MEDIAEVAL COMMENTARIES ON THE SENTENCES OF PETER LOMBARD VOLUME I
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MEDIAEVAL COMMENTARIES ON THE SENTENCES OF PETER LOMBARD Current Research VOLUME I
EDITED BY
G.R. EVANS
BRILL LEIDEN • BOSTON • KOLN 2002
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mediaeval commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard / edited by G.R. Evans, p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 9004119817 (v. 1 : alk. paper) 1. Peter Lombard, Bishop of Paris, ca. 1100-1160. Sententiarum libri IV 2. Theology, Doctrinal—History—Middle Ages, 600-1500. I. Evans, G.R. (Gillian Rosemary) BX1749.P4M43 2001 230'.2—dc21
2001043006
CIP
Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufhahme Mediaeval commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard / ed. by G. R. Evans - Leiden ; Boston ; Koln : Brill, 2002 Vol. l.-(2002) ISBN 90-04-11981-7
ISBN 900411981 7 © Copyright 2002 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorisation to photocopy itemsfor internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS
PUBLISHER'S NOTE The Publisher wishes to thank Russell L. Friedman for his help with the proofs and index of this book.
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CONTENTS
List of Contributors Introduction
ix xiii
Lombardus electronicus: A Biographical Database of Medieval Commentators on Peter Lombard's Sentences
1
Steven J. Livesey
Die Sentenzen des Petrus Lombardus in der Diskussion seiner Schule
25
L. Hodl
The Sentences Commentary, 1250-1320. General Trends, The Impact of the Religious Orders, and the Test Case of Predestination
41
Russell L. Friedman
Paris
The Commentary of John of Paris (Quidort) on the Sentences Jean Dunbabin
Peter Auriol's Way with Words. The Genesis of Peter AurioPs Commentaries on Peter Lombard's First and Fourth Books of the Sentences
131
149
Lauge 0. Nielsen
Parisian Commentaries from Peter Auriol to Gregory of Rimini, and the Problem of Predestination
221
Chris Schabel
La Lectura sur les deux premiers livres des Sentences de Gregoire de Rimini O.E.S.A. (1300-1358) Pascak Sermon
267
Vlll
CONTENTS
Oxford Early Oxford Theology Rega Wood
289
The Beginning of a Tradition: the Sentences Commentary of Richard Fishacre, OP R. James Long
345
Oxford Franciscans after Ockham: Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham Chris Schabel
359
Themes and Personalities in Sentence Commentaries at Oxford in the 1330s Raymond Edwards
379
Les premiers ecrits theologiques de Bradwardine: textes inedits et decouvertes recentes Jean-Francois Genest
395
Other Centres Sentences Commentaries of the Later Fourteenth Century Paul J. J. M. Bakker and Chris Schabel The Commentary on the Sentences of Marsilius of Inghen Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen
425
....
465
Conclusion Russell L. Friedman
507
Index
529
Russell L. Friedman
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
P. J. J. M. Bakker is a research fellow at the Center of Medieval and Renaissance Natural Philosophy at the University of Nijmegen. He has published several articles on Medieval philosophy and theology. He co-edited Philosophic und Theologie des ausgehenden Mittelalters. Marsilius von Inghen und das Denken seiner Zeit (Leiden 2000). Pascale Bermon works at IRHT, Paris. She has written her PhD, Assent and its Object in the Sentences Commentary of Gregory of Rimini (1300-1358), Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris, 1999 (to be published). Jean Dunbabin is Fellow and Tutor at St. Anne's College, Oxford. She specializes in French medieval history and in scholastic thought. Her recent publications include France in the Making, 843-1180 (2nd ed. Oxford UP 2000) and Charles I of Anjou. Power, Kingship and StateMaking in Thirteenth-Century Europe (Longman, London and New York 1998). Raymond Edwards is an independent scholar and writer. His particular interest is the study of Peter Lombard's Sentences at Oxford in the early fourteenth century. He is currently working on a translation of Henry of Harclay's Quaestiones Ordinariae. G. R. Evans lectures in theology in the University of Cambridge and is the author of studies of a series of patristic and medieval authors and two volumes on The Language and Logic of the Bible in the Middle Ages. Russell L. Friedman of the University of Copenhagen, Denmark, is a specialist in medieval intellectual history and in medieval diplomatics. He is co-editor of Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition (Copenhagen, 1999) and of Diplomatarium Danicum, series 4, vol. 7 (Copenhagen, 2000).
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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
From 1987 to 1997 Jean-Fran9ois Genest was director of the Section de Codicologie at the Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes (CNRS, Paris). He specializes in studies of the intellectual exchanges between Oxford and Paris in the fourteenth century and his recent publications include Predetermination et liberte creee a Oxford au XIV siecle, Buckingham contre Bradwardine, Paris, 1992. Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen teaches Philosophy at the University of Nijmegen. He has published several books and numerous articles on medieval philosophy and theology. Ludwig Hodl is Emeritus Professor of Dogmatics and the History of Dogmas at the Faculty of Catholic Theology of the Ruhr-Universitat in Bochum. He has dedicated himself specifically to the scholastic literature and theology of the Middle Ages (12th—14th century) in both research and teaching. Among his many editions of scholastic texts are Henrici de Gandavo Summa (Quaestiones ordinariae] art. XLI—XLVI. (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. De Wulf-Mansion Centra. Series 2: Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia XXIX), Leuven, University Press 1998. Steven J. Livesey is Professor and Chair of the Department of the History of Science at the University of Oklahoma. He specializes in medieval science, the history of early scientific methodologies and science in medieval universities, and his publications include Theology and Science in the Fourteenth Century: Three Questions on the Unity and Subalteration of the Sciences from John of Reading's Commentary on the Sentences, edition and critical commentary. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1989 and "Scientific Writing in the Latin Middle Ages," in Scientific Books, Libraries and Collectors, ed. Andrew Hunter. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000, pp. 72-98. R. James Long is a Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Department at Fairfield University in Connecticut. He specializes in early Oxford philosophy and theology, and his most recent book (with Maura O'Carroll) is The Life and Works of Richard Fishacre OP. Prolegomena to the Edition of his Commentary on the 'Sentences' (Munich: BAdW, 1999).
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
XI
Lauge O. Nielsen, dr. Theol., Senior Lecturer at the University of Copenhagen and vice-dean of the Faculty of Theology, specializes in medieval Church history, and his recent publication include several articles on the Franciscan theologian and philosopher Peter Auriol. Chris Schabel is Lecturer in Medieval History at the University of Cyprus. He specialises in intellectual history and Frankish Cyprus, and his recent publications include The Cartulary of the Cathedral of Holy Wisdom of Nicosia and Tlieology at Paris 1316-1345. Rega Wood is the general editor of Richard Rufus of Cornwall's works and a research professor at Stanford University. A historian of medieval philosophy, she has edited works by Ockham, Scotus, and Wodeham. Recent publications include Ockham on the Virtues.
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INTRODUCTION G. R. Evans
The Sentences of Peter Lombard came to have huge significance for the mediaeval study of theology in the West. They began inauspiciously, in controversy and rejection. But once they found their audience, for many generations they challenged the Scriptures as the focal point of commentary and the leading text for theological study. As essay after essay in this volume makes plain, the Sentences always prompted questions. That was one of their pedagogic purposes. We can see shifting patterns forming in the commentaries decade by decade as a topic is actively taken up for a time and then gives way to another. Often work on the Sentences is the first place to look to discover the views of a scholar, a place, even a period, on what was controversial and why. A large number of commentaries on the Sentences survive and individual commentaries are often very long indeed. Jean Dunbabin speaks of the 'huge works' of Quidort and Peter Auriol of the 'monumental' work of Peter Auriol. The sheer volume of the material presents a problem in drawing together a volume on these commentaries. It has seemed best to be pragmatic. I began by exploring with scholars working in the field what each was doing and felt best able to write about, so as to begin to establish the status quaestionis. It has become clear that there is scope for a second volume. It is intended that Volume II will fill some of the gaps in Volume I, and that it will include a general introduction and papers whose authors were not able to complete them in time for the first volume. It is planned to cover Ockham and Scotus more extensively. Certain other major authors it would be superfluous to include at length in Volume II since they have been admirably catered for in other recent studies. These include the study of Aquinas on the Sentences in J.-P. Torrell, Initiation a saint Thomas d'Aquin. Sa personne et son oeuvre (Paris, 1993), pp. 53—78 and that of Bonaventure by J. G. Bougerol, Introduction a saint Bonaventure (Paris, 1988), p. 5, pp. 128-31, pp. 186-96 and pp. 113-8. Of the remaining omissions in the present volume, the needs for something on the
XIV
INTRODUCTION
earliest commentaries; for detailed treatment of further thirteenth century Paris theologians and more on Oxford in the late thirteenth and early to mid-fourteenth century; for coverage of Oxford Dominicans such as Holcot, are clear. There is also much to be said for extending further the geographical range and the period of time covered and thus taking the story onwards into the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. That is the plan; a number of authors have expressed their willingness to contribute. It is always difficult to achieve a literary unity in a volume with many authors. We have tried to create an accessible working framework within which scholars may 'place' work in which they themselves may be engaged and 'find' reference to mediaeval work on which they need information. We hope this first volume accurately reflects the state of scholarship at the time of its going to press and that the second will complete a work of reference which will fill a need for some decades to come.
LOMBARDUS
ELECTRONICUS:
A BIOGRAPHICAL DATABASE OF MEDIEVAL COMMENTATORS ON PETER LOMBARD'S SENTENCES Steven J. Livesey
For more than fifty years, laborers in the field of Sentential literature have relied on Friedrich Stegmuller's Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombard? as a first source in the search for medieval (and post-medieval) commentaries. Although there had been general bibliographical sources for theological literature, like Hurter's Nommclator literarius? or geographically-specific repertoria like Glorieux's catalogue of Paris masters of theology,3 until Stegmuller's publication,4 scholars were forced to search piecemeal through general repertoria, manuscript catalogues, and incipitaires for commentaries. It was far from perfect. Stegmuller himself recognized its shortcomings, noting that his teaching obligations at Wiirzburg and lack of funds—in an era before large-scale granting agencies—meant that he could rarely or only briefly spend time in libraries outside his region. The war also precluded travel and still worse produced shortages of critical materials.5 While early users of the Repertorium regarded it as "a revelation, . . . one of the most beautiful monuments erected up to the present time to the glory of the Quatuor libri Sententiarum"6 they also pointed out its shortcomings.
1
2 vols. Wiirzburg: F. Schoningh 1947. Hugo Hurter, Nomenclator literanus theologiae catholicae theologos exhibens aetate, natione, disciplinis distinctos. . . . 3rd ed., 5 v. in 6. Oeniponte: Libraria academica Wagneriana 1906, of which the first two volumes surveyed the period before the Council of Trent. 3 P. Glorieux, Repertoire des maitres en theologie de Paris au XIIP siecle. 2 vols. Paris: Vrin 1933. 4 Already anticipated by previous installment, "Repertorium initiorum plurimorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi commentariorum," Romische Quartalschrift fur christliche Alterumskunde und fur Kirchengeschichte 45 (1937), 85-360. 3 Repertonum p. vi. 6 V. Doucet, Commentaires sur les Sentences, Supplement au Repertoire de M. Frederic Stegmueller. Florence 1954. p. 4. 2
2
STEVEN J. LIVESEY
One of the problems was its incomplete survey of commentaries and manuscripts. Although his review was focused ostensibly on item 417 of the Repertorium (Johannes Damascenus), Eligius Buytaert prefaced his corrections with some sixteen pages of additions and corrections to the manuscript sources of other entries.7 This was followed almost simultaneously by Victorin Doucet's Supplement, containing references to some 775 manuscripts, many of which went beyond information provided by Stegmiiller. Not surprisingly, some 287 of these were Italian manuscripts, and a further 134 were from the Vatican. Few were from Germany and Eastern Europe.8 The latter became the focus of a series of addenda published in the 1950s and 1960s by Czech and Polish scholars, drawing on the collections of their countries.9 And, of course, since the late 1960s, numerous manuscripts of texts included in Stegmiiller have come to light, largely published in far-flung references not readily identifiable as supplements to the Repertorium. The other major defect was the misattribution of texts to medieval authors. Beyond the cases brought to light early on by Buytaert and Doucet, and then over the past fifty years by legions of scholars, one
7 Eligius Buytaert, "Damascenus latinus. On Item 417 of Stegmiiller's Repertorium Commentariorum," Franciscan Studies 13 (1953), 37-70. 8 V. Doucet, Commentaires sur les Sentences, Supplement au Repertoire de M. Frederic Stegmueller. Florence 1954. 9 J. B. Korolec, A. Poltawski, Z. Wlodek, "Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplement au Repertoire de F. Stegmiiller," Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 1 (1958), 28-30; M. Golaszewska, J. B. Korolec, A. Poltawski, Z. K. Siemiatkowska, I. Tarnowska, Z. Wfodek, "Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplement au Repertoire de F. Stegmuller," MPP 2 (1958), 22-27; Zdzislaw Kuksewicz, "Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplement au Repertoire de F. Stegmuller," MPP 5 (1960), 4549; Z. Wlodek, "Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplement au Repertoire de F. Stegmuller," MPP 5 (1960), 144-146; Z. Wlodek, "Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplement au Repertoire de F. Stegmuller d'apres les MSS de la Bibliotheque du Grand Seminaire de Pelplin," MPP 8 (1961), 33-38; Ryszard Palacz, "Supplement au Repertoire de F. Stegmuller," MPP 9 (1961), 46-47; J. B. Korolec, R. Palacz, "Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplement au Repertoire de F. Stegmuller," MPP 11 (1963), 140-145; Jerzy Rebeta, "Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplement au Repertoire de F. Stegmuller," MPP 12 (1967), 135-137; Josef Tfiska, "Sententiarii Pragensis," MPP 13 (1968), 100-110; Kazimierz Wqjcik, "Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplement au Repertoire de F. Stegmuller," MPP 13 (1968), 111-114; Sophie Wlodek, "Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplement au Repertoire de F. Stegmuller d'apres les MSS de la Bibliotheque de 1'Universite de Wroclaw," Bulletin de philosophic medievak 6 (1964). 100-104; Sophie Wlodek, "Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplement au Repertoire de F. Stegmuller d'apres les MSS. des Bibliotheques de Prague," ibid. 1 (1965), 91-95.
LOMBARDUS ELECTRONICUS
6
might note the two texts itemized as 515 and 516. Stegmiiller, probably drawing upon Doucet's earlier review of Glorieux, created a phantom author, Laurentius Anglicus, whose commentary on the Sentences was preserved in Manchester, John Ryland's 198. Here wras a case that was clearly caused by the inability to view materials or to inquire from those in a position to do so: not only did the incipit of the text in MS 198 match that of Florence, BN Gentr. Conv. Soppr. G.5.1348 (which Stegmiiller assigned to Laurentius de Bononia), but the John Ryland's manuscript itself assigns the text to Laurentius Opimus de Bononia.10 Availability of the manuscript or a more comprehensive search for information about Servite authors might have avoided this particular error.11 This example of the misattribution to Laurentius Anglicus illustrates a further deficiency that perhaps never was within the original scope of Stegmiiller's work. Many, if not most entries began with a few details about the identity of the author, general information about teaching positions, or the dates of the author's lectures on the Sentences. And, of course, in the second volume Stegmiiller provided an index chronologicus12 to situate individual authors (although not necessarily their commentaries) within the broad sweep of theological developments. But the clear focus of the work was the manuscripts in which the texts were contained, not the biographies of the authors themselves. Over the past half century, research focused on the Sentences has tended to reflect two distinct but related interests. First, there has been a substantial continuation of individual studies drawing upon
10 Victorin Doucet, review of Glorieux, Repertoire des Maitres en theologie . . ., AFH 26 (1933), 206-214 at 213. Actually, the explanation of the error is a bit more complicated, since Doucet misread the attribution as Laurentius Opimus (opus?) super sententias and for whatever reason [perhaps that Manchester is in England?], seized upon Glorieux's Laurentius Anglicus. 11 The information about Laurentius Opimus de Bononia published before 1947 could be found in S. M. Berardo, "II dottore ordinatissimo ven. Lorenzo Opimo dei Send di Maria vesc. di Trau," // Comune di Bologna. Bologna 1932. 77-84; Corrado Berti, La sanctificazione dell'anima e il merito secondo maestro Lorenzo da Bologna [Universitas Catholica Lovaniensis. Sylloge excerptorum e dissertationibus ad gradum doctoris in Sacra Theologia vel in lure canonico consequendum conscriptis VI.8]. Gembloux 1939; Giovanni Fantuzzi, Notizie degli scrittori Bolognesi. 9 vols. Bologna: Stamp, di San Tommaso d'Aquino 1781-1794. v. 9 (1794), 141, 160-161; and Monumenta ordinis servorum Santae Mariae, ed. A. Morini and P. Soulier. t. 1. Bruxelles: Societe Beige de Librarie 1897. p. 169. 12 Vol. 2, pp. 707-731.
4
STEVEN J. LIVESEY
the commentaries known to us, and in fact, this research has helped augment the canon of commentaries beyond Stegmuller's original list.13 In many, but not all cases, the study of the content of commentaries has been accompanied by additional research into the lives of the authors. At the same time, scholars looking more globally at institutions have increased our knowledge about the place of commentaries on the Sentences in university faculties of theology or in the studia of religious orders proximate to medieval universities.14 The result of both of these efforts has been a more complete picture of the texts themselves, often in the context of the institutions in which they were written. While we now know a great deal more about individual commentators and their works, and about theological faculties or religious studia, these studies tend to focus either on the microhistories of single cases or the peculiar characteristics of local or regional educational institutions. What I should like to pursue in this essay is an analysis of the entire known population of commentators on the Sentences, and to do so, I will draw upon a database that collects biographical and bibliographical information about medieval commentators on both Peter Lombard's Sentences and Aristotle's works. Although there is a good deal of overlap among these two populations, I will confine my remarks only to the former, with occasional references to the latter as a means of comparison. Before proceeding, one needs to be very clear about the criteria for inclusion in the database. This is very important, because as is well known, 'reading' or lecturing on the Sentences was a requirement
13 For the first thirty years of this period, there is a convenient bibliography that surveys research based on Sentences commentaries: John Van Dyk, "Thirty Years since Stegmuller: A Bibliographical Guide to the Study of Medieval Sentence Commentaries since the Publication of Stegmuller's Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi (1947)," Franciscan Studies 39 (1979), 255-315. For the subsequent period, serial bibliographies like the International Medieval Bibliography, and more recently, the Bibliographie annuelle du moyen-age tardif survey most of these studies. 14 The list of such works is too long to reproduce here, but representative examples can be found in J. I. Catto, "Theology and Theologians 1220-1320," in The History of the University of Oxford, vol. I, The Early Oxford Schools, ed. J. I. Catto. Oxford: Oxford UP 1984. pp. 471-517; W. J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in FourteenthCentury England. Princeton: Princeton UP 1987; Monika Asztalos, "The Faculty of Theology," in A History of the University in Europe, vol. I, Universities in the Middle Ages, ed. Hilde de Ridder-Symoens. Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1992. pp. 409-441; and Storia della teologia ml Medioevo, ed. Giulio D'Onofrio. 3 vols. Casale Monferrato: Piemme 1996.
LOMBARDUS ELECTRONICUS
3
imposed on all candidates for degrees in theology. Because the database—like Stegmiiller's original Repertorium and its subsequent supplements—focuses on the textual survival of commentaries, mere oral transmission of one's ideas will not suffice for inclusion in the database. By the same token, there are significant numbers of commentaries on the Sentences that cannot be attributed with precision to any particular author, and because the goal of the database is to collect biographical information about commentators, anonymous commentaries—however interesting or important—are not included. In distinguishing between written and oral transmissions of commentaries, I have drawn upon a variety of sources. First, many of the commentators qualify for inclusion in the database because their commentaries are extant in manuscript copies or early printed editions. Here, of course, I have followed various repertoria, some of which have already been discussed, together with manuscript catalogues, serial bibliographies, and references in modern secondary sources. Historical catalogues—both medieval and more recent—indicating that a commentary once existed have also proved useful in identifying commentators. Finally, the internal evidence of authors themselves or their readers (not hearers) has also qualified some commentators for inclusion. The database is a set of eleven tables linked together by the prescribed name of the commentator. One is a look-up table that provides aliases useful in identifying commentators. Basic biographical information, including the commentator's birth and death dates and places, social status, parental names, and family profession, is stored in an initial name table, which is in turn linked to the remaining nine subordinate tables that collect information about the individual's educational history, ecclesiastical positions, geographical movements, personal relationships to students, masters, patrons, and the like, professional careers, writings and other intellectual products, membership in religious orders, and teaching and lecturing. A final table stores bibliographical information for each commentator. While the data are entered under a unique program written in Visual Basic, they are stored and indexed in a standard Microsoft Access database format, and hence retrievable under MS Access or virtually any other commercial database software. As a result, one can devise and modify queries of the data that suit individual purposes. At present, there are approximately 45,000 records in the database describing the lives of nearly 1600 commentators. The greatest
6
STEVEN J. LIVESEY
number of these (nearly 20,000) comprises the table that stores information about texts composed by commentators. In addition, there are more than 8,000 records pertaining to the educational careers of commentators, approximately 3,100 ecclesiastical positions, and 4,600 records indicating relationships to masters, students, patrons, and the like. But as in any population, about some commentators we know a great deal; of others, there is virtually no information. For example, of Arnold Woestefeldes, the long-time master of arts and student of theology at Leipzig, we have nearly 80 educational records. But for nearly a third of the commentators, there are no records or only one record. Of the 1584 commentators in the database, 893 produced commentaries on the Sentences.1^ Of these, we know the birth countries for 503, or 56%. In descending order, 113 (22.5%) were French; 110 (21.9%) were English; 95 (18.9%) were Italian; 76 (15.1%) were German; and the remaining 109 (21.7%) were from an array of other locations across Europe and the Mediterranean.16 For 362, we know the city of birth or its environs, and as one might expect, none recurs with considerable frequency.17 We know the death places for 392 commentators, which in descending order of frequency are Avignon (25), Paris (25), Rome (22), Vienna (17), and Cologne (15), while the remaining 288 range over 193 locations. Clearly, while commentators hailed from all regions of Europe, they gravitated to ecclesiastical and educational centers. We know the social origins of 114, or slightly more than one in eight commentators. Of these, only sixteen were of peasant, illegitimate or otherwise low birth; at the other end of the spectrum, only nine were of middle to upper aristocratic birth. The vast majority sprang from the local domini and knights (54) or urban bourgeoisie (35). Town scholars rose from a variety of occupational backgrounds, the most prominent being a variety of manual trades and notaries.18
15 By comparison, 855 commentators produced commentators on Aristotle; 216 commentators on the Sentences also produced commentaries on Aristotle. 15 For the universal data set, there are some notable shifts: of the 780 commentators for whom nationality is known, 183 (23.5%) were Italian, 160 (20.5%) were French, 144 (18.5%) were English, and 109 (14%) were German. The remaining 184 (23.6%) were drawn from a variety of countries. 11 The most frequent cities, in descending order, are Florence (8), Toulouse (7), Siena and Bologna (5 each), and Naples (4). 18 For the universal data set, we know the social origins of 185 (or fewer than
LOMBARDUS ELECTRONICUS
1
For 205 commentators on the Sentences, we have reasonably reliable data about birth and death dates. They suggest that as a whole, the population lived a somewhat long life, 64.4 years, with the longest being 101 and the shortest 29.19 Of these commentators, 636, or more than two-thirds, were members of religious orders. Of these, 181 were Franciscans, 175 Dominicans, 139 Carmelites, 86 Augustinians, 25 Cistercians, 22 Benedictines, and the remaining 14 spread among six other orders.20 While some (particularly those clustered near the early period of this population) entered the order at an early age, the average age of entry was about 23.8 years.21 Among the population that had previously passed through a faculty of arts, the average age at matriculation was 20.96 years, and
one in eight) commentators. An equal number (21) derived from aristocratic and very low birth. Again, the vast majority came from local domini and knightly class (78) or urban bourgeoisie (65). Among this population, nine were from manual trades and six notaries, and the remainder from a variety of professions. 19 Every record in the database contains the provision for recording ranges of dates, corresponding to the incomplete historical record. That is, every date field is actually a sequence of four fields, two permitting the codes "p" (post), "a" (ante), and "c" (circa), and two others corresponding to the four-place date. As a result, one can enter the date range "p 1210 a 1215" to signify the historical evidence for an event that took place within this five-year period. These average lifespans have been calculated for those commentators whose birthdates and deathdates are either exact, or in which the birth and death dates were earlier or later respectively than the given numeric year. Thus, the calculated lifespan is a conservative one, and commentators could be assumed to have lived, on average, at least to this age. If one adopts a stricter standard, that of insisting upon exact birth and death years, the number of commentators on the Sentences satisfying this criterion falls to 40, with an average lifespan of 63.18 years, and a maximum and minimum of 84 and 33 years. Within the universal population of all commentators in the database, the averages are fairly consistent: 64.26 years [335 commentators (extended criteria)] and 63.18 years [72 commentators (strict criteria)]. However, in all cases, the standard deviations are quite high (ranging from 12.59 to 12.81), so the averages may tell us less than we would wish. 20 The discrepancy in the totals arises because six commentators changed affiliation during their lifetimes: Nicolaus de Orbellis (OEM Obs. to OEM Conv.), Jacobus dejutirboc (O.Cist. to O.Carth.), Narcissus Pfister de Augusta (OP to OSB), Johannes Tongrensis (O.Praem. to OEM), Johannes Briselotus (O.Carm. to OSB), and Antonius Niger (OEM Conv. to OEM Obs.). 21 These data derived from the fifty commentators on the Sentences for whom we have both an exact or approximate birthdate and date of entry in the order. One commentator (Jacobus dejutirboc) was about 19 at entry into the Cistercian Order; his transference to the Carthusians came at about age 61. Not surprisingly, the standard deviation for these data is 13.67, in part because of the small pool, but also because commentators could and did enter orders at any time of their lives.
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STEVEN J. LFVESEY
at attainment of the M.A. 25.43 years.22 Commentators on the Sentences matriculated in theology on average at just under age 33,23 and completed their course of study at age 40.62 years.24 Their reading of the Sentences came on average at slightly more that 35 years of age, but for seculars in theological faculties, this was delayed about a year, while for students in orders, it occurred at approximately 32.5 years of age, probably reflecting the tendency—captured in the database tables—of such students to read the Sentences preliminarily at provincial schools.25 Once they had completed their degrees, commentators on the Sentences seem to have played an active role in the life and governance of their faculties or universities. They are recorded as having served on average five times as examinator in their faculty, in some cases much more frequently, as for example, Arnold Woestefeldes at Leipzig, who performed this duty on 39 occasions in the first third of the sixteenth century, or Johannes Kleine at Leipzig and Greifswald, who is recorded to have served 15 times in the second half of the fifteenth century. Among the population of Sentences commentators, seventy-nine were deans of arts, forty-nine were deans of theology, and eighty-five were rectors—often on multiple occasions during their careers.26
22
These averages are based on a fairly small population of twenty five, for whom there are accurate dates of both birth and matriculation. Among the universal population in the database, there are fifty-eight such commentators, and the average age of matriculation was rather similar, 20.57 years. Standard deviations for these two groups were 6.21 and 4.97, respectively. There were forty commentators on the Sentences for whom we have accurate dates of birth and attainment of the M.A. Among the commentators at large, there are 76 such individuals, with an average age of 25.88 years at the attainment of the M.A. Standard deviations for these groups were 6.04 and 6.48, respectively. 23 Average age 32.95, derived from the forty commentators with accurate dates of birth and matriculation; the standard deviation was 8.18. 24 Derived from the sixty-three commentators with accurate dates of birth and attainment of the doctorate; the standard deviation for this population was 8.74. 25 Twenty-five students in studia of religious orders: average age 32.48 years, standard deviation 9.40; seventy-eight students in university theological faculties: average age 36.17 years, standard deviation 7.34; and the combined data: average age 35.22 years, standard deviation 8.00. 26 Among the 893 commentators on the Sentences, 79 served as Dean of Arts a total of 146 terms; among the remaining 691 individuals in the database, 82 served in this capacity for a total of 154 terms. The 49 deans of theology among the commentators on the Sentences served 120 terms; there were 19 deans of theology recorded in the database who are not included in this list, because no commentary has survived or was attributed in the past. The 85 commentators on the Sentences served
LOMBARDUS ELECTRONICUS
9
We know the identities of 1223 students of 128 of these commentators. While in most cases, we know only a small number of students taught by masters—generally one or two—in a handful, we know the identities and origins of several dozens.27 Perhaps more interesting than the numbers of students is the correspondence between the origins of students and their masters. At Leipzig, for example, the great majority of Magnus Hund's students hailed from Germany north of Leipzig, while only slightly earlier Conrad Wimpina's students came from Germany south of Coburg. A century earlier at Paris and then Prague, Henry of Embecke's students were largely from northern Germany. Of course, a good deal of this can be explained by the division of the universities into nations, since Magnus Hund matriculated in 1482 in the Saxon nation, while Conrad Wimpina matriculated in 1479 in the Bavarian nation, and thus would be expected to teach students from their own nation.28 Nevertheless, there does seem to be a tendency to select masters from the region close to home: Henry, from Einbecke midway between Hildesheim and Gottingen, selected as his own masters Arnoldus from Einbecke and Albert of Saxony from Helmstedt, and among his own students nearly 30% were from locations within 100 miles of his
as rector for 191 terms, significantly more frequently than the remaining 89 noncommentators who served 145 terms. For some, like Marsilius of Inghen, who took his degree rather late in life, all service as rector preceded his (short) theological career; others, like Johannes de Dabrowka (who served eight times as rector of Krakow), performed most or all of their service after completing their theological degrees. While the significantly higher service as rector may be tied to the prestige of the superior faculty, there are so many additional factors that it is difficult if not impossible to make such correlations. 27 By far, the leader of the group is Arnoldus Woestefeldes, who taught at Leipzig between 1498 and 1538, for whom we have recorded 131 students. Others in this group are Magnus Hund de Magdeburg (98), Conrad Wimpina (87), Conrad de Soltau (74), Nicolaus de Luthomyssl (56), Paul of Venice (52), and Johannes Ottonis de Munsterberg (51). 28 G. Erler, Die Matrikel der Universitat Leipzig- 3 volumes. Leipzig: Giesecke u. Devrient 1895-1902. S.1482 S.21 (Magnus Hund); W 1479 B.31 (Conradus Wimpina). The database contains records for 98 of Magnus' students at Leipzig, for 90 of whom we know places of origin. Of these, 74 were from towns within 90 miles of Magdeburg, Magnus' birthplace; 62 are located within 60 miles; and 20 are located within 30 miles. Eleven hailed from Magdeburg. For Conrad, from Bad Wimpfen, there are 87 students at Leipzig in the database. Thirty-four were from towns within 90 miles of Conrad's home; twenty-six were from towns within 60 miles. Even with the underlying affiliation in the nation, the significant numbers of proximate students suggest a selection based partly on geography.
10
STEVEN J. LIVESEY
hometown.29 At Paris, of the 30 students of Marsilius of Inghen whose origins are identifiable, 26 were within 75 kilometers of Nijmegen, as was the home of his own master, Wilhelmus Buser de Huesden.30 For the most part, the commentators in the database enjoyed favorable positions within the Church. One hundred and twenty-eight are known to have received a canonry during their lifetimes. Of these, fourteen were men who subsequently entered religious orders and thereupon resigned their positions in the cathedral. Consequently, of the 257 commentators who remained seculars throughout their lifetime, 114 (44%) became canons, and several enjoyed multiple appointments over the course of their ecclesiastical careers.31 One hundred and seven commentators became bishops during their lifetimes, of which 83 were regular clergy.32 Thirty-three became arch-
29 We have data only for a relatively thin segment of Henry's career. He was apparently master of arts and proctor of the English Nation at Paris in 1356—57 and served as examinator in 1357-58 [ACUP 1.195, 203, 209, 211, 225]; in 1362 the University petitioned for a canonry and prebend in St. Mary's, Erfurt [Overmann 2(1929) 268 no. 552]. In 1367 he appears in Prague as Vice-Rector, then Rector in 1368, and Dean of Arts in 1369, at sometime before which he was also a bachelor of theology \Liber Decanorum 1.18, 133, 137; Josef Tfiska, zuotopisny slovnik pfedhusitske Prazke University 1348-1409 (Repertorium biographicum Universitatis Pragensis praehussiticae 1348-1409). Prague: Universitas Carolina 1981. p. 150]. During this period he was also canon of St. Peter's, Mainz (1367), subdeacon, Worms (1369), and canon, Worms (1369 until at least 1371). For these brief periods, he is known to have had 23 students, of which 21 are identifiable. Those from his home region included students from Arnstadt, Hildesheim, Miihlhausen (Thiiringen), Nordhausen, Osnabruck, and Schleusingen. 30 ACUP 1.294-512. As Jacques Verger notes ["Patterns," in A History of the University in Europe, v. 1: Universities in the Middle Ages, ed. H. De Ridder-Symoens. Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1992. pp. 35-74 at 40], universities tended to recruit students from distinct catchment areas. But the origins of the students discussed here also suggest that the catchment area was reduced further among individual masters. Such restricted recruitment, however, had limits. Although the vast majority of Marsilius' students was from the Low Countries and far western Germany, in 1369-71 he had students from Sweden, Kolobrzeg and Boisville-la-St.-Pere. 31 These 114 seculars were appointed to 216 canonries, and average of nearly two. Among the most prolific receivers were Conrad de Susato (10), Pierre d'Ailly (9), Conrad de Soltau (7), and Thomas de Strampino (6). As one might expect, both from the expansion of benefices and the increased survival in the historical record, the database records a significant increase in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries: from 41 recorded before 1300, the number increases to 103 in the fourteenth century and 119 in the fifteenth century. 32 Among these, Franciscans and Carmelites each numbered 21, Dominicans 19, and Augustinians 15. Within the population as a whole, several obtained successive sees during their lifetimes: Jacobus de Teramo (4), Benedictus Tancredi Perusinus (4), Angelus de Camerino (4), Durand de St. Pourcain (3), Pierre d'Ailly (3), Dominicus de Cremona (3), and Petrus de Candia (3).
LOMBARDUS ELECTRONICUS
11
bishops, of which 27 were regular clergy.33 There were 36 cardinals of all ranks among the cohort of commentators, of which 24 were regulars.34 Four became pope.35 Within their own orders, 121 are recorded as having served as prior conventualis or guardian, 171 as prior or minister provincialis, and 34 as prior or minister generalis.36 While theologians may have complained about the lucrative prospects of their colleagues in law and medicine, there were similar rewards for the most accomplished within their own ranks.37 Of course, the central—indeed, denning—focus of the database is the table that collects information about the texts produced by this pool of authors. Because this table attempts to assemble and correct information from Stegmiiller, the subsequent studies that augmented the Repertorium., and the many individual accounts of commentators and their texts before and since 1949, it may in one sense be a retrospective compilation of the Sentential tradition. However, it both falls short of a new Repertorium and goes beyond it. Unlike the Repertorium, it does not attempt to collect information about every manuscript copy of commentaries on the Sentences, nor does it give incipits for each book in the commentary, as Stegmiiller frequently did. Aside from issues of scale and economy, the reason for this shift in focus was that the database was designed primarily as a biographical tool, and hence the table presents the commentator's Nachlass rather than an exhaustive list of manuscript and printed
33 Here the Franciscans maintained their lead with 11, followed by the Augustinians (7), and Dominicans (6); the Carmelites, so prominent among the regular bishops, achieved one. Among those translated from one archiepiscopal see to another were Robert de Waldby, Petrus Rogerii de Malomonte, and Jacobus Capocci de Viterbio. 34 Including 10 Dominicans, 9 Franciscans, and 2 Augustinians. 35 Hadrian VI, Alexander V, Innocent V, Clement VI. Innocent III, included by Stegmuller (397,1) for his Summa sacramentorum, is not included here because the work has been reclassified for the purpose of the database as a theological work, but not Sentential; most historians of canon law now reject that "magister Rolandus" who wrote a Sententiae is identical to Rolandus Bandinelli (= Pope Alexander III). 36 Clearly, the relative numbers here reflect greater survival of records for positions of greater responsibility. While the database also records appointments to lower orders, in most cases the survival of such details is fragmentary. 3/ Peter Moraw, "Careers of Graduates," A History of the University in Europe, v. 1: Universities in the Middle Ages, ed. H. De Ridder-Symoens. Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1992. pp. 257-258; James A. Brundage, "From Classroom to Courtroom: Parisian Canonists and their Careers," ^eitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fur Rechtsgeschichte. Kanonistische Abteilung 114 (1997), 342~361 at 345ff. While it is certainly true that jurists did quite well in the acquisition of benefices, the same appears to be true among graduates of theology, although their faculty tended to be considerably smaller.
12
STEVEN J. LIVESEY
survivors of the text. On the other hand, it does attempt to distinguish versions or revisions of texts as separate records in this table; so, for example, Nicolaus de Dinkelspuhl's Quaestiones communes are distinguished from the Quaestiones magistrates and the Lectura Mellicensis. And while no attempt has been made to provide a list of all manuscript witnesses, each record contains a bibliographical field in which the goal has been to provide references that lead the user to relevant sources where manuscript sources are collected. When texts have had little or no modern examination, this bibliographic field presents manuscript references.38 Like all tables in the database, the text table contains fields that make possible searching and sorting texts by several criteria. Each record contains an index field that classifies the text within several medieval literary genres. Like the other biographical tables, the text table stores multiple date fields that allow one to focus on texts written within a range of dates. Geographical fields permit one to sort texts by locations of composition. And an incipit field assists in identification of otherwise anonymous or unidentified texts. By joining tables and clearly specifying search conditions, one can winnow the 20,000 texts in the database to find a subset that meets specific conditions reflected in the biography of the author. One can also distinguish between texts incontestably attributed to authors and those for which there is some doubt about authorship. I have also retained in this table some works that have been shown to be misattributions, in part to serve as a corrective for earlier studies. Each category is distinguished by a special symbol in the record, so that one can omit spurious works from an analysis of the data. There are at present 1166 commentaries on the Sentences recorded in the database, for which the attribution to the specified author is attested on certain or probable grounds. For some 635 of these, the records specify the location where the commentary was produced. However, this underrepresents the information regarding place, because in general I have not placed arbitrary or conjectural information in fields without explicit references as evidence. If, however, we look to the table that stores information about the commentators' edu-
38 Among the nearly 20,000 records of texts at present, several thousands contain references to manuscript witnesses to the text in the record, including the major national libraries of most European countries, as well as prominent university, cathedral and other ecclesiastical libraries.
LOMBARDUS ELECTRONICUS
13
cational careers, we find that 83 additional commentators are recorded as sententiarius or baccalaurius Sententiarius with an associated place, making it possible to say something about the place of origin of perhaps 718 commentaries on the Sentences. Owing to the preeminence of its theological faculty and probably the incomplete survival in the historical record, it is perhaps not surprising that 290 (slightly more than 40%) of these were associated with Paris. Furthermore, Oxford was responsible for 76 (about 10.6%), Krakow 56 (7.8%), and Vienna 50 (7.0%). The remaining third derived from a large array of locations, with none commanding more than 4%. The cohort of commentators on the Sentences produced a total of 12,863 texts for which the attribution is incontestable or probable. Of these, sermons or sermon collections constituted the largest share (1829 or 14.2%), followed by commentaries on the Bible (1739 or 13.5%), and theological works besides commentaries on the Bible and the Sentences (1628 or 12.7%), while the 1166 commentaries on the Sentences constituted only 9.1% of the total. Without doubt, these counts of texts must be only a gross and highly inaccurate assessment of medieval productivity, for a variety of reasons. Any such assessment is based on the contingencies of historical survival, for even though the texts recorded in the database reflect both what is extant and the historical reports of each author's production, both witnesses are certainly incomplete and vary in quality from one author to another. Furthermore, what counts as a unit of authorship varies in a culture like that of the Middle Ages, where parts of texts become detached from the original, only to become independent texts, on some occasions overstating an author's production, on others understating it.39 Be that as it may, while aggregate numbers of texts are probably not good indicators of productivity because of the different ways texts have survived and are thus counted in the database, comparisons between the relative proportions may reduce these factors and produce some- interesting results. We may look, for example, at three 39 For a more complete discussion of this problem and its application to the database, see my "Unique Manuscripts and Medieval Productivity: How Shall We Count?" in Computing Techniques and the History of Universities, ed. Peter Denley [Halbgraue Reihe zur historischen Fachinformatik A30]. St. Katharinen: Scripta Mercaturae Verlag 1996. pp. 65-85, and "De vitis illustribus et mediocribus: A Biographical Database of Franciscan Commentators on Aristotle and Peter Lombard's Sentences" Franciscan Studies 56 (1998), 203-237, esp. 213-215.
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STEVEN J. LIVESEY
subsets of commentators: (1) 669 authors who commented on the Sentences, but not Aristotle's works; (2) 216 authors who commented on both the Sentences and at least one of Aristotle's works; and for comparison (3) 639 authors who commented on Aristotle, but not the Sentences. Each of the three groups taken as a whole composed approximately the same total number of texts, suggesting at first glance that those whose interests spanned both Aristotle and the Sentences were more productive. Yet it appears that this too may be explained by discrepancies in historical survival. We know more about this middle group: we are nearly twice as likely to know something about the educational background or ecclesiastical positions of those who commented on both sets of texts as those whose authorship is limited to one.40 The rather significant levels of membership in religious orders may have some bearing on this, because of the early and sustained interest among the orders in preserving the biographical details of their members. But as we have seen, membership in religious orders extended across all the commentators on the Sentences*1 so that additional factors affecting historical preservation are clearly at work. In the final analysis, it may simply be that commentators whose production included both Aristotle and the Sentences were more likely to be active in a variety of areas. Among the categories of texts preserved, it is perhaps not surprising to find that commentators on the Sentences, particularly those in the first, exclusive category, were significantly more inclined to have produced commentaries on the Bible, sermon literature, and other theological works as well. Once again, this very likely results from the heavy representation of members in religious orders, although those in the middle group who commented on both Aristotle and the Sentences seem to have produced disproportionately more spiritual or meditative works. The same is surely true for the disproportionate production of polemical works, either the result of the theological controversies of the Late Middle Ages, or the internal controversies among the mendicants; in either case, they seem to
40 The three categories of commentators generates the following number of educational records: 3067, 1797, 3045; ecclesiastical records: 1396, 625, 941. 41 Among commentators on both Aristotle and the Sentences, 152 (70.4%) were members of religious orders; 480 (71.7%) of the commentators on the Sentences only were members of orders; while only 166 (26.0%) of the commentators on only Aristotle were members of orders.
