Management and Organization Paradoxes
Advances in Organization Studies Advances in Organization Studies includes cutting-edge work in comparative management and intercultural comparison, studies of organizational culture, communication, and aesthetics, as well as in the area of interorganizational collaboration — strategic alliances, joint ventures, networks and collaborations of all kinds, where comparative, intercultural, and communicative issues have an especial salience. Purely theoretical as well as empirically based studies are included. General Editors Stewart Clegg School of Management University of Technology Sydney Quay Street, Haymarket P.O.Box 123 Broadway, NSW 2007 Australia
[email protected] Alfred Kieser University of Mannheim D 68 131 Mannheim Germany
[email protected]
Volume 9 Management and Organization Paradoxes Edited by Stewart R. Clegg
Management and Organization Paradoxes Edited by
Stewart R. Clegg University of Technology, Sydney
John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam/Philadelphia
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The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Management and organization paradoxes / edited by Stewart R. Clegg. p. cm. (Advances in Organization Studies, issn 1566–1075 ; v. 9) Rev. papers from the APROS2000 conference in Sydney. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Management-Philosophy-Congresses. 2. Organization-Philosophy-Congresses. 3. Paradoxes-congresses. I.Clegg, Steward. II. Australian and Pacific Researches in Organization Studies (Organization). III. Advances in organization studies; 9. HD29.M283 2002 658’.001-dc21 isbn 90 272 3307 1 (Eur.) / 1 58811 257 8 (US) (Hb; alk. paper) isbn 90 272 3306 3 (Eur.) / 1 58811 208 X (US) (Pb; alk. paper)
2002021463
© 2002 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands
Table of contents
Acknowledgements 1. General introduction Stewart R. Clegg Part I Representing Paradoxes 2. Management, paradox, and permanent dialectics João Vieira da Cunha, Stewart R. Clegg and Miguel Pina e Cunha 3. The meanings of risk and interorganizational collaboration Paul K. Couchman and Liz Fulop
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4. Workers’ playtime?: Unravelling the paradox of covert resistance in organizations Peter Fleming and André Spicer
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5. Paradox in symbols and subjects: The politics of constructing “The Wharfie” André Spicer, John W. Selsky and Julian Teicher
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6. Politics and popular culture: Organizational carnival in the Springfield nuclear power plant Carl Rhodes
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7. From value conflicts to multiple mandates: On organising ethical knowledge and its paradoxes Fernando Leal and Patricia Shipley
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Part II Materialising Paradoxes 8. Organizational paradoxes and business ethics: In search of new modes of existence Eduardo Ibarra-Colado
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9. Beyond the ‘war for talent’ hype: Occupational and organizational change in the business professions Timothy Morris and Ashly Pinnington
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10. Expectations, emotions and money: Finance organizations and futures Jocelyn Pixley
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11. Psychoanalysis and auditing David Crowther
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12. A paradox of governance: Convergent policy and divergent practice in corporate governance in Asia Thomas Clarke
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13. Multinationals, corporate governance and financial internationalisation Glenn Morgan
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14. Managing the interconnected organization: An internal tension perspective Antoine Hermens
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About the contributors
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Index
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Acknowledgements
This book would not have been possible without the assistance of many people and some organizations. First, I would like to acknowledge the work of all the stream coordinators at the APROS 2000 conference in Sydney, at which earlier versions of these chapters first appeared as papers — their work is appreciated greatly. Second, I would like to thank, in particular, Jenny Onyx, Thomas Clarke and Stella Ng and Thomas Clarke, from the UTS School of Management, and Ernie Waldstein, Jenni Stevenson and Mary Noonan, from the Executive Development Unit, for all the support they gave in facilitating the conference. Third, my appreciation to my colleagues in ORCA (Organizational Researchers in Collaboration and Alliances), a Key Research Strength at UTS, who helped in the organization of APROS, especially Thekla Rura-Polley. Fourth, I want to thank Peter Booth, the Dean of the Faculty of Business at UTS, and Robert Lal, Information Technology (IT) Manager, for their assistance at key stages. Salvador Porras did a great job of helping out at crucial times, especially with the website. However, it is one person, in particular, who deserves my thanks and those of all the contributors, and that is Cleusa Lester, whose executive assistance was - and continues to be - of inestimable value in achieving various projects.
Chapter 1
General introduction Stewart R. Clegg
The paradox is the orthodoxy of our age Niklas Luhmann
The Academy of Management Review, under the guest editorship of Kathleen M. Eisenhardt (2000), published a special issue of the journal dedicated to “Change and development journeys into a pluralistic world.” Taking “Paradox, Spirals, Ambivalence: The New Language of Change and Pluralism” as the theme, Eisenhardt said in her introduction: Several unanticipated themes emerge in the special issue. The most central is paradox. Paradox is the simultaneous existence of two inconsistent states, such as between innovation and efficiency, collaboration and competition, or new and old. Rather than compromising between the two in some sort of Goldilocks fantasy, vibrant organizations, groups, and individuals change by simultaneously holding the two states. This duality of coexisting tensions creates an edge of chaos, not a bland halfway point between one extreme and the other. The management of this duality hinges on exploring the tension in a creative way that captures both extremes, thereby capitalizing on the inherent pluralism within the duality (Eisenhardt 2000: 703).
It is not clear from Eisenhardt (2000) whether the paradoxes that she sees the journal dealing with reside in either the means of representation (a Goldilocks fantasy?) or in the material world, where “vibrant organizations, groups, and individuals change by simultaneously holding the two states.” In many respects the tension between materialisation and representation is the central issue. Are the paradoxes inherent to the nature of that which is being represented or the means of representation? It is the centrality of this question that determines the structure of the present volume,1 with its binary division between “representation” and “materialisation” — or, as I prefer in the active voice, between “representing” and “materialising”. The focus is on how we represent and materialise dialectics, (dis)organization and contradiction Of course, any division between materiality and representation is in part artificial, as the word is invariably material (Silverman and Torode 1980). Ever
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since the ordinary language philosophers, after Wittgenstein (1972) and Austin (1975), attended to the performative functions of everyday speech, one has been well aware of the things that words do. Some aspects of the world may well be seen as paradoxical, irrespective of the words used to represent them. Some paradoxes that are extant in reality may well be obliterated by the words — the theories — chosen to represent them. Marianne Lewis’ (2000) contribution to the Academy of Management Review, “Exploring Paradox: Towards a More Comprehensive Guide”, argues that conceptions of management and organization theory have, more often than not, stressed smooth rationality, linearity and planned change, rather than dialectics, discord and contradiction. Thus, the recognition of paradox is an effect of relatively recent forms of representation — because long-standing approaches have stressed singular rather than plural multi-dimensional perspectives.
Representing paradoxes The chapter by João Vieira da Cunha, Stewart Clegg and Miguel Pina e Cunha on “Management, Paradox, and Permanent Dialectics” addresses themes of dialectical representation of paradox in management and organization theory. A synthesis of these paradoxes emerges from a dialectical view of strategy and organization, built from four identifiable principles: those of simultaneity, locality, minimality and generality. In many respects this chapter functions as an excellent introduction to the overall themes of the volume. The fact that the concepts of dialectical strategy and dialectical organization offer a way to achieve a synthesis between opposing schools demonstrates the potential of a dialectical view of management. Competing representations can be held in conjunction, as Eisendhardt (20000) suggests. “The Meanings of Risk and Interorganizational Collaboration” by Paul Couchman and Liz Fulop, deals directly with issues of representation in a specific research project. How do management researchers represent the realities that they construct when working cooperatively with others whose constructions are very different? How should the ensuing paradox and tension of competing views of the same reality be dealt with? In this chapter they deal with sensemaking as discursive practices, shaping meanings; they also examine how organizations and subjectivities are constituted. Organization texts shape choices between contradictory and competing meanings. The choices between these competing and contradictory positions are not resolved through rational argumentation so much as the power of rhetorical representation. The chapter analyses how competing discourses emerged in a discursive arena (and how a particular discourse came to dominate). Various aspects of management practice were obscured by discursive dominance. However, the dialectical position of holding simultaneous ways of making sense
General introduction
was a source of risk, contestation and contradiction for the project. Not surprisingly, the dominant discursive practices, whose roots were in rationalism and modernism, overcame any sense of dialectics, paradox and contradiction. The dominant discourse provided a distinctive mode of talking and writing about collaborative projects. However, the consequence was that management was weakened to the extent that it did not engage with paradox and incommensurability — both of which are endemic to securing multi-disciplinary engagement in cross-sector collaborations. The dialectics of power and resistance have been staples of the labour process perspective in industrial sociology and organization theory for over twenty years. Authors such as Willis (1974) and Burawoy (1979) argue that resistance, when articulated in the form of humour, irony and cynicism, rather than overt “struggle”, may have the paradoxical outcome of inadvertently reproducing the domination that workers seek to escape, because it provides a specious and illusory sense of freedom. It is this false freedom that inclines them to disengage from more “material” and traditionally located resistances. Resistance through joking and cynicism can actually assume the (paradoxical) status of consent due to its “safety valve” effects in power relationships. In “Workers Playtime: Unravelling the Paradox of Covert Resistance in Organizations” by Peter Fleming and André Spicer, models of power underpinning judgements of “effective” or “ineffective” resistance in relation to humour, irony and cynicism are discussed. The standards of radical upheaval and economic transformation may be important criteria. However, holding to these standards may also marginalise many other forms of transgression that can effectively alter organizational status quo. Different forms of resistance may interact in complex, ambiguous and often paradoxical ways. Humour, irony, and cynicism may be subversive on one set of co-ordinates but support or undermine resistances at other levels. In order to think about resistance in this multiple sense, the authors develop the notion of “plateaux of power and resistance.” Representationally, they draw upon a spatial metaphor to illustrate how resistance may overlap, collide and interrelate in unpredictable ways with different outcomes. In the following chapter, “Paradox in Symbols and Subjects: The Politics of Constructing ‘The Wharfie’”, André Spicer joins with John Selsky and Julian Teicher to research one of the most celebrated industrial relations disputes of recent times in Australia. The Maritime Union of Australia was involved in a longrunning dispute with Patrick, a stevedoring company. The dispute involved secret meetings between government and business to organize strike breakers (what price the liberal state?) and a campaign of struggle waged on many fronts — not least in various media representations of the union. The symbolic aspects of the conflict centred on struggles around how “the wharfie” was constructed. The authors use
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Bakhtin’s (1981) concept of dialogue to analyse the paradoxical discourses adopted by key parties to the dispute. By examining the role of symbolic identity struggles concerning the ways that subjects are recognized, the authors show how discourse is central to workplace disputes. Bakhtin is also central to “Politics and Popular Culture: Organizational Carnival in the Springfield Nuclear Power Plant” by Carl Rhodes. As most readers will be aware, Springfield is home to the most famous family in America — The Simpsons. The proposition is that this television show provides the opportunity for a compelling and political critique of the logic of “normal” organizational life. In providing both a parody and a critique of organizations, The Simpsons also offers viewers the possibility of questioning alternatives to existing and potentially oppressive social relationships at work. There are clear continuities between the analysis of The Simpsons and the previous two chapters. Methodologically, Bakhtin is the link between Rhodes and Spicer, Selsky and Teicher, while the importance of humour links the chapter with that of Fleming and Spicer. However, all three of the previous chapters raise important and implicit issues about ethics — an issue that takes centre-stage in the chapter on “From Value Conflicts to Multiple Mandates: On Organizing Ethical Knowledge and its Paradoxes” by Fernando Leal and Patricia Shipley. Leal and Shipley start from the single most influential representation of the modern condition for organization theory — that of Max Weber’s “Outline of an Interpretive Sociology.” The key concept for Weber was “rationality”, which Weber placed at the centre of his framework for understanding modernity. Modernity was understood as a sphere in which conflicting rationalities and values were normal, and it is the clash of values that forms the focus for Leal and Shipley. At this point they connect Weber with another titan of modernity — Emile Durkheim. Durkheim sought to illuminate the problems of society from an ethical point of view, particularly as these were constructed in relation to the division of labour in society. It is through the particular roles that the division of labour frames that people learn both who they are and what is valuable within society and organizations. Leal and Shipley go on to argue that, increasingly, the moral order of modernity, in which divisions of labour functioned as a basis for moral order, is now disintegrating. The recent tendency is for a division to develop where the ties bind less than they cleave; the division is between disorganised junk jobs — parttime and secondary labour market options — and organized good jobs, which are challenging, varied, and creative, through which cleavage a contradictory reality is symbolised and materialised.
General introduction
Materialising paradoxes The second part of the book opens with a chapter by Eduardo Ibarra-Colado, “Organizational Paradoxes and Business Ethics: In Search of New Modes of Existence”, which also focuses on the possibility of ethical business practice. Management guru’s, whose voices became so insistent from the 1980s onwards, argue that the dynamics that govern organizations stress the normalcy of inconsistencies — rather than consistencies — in rationality. The chapter analyses business ethics, dilemmas and paradoxes, using three scenarios. The first scenario demonstrates the paradoxes that occur when corporate discourses and representations do not correspond to practices and actions. The second scenario shows the symbolic devices used by corporations to generate identification and to build consensus, especially in the “management excellence” framework. The framework of excellence projects an imaginary subject that permanently confronts and defeats the real nature of the person at work. The third scenario shows that the “ethical explosion” of the last decade of the 20th century reveals the business of ethics as a “non-ethical ethics”. In the final part of the chapter some ideas are presented for the construction of a different kind of organizational ethics. It might be possible to transform corporations from structures of subjugation and domination to spaces of greater equity, plural coexistence and recreation, in which free will might flourish. While Ibarra-Colado dealt with corporate companies, Timothy Morris and Ashly Pinnington, in their chapter on “Beyond the “War for Talent” Hype: Occupational and Organizational Change in the Business Professions”, address another aspect of organizational reality. The chapter develops a framework for understanding how the formation or adaptation of professions may affect, as well as be affected by, organizational dynamics. It challenges arguments that the new professional firm archetype is more managed and bureaucratic than the previously autonomous realm of professional practice. Some professional firms actually display anti-managerial values that mimic those of entrepreneurial innovation favoured by excellence models. The entrepreneur is seen as a heroic figure, replacing the previously held aspirations of a professional service ethos. Ironically, although work on professional firms initially focused on the interaction of occupational and organizational systems of control, the two types of control have become increasingly disconnected. Here is the paradox: as the professional firm became more researched by organization theorists, they focused less and less on what made it distinctive. When that paradox is faced, radically different interpretations of the professional firm occur. Jocelyn Pixley argues in the chapter “Expectation, Emotions and Money: Finance Organizations and Futures” that, in finance organizations dedicated to
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making money, rationality appears to be prevalent. On the other hand, tension, insecurity and irrationality also prevail in the finance sector, because of the fundamental uncertainty of speculation in the face of an unknown future. Corporate entities routinely compete and engage in internal conflicts concerning investment decisions, as they assess opportunities. The considerable quantities of data available for decision-making always “looks through the rear window” and cannot predict the business future. Decision-makers have to rely not only on data but also emotions, such as feelings of confidence and trust in organizations and their managers. Instinct and organizational rituals, as well as a constant preoccupation with “the news”, shape the reality that their investment decisions make and respond to. In such a scenario, it is irrational to represent the outcome of a complex data-driven and emotional decision-process, as if it were wholly rational. In David Crowther’s chapter on “Psychoanalysis and Auditing”, the critique of rationality is extended further. If corporations cannot make money rationally, as Pixley suggests, what are they doing? Crowther uses audits of company accounts as data. By applying psychoanalytic theory, he proposes in Freudian terms that the managers of organizations project their insecurity and a need continually to seek reaffirmation of individual worth and recognition. In Lacanian terms, managers see their own value as individuals by means of representation in the mirror of organizational existence. In this mirror, organizational routines and rituals provide a validation of the present through its connection to a sanctified past. Accounting routines are seen to fulfil a quasi-religious purpose within organizations, for both authors and interpreters of corporate accounts. The managers of the organization are depicted and instituted as a type of priesthood, in an organizational religion. Thomas Clarke also looks at the audit performance of organizations but does so in terms of their governance regimes. In a wide-ranging review of “A Paradox of Governance: Convergent Policy and Divergent Practice in Corporate Governance in Asia”, he argues that the Asian financial crisis proved a severe shock to the confidence of “miracle economies”. It revealed that a quarter century of rapid economic growth was based on frail foundations of corporate governance. The East Asian economies have adopted reformed codes of governance, at least formally. However, these reforms in codes may not transform practice nor alter the dependent status of economies based on the branch production of technology commodities for Western multinationals. The Asian crisis was symptomatic of a profound instability in the operation of international financial markets. Paradoxically, the introduction of global standards of corporate governance makes the developing world more, rather than less, exposed to unanticipated and overwhelming pressures from financial markets. In his chapter on “Multinationals, Corporate Governance, and Financial Internationalization”, Glenn Morgan analyses UK, German, Japanese and US
General introduction
multinationals, in terms of their financial internationalisation. Overall, Japan is the least internationalised, while US multinationals have the smallest amount of ownership by foreign investors. On the other hand, Germany is in an intermediate position, whilst the US and the UK hold the most foreign assets, and have changed least as a result of internationalisation pressures. Internationalisation of financial structures has variable impacts on corporate governance structures. The chapter argues that governance regimes vary according to the existing structure of the firm. Japanese firms are least affected by governance changes, because activities are cross subsidised, businesses built slowly, and failing units restructured without extensive external monitoring, because of the availability of long-term credit. German multinationals have to deal with competing modes of corporate governance while UK and US firms combine a strong hierarchy in terms of financial controls, with strong heterarchical organizations. The conclusion to be drawn from Clarke and Morgan’s chapters is that it would be inappropriate to assume that there is either a convergence in organization form or in capitalism — capitalism and organizations still have distinct national flavours. Hence, the national embeddedness of economic activity means that many of the discourses of modernity — the theory of the firm; of organizations; of governance — that assume a settled and stable ontological object for their reflections, theory and inquiry are fooling themselves. They are living in a paradoxical world because its material reality confounds their theoretical assumptions: the reality is highly contingent, embedded and variable, while the assumptions proffers grand narratives that deny the differences illustrated in these chapters. Antoine Hermens, an Australian strategist, contributes the last chapter on “Managing the Interconnected Organization: An Internal Tension Perspective.” The argument harks back to the themes of the second chapter, by João Vieira da Cunha, Stewart Clegg and Miguel Pina e Cunha, in its suggestion that strategic alliances should be examined as dialectical systems. The organizational strategies of firms in strategic alliances are comprised of a mix of embeddedness, cooperation, and a long-term orientation, while flexibility, competition and a short-term orientation frame the markets in which the alliances are formed. The balance between the multiple conflicting forces of firms and markets determine alliance stability, and the outcomes are linked to imbalances in these dialectical forces. It is only when market and hierarchy forces are in equilibrium, and cost benefit trade offs are equal, that alliances will be stable and effective. Overall, the contributions to Paradoxes and Dialectics in Management and Organization are diverse and challenging. Each contribution takes a different angle on the central theme. Although there are family resemblances between some of the chapters, at their outer limits these resemblances appear faint; nonetheless, all of the chapters illuminate diverse aspects of contemporary paradoxes in management
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and organization theory. The book provides, in each of its chapters, a challenge to the still overwhelmingly rationalist views of theory and practice that dominate the field and provides new directions for understanding organizations and management.
Notes 1. The volume arose from papers presented at APROS — Asia Pacific Researchers in Organization Studies. The APROS 2000 conference was organized by the editor in collaboration with colleagues from the University of Technology, Sydney, as well as others from the world-wide APROS network, and was held in December 2000. The papers selected are a small sample from the various streams of the conference. The papers were all substantially revised within the design chosen for the structure of the book, through a process of mutually constructive criticism by the authors. The theme of “paradox” was clearly signalled as the rationale and theme for the volume and thus the selection of contributions and the revisions were all made with this theme explicitly in mind.
References Austin, J. L. (1975). How to do things with words. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bakhtin, M. (1981). The dialogic imagination: Four essays. In Michael Holquist (Ed.). Austin: University of Texas Press. Burawoy, M. (1979). Manufacturing consent: Changes in the labor process under monopoly capitalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Eisenhardt, K. M. (2000). Paradox, spirals, ambivalence: The new language of change and pluralism. The Academy of Management Review, 25: 703–5. Lewis, M. W. (2000). Exploring paradox: Towards a more comprehensive guide. The Academy of Management Review, 25:760–76. Silverman, D. and Torode, B. (1980). The material word: Some theories of language and its limits. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Willis, P. E. (1977). Learning to labour: How working class kids get working class jobs. Farnborough: Saxon House. Wittgenstein, L. (1972). Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.
