Marx on the Choice between Socialism and Communism

Marx on the Choice between Socialism and Communism Stanley Moore This book clarifies a problem central to the current worldwide crisis of communism. That crisis reflects the extent to which communists now disagree about the nature

· ~~~~a'I~WoW~~~-gew from Deng, Brezhnev from the Eurocommunists is in the last analysis their choice of goals. Marx contrasts two types of postcapitalist economy: in one exploitation has been abolished but not exchange; in the other both have been abolished. Moore examines the arguments Marx offers to support

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Marx on the Choice between· Socialism and Communism Stanley Moore

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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Copyright© 1980 by Stanley Moore All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Moore, Stanley Williams, 1914Marx on the choice between socialism and communism. Bibliography: p. Includes index. I. Marx, Karl, 1818-1883. 2. Communism. 3. Socialism. 4. Communist revisionism. I. Title. HX39.5.M648 335.4'13 79-15876 ISBN 0-674-55092-7

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Preface Statement of the Problem: Lenin, Engels, Tugan-Baranovsky Arguments from Principles of Philosophical Communism, 1843-1844 Arguments from Principles of Historical Materialism, 1845-1848 Appeal to Hegel: The Critique of the Gotha Program Appeal to Hegel: Capital Two Types of Socialism: Marx against Marx Responses to Four Challenges, 1871-1880 Notes Works Cited Index

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Preface

On December 4, 1978, the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation broadcast its program, calling for overthrow of the government headed by Pol Pot and I eng Sary. According to an account published next day in the New York Times, among the abuses this declaration condemns are the establishment of communes and the abolition of money and markets. The Pol Pot government is accused of herding the Kampuchean people into camouflaged concentration camps, forcing them to overwork while providing them only the minimum of food· and clothing, so that they live in misery as slaves. In place of this system, the United Front promises to establish a planned economy with markets, banks, and money; to abolish forced labor; and to institute an eighthour work day with pay according to work done. From the standpoint of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, the program of the United Front is correct. It is true that wages and markets, money and banks, have no place in a fully communist economy. But, according to The Critique of the Gotha· Program and State and Revolution, the foundations for that economy must be built in a transitional economy-which Marx calls the lower stage of communism and Lenin calls socialism. This is a classless

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economy where workers receive incomes proportioned to their contributions and exchange those incomes for consumers' goods. The error of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary was not that their goal was incorrect, but that they tried to achieve it in the absence of its necessary conditions. Theirs was basically an error of timing. From the standpoint of modern revisionism, the proposal to restore wages and markets, money and banks, is correct for a more fundamental reason. A communist economy is incompatible with a complex culture. The goal of establishing such an economy, immediately or ultimately, is therefore incompatible with the goal of creating a social order where the free. development of each is conditioned by the free development of all. · The evidence of the historical record-stretching back to 191 7 and now including fifteen countries where communists hold power-renders wholly improbable the transition to communism predicted by Marx and Lenin. The Soviet Union, Brezhnev claims in his speech for the sixtieth anniversary of the October Revolution, has built socialism and is currently building communism. But where is the evidence that Soviet society is now closer to eliminating wages and markets than it was in 1939when Stalin, reviewing for the Eighteenth Congress the gains from five years of wholesale terror, entitled his report "From Socialism to Communism"? Where is the evidence that Chinese society is now closer to eliminating wages and markets than it was in 1958-when adulators of Mao, at the height of the Great Leap Forward, predicted transition to communism in the near future? Where is the evidence that Cuban society is now closer to eliminating wages and markets than it was in 1964-when Guevara, invoking the spirit of the Sierra Maestra, argued for the primacy of moral rather than material incen-

Preface

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tives in building socialism? Is there any evidence that any of these countries will be closer to eliminating wages and markets fifteen, twenty, forty years from now? Compared with its account of the transition to communism, has any other part of Marxian theory failed more decisively the test of practice? The dogma that socialism must be the prelude to communism has proved an increasingly serious obstacle to developing efficient, dynamic socialist economies in countries under communist control. A consequence has been the emergence, among economic theorists in Eastern Europe, of proposals for reforming existing bureaucratic socialist economies in the direction of market socialism. Liberman of the Soviet Union, Horvat of Yugoslavia, Brus of Poland, and Sik of Czechoslovakia exemplify this trend. Their common message is that socialist economic organization of the Soviet type, whatever may have been its initial advantages, is now a fetter on the forces of production. To suggest that replacement of bureaucratic socialism by market socialism is more likely than its replacement by communism is to reject almost everything Marx wrote on postcapitalist economic organization. Yet, though some of the Eastern European reformers explicitly reject Marx's views on economic development after the revolution, to the best of my knowledge not one supports his rejection by ana~yzing critically the arguments on which those views are based. Whether Marx's conclusions are invoked by Leninists or discarded by revisionists, his reasoning remains obscure. To dispel that obscurity is the purpose of this book. It attempts to identify and evaluate Marx's arguments for the superiority of communism over socialism, together with his reasons for predicting replacement of capitalism

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Preface

by the type of socialism sketched in The Critique of the Gotha Program rather than by the type implicit in the program of Lassalle. More than economic issues are involved in the choice between socialism and communism as a final goal. The dogma that socialism must be the prelude to communism serves to justify repressive features of societies under communist rule, in the face of criticism from socialist dissidents within such societies and from those revisionists outside them inaccurately called Eurocommunists. The economic counterpart of their demands for political democracy and cultural pluralism is the demand for increasing the role of markets, as devices !or dispersing decisions and multiplying options, within a framewor_k of planning. All three demands can be linked and strengthened through a reasoned rejection of communism as a final goal. In "Utopian Themes in Marx and Mao" and "Marx and Lenin as Historical Materialists" I have examined aspects of this opposition with direct reference to recent history. By contrast, the following discussion is wholly confined to the writings of Marx. Yet its exposure of the conflict between communism and- historical materialism is relevant to the present, perhaps even to the future, in so far as it explains the recurrent challenge of revisionism. University of California, San Diego December 1979

Marx on the Choice between Socialism and Communism

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Statement of the Problem: Lenin, Engels, Tugan-Baranovsky

In State and Revolution Lenin draws two contrasts between socialism and communism, both of which revise prevailing terminology. He proposes that the Bolsheviks substitute 'Communist' for 'Social Democratic' in their party name, to dissociate themselves from parties controlled by leaders of the Second International. And he calls socialism that type of classless economy which Marx calls the first stage of communism. After 1917, what had been a contrast between two trends in the socialist movement and a contrast between two types of communist society became-for Lenin's followers at least -contrasts between socialism and communism. 1 The theoretical interest of these proposals lies in the fact that Lenin asserts a connection between them. Disagreements between communists and social democrats concerning tactics are .connected, he suggests, with disagreements concerning aims. That type of classless economy which for communists is a transitional stage is for socialists the ultimate goal. 2 For his proposal to rename the party, Lenin invokes the authority of Engels-specifically of a preface written in 1894 for some articles first published twenty years earlier. There Engels writes: 1

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Chapter One

It will be noticed that in all these articles ... I call myself not a Social Democrat but a Communist. Those who called themselves Social Democrats in different countries at that time were far from advocating takeover by society of all the means of production. In France a Social Democrat was a democratic republican with more or less genuine, though invariably vague, sympathies for the working class-such people as Ledru-Rollin in 1848 and the Proudhonist "Radical Socialists" of 1874. In Germany the Lassalleans called themselves Social Democrats; but though large numbers of them had come to see the necessity for socialization of the means of production, Lassalle's demand for producers' cooperatives with state aid remained their sole officially recognized program. For Marx and me it was therefore quite impossible to choose such an elastic term for our specific point of view. Today the situation is quite different and the name can passhowever unsuitable it remains for a party whose economic program is not merely socialist in general but specifically communist, and whose ultimate political aim is to overcome the entire state and consequently democracy as well. 3 For his proposal to rename the first stage of postcapitalist development, Lenin appeals to current usageasserting that what Marx calls the first stage of communism is commonly called socialism. Yet among Marxists the usage he describes as common was decidedly exceptional in 1917. For more than twenty years orthodox Marxists had drawn no clear distinction between 'socialism' and 'communism' as denoting different economic systems: the terms were treated either as equivalent or as indicating unspecified differences of degree. However, the most notable proponent of a different usage was plainly

Statement of the Problem

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on Lenin's mind at this point in his discussion. TuganBaranovsky is denounced as a bourgeois ideologist shortly after the first appeal to common usage, immediately before two further appeals. Those appeals mask Lenin's debt to the principal theorist among revisionist critics of Marx. 4 At the start of Modern Socialism in Its Historical Development, Tugan-Baranovsky uses economic criteria to divide socialism, in the broad sense of the word, into two types: socialism in the narrow sense, and communism. In both socialist and communist economies the means of production are collectively owned: no one can live on r~nt, interest, or profit. In a socialist economy, however, individuals receive· incomes, with which they buy consumers' goods. In a communist economy no one receives an income: consumers' goods, though some are rationed, are all free. Anarchists, according to Tugan-Baranovsky, do not have a distinctive economic goal. They divide into anarchist socialists and anarchist communists, depending on whether they advocate a socialist or a communist economy functioning without coercion of any kind. Owen, Cabet, and Godwin are communists, according to this classification: Fourier, the Saint-Simonians, and Proudhon are socialists. 5 To apply this distinction to the postcapitalist economic systems sketched by Marx in The Critique of the Gotha Program is to rename socialism what Marx calls the first stage of communism. In this economy the means of production are collectively owned; but each producer is paid a wage-a certificate of work performed, exchangeable for consumers' goods. He receives from society a certificate that he has furnished such and such an amount of labor (after deducting his labor for the common fund), and with this

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· Chapter One

certificate he draws from the social stock means of consumption which have cost an equivalent amount of labor. 6 What Marx calls the higher stage of communist society fits Tugan-Baranovsky's definition of communism. Attaining the ideal of distributing consumers' goods to each according to his needs involves developing a system of production where workers no longer receive incomes. 7 To examine from this standpoint the account of postcapitalist stages in The Critique of the Gotha Program is to suggest comparison with the two-stage account in The Communist Manifesto. In Part Two of the latter work Marx proposes ten transitional measures~ to be introduced immediately after the proletariat seizes power. Would these establish a socialist economy, by abolishing exploitation but not exchange? After listing these , measures, he predicts some long-term developments in postcapitalist society. Do these indicate a transition from socialism to communism, through abolition of exchange? Though the transitional measures would not immediately establish a socialist economy, that would be their ultimate effect. The proposal for a steeply graduated income tax and the proposal for centralizing credit in the hands of the state presuppose exchange. Yet though another proposal calls for abolishing private ownership of land, private ownership of other means of production would be ended only gradually, as a result of the abolition of inheritance. Completion of this process would establish a socialist economy, comparable to that discussed in The Critique of the Gotha Program.~~, Marx's account of long:-term developments, on the other hand, is inconclusive. He neither asserts nor denies that disappearance of class distinctions and atrophy of

Statement of the Problem

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the political state. will be accompanied by abolition of exchange. 9 The economic contrast Marx left unclear had already been clarified by Engels in his Principles of Communism-a preliminary draft, in the form of a catechism, for what eventually became the Manifesto. In his answer to Question 18, concerning the course of the revolution, Engels presents a list of twelve transitional measures which differ only in detail from the transitional measures in the Manifesto. Those which point most clearly toward establishment of a classless exchange economy are the following: 1. Limitation of private property through progressive taxation, heavy inheritance taxes, abolition of inheritance through collateral lines .... 2. Gradual expropriation of landowners, industrialists, railroad magnates, and shipowners-in part through competition from state industry, in part directly with compensation in the form of bonds. 4. Organization of labor or employment of proletarians on publicly owned land, in publicly owned factories and workshops, with competition among workers abolished and with factory owners-while these continue to exist-paying the same high wages as the state. 6. Centralization of money and credit in the hands of the state through a national bank operating with state capital, and suppression of all private banks and bankers. 10 After presenting his transitional program for the revolution, Engels offers some long-range predictions which outline its final goal. Ultimately, when all capital, all production, and all exchange are gathered into the hands of the nation,

Chapter One

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private property will disappear of its own accord; money will become superfluous; and production will expand so much, men will change so much, that the last economic institutions of the old society will die away. 11 By predicting that private property will disappear and money will become superfluous, Engels predicts the withering away of exchange. Another section of the Principles is devoted to distinguishing communists from socialists. After discussing what he calls reactionary socialists and what he calls bourgeois socialists, Engel writes: ..-

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Finally, the third category consists of democratic socialists, who favor some of the measures communists advocate, as described in Question -18, not as part of the transition to communism, however, but as measures they believe will be sufficient to abolish the evils and miseries of present -day society .12 The contrast Engels drew in 184 7 between communists and democratic socialists anticipates that which Lenin drew in 1917 between communists and social democrats. Engels does not use the term 'socialism' to denote the kind of economy at which democratic socialists aim. But he asserts that what for communists is a transitional stage is for democratic socialists the ultimate goal. And he implies that while democratic socialists aim at abolishing exploitation, communists aim at abolishing both exploitation and exchange. Lenin's terminology, this passage from Engels suggests, improves upon that of Marx by clarifying a contrast between goals which Marx's terminology obscures. To recognize that communists differ from socialists with respect to aims as well as tactics is to illuminate

Statement of the Problem

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some basic issues in the critique of capitalist culture. Consider the opposition in economic theory typified by Lange an~ Preobrazhensky. Or the opposition in legal theory typified by Renner and Pashukanis. Or the opposition in philosophy typified by Vorlander and Lukacs. In each case the critics agree in attacking capitalist exploitation: they differ in their evaluation of ideas and institutions connected with commodity exchange. To view such persistently recurring conflicts from the standpoint suggested by Lenin is to discover their connection with one another and with practical decisions affecting nearly every sphere of postcapitalist culture. By clarifying Marxian theory in this fashion does Lenin also render it more plausible? To recognize that communists differ from socialists with respect to goals as well as tactics is to confront the problem of demonstrating that a society which has abolished exploitation but not exchange is in some sense inferior to a society which has abolished both. Lenin does not argue the superiority of communism. Nor does Engels. Both treat it as demonstrated truth; and for the demonstration they look to Marx. Yet where i'n Marx's writings is that demonstration to be found? In the remainder of this discussion I propose to uncover and evaluate Marx's arguments for the superiority of communism, by analyzing the comparisons he draws between classless economies with exchange and classless economies without exchange. I shall attempt to show that his major arguments for the superiority of communism rely on moral and philosophical principles, derived from Feuerbach in The Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts, from Hegel in The Critique of the Gotha Program and Capital. I shall further attempt to show that Marx's ideal of communism is incompatible with his materialist approach to history.

Philosophical Communism

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Arguments from Principles of Philosophical Communism, 1843-1844

In a programmatic letter for the German-French Yearbook, written a few months before his conversion to communism, Marx declares: That self-reliance, that freedom, which disappeared from earth with the Greeks, and with Christianity vanished into the blue haze of heaven, must again be awakened in the hearts of men. Then only can men move from society ( Gesellschaft) to a new community ( Gemeinschaft) uniting them for their highest ends -a democratic state. 1 Is Marx's contrast between community and society connected by anything more than verbal coincidence with the contrast elaborated by Tonnies forty years later? Evidently Tonnies thought so. The comparison Marx draws between feudalism and capitalism in On the Jewish Question (which was published together with the programmatic letter), Tonnies in Marx: Leben und Lehre connects with his own comparison between community and society. In the first preface to Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft Marx is listed as a major source of its ideas. More significantly, the first edition of that work is subtitled "An Investigation of Communism and Socialism as Observable Forms of Culture." 2 In the years from 1844 through 8

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1848 Marx came eventually to recognize the truth of a contention implicit in this title-that the contrast between society and community cuts across the contrast between class and classless economies. Prior to 1847 German communism developed from two different sources. On the one hand, a few German workmen in Paris were converted to communism by French revolutionaries who had revived the doctrines of Babeuf. On the other hand, a few German intellectuals developed communist critiques of capitalist culture from the starting point of Feuerbach's humanism. Philosophical and proletarian communism merged when Hess, Engels, and Marx joined former members of the League of the Just in establishing the Communist League, and the new organization adopted as its program The Communist Manifesto. 3 The attack on capitalist culture presented by the philosophical communists is a moral critique, of the type which uses a theory of man's essential nature as a criterion for evaluating existing institutions. This critique starts from the account of human nature set forth in Feuerbach's Essence of Christianity. All animals, according to Feuerbach, are conscious of themselves as individuals: men are also conscious of their essential nature, their species. Men consequently differ from other animals in possessing both an outer and an inner life. In his outer life each man is conscious of existing as an individual. In his inner life he is conscious of sharing the essential nature of all men. This is the doctrine that underlies Marx's characterization of man as a species being (Gattungswesen) in On the Jewish Question, The EconomicPhilosophical Manuscripts, and The Holy Family. 4 The second step of the critique is to ask what kind of social order is best fitted for harmonizing men's existence

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Chapter Two

with this essential nature. Contemporary exchange economies-the critics argue-dehumanize men, compelling them to behave as isolated individuals caught in a war of each against all. To characterize this cleavage between existence and essence, the philosophical communists adopt from Hegel the terms 'alienation' ( Entiiusserung) and 'estrangement' (Entfremdung )-which, unlike Hegel, they use interchangeably. What then is their remedy for the dehumanization, the estrangement, produced by capitalist institutions? Men's existence can be brought into harmony with their essence only in a social order based upon the principle of community, the unity of man with man. 5 This is the doctrine _that underlies Marx's call for a return from Gesellschaft to Gemeinschaft. The third step is to equate this rebirth of community with the victory of communism. Throughout roughly the latter half of 1843-during which he wrote his Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, the programmatic letter quoted above, and On the Jewish Question-Marx had taken the second step but had not yet reached the third. In another programmatic letter for the German-French Yearbook, he writes: I am not for setting up a dogmatic standard. On the contrary, we must try to help the dogmatists understand what they are saying. Especially is communism a dogmatic abstraction-by which I mean, not an . imagined, hypothetical communism, but actually ~x.Ist­ ing communism as taught by Cabet, Dezamy, Wetthng, and the like. Such communism is infected with its opposite, private concern, and is only a one-sided manifestation of the humanistic principle. Transcendence of private property is by no means identical with communism. Beside communism arose other socialist doctrines, such as those of Fourier, Proudhon, and the

Philosophical Communism

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like-opposed to it not accidentally but necessarily, because it is only a particular, one-sided realization of the socialist principle. (i In spite of these criticisms, Marx's conversion to communism a short time later did not involve a radical break in his development. In the first place, the shift involved only a choice of means. A rebirth of community remained his goal: he now accepted the communist movement as an instrument for attaining it. In the second place, he did not retract his criticism of actually existing communism. In his Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right heproclaims his adherence to an imagined, hypothetical communism-a revolutionary movement in which the proletarian communism of Dezamy and Weitling will unite with the philosophical communism of Hess and Engels. This is the thought which underlies his statement that the proletariat will be the heart, philosophy the head, of Germany's emancipation! At about the time he became a communist, Marx commenced his study of political economy. Its first result was The Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. These fragments of a critique of political economy are written from the standpoint of philosophical communism. But they also mark a· major step in the development of Marx's historical materialism. There, for the first time, he presents an account of capitalist exploitation and a discussion of the laws of capitalist development. The result is a pervasive conflict between the approach of philosophical communism-centered upon the problem of estrange-ment, the conflict of .human existence with human essence -and the approach of historical materialism-centered upon the problem of exploitation, the conflict of proletarians with bourgeoisie. That the problems differ can be shown by asking whether ending exploitation is sufficient

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Chapter Two

to end estrangement, and if it is not, what else is required. That the approaches conflict can be shown by examining the criticisms Marx directs against contemporary communists and socialists. At the beginning of the fragment entitled "Private Property and Communism," Marx distinguishes three levels of communist theory: on the highest level he places philosophical communism; on the lower levels, varieties of proletarian communism. What he calls crude communism attacks culture in the name of equality, marriage in the name of community. Though he does not name them, he seems to have in mind the Babouvist conspirators represented by the journal L'Humarzitaire. The intermediate level has two divisions: communism "still of a political nature, democratic or despotic"; and communism "with transcendence of the state, but in essence still incomplete and still affected by private property, by the estrangement of man." Though he does not name them, it seems probable that he has in mind Cabet and Blanqui for the first division, Dezamy and Weitling for the second. The highest level Marx calls communism as humanism: he proclaims it to be the final resolution of the conflicts between man and man, individual and species, existence and essence. Though he does not name them, he seems to have in mind Hess, Engels, and of course himself. s What is meant by the charge that some types of communism fail to overcome estrangement? Part of Marx's answer is concerned with the free development of personality. Private property suppresses individuality through competition in the market: equalitarian communism suppresses individuality through coercion by the community. Crude communists offer the divisiveness of envy as a cure for the divisiveness of greed. Such a program involves "abstract negation of the entire world of

Philosophical Communism

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culture and civilization, regression to the unnatural simplicity of the poor and wantless man who, far from going beyond private property, has not even reached it." 9 What is the alternative to this levelling communism? 'How can the cultural complexity developed in the era of private property be preserved in the era of humanistic communism? By establishing, Marx suggests, a creative tension between community and individuality. Discussing his own variety of communism, he writes: Social activity and enjoyment do not exist solely in the form of immediately communal activity and enjoyment ... For example, when I am active scientifically -an activity I can seldom pursue in immediate community with others-I am nevertheless socially active, because I am active as a man. Not only is the material of my activity-even the language in which I think. provided for me as a social product; my own existence is social activity. What I make by myself I make for society, conscious of myself as a social being. 10 In the complex culture Marx envisages, what institutional arrangements will link activities which are social but not immediately communal with other activities of this type apd with immediately communal activities? In the past-as he recognizes at other points in The Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts-division of labor and commodity exchange haye been the major means for developing and maintaining the complexity of culture. 11 If exploitation were the sole source of dehumanization and estrangement, the problem might be solved without eliminating division of labor or commodity exchange. Private ownership of the means of production would be abolished: no one could live on profit, rent, or interest. Yet individual producers would receive wages, with which to

