division at Schoenau, 221. Infanterie-Division at Limbourg, and 239. Infanterie-Division near Sponeck, while a supporting crossing was conducted by Höheres Kommando XXXIII’s 554. Infanterie-Division at Neuf-Brisach. On the northern flank XXV AK’s 557. Infanterie-Division crossed at Rhinau in a diversionary operation against the 103e Division d’infanterie forteresse. As soon as the barrage ended, German troops quickly crossed the river in motorized assault boats. Surviving French positions fired on the boats, but without supporting artillery they could only hinder, not stop, the river crossing. In only two places were the river crossings seriously opposed by French troops. Upon landing on the French side, German infantry and combat engineers systematically assaulted French positions, some of which fought to the last man in close combat. Once the riverbank was cleared, engineers began assembling motorized pontoon boats to ferry heavy equipment and building pontoon bridges for follow-on forces. At Schoenau, the 218. Infanterie-Division’s IR 397 crossing in the 242e RI’s sector was held up by Casemate Schoenau Sud. Although the casemate was heavily damaged, the crew continued to fight, firing on German assault teams and pinning the soldiers to the riverbank. As casualties mounted, the commander of IR 397 suspended the regiment’s crossing operation. Meanwhile three kilometres (two miles) to the south, the division’s other regiment – IR 386 – had better success. Crossing in an area with fewer fortifications, the regiment’s assault teams quickly cleared the French first defensive line. By 1100hrs, forward elements were engaging third-line defences and by noon several casemates were captured. Further south, the 221. Infanterie-Divisions’s IR 350 and 360 crossed the river easily north and south of Limbourg after 88mm guns pulverized the casemates and blockhouses of the 42e RIF, killing several of the French crews. Except for two blockhouses that held out into early afternoon, German assault teams quickly cleared the riverbank of resistance and less than an hour after the start of the operation the division’s engineers began building a pontoon bridge. During the afternoon, lead elements of IR 360 probed the French third defensive line near the village of Marckolsheim, but after receiving fire from several casemates were forced to take defensive positions. South of Sponeck, the 239. Infanterie-Divisions’s IR 444 and 327 rapidly crossed the Rhine and advanced from the riverbank against weak resistance from the 9e Bataillon de chasseurs Pyrénéens and II/42e RIF. However, fire from third-line casemates and counterattacks by elements of the 9e Bataillon
de chasseurs Pyrénéens near the village of Kunheim repulsed German reconnaissance detachments and halted the division’s advance for the day. The fiercest fighting took place near Neuf-Brisach between the 554. Infanterie-Divisions’s IR 623 and the 28e RIF. Fire from Casemate FortMortier and several well-camouflaged blockhouses, coordinated with artillery fire, destroyed 12 of 15 assault boats and forced the division to shift its crossing further upstream. Once across the river, IR 623 met stiff resistance trying to expand the bridgehead. In close combat German infantry and engineers attacked French casemates and blockhouses one by one. But stubborn resistance combined with three desperate counterattacks by II/28e RIF inflicted significant German casualties and held IR 623 to the riverbank. Armeeoberkommando 7’s greatest success that day was at Rhinau where XXV AK’s diversionary attack struck the 34e RIF of the 103e Division d’infantrie de forteresse. At 1300hrs, 88mm and 83.5mm Flak smashed the casemates and blockhouses on the bank of the Rhine, as indirect fire bombarded the area around the crossing point and French third-line positions. The 557. Infanterie-Divisions’s IR 633 crossed the river easily and established a bridgehead against minimal resistance. Only Casemate Rhinau-Sud, whose crew held out until the next day, hindered the German assault. At 1700hrs, elements of IR 633 penetrated the third line, taking two