Part I
Representing Paradoxes
Chapter 2
Management, paradox, and permanent dialectics João Vieira da Cunha, Stewart R. Clegg and Miguel Pina e Cunha
Introduction Few words appear more often in the recent literature on management than “paradox”. In the popular business press, managers are alerted to emergent trends in the “age of paradox” (Handy 1995), called on to “master paradox” (Peters 1987: 391–397) and to “own up to the great paradox” (Peters 1992: 615). In fact, Tom Peters — probably the most well-known business “guru” — when asked what would be the most important lesson he would like to teach humanity, answered the following: “success is the result of deep grooves, but deep grooves destroy adaptability [which is the touchstone of success]” — the “great paradox” (Peters 1992: 616). Academically, paradox has been a central topic since the Ancients. Zeno, the fifth century BC Greek philosopher from Elea, devised a number of ingenious brain-teasers constructed around the idea of infinity that have come down to us as “Zeno’s Paradoxes”. The most famous of these concerned a race between a tortoise and the Greek hero Achilles, where the tortoise — a notoriously slow reptile — is given a head start. According to Zeno, the speedy Achilles could never overtake the reptile because when he reached the point at which the tortoise began he would have moved on to a further position, a process that he took to be infinite. Philosophically, as many have attested since, the various “proofs” of the paradox have foundered on some aspect of other of the terms of their expression, as for instance, when, after Aristotle, infinity is conceived in either its “actual” or “potential” characteristics. What characterizes a paradox is the seeming impossibility of the existence of two simultaneous states of affairs because of their contradictory quality. In Zeno’s paradox it is the contradictory qualities attributed to time and motion. In the academic literature on management and organizations, paradox has a less august pedigree, but can be traced back at least as far as Adam Smith’s “pin
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factory”, where integration and differentiation surface as one of the major tensions underlying the rise of the modern industrial organization (Smith 1991). More recently scholars have found paradox in such diverse fields as organization theory (Weick 1993a; Hatch 1999), time and organization (Burrell 1992), organizational change (Orlikowski and Hofman 1997; Edelman and Benning 1998), organizational culture (Machin and Carrithers 1996), leadership (Thayer 1988) and communication (Yates and Orlikowski 1999). Ever since scientific management (Taylor 1947) several attempts have been made to tackle paradox. These attempts fall mainly into two approaches that succeeded each other historically, and that now can be said to co-exist. First, scholars attempted to find the “best way” to come to grips with the tensions between two terms — in Taylor’s case the classical terms of “time” and “motion”, which he redefined as being bounded by the poles of differentiation and integration. Thus, Taylor (1947) sought to find the best way to differentiate tasks along a production line (motion) and to define the principles that should guide managers’ behaviour for integration to be as efficient as possible (time). Fayol (1949) and Barnard (1938) aimed at the higher echelons of the corporation. The first attempted to formalize administrative principles, being concerned more with integration than with differentiation (seeing integration as the most pressing problem for top management). Barnard was more ambitious and coupled a normative statement of the functions of the executive — all related to coordination roles — with a descriptive statement of the basis and need for differentiation that aims to explain the need for the very existence of organizations. A different approach, often labelled contingency theory, emerged around the middle of the century. At this time, inquiry into the relationship on the determinants of organizational structure showed that different environments (Burns and Stalker 1961) and technologies (Woodward 1965), among other factors, determined the “right” organizational structure to adopt. These findings inspired a stream of research aiming at mapping different possible states of these factors and the adequate organizational configurations and decisions best able to succeed in each state. Hence, paradox was tackled by framing its poles as options that were fitter for different environmental and organizational states. Thus, assessing whether the environment favored one strategy or the other would solve the paradox of efficiency/effectiveness and determine the strategy to be implemented (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). The contingency perspective is still dominant in academia but the explosion of normative theories (e.g. Peters and Waterman 1982; Peters 1987; 1992; 1994) in the popular business literature has revivified “one best way” approaches (Shapiro 1995). These have been driven by a social construction of the future of business environments that includes features such as “hypercompetition” (D’Aveni 1995),
Management, paradox, and permanent dialectics
shortening of product life cycles (Bettis and Hitt 1995), a highly educated work force (Drucker 1996; Handy 1991), and ever-shifting consumer tastes (Peters 1992). With such emphases emerged a series of prescriptions that set standards for organizational practice as well as strategies for success. Additionally, paradox gained pervasiveness in organizational settings for three other main reasons. The adoption of information technology has been seen as inherently paradoxical (Johnson and Rice 1984). E-mail communication, for example, is at the same time both formal and informal (Yates and Orlikowski 1999) and the implementation of this type of technology is a process that is both efficient and effective, and emergent and planned (Orlikowski and Hofman 1997). Second, environmental changes place increasingly contradictory demands on companies. Taking the personal computer industry as an example, companies in that sector need to have a high rate of innovation while keeping costs low (and lowering them further), which means they have to master the paradox bounded by the opposite poles of effectiveness and efficiency (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997). Not only has paradox become more pervasive in organizations but also has been more acutely felt and perceived by organizational members, especially by managers. While “management gurus” have been articulating the problems organizations face in a way that makes managers perceive their importance and urgency, when these “gurus” switch from being problem-tellers to problem-solvers, they advocate a series of policies and behaviours extremely counter-intuitive for the average manager (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 1996). These policies and behaviours usually come from the analysis of so-called “success cases”, and more often than not, these cases involve large, often multinational companies, which can call on resources and workers far beyond the reach of the “average” company. In addition, these prescriptions are frequently contradictory, not only between authors but also in the work of the same author. Tom Peters offers a striking example of this feature of “guru” advice. In a clear allusion to In Search of Excellence, he wrote in a later book that “Excellence isn’t, there are no excellent companies” (Peters 1987: 3) and then goes on to argue that the prescriptions he offered together with Waterman in the first book were wrong and fallacious. These contradictions increase the perception of paradox felt by managers by creating bipolar tensions not only in the problems they face but also in the solutions available to handle them. The presence of paradox thus becomes a problem on its own (Shapiro 1995; Peters 1992). Three possible answers to the problem of paradox appear to emerge in the literature. The first one, present in both business and academic literatures, states that paradox is essentially unsolvable — something to be sustained or endured, not tackled. In this vein, Miller (1993) has shown that success inevitably breeds failure, and Mintzberg and McHugh (1985) demonstrated that planning always brings
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unintended consequences that may end up jeopardizing the plan itself. In the practitioner-oriented literature, Peters (1992) has argued that success comes from both adaptivity and “deep grooves” (i.e. from exploration and exploitation), which are irreconcilable, while Senge (1990) contended that learning breeds ignorance (by hampering new learning). The second strategy available to deal with paradox is to reach a compromise between the two poles that frame it. This compromise may result from a contingency approach (Burns and Stalker 1961), where the organization chooses the right mix of opposites (e.g. foregoing some effectiveness in order to obtain more efficiency) in order to make the best of external and internal conditions. Alternatively, such a compromise may emerge from an outright inability to hold such a state of tension, allowing a solution to emerge from its pattern of actions and decisions. Finally, one can attempt to integrate these opposites and “solve” the paradox through a synthesis, foregoing any compromise. According to this line of reasoning, it is possible for the organization to be efficiently effective, loosely tight coupled, and follow a deliberately emergent change strategy. Dialectical reasoning, where thesis and antithesis are combined into a synthesis, is a potentially useful framework to address this challenge, and to help managers tackle paradox without having to subdue any of the contradictory goals often entailed. We argue for the relevance of this view by showing the need for an integrative dialectical view of management. We present its potential, for both theory and practice, by discussing its application to what Mintzberg, Quinn and Ghoshal (1995) labelled manager’s foremost concerns — strategy and organization. After assessing its fit under the four characteristics that Benson (1977) put forth as necessary for an approach to organization theory to be considered dialectical, we show that this perspective has relevant theoretical and practical implications and then proceed to draw four overarching principles guiding this perspective. In order to do so, our argument is organized as follows: first, we discuss the fundamentals of organizational dialectics, highlighting the importance of considering an approach to this topic in which thesis and antithesis are present simultaneously, and not sequentially, as previous approaches to dialectics in management have assumed. We then proceed to show how this approach can be used to shed a new light on the topics of strategy and organization and then present the four major principles guiding such a “permanent dialectics” view of management.
Fundamentals of organizational dialectics Dialectics can, in essence, be understood as a process or as a permanent state. Understanding dialectical phenomena as a process means that a given condition
Management, paradox, and permanent dialectics
and its negation come in a never-ending succession, in which a thesis gives birth to its antithesis, which is in turn transformed into its own antithesis. This view of dialectics started as a rhetorical strategy developed by Socrates (Durant 1991) and was employed by Marx (1978) to explain the historical evolution of society in an attempt to extrapolate the future of capitalist systems. The underlying principles of this approach — articulated by Engels in his Dialectics of Nature (Engels 1873) — are threefold. First, there will be a mutual struggle whereby a phenomenon inevitably generates its opposite. The second principle is the negation of the negation (the struggle of opposites is cyclical and never-ending), while the third is the transformation of quantity into quality (incremental changes lead to discontinuous change). The various applications of this approach to dialectics to organizations resulted in the building of a (process) dialectical model of organization. Table 1 categorizes the major contributions of a dialectical view of management. Blau and Scott (1962) first proposed the merits of approaching management through this lens but it was Benson (1973; 1977) who first built an overarching argument for its relevance for organization theorists. This author drew on Mills’ (1962) criticisms of reliance on natural dialectical laws to understand social phenomena, to reframe the bureaucratic-professional conflict as a dialectical phenomenon (Benson 1973) and to formulate the four underlying principles of this approach for the study of organization. These principles were social construction, totality, contradiction and praxis (Benson 1977). Other authors followed by explicitly or implicitly addressing organizational phenomena dialectically. Lourenço and Glidewell (1975) explicitly treated organizational conflict in such terms and Greiner’s (1972) understanding of the evolution of organizational structures also showed clear manifestations of this approach, although in a somewhat implicit form. Greiner (1972: 84) states that “delegation, which grows out of and becomes the solution to, demands for greater autonomy in the preceding [revolution] eventually provokes a major revolutionary crisis that is characterized by attempts to regain control over the diversity created through increased delegation.” In these words, although he may not know it, Greiner echoes Engel’s principles discussed above. The growing presence of contradictions, tensions and paradoxes in organizations and their articulation in the management literature provide evidence that thesis and antithesis not only occur in succession but can also be present simultaneously (e.g. increasing demands for “affordable innovation”). This led authors to adopt an approach to permanent dialectical phenomena in organizations. A similar conception would be that grounded on Heraclitus’ (more recently developed by Hegel [1892]) view of dialectics as a phenomenon where two distinct/ contradictory entities engage each other in conflict, generating a synthesis that incorporates, and differs from each of them (Duran 1991; Van de Ven and Poole
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Table 1.Major contributions towards a dialectical view of management Dialectics as process
Permanent dialectics
‘Total’ approaches
Benson (1975, 1977) Goldman & Van Houten (1977)
–
‘Partial’ approaches
Blau & Scott (1962) Chanin & Shapiro (1985) Georgiou (1973) Greiner (1972) Lourenço & Glidewell (1975) Mason (1969, 1996) Nielsen (1990, 1996) Schumpeter (1934)
Authors on organizational improvisation (for a review see Cunha, Cunha & Kamoche [1999]) Brews & Hunt (1999) Brown & Eisenhardt (1997) Burrell (1992) Camillus (1982) Church (1999) Edelman & Benning (1998) Eisenhardt & Tabrizi (1995) Follett (1940a, 1940b) Mintzberg & McHugh (1985) Mintzberg & Waters (1982) Stacey (1991, 1996) Weick (1979, 1995)
1995). The application of this approach to organizational research has, however, been limited to isolated themes. Thus, Follett (1940a; 1940b) showed how autonomy and control could be coupled in an organization; Edelman and Benning (1998) argued for the possibility of incrementally punctuated organizational change; Yates and Orlikowski (1999; Orlikowski and Yates 1998) showed how organizational communication could be formal and informal and how opposite views of organizational time can be integrated, while Brews and Hunt (1999) contended that strategy can be simultaneously emergent and deliberate. Nonetheless, these aforesaid authors have not put forward an integrative view of management from a position of “permanent dialectics”, such as Benson (1977) has done for “process dialectics”. However, they have proved the pervasiveness of paradox in organizational life and the potential that dialectics has to provide insights to study and to tackle those paradoxes. Drawing on this stream of research, a dialectical model of organization, strategy and change can be developed in order to show the potential of integrating these findings and laying out the groundwork for future efforts at a dialectical understanding of organizational phenomena. To accomplish this task, we will look at research that surfaces opposite forces in organizations, such as planning and action (Crossan and Sorrenti 1997; Moorman and Miner 1998a; 1998b), organization and disorganization (Weick 1995), incrementalism and punctuated equilibrium (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997), and exploration and exploitation (Orlikowski 1996),
Management, paradox, and permanent dialectics
arguing that they can be harnessed, via synthesis, for the benefit of an organization’s competitiveness and sustained success.
Dialectical strategy One of the most pervasive debates in management is that between the “planning school” (Ansoff, Avner, Brandenburg, Portner, and Radosevich 1970) and the “learning school” (Mintzberg 1990; Mintzberg and McHugh 1985). Proponents of planning argue that the main triggers of organizational action are pre-planned events (Miller and Cardinal 1994). They claim that the way to sustained competitiveness comes from excellence at environmental scanning and at organizational assessment, in order to combine the corporation’s strengths with market opportunities, into a plan for subsequent implementation (Porter 1982). This approach materializes in a process of high efficiency, because resources are allocated to the more profitable business units (Wooldridge and Floyd 1990), but of low effectiveness, because obedience to the plan hinders managers’ flexibility and reaction speed. Those adhering to this view see strategy as mostly deliberate, i.e. emanating from the organization’s will. Those that espouse the “learning” school contend that the high level of turbulence most companies now experience cannot be handled via reflection alone (or at all) (Lindblom 1959). Instead, organizational action is triggered by any event in the environment perceived as either a threat or as an opportunity, and not only by those events prescribed in a plan. The more radical adherents to this view, the members of the “action school”, argue that even without the presence of environmental stimuli for action, organizations must change and experiment. Their rationale for this statement is twofold. First, since environments are social constructions (Berger and Luckmannn 1991; Smircich and Stubbart 1985) stimuli may be misperceived as absent when they are in fact there, and thus uncalled-for action allows refinement of the organization-wide perception of the environment. Second, experiments allow the organization to shape its environment, increasing its competitive basis and depleting that of its competitors (Hamel and Prahalad 1994). In this vein, strategy is a highly effective process. The inexistence of a formal plan permits a high flexibility and a high reaction speed, allowing organizational members to reap unexpected opportunities or parry unexpected threats in the environment (Eisenhardt 1989). What is gained in effectiveness is often lost in efficiency. The use of experiments is costly due to the often low ratio of successes over failures (Cooper 1979) and the danger of the company “spreading itself too thin” over numerous opportunities, which is always a problem for a very flexible strategic process (Miner, Moorman and Bassoff
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1996). Thus, as far as this perspective is concerned, the results of a company’s strategy tend to be emergent and are only made coherent via a post-hoc interpretation of action (Mintzberg and Waters 1982). Recently, a synthesis between these two opposite views of strategy has emerged. This synthesis, through organizational improvisation, allows for integration between planning and action, without calling either for a compromise between these opposites or for the presence of one in spite of the other (Table 2 summarizes this approach). Instead, organizational improvisation or “real-time planning” shows that learning “action” strategies happen because of a plan and not in spite of it (Weick 1998). This view of strategy argues that organizational action is triggered when environmental stimuli call for fast, flexible action, grounded on a preformulated plan, aimed at providing the grounding for this posture. Jazz musician’s use of musical scores to improvise collectively (Berliner 1994), and Shell’s use of scenario planning to respond to an unexpected discontinuity in oil prices (Wack 1985), are but two examples of how plans can be used to foster adaptiveness and flexibility. This results in a process that is both effective and efficient. It is effective because the plan is used to foster flexibility by creating an unobtrusive means of coordination that allows action to be integrated towards a common goal (Bastien and Hostager 1988), permitting a substantial degree of flexibility. It is efficient because the bricolage dimension of improvisation (handling tasks with available resources) allows the organization to deploy its resources to multiple uses and thus escape from the increasing costs that using specialized resources for planned or emergent activities normally entails (Scribner 1986). As far as results go, one can classify improvisation as a deliberately emergent strategy inasmuch as a deliberate plan is composed in order to facilitate the organization’s ability to adapt and swiftly respond to emerging internal and external threats and opportunities (Barrett 1998). Organizational improvisation is grounded on the realization that organizations prefer following plans to constantly re-inventing themselves (Weick 1998) and thus, depends on the pre-existence of a plan and of an organizational infrastructure to guide its practice. However, these are not the only two factors that are needed to plan in real time. There are additional conditions necessary for the practice of improvisation and one can unearth a set of influencing factors that determine its success. These conditions and influencing factors can be grouped, using a dialectical lens, along three syntheses: (1) an experimental culture coupled with tight controls; (2) memory both as friend and foe, and (3) skilled individuals coupled with unskilled resources. As far as the first synthesis goes, the point is that a mix of formal controls can help foster an experimental culture. This type of culture results from a set of values and beliefs that promote action and experimentation — as opposed to reflection and planning — as a way of understanding and dealing with reality. The point is to
Management, paradox, and permanent dialectics
Table 2.A dialectical approach to strategy Thesis
Synthesis
Antithesis
Overarching synthesis Strategy is planned
Strategy is deliberately emer- Strategy is emergent gent
Elements Complying culture
Complying experimental culture
Experimental culture
Past helps future success (memory as friend)
Past can be recombined to Past hinders future success help future success (memory (memory as foe) as friend and foe)
Skilled/specialized individ- Skilled individuals with gen- Generalist individuals and resources uals and resources eralist resources
be able to tolerate errors and, ideally, be able to espouse what Weick (1999) calls an “aesthetic of imperfection”. Those that do, recognize that in turbulent environments it is difficult to survive, let alone prevail, without seriously pursuing innovation. These companies accept the 90%+ failure rates for which innovation is well known in the business arena (Craig and Hart 1992) as the price to pay for the 10% that do succeed and for the learning that ensues (Crossan and Sorrenti 1997). Cultures, in this kind of organizations, have strong “pro-innovation” biases and believe that a great plan can only be accomplished from finding an emerging pattern in actions taken in the past, through sensemaking (Weick 1995). To foster such a culture, these companies can use two major mechanisms. First, they reward people based on the number of “competent mistakes” they have made (a competent mistake being one that results from novel ideas and not from flawed execution) (Picken and Dess 1997). Second, they can tap the power of symbolic action and stories as third order controls (Perrow 1986; Weick 1999) by diffusing tales of “competent mistakes” as role models for the organization’s members. Another value that an organization must espouse for improvisation to occur is that of urgency. The occurrence of an unexpected and “unplanned-for” event is not enough for improvisation to happen. Those that aim to tackle this event need also to feel that only fast action can address it (Perry 1991). Otherwise they can fall back on planning (because they perceive that they have time to do so) instead of being pushed to compose a course of action in real-time — a process of a far more daunting nature than the former (Eisenberg 1990). In order for this culture to thrive, it must be coupled with a mix of control mechanisms that allow it to converge with corporate-wide goals. Otherwise it
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would risk sharp disaggregation and cross the thin line between flexibility and unproductive random action (Stacey 1991). This control mix is composed by three major elements: (1) first and second order “invisible” controls, (2) milestones and (3) clear goals. Most authors on improvisation argue that the only kind of control mechanisms applicable in an organization that aims to improvise are third order controls, meaning indirect controls that coordinate via culture or ideology (Perrow 1986; Mintzberg 1995; Weick 1993a). Such an argument can be justified by drawing on the work of Dougherty, who has shown the difficulties of pursuing novel actions in organizations stifled by first (direct supervision) and second (standardization) order coordination mechanisms (Dougherty 1996). However, drawing on recent findings in critical studies of organizational control, we contend that improvisation can happen in environments where first and second order mechanisms are abundant. The touchstone for controlling improvisation lies, we argue, not in the degree of obtrusiveness of those mechanisms, but in their invisibility. In what concerns first order controls, direct supervision can be “delegated” from superior to peers, allowing for the maintenance of this type of coordination without hampering creativity (Sewell 1998). In jazz improvisation, band members are often chosen because of their reputation not among critics but fellow players (Hatch 1999). Second order controls can be rendered invisible by incorporating them in the production technology itself (be it of tangible goods or services) (Joerges and Czarniawska 1998; Barley and Kunda 1992). Milestones or action deadlines have been found to be an effective mechanism to hold the momentum/sense of urgency first triggered by an unexpected and “unplanned-for” event (Gardner and Roggoff 1990). Furthermore, milestones are opportunities to perform a check between current actions and the development of the situation the organization is facing, allowing detection of any deviations/ misperceptions that need to be corrected (Eisenhardt and Brown 1998). Moreover, milestones are currently set in advance and planned, thus providing a sense of structure/routinization to improvisational activities often perceived to result from chaos and disorder (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995). Finally, milestones serve as moments of feedback as partial stages/steps are concluded and thus, potentially increase individual motivation — building the momentum and the sense of urgency needed for improvisation to be sustained. Clearly articulated goals serve the all-important function of ensuring that improvisational activity amounts to the attainment of organizational objectives. In organizational settings clearly articulated goals perform a very similar function to that of the song in jazz improvisation. They are akin to a magnetic field (or a strange attractor, to use complexity theory) that, although not prescribing individual action, are strongly normative in concerning the results of such action (Weick
Management, paradox, and permanent dialectics
1993a). They also contribute to coordination among individual members by defining the results of their activity in a similar process to that of standardization of outputs (Mintzberg 1995). Memory, as stated by the second synthesis, can be both helpful and harmful to improvisation. On the one hand, as far as procedural memory goes, a small number of routines will be a central condition for improvisation. In this light, improvisation appears to occur only when an organization/individual does not have an adequate routine/procedural memory to respond to an unexpected situation (Moorman and Miner 1995). In situations for which an adequate routine does exist, then improvisation will be highly unlikely. This rationale is grounded on the following: first, it would be inefficient to invest in finding an improvisational course of action when another that is just as effective is already stored in memory; second, these response processes are often unconscious, automatic and undetected, lowering the deliberateness of choice. However, in spite of empirical proof that procedural organizational memory does hinder improvisation (Moorman and Miner 1998b), it is at least theoretically arguable that the opposite is also true. If we understand routines as grammars (Pentland and Rueter 1994), knowing that the elements in grammars can be combined in endless possibilities, procedural memory would be the organizational counterpart of the score of a song. Organizational improvisers could embellish/modify the score at will during action (Moorman and Miner 1998a; Weick 1998). Moreover, there is also empirical evidence that this is so: in a study of improvisation in the computer industry, Brown and Eisenhardt (1995) found that firms with established routines are more likely to improvise than others that do not. Our contribution to the untangling of this paradox lies in affirming that although organizational memory hinders improvisation, its ability to do so can be severely attenuated if the organization can build the necessary will to depart from current grammatical forms and use their elements to create new routines as action is unfolding. On the other hand, declarative memory, or knowledge of facts (Anderson 1983), is more related to qualitative variations of organizational improvisation. It plays an important role in the degree of improvisation: the more facts an organization knows the broader and, arguably, more diversified its basis for creativity, and thus for improvisation (Amabile 1998; Woodman, Sawyer and Griffin 1993; Moorman and Miner 1998b). Nonetheless, it must also be stated that a wide span of declarative memory may slow the speed of improvisation because of the time that individuals must invest searching through all available alternatives (Moorman and Miner 1998a). However, one could argue that bounded rationality would act to counter this phenomenon (Simon 1990). Finally, regarding the synthesis between specialization and generality, improvisation seems to call for skilled individuals to deal with unskilled/general-purpose resources. In an organization that aims to be proficient at real-time planning the level of
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performative skill that each individual possesses determines his/her ability to pursue improvisational activity very distant from organizational routine (Weick 1999 1993a; Crossan, White, Lane and Klus 1996). Additionally, when improvisation is a group phenomenon, this group’s improvisational performance will be limited by the ability of its least skilled member (Bastien and Hostager 1991; Hatch 1999). The relevance given to skill rests on it being a vehicle for creativity to be put in practice. Thus, individual creativity is also an important trait that an improviser must possess (Erickson 1982; Crossan 1998). Only high levels of individual creativity will allow for radical departures from current organizational practice. According to Weick these will reflect “purer instances of improvisation” (1998: 545), where lower levels result in “variations” or “embellishments” that still retain much of the original routine/idea and that may not be as effective. Another organizational attribute that can do much for the effectiveness of improvisation is member skill diversity. Homogeneous organizations are not prone to use diverse approaches to solve problems or to reap opportunities (Hannan and Freeman 1989). Thus, the “novel” element of organization improvisation will be seriously compromised if the organization does not benefit from a diverse population and it will probably be limited to mere embellishments or small variations upon existing ideas, products, practices and routines (Weick 1998 1999; Hatch 1997). Contrary to what happens with organizational members, the resources the individual/team/organization possesses are more favourable to improvisation if they are unskilled and unspecialized. In fact, specialized and limited purpose resources can thwart improvisation by limiting organizational members’ ability to turn their ideas into practice. Conversely, multi-purpose resources are flexible enough to be deployed in a variety of uses, even if those uses were never part of the organization’s original intentions (or even imagination) for their applicability (Weick 1993a). Thus, resources may affect improvisation through the bricolage dimension by augmenting the possible courses of action an organization can take, due to resource flexibility. General-purpose resources reduce the number of constraints upon those that are conceiving action as it unfolds, thus increasing their potential degree of departure from standard practice/ideas and, ultimately, their ability to reach “purer” forms of improvisation. Taking these three syntheses into account, one can argue that improvisation amounts to an integration between planning and action and thus offers a path for building a dialectical view of management.