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Chapter Two

buy consumers' goods. Such a solution, it might be argued, could end the injustices of contemporary civilization while preserving its complexity. But this solution Marx rejects, on grounds most clearly stated in his criticism of Proudhon. In the fragment entitled "Estranged Labor," Marx points out that political economy proceeds from labor as the soul of production yet gives labor nothing, private property everything. He concludes that political economy simply formulates the laws of labor's estrangement. And he adds: We perceive, therefore, that wages and private property are identical. For wage labor-where labor is in the pay of its product, its object-is only a necessary consequence of the estrangement of labor. Where labor is paid a wage it appears, not as an end in itself, but as the servant of wages ... A compulsory increase in wages ... would therefore be nothing but higher payment to the slave: it would not win for the laborer or his labor their human status and dignity. Even equality of payment, such as Proudhon demands, would merely reduplicate the relation of contemporary laborers to their labor as a relation of all men to labor. Society would then be perceived as an abstract capitalist. 12 The key to this argument is its contrast between workers whose work is an end in itself and workers whose work is only a means to something else-immediately to being paid, ultimately to buying goods which others have produced. Marx contends that workers of this second sort exist in a condition of pctrangement, whether or not they are exploited. Capitalism he attacks as an economy of exploitation through exchange. Proudbon's socialist alternative he attacks simply as an econ-

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omy of exchange. Proudhon, he writes in The Holy Family, proposes to abolish economic estrangement within a framework of economic estrangement. 13 To ask why exchange entails estrangement, even in the absence of exploitation, is to uncover the moral premises from which Marx argues. Men's productive work connects them with their fellow men-with the universal, the species. To make this service of the universal, not the unintended consequence, but the conscious motive of human activity is to achieve distinctively human status and dignity. This requires transformation of productive work into an end in itself, total fusion of labor and enjoyment in free activity. But the cleavage between labor and enjoyment inherent in an exchange economy is incompatible with this goal. The motive of those who exchange, either products for products or work for products, is to earn a living-to receive an income and spend it satisfying egoistic needs. Their work is not free activity but forced labor. Dehumanization and estrangementconflict between human existence and human essenceare therefore inextricably embedded in exchange. 14 This moral condemnation of exchange as a system of egoism and self-interest explains why Marx conflates the Hegel\an concepts of alienation ( Entiiusserung) and estrangement (Entfremdung). For Hegel, alienation is giving up or transferring something that is one's own, while estrangement is alie.nation that results in conflictwhere what the agent has relinquished confronts him as a hostile and destructive power. Hegel's discussion of civil society and the political state in The Philosophy of Right could be described as a plan for preventing a system of alienation from developing into a system of estrangement. Similarly, Proudhon's socialism could be described as a plan for abolishing estrangement within

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Chapter Two

a system of alienation. Yet for the moral critique developed by the philosophical communists from Feuerbach's humanism, distinguishing estrangement from alienation in this fashion serves only to obscure the crucial problem. Though class conflict is an evil, it is rooted in the more general evil of egoism and self-interest. 15 Granted that egoism is the basic evil, can it be abolished all at once? Does Marx envisage a transitional stage between capitalism and humanistic communism? And if so, does he envisage for this stage an economy where exploitation has been abolished but not exchange? Comparing communism to atheism, at the close of the fragment entitled "Private. Property and Communism," Marx writes: Socialism ... is the positive self-consciousness of man, no longer mediated through the transcendence of religion, just as real life is the positive reality of man, no longer mediated through the transcendence of private property-through communism. Communism is the phase of the negation of the negation. It is accordingly an actual stage, necessary for the next period in the process of historical development toward human emancipation and rebirth. Communism is the necessary form and dynamic principle of the immediate future: but communism as such is not the goal of human development-the form of huinan society. The reference to positive self-consciousness suggests that what Marx calls socialism in this passage is what he calls communism as fully developed huma"ism in the passage, at the beginning of the same fragment, where he distinguishes different levels of communism. It seems plausible, accordingly, to identify what he calls communism here with what there he calls undeveloped com-

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munism. If these identifications are correct, Marx is predicting that triumph of proletarian communism will pave the way for triumph of philosophical communism. 16 Will the two stages differ in economic organization? Part of Marx's charge that proletarian communism is infected with the principle of private property seems closely to resemble his critique of Proudhon. The community is only a community of labor, an equality of payment received from communal capital, from the community as universal capitalist. Both sides of the relation are raised to an imagined universality-labor as the condition in which everyone is placed, capital as the recognized universality and power of the community. 17 Is Marx asserting that proletarian communists aim at an economy where individuals will receive incomes, which they will use to buy consumers' goods? If so, what specific communists could he have had in mind? It seems more plausible to interpret the passage as referring to moral attitudes rather than to economic institutions. In the economy envisaged by proletarian communists, producers will not receive incomes with which to buy commodities. But they will work to satisfy needs that are egoistic rather than communal, no different from those of other animals rather than distinctively human. They will therefore work for the sake of being paid, in the sense that .they will not regard their work as an end in itself. Marx's reference to a communal capitalist paying for labor uses these terms in an extended sense. He is concerned here, riot with survival of exploitation through exchange, but with survival of the cleavage between labor and enjoyment-with what is now called the question of material incentives. If this interpretation is correct,

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Chapter Two

Marx's contrast between communism as a transitional stage and socialism as the final goal equates communism with abolition of exchange as well as exploitation, socialism with what Hess later called true socialism. 18 To bring together Marx's criticisms of proletarian communism is to disclose an unresolved tension between the principles of philosophical communism and the principles of historical materialism. On the one hand, he attacks some proletarian communists for rejecting the entire world of culture and civilization. On the other · hand, he attacks all of them for accepting the cleavage between labor and enjoyment. How then does he propose to retain the complexity of culture while ending the cleavage between labor -and enjoyment? Considering the complexity of culture from the standpoint of historical materialism, he recognizes that in the past its material basis has been division of labor and commodity exchange. Considering division of labor and commodity exchange from the standpoint of philosophical communism, heargues that their moral effect must be dehumanization and estrangement. What then can take their place in the complex culture of the future? Throughout The EconomicPhilosophical Manuscripts there is not even the suggestion of an answer.

3

Arguments from Principles of Historical Materialism, 1845-1848

Marx considered The German Ideology-which he commenced writing, in collaboration with Engels, toward the end of 1845-a turning-point in his theoretical development. Through this critique of the ~deol.ogical outlook of post-Hegelian philosophy-he wntes m the Preface to his Critique of Political Economy-he and Engels settled accounts with their former philosophical convictions. 1 Yet critical examination of The German Ideology reveals that the break was less radical than Marx thought. While the premises of philosophi~al communism were rejected, its conclusions were retamed. To the extent that this attempt to derive old conclusions from new premises was unsuccessful, the conflict . b~twe~n philosophical communism and histo~ical ~atenahsm m his earlier work was not resolved but mtenstfied. The external stimulus for The German Ideology was publication of Stirner's Thf Ego and His Own, tog.ether with the controversies it engendered among Sttrner, Feuerbach,. Bauer, and Hess. Stirner extends Feuerbach's critique of God to Feuerbach's account .of man. For Feuerbach, God is an illusion that contams a truthman's ess~ntial nature conceived as existing separately from man. For Stirner, Feuerbach's account of man's essential nature is itself an illusion-a secular residue of 19

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Chapter Three

religious superstition. Confronted with this challenge, Marx does not offer a defense of Feuerbach's account of human nature. Instead, he explicitly disowns it. Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion, by anything you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals when they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step made possible by their physical organization. Both Feuerbach's humanism and Stirner's criticism are attacked on the ground that they are based on philosophical dogmas rather than empirical statements. Philosophy is to empirical knowledge-.the author of The EconomicPhilosophical Manuscripts now declares-what masturbation is to love. 2 In conjunction with this shift, Marx reverses the roles he had earlier ascribed to philosophical and proletarian communism. Previously, proletarian communism was regarded as a transitional stage, through which the entire movement would develop toward philosophical communism. Now, philosophical communism is regarded as a transitional stage, through which a few intellectuals have developed toward proletarian communism. Adopting the name for philosophical communism. recently introduced by Hess, Marx writes: Conditions actually existing in Germany necessitated the formation of this hybrid sect, which attempted to reconcile communism with the dominant ideas of the time. It was equally necessary that a number of German communists-starting from philosophyshould reach communism t 1 this path, and that others -unable to break free from ideology-should go on preaching true socialism to the end.

Historical Materialism

21

Viewed from this standpoint, The Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts reflect less the advanced state of Germany's philosophy than the backward state of Germany's economy.a Having repudiated philosophical communism, Marx now presents himself as a theoretical spokesman of proletarian communism. Communism is not for us a state of affairs which ought to be established, an ideal in accordance with which reality should be transformed. For us communism is the real movement abolishing the present state of affairs, a movement whose necessary conditions exist as part of that same state of affairs. .

'

To investigate empirically those necessary conditions is the task of historical materialism, which is not moral philosophy-prescribing for proletarian communism its final goal-but social science-explaining to proletarian communism its historical origins, influencing its tactical decisions, predicting its approaching victory. 4 According to Marx, his materialist approach to history has four presuppositions. First, men differ from other animals in producing their means of subsistence. Second, this method of satisfying biological needs involves emergence of cultural needs. Third, satisfying both biological and cultural needs involves social organization -first the family, then other institutions. Fourth, since different techniques for producing goods to satisfy biological and cultural needs involve different forms of social organization, the history of production and exchange is the key to the whole of human history. In contrast to the arbitrary premises of philosophers, these principles are presented as empirically verifiable-as hypotheses for scientifically investigating social change. 5

22

Chapter Three

How consistently does Marx apply these principles? The uncompleted opening chapter of The German Ideology is a collection of loosely related fragments, about half of which deal with aspects and segments of social evolution-from the tribal era, through the slave, feudal, and capitalist eras, to communism. What in later works Marx calls relations of production are here called forms of intercourse. Though changes in these forms of intercourse are asserted to result from changes in the forces of production, there is little discussion of technology. Instead, past development of the forces of production is traced through development of the division of labor in society, which is equated with development of private property and associated' with development of commodity exchange. Marx's account of the past focuses upon the decomposition of communal forms of intercourse through the combined power of these fragmenting agencies. His prediction for the future promises a rebirth of community through ending division of labor, private property, and commodity exchange. What ties these historical fragments together is less a sociology of change, exploring the interaction of technology and institutions, than a dialectic of liberation, contrasting the long loss of community to society with the sudden leap to community regained. 6 The account of exploitation in The German Ideology cuts across this contrast between community and society. Exploitation is described as taking place initially through communal forms of intercourse, ultimately through exchange. In slave and feudal systems the dominant class is organized as a community, which coerces and exploits the direct pr"ducers. Because the power of slaveowners depends upon their communal organization, slaves are communal private property. In the relation of

, I~ :. ,

Historical Materialism

23

feudal landowners to serfs communal organization plays a similar role. Capitalism, by contrast, is a system of p~re private property, wholly emancipat~d ~rom commumty. Only in capitalist society does explOitation normally take • • • place through exchange. 7 Why does Marx predict that capttal~sm wtll_ be replaced by communism-that the revolution endmg e~­ ploitation will also end exchange? According to his account of the past, exchange existed in slave and f~ud_al economies, though not on the same scale as in capita_hst economies and not as the normal mechanis~ of exp~~Ita­ tion. Why identify abolition of capitalism wtth abohtton, rather than transformation, of exchange? · Nowhere in The German Ideology does Marx present an argument to show that co'ntinued devel~pment of the forces of production must eventually prove ~ncom­ patible with relations of exchan~e. ~t ~orne pomts. he simply assumes that ending explOitation mvolv~s. endmg exchange. At other points he presents a cntlque ~f exchange which resembles in sig~ifica~t respe.cts the cntique presented in The Economzc-Phzlosophzcal Manuscripts. Exchange develops with division of labor. Both separate labor from enjoyment. This ~le~v~ge produces a conflict between the interest of each tndtvtdual and the common interest of all the individuals made interdependent by division of labor and commodity .excha~ge. Because each individual seeks only his particular mterest, the common interest confronts him-in the market and the state-as an alien and coercive power. This estrangement cannot be ended, forced labor cannot be replaced by free activity, without ending both division of labor and exchange. s . . Though this critique agrees in its conclusions ~1th the critique in The Economic-Philosophical Manuscrzpts,

24

Chapter Three

ostensibl~ it sta~ts from different premises. Every ab-

stract philosophical contrast between human existence ~nd hu~an essence, according to The German Ideology, Is the distorted reflection of some concrete historical conflict between social relations and human needs. n But if a conflict between social relations and human needs is the n~w starti~g-point for Marx's argument, from what specific premises does he reach his old conclusion? Does ~ve~y. instit~tion which channels activities motivated by ~ndividual mterests toward results promoting collective mter~sts frus.t~ate some human need? Or, to put the same questiOn positively, is there a human need for total fusion of. particula.r m~tives with the common good? If so, is thi.s need bw~ogic~l or cultural? What is the empirical e.viden~~ for Its existence? Either this professedly scientific cntique dogmatically assumes what it ought empirically. to pr.o~e, or it surreptitiously relies on the philosophical cntique set forth in The Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts. ~hat are ~he material prerequisites for fusing labor and enJoyment In free activity? Here again the argument of The German Ideology parallels that of The EconomicPhilosophical Manuscripts: Two practical conditions are required for abolishing this "estrangement" ...·For it to become an "intolerable" power, a power against which men carry out a revolution, it must have produced the contradiction that a wholly pro~ertyless mass of humanity is confronted by a world of wealth and culture. Both sides of this contradiction presuppose that the forces of production have attained a high level of development.1° The problem raised in connection with The Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts now recurs. According

~

I

Historical Materialism

25

to the account of social evolution presented in The German Ideology, the material basis for creating the world of wealth and culture has been development of division C!f labor and commodity exchange. The moral desirability of abolishing these institutions follows from the premises of philosophical communism. But its practical unfeasibility seems to follow from the premises of historical materialism. In The German Ideology Marx takes the argument one step further, by indicating how division of labor will be transcended in communist society. With division of labor, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a cowherd, or a critical-critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his livelihood. In a communist society no one has a single, exclusive sphere of activity: each can cultivate any field he likes. Society regulates the general production, and so makes it possible for me to do this today, that tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, raise cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I pleasewithout ever becoming hunter, fisherman, cowherd, or critic. 11 How will society make it possible for me to do this? Division of labor always involves different individuals performing complementary functions. Often it involves specialization, attaching one individual to one function throughout his working life. What Marx depicts here is a situation where ·specialization has ended but differentiation of functions remains. How then will society regulate production in an economy complicated, not only by differentiation of functions, but by fluidity of occupations as well?

26

Chapter Three

One way to coordinate individual activities with social requirements would be for a planning authority to assign each individual a series of different occupations. According to Marx, however, each individual will make such choices for himself. An alternative method, providing greater scope for individual choice, would be to utilize the mechanism of exchange. Planning authorities might establish job requirements and wage scales for the various branches of production, with the aim of eliciting supplies of different types of labor corresponding to the complex requirements of society. It can be argued that ending specialization and making occupation a matter of individual choice, in an economy complex enough to sustain a world of wealth and culture, would render exchange more necessary than before. Nowhere in The German Ideology does Marx consider the socialist alternative to communism-ending exploitation without ending exchange. Proudhon's proposals, discussed at some length in The Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts and The Holy Family, receive in the five hundred pages of this later work no more than a short, crossed-out footnote. 12 But in The Poverty of Philosophy-which he commenced writing at the end of 1846-Marx returned to the challenge of Proudhon. The thesis that ending exploitation involves ending exchange is supported there by arguments based on political economy and economic history. The first premise of the argument from economic history is that when one mode of production is replaced by another, all relations of production are changed. Economic categories are nothing more than abstractions, theoretical manifestations of social relations of production ... These social relations are closely connected with productive forces. In acquiring new

Historical Materialism

27

productive forces, men change their mode of production; in changing their mode of production, their manner of making a living, they change all their social relations. The second premise is that in the capitalist mode of production exploitation takes place through exchange. The conclusion is that ending capitalist exploitation involves ending exchange as well. 13 Granted that ending capitalist exploitation involves ending capitalist exchange, does this amount to ending all exchange? Is Marx asserting that transition from one mode of production to another alters all social relations of the replaced mode? Or is he asserting that it eliminates all of them? What· his conclusion requires is elimination; but that is inconsistent with his less abstract accounts of economic history. These describe exchange as playing a role in slave, feudal, and capitalist modes of production-though a different role in each. 14 Why not yet another role in the classless economy of the future? In addition to this argument from economic history, Marx attempts to prove that a classless exchange economy would be unworkable. Remarking that Proudhon was not the first to propose establishing such an economy, he summarizes and criticizes a similar proposal of Bray. The ideal social system, according to Bray, is community of possessions. As a first step toward this ideal, he propo~es replacing capitalist enterprises with joint-stock compam~s of producers. In this transitional economy no. one ":Ill live on rent, interest, or profit; but producers will receive incomes, with which to buy consumers' goods. What Proudhon proposes as a final goal, Bray proposes as a transitional stage between capitalism and communism. 15 Marx's critique of Bray's classless exchange economy involves constructing a dilemma. Assuming an econ-

28

Chapter Three

omy of two individuals, one of whom works six hours and the other twelve, he asks what the latter can do with his surplus product. On the one hand, the man who has worked twelve hours can stop work until the man who has worked six hours catches up. But then, Marx asserts, this classless economy will be characterized by the overproduction and unemployment that render capitalism unworkable. This conclusion, however, acquires whatever plausibility it has from misrepresenting Bray's model. Marx assumes an exchange economy of only two workers, Bray an exchange economy of five million workers. If one man works more than the other in Marx's economy, disproportionality of production is a Iikdy consequence. If some men work more than others in Bray's economy, disproportionality of production is less likely. And any that occurs can be remedied by redistribution of the labor force rather than by unemployment. 16 Alternatively, Marx continues, the man who has worked twelve hours can consume his surplus product. But from the moment he has no longer to exchange because he has produced, he has no need to produce for exchange; and the basic assumption of a society built upon exchange and division of labor fails. 17 Yet if the man who has. worked twelve hours can consume half of his product, it does not follow that he has no need to ¥toduce for exchange. He might need to exchange the other half. Even if he can consume all of his product, this will not render exchange and division of labor superfluous. He may need them, in the sense that they will enable him to satisfy more of his needs than would producing by himself everything that he consumes.

29

Historical Materialism

In addition to considering exchange, Marx also attacks Bray's proposal from the standpoint of production.

0

It is in the nature of large-scale industry that working hours should be equal for all. What is today the result of capital and competition of workers among themselves will be tomorrow, if you abolish the relation of labor to capital, the result of an agreement based on the relation of the sum of productive forces to the sum of existing needs. But such an agreement is a condemnation of individual exchange; and we are back at our first conclusion. 1 s

Yet though large-scale industry may require that everyone work the same number of hours per day, does it require everyone to work the same number of days per week or the same number of months per year? Though with large-scale industry individual workers cannot start and stop work as they feel inclined, can they not contract individually to work for different periods? Even if all workers contract collectively to provide specified quantities of labor at specified rates of payment throughout a specified period, will this render individual exchange superfluous? How will each wage-earner acquire consumers' goods? Marx did not try to strengthen these frail arguments in subsequent writings. Instead, some ten months later, he abandoned all of them and adopted the position of Bray. The Communist Manifesto repeats, without support of any argument, the charges against Proudhon set forth in The Poverty of Philosophy. His proposal to establish a clas~less ·exchange economy is derided as an ~ttempt to preserve existing society without its revolutionary elements, to eliminate the proletariat while retain0

30

Chapter Three

ing t~e bourgeoisie. But in its immediate program the Manzfesto follows Bray in proposing to establish a classless. ex~hange economy as a transitional stage between capitalism and communism. 1 n . ~h~ a transitional stage? Why not a final goal? In his Prmcrples of Communism, Engels distinguishes the two stages and then uses this distinction to contrast the goals of socialists and communists. But he offers no argume~ts to s~ow. that ~bolition of exchange is morally desirable, histoncally mevitable, or both. In the Manifesto we might expect Marx to build on the foundations Eng~ls lai.d-not only adopting his distinctions but supportmg his assertions with arguments. What we find ' however, is equal dogmatism and less clarity. The ten prop.osals constituting his immediate program Marx descnbes as measures "which seem economically insufficient and unviable, yet in the cours~ of the movement push beyond themselves and provide necessary means for revolutionizing the entire mode of produc fIOn.." 20 0 n what grounds are they judged insufficient and unviable? Not on those set forth in The Poverty of Phil~sophy .. ~f the arguments presented there against Bra~ s transitional program are valid, they are also valid agamst the transitional program of the Manifesto. But in the Manifesto no new arguments are presented to show that a ~lassless exchange economy will be initially viable but ultimately transitory. Pronouncement takes the place 1 of reasoning. ' Thou~h Engels devotes one section of his Principles ~o contrastmg communists with socialists, this contrast ~~ o~sc.ured in Part Three of the Manifesto, entitled Socialist and Communist Literature." Proudhon is criticize.d .in ~, section entit.led ~'Conservative or Bourgeois Socialism. Babeuf, Samt-Simon, Fourier, Owen, and

Historical Materialism

31

Cabet are lumped together in a section entitled "CriticalUtopian Socialism and Communism." Though the titles indicate that socialists differ from communists, the discussion offers no criterion for distinguishing between them. There is evidence to suggest that this obscurity was intentional. Two preliminary plans for Part Three of the Manifesto have survived. In both Marx proposes to devote one section of the discussion solely to communism. Yet no such section is included in the published text. To connect this omission with Marx's failure to distingutsh communism from socialism in the published text is to find in the pattern of revision a pattern of evasion. :!l Why did Marx avoid discussing the issues Engels raised? It is unlikely that he considered them unimportant. It is more likely that at this point in his development he had no suitable arguments to offer. To appeal to the moral argument he had presented in The EconomicPhilosophical Manuscripts would be incompatible with the claims of scientific socialism. To appeal to the economic arguments he had presented in The Poverty of Philosophy would be incompatible with his transitional program. Yet where else could he turn?

