Mars Learning: The Marine Corp's Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940

Mars Learning

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Mars Learning The Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940

Keith B. Bickel

l ' '

A Member of the Perseus Rook Croup

All rights reserved, Printed in the United Stater;of America, No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, incltiding photocopy, recording, or any infarmation storage and retrieval system, withnut permission in writkg from the publisher, Ccyyright Q 2001 by Westview P r ~ sA, Member of the Perseus Books Grotlp P~tbIishedin 2002 in tlw United Stater; of America by Wwtview Press, 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301-2877, and in tl-re United Kingdom by West-view Press, "L Hid's Copse b a d , Cttrnnor HitX, Oxford OX2 9JJ Find us on the World Wide Web at wm.westviewpress.com Library of Ccmgress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bickel, Keitlrt B. Mars Iearr-ring : the Marine Corps development of srnalI wars doctr"ine, 19151940 / Keith F. Bickef, p, cm, EBN Q-8133-9775-8(pbk.) I, United Staks. Marine Corps-History-20th century. 2. Cc>unter-instlrgency United States. 4, Peacekeeping force~caribbean operations. 3. Peacekeeping forc Region. S, Low-intensity conflicts (Mititay sciC7ie1-r~). 5. Haiti-History-Amerian occupation, 1915-193, 7, Dc?minicanReptlblican-Histor y-American ocmpa tion, 1916-1%3. 8, Nicara~a-HbtoryVRevotutic~n, 1926-1929, 1. Title.

The paper ttsed in this publication meets the requirements of the Amex-icanNational Standard far Pemanence of Paper for Prir-rtedLibrary Materials 239-48-1984.

To my mother who gnve me the gift of reading. A ~ f iCarnaron i qtlielz, por su ejemplo, me mostraba el gozo de escvibiu.

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Contents

1

Terms of Art

hformal Versus Formal Doctrine, 4 W ~ aShapes t Doctrine? 7 Focushg on. the Process as @posed to the Product, 15 A Process for hformal Versus Formal Doctrine Making, 17 Haiti, the Clomirtican Republic, and Nicaragua: Mlhy These Cmes? 18 Methad m d Orgmization, 19 2

Historical and Institutional Context far Small Wars Learning 27

Historical Context: Service in the Army's Small Wars, 28 Historical Context: Informal and Formal Doctrirze for the Army, 42 Instifutional Context: Development of the Marine Corps Schools, 50 hstitutianal Context: Marlne Doctrine pre-Haiti, 57 3

Intervention in Haiti and Lessons Learned

Conduct of the Small Warn; 69 iJessons from the Haitian Expcrienee, 911 4

Intervention in the Dominican Republic and Lessons Learned

Conduct of the Small War, 102 Lessons from the Dominican Experience, 128

Contelzts

5

Xntemention in Nicaragua and Lessons Learned Conduct of the Small War, 155 Lessons from the Nicaraguan Experience, 178 Small W a s Training Belclre the SrmIL Warn MA.IZZSLII, 186

6

From Nicaragua to the Sfaall Wars Manual .A Clash of Visions Sparks Debate in the Corps, 205 A Period cJf Fervent Writing Begins, 209

Small Wars Trainhg Pauses, 211 9

Concluding Thaughts Did Stimuli External to the I~lstitution Shnpe the Final Pmduct? 235 Did Stimuli hternal to the Institution 511ape the Final Froduct? 237 Did hdividuals Shape the Final Product? 239 Some Confirmhg Observations horn the Literabre on Corporate Leanling, 244 Implications for 7'r,day, 247

155

List of Tables, Figures, and Maps

2.1

%all wars measurcls discussed in the Army's professional journals, 1898-1915

3.1 Comparison of prior dockine and measures used in Haiti 4.1 4.2 5.1 5.2

Comparison of prior doctrine and measures used in the Dominican Republic Small wars measures discussed in the Corps's professimlal journals, 1918---1926 Cornparison of prior docrrine and measures used in Nicaragua Small wars measures discussed in the Corps's professional journals, 1927-1941

Figzr res 1.1 Pe~entageof officers in small wars, 1915-1935

2.1 2.2

Grow& of the officer corps, 1915--1940 Evolution of the Marirze Corps Schools, 1891-1934

3.1

Number of Marines deployed to Haiti, 19151922

4.1

Republic, Number oE Marines deployed to the Domi~~ican 19161924

5.1 5.2

Number oE Marines deployed to Nicaragua, 1922-1933 Cornparison of Harrington's and tl'tley's viekvs on small wars

Lkf of Tables, Figures, n ~ lLlnps d

X

5.3 Average percel~tageof COC cu,rriculum devoted to small wars, 1930-1940 5.4 Average percentage of F K curriculum devoted to small wars and landhg operations, 1932-1937 6.1

Hours of small wars instruction in the Marine Corps Schools, 1E2-1941

Maps 3.2

Haiti Division sf Haiti into districts

4.1

The Dominican :Republic

4.2

First attacks and district delheations in the Dominican Republic Illustration of cordon operations in the Dominican Republic

3.1

4.3

5.1 Nicaragua 5.2 Sandino's m4or areas of operatims 5.3 Illustration of different gasrison concepts

190 191

Preface Private Willie Graymon is relnelnbered by history perhaps in a way he would rather not be. On Octoher 4,1898, be fired the opening shots of an American colonial war for the Philippine Islands. More important, his shots marked the b e g h j n g of a four-decade U.S. commitment to waging what were then referred to as "mall wars" h the Pacific and Caribbem, with the Phiipl>ine Insurrectim (989%196)2), h e r i c m miii&so suppressed rebel "armi,esr' in the southern (Moro) 13hilippines (1903-IN&), Cuba (19Q6--1909),Haiti (1935-19341, the Uminnicm Republic (3916-19241, anci Nicaragua (1927-1933). Wl~ereasMarine Corps forces participated to a lesser extall: in the Phifjppines and Cuba, by World War I the smal wars mission belonged entirely to the Corps. Haiti, the Dominicm Republic, and Nicaragua were the Marines' alone to win or lose. Miin t h y did, and in the process some officers began to think &out g and institutionalizing lessons h r n those campaips for futurt. generations of Masine offirers. A doctrjne for m a l l wars began to take shape. Durin.g the period from &out 1910 to the early 1920s, much of the doctrine development procew was informal, propagated through brigade memoranda and, the professionat Eteratare. In the %%OS, however, the Corps moved towards fnrmalizing small wars dockine and by 3935, institutimalized it in training and production of the capstone Marttral cif-S~nall Wars Opcmtions, The doctrinal process thcn abated somewhat, although the Corps commandant convened, a small board in 1939 to revise the manuai. In 1940 the Rcrarine Corps formaLIy published if as the renamed Si~ralEWars Manual, just when it became the most irrelevant because of the onset of World War 112, Over forty-five years later, in 1986, when the United States was still cmcemed with Cold War proxy confrontations in Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Afghanistan, the Corps resurrected the Slnall ktiars Manzizl m d reprinted it in its entimty, without edits, as "an aid to education and tsajning jn the historical appmaCh of Marine Corps units cmductlng operations in Isw-intensity conflicts."l It was consjdered ""oneof the best books on mftitary operations im peacekeephg and counterinsurgencyoperations published before World War 11,""and as such, comanding offi-

xii

Preface

cers were responsible for maLng the book available to Marhes engaged in those types of operatims,%at is still true today. The Snznll Wars Manual was one of those used to hstruct soldiers headed for Somalia and Bosnia.3 It is still used within the curriculum of The Basic School, at which every lieutenant in the Corps is trained." Upon refiction, the history of single hegemonic states-fur example, Rome, Spain, France, and England-suggests that the policing of lesser powers becomes a preoccupation during relativek stable or peaceful periods. In the wake of the Cold War the tlnited States has alreaeiy eng a g d in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia. 'Thus, with republicat-ion of the SrrralI Wars Manzknl, the Corps might be prescient in returning to a doctrine with applic"hi1ity to a future of messy internal wars. However, in so doing, the Corps of today is borrowi.ng doctrine that is over sjxty years old. That sixty-year-old doctrine on small wars was one of the first formal doctrines ever created by che Marine Corps*"No serious study of this historic first, however, has been published in the academic literature. This gap leaves the opportunity to ask why the doctrine Inoked the way it did. That is kvhat thit; book does, focusing on several conconnit.& yuestions: (1)What we= the small. wars lessons that Marine officers thought they learned f m Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua? (2) Was there an informal process, k addition to the formal process, by which small wars lessons were conveyed to Corps officers? and (3) How were lessons institutionalized and distilled into formal doctrine? Answering these ques.lions has been a long hut fun process, nlong the way I have incurred debts of gratitude that f wish to begh repaying here, First and formost, I want to thank Eliot Cohen, not just for all the support and $ d a n c e he gave me durjng the entire process bttt more important (to me), lfor the intellectualmilieu that he built around me during my stutSies. We start& together in the Strategic Stuciies program at Johns H a p h s , he as adviser and I as student. Over the past yeam the program he has created, the peers he has brought into the program, m d the esprit de corps he has engmdered art: a credit to his talents, to the instiwtion, and to those who fhancidy support:his work. I also kvant to thank my dissertation committee-hdrew Bacevich, Michael Mandefiaum, Bmce Parrott, and I'homas McNaugher-for ~ a d i n gthis monograph and for their thoughtful. insights, which helped to make it better. I owe deep thanks to Mike Vickers for aU the hours he spent bouncing ideas and sources back and forth with me when he easily could have focused on his own work. He helped me phpokt the literature on corparate lemjng and gave me insights throughout the process that helped clarify my own thinking. I am also inddted to Phebe Novakowic, now

Preface

*..

XZEZ

with the Office of the Deputy Scrctary of Defe~~se, and Dave Morrison, iormerly at the m i t e House Office of Management and Budget, for giving me extended leave to filtish the core historical chapkrs and enjoy the first w e k s of my daughter's life. My old kiend Raffi Gregorian was there at the beghning when I east about for a topic, and his suggestions helped me form the basis fcrr &is book. Brim ,fon Hoffmm, h d r e w Bktle, David Brooks, Col" Robert Lee, and Gary Anderson all provided helpful guidance or perspective. Andrew Marshal.l, Andrew :K Tom Welch, Jm van Tol, IJatnek Curry, fim EitzShonds, and emer alf provided mother milieu for my intelleetuat growth and conl-inually prodded m to finish this study of the past so I codd focus m e again on the fubre. 1 would also like to f i m k my editors at We&iec\l, particularly Leo Wieg~nm,Dabrid, Perv;in, m d Dabrid McBrid,e for their interme enthusiasm, m d aggressiveness in bring4ng this manuscript to puhlication, They have been a fun bunch to work with. My studies m d this book could not have been cmpleted wi.lhout the generous assistance of the Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Sbdies (SAIS), the Lynde and Harry Bradtey Eoundation, the C)lin Foundat-im, and the Marine Corps Foundation. N u e r - . ous research staff helped me find sources I sometimes did not befieve existed. Arny Canton of the Personal Papers Sction, Bob Aquilina, Annette h e r m a n , t e r n Kaljot, and Danny Crawford of the Historical Reference Section, Bemis Frank of the Oral History Cdlectim, and the library staff of the Mazine Corps Historical Center were d wonderfutfy helpfd. So, too, was Kerry Strong and her staff at the Marine Corps Archives in Quantico, Virginia. Mitch Yockelson md. the staff of the National Archiwes helped me find related Army and Marine Corps material. The library and aschives stag at the A m y W r College in Caslislc, Pennsylvmia, allowed me access to old Army manuals beyond what I had a right to expect. 1thank atl the archivists for their trust in allowing me unktterc3d access to some of &eis most fragile and unca.t.aiogedmteriala I would also like to thank Linda Carlson, Kate Picard, and the rest of the SAIS tibrary staff for their help in tracking down sources throughout my research efforts" By custm, spouses and fmil:y tend to be thanked last, But they truly are never last. They provide the emotional (md often editorial) support without kvhich neither books nor theis authors kvndd be complete. My own wife, Suzan, helped me research sources, edited key parts of my work, and, mom irnpmtmt, bore. my pmious daughter, Jordana, nurturing her alS those weekends I spent inthe library, them tend'lng to me when 1was horn, 1thhk the most iappropriate thanks 1c d d ever offer them is not in words but in the time 1now spend nufturing them.

Preface

Notes 2 . U.S. Marine Corps, *Wemorandumfram the Deputy Chief of S"EE far Plans, Policies and Operations," in Sfnntl Wars Marzunl (Quanticcl, VA: Marine Corps Schools, 1940; reprint, Washington DC: Department of the Navy, 1986), foreword. 2. Ibid. 3. Col. Gary Anderson, instructor, Marine Corps College, Quantico, VA, interview by author, August 1994. 4. Col. Robed tee, Commanding Officer, U.S. Marine Corps Basic School, intexlriew with author, January 1997. 5, The other was the simuftane~uscreation of amphibictus warfare doctrine,

Terms of Art

What are small wars, and what is doctrine? The term small roars was used by British and, later, American military thinkers to liistinguish warfare against guerrilla forces and tribal a r ~ ~ i from e s the major conventional style of was that characterized warfare on the European continent. The Marine Corps Srlzall Wars M12az~aZpubliskd in 1940 recognized that the phrase was "often a vague name for any one of a great variety of mjlitary operations. "1 Consequently, the Manual's writers opted for a broad definition: Operatians undertaken under executke authority, wherein military farce is eambined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs af another state whose go>vernmentis unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory- far the p~servationof life and such interests as are determined by the foreign palicy of our nation.'

In modern usage the term has undergone mmerous transformations, including cnz~nZ.criszrzcy, low-itzte~sitymzfEicf,hser reghlzal mnti~~gazcies, and now small-scall c a n l i n g Tbe first of these terms-carrl.rteril.zsurgerzcy-best encapsdates what the Marines accomplished alongside the Arrny in the Pacific and then done in the CaribZlean: tbey carrit.d out po:[itical and miiitary operdions to defeat a bmd or bands of armed dtizens trying to overthrow the established authori-ty of a country by means of guerrilla warfare. This narrower genre of small wars is the focus in this and book, but X also occasionally make use of the terms coa~rtrrirzsz.rrg~tcy wa$arc to rcinforce the difference betwecm peacekeeping and atztitq~~rrrilla sirnple htcrvention missions. By comparison to small wars, ""dctnine" is a more slippery cmcept to define. The colzlmf of doctrhe may be fairly easy to recognize. Fin.ding a consistent definition or understanding cJf +e cofzcept Of doctrine, however, is not so easy. Definitions varied widely during the entirc?twentiell.i

century m d markedly so among the military writers of the period u ~ ~ d e r study here, Cmplicating the picture, not aXI authors are really talking about etoctrine when they thfnk they are. Some art^ really focused m strategy, not rnilitary doctrine per seeGeneraily, though, most writers offering a diffcrcnt definition of doctrine generally would recognize another witer" discussion as one on doctrine..This suggests that the cmcept ol doctrine is wider than most of the definitictns that have been offered to date. The term doctrine itself entered the U.S. military lexicon sometime just before a f 912 editorial board piece i,n the Army's 11If:a31ty Jozir~takdefined it as ""no more than a mems to some national conception of war."Vrom where it came exactly is unhown. The author of the first semhal American study of doctrine, C o m m o d o ~h d e y W* Knox, believed that doctrhe was a nineteenth-century Europem intellectual construct designed to help commanding officers teach or train their subordirrates so that they would think like their commander or at least understand his intent in war.4 Mllhether other officers believed the same is m h o w n ; those who wrote generally etid not bother to inform the reader of the term's origin, o ~ ~ofl y.the aulhor 'S own conception of the term The Marine Corps first addressed the issue of docrtrine in the lead issues of the new Marir.te COT Guzettr. (1916) h e n a debate was joined cmceming how the Corps kvould use its forces in the future-. m essence, what its primary mission should be. The precipitatixzg article, written by future commandmt Maj. J o h Russell, argued that m understanding of doctrine was critical to the Corps's luture."n Che process, he foreshadowed the developmnt of two different concepts of doctrine that still exist today hssefl first quoted a co on contemporary understanding of doctrine as "the application of the Art of Warfbnd argued that this concept of doctrine made it synonymus with a colIertion of principles.6 He argued that it was a a w e d interpretation of doctrine. Principles to him were h-rdamental trutS?sabout Hghti,ng war. 'They we= derived from the study of military history. Doctrine, by cmtrast, meant adapting principles "to the circumstances and character not only of the military organizatim but of the nation it rcpresents,'hand then ilpplyitzg them,? Russell even went so far as to criticize publidy the Army's Fkld Semicc RecquInt i r t ~ sfor cclnfLusiw the issues of principles, doctrine, and regulaticms such that gemeratims of officers wme being incorrectly trained to face future warfare. This led. to Russell" own cmcqtion of doctrine as "a teachislg that provides for a k u t u a i understanding' among the ccmlmissioned [officers]" m d that gives unity to Chc thot~ghtsand acti,ons of those officers.K Precisely because it was a teachixlg, and thus interpretive, doctrine could be wrong whereas princigles never were. Because of this interpretive &merit to doctrine, RusseU ~ ~one a ofs the first Corps ofiicers to call openly

for the creation of staffs to develop doctrjne rathcr &an leaving it i,n Ihc ad hoc state of privatization that characterized prcvious doctrine fomulation to date within the Corps."' The response to Rusself's essay from his peers was swift and contentious. Many viewed doctrine differently. Most feit the Corps either did have a doctri~~e or did not need its own, Since the term doctrine had only entered the American military lexico~~ within the previous decade (or less), it is not surp"sing that some of Russell" detractors criticized his use of the term itself, One commentator tried to avoid the contentious nature of rhe debate by prcferrhg old terms, despite the fact that no older terms adequately described what the debaters were arguing over." Anotkr commclmtatcrr contended doctrine was simply an expression coined just to fill a vocabulary void but then proceeded to offer a definition similar to Russell's, saying that doctrine was "a particular set of opinions held as a guide to action by all members of a cornmand . . . , in cases not deteminabie by fixed military principles, so that the will of the suprem comrnander must, in every part of his command, be promptly executed in the same manner as if he were hirnself prltsent and acting.""llCapt. Earl Ellis, later famous for his mphibious doctrine efforts, also weighed in with a paraIXet defhition provided by President oi the Naval War Cnlege iadm. =-right: ""A doctrine . . . may be defined as a general policy outlined by s ~ ~ p e r i authority. or and communicated to subordinates as a guide which enables them to predict the probable wishes of their superior fn cases vvhere a definite statement of these wishes is not a~ailable.~'Iz The Army" contemporary discussions mirrored those of Russell and his critics. n e r e was a conthual search for a useful defhition, discussion of the distinction between doctrine and principles, and complaints about the way field manuals oi the day confused, the two and thus confused officer training. For example, one cJf the first attempts to create a more pragmatic definjtion fnr the Arm,y rcls~dtedin not me, but three, definitions, Doctrine was first defhed as a ""cnclusion about how best to utilize military and economfc sources in wmffThen it became "a theory of using a nation" force under particular conditions.'Yinally it was "all that is authoritatively taught in the military establishment for the purpose of governing the conduct of war and training.'"l" Each of these definitions share?d a c m o n thread: They refersed to the way hokvledge was to be ayf?lied to the art of war, Little more was ad.dcd to the conceptual understanding of doctrint. in the i m e d i a t e pre-World War If period. Sinct. then, although definitional usage has sharpened over time, one trend has not abated. Virtuafly every American writer on doctrine who does not quote the U.S. Asrgy Dictiolzary of Rvms offers different fsomtimes multiple) dcfjnitions of the term.1"

Perhaps the best way to undwstand m d e m conceptions of doctrine is h t:he li@t of Paul Heibert"~portrayal of an intellectual debate in the

1970s between Gen. Mrllliam E, DePuy and Lt. Gen. J c : , h Cushmm,lV11-t Herbert's documented viey Gen..DePuy did not trust the bitiative of his subordinates (based.on his expesjences &ring World War 11) and felt that clear instructions about what to do we^ afways necessary. 'l'his attihtde supposedly spilled over into hiz; vjecv of doctrine: It was a set of rules or techniques+ssential.fy hstmctions-necessary for success on the modern battlefield and to be fnllowed as closely as possibk. Acceding tc:,Herberf, Lt. Gen. Cuslhman, by contrast, trusted his subordinates morc3 and gave them intellectual. leeway for initiative. Concomitantly he felt doctrine was more oE a guide h t ""alowed for the infinite variety of conditions and situations characteristic of human affairs."% It therefore required ""judgment in appfication," 'These two contrasting views of doctrine mark the pdar ends of a spectrum of definitions and understanding~of doclsine. nlmost every other de8nitim one fhds, from both the period, of this study and aft-er, fits somwkere along that spectrum.17 Not surprisingly, many civilian writers, and several military ones, have stradded the dehitionnl fence bp embracing doctrinc as both a guide and a template of tecbnirfuesto be applied on the battlefield.. Service manuals-notahly some eciitions of the Army's dictionary of terms-l~we taken the same appr0ach.m m e can sce in the S~nallGZlurs Murzliurl itself sections providing authoritative techniques that maders could deviate from only at their own peril a d other sections providing guidmce brat calling for individual initiative in applicatio~~. This study ernbraces both views of doctrine-as rules and as guidance-because both have been influential over time in the development m d revision of doctrixle m d because neither is w r o ~ ~Neither g. is wrong in the sense that &pending upon the amount of control they wish to exercise over their subordinates, commanding generals hawe the right to decide how much their subordinates should ""sick to the textf' or use their own hitiative,