Management, paradox, and permanent dialectics
Dialectical organization Paralleling the debate between the “planning” and “action” schools, both academicians and practitioners have been discussing whether the hierarchical/bureaucratic organizational model should be maintained or whether organizations should migrate to self-regulating and managing forms, such as networks. Those espousing the “hierarchy” school argue that the existence of tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1966), technological, human physical and mental limitations (Barnard 1938), and the appeal of lower transaction costs (Williamson 1971), justify the need for hierarchy and order-based relationships. Their emphasis is on the mechanisms that will allow the differentiation of workers in specialized roles and on how to control their efforts in order to attain the higher-order organizational goals. These control mechanisms are often of a formal nature, because organizational growth makes interpersonal coordination, such as mutual adjustment and direct supervision, very inefficient and sometimes outright impossible (Greiner 1972). Standardization of procedures, outputs and skills are thus the favoured integration devices (Mintzberg 1995). Control, and not mere coordination, seems to be the main goal of this type of organizations. Opposing this view are those that claim that changes in the environment, such as a higher competitive pressure (Bettis and Hitt 1995) and a better educated workforce (Handy 1991; Drucker 1996) allow and demand the shift towards selfmanaged/network-based organizational forms. Drawing from research on organizational learning, this view argues that shared values and beliefs are more pervasive than the “hierarchy” view holds. Shared beliefs serve as a powerful normalizing force that bind organizational members invisibly to a shared mental model of themselves, the organization and its relevant environment (Argyris and Schön 1992; Senge 1990). Thus, the major challenge for the organization is to harness this force in order to attain a higher integration level allowing employees, as a group, to meet the diversity/complexity of the environment (Emery and Trist 1965; Stacey 1996). Integration is thus assured by informal controls, such as culture transmitted by socialization and rituals (Schein 1985), in an attempt to manage what the “hierarchy” approach left unattended, thwarting its ability to change and adapt. The major goal of the “self-management” view is thus to foster integration/ coordination by engaging organizational members in the process of building a shared mental model of where the organization is, as well as what it aspires to be. The integration of these two opposing perspectives into a synthesis has already been attempted. The most notable of these attempts was Mary Parker Follet’s writings on business as an integrative unity (Follett 1940a), where she showed how to integrate the disparate needs of employers and employees, and how to give orders (Follett 1940b). She showed how framing orders as a “law of the situation”,
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instead of as a personal demand from management, allows the coordination and control of employee action while freeing it to take whatever course is adequate to handle the task at hand. Follett’s groundbreaking writings, however, did not take into account the pervasive role of culture and manufacturing technology as powerful, yet unobtrusive, controls and limitation mechanisms able to jeopardize any effort towards diversity (Barker 1993). Drawing on Follett’s work, we propose an integrative view of organization, which favours integrative differentiation (Table 3 summarizes this approach). Again, we present a set of syntheses to make this argument: (1) trusting unmet organizational members (minimal trust), (2) uncommitted commitment (minimal commitment), (3) agreeing on disagreeing (minimal consensus) and; (4) control to liberate (minimal structure). Table 3.A dialectical approach to organization Thesis
Synthesis
Antithesis
Minimal structure (loosely-tight organization)
Self-managed teams (loose-organization)
Overarching synthesis Hierarchy (tight organization) Elements Power / standardization (impersonal relationships)
Trust via standardization Trust (impersonal personal relation- (personal relationships) ships)
Uncommitment
Committed uncommitment
Commitment
Homogeneity (agreeing)
Diversified homogeneity (agreeing to disagree)
Diversity (disagreeing)
Control
Control to be free
Freedom
As far as the first synthesis goes, this apparent paradox is resolved by using trust as an integrating mechanism. Trust is grounded not in interpersonal ties but in stereotypes, thus exempting organizational members from the personal disclosure that trust-based organizational forms often entail (McAllister 1995), allowing for the necessary differentiation needed to meet the complexity of turbulent environments (Emery and Trist 1965). This “minimal trust” amounts, therefore, to organizational members trusting someone they do not know. The elements normally associated with building trust are kept to a minimum level just about necessary for the degree of integration needed to fight fragmentation. The point here is to create the conditions needed for trust to emerge (the belief that the
Management, paradox, and permanent dialectics
individual with whom someone is interacting, will act in a way that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to him or her), with the minimum level of commonality and personal disclosure. This is coordinated by means of a generalized other (Jarvenpaa and Shaw 1998), instead of social similarity. In this type of coordination, trust arises from a self-fulfilling prophecy of trustworthiness the individual develops, based on stereotypes of interactants and on previous network/team experiences. Indoctrination mechanisms have an important role to play in this process. Indoctrination need not to be related to the inculcation of particular organizational values and beliefs. Its purpose may be to facilitate coordination by a generalized other. The process would now aim at creating favourable stereotypes of the categories of people that newcomers are prone to interact with. It would seek to develop a favourable attitude towards working in trust-based settings (Armstrong and Cole 1995). Creating an attitude favourable to trusting other members of the organization is ultimately equivalent to fostering institution-based trust, because members are trusted on the basis of their affiliation with the organization (Frances, Levacic, Mitchell and Thompson 1991). For this to be possible, a different (one is tempted to say “minimal”) conception of culture and structure must also be present. The second and third synthesis can be grouped under the umbrella of a “minimal” organizational culture. Here, the high levels of commitment and consensus favoured by much of the prescriptive management literature — arising from the self-management approach — are replaced by minimal levels of both factors in order to avoid the detrimental effects potentially generated by this approach. As far as minimal commitment goes, its purpose is to promote the level of commitment needed to assure the necessary level of performance on behalf of the individual, while avoiding blind adherence to individual, group and organizational decisions. Organizational members must take the success of their organization as a central value, but they also have to be permeable to information that goes against decisions made both by them as individuals, and by the group or organization to which they belong as a whole. The dynamics that underlie a “healthy” level of commitment to an organization are coincident with those that explain individual and group pathologies found in organizations, such as groupthink and individual defensive routines (Janis 1971; Argyris 1992; Harvey 1996). Commitment is the result of attempts to resolve cognitive dissonance arising from making public and explicit choices without sufficient external justifications (Salancik 1977; Eiser 1980). The challenge lies in promoting a set of values and beliefs that foster a positive attitude towards public and explicit errors (Weick 1999), that attenuate the need for triggering the dissonance reduction process, because the organization values mistakes, when they are an input for learning (Sitkin 1992).
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Minimal commitment needs, however, to be coupled with minimal consensus in order to avoid the negative consequences brought by strong cultures, without losing the unobtrusiveness of the controls they rely on. Minimal consensus is grounded on the understanding that diversity of perceptions favours a richer understanding of the environment and, therefore, allows the organization to act in a more informed way (Starbuck 1965). Moreover, diversity in the composition of the organization’s population allows a wider repertoire of solutions and a higher level of flexibility (Hedberg, Nystrom and Starbuck 1976). These characteristics facilitate, in turn, a higher degree of adaptability to changing environments (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997) — the major reason why trust-based organizations are adopted (Powell 1990). This is accomplished by matching external complexity, which can reach significantly high values in this kind of environment (Emery and Trist 1965), with complexity of individual organizational members, instead of with complexity of organizational design (Weick 1993a). In short, the organization copes with environmental complexity by having very diverse members, instead of adopting complex structural forms. Minimal consensus rests on a deliberate and intentional effort to reduce commonalities among organizational members to the minimum level required for integration to be feasible. Creating such a basis for integration requires abandoning the pursuit of common perceptions of the environment, values and beliefs in favour of promoting compatibility among these in different organizational members. The purpose of this is to allow trust to emerge by a perception of compatibility instead of one of similarity (Weick 1993b). In this way, individuals acknowledge that they hold a valuable perception of reality, but also realize that perception is limited. Real capacities for action and decision-making can only be harnessed when combined with different views from other members. It is important, though, that those perceptions, while not being identical, are compatible in the sense that they illuminate a certain reality from different but complementary (as opposed to antagonistic) perspectives (Hedberg et al 1976). Finally, the fourth synthesis, which we label “minimal structure”, is constituted by three elements: coordination by action, based on a minimal set of rules and, on a shared social objective. Due to the absence of a strong culture from which trust and coordination can be derived, this type of organization replaces a shared system of values, beliefs and perceptions, by coordination through action. This means that the integration of the individual efforts of organizational members does not rely on sharing the same culture but on having a compatible perception of the challenges posed by the environment (Weick 1993a), that creates a “law of the situation” (Follett 1940b) for individuals to obey. Like coordination by culture, this is still a third order control, but one that promotes, instead of hinders, diversity. It fosters the emergence of compatible (as opposed to shared) views on the problem or
Management, paradox, and permanent dialectics
opportunity, facing the group, allowing for a broad variety of alternative courses of action to appear (Eisenberg 1990). Control in minimal networks is also achieved through a small set of rules that govern the interaction among their members (Weick 1999; Bastien and Hostager 1991). Those rules can emerge from the nature of the task faced by the group or from broader social norms (Hatch 1997). As far as the nature of the task is concerned, these rules are embodied in a restricted set of cognitive and behavioural alternatives the members can choose from. In spite of the diversity desirable in this kind of organization, this set of alternatives is restricted because of the necessary compatibility among its members for minimal integration to occur (Brown and Duguid 1991). This set of alternatives can be equated to an organizational grammar: a set of elements and combination rules among those elements that allow for the formation of an almost infinite set of different courses of action, from a limited set of inputs (Pentland and Rueter 1994). In minimal networks, social norms are limited to those coming from the professional and industry-specific cultures of its members (Hutchins 1991). The organization should restrain itself from adding to those rules at the expense of limiting the scope of diversity (Weick 1995). Another important mechanism of coordination in minimal networks is a shared social objective. In fact, because of the parsimony of control mechanisms, its members must explicitly share the organization’s goals (Orr 1990). Otherwise, although individual teams may adequately respond to problems or opportunities in the environment, the ad hoc basis on which they do so could continuously increase the fragmentation of the organization as a whole, compromising its longterm integrity (Senge 1990).
Towards a dialectical view of management The fact that the concepts of dialectical strategy and dialectical organization offer a way to achieve a synthesis between opposing schools begins to demonstrate the potential for a dialectical view of management. In order to accomplish this task, we will draw on Benson’s (1997) four principles of a dialectical view of organization theory. In fact, although this author’s approach is wedded to a “process” view of dialectics, the underlying principles of his approach appear to apply to a “permanent dialectics” perspective of this phenomenon. The principle of social construction calls for identifying sources both of constraint and of deviation/construction. As far as dialectical strategy goes, the source of constraint is the plan, the “minimal” prescribed part of strategy that allows for adaptivity to emerge (Brews and Hunt 1999). Its source of variation comes from the stimuli that press the organization/individual to adapt and to be flexible as
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action unfolds and from the ability to “bricolate” with and around the prescribed plan (Berry and Irvine 1986). In dialectical organization, the source of constraint is the minimally formalized structure, including shared goals and the stereotypes acquired in the indoctrination process (Covaleski, Dirsmith, Heian and Samuel 1998). Deviation and construction comes from the perception of errors as learning opportunities (Sitkin 1992) and from the role of action as a ground for coordination (Follett 1940b). The principle of totality calls for an underlying “whole” to which semi-autonomous parts are linked. At the organizational level, the “whole” behind an instance of a dialectical strategy is the overarching action culture that grounds it. Individually, looking at this phenomenon as an enactment of distilled experience (Crossan and Sorrenti 1997), and a high level of skill, organizational member’s life experiences frame the background that allows for discrete instances of improvisation to appear (Hatch 1999). These overarching elements notwithstanding, each dialectical strategy is autonomous in the way that it depends on the specific details of the plan driving it and on the people working towards it. Dialectical organizations, on their side, take much of their rules and structure from general societal norms (Bastien and Hostager 1988; Eisenberg 1990) and depend on the diversity of their members, who encompass a wide span of settings of which a particular organization is just a single element. Nonetheless, each organization uses these norms and this diversity uniquely, rendering it partially autonomous from the milieu where it stands. The principle of contradiction gives, perhaps, the clearer illustration of dialectics by stating that this type of phenomena only emerges where two opposing forces are at work. The fact that plans necessarily possess an emergent component (Minztberg and McHugh 1985), either because of the complexity of environmental interaction, or because of communication distortion, allows us to unearth this principle in a dialectical strategy. The fact that human interaction creates an informal “shadow” system in every formal structure (Krackhardt and Hanson 1993; Sayles 1989), allows the contradictions to emerge as a characteristic of the concept of dialectical organization. Finally, praxis (which Benson defines as “free and creative construction of social arrangements” [1977: 5]) is also visible in both concepts. Dialectical strategies are often prone to formalization, which eventually ends up creating punctuated change via an incremental process (Edelman and Benning 1998). Dialectical organizations, with their low levels of commitment and consensus, allow their arrangements to be in permanent reconstruction, a state of “organizing” (Weick 1979). Summing up, this argument appears to have the potential to contribute towards a dialectical view of management sufficiently for its major underlying principles to be worthy of closer scrutiny. By attempting this, we go beyond the
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current state of the art of the dialectical perspective on management — which has been focusing on demonstrating its relevance and applying itself to several disconnected fields of management inquiry — by proposing a set of underlying principles of permanent management dialectics. This is done with the purpose of providing a novel basis for research into the paradoxes present in organizations as well as contributing a new understanding for practitioners to benefit from those paradoxes. Four principles guide this approach: simultaneity, locality, minimality and generality (Table 4 contrast these with those of a “process” approach). Table 4.Contrasting ‘approaches to management dialectics Dialectics as process
Permanent Dialectics
Social construction – Source of constraint – Source of deviation / construction
Simultaneity – Mutual support of opposites – Manager as ‘surfacer’ and – holder of tension – Pervasiveness of paradox
Totality – Overarching whole – Determinants of parts autonomy
Locality – Local enactment – Action as arena of integration – Probability of formalization
Contradiction – Presence of embedded opposites
Minimality – Small causes lead to big effects – Quantity: border of necessity – Quality: unobtrusiveness
Praxis – Process of creative reconstruction of social arrangements
Generality – Toleration of opposites – Low skill resources – Efficient effectiveness
Simultaneity means that a dialectical view of management is grounded on the interplay of contradictory forces and not in the attempt to subdue one to the other. Under this principle, a thesis does not exist despite its antithesis but because of it. Each pole of the dialectic needs the other to sustain its presence. The concepts of dialectical strategy and dialectical organization support this argument. Research has shown that, under a dialectical view of strategy, the design of a “minimal” plan, where goals and deadlines are scrupulously prescribed and enforced, enhances the firm’s flexibility and adaptability to unexpected internal and external shifts (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997). Additionally, Hutchins (1991) proved that some level of structure is needed for informal cooperation to emerge and Ezzamel and Willmott (1998) found that loosely coupled structures were heavily dependent upon highly structured relationships and reward systems. Thus,
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a second insight from this principle is that the role of the manager shifts from choosing between the poles of a given paradox, as contingency theory prescribes (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967), and from holding this paradox, to surfacing it, making it visible, promoting an integration between its opposites. In fact, Follett (1940b) contended that using the “situation” as a source of “law” (or orders) allowed for integration between a directive and a democratic approach to leadership and organization. Weick’s research into firefighting has proved this point eloquently, and shown how rules and plans are critical in unexpected and unplanned-for situations (Weick 1993b). Finally, simultaneity means that one can seldom escape paradox in managerial life. Mintzberg has documented the close linkage between deliberate and emergent strategy (Mintzberg and Waters 1982; Mintzberg and McHugh 1985), showing that emergent and unplanned/unintended action will probably sprout from the most deliberate of plans. There are two brief explanations for this phenomenon. First, communication distortion impedes people in understanding a message exactly as its conveyor understands it (Mintzberg 1990). Second, changes in the environment surround most businesses (Bettis and Hitt 1995), shifting them towards a “turbulent field”, where emergence is the norm because of the complexity of relationships between environmental factors (Emery and Trist 1965; Lane and Maxfield 1996). Locality means that the synthesis between two opposing poles of a paradox does not result from an overarching design effort; but from case-by-case enactment. The first inference one can make from this principle is that a synthesis is a local phenomenon, resulting from the decisions taken by an organization or individual concerning a specific challenge or problem. Second, this synthesis occurs not in reflection but in action. Given most organization’s biases towards pre-conception (Weick 1998), few would endure the poles of paradoxes dealing with deviation from current practice if it were not because of poignant challenges from the environment (Mintzberg 1996). Moreover, it is these poles’ demand for action that permits and facilitates the integration between opposites as action unfolds (Crossan and Sorrenti 1997; Crossan 1997). Finally, and in spite of this, the transition from local responses to organizational (global) routines is possible. This is accomplished as those responses good results carry them throughout the organization via stories (Orr 1990) that get shared and slowly creep into the organization’s memory (Moorman and Miner 1998a 1998b). Again, the concepts of dialectical strategy and dialectical organization support these claims. The “planned” part of a dialectical strategy would go forever undisturbed without an external event demanding flexibility, because of most organization’s bias towards planning (Weick 1998). It is only in response to such an event that organizations/individuals adapt in and around a plan and, through action, create novel solutions that may end up stored in the organization’s memory, be it
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procedural or declarative (Miner, Moorman and Bassoff 1996; Vera and Crossan 1999). As far as organizing goes, research into innovation implementation and group cooperation has shown that structures are often as enduring as the life span of a project (Johnson and Rice 1987), and that these structures emerge from action, which acts as the prime coordination mechanism (Bastien and Hostager 1988). Additionally, these organizational configurations are often formalized and crystallized in the organization (Orlikowski 1996). Minimality means that the ability to use a paradox to build a synthesis depends on maintaining only sufficient levels of each of the paradox’s poles in order to avoid one taking over the other. There are three arguments underlying this principle. The first is that, as complexity theory posits, big effects come from small causes (Prigogine 1984). Thus, synthesis occurs when the necessary “strange attractors” create an “organizational force field” that will bind corporate action, preventing it falling into an orbit that is too close to one of the poles of paradox. Two different tasks are called for, which one finds in the two remaining arguments sustaining this principle: creating the necessary quantity and quality of structure (plans, rules, procedures, organizational configurations) for integration to be possible. As far as quantity goes, this implies searching the level that is sufficient for synthesis to emerge, while taking care to stay on the thin line that separates stifling order from entropic disorder (the “edge of chaos” [Pascale 1999]) and that integrates them both (Lane and Robert 1996). As far as quality goes, this calls for procuring an unobtrusive type of structure, one which allows for both dialectical strategy and organization to thrive (Sewell 1998). Otherwise, independently of the extent to which that structure is developed its effect will always be more restraining than liberating. Thus, a dialectical strategy not only needs plans more akin to a jazz rather than classical music score (the latter having much more prescribed notes to be played [Perry 1991]), but also plans that do away with prescribed actions and replace them with goals and deadlines (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995). In the same vein, a dialectical organization not only needs fewer controls but also less visible ones (Covaleski et al. 1998). Although one can expand the span of control almost to infinity, this will not transmit the perception of freedom of action that an empowerment program will, but it will reduce the perceived amount of control one has to endure (McGregor 1960). Replacing orders with the law of the situation (Follett 1940b), superior supervision with peer vigilance (Romme 1999) and procedural specification with technological limitations goes a long way in promoting nimbler organizational forms. Generality means that obtaining a synthesis requires that the “minimal” that is prescribed and pre-conceived must possess a high degree of generality. The first insight emerging from this principle is the need to “tolerate” opposites. If results have to be effective and efficient; structured and unstructured, and deliberate and
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emergent, then individuals and resources cannot be committed or specialized to a specific set of courses of action/solutions. They must be flexible enough to accommodate several, which may well be contradictory (refer to the concept of patching [Eisenhardt and Brown 1999]). The second insight is that the resources available to organizational members, whether materials, plans, structures or information systems, must be “fool-proof”. This means shifting the responsibility for avoiding dysfunctions from the individual to the organization (Anderson 1983) by embedding the necessary mechanisms for these dysfunctions to be avoided in what is formalized. Instead of relying on recruiting some special kind of employees that do not fall to phenomena such as groupthink (Janis 1971), one could build an organization and a strategy that subsumed this type of behaviour in an emergent way. Finally, generality allows us to answer what some consider the greatest paradox in modern organizations — the dilemma between effectiveness and efficiency (Peters 1992; Bennis 1989). By relying on general resources and plans, an organization can shift strategy and form using bricolage, that is, it can “make do” with available resources (Levi-Strauss 1966) without having to acquire new ones, thus exploiting those it possesses even as it changes direction. A dialectical view of strategy and organization supports these arguments because its plans and configurations, respectively, show how generality allows for several syntheses to emerge. Turning to dialectical strategies, research has shown that general plans that do not specify steps but instead provide major goals and deadlines allow for innovation to take place with high levels of efficiency (Sobek, Ward and Liker 1999). However, these plans, as Perry (1991) shows, allow organizations to adapt to unexpected circumstances and thus make its realized strategy a much more deliberate endeavour, allowing for opposite directions to be weaved into a synthesis. Moreover, such plans generally are simple and can be understood and improvised around even by the most junior of organizational members (see Orlikowski 1996 for an example). Dialectical organizations rely on systems such as MBO and mentoring (Covaleski et al. 1998). These allow and facilitate opposite goals of controlling and liberating and do not require much skill because they are either embedded in the general social fabric or built into the technology of production (Ezzamel and Willmott 1998). Additionally, the unobtrusiveness of controls allows for creative effectiveness-seeking behaviour, coupled with the necessary normalization for efficiency to be attained (Sewell 1998).