LOMBAKDUS ELECTROMICUS
15
have left their philosophical colleagues far behind in this category. Commentators on the Sentences also seem to have left significantly more quaestiones disputatae and quaestiones de quolibet than those who commented exclusively on Aristotle.42 If we look at the preferences for particular Aristotelian works by those who commented on the Sentences and those who did not, we find that the former seem to have preferred the Physics, Metaphysics, Ethics, and Politics, rather than several of Aristotle's logical works (especially the Posterior Analytics, the Categories, and the Prior Analytics] and Porphyry's Isagoge. Although this observation must be tempered by the relatively small number of texts and the fact that commentators continued to read across the spectrum of Aristotle's corpus, it may be an additional factor in the discussion of the philosophical or logical orientation of the use of analytical languages to pursue theological and philosophical issues.43 This initial attempt at describing the population of commentators on the Sentences provides some surprising contrasts. While most sprang from rather ordinary backgrounds, they lived, on the whole, longer and more successful lives than the general population of the period. Within the elite institution of the university, they frequently came to assume positions of leadership and influence that continued to follow
42 The reasons for this discrepancy are not entirely clear. The database does not distinguish between quaestiones created in the arts or theological faculty, although the 'titles' or incipits often give an indication of their orientation. While both disputationes ordinariae and de quolibet were held at regular intervals in both faculties, quodlibets seem to have developed later and occurred much less frequently, that is, consistent with the reduced position in the database. After 1334, written quodlibeta almost disappear from the faculty of theology, while they continue in use in arts. This seems to be almost opposite the data suggested here, and demands further investigation. See Brian Lawn, Rise and decline of the scholastic Quaestio disputata: with special emphasis on its use in the teaching of medicine and science. Leiden: E. J. Brill 1993. pp. 13-17; P. Glorieux, La litterature quodlibetique. 2 vols. Paris: Vrin 1925, 1935. 1.57. 43 See especially John Murdoch, "The Analytic Character of Late Medieval Learning: Natural Philosophy without Nature," Approaches to Nature in the Middle Ages, ed. Lawrence Roberts (Binghamton, NY 1984) 171-213, at 196-197. Murdoch himself notes that the Physics was more popular among Oxford readers than Paris commentators, by a proportion of two to one. By applying queries involving geographical place and time to related tables of texts, one could investigate similar preferences for other university sites and among other Aristotelian works. While I have not undertaken a precise count, a cursory look at indexes of auctoritates in commentaries on the Sentences suggests modo grosso a similar emphasis: with the exception of prologues (where issues of scientia were discussed via references to the Posterior Analytics], citations tended to reflect the Physics, Metaphysics, Ethics, and De anima more than the logical works.
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STEVEN J. LIVESEY
them when they left academic pursuits for careers in the Church or State. And while in pursuit of their careers they moved frequently between university and ecclesiastical centers of Europe, they often retained surprisingly local ties through their masters and students. In many respects, they are a remarkably diverse cohort. This diversity extends to the defining criteria of the cohort, the writings they produced. Stegmiiller's original Repertorium, like the many subsequent collective and individual studies, tended to focus on single products of medieval authors. In the final analysis, however, the distribution of categories of texts suggests that authors in these groups were remarkably diverse in their interests. None of the categories surveyed in the database came to dominate the field. Even when all of Aristotle's works are collapsed into a single category of texts, the collective picture remains that no category exceeded 30% of the total.44 While they may have expressed individual preferences for particular texts, they also read and wrote widely across the disciplines in which they were engaged. In retrospect, this is hardly surprising. Students who commented on the Sentences while pursuing a theological degree could hardly afford to specialize too narrowly in a single field. As Francesco del Punta has suggested recently, the medieval scholastic commentary was a genre that embraced a conception of knowledge that extended to all domains—theology, philosophy, law, literature, grammar—both in its form and its content.45 The mental acuity that scholastic education sought to cultivate was enhanced by the exposure to this diverse literature. Judging from the success of the population surveyed by the database, diversity paid dividends in the Late Middle Ages.
44
See Table 1: among commentators on Aristotle but not the Sentences—that is, a pool of authors that self-selects this category of texts—it comprised only 28.12%. Among commentators on the Sentences (including those who commented on Aristotle) the figure drops to 6.78% [Table 3]. For virtually all categories and all pools of commentators, the maximum is under 15%. 45 Francesco del Punta, "The Genre of Commentaries in the Middle Ages and its Relation to the Nature and Originality of Medieval Thought," Was ist Philosophic im Mittelalter. Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses fiir mittelalterliche Philosophic der Societe Internationale pour I'Etude de la Philosophic Medievale 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt, ed. Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1998. pp. 138-151, esp. 144-145.
Table 1 : Selected Text Categories for Populations of Commentators1 Text Category
Commentaries on Aristotle Biblia Sacra Sermones Other Theological Works Commentaries on Sentences Quaestiones disputatae2 Ecclesiastical works Spiritual Works Epistolae Polemical works Quaestiones de quolibet Misc. Philosophical Works Other Text Categories
1 2
Commentators on the Sentences but not Aristotle (6190 Texts)
Commentators on both Aristotle and the Sentences (6283 Texts)
Commentators on Aristotle but not the Sentences (6280 Texts)
Number of Texts
Percent of Total
Number of Texts
Percent of Total
Number of Texts
Percent of Total
N/A
N/A
872
13.88
1766
28.12
1070 1030 872
17.29 16.64 14.09
619 771 686
9.95 12.27 10.92
318 350 326
5.06 5.57 5.19
796
12.86
366
5.83
N/A
N/A
395
6.38
408
6.49
211
3.36
237
3.83
154
2.45
43
0.68
223 223 192 156
3.60 3.60 3.10 2.52
327 287 214 178
5.20 4.57 3.41 2.83
122 741 54 59
1.94 11.80 0.86 0.94
127
2.05
143
2.28
158
2.52
869
14.04
1258
20.02
2132
33.95
Discrepancies in totals arise because of inclusion of non-authentic texts stored in database. Includes texts distinguished as quaestiones ordinariae.
Table 2: Selected Categories of Aristotle Commentaries for Populations of Commentators Text Category
Physics De anima Metaphysics Ethica Analytica Posteriora Perihermenias Categories De generatione et corruptione Porphyry, Isagoge De caelo et mundo Politica Meteorologica Analytica priora De sophisticis elenchis Topica Other Texts
Commentators on both Aristotle and the Sentences (872 Texts)
Commentators on Aristotle but not the Sentences (1766 Texts)
Number of Texts
Percent of Total
Number of Texts
105 83 75 67 42 39 38 36
12.04 9.52
162 152 106 86 110 89
35 30 25 25 24
4.01 3.44 2.87 2.87 2.75 2.52 1.83 24.08
22 16 210
8.60 7.68 4.82 4.47 4.36 4.13
Percent of Total
105 62
9.17 8.61 6.00 4.87 6.23 5.04 5.95 3.51
94 60 27 66 79 57 47 464
5.32 3.40 1.53 3.73 4.47 3.23 2.66 26.27
Table 3: Selected Text Categories for Combined Populations of Commentators on the Sentences and Aristotle's Works Text Category
Sermones Biblia Sacra Other Theological Works Commentaries on Sentences Commentaries on Aristotle Quaestiones disputatae3 Spiritual works Epistolae Polemical works Ecclesiastical Works Quaestiones de quolibet Misc. Philosophical Works Other Text Categories
3
Commentators on the Sentences (12,863 Texts)
Commentators on Aristotle (12,563 Texts)
Number of Texts
Percent of Total
Number of Texts
Percent of Total
1829 1739 1628
14.22 13.52 12.66
1121 937 1012
8.92 7.46 8.06
1166
9.06
363
2.89
872
6.78
2638
21.00
812 572 515 416 399 349 279
6.31 4.45 4.00 3.23 3.10 2.71 2.17
619 449 1028 268 197 237 301
4.93 3.57 8.18 2.13 1.57 1.88 2.40
3392
27.00
2287
Includes texts distinguished as quaestiones ordinariae.
17.78
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STEVEN J. LIVESEY
Arnoldus Woestefeldes* Student/Master Origins
•
Arnoldus Woestefeldes' Masters' Birthplaces
8 University of Leipzig * Arnoldus Woestefeldes' Birthplace Arnoldus Woestefeldes' Students' Birthplaces ( 83 Students, 42 Distinct Locations) ° 0-2.4% o 2.4-6% o 6 - 9.6%
* I wish to thank Dr. May Yuan and Ms. Aimee Coins, Department of Geography, The University of Oklahoma, for their assistance in creating these maps in Arc View.
LOMBARDUS ELECTROMCUS
Conradus Wimpina Student/Master Origins
• Conradus Wimpina's Master's Birthplace 8 University of Leipzig * Conradus Wimpina's Birthplace Conradus Wimpina's Students' Birthplaces (87 Students, 62 Distinct Locations)
- 0 - 1.3% o 1.3-3.6% O 3.6-6.1%
21
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STEVEN J. LIVESEY
Magnus Hund de Magdeburg Student/Master Origins
• Magnus Hund de Magdeburg's Masters' Birthplaces » University of Leipzig * Magnus Hund de Magdeburg's Birthplace Magnus Hund de Magdeburg's Students' Birthplaces (90 Students, 49 Distinct Locations) ° 0-2% o 2-8% O 8-12%
LOMRARDUS
ELECTRONICUS
Marsilius de Inghen Student/Master Origins
• Marsilius de Inghen's Masters' Birthplaces & University of Paris * Marsilius de Inghen's Birthplace Marsilius de Inghen's Students' Birthplaces (28 Students, 20 Distinct Locations) o 0-4% o 4-8% o 8-19%
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DIE SENTENZEN DES PETRUS LOMBARDUS IN DER DISKUSSION SEINER SCHULE L. Hodl
Die Sentenzenbiicher des Petrus Lombardus waren Schul- und Lehrbuch der Theologie im ganzen Mittelalter (vom 12.-16. Jh.), und zwar nicht auf Grund einer hoheren, von auBen kommenden Verordnung, sondern auf dem Weg der lebendigen Tradition und Rezeption. Diese groBe literarische Geschichte begann in der Domschule von Paris, deren Lehrer Petrus Lombardus schon vor 1144 geworden war und bis zu seiner Ernennung zum Bischof von Paris (1159) auch blieb. Wie andere Magister der Theologie schrieb auch er fur seine Studenten ein Textbuch der Vatersentenzen, in dem er die Themen der Theologie in einer systematischen Ordnung zur Sprache brachte, diskutierte und fur den Dienst der Kleriker auslegte. Dieses Textbuch ist weder literarisch noch sachlich einmalig, darum muB nach den Griinden seines ausnehmenden literarischen Geschickes gefragt werden. Die Geschichte eines Buches ist Geistesgeschichte, deren Entwicklung ebenso von den auBeren zeitgeschichtlichen Bedingungen beeinfluBt ist, wie auch und gerade vom zeitbedingten Geschick seiner Rezeption durch Lehrer und Schuler. Die Schul- und Bildungsgeschichte in der ersten Halfte des 12. Jahrhunderts in Paris war dieser Rezeptionsgeschichte ebenso forderlich wie die Geschichte der Lehrer und Gelehrten in diesen Schulen. Unter dem Titel "Aufbruch—Wandel—Erneuerung. Beitrage zur 'Renaissance' des 12. Jahrhunderts"1 wurden jiingst Wege und Ziele der Bildungsgeschichte beschrieben, die ganz wesentlich immer auch von den Lehrenden und Lernenden der Zeit bestimmt ist. In der Pariser Domschule brachten zwei Gelehrte die Sentenzenbiicher zu bleibendem Ansehen: Petrus Comestor und Odo von Ourscamp. Die Lektiire der Sentenzen durch den ersteren und die Diskussion derselben durch den anderen gaben der Geschichte der Sentenzenbucher den Charakter eines Neuanfangs,
1
Hrsg. von G. Wieland (9. Blaubeuer Symposion vom 9 bis 11 Oktober 1992) Stuttgart 1994.
26
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eines literarischen und wissenschaftlichen Anfangens, das den Fortgang aus sich heraus bestimmte. Um es mit M. Heidegger zu sageii: was groB begonnen hat, kommt auch groB voran und zur Vollendung. Lectio und disputatio lieBen die Sentenzenbiicher nicht veralten; sie verliehen der littera immer aufs neue Geist und Kraft.
1. Die Lektiire der Sentenzenbiicher in der Pariser Domschule Der umfangreiche Prolog zu den Sentenzenbuchern in der sogenannten Ps. Poitiers-Glosse ist die erste literaturgeschichtliche Erorterung des Schulbuches des Lombarden. Leider wurde dieser Prolog in 2 Teilen publiziert und hat noch keine umfassende Analyse erfahren.2 Dieser Prolog ist bereits die Frucht des intensiven Umgangs mit dem Text. In der Bamberger Uberlieferung steht der Prolog am Rand der Glosse,3 d.h. er wurde spater angefiigt. Sachlich und sprachlich verrat er die Denk- und Ausdrucksweise des Petrus Comestor, der Schiller und Nachfolger des Petrus Lombardus in der Domschule war und von 1168 an deren Kanzler. GroBe und Grenze der theologischen Forschung werden in das Gleichnislicht der biblischen Erzahlung vom Aufstieg des Moses auf den Berg der Offenbarung (Ex. 19,21. 24; 24, 1. 18; 32, 15. 17) geriickt. Der Autor der "Historia Scholastica" (1169/73) hat diese biblische Geschichte, unbekummert um die verwirrende Quellenlage der Textkapitel in der Bibel, in einem einheitlichen, durchsichtigen Geschehenszusammenhang dargestellt.4 Aaron und die Altesten des Volkes durften nur bis an den Berg der Offenbarung herantreten und bei Lebensgefahr diese Grenze nicht iibersteigen. Allein Moses bestieg den Gipfel des Berges in der Gottesbegegnung und empfing dort die Offenbarung. Da die Riickkehr des Moses lange auf sich warten lieB, wurden Fiihrer und Volk des Wartens miide und kehrten ins Lager zuriick, nur Josue, der Diener des Moses, hielt in der Erwartung der Ruckkunft seines Herrn an der Grenze aus.5 2 R.-M. Martin, Note sur 1'oeuvre litteraire de Pierre le Mangeur, in: Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale 3, 1931, 63—64; D. O. Lottin, Le prologue des Gloses sur les Sentences attributes . . . Pierre de Poitiers, ebd. 7, 1935, 70—73. 3 Cod.lat. Patr. 128, Staatl. Bibliothek Bamberg, fol. 27ra-29ra (Sigle B). 4 Vgl. Historia scholastica. Historia libri Exodi, PL 198, 1169; vgl. Bibliorum sacrorum Glossa ordinaria, Tom. I, Venedig 1603, 663, 722. 5 Prolog "Surnma divine pagine" ed. R.-M. Martin (Anm. 2), 63.
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Diese Geschichte des Aufstiegs zur Gottesoffenbarung wurde in der Vatertheologie (z.B. von Gregor von Nyssa) haufig "mystice", in geistlicher Sinngebimg gelesen und als Wegfiihrung im Glauben erklart. Der Prolog zur Ps. Poitiers-Glosse analysiert den Weg der theologischen Forschung. Trager der Offenbarung sind allein Jesus Christus und seine Apostel. Die Theologen mussen die ihnen vorgegebenen Grenzen wahren und im eifrigen Studium der Heiligen Schrift aushalten. Viele aber kehren ihr den Rucken, weil sie ob der Fulle dieser Schriften an ihrer Kraft zweifeln, und gehen zu "den anderen Fakultaten". Auch solche sind, die den irdischen Geschaften obliegen und von der HI. Schrift nichts erwarten. Ferner sind darunter auch solche, welche die Grenzen der Uberlieferung iiberschreiten: die "haeretici", "blasphemi".6 Diese alle brauchen das Lehrbuch des Magisters, das die Furchtsamen anruft, die Faulen anfordert und die Haretiker zurechtweist. Diese Skizze der Addressaten, der Horer und Leser der Sentenzenbiicher, ist hochst bemerkenswert, denn sie zeigt, daB sich die Theologen als "facultas" verstehen neben den anderen Fakultatem.7 Zu diesen "ceterae facultates" zahlen sicher die "artes liberales", moglicherweise aber auch die Juristen. Die "Universitas" gewann also bereits in der 2. Halfte des 12. Jahrhunderts Gestalt. Das Selbstverstandnis der Theologie, das sich in ihrem Schulbuch spiegelt, gewinnt feste Formen. Indem die "studiosi doctores sacre scripture" klare Vorstellungen liber das Studium der Theologie entwickeln, ist Theologie nicht mehr Sache der singularen Begabung und der besonderen Spiritualitat, sondern methodisch gesichertes Lehren und Lernen. Ein Schul- und Lehrbuch ist dann die unabdingbare Voraussetzung dieser "facultas". Das Textbuch ersetzt nicht den Lehrer, im Gegenteil, die Schule braucht allererst den Lehrer. In der Ps.Poitiers-Glosse zu I d. 1 wird das Unterscheidende der scholastischen Theologie vom "doctor scholasticus" her bestimmt, d.h. von der Methode des Denkens und Lehrens.8 Die Bestimmung "scholastisch" betrifft also primar die Methode des dialektischen, argumentativen Lehrens. Die Schule ist
6
Ebd. 64. Im Prolog ed. D. O. Lottin p. 71 wird "facultas" auch in der Bedeutung von Vermogen verwendet. Vgl. B. Geyer, Facultas theologica. Eine bedeutungsgeschichtliche Untersuchung, in: Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte 1964, 133-145. 8 Cod. B. fol. 28ra: "Satis redolet loquendi modus doctorem scolasticum." 7
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darum im mittelalterlichen Verstandnis nicht eine Einrichtung, ein Bildungsinstitut, sondern die (korporative) Gemeinschaft der Magister und der Scholaren. Die Sentenzenbucher des Lombarden wurden auch nach dessen Ernennung zum Bischof von Paris in der Domschule weitergefuhrt. In dem wohl zu Unrecht Prapositinus zuerkannten Traktat uber das "peccatum originale" wird berichtet, daB Mauritius von Sully, Magister und Archidiakon in Paris und seit 1160 (als Nachfolger des Petrus Lombardus) Bischof, durch viele Bitten und Uberredungen angehalten wurde, sich den "opera Lombardi", und also auch dessen Sentenzenbiichern, zu widmen.9 Was neuerdings tiber die Ursunde gelehrt wurde, konnte er selber nicht bestatigen; aber die Magister Petrus (Comestor oder P. von Poitiers) und Walter, Magister und Kanoniker von Notre-Dame, lehrten nichts anderes, als was in den Sentenzen des Lombarden geschrieben steht. Fur sie gilt die "sententiarum Lumbardi auctoritas".10 "Sententiae" sind nun nicht mehr einfach die Vatersentenzen, sondern die des Lombarden. Diese umfassen zwar auch in uberwaltigender Fiille die Lehrsatze der Vater, aber in der Ordnung, Auslegung und Diskussion des Petrus Lombardus. Er verlieh ihnen eine neue, seine "auctoritas", indem er sie neu zur Sprache, zur Diskussion und zur Erkenntnis brachte. Die Ps.Poitiers-Glosse hat die scholastische Methode des Petrus sehr prazis und zutreffend von der Augustins und der Vater abgehoben. Zum 1. Kapitel der Sententiae, in dem Augustins Unterscheidung von "res" und "signa" aus dessen Schrift "De doctrina Christiana" vorgestellt wird,11 bemerkt die Glosse, daB das Verhaltnis von "res" und "signa" in der dialektisch belehrten Theologie anders ist, als Augustin und die Vater es verstanden. Fur diese waren alle "res" der Schopfungs- und Heilsgeschichte offen fur die durch sie bezeichnete, bleibende Wahrheit. Logik und Dialektik gehen aber von den Zeichen aus und gelangen im ProzeB des begrifflich angestrengten Denkens zur wahren und wirklichen Sache.12
9
Vgl. O. Lottin, Un traite de l'ecole porretaine attribue faussement. . . Prevostin du Cremone. Psychologic et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siecles, Bd. VI, Gembloux 1960, 19-20. 10 I. Brady, Peter Manducator and the oral Teachings of Peter Lombard, in: Antonianum 41, 1966, 454-490. 11 Sent. I, d.l, c.l, ed. Rom 1971, 55. 12 Ps.Poitiers-Glosse, Sent I, d.l, c.l, Cod. B. fol. 29ra: "Nonnulla tamen est differentia inter theologiae signa et liberalium artium significantia: in illis enim voces
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In der Symboltheologie der Vater kann jede Sache und Tat-Sache zum offenbarenden Zeichen der Erkenntnis werden; in der dialektischen Theologie miissen Sprache und Ausdruck, Sinn und Bedeutung kritisch erfragt und begrundet werden. Diese dialektische Sprachregelung ist aber nicht nur eine Frage der Ausdrucksweise, sondern der wahren und wirklichen Erkenntis. Kein anderer Traktat der Theologie war fur diese Kritik der reinen Sprache empfanglicher als die Gottes- und Trinitatslehre, in welcher die standigen Kontroversen die korrekte, dogmatische Ausdrucksweise verlangten. Weil die liturgischen, hymnischen Texte nicht dieser Regelung folgten, gaben sie der dialektischen Theologie diese kritischen Ruckfragen auf. In den wechselnden Strophen ruhmen die Texte des "Gloria" und des "Te Deum" der Romischen Liturgie Gott als den Vater und diesen als den einen und wahren Gott, den eingeborenen Sohn und den Heiligen Geist als wesensgleich. Ist aber diese Sprechweise: ".. . solus Pater est Deus. .. Pater est solus Deus ..." im Sinne der Aussagelogik korrekt und legitim.13 MuB es nicht vielmehr heiBen: Vater, Sohn und Heiliger Geist ist der eine Gott; diese Trinitas heiBt allein Gott.14 In den altkirchlichen Auseinandersetzungen mit den Irrlehren des Anus und des Sabellius muBte diese Sprachregelung wiederholt kritisch gepriift werden. Im AnschluB an Augustins Ausfuhrungen gegen den arianischen Bischof Maximinus hielt auch Petrus Lombardus am Bekenntnis fest: der Vater ist der eine und wahre Gott. Man konne aber nicht sagen: der Vater ist allein Gott.15 Des Lombarden "socius", Kollege, Magister Odo war anderer Meinung, wie die Ps. Poitiers-Glosse berichtet. "Der Vater ist allein Gott! bedeutet nichts anderes als: "Der Vater ist der eine Gott!"16 Zum rechten Verstandnis muB man aber bedenken, daB das Pradikat "est solus Deus" analytisch das Subjekt betrifft und keine erganzende oder erweiternde Bestimmung bedeutet.
significantia, in hac res signa dicuntur. In sacra enim pagina signum dicitur omnis res per quam in ea aliquid significatur, res enim quaelibet tot significationes habere potest, quot habet proprietates intrinsecas vel extrinsecas vel cum alia re convenientias . . .". 13 Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I, d.21, c.2, ed. Rom 1971, 175. 14 Ebd. 15 Ebd. c.2, n.3, ed. 176. 16 Cod. B. fol. 43rb ". . . dicit tamen magister Odo, quod Pater est solus Deus nee est alius sensus quam Pater est unus Deus."
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Die Schuler des Lombarden lieBen aber diese Auslegung nicht gelten. Sie suchten und fanden eine zusatzliche Sentenz in Augustins Schrift gegen Maximinus und fiigten sie dem Sentenzenbuch ein. In der Glosse heiBt es: "Es sei angemerkt, dafi nach der Veroffentlichung dieses Buches an dieser Stelle (d.21, c.2, n.5) eine Beweistelle (auctoritas) Augustins hinzugeschrieben wurde, die bestatigt, daB man es nicht konzedieren konne: 'der Vater sei allein Gott'".17 Mit Recht merkten die Editoren der Sentenzenbiicher des Lombarden an, daB die Frage ofFen bleiben muB, wer diese Erganzung angebracht habe, der Magister oder einer seiner Schiiler.18 Die Auseinandersetzung mit Magister Odo spricht aber dafiir, daB diese Glosse vom Schuler und Nachfolger des Lombarden von Petrus Comestor erganzt wurde, wie noch eingehender zu zeigen ist. An dieser Stelle wird die zeitgeschichtliche komplexe Situation der Ps. Poitiers-Glosse sichtbar. Diese Glosse ist durch die Schuluberlieferung des Petrus Comestor bestens uber die Geschichte der Auslegung der Sentenzen informiert und kennt auch die internen Vorgange. Selbstredend konnte auch Petrus Lombardus bei der wiederholten Lesung und Erklarung der Sentenzen Erganzungen und Korrekturen vornehmen. In der Glosse zu Sent. I, d.5, c.l ist ausdrucklich davon die Rede, daB sich der Magister bei der 2. Vorlesung (traditio) sicherer ausgedriickt habe als bei der ersten, obgleich beide LehrauBerungen giiltig ("catholice") waren.19 In diesen Ausfuhrungen geht es ebenfalls um ein sprachlogisches Problem: "Kami man sagen: 'Der Vater zeugt das gottliche Wesen'."20 Bei der Erorterung des Problems werden auch die Einwande genannt, die gegen die genannte Wendung sprechen. "Sie aber betrefFen den Magister nicht". In der Bamberger Uberlieferung heiBt es aber: ". . . non tangunt Manducatorem."21 Von der Sache her ist der Lombarde gemeint. Die Bamberger Glosse identifiziert aber den Magister, der wiederholt angefuhrt wird, hier an dieser Stelle mit dem Comestor, der Lehrer der Schulergeneration des Lombarden war. Zwei Generationen kommen in den Glossen zu Wort und Petrus
17
18 19 20 21
Ebd. Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I, d.21 c.2, n.5, ed. 176f. (Anmerkung). Ps. Poitiers-Glosse, Sent. I, d.5, c.l, Cod. B. fol. 34rb. Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I, d.5, c.l, n.1-4, ed. 80-81. Cod. B. fol. 34rb.
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Comestor verbindet sie, weil er die Tradition der Schule als deren Magister und Kanzler wahrte. Die Ps.Poitiers-Glosse ist der getreue literarische Spiegel der komplexen Tradition der Domschule bis zu seinem Tode 1187. Wie groB ist sein eigener doktrinarer EinfluB auf diese Tradition? In der Diskussion und in der Auseinandersetzung muBte sie gewahrt und weitergegeben werden. In der 17. Distinktion des 1. Buches, in welcher der Lombarde auch iiber die Identitat und Differenz von Geist und Geistesgnade handelt, wird auch die Frage der Vermehrung und Steigerung der Gnade im Glaubenden erortert.22 Diese kann auch in ihm wachsen und abnehmen, denn die VerheiBung des Geistes ist auch fur den Glaubenden kein leeres Versprechen. Konnte sie nicht mehr oder weniger empfangen werden, schreibt Augustin in der angefuhrten Sentenz aus seinen Vortragen zum Johannes-Evangelium, wie hatte dann Eliseus seinen Meister vor dessen Himmelfahrt bitten konnen: "Der Geist der in dir ist, sei in doppelter Weise in mir" (4 Kg. 2,9).23 In der Domschule von Paris warf dieser Schriftverweis Augustins eine typische Schulfrage auf. Bedeutet diese Bitte des Schulers nicht, daB er im Besitz des Geistes uber seinem Lehrer steht. Dagegen steht doch das Wort Jesu: "Der Schiiler steht nicht iiber seinem Meister" (Mt 10,24). Petrus Comestor hat in der Historia scholastica im AnschluB an die Glossa ordinaria ausfuhrlich diese Frage diskutiert.24 Die Bitte des Prophetenschiilers kann nicht im Sinne der doppelten (gesteigerten) Gnade verstanden werden, sondern im Sinne der zweifach verschiedenen Gnadengabe der Prophetie und der Wundermacht, die selbstredend auch der Meister selber besaB. So steht der Schiiler keineswegs uber dem Meister. Diese Sentenz wurde zusatzlich in das Schulbuch des Lombarden eingetragen, obwohl sie der Augustinussentenz widerspricht.25 Die Ps.Poitiers-Glosse kennt diesen Zusammenhang sehr genau: "ganz offensichtlich widerspricht Augustin dem Ausleger des (4.)
22
Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I d.17, c.5, ed. 146-148. Ebd. 147. 24 Petrus Comestor, Historia scholastica. Historia libri IV Regum, c.2, PL 198, 1387: ". . . 'Obsecro ut fiat spiritus tuus duplex in me. Qui respondit: Rem difncilem postulas, tamen si videris me, quando tollar a te, erit, alioquin non erit'. Spiritum duplicem habuit Elias, id est ad duo, ad prophetiam et ad miracula. Et ad eadem duo fuit spiritus in Eliseo, et ita non petiit 'discipulus esse superior magistrum'". 23 Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 17, c.5 n.6, ed. 147. 23
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Buches der Konige, der am Ende der Glosse, die nach der Veroffentlichung des Buches am Rande angefugt wurde, in dieser Weise sagt. . ,".26 Ganz zu Recht merken die Herausgeber der Sentenzen des Lombarden an: "Diese Anfugung wurde in der Ps. Poitiers-Glosse als authentisch genommen, aber nicht als zutreffend."27 Sie kann also nicht vom Lombarden selber stammen; sein Schuler und Nachfolger, der "Expositor" des Buches der Konige, der Comestor, hat sie nachgetragen und in der Schule diskutiert. Die Schuler und Horer des Petrus Comestor haben diese Diskussion in der Ps.Poitiers-Glosse iiberliefert. 2 Lehrer kommen in ihr (in ungleicher Weise) zu Wort: Petrus Lombardus und Petrus Comestor und 2 Schulergenerationen sind Horer dieser Tradition, die von Schiilern des Comestor in der Ps. Poitiers-Glosse mitgeschrieben wurde. Das Sentenzenbuch erlangte so seine Erstauslegung, seine Glossa ordinaria.
2. Die Disputation der Sentenzen des Lombarden in der Schule des Odo von Ourscamp
In der Schultradition der Sentenzenglossen wird haufig der Name des Odo von Ourscamp erwahnt. Wahrend die Namen der zeitgenossischen Theologen in der Regel anonym bleiben—gelegentlich werden der Manducator und Petrus Abaelard im 1. Buch erwahnt28— wird Magister Odo immer mit Namen genannt: zu Sent. I, d. 1, c.l (ed. 55, Glosse, B. fol. 28va) zweimal mit seiner abweichenden Lehrmeinung zur Frage der rechtfertigenden Kraft der altbundlichen Sakramente; zu d.21, c.2, n.l (ed. 175, Glossa, B. fol. 43rb): "dicit tamen m.(agister) Odo" zur Frage der trinitatstheologischen Ausdrucksweise; zu d.24, c. un., n.l (ed. 187, Glossa, B. fol. 45ra): "tamen m.(agister) Odo plane asserit" zur theologischen Sprachlogik; zu d. 25, c.2, n.4 (ed. 194, Glossa, B. fol. 45vb und 46ra) in 2 Quastionen liber die trinitatstheologische Aussage. Kritischer auBert sich Odo in den Glossen zur Ehelehre des Petrus Lombardus: zu IV d.34, c.3, n.4 (ed. 465f, Glossa, Clm 22288, fol. 90ra): Hoc dixit m.(agister) Odo quod m.(agister) P.(etrus) salva pace
26 27 28
Ps.Poitiers-Glosse, Sent. I d.17, c.6, Cod. B. fol. 41rb. Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I, d.17, c.6, ed. 147 Anm. Ps.Poitiers-Glosse, Cod. B. fol. 34rb und 36rb.
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sua hoc minus circumscripte apposuit. . ."; zu IV, d.38, c.3, n.4 (ed. 483, Anmerkung): "M.(agister) O.(do) voce subobscura et remissa auricularibus suis dixit quod haec solutio falsa est;29 zu IV d.39, c.5, n.2 (ed. 489, Glossa, Clm 22288, fol. 92vb): "Ideo dixit m.(agister) Odo quod hoc decretum datum fuit in alio casu . . .". Ausnehmende literarische Bedeutung erlangte der Magister Odo in den vielfaltigen Quastionensammlungen, die unter seinem Namen handschriftlich iiberliefert sind und deren Authentizitat seit der verdienstvollen Edition durch Kardinal J. B. Pitra noch nicht endgiiltig abgeschlossen werden konnte.30 Einen Uberblick der handschriftlichen Uberlieferung der Quastionen mit Auflistung der Titel vermittelt F. Giusberti in einer postum erschienenen Studie.31 Alle diese Quastionen sind in Reportationes, in Schulernachschriften iiberliefert. In einer Reihe von Quastionen wird neben dem Magister Odo und dem Lombarden ofters ein weiterer "magister noster" erwahnt, der nach den kritischen Analysen von I. Brady, dem Mitarbeiter an der kritischen Edition der Sentenzenbucher des Lombarden, Petrus Comestor ist.32 In den genannten Quastionen findet sich also die namliche Schulsituation wie in der Ps.Poitiers-Glosse, allerdings mit dem Unterschied, daB Magister Odo fuhrende Autoritat ist. Methodisch und thematisch reprasentieren sie die Pariser Domschule in der 2. Halfte des 12. Jahrhunderts. Wer aber ist Magister Odo? A. M. Landgraf wollte auf Grund seiner intensiven handschriftlichen Forschungen den Pariser Magister und Kanzler Odo vom Magister und (spateren) Kardinal Odo von Soisson (von Ourscamp) unterscheiden, weil sich die Odo-Zitate der Ps. Poitiers Glosse in den Quastionen des Odo von Ourscamp nicht verifizieren lassen, jedenfalls nicht im Sinne einer wortlichen Ubereinstimmung.33 Die Glossen und Quastionen sind Schulernachschriften
29
Vgl. Petrus Lombardus, Sent. IV d.38, n.5, ed. 483 Anm. J. B. Card. Pitra, Analecta novissima Spicilegii Solesmensis. Altera continuatio. Tom. II, Paris 1888, 3-187. 31 F. Giusberti, Materials for a Study on twelfth Century Scholasticism. (History of Logic II), Neapel 1982, 111-151. Zu den aufgelisteten Odo-Handschriften kame noch die Hs. 178 des Domgymnasiums in Magdeburg, fol. 73f., auf die mich schon vor vielen Jahren mein Miinchener Lehrer der Palaographie, Herr Prof. Dr. B. BischofF, hingewiesen hat. Leider ist diese Hs, seit dem 2. Weltkrieg verschollen. 32 I. Brady O. F. M., Peter Manducator and the oral Teachings of Peter Lombard, in: Ant. 41, 1966, 454-490. 33 A. M. Landgraf, Zwei Gelehrte aus der Umgebung des Petrus Lombardus, in: Divus Thomas (Freiburg) 11, 1933, 161-175. Die Unterscheidung findet sich auch 30
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und keine authentischen Lehrzeugnisse. Die fruhe schrifdiche Uberlieferung der Pariser Domschule darf nicht nach den spateren Regeln der Schriftlichkeit in der Universitat verstanden werden. Inzwischen aber hat sich die Erkenntnis durchgesetzt: "On a parfois distingu, Odo le chancellier et Odo d'Ourscamp . . . mais il s'agit du menie personage."34 Odo von Soisson war Schuler und Kollege des Petrus Lombardus in der Domschule, 1160—1168 deren Kanzler. 1168 trat er in das Cisterzienserkloster in Ourscamp ein, dessen Abt er bald wurde. Seit 1168 stand er in Korrespondenz mit Papst Alexander III, der ihn 1173 zum Kardinalbischof von Tusculum ernannte. Auch als solcher engagierte er sich in der Theologie der Domschule. Die oben erwahnte Nachricht, Odo habe gegenuber seinen Ratgebern ("auricularibus") geauBert, die Auslegung einer eherechtlichen Bestimmung durch Petrus Lombardus sei falsch ("falsa"), kann sich nur auf den Kardinal beziehen, denn Magister haben in der Regel keine Ratgeber. Und die zweimalige lehramtliche Verurteilung des christologischen Nihilianimus des Petrus Lombardus durch denselben Papst (1170 und 1177),35 konnte ebenfalls in Zusammenhang mit seiner Berufung an die Kurie stehen. Er kannte die "Irrlehre" des Petrus Lombardus aus seiner eigenen Lehrtatigkeit in Paris. Davon spater aber noch mehr! Glossen und Quastionen gehoren im scholastischen Unterricht zusammen wie Materie und Form. Die Sentenzen sind das Materialelement, die Quastionen das Formalelement. Die Texterklarung der Sentenzen fiihrt unausweichlich zur Quaestio; je genauer der Wordaut abgefragt wird, desto dringlicher wird die Befragung des Inhalts, die ihrerseits nach den Regeln der Dialektik zu geschehen hat. Pro und Contra wechseln nun argumentativ ab, das heiBt nicht in gegensatzlichen Vatersentenzen, die interpretativ zu klaren sind. Ein und dieselbe Sentenz muB im Fur und Wider der Denkgrunde entschieden werden, so daB am Ende die Lehrsentenz des Magisters entscheidend ist. In der Domschule und ihrem Unterricht vollzog sich dieser epochale Wandel von der Vatersentenz zum Lehrentscheid des Magisters. Das unzweifelhaft interessanteste theologische Beispiel dieser Lehrentwicklung ist der christologische Nihilianimus, der Streit um die in: A. M. Landgraf, Introduction . . . 1'histoire de la litterature theologique de la scolastique naissante. Ed. franc. A. M. Landry et L.-B. Geiger, Montreal 1973, 157-158. 34 J. Longere, in: Dictionnaire de Spiritualite ascetique et mystique XI, 1982, 628-631. 35 Vgl. H. Denzinger - A. Schonmetzer, Enchiridion Symbolorum. nn.749, 750.
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sprachlogisch korrekte Ausdruckweise des Satzes von der Menschwerdung Gottes. Nicht zuletzt hat gerade dieser Streit auch dem Schulbuch des Lombarden Tiber die Schulgrenzen hinweg Beachtung und EinfluB verschafft. In lib. Ill, d.6, c. 1 wirft der Magister die Frage auf: MuB aus dem Glaubenssatz: "Deus factus est homo" auch gefolgert werden, daB Gott etwas ("aliquid esse") geworden ist.36 Dagegen spricht die zentrale theologische Erkenntnis, daB Gott nicht "ein Etwas" werden kann. Mit aller Leidenschaft, die Theologie und Glaubensuberzeugung aufbieten konnen, wurde diese Frage disputiert, und zwar als Frage des Heiles.37 Wiederholt hat Magister Odo dieses Problem in der Auseinandersetzung mit Petrus Lombardus diskutiert und dessen These verworfen. Die F. Giusberti veroffentlichten Listen der Quastionentitel bezeugen dieses Thema.38 Die oben erwahnte verschollene Hs. 178 des Magdeburger Domgymnasiums fol. 73f. ware fur Odos Argumentation besonders aufschluBreich, wie die von Herrn Prof. Dr. B. BischofT notierten Ausfuhrungen besagen.39 Danach stellte der Magister fest: indem und insofern der Ewige Logos (in der Inkarnation) die menschliche Natur angenommen hat, wurde er nicht zu etwas gemacht ("nee factus est aliquid"). Diese Sprechweise, Gott ware zu etwas gemacht worden, ist in der Tat falsch. So weit ist sich Odo mit seinem Pariser Kollegen einig. In der Menschwerdung ist aber der Logos ein Geschopf, ein kreturlicher Mensch geworden, und also ist er auch etwas. Wenn dieser Ansatz: Christus ist Geschopf, seine Gultigkeit hat, dann mu auch die Folgerung: Er ist etwas, gultig bleiben. Auf dem Hintergrund dieser Diskussion muB man die zweifache Lehrentscheidung Alexander III. sehr kritisch lesen: Sie verurteilt den Satz: "Christus secundum quod est homo, non est aliquid".40 Sie vermeidet also geflissentlich die Aussage uber ein Gemacht-Werden oder Geworden-Sein. Diese lehramtliche Aussage ist sprachlogisch korrekt. Die Aussagen des 36
Petrus Lombardus, Sent. Ill d.6, c.l, ed. 49-50. Kommentar "Totius sacrae scripturae" zu den Paulinen. Rom. 1,3, Cod. Vatic. Ottob. 445, fol. 8va: ". . . quemadmodum enim circa divinitatem Christi errare damnabile est, et circa humanitatem. Quare quicumque in hoc errore sunt, in errore damnabili sunt et sic in mortali. . . Ergo nemo in tali fide descendens salvari potest." Herr DDr. R. Peppermuller, dem ich ein Manuskript dieses Kommentars verdanke, bereitet eine kritische Edition desselben vor. In einer umfangreichen Quastion zu Rom. 1,3 wird die Frage des christologischen Nihilianismus diskutiert, und zwar in Abhangigkeit von den Sentenzen des Lombarden. 38 Vgl. F. Giusberti, Materials. (Anm. 31). S. 124, n.37; S. 131, n. 155. 39 Vgl. Anm. 31. 40 H. Denzinger - A. Schonmetzer, Enchiridion Symbolorum. n.749. 37
36
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Lombarden sind nicht korrekt, zum mindesten miBverstandlich, weil sie Seins- und Werde-Wendungen nicht kritisch unterscheiden. Magister Odo analysisierte die theologischen Satze von der Trinitat und von der Inkarnation streng in aussagelogischer Absicht. Das Pradikat des Satzes—"der Vater ist der eine Got?' oder: "Gott ist Mensch geworden"—darf die Identitat des Subsjekts nicht aufheben und nicht verandern. Gott ist Vater, Sohn und Heiliger Geist in der Einheit und Selbigkeit des Wesens, so daB Vater, Sohn und Heiliger Geist je fur sich und jeder Einzelne der eine Gott ist und in wesenhafter Einheit gleich Gott ist. Der menschliche Gottlogos Jesus Christus ist Gott und Mensch und also auch Geschopf, und zwar als kategorial bestimmtes und bestimmbares Etwas. Eine kurzschliissige und eilfertige theologische Aussage—"Gott kann nicht etwas werden und geworden sein"—ist irrefuhrend. Die Sprachlogik ermittelt und vermittelt zwar nicht die Einsicht in das Geheimnis Gottes und der Geschichte, aber sie bewahrt vor MiBverstandnissen und Fehldeutungen. Solche das Geheimnis bewahrende sprachlogische Aussage muB in der Sprachiibung der Schule gelernt werden. Die Befragung der dogmatischen Satze geschieht in der Quaestio. Glosse und Quaestio lassen sich nicht trennen, selbst wenn die einzelnen Magister unterschiedliche Akzente im Unterricht setzen konnten. Magister Odo war unzweifelhaft an der Domschule der geiibtere Dialektiker. Wenn ihn Clarenbald von Arras im Prolog seines Kommentars zu des Boethius Schrift De Trinitate seinen "lieben Freund" nennt41 und wenn er mit Roland Bandinelli, Papst Alexander III., in kollegialer Beziehung stand, dann ist die Annahme begriindet, daB der Magister in der boethianischen Dialektik grofi geworden ist. Er brachte diese Methode in die Pariser Domschule ein und wandte sie am Schulbuch des Lombarden an, so daB Text und Methode der Auslegung zu einer unauflosbaren Einheit zusammenkamen. Zwei Quastionen aus der Ps. Poitiers-Glosse, die hier anhangsweise veroffentlicht werden, zeigen, daB und wie die beiden literarischen Elemente zusammenffehoren. In den beiden Quastionen aus o '**** der Schultradition des Comestor wird Magister Odo namentlich genannt, nun wieder als Opponent in der Domschule, der sprachlogisch argumentiert und die Sentenzen des Petrus Lombardus dialektisch pruft.
41
Vgl. J. Longere, in: Dictionnaire de Spiritualite XI, 628-631.
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Anhang: 2 Quastionen zu Petrus Lombardus, Sent. / d.25, c.3 in der Ps Poitiers-Glosse.
