Measuring and Mapping Cultures (International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology)

Measuring and Mapping Cultures: 25 Years of Comparative Value Surveys

International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology Editors

Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo Rubin Patterson Masamichi Sasaki

VOLUME 104

Measuring and Mapping Cultures: 25 Years of Comparative Value Surveys Edited by

Yilmaz Esmer and Thorleif Pettersson

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2007

Originally published as Volume 5 no. 2–3 (2006) of Brill’s journal ‘Comparative Sociology’ Coverphoto © World Values Survey (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org) This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A C.I.P. record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa (10th : 2004 : Olomouc, Czech Republic) Gregory of Nyssa : Contra Eunomium II : an English version with supporting studies : proceedings of the 10th International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa (Olomouc, September 15–18, 2004) / edited by Lenka Karfíková . . . [et al.] with the assistance of Vít Hu“ek and Ladislav Chvátal. p. cm. — (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, ISSN 0920-623X ; v. 82) English, French, and German. Contra Eunomium II translated from the Greek by Stuart George Hall. Includes bibliographical references and indexes. ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15518-3 ISBN-10: 90-04-15518-X (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Gregory, of Nyssa, Saint, ca. 335-ca. 394—Congresses. 2. Eunomius, Bp. of Cyzicus, ca. 335-ca. 394— Congresses. 3. Eunomianism—Congresses. 4. Church history—Primitive and early church, ca. 30-600—Congresses. I. Karfíková, Lenka. II. Hall, Stuart George. III. Gregory, of Nyssa, Saint, ca. 335-ca. 394. Contra Eunomium.

ISSN 0074-8684 ISBN-10: 90 04 15820 0 ISBN-13: 978 90 04 15820 7 © Copyright 2007 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

Contents Introduction ...................................................................................... Esmer, Yilmaz; Pettersson, Thorleif

1

Mapping Global Values .................................................................. Inglehart, Ronald

11

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications .................................................................................. Schwartz, Shalom H. Globalization, “McDonaldization” and Values: Quo Vadis? ...... Esmer, Yilmaz

33

79

Individualization in Europe and America: Connecting Religious and Moral Values ...................................................... Nevitte, Neil; Cochrane, Christopher

99

Religion in Contemporary Society: Eroded by Human Well-being, Supported by Cultural Diversity ............................ Pettersson, Thorleif

127

Democratization in the Human Development Perspective .......... Welzel, Christian

155

Index ................................................................................................

187

This volume, commemorating the 25th anniversary of values surveys, is dedicated to Dan Brändström, Director of the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation, an enthusiastic believer in values research and a staunch supporter of the academic study of values. The World Values Survey project is deeply indebted to Dan for his relentless efforts to make available comparative survey data on values to the wider social science community and policy makers around the globe.

Dan Brändström

Introduction Yilmaz Esmer and Thorleif Pettersson The study of human values has a long and distinguished tradition. The importance of the citizens’ mindset for various spheres of social life has been recognized by thinkers going all the way to Ancient Greece. Indeed, Plato is well known for establishing a one-to-one correspondence between the types of constitutions and the orientations of the individuals’ minds. According to him, states were shaped by the character of their citizens. Aristotle, on the other hand, likened the rulers of a society to flute players. It was the people who actually made the flute. Thus, at the end of the day, the determining factor – the independent variable, if you willwas the character, the nature, the mindset of the citizenry. From Ibn-i Khaldun, to Montesquieu, Tocqueville and Weber, to name but a few, many great classical thinkers emphasized the importance of cultural values, if we are to use the contemporary terminology, for understanding and explaining social structure, institutions, and change. Despite this highly eminent tradition of over two millennia, the empirical study of the collective mindset is an extremely recent phenomenon. In fact, large scale comparative values studies involving a variety of cultures have a history of few decades only. Almond and Verba’s The Civic Culture and Alex Inkeles’ Becoming Modern are roughly half a century old and both included only a handful of societies. The Eurobarometer, a remarkable project indeed, was envisaged and implemented by the Commission of the European Communities in the early 1970s. Although currently replicated in different parts of the globe such as Latin America, Africa and East Asia, at the time of its inception it was very much a “European project.” Nevertheless, we owe a great debt to the Eurobarometer both for taking the bold step in the right direction and for the invaluable European time series data it has made available to all those interested. However, we believe it would not be inaccurate or unfair to say that 1981 is the actual year of birth of the empirical study of cultural values

2 • Yilmaz Esmer and Thorleif Pettersson

on a global scale. European and World Values surveys were born in that year thanks to the laudable efforts of such visionaries as JacquesRene Rabier, Ruud de Moor, Jan Kerkhofs and, shortly thereafter, Ronald Inglehart. Today, as we celebrate the 25th anniversary of values surveys, we gratefully acknowledge our indebtedness to them and to their collaborators. The number of countries included in the first values survey was modest by today’s standards and the project comprised mainly nations of the industrialized West. Even then, however, such diverse societies as the United States, Mexico, South Africa, Japan, S. Korea, Argentina, Australia, in addition to Western Europe, were surveyed. Today, looking back 25 years, one realizes that data collected in this first round is a treasure beyond description for those interested in cultural change and in the mapping of cultural values. One only wishes, egotistically, that more societies could have been part of that first round. Fortunately, it took less than a decade for this wish to come true. The second round of Values Surveys carried out around 1990 comprised no less than 43 societies from every corner of the globe and all major cultural traditions. In the following rounds, the total number of countries that participated in one or more of the surveys exceeded 80. At the time of this writing, World Values Survey researchers, who now form a truly global network of social scientists, are busy in all continents collecting data for the fifth round of World Values Surveys. Consequently, the academic community as well as policy makers will shortly have access to data on a very broad range of values at five points in time covering a time span of one quarter of a century, We, as the editors of this special issue of Comparative Sociology, believe this is indeed cause for celebration. A much welcome development in the field has been the coming into existence of a number of additional international surveys. The International Social Survey Program which started in the 1980s now covers a wide range of countries. The European Social Survey is the most recent project (it was first fielded in 2002) and covers around 25 European countries. It has a well-deserved reputation for its uncompromisingly rigorous methodological standards. Both the ISSP and the ESS contain core questionnaires which are repeated in every round and, in addition, rotating modules on important topics. Then, as already mentioned, there are regional or continental barometers which can be regarded as the offsprings of the Eurobarometer. In addition to the general ones, there are a number of international survey programs on more specific topics such as religion or electoral behavior. Nevertheless, the World Values Survey continues to be the largest and most comprehensive survey project with the widest geographical coverage.

Introduction • 3

The core assumption of values studies is that culture matters. Since values, which are the basic orientations or principles that guide attitudes and behavior, are central to any culture, it follows that values matter as well. Values are intrinsically interesting and have been shown to be closely related to formal structures. Just to give one example, values pertaining to tolerance, individual freedom and interpersonal trust are all highly correlated with the existence or non-existence of democratic institutions. But values are also very useful for the mapping of cultures. Cultural classifications and cultural maps of the world depend on values and are either drawn by using data from values surveys (e.g. Inglehart) or – if they are a priori theoretical constructs – (e.g. Schwartz) need data from these surveys to be validated. Either way, it is necessary to delineate basic value dimensions. Two of the best known and most frequently cited schemes for classifying and mapping basic value dimensions in the literature belong to Ronald Inglehart and Shalom Schwartz. Both authors have contributed articles to this volume summarizing and updating their respective theories. In his contribution to this issue, Ronald Inglehart expounds on his two-dimensional map of global values based on data collected from World/European Values Surveys since 1981. Inglehart and his collaborators (see, for example, Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) have argued that although values and beliefs vary in a great many different ways, they can be adequately summarized in two basic dimensions: the traditional/secular-rational dimension and the survival/selfexpression dimension. Inglehart’s global values map places all societies on these two dimensions. Data show that societies occupy meaningful and predictable positions on this map forming “cultural zones.” Two factors seem to have a profound effect on a given society’s position on the map. First, whether a society is predominantly agrarian, industrialized or postindustrialized makes a difference in its value system. Second, the cultural tradition of the society, that is history, seems to have a deep impact on the configuration of values. Inglehart observes that “gradual” but nevertheless “major cultural changes are occurring, and that a society’s religious tradition, colonial history, and other major historical factors, give rise to distinctive cultural traditions that continue to influence a society’s value system despite forces of modernization.” Although Inglehart emphasizes that modernization is not a linear process, nevertheless he predicts that economic development and welfare will give rise to self-expression values and that these in turn will support and enhance democratic institutions. Shalom Schwartz takes a different approach in that his cultural orientations are theoretically derived. As explained in his article in this issue as well as his earlier writings (see, for example, Schwarz 1994a; 1994b,

4 • Yilmaz Esmer and Thorleif Pettersson

2003; 2004) Schwartz takes as his starting point the specification of “a coherent, integrated system of relations among the orientations” and then moves on to test this theoretical model. Very briefly, Schwartz’ theory is based upon “seven cultural value orientations that form three cultural value dimensions.” These orientations and dimensions are explained in Schwartz’ article in this issue and therefore will not be repeated here. However, another major difference between the Inglehart and Schwartz models is worth noting: Inglehart’s dimensions are orthogonal while Schwartz’ theory depicts a circular configuration of value orientations and distinguishes between close and distant orientations. It is interesting and reassuring that, despite their differing methodologies and entirely independent data sources, Inglehart’s two dimensions are closely related to two corresponding Schwartz dimensions. However, Schwartz notes that his third dimension, mastery/harmony, “taps a different aspect of culture” and that this is to be expected since it is the only dimension that is “not strongly related to socio-economic development.” Both Inglehart’s and Schwartz’ articles include cultural maps of the world (Figures 1 and 4, respectively) reflecting, of course, their approaches and their data. Those interested in the classification and charting of cultures will find great comfort in Schwartz’ conclusion that “The most striking finding when comparing the mapping of national cultures in the research based on the Hofstede, Inglehart, and Schwartz approaches is that they identify such similar cultures around the world. [. . .] This is amazing, considering how different the approaches are.” This is not only amazing but at the same time extremely significant. It is a forceful refutation of the skeptical viewpoint that cultures cannot be measured. The article by Yilmaz Esmer is an attempt to trace value change during the longest time period that data from the values surveys will allow, that is, from 1981 to 2001. Two decades is a rather short span for the study of cultural change. As indicated by Schwartz in his article in this volume, cultural change is slow and cultural value orientations are “relatively stable.” However, the last two decades of the 20th century are a period of intense political and economic changes and turmoil. It is reasonable to assume that such far reaching changes should have had some impact on values as well. Esmer finds some evidence of change in his sample of some 20 countries but these are not “sweeping” by any stretch of the imagination. More interestingly, Esmer fails to find any confirmation of a value convergence. He concludes that cultural values are robust and resilient. Contrary to what is often assumed, the strong winds of globalization have according to Esmer’s analyses not yet been able to sweep away cultural diversity. At least for his limited sample, he observes that

Introduction • 5

values are as dispersed as ever and that “McDonaldization” has not reached beyond the surface. While Esmer tries to trace change and possible convergence in a broad range of values between 1981 and 2001, Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane, in their article entitled “Keeping it together: individualization and changing moral values” focus on the process of individualization during the same period of time. It is commonly assumed that modernization and particularly economic advances accelerate the move towards individualization (Ester, Halman and de Moor, 1993). Inglehart emphasizes the role of the “postmodern shift” in freeing the individual both from religious controls (mainly a consequence of the transition from the agrarian to the industrial society) and from state authority (mainly a consequence of the transition from industrialism to post-industrialism) (Inglehart, 1997). Nevitte and Cochrane write that “at the core, the concept of individualization is about the declining salience of traditional norm-generating institutions in the lives of people in post-industrial societies,” and investigate “one central aspect of individualization, namely, the connection between religiosity and moral values.” Their article tests a number of hypotheses regarding this relationship using factor analysis, correlation and regression techniques. One of the most significant conclusions is the reaffirmation of “American exceptionalism.” The publics of all countries in their sample have become more permissive, in varying degrees, during the last two decades of the 20th century. However, although the association between religion and moral values has generally become weaker in Europe, no such change is observed in North America. To the contrary, “Among North Americans, and particularly Americans, by contrast the connection between religious and moral outlooks actually becomes significantly stronger over the same time period.” One explanation that the authors offer for this difference is the much greater levels of associational involvement in North America compared to Europe. There is no doubt that religion and religiosity are at the core of cultural values. So much so that, according to Huntington “Of all the objective elements which define civilizations, however, the most important usually is religion” (1998:42). Indeed, “religion is a central defining characteristic of civilizations” (1998:47). One frequently asked question in this respect is whether, as an overall trend, the world is secularizing (see, for example, Norris and Inglehart, 2004) or it is in fact de-secularizing (see, for example, Berger, 1999). Thorleif Pettersson tests the predictions of the two major competing theories in this field: the widely known and acclaimed secularization theory which predicts a negative correlation between socio-economic development and religiosity; and the so-called “supply side theories of religion” which view religious diversity as the

6 • Yilmaz Esmer and Thorleif Pettersson

key independent variable. Using the economic market metaphor, the latter predict a positive correlation with religious diversity and the level of religiosity in a given community. This relationship is expected to hold true regardless of the degree of modernization. Analyzing data from about 50,000 respondents in 37 predominantly Christian countries, Pettersson finds support for both modernization and supply side theories. In what must be the largest scale test of these theories, the author concludes that both theories bear some truth and that it would be too simplistic to view modernization as a universal factor behind religious decline. The last article in the volume by Christian Welzel elaborates the author’s theory of democratization as an “institutional component of a broader process of human development.” According to the UNDP, the publisher of the annual World Human Development Reports, “The real objective of development is to increase people’s development choices” (UNDP, 1991:13). Subsequently, in the 2002 Human Development Report, it was declared that “for politics and political institutions to promote human development and safeguard the freedom and dignity of all people, democracy must widen and deepen” (UNDP, 2002:1). Welzel argues that “rising emancipative ideals” are the force behind the process of human development – a process that empowers people with ever-widening choices. The all-important conclusion that Welzel reaches is that democracy is not a regime or an “achievement” that is reserved exclusively for some cultures. This conclusion has far reaching implications and is a clear refutation of the contention that some cultures are simply unable to develop a democratic culture. It is important to note that Welzel is very explicit in accepting the crucial importance of democratic values while recognizing that all cultures have the potential to develop these values. This volume, then, brings together six original articles around the theme of mapping and measuring of cultural values and tracing change in a number of important value dimensions. The first two papers by Inglehart and by Schwartz draw up two different but nevertheless complementary approaches to the delineation of major value dimensions. Both authors offer cultural maps of the world indicating the positions of national cultures. The paper by Esmer that follows these two frameworks for the study of cultural values presents a general overview of value change/stability between 1981 and 2001 and tests the convergence of values hypothesis. The subsequent articles by Nevitte and Cochrane, Pettersson and Welzel tackle three important processes: individualization, secularization and democratization. They all make generous use of the World/European Values Survey data. The volume is yet another and very modest demonstration that the

Introduction • 7

data collected by the Values Surveys is a treasure that has been and will continue to be widely used. Thanks to these data, many social science theories have for the first time been tested on world wide data. Thus, in a sense, data from these surveys gave new life to Tocqueville, Durkheim, Marx, Weber and many others. It is now possible, to a large extent, to confirm or disconfirm the many claims of the modernization theory (perhaps the most enduring and the most widely cited theory in the social sciences) and its variants using data from values surveys. Until recently, this was something that social scientists could only dream about. Data collected from values surveys are invaluable for policy makers as well. Indeed, such global organizations as the United Nations and the World Bank, among others, have recognized the great importance of values data for practitioners of economic and social development, educational reforms, democratization, marketing, etc. to name but a few areas that have made extensive use of the results obtained by values researchers. We would like to introduce this special issue of Comparative Sociology with these comments on the value surveys by Romano Prodi, the Prime Minister of Italy and the former President of the European Commission: “The growing globalization of the world makes it increasingly important to understand [. . .] cultural diversity. People with widely varying beliefs and values can live together and work together productively, but for this to happen, it is crucial to understand and appreciate their distinctive worldviews. [. . .] These surveys represent a major step in that direction. They provide data from representative samples of the publics of societies containing 85 percent of the world’s population and covering the full range of variation, from the richest countries on earth to some of the poorest, and examining societies that were historically shaped by a wide variety of religions, political and cultural traditions.”1 Acknowledgements The WVS/EVS surveys have been made possible by a large network of scholars and survey researchers around the globe. We owe each and every one of them a large debt of gratitude. On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the values surveys, it is our great pleasure to acknowledge their contributions to the creation of the WVS/EVS dataset. They are:

1 Foreword by Romano Prodi to Inglehart, R. et al., eds., 2004. Human Beliefs and Values. Mexico: Siglo XXI editors.

8 • Yilmaz Esmer and Thorleif Pettersson

Anthony M. Abela, Abdel-Hamid Abdel-Latif, Q. K. Ahmad, Rasa Alishauskene, Helmut Anheier, W. A. Arts, Jose Arocena, Soo Young Auh, Taghi Azadarmaki, Ljiljana Bacevic, Olga Balakireva, Josip Balobn, Miguel Basanez, Elena Bashkirova, Abdallah Bedaida, Jorge Benitez, Jaak Billiet, Antoine Bilodeau, Alan Black, Sheila Bluhm, Rahma Bourquia, Ammar Boukhedir, Fares al Braizat, Pierre Brechon, Pavel Campeanu, Augustin Canzani, Marita Carballo, Henrique Carlos de O. de Castro, Pi-Chao Chen, Pradeep Chhibber, Mark F. Chingono, Hei-yuan Chiu, Margit Cleveland, Russell Dalton, Andrew P. Davidson, Juan DíezMedrano, Juan Diez-Nicolas, Herman de Dijn, Karel Dobbelaere, Peter J. D. Drenth, Javier Elzo, Zsolt Enyedi, P. Estgen, T. Fahey, Nadjematul Faizah, Georgy Fotev, James Georgas, C. Geppaart, Renzo Gubert, Linda Luz Guerrero, Peter Gundelach, Jacques Hagenaars, Pham Minh Hac, Loek Halman, Mustafa Hamarneh, Sang-Jin Han, Stephen Harding, Mari Harris, Bernadette C. Hayes, Camilo Herrera, Virginia Hodgkinson, Nadirsyah Hosen, Muhamad Nadratuzzaman Hosen, Kenji Iijima, Ronald Inglehart, Ljubov Ishimova, Wolfgang Jagodzinski, Aleksandra JasinskaKania, Fridrik Jonsson, Stanislovas Juknevicius, Edward Kakonge, Mebs Kanji, Jan Kerkhofs, Johann Kinghorn, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Hennie Kotze, Zuzana Kusa, Marta Lagos, Bernhard C. Lategan, M. Legrand, Carlos Lemoine, Noah Lewin-Epstein, Ola Listhaug, Jin-yun Liu, Ruud Luijkx, Brina Malnar, Mahar Mangahas, Mario Marinov, Carlos Matheus, Robert B. Mattes, Gustavo Mendez, Rafael Mendizabal, Shen Mingming, Felipe Miranda, Mansoor Moaddel, Temirlan Tilekovich Moldogaziev, Jose Molina, Manjit Monga, Alejandro Moreno, Gaspar K. Munishi, Neil Nevitte, Pham Thanh Nghi, Pippa Norris, Sakari Nurmela, Elone Nwabuzor, Dragomir Pantic, Rafael Pardo, Juhani Pehkonen, Pradeep Peiris, Paul Perry, Gevork Pogosian, Bi Puranen, Ladislav Rabusic, Andrei Raichev, Anu Rentel, Angel Rivera-Ortiz, Isabel Vega Robles, Catalina Romero, David Rotman, Andrus Saar, Rajab Sattarov,Tan Ern Ser, Sandeep Shastri, Renata Siemienska, Maria Silvestre, John Sudarsky, Toru Takahashi, Farooq Tanwir, Jean-Francois Tchernia, Kareem Tejumola, Larissa Titarenko, Gabor Toka, Miklos Tomka, Alfredo Torres, Niko Tos, Jorge Vala, Andrei Vardomatskii, Malina Voicu, Alan Webster, Friedrich Welsch, Christian Welzel, Manuel Villaverde Cabral, Bogdan Voicu, Seiko Yamazaki, Birol Yeshilada, Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar, Josefina Zaiter, Brigita Zepa, Ignacio Zuasnabar, P. Zulehner. The value surveys are indebted to these scholars and many organizations that have made generous contributions to our project. Among our many friends, however, Professor Dan Brändström, Director of the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation, deserves a special mention for his invaluable support, assistance, and advice. This volume is dedicated to him.

Introduction • 9

References Berger, Peter L., ed. 1999 The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics. Grand Rapids, Mi. and Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. Ester, Peter, Loek Halman and Ruud de Moor, eds. 1993 The Individualizing Society: Value Value Change in Europe and North America. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press. Huntington, Samuel P. 1998 The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. London: Touchstone Books. Inglehart, Ronald 1997 Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne Baker 2000 “Modernization, Cultural Change and the Persistence of Traditional Values.” American Sociological Review (February): 19-51. Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel 2005 Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart 2004 Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schwartz, Shalom H. 1994a “Are There Universal Aspects in the Content and Structure of Values?” Journal of Social Issues 50: 19-45. 1994b “Beyond Individualism and Collectivism: New Cultural Dimensions of Values,” pp. 85-119 in Individualism and Collectivism: Theory, Method and Applications, edited by U. Kim et al. Newbury Park, CA.: Sage. 2003 “A Proposal for Measuring Value Orientations Across Nations,” ch. 7 in Questionnaire Development Report of the European Social Survey. 2004 “Mapping and Interpreting Cultural Differences Around the World,” in Comparing Cultures: Dimensions of Culture in a Comparative Perspective, edited by H. Vinken, J. Soeters and P. Ester. Leiden: Brill. UNDP 1991 Human Development Report 1991. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2002 Human Development Report 2002. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mapping Global Values Ronald Inglehart Abstract Modernization goes through two main phases, each of which brings distinctive changes in people’s worldviews. The Industrial Revolution was linked with a shift from traditional to secular-rational values, bringing bureaucratization, centralization, standardization and the secularization of authority. In the post-industrial phase of modernization, a shift from survival values to self-expression values, brings increasing emancipation from both religious and secular-rational authority. Rising mass emphasis on self-expression values makes democracy increasingly likely to emerge. Although the desire for freedom is a universal human aspiration, it does not take top priority when people grow up with the feeling that survival is uncertain. But when survival seems secure, increasing emphasis on self-expression values makes the emergence of democracy increasingly likely where it does not yet exist, and makes democracy increasingly effective where it already exists.

Introduction The world now contains nearly 200 independent countries, and the beliefs and values of their publics differ greatly, in thousands of different ways. Yet, among the many dimensions of cross-cultural variation, two are particularly important. Each dimension reflects one of the two waves of economic development that have transformed the world economically, socially and politically in modern times: the transition from agrarian society to industrial society that emerged two hundred years ago and is now transforming China, India, Indonesia and many other countries; and the transition from industrial society to the post-industrial or knowledge society that began to emerge fifty years ago and is now reshaping

12 • Ronald Inglehart

the socioeconomic systems of the U.S., Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Australia and other economically advanced societies. These processes of economic and technological change have given rise to two key dimensions of cross-cultural variation: (1) a Traditional/SecularRational dimension that reflects the contrast between the relatively religious and traditional values that generally prevail in agrarian societies, and the relatively secular, bureaucratic and rational values that generally prevail in urban, industrialized societies; and (2) a Survival/Self-expression dimension that also taps a wide range of beliefs and values, reflecting an inter-generational shift from an emphasis on economic and physical security above all, towards increasing emphasis on self-expression, subjective well-being, and quality of life concerns. These dimensions are robust aspects of cross-cultural variation, and they make it possible to map the position of any society on a two-dimensional map that reflects their relative positions at any given time. But gradual shifts are occurring along these dimensions, transforming many aspects of society. One of the most important of these changes is the fact that the shift toward increasing emphasis on Self-expression values makes democratic political institutions increasingly likely to emerge and flourish. Our analysis is based on a body of survey evidence that represents 85 percent of the world’s population. Data from four waves of the Values Surveys, carried out from 1981 to 2001, indicate that major cultural changes are occurring, and that a society’s religious tradition, colonial history, and other major historical factors, give rise to distinctive cultural traditions that continue to influence a society’s value system despite the forces of modernization. Modernization and Cultural Change In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, modernization theorists from Karl Marx to Max Weber analyzed the emerging industrial society and tried to predict its future. Their analyses of cultural change emphasized the rise of rationality and the decline of religion, and they assumed that these developments would continue in linear fashion, with the future being a continuation of the same trends that were occurring during the 19th century. From today’s perspective, it is clear that modernization is more complex than these early views anticipated. The numbers of industrial workers ceased growing decades ago in economically advanced societies, and virtually no one any longer expects a proletarian revolution. Moreover, it is increasingly evident that religion has not vanished as predicted. Furthermore, it is apparent that modernization can not be equated with Westernization, as early analyses assumed. Non-Western societies in East Asia have surpassed their Western role models in key aspects of

Mapping Global Values • 13

modernization such as rates of economic growth and high life expectancy, and few observers today attribute moral superiority to the West. Although, today, few people accept the original Marxist version of modernization theory, one of its core concepts still seems valid: the insight that, once industrialization begins, it produces pervasive social and cultural consequences, from rising educational levels to changing gender roles. This article maps cross-cultural variation using data from the World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys, which have measured the beliefs and values of most of the world’s people. These surveys offer an unprecedentedly rich source of insight into the relationships between economic development and social and political change. They show that, even during the relatively brief time since the first wave of the Values Surveys was carried out in 1981, substantial changes have occurred in the values and beliefs of the publics of these societies. These changes are closely linked with the economic changes experienced by a given society. As we will demonstrate, economic development is associated with predictable changes away from absolute norms and values, toward a syndrome of increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting, and post-industrial values. But we find evidence of both massive cultural change and the persistence of traditional values. Throughout most of history, survival has been uncertain for most people. But the remarkable economic growth of the era following World War II, together with the rise of the welfare state, brought fundamentally new conditions in advanced industrial societies. The postwar birth cohorts of these countries grew up under conditions of prosperity that were unprecedented in human history, and the welfare state reinforced the feeling that survival was secure, producing an intergenerational value change that is gradually transforming the politics and cultural norms of advanced industrial societies. The best documented aspect of this change is the shift from Materialist to Postmaterialist priorities. A massive body of evidence gathered from 1970 to the present demonstrates that an intergenerational shift from Materialist to Postmaterialist priorities is transforming the behavior and goals of the people of advanced industrial societies (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). But recent research demonstrates that this trend is only one aspect of an even broader cultural shift from Survival values to Self-expression values. Economic development and cultural change move in two major phases, each of which gives rise to a major dimension of cross-national value differences. Factor analysis of national-level data from the 43 societies studied in the 1990 World Values Survey found that two main dimensions accounted for well over half of the cross-national variance in more than a score of variables tapping basic values across a wide range of domains,

14 • Ronald Inglehart

ranging from politics to economic life and sexual behavior (Inglehart, 1997). These dimensions of cross-cultural variation are robust; when the 1990-1991 factor analysis was replicated with the data from the 19951998 surveys, the same two dimensions of cross-cultural variation emerged – even though the new analysis was based on 23 additional countries not included in the earlier study (Inglehart and Baker, 2000). The same two dimensions also emerged in analysis of data from the 2000-2001 surveys – although numerous additional countries were again added to the pool, including eight predominantly Islamic societies – a cultural region that had been relatively neglected in previous surveys (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Each dimension taps a major axis of cross-cultural variation involving many different values. Table 1 shows the results of this most recent set of analyses, based on data from more than 70 societies, aggregated to the national level. Although each of the two main dimensions is linked closely with scores of values, for technical reasons, our indices were constructed by using only five key indicators for each of the two dimensions. Table 1 Two Dimensions of Cross-Cultural Variation First Factor (46%) TRADITIONAL VALUES emphasize the following: God is very important in respondent’s life It is more important for a child to learn obedience and religious faith than independence and determination [Autonomy index] Abortion is never justifiable Respondent has strong sense of national prideRespondent favors more respect for authority

Factor Loadings .91 .88 .82 .81 .73

(SECULAR-RATIONAL VALUES emphasize the opposite) Second Factor (25%) SURVIVAL VALUES emphasize the following: R. gives priority to economic and physical security over self expression and quality of life [4-item Materialist/Postmaterialist Values Index] Respondent describes self as not very happy Homosexuality is never justifiable R. has not and would not sign a petition You have to be very careful about trusting people

.87 .81 .77 .74 .46

(SELF-EXPRESSION VALUES emphasize the opposite) The original polarities vary; the above statements show how each item relates to the given factor. Source: World Values Survey data from more than 200 surveys carried out in four waves in 78 societies. (Factors = 2, varimax rotation, listwise deletion)

Mapping Global Values • 15

Human values are structured in a surprisingly coherent way: the two dimensions explain fully 71 percent of the cross-cultural variation among these ten items. More impressive still is the fact that each of these two dimensions taps a broad range of other attitudes, extending over a number of seemingly diverse domains. Table 2 shows the correlations of 24 additional variables that are relatively strongly linked with the first dimension, showing correlations above the .40 level. Table 2 Correlates of Traditional vs. Secular-rational Values TRADITIONAL values emphasize the following:

Correlation with Traditional/ Secular Rational Values

Religion is very important in respondent’s life Respondent believes in Heaven One of respondent’s main goals in life has been to make his/her parents proud Respondent believes in Hell Respondent attends church regularly Respondent has a great deal of confidence in the country’s churches Respondent gets comfort and strength from religion Respondent describes self as “a religious person” Euthanasia is never justifiable Work is very important in respondent’s life There should be stricter limits on selling foreign goods here Suicide is never justifiable Parents’ duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being Respondent seldom or never discusses politics Respondent places self on Right side of a Left-Right scale Divorce is never justifiable There are absolutely clear guidelines about good and evil Expressing one’s own preferences clearly is more important than understanding others’ preferences My country’s environmental problems can be solved without any international agreements to handle them If a woman earns more money than her husband, it’s almost certain to cause problems One must always love and respect one’s parents regardless of their behavior Family is very important in respondent’s life Relatively favorable to having the army rule the country R. favors having a relatively large number of children

.89 .88 .81 .76 .75 .72 .71 .66 .65 .63 .61 .60 .57 .57 .57 .56 .56 .56 .53 .49 .45 .43 .41 .40

(SECULAR-RATIONAL values emphasize the opposite) The number in the right hand column shows how strongly each variable is correlated with the Traditional/Secular-rational Values Index. The original polarities vary; the above statements show how each item relates to the Traditional/Secular-rational values index. Source: Nation-level data from 65 societies surveyed in the 1990 and 1996 World Values Surveys.

16 • Ronald Inglehart

The Traditional/Secular-Rational dimension reflects the contrast between the relatively religious and traditional values that generally prevail in agrarian societies, and the relatively secular, bureaucratic and rational values that generally prevail in urban, industrialized societies. Traditional societies emphasize the importance of religion, deference to authority, parent-child ties and two-parent traditional families, and absolute moral standards; they reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide, and tend to be patriotic and nationalistic. In contrast, societies with secular-rational values display the opposite preferences on all of these topics. Table 3 shows 31 additional variables that are closely linked with the Survival/Self-expression’ dimension, which also taps a wide range of beliefs and values. A central component involves the polarization between Materialist and Postmaterialist values that reflects an intergenerational shift from an emphasis on economic and physical security above all, towards increasing emphasis on self-expression, subjective well-being, and quality of life concerns. Societies that rank high on Survival values tend to emphasize materialist orientations and traditional gender roles; they are relatively intolerant of foreigners, gays and lesbians and other outgroups, show relatively low levels of subjective well-being, rank relatively low on interpersonal trust, and emphasize hard work, rather than imagination or tolerance, as important things to teach a child. Societies that emphasize Self-Expression values, display the opposite preferences on all these topics. These two dimensions are remarkably robust. If we compare the results from the two most recent waves of the Values Surveys, we find a .92 correlation between the positions of given countries on the Traditional/ Secular-rational values dimension from one wave of the surveys to the next. With the Survival/Self-expression dimension, the positions of given countries are even more stable: their positions in the earlier wave show a .95 correlation with their positions five years later. Although major changes are occurring along these dimensions, the relative positions of given countries are highly stable. If one compares the map based on the 1990 surveys with the map based on the 1995 surveys or the 2000 surveys, they initially seem to be the same map, showing given clusters of countries (such as Protestant Europe, the English-speaking countries, the Latin American societies, the Confucian societies) in the same relative position – although each successive wave of surveys was not only carried out roughly five years later than the previous one, but included many countries not covered in previous surveys. Figure 1 shows a two-dimensional cultural map on which the value systems of 80 societies are depicted, using the most recent data available for each country (mostly from the 2000 wave but in some cases

Mapping Global Values • 17 Table 3 Correlates of Survival vs. Self-expression Values SURVIVAL values emphasize the following:

Correlation with Survival/ Self-expression Values

Men make better political leaders than women Respondent is dissatisfied with financial situation of his/her household A woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled R. rejects foreigners, homosexuals and people with AIDS as neighbors R. favors more emphasis on the development of technology R. has not recycled things to protect the environment R. has not attended a meeting or signed a petition to protect the environment When seeking a job, a good income and safe job are more important than a feeling of accomplishment and working with people you like R. is relatively favorable to state ownership of business and industry A child needs a home with both a father and mother to grow up happily R. does not describe own health as very good One must always love and respect one’s parents regardless of their behavior When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women Prostitution is never justifiable Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for R. does not have much free choice or control over his/her life A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl R. does not favor less emphasis on money and material possessions R. rejects people with criminal records as neighbors R. rejects heavy drinkers as neighbors Hard work is one of the most important things to teach a child Imagination is not one of the most important things to teach a child Tolerance and respect for others are not the most important things to teach a child Scientific discoveries will help, rather than harm, humanity Leisure is not very important in life Friends are not very important in life Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections would be a good form of government R. has not and would not take part in a boycott Government ownership of business and industry should be increased Democracy is not necessarily the best form of government R. opposes sending economic aid to poorer countries

.86 .83 .83 .81 .78 .78 .75 .74 .74 .73 .73 .71 .69 .69 .68 .67 .67 .66 .66 .65 .64 .62 .62 .60 .60 .58 .56 .56 .55 .45 .42

(SELF-EXPRESSION values emphasize the opposite) The number in the right hand column shows how strongly each variable is correlated with the Survival/Self-Expression Values Index. The original polarities vary; the above statements show how each item relates to the Traditional/Secular-rational values index. Source: nation-level data from 65 societies surveyed in the 1990 and 1996 World Values Surveys.

18 • Ronald Inglehart

Secular-Rational values

Figure 1 Cultural Map of the World in 2000 2.0

nfu

1.5

Co Bulgaria

1.0

Russia

S. Korea

Montenegro Latvia Albania Serbia

0.5 Moldova

Slovenia Taiwan

nis mmu E x - C o Bosnia

Georgia Azerbaijan Armenia

t

Switzerland

Luxem bourg Iceland Belgium Israel Austria Great Italy Britain Croatia New Zealand Spain

Catholic Europe

India

South Asia

Denmark Netherlands

France

Uruguay

Poland

Romania

Sweden

Norway

West Germany Finland

Greece

Slovakia

Hungary Macedonia

0

English speaking

Canada Australia

N. Ireland U.S.A.

Vietnam

Turkey Portugal Ireland Indonesia Chile Argentina Philippines Bangladesh Dominican Iran Peru Republic Pakistan South Brazil Latin America Africa Jordan Mexico Uganda Nigeria Zimbabwe Algeria Egypt Venezuela Tanzania Morocco Colombia Puerto Afr ic a Rico El Salvador

-1.0

Traditional values

Czech

Lith uania

Protestant Europe

East Germany

China Estonia

Ukraine Belarus

-0.5

Japan

n cia

-1.5

-2.0 -2

-1.5

Survival values

-1

-0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

Self Expression values

from the 1995 wave). The vertical dimension represents the Traditional/ Secular-rational dimension, and the horizontal dimension reflects the Survival/Self-expression values dimension. Both dimensions are strongly linked with economic development, with the value systems of rich countries differing systematically from those of poor countries. Thus, Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the U.S. and all other societies with a 1995 annual per capita GNP over $15,000 rank relatively high on both dimensions: without exception, they fall in a broad zone near the upper right-hand corner. Conversely, every one of the societies with per capita GNPs below $2,000 falls into a cluster at the lower left of the map; India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Morocco, Brazil and Peru all fall into this economic zone, which cuts across the African, South Asian, ex-Communist, and Orthodox cultural zones. The remaining societies fall into interme-

Mapping Global Values • 19

diate cultural-economic zones. Economic development seems to pull societies in a common direction regardless of their cultural heritage. Economic Development Interacts with a Society’s Cultural Heritage Nevertheless, two centuries after the industrial revolution began, distinctive cultural zones persist. Different societies follow different trajectories, even when they are subjected to the same forces of economic development, because situation-specific factors, such as a society’s cultural heritage, also shape how a particular society develops. Huntington (1996) has emphasized the role of religion in shaping the world’s eight major civilizations: Western Christianity, Orthodox, Islam, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, African, and Latin American. Despite the forces of modernization, these zones were shaped by religious traditions that are still powerful today. Economic development is strongly associated with both dimensions of cultural change. But a society’s cultural heritage also plays a role. Thus, all eleven Latin American societies fall into a coherent cluster, showing relatively similar values: they rank high on traditional religious values, but are characterized by stronger emphasis on Self-expression values than their economic levels would predict. Economic factors are important, but they are only part of the story; such factors as their common Iberian colonial heritage seem to have left an impact that persists centuries later. Similarly, despite their wide geographic dispersion, the English-speaking countries constitute a compact cultural zone. In the same way, the historically Roman Catholic societies of Western Europe (e.g., Italy, Portugal, Spain, France, Belgium and Austria) display relatively traditional values when compared with Confucian or ex-Communist societies with the same proportion of industrial workers. And, virtually all of the historically Protestant societies (e.g., West Germany, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland) rank higher on both the traditional-secular rational dimension and the survival/self-expression dimension than do the historically Roman Catholic societies. All four of the Confucian-influenced societies (China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan) have relatively secular values, constituting a Confucian cultural zone, despite substantial differences in wealth. As Huntington claimed, the Orthodox societies constitute another distinct cultural zone. A society’s religious and colonial heritage seem to have had an enduring impact on the contemporary value systems of the 80 societies. But a society’s culture reflects its entire historical heritage. A central historical event of the twentieth century was the rise and fall of a Communist empire that once ruled one-third of the world’s population. Communism

20 • Ronald Inglehart

left a clear imprint on the value systems of those who lived under it. East Germany remains culturally close to West Germany despite four decades of Communist rule, but its value system has been drawn toward the Communist zone. And, although China is a member of the Confucian zone, it also falls within a broad Communist-influenced zone. Similarly, Azerbaijan, though part of an Islamic cluster, also falls within the Communist superzone that dominated it for decades. Changes in GNP and occupational structure have important influences on prevailing world views, but traditional cultural influences persist. The ex-communist societies of Central and Eastern Europe all fall into the upper left-hand quadrant of our cultural map, ranking high on the Traditional/secular-rational dimension (toward the secular pole), but low on the Survival/self expression dimension (falling near the survivaloriented pole). A broken line encircles all of the societies that have experienced Communist rule, and, although they overlap with several different cultural traditions, they form a reasonably coherent group. Although by no means the poorest countries in the world, many Central and Eastern Europe societies have recently experienced the collapse of Communism, shattering their economic, political and social systems and bringing a pervasive sense of insecurity. Thus, Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova rank lowest of any countries on earth on the Survival/Selfexpression dimension, exhibiting lower levels of subjective well-being than much poorer countries such as India, Bangladesh, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Pakistan. People who have experienced stable poverty throughout their lives tend to emphasize survival values, but those who have experienced the collapse of their social system (and may, as in Russia, currently have living standards and life expectancies far below where they were 15 years ago) experience a sense of unpredictability and insecurity that leads them to emphasize Survival values even more heavily than those who are accustomed to an even lower standard of living. Not surprisingly, Communist rule seems conducive to the emergence of a relatively secular-rational culture: the ex-Communist countries in general, and those that were members of the Soviet Union in particular (and thus experienced communist rule for seven decades, rather then merely four decades), rank higher on secular-rational values than noncommunist countries. And, to an equally striking extent, ex-communist countries in general, and former Soviet countries in particular, tend to emphasize survival values far more heavily than societies that have not experienced communist rule. Thus, as Inglehart and Baker (2000) demonstrate with multiple regression analysis, even when we control for level of economic development and other factors, a history of Communist rule continues to account for a significant share of the cross-cultural variance in basic values (with

Mapping Global Values • 21

seven decades of Communist rule having more impact than four decades). But, by comparison with societies historically shaped by a Roman Catholic or Protestant cultural tradition, an Orthodox tradition seems to reduce emphasis on Self-expression values. A society’s position on the Survival/Self-expression values dimension has important political implications; as we will see, it is strongly linked with its level of democracy. Individualism, Autonomy and Self-expression Values As Tables 1, 2 and 3 demonstrated, the two main dimensions of crosscultural variation tap a wide range of beliefs and attitudes. But their ramifications go farther still; the Survival/Self-expression values dimension taps a concept of major interest to psychologists, although they refer to it as individualism. The broad distinction between individualism and collectivism is a central theme in psychological research on cross-cultural differences. Hofstede (1980) defined individualism as a focus on rights above duties, a concern for oneself and immediate family, an emphasis on personal autonomy and self-fulfillment, and a basing of identity on one’s personal accomplishments. Hofstede developed a survey instrument that measured individualism/collectivism among IBM employees in more than 40 societies. More recently, individualism has been measured cross-nationally by Triandis (1989, 2001, and 2003). Schwartz (1992, 1994, and 2003) measured the related concept of autonomy/embeddedness among students and teachers in scores of countries. As we will demonstrate, individualismcollectivism as measured by Hofstede and Triandis, and autonomy/ embeddness as measured by Schwartz, seem to tap the same dimension of cross-cultural variation as Survival/Self-expression values; they all reflect the extent to which a given society emphasizes autonomous human choice. Individualism/collectivism, autonomy/embeddedness and survival/ self-expression values are all linked with the process of human development, which moves toward diminishing constraints on human choice (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Self-expression values are defined in very similar terms to Hofstede’s emphasis on personal autonomy and self-fulfillment as core elements of individualism. Similarly, Schwartz’s emphasis on intellectual autonomy and affective autonomy captures core elements of self-expression values. All of these variables reflect a common theme: an emphasis on free choice. The core principle of collectivism is that groups bind and mutually obligate individuals. In collectivist societies, social units have a common fate and common goals; the personal is simply a component of the social,

22 • Ronald Inglehart

making the in-group crucial. Collectivism implies that group membership is a central aspect of identity, and sacrificing individual goals for the common good is strongly emphasized. Collectivism further implies that fulfillment comes from carrying out externally defined obligations, making people focus on meeting others’ expectations. Accordingly, emotional self-restraint is valued to ensure harmony, even at the cost of one’s own happiness. In collectivist societies, social context is prominent in people’s perceptions and causal reasoning, and meaning is contextualized. Finally, collectivism implies that important group memberships are seen as fixed facts of life, toward which people have no choice; they must accommodate. Boundaries between in-groups and outgroups are stable, relatively impermeable, and important; exchanges are based on mutual obligations and patriarchal ties. Today, empirical measures of individualism, autonomy and self-expression values are available from many societies, and it turns out that they all tap a common dimension of cross-cultural variation, reflecting an emphasis on autonomous human choice. The mean national scores on these three variables show are closely correlated, with an average strength of r = .66. As Table 4 demonstrates, factor analysis of the mean national scores from many countries reveals that individualism, autonomy and self-expression values all tap a single underlying dimension, which accounts for fully 78 percent of the cross- national variance. High levels of individualism go with high levels of autonomy and high levels of self-expression values. Hofstede’s, Schwartz’s, Triandis’ and Inglehart’s measures all tap cross-cultural variation in a common aspect of human psychology: the drive toward broader human choice. As the Values Surveys demonstrate, they also measure something that extends far beyond whether given cultures have an individualistic or collective outlook. Societies that rank high on self-expression tend to emphasize individual autonomy and the quality of life, rather than economic and Table 4 Self-expression Values and Individualism and Autonomy Scales tap a common dimension The Individualism/Autonomy/Self-expression Dimension: emphasis on autonomous choice (Principal Component Analysis) Inglehart, Survival vs. Self-expression values Hofstede, Individualism vs. Collectivism rankings Schwartz, Autonomy vs. Embeddedness, (mean of student/teacher samples)