Conclusion Environmental changes and organizational opportunities have been planting paradoxes in several areas of organizational theory and practice. Some authors
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drew on a process view of dialectics to show how the opposing poles of these paradoxes succeeded each other in the course of time. Nonetheless, new competitive landscapes demand more of organizations. Contradictions now co-exist in time and must be tackled simultaneously. Several authors have acknowledged this and have been looking at how this could be accomplished in several fields of management inquiry. However, this effort has, until now, lacked the necessary overarching framework for its integration and fruition into insights for practice. In this light, we have presented a rationale for the potential of such an approach for current management theory and practice by developing a “permanent dialectical” view (where opposites exist simultaneously instead of in succession) of strategy and organization. Having surfaced the need and the potential for this perspective, we then postulated four principles that underlie a “permanent” dialectical view of management, after first assessing whether it was truly a dialectical approach by showing its compliance with Benson’s (1977) basic principles of dialectical analysis. Thus, the present effort goes beyond current theory because, first, it presents the need and potential for an overarching view of management as an act of synthesis, thus providing a platform to integrate the separate findings researchers have obtained when applying this view in a somewhat implicit manner to particular fields of inquiry. Second, it argues for the need to go beyond the process approach, to a permanent dialectical view of management, because of the growing simultaneity in the presence of opposite forces and demands upon organizations. Finally, the principles we put forth go beyond the argument for the relevance of such a view to management research by surfacing common themes found in dialectical phenomena in organizations — providing a basis for both investigation of, and action upon, this type of phenomena. Our effort has implications for both theory and practice. As far as theory goes, we contribute an argument for the need and the potential of a dialectical view of management and a set of principles to guide the construction of such a view. As far as practice goes, a dialectical approach shows that “traditional” practices, such as planning and formal organizations, are alive and well. Obtaining the results that “gurus” claim are demanded by current competitive environments does not mean adopting the practices they proclaim. It is just the opposite: plans foster adaptivity and flexibility, while structure and norms foster creativity and liberation. The challenge is to find a synthesis that integrates two opposing forces or demands, which means that one has to hold two contradictory ideas in thought and in practice, at the same point in time. According to F. Scott Fitzgerald (1968), to be able to do so is the nature of true genius. We might not go as far as this but we do think it might make for better management and organization theory and practice.
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Chapter 3
The meanings of risk and interorganizational collaboration Paul K. Couchman and Liz Fulop
Introduction: Paradox and meanings Paradox can be described as an all-embracing concept for dealing with conflicting demands, opposites or contradictions in organizational affairs that help expose seemingly irrational and absurd relationships, processes and practices (Lewis 2000: 760). Paradox itself does not represent something new in management and organizational theory but rather, what has changed is its meaning. It is now more than ever seen by many theorists as the sine qua non for making sense of a world that is both global and local, diverse in its workforce, technologically fast and smart, and destined for disruptive experiences and the unexpected. Indeed, paradox is an “umbrella” term for understanding the universal conditions of life, and for managing the inevitable complexity, ambiguity and diversity that this brings into organizations (Lewis 2000: 760). In this chapter we focus on two key aspects of paradox. The first is that paradoxes are constructed through sense making (Ford and Backoff: 1988, cited in Lewis 2000: 761). In this chapter we refer to sense making in terms of how discursive practices and discourses shape meanings. We examine how organizations, as sites of discursive practice, are constituted and, in the process, constitute the subjectivities of those who engage in sense making (Mills 1993). This notion of sense making is concerned with how contradictory and competing meanings become undecidable because of the nature of the texts themselves (Linstead 1993: 59; Jeffcutt 1993). In short, we are dealing with indeterminate meanings as understood from a deconstructionist perspective (Hassard 1993: 20) in which subjectivity is treated as an artifact of different historical and social traces that enter consciousness through symbolic systems that both differentiate and fix meanings (Linstead 1993: 58–9). Sense making renders any understanding or meaning of risk undecidable and contested in ways that are denied in the self-understandings of positivist approaches, such as in techno-scientific methods (Burton and Carlen 1979: 17;
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Linstead 1993: 68–9). As Linstead says, organizations as text partially constitute the subjectivity of those involved in their production but they can never completely constitute meanings. “Readers” come with traces of other texts, cultural forms and ways of reading (or reading positions) that change the nature of the text thus altering how textual materials are consumed by the “reader” (Linstead 1993: 59; also see Hassard 1993: 21). Deconstruction thus offers a way of theorizing and understanding risk as paradoxical. Such an approach to risk has been unexplored in the management and organizational literature. Deconstruction is at the heart of understanding paradox. One of its key tenets is that every text bears within it the disruptive potential of deconstruction and for “ironic self-negation” with each proposition or statement potentially containing its own contradiction (Norris 1982: 48; Hassard 1993: 21). There is no necessarily correct way to deploy deconstruction but the process is committed to self-engendered paradox because, from this perspective, texts defy any settled or definitive reading, and all texts are open to further deconstruction (Norris 1982: 48). The second focus of the chapter is on how paradox becomes evident through self-reflections or interactions (Ford and Backoff: 1988, cited in Lewis 2000: 761). We draw on the reflective account of one of the authors who became involved in a cross-sector collaborative research project. The reflections are based on recollections of discussions that took place over a six months period (between 1997–1998) that represented the developmental phase of the project. The recollections were written in a draft paper drawing on both the narrative form and theoretical arguments. The draft was then passed to the co-author to undertake a discourse analysis. The co-author questioned the account given in the draft and sought a more critical and reflexive rendition by its author. So the text was modified. The co-author, acting as the “other” or interpellator, interwove the text with other traces in the form of theories, insights and certain ways of framing questions, effectively de-centring the subject (the author of the text) as the authoritative source of meanings. The original author’s reflections were treated as “…a convenient location for the throughput of discourses” (Hassard 1993: 13; Linstead 1993: 59). In other words, once the text was written and passed on, the reading of the text by another created its intertextuality or multiple meanings that remain independent of any individual interpretations (Hassard 1993: 15; Linstead 1993: 59). We expand on this approach later in the chapter when we outline how language games and discourse shape meanings. The project, which was funded under the Australian Government’s Cooperative Research Centre (CRC) Program,1 aimed to provide support for collaborative R&D projects in the Australian manufacturing sector. The later part of the chapter analyses how three competing or incommensurate discourses emerged in the initial
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discussions over the direction that the project should take. It explores how risk management and techno-scientific ways of knowing were introduced into the emerging discourse and how these were contested. As Foucault (1972, cited in Chan 2001: 79–80) states, for a topic such as risk to become constructed in a discourse requires that three conditions be met. First, the ability to think, choose, speak and question has already to be part of “…broader disciplinary and institutional contexts … and disciplines that act to discipline and control their practitioners” (Linstead 1996, cited in Fulop, Linstead and Clarke 1999: 323). There has to be evidence of a disciplinary regime. Cross-sector collaborations bring into tension and conflict extraordinarily complex ways of framing problems, as well as divergent knowledge and truth claims based on competing disciplinary paradigms, particularly in academia. Second, to meet Foucault’s other criteria, such collaborations must bring together disparate institutional systems. The CRCs arose from deliberate attempts by government to break down barriers between the public sector and business and to use collaboration to change how specialist practitioners, with their distinctive forms of knowing (for example, scientists, product development engineers, academic researchers, business managers, etc.), solve major industry problems. Thus, collaborations of this kind across industry sectors create demarcations and contestations over diverse linguistic forms and truth claims within disciplinary practices and serve to redefine power relations across disciplines and within various fields of practice (see also Chan 2001: 72–4). Lastly, the settings have to be ordered to establish which issues have importance and whose interests are privileged. The CRCs’ policies clearly gave prominence to industry needs and privileged applied research over pure or discoverybased research. The policies were designed to create a more relevant and vibrant research agenda through university-industry partnerships and multi-disciplinary research. It also sought to shift the funding of public sector research increasingly into the private sector. Fairclough (1992, cited in Chan 2001: 78, 30) argues that discursive formations have to be examined in the context of economic, political and institutional settings that give rise to them and allow the object of a discourse, such as risk management, to emerge in the first place. In other words, the conditions of possibility of a discourse have to be understood in terms of the contextual conditions (described above) that mediate the emergence of a discourse. Discursive practices and relationships create the conditions of possibility through which material events are related to words and through which they attain some meaning (Jacques 1995: 19). Discourse analysis requires that account be taken of the constitutive role of such discourses and the historical conditions from which they emerge and become part of the discursive nature of reality (Sturdy and Morgan 2000: 4).
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Meanings of risk It is not our intention to cover all the many ways in which risk has been written about. Instead, we provide a brief historical overview of its place in modernist thinking and then consider its representation in the management, organizational and, more recently, interorganizational collaboration (IOC) literatures. The concept of “risk” emerged during the period of modernity and has been central to economic and business discourse since the 18th century. As Giddens (1990: 34) observed, the notion of risk has to a large extent replaced the idea of fate in human affairs and this “represents an alteration in the perception of determination and contingency, such that human moral imperatives, natural causes, and chance reign in place of religious cosmologies. The idea of chance, in its modern senses, emerges at the same time as that of risk.” While financial practices for coping with the hazards of trade can be traced back to antiquity that we would now call “risk management” (for example, Baskin and Miranti 1997), the word risk appears to have entered the English language from French as recently as the 17th century. By the early 18th century, the word was clearly associated with commerce and risk referred to as “the chance or hazard of commercial loss, (specifically) in the case of insured property or goods” (Oxford English Dictionary). In the new discipline of political economy, the discourse of risk was associated with profit, positing the entrepreneur as the model of virtuous individualism in capitalist society. The chance an entrepreneur took in venturing an investment was seen as the source of any profit obtained and the higher the risk taken, the greater the potential for profit. Investing entrepreneurs take a risk, defined as exposure to the chance of loss, in the expectation of a return on the investment. The risk can be a “calculated risk” (calculated through various technoscientific approaches), in that the entrepreneur may be aware of the threats facing a chosen course of action (also see Luhmann [1988] for a similar view). Herein lies the fundamental element of risk management in contemporary management discourse: to identify, evaluate and take action to manage risk is to reaffirm individuality (as embodied in the heroics of the male entrepreneur) and to do so by acting rationally. Put formally, this may be stated as: The theory of risk evaluation and management is a department of a wider theory of rationality in choice and action. In particular, it belongs to the domain known as practical reasoning, whose object is the rational choice of courses of conduct. The risks it involves are clearly one of the salient features of such a choice (Rescher 1983: 5).
In management-related studies risk is almost entirely presented within a dominant discourse described by Lupton (1999: 2) as a “techno-scientific approach.” Risk is
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largely taken-for-granted as an objective phenomenon, one that can be identified, for which causal factors can be mapped, and predictive models of risk relations built. People’s responses to various types of risk can be estimated and ways of limiting the effects of risks proposed. The notion of rationality, and even bounded rationality, governing management action has permeated management discourse and is also well established in organizational theory (for example, Abrahamson 1996). This phenomenon is most clearly observed in the field of financial risk management. While financial risk management has long been a key element in capital investment decision-making it has undergone something of a “revolution” since the late 20th century (for example, Lore and Borodovsky 2000). The theory and practice of risk management has advanced considerably. Following a number of widely reported major financial disasters in the 1990s it has now become “the paramount topic” in finance management. Shrivastava (1995: 120) describes nine different ways in which financial risks have been described in the literature and these are not exhaustive. The concept of risk also appears in other areas of contemporary management discourse, which we do not intend to explore at this point. We are more interested in how risk has been incorporated into the field of project management, where risk management has been embraced as a central element. The recognition of risk as a special concern of project managers was formalized in 1987 when the US-based Project Management Institute included risk management in its “Project Management Body of Knowledge” or “PMBOK”. PMBOK was a document that sought to cover “all those topics, subject areas and intellectual processes which are involved in the application of sound management principles to … projects” (Project Management Institute 1996: vii). Interest in risk within project management was given a major stimulus and institutional legitimacy in the 1990s as a result of major failures, and other problems in the management of software-intensive projects, especially defence procurement projects in the USA (for example, Conrow and Shishido 1997). The PMBOK is an attempt, by an organization that has sought to professionalize the practice of project management to crystallize the discourse of risk around a set of would-be disciplinary practices. The 1996 revision of this document (renamed “A Guide to the PMBOK”; Project Management Institute 1996) clarified this purpose, as to identify and describe that subset of the PMBOK which is generally accepted. Generally accepted means that the knowledge and practices described are applicable to most projects most of the time, and that there is widespread consensus about their value and usefulness (Project Management Institute 1996: 3).
The PMBOK model of project management defines its project management task as “the application of knowledge, skills, tools, and techniques to project activities in
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order to meet or exceed stakeholder needs and expectations from a project” (p. 6). Risk management is seen as one of nine distinctive knowledge areas included in the management of projects. Project risk management encompasses “the processes concerned with identifying, analyzing and responding to project risk. It includes maximizing the results of positive events, and minimizing the consequences of adverse events” (p. 11). As a number of writers in this field have emphasized, it is due to their uniqueness that projects are “risky” and are prone to things going wrong or not proceeding according to plan: Projects are particularly susceptible to risk because each project is unique in some measure. The degree of uniqueness can vary dramatically. …. This uniqueness means that the past is an imperfect guide to the future. We are never completely sure what the future holds. There is always the risk that things will not go as planned (Frame 1994: 75).
Rational managers — those who accept the PMBOK discourse — plan and act to ensure that positive outcomes are achieved and negative outcomes avoided or minimised. Management is promised control of its future and destiny. Another dimension contributing to project risk occurs in those projects that involve IOC, as is the case for projects carried out under the auspices of an R & D consortium or a supply chain partnership. Here a number of different sources of risk are identified and, although the concept of risk has long been central to management practice and discourse, and the “risky” nature of IOCs is widely acknowledged (see Powell 1990: 318), the concept of risk in this context remains poorly understood in theory. Of the many different approaches to the analysis of IOC, it is the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) perspective that particularly privileges risk. The approach is embedded in techno-scientific methods and is premised on the argument that there are many incentives for self-interested opportunistic behaviour by actors in relationships of dependence. It is based on notions of what would be the rational behaviour of a self-regarding and possessively individualistic actor in determining appropriate forms of governance to minimize economic transaction costs (Williamson 1985). Because of this, the approach focuses on means to pre-empt the risk of opportunism and the associated lack of trust between exchange parties, for example, through employment contracts and the use of management fiat. However, the TCE approach to risk is poorly developed in addressing power dynamics and asymmetric power relationships amongst collaborating organizations (Gray 1999), and it ignores the embeddedness of economic activities in their social, cultural and historical contexts (Powell 1990; Granovetter 1985). However, there have been attempts to address these criticisms and further develop the TCE framework and position it as a dominant discourse in the field of IOC studies.
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Further developments of the TCE approach have introduced a number of different sources of risk, notably relational risk, and the trust dynamics involved (Ring and Van de Ven 1992; Nooteboom, Berger and Noorderhaven 1997; Nooteboom 1999). These sources of risk include the possibility of one partner opportunistically exploiting other partners to its own advantage (for example, by breaking confidentiality agreements, misappropriating proprietary knowledge, appropriating all or a disproportionate share of benefits, etc.). Additionally, there may be spill overs (that is, through collaborative relationships, a company’s strategic knowledge and core competencies are leaked to competitors, and competency-related risks (where one or more parties are unable to deliver on their agreed contribution due to a lack of the necessary capability or resources, rather than any opportunistic intention). Nooteboom (1999: 110) notes that unpredictable events in the environment can increase the risks of opportunism because such events may be the catalyst for one or more of the partners to act opportunistically, bringing risk into the foreground of theories of IOC (also see Das and Teng 2001). However, such work does not go far enough. One needs to regard risk as a construct of management discourse and as a language game (see Hardy and Phillips 1999) in which complex and indeterminate meanings defy the drive to rationalize the world. Additionally, the privileging of rationality, science and technological progress has been contested in more sociologically grounded approaches to risk. Socio-cultural approaches seek to understand risk and risk discourses as products of their social, cultural and historical contexts (for example, Douglas 1992; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Beck 1992; Lupton 1999). Socio-cultural approaches stand in stark contrast to the techno-scientific approaches that treat risk as an “unproblematic” fact. While risk is acknowledged as a generic feature of all epochs, the risk society thesis (Beck 1992) argues that post-industrial society is marked by a redefinition of the meaning of risk and the politicization of science itself (Shrivastava 1995: 120). Beck argues that we live in a world — a risk society — where, increasingly, disasters, catastrophes and other unknown and unintended consequences of new industrialized, decision-produced incalculability spread unanticipated threats globally (Beck 1992: 22). Germ warfare, ozone holes, genetically modified food and pesticides, global terrorism and even Internet viruses are immediate examples of such threats. The paradoxical nature of the risk society lies in the fact that science (and the techno-scientific method) is simultaneously one of “the causes, medium of definition and the source of solutions to risks” (Beck 1992: 155). In the period of modernization, risks were produced in tandem with wealth creation and were minor, often seen as the latent or side effects of modern production and scientific progress. In post-industrial society this relationship is reversed and risk comes to dominate social change and all notions of progress (Shrivastava 1995: 119).