Informal Versus Formal Doctrine The issue of which ""text" to stick to highlights a distinction this study will m& ~ g a r d i n gthe dclctrinal product-a dislinctim between fnrmal and informal doctrine reflecting "fomal and informal processes and struch;lres for the . . . sharing . . . of knowledge and skills" "generally evident i,n all or.t;anizations but particularly so for the Carps during the period under consideration in this book,lWoctrine is most often associated with the training manuals published for school and field use.. Manuals arc the most visible manifestation of doctrine and, by their revision, of

doctrinal crihange. Training circulars and pamphlets are a slightly less visible manifestation of doctrine. AIl of these together-manuals, training circulars, and pamphkts-are part of what this study will refer to as fornzd doctrirre. Any study o f military doctrine, hokvever, is incomplete without an understanding of how ideas may be trmsmitted among the officer corps and improved upon before tbey become instihttionallg,recognized or sanctioned. Probably the most common method of idea exchange is writkg articles for the professional journals, such as the I~qantryfitlr~~al, the Marine Corps Gazette, and the N~27alf~tsfifufe Praeeedi~tgs.Far less common, but apparmt in the cases that follow are fieid ordms analyzing the overalf situation and proffering theories of what works and what does not. Finally officers write tcr each other and socidize in other ways that can facilitate the spread of ideas, bat those ways are, at least for the period and institution considered here, lost to recorded history Consequmtly, professiclnal articles, field orders, and personal letters will f o m the basis of what is referred to here as itilfunnlrl dtlcfrkc. The key distinction to remember between Iformal and hformal doctrine is that the former embodies institutionalized a d institutionally sanctioned products that give authoritative imprirnat-urto doctrine and that are disseminated officially wiChin the sewice or branch whereas the latter embodies personal ideas that others may choose to use and follow but that do not have instituli.ctnal blessing and thus are not officially disseminn.t.ed. Making the distinction betwem both types of docrtrine can be us&l in two ways. First, folding i~~furmal doctrine into the owerail allalysis of doctrine formatim helps explain the lag that- may arise between prosecuting relatively new ways of war and developing doctrirze for passing on the lessons of those new w y s . Seccmd, it contributes to an understandjng of the r o e individuals play in the development of doctrinc, particularlp f o m d doctrine, Readers will notice in the historical chapters that fnllcrw a lag between when operations are cmducted and when new training courses are created and institutionally sanctioned lessons are disseminated. Most obvious, there was a lag between all the campaigns =viewed in this book and the de\delopmmt of the Small Waus Ma~zualitself. The precise reason or reasons for the lags can only be guessed, but there are two general categories of possi:bilities. One has to do with institutional stmcture and the other with institutional visim, It takes longer for an institution to distill and dissernhate lessons than it takes for an individual to do so, As will become evident h Chapter 6, the productim oE both mphibious and small wars doctrine took almost a year fmm beginning to end, and both processes requircd knowledge able indkiduals freed from field operations to help draft the manuals. The puhlication or dissemhatlon of hformai doctrine can help fill the gap during such lags and at-times m y be drive11 by the fact that there are

such lags, Alternatively of course, the dissetnination of kfomtal doctrine may increase the lag period as senior members of the institutional.hiwarr their time to chy decide that a formal doctrine may not be needed c ~ take see that it gets do~newell. This is where institutional vision plays a role. The senior leadership may decide there is no need for change-ither because exist* doctrine already serves the new need or because the institution may soon embark on an alternative c o u r s e s o it is content to let informal doctrhe fill the intekctuai void. Such seems to have been the case for the :Marine Corps durkg a sigtnil-icant portio~nof the period mder study he=. As the following chapters discuss at length, the Marir\es through the 1920s borrowed Army small wars doctri~~e, so the i~tformaldoctrine may have been seen as a sufficient addition ta that A r l ~ ydodrine ta account for Marine experiences, Meanwhile, the senior Marine leadership s e e m d mow i n t e ~ s t e din undertaking missims more closely related to national s ~ ~ r v i vin a l the post-World War 1 period and then again in the 1930s. Thus the failure to develop formal doctrine early on-but to allow the flourishifig of infomal doctrine-may reflect a lack of strategic concern on the part of Corps leaders despite Che operational problems presetnted by each of the three cases discussed in this book-Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicarqua. Ch-te possibly sees this ~ f l e c t e dim the '%"bushf" war trainjlng schools established in each c o t ~ ~ ~and t r ythe concursclmt failure to establish such training schools in the United States. Une problem with this appmach, however, is that by failing to provide for a rczlativefy comprehensive doctrine-which the inormal doctrine most certainly was not-Marke officers wound up "reinventing the wheel'-in each of the three hswgencies thry encountered. The notion of infarxnal doctrinc also contributes to an understanding of the role that individuais and their ideas play in doctrine mal
ature (cited throughout this chapter) has t e ~ ~ d etodanalyze the dodrinal

prod~ict,and not the doch-inal pmcess that rendercd the product, when really they are inextricabIy linked. If we consider that doctrine formation cmsists of institution& learning and that learning is reprtlsetnted both in a product (something learned) and in the process that yields the product, without underthen it is difficult to understmd what caused the doctri~~e standjng how it came into being." %coznd, linking product and process adds complcxily to the understanding of d o c t b . The premium placed upon finding a single causal explanaticm (or sometimes two) for a given phenomenon can mask a more complex interaction of causes that usually mderlies the genesis and transmission of recorded ideas, such as those that doctrine embodies. Third, to "o fair, the historical record on the process behind doctrinal development is often il~complete." Archival material key to m d e r s t a n h g the relationship between proponents, authors, and ideas often simply does not exist mymore. Researchers fail to f h d archival, materials on, and thus the l;inb between, individuals and their ideas, organimtions, and the environment in which both operate. 22 This in turn creates a level-of-aggregation problem L\rhercrhy scholars posit that learni,ng takes place at h i g k r and higher levels of an institution when that simply m y not be the ease.23 One sees this problem, for example, in the few writers w h do acknowledge indit.idual contributions to doctrine making: they ascribe key roles to the gez~eralsunder whom, a doctrine was promulgated rather than digging under the surface to see if there were. mre junior officers from whose minds or pens the dodrine's tenets emerged.

What Shapes Doctrine? Prhcipally one of three approaches is taken to explajn the origin of doctrinal content. The first argues that the urtderpinnings of doctrine are stimuli external to the institution: the balance of power between nations, advances in technology, battlefield terrain or geography, budget constraints, and so m. 'Theorlttically M;hen one or a number of these change, so too will doc&jne,N'early every scholar of doctrine posi.ts that external stimdi of s o m sort underpin doctrinal change, The second approach, alcin to Gaham Atison's bureaucratic organizational model, argues that stimuli inside the inslitution hest explain the formulatiost of doctrine.24 Undrrr this approach, doctrhe changes when organizational purpose, interests, internal stntcture, or personnel chmge. The third, and hemtofore least inn,uential,, approach explains doclrjnal farm,ul&iozn in t e r m of Ihe individuals who control, the development process itself or who are civilian inter1opc.n; (generally pditicat leaders). It should be noted clearly that very few h c b i n d scholars adhere strictly to a single explanat-ion..As

will become evident from the discussion, several establish cmditions in their analysis that dZow them, for example, to point to external and intercircurnstmces, nal stimuli, depend@ u ~ c m

The Role 4 Exter~zafStin-lnIi in Shaping Doctrim The extend stimufi aMecting doctrine that- are most cjted in Che litemture are technology geography resources, and even the structure of states in the international system, with the majority of scholars suggesting that more than one mderlies change. The tec-tchnolotity adherents posit a simple relationship: Military doctrine changes as technofogy changes. :For some writers this is eitber a matter of faith or simply more. ohvious to them than their audience because they state the relationhip as fact without providing concrete exmples to prove the point." Other writers are mow specific: Major doctrinal change emanates from conventimai or nuclear technology 26 For example, Active Defense, and later Air Land Battle, had their genesis in the development of coolbined-arms warfare, made manifest by technology such as antitank weapcms and air-to-air missiles working alongside tanks and mechanized infantry,'7 Similarly, the Prussians develuped, their artillery doctrine based upon technological etries vis-8-vis the French.B Finally the development of nuclear weapolls led to changes not only in strdegic doctr.ine-that is, the turn to deterrencebut also led to changes in conventional doctrines, most visibly that associated with the Army"s Pentomic Dkision.2" Those who posit geography is a determhant of doctrine argue that military organizations seek to mitigate bntflefield threats identified with a certain type of geography (e.g., mechanized warfare. on the plains of the Cold War Centrd Front versus guarilla hvarfare in the jungles of Vietnam). The geography oi future war is identified by m mlysjs of the national security policies of a state (i.e., who it views as the likely threat), In this view, the choice of tec-tchnology is a result of doctrine not the principal input into it. Tkus doctrine is deemed to cbange with national securiy policy changes: "White the dcxltrine has been affwted by technological advances [e.g., nuclear weapons] . . . the selection of Zfie types of technology [around which doctrine w u l d be crafted] has depended on the initial decision-which was usually made outside the Army-of where a future battle might be fought.'Todrine ultimately ""depended upon the selection of the possible future battlefield and the conditions under which a battle rrtight be fought."'3"' n o s e who posit that resottrce levels (almost always budgetary levels) prirzciQaUy drive doctrinal change still only argue that they do so indi~ c t l ynnot , cfirectly Resomes affect and usually constrairt, some intermediary (e.g*,force structure or prclcztrement) that in turn affects the final

cmtent of doctrine."' How this works precisely is never quite spelled out, and the argument is difficult to counter, if d y because it says so little, The aqu"ent does, however, form a bridge between those who argue that stimuli external to an institution drive doctrinal content and those who argue that stimuli internal to the institution drive it, Those who argue that the strucbre of states in the ir-ttematicmai system drives docrrine make two asguments. Orte is that thc structure of the international system itself-the distribution of capabilities or power ammg a set of states-determfnes which cltoctrines art? adopted." Specifically, states seeking to revj,se the current b a h c e will adopt offensive doctrines whereas states embracing the status quo will adopt deknsive ones, with Germany aciduced as p r o d of the fomer and Britain and France as prod of Ihe lame" m e second strain argues that Che mu1,tiplieity of nations in the world engenders ali sorts of threats across the spectrum of connict, causirrg nations to develop different doctrines to balarsce against those threats.34 Supposedly, nuclear and counterjnszlrf~erncyductrines in particular derive from this &rent-spectrum pmblern, as natinns have been foxed away from "ccmventicmal wars of classical doctri~?e.'"3' Part of the problem with this approach is Ihat the proponents of it usually mistake doctrine for strategy They really m a n that the internatimlal system will determine a state" sirutegy. The doctrine, or how the mflitary is expecled to carry out that strategy, is left uundefjncd.

Those who posit that stimuli internal to a military institution drive the formulation cJf doctrine generally downplay the fmportance of exkmal stimuli in the formc.ttion of doctrine: "Although international variables am very innportant, it is domestic jnstituticms which are primary for understandix~gwhy general demands of the intcmational sptem are translated into a particular military doctriule.'""6lrditutions become primary because they "induce actors to pay special attention to particullar goals. They also offer a range of strategies for achieving these aims. These goals and strategies affect the way domestic actors interpret internatianiaf circumstances."~~ W t h k this appmach the arguments for determining doctrinal cmtent inferest m d organizafa11 into two overarchhg categories: organiztltk~~nl tional sfnrckrrre. The organj.zational interest adherents posit that institutions arc. fundmentally political entities in which actors make, change, or adherc. to doctrines based upon how well that doctrine helps an organization earn resources, wage a certain mission, or simply influence other organizations around it. Who the actors are matters less than the fact that the organizatio~~ overall benc.fit.s fmm their actions. The or.t;anizationd

structuralists posit that the structure of the hstitnxtio~~ (Le., h the case of military hierarchies, who controls the nature of, or movement within, that hierarchy) determines what doctrhe the instiktion will create or follow, Fhally, one n w school o( thought, not easily ca.t.egorizedwiChin Ihe above approaches, posits that doctrine is a product of institutional cull tures and of historical experiences, upon which arc. built traditions that will cause doctrine (regarding the same techolngy or form of warfare) to be different k m one military organization to another. U ~ ~ d the e r organization& interest apprcrach, t h e key desires-influence, missio~~, m d resources-form the focus in the literattrre on doctrine iormation. Of t h three, the hRuencc argument is clearly the most overarching, for one would want influence to c o r n a n d resources or dict;lte what mission one's orgmization will accept. But the question ""lfluence for what'?"' is not always answered so clearly In m e work for example, the answer is sometimes for Esourcles and other times for multiple other reasons: soldiers . . . become . . . a self-ec>nseiouscommunity tzrt-rose views of combat, doctrine, equipment, and the needs of the services are culored by their identification with tanks, and by their sense of competitim with every other community tzrithin an army, almost always for inauence, but also for funds, prestige, career opportunities, and the simple satisfaction of "winning."38

A fear of being left out of the core mission is the thesis of the second organizational interest approach-the mission argument. In this line of thought, ixrstit.utions develop doctrhes that prwid.e justification for assuming certaill missions, even to the extent of sacrgichg needed capabilities. .hkey example cited as supportin$ evidence is the Army's fr-tilzrrtilto adopt counterinsurgency measures to fight in Vietnm. hstead., the Army focused on competing with thr Air Force and Navy for the right to fight the Soviets on the Celltrizl Front: "Since the Army was struggling against the Navy and Air Force to be part of the 'big war' that defined the most impmtant strategy-naticmal defense-it &opted the tactics appropriate for the type of war in Vietnm becarnse its eyes were always on the bigger pj.cture."'"" The third organizational interest approach, the resource arglxment, posits that military thinkers develop doctrine as a way of controlling resources or redirectin.g resource allocation: "We should anticipate, then, that each military organization will innovate only if the speeific changes wil) benefit them im their struggle with the other service branches over their share of the miljtary budget."'"%Again, an exmplc here is the Army" failure to adopt counterinsurgency hVietnam: Innovation in counterinsurgency did not cater to the short-term budgetary

interests of the services. Another example is Gen. DePuy'S dde~relopment

of Active Defense as a means for (depending on who is arguing) either dtrfeneiing the Army's budget or increasing Rsourtles for the armored branch of the A r l ~ ywhile diminishing the resources de~rotedto the inh t r y and artillery.41 Note that the resource argument here is different in a key way from the =source argulnernt discussed in the secgm h o v e on external stirnulj. Namely, =source levels above were considered a determinmt of doctrinal content. Here, doctrine is mmipu1"te"lo cmtrol resource levels. In the construd of strict social science, proponerds of the argumcnt that external stimuli underpin doctrinal formulation = g a d resources as the indepmtfent variable and doctrine the liependent one. The organizational hterest approach posits exactly the opposite. NaturalXy one can envision a circdar argument emerging betwem the two schooIs, Similar to the organjzaticrnal interest apyroa", the organizational structure approach in the doctrinal literature treats military orgarrizations as polities in which members exercise influence over mother. However, structuralists are iIlclined to refine the argummt to rt?flect the fact that militaries are strict hierarchies. The ability to inRztelnce is dictated by access to power, which ma)i hdicate service leadership, school or trahing leadership, or those who controt the promotion syskm. The prirnary proponent of Phe structwalist approach couchcs Che importance of external realities in terms of the organization" promotional stmcturc: "Peaceovation may be explainable in terms of how well military communities eval~~ate the future character of war, and how they effect change in the senior officer corps."U Even where there is military gmius, access to the service leaders is rc.quirt.d in order to translate ideas into institutional actiorr.43 .A related view focuses u p m the requirement for organizatimlal consensus within a service that doctrhai change is =quired. Although external pressures may set the stage fnr doctrinal change, this school of thought emphasizes the development of the "milit.avFscyclical instikrtional learning process in respmding to thcrse ct,nditions."JJ By focusing on the roles of institutional rnernory in learning and m the fact that "institutional m e m r y is what old members of an organization know and what new members must learn through a process of sociatization," this view implies an organizatimal structural.ist argument, though Merent from fiosen". T h i s is confirmed by the achowledgment that "the organi.zatic,n%social structure and shifts in pditicat power among members withh an organization determhe whose individual learniing matters"An individual may not have the power, position, or influence in tbe organization to ensure that his individual learning resutts in changes to an organization" institutional rnernorytM";f Though this particular approach

best rnelds extenlal and ims.t.tutional factors to explain why doctrine chaizges, it does not explah why the doctrine actually looks the way it does. :Nor does it attempt to explaifi how much consensus is needed, m among k l r h o r n , for doctrine to changeeJ:b Finally the notion of ""culture" and. "kadition" is at the heart of the last organizational approach to explainjl~gdoctrinal ovation and change. This approach argues that although external factors play a role in doctrhe making, the culture or tradition of an institution makes it susceptirapidly and, by implication, ble to incorporating certain types of doctri~~e not others. By "cmlture" is meant a "set of basic assumptions and values that shape shared understmdings, and the forms or practices whereby these meanings artl exp~ssed,affirmed, and communicated to the members of an organization.'""7y "tradition" is meant "a set of values, attitudes, teachings and techni.ques passed duwn from one gmeratim to the nertC."" K e notion here is that the real world may imphge on mibary ideation but that the organization's interprebtianal "vision fiters" determine what part of the environment is acted upon: "Whik the peculiarities of geography and stratregic position played [A mle . . . the greatest inRuezzce on how an army received quick-fiiring artaery was internal-the result of the hterplay between new ideas and pre-existing doctrine."dg Tl~enotion of culwal drivers of dcrctrim is comparatively better derel loped in the political science literature on strategy and military pawer than it is on doctrine.?%fndeed, itiis new to the literature on doctrine per se and as such does not yet addrttss the basic frustrations raised by Johnston concerning where preferences come from, how are they ranked, and the level of vagueness about culture" relationship to cbojcc, that is, about what cuiture does in a behavioral sense.%One cannot help but notice, however, that contemporary arg~~znezlts about culture and tradition carry strong underlying currents of individuaf role and choice in propac ethe core of the cultural gating the tenets of culture, particularly s i ~ ~at argulnents, organizations are still supposedly influenced by external considerations.'2 The Role of Ifzditlideanls in Slzirpi~gDoctrine

Scholars of doctrine formation generdy place comparatively tittle emphasis upon the role ol incfividuals in the post-Wrld War II pesiod.53 hstead, some writers make the mistake of mthropomorphizixlg states or organizations as though they were ~sponsiblefor inkrpreting their enviz mn,ment,54 When was the last time a state or an ~ " " i z a t i o ~interp~ted somth-ing? They do not-indivjbuals do.. That fact has given rise in the literature to a form of copitive comp"rZmenta1izatimProponents arguing o r the primacy of stimuli external or j17temd to the bureaucracy are

increasingly making oblique references to important roles individuals can play.TU811 of these d e s tend, though, to fall within one of four categmies associated with what one could call a ""greatman""school: civilian intervener, military leader (near or at the top of his service Inierarchy), military maverick, m d military genius, The civilian Fntervener has received the most discussion in the relatively recent literature, mostly because Posen" work is one of the s e ~ ~ h a l mechanism of civilim intervention supposedy works on doctrine,'"e works this way: Civilians intervene in d i t a r y organizations during peacetime because they fear the c u r r e ~military ~t doctrixle does not meet the needs of national strategy" The military, in other words, is on a course for hture disaster or defeat. Civilian leaders avert that fate by setting the plilical parameters withh which the military est;xblishme& has to operate, and. this political environment provides the philosophical backdrop that allows or inhibib doctrinal innwation. A classic example cited is Hitler's planned aggressicm against his neighborhg countries while faced with the constraint of a possible two-front wm58 The opposite of aggression, fear, also motivated other leaders to intervene in their military doctrines as ~ 1 1 . ~ 9 "Military maverick" is the label given to offjeerswho do not have the rank wit;hin their service to effect chmge directly but who seek nonetheven at t-he expense of their careers. The classic exarnplc is . Billy Mitchell, a strong proponent of air power who put his beliefs about its efficacy to fie test in 3921 (admittedly within parameters likely to highlight success over failure) by having anchored ships bombed from the air. A key notion about why mavericks lead doctrinal change is starkty simplistic: "Due to their parochial inte~sts,a group of 9rviees cannot create militmy doctrine on their own,"m Xnstead, the details of doctrirre formation and operational innovation are left to mavericks within militirry organizations, presumably because they either see the wed for change morc clearly or because they are apolitical creatures out of step with their service leadership. The opposite of tbe maverick would be fie rnilitary leader who does have the rank, and therebre power, to effect doctrinal cihange. The argument here is that althou* the power of an idea may be determined by fie character of the man who holds it, fie outcome af the bureaucratic struggle around that idea hhges on who is doing the struggling.61 M o ever is doing the struggling must have the power to do it successfu)ly and fierefore must be a leader. Doctrinal change is thus associated cornpletely wi& top-down djrectim and will be based upon the prekrclnces and preconceptions-like Stalin and. his ""permanently operati tors,'Ton 5eekt m d panzer warfare, m d DePuy and Active Ue whoever is doing the leading." Fmom time to time thcre will be majors

and captains who physically write the doctrinel but they are generally treated in the literature as mere scribes.63 The final role accorded to individuals in the literature is that af the "military genitas*'"is is the individual to whom credit is give11 for the intellectual genesis of a certairr doctrine. Capt. Ear1 Ellis, the progmitor of amphibious warfare, is a classic example of such an individual.64 British air chief Marshal Hugh Trenchard might be co~~sidered mo&er.b5 With the ad.vent of nuclear weapons, the notiovl of the doctrinal gcrnius has been expmded to include civilians such as Bemard Brodie, Mbert Whlstetter, H e r m n K h n , and Coln Gray' who, d u ~ i n gthe Cofd Wr, provided the irrtekctual genesis for nuckllar doctrines. The four categories of "great men" aside, throughout the literaturt. on modern doctrine making, no attention is give11 to the comparatively ordinary individual who by dint of expertise is granted the authority to creak doctrine.& 'This indhidual is cctrtaillty not a civifian. He is not a maverick borrowing doctrine from others or bucking political, authority in the institution. One might be tempted to call him a genius, but that need not be the case. (fndeed, one often finds the term genizds associated with individuals who create doctrine based upon a prospective vision of warfase, not a retrospective a d y s i s of actual experience as is the case in this study.) Finab, the individual is not necessarity a Leader or in the top ranks of"his service. Instead, one might tbnk of him as a promoter of change: one who is a recognized au&ority on a particdar form. of ~tarfarcoand who therefore is given the apportufiity to create or change doctrine. If one were to label this type of i.ndividual, one might call him the ""expert," 'The expert may still be subject to the whims of superiors who can accept or reject his doctrinal promulgations, and so in that sense may be beholden to the military leadcr role &cussed above, Or the expert may sway the opinion of enough of his peers to make his arguments take on an importace the leadership simply cannot ignore. In a way, tthis appmch compases with the cdtural arguments: Both focus to a cltegree on change within organizatims that does not originate with the leadership. 'The cultural. argument, by focusing upon notions of shared assumptions, decision d e s , and values tries to establish the constraints on change ksm b&w and even withill the rnilitary leaderdip. The argument for the individzaal's mle here is differcnt in that it focuses on opportunity rather than constraint in doctrine making. In this it is consisknt with a r g u m t s in the c q o r a t e lea g literabre that focus on ""chan?pictnsof learning" at mrrltiple levels of an organizdion to exptain instances of organizational learning." This approach is not meant to be the antithesis of, say, the organizaticmal stmcturalist and the "great man" arguments (since learning can occur at multipite levels), but it cer-

tahly cmtrasts with those in a way that s~~ggests that alternative forces can influence the formulation of doctrinal products. It should not be surprising that the change in the cases here cclmes from the lower and midgrade officers. As Figure 1.1shows, roughly onethird of Marine ofiicers were deployed in each of the three s m l l wars between 1915 and 1933, usually distributed evenly acmss the ranks. As t-he follokving chapters will illustrate, thc nature of garrisoning in-country meant that the preponderant amount of field work fell on the captains and lieutenants. They werl, at the front lines of the fight and of t-he learning curve, wljch shows in the ranks crl rhose who prodwed the hformal, and later Lformal, doctrhe. Lewitt and March assert that tbc.conserva~onof experience is importmt to the success of learnhg: "Unless I.he implicatiws of expaience can be transfened from those who experienced it to those who did, not, the lessms of history are likety to be lost through turnover of persomel."@That s e m s a commonsellse position, and one that did not escape some of the same oEicers who wen. h positictns of tead-ring authorilty later. 'They imparted their howledge and experkace to a growing officer corps (that hipled in slze betwee11 1915 and 1920), as the discussion ifi Chapter 5 hightights.