I.

Critique of the Gotha Program

4

Appeal to Hegel: The Critique of the Gotha Program

Scattered through the thousands of pages Marx wrote after 1848 on economic theory are discussions of ~he views of some socialist theorists on some specific Issues. But the only socialist theories he. approaches systematically in these works are those of four Ricardian socialists, to whom he devotes an unfinished chapter in Theories of Surplus Value. Comparisons between capitalist and socialist solutions for some specific problems are scattered through his discussions of capitalist economic institutions. But in only three short passagesone par~graph in the first volume of Capital, three paragraphs In The Critique of Political Economy, ten paragraphs in The Critique of the Gotha Program-does he cons!der classless economies as unified systems of productiOn and distribution. 0J)ly in the last of these does he c~r.":ast socialism with communism and argue the supenonty of communism. Analyzing the phenomenon of commodity fetishism in the opening chapter of Capital, Marx compares economies of commodity production with four economies in which relations between men in the process of production do not take the form of relations between things in the process of exchange. The fourth of these examples is a socialist economy. 32

33

Let us ... now consider an association of free men, carrying on their work with means of production held in common and consciously combining their individual capacities for labor into a single social capacity for labor ... The total product of this association is a social product. One part serves as new means of production, and remains social. But another part is consumed by the associates as their means of subsistence, and must be distributed among them. The type of this distribution will vary with the social organization of production, and with the corresponding level of historical development attained by the producers. Solely for a parallel with commodity production, let us assume that the share of each producer is determined by his labor time. In this case labor time plays a double role. On the one hand, its socially planned distribution maintains the proper proportion between different kinds of work and different needs. On the other hand, it measures each individual's share in the common labor and consequently his share in that part of the common product available for individual consumption. 1 Attacking in The Critique of the Gotha Program the claim that workers have a right to the undiminished product of their labor, Marx argues that even when exploitation is abolished society cannot recognize such a right. Part of the social product must serve as new means of production. Part of the means of consumption must be used for communal needs, such as health and education, and for the needs of those unable to work. In the transitional classless economy that emerges from capitalism, each producer will periodically receive a certificate stating the amount of labor he has contributed. From that amount will be subtracted a tax for the common

., 34

Chapter Four

fund, leaving him a net amount to spend for individual consumption. That net amount he will exchange for consumers' goods that have cost an equivalent amount of labor. 2 Both discussions stress the resemblance between a classless economy of this type and a capitalist economy. Marx writes in the Critique: Here the same principle prevails as that which regulates commodity exchange, to the extent that the latter is an exchange of equal values. Content and form are changed, because here no one can provide anything but his labor and no one can own anything but what he individually consumes: But in distributing means of consumption among individual producers the same principle prevails as in the exchange of commodity equivalents-a given quantity of labor in one form is exchanged for an equal quantity of labor in another form. 3 Both discussions deny that all classless economies will be of this type. The alternative, left vague in Capital, is identified in the Critique. There Marx writes that the transitional stage of classless society will develop into a higher stage, where distribution according to contribution will be replaced by distribution according to need. To paraphrase his point in Lenin's language, socialism-an economy of exchange without exploitation-will develop into communism-an economy with neither exploitation nor exchange. 4 Finally, both discussions assert that the system of distribution depends upon the level of development attained by the system of production, and upon the corresponding level of development attained by the producers. Marx writes in the Critique:

Critique of the Gotha Program

35

Distribution of the means of consumption is merely a consequence of the prevailing distribution of the conditions of production; and that distribution is a feature of the mode of production. For example, the capitalist mode of production distributes the material conditions of production to non-workers as their property in capital and land, while the masses own only personal conditions of production, their labor power. This distribution of the elements of production entails the existing distribution of means of consumption. If the material conditions of production were the collective property of the workers themselves, this would entail a different distribution of the means of . consumption} Transition from the classless· economy of socialism to the classless economy of communism involves changing the system of distributing the means of consumption. Upon what change in distribution of the conditions of production does this development depend? In both socialist and communist economies the material conditions of production are the collective property of the workers. The change must then involve ownership of the personal conditions of production. Under socialism, as under capitalism, each worker owns his capacity to labor as his private property: under communism these capacities become public property. From the standpoint of historical materialism, the crucial condition for transition to communism is abolition of wage labor. 11 Marx contrasts this approach to the approach of what he calls vulgar socialism. Vulgar socialists treat distribution as independent of production and advocate socialism as a system of distribution superior to that of capitalism. But by what arguments can they establish its superiority? Even capitalist economies include a sector

36

Chapter Four

of communal consumption-highways in all, for example, education in some-where consumers' goods are free. Apologists for capitalism defend some ideal balance among three kinds of claims-need, work, and ownership of the means of production-as the most equitable system of distribution. In classless economies no more than two kinds of claims-need and work-will be recognized. Many socialists advocate some ideal balance of these two principles as the most equitable system of distribution. Others advocate as still more equitable a communist economy, where the single principle of distribution is need. To approach the problem from this standpoint, Marx suggests, is to .become engulfed in disputes among socialist sectarians over ideals· of distributive justice. 7 Yet to analyze distribution from the standpoint of historical materialism, it is not sufficient to connect differences among capitalist, socialist, and communist systems of distribution with differences among capitalist, socialist, and communist modes of production. It is also necessary to connect these different modes of production with different levels in the development of the forces of production. Marx's account of the transition from capitalism to socialism seems to meet this requirement. Because of its resemblance to a capitalist system of distribution, he suggests, a socialist system of distribution is the only feasible arrangement for the classless economy that first emerges from the overthrow of capitalism. But his account of the transition from socialism to communism seems to abandon this line of explanation. That transition is explained in terms of the superiority of communism as an ideal of distributive justice. Defending his discussion of justice, Marx suggests that his account of socialism and communism consists of

Critique of the Gotha Program

37

two independent arguments-one developed from the standpoint of the Gotha Program, the other from his own standpoint. I have dealt at length ... with "equal right" and "equitable distribution" ... in order to show how outrageous it is ... to pervert the realistic outlook, which has so laboriously been instilled in the party ... by ideological nonsense about "right" and such, common among democrats and French socialists.H To develop this suggestion is to divide Marx's discussion into two arguments, reaching the same conclusion from different premises. The paragraph comparing socialist with communist distribution in terms of right and equity approaches the topic from the ideological standpoint of the Gotha Program. The succeeding paragraph-listing changes in the division of labor, in the relation of labor to enjoyment, and in the productivity of labor as prerequisites for transition to communist distribution-approaches the topic from the realistic standpoint of historical materialism. To test this interpretation, I shall examine the adequacy of the argument from historical materialism, considered in isolation from the discussion of distributive justice. In predicting the transition from socialism to communism is Marx predictiJ?.g that at a certain level of development the productive forces of a socialist economy will come into conflict with its relations of exchange? Listing in The Critique of the Gotha Program the prerequisites for this transition, he writes: In a higher stage of communist society, after the servitude of subordination to the division of labor has disappeared, and with it the opposition between mental

............--------------------Critique of the Gotha Program 38.

39

Chapter Four

and physical labor; after labor has become, not only a means of life, but the primary need of life; after each individual's productive power has increased with his all-round development and all the springs of cooperative wealth flow more freely-only then can the narrow limits of bourgeois right be wholly left behind, and can society inscribe upon its banners: From each according to his ability, to each according to his need.!) Three prerequisites are listed here: a change in the division of labor; a change in the general attitude toward labor; and continued economic growth. In The Critique of the Gotha Program Marx presents no argument to show that these developments will at some point prove incompatible with earning wages and buying consumers' goods. But from what he writes on these three topics in other works-notably the Grundrisse and Capital-it is possible to identify and evaluate such arguments. I shall first consider an argument for the obsolescence of commodity exchange. focusing on the impact of industrial technology upon the productivity of labor. I shall next consider an argument focusing on the impact of that technology upon the division of labor. And I shall finally consider an argument focusing on the impact of these two changes upon the attractiveness of labor. At one point in the Grundrisse Marx seems to argue that development of the tech.nology of industrial capitalism, culminating in the automatic factory, renders obsolete the productive relations of commodity exchange. He writes: The exchange of living labor against objectified labor -the existence of social labor in the form of the opposition between capital and wage labor-is the ultimate development of the value relation and of pro-

duction based on value. The enduring condition for such production is that the amount of direct labor time, the quantity of labor used, is the determining factor in the production of wealth. But to the degree that large-scale industry develops, the creation of real wealth becomes less dependent on labor time and the quantity of labor employed. Increasingly it depends on the power of agencies set in motion during labor, whose effectiveness is wholly disproportionate to the direct labor time required for their productiondepending instead upon the general level of science and the corresponding progress of technology ... Labor now seems less a constituent of the process of production: hu.man beings become more the superintendents and regulators of that process ... As soon as labor in its direct form is no longer the major source of wealth, labor time ceases to be the measure of wealth, and accordingly exchange value [ceases to be the measure] of use value ... Consequently production based upon exchange value breaks down. 10 This argument, however, is inconsistent with the discussions of use value and exchange value in The Critique of Political Economy and Capital. At no stage of economic development, Marx writes there, is exchange value the measure of use value. At no stage is labor time the measure of wealth, considered as a sum of use values. But at all stages-includjng that of industrial capitalism -it is the measure of wealth, considered as a sum of exchange values. Nowhere in the long chapter entitled "Machinery and Modern Industry" in the first volume of Capital does this argument for the incompatibility of industrial technology with commodity exchange recur.U In Capital Marx stresses the potentialities of industrial technology for ending subordination to the division

40

Chapter Four

of labor. In the chapter entitled "Machinery and Modern Industry," he writes: Modern industry never treats the existing form of a process of production as final ... By means of machinery, chemical processes, and other methods, it continually revolutionizes not only the technical basis of production but also the functions of individual laborers and the combination of these functions in the process of production. At the same time it revolutionizes the division of labor in society, pushing masses of capital and labor from one branch of production to another. The nature of large-scale industry therefore requires variation of labor, fluidity of functions, universal mobility of workers. Yet in its ·capitalist form large-scale industry reproduces the old division of labor with its ossified specialization. We have seen how this absolute contradiction destroys all peace, permanence, and security in the situation of the worker, threatening to snatch from his hands the means of labor which are his livelihood, to render him superfluous along with his specialty. We have seen how it involves continual sacrifice of the working class, unlimited squandering of labor power, and the ravages of social anarchy. That is the negative side. At present the requirement for variation of labor prevails in the form of unforeseen and destructive consequences, like those of a law of nature that overwhelms all obstacles. Yet through such catastrophes large-scale industry makes it a matter of life or death to recognize variation of labor, together with maximum versatility of the laborer, as a universal law of production and to alter the relations of production to insure the normal functioning of this law. This involves replacing the enormity of a laboring population kept in misery, as

Critique of the Gotha Program

41

a reserve available for the changing requirements of capitalist exploitation, with the unlimited availability of human beings to meet changing requirements for labor of different kinds. It involves replacing fragments of individuals, mere embodiments of specialized social functions, with completely developed individuals, for each of whom his various social functions are successive modes of self-expression. 12 This passage indicates that for Marx ending the servitude of subordination to the division of labor is not equivalent to ending differentiation of social functions. It is instead equivalent to ending specialization, the attachment of one individual to one function throughout his working life. But how is ending specialization connected with ending commodity exchange? To combine fluidity of occupations with differentiation of functions is to complicate the problem of allotting different kinds of work, in appropriate quantities, to the satisfaction of different kinds of needs. One possible solution for this problem envisages establishment of an economy in which producers receive wages for different types of labor and spend their wages for consumers' goods. Such a solution is ruled out only in the extreme case where transformation of toil into self-expression develops to the point of destroying the distinction between work and leisure. Total fusion of labor and enjoyment in free activity would abolish the wage system. But until that point is reached, fluidity of occupation is compatible with either socialism or communism. . At one point in the Grundrisse Marx seems to predict that development of industrial technology will lead to ~otal fusion of labor and enjoyment. Criticizing Adam Smith's contention that equal quantities of labor must at all times have the same value for the laborer because

42

Chapter Four

they involve equal sacrifices of ease, liberty, and happiness, he writes: Rest is presented as the ideal state, as identical with freedom and happiness. That an individual ... also needs a normal amount of work, of cessation from rest, seems not to occur to Smith. Certainly the measure of work seems externally given-by the goal to be attained and by the obstacles to its attainment that must be overcome by work. But Smith has no conception that this overcoming of obstacles is itself an exercise of freedom; that external goals, ceasing to appear merely as necessities of nature, become goals the individual chooses for himself; that labor becomes a sphere of activity for self-realization, for objectification of the subject, and consequently for real freedom. Of course in the historical forms of slave, serf, and wage labor, work does appear as repulsive and externally imposed, as forced labor; and by contrast not working appears as freedom and happiness. Nor is this true only for antagonistic labor. It holds for the entire period from loss of the subjective and objective conditions that made work attractive, a means of individual self-expression, in pastoral and like societies up to the re-establishment of such conditions in the future ... The labor of material production can regain this character only when ( 1 ) its soCial character is recognized and ( 2) it acquires a scientific character and becomes universal labor-when human effort as a force of nature, harnessed to perform a particular function, is replaced by human effort as intelligence, the activity of regulating all the forces of nature involved in the process of production. 1 :l This account seems to provide a basis for connecting socialist and communist systems of distribution with

Critique of the Gotha Program

43

successive stages in the development of the forces of production. Socialist relations of production will prevail from the time when labor loses its antagonistic character, through abolition of exploitation, to the time when labor becomes the primary need of life, through transformation of toil into self-expression. At a stage of classless society where labor is not yet identical with enjoyment, work is an appropriate principle of distribution. At a stage where the two fuse into one, the only appropriate principle is need. It can be questioned, however, whether the increased attractiveness of labor that Marx predicts would destroy the distinction between work and leisure. A crucial word Smith uses in the passage Marx attacks is "liberty." 14 Assume that technological ·progress continues indefinitely to render labor in industrial production more attractive-less physically burdensome, more varied, more intellectually challenging. Will not such cooperative labor continue to involve some sacrifice of freedom, in the sense of individual autonomy, by comparison with the activities of leisure? In the third volume of Capital, Marx explicitly accepts this argument. Discussing limitation of the working day, he writes: Just as savages must struggle with nature to satisfy their needs, to maintain and reproduce their life, so must civilized men; and they must do so in all forms of society and within all possible modes of production. In the course of social development this realm of natural necessity expands with the expansion of men's needs; and at the same time forces of production develop to satisfy those needs. Freedom in this area can only consist in socialized men, the associated · producers, rationally regulating their interaction with

44

Chapter Four

nature; bringing it under their common control instead of being ruled by it as a blind power; doing this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most appropriate to, most worthy of, their human nature. Yet it always remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human powers which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom. Yet this realm of freedom can flourish only on the foundation of the realm of necessity. Its primary requisite is shortening the working day. Hi Here Marx concedes that the trends he predicts in the development of the forces of production are insufficient, by themselves, to produc.e the transition he predicts from socialism to communism. Those trends would prove incompatible with the productive relations of wage labor and commodity exchange only if they resulted in the total fusion of labor and enjoyment. But, as Marx discusses them in Capital, they approach this goal without ever reaching it. At some point they may create a situation where communism becomes possible: at no point will they create a situation where socialism becomes impossible. This conclusion accords with the language of the Critique, where Marx writes of a situation where men "can"-not where they must-replace socialism with communism. To accept the preceding analysis is to reject the suggestion that Marx's account of the connection between socialism and communism consists of two independent arguments: one predicting, within the framework of historical materialism, the transition from socialism to communism; the other asserting, through appeal to an ideal of justice, the inferiority of socialism to communism. The argument from historical materialism proves at most that classless economies will develop to a point

Critique of the Gotha Program

45

where men can choose between socialism and communism. The prediction that they will then choose communism rests wholly upon the argument from distributive justice. Marx's moral evaluation of socialism consists in a highly abstract argument-contending that any institutions are inequitable to the extent that they operate through general rules-illustrated by two applications to a socialist system of distribution. I shall consider the applications first. After characterizing socialist distribution as a system of equal right-because each producer exchanges his certificate of labor time contributed, less taxes, for consumers' goods that have cost an equal quantity of labor time-Marx continues: But one man is superior to another physically or mentally, and accordingly supplies more labor in the same time or works for a longer time ... This equal right is an unequal right for unequal labor. It recognizes no class differences, because each individual is simply a worker like the rest; but it tacitly recognizes unequal productive capacities, as natural privileges. 16 Suppose we accept the contention that inequality of incomes is unfair. Must we then accept Marx's remedy? His alternative to inequalitarian socialism is communism, where incomes no longer exist. A second alternative is equalitarian socialism, · where all workers receive the same income. Some of Marx's predecessors and contemporaries-the Saint-Simonians, for example-advocated the inequalitarian socialism he describes. Others-Pecqueur, for example-advocated the equalitarian socialism he ignores. 17 What I have called equalitarian socialism, it might be objected, does not fit Marx's definition of socialism,

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Chapter Four

because in such an economy workers' incomes are not proportioned to their contributions. This objection might be valid if Marx, like the vulgar socialists, defined socialism as a system of distribution. But since he defines socialism (which he calls here the first stage of communism) as a mode of production-a classless economy where producers receive incomes with which they purchase consumers' goods-the objection is invalid. What Marx claims is an inequity could be remedied without moving from a socialist to a communist mode of production. Marx's second illustrative argument contends that a socialist economy is inequitable because it provides equal incomes for unequal needs. One worker is married, another is not; one has more children than another ... Consequently, though two workers provide equal amounts of labor and receive equal shares of society's stock of consumers' goods, in fact one will receive more than the other, one will be richer than the other .18 Suppose we accept the contention that it is unfair to pay workers with dependents and workers without dependents the same wage for the same work. Must we then accept Marx's remedy? The only solution he considers is to move from socialis~ to communism, where consumers' goods are free. Yet other remedies are feasible within a socialist economy. An obvious alternative is to vary, in proportion to the number of his dependents, the tax for communal needs subtracted from each worker's wage. A more radical alternative is to allot housewives and children incomes out of the fund for communal needs. In a socialist society that provides every one of its members with certificates for purchasing consumers' goods, no individual is economically dependent

Critique of the Gotha Program

47

upon another individual. This ideal is embodied in the socialist economy advocated by Pecqueur. 11) Pecqueur's ideal, it might be objected, should be called communist rather than socialist, because in such an economy incomes based on need would outnumber incomes based on work. For vulgar socialism, which defi~es. so~ialism. and communism simply as systems of dtstnbutiOn, this objection might be valid. Marx predicts ~hat the share of. t~e communal sector will sharply mcrease from capitalism through socialism to communism. Yet he defines socialism and communism as modes of production. According to his definition, a classless ec?nomy remains socialist as long as the producers are. patd wages-~ven if their incomes are outnumbered by incomes allotted to others on the basis of need. A socialist economy, so defined, could abolish economic dependence without abolishing wage labor or commodity exchange. Ma:x's specific arguments for the superiority of communism are presented as applications of the general argument that any social system is inequitable to the extent t~a~ it operates through general rules. After stating that soctahst exchange is more equalitarian than capitalist e.xchange-first, because it is not a means of exploitatiOn, and second, because all prices are proportionate to labor costs-he continues: In spite of this progress, .this equal right is still burdened with a bourgeois limitation. The right of the producers is proportionate to the labor they contribute: the equality consists in measurement by a common standard, labor. [Here follows the argument concerning inequality of wages.] It is therefore a right of inequality in its content, like every right. Right by its very nature consists in application of a common stan-

Chapter Four

48

dard; but unequal individuals (and they would not be different individuals if they were not unequal) can be measured by a common standard only to the extent that they are viewed from a common standpoint, considered in some particular aspect. In this case, they are viewed simply as workers; everything else is disregarded. [Here follows the argument concerning dependents.] To avoid these defects right, instead of 20 being equal, would have to be unequal. This argument uses the word 'Recht' in the sense of a claim upon others which is justifiable on legal or moral grounds. Yet though recognition of a right to payment for work distinguishes socialism from communism, that is not the only right recognized in a socialist society. Marx's attack on the slogan that workers have a right to the undiminished product of their labor points to other rights-claims of individuals who are unable to work, for example. His proposal to subtract from the total hours worked by each producer a tax for communal needs is a device for balancing competing rights. So what is the force of his general argument? Though each right concerns individuals only in some particular aspect, a system of rights concerns them in as many aspects as the system covers. Marx's argument, however, also uses the word 'Recht' in the sense of a system of general rules specifying claims upon others which are justifiable on legal or moral grounds. His critique of socialist Recht in this sense does not argue the unfairness of wage labor-his specific arguments do that-but the unfairness of general rules. According to this argument, no system of general rules, however complicated, can consider all the aspects in which individuals differ from one another. To apply such rules entails applying the same standard to different cases. I

.