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Science’s monopoly over the rationality of risk decisions is called into question once the knowledge base of science, and hence techno-scientific methods, is seen as flawed. Reflexive approaches to science open up debates about its failures and flaws and help politicize its knowledge claims. The risk society is one in which the fallibility of science is extended beyond its own knowledge-practices — as a matter internal to scientific practice — and opens up the possibility of breaking its monopoly over the rationality of risky decisions. New meanings can emerge around differences in the conceptualization of risk and knowledge (Shrivastava 1995: 120), developing new discourses of risk and hence, competing meanings.
Discourse and language games and competing meanings Discourse can be interpreted in terms of “what can be said” and is concerned with the “relationship between bodies, meanings, power and language” (Jacques 1995: 19). Foucault (1972, 1980) sees language as the embodiment of knowledge and power, which always implicated in how sense is made of the world (also Linstead 1993; Clegg 1998, and Chan 2001). Foucault contends that speaking embodies particular ways of seeing that give advantage to certain groups and give rise to particular forms of action and practice as expressions of power. Following Foucault, we conceive of discourse as a “complex nest of ideas, linguistic expressions, assumptions, justifications, defences, social institutions and practical actions” (Fulop, Linstead and Clarke 1999: 3). Our concern is with how power is inscribed in a discourse and how it transforms subjectivities through the language games within and between organizations. Chan elaborates on this point: “[P]arties construct competing discourses — and each discourse is linked to a contestation over power. Implicit within a discourse are the continued productivity of power and the movement of meaning” (2001: 72). Language games based on different knowledge regimes (Lilley 2001, citing Deleuze 1986: 51) ensure that various forms of discourse circulate in organizations (as discursive and non-discursive practices) and have the potential to create “collective” and unacknowledged blindness to entire courses of action or ways of understanding. Discourses in themselves cannot do anything: “Discourses inform texts … which in turn are ‘read’ by managers or others in specific organizational contexts — discourses must have participants in order to function” (Fulop, Linstead and Clarke 1999: 326). But participants are often “enrolled” into discourses (in the form of texts) that involve restricted styles and narrative forms that set up a self-referential context, foreclosing certain actions and thoughts. Discourses can involve highly restricted semantic fields, where meanings seem perpetually fixed, or have fixed criteria of relevance, where some ideas, tools or
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techniques seem immutable, “natural” or cast, as it were, as if they were inevitable (Fulop 1992). That fact that so many managers unreflexively resort to technoscientific ways of making sense of risk is partially explained by these aspects of discursive formation. Texts are crucial in revealing how collective and “unacknowledged blindness” emerges through discourse and discursive practices.
Texts, genres and subjectivity Texts comprise utterances (the use of language) in a social setting, including discussions between managers, as well as the most banal of social exchanges. Language, however, is patterned by genres and these include particular forms of narrative (the heroic, the epic, the tragic, etc.) and, as mentioned above, language games (see Clegg, 1975; Jeffcutt 1993; Downing 1997; Fulop and Rifkin 1999; Chan 2001: 71–2). Language is also made up of rallying symbols, myths, metaphors and imagery that act on social subjects emotionally and linguistically and help form particular reading positions from which meanings emerge (Fulop Linstead and Clarke 1999: 328; Browne, Banerjee, Fulop and Linstead 1999: 402; Linstead, 1993; Linstead 1999). Genres assist in reinforcing how narratives should be read, who should read them, and the contexts in which they should be read. They help create the stability of reference within discursive practices (Fulop 1992), even though multiple meanings and narratives circulate at any given time. In any activity (be it a discussion or some other form of linguistic exchange), more than one text is produced, and can include minutes, agendas, and other “products” (Fairclough, 1992 in Chan 2001:78). Texts are central to how we create multiple meanings because their constituent messages can never have a single, fixed meaning or remain static. One of the most significant factors accounting for a plurality of meaning arises from how a discourse is recognized by its readers. Such “acts” of recognition are based on the perspectives or positions adopted in any reading of texts. Texts also possess a specific staging, referred to as “genre”. “Participants understand texts in social contexts or specific social occasions because they have prior experience of them and genres assist in making texts identifiable and meaningful in specific settings” (Fulop, Linstead and Clarke 1999: 329; Linstead 1993). Genres are the signals, conventions and cues that allow someone to understand the meanings to be negotiated in a text — to anticipate what utterances, demeanour and expressions are warranted, and how they are likely to be received by the audience hearing or reading them. To a large extent, genres help define the rules of inclusion and exclusion, the silencing of some voices and the privileging of others, the marginalizing of certain accounts, and defining who are the objects and subjects of a discourse (Fulop 1992; Hardy and Phillips 1999).
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Challenging dominant forms of representation in any discourse, such as risk management, means understanding how individual subjects constitute their sense of reality and identities, and how these meet the needs of the knowledge produced. Discursive formations are only partially constitutive of subjectivity because of the traces of other texts that “readers” bring to any organizational encounter (Linstead 1993: 59). In effect, “subjectivity refers simultaneously to the conditions of individuality and self-awareness, which are continually formed and reformed under changing social, economic and historical circumstances” (Fulop, Linstead and Clarke 1999: 329; Linstead 1993: 59: Chan 2001: 17). Subjectivity is itself produced through different discourses, and “…for a discourse to ‘work’, the discourse has to produce the subject and to define the subject-positions from which knowledge proceeds” (Chan 2001: 18; citing Hall 1997: 61). Social subjects read discourses in different ways because we each adopt certain “reading positions” from which a text appears meaningful and coherent. In adopting a reading position, the subject complies with how the discourse is constructed in it. This compliance leads to the subject being defined and described by, and even identifying with, the discourse. Compliance leads to an inability to see contradictions and conflicts and, in particular circumstances, adopting such a position might be rewarded in the organization ensuring contradictions and conflicts are not “noticed”. Subjects who resist an obvious reading position encoded in a text are referred to as resisting or oppositional subjects (Linstead 1985). Power is exercised continually to ensure that there is complicity with particular discourses and to adopt compliant reading positions, as though there were no other choices (Clegg 1998). For Lilley (2001) the nature of language games means that there are a multiplicity of appropriate sites for our possible allegiances as well as inappropriate sites to stand against and that any potentially enduring site will almost always be immediately subverted by webs of micro-strategies. Power and knowledge are contested, as it were, and reside in a bewildering array of multifarious allies and assailants within certain language games (Lilley, 1995). We draw on this framework to make sense of how three competing discourses arose in a project that, for all intents and purposes (at least from the accounts of the author involved in the project) had nothing to do with risk management. What follows is a recollection of the events and discussions that occurred over a critical part of the project. These recollections will be treated as discourse and texts, as mentioned earlier. The recollections are imperfect, incomplete, and unlikely to be made the same way by other participants in the project. Thus, from the outset we acknowledge that what we are dealing with here is, to quote Jeffcutt (1993: 43), an “Unfinished Analysis”. More importantly, as we stated in the first part of the chapter, the subjectivity at issue here involves both the authors as writers and readers of texts.
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Reflections on a collaborative project In this part of the chapter we recount discussions and events that occurred during the formulation of a new CRC-funded cross-sector research project that was aimed at supporting collaborative R& D projects in Australian manufacturing. The project did not begin with any explicit consideration of risk but came to focus on it for various reasons that will soon become apparent. The discussions took place within the CRC for Intelligent Manufacturing Systems and Technologies, which was then one of ten centres under the CRC Program dedicated to manufacturing technology. The core participants of this CRC at this time comprised six companies, four universities, and the CSIRO Division of Manufacturing Science and Technology. At the time of the project discussions, R & D activities under the Centre’s three research programmes were all project-based, with each project being formulated and managed by a sub-set of the partners. Projects were mostly initiated in response to a specific industry need (that is, an operational or technical problem identified by one of the industry partners) and were developed during a preliminary “definition phase” that involved close collaboration between two or more of the research and industry partners. Once a full project had been agreed and approved by the CRC Board, a Project Leader and a Project Management Committee were appointed and CRC funds allocated (which were usually matched or exceeded by “in-kind” and other resource contributions from the collaborating partners). Projects were established and funded for a defined period of time to produce specified products, usually referred to in the CRC as “deliverables”. At the time of the discussions, there was a strong preference for projects producing intellectual property that could become a future source of income to the CRC (for example, as royalties from the licensing of a patent). Within the CRC, “intelligent manufacturing systems” were very much seen from an engineering perspective as encompassing the hardware and software employed in manufacturing processes (for example, computer software to optimize the cutting of shapes from flat steel plates, motor controllers for metal cutting machines, industrial laser cutting devices, etc.). The project discussions were initiated by one of the CRC’s industry partners, a supplier of structural components to several major high technology manufacturers overseas. Since the early 1990s, as in most areas of manufacturing in Australia, this company had adapted to major changes in its industry and these changes were themselves a response to a dominant government discourse. Changes included: – –
A policy environment in which there was a reduction in Government protection and support Volatility and change in the levels of demand for the industry’s products
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–
–
Significant change in the relationship between the major manufacturers and their suppliers, with a move towards collaborative risk-sharing contracts (requiring suppliers to undertake R & D and component design, rather than just building components to customer specification) and towards sole source suppliers for components (a trend which reduced the number of suppliers and increased competition for contracts) Increasing pressures from the major manufacturers to reduce the cost of components supplied.
It was in this context that the company had joined the CRC in order to gain access to knowledge and resources that it was believed would help improve its performance and expand its capabilities, thereby contributing to increased competitiveness. Prior to the discussions, one of the areas for possible collaborative research identified by the company had been support for new product development activities under the rubric of “enhanced concurrent engineering”. The company had pursued a concurrent engineering approach2 to the management of its design and development projects since the late 1980s. It had done so in response to pressures from customers to reduce development lead times, maintain tight delivery schedules, improve responsiveness to customer requirements (including the ability to respond to design changes initiated by the customer), and reduce both the costs of development and of the manufacture of the components produced. Furthermore, most of the major companies in the industry had adopted some form of concurrent engineering in their development programs, and the company had learned from a number of these through its various supply contracts. Through the proposed CRC-based collaborative research projects, the company now sought “process enhancements” that would help reduce development lead times and enable it to undertake projects of broader scope through strategic alliances. The company provided a starting point for the consideration of suitable projects by identifying a number of possible development initiatives. These suggested initiatives ranged from the establishment of a demonstrator networking technology (which could support 24-hours a day operations across global time zones) through to “a review of prospective alliance partners” (which would enable the company to undertake collaborative contracts of broader scope). Finally, in the discussions with representatives from potential research collaborators (from two universities and CSIRO), initiated at the instigation of the CRC’s Executive Director, two key problems experienced by the company in its project activities were identified. This was the first visible hint at an emerging discourse, not around the notion of risk, but around general problems and the management of projects. The first was that of more effectively managing the relationships with other organizations involved in development projects, most notably suppliers and the customer.
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Experience had shown that these relationships sometimes became problematic for the company during the course of a project; for example, when a supplier failed to meet a deadline, when there was conflict with a customer over the detail of a component design, or when a customer unexpectedly initiated design changes to a component. The second problem was that of ensuring the company’s two manufacturing sites were able to work together on development projects. These were geographically separated and had different backgrounds, cultures and specializations. Again, experience had shown that the desired level of collaboration had been difficult to achieve and manage and caused problems during projects.
Incommensurate discourses Initial discussions on an appropriate project focus and “deliverables” revealed diverging perspectives among the potential partners. Each of these perspectives was framed by a distinctive discourse, both in terms of the framing of the problem and the language used to demarcate it. An engineering perspective (adopted by the representatives from one university and CSIRO), was to focus on “collaboration technology”, described as hardware and software required to support geographically dispersed development teams. Under this approach, the emphasis was on the development of a technology “platform” — networked computers with design support software — which would enable project personnel to work together across time and space in a “virtual team”. Such an approach has been the focus of considerable interest within the engineering community, as a form of discourse, since the early-1990s (for example, Munkvold 1996). Key statements proffered by the engineers focused on structures and edifices that engineers could physically “construct” and were captured in the metaphor of a “platform” as a technological system on which to build support for human activity and thereby create “virtuality”. The emerging discourse was couched in the truth claims of expert knowledge specialized in information technology, system design and implementation. The obligatory passage points (Clegg; 1989; 1998; Chan 2001) in this language game concerned technical and physical mastery and objects of manipulation, such as circuits. From an organizational studies perspective (advanced by the author of these reflections, who was a management researcher at the second university), a different approach was proffered — one that drew on the findings and methods of the burgeoning field of “CSCW” or “Computer Supported Cooperative Work” (for example Shapiro, Tauber and Traunmüller 1996) to investigate practices and tools that would facilitate communication, cooperation and collaboration within geographically dispersed cross-functional teams. According to this approach, recent
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advances in information and communication technologies should not be seen as a panacea for the problems involved in collaborative projects. So, the proposed project should focus on “human factors” in the introduction of collaboration technologies. Support for this view was gained from a number of scholarly sources: It is now widely recognized that, despite the considerable investment in the development of these technologies, the results to date have fallen far short of expectations. A large and growing body of behavioural research has addressed this problem … and in virtually every case it has been discovered that the failure or poor performance was due to a lack of attention to the human and organizational aspects of the technology (Department of Management, University of Wollongong, CRC Project Discussion Proposal March 1997).
To address this issue of useability, a “user-centred approach” to technology design was proposed (Olson and Olson 1991) and a starting point for the project proposed as research into “user needs” within the social context of innovation in Australian manufacturing companies. Key ideas and concepts were derived from organizational studies, informed as it is by a rich and eclectic knowledge base drawn from the social sciences, and it was hoped that this would be the dominant discourse within which the project was framed. The following terms were proposed as core foci: – –
–
“Communication” — the exchange of ideas and information between cooperating parties “Cooperation/collaboration” — where parties work together effectively towards common objectives, a focus of considerable recent interest in the management and IOC literature “Useability”, addressing the interface between people and machines and focusing attention on the “fit” between technology and social systems.
The discourse, with its distinct discursive practices such as trying to encourage a polyphony of voices, was quite explicitly set against that of the engineers. From the management researcher’s point of view this was seen to be far too concerned with “technical fixes” and insufficiently concerned with the human and social elements of what many in the social science community see as “socio-technical systems”. A concern to reinstate the “user” as an actor in the design and development of the system, as both object and subject, was central to this discourse and stood in opposition to that of the expert-driven approach offered by the engineers, in which the human elements disappeared. The senior company manager, whose background was also engineering, and who was responsible for ensuring the proposed project would meet his company’s needs, took a very different approach to that of the engineers and the management researcher. According to him, the key issue associated with the setting up and
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management of collaborative R& D projects was the establishment of effective risk management systems. His approach was framed within a techno-scientific discourse of risk management, thus, already privileging rational action above all else — action that seeks both control and predictability. Rather than adopt a fatalistic, or more common ad hoc approach to project risk, this discourse positions the rational manager as calculating on the basis of “an understanding that unanticipated results may be a consequence of our own activities or decisions” (Giddens 1990: 30). As noted above, this perspective on risk management has become a central element in the discourse that informs the practice of project management. It provides for many managers the genre in which they make sense of risk, giving them a dominant reading position from whence it becomes exceedingly difficult to entertain oppositional views or competing discourses. From this can form the basis of the collective blindness referred to earlier. According to the company manager, his managers needed to be fully informed about possible sources of risk across the project life cycle, and needed to be able to develop strategies to manage the identified sources of risk. The managers and other project personnel did indeed act to manage perceived risks, but they did so in an unreflective and mostly ad hoc way, using rules of thumb and methods they had learned through experience. From the company manager’s perspective, the problems with such informal approaches to risk management in projects were several. Unforeseen risks could arise for which the project team was not prepared, the company could lose crucial risk management knowledge when experienced personnel left the company, and the lack of reflection and documentation meant there could be little or no organizational learning of effective risk management practices. The company manager argued that a more systematic risk management procedure would overcome these problems, and developing such a procedure would help the company identify and address the various problems that it had experienced in managing collaborative R & D projects. The language game that was being developed invoked, first, the heroics of “rational action”, of taking deliberate action aimed at maximizing positive outcomes and minimizing negative outcomes, and, second, “systematization”, the replacement of the informal, ad hoc, tacit, and unreflected, with action that is formalized, routinized, explicit and documented. The discourse generated privileged ways of seeing the world, worked from a fixed criterion of relevance (the technical-rational), and drew on a restricted semantic field (“the company” as represented by management’s voice) that prefigured the emerging discourse of risk within the project. Even while discussions were ongoing, and these tensions had not been resolved, the pressure was to deliver something tangible to the company. It was this that led to agreement to proceed with a formal proposal outlining the project’s aim, which
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was “to develop a user requirements specification for a Risk Management Toolkit, that will assist Australian firms to set up and manage collaborative R & D partnerships”. A key defining aspect of the collaborative project was the multiplicity of texts and traces that were creeping into relations, which were beginning to structure the collaboration into a particular form of discursive arena (Fulop 1992). Even though the dominant discourse of risk management was gaining pre-eminence, its meaning was far from agreed to by all but rather, was becoming fragmented, messy and intermingled with multiple meanings. In the context of a collaborative CRC project, the company is usually very powerful and can be decisive in framing the terms of reference for a project. In effect, it shaped the power relations of collaboration and effectively set the ground rules for legitimate knowledge claims and a “regime of truth” (Chan 2001: 17), to which all participants are expected to subscribe. Thus, it would not be unusual for the company representative on the CRC Board to promote the project and frame it in a particular discourse. The engineering-oriented Board of the CRC in question, with its focus on the creation of intellectual property rights through R & D projects, found the metaphor of the “toolkit” both familiar and acceptable. It provided a valuable rallying symbol (Fulop 1992) for focussing attention and making certain meanings stick. More practically, the risk management discourse gave the project a stable and legitimate focus from the vantage point of the company. A “toolkit” is a tangible and visible “deliverable”. The project proceeded with a clearly expressed industry need: technologies, tools and practices to support collaborative development projects (as in supply chain partnerships) involving Australian manufacturers. The project was to address this need through the development of a “Risk Management Toolkit”. The engineers and management researcher were embarking on a project that was largely outside their know-how and expertise, and the disciplinary bases upon which they could make their knowledge claims and assert their authority. While this had the potential of enrolling them as compliant subjects who would go along with things, this is not quite what happened. The risk management discourse was an interesting and an unexpected phenomenon for the management researcher, given the engineering orientation of the CRC with its bias towards “technical fixes”. However, the fixed criterion of relevance of the techno-scientific view of risk and the restricted semantic field of “toolkits”, and other such symbols, created instabilities and contradictions in how risk was being talked about by the participants. Risk management, which, before the project discussions, had not been considered as a possible option to pursue, became an object of interest and study and the more that was learnt about it, the more its methods and theories were questioned. By engaging with this discourse, the management researcher was afforded the opportunity to contest its more conventional
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meanings, even though the initial discussions were cast in terms of the narrow referential context of a techno-scientific solution. This narrowness did not go unchallenged and oppositional and resistant reading positions did emerge, as seen by the manner in which risk management was presented at the end of the project.
Contesting the meanings of risk The task of the project moved to producing the specifications for a “toolkit”, which would help those involved in collaborative R & D projects to manage project risks both within the company and hopefully, Australia-wide. The management researcher was forced to engage with the risk discourse, particularly as it had been applied as part of the prescriptive-normative discourse in project management. Even at a common sense level, it is easily recognized that projects can and often do “come unstuck”. That is, projects may not proceed according to plan, various problems may arise or be encountered, which lead to project objectives not being achieved or being only partly met, to budgets being “blown out”, and schedules “over-run”. Thus, projects are prone to risk, and the most significant source of project risk identified in this literature is what has been termed “human risk”. For example, as one project management practitioner put it: Human risk arises from the fact that the human players in projects — project staff, managers, customers and vendors — are complex, marginally predictable beings. Projects are constantly plagued with problems of human resource reliability, competence and availability. They are further buffeted by the consequences of political struggles, the turnover of key players, and the fickleness of customers. If one were to create a detailed list of risk factors affecting a specific project, the list of human risks would surely be the longest (Frame 1994: 81–82).
The essence of project management, as a formalized managerial practice, is that it seeks to systematize the activities through which risks are identified, evaluated, and managed. Risk management is the crucial aspect here and may be defined in this language game of managers as: The practice of reacting to a perceived risk (through risk analysis or other observations) in such a way as to minimize the adverse consequences that may arise, should the risk materialize. It can form part of a plan; it can be a purely reactive procedure; or it can be a combination of both (Webb 1994: 294–5).