Focusing on.the Process as Opposed to the Product Thinking about the process, as opposed to product, of doctrine making seems to be a post-World War :IIphenomenon. Morltower, little of the discussion on process focuses on the prewar period, despite the fact that there is literature on the doctrizlal product that focuses on th prewar and intrawar periocls. By far the m;ljority of the literature sfmply provides brief snapshots of how the process is organizccf at various times within the irtstitution or criticizes a particular institution" ((e.g.. the Armfs) prwess as it stands at that point in t h e . As one might expect, the Iiterature on process is dominat-ed altnost exclusively by military writers (who have a closer proximity to th process) writing for a peer audience via, the professional military joumds. m i n h g on dlxtrh~alprncess ill the United Staks tmds to falf wi&hz three categories: (1) historical discussion of the indkiduai process that dominated efoctrine development before Wortd W a E, (2) historical discussion of the cornmince process that. postdates the period of:individual &minance, which evolved durhg the latter nineteenth century, and generally lasted until Mi'orld War 11, and (3) contempctrq disctrssim of institutional bt~rea~cratic processes that foltowed the committee appmach (e.g., which offices participate what is the trail of information through the organization, etc.). This last category prtrdominates over the other two in t-he doctrinal litecah.lre. Intercslingly, there is xninhaX discnnssion of the interactio~l

FIGURE: 1.1 Pefcent-ageof Officms in S m l t Wars, f 915-2935

sou~cr-: Navy Deparhnent, Register of the Cornlnissioned and Warrant Oficcrs of tile Uilited States Nar,y and Man'nc Colps (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, various years, 1915-1940)

between the official processes and ideas espoused in foreign doctrine; yet it is clear from reading the military journals throughout the twentieth century that officers read from foreign sources, and the journals themselves often trmdated or LE arized foreign thinking on a myriad of topics. The discussions of individual and committee processes tend to be descriptive of the nineteenth century, when the formulation of doctrinealmost aU of it taetieai doctrine like Emory Upton's f~$anirry7i3cfics-was a privatized affair. Generally, these historical discussions of process are divorced from the actual doctrines developed. A key exception is Herbert's work analyzing the formation of Active Defense and Air-Land Battle in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Herbert demonstrates how the doctrinal product of Active Defense is best understood within the context of DePuy's running the formal process himself.6We also describes the bureaucratic approach insome detail.70 Discussion of newer bureaucratic processes also tends to be descriptive and divorced from particular doctrinal products created. The basic doctrine-producing process is recognizable from presentation to presentation, but responsibility within a given service clearly shifts from office to office through time. For example, within the Army during the twentieth century, doctrinal responsibility has fallen to the General Staff, the

brmch schools, the A r l ~ yWar College, the Command and General Staff Cdlege (as opposed to the General Staff itself), the Concept Development Center, and the Training a d Doctrine Command (TRADOC), to name just a few? The Marine corps has shown a bit more stability in this regard., generally keeping doctrine development associated with the Marine Corps S c h o o l s n i e r s i t , although respmsibility has shifted to various offices, like Concepts, Doctrine and Studies Activity ((I:mA).72 Constant reorganization of doctrine control, has generated criticism that generally shows a more ad hoc doctrine-mahg process at work than one might expect in an organization with well-defhled hierarchies and responsibilities." Sometimes doctrine seems a by-product of instruction, even when an ordered process [email protected] times, turmoil is m a s k d by the ordered facade of delineated responsibilities within a bureaucracy7Vor instance, not enough personnel may be ass i p e d to accomplish the work-load ina timely fashiar\, or they may be inexperienced jn dclctrinal matters.%This in turn causes a lack of timelhess that renders the final product obsolete. Alternativelqi, time delays may cause multiple people to be assigned the sarne project because their tours of duty rotate them through the doctrine office too wickly. This can lead to further delays as new personnel get up to speed on the project dumped in their lap. Worse, it can lead to frequent changes in the evolution of the doctrinal produd as new personnel,irnpose their own views (a "my way" ssyndrome).m Finally the pmess might work as it is supgosed to but is deeply fliiwed. For example, the process may be too cumbcrsome, causing the same time delay problems j ~ ~discussed. st Ch the more mundane side, multiple peer and superior reviews may cause conRicting points of view to be concealed rather tban expmed: "Efforts to gain cornplete agreeme~~t or prescribe a single solution usually lead to vague ge13eralitjes that c m be accepted by all parties."yg All these criticisms underscore MIhy this study emphasizes that the product and process of doctrine maki.ng are best understood together, not separately. The process may look neat, but it is not necessarily so. This makes tracing doctrinai development alZ the mom difficult, but that difficulty should not cause the et-fort to be swept aside. In tracing the process, one can sometimes hd-even within the context of environmental and organizational ccmstraints-individd who have exercised their ability to influence the contelzt of the product. A Process for Irrfoma2 Versus Formal Doctrine Making

Military officers writing about the hctrirzal process focus almost exclusively on the formal, i~~stitutionalized mechanisms of the doctrinal process. None of them discusses an informal part of the process in which they unwittingly take part: use of the military journals to spread new

ideas among their peers, As the followhg chapters will de~nonstrate, however, focusing on the institutionalized doctrirral processes done can cause one to miss part of the evolution of doctrine, particularly for the period examined i,n this study, wherc. the doctrind process, &though bu~aucratized,was not as elaborate or as long as it seems today The infomal doctrine process ultimately involves the dissemination of new ideas to the officer corps, 'The m c h a n i s m of disse~ninationare twofold. The most obvious is through personal contact. Officers can s p r e d their ideas durhg thcir interartions, verbal or written, with Other officers. tlnfortunat-ely, no real records exist to show an oral process at work during the period studid here.;""On the written side, these is only sparse discussion of doctrine matters overall, but it demonstrates well the informal process at work, The second mee:hanism of infctrrnal doctrine trmsmission is the writing of monographs on doctrinal topics. Generally one associates this mechanism with published articles, almost a l w v in the military journals. Far the period mdes review though, mother form of monograph that is irmportant is the student paper. Writing to fdfill classroom requirements, officers sometimes took the initiative to solve battlefield problems in unique ways or to codify ad hoc processes that they saw worked well in the field. These papers wese ofkn collected into files that rczmained open for other ogicers (mostly sbdmt-officers) to peruse. Occasio~~atSy thcy we= even published by the military journals. Collecting student papers for others to read can blur the distinction between informal and formal prclcesses. One could argue that at that point the institutio~~ is sanctiming the information embodied in Chose papers for others to learn. The same can be said of when a particular service uses a rnilitary journd to espouse a point of view to its off-icercmps or to provide lessons on a pmticular topic in lieu of f o r d doctrine." ActualJy, both of these situatims can be importmt parts of the infomal processaimost an evoluticlnary step between the informal and formal product that evenbally emerges. To distinguish them from the morc3 common articles or less common written exchmges that did not have any institutional hnprimatur, they are referred to herein as "officially sanctioned informal doctrine." Note that they are still considered informal, to distinguish them from the formal pmccss initiated by the institution to create an officiat etoctrine that is taught in the schods and published in manual form for all officers to use.

Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua: Why These Cases? In the space of less than two decades (4915-1932) the Marines fought three smnll wars that formed the practical basis for the doctrille that

emerged durhg and at the end of that two-decade period, Moreover, that doctrine represents learnhg that was instilled in the Carps and disseminated from junior officers informally through articles and monqraphs and formally thsougb official. Marine Corps Headquarters processesThat doctrine did not result from the imposition or sponsorship of elre senior service leaders as, say, UePuy"s Active Defense did, although organizational structuralists rightly will, be able to p i n t to at least one active participant near the top of the Marine leadership, and ultimately Corps commander's passive acyufescence, in the promulgation of the find product. Simultaneously, the period under study here shows the instit.utionalization of bureaucratic prwesses for making dwtrine. Yet the impetudor creating the Sttlall Wars Mknrlal ws guided by a few key indjviduals below the. senior leadership, The draftirrg of both editions of the Small ivfu~zziralwas accompfi"ed by officers whose etiperience gave them the credii3iilitly"to accomplish the task and whosc ideas can be traced through informal doctrine to detcrmhe their role in shaping the final doctrine. In this the cases that follow, taken together, pmvide uncommcm archival evidence to discern the role of individuals in the doctrhe m a b g process. :Not often in the literature on war (particdarly small. wars) and organizations can m e trace what an organization thought it learned frorn its okvn expe"ence"Ehc. way the followjng chapters do, Indwd, the opposite usually applies. One set of the work done on small wars tends to be straight histary, written as much to capturt- history readers as to analyze s o m particu,lar facets of a particular struggle." lsecond set of"the s~nall wars literature anaIyzes or stakes out a pofitkaX position for or against U.S. intervention policy without focusing per se upon lessons learned.82 A third set approaches s~nallwars from the guerrillas' perspetive, trying to understmd this type of war in light of political theory, such as Maoist rewolutionary theory.8" fourth set of small wars titeraturt, examines what d i t a r y inslitutions, American or foreign, may have to learn fram their own and others' experiences.%I say ""nna)imbecause, in the absence of studying the doctritle process, learning is inferrcsd from malyzing successive actions. In rare instances, bits and pieces of informal doctrjne may infom that ml;sis, but a systematic study of doctrine is absent.8" Method and Qqanization

In ~ a l i t y inferring learning from action and subsequent rmctions has its place hercz as well-but. with the unfolding doctrinai process included so that one can measure how well action and idea dovetail or deviate. h that vein, I have undertaken essentiaily a longitudinal study of an organization in the midst of leming how to fight a particular form of war-

.fare The m t e r i d lends itself best to a historical approach: I use a rough chronologiral organization both to let the rcladcr decide on the relationship between action a d words and because the cases themselves fctllow each other in time (wi& some overlap between Haiti and the Dominican Republic). 'The chapters that foilow are not simply a history of the Marine small wars carrtpaig~~s per seeHowever, because no one has analyzed the Haitian and Nicaragum campaigs adequately m d because I have some difference of interptation with the sole c m p a i p history on the Dominican Republic, this book chronicles the Marine effctrts in each country. Without recourse to literary citations, this was the only way I c o d d demonstrate the basis for the doctrinal thoughts that follow. It was also the best way to show the links, where they existed, between campaigns, the ideas that followed, and the subsequent responses during the next campafgn. In the process, the links between ideas and ineiividuals become clearer as well. Since a central thesis of this study is that the Marhes developed their small wars doctrine based upon learning f r w liirect experience, Chapter 2 lays out some institutional background to show where early Marine doctrine c a m from. (the Army" small wars experience) and to show how the Marines developed their own institutional structures for creating their own doctrhe later. Chapter 2 ends with the htellectual overlaythe hformal and formal doctrhal tenets-relevant to the Marineskentering Hafti in 1915. Chapter 3 opens with an analysls of tbe Haitian campaigns to see how they unfolded, drawi.ng out where they did and did not adhere to any z"eZevmt doctri;ne, and closes with a discussion of the ideas anci training that emerged during and after the Haitian expcrlrience. Chapter 4 follows the same format for the Damhican. Republic, showkg the evident (and nut so evident) impxt of the Haitian experience on the Dominican intervention. Chapter 5 does the same for Nicaragua, Slnce Nicaragm is the last of the Marine mal w s before m r l d War 11, Chapter 6 focuses exclusively upon the period after Nicaragua: the renaissance of Marine intellectual thought on doctrine leading to the pmduction of the Small Wurs Manual in 1935 and again i,n 19.10. Chapter 7 afkrs some concluding thoughts and, in the process, highlights how a completely diff'eent set of literature on corporate learning provides observations that confirm the approach taken in this study. Notes 1. United States Marine Corps, Srnnfl W ~ r Manual s (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps %hoots, 1940; reprint, Manhattan, K% Sunflower Univ. Press, 19871, p. 1-2. This editicjn is the t~ersionused for the remainder of the study

2. Ibid., p. l -l. 3, Editorial, I~Zfnntjyjournal, vol. 9, no, 2 (Sept.-Oct. 1912), p. 257. The editors apparently believed the General Staff had a tendency to borrow doctrine from other nations. They assailed such borrowing because of diffewnt "national rharacteristics," "habits of thought," and ""hstorical development" k w e e n nations. They alw attacked the General Staff fctr producing nc, histories of Army exploits, for not having studied the Army" own history, and, finally, for not having a historical office to perform such studies. 4. Comdr. Budley W. b o x , ""The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare," '.S. Ma.r?nlI ~ z ~ f C C t d f Proceedings, t? VOX. "2, no. 2 (Mar.-Apr. 1915), p. 327. 5, hiraj, John 1-1, Russetl, "A Plea for a Mission," m r i t z e Corps Cazetde; vol. I, no. 2 (June 1(316), p. 115. See also the responses to RusseXlls article published in the same issue as well as further cmtributions to the debate in Nlnri~zeCorps Gazeftep vol. 1, no. 3 (Sept. 1916) and vol. 2, no. 4 (Dec. 1916). 6. Russell, "Plea for a Mission," p. 115; n/Jnrin~Corps Gazette, vol. 1, no. 3 (Sept. 1915) and vol. 2, no. 4 (Dec. 1916). '7. Russell, "Plea for a Mission," p. 115; Marir-zc Corps CazeCfe,vol. 1, no. 3 (Sept. 1915) and vol. 2, no. 4 (Dec. 1916). 8. Russell, "Plea for a Mission," p. 115; Marir-zc Corps CazeCfe,vol. 1, no. 3 (Sept. 4946) and vol. I, no. 4 (Dec. 1916). 9. The doctrine Esrrmulation prc>cessRussefl referred to will be discussed at the begiming of Chapter 2. 10, Maj. T, H. Low, *'Biscussim on a Plea for a Missian and Dactrinerf' lLlnri~ze Corps Gazetfe, vol. 1, no. 3 (Sept. 1916), p. 334. 21, Lt. Col. John "I" Myers, 'Discussion on a Plea for a Missian and Doctrine,'' M~rz'zzeCOTS Casedfe,vol. 1, no. 2 (June 1916), p. 196. 22. Capt. Earl Ellis, "Discussion on a Plea for a Mission and Doctrine," Mrvlnri~ze Co~psCazefte, VC$. 1, no. 2 (June 191G), g. 197. 13. Lt. Cot, P-ijalmar Ericksan, ""P>rctrinesand Principles of War," Infalilt9 lour~ a lvol. , 22, no. 1 (Jan. 15224), pp, 47-49. 14, Cf. Brig. Gen. Dale Q. Smith, US Militra~yhet-rinc: A S t ~ i d ya~zdAppraisal (Boston: Little, Brown, 1955), p. 8; Paul R, Viotti, ""ftraduction: Military Doctrinep'" in Compnradi.ere Defe~zscP"oIZIC;Y,ed, Frank B. P-iclrton Ill, Anthany C. Ragersort, and Edwad L. Warner IIl (Baltimore: J o h s Hopkins Univ. Press, 1974), p- 2 90; Barry R. Pc>sen, 5rhc Sources oJ^Milz'fayDocFri~c(Xthaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 198111, p. '7; Maj. W y n e M, Halep ""A Critique of the Uoctrine-l'raining Fit," MIllilita~yReview, vol. 65, no. 6 (June 1985), pp, 32-33; Kevin P. Shehan, "fieparing for an Imaginary War? Examining Peacetime, Functions and Changes crf Army Doctrine" (l3h.D. dissertation, Halvard Univ., 19881, p. 1; Stephen E Rssen, Wilzning the Riaf War: lnlzovntiolz alzd the ModetanMiliday (Ithaca: Cornell Linillz Press' 19911, p. 7, 15. Gen. DePuy was head of the Ammy" Training and Doctrine Command (TMDQC) in the 1970s and the principal intellectual force behind the production of the 1976 edition of FM10Q-5: Bperafbns, which introduced the doctrine called ""Active Deknse." Lt. Gen. John Gushman was the commandant of Combined Arms Command whom BePuy froze out of the doctrinal process because of their intellectual differences cwer both the cmtent and the process of creating the 1976 FMIUO-5.

16. Paul Hehert, "Toward the Best Available Thought: The Writing of Field Manual 100-5, 'Operatiom%by the Uni"EeQs a t e s Army, 19m-76" (P1-i.D. diswrtation, Ohio State Univ., 19851, pp, 122-123. Herbert. d i s c u s ~ In s more detail the intellechal differences between DeFuy and CuAman in chapter 5 of his diswrtatic~n. 17. For sources more in line with De13uy%view of doctrine as "innstructions,'" see Ericksan, "Dc~ctri~les and Principles,"". 49; Maj. E, 5. Johnstom, "Eield Seivice Regulations of the Future," MMI'lita~y Reviewt vol. 16, no. 61 (June 1936), p. 10; Col. FT. W. Ffolden, ""7-he Mission of the AAF klnoot of Applied Tactics," Militafy Reviei-u,vol. 24, no. 7 (Oct. 19&), n.p.; Maj. Gen. I. B, Holley, ""The Doctrinal Process: Some Suggested Steps," Mililally Review, VOX.. 59, no. 4 (Apr. 1"39), p. 4; Huba Wass de Czega, "The Military Refclrm Debate," paper presented at the 20th USMA Senior Conference f0Tc>warda New American Apprc3ach to Warfaretr), West Point, NI',1982, pp, 47-48. For saurces more in line with Cushman" view see Mnox, ""Te Role of Doctrine," p 883; Russell, ""Pea far a Mission," p 1115; Maj. J C I Greenwood, ~ "Tl-ioraghts an Dc>ctrine,"Wari-kril.le Corps Gazette, vol. 4 7 no. 11 (Nov. 1963), pp. 40-43; Timothy X Lupfer, Tfze Dynnnrr'es of Doctrine: The Cl~fzges ir-z Ccrnzan Taeficaf Ilaelrir-zcDuring WurM Wm I, Il,eavenwc)rth Papers, no. 4 (Fort Leavenworth, KK U.S. Army Command and Gmeral Staff College;?, 1981), p. vii; Gen. Gc3rdon R. Strllivan, "Ddrine: A Guide to the Future," Military Review, vol. 7 2 , no. 2 (Feb. 1992), p, 4. Hereafter, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College is cited as USACGSC. 18. Cf. Diclionary of- U.S. Arfny Terms, "Army Regulations 320-5, Change #l" (Washington, BC: Department of the Army, 1%3), p. 146, 19, Edwin C. Nevis, Anthorty J, DiBella, and Janet M. Could, ""Understanding Organizations as Learning Systems," 9~1rrnlzMannge~rzentReview, vol. 36, no, 2 (Winter 13951, p. 75, 20. Chris Argyris and Banald Schiin, Organizalz'onnlLer;lr~ingX:I Theo~y~ Metltod, and Prnelice (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 19961, p. 3. 21. A classic example af this results frc~mthe Army" '"ten-year rule" tzrhereby up to the middle of the Wentlieth century; material over ten years old was dispc~sedof because it tzras thought to be outdated and therefore useless. A different example is prwided by the Corps itself, which in its zeal to give students unfettered access tc~ideas, maintained an open-shelf, library-like system that altawed papers and manuals to disappear over the decades. 22. Thus Stephen Rosen's caution about, and Alastair Johnston" acknowledgment of, the practical difficulties of determining what people think or thou@~tin the absence of a solid paper trail of their ideas. Stephen F" Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," Intenzatio~zatSec~rrify,vol. 19, na. 4 (Spring 19f)5), g. 14; Alastajr 1. Jclhston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," hternnfional Securily, vol. 19, no. 4 (Spring 1%5), pp. 32-64 23. Argyris and ScihGn, Qrganiza timznl Lear~i~zg II, p. 190. 24. Graham T, Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cubn~Missile Crisis (Bostm: Little, Brown, 1971), chaps. 3,s. 25. Col. Victor W Hobson Jr. and Col. OIiver G. Kinney ""Keeping Pace with the Future: Development of Doctrine at the US Army Command and General Staff CoXIege," Military Review, vol. 37, no. 8 (Nov. 1957), p. 10; Sullivan, "Doctrinc;,"". 4.

26. Smith, US Mitl'fn~yDoctrine, chap. 5. 27. Herbert, "Best Available Thought," pp. 140-420; Sheehan, "Imaginary War?" ppgp. 357,359. 28. Bruce Cudmrmdsson, On Artilleq (Westport, CT: Praegel; 19931, chap. 4. 29. Arnold L. Horelick, ""Perspectives on the Study of Comparative Military Doctrine," in Cumpnrative Defense Policy, ed. Frank B. P-icyrton 111, Anthany C. Rogerson, and Edward L. VVarner IXI (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1974). 30. Maj. Robert Doughty The Etlolutl'on c?f UsS.Anrzy Tactical DBocfrine, 2946-76, Leavenworth Papers, no. 1 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, 1979), p. 47. 34. Maj. Terrence P! Murray ""Etablishing Force Structure and Doctrine,," m r i n e Cstps Gazefte, VOX. 67, no. 9 (Sept. 19831, pp. 6041; Sullivan, "Dwtrine,'' p. 7; SheeI-tan, "Imaginary War?" p. 3355; Eclward BlankenLEagen, "Organizational Learning in the Development of Doctrine in the U.S. Army, 2976-1986: A Historically Based Study" (PhD. ditisedation, George Wmhington Univ., 19941, pp.92-95, 32. Posen, 5otirces of MI'lifa~yDoctrine, pp. 22&-231. 33. Ibid., pp. 47-50,228-236; Barry R. Ps>sen,review of Milir5trry Itzno-r?afionir-z kll~ Interwar Period: ed, WiIliarnson Murray and Allan Millett, Stmtegic Reviezu (Winter 1997, pp. f;;?--C;IC;. 34. E%arelick,"Perspectives," p. 494. 35.Ibid. 36. Debarah D, Avant, "The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: The United States in Vietnam and Britain in the Bmr War and Malaya" [Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. oaf Calift~mia-San Diego, 1994), p. I . 37. Ibid., p. 4. 38. Maj. Paul FT. FTerbert, Deciding W z n f Has E.0 Be Done: General William E. DePuy alzd trite 2976 Edition I?f' FM 200-5, i,perr;rticlns, Leavenworth Papers, no. 16 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USAGGX, 19881, p. 101. Tbc Army a~zd 39, Avant, ""lnstutitional Sources," p 26; Andrew Krepine~ich~ Vieinant (Baltimore: Johns Flclrpkins Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 7,21'7,2@3. 40. Avant, "Institutional Sosxrces,;,"~. 209. 41. Herbert, ""Bst Available Thought," pp. 183, 240; and n. 236, n. 238; SheeI-tan, ""Iaginary War?" p abstract. 42. Rosen, Winlzi~zgtrlte Next War, p. 52. 43. Bid., p. 66. Indeed, Rosen has stated that an entirely new generation of officers may have to come to power in their particular branch or service befitre difficuft innovations are implemented. Stephen P. Rosen, Net Assessment Summer Study Sc3ssion discussion, Aug. 1994. 44. Richard Duncan Downie, Le~rnl'zzgfrom Cun,flicC: Tlze US. Mililfnzy in Vietnam, EE Salvador, and f.l?ieDrz~gWar (Wesport, C??:Praeger, 1998), p. 5. 45. Ibid., pp. 25,35,36,272,279,237, 46. Ibid., pp, 23-25, 47- Elizabeth Mier, *'Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars,'" Tnfernational Security, vol. 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995), p. '70. For a similar definition of culture, see Johnston, ""7linking About Strategic Cuf ture," p.45. 48. Bruce Gudmundsson, "Maneuver Warfare: The German Tradition," in inte Mntzeziver Wafare Debntl~,ed. Richard Hooker (Novato, CA: Presidict, 49942, p. 2.