(God.lat. Patr., Staatl. Bibl. Bamberg 128, fol. 45va-46ra God.lat. VII C 14, Bibl. Naz. Neapel, fol. 15va-16ra) "Quod autem" etc. . . . aliquis . . .gradus, ut una persona sit rnaior alia, sed tola deitas, id est trinitas, id est quaelibet personarum est aequalis alii sui perfectione, quia quaelibet earum perfecta est, ut exceptis vocabulis etc. Intellige hoc esse dictum de nominibus quae ab aeterno Deo conveniunt, quia hoc nomen 'homo' non dicitur de tribus personis, similiter 'missus' et 'datus', secundum quod de Filio et de Spiritu sancto dicuntur, quia non de Patre dicitur, ut ei missionis auctoritas reservetur. Hoc autem nomen 'trinitas' personarum proprietates indicat, non ipsum sibi Patrem. Dicit enim Sabellius trinitatis distinctionem tantum esse in nominibus et eundem dixit modo Patrem. modo Filium, modo Spiritum sanctum, et ita idem sibi Pater erat, quia qui prius fuit Filius, postea fuit Pater et e converse. Nee Pater Filu vel Spiritus Sancti personam aliquando excludit. Dixit enim Sabellius nee Filium nee Spiritum Sanctum esse, quando Pater erat et tres hypostases etc. Ecce duo dicta sunt superius, scilicet quod huiusmodi propositiones: "Deus est tres personae", "Pater est unus Deus" et huiusmodi potius conceduntur ratione negandi quam affirmandi. Secundo dictum est quod hie "Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt tres personae", hoc nomen personae non significat essentiam.
Sunt tamen alii qui de his duobus contradicunt in contrarium opinantes quod huiusmodi propositiones praedictae sunt affirmativae. Hoc modo probare videntur: "Deus est Pater", haec est affirmativa, hoc nullus negat. Similiter et haec "Deus est Filus", et haec "Deus est Spiritus Sanctus". Ergo tres personae affirmative dicuntur de Deo. Sed hoc nomen 'trinitas' significat illas tres personas, et "Deus est trinitas". Ergo trinitas affirmative dicitur de Deo. Sed qua propositione nisi ista "Deus est trinitas". Ergo ista est affirmativa. Item, "Trinitas est Deus". Haec propositio est affirmativa et vera, habet aliquam conversam. Ergo et ilia est affirmativa. Sed haec est eius conversa "Deus est trinitas". Ergo est affirmativa. Item, iste negat "Deum esse trinitatem" et tu ei contradicis. Ergo affirmas "Deum esse trinitatem". Sed qua propositione, nisi ista "Deus est trinitas". Ergo ipsa est affirmativa. Amplius, haec propositio "Deus est trinitas" vel "non est trinitas" habet praedicatum distinctum secundum affirmationem et negationem. Alter istorum
38
L. HODL
concedit praedicatum secundum negationem scilicet quod "Deus non est trinitas", alter secundum affirmationem scilicet quod "Deus est trinitas". Ergo affirmat "Deum esse trinitatem". Sed hoc nulla propositione affirmat nisi ista "Deus est trinitas". Ergo ipsa est affirmativa. Item, idem est "Patrem esse Deum" et "esse unum Deum". Sed affirmative dicitur Deus. Ergo affirmative dicitur unus Deus. Et sic haec propositio est affirmativa "Pater est Deus" et "unus Deus". Item, Sabellius dicit quod "Deus non est tres personae". Ipse negat "Deum esse tres personas". Tu, o catholice, ei contradicis! Ergo affirmas "Deum esse tres personas". Similiter tu negas "Deum esse tres substantias". Arius tibi contradicit, ergo ipse affirmat "Deum esse tres substantias". Ergo haec est affirmativa "Deus est tres substantiae". Hinc oportunitatem insistendi assumunt. Nos autem compendium ex credulitate sumentes dicimus quod et hoc et illud sane dici potest. Tamen magister Odo in hanc partem declinat, scilicet quod praedictae propositiones sint affirmativae et ratione affirmandi concedantur. Quod autem obicitur ei de auctoritate Hilarii,42 nil obest. Verum est enim quod "professio consortii sustulit intelligentiam singularitatis" non negando sed potius ponendo contrarium. Dum enim dico "Deus est tres personae", satis consignifico quod non est tantum una persona. Non tamen haec propositio hoc significat, sicut cum dico "Socrates est rationalis" satis aufero intelligentiam irrationalis, non tamen hoc dicendo dico "Socratem non esse irrationalem".
Item dictum est supra hoc nomen personae non sigmficet essentiam in plurali sed tantum in singular!. Unde cum quaeritur "quid tres", per "quid" non quaeritur ibi de substantia sed de personis vel proprietatibus. Ad hoc ergo sic instant. Vide igitur quod origo quaestionis ex verbis lohannis, ut dicunt, procedit: "Hii, scilicet tres sunt qui testimonium dant in caelo" (1 loh. 5,8) etc. Cum ergo iam haberemus nomina proprietatum et post quaeratur "quid tres", dicunt non quaeri ibi de proprietatibus. Iam enim certificatae erant proprietates per antecedentia vocabula, scilicet Pater, Filius et Spiritus Sanctus. Super vacuum ergo esset de his quaerere. Ut, cum sciam quod iste est Socrates, stultum esset quaerere "Socrates quis est". Sed de substantia communi bene pos-
42 Hilarius, IV De trinitate, n.17, CCL 62, 120; PL 10, 110A-111A; cf. Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I, d.24, c.un., n.5, ed. 188.
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sem quaerere, scilicet "Socrates quid est", scilicet an homo an aliud. Sic de proprietatibus dicunt. Item, dictum est ab Augustino superius quod "Pater est persona", "Filius est persona", "Spiritus Sanctus, est persona", ideo "Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt personae".43 Et oppositum fuit ab eodem Augustino quod eodem modo, quia "Pater est Deus", "Filius est Deus", "Spiritus sanctus est Deus", ideo "Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt tres dii".44 <Et fuit talis solutio, quod non est concedendum quod essent tres dii>,45 quia scriptura contradicit. Similiter nee tres essentiae, nee diversitas in essentia ponatur. Per quod videtur innuisse Augustinus quod, nisi scriptura contradiceret, bene posset concedi quod essent tres dii. Et si hoc concederetur non tamen hoc nomen 'Deus', in plurali mutat significationem, immo significaret essentiam, quia ex significatione nominis pluralis pluralitas in personis ostenderetur, non in essentia. Cum ergo, nisi scriptura contradiceret et nisi diversitas essentiae innueretur, posset concedi quod "Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt tres dii vel essentiae". Et cum hoc nomen 'dii' vel 'essentiae' significaret in plurali essentiam, cur non dicamus quod hoc nomen 'personae' significaret essentiam, cum bene concedamus pluralitatem personarum, quia nee scriptura contradicit, nec ideo diversitas essentiae innuitur. Sane, si bene attendas, satis convenienter instant, nee magister Odo aliquam adhibuit solutionem, quia furtim in illorum labitur opinionem. Item, dictum est superius ab Augustino,46 quod "cum quaeritur 'quid tres', magna prorsus inopia" etc. et ideo necesse fuit aliquod nomen reperiri quo responderetur et inventum est hoc nomen personae, "non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur". Sed secundum nos non laborabat inopia, quia poterat responderi hoc nomen 'trinitas' quod ante fuit inventum quam hoc nomen 'persona', quia hoc nomen 'trinitas' semper catholici tenuerunt. Ita ergo convenienter poterat responderi hoc nomen 'trinitas' sicut hoc nomen 'persona', cum secundum nos idem habeat significare, scilicet proprietates. Videsne qualiter cognitur(?) satis certe subtiliter? Sed secundum eos satis "laborabat inopia humanum eloquium", quia cum quaeritur "Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus quid tres sunt" et pluralitatem personarum per suppositum scilicet per haec tria nomina "Pater, Filius, Spiritus 43 44
Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I, d.23, c.l, ed. 181. Ebd. c.3, ed. 183-184; vgl. Augustinus, De Trinitate VII, c.4, n.8, CCL 50,
258. 45
Cod.lat. VII V 14, Bibl. Naz. Neapel, fol. 16ra. Augustinus, De Trinitate V, c.9 n.10 ed. CCL 50, 217; cf. Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I, d.23, c.l, n.3, ed. 182. 46
40
L. HODL
Sanctus" et identitatem essentia consignificamus 'per quid', quia 'quid' quaerit de substantia. Et ideo necesse fuit invenire aliquod nomen quod hoc totum significaret, scilicet quod et diversitatem personarum innueret et substantiam significaret, quod non faciebat hoc nomen 'trinitas', quia significet proprietates et non essentiam. Necessario igitur repertum fuit hoc nomen personae, quod haec duo faceret, scilicet substantiam significaret et pluralitatem personarum innueret, quod ipsum quidem facit et nullum aliud nomen. Duas quaestiones has superius positas et sufficienter expositas.
Summarium Die Sentenzenbiicher des Petrus Lombardus wurden durch die Ps.PoitiersGlosse als Schul- und Lehrbuch in der Pariser Domschule verwendet. Deren (spaterer) Prolog ist die erste literaturgeschichtliche Wurdigung der Schulbuches. In dieser Glosse vollzog sich ein epochaler Wandel in der Theologie von den Vatersentenzen zur magistralen Sentenz der Schule und foglich zur Wissenschaft der theologischen Fakultat. Glosse und Quaestio sind das doppelte Element der theologischen Methode, welche die Magister Petrus Comestor und Odo von Ourscamp als bleibende Bestimmung der Theologie gel tend machten.
THE SENTENCES COMMENTARY, 1250-1320 GENERAL TRENDS, THE IMPACT OF THE RELIGIOUS ORDERS, AND THE TEST CASE OF PREDESTINATION Russell L. Friedman*
Introduction
To most of those interested in medieval intellectual history, the seventy years under consideration here are best known for the "giants" of medieval thought that they boast: Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), Bonaventure (d. 1274), John Duns Scotus (d. 1308), William Ockham (d. 1347), and perhaps Henry of Ghent (d. 1293) and Peter Auriol (d. 1322). Certainly any attempt to chart the fortune of the Sentences commentary in these years must take these figures into account. But the great deal of attention that has been lavished on them—and especially on Thomas Aquinas—has had a rather adverse effect on study of the period as a whole: witness the large number of Sentences commentaries from the period that still remain in manuscript and the paucity of chronologically comprehensive studies of the period.
* Thanks go to William Duba, Lauge Nielsen, and Chris Schabel for thoroughly commenting on this article, and to Sylvain Piron for his comments on my presentation of later thirteenth-century Franciscans. For sending me invaluable information I would like to thank Paul Bakker, James Bell, Hans Kraml, and Roberto Lambertini. I could not have written the article without the prompt services of The Royal Library in Copenhagen, and I am especially grateful to Susanne Mose Hartvig of interlibrary loan. The Danish Academy in Rome graciously provided me with lodging for two months while conducting necessary research at the Vatican Library as well as with a travel grant that allowed me to consult material in the University Library in Bologna; I am grateful to the Academy's director Jan Zahle and Dronning Ingrids Romerske Fond. In what follows, I use the following abbreviations: AFH — Archivum Franciscanum Historicum; AFP = Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum; AHDLMA - Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen Age; D&S — Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale; FS — Franciscan Studies; FranzSt — Franziskanische Studien; RSPT — Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques; RTAM - Recherches de theolagie ancienne et medievale; %KTh — ^eitschrift fur katholische Theologie. In creating a chronological order for Sent, commentaries, I have whenever possible utilized the dates when a scholar lectured on the Sent., and not when he revised his work into its present form (if he did that).
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This state of affairs can only be described as unfortunate. In these years the Sentences commentary really came into its own as a preferred medium of scholastic theological (and philosophical) discourse, certainly rivaling, and often outshining, other vehicles of theological expression (e.g. Quodlibetal questions, Summae, Biblical commentaries). A sign of this in the period 1250-1320 is that it became increasingly common for theologians to produce several Sentences commentaries (or several versions of their one Sentences commentary), having either lectured on the Sentences several times or having taken several opportunities to rework the material used in their lectures. Furthermore, during the period a good (i.e. provocative, but not too provocative) Sentences commentary became one way to quick advancement in the Church hierarchy. Parallel with the development of the Sentences commentary into a major bearer of theological ideas, the very structure of the commentaries themselves changed a great deal, and certainly the thought expressed in them saw a great deal of development. Perhaps most significantly with regard to this last point, there arose shared theological tendencies, best described as traditions: a Franciscan theological tradition and a Dominican one. It is developments like these that I want to investigate in what follows by looking at many commentaries from this 70 year period in order to get at least an impression of how the genre and the ideas contained in it developed. It is important to state at the outset that I do not aim here at an exhaustive treatment of all Sentences commentaries 1250-1320. One reason for this is that the majority of Sentences commentaries that survive from the period have received so little modern attention that the exposition here is of necessity uneven, following the contours of the scholarship to date: more facts and interpretations where there are modern studies and editions, fewer where these are lacking. Just as important, according to the standard inventories of medieval Sentences commentaries, Stegmiiller and Doucet, there survive in one form or another some 70 commentaries from the 70 years under consideration here—and this does not include anonymous commentaries.1 Attempting to give any kind of detailed impression of them
1
F. Stegmiiller, Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi, 2 vols. (Wiirzburg, 1947) supplemented by V. Doucet, Commentaires sur les Sentences: supplement au repertoire de M. Frederic Stegmueller (Florence, 1954). The most comprehensive guide to printed medieval philosophical and theological texts (including Sent, commentaries), in both early printed editions and in modern critical editions, is R. Schonburger
THE SENTENCES COMMENTARY, 1250-1320
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all would obscure more than it would reveal. Here, then, I want to give a general status quaestionis: what we know or can deduce about the major commentaries of the era and about general doctrinal and structural developments in these commentaries. To help give the study a focus, I have chosen to look consistently at one of the central issues in medieval theology: predestination. Two distinctions of Peter Lombard's Sentences are devoted to this subject (book I, dd. 40 and 41), and because the issue had so many important ramifications— human salvation and free will, God's omnipotence, justice, and goodness—nearly every medieval theologian discussed it to one extent or another. Predestination, then, will serve to give us both a doctrinal story line and a relatively firm point of departure to look at the development of the commentary on the Sentences as a genre. The article is divided into four main parts. In part one, I give a chronologically arranged description of the major Sentences commentaries from the period; the purpose of this part is to describe who wrote what when, and to give a very general idea of such things as the significance of the individual commentary and where it fits into the thought of the period, while also providing a select bibliography of studies dealing with the Sentences commentary in question. For reasons that will become clear, I divide this first section into six subsections. In part two, using as my point of departure treatments of
and B. Kible, eds., Repertorium edierter Texte des Mittelalters aus dem Bereich der Philosophic und angrenzender Gebiete (Berlin, 1994). For Dominicans, one should consult Th. Kaeppeli O.P., ed., Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi, 4 vols. (Rome, 1970-93; vol. 4, edited by Th. Kaeppeli O.P. and E. Panella O.P., contains a supplement to the first three volumes), which contains entries for all of the Dominicans named below, with lists of MSS and editions of their various works, as well as select secondary literature. For Franciscans, the best starting place is the electronic catalogue that is being compiled by B. Roest and M. van der Heijden, Franciscan Authors 13th18th Centuries: A Catalogue in Progress (http://users.bart.nl/~roestb/franciscan). NB: in the interests of space, I do not refer to any of these works below, unless I update or refer to their information. For biographies and studies of specific figures (besides the more detailed references given below), see in addition to Kaeppeli for Dominicans and Roest/van der Heijden for Franciscans, P. Glorieux, Repertoire des maitres en theologie de Paris au XIII" siecle, 2 vols. (Paris, 1933—34); A. B. Emden, A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to 1500, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1957-59) and idem, A Biographical Register of the University of Cambridge to 1500 (Cambridge, 1963); the more recent entries in the Dictionnaire d'histoire et de geographic ecclesiastiques are especially useful for their literature lists, and the entries in the Lexikon des Mittelalters are usually excellent. While old, many of the articles in the Dictionnaire de theologie catholique are useful, and some are still essential.
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RUSSELL L. FRIEDMAN
predestination in the commentaries of the era, I deal first with how the internal structure of the Sentences commentary changed in these years; thereafter I look at developments in the role of the Sentences commentary as a bearer of theological ideas. In part three, again using predestination as the example, I give a case study of the doctrinal development in the period. Finally, in part four, I deal with some of the ways one aspect of the period's larger theological context—the formation of theological traditions—affected the Sentences commentaries.2
I. Sentences commentaries, 1250—1320 A. Aquinas and Bonaventure
It is important to remember that, while there were commentaries on Peter Lombard's Sentences even before Alexander of Hales' early effort of 1223-27, nevertheless by the time Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas read the Sentences at Paris, the genre was still in its beginning stages. We know that Aquinas had sat at the feet of Albert the Great, while one of Bonaventure's masters was Alexander of Hales himself. Bonaventure probably held his lectures from 1250 until 1252, although he most likely reworked the lectures into the ordinatio that we have today during his term as regent master at Paris from 1253-57.3 Aquinas was a few years Bonaventure's junior, and we
2 One debate that I will not address explicitly in what follows is that of the independence or creativity of Oxford/English theology in relation to Parisian theology, and here I will treat Oxford (and Cambridge) and Paris as a shared theological (and more generally scholastic) culture. The available evidence as far as it has been studied to date seems to me to show that for the period before about 1320 it is simply anachronistic to consider English and continental theologians separately from each other in terms of their scholastic production (as opposed to criteria based on "nationality" or university affiliation). The two geographical regions were inextricably linked both by a flow of manuscripts and of scholars, and this created a shared scholastic culture. J. I. Catto, 'Theology and Theologians 1220-1320' in The History of the University of Oxford, vol. 1, The Early Oxford Schools, J. I. Catto, ed. (Oxford, 1984), pp. 471-517, gives a nice introduction to the scholastic production (including Sent, commentaries) of Oxford in the years under consideration here. 3 See the elegant study of J. G. Bougerol, Introduction a saint Bonaventure (Paris, 1988), esp. p. 5 (for the date of the Sent, lectures), pp. 128-31 and 186-96 (on the commentary itself), and 113—18 (for near contemporary sources used in Bonaventure's commentary, where Bougerol shows that Odo Rigaud was a major source and that
THE SENTENCES COMMENTARY, 1250-1320
45
know that he was sent to Paris in September 1252 and lectured there on the Sentences until he incepted in early 1256; after his inception he probably continued working on his Sentences commentary during his first regency in Paris (1256-59; he had a second regency 1269-72), and at least one question in it was composed as late as the mid-1260's.4 Thus, Bonaventure and Aquinas read the Sentences roughly simultaneously: right after 1250. Just as importantly in the context of this article, their commentaries (and their thought more generally) would play an important role over the course of the next 70 years. In a great deal of modern literature on the thought of the medieval period, Aquinas, the Angelic Doctor, takes the central role. Aquinas is without question the most studied scholastic author, both from a philosophical and a theological point of view, and several historicgraphic schemes have been developed within the last century in which Aquinas is the highpoint of medieval scholastic thought.5 And yet, even after his canonization in 1323, medieval thinkers in no way considered Aquinas' views too sacred to criticize, and in the period under consideration and especially outside the Dominican order, Aquinas' positions were often found wanting. Thus, the modern, overwhelming interest in Aquinas, when transferred uncritically to the medieval period, is anachronistic.
Thomas Aquinas, when composing his own commentary, had Bonventure's commentary before him). Bonaventure's Sent, commentary is to be found in the first four volumes of his Opera Omnia (Quaracchi, 1882-89). 4 For an excellent recent biography of Aquinas, see J.-P. Torrell, Initiation a saint Thomas d'Aquin. Sa personne et son eeuvre (Paris, 1993); for Thomas' Sent, lectures specifically, see pp. 53-78. Torrell's work (now also translated at least into English and Italian) updates the classic study of J. A. Weisheipl: Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Works (New York, 1974). See also The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, N. Kretzmann and E. Stump, eds. (Cambridge, 1993); B. Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford, 1992), which also deals with theological aspects of Aquinas' work. There are many editions of Aquinas' Sent.; I have used that found in S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia, v. 1 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1980). On the question composed in the 1260's, see B. M. Lemaigre, 'Perfection de Dieu et multiplicite des attributs divins: Pourquoi S. Thomas a-t-il insere la dispute des attributs divins (I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3) dans son commentaire des Sentences?', RSPT 50 (1966), pp. 198-227, and the literature referred to there (p. 198). There is a possibility that Aquinas produced a second written Sent, commentary; on this alia lectura fratris Thomae, see Torrell, Initiation, pp. 66-69 and the literature referred to there. 3 Etienne Gilson's interpretation of medieval thought is probably the best known example of this. For an intelligent recent consideration of, among others, Gilson's version of the history of medieval thought, see B. D. Kent, Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century (CUA Press, 1995), pp. 5-19.
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This is not, however, to deny that Aquinas is one of the central figures of medieval thought: he is of immense philosophical, theological, and historical significance. It is a testament to this that shortly after Aquinas' death the Franciscan William de la Mare thought it necessary to write a "corrective" (Correctorium) to many of his positions, so that Franciscan theological students could avoid Aquinas' "errors" (see below, § IV). Moreover, Aquinas' position on most theological matters was discussed and debated as a matter of course. On the issue of predestination, for example, we will see that Aquinas' views—not just from his early Sentences commentary, but also from his Summae and other works—became part of the standard repertoire that had to be considered in (nearly) every Sentences commentary in order to show that the Bachelor had control over the "literature". Further, Aquinas stands to the medieval Dominican intellectual tradition as something of a founder, having expressed a complex of solutions to theological problems that the Dominican order at a very early date (1286) made it mandatory for their theologians to follow. His Sentences commentary was especially influential during the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, and in the early fourteenth century it was the work that Dominican theologians were required by their order to use when they studied Thomas;6 in the early fifteenth century, John Capreolus, "the prince of the Thomists", commented on Aquinas' Sentences, not on his Summa.7 Like Aquinas with the Dominicans, the Seraphic Doctor, Bonaventure, stands to the Franciscans as something of an intellectual founder, although he would come to be displaced somewhat as the immediate inspiration for Franciscan theology by John Duns Scotus beginning in the first decades of the fourteenth century. Thus, if in the later part of our period Bonaventure's specific solutions to theological problems were often abandoned when Scotus' came with more up-to-date ones, nevertheless as we will see Scotus was frequently indebted to Bonaventure for the tack that he took in his solution: it was Bonaventure who had solidified the general Franciscan tendencies. Bonaventure's influence is at least in part a reflection of his immense authority as the "second founder" of the Franciscan 6 See W. J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England (Princeton, 1987), p. 177, and further 178-82. 7 For more on the importance of the Sent, commentary in comparison to Aquinas' other works, see Torrell, Initiation (cit. n. 4), pp. 69, 454—62.
THE SENTENCES COMMENTARY, 1250-1320
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order: he was Minister General from 1257 until 1273 (when he was made a Cardinal). At any rate, Bonaventure's Sentences commentary was extremely popular in the later Middle Ages, as a consideration of the many abbreviations of it reveal,8 not to mention the scores of manuscript copies of the work itself that still survive. B. Sentences commentaries, 1256-c. 1285 Thus, the positions that Bonaventure and Aquinas espoused in their Sentences commentaries (and later works) in a very real sense set the tone for much of the following period. This certainly seems to be true of the first 30 years following their Sentences lectures. The Sentences commentaries of this period immediately following Aquinas and Bonaventure's Parisian years are in general not well known or investigated, yet the studies that have been made to date suggest that Bonaventure's and Aquinas' ideas had a large influence among this group of scholars. What these studies have also suggested is that the thought of this period, in contrast to that after around 1285, is characterized on the whole by a lack of fixed party lines. On some issues, we can see in these commentaries the beginnings of the shared theological tendencies—the theological traditions, Franciscan and Dominican—that come to color the rest of the period. On the whole, however, lines had not been sharply drawn this early on, and "showdowns" between Franciscan and Dominican theologies are seldom seen. Even when, for example, a Franciscan theologian leans to a solution that is very different than that found in Aquinas, little is made of this difference—the disagreement went unemphasized; mutatis mutandis the same is true of Dominican theologians. And on some issues, e.g. the cause of predestination (see below, § III), Dominican theologians seem to have accepted a Franciscan type of solution. There seems to be a lack of confrontationalism in the Sentences commentaries of these years. The earliest Sentences commentaries we have from this period stem from Dominicans.9 Probably the first is that of Peter of Tarentaise,
8
For a list of these abbreviations, along with some thoughts on approaches to their study, see Z. Alzeghy, 'Abbreviationes Bonaventurae. Handshriftliche Ausziige aus dem Sentenzenkommentar des hi. Bonaventura in Mittelalter', Gregorianum 28 (1947), pp. 474-510. 9 In the following description of early Dominican Sent, commentaries, I have not
48
RUSSELL L. FRIEDMAN
who in the five months prior to his death on 22 June 1276 was Pope Innocent V. Peter read the Sentences at Paris 1257—59, although he revised the lectures into the form in which we now have them during his first regency at Paris in 1259—64; he was again regent master at Paris in 1267—69. As might be expected for a figure of such importance, we have both an early printed edition and more than 100 MSS that contain one or more books of his Sentences commentary.10 Moreover, there are several abbreviations of Peter's Sentences commentary, further testimony to his importance.11 Peter of Tarentaise' included the recendy edited Quaestiones in libros quatuor Sententiarwn of Robert Kilwardby (Munich, 1982-95, as part of the series released by the Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften), which were probably written sometime after 1256 (cf. Quaestiones in librum primum Sententiarum, ed. J. Schneider [Munich, 1986], p. 56). Although I cannot entirely concur with the judgement of one of the editors that "unser text darf nicht als Sentenzen-kommentar bezeichnet werden" (ibid., p. 22)—this must depend on how one defines 'Sent, commentary'—nevertheless this text is highly unusual for this early period both in its format of questions only loosely related to Lombard's text and in that it does not seem to have any particular connection to Kilwardby's attainment of the magisterium (ibid., p. 56). See also Wood's contribution to this volume, esp. p. 290 n. 5. 10 The edition is Innocentii V pontificis maximi in IV libros Sent, commentaria (Toulouse, 1652); it was reprinted by The Gregg Press in 1964. On problems with this edition and the importance of Peter's Sent, commentary in general, see R.-M. Martin, 'Pour une reedition critique du commentaire de Pierre de Tarentaise sur le Livre des Sentences de Pierre Lombard', in Miscellanea Historica Albert de Meyer (Louvain Brussels, 1946), vol. 2, pp. 590-602. On Peter's Sent, commentary in general, see H.-D. Simonin, 'Les ecrits de Pierre de Tarentaise', in Beatus Innocentius PP. V (Petrus de Tarantasia O.P.). Studia et documenta (Rome, 1943), pp. 163-335, esp. pp. 163-213, which should be updated by O. Lottin, 'A propos du Commentaire des Sentences de Pierre de Tarentaise', RTAM 13 (1946), pp. 86-98 and L.-B. Gillon, 'Sur les ecrits de Pierre de Tarentaise et leur chronologic', appendix in M. H. Laurent, Le bienheureux Innocent V (Pierre de Tarentaise) et son temps (Vatican, 1947), pp. 361-90, esp. pp. 361-62. Ch. 2 in Laurent's book, 'Le maitre en theologie', pp. 39-66 is the best account of Peter's years at Paris (superceding in large part R. Creytens, 'Pierre de Tarentaise, professeur a Paris et prieur provincial de France', in Beatus Innocentius, pp. 73-100). There is a second, more Thomistic, redaction of book II of Peter's Sent., perhaps made as a consequence of the investigation conducted sometime between 1264 and 1267 into the orthodoxy of 108 articles taken from his commentary. See on this, W. J. Courtenay, 'Dominicans and Suspect Opinion in the Thirteenth Century: The Cases of Stephen of Venizy, Peter of Tarentaise, and the Articles of 1270 and 1271', Vivarium 32 (1994), pp. 186-95, esp. n. 14; L. Bianchi, 'Censure, liberte et progres intellectuel a PUniversite de Paris au XIIF siecle', AHDLMA 63 (1996), pp. 45-93, esp. pp. 65, 70, 76. 1 ' One of these abbreviations is that of the English Dominican William of Rothwell, probably written between 1270 and 1280, which is contained in 13 MSS. This work has recently been the subject of an interesting study by K. Emery, Jr., 'The "Sentences" Abbreviation of William de Rothwell, O.P. University of Pennsylvania, Lat. MS. 32', RTAM 51 (1984), pp. 69-135 (see p. 132 for the date of William's commentary, and p. 69 for a list of MSS). Through a detailed comparison with
THE SENTENCES COMMENTARY, 1250-1320
49
work has been characterized as an irenic road of moderation between the views of the two masters, Aquinas and Bonaventure; in many cases he presents both of their views and leaves the question open or tries to harmonize the views of the two earlier theologians, although—perhaps surprisingly—when Peter makes a choice between them he often leans towards Bonaventure.12 We know far less about the other Dominican commentaries and their authors from these years. Roughly contemporary with Peter, the Italian Dominican Hannibaldus of Hannibaldi (d. 1272) was regent master of theology at Paris 1260-62. We have a written version of all four books of Hannibaldus' commentary; 14 MSS contain at least one of the books, and the entire commentary has been printed several times as a part of the Opera Omnia of Thomas Aquinas. Hannibaldus' Sentences commentary, probably written in the years 1260-61, has been described as a "mosaic of extracts from similar works of Thomas Aquinas and Peter of Tarentaise."13 It was probably also in this same time frame—and more specifically probably between 1256 and 1265—that Bombolognus of Bologna was composing his Sentences commentary, of which books I and III survive in one and two copies respectively. It seems unlikely that Bombolognus ever taught in Paris.14 In the years 1270-72, Roman of Rome
contemporary theological texts, Emery deftly shows that Rothwell's "Abbreviation" is an interesting work in its own right on account of what Rothwell selected to include from Peter's commentary, and what he chose to ignore. 12 See, e.g., Martin, 'Pour une reedition' (cit. n. 10); Emery, 'The "Sentences" Abbreviation' (cit. n. 11), esp. pp. 78-81. 13 See Martin, 'Pour une reedition' (cit. n. 10), p. 591, also p. 594. Hannibaldus' Sent, commentary is found printed in e.g. S. Thomae de Aquino Scripta ad Hannibaldum ep. super IV libros Sent. (Basel, 1492); Aquinas, Opera Omnia, vol. 17 (Rome, 1570); Aquinas, Opera Omnia, v. 11 (Paris, 1660). 14 For the date, see B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz. Untersuchungen z.ur Dominikanertheologie z.u Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts (Miinster, 1967), p. 398; I am rather sceptical about the possibility mentioned there and raised originally by Grabmann of narrowing the dates down still further to "bald nach 1256" on the strength of the "fact" that Bombolognus apparently did not know Aquinas' commentary on Boethius' De trinitate. Book I of Bombolognus' commentary is found in MS Bologna, Bibl. Univ. 753 (1506); Book III in MS Bologna, Bibl. Univ. 755 (1508) and Assisi, Bibl. Com. 155. In Lexikon des Mittelalters, s.v. 'Bombolognus von Bologna', it is claimed that book IV of Bombolognus Sent, commentary can be found in a MS in Bologna, Bibl. Archiginnasio, but I have been unable to confirm this elsewhere. Nevertheless, F. Pelster has presented evidence that a written version of books II and IV did exist at one time; see his 'Les manuscrits de Bombolognus de Bologne, O.P.', RTAM 9 (1937), pp. 404-12, esp. p. 412. I have not had access to A. D'Amoto, 'Bombologno de Musolinis da Bologna. Notizie biografiche e bibliografiche', Sapiens 1 (1948), pp. 75-90, 232-52.
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(d. 1273) was lecturing on the Sentences at Paris, where he succeeded Thomas Aquinas as regent master after the latter's second regency finished in 1272; books I and II of his commentary survive in a single MS.15 Perhaps as a result of the fact that their commentaries could not have had great medieval impact, neither Bombolognus nor Roman have attracted much modern attention.16 Finally, probably dating from 1273 to 1277 there is a fragment of a single Oxford contribution to the Dominican Sentences commentary production of these years: Richard KnapwelPs Notabilia super primum Sententiarum. In fact, the Notabilia, which in their present state end at I Sentences, d. 16, are probably notes that Knapwell wrote in preparation for his lecturing on the Sentences. They have already been used to establish a development in his thought on, e.g., the issue of the unicity of substantial form that he would come to defend so staunchly in his later Correctorium "Quare" and disputed questions.17 The first Franciscan after Bonaventure whose commentary we have is Walter of Bruges (d. 1307, after having been Bishop of Poitiers). Walter probably lectured on the Sentences at Paris sometime between 1261 and 1265, and the latest verdict is that he was regent master there 1267-68.18 We have books I, II, and IV of Walter's com-
15 Both in Vat. Palat. lat. 331; in addition, there exists a short cursory commentary on the Sent, by Roman in Vat. Ottob. lat. 1430, ff. 95r-119v. See on Roman and his Sent, commentaries, M. Grabmann, 'Romanus de Roma O.P. (| 1273) und der Prolog seines Sentenzenkommentares. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der scholastischen prologi und principia', Divus Thomas. Jahrbuch jur Philosophic und spekulative tteologie 19 (1941), pp. 166-94 (reprinted in idem, Mittelalterliches Geistesleben, vol. 3 [Munich, 1956], pp. 280-305). 16 But see, e.g., Auer, Gnadenlehre (cit. below n. 27) and Schmaus, Liber propugnatorius (cit. below n. 193), at the relevant pages; specifically on Bombolognus, see also below n. 163. 17 Knapwell's Notabilia to I Sent., dd. 1~16 are found in Oxford, Magdalen College 56, ff. 184-91. See on them, M. D. Chenu, 'Le premier diffusion du Thomisme a Oxford: Klapwell et ses "notes" sur les Sentences', AHDLMA 3 (1928), pp. 185-200 (for the dates, see pp. 185-88), who concentrates especially on Knapwell's theory of the powers of the soul. See also, Catto, 'Theology and Theologians' (cit. n. 2), pp. 498—99; for a bio-bibliographical sketch of Knapwell, see F. J. Roensch, Early Thomistic School (Dubuque, 1964), pp. 34-40. 18 See most recently on the dating of Walter's regency, I. Brady, 'Questions at Paris c. 1260-1270 (cod. Flor. Bibl. Naz. Conv. soppr. B.6.912)', AFH 61 (1968), pp. 434-61 and AFH 62 (1969), pp. 357-76, 678-92, esp. pp. 682, 688. To the editions from Walter's Sent, commentary listed in Schonburger and Kible (cit. n. 1) should be added: L. Amoros, 'La teologia como ciencia practica en la escuela franciscana en los tiempos que preceden a Escoto', AHDLMA 9 (1934), pp. 261-303, esp. pp. 277-81 (edition of I Sent., Prologue, q. 4); J. Beumer, 'Die vier Ursachen
THE SENTENCES COMMENTARY, 1250-1320
51
mentary in 2-3 copies each, but it appears that at least book I stems from a different redaction than book IV does: the redaction of the former dating from shortly after 1270, that of the latter from 1261-65 (i.e. the time of Walter's Sentences lectures).19 In the studies of his Sentences commentary to date, some areas of Walter's thought have been shown to fit well into an emerging Franciscan style of solution to theological and philosophical problems—and he has been called one of Bonaventure's early followers—yet several studies have shown that he was by no means adverse to taking up Thomistic positions.20 He seems decidedly not to have been a party liner. While the number of MSS that contain Walter's Sentences commentary seems to indicate that it did not have widespread influence, it was nevertheless sufficiently well known that an anonymous commentary on IV Sentences (in MS Padua, Bibl. Ant. 239) and another on I Sentences (in MS Assisi, Bibl. com. 129) frequently quote verbatim from Walter's work.21 Shortly after Bruges read his Sentences commentary, the future Archbishop of Canterbury, John Pecham OFM (d. 1292), was active at Paris, and we have the first book of his Sentences commentary preserved in two copies. The latest view is that Pecham was regent master at Paris from spring of 1270-spring of 1271, and from 1272^75 Pecham was Franciscan regent at Oxford (after which time he was the head of the Franciscan province of England); this would mean that he lectured on the Sentences sometime in the mid- to late 1260's.22
der Theologie nach dem unedierten Sentenzenkornmentar des Walter von Brugge OFM', FranzSt 40 (1958), pp. 361-81, esp. pp. 370-81 (edition of four questions from the prologue of Walter's I Sent.); P. de Mattia, Le questioni sull'eucaristia di Gualtiero di Bruges, O.F.M. (1225-1307) (Rome, 1962) (edition of IV Sent., dd. 8-13). 19 For this conclusion and a discussion of the dating of Walter's commentary, see V. Heynck, 'Von wem stammen die Randbemerkungen zum Sentenzenkommentar des Petrus von Tarantasia in Cod. Avignon Musee Calvet 288?', FranzSt 44 (1962), pp. 75-82, esp. pp. 79-80. Mattia (Le questioni [cit. n. 18], pp. 16—17) shows that Walter refers to his I Sent, in his IV Sent., a fact that may affect the dating. 20 See Heynck, 'Von wem stammen' (cit. n. 19), pp. 80-81; for Aquinas' significance see esp. Beumer, 'Die vier Ursachen' (cit. n. 18), pp. 361-70. One area in which Walter fit rather well into an emerging Franciscan tradition was in trinitarian theology; see R. L. Friedman, 'In principio erat Verbum: the Incorporation of Philosophical Psychology into Trinitarian Theology, 1250-1325' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1997), pp. 85-90. 21 See Heynck, 'Von wem stammen' (cit. n. 19), pp. 81—82; in addition Heynck shows that the dense marginal notation in a MS of Peter of Tarentaise' IV Sent, is from Walter's IV Sent. 22 For the dates of Pecham's regency, see Brady, 'Questions at Paris' (cit. n. 18), pp. 687—89; for further dates in Pecham's academic career, see G. Etzkorn's
52
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While at Paris, Pecham was probably the teacher of William de la Mare (d. after 1282), who is better known for his Correctorium fratris Thomae than for his Sentences commentary; nevertheless the latter work is unique among the Franciscan Sentences commentaries of these years in that a project to critically edit it is underway, with critical editions of books I and II already available.23 In the judgement of his editor, it is very probable that William composed the Sentences commentary that we now have in the period 1268-70 at Paris; it has been suggested that in 1271-72 William followed John Pecham as Franciscan regent master at Paris.24 Where William's commentary can be compared with Pecham's (i.e. book I), it reveals a great debt to the earlier work. Moreover, among Franciscans, Bonaventure had an extremely large influence on William—both directly and also through Pecham and, to a far lesser extent, through Walter of Bruges; Roger Bacon's influence can also be documented. From the Dominicans, Aquinas and Peter of Tarentaise play a role.25 There are five
'Introduction' to loannis Pecham, Quodlibeta quatuor (Grottaferrata, 1989) 21*-25*; most recently, A. Boureau, Theologie, science et censure au XIIF siecle (Paris, 1999). Pecham's I Sent, is found in Florence, Bibl. Naz. Conv. Soppr. G. 4. 854 and Naples, Bibl. Naz. VII C 2. There is a question list from the Florence MS in H. Spettmann, 'Der Sentenzenkommentar der Franziskanerbischofs Johannes Pecham (| 1292)', Divus Thomas. fahrbuch fur Philosophic und spekulative Theologie 5 (1927), pp. 327-45. To the editions from John's Sent, commentary listed in Schonburger and Kible (cit. n. 1) should be added: A. Daniels, Quellenbeitrage und Untersuchungen z.ur Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im dreizehnten Jahrhundert (Miinster, 1909), pp. 41-50 (edition of I Sent., d. 2, q. 1). 23 Editions by Hans Kraml in Guillelmus de la Mare, Scriptum in Primum Librum Sententiarum (Munich, 1989) and Scriptum in Secundum Librum Sententiarum (Munich, 1995). Dr. Kraml has informed me that a final volume with William's books Ill-TV is forthcoming in this same series. 24 See Kraml's introduction to Scriptum in Primum Librum Sententiarum, pp. 13*-16*, and to Scriptum in Secundum Librum Sententiarum, p. 23*. For the suggestion of the dates for William's regency see Kraml's article in Lexikon des Mittelalters, s.v. 'Wilhelm de la Mare'; Brady, 'Questions at Paris' (cit. n. 18), pp. 687-89 seems to lean towards the same dating for William's regency. An earlier view (supported by Glorieux and Pelster), that William was regent master at Paris in 1274-75, was contested by L.-J. Bataillon in Bulletin Thomiste 9 (1954), pp. 948-51 (cf. also RSPT 75 [1991], p. 510); Bataillon favors a date for William's regency closer to (perhaps prior to) 1270, and he has recently supported this view by the fact that William seems to exhibit knowledge of none of Aquinas' works except his Sent, commentary (cf. RSPT 81 [1997], p. 188). 25 Cf. Kraml's introduction to Primum Librum, p. 17*, and to Secundum Librum, pp. 22*-23*. Dr. Kraml has informed me that William makes use of the same sources in his commentary on III and IV Sent. In volume 2 of La raison et le miracle. Les doctrines eucharistiques (c. 1250-c. 1400) (Nijmegen, 1999), pp. 8-22, P. J. J. M. Bakker studies the use of sources in parts of book IV of both William de la Mare's and Nicholas of Ockham's (on whom see below) Sent, commentaries. Volume 1 of Bakker's
THE SENTENCES
COMMENTARY, 1250
1320
53
copies of William's book I, seven of his book II, and two each of books III and IV, so at least the first two books seem to have had some readership. Another Franciscan of these years, Matthew of Aquasparta, became the Minister General of the Order in 1287 and was a Cardinal at his death in 1302. He probably lectured on the Sentences in 1271 72 and it is highly likely that he was regent master at Paris 1278-79, having become a master in 1276 or 1277. Books I, II, and IV of Matthew's Sentences commentary survive only in his autograph copy.26 While there have been a few studies that take this work into account, both the extraordinarily difficult hand in which it is written and the limited influence it could have had on Aquasparta's contemporaries seem to have deterred scholarly interest in it; Matthew is better known for his later Quodlibetal and disputed questions.27 All four books of Richard of Mediavilla's Sentences commentary were printed several times in the Early Modern Period, and the 1591 Brescia edition was reprinted by Minerva (Frankfurt) in 1963. Hocedez, whose 1925 study of Richard's life and thought is still the basic starting point, dates Richard's lectures on the Sentences to 1278-80, but argues that the commentary that has come down to us today is the result of further revisions in the late 1280's and the 1290's. Richard was Franciscan regent master in theology at Paris 1284—87.28 Not study traces development on three eucharistic issues from around 1250 until around 1350 and deals with many of the Sent, commentaries discussed in the present article. 26 For Aquasparta's dates, see V. Doucet's 'Introductio critica' to Aquasparta, Quaestiones disputatae de gratia (Quaracchi, 1935), p. xvi, modified slightly by P. Glorieux, 'Maitre franciscains regents a Paris. Mise au point', RTAM 18 (1951), pp. 324-33, esp. p. 325. In his introduction, Doucet presents a complete question list of Matthew's Sent, commentary from MS Todi, Bibl. Com. 122 (book I except dd. 18-19) and MS Assisi, Bibl. Com. 132 (books I, dd. 18-19, II, and IV). 2/ But see, e.g., S. Marrone, 'Matthew of Aquasparta, Henry of Ghent and Augustinian Epistemology after Bonaventure', FmnzSt 65 (1983), pp. 252~90, who makes a comparative examination of Matthew's Sent, commentary and his later works on the issue of divine illumination; and especially J. Auer, Die Entwicklung der Gnadenlehre in der Hochsclwlastik mil besonderer Beriickskhtigung des Kardinals Matteo d'Acquasparta. I. Teil. Das Wesen der Gnade; II. Teil: Das IVirken der Gnade (Freiburg, 1942 and 1951), which is an important source of information and texts not just on Aquasparta, but on nearly every theologian from the last half of the thirteenth century, showing the doctrinal fluidity of these early years. See also Z. Hayes, The General Doctrine of Creation in the Thirteenth Century, with Special Emphasis on Matthew of Aquasparta (Munich, 1964), which discusses Matthew's Sent, commentary. 28 Richard de Mediavilla has traditionally been called "of Middleton"; L.-J. Bataillon, RSPT78 (1994), p. 415, n. 2, has presented evidence from an early fourteenth century manuscript that Richard was named in the venacular "de Menevyl"
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only the early printed editions, but also the over 50 MSS that contain one or more of the books of his commentary attest to Richard's medieval and early modern significance. Richard's commentary, as is the case for so many of the commentaries from these years, shows signs of having been influenced by Bonaventure on some issues, but also frequently by Aquinas on others, as well as by Peter of Tarentaise.29 The only Franciscan from these years for whom we have a Sentences commentary that descends from lectures held at Oxford is that of Nicholas of Ockham. The most recent research into Nicholas' curriculum vitae has concluded that he studied in Paris c. 1270-74, but read his Sentences commentary at Oxford probably in 1280^82; he was regent master at Oxford 1286-87. In at least two MSS (Oxford, Merton College 134 and Vatican, Ottob. lat. 623) all four books of Nicholas' commentary are found together, and one or more books are contained in eight others. Despite the fact that it obviously had some readership, the work is rather unstudied.30 Finally, sometime
(probably "of Menneville" in the north of France); I use 'Richard of Mediavilla' throughout this article. On Richard, see E. Hocedez, Richard de Middleton: sa vie, ses osuvres, sa doctrines (Louvain, 1925), esp. pp. 75, 93-115 (on regency) and pp. 49-55, 71-79 (dating of Sent, commentary); the completion of book IV is dated by Hocedez to between the end of 1294 and 1298; book Fs composition to after 1284. R. Zavalloni, Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralite des formes (Louvain, 1951), p. 507 tentatively dates Richard's commentary on II Sent, to 1285-86. Richard died sometime in the first decade of the fourteenth century (1302-08). 29 See, Hocedez, Richard (cit. n. 28), pp. 78-79, 381-86; for Peter of Tarentaise' influence, see e.g. J. Lechner, Die Sakramentenlehre des Richard von Mediavilla (Munich, 1925). 30 See C. Saco Alarcon, 'Nicolas de Ockham OFM (f c. 1320). Vida y obras', Antomanum 53 (1978), pp. 493-573, esp. pp. 503-08 for Sent, lectures and 538-45 on the commentary itself (list of MSS on p. 544). See also D. Burr's thorough Euchanstic Presence and Conversion in Late Thirteenth-Century Franciscan Thought (Philadelphia, 1984), p. 33; J. Th. Ernst, Die Lehre der hochmittelalterlichen Theologen von der vollkommenen Erkenntnis Christi. Ein Versuch z.ur Auslegung der klassischen Dreiteilung: Visio beata, scientia infusa und scientia acquisita (Freiburg, 1971), pp. 232-34, which moreover contains an investigation of 'Die Sentenzenkommentare zwischen 1250 und 1310' on the topic of Christ's knowledge, pp. 206-302. Burr shows that Nicholas adopts the opinion common to Bonaventure and Aquinas, while Ernst make clear that Nicholas was heavily influenced by Bonaventure; Auer, Gnadenlehre (cit. n. 27) shows that Nicholas was influenced by Aquinas in several aspects of his theology. According to Doucet (cit. n. 1) nr. 552, there may be two versions of Nicholas' IV Sent. The explicit to book I in Florence, Bibl. naz. conv. soppr. G. 5. 858 (f. 49vb) reads: "Explicit lectura super primum Sententiarum ordinata a fratre Nicholao de Anglia ordinis minorum." To the editions from Nicholas' Sent, commentary listed in Schonburger and Kible (cit. n. 1) should be added: Daniels, Quellenbeitrage (cit. n. 22), pp. 82-83 (edition of I Sent., d. 3, q. 2).