Critique of the Gotha Program

49

Any social system is inequitable, therefore, to the extent that it operates through general rules. Suppose we accept the contention that no system of general rules can consider all the aspects in which individuals differ from one another. Must we then agree that any such system is unfair? From what conception of equity or fairness does it follow that every respect in which individuals differ provides grounds for different treatment? On the contrary, does not equity or fairness always involve treating some differences as grounds for different treatment, while deliberately ignoring all the rest? If Marx had specified the differences relevant to equitable treatment, then shown that no system of general rules could consider all of these, his critique might be more plausible. (He would still have to show that communism is not equally defective in this regard.) As it stands, his general argument for the unfairness of socialist rules is no more convincing than his specific arguments for the unfairness of socialist wages. To expose its inconclusiveness, however, is not to exhaust the significance of Marx's general argument. Two clues point to its immediate source, and in so doing connect it with a major philosophical tradition. One clue is the distinctively Hegelian character of Marx's reasoning. His critique of bourgeois right-in terms of the dialectic of equality, inequality, and individuality-closely parallels the .section on Identity and Difference, near the beginning of the Doctrine of Essence, in Hegel's Logic. 21 The other clue is . an inconsistency in Marx's account of the connection between right and general rules. Discussing bourgeois right-which, according to him, prevails in socialist as well as in capitalist societies-he asserts that all right by its very nature involves applying

50

Chapter Four

the same standard to different cases. Yet immediately afterward he denies that this is true of communist right. These defects are unavoidable in the first phase of communist society, as it emerges after prolonged birth pangs from capitalist society. Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and the corresponding level of cultural development ... [Only with attainment of] the higher phase of communist society ... can the narrow limits of bourgeois right be wholly left behind. 22 He seems committed to the paradox that a certain kind of right is free from the defe~ts of all right. Taken together, the two clues indicate that Marx's comparison of socialist and communist right is based on Paragraphs 29 and 30 of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. In Paragraph 29 Hegel attacks as formalistic the ordinary conception of right as a system of general rules, referring for support to the critique of abstract identity presented in his Logic. His own conception of right as any embodiment of freedom includes not only general rules-legal or moral-but also those patterns of solidarity-paternal or fraternal-that characterize such communities as the family and what he calls the political state. He writes in Paragraph 30: By contrast with the right which is comparatively formal-that is, abstract-and so comparatively restricted, a higher right belongs to the sphere and stage of mind in which mind has determined and actualized within itself the further moments contained in its Idea; and it belongs to this sphere as the sphere which is concreter, intrinsically richer, and more genuinely uni versa I. 211

Critique of the Gotha Program

51

To relate Marx's comparison between socialist and communist right to these passages is to find a source not only for his dialectic of equality but also for his inconsistent statements about the connection between right and general rules. When he states that all right shares the abstract character of bourgeois right, he has in mind the ordinary conception of right. When he states that communist right is wholly free from the limitations of bourgeois right, he has in mind Hegel's higher level of right. Though the inconsistency is not removed, it is explained. If this interpretation is correct, Marx's comparison between socialist and communist right has a distinguished philosophical ancestry. His argument for the inferiority of socialism to communism is a version of the traditional argument-dating back to Plato's Statesman-for the inferiority of Gesellschaft to Gemeinschaft. 24

Capital

5

Appeal to Hegel: Capital

To study The Critique of the Gotha Program with the aid of State and Revolution, then to look in Capital for clarification of the basio issue dividing communists from socialists, is to meet with disappointment. Nowhere does Marx clearly separate the transition to socialism from the transition to communism. The passage predicting expropriation of the expropriators-in the section entitled "Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation"-is his nearest approach to predicting a transition from capitalism to socialism. Yet the language of that passage is so vague that it can be read as predicting transition to either socialism or communism. The passage predicting disappearance of commodity fetishismin the section entitled "The Fetishism of Commodities and Its Secret"-is his nearest approach to predicting a transition to communism. ·yet the context of that passage indicates that this prediction could be fulfilled by either communism or socialism. An argument for the moral superiority of communism can be discerned in Capital: but it is stated far less clearly than its counterpart in the Critique. On the economic issue dividing communists from socialists it is not the three volumes of Capital that explain the ten paragraphs of the Critique, but conversely. 52

......

53

The aim of Capital, Marx writes in the Preface, is to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society. His account of that law, presented in the chapters on capitalist accumulation, culminates in three predictions: class polarization, increasing misery, expropriation of the capitalist class. Concerning the property relations that will replace capitalist property relations, he writes in the first and second editions: Capitalist private property-based upon the capitalist mode of production and the capitalist mode of appropriation-is the first negation of individual private property based upon the proprietor's own labor. But capitalist production engenders, with the inevitability of a natural process, its own negation. It is the negation of the negation. This re-establishes individual property, based however upon the achievement of the capitalist era: cooperation of free workers and their collective ownership of the land and the instruments of production created by labor. Transformation of widely dispersed private property, based upon the individual proprietor's own labor, into capitalist private property is of course a much more protracted, harsh, and difficult process than transformation of capitalist private property-in fact already resting upon social exploitation of the means of production-into social property. 1 Dlihring derides this account of postcapitalist property as abuse of language-a Hegelian synthesis in which the contradiction between individual and social property is both overcome and preserved. Marx-he concludes-remains in the nebulous world of property which is both individual and social, leaving his followers to solve for themselves that profound dialectical enigma. 2

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Chapter Five

Replying to Diihring's criticism, Engels writes: The situation resulting from expropriation of the expropriators is characterized as the re-establishment of individual property, but on the basis of social ownership of the land and the instruments of production created by labor. To anyone who understands German this means that land and the other means of production are social property, while the products-that is, the means of consumption-are individual property. This account of postcapitalist property, Engels continues, corresponds to the description of a socialist economy in the opening chapter of Capitaz.a The crucial premise in this interpretation of the quoted passage-the basis for ascribing a specificially socialist content to Marx's prediction-is the claim that Marx's language clearly limits social property to means of production and individual property to means of consumption. These asserted limitations I shall examine separately, in the light of the textual evidence. Marx's revision of the section on the historical tendency of capitalist accumulation, in the French edition of Capital, indicates that he did mean to restrict social property to means of production but believed he had not made this clear in the first and second editions. In the French edition he inserted a statement defining private property and its antithesis, social or collective property, solely in terms of ownership of the means of production. This change clearly limits social property to means of production. 4 When Marx describes individual property as based upon social ownership of the means of production, Engels argues, he obviously intends to limit individual property to means of consumption. What Marx actually writes, however, is that postcapitalist individual property

Capital

55

will be based upon the achievement of the capitalist era. Unless he meant to describe social ownership of the means of production as an achievement of the capitalist era, he meant to describe it as a type of individual property. The Engels interpretation is further weakened by a revision of the quoted passage in the French edition, where Marx added a denial that postcapitalist individual property is private property. He had already limited private property to means of production. If he intended to limit individual property to means of consumption, this revision was superftuous. 11 The Engels interpretation is also challenged by comparing the quoted passage with parallel discussions of postcapitalist property in Marx's other writings. Describing a socialist economy in The Critique of the Gotha Program, Marx states that the means of production will be public property and only means of consumption can become the property of individuals. If property of individuals is equated with individual property, this passage supports the position of Engels. But in The Civil War in France, Marx writes that the Commune intended "to make individual property a truth by transforming the means of production, land and capital, now chiefly the mean~ of enslaving and exploiting labour, into mere instruments of free and associated labour." If Marx is describing here conditions under which means of production become individual property, he assigns a meaning to the expression incompatible with that assigned by Engels.li Though the discussion of postcapitalist property in The Communist Manifesto does not use the expression 'individual property,' in a passage which parallels the passage on the negation of the negation in Capital Marx elaborates the contrast suggested by The Civil War in France:

capital

56

We Communists are accused of proposing to abolish personal property, acquired by one's own Ia bor-the property which is the basis of all personal freedom, activity, and independence ... Do you mean the property of the small artisan and the small peasant, which preceded capitalist property? We do not need to abolish it· for the development of industry has largely ' . destroyed it already and continues to destroy It every day ... Property in its present form is based on t?e . antagonism of capital and wage labor ... In capttahst society living labor is simply a means to increase accumulated labor. In communist society accumulated labor is simply a means to dev.elop, bro~de.n ~ an~ enrich the life of the laborer ... In capttahst soctety capital has independence and personality, while t.he living individual is dependent and lacks personality.. Yet the bourgeoisie call abolition of this state of affatrs abolition of personality and freedom! i To trace Marx's concept of individual pr~pe~t~ ba~k through still earlier writings is to reveal its ongms. In · for what D"hrmg philosophical communism. THe solutiOn u ..•·· calls the dialectical enigma of property wh ic~ i~ .bot~ individual and social is that in Marx's usage mdtvtdua · . . not opposed to socta · 1 proper ty, t-ut to dehu•. property IS lJI' manized or estranged property.x •rn 1 To weigh the textual evidence is to reject the ~ at that Marx's analysis of capitalist accumulatioa y . . . . . · .:::t econom ·_ in predtctmg transitiOn to a specifically socta1I=::> . . . _., to a com This is not to assert that it predicts transttiO•· · · Is · neutra 11 y, It munist economy but that, taken htera d1 · 1·~s tween the two. Yet since the Manifesto Imp 1...- • an . 'tl y "r::~~~sserts, Critique of the Gotha Program exp IICI . capitalism will be replaced im~ediately. by. soc eventually by communism, why IS the pomt

57

It is important because Engels-though he oversiml'fi s the connection-correctly links the passage prePd! t~ng expropriation of the expropriators, in the section tc t . 1'tst accumu 1atton, . . h t he the tendency o f captta Wit on sage describing a socialist economy, in the section on pP h . mmodity fetishism. Marx constructs that ypothettcal c~cialist economy as an example of a mode of production :ree from commodity fetishism. Almost immediately afterward, he predicts the disappearance of commodity fetishism. His socialist example renders this prediction neutral between socialism and communism. His later prediction is rendered similarly neutral by the vagueness of its language. Their shared ostensible neutrality invites conflating the two predictions. . Marx predicts the disappearance of commodity fetishism in a passage that recalls some themes of philosophical communism. In what seems a digression from his central argument, he contrasts the types of religious belief characteristic of capitalist and precapitalist cultures. Nature worship corresponds to stages in the development of the forces of production where men's relations to one another and to nature are restricted within narrow limits. Protestant Christianity with its cult of abstract man corresponds to the capitalist stage of development, to a society dominated by commodity exchange. Marx continues:

~he religious reflection of the r.eal world can wholly dtsappear only when men encounter in their practical, W?rkday life none but transparently rational relations With one another and with nature. The structure of the social life process-that is, of the material process of Production-does not strip off its mystic veil until it becomes the creation of freely associated men, under their conscious, planned control. Such a society re-

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Chapter Five

We Communists are accused of proposing to abolish personal property, acquired by one's own labor-the property which is the basis of all personal freedom, activity, and independence ... Do you mean the p.roperty of the small artisan and the small peasant, whtch preceded capitalist property? We do not need to abolish it; for the development of industry has lar~ely destroyed it already and continues to destroy It every day ... Property in its present form is based on antagonism of capital and wage labor ... In capttahst society living labor is simply a means to increase accumulated labor. In communist society accumulated labor is simply a means to develop, broaden, and enrich the life of the laborer ... In capitalist society capital has independence and personality, while t.he living individual is dependent and lacks personality .. Yet the bourgeoisie call abolition of this state of affairs abolition of personality and freedom! 7 To trace Marx's concept of individual property back through still earlier writings is to reveal its ori~~ns. in philosophical communism. THe solution for w~at ~uhnng calls the dialectical enigma of property which IS both individual and social is that in Marx's usage individual property is not opposed to social property, but to dehu• manized or estranged property. s_ To weigh the textual evidence is to r~ject the .clatm that Marx's analysis of capitalist accumulatiOn culmmates in predicting transition to a specifically socialist economy. This is not to assert that it predicts transition to a communist economy but that, taken literally, it is neutral between the two. Yet since the Manifesto implies, and The Critique of the Gotha Program explicitly assert~, ~hat capitalism will be replaced immediately. by. soctahsm~ eventually by communism, why is the pomt Important.

t?e .

Capital

57

It is important because Engels-though he oversimplifies the connection-correctly links the passage predicting expropriation of the expropriators, in the section on the tendency of capitalist accumulation, with the passage describing a socialist economy, in the section on commodity fetishism. Marx constructs that hypothetical socialist economy as an example of a mode of production free from commodity fetishism. Almost immediately afterward, he predicts the disappearance of commodity fetishism. His socialist example renders this prediction neutral between socialism and communism. His later prediction is rendered similarly neutral by the vagueness of its language. Their shared ostensible neutrality invites conftating the two predictions. Marx predicts the disappearance of commodity fetishism in a passage that recalls some themes of philosophical communism. In what seems a digression from his central argument, he contrasts the types of religious belief characteristic of capitalist and precapitalist cultures. Nature worship corresponds to stages in the development of the forces of production where men's relations to one another and to nature are restricted within narrow limits. Protestant Christianity with its cult of abstract man corresponds to the capitalist stage of development, to a society dominated by commodity exchange. Marx continues: The religious reflection of the real world can wholly disappear only when men encounter in their practical, workday life none but transparently rational relations with one another and with nature. The structure of the social life process-that is, of the material process of production-does not strip off its mystic veil until it becomes the creation of freely associated men, under their conscious, planned control. Such a society re-

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Chapter Five

quires, however, a material basis-a set of material conditions which are the unintended product of a long and painful process of development.n Upon what grounds does Marx predict the total disappearance of commodity fetishism? His wholly static analysis of commodity exchange in the opening chapters of Capital provides no evidence or argument to support such a prediction. The reference to freely associated men suggests that abolition of exploitation is one of the conditions he has in mind; and his subsequent discussion of capitalist accumulation provides both evidence and argument for predicting fulfilment of this requirement. Is abolition of exploitation the only condition? If Marx explicitly identified abolishing fetishism with transition to communism, abolishing exploitaton with transition to socialism, the disparity of the two predictions would be clear. But since both are presented as neutral, it is easy to conflate them-to regard the first prediction as adequately grounded on the evidence and argument, presented five hundred pages later, for the second. At the level of overt argument, the two long-range predictions Marx makes in Capital do not extend beyond the transition from capitalism to socialism. Yet, without openly admitting it, he complements the arguments he develops within the framework of historical materialism with an argument, developed within the framework of Hegelian philosophy, for the moral desirability of communism. From the first appearance of Capital, Marx was criticized for relying on Hegelian formulae instead of empirical evidence in his prediction of proletarian revolution and his analysis of commodity exchange. In the Afterword to the second edition of Capital, he replied to some of these criticisms. Distinguishing between the rational and the mystical elements in Hegel's dialectic, he

Capital

59

wrote that in Capital he had openly proclaimed himself Hegel's pupil-adding that in the chapter on commodities he had "coquetted" with Hegel's distinctive terminology.10 His use of Hegel's terminology, however, was more than mere flirtation. To follow its clues is to uncover two basic debts the pupil owed his teacher. First, his analysis of commodity exchange relies upon the central assumption of the Logic. Second, his critique of capitalist society parallels the central argument of The Philosophy of Right. In Capital Marx devotes almost one hundred pages to commodity exchange and money before reaching the topic of exploitation. His opening chapter parallels in terminology and reasoning the chapters on Existence and Appearance, near the middle of the Doctrine of Essence, in Heg~l's Logic. The analysis of commodity exchange is developed in terms of the contrast between appearance and substance, accident and essence. Its initial premise is that exchange values, which relate commodities with one another, must reflect some nonrelational property of each commodity taken separately-its value. Applying in this fashion to commodity exchange one variant of the basic assumption of Hegel's Logic-now called the Doctrine of Internal Relations-Marx asserts that exchange value is related to value as appearance to substance. 11 In the final section of the opening chapter, dealing with what Marx calls commodity fetishism, the contrast between appearance and substance inherent in commodity exchange is developed into a critique of the formalism pervading every level of capitalist culture. Through commodity exchange, Marx asserts, relations between men in the process of production take on the appearance of relations between things in the process of exchange. Capitalist society-where for the first time in history most products take the form of commodities-is accord-

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Chapter Five

ingly characterized by pervasive conflicts· between form and content, appearance and substance, accident and essence. 12 This critique of capitalist society parallels the critique of civil society in The Philosophy of Right. According to Hegel, the institutional embodiment of the contrast between substance and appearance, essence and accident, is the contrast between community and society. Substance is distinguished from appearance as that which can exist by itself from that whose existence depends on something else. Because the existence of any man depends on the existence of some community, communities exhibit the independence of substances, indiviquals the dependence of appearances. Hegel writes in Paragraphs 144 and 145: The objective ethical order (Sittlichkeit) ... is substance made concrete by subjectivity as infinite form. Hence it posits within itself distinctions whose specific character is thereby determined by the concept, and which endow the ethical order with a stable content independently necessary and subsistent in exaltation above subjective opinion and caprice. These distinctions are absolutely valid laws and institutions ... To these powers individuals are related as accidents to substance, and it is in individuals that these powers are represented, have the shape of appearance, and · become actualized. The family and the political state, those elements in the complex structure of Hegel's ideal state which clearly exemplify the primacy of the group, he calls substantial. Civil society, that element which seems to exemplify the primacy of the individual, he calls the external, or apparent, state. 1 a Civil society is for Hegel-as capitalist society is

Capital

61

for Marx-both a realm of commodity exchange ( V eriiusserung), whose economic tendency is increasingly to pit the poor against the rich, and a realm of alienation ( Entiiusserung), whose metaphysical characteristic is the opposition of existence and essence, appearance and· substance. For Hegel, subordination of civil society to the political state mediates, in the sense of reconciling, the sociallension between poor and rich as well as the metaphysical tension between appearance and substance. 14 A corresponding double role is assigned by Marx to proletarian revolution. The social order that replaces capitalism, he predicts, will end the opposition between appearance and substance as well as the distinction between rich and poor. The parts of Capital that most closely parallel parts of The Philosophy .of Right are the analysis of capitalist accumulation, where Marx predicts the end of capitalist exploitation, and the analysis of commodity exchange, where he predicts the end of commodity fetishism. Granted that Marx discusses questions Hegel raised, does he support his answers by Hegelian arguments? Examination reveals that his analysis of commodity exchange is Hegelian in this stronger sense, but his analysis of capitalist accumulation is not. In predicting the end of exploitation, Marx characterizes capitalist property as the negation of individual private property, and postcapitalist individual property as the negation of the negation. Yet this prediction concludes some two hundred pages of economic argument, developed wholly within the framework of historical materialism. In reply to those like Mikhailovsky who interpret the Hegelian language as evidence of Hegelian argument, Marx can point to nine chapters of economic analysis, packed with empirical data, to show that he has

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Chapter Five

made use of Hegel merely to describe the pattern, not to establish it. 15 In predicting the end of commodity fetishism, Marx uses only the language of historical materialism. Yet though he suggests that the grounds for this prediction are the same as those for predicting the end of exploitation, examination of his subsequent account of capitalist accumulation reveals no economic grounds for predicting the end of commodity exchange. Apart from this empty promise, the earlier prediction derives its plausibility from an argument that abolition of commodity exchange is morally desirable. That argument, suggested ratper than . explicitly stated in Marx's analysis of commodity exchange, is a counterpart of the argument presented in The EconomicPhilosophical Manuscripts. Its starting point is different. Feuerbach's account of man's essential nature has been replaced by the analogous, though far more complex, account of Hegel. The rest of the argument is unchanged. Its unstated premise is that the greater the conformity of appearance to substance, existence to essence, characterizing a social order, the greater is the moral worth of that social order. Its stated premise is that appearance is opposed to substance in cultures based upon exchange economies, but not in cultures based upon natural economies. The conclusion follows that; other things being equal, cultures based upon exchange economies are morally inferior to cultures based upon natural economies. Buried in his account of commodity fetishism is the demand for a rebirth of community that Marx first raised in 1843. 16

6

Two Types of Socialism: Marx against Marx

The moral argument in Capital-like its counter. parts in The Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts and The Critique of the Gotha Program-asserts the superiority of· communism to socialism. Yet it seems nullified by Marx's claim that fetishism would be eliminated in the socialist economy described in Capital. To explore this difficulty is to question the basis for that claim. On what grounds can Marx assert that abolishing exploitation, without abolishing exchange, will end commodity fetishism? In the final section of his opening chapter, Marx gives four examples of economies free from commodity fetishism: Crusoe's economy, a self-sufficient patriarchal economy, a feudal economy, and a socialist economy. 1 The first three are natural economies, in the sense that individual producers normally consume what they produce instead of exchanging it for what others produce. But in the socialist economy, where individual producers normally consume what others produce, will not distribution of consumers' goods require exchange? On what grounds can Marx deny that every socialist economy is an economy of commodity exchange? And on what grounds can he deny that commodity exchange-even in a classless economy-entails commodity fetishism? 63

Chapter Six

64

This is partly a question of definition. In the opening section of the chapter on commodities, Marx writes: A thing can be useful and a product of human labor without being a commodity. Someone who satisfies his needs with products of his own labor creates use values but not commodities. In order to produce commodities, he must not only produce use values, but use values for others-social use values. If all goods produced for exchange are commodities, then trading certificates of labor for consumers' goods in a socialist economy is buying commodities. However, a few paragraphs later Marx adds:

In the traditional Indian community there is social division of labor, but products do not become commodities. To take an example nearer home, labor is systematically divided in every factory, but this division does not function through the workers exchanging their individual products with one another. Only products of different labot processes, carried on independently for the accounts of different private individuals, confront one another as commodities. ~f ~~ly

goods produced for exchange between private Individuals are commodities, then socialist distribution does not involve selling commodities. This definition of commodities enables Marx, in The Critique of the Gotha Program, to contrast socialist exchange with commodity exchange.!! The issue ceases to be merely verbal if we ask whether the sources of fetishism in economies dominated by commodity exchange will be absent from socialist economies. This question is too general to permit a single answer. In The Critique of the Gotha Program Marx describes one type of socialist economy: in The

Two Types of Socialism

65

Communist Manifesto he suggests a different type. From the first, it can be argued, the sources of fetishism have been eliminated: from the second they have not. The socialist economy described in The Critique of the Gotha Program differs from a capitalist economy in two respects relevant to the survival of fetishism. Because producers' goods are not exchanged, the role of exchange is radically curtailed. Furthermore, in exchange of con·sumers' goods for certificates of labor, price does not diverge from labor cost.a In the third volume of Capital Marx writes that in precapitalist economies commodities normally exchange at prices proportionate to their labor costs. And in the first volume he writes of precapitalist social formations: In the ancient Asiatic, the antique, and similar modes of production, transformation of products into commodities and men into commodity producers plays a subordinate role-though this grows more significant as these communities approach their dissolution .... In comparison with capitalist society, these old social organisms of production are far more simple and transparent. 4 From these considerations it seems plausible to argue by analogy that transition to the type of socialism described in the Critique-by limiting the sphere of exchange and equating price with labor cost-will dispel to a great extent the illusions of fetishism. Marx asserts that the socialist economy described in the Critique will be as free from fetishism as the communist-that in neither will the labor cost of a product take on the appearance of a material property of the product, its value. 5 Whether or not this claim is an exaggeration, viewing these economies in terms of a transition