Tenrzs of Art Since traditions are considered a bedrc~ckof culture, changing traditions results in changing culture as tzreJ1. Far the purposes of this book, the two concepts are used similarly enough that they may be treated as the same. 49. Gudmrmdsson, On Artillerpp p, 1. Examples given to suppart the cultural approach come from several different cases of the French and German armies. See Kieq ""Culture and Military Doctrine," pp, 65-66, an8 Gudmrmdssan, On Artillery, pp. 2,4, for ovemiews of the aampXc3fi. 50. Rosen, Winning the Next War. Barry R. Pcfsen, Kier, and others seem to confuse strategy with doctrine, which is easy to do at that XeveX because what little strategic doctrine exists (e.g., the SingXe Integrated Operations Plan and asso>ciated documents) is often rmavailable to the academic commrmity. 51. Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," p. 444. 52, Ker, "Cufture and Military Doctrine," p. 81. 53. This contrasts markedly with studies of doctrine formation before the rise of bureaucracies, that is, befow the turn of the twentieth century This study focuses on the unique period during the rise and strengthenkg of the Marine Corps bum reaucnlcy and touches on the Army during the same period In its history 54. Cf. Posen, Sources $Militnty Doctrirze, p. 39: ""States and military organizations are responsible for interpreting new mititar)~technology and responding to geographic constraints and opportunities." 55. Note that the proponents of the primacy of internal stimuli rarefy, if ever, consider individuals as one of the internal stimuli tcr take into account. Instead, arguments about structure, resources, and so on predominate in the literature on doctrine making. with doctrine, 56. However, as pointed out earlier, Posen confuses stratef;~" 57. Posen, Sources of Military DoeCrir-213;pp,53-54, 58. Ibid., p. 75. 59, Ibid., pp. 75-78. 60. Ibid., p. 159, 61. Herbert, ''Best Available Thought," p. 9. 62. Benjamen S. Lambeth, "The %)urces of Soviet Military Doctrine," in Comp~rntiueDefe~sclPolicy, ed. Frank B, f-lorton 111, Anthony C, Ragerson, and Edward L. W r n e r III (Baltimore: Johns P-iopkins Univ. Press, 1974), p- 211; Sheehan, "Imaginary Mlar?" pp. 3 4 6 3 7 ; Lupfer, 'The Dynamics of Doctrine, p. 21; Hehert; Tames S. Gorum, Tlzc Roots r;?fBfitzkuieg:Han zlon Se&t alzd German Mz'll'fa~yReforurl (Lawrence: Univ. 13ressof Kansas, 1992). 63. Hehert, Decidirzg Whal I-Im to Bc Dane, p. 87. 64. Rc~sen,pp. 6647, pp. 132-135. 65. Smith, US Milita~yIdoctri~ze~ 66. "Modern" refers to the period from the prc~fessionalizatiort of the Army and Marine Corps to the presrznt, when individuals like Upton, Waper, and Smith no longer published their own tzrritings for purchase by the military servicm, 67. Cf. Argyris and &hiin, Op.snl.ziztztionnlLenr~ingII, p. 17; Nevis, Biklla, and Goulcl, ""Understanding Brganizations," p. 77; Daniel H. Kim, "The Link BeWeen Individual and Organizational Learning," Sloan 2Llnlzngement Review, vol. 35, no. 1 (Fall 1993), p. 43.

68. Bahara Levitt and James G. March, ""Organizational learning," Annzltal Reviezo of Sucl;sEogy, vol. 44 (1988), p. 328. 69. Hehert, ""Best Available Thc>ught." 70. Ibid., pp. 12&134. 71. Sheehan, "Imaginary VVar?" p-56. 72. Lt. Col. J, C. Bryan Jr., "Concepts, Drtdrine and Studies: A Cohaive Frrrce for R&D," 'rine Corp Gnzef te, vol. 62, no. 3 (Mar. 1978), p-24, 73. Greenwood, '*Thoughts on Doctrine," p 44. 74. Hobsrrm and Kinney, ""Keeping Face with the Future," p 10; Maj. Gm. tione1 C. McGarr, "The Power of Thought: New Horizons," Military Rez~iew,vol. 39, no. 6 (Sept. 1959), p. 8. 75. Greenwood, "Thoughts on Doctrine"; Lt. Col. Jack Burkett, "Dynamic Management of US Army L)octrine,"Wiitl'taryReview, vol. 71, no. 2 (Feb. 1991), p. 82. 76. Ibid. 77. Ibid., p. 82. 78. Greenwood, "Thoughts on Doctrine," p 44. 79, The Marine Corps Oral History Project has volumes of transcribed oral records from Marines. Unfc~rtunately,none of the fifty-odd histories of personnel w h ~ served ) in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, a r Nicaragua discuss doctrinemaking at all. 80. Cf. U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, Division af Qperatians and Training, ""Combat Reports of Operationti in Nicarapa," Mal-ine COTSGazette, vol. 13, no. 4 (Dec. 1928), pp. 241-247. 81. John M. Gates, Sclzoolbooks alzd Krngs: Tke Utzited States Army ifi the Philippines' 1598-1902 (Westport, 6-T:Greenwood Press, 19'73); Col. R. Ernest Dupuy and Maj. Gen. William H. Baumer, The Little Wars of the &lited States (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1968); Gordon McCormick, Slznrp Lfrcssed Men: Peru's Tupac Arnat-zt Revt~tutiorzayMovesnctz t (Santa Monica, CA: U N E) National Defense Research Institute, 1993); Daniet P. Bolger, Scenesfiom an U~$nislt~dWar: Lozo-Infensify Cotzflict in Korea, 196669, Leavenkvrtrth Papers, no. 19 (Fort Leavenwodh, KS: USACCSC, 1991); Ian Beckett, The Roots of Counter-i?zstlqency:Arnzifi and Guerrilla Wafnrc, 1900-2945 (London: Blandford Press, 11988); Brian M, Linn, The U.S. Arnzy and Cozdnterinsztrgency in trlte PF1ilipyirte War, 1899-1 902 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North CaroXina Press, 1989); Gienn Anthony May, Bntfl'efiv Bafangas: A Pjtilippi~zo Provinw nf War (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1991); AXfan R. MiUett, The Politics cf Interz~enflion: The Milifary Qcc~dpnf;ion I?J:Cuba, 1906-1 909 (Colurnbus: Ohio State Univ. Presa 19(;8). 82. Lester D. Langley, The Bnrznna Wars: U.S. Tnteuvenliorz in flse Cnribbenn, 1898-1934 (Lexington: t'niv, af Kentucky Press, 11985); Michael X KLare and Peter Kornbluh, eds., Low lzz tensr'ty Warfnl"t7: C~unteri~zsurge~cy, Proinsgirge~zcy,and A~ti-terrorismi~ the EigI.1lil.s (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); Benjamin C. Schwarz, American C o u n t e r i r z s t Boctri~ze:'The Frtlstrafr'ons of Refinrz and flte Rlusions of Nation Building (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1991); Ernest Evans, Warn Witr'la~ifSpEendur: Ttze U.S. Military and Low-tezrel Conflict (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987).

83. Mao Tse Tung, On Czt~rrillaWafnue, trans. Brig. Gen. Samuel Griffith (New York: Praeger, 1964); Gerard Chaliand, Gzrcn-illa Strategies: An Historiclift Anlfialogy from the Long MnrcIz to Afglznrzis;.tarz(Eterketey: Univ. of Califc3mia Press, 1982). 84. D, MichaeI Stzafer, Deadly Paradig?ns: Thc Failtire of U.S. Co~~?Gerir?sz~rge~~cy Policy (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2988); Jufian Paget, Cotrnter-ilzsurgegcy Operaf-ians: Te7iceht.liqucs of-Guerrilla Warfare (New York: VValkes, 4963; Sir Robert Thompson, Defeatiu~gComnzunist Irtsurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnnnz (NewYork: Praeger, 3466); John S. Puslay, Counferinszrrgeney W~rfare(New York: Free Press, 1965); Kenneth Ailard, Somalia Opemtians: Lessons Learned (Mshington, DC: National Defense Unjv. Press, 1995); T. N. Greene, ed., The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him: Sefecfionsfi.f~mthe Mlarine Corps Gazefie (New York: Praeger, 1962); lan F.W. Beckett and Jol-in FirnXcttt, eds., Armed Forces and (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985); Bruee Hoffman, jenCou~?l.er-insurgerzcy nifer Taw, and David Arnold, Lessons for Contemporary Cozinterinsuqencr'es: Ttze Rhodesiarz Expcrieace (Santa Mcmica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 4994); Bruee f-loffman and Jennifer Taw, Defense Policy aud LOW-I~~te~zsity Conflict: The Dcvelayntent of Britain's "Smnfl Wars" Ductrilze During the 1950's. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 1991); Stephen Hosmer, The. Army S Role in Counterilzsurgeszcy nrzd Tnsurgelzcy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center; 1990); Frank Kitsan, Low Tntc~~~Z'ty Opcratiuns: Sz.rbzyersiotz, Inszdrge~tcya ~ n Peacckeepirzg l (London: Faber and Faber, 1971); Thornas R. Mockaitis, Britislz Cuzlnter-i~surgeney, 1939-2960 (London: Macmillan, 1990). 85. Avant" work is one of the few aceiptions that prove the general rule-

Historical and Institutional Context for Small Wars Learning

Clausewitz wrote that there are three ways armies could learn about warism. The mnst obvious and best was experitnce.1 Battlefield experience was best, but peacetime manewers could serve as a potentially useful substitute shce from them officers m d soldiers could ]bear11 to recogi~ize and cope with some of the natural friction of the real batdefictfd,%e second way was to shlefy f o w i p experience, generally by attraceing foreign officers to advise one's own commanders"3The third was to study historical exampleone's own and that of oth.ers-h order to explain m idea, show the application of an idea, liemonstrate the possibffity of an idea, m d fhally to deduce a doctrhe.4 The Marhe Corps during the period &er discussion here gained over a decade's wor& of direct experience fighting its own smail wars, As the f ~ 1 f , ~ k vehapters hg show Ihe Marines learned predominanCry from their own experimccf;,Clausewitz's favored, method of learning. 13y way of contrast, rninkal lea g occurrcld from f o ~ i sour~es: p Certizinly the Corps did not invite foreign officess to observe their operations in the field. There was a small body of furcign literature, rmostly British, with which some Marhe officers were f a ~ l i a rTo . the extent trace irmfluences from that literature can be discerned, it occurs in the pradttctiom of the Snrall Wars Mat2z~alnear 1935 and, as such, is relegated. to the proper discussion in the sixth chapter. M a t this chapkr hightights is that the Makclls did have access to learning from t.listorical example-direclly from the Army's experknees in U?e Philippines and Cuba and,indirt.ctly from the mhhalist doctrine that emerged h r n those experiences, It also highlights the fact that the Corps began bt~ildhgits own edracatiod systein shortly after the Army did, so that it could learn h m its own experiences, The first section of this chapter, then, encapsulates the salient lessons .from the Armvs t h e experie~~ces against the F%pi.ao, Moro, and Craban

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insurgents. 'The second section. shows the minimalist doctrine that the Arrny produred from its own experience, The third section discusses the evolution of the Mark~eCorps Schods and, as such, forms the institutional backdrop for the smdl wars tsajning and dockine formation that took place in the late 1920s and early 1930s that is discussed in the later chaptas Finally, the last section of this chapter sets the stage for showing changes h Marine thought over the period by highlighthg Carps doctrhe pre-Haiti, The importance of the first two sections of this chapter bec m e s m m apparent here, and in the beginning of Chapter 3, ar; the Army's doctrhe is borrowed by both the Navy and Marine Corps..

Historical Context: Semice in the Army's Small Wss All told, the Army undertook three major antjguerrilla expeditimary effnrts between the Spanish-American War and m r l d War I. The first t ~ o k place on the northern islmds of the Philipphe archipelago between Febmary 1898 and. JuXy 1902. Here, the U.S. Army, with some help from the Marine Corps, fout;ht mugbly three distinct campaigns against Filipino forces following a nine-month stalemate in and arou~ldt%rc capital city of Manila. The stalemate is important because during it the Arny invented civil pacification m e a s w s that formed the basis for the Army's counterinsufgency efforts throughout the rest of the cmpa,ign. htlowing the stalemate, the Army dispersed th Phirippine forces surrmnding Manila. In retaliation, and facing a ccrnwentionaily superior force, the Filipino Army waged guerriua warfare province by province for the ensuing three years until the last major jlmsurgent leader capiblated. Once the northern Philippine I s l d s were pacified, the Army turned its at-tention in late 1,902 toward, stxb~mgatingthe snuthcm islands- These were home to a culturally distinct group of people known as Moros. Here the Army"s effmts quickly turned into a desultory, prolmged campaign of punishing Moro gzserrilfas who did not recognize Americm suzerahty over their half of th Philipphe archipelago, Four years later, the is1mds settled down to relatiwe calm. Althoul;lz there wodd be randomly sporadic Rare-ups through the late 1910s, by 1906 the Army corld claim essentially another counterinsurgenry success. Imediately thereafter, the A r v was tl-twt into its final pacification elCnrt halfway around the world from the fiilippines, in Cuba, Bcginning inOctober 1906, the Army and.the Marines invaded that island and braced for a prolonged war with veterans of the Cuban insurrection movement. War did not break out, though, Instead, the Army and Marine Corps pacified the island. through peaceful measures, During the prwess, the Army implemented a nurnber of civil and military measures i t had learned from the 13hil$pine and Moro insurgencies that con-

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tributed in na small way ta keeping the potelztially explosive cmflict in hand, Over the course of ail three of the Army's ercpeditions, the lessons it learned in the field were hardy incorporated into formal doclsine. Instead, Army doctrine emphasized training for modern wars against Gmat Power opponents. Wilhin the Army" sschool structure created during this period, the course of study foc~~sed on molding young officers into professionds capahle of fightirrg large-scale conventional warfare. It certainly did not distil1 and pass along the lessons of the small wars then under way.

Nrrtrrw and P~ogressilff~ oftfir. Philippine fnsurrr?ct.iou Followhg Admiral Dcwey" swrprising defeat of the Spanish Navy in Manila Harbor, American forces occupied Manila tcr take ~ceivershipof ent from the Spanish. 8nce calm was established, U.S. forces found. themselves facing a solid, entrenched encirclement of Manila's outskirts by soldiers of the Filipino Army led by E d i o kuinaldo. These fighters had taken up a r m d o oust the Spmish, m d they were expectkg to be crowned the liberators of a newly independent state by departing American forces. The campaig~zta disperse the Filipino Army was fought in a cmvezztional manner. Both sides gave battle organized at th regimental and.divisional levels. 'f'heinsurgents attacked, and were attacked, in large numbers through the early fall. S o m 4,,(1(1C1Filipinos clefended the bridge at Bacoor horn Gen. Lawton. Another 3,000 attacked Gen. MacArthur at San Fernando. In acidition to the relatively high number of troops engaged in battle, war on the min isldnd of Luzm cmsisted of attackjng and defending entrenchments and field fortifications that surrounded cities and trrwns. nroughout the battle reports, both official and personal, one finds repea.t.ed reference to entrenchments, to the point that iighting from trenches became known as the "Filipino's characteristic style of warfare."s By the late Fall af 1899, the Filipino Army per se no longer existed. The Army leadership followed up with an amnesty offer for all insusgents who turned themselves in. Withi11 several months it became clear the arnnesty was a fajlure as guarilla, warfare began to break out Chrotrgholrt the islands. The Army" initial msponse to the shift to guerrilla warfare largely emphasized taking cities to hold the centers of populace and government,"ndeed, most camrmanders did no more than that, Operationally, the &my assunled a very kfensive posturt;, It is easy to see why. The guerrillas fought only when they out-numbered U.S. troops, The physi-

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c d terrai,n ofen made it too difficult for the Army to keep large forces operating together. Meanwhile?some generals, like. Brig. Gen. Samuel h u n g , felt they could send no fewer than forty to fifty men m patrol because smaller scouting parties were often ambushed, massacred, and mutilated. Finally, all Army movements seemed to be h o w n to the insurgents because they had a strcrnger intelligence service than the Americans did. The guerrilla" stronger intelligence service partly resulted from how Aguinaldcr organized his guerrilla arn-ty after it was dispersed. Principally, he decentralized commmd and contrd of his forces so that: t-hey almost always operated. onXy locaf.ly. The ¢ralized. nature of Aguinaldo" organization memt that guerrillas fought knowing their okvn territory 'This gave the insurgents the advantage of bowing the local populace; they coufd get aid (supplies or intelligenre) from the villages when necessary The disadvantage to decentraikation, c ~ n ethat ultimately worked in fa~rorof the Amty was that warfare b e m e h o s t exdusively a series of local engagements. The difficulties of cmmunicatiltn meant that the different gmups and bands could not coordinate a coherent cmpaign, and thus there was no smstained offensive canability Tactica1ly, to compensate for poor aim and bad. ammunition, the guerrillas developed several different methods of waging battle. Some units simplq. fired into Army and town garrisons at night \N.hen it was harder to chase after them, Others foutght by day, buildjng and hiding behind trenches, earthworks, and other quasi-permanent fortifications duritheir attacks. Generally, these obstacles were easily overrun, The war consequently degenerated into one of ambushes on small patrols and supply lines, rapid attacks on posts, and interdiction of tclepaph cornmunications. Added to the direct danger of attack wcre n u e m u s traps laid for unwary patrols, such as pits with stakes in the bottom or trip lines attached to bow-and-arrow springs.7 In the midst of an intractable pmblem, the Army in March 1,900 offered another amnesty In a triumph of hope over political, mality the amnesty was kept open until nearly the end of the year. Even by then it was clear to the most compassionate field. commanders that: the benevolent policies undertaken by the Army seemed to have failed, Kindness was being mistakn for weakness, and benwotence was not repaid with popular support. In Dcccmher 1900, the commanding general in the Philippines, Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, put the A m y on the military offenshe, suhorclinating civil measures to military ones. Success came within months of the new campaign. Aguinalda was captured. d i v e in March 1901. By April, tactical e~~gagements wem down rougl~ly--third from the previMay most guerrilla leaders had surrendered. 'The war ous Dece~~ber.V~y

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was not over, but it was claser. Another year of steady campaig~~hg was reytlired to track down and kill the few holdout guerrilla leaders,

Natzcre and Progression of the M o m f~szlrgency War in the northern Philippine Islmds minimally affected life in thc. snuthcm islands of the archipelago, of which the island of Mindanao is the largest, Like its sister islands to the south, i"tm popdated by an ethnically distinct group of Islamic people collectively known as Morcrs.9 The Mams had a proud, cemturies-long history of slavifig off sub~ugation by various outsiders. Even the Spanish, present in the Philippine archipelago for some three centuries, had failed to assert dominion ower these people. The US. Army succeeded hvlnere ail others had .failed. A1thougfn the southern islands wese lightly gasrisoned by the Army in M a y 1900, the Moros wew left alone until the end of the Phibpine Insurrection in 1902. Then, the A r i ~ yabrogated its owl1 peace treaty-the Bates Agreement of 1900-with the Moro leaders and.began occupying the maitl islands of the archipelago. In response, the Moros launched an inszxrgmcy that lasted roughly four years-fmm 191)2 to 1906.cvilhsporadic uprisings thereafter. The nahre of this insurgmcy was different in key respects to that of the northern islands. Offensively, the Moro insurgents were far more brave than their Filipino Army cmterparts, attacking camps and garrisons with a viciausnes hi.tl~ertounseen by the Army of the PMippines. As one officer described the ai-i;acks: A barbed wire fence and chain af lanterm encircled the camp. Nightly attempts were made by the Moros to rush the outpo~st.Our bullets failed to stop the charge af these hysterical fanatics. At close quarters, their razorsharp knives were d e a d l y 4 v e n after the tribesmen tzrer-e riddled with lead. One n a t i v e h i s feet shot off-crawled on his hands and knees several yards before collapsing from loss of blood, In must instances, the enemy attack cauIcl not be checked until the Moros became entangled in the barbed wire fencing.10

Another difference was that the Moros usually fuught with bolos-long, sharp h i v e s that could eviscerate or behead a man-rather than with rifles, of which they had very few, Finally, t h y almost never used trenches, instead talting adwantage of natural terrain f e a t m s a d the dense vegetation. The most insidims terrain featurc was cogon, a form of high grass that lined the sides af most trails. So thick was it that virtual walls formed on each side of the trails, impairing vision significantly. Its razor-harp,

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blade-like leaf could slice an hcautious person badly Moros, however, could crawl throu* the cogm almost undetected until. too late, and they took advantage of this fact to ambush patrols. Bolomen wodd h e both sides of a trail. As a patrol marched by, riflemen wodd open fire from s o m point ahead of the file, When the marchers3eployed toward. their hmt, the bdomen would strike h m both flanks. Hand-to-hanci fightimg ensued because the trails were usually too narrow to use rifles, Compounding the problem, bayonet fencing was little match against the expertise of a close-in, boto-wieldhg Moro. I'he first nurnber of patrols thus attacked sufiered devastathg losses, and their attackers escaped. Defensively, the Moros had.almost no capacity to engage in prolonged guerrilla warfare. Although they could always play the part of innocent local if caught, they rarely plamed beyond the next engagemnt. Their subsistence-level economy also meant they never could gather enough supplies to campaign. Consequently, they could not take to the field for m exte~zdedperiod. 'They always had to return to their homes simply to survhe, Thus, the Moms almost always retreated to and attempted to protect their large fortlike dwellings, called cutfus. Although often ingeniously engineered, they wcre built of materials that codd not withstand Army artillery Also, the Moros could not endure prolonged sieges of these cuffosgiven their subsistence economy. Conseyuently the Army often rebliat-ed by orgmizing expeditions to destroy nearby caffos,If an officer h e w where to find the cnttos, he usually h e w the enemy" line oi retreat, which gave him a decieSed adwntage against the Moros. At no time did Army ofiicers fail. to overrun a caifo they aBacked.1" This process continued throughout 1904 and 1905 as all but one particularly recalcitrant More leader submitted to U.S. authority It ended by early 1906 with two evezzts. First, in October 1905 a company of troops h u n d the last insurgent leader and ambushed his blddcn beadquarters, k i l h g him im the prwess. Second, in March 1906 the Army assaulted a Moro community that had isolated itself at the top of a volcano called Bud Dajo, By the end of three days, hnienty-three Americans were killed while an estimated 1,2110 Moros (including w m e n and chifdwn) were killed in return. Thereafter, Mindanao, Jdo, and the Cake I:,,anaoregion returned to rclative peacefuhess.12 mrough 1907 and 1908 all of the few r m a i ~ ~ i smalfer ng posts werl, abaneioned. Army expeditions became limited to shows of force and mking major arrests nniy.13

Around. the same time the Army was tsacl
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for American ecmomic hterests but for its strategic position astride shipping lanes to the newly completed Panama Canal. In September 1906, the Theoclore Roosevelt administration exercised the U.S. right under the Pfatt Amendment to htervene in Cuba,lVor the next three years, until 1909, the Army (and to a lesser extent the Marine Corps) pacified the island nation, In the process, officers used civil and military measures that mare closely mirrored the lessons of the northern Fhilippisles.. Unlike the two p ~ v i o l l cases s presented above, the Army h Cuba initially intervmed between two opposing factions mther than fachg an enemy of its own. StilI, hrmy leaders felt at lea& one of the opposing factions would turn m it and wage a llasty little war against the hterveners. Fortunateiy for the Army, the insurgent army that formed never really unified. It operated as alizost two separate armies: one led by Pinar del Rio in the western part of Cuha, the other led by Faustino (Pino) Guerra in the eastern part. Recruits came from hrgely unemployed mal workers for w h m field operations was an opportunity to have some fun and eat meat.1' In the field, the insurgents malntaisled the political and military initiative by threatening foreign property and demonstrating the central government" hability to stop them. Once Roosevelt authorized the hterventian, some 5,400 men were sent to Cuha under leadership that had served in thr Philippines. Most of the officers in staff and command positions also had served in the Philippines or the previous Cuban admirzistratiosl. First afiktore, though, were the Marines, led by Col. Littletcm W.1: Waler (who had led a brutal paci.ficati.on of the F"hi.lippine island of Sarnar; d-iseussion below). The ed across the countvside to galrrison toms, villages, and potentially strategic byways. Surprisingly, h a t little hostility they encountered c m e from the disgruntled militia (of the Nationdist government), not from the i~stlrreclos(of tbe Federal Reprrbljcan firction). After the Marines, and then the Army, ggarrisoned the strategic points artlund the island, they then initiated exte~~sive patrollhg througho~~t the coulztryside to intimidate the rural popuhce into not supporting the rebels or causing other diEEiculties-lvatroitingwas also undertaken to map in detail the entise island for intelfigence purposes. Proba:hZy the single most impmtmt step the Army took was to avoid any mftitav action. Secretary of War Wlliam Hawarcl Taft, iike the Army leaderfip, felt that activc mcaswes by the Army would have e a d y dispersed the 50,000 or so rebefs (as had been done in the Philippines),l? I-lowever, the h y would have had a more difficult time suppressing the dispersed bands, Taft decided instead to leave the rebel forces as intact as possible so any tmce and compromise could be enforced by its leadership. He succeeded in large measure because boflz sides wanted h e r i c a n htemelztion. This meant that while the Army had prepnred to

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engage in another bluody antiguerrilla effort, instead it bccme sintply an Army of populace pacification.