casemates and flanking adjacent defences from the rear. By nightfall, the 557. Infanterie-Division had cleared a four-kilometre (two-mile) gap through the 34e RIF’s defences. That evening, the main bridgehead of XXVII AK and Höheres Kommando XXXIII was 30km (19 miles) wide and two kilometres (one mile) deep, while to the north XXV AK’s smaller bridgehead was nine kilometres (six miles) wide and four (two miles) deep. Although all five assaulting divisions were established on the left bank of the Rhine, only one – the 557. InfanterieDivision – had breached the French main defensive line. Yet, with no reserves and little artillery, the French 103e and 104e Divisions d’infanterie forteresse could not expect to hold the German offensive much longer. Throughout the night more German infantry and artillery crossed the Rhine. At daybreak, 16 June, the offensive was renewed with a 30-minute bombardment of French positions followed by ground attacks supported by Flak and anti-tank guns. Intense fighting took place as German infantry and engineers assaulted third-line casemates and strongpoints. Units of the 104e DIF conducted several successful local counterattacks, but the tide turned in favour of the Germans when, in the mid-morning, Stukas began dive-bombing French casemates. In quick succession two casemates were destroyed and several others damaged. With no anti-aircraft artillery to return fire, the effect
LEFT German assault troops of the 239. Infanterie Division rest next to a destroyed French blockhouse (G22) located south of Casemate Eiswasserkopf. In the background reinforcements assemble after crossing the Rhine over a pontoon bridge. (M. Romanych) RIGHT Despite being heavily damaged during the German preparatory bombardment, the crew of Casemate Fort-Mortier stubbornly resisted the 554. Infanterie-Division’s river crossing. (M. Rupp)
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The failure of the Maginot line was not the fault of French fortress troops who often fought valiantly against superior odds. At Casemate Marckolsheim-Nord (Secteur fortifié de Colmar), the crew endured bombardment by 150mm howitzers and 88mm Flak and then stubbornly resisted a close assault by German combat engineers. About one third of the crew was killed and the casemate was left in ruins. (M. Romanych)
on the French soldiers was demoralizing, and as the Stuka attacks continued on into the afternoon, French resistance finally started to break. By evening the 218., 221. and 239. Infanterie-Divisionen successfully pierced the French line in several places. At Marckolsheim, two casemates – Marckolsheim-Nord and -Sud – manned by the 42e RIF put up stubborn resistance. After repeated bombing by Stukas and bombardment by 88mm Flak, German assault teams from the 221. Infanterie-Division attacked Casemate Marckolsheim-Sud. With one cupola buried under dirt flung up by the Stuka bombs and the other disabled by 88mm Flak, the casemate crew could not defend itself. German combat engineers climbed on top of the casemate and threw explosive charges into the casemate, severely damaging the casemate’s interior and killing one of the crew. Forced out by the explosions, the survivors surrendered to German troops surrounding the casemate. The next morning German troops attacked Marckolsheim-Nord. Preparatory bombardment by a battery of 150mm howitzers and several 88mm Flak guns destroyed most of the casemate’s weapons. As German troops moved in for the assault, the casemate crew fought bravely, but when they tried to abandon the casemate they were forced back inside after nine of the approximately 25 crewmen were killed, including the casemate’s commander. German combat engineers then threw three explosive charges into the casemate, which set fire to the interior and detonated the ammunition. Unable to continue to fight, the remaining crewmembers surrendered. That night, the 104e and 105e Divisions d’infanterie forteresse pulled back to establish a new defensive line in the Vosges Mountains. Several casemate crews were left in place to cover the withdrawal; a few of which held out