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from society to community suggests that the restriction and simplification of exchange predicted for the socialist economy will be transitional-a preliminary step toward complete elimination of exchange. That explains, though it does not justify, Marx's calling this type of socialism the lower stage of communism. To turn from The Critique of the Gotha Program to The Communist Manifesto is to encounter a quite different type of socialist economy, which does not eliminate or even weaken the sources of fetishism. According to the Manifesto, victory of the proletariat will inaugurate a process of piecemeal socialization. The transitional program proposed. for advanced capitalist countries includes the following measures:. I. Abolition of property in land and use of ground rent for state expenditures. 2. Steeply progressive taxation. 3. Abolition of the right to inherit. 5. Centralization of credit in the hands of the state, through a national bank with state capital and an exclusive monopoly. 6. Centralization of transport in the hands of the state. 7. Multiplication of national factories and means of production, extension and impr_ovement of arable land, in accordance with a social plan. 6 The immediate result of introducing these measures would be a mixed economy, combining socialism with capitalism. Many units of production and exchange would continue as capitalist enterprises. The functioning of this capitalist sector would involve markets for means of production (though only a rental market for land), labor markets, and markets for means of consumption. Pre-

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sumably these markets would be subjected to regulations and restrictions quite different from those in the preceding capitalist economy. And presumably the socialist sector would function through these same markets. The ultimate result of these measures would be a socialist economy, combining markets with planning. The measures of the transitional program that would ultimately abolish exploitation-confiscating the land, ·prohibiting inheritance-are not measures that would abolish exchange. After attainment of a wholly socialist economy markets could continue to regulate all of production, together with the private sector of consumption, within a framework of planning. Division of each year's total product between means of production and means of consumption would be a planning decision. But distribution of means of production among different units of production could take place through markets. Division of each year's total production of consumers' goods into a portion destined for communal consumption and a portion destined for private consumption would be a planning decision. But distribution of the portion available for private consumption could take place through markets. Division between workers and nonworkers of the portion of consumers' goods available for private consumption would be a planning decision. But distribution of the workers' total share among individual workers could take place through markets for labor, in combination with markets for consumers' goods. A classless economy of this type-combining markets with planning-is now called market socialism. To examine the cormection between socialism and fetishism is to cut beneath the surface of Marx's argument. The claim that every type of socialism would be free from fetishism is indefensible. Yet qualifying this

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claim to render it defensible results in opposing the two long-range predictions which the argument of Capital conftates. The type of socialism required for Marx's discussion of commodity fetishism is that of the Critique: the type appropriate for his discussion of capitalist accumulation is that of the Manifesto. To recognize this incompatibility is to separate the covert from the overt argument of Capital. The prediction that commodity fetishism will disappear is exposed as a moral imperative, based upon principles of philosophical communism, disguised as a factual statement, based upon principles of historical materialism. Why is the socialism of the M a11ifesto more appropriate than the socialism of the Critique for Marx's account of the historical tendency of capitalist accumulation? Two sets of arguments suggested by Marx himself can be used to support this claim. One set is concerned with historical continuity, the other with economic workability. Marx writes in the Critique that the transitional classless economy which succeeds abolition of exploitation will be stamped in every respect-economically, morally, and intellectually-with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges} Which fits this description better, the socialist economy of the Manifesto or that of the Critique? The transitional measures listed in the Manifesto constitute a concrete program for advancing from a wholly capitalist economy, through a mixed capitalist and socialist economy, to a wholly socialist economy. What would be a comparable program for advancing from a capitalist economy to the socialist economy of the Critique? The type of socialist economy described in Capital corresponds to the type predicted in the Critique. The

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first example of an economy free from fetishism is that of Robinson Crusoe, whose bookkeeping-according to Marx-equates cost of production with labor cost. The fourth example is a socialist economy which exhibits all the characteristics of Robinson's labor on a social rather than an individual scale. In this economy then, as in Crusoe's economy, cost of production is equated with labor cost. Yet Marx writes that he has chosen to discuss this socialist economy solely for the sake of a parallel with commodity production. s The parallel would have been still closer if he had chosen for his example the socialist economy implicit in the Manifesto-where, as in capitalist economies, costs of production diverge from labor costs. The type of socialism implicit in the Manifesto is the type implicit in the program of Lassalle. During the period of rivalry between followers of Marx and followers of Lassalle, Liebknecht asked Marx to write a preface for a new edition of the Manifesto. The preface Marx and Engels wrote in 1872 does not mention Lassalle by name. But it denies the efficacy he claimed for his major political proposal-introduction of universal suffrage. And it withdraws any support the transitional program might provide for his major economic proposal-establis~ment of producers' cooperatives with state aid. No particular importance should be ascribed to the transitional program, its authors now assert, · because parts of it have become obsolete. Its obsolescence they attribute to the tremendous growth of modern industry and the concomitant growth of the trade union movement, together ~ith the political experience gained in the French RevolutiOn of 1848 and the Paris Commune. Perhaps some parts of the original program had become obsolete in the course of twenty-five years. But was the type of socialism pre-

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dieted, after three more years, in The Critique of the Gotha Program a revision of the transitional program of the Manifesto appropriate to these changes in the situation of the proletariat? Or was it appropriate solely for presenting socialism as an unstable preliminary, rather than a viable alternative, to communism? Examining the Preface of 1872 in its historical context points to the conclusion that Marx disowned his former economic program, not because it had become obsolete, but because it had become the program of Lassalle. 9 These arguments from continuity can be complemented by attacking the socialism of the Critique as economically unworkable. Such a criticism can be derived from arguments developed by Marx himself in attacking as utopian the economic programs of Gray and Proudhon. Discussing classless economies in The Critique of the Gotha Program, Marx writes: Within the cooperative society based upon collective ownership of the means of production, producers do not exchange their products. Nor does the labor embodied in these products appear as their value, as a material property they possess; for here-in contrast to capitalism-individual labor is no longer indirectly, but directly, a constituent part of the aggregate labor of society. 10 What is meant by contrasting a direct with an indirect connection between individual and aggregate labor? The statements that producers do not exchange their products and that the labor costs of these products do not take the form of values imply that indirect connection is connection through a market. But, as Marx suggests elsewhere, attempts to connect individual labor directly

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with aggregate labor present serious difficulties. One is the difficulty of calculating hours of labor contributed by different producers. Another is the difficulty of calculating the labor costs of different products. Discussing in his Critique of Political Economy the classless exchange economies proposed by Proudhon and by the Ricardian socialists Bray and Gray, Marx writes: The theory that labor time should serve directly as money was first systematically developed by John Gray. He proposed that a national central bank should ascertain through its branches the labor time expended in producing different commodities. In exchange for each commodity, its producer would receive an official certificate of its value-that is, a receipt for the labor time the commodity contained. These banknotes-of one labor week, one labor day, one labor hour, and so on -would then serve to claim other commodities, stored in the bank's warehouses, which had cost an equivalent amount of labor. Marx goes on to argue that this scheme for connecting individual with aggregate labor is self-defeating. Since labor time is the intrinsic measure of value, why use another external standard? Why is exchange value transformed into price? Why are the values of all commodities computed in terms of one exclusive commodity, which is accordingly transformed into the appropriate expression of exchange value-that is, money? This was the problem Gray had to solve. But instead of solving _it, he assumed that commodities could be directly compared with one another as products of social labor. Yet they are only comparable as what they are. Commodities are immediate products of separated, independent, private labors; they must

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establish themselves as embodiments of universal social labor through their alienation in the process of exchange. On the basis of commodity production, labor becomes social labor only through the universal alienation of individual labors. But Gray, treating the labor time contained in commodities as directly social, treats it as communal labor time-as the labor time of directly associated individuals. If this were the case, a specific commodity-such as gold or silver-would not confront other commodities as the incarnation of universal labor; and exchange value would not become price. What is more, use value would not become exchange value; products would not b~come commodities; and consequently the entire basis of bourgeois production would be abolished. But this is not what Gray had in mind. Goods are to be produced as commodities but not exchanged as commodities. 11 This criticism pivots on Marx's contrast between abstract and concrete labor. Commodities of different kinds are produced by qualitatively different kinds of concrete labor-mining iron, growing wheat, weaving linen, and so on. But the values, or labor costs, of these commodities are quantities of homogeneous abstract labor-what Marx calls in this passage universal social labor. One hour of concrete labor, highly skilled or unusually intense, is equivalent to more than one hour of abstract labor. 12 Assume, for the sake of argument, that through observation and calculation the authorities of Gray's central bank could ascertain the hours of different kinds of concrete labor required to produce each commodity. They could not, according to Marx, calculate the hours of abstract labor equivalent to these hours of concrete labor. That calculation could be accomplished only through

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establishment of equilibrium prices for the commodities in a competitive market-a process which involves divergence of prices from labor costs. In proposing that goods be produced as commodities-as products of separated, independent, private labors-but prohibiting their exchange as commodities-at prices which diverge from labor costs-Gray's program is therefore self-defeating. Does this criticism apply to the socialist economy sketched by Marx in The Critique of the Gotha Program? He states there that in the classless economies of the future individual labor will be directly a part of the aggregate labor of society. He also states that in the transitional socialist economy each worker will receive a certificate stating the amount of labor he has contributed (less a deduction for the common fund) ;then exchange it for consumers' goods that have cost an equivalent amount of labor. How, in such an economy, could the relevant quantities of labor be ascertained? The authorities could record the quantities of concrete labor contributed by each worker. Assume, for the sake of argument, that through observation and calculation they could also ascertain the hours of different kinds of concrete labor required for producing each· of the different kinds of consumers' goods. They could not, according to Marx's critique of Gray and Proudhon, calculate the hours of abstract labor equivalent to these hours of concrete labor without recourse to competitive markets. Why translate concrete into abstract labor? Why not count any two hours of concrete labor as equivalent? This is the solution of Proudhon and Dtihring, but not that of Marx. In The Critique of Political Economy, it is true, Marx seems to assert that translation of concrete into abstract labor is peculiar to the capitalist mode of

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production. But in Capital he writes that the problem of allocating labor, in appropriate quantities, among specific kinds of productive activities is central for every system of production; and his language clearly implies that solution of this problem involves translating concrete into abstract labor. In a simple economy-like that of Crusoe or that of a self-sufficient household-this translation requires no formal mechanism. In the complex economy of capitalism the translation is effected through the mechanism of the market. Some corresponding mechanism is required by any complex socialist economy .1 a In the socialist economy implicit in the Manifesto translation of concrete into abstract labor could be effected through competitive markets for labor. But this solution is impossible for the socialist economy described in the Critique-or for any communist economy. Marx writes that labor time plays a double role in the socialist economy described in Capital. On the one hand, it measures each individual's share in the common labor and consequently his share in that portion of the common product available for individual consumption. On the other hand, its socially planned allocation maintains the proper proportion between different kinds of work and different needs. In a communist economy, calculation of labor time will lose its distributive function. But in the communist economy that- Marx envisages will not calculation of labor time retain its planning function? How then can planners calculate the proper proportion between different kinds of work and different needs? Assume, for the sake of argument, that through observation and calculation they could ascertain the hours of different kinds of concrete labor required for producing each different product. How could they calculate the hours of abstract labor equivalent to these hours of con-

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crete labor? If in every complex economy a labor market is required for translating concrete into abstract labor, the communist economy that Marx predicts is not simply remote but unattainable. In all his major economic writings-from The Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts to Capital-Marx attacks the proposals, made by Proudhon and the Ricardian socialists, for establishing classless exchange economies where certificates of labor time would serve as money. In these critiques four different lines of argument can be discerned. The Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts present a philosophical argument, evaluating morally the institution of exchange in terms of a theory of man's essential nature. An economic argument-claiming that in such economies ratios of exchange could not be proportional to labor costs in every case because competitive markets would be required to balance supply and demand-is given its clearest formulation in The Poverty of Philosophy. A second philosophical argumentderiving from the discussion of quantity and measure in Hegel's Logic the claim that determining the labor cost of any commodity requires exchanging it with a standard commodity-is given its clearest formulation in the Grundrisse. A second economic argument-claiming that in such economies competitive markets would be required to translate concrete labor into abstract labor-is given its clearest formulation in The. Critique of Political Economy.14 To compare these arguments is to encounter once again the conflict between communism and historical materialism. The persisting influence of his moral argument apparently blinded Marx to a consequence entailed by both his economic arguments-that the only workable complex classless economies are socialist economies with competitive markets.

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Responses to Four Challenges, 1871-1880

Why do the many volumes containing Marx's writings after 1848 contain only a few paragraphs dealing with postcapitalist economies as unified systems of production and exchange? The standard explanation-first suggested by Marx in the Afterword to the second ·edition of Capital-is that scientific socialism cannot describe in any detail the society that will replace capitalism. Utopians speculate about the socialist future: Marxists analyze the capitalist present. 1 To focus on the contrast between socialism and communism is to suggest a different explanation. Marx does make predictions outlining the structure of postcapitalist economies. Some he supports with empirical evidence and economic analysis: one he does not. To support his prediction that socialist economies will develop into communist economies, could he have produced arguments which conformed to the requirements of scientific socialism? Or would the attempt have plainly exposed his inability to reach a communist conclusion from the starting point of historical materialism? The plausibility of the standard explanation has been decisively weakened by publication of manuscripts Marx left unpublished during his lifetime-notably The German Ideology and The Critique of the Gotha Program. 76

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The German Ideology was written from the standpoint of historical materialism and scientific socialism. Yet it contains discussions of communist society comparable to those presented in The Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts. The striking change from extensive discussion to cryptic paragraphs does not date from 1845, when Marx abandoned the standpoint of philosophical communism. It dates instead from 1848, when in The Communist Manifesto he first recognized (with reservations repeated in his later work) the practicability of a socialist alternative to communism. Furthermore, the change in what he planned to write occurred even later than the change in what he wrote. In 1851 he planned to devote one entire volume, out of a projected four, to socialist theory. In 1858, thirteen years after adopting the standpoint of scientific socialism, he planned to combine a critical history of socialist theory with his critical history of political economy. 2 Publication of The Critique of the Gotha Program revealed that in 1875 Marx had predicted, not only what type of classless economy would replace capitalism, but what second type of classless economy would replace the first. Both predictions exceed the limits Marx had suggested two years before in his Afterword to the second edition of Capital. These considerations are sufficient to refute the explanation suggested by Marx, which focuses on the contrast between utopian and scientific. But they are insufficient to confirm the rival explanation which focuses on the socialist alternative to communism. To support that hypothesis, I shall examine four responses elicited from Marx by situations which challenged him to state his views on postcapitalist economic organization. The statements in his Afterword to the second edition of

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Capital and his Notes on Wagner are restricted to problems of theory. The statements in The Civil War in France and The Critique of the Gotha Program also involve programs of contemporary socialist movements. I shall discuss the latter first. Marx presented The Civil War in France to the General Council of the First International on 30 May 1871. Nearly a month earlier Frederic Harrison had published an article "The Revolution of the Commune," with which Marx took issue on a number of points without citing the source of the opinions he attacked.R Defending the Commune as a major advance in the class struggle of workers against capitalists, Harrison writes: Primarily the Revolution is a political, but really and mainly a social movement. And the first is but the manifestation of the second. This struggle of the capital against the provinces, of the great cities against the country, of the Republic against Monarchy, of Communal against Parliamentary government-what does it mean? There is one thing which inspires and causes these. That one thing is the struggle of the workman against the capitalist ... And so all of these contrasted systems virtually spring out of the grand contrast of all society, those who live by their labour, and those who live by accumulated capital. And the transcendent importance of this crisis is this-that for the first time in modern Europe the workmen of the chief city of the Continent have organized a regular government in the name of a new social order. But Harrison, a follower of Comte, does not identify this new social order with communism. That the revolution has a strong communistic side is a weakness, he

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writes, because communism is incompatible with human nature. That [new] social order as yet is most vaguely apprehended; but it is not to any sensible extent a system of Communism. There may be an element of enthusiastic Communists among the leaders: but the people are not, and never can be, in a body Communists. It is one of the vulgar calumnies against Comte that his system countenances Communism, of which it is the most resolute opponent. It is, as he proved, the very starting point of all society to recognize property under proper conditions ... He showed that to exercise over the individual that amount of control, and to exact from him that amount of social devotion, which is essential to every system of Communism, it would be fatal to leave him in possession of his own family, to the individualist interest of his own household. 4 This attack provoked from Marx the following reply: The Commune, ... [apologists for existing society] exclaim, intends to abolish property, the basis of all civilization! Yes, gentlemen, the Commune intended to abolish that class-property which makes the labour of the many the wealth of the few ... It wanted to make individual property a truth by transforming the means of production, land and capital, now chiefly the means of enslaving and exploiting labour, into mere instruments of free and associated labour. But this is Communism, "impossible" Communism! Why, ·those members of the ruling classes who are intelligent enough to perceive the impossibility of continuing the present system ... have become apostles of cooperative production. If cooperative production is not to remain a sham and a snare; if it is to supersede the Capitalist

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system; if united cooperative societies are to regulate national production upon a common plan, thus taking it under their own control, and putting an end to the constant anarchy and periodical convulsions which are the fatality of capitalist production-what else, gentlemen, would it be but Communism, "possible" Communism? 5 This reply contains more rhetoric than argument. It is dogmatic if "communism" is used here in the sense that Engels used it, during the next four years, to distinguish the views he shared with Marx from the socialist views of Proudhon and Lassalle!1 In that case, possible and impossible communism coincide: tbe unviability of the socialist alternative is simply assumed. On the other hand, the reply is evasive if "communism" has been tacitly redefined, through the contrast between its possible and impossible varieties, to include the socialist alternative. In that case, Marx's reference to possible communism is wholly irrelevant to Harrison's attack on impossible communism. In any case. the reply is obscure, because its language is not clear enough to disclose which of these readings corresponds to the author's intention. The possibility that in this passage Marx intended to stretch the definition of communism to cover all kinds of socialism can be ruled out, it might be argued, on the basis of external evidence. Throughout the preceding twenty-eight years he had repeatedly contrasted communism as an economic system with other types of socialism. Yet against this evidence must be weighed the fact that what was unclear suggestion in 1871 became, four years later, explicit characterization. Describing a classless exchange economy in The Critique of the Gotha Program, Marx calls it, not socialism, but the first stage of communism.7

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At first reading The Critique of the Gotha Program seems lacking in focus-a jumble of criticisms, some basic and challenging, some petty and unfair, linked objectively by the text of the Gotha Program and subjectively by Marx's hostility to Lassalle. From the confusion, however, two sharp theoretical distinctions emerge: an economic contrast between what Marx calls the first and second stages of communism; and a political contrast between proletarian dictatorship and what Marx calls vulgar democracy. Lenin finds a focus for the Critique by interpreting the first as a contrast of ends and the second as a complementary contrast of means. This double contrast, he suggests, divides orthodox from revisionist Marxists-with the consequence that many who have called themselves orthodox are classified by Lenin as revisionists. Pursuing the final goal of a socialist economy by the path of parliamentary democracy, contemporary German Social Democrats are heirs of Lassalle. Pursuing the final goal of a communist economy by the path of revolutionary dictatorship, the Russian Bolsheviks are heirs of Marx. s To accept Lenin's interpretation of Marx's question does not entail accepting his endorsement of Marx's answer. Let us grant that The Critique of the Gotha Program raises the crucial problem of choosing either socialism or communism as a final goal. Then let us examine the methods by whic~ Marx argues his case. Marx's discussion of the transition to socialism is dogmatic, in predicting that every such transition will involve the same type of socialism. Upon what grounds does he assert that in every socialist economy consumers' goods will exchange for certificates of labor in quantities proportionate to labor costs? Why does he dismiss in 1875 the alternative he suggested in 1848? The Critique

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of the Gotha Program does not tell us. In place of reasoned argument, it offers simple prophecy. Marx's discussion of the transition to communism is evasive, in appealing to an argument he does not produce while deprecating the argument he does produce. The argument he makes is moral, a comparison of socialist and communist distribution in terms of an ideal of justice. Yet after offering it, he ridicules such appeals to justice as the obsolete ideological nonsense of democrats and vulgar socialists. A scientific discussion, he suggests, would demonstrate that continued development of the forces of production will render inevitable replacement of socialist distribution by communist distribution. 1) Yet such a demonstration cannot ·be found in The Critique of the Gotha Program-or elsewhere in his writings. Marx's discussion of socialism is obscure, in resorting to abuse of language for suggesting the transitional character of socialist economies. He calls socialism a kind of communism. Yet he also asserts that socialist distribution, since it is based upon exchange of equivalents, is "in principle" bourgeois. 10 Why is it bourgeois? The capitalist mode of production is a system of exploitation through exchange. The socialist mode of production is a system of exchange without exploitation. There is no more justification for describing socialist distribution as in principle bourgeois than for describing c;apitalist distribution as in principle socialist. To read that the classless economy which replaces capitalism will constitute the first stage of communism yet remain in principle bourgeois is to receive the impression that this economy will be inherently unstable, irremediably transitory. But this is wholly a rhetorical effect. Analysis reveals that the transitory character which Marx ascribes to socialism, rather than deriving from tension

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between forces and relations of production, derives instead from tension between the ordinary use and the tendentious misuse of words. This persuasive effect is strengthened by the ~e~ni­ tions Marx assigns to three terms central for the descnphon of socialist economies-commodities, money, and wages. In the transitional economy described in the Critique consumers' goods are not commodities, as Marx defines commodities, although they are goods produced f?r exchange. In this economy certificates of labor contnbuted are not money, as Marx defines money, although they are the accepted medium of exchange. In this economy producers do not receive wages, as Mar~ define~ wages, although they receive incomes for workmg, which they spend in buying consumers' goods. 11 According to M~~x's usage, establishment of socialis~ eliminat~s commodities, money, and wages. But accordmg to ordmary usage,. establishment of communism has this result. The rhetoncal effect of this tension between two sets of definitions is to suggest that eliminating commodities, money, and w~g~s in one sense but not the other is a first step toward ehm~­ nating them in both senses-that socialism is ~ transitional stage between capitalism and communism. T? accept this suggestion, however, is to mistake verbal manipulation for economic analysis. In writing both The Critique of the Gotha ~rogran: and The Civil War in France. Marx confronted Immediate practical problems as well as basic theoretical issues. In both cases, for example, a clear and thorough statement of his communist position would have revealed how little support it had among any of the cont~nd­ ing factions. During the same peri~d two other Sit~a­ tions, free from such tactical constramts, challenged htm to clarify and defend his views on the character of

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postcapitalist economies. Yet his responses to this second set are no more straightforward than his responses to the first. In 1872 and 1873 appeared the second edition of the first volume of Capital, with an Afterword in which Marx commented on some reviews of the first edition. Discussing different conceptions of the method employed in Capital, he writes: Thus the Paris Revue Positiviste reproaches me, on the one hand, with treating economics metaphysically; and on the other hand (imagine!) with confining myself merely to critical analysis of the given, instead of writing recipes ( Comtist ones?) for the cook-shops of the future. 12 · Marx refers here to a review of Capital by de Roberty, a follower of Comte, which concludes with the following observations: In one word, the richness of Marx's work is due mainly to its employing, for the first time in the service of socialist ideas, the rigorous methods of science. But while recognizing these merits ... we hasten to add that the root idea of the entire work is in our opinion, if not completely false, at least too little in accord with known laws regulating the economic order to have a decisive influence on the struggle of labor against the despotism of capital. In our opinion the social question is strikingly misplaced when, instead of investigating the necessary conditions for sound production and just distribution of wealth, a theorist confines himself to analyzing its constituent elements -telling us, for example, that the source of the income produced by capital is unpaid appropriation of human labor. Now the profit of capitalists may be what you

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please: it is nevertheless a necessary gear in the mechanism of modern industry. We conclude by expressing the wish ... to find in subsequent volumes of this remarkable work a little less dialectic and even greater use, if that is possible, of the inductive method. 1 a To compare these criticisms, in their actual wording, with Marx's report of them is to discover three discrepancies. First, the criticism that Marx does not investigate the necessary conditions for sound production and just distribution of wealth is reported as a demand that he provide recipes for the cook-shops of the future. Second, de Roberty does not criticize Marx for confining himself to critical analysis of the given. Instead, he criticizes him for providing an analysis of the given that is radically incomplete-for confining himself to exposing the origin of profit in unpaid labor while neglecting to analyze the role it plays in the processes of production and distribution. Third, these two criticisms are complementary. Marx's failure to analyze concretely the processes of capitalist production and distribution is responsible, de Roberty suggests, for his failure to specify the basic features of the socialist production and distribution that will replace them. It can be argued that these criticisms are mistaken. It cannot be argued that Marx reports them accurately. By his distortion of de Roberty's criticisms, is Marx suggesting that the sole alternative to utopian speculation is analysis without prediction? Taken in its narrowest sense, the principle of restricting analysis to the given bars any prediction at all. Such an absolute prohibition seems implied in equating de Roberty's call for an investigation of the necessary conditions for sound production and just distribution with a call for providing recipes for the cook-shops of the future.