THE SENTKVCES COMMENTARY, 1250-1320
55
in the period 1252^1290, a Franciscan named Richard Carew commented on the Sentences and the first book of his commentary is preserved in a single Assisi manuscript. Richard is rather reliant on Bonaventure, but he and his work were sufficiently well known to be mentioned by several medieval theologians coming after him, including the Oxford Mertonian Thomas of Buckingham (d. c. 1349).31 Outside of the two largest mendicant orders there survives the Sentences commentary of Giles of Rome (d. 1316), who in 1287 was made the teaching doctor of the Augustinian Order and in 1292 became the Order's General. Recent research suggests that Giles lectured on the Sentences before 1271, 32 although he did not receive the master's degree until sometime between 1285 and 1287 as a result of the investigation into the orthodoxy of 51 articles taken from his commentary on I Sentences.33 We have from Giles reportationes (fragmentary in some cases) of his lectures on all four books of the Sentences.34 In addition, Giles made an ordinatio version of his commentary on I (around 1271-73) and II (not finished before 1309)
31 It was Buckingham's two references to Carew that started Jean-Francois Genest on the fascinating piece of detective work that allowed him to set Carew's name to the commentary found in MS Assisi, Bibl. Com. 162; see 'Un "doctor antiquus" cite par Thomas de Buckingham: Richard Carew', AFH 73 (1980), pp. 497-513. Carew's dates are established by Genest as between Bonaventure's lecturing on the Sent. (1252) and a reference to Carew in a work from around 1290. A final Franciscan who probably wrote in this period is Simon of Lens, whom Stegmuller reports to have been a master of theology around 1281 and regent master at Paris 1294-95; Simon's commentary on II Sent, is contained in MS Todi, Bibl. Com. 120; see the relevant pages in Auer, Gnadenlehre (cit. n. 27) for a study of some of Simon's positions. For a nice introduction to the thought and the works (including Sent, commentaries) of Franciscan thinkers c. 1255-1300, see F.-X. Putallaz' Figures franciscaines de Bonaventure a Duns Scot (Paris, 1997; also available in Italian translation), which has an excellent bibliography; one of Putallaz' main points is that the notion of a "neo-Augustinian school" among post-Bonaventurean Franciscans is untenable. 32 See R. Wielockx' conclusions in his edition of Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia III. 1 Apologia (Florence, 1985), pp. 236-40; 1271 is the earliest possible date of composition of Giles' Ordinatio on I Sent., which is presumably based on his lectures. 33 See most recently on the investigation of Giles' orthodoxy J. M. M. H. Thijssen, '1277 Revisited: A New Interpretation of the Doctrinal Investigation of Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome', Vivarium 35 (1997), pp. 72-101 and R. Wielockx, 'Procedures contre Gilles de Rome et Thomas d'Aquin', RSPT 83 (1999), pp. 293-313, and the literature referred to in those papers. Giles' defense of these articles is contained in Apologia (cit. n. 32). 34 Concetta Luna has been instrumental in making this material available. See her 'Fragments d'une reportation du commentaire de Gilles de Rome sur le premier livre des Sentences. Les extraits des mss. Clm. 8005 et Paris, B.N., Lat. 15819',
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Sentences. These last two works were printed several times in the early modern period (and the Venice 1521 edition of Giles' I Sentences was reprinted by Minerva in 1968), and they are contained in more than 40 MSS. A critical edition of Giles' Ordinatio is underway as part of the Aegidius Romanus Opera Omnia.35 C. Sentences commentaries c. 1285—c. 1300 1285 is by no means a magic date; but in the 1290's we can see clearly a change in the structure of Sentences commentaries and in the pattern of their being read that continues throughout the rest of the period under examination here (see below, § II). Moreover, there are doctrinal developments after 1285 that speak for making a cut off point at 1285. In the aftermath of the condemnations of 1277, which touched on some of Thomas Aquinas' doctrine, and the writing of the Correctorium fratris Thomae by William de la Mare, there is a general drawing of doctrinal lines starting around 1285. After this point, the Dominicans generally adhered to (in fact were statutorily required to adhere to) Thomas' theological positions, while a complex of solutions to many theological problems increasingly came to characterize what we can call a "Franciscan theological tradition". The rather non-confrontational attitude that we saw in the Sentences commentaries of the preceding 20^30 years disappeared quite quickly after 1285, and was replaced on many issues by conscious opposition between two large traditions: the Franciscan and the Dominican (see below § III and esp. IV). Besides one literal commentary on the Sentences by an Augustinian Hermit and one Cistercian commentary that is highly indebted to Aquinas, we only possess Sentences commentaries from members of
RSPT74 (1990), pp. 234-54, 446-56; 'La Reportatio della lettura di Egidio Romano sul libro III delle Sentence e il problema dell'autenticita dell'Ordinatio', D&S 1 (1990), pp. 179-225 and 2 (1991), pp. 75-146; 'La lecture de Gilles de Rome sur le quatrieme livre des Sentences. Les extraits du Clm. 8005' RTAM 57 (1990), pp. 216-54. In addition, an edition of Giles' recently discovered reportatio on II Sent, is announced by F. del Punta and C. Trifogli in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London New York, 1998), vol. 4, s.v. 'Giles of Rome'. 35 General editors, Francesco del Punta, Gianfranco Fioravanti, and Concetta Luna. The MS count is taken from Stegmuller; when the catalogue of MSS published as part of the ongoing Opera Omnia project is completed, we will have a much better idea of Giles' legacy. The Ordinatio on III Sent, attributed to Giles in, e.g., Stegmiiller is spurious; see Luna, 'La Reportatio della lettura' (cit. n. 34).
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the two large mendicant orders for the last fifteen years of the thirteenth century.36 All in all, it is the Dominican commentaries from these years that have received the most modern scholarly attention, a group of twentieth-century German scholars having delved deeply into the Dominican Sentences commentaries of the fifteen or so years to either side of 1300. The work of such scholars as Koch, Hodl, Decker, Ullrich, Kohler, and Ott leave us on the whole in a much better position with regard to Dominicans than to Franciscans:37 we have more reliable dating for Dominicans, we can trace lines of influence among the Dominicans on a number of issues from around 1290 until the 1310's, and on certain topics we know more than just the basic outlines of their thought. Thus, it is with the Dominicans that we begin. John of Paris, O.P. (d. 1306), also known as John Quidort, is far better known for his important contribution to medieval political thought, De potestate regia et papali, than he is for his Sentences commentary. In addition, John is almost certainly one of the Dominican writers who responded to William de la Mare's Correctorium of Thomas
36
The Augustinian commentary is James of Viterbo's, who read the Sent, at Paris between 1288 and 1292, and was regent master there 1293-99 (see P. D. Gutierrez, O.E.S.A., De B. lacobi Viterbiensis O.E.SA. Vita, operibus et doctrina theologica [Rome, 1939], p. 26). His Sent, commentary, preserved in Siena, Bibl. Comm. G V 15, is a literal commentary that Gutierrez describes as "opus parvi momenti ad doctrinam B. lacobi cognoscendam" (ibid.). The Cistercian commentary is that of Humbert of Prouilly (d. 1298), which is the first Cistercian Sent, commentary that we possess and which probably dates from the last decade of the thirteenth century. See on Humbert, C. Heidack, Humbert von Preuilly (f 1298), einer der altesten Thomasischen Denker. Eine philosophiehistorische Untersuchung mit Textbeilagen aus dem unedierten Sentenzenkommentar Humberts und den "Quaestiones diversarum opinionum", die dem Humbert zugeschrieben werden (Dissertation, Bonn, 1965), which contains excerpts from Humbert's I-TV Sent, on the issues of distinction, individuation, eternity of the world, the soul, cognition, and will (pp. 113-38). Further, I will not deal with the short Quaestiones in I Sent, by Bernard of Auvergne, OP (Paris c. 1294-97) contained on ff. 1-17 of Prague, Univ. knihovna XIII.D.5 or Raymond Lull's Quaestiones super Sententias (disputed in Paris 15-22 August, 1298). 37 J. Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano O.P. Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts (Miinster i. W., 1927); L. Hodl, Die Grundfragen der Sakramentenlehre nach Heweus Natalis O.P. (f 1323) (Munich, 1956); Decker, Gotteslehre (cit. n. 14); L. Ullrich, Fragen der Schopjungslehre nach Jakob von Metz, O.P. (Leipzig, 1966); T.W. Kohler, O.S.B., Der Begriff der Einheit und ihr ontologisches Prinzip nach dem Sentenzenkommentar des Jakob von Metz O.P. (Rome, 1971); L. Ott, Die Lehre des Durandus de S. Porciano O.P. vom Weihesakrament (Munich, 1972). In addition, C. Vollert, The Doctrine of Hervaeus Natalis on Primitive Justice and Original Sin (Rome, 1947); K. Plotnik, Hervaeus Natalis OP and the Controversies over the Real Presence and Transubstantiation (Munich, 1970).
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Aquinas' work in the Comctorium "Circa".38 But perhaps the fame that these other works garnered him goes some way to explaining why a part of his Sentences commentary has received a critical edition. While all four books of John's Sentences commentary have been preserved—five MSS contain one or more books and several others contain substantial fragments—only books I-II have yet been edited.39 As their editor, J.-P. Muller, shows, John's commentary on I~II Sentences is a reportatio of Parisian lectures that took place, according to the independent calculations of Muller and Decker, between around 1292 and 1295.40 John was a provocative thinker, and as testimony to this, his lectures on the Sentences at the University of Paris led to a denunciation, and after an examination of his Sentences commentary, at least sixteen articles were extracted from it and condemned. Part of John's defense of his views has been preserved and edited.41 A second Dominican commentary from these years has been edited recently: that of John of Sterngassen (d. before 1327).42 John may
38
There are difficulties in establishing a date for this work with respect to John's career and especially his Sent, commentary; see L. Hodl, 'Geistesgeschichtliche und literarkritische Erhebungen zum Korrektorienstreit (1277-1287)', RTAM 33 (1966), pp. 81-114, esp. pp. 99-108. For a bio-bibliographical sketch of John, see Roensch, Early Thomistic School (cit. n. 17), pp. 98-104 and J. Dunbabin's contibution to this volume. 39 Jean de Paris (Quidort), O.P., Commentaire sur les Sentences. Reportation Livre I II, ed. J.-P. Muller, O.S.B. (Rome, 1961-64); on the MSS, see ed. cit., vol. 1, pp. xi—xxii and vol. 2, pp. ix—xv, supplemented by Kaeppeli (cit. n. 1), vol. 2 nr. 2573. 40 Muller's claim (referring to his 'La date de la lecture sur les Sentences de Jean Qjiidort', Angelicum 36 [1959], pp. 129-62): 1292-96 (ed. cit., vol. 1, p. x) and certain indications that it was 1292—93 and 1293—94 (pp. xxix-xxx); Decker places John's lectures 1295 or shortly before (Gotteslehre [cit. n. 14], pp. 31-44, 107-08); cf. also Ullrich, Schopfungslehre (cit. n. 37), pp. 69-75. That the work is a reportatio, see Muller's introduction to the edition, vol. 1, pp. xxii-xxvi. 41 See P. Glorieux, 'Un memoire justificatif de Bernard de Trilia', RSPT 17 (1928), pp. 407-13 (plus J.-P. Muller, 'A propos du Memoire justificatif de Jean Quidort', RTAM 19 [1952], pp. 343-51 which contains supplemental material). Glorieux later concluded that the defense belonged to John of Paris and not Bernard of Trilia ('Bernard de Trilia? ou Jean de Paris?', RSPT 19 [1930], pp. 469-74). Glorieux gave as a date of composition for the defense 1286—87, but this was based on the mistaken assumption that it belonged to Bernard of Trilia, and it must be dated to sometime in the mid-1290's, after John's Sent, lectures (see Muller, ed. cit., vol. 1, p. x). 42 W. Senner, ed., Johannes von Sterngassen und sein Sentenzenkommentar (Berlin, 1995), 2 vols. Unfortunately I was only able to inspect this edition when the present article was already in press, but Senner in his study of the commentary (vol. 1) leans towards dating John's Sent, commentary later than Decker did (see below, n. 43), to the period 1307/08-23, in part because Senner sees no compelling reason to
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have read the Sentences at Paris between 1290 and 1295.43 We have all four books of Sterngassen's commentary and there are 14 witnesses to all or part of it, so it had a significant readership. Besides Thomas Aquinas, John mentions both Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome. There is one other Dominican theologian from these years whose Sentences commentary had a broad appeal. This is William Peter Godinus (d. 1336), who lectured on the Sentences twice: once (as sub-lector) at Toulouse, in 1296-98, and a second time at Paris 1299-1300, in order to fulfill the requirements for his inception. In these years, presumably from 1296 on, William was at work on his Ordinatio, which he released around 1300.44 This work, which exists in whole or in part in 13 MSS,45 is called in some of the MSS Lectum Thomasina., and this reflects William's effort on the whole to elaborate and defend the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas. Indeed, Decker suggests that Godinus' commentary was popular precisely because it was a relatively short and concise compilation of Thomas' views that was particularly useful to Dominican theological students.46 William was regent master in theology at Paris 1304-06, and in 1306 he debated with the Franciscan regent master John Duns Scotus on the topic of individuation;47 he served as lector of theology at the school of the Papal Curia from 1306—12, at which time he was raised to the Cardinalate.48
place John's lectures in Paris; see ed. cit., vol. 1, pp. 171-73, 205-08, and passim. See also Senner's 'Jean de Sterngassen et son commentaire des Sentences', Revue Thomiste 97 (1997), pp. 83-98 (on this journal issue, see below, n. 170). 43 The dates are from Decker, Gotteskhre (cit. n. 14), pp. 45-46, 107 (but see above, n. 42). As Decker states there, there is not much firm ground to stand on when dating Sterngassen's commentary, and the dates are arrived at by noting that Sterngassen does mention Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Giles, while he does not use either the commentary of John of Paris or that of William Peter Godinus. 44 See for the dating Decker, Gotteskhre (cit. n. 14), pp. 24-44, 107; Ullrich, Schb'pfungslehre (cit. n. 37), pp. 75—79. For a bio-bibliographical sketch of William, see Roensch, Early Thomistic School (cit. n. 17), pp. 120-24. 45 Kaeppeli (cit. n. 1), vol. 2 nr. 1628, lists two incipits for the first two of the four books, which may mean that there are two versions of these. As far as I know, no one has studied this. 46 Decker, Gotteskhre (cit. n. 14), pp. 29-31. 47 See on William's disputation with Scotus, C. Stroick, 'Eine Pariser Disputation vom Jahre 1306' in Thomas von Aquino. Interpretation und Reception, ed. W. P. Eckert (Mainz, 1974), pp. 559-608. 48 There is also an anonymous Dominican commentary from the last decade of the thirteenth century found in the Vatican Library (Vat. lat. 1114). Decker describes
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The first Franciscan Sentences lectures from this period for which we have written evidence are those of Peter John Olivi (d. 1298). The scholar who has most recently tackled the complex issues surrounding Olivi's works having something to do with Lombard's Sentences is Sylvain Piron.49 He has argued that Olivi read cursorily on the Sentences in Narbonne around 1276-79; we have no written records of these lectures. On the other hand, from the lectures that Olivi held on the Sentences during his tenure at the Franciscan convent in Florence in 1287—89 we have reportationes preserved in two Padua MSS (23 questions for book II, 1 for book III, and 79 for book IV).50 Besides this, Olivi has left us a large, ordinated series of questions on book II of the Sentences which has been published in its entirety in a critical edition,51 as well as several questions on I, III, and IV Sentences.^ Piron thinks that this now incomplete "Summa of questions"on I-IV Sentences originated in disputations held between the late 1270's and the mid-1290's; thus, it may have been "originally conceived as discrete examinations of particular issues connected with the Sentences", and not as a Sentences commentary as such.53 Olivi, besides having been an acute thinker with interesting ideas on
this commentary as "nur ein sehr bescheidenes Exzerpt aus Thomas", but does say that it sometimes reveals the divergence between Thomas' position in his Sent, commentary and his Summa theologica; see Decker, Gotteskhre (cit. n. 14), pp. 46-49, 107. A. Fries, 'Cod. Vat. lat. 1114 und der Sentenzenkommentar des Johannes von Lichtenberg O.P.', AFP 1 (1937), pp. 305-19, attempted to assign this anonymous commentary to John of Lichtenberg, but this has not met with widespread acceptance (see esp. Decker, Gotteskhre, p. 19, pp. 46-49). Book IV, dd. 1-18 of lichtenberg's commentary (read 1305—08) may be found, however, in Cracow, Bibl. Jagiell. MS 1583, ff. 118-42, according to Kaeppeli (cit. n. 1), vol. 2 nr. 2600. 49 I am grateful to Dr. Piron for having communicated to me privately some findings available only in his unpublished doctoral dissertation ('Parcours d'un intellectuel franciscain. D'une theologie vers une pensee sociale: 1' euvre de Pierre de Jean Olivi (ca. 1248-1298) et son traite "De contractibus'" [Paris, EHESS, 1999]); I have also benefitted from his article 'Les oeuvres perdues d'Olivi: essai de reconstitution', AFH 91 (1998), pp. 357-94. For supplementary information on the works of Olivi that can be called Sent, commentaries as well as references to earlier literature, see V. Heynck, 'Zur Datierung der Sentenzenkommentare des Petrus Johannis Olivi und des Petrus Trabibus', FranzSt 38 (1956), pp. 371-98. 50 See Piron, 'Les oeuvres perdues' (cit. n. 49), pp. 377-80; Heynck, 'Zur Datierung' (cit. n. 49), pp. 371-78, esp. 372. 51 B. Jansen, S.I., Fr. Petrus lohannis Olivi O.F.M. Quaestiones in Secundum Librum Sententiarum, 3 vols. (Quaracchi, 1922-26). 52 For a list of these questions, see J. Koch, 'Der Sentenzenkommentar des Petrus lohannis Olivi', RTAM 2 (1930), pp. 290-310 (reprinted in idem, Kleine Schriften [Rome, 1973], vol. 2, pp. 167-89). 53 D. Burr, The Persecution of Peter Olivi (Philadelphia, 1976), p. 11; Burr's book is the basic starting point for the study of Olivi's life and works.
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the categories, optics, and psychology, as well as on more purely theological subjects, is well known for having suffered the condemnation of some of his works—in fact twice: once in 1283 at the hands of his own order (when Richard of Mediavilla was part of the investigating committee), once posthumously in 1326 at the command of Pope John XXII.54 Olivi had a student, Peter of Trabibus, OFM, who has also left us a Sentences commentary. His books I and IV are contained in one MS each, while his book II is found in two; this work is without doubt an ordinatio. In addition, Alois Huning has convincingly argued that we should assign to Peter the reportatio on books II and III found in Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359.55 We can date quite precisely the lectures that this reportatio records to 1294-96, and Huning argues on this basis that Peter's Ordinatio, created through a reworking of the reportatio text, was written sometime after 1296 and probably before 1301, but certainly before 1304.56 Although Trabibus was a student of Olivi, he was by no means a slavish one; as one example of this it might be mentioned that in his Sentences commentary he rejects the view that his teacher upheld on Eucharistic presence.57 The theologian John of Erfurt, whose Sentences commentary dates from these years, has often been identified with the noted legal scholar of the same name who wrote the popular Tabula utriusque iuris. Sylvain Piron has called this claim into question, raising the point that the lawyer John would have been more than fifty years old by the end of the thirteenth century, when his Sentences commentary clearly was written; this would be atypical.58 Piron proposes instead that the Sentences commentary was written by a younger German Franciscan
54 For aspects of Olivi's thinking from his Sent, commentary, see e.g. K. H. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology and the Foundation of Semantics 1250-1345 (Leiden - New York, 1988), pp. 39-54 and the literature referred to there. 55 A. Huning, 'Die Stellung des Petrus de Trabibus zur Philosophic nach dem zweiten Prolog zum ersten Buch seines Sentenzenkommentars. Ms. 154, Biblioteca Comunale, Assisi', FramSt 46 (1964), pp. 193-286 and 47 (1965), pp. 1-43, esp. part I pp. 213~23; this article also contains a very fine review of the literature on Trabibus up until 1964. Huning's work modifies the dating of Trabibus' Sent, commentary proposed by Heynck, 'Zur Datierung' (cit. n. 49), esp. p. 397. The most recent work on Trabibus is Sylvain Piron's 'Le poete et le theologien: une rencontre dans le studium de Santa Croce' forthcoming in Picenum Seraphicum n.s. 19. 56 See Huning, 'Die Stellung' (cit. n. 55), esp. pp. 221-23. 37 See Burr, Eucharistic Presence (cit. n. 30), pp. 33-34. 58 See Piron, 'Parcours' (cit. n. 49), pp. 212-13.
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studying in Italy in the 1290's. Whatever the case may be, Valens Heynck, who has studied John's IV Sentences, gives a tentative date for that work of 1294-1304, and shows that on a number of issues John was influenced by Peter of Trabibus, although Heynck also shows that John had a mind of his own, not being content to simply parrot Trabibus' views.59 At least twelve MSS contain one or more of the four books of John's Sentences commentary. Despite the fairly large number of MS witnesses to his commentary and the statement by Heynck to the effect that John was the most significant German Franciscan scholastic of the time,60 his Sentences commentary has received very little attention. Another little studied Franciscan work from these years is the Sentences commentary of Vital du Four (d. 1327 as a Cardinal). Vital seems to have studied at Paris in the late 1280's or early 1290's under the Franciscan master Jacob of Carceto (de Quesnoy), but Vital himself appears to have spent the rest of his scholastic career teaching first in Montpellier and then in Toulouse. There survives a principial lecture for his book I (MS Prague Univ. 2297, ff. 18-24) as well as a reportatio of book IV (Vat. lat 1095, ff. 1—66) stemming from lectures held in 1295^96 when Vital was teaching in Montpellier; Vital may already have lectured on the first three books of the Sentences in the same town in the years from 1292 to 1295. From Montpellier it seems Vital went directly to teach at Toulouse, and he appears to have remained here until 1307 (when he was elected head of the Franciscan province of Aquitaine). It was probably while he was at Toulouse that he was made a master.61 Burr, who has
59
V. Heynck, 'Studien zu Johannes von Erfurt. I. Das vierte Buch seines Sentenzenkommentars', FranzSt 40 (1958), 329-60, 'II. Sein Verhaltnis zur Olivischule', FranzSt 42 (1960), 153-96, esp. II, pp. 194-95. David Burr in Eucharistic Presence (cit. n. 30), p. 34, offers further support with regard to eucharistic presence for Heynck's contention that Peter of Trabibus was an influence on John, and Burr claims that the section of John's work that he examined was "obviously written in opposition to the trend" in the Franciscan order that Burr traces up to Scotus. I have not had access to John's Sent, commentary. 60 Heynck, 'Studien II' (cit. n. 59), p. 196; it should be remembered that Heynck believed John to have been an important legal scholar. 61 For Vital's life and works, see the introduction by F. M. Delorme to Vitalis de Fumo Quodlibeta tria (Rome, 1947), pp. v-xiv; for Vital's curriculum vitae esp. pp. vi-vii. See also Piron, 'Parcours' (cit. n. 49), pp. 58-59. As Stegmiiller, nr. 922, mentions, Vital's I Sent, is frequently cited in MS Todi, Bibl. Com. 95; see on this, F. Delorme, 'L'ceuvre scolastique de Maitre Vital du Four d'apres le ms. 95 de Todi', La France frandscaine 9 (1926), pp. 421-71, esp. 421-51. To the editions from
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studied Vital's commentary on book IV for its theory of Eucharistic presence, places him on that issue within the general late thirteenthcentury trend of the Franciscan order, and Heynck has shown that Vital was influenced by Olivi.62 There is one final major Franciscan Sentences commentary from the period before 1300: that of William of Ware. We know basically nothing about William himself: we know neither when he was born or when he died; although tradition has that he was Scotus' teacher, he is never referred to as "master" in the sources, but only as "inceptor". His commentary on all four books of the Sentences is the only work that we have from William. Despite its immense importance as a witness to the state of Franciscan theology and philosophy around the turn of the century, it still awaits its editor. Much work is in store for that editor: not only are there some 35 extant MSS that contain one or more books of Ware's commentary on the Sentences, but there are several versions of the text extant in these many MSS. Moreover, we have as of yet no clear picture of the nature of these different versions. It seems that Ware read the Sentences at least twice (once at Oxford around 1295 and then at Paris at a later point) and perhaps a third time, and evidence has been offered for the existence of different redactions of his Sentences commentaries that may correspond to these various lectures.63 But in a recent article Ludwig Hodl has argued that in one question from the beginning
Vital's Sent, commentary listed in Schonburger and Kible (cit. n. 1) should be added an edition of IV Sent., d. 24, pt. 2 by L. Hodl in P. Wilpert and R. Hoffmann eds., Lex et Sacramentum im Mittelalter (Berlin, 1969), pp. 19-30. 62 Burr, Eucharistic Presence (cit. n. 30), pp. 65-68 and Heynck, 'Studien II' (cit. n. 59), p. 194, n. 70. Huning, 'Die Stellung' (cit. n. 55), p. 222, on the basis of his revised dating for Peter of Trabibus' Ordinatio, rejects that Vital could have used that work as Heynck had suggested. 63 Moreover, until 1904 a Torino manuscript contained a reportatio of Ware's commentary on book I, but this was destroyed by fire in that year. On the different redactions of Ware's work, see J. Lechner, 'Die mehrfachen Fassungen des Sentenzenkommentars des Wilhelm von Ware O.F.M. Allgemeine handschrifdiche Beobachtungen', FranzSt 31 (1949), pp. 14-31, who argues that there are in all probability at least three versions of each of the four books of Ware's Sent, commentary (pp. 28—31). There are early colophons attributing the work to Oxford lectures (see on this and for literature Catto, 'Theology and Theologians' [cit. n. 2], pp. 510—11). For a list of questions for all four books see A. Daniels, 'Zu den Beziehungen zwischen Wilhelm von Ware und Johannes Duns Scotus', FranzSt 4 (1917), pp. 221-38. Several questions found in some copies of Ware's commentary are in fact the work of Martin of Alnwick; see J. Lechner, 'Beitrage zum Schrifttum des Martinus Anglicus (Martin von Alnwick) O.F.M.', FranzSt 19 (1932), pp. 1-12.
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of book II, the various versions of the text are a result of repeated corrections made to a raw reportatio text—corrections made not by Ware himself but by scholars in the Franciscan schools coming after him and using his work.64 Thus, at this point we can make no general claims as to the state of Ware's work, and probably only a concerted editing effort will allow us to do so. Despite these formidable obstacles, an edition of Ware's entire Sentences is a desideratum of the highest order for the study of the intellectual milieu at Oxford and Paris around the turn of the century.63 It has long been recognized that Ware was an important figure in the Franciscan theological tradition, but in recent years especially Ludwig Hodl has been instrumental in confirming just how central a role Ware played in setting the theological agenda of both Franciscan and Dominican theologians in the first decade of the fourteenth century, and also
One important study of Ware's Sent, commentary that should be mentioned is G. Gal, 'Gulielmi de Ware, O.F.M.: Doctrina philosophica per summa capita proposita', FS 14 (1954), pp. 155-80, 265-92. To the editions from William's Sent, commentary listed in Schonburger and Kible (cit. n. 1) should be added: H. Spettmann, Die Erkenntnislehre der mittelalterlichen Franziskanersch.uk von Bonauentura bis Scotus (Paderborn, 1925), pp. 80—85 (edition of II Sent., q. 28 = 'utrum species requiratur in intellectu propter defectum potentiae vel propter absentiam objecti'); M. Schmaus, 'Augustinus und die Trinitatslehre Wilhelms v. Ware', in M. Grabmann and J. Mausbach, eds., Aurelius Augustinus: Die Festschrift der Gorres Gesellschaft zum 1500. Todestage des Heiligen Augustinus (Cologne, 1930), pp. 315—52 (editions of I Sent., d. 17, q. 1 and I Sent., d. 27, qq. 4-7); W. Lampen, in De causalitate sacramentorum iuxta scholam frandscanam (Bonn, 1931), pp. 37-45 (edition of IV Sent., q. 1); L. Hodl, 'Literar- und problemgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Sentenzenkommentar des Wilhelm von Ware O.M. (nach 1305)', RTAM 57 (1990), 97-141 (edition of II Sent., d. 1, q. 6); C. A. Silvestri, 'William of Ware's "Quaestiones in IV libros Sententiarum" 2, q. 9: "Utrum repugnet alicui creaturae, inquantum creatura est, fuisse ab aeterno" (ca. 1300)' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 1995); Friedman, 'In principio' (cit. n. 20), App. 8, pp. 533-47 (editions of I Sent., d. 9, q. 5, I Sent., d. 13, q. 2, and I Sent., d. 27, q. 2); J. R. Bell, 'Conceiving the Word: Discussions of the Motherhood of Mary in the Oxford Franciscan School 1285-1315' (Ph.D. dissertation, Catholic University of America, forthcoming), ch. 4 (edition of III Sent., d. 4). 54 See Hodl, 'Literar- und problemgeschichtliche' (cit. n. 63), pp. 106-22. Hodl argues further that the dense marginal notation found in several MSS of William's Sent, (including Florence, Bibl. Laurenziana Cod. lat. Plut. 33 dext. 1, on which see J. Lechner, 'Beitrage zum mittelalterl. Franziskanerschrifttum vornehmlich der Oxforder Schule des 13.714. Jahrh., auf Grund einer Florentiner Wilhelm von Ware-Hs.', FranzSt 19 [1932], pp. 99-127) and which gives us a rather detailed view of the Oxford debate in the late 1290's on the subjects dealt with is not a product of this school revision but of a later scribe. 65 An edition of Ware's Sent, was announced in 1984 by C. Marabelli in Bulletin de philosophie medievale 26 (see C22), but no further announcement has been made since 1990 (see C23).
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how important he was for the development of John Duns Scotus' theology.66 D. John Duns Scotus
In any attempt to trace the intellectual history of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the Subtle Doctor, John Duns Scotus (d. 1308) looms large.67 This is perhaps especially true of an endeavor to look at intellectual history in the light of the Sentences commentaries produced in this time period, because Scotus used the Sentences commentary as the primary vehicle for his theological and philosophical speculation, lecturing on the Sentences several times and also revising his lectures. Despite the fact that the textual situation for Scotus' Sentences commentaries is extremely complex—both on account of Scotus' own repeated lecturing and reworking of his lectures and of the fact that his students and secretaries modified some of the resulting commentaries after his death—determined efforts to place and date the various versions have given us at least a likely scenario.68
66
Cf. Hodl, 'literar- und problemgeschichtliche' (cit. n. 63); idem, 'Untersuchungen zum scholastischen Begriff des Schopferischen in der Theologie des Wilhelm von Ware O.M. (| 1304)', in B. Mojsisch and O. Pluta eds., Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi (Amsterdam, 1991), vol. 1, pp. 387-408. Other confirmations of Ware's importance can be found in, e.g.: A. Emmen, 'Wilhelm von Ware, Duns Scotus' Vorlaufer in der Immakuladehre', Antonianum 40 (1965), pp. 363-94; S. D. Dumont, 'William of Ware, Richard of Conington and the Collatioms Oxonienses of John Duns Scotus', in L. Honnefelder et al. eds., John Duns Scotus. Metaphysics and Ethics (Leiden - New York, 1996), pp. 59-85; Bell, 'Conceiving the Word' (cit. n. 63). 67 For a recent overview of Scotus' life, works, and thought with bibliography, see S.D. Dumont's in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London - New York, 1998), vol. 3, s.v. 'Duns Scotus, John'. 68 What follows can be characterized as a slightly modified version of the "received view" of Scotus' life and works, which was first established in the introductions to the Vatican editions of Scotus' works and in several studies by Charles Balic. V. Richter, in the articles collected in Studien zum literarischen Werk von Johannes Duns Scotus (Munich, 1988), has called into question several of the basic assumptions of this received view of Scotus' works. Among the most important modifications that Richter has suggested are 1) the Lectura is not an independent work, but is merely an abbreviation of a version of the Ordinatio; 2) the MS (Assisi, Bibl. Com. 137) that was the basis for many of the editorial decisions behind the critical edition of the Ordinatio is in fact not the most reliable MS; 3) there is no need to postulate that Scotus ever lectured at Cambridge. Thus, many textual questions remain open in Scotus studies. To the editions from Scotus' Sent, commentaries listed in Schonburger and Kible (cit. n. 1) should be added: V. Richter, '"Univocatio—vestigium—imago": zu Scotus theologische Erkenntnislehre', in L. Sileo, ed., Via Scoti: Methodologica ad
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Scotus studied theology at Oxford and perhaps Paris in the 1290's. We are certain that he was in Oxford studying theology by the year 1300, and he delivered lectures on the Sentences there, lectures which have come down to us in the form of Scotus' Lectura. We know from Scotus' own testimony that he was at work on the revised version of his Sentences lectures, the Ordinatio, by 1300, and that he was in Oxford at this time. In the autumn of 1302, Scotus was sent to Paris to lecture on the Sentences. These lectures were interrupted by Scotus' expulsion from France in June 1303 as part of the dispute between King Philip the Fair of France and Pope Boniface VIII,69 but he returned to Paris after this exile no later than autumn 1304. By early 1305 he had been made a master of theology. Scotus was regent master at Paris until 1307, when the order moved him to the Franciscan convent in Cologne, where he died the next year. Besides the Lectura and the Ordinatio, we have several reportationes of Scotus' Parisian lecture series on the Sentences, and it seems likely that in at least his first lecture period at Paris (1302—03), Scotus was simultaneously lecturing on the Sentences and revising the last three books of his Ordinatio. One of the Parisian reportationes, the as-yet unpublished reportatio examinata on I Sentences (also known as Reportatio 1A) was certainly reworked by Scotus, and it most likely contains a text that post-dates book I of the Ordinatio.,70 In addition to all of these Sentences commentaries, Scotus may have lectured on the Sentences at Cambridge at some point in his career.
mentem Joannis Duns Scoti (Rome, 1995), pp. 509~24 (re-editions of I Ordinatio, d. 3, q. 2 and I Ordinatio, d. 3, q. 5) as well as the editions listed in n. 70 below. 69 See on this event and its ramifications for the University of Paris, W. J. Courtenay, 'Between Pope and King: The Parisian Letters of Adhesion of 1303', Speculum 71 (1996), pp. 577-605. 70 Prof. Timothy B. Noone has informed me that Allan Wolter and Girard Etzkorn are preparing a critical edition of Scotus' Rep. 1A from all five extant manuscripts. Noone himself has made available an edition of d. 36 of this work in 'Scotus on Divine Ideas: Rep. Paris. I—A, d. 36', Medioevo. Rivista di storia della filosqfia medievak 24 (1998), pp. 359-453. Other editions of previously unedited texts from Scotus' Sent, commentaries are found in the Innsbruck dissertations of K. Rodler ('Der Prolog der Reportata Parisiensia des Johannes Duns Scotus', 1991) and A. Eichinger ('Untersuchung iiber die "fruitio" im Pariser Sentenzenkommentar von Johannes Duns Scotus', 1994); on these see the short descriptions in ZKTh 113 (1991), pp. 502-03 (Rodler) and ZKTh 117 (1995), pp. 503-04 (Eichinger). Most recently,}. R. Soder, Kontingenz und Wissen: Die Lehre von den futura contingentia bei Johannes Duns Scotus (Munster, 1998), for Rep. 1A, has edited dd. 38 and 39-40, transcribed d. 43, q. 2 and d. 44, q. 2, and described the status quaestionis (pp. 217—23).
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This short biography should be convincing enough evidence for the central role the Sentences commentary played in the exposition of Scotus' thought. Both the impressive number of MSS and early printed editions of his Sentences commentary, as well as the obvious doctrinal influence that Scotus exercised through it, bear witness to the importance of Scotus' himself to later-medieval scholastic thought both within the Franciscan order and outside of it. In nearly every facet of theology and philosophy, Scotus made a mark; evidence of his impact on the scholastic discussion is nearly immediate within the Franciscan theological current, and by 1307 there is sign of a Dominican reaction.71 But it must be stressed that, while Scotus tackled the pressing theological and philosophical problems of his day with immense imagination and acuity of mind—and on at least the issue of the univocity of the concept of being he seems to have introduced a radically new position into the scholastic theological discussion—nevertheless most of his views have clear roots in the Franciscan tradition of the second half of the thirteenth century/2 On many matters, then, Scotus acts as something of a filter, taking in the Franciscan theological tradition that he inherited, and passing it on to those coming after him in a terminologically and conceptually updated form that would exercise immense influence into the early modern period. Recent studies have shown this to be true of,
71 For some early Franciscan reaction to Scotus' views, in this case critical, see Dumont, 'William of Ware' (cit. n. 66). Henry of Harclay's Parisian Sent, commentary offers more positive reaction to Scotus' work (although Henry was a secular, see below). Decker, Gotteslehre (cit. n. 14), pp. 45, 72, 86-87, maintains that the first Dominican polemic against Scotus of which we know (c. 1307) is Durand of St. Fountain's attack in the first redaction of his Sent, commentary, book I, d. 2, q. 1 (on the distinction of the divine attributes from one another). 72 Most importantly, Scotus consistently built up his own positions primarily through a critical confrontation with the thought of Henry of Ghent, who on many issues was a part of the Franciscan tradition. For Henry's role vis-a-vis Scotus see most recently Stephen Dumont's 'Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus', ch. 13 of J. Marenbon, ed., Routledge History of Philosophy, vol. 3: Medieval Philosophy (London, 1998), pp. 291-328. On pp. 296-97 Dumont suggests that a possible reason for Scotus' overwhelming reliance on Henry of Ghent could be the 1282 Franciscan restrictions on reading Aquinas, which made Henry's Summa an obvious alternative as a training piece in current systematic theology. I would add that the fact that Henry quite frequently has theological tendencies that agree with more general Franciscan tendencies may also help explain why Scotus found it so easy and profitable to engage in a prolonged one-way discussion with Henry.