until 18 June. The 221. Infanterie-Division entered Colmar on 17 June, a day later than initially planned. Further south, Heeresgruppe A’s XIX AK (mot.) reached the Swiss border. The fortresses in the Metz and Lauter regions were now cut off from the rest of France and, according to German claims, 500,000 troops of French Groupe d’armées 2 were encircled in the Vosges Mountains. For the next seven days, Heeresgruppe C’s three armies steadily reduced the pocket until the last French units surrendered on 25 June. Yet, when the armistice took effect, the main fortifications of the Maginot Line were still intact and capable of continuing the fight. Although active combat had ended, several fortress commanders refused to admit defeat. Remaining defiant, they surrendered only after being ordered by Gén. Georges, and then only under protest. In early July, a week after the rest of the French Army laid down arms, the last fortress was handed over by its crew to the Wehrmacht. 90
AFTERMATH
The French Army’s employment of the Maginot Line was a series of poor decisions and missed opportunities. First, the GQG’s focus on the major fortresses in northern Alsace and Lorraine left other sectors vulnerable to German attack. Although it was reasonable to expect the Wehrmacht would attack where the defences were weakest, during planning the GQG fixated on the possibility of an attack against the Maginot Line proper. Second, during the campaign, too many divisions were tied down in the fortifications of the Metz and Lauter regions in violation of the Maginot Line’s own purpose of conserving manpower. Even as the Wehrmacht overran the Belgian border defences and surrounded Allied forces at Dunkirk, about 20 per cent of field divisions remained inactive along the Maginot Line. Thirdly, the GQG compounded its earlier mistakes by failing to counter the German’s advance through the Ardennes with an offensive from the Maginot Line proper into the southern flank of the Heeresgruppe A. Lastly, had the French Army moved its reserve formations into the fortifications of the Lille and Maubeuge regions, it is possible that Heeresgruppe A’s advance could have been blunted, giving time for Groupe d’armées 1 to reorganize during its retreat from Belgium. Despite its triumphs against fortifications in the Ardennes and Lille– Maubeuge regions, the Wehrmacht had much less success against the stronger fortifications in Alsace and Lorraine. Of the 58 major Maginot fortified works, the Wehrmacht captured ten (La Ferté, Bersillies, La Salmagne, Boussois, Sarts, Eth, Bambesch, Kerfent, Haut-Poirier and Welschhof). Another two fortresses (Chesnois and Vélosnes) and one fort (Thonnelle) in the Montmédy sector were abandoned by their crews to the Germans without a fight. The loss of these fortifications was more due to the absence of supporting interval infantry and artillery than it was to German tactical prowess. Otherwise, Maginot fortress troops withstood the test of battle, repulsing ground attacks against one fortress (Fermont) and two forts (Ferme-Chappy and Einseling). A further five fortresses (Mont-des-Welches, Michelsberg, Four-à-Chaux, Hochwald and Schoenenbourg) and three forts (Laudrefang, Teting and Lembach) withstood intense aerial and artillery bombardment. Regardless of extensive design and planning, even the Maginot Line proper had several tactical weaknesses that became apparent during battle. One weakness was the lack of offensive combat power. The fortress artillery, while powerful, was outranged by German heavy artillery that could 91
Fortress Simserhof near Bitche is handed over to Gen.Obst. Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, commander of Heeresgruppe C, on 3 July 1940. (M. Romanych)