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Yet so sweeping a rejection of prediction is incompatible with Marx's practice in Capital. The argument of that work culminates in predictions: class polarization, increasing misery, expropriation of the expropriators. Marx's aim, he states in the Preface, is to analyze the given in the sense of discovering its law of motion-to find in the present the basis for predicting the future. 14 Marx's practice in Capital is consistent with his pronouncements on method, both before and after he published the second edition. Contrasting scientific with utopian socialism in The German Ideology and The Poverty of Philosophy, he distinguishes two kinds of prediction: the scientific kind differs from the. utopian as empirical investigation from visionary speculation and as description from prescription. Delimiting the field of scientific prediction in The Critique of Political Economy, he writes that transformation of the economic conditions of production can be determined with the precision of natural science-though transformation of the ideological superstructure cannot. Outlining in Capital the historical tendency of capitalist accumulation, he writes that capitalism produces with the inexorability of a natural process its own negation-collective ownership of the means of production. In his reply to Mikhailovsky-written four years later than his Afterword to Capital-his earlier position is reaffirmed. 15 Instead of caricaturing de Roberty's criticism, Marx might consistently have replied to it along these lines. First, by denying that the aim of Capital was to construct an ideal of sound production and just distribution. Second, by asserting that its aim was to find in the present the basis for predicting the future. Third, by citing those sections of Capital which predict abolition of capitalist exploitation and disappearance of commodity fetishism.

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At this point, however, his reply would be incomplete; for it would not answer the question de Roberty raised concerning the system of distribution that will replace capitalism. In completing his reply, Marx would face three choices: to specify a socialist system of distribution; to specify a communist system; or to specify initially a socialist, eventually a communist, system. The first choice would expose him to the charge that he had abandoned the attempt to base a communist program upon the foundation of historical materialism. The other choices would expose him to the charge that he had substituted, at a crucial point, moral prescription for scientific prediction. Faced with a challenge he could not answer without sacrificing either the goal of communism or the claims of scientific socialism, he dodged the question with a jeer about the cook-shops of the future. During 1879 and 1880 Marx wrote a lengthy reply to the critique of his economic theories presented in Wagner's Lehrbuch der politischen Okonomie. These notes on Wagner contain his final response to the challenge to clarify and defend his conception of the classless economy that will replace capitalism. Attacking Marx's labor theory of value, Wagner writes: It is not only irrelevant to the formation of exchange value in contemporary commercial transactions. It is also irrelevant-as Schaffie has clearly and conclusively shown in his Quintessenz and his Socialen Korper-to the relations that must of necessity develop in· Marx's hypothetical social state. Marx comments: The social state which Herr Schaffie has so kindly "developed" for me is here transformed from the social

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state that his hypothesis falsely attributes to me into Marx's "social state." Wagner continues: A striking example is that of corn and similar crops, whose exchange value would have to be regulated by a system of "social taxes" rather than solely by labor cost, in order to counter the effects of fluctuating harvests upon relatively constant requirements. Marx comments: Nonsense, every word of it! ... I have nowhere spoken of "social taxes." And my analysis of value is concerned with capitalist relations-not with applying this theory of value to the "social state" constructed, not · by me, but by Herr Schaffie for me. 1n Is it true that Schaffie invented the socialist economy he attributed to Marx? In The Quintessence of Socialism he specifically cites the account of a socialist economy in the first chapter of Capital, pointing out that Marx presents this account as a hypothetical construction. Accurately paraphrasing the passage, Schaffie identifies the basic features of that economy: collective ownership of the means of production; distribution of consumers' goods in proportion to work contributed; and use of labor time as the sole measure of cost, both in planning total production and in distributing consumers' goods. 17 Is it true that Marx does not apply his labor theory of value to socialist economies? Because he defines 'value' as coextensive with commodity fetishism. and confines commodity fetishism to class societies, he does not apply the word to socialist economies. 1 s But the central principle of his theory of value-that labor time is the sole measure of real cost-he does apply to socialism. In the classless economy discussed as a hypothesis in Capital-

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and predicted as a transitional stage in The Critique of the Gotha Program-labor time is the sole measure of cost. Furthermore, in The Critique of Political Economy and The Poverty of Philosophy Marx uses a subordinate principle of his theory of value-that real cost is measured in units of abstract rather than concrete labor-to deny the viability of the socialist economies advocated by Proudhon and Gray. 1H What then are the facts? Marx had been correctly reported by Schaffie. And he had applied his theory of value to socialist economies. Why then did he deny those facts? Had he forgotten in 1879 what he had written in 1847,1859, 1867,and1875? The sweeping denials in the Notes on Wagner, like the bold prophecies in The Critique of the .Gotha Program, are responses to a difficulty that derives, not from the general requirements for scientific prediction, but from the particular circumstances of Marx's intellectual history. The inconsistency of his four responses with one another-together with their level of logical cogency and factual accuracy, so strikingly inferior to the usual level of his writing-reflect a frustration whose roots can be discovered in The Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts. Marx adopted communism as a goal, on moral and philosophical grounds, before he adopted the approach of historical materialism and scientific socialism. For nearly forty years he fought the socialist alternative-first in the program of Proudhon, later in that of Lassalle. Yet the principles of historical materialism and scientific socialism, applied to the present in order to predict the future, do not point beyond a socialist society. After the Manifesto, and to a greater degree after Capital, communism became for Marx a goal he was unwilling to abandon but unable to defend.

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Chapter Seven

This tension, latent in the development of his ideas, became manifest in their subsequent history. To examine its role in the doctrinal disputes of the last one hundred years is to find in the conflict between communism and historical materialism a key to the dialectic of Marxism.

Notes, Works Cited, Index

Notes

Passages are cited by paragraph number rather than by page number, on the assumption that the inconvenience of counting paragraphs is outweighed by the convenience of using any of a variety of editions, including English translations. In some translations the correspondence of paragraphs is not exact: but the divergence is seldom substantial. The editions I have used are identified in the section Works Cited.

Chapter One. Statement of the Problem 1. Lenin, State and Revolution, ch. 4, sec. 6, para. 4; ch. 5, sec. 3, paras. 6, 11, 12. Also Lenin, "A German Voice on the War," para. 5; Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution," thesis 9; Lenin, "From the Destruction of the Old Social System to the Creation of the New," paras. 6-7.

2. Lenin, State and Revolution, ch. 4, sec. 6, paras. 1-3; ch. 5, sec. 4, paras. 12-13. Also Lenin, "Plan staty 'K voprosu o roli gosudarstva,'" paras. 1-2; Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution," point 19, throughout; Lenin, "Report on the Review of the Program and on Changing the Name of the Party," paras. 1-3; Lenin, "Report on Subbotniks," paras. 2-9. 3. Lenin, State and Revolution, ch. 4, sec. 6, paras. 1-3; Engels, "Vorwort zur Broschtire lnternationales aus dem 93

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94

Notes to Chapter One

'Volksstaat' (1871-75)," para. 7. Also Marx; Die Klassenkiimpfe in Frankreich, sec. 2, paras. 6-4 from end; Marx, Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte, sec. 3, para. 11; Engels, "Preface to the English Edition of The Communist Manifesto, 1888," para. 5. 4. On usage among Marxists prior to 1917, see M tiller, Ursprung und Geschichte des Wortes "Sozialismus" und seiner Verwandten, part 2, ch. 3, div. 3, sees. 9-10; div. 5, sees. 6-7. Also Mehring, Geschichte der deutschen Sozialdemokratie, vol. 1, intro., para. 2; Kautsky, Die soziale Revolution, part 2, sec. 4, paras. 6, 10-13; sec. 8, paras. 5, 9, 13, 26, 28; Tugan-Baranovsky, Modern Socialism, intro., paras. 27-40; Bernstein, "Tugan-Baranowsky als Sozialist," para. 20; Plekhanov, "Frantsuzskii utopicheskii so~sializm XIX veka," para. 1, note. On Lenin's references, covert and overt, to TuganBaranovsky, see Lenin, State and Revolution, ch. 5, sec. 3, paras. 6, 10, 11, 12; Lenin, "A Liberal Professor on Equality", throughout; Rubakin, Sredi knig, vol. 2, intro. to sees. 401-409, para. 3; Lenin, "Book Review: N. A. Rubakin, Among Books," throughout; Lenin, Karl Marx, bibliography, para. 4. Comparison of "A Liberal Professor on Equality," paras. 2-7, with Modern Socialism, intro., paras. 20-26, shows that in 1914 Lenin had not read Tugan's book. Repetition of this criticism in State and Revolution shows that he still had not read it in 1917. If Tugan was his source, the connection was indirect. Rubakin's book provides the requisite link. 5. Tugan-Baranovsky, Modern Socialism, intro., paras. 27-40; ch. 4. div. 1 (Saint-Simonians); div. 2 (Cabet); ch. 5, div. 2 (Owen, Fourier); ch. 6 (Godwin, Proudhon). 6. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, para. 26. For use of the term 'wages' in this connection, see ch. 4, note 6, below.

Notes to Chapter Two

95

7. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, paras. 29-31. 8. Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, part 2, paras. 16-3 from end. For the socialist origins of these measures, see Ryazanov, Explanatory Notes to The Communist Manifesto, div. 2, sec. 46, throughout. 9. Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, part 2, last two paras.

10. Engels, Grundsiitze des Kommunismus, answer to question 18, paras. 3, 4, 6, 8. 11. Engels, Grundsiitze des Kommunismus, answer to question 18, para. 15.

12. Engels, Grundsiitze des Kommunismus, answer to question 24, last para. For background, see "Ansprache der Volkshalle des Bundes der Gerechten. November 1846," point 2; point 4; point 10, question 3; "Ans prache der Volkshalle des Bundes der Gerechten. Februar 1847," paras. 3-1 from end; "Entwurf cines Kommunistischen Glaubensbekenntnisses," questions 16-18; Engels, "Die Kommunisten und Karl Heinzen," div. 1, paras. 14-18; div. 2, paras. 1-4; Hess, "Die Folgen einer Revolution des Proletariats," div. 1, paras. 1, 4; div. 2, paras. 5-8; Engels to Marx 25/26 October 1847, last para. For tactical implications, see Engels, Grundsiitze des Kommunismus, answer to question 25, paras. 1, 4; Marx/ Engels, Manifest der Kommunist(schen Partei, part 4, paras. 2, 5-6. Chapter Two. Philosophical Communism 1. Marx, "Briefe ·aus den Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbiichern," letter 2, paras. 7-9. See also Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, ch. 17 "Der Unterschied des Christentums vom Heidentum," paras. 2-3; ch. 18 "Die christliche Bedeutung ... ," para. 1; Marx, "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen

96

Notes to Chapter Two

Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung," paras. 1-3; Hegel, Phiinomenologie des Geistes, ch. 5, div. 2, paras. 6-11. 2. Tennies, Marx: Leben und Lehre, part 1, sec. 1, final para.; foreword, para. 2; Tennies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, foreword, para. 7; conclusion, sec. 9, throughout; Tennies, "Vorrede zur dritten Auftage, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft," paras. 1-2. 3. Engels, "Der Sozialismus in Deutschland," part 1, para. 1. See also Engels, "Progress of Social Reform on the Continent," sec. 2, throughout; Engels, "Zur Geschichte des Bundes der Kommunisten," paras. 4-26; Hess, "Ober die sozialistische Bewegung in Deutschland," throughout. 4. Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, .ch. 1, paras. 2-3; Feuer bach, Grundsiitze der Philosophie der Zukunft, sees. 41, 53; Hess, "Ober die sozialistische Bewegung in Deutschland," intra., sec. 1, sec. 2; Marx to Feuerbach 11 August 1844, paras. 1-2; Marx "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung," paras. 1-7, 20-29; Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Die entfremdete Arbeit,'' paras. 26-32; sec. "Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik," paras. 7-10. The role played by Feuerbach's theory of human nature in Marx's conversion to communism is wholly obscured in the account Engels wrote some forty-five years later. Contrast with the passages cited above, Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, sec. 1, paras. 6-2 from end; sec. 3, throughout. 5. Feuer bach, Das Wesen des Christentums, ch. 7 "Das Mysterium der Dreieinigkeit ... ," paras. 5-7; ch. 19 "Der christliche Himmel ... ," paras. 1-2; Feuerbach, Grundsiitze der Philosophie der Zukunft, sees. 23, 41, 59, 60, 63; Hess, "Ober die sozialistische Bewegung in Deutschland," intra., paras. 1-6; sec. 1, para. 3; sec. 2, para. 9; Hess, "Socialismus und Communismus," paras. 3-6, 9-11 ; Hess, "Ober das Geldwesen," throughout; Engels, "Umrisse zu einer

Notes to Chapter Two

97

Kritik der NationalOkonomie," divs. 1, 3, 6, 9, 11; Engels, "Die Lage Englands. Past and Present by Thomas Carlyle," paras. 10-8 from end. For Marx, see ch. 2, notes 1 above and 6 below. For the definition of alienation and estrangement in terms of conflict between existence and essence~ see Marx, Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie, part 2, ch. 2, para. 3; ch. 3, paras. 19-23; ch. 4, para. 7. 6. Marx, "Briefe aus den Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbuchern," letter 3, para. 5. On the potentialities of democracy -not simply as a form of government but as a type of culture-for curing estrangement and achieving community, see Marx, "Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts," comment on sec. 279, paras. 13-1 from end; comment on sec. 289, paras. 3-7; intra. comment on sees. 304-307, paras. 14-33; comment on sec. 306, paras. 1-17, 31 ; comment on sec. 307, para. 9; comment on sec. 308, paras. 25-38, 43; Marx, "Briefe aus den Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbuchern," letter 2, paras. 7-17; Marx, "Zur Judenfrage," part 1, paras. 3940, 44-48, 56-59, 67, 74-75, 95-112; part 2, paras. 35-36, 50, 54-59. 7. Marx, "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung," paras. 1-7, 20-29, 33-49. Compare Engels, "Rapid Progress of Communism in Germany," installment 2, throughout. Eventually Feuerbach followed Hess, Engels, and Marx in identifying communism with the realization of community. See Feuerbach, "Das Wesen des .Christentums in Beziehung auf den Einzigen und sein Eigentum," paras. 7-18. 8. Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Privateigentum und Kommunismus," paras. 2-8. For explicit references to these theorists, see Marx, "Briefe aus den Deutsch-Franzosischen Jahrbuchern," letter 3, para. 5; Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, preface, para. 4; Marx/Engels, Die heilige Familie, ch. 6, sec. 3, subsec. 4,

98

Notes to Chapter Two

para. 38; Marx, Notizbuch aus den Jahren 1844-1847, excerpt from page 25; Marx, Die Klassenkiimpfe in Frankreich, sec. 3, para. 20 from end. 9. Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Privateigentum und Kommunismus," paras. 3-6. Also the same work, sec. "Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik," para. 82; Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Ideologie, vol. 1, ch. 1, div. A, sec. 1, para. 3, note; para. 10; Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, part 3, sec. 3, paras. 1-2. 10. Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Privateigentum und Kommunismus," paras. 13-14.

11. Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Arbeitslohn," para. 36; sec. "Bedtitfnis, Produktion und Arbeitsteilung," paras. 18-19, 29-35. Compare Marx, "Ausziige aus Mills Elemens d'economie politique," comment 1, para. 23. 12. Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Die entfremdete Arbeit," paras. 59-61. 13. Marx/Engels, Die heilige Familie, ch. 4, sec. 4, comment 3, paras. 18-20. 14. Marx, "Ausziige aus Mills Elemens d'&·onomie politique," comment 1, paras. 19-23; comment 2, throughout; Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Arbeitslohn," paras. 45-48; sec. "Die entfremdete Arbeit," paras. 10-23, 26-34; sec. "Privateigentum und Kommunismus," paras. 21-30; sec. "Bediirfnis, Produktion und Arbeitsteilung," paras. 1-7; Marx/Engels, Die heilige Familie, ch. 6, sec. 3, subsec. 2, paras. 44-45, 57. Compare Feuerbach ' Das Wesen. des Christentums, ch. 19 "Der christliche Himmel ... ,"paras. 1-2. For the development of this ideal through a series of contrasts between classical and modern culture, see Aristotle, Politics, book 1, ch. 4, sec. 3; book 2, ch. 9, sees. 2-4; book 7, ch. 9, sees. 3-8; ch. 14, sees. 9-14; ch. 15, sees. 1-6;

Notes to Chapter Two

99

book 8, ch. 3, sees. 1-6; Rousseau, Du Contrat social, book 3, ch. 15, paras. 1-3, 9-11; Schiller, Vber die iisthetische Erziehung des Menschen, letters 5-6, 26-27, throughout; Hegel, Phiinomenologie des Geistes, preface, paras. 11, 33; ch. 5, div. 2, paras. 1-11; ch. 6, paras. 1-6; Cieszkowski, Prolegomena zur Historiosophie, ch. 1, paras. 23-28, 35-43; ch. 3, div. 1, paras. 4-16; div. 3, paras. 15-31; Feuerbach, Das W esen des Christentums, ch. 17 "Der Unterschied des Christentums vom Heidentum," paras. 2-3; ch. 18 "Die 'christliche Bedeutung ... ," para. 1; ch. 19 "Der christliche Himmel ... ," paras. 1-2; Hess, Die europiiische Triarchie, intro., div. 1, para. 2; div 2, paras. 2-3; div. 4, paras. 1-4; Hess 7 "Socialismus und Communismus," paras. 9-11; Hess, "Philosophie der That," last para.; Hess, "Ober das Geldwesen," sees. 8-11; Hess, "Systeme des contradictions economiques ou philosophie de Ia misere. Par.P.-J. Proudhon," paras. 2-3; Marx, "Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts," comment on sec. 279, last para.; Marx, "Briefe aus den DeutschFranzosischer Jahrbiichern," letter 2, paras. 7-9; Marx, "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung," para. 3; Marx, "Zur J udenfrage," part 1, paras. 6-1 from end; Marx/Engels, Die heilige Familie, ch. 6, sec. 3, subsec. 2, para. 57; subsec. 3, paras. 12-13; Marx, "Einleitung zur Kritik der politischen bkonomie," part 1, sec. 1, paras. 2-3; Marx, Grundrisse, ch. 3, para. 2; ch. 3, sec. 2, div. 21 "Progressive Epochen der okonomischen Gesellschaftsformation," paras. 8, 20-24; Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 11, para. 8; ch. 13, sec. 3, div. 2, paras. 11-12. 15. On exchange without e·strangement, contrast Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, sees. 65-68; Marx, "Ausziige aus Mills Elemens d'economie politique," comment 1, paras. 2-17; Marx,. Grundrisse, appendix "Fragment des Urtextes ... ", sec. 3, div. 2, para. 1; Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 3, sec. 2, div. 1, para. 13. On identification of alienation with estrangement, contrast Marx, "Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts," comment

100

Notes to Chapter Two

on sec. 261, para. 6; comment on sec. 279, paras. 9-5 from end; intro. comment on sees. 304-307, paras. 18-2I ; Moore, "Karl Marx, 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right,'" sec. 4, paras. 9-I1. Also Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik," para. 30; Hegel, Phanomenologie des Geistes, ch. 8, paras. 1-5. Also Marx/Engels, Die heilige Familie, ch. 8, sec. 4, para. 6; Gauvin, "Entfremdung et Entausserung dans la Phenomenologie," intro., throughout; sec. I, throughout. For attacks on egoism preceding his conversion to communism, see Marx, "Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts," comment on sec. 289, paras. 3-7; intro. comment on sees. 304-307, para. 28; Marx, "Zur Judenfrage," part I, paras. 39, 75, 93-II2; part 2, paras. 34-37,.50-60.