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e.g., trinitarian theology, eucharistic theology, psychology and epistemology, and, as we will see below, it is also true of predestination.73 E. Sentences commentaries between Scotus and Auriol, c. 1300-1317
The study of the Sentences commentary for the period after Scotus presents special problems that make any claims about the authors, their works and doctrine, even more provisional than for the preceding 50-year period. To begin with, many of these works are—as is also the case for the majority of the Sentences commentaries from the earlier period—nearly completely unedited. But far more problematic than this are two characteristics of these commentaries, characteristics they share with the commentaries of William of Ware and John Duns Scotus and are a manifestation of the fact that the Sentences commentary was becoming a major vehicle of expression for theological ideas. First, Sentences commentaries tend to increase in size and complexity in these years; second, as will be clear below, many of the Sentences commentaries from this period exist in more than one redaction. In accordance with this difficult textual situation, there is a general lack of doctrinal studies dealing with the period. Further, without more textual work we cannot make more precise our poor knowledge of the relative dating of the scholars who worked in these years.74
73 For Scotus' trinitarian theology, see Friedman, 'In principle? (cit. n. 20), pp. 201-46 and idem, 'Divergent Traditions in Later-Medieval Trinitarian Theology: Relations, Emanations, and the Use of Philosophical Psychology', Studia Theologica 53 (1999), pp. 13-25, esp. p. 22. On the Eucharist, see Burr, Eucharistic Presence (cit. n. 30), pp. 1~2, 76-107 and Bakker, La raison, (cit. n. 25), vol. 1, passim. On psychology and epistemology, see e.g. Tachau, Vision and Certitude (cit. n. 54), pp. 55-81. 14 In what follows, I will not deal with the following Sent, commentaries. Richard of Bromwich, OSB (read at Oxford c. 1307-11, see Courtenay, Schools and Scholars [cit. n. 6], p. 371, n. 32, also p. 47), Worcester, Cath. Lib. MS F.I39, ff. 9-261 = I-IV (Question list and edition of I Sent. dd. 41-44 in M. Schmaus, 'Le Commentaire des Sentences de Richard de Bromwych OSB', RTAM 5 [1933], pp. 205-17). Radulphus Brito (lectured Paris 1308-09), Pavia, Univ. 244. The anonymous Dominican commentary found in MS Bruge, Stadtbibliothek 491, ff. 259r~315v (bk I = ff. 259r-299; II-IV = ff. 300-315), part of which may belong to William of Macclesfield and which was probably composed shortly after 1300 (Decker, Gotteslehre [cit. n. 14], pp. 49-72, 107; Ullrich, Schopfungslehre [cit. n. 37], pp. 79-90; Hodl, 'Geistesgeschichtliche' [cit. n. 38], pp. 112-14). The Sent, commentary of James of Lausanne, OP (read Sent. Paris, 1314-15, d. 1322) exists in two versions: a literal commentary (I-IV: Vienna, ONB 1468 and 4593; Krakow, Cath. I l l ; Maihingen, Furstl. Bibl. II Lat 1, ff. 1-45) and a ques-
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We have, however, rather firm dates for a few scholars of these years; for instance the Dominican Hervaeus Natalis (Herve Nedellec or Noel, d. 1323). Hervaeus read the Sentences at Paris shortly after 1300 (probably in 1302~03) and was regent master in theology there in 1307-09 and again in 1316-18. The written ordinatio of his commentary on I—IV Sentences, which is preserved in twelve MSS and two early printed editions, was probably worked into its present form in 1309 or later.73 Thus, Hervaeus is one of the increasing number of scholars who in these years were beginning to use the Sentences commentary as a vehicle for mature thought, returning to it after his schooling was officially over. Hervaeus was an immensely powerful figure in the first quarter of the fourteenth century: he was the head of the Dominican province of France beginning in 1309 and Minister General of the Dominican order from 1318 until his death. He was also one of the leading Thomists of his day and the driving force behind numerous polemics against scholars whom he thought had misrepresented or rejected the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas. Two of those scholars were in his own order: James of Metz and Durand of St. Pourcain.76 We know basically nothing about James of Metz' life: we do not know why he was called "of Metz", whether he became a master, or even when he died. From the texts of the copies of his Sentences commentaries that we have, we can deduce that he read the Sentences twice, and on the basis of comparison with roughly contemporary commentaries we can conjecture that the first lecture series took place around 1300—01, the second around 1302—03. While it would not have been unusual in this era for this second lecture course to have been at Paris as part of the requirements for
tion commentary (Prague, Met. Kap. C 27, HI, IV; Vienna, ONE 1542, MI, perhaps copied from Prague; and the Maihingen MS, up to I, d. 19, ff. 46-75). On MSS and versions see Schabel et al. (art. cit. below n. 83) (with ed. of I, d. 38 [2nd version]), and Koch, Durandus (cit. n. 37), pp. 279-85. Even the question commentary appears derivative of Durand and Peter of Palude: see Vollert, The Doctrine (cit. n. 37), p. 112; Decker, Gotteslehre (cit. n. 14), pp. 14-15, n. 7; Dettloff, Entwicklung (cit. below n. 91), p. 138; and below n. 170. 75 For an excellent biographical study of Hervaeus see A. de Guimaraes, 'Herve Noel (f 1323). Etude biographique', AFP 8 (1938), pp. 5-81. On the dating of the written version of his Sent, commentary, see Decker, Gotteslehre (cit. n. 14), pp. 73-77, 108. The Paris 1647 edition of his Sent, commentary was reprinted by The Gregg Press in 1966. 76 I will deal with the actual polemics and their place in the period's intellectual history below (§ IV); let it suffice here to give an account of the Sent, commentaries of these two important Dominican thinkers.
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incepting, we simply do not know whether James ever was at Paris.77 The nature of the written texts that preserve James' Sentences commentaries is very nearly as opaque as information on his life. There are twelve MSS that are known to contain the commentaries in whole or in part, but they present an impressive multiplicity of versions. The most recent study has suggested that from one original reportatio of James' first lecture series, two different revised versions were composed. On the basis of two different reportatioms of his second lecture series, five (!) different revised versions were composed.78 Whether James himself had a hand in the reworking of the original reportationes of his lectures, or whether much, if not all, of this was carried out by unknown students of his, is an open question. James' Sentences commentary has in fact received a great deal of attention from modern scholars. Starting with the foundational studies of Koch in the 1930's, and continuing with Hodl, Decker, Ullrich, and Kohler in the 1950's-'70's, his work has been focused upon both because his own Sentences commentary was attacked, presumably by Hervaeus Natalis, and because he influenced several Dominican theologians, among whom was Durand of St. Pourain. 79 77
See for the present state of the question, Kohler, Der Begriff (cit. n. 37), pp. 17-31. 78 Kohler, Der Begriff (cit. n. 37), pp. 32-66 builds upon and to an extent supercedes the earlier studies of Decker and Ullrich. For a list of MSS containing James' commentary see ibid., pp. 32-36; for a pictorial representation of Kohler's extremely complex suggested stemma, see p. 64. To the editions from James' Sent, commentary listed in Schonburger and Kible (cit. n. 1) should be added: Ott, Die Lehre (cit. n. 37), pp. 149-52 (= first lecture series, IV Sent., d. 7, q. 4). 79 Koch suggested that James was the "Lehrer des Durandus"; later studies have argued for caution on this point: thus far in all instances in which an influence of one on the other can be demonstrated, it appears to be James who had an influence on Durand, but this is not to say that James had any official connection to Durand. Hodl, Die Grundfragen (cit. n. 37), pp. 12, 135ff., 163ffi, 257-60, argues that the anonymous commentary on IV Sent, found in Vat. lat. 985 and Vat. lat. 1118 was written by a student of James of Metz between 1305 and 1309; this student elaborated on James' critique of Thomistic sacramental theology, and in particular criticized some positions taken by Hervaeus Natalis. Hodl argues further that Durand of St. Pourcain, when composing his IV Sent., relied on this anonymous commentary, but this claim has been contested and the question of direction of influence (and hence also of dating) seems to remain open (see Plotnik, Hervaeus Natalis [cit. n. 37], p. 53). Kohler, Der Begriff (cit. n. 37), pp. 205-08, shows some marked parallels between James of Metz' Sent, commentary and the anonymous commentary on I Sent, found in Codex Cent. II 6 of the Stadtbibliothek in Nurnberg, and he very hesitantiy suggests that the author of this commentary may have belonged to the same Dominican scholarly generation as James, John of Sterngassen, and William Peter Godinus (pp. 205-08, and esp. n. 150).
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Perhaps no one from this period was the focus of so much polemic as was Durand (d. 1334). Durand was roundly criticized and even censured for having held and taught opinions contrary to those of Thomas Aquinas, who, in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries became increasingly considered the normative theologian of the order. Durand's Sentences commentary has come down to us in three different redactions.80 The first redaction was connected with lectures that Durand gave at one of the provincial Dominican studia, and he worked it into written form in the years 1304-07 or 1308 at the latest; we have three books of this redaction (no MSS of book III have been found to date, although it seems certain that it existed in written form at one time), plus a fragment of additiones to the first book that modified and made more precise Durand's views. Durand began a second lecture series on the Sentences in Paris in 1307 or latest 1308, this time to fulfill the requirements for receiving his master's degree, and these lectures were eventually reworked into a second written commentary of which we have books II—IV; this reworking probably took place in 1310^11. Durand was regent master in theology at Paris from 1312-13, during which time Peter of Palude was also studying there. In 1313 he left Paris for Avignon where Pope Clement V had appointed him lector at the Papal Curia's school (the successor of William Peter Godinus). Durand redacted a third and final Sentences commentary later in his career, between 1317 and 1327, while he was bishop first of Limoux, then of Le Puy-enVelay, and finally of Meaux. It is this third version that was published some 15 times in the early modern period, and the Venice 1571 edition was reprinted by The Gregg Press in 1964. Around fifty MSS contain at least one of the books of the three redactions of Durand's Sentences commentary, primarily that of the third version, and this attests to the impact that his provocative theology had both within and without the Dominican order. Later theologians, e.g. Peter Auriol, the Augustinian Hermit Dionysius de Burgo Sancti Sepulchri (read Sentences 1316-17), and the Dominican Bernard 80 On Durand and his Sent, commentaries, cf. esp. Koch, Durandus (cit. n. 37), pp. 5-92 updated (especially for the first redaction) by Decker, Gotteslehre (cit. n. 14), pp. 77—88, 108; and my section in Schabel et al. (art. cit. below n. 83), arguing that some of Durand's second version of book I can be reconstructed from Peter of Palude. The most comprehensive study of Durand's thought of which I know is M.T.B.-B. Fumagalli, Durando di S. Porziano. Elementi filosofici della terza redazione del 'Commento alle Sentence' (Florence, 1969).
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Lombardi (read Sentences 1327-28) frequently use Durand as a foil.81 As was mentioned, Peter of Palude (d. 1342), whose is the final major Dominican Sentences commentary from our period, was studying at Paris while Durand was regent master there. Peter lectured on the Sentences at Paris probably 1310-12 and was regent master in theology there 1314-17. He reworked his lectures into the ordinatio that we have today beginning with book I in 1310/11, and thereafter III, II, IV; book IV was finished no earlier than the beginning of 1315.82 Peter was one of the many Dominican theologians who wrote against Durand, and he was a member of two Dominican committees that sat in judgment of Durand's commentaries in 1314 and then 1316/17. In fact, Peter's Sentences commentary was obviously meant to be a point by point rebuttal of Durand's, and he incorporates a great deal of Durand's Sentences commentary into his own as verbatim citations.83 A further special quality of Peter's Sentences commentary is imparted by his having been a canon lawyer of some stature; thus in book IV on the sacraments, Peter is in his element.84 There exist some 20 MSS that contain all or part of Peter's Sentences commentary as well as several early modern printings of the last two books (books I and II do not appear ever to have been printed).85 The popularity that this many MSS would seem to indicate is confirmed by the existence of a compilation, dating from around 1320, of extracts from Peter's I-III Sentences perhaps made by one
81 For AurioPs commentaries see below; on Dionysius and Bernard, see C. Schabel's contribution to this volume: 'Parisian Commentaries'. 82 On Peter in general see J. Dunbabin, A Hound of God: Pierre de la Palud and the Fourteenth-Century Church (Oxford UP, 1991); pp. 26-52 deal specifically with his Sent. commentary. On the dating, see Schabel et al. (art. cit. below n. 83). 83 See Dunbabin, A Hound of God (cit. n. 82), pp. 39—42; as Dunbabin remarks there, at least in book IV (and perhaps in book III) of his Sent, commentary, Palude was using the second version of Durand's Sent, commentary (Koch, Durandus [cit. n. 37] believed that he was using the first). In a forthcoming article ('Peter of Palude and the Parisian Reaction to Durand of St. Pourcain on Future Contingents', AFP), Chris Schabel and Irene Balcoyiannopoulou edit part of Palude's treatment of future contingents (I Sent., d. 38, q. 3) from all four extant MSS, and Schabel and I argue that Palude also used Durand's second version of book I. 84 See Dunbabin, A Hound of God (cit. n. 82) esp. pp. 42-51. 85 On MSS, see Kaeppeli (cit. n. 1), vol. 3 nr. 3286. G. Etzkorn in his extremely useful Iter Vaticanum Franciscanum: A Description of Some One Hundred Manuscripts of the Vaticanus Latinus Collection (Leiden - New York, 1996) mistakenly attributes the commentary on I Sent, in Vat. lat. 4284 to Palude; the commentary is really that of Peter Plaout de Palma (read Sent, at Paris c. 1391-93).
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of his students; the Sentences commentary of Peter's student, James of Lausanne is heavily dependent on Peter's commentary.86 It may seem odd to begin the discussion of Franciscan commentaries with the English secular theologian Henry of Harclay (d. 1317), yet on the issues on which his Sentences commentary has been studied thus far, Henry fits very much into the Franciscan theological tradition.87 Henry lectured on the Sentences at Paris, perhaps while Duns Scotus was there (after 1302), and the written commentary on book I that we possess has a definitely Scotistic stamp; in predestination, for instance, he follows Scotus' solution very closely. Henry went on to become the Chancellor of Oxford University in 1312, and to write a series of Quaestiones that reflect a spirit more critical towards Scotus and more independent than that in his Sentences commentary, and he is noted for, among other positions, his support of atomism and rejection of a Scotistic type of realism. Yet his commentary on the Sentences was important enough to have warranted that Aufredo Gonteri Brito, OFM, in the mid-1320's read his Sentences commentary secundum Henricum, and the two MSS of Brito's commentary on I Sentences are such verbatim copies of Henry's I Sentences (with additions here and there) that we have in essence four witnesses to Harclay's commentary.88 Thus, when Michael Schmaus
86 On the compilation found in MS Barcelona, Ripoll 77bis, see C. Schabel's contribution to this volume: 'Parisian Commentaries', n. 44, and Dunbabin, A Hound of God (cit. n. 82), pp. 35-36. On James of Lausanne's Sent, commentary (second version), see above, n. 74. 87 The fundamental study of Henry's Sent, commentary is still C. Balic, 'Henricus de Harcley et loannes Duns Scotus' in Melanges offerts a Etienne Gilson (Toronto — Paris, 1959), pp. 93-121, 701-02 with information on MSS and on Henry's doctrine and relation to Scotus. Richter, Studien (cit. n. 68), pp. 79-85, shows that in Henry's I Sent., d. 2, qq. 1-3 (which Richter edits, pp. 86-94) Henry used Scotus' Rep. 1A (Balic had also maintained that Henry made use of this text of Scotus) and that Henry was critical of Scotus' view; Richter gives as a date for the written version of Harclay's Sent, "wahrscheinlich vor 1310" (p. 81). To the editions listed in Schonburger and Kible (cit. n. 1) should be added: C. Schabel, 'Aufredo Gonteri Brito secundum Henry of Harclay on Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents', Disputatio 2 (1997), 159-95 (edition of I Sent. dd. 38-39); Friedman, '/« prmtipio1 (cit. n. 20), App. 9, pp. 548-54 (edition of I Sent. d. 11, q. 2). Hermann Kostler, 'Gotteserkenntnis im Sentenzenkommentar Heinrichs von Harclay' (Dissertation, Innsbruck, 1978) has edited three questions from Henry's I Sent, on this topic; I have not had access to this work, but see ZKTh 100 (1978), p. 686 for a brief description. 88 Henry's I Sent, is contained in Vat. lat. 13687 and Casale Monferrato, Bibl. del Seminario Vescovile MS B.2. See on Gonteri Brito, C. Schabel's contribution
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edited the question on predestination from the Sentences commentary of a then-unidentified follower of Scotus (= Gonteri Brito), he also provided us with an edition of Harclay's question!89 We know that Alexander of Alessandria (d. 1314) replaced John Duns Scotus as Franciscan regent master in theology at Paris when Scotus left for Cologne in 1307. He remained regent master at Paris until 1308. Alexander has left us two very distinct Sentences commentaries. The first commentary dates from sometime before 1303, and it can only be characterized as Bonaventurean. In the distinctions on predestination, e.g., not only does Alexander deal with the very same questions that Bonaventure had dealt with in precisely the same order as the Seraphic Doctor had, he also lifts whole passages from Bonaventure, rearranging them slightly to give what is in effect an abbreviation of Bonaventure's position.90 But apparently during his period as regent master, Alexander returned to the Sentences, and wrote a completely new commentary that is extremely different in character from his earlier work: at times influenced by Scotus, but on certain issues, e.g. predestination, not even mentioning the Subtle Doctor's ideas. The second version of Alexander's commentary seems to be a significant work of speculative theology authored by an independent and mature theological mind.91 We have all four
to this volume: 'Parisian Commentaries'. Balic, 'Henricus' (cit. n. 87) argues that the commentary on II Sent, found in Vat. Borgh. lat. 346 belongs to Henry (and that in his commentary on book II, Aufredo again read secundum Henricum), but Anneliese Maier has disputed this claim; see her 'Der anonyme Sententiarius des Borgh. 346', AFH 53 (1960), pp. 3-29 (reprinted in Maier's Ausgehendes Mittelalter, vol. 1 [Rome, 1964], pp. 307-34). 89 See M. Schmaus, 'Uno sconosciuto discepolo di Scoto. Intorno alia prescienza di Dio', Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica 24 (1932), 327-55; the question on predestination is found on pp. 345—55; out of this, only seven paragraphs were added by Gonteri. I hope to publish in the near future a composite text of Harclay and Gonteri that distinguishes between the work of the two theologians. 90 Indeed, Doucet (cit. n. 1) expresses doubt as to whether this "abbreviation of Bonaventure" was actually composed by Alexander, cf. nr. 55. I have used the early redaction of Alexander's Sent, commentary in Vat. Ross. 252 (predestination on ff. 52vb~55va). In trinitarian theology, Alexander is very nearly as Bonaventurean as in predestination, but he does show cognizance of debate after the Seraphic Doctor; see Friedman, 'In principle? (cit. n. 20), pp. 173-77. 91 See most recently M. Rossini, '"Quod coexsistit exsistit": Alessandro di Alessandria e i futuri contingenti', in Sileo, ed., Via Scoti (cit. n. 68), pp. 1049-63. Rossini announces here (n. 2) the preparation of a critical edition of the second version of Alexander's Sent, commentary. Rossini claims (p. 1049) that the first version of Alexander's commentary was neither corrected nor authorized by its author, whereas the second version was. For a study of some of Alexander's positions, see W. Dettloff,
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books of both versions; some seven MSS contain one or more of the books of the first version of Alexander's Sentences commentary and eight witness the second version. The relative popularity of his Sentences commentary may have something to do with the fact that from 1313 until his death in 1314 Alexander was the Minister General of the Franciscan order. Chronologically speaking, two Englishmen who probably never studied on the continent must be considered next. The first, William of Nottingham (d. 1336), has left us a commentary on I—IV Sentences that is extremely useful in putting together the historical context in which William worked. William's Sentences commentary, which survives in just one MS (Cambridge, Gonville and Caius 300/514), is perhaps well described as "chatty". He talks about the debates that he has witnessed or heard of, and the names of other scholars are even mentioned in his commentary, something that is not altogether common in this period of scholastic writing.92 William informs us, for example, that Scotus gave up one of his most controversial theological ideas (one that Scotus may have been censured for): that the divine persons were not relatives but absolutes.93 Moreover, William is the only theologian who tells us that John of Berwick, OFM, and William of Macclesfield, OP, held a trinitarian position that was discussed anonymously in practically every Sentences commentary between 1280 and 1320.94 From his citations of William of Ware, we know that the latter had a large influence on Nottingham, while it seems that Scotus did not. Nottingham probably read the
Die Entwicklung der Akzeptations- und Verdienstlehre von Duns Scotus bis Luther mit besonderer Berucksichtigung der Franziskanertheologen (Munster, 1963), pp. 4-10; Dettlof's work contains studies of nearly all the Sent, commentaries discussed in §§ I.E—F of this article. The text in Schonburger and Kible (cit. n. 1) nr. 10717 is Alexander's III Sent., d. 3, q. 1, and was edited by A. Emmen in his 'Wilhelm von Ware' (cit. n. 66), pp. 392-94. 92 To Schonburger and Kible (cit. n. 1) add: M. Schmaus, 'Neue Mitteilungen zum Sentenzenkommentar Wilhelms von Nottingham', Fran^St 19 (1932), pp. 195-223 (ed. of I Sent., dd. 38-41, 45—48 with qq. list for all four books); A. Emmen, in Marianum 5 (1943), pp. 245-60 (III Sent., d. 3, q. 1); J. Barbaric, Guilelmi de Nottingham O.F.M. (f 1336). Quaestiones sex de Eucharistiae sacramento (Rome, 1976) (IV Sent., dd. 8-13); and Bell, 'Conceiving the Word' (cit. n. 63), ch. 7 (III Sent., d. 3, q. 2). Barbaric argues that the commentary was composed before 1310 (p. 33). 93 For William's text, see Scotus, Opera Omnia VI, 'Adnotationes', p. 24*; for the context, see Friedman, 'In principio' (cit. n. 20), pp. 201-28. 94 See Scotus, I Ordinatio, d. 11, q. 2 (Opera Omnia V, p. 10) and Friedman, 'In principio' (cit. n. 20), pp. 189-92, esp. n. 78.
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Sentences in 1306-08, a date arrived at because he quotes from Scotus' Ordinatio, available from 1306. It is in part because he quotes from William of Nottingham's commentary on the Sentences that we can date Robert Cowton's commentary on I—IV Sentences to c. 1309-11. As far as we know, Cowton never became a master and never was in Paris—although Hechich, who has made a thorough study of Gowton and especially of book III of his Sentences commentary, suggests that he might have been at Paris at some time, since this would explain why Prosper of Reggio Emilia, OESA, mentions his name among Parisian opiniones.95 Cowton was a significant scholar as can be determined by the fact that 17 MSS contain one or more books of his Sentences commentary; further, an abbreviation of Cowton's I—IV Sentences was made by Richard Snetisham around the beginning of the fifteenth century, and this abbreviation itself exists in some ten MSS.96 Michalski has suggested that Robert's Sentences commentary survives in multiple redactions, but it is indicative of the little work that has been done on it that this suggestion has not been systematically put to the test.97 Doctrinally, Cowton is perhaps best known as an early defender of Mary's Immaculate Conception, although he has also been studied on his theory of future contingents and theory of belief.98 His thought is
95 On Robert being at Paris, see B. Hechich, O.F.M., De immaculata conceptione beatae Mariae virginis secundum Thomam de Sutton O.P. et Robertum de Cowton O.F.M. (Rome, 1958), p. 23 and nn. 71-72; on Cowton's Sent, commentary see ibid., pp. 31—47, and esp. for its dating see pp. 40—41 (the terminus ante quern is provided by the Quodlibetal questions of Robert of Walsingham O.Carm. [Quodl. I disputed early in 1312] and James of Ascoli OFM [disputed in 1311 or 1312], both of which quote from Cowton's commentary). To the editions from Cowton's Sent, commentary listed in Schonburger and Kible (cit. n. 1) should be added: V. Nadalin, Roberti de Cowton O.F.M. Quaestio disputata de ratione primaria incamationis (Rome, 1961), esp. pp. 31-58 (edition of III Sent., question preliminary to q. 1); Friedman, 'In principle? (cit. n. 20), App. 7, pp. 511-23 (edition of I Sent., d. 11); Bell, 'Conceiving the Word' (cit. n. 63), ch. 10 (edition of III Seat., d. 4). 96 There is mention in one MS of another abbreviation of Cowton's Sent, commentary made by the important philosopher John Sharpe, but the work is not otherwise known; two MSS, however, do contain a Notabilia super Sententias I—III secundum Cowton et Thomam. See on these abbreviations, besides Stegmiiller and Doucet (cit. n. 1), Hechich, De immaculata conceptione (cit. n. 95), pp. 29-32 and H. Theissing, Glaube und Theologie (cit. below n. 98), p. 8. 97 See for the suggestion, C. Michalski, 'Die vielfachen Redaktionen einiger Kommentare zu Petrus Lombardus', in Miscellanea Francesco Ehrle vol. 1 (Rome, 1924), pp. 219-64, esp. p. 259. 98 For the immaculate conception, see Hechich's book and, on a related issue, Bell, 'Conceiving the Word' (cit. n. 63); on future contingents, H. Schwamm, Robert
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often indebted to the important Parisian secular theologian, Henry of Ghent." A critical edition of Cowton's Sentences commentary is in the advanced planning stages at the Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften; the first volume is scheduled to appear in 2007/8.10° Other than the fact that his scholarly career was located at Paris, we know very little about Hugh of Novo Castro. The date for his lectures on the Sentences is normally given as 1307—17, but after a careful examination of the available evidence Valens Heynck concludes that everything speaks for sometime in the first years of the 1310's.101 In the same article Heynck presents evidence that suggests that Hugh came originally from a German speaking region, perhaps from Neufchateau in Lotharingia or from Neuberg in the custody of Basel, and not from Newcastle in England, although the evidence is slim either way (to avoid confusion, here I use the Latin 'Novo Castro').102 We have all four books of Hugh's Sentences commentary and there are 24 manuscripts known to preserve one or more of these books.103 At least books II and III (and perhaps book IV) are
Cowton O.F.M. uber das gottliche Vorherwissen (Innsbruck, 1931); on belief, H. Theissing, Glaube und Theologie bei Robert Cowton OFM (Miinster i. W., 1969). 99 See the works of Schwamm and Theissing (cit. n. 98) and below at and around n. 176. 100 I thank Dr. Alexander Eichinger of the Akademie for this information, and James Bell for alerting me to the fact that an edition of Cowton is in the works. 101 V. Heynck, 'Der Skotist Hugo de Novo Castro, OFM', FranzSt 43 (1961), pp. 244-70, esp. p. 257. Heynck's article supplements and on certain points supercedes L. Amoros, 'Hugo von Novocastro O.F.M. und sein Kommentar zum ersten Buch der Sentenzen', FranzSt 20 (1933), pp. 177-222. Amoros (pp. 193-222) gives a question list for book I of Hugh's commentary from MS Florence, Bibl. Laurenziana, S. Croce Plut. XXX dextr. 2. The most recent study of Hugh, as far as I am aware, is Eugenio Randi's // sovrano e I'orologiaio. Due immagini di Dio ml dibattito sulla "potentia absoluta" fra XIII e XIV secolo (Florence, 1987), esp. pp. 77-83, 124-30 (biographical and textual study), 131-72 (editions of texts from I Sent., dd. 42-44). The edition in Schonburger and Kible (cit. n. 1) nr. 14034 is from Hugh's commentary on III Sent., not I Sent, as claimed there. 102 See Heynck, 'Der Skotist' (cit. n. 101), pp. 264-67. 103 Heynck, 'Der Skotist' (cit. n. 101), p. 258, gives a list of 23 MSS. In addition, I was able to confirm with the gracious help of Dr. Robert Schweitzer of the Stadtbibliothek in Liibeck that, as both Doucet and Heynck suggested, MS theol. lat. 2° 116 of the Bibliothek der Hansestadt Liibeck contains book I (ff. 1-13 Iv), book II (ff. 133ra-222rb), and book III (ff. 225ra-293rb) of Hugh's Sent, commentary. This MS, as is the case with nearly all the other MSS of the library in Liibeck, was removed by Soviet forces immediately after the Second World War, and returned only in the beginning of the 1990's; see Robert Schweitzer, 'Die alten und wertvollen Bestande der Stadtbibliothek. Entstehung der Sammlung, Geschichte der Auslagerung, Bedeutung der Riickkehr' in Der Wagen. Ein liibeckisches Jahrbuch (1992), pp. 73-105.
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found in two redactions, and Heynck concludes on the basis of Hugh's citation of his own (presumably magisterial) Quodlibet (which is now lost) in the second redaction of book II that this redaction must date to his years as regent master at Paris (c. 1321/22). It seems that all of the copies of the first book that we have belong to this second redaction.104 As 24 MSS would indicate, Hugh seems to have had a great deal of influence, with such scholars as John of Bassol, Landulph Caracciolo, Aufredo Gonteri Brito, and Peter of Aquila bearing witness to this, and historians have seen Hugh as something of a key figure in early Scotism.103 We have no MS copies of the Sentences commentary of John of Bassol, OFM, (d. 1333) but an edition of all four books was printed in Paris in 1516-17; in addition, book IV was printed around 1480. We know from the explicit of the incunabulum that Bassol lectured on book IV in 1313 in Reims, and we can surmise that he lectured on the other books around the same time, but the printed Sentences commentary that we have is probably an ordinatio revised in the years after 1313, perhaps as late as 1320.106 John is best known as a favored
The Liibeck MS had been attributed in the handwritten catalogues of the library to Scotellus = Peter of Aquila. 104 On the redactions, see Heynck, 'Der Skotist' (cit. n. 101), pp. 258-60, 267; Randi, // sovrano (cit. n. 101), p. 129. 105 E.g. W. Volz, Die Lehre des Johannes de Bassolis von den Produktionen in Gott. Ein Vergleich mil der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus (Munich, 1969), p. 59, who claims: "Hugo de Novocastro scheint tatsachlich unter den ersten Schulern des Duns Scotus besonders geschatzt worden zu sein und fur manche von ihnen die Rolle eines Vermittlers der skotischen Lehre bzw. eines zweiten literarischen Vorbilds neben Duns Scotus gespielt zu haben." See also Heynck, 'Der Skotist' (cit. n. 101), passim. On Caracciolo, Gonteri Brito, and Peter of Aquila, see C. Schabel's contribution to this volume: 'Parisian Commentaries'. Schabel informs me that the parts of Aufredo Gonteri Brito's treatment of future contingents that are not copied from Henry of Harclay seem to be paraphrases of Hugh of Novo Castro's treatment (on Brito and Harclay, see above at and around n. 88). 106 Dettloff, Entwicklung (cit. n. 91), pp. 152-53 hesitantly claimed that Bassol attacks one of Peter Auriol's most characteristic positions, and suggested that Bassol's written commentary postdates Auriol's written work (c. 1316); Volz, Die Lehre des Johannes (cit. n. 105), pp. 24-25 rejects this possibility, claiming that the Sent, commentary we have from Bassol was written in or before 1313; yet the evidence offered by P. S. Azcona regarding the apparent mutual reliance of Peter of Navarre and John of Bassol (see below, n. 107) would seem to clearly indicate that Bassol's work was put into its written form later than 1313. More research is necessary before we have a firmer dating for Bassol. Volz' treatment of Bassol's life (pp. 6-17) and works (18-27) is the best I have found, superceding M. Pasiecznik, 'John de Bassolis O.F.M.', FS 13 (1953), pp. 59-77 and 14 (1954), pp. 49-80, which is, however, still useful for its study of John's thought. Note that the often-made claim that John
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disciple of Scotus, although it is now clear that he was by no means an uncritical follower of Scotus (cf. e.g. below § III, around n. 175). The Franciscan Peter of Navarre, who probably lectured on the Sentences in the early 1320's, is an important witness to the fact that Bassol did have some readership: many places in Navarre's commentary are clearly related to Bassol's text. In fact, Navarre's editor shows that there is a complex interrelationship between the work of Navarre and that of Bassol: in some cases the dependence seems to go one way, in some cases the other. We might be able to explain this by postulating that Navarre used an earlier redaction of Bassol's commentary than the one that we now have (a reportatio of the original Reims lectures?). We seem to be able to conclude that Bassol was an important source for Navarre, and in particular the former may have influenced the latter's reading of Scotus, but unless more evidence comes to light, it is not possible to be more specific than this.107 A final major Franciscan commentary from this period is that of William of Alnwick (d. 1333).108 Alnwick was one of Scotus' closest associates in the early fourteenth century, and most significantly for the present article he was involved in the editing of Scotus' Sentences commentary after the master's death and is given credit for compiling the so-called Additiones magnae, supplements to Scotus' I—II Ordinatio that attempt to fill gaps there. Alnwick's work has been used in the attempt to understand Scotus' thought and its reception better.109 Alnwick's university career seems to have been split between
died in 1347 seems to have originated in 1853, and to have no medieval or early modern source; see Volz, pp. 10-11. 107 See Doctoris Fundati Petri de Atarrabia sive de Ncwarra, OFM, In Primum Sententiarum Scriptum, 2 vols., ed. P. S. Azcona, OFM (Madrid, 1974), pp. 75-79 (see on Navarre, C. Schabel's contribution to this volume: 'Parisian Commentaries'). Volz, Die Lehre des Johannes de Bassolis (cit. n. 105), pp. 28-53 analyzes the relation between Bassol and Scotus, and pp. 55-64, shows that both Robert Cowton and esp. Hugh of Novo Castro influenced John's thought, also analyzing the contribution of, e.g., Thomas Aquinas. 108 Most recently on Alnwick, see G. Alliney, 'Quaestiones de tempore o // Sent., D. 2, QQ 1-3? Chiarimenti sulla tradizione manoscritta di Guglielmo di Alnwick', AFH 92 (1999), pp. 117—42; for the dating of Alnwick's career given below, see esp. pp. 138-39. For further information on Alnwick's life and work, see A. Ledoux's introduction to Alnwick's Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili et de Quodlibet (Quaracchi, 1937), pp. x-xlvi, as well as the literature referred to below, n. 109. 109 See, e.g., S. D. Dumont, 'The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the fourteenth Century: John Duns Scotus and William of Alnwick', Medieval Studies 49 (1987), pp. 1-75, and T. B. Noone, 'Alnwick on the Origin, Nature, and Function of the Formal Distinction', FS 53 (1993), pp. 231-61.
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Paris and Oxford. A remark in one of the manuscripts containing some of his writings claims that he was licensed to teach theology at Paris, which implies that he read the Sentences there. This probably took place in the period 1313-15; we know further that Alnwick was functioning as Franciscan regent master at Oxford while Henry of Harclay was Chancellor of that University (1312 17), perhaps in 1316. Alnwick then taught as regent master in Paris during the academic year 1317-18. After teaching at Paris, Alnwick served as lector at the Franciscan convents in Montpellier and Bologna; it is in this period that his Determinatioms (which form one of his most important and still unedited scholastic works) were disputed. There are two major MSS that contain Alnwick's commentary on I—IV Sentences, and several MSS contain fragments; only occasional questions have been edited from the work.110 As we have seen, throughout the entire period 1250 1320, the vast majority of extant Sentences commentaries are from Franciscans or Dominicans, but at least one commentary from the first two 110
The major MSS are Assisi, Bibl. Com. 172 (I-W) and Padua, Bibl. Anton. 291 (I-II). For a discussion of Alnwick's Sent, commentary along with a question list from these two MSS, see V. Doucet, 'Descriptio codicis 172 bibliotecae communalis Assisiensis', AFH 25 (1932), pp. 257-74, 378-89, 502-24; Doucet suggests that the two major MSS contain different versions of the commentary, pp. 272n, 518. For the most recent work on the various versions of Alnwick's commentary, see Alliney, 'Quaestiones' (cit. n. 108), esp. pp. 129-31. To the editions of texts from Alnwick's Sent, commentary listed in Schonburger and Kible (cit. n. 1) should be added: M. Bassi, 'La settima questione del Prologo del Commento alle Sentenze di Guglielmo di Alnwick' (pp. 129-56) and G. Alliney, 'E' necessario amare Dio? Una questione inedita di Guglielmo di Alnwick sulla fruizione beatifica' (pp. 87—112, edition of I Sent., d. 1, q. 1), both in G. Alliney and L. Cova, eds. Parva Mediaevalia. Studi per Maria Elena Reina (Trieste, 1993). S. D. Dumont in 'New Questions by Thomas Wylton', D&S 9 (1998), pp. 341-79, on p. 355 n. 34 refers to an edition of II Sent., q. 6 in J. D'Souza, The Principal Philosophical Tenets of William of Alnwick's Commentary on the Sentences' (Dissertation, Salesian Pontifical University, 2 vols., Rome, 1970); I have not had access to this work. Doucet, 'Descriptio', pp. 387-88 uses the Sent, commentary of John of Reading as evidence for Alnwick's authorship of his commentary; while we have no firm dates for John's commentary, it may well fall into our period since William Ockham cites it in his own commentary; on John, see most recently G. Alliney, 'Fra Scoto e Ockham: Giovanni di Reading e il dibattito sulla liberta a Oxford (1310-1320)', D&S 7 (1996), pp. 243-368, with an edition of I Sent., d. 1, q. 6, along with the literature referred to there (pp. 274-88). A final important Franciscan commentary that may be from these years is that tentatively attributed to Antonius Andreas, on whom see M. Gensler, 'Antonius Andreae—The Faithful Pupil? Antonius Andreae's Doctrine of Individuation', Mediaevalia philosophica Polonorum 31 (1992), pp. 25-37 and idem, 'Catalogue of Works by or Ascribed to Antonius Andreae', ibid., pp. 147-55 (on the Sent, commentary with list of MSS, p. 152).
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decades of the fourteenth century survives that was written by a member of another religious order: the Augustinian Hermit, Augustinus Triumphus (d. 1328).111 Augustinus is best known as a devoted apologist for papal power. In fact, his statements on this matter in his Summa de potestate ecclesiastica are rather extreme and this has drawn a great deal of attention, written as this work was in the twilight years of the "papal monarchy". Augustinus was a trained theologian, who was at Paris 1297-1300, and who read the Sentences there c. 1303. He was the Augustinian regent master in theology at Paris c. 1313. We have the first book of his Sentences commentary preserved in one MS (Troyes, Bibl. Mun. 296).112 F. Peter Auriol and William Ockham
While devoting a whole section to William Ockham's work in this overview of important Sentences commentaries seems to require no justification, the fact that the Venerable Inceptor must share that section with the French Franciscan Peter Auriol probably does. Whereas it was a commonplace in literature from the earlier part of this century to treat Auriol as something of a "nominalist" forerunner of his
111 The secular Henry of Harclay (see above) should also be remembered here. Thomas Wylton, another secular, lectured on the Sent, around 1310; only recently have any questions from Wylton's Sent, commentary been discovered; see on this C. Schabel's contribution to this volume: 'Parisian Commentaries' and esp. Dumont, 'New Questions' (cit. n. 110). For some thoughts on the reason for the skewed production of Sent, commentaries in this period, see W. J. Courtenay, 'Book Production and Libraries in 14th-Century Paris', Filosqfia e teologia nel trecento. Studi in ricordo di Eugenia Randi, ed. L. Bianchi (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1994), pp. 367—80, esp. p. 373. 112 See on this commentary, M. Schmaus, 'Die Gotteslehre des Augustinus Triumphus nach seinem Sentenzenkommentar', in Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters. Festschrift fur Martin Grabmann (Miinster, 1934), vol. 2, pp. 896-953, which includes a question list plus editions of several questions including that on predestination (pp. 948-51). For the dates, see A. Zumkeller, 'Die Augustinerschule des Mittelalters. Vertreter und philosophisch-theologische Lehre', Analecta Augustiniana 27 (1964), pp. 167-262, esp. pp. 174, 201-02. Besides Dionysius de Burgo Sancti Sepulchri mentioned above (at and around n. 81), two other Augustinian theologians seem to have left Sent, commentaries from these years: Prosper of Reggio Emilia's "commentary" on book I, Prologue and d. 1 (Vat. lat. 1086) composed around 1318, an important source of information about the theological faculty and discussion at Paris in the 1310's; Henry of Freimar the Younger who taught at Paris c. 1318-19, and has left Additiones in libros Sent, (which were printed in Basel in 1497 along with Giles of Rome's commentary) and a commentary on IV Sent, which is contained in whole or in part in 17 MSS. See on these two scholars, Zumkeller, 'Die Augustinerschule', esp. pp. 174, 203-04, 207-08.
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slightly younger contemporary Ockharn, in recent years it has become increasingly clear that Auriol was an extremely important and innovative thinker in his own right, whose ideas were in turn the focus of an immense amount of critical attention right into the Early Modern period.113 Thus, Auriol is beginning to be regarded as one of the major figures of later-medieval scholasticism, on a par in terms of ingenuity and influence (although not in terms of modern attention) with his English confrere. Auriol taught at Bologna and at Toulouse, before being sent to Paris in 1316 to read the Sentences as part of the requirements for attaining the master's degree. When he arrived in Paris, he had probably already finished his monumental Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, a work which in its early modern printing fills over 1100 folio pages, and of which we have the copy—finished in Cahors on May 19, 1317—that Auriol dedicated to Pope John XXII, one of his supporters.114 Besides the Scriptum, we have reportationes of lectures that Auriol held on all four books of the Sentences^ some of which
113 See e.g. Tachau, Vision and Certitude (cit. n. 54), pp. 85-112 and passim; Halverson's works cited below, n. 150; Friedman, "In principle" (cit. n. 20), esp. pp. 293-340; C. Schabel, Theology at Paris 1316-1345: Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents (Aldershot, 2000). For more information on Auriol along with a bibliography of Auriol studies, see The Peter Auriol Homepage (— http://www.igl.ku.dk/~russ/auriol.html). 114 The edition was published in Rome in 1596; the prologue and dd. 1—8 of Auriol's Scriptum have been edited from the copy that Auriol presented to the Pope (Vat. Borgh. lat. 329) by E. Buytaert in Peter Aureoli, Scriptum super Primum Sententiarum, 2 vols. (St. Bonaventure, 1952-56). To the editions of texts from Auriol's Sent, commentaries listed in Schonburger and Kible (cit. n. 1) should be added: J. Halverson, 'Peter Aureol and the Re-emergence of Predestinarian Pluralism in Latin Theology, 1317—1344' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1993), with preliminary editions of dd. 45-47 and parts of dd. 40 and 41; D. Perler, 'Peter Aureol vs. Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality', AHDLMA 61 (1994), pp. 227-262 (partial edition of Scriptum, d. 23); S. F. Brown, 'Peter Aureoli: De unitate conceptus entis (Reportatio Parisiensis in I Sententiarum, dist. 2, p. 1, qq. 1-3 et p. 2, qq. 1-2)', Traditio 50 (1995), pp. 199-248; C. Schabel, 'Peter Aureol on Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents', Cahiers de I'institut du moyen-dge grec et latin 65 (1995), pp. 63-212 (edition of Scriptum, dd. 38-39); idem, 'Place, Space, and the Physics of Grace in Auriol's Sentences Commentary', Vivarium 38 (2000), pp. 143-54 (edition of II Sent., d. 2, part 3, q. 1, along with MS study); Friedman, "/« principio" (cit. n. 20) App. 2-4 (editions of Scriptum, d. 9 [part 1], and d. 27), and App. 1 (MS study); R. L. Friedman, edition of Scriptum, d. 35, q. 4 available at The Peter Auriol Homepage (= http://www. igl.ku.dk/~russ/auriol.html). Especially for the details of Auriol's life and works other than his Sent, commentaries see A. Teetaert in Dictionnaire de theologie catholique 12,2, s.v. 'Pierre Auriol'; also Buytaert's introduction to the edition mentioned above. 115 Reportationes of Books II-IV were printed in 1605 in Rome along with Auriol's
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have obviously been reworked by Auriol himself, but the relationship between all of these texts is complex and historical study has been slow to get underway.116 Here it should be stressed, however, that Auriol is yet another example of the trend that was picking up speed from the late thirteenth century on of scholars using the Sentences commentary as the major vehicle of scholastic expression. After lecturing on the Sentences at Paris from 1316—18, Auriol was made a master at the written request of John XXII. Auriol stayed at Paris, serving as regent master until 1320 or 1321, when he was appointed by the same Pope to the Archbishopric of Aix-en-Provence. Auriol did not enjoy his new position for long: he died early in 1322. With the Sentences lectures of William Ockham (d. 1347), we have reached the end point of this overview of Sentences commentaries, 1250-1320. Ockham probably read the Sentences at Oxford in 1317 19, and from these lectures stem reportationes on II-IV Sentences111 Although he never took up duties as a master, Ockham was actively engaged in teaching, debate, and writing, probably in the Franciscan houses in Oxford and London, in the years 1319—24. It was during this time that he finished the major part of his scholastic work, including his Ordinatio on I Sentences.118 The rest of Ockham's story is generally well known: charges of heresy were brought against him in 1324 by the Chancellor of Oxford University, John Lutterell, and the ensuing case was delated to the papal curia in Avignon. There, while awaiting the judgement of a commission appointed by Pope John XXII to examine his writings (a commission that included Durand of St. Pourcain), Ockham became convinced that the Pope was a heretic, and he fled in 1328 to the court of Emperor Louis of Bavaria in Munich, where he spent the rest of his life writing rather vituperative political treatises against the Pope.119
single Quodlibet (composed 1320 at Paris). A critical edition of the unpublished Rep. in I Sent, is being prepared by L. O. Nielsen, C. Schabel, and myself. 116 See, however, L. O. Nielsen's contribution to this volume and the literature referred to there. 117 See, for a recent account of Ockham's life, works, and thought with bibliography, Claude Panaccio's in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London - New York, 1998), vol. 9, s.v. 'William of Ockham'. See also M. M. Adams' monumental William Ockham, 2 vols. (Notre Dame, Ind., 1987). 118 Ockham's Sent, commentary is now available in critical edition in his Opera theologica (St. Bonaventure, NY), Ordinatio - vols. 1-4 (1967-79) and II-IV Rep. vols. 5-7 (1981-84). 119 See on Ockham's case, J. M. M. H. Thijssen, Censure and Heresy at the University
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Auriol and Ockham mark the end of the period with which we are concerned here. In some ways they also mark a clear doctrinal beginning to a new period. The thought of Ockham and of Auriol would prove to be not only innovative and interesting, but also provocative to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, stimulating sometimes fervent debate and controversy. But that is a story for other chapters in this volume.120 Here, we must step back and examine the structural and doctrinal developments in Sentences commentaries that took place between 1250 and 1320.