Variance explained 78% .91 .87 .87

Mapping Global Values • 23

physical security. Their publics have relatively low levels of confidence in technology and scientific discoveries as the solution to human problems, and they are relatively likely to act to protect the environment. These societies also rank relatively high on gender equality, tolerance of gays, lesbians, foreigners and other outgroups; they show relatively high levels of subjective well-being, and interpersonal trust, and they emphasize imagination and tolerance, as important things to teach a child. But individualism, autonomy and self-expression are not static characteristics of societies. They change with the course of socioeconomic development. As we have seen, socioeconomic development brings rising levels of existential security (especially in its post-industrial phase), which leads to an increasing emphasis on individualism, autonomy and self-expression. Birch and Cobb (1981) view this process as reflecting an evolutionary trend towards the “liberation of life.” Inglehart and Welzel (2005) describe it as a process of human development in which the most distinctively human ability – the ability to make autonomous choices, instead of following biologically and socially predetermined behavior – becomes an increasingly central feature of modern societies. As we will see, this syndrome of individualism, autonomy, and self-expression is conducive to the emergence and survival of democratic institutions. The common dimension underlying individualism, autonomy and selfexpression is remarkably robust. It emerges even when one uses different measurement approaches, different types of samples, and different time periods. Hofstede found it in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when analyzing the values of a cross-national sample of IBM employees. Schwartz measured it in surveys of students and teachers carried out from 1988 to 2002; and Inglehart first found it in an analysis of representative national samples of the publics of 43 societies surveyed in 1989-91, with the same dimension emerging in successive cross-national surveys in 1995 and in 2000. This dimension seems to be an enduring feature of crosscultural variation, to such an extent that one might almost conclude that it is difficult to avoid finding it if one measures the basic values of a broad range of societies. Individualism, Autonomy and Self-expression as Evolving Phenomena Most cultural-psychological theories have treated the individualismcollectivism polarity as a static attribute of given cultures, overlooking the possibility that individualist and collectivist orientations reflect a society’s socioeconomic conditions at a given time. Our theory holds that the extent to which Self-expression values (or individualism) prevail over

24 • Ronald Inglehart

Survival values (or collectivism) reflects a society’s level of development; as external constraints on human choice recede, people (and societies) place increasing emphasis on self-expression values or individualism. This pattern is not culture-specific. It is universal. The most fundamental external constraint on human choice is the extent to which physical survival is secure or insecure. Throughout most of history, survival has been precarious for most people. Most children did not survive to adulthood, and malnutrition and associated diseases were the leading cause of death. This is remote from the experience of Western publics today, but existential insecurity is still the dominant reality in most of the world. Under such conditions, Survival values take top priority. Survival is such a fundamental goal that, if it seems uncertain, one’s entire life strategy is shaped by that fact. Low levels of socioeconomic development not only impose material constraints on people’s choices; they also are linked with low levels of education and information. This intellectual poverty imposes cognitive constraints on people’s choices. Finally, in the absence of the welfare state, strong group obligations are the only form of social insurance, imposing social constraints on people’s choices. In recent history, a growing number of societies have attained unprecedented levels of economic development. Diminishing material, cognitive and social constraints on human choice are bringing a shift from emphasis on Survival values to emphasis on Self-expression values, and from a collective focus to an individual one. People’s sense of human autonomy becomes stronger as objective existential constraints on human choice recede. As will be seen, this has important societal consequences. Mass emphasis on human choice tends to favor the political system that provides the widest room for choice: democracy. Economic Development and Cultural Change Because our two main dimensions of cross-cultural variation – Traditional/ Secular-rational values and Survival/Self-expression values – are linked with economic development, we find pervasive differences between the worldviews of people in rich and poor societies. Moreover, time series evidence shows that, with economic development, societies tend to move from the values prevailing in low-income societies toward greater emphasis on secular-rational and self-expression values (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). These changes largely reflect a process of intergenerational value change. Throughout advanced industrial societies, the young emphasize

Mapping Global Values • 25

self-expression values and secular-rational values more strongly than the old. Cohort analysis indicates that the distinctive values of younger cohorts are stable characteristics that persist as they age. Consequently, as younger birth cohorts replace older ones in the adult population, the society’s prevailing values change in a roughly predictable direction. The unprecedented level of economic development during the past several decades, coupled with the emergence of the welfare state in advanced societies, means that an increasing share of the population has grown up taking survival for granted. Thus, priorities have shifted from an overwhelming emphasis on economic and physical security toward an increasing emphasis on subjective well-being, self-expression and quality of life. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) demonstrate that orientations have shifted from Traditional toward Secular-rational values, and from Survival values toward Self-expression values in almost all advanced industrial societies that have experienced economic growth. The Societal Impact of Changing Values Evidence from the Values Surveys demonstrates that people’s orientations concerning religion, politics, gender roles, work motivations, and sexual norms are evolving, – along with their attitudes toward childrearing, their tolerance of foreigners, gays and lesbians, and their attitudes toward science and technology (Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Figure 2 provides one example, showing the percentage of respondents saying that homosexuality is “Never” justifiable. The respondents were shown a ten-point scale, on which point 1 means that homosexuality is never justifiable, and point 10 means that it is always justifiable, with the eight intermediate points indicating intermediate positions. As this figure demonstrates, in 1981 about half of those surveyed in five Western countries took the extreme negative position, placing themselves at point 1 on the scale (the publics of developing countries being even less tolerant of homosexuality). However, attitudes changed substantially in subsequent years. By the 2000 survey, only about 25 percent of the West Europeans, and 32 percent of the Americans took this position. Although attitudes toward homosexuality show a .86 stability correlation across the two most recent waves of the WVS, sizeable changes are occurring; most countries were changing, but their relative positions remained surprisingly stable, reflecting an underlying component of continuity within given generations. Thus, change is occurring largely through intergenerational population replacement. The cumulative effect of changing attitudes in this field has led to recent societal-level changes, such as the legalization of same-sex marriages

26 • Ronald Inglehart

Figure 2 Changes in the percentage saying that homosexuality is never justifiable, in Britain, France, Germany Italy, and the U.S., from 1981 to 2000 70 60 50 1981 1990 1995 2000

40 30 20 10 0 W. Europe

U.S.

in some countries and certain cities in the U.S. This, in turn, mobilized a strong reaction by people with traditional values and referenda seeking to ban same-sex marriage, giving rise to widespread belief that the U.S. public in general is becoming increasingly hostile to gays and lesbians; the opposite is true. The basic values of individuals are changing, and these changes have a major impact on a wide range of important societal-level phenomena. They are reshaping the extent to which given societies have objective gender equality in political, social and economic life, as well as human fertility rates, the role of religion, legislation concerning the rights of gays and lesbians, and environmental protection laws. Changing individuallevel values also seem to have a major influence on the extent to which a society has good governance, and the emergence and flourishing of democratic institutions. Self-expression Values and Democracy A society’s position on the survival/self-expression index is strongly correlated with its level of democracy, as indicated by its scores on the Freedom House ratings of political rights and civil liberties. This relationship is remarkably powerful, and it is clearly not a methodological artifact, since the two variables are measured at different levels and come from entirely different sources. Virtually all of the societies that rank high on Survival/Self-expression values are stable democracies. Virtually all of the societies that rank low on this dimension have authoritarian

Mapping Global Values • 27

governments. We find a correlation of .83 between survival/self-expression values and democracy; this is significant at a very high level, and seems to reflect a causal linkage (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, articles 7 and 8). The Freedom House measures are limited by the fact that they only measure the extent to which civil and political liberties are institutionalized, which does not necessarily reflect the extent to which these liberties are actually respected by political elites. Some very important recent literature has emphasized the importance of the distinction between formal democracy and genuine liberal democracy (Ottaway, 2003; O’Donnell, Vargas Cullel and Iazzetta [eds.], 2004). In order to tap the latter, we need a measure of “effective democracy” which reflects not only the extent to which formal civil and political liberties are institutionalized, but also measures the extent to which these liberties are actually practiced, thus indicating how much free choice people really have in their lives. To construct such an index of effective democracy, we multiply the Freedom House measures of civil and political rights by the World Bank’s anti-corruption scores (Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2003), which we see as an indicator of “elite integrity,” or the extent to which state power actually follows legal norms (see Inglehart and Welzel, 2005 for a more detailed discussion of this index). When we examine the linkage between this measure of genuine democracy and mass self-expression values, we find an amazingly strong correlation of r = .90 across 73 nations. This reflects a powerful cross-level linkage, connecting mass values that emphasize free choice, and the extent to which societal institutions actually provide free choice. Figure 3 depicts the relationship between this index of effective democracy and mass self-expression values. The extent to which self-expression values are present in a society explains over 80 percent of the crossnational variance in the extent to which liberal democracy is actually practiced. These findings suggest that the importance of the linkage between individual-level values and democratic institutions has been underestimated. Mass preferences play a crucial role in the emergence of genuine democracy (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). The linkage between mass self-expression values and democratic institutions is remarkably strong and consistent, having only a few outliers: such countries as China, Iran and Vietnam show lower levels of democracy than their publics’ values would predict. These countries have authoritarian regimes that are under growing societal pressure to liberalize, and we expect that they will liberalize within the next 15 to 20 years. Authoritarian rulers of some Asian societies have argued that the distinctive “Asian values” of these societies make them unsuitable for democracy (Lee and Zakaria, 1994; Thompson, 2000). But, in fact, the position

28 • Ronald Inglehart

Figure 3 Self-expression values and Effective Democracy. From Inglehart and Welzel, 2005 HIGH 105

Finland

100 95

Level of Effective Democracy (2000-2002)

Sweden

Iceland

Netherld.

Switzerld. Canada

90

Austria

85

Norway U.S.A.

Australia

G.B. Ireland Germany (E.) Germany (W.)

80 75

Portugal

70

Spain

France

Japan

Chile

Belgium

65 Slovenia

Israel

60 Taiwan

55

Uruguay

Estonia

Italy

Hungary

South Africa Czech R. Slovakia Poland

50 45

South Korea

40

Lithuania

Latvia

35

Bulgaria

Croatia Dominican R.

30

India

Peru Brazil

El Salvad.

Romania

25 20

Philippines Argentina

Jordan Moldova Albania

15

Bangladesh Georgia Algeria Tanzania Pakistan

10 5

LOW

New Zeald.

Denmark

Zimbabwe

0 5

10

Azerbaij

15

Mexico

Turkey Yugoslavia Venezuela

r = .90***

Nigeria Egypt Indonesia China Belarus Uganda Iran

<

Russia

Vietnam 20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

Percent Emphasizing Self-expression Values (mid 1990s)

60

65

70

+

of most Asian countries on Figure 5 is about what their level of socioeconomic development would predict. Japan ranks with the established Western democracies, both on the self-expression values dimension, and on its level of democracy. The positions of Taiwan and South Korea on both dimensions is similar to those of other relatively new democracies such as Hungary or Poland. The publics of Confucian societies are more supportive of democracy than is generally believed. Which comes first – a democratic political culture or democratic institutions? The extent to which people emphasize self-expression values is closely linked with the flourishing of democratic institutions. But what causes what? I have argued that economic development interacts with a society’s cultural heritage, so that high levels of development (linked with the rise of the knowledge society) bring growing emphasis on Self-expression values, which produce strong mass demands for liberalization and democratic institutions. The reverse interpretation would be that democratic

Mapping Global Values • 29

institutions give rise to the self-expression values that are so closely linked with them. In other words, democracy makes people healthy, happy, non-sexist, tolerant and trusting, and instills Post-materialist values. This interpretation is appealing, and, if it were true, it would provide a powerful argument for democracy, implying that we have a quick fix for most of the world’s problems: adopt democratic institutions and live happily ever after. Unfortunately, the experience of the Soviet Union’s successor states does not support this interpretation. Since their dramatic move toward democracy in 1991, they have not become healthier, happier, more trusting, more tolerant or more Postmaterialist: most of them have moved in exactly the opposite direction. The fact that their people are living in economic and physical insecurity seems to have more impact than the fact that their leaders are chosen by reasonably free elections. Moreover, the World Values Survey demonstrate that growing emphasis on self-expression values emerged through a process of inter-generational change within the authoritarian communist regimes; democratic regimes do not necessarily produce self-expression values, and self-expression values can emerge even within authoritarian regimes if they produce rising levels of existential security. Democratic institutions do not automatically produce a culture that emphasizes self-expression values. Instead, it seems that economic development gradually leads to social and cultural changes that make democratic institutions more likely to survive and flourish. That would help explain why mass democracy did not emerge until a relatively recent point in history, and why, even now, it is most likely to be found in economically more developed countries – in particular, those that emphasize self-expression values over survival values. During the past few decades, most industrialized societies have moved toward increasing emphasis on Self-expression values, in an intergenerational cultural shift linked with economic development. In the long run, the process of intergenerational population replacement tends to make these values more widespread. The flourishing of democratic institutions is also contingent on economic development and political stability, but, other things being equal, the inter-generational shift toward increasing emphasis on Self-expression values produces growing mass pressures in favor of democracy. Conclusion Modernization is not linear. It goes through various phases, each of which brings distinctive changes in people’s worldviews. The Industrial

30 • Ronald Inglehart

Revolution was linked with a shift from traditional to secular-rational values, bringing the secularization of authority. In the post-industrial phase of modernization, another cultural change becomes dominant: a shift from survival values to self-expression values, which brings increasing emancipation from authority. Rising self-expression values makes democracy increasingly likely to emerge – indeed, beyond a certain point it becomes increasingly difficult to avoid democratization. Cross-cultural variation is surprisingly coherent, and a wide range of attitudes (reflecting people’s beliefs and values in such different life domains as the family, work, religion, environment, politics and sexual behavior) reflect just two major underlying dimensions: one that taps the polarization between traditional values and secular-rational values, and a second dimension that taps the polarization between survival values and self-expression values. The world’s societies cluster into relatively homogenous cultural zones, reflecting their historical heritage, and these cultural zones persist robustly over time. Although the desire for freedom is a universal human aspiration, it does not take top priority when people grow up with the feeling that survival is uncertain. But, when survival seems secure, increasing emphasis on self-expression values makes the emergence of democracy increasingly likely where it does not yet exist, and makes democracy increasingly effective where it already exists. Conversely, adopting democratic institutions does not automatically make self-expression values people’s top priority. These values emerge when socioeconomic development gives rise to a subjective sense of existential security. This can occur under either democratic or authoritarian institutions, and, when it does, it generates mass demands for democracy. We find that when socioeconomic development reaches the post-industrial phase, it produces a rising emphasis on “self-expression values.” These values give high priority to the civil and political liberties that are central to democracy, so the cultural shift from emphasis on Survival values to Self-expression values is inherently conducive to democracy. The powerful correlation shown in Figure 3 reflects a causal process in which economic development gives rise to increasing emphasis on selfexpression values, which in turn lead to the emergence and flourishing of democratic institutions. Demonstrating that the rise of self-expression values is conducive to democracy, rather than the other way around, requires a complex empirical analysis that I will not present here since it appears in Inglehart and Welzel (2005). Analysis of data from scores of societies reveals two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation: a Traditional/Secular-Rational values dimen-

Mapping Global Values • 31

sion and a Survival/Self-expression values dimension. These dimensions are deep-rooted aspects of cross-cultural variation, and they make it possible to map the position of any society on a two-dimensional map that reflects their relative positions. Despite their relative stability, gradual shifts are occurring along these dimensions, and they are transforming many aspects of society. One particularly important change stems from the fact that the shift from Survival values toward Self-expression values, makes democratic political institutions increasingly likely to emerge and flourish. References Birch, Charles and John B. Cobb Jr. 1981 The Liberation of Life: From the Cell to the Community. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Huntington, Samuel P. 1996 The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster. Hofstede, Geert 1980 Culture’s Consequences: Intentional Differences in Work-related Values. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Inglehart, Ronald 1997 Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne Baker 2000 “Modernization, Cultural Change and the Persistence of Traditional Values.” American Sociological Review (February):19-51. Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel 2005 Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi 2003 “Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002.” World Bank Policy Research Department Working Paper No. 2195, Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Lee, Kuan Yew and Fareed Zakaria 1994 “Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew.” Foreign Affairs 73 (2): 109-26. Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart 2004 Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. O’Donnell, Guillermo, Jorge Vargas Cullel and Osvaldo Miguel Iazzetta (eds.) 2004 The Quality of Democracy: Theory and Applications. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Ottaway, Marina 2003 Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

32 • Ronald Inglehart Schwartz, Shlalom H. 1992 “Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries.” In Mark P. Zanna (ed.): Advances in Social Psychology. New York: Academic Press. 1-65. 1994 “Beyond Individualism/Collectivism: New Cultural Dimensions of Values.” In U. Kim, H.C. Triandis, C. Kagitcibasi, S-C. Choi, & G. Yoon (eds.), Individualism and Collectivism: Theory, Method and Applications. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 85-119. 2003 “Mapping and Interpreting Cultural Differences around the World.” in Henk Vinken, Joseph Soeters, and Peter Ester (eds.), Comparing Cultures, Dimensions of Culture in a Comparative Perspective. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. Thompson, John B. 2000 “The Survival of Asian Values as ‘Zivilisationskritik’.” Theory and Society 29: 651-86. Triandis, Harry C. 1989 “The Self and Social Behavior in Differing Cultural Contexts.” Psychological Review 96: 506-20. 1995 Individualism and Collectivism. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 2001 Individualism and Collectivism. In D. Matsumoto (ed.) Handbook of CrossCultural Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press. 2003 “Dimensions of Culture Beyond Hofstede.” In Henk Vinken, Joseph Soeters, and Peter Ester (eds.), Comparing Cultures, Dimensions of Culture in a Comparative Perspective. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. Weber, Max 1904 The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. [original, 1904-1905; English 1958 translation, 1958]. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications Shalom H. Schwartz1 Abstract This article presents a theory of seven cultural value orientations that form three cultural value dimensions. This theory permits more finely tuned characterization of cultures than other theories. It is distinctive in deriving the cultural orientations from a priori theorizing. It also specifies a coherent, integrated system of relations among the orientations, postulating that they are interdependent rather than orthogonal. Analyses of data from 73 countries, using two different instruments, validate the 7 cultural orientations and the structure of interrelations among them. Conceptual and empirical comparisons of these orientations with Inglehart’s two dimensions clarify similarities and differences. Using the cultural orientations, I generate a worldwide empirical mapping of 76 national cultures that identifies 7 transnational cultural groupings: West European, English-speaking, Latin American, East European, South Asian, Confucian influenced, and African and Middle Eastern. I briefly discuss distinctive cultural characteristics of these groupings. I then examine examples of socioeconomic, political, and demographic factors that give rise to national differences on the cultural value dimensions, factors that are themselves reciprocally influenced by culture. Finally, I examine consequences of prevailing cultural value orientations for

1

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This research was supported by Israel Science Foundation Grant No. 921/02-1.

34 • Shalom H. Schwartz

attitudes and behavior (e.g., conventional morality, opposition to immigration, political activism) and argue that culture mediates the effects of major social structural variables on them.

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications Recent years have seen the emergence of several theories and instruments for mapping and comparing national cultures. Interestingly, the main theories have emerged from different disciplines. Hofstede developed his theory of work values (e.g., 1980, 2001) to make sense of data gathered for purposes of management by IBM. The four and later five dimensions he derived to compare country cultures have been widely applied in the fields of business and management. Inglehart developed his theory of materialism-postmaterialism (e.g., 1977, 1990), which he later refined to include two dimensions (e.g., 1997, Inglehart & Baker, 2000), in order to address issues in political science and sociology about the effects of modernization. My own theory emerged later than these two (Schwartz, 1994b, 1999, 2004) out of my studies of individual differences in value priorities and their effects on attitudes and behavior, a sub-field of social psychology. This article presents my theory of seven cultural value orientations that form three cultural value dimensions. At the cost of greater complexity than the other theories, this theory permits more finely tuned characterization of cultures. To validate the theory, I present analyses of data from 73 countries, using two different instruments. Conceptual and empirical comparisons of the cultural value orientations with Inglehart’s two dimensions clarify their similarities and differences. Using the seven validated cultural orientations, I generate a worldwide map of national cultures that identifies distinctive cultural regions. The article then addresses the question of the antecedents that give rise to national differences on the cultural value dimensions. Finally, it examines some consequences of prevailing cultural value orientations on attitudes and behavior within countries. The approach presented here is distinctive in deriving the seven cultural orientations from a priori theorizing and then testing the fit of these orientations to empirical data. Moreover, the a priori theorizing specified a coherent, integrated system of relations among the orientations, which was then tested. Cultural Orientations – Basic Assumptions I view culture as the rich complex of meanings, beliefs, practices, symbols, norms, and values prevalent among people in a society. The prevailing

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 35

value emphases in a society may be the most central feature of culture (Hofstede, 1980; Inglehart, 1977; Schwartz, 1999; Weber, 1958; Williams, 1958). These value emphases express shared conceptions of what is good and desirable in the culture, the cultural ideals. Cultural value emphases shape and justify individual and group beliefs, actions, and goals. Institutional arrangements and policies, norms, and everyday practices express underlying cultural value emphases in societies. For example, a cultural value emphasis on success and ambition may be reflected in and promote highly competitive economic systems, confrontational legal systems, and child-rearing practices that pressure children to achieve. The preference element in cultural value orientations – values as ideals – promotes coherence among the various aspects of culture. Because prevailing cultural value orientations represent ideals, aspects of culture that are incompatible with them are likely to generate tension and to elicit criticism and pressure to change. In a society whose cultural value orientations emphasize collective responsibility, for example, a firm that fires long-term employees in the interests of profitability is likely to elicit widespread criticism and pressure to change policies. Of course, cultures are not fully coherent. In addition to a dominant culture, subgroups within societies espouse conflicting value emphases. The dominant cultural orientation changes in response to shifting power relations among these subgroups. But change is slow. Another important feature of cultural value orientations is that they are relatively stable (Hofstede, 2001; Schwartz, Bardi & Bianchi, 2000). Some researchers argue that elements of culture persist over hundreds of years (e.g., Kohn & Schooler, 1983; Putnam, 1993). Yet, cultural value orientations do change gradually. Societal adaptation to epidemics, technological advances, increasing wealth, contact with other cultures, and other exogenous factors leads to changes in cultural value emphases. Culture joins with social structure, history, demography, and ecology in complex reciprocal relations that influence every aspect of how we live. But culture is difficult to measure. To reveal the cultural orientations in a society, we could look at the themes of children’s stories, at the systems of law, at the ways economic exchange is organized, or at socialization practices. These indirect indexes of underlying orientations in the prevailing culture each describe a narrow aspect of the culture. When researchers try to identify culture by studying the literature of a society or its legal, economic, family, or governance systems, what they seek, implicitly or explicitly, are underlying value emphases (Weber, 1958; Williams, 1968). Therefore, studying value emphases directly is an especially efficient way to capture and characterize cultures.

36 • Shalom H. Schwartz

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations Cultural value orientations evolve as societies confront basic issues or problems in regulating human activity. People must recognize these problems, plan responses to them, and motivate one another to cope with them. The ways that societies respond to these basic issues or problems can be used to identify dimensions on which cultures may differ from one another. The cultural value orientations at the poles of these dimensions are Weberian ideal-types. I derived value dimensions for comparing cultures by considering three of the critical issues that confront all societies. The first issue is the nature of the relation or the boundaries between the person and the group: To what extent are people autonomous vs. embedded in their groups? I label the polar locations on this cultural dimension autonomy versus embeddedness. In autonomy cultures, people are viewed as autonomous, bounded entities. They should cultivate and express their own preferences, feelings, ideas, and abilities, and find meaning in their own uniqueness. There are two types of autonomy: Intellectual autonomy encourages individuals to pursue their own ideas and intellectual directions independently. Examples of important values in such cultures include broadmindedness, curiosity, and creativity. Affective autonomy encourages individuals to pursue affectively positive experience for themselves. Important values include pleasure, exciting life, and varied life. In cultures with an emphasis on embeddedness, people are viewed as entities embedded in the collectivity. Meaning in life comes largely through social relationships, through identifying with the group, participating in its shared way of life, and striving toward its shared goals. Embedded cultures emphasize maintaining the status quo and restraining actions that might disrupt in-group solidarity or the traditional order. Important values in such cultures are social order, respect for tradition, security, obedience, and wisdom. The second societal problem is to guarantee that people behave in a responsible manner that preserves the social fabric. That is, people must engage in the productive work necessary to maintain society rather than compete destructively or withhold their efforts. People must be induced to consider the welfare of others, to coordinate with them, and thereby manage their unavoidable interdependencies. The polar solution labeled cultural egalitarianism seeks to induce people to recognize one another as moral equals who share basic interests as human beings. People are socialized to internalize a commitment to cooperate and to feel concern for everyone’s welfare. They are expected to act for the benefit of others

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 37

as a matter of choice. Important values in such cultures include equality, social justice, responsibility, help, and honesty. The polar alternative labeled cultural hierarchy relies on hierarchical systems of ascribed roles to insure responsible, productive behavior. It defines the unequal distribution of power, roles, and resources as legitimate. People are socialized to take the hierarchical distribution of roles for granted and to comply with the obligations and rules attached to their roles. Values like social power, authority, humility, and wealth are highly important in hierarchical cultures. The third societal problem is to regulate how people manage their relations to the natural and social world. The cultural response to this problem labeled harmony emphasizes fitting into the world as it is, trying to understand and appreciate rather than to change, direct, or to exploit. Important values in harmony cultures include world at peace, unity with nature, and protecting the environment. Mastery is the polar cultural response to this problem. It encourages active self-assertion in order to master, direct, and change the natural and social environment to attain group or personal goals. Values such as ambition, success, daring, and competence are especially important in mastery cultures. In sum, the theory specifies three bipolar dimensions of culture that represent alternative resolutions to each of three problems that confront all societies: embeddedness versus autonomy, hierarchy versus egalitarianism, and mastery versus harmony (see Figure 1). A societal emphasis on the cultural type at one pole of a dimension typically accompanies a de-emphasis on the polar type, with which it tends to conflict. Thus, as we will see below, American culture tends to emphasize mastery and affective autonomy and to give little emphasis to harmony. And the culture in Singapore emphasizes hierarchy but not egalitarianism and intellectual autonomy. The cultural value orientations are also interrelated based on compatibility among them. That is, because certain orientations share assumptions, it is easier to affirm and act on them simultaneously in a culture. For example, egalitarianism and intellectual autonomy share the assumption that people can and should take individual responsibility for their actions and make decisions based on their own personal understanding of situations. And high egalitarianism and intellectual autonomy usually appear together, as in Western Europe. Embeddedness and hierarchy share the assumption that a person’s roles in and obligations to collectivities are more important than her unique ideas and aspirations. And embeddedness and hierarchy are both high in the Southeast Asian cultures I have studied.

38 • Shalom H. Schwartz

Figure 1 Cultural Dimensions: Prototypical Structure

HARMONY Unity With Nature World at Peace

EGALITARIANISM Social Justice Equality

EMBEDDEDNESS Social Order, Obedience Respect for Tradition

INTELLECTUAL AUTONOMY

HIERARCHY

Broadmindedness Curiosity

Authority Humble

AFFECTIVE AUTONOMY

MASTERY Ambition Daring

Pleasure

The shared and opposing assumptions inherent in cultural values yield a coherent circular structure of relations among them. The structure reflects the cultural orientations that are compatible (adjacent in the circle) or incompatible (distant around the circle). This view of cultural dimensions as forming an integrated, non-orthogonal system, distinguishes my approach from others. Hofstede (1980, 2001) conceptualized his dimensions as independent. He assessed them as orthogonal factors. Inglehart (1997) derived his orthogonal dimensions empirically from a factor analysis of nation-level correlations among numerous attitudes and beliefs. Measuring Cultural Value Orientations I assume that the average value priorities of societal members point to the underlying cultural emphases to which they are exposed (Schwartz, 2004). Like Hofstede (2001) and Inglehart (1997), I therefore infer the cultural value orientations that characterize societies by averaging the

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 39

value priorities of individuals in matched samples from each society. My measurement of value priorities differs from that prevalent in survey research, however. I focus on basic values. Consensus regarding how to conceptualize basic values has emerged gradually since the 1950’s. It includes six main features (explicated more fully in Schwartz, 2005a): (1) Values are beliefs that are linked inextricably to affect. (2) Values refer to desirable goals that motivate action. (3) Values transcend specific actions and situations (e.g., obedience and honesty are values that are relevant at work or in school, in sports, business, and politics, with family, friends, or strangers). This feature distinguishes values from narrower concepts like norms and attitudes that usually refer to specific actions, objects, or situations. (4) Values serve as standards or criteria that guide the selection or evaluation of actions, policies, people, and events. (5) Values are ordered by importance relative to one another to form a system of priorities. This hierarchical feature also distinguishes values from norms and attitudes. (6) The relative importance of values guides action. The tradeoff among relevant, competing values is what guides attitudes and behaviors (Schwartz, 1992, 1996; Tetlock, 1986). Implicitly, most survey researchers hold conceptions of values close to this one. Unlike the method I adopt below, however, many of the value items used in survey research are inconsistent with some of these features. The items often refer to specific situations or domains. They do not measure ‘basic’ values in the sense of values that are relevant across virtually all situations. This affects value priorities. Consider the item ‘giving people more say in important government decisions’. Support for or opposition to the current government influences the importance respondents attribute to this goal (Israeli data from 1999). The meaning of such items depends on the interaction between people’s ‘basic’ values and the context and domain in which the items are measured. Researchers often combine responses to items from a number of specific domains in order to infer underlying, trans-situational values (e.g., materialism). But, because situation-specific items are sensitive to prevailing socio-political conditions, the choice of items may still substantially influence both group and individual-level priorities (e.g., Clarke, et al., 1999). Contrary to features 5 and 6, many survey items do not measure values in terms of importance. Instead, they present attitude or opinion statements and employ agree-disagree, approve-disapprove, or other evaluative response scales. The researcher may then try to infer indirectly the importance of the values presumed to underlie these attitudes or

40 • Shalom H. Schwartz

opinions. But multiple values may underlie any given attitude or opinion. Hence, it is hazardous to infer basic value priorities from responses to specific attitude and opinion items. In order to discover basic values with this approach, one must ask numerous questions across many domains of content. One then searches for underlying consistencies of response that may or may not be present. Such an approach requires many items and may not discern clear sets of basic value priorities. Inglehart adopted this approach in deriving his two updated dimensions of culture. He describes the tradition/secular-rational dimension, for example, as centrally concerned with orientations toward authority (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). He bases this on five items that load together in a factor analysis (importance of God, importance of obedience and religious faith for children, justifiability of abortion, sense of national pride, and attitude toward respect for authority). The secular/rational pole of this orientation is not measured directly. It is inferred from responses that reject these five items. The two items that load most strongly on this factor both concern religion. The broader meaning of this dimension is inferred from the correlations of the five-item index with various beliefs and attitudes. The meaning of such dimensions, derived by inference from correlations among diverse items rather than clearly defined and operationalized a priori, is necessarily loose. To operationalize the value priorities of individuals, in one set of studies, I used the Schwartz Value Survey that includes 56 or 57 value items (SVS: Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004). These abstract items (e.g., social justice, humility, creativity, social order, pleasure, ambition) are each followed in parenthesis by a phrase that further specifies their meaning. Respondents rate the importance of each “as a guiding principle in MY life.” Respondents from cultural groups on every inhabited continent have completed the survey, anonymously, in their native language (N > 75,000).2 This survey is intended to include all the motivationally distinct values likely to be recognized across cultures, a claim for which there is growing evidence (Schwartz, 2005a). Values whose meanings differ across cultures should not be used in cross-cultural comparison. Otherwise, group differences might reflect the fact that different concepts are measured in each group. Separate multidimensional scaling analyses of the value items within each of 66 countries established that 45 of the items have reasonably equivalent meanings in each country (Schwartz, 1994a, 1999; Fontaine, et al., 2005). To test

2

I am indebted to over 100 collaborators for their aid in gathering the data.

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 41

the theory, I specified in advance a set of three to eight value items expected to represent each of the seven cultural orientations. Data from representative national samples in 20 countries, gathered as part of the European Social Survey (2002-3), provided a second test of the theory. This survey includes a 21-items short version of the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ: Schwartz, et al., 2001; Schwartz, 2003, 2005b, 2006) designed to measure basic individual values. Each portrait describes a person’s goals, aspirations, or wishes that point implicitly to the importance of a value. For example, “Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to her. She likes to do things in her own original way.” Regarding each portrait, respondents answer: “How much like you is this person?” Respondents’ own values are inferred from their self-reported similarity to people described implicitly in terms of particular values. Within-country analyses in each country confirmed reasonable meaning equivalence across countries for all 21 items. To test the theory, I specified in advance items expected to represent the cultural orientations. Empirical Evaluation of the Theory of Cultural Value Orientations A first assessment of the validity of the seven cultural value orientations and the relations among them used SVS data gathered in 1988-2000. Participants were 80 samples of schoolteachers (k-12) from 58 national groups and 115 samples of college students from 64 national groups, together constituting 67 nations and 70 different cultural groups. Samples from ethnically heterogeneous nations came from the dominant, majority group. Most samples included between 180 and 280 respondents. For each sample, we computed the mean ratings of the 45 value items and then correlated items across samples. This treats the sample as the unit of analysis. The sample level correlations are statistically independent of the correlations across individuals within any sample. Thus, the analyses are at the sample (country) or culture level, not the individual level. Correlations between the sample means were used in a multidimensional scaling analysis (Borg & Lingoes, 1987; Guttman, 1968) to assess the presence of the seven cultural orientations and the relations among them. The 2-dimensional projection in Figure 2 portrays the pattern of intercorrelations among values, based on the sample means. Each value item is represented by a point such that the more positive the correlation between any pair of value items the closer they are in the space, and the less positive their correlation the more distant. Comparing Figure 2

42 • Shalom H. Schwartz

with Figure 1 reveals that the observed content and structure of cultural value orientations fully support the theorized content and structure. This analysis clearly discriminates the seven orientations: The value items selected a priori to represent each value orientation are located within a unique wedge-shaped region of the space.3 Equally important, the regions representing each orientation form the integrated cultural system postulated by the theory: They emanate from the center of the circle, follow the expected order around the circle, and form the poles of the three broad cultural dimensions. The second assessment of the theory of cultural value orientations used the 21-item PVQ data from the representative national samples of the ESS. To obtain a sufficient number of samples for a reliable Multidimensional Scaling Analysis, we split the 20 countries into 52 cultural groups, each with a minimum of 40 respondents.4 We computed group means for each item and correlated the items across the groups. Figure 3 presents the two dimensional projection of relations among the items. The observed content and structure of cultural value orientations in this figure again support the theorized content and structure fully. Because the ESS value scale has few items and was not designed to measure cultural orientations, only three or fewer items represent each orientation (except embeddedness with six). Nonetheless, there are seven distinguishable regions representing the seven orientations. The regions follow the expected order around the circle and form the three polar cultural dimensions. The score for each cultural value orientation in a country is the mean importance rating of the value items that represent it. Prior to computing these scores, we centered each individual respondent’s ratings of the value items on his/her mean rating of all of the items. This controls for individual as well as group biases in use of the response scales.5 In order to increase the reliability of country scores based on the SVS data, I combined the means of the teacher and student samples in the 52 countries in which both types of samples were available. In 21 countries, only either teacher or student data were available. For these countries, I estimated the missing sample means based on regression coefficients

3 One item, ‘accepting my portion in life,’ emerged in the egalitarianism region rather than in the expected harmony region which is adjacent. Its correlations with other items also failed to support an interpretation as a harmony value. We therefore dropped it from the analyses. 4 My thanks to Ariel Knafo for deriving these ethnic group samples. 5 Schwartz (1992; 2006) further explains how to perform the scale use correction and why it is necessary.

*CURIOUS

INTELLECTUAL AUTONOMY

*LOYAL

*SOCIAL JUSTICE

HELPFUL*

AFFECTIVE AUTONOMY

ENJOYING*LIFE

VARIED LIFE*

*WORLD OF BEAUTY

MASTERY

*DARING

INFLUENTIAL*

SOCIAL*RECOGNITION CHOOSING OWN GOALS*

*INDEPEDENT

*AUTHORITY

*SOCIAL POWER

*WEALTH

HIERARCHY

OBEDIENT* *MODERATE POLITENESS* *HONOR ELDERS NATIONAL *SECURITY CLEAN* *SELF *FAMILY DEVOUT* DISCIPLINE SECURITY *WISDOM *PROTECT MY PUBLIC IMAGE RECIPROCATION *OF FAVORS *HUMBLE

*SOCIAL ORDER

EMBEDDEDNESS

*RESPECT TRADITION *FORGIVING

*CAPABLE SUCCESSFUL* AMBITIOUS*

*WORLD AT PEACE

PLEASURE*

EXCITING LIFE

*CREATIVITY

*BROADMINDEDNESS *FREEDOM

*EQUALITY

RESPONSIBLE*

HONEST*

EGALITARIANISM

ACCEPT MY PORTION IN LIFE*

*PROTECT ENVIRONMENT *UNITY WITH NATURE

HARMONY

Figure 2 Cultural Level MDS-195 Samples, 70 Cultural Groups (Coefficient Alienation .18)

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 43

follow rules 7

HIERARCHY

tradition 20 wealth 2 successful 13 4 show abilities

8 understand listen

loyal 18 devoted

fun 21 pleasure

new 6 experiences

AFFECTIVE AUTONOMY

10 good time spoil self

free, own INTELLECTUAL 11decisions AUTONOMY creative 1 original

EGALITARIANISM

help others 12

equality 3 for all

HARMONY

risk 15 excitement

MASTERY

tell 17 others

state protect behave 14 properly 16 5 secure surroundings

EMBEDDEDNESS

inconspicuous modest 9

care for 19 nature

Figure 3 Cultural Level MDS-52 Cultural Groups from ESS (coefficient alienation .14)

44 • Shalom H. Schwartz

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 45

generated by regressing student and teacher means from the 52 countries where both were available on one another. For a lower-bound estimate of the adequacy of the combined teacherand student-based SVS scores for measuring cultural differences among societies, I correlated them with the scores based on 25 representative national or sub-national samples from the ESS. I refer to this as a ‘lowerbound’ estimate because of a set of methodological factors that would weaken any associations: The ESS scores are each based on very few items, as noted above, the ESS data were gathered an average of seven years later, the ESS and SVS methods of measurement differ greatly and, most important, the ESS countries come only from Europe plus Israel, thereby substantially restricting the range of scores on the cultural orientations. The observed Pearson correlations ranged from .45 (mastery) to .80 (intellectual autonomy), mean .63. In light of the methodological problems that weaken these correlations, this finding provides considerable support for the adequacy of the combined teacher- and student-based SVS scores for capturing cultural differences among whole societies Contrasting the Inglehart and Schwartz Dimensions Based on the European and World Value Surveys, Inglehart (e.g., Inglehart & Baker, 2000) extended his earlier work on materialism and post-materialism to propose two value dimensions on which to compare national cultures, tradition vs. secular-rational and survival vs. self-expression. This section discusses conceptual and empirical relations between these dimensions and the cultural orientations presented above. Inglehart derived scores on the two dimensions for 72 countries, 63 of which overlap with the countries I have studied with the SVS. Correlations between the Inglehart and Schwartz dimensions across these countries provide an empirical basis for assessing their similarities and differences. To further assess relations among the Inglehart and Schwartz dimensions, I used the scores on my dimensions derived from the PVQ21 in the ESS countries. I computed separate scores for East and West Germany because Inglehart has separate scores for these regions. These 21 groups vary less than the 63 countries in the SVS-based analyses both culturally and socially. Should both sets of analyses yield similar results, despite diverse samples and different methods, we can have confidence in their robustness. The tradition/secular-rational dimension centrally concerns orientations toward authority. It contrasts societies in which religion, nation, and family are highly important with those in which they are not so important. In traditional societies, children’s first duty is to their parents

46 • Shalom H. Schwartz

and parents are expected to sacrifice themselves for their children. Male dominance is the norm, absolute standards of morality prevail, and national pride is high. “Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite preferences on all of these topics” (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 25). The five-item index used to measure this dimension correlates highly with these beliefs and attitudes. The two items that load most strongly on the factor, however, both concern religious belief. This dimension overlaps conceptually with my autonomy/embeddedness dimension. Both concern the degree to which the individual is submerged in all-encompassing structures of tight mutual obligations. Inglehart’s description implies that, in traditional societies, people’s ties to their religious, national, and family groups are the source of meaning in their lives – a core aspect of embeddedness. The weakening of encompassing structures and of absolute standards in secular-rational societies frees individuals to think, do, and feel more independently – a core aspect of autonomy. Now consider correlations between the dimensions across 63 countries with the SVS measure of my dimensions and, in parentheses, across the 21 ESS countries with the PVQ21 measure. The tradition/secular-rational dimension correlates .60 (.51) with intellectual autonomy, .53 (.38) with affective autonomy, -.57 (-.33) with embeddedness, and .60 (.41) with the autonomy/embeddedness dimension. As the pairs of correlations indicate, both sets of analyses yield similar pictures. For a more in-depth examination, I elaborate on the 63-country analysis. The autonomy/embeddedness dimension shares considerable variance (36%) with the tradition/ secular-rational dimension, but they array nations somewhat differently. For example, East Germany ranks in the top 10% of nations on both dimensions and Zimbabwe in the bottom 15%. But Bulgaria, China, and Estonia rank in the top 10% on tradition/ secular-rational but the bottom third on autonomy/embeddedness. The centrality of religion in the Inglehart index may explain this difference in country locations on the two dimensions. Their high secularrational rankings may be due to a breakdown of religious faith and absolute standards of traditional morality during decades of communist rule. The autonomy/embeddedness dimension gives less weight to religious faith. It focuses more on how legitimate it is for individuals to cultivate unique ways of thinking, acting, and feeling vs. submerging the self in an encompassing collectivity. The culture in Bulgaria, China, and Estonia may have become quite secular. At the same time, the low scores on autonomy/embeddedness suggest that the culture still stresses finding meaning through ties to the in-group. The two dimensions apparently capture different aspects of the culture in these countries.