bombard the fortifications without getting into a counterbattery fight. Yet, the Wehrmacht could not exploit this weakness because 210mm, 305mm and 420mm artillery pieces did not significantly damage the main fortified works. Even the 305mm round that hit one of Fortress Fermont’s turrets inflicted minimal physical damage. Additionally, the siege artillery was inaccurate. At Hochwald and Schoenenbourg, the bombardments registered few direct hits and generally succeeded only in cratering the ground and blasting away sections of the obstacle belt. Another weakness was the lack of anti-aircraft weapons, which allowed German dive-bombers to freely attack the forts at Maubeuge and fortresses Four-à-Chaux, Hochwald and Schoenenbourg. In desperation, the crews of Four-à-Chaux and Hochwald resorted to using casemate-mounted 75mm guns as anti-aircraft guns. However, as it turned out, aerial bombs inflicted little damage on the fortifications, possibly because 60 per cent of the bombs missed their targets. Yet, although the physical impact of dive-bombing was minimal, the psychological impact was great, demoralizing fortress troops at Maubeuge, in the Vosges Mountains and along the third-line casemates of the Rhine front. The Maginot line’s primary nemesis was the 88mm gun. Direct fire from 88mm guns at ranges less than 1,000m (3,280ft) easily destroyed casemates and combat blocks in a matter of minutes. Even at Fortress Fermont where just two 88mm guns fired on the fortress, only luck averted disaster for the French. Fire from other artillery pieces – 37mm anti-tank, 20mm Flak, and 105mm and 150mm guns – had minimal impact, except to force French crews to button up the weapon embrasures. Even direct fire by 150mm howitzers using anti-concrete rounds succeeded only against the fortifications of Secteur fortifié de Rohrbach after prolonged bombardment, or in the case of Fort Haut-Poirier, a lucky hit. The Wehrmacht defeated the Maginot Line because there was little to no coordination between the French fortress troops and the field army. To be effective, the fortifications of the Maginot Line had to fight as a system of mutually supporting positions reinforced by mobile infantry and artillery that could move to counter German attacks. In most of their battles, the fortress units fought in isolation against overwhelming odds. That they often put up stubborn resistance while the rest of the French Army collapsed is a testimony to the legacy of the Maginot Line and the soldiers that manned it. 92
THE BATTLEFIELDS TODAY More than six decades after the end of the French campaign, a remarkable number of the Maginot fortifications remain. Although urban growth has altered the countryside, the landscape looks very similar to how it did in 1940. One notable difference is vegetation. In 1940, the main fortification line cut a long swath across the countryside, but today it has overgrown with forest and scrub brush. As a result, it is difficult to envisage the full extent of the Maginot Line as a linear fortification. Gone forever are the obstacle belts that fronted the length of the fortification line. Most anti-tank rails and barbed-wire entanglements were removed and scrapped by the Germans during the war, although a few short sections remain near the larger fortifications. Also gone are most of the Rhine River casemates, which were removed when the river was widened in 1970s to facilitate navigation. Local community and preservation groups maintain 20 or more fortified works as historical sites. Detailed information about these groups can be found on the Internet. While most preservation groups emphasize the technological and engineering aspects of the Maginot line, a few also include exhibits about the combat action. Most notable are Fort La Ferté, Fortress Fermont, Fort Bambesch, Fortress Schoenenbourg and Casemate Markolsheim, each of which was the scene of significant combat. Recently, several communities and historical associations have initiated efforts to link several elements of the Maginot Line into larger sites that provide a picture of the fighting of 1940. Near Saint-Avold, visitors can visit both forts Bambesch and Einseling while walking a short section of the former Secteur fortifié de Faulquemont. In the Sarre region, near the town of Barst, a local group has restored several casemates, blockhouses, fieldworks and other defensive features that were manned by the French 82e RMIF in 1940. Further east, at Fortress Schoenenbourg