Civil Meastires Used to Cazlnter the Phitippine Itzszargents The fnitial U.S. strategy fnr taking control of the Philippine Islands was one that has been referred to as, using McKiniefs own words, ""benevolent assimilation," "Prixlcipally, this involved. institutirrg a hust of reforms that counterint;urgency practitioners of the 1960s wollld have recopized as ""civic action.""" h order to cont-rol the populace better, the Army tried to normalize life in the capital as quickly as possible, The Army mopened the schools and secularized the education,lUIt enacted sanitation measures to clean up the city after the h e s i c a n siege and opened medical hcilities to prevent the spread of diseases. Ti, stimulate the economy, the Army dec1arc.d Mmila a free-trade port, opening trade to the ships of all nations. It also ellgaged in numerous civic repair projects to relnvigorate public works (such as roads and local marketplaces) so that internal trade c d d begin again. Whell guerrilla warfare set in, the &my initidly did not expelld m c h energy tryhg to defeat the insurgents militarily Rather, it continued the prwess begm in Manila, bringing civil government to the differmt muxlicipalities and provinces, developing police forces, building roads, opening schools and hospitals, and building or rebuilding markets to encourage trade and develop the local economies. There were strtlng prxtical reasons frtr doing so, Schods, for example, w e often a means for keeping otherwise unoccupied children off the stmets and a means for spreacfing English as the spoken hnguage. Medicai stations were an abs d u k necessity for protecting the field soldiers"Apart from the dmgerous field operations, the cl-imate engendered malaria and other tropical diseases that iJrained Army strength in the prowinces. Given the epidemiological nature of some of the djseases, it made as much sense if not more to provide medicaI care to the natkes and teach them healthy hiabits so that ilhesses wodd not be spread to the trcrcrps. Finally, the Army enacted and continued thnlughout the cmpaigns a road-building progrm to increase rrrilitary and economic mobjljty while psovidirtg paid employment to the mrat poor, the recruit base for the insurgmt bands." hdeed, mad-building was the clne civil masure that continued unabated when the Army went m the offensive agahst the insurgents after the secesty hDecember 1900, A. key, new measure introduced during the Army" osffensives was martid law-the suspension of civil judicial rights, Officers were given sumrnary court powers and were allowed to rwoke local due-process

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rights and even to suspend the right to trial. Travel restrictions and martial curfews were used to better track the movements of various individuals within the popdace. En some places all males had to have a rclgjstration certificate; no male over ej;tyhteem would be allowed out ol town without a pass; and the comings and. goings of all people had to be recorded by the town presiderzfe within twenv-four hours of their travel. In practire, the Army targeted the social elites becausc? of their economic ability to contribute to the guerrilla cause and because they wielded controi over the peasant masses recruited by the insurgents. Commanders struck at the eliteskeeonamie and social power by imprisoning them ol. exiling them to Manila, and forfeiting their property to others." En the end they coopwated, more for poiiticaf than personal hardship reasons, but it didn't really matter why.22 Even with such cooperation, military measures were still required to finish off the guerrillas for good.

Civil M e a s u ~ sUsed fo Coutzfer the Morn Insur
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Civil Measzrres Used to Coznzfev the C u h n Ik~szhrgen1"S The Army in Cuba fnitiated a rmge of civil measures with severaf key difife~rzcesfrom the Philippine experience. Although Che Army djd not intervene as much in the educational and medjlcal systems in Cu:ba as it had in the Philippines, it did ensure that the schocrls remained open and perhaps helped rural peasants get access to medical care on an ad hoc basis. h t the Army placed mu& greater store in public works projects than it had in the Philipphes. For example, it focused on the imprtwement of harbor facilit.ies, w&er m d secver systems, and the construction of publjc buil.dings, and it engaged extensively h road-building. Zt did so for both rnilitary and ecclnornic reasom, just its it had in the PhiXippinrs.2-~y the time the hrmy hvit:hdrc.w in 19(39, sonne I00 miles of new roads had been constructed from scratctn and h u n d ~ d more s improved. One m e a s m the Army did not ulldertake was martial law. Secretary Taft's emphasis upon civilian control of the Army's paciification effort meant that the Army had to use the civilian court system to try insurgents. In the end, because the Army was never tested with a Ml-fledged guerrila war, American wstraint in civil affairs did not have any negative impacts, By the same token, we do not know what the Army's full pcrtcntial in this area could have been. ivfilifrr~jMeaszrres tised f n Caunter the Plzz'lipine Insurgents

The military measures that the Army undertoak in the Philippines fell into the categories of garrisoning, scout and constabulary formation, intelligmce activities, patmllhtg, and night and search-and-destroy activities. Garrisons hecme a centerpiece of the cmgaigns against Agukaldo's pemilf.as, Several reasons account for this. Most important, town and vitfage garrisons gave some protectim to those vvho w o d d help the American cause (e,g., by giving intelligence) or who at least were not: openly hostiXe to it." A k oonc ttroops occupied a town or village, the natiwes usually rekmed from their mountajn hikaways to =engage in c o r n a c e and rehstitute a normal village life, Garrisoning troops gave the Army steady access to social contacts who could prove valuable h persuading the people to accept American dominion. The social relations a commandil~gofficer formed helped him discern, from an intelligcnce point of viewl who were good sousces of information and who were not. Garrisoning also gave the troops opportunity, through patrols, to become familiar with the surrounding topography. All too often, though, the number of troops available was insuiiicient to protect the garrison and campaip effectkely irr the surrounding countryside. This personnel shortage is whn.t.drczve many cmmanders to endorse and im-

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plement the hiring and training of local militias, commonly called ""scouts" or "constabularies." The first official unit created was the famous Macabebe Scouts, organized under the c o r n a n d of Lt. M.A, Watson of Che 4th Cavalry. 'This troop comprised members of the Maca:bebe ethnic group who were openly hostile to the Tagalog-dominant insufgent mwernent. They wert. excellent scouts: goad shots, brave, and good at handling canoes, they knew the stream neworks and the topography within givm arcas well; and they werl, better marchers than many of the volunteer and regdar Army troops..Most important, as natives they spoke the local languages and dialects, were well acquainted with the local customs, and thus we= better able to =cure information a d detect spies and enemy scouts than could Army persomet. The Macabebesbuccess did nut go unnoticed by s m e in the Army leadership. When then-jrcretary of War Elihu Root informed MacArtbur in late 1900 that some 28,000 Volunteers would be called back home, even reluctant commanders were forced to consider raising local auxiliary units to stanch the manpower drain.28 'I'hereafter, scout units were organized and arlxed on a much larger basis than had previously been thought prudent or necessafy In January 1901, some 1,400 scouts performed auxiliary service with the Army. Six months later there were 5,400, and the number was increasing. Clften they went unpaid but were allowed to turn h the rifles they had captured for a thirty-peso reward.2"" As scout units became an accepted part oE the counkrk~surgencyeffort, the Army began experime~~thg (sometimes reluctantly) with creating other native unj.ts to protect th villages and to augment manpower. Takfng adwantage of this trend, the civilian Philippifie Co 190f. Composccf of mally estabiiished the Philippine Constabday in J ~ d y 150-man units, the role of constabulari.~lay between that of mobile police a d scouts. Like the scouts, they became quite adept at t r a c b g down crixninals and, occasionally, ins~~rgents. Their chief contribution came from the htelligmce they provided. (3n intelligence, the most impo"t"nt defect in the Army's overall efanalysis, fort was continued decentralization of intelljgence collectio~~, and distribution. Maps of insurgent camps drawn by one w i t were usual:ty not forwarded to tbe succeeding unit tirking command. Often, the commander of one province or town rarely knew who had been positively identified as a guerrilla by officers of the next province or town. Mmy guerrilla ofEicers escaped capture because of this lack of shared hokvledge. W t h MacArthur" change in strategy came intelligence reforms as well. In December 19W, he reorganized the Dclparment of Secret Service into the Divisim of Military Wormation to centrally collect and dissemi-

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nate intelligence throughout the Philippines." a c e this centralized intelligence syskm was in place, however, pressure for expanding collection increased as welt. 'That meant more patmlling. Refnre the second amnesty, few pat-rols had operated in the bush. For those patrols that dld go out, there was no consistency in size or style of patrolling. Some werl, small, roving patrds of up to twenty-five men that would seek to maintain constant contact with the enemy." The majority of patrols, though, were company- and regiment-sized scoutilrg columns (100-3,001) troops) that searched only where the insurgents were last reported to be or searched the neighbortnoods that surrounded various municipalities. Few cornrmandfitrs thought to set up their own ambush patrols.32 With Ihe ekange in strategy came a concomitmt change in patmllIng tactics. They were better coordinated and became a centerpiece of antigucrrilla operations rather than an adjunct to them. Combat patrding and settkg ambushes by small units becaxne the norm. Constantly harassing guerrilla forces in the field, these small patrols coordinated. in large or simply chase the insurgents. a h e r times they area sweeps to cap* wouM surround a vijilage, guard the &ails and roads, and then search all houses for suspected guerrillas or sympathizers, To mitigate guerrilla intelligence eMorts, patrols began mcrving only at night m d off the main paths. Somtimes they would start out horn tokvn at sml-rset down one trail, only to double back in the dark m d set off down mother, hdeed, the most effective use of patrols occurred when they operated at night and when they conducted search-and-destroy raids hthe com~tryside. As the Army attempted to drive the insurgents to the ground, searchand-destroy tactics became an integrat part of this effort. Actively seeking and destroying the guerri:lla foxes and their supplics in the countryside, rather than in the villages, became the slna yua non of success, Most commanders chose to f ~ u on s the number of rifles captured and gucrrillas killed or wounded as their measures of effectiveness."" Others, in cmtrast, focused on larger measures of success, particularly focusing on food provisions. In January 1902, fnr example, m e scouting party destroyed (innjneteen days) 308 cattle, fifty-seven carabao, and 250 tons of palay, and that was minor damage in l g h t of the actions of other patrds.3 h one distrkt alone, the A m y cmfiscated some 20f)O(t-50,1100 tons of rice during the year." At times, the raids codd be extraordinarily fierce: One patrol, unable to capture an elusive guerrilla leader in three 800 outposts and stmhouses, and weeks, destroyed nineteen ""tw~~s,',"" tcms of rice and hemp whilie killing 151) guerriilas, capt~ring100, and iorchg 900 mom to surrender.36 Just how bmtal this military offensive became can be seen in the attempt to paciiFy Sarnar after the Ralmgiga Massacre of Sptember 1901.

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Gen. Jacob H. (Hell-RaisingJake) SmiCh, ordered to pacify Samixr, did so viciously, The military application of Smith"s strateg is exermplilied by the actions of a Marke Corps battalion under the commmd of Maj. Littletm W.1;. Waller, to whom. Smith ordered: "X want no prisoners. I wish you to burn and kill; the more you burn and lcill the better it will please me."" 74. Littleton did not disappoint Smith. :ill one three-day period h mid-N'ovexx7bet; Mialler's patrols burned 255 houses, Elled 39 ilzsur~ctos, captured another eighteen, and destroyed an incalcul&le a m m t of rice l and hemp." At the town of Basey, Waller conducted a d m d ~ e a tcourt, persnnnlly ordering the s u m m y executions of eleven of his own guides. For this action, he and Smith were court-martialed and also hvestigated by Congress. tnterestingly, the military court found Lliallrr's actions warranted by the immediate circumstances and acquitted hisn. S-mi,th, bp contrast, was liormally admonished m d forced to retire. Before his court-martial, Smith had already lifted some of his restrictions on noncon^rbatants while simultaneously enacthg one of the mast unique (and. cmtroversial) measures used in small wars-recmcentration. Snlith ordered ali rural people to move into newly created village neigkiborhoods m d to bring all their property into the new jurisdictions. This reconcentration policy was modeled on Brig. Gm. John Bell" offensive in Batangas. To bring Batangas back under control, BcfZ had recmcentrated outlyhg villages m d neighborhoads into the provhcial towns. Within the concentration znnes, schools and medical care were provided, aithough some number of the resettled died of malnutriticln ant( sickness." To boost: t-he food supply, acquiescent vi,llagers WE permitted to harvest known guerr2la crups for their own private benefit. Once Bell secured the resettlexnent areas, he conducted a fierce campaip in the countryside with vcry destructive effects. Small patrols, night nnarches, search-and-destroy operations, and rainy-season campaigning effectively attrited the guerrilla forces. Within six months of beginning the campaign, Bell had effectively wiped out guerrilla resistance in the last province. Left with no staff or personal aides, the best known guarilla leader s u r ~ n d e r e da h e in Agril 1902. With that, the Philippine War came to a cfose, Tfne official end of hostilities was declarcd on July 4, 1902. Forty-four yeass later, in 1946, AguhaIdo saw his Philippines become an independent nation.

Milifrrcj Nleaszrres tised to Counter the Mom hsuvgents Many of the military measures undertaken to defeat the Mora insurgcrncy rcsembf.ed those developed during the last antiguerrilla carnpaigsl of the *lippine War. Garrisons, intelligence collection and dissemination, patrolling, m d search-and-destroy missio~~s all bore the impri12t of

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the previous war. In important respects, though, war against the Maro insurgents did nut mimic war agaixlst the Filipino insurgmts. Scouts we= not as wideb used in the south, t l ~ o q h auxiliaries to some extmt were.40 %arch-and-destroy missions focused on different targets in the south. The nature of patrolling was often different from that in the nor2h. Garrisms p1ayc.d an important part of occupyhg Mindanao and, to a lesser degree, the other islands. OrighaXly, they were sprcad over difkrent portions of the island. However, shortlt; after the Mom i n s q e n t d e came active, most of the Army's garrisons and posts were reconcentrated in four key areas,.Smaller posts and statiorns around the rclmokr regions of Mhdmao and on other islands were handed over to auxiliary Iforces* I'he ones the Army retained were rdatively large: battalion or ~ g i m e n t size. This differed greatly from the squad and campany sized posts of the northern cmpaigns. This fact had an impact on how ccrmmanders prosecuted the insurgency The mnpower required to guard these larger pods, such as Camp Marahui, meant patrols could not be sent out often. Indeed., smaIl detachments were sent out only once a week, in stark contrast to the frequency of patrolting durilng the offensive in the north." l i s meant that the Arrny remained operationally on the d&nsive throughout much of the insurgency b t h e r than using offensive, small combat patrols to turr-? or flush out the Maro insurgernts, Che Army prrzdnminantly waited in the c m p s until an actual attack, or word of an hpending one, xcurred. I'hen, whole companies and batta%ilmswere sent out to mete ppuishment on the preswed attackers." Typicall~;100-300 soldiers plus an equal number of porters went on such expeditions, Officers waited for the offending parties to return to their cltwcllings and then stormed their claffrts and djsarmed the remajning populace. After such wtributhe attacks, the Moro raids usually ceased fur a period.@ The nabre of search-and-destroy operations msdting from these expeditions differed frm those of the Filipino insurgelncy The emphasis of such operations was punitive, not psclemptive or preventathe, Patrols or s on seaxh-and-destroy missions were not seekir^lgfoodstuffs and supplies hidden ixl mountain or jwngle storehouses in order to starve out the insurgents. Rather, they focused on finding hidden ~'lkttosand other strongholds to which maraudin$ parties had retreated. Army expeditions, large as they we=, would sweep over l q e skvaths of mtfos and hrts in one operation, What they sought to destroy was the leadership and stubbornness of recalcitrmt dattl?s, symbolized more. by &straying their caf tcls than their sources of supply. In the area of intejligence, the Army took advantage of lessons learned in the p ~ v i o u scampaigns to p ~ v e n intelligence t failures. However, despite the abunctant similarities in the use of intellgence as-

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sets, there was one key difference between insurgencies, Because the Army centralized so much of its manpower within fewer, larger garrisms, the key method of centralizing intelligence collection and dfstribution to overcome commmd clispersion di,d not play as important a role agajnst the Moro insurgents, In the end, the most effective measure of success was "decapitatingf' the dlirtfo leadership of villages. Given the quasi-trihial cdhare of tbe MOros, and the power dattus bad w e r their own people, this measure made as much smse as targeting the Filipino elitcs had in the northern campaigns, M e n , fos example, the ~calcitrantMoro leader Datto Ali undertook a prolonged campaip in 1903 against the American occupiers, the Army targeted him perscmally, It took two years for the Army to catch up with him. When, in C>ctober1905, he was fom~dand lkiilled, the Moro insurgency was essentially finished. n m u g h 1907 and 1908, all of the few ~maiz~in smaller g posts werl, abaneioned. Army expeditions became hited to shows of force and mking major arrests dy.&

Military M u s t r ~ Used s fo Ccrtlntcr the Cuban Ilzszlrgents Even thougtn the Army did not actualfy engage in combat, i t s preparation fnr that evtllhtality led it to undertakez a number of military measures it had learned in the Philippines, north and south. From garrisoning and patrolling to intelligcmce functions, the Army rapidly displayed a certain prowess that came from experience. How it would have fared had fighting achaal:ly broken out will rcrnain unknowablc, but the xtions it took probab%ystaved off that potentialib-. The 2,OW n/larines wbo waded ashorc. in September 1906 i set out to garrison towns and help the Army occupy railways, bases of supply. and skategic points, As in the northern Philippines, all major towns and villages were. garriscmed. Garrisons were also formed to cantrol the transpo&t"aionsystem, mostly near rail nets and coastal towns. Special attention was focused upon the most rebellious provinces, which were garrisoned with cavalry units throughout the fnterventim, nlr garrisons were expeckd to patrol their own districts. Each garrison cmmander was ordered to have a c o l u m operating in the countryside, on the move at all times. This was to show the native populace that lawlessness would not be tolerated and also that they were always pratected." Mmt of these patl-ols were either columns of mounted infantry that operated in the open plailrs of the interior or small foot patrols like the ones used in the northern Philippines. A b s e ~cmflict, ~t the Army undertook no search-md-destroy operations and no night operations either. Wetkter it would have done so, a d what measures of success it would have used, one can only speculate.

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h the area of military htelligetnce, one sees the effects of the Fhilipphe experience on the Army*At the outset of occupation, Gen. Bell ordered nurnerous intelligence-gathering missions. He focused on creating individual dossiers containing m e s , descript.ions, and addresses of all, known and suspected insurgents, and then the types and numbers of arms they mi@t have. 'These wert? centralized in Havana at the newly created Military htelligence Division (MID). MID also had oversight responsibilities for the mapping of Cuba," h a n i s m patroIs did the actual mapping W e on ~ccmnaissancem d then forwarded tbr map sketchrs to Havana. By the time the etngheers m d other patrols had completed covering every nook and cranny of the island, U,S, trooys knew the hills as well or better than etid the insurgents. Unlike the Philippines, the Army made no attempt to form scout units. Had hostilities brclken out it might have dune so, but there are no indications that it definitely wodd have. But Army officers did use the Rural Guasd, the official Cuban militia, as a f o m of constabulary. The Army seems to have isrcreased their training and viabihty to carry out t k i r policing function. In case of rebeflion they were supposed to be g i v m patm11irrg xnissions to help the Army subdtae the populace." In the fjnal analysis, there is no teiling h w the Army would have perfnrmed in the event of hostitities. Hwever, with all major parts of the island garrisoned, military intelligence flowing to colnmanders who needed it, patrols ready to assume the offensive, and the :Rural Guard predisposed to operate against the Cuban fnsurgents, the Army might well have broken the hsurrection in less time than it took to subdue the Filipino insurrectos, Instead, after three years of occupation, it began withdrawing peacefully f m Cuba on January 1, 19159. "f"hert?after,the Army engaged inno m a l l wars until after World War 11.

Historical Context: Informal and Formal Boct-rirte far the A m y Despite four years of experirnentatim and final success in the northern PMippines, the k m y created no forml trainhg or doctrines for transmitting what small wars lessons it had learned to future generations of officus. 'f'hesame was true after the Moro insurgency. Only several years after the end of the Clxhan Pacification did the Army formally presetnt small wars doctrhe to its officers, and then only h mhimal fashion. The corporate memory that existed among Army officers after the Philippine Insl,lrrcctian was by and large allowed to fade away wi& time. flow was the corporate memory built in the first place? Principallfi;it was the result of personal experiences. Officers fought d a y by day,seeillg the war as it unfolded and adapting incrementally os radically depemd-

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h g upon the carnmmdhg ofillcer. Brim Linn cmcludes this was a blessing: 'The key to the Amy's success was its lack of adherence to rigid doctrines or theories and the vvillirrgness of its officctrs to experiment with novel pacification schemes."38 Blessing or not, the rea:lity was that officess experimented because often they were left to their own devices out in the pwinces. 'I'he lack of roads and reliable communications isolated garrisons from each other and the Army leadership. Each of the commanders generally passed on their knowledge in the fnrm of h a t we now call after-acticm reports (AARs). Hwever, these reports were passed verlicdly up the chain of command and then fjled. They were rarely sharcd directly with peer officers. Thus, officers had. to learn of successful technipes in other ways. For example, commanding generals like MacArthur might write explicit hstructions for their own subordbates (but not those under another" command) based on what had been passed up the chain of command. b o w l e d g e thus traveled .from the top docvn. This may explain why the cornmmdhg gelrerals of the Cuban Pacification implemented key measures so quickXy upon intervention. Officers might acquire knowledge of successful techniques through social. and professional, contact-S-a sideways movement of knowledge. Unfortunately, the kinds and volume of records (Xetters, diaries, e t ~by ~ )subordinate officers that would conclusively show this have not been cdected by archives. Finalfy, officers codd read accounts of the Army" actions in the Philjppines and elsewhere through a slowly growing body cJf literature in the professional journals and in official reports cmmissioned by the Army leadership. fndeed, until 11911, these were the only widely available venue of lessons learned and doctrine available to the officer corps.