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 47

The tradition/secular-rational dimension also has some conceptual overlap with the egalitarianism/hierarchy dimension. Both concern deference to authority. The emphasis on national pride in traditional societies also expresses a hierarchical orientation, and the preference for male dominance is compatible with hierarchy and opposed to egalitarianism. The overlap is limited, however, because the Inglehart dimension does not relate to the primary focus of egalitarianism/hierarchy. Both egalitarianism and hierarchy seek to preserve the social fabric by promoting responsible behavior that considers the welfare of others. They differ in grounding such behavior in voluntary choice based on internalized commitments (egalitarianism) or in conformity to the obligations and expectations of ascribed roles (hierarchy). The empirical associations reflect little overlap. The tradition/secular-rational dimension correlated -.00 (.22) with egalitarianism, -.32 (-.21) with hierarchy, and .22 (.25) with the egalitarianism/hierarchy dimension. Unexpectedly, given no obvious conceptual overlap, the tradition/secular-rational dimension correlated somewhat positively with the harmony/mastery dimension (.36/.34). Thus, more secular-rational societies are also societies that tend more to emphasize fitting into the natural and social world as it is, trying to understand and appreciate rather than to change or to exploit. The nations with cultures especially high on both harmony and secular-rational orientations are all in Western Europe. These nations have well-to-do, educated, and involved publics. Such publics responded to two devastating wars and to severe ecological crises by developing rationally-based relations of harmony among themselves and with the environment. Inglehart’s second dimension, survival/self-expression, contrasts societies in which people primarily focus on economic and physical security (survival) with societies in which security is high and quality-of-life issues are central (self-expression). In the latter, many people are well educated and work in the services. This demands of them more freedom of judgment, innovation, and autonomous decision-making and equips them with relevant communication and information-processing skills. Trust, tolerance, subjective well-being, political activism, and concern for the environment are high. At the survival pole, people feel threatened by and are intolerant of those who are different (e.g., ethnically or in sexual preference) or who seek cultural change (e.g., women’s movements). At the self-expression pole, difference and change are accepted and even seen as enriching, and out-groups are increasingly seen as meriting equal rights. This dimension also overlaps with the autonomy/embeddedness dimension. They both concern the degree to which individuals should be

48 • Shalom H. Schwartz

encouraged to express their uniqueness and independence in thought, action, and feelings. Empirically, they are substantially associated. Survival/self-expression correlated -.66 (-.65) with embeddedness, .55 (.40) with affective autonomy, .57 (.65) with intellectual autonomy, and .64 (.63) with the autonomy/embeddedness dimension, with which it shares 41% of its variance. These two dimensions array nations quite similarly. For example, Sweden and Denmark rank very high on both dimensions and Uganda and Zimbabwe rank very low. But there are differences. Both Ghana and West Germany are moderate on survival/self-expression, but Ghana is very low on autonomy/embeddedness and West Germany very high. The egalitarianism/hierarchy dimension also overlaps conceptually with survival/self-expression. The latter pits trust, tolerance, and support for the equal rights of out-groups against low trust, intolerance, and rejection of out-groups as threatening. This closely parallels some aspects of high vs. low egalitarianism. Political activism and opposition to change in accepted roles also conflict with hierarchy, though these elements are less critical. The empirical correlations support these inferences. Survival/ self-expression correlated .72 (.63) with egalitarianism, -.41 (-.25) with hierarchy, and .59 (.50) with the egalitarianism/hierarchy dimension with which it shares 35% of its variance. Sweden and Norway are very high on both dimensions and Bulgaria is very low on both. But many nations do not exhibit consistent ranks on the two cultural dimensions. Japan is very low on egalitarianism (vs. hierarchy) but moderately high on self-expression (vs. survival), for example. My dimension emphasizes the idea that Japanese culture organizes relations of interdependency in role-based hierarchical terms. The Inglehart dimension may reflect the consequences for culture of Japanese society’s wealth, high level of education, and advanced service economy. Thus, these two dimensions capture different, not necessarily contradictory, aspects of culture. The contrasting feelings of interpersonal threat vs. trust and the focus on material security vs. environmental protection of the survival/selfexpression dimension parallel a low vs. high harmony orientation. Empirically, however, there is no association either with harmony or with the harmony/mastery dimension. Harmony emphasizes fitting into and accepting the social and natural environments rather than changing or using them. Self-expression implies a more activist orientation to people and nature. This may explain the lack of association. In sum, there is substantial overlap between Inglehart’s tradition/ secular-rational dimension and my autonomy/embeddedness dimension and between Inglehart’s survival/self-expression dimension and both my

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 49

autonomy/embeddedness and egalitarianism/hierarchy dimensions. Given the differences in the way the dimensions were derived, in the scales used to measure them, and in the nature of the samples studied, this overlap is striking. It strongly supports the idea that these dimensions capture real, robust aspects of cultural difference. On the other hand, some nations exhibit substantially divergent rankings on the overlapping dimensions. This makes clear that each dimension also captures unique aspects of culture. Thus, for example, the level of conventional religious commitment in a country appears to influence tradition/secular-rational scores crucially but have much less impact on autonomy/embeddedness scores. In contrast, the cultural emphasis on extended in-group bonds vs. pursuit of individual uniqueness appears to influence autonomy-embeddedness scores more than tradition/secular rational-scores. Moreover, my harmony/mastery dimension apparently taps aspects of culture not measured by the Inglehart dimensions, as evidenced by its low correlations with them. As we will see, harmony/mastery is the only cultural dimension not strongly related to socio-economic development. Countries as a Cultural Unit Almost all large, comparative, cross-cultural studies treat countries as their cultural unit. Countries are rarely homogeneous societies with a unified culture. Inferences about national culture may depend on which subgroups are studied. The research on my cultural dimensions with the SVS used country scores from teacher and student samples rather than representative national samples. This makes it especially important to establish that scores derived from different types of samples order countries in the same way on the dimensions. If a meaningful general culture impacts upon varied groups within countries, the order of countries on cultural dimensions should be quite similar whether we measure culture using one type of subsample from the dominant group or another. The same countries should score higher and the same countries lower on each cultural orientation whether the set of samples consists, for example, of older or of younger respondents. I assessed consistency in the relative scores of countries on the seven cultural orientations measured with the SVS, using three types of subsamples. I first assessed whether younger and older subcultures yield similar relative national scores. I split the teacher samples into those 37 years or younger and those older. There were 55 countries with at least 33 respondents in each age group. The relative national scores, based on these two subgroups, were very similar. Correlations ranged from .96

50 • Shalom H. Schwartz

for embeddedness to .78 for mastery (mean .91). I also compared national scores using male vs. female student subgroups across 64 countries. This yielded similar results: Correlations ranged from .96 for embeddedness to .82 for egalitarianism (mean .90). Finally, I compared national scores based on the teacher vs. the student samples across 53 countries. Correlations ranged from .90 for egalitarianism to .57 for mastery (mean .81). Although still substantial, the somewhat weaker correlations in this last comparison reflect the fact that the samples differed in both age and occupation. This suggests that closely matching the characteristics of the samples from each country is critical when comparing national cultural orientations. These data demonstrate that the similarity of cultural value orientations within countries, when viewed against the background of cultural distance between countries, is considerable. Taken together, the findings support the view that countries are meaningful cultural units. In comparing national cultures, however, it is important to insure that the samples from different countries are matched on critical characteristics (e.g., all teacher samples, all student samples, or all properly drawn national samples). Cultural Distinctiveness of World Regions Both theoretical arguments and empirical analyses suggest that there are culturally distinct world regions (Hofstede, 2001; Huntington, 1993; Inglehart, 1997; Schwartz, 1999). This section examines the locations in cultural space of 76 cultural groups based on the combined teacher and student samples (73 countries, with Israel split into Arabs and Jews, Germany into East and West, and Canada into Anglo and French-speaking national groups). For this purpose, I first standardized the mean importance of all seven cultural orientations within each group. Each group profile therefore reflects the relative importance of each cultural orientation within a national group. Unlike Inglehart’s mapping of national cultures on two orthogonal variables (his dimensions), I map them simultaneously on seven variables (my cultural orientations). Mapping locations of the national groups on the seven orientations in a two dimensional space necessarily entails some imprecision. The richness gained in describing cultures largely compensates for the loss of precision because the degree of imprecision is limited (see below). The ‘co-plot’ multidimensional scaling technique (Goldreich & Raveh, 1993) maps the cultural distances between groups. It computes a matrix of profile differences between all pairs of groups by summing the absolute differences between the groups on each of the seven value orientations. From this matrix it generates a two-dimensional spatial representation

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 51

of the similarities and differences among groups (see Figure 4). It then calculates vectors (optimal regression lines) in the MDS space that show the direction of increasing scores for each of the seven orientations. In Figure 4, I drew the full vector for embeddedness from lower left to upper right and short arrows to indicate the angles of the vectors for the other orientations. These other vectors also extend through the center of gravity of the figure, just above Romania. The correlation between the actual scores of the cultural groups on an orientation and their locations along the vector that represents the orientation appear in parentheses. The substantial magnitude of these correlations (range .75 to .98) indicates that the locations of most samples provide quite an accurate picture. This is because countries usually exhibit a profile that reflects the coherence of the theoretical structure of cultural dimensions. If the culture of a country emphasizes one polar value orientation, it typically deemphasizes the opposing polar orientation. Moreover, the relative importance of adjacent cultural orientations is usually similar too. For example, Italian culture, compared to all the others, is very high both in egalitarianism and in the adjacent harmony orientation but very low in the opposing hierarchy and adjacent mastery orientations. Chinese culture shows the reverse profile.6 Locations of nations along these vectors relative to one another reveal, graphically, the specific ways in which national cultures resemble or differ from one another. For example, the farther a nation toward the upper right, the greater the cultural emphasis on embeddedness relative to other nations and the farther toward the lower left, the less the cultural emphasis on embeddedness. To locate a nation on a cultural orientation, draw a perpendicular line from the position of the nation to the vector for that orientation. Perpendiculars drawn to the embeddedness vector in Figure 4 show that this orientation is especially emphasized in Yemen, less so in Macedonia, and very little in East Germany. Consider two examples of how Figure 4 represents the cultural profile of a country on all seven cultural orientations. Culture in Sweden (upper left) strongly emphasizes harmony, intellectual autonomy, and egalitarianism and moderately emphasizes affective autonomy. The cultural emphasis on embeddedness is low, and it is very low for mastery and 6

Japan presents a striking exception. Seven samples from around Japan reveal an unusual combination of cultural elements. The culture strongly emphasizes hierarchy and harmony but not embeddedness, which is adjacent to them, and it strongly emphasizes intellectual autonomy but not the adjacent egalitarianism. Thus, the location of Japan in the co-plot is necessarily misleading. This unusual combination would not surprise many scholars of Japanese culture (e.g., Benedict, 1974; Matsumoto, 2002). It points to a culture in tension and transition.

SPAIN

NORWAY

FINLAND

ITALY

INTELLECTUAL AUTONOMY (.93)

MEXICO ROMANIA

POLAND

INDONESIA SINGAPORE

CANADA ENG

AFFECTIVE AUTONOMY (.92)

NEW UK ZEALAND

ISRAEL JEWS

JAPAN

MASTERY (.88)

USA THAILAND

HIERARCHY (.87)

ZIMBABWE

CHINA

INDIA

JORDAN

IRAN

UGANDA

NAMIBIA

NEPAL

GHANA

NIGERIA

SENEGAL

EMBEDDEDNESS (.98)

S AFRICA

YEMEN

S KOREA

VENEZUELA ARGENTINA YUGO- TURKEY MACEDONIA ISRAEL BRAZIL SLAVIA RUSSIA PERU ARABS COSTA BULGARIA RICA UKRAINE TAIWAN AUSTRALIA CROATIA HONG KONG IRELAND

CHILE

HUNGARY

SLOVAKIA GEORGIA FIJI BOSNIA HZ PHILIPPINES ESTONIA CYPRUS BOLIVIA Gr MALAYSIA

LATVIA

CZECH REP

SLOVENIA

PORTUGAL NETHERLANDS GREECE FRANCE

BELGIUM SWEDEN GERMANY DENMARK AUSTRIA W CANADA GERMANY E FR

SWITZERLAND FR

EGALITARIANISM (.75)

HARMONY (.79)

ETHIOPIA

EGYPT CAMEROON

Figure 4 Co-Plot Map of 76 National Groups on Seven Cultural Orientations (coefficient alienation .11)

52 • Shalom H. Schwartz

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 53

hierarchy. In contrast, in Zimbabwe (lower right), mastery, embeddedness, and hierarchy are highly emphasized, affective autonomy moderately emphasized, and egalitarianism, intellectual autonomy, and harmony receive little cultural emphasis. The spatial map of the 76 national cultures reveals seven transnational cultural groupings: West European countries (clear circles) to the far left, English-speaking countries in the lower left center (dark circles), Latin American countries in the center (shaded circles), East European countries in the upper center and to the left of Latin America (lightly shaded circles), South Asian countries (shaded circles) in a band to the right, Confucian influenced countries below them to the right (clear circles), and African and Middle Eastern countries (dark circles) to the far right and above. Only nine cultures are located outside of their expected region. Four of these are from the culturally diverse Middle East (Turkey, Greek Cyprus, Israel Arabs, Israel Jews) The regions show striking parallels with the zones Huntington (1993) suggested and those Hofstede (1980) and Inglehart and Baker (2000) found. Schwartz and Ros (1995) and Schwartz and Bardi (1997) provide initial explanations for the emergence of the English-speaking, West European, and East European cultural profiles. Most regions reflect some geographical proximity. Hence, some of the cultural similarity within regions is doubtless due to diffusion of values, norms, practices, and institutions across national borders (Naroll, 1973). But shared histories, language, religion, level of development, and other factors also play a part. To illustrate the sensitivity of the cultural orientations to such factors, consider the cultures that are not located in their expected regions. French Canadian culture is apparently closer to West European and particularly French culture than to English speaking Canadian culture, reflecting its historic and linguistic roots. East German culture is close to West German rather than part of the East European region. This probably reflects continued cultural ties from the pre-communist era. Turkish culture is higher on egalitarianism and autonomy and lower on hierarchy and embeddedness than its Middle Eastern Muslim neighbors are. This probably reflects its secular democracy, long history of East European influence, and recent struggles to join the West. Greek Cypriot culture is relatively high in embeddedness and low in autonomy. This may reflect its history of over 1000 years of rule by the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires and its Eastern Orthodox religion. Israeli Jewish culture is close to the English-speaking cultures and distant from the surrounding Middle East to which its Arab culture is close. Europeans founded Israel and it has strong political and economic links to the USA. Among the Latin American countries, the populations of Bolivia and Peru were least

54 • Shalom H. Schwartz

exposed to European culture and economically least developed. This probably explains why their cultures are much higher in hierarchy and embeddedness than those of their neighbors. For Japan, see footnote 5. Next, let us examine the cultural orientations that characterize each distinct cultural region. I base these characterizations on the actual cultural orientation scores because, as noted above, locations on seven variables in two dimensions cannot be perfect. Nonetheless, the locations of regions on the vectors in Figure 4 are quite accurate and highly informative. West Europe. Corresponding to its location on the left of Figure 4, West European culture emphasizes intellectual autonomy, egalitarianism, and harmony more than any other region. It is the lowest region on hierarchy and embeddedness. This profile holds even after controlling for national wealth (GDP per capita in 1985). Thus, though West Europe’s high economic level may influence its culture, other factors are apparently critical. This cultural profile is fitting for a region of democratic, welfare states where concern for the environment is especially high (cf. Ester, Halman, & Seuren, 1994). Although when compared with other world regions, West European countries share a broad culture, there is substantial cultural variation within the region too. Consider two examples. Greek culture is the least typical of Western Europe – higher on mastery and lower on intellectual autonomy and egalitarianism than the others are. French and Swiss French cultures display a relatively high hierarchy orientation for Western Europe, together with the usual high affective and intellectual autonomy. They apparently retain a somewhat hierarchical orientation despite their emphasis on autonomy. Detailed analysis of such variations is beyond the scope of this article, but cultural differences within regions are meaningful. English-Speaking. The culture of the English-speaking region is especially high in affective autonomy and mastery and low in harmony and embeddedness, compared with the rest of the world. It is average in intellectual autonomy, hierarchy, and egalitarianism. The culture in America differs from that in other English-speaking countries by emphasizing mastery and hierarchy more and intellectual autonomy, harmony, and egalitarianism less. This profile points to a cultural orientation that encourages an assertive, pragmatic, entrepreneurial, and even exploitative orientation to the social and natural environment. With the exception of the USA, this region is particularly homogeneous. Cultural Differences in the ‘West’. There is a widespread view of Western culture as individualist. Hence, the differences within the West that the more complex conception of cultural orientations reveals deserve more

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 55

detailed explication (see Schwartz & Ross, 1995). Comparisons of 22 West European samples with six United States samples show large and significant differences on six of the seven culture orientations. Egalitarianism, intellectual autonomy, and harmony are higher in Western Europe; mastery, hierarchy, and embeddedness are higher in the United States. Using the term “individualist” to describe either of these cultures distorts the picture these analyses reveal. Cultural orientations in Western Europe are individualist in one sense: They emphasize intellectual and affective autonomy and de-emphasize hierarchy and embeddedness relative to other cultures in most of the world. But West European priorities contradict conventional views of individualism in another sense: They emphasize egalitarianism and harmony and de-emphasize mastery. That is, this culture calls for selfless concern for the welfare of others and fitting into the natural and social world rather than striving to change it through assertive action. This runs directly counter to what individualism is usually understood to mean. Cultural emphases in the United States show a different but equally complex pattern: The individualistic aspect of American value orientations is the emphasis on affective autonomy and mastery at the expense of harmony. This combination may be the source of the stereotypical view of American culture as justifying and encouraging egotistic selfadvancement. But this is not prototypical individualism because intellectual autonomy is relatively unimportant. Moreover, both hierarchy and embeddedness, the orientations central to collectivism, are high compared with Western Europe. This fits the emphasis on religion, conservative family values, and punitiveness toward deviance in America. The empirical profile is compatible with in-depth analyses of American culture (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1986; Etzioni, 1993). Confucian. The Confucian-influenced region also exhibits a pragmatic, entrepreneurial orientation. However, this orientation combines a heavy emphasis on hierarchy and mastery with a rejection of egalitarianism and harmony as compared with other regions. This region emphasizes embeddedness more than all the European and American cultures. This cultural profile is consonant with many analyses of Confucian culture (e.g., Bond, 1996). Within-region differences are small except for Japan, which is substantially higher on harmony and intellectual autonomy and lower on embeddedness and hierarchy. Africa and the Middle East.7 The cultural groups from sub-Saharan and North Africa and the Muslim Middle East form a broad region that

7

I exclude Cyprus, Israeli Jews, and Turkey, which were discussed above.

56 • Shalom H. Schwartz

does not break down into clear sub-regions. These cultures are especially high in embeddedness and low in affective and intellectual autonomy. Thus, they emphasize finding meaning in life largely through social relationships and protecting group solidarity and the traditional order rather than cultivating individual uniqueness. This fits well with the conclusions of studies of the Middle East (e.g., Lewis, 2003) and sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Gyekye, 1997). There is a great deal of variation within the region on all but embeddedness, egalitarianism, and intellectual autonomy. South Asia. The culture in the South Asian region is particularly high in hierarchy and embeddedness and low in autonomy and egalitarianism. This points to an emphasis on fulfilling one’s obligations in a hierarchical system – obeying expectations from those in roles of greater status or authority and expecting humility and obedience from those in inferior roles. As in Africa, here social relationships rather than autonomous pursuits are expected to give meaning to life. With the exception of India’s especially high rating on mastery, all the groups are culturally quite homogenous. The variety of dominant religions (Hinduism, Roman Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism, Methodist Protestantism) in this region does not produce cultural heterogeneity on the basic orientations. East Europe. The East European cultures are low in embeddedness and hierarchy compared with Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, but higher in these cultural orientations than Western Europe and the Americas. Although the East European cultural groups do form a region in the spatial projection, the cultures in this region vary substantially on hierarchy, mastery, and harmony. A closer look at the map reveals that the Baltic and East-Central states form a sub-region toward the top center and the Balkan and more Eastern states form a sub-region to their right and below.8 The former are higher in harmony, intellectual autonomy, and egalitarianism and lower in mastery and hierarchy than the Balkan and more Eastern states. The Baltic and East-Central states have stronger historical and trade links to Western Europe, were less penetrated by totalitarian communist rule, and threw it off earlier. This may help account for why their profile is closer to that of Western Europe. In an earlier paper, my colleagues and I inferred from the profile of the EastCentral states that their population had largely rejected both the rhetoric and the social organization of communist regimes, while insisting on their intellectual independence (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997; Schwartz, Bardi, & Bianchi, 2000).9

8

Georgia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are exceptions that require further study. The finding that East European countries that experienced more invasive communist rule were lower in harmony and higher in mastery undermines our earlier inter9

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 57

Latin America. Finally, the culture of the Latin American region is close to the worldwide average in all seven orientations. Moreover, excepting Bolivia and Peru, whose populations have been least exposed to European culture, this region is particularly homogeneous culturally. Some researchers describe Latin American culture as collectivist (e.g., Hofstede, 2001; Triandis, 1995). Compared with Western Europe, this seems to be so. Latin America is higher in hierarchy and embeddedness, presumably the main components of collectivism, and lower in intellectual autonomy, presumably the main component of individualism. The opposite is the case, however, when we compare Latin America to Africa and the Middle East, South Asia, and Confucian-influenced cultures. This example highlights the importance of the frame of comparison. The culture of a group may look different when viewed in a worldwide perspective than when inferred from narrower comparisons. Relations of Culture to Socioeconomic, Political, and Demographic Characteristics Having seen that national cultural groups and regions of the world differ systematically on the cultural dimensions, two critical questions arise. How do these cultural differences arise? And do they matter? Socioeconomic, political, and demographic factors all impact on culture and, I will argue, are themselves reciprocally influenced by culture. I present analyses for one key variable representing each of these factors – socioeconomic development, level of democracy, and household/family size. Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann (2003) traced a causal sequence among socioeconomic development, values, and democratization. They argued that socioeconomic development increases individual resources and thereby gives people the means to make choices. Utilizing these means, people cultivate their presumed inherent human desire for choice, giving rise to “mass emancipative values.” Pursuit of these values leads to democratization – institutionalizing freedom rights that provide the legal guarantee of choice. Using a measure of emancipative values drawn from the World and European Value Surveys, Welzel, et al. present analyses showing that values indeed mediate the relationship between socioeconomic development and democratization. Their causal argument contradicts views that values impact on socioeconomic development or that democratization influences values. I next examine how well this argument holds when we employ different measures of values and a set of 72 countries, 15 of which do not overlap those they studied. pretation of the high harmony scores as reflecting adaptation to life in totalitarian regimes by avoiding trouble and refraining from taking initiatives.

58 • Shalom H. Schwartz

In order to simplify the empirical presentations, I will use the three polar value dimensions formed by the seven cultural orientations rather than the separate orientations. Two of the cultural value dimensions express what Welzel et al. call emancipative values – the dimensions of autonomy versus embeddedness values and of egalitarianism vs. hierarchy values. The first dimension emphasizes autonomous choice and cultivation of individuals’ unique ideas and preferences rather than following and preserving traditional and externally imposed ideas and preferences. The second dimension emphasizes voluntary regulation of behavior based on equality rather than regulation of behavior through submission to role expectations built into existing hierarchies. Socioeconomic Development and Democratization The top panel of Table 1 presents correlations across 73 countries between four indexes of socioeconomic development and scores on the three value dimensions. The latter are computed by subtracting the score for the second pole from the first (e.g. harmony minus mastery). The values data are largely from the mid-90’s.10 The correlations portray associations with development about 10 and two years earlier, concurrently, and almost 10 years later. The second panel of Table 1 presents correlations with democratization scores from Freedom House (higher scores signify greater civil liberties and political rights) about 10 years earlier, concurrently, and seven years later (Freedom House, various years). As expected, all correlations with the autonomy and egalitarianism dimensions are substantial, whereas those with the harmony vs. mastery dimension are low. To assess causal relations, I carried out a path analysis in which earlier indexes of democratization predict later indexes and in which development might affect democratization either directly or through values. Following Welzel, et al., I measured development with the Vanhanen (1997) ‘index of power resources’ for 1993. This index includes measures of material and intellectual resources and the complexity of the occupational system. This makes it better than a pure economic index for measuring individual resources. Because the 1995 index of democratization is included in Figure 5a to predict the 2002 index, paths from other predictors signify effects on change in the level of democratization. Figure 5a reveals that cultural emphases on autonomy and on egalitar10 Combining values data from somewhat different points in time poses little problem because value change at the national level on these dimensions is very slow (see Schwartz, Bardi, & Bianchi, 2000).

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 59 Table 1 Correlations of Cultural Value Dimensions with Socioeconomic Development Democratization, and Household Size N

Autonomy minus Embeddedness

Egalitarianism minus Hierarchy

Harmony minus Mastery

Socioeconomic Development 1985 GDPpc 1995 GDPpc 1993 Index of Power Resources 2004 GNIpc

73 73 72 73

.58** .73** .78** .75**

.42** .46** .58** .53**

.27* .19 .14 .20

Democratization 1985 Freedom House Index 1995 Freedom House Index 2002 Freedom House Index

73 73 73

.58** .71** .70**

.46** .52** .57**

.03 .36** .38**

Household Size 1985 Average Family Size 2001 Average Household Size

73 73

-.70** -.75**

-.61** -.36**

-.41** -.32**

**p<.01, *p<.05, 2-tailed Notes: GDPpc=Gross Domestic Product per Capita, from the World Bank; GNIpc=Gross National Income per Capita, from the World Bank; Average Household/Family Size=from the Encyclopaedia Britannica Almanac

ianism values both predict increases in democratization. Earlier development affects these cultural values and they, in turn, fully mediate the effects of development on increasing democratization. Democratization in 1985 does not predict later cultural values over and above the effects of development. The path analysis clearly supports the Welzel, et al. causal argument. For them, development influences values which, in turn, influence change in democracy levels. Here, development influences change in democracy levels only insofar as it affects autonomy and egalitarian values, not directly. Support for this causal sequence derives from a different set of cultural values than those studied by Welzel, et al. and from a somewhat different set of countries and of years. The current analysis further demonstrates that the prior level of democracy has no impact on cultural values, once development is controlled. However, this analysis does not test whether cultural values have a reciprocal influence on socioeconomic development. The path analysis in Figure 5b addresses this issue. Because no Vanhanen index of individual resources is available for the years after 1993, I chose the latest, best, available index of socioeconomic development for this analysis – gross national income per capita

.59**

.78**

.69**

Values 1995: Egalitarianism vs. Hierarchy

Values 1995: Autonomy vs. Embeddedness

Democracy 1995

.16**

.18**

.64** Democracy 2002

R2 = .75

.59**

Values 1995: Egalitarianism vs. Hierarchy

Values 1995: Autonomy vs. Embeddedness

Notes: Broken arrows indicate nonsignificant paths. ** p<.01, * p<.05.

Individual Resources 1993

.78**

.69**

Democracy 1995

.73**

.20**

Gross National Income per capita 2004

R2 = .78

Figure 5b Causal model predicting change in socioeconomic level with democracy and cultural values across 73 countries

Notes: Broken arrows indicate nonsignificant paths. ** p<.01, * p<.05.

Individual Resources 1993

Democracy 1985

Figure 5a Causal model predicting change in democracy with socioeconomic level and cultural values across 73 countries

60 • Shalom H. Schwartz

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 61

in 2004. Figure 5b reveals that neither democracy nor egalitarianism values in 1995 predict change in socioeconomic development from 1993 to 2004. However, autonomy values significantly predict the change. Thus, this dimension of cultural values reciprocally influences socioeconomic development. I cannot estimate the relative strength of these reciprocal influences because we lack earlier measures of the cultural values. Nonetheless, with the caveat that the earlier and later measures of socioeconomic development differed, this analysis provides evidence that contradicts the Welzel, et al. unidirectional view of relations between values and development. Family/Household Size The demographic characteristic I examine is average family/household size in a country. Researchers have largely overlooked the importance of this variable as a determinant and consequence of culture. The third panel in Table 1 reports the correlations of the cultural value dimensions with average family size in 1985 and with average household size in 2001.11 The negative correlations indicate that the larger the average family or household, the greater the cultural emphasis on embeddedness, hierarchy, and mastery values. At the country level, cultural value orientations relate strongly to family size. The size of people’s own family, however, does not relate to their own personal values. How does this happen? The key is societal norms for managing family relations. Societal norms reflect what is required and possible in order for the typical family to function smoothly. These norms reflect the prototypical size and composition of households. They specify how to organize families, raise children, and regulate interaction. Families largely conform to these norms, so variation in the size of particular families has less impact on its members. How might family/household size influence culture? Where the typical household is large, it is crucial for behavior to be predictable. This requires high levels of social control from above. Emphasizing obedience to authority, conformity to norms, and fulfilling role obligations unquestioningly is functional. If family members view themselves as inseparable parts of a family collectivity and identify with its interests, even large families can run smoothly. These family practices and norms foster cultural embeddedness and hierarchy in the society. Large families are incompatible with cultural autonomy and egalitarianism. The demands 11 Data are from the Encyclopaedia Britannica Almanac. The date (1985, 2001) is the median of about a 5 year period for which the data were reported.

62 • Shalom H. Schwartz

of coordination in large families preclude treating each member as a unique individual with equal rights. They discourage permitting each family member to make decisions autonomously and to pursue his or her own ideas, interests, and desires. A greater need for pragmatic problem solving in larger families may account for the somewhat stronger emphasis on mastery values. The preceding explains the possible causal influence of family/household size on cultural value orientations. The influence of cultural values on family/household size is also likely to contribute to the correlations. Autonomy values, in particular, encourage having few children so that each can develop his or her unique abilities and interests. Autonomy and egalitarianism values encourage and justify women’s pursuit of meaningful non-family roles. This too reduces the number of children. Embeddedness values promote commitment to the in-group. They sanctify group continuity and, hence, having many children to promote it. Autonomy values sanctify individual choice. They justify weighing children against alternative paths for achieving personal meaning in life, such as careers. The path analysis in Figure 6 examines possible causal relations among culture, average household/family size, and socioeconomic level. For many countries, I found no statistics for average household size that antedated the mid-90’s measurement of culture or for average family size that post-dated this period. Examination of concurrent measures of average household and family size for 60 countries around 1983 reveals that they correlated highly (.87).12 I therefore used household and family size as proxies for one another in the analysis. Starting on the left in Figure 6, we see that greater socioeconomic resources (Individual Resources 1980) lead to smaller families (Family Size 1985), but family size does not appear to affect change in socioeconomic level (Individual Resources 1993). Next, the figure reveals a substantial influence of family size on all three cultural value dimensions, over and above the direct effects of socioeconomic resources. Larger families in a country induce less cultural emphasis on harmony, egalitarianism, and autonomy values, whereas greater socioeconomic resources lead to more emphasis on autonomy and egalitarianism but do not affect harmony vs. mastery. Moreover, family size apparently mediates some of the effect of socioeconomic resources on cultural values (indirect paths from Individual Resources 1980 through Family Size 1985).13 Clearly, family size is important in the development of culture. 12 Household size data are from Kurian (1984) and family size data from the Encyclopaedia Britannica Almanac 1985. 13 Direct paths from Individual Resources 1980 to the three cultural dimensions are left out of the figure to avoid clutter. None is significant.

Individual Resources 1993

-.36**

.33**

-.41**

.56**

-.42**

Values 1995: Autonomy vs. Embeddedness

Values 1995: Egalitarianism vs. Hierarchy

Values 1995: Harmony vs. Mastery

Notes: Broken arrows indicate nonsignificant paths. ** p<.01, * p<.05.

.97**

Individual Resources 1980

-.60**

Family Size 1985

-.44**

.31**

-.15**

.60**

Household Size 2001

R2 = .73

Figure 6 Causal model predicting change in average household/family size with socioeconomic level and cultural values across 73 countries

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 63

64 • Shalom H. Schwartz

The right half of Figure 6 reveals that all three cultural value dimensions predict change in household size. Moreover, two dimensions, egalitarianism vs. hierarchy and autonomy vs. embeddedness, fully mediate relations of socioeconomic resources to change in household size. Thus, increasing socioeconomic level appears to promote a drop in the size of households only insofar as it leads to change in cultural values. The three cultural value dimensions also partially mediate effects of earlier family size on later household size. To the extent that smaller families and rising resources increase autonomy values, they promote a decrease in household size. To the extent that smaller families increase harmony values, they also promote decreasing household size, though this effect is weak. The above findings parallel the zero-order correlations; but the path from egalitarianism to household size reverses the correlation. Although smaller families promote a cultural emphasis on egalitarianism vs. hierarchy values, a cultural emphasis on egalitarianism values contributes to maintaining larger households over time. In other words, an emphasis on hierarchy values promotes a reduction in household size. This effect holds even when the other two value dimensions are not included as predictors. One speculative interpretation is that both formal and informal normative influence on families is greater in societies whose culture emphasizes hierarchy values. If governments seek to raise productivity through increasing women’s participation in the workforce, they are likely to generate societal norms that oppose large families. Such norms may reduce family size more effectively in cultures high in hierarchy. Congruent with this interpretation, the greatest reductions in household size have occurred in China, with its formal anti-natalist policies, and in the East Asian “Tigers” which have rapidly moved toward market economies and whose culture is highly hierarchical. Consequences of Cultural Value Orientations Finally, we consider some consequences of national differences in the cultural value orientations. We examine how culture relates to women’s position in society, to a selection of social attitudes held by societal members, and to important social behaviors. Women’s Equality The equality of women and their opportunities for autonomous decisionmaking is one domain in which cultural orientations are likely to influence

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 65

practices. Women should have greater independence to develop their own capabilities and follow their own preferences if the culture emphasizes autonomy rather than embeddedness. Similarly, cultures that emphasize egalitarian rather than hierarchical, role-based regulation of interdependence and work are likely to promote greater equality. A cultural preference for harmonious relations in contrast to assertive mastery might also enhance women’s equality, because women around the world value benevolence more and power less than men (Schwartz & Rubel, 2005). Women’s equality and autonomy are greater in wealthier and more economically developed countries (e.g., Apodaca, 1998). Doubtless, some of this association is direct. Material and intellectual resources free individuals – men and especially women – from some of their dependence on the support of their families, enabling them to strike out on their own and to demand more equal opportunities. However, the prevailing cultural orientations may mediate the impact of increased individual resources that accompanies national wealth. Cultural orientations may legitimize and facilitate but also delegitimize and inhibit the pursuit of equality. This can occur through informal or formal sanctions experienced in everyday interaction and through encounters with the structures, practices, and regulations of societal institutions that are grounded in and justified by the cultural orientations. To assess possible mediation by culture, I first correlated both individual resources and the cultural value dimensions with several indicators of women’s equality. I then examined relations of individual resources with these indicators, controlling the effects of culture. This reveals whether cultural mediation substantially shrinks the association with resources. Ratings of women’s equality in 69 countries in four domains – social, health, education, and employment – in 1988 (Population Crisis Committee, 1988) served as one set of indicators. The Vanhanen country scores for power resources in 1993 indexed availability of resources to individuals. The data on the cultural dimensions and resources post-date the equality data by five to six years on average. However, this should have little effect on the associations: The cultural orientations demonstrate considerable stability (Schwartz, Bardi, & Bianchi, 2000), and analyses using gross domestic product per capita in 1985 to index country wealth yielded essentially the same results. The top panel of Table 2 shows the correlations of the three cultural value dimensions and individual resources with the five indicators of women’s equality. All three cultural dimensions as well as individual resources correlate significantly with the overall average and with most sub-categories of equality. Autonomy vs. embeddedness has the strongest

66 • Shalom H. Schwartz

associations, followed by individual resources, egalitarianism vs. hierarchy, and harmony vs. mastery. All correlations are in the expected direction. The last row of the panel reveals the effect of introducing the three cultural value dimensions as mediators. Clearly supporting cultural mediation, the variance in the overall index of women’s equality accounted for by individual resources shrinks 80%, when culture is controlled. Interestingly, though culture mediates resource effects in all four domains, mediation is smallest (50% reduction) for employment equality, the domain most directly concerned with producing wealth. The bottom panel of Table 2 examines cultural mediation of two other indicators of women’s equality and autonomy, the percent of ministerial positions filled by women in national parliaments in 1994-98 (United Nations Women Watch, 1999) and the percent of married women aged 19-45 who used any method of contraception in 1990-97 (United Nations Population Division, 1998). Cultural value dimensions and individual resources correlated substantially with both indicators, as expected. The more socio-economically developed the country and the more its culture emphasized autonomy, egalitarianism, and harmony values, the more political equality and sexual autonomy women enjoyed. Culture partially mediated the relation of resources to women’s attainment of ministerial positions, reducing the variance explained by 70%. It fully mediated the relation of resources to contraception use, reducing the variance explained by 97%. Here too, the main mediator was the cultural emphasis on autonomy vs. embeddedness values. Social Attitudes To examine relations of cultural value emphases to the social attitudes of societal members, I drew on data from the 2000 wave of the World Value Survey (Inglehart, et al., 2004). Table 3 presents correlations of the cultural value dimensions with selected attitudes concerning qualities important for children to learn, conventional morality, competition, and tolerance for out-group members. It also presents correlations of these variables with indexes of country levels of wealth and democratization from the same period. To assess the extent to which cultural values mediate effects of wealth and democracy on attitudes, it presents partial correlations controlling the cultural values in parentheses. People in countries with cultures high in embeddedness and low in autonomy choose obedience and hard work, but reject imagination, as especially important for children. The chosen qualities promote conforming and contributing to the group in traditional ways, the rejected quality would threaten tradition by generating potentially disruptive, orig-

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 67 Table 2 Culture and Women’s Equality: Correlations and Mediation of the Effects of Country Wealth Women’s Equality in 1988

Autonomy vs. Embeddedness Egalitarianism vs. Hierarchy Harmony vs. Mastery Individual Resources 1993 Individual Resources 1995 controlling culture

N

Social

Health Educational

66

.58**

.76**

.70**

.42**

.73**

66

.31*

.39**

.45**

.13

.39**

66

.35**

.23

.18

.25*

.31**

65

.48**

.66**

.67**

.50**

.68**

65

.09

.21

.27*

.35**

.30*

N % Ministers who are N Women 1994-98 Autonomy vs. 70 Embeddedness Egalitarianism vs. 70 Hierarchy Harmony vs. 70 Mastery Individual Resources 70 1993 Individual Resources 70 1995 controlling culture

Employment Average

% Married Women 19-45 who use Contraception 1990-97

.51**

53

.76**

.54**

53

.26*

.26*

53

.11

.63**

52

.64**

.34**

52

.20

**p<.01, *p<.05, 2-tailed.

inal ideas. Countries whose culture emphasizes hierarchy and mastery also view hard work – critical to insure fulfilling role obligations faithfully and struggling persistently to master reality – as especially important. Obedience does not relate significantly to the egalitarianism/hierarchy dimension, but it does go with a cultural hierarchy orientation as one might expect. Only harmony/mastery, but neither national culture, nor wealth, nor democracy predicts the importance of unselfishness. A mastery orientation may legitimize selfishness because it justifies self-assertion in order to get ahead. People in countries whose culture emphasizes embeddedness, hierarchy, and mastery consider unconditional respect for parents and religion more important and they more strongly oppose behavior that threatens traditional family and sexual mores compared to people in countries

57 59 59 60 60 52

55 55

% who agree that: Must respect parents regardless of qualities & faults Religion very important in life Homosexuality never justifiable Abortion never justifiable Divorce never justifiable Competition is good

% who say would not like as neighbor: Immigrants/foreign workers People with a criminal record -.56** -.43**

-.77** -.71** -.75** -.58** -.63** -.21

-.52** -.53** .48** .03

Autonomy vs. Embeddedness

-.45** -.44**

-.57** -.32* -.63** -.36** -.50** -.32*

-.14 -.57** .24 -.05

Egalitarianism vs. Hierarchy

-.23 -.30*

-.40** -.42** -.39** -.41** -.42** -.29*

-.21 -.27* -.04 -.30*

Harmony vs. Mastery

-.43** -.21

-.64** -.57** -.79** -.48** -.49** -.40**

-.45** -.41** .29* -.05

(.00) (.27)

(-.11) (-.13) (-.48**) (-.06) (.04) (-.30*)

(-.17)A (-.05) (-.05) (-.04)

Democracy 1995 Freedom House

Correlations in parentheses are controlled for country scores on the three cultural value dimensions. **p<.01, *p<.05, 2-tailed.

58 58 58 58

% who select as an especially desirable quality for children to learn Obedience Hard Work Imagination Unselfishness

A

N

Social Attitude

(-.32*) (.01) (.41**) (.07) (.08) (.05)

(-.10) (-.37**) (.33*) (.11)

-.40** (.08) -.57** (-.39**)

-.71** -.48** -.75** -.38** -.46** -.14

-.41** -.62** .56** .11

Economic Level GDPpc 1995

Table 3 Cultural Values and Social Attitudes: Correlations and Mediation of Democracy and Economic Level Effects by Culture (Partialed)

68 • Shalom H. Schwartz

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 69

where autonomy, egalitarianism, and harmony values prevail. These findings are congruent with the fact that the two attitudes express conformity to expectations of authorities and extended kin-groups but thwart innovative, unconventional behavior that expresses individual preferences, and they reject new realities. People are more likely to view competition as good if they live in countries with cultures that emphasize hierarchy and mastery. Both these cultural orientations justify the differential distribution of resources to which competition is directed, whereas their opposing poles, egalitarianism and harmony, call for cooperative regulation of interdependence. Readiness to accept immigrants, foreign workers, or people with criminal records as neighbors is lower in cultures that emphasize embeddedness and hierarchy as opposed to autonomy and egalitarianism. In such cultures, people are more likely to fear exposure to values, beliefs, norms, practices, traditions, etc., that differ from their own. Such exposure challenges and endangers the values, beliefs, etc. they cherish and might undermine the established hierarchical structure of roles they assume to be necessary for the smooth functioning of their society. A cultural emphasis on harmony values, which encourages tolerance, also correlates with acceptance of those with criminal records significantly and of immigrants weakly. Table 3 indicates that national level of democracy correlates significantly with 10 of the 12 social attitudes, as does national economic level. Does culture mediate these associations? I take a reduction of at least 60% in the variance that a structural variable explains to indicate substantial mediation. Using this criterion, the partial correlations in Table 3 reveal that culture substantially mediates the effects of each structural variable for nine of the 10 attitudes it predicts. Culture does not mediate the tendency to approve of competition more where democracy is lower, and it shrinks by only 47% the association of lower national wealth with rejection of neighbors who have a criminal record. These findings suggest that social structural variables may affect individuals’ attitudes largely through their effects on the cultural orientations that prevail in the society.14

14

Although less plausible, one might suggest that cultural orientations influence individuals’ attitudes largely through their effects on the social structural variables. Applying the same criterion of a reduction of at least 60% in the explained variance, this time partialing culture on the structural variables, reveals that democracy and economic level substantially mediate the effects of autonomy vs. embeddedness for only two of the 10 attitudes it predicts, of egalitarianism vs. hierarchy for four of the nine attitudes it predicts, and of harmony vs. mastery for none of the nine attitudes it predicts (partial correlations available from the author).

70 • Shalom H. Schwartz

Attitudes and Behavior in the European Social Survey Thus far, we have examined relations of cultural orientations to the attitudes and behavior of societal members using culture scores based on the SVS. As discussed above, the human values items in the European Social Survey (ESS) also provide scores for these orientations. These scores are based on few items and the heterogeneity and number of countries in the ESS data set is limited. However, studying relations of the cultural value orientations to attitudes and behavior in the representative national samples of the ESS can shed light on the robustness of the cultural value theory. Here, I examine relations of the cultural value orientations to one attitude (opposition to immigration) and two types of behavior (membership in voluntary organizations and political activism). I also present relations of social structural variables to the attitude and behaviors and assess the extent to which culture mediates these relations. In Schwartz (2006), I present more elaborate analyses of the relations of culture to these and other attitudes and behavior, using hierarchical linear modeling to take both individual level (e.g., age, education, personal values) and country level variables into account simultaneously. Table 4 presents correlations with the seven cultural orientations, with measures of country wealth (gross domestic product per capita in 1999) and average annual inflation between 1990 and 1999 from the ESS macro-data file, and with average household size in 2001. The index of democracy varies insufficiently across these countries to merit inclusion. Three ESS items measured opposition to accepting ‘other’ immigrants – those of a different race/ethnic group, from poorer European, and poorer non-European countries. A summary index of these items revealed great variation in levels of opposition across countries.15 Column 1 in Table 4 reveals that opposition to ‘other’ immigrants correlates negatively with intellectual autonomy, egalitarianism, and country economic level, and positively with inflation and household size. The two cultural orientations emphasize openness to and tolerance for what is new and different as well as treating others as moral equals. As such, they encourage acceptance of immigrants and militate against opposing them. To assess mediation of structural effects by culture, I partialed on these two cultural orientations. The partial correlations in parentheses suggest full mediation of structural effects.

15 I included only the 15 West European countries in this analysis, because immigration to East Europe and to Israel has different meanings.

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 71 Table 4 Correlations of Cultural Value Orientations with Selected Attitudes and Behavior across European Social Survey Countries and Mediation of Structural Effects Cultural Value Orientation

Opposition to ‘Other’ Immigrants N

Embeddedness Intellectual Autonomy Affective Autonomy Hierarchy Egalitarianism Harmony Mastery GDPpc 1999 Inflation 1990-99 Household Size 2001

Political Activism

15

Membership in Voluntary Organizations 18

.49 -.63* -.33 .33 -.68** -.23 .19 -.56* (.12)A .69** (.12) .45 (-.04)

-.76** .79** .42 -.26 .60** .06 .07 .54* (.31) -.56* (-.06) -.73** (-.39)

-.63** .84** .40 -.48* .78** .17 -.18 .53* (.39) -.68** (-.19) -.68** (-.20)

20

** p<.01, * p<.05, 2-tailed. Notes: ACorrelation partialed for intellectual autonomy and egalitarianism cultural orientations.

Consider next membership in voluntary organizations, a core aspect of social capital (e.g., Putnam, 2000). The number of memberships in 12 types of organizations (e.g., sports, humanitarian, labor, religious) indexed this variable in the ESS. Column 2 of Table 4 reports correlations with membership. Three cultural orientations and all three structural variables predicted country differences. Greater intellectual autonomy, egalitarianism, and country wealth go with joining voluntary organizations. Cultural embeddedness, higher inflation, and larger households accompany lower membership. Intellectual autonomy and egalitarianism both entail a cultural view of individuals as independent actors with rights and responsibilities to express these interests through voluntary action. This would encourage joining voluntary organizations. In contrast, cultural embeddedness may discourage unnecessary involvement with people outside the broad ingroup; it emphasizes loyalty and devotion to the in-group instead. Such a cultural atmosphere would not support membership in voluntary groups in the wider society. After partialing on intellectual autonomy and egalitarianism, the variance explained by GDPpc, by inflation, and by household size all shrink by at least 60%, suggesting substantial mediation by culture. As a final example, consider political activism. This was measured as the number of politically relevant, legal acts that respondents reported performing in the 12 past months out of nine (e.g., contacting a politician,

72 • Shalom H. Schwartz

participating in a public demonstration, boycotting a product). Intellectual autonomy and egalitarianism predicted greater political activism (column 3 of Table 4), whereas the opposing cultural orientations, embeddedness and hierarchy predicted less activism. Political activism necessitates taking initiatives, expressing views that may oppose conventional practices or expectations, often promoting causes that go beyond in-group selfinterest (e.g., protecting the weak or the environment). Such action fits a cultural atmosphere that encourages autonomous thought, individual responsibility, and cooperative work, but it violates a cultural atmosphere focused on preserving the status quo and the authoritative social order. All three structural variables also correlated significantly with political activism. The cultural orientations of intellectual autonomy and egalitarianism mediated the strong negative effects of inflation and large households on political activism, but not the enhancing effect of country wealth. The three sets of findings in Table 4 suggest, with only one exception, that country wealth, inflation, and household size influence these important attitudes and behaviors largely through their influence on the prevailing cultural value orientations.16 The findings with the ESS data together with those reported earlier for combined teacher and student samples across many nations demonstrate that the cultural orientations have robust effects even when measured with different instruments, in different types of samples, and across a wide variety of countries. It is often more convenient to work with the three cultural dimensions, as reported in Tables 1-3. However, the correlations of the single cultural orientations in Table 4 show that doing so may sometimes obscure meaningful information. The orientations that constitute the poles of each dimension correlate in opposing directions in almost every case, but the strength of the correlations can vary considerably. For all three examples in Table 4, egalitarianism has much stronger correlations than hierarchy, its opposing pole. Moreover, the correlations of intellectual autonomy are much stronger than those of affective autonomy, the orientation with which it combines to form the autonomy pole of the autonomy/embeddedness dimension. These patterns doubtless reflect the particular topics of study. It is therefore worthwhile, in each case, to examine whether combining cultural orientations to form dimensions loses important information. 16

Here too, one might speculate that the two cultural orientations influence individuals’ attitudes and behavior largely through their effects on the social structural variables. Controlling for all three structural variables, the variance explained by the two key cultural values shrinks substantially in five of the six cases. However, the partial correlations for egalitarianism and intellectual autonomy are larger than those for the structural variables in 15 of 18 comparisons (2 values × 3 structural variables × 3 dependent variables).