with its excellent museum and the nearby casemates at Oberroedern, visitors can gain an appreciation for the German attack against the Haguenau sector. The remainder of the Maginot Line and border defences lies abandoned in the countryside, largely ignored by the local populace. All along the northern French border small casemates and blockhouses dot the landscape. In the forests near Metz, Thionville, Bitche and Lembach are the traces of field fortifications built by the French interval infantry as well as occasional shell craters from the German attacks. Those exploring off the beaten path should be aware that some sections of the Maginot Line are located on military-controlled terrain. 93
FURTHER READING English-language books about combat and the Maginot Line are few in number. Most histories are in French language. Here are some recommended works that are currently in print: Alcorn, William, Fortress 10: The Maginot Line 1928–45 (Osprey Publishing Ltd: Oxford, 2003) Frieser, Karl-Heinz, and Greenwood, John T., The Blitzkrieg Legend: the 1940 Campaign in the West (Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, Maryland, 2005) Kaufmann, J. E., and Kaufmann, H. W., Fortress France: The Maginot Line and French Defenses in World War II (Praeger Security International: Connecticut, 2006) Mary, Jean-Yves, and Hohnadel, Alain, Hommes et ouvrages de la ligne Maginot, Volumes 13 (Histoire & Collections: Paris, 2000–2003) Pallud, Jean Paul, Blitzkrieg in the West: Then and Now (After the Battle: London, 1991)
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INDEX Figures in bold refer to illustrations advanced/forward posts 18, 56, 57, 69, 77 aircraft 15, 20, 30, 48, 57, 60, 61, 76, 82–3, 84, 92; Do 17 57; He 111 57, 81; Ju 87 Stuka 26, 48, 49, 57, 61, 75, 76, 79, 79, 80, 81, 82–3, 84, 89–90; Ju 88 57; Me 110 57 Aisne River, French defences along 36, 52 Alsace and Lorraine, defences/fighting in 5, 8, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 28, 29, 30, 32, 52, 56, 69, 73–7, 78, 79–80, 91 ammunition, stocks of 17, 28, 77 Ardennes region, defences/fighting in 5, 11, 19, 20, 28, 31, 33–4, 34, 35–6, 91 armoured cupolas 29, 37, 45 attacks on 20, 21, 26, 30, 42–3, 44, 45, 48, 49, 51, 51, 53, 55, 66, 67, 67, 68, 70–1, 72, 75, 76, 79, 79, 80, 82–3, 88 defensive armament 37, 49, 79, 82–3, 84 role/uses of 18, 53, 85 armoured turrets 8, 15, 19, 37, 46, 50, 73, 80 AMmo50 model 45–6, 48, 49, 50 attacks on 21, 26, 40, 41, 42–3, 44, 45, 49–50, 49, 51, 53, 64, 64, 70–1, 72, 92 defensive armament 17, 36, 37, 45–6, 48, 50, 53, 55, 57, 61, 64, 67, 68, 70–1, 72, 73, 74 artillery (French) 11, 17, 17, 18, 18, 19, 30, 31, 32, 33, 37, 50, 51, 52, 53, 56, 57, 60, 61, 63, 63, 66, 68, 69, 73, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 85, 89, 91, 92 anti-tank guns 19, 35, 40, 46: 37mm 17, 18, 77, 85; 47mm 17, 18, 36, 46, 57, 66, 77, 82–3, 84, 85; 65mm 57 howitzers/light guns: 25mm 36, 37, 45, 50, 73; 74mm 73; 75mm 8, 15, 17, 19, 28, 37, 50, 53, 55, 57, 61, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 85, 92; 120mm 46, 85; 135mm 8, 17, 74, 75, 77; 150mm 85; 155mm 46, 50, 57; 370mm 19 mortars 19, 73: 50mm 20, 45, 70–1, 72, 77, 82–3, 84; 81mm 17, 55, 66, 68, 74 railway guns 57, 60, 77 artillery (German) 5, 9, 11, 15, 20, 21, 21, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 37, 40, 41, 41, 42–3, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49–50, 50, 51, 51, 52, 53, 53, 56, 57, 58–9, 60, 61, 63, 64, 64, 66, 66, 67, 67, 68, 69, 73, 73, 74, 75, 76, 76, 79, 80, 81, 85, 89, 89, 90, 90, 91, 92 anti-tank guns 9, 30, 46, 60, 61, 64, 81, 89: 37mm 20, 33, 48, 50, 51, 57, 64, 67, 67, 68, 70–1, 72, 74, 75, 76, 76, 80, 85, 92; 47mm 55; 88mm 26, 57, 61, 63, 75, 79, 82–3, 84 field/infantry guns: 75mm 20, 63, 64; 100mm 40, 48; 170mm gun 81 Flak 8, 33: 20mm 20, 50, 57, 66, 67, 68, 70–1, 72, 75, 76, 85, 92; 37mm 20; 81mm 68; 83.5mm 81, 89; 88mm 26, 33, 40, 41, 42–3, 44, 45, 48, 49, 49, 51, 51, 53, 55, 57, 63, 66, 66, 67, 67, 69, 70–1, 72, 73, 74, 76, 80, 80, 81, 85, 85, 88, 89, 90, 90, 92