Drawing on this “how to”, pragmatic, discourse, the project developed a risk management procedure. The overall aim of this was to provide a structured framework (a system or formal procedure accompanied by a set of supporting “tools”) to enable companies to move beyond an ad hoc approach and so develop
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a more systemic risk management capability for its collaborative R & D projects. The procedure was designed to lead project team members through four main phases of activity, in a programmed way, with specific tasks to be performed and designated outputs to be produced at each phase. The risk management discourse served to impose a structure on management action, somewhat akin to the “standard operating procedures” frequently deployed by industrial engineers to define manufacturing jobs on the shopfloor (for example, at assembly-line work stations). This was a form of disciplinary practice well recognized in the literature as a potential regime of control and surveillance (Foucault 1972). Under this framework, systematic action is meant to replace the informal and the ad hoc, and the activities of project managers thereby become rationalized. It is in essence a form of standardization and, as such, represents a significant departure from the discourses on organizational reform that have more or less dominated the management literature since the 1980s (for example du Gay, Salaman and Rees 1996: 266). The second step in this procedure (“risk identification and assessment”) provided a system to help project team members identify, evaluate (that is, make subjective judgements in terms of the probability of occurrence and the likely impact of occurrence) and prioritize all possible foreseeable sources of project risk. Such risk-sources were seen as events, decisions, resource changes or other phenomena that could detrimentally affect the project or its outcomes. As part of the formulation of this component of the toolkit, a typology of possible risk sources was developed, drawing on the risk assessment literature, the project experiences of company employees and input from the researchers. This was used to create one of the risk management “tools” — a risk identification “checklist” (see Table 1). Checklists are widely used in engineering practice and in project management. They serve as prompts for action and as guides for the sequencing of tasks. In this case, the aim of this tool was to ensure project team members identified all possible sources of risk to a project. The operators became the objects of risk (project team members) to be programmed to anticipate risks, avoid risks, and even “live” risk in their roles as employees. Examination of the checklist reveals fragments of the competing discourses in the project’s formulation, signalling an indeterminacy of meanings. Neither of the two competing discourses was “written out of the script” as one might have expected, with the engineering being the most marginalized. For example, the engineers’ focus on a technological platform to support a geographically dispersed collaborative project team, which in the engineering discourse was the solution to the industry problem, is found interspersed in the toolkit’s checklist. But the “platform”, rather than a solution to the problem, has become in this risk discourse a potential problem to be managed, that is, a possible source of project risk (D3). That is, the checklist prompts project team members to consider if such things as
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Table 1.Overview of the toolkit’s risk identification checklist A A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
Process-related sources of risk Project estimates and planning Project management Project integration Project activities Hand-over to production
B B1 B2
Resource-related sources of risk Human resource availability Availability & effectiveness of tools & systems
C C1 C2 C3
Organizational sources of risk Organizational culture Organizational support for the project Potential sources of interference from within the organizational environment
D D1 D2 D3
Relationship sources of risk Relationship with the customer Relationship with key suppliers Relationship with other collaborating organizations
network-based collaborative technologies (for example, e-mail, Intranet, etc.) are likely to be an area where problems will arise during the course of a project. If so, the team members are charged with detailing the nature of the risk and assessing its probability and likely impact on the project. In the event that the risk source is judged to be a priority, then the team is required to formulate an explicit risk response strategy either to pre-empt it or to deal with its eventuation. Fragments of language used in the organizational discourse are more evident. Under “project integration”, communication among team members, coordination of the project activities, level of collaboration within and across the cooperating organizations, and teamwork effectiveness, are introduced. The sources of risk listed here derive from the concerns addressed in the organizational discourse though they remain subordinated in the hierarchy of the toolkit where the rational still dominates. While there has not been an overturning of the dominant discourse of risk management and the privileging of the techno-scientific discourse, the toolkit, as part of discursive practice, does reveal how contradictory and competing meanings are now inscribed in the text. Also, it shows that the readers of these texts — the employees and managers — will make sense of them differently and paradoxically.
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Conclusion The acceptance of paradox, as a central feature of organizational theorizing, signals the abandonment of the search for authoritative interpretations of meanings and instead favours representations that capture diversity and multiple voices (Jeffcutt 1993). Drawing on deconstruction and discourse analysis we have shown how in discussions leading to a CRC project, some things became permissible while others did not; some became imaginable while others were not, and some choices and options about the project’s direction were foreclosed by the adoption of a dominant discourse. Our analysis begs a number of unresolved questions: was it possible to have created another autonomous discourse and if so, how would it have unfolded? Was the context of the project, and the genre it adopted, impossible to change or transcend? More importantly, were the project participants engaged in a “collective blindness” and if so, would it have been possible to change this in any way (that is, alter the dominant discourse of risk management as rational practice)? More practically, given the industry problem facing the CRC project, what could have been an acceptable alternative to the toolkit as a “deliverable”? We have sought to highlight paradox and to show that, even though the risk management discourse worked to sustain a particular knowledge/power nexus, oppositional thinking did emerge. The analysis reveals that resistance and opposition are inherent in the nature of intertextuality but suggests that is difficult to overturn a dominant discourse in any radical way. It seems that making science socially fallible, the centrepiece of the risk society, will proceed only in small steps. By accepting the discourse approach, we have also subscribed to certain ways of seeing and reading risk that have likely foreclosed other possibilities. What we have presented here is only one of several different ways in which we could have analyzed risk as sense making. We chose to adopt a specific form of discourse analysis to apply to the management of a cross-sector collaboration and in so doing, have opened up this area of research interest to a potentially new mode of analysis, one which has rarely been attempted before. Our analysis shows how competing discourses emerged in a given discursive arena (as is typically the case during the establishment of every cross-sector IOC), and how a particular discourse came to dominate thereby providing a potentially powerful truth regime for all concerned. Through our representation of risk, as a dominant discourse of technoscientific rationality, we revealed how various aspects of management practice are obscured, that can become sources of project risk (for example, managerial incompetence, dishonesty, and intra- and inter-organizational politics), notably those arising from the “human aspect” of management action. Many of these aspects exist as sub-texts in our analysis and require further elaboration. However, not all elements of the three competing discourses were written out of the script of
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risk management and traces of them were incorporated within the discourse, “humanizing” it to some extent and opening a vitiating space for further contestation and contradictions to creep in. Perhaps most importantly, the analysis helps to make sense of risk management as a distinctive discursive practice with its roots in rationalism and modernism, through which (contrary to the claims of many) management action cannot be successfully systematized and rationalized. Thus, risk management discourse, as embodied in the toolkit procedures, provides a framework for the practice of management. It is a distinctive mode of talking and writing about collaborative projects that not only shapes the subjectivity of all involved but positions them in certain discursive relationships that frame the way in which they gain knowledge of the world. Management can be enriched when it has to engage with paradox and incommensurability and we have shown that both are endemic to cross-sector collaborations and multi-disciplinary engagement.
Notes 1. The CRC Program was launched by the Australian Government in May 1990 and since its inception 72 CRCs have been established (at the time of the discussions reported here, there were 65 in operation). Commonwealth funding for the CRCs was around $140 million in the 1999 fiscal year (about 3.5% of the total funds allocated for Science and Innovation Programs in that year), which made up around one third of the resources available to the CRCs. 2. The concept of concurrent engineering emerged in the USA in the late-1980s, and has since become institutionalized as a distinctive approach to the management of product innovation activities within an organization. It stresses the integration of new product design and development activities, for example through cross-functional teamwork (see Gerwin and Susman 1996).
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Sturdy, A. and Morgan, G. (2000). Beyond organizational change: Towards a discursive approach to change and a structural approach to discourse. Paper presented at Asia Pacific Researchers in Organization Studies (APROS) Conference, Organizing Knowledge Economies and Societies. Sydney: University of Technology, Sydney. Webb, A. (1994). Managing innovative projects. London: Chapman and Hall. Williamson, O. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: The Free Press.
Chapter 4
Workers’ playtime? Unravelling the paradox of covert resistance in organizations* Peter Fleming and André Spicer
Introduction When corporate relations of power target the hearts and minds of workers, is employee resistance possible? That question has become an increasingly important issue in recent critical organization studies. With the advent of “cultural cleansing” (Strangleman and Roberts 1999), “designer selves” (Casey 1995) and other forms of “normative controls” (Kunda 1992) related to culture engineering and teamwork, numerous studies have argued that even the capacity for workers to resist management has been insidiously undermined. In the past, workers could usually resist corporate controls because they tended to be less normative but when attempts are made to shape the very identities of workers, dissent is all but erased from the discursive landscape (Willmott 1993). There is a problem with such a pessimistic reading of new management technologies, of course. It offers unwarranted exaggeration of the success of management power and the underestimation of the myriad of ways some workers resist corporate control, even under the most claustrophobic hegemonic conditions (Thompson and Ackroyd 1995). Just because open, overt and collectivised forms of resistance characteristic of Fordism are less prevalent today it does not necessarily mean that the recalcitrant worker has finally been subdued. Indeed, a recent stream of research has pointed to more covert, quotidian and even “subjective” modalities of worker resistance in “high-commitment” organizations, which were perhaps missed in the past because of their subtly and ostensible innocuousness (Fleming and Sewell forthcoming). In light of attempts to broaden definitions of worker opposition, an array of employee practices have been highlighted as possible strategies of resistance to cultural control. Joking, irony, cynicism and scepticism, for example, have been documented as “weapons” workers may use to block and resist new types of
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corporate domination at the level of selfhood, as our review will shortly demonstrate. In evaluating the research investigating these expressions of resistance, however, we have identified an interesting tension, or paradox, regarding their effectiveness as forms of opposition. Some commentators have argued that resistance articulated in the form of humour, irony and cynicism may have the paradoxical outcome of inadvertently reproducing the domination workers seek to escape because they are given a specious and illusionary sense of freedom and thus disengage from more “material” and traditionally located resistances. Indeed, Collinson (1992; 1994) and du Gay and Salaman (1992), among others, demonstrate how resistance through joking and cynicism can actually assume the (paradoxical) status of consent due to the “safety valve” effects they can have in certain power relationships (also see Fleming and Spicer forthcoming). In this chapter we attempt to unravel this paradox by surfacing the models of power underpinning judgements of “effective” or “ineffective” resistance in relation to humour, irony and cynicism. It is suggested that those interpretations that consider humour, irony and cynicism as outright ineffective still implicitly employ a singular model of power, one that judges all forms of opposition against the standard of radical upheaval and economic transformation. Such an approach is, of course, important for highlighting cases in which some types of resistance are inadvertently functional for a dominant system of power. However, it may also marginalise many other forms of transgression that are effective in altering different status quo (to pluralise the Latin term) operating in contemporary organizations. Although cynicism, for example, may not necessarily yield higher wages, it may still challenge, in transformative ways, the emotional or “psychic” normalcy of organizational life. Resistances to different status quo, however, are not mutually exclusive as they may interact in complex, ambiguous and often paradoxical ways. That is to say, humour, irony, and cynicism may be subversive on one set of co-ordinates but have spill over effects that either support or undermine resistances on other levels. In order to think about resistance in this multiple sense, we develop the notion of “plateaux of power and resistance”. We use this to conceptualise different articulations of force and their respective oppositions. The concept draws upon a spatial metaphor to tease out the multifarious power and resistance relations present in organizations and illustrate how they are not isolated from one another or mutually exclusive. They may overlap, collide and interrelate in unpredictable ways with different outcomes. Whether humour, irony and cynicism undermine or support traditional forms of organized resistance such as unionism or collective action, for example, becomes an important issue to explore in specific contexts.
Workers’ playtime?
Resistance to corporate colonisation? The emergence of culture engineering and normative control as prominent mechanisms of control in contemporary organizations has received much attention in organization studies. “Guru’s” of culture management argued that if managers instil in employees a unifying set of values, beliefs and norms about the company, then workers can control themselves and come to want what senior management wants of them, through their own volition (Peters and Waterman 1982; Deal and Kennedy 1982). The identities of workers have been a concern for managers since the dawn of the industrial era (Parker 2000). However, the extent and reach of corporate culture manipulation, as it has emerged in tandem with teams and electronic surveillance, has surpassed even the wildest control fantasies entertained by previous movements. Critical management scholars have been interested in this modality of control, showing how the relaxation of formal control and the promotion of empowerment and participation is to a large extent nominal, and often belies a more insidious network of influence operating at the level of selfhood. Under this form of governance, the subjectivities of workers are “colonised” (Casey 1995), thereby reducing or even erasing the desire to resist corporate hegemony. Consequently, the emphasis has been on the cultural constitution of “engineered selves” (Kunda 1992), “designer selves” (Casey 1995), and “enterprising selves” (du Gay 1996) — that is, the production of types of worker subjectivity that identify with the company and are compatible with the maintenance of asymmetrical relations of power. One of the most striking aspects of this research is what appears to be an almost total lack of employee resistance to management. As Thompson and Ackroyd (1995) forcefully argue, these studies give a totalising portrayal of new managerial controls whereby workers obediently mirror the demands of the dominant discourse (also see Ackroyd and Thompson 1999; McKinlay and Taylor 1996; Rosenthal et al 1997). Part of the reason why resistance is underplayed in this literature is because its conceptualization proffered an inadequate or incomplete notion. If one studies culture engineering and thinks of resistance purely as overt, organized and openly confrontational practices, then one will often come to the conclusion that employee recalcitrance has disappeared. Under the normative rhetoric of current management discourse (often using phrases like “We’re all friends now” or “We’re all members of one happy family”) resistance may seem an outmoded and old-fashioned concept. A relatively recent stream of research, conducted among others by Kondo (1990), Jermier et al (1994), Edwards et al (1995), Gabriel (1999), and Knights and McCabe (2000), is very useful in extending definitions of resistance to include forms of opposition that are more inconspicuous, covert, unorganized and
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“subjective”. This scholarship has attempted to re-evaluate traditional conceptions of resistance and, in the process, de-romanticise it to include what might appear to be more mundane and quotidian aspects of organizational life (de Certeau 1984). With this in mind, a whole range of employee responses to and experiences of culture engineering should be examined as potentially transgressive activities. Here we concentrate on three so-called subjective and often covert modalities of resistance identified in the literature as ways workers may endeavour to escape the insidiously psychological and identity constituting technologies of modern culture management. Humour, irony and cynicism have received some attention in organization studies as alternative responses to corporate culture programmes and possible strategies of employee dissent. Even those studies considered over determinist by Thompson and Ackroyd (1995) registered the presence of employee humour, irony and cynicism. However, we have noticed that the literature discussing these phenomena is riddled with uncertainty and theoretical ambivalence regarding their efficacy as opposition to corporate culture. That is to say, if we are to consider joking, sardonic humour and an ironic disposition, for example, as forms of resistance, then are they actually effective in changing the status quo and transforming relations of power? In light of earlier studies of counter culture (Willis 1977; Burawoy 1979), is an inadvertent outcome an “ideological” effect whereby workers gain a specious sense of freedom and autonomy that unwittingly reconciles them even more profoundly to their own domination? Or in a similar vein, may humour, irony and cynicism work as a “safety valve” that enables workers to let off steam in a manner that does not threaten prevailing relations of power? Or are these conclusions overly pessimistic and miss the point regarding the pragmatic validity of even the smallest of refusals? In order to unravel the tension animating these explanations we will set the scene by examining, in turn, the literature on humour, irony, and cynicism, as strategies of “effective” and “ineffective” employee resistances.
Humour Humour is a significant part of day-to-day interaction in the workplace. Jokes, parodies and spoofs can all be found in the informal interaction amongst coworkers, and between superiors and subordinates. There is a good deal of literature that reveals particular functions of humour such as reinforcing group norms and identities (Bradney 1957; Roy 1958; Coser 1959), a managerial tool of control (Malone 1980), and as a way managers negotiate paradoxical situations (Hatch and Ehlrich 1993). However, here we aim to probe humour as a strategy of resistance
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in organizations, particularly in the context of high commitment organizations and corporate culture strategies. One stream of research examining humour has pointed out that it can be a significant way workers subvert dominant forms of control. Linstead’s (1985a) analysis of employee humour in an industrial bakery highlights how it symbolically reverses dominant cultural myths supporting particular power relations. In another article, Linstead (1985b) extends this idea by arguing that humour is used to establish a discursive realm “outside” that which can be controlled by management. Building on Willis (1977) and Burawoy (1979), Collinson (1988: 184–5) observed in his study of workers in an auto factory how “shop-floor humour was in part a form of resistance both to the tightly controlled repetitious work task and to the social organization of production within the company”. This humour enabled resistance to management and corporate culture but also had a darker side, in particular the psychological abuse, individualism and masculinity associated with this workplace counter-culture. Indeed, resistance through “humorous distance” often ended up reinforcing the non-participation of workers in key management functions, thus having the outcome of consolidating and even perpetuating their own subordination. As a result, humour and joking are “unlikely to be effective forms of resistance given the disciplinary processes that characterise contemporary organizations” (Collinson 1994: 51) because they take place in the subjective realm rather than being emancipatory in any concrete way. Examining more formalised types of humour, Deeks (1993) argues that the cartoons found in the New Yorker magazine provide both a humorous look at corporate life and a cutting critique of the structure and norms of the modern corporate world. Similarly, Rodrigues and Collinson (1995) investigate how humorous cartoons produced in a union newspaper within Brazilian Telecom were employed as a subversive form of critique of a corporate culture program, staff redundancies, and managerial favouritism. They maintain that these humorous cartoons were effective because they created an alternative narrative or script for workers to understand their experience at Telecom, one for which they could not be directly punished. The cartoons also proved to be instrumental in so far as they facilitated an already established union movement and were crucial in changing some managerial policies (such as training) and augmenting bargaining power. Filby and Willmott (1988) also reflect on the transgressive potential of humorous cartoons used by members of a public relations division to resist and make sense of the incompetence and absurdity of bureaucracy. As Ackroyd and Thomson claim, in the context of corporate culture building, “a good deal of contemporary joking at work features cynical comment on the validity of managerial claims and the actions and motives of managers. It is no exaggeration to say that it constitutes a continuous undercurrent of satirical debunking of management pretension”
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(1999: 103). But as we can see from the literature, there is a tension between interpretations that view worker humour as a useful form of resistance in certain circumstances, and those that view it as a reaction that paradoxically reproduces employee dependence and disenfranchisement.
Irony A second form of resistance to managerial strategies, some writers argue, can be found in the phenomenon of irony.1 Irony overlaps significantly with humour, often with the two categories being conflated, such as examination of ironic humour or humour being seen as an ironic strategy (Hatch 1997). It is important to emphasise the distinction because although irony may take a humorous form (or visa versa) it is possible to have forms of irony that are not humorous (Trethewey 1997). The “ironic disposition” (Kierkegaard 1992) is sometimes referred to as a cultural symptom of post-modernity (Rorty 1989) but the question that concerns us here is whether it can be considered an effective form of resistance to corporate colonisation. Or, as Johansson and Woodilla (1999) ask, is irony a form of resistance that subverts the status quo or reinforces it? In the field of social theory, Richard Harvey Brown (1987) makes an interesting distinction between practices of irony that are “ritualistic” and those that are “dialectical”. Ritualistic irony works as a safety valve that allows subordinates to let off steam in a manner that does not radically challenge the existent social order. Some sects of the medieval Church, for example, celebrated the “day of the ass” once a year in which the figure of Jesus was replaced by a wooden ass and mockingly worshipped. Such a release provides a manageable outlet for tension and frustration, reinforcing the power of the Church for the rest of the year. Dialectical irony, on the other hand, is a practice that indicates how the ideals of power (freedom, democracy etc.) have the unintended and often opposite effect for those who are subjected to them (servitude, autocracy etc.). This kind of ironic insight disrupts power at an ideological level because it symbolically reverses the very foundational discourses of dominant groups. We could apply the rough distinction between ritualistic and dialectical irony to the scant but growing literature on employee responses in the context of culture engineering. First, in the context of a consideration of irony as subversive resistance, Fleming and Sewell (forthcoming) develop the concept of “Švejkism” taken from Jarošlav Hasek’s novel The Good Solider Švejk and illustrate how irony can operate as a practicable mode of resistance at the level of self. An ironic practice of self is not only a useful form of resistance when the target of power is the very subjectivity of workers. It may also be one of the few options immediately available,
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in a context where team normalisation is intense and traditional opposition, such as unionism, has lost its legitimacy. However, some have given a more “safety valve” interpretation of irony in this context. In his Engineering Culture (1992), Kunda argues that one element of role embracement was the perceived capacity to distance oneself from the demands of the culture. In “Tech”, the managerial push to build a high commitment culture was met by workers with a sense of irony, which he called “cognitive distancing”: Cognitive distancing — disputing popular ideological formulations — is manifested when one suggests that one is “wise” to what is “really” going on. Being “wise” implies that despite behaviours and expressions indicating identification, one is also fully cognisant of their underlying meaning, and thus free of control: autonomous enough to know what is going on and dignified enough to express that knowledge (Kunda 1992: 178).