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 73

Conclusions This article presented a theory of seven cultural value orientations that form three cultural value dimensions. Although it is more complex than other dimensional theories of cultural variation, this theory permits more finely tuned characterizations of cultures. Analyses of data from 73 countries using one instrument and from 20 countries using another demonstrate the validity of the seven cultural orientations. Equally important, the analyses showed that these orientations form an integrated circular structure that captures their theorized compatibilities and oppositions. This yields three broad dimensions (Figure 1). The analyses demonstrated that all three cultural dimensions contribute uniquely to the explanation of important social phenomena. The autonomy/embeddedness and egalitarianism/hierarchy dimensions often showed a similar pattern of positive or negative associations. This reflects the positions of their component orientations, as adjacent or opposed, in the circular structure of cultural orientations. The harmony/mastery dimension exhibited a different pattern of associations. It correlated least strongly with indicators of socio-economic development. Its correlations with the attitudes and behavior studied here were also weaker, perhaps because this article focused on variables related to development. On the other hand, measurement of harmony and mastery may be problematic. The aspects of culture that the harmony/mastery dimension captures may be especially distinctive. It added a unique element to our understanding of attitudes toward unselfishness and competition. The most striking finding when comparing the mapping of national cultures in the research based on the Hofstede, Inglehart, and Schwartz approaches is that they identify such similar cultural regions around the world. At least two of the three approaches, and usually all three, identify African, Confucian, East-Central European (ex-communist), EnglishSpeaking, Latin American, South Asian, and West European regions. This is amazing, considering how different the approaches are. They differ in their basic cultural constructs, in their methods of measurement (work values and attitudes; beliefs, preferences, and judgments on a range of topics; abstract values or profiles reflecting individuals’ important goals), in the types of samples studied (IBM employees, representative national samples, teachers, students), and in their data-gathering periods (from the late ’60s into the 21st century). The emergence of similar cultural regions across approaches affirms the reality of the systematic cultural value differences these approaches tap. The location of similar sets of countries in these regions in the Inglehart and Schwartz mappings also affirms the meaningfulness of countries as cultural units. The substantially similar ordering of countries

74 • Shalom H. Schwartz

on cultural orientations or dimensions, when different sub-samples (e.g., age or gender samples) are used to map countries in both the Schwartz and Inglehart analyses, further supports the idea of national cultures. Nonetheless, it is important to investigate other cultural units, such as ethnic groups, in future research. The research reported here, that used 52 ethnic subgroups from the ESS data as the unit of analysis, demonstrated that discrimination of the seven cultural orientations holds at the ethnic group level and not only at the country level. This enables us to ask questions about cultural differences and similarities among ethnic groups, to compare the impact of nation with that of ethnicity, and to assess the effects of immigration to new countries on the culture of ethnic groups. The analyses revealed substantial empirical overlap between Inglehart’s tradition/secular-rational dimension and my autonomy/embeddedness dimension and between Inglehart’s survival/self-expression dimension and both my autonomy/embeddedness and egalitarianism/hierarchy dimensions. Nonetheless, several countries exhibited substantially divergent rankings on each of these overlapping dimensions. Each dimension apparently captures some aspects of culture not captured by the others. For example, the level of conventional religious commitment apparently influences tradition/secular-rational scores strongly but has much less impact on autonomy/embeddedness scores. In contrast, autonomy-embeddedness scores apparently reflect the cultural emphasis on extended in-group bonds vs. pursuit of individual uniqueness more than tradition/secular rationalscores do. This difference between the cultural dimensions accounts for the divergent rankings of ex-communist countries on the two dimensions. The conceptual and empirical differences between the Schwartz and Inglehart dimensions can be exploited by using them together to derive deeper understandings of particular national cultures. Doing so may also contribute to our understanding of what each dimension and cultural orientation actually taps. We do not yet know what the optimal number of dimensions and orientations is for characterizing and broadly comparing cultures. Nor do we know which dimensions and orientations will be most fruitful. The findings from research using the approach presented here and the World Value Survey suggest, however, that studying basic values is a desirable path to follow. Values are particularly significant dimensions for comparing cultures because they affect so many different aspects of life. But other dimensions of cultural difference may also be important. The critical value dimensions are unlikely to be orthogonal. They evolve as preferences for resolving basic issues in managing life in society. It is not logical that preferences for resolving one issue are independent

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 75

of those for other issues. Cultures that encourage autonomy in individual/ group relations are unlikely to prefer hierarchy for managing human interdependence. Though they are not opposites, autonomy and hierarchy rarely appear together because they presume conflicting views of human nature. Of course, we can derive orthogonal dimensions from data. But in doing so we miss the pull toward coherence in national cultures. To conclude, I quote an earlier summary of the points on which the approach to cultural dimensions presented here differs from others (Schwartz, 2004, p. 73): “(a) It derived the cultural orientations from a priori theorizing rather than post hoc examination of data. (b) It designated a priori the value items that serve as markers for each orientation. (c) It used as measures only items tested for cross-cultural equivalence of meaning. (d) It included a set of items demonstrated to cover the range of values recognized cross-culturally, a step toward ensuring relative comprehensiveness of cultural value dimensions. (e) It specified how the cultural orientations are organized into a coherent system of related dimensions and verified this organization, rather than assuming that orthogonal dimensions best capture cultural reality. (f ) It brought empirical evidence that the order of national cultures on each of the orientations is robust across different types of samples from each of a large number of nations around the world [and using different instruments]. These distinctive features increase the promise of this approach for future research.” References Apodaca, C. 1998 “Measuring women’s economic and social rights achievement”. Human Rights Quarterly, 20, 139-172. Bellah, R. N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W. M., Swidler, A., & Tipton, S. M. 1986 Habits of the heart: Individualism and commitment in American life. New York: Harper & Row. Benedict, R. 1974/1946 The chrysanthemum and the sword: Patterns of Japanese culture. New York: New American Library. Bond, M. H. 1996 “Chinese values”. In M. H. Bond (Ed.) Handbook of Chinese psychology. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Borg, I., & Lingoes, J. C. 1987 Multidimensional similarity structure analysis. New York: Springer-Verlag. Clarke, H. D., Kornberg, A., McIntyre, C., Bauer-Kaase, P., & Kasse, M. 1999 “The effect of economic priorities on the measurement of value change: New experimental evidence”. American Political Science Review, 93, 637-647. Encyclopaedia Britannica Almanac 2005 2004 Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica.

76 • Shalom H. Schwartz Ester, P., Halman, L., & Seuren, B. 1994 “Environmental concern and offering willingness in Europe and North America”. In P. Ester, L. Halman, & R. de Moor (Eds.), The individualizing society: Value change in Europe and North America. Tilburg, The Netherlands: Tilburg University Press. Etzioni, A. 1993 The spirit of community: The reinvention of American society. New York: Simon & Schuster. Fontaine, J. R. J., Poortinga, Y. H., Delbeke, L. 2005, July Structural equivalence of the values domain across cultures: Separating sampling fluctuations from systematic, meaningful variation. In symposium on Measuring Basic Human Values, 1st European Association for Survey Research Conference, Barcelona, Spain. Freedom House (ed.) various Freedom in the world. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. years Goldreich, Y. & Raveh, A. 1993 “Coplot display technique as an aid to climatic classification”. Geographical Analysis, 25, 337-353. Guttman, L. 1968 “A general nonmetric technique for finding the smallest coordinate space for a configuration of points”. Psychometrica, 33, 469-506. Gyekye K. 1997 Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience. Oxford University Press: New York. Hofstede, G. 1980 Culture’s consequences: International differences in work-related values. Beverly Hills CA: Sage. Hofstede, G. 2001 Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations (2nd ed.). Beverly Hills CA: Sage. Huntington, S. P. 1993 “The clash of civilizations”. Foreign Affairs, 72, 22-49. Inglehart, R. 1997 Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic and political change in 43 societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, R., & Baker, W. E. 2000 “Modernization, cultural change, and the persistence of traditional values”. American Sociological Review, 65, 19-51. Inglehart, R., & Basanez, M. Diez-Medrano, J., Halman, L., & Luijkx, R. 2004 Human beliefs and values: A cross-cultural sourcebook based on the 1999-2002 value surveys. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Editores. Kohn, M. L., & Schooler, C. 1983 Work and personality. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Kurian, G. T. 1984 The new book of world rankings. New York: Facts on File Publishers. Lewis, B. 2003 What went wrong: The clash between Islam and modernity in the Middle East. New York: Harper Collins.

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 77 Matsumoto, D. R. 2002 The new Japan: Debunking seven cultural stereotypes. Boston: Intercultural Press. Naroll, R. 1973 “Galton’s problem”. In R. Naroll & R. Cohen (Eds.), A handbook of method in cultural anthropology (pp. 974-989). New York: Columbia University Press. Population Crisis Committee 1988, June Population Briefing Paper No. 20. Washington DC: Population Crisis Committee Putnam, R. D. 1993 Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2000 Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community, New York: Simon & Schuster. Schwartz, S. H. 1992 “Universals in the content and structure of values: Theory and empirical tests in 20 countries”. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 25) (pp. 1-65). New York: Academic Press. 1994a “Are there universal aspects in the content and structure of values?” Journal of Social Issues, 50, 19-45. 1994b “Beyond Individualism/Collectivism: New cultural dimensions of values”. In U. Kim, H. C. Triandis, C. Kagitcibasi, S.-C. Choi, & G. Yoon (Eds.), Individualism and collectivism: Theory, method and applications (pp. 85-119). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 1999 “Cultural value differences: Some implications for work”. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 48, 23-47. 1996 “Value priorities and behavior: Applying a theory of integrated value systems”. In Seligman, C., Olson, J. M. and Zanna, M. P. (eds.), The psychology of values: The Ontario symposium, Vol. 8. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 2003 “A proposal for measuring value orientations across nations”. In Questionnaire development report of the European Social Survey (chap. 7). Retrieved from http:// naticent02.uuhost.uk.uu.net/questionnaire/chapter_07.doc 2004 “Mapping and interpreting cultural differences around the world”. In Vinken, H., Soeters, J. and Ester P. (eds.), Comparing cultures, Dimensions of culture in a comparative perspective. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. 2005a “Basic human values: Their content and structure across countries”. In A. Tamayo & J. B. Porto (Eds.), Valores e Comportamento nas Organizações [Values and Behavior in Organizations] pp. 21-55. Petrópolis, Brazil: Vozes. 2005b “Robustness and fruitfulness of a theory of universals in individual human values”. In A. Tamayo & J. B. Porto (Eds.), ibid., pp. 56-95. 2006 Value orientations: Measurement, antecedents and consequences across nations. In R. Jowell, C. Roberts, R. Fitzgerald, & G. Eva (Eds.), Measuring attitudes cross-nationally – lessons from the European Social Survey. London: Sage. Schwartz, S. H., & Bardi, A. 1997 “Influences of adaptation to communist rule on value priorities in Eastern Europe”. Political Psychology, 18, 385-410. Schwartz, S. H., Bardi, A., & Bianchi, G. 2000 “Value adaptation to the imposition and collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe”. In S. A. Renshon & J. Duckitt (Eds.), Political Psychology: Cultural and Cross Cultural Perspectives (pp. 217-237). London: Macmillan.

78 • Shalom H. Schwartz Schwartz, S. H., & Boehnke, K. 2004 “Evaluating the structure of human values with confirmatory factor analysis”. Journal of Research in Personality, 38, 230-255. Schwartz, S. H., Melech, G., Lehmann, A., Burgess, S., & Harris, M. 2001 “Extending the cross-cultural validity of the theory of basic human values with a different method of measurement”. Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology, 32, 519-542. Schwartz, S. H., & Ros, M. 1995 “Values in the West: A theoretical and empirical challenge to the IndividualismCollectivism cultural dimension”. World Psychology, 1, 99-122. Schwartz, S. H., & Rubel, T. 2005 “Sex differences in value priorities: Cross-cultural and multimethod studies”. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 1010-1028. Tetlock, P. E. 1986 “A value pluralism model of ideological reasoning”. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 819-827. Triandis, H. 1995 Individualism and collectivism. Boulder, CO: Westview. United Nations Women Watch 1999 Fact sheet on women in government. Update of Website: http://www.un.org/ womenwatch/daw/public/percent.htm. United Nations Population Division 1998 World Population Monitoring. Earlier update of Website: http://unstats.un.org/ unsd/mi. Vanhanen, T. 1997 Prospects of democracy. London: Routledge. Weber, M. 1958 The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. New York: Scribners. Welzel, C., Inglehart, R., & Klingemann, H.-D. 2003 “The theory of human development: A cross-cultural analysis”. European Journal of Political Research, 62, 341-379. Williams, R. M., Jr. 1968 “Values”. In E. Sills (Ed.), International encyclopedia of the social sciences. New York: Macmillan. Women’s social equality 1988 Population Briefing Paper No. 20, June 1988, Washington DC: Population Crisis Committee.

Globalization, “McDonaldization” and Values: Quo Vadis? Yilmaz Esmer Abstract It is frequently asserted that the ongoing process that is commonly referred to as globalization should bring about widespread changes in values. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that the unparalleled increases in the flow of capital, goods, services and information coupled with the revolutionary developments in information and communication technologies should result in a convergence of values. This paper is attempt to assess the direction and the magnitude of value change between 1981, when the first WVS/EVS surveys were conducted, and 2001, the last year for which data are available. Data from some 20 countries are analyzed to follow possible changes in values. Furthermore, the paper offers a test of the convergence hypothesis by examining the standard deviations and the coefficients of variation of a wideranging list of values. The conclusion is that cultural value change has been rather limited during this period at least for this sample of countries. Among the dimensions studied, marriage, family and gender relations seem to be the area of most significant change. On the other hand, we have found almost no evidence for even a slow convergence of values.

During the two and a half decades following the first round of values surveys in 1981, the world has witnessed profound changes in political, economic and social spheres and ever accelerating technological advances. If the well-known Chinese curse, “may you live in interesting times” was ever to refer to a specific time period in human history, the last couple of decades of the 20th century would certainly be a strong candidate.

80 • Yilmaz Esmer

The major developments of this era are only too familiar to repeat here. We like to recall historical periods by certain keywords to refer to its major characteristics. And it would perhaps be an understatement to say that the most popular keyword to characterize the last 25 years of world history is “globalization.” The term, according to Anthony Giddens, “has come from nowhere to be everywhere in a period of just a decade.” (quoted in Dervis 2005:3) A casual Google search at the time of this writing turned out no less than 110 million entries for “globalization – definition.” Globalization is customarily defined as an unparalleled increase in the flow of capital, goods, services, and information. Less mentioned are increased political, legal and cultural exchanges which are assumed to bring about convergence in these spheres. However, at least to this author, the most dazzling developments took place in information and communication technologies. Many products and services that seem to be integral and indispensable parts of our lives either became widespread or even came into existence during this era. Younger generations cannot even imagine a life without portable computers, mobile telephones, the internet, MP3 players and so goes on the list. Yet those in their 50s today will remember the days when such gadgets and services were too wild even for the fantasies of writers of science fiction. The impact of these technological developments on both the speed and the volume of communication and information exchange has been mind boggling. It was around the middle of the last century when social scientists were measuring postal mail and telephone traffic as indicators of social integration. In two seminal works, Nationalism and Social Communication (Deutsch 1962) and The Nerves of Government (Deutsch 1966) Karl Deutsch was drawing attention to the central role of communication in government and international relations. Likening it to the nerve system of an organism, Deutsch stressed the significance of communication as well as the movement of goods and services in drawing up civilizational and cultural boundaries. “Several societies might be connected to each other by a larger interchange of goods and services than with any other societies. In this case we might say that they form a sort of great society, something parallel in some respects to what is sometimes called a civilization, but not identical with it.” Furthermore, communication is an important element in forming the “common set of stable, habitual preferences” that defines a culture. “In so far as a common culture facilitates communication, it forms a community” (Deutsch 1962:88; emphases original). The “interchange of goods and services” as well as capital among countries today is not even comparable to what existed in the 1950s.

Globalization, “McDonaldization” and Values: Quo Vadis? • 81

Capital markets are highly integrated around the globe and huge sums can travel between countries instantly, sometimes opening the door for serious financial crises. Movies and books circle the world in a few seconds. Tens or even hundreds of millions visit the same websites, watch the same news channels, and even laugh at the same jokes that are circulated on the internet. They watch the same movies and enjoy the same fast food. McDonald serves “more customers daily than there are people in Greece, Ireland, and Switzerland together” (Barber 1996:23). According to the Universal Postal Union (www.upu.int), as of October 2005, people around the world send 16 million international postal items and 1.2 billion domestic postal items a day. Compared to the e-mail traffic, however, these figures look rather unimpressive. Again as of October 2005, there were 1.2 billion active e-mail accounts and 686 million e-mail users in the world. The number of e-mail messages per day were estimated to be around 141 billion (figures are from www.radicati. com). Telecommunication statistics published by the International Telecommunication Union, an agency of the U.N., are equally, if not more, remarkable. In 1991, there were 546 million main telephone lines and only 16 million mobile cellular subscribers in the world. By the end of 2004, while the number of main lines more than doubled to 1,207 million, the number of mobile subscribers reached 1,758 million. The number of internet users increased almost two-hundredfold, from 4.4 to 863 million. Despite the astounding rise in internet communications, globalization had an effect on more conventional modes of telecommunication as well. For instance, again between 1991 and 2004, international telephone traffic minutes increased from 38 billion to 145 billion (www. itu.org). As critics point out, there is no doubt that globalization has not yet reached large populations in the third world who are, for all intents and purposes, outside the “global loop.” However, it is equally true that at the end of the 20th century, more people than ever in the history of mankind were involved in the international exchange of goods, services and cultural products and were engaged in intense communication. As put by Stiglitz (2002:4) “Globalization has reduced the sense of isolation felt in much of the developing world and has given many people in the developing countries access to knowledge well beyond the reach of even the wealthiest in any country a century ago. The antiglobalization protests themselves are a result of this connectedness.” So profound were the developments in international communication during the last 15 to 20 years. On the other hand, the changes in the global political and economic scene were extraordinary as well, to say the least. At the beginning of the decade of the 1980s, when the first

82 • Yilmaz Esmer

European and World Values Surveys were carried out, the European Union had nine member states. By 1995, that number rose to 15 and on January 1, 2002, twelve of the 15 members took a gigantic step towards economic integration and adopted a common currency. Two years later, in 2004, the EU accepted 10 more countries for full membership and four additional ones are at the doorsteps. Although the process is by no means complete and although nation-states are still the main centers of political decision-making, Europe today is more united and integrated than it has ever been in its history. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Communist system represented yet another momentous step towards political and economic integration. Although this was not “the end of history,” it nevertheless brought an end to the Cold War and the bipolarity in international relations that the world had gotten so used to. Most of the formerly Communist Eastern Europe and some former Soviet republics acceded to the EU. Markets opened up. Exchanges at all levels and in all spheres between the former East and the West intensified. Indeed, “there is a profound sense of globalism brought about by tourism, by world sport, world news, McDonaldization, AIDS, human rights and so on” (Turner 1994:9). In view of these radical changes and technological developments, a legitimate question to ask is what happened to cultural values. First, did the values change significantly and if so what was the magnitude and direction of the change? Second, is the world really “McDonaldizing?” (Ritzer 2000). In other words, can one meaningfully talk about a convergence of values. If values are dependent on or even simply related to economic, political and technological structures, convergence of values would be a very plausible hypothesis. In fact, cultural convergence of sorts is a very widely held assumption. Berger (2002:2) agrees with the common wisdom: “What everyone assumes is not always wrong. There is indeed an emerging global culture, and it is heavily American in origin and content. It is not the only game in town [. . .] but it is the biggest game going and it will likely stay that way for the foreseeable future.” Inkeles (1998) while recognizing the existence of strong local resistances here and there, nevertheless, makes a strong case for convergence. He distinguishes between two areas of convergence. First, there is convergence at the institutional level. All nations adopt similar institutional patterns. But more important for our present purposes, “the second realm of convergence involves the movement of national populations away from whatever had been their diverse indigenous cultural patterns and toward the adoption of attitudes, values and modes of daily behavior that constitute the elements of a more or less common world culture. In this

Globalization, “McDonaldization” and Values: Quo Vadis? • 83

process, almost every aspect of life is influenced, and in many instances profoundly changed” (Inkeles 1998:xiv). Inkeles (1998:xvii) goes further to argue that “the transformative power of modern institutions is so great that the response of the people to them will be very much alike regardless of the population’s cultural starting point or the larger socioeconomic context in which they are located.” This is a powerful statement indeed and one with which Taylor (2001), among others, disagrees. In Taylor’s view, modernization is not an acultural process as argued by many. Forces of modernization interact with local cultural values and may proceed along different paths. Hence, alternative or multiple modernities. Convergence or not, the widely acknowledged assumption is that modernization and globalization will inevitably bring about significant changes in values. Change may be unilinear as many classical and some contemporary modernization theorists predicted or it may be more culture dependent (Taylor 2001) and will not necessarily follow a predetermined path (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). If we assume value change to be propelled by the powerful forces of modernization and globalization, we are faced with a number of important and interesting questions. First, which values are most likely to change and how fast? Second, which societies will be more prone and which will be more resistant to change? Third, should we expect value change in a whole society or in certain segments of it, such as the better educated, the younger, the well-off, etc.? Fourth, assuming change, will it be change along parallel paths or do we observe a convergence (at least a move towards convergence) of values? At the other extreme, is it even possible that, despite such cultural standardization on the surface, some cultural values are diverging rather than converging? It is often stated that advanced societies are characterized by a value shift towards individualization (Ester, Halman and de Moor 1993). So much so that, individualization lies at the core of all value change brought about by modernization (Inkeles 1998). Inglehart argues that this move toward individualization, already visible during the process of industrialization, becomes even more pronounced and more free of state authority in the postindustrialized society (Inglehart 1997). Religion is a major area of expected change. It is thought that increased secularization is itself highly related to individualization. Individualization, after all, means a weakening of social and state controls on the individual and religion, in one form or another, has been the main vehicle of social control in all societies. That modernization (that is, an emphasis on rational thinking and the scientific method) will bring about secularization is a core idea of the Enlightenment. The secularization process is thought to have accelerated particularly in Western Europe in the

84 • Yilmaz Esmer

post-World War II era, but persistently high levels of religiosity in the United States is still in want of a satisfactory explanation. Another possible exception is the Islamic world which, to many, is becoming, if anything, not less but rather more religious. Therefore, many argue that the predictions of secularization theory simply did not materialize (Berger 1999). Nevertheless, there is good reason, both theoretical and empirical, to think that we have been heading towards a more secularized world on the whole despite strong resistance and sporadic reversals (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Clearly, religion is one major area for observing change. Family is as universal an institution as one can find. It exists in some form or another in every society and people everywhere always have and still do attach great importance to the family (Esmer 2004). Emphasizing the centrality of marriage and family relations in every society, Inkeles (1998:xvii) writes that “if marriage and family patterns can be shown to converge, then it might be argued that no other institution can hope to escape the pressures for the adoption of new modes of interpersonal relationship. We do indeed find much evidence of profound change and of resultant convergence in the way in which marriages are arranged in residence patterns, in fertility rates and in many other matters.” The expected direction of change is a move away from arranged marriages, extended families and large numbers of children. Divorce becomes more and more commonplace and acceptable. Premarital sex ceases to be a taboo. In fact, the very logic of a legal marriage is questioned and consensual unions may be preferred over civil or church marriages. Very much related to changes in marriage and family relations are the status of women and gender relations. Industrialization opened the way for female employment. Postindustrialization made it possible for women to pursue careers in areas traditionally in the exclusive domain of men such as politics, banking, sciences, etc. Along with these developments, values changed as well. Gender equity, as least in theory, gained wider acceptance. Female employment became much more widespread and, more importantly, gained widespread approval. As a natural consequence of these changes, women in postindustrialized societies demand more sexual freedoms and equality with men in the bedroom. Helped by the advances in birth control methods, virginity and chastity are expected to lose their status as core values in large segments of postindustrial societies. The postmaterialist citizen is expected to be more tolerant of differences. Minorities are not to be discriminated against and differences in sexual orientations are to be accepted. Tolerance, of course, is a central demo-

Globalization, “McDonaldization” and Values: Quo Vadis? • 85

cratic value as well and globalization is expected to bring about a pronounced shift towards democratic values such as tolerance, participation, free speech, rule of law, etc. While political values become more democratic, economic values are to favor market over state regulation or intervention. Competition, entrepreneurship, meritocracy are to become dominant values. This is only natural if free movement of goods, services and finance capital (but certainly not labor) is a fundamental and defining characteristic of globalization. Globalization should also cause a decrease in nationalism and nationalistic sentiments. If national borders mean less and less both economically and culturally, it follows that nationalism as a value must lose ground. The eventual expectation would be a global citizen with global values – however one defines the latter. In short, the cultural consequences of modernization which can be summed up as a decrease in the importance of religion, traditional family and nationalism are assumed to continue and even intensify. To this list, one could add the dominant political and economic/business values that we have briefly mentioned above. Finally, standardization of all cultural forms, or “McDonaldization” would reign. Are these developments, which make eminent sense from a certain theoretical viewpoint, indeed taking place? Or are the local forces putting up strong and successful resistance to the winds of globalization? Inglehart and Baker (2000) – while arguing that economic development has a powerful impact on cultural values – nevertheless think that both of the above statements are true. In other words, while there is evidence of significant and large scale cultural change, cultural traditions do persist in many places. Is beauty, then, in the eye of the beholder? To some extent this must be true – you will probably find change if you look for change and vice versa. It is also true that the answer to the question mostly depends on where you look. Take religiosity, for example. If your focus is Northern and Western Europe, you find strong confirmation of secularization theory. If you turn your eyes to the United States – an equally modernized, wealthy and postindustrial society – you will observe exactly the opposite. Which one is the exception? And how about the less developed, less advanced corners of the globe? How does one even begin to explain the resurgence of fundamentalist Islam? It seems like both modernization theorists and culturalists are right to some extent. And perhaps it would be misleading to assume that a single answer valid for all societies or even only for a subset of societies exists. Nevertheless, it is hard to resist the temptation to detect the overall direction of the winds of change.

86 • Yilmaz Esmer

Convergence is yet another issue and perhaps the key concept to test whether culture is a dependent or an independent variable. If, despite all the developments that we have very briefly summarized above, there is still no observable convergence of values, it will be difficult if not impossible to argue that cultural values simply follow and reflect political, economic and technological changes. Inglehart and Baker (2000:49), after examining data from 65 societies, conclude that “Economic development tends to push societies in a common direction, but rather than converging, they seem to move on parallel trajectories shaped by their cultural heritages. We doubt that the forces of modernization will produce a homogenized world culture in the foreseeable future.” Put differently, modernization (economic and technological development, industrialization, mass education, etc.) does exert an influence on values in a predicted direction, but the magnitude and occasionally even the direction of the influence will depend on cultural heritage – a concept which, for the most part, can be translated as “religious traditions.”1 Taken to its logical extreme, this line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that religious tradition is the single most important factor in explaining cultural change. In other words, forces of modernization will have different effects even on secularized populations depending on their past religious traditions or heritage. Szakolczai and Fustos (1998) emphasize the significance of axial belief systems in structuring value systems. Thus, they concur with Inglehart and Baker about the importance of, for example, Catholic and Protestant traditions as axial moments. One remembers the widely told story about the survey researcher asking a respondent her religion. When given the answer “I am an atheist” the interviewer probes further: “I understand; but are you a Catholic atheist or a Protestant atheist?” Research seems to confirm that being a Catholic atheist or a Protestant atheist – or Jewish or Muslim atheist, for that matter – does make a difference. If that is the case, and if such “axial moments” have long-lasting effects, then the cultural convergence predicted by the broad range of scholars who see structure and communication as major independent variables is a long way off. Adding an important dimension to the convergence-divergence debate, Diez-Nicolas (2002) argues that a convergence of values will take place among the elite much sooner than the masses and he has developed a social position scale to test his hypothesis. He finds that those at the top of the scale do indeed exhibit a convergence of values. 1 Inglehart and Baker (2000) do mention factors other than religion that define a society’s cultural heritage. For instance, experience of living under Communism is one such factor.

Globalization, “McDonaldization” and Values: Quo Vadis? • 87

The minimum necessary requirement to answer the questions that we have posed is the availability of a measure of cultural change. But defining and measuring cultural change is not a simple task, to say the least. The concept is multi-dimensional in the true sense of the word and both the magnitude and the direction of change are different for different dimensions as well as for different societies. Thus for each society, one can think of a matrix of value dimensions and the velocity of change. If one wanted, one could further divide the matrix into different age, education, income, etc. groups. There have been well-known attempts to reduce the number of value dimensions and to trace change along these limited numbers of dimensions which can explain a significant proportion of the total variance in all measured values. The updated versions of two of the most notable contributions in the literature to the mapping of global values are included in this volume (see the articles by Inglehart and by Schwartz) where the authors explain their schemes in detail. In this article, I have a much more modest aim. I will select few theoretically significant value clusters that have been listed above to try to see if and how they have changed since 1981. In addition variances between the two points in time will be compared in order to assess whether or not one can meaningfully talk about a convergence of values. Data and Analysis European and World Values Surveys enable us to trace cultural change in some 20 countries in the two decades between 1981 and 2001. Admittedly, this is a limited number of cases for a conclusive analysis. However, the list of countries for which comparative data are available for 1981 and for two decades later includes societies from all continents and at varying levels of economic development (Table 1). Of course, 20 years may be too short a period of time to see the full effects of the political, economic and technological developments of the era, but this is the longest time span that our data will allow. The following analysis looks at data both at the individual and country levels. At the individual level, overall means and variances for 1981 and 20012 surveys are compared. The former, of course, will show us the degree and the direction of change. A decrease in variances, on the other hand, will point out to a convergence. Data for the individual level analyses are weighted so that the sample sizes of countries are

2

Actually, these surveys have been conducted between 1999 and 2001 with the exception of Australia where the most recent survey is dated 1996.

88 • Yilmaz Esmer

Table 1 Countries Included in the 20-Year Comparison GDP/Cap 1980 Argentina Australia Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France W. Germany/Germany Great Britain+N. Ireland Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Japan S. Korea Mexico Netherlands S. Africa Spain Sweden USA

GDP/Cap 1998

8,245 14,334 14,467 16,176 15,227 12,948 15,103 14,113 12,928 n.a.

9,219 20,390 19,442 20,559 22,123 18,324 19,558 17,799 18,714 6,780

8,541 13,153 13,429 4,114 6,289 14,700 4,390 9,492 14,936 18,577

18,183 17,759 20,431 13,317 6,655 20,224 3,858 14,227 18,685 27,331

Source: Maddison, Angus. 2001. The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. Paris: OECD.

equalized. At the country level, we compare the variances of country means at the beginning and the end of the two decades. Again, a decrease in these variances would indicate that, on the average, the countries in question are getting closer with respect to the particular value. It is not impossible for the comparison of variances at these two levels to yield different results. To clarify the point by way of a more familiar example, income distribution of individuals in a given country may deteriorate but at the same time regional mean incomes may get closer to the overall mean. It is sometimes asserted that, when the means of the two measurements (in our case the means for 1981 and 2001 surveys) are significantly different, the coefficient of variation V (where V is equal to the standard deviation divided by the mean) is a better measure of dispersion since it corrects the standard deviation for the size of the mean. It can

Globalization, “McDonaldization” and Values: Quo Vadis? • 89

be shown that the maximum value that V can attain is equal to the square root of N-1. Thus a comparison of the ratio of V to the maximum possible value of V is an indicator of convergence or divergence. Our analyses take into account the changes in both the standard deviations and the coefficients of variation. Before reporting the results, we should warn that statistical significance levels should be regarded with great caution. It is clear that with tens of thousands of observations, even infinitesimal differences at the individual level will be statistically significant. On the other hand, with a maximum of 21 observations at the country level, it will be very difficult to obtain statistical significance. Finally, it should be noted that not every country in Table 1 is included in every analysis due to the fact that some questions have not been asked in some countries. We now turn our attention to the results of the analyses, starting with religiosity. a. Religiosity Secularization theory has a clear and universal prediction with respect to the relationship between modernization and the level of religiosity: higher levels of economic welfare and higher levels of secular education with its emphasis on the scientific method will bring about a noticeable decrease in the importance of religion. On the other hand, critics of secularization theories draw our attention to the positive correlation between religious diversity and the level of religiosity (for a detailed analysis of these approaches see Pettersson in this issue; see also Esmer and Pettersson, forthcoming). Needless to say, religiosity itself is a multi-dimensional concept and the researcher is faced with the task of selecting the appropriate indicators for operationalizing each dimension of religiosity. At the very minimum, a distinction is made between faith and practice. Considering data limitations, I will use two measures of religiosity in the following analyses: a. “Importance of God in one’s life scale” which runs from 1 to 10 with higher values indicating more importance of God in respondent’s life. The scale has been used in all values surveys since 1981 and has proved to be a valid and reliable measure. b. An additive scale (RELSCALE) consisting of six dichotomous (0 and 1) questions. These are: i. Religion is an important value for children to learn ii. Attendance at religious services (once a week or more vs. less frequently)

90 • Yilmaz Esmer

iii. Respondent defines himself/herself as a religious person vs. not religious or atheist iv. Belief in life after death v. Belief in hell vi. Belief in heaven The six variables that make up the RELSCALE all have high item to scale correlations with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.82 for 1981 (16,009 observations) and 0.81 for 2001 (19,081) observations.3 The scale has a minimum value of 0 (not religious at all) and a maximum value of 6 (very religious). The mean importance of God score for individuals in 1981 was 6.19 with a standard deviation of 3.20. In 2001, this score was 6.20 with a standard deviation of 3.25. Although the difference between the two means is significant at the 0.01 level for reasons mentioned above, it is obvious that there was no change in the importance of God during this time period. On the other hand, the standard deviation increased very slightly, ruling out progress towards convergence. The mean for the six-item religiosity scale, again at the individual level, decreased from 3.76 to 3.50 from 1981 to 2001. Unlike the importance of God and in line with the predictions of secularization theory, we observe an overall decline in religiosity during the period of our analysis. Interestingly enough, the standard deviation of the scale increased also (2.25 in 1981 and 2.29 in 2001) disconfirming the convergence hypothesis. Table 2 reports the standard deviations of the country means giving us an idea about the overall dispersion when countries are the units of analysis. Confirming the individual level analysis, we observe that the variances of both variables, let alone decrease, have increased between 1981 and 2001. As the last two columns in Table 2 indicate, this finding is confirmed when the standard deviation is replaced by the coefficient of variation as our measure of dispersion. These data lead us to conclude that we do not observe a convergence of religious values during the last two decades of the 20th century for the countries analyzed. To the contrary, a slight decrease in religiosity overall is, if anything, accompanied by divergence.

3 Reliability scores are calculated from weighted data while the number of observations refer to the actual (unweighted) number of cases.

Globalization, “McDonaldization” and Values: Quo Vadis? • 91 Table 2 Standard Deviations and Coefficients of Variation: 1981 and 2001 (Means or Proportions of Countries) Standard Deviation

Levene’s Test

Coefficient of variation (V)

V/Vmax

1981

2001

F

Sig.

1981

2001

1981

2001

Importance of God

1.46 (20)

1.63 (21)

0.44

0.51

0.236

0.262

0.054

0.059

Six-item religiosity scale

1.16 (19)

1.18 (20)

0.00

1.00

0.314

0.342

0.074

0.078

Proportion most people can be trusted

10.87 (21)

15.44 (21)

1.05

0.31

0.285

0.422

0.064

0.094

Proportion saying “marriage is outdated”

5.17 (21)

7.21 (21)

1.07

0.31

0.296

0.355

0.066

0.079

Mean justifiability of divorce

0.85 (21)

0.96 (21)

0.73

0.40

0.177

0.166

0.040

0.037

Mean justifiability of abortion

1.00 (21)

1.28 (21)

0.88

0.35

0.256

0.281

0.057

0.063

Mean ideal number of children

0.40 (20)

0.19 (9)

2.63

0.62

0.147

0.072

0.034

0.025

Proportion not wanting neighbor of diff. race

4.96 (20)

8.06 (19)

2.96

0.09

0.603

0.758

0.139

0.179

Proportion choosing respect & tolerance as important for children

11.63 (20)

7.73 (21)

3.32

0.08

0.233

0.098

0.053

0.022

Justifiability of homosexuality

1.01 (21)

1.56 (21)

2.07

0.16

0.325

0.312

0.073

0.070

Proportion who have signed a petition

16.73 (20)

22.01 (21)

0.88

0.35

0.417

0.406

0.096

0.091

Proportion willing to fight for country

18.34 (21)

16.53 (13)

0.33

0.57

0.281

0.263

0.063

0.076

Proportion very proud of nationality

16.91 (21)

20.91 (21)

1.05

0.31

0.351

0.418

0.078

0.093

Mean life satisfaction scale

0.74 (20)

0.74 (21)

0.06

0.81

0.101

0.101

0.023

0.023

92 • Yilmaz Esmer

b. Interpersonal Trust Interpersonal trust, an important component of social capital, is closely related both to economic development and democratization. Since the period we are analyzing has witnessed both economic development and considerable democratization, we should expect to observe an increase in the overall levels of interpersonal trust and a convergence of societies with respect to this value. In 1981, the proportion of those who stated that “most people can be trusted” was 38.3 percent. At the end of the twenty-year period, the figure stood at 36.4%. The difference is small enough to be ignored, but it is apparent that interpersonal trust did not increase despite the institutional and structural changes that took place. Aggregated proportions are very similar. On the other hand, the standard deviation of country proportions increased substantially from 10.87 to 15.44, indicating that although the overall trust levels did not change much, the dispersion around the mean became larger. Similarly, V/Vmax values given in Table 2 increased during the period of analysis disconfirming any expectations of convergence. c. Marriage and Family As already mentioned, according to Inkeles, marriage and family relations are so central that if we are to look for change anywhere we had better start with the family. We use the following four indicators to follow the changes in this core institution: – – – –

Proportion of Position on a Position on a Ideal number

those stating that ‘marriage is an outdated institution.’ 10-point ‘justifiability of divorce’ scale. 10-point ‘justifiability of abortion’ scale. of children

In 1981, 17.4 percent of the persons interviewed (weighted to equalize the Ns for all countries) agreed with the statement that marriage is an outdated institution. In 2001, the proportion was up to 20.5 percent. This is not a very substantial increase but needs to be noted nevertheless. However, the standard deviation, once again, increased considerably from 5.17 to 7.21. By the same token, the V/Vmax value increased from 0.066 to 0.079. The slight shift away from traditional marriage did not take place at an even pace. Once more, measures of dispersion point out to divergence rather than convergence. Parallel to the increase in the proportion of those who believe that traditional marriage is an outdated institution, there is a marked rise in

Globalization, “McDonaldization” and Values: Quo Vadis? • 93

the acceptance of divorce. On the “justifiability of divorce scale” where higher scores indicate greater acceptance, the mean increased from 4.82 to 5.82 while the standard deviation remained essentially the same (2.92 in 1981 vs. 2.95 in 2001). Equal variances but higher means for this variable are indicative of a parallel change rather than convergence or divergence. The standard deviation of country means, on the other hand, did increase from 0.85 to 0.96 while the V/Vmax values were essentially unchanged (0.040 vs. 0.037). In short, the attitudes towards divorce became considerably more favorable without exhibiting a converging or a diverging pattern. WVS/EVS questionnaires included a scale, same as the divorce scale, to tap attitudes about abortion. In agreement with our expectations, like the divorce score, the mean “justifiability of abortion” score also increased from 3.92 to 4.52. There was also a slight increase in standard deviation from 2.95 to 3.09. On the other hand, the rise in variance at the aggregate level is much more marked and this increase in dispersion is confirmed by the coefficients of variation. Finally, we compare the means, variances and the coefficients of variance of the answers given to the question about the ideal number of children. Although an excellent indicator, this question was asked only in nine countries in 2001. Therefore, the findings about this variable should be regarded as extremely tentative. Nevertheless, we observe a slight decrease in the mean ideal number of children and a very slight increase in variance at the individual level. Although at the macro level, a marked decrease in variance and a much less decrease in V/Vmax values are observed, it is not wise to reach even a tentative conclusion based on nine observations only. d. Tolerance It is interesting to see if, as a result of the spread of democratic regimes, expansion of individual freedoms, growing emphasis on human rights, highlighting of anti-discriminatory measures and various campaigns in the 1980s and 1990s, populations in general have become more tolerant and respectful of differences. We use two indicators to trace the changes in tolerance levels: a. proportion of those who do not want a neighbor of a different race, and b. whether or not respondents have chosen respect for others and tolerance as a desirable child quality. At least judging by this subset of countries and using the “want/not want neighbor of a different race” question as an indicator of tolerance, we observe that individuals have become less and not more tolerant.

94 • Yilmaz Esmer

The proportion of those who are not happy with a neighbor of a different race rose from 8.2 percent in 1981 to 11.0 percent in 2001. This is a significant, and perhaps alarming, increase indeed. One slight consolation could be the big increase in standard deviations at the macro level (4.96 in 1981 to 8.06 in 2001). At least the move towards racial intolerance is not uniform as confirmed by the coefficients of variation as well. The second indicator of tolerance is the proportion of those who choose tolerance and respect for others as a desirable child quality. Unlike racial intolerance, we observe a significant increase towards more tolerance with this indicator. Indeed, the proportion of those who chose respect and tolerance as a desirable child quality jumped from around one half (49.9 percent) to almost four-fifths (78.8 percent). This is a remarkable ascent indeed. Furthermore, the standard deviations and the coefficients of variation at the aggregate level also point to a convergence. In fact, so far, this is the first indicator in the analysis which can lend support to the convergence hypothesis. (Table 2). e. Tolerance for Homosexuality Acceptance of or at least greater tolerance for different sexual orientations and of more sexual freedom is seen as a fundamental component of the so-called self-expression values (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Almost all Western democracies have taken legal measures in the last couple of decades to end various kinds of discrimination against homosexuals. Some have gone all the way to accepting homosexual marriages and granting gay/lesbian couples the same rights as heterosexual couples. Needless to say, the situation is quite different in traditional and particularly in Islamic societies. However, our sample does not include any predominantly Muslim societies and only a couple developing countries. Therefore, in our subset of countries, we can expect to observe increased acceptance of homosexuality. This indeed is the case. In 1981, mean “justifiability of homosexuality” score was 3.12 on a scale of 1 to 10. Thus, to a great extent, homosexuality was regarded as unjustifiable and unacceptable. In 2001, the mean rose to 5.07. This is certainly a significant shift in values although still far from a high degree of acceptance. At the individual level, the variance for this scale has increased during the 20-year period. The same is true for the aggregate level data as well (1.01 in 1981 and 1.56 in 2001). The increases in variances both at the micro and the macro levels while the V/Vmax ratios remaining essentially the same indicate that the change in the attitudes towards homosexuality is, at least yet, not in the direction of convergence.