If: &ere was no forlnaX attempt to train officers in counterinsurge~~cy, of what there were at least a few attcsnpts to pass on an understallwas occurring in the Philippines to officers back in the States. 'rhe use of both civil and military measures was discussed in Che professional journals, although, as Table 21 shows, to a limited extent. The discussion of measures often took a backseat to a discussion of the fighting envirmmemt (Filipino or M m tactics, terrain features, etc.), vvRich usua,lly grabbed the readershattention better. Moreover, the number of small wars articles reprt-sented a tiny portion of the overall literature dealhg with professional mititary concerns.@ Indeed, of over 850 professional journal articfes during the period 389G1915, only twtmty-nine (3 percent) dealt with srnail wars problems. Of those, most simply discussed in anecdotd fashion the natlarc3 of the

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TABLE 2.1 Small Wars Measures Discussed in the Army" Professional Journals, 1898--1%25 # Articles W / &).iscussion Measures Discussed Civil Measures Medical / Sanitation Martial t a w Military Measures Carriwns Scouts / Constabulary TnteXligence Procedures Columar: 13unitivePatrolling Srnatl Unit Combat Patrolling Night Operations Search and Destrc3y 8ps Recmecmtraticm

Philipphe and, to a much lesser extent, the Maro insurger~cies..Within those twenty-nine articles, there was mivlimal discussion of civil measures. As one might expect, even within the anecdotal histories mftitary measures received some discussion. As is evident horn the precedjng, only four articles dealt with civil Despik the fact that measures, two on education and two m martial h. externsive medical and potitical measures were used throughout the first and last intervention, only one argument for using medical measures emerged in the professional literature." The same holds true for the educational and civil construction (indzrding road-buifding) measures that were utilized only to a slightly lesser extent. C)ne might have anticipated s o w treatment of martial law against the Mortw, but it never occurred, C)n the military side, garrisnnhg was discussed only in relation to the northern Philippine occupationf and then only one article significantly c a p t m d the sipificrant features of this r ~ a s u r e . ~ Wdiscussion ~o of garrisoning against the Msros ar in Cuba occurred. The utility of scouts and constabulary fnrces received considerabfe coverage consistat with their use in ail three of the Army's efforts." Two prize-winnhg essays in the Jorrmal of the Military Service I~stifutimliofthe UniCcd S1.utcs detailed accurately why scout units we= high.ly effective." On the importance of proper fntelligence procedures, there was minhnai discussim, mostty in relalinm to Cuba."Wespite the e~nphasisaccorded smail-unit combat-patrolling measures during the nurthern Philippine campaigs, most of the articles anecdotatly discussed the use of large columnar patrols, much like those used to disperse the Filipino Army and ta destroy the Maro cat-

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tos. m l y three articles analyzed to s o m extent the utility of smalf patrols (each based respectively m the Filipino, Mom, md.Cuban campaigns).% Tl-rroughout the articles on patrolling, there was but one brief, mhelpful description. of search-and-destroy operation.s.s"ere was also no more than a passing reference to night operations, despite their impcntance particularly in the first two sets of campaigns." Yet the far less used practice of reconcentration was accorded serious attention by three different autlnors, including one writing on Cuba, where it was not: applied.'K Prcrbably the mod important official effctrt to analyze the Philippine experience was undertaken FR 1906 by Capt. J.RM, Taylor, who wmle a book-length manuscript chronicling a history of the fiifippine insurmction.sVaylor was detailed away from his normal duties to write the history, and the manuscript made it to the galley-proof stage with his martjinalia included. Hwever, Secretary of War Taft, who had personally approved Taylor's work orders, let the effort languish for Chree years. Finally, in 1909, the project was terminated for reasons that remain unclear, although bound copies of the galley proofs wercl. disseminated to some of the official military libraries. Un the civil side, Taylor focused only upon political and judicial measures, without due regard for the Army's educational and meciicaf efforts. C)n the political side, he credited MaeArthur's creation of the RIi_pirroFederal Party as a highly successful endeavor to help end the war. Ch the judicial side, Taylor discussed mostly the treatment of prisoners, addressing climtty the impfcmentation or benefits of martid law. On the miZitv side, Taylor devoted extensive attention to most of the measures discussed above-garrisoning1 patmliing, search-and-destroy operatio~~s, the formation of scouts, and pop"iation reconcentration. Taylor wrote approvingly of MarArthur" efforts to garrism m d protect the inhabitants of willages. Althwgh Taylor indicated that native help ~ @ have fititigated trhe threat to small, garrisons, he did rrot devote much &mtion to U?e issue oi formhg scout mits. On patrojfing, Taylm's history really only touched upon the subject when discusshg incidents of intellig e ~ ~ failttres ce refatkg to villago mpport for t-he guerrillas and rc3laling to guerrilla tactics on Samar, Stilf, Taylor did devote same effort to analyzhg the search-and-desbcry tactics of patmls, mting, for example, the importance of long-range search-and-destray operations targeting the foodhouses and camps of the insurgents, The final military measure 'IBylor inchded in his history is Bell's recmcent-rationpolicy Taylor opined that Bell had Little choice but to instihte zones of protectio~~ so lhose who did not want to give up their food (usually the poorer masses) would not have to.60 W~ik Taylor 's history was never published, the Military fntelligence Division in Manila commissioned a report covering antiguarilla, wariare

t

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on Samar durhg 19061906 that was published with the General Stafffs sanction as a long artide in th relatively new f~finztryjour~ml." "tended to inform new dicers arriv* on Smar, the report gave them a fiavor of gucrrila war at its nastiest-.rhroughout alf of the writing on this period, this one piece is sipificant for the amount of accurate detail it cmtain.ed regardhg p a t d tactics and the intelligence infrastwcbre required in order to operate effectively against guerrilla fighters, and it is sig~nificant y sanction, for being one of a few with oifi.cial h

'Tozuard Forvlal Doctrine: The Amzy's New Edncntio~aESystem C)fficttrsand soldiers sent to the Philippines during 189SlW9 were not trained to fight h the mmner necessary to overcome the hsurgent tactics. One Observer accurately commented, "The metl-rods of deploying laid down in the drill regutations were not aIv\iays fotrnd appIfcable here.w Officers and soldicrs alike had to be trained in small wars operations h the field. This fact did not cbange thrwghout the three interventions. :lf anything, the Army as m institution was heading the other dirrction, toward modern war &fined as a war with a first-rate power, "'as exesnplified in the recent Russo-f ay anese W m In 3902 S e c ~ t a r yof War Elihu Root implemented a new educatimal system that called for one- and three-year courses at all the garrison schools and created a new War Colllege and the General Staff and Service College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The first-year curriculm at the hhntry m d Cavalry School focused on military engj.neering, foreip hguages, militarqi law, and leadership of combined a m s units up to the division level.@Later it was amended to iz~cludeAdmz'zzistrafio~zand the Strratl Anns Firirz,y IZega(Llfi~ns.b"e second year curriculum at the LeavenworZh Stafi"College focused on preparing o&cers for General Staff duties, logistics, and the operationd control of units up to tbr corps level.66 Military art was taught throughout by map exercises, terrah probXems, and war games*h none of the curricula materials available for the Leavw o r t h schools and Army War College were guerrilla w a s wed as e ~ arnpfcs in any of these probiems. 'The same is true of the promotion e x m questions designed by the Generd Staff." There was no notion of t-ting for pacification or guerrilla warfare.. At the pinnncle of the officer education system stood the Army War College. If officer trainbg up until the Was College focused on the theoreticat, then the practical application of that leamiq, as seen through the War College course syllabi and pmjecb completed for thc General Staff, should. have minored the content of the prior schoolskcurricula. If true, then a l m s t nothing in the way of counteritlsqency warfare seems to have been tarnght. The Clzrmzic.lc ofthe Anrry War College contains a year-.

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by-year expositio~zon the courses, including attelzdees and cmme~ztary, none of which topically covered counterinsurgency in its various known guises-smdl wars, minor tactics, bush warfare, or pacification.68 War College syU.abi and war phzs prodwed by Ihe students (for official General Staff use) confirm this observation, hdeed, one is stmck by how much the syllabi empkasized waging war agair~sta Great Power .from the beginning of Cuba (1906) through to World W r I, The war plans throughout this period (famously known fnr their use of colos classification) focused on Jagan (Orange), Germany (Black), Great Britain (Red), and Mexico (Green)," m e sole reference to guerrilla warfare within the curricula is a paragraph on how the Army would, have to fight a Japanese invasion of the Philippine Istanc3s.m Curricular map problems, map maneuvers, and tactical. rides canfirm the thrust of the syllabi.71 These pedagogical devices and Civil War-based staE rides demonstrated a marked focus upon large c m e n tional battle.72 For example, in one problem set students had to plan how to retake Cuba from insurgents," The question format m k e s clear that officr;rswere to focus their answers on thc logistics of loading hips, embarking, knding the invasion force in Cuba, and reta:king miljor cities.. Even thougtn the tT.5. Army would be facing an hsurgent a r q the prclhlem clearZy assumed the fnsurgents worald fight like a convmtionaf army, with use of trenches and other accouterments of linear warfare. To combat the insurgmts, the Army would operate a division-sized force, just as it would against any other land power. Nowhere in the problem set was m y mswer ever expected (or warranted) from the strxde~ztscmcerning how to fight once the Army landed. The same conventional thrust is confirmed in the solution sets to the war plan problem sets.. In the "Military Monograph on. Cuba," the answer to the problem of fightirrg against insurgents was simply: "The primary object of the hvading forces is the capme and occupation of the city of Havana. After this is accomplished, the prhcipal seaport cities are to be occupied, also other cities of importance, and.a mObile force kept h the field in all the pmvinces at the same time, until armed resistance ceases m d the insurgent bmds are run to eart-h."74 m e "Military Monograph on the Dominican Republic" contained the same answer despite the fact that here it was c m s i d e ~ dprobable "that irreguiar warfare will be resorted to almost immediately.'"75 The same was true in the "Military Monograph on Costa Rica" and the 'Military Notes on N i r a r a g d x despite the beliczf by both General Staff writers that the "name of (Costa Nca] lends itseif tn guerrilla warfarerhand that Ihe Pllicaraguan military had a long history of employing guerrilla warfare and should be expeckd to resort to it atgaiz~were the Unfted States to intervene there.7""It is perhaps a furt-her sign of Ihe Generd StaM's &Merest inpreparjng for

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such evezztualities that these monographs were the last problelxs given on Caribbem hterventions until after Mlorld War I.

F'oir~r~al Doefrine: Lessons Learned and Their Dr'ssemi~mf.l;an I'he principal imtructional manuals that officers and soldiers would have had entering the Philippines did not contain small wars instruction of any practical sort, All of them-the 1892 irrctops in Gnnzpaign: RquEntions for the Ar~nyof the United Slates, Wagner's 1896 and 1899 editions of The Semice of Seczaify and I~-Zfomzation, and the 1898 Ilfanfry Drik! Kegulatilmswere written prinripally for waging conventioslal warfare. For example, VVaper"s Service of Security discussed recannaissmce, the usc of cavalry screelzs, and large column operations, among other subjects.7Yhe 1898 Field Service Regulations discussed how to deploy and use tactical-level troflt7mn the attack and defense using Civil War-style fomaticms.79 A significant part ol these mnuals was devoted more to learning and pract i c a parade-ground drills and performing logistics functions than actual fighting. Despite the manuals' focus o~zco~zventionaloperations and drill, there were scattered bits of material that could have heXped the Army prosecute antiguerrih warfare. For example, garritioni~~g a d using local guides for scouting and intelligence were discussed briefly Wagner did touch lightly upon the issue of small combat patrols, suggesting they codd be used to seize other patrols instead of si~nply for recomaissance.BR The fact that these measures had to be reinvented hthe field suggests the advice went eeded or unseen amid the sea of conventional instruction in the mmuals. A total of six different doctrinal manuals were written or updated throughout the period 1888-1915, yet only two eventually contajned more than a cursory treatment of random military measures used in three campaigns. At that, they were published three and five years, respectively, after the end of Cuba., Dufing that period, the paucity of doctrinal change is quite stark given the rapidity Wjfh \zrhich new editions were pubhshed, The 1902 I~zfa~.rts?l, Drill Regzllations was mostly a simple resprirrt of the prior (1.898)editiiol.81 This was the pmmier tactical manual used for trah% soldiers, yet it had not changed inthe four jntervcning years; there was no rnentim of guerrilla warfare, The 1904 edigon remained little more than a discourse about practice drills on how to parade, march, lieplo?i,and fight in different formations. Meanwhile, its 1905 companion volume, Formal Notes, was no more than a =interpretation md. repetition of the 1904 volume." I'he other premier manual, Troops in Campaign, also remahed unchanged between the 1892 and 19003editians.83

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Wagner's manuals, used extensively in the Army' similarly underwent few changes during this period. His fourth edition of 0qyaizizatiut-r nrzd 'Ibciifs, pubtished in 3901, contained no relevmt changes to account for m a l l wars." m e s m e is true for his 1906 edition of Qrgalolzatio~~ and Taeiics," These manuals rcmained historical sketches of h f a n t v focusing almost exclusiwely upon large conventbnal wars. 1"Jagner was apparel~tlyunconcerned with integrating the tactical lessons of counterinsurgency into the manualls used to teach new officers the ways of war. His other manuals provide e\iidtmce of this as well. The B03 edicontained n new material on tion of T!ze Service of Securily arld f ~ f ~ r m a f & guides, but even then only to discuss how they should be protected from retaliation.86 m e new doctrhal, manual was created during the period by the Gene r d Stalf. The Field Service Regulations, first published in 1905, was htosely based on ?mops in C a ~ ~ y a i pItl .was the first doctrinaf product of Elihu Root's new A r l ~ yeducational syste~sand was designed principally to teach officers to command. divisions in wartime.w Uxriquely, the 3905 Field Ser-oicls Regulalirms was the first manual to discuss insurrections and rebellions to pie all,^ even if onIy i,n broad gemrdities. Faced With a war of iTts~rrection,one of the commandefs two prima7 concerns was the proteetim of loyal citizms and placing the b d e n of war on disloyal citizenry. Toward that end, officers would be granted bmad powcrs and allowed to "expel, transfer, imprison, or fine revolted citizens.""" The "It is vicother primary concern was the militay d&at of the i~~s~krrectos~ tory in the fjeld that ends the strik and settles the future retations between the contending parties."'"Y How oificers were to accomplished &at goal, however, was left unspecified, just as it was in all the other manuas. No mention was made of gmrisoning to protect the citizenry. The advice on intelligence was merely stated as an obvjous g a d with no sugge* tion as how to achieve that goal: "When the enerny has adcrpted guerrilla wartarc, the search for infnrmatim acquires spedal importance. An efficient secret service under keen officers should be organized without delay..'"Wnder the scrction on patrols, officers wert? adVised to awoid cornbat: and not pursue host.ile forces. 'This advjce directly contradicted the Army" successful patrolling measures on Luzon and to a lesser extent Samar. Even at the height of the Cuban campaig~ns,the 1908 edition of the F k M Service Regtllntz'uns remined basicalfy unchanged from the 1905 edition save for the advice on patrols." No longer were patrols strictly for rclconnaissance; they could be specially f o m d to colnbat other m a i l units." The change did not last Img. The 1910 edition, foll.wing Cuba, removed its few references to guerrilla warfare,gWoreover, even the genedjzccf dcfjnition of insurgencies was deleted.

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Where the Field Sewice I<egtrlaliorzs left off, the 1911 I~$~rztryDrifl IZegrcIatiolzs and the 1914 Clnualry Drill Xqzslntions picked up. Xn a mltipage section entitled "Minor TVVarfare," m a l l wars were for the first time institutionalty recognized as a type of war distinct from the conventional style of comhat normally waged,gUlthough a comparison of the doctrine to the c m p a i p s (parCicularly the norl.lhern Phi3jppines campaips) reveals it to be imperfect, as a first effort it should not be unduly criticized. n e r e was a good. discussion of tnsurgmt tactics m d the first dkcussion of tactical respan""" The responses focused principally upon small unit combat patrolling and night operations." Several omissions should be noted, however, There was no discussion of civic measures or even an achowledgment of their role incountering guerritlati; no discussion of"garrisoning; no disclnssion of the special intelajgence el_lorts required against insurgents; and, finafiy, no discussion of search-and-destroy measures. The 191.4 Cumluy Sewice R q a l a l k ~ s in , cmtrasl to prjor editions, also included a section on Mhor Nrfare, but it differed hmmy rcspects from the discussion in the h f a l . ~Drill t ~ X ~ h f i m z s . ~Not h rnh was the Cuvaly Seruire Regzrlalions discussion longer and more detailed, it included a number of measures not contained iP1 the J l f a ~ z t yDriE Regulafiilns, Far example, garrisoning was prominently discussed, as were search-and-destroy tactics. Th.e use of"aggressive patrolling on exte~ndedduty in the countryside was also covered. Such tseatrnent of many of the military measures used since the Philippines mark this 1914 editicm as the highwater point in codifying formal counterinsurgency doctrine. Thereafter, all discussion of guerdla warfare was removed from subsequent editims of Of ~ ( I U T S ~small , ~ a r were s no longer the the (:IZvalySewice Regultltio~~. province of Ihe Army The very next year t-he Marine Corps began the first of three jnterventims that wwld lead. it over the next hYenty years to produce its crvvn manual on ccmducting small wars operations.

Irrstitutisrtal Cantexit-: Development of the Marine Corps Schools For over their first century in service, Marhes undertook missions for which no formal trafning was prowided. New recruits and officers learned on the job undcr the tutelage of veterans (not that rnuch training would have been needed). In their earliest days, Marines "were basjcalfy soldlers detafled for sea service whose primmy duties were to fight hoard but not sail their sh@s."W In reality, they spent most of their time enforcing ship regulations, preventing desertion and theft, and sewing as the capt"i"lquards." They ""were aboard ship to pmtect the ship's officers and the vessel from the crcw, many of whom were or rnight be

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drunkards, malcontents, thieves, arsonists, thugs, and mutineers."gg Marines were essentialb police at sea, Between the American Revolution and the Civil W r , Marines undertook whatever mission they codd find d e p e n h g upon the needs of the nation or institutional pressures. Sometimes they focused on forming landing parties for overseas missions or for providing guarcis for Navy yards.'" Qther times they prepared for extended land service with the Arrny and, indeed, participated in the 1830s Seminole Wars and the Mexican War of 1848, W e n cooperation between the Army and Corps broke d o w i ~shortly after the Mexican War, the primary Marine mission changed to that of going ashore to protect Ameriran lives and property in various Lath American nations. The Corps's mission changed yet agaill with the Civil Wtr; durinlq hvhich Marincs replaced shjp" gmners due to a shortage of sailors who ordinarily performed such work,l"l There is s o w question as to how extensively they partook in amphibious raids asErore,l02 They did, however, return to their policing roots, such as wheiz they suppressed the New York draft riots in 1863, stopped Cuban filibusters marching on New York City (1869), put down electicm riots in Pfiladelphia (18?70), m d broke up il,lega:i djstillerjcs in Brooklyn on numerous occasions between 186"lnd 1871, The advent m d spread of modern steel battleships in the late nineteenth (~ei~tury permanently eliminated some of the older Marine missions. These ships, with their larger caliber guns, mquircd a technical proficiency from their crew that h tunn rczquired extensive naval trainhg that tended to weed out characters inclined ta mutiny. Because of the new professional.ism Marines were no longer needed to guard the captain, alld because of torpedoes they were no longer needed to repel boarders or attack elnemy sailors. =ring this period, the Corps b e m e vuherable to an inRuential cadre of Navy officers who, begisrning in the 1 8 9 0 tried ~ ~ to throw the Corps oft^ ships altogethe~losIn the end, the 1901) Navy Gcneral Board under Adnn. Gcorge Dewey forinalfy tasked the Corps with defendjng bases in the Caribbean and possibly o f f the Chinese mainland as well-what became h o w n as the Advmced Base mission.104 This maiintained the historical tie between Marhe m d sailor, despite the best efforts of some Navy ofkers to sever it. In Espmse to the rising naval professictnalism, the growing complexity of modern naval operations such as base dcfense, and the t h e & of being eliminated from the Navy, the Corps in 1891 opened its own Marine School of ilpplication in Washington. It was designed to provide instruction for newly commissioned officess who were incre;asingly being required to learn the art of war over policixzg. In the t w decades follcrwirrg the first class of the shoal of h p l i c a tion, the Carps begm organizing expeditionary battalions to take and

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hold overseas bases for the battle fleet. For a period it was also give11 a coastal artillery mission that almost caused it to be merged into the Army, specifically as a Corps of Marine Artilleryil"JW e n the pmposed merger looked like it wot~ldfail, President Tfieodore Roosevelt (no fan of the Corps) went to the other extreme of trying to isolate the h/farincrs as much as possible from the Army and from Nawy shigs with ExecUf;iw Order 969 (in 1908) Xisthg the m a h duties of the Marhe Corps in order of priority:l"b I. Garrison navy yards and stations inside and outside of the United States; 2, Provide mobile defense for naval bases and stations outside the United States; 3, Man static naval base defenses outside the United States; 4, Garrison the Panama Cmal; and 5. Pmvide expeditionary duty overseas in times of peace. Despite all attempts to make them yard guards, the Marines focused on other missions, particularly the advance base mission. In 1910 the Corps founded the Advmce Base School in New London, Cmnectkut, and c ~ a t e dthe first Acfvanced Rase Force in 1913. The foifowing year the 1st and 2nd Marine Regiments conducted the first Advanced Base exercises ever on the small islmd of Culebra, off Puerto Rico. That same yeas, Marines assaulted and took the Mexican port of k r a Cruz by sea, proving thcir a(3iliV to conduct such missions and consequently their importance to the Navy. political develDespite the Marines' Advanced Base focus, unfoldi~~g opments in the Caribbean during this period sltokvly forced the Corps tow d smal war operations as its primary mission. The stage for this shift away fl.c)m Advanced Base operations ironically was set by President Roosevelt. before the Corps even began experirns~tjngwith them, Cmcerned about asserting the Nonroe Doctrine in the Caribbean, Roosevelt issued his awn official corollary in 1904 in Mxhich he [expanded] the traditianal American defmsive posture into an assumption af U.S. respc~nsibilityfor the international gocd behavior-both pc~liticaland financial-~f Latin American nations. He declared in effect that if nations within the American defensive zone in the Western Hemisphere failed to meet their legal obligations, the United States would see that they did m, by direct military intervention if necessaryin7

Wth this carollary, Koosevelt effectively p ~ v e n t e dEuropean c ~ d i t o r s .from intervezzhg in Caribbean affairs bp assurning an American right to