This sense of autonomy among workers, Kunda argues, was vitally important in the process of subjective incorporation because their very ability to distance themselves through irony allowed them to internalise the culture without feeling they were being colonised. In not taking the culture seriously, they were even more profoundly controlled by it because of the psychic distance they felt they could achieve. Thus, ironic resistance did not really change the material power relations at Tech and, if anything, helped maintain managerial domination because of the illusion of freedom it often gave workers. A similar argument has been made by Kets de Vries (1990) in his analysis of the organizational fool. He argues that the fool deploys irony and other strategies of sanctioned critique in order to help leaders recognise their follies and bring them down to earth. The principal use of the fool’s irony is to sustain existing structures of power rather than radically transforming them.
Cynicism A third way that employees may respond to attempts to colonise their subjectivity via corporate culture management is cynicism. It has become somewhat commonplace to identify the widespread nature of cynicism in contemporary society (Lasch 1978; Sloterdijk 1988; Žižek 1989) and the workplace (Kanter and Mirvis 1989). We understand cynicism to be situations where people look for the “naked truth” behind the official “party line” so that blatant contradictions are laid bear: Cynical thinking can only arise when two views of things have become possible, an official and an unofficial view, a veiled and a naked view, one from the viewpoint of heroes and one from the viewpoint of valets. In a culture in which one is regularly told lies, one wants to know not merely the truth but the naked truth. Where that cannot be that is not allowed to be, one has to draw out what the
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“naked” facts look like, no matter what morality has to say about it. In a certain way, “ruling” and “lying” are synonymous. The truth of the rulers and truth of the servants are different (Sloterdijk 1984: 218).
A cynical search for the “naked truth” is evident in a number of recent studies of organizations where we meet workers who secretly voice statements of disbelief about the official culture and are rather jaundiced with respect to managerial exhortations. These workers could “see through” the hollow promises of human resource departments and do not really “buy into” the hype of the corporate culture pundits. Kunda (1992) found employees calling the culture “California bathtub crap.” Collinson (1992) records workers referring to the push to build a culture of excellence as “Yankee propaganda” and the company newsletter became known as “Goebbels Gazette”. Managerialist writers such as Kanter and Mirvis (1989), Anderson, (1996), Dean, Brandes, and Dharwadkar (1998) and Wanous, Reichers and Austin (2000) identify employee cynicism as a “problem” that impedes the smooth functioning of culture, team affiliation and other human resource management initiatives. Subsequently it is claimed that “research on cynicism should help us to better understand a phenomenon that is pervasive in modern organizations, and perhaps find better ways to manage or prevent it” (Dean, Brandes, and Dharwadkar 1998: 350). Scholars with a more critical view have interpreted cynicism as a defence mechanism, a way of resisting the corporate colonisation of the self. Kunda (1992) and Casey (1995), for example, argue that workers use cynicism to protect their “backstage selves” from the insidiously ubiquitous culture machine when it gets a little too claustrophobic. Cynicism is a way of escaping the encroaching logic of managerialism and provides an inner “free space” for workers when other avenues for opposition have been blocked. In Work, Self and Society (1995) Casey observed how a number of employees resisted the psychological “siege and assault” of the culture through cynical detachment. “Ironic cynicism protects against both commitment to the company… and its further encroachment into the private realm of (relative) individual choice and apparent self-determination” (Casey 1995: 175). Casey categorised the cynical response under the heading of capitulation, a last resort attempt to escape the culture, but an attempt that simply reconciles workers to the domination they are trying to escape. Again, this safety valve, or more accurately, “ideology” approach, is a popular way critical scholars make sense of cynicism in this context because, although cynicism has the appearance of opposition, it can actually give employees a feeling of freedom without changing their social status of subordination. Such an approach to cynicism can be found elsewhere. Willmott (1993) evokes Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) notion of “cool alternation” to argue that cynicism is a strategy whereby individuals subjectively “distance” or dis-identify themselves
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from the roles they play. Willmott then develops Kunda’s (1992) findings to show how such cynical dis-identification can actually incorporate workers into the relations of power they seek to escape. Cynicism at “Tech” may have allowed employees to resist naive seduction by the corporate culture. However, there was “a less obvious and perverse effect of playing the game of cool alternation … an undermining or numbing of a capacity directly to criticise or resist the cultural logic [because it] was interpreted as evidence of Tech’s commitment to openness, freedom of expression, etc.” (Willmott 1993: 537). According to Willmott, that there exists a possibility to be cynical about the culture is something that is perceived by employees as a sign of the company’s partial dedication to freedom. It is this partiality that consequently forestalled any initiative to organize more effective forms of opposition on the part of employees. The capacity to challenge company culture provoked a counterfeit sense of selfdetermination that allowed corporate roles to be enacted without the friction that is usually present when one feels hard done by. Employees became trapped in a “vicious circle of cynicism and dependence” (Willmott 1993: 518), which disarmed them of any ability to challenge the existing power structure. A similar reading of worker cynicism can be found in du Gay and Salaman’s (1992) analysis of enterprise culture. They discuss how the recent push to build cultures of excellence in the UK guilefully transmogrifies workers into entrepreneurial, enterprising selves. In broaching the topic of worker resistance to enterprise in the organizations they studied, it is claimed that: Certainly the discourse of enterprise appears to have no serious rivals today … even if people do not take enterprise seriously, even if they keep a certain cynical distance from its claims, they are still reproducing it through their involvement in everyday practices within which enterprise is inscribed (du Gay and Salaman 1992:630).
Similarly to Willmott (1993), du Gay and Salaman insist that even when we negatively distance ourselves from the dictates of enterprise culture, nevertheless, the discourse is reproduced. In approaching cynicism in this way, du Gay and Salaman draw directly from the work of Žižek. For Žižek “cynical distance is just one way to blind ourselves to the structuring power of ideological fantasy: even if we do not take things seriously, even if we keep an ironical distance, we are still doing them” (Žižek 1989: 32, emphasis original). Can cynicism be dismissed so easily as an effective form of resistance? Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) make the point that more subjective forms of resistance (such as irony and cynicism) may be effective in the limited sense of blocking identity colonisation. They write that “ironic, sardonic and satirical commentary on management initiatives … become in the current context significant forms of misbehaviour. Management today has an interest in trying to incorporate the
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sentiments of its employees and to harness their goodwill by doing so” (Ackroyd and Thompson 1999: 103). Similarly, Sturdy and Fineman (2001: 146) argue that, “cynicism is much more than a psychological safety valve; it is a conduit for questioning and resistance which may produce alternative, sceptical, rationales and rhetoric’s. These can provide the basis for challenges to existing orders or, more simply, limit the scope of totalising control.” Cynical commentary, in the vein of its originator, Diogenes of Sinope, may hold up to ridicule the hollow rhetoric of empowerment, teams, and participation and, in doing so, either facilitate other forms of resistance (Rodrigues and Collinson 1995) or simply deflect attempts to mould person-hood (Fleming and Sewell, forthcoming). To summarise our review of humour, irony and cynicism, we notice an important tension when they are investigated in the context of corporate culture building. Critical scholarship now recognises that workers often enact more covert expressions of resistance, but the problem then becomes how to judge its effectiveness. An implicit concern that we see in this research is whether resistance to corporate culture through humour, irony and cynicism actually transforms the status quo, or paradoxically reproduces it. A closer look at the problem reveals a set of complex and extremely ambiguous questions. What do we mean by effectiveness? What criteria do we use to judge the “success” of resistance and are such criteria singular or multiple? What do we mean by “transform”? If power is not manifested in one form but many, do we need to rethink what we mean by transformative resistance to account for multiple planes of influence? Similarly, is there simply one status quo in organizations or is the category manifold? And what are the relationships among different levels of power and resistance? In the next section we want to address these questions by developing the notion of “plateaux of power and resistance” in order to evaluate the efficacy of humour, irony and cynicism as resistance in contemporary workplaces.
Plateaux of power and resistance In many critical studies of workplace power and resistance, a rather simple notion of the status quo is used to posit a singular totality which is either shaken by resistance, chipped away at gradually, or inadvertently supported and reproduced. Here the status quo usually involves an assemblage of hierarchies, authority relations and forms of domination revolving around capitalism, and sometimes patriarchy. The sheer structural materiality of this status quo therefore calls for resistance that does not happen only in the minds of workers but is also engaged concretely. Thus, one of the reasons critical scholars often treat humoristic, ironic and cynical resistance with suspicion is because the spectre of “idealism” is deemed
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to be not far a way. That is to say, there is a danger of over-emphasising the power of the merely subjective to change, influence or challenge the “material” power arrangements of an organization. In romanticising subjective forms of resistance, we may be led to conclude that these kinds of opposition are sufficient to radically transform relations of exploitation and domination. We have sympathies with this cautious admonition because it does question some of the more naive “post modern” interpretations of resistance that are currently gaining vogue.2 However, privileging material resistance in this way has some problems of its own. It almost seems that power is seen as a singular force emanating solely from the relations of capitalist production. Effective resistance, from this perspective, must block power at this arcane material level because it is here that the totality of organizational domination coalesces and is maintained. As du Gay and Salaman (1992) stated earlier, subjective resistance may give workers some breathing space but it does not change the one important thing (ie, the material relations of late capitalism). Not only is the rather simplistic mind/body dualism perpetuated here, but the extremely complex play of different dimensions and articulations of power and resistance go unacknowledged. We argue that there are invariably a number of status quo in contemporary workplaces that matter to management and employees and are maintained by modalities of power that are not necessarily reducible to one singular articulation. If resistance is in some way immanent in the very act of power, and these power relations are multiple rather than singular, then transformations may occur and be effective in their own right, on different levels. We call this approach “plateaux of power and resistance” and hope that it may be useful to negotiate the tension in readings of humour, irony and cynicism. The term plateaux evokes a spatial metaphor that points to different (yet inter-related) planes of power relations, with the implication that upon each plateau we may see modalities of resistance that are best suited (or not, as the case may be) to challenge that particular line of force. We use the metaphor of plateaux in a geometrical rather than geographical sense. In geometry the notion of a plane refers to a flat surface that is rendered possible by a class of similarities and equivalences. Such surfaces in a social setting are multiple and semi-autonomous, but also intimately connected at unpredictable points. Although such a concept could be seen as too abstract and far removed from the processes of organizational life, we think it can make a significant contribution to the way we conceive power and resistance in the contemporary workplace. In the following sections the different elements of our model are discussed in turn.
A thousand plateaux of power There has been a significant and ongoing debate about how power should be conceptualised in the study of organization (see Clegg 1989 for review). Recent
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developments have seen a thorough rejection of agent-based views of power (Pfeffer 1981) where it is understood as a characteristic of the individual. State based views of power (Clegg and Dunkerly 1980), where power has been conceptualised as residing with the structure of the (capitalist) state, have also been rejected. These two conceptions have been largely challenged by a theory of power that examines relations of force as dispersed or “capillary” (Foucault 1980; Knights and Willmott 1989; Clegg and Hardy 1996). These dispersed power relations have been imagined as constituting multiple “circuits of power” (Clegg 1989) instead of a system that makes up a single relation of force and influence. This increasingly prevalent conception of power has seen attention be given to the various circuits of power that operate in contemporary organizations. These can include systems of technocratic knowledge (eg., Bihamini 1994; Sewell and Wilkinson 1992; Townley 1994), popular culture and consumption (du Gay 1996), and gender (Alvesson and Billig 1997) to name a few. This growing range of studies points out the qualitatively different and specific fields of power that co-inhabit a particular space, and show how each field of power tends to make particular courses of action seem rational while other courses of action are marginalised. It is these multiple fields of power we refer to as “plateaux”, after Deleuze and Guattari (1987). We use the term plateaux because it provides a spatial understanding of power that is especially handy for stressing the multiple lines of force and resistance. A number of other analyses of power and resistance use spatial metaphors such as “beyond the pale”, “transgressing the boundaries” and “escape attempts.” But for us the notion of plateaux (or plane, level, line) makes it easier to isolate the montage of diverse power/resistance assemblages without necessarily privileging one as more “real” (which is not to say all forms of power and resistance are equivalent). To be sure, a plateau is a system of force/resistance relations organized around a particular issue that may be visible or invisible to the actors involved. Examples of plateaux are gender, corporate culture, the wage/effort bargain, aesthetic codes, professionalism, and sexual orientation. On each plateau of power it may be possible to identify an attendant set of resistances that are constituted and characterised by the specific logic of the power in question (and vice versa). An important element of our model is the idea that plateaux of power and resistance do not necessarily exist in complete independence of one another but overlap and influence each other in ambiguous ways. Using the language of Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 7), each plateau is interconnected to the others by a rhizome — a complex system of underground affiliations where “any point of a rhizome can be connected to any other, and must be”. Thus, a particular movement or articulation on one plateau of power may also simultaneously initiate an action on another plateaux of power with congruent, conflicting or independent outcomes.
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The final aspect of our model is the idea that within a particular spatialtemporal context there are not an infinite number of equally important plateaux of power. Rather, some plateaux of power may encompass people’s lives more than others. For instance, multinational capitalism and scientific management might be some of the most encompassing plateaux of power for a worker in the Maquiladora on the US/Mexico boarder (Pena 1997), whereas power relations demanding an aesthetic form of labour or particular ethnic background may be of little consequence. Within a service sector company in a post-industrial Western city (the hospitality industry for instance) the plateau of aesthetic power may be central to workers lives (Nickson, Warhurst, Witz, and Cullen 2001). For women performing unpaid domestic labour in the home, the gendered division of labour may be experienced as the central plateaux of power. At any rate, the key task in an analysis would be to identify the plateaux of power that “matter the most” within a located situation, examine the inter-relationships between differing plateaux and how these inter-relations feed into one another.
A thousand swarming refusals Now that we have tentatively sketched a model of power, we turn back to the issue of resistance. As we pointed out above, many theories of resistance are based on a rather singular understanding of power — that is, there is one dominant system of power against which an act is judged oppositional, ineffective or even self-defeating. Using this approach, only acts that aim for some sort of “great refusal” (Marcuse 1972), or that radically overthrow the dominant system of power, are counted as effective opposition. On the other hand, resistance that does not pose any serious or systematic challenge to a dominant system of power is typically seen to be ineffective, and even reproductive of that power. This is why organized forms of resistance with more “revolutionary” intent have usually been privileged, whilst more covert forms of resistance are marginalised, or judged as nothing more than safety valves. If we adopt the model of power that we have advanced, we would see any particular act as implicated on a number of plateaux of power. This would mean, as Foucault suggests, a multiplicity of resistances are possible: There is no single locus of the Great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case: resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent; still others that are quick to compromise, interested, or sacrificial; by definition, they can only exist in the strategic field of power relations. But this does not mean that they are only a reaction or rebound, forming with respect to the basic domination an underside that is in the end always passive, doomed to defeat (Foucault 1978, 94–5).
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Following Foucault, we maintain that there is not a single locus of opposition but a swarm of multiple refusals, because there are many plateaux of power that organize the power/opposition terrain in contemporary workplaces. We can then add a degree of complexity to this model and argue that each particular action is imputed simultaneously on a number of plateaux of power, which are interconnected. An act may be considered resistant in terms of the co-ordinates of one plateau, but may be thoroughly functional in terms of another plateaux. Or conversely, while an act may be deemed resistant on one plateau, it can be judged as thoroughly functional on another plateau but subversive on yet another. Finally, not all forms of resistance should be considered equally important or in some way “revolutionary”. A small refusal on the grounds of asserting one’s right to listen to punk music in the workplace, and thereby challenging the plateaux of aesthetic power emphasised by bureaucratic rules, may have little effect on race and sex discrimination. This is not to say, however, that such small refusals may not be strategically connected to other plateaux of power. For instance, by challenging a ruling on music in the workplace our recalcitrant punk fan may open up a space to challenge other aesthetic rules, such as dress, decoration of personal workspace, and perhaps even jolt latent gender discrimination based on aesthetics (“they don’t look professional”). Collective unionism in the hyper-Taylorised Maquiladora organizations may be useful whereas humour may facilitate effective forms of opposition but, on its own, will not change exploitation. For sure, if the resistance that these workers express is only humour and cynicism it may allow them to “get by” but it is surely a modality of dissent that multinational capital can live with. However, in an organization demanding the loyalties and sentiments of workers, that has an actual “investment” in the subjectivities of workers and the way they experience organizational life, then cynicism and humour may be extremely effective for challenging power on this particular level. For example, an exaggerated service smile or the “over identification” with a culture campaign may actually harm the productive and sales activities of the organization and undermine the legitimacy of management even more profoundly than traditional acts of dissent.
Discussion How should we approach humour, irony and cynicism given our model? The central insight of “plateaux of power and resistance” is that a number of interlinking resistances may occur simultaneously, with different effects on different planes of power and resistance. Humour, irony and cynicism may be judged effective forms of resistance against types of managerial power that specifically targets the selves of
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workers, a type of power that is significantly novel to the traditional wage/effort bargain (although the aims are the same). In other words, humour, irony, and cynicism may reside as opposition on a particular plateau of power and be best suited to deal with organizational domination of the “soft” HRM type. Such a disposition may not over-turn the economic apparatus and hierarchy of late capitalism. However, as Johansson and Woodilla (1999:29, emphasis original) point out in relation to irony, it “can be interpreted as turning the emotional hierarchy upside down and thereby, from a broader perspective, irony is altering the power relations.” However, plateaux are not separate but linked in ambiguous ways. When one of these resistances is articulated towards, say a corporate culture campaign, it may have outcomes that are subversive on one plateau but thoroughly functional and reproductive on another plateaux. For example, when an employee is cynically ironic towards a culture-engineering program, this may effectively block the colonisation of self by managerial interests or disrupt the emotional economy of managerial domination, but will also have ramifications for other struggles being waged on different political territories. These ramifications are almost always unpredictable and complex. Let’s look at some examples already discussed. Rodrigues and Collinson (1995) illustrated how worker humour actually facilitated and consolidated effective union opposition by caricaturing management and lampooning the corporate culture strategy. Here, humour is a strategy of resistance geared specifically towards dealing with managerial power that targets the sentiments of workers. Traditional unionism may not necessarily be enough to deal with this type of force. The two plateaux of resistance form a congruent relationship, giving employee dissent greater impact. The outcomes of resistance to power on one level (cultural symbolic system) support and are harmonious with those on another level (the effort/wage bargain). Rather than reducing all power to its capitalist/economic variant, and all resistance to that which successfully or unsuccessfully overturns economic exploitation, we produce a more multi-dimensional portrayal. It is one that surfaces the different criteria by which we identify power and the effectiveness of the resistance it may provoke, as well as the interrelationships among the different levels we have outlined. In the case of Collinson’s (1988; 1992; 1994) investigation of Slavs we witness a different situation regarding the outcome of the intermingling of cynical humour with the wage/effort bargain. The cynicism and wry humour of workers, in this case, obviously blocks the incorporation of their subjectivities into the corporate culture program designed by the new American managers. So at this level we have an effective modality of resistance because the managerial aim of identity colonisation and “cleansing” is thwarted. But how does this response spill over onto other plateaux of power and resistance relations, especially the capitalist wage labour arrangement? As Collinson argues in a number of articles, cynicism and
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ironic humour actually undermined resistance against economic privilege because it distanced workers from important managerial functions (managers were seen to be inferior and they did not want to have anything to do with them) and, thus, perpetuated their own emasculation. The outcome of cynical humour was, therefore, effective on its own plateau, but had self-defeating spill over effects on more traditional forms of organized dissent. In the Slavs case it would be tempting to simply dismiss cynical humour and irony as illusory forms of opposition that merely operate as a safety valve to capitalist domination. Such an interpretation would exclude, however, the significance of these so-called subjective types of dissent outright, which does not necessarily have to be the case. Although it is obvious that in this empirical example cynicism reinforces asymmetrical gender relations, and undermines “traditional” resistance that could have challenged economic subordination, we maintain that it is still best to have a pluralistic understanding of lines of influence and opposition rather than a reductive one. We should therefore speak of links, relationships and interferences instead of “illusions”, “falsity” or “ideology” because to categorise humour, irony and cynicism as merely safety valves underestimates the potential efficacy of seemingly innocuous words, gestures and emotions. This is especially the case when the very hearts and minds of workers is the terrain of struggle. We offer a third example to substantiate our argument. In a call-centre organization one of the authors is researching (“Sunray” Customer Development), union membership is strongly “discouraged” and there is an absence of other organized forms of worker opposition. Indeed, economic exploitation is rife. Management control strategies involve a whole variety of techniques typical in callcentre organizations, one of which is the promulgation of a high-commitment corporate culture. Even though some workers do become committed and loyal to Sunray as a result of the culture program, we also discovered an informal network of communications and appraisals marked by a high degree of cynical and humoristic satire. For instance, workers cynically transformed the company slogan into their own bawdy anagram that mocks such blatant attempts at thought control. It was in this way that workers resisted the almost ubiquitous corporate culture and the concerted managerial attempts to co-opt their very senses of self. Because this type of resistance does not overturn the capital/labour hierarchy one should not assume that it is merely “illusionary” and “unreal” (Knights and Collinson 1987: 472). Such resistance, in its own terms, disrupts and even transforms the linguistic and symbolic status quo upon which the unitary culture depends for its perpetuation. This very material aim of Sunray management, one in which authority has both economically and symbolically invested, is derailed by a marginal few. The cynicism we observed also helped employees to highlight economic exploitation at Sunray because the “discourse of empowerment” was
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turned back on management and used to accentuate the very real economic disempowerment faced by workers. This is possibly one factor that has created the conditions for more collective forms of labour dissent, as Sunray workers have contacted the local service workers union and have seriously discussed formally organizing their opposition. In specific contexts the findings will be different, of course. Our point is that we should be identifying the multiple lines of force and their attendant resistances without presuming a singular model of power and resistance when making judgements about the effectiveness and outcomes of opposition. Or put simply, one act or expression of transgression may have different consequences that should be judged by different but associated criteria. The temptation to reduce appraisals of power and resistance to “all or nothing” logic is strong, given the importance of totalities in the tradition of critical social research. Moreover, we have no intention of romanticising humour, irony and cynicism as resistance(s) that are always effective. Rather, we aim to place a more sophisticated theoretical grid onto our interpretations so that we can develop an appreciation for polymorphous logics of resistance and power, as well as their complex mutual influences.