II. The Changing Structure and Role of Sentences Commentaries, 1250-1320 In the seventy years under consideration here, the structure of Sentences commentaries underwent a marked development, so much so that one could in many cases make a reasonably accurate guess as to whether an anonymous commentary was written towards the beginning or towards the end of our period just on the basis of its structural characteristics. In addition, as has been mentioned above, Sentences commentaries took on a role during this period that they certainly had not had at its beginning, becoming a nearly unrivalled vehicle of expression for theologians' scholastic thought. An ever increasing number of theologians over the course of this period returned to the Sentences as a flexible framework in which they could develop their philosophical, scientific, and theological ideas. As a result, Sentences commentaries become one of the most—if not the most—valuable sources available to us for later-medieval treatments of these issues. Here we will look at each of these developments in turn. As mentioned above, Bonaventure and Aquinas both read and edited their Sentences commentaries in the early to mid-1250's. Hence, taking their commentaries as a starting point, we can get a good idea of how a thoroughly worked through Sentences commentary was structured in the mid-thirteenth century. There are, in fact, many similarities between their commentaries in terms of the way the works
of Paris, 1200-1400 [Philadelphia, 1998], pp. 14-15, 176-77 and the literature referred to there. 120 See, e.g., the contributions by C. Schabel.
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are structured. Looking at their Sentences commentaries as a whole, it is immediately clear that both theologians keep very close to the organizational principles in Lombard's text as it was available in the middle of the thirteenth century. Lombard's work was, of course, divided into four books—on God, creation and creatures, Christ and the virtues, and the sacraments and last things, respectively—which were further subdivided into "distinctions" (48, 44, 40, and 50 in each respective book).121 For all four books, Bonaventure and Aquinas commented on Lombard's text distinction by distinction, and within individual distinctions they deal with a variety of issues in roughly the same order that they appear in Lombard's text.122 Put simply, Bonaventure and Aquinas practiced an "exhaustive" method of commenting on the Sentences. Taking a closer look at the distinctions devoted to predestination in Aquinas and Bonaventure's commentaries (book I, dd. 40-41), further common characteristics quickly become apparent. Take the internal organization of the distinctions. Both authors begin their treatments with a divisio textus, a short, precise account of the major points Lombard discusses in the text under consideration, along with a description of the text's place in relation to its surrounding distinctions, in this case linking it to Lombard's treatment of divine knowledge (book I, dd. 35-39). There follows in both cases a short description of the subjects that will be broached in the main text of the distinction to follow. After this, comes the main body of the distinction. This is composed of several 'questions'—the basic unit of medieval theological (and philosophical, legal, and medical) inquiry— each one dealing with a specific, well-defined issue or topic.123 Bonaventure and Aquinas have 12 and 11 questions respectively in their
121
In turn, the distinctions were subdivided into chapters. While the chapter divisions stem from Lombard himself, the distinctions were an organizational convenience introduced by Alexander of Hales; see on this, I. Brady, 'The Distinctions of Lombard's Book of Sentences and Alexander of Hales', FS 25 (1965), pp. 90-116. 122 Cp. though Jan Aertsen in 'Aquinas's philosophy in its historical setting', The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas (cit. n. 4), p. 16; Weisheipl, Friar Thomas (cit. n. 4), p. 70; Torrell, Initiation (cit. n. 4), pp. 63~65, who claim that Aquinas organized his Sent, commentary differently than Lombard, based on a scheme of exitus and redditus, as opposed to Lombard's scheme of things vs. signs. This may be true on a theoretical plane, but the fact is that, esp. when viewed in light of later structural developments in the Sent, commentary as a genre, Aquinas kept very close to Lombard's text organizationally. 123 The medieval latin term for these "basic units of inquiry" varied; thus Aquinas
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dd. 40 41, and the large number of topics discussed by them is a manifestation of the exhaustive method of commenting on Lombard's text mentioned above. The large number is also a manifestation of the fact that their questions are small, taking up at most a few columns of text. The fact that the issues dealt with in the questions are well denned—indeed, narrow—makes finding one's way around a Sentences commentary from the middle of the thirteenth century rather easy. It is like having an extremely detailed table of contents: one can find in quite short order the question or questions that might have something to say about the particular philosophical or theological issue in which one is interested. The structure of the questions themselves is a shared feature of Bonaventure and Aquinas' commentaries, following a relatively set pattern of five distinct parts. Taking a question from Bonaventure as an example:124 1) The question to be addressed: Is predestination something eternal or temporal? (Utrum praedestinatio sit quid aeternum, an temporale?} 2) Next follow several arguments (in this case four) for the position "that predestination is something eternal" (Quod autem praedestinatio sit quid aeternum). These arguments can be "rational", reasoning from basic philosophical principles to a conclusion, or they can be "from authority", i.e. when one of the premises is a quotation from Scripture (as here, from Paul's letter to the Ephesians) or a Church Father. Often (but not always, and not in this specific case) the first arguments presented in a question will support the position that the author will eventually argue against.125 3) There follow several (in this case five) arguments (both rational and from authority) for the opposite position (in this particular instance: that predestination is temporal). This section begins with "on the contrary" (Contra or Sed contra]. 4) A 'conclusion' or 'solution' follows. This is the author's own considered opinion. In this case Bonaventure draws a semantic dis-
divided his distinctions into quaestiones and subdivided these into articuli, which were the basic units of inquiry; Bonaventure on the other hand divided his distinctions into articuli and subdivided them into quaestiones. I adopt 'question' for simplicity. 124 I Sent., d. 41, art. 1, q. 1. (Opera Otnnia, vol. 1, pp. 702-3). 123 More consistently than Bonaventure, Aquinas presents arguments for the position to be rejected first, and thereafter arguments for the position he will accept. See for a similar breakdown of one of Aquinas' questions, Aertsen, 'Aquinas's Philosophy' (cit. n. 122), pp. 18-19.
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tinction, claiming that predestination's principal significate is the divine essence (i.e. God's judgement to predestine this person), which is eternal, but its connotata are saved creatures and their grace and glory, and these are temporal. Thus, for Bonaventure predestination must be considered something eternal (pmedestinatio est quid aeternum et ab aeterno). 5) Rebuttals of the arguments for the position rejected close the question.
There are two things to be noted about this method of proceeding, over and above the fact that it is a feature shared by the Sentences commentaries of Aquinas and Bonaventure. First, it is "argument centered"; that is to say, the way in which the issue is defined is through various arguments being offered for two particular positions on the matter in question (usually a "wrong" position and the "right" one). This type of structure should be understood in contrast to the position-centered question that becomes popular towards the end of the century, in which the issue is denned through several well elaborated positions (each supported by several arguments). A second and related thing to be noted is that argument-centered questions are rather straightforward; they are most often short and to the point: it is a structure that lends itself to determining quickly where the author stands and why. Returning to the larger structure of their Sentences commentaries, the very end of d. 41 in each of their commentaries gives a nice example of the way in which Bonaventure and Aquinas closely follow Lombard's own organizational plan. At the end of I Sentences, d. 41, Lombard sets a "coda" that deals not so much with predestination per se, but with God's knowledge. For Lombard, returning explicitly to God's knowledge after having dealt with a subset of it (predestination and reprobation) was undoubtedly a means of showing that dd. 35-41 ought to be considered a unit, inasmuch as they all have to do with various facets of God's knowledge. But the only compelling reason for Lombard's commentators to deal explicitly with divine knowledge at the end of d. 41, was that Lombard did so: the issue could easily have been discussed fully in dd. 35 or dd. 38-39, where it topically fits more comfortably. By their inclusion of the coda on divine knowledge at the end of d. 41, Bonaventure and Aquinas again show just how closely they kept to the original structure of Lombard's text, and this is another manifestation of their exhaustive method of commenting on the text.
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At the end of each of the distinctions of his Sentences commentary, Bonaventure raises certain "doubts" (dubia) about Lombard's text.126 This is something Aquinas rarely does, and indeed these dubia are something of a throwback to an earlier period of Sentences commentaries and commentaries more generally, when the entire commentary was basically a gloss centered on various questions raised by words or phrases in the text. Gloss style Sentences commentaries—popular even in the scholarly generation before Aquinas and Bonaventure, as Alexander of Hales' Gloss on the Sentences shows—were far more bound to the text than are the question style commentaries Bonaventure and Aquinas favor.127 This is the great advantage of the question: it allows for a great deal more initiative on the part of the lecturer/author to explore many different issues, and his ingenuity can be seen not only in the solutions that he offers to knotty theological problems, but in the very questions that he raises. This, then, can serve to give an impression of the overall structure of mid-thirteenth century Sentences commentaries. We can mention as the two main general features they exhibit, 1) an exhaustive method of commenting on the text and 2) the employment of argument-centered questions. To see how this mid-thirteenth century Sentences commentary structure has changed in some commentaries by the early fourteenth century, we can use the Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus (c. 1300) as our point of departure, drawing in other early fourteenth-century commentaries in order to illustrate that Scotus' work is not atypical for the period.128 If we look at the overall structure of Scotus' work, we can see immediately that the exhaustive method of commenting on the Sentences is no longer completely in vogue. Although Scotus deals with nearly every distinction that appears in Lombard's text, he does ignore some altogether (e.g. he collapses I Sentences, dd. 14, 15, and 16 into one distinction). This is not atypical of the commentaries of the first twenty years of the four-
126 Bougerol, Introduction (cit. n. 3), p. 190, draws a link between these dubia and some of the questions from Odo Rigaud's commentary, but does not go into detail on this point; see also ibid., p. 131. 127 See on this P. Glorieux, s.v. 'Sentences' in Dictionnaire de theologie catholique, vol. 14, coll. 1859-83, esp. coll. 1874—75. As Glorieux notes, an even later example of the use of dubia is found in Bombolognus of Bologna's commentary, on which see above § I.E. 128 In what follows, my remarks are in general confined to commentaries on book I of the Sent., since this is what is best known and most available to me.
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teenth century. For example William of Nottingham collapses I Sentences, dd. 40 and 41 (both dealing with predestination in Lombard's Sentences] together and deals with them as a unit, and William does this in quite a few other places throughout his Sentences commentary;129 Robert Cowton and William of Amwick also collapse distinctions together or simply drop them.130 In fact, in some cases it is relatively clear that a part of this selection process is a type of redistribution of doctrinal topics, collecting various issues in particular distinctions. Take as an example of this, book I, dd. 33 and 34 (both on the nature of the divine trinitarian relations), which in the thirteenth century were among the most important of the distinctions having to do with trinitarian issues. These two distinctions were basically emptied of importance by early fourteenth-century Franciscan authors, who held to an emanation trinitarian theology. The result of this in the Franciscan commentaries of the era was that book I, dd. 33 and 34 became either rather perfunctory discussions, referring to or repeating other places in the commentary, or were ignored altogether.131 Scotus is an example of this: he collapses dd. 33 and 34 of his I Ordinatio together and devotes just two pages (in the critical edition) to this composite distinction, dealing with the issue sine argumentis; others who deal in a similar summary fashion are William of Nottingham and Robert Cowton. In general, then, what we see here is the movement from an exhaustive method of commenting on Lombard's text to a selective method. This movement becomes even clearer when we narrow our focus to the composition of individual distinctions. Whereas in each distinction of their commentaries, Bonaventure and Aquinas had had a whole series of relatively short questions, each dealing with one well defined issue, in Scotus' Ordinatio this is replaced by fewer questions within each distinction and much longer and more elaborate treatments of these fewer questions. We can start by looking specifically at Scotus' treatment of predestination: book I, dd. 40 and 41. In
129
See the question list in Schmaus, 'Neue Mitteilungen' (cit. n. 92). E.g. Cowton's treatment of predestination is one question that Cowton explicitly says covers dd. 40 and 41; for examples from Alnwick's commentary, see the question list in Doucet, 'Descriptio' (cit. n. 110). 131 See, Friedman, 'In principio' (cit. n. 20) passim. James Bell informs me that a similar redistribution took place in book III of early fourteenth-century Franciscan Sent, commentaries with regard to the complex of issues surrounding Mary's motherhood; see on this matter his dissertation, 'Conceiving the Word' (cit. n. 63). 130
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the first of these distinctions, Scotus asks just one question: "whether someone who is predestined can be damned" (utrum praedestinatus possit damnari}; this question is one of the shortest in Scotus' entire I Ordinatio, being a mere five pages in the critical edition; moreover his treatment of this issue explicitly builds upon and refers to his treatment of future contingents (I Ordinatio, d. 38). Thus, when one turns to d. 41 it becomes absolutely clear that this second distinction is the weightiest part of Scotus' treatment of predestination. Here Scotus asks, "Is there something merited about predestination or reprobation?"; this single question is 24 pages long in the critical edition. Thus in these two distinctions, Scotus has narrowed his attention down to one minor and one major topic, whereas Bonaventure and Aquinas each dealt with more than 10 different topics; on the other hand, in the major topic he deals with (the cause of predestination), Scotus has expanded his treatment enormously in comparison to either of the earlier theologians' discussion of this particular issue. The case is similar with regard to other distinctions in Scotus' Ordinatio: he has nearly invariably narrowed his field of inquiry, but what he chooses to discuss he generally treats at greater length than was the practice five decades earlier. While quaestiones unicae are rather common in Scotus' Ordinatio, even when he deals with multiple questions in a single distinction, his approach is often different from Aquinas and Bonaventure's. In many cases, Scotus does not deal with each of these questions as a discrete unit, but rather with all of them together as various facets of one larger issue. Thus, he frequently asks multiple questions altogether at the outset of the distinction and returns to them only after he has dealt with the larger issue, and then more by way of a summary of what has already been determined in the main body of the distinction (e.g., I Ordinatio, d. 2, part 2, qq. 1-4; ibid., d. 27, qq. 1-3). While a few theologians from the period 1300^20 include on average three or more questions in the individual distinctions, nevertheless we can comfortably generalize by saying that by the early fourteenth century, keeping close to Lombard's organization and subject matter was no longer the prime concern; theologians in this later period discussed the "hot" topics (or at least the ones that interested them most) and ignored the others. Thus, whereas Aquinas and Bonaventure, in their effort to stay close to Lombard's text, had included the "coda" on divine knowledge at the very end of d. 41, this is dropped in nearly every early fourteenth-century Sentences com-
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mentary. Further, in, e.g., their discussions of predestination, early fourteenth-century theologians tend to concentrate on only a few issues: whether someone who is saved can be damned, whether the number of the saved is necessary, and—by far the most hotly debated— whether there is a meritorious cause of someone's predestination. The process of moving from an exhaustive to a selective method of commenting on Lombard is by no means set in stone in the early fourteenth century, when one can still find theologians who more or less exhaustively comment on Lombard. Thus, we can see in Alexander of Alessandria's later Sentences commentary (c. 1307/08) a distinct conservatism at least in this respect: Alexander asks many questions (e.g., I Sentences, d. 40 has 7 qq.; d. 41 has 6) and in roughly the same order that one would expect from an earlier commentary, and he even includes the coda question on divine knowledge; moreover, he gives rather detailed divisiones textus in his commentary, something that reminds more of Bonaventure and Aquinas than of the typical early fourteenth-century commentary.132 A similar conservatism can be seen in Augustinus Triumphus' Sentences commentary.133 Hugh of Novo Castro often asks 3-5 questions per distinction,134 and the Dominican commentaries are as a group somewhat more conservative in their use of the selective method than are the Franciscan: one most often finds 2-3 questions per distinction with very few distinctions ignored in the commentaries of Hervaeus Natalis, James of Metz, Durand of St. Pourcain, and Peter of Palude.135 But, it should be noted that 2 or 3 questions per distinction is significantly fewer than what is routinely found in Bonaventure and Aquinas. Moreover, as a type of confirmation of the trend being described here, the tendency to deal with fewer and fewer issues in greater and greater
132
I have examined Alexander's I Sent. (later redaction) in Vat. Borgh. lat. 311 (dd. 40-41 on ff. 145r-49v); the coda question is contained on ff. 149ra-va. 133 See the question list for Augustinus' commentary in Schmaus, 'Die Gotteslehre des Augustinus Triumphus' (cit. n. 112). 134 See the question list for Hugh's I Sent. in Amoros, 'Hugo von Novocastro' (cit. n. 101). 135 The structure of Hervaeus' I Sent. is somewhat out of the ordinary in that book I ends with d. 42 (see reprint cit. above, n. 75). I have had access to the versions of James of Metz' second redaction found in Vat. Borgh. lat. 122 (I-IV Sent.) and Vat. Palat. lat. 373 (I-II Sent.) and to Durand's version III in the reprint of the Venice 1571 ed. (Gregg Press, 1964). I have examined Peter of Palude's commentary on book I in MS Paris, Bibl. Mazarine 898; Palude appears to average some 3-4 questions per distinction, slighdy more than his contemporary confreres.
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depth and to leave aside Lombard's original ordering of topics and distinctions will continue into the later fourteenth century, when several commentaries on the Sentences resemble Pierre d'Ailly's (read at Paris 1375-76) with only 21 questions in the entire commentary, and with book II completely ignored.136 That the development becomes so radical in the later period is caused at least in part by the fact that, whereas in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries the norm appears to have been a two-year lecture period (and Aquinas had at least three years), perhaps on account of mounting pressure to get more students through the system, beginning in the mid-fourteenth century, it became expected that one year would suffice.137 Not only had the arrangement of questions within distinctions changed by the time we reach Scotus, so had the way individual questions were structured. As we saw above, when Aquinas and Bonaventure wrote, there was a relatively fixed structure for the individual question, and this structure was built up around an "argument-centered" arrangement. As the thirteenth century wore on, however, more and more fully developed positions on any particular issue accumulated and as part of the living theological debate of the time these positions had to be taken into account by authors of Sentences commentaries. Indeed, examining many positions provided an opportunity for the authors to exhibit their critical skills and demonstrate in a clear fashion how their own solution to the problem at hand was superior to those previously offered. This no doubt contributed to the fact that argument-centered questions become less and less typical, being replaced by "position-centered" questions: an arrangement in which several positions, each described at some length and supported by a number of arguments, became the focus of attention. In this type of question, the author developed his solution gradually—in fact, dialectically—in contradistinction to the various opinions presented and critically considered. This is certainly one of the reasons that questions had in general become larger and more elabo-
136 See on this development, P. Bakker and C. Schabel's contribution to this volume; Glorieux, s.v. 'Sentences' (cit. n. 127), coll. 1873-76; idem, 'L'enseignement au moyen age. Techniques et methodes en usage a la Faculte de Theologie de Paris, au XIII siecle', AHDLMA 35 (1969), pp. 65-186, esp. pp. 116-17. 137 See WJ. Courtenay, 'Programs of Study and Genres of Scholastic Theological Production in the Fourteenth Century', in J. Hamesse, ed., Manuels, programmes de cours et techniques d'enseignement dans les universites medievales (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1994), pp. 325-50, esp. 333-36.
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rate by the beginning of the fourteenth century: both the presentation and the refutation of each rival position was given a large amount of space, and often only after several positions had been analyzed in this fashion did the author offer his own position, which then in turn had to be elaborated and defended from possible attacks. A good example of a position-centered question is found in Scotus' treatment of the cause of predestination in his Ordinatio (I, d. 41, q. un.): 1) The question to be addressed: Is there something merited about predestination or reprobation? (Utrum sit aliquod meritum praedestinationis vel reprobationis?} 2) Next follow the "principal arguments" the arguments that frame the entire question by presenting a 'yes' and a 'no' position. Here Scotus begins by presenting two arguments (one rational and one from authority) that seem to show that human beings must merit their salvation or damnation. 3) There follow several arguments (in this case two, both from authority) for the opposite position, that human beings do not merit their salvation. This section begins with "on the contrary" (Contra).
Thus far, Scotus' question is very similar to what we would find in Bonaventure or Aquinas. But it is at this point—where Bonaventure or Aquinas would come with their "conclusion", i.e. their own considered opinion—that Scotus' treatment begins to look different: 4) Scotus' reply to the question, which consists of several modules, in each of which he presents and considers one position along with a number of arguments used to support it: a) A position offered and then retracted by Augustine. b) A position offered by Peter Lombard. c) A Thomistic position138—here Scotus uses several arguments taken from Henry of Ghent in order to refute the Thomistic position. d) Henry of Ghent's position on the matter,139 which—as is typical—Scotus takes as the springboard for his own ideas, and against which he argues in his own name (contra istud arguo). e) Scotus' own considered view.140 Here Scotus also presents possible objections to his own position and replies to them.
138
For Thomas' position, see below, at and around nn. 154-57. For Henry's ideas on predestination see his Quodl. IV, qq. 18-19 and esp. Quodl. VIII, q. 5. The most reliable study of Henry's theory of predestination to date is that of Marilyn McCord Adams in her William Ockham (cit. n. 117), pp. 1311-16. 140 For Scotus' view, see below, at and around nn. 167-69. 139
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5) Rebuttals of the principal arguments for the position rejected close the question, as was the case with Bonaventure and Aquinas.
Thus Scotus' presentation is built up around an examination of four positions that have previously been offered as solutions to the problem of the cause of predestination, and Scotus' own position is more or less explicitly created in an attempt to avoid the difficulties that he himself or (as he claims) others have pointed out with the other positions described. Scotus' Ordinatio is composed almost without exception of position-centered questions. To give just one other even more elaborate example of this type of question, I can mention I Ordinatio d. 11, Scotus' treatment of the distinction between generation and active spiration (the emanation of the Son and the Holy Spirit respectively). In this distinction, Scotus presents no less than seven positions, acting like a narrator adjudicating between the various positions, dismissing what he finds unacceptable, but taking from them what he finds to be worthwhile and what will eventually play a role in his own solution to the question.141 This type of complex "orchestrated" or "dramatic" structure for individual questions within Sentences commentaries—with each position playing a set role in the process of revealing the "proper" opinion—becomes the rule during the first decades of the fourteenth century. Scotus is certainly not the only one who uses it: it can be found in the Sentences commentaries of, among others, Henry of Harclay, Hervaeus Natalis, Durand of St. Pourcain, Peter of Palude,142 Robert Cowton, Hugh of Novo Castro, Peter Auriol, and William Ockham. As has been mentioned, the argument-centered question of Bonaventure and Aquinas had distinct advantages: it made and makes it fairly easy to determine the author's position on any particular issue addressed. Position-centered questions, on the other hand, are dialectical: one arrives only gradually at an understanding of where the author stands in relation to the other positions presented. Moreover, the exhaustive method of commenting on the Sentences practiced by
141
See Friedman, 'In principio' (cit. n. 20), pp. 239-46. Dunbabin, A Hound of God (cit. n. 82), pp. 32-34 remarks on this structure in Palude's commentary. Dunbabin seems to claim (p. 34) that this style of commenting 1) aimed at identifying "small nuggets of truth instead of offering large conclusions" and 2) contributed to the fact that "original formulations of problems surfaced only occasionally"; perhaps it is a question of defining terms, but I see very little evidence for either generalization. 142
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Bonaventure and Aquinas, and in particular the large number of discrete questions that they asked within the distinctions, functions almost like an index to their commentaries, making it relatively easy to determine where to look in order to find their position on any given subject. Are there no advantages, then, to the structural characteristics that became popular in commentaries of the early fourteenth century? It is without question true that, on account of the selective method of commenting on the Sentences, it is difficult to determine precisely where an early fourteenth-century theologian's ideas on any particular subject will be. Because fewer subjects are explicitly broached, important discussions on any given subject that might interest the modern researcher may be "buried" in discussions of more or less closely related topics (or may not be found at all). So, one has to "dig" more in a commentary from the later part of our period. On the other hand, if one investigates what interested theologians of the time—what they devoted whole questions and distinctions to—one will often find longer and more detailed treatments of those topics than were usual in the earlier part of the period. Here questions that are position-centered can also be of help: while they make it more difficult in practice to determine quickly the theologian's own position than typical argument-centered questions, they are nevertheless useful because they gave the author many opportunities to set out his own position in an extremely precise manner in contrast to other positions. Thus the style of commentary that emerges in the later part of our period certainly does have advantages. Put shortly: it takes more work, but allows for great precision. Having shown that the structure of commentaries changes in the fifty year period between Bonaventure and Aquinas on the one hand and Scotus on the other, the question naturally arises as to when and how these changes in the structuring of Sentences commentaries came about. This is not an altogether easy question to answer. As a group, the Sentences commentaries from the first thirty or so years following the composition of Bonaventure and Aquinas' commentaries do not deviate in any significant way from the structure we have seen to characterize the latter. Thus, they use an exhaustive method of commenting, in general dealing with every distinction and asking many, short questions within the distinction. To make the latter point a little more concrete, it can be mentioned that Peter of Tarentaise' I Sentences, dd. 40 and 41 together contain 17 questions;
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Bombolognus of Bologna 12; Walter of Bruges 14; Matthew of Aquasparta 13; Giles of Rome 16. In line with this exhaustive method of commenting, they keep very close to Lombard's text, e.g. at the end of book I, d. 41 all of them include a coda question on divine knowledge. Further, the questions contained in these commentaries follow the same structure we saw Bonaventure and Aquinas use above: argument-centered questions are the rule. Even as late as the last decade of the thirteenth century or first few years of the fourteenth, we can find a commentary like that of Peter of Trabibus, which has a very traditional structure, exhaustively commenting on the text and employing most often argument-centered questions (and here one could mention Alexander of Alessandria's even later second redaction). Yet it is in the 1290's that we can clearly see the first movement towards a selective approach. Thus, while in some distinctions William of Ware asks 5 or even 7 questions, and the questions are discretely dealt with one after another, nevertheless he drops several distinctions completely from his first book (e.g. dd. 24 and 25, dd. 29 and 31; book I ends at d. 36).143 Likewise, John of Paris drops certain distinctions and averages some 2-3 questions per distinction (but with as many as 8 qq. in some distinctions).144 So at this point, given our incomplete knowledge of the Sentences commentaries of the era, it seems as though the change from exhaustive to selective commenting on the Sentences took place in the 1290's, and hence that Scotus was one of its first practitioners. The story seems to be more interesting with regard to the development of position-centered questions. Here we can isolate a possible root of this type of question, which laid the foundation for its widespread adoption in the later part of our period. It has already been mentioned that Peter of Tarentaise in many of his questions presented the views of both Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure and— in line with the non-confrontational attitude of his time—either left the question open or tried to harmonize the views of the two ear143 See the question list in Daniels, 'Zu den Beziehungen' (cit. n. 63), which unfortunately does not give the distinctions to which the questions listed belong; the claim about dropped distinctions is based on my own work with MSS of William's I Sent. Note, however, that Lechner, 'Die mehrfachen' (cit. n. 63) posited multiple redactions of Ware's commentary in part because various MSS contain the same material in different distinctions. 144 See the edition of books I—II of John's Sent, commentary (cit. n. 39), it is difficult to determine how much the fact that John's work is a reportatio might affect its value as a witness to the trend under discussion here.
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Her theologians. Here we see that Peter by default uses an early version of the position-centered question, where the positions are simply Bonaventure's and Aquinas'. I say that Peter used an "early version", because although he does sometimes use the other positions in the creation of a new position of his own (e.g., by harmonizing them), quite often he leaves the matter unresolved or goes with the one author or the other. One can find questions similar to those found in Peter's Sentences commentary in, e.g., Walter of Bruges, in Bombolognus of Bologna, in Giles of Rome, and in Richard of Mediavilla.145 Perhaps this early use of the position-centered question set a precedent for the more elaborate use found in e.g. William of Ware, whose questions are nearly always position centered, and who uses the positions that he describes as a means to precisely delimit his own solution to the problem at hand. Thus, again we seem to have a situation in which the 1290's formed the crucial transition period from the use of the old style of question (argument centered) to a more modern one (position centered). It was mentioned above (§ I.E) that it is difficult to get any kind of overview of the Sentences commentaries that we have from the early fourteenth century, and it was suggested that this is due ,to two characteristics of these commentaries. The first characteristic has its origins in precisely the development that we have just considered: the commentaries become structurally more complex, and, as we have just seen, this can be both a help and a hindrance when studying the doctrine contained in them. The second characteristic is that many of the Sentences commentaries from this period exist in more than one redaction. Partially the explanation for this latter development lies in the fact that the Sentences commentary was increasingly viewed as a preferred tool when a theologian wanted to make public his theology and philosophy. Lombard's Sentences was a ready made framework for theological and philosophical speculation that every theologian was of necessity familiar with from his theological education, and it gave nearly endless opportunities to discuss just about any topic one might want to discuss. Thus, some theologians, e.g. Hervaeus Natalis, Durand of St. Pourcain, Peter of Palude, 145 In fact, one can find this type of question in Bonaventure and Aquinas, but it is rare; see e.g. each of their I Sent., d. 13. For examples from Richard of Mediavilla, who sometimes presents three positions, see e.g. Friedman, 'In principio' (cit. n. 20), pp. 165-73.
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Alexander of Alessandria, and Hugh of Novo Castro, used their regency or even time in their later administrative careers to polish their Sentences commentary into an ordinatio. But a second reason for there being several redactions of the commentaries of these years has to do with the fact that the Sentences seems to have been increasingly used as a textbook at several levels of mendicant theological education towards the end of the thirteenth century, and the theologians who lectured on it often used the opportunity to redact a version of their commentary. The mendicant orders ran two distinct educational programs at their major studio, generalia.146 The more basic program was called the 'lectorate', and involved all education up to but not including the stage of bachelor of the Sentences. Although this stage of mendicant education would take place at a studium generate of the order, nevertheless the program was internal to the order in question, requiring no interface with a University. Once completed, the lectorate made the student eligible to begin the second of the two mendicant educational programs, the doctorate, the most important requirement of which was reading the Sentences at a studium generate. Completing the lectorate was also the prerequisite for the theological student to teach in one of the order's provincial convents. Completion of the lectorate seems thus to have been a minimum requirement for further activity in the order's system of theological education. We have a good deal of evidence that in the later part of our period it was common practice that, after they had finished the lectorate, those mendicant theological students who would eventually pursue the doctorate, would spend several years in teaching or administrative duties, 146
See for a detailed picture of the way that this system worked in the Franciscan order (with references to literature for the Augustinian Hermits), W. J. Courtenay, 'The Parisian Franciscan Community in 1303', FS 53 (1993), pp. 155-73, esp. 157-63; B. Roest, A History of Franciscan Education (c. 1210-1517) (Leiden, 2000), pp. 87-115 (on degree programs), 123-33 (on Sent.). For the Dominicans, see Guimaraes, 'Herve Noel' (cit. n. 75), pp. 25~32 and M. M. Mulchahey, "First the Bow is Bent in Study . . ." Dominican Education before 1350 (Toronto, 1998), esp. pp. 331—36, 383-84, which also deals with the importance of the Sent, in this connection. In Schools and Scholars (cit. n. 6), p. 47, n. 56, W.J. Courtenay mentions that the written version of the Sent. commentary of the Benedictine Richard of Bromwich (on whom, see above, n. 74) was created before he read the Sent, for the degree at Oxford; we can thus infer that the Benedictines used a similar system. While Courtenay's Parisian Scholars in the Early Fourteenth Century: A Social Portrait (Cambridge, 1999) focuses primarily on secular scholars, pp. 111-13 contain interesting comments on the effect the mendicant educational system had on the geographical make-up of the mendicant student body at Paris.
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rather than immediately advancing to the doctorate. Those who returned to teaching duties at some provincial studium, might well lecture on the Sentences as a part of their own teaching of less advanced students. This system had at least two advantages. First, the order ensured that it had advanced teachers, who had already carried out a great part of their theological education at a studium generate, lecturing at the more minor theological stadia of the order. Second, these students who lectured on the Sentences at the provincial studio,, got in effect one or more "practice runs" on their Sentences commentary, something that would undoubtedly prove to be of value in the event that they were chosen to go to Paris (or Oxford) and read the Sentences as part of the degree requirements for the doctorate in theology. Here is the significant point for Sentences commentaries in the later part of our era: we have written Sentences commentaries from quite a number of scholars that originated in lectures earlier than those that finally helped earn them their degree. Scotus is a fine example of this: both his Oxford Lectura and the Ordinatio based on it antedate (for the most part) his lecturing for the degree at Paris. William of Ware is another example of an English scholar who lectured at both Oxford and at Paris. Continental scholars also followed this type of study program: lecturing first away from Paris and then at the capital of theology itself. As we have seen, the first redaction of Durand of St. Pourgain's Sentences commentary was composed while he lectured at one of the Dominican provincial convents, and it is only the second redaction that reflects his lectures at Paris; William Peter Godinus and perhaps James of Metz followed the same sort of pattern. The only Sentences commentary that we know of from John of Bassol originated in lectures at the Franciscan convent at Reims; a similar situation holds for the slightly earlier commentaries of Peter of Trabibus, who lectured in Italy, and Vital du Four, who lectured in Montpellier.147 Finally, we see this same pattern with Peter Auriol, who lectured at Bologna and Toulouse, in the process laying the groundwork for his mammoth Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, before beginning the two years of lecturing at Paris which eventually earned him the master's degree. The fact that
147 The same may be true of John of Erfurt. Peter Olivi had also lectured on the Sent. in France and Italy at provincial studia. We seem to have too little evidence from the earlier part of our period to say anything about the concrete effects of this system before about 1290-95.
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the Sentences seems to have been taught on a fairly regular basis at the provincial studia. of the mendicant orders speaks eloquently for the work's significance, both to the orders and to the individual scholars who were lecturing on it.148 Just as importantly for our purposes, it has had the effect that we have several redactions of a number of Sentences commentaries after 1290. Thus, by the time we reach the 1290's and into the early fourteenth century, in addition to all of the more purely structural development that we have examined here, the Sentences commentary seems to have taken on an extremely important role in especially mendicant education, even apart from its obvious significance as a partial requirement for the doctorate. In line with this, it should be added, the reputation that a good Sentences commentary—i.e., one that would draw attention without creating scandal—could procure for a scholar was one road to success and promotion in the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Witnesses to this fact include such diverse scholars as William Peter Godinus, Durand of St. Pourcain, and Peter Auriol, the promotion of whom by the Pope to trusted positions followed closely on their Sentences lectures.149 Most importantly, the Sentences commentary was no longer a work that was nearly exclusively associated with a student's pursuit of the doctorate, it was a work that was a—perhaps the—preferred format for the theologian.
III. Predestination: A Short Doctrinal Case Study
We have seen that in terms of the structure of their Sentences commentaries, there is a great deal of similarity between the commentaries produced by Bonaventure and Aquinas. Also doctrinally, in many areas, we can find a great deal of overlap between their Sentences commentaries. Here, their positions on the cause of predestination will be considered, and we will follow the development of the doc-
H8 This significance is confirmed by several MSS in which it appears that we have elaborate notes made as preparation for actually lecturing on the Sent. See, e.g., P. Glorieux, 'Un avant-projet de Commentaire sur les Sentences', RTAM 23 (1956), 260-76; this "avant-projet" is dated by Glorieux to around 1290. Richard Knapwell's Notablia (on which, see above § I.B) were probably also preparatory notes. 149 See also Courtenay, Schools and Scholars (cit. n. 6), pp. 46-47 and C. Schabel's contribution to this volume: 'Parisian Commentaries'.
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trine through to 1320.150 While in Aquinas and Bonaventure's commentaries the cause of predestination and reprobation take up only a small part of the two distinctions devoted to the issue of predestination (basically one question each out of 11 and 12 respectively), in later commentaries, in which the number of questions contained in each distinction decreases, this becomes the principal issue. Hopefully, this short doctrinal case study will serve to give an impression of the ebb and flow of debate in these years, as well as a more precise picture of lines of influence than has been possible up to now, although it must be stressed that this is merely a case study.151 What—and just as importantly, who—causes predestination? The answer to this question in the later Middle Ages had to take into account two accepted parameters. First, there was God's transcendence, on account of which nothing a human being did could "force" God to save him or her. A theory of predestination in which human beings were able to merit salvation on the basis of their own abilities was called "pelagian", after the fifth-century writer Pelagius, who maintained that human beings could merit salvation without any supernatural assistance. Pelagian theories of predestination were considered generally unacceptable in the Middle Ages. God's transcendence is thus one of the parameters later-medieval theologians had to work with. On the other hand, it was generally agreed that human beings had free will; most later-medieval theologians tried to ensure that there was room for human free will in their theories of predestination, if for no other reason than because God would seem to 150 On predestination in this period, see, e.g., P. Vignaux, Justification et predestination au XIV" siecle: Duns Scot, Pierre d'Auriole, Guillaume d'Occam, Gregom de Rimini (Paris, 1934); W. Pannenberg, Die Prddestinationslehre des Duns Skotus im Zusammenhang der scholastischen Lehrentwwklung (Gottingen, 1954); J. L. Halverson, Peter Aureol on Predestination: A Challenge to Late Medieval Thought (Leiden — New York, 1998) and idem, 'Franciscan Theology and Predestinarian Pluralism in Late-Medieval Thought', Speculum 70 (1995), pp. 1-26 (also the studies of related issues in Dettloff, Entwicklung [cit. n. 91] and Auer, Gnadenlehre [cit. n. 27]). In my study of predestination, I have kept the quotation of Latin texts—even from MSS and early printed sources—to a minimum. Full documentation of my claims will have to await another article specifically dealing with the issue of predestination in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. 131 In particular it should be stressed that the history of medieval theology could never be written on the basis of Sent, commentaries alone; even in the later part of our period, when they play an extremely large role, in order to study e.g. predestination, one would have to look at many other sources (e.g. quodlibetal and disputed questions, summae) to get a reliable picture of the ebb and flow of debate, the lines of influence, and the significance of ideas.
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be unjust in damning a person without taking into account that person's free actions. So, here we see that the notion of a just God also plays a role in discussions of this issue. Thus, the question of the cause of predestination boils down to what role the individual's merit or demerit plays in the mechanics of salvation. Both Bonaventure and Aquinas hold a position on the cause of predestination and reprobation that has been dubbed "SPE": single particular election. SPE was an attempt to explain why some are predestined to eternal glory and others reprobated to eternal punishment, while striking a balance between God's transcendence and justice on the one hand and human free will on the other. James Halverson describes SPE as follows: According to SPE God actively wills to save particular individuals, and therefore those individuals receive grace. Those for whom God does not will salvation do not receive grace and thus remain in sin and justly merit damnation. According to this account, the term 'predestination' refers to the divine will to save particular individuals; reprobation refers to the foreknowledge of sins in those toward whom God does not have such a will.152
Thus, on single particular election, God of his own boundless mercy elects certain individuals to be saved; all those who are not elected by God are damned on account of their own sins. It should be noted that SPE was a remarkably successful explanation for the processes of predestination and reprobation: it was held in one version or another not only by Bonaventure and Aquinas, but by all scholastic theologians in the period before Peter Auriol. If on the whole, Aquinas and Bonaventure agree on SPE as the way to explain the cause of predestination, they are not in complete agreement on the details. SPE was an extremely broad explanation, and quite a few versions of it were promulgated over the years. Bonaventure's understanding of the processes of predestination and reprobation are based on a semantic breakdown of these terms. As we have already seen (§ II), Bonaventure claims that the act of predestination has a principal significate, the divine willing for a creature to be saved, and two connotata, i.e. the saved creature's grace and final glory. Bonaventure draws a similar distinction with regard
152 Halverson, 'Franciscan Theology' (cit. n. 150), p. 1; also idem, Peter Aureol (cit. n. 150), passim.
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to reprobation: the principal significate is God's eternal purpose (i.e. not willing for this individual to be saved—NB: this is not the same as God willing for this individual not to be saved), the connotata are the hardening of the sinner's heart and his or her final punishment. Through these semantic distinctions, Bonaventure explains just how predestination has a meritorious cause and how it does not. In the process of predestination, we have first God's eternal purpose to save this particular person. This has no meritorious cause on our part. The person is then infused with grace, something that he or she could never earn on their own and is thus again unmerited. Finally, the person receives eternal glory, this time merited by the fact that they died in a state of grace. There is a corresponding process for reprobation: first God's eternal purpose to ignore this particular person with respect to salvation (i.e. to will nothing for them): this is uncaused; then the temporal hardening of the sinner's heart, which does have a meritorious cause in the person's sin; finally eternal punishment is merited on the basis of dying in a state of sin. Thus, there is an asymmetry in the processes for predestination and reprobation, and this asymmetry arises specifically at the middle step of the processes: those for whom God has willed salvation are saved through no merit of their own; those for whom God has not willed salvation are damned on account of their own sin. This is SPE.153 Aquinas too gives an SPE theory: predestination for Aquinas is God's active will to save certain individuals; reprobation, on the other hand, is his will to permit certain individuals to sin, and hence to be justly damned.154 In contrast to Bonaventure, however, Aquinas consistently talks about predestination in contrast to its effects, grace and glory; similarly with the sinner's hardening of heart and eternal punishment with respect to reprobation.155 That is to say, Aquinas draws a sharper distinction between predestination, on the one hand, and grace and glory, on the other, than does Bonaventure (who thought that all three were involved in "predestination"); we can
153
I Sent., d. 41, art. 1, q. 1 (Opera Omnia 1, p. 729). See Summa theologica, q. 23, aa. 2-3. Aquinas' position underwent some development in the course of his career, and here I rely on the later work, since that is what many medieval theologians after Aquinas will use on this issue; but one can certainly find Aquinas' theory in nuce in his I Sent., dd. 40-41; see also below, § IV at and around n. 199. 135 Summa theologica, q. 23, a. 5 forms the basis of the following exposition (but see also I Sent., d. 41, q. 1, a. 3). lo4
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perhaps describe the Franciscan's view as more flexible on this point, and it is no accident that the greatest amount of development in theories of predestination throughout our period comes from Franciscans.156 If we take as our starting point what Aquinas means by predestination and reprobation, and ask whether there is a cause of predestination, then according to Aquinas we have to draw a distinction between a cause in general—i.e. is there a cause that God predestines some unspecified individuals but does not predestine other unspecified individuals—and a cause in particular, i.e. is there a cause that this particular individual is predestined, while that particular individual is not. To this latter question, Aquinas answers no: God simply chooses as pleases him without there being any cause or reason for the choice. If we ask whether there is a cause for predestination and reprobation in general, however, Aquinas maintains that God saves some and allows others to be damned because this better expresses his justice and goodness, and makes the universe more perfect. Further, if we turn back to the distinction between predestination and its effects, the predestination or reprobation of an individual has no meritorious cause—God simply decides who is saved, and ignores all others—yet the effects of an individual's predestination or reprobation can have meritorious causes. Thus, e.g., glory is the final cause of grace, while grace is the efficient cause of glory. Here again, then, we have SPE: God actively decides only who is saved, but their own sin is the meritorious cause of a sinner's punishment. We can look briefly at one other sub-issue to predestination in Aquinas and Bonaventure, a sub-issue that will come to play a large role in the later part of our period: the two theologians differ on whether predestination is primarily an act of the divine intellect or of the divine will. Bonaventure holds that, although one can say that it is either, he himself prefers to say that it is primarily an act of the will rather than the intellect. Aquinas, on the other hand, holds
156 See on this last point, Halverson, 'Franciscan Theology' (cit. n. 150), p. 3. I do not want to overemphasize this difference between Bonaventure and Aquinas— Aquinas admits for example that grace and glory are included "obliquely" in the definition of predestination, while it is implicit in Bonaventure's account that grace and glory are effects of predestination (taken as predestination's principal significate); it is nevertheless true that Aquinas draws a more explicit distinction between predestination and its effects, grace and glory, than does Bonaventure.