Globalization, “McDonaldization” and Values: Quo Vadis? • 95

f. Participation and Efficacy Citizens of postindustrial countries engage in various modes of political participation and feel that they can make a difference. They take part in a range of campaigns around issues, they demonstrate, they boycott goods and they strike. They form and join voluntary organizations. Within the limits of this chapter, we test change and convergence hypotheses with respect to participation with one indicator: actually having signed a petition to demand some action by the authorities. In 1981, 40.8 percent of the citizens of our sample of countries indicated that they had signed a petition. In 2001, this figure was 52.4 percent. This is an increase in the expected direction. However, macro level variances (comparison of both standard deviations and coefficients of variation), once again, point to a divergence rather than convergence. g. Nationalism Is globalization the antidote of nationalism or is it a process that, perhaps paradoxically, reinforces nationalism? Both arguments are plausible and have their proponents. Nevertheless, at least theoretically, all the familiar developments that we referred to at the beginning of this chapter should generate less and not more nationalistic feelings. It is hard to envision McDonaldization to foster nationalism unless it is thought to encourage reactive thoughts and wake up dormant values. WVS/EV questionnaires include two interesting questions to tap nationalism. They are: how proud the respondent is of his/her nationality; and whether or not the respondent would be willing to fight for his/her country. In 1981, 66.2 percent of the respondents indicated that they would be willing to fight for their country. In 2001, the proportion was slightly lower at 63.3 percent. At the macro level the variance in 2001 is also slightly lower but, as confirmed by the increase in V/Vmax proportions from 1981 to 2001, this is mostly due to the significantly lower number of observations (N = 13) in 2001. Otherwise, we again observe divergence rather than convergence. With respect to our second indicator of nationalist sentiments, almost no change occurred in the proportion of those who are very proud of their nationalities (48.5 percent in 1981 and 49.4 percent in 2001). On the other hand, the standard deviation of country level proportions increased from 16.91 to 20.91 and the V/Vmax ratio from 0.078 to 0.093. It seems like the level of nationalistic sentiments have remained much the same during this period while the variance has increased slightly.

96 • Yilmaz Esmer

h. Life Satisfaction Finally, we look at the life satisfaction levels of individuals in 1981 and 2001. In both surveys, respondents were asked to place themselves on a ten-point life satisfaction scale. Interestingly enough, the mean score is exactly the same (7.32) for the two points in time and the standard deviations are almost equal (2.07 vs. 2.13) as well. It seems like all the radical and revolutionary changes that took place in the course of the two decades made people (at least the populations of the countries that are in our sample) neither less, nor more satisfied with their lives. Furthermore, the distribution for this question remained unchanged as well both at the individual and the macro levels. Apparently, of all the values we have analyzed, life satisfaction has been the most stable, with respect to both central tendency and dispersion during the last two decades of the last century. Conclusion The 1980s and the 1990s have been an era of rapid and intense technological, political and economic change. Revolutionary innovations in information and communication technologies connected individuals in all parts of the globe in an unprecedented manner. The internet provided not only an invaluable source of information with its billions of pages available online, but it also became a forum for voicing opinions on virtually every conceivable subject and issue. For the first time in history, no financial means are needed to reach out and potentially persuade millions. New technologies have been changing the way business is conducted in a profound way. It is often argued that, as a result of these developments, a standardized world culture is emerging or, as some like to declare, the world is being “McDonaldized.” Globalization can be good or bad depending on one’s viewpoint. More specifically, it can be good for some and not so good for others. But there is no question that globalization is advancing at an incredible speed. The political developments of the period have not been less impressive. A system that ruled over a third of the world as well as its ideological foundations collapsed. Almost overnight, totalitarian states took steps to convert themselves to democracy. Likewise, and again almost overnight, centrally planned economies of the Eastern bloc became market economies. Few social scientists would argue that such sweeping changes will not produce and accelerate cultural change. After all, if such far reaching, intense, and pervasive transformations do not change cultural values, what will?

Globalization, “McDonaldization” and Values: Quo Vadis? • 97

A second, and equally common, expectation is that we have been experiencing a convergence of values. After all, without convergence, McDonaldization is a hollow concept. In this article, we attempted a modest test of both assumptions – change and convergence – in a number of cultural spheres. We used data from the 1981 and the 1999-2001 rounds of European and World Values Surveys. Although this choice severely limited the size of our sample, we wanted to use the longest time period data would allow. Indeed, even 20 years is a short period of time to fully observe cultural change. When data from the 2005-2006 surveys become available, it will be possible to increase both the number and the diversity of countries substantially. With data from around 20 countries, mostly from the industrialized world, we conclude that cultural value change has been rather limited and mass values are not converging. It seems marriage and family relations are one area of, albeit limited, change. If Inkeles is right, change in this sphere should be followed by change of values in a variety of areas. But we certainly have not been able to find any evidence to substantiate Inkeles’ convergence thesis. However, a number of considerations prevent us from making a conclusive statement. First, both the direction and the speed of change will be different in different societies. Local cultures will no doubt play an important role here (Taylor 2001; Ester, Halman, de Moor 1993). Second, short term divergence or non-convergence does not necessarily rule out long term convergence (Ester, Halman, de Moor 1993). As noted, 20 years may not be a sufficiently long period for the process of cultural change to unveil. Third, convergence may start at the elite level (Diez-Nicolas, 2002) and then spread to the masses with a lag. Fourth, generational replacement may be the main vehicle of value change (Inglehart 1997). With all these caveats, we have found evidence of limited cultural change and almost no evidence of convergence between 1981 and 2001. We may further speculate that, if convergence is infrequent – almost non-existent – in our sample of mostly advanced, industrialized countries, it is much less likely to be observed in less developed societies. References Barber, Benjamin R. 1996 Jihad vs. McWorld. New York: Ballantine Books. Berger, Peter L., ed. 1999 The Desecularization of the World. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 2002 “Introduction” in Berger, Peter L. and Samuel P. Huntington, Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World. 1-16. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

98 • Yilmaz Esmer Dervis, Kemal 2005 A Better Globalization: Legitimacy, Governance and Reform. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development. Deutsch, Karl W. 1962 Nationalism and Social Communication. 2nd ed. Cambridge and London: The M.I.T. Press. 1966 The Nerves of Government. Ontario: The Free Press (originally published in 1963). Diez-Nicolas, Juan 2002 “Two Contradictory Hypotheses on Global Governance: Societal Convergence or Civilization Difference and Clash.” Comparative Sociology. Vol. 1. no. 3-4. 465-94. Esmer, Yilmaz 2004 “Cross-cultural Comparisons, Survey Methodology and the Values Surveys.” in Inglehart, Ronald, et al., eds. Human Beliefs and Values. 385-399. Mexico: Siglo XXI editors. Esmer, Yilmaz and Thorleif Pettersson 2007 “Religion at the Ballot Box.” In Dalton, Russell and Hans-Dieter Klingeman, eds. Handbook of Political Behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ester, Peter, Loek Halman and Ruud de Moor, eds. 1993 The Individualizing Society: Value Change in Europe and North America. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press. Inglehart, Ronald 1997 Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne Baker 2000 “Modernization, Cultural Change and the Persistence of Traditional Values.” American Sociological Review, vol. 65. 19-51. Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel 2005 Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. Inkeles, Alex 1998 One World Emerging? Convergence and Divergence in Industrial Societies. Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press. Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart 2004 Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ritzer, George 2000 The McDonaldization of Society. Thousand Oaks, California: Pine Forge Press. Szakolczai, Arpad and Laszio Fustos 1998 “Value Systems in Axial Moments: A Comparative Analysis of 24 European Countries.” European Sociological Review. Vol. 14. no. 3. 211-229. Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2002 Globalization and Its Discontents. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Co. Taylor, Charles 2001 “Two Theories of Modernity.” in Gaonkar, Dilip P., ed. Alternative Modernities. 172-196. Durham and London: Duke University Press. Turner, Bryan S. 1994 Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism. London and New York: Routledge.

Individualization in Europe and America: Connecting Religious and Moral Values Neil Nevitte1 and Christopher Cochrane1 Abstract After reviewing the major variations in how individualization is interpreted and explained, this article turns to the World Values Survey (WVS) data to empirically investigate one central aspect of individualization, namely, the connection between religiosity and moral values. That analysis demonstrates, first, that rates of decline in levels of religiosity in most advanced industrial states have been quite modest. The rate of change in moral outlooks, by contrast, has been much more striking. Those two core findings, we argue, draw attention to the question of what explains these cross-national and cross-time variations. The remainder of the article empirically explores a variety of plausible explanations. The results of that analysis reveal not only significant variations between European and North American publics, but also that associational behavior plays a significant role in gearing the dynamics of individualization.

I. Introduction Studies of human values must at some point hitch themselves to a theory of “belief systems.” As Williams (1968) put it, “it is the rare and limiting case if and when a person’s behavior is guided over a considerable period of time by one and only one value . . . More often particular acts or sequences of acts are steered by multiple and changing clusters of values”

1

University of Toronto.

100 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane

(287: emphasis added). Examining discrete value dimensions can certainly answer questions about whether, say, support for free enterprise has gone up or down over time. But if people rarely make decisions based on a single value, then the theme of value change might be more productively explored from the vantage point of whether, and how, “clusters” of values change with the passage of time. The primary focus of this article is on two sets of values, religiosity and morality, that are often taken as significant dimensions of value change as states experience the transition from industrialism to post-industrialism (Apter, 1965; Bell, 1973; Huntington, 1974; Inglehart, 1977). The investigation empirically tests hypotheses that are informed by the theory of “individualization.” Individualization refers to the decoupling of human values from such traditional value-generating institutions as family, work, politics and religion (Weber, 1958; Rokeach, 1973; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Baker, 2005). “With the multiplication of life chances and opportunities,” Weber (1978) wrote of modern society in the early twentieth century, “the individual becomes less and less content with being bound to rigid and undifferentiated forms of life prescribed by the group. Increasingly he desires to shape his life as an individual and to enjoy the fruits of his own abilities and labour as he himself wishes” (375). An observable implication of this theory is that individuals in advanced industrial states are taking fewer and fewer cues from religion in formulating their core moral values (Halman and de Moor, 1993). This hypothesis is tested using evidence from the World Values Survey (WVS). The core finding is that the results are uneven: there are systematic and sustained variations between North American and European publics. The connection between religiosity and moral outlooks has weakened substantially in every European country for which we have data. The opposite pattern emerged in North America. The final part of the analysis investigates compelling explanations for these different patterns. II. Conceptualizing Individualization Different scholars use the term individualization to capture different concepts, while others label the same concepts with different terminology. According to Beck (2002), “one can hardly think of a word heavier with misunderstanding than ‘individualization’ has proven to have in the English speaking countries” (xxi). Some scholars, like Beck, approach the topic of individualization from a normative perspective (Lasch, 1979), while others adopt a more empirically grounded approach (Inglehart, 1977; Halman and de Moor, 1993; Halman and Petterson, 1995). That

Individualization in Europe and America • 101

said, both perspectives nonetheless emphasize different aspects of a common underlying theme. At its core, individualization refers to the declining salience of traditional value-generating institutions in the lives of people in post-industrial societies. The first variant of individualization might be labeled “postmodern individualization” or what Beck (2002) calls “individualization” in the “social scientific sense” (xxi). Drawing on the canons of sociology, Beck defines individualization as a process of “high-level socialization” in highly differentiated societies. Communal integration is contingent on individuals recognizing their “self-insufficiency” and “the fundamental incompleteness of the self.” As Beck put it, “. . . human mutuality and community rests no longer on solidly established traditions, but rather, on a paradoxical collectively of reciprocal individualization” (xix). Citizens must choose their way through a myriad of complex incentives and pressures because the guidance from traditional social institutions and the certainties arising out of traditional social structures are longer in place (Beck, 2002). The declining importance of traditional social institutions is not, however, a direct path to individual freedom. Rather it is associated with the highly problematic and “precarious” freedoms of what Beck calls the “do-it yourself biography”: . . . certainties have fragmented into questions which are now spinning around in people’s heads. But it is more than that. Social action needs routines in which to be enacted. One can say that our thoughts and actions are shaped, at the deepest level, by something of which we are hardly or not at all aware . . . it is precisely this level of pre-conscious ‘collective habitualizations,’ of matters taken for granted, that is breaking down into a cloud of possibilities to be thought about and negotiated. The deep layer of foreclosed decisions is being forced up into the level of decision making (6).

These “precarious freedoms” overload the decision-making capacities of individuals as people struggle to navigate modern social environments replete with impossibly complex arrays of institutional incentives and constraints (Beck, 2002):2 “. . . God nature and the social system are being progressively replaced, in greater and lesser steps, by the individual – confused, astray, helpless and at a loss. With the abolition of the old

2

Beck (2001) argues that what he means by “individualization” is an entirely different concept than “individuation,” the term that Inglehart employs. Even so, both Beck and Inglehart use their respective terms to encompass the retreating influence of traditional social institutions on the lives of individuals.

102 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane

coordinates a question arises that has been decried and acclaimed, derided, pronounced sacred, guilty and dead: the question of the individual” (8). A second set of more empirically oriented conceptualizations of individualization resemble what Flanagan and Lee call “postmodernist libertarians” (Flanagan and Lee, 2003:267). In an account that resonates with Huntington’s (1974) conjectures about the shape of post-industrial politics, Flanagan and Lee depict a growing class of educated and affluent citizens whose underlying value set is premised on a broad conception of autonomy: an autonomy that extends well beyond a mere freedom from government interference to encompass a broader range of limitations on individual choice. “Although they are more tolerant of a plurality of different kinds of ethnic groups and lifestyles,” Flanagan and Lee point out, “they are also more dissatisfied with their personal lives and substantially more distrustful of virtually all social and political institutions. Not only is their loyalty to major social and political institutions eroding but also their willingness to make sacrifices for other individuals, groups, or even their nation” (Flanagan and Lee, 2003:267). There is conceptual overlap between this interpretation and Inglehart’s (1977) emphasis on “postmaterialism” or what Nevitte (1996) calls the “decline of deference”. All of these accounts emphasize a growing resistance to constraints on individual choice and a decreasing adherence to traditional social and political institutions. Traditional family structures have given way to conscious decisions about whether and when to marry and have children, and religions have lost their hold on the moral values of their own adherents. Central to this variant of the individualization hypothesis is that “. . . values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviors are increasingly based on personal choice and are less dependent on tradition and social institutions” (Halman and de Moor, 1993:72). That transformation is consistent with Inglehart’s (1997) observations concerning “the postmodern shift away from both religious and state authority” (87). The unifying theme is that individuals are guided less by traditional institutions than they once were, and thus the necessity of individual decisionmaking has expanded. The remainder of this article tests the theory of individualization in two steps. First, we propose an operational definition of individualization. We then turn to an empirical examination of cross-national and cross-time survey data on value change in post-industrial Western countries. The empirical question to be explored is whether religion is losing its hold on the moral outlooks of citizens in Western countries. The central concern is not just the question of whether religion itself is losing ground in modern societies (secularization). Rather the question is whether people are becoming increasingly inclined to exhibit autonomy,

Individualization in Europe and America • 103

individualization, when it comes to making decisions about important moral questions. Are they becoming more or less inclined to take their moral cues from religion? III. Measuring Value Change in Empirical Perspective One of Converse’s (1964) seminal observations is that “belief systems have never surrendered easily to empirical study or quantification. Indeed, they have often served as primary exhibits for the doctrine that what is important to study cannot be measured and that what can be measured is not important to study.” (206) But Converse (1964) also cautioned that “. . . no intellectual position is likely to become obsolete quite so rapidly as one that takes current empirical capabilities as the limit of the possible in a more absolute sense” (206). Indeed, current research into patterns of human values benefits from an accumulation of systematic public opinion survey data, not the least of these are the broadly comparative data from the World Values Survey (WVS). If values are the primal elements of human culture, and individual human beings are the beakers in which elemental compounding occurs, then direct, individual-level survey evidence of human values is a promising focal point for studies of individualization. The World Values Survey data come from nationally representative random samples of publics surveyed in 21 countries in 1981-1983 (N = 28 764), 43 countries in 19901993 (N = 59 169), 45 countries in 1995-1997 (N = 78 574), and 67 countries in 1999-2002 (N = 96 296). Many of the survey items from the 1981 wave of the survey are asked in precisely the same way in each of the successive waves and in each of the participating countries. To maximize the breadth and reliability of the longitudinal analysis, attention is focused only on those advanced industrial states for which there are data from at least three time-points beginning in 1981. The questionnaires used in each of these countries were screened to isolate those variables that met two important criteria for inclusion: first, identical question wording and, second, identical response categories across countries and time-points. This strategy yields 63 variables for analysis across 15 countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States and West Germany (See Appendix A). To identify underlying structures in the responses to the 63 survey items that met these criteria for inclusion, the data from each of the 15 countries and four time-points were pooled and subjected to exploratory factor analysis (Principal Components). There are nine survey items which load heavily on the single component that we label “religiosity.” These

104 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane

items include questions about the importance of God and religion in the lives of respondents, whether respondents get comfort and strength from religion, beliefs in God, heaven, an after-life and hell. Measures of church attendance rates and confidence in the churches also load onto this “religiosity” dimension (see Appendix C for question wording and variable coding). Together, these items provide both a highly reliable and broad measure of religiosity (Cronbach’s Alpha = .910).3 Moral outlooks are captured by questions which ask about the justifiability of homosexuality, abortion, divorce, suicide and euthanasia. Responses to these questions comprise a highly reliable scale of moral traditionalism/ permissiveness (Cronbach’s Alpha = .813). The underlying component captures the extent to which individuals are willing to tolerate deviation from precisely those kinds of moral values that have been at the core of traditional religious teachings. By focusing on the connection between religious and moral outlooks, our goal is to examine the influence of one the most powerful and traditional social institutions on precisely those moral values within its traditional sphere of influence. Given that these indicators are reliable, the analysis proceeds to test empirically the proposition that value change is occurring in the direction of “. . . free personal choices, which make human relations less bound by tradition, less prescribed by social norms and less enforced by social control” (Akker, Halman, de Moor, 1993:100). IV. Value Change and Individualization: Evidence from the World Values Survey Figure 1 highlights the trends in religiosity for each of the countries in our analysis as well as the weighted trend lines for Europe and North America.4 As the figure illustrates, the aggregate trends for Europe and 3 There is, of course, a conceptual distinction between institutional and spiritual dimensions of religiosity. But factor analysis and subsequent reliability checks within each country show that there is no statistical justification for treating these dimensions separately. The scale clearly measures a single component and is highly reliable in every country for which we have data. 4 Because the focus is on trends, lines of best fit are plotted through the values for those countries for which there are at least three time-points of data beginning in 1981. And because the samples are nationally representative, the trend lines for Europe and North America are weighted to capture population differences between the countries within each region:

5(Population of X1..n ÷ m Population of Selected European | North American Countries * Y1...n) N

This weighting procedure ensures that the countries within Europe and North America affect the aggregate means to their relative share of the population.

Individualization in Europe and America • 105

North America are relatively stable; there has been a marginal decline in levels of religiosity between 1981 and 2000. On the whole, Europeans and North Americans were almost as religious in 2000 as they were in 1981. A more detailed probing of these data, however, shows that this aggregate stability masks significant within country variations, particularly in Europe. Among European publics, levels of religiosity declined in seven countries, they were stable in two countries, and they increased in four countries (substantially so in three of them). Finns, Danes and Swedes turned out to be somewhat more religious in 2000 than 1981, while their counterparts in Norway became noticeably less religious over the same period. Indeed, Finns and Icelanders exhibit higher levels of religiosity in 2000 than the European average, whereas Swedes consistently remain among the least religious respondents. Scandinavians tend to be less religious than the European average, but the within group differences turn out to be larger than the difference between Scandinavia and the rest of Europe. Spain, France, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands seem to be on similar trajectories. Each of these countries experienced a significant decline in levels of religiosity. Britain followed the same general pattern even though the rate change was considerably less pronounced. These shared trajectories seem to point to a general pattern when it comes to religiosity in Europe, although this pattern is not replicated either in Scandinavian countries or in the highly religious and Catholic countries of Italy and Ireland. There is what might be called a core European trajectory, but there are important exceptions to that trajectory. What about North America? According to the WVS data, North Americans are substantially more religious than their European counterparts. Although both Canadians and Americans became somewhat less religious between 1981 and 2000, the United States remained the most religious country in our analysis and Canadians in 2000 were well above the European average. Indeed, Italy and Ireland are the only European countries to exhibit higher levels of religiosity than Canada. Similar cross-national variations in the pace and direction of securalization have been reported by other researchers (Halman and Petterson, 1995). The more surprising finding perhaps is the evidence of the relative stability in levels of religiosity between 1981 and 2000. Levels of religiosity have declined, but they are not plummeting and nor are they down everywhere.

High religiosity

Britain W. Germany Belgium

Italy Spain Iceland

Canada

Ireland

.280

.380

Sweden Denmark

France

Netherlands

.480 Finland Norway

.580

.680

.780

1980 Source: World Values Survey, 1981-2000

Low religiosity

United States

1990

2000

Figure 1 Religiosity (Trend Lines), 1981-2000 North America

Europe

2010 (projection)

W.Germany Norway Netherlands Belgium France Sweden

Denmark

Spain Britain

Iceland Finland

Canada

Italy Ireland

United States

106 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane

Individualization in Europe and America • 107

Given the historical leadership of organized religion in providing guidance on the moral issues of the day, it is reasonable to speculate that levels of religiosity might well shape orientations towards other such value dimensions as “moral outlooks.” The empirical implication is that national changes in moral outlooks will simply track the changing levels of religiosity in each country; traditional moral outlooks would follow the same pattern as the levels of religiosity depicted in Figure 1. The data in Figure 2 summarize the shift in levels of moral permissiveness for the same set of countries over the same period. There is evidence of a clear pattern but a straightforward interpretation provides no clear support for the hypothesis that moral outlooks are simply a byproduct of religiosity: publics in every country except one (Denmark) became progressively more permissive in their moral outlooks between 1981 and 2000.5 The pattern in both Europe and North America is toward substantial increases in levels of moral permissiveness. American and European publics became more tolerant of abortion, divorce, euthanasia, suicide and especially homosexuality. Italy and Ireland are outliers on one end; publics in both of these highly religious Catholic countries remained relatively traditional in their moral outlooks. The Netherlands and Sweden stand as outliers on the other end. Swedes, the most secular public in Figure 1, experienced substantial increases in levels of moral permissiveness between 1981 and 2000 (Figure 2). There is also evidence of distinct clusters of countries in Figure 2. The largest cluster occupies the higher end of the mid-range in Figure 2: Denmark, France, Iceland, Norway, Spain, Finland, Canada and Belgium. These countries are moving to roughly the same place when it comes to levels of moral permissiveness. Britain, Germany and the United States cluster on the lower end of the mid-range. Despite their substantial differences in levels of religiosity, the moral values trajectories of this set of publics are nonetheless converging. The evidence of a consistent pattern of changing moral values presents an empirical challenge to the simple intuition that changing moral outlooks are simply a by-product of secularization, or vice versa. If levels of religiosity have been relatively stable over these two decades and if there has been substantial variability between countries, then what accounts for the uniform and substantial rise in moral permissiveness over the same period and in the same publics? 5 Denmark is the only exception. Because it is the lone exception to the trend, we include Denmark even though we only have Danish data on moral permissiveness for 1981 and 2000.

Permissive

Finland Sweden France

Netherlands

Denmark

.180

Ireland

Iceland Britain W. Germany Canada Norway .280 Italy Belgium United States Spain

.380

.480

.580

1980 Source: World Values Survey, 1981-2000

Traditional

.680

1990

2000

Figure 2 Moral Permissiveness (Trend Lines), 1981-2000

2010 (projection)

Ireland

Italy

United States W. Germany Britain

Europe North America

Denmark France Iceland Norway Spain Finland Canada Belgium

Netherlands

Sweden

108 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane

Individualization in Europe and America • 109

One obvious candidate explanation, of course, is the individualization hypothesis. According to the individualization hypothesis, aggregate stability and cross-national variability in religiosity might co-exist alongside evidence of substantial and across-the-board changes in moral outlooks because citizens are deferring less to religious authority when formulating their moral outlooks. In effect, religiosity and moral outlooks are coming increasingly decoupled. The observable implication of that line of argument is that there will be a declining correlation between the religiosity and the moral outlooks of citizens. The data presented in Figure 3 track the across-time shifts in the strength of the correlation (Pearson’s r) between religiosity and moral permissiveness among publics in Europe and North America. The results are somewhat mixed. On the one hand, the strength of the relationship between religiosity and moral values has clearly weakened throughout Europe. Intriguingly, the correlation between religiosity and moral permissiveness has declined in each and every one of the European countries for which we have data. The hold of religiosity on the moral values of Danes, Fins and Germans has changed the most, but slightly weaker versions of the same pattern are evident in all of the other European countries as well. Among North Americans, and particularly Americans, the pattern is completely different: the connection between religious and moral outlooks has actually become significantly stronger over the same time period. These North American data suggest an important caveat to the argument that individualization is a consequence of features that postindustrial countries share in common. The European findings are consistent with the individualization hypothesis; the North American findings clearly are not. The correlation between religious and moral outlooks strengthened in North America and weakened in Europe as the gap in moral outlooks between religious and secular citizens widened in North America and shrank in Europe. Despite across-the-board increases in moral permissiveness in North America, opinions about controversial moral issues were more polarized along the religious/secular cleavage in 2000 than they were in 1981. In sum, these findings are consistent with the interpretation that religion is losing its hold on the moral values of Europeans. At the same time, however, the values divide between religious and secular Americans has widened considerably. These comparative data appear to suggest that the straightforward intuition concerning the linkages between religiosity and moral outlooks needs to be reconsidered. Changing moral outlooks, clearly, are a consequence of far more than simply declining levels of religiosity. Religiosity has not declined in every country, yet publics have become uniformly

Stronger Association

(Pearson’s R)

.200

.250

.300

.350

.400

.450

.500

.550

.600

1980

1990

2000

2010 (projection)

Figure 3 Correlations of Religiosity and Moral Outlooks (Trend Lines), 1981-2000

Source: World Values Survey, 1981-2000

Weaker Association

.650

110 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane

Individualization in Europe and America • 111

more permissive in their moral outlooks. These findings prompt a deeper investigation of the connection between religiosity and morality. The question that needs to be explained is why religiosity serves to insulate its adherents from wider national trends towards moral permissiveness much more effectively in some countries than in others? V. Group Involvement and Individualization: Findings Nearly a century ago, Durkheim (1947) claimed that a “. . . society cannot make its influence felt unless it is in action, and it is not in action unless the individuals who compose it are assembled together and act in common. It is by common action that it takes consciousness of itself and realizes its position; it is before all else an active cooperation” (418). Durkheim’s observation certainly resonates with contemporary perspectives on the cultural implications of interactions between individuals (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 2000; Baker, 2005). Debates about the causes, implications, or even the “decline of social capital” remain contentious (Hall, 1999). Nonetheless, a substantial body of empirical evidence suggests that people who spend their time interacting with others develop different social outlooks than those who do not (Putnam, 2000). A variety of theorists have argued that “social networks” and community involvement generate feelings of communal belonging and provide individuals with important avenues of social, emotional and even financial support (Durkheim, 1947; Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 2000). The clear implication is that there is a connection between levels of associational involvement and individualization. That connection can be explored by asking: does active association in group-life serve to reinforce the hold of traditional social institutions over the outlooks of individuals in advanced industrial societies? One possible explanation for different rates and directions of change in the connection between religious and moral outlooks might be that there are cross-national variations in how effectively religious institutions facilitate active interactions between like-minded individuals. Religionbased associational involvement is an example of what Putnam (2000) called “bonding social capital” (3). According to Putnam (2000), “some forms of social capital are, by choice or necessity, inward looking and tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups” (22). Interactions between comparatively like-minded individuals are precisely the type of mechanism by which norms and values are inculcated and reinforced (Durkheim, 1947; Hunter, 1991; Putnam, 2000; Baker, 2005). It is certainly plausible to suppose that moral values are reinforced, and more resistant to change, when people are surrounded by others who

112 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane

share the same viewpoints on controversial moral issues. Active associational involvement in religious organizations, according to this perspective, may serve as a bulwark against broader trends towards value change in the country as a whole. This hypothesis can be tested empirically with a simple multivariate analysis. The dependent variable in this OLS model is the rate of change (slope) in individualization which can be operationalized at each time point, and for each country, as the Product Moment Correlation (r) of the relationship between religiosity and moral permissiveness. The independent variable in the model is the percentage of religious respondents (religiosity > .75/1) who indicated that they were actively involved as unpaid volunteers in a church or religious organization. If active associational involvement in religious organizations shelters participants from broader trends towards moral permissiveness, then we would expect the connection between religious and moral outlooks to be stronger in those countries where religious people are actively engaged in associational life. Before proceeding directly to that test, however, it is useful to consider the structure of the model more generally to explicitly identify how it can address some potentially important objections. One possibility is that declining associational involvement is but one aspect of the broader phenomenon of individualization. If individualization entails both a retreat from associational life and a decoupling of religious and moral values, then levels of associational activity would co-vary with the individualization of moral values because both capture different aspects of essentially the same process. The key explanatory variable, in other words, may not be truly “independent” of the dependent variable. A second issue to consider concerns the problem of establishing the direction of causality. As people’s moral outlooks diverge from the value sets stressed in their churches, the consensus on moral values among parishioners may break down and reduce the incentives for these people to interact with one another in associational groups. The gist of this account is that norms of reciprocity cause associational involvement, rather than the other way around. People join groups because they trust and like each other; they do not trust and like each other because they happen to join the same groups (Putnam, 2000; Newton, 2001). Another possibility is that the individualization of moral values is simply a by-product of secularization. As religiosity declines, so too perhaps does the connection between religious and moral outlooks. This possibility can be taken into account in the model by introducing controls for changing levels of religiosity. Finally, there is the problem of over-determination to consider (Przeworski and Teune, 1970). There are reasons to suppose that levels of associa-

Individualization in Europe and America • 113

tional involvement may differ in Europe and North America. But there are many features other than levels of associational involvement that distinguish Europeans from North Americans. The threat, therefore, is that the model will “over-determine” the explanatory power of associational involvement. Each of these conceptual concerns inform the specification of the regression model. First, the potential endogeneity problem can be addressed by predicting the slope of individualization between 1981 and 2000 with the level of associational involvement in 1981. This strategy strengthens the causal inference by establishing that the influence of associational involvement is temporally prior to individualization. Associational involvement predicts future levels of individualization. Second, the possibility that associational involvement is an effect of individualization can be taken into account by introducing controls for the rate and direction of change in the associational involvement of religious people. If declining associational involvement is a by-product of the same broader phenomena that results in a de-coupling of religious and moral values, then the rate of change in associational involvement should be a powerful predictor of across-time changes in individualization. Third, the reverse causality argument can be addressed by controlling for the rate of change in moral permissiveness. Controlling for the rate of change in moral permissiveness makes it possible to gauge the predictive power of associational involvement independent of the effects of changing levels of moral permissiveness. If individualization is a consequence of changing moral outlooks, then introducing a measure of changing moral outlooks to the model should reduce the magnitude of the regression coefficient for religious association. Fourth, by controlling for changing levels of religiosity, the model rules out the possibility that the relationship between active involvement by religious people and the individualization of moral values is endogenous to a broader phenomenon of secularization. Secularization is an important phenomenon in its own right, but it is conceptually distinct from the phenomenon of individualization. Recall that individualization is concerned with the connection between religious and moral values, and not the absolute levels, or rates of change, in religious or moral outlooks. Finally, the potential problem of over-determination is dealt with in two simple steps. The first step introduces controls in the main regression model for a country’s location in Europe and North America. The second step entails running a background analysis that applies only to the European countries in the analysis. If Europeans and North Americans diverge in terms of individualization, then individualization may well correlate with any other variables on which Europeans and North Americans

114 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane

differ. A more persuasive case can be made in these regards if the relationship between the independent (associational involvement of religious people) and dependent (individualization of moral and religious outlooks) variables extends beyond the differences between Europe and North America. Table 1 summarizes the results of the overall analysis. The results in the first bloc of the model show that the differences between Europe and North America (summarized in Figure 3) are indeed statistically significant. The strength of the relationship between religiosity and moral outlooks declined more in Europe than in North America. The second bloc of the model introduces the level of active associational involvement among religious people in 1981. According to these data, the associational involvement of religious people in 1981 is a powerful predictor of the rate of individualization between 1981 and 2000.6 Indeed, the relationship is so strong the differences between Europe and North America disappear when active associational involvement is taken into account. Indeed, the analysis shows that if religious people in Europe were as actively involved in associational groups as their counterparts in North America, the connection between religiosity and moral outlooks in Europe would have increased, rather than decreased. The third bloc of the model introduces controls for the rates of change in associational involvement, religiosity and moral permissiveness. Here, the data indicate that only one of these variables, the changing levels of associational involvement, has an independent effect on the individualization of moral and religious values.7 Moreover, notice that the introduction of these variables has no effect on the predictive power of the level of associational involvement among religious people in 1981. These findings provide supporting evidence for the contention that active associational involvement among religious people offsets the broader

6

To test the possibility that associational involvement in 1981 is a proxy for levels of involvement in 2000, we tested the predictive power of the involvement of religious people at both time points. Levels of associational involvement in 2000 do not have an independent effect on the rate of change in individualization between 1981 and 2000. As with any causal relationship, the relevant levels of the explanatory variable (associational involvement of religious people) are temporally prior to the observed effect in the dependent variable (changing rates of individualization). 7 This opens up the possibility that levels of associational involvement are at least somewhat a part – rather than exclusively a cause – of individualization. But this finding is not sufficiently strong to rule out our central contention that the effects of associational involvement are causally and temporally prior to the process of individualization. Indeed, associational involvement in 1981 more powerfully predicts the individualization of moral values in 2000 than does the level of associational involvement in 2000.

Individualization in Europe and America • 115

Table 1 Predictors of Individualization, 1981-2000 (OLS Regression) Bloc 1 b (SE) Europe Active in 1981 Active Slope (81-00) Religiosity Slope (81-00) Moral Permissiveness Slope (81-00) Constant R-Squared Adjusted R-Squared

–.067(.026)***

.020(.024) .341 .290

Bloc 2 b (SE) .041 (.050) .007 (.003)***

–.138(.069)** .556 .481

Bloc 3 b (SE) .068(.051) .007(.003)*** .016(.009)* .246(.279) .438(.301) –.189(.065)*** .763 .631

**** p < .01 *** p < .05 ** p < .10 * p < .15 Source: World Values Survey, 1981-2000

societal trends toward a decoupling of moral and religious values. In those countries where religious people are actively involved as volunteers in church or religious organizations, the individualization of moral values has either not occurred at all, or has proceeded at a much slower pace than in those countries where religious people are not actively involved as volunteers.8 Significantly, this finding is not simply a proxy for different levels of active religiosity or for differences between Europe and North America. Church attendance in Ireland, for instance, is far higher than it is in the United States. And it is far higher in Italy than in Canada. But the clear evidence is that while individualization of moral values has occurred in both Ireland and Italy, no such pattern is evident in the United States or Canada. Active associational involvement in religious groups turns out to be about four and six times higher in both Canada and the United States, respectively, than in either Italy or Ireland. Moreover, these statistically significant results emerge, and operate in the same direction and with about the same magnitude, when the same analysis is applied only to the European countries. The implication is clear: active associational involvement in voluntary religious organizations serves as a counterweight to the individualization of religious and moral values in a far more profound way than either passive spirituality or even such habitual, but generally non-interactive, forms of involvement as church attendance.

8 This aggregate level finding persists at the individual level as well. The correlation between religious and moral outlooks is higher among those who are actively involved as volunteers than among those who are not.

116 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane

There are strong theoretical arguments that led us to conjecture about the existence of precisely this type of a relationship. Not the least of these arguments is that people who actively associate with like minded individuals are more inclined to maintain the values of the group than those who do not (Durkheim, 1947; Putnam, 2000; Baker, 2005). For this reason, it comes as no surprise to discover that levels of associational involvement in 1981 turns out to be a powerful predictor of the extent to which the relationship between religious and moral outlooks changed between 1981 and 2000. VI. Concluding Discussion There are at least two important political implications that follow from these findings. First, the rising level of moral permissiveness in the United States is mainly attributable to value change among a particular subset of Americans. Secular Americans experienced very substantial changes in their moral outlooks over the course of the last two decades of the Twenty-first Century. There were truly remarkable increases in levels of permissiveness. Second, a clear consequence of this pattern of value change is that secular and religious American became far more distinctive in their moral outlooks in 2000 than they were in 1981. Societies are more divided when the disagreements between people overlap than when they do not. Whatever the consensus Americans experienced in their moral values in 1981, that consensus had all but disappeared by 2000. The North American data also suggest that religion was a more powerful cleavage in 2000 than it was in 1981, and that moral issues are becoming more, rather than less, divisive in both Canada and the United States. The obvious paradox is that as secularization and moral permissiveness increase in the United States, the salience of religious and moral outlooks as a dividing line in American society also increases. Unlike North America, the European trends point to a growing convergence in moral outlooks between religious and secular Europeans; religion commands less of a hold over the moral outlooks of religious Europeans. Compared to the polarization of North American publics, the moral outlooks of religious Europeans are more alike those of their secular European counterparts. There is clearly substantial empirical support for the individualization hypothesis in Europe. From Finland to Italy, European publics are all moving in the same direction when it comes to how they connect their religious and their moral outlooks. The findings here also provide considerable support for the contention that active associational involvement with like minded individuals has a significant impact on the dynamics of individualization over the past 20

Individualization in Europe and America • 117

years. The focus of this particular analysis is confined to the linkages between religious and moral values. But the findings clearly raise a broader possibility, namely, that the dynamics of individualization in such other value domains as the family, or the work place, may be geared similarly by such associational factors as family structures or rates of unionization. The findings also suggest that it may be fruitful to revisit our focus on religiosity and moral outlooks. One possibility to explore is that secularism may well turn out to be more akin to religiosity than to the absence of religiosity. The fact that secular and religious Americans are far more likely than Europeans to participate in the associational life of their country might explain both the slower rate of moral permissiveness among religious Americans and the hyper secularism of non-religious Americans. Some evidence seems to support this conjecture. In 1981, secular Europeans were far more permissive in their moral outlooks than secular Americans. By 2000, however, that pattern had completely reversed. The implication is that associational involvement reinforces the moral outlooks of secular people in much the same way it does for their religious counterparts (Hunter, 1991). That conclusion gives an entirely new meaning to Beck’s (2001) aphorism that “. . . human mutuality and community rests . . . on a paradoxical collectively of reciprocal individualization” (xix). It may turn out that books on “individualism”, “individuation” and “individualization” belong on the same shelf at the library after all. References Abramson, Paul and Ronald Inglehart 1992 “Generational Replacement and Value Change in Eight West European Societies.” British Journal of Political Science, 22: 183-228. Akker, P., L. Halman, and de Moor 1993 “Primary Relations in Western Societies.” In Ester, Halman and de Moor (eds). The Individualizing Society: Value Change in Europe and North America. Tilburg, NL: Tilburg University Press. Apter, David E. 1965 The Politics of Modernization. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1965. Arts, Wil and Loek Halman, eds 2004 European Values at the Turn of the Millennium, European Values Studies 7. Leiden, NL: Brill. Baker, Wayne 2005 America’s Crisis of Values: Reality and Perception. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Barnes, Samuel, Max Kasse and Klaus Allerbeck 1979 Political Action. Beverley Hills, CA: Sage.

118 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane Beck, Ulrich and Beck-Gernsheim, Elisabeth 2002 Individualization: Institutionalized Individualism and its Social and Political Consequences. London, UK: Sage. Bell, Daniel 1973 The Coming of Postindustrial Society. New York, NY: Basic Books. Berger, Peter 1969 A Rumor of Angels. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Coleman, James S. 1988 “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital.” American Journal of Sociology. 94 (Supplement): S95-S120. Converse, Philip E. 1964 “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics.” In David Apter ed. Ideology and Discontent. New York, NY: The Free Press of Glencoe. de Moor, Ruud, ed. 1995 Values in Western Societies, European Values Studies. Tilburg, NL: Tilburg University Press. Durkheim, Emile 1947 The Elementary forms of the Religious Life; A Study in Religious Sociology. New York, NY: The Free Press. Feldman, Stanley 1988 “Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: The Role of Core Beliefs and Values.” American Journal of Political Science, 32: 416-440. Flanagan, Scott C. and Aie-Rie Lee 2003 “The New Politics, Culture Wars, and the Authoritarian-Libertarian Value Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies.” Comparative Political Studies, 36: 235-270. Flanagan, Scott C. 1987 “Changing Values in Advanced Industrial Societies Revisited: Towards a Resolution of the Values Debate.” American Political Science Review, 81: 1303-1319. 1982 “Changing Values in Advanced Industrial Societies.” Comparative Political Studies, 14: 403-444. Hall, Peter A. 1999 “Social Capital in Britain.” British Journal of Political Science, 29: 417-461. Halman, Loek and Thorleif Petterson 1995 “Individualization and Value Fragmentation.” In Ruud de Moor (ed). Values in Western Societies. Tilburg, NL: Tilburg University Press. Halman, L. and R. de Moor 1993 “Religion, Churches and Moral Values.” In Ester, Halman and de Moor (eds). The Individualizing Society: Value Change in Europe and North America. Tilburg, NL: Tilburg University Press, 37-66. Hunter, James Davidson 1991 Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. New York, NY: Basic Books. Huntington, Samuel 1974 “Postindustrial Politics: How Benign Will It Be?” Comparative Politics, 6: 163-191. Inglehart, Ronald 1997 Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Individualization in Europe and America • 119 1990

Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1977 Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, Ronald, Neil Nevitte and Miguel Basañez 1996 The North American Trajectory: Cultural, Economic, and Political Ties among the United States, Canada, and Mexico. New York, NY: Aldine De Gruyter. Kasse, Max and Kenneth Newton 1995 Beliefs in Government. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Lasch, Christopher 1979 The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations. New York, NY: Warner Books. McClosky, Herbert and John Zaller 1984 The American Ethos: Public Attitudes toward Capitalism and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Nevitte, Neil 1996 The Decline of Deference: Canadian Value Change in Cross-National Perspective. Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press. Newton, Kenneth 2001 “Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy.” International Political Science Review. 22: 201-214. Przeworski, Adam and Henry Teune 1970 The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New York: Wiley. Putnam, Robert 2000 Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster. Rokeach, M. 1973 The Nature of Human Values. New York, NY: Free Press. Sears, David 1983 “The persistence of early political predispositions: the roles of attitude object and life stage.” In Wheeler and Shaver (eds). Review of Personality and Social Psychology. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 79-116. Weber, Max 1978 Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (eds). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. (2 Volumes) 1958 The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York, NY: Scribner’s. Williams, Robin M. 1968 “The Concept of Values.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. David C. Sills (ed.) New York, NY: Crowell Collier & MacMillan, Inc.

120 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane

Appendix A: Countries, Waves and Sample Sizes 1981-1983 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

France Britain Germany (West) Italy Netherlands Denmark Belgium Spain Ireland United States Canada Norway Sweden Iceland Finland

Total

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1

200 231 305 348 221 182 145 303 217 325 254 246 954 927 1 003

23 736

1990-1991 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 4 1 1 1 1 1

1995-1997

002 484 101 018 017 030 792 147 000 839 730 239 047 702 588

– 1 093 1 017 – – – – 1 211 – 1 542 – 1 127 1 009 – 987

19 861

7 897

1999-2001 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1

615 000 036 000 003 023 912 409 012 200 931 – 1 015 968 1 038

20 002

23.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

16.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

V196: Importance of God V197: Strength from Religion V191: Believe in God V195: Believe in Heaven V186: Importance of Religion V185: Church Attendance V192: Believe in After-Life V147: Confidence in: The Churches V194: Believe in Hell V91: Job: Use Initiative V94: Job: Responsible Job V93: Job: Achieve Something V96: Job: Meets Abilities V95: Job: Interesting V89: Job: Respected by People V136: Attend Lawful Demonstrations V137: Join Unofficial Strikes V135: Join Boycotts V138: Occupy Buildings V134: Sign Petition V155: Confidence: Parliament V156: Confidence: The Civil Service V149: Confidence: The Press –.717 –.709 –.660 –.567 .026 .057 –.027

.085 –.063 .094 –.034 .164 .054 .008 –.015

–.101

–.159 –.071 –.114 –.006 .059 .119 –.012 .036

–.745

–.042 –.096 .001 –.094 .007 –.097 .074

–.003 .723 .654 .616 .573 .525 .483

.640 –.025 –.007 .077 .056 –.010 .089

–.080 .059 .094 .039 .105 .040 –.056 .095

–.018 .018 –.009 –.023 –.003 .051 .043 .007

.601

.014 –.047 –.002 –.039 .745 .717

–.008

.002 –.017 .036 –.012 –.001 –.009 .051

–.019 .052 –.003 .036 .008 .060 –.001 .243

.016

.113 –.022 .148 –.083 –.039 –.034

–.034

.038 –.029 .058 –.073 –.061 .012 –.063

.066 –.057 –.060 .010 –.088 –.059 .007 –.034

–.002

–.056 –.186 –.059 –.157 .043 .065

–.146

.189 –.066 .055 –.042 –.071 –.071 .032

–.157 .120 .054 .158 .056 .253 .038 .210

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Job Traits: Political Institutional Civil Moral Fulfillment Protest Confidence Permissiveness Permissiveness

–.868 .804 .778 .769 .757 .700 .706 .687

1. Religiosity

Appendix B: Rotated Factor Analysis (PCF)

–.003

–.023 .023 –.052 .078 .049 .054

–.010

–.052 .034 .066 .052 –.037 .051 –.018

–.045 .022 .015 .025 .036 .033 .001 .047

–.022

.019 –.060 .018 –.085 –.017 –.009

–.082

–.010 .004 .048 –.012 .015 –.022 .057

.001 .003 –.004 –.004 .009 –.012 –.042 .029

–.072

–.064 .029 –.041 .083 .062 .008

.025

–.065 –.059 –.146 –.057 –.192 –.177 –.316

.025 .003 –.020 –.058 .009 .013 .009 .012

7. 8. 9. Subjective Neighbors: Job Traits: Well-Being Minorities Economic

–.109

–.029 .075 –.205 .218 .032 .087

–.047

.125 –.018 .061 .139 –.087 .131 –.138

.008 –.040 .030 .119 .002 –.069 .013 .120

10. Military Nationalism

.048

–.014 –.125 –.027 –.172 .032

.048

–.209 –.041 .019 –.071 .115 –.097 .067

–.049 .076 .090 –.162 .142 .026 –.103 .054

11. Family Life

Individualization in Europe and America • 121

24. V151: Confidence: Labor/Trade Unions 25. V152: Confidence: The Police 26. V204: Justifiable: Illegal Govt. Benefits 27. V207: Justifiable: Accepting Bribe 28. V206: Justifiable: Cheat on Taxes 29. V211: Justifiable: Divorce 30. V210: Justifiable: Abortion 31. V212: Justifiable: Euthanasia 32. V208: Justifiable: Homosexuality 33. V213: Justifiable: Suicide 34. V81: Life Satisfaction 35. V11: Happiness 36. V82: Freedom & Control 37. V69: Neighbors: Different Race 38. V73: Neighbors: Immigrants 39. V90: Job: Good Hours 40. V92: Job: Generous Holidays 41. V87: Job: Not too much Pressure 42. V86: Job: Good Pay 43. V88: Good Job Security

Appendix B (cont.)