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guarmtee European financial interests in those countries, The U~zited States would itself intervene in other natims to set their finances striright, usually by t a k i q ower anci acting as the rczceiver of Customs funds. From ~ S and olfner creditors would be paid off while the those ~ L I I ~European nation's finances we= set straight. The first country for which the cmllary was applied was the Dominican Republic in 1904. That intervention, and similar olzes that followed, were peaceful and successful, so that the Carps r m I y had to occupy the filtancially troubled nations and even then did not bave to fight. H w ever, beginning in 1,915 the nature of h e r i c a n intervention changed when President Woodrow Wilson offered armed forces to the Domhican a t for its protecticm, Although the offer was politely declined, in one stroke "the policy [of h e r i e a n guarantees] had Chus been extended, from financial sulpemi&ion to the necessary control to assure the maintenance of peace."log The pmblem was whether such actions could be construed as initiating war. One interpretation, widely believed at the tirne, stated "if you land m e secticsn of the Army that is war." Yet "you can l a d a Sailor or a Marine a d it is not considered war."jo9 Thus, t0 prevent war, the Corps assumed full responsibi1i.l-yas the land arm of the Navy for protectjng instaIled governments in the Caribbean. Haiti, the Dominican RegubEc, and Nicaragua wcrdd pmve to be tbe test cases of the its ability to accomplish Chat mission. While the tension between the Advanced Base and intervention missions &bed and flowed, the hlfarines we^ sloLvly expanding their training sygem, In 1915, the Corps established the Field Artillery khoal because this task was felt impmtmt for Advanced Base work as well as for expeditimary duty. 'fl-te Corps also sent: officen; to the various Army schook-swh as the Army Machine Gun School-to receive kaining. Not all training was military in naturc, Zlowever, The Marine Officers' School in 1917 taught roaei-buitding as wetl.110 P~surrtabiythis reflected Marhe experiences in Haiti as well as kstfiutional anticipation that the State Department might reqrrire the Corps to engage in similar activity in the future.. Despite the haeasing Marine Corps emphasis upon training, howevcr, the Commandant occasionally closed some of the schools fos a year or more to send troops off to expeditionary duv.111 Most important, during this period the Marines developed tbrir own prdessional journal-Marine Goys Guzcrtte-as a mechanism, for promoting the interchange of ideas among offjcers, Previously, officers had d y been able to read (and hardy write for) the Navy's Proceedings, which cmtained no articles about small wars until five yeass after the landkg in Haiti. Marhe ofiicers may have d s o read the Arcmy" l~zfantryMagazine, which contained only a few relevant artides (on the Philippines) during the immediate pre-World War E period, Now they had their own

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prdessional journal. hdeed, the very first issue, in 1916, started a deba.t.e over fuhnre missions that would not end even after one of the principal authors, Maj. John Russell, became Commandant two decades later. In the meantime, MariJles would be sent to fight a type of war far hvhich they had never planned+mtinental war in Europe. In the postmr period the Corps continued advancing officer education and took a nascenl interest in produchg its own forma) doctrine. The intellectual pursuit of rrrilitary knowledge and training was elevated by new Corpwschools, just as the A r q had done twenty p a r s prior with the establishment of the Army War College and the Schools of the Line at Fort Leavmwor.th, New l a n d i ~ gF o m Malzz~aleditions were written to reflect the experiences of World W r I. From the perspcetive of 1920, one might not have seen the renaissance in fomal Marine doctrhe coming. Nevertheless, oficer tralnjng for the Marine Corps can be said to have entered the modem age after World War I. NaturallyI Chat seminal conflict dominated contempctrary Masine thhking abuut war. The Commmdmt" report of 1939, for example, contained only three paragraphs on Haiti and the Dominican Republic despite the heightened mtiguercilla: effort under way in bath countries.m The remaining dozen or so pages were devoted to Marine experiences ican Expeditionary Force (AEF) in France. The war's himy Marine Corps schools was predictable: "Due to the recentness of the Vllorfd War, the new curricuIum, understandably, emphasized infantry in land operations, and was strwgly influenced by the teachings and methods of the Army-"ll" Moreover, the war had brought about a sixfold increase in the size oi the officer corps since the beginnirrg of the Dominican intervention. Even though that number was whittled duwn after the war, as Figure 2.1 shows, the Marines now had a new authorized level of approximately 3,000 officers, still a threefold expansion over a period of three years (19261919). Most of these officers needed professional trainhg beyond the hasty trahin.g they received in the AEF camps in France, Thus, the mdant J o h Lejeconsoldation and expansion of the schools by Co une was a naturd reaction to institutional growing pains (see Figure 22)Similarly, the offiicers assigned to teach at tlte xhools we= more likely to have served in the AEI;, rather than pull officers out of the hcrt Dominican campaigns. Thus, again, it W= natural that World War I tfiillking wodd dominate the curriculram in the earliest p a r s of the new schools. Nonetheless, as it became clearer in the aftermath of the war that the Marhes would never have the requisite resotlrces to prosecute war on a continental scatc-resources the Army had and could. apply to that mission-the Marines began to face the prtlbIem of what mission they would undertake in the postwar period. This uncertainty; plus the newness of

FIGURE 2.1 Grow-th of the Officer Corps, 1915-1 940. Navy Department, Register of t k Commissiunlrd nlzd Warrnlzt Officers of the Ulzited States Nnzy n ~ Mal.z'ne d Cotps (Wshington, BC: Government 13rintingOffice, various years, lli315-1940)

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establishing a modern, rigorous, proft.ssiona1 education syskm, k d the Marines over the next two decades to hedge in their trairzhg and doctrhe. As a more contemporary author put it: "It must first of alf be real.ized that no system of school can possible cover alil the possible c m t i n gencies of war, and therefo~,it is of-great importance to make all tactical trainjng as dastic and adaptable as possible,"ll" The reorganizafion of formal :Marhe officer training began in 1919 on Parris Island wheln the Hrst class of twentp-nine ofiicers was enrolled for twenty-two weeks of dassroom schooling, as opposed to the more prac"cicum-orientedtraining that had heetofare existed.ljV:ll course syllabj from several years later are m y guide, this first class was preoccupied primarily with general tactics that would serve midlevel officers in most any type of war. fn January 1921), the Marine Corps Schools were moved from Parris Islmd and Philadelqhia and formally reconslituted at Quan-

Hktosical and Institzi timznl Cc~fztext for Learrzi~zg 31891: Schc3ol of Application

1408: Marine Officers School 1917: Officer Training School 1919: Officer infantry School 1Et:Maine G r p s 5chooi J Basic Course Zf Comyany QfficersT~ourse

2 FF'ield OfficersTourse

% 1934: Marine Corps Schmls J Basic School Zf Junior Officers' School

2 Senior Officers3chool FIGURE 2.2 Evolution of the Marine Corps Schools, 1891-1934. Maj. C.H. Mel-calf, ""A History of the Education of Marine Officers," Marim Ct~rpsGazette, vof. 20, no. 2 (May 1936); Robe& B&s Heinl Jr., Soldiers of t ! ~ Sm: The Unit& SC~tes:Srii"l~Corps, 1775-2962, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Pub. Co. of America, 1991j, p. 254

SC3URCE:

tico. Fisst estabbshed was the Field Clffkers' khool. It focused on trai.ning offjcers& w e the rank of cagtajn (i.e., majors thrnugh colunels), The following year, 1921, the Company 0fficers"hool was establilihed to train majors, captains, and exceptional lieutenants in company-level officership. &out two dozen officers were sent ually to each of these schools fnr approximately twenty houfs of instmction per week for fiirty-five weeks. Even .crhough the schools were renamed h 1934, their basic structure remained the same for the two decades yrecedhg Wbrld. War II. For at least the first decade af the new schools%existcmce, "the curricul~xmmirrored that of the Army's staff sehaol at Fort ZJeavenworthm d the studies centered. arwnd Army doctris\e, Army orgmizatim, and Army pmhlems."flWarine officers did not have to attend these schools, though, to receive A r m y hdoctrination. They could elect instead to anend any one of a nunnber of Army schools: the Xnfantry School at Fort B m i n g ; the %hod of the Line of the A m y Generd Staff Clollege; the A m y Artillery %hoots; the Chemical Warfare khool; the Signal Corps khool; and the Judge Advocate Generals School.117 Similarly reflecting their naval tradition, officers could also attend the Naval War Coilege and the new Naval Aviation School. Finallyi,the Basic Officers' %hod was established in 1922

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to give recruited officers their first tralinhg in the Corps*'That s m e year, a correspondenceschool for field officers was established under the aegis of the Marhe Corps Institute based upcm coursework from the International Correspctnde~~ce Scbools of Scranton, X"ennsyJvania.""e field garrison schools were also set up under the aegis oi this school. For the next ten years, mtil the establishment sf the Fleet Marhe Force in 1933, t-he C o v s walked a middle line, teachhg Army and Navy methods of warfare. This is evident in the Corps" training exercises of the tirne, I'he Corps undertook s o w of its earliest amphibious warfare exercises when it held Advanced Base training with the Navy at Guantanamo, Cuba, and at Culclbra in 1922."Weanwhile, that same year a large battle exercise was conducted at Gettysburg under the c a m a n d of now Brig. Gen. Smedley Butler (Medal of Honor whner in Haiti). Among other things, the Marines reenacted Pickett" charge. h lectures and.presentations at GettMurg, i?narine officers ft,eused m lessons learned from the battles of the Americm Revoltrt-ion and Civil War. In 1925, the Corps conducted mother Advanced Base exercise on Oahu, Hawaii, The vaciliatrion between Arlny and Navy teachings wcruid conti11u.e until, as the following chapters show, the Mwimes began developing their own missim-trahing regimen and, dtirnately doctrjne. t"nti.1 that time, though, the Cctrpumtinued to struggle with an uncertainty over mission, whifh in turn was a product of the vagaries of Wilsonian foreign policy OTI the one hrmd., tlne Corps had been sent to fight in a conthental war, but the growth of isolationism made the prospects of a similar war appear r e ~ ~ o tCln e . the other hand, the Corps waged two simultaneous small wars m d continued to occupy those countries, all the while intervening in other Caribbean nations. So what was their prirnaq missitm? Was is to wage continmtal-style war? Was it to suppress insurrectionary tendencies and show the flag by force in Lath American debtor nations? Or was it to become an Aclvanced Base force that seized and proteckd ports and fueling st&ions for the Navy? As the schools were being established in the first years of the 1 9 2 0 ~the ~ Corps as an institution did not have clear allswers to these qwstrions. Ncrt until a joint h r m y - N a v y board determined roles and missions in 1927 would they- Meanwhile, practical reasons kept the Corps feaning toward Army teaching. For example, large-scale (i.e., S h a r p s b u ~and Gettysburg) exexises were undertake~~ because the Corps could not hold joint exercises wif-;hthe fleet; the Navy" sshlps were all committed dsewherc around the globe. Institutional Context: Marine Racrtrine pre-Haiti

As one w o d d assume, if not expect, Marint. Corps doctrke followed the same path as its training regimen, vacillating between Navy and Army

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procedures. For its first c e ~ ~ t uof r yexistence, most of the Marine dwtrine for duty aboard ship was borrowed from the Navy whife that for shore duty was borrowed from the I"irmy+Up through the first decade of the 1 8 0 0 ~the ~ Marines trained with the same manuals used by the Arl~y, particularly Friedrich von Stcuben's Regulafiol.zsfor the Order 6"Discipli~ze of the Troqs of fhe Usliked Statc.s,"O From then until the Semhole Wars ol the 1P120s and 1830s, "the drill and tactics tau$ht to Marines weso those prcscrihed by Winfield Scott's Itfantry Tactics,"lZ That lasted until the immediate pwt-Civil War pwiod when the Corps Cumlnanciant worked with Emory U'pton on his I~qantryTUctics (1867) and szlbseyuently ad.opted the manual (in 1876) fnr Marine rase.1" As one historian of the period noted: There seems to have been little effort made to digest the lessons in military tactics learned during the Civil War and to teach them to the personnel of the Corps. Being a marine or soldier in those days war; a practical kind. of profession, learned only by experience and by personal contact with older men. Practically the only bomks available on tactics and strategy until near the close of the period were Ec>reignpublications. Upton" sand Wagner's works on tactics and relatczct subjects then became the standard. Not many marine officers, however; took the study of their prc~fessionseriously.~~

The Corps did not dcvelop its own travling manual until 1885: It was entitled the Marisle Covs ivfulzual,'21 It borrowed from both Army and Navy manuals to give Marine training a combhed flavor of skirmishhg, riflery, bayonet, ceremonies, sea artillery, swimming, boating, signds, and broaeiswod."~In 1.905, the Navy produced its own manuaj for expeditionary duty, l a f ~ d i ~ zForce , y u ~ Small ~ d Anw Irzsfructiolzs, Urn."'" It borrowed heavily from the Army" 1904 Infclntry Drill Recq~~latiuns, :It also borrowed discussions on elements of scouting Eram the British Aids fo Scozrti~~g."~ The Navy revised this mmual twice, including once in 15312 to accord with chmges in provisions of the A m y " 11311 Itfantry Drill Reg~d~lticms.1"NW the :Navy manual contairred the Army's secticm m minor warfare i,n its entirev. This blatant use of Army doctrhe m y have been typical of the Corps, but it was strange comjng from the Navy. PerI - r a p d e Navy boards writing and ~wisingthe m m u d felt out of their area of expertise djscussing operations ashore and so turned to the mast likely source of experience. Meanwhile, to supplement the Navy manual, the Corps used other standard Army textbooks for tactics and field engineering, in.clrading Wagner's two volumes on Tactics and fhc Seczlrify @hfovrvrili.z'o~+~z~ When the Army in 1918 produced the small Stzrdies iv1 MZirZm Tactics, the Corps may have b o r r m d this monotgraph for their muse in duty ashore.130

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In the process of borrokving doctrine for expeditionary duty the Corps borrowed what little doctrine the Army had. written for operating in small wars, which focused predomfnately on patrol tactics. I'hus, as the Marhes went- into Haiti they were oMicialiy exposed only to the Army's limited view of small wars generated prirrcipally frm their Philippine experimces. Briefly recapitdated, this meant that the Marines would face ill-orga,nized forces endcavoring "to win by stealth or by force of superior numbers, empfoyjng ambuscades, sudden daz;hes or rushes, and hand-to-hand fighting."=j In response, the Marines shcruld operate in s~nalluniks, up to the con?pany level. Because they generally would have insufficient inteliigence, they would. have to march and camp ready to deploy their firepower at a mommtfs notice, On the march, tlanking patrols would probably be impossible, and adLrance g a d s were not advisable. As trails would be narrow#the column of twos or files would be a convenient formation. If rushed from the Rank, such a colu able to face and fire t w a r d either Rmk. Fi,ndy, night operations wcre highly advisable: ""lrmgular troops ramly provide proper camp protection, m d they may frequently be surprised m d sevewly punished by a properly co~tductednight march and attack.'"3z Missing from th .Army%ddoctrine, and thus Marhe doctrine as well, w a several measures that the &my undertooii in its campafgns and that the Marines Corps would undertake as well in each of its t h e small wars, There was m disc~ssimof garrisoning. There was no discussion of what types of tactics would counter the ""c-merrty'sown methods." There was no discussion of the special htelXigence efforts required against insurgents. There was no discussion of forming native constabulary forces. Finally there was no discussion of search-and-destry ogeratims or measures for determining t%le success of the sntall war effort. During the course of the HaiGan campaigs, the Marhes would have to discover on their own the utility of these measures, but to their credit they would do so with sttccess. In the process, hdividual Marhes would learn from their experiences and begin trmsmitting t h i r knowledge to fellow officers &rough informal and formal mechanisms, evenbally contributing to a body of lessons learned about s~nallwars. The final cmlmination of the transmission process, thou*, would take twenty years from the first landing in Haiti. Notes l . Carf von Clausewitz, On War, @d.and trans. Michael Hctward and 13eter Paret (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), p. 122. Thjs thought is present throughout books 1 and 2 (van CXawewitz used the term ""buok" "for what are actually parts of a single volume).

Historical and Institzi timznl Cc~fztext for Learrzi~zg 2. ibid., p. 1 2 , 3, Ibid., p. 122. 4. Clausewitz, On War, book 2, chap. 6. 5, Cf. Repor2 of the Lieutenant General Commanding the Army, Annual Report I?( the War Department-, 3900, vol. 2, pt. 4 (Washington, BC: Government Printing Office, 4900); Lt, Caf. James Parkel; "%me Random Notes on the Fighting in the Philippines,'"jclumnl of the MiEiCaq Scrzrice institution c?f the Utzited Stnfes, vol. 27 fl"dc>v.19QQ), p. 324. Ffe~after,editions of the Annual Report c$ the War Dep~rCnzenC are cited as ARWD, along with the relevant year (which r q r e x n t s both the year to which the report pertains and the publication date), volume number, and part number. 6. Gienn Anthony May, Bntflefor Batartgas: A Phlli;~pi~?e Provi~?cenC War (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1991), p. 33. Cited fram Gen. Gec3rge Morgan to AG, 4 Biv-, 8 AC, 7 Feb. 1900, RC: 94; Col. Geurge Anderson to AG, Wheaton" Brig., 9 Feb. 4900, RG 94; and Gen. T11eodore Schwan to Henry C. Corbin, 16 Feb. 4900, Con. 1, HCC. '7. Brian M. Idinn, The U.S. Army and Cozlnterlnsurgcszcy izz the Pbzilippine War, 2899-2902 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolha Press, 19891, p. 203, 8. John M. Gates, Scltoolboaks n~zdKrags: Tbw Unifed Stales Arvrzy i~zthe Pj~ilippines~ 1898-1902 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973), p. 230. 9. Moro is Spanish for '* Muc>r." 10. A. E, Feuer#Cornkt Diary: Episodesfvorn the P.lisEury of Ctrc 22nd Regimep~t, 2866-2905 (New York: Raeger, 1491), p, 167, 14. Repo&sof the Division and Department Commandera ARWCZ, 2903-1909, 2 2. Reports of the Divisic)~and Department Commanders, ARWD, 2 9137, vol. 1, pt. 3, p. 249. 2 3. Rqorts of the Bivisian and Department Commanders, ARWD, 29138, vol. 2, pt. 3 p. 215. 14. The Platt amendment of 4901, ratified by the U.S. Senate simultaneously with the new Cuban constitution, arrc>gatedto the United States the right to intervene in Cuban affairs. Tfze Xblilitnty Qccupatio~of Cuba, 25. Allan R, Milltrz-tt,The Politics ofI1zterz7enfh~: 1906-3909 (Colurnbus: Ohio State Univ, Press, 1968), p. 60. 26, Ibid., p. 1251'7. Repc~dof the Secreta ry of War, ARWD, 1906, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 458. 2 8, There were several reasons, explicit and implicit, for assuming the strategy, A key reascyn was a mismatch beween means and ends. There were not enough trwps on hand to enforce a military solutic~nfor achieving domirrion. Even if the appropriate number of troops were available in Manila, they could rarely travel in time to where they were needed most. Most districts were isolated frclm Manila, as well as from each c~ther,due to dense vegetation, bad roads, and other terrain features generally unsuitable to rapid overland travel, Thew tzrel-e, however, enough troops to implement governmental and municipal reforms to better the lives of Manila" residents. The administratlion"~polity was that by ma king an example of Manila, the capital city, Filipino natives would see their interests coincide with American interests. In turn, it was thought, the other townships and villages would spc~ntane~usly accept American dominic~n,and oppasitic~nwould cease.

Another reasotn f o x adopting the strategy of benevolence lay in the civilizing mission that political progressives in the United States assumed tvas their duty otverseas: " m e army's work to promote pubtic healtl-t, judicial rehrm, tax equalization, honest government and public education often mirrored work done in these same areas by progressive reformers in America" Fates, 1973, p. 67). McKinley himself stressed the civilizing mission in his letter of instructions to Gen. Wesley Merritt, commander of U,S, forces in the Philippines, Local customs, laws, and government rc3utines were to be respected within reason. American troops were to protect the people and ensure that private property was respected, Interestingly, such benevolent political oversight would become evident again later in State Department orders to the Marine commanders in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. A third explanation for adopting the sbategy of benevolent assimilation is the enviromental conditions under which U.S. troops verated in the PhiXipphes. Pryor sanitation and the climate both contributed to sc~aringdisease rates in populated areas. Debris and trash were strewn all about Manila, creating a significant public health hazard, particularly given the large population of the city. Indeed, smallpox broke out among Spanish prisoners of war in the months after American occupation. The threat of fudl-ter; large-scale epidemics led to the enactment of municipal sanitation measures. 19. Previously, the edzlcatimal curriculum had been dctrninated by the religious teachings of the Spanish Catholic priests rather than the teaching of discrete subjects such as math, reading, and history 20. Report of the Secretary of War, ARWL), 1900, vol. 1, pt. I, p, 12; Gates, Scfzoolbooksatid Krags, pp. 1353,212. 21. Reports of 1,ieutenant General Commanding the Army and Department Commanders, ARWD' 11902, vol. 2, pt. 9, p. 192, 22. Gates, Schoolbooks nlzd Krags, p. 275. 23. Repasts of Lieutenant General Commanding the Army and Department Commanders, ARWT;? 1902, vol. 1, pt. 9, p. 526. 24. Repc~rtsof the Divisictn and Department Commanders, RRWB, 19(39, vol. I, pt. 3, p. 225. 25. Gen. Bliss described one commander's method for dealing with Morn prisoners. Whenever one of the guards or officers became suspiciow, he would fire one shot in the air. Instantly; at1 prisoners would hit the ground, holding their arms out at right angles from their bodies. Anyone left standing was wually shot immediately. To demonstrate the effectiveness of this method, the commander pulled out his pistd without warning and fired it, startling even Bliss. Every single prisoner dropped immediately including a few who, knee deep in a stream, simply dropped into the water facedown and held their breath until pulled out by a guard. Diary from 1905, Tasker H. Bliss Papers, Army VVar College, Military e~ Barracks, Carlisle, PA, History I ~ t i t u t Carlisle 26. Millcstit, hlitics qf Xtz terzlrtntioitn, p. 1332. 27. Repctd of Gen. MacArthur, AXWD, 1900, vol. 1, pt. 4, p. 415. 28. Gates, Schoolbooks n ~ Krags, d p. 21 2, 29. One brave mjssion probably did more to heighten the visibifity of the scouts than any other-the captuw of Aguinaldcl in March 4901, In that month,

62

Hktosical and Institzi timznl Cc~fztext for Learrzi~zg

Gen. Funston set out with a company of Macabde Scouts to capture Aguinaldo when his hideout was discover-ed through captured documents. To disguise his effort; Funston and the other American officers passed themselves off as prisoners being taken to Aguinaldo by a guerrilla band. Despite extreme starvation and personal privation, the ruse was a success, Funston pulled off his coup with two scout officers, personally capturing Aguinaldo. 30. Gates, Schoolbooks ntzd Krags, p. 208. 31. Repc~l"cof Gen. MacArthur, AX WD, 19C10f vol. 1, pt. 4, p. 345. 32- Cf. dispatch of Col. Gardner, ARWD, 1900, volt. 1, pt. 4, p. 394. 33. Gen. Otis himself began emphasizing this measure in his action reports of 489&4899, Given that Army intelligence believed the Filipino insurgents had nc, more than 25,886 rifles as of October 1899 and that few could be impctrted from abroad (despite the many attempts to do so), this measure was used as a model indicator of how well the Army was or was not succeeding in its pacification mission. Report of the Secretary of War, ARWD? 1899, vcll, 4, pt. 4, pp. 63-73; Report of the Lieutmant General Commanding the Army, ARWD! 290OSvol. 1, pt. 4, p. 211. 34. May, Battlefar Bata~g-ns,p. 256, 35. Idinn,U.S. Anny and Gnuntcrins~~rgency, p. 5'7. 36. Ibid., p, 117'. 37. Gates, Sdzoolbaoks nlzd Krags, p. 254; cited in 57th Gong., 2d sess., 1903, Senate Dc>cument213, pp. 2-3. 38. Dispatch by Maj. Walleu; 22 Nov. 1901, Report of Brig. Gen. James Wade, Commander, Department of the Southern Philippines, Reports of Lieutenant General Commanding the Army and Department Commanders, ARWD, 1902, vol. 1, pt. 9. 39. Linn, U.S. Army and C c s u n t e r i n s u r g p. 27. 40. k o u t s were either separate or part of established military unlb and thus under militmry authority. By contrast, auxiliaries had police-like functions and thus came under political cmtrol. 41, Feuer, Cvfnbnt Dlirqf p, 468. 42. These colums, though large, still had to guard against the Moro Ranking tactic. To do m, officers scjmetimes broke their patrols into two or three sections separated by roughly one hundred yards. Thus only one or two sections of the column were Iikety to be attacked, altr.twing other sections to outflank the Moros. Officers also quickly developed another innovative technique. Men would count off as odd- and even-numbered. When Moro riflemen opened fire, the point guard tzrould counterattack to the front, The remairzing men would pivot to the left a r right, depending on whether they were odd C J even ~ in the count offt and face both Rank. In this way, all men h$their backs covered by two fellc~wsoldiers in the fighting that ensued. If they were lucky, some of the men might have sawed-off shotguns, which w e l ~ considered the best weapom for close-in jungle and trail fighting. Since the m n also needed machetes and bolos of their own for various trail activities, they quickly learned to fight with these as weft. Repc~l"cs of the Division and Department Commanders, ARWD, 3904, vol. 1, pt. 3, g. 279. 43. Dispatch of Capt. f. J. Pershing, Reports of the Division and Department Commanders, ARWCZ, 1303, vol. 1, pt. 3, p. 324.