Conclusion To conclude, both safety valve and transformative interpretations regarding the effectiveness of humour, irony and cynicism as resistance (to culture- engineering) seem to be underpinned by particular models of power and resistance that are either too reductive or unclear regarding the mosaic nature of force in any given situation. By introducing the notion of plateaux of power and resistance, we hope that future research may be in a better position to tease out the complex and often paradoxical dimensions of both overt and covert resistance in contemporary organizations. We are by no means advocating some sort of post-modern relativism that makes all forms of power and resistances equivalent and equally important. Rather, we are calling for a contextual sensibility that can distinguish, in concrete situations, the different lines of force (and the resistance that they may provoke), the characteristics that mark those lines of force as different, and then judge (using semi-autonomous criteria) their effectiveness on their own specific grounds. Only then can we gain a more nuanced understanding of humour, irony and cynicism as means through which employees may oppose the multifaceted and often paradoxical regime of contemporary employment.
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Notes * We would like to thank Campbell Jones, Andrew Sturdy, Yiannis Gabriel and Stewart R. Clegg for their comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. 1. Some research examines irony as a methodological tool for investigating organizational life (eg. Trethewey 1999; Johansson and Woodilla 1999; Sewell forthcoming). Here, however, we deal with irony as a phenomenon within organizations. 2. Here we are referring to the political (rather than epistemological) implications of post modern approaches. As Fraser (1995) points out, this has largely lead to an assertion of a ‘politics of recognition’ whereby issues of signification and representation become central at the expense of ‘politics of redistribution’. Examples of the former include Rorty’s (1989) suggestion of holding multiple views at once (also see Rorty 1998), carnivalesque celebrations where subordinate identities are over thrown (Rhodes, this volume), or the ‘re-signification’ of economic regimes (Gibson-Graham 1996). The main criticism levelled at such approaches is the ‘idealism’ of the assumption that simply changing our discourse (words) about the world will lead to radical transformations (Bourdieu 1983; Eagleton 1991).
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Chapter 5
Paradox in symbols and subjects The politics of constructing “The Wharfie”* André Spicer, John W. Selsky and Julian Teicher
Introduction In this chapter we examine how a bitter industrial relations dispute that occurred in Australian seaports during 1997–98 became important because it concerned not only economic entitlements but also symbolic reality. The symbolic aspect of the conflict centred on struggles around how a key figure, or subject, “the wharfie”, was understood. We use Bakhtin’s concept of dialogue to point out how multiple, often paradoxical discourses are related in an “ecology” of discourses to make sense of the subject. The chapter investigates the ways that different key parties constructed the wharfie in public media texts. We use a critical discourse analysis method, uncovering significant discursive struggle around the subject position of “the wharfie”, illustrating how different understandings of that subject led to different patterns in its engagement. By examining the role of symbolic identity struggles around the ways that subjects are recognized in discursive dialogue, we show that discourse is central to economic struggles in the workplace. The waterfront dispute that occurred in and around Australian seaports during 1997–98 was a central event in the changing nature of the Australian workplace. As is typical in labour disputes, many commentators explained it in terms of conflict around economic resources such as profits, jobs, and wages (e.g., Griffin and Svensen 1998). In Australia, industrial relations have always been strongly framed by legal process, so it was no surprise that the parties to this dispute contended in the legal arenas of the Industrial Relations Commission and the courts. But they also fought bitterly in the media and the “court of public opinion” (Trinca and Davis 2000). How are we to understand this dispute, deeply etched as it was with both economic and symbolic features? In such disputes, how can we interpret their symbolic features, which have not received adequate research attention? In this chapter we offer an understanding that draws on theories of language, discourse and identity as developed and empirically tested in organization studies.
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A number of researchers have highlighted how symbolic forms of power are not totalising but are sites of struggle (Ackroyd and Thompson 1995). Thompson and Ackroyd (1999: 100) have argued: “Struggle at work was, until recently, centrally concerned with material issues, with amounts of work done and the reappropriation of time and materials as the principal matters of dispute. These days, struggle is more centrally concerned with the matter of identity.” Power exercised through symbolic representations, such as discourse and identity, thus are crucial aspects of labour conflicts in today’s workplaces. Important research on power in the workplace has examined popular regimes of knowledge and highlighted the construction of identity or subjectivity, such as management rhetoric and the construction of the employee (Jacques 1996), as key sites of power (Knights and Willmott 1989; Clegg 1989). Such insight finds resonance in political studies, where the recent decline in traditional ways of voicing material struggle has been noted: [T]he language of distribution is less salient today. The movements that not long ago boldly demanded an equitable share of resources and wealth have not, to be sure, wholly disappeared. But thanks to the sustained neo-liberal rhetorical assault on egalitarianism, to the absence of any credible model of “feasible socialism” and to widespread doubts about the viability of state-Keynesian social democracy in the face of globalization, their role has been greatly reduced (Fraser 2000: 107–108).
Fraser (1995) argues there has been a shift from a politics of redistribution to a politics of recognition. The latter is concerned with how identities are constructed and who has a legitimate voice in society. This is reflected in the many contemporary movements of identity politics, such as around queer, women’s, and indigenous identities. According to Fraser (2000: 71), a politics of recognition aims to challenge cultural or symbolic injustices “rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation”. She suggests that new theoretical frameworks are needed to encompass both the new identity as well as more traditional distributional politics. Fraser’s politics of recognition may enrich the understanding of political struggles in organizations. The politics of identity or recognition recapitulate the symbolic aspect of such struggles, while the politics of redistribution recapitulate the economic or material aspects. Thus, in this chapter we intend to show the paradoxical interplay between the politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution in a specific labour dispute. Such disputes have usually been associated with Fraser’s politics of redistribution but we employ conceptual tools associated with the politics of recognition in order to highlight their symbolic features. We show that paradox lies in how workers, in this case Australian “wharfies” (longshoremen or dockers), resisted attempts by key players in the waterfront dispute to construct and inscribe certain identities for them. By focusing on struggles in the symbolic arena of this dispute we are not suggesting that
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material issues were any less salient than in other disputes during the past century. However, in this dispute the material struggles were waged in part through the differing understandings of the identity or subject position of “the wharfie”, which did appear to be new or at least much more prominent than previously. There has been little research into the role of discourse and identity in the context of industrial relations disputes. An exception is Herod who argues that “discursive practices — how a dispute, process or situation is represented to a broader audience — can thus be important elements in the institutional reproduction of labour markets and, consequently, of workers themselves” (1998: 178). In this chapter we aim to further this insight by examining an important symbolic aspect of the waterfront dispute. We focus on how conflicting and sometimes paradoxical images of the Australian wharfie were mobilized and used by “business” and “union” networks of interest during the dispute. These images were constructed by different actors’ discourses as reported in the public media. We argue that the different ways in which the wharfie was represented led to very different courses of action becoming possible and legitimate for the actors within each network. We proceed first by reviewing the literature on discourse studies of organization in order to develop a framework to understand struggles around symbolic resources. Drawing on the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, we suggest that discourses in a social arena can exist in an “ecology” of dialogue, one that sometimes generates paradoxical constructions of the same object. We then describe the empirical setting, its history, and the context in which the waterfront dispute occurred. Next, we analyse the discourses used by the two key interest groups in the dispute to construct the wharfie and examine how these discourses connected to “legitimate” courses of action. We conclude with two implications for critical discourse theory: the need to appreciate the politics of multiple discourses, and the need to “materialize” discourse analysis by understanding the role of discourses in the reproduction of social structures.
Symbolic aspects of labour disputes Meaning and critical discourse analysis Meaning and sensemaking are central concerns in organization studies (Pondy and Mitroff 1979; Manning 1979; Smircich 1983; Weick 1995). A variety of approaches seek to understand processes of meaning in organizations (see Putnam and Fairhurst 1999 for a review), and one important recent approach is discourse (Grant, Keenoy and Oswick 1998). Broadly, discourse can be conceptualised as texts that momentarily fix a particular framework of meaning about something.
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According to Heracleous and Hendry (2000), discourse approaches in organization studies can be divided into three broad categories: interpretive, which examines discourse as constructive of social and organizational reality; managerialist, which examines discourse as a tool in the service of managerial processes such as leadership and change, and critical, which considers relations of power in the discursive construction of objects. In a previous paper (Spicer, Selsky and Teicher, 2000) we used an interpretive approach to study the process of active sensemaking during the waterfront dispute. In this paper we adopt a critical approach in order to examine how power worked through discourse in the same dispute. In the critical discourse approach, a discourse is a set of statements (Foucault 1972) found in texts that do not just describe but also construct or “make up” (Hacking 1986; 1999) an “object”. An object is understood here as a generic term for some aspect of reality; it can stand for a person, a physical entity, an event, an issue, etc. Understanding discourse is [a] task that consists of not — or no longer — treating discourse as a group of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. Of course discourses are composed of signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things. It is this more that renders them irreducible to language (langue) and to speech. It is this “more” that we must reveal and describe (Foucault 1972: 49).
These systems of signs may include written texts (e.g., literature, manuals, annual reports), spoken texts (conversation, interviews, speeches), visual texts (film, paintings), spatial texts (buildings, landscapes), and performance (drama, dance, non-verbal cues). The set of discursive statements found in any set of texts not only describes the object(s) with some degree of accuracy, but also constitutes the very object(s) that it purports to describe (Grant, Keenoy and Oswick 2000). Hay notes that this occurs through narratives or stories. In a particular case: [w]hat is interesting… is not so much the descriptive accuracy (or otherwise) of the presentation of key events. Ultimately far more significant is their narrativisation, the subject positions constructed and the resulting attributions of causality and responsibility — in sum, the discursive selectivity imposed by such narratives upon the decoding process (Hay 1996: 265–266).
Discourses and the narratives they create/construct fundamentally shape how actors act with respect to the object(s). That is, discourses “do not just describe things; they do things. And being active they have social and political implications” (Potter and Wetherall 1987: 6; see also Austin 1966; Van Dijk 1997a; 1997b). Moreover, actors in a social arena can use discourses as resources to seek legitimacy for their interest(s) and position(s) and to enact strategy (Hardy, Palmer and Phillips 2000). Discourses influence social constructions of the arena and make
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certain “strategies of engagement” with it sensible and legitimate (Hardy and Phillips 1998). Extant discourses in a particular social arena do not have equal prominence and political legitimacy (Fairclough 1995). In any discursive arena a dominant discourse is likely to be used by powerful actors and it will be rendered legitimate; other discourses may be voiced and used by less powerful actors and those discourses are likely to be marginalized. We can expect the dominant discourse to entrain a particular way of thinking and acting being considered normal or rational, whereas other ways of thinking and acting get branded as abnormal or irrational. For example, if the dominant discourse of the day “makes up” killer whales as dangerous creatures or economically valuable commodities, then a whaling industry is likely to develop to destroy or harvest them (Lawrence, Phillips & Hardy 2000). On the other hand, if the dominant discourse makes up killer whales as a natural beauty, then an eco-tourism industry and research stations are likely to develop to manage and enjoy them. One particular class of objects that has attracted recent research attention in organization studies is subject positions, how they are constructed through discourse, and how power works through them. The analysis of power relations should focus on the creation of an image of subjectivity in discourse (Foucault 1977). Judith Butler nicely summarises the central lesson in Foucault’s study of power and discourse in the prison: Foucault suggests that the prisoner is not regulated by an exterior relation of power, whereby an institution takes a pre-given individual as the target of its subordinating aims. On the contrary, the individual is formed or, rather, formulated through his discursively constituted “identity” as prisoner. Subjection is, literally, the making of a subject, the principal of regulation according to which a subject is formulated or produced. Such subjection is a kind of power that not only unilaterally acts on a given individual as a form of domination, but also activates or forms the subject (Butler, 1997: 84; emphasis in original).
A number of empirical organizational studies of the construction of subjects through discourse and the implications for power have been produced in the past decade (e.g., du Gay 1996; Fournier 1998; Townley 1996; Garsten and Grey 1997; Kunda 1992; and Sewell and Wilkinson 1992). In this chapter we examine the complex construction of the subject position, “wharfie”, in the context of the Australian waterfront dispute and the implications of these constructive activities in the dispute itself and for labour relations in Australia more generally.
Resistance and dialogue The approach outlined above couples a single dominant discourse tightly to a certain strategy of engagement with the subject. However, one cannot assume that
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a single dominant discourse is able to “inscribe” one or more subjects unproblematically (Ackroyd and Thompson 1999; Mumby 1997; Newton 1998; Gabriel 1999). Rather, subjects may resist and re-articulate the subject positions within which they find themselves inscribed. It is this insight that has stimulated a fertile research area on resistance to dominant discourses through humour (Collinson 1992), worker irony and “Švejkism” (Fleming and Sewell forthcoming), cynicism (Fleming and Spicer in this volume), and alternative or sub-cultural identities. Such a line of research pushes us to re-think the relation between discourse concerning a subject position and the frameworks of meaning and power mobilized around the subject position. This recent work on resistance may need to appreciate the contribution of traditional collective forms of organized resistance such as unions. For instance, as we indicate from the waterfront dispute below, a union and its allies organized a visible, articulate and potent response to a discourse that other interests were trying to position as dominant. In order to understand how worker resistance to and through a particular discourse takes place in an organized situation, it may be useful to think in terms of an ecology of discourses in dialogue. Mikhail Bakhtin argued that language should be understood as a dialogue in which different words come into contact with one another. Meaning is the result of this contact: The word, directed towards its object, enters into a dialogically agitated and tension-filled environment of alien words, value judgments and accents, weaves in and out of complex interrelationships, merges with some, recoils from others, intersects with yet a third group: and all this may crucially shape discourse, may leave a trace in all its semantic layers, may complicate its expression and influence its entire stylistic profile (Bakhtin 1981: 276).
Following its recent usage in organization studies, we use dialogue to mean a situation where two or more relatively legitimate systems of discourse co-exist within an organized site: Dialogical analyses explicitly acknowledge that “organization” is comprised of a multiplicity of discourses which reflect the “plurivocal” meanings brought to bear by participants. Potentially, this permits a multitude of “organizational realities” which, although relatively autonomous discourses, may overlap and permeate each other. Similarly, actors who are “locked into” particular discourses may experience and interpret the same discursive event — such as a conversation — differently (Grant, Keenoy and Oswick 1998: 7).
In situations where relatively organized groups offer alternatives to the dominant discourse, the notion of dialogue may help us to understand their positionality. From a critical discourse perspective, the “inscribed” subjects may understand discursive processes in an organization as a dialogue potentially involving both
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acceptance and resistance. This implies that different and often paradoxical understandings of the same subject position may be present simultaneously in the same social arena. Moreover, a dialogue of discourses means that different courses of action may be legitimated in the same discursive arena because, as suggested above, each discourse in a dialogue does not speak from a position of equal power and legitimacy — some may dominate and others may be marginalized. Some recent examples point out the differing discourses of a particular subject by different groups, and how this leads to certain relations of power and (often uneasy) interactional dynamics. Hardy and Phillips (1998), for instance, demonstrate how three different types of organizations constructed and hence acted on the subject of “the refugee” in different ways. By examining discourses in dialogue we may be better able to understand conflicting and often paradoxical constructions of particular identities and how these may enable paradoxical strategies of engagement to become viable. Indeed, examining discursive processes as a dialogue may prove to be relevant in situations where more than one organized actor voices a coherent discourse, as in industrial relations disputes.
Method For this case study we used a five-step process informed by previous studies of critical discourse analysis (e.g., Potter and Whetherall 1987; Fairclough 1995; Van Dijk 1997a). First, we examined the historical, political, and industrial relations contexts within which the 1997–98 waterfront dispute occurred. Second, we gathered a defined body of naturally occurring texts. For this project, the database consisted of 439 public media reports (see Appendix) about the dispute obtained from the Reuters Business Briefing database for the full years 1997 and 1998, using the search terms “port” and “Melbourne”. (Melbourne was the initial and primary site of contention in this dispute.) Third, through a close reading of these texts, we identified the discourses used to understand a particular object — in this case, the subject “wharfie”. Fourth, we interpreted each of the discourses that emerged by means of expansion analysis (Gephart 1993)1 and grouped them according to networks of interest. Using evidence from the contextual analysis and from existing studies of the dispute we identified two prominent networks of interests: – –
Union network: workers (including wharfies), their unions, and support groups in the community; and Business network: relevant firms, certain business support groups, parts of the Liberal-National Party federal government, and elements of the state administrative apparatus.
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Finally, we examined the ecology of discourses in dialogue in each network and derived which activities, or strategies of engagement, actors in each network considered legitimate. That is, discourses were used in each network to construct certain images and identities of “the wharfie”, and by each network in their dialogues with the other network and with the public.
The Australian waterfront dispute and its historical context The events of the 1997–98 waterfront dispute are receding into Australian history. Both key antagonists, Patrick Stevedores and the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA), have not only survived but also created a more productive and cooperative relationship. At one level the dispute was just one in a century-long series of “stoushes” on the waterfront but at another it was far more significant. There were clear resonances with the sometime violent history of class conflict on the Australian wharves. Indeed, the dispute bore more than passing similarity to the Great Strikes of the 1890s. Judging by the level of support from seafarers’ unions around the world, including the United States and the United Kingdom, this dispute resonated with their own battles. But the dispute also held particular significance in the contemporary Australian political scene. A confrontation between a militant union and an employer had been widely expected since the election of a Liberal-National government in 1996. In contrast to its Labor Party predecessor, which had cultivated a close relationship with the unions, the LiberalNational government was elected on a policy of reducing union power and influence in the workplace and reforming the waterfront.
The waterfront and unionism The importance of the waterfront and waterfront struggles is reflected in both art and history. For example, the legendary film On the Waterfront, was inspired by union corruption on the docks at Hoboken, New Jersey, its theme being that “selfappointed tyrants can be fought and defeated by right-thinking men in a vital democracy” (Murray 1978: 95). Numerous books recount the history of waterfront struggles and demonstrate the wider political ramifications of these confrontations (e.g., Nelson 1988). In the Australian situation, history and literature about the waterfront are intertwined (e.g., Morrison 1955, 1984; Lowenstein and Hills 1982). Unions of wharf labourers were formed in Australian ports in the 1870s and combined into a loose federation in early 1890. In August of that year these unions became key participants in the Maritime Strike, a major confrontation over the principle of freedom of association, a dispute that involved employers in the pastoral, mining and transport industries in the eastern colonies of Australia. In the
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ensuing struggle the waterfront was de-unionised and maritime labour came to be regulated through an employer-controlled agency (Svensen 1995). Following federation in 1901 (which created the nation of Australia out of what had previously been separate colonial states), the unions were formed into the Waterside Workers Federation and then registered under the fledgling Conciliation and Arbitration Act in 1904, thereby gaining access to arbitrated awards which regulated wages and conditions. Despite this, the waterfront was periodically convulsed by major conflicts, with de-unionisation a temporary outcome. For example, the union’s involvement in the 1917 General Strike resulted in the reestablishment of employer operated labour bureaux. Also, in 1928 strikes protesting an Arbitration Court decision reducing wages and conditions led the Bruce Government to enact its “Dog Collar Act” requiring wharfies to be licensed. Nonunion labour was again introduced to the waterfront and in the ensuing struggle in Melbourne police shot several unionists, one fatally. The union did not recover until World War 2 when labour shortages and the need to prosecute the war effort enabled it to secure an early form of tripartite industry regulation, marked by a shift from the “bull system” under which supervisors selected workers for regular employment. Permanent employment was not introduced until 1967. However, the continuance of industry employment and the “monopoly” position of the union and its strong influence over recruitment and redundancy were seen to inhibit the development of employee commitment and innovative working arrangements (Turnbull 1991; Productivity Commission, 1998). Under this regime work and technology on the waterfront was transformed, beginning with mechanization in the 1950s and containerization in the 1970s. Over the period 1957–1987 the workforce fell from 25,600 to 5,500. While the waterfront workforce continued to decline throughout the twentieth century, by the 1980s a range of business and political interests argued that the nation’s ability to compete globally required a quantum leap in waterfront productivity. The docks were represented as a crippling bottleneck to productivity elsewhere in the economy. The Labor Party held o