howitzers 33, 48, 52, 60, 61: 105mm 20, 21, 40, 48, 49, 55, 55, 56, 63, 75, 79, 80, 92; 150mm 20, 21, 40, 41, 48, 57, 66, 73, 74, 75, 79, 90, 90, 92; 210mm 21, 40, 41, 48, 53, 92; 240mm 81; 305mm 21, 51, 53, 53, 81, 92; 355mm 21, 57, 66, 75, 79, 81; 420mm 21, 21, 57, 60, 64, 66, 75, 79, 80, 79, 92 mortars: 50mm 20; 81mm 20, 68; 600mm 21 railway guns: 150mm 21; 280mm 21; 305mm 57; 800mm 21 artillery observation posts 60, 65, 69 assault boats 80, 81, 81, 88, 89 Barst strongpoint, fall of 60, 64 Belgium 9, 46 Allied forces in 28, 29, 36 border defences 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 16–17, 18–19, 21, 27, 46, 50, 91 French forces in 27, 31, 35, 52, 91 German threat 20, 21, 28, 29, 30, 35, 91 Besson, Gén. Antoine 12–13, 16 Biding strongpoint, fall of 61, 64 Billotte, Gén. Gaston 12, 13, 16, 31 Bitche, defences/fight for 8, 9, 69, 74, 76, 93 Blanchard, Gén. Georges 13 blockhouses 8, 30, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 50, 53, 57, 60, 77, 93 attacks on 21, 33, 33, 35, 36, 42–3, 44, 48, 52, 56, 60–1, 63, 63, 64, 66, 67, 69, 70–1, 72, 73, 75, 75, 76, 76, 79, 80, 80, 85, 88, 89, 89 construction of 10, 16, 17, 19, 31, 33, 35, 46, 57, 69, 74, 85 defensive armament 9, 33, 36, 46, 60, 61, 63, 64, 76, 89 manning of 19, 33, 35, 36, 48, 64, 76, 76 blockhouses (by name) Bellevue 32; Clairière 75, 76; Marbach 76; Paquis-des-Cailles 33; Verrerie 76 Bourguignon, Lt. Maurice 37, 44, 45 Breisach area, attacks in 80 British Army/BEF 10, 15, 16, 28 Broché, Capt. 68, 70–1, 72 Busch, Gen. der Infanterie Ernst 13, 14 Buschhubelwald, fighting for 63, 64 Cappel strongpoint, assault on 60, 63, 64 casemates 16, 18, 50, 61, 93 attacks on 21, 48, 50, 50, 51, 55, 57, 60, 64, 74, 75, 76, 79, 80, 80, 85, 85, 88, 88, 89, 90, 92 construction of 8, 9, 17, 18, 74, 85, 93 crews 9, 18, 19, 45, 48, 49, 50, 51, 64, 74, 80, 85, 90 defensive armament 17–18, 18, 48, 57, 64, 79, 80, 88, 92 role of 17, 18 vulnerability of 17, 18, 48 casemates (by name) Aschbach-Est 77, 79–80, 82–3, 84; Aschbach-Ouest 79–80; Bining 74; Bois-de-Beuveille 55; Bois-de-Marpent Nord 46, 48; Bois-de-Marpent Sud
46, 48; Crèvecoeur 49; Eiswasserkopf 88, 89; Fort-Mortier 89, 89; Héronfontaine 46, 48, 49, 50, 50; Jeanlain 50, 51; L’Epinette 48; Limbourg-Nord 85; MarckolsheimNord 90, 90, 93; Marckolsheim-Sud 90, 93; Margut 36, 41; MC30 64; Mottenberg Sud 68; OberroedernNord 76, 77, 79–80, 82–3, 84; Oberroedern-Sud 80; Ostergnies 46, 48; Ouest de Singling 74; Puxieux 55; Quatre Vents Nord 68; Rhinau-Sud 89; Rocq 46, 48; Scheonau Sud 88; Verrerie 76 Chiers River, action along 33, 36, 53 Colmar 13, 16, 28, 81, 90 combat blocks 17, 36, 45, 46, 46, 48, 48, 49, 53, 65, 67, 68, 73 attacks on 21, 42–3, 44, 49, 51, 55, 67, 68, 73, 92 construction of 18 defensive armament 18, 36, 55, 74, 75, 77 Denecke, Gen.Lt. Erich 77, 80 disinformation, German use of 11 Dunkirk, Allies retreat to 36, 91 evacuation from 5, 50, 52 Dyle Line 27–8, 31 entrance blocks 17, 53, 55, 65, 67, 68, 74 Escault fortifications, attacks on 48–52 flood zones, creation/role 57, 60, 60, 63 fortresses (by name) Anzeling 66, 68; Chesnois 37, 41, 52, 91; Fermont 31, 53, 53, 55, 56, 58–9, 91, 92, 93; Four-à-Chaux 74, 76, 91, 92; Grand-Hohékirkel 74; Hackenberg 17, 28, 65, 68; Hochwald 17, 69, 74–5, 76, 77, 79, 79, 80, 91, 92; Latiremont 31, 53, 55, 56; Metrich 15, 65; Michelsberg 68; Mont-desWelches 68, 91; Scheonenbourg 21, 77, 79, 79, 80, 91, 92, 93; Simserhof 8, 73, 74, 92; Vélosnes 52, 91 fortresses (general) 36, 53, 55, 93 construction of 17, 45, 74–5 crews/troops 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 19, 20, 36, 42–3, 44, 45, 49, 52, 53, 55, 56, 65–6, 68, 70–1, 72, 75, 76, 76, 79, 82–3, 84, 89, 90, 90, 91, 92 forts (by name) Bambesch 66, 66, 67, 68, 91, 93; Bersillies 45, 48, 49, 91; Boussois 45, 46, 46, 48, 48, 49, 91; Eben-Emael 61; Einseling 66, 67, 67, 68, 91, 93; Eth 51, 51, 91; Ferme-Chappy 53, 55, 56, 58–9, 91; Fermont 53; HautPoirier 73–4, 73, 91, 92; Kerfent 66, 67–8, 67, 70–1, 72, 91; La Ferté 36–7, 37, 38–9, 40–1, 40, 41, 42–3, 44, 45–6, 51, 53, 91, 93; La Salmagne 45, 48, 49, 91; Laudrefang 66, 67, 68, 91; Lembach 76, 91; Maulde 50, 51; Michelsberg 69; Mottenberg 68; Rohrbach 73, 74; Sarts 49–50, 49, 91;