I6. Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische manuskripte, sec. "Privateigentum und Kommunismus," paras. 37, 38. Also the same work, sec. "Bediirfnis, Produktion und Arbeitsteilung," paras. 9-I 0; sec. "Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik," paras. 81-82. For background, see ch. 2, note 7, above. I7. Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Privateigentum und Kommunismus," para. 4. 18. For the cleavage between labor and enjoyment in undeveloped communism, see Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Die entfremdete Arbeit," paras. 20-34; sec. "Privateigentum und Kommunismus," paras. 2-3, 7, 2I-30, 32. On true socialism, see Hess, "Socialismus und Communismus," para. 9; Hess, '-'Ober die Noth in unserer Gesellschaft," paras. 29-35. Chapter Three. Historical Materialism I. Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Okonomie, preface, paras. 4-5. 2. Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Jdeologie, vol. I, ch. I, div. A, para. 8; Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, ch. I, paras. 1-2, 4; Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Jdeologie,

Notes to Chapter Three

I01

vol. I, ch. 3, part I, div. I, sec. 6, subsec. C "Der humane Liberalismus," paras. 9-I7. On Feuerbach, see also Marx, "Thesen tiber Feuerbach," theses 4-7; Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Jdeologie, vol. 1, ch. 1, div. A, sec. 2, paras. 6-9. On the relation of philosophy to empirical knowledge, see also Marx/Engels, Die heilige Familie, ch. 5, sec. 2, throughout; ch. 6, sec. 3, subsec. 4, paras. 3-10, 35-38; Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Jdeologie, vol. I, ch. I, div. A, ·paras. 22-26; Marx, Misere de Ia philosophie, ch. 2, part 1, paras. I-5; observation I, throughout. 3. Marx/Engels, Die deutsche ldeologie, vol. 2, intro., throughout. On true socialism, see also the same work, vol. I, ch. 3, part I, div. 1, sec. 6, subsec. A "Der politische Liberalismus," paras. I..,.. 7; subsec. B "Der Kommunismus," fourth logical construction, para. 3; subsec. C "Der humane Liberalismus," para. 1; vol. 2, ch. 1, sec. A, paras. 7-17; ch. 4, paras. · 24-26, 50-51; Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, part 3, sec. 1, div. 3, throughout. For background, see ch·. 2, note 18, above. On moving through philosophy to communism, compare Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Jdeologie, vol. 1, ch. 1, div. A, sec. 2, para. 5; div. B, sec. 3, para. 10; Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, part 1, para. 44. 4. Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Jdeologie, vol. I, ch. 1, div. A, sec. I, para. 11. Also the same work, vol. 1, ch. 3, part 1, div. 2, sec. 5, subsec. "Die Gesellschaft als biirgerliche Gesellschaft," subdiv. 2, para. 58; Marx, Misere de Ia philosophie, ch. 2, part 1, observation 7, para. 11; Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, part 2, paras. 1-:-9; part 4, para. 2; Marx "Konspekt des Buches von Bakunin Staatlichkeit und Anarchie," comment on p. 279 of Bakunin's book. 5. Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Jdeologie, vol. 1, ch. 1, div. A, sec. 1, paras. 1-7. Also the same work, vol. 1, ch. 1,

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102

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div. A, paras. 6-10, 22-26; sec. 2, paras. 10-13; div. B, sec. 3, para. 10; Marx to Annenkov 28 December 1846, paras. 6-8; Marx, Misere de La philosophie, ch. 2, part 1, observation 2, throughout; Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, part 2, paras. 59-61; Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Okonomie, preface, para. 4. 6. Marx/Engels, Die deutsche ldeologie, vol. 1, ch. 1, div. A, paras. 11-21; sec. I, paras. 8-1I; div. B, throughout. On the interconnection of division of labor, exchange, and private property, contrast Marx, Kapital, vol. I, ch. 2, para. 9; ch. I2, sec. 4, paras. 1-4, 7-9. 7. Marx/Engels, Die deutsche ldeologie, vol. 1, ch. 1, div. A, paras. 15, 18; sec. 1, para. 13; div. B, sec. I, para. 25; sec. 2, para. 1; sec. 3, paras. 1, 3. Also Marx, Grundrisse, ch. 3, sec. 2, div. 21 "Progressive Epochen der okonomischen Gesellschaftsformation," paras. 14, 20, 24; Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. I, sec. 4, para. 16. 8. Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Jdeologie, vol. 1, ch. 1, div. A, sec. 1, paras. 7-10. Compare the same work, vol. I, ch. 1, div. B, sec. 3, paras. 1-9; div. C, paras. 7-13; ch. 3, part I, div. 2, sec. 2 "Phanomenologie .. ," paras. 24-26, 55, note; sec. C "Mein Selbstgenuss," paras. 1-3; Marx, Grundrisse, ch. 2, div. 9 "Das Geld ... ," para. 2. 9. Marx/Engels, Die deutsche ldeologie, vol. I, ch. 3, part 1, div. 2, sec. 6 "Das hohe Lied ... ," paras. 10-11, 16-17. 10. Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Jdeologie, vol. I, ch. 1, div. A, sec. I, para. 10. Also the same work, vol. I, ch. I, div. A, sec. 1, para. 3, note; sec. 2, para. 2; div. B, sec. 1, para. 26; sec. 3, paras. 2, 10; div. C, para. 5; ch. 3, part I, div. 2, sec. 6 "Das hohe Lied ... ,"para. 49; Marx "Arbeitslohn," div. A, point 1; div. C, sec. 8, throughout. II. Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Jdeologie, vol. 1, ch. 1, div. A, sec. 1, para. 9. Also the same work, vol. 1, ch. 1,

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103

div. B, sec. 3, paras. 6, 8; ch. 3, part 1, div. 2, sec. 5, subsec. "Organization der Arbeit," paras. I2-13, I6. 12. Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Jdeologie, vol. 1, ch. 3, part 1, div. 1, sec. 6, subsec. B "Der Kommunismus" fourth logical construction, para. 3, note. In one other pass;ge Marx attacks Griin's critique of Proudhon, referring to his own critique in The Holy Family without any further analysis of Proudhon's ideas. See the same work, vol. 2, ch. 4, sec. ." Proudhon," throughout. 13. Marx, Misere de La philosophie, ch. 2, part 1, observation 2, paras. 1-2; ch. 1, part 2, paras. 34-31 from end, paras. 4-1 from end. On the first premise, see also Marx to Annenkov 28 December 1846, para. 8; Marx, Misere de Ia philosophie, ch. 2, part4, para. 1; Marx, "Arbeitslohn," div. C, sec. 6, point 5, para. 5; Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, part 3, sec. 2, paras. 1-4; Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Okonomie, preface, para. 4; Marx, Kapital, vol. 3, ch. 51, para. 5. 14. Marx, Misere de Ia philosophie, ch. 1, part I, paras. 12-I7; part 2, paras. 93-IOO. Also Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, part I, paras. 7-8; and the passages cited in ch. 3, note 6, above. See further Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 3, sec. 2, div. 1, para. 22, note; vol. 3, ch. 10, para. 13; ch. 20, paras. 10, 24. 15. Marx, Misere de Ia philosophie, ch. I, part 2, paras. 28-14 from end. 16. Marx, Misere de Ia philosophie, ch. I, part 2, paras. 13-9 from end; Bray, Labour's Wrongs and Labour's Remedy, ch. 11, paras. 7, 14-15. I7. Marx, Misere de Ia philosophie, ch. I, part 2, para. 8 from end. I8. Marx, Misere de Ia philosophie, ch. I, part 2, paras. 7-6 from end.

104

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Notes to Chapter Four

19. Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommun.istischen Partel, part 3, sec. 2, paras. 1-4; part 2, paras. 16-3 from end. Compare Marx/Engels, "Forderungen der Kommunistischen Partei in Deutschland," points 7-17. For background, see ch. 1, notes 8 and 12, above.

105

risse, ch. 3, sec. 3, div. 13, subsec. "Entfremdung der Arbeitsbedingungen ... ," para. 3. Marx defines wage labor as the sale of a commodity, labor power. He defines commodities in turn, not simply as goods that are exchanged, but as goods that are exchanged between private individuals. See ch. 6, note 2, below. It follows from these definitions that payments for work in a socialist economy are not wages. See, in addition to the passages cited above, Marx, "Arbeitslohn," div. A, point 1; div. C, sec. 6, point 5, throughout; sec. 8, paras. 1-3; Marx, "Lohnarbeit und Kapital," installment 1, paras. 7-9; installment 3, paras. 1-4, 13-19, 25-26; Marx, Grundrisse, ch. 3, sec. 2, div. 20, paras. 3, 7-15; Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 4, sec. 3, paras. 1-9; ch. 17, throughout; vol. 3, ch. 50, paras. 4-2 from end; ch. 51, paras. 5-7. According to Marx's definition of wages, the transition from capitalism to socialism abolishes wage labor. But according .to the ordinary definition of wages, as incomes received for working, wage labor is abolished only with the transition from socialism to communism.

20. Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Parlei, part 2, para. 15 from end. 21. Marx, "Planentwurf zum dritten Abschnitt des Manifestes der Kommunistischen Partei," throughout. For background, see ch. 1, notes 8 and 12, above. Chapter Four. Critique of the Gotha Program

1. Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 1, sec: 4, para. 15. 2. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, para. 26. Compare Marx, Kapital, vol. 2, ch. 18, sec. 2, para. 18. 3. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, paras. 26-27, 30; Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 1, sec. 4, para. 15.

7. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, paras. 4-5, 9-10, 19-20, 26, 33-34.

4. Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 1, sec. 4, para. 15; Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, paras. 30-31.

8. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, para. 32.

5. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, paras. 33-34; Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 1, sec. 4, para. 15. Also Marx, Grundrisse, ch. 3, sec. 3, div. 13, subsec. "Entfremdung der Arbeitsbedingungen ... ," paras. 1-3; Marx, "Einleitung zur Kritik der politischen bkonomie," sec. 2, paras. 3-4, 24-31; Marx, Kapital, vol. 3, ch. 51, throughout.

9. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, para. 31.

10. Marx, Grundrisse, ch. 3, sec. 2, div. 49, para. 1. Also the same work, ch. 3, sec. 2, div. 48, paras. 6, 10-11; div. 50, paras. 2-4. 11. Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Okonomie, ch. 1, paras. 1-4, 15-16; div. A, paras. 1, 3, 9, 14; Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 1, sec. 1, paras. 3-4, 9-14, 19; sec. 2, paras. 7-8, 14-15; ch. 17, para. 16; ch. 13, throughout.

6. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 2, paras. 3, 6-7. Also Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Die entfremdete Arbeit," paras. 59-61; Marx, Grund~

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106

Notes to Chapter Four

Notes to Chapter Five

107

12. Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 13, sec. 9, para, 13. Compare the same work, vol. 1, ch. 12, sees. 1-3, throughout.

20. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part I, comment 3, para. 29.

13. Marx, Grundrisse, ch. 3, sec. 2, div. 33, para. 1. Also the same work, ch. 3, sec. 1, div. 20, pan!. 4; sec. 2, div. 51, para. 1.

2I. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, book 2, section 1, ch. 2, divs. 1-2, throughout.

14. Smith, Wealth of Nations, book 1, ch. 5, para. 7. The reference Marx gives for this passage indicates that his German version is based on a French translation rather than on the English original. 15. Marx, Kapital, vol. 3, ch. 48, div. 3, para. 2. Also the same work, vol. 1, ch. 1, sec. 2, para. 7; para. 16, note. 16. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer P~ogramms, part 1, comment 3, para. 29. Contrast Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Privateigentum und Kommunismus," para. 3. But see Marx/Engels, Die deutsche ldeologie, vol. 2, ch. 5, paras. 56-57. The last passage was originally written by Hess, then slightly amplified in the later version. See Monke, "Ober die Mitarbeit von Moses Hess an der Deutschen I deologie," sees. 4-5, throughout. 17. Doctrine de Saint-Simon, session 6, paras. 14-1 from end; Pecqueur, Theorie nouvelle d'economie sociale et politique, ch. 42, paras. 10-19; ch. 43, sees. 1-2, 4, 6, 1I-12, throughout; ch. 44, div. 3, sec. 12, throughout. For Marx's knowledge of Pecqueur, see Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Arbeitslohn," para. 58; sec. "Profit des Kapitals," div. 4, paras. 29-32;. Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 23, para. 4, note; ch. 24, sec. 7, para. 4; vol. 3, ch. 36, para. 50. 18. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, para. 29. 19. Pecqueur, Theorie nouvelle d'economie sociale et politique, ch. 24, conclusion, paras. 11-13, 29-32; ch. 43, sec. 9, throughout; ch. 44, div. 3, sec. 11, throughout.

22. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part I, comment 3, paras. 29-31. 23. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Knox's translation, sees. 29-30. 24. Plato, Republic, 405, 423-427; Plato, Statesman, 293-297; Plato, Laws, 875; Hegel, "Ober die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts," sec. 3, paras. 1-17; Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, preface, para.lO; sees. 29, 185; Marx, "Zur Judenfrage," part 1, para. 6 from end; Marx/Engels, Die heilige Familie, ch. 6, sec. 3, div. 2, para. 57; ch. 8, sec. 3, div. 1, para. 11. Also Tonnies, "Hegels Naturrecht," paras. 1-2, 7-12. Chapter Five. Capital 1. Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, Preface to the first edition, para. 10; second edition, ch. 24, sec. 7, paras. 2-3. 2. Dtihring, Kritische Geschichte der NationalOkonomie, second edition, part 8, ch. 2, sees. 4-5. See also the same work, first edition, part 8, ch. 2, sec. 3, para. 3. 3. Engels, Herrn Eugen Diihrings Umwiilzung der Wissenschaft, sec. 1, ch. 13, para. 5. 4. Compare Marx, Kapital, vol. I, second edition, ch. 24, sec. 7, para. I, with Marx, Le Capital, ch. 32, para. 2. The dates suggest that Marx made this change, together with the change cited in the fo1Iowing note, in response to DUbring's criticism. 5. Compare Marx, Kapital, vol. I, second edition, ch. 24, sec. 7, para. 2, with Marx, Le Capital, ch. 32, para. 8.

108

Notes to Chapter Five

6. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, paras. 25, 27; Marx, Civil War in France, sec. 3, para. 14. 7. Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, part 2, paras. 14-15, 17, 23-25. Compare Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 13, last para.; ch. 24, sec. 7, para. 3. 8. See Marx/Engels, Die deutsche ldeologie, vol. 1, ch. 1, div. B, sec. 3, paras. 3-9; ch. 3, part 1, div. 1, sec. 6, subsec. 2 "Der Kommunismus," paras. 11-7 from end; Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Grundrente," paras. 15-7 from end; sec. "Die entfremdete Arbeit," paras. 65-68; sec. "Privateigentum und Arbeit," para. 1; sec. "Geld," paras. 4, 10, 13-14, 17; Marx, "Auszlige a us Mills Elemens d'economie politique," comment 1, paras. 2-6, 8, 10, 17; comment 2, paras. 8-17. ·

9. Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 1, sec. 4, para. 16. On the contrast between nature worship and Christianity, see Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, ch. 17 "Der Unterschied des Christentums vom Heidentum," paras. 2-4; ch. 19, "Der christliche Himmel ... ," paras. 12-14. For the triad of liberation, see Marx, Grundrisse, ch. 2, div. 9, para. 2. Also Marx, "Zur Judenfrage," part 1, paras. 12-1 from end; Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Jdeologie, vol. 1, ch. 1, div. C, paras. 7-13; Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, part 2, paras. I4-25; Marx, Theorien uber den Mehrwert, ch. 24, sec. 3, part 1, para. 16; Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 24, sec. 7, para. 7. · 10. Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, Afterword to the second edition, paras. 2I, 28-29. Compare Dlihring, "Marx, Das Kapital," para. I; Dlihring, Kritische Geschichte der Nationa/0konomie, first edition, part 8, ch. 2, sec. 2, para. 1; sec. 3, paras. 1, 3; Dlihring, Kritische Geschichte der Nationa/Okonomie, second edition, part 8, ch. 2, sec. 2, throughout, sec. 3, para. I; sec. 4, throughout; sec. 5, para. 1. For comment, see Marx to Engels 8 January 1868, letter 1, para. 3; letter 2,

Notes to Chapter Five

109

paras. 1-4; Marx to Kugelmann 6 March 1868, para. 2. Compare also Lange, Die Arbeiterfrage, ch. 5, paras. 4-3 from end. For comment, see Marx to his daughter Jenny 31 May 1870, para. 4; Marx to Kugelmann 27 June 1870, paras. 5-6. Concerning Marx's suggestion that his attitude toward Hegel has not changed, see Moore, "Marx and the Origin of Dialectical Materialism," sees. 3-4, throughout.

11. Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 1, sec. 1, paras. 5-14; sec. 3, para. 2; sec. 3, part 1, div. 3, paras. 6-8; div. 4, para. 1; ch. 4, sec. 2, last para., note; ch. 10, para. 8; ch. 17, paras. 6-7, 13, 20; ch. 18, para. 3; vol. 3, ch. 2, para. 6; ch. 9, seventh-from-last para.; ch. 12, sec. 3, para. 3; ch. 48, div. 3, paras. 1, 6, 15. For a critical analysis, see Moore, "The Metaphysical Argument in Marx's Labour Theory of Value," throughout. 12 .. Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, Preface to the first edition, para. 3; ch. 1, sec. 4, throughout; ch. 2, paras. 15, 17; ch. 17, para. 13; vol. 3, ch. 24, paras 1-4; ch. 48, throughout. Also Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Okonomie, ch. 1, paras. 1214; Marx, Grundrisse, ch. 2, div. 9, paras. 1-13; ch. 3, div. 1, throughout. The occurrence of 'Entfremdung' and its cognates in some of these passages points to the close connection between Marx's discussion of commodity fetishism in Capital and his discussion of estranged labor in The Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts. See also ch. 2, note 15 (first part) and ch. 5, note 9, above. 13. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Knox's translation, sees. 144-145. Also the same work, sees. 146-149. On the substantial nature of the ·family and the political state, see the same work, sees. 156-158, 163, 257-258, 260, 264-267, 270. On the external, or apparent, character of civil society, see the same work, sees. 154, 157, 181, 183-185; Hegel, Enzyklopiidie, sees. 131-133. On the general topic, see also

110

Notes to Chapter Five

Notes to Chapter Six

111

Hegel, Vorlesungen tiber die Geschichte der Philosophie, part 1, sec. 1, ch. 3, div. 2 "Aristotle," subsec. "Politik," throughout; Marx, "Einleitung zur Kritik der politischen bkonomie," sec. 1, paras. 2-3; Tonnies, "Vorrede zur zweiten Auflage, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft," paras. 13, 40.

3. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, paras. 25, 27-28. See also Marx, Theorien tiber den Mehrwert, ch. 20, sec. 3, div. 4 (Bailey), subsec. 1, para. 24; Marx, Kapital, vol. 2, ch. 16, sec. 3, para. 5; ch. 18, sec. 2, para. 18.

14. On civil society as a realm of alienation, see ch. 5, note 13, above. Also Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, sees. 65-67, 73. On tension between poor and rich, see the same work, sees. 189, 199-201, 237, 241-246. On subordination of civil society to the political state, see the same work, sees. 157, 185, 249-256, 258, 264-270, 287289, 301-303, 314-318. Compare Hegel, "Ober die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts," sec. 3, paras. 1-18; Marx, "Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts," comments on sections 287-297, 301-303; intro. comment on sees. 304-307; comments on sees. 308-311.

4. Marx, Kapital, vol. 3, ch. 10, paras. 10-13, 20; vol. 1, ch. 1, sec. 4, para. 16. Compare Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Okonomie, ch. 1, paras. 12-14; Marx, Grundrisse, eh. 2, div. 9, paras. 1-2; ch. 3, sec. 2, div. 21, para. 8; Marx, Kapital, vol. 3, ch. 48, div. 3, paras. 11-19.

15. Marx to the editors of Otechestvennyia Zapiski, November 1877, div. 2, paras. 1-2. Also Engels, Herrn Eugen Dtihrings Umwiilzung der Wissenschaft, part 1, ch. 13, paras. 8-11. 16. See ch. 5, notes 9 and 12, above. For background see ch. 2, note 14, para. 2, above; Plamenatz, Marx's Philosophy of Man, cbs. 2 and 3, throughout; Moore, "Seven Notes on Commodity Fetishism," throughout. Chapter Six. Two Types of Socialism 1. Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 1, sec. 4, paras. 11-15.

2. Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 1, sec. 1, para. 19; sec. 2, para. 5; Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, para. 27. Also Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Okonomie, ch. 1, para. 34; ch. 2, div. B, para. 15; Marx, Grundrisse, ch. 2, div. 9, para. 4. Marx does not consistently adhere to this restrictive definition. See Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 2, para. 9; vol. 3, ch. 20, paras. 10, 24.

5. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, para. 25. 6. Marx/Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, part 2, paras. 14-3 from end. 7. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, para. 26. 8. Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 1, sec. 4, paras. 12, 15; Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, paras. 26, 28. 9. Marx/Engels, "Vorwort zum Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei,'' para. 2. Compare Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 3, throughout; part 4, paras. 7-16. On the need for a critique of Lassalle's program, see Marx to Liebknecht 13 April 1871, para. 6; Engels to Liebknecht 23 April 1872, para. 10; Marx/Engels, "Vorwort zum Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei," para. 3; Liebknecht to Marx 16 May 1873, ·para. 1; Bebel to Engels before 19 May 1873, paras. 1, 4-7; Be bel to Marx 19 May 1873, paras. 2-3; Engels to Bebel 20 June 1873, next-tolast para.; Engels to· Be bel 18/28 March 1875, paras. 3, 8-9, 11-14; Marx to Bracke 5 May 1875, paras. 1-6. On the connection between Lassalle's program and the transitional program of the Manifesto, contrast Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 3, para. 6; part 4, paras. 6,

112

Notes to Chapter Six

Notes to Chapter Seven

113

10-12; Engels, "Vorwort zur vierten Ausgahe des Manifests der K_ommunistischen Partei," para. 17, note; Mehring, Geschlchte der deutschen Sozialdemokratie, book 3, ch. 1, sec. 6, throughout; Mehring, Karl Marx, ch. 10 sec. 7 paras 10-13. ' ' .