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that it is primarily an act of the intellect, and only concomitantly an act of the will; predestination, for Aquinas, is an act of the divine intellect knowing causally who is to be actively saved.157 Although neither theologian will say that predestination is exclusively an act of the one attribute or the other, nevertheless, they each lean toward a particular attribute, and these early tendencies become increasingly important in later thinkers (see also below and in § IV), where Dominicans clearly have an intellectualist bent (e.g. Hervaeus Natalis, Durand of St. Pourgain, Thomas Anglicus) while Franciscans have a clear voluntarist leaning (e.g. John Duns Scotus, Peter Auriol, William Ockham). The last point serves to illustrate the foundational role that Bonaventure and Aquinas play in the general doctrinal development of the period 1250-1320. While later scholars certainly do refer back to earlier participants in the university scholastic discussion—especially to Albert the Great and Alexander of Hales, who were noticeable influences on Aquinas and Bonaventure respectively—nevertheless it is Aquinas and Bonaventure who lay the groundwork for what will develop into competing theological (and more broadly, intellectual) traditions among the Dominicans and Franciscans respectively. In the specific case of the cause of predestination, this certainly holds true. As we have seen, Bonaventure and Aquinas had major areas of agreement on the issue—e.g., they both hold SPE—but on several more minor matters they disagreed or at least did not fully agree. In the development of the doctrine of the cause of predestination in the Sentences commentaries of the period 1250—1320, what we will trace is what happened to those disagreements over the course of the period, because they were the loci for change. In particular the Franciscans developed Bonaventure's ideas where they were not in accord with Aquinas into a position that deviated significantly from the Dominican development of Aquinas' ideas; and eventually, in the form of Peter AurioPs theory of General Election, the Franciscan tradition broke completely with SPE. Thus there came into being over the course of this time period theological traditions among the Franciscans and the Dominicans. By 'tradition' I understand a handing
157 See Halverson, Peter Aureol (cit. n. 150), pp. 78-81 and the texts given there; Halverson (p. 80, n. 10) overstates his case against the secondary literature: Pannenberg, at any rate, knew that Bonaventure leaned towards predestination being an act of the will; see Pradestinatiomlehre (cit. n. 150), p. 34, esp. n. 33.
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down from one scholarly generation to the next of general positions on—one might call them: very basic approaches to—certain philosophical and theological problems. These positions were often developed within the one tradition in conscious opposition to the other tradition, but the positions were general enough that there was also usually a great deal of disagreement and development internal to each tradition. These theological traditions in the two largest mendicant orders color the intellectual history of the time, drawing in theologians from other orders and those unaffiliated with any order.158 Two things, however, must be stressed about this scenario. First, these theological traditions only stabilize over time, so especially in the 1250's through 1270's they were by no means set in stone; moreover, as was mentioned above (§ I.B) we find not only theologians who adopted positions from both Bonaventure and Aquinas, but also some who tried not to take sides in any basic divergences in the tendencies of the two groups and indeed some who seem to have actively endeavored to make Bonaventure and Aquinas agree. The early period was characterized by non-confrontationalism; as we will see below in § IV, only after around 1280 does confrontation between the theological traditions become marked. Second, at no time was any thinker necessarily a party-liner on any particular issue; thus a Franciscan theologian who leaned towards Bonaventure on the issue of predestination, might well reject him outright when discussing some other issue. If we consider the Sentences commentaries of the early period soon after Bonaventure and Aquinas read the Sentences, we can rather quickly confirm the general tendency toward non-confrontationalism already noted. As was mentioned above (§ I.B), doctrinally Peter of
158
See also § IV, below. Predestination was certainly not the only area of theology that saw this type of development. In trinitarian theology similar traditions are found (see Friedman, 'Divergent Traditions' [cit. n. 73] and especially idem, '/« principle? [cit. n. 20]); David Burr in Eucharistic Presence (cit. n. 30) has shown how in the period up to Scotus, Franciscan eucharistic theology developed away from the essential agreement of Bonaventure and Aquinas. Other examples are to be found in: Kent, Virtues of the Will (cit. n. 5), pp. 94—149 on voluntarism and the will's freedom among the Franciscans; Putallaz, Figures Jranciscaines (cit. n. 31), pp. 81-140 ("sensibilites franciscaines"), who offers in particular a study of theology as a science and concludes that there is "une certaine unite doctrinale chez les Franciscains post-bonaventuriens" (p. 115), and who traces these shared doctrinal tendencies primarily back to the Franciscan religious ideals of poverty and the evangelical life (e.g. p. 116).
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Tarentaise' commentary has been described as being something of a middle road between Aquinas and Bonaventure, but often Peter leans towards Bonaventure's solution to particular problems. This latter holds good in Peter's treatment of the cause of predestination, where he uses Bonaventure's semantic breakdown of 'predestination' and 'reprobation' in order to explain how SPE works.139 But Peter is not alone in his acceptance of the Bonaventurian framework: in fact, what is striking about the treatments of predestination of these years is that the Bonaventurian, and more generally Franciscan, semantic analysis of predestination is predominant.160 It is perhaps no surprise that there is a tendency among the Franciscan theologians to follow Bonaventure and use an explicitly semantic account in which various—in this case three—meanings of the words 'predestination' and 'reprobation' explain just how these processes have a meritorious cause and how they do not. And this is indeed what we find in e.g. John Pecham and William de la Mare;161 Walter of Bruges, while accepting Bonaventure's semantic framework, gives predestination one principal meaning and four different connotata: in addition to glory, three different kinds of grace.162 What is perhaps more 159
Ed. cit. (n. 10), p. 340 (predestination), 341a (reprobation). It should be noted, as Halverson has pointed out (e.g. 'Franciscan Theology', [cit. n. 150], pp. 3-4), that Bonaventure's semantic solution is in its essentials something he inherited from Alexander of Hales; thus while it is at least likely that in many of the cases below, Bonaventure was the direct or indirect source of the semantic treatment of predestination, I do not want to rule out the possibility that Alexander of Hales or the Summa Halensis also played a role. 160 This conclusion runs contrary to Halverson's claim ('Franciscan Theology', [cit. n. 150], p. 1) that "the most popular version of SPE in the thirteenth century was articulated by Thomas Aquinas", but neither Halverson nor I have investigated the many quodlibetal questions and other theological sources from the period. 161 John Pecham, I Sent., d. 41, q. 1 (Florence, Bibl. Naz. Conv. Soppr. G. 4. 854, f. 116ra): ". . . in praedestinatione tria intelliguntur: propositum aeternum, gratia, et gloria; similiter in reprobatione (obduratione MS) tria: praevisio aeterna et propositum, poena temporalis obdurationis, et aeterna <poena>. Primum in praedestinatione et primum in reprobatione non sunt a meritis creat [a], quia sunt aeterna; ultimum in praedestinatione et reprobatione simpliciter cadunt sub merito, scilicet gloria et poena aeterna; de duobus vero mediis, distinguitur, quia poena temporalis obdurationis simpliciter cadit sub merito, gratia vero non cadit sub merito . . ." For William de la Mare's treatment, see ed. cit. (n. 23), pp. 495-96. 162 Walter of Bruges, I Sent., d. 41, q. 1 (Vat. Chigi. lat. B. VI. 94, f. 73v): "Responsio: praedestinatio quinque includit, scilicet propositum Dei aeternum, gratiam praevenientem, gratiam iustificantem, gratiam persevare facientem, et gloriam beatificantem. . . . Dic ergo quod praedestinatio quoad primum, propositum Dei aeternum, nullo modo habet (?) causam meritoriam, et sic loquuntur sancti; quoad secundum, scilicet gratiam praevenientem, potest habere meritum digni . . ."
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surprising is that Dominicans—in addition to Peter of Tarentaise— also use the Seraphic Doctor's explanatory model. Thus, Bombolognus of Bologna gives a Bonaventurian account,163 while Roman of Rome relies on a mixture of Bonaventure and Aquinas, neatly blending a semantic and a cause/effect distinction together.164 In fact, the only theologians among these early writers of Sentences commentaries who stay close to Aquinas' explanation for the cause of predestination are Giles of Rome, Nicholas of Ockham, and, to a lesser extent, Richard of Mediavilla.165 Just as important, however, as the fact that a Bonaventurian version of SPE was most current at the time, is the fact that the disagreements between Bonaventure and Aquinas were not remarked on. Scholars in these early years were not interested in showdowns between the positions of the two earlier theologians. We will return shortly to the development of predestination in the Dominican tradition after around 1285. Here, I will simply restate that the Bonaventurian SPE account was predominant in the Sentences commentaries of the Franciscan tradition into the 1290's.166 This is significant when we turn to the cause of predestination in the thought of John Duns Scotus. In the older works of Vignaux and Pannenberg, 163 Bombolognus of Bologna, I Sent., d. 41, q. 1 (Bologna Univ. 753 [1506], f. 87va): "Respondeo: de praedestinatione est loqui dupliciter: uno modo quantum ad principale (?) significatum praedestinationis, alio modo quantum ad connotatum, quod duplex est: presens gratia et futura gloria . . .". Bonaventure's influence is prominent also in Bombolognus' III Sent.; see e.g. C. Piana, 'L'influsso di S. Bonaventura su la Cristologia di Bombologno da Bologna', Antonianum 23 (1948), pp. 475-500. 164 Roman of Rome, I Sent., d. 41, q. 2 (Vat. Palat. lat. 331, f. 90ra): ". . . attendendum est quod in praedestinatione duo sunt. Unum quod est de principali significato praedestinationis, aliud quod ad id sequitur, praedestinationis scilicet effectus. Quoad primum, praedestinatio non habet causam, quia praecognitionis et voluntatis divinae causa non est. . ." 165 For Giles, see ed. cit. (around n. 35), f. 217ra, and Decker, Gotteskhre (cit. n. 14), p. 243, nn. 47-48. For Nicholas of Ockham, see MS Florence, Bibl. naz. conv. soppr. G. 5. 858, f. 45ra (= d. 41, q. 3). I have not had Richard's commentary available to me as I wrote, and have relied on Hocedez, Richard (cit. n. 28), pp. 247-52. 166 Unfortunately I have had access to neither Peter Olivi's question on predestination listed in Koch's article (cit. n. 52) nor to John of Erfurt's treatment of the issue. William of Ware (as far as is known) did not deal with the issue, and the question on predestination that Pannenberg, Pradestinationslehre (cit. n. 150), pp. 51-52, studied was in fact the work of Martin of Alnwick (see above n. 63). M. Schmaus has edited Peter of Trabibus' I Sent., dd. 38 and 40—41 in 'Des Petrus Trabibus Lehre tiber das gottliche Vorauswissen und Predestination', Antonianum 10 (1935), pp. 121-48; Peter gives an SPE account that is more explicitly cause and effect than the usual Franciscan treatment, ibid., pp. 143-44; for further Thomistic influence, see p. 147.
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Scotus was seen as having broken radically with the Franciscan tradition on this issue, but more recently Halverson has shown that Scotus was in fact well in line with it, although he does make use of a new terminological and conceptual apparatus.167 Scotus introduced into the discussion of predestination the logical concept of "instants of nature", i.e. a non-temporal ordering based on logical priority.168 Thus, one durationless instant—even God's eternal "now"— can be divided into several instants of nature which reflect the logical order of action "in" that instant. Scotus uses this tool to describe very precisely what it means for Peter to be saved and for Judas to be reprobated. In the first instant of nature, Peter and Judas are presented to God's will as complete equals. In the second instant of nature, God wills grace for Peter, while he does not will anything for Judas. In the third instant of nature, Peter, on account of God's having willed him grace, is ordained to glory, while God permits Judas, who has not received grace, to lapse into mortal sin. Finally, in the fourth instant of nature, while Peter is given eternal glory, God wills that Judas be justly punished for his evil use of free will.169 For our purposes here, there are two main items of interest in Scotus' theory of predestination. First, as Halverson has pointed out, Scotus' asymmetrical causal processes for predestination and reprobation over four instants of nature is equivalent to the Franciscan semantic approach to this issue that we have already seen. Take away the logical framework built around instants of nature and substitute instead principal significates and connotata, and one can discern quite clearly, e.g., Bonaventure's SPE theory. The second instant of nature, at which point God of his own accord grants grace to Peter and not to Judas, is equivalent to Bonaventure's principal significate of predestination, and is absolutely unaffected by human merit or demerit; the third instant, when God actually gives grace to the one and not to the other, is parallel to the first connotata of predestination and reprobation; the fourth instant is likewise parallel
167
See Halverson, 'Franciscan Theology', (cit. n. 150), pp. 4-5. On "instans naturae" and their background in the scholastic discussion of the later thirteenth century, see S. D. Dumont, 'Time, Contradiction, and Freedom of the Will in the Late Thirteenth Century', D&S 3,2 (1992), pp. 561-97, and the literature referred to there. It should be noted that this logical priority is conceived by the theologians who use it to be in re extra, and is not a merely conceptual device. 169 I Ordinatio, d. 41, q. unica (Opera Omma VI, pp. 332-34, nn. 40-45). 168
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to the second connotata. The second main thing to be noted about Scotus' theory is that there is a singular stress on God's will in it, something we have also seen in its beginning stages in Bonaventure; Scotus' theory is a voluntarist theory, a tendency that he has borrowed from his theological tradition and made more pronounced. But if Scotus' theory is equivalent in a certain sense to earlier Franciscan SPE theories, it must be said that it has been thoroughly repackaged. Scotus' theory of the cause of predestination is colored by his use of instants of nature, and this is one way that we can trace his impact in the period that follows. For Scotus' large impact on the thought of the Franciscans who wrote in the first twenty years of the fourteenth century has been taken for granted in much of the secondary literature on the period. Indeed, Scotus has often been taken as the starting point for investigation of this period (and even of the previous period, in the search for "forerunners" to Scotus). In a like manner, Thomas dominates the literature on Dominican thinkers who wrote from 1290 until 1320. Thus, when studying the thought of these 20-30 years, we confront immediately two terms that are prominent in the historiography on this era: Thomism and Scotism. Taking the cause of predestination as our case-study, we can get at least an impression of the usefulness of these terms in one particular subject, and try to determine to what extent they can and should be used as descriptive categories for the scholars of these years. Thomism is the easier to tackle. Thanks to Bruno Decker's investigation of the Sentences commentaries of James of Metz and his contemporaries, we have a study of most of the Dominican commentaries from these years on predestination. Decker's conclusion is that with a few minor developments added by Giles of Rome and William Peter Godinus, the doctrine of James of Metz and that of Durand of St. Pourcain in the first redaction of his Sentences commentary is consistent with that of Thomas Aquinas. Moreover, Decker shows that James' and Durand's ideas on the subject in all of their essentials are the same as those found in the Sentences commentary of the recognized Thomist Hervaeus Natalis; I can add that they are also essentially the same as those of John of Paris, John of Sterngassen, and Peter of Palude.170 As a group, then, the Dominicans of these
1/0
See Decker, Gotteslehre (cit. n. 14), pp. 238-51. I have consulted Sterngassen
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years held that a cause can be found in general for predestination, in God's justice and mercy and in the greater perfection of the universe; but with regard to the predestination or reprobation of particular individuals, no reason or cause can be assigned other than God's having chosen to save or not to save the individual in question. This is an interesting finding, because the Dominican Order began to enforce a sometimes strict adherence to the thought of Thomas Aquinas in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries (see below, § IV), and it is on account of this that both James of Metz and Durand were attacked—the latter on the very issue of predestination!—and yet their theories of predestination show that they cannot be considered doctrinaire anti-Thomists. As for Franciscans, often the scholars of these years are described by the blanket term 'Scotist', and hence Scotism is treated as though it were something monolithic, neither admitting of degrees nor allowing for dissent.171 And yet, if we look at the case of the cause of predestination, it is simply difficult to confirm this. As we have seen, the most characteristic feature of Scotus' theory of predestination is his use of "instants of nature", and particularly that predestination in Vat. lat. 1092 (predestination on ff. 24vb—25va); John of Paris' ideas are found in ed. cit (n. 39), vol. 1, pp. 441-42; I have examined Palude's treatment of this issue (I Sent., d. 41, q. 1) in Basel, Univ. Bibl. B II 21, ff. 230r-31r. Also James of Lausanne (on whom see above, n. 74) in the second version of his Sent, commentary, book I, d. 41, q. 1 adhered to these same ideas; for James, I have used Vienna, ONE 1542, ff. 48rb-48va (on photocopies kindly supplied by the Hill Monastic Manuscript Library of St. John's Abbey, Collegeville, Minnesota). Note that Revue Thomiste 97,1 (January-March 1997) is devoted to Saint Thomas au XIVs siecle and is thus of immediate pertinence to the topic of Thomism in this period, discussing, among others, Hervaeus Natalis, Durand of St. Pourcain, and John of Sterngassen (for the latter, see art. cit. above, n. 42; see also below, n. 201). 171 One example of this monolithic view can be found in Stephen Dumont's otherwise excellent 'The Scotist of Vat. Lat. 869', AFH 81 (1988), pp. 254 ~83, where on p. 280, after mentioning that he has examined "more than a dozen Scotists writing in the first two decades after Scotus' death", Dumont lists seventeen scholars, who, when added to the other scholars studied in the article, basically comprise all Franciscans from this period for whom we have written material except Peter Auriol and William Ockham; it is hard to see how 'Scotist' is a useful analytical category when used in this way. On early Scotism, see C. Berube, 'La premiere ecole scotiste', in Z. Kaluza and P. Vignaux eds., Logique, ontologie et theologie au XIVe siecle. Preuve et raison a I'Universite de Paris (Paris, 1984), pp. 9-24. Catto, 'Theology and Theologians' (cit. n. 2), pp. 509-11, also mentions how misleading it is to call Cowton, Nottingham, and Alnwick "Scotists". For some thoughts on Scotism in relation to yet another of this period's reputed "Scotists", see my 'Francis of Marchia and John Duns Scotus on the Psychological Model of the Trinity', Picenurn Seraphicum n.s. 18 (1999), pp. 11-56.
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and reprobation are asymmetric processes that take place over four instants of nature. Of the Sentences commentaries from these years, that of the secular theologian, Henry of Harclay, exhibits a great deal of affinity with Scotus on the issue of predestination, giving his instants of nature account in a slightly modified form.172 Hugh of Novo Castro, calling Scotus doctor noster, also presents the Subtle Doctor's instants of nature account and defends it against the positions of both Aquinas and Henry of Ghent.173 But those are the only two. Alexander of Alessandria's later commentary is interesting with respect to predestination, because he does not mention Scotus' instants of nature solution, relying instead on the semantic approach typical of earlier Franciscan thought, although he comes out firmly for predestination being an act of the divine intellect, not of the will, thus bucking the general trend of his order.174 Also John of Bassol, who is ordinarily considered a close follower of Scotus, makes no mention of the Subtle Doctor's instant of nature account.170 Robert Cowton expressly opts for Henry of Ghent's theory, defending Henry against attack and calling him doctor quern teneo, eloquent testimony to Henry's continued influence. It is clear from Cowton's treatment of the topic that he read Henry extremely carefully.176 Neither William of Nottingham nor William of Alnwick broach this issue directly, but Nottingham in his treatment of future contingents seems to be basically uninfluenced by Scotus' solution to that problem.177 Thus, if
1/2 Schmaus, 'Uno sconosciuto discepolo' (cit. n. 89), p. 353 for Henry's "modus ponendi". 173 Hugh of Novo Castro, I Sent. d. 40, q. 3 (Paris, BN lat. 15864, f. 52rb; Florence, Bibl. Laurenziana, S. Croce Plut. XXX, dext. 2, f. 81va): " dicit igitur quod in praedestinatione est talis ordo. In prirno signo instantis aeternitatis Deus videt Petrum; in secundo signo vult sibi \itam aeternam; in tertio signo vult sibi ilia quae sunt necessaria ad hoc consequendum, sicut gratiam et bona opera. Sed in reprobatione est alius ordo: primo occurit ludas; in secundo signo videntur mala opera eius; et in tertio damnatur ad poenam aeternam." 174 I have used Alexander's I Sent., dd. 40 and 41 in Vat. Borgh. lat. 311, ff. 145r-49v; for his treatment of the cause of predestination, see d. 41, qq. 1 and 2 (f. 147rb-vb); for predestination as an act of the divine intellect, see d. 40, q. 1 (f. 145rb). 175 Paris 1516 edition, I Sent., d. 41, q. unica (ff. 203va-205vb). 176 I have made an edition of Cowton's I Sent. dd. 40-41 based on MS Vienna, ONE 1397, ff. 97ra-99ra, and MS Cambridge, Gonville and Caius 324/378, ff. 115v— 17v. I hope to make this edition available soon. For another area (trinitarian theology) in which Cowton reveals a marked debt to Henry of Ghent, see Friedman, 'In principlo? (cit. n. 20), pp. 178-81; also above, at n. 99. 177 See Schmaus, 'Neue Mitteilungen' (cit. n. 92), pp. 195-96 (Schmaus' intro-
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the tendency shown on the issue of predestination is anything to judge by, the terms 'Scotism' and 'Scotist' should be used with care.178 Moreover, on the basis of these findings a possible way of approaching the history of Scotism as a movement, and its relation to the Franciscan theological tradition more generally—at least in this early period—can be suggested. This approach would involve studies of particular issues as they were dealt with by Franciscans in this period, with a view to determining: 1) when Scotus made a direct positive impact on any particular theologian; 2) when Scotus and another theologian rely on a common Franciscan theological tradition and thus have similar ideas, without Scotus' own contribution having been a decisive one; or 3) when Scotus was either ignored or rejected. Until this point, all of the positions that we have considered have been SPE theories; Peter Auriol appears to be the first scholar to have broken with SPE. Auriol's theory of predestination has been termed General Election (GE), and Halverson sees it as having opened a new approach to the problem.179 As we have seen, in SPE, God elected certain individuals, who then were saved, while all those who were not elected were damned on account of their own sin. This was unacceptable to Auriol, who, referring to I Timothy 2.4, claimed that "God wills that everyone be saved". Further, Auriol emphasized that God's elective will could not be focused on individuals, because
duction) and pp. 206-17 (dd. 38-39 and 40-41); Nottingham's question on predestination ("utrum praedestinatio tantam habeat certitudinem, quod impossible sit praedestinatum damnari") tends to turn the discussion to the same issues normally tackled in questions on future contingents. Alnwick on other issues can be shown to have been an "independent" Scotist, see, e.g., Dumont, 'The Univocity' (cit. n. 109), esp. pp. 2-4. 178 There is another witness for the issue of Scotism that seems to stem from this period: the anonymous commentary on I Sent, found in Vat. Ottob. lat. 360 and Lyon, Bibl. de la ville 653, the author of which follows Scotus extremely closely in certain areas of trinitarian theology—almost to the point of being an abbreviation (see Friedman, 'In principio' [cit. n. 20], p. 276)—but in predestination ignores the instants of nature account. Chris Schabel and I have examined this commentary for various subjects and have suggested that it was authored before 1317, when Peter Auriol's work became available, since the author shows no awareness at all of Auriol's most controversial views, but see also Schabel's contribution to this volume: 'Parisian Commentaries', esp. n. 48. 179 Halverson, 'Franciscan Theology' (cit. n. 150), passim; idem, Peter Aureol (cit. n. 150), e.g. pp. 76-108, 172-73. I think that in fact most, if not all, of the elements that went into Auriol's solution had been proposed by earlier thinkers, but I do believe that Halverson is correct in saying that Auriol first pulled these elements into a well developed system; in any case, when later thinkers attacked GE, they concentrated on Auriol's version of it.
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then the individual's free will would play no part in the economy of salvation. Thus, for Auriol, God offers his grace freely to all; hence the term 'General Election'. How then does Auriol explain why some are saved while others are damned? This comes about, according to Auriol, based on the response of the individual to the generally offered grace. In cases where God knows that an individual actively resists the grace by setting up some kind of hindrance or obstacle to it (an obex gratiae), then he or she is justly damned; if, on the other hand, the individual passively accepts the grace, then God foreknows the absence of any obstacle and predestines that person to glory. Auriol believes that he has avoided any hint of pelagianism—where human beings can merit salvation on their own account—because individuals do not do anything actively in order to earn their salvation on his theory; they are only required to passively accept grace. For Auriol, this passive acceptance is not a positive cause of the individual's salvation, but a merely negative one; it is the absence of an obstacle to grace. On the other hand, the obex gratiae, be it original sin or actual sin, is a positive cause of an individual not meriting eternal life. In this way, Auriol believes that he can explain how God is transcendent while the individual's free will plays a role in his or her salvation, something he thought was lacking in SPE accounts of predestination. Moreover, Auriol's theory of predestination is one in which God's will is the central attribute, and he vigorously attacks intellectualist theories of predestination like those of Richard of Mediavilla and especially Durand of St. Pourcain.180 Thus, here we can see that Auriol fits into the Franciscan voluntarist leaning that we have traced from an initial tendency in Bonaventure through Scotus' theory stressing divine voluntarism. It seems that Auriol was not the only figure in the late 1310's who found the traditional SPE explanation for predestination wanting: William Ockham appears to have thought the same. Ockham's position on predestination has been characterized as one in which God's predestination of individuals is based on their foreseen meritorious actions, i.e. a nearly Pelagian theory in which there is an
iso Auriol's theory of the divine will and its place in his theory of predestination is a major preoccupation of Halverson's Peter Aureol (cit. n. 150), pp. 13-108; specifically for Auriol's case against Richard of Mediavilla, see pp. 82-83, for his case against Durand, pp. 70-72. See also Vignaux, Justification (cit. n. 150), pp. 61-80.
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external cause of God's election of individuals. James Halverson, however, has recently argued against this view, maintaining instead that Ockham's theory of predestination can best be understood if we assume that he held a GE account.181 Halverson's interpretation of Ockham is necessarily conjectural, since Ockham never expresses himself explicitly on the topic of election; yet Halverson's argumentation is convincing. Here I will give only the conclusion: Ockham combined a GE account of predestination with a pactum theology, employing the distinction between God's absolute and ordained powers. Thus, of his absolute power, God could have chosen any criterion for deciding who should be predestined and who reprobate; of his ordained power, God has freely bound himself to give eternal life to all those who do not resist his general offer of grace. This resistance by the individual would take the form of some kind of obstacle to that grace. Moreover, for Ockham, in line with the general Franciscan tendency in our period, it is the divine will that is the attribute that effects predestination. With Peter Auriol, and almost undoubtedly with William Ockham too, the consensus explanation for predestination that we have traced from Bonaventure and Aquinas was rejected for something new: General Election. This is significant not just looking back over the seventy years that we have sketched here, but also looking forward. It was in particular Auriol's solution that would prompt Francis of Marchia's (read Sentences at Paris 1319—20) remarkably innovative defense of SPE as well as the Augustinian Hermit, Gregory of Rimini's (read Sentences at Paris 1343-44) contribution to the debate, which gave yet a third general predestinarian option: Double Particular Election (DPE) in which God actively wills from all eternity to save certain individuals and also actively wills from all eternity to damn certain other individuals.182
181 Halverson, 'Franciscan Theology' (cit. n. 150), pp. 13—19; idem, Peter Aureol (cit. n. 150), pp. 113—22, with references to earlier literature. For translations of a selection of Ockham's works relevant to the question of predestination (including his I Sent.), see William Ockham, Predestination, God's Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents, M.M. Adams and N. Kretzmann, trans. (2nd ed.: Indianapolis, 1983). 182 See on these developments, C. Schabel's contributions to this volume: 'Parisian Commentaries' and 'Oxford Franciscans'.
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IV. Sentences commentaries and theological traditions, 1250—1320
With few exceptions, up to this point I have looked at Sentences commentaries as though they were divorced from the larger doctrinal and institutional context in which they were written. This has been a necessary, but unfortunate, simplification: Sentences commentaries were a part of the theological dialogue at the medieval university, and they were certainly influenced by that larger doctrinal and institutional context. To go at least a little way in making up for this simplification, in this last section I want to sketch just one aspect of the larger context in which Sentences commentaries were written, one that had a great deal of significance for Sentences commentaries of the era. This aspect has already been mentioned: the formation of theological (and, more broadly, intellectual) traditions.183 These theological traditions, the Franciscan and the Dominican, were reflected in the Sentences commentaries of the period in quite a few ways. The point has already been made about the non-confrontational attitude of the Sentences commentaries of the first 20-25 years following Bonaventure's and Aquinas' lecturing at Paris. While it is clear that, from the time the two major mendicant orders became a part of the university establishment, they had different intellectual inclinations, nevertheless these differences varied in degree from issue to issue, and, as we have seen with the topic of the cause of predestination, there was often a great deal of agreement between, e.g. Aquinas and Bonaventure.184 Certain issues, however, became critical in the course of the 1270's. Some of these were involved in the condemnation of 1277, where several of Thomas' views were implicitly censured.185 This implicit censure was followed up by the IBS \Vhen I use the term 'theological tradition', it is with the recognition that many of the issues that stood between the traditions were "philosophical" in nature. 184 A nice synthetic statement on the establishment of "schools of thought" in the religious orders is William J. Courtenay's in Schools and Scholars (cit. n. 6), pp. 175-92, although, as my comments in § III indicate, I believe that Scotism as a school of thought will come to look rather different when we have more thoroughly investigated both Scotus' debt to his own Franciscan theological tradition and the reaction of scholars coming after him to Scotus on various issues. It may well come to look like a broad "Franciscan" tradition that had various branches (Henrician, Bonaventurean, Scotist) from 1250~1350, rather than any genuine Scotistic school of thought being at issue. The research remains to be done. 185 It has also been suggested that in 1277 a process was initiated which was explicitiy directed against some of Thomas' teachings and was separate from the condemnations of 1277 and the process against Giles of Rome, but this process
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Franciscan William de la Mare, who wrote a work sometime between 1277 and 1279 in which he singled out some 118 erroneous propositions from various of Thomas' theological works, including nine taken from his commentary on book I of the Sentences. Mare's work became known as Correctorium jratris Thomae or the "corrective" to Thomas' theological and philosophical errors. In 1282, at their general chapter in Strasbourg, the Franciscan order mandated that only the most talented of their students were to read Aquinas' Summa theologica, and then only with William's Correctorium actually set into Aquinas' text, so that they not be led astray by the Dominican's errors.186 In this way, William's work became something of an official statement by the Franciscan order on Thomas' thought. It should be noted that in his Correctorium, William's attitude towards Thomas seems to be mostly one of respectful disagreement; at the very least one can say that William took Thomas' positions seriously enough to respond to them through argument rather than just dismissing them.187 Certainly, the Franciscans who made the decree at Strasbourg in 1282, were indirectly acknowledging Aquinas' importance as a theologian. But the Correctorium was an officially approved challenge to the Dominican order's greatest light by the Franciscans, and coming in the aftermath of 1277, the Dominicans did not allow the Correctorium to stand unanswered. In fact, by 1284 four works had been written in direct response to William's, which was called by its detractors a Corruptorium. These four works are the so-called Correctoria conuptorii. These point by point responses are named for the first word of their text: the Correctorium "Quare" by Richard Knap well, the Correctorium "Sciendum" by Robert Orford, the Correctorium "Quaestione" probably by William of Macclesfield, and the Correctorium "Circa" probably by John of Paris, the only non-English author of one of the Correctoria.^8 Moreover, at their general chapter held in
against Thomas was abandoned soon after; see the articles referred to above n. 33 and the literature referred to in them. 186 William's Correctorium Jratris Thomae is edited by P. Glorieux in Les premieres polemiques thomistes. I. Le Correctorium conuptorii "Quare" (Paris, 1929) along with the text of this, the first of the Correctoria conuptorii. F. E. Kelley, in his Introduction to Richard Knapwell Quaestio disputata de unitate formae (Paris, 1982), proves conclusively that Knapwell authored the Correctorium "Quare" (pp. 18-23). I8/ See also Torrell, Initiation (cit. n. 4), pp. 446-47. 188 On the Correctoria literature, the best starting place is the thorough examination by Ludwig Hodl, 'Geistesgeschichtliche' (cit n. 38), along with Hodl's article
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Paris in 1286, the Dominicans made it a requirement that all of their teachers uphold Thomas' doctrine. Thus, by the mid-1280's hard lines had begun to be drawn between the two largest mendicant orders on both a doctrinal and on a more purely political plane; and it is in the years following this first hardening of lines that we can clearly see the formation of theological traditions corresponding to those lines. Basically, what we see in the Franciscans and Dominicans in the later thirteenth and early fourteenth century is the development of intellectual and corporate identities through opposition, in which the opposition—at least at the University—centered around the development of Thomism on the one hand, and of a broadly Franciscan style of theology (and philosophy) on the other. The history of this development has yet to be charted in detail, but there is every indication that it permeates the thought of the era. Here we will simply consider some of its ramifications for Sentences commentaries. If we look at the Dominicans first, the Correctoria were the first stage in the Dominican defense of Thomism. A second stage came when the Dominicans took the initiative and wrote against errors that they perceived to lie in works of other scholars;189 these works can be assimilated to the Correctoria literature, and they are most significant for us here, because some of them were directed against other scholar's deviations from Thomas in their Sentences commentaries. The departures from Aquinas' teaching that Giles of Rome reputedly made in his I Sentences, for example, were catalogued and attacked by both Robert Orford and an anonymous Dominican writer.190 From the very end of our period, there is a Correctorium of
'Korrektorienstreit' in Lexikon des Mittelalters and the literature referred to there; most recently, M. J. F. M. Hoenen's interesting 'The Literary Reception of Thomas Aquinas' view on the Provability of the Eternity of the World in de la Mare's Correctorium (1278-9) and the Correctoria Corruptorii (1279-ca 1286)' in The Eternity of the World in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas and his Contemporaries, J. B. M. Wissink, ed. (Leiden, 1990), pp. 39-68. On the general fate of Thomas' philosophy and theology in these years, see P. Glorieux, 'Pro et contra Thomam: Un survol de cinquante annees', in Sapientiae procerum amore, T. Kohler, ed. (Rome, 1974), pp. 255-87. There was also a fifth, more wide-ranging, reply to detractors of Thomas by Rambert of Bologna (or Primadizzi). 189 The idea of there being two phases in the struggle over Thomas and Thomism descends from Franz Ehrle's 'Der Kampf um die Lehre des hi. Thomas von Aquin in den ersten fiinfzig Jahren nach seinem Tod', ^KTh 37 (1913), pp. 266-318. 190 See Robert Orford's Reprobationes diclomm a fratre Egidio in pnmum Sententiarum,
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part of Peter AurioPs Scriptum by the Dominican Raymond Bequini.191 One of the great writers of this genre of polemical works was the English Dominican theologian, Thomas of Sutton. Sutton wrote a work that has been called the "Cowton critique": a series of responses to Robert Cowton's I III Sentences along with responses to Scotus' book IV.192 Sutton does not reply to every distinction in Cowton's (and Scotus') Sentences commentary—there is no critique of Cowton's view of predestination, for instance—instead he concentrates on what appeared to him to be the most erroneous deviations from Thomas. Thus, the Cowton critique is basically a selective commentary on the Sentences that takes up important questions where the Franciscan theological tradition, as represented by Cowton and by Scotus, differ from Thomas Aquinas and the Dominican theological tradition, presenting the response of a leading Thomist. Thomas of Sutton is most probably not the same person as the otherwise unknown "Thomas Anglicus" who wrote a work called the Liber propugnatorius (composed 1311-c. 1323), which is a distinction by distinction critique from a Thomistic point of view of book I of John Duns Scotus' Sentences commentary.193 The Liber propugnatorius is
A.P. Vella, ed. (Paris, 1968); Incerti auctoris impugnatioms contra Aegidium Romanum contradicentem Thomae super primum Sent., G. Bruni, ed. (Vatican, 1942), which has been tentatively attributed to Bernard of Auvergne. See also F. Pelster, 'Thomistische Streitschriften gegen Aegidius Romanus und ihre Verfasser: Thomas von Sutton und Robert von Orford, O.P.', Gregorianum 24 (1943), pp. 135-70. Not to give an unbalanced view, it should also be noted that written works other than Sent, commentaries by, e.g., Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and James of Viterbo (his Quodlibets) were the subject of Dominican criticism. 191 See F. Pelster, 'Zur ersten Polemik gegen Aureoli: Raymundus Bequini O.P., seine Quastionen und sein Correctorium Petri Aureoli, das Quodlibet des Jacobus de Apamiis O.E.S.A.', FS 15 (1955), pp. 30-47. 192 The Cowton critique was written sometime after 1312 (when Cowton's Sent, commentary was available). See on the work, F. Pelster, 'Thomas von Sutton O.Pr., ein Oxforder Verteidiger der thomistischen Lehre', %KTh 46 (1922), pp. 212-52, esp. pp. 361-401, with a question list pp. 395-401. It was B. Hechich who showed conclusively that the "Thomas Anglicus" who wrote this work was indeed Thomas of Sutton; see De immaculata conceptione (cit. n. 95), pp. 7—14. For a bio-bibliographical sketch of Sutton, see Roensch, Early Thomistic School (cit. n. 17), pp. 44-51. To the editions listed in Schonburger and Kible (cit. n. 1) should be added: Friedman, 'In principle' (cit. n. 20), App. 7, pp. 523-32 (edition of q. 13 of Sutton's Cowton critique). 193 Edition in Liber propugnatorius super I Sent, contra loh. Scotum (Venice 1523; rpt. Frankfurt, 1966). M. Schmaus, Der "Liber propugnatorius" des Thomas Anglicus und die I^ehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus, II Teil: Die Trinitarischen Lehrdifferenzen (Minister, 1930) is the most sustained attempt to set a part of the Liber
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interesting to us here because it has a question devoted to Scotus' theory of predestination, and offers a clear statement on the differences between Dominican and Franciscan thought on the subject in the early fourteenth century. As is typical with the Liber propugnatorius, the author shows the interrelation of various parts of Scotus' theology: he had read Scotus' work closely enough to see it as an organic whole. The problem, according to Thomas, with Scotus' treatment of a whole complex of issues including God's foreknowledge and predestination is the following: Scotus believes that God cannot have practical cognition before an act of the will.194 Following up on this major divide, Thomas Anglicus claims that predestination is primarily a function of the divine intellect; Scotus (and other Franciscans) were simply wrong to assert that the will was the primary moving factor, with the intellect taking on a secondary role. If things worked the way that Scotus would have it, then our not dying in the state of grace, and hence not being saved, would be God's fault, because God would have had no particular ground on which to will grace to Peter and not to Judas in the first place. According to Thomas Anglicus, the Franciscan view would entail that God is the cause of our evil works!195 Here then, we see that a source of minor disagreement between Aquinas and Bonaventure some 60 years before
propugnatorius into its theological context, and is invaluable for the study of latermedieval trinitarian thought that it presents; for the Liber propugnatorius' dates of composition, see ibid., p. 4, n. 13, although the fact that Aquinas is never called 'saint' in the work is no guarantee that it was written before his canonization in 1323 (as Schmaus maintains). Schmaus thought that Thomas Anglicus was Thomas of Sutton, but could provide no conclusive evidence; since then, Theissing, Glaube und Theologie (cit. n. 98), p. 16, and J. Schneider in the Introduction to the edition of Sutton's Quaestiones ordinariae (Munich, 1977), pp. 63*-66* have argued that the Liber propugnatorius was not authored by Thomas of Sutton. 194 Liber propugnatorius, d. 37^38, q. unica, f. 117vb: "Quod autem dicit in ista quaestione quod intellectus divinus non potest habere cognitionem practicam proprie dictam ante actum voluntatis, istud non videtur verum ..." 193 Liber propugnatorius, d. 41, f. 123ra-b: "Quod enim dicit Deum scire peccatum commissionis futurum per hoc quod scit se cooperaturum ad substantiam actus, et non ad debitam circumstantiam illius, non videtur bene dictum, quia priusquam Deus non velit cooperari debitae circumstantiae actus, oportet assignare aliquam rationem huius ex parte nostra, puta quia non nolumus operari talem circumstantiam. Non enim ideo nos non recte operamur, quia Deus nobis non cooperatur, sed magis econverso: ideo Deus nobis non cooperatur, quia nos non operamur. Alioquin esset Deo imputandum quod non recte operemur. Ex quo patet quod prius Deus videt nos non operaturos recte quam ipse velit non cooperari vel non velit cooperari."