Historical a ~ X~zstitutional d ContextJar Legrning

63

44. Annual Reports of the Division and Department Commanders, ARWD, 19M, vol. 4, pt. 3, p. 215.

45. Millett, Pt~ll'ticsof Inlerve~ztio~z~ pp. 125-226. 46. Repc~rtof the Scretary of War, AXWD, 1907, u d . 1, pt, 4, p. 172, 47- Milletl, Politics oflnterve~ztion,p. 226. 48. Linn, U.S. Army alzd Cour?ken'nsurgency,p. 169, 49. T h e e professional journals provided military reading h r officers of the day: the Journal cf the Military Service lnstituf ion of the Unifed States, the ju~irnnlof the U.S. Itfantq Association (later the ItGn~tryfoz-lrrzal),and the fozkmal of the US, Cavnlty Associal2tiun (later the Gazpaly journal). They were published quarterly; generally with a half dozen main a&icles each, or twenty-four annually, Between the three journals, then, ower seventy main articles on military affairs were published each year* 50. Lt. Col. Robert L. Bullard, "Military Pacifieatian," "urnal c?f the MiEifa~yService Insfitutiorz offhe LInil-lrdStatesf vol. 46 (Jan.-Feb. 1910), pp. 1-24. 51. Capt. W. L. Siberl; "Military Occupation of Northern Luzon," "fournal of tlte Militnfy Service hzslitution #the Unifed Slrates7vol. 30 (Jan.-Mar:19021, pp. 404408. 52. Capt. J, N. Munro, "The Philippine Native Scouts," 1 1 q ~ n fjozdrvral, q vol. 2, no. 1 (July 1905), pp. 178-190; Maj. Witfiarn H. Johnston, jf"E@yment of Philippine %out5 in War," "~ourr-mlof the Militnrp Service Institztiiorz of the United Stakes, vol. 38 @an.-Mar=1906), pp. 67-77'. 53. Capt. Charles D. modes, "The Utilizatim of Native Troops in Our Foreign Possessionti," "jclumnl of the Military Service Instr'tutiorz I?( trlte Uftited States, volt. 30 (Jan. 1902), pp. 1-21; Col. lames W. Powetl, "The Utilization of Natirie Troops in Our F o r e i p Possessions,'"u~rrrzail of the Mililtz~yService I~rzstitutiouof tlze Utzited Sl~tes,VOX.30 (Jan. 1902), pp. 23-41. 54. Lt. Col. Robest L. Bullard, "The Army in Cuba," Joumnl of tlte Milr'laty Service Insliizllion oftlze Ut~l'tedStates, 1701. rill Wuly-NOV.19071, pp. 152-1 57. k Militay Servicc 55. Lt. Louis McLane Hamilton, "bungle Tactics," )t?urr-znlof E Tnstiflrfion cf the Unild Stales, vol. 37 Uune-Nov. 19051, pp, 23-28; Maj. Augustus P. BLocksam, "A Retmspect and Prospect of Mrar,""our~lnl offhe Militay Service Instittition of the United States, vol. 35 (June-Nov. 1904), pp. 21S226; BulXard, ""The Army in Cuba,""p. 152-157. 56. Capt. Peter E Eaub, "The Island of Samar and the Capture of Lukban,'" jozrrnnl of !he Military Service Institution of flte United Slates, vol. 33 (June-No% 1903), pp. 369-381. 57. Maj. C. J. Crane, " m e Fighting Tactics of Filipinc)~,"Jozrmnl of flip Military Sef-zliceInsfitzrtEorz oflfze United S r n t e ~vol. ~ 31 Uune-Nov: 1902), p. 497; Lt. Edwin A. Hickman, 'Ternarks on the Last Days of the Insurrection in Southern Luzc>nfP' jourrlal tf Cfze U.S. I n f a ~ t yAssuciatiorz, vol. 14, no, 50 (Oct. 1903), pp. 300,306. 58, Hickman, ""Lst Bays of the Insurrection'" Maj. Hu& D. Wise, "Notes on Field Srvice in Samar," Tn$ztzlq jounznl, ucd. 4, na. 1(July 14Q7),pp. 3-55; Bullard, "Military I>acificatian.*' 59, Capt. John R.M. Taylor, The Philippizze Inszcrrecfion Ag~z'zzsi:Clip Unifed Slntes, vol. 2, May 19, 4898 to ftdly 4, 3902 (TNashington, DC: War Depadment, Bureau of Insular Affairs, 1906). 60. Ibid., p. 27-HS.

64

Hktorical and Institzi timzal Cc~fztext for Learrzi~zg

61. Wise, "Notes on Field Sewice," ppgp. 3-55. 62. Parker, "Some Random Notests,"p. 330, 63. Repc~rtof the Secretary of War, ARWQ 1908, vtd. 1, pt. 1, p. 35'7. Tn fact, refer-ences to the Russct-Japanese war as exemplar of the modern tvay of cornbat litter the numerous repor2s of the chief of staff and athers for many years after the Cuban campaigns. 64. Timotfiy M. Nenningeu; "The Army Enters the 20th Century, 19041927,'" in Ag~insEAll El-~emit>s: Inlerprelntions cfMilirc6ary Histo~yfionzCof~p~ial Ti~rzesto Ilte Present, ed. Kenneth J. Hagan and Wiliiam 13. Roberts ( N e w York: Greenwoad Press, 19861, p. 228. 65. Journalsf Reparts and Related Papers of the 3rd Division, 1W3-1910, vol. 9, memorandum regc~rtno. 31, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, DC, Hereafter, Record Croup 465 is cited as R(; 165. 66, Nenninger, "Army Enters the 20th Century," p. 229, 67. Journals, Reparts and Related Papers of the 3rd Division, 1W3-1910, vol. 7, memorandum report no. 258, RC; 165. 68. Army War College Instructional Records, 1912-1940, RG 165. 69. Ibid. '70. Arvrly War College Probknz #2 2, U~zitedSfales-jnpnn: Considerafions 14pon 170ssible biostilities zuitfr Japarz, 1Q June 1907; p, 56, Army War College, Military History Institute, curricular archives, 1906-1912, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, FA. Hereaftex; the Military History Imtitute is cited as MHI. 71. Outliue of Course of Instruction: Anrzy War College Course 1?( 2909-1 910, p. 6, MP.11, curricular archives, 1906-1942. 72. Army War College course 191S1924, vol. 2, Problems and Exercises, 13G 165. The General Stai'f;in their fascination with the Prussian institution on which they modeled themselves, even took to calling their map maneuvers '* Kriegspiel." 73,R m y War College Course in Military Rrf, 1909-2920: Oversms Probt~msI--& MH1, curricular archives, 19UCi-1912. 74, Military Monograph opt Cziba, Army War College Course in Milifnry Art, 1909-1910: Green and Blzie ProbEerrz (No. 3), p, 46, MHf, curricular archives, 490&1912. 75. Milz'fn?yILlonogmph on the Dolrziniccan Republic, A r ~ r ~War y College Cozrrse in Military Ark, 1909-3910: Greefz and Blue Problent (NO.31, p. 86, MHl, curricular archives, 1906-1 912, 5%. Military Munogmplz on Cmta Rica, Arnzy War College Course izz M i l i f n y Art, 1909-1910: G ~ e r zand Blue Prc~blcm(No. 3), NlExfI, curricular archives, 490&4912; Mil1'1.n~Notes on Nicramgtia, Arnzy War College Course ir-z Mr'lr'tn~y Art, 1909-2910: Green and Blue Problem (No. 31, MH1, curricular archives, 19061912. 77. Militaty Notes on Nicaragua, p. 21, 78. Arthttr L. W a ~ e l ;The Setvice of S~ctlrityand Information (Kansas City MO: Hudson-Emberfy), 5th ed. (1896), 9th ed, (1899. '79. Maj. Williarn F;.. Spurgin, Irzfanf~yDrill Regztlnfions, Exfended O r h r , 1898 (Kantias Cily; MO: Hudson Kimberly 18911). 80. Wagner; Seczrrify and Infovmafiozf, 5th ed. (1896), p. 144.

81. hqanfry Drill Regulations, Extended Qrdel; 1902 (Kansas City, MO: Hudson Kimberly, 11902). Z ~ ~ ~Regztl~tions,1904 (Kansas C i t MO: ~ Hudson Kimberty, 1904); 82. T T T ~ Q P Drill Capt.. M. B. Stewad and Capt. R. C. Davisf Motes ~alzdSziggcstit~rzsorz the New Znf n ~ t r yDrill Regzilnifions (Kansas City, M O : Franklin Hudmn, 1905). 83. Boop"in Cnmpraigtz: Xegul~fiottsfor the Army of the Utzited Strafes, 1903 (Kantias City, MO: Hudson Kirnberliy, 1903). 84. ArtX-rur L. Wagner; Qrganimii;ltisnand Tactics, 4th ed-.(Kansas C i t MO: ~ Hudson-Kimberliy, 1901). 85. Wagner; Organization and Tactics, '7th ed-.(1906). 86- Wagner; Sec14rity and I~zformnt iurz, 44th ed. (1903). 87. [U.S. Anuyl Field Service Regtilatio~~s, 1905 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 11905). 88. Ibid., p. 217, 89. Ibid. 90. Ibid., p. 39. 91. [U.S. A r t ~ y Field l Servke Reguhf ions, 1905, zoiflt Antendmcnts to 1908 (Mrashington, DC: G w e m m n t Printing Office, 1908). 92. Proposed Field Semi;cc Regtilafions, Art-icles TI and 111: Tke Service of kfor~natl.on and Orders, 1908 (Fort Leavenwo&h, E: Army Service Schwls, 1908), p. 4. 93. [U.S. Arnzyl Field Service Regtil~tions,1910 (Washington, DC: Go?vernment Printing Office, 44910), pp. 4'1,495, 94. X~~fiznt~y Drill Regzllatious, 3922, witilt War Department Clzauges (New York: ecjnAppleton, 1917). Appendix 3 of this edition of the I n f ~ n t qDrill Rcgu~~ztiotts tains an outline of the 1910 editian. 95. Ibid. 96, Caz~allySeruie Regulntimzs, 2924 (Experinrentall (TNashington, DC: Govern.ment Printing Office, 1914). 97, Allan R, Mitlett, Semper Fidctis: The kll'story of ftw United Stakes Maritze Corps (New Ycfrk: Free Press, 1991), p. 6. 98, Clyde H, Metcaff#A i-Jisf.0~ offtic United Stakes m~larilzeCorps (New York: C. P. Putnam" s n s , 1939), chaps 2-3, 99. Millel-t,Semper Fidetis, p. 33; Metcall, A kll'storp, p. 26. 2 00. Metcalf, A Histo~y~ pp. 2 4,233, 101. Bid ., p. 84. 202. 130bert Bebs Heinl Jr., Soldiers of the Sea: Tke United States lLlnri~zeCorps, 1;77$-1962,2nd ed. (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Pub. Co. of America, 1991), p. 73; Metealf, A Hisfofy,p. 192, 103. Heinl, Soldiers of Elze Scn, pp. 101-106; Jack Shulimso)~,Tke Marir-ze Carp' Searchfor n Miss1;71z, 1880-1898 (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1993), pp. 94-95. 2 04, Shufimsrrm, Senrcfzfar n Mission, pp. 11,200-201, 105, Ibid., p. 206; Heinl, sol die^ of fhc Sera, pp. 427,4454. 206. Miflett, Scnzper Pidell's, p. 2 39; ""Report on Marine Corps Duplication of Effort Between Army and Navyf'' 17 Dec. 1932, g. 3, Marine Corps Research Center, Archives Branch, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA.

66

Hktorical and Institzi timznl Cc~fztext for Learrzi~zg

10'7. Capt. Stephen M. Fuller and Graham A. Cosmas, Marines in k l l ~Dor7tit~icnn Rep~lblic,191&1924 (Wshington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, History and Museums Division, 1974), p. 5. 108, Lt. Col, C. H. Metcalf, "The Marine Corps and the Changing Caribbean Policy," M a r i ~ eCor~jsGnzefte,vol. 21, no. 3 (Aug. 19372, p. 28, 109. Maj. Edwin N. McCtellan, "American Marines in Nicaragua," Mnrirre vol. 6, no, 2 (June 1921), p. 51. C c ~ fGazette, ~s 110.Gen. ]E&sterDessez, p. 12, Oral History- Golf ection, Marine Corps Historical Centeu; Washington, DC. 111.. Repc~E"cof the Major General Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, Annzlnl Reports of the Nnvy Depgrfmert t, 2 92 6 (Washington, DC: Govei-nment Printing Office, 1917).flereafttex;the Repc~rtof the Major General Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps from other editions of the Anntrnl Reporfs of lfze Mazy Deparfmertt is cited as ARND, along with the year to which the edition of Annttnl Reporfs pertains (the edition for a given year is published in the fc3llowing year). 212. ARNB, 2919. 113. Lt. Antltony A. Frances, "History- of the Marine Corps &hooXsfnMS, Dec. 1945, p- 27, Marine Corps Research Center, Archives Branch, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA. 144. ibid, 115.. Ibid. 146. ""A History of the Field Officers"Sch~ol,"Senior School Syllabi, ghedules, Synopsis, Regulations, Courses 1939-1 970, Marine Corps Research Center, Archives Branch, Marine Corps Combat Develr>pmentCommand, Quantico, !A. 2 17. Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 255. 118. ARNI), 1923, p. 965. 219, "fat amphibious training, however, looked less like the GixadalcanaX campaign and more like the simpler, unoppoxd landing exercises that EIIis and Harrington tzrrote about in the Mnritze Corps Glrzetfe. 120. Het'nl, Soldiers fl~eSea, p. 27. 121. Ibid., p. 65. 2 22, Millett, Selrziyer Fidelis, p. 111. 123. Metcalf, A Hisfofy,p. 245, 2 24. f-leinl, Soldiers of the f ea, p. 108, 125. Ibid., pp. 108-109. 226, Tke hndirzg-Force and Sruzall Arlrzs X~zstructiotzs,2905 (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1905). 127. ibid., p. 94. The section on scouting was copied from that tzrritten by Maj. Gen. Baden Pc)well, fc3'crtunderof the Boy kouts, based on his experiences fighting the 4900-1 902 Boyer War in South Af rica, 128, The knditzg-Force and Sruzall Arms X~zstructiotzs,2912 (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 11i342). 2 2 9 , Frances, "Marine Corps Schools," pp. 21. 130. Sfzldies in Minor TacCE'm, 1925 (Fort Leavenworth, K5: Army Service Schooiis Press, 1918). Unfortunately, although there are a few rare references to this document in Marine writings, it has disappeared from the Marine Corps

Historical a ~ X~zstz'tutional d ContextJar Legrning

67

Archives (box 12, Historical Amphibious File 263). The Army's archive at Fort Leavenworth. does not have a copy e i t l ~ e ~ 131 . T~?fanf ry Drill Regultkfions, 1931, zoz'lfh War fle~~7larfmt7flf 611~ngcs(New Yc3rk: Appleton, 1917), pp. 135-136. 132, k i d .

MAP 3.1 Haiti

Intervention in Haiti and Lessons Learned Conduct of the Small War Tn July 1915, an angry mob dragged Haitian President V, Guillaume Sam from hfs hiding place in the French legation in Port-au-Prhce and dismembered him-a fate not uncommon h r Haitim leaders" In the ensuing absence of g o v e m e n t authority, US, Marines under the command of Col. Littleton Waller landed on July 28 to protect Americm interests.1 W o days later, an angry mob &tacked U.S. Navy seamen on shore, killixrg two. The next day, the French Navy landed a guard. to reestablish security at its legation. Based on the premise of 'f"heodore Raoseveltfs to ktercorollary discussed in Chapter 2, the Marhe Corps was assig~~ed vene to help reestablish internal order and run elections. Reestablishing order prcrved more problematic than initially presumed. Wthin weeks the Mashes fotlind themselves embroiled in a slnall war agaillst bands of insurgents-the Cacos-who were supporting the political aspirations of Dr. Rosalvo Robo. Cacos were, in the eyes of the Nliarjnes, "sddiers [who] fought. i,n the hope of the pillage and loot which ~ s u l t e dfrom revolutions, As a general rule, they were on, the side of the 'outs,' and the men helped m e p s i d e n t to power often were fnstrume~~tal in driving him out a few m011ths later.'" "rice violent overthrow was the norm of Haitian political successorshlp, pxlesidential, aspirants in Haiti-in this case Bobo-habitual)y went to Caco chiefs to solicit armed m d political support in exchmge for fi~zancialpayments of varying kinds. Thus, well before the Masine intervention, Cacos had been a powerful, if chaotic, force in Hai"cian pofitics. As a result, it took the Marines over a year, until Late 19l1.6, to sttppress the rebellkg Caco bands. Two years later, however, two new Caco leaders emerged to rc-.ignite the rebellion. From 4918 to 1920, the Marhes undertook a second campaign to suppress the insusgemts, succeeding slOWfr until they killed

70

Intervention in Haiti

the Caco leaden; and dispersed their bands. mercafter, the Mari,nes were able to witihdraw into Port-au-Pri_nceand continue controfiing Haiti from the capital until their deparbre fifteen ycars later in 19%. The initial Marine laslding in 130rt-au-Prince comprhed sorne 330 Marines who required two days to complete their 1anding.Un additional five companies were sent as i m d i a t e reinforcements from G m tan-, Cuba. Seven morc companies followed in mid-August, and two weeks later an artilleq battalion of three companies was sent as well, Within a month, roughly 2,000 soldiers comprising the 1st and 2 n d Marines had bem transported to Maiti and placed under Col. Waller's c m m n d as the 1St Provisional Brigade." At first, the Marines concentrated on occupying and controlling Haiti's ports. This was donc Largely to eontrd f o ~ i g naccess to Haiti, particularly after the French guard landed. The Americans wmted no further foreip lmdings for fear some Eurapem power (the French in this case) might try to reestablish a permanent presence in Haiti, 'The Americans were worried that ""some such foreign power [mi&t] take advantage of an opportunity when we were othercvise engaged, to annex [Haiti], thereby establshing a base, wf-tence lightning blows might be directed against the Panama Canal, uur Gulf and South Atlantic ports, Puerto :Rico and Cuba."" The Woodrow WF1san admfnistration moved yuicl;ly to formalize its right to intervene in Haitian affairs when on August 24 it signed a treaty with the Haitian governmnt giving it iinancial and some political pmtectorate powers over L?fl of Haiti. From the pctrts, M a k e s moved to occupy the larger cities to maintain law and order. They initially met little resistance from the local populace. I-lowever, over the ensufng weeks Caco bands began instigating revolts outsidt. the nnajor cities, causjng the Marines to occupy towns where trouble occurred. Additionally, the two primary avenues oi food supply to Port-au-Prince became threatcmed by the emboldened Cacos, and platoons of Marines werc forced to spread out kom the Haitian capital in order to ensure the smooth supgly of food. into the city To deal with the rising tide of violmce, the Corps declamd an amnesty in August 11915 asld deelided to try to dj,sarm the Cacos. Waller also signed a convention with the primary Caco chicftajns promisixlg iinancial rewards in return fnr ceasing hatile activity a d giving up their w n and their followers' guns. Each Caco soldier surrel-tdering his arms would be paid in the native Haitian currency, five gourds, while the chiefs would be given twenv-five.6 All of the money was paid in a lump s~trnto the eh,iefs, wfio were to distribuk the money among their subchieftains and regular followers. Initidly, only 512 arms were collectd. The reward was then raised to ten gourds for soldiers and 100 for the chiefs,'?Still the m e s t y enjoy4 only modest success. 'The s m for Caco

Intervention irz Haiti

71

soldiers was raised yet agah to fifteen gourds, which had a negligible impact because it signaled to the Cacos that they might be able to hold out for even higher prices.8 &ring Octc.,ber and November, only 1,258 more arms were turned in."e Cacos were not disarming. Meanwhile, the Marines had already disbmded the ragtag governmnt amy.

Natzcre and Progression of the Inszcrgcrzcy I-lwing launched violt-mt rebellions from the mountainous and jungle interior of Hajti long before the twentieth century the Cacos were fairly adept at initiating and.engaging in guerrilla warfare even though they never were as organized or as well armed as their Filipino, Dominican, or Nicaragmn counterparts. Wben rninor Caco chiefs were not paid off by their higher chiefs during the 1915 amnesty several formed splinter groups that began attacking Marine patmls and outposts." C~acobands and sysnpat:hizers in the towns of Cap Walicn and Gonaives became openly hostile and rebellious to the p ~ j nof t deliberately interdicting supplies to tbose towns. 'I'he Mazines thus decided to disarm by force the l q e s t Cacos bands based in t-he province of Grand Riviere. Disaming the Cacos proved a tough task. First and foremost, the Cacos generally had better intelligence and,atfiough primitive, better cornmunicatinn networks than did the Ammican forces. By bowing Ml)nen and where Marine forces were expected to be, t h y could avoid or engage those forces as desired. Additionally, the Caclrs had .the advantage of knowing their home terrain well enough to establish hidden ambushes and to disappear durirrg an engagement. Like the insurgents on Samar ten years before, they also used conch shells and ""voodoo'~rurnsto communicate collected intelligence.11 As a result, the Cacos at first maiintained the initiative in the field and through ambushes held th initial,advantages of surprise while operating on the tactical offensive. In addition to superior information, the Cacos also unclerstood how to fight better-equipped forces in the jungle. First of all, they generally shot at the Rcrarines from long range. They fired upcm the small patrols constantly, but snrnetimes they would attack the town garrisons as wefl. Small attacl