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Teting 66, 91; Thonnelle 52, 91; Welschhof 73, 73, 74, 91 forts (general) 36, 53, 55, 69, 93 construction of 17, 18, 45–6 crews/troops 17, 37, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 67, 68, 73–4 vulnerability/weaknesses 36, 73 French Army 15 chain of command 12–13, 16, 20 commander of 32, 36, 37, 52, 56 deployment at outbreak of war 9 division/group commanders 12–13, 33 effects of defensive posture 16, 27 evacuation of forces to Britain 50 general officer corps 12–13 GQG 10, 19, 27, 36, 91 lays down its arms 90 order of battle 22–4 slowness of command system 16, 36 Gamelin, Gén. Maurice 12, 13, 16, 27, 52 Georges, Gén. Alphonse 12, 13, 90 German army army group commanders 12, 13–14, 69 chain of command 13 command and control 15 general officer corps 12, 13–14 operational flexibility of 15 order of battle 24–6 Germer, Oblt. Alfred 42–3, 44 Gollé, Maj. 68, 70–1, 72 Greiff, Gen. der Infanterie 65, 66 Grossberg strongpoint, fighting for 61 Guderian, Gen. der Panzergruppe Heinz 13, 31, 32, 33, 36, 52 Hautmont, action/defences near 46 Hoffen, fighting at 77, 79 Holving strongpoint, assault on 63–4, 64 Hoste, fighting for 61, 63, 64 interval artillery 17, 18, 19, 26, 75, 91 interval casemates 17–18, 36, 65, 69, 73, 77 attacks on 68, 74 construction of 18, 45, 46, 55, 66, 85 defensive armament 18, 55, 73, 77, 85 manning of 66, 68, 73 interval troops/units 18, 19, 20, 31, 35, 37, 52, 56, 75, 77, 91, 93 order of battle 22–4 Kalmerich Forest 63, 64 Knop strongpoint, German capture of 65 Kunheim, fighting near 86–7, 89 Leeb, Gen.Obst. Wilhelm Ritter von 13, 14, 14, 20, 56, 92 Lembach, defences around 69, 74, 93 Lille region, defences in 31, 36, 45, 52, 91 Limbourg, German crossing at 88 Longuyon, defences near 8, 9, 53 Longwy salient, fight for 31 Luftwaffe operations see also aircraft 11, 26, 28, 33, 48, 49, 57, 60, 61, 61, 75, 76, 79, 79, 80, 80, 81, 82–3, 84, 85, 89, 91, 92 Luxembourg, French/German forces in 31 Maginot Line command structure 13, 20
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construction of 5, 8–9, 10, 16, 18–19, 33 effects of budget cuts 9, 17, 33, 35, 45 declared ready for action 9 extent of 16–17, 91 first fort to fall 45 and French strategy/war plan 5, 8 gaps/weaknesses in 5, 8, 9, 16, 18, 19, 32, 33, 35, 66, 74, 91, 92 German training to attack 15, 29 lack of offensive combat power 91 resilience of 20, 21, 90, 92 role of 5, 8–9, 10, 12, 27–8 surrender of last fortress 90 surviving fortifications 93 Marckolsheim, fighting near 88, 90 Maubeuge region, defences/fighting in 8, 9, 16, 17, 19, 20, 36, 45–6, 47, 48–50, 91, 92 Metz area, defences/fighting in 16, 19, 32, 52, 53, 54, 55–6, 57, 65, 66, 67, 90, 91, 93 Meuse River, defences/crossing of 31, 33, 35, 36, 53 Moderbach River, action along 63, 64 Monthermé, action near 33, 35 Montmédy sector 16, 52 defences/fighting in 9, 17, 19, 36, 91 Mormal Forest, defences in 8, 16–17, 46, 48 Moselle River, defences along 31, 56, 65 Mulhouse, French forces near 16, 81 narrow-gauge railway, role of 77 Neuf-Brisach, action at 88, 89 Nied River, action along 57, 61, 65, 66 Oberotterbach, German forces near 21 Oberroedern, fighting near 77, 79–80 observation blocks 50, 67, 70–1, 72 obstacle belts 18, 80, 93: anti-tank ditches/rails 8, 17, 18, 35, 35, 37, 37, 46, 50, 57, 77, 82–3, 84, 93; barbed-wire entanglements 10, 18, 33, 35, 35, 37, 37, 41, 46, 48, 49, 50, 55, 57, 63, 67, 68, 70–1, 72, 73, 77, 80, 82–3, 84; minefields 30, 57, 77 Obstfelder, Gen.Lt. Hans von 48 Olizy, fighting near 37 Operation Fackel 32, 56 Operation Kleiner Bär 81, 85, 88–90 Operation Tiger 56–7, 60–1, 62, 63–4, 63, 65 Phoney War 10, 11, 11, 14, 46 Poland, German invasion of 9, 11, 13, 14, 28 pontoon bridges/boats 81, 81, 88, 89 POWs 32, 33, 49, 50, 60, 63, 74, 76, 76, 77, 79 Prételat, Gén. André-Gaston 9, 12, 12, 13, 31, 32, 52, 53, 69 propaganda, German use of 11, 11 radios, use of 12, 15, 16 Raismes Forest, defences in 8, 16–17, 50 Region fortifié de la Lauter 16, 20 defences/fighting in 8, 9, 16, 17, 19, 57, 74–6, 74, 76, 80, 90, 91 Region fortifié de Metz 16, 20 defences/fighting in 8, 9, 16, 17, 19, 29, 53, 54, 55–6 Réquin, Gén. 10 Rhinau, fighting/river crossing at 88, 89