–.114 .037 .047 .029 –.003 –.009 –.022 –.002 –.066 –.031 –.033 .002 –.076 .009 .019 .102 .190 .220 .040 .104

.137 .075

.077

.169

.244 .347 .259 .174

.206 –.060 .038 –.051 .000

–.016 .046 .007 .040

–.003 .056

–.024 .025

.041 –.015 –.007 .034

.099 –.024 .004 .040 .042

.115 .110 .074 .170

.072

–.028

.153 .069

–.204

–.039 .021

–.029 –.004 .018 .015

.008 –.054 .039 –.049 –.004

.053 .016 .080 –.003

.115

.028

.569 .006

.600

.105 –.064

.013 .007 .044 –.064

–.186 .077 .002 –.030 .020

–.027 –.057 –.098 –.014

–.683

–.698

–.093 –.720

–.039

–.006 .038

.028 .007 .032 .022

.587 –.035 .025 .067 .033

.766 .735 .687 .683

.123

.130

.062 .033

–.024

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Job Traits: Political Institutional Civil Moral Fulfillment Protest Confidence Permissiveness Permissiveness

–.017

1. Religiosity

–.020 –.051

–.015 .033 .008 –.046

.063 –.828 .774 –.639 –.026

.027 .013 –.018 –.030

.007

.042

.102 .046

.019

.010 .020

.861 .027 .086 .065

–.024 .017 –.014 .039 .863

.050 .009 –.045 .117

–.047

–.029

–.015 .010

–.040

–.564 –.533

–.039 –.723 –.664 –.571

–.064 –.007 .002 .000 –.040

.018 –.007 –.016 –.030

–.003

.014

.045 .017

–.134

7. 8. 9. Subjective Neighbors: Job Traits: Well-Being Minorities Economic

.192 .335

.011 –.018 –.149 –.174

.139 –.008 –.003 –.092 –.004

–.021 –.032 –.060 .160

.010

.008

.304 .063

–.044

10. Military Nationalism

.039 .039

.022 –.035 –.010 –.003

.108 .011 –.006 .082 .030

.077 .008 .000 .120

.018

–.055

–.057 –.020

.013

11. Family Life

122 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane

–.003 –.023

.027

.038

7.36 .910

Eigenvalue: Alpha:

3.34 .731

.081 .009

.007 .237

44. V126: Fight in War 45. V148: Confidence: The Armed Forces 46. V109: Child Needs Mother & Father 47. V110: Women Need Children 2.72 .764

.071

.055

–.025 .152

2.45 .708

.016

.019

.122 .394

1.86 .579

.095

.005

–.047 –.004

1.66 .813

.109

.188

.033 .114

1.50 .556

–.126

.008

.049 .035

1.38 .703

.080

.038

.002 .068

1.22 .672

.021

–.001

.078 .025

1.20 .408

–.079

.005

.624 .514

1.10 .365

.668

.663

–.061 –.090

Individualization in Europe and America • 123

124 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane

Appendix C: Question Wording, Variable Coding and Scale Construction I. Religiosity (Scale) = ([v196/9]+v197 +v191+v195+[v186/4]+[v185/6]+v192+[v147/3]+v194)/9 1. V196 HOW IMPORTANT IS GOD IN YOUR LIFE How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate – 10 means very important and 1 means not at all important. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

(0)9 Not at all (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Very

2. V197 COMFORT AND STRENGTH FROM RELIGION Do you find that you get comfort and strength from religion? 0 No 1 Yes 3. V191 BELIEVE IN GOD Which, if any, of the following do you believe in? Believe in God. 0 No 1 Yes 4. V195 BELIEVE IN HEAVEN Which, if any, of the following do you believe in? Believe in heaven. 0 No 1 Yes 5. V186 RELIGION IMPORTANT For each of the following aspects, indicate how important it is in your life: religion. 1 2 3 4

9

(3) (2) (1) (0)

Very important Rather important Not very important Not at all important

Values in parentheses represent variable re-coding where different from the original.

Individualization in Europe and America • 125

6. V185 HOW OFTEN DO YOU ATTEND RELIGIOUS SERVICES Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

(6) (5) (4) (3) (3) (2) (1) (0)

More than once a week Once a week Once month Only on special holy days/Christmas/Easter days Other specific holy days Once a year Less often Never practically never

7. V192 BELIEVE IN LIFE AFTER DEATH Which, if any, of the following do you believe in? Believe in life after death. 0 No 1 Yes 8. V147 CONFIDENCE: CHURCHES I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? The churches. 1 2 3 4

(3) (2) (1) (0)

A great deal Quite a lot Not very much None at all

9. V194 BELIEVE IN HELL Which, if any, of the following do you believe in? Believe in hell. 0 No 1 Yes II. Work Motivations (Scale): A. Fulfillment = (V91+V94+V93+V96+V95+V89) B. Comfort = (V90+V92+V87+V86+ Here are some more aspects of a job that people say are important. Please look at them and tell me which ones you personally think are important in a job. Mentioned 1 | Not Mentioned 2 (0) Personal Fulfillment: 10. V91 An opportunity to use initiative 11. V94 A responsible job 12. V93 A job in which you feel you achieve something 13. V96 A job that meets one’s abilities 14. V95 A job that is interesting 15. V89 A job respected by people in general

126 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane

Economic Comfort: 39. V90 Good hours 40. V92 Generous holidays 41. V87 Not too much pressure 42. V86 Good pay 43. V88 Good job security III. Protest Potential (Scale) = (v136+v137+v135+v138+v134)/5 Now I’d like you to look at this card. I’m going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances, do it: Have Done 1 | Might Do 2(1) | Would Never 3(0) 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

V136 V137 V135 V138 V134

Attending lawful demonstrations Joining unofficial strikes Joining in boycotts Occupying buildings or factories Signing a petition

IV. Moral Permissiveness (Scale) = (v211+v210+v212+v208+v213)/5 Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: 1(0) Never Justifiable 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

V211 V210 V212 V208 V213

2(1) 3(2) 4(3) 5(4) 6(5) 7(6) 8(7) 9(8)

10(9) Always Justifiable

Divorce Abortion Euthanasia Homosexuality Suicide

V. Technical Notes • Data are weighted using standard national weights. • There are only two time-points of data (1981 & 2000) for moral permissiveness in Denmark. There are at least three time-points of data beginning in 1981 for the other countries in Figures 1, 2 and 3.

Religion in Contemporary Society: Eroded by Human Well-being, Supported by Cultural Diversity Thorleif Pettersson1 Abstract Most versions of secularization theory expect advanced modernity to weaken religion. In contrast, this chapter argues that two different dimensions of contemporary society affect religion in opposite ways. Rising levels of human security and well-being are assumed to drive towards religious decline, while growing cultural diversity is assumed to push towards religious growth. These two hypotheses are simultaneously investigated, using world wide data for 50 000 respondents from 37 countries with a predominantly Christian heritage. As dependent variables, two dimensions of religious involvement which relate to two core aspects of secularization theory are analyzed: church-oriented religious involvement and preferences for a religious impact on politics. The findings from three different analytical strategies demonstrate that each of the two religious orientations is positively related to the cultural diversity, and also that each of them is negatively related to human security and well-being. Furthermore, the results also indicate that the religious changes which took place between 1981 and 1999/2000 are negatively related to human well-being and security, and positively to cultural diversity. Thus, a set of comprehensive analyses of one and the same set of world wide data indicate that human security and cultural diversity affect religious

1

Uppsala University

128 • Thorleif Pettersson

involvement in opposite ways. It seems too simplistic, therefore, to view modernization as a universal cause of religious decline.

Modernization as a General Cause of Secularization? Most versions of secularization theory attempt to explain religious decline as an effect of modernization, and economic development, functional and structural differentiation, urbanization, industrialization and rising education are all said to weaken religion. Even if the different modernization processes need not be of equal importance, they are said to have led to a society where religion has become one subsystem among other subsystems to the point where religion has lost much of its former overarching relevance for both individuals and society. As a result of modernization, secular institutions are said to have become increasingly independent and autonomous in relation to religion, religious institutions to have become increasingly affected by secular norms and patterns, and individual world-views and value systems to have become increasingly emancipated from religious authorities. Comparative analyses give strong empirical support to the claim that modernization erodes religious involvement. For instance, national averages for the subjective importance which people attach to God correlate substantively negative with each of three standard measures of modernization (Esmer & Pettersson 2006; cf. Inglehart & Norris 2004: 14). The religious decline is also known to be especially apparent in Western Europe, one of the most economically developed regions in the world (Casanova 1994; Acquaviva 1979). But at the same time, the advanced countries in Western Europe are also known to diverge considerably in religious matters. Religious participation is substantively higher in the Southern Catholic parts when compared to the Northern Protestant. These intra-European differences demonstrate that the level of religious involvement in a country is also affected by factors other than modernization and economic development. A similar conclusion can be made from the relationships between the levels of religious involvement and the various measures of modernization, which were mentioned above. Even if the reported correlations (often ranging around –.60) demonstrate a substantial effect of modernization, they also give room for other factors which are not directly related to economic development and modernization in a narrow sense. Obviously, such a complex social phenomena as the strength of contemporary religion cannot be explained by only one single factor. Even if most secularization theorists agree that structural and functional differentiation have reduced religion’s influence on public life, there

Religion in Contemporary Society • 129

is considerable disagreement about the impact of this development at other social levels. Some assume that the differentiation between religious and secular institutions has led to a privatized religion which has remained relevant to personal and private matters. Religion is assumed to have been transformed and to have become increasingly assigned to the home – family life, love, and intimacy – and to have become a matter of individual and private taste (see e.g. Turner 1991, 2000). Such a privatized religion does not concern itself with public and political matters, and secularization in this sense does not necessarily call for a decline in individual religiosity. It is only the societal effects of religion which have ceased. The many different views on secularization suggest that one should not speak of the secularization theory. Instead, it has been emphasized that the “secularization paradigm” includes several competing understandings of what secularization is and which modernization processes it is driven by (Gorski 2000: 141). In order to investigate some of the different approaches to secularization, this chapter will investigate the specific effects of two different dimensions of modernization. The first concerns the effects of rising levels of existential security and human well-being. The second concerns the effects of growing levels of cultural diversity. In this analysis, these two dimensions of modernization are assumed to have opposite effects on religion. Religion and Existential Security It is regularly claimed that economic development brings improved wellbeing and human security. It is also frequently claimed that lack of human security and well-being brings higher levels of religious involvement, with religion being interpreted as a compensator for poor and difficult conditions of life. In short, religion has been explained as a response to human deprivation. Karl Marx’ classical verdict that “religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions” is one of the most well-known expressions of this line of thought. This view is also part of Christian teachings: “Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest” (Matt 11: 28-30). In the early 1960s, sociologists Charles Glock and Rodney Stark forwarded an extensive theory on how different forms of human deprivation gave rise to different kinds of religious involvement (Glock 1964; Glock & Stark 1965). Economic deprivation was said to lead to sect activities, social deprivation to church involvement, health deprivation to healing movements, ethical deprivation to reform movements, and psychic deprivation to religious cults. Recently, political scientists Pippa Norris

130 • Thorleif Pettersson

and Ronald Inglehart have presented new cross-cultural support for the assumption that religious involvement is driven by existential insecurity. All other factors being equal, they claim that “the experiences of growing up in less secure societies will heighten the importance of religious values, while conversely experience from more secure conditions will lessen it” (Norris & Inglehart 2004: 18; italics in the original). Their main thesis is that religion reduces insecurity, and that the need for such a reduction is more pressing under conditions of insecurity and deprivation. This mechanism is said to operate at both the societal and the individual level, although the effect at the societal level is assumed to be the most important. Analyzing data from some 80 different societies, Norris and Inglehart demonstrated that the levels of people’s religious involvement “could, indeed, be predicted with considerable accuracy from a society’s level of economic development and other indicators of human development” (Norris & Inglehart 2003: 220). The most crucial variables for the explanation of why some countries scored low on religious involvement were those that had an obvious impact on people’s experiences of existential security. However, increasing human security and the decline of religious involvement need not necessarily mean that people loose interest in spiritual issues in a more general sense. To the contrary, it has also been claimed that “spiritual concerns will always be part of the human condition” (Inglehart 1997: 80). In secure circumstances (that is in the economically well advanced and wealthy societies) people are still assumed to try improving their quality of life with, for instance, the satisfaction of their spiritual needs. “The need for meaning becomes more salient at high levels of existential security so that, even in rich countries, although church attendance is declining, spiritual concerns more broadly are not disappearing” (Norris & Inglehart 2004: 75). As empirical evidence for this, it is demonstrated that those who report being concerned about the meaning of life have increased at the same time as more traditional forms of religious involvement have decreased. Whether such spiritual concerns in the broad sense should be theoretically associated with religion in the same way as church attendance and adherence to traditional church dogmas is, however, a debated issue. Even if spiritual concerns in the broad sense can be viewed as religion from a functional point of view, it is less obvious that they should be regarded as religion in the same substantive way as for instance belief in a transcendent God. Disregarding whether spiritual concerns in the broad sense should be regarded as religion or not, the fact remains that economic growth and increased human security appear to weaken religion. At the same time, it should also however also be noted that the advanced economic and technological developments in contemporary society are said to led to a

Religion in Contemporary Society • 131

so-called risk society where “the threats produced so far on the path of industrial society begin to predominate” (Beck 1994: 6; cf. Beck 1992). The growing risks from nuclear power and atomic bombs, global warming caused by the intense use of oil and petrol for transportation, chemical toxic wastes, biotechnical manipulations and so forth are said to have a negative impact on people’s perception of human security. In fact, the mixture of increased well-being and the emerging new risks which characterize today’s society has been assumed to bring new forms of religious sensibility and spiritual endeavors (Giddens 1991: 207). In a similar way, advanced modernization is said to undermine “all the old certainties”. This would make people more eager to accept religious worldviews which can restore certainty (Berger 1999). In summary, modernization and socio-economic development are generally assumed to raise human security and well-being and thereby to erode religious involvement. In contrast, others have emphasized that new developments towards growing uncertainties in the contemporary risk society have increased human insecurity, and that this would be accompanied by a growing sensibility for religious values and beliefs. Thus, advanced economic development may not be such an indisputable path to declining religion as the secularization paradigm assumes; there are reasons to question advanced modernity as an inevitable cause of secularization and general religious decline. It has even been concluded that it is time “to carry the secularization doctrine to the graveyard of failed theories, and there to whisper ‘Requiescat in pace’” (Stark & Finke 2000: 79). Religion and Cultural Diversity The so-called religious supply side or market theory is an interesting alternative to the secularization paradigm. This theory denies that people’s religious demands are negatively affected by economic development and refutes that modernization causes inevitable religious declines. Instead, the religious market theory intends to “explain religious variation by looking at the supply of religion” (Finke & Stark 2003: 100; italics in the original). The basic assumption of this approach is that religious participation depends on the quality of the religious supply. The religious supply is in turn assumed to depend on the degree of pluralism among churches and denominations and/or the degree of regulation of the religious economy. The higher the religious pluralism and the lower the regulation of religious economies, the better the quality of the supply and the higher the religious participation (for a review, see e.g. Chaves & Gorski 2001). Some relate the positive impact of religious pluralism

132 • Thorleif Pettersson

to competition between the actors in the religious economy. The more competition they face, the more likely they would be to adapt their products to the demands of the “consumers” in order to maintain or increase their market shares. Such market adaptation is said to result in a rich and diversified supply of religious “goods” and thus to increase the likelihood that consumers can find religious services well adapted to their preferences. Another assumption is that religious participation will be lower the more regulated the religious sector is. The explanation is that regulation limits competition and that it thereby decreases the quality of the religious supply. Therefore, regulation of religious markets is assumed to lead to lower levels of religious participation. However, a recent review of the research on the effects of religious pluralism concluded that it would be more fruitful to search for the specific conditions under which religious pluralism has an impact on the vitality of the religious economy than to search for a general and invariantly positive relationship between religious pluralism and religious participation. Such a general relationship has indeed been difficult to demonstrate (Chaves & Gorski 2001: 278f ). It has been especially difficult to demonstrate such a positive relationship when investigating religious involvement and religious pluralism at the country level. The explanation might be that the religious supply would primarily have an effect when the local religious markets are small enough to give the potential participants a genuine choice (Stark & Finke 2000: 219). It is only when the potential participants in a religious service can choose between different kinds of services within a reasonable traveling distance that the diversity in the religious supply would have an impact. And yet, because of a lack of local data, studies of the impact of religious pluralism have often investigated religious participation at the national level and disregarded the local dimension. For this reason, cross-country analyses of the effects of religious pluralism may have obscured the effects of religious pluralism which would be primarily visible at the local levels. Another advantage of local analyses of religious pluralism is that they minimize the influences of other factors which may contaminate the results from cross-country analyses. These reasons may explain why analyses of religious pluralism in comparatively small local religious economies have been able to demonstrate the expected positive relationships between religious pluralism and religious participation, while cross-country analyses have not (Hamberg & Pettersson 1994, 1997; Pettersson 2001; Pettersson & Hamberg 1997). However, it should also be noted that local analyses of religious pluralism have not invariantly demonstrated the expected positive effects (Olson 2002: 151). Therefore, whether reli-

Religion in Contemporary Society • 133

gious pluralism engenders increasing participation or not might also depend on some other factors. As an example of such a factor, a recent analysis has suggested that the positive impact of a diversified religious supply is moderated by the degree of heterogeneity in people’s religious demands and worldviews (Hamberg & Pettersson 2002). The analysis argued that where there is real diversity in religious demands and worldviews, religious participation will be higher the more pluralistic the religious supply. However, where there is little diversity of religious demands and worldviews, a pluralistic religious supply would have less impact on religious participation. In such a case, there would be fewer potential consumers of the differentiated supply. Therefore, rather than being a universal factor leading to increased religious participation, pluralism in the religious supply would mainly give increased religious participation where there is sufficient heterogeneity in peoples’ religious beliefs and worldviews. In this regard, it is of special interest to note that contemporary society is often said to be culturally diversified (Crook et al. 1992: 221f ), marked by considerable diversity in people’s religious worldviews and also by a great number of different kinds of religious organizations. Advanced modernity is said to give rise to a kind of consumerist orientation towards ready-made lifestyles and to dissolve unified cultural traditions into differentiated segments. The political realm has witnessed a shift from economic to socio-cultural concerns and advanced modernity is said to foster multiple and cross-cutting identities which are situated in a number of “imagined communities”, where membership is a matter of taste and choice. In individualized contemporary society, people are said to make their own decisions, “rather than simply living up to the expectations of community or fulfilling obligations to someone else” (Wuthnow 1991: 12), and individual identity is assumed to be increasingly open, reflective, differentiated, and individuated (cf. Berger et al. 1973). In contemporary society, there are few compulsory obligations and people are assumed to be increasingly free to choose the convictions, beliefs, and practices they like (Giddens 1991: 84). There is also a growing number of market oriented suppliers of ready-made world views which offer an increasing number of options to choose from. The new electronic information technology is an important device for the marketing of such ideological alternatives. Thus, the emergence of a whole range of smallgroup, non-class political practices-micropolitics is a prominent characteristic of today’s world (Thomson 1992: 235). In this way, contemporary society is associated with increasing influences for personal choices from a growing pool of equally permissible and feasible options. And as a

134 • Thorleif Pettersson

consequence, ideological memberships have become more pluralistic and fragmented. When growing numbers of people, with different value priorities, choose freely from an enlarged pool of ideological options, the probability that they will choose differently increases. In situations where individuals have more options for their daily lives, personal beliefs and values will increasingly replace shared norms as influences on the choices people make (Berry 1994: 83). In this sense, one of the hallmarks of individualized contemporary society is cultural diversity, both with regard to individual world views and to ideology-based associations and communities. The recent extension of the religious market theory which was discussed above concluded that it is precisely the combination of these two dimensions of cultural diversity which would drive towards higher levels of religious participation. Since contemporary society is characterized by these two features of cultural diversity, it can therefore be expected to promote increased religious involvement. Where, ceteris paribus, secularization theories would assume the advanced welfare societies to be associated with increased security and therefore with lower levels of religious involvement, the extension of the religious market theory which is forwarded in this analysis would assume the culturally diversified contemporary society to be associated with comparatively higher levels. Thus, two different dimensions of contemporary society can be assumed to push in opposite directions with regard to the role of religion. This is the basic assumption which is investigated in this chapter. The assumption of increased religious participation in the culturally diversified contemporary society is not a new one. It has been argued that a return to religion is required in order to solve post-modernity’s growing emphasis on self-interest and its negative impact on morality (Bell 1976: 171; for a fuller discussion, see O’Neill, 1988; cf. Berger 1999). It has also been suggested that secularization is primarily related to the industrialization phase of modernization, but not to the subsequent developments into the advanced knowledge and service society. During the latter developments, previous secularization processes are said to be counterbalanced by growing concerns for the meaning and purpose of life (Inglehart & Baker 2000: 49; compare also the above discussion of secularization theory). But, even if the assumption that cultural diversity fosters increased levels of religious involvement is not new, the theoretical foundation for this claim, which is forwarded here, differs from the theoretical underpinnings of the earlier assumptions in this regard. In this chapter, the assumption is based on a recent extension of the religious market theory.

Religion in Contemporary Society • 135

In order to clarify the concept of cultural diversity, a theoretical model for allocentrism and idiocentrism can be of help (Triandis 1994). The model is partly based on a typology for four elementary forms of social relations (Fiske 1991). Communal sharing is a relationship in which people are merged so that the boundaries of individual selves are indistinct, while authority ranking is a transitive asymmetrical relationship of inequality. Equality matching is an egalitarian relationship among peers who are distinct but coequal individuals, while the relationship of market pricing is mediated by market values (Fiske 1991: 13f ). These four distinct types of social relations are said to be fundamental in the sense that they build the most basic grammar for social relations and general in the sense that they give order to most forms of social interaction, thought and affect. They are further said to be elementary in the sense that they are basic constituents for all social forms of a higher order and to be universal in the sense that they form the basis for social relations in all cultures. These four types of social relations can therefore be used as a basis for cross-cultural analyses of social relations. They can also be used as a basis for the analysis of cultural diversity. The model for allocentrism and idiocentrism holds that the four types of relationships are differently sampled in different societies. Allocentric types (communal sharing and authority ranking) are more often sampled in collectivist countries while idiocentric types (equality matching and market pricing) are more often sampled in individualist countries. In an allocentric and collectivist context, groups tend to be the basic unit for social perception, while in an idiocentric and individualist context, the individual is the basic unit. For instance, it would be idiocentric to attribute individual success to people’s own ability, but allocentric to attribute it to the help of others. It would be idiocentric to appreciate achievement for self-glory, while it would be allocentric to appreciate it for the groups’ sake. In idiocentric societies, personal goals have primacy over in-group goals, while the opposite would be the case in allocentric societies. Comparisons of how attributes like these are chosen in different societies would therefore indicate the degrees to which the cultures of these societies can be characterized as either allocentric/collective or as idiocentric/individualistic. Based on the claim that individualism fosters cultural diversity, idiocentric attributes can then be seen as indicators of a diversified culture. In addition to the impact of cultural diversity and human security, the levels of religious involvement are also known to differ between different religious traditions. For instance, religious participation is known to be higher in Catholic and Orthodox contexts than in Protestant. The levels of religious involvement are also known to depend on a number

136 • Thorleif Pettersson

of micro-level factors. It has frequently been showed that the younger and better educated, the males, those who are single without children, and those who live in urbanized areas tend to be less interested in religious matters (see e.g. Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi 1975; Inglehart 1997; Pettersson 1994). In this investigation, these factors are mainly introduced in order to control for the impact of factors which might be related to the key factors of cultural diversity and human security. In summary, then, this investigation assumes that cultural diversity with pluralism among ideology based small-scale communities together with heterogeneity in people’s world views is a cause of growing religious involvement. In contrast, advancements in human security and well-being are assumed to cause declining levels of religious involvement. These are the two main macro-level hypotheses which will be simultaneously investigated in this analysis. In addition, people’s religious involvement is also assumed to depend on a number of micro-level factors such as age, gender, education, etc. In the subsequent part of this chapter, these macro- and micro level hypotheses will be analyzed, using a comprehensive set of data from some 50 000 respondents and 37 countries with a predominantly Christian heritage. Data and Measures Data: This investigation is primarily built on data from the European Values Study (EVS)/World Values Survey (WVS) wave from 1999/2000. For further information on the EVS/WVS projects, see e.g. Harding et al., 1986; Ester et al., 1994; Inglehart, 1990, 1997; Halman 2001; Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart et al. 2004; see also the EVS and WVS websites: http://evs.kub.nl and www.worldvaluessurvey.org. The empirical analyses are based on the data from 37 countries being mainly influenced by Christianity in their religious traditions. This selection is made in order to limit the investigation to concern at least, in principle, similar dimensions of religious involvement. The 37 countries and their respective sample sizes are as follows: Argentina (ARE) 1 280, Austria (AUT) 1 552, Belarus (BLR) 1 000, Belgium (BEL) 1 912, Bulgaria (BGR) 1 000, Canada (CAN) 1 931, Chile (CHL) 1 200, Croatia (HRV) 1 003, Czech Republic (CZE) 1 908, Denmark (DNK) 1 023, Estonia (EST) 1 005, Finland (FIN) 1 038, France (FRA) 1 616, Germany (DEU) 2 036, Greece (GRC) 1 142, Hungary (HUN) 1 000, Iceland (ISL) 968, Ireland (IRL) 1 012, Italy (ITA) 2 000, Latvia (LVA) 1 013, Lithuania (LTU) 1 018, Luxembourg (LUX) 1 211, Malta (MLT) 1 002, Mexico (MEX) 1 535, Netherlands (NLD) 1 003, Philippines (PHL) 1 200, Poland (POL) 1 095, Portugal (PRT) 1 000, Romania (ROM) 1 146, Russia

Religion in Contemporary Society • 137

(RUS) 2 500, Slovakia (SVK) 1 331, Slovenia (SVN) 1 006, South Africa (ZAF) 3 000, Spain (ESP) 1 200, Sweden (SWE) 1 015, Ukraine (UKR) 1 195 and United States (US) 1 200. Unfortunately, due to missing data for some key variables, a few countries with a Christian cultural heritage which participated in the 1999/2000 wave can not be included in this analysis. Dependent variables: Church-oriented religious involvement and the relationship between religion and politics. For reasons of space, this analysis will consider only two dimensions of religious involvement. The first is a broad dimension of a church oriented religious involvement, while the second covers people’s preferences for a religious impact on politics. Referring to the introductory theoretical discussion, these two dimensions relate to two of the main aspects of secularization, namely the level of religious involvement, and the degree of differentiation between religion and secular society. The church-oriented religious involvement is measured by five items/indicators. These are, a) one item on how often the respondent attends religious services, b) one indicator for church attachment which taps confidence in one’s church together with opinions on whether this gives adequate answers to moral problems, family problems, spiritual problems, and social problems, c) one indicator for the importance of God, d) one indicator for eschatological beliefs in life after death, heaven and hell, and e) one indicator for religious devotions, which taps personal prayer and whether one gets support from one’s religion or not. Views on the relationship between religion and politics are measured by two items. These tap the degree to which one rejects that a) religious leaders should not influence how people vote in elections, and b) that religious leaders should not influence government decisions (for a discussion of the validity of these two items for this purpose, see Halman & Pettersson 2002a, Norris & Inglehart 2004). It should be noted that people’s views on the relationship between religion and politics only indicates whether they prefer a differentiation between religion and politics. Thus, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between the actual level of differentiation between religion and politics in a society, and the micro level compartmentalization with regard to whether or not people prefer a separation between religion and politics (cf. Dobbelaere 2002: 169f ) Table 1 shows the results from an explanatory factor analysis of a two-dimensional factor structure for these 7 items/indicators. The results demonstrate that the items/indicators are related as expected to the two theoretical dimensions of religious involvement. It should also be noted that a component analysis of the aggregated items/indicators demonstrate the same two-dimensional factor structure. The factor scores from either the individual level or the national aggregated level religious indicators

138 • Thorleif Pettersson

Table 1 Results from an explanatory factor analysis of a two-dimensional model for 7 indicators for religious involvement. EVS/WVS data from 37 countries with a predominantly Christian cultural heritage

can therefore be used to measure the two dimensions of religious involvement. Independent micro-level variables for social background: As micro-level control variables, five indicators for individual level social background will be used. These relate to age, gender, education, family status (having children) and life satisfaction (see the above theoretical discussion on this). Education is measured by a question which asked the age at which the respondents finished/will finish his or her education. Admittedly, this is a crude measure of the degree of education. However, more nuanced measures, taking each country’s specific education system into account, would infringe on cross-country comparability. Measures for cultural diversity and human well-being and security: The key research issue of this analysis is to investigate how the two dimensions of religious involvement are related to the macro-level factors of cultural diversity and human security. Considering the available data, it is a difficult task to measure the levels of cultural diversity. This analysis relies in a tentative manner on three macro-level indicators for this pur-

Religion in Contemporary Society • 139

pose. These tap the degree of cultural idiocentrism, the degree of pluralism among social movements and voluntary associations, and the size of the information technology sector. The introductory theoretical discussion pointed to these three dimensions as especially interesting for the analysis of cultural diversity. The measure of cultural idiocentrism is obtained as factor scores from five aggregated indicators of idiocentric orientations (cf. the above discussion on this). These indicators tap a) views on whether there are general rules for what is right and wrong, true or false, or whether this always depends on the situation, b) appreciation of independence and respect for others as a personal quality, c) the experience of free choice and control in one’s life, d) the opinion that it is important to be able to take initiatives in one’s job, and e) how many different social movements and organizations, except religious organizations, one is active member of. These 5 indicators can all be seen as indicators of an idiocentric orientation (cf. Triandis 1994: Table 3.1). It should also be noted that the indicators are positively correlated to each other and that they are related to one and the same latent factor. This has been forwarded as a criterion for their use in cross-cultural analyses (Triandis 1994: 46). Obviously, other indicators of idiocentrism might be preferred, but these five items are the best available in the EVS/WVS data set. The indicator of organizational pluralism taps the degree of pluralism with regard to active memberships in a number of voluntary organizations and social movements. This measure is based on the well-known Herfindahl index. The more evenly spread the memberships across a given number of different movements, the higher the level of organizational pluralism. Finally, the measure for the size of the information technology taps the national number of Internet connections per capita. This measure is obtained from the statistics which are reported by the World Bank. The results of a principal component analysis of the three indicators for cultural diversity demonstrate that they all relate to one and the same latent dimension. The first component explains about 65 percent of the total variance in the three indicators. The mean correlation between the three indicators is .45. The country factor scores for this dimension can, therefore, tentatively be used as a measure for the national levels of cultural diversity. In order to measure the degree of human security and well-being, a somewhat modified version of the so-called Human Well-being Index (HWI) will be used (Prescott-Allen 2001). The modified measure covers four components of human security. These are health and population (life expectancy at birth and fertility rate), wealth (average of household

140 • Thorleif Pettersson

and national wealth), community (two indices for, respectively, freedom and governance and peace and order), and equity (average of household and gender equity). The equity index is only included in the human well-being index if it decreases the average of the three first-mentioned components. This prevents the well-being index from offsetting poor performance in the other three components of well-being (Prescott-Allen 2001: 152). The four components of human well-being are all positively correlated. The HWI measure has been showed to correlate positively with several other measures of standard of living (Prescott-Allen 2001). This demonstrates the validity of the index as a relevant measure of human security and standard of living. Results Country differences in the independent and dependent variables: It should first be noted that there is a significant positive correlation between the measures for human well-being and cultural diversity (r = .65, p < .01). Even if this correlation does not reach the magnitude where multicollinearity becomes a serious problem (Edlund 1997: 84-100), checks for this are called for when both of these measures are used as independent variables in multiple regression analyses. A scatterplot of the index for human well-being and the measure for cultural diversity shows that societies which score comparatively low on human well-being and high on cultural diversity are largely missing among the 37 countries which are chosen for this study. Thus, roughly one fourth of the scatterplot is empty. However, an investigation of the relationship between cultural fractionalism and standard of living has argued that there are no binding mechanisms which would prevent countries from falling in this part of the scatterplot (Pettersson & Esmer 2005). To the contrary, it has even been suggested that cultural fractionalism may actually lead to lower levels of economic development and standard of living (Alesina et al. 2003). As expected from the factor analyses of the two dimensions of religious involvement, the correlation between the church-oriented religious involvement and the preferences for a religious impact on politics is considerably smaller, both at the individual and the aggregated levels. The relationship at the latter level is demonstrated by Figure 1, which shows a scatterplot of the country means for the factor scores for the two religious dimensions. Especially the U.S., South Africa, and Mexico score high on both dimensions, in contrast to France, Denmark, Belgium, Bulgaria, Luxemburg, and Austria, which score comparatively low on both. Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, Spain, and Russia score low on the church-oriented religious involvement, but comparatively high on

Religion in Contemporary Society • 141

Figure 1 Church-oriented religion and preferences for a religious impact on politics in 37 countries.

preferences for a religious impact on politics, while Poland, Malta, Croatia, Romania, and the Philippines show the opposite pattern, with high scores on church-oriented religion and comparatively low scores on the preferences for a religious impact on politics. Religious involvement, human security and cultural diversity: As already emphasized, the main research question of this investigation concerns the ways in which people’s church-oriented religious involvement and their preferences for a religious impact on politics, respectively, are related to the levels of human security and cultural diversity in the countries where they live. In order to investigate this, one multiple regression analysis for each of the two dependent variables will be used as a first test. In these two analyses, only macro-level data will be considered. In order to control for the impact of Catholicism and Orthodoxy on the levels of religious involvement, each county’s scores for the percentage of adherents to these two traditions will be introduced as control variables. Thus, Protestantism is used as the reference category. The results from

142 • Thorleif Pettersson

Table 2 Results from two multiple regression analyses with church-oriented religious involvement and preferences for a religious impact on politics as dependent variables. Aggregated data for 37 countries with a predominant Christian culture. Entries are unstandardized multiple regression coefficients Church-oriented religious involvement Constant Human security Cultural diversity Catholic tradition Orthodox tradition Multiple R

1.27 –.03 .26 1.11 .60 .75

*** *** ** *** ***

Preferences for a religious impact on politics .70 –.01 .12 –.12 –.18 .55

*** ** *

*

*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05.

the multiple regression analyses are presented in Table 2. The multiple regression coefficients demonstrate that cultural diversity is positively related to each of the two dimensions of religious involvement, while human security and well-being is negatively related. Detailed analyses of the possible effects of multicollinearity between the measures for human well-being and cultural diversity have demonstrated these to be negligible. In summary, therefore, it can be concluded that two multiple regression analyses of aggregated data have supported each of the two main hypotheses which are forwarded in this investigation. In a second set of analyses, only micro-level data are analyzed. In these analyses, the national levels of human well-being and cultural diversity have been transformed into individual context variables. Thus, each respondent from a given country has been assigned the national scores for human well-being and cultural diversity. As measures of religious involvement, the factor scores from the factor analysis of the individual level indicators for religious involvement have been used. The analyses of the individual level data have been performed as a comparative analysis of three different regression models. The first model includes only the individual level background data as predictors of the two dimensions of religious involvement. In accordance with the introductory theoretical discussion, the relevant background variables include age, gender, education, family status (having children or not) and life satisfaction. The second regression model includes the individual level background data together with dummy variables for being Catholic or Orthodox (being a Protestant is used as reference category) as independent variables. In

Religion in Contemporary Society • 143

the third model, the context variables for human security and cultural diversity are included as predictors for religious involvement. The results for these regression models are reported in Tables 3 and 4. The results from the regression analyses show the same pattern as the analyses of the aggregated level data. Human well-being appears to be negatively related to each of the two dimensions of religious involvement, while cultural diversity is positively related. The regression analyses demonstrate that these relationships are independent of the impacts of individual background data, including which religious tradition one belongs to. It should also be noted that the two dimensions of religious involvement appear to be somewhat differently related to the individual level background variables. In the case of church-oriented religious involvement, the background variables seem to work quite as expected (see model 3). Old age, female gender, and full family status (having children) are positively related to religious involvement, while education appears to have a negative impact. It should also be noted that subjective life satisfaction is positively related to church-oriented religious involvement, and not negatively, which the hypothesis of the negative impact of existential insecurity might be interpreted to suggest. However, if one considers that this hypothesis assumes that the role of religion is to ease the burdens Table 3 Results for three models of multiple regression analyses. Dependent variable: Church oriented religious involvement. Entries are unstandardized multiple regression coefficients. Data from 37 countries with a predominant Christian culture. Number of respondents: 39.200 Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

–.56 .00 .30 .10 –.03 .02

–.96 –.01 .26 .10 –.01 .02

.97 .01 .27 .05 –.02 .04

Social background Constant Old age Female gender Have children More education Life satisfaction Religious denomination Catholic Orthodox Security, Cultural diversity Human Well-being Index Cultural Diversity Multiple R Change Multiple R Square *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05.

*** n.s.

*** *** *** ***

*** * *** *** *** ***

.70 *** .58 ***

.26 ***

.42 *** .11 ***

*** *** *** *** *** ***

.83 *** .58 *** –.04 .31 .56 .14

*** *** *** ***

144 • Thorleif Pettersson

Table 4 Results for three models of multiple regression analyses. Dependent variable: Preferences of a religious impact on politics. Entries are unstandardized multiple regression coefficients. Data from 37 countries with a predominant Christian culture. Number of respondents: 39.200 Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

–.11 –.01 .06 .03 .00 .00

–.12 –.01 .06 .03 .00 .00

.65 .01 .06 .01 –.01 .00

Social background Constant Old age Female gender Have children More education Life satisfaction Religious tradition Catholic Orthodox Security, Cultural diversity Human Well-being Index Cultural Diversity Multiple R Change Multiple R Square

** ** *** *** n.s n.s

*** ** *** *** n.s n.s

.02 n.s .03 n.s

.05 ***

.05 *** .00 n.s

*** n.s.

*** * * n.s

.08 *** .08 *** –.01 .17 .15 .02

*** *** *** ***

*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05.

of existential insecurity, the positive regression coefficient can be interpreted as saying that religious involvement has really fulfilled this role. Put in theoretical terms, a proper individual level analysis of the hypothesis on religion as a compensator for human insecurity call for a comparison of people’s well-being, both before and after they have developed a religious commitment. However, longitudinal data which would allow such an analysis are difficult to find. With regard to the preferences for a religious impact on politics, Table 4 demonstrates that both age and subjective life satisfaction are insignificant as predictor variables. Both of the two analyses which have been described so far are in a way flawed. The analyses of the macro-level data ignored the effects of individual level factors, while the analyses of the micro-level data violate the assumption of independence of the disaggregated macro-level observations. Thus, both aggregating and disaggregating are related to different kinds of error (Bryk et al. 1992: XIV). In order to take these errors into account, the results from two analyses which combine microand macro-level data will be presented next. The multi-level analyses are based on the HLM program which enables the estimation of the simultaneous effects of both micro- and macro level independent vari-

Religion in Contemporary Society • 145

Table 5 Results from two multi-level hierarchical linear regressions of micro- and macrolevel factors affecting people’s church-oriented religious involvement and their preferences for a religious impact on politics. Entries are unstandardized multilevel regression coefficients. 1999-2000 EVS/WVS data for 39.200 respondents from 37 countries. Church-oriented religious Preferences for a religious involvement, degrees of impact on politics, degrees freedom, p-value of freedom, p-value Micro-level factors: Age Gender Education Have children Life satisfaction Macro-level factors Human well-being Cultural diversity Catholic tradition Orthodox tradition

.01, .32, –.02, .03, .04,

df df df df df

36, 36, 36, 36, 36,

p p p p p

< < < < <

.001 .001 .001 .001 .001

.00, .06, –.01, .02, .00,

df df df df df

36, 36, 36, 36, 36,

n.s. p < .001 n.s. p < .01 n.s.

–.03, .26, 1.26, .89,

df df df df

32, 32, 32, 32,

p p p p

< < < <

.001 .01 .001 .01

–.01, .16, –.18, –.25,

df df df df

32, 32, 32, 24,

p < .01 p < .001 n.s. n.s.

ables on the two individual level religious orientations (see e.g. Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Hox, 1995). The results are presented in Table 5. The hierarchical multi-level regression analyses demonstrate the same patterns as the previous analyses. Thus, even after allowing for the various micro-level characteristics, there is still a significant impact of human security and cultural diversity on each of the two dimensions of religious involvement. The levels of human security and well-being are negatively related to the two religious dimensions, while the levels of cultural diversity are positively related. With regard to the individual level predictors, the results are also quite in accordance with the findings from the previous analyses. In summary, therefore, it can be concluded that the three sets of regression analyses which are reported in this investigation have yielded rather similar results. This underlines the robustness of the findings. Each of the three sets of analyses has confirmed that human well-being and security is negatively related to religious involvement and that cultural diversity is positively related. Religious change between 1981 and 1999/2000: In order to investigate in more detail the religious changes which have taken place, Table 6 presents the results for the 16 countries which participated both in the 1981 and 1999/2000 waves of the value studies. Since the items which were

146 • Thorleif Pettersson

Table 6 Mean scores for church-oriented religion in 1981 and 1999/2000 among 16 countries with a predominantly Christian cultural heritage. Year Country: Mexico Ireland United States South Africa Argentine Canada Italy Spain Iceland Hungary Belgium The Netherlands Finland France Denmark Sweden

Difference

1981

1999/2000

107.4 107.2 106.0 105.6 102.0 101.8 100.0 99.3 98.0 98.0 97.3 95.3 93.5 93.2 92.5 91.8

108.5 103.3 106.0 107.5 102.7 100.0 102.5 96.9 97.7 94.4 94.4 93.9 96.9 92.8 93.1 92.7

Increase, p < .001 Decrease, p < .001 No difference Increase, p < .001 No difference Decrease, p < .001 Increase, p < .001 Decrease, p < .001 No difference Decrease, p < .001 Decrease, p < .001 Decrease, p < .05 Increase, p < .001 No difference No difference Increase, p < .05

used to study people’s preferences for a religious impact on politics were not included in the 1981 questionnaire, results for this dimension can not be reported. The scores which are reported in Table 6 are based on the same kind of factor scores which were described in relation to Table 1. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results, the factor scores obtained from a factor analysis of the entire data set of 5 indicators have been transformed to have a mean value of 100 and a standard deviation of 10. In Table 6, the countries are ranked from highest to lowest as at the beginning of the period under study in 1981. The findings demonstrate that the religious changes which took place between 1981 and 1999/2000 did not follow one and the same pattern in each of the 16 countries. There was a religious decline in 6 countries, a religious increase in 5 countries and religious stability in 5 countries. This diversified pattern of religious change undoubtedly warns against any easy and general assumption of a general linear religious decline in contemporary society. Looking at the diversified results for religious change, it is not easy to detect any systematic pattern. Increases are found in countries with both the highest levels of religious involvement (Mexico, Italy) and the lowest (Finland, Sweden), and the same

Religion in Contemporary Society • 147

can be noted for the countries which show decreases. Furthermore, the pattern of increases and decreases seems to be unrelated to the CatholicProtestant divide. Both increases and decreases are found among the Catholic countries, and the same goes for Protestant countries. However, and rather relevant to this investigation, one interesting tendency, although weak, can be detected if one takes a closer look at both the size and the direction of the religious changes. If one calculates the differences between 1999/2000 and 1981, a positive value indicates a religious increase, and a negative value a decrease. The partial correlation between the level of human security at the end of the period under study and the changes in religious involvement, and allowing for the level of cultural diversity shows itself to be negative (–.41), while the corresponding partial correlation for cultural diversity shows to be positive (.28). Even if none of these two coefficients is statistically significant, this pattern nevertheless coincides with the previous findings of a differential impact of human security and cultural diversity. The result also indicates that detailed longitudinal analyses would be an interesting alternative to the cross-sectional analyses which have been reported in this chapter. In this regard, it should furthermore be noted that the pattern for religious decreases and increases is also discernible in some preliminary analyses of parts of the WVS data from the 2005/2006 wave. Therefore, detailed analyses of the complete set of data from this wave will be of great interest in relation to the two main hypotheses on religious change which have been set out in this analysis. Conclusions This investigation started from the assumption that religion is eroded by human security and fostered by cultural diversity. Thus, two different dimensions of advanced modernity are assumed to affect religion in opposite ways. In addition (and in this analysis mainly introduced as a kind of control variables), the levels of people’s religious involvement are also assumed to be related to the kind of Christian tradition to which they belong, and also to their socio-economic background. In comparison to Protestantism, both Catholicism and Orthodoxy are assumed to be related to higher levels of religious involvement. Social background such as old age, female gender, full family status (having children) and low education are also assumed to drive people towards higher levels of religious involvement. As dependent variables for the two main hypotheses, two dimensions of religious involvement have been investigated. The first is a general church-oriented religiosity, while the second concerns people’s preferences for a religious impact on politics. These two dimensions have been selected since they relate to two core aspects of secularization theory.