On Proudhon and Diihring, see Marx, M is ere de la philosophie, ch. 1, part 2, paras. 20-23, 35-39, 54; Engels, Herrn Eugen Diihrings Umwii/zung der Wissenschaft, sec. 2, ch. 6, throughout.

See also Bakounine, Gosudarstvennost' i anarkhiia original pagination, 274-276, 282-284. In his critical syn~ o.psis of thi~ book Marx comments at length on the discusSion separatmg these passages, devoting roughly a thousand words .of c~iti~ism to a thousand words of text. But the passages tdentifymg Lassalle's program with his own he summarizes with no comment at all. See Marx, "Konspekt des Buche~. v.on Bakunin Staatlichkeit und Anarchie," synopsis and cnttcism of pages 275-284.

14. For the first philosophical argument, see chapter 2, above. For the first economic argument, see Marx, Mise,-e de la philosophie, ch. 1, part 1, paras. 33 to end; sec. 2, paras. 57-66, 80-100, 112-123; Marx, Grundrisse, ch. 2, div. 4, paras. 1-4; div. 7, paras. 1-3. For the second philosophical argument, see Marx, Grundrisse, ch. 2, div. 5, paras. 1-17; Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Okonomie, ch. 2, para. 9; Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 1, sec. 3, div. 1, part 3, paras. 1-12. For the second economic argument, see ch. 6, notes 11-13, above.

10. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part" 1, comment 3, para. 25.

Chapter Seven. Responses to Four Challenges

. 11. Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Okonomie, ch. 2, dtv. B, paras. 13-16. See also Marx, Grundrisse, ch. 2, div. 14, paras. 1-3; Marx to Weydemeyer 1 February 1859, nextto-last para.; Marx, Kapita/, vol. 1, ch. 3, para. 3, note; vol. 3, ch. 36, paras. 46-50. 12. Marx, Misere de Ia philosophie, ch. 1, part 2, paras. 35-46; Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Okonomie, ch. 1, paras. 5-10; Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 1, sec. 2, paras. 1-10; ch. 3, para. 3; ch. 5, paras, 2-1 from end. 13: .Marx, Grundrisse, ch. 2, div. 14, para. 4; Marx, Zur Kntzk der politischen Okonomie, ch. 1, para. 13; sec. A, para. 13; Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 1, sec. 1, para. 12; sec. 2, paras. 10, 16; sec. 4, paras. 2, 12, 15; vol. 2, ch. 16, sec. 3, para. 5; ch. 18, sec. 2, para. 18; vol. 3, ch. 10, para. 37; ch. 15, sec. 4, paras. 3-6; ch. 39, paras. 45-47; ch. 49, paras. 4-1 from end; Marx to Engels 8 January 1868, letter 2, para. 4; Marx to Kugelmann 11 July 1868 para. 3· Marx Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, com~ent 3, p~ra. 29~

1. Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, Afterword to the second edition, para. 17. See also Marx to Sorge 19 October 1877, paras. 4-5. 2. Marx to Engels 24 November 1851, para. 2; Engels to Marx 27 November 1851, para. 2; Marx to Lassalle 22 February 1858, paras. 4-6; Marx, Theorien iiber den Mehrwert, ch. 7, para. 1.

3. For replies to Harrison, in addition to the onb" discussed below, see (I) on universal suffrage, Marx, Civil War in France, part 3, para. 10; Harrison, "Revolution of the Commune," para. 30; (2) on centralization, Marx, Civil War in France, part. 3, paras. i0-11; Harrison, "Revolution of the Commune," paras. 16, 19-20, 25-27; (3) on Comtism and the working class, Marx, "First Draft of The Civil War in France," frag·ment "Workmen and Comte," throughout; Harrison, "Revolution of the Commune," para. 39. 4. Harrison, "Revolution of the Commune," paras. 40-42.

114

Notes to Chapter Seven

5. Marx, Civil War in France, part 3, para. 14; Marx, "First Draft of The Civil War in France," fragment "Comtist View," para. 1. 6. Engels, "Vorwort zur Broschiire Internationales aus dem 'Volksstaat' (1871-75 )," para. 7. As this passage shows, Engels continued to use the term 'communism' to denote a specific type of socialist economy. See also his discussion of Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Owen: Herrn Eugen Diihrings Umwiilzung der Wissenschaft, sec. 3, ch. 1, paras. 1-18; ch. 4, para. 20. 7. Contrast with Marx's usage in The Civil War in France and The Critique of the Gotha Program the following passages from earlier writings: Mar~, "Briefe aus den Deutsch-Franzosischen Jahrbiichern," letter 3, para. 5; Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, sec. "Privateigentum und Kommunismus," para. 2; Marx/Engels, Die deutsche ldeologie, vol. 1, ch. 3, part 1, div. 1, sec. 6, subsec. B "Der Kommunismus," fourth logical construction, para. 3; vol. 2, ch. 5, paras. 56-57; Marx, Misere de Ia philosophie, ch. 1, sec. 2, paras. 29-28 from end, 14 from end; Marx, Die Klassenkiimpfe in Frankreich, sec. 3, paras. 26-21 from end; Marx to Engels 14 August 1851, paras. 2-7; Marx, Grundrisse, ch. 3, para. 7; Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Okonomie, ch. 2, div. B. paras. 13-16; Marx to Weydemeyer 1 February 1859, next-to-last para.; Marx, Theorien uber den Mehrwert, ch. 21, para. 1. For the blurring of this terminological distinction among Marx's German followers in the years from 1869 through 1875, see Mayer, "Die Trennung der proletarischen von der biirgerlichen Demokratie," sees. 9-10, throughout; Bebel, Unsere Ziele, paras. 53 from end, 13-8 from end; Liebknecht, Speech to the Gotha Congress, 24 May 1875, paras. 3-7; Liebknecht, Reply to Strecker, 24 May 1875, throughout. For Engels' usage in this period, see ch. 7, note 6, above. For Social Democratic usage after Engels' death, see ch. 1, note 4, above.

Notes to Chapter Seven

115

8. On the contrast of ends, see Lenin, State and Revolution, ch. 4, sec. 6, para. 2; ch. 5, sec. 3, paras. 1-7. On the contrast of means, see Lenin, State and Revolution, ch. 4, sec. 3, throughout; ch. 5, sec. 1, para. 4. Also Lenin, "Marksizm o gosudarstve," div. 16, last para. See further Korsch, Introduction to Randglossen zum Programm der deutschen Arbeiterpartei, by Karl Marx, sees. 3-4, 6, 9, throughout; Lukacs, Lenin, ch. 5, paras. 1-3; Lukacs, "Die neue Ausgabe von Lassalles Briefen," paras. . 18, 25-27. 9. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, paras. 4-5, 32. 10. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, para. 28. 11. For commodities and wages see. ch. 6, note 2, and ch. 4, note 6, above. Marx admits that the certificates of labor contributed function as means of payment; but because they do not circulate he denies that they function as money. See Marx/Engels, Die deutsche Ideologie, vol. 1, ch. 3, part 2, div. "Der Verein," subsec. "Geld," paras. 1-3; Marx, Grundrisse, ch. 2, div. 5, paras. 4-5; div. 7, paras. 1-3; Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Okonomie, ch. 1, para. 30; ch. 2, para. 9; div. B, paras. 13-16; Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 1, sec. 3, part 3, div. 3, para. 2; ch. 3, sec. 1, para. 3, note; sec. 3, para. 1; vol. 2, ch. 18, sec. 2, para. 18. For the tendency to treat ending capitalist exploitation as a sufficient condition for ending commodity exchange, see also chapter 3, above. 12. Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, Afterword to the second edition, para. 17. 13. De Roberty, "Marx: Der Kapital," para. 3. Compare Diihring, Kritische Geschichte der N ationaWkonomie, first edition, part 8, ch. 2, sec. 3, para. 3. 14. Marx, Kapital, Preface to the first edition, para. 9.

116

Notes to Chapter Seven

15. Marx/Engels, Die deutsche I deologie, vol. J, ch. 1, div. A, sec. 1, para. 11; Marx, Misere de Ia philosophie, ch. 2, part 1, observation 7, para. 11 ; Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Okonomie, preface, para. 4; Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 24, sec. 7, para. 7; Marx to the editors of Otechestvennyia Zapiski November 1877, div. 2, paras. 1-2.

Works Cited

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The editions I have used in preparing the notes are listed here: but readers can use other editions, including translations. See the introduction to the Notes section.

17. Schaffie, Quintessenz des Socialismus, ch. 2, para. 13; ch. 6, paras. 8-16. For Marx's direct acquaintance with Schaffie's book, see Marx to Fleckles 21 1anuary 1877, para. 4; Ex Libris: Karl Marx und Friedrich _Engels, item 415.

MEW abbreviates Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels Werke, 39 volumes with a supplementary volume in two parts. Institut ftir MaLismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED. Berlin: Dietz, 1956-1968.

18. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, part 1, comment 3, para. 25; Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, ch. 1, sec. 4, paras. 2-8, 11-12, 15. Also Moore, "Marx and the State of Nature," sec. 3, throughout.

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19. For labor time as the measure of cost, see ch. 6, notes 3 and 8, above. For abstract and concrete labor, see ch. 6, notes 11-13, above.

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Index

Abstract labor, 72, 75, 89. See also Labor time Alienation (Entiiusserung), 10, 15-16, 60-61,72. See also Estrangement Anarchism, 3. See also Communism; Socialism Appearance. See Essence and Existence; Society Babeuf, Gracchus, 9, 30 Babouvists, 12 Bauer, Bruno, 19 Blanqui, Louis-Auguste, 12 Bray, John Francis, 27-30, 71 Cabet, Etienne, 3, 10, 12, 31 Capitalism definition of, 23 division of labor in, 25, 40-41 end of, 53, 61, 86 and exchange, 10, 23, 26, 27, 57, 59-61 and exploitation, 11, 17, 23,27,59,84-85,86 and fetishism, 57, 59-60 versus feudalism, 8, 63

and individuality, 12-13, 41, 53, 55-56 resemblance to socialism, 33, 34, 35, 36,49, 6870,82 Civil society, 15, 60-61 Classless economy. See Communism; Socialism Commodity, definitions of, 64,71,83 Commodity exchange. See Exchange Commodity fetishism. See Fetishism Communism and community, 8-9, 1011,12,22,51,62,6566 and cultural complexity, 12-14, 18,75 definitions of, 1-3, 1011,34,79-80,82 economic arguments against, 7 4-7 5 and estrangement, 12-13, 23-24 as final goal, 1-2, 5-6, 27,30,65-66,81,89 versus historical material-

129

r '

'

'1\1

130

Communism (continued) ism, 7, 11-12, 18, 19, 24-25, 31, 74-75, 76, 87,89-90 and individuality, 12-14, 18,56, 79 moral arguments for, 7, 9-11,13-15,23-24, 25,36-37,44-49,51, 52,58-62,63,68,82, 89 moral defects of, 12-13, 17-18 transition to, 4-5, 5-6, 24-25,26-27,35,3645,52,56-57,58,6566,82 as transitional stage, 1618 Communists democratic, 12 despotic, 12, 81 in Paris Commune, 7879 philosophical, 9-11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19,20-21, 23-24,24-25,56,68, 77 proletarian, 9, 11, 12-13, 16-18, 20-21 versus socialists, 1-2, 67, 10-11, 13-15,3031,52,69-70,81,89 utopian, 31, 79 Community (Gemeinschaft) and communism, 8-9, 10-11, 12, 22, 51, 62, 65-66 and democracy, 8, 9-10 dissolution of, 22, 65 and estrangement, 10

Index

,\''

Index

and exploitation, 22-23 and feudalism, 8 rebirth of, 8, 10, 11, 22, 62 versus society, 8-9, 10, 22-23,51,59-61,62 and substance, 60 Complexity of culture and communism, 12-13, 18, 74-75 and division of labor, 13, 18, 24-25 and exchange, 13-14, 18, 24-25, 26, 74-75 See also Individuality Comte,.Auguste, 78-79, 84 Cooperatives, 69, 79-,--80 Crusoe's economy, 63, 69, 74

socialist, 3-4, 33-37, 4243,45-49,64,74,82, 87,88 Division of labor capitalist, 25, 40-41 and cultural complexity, 13-14,18,24-25 definition of, 25 end of, 18, 22, 25-26, 28, 37-38, 39-41 and estrangement, 13-15, 18,23 and exchange, 23, 26, 41, 64 and specialization, 2526,41 Doctrine of Internal Relations, 59 Dtihring,Eugen,53,56,73 Engels, Friedrich, 1-2, 56, 7, 9, 11, 12, 19, 30, 31,54-56,69,80 Equality, 45-49, 51 Essence and existence, 910, 11' 12, 15, 24, 5961,62 Estrangement (Entfremdung) and communism, 12-13, 23-24 definitions of, 10, 15-16 and division of labor, 1315, 18 end of, 10, 11-12, 13-16, 23-25, 60-61 and exchange, 13-15, 18 and exploitation, 11-12, 13-15 and individuality, 12-13, 56 See also Fetishism

Dehumanization. See Estrangement Democrats, 2, 8, 37. See also Socialists, democratic de Roberty, Eugene, 84-87 Dezamy, Theodore, 10, 11, 12 Dictatorship of proletariat, 81 Distribution capitalist, 35-36, 82 communist, 3, 4, 34-37, 42-43,45-49,82,87 and historical materialism, 34-35, 36, 37, 82 and justice, 35-36, 3637,44-49,82,84-85, 86 principles of, 3, 35-36, 38, 43, 45-49

'~j· '

131

Exchange capitalist, 10, 23, 26, 27, 47,57,59,61 and cultural complexity, 13-14, 18, 24-25, 26, 74-75 and division of labor, 23, 26,41, 64 end of, 4-6, 7, 13-14, 17-18,23,26-27,28, 38-39,41,57-58,62 and estrangement, 13-15, 18 precapitalist, 23, 27, 65 socialist, 27-29, 30, 3334,63-68,70-74 Exchange value and labor time, 38-39, 65,71-73,81-82,8789 and use value, 38-39 and value, 59 Existence and essence. See Essence and existence Exploitation capitalist, 11, 17, 23, 27, 59, 84-85, 86 communist, 17-18 and community, 22-23 definition of, 13 end of, 4, 6 ,7, 16, 18, 23, 26-27,43,53,58,6162,68,86 and estrangement, 1 1-12, 13-15 and fetishism, 58 precapitalist, 22-23, 42

Fetishism capitalist, 57, 59-60 definition of, 32, 59-60

Index

132

Fetishism (continued) end of, 52, 57-58, 61, 62,

63-68, 86 and exchange, 57-58,59-

62, 63-68 precapitalist, 65 and socialism, 32, 57-58,

63-68, 88-89 See also Estrangement Feudal society, 8, 22-23,

27,42,63 Feuerbach, Ludwig, 7, 9,

16,19,20,62 Forces of production. See Historical materialism Fourier, Charles, 3, 10, 30 Free activity. See Labor and enjoyment Freedom, 42-44, 50, 56. See also Individuality; Labor and enjoyment

and distribution, 34-35,

36,37,82 and market socialism, 68-

75 presuppositions of, 21 as social science, 21, 22,

24 versus socialism, 26-29,

35-45, 68-75 and transition to communism, 5-6, 24-25, 26-

27,35,36-45,56-57, 58, 65-66, 82 and transition to socialism, 36, 56-57, 58, 65,

68, 69-70, 81-82 See also Socialists; scientific Human nature Feuerbach's account of,

9, 19-20, 62 Hegel's account of, 60-

Gemeinschaft. See Community Gesellschaft. See Society Godwin, William, 3 Gray, John, 70-73,89

61,62 Marx's account of, 9, 14-

15,19-20,60-61,62 Individuality, 12-13, 26, 41-44, 53-56. See also Complexity of culture

Harrison, Frederic, 78-79,

80 Hegel, G. W. F., 7, 10, 15-

16,19,49-51,53,5862 Hess, Moses, 9, 11, 12, 18, 19 Historical materialism versus communism, 7,

11-12,18,19,24-25, 31,74-75,76,87,8990

Labor, division of. See Division of labor Labor and enjoyment in class economies, 42 in communist economies,

15,17-18,23-24,38, 41-44 in exchange economies,

15,23,41 in pastoral economies, 42 See also Individuality

Index Labor market, 26, 41, 74 Labor time and distribution, 3-4, 33,

34,36,41,45-47,74

133

definitions of, 83 end of, 6, 83 labor, 3-4, 33-34, 71-72,

75

and exchange value, 38-

39,65, 71-73,81-82, 87-89 and planning, 25-26, 33, 69, 74-75, 88 Lange, Oskar, 7 Lassalle, Ferdinand, 2, 6970,80, 81,89 Ledru-Rollin, AlexandreAuguste, 2 Lenin, V. 1., 1-3, 6-7, 34,

81 Liebknecht, Wilhelm, 69 Lukacs, Georg, 7 Market and common interest, 23 labor, 26, 41,74 See also Exchange; Socialism, market Marxists orthodox, 2, 81 revisionist, 3, 81 Material incentives, 17. See also Labor and enjoyment Materialism, historical. See Historical materialism Means of production. See Property, collective; Property, private Mixed economy, 4, 5;66-

67,68 Mode of production. See Historical materialism Money analysis of, 59, 71-72

Needs communal, 33, 46, 47,48 and distribution, 4, 34,

36,38,43,46-47 expansion of, 21, 43 matching incomes to, 46-

47 matching work to, 26, 33,

74 and social relations, 21,

24,28,43 Negation of the negation,

53,61 Owen, Robert, 3, 30 Pashukanis, E. B., 7 Pecqueur, Constantin, 45,

47 Planning, 25-26, 33, 43-44,

57,66,67,69, 74-75, 80, 88 Plato, 51 Prediction of end to capitalism, 53,

61, 86 of end to fetishism, 52,

57-58,61,62,65-66, 68,86 scientific, 21, 76, 77, 8587, 89-90 of transition to communism, 4-5, 5-6, 36, 37-

45,52,56-58,76, 77, 82

134

Prediction (continued) of transition to socialism, 36,52,56-57,58,68, 77, 81-82 utopian, 76, 77, 84, 85, 86 Preobrazhensky, Evgeny, 7 Property collective, 3, 4, 5, 22-23, 33,35,53-55,88 individual, 53-56, 79 private, 4, 5, 6, 12-13, 14,22-23,35,53-55 See also Division of labor; Exchange; Individuality Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph, 2, 3, 10, 14, 15, 17, 26, 27,29,30, 71, 73, 75, 80, 89 Relations of production. See Historical materialism Religion, end of, 16, 19-20, 57-58 Renner, Karl, 7 Revisionism, 3, 81 Ricardian socialists, 32, 71, 75 Rights abstract and concrete, 49-51 in communist economies, 50 definitions of, 48-49, 5051 equal and unequal, 37, 45-48 and general rules, 47-51

Index

in socialist economies, 45-49 Saint-Simon, Henri de, 30 Saint-Simonians, 3, 45 Schaffle, A. F. E., 87-89 Smith, Adam, 41-43 Socialism definitions of, 1, 2-3, 1011,34,45-46,47,7980,82 economic arguments for, 13-14,26,36 economic viability of, 2729,30,44,70-75,77 and exchange, 27-29, 30, 33-34, 63-68, 70-74 and fetishism, 32~ 57-58, 63-68, 88-89 as final goal, 1, 6, 16-18, 27,30, 81,87 versus historical materalism, 26-29, 35-45, 6875 market, 4, 5, 64-65, 6667,68-75 moral arguments against, 14-16,44-49,75 moral arguments for, 1618, 35-36 nonmarket, 3-4, 32-34, .54, 57, 63-66, 68-75, 87-88 resemblance to capitalism, 33, 34, 35, 36, 49, 68-70, 82 and society, 8-9, 51, 6566 transition to, 4, 5, 36, 52, 56-57,58,65,66-67, 68,69-70,77,81-82

135

Index as transitional stage, 1-2, 3-4,6,27, 30,34-36, 37-39,41-45,66-67, 70,73,82-83,87 Socialists versus communists, 1-2, 6-7, 10-11, 13-15, 30-31,52,69-70, 81, 89 democratic, 1, 2, 6, 3 7, 69, 81 equalitarian, 37, 45-46 scientific, 21, 24, 31, 76, 77, 82, 84, 87, 89 true, 18, 20 utopian, 31-32 vulgar, 33-37, 46, 47 Society ( Gesellschaft) and appearance, 59-61 and capitalism, 8, 10 versus community, 8-9, 10,22-23,51,59-61, 62 and estrangement, 10 and socialism, 8-9, 51, 65-66 Species being, 9. See also Human nature, Marx's account of

State and common interest, 23 communist, 12 democratic, 8, 81 end of, 2, 4-5, 12 political, 5, 15, 50, 60-61 socialist, 5, 66, 81 Stirner, Max, 19, 20 Substance. See Community; Essence and existence Tonnies, Ferdinand, 8 Tugan-Baranovsky, M. I., 3-4 Vorlander, Karl, 7 Wages · capitalist, 14 communist, 17 deductions from, 3-4, 33-34,45,46,48,73 definitions of, 3, 17, 83 end of, 4, 35, 45, 83 socialist, 3-4, 13-15, 2526,32-33,35,45-49, 73 Wagner, Adolph, 87-88 Weitling, Wilhelm, 10, 11, 12

his claim that the first is in -some sense inferior to the second. Two conclusions emerge. First, Marx's major arguments for abolishing exchange rely on moral and philosophical principles, derived from Feuerbach in the earlier writings and from Hegel in the later. Second, Marx's ideal of communism is incompatible with his materialist approach to history. Both conclusions imply that modem revisionism is the heir of scientific socialism. Stanley Moore is Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus, University of California, ~an Diego.

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