Rhine defences/region 8, 12, 16, 18, 81, 92 Rhine River, defences/crossings 8, 14, 16, 18, 18, 27, 28, 69, 77, 80, 81, 81, 85, 85, 86–7, 88–90, 89, 93 Rommel, Gen.Maj. Erwin 13, 35 Rundstedt, Gen.Obst. Gerd von 13, 20 Saar offensive 10, 11, 13, 14 Saarbrücken, German forces near 9, 11, 29 Saarland, fighting in 8, 9, 10, 29 Sambre River, action along 35, 45, 46, 48 Sarralbe, defences near 61, 63, 64, 64, 69 Sarre Gap, defences/fighting in 8, 9, 11, 16, 18, 20, 56–7, 60–1, 63–4, 65, 69 Sarre region, defences/fighting in 5, 12, 28, 32, 53, 56–7, 75, 93 Sarre River, defences along 8, 30, 57, 60 Sarrebourg, German actions near 69 Secteur fortifié de Boulay 65–6, 68, 69 Secteur fortifié de Colmar 90 Secteur fortifié de la Crusnes 53, 54, 55 Secteur fortifié de Faulquemont 65, 66, 67–8, 73, 93 Secteur fortifié de Haguenau 69, 75, 76, 76, 77, 79–80, 79 Secteur fortifié de la Sarre 60, 61, 69, 74 Secteur fortifié de Maubeuge 36, 45–6, 48 Secteur fortifié de Montmédy 36, 52 Secteur fortifié de Rohrbach 17, 69, 92 Secteur fortifié de Thionville 65 Secteur fortifié des Vosges 69, 75 Secteur fortifié Escaut 50 Sedan/Sedan Gap 5, 19, 20, 27–8, 31, 32, 33, 36, 45 Solre-le-Chateau, defences near 35 Somme River, French forces along 52 Switzerland, forces along border with 11, 13, 16, 19, 20, 27, 52, 90 tanks 5, 10, 32, 32, 33, 35, 37, 41, 63, 85 Theissen, Gen.Lt. Edgar 69, 73, 74 Thionville 10, 55, 93 trenches, construction/use of 10, 57 ventilation shafts/systems 48, 49, 50, 67 Vialle, Lt. 82–3, 84 Villy, fight for 36, 37, 40, 41 Vosges Mountains, defences/fighting in 56, 69, 74, 76, 77, 79, 81, 90, 92 weapon embrasures 30, 45, 48, 49, 50, 55, 67, 74, 75, 80, 85, 92 weapons (French) machine guns 17–18, 19, 35, 36, 37, 40, 45, 46, 49, 50, 53, 55, 56, 57, 61, 63, 64, 64, 66, 67, 70–1, 72, 73, 74, 77, 79, 80, 82–3, 84, 85 weapons (German) explosive charges 20, 30, 35, 40, 41, 42–3, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 75, 90 flame-throwers 20, 30, 35 grenades 41, 45, 50, 75, 76, 82–3, 84 machine guns 9, 30, 67 mines 10 rifles 30, 63 West Wall 9, 10, 11, 14, 29, 81 Weygand, Gén. Maxime 52 Weygand Line 52 Witzleben, Gen.Obst. Erwin von 9, 14, 64, 65
Campaign • 218
accounts of history’s greatest conflicts, detailing the command strategies, tactics and battle experiences of the opposing forces throughout the crucial stages of each campaign
MAGINOT LINE 1940 battles on the French Frontier German front line, 15 June German front line, 17 June German front line, 19 June German front line, 21 June German advance, 16–17 June German advance, 18–19 June German advance, 20–21 June
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Wissembourg
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Sarralbe
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Sarreguemines
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Sélestat
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St-Dié
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Remnants of French Groupe d’armées 2
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Constructed during the 1930s, the maginot line was supposed to form the ultimate defence against a german invasion of France. but the strength of the line varied widely, and during the assault on France in may 1940 the germans were able to identify its weak points and focus their attacks against them. While the invading army was able to smash through the lightly defended section along the river meuse, at other points the line held. although the maginot line was to prove a strategic failure, the stiff resistance put up by some of the fortresses was a testament to the fighting ability of the French army. this is the story of the seven major german operations launched against the maginot line, and the defiant fight put up by this most famous of fortifications.
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maps
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