148 • Thorleif Pettersson

The hypothesis of a differential impact of human well-being and cultural diversity has been tested on a comprehensive set of data from 37 countries with a predominantly Christian cultural heritage. These countries were chosen in order to obtain comparable measures of religious involvement. The empirical results supported each of the two macro-level theoretical hypotheses, and it is difficult to conclude from the detailed results of the regression analyses that one of them is able to explain more of the variance in religious involvement than the other. Accordingly, the two theoretical perspectives which assume religion to be differently affected by two different dimensions of modernization appear to have roughly the same explanatory power. These results demonstrate that in analyses of religious change, one should not treat modernization as one homogeneous factor which would have one, and only one, impact on religion. Instead, different dimensions of modern society seem to be associated with different kinds of religious change. Thus, with two well-known statements in mind, the results neither recommend the immediate burial of the secularization theory (cf. Stark and Finke 2000: 79), nor call for a deadly strike at the religious supply side theory (cf. Bruce 1999: 2). The conclusion that human well-being and cultural diversity have opposite effects on religious involvement is based on an analytical strategy which allowed that these two factors were investigated simultaneously, using one and the same comprehensive set of empirical data. In contrast, previous conclusions on the merits of the two different theoretical perspectives on the relation between religion and modernization have too seldom been based on such a comparative analytical strategy. It would undoubtedly be of great interest to find data which would allow even more detailed analyses of the effects of a possible developmental sequence between advances in human security and cultural diversity respectively. Thus, one would expect advanced social progress to yield lower levels of religious participation together with higher levels of cultural pluralism, which in turn would lead to higher levels of religious involvement (cf. Halman & Pettersson 2002b). However, the analysis which is reported in this chapter has mostly relied on cross-sectional data. Needless to say, analyses of such data analyses do not give strong support for theoretical assumptions on developments over time. Therefore, it was of considerable interest to find that the analysis of religious changes during the previous two decades indicated a similar pattern as the crosssectional analyses. Even if the results were not statistically significant, the analysis of the religious changes that had taken place between 1981 and 1999/2000 indicated that human security was related to religious declines and cultural diversity to religious increases. Furthermore, the analysis of the longitudinal data clearly demonstrated that one should be very cau-

Religion in Contemporary Society • 149

tious in assuming any universal linear religious decline in contemporary society. Instead, the results indicated that religious increases were as frequent as religious decreases, and that in addition several countries showed no changes at all. It should also be noted that the data analyzed in this chapter hardly demonstrate that people have widespread preferences for religious leaders to be potent actors in the political realm. Rather, in spite of the systematic country differences in this regard, the data suggest that in most countries comparatively large portions of the mass publics appear to remain skeptic towards a religious influence on politics and public matters (cf. Halman & Pettersson 2002a). This conclusion is also supported by another set of data, the so called RAMP project, which asked people in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal and Sweden, respectively, whether the main religions should have an influence on politics or not. These data showed that large majorities were of the opinion that they should not (Halman & Pettersson 2002b). These results are of special interest in relation to recent claims that the contemporary religions refuse the marginal and privatized role which theories of secularization and modernization have reserved for them (Casanova 1994). Even if cultural diversity seems to breed a positive understanding for such a role, the data analyzed in this paper can hardly be said to demonstrate that ordinary people by and large are ready to accept a religious influence on politics. Obviously, the analyses presented in this investigation need critical examination. In particular, the indicator for cultural diversity calls for further development, preferably based on data which would allow a broader coverage of different dimensions of macro-level culture. At the same time, a valid indicator for the degree of heterogeneity in people’s world-views and religious preferences should preferably be based on individual level data. In order to establish a macro-level measure of cultural diversity from such data, the theoretical model for idiocentric and allocentric perceptions of society seems promising. Thus, to equate cultural diversity with idiocentric outlooks in combination with heterogeneous small-group, non-class political practices-micropolitics might be a fruitful research avenue to follow. With regard to the two dependent variables which have been analyzed in this investigation, the indicator for church-oriented religious involvement appears straightforward and unproblematic. Even so, it might prove interesting to continue this kind of investigation for other dimensions of religious involvement as well, not least for dimensions which are less church oriented since such more open, non-organized forms of religious involvement are often said to be on the increase. Better measures for such dimensions of religious involvement

150 • Thorleif Pettersson

might well cast further light on the processes which are discussed in this analysis. Finally, it must be emphasized that the level of religious participation in a given country is likely to depend on a number of factors which are not investigated in chapter. For instance, country specific developments in church history, country specific relationships between religion and nationalism, country specific relations between religion and different social and ethnic strata, country specific relationships between religion and the political party system, etc., may all effect the levels of church involvement and people’s views on the relationship between religion and politics. Therefore, the country differences demonstrated in this analysis may also depend on factors which have not been investigated or controlled for. Even so, the systematic relationships which have been demonstrated between human security, cultural diversity, and religious involvement, still deserve attention. These systematic relationships were found in a comprehensive set of data, including some 50 000 respondents from 37 countries with different Christian traditions and different levels of cultural pluralism and social progress. Furthermore, these relationships are also highly relevant with regard to both secularization theory and the religious market theory, two key perspectives in contemporary religious studies. In summary, it can therefore be concluded that both the research strategy which has been developed in this investigation and the empirical results which have been found have contributed to a deepened understanding of the intriguing relations between human well-being, cultural diversity and religious change. References Acquaviva, S. 1979 The Decline of the Sacred in Industrial Society. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Alesina, A., Dewleeschlawer, A., Easterley, W., Kurlat, S. and Wacziarg, R. 2003 “Fractionalization,” Journal of Economic Growth, 8. Argyle, M. and B. Beit-Hallahmi 1975 The Social Psychology of Religion. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Beck, U. 1992 Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage Publications 1992 “The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization”, U. Beck, A. Giddens and S. Lash. Reflexive Modernization. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Bell, D. 1976 The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, London: Heinemann. Berger, P., Berger, P. and Kellner, H. 1973 The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness. New York: Random House.

Religion in Contemporary Society • 151 Berry, J. 1994 Bruce, S. 1999 Casanova, J. 1994

“Ecology of Individualism and Collectivism”, U. Kim et al. (eds) Individualism and Collectivism. Theory, Method and Applications, London: Sage Publications. Choice and Religion: A Critique of Rational Choice Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Chaves, M. and Gorski, Ph. 2001 “Religious Pluralism and Religious Participation,” Annual Review of Sociology 27: 261-281. Crook, S., Pakulski, J. and Waters, M. 1992 Postmodernization. Change in Advanced Society, London: Sage. Dobbelaere, K. 2002 Secularization. An Analysis of Three Levels. Oxford: P.I.E.-Peter Lang. Edlund, P. O. 1997 SPSS för Windows. Multipel Regressionsanalys. Lund: Studentlitteratur Eisenstadt, S. 2002 “Some Observations on Multiple Modernities.” In Multiple Modernities. European, Chinese and other Interpretations, edited by D. Sachsenmayer, J. Riedel with S. Eisenstadt, 28-41, Boston: Brill. Esmer, Y. and Pettersson, T. 2006 “Religion and the Ballot Box. The Effects of Religion and Religiosity on Voting Behavior”. R. Dalton and H. D. Klingeman (eds) Oxford Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press (in press). Ester, P., L. Halman and R. de Moor, eds. 1994 The Individualizing Society. Value Change in Europe and North America. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press. Estes, R. 2004 At the Crossroads. Dilemmas in World Development at the Outset of a NewCentury, Dordrect: Kluwer International. Forthcoming. Finke, R. and R. Star 2003 “The Dynamics of Religious Economies.” In Handbook of the Sociology of Rreligion, edited by M. Dillon, 96-109. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. Fiske, A. P. 1991 Structures of Social Life. The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations. New York: The Free Press. Giddens, A. 1991 Modernity and Self-identity. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Gorski, R. 2000 “Historizicing the Secularization Debate: Church, State, and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe. American Sociological Review 65, February, 138–167. Hagenaars, J., L. Halman and G. Moors 2003 “Exploring Europe’s Basic Values Map.” In The Cultural Diversity of European Unity, edited by W. Arts, J Hagenaars and L. Halman, 23-58. Boston: Brill.

152 • Thorleif Pettersson Halman, L. 2001

The European Values Study: A Third Wave. Source Book of the 1999/2000 European Values Study Surveys. Tilburg: EVS, WORC, Tilburg University. Halman, L. and Vloet, A. 1994 Measuring and Comparing Values in 16 countries of the Western World. Tilburg University: WORC. Halman, L. and T. Pettersson 2002a “Religion und Politik in zeitgenössischen Gesellschaft: Differentzierung oder Entdifferenzierung?” In Politik und Religion. Politische. Vierteljahresschrift. Sonderheft 33/2002, edited by M. Minkenberg and U. Willems, 303-322. Halman, L. and T. Pettersson 2002b Moral pluralism. Yearbook for the Scientific Study of Religion 13: 173-204. Hamberg, E. and T. Pettersson 2002 “Religious Markets: Supply, Demand, and Rational Choices.” In Sacred Markets, Sacred Canopies: Essays on Religious Markets and Religious Pluralism, edited by T. Jelen, 91-114. Lanham: Rowman-Litttlefeld. Harding, S., D. Phillips and M. Fogarty 1986 Contrasting Values in Western Europe. Unity Diversity and Change, London: MacMilan Hox, J. 1995 Applied Multilevel Analysis, Amsterdam: TT-Publikaties. Inglehart, R. 1990 Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1997 Modernization and Postmodernization. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, R. and W. Baker 2000 “Modernization, Cultural Change and the Persistence of Traditional Values.” American Sociological Review 65: 19-51. Luckmann, T. 1967 Invisible Religion. New York: MacMillan. O’Neill, J. 1988 “Religion and Postmodernism: The Bond,” in Bell and Jameson, Theory, Culture and Society, 5 (2/3). Olson, D. 2002 “Competing Notions of Religious Competition and Conflict in Theories of Religious Economies.” In T. Jelen (ed.) Sacred Markets, Sacred Canopies: Essays on Religious Markets and Religious Pluralism. Lanham: Rowman-Littlefeld Pettersson, T. 1994 “Individualizacion, Secularizacion y Cambio de Valor Moral en la Escandinavia Contemporanea.” In Tendencias Mundiales de Cambio en los Valores Sociales y Politicos, edited by J. Diez Nicolas and R. Inglehart, 483-498. Madrid: Los Libros de Fundesco. 2003a “Basic Values and Civic Education. A Comparative Analysis of Adolescent Orientations Towards Gender Equality and Good Citizenship. www.worldvaluessurvey.org. 2003b “The Relations Between Religion and Politics in the Western World. The Impact of Secularization, Postmodernization and People’s Basic Value Orientations. www.worldvaluessurvey.org. Raudenbush, S. and A. Bryk 2002 Linear Models. Applications and Data Analysis Methods. London: Sage.

Religion in Contemporary Society • 153 Stark, R. and R. Finke 2000 Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion. Berkeley: University of California Press. Thomson, K. 1992 “Social Pluralism and Post-modernity.” In Modernity and its Futures, edited by S. Hall, D. Held and T. McGrew, 221-272. Cambridge: Polity Press. Turner, B. 1991 Religion and Social Theory. London: Sage. 2000 “Globalization and the Postmodernization of Culture.” In Globalization. The Reader, edited by J. Beynon and D. Dunkerly. London: The Athlone Press. Welzel, C., Inglehart, R. and Klingemann, H.D. 2002 “The Theory of Human Development.” European Journal of Political Research 42: 341-379. Wuthnow, R. 1991 Acts of Compassion. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Democratization in the Human Development Perspective Christian Welzel1 Abstract This article describes a model that considers the emergence and florescence of democracies as something embedded in a more encompassing evolutionary process. Democratization in this light is the institutional component of a broader process of human development that promotes people empowerment on various fronts. In this process increasing individual resources give rise to emancipative values that in turn release democratizing social pressures.

Introduction This article describes a model that considers the emergence and florescence of democracies as something embedded in a more encompassing evolutionary process. Democratization, in this light, is the institutional component of a broader process of human development. Sen (1999) introduced the term human development. The basic idea of the concept, the enhancement of human choice, has been further elaborated by Welzel (2002) in an attempt to bring emancipative values into the concept. Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann (2003) illustrated the empirical validity of this approach, while Inglehart and Welzel (2005) illuminated its wider implications. This article summarizes the human development approach and its view on democracy. The concept of human development proposed by Welzel integrates economic, cultural, and institutional changes into one theme: the social

1

International University Bremen.

156 • Christian Welzel

practice of human choice; that is, the extent to which people pursue self-chosen preferences in shaping their daily activities and lives in general. The human development of societies advances to the extent to which human choice becomes a practiced standard in the respective society. How much this is the case can be measured in three aspects of social reality, as I will show. Human Development and Human Nature Analogous to psychology, where human development means the maturation of a person’s ability to set one’s own preferences and to actualize oneself (Chirkov, Ryan, Kim and Kaplan 2003), the human development of whole societies means progress towards conditions that enable, stimulate, and entitle people to shape their lives based on their own choices. Thus, the human development of entire societies is equivalent to the empowerment of their people in pursuing intrinsic choices. From the viewpoint of self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan 2000; Ryan and Deci 2000), a development that features self-generated choices deserves the attribute “human” because the potential to make autonomous choices, to follow intrinsic motivations, and to express and direct oneself, is the most distinctive property of the human species; people’s potential to self-actualization constitutes the “human” potential inherent in any society. Societies do not differ in this human potential. They differ in the social conditions that enable, stimulate, and entitle people to develop and realize their human potential. The concept of human development intends to measure exactly these differences in the “human” condition of societies. It assumes constancy in people’s human potential, but variation in the social conditions that allow this potential to unfold. A cultural relativist might object that there can be no universally acceptable definition of human development because the understanding of what is human differs from one culture to the next. In particular, a relativist might argue that my concept’s focus on pursuing self-chosen preferences reflects a typically Western fixation on individualism that is entirely alien, and thus unacceptable, to non-Western cultures. I agree that notions of what is “human” can differ on the grounds of culture, but taking the position of cultural relativism to its extreme would mean that there is no ground for a common notion of humanity whatsoever. In the end, this position can only be upheld if one denies an undeniable fact: that the potential to reason, judge, and choose is a universally human potential. To argue otherwise would be the same as stating that the potential to reason, judge, and choose is uniquely Western and does not apply to people having grown up under the imprint of Confucian,

Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 157

Islamic or other non-Western traditions. This is an obviously absurd position as it divides humankind into different species on the basis of cultural differences. Hence, I insist that the potential to make autonomous judgments and to pursue self-chosen preferences is universally human, not culture-specific. What differs on the grounds of culture is how much room is given to the human potential for choice; the potential itself, however, is culturally invariant. To pursue self-chosen priorities is not only a universal potential of the human species. It is also a universal human desire, reflected in higher life satisfaction when given room to realize it. This position is supported by ample evidence from cross-cultural psychology showing that people whose activities are driven by intrinsic motivations (which means they act according to self-chosen preferences), have increased feelings of fulfillment, subjective well-being, and general life satisfaction, irrespective of diversity in cultural backgrounds. “Autonomy”, “agency” and “selfactualization” are universal psychological needs that diminish life satisfaction when unsatisfied (Ryan and Deci 2001). Even people in “collectivist” cultures systematically report lower levels of life satisfaction when they feel they have little choice in determining how their life turns out. Evidence from the World Values Surveys illustrates the universality of the connection between perceived freedom of choice and life satisfaction. Thus, the individual-level linkage between life satisfaction and people’s perception of choice is present throughout all cultural zones.2 Figure 1 presents the correlation between these two survey questions across 74 nations in nine distinct cultural regions. The correlations are consistently positive. There is nothing uniquely Western in the fact that more freedom of choice tends to create higher levels of life satisfaction. Unquestionably, philosophers from Plato to Hobbes to Elias saw a quintessential characteristic of culture in its taming function; that is, its tendency to constrain people’s striving for autonomy, self-direction, and choice by instilling in them ideals of social conformity. However, this taming function is by no means invariant. Instead, as Inglehart and Welzel (2005) show, cultures are much more “successful” in taming people’s strive for self-direction under pressing existential conditions. Existential pressures make people mentally more prepared to accept the priority of group discipline and authority over individual autonomy and choice. It is a systematic finding that conformity values tend to dominate in societies

2 The analyses underlying Figure 1 are based on data from the World Values Surveys. Information on the full set of nations in the World Values Survey is available from the project website (www.worldvaluessurvey.org).

158 • Christian Welzel

Figure 1 Life Satisfaction and the Perception of Choice and Autonomy

Source: Inglehart and Welzel (2005:140).

with more pressing existential conditions, whereas emancipative values that emphasize human self-expression tend to prevail in societies with more comfortable and permissive existential conditions (Welzel et al. 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). As I will argue, how pressing or permissive existential conditions are is not only a matter of material wealth; it is also a matter of education levels and social networking opportunities. Centering the concept of human development on self-generated choices is equivalent to defining human development as “people empowerment,” where people empowerment means diminishing constraints on people’s potential to direct their lives themselves. People empowerment, in this sense, is a matter of the social conditions in which people live. As depicted in Table 1, these conditions are relevant in three aspects: economic, cultural, and institutional. Thus, people empowerment involves at least three things. First, people must be enabled to pursue self-chosen preferences. This is a matter of their socioeconomic conditions, which do or do not

Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 159 Table 1 The Human Development of Societies Human development ...

SOCIOECONOMIC Dimension

. . . takes place when:

growing rising expanding Civic Resources Emancipative Values Democratic Liberties extend people’s action enhance people’s action widen people’s action repertoires motivations rights

. . . determines:

. . . enlarges people’s:

. . . means in short:

CULTURAL Dimension

INSTITUTIONAL Dimension

T h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h p e o p l e a r e a b l e w i l l i n g a l l o w e d t o p u r s u e s e l f - c h o s e n p r i o r i t i e s Capabilities of

Aspirations Entitlements for to S E L F - D I R E C T I O N

P e o p l e E m p o w e r m e n t (diminishing constraints on intrinsic human choice)

Source: Adapted from Welzel (2002:46).

give people the means needed to pursue self-chosen preferences. Second, people must feel encouraged to pursue self-chosen preferences, making them feel free from pressures to group conformity. This is a matter of people’s cultural environment, which does or does not support the values stimulating people to pursue their own choices in life. Third, people must be allowed to pursue their own choices in both private and public affairs. This is a matter of people’s institutional context, which does or does not give them rights entitling them to make autonomous choices. Thus, people empowerment operates on the level of people’s capabilities, motivations, and entitlements to set their own goals in life and pursue self-chosen priorities. Empowerment through Capabilities: The Role of Civic Resources People’s capabilities to pursue self-chosen activities depend critically on available resources that people can access and use according to their choice. There are three types of resources involved: (1) material means, (2) intellectual skills, and (3) networking opportunities. Each of these types of resource increases people’s action repertoire in manifold ways. The expanded action repertoire also includes “civic” actions that people undertake jointly with others, which is noteworthy as such civic actions are the quintessential means to hold decision makers responsible for what people want out of life. Because of their common potential for civic

160 • Christian Welzel

action, I summarize people’s material, intellectual, and social resources under the term “civic resources.” Modernization is linked with an increase in material, intellectual, and social resources. Through technology-driven productivity growth, economic development increases and diversifies people’s supply of goods and services and raises their financial incomes, making them able to invest the time, money, and equipment needed for many activities, both private and civic. All these kinds of material resources make people meanswise more capable. Furthermore, modernization is linked with rising levels of education, more easily available information, and a mobilization of human intellect by its tendency to widen knowledge-intensive economic and cultural activities. All this increases people’s intellectual skills, making them cognitively more capable to invent and undertake human activities. Finally, modernization tends to produce denser, more diversified, and more widely networked populations, offering people a greater variety of possible connections to other people. More networking opportunities lower people’s existential dependence on strong, but few, in-group ties, allowing individuals to choose between diverse affiliations to other people, groups of people, or voluntary associations (Granovetter 1973). Networking opportunities empower people connection-wise, making them socially more capable to initiate and join activities with others. To obtain a summary indicator of civic resources combining material, intellectual, and social resources, I use Vanhanen’s (1997) index of “power resources.” This index combines the level and distribution of (1) material resources (share of family farms in the agrarian sector weighed for this sector’s contribution to GDP, combined with estimates of the deconcentration of non-agrarian economic resources), (2) intellectual resources (literacy rate combined with tertiary enrollment ratios), and (3) a measure of social complexity (estimates of occupational differentiation combined with urbanization rates). I suppose the latter to indicate the diversity and electivity in people’s social connections. All in all, modernization increases and diversifies people’s civic resources, including their material means, intellectual skills, and social opportunities. This makes people more capable to follow their own preferences and pursue self-chosen activities. Human development will be off base without the enabling effect of civic resources.3 3

The index yields values of maximum 100. For more details see the Internet Appendix to Inglehart and Welzel (2005) at “http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/publications/ humandevelopment.html,” under “Variables” (#08).

Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 161

Empowerment through Motivations: The Role of Emancipative Values People empowerment has a mentality component as well. To become a widespread practice in social life, human choice needs not only people who are able to pursue self-chosen activities, but also people who are willing to do so. This is a matter of motivations, which are most powerful if they are intrinsic, based on internalized values and ideals. People internalize value orientations mostly through the subconscious mechanisms of socialization. Socialization allows cultures to reproduce themselves, passing on the values that are constitutive for their identity from one generation to the next. Value systems that place emphasis on collective conformity, and thus discourage people to pursue self-chosen preferences, can and do survive, even though these value systems systematically produce lower life satisfaction. The striving for self-direction is innate to human nature, but this does not mean that it cannot be discouraged by a culture’s prevailing value system and mental climate. Conformist value systems place collective discipline over individual autonomy. Doing so, they discourage any activity that would set an individual too much apart from its related group. By contrast, emancipative values emphasize human self-expression; they encourage people to pursue self-chosen preferences, even if this diminishes group conformity. Actually, group conformity is not seen as a value in itself when emancipative ideals gain momentum. Quite the contrary, the opposite of group conformity – human diversity – becomes increasingly seen as an enrichment of social experience. Again, these insights are well anchored in cross-cultural psychology, which has long emphasized the difference between “collectivist” and “individualist” cultures (Hofstede 2001; Triandis 1995; Markus, Kitayama and Heiman 1996; Schwartz 2003). I prefer the term “emancipative” to “individualist” because “individualism” is too easily confused with selfishness and egoism, obscuring the fact that individualism goes more easily together with humanism than do collectivism/conformism (which usually combine in-group favoritism with out-group discrimination). In fact, emancipative values mean a universal appreciation of human autonomy in general, including other people’s autonomy, leading to greater tolerance of non-conformity. Emancipative values involve a universal notion of human freedom in general, rather than a selfish emphasis on one’s own freedom alone. Also, emancipative values are not anti-collective in the sense that they withhold people from initiating and joining civic actions with other people. On the contrary, emancipative values actually encourage people to initiate and join various new types of contentious but peaceful civic activities that keep

162 • Christian Welzel

Figure 2 Raw Measures of Democracy and Measures of Honest Democracy

power holders responsive to the public. These activities have an inherently elite-challenging nature (Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch 2005). Emancipative values are not a constant cultural trait of societies. Instead, societies move towards more emancipative values when existential conditions become more permissive, giving the human strive for choice more room. This happens even in societies in which conformist values have a long tradition. Today, we observe a generational shift to emancipative values in all affluent post-industrial societies, including Confucian societies such as Japan and South Korea. The value change towards more emancipative ideals is observed in all societies in which sustained economic development provides the civic resources needed to diminish objective constraints on people’s intrinsic life choices. Emancipative values become more widespread only where existential pressures on human autonomy recede. We do not yet observe pronounced generational differences in emancipative values in China and Vietnam, where the civic resources nurturing these values are still in short supply for huge parts of the population (which, in the case of China, will change in the foreseeable future if economic growth continues as it has done in the last twenty years). By the same token, generational differences in emphasis on emancipative ideals did emerge in Taiwan and South Korea, two countries that have been on a growth path for a much longer time than China and Vietnam, and which, precisely for this reason, have

Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 163

more widespread civic resources. Thus, cultural traditions are not like an immutable genetic heritage that makes societies immune to the emancipatory effects of growing civic resources. Based on World Values Surveys data, I use an index of emancipative values involving questions that tap civil and political freedom, political expression, and a valuation of human diversity, other people and subjective well-being. Taken together, these values share a common emphasis on the ideal of a human being who is free in life choices and equal in this freedom. The particular components of the emancipative values syndrome include (factor loadings on common dimension in brackets):4 – a valuation of civil and political freedom, reflected in liberty aspirations (.87); – a valuation of political expression, reflected in participation in petitions (.84); – a valuation of non-conformity, reflected in an acceptance of homosexuality (.78); – a valuation of the life one lives, reflected in general life satisfaction (.82); – a valuation of people in general, reflected in interpersonal trust (.61). Rising emancipative ideals are the central cultural force in the process of human development, motivating people to set their own priorities, define their preferred way of living, pursue self-chosen activities, and join forces with others to struggle for the rights to do so. Human development will be incomplete in the absence of the motivating effect of emancipative values. Empowerment through Entitlements: The Role of Democratic Liberties Human empowerment not only requires people to be capable and willing to pursue self-chosen preferences. People must also be allowed to do so. This is a matter of rights, as only rights can entitle people to pursue their own choices. In complex modern societies, freedom of choice has

4

The index is created in such a way that it can be interpreted as the percentage of people emphasizing emancipative values. For additional information on measurement and scaling details, see the Internet Appendix to Inglehart and Welzel (2005) at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/publications/humandevelopment.html, under “Variables” (#49).

164 • Christian Welzel

both an inward-directed and an outward-directed aspect. Inward freedom (“negative” freedom) protects individuals from interventions into their private decision-making freedom in such areas as the choice of occupation, residence, partner, religious beliefs, leisure time activities or sexual orientation. The shielding aspect of inward freedom is guaranteed by specifically civil rights. However, civil rights do not suffice to provide freedom of choice in societies in which major aspects of people’s daily lives are subject to political regulations. Hence, entitling people to influence political matters that affect their lives requires rights as well. In this case, we talk about political rights. Like civil rights, political rights are individual rights in the sense that their practice is left to individuals, not groups. Political rights include the right to associate with others, to found interest associations or political parties, the right to initiate and join public actions such as boycotts, petitions or demonstrations, the right to sue officials, the right to access administrative information, and the right to vote in elections and referenda. These rights safeguard outward freedom (“positive” freedom), which does not shield people inwardly from the state; it gives them opportunities to reach outward in influencing and direct state activities (Rose 1995). Inward freedom and outward freedom become manifest in civil and political rights. Taken together, these rights constitute democratic liberties, that is, liberties for the people. To make democratic liberties practicable, these liberties must not only be legally codified in the form of rights; elites must also be so honest as to supply these liberties in ways that do not corrupt them (Finer 1999; Rose 2001). Thus, honest governance (i.e., the absence of corrupt governance) interacts with the legal supply of democratic liberties to produce uncorrupted or honest democracy. Uncorrupted governance is an important supply-side condition to make given democratic liberties practicable for the people. The sheer legal codification of democratic liberties does not guarantee people any real freedom if power holders are not committed to the principles of honest government. Hence, my concern is with honest democracy, not with raw measures of democracy that ignore fundamental aspects of the quality of democracy. By definition, corruption means a dishonest use of public power for private benefit (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2005). Such abuse of power does not only involve violations of formal procedures. More practically, corrupt or dishonest government means financial expropriation of the public and blocking popular control over state power. Thus, corrupt government tends to undermine citizens’ rights, and in extreme cases comes close to disenfranchizing the electorate, even if democratic liberties remain formally untouched. The simple truth is that democracy

Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 165

cannot take effect in rogue states in which the use of public power is corrupted and serves the unchecked rent-seeking interests of office holders. One can even say that each additional unit of corrupt government is one step further towards disempowering ordinary people. Since the empowerment of people is at the heart of democracy, absence of corrupt government, or honest governance, is a condition in the supply of democratic liberties that is critically relevant to the extent to which democracy can take effect. This justifies a qualification of the honesty of democracy using indicators of corrupt government or its absence. I measure honest democracy by specifying the interaction between democratic liberties and honest (i.e., uncorrupt) governance, multiplying percentage scores of democracy with fractions from 0 to 1.0 for honest governance (with 1.0 being the maximum honesty score): Democratic Liberties * (percentages

Honest Governance weights from 0 to 1.0

= =

Honest Democracy weighed percentages)

Democratic Liberties: civil and political rights scores from Freedom House (inverted scores added and maximum equated with 100). Honest Governance: control of corruption scores from the World Bank’s Good Governance indicators (normalized).5

The index of honest democracy has certain noteworthy properties. Because I use measures of honest governance as a weighting factor that varies between 0 (for the most corrupt country) and 1.0 (for the least corrupt country), high scores in honesty cannot compensate for low scores in democracy. Even a maximum honesty score of 1.0 cannot do more than maintain a given raw level of democracy. Put differently, a democracy score can only be downgraded, not upgraded, by a favorable honesty score. Because honest democracy is democracy with an additional qualification, democratic liberties are necessary, but not sufficient, to produce it. Honest governance, too, is needed to produce honest democracy. In that sense, honest democracy is a more demanding measure than democracy without this qualification, which is exactly the intention behind making the qualification. Consider the example of Singapore. It has a low democracy score and a high honesty score because the city-state is known for its restrictions

5 For a detailed description of these measures, see the website http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/publications/humandevelopment.html under “Variables” (#21).

166 • Christian Welzel

on democratic liberties as well as its uncorrupt government practices. But, as Figure 2 illustrates, Singapore’s favorable honesty score cannot compensate for its low democracy score, so the city-state’s score in honest democracy is as low as its raw score in democracy (even somewhat lower because there is no perfectly honest governance). Thus, a country can show a low score in honest democracy for two different reasons: either its democracy score is low, or its honesty score is low. This property of the index is fully intentional: whether citizens cannot practice democratic liberties because these liberties are not instituted, or whether they are hindered to practice them because dishonest government renders these liberties impracticable, is entirely irrelevant to the fact that citizens in both cases are not in the situation to practice their liberties. This is exactly what is crucial for honest democracy. Conversely, a society must achieve both a high democracy score and a high honesty score to achieve a high score in honest democracy. As Figure 2 shows, Singapore reaches the 33rd percentile in its raw democracy score, as compared to the 10th percentile for China. This reflects that civil and political liberties in Singapore are not as rigidly restricted as they are in China, for which reason Singapore is rated by Freedom House as “partly free” and China as “not free.” On the other hand, Singapore is rated only partly free, not entirely free, because it imposes considerable restrictions on democratic liberties. Still, because of its very high honesty score, its low raw score for democracy is translated almost undiminished into its score for honest democracy. Nevertheless, Singapore’s score for honest democracy remains low because a low democracy score cannot be compensated. Bolivia, on the other hand, ranks much higher in raw democracy than Singapore. This is perfectly appropriate as Bolivia indeed has much wider democratic liberties than Singapore. Yet, a very low score in honest governance dramatically downgrades the score for honest democracy, rendering Bolivia’s democratic liberties largely irrelevant. The reality behind this is very well reflected in all five indicators of “good governance” provided by the World Bank. For example, political violence, terror, and patronage are so pervasive in Bolivia that the liberties the constitution assigns to its citizens are hardly practicable. To be sure, Bolivia has institutionalized much wider democratic liberties than Singapore, for which reason Bolivia ranks much higher in raw democracy (and rightly so). But the Singaporeans’ fewer liberties are less corrupted by dishonest governance practices than the Bolivians’ wider liberties. In the end, Bolivia’s score in honest democracy falls even below the low score of Singapore. These differences in honest democracy are highly indicative of the citizens “real” liberties.

Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 167

Figure 3 The Triangular Nexus of Human Development Democratic Liberties .88 .95 Civic Resources

.97 .89 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

.88

.96 Emancipative Values

Note: Numbers on bidirectional arrows are correlation coefficients (r). Numbers on one-directional arrows are factor loadings on common underlying dimension. N = 74.

Uncorrupted democratic liberties operate on the level of entitlements, empowering people legally to pursue self-chosen activities. From this perspective, democracy is the institutional setting most suited to the human potential for choice and self-direction. Hence, the significance of democratization lies in the fact that it contributes the institutional component to human development. It is thus one of three major contributions to human development and should be considered in this broader context. Human development will be incomplete without the entitling effect of democratic liberties. The Triangular Nexus Conceptually, civic resources, emancipative values, and democratic liberties belong together as each of these components makes a distinctive contribution to a common underlying theme: human empowerment. But these three components are not only logically linked. Empirically, too, these components are closely tied to each other. In fact, civic resources, emancipative values, and democratic liberties converge in a robust and coherent dimension, which a factor analysis clearly demonstrates. As Figure 3 depicts, across a global sample of 74 nations for which measures of all three variables are available, there is a 92-percent overlapping variance between national levels of civic resources, emancipative values, and democratic liberties, with each of the three components showing a .96 loading on their common underlying factor, human development (to see which 74 nations exactly are included in this analysis, see Figure 4 or 5 below).

168 • Christian Welzel

How do the linkages between the three components of human development operate? I argue that emancipative values gain momentum in societies to the extent to which societal constraints on people’s intrinsic choices recede, which happens when growing civic resources make people materially, cognitively, and socially more capable to pursue selfchosen activities. Increasing capabilities of action nurture a basic sense of human agency. This leads people to question unlimited authority, makes them receptive to the idea of civil and political liberties, and finally makes them ready to struggle for the rights that effectively guarantee these liberties. Evidence in History The human development nexus between civic resources, emancipative ideals, and democratic liberties is evident throughout history. Even though democratic liberties have never been granted in a fully inclusive form in pre-industrial times, it nevertheless holds true that whenever these liberties became effective for at least significant parts of the population it happened because these parts of the population disposed of the civic resources enabling them to struggle for civil and political liberties, and because they have been inspired by the emancipative ideals motivating them to struggle for these liberties. Because rulers give away part of their powers by granting liberties to considerable parts of the public, they have not usually been very keen to do this, unless the public had the means and the will to enforce these liberties, which is only the case when civic resources and emancipative ideals are relatively widespread. The history of pre-industrial societies is full of hunger revolts in which exploited peasants spontaneously rebelled from time to time against the most pressing hardship. In none of these revolts, however, did people come up with a program to implement civil and political rights that empower the people. The entire idea of rights, be it property rights or voting rights, was alien to exploited peasant populations in despotic agrarian empires from Eastern Europe to the Middle East to India to China. Instead, the idea of civil and political rights was born in free farmer societies in ancient Athens and the Roman Republic; it was re-invented by free farmer societies and merchant republics in late medieval Europe, most notably in Northern Italy, the Lowlands, Switzerland, Iceland, England and Scandinavia, and expanded to establish early limited forms of democracy in the era of pre-industrial capitalism through the liberal revolutions in Northwestern Europe and its offshoots in Northern America and Oceania, enacting principles such as “no taxation without representation” (Dahl 1973; McNeill 1990; Finer 1999).

Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 169

Without question, the liberal revolutions established only limited versions of democracy, none of which qualifies as a democracy under contemporary standards, for the entitlement to civil and political liberties was far from being fully inclusive. But the first and foremost step was made with the very definition of these liberties, committing governments for the first time since classical Athens to the well-being of the people, even if the people were not yet defined comprehensively. It is significant that the implementation of democratic liberties, however limited, has been pioneered by capitalist freeholder societies whose members experienced a significant degree of existential autonomy. Such autonomy nurtures a basic sense of human agency, making people more critical towards unlimited and uncontrolled authority, more receptive to the idea of civil and political rights and more ready to struggle for them in case they are in short supply. These popular struggles characterize social movements from the liberal revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries to the people demonstrations of the Third Wave in the late 20th century. These popular struggles are at the very heart of democratization. Achieving democratization by popular struggles is only possible if people have the means and will to enforce democratic liberties on their rulers. Again, this is only the case when civic resources and emancipative ideals are relatively widespread among the people. People-Driven and Non-People-Driven Democratization Of course, it is perfectly possible that rulers install democratic liberties even if most of the population is neither capable nor willing to enforce these liberties. This can happen for various reasons. There can be the rare case of benevolent rulers who unaffectedly install democratic liberties. Commitments of this kind are most likely rooted in historical bonds to a model country of democracy, bonds that make rulers feel obligated to democratic norms. The adoption of democracy at the start of India’s national independence in 1947 might be the most obvious case in point. Alternatively, rulers might enact democratic liberties because they have learnt from disastrous recent experiences with non-democratic forms of government, so that democracy appears to be the only viable alternative left; democratization in Germany, Austria, Italy and Japan after World War II might partly fall into that category. “Enlightened democratization” in that sense is the only case in which honest democracy is the outcome even if there is little effective pressure by the population to realize honest democracy. However, this case is as rare as the species of benevolent dictators. A second, more likely possibility that rulers will install democracy in

170 • Christian Welzel

the absence of population pressures is when these rulers are depending on the will of external powers that are strongly pressing for democratization. This case of “external democratization” is typical of post-war democracies such as West Germany, Austria, Italy, and Japan after World War II. The overriding power of the U.S. left these countries’ post-war leaders no other viable option than democracy. The U.S.-led attempts to install democracy in post-war Afghanistan and Iraq fall into the same category of externally guided democratization. A third and increasingly widespread possibility that rulers will install democracy without being pressed to do so by their own population is when rulers believe that they can effectively corrupt democratic liberties in practice, and when the pretense of democracy seems to be a useful means to open the doors to the international community, especially donor organizations. This case of “opportunistic democratization” has become more likely since the Washington Consensus, after which Western credits have been tied to conditions of “good governance.” Enlightened democratization, external democratization, and opportunistic democratization are all cases of democratization in which the elites install democratic liberties even though they are not forced to do so by popular pressures. This is so because the population in these cases has neither the means making it capable, nor the motivations making it willing, to launch democratization pressure. If this is so, the population also has little of the means and will to practice given democratic liberties effectively. The most likely result of this is corrupted democracy because, in a population largely incapable and discouraged to enforce democratic liberties, the rent-seeking interests of power holders can unfold largely unchecked. Thus, corrupted democracy is most likely in the absence of the enabling and motivating aspects of human development on the side of the people. In fact, there are indications that various forms of corrupted democracy are going to replace open dictatorship as the modal type of regime when the enabling and motivating aspects of human development have not yet reached the people. By the same token, the emergence of honest democracy is an elite-side step in human development that is closely tied to the enabling and motivating steps on the side of the people. If growing civic resources make people more capable, and rising emancipative values make them more willing to practice democratic liberties, it becomes increasingly likely that these people initiate and join social movements that demand and struggle for greater and less corrupted democratic liberties. In a democracy, this will result in social pressures to widen already existing liberties or to reduce abusing practices of them. In an authoritarian system, such liberation movements challenge the

Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 171

whole political regime itself because the enactment of civil and political liberties puts an end to authoritarian rule. This makes liberation movements a risky adventure. Authoritarian elites may decide at any point to terminate such a movement by force, as happened in 1989 in China. But suppression is not an unlimited option. Quite the contrary, confronted with a public whose members are capable and motivated to initiate and join widespread mass actions, the coercive option is likely to fail. Democracy movements can only be suppressed by military means if they are concentrated on a few places and limited to isolated groups of the population. Such was the case when members of the thin student population initiated pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in the summer of 1989. However, when mass demonstrations spread all over the country, involving various groups of the population, as was true in the GDR, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic states, military suppression becomes almost impossible. This is not to say that coercive regimes cannot survive when they have lost the support of the population. The sad truth is that they can – but only as long as the population does not dispose of the resources that enable it, and is not inspired by the ideals that stimulate it to launch a mass liberation movement. Once, however, civic resources and emancipative ideals become widespread, no coercive regime can survive for long time (except when it is externally supported by a non-democratic empire). Experiencing Autonomy Economic development helps give rise to emancipative values because it provides a basic sense of human agency, on the basis of which emancipative goals enter the realm of the possible. This is so because economic development increases individually accessible resources, including material means, intellectual skills, and social opportunities, all of which widen people’s action repertoire, giving them a sense of autonomy and agency. Sometimes, however, economic development can be suspiciously one-sided, as is the case in oil-exporting countries, which are super-rich, but otherwise very traditional. Oil-exporting economies do not nurture the sense of autonomy that gives rise to emancipative values in post-industrial knowledge economies. This is an important illustration of the fact that sheer material wealth alone does little to provide a sense of human autonomy, unless it is accompanied by high levels of education (which make people intellectually more autonomous) and highly elective patterns of connectivity (which make them socially more autonomous). The activities needed to sustain a rent-seeking economy require little intellectual skills and little

172 • Christian Welzel

electivity in people’s social networks. A rent-seeking economy can become rich while keeping people on a low level of skills and locked in closelyknit social groups. This emphasizes that the nature of a society’s prevailing economic activities plays a decisive role in determining whether higher cognitive skills and more elective social connections are favored. Only in combination with these factors does economic development nurture a basic sense of human autonomy. If major economic activities require individual creativity and initiative, they nurture a sense of individual competence, mastery, and autonomy. If they involve rather standardized routine work, they undermine this sense of agency. Thus, Nolan and Lenski (1999) provide evidence that people in hunter-gatherer societies had more individualistic values than people who grew up in the “labor-repressive” agrarian empires. On the scale of emancipative values, hunter-gatherer societies would probably score higher than agrarian empires. It is no coincidence that huntergatherer societies have been relatively democratic, whereas the hallmark of agrarian empires was despotism (Ember, Ember and Russett 1997). By contrast, whenever civil and political liberties have been institutionalized in pre-industrial times, it was in free farmer societies or free merchant republics in which private property on land and free access to markets gave people some degree of existential autonomy, even if they were not affluent. These societies have neither been rich, nor have their people been existentially secure by current standards; nevertheless, it was in exactly these societies that the philosophies of Humanism and Enlightenment established an emancipative ethos. Again, it is no coincidence that free farmer and merchant societies in Western Europe and Northern America were the cradle of modern liberal democracy. The meritocratic middle classes in these societies have been the strongest proponents of the civil and political liberties that define democracy until today. Industrialization did not strengthen this emancipative ethos, and the working class was not the most powerful social force in pushing for democracy, contrary to what Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) suggest. The working class demanded a welfare state and universal suffrage, but often enough at the expense of civil and political liberties. Quite frequently, the working class helped in voting fascist, communist, and populist parties into office. Once in power, these parties restricted civil and political liberties or nullified them altogether. In any case, the working class did not place special emphasis on civil and political liberties, in line with what Lipset (1959) once described as “working class authoritarianism.” Thus, the rise and expansion of the working class did not bring or strengthen emancipative ideals.

Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 173

The daily work performed by the typical blue-collar worker of the industrial age was standardized manual routines, nothing that nurtures human creativity and independent thinking. The Fordist organization of economic and social life in industrial societies, with their gigantic factories, huge bureaucracies, uniform social classes and prefixed role models, has been rigidly standardized. People hardly experienced themselves as autonomous individuals in this standardized world. Even though the mechanical worldview of the industrial age gave rise to secular-rational values, it did not support emancipative values to the same extent. Uncoupled from emancipative values, the secular-rational worldview was perfectly compatible with communist, fascist and other forms of totalitarian ideologies. Although it is true that industrialization brought universal suffrage and mass involvement into politics, mass political involvement was as often realized in authoritarian forms as it was in democratic forms. The post-industrial age brings another turn as the rise of knowledgeintensive economies changes the nature of economic activities. Tasks in knowledge-intensive professions become more cognition-based and involve more intellectual creativity, which offers a wider scope for individual judgment and thinking. The change in the nature of economic activities goes along with more flexible ways in which the whole society is organized, de-standardizing social classes, social roles, career patterns and life courses, making group affiliations, role models and biographies a more elective matter of people’s own choices. Individualization (Beck 2002) in that sense does not mean the destruction or reduction of people’s connectivity, but more individual freedom to connect and disconnect as they choose, making social networks more diverse, flexible, modular, and elective. This individualization trend nourishes a sense of autonomy and life control and an emancipative ethos that brings social pressures to widen and deepen civil and political rights and equal opportunities, including consumer rights, women’s rights, children’s rights, the rights of gays and lesbians, freedom of information rights, as well as increasing pressures on elites to govern transparently, accountably, and responsively. Rising emancipative values are the central motivational force in this process, helping to make societies ever more people-centered. Table 2 summarizes these arguments. Raw Democracy and Honest Democracy Their common focus on intrinsic human choice intertwines civic resources, emancipative values, and democratic liberties to a remarkable extent. To illustrate this point, Figure 4 displays the relationship between the spread of civic resources and emancipative values among national populations,

174 • Christian Welzel Table 2 Democratization as an Outcome of Human Development Process S O C I O E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T ‡

‡

‡

Productivity growth and Rising levels of education Growing social diversification the welfare state increase and increasingly knowledgewidens people’s networking people’s available means. intensive work widen opportunities. people’s cognitive skills. ‡

‡

‡

People become materially more autonomous.

People become intellectually more autonomous.

People become socially more autonomous.

‡

‡

‡

Diminishing constraints on autonomous choice nurture a basic sense of human self-direction, making people more receptive to the idea of civil and political freedom as a matter of rights. ‡ R I S I N G E M A N C I P A T I V E V A L U E S in non-democracies in democracies ‡

‡

‡

‡

growing growing growing growing number of mass support number of number of civil and for civil and liberal equal political rights political rights reformers opportunity activists movements among elites activists ‡

‡

‡

‡

‡

growing increasingly mass support responsive for equal and honest opportunity elites movements

‡

‡

‡

Formal adoption of democratic liberties Increasingly uncorrupted democratic liberties ‡

‡

DEMOCRATIZATION or PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT

both measured in the early 1990s and mid 1990s respectively.6 Knowing how widespread civic resources are in a society, we can explain 80 percent of the cross-national variance in emancipative values. 6 A dating of the exact year of the measurement is not possible as the measures vary by four to five years from country to country. On average, the year of measurement is 1993 for both civic resources and emancipative values.

Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 175

Figure 4 Civic Resources and Emancipative Values

Figure 5 displays the relationship between the spread of emancipative values in the early 1990s and varying degrees of honest democracy7 in 2002-04. Knowing how widespread emancipative values are in a population, we can explain 79 percent of the cross-national variation in the presence of honest democracy. To the effective practice of democracy, honest democracy is a much more meaningful measure than democracy without this additional qualification. From this perspective, it is noteworthy that my measure of

7

Our measure of honest democracy combines the formal presence of civil and political rights and the elites’ respect of honest governance (“elite integrity”) in such a way that high scores in elite integrity cannot do more than simply reproduce a given level of civil and political rights (measured in percentiles of the possible maximum), whereas low scores in elite integrity can seriously downgrade a given level of civil and political rights. For measurement details, see the Internet Appendix to Inglehart and Welzel (2005) at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/publications/humandevelopment.html, under “Variables” (#21).

176 • Christian Welzel

Figure 5 Emancipative Values and Democratic Liberties

honest democracy is much more closely associated with emancipative mass values than are standard measures of democracy which do not take honest governance into account. After all, this is perfectly logical in the human development perspective: the liberating social forces that can release effective social pressures on elites to respect democratic liberties are only present to the extent to which a public disposes of the resources enabling it, and to the extent to which it is inspired by the ideals motivating it to struggle for democratic liberties. Effect Thresholds The links between societal levels of civic resources and emancipative values, and between emancipative values and democratic liberties, are systematic and linear. Yet, even strongly linear relationships such as these are not perfectly deterministic. Nations are not positioned on a straight line. Rather, they are scattered along distinct but relatively broad corridors (i.e., confidence intervals), as depicted by the left and right dotted boundaries in Figures 4 and 5.

Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 177

These corridors reflect thresholds in the effects of resources on values and of values on liberties, implying that not every one-unit increase in civic resources is reflected in a corresponding increase in emancipative values, and that not every one-unit increase in emancipative values is reflected in a corresponding increase in democratic liberties. The size of the increase in civic resources needed to make corresponding increases in emancipative values very likely (say to 95 percent likely), as well as the size of the increase in emancipative values required to make corresponding increases in democratic liberties very likely, is relatively large. Generally speaking, we deal with the increase in an independent variable X needed to yield a corresponding increase in a dependent variable Y, which I call the “effect threshold” of X on Y. In the present case, the size of the effect threshold is depicted by the horizontal widths of the corridors, demarcated by the dotted lines in Figures 4 and 5. Since relationships in the social and political world are never strictly deterministic, the existence of effect thresholds is what we usually expect. Consider Figure 4 again. If one starts moving from any point at the left boundary to the right, that is, along increasing civic resources, it is not very likely that the next society one encounters scores higher in emancipative values than the previous one, unless one’s move exceeds a horizontal distance as large as the width of the whole corridor. Exceeding this distance, it becomes almost certain that the next society with more widespread civic resources than the previous one also has more widespread emancipative values than the previous one. The same applies to Figure 5. As one moves from less to more widespread emancipative values, starting at any point on the left boundary of the corridor, the next society is not very likely to have wider democratic liberties than the previous one—as long as one’s move does not cross the right boundary of the corridor. But, if one crosses this boundary, it is virtually guaranteed that the next society with more widespread emancipative values than the previous one also has wider democratic liberties. The effect thresholds are rather large—so large indeed that the effects become fully apparent only when taking the entire global variation into account. In contrast, most geographical regions are internally so coherent that the variation among their nations hardly overcomes the threshold of the effects of resources on values and of values on liberties. This is noteworthy as it clarifies that the linkages constituting human development can be easily overlooked from too narrow a perspective. The human development nexus becomes fully apparent only when large-scale variation of a global scope is taken into account. As a consequence, the nexus is not very evident at the individual level within nations. For example, the individual-level link between civic resources

178 • Christian Welzel

and emancipative values is, in general, relatively weak and, in some national samples, even insignificant. Pooled across all national samples, however, the individual-level link between civic resources and emancipative values is highly significant, with civic resources showing a .22 beta-effect on emancipative values, which is considerably strong given the large random error in individual-level mass data.8 Thus, the effect becomes apparent only if the large-scale variation between nations is taken into account. This is very indicative of the nature of the effect of civic resources on emancipative values. The fact that this effect is weak, and sometimes even invisible, among individuals within the same nation shows that individuals do not internalize stronger emancipative ideals because they command more civic resources than most other individuals in their society. Instead, individuals internalize stronger emancipative ideals when the general level of civic resources is high; that is, when not only they themselves, but when most individuals in their nation, dispose of many civic resources. This is obvious from the fact that civic resources do show a relatively strong individual-level effect on emancipative values in the pooled dataset when the full between-nation variation is taken into account. Accordingly, the national average of civic resources determines an individual’s emancipative values more than this individual’s own civic resources. This implies that the effect of resources on values is mostly contextual or ecological by nature.9 It is for this reason that the same relation between civic resources and emancipative values is even stronger at the aggregate level when one uses national averages of civic resources and emancipative values (in this case there is an effect of beta = .89). By aggregating individual-level data to the nation level, one reduces the existing variance solely to its between-nation component. As we have seen, this component of the variance is more significant than the variation among individuals within nations, which is indeed largely contaminated with random measurement error. Aggregation eliminates random measurement error at the individual level because negative and positive deviations from a given mean cancel each other out when averaging them. Hence, the pooled

8 To calculate this effect, a variable combining an individual’s level of formal education (measured on a nine-point ordinal scale from no education to university-level education) and its income level (measured in national currency deciles of available household income) has been constructed. For the magnitude of the effect it doesn’t matter if one uses an additive or multiplicative combination of education and income. 9 Welzel (2003) has shown this using more sophisticated multi-level models.

Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 179

individual-level relation between civic resources and emancipative values is much weaker than the aggregate-level relation between the same two variables. This, however, does not invalidate the aggregate-level relation. It only shows how much random noise there is on the individual level. Intrinsic and Instrumental Support for Democracy The societal-level relation between emancipative values and democratic liberties does not have an individual-level equivalent. Democratic liberties are a system property that does not vary at the individual level. However, one might suppose that the effect of emancipative values on democratic liberties exists because, and only because, widespread emancipative values produce mass support for democracy. Thus, aggregate measures of explicit support for democracy should have an even more direct effect on democratic liberties than have emancipative values. Surprising as it may seem, this is not the case. When one calculates the percentage of people in a country who express strong support for democracy,10 this variable explains only 32 percent of the variation in democratic liberties over 74 nations in the World Values Survey. By contrast, the national levels of emancipative values explain 79 percent of the variation in democratic liberties, even though none of the components of these values refers explicitly to democracy itself. Adding explicit support of democracy to emancipative values as an explanatory factor increases the explained variance by only five percent, with explicit democratic support showing a much weaker and less significant effect

10

Following Klingemann (1999), I create an “autocracy-democracy preference” index as follows: I first sum up the extent to which a respondent endorses the statements, “Having a democratic political system” (V166 in WVS III-IV) and “Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government” (V172). Approval of these statements can be expressed in four categories: “very good” (recoded 3), “fairly good” (recoded 2), “fairly bad” (coded 1) and “very bad” (coded 0) for the former statement, and “agree strongly” (coded 3), “agree” (coded 2), “disagree” (coded 1) and “disagree strongly” (coded 0) for the latter. Thus, support for these statements adds up to produce a scale from 0 to 6, with 6 representing the highest support for democracy. In the second step, I sum up people’s agreement that “Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections” (V164) and “Having the army rule” (V165) would be a good way to run this country. This also creates a 0-to-6 scale, measuring support for authoritarian forms of government. I then subtract support for authoritarian rule from support for democracy, yielding an index from –6 (maximum support for autocracy) to +6 (maximum support for democracy). Finally, I calculate for each sample the percentage scoring at least +4 on this –6 to +6 index, classifying those respondents as “strong” overt supporters of democracy.

180 • Christian Welzel

than emancipative values.11 Hence, the effect of emancipative values on democratic liberties does not operate by producing more people who express overt support of democracy. This is all the more noteworthy as I use an elaborated indicator of support for democracy that balances people’s support of democracy against their support of authoritarian alternatives to democracy, such as military rule. This indicator measures net support for democracy, which is not inflated by people who react favorably on the term democracy without rejecting other political systems. This finding directs attention to the relationship between emancipative values and support for democracy. Should these two variables not be strongly related because democracy is the natural system preferred by people who emphasize human emancipation? Indeed, there is a positive relationship between emancipative values and support for democracy. At the aggregate-level, percentages of people holding emancipative values correlate at .53 with percentages expressing strong overt support for democracy (N = 71). Pooled across all samples, the individuals’ emphasis on emancipative values correlates with their support for democracy at .26. These correlations are highly significant and point in the expected direction. But they are weaker than one might suspect. Why is this the case? As Welzel (2006) demonstrates, the relation between emancipative values and support for democracy exists at the societal level because societies having relatively large numbers of people who emphasize emancipative values (that is, above 45%) always produce a majority of people who explicitly support democracy. Thus, relatively widespread emancipative values are a sufficient condition to produce majorities of overt democrats. What weakens the relation, however, is that it does not hold in the reverse direction. Among societies with low proportions of people emphasizing emancipative values, the proportion of overt supporters of democracy is not necessarily low. Among societies with low levels of emancipative values, one can find a wide range of overt support for democracy from a low of almost zero percent in Vietnam, to a high of roughly 80 percent in Bangladesh. Hence, emancipative values are a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for producing majorities of overt supporters of democracy. Why this is so becomes obvious when one examines the attitudinal predictors of support for democracy at the individual level. Emancipative

11

More precise regression results are found in Welzel and Inglehart (forthcoming).

Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 181

values are a significant individual-level predictor of overt support for democracy because emancipation minded people have an intrinsic tendency to endorse the civil and political liberties that define democracy. People who support democracy on the basis of emancipative values support it because of its inherent liberating qualities, not as a means to other ends. This is what I call “intrinsic” support. Yet, many people with weak emancipative orientations also support democracy, but for other reasons. This is obvious from the fact that how good people think democracies are at maintaining order and managing a prospering economy is an even better predictor of support of democracy than are emancipative values. This sort of support is detached from an intrinsic valuation of democracy’s inherent qualities. It derives from performance expectations. Thus, democracy is valued as a means to other ends, not an end in itself. This is what I call “instrumental” support. The distinction between intrinsic and instrumental support is of critical importance. It helps explain why emancipative values are a much more powerful predictor of democratic liberties than is overt support for democracy. Even the most sophisticated measures of overt support for democracy are highly inflated by instrumental support motives. Only to a lesser extent do they measure intrinsic support for democracy. This makes it necessary to split the overt supporters of democracy into intrinsic supporters (i.e., those placing relatively strong emphasis on emancipative values) and instrumental supporters (i.e., those placing relatively little emphasis on emancipative values). Figure 6 partitions the overall democratic support into its intrinsic and instrumental components.12 This partition yields highly interesting results. Obviously, overall support of democracy does not differentiate the world very much any more; it has spread around the globe, showing high levels even in Sub-Saharan Africa. But intrinsic support continues to differentiate the world; it has not diffused into all corners of the planet.

12 Respondents scoring high in support for democracy (4 or higher in the autocracydemocracy preference index described in fn. 9 above) have been divided into (a) those having above-average emancipative values (i.e., scoring above the overall mean in individual-level emancipative values) and (b) those having below-average emancipative values. Group (a) has been classified as intrinsic supporters of democracy, group (b) as instrumental supporters. For each sample, the percentage of both groups has been calculated. Finally, a percentage difference index has been created by subtracting instrumental from intrinsic supporters. For further details on instrumental and intrinsic support of democracy, see the Internet Appendix to Inglehart and Welzel (2005) at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/publications/humandevelopment.html, under “Variables” (#58–60).

182 • Christian Welzel

Figure 6 Partitioning Support for Democracy into its Instrumental and Intrinsic Components

Instead, intrinsic support for democracy is an exclusive property of regions that are far advanced in human development. To extend this logic one step further, Figure 7 shows how strongly the composition of support of democracy across cultural regions is related to the level of honest democracy. The extent to which intrinsic supporters exceed instrumental supporters places a cultural zone higher in the level of honest democracy. This finding is a highly valid simplification of the same relation among the much larger number of single nations because the few cultural zones in Figure 7 capture fully 85 percent of the entire cross-national variation in democratic liberties and intrinsic versus instrumental support for democracy. These findings confirm the emphasis that human development theory places on the theme of emancipation. Support for democracy is relevant to real democratic liberties only insofar as it is tied to emancipative ideals. Honest democracy, at least, is essentially an emancipative achievement, which makes it a central aspect of human development.

Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 183

Figure 7 Honest Democracy and Intrinsic vs. Instrumental Support for Democracy

Conclusion This article has described democratization as an integral part of a broader process of human development that empowers people. Rising emancipative ideals provide the driving motivational force in this process, and they are not simply a given or absent heritage of cultural tradition. They emerge systematically in the wake of major socioeconomic transformations, all of which have in common that they diminish societal constraints on people’s life choices. Societal constraints on human choice recede when growing civic resources make people materially, intellectually, and socially more independent, nurturing a fundamental sense of autonomy and agency that makes people receptive to emancipative ideals, including the idea that having civil and political freedom is a most natural right for people to have, and is worthwhile to struggle for. Just as the socioeconomic transformations nurturing emancipative ideals can happen in both democratic and non-democratic systems, emancipative ideals, too, can emerge in democratic as well as non-democratic

184 • Christian Welzel

systems. Thus, there are two ideal-typical pathways through which these ideals promote democratic progress, that is, people empowerment. If emancipative ideals emerge in a non-democracy, the conditions of mobilizing a democracy movement improve because more people have the intrinsic motivation to struggle for democratic liberties. Also, the probability that parts of the younger elite cohorts will be affected by a societal value change to more emancipative ideals increases, making it more likely that a camp of liberal reformers splits off. All this increases the likelihood of adopting democratic liberties where they are not yet in place. On the other hand, democratic liberties can have been in place for quite some time, such that emancipative ideals become more pronounced in an already democratic setting. In this case, these values fuel various social movement activities, many of which have in common that they struggle for better specified or practiced democratic liberties. These movements are proponents of many of the transformations that Cain, Dalton and Scarrow (2004) portray as a third transformation of democracy, making existing democracies more people-centered. Together, the adoption of democratic liberties where they did not yet exist, and the enrichment of these liberties by more honest practices where they already do exist, constitute democratic progress. Both tracks of progress are an integral part of a broader process of human development in which rising emancipative values provide the central motivational force in fueling people empowerment. These insights have positive and negative implications. The positive implication is that honest democracy is not an exclusive achievement available only to specific cultures. Instead, it is an integral part of a broader process of human development, and so it can take root everywhere where human development advances. The negative implication is that it indeed needs the development of both people’s means and mentalities to anchor honest democracy in a society. True, democratic liberties can be adopted in any society, fully irrespective of people’s means and mentalities, but honest democracy which people are able and willing to practice is not. When people lack the abilities and willingness to do so, corrupt democracy is the most likely outcome. Unfortunately, corrupt democracy disempowers people almost as much as open dictatorship. In order to favor honest democracy, one must increase people’s capabilities and motivation to take their lives into their own hands. This means to enhance the spread of civic resources and emancipative values. How this is done is a different question, but the key to flourishing democracy lies in these resources and values. Honest democracy is simply not possible without a supportive social environment.

Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 185

References Beck, Ulrich 2002 “Losing the Traditional: Individualization and ‘precarious freedoms’.” In Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim, eds., Individualization. London: Sage, pp. 1-21. Chirkov, V. I., R. M. Ryan, Y. Kim and U. Kaplan 2003 Differentiating Autonomy from Individualism and Independence: A Selfdetermination Theory Perspective on Internalization of Cultural Orientations and Well-being,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84: 97-110. Cain, Bruce E., Russell J. Dalton and Susan E. Scarrow 2004 Democracy Transformed? Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Conradt, David 1980 “The Changing Political Culture.” In Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited. Boston: Little Brown. Dalton, Russell J. 1988 “Politics and Culture in West Germany.” In Samuel H. Barnes, ed., Politics and Culture Series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. Deci, Edward. L. and Richard M. Ryan 2000 “The What and Why of Goal Pursuits: Human Needs and the Selfdetermination of Behavior,” Psychological Inquiry 11: 227-68. Diamond, Larry 1993 “The Globalization of Democracy.” In Robert O. Slater, Barry M. Schutz and Steven R. Dorr, eds. Global Transformation and the Third World. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 31-69. Ember, Melvin, Carol R. Ember and Bruce M. Russett 1997 “Inequality and Democracy in the Anthropological Record.” In Manus Midlarski, ed. Inequality, Democracy and Economic Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 110-30. Finer, Samuel E. 1999 The History of Government (volume 1). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Granovetter, Mark S. 1973 “The Strength of Weak Ties.” American Journal of Sociology 78: 1360-80. Hofstede, Geert 2001 Culture’s Consequences: Intentional Differences in Work-related Values. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Huntington, Samuel P. 1991 The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Inglehart, Ronald 1977 The Silent Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel 2005 Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence. New York: Cambridge University Press. Lipset, Seymour M. 1959 “Democracy and Working-class Authoritarianism,” American Sociological Review 24: 482-501.

186 • Christian Welzel Markus, H. R., S. Kitayama and R. J. Heiman 1996 “Culture and Basic Psychological Principles.” In E. T. Higgins and A. W. Kruglanski, eds., Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles. New York: Guilford. McNeill, William 1990 The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Nolan, Patrick and Gerhard Lenski 1999 Human Societies: An Introduction to Macrosociology (8th ed.). New York: McGrawHill. Page, Benjamin and Robert Shapiro 1992 The Rational Public. Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Rose, Richard 1995 “Freedom as a Fundamental Value,” International Social Science Journal 145: 457-71. 2001 “A Divergent Europe,” Journal of Democracy 12 (1): 93-106. Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyn Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens 1992 Capitalist Development and Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ryan, Richard M. and Edward L. Deci 2000 “Self-determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being,” American Psychologist 55: 68-78. 2001 “On Happiness and Human Potentials: A Review of Research on Hedonic and Eudamonic Well-Being.” Annual Review of Psychology 52: 141-66. Sen, Amartya 1999 Development as Freedom. New York: Alfred Knopf. Schwartz, Shalom H. 2003 “Mapping and Interpreting Cultural Differences Around the World.” In Henk Vinken, Joseph Soeters, and Peter Ester, eds. Comparing Cultures, Dimensions of Culture in a Comparative Perspective. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. Triandis, Harry C. 1995 Individualism and Collectivism. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Vanhanen, Tatu, ed. 1997 Prospects of Democracy: A Study of 172 Countries. London: Routledge. Welzel, Christian 2002 Fluchtpunkt Humanentwicklung: Über die Grundlagen der Demokratie und die Ursachen ihrer Ausbreitung [Focal Point Human Development: On the Foundations of Democracy and the Causes of its Expansion], Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag. 2006 “Democratization as an Emancipative Process.” European Journal of Political Research 45: 753–778. Welzel, Christian, Ronald Inglehart and Hans-Dieter Klingemann 2003 “The Theory of Human Development: A Cross-cultural Analysis.” European Journal of Political Research 42 (2): 341-80. Welzel, Christian, Ronald Inglehart and Franziska Deutsch 2005 “Social Capital, Associational Life and Collective action: What Aspects of Social Capital Have the Greatest ‘Civic’ Payoff ?” Journal of Civil Society 1 (2): 121-46.

Index Abortion 16, 40, 91, 92, 93, 104, 107 Acquaviva, S. 128, 150 Active Associational Involvement 112, 114, 115, 116 Affective Autonomy 21, 37, 46, 48, 51, 53, 54, 55, 72 Africa 1, 56, 57 South Africa 2, 88, 137, 140, 146 Saharan Africa 56 Sub-Saharan Africa 55, 56, 181 North Africa 55 AIDS 17, 82 Akker, P. 104, 117 Alesina, A. 144, 150 Allerbeck, Klaus 117 Allocentrism 135 Almond, Gabriel 1, 185 American 5, 25, 82, 109, 113, 116 American Culture 37, 55 American Exceptionalism 5 American Value Orientations 55 Latin American 16, 19, 33, 53, 57, 73 North American 5, 99, 100, 104, 105, 107, 109 Religious American 116, 117 Secular American 116, 117 American Exceptionalism 5 Ancient Greece 1 Anti-Corruption Scores 27 Apodaca, C. 65, 75 Apter, David E. 100, 117, 118 Argentina 2, 88, 136 Argyle, M. 136, 150 Aristotle 1 Asia East Asia 1, 12, 64 East Asian Tigers 64 Southeast Asian Cultures 37 Associational Group 112, 114 Associational Involvement 5, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117 Australia 2, 12, 87, 88 Austria 19, 136, 139, 169, 170 Authority 11, 14, 16, 30, 37, 40, 45, 47, 56, 61, 135, 157, 168, 169 State Authority 5, 83,102 Secular-Rational Authority 11 Religious Authority 109 Authority Ranking 135

Autonomy—Embeddedness 21, 46, 47, 48, 49, 72, 73, 74 Axial Belief Systems 86 Axial Moments 86 Baker, Wayne 3, 9, 14, 20, 24, 31, 34, 40, 45, 46, 53, 76, 85, 86, 98, 100, 111, 116, 117, 134, 136, 152 Baltic 56, 171 Barber, Benjamin R. 81, 96 Bardi, A. 35, 53, 56, 58, 65, 77 Bauer-Kaase, P. 75 Beck, Ulrich 100, 101, 117, 118, 131, 150, 173, 185 Beck-Gernsheim, Elisabeth 118, 185 Beit-Hallahmi, B. 136, 150 Belarus 136 Belgium 19, 88, 103, 105, 107, 120, 136, 140, 146, 149 Belief System 86, 99, 103 Bell, Daniel 100, 118, 134, 150 Bellah, R. 55, 75 Benedict, R. 51, 75 Berger, Peter L. 5, 9, 82, 84, 97, 118, 131, 133, 134, 150 Berry, J. 134, 151 Bianchi, G. 35, 56, 58, 65, 77 Birch, Charles 23, 31 Boehnke, K. 40, 78 Bolivia 53, 53, 166 Bonding Social Capital 111 Borg, I. 41, 75 Bosnia-Herzegovina 56 Brazil 18, 77 Britain 18, 26, 88, 105, 107, 120, 149 Bruce, S 148, 151 Bryk, A. 144, 145, 152 Buddhism 56 Bulgaria 20, 46, 48, 136, 140 Burgess, S. 78 Byzantine 53 Canada 12, 50, 88, 103, 105, 107, 115, 116, 120, 136, 146 Casanova, J. 128, 149, 151 Catholic 19, 86, 105, 107, 128, 135, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147 Catholic Atheist 86 Central European 73

188 • Index Change Cultural Change 2, 3, 4, 9, 12, 13, 19, 29, 30, 47, 85, 86, 87, 96, 97 Economic Change 4, 13, 96 Intergenerational Value Change 13, 24 Value Change 4, 6, 9, 13, 24, 58, 79, 83, 97, 100, 102, 104, 112, 116, 162, 184 Religious Change 127, 145, 146, 147, 148, 150 Chaves, G. 131, 132, 151 Chile 136 China 11, 19, 20, 27, 46, 64, 162, 166, 168, 171 Chinese Culture 51 Chinese Curse 79 Christian 6, 19, 127, 129, 136, 137, 138, 142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 150 Classical Thinkers 1 Cobb, John B. Jr. 23, 31 Cold War 82 Coleman, James S. 111, 118 Collective Mindset 1 Collectivism 21, 22, 23, 24, 55, 57, 161 Collectivist Societies 21, 22 Commission of the European Communities 1 Communal Sharing 135 Community Involvement 111 Confucian 16, 19, 20, 28, 33, 53, 55, 57, 73, 156, 162 Convergence 4, 5, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 116 Convergence of Values 6, 79, 82, 83, 86, 87, 97 Convergence-Divergence Debate 86 Converse, Philip E. 103, 118 Croatia 136, 141 Cronbach’s Alpha 90, 104 Cullel, Vargas 27, 31 Culture Cultural Diversity 4, 7, 127, 129, 134, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145, 147, 148, 149, 150 Cultural Maps of the World 3, 4, 6, 16, 20 Cultural Tradition 2, 3, 7, 12, 20, 21, 85, 133, 163, 183 Cultural Value Dimension 4, 33, 34, 58, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 73, 75 Cultural Value Orientation 4, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 50, 61, 62, 64, 70, 72, 73 Cultural Zones 3, 18, 19, 30, 157, 182

Cultural Grouping 33, 53 Cultural Heritage 19, 28, 86, 137, 146, 148 Cultural Orientation 3, 33, 34, 35, 38, 41, 42, 45, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 58, 64, 65, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75 Cyprus 53, 55 Czech Republic 136 De Moor, Ruud 2, 5, 9, 76, 83, 97, 98, 100, 102, 104, 117, 118, 151 Decline of Deference 102 Democratization 6, 7, 30, 57, 58, 59, 66, 92, 167, 169, 170, 183 Democratic Institutions 3, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 Denmark 19, 48, 88, 103, 107, 120, 126, 136, 140, 146, 149 Dervis, Kemal 80, 98 Deutsch, Karl W. 80, 98 Divorce 16, 91, 92, 93, 104, 107 Dobbelaere, Karel 8, 137, 151 Durkheim, Emile 7, 111, 116 East European 33, 53, 56 East-Central European 73 Eastern Bloc 96 Economy Economic and Physical Security 12, 14, 16, 25, 47 Economic Development 3, 4, 5, 11, 13, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 49, 57, 58, 59, 61, 73, 85, 87, 92, 128, 129, 130, 131, 140, 160, 162, 171, 172 Economic Growth 13, 25, 130, 162 Edlund, P. O. 140, 151 Education 7, 13, 17, 24, 28, 36, 38, 48, 65, 70, 86, 87, 89, 142, 143, 144, 147, 158, 160, 171, 174, 178 Egalitarianism 36, 37, 42, 47, 48, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 61, 62, 64, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72 Egalitarianism/Hierarchy Dimension 47, 48, 49, 67, 73, 74 Elite Integrity 27, 175 Embeddedness 36, 37, 42, 46, 48, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 71, 72 Encyclopedia Britannica Almanac 59, 61, 62, 75 End of History 82 Endogeneity Problem 113 Enlightenment 83, 172 Equality Matching 135 Esmer, Yilmaz 1, 4, 5, 6, 79, 84, 98, 128, 140, 151

Index • 189 Ester, Peter 5, 9, 32, 76, 77, 83, 97, 98, 118, 136, 151 Estonia 46, 136 Etzioni, A. 55, 76 EU 46, 136 Eurobarometer 1, 2 Europe 5, 20, 45, 82, 99, 104, 105, 107, 109, 113, 114, 115 Eastern Europe 8, 20, 37, 70, 82, 168 East-Central Europe 73 European Project 1 European Social Study 136 European Social Survey 9, 13, 41, 45, 57, 77, 82, 87, 97 European Values Survey 2, 3, 6 Euthanasia 16, 104, 107 Ex-Communist 18, 19, 20, 73, 74 Existential Security 23, 29, 30, 129, 130 Factor Analysis 5, 14, 22, 38, 40, 103, 104, 137, 138, 142, 146, 167 Fertility Rates 26, 84 Finke, R. 131, 132, 148, 151, 153 Finland 19, 88, 103, 107, 116, 120, 136, 140, 146, 149 Fiske, A. P. 135, 151 Flanagan, Scott C. 102, 118 Fogarty, M. 152 Fontaine, J. R. J. 40, 76 Formal Democracy 27 France 18, 19, 26, 88, 103, 105, 107, 120, 136, 140, 146 Freedom House 26, 27, 58, 59, 68, 76, 165, 166 Fundamentalist Islam 85 Fustos, Laszio 86, 98 Gender 13, 23, 26, 74, 79, 84, 136, 138, 140, 142, 143, 144, 147 Gender Roles 13, 16, 25 Germany 18, 26, 105, 107, 109, 130, 169 West Germany 19, 20, 45, 48, 50, 103, 170 East Germany 20, 45, 46, 50, 51 Giddens, Anthony 80, 131, 133, 150, 151 Globalization 4, 7, 79, 80, 81, 83, 85, 95, 96 Glock, Charles 129 Goldreich, Y. 50, 76 Gorski, R. 129, 131, 132, 151 Great Britain 88, 149 Greece 81, 136 Greek Cyprus 53 Gyekye, K. 56, 76

Halman, Loek 5, 8, 9, 54, 76, 83, 97, 98, 100, 102, 104, 105, 117, 118, 136, 137, 148, 149, 151, 152 Hamberg, E. 132, 133, 152 Harmony/Mastery 47, 48, 49, 67, 73 Harris, M. 8, 78 Health 17, 29, 65, 129, 139 Hierarchy 37, 47, 48, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 64, 67, 69, 72, 75 Cultural Hierarchy 37, 67 Hindu 19 Hinduism 56 Historical Heritage 19, 30 History 1, 3, 13, 20, 24, 29, 35, 53, 81, 82, 96, 168 Colonial History 3, 12 Human History 13, 79 Church History 150 World History 80 Hofstede, Geert 4, 21, 22, 23, 31, 32, 34, 35, 38, 50, 53, 57, 73, 76, 161, 185 Hox, J. 145, 152 Human Choice 21, 22, 24, 155, 156, 159, 161, 173, 183 Human Development 6, 21, 23, 130, 155, 156, 158, 163, 167, 168, 170, 176, 177, 182, 183, 184 Human Development Report 6 Human Security 127, 129, 130, 131, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145, 147, 148, 150 Human Well-Being 127, 129, 138, 140, 142, 145, 148, 150 Human Well-Being Index 139, 140, 143, 144 Hungary 28, 88, 136, 146, 149 Hunter, James Davison 111, 117, 118 Huntington, Samuel P. 5, 9, 19, 31, 50, 53, 76, 97, 100, 102, 118, 185 Iazzetta, Miguel 27, 31 IBM 21, 23, 34, 73 Ibn-I Khaldun 1 Iceland 19, 88, 103, 105, 107, 120, 136, 146, 168 India 11, 18, 20, 56, 168 Indonesia 11 Industrial Revolution 11, 19 Inglehart 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 38, 40, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 53, 57, 66, 73, 74, 76, 78, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 94, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 117, 118, 119, 128, 130, 134, 136, 137, 152, 153, 155, 157, 158, 160, 162, 163, 175, 180, 181, 185, 186

190 • Index Inkeles, Alex 1, 82, 83, 84, 92, 97, 98 International Social Survey Program 2 Iran 27, 28 Ireland 81, 88, 103, 105, 107, 115, 120, 136, 146, 149 Islam 14, 19, 20, 56, 84, 85, 94 Israel 45, 50, 53, 70 Israel Arabs 53 Israel Jews 53, 55 International Social Survey Program 2 Italian Culture 51 Italy 7, 18, 19, 26, 88, 103, 105, 107, 115, 116, 120, 136, 146, 168, 169, 170 Idiocentrism 135, 139 Imagined Communities 133 Importance of Obedience 40 Individual Autonomy 22, 157, 161 Individual Freedom 3, 93, 101, 173 Individualism 21, 22, 23, 24, 55, 56, 57, 117, 135, 161 Individualization 5, 6, 100, 83, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117 Industrial Revolution 19 Industrialism 5, 100 Intellectual Autonomy 21, 37, 45, 46, 48, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 70, 71, 72 Intergenerational Shift 13, 16 Intergenerational Value Change 13, 24 Interpersonal Trust 3, 16, 23, 92, 163 Japan 2, 12, 18, 19, 28, 48, 51, 54, 55, 88, 162, 169, 170 Kasse, M. 75, 117, 119 Kaufman, Daniel 27, 31, 164 Kellner, H. 150 Kerkhofs, Jan 2, 8 Klingemann, Hans-Dieter 8, 57, 78, 153, 155, 179 Knafo, Ariel 42 Knowledge Society 11, 28 Kohn, M. L. 35, 76 Kornberg, A. 75 Kraay, Aart 27, 31, 164 Kurian, G. T. 62, 76 Large Scale Comparative Values Studies 1 Lasch, Christopher 100, 119 Latvia 136 Lee, Aie-Rie 102, 118 Lee, Kuan Yew 27, 31 Lehmann, A. 78 Lenski, Gerhard 172, 186 Liberal Democracy 27, 172

Life Expectancy 13, 139 Life Satisfaction 91, 96, 138, 142, 143, 144, 157, 161, 163 Lingoes, J. C. 41, 75 Lithuania 2 Luxembourg 136 Macedonia 51 Maddison, Angus 88 Madsen, R. 55, 75 Malta 136, 141 Marriage 79, 84, 91, 92 Same-Sex Marriages 25, 26 Traditional Marriage 92 Homosexual Marriages 94, 97 Marx, Karl 7, 12, 129 Mass Emancipative Values 57 Mastery 37, 45, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 61, 62, 65, 66, 67, 69, 172 Mastery/Harmony 4 Mastruzzi, Massimo 27, 31, 164 Matsumoto, D. 32, 51 Mcclosky, Herbert 100, 119 McDonaldization 5, 79, 82, 85, 95, 97 McNeill, William 168, 186 Melech, G. Methodist Protestantism 56 Mexico 2, 88, 136, 140, 146 Middle East 57, 168 Middle Eastern 33, 53, 55, 56 Mindset 1 Modernization 3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 19, 30, 34, 83, 85, 86, 89, 128, 129, 131, 134, 148, 149, 160 Modernization Theory 7, 13 Montesquieu 1 Moors, G. 151 Moral Outlooks 5, 99, 100, 102, 104, 107, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117 Moral Traditionalism/Permissiveness 104 Multidimensional Scaling 40, 41, 50 Multiple Regression 20, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144 National Culture 4, 6, 33, 34, 45, 49, 50, 51, 53, 67, 73, 74, 75 National Pride 14, 40, 46, 47 Nationalism 85, 95, 150 Nationalistic Sentiments 85, 95 Netherlands 88, 103, 105, 107, 120, 136, 140, 146, 149 Nevitte, Neil 5, 6, 8, 99, 102, 119 Newton, Kenneth 112, 119 Nigeria 18 Nolan, Patrick 172, 186

Index • 191 Non-Western 12, 156, 157 Norris, Pippa 5, 8, 9, 25, 31, 84, 98, 128, 129, 130, 137 Northwestern Europe 168 Norway 19, 48, 103, 105, 107, 120, 149 O’Donnell, Guillermo 27, 31 OLS Model 112 Olson, D. 132, 152 O’Neill, J. 134, 152 Orthodox 18, 19, 21, 53, 135, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147 Ottaway, Marina 27, 31 Ottoman Empires 53 Pakistan 18, 20 Peru 18, 53, 57 Pettersson, Thorleif 1, 5, 6, 89, 98, 127, 128, 132, 133, 136, 137, 140, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152 Philippines 136, 141 Phillips, D. 152 Plato 1, 157 Poland 128, 136, 141, 14 Political Activism 34, 46, 70, 71, 72 Political Elites 27 Political Stability 29 Population Crisis Committee 65, 77, 78 Portrait Values Questionnaire 41 Portugal 19, 28, 52, 136, 149 Postindustrial Society 85 Post-Industrialism 5, 100 Post-Industrial Value 13 Postmaterialist 29, 84 Post-Modernity 134 Postmodern Individualization 101 Postmodern Shift 5, 102 Postmodernist Libertarians 102 Prescott-Allen 139, 140 Prodi, Romano 7 Product Moment Correlation 112 Protestant 16, 19, 21, 86, 128, 135, 142, 147 Protestantism 56, 141 Przeworski, Adam 112, 119 Putnam, Robert 35, 71, 77, 111, 112, 116, 119 PVQ 41, 42, 45, 46 Quality of Life 12, 14, 16, 22, 25, 47, 130 Rabier, Jacques-Rene 2 Raudenbush, S. 145, 152 Raveh, A. 50, 76 Regression Model 113, 142, 143

Religion 2, 5, 7, 12, 15, 16, 19, 25, 26, 30, 40, 45, 46, 53, 55, 56, 67, 83, 84, 85, 86, 89, 100, 102, 103, 104, 107, 109, 116, 124, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 134, 137, 141, 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150 Religiosity 5, 6, 84, 85, 89, 90, 91, 99, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 129, 147 Religious Authority 109 Religious Decline 6, 127, 128, 131, 146, 148, 149 Religious Diversity 5, 6, 89 Religious Impact on Politics 127, 137, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146, 147 Religious Involvement 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149 Religious Market 131, 132, 134, 150 Religious Market Theory 131, 134, 150 Religious Orientations 127, 145 Religious Participation 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 148, 150 Religious Pluralism 131, 132 Religious Tradition 3, 12, 19, 86, 135, 136, 143 Religious/Secular Cleavage 109 Ritzer, George 82, 98 Rokeach, M. 100, 119 Roman Catholic 19, 21, 56 Romania 20, 51, 136, 141 Ros, M. 53, 55, 78 Rose, Richard 164, 186 Rubel, T. 65, 78 Rueschemeyer, Dietrich 172, 186 Russia 20, 136, 140 Ryan, Richard M. 156, 157, 185, 186 Schooler, C. 35, 76 Schwartz Value Survey 40 Schwartz, Shalom H. 3, 4, 6, 9, 21, 22, 23, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 50, 53, 55, 56, 65, 70, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 87 Secularization 6, 11, 30, 83, 102, 107, 112, 113, 116, 129, 131, 134, 137, 149 Secularization Paradigm 129, 131 Secularization Theorist 128 Secularization Theory 5, 84, 85, 89, 90, 127, 128, 129, 134, 147, 148, 150 Secular-Rational Values 11, 16, 20, 25, 30, 46, 173

192 • Index Self-Expression 12, 16, 19, 22, 23, 25, 26, 45, 47, 48, 158, 161 Self-Expression Values 3, 11, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 94 Survival/Self-Expression Dimension 19, 48, 74, 47 Sen, Amartya 155, 186 Seuren, B. 54, 76 Sexual Norm 25 Social Network 111, 158, 172, 173 Social Outlook 111 Socio-Economic Development 4, 5, 23, 24, 28, 30, 49, 57, 58, 59, 61, 73, 131 South Korea 2, 19, 28, 88, 162 Soviet Union 20, 29, 82 Spain 19, 88, 103, 105, 107, 120, 137, 140, 146 Star, R. 151 Stark, Rodney 129, 131, 132, 148, 153 State 1, 5, 27, 29, 164, 165, 44, 83, 85, 100 City State 165, 166 Member States 82 Nation State 82 Totalitarian States 96 Industrial States 99, 100, 103 State Authority 5, 83, 102 Stiglitz, Joseph E. 81, 98 Subjective Well-Being 12, 16, 20, 23, 25, 47, 157, 163 Suicide 16, 104, 107 Sullivan, W. 55, 75 Supply-Side Theories of Religion 5 Sweden 18, 19, 48, 51, 88, 103, 107, 120, 137, 140, 146, 149 Swidler, A. 55, 75 Szakolczai, Arpad 86, 98 Taiwan 19, 28, 162 Taylor, Charles 83, 97, 98 Tetlock, P. E. 39, 78 Teune, Henry 112, 119 Theory of Materialism 34 Thompson, John B. 27, 32 Thomson, K. 133, 153 Tipton, S. M. 55, 75 Tocqueville, A. 1, 7 Tolerance 3, 16, 23, 47, 48, 66, 69, 70, 85, 91, 93, 94, 161 Tolerance of Foreigners 25 Tolerance of Gays and Lesbians 23 Tradition Traditional Social Institution 101, 104, 111 Traditional/Secular-Rational Dimension 3, 12, 16, 18, 20

Traditional/Secular-Rational Values Index 15, 17 Triandis, Harry C. 21, 22, 32, 57, 77, 78, 139, 161, 186 Turkey 53, 55 Turner, Bryan S. 82, 98, 129, 153 Uganda 20, 48 Ukraine 20, 137 UNDP 6, 9 United Nations 7, 66 United Nations Population Division 66, 78 United States 2, 12, 18, 26, 53, 54, 55, 84, 85, 103, 105, 107, 115, 116, 120, 137, 140, 146, 170 Universal Postal Union 81 Urbanization 16, 128 Values 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 65, 75, 85, 88, 89, 90, 92, 99, 100, 102, 112, 117, 145, 146, 147, 161 Cross-National Value Differences 13 Cultural Value Theory 70 Moral Values 5, 99, 100, 102, 104, 107, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117 Traditional Value-Generating Institutions 100, 101 Traditional Values 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 26, 30 Two-Dimensional Map of Global Values 3 Value Change 4, 6, 13, 24, 58, 79, 83, 97, 100, 102, 103, 104, 112, 116, 162, 184 Value Clusters 87 Value Convergence 4 Value Differences 73 Value Dimensions 3, 4, 6, 33, 34, 36, 58, 59, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 73, 74, 75, 87, 100, 107 Value Emphases 35, 66 Value Orientations 4, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 47, 50, 51, 55, 59, 61, 62, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 161 Value Priorities 34, 38, 39, 40, 134 Value Shift 83 Value System 3, 12, 16, 18, 19, 20, 86, 128, 161 Vanhanen, Tatu 58, 59, 65, 160, 186 Verba, Sidney 1, 185 Vietnam 27, 162, 180 Weber, Max 1, 7, 12, 32, 35, 36, 78, 100, 119 Welfare 3, 36, 47, 55, 89, 134

Index • 193 Welfare State 13, 24, 25, 54, 172, 174 Welzel, Christian 3, 6, 8, 9, 13, 14, 21, 23, 24, 25, 27, 30, 31, 57, 58, 59, 61, 78, 83, 94, 98, 153 Western Europe 2, 12, 19, 26, 54, 56, 83, 85, 128, 172 Westernization 12 Williams, Robin M. 35, 78, 99, 119 Work Motivations 25, 125 World Bank 7, 27, 139, 165, 166 World Human Development Reports 6

World Values Survey 25, 29, 79, 82, 93, 95, 97, 99, 100, 103, 104, 136, 139, 147 World War II 13, 84, 169, 170 Wuthnow, R. 133, 153 Yemen 51 Zakaria, Fareed 27, 31 Zaller, John 100, 119 Zimbabwe 18, 20, 46, 48, 53