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has become the major gulf between Franciscan and Dominican views of predestination. The Dominicans did not merely write in response to those outside of the order who disagreed with Thomas: at least James of Metz and Durand of St. Pourgain became the focus of polemics by fellow Dominicans. With regard to James of Metz, we have a so-called Correctorium of James' I, II, and IV Sentences, probably written by Hervaeus Natalis.196 But without question the most spectacular example of the way that the increasingly stringent enforcement of Thomism in these years in the Dominican order could directly influence the content of a Sentences commentary is the case of Durand of St. Pourgain. As was mentioned above, Durand lectured at a provincial Dominican studium during the early years of the fourteenth century; he put these lectures into written form at latest in 1308. In this first version of his Sentences commentary Durand made no great issue out of following the doctrine of Aquinas strictly, something that we have seen was already mandated by the Dominican order; it seems that in the lectures that he gave on the Sentences at Paris in c. 1307—08, Durand was just as unthomistic in his approach. Perhaps as a reaction to Durand's attitude towards Thomas, the 1286 mandate to uphold and defend Thomas' doctrine was reissued and augmented at the Dominican general chapter at Saragossa in 1309, and Durand appears to have been told that unless he follow a more strict Thomistic line, he might well sacrifice the master's degree. In any event, the written Sentences commentary from around 1311 that was based on his Parisian lectures is, at least in spots, somewhat more Thomistic than his first redaction. Durand was promoted to the magisterium, although this may have been a result of pressure from a higher authority,197 since immediately after Durand's regency (1312—13), Pope Clement V called him to Avignon to be lecturer in theology there, and the Dominican order began an investigation into his orthodoxy.
196 Found in MS Le Mans 231, ff. 150-75; for the state of the research on this text, see most recently Kohler, Der Begnff (c&. n. 37), pp. 2~3 and 9. The portion of this text dealing with James' IV Sent., d. 7, q. 4, is edited in Ott, Die Lehre (cit. n. 37), pp. 152-54. 197 See for this suggestion, and for more on the events of these years in general, Guimaraes, 'Herve Noel' (cit. n. 75), p. 46ff. It should be noted that, in a "conclusion" to the third version of his Sent. Commentary, Durand claims that his first version was released without his permission, and that he only approved the use of his third version (ed. cit. above n. 135, f. 423rb).
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This investigation was undoubtedly at the instigation of the powerful head of the Dominican province of France, Hervaeus Natalis, who had begun writing tracts against Durand's philosophy and theology from as early as 1307/8. A group of nine Parisian theologians, including Peter of Palude, agreed on a list of 93 possibly heretical statements taken from Durand's Sentences commentaries. The list was finished by July 1314 and Durand was given the chance to reply to it, apparently retracting some of his statements, explaining others.198 The replies were apparently insufficient to the Dominican order (and especially Hervaeus Natalis), because a second committee was formed to investigate Durand's writings and composed a list of 235 articles (taken from Durand's Sentences commentary) in which Durand deviated from Thomas' teaching, a list that Koch dates to 1316/17. To give a sense of the types of objections that Durand met with, we can cite the one article having to do with predestination out of this second list. Here we read that In d. 41, art. 2 [Durand] disproves two things that Thomas posits in the first part [of the Summa theologica], q. 23, art. 5. The first of these is that one effect of predestination is the final cause of the other [effect], namely glory of grace, which [Durand] disproves because glory is not an effect—he claims—of predestination strictly taken, the opposite of which Thomas maintains in d. 40 of [book] I [of his Sentences commentary, q. 2,] art. 1 and in many other places. The second [thing he disproves that Thomas posits] is that the total cause of the effect of predestination can be found in the perfection of the universe, which even though Thomas never claims explicitly, nevertheless he suggests in the rebuttal of the third argument at the place mentioned above.199
198 See on this list, Koch, Durandus (cit. n. 37), pp. 16-22 (where Koch shows that the list was drawn from redactions 1 and 2 of Durand's commentary on books II and IV of the Sent.}, 200-203; for an edition, see Koch's Kleine Schrifte (cit. n. 52), vol. 2, pp. 53-72. 199 For Koch's dating, see Durandus (cit. n. 37), p. 204, and further 203-08; for an edition, see Koch's Kleine Schrifte (cit. n. 52), vol. 2, pp. 72—118, this particular article (nr. 30) on p. 78: "D. 41, art. 2 improbat duo quae Thomas ponit parte prima, q. 23, art. 5, quorum primum est quod unus effectus praedestinationis est causa finalis alterius, scilicet gloria gratiae; quod improbat quia gloria non est effectus, ut dicit, praedestinationis proprie acceptae, cuius contrarium dicit Thomas d. 40 primi art. 1, et in multis aliis locis. Secundum est quod causa totalis effectus praedestinationis potest reddi ex perfectione universi, quod Thomas, quamvis non exprimat, innuit tamen ubi supra in solutione tertii argumenti." Decker, Gotteslehre (cit. n. 14), p. 251, discusses this article.
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Thus, Durand was attacked not only for rejecting positions Thomas explicitly held, but also for rejecting positions that his later interpreters took to be so implicit in Thomas' words that they were "obvious"—Durand was up against not only Thomas' words, but also a particular way of interpreting Thomas that ruled out any other interpretation. As we have already seen above, Durand's doctrine of predestination in the first redaction of his Sentences commentary is Thomistic, thus this particular criticism may have been the source of some frustration to him.200 Also interesting here is that Aquinas' Sentences commentary clearly formed an important basis for the interpretation of Aquinas' thought in the second decade of the fourteenth century. By around the time this second list was compiled, Durand had had the good fortune of having been elevated to the rank of bishop, and therefore was no longer under the disciplinary and jurisdictional authority of the Dominican order, so he could afford to ignore his accusers. And in the third redaction of his Sentences commentary (books I-III written c. 1317-25, book IV 1325-27) he returned to many of the positions (sometimes modified on the basis of his critics' arguments) that he had held in the first redaction. Durand's ever increasing importance as a bishop and advisor of Popes (he was, for example, appointed by Pope John XXII to be one of those who investigated the orthodoxy of William Ockham) did not deter his Dominican detractors: in the late 1320's an otherwise anonymous Dominican commonly known as "Durandellus" wrote a critical commentary to the first redaction of Durand's Sentences commentary which has as its incipit: "evidentiae contra Durandum"; the 13 MSS that contain this work testify that it was read.201 Ironically perhaps, Durand's final years (1333-34) were also marked by conflict:
200 This is not a unique situation; in his trinitarian theology, e.g., Durand certainly fits into the Dominican tradition, but he takes tendencies found in it to a sort of "logical conclusion", and was criticized on that basis; see on this, Friedman, 7n principle' (cit. n. 20), pp. 283-88. 201 On this "anti-commentary" and its author see Koch, Durandus (cit. n. 37), pp. 340-69 and esp. M. Lanczkowski and R. Wittwer, 'Les Evidentiae contra Durandum de Durandellus: remarques introductives', Revue Thomiste 97 (1997), pp. 143-56, who announce an edition of the Evidentiae; this issue of Revue Thomiste (see above, n. 170) contains several other articles devoted to Durandellus' thought. For the MSS, see Kaeppeli (cit. n. 1), vol. 1 nr. 923 or Lanczkowski-Wittwer, pp. 155-56 (along with an edition of the Prooemium of the work); there are several excerpts from book IV, dd. 7, 24, and 25 in Ott, Die Lehre (cit. n. 37).
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this time with John XXII who was displeased with Durand's judgement on John's own view of the beatific vision. The case of Durand, who became the focus of a determined attempt by the Dominican order to make its members conform in their scholastic work to the expressed (and sometimes implicit) views of Thomas Aquinas, shows perfectly well that Thomism could have a very concrete effect on Sentences commentaries. Both the compromise second redaction, and the modified third redaction, in which Durand returns to many of his original views while taking into consideration the criticisms of his attackers, were affected by the critique that he received at the hands of his order. In addition to this, especially the fact that he redacted a third version of his commentary clearly shows that Durand considered the commentary on the Sentences to be an extremely useful vehicle for making public his theology and philosophy. If we turn to the Franciscans, while the Correctorium is the most famous of the Franciscan critiques of Dominican works, it is far from the only one, and it becomes quickly apparent that around 1280, when the Correctorium had just been written, the differences between the intellectual tendencies of the two orders had reached something of a critical mass. Thus, from right around 1280 we might mention the Franciscan Roger Marston's De emanatione aeterna: a sustained attack on nearly every aspect of Aquinas' trinitarian theology from the Franciscan point of view.202 Marston's is certainly not the only evidence that the lines between the two orders on doctrinal matters were hardening. But the character of the intellectual identity that the Franciscans created was rather different from that of the Dominicans: unlike the Dominicans with Aquinas, or the Augustinian Hermits with Giles of Rome, the Franciscans did not legislate who should be followed, or even what positions should be adhered to, merely that certain views were to be treated with extreme suspicion. Their intellectual identity, then, did not rely on stringent adherence to any one master's thought—as we have already seen with "Scotism" in the early fourteenth century (§ III), Franciscan theologians held a multiplicity of views. Yet one can clearly discern a Franciscan
202 Roger Marston, Quaestiones disputatae De emanatione aeterna, De statu naturae lapsae, De anima (Quaracchi, 1932). For a study of Roger's attack on Thomas, see Friedman, 'In principio' (cit. n. 20), pp. 95-104 and 'Divergent Traditions' (cit. n. 73), pp. 19-20.
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style of theology in our period: basic approaches to theological problems that are shared by nearly all Franciscans. Good examples of this are the semantic breakdown of the terms 'predestination' and 'reprobation' or the stress on the divine will that played such a large role in Franciscan treatments of the cause of predestination. The thought that we find in Franciscan Sentences commentaries from the years after around 1280 have a distinct tendency to reflect these basic Franciscan theological inclinations. Moreover, we can show in many cases that the positions that were defended by the Franciscan tradition were developed in conscious opposition to the Dominican theological tradition. One of the broad tendencies that characterize Franciscan theology of this period is adherence to an emanation trinitarian theology. This is one of the hottest points of contention in nearly every Franciscan Sentences commentary from the period 1280-1320, and the emanation trinitarian theology typical of the Franciscans is nearly always set in explicit contrast to the relation trinitarian theology favored by the Dominicans. Sometimes the Franciscan attempt to contradict the Dominicans on this issue reaches a fevered pitch. One example of this is found in the Sentences commentary of William of Ware. William, in answer to an authoritative passage of Anselm that the Dominicans used to support their position, says explicitly that, no matter how many passages of his they could cite for their position, the Dominican tradition has simply misunderstood Anselm; the Dominicans, according to William, should instead turn their attention to other passages where Anselm makes perfectly clear that the Franciscan view is correct!203 Statements like this, in which the clashing tendencies of the two theological traditions are clearly expressed, can easily be found in nearly every Sentences commentary of the era. On the other hand, the relationship between the two traditions was not entirely made up of opposition and rebuttal. Some of the most significant developments in the Franciscan trinitarian theology of the period arise on account of taking seriously Dominican critique of earlier Franciscan positions. Thus, where Henry of Ghent (who, although a secular, was definitely a part of the Franciscan theological tradition on many issues) had maintained that the rational distinction between the divine attributes, intellect and will, was the
203
See Friedman, 'In principle (cit. n. 20), p. 197 and passim.
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ultimate basis for the real distinction between the divine persons, Scotus, explicitly agreeing with Dominican critique of Henry's position, argues that no rational distinction can serve as the basis for a real distinction; Scotus instead claims that the formal distinction between the attributes is the ultimate basis for the real distinction between the persons. Later, after Scotus had in turn been criticized by the Dominicans for his position, Peter Auriol—again in explicit agreement with the Dominican critique—turns the Franciscan position on its head, claiming that it is in fact the real distinction between the persons that is the basis for the merely connotative distinction between the attributes (the divine intellect, e.g., is the divine essence as it connotes the production of the really distinct Son).204 Note that this was not a one-way phenomenon: influence can also be demonstrated of Franciscan theologians on Dominican.205 Thus, the development of these intellectual identities left its mark in several ways on the Sentences commentaries of the period 1250-1320. There were "physical" effects like the very existence of Dominican "anti-commentaries" such as those against Giles of Rome, Robert Cowton, John Duns Scotus, and Durand of St. Pourcain; it is also in part due to this development that we have three versions of Durand's commentary. The thought itself contained in the commentaries of the era was also heavily influenced by the intellectual identities. In sum: until we have a fuller picture of the way in which these two theological traditions developed and interacted with each other, our understanding of the Sentences commentaries 1250-1320 will be incomplete.
204 See on this Friedman, 'Divergent Traditions' (cit. n. 73), and especially Friedman, 'In principle1 (cit. n. 20), passim. While it is generally true, as Courtenay, Schools and Scholars (cit. n. 6), p. 185 writes, that "academic debates among Franciscans centered more on personalities within their own order and on such secular theologians as Henry of Ghent" than on Dominicans, I am hesitant about his claim (ibid.) that the Franciscans "were not particularly concerned with the Thomists". There is a good deal of evidence that, at least in trinitarian theology, significant developments arose precisely because some Franciscans were paying close attention to the Thomists. 205 jn trinitarian theology, for example, see the influence of Scotus on the Dominicans in H. G. Gelber, 'Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought, 1300-1335' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1974), pp. 106-29.
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Concluding Remarks
It is time to pull together the most important threads in this cursory overview of commentaries on the Sentences between 1250 and 1320. Clearly, in this time period the Sentences commentary underwent a change in its role as theological literature. When we read the Sentences commentaries of Bonaventure and Aquinas, it is with the recognition that they were early works and, especially with Aquinas, do not represent the most mature and well-developed version of their scholastic theology. This is true of many of the Sentences commentaries from the later thirteenth century: rarely do they represent the definitive and mature theology of the scholar in question. While for some scholars this continues to be true in the last years of the thirteenth century and the first twenty years of the fourteenth—one thinks, e.g., of Henry of Harclay and his Quaestiones or of William of Alnwick and his Determinations, which supplant their Sentences commentaries as their definitive work—nevertheless, the Sentences commentary becomes increasingly a work that scholars polished and reworked throughout their careers, witness, among others, William of Ware, John Duns Scotus, Hervaeus Natalis, Durand of St. Pourcain, and Peter Auriol. The Sentences commentary by the end of our period had become far more than just another step on the way to a master's degree in theology, it was a favored form of theological expression. What is perhaps most striking, however, about the Sentences commentaries of the period as a whole is the immense amount of work that remains to be done on them. Only eight of some 70 Sentences commentaries that survive from these years have received modern critical editions of one book or more (Bonaventure, Aquinas, de la Mare, Olivi, John of Paris, John of Sterngassen, Scotus, and Ockham). It is true that in some cases we have early printed editions (often deficient) to work with, but for the vast majority of scholars between 1250 and 1320, including key theologians of the period like John Pecham, William of Ware, James of Metz, Henry of Harclay, Peter of Palude, and William of Alnwick, to determine the thought contained in their Sentences commentaries on most issues requires going to the manuscripts. And as has been mentioned, until more of these texts (as well as the many other theological works that still remain only in MSS) are edited in their entirety and studied both for themselves and in relation to other works of the period, basic questions
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about dating and doctrine will remain unanswered. Thus, the present article can only be considered a provisional status report, and— given continued interest in medieval theology and philosophy—one that will hopefully need a great deal of updating already within the next decade or so.
PARIS
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THE COMMENTARY OF JOHN OF PARIS (QUIDORT) ON THE SENTENCES Jean Dunbabin
The academic year 1293-1294 at St. Jacques must have been stimulating for the theology students present; the two bachelors lecturing on the Sentences were Meister Eckhart and John of Paris.' Both were to prove highly controversial figures within the Dominican order and beyond it; but in very different ways. While John's teaching on impanation was condemned by the masters of Paris in his own lifetime and he was forbidden to lecture publicly in 1305,2 Eckhart died in 1328 during the course of proceedings against him for what were seen as excessive neoplatonist leanings. Neither John nor Eckhart propounded in the lectures on the Sentences the views for which they later became notorious. But their capacities for independent thought were evident even at this early stage in their careers. Indeed, so marked was John's love of speculation and his trenchancy of expression that anxiety mounted among the masters who heard accounts of his lectures on the Sentences. They feared too many novelties were being propounded.3 In 1295,4 the bachelor was required to explain a series of erroneous or questionable statements allegedly made by him.5 After taking exception to the way in which the proceedings were conducted, John argued that some opinions he had 1
See T. Kaeppeli, Scriptores ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi, vol. 1 (Rome 1970) p. 354 and vol. 2 (Rome 1975), p. 517, hereafter SOP. 2 Chartularium uniuersitatis Parisiensis ed. H. Denifle and E. Chatelain (Paris 1881), 2, p. 120, hereafter CUP. 3 John complained that he did not know who his accusers were. The process may have been initiated exclusively by the Dominican masters; in which case it was an early example of an examination which later became standard. 4 J.-P. Miiller, 'A propos du Memoire justicatif de Jean Quidort. L'article sur le rapport entre 1'essence et 1'existence', Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale (hereafter: RTAM) 19 (1952), p. 349. 5 P. Glorieux, 'Un memoire justificatif de Bernard de Trilia', Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques (hereafter: RSPT) 18 (1928), pp. 405-26; and 19 (1929), pp. 23~58. For the correct attribution to John of Paris see Glorieux, RSPT 20 (1930), pp. 469-74. Muller, 'A propos du Memoire . . .,' pp. 350-51, argues, from the catalogue contained in MS Bordeaux 147, that the justification was originally much longer than what has been found to date.
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merely cited had been imputed to him when they were not his; other statements for which he was criticized were identical with the views of Thomas Aquinas or Giles of Rome. On the beatific vision, he declared that he had specifically told his audience that he was trying to open out the question, not to formulate opinions, an endeavour in which he had been encouraged by the masters in theology who regarded constructive enquiry on the subject as desirable provided assertions were avoided.6 But on the accidents surviving in the bread and wine after consecration, John did admit that two elements of what he had originally taught were erroneous, and stated that he had already publicly retracted these. The effect of John's self-justification on his critics is not known. It has become customary among historians to regard his late promotion to the mastership in theology—he received this in 13047— as the product of the distrust generated by his lectures on the Sentences.8 But the connection between the two is not certain. The eulogy delivered at his inception contained no hint of past trouble;9 indeed, its stress on John's present accession to the professorial chair without coercion might be read to imply that in the past the reluctance had been on his side. John's commentary on the Sentences, written up between 1292 and 1296,10 is a huge work. The first two books were edited by J.-P. Miiller;11 books III and IV remain in manuscript. Since book IV (the one that attracted by far the majority of critical articles in 1295) is found only in three manuscripts, Basle Univ. B. 3, 13, Paris Arsenal 379 (which is a briefer recension),12 and Paris Mazarine 889, I have used the Mazarine MS for books III and IV. Until a modern edition is available for books III and IV the relative reliability of the manuscripts cannot be assessed. In preferring the Mazarine (which has been fairly systematically corrected) I have followed the majority 6 On this see C. Trottmann, La vision beatifique. Des disputes scolastiques a sa definition par Benoit XII (Rome 1995), p. 385, where John's treatment of the theme is described as 'a lame compromise'. 7 Kaeppeli, SOP II, p. 517. 8 E.g. J. Watt, John of Paris. On Royal and Papal Power (Toronto 1971), p. 10. 9 The eulogy is edited in M. Grabmann, 'Studien zu Joh. Quidort von Paris', Sitzungsber. d. Bayer. Akad. d. Wiss., Philos-philol. u. hist. Kl., Jg 3 (1922), pp. 58-60. 10 J.-P. Miiller, 'La date de la lecture sur les Sentences de Jean Quidort', Angelicum 36 (1959), p. 162. 11 Studia Anselmiana 47, Rome 1961; and 51, Rome 1964. 12 Ed. Miiller, vol. 2, pp. xiv-xv and note 19.
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of those who have worked on the commentary. It would be interesting to know whether the weakness of the manuscript tradition for book IV as against those for books I and II was simply a reflection of the commentary's inordinate length or was related to the amount of criticism book IV had attracted. Both Glorieux and Miiller have stressed that the whole work survives only in reportationes produced by John's students, and that these vary textually.13 Glorieux, who was inclined to be very critical of such reportationes, described the Mazarine MS as 'texte d'eleve moyen ou capricieux'.14 As Miiller pointed out, John himself recognized the lecture notes of his pupils as authoritative, especially those of a monk from St. Victor who was present.11 But this version is not extant. Modern readers therefore have to make do with what is available. The deficiencies of a reportatio as a source are obvious. Miiller's list of minor misunderstandings and slips of the pen is less revealing than his exposition of the substantial variant readings for Books I and II.16 Presumably such variations were equally marked in books III and IV. Pupils did not always accurately understand the complexity of their master's arguments, and therefore chose to omit or abbreviate points that the master himself might regard as important. In the case of the Mazarine manuscript, the scribe sometimes compressed his material almost to the point of incomprehensibility, presumably because he was trying to keep up, and the omissions in the argument were of points which he expected to be familiar. But despite these serious lapses, reportationes have the advantage of taking their reader right into the classroom, conveying an element of the drama, the cut-and-thrust of debate, that more considered, edited texts frequently lose. The first characteristic to strike the reader of John's commentary on the Sentences is its author's intellectual energy. The range and variety of the questions he posed were remarkable. He was disinclined to pass a subject by either as too difficult or as rendered stale by too much debate. And to the elucidation of all these questions he brought a formidable range of authorities. By way of illustration, his 13 J.-P. Miiller, 'Les reportations des deux premiers livres du commentaire sur les Sentences de Jean Quidort de Paris OP', Angelicum 33 (1956), pp. 361-402. 14 'Memoire justificatif. . .' RSPT 19 (1929), p. 31. 13 Ed. Sentences vol. 1, p. xxix; vol. 2, p. xxxvi. This is proof that lectures on the Sentences given in the mendicant convents were open to a wider audience. 16 Ed. vol. 1, pp. xxiv-vi; ed. vol. 2, pp. xiii—xiv, xvi-xxiii, xxxvi-xlii.
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discussion of the location of the earthly paradise, by which he seems to have meant the Garden of Eden, offers a rich insight into his intellectual curiosity (book II, q. 46 = d. 17, q. 1, ed. cit, vol. 2, pp. 134-39. John took as his starting point the discussion of one aspect of the question by Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, qu. 102, art. 2. Thomas had contrasted the need of men for a temperate climate with the widely held belief that the earthly paradise lay below the equator, an area that Aristotle held to be uninhabitable because of the heat. Thomas concluded that the earthly paradise must be temperate, whether or not it lay below the equator. He did not appear to be much interested in the matter. John, on the other hand, was fascinated, so much so that he offered two different treatments of the question. The first version pitted Scriptural authority (unspecified), John of Damascus De fide orthodoxa II, 7, and Augustine (surely a mistake for Avicenna?), who allegedly asserted that paradise was temperate and had many cities, against Plato,17 who argued that the part of the world furthest away from the two poles was too hot for human habitation. 'Et ideo dico quod paradisus terrestris est sub illo circulo in puncto orientis' (vol. 2, p. 137—the last words deriving from Isidore's Etymologies). The second, and longer, treatment of the question pitted quidam sancti against the authority of Ptolemy, whom it followed in dividing the world into climactic zones, and in describing the sun's progress through the signs of the zodiac, Aries and Libra. John came to the same conclusion against Ptolemy as he had against Plato, 'ego dico ibi esse terram temperatissimam' (vol. 2, p. 137). John then put forward four reasons, the same for each treatment though differently expressed, for thinking that Plato and Ptolemy were wrong. These were that night and day were equal at the equator, that summer and winter were both very short at the equator, there being two summers and two winters each year; that the sun moved more quickly over the equator than elsewhere; and that the sea vapours fell as rain in the area. To the second treatment he then added a striking fifth argument, based on the Ptolemaic theory of precession, the slow rotation of the fixed stars around the poles of the axes of the zodiac, moving by one degree in every hundred 17
Miiller points out that his source was Chalcidius's commentary on the Timaeus ed. J. H. Waszink (Leiden 1962), pp. 114 and 115.
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years. From this John deduced that at the time of creation the sun was further away than usual from the equator, and therefore that the Garden of Eden could have been habitable if situated there (vol. 2, pp. 134-9). It would of course be dangerous to assume that John had firsthand knowledge of Ptolemy's Almagest, which had been translated by Gerard of Cremona in 1175, but which most medieval scholars preferred to approach through summaries or commentaries. John's discussion had its roots in Robert Grosseteste's De natura locorum,1® in which mathematical speculation about the impact of the sun's rays was tied into the question of where the earthly paradise might be located. But its immediate source seems to have been Robert the Englishman's 1271 commentary on the Sphere of Sacrobosco, the standard early thirteenth-century textbook on astronomy.19 Robert added to Sacrobosco's material an extended defence of the belief that the equatorial regions were not only habitable but also very temperate.20 He mentioned, but did not dwell on, the relevance of this for the earthly paradise. John abbreviated Robert's arguments, but kept quite close to his wording. He even took on board Robert's indignant comment that the Arab astronomer Alfraganus (al-Farghani) was wrong in denying habitability beyond the last clime, because on this theory most of England would be uninhabitable.21 Perhaps characteristically, John added that Scotland also did not conform to Alfraganus's model. However John's fifth argument was independent of Robert, who added little to Sacrobosco on precession. John's source for this seems to have been Bernard of Trilia's Quaestiones in tractatu de Sphera Johannis de Sacro bosco, written between 1263 and 1266 for the instruction of Dominicans.22 Bernard expounded the argument for precession, then explained Ptolemy's prophecy that in the future the motion of the sun would lead to uninhabitable regions below the equator becoming
18 Ed. L. Bauer, Die philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, bischofs von Lincoln (Munster-i-W, 1912), pp~ 66-8. 19 Ed. and tr. L. Thorndike, The Sphere of Sacrobosco and its Commentators (Chicago 1949), pp. 143—98. I am grateful for help on medieval astronomy from Dr. S. Judge. 20 Thorndike pp. 188-93. It is interesting to compare this with the much more hesitant treatment of the same question by Bacon, Opus mains ed. J. H. Bridges, vol. 1 (London 1890), pp. 135-7. Was Robert responding to Bacon's doubts? 21 Thorndike p. 187. 22 Quoted in P. Duhem, Le systeme du monde t. 3 (Paris 1915), p. 379. See Miiller, vol. 2, p. 138. Dating in Thorndike, p. 23.
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habitable. Bernard then went on to produce Thabit's alternative thesis, which made no impact on John. Assuming John to have had versions of both Robert the Englishman's commentary and Bernard of Trilia's questions, his argument still required both synthetical skill and originality of mind. He had to apply recent astronomical literature to the location of the earthly paradise, and to turn Ptolemy's prophecy on its head, making it relate to time past, to the early years of creation.23 That he did so was proof of his intellectual ingenuity. In the course of the argument he enunciated his belief that precession could be used to calculate the time of creation. Since creation began when the sun was in the first degree of Aries, and since when John was writing it was in the twenty-eighth degree of Gemini, if each degree took a hundred years, and each sign had thirty degrees, the calculation was straightforward. It is interesting that John had heard of this theory without apparently having been told that it was very controversial.24 Before studying theology, John had acquired distinction as a master of arts.25 It is probable that his interest in cosmology and geography dated back to that period, and should be added to the list of intellectual preoccupations, a love of grammatical theories, speculative grammar, and dialectical finesse, that Miiller has noted as deriving from his early training.26 John was certainly unusual among mendicants in having enjoyed so wide a liberal education before he entered the Dominican order. It may be that this was a factor in arousing distrust for him among his superiors. The more conventional and acceptable fruit of John's arts training was his knowledge and discriminating use of the works of Aristotle, a characteristic not unexpected in a Dominican of the generation after Albertus Magnus. John differentiated between the two available translations of the Metaphysics (vol. 1, p. 14) and of the Physics (vol. 2, p. 144), he mentioned the new translation of De Anima (vol. 1 23
Cf. Bacon's argument, Opus mains vol. 9, p. 193, using precession to explain why the earthly paradise later became too hot to be entered by men. 24 Summa Philosophiae once attributed to Robert Grosseteste, ed. L. Bauer, Die philosophischen Werke ... p. 567. 25 Grabmann, 'Studien zu Joh. von Paris' p. 59. The eulogy (see above n. 9) suggests that John had taught for longer than usual in the arts faculty. But if the suggestion of A. J. Heiman, 'The first quodlibet of Jean Quidort' in ed. J. R. O'Donnell, Nine Mediaeval Thinkers (Toronto 1955), p. 271 is correct, then he only incepted in 1290. 26 Ed. Sentences vol. 1, p. xxxviii.
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p. 295). He showed familiarity with many of the libri naturales. More unusually, he drew on a respectable range of Arabic sources; on Avicenna and Averroes with whom he regularly disagreed, but also extensively on Alhazen's work on Optics, on Albumasar (Abu Ma'Shar)'s Mains intwductorium (vol. 1, p. 433), more commonly cited by twelfththan by thirteenth-century scholars, on Alpetragius (al-Bitrugi) and Algazel.27 Unlike Aquinas,28 he quoted from Bernard Sylvester (vol. 2, p. 91), Alan of LiUe (vol. 1, pp. 242, 243, 247) and Simon of Tournai (vol. 1, p. 329), thus showing his familiarity with writers of stature of the twelfth century who had ceased to be commonly discussed by most later thirteenth century theologians. It is unlikely that he had actually read their works; but his nodding acquaintaince (through florilegia?) with some at least of their theories had probably been acquired before he began his theological studies. John was skilled in putting across his formidable learning with clarity. One notable characteristic of his lectures was his ability to produce easily understood analogies to help his pupils grasp difficult abstract ideas. Explaining the gift of the holy spirit to particular individuals, he stated that this was not a new gift, but a gift given in a new way. The analogy he produced was the difference between leaving his robe with someone without giving permission for its use, and leaving it with specific permission (vol. 1, p. 182). In discussing the characteristics inherent in men through nature, in particular their desirable warm-bloodedness and their undesirable corruptibility, he argued that both were in some sense a reflection of the human form. He drew an analogy with a craftsman who wanted to make a sharp knife. He chose iron for the purpose, because he knew it to be both hard and malleable; but he also knew iron could break and would rust. If he could have found an alternative material without these defects, he would have done so (vol. 2, p. 193). Less ambitiously, familiar images abounded in John's text. The effect of extreme unction was compared with that of a syrup or a bath in helping to heal the sick (Maz. 899, fol. 89v). Confirmation was said to make a man a knight of Christ (Maz. 899, fol. 80v). More than the average scholastic, John revelled in the business of argument. He enjoyed explaining to his audience the procedures he 27
For citations see index in ed. Miiller, vol. 1, pp. 502~4 and vol. 2, pp. 149-51. I rely on C. H. Lohr, St. Thomas Aquinas Scriptum super sententiis. An index of authorities cited (Avebury 1980). 28
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would follow in discussion. For example, on the controversial point of whether the soul was distinct from its powers, he said: circa istam opinonem (i.e. Giles of Rome's opinion that it was) sic procedam, quia primo ponam eius a quibusdam reprobationem, secundo eius defensionem, quia reprobantes non videntur accipere mentem ponentis. Tertio ponam defensiones impugnationem (vol. 1, p. 56). He therefore saw his own contribution to the argument as lying at least as much in the proper understanding of his opponent's point of view as in his own solution. True to the principle John enunciated in his self-justification of 1295, he presented in his commentary a wide range of possible opinions on every issue, each usually introduced by 'alii dicunt', but sometimes ascribed to a member of his audience, 'tu dicis' (just a figure of speech, or were masters hostile to him occasionally present?), or 'tu dices'. Some of these opinions he immediately discounted as false; others he examined to extract an element of truth from them; others he left uncriticized. On certain delicate issues he went no further than this, as he himself noted for the benefit of his critics in 1295.29 But usually he was not afraid to clarify his own opinion, 'sed dico'. For example, having cited the common Franciscan view on essence and existence, he said 'istam tamen opinionem non credo veram. Immo videtur mihi alia opinio probabilior' (vol. 2, p. 142). Sometimes he expressed his views in a somewhat bad-tempered way, as for example when, after citing the official historical defence for clerics as possessors of private property,30 he railed: 'ego Johannes dico quod etiam quislibet laicus ad hoc tenetur quod si subicere nollet divitias suas deo peccaret mortaliter, unde non intelligo quid velint dicere, sed non teneo quod possint habere proprietatem' (Maz. 889, fol. 90r). Such comments have led A. Pattin to ascribe to John 'une language intransigeante.'31 That John was not always intransigent in the content of his views emerges from his handling of the eucharistic transformation of the bread and wine, in the question 'utrum manente unitate formarum
29
Glorieux, 'Memoire justificatif RSPT 18 (1928), p. 412. For a different perspective on ecclesiastical propriety, see J. Coleman, 'The intellectual milieu of John of Paris OP', in ed. A. Biihler and J. Miethke, Das Publikum politischer Theorie im 14 Jahrhundert (Munich 1992), pp. 172—206. 31 In Dictionnaire des lettres jrancaises. Le Moyen Age 2nd ed. (Paris 1993), p. 831. 30
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fiat conversio totius in totum, ita quod materia in materiam et forma in formam' (Maz. 889, fol. 84r). Here Thomas Aquinas's opinion that the matter of the bread was transformed into the matter of Christ's body and the form of the bread into the form of Christ's body had been challenged by Giles of Rome.32 John pointed out that adherents of the plurality of forms (he was thinking specifically of Henry of Ghent) had no problem in asserting that both matter and form were transformed. He then reviewed the various opinions put forward by adherents of the unity of forms, of whom he was in principle clearly one.33 After offering his preferred solution, which he believed to be that of Thomas, he declared: si autem isti modo dicendi non placet tune dicitur quod in Christo et in quolibet alio homine sunt plures formae. Melius est enim dicere contra unitatem formarum quam contra unitatem sacramenti (Maz. 889, fol. 84v).
Here he was following the argument suggested by Godfrey of Fontaines in his second quodlibet, qu. 7, though John stated his position less cautiously than Godfrey.34 This instance of flexibility on John's part leads naturally to a discussion of the two most important and not always compatible constraints under which he worked: the impact of the 1277 condemnation, and that of the 1279 Dominican General Chapter's command that all members of the order should revere Thomas Aquinas. Given the context of theological debate in the 1290s, John's commentary on the Sentences was as hazardous an endeavour as crossing a mine-field. The 219 articles condemned in 1277 were still at the forefront of Parisian academics' minds in the 1290s. Although the death in 1285 of Pope Martin IV, who as cardinal and papal legate had been concerned in their promulgation, had somewhat eased the situation, it was not to be until 1325, two years after Thomas Aquinas's canonization, that the bishop of Paris would formally modify the condemnation, at least in relation to anything the new saint had said. John referred to the articles on many occasions. Illustrative of the problems 32 W. Plotnik, 'Transubstantiation in the Eucharistic Theology of Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines' in Wahrheit und Verkiindigung. Michael Schmaus z.wn 70. Geburtstag (Munich 1967), pp. 1073-86. 33 see J.-P. Miiller, 'Der Tractatus de formis des Johannes Quidort von Paris', Divus Thomas (Freiburg) 19 (1941), pp. 195-210. 34 For a discussion of this see J. R. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines (Washington DC 1981), pp. 334-42.
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they caused him was his final remark in his treatment of the superiority of the intellect over the will, a point in which he believed he was following Aquinas:35 Sed tu dices mihi quod cado in articulum, quia sequitur secundum hoc quod cogitur voluntas ab intellectu, quod est interdictum in articulo.36 Dico quod non cado in articulum et si cado vel in isto vel in aliis, pro non dicitur habeatur (vol. 2, p. 180).
Having protested his willingness to recant if wrong, John went on to argue that his thesis did not involve the will in being coerced by the intellect, and therefore the condemned article was not relevant to his discussion. Most early twentieth-century commentators on the commentary were concerned to evaluate how accurately John upheld the teaching of Thomas Aquinas. There can be no doubt that, by and large, John intended to do so. As the author of Correctorium circa., which he was probably composing concurrently with his Sentence commentary,37 John has correctly been identified as an important member of the early Thomistic school.38 In the commentary he referred to Thomas as doctor egregius; he knew his work well enough to approve the development in thought between the early commentary on the Sentences and the later quodlibets (vol. 2, p. 47); he drew citations from a broad spectrum of Thomas's theological output. The main lines of his own interpretations were deeply imbued with Thomistic ideas. On some issues John was one of the few scholars to accept Thomas's views, for example in asserting that substance and accidents remained integrated even when a consecrated host was swallowed by an unbeliever or an animal.39 35 On this see O. Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux XIF et XIIP siecles vol. 1 (Gembloux 1948), pp. 300-302. 36 CUP vol. 1, no 473, art. 163. 37 I here follow the chronology of Pattin, Dictionnaire p. 830. The date provided by J.-P. Miiller, Le Correctorium corruptorii "circa" de Jean Quidort de Paris (Studia Anselrniana 12, 13, Rome 1941) rested on the assumption that the commentary on the Sentences was written much earlier than Miiller himself later established; see 'La date de la lecture . . .' Angelicum 36 (1959), p. 162. The suggestion of L. Hodl, that the treatise could have been written when John was still a master of arts ('Geistesgeschichtliche und literarkritische Erhebungen zum Korrektorienstreit (1277-1287)' RTAM 33, 1966, p. 108) strikes me as inherently improbable, given the assurance of Miiller in his edition p. xxxi that the author must already have been a member of the Dominican order. 38 See F. J. Roensch, The early Thomistic school (Dubuque, Iowa, 1964), pp. 98—104. 39 G. Macy, 'Reception of the Eucharist According to the Theologians: A Case
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On the other hand, John did sometimes depart from Thomas. At least three times in the course of Book II he gave Thomas's opinion on a topic and then commented 'sed hoc non intelligo'.40 Long ago, Grabmann pointed out that John's view of the intellectus agens was not the same as that of his great predecessor.41 Miiller drew attention to the differences between the two scholars in regard to esse and essential Gilson raised the question of whether their difference of opinion on such a fundamental point as being meant that John could be counted a Thomist at all in the proper sense of the word.43 R.-A. Gauthier saw John as improving on Thomas's teaching about the acquired and infused virtues,44 while C. Trottmann thought he failed fully to understand his model on the beatific vision.45 To most readers of the end of the twentieth century, defining John's position only in relation to Thomas will not now be a priority. The Dominican General Chapter's 1279 command was not intended to turn theologians into rigid apologists for their great doctor. Writing four decades after Thomas produced his work on the Sentences,46 John was affected by the 1277 condemnation and also by the ideas of his great contemporaries, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Giles of Rome. He had to take account of their suggestions, especially those of Godfrey, with whom he shared much. While he usually disagreed with Henry and often with Giles, occasionally Giles earned his heartfelt approval.47 In reflecting on recent controversies, John was fulfilling the expectations of his audience, who expected to hear up-to-date analyses. Because John was later to earn notoriety for his tract De modo existendi corporis Christi in sacramento a/tarn,48 what he had to say about the
of Diversity in the 13th and 14th Centuries', Theology and the University (Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the College Theology Society, 1987) ed. John Apczynski (University Press of America: Lanham, MD, 1990), pp. 28, 29. 40 Miiller, ed. vol. 2, pp. xxix-xxx. 41 'Studien zu Joh. von Paris' p. 55. 42 'A propos du Memoire justificatif. . .' p. 347; on this see also C. Trabold, 'Das esse actualis existentiae nach Johannes Quidort von Paris', Freiburger Zeitschrift fiir Philosophie und Theologie, 5 (1958), pp. 3-36. 43 History of Christian Philosophy p. 426. 44 Magnanimite (Paris 1952), p. 455 note 3. 43 La vision beatifique p. 351. 46 J. A. Weisheipl, OP, Friar Thomas d'Aquino (Oxford 1975), p. 358. 47 Muller, vol. 2, p. xxx. 48 There have been two modern editions, J. H. Martin in Viator 6 (1975), pp. 195-240—with English translation; and A. Pattin, Angelicum 54 (1977), pp. 184-206.
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eucharist in the commentary on the Sentences is of interest, especially in view of his retraction of two propositions concerning it in his justification. The two propositions came in his response to the question 'utrum accidentia remaneant sine subiecto?' (Maz. 889, fol. 84v). Given that articles 139, 140 and 141 of the 1277 condemnation explicitly rejected the arguments that might be put forward against the proposition, John had no difficulty in agreeing that truth required the accidents alone to remain after the consecration: dico quod remanent sicut ab omnibus testatur. He then set himself four tasks, those of explaining what theologians said on the issue, of refuting the allegation that anything impossible was involved, of enquiring whether all the accidents remained, and then of discussing the difficult questions of whether colour could be visible without quantity and whether quality without quantity could have extension. These last issues arose from speculation about what exactly it was that the onlooker saw on the altar after transubstantiation (a word John avoided) had taken place. In explaining theological opinion, John took Thomas's position: the accidents could not inhere in the substance of the bread after the consecration, because the bread was no longer there; nor could they inhere in the body of Christ, because they were not the correct accidents. Nor could they inhere in the air around about, since neither whiteness nor hardness were the properties of air. Therefore they did not inhere in any subject as normally conceived. The arguments put forward to suggest that God could not bring this about were false. But in relation to the third and fourth questions, it was Godfrey of Fontaines who provided the foundation of what John said. In 1287 Godfrey had been asked whether a given quality could exist apart from any subject or apart from any quantity (Quodlibet 4, question 22). The question related to his theory of transubstantiation articulated in Quodlibet 4, question 3.49 Godfrey now distinguished between quantity, which by divine intervention at the eucharist could be separated from substance, and sensible quality, which he did not believe to be separable. For example, whiteness could not be perceived without the surface on which it was found. It was with this cautiously phrased conclusion that John apparently disagreed. He argued 'si totum sit per miraculum, nee plus dependet qualitas a quantitate quam quantitas a substantia' (Maz.
49
On this see J. F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought. . ., pp. 216-24.
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889, fol. 84v). In other words he rejected the order of accidents on which Godfrey relied, and allowed for the possibility that quality also might exist on its own by divine intervention. He went on to suggest by a series of analogies situations in which whiteness might be visible in some sense without quantity: remota quantitate remaneat qualitas extensa scilicet per superficiem et sic est visibilis sicut et cera retinet figuram sigilli separata (Max. 889, fol. 84v). The precise words imputed to him in the justification—Quod albedo sine quantitate esset visibilis actu, quia esset extensa quadam extensione effecta ab extensione quantitatis, sicut apparet de vase et aqua, sigillo etc. Item huiusmodi albedo esset visibilis, etiam dato quod non esset extensa, et hoc non actione sed aptitudine50—do not occur in the much abbreviated version of the fourth question provided in the Mazarine MS (though they seem to be an accurate summary of what he said), but nor does the retraction which John declared was recorded in the St. Victor reportatio.51 In his justification John declared 'at last I specifically retracted the whole of that question, stating expressly that on this subject the only proposition that should be held is that God can make accidents without a subject and whiteness without quantity and a soul outside the body.' From this it appears that his critics objected, not to his relatively small difference of opinion with Godfrey to which he continued to adhere, but to the whole pursuit of this line of enquiry. If so, they did not succeed in dissuading John more than temporarily from trying to comprehend the mystery. When in 1305 he put forward his theory of impanation as a possible alternative to transubstantiation (though he was careful to express his own belief in the latter), he stressed that one advantage of impanation lay in not requiring the accidents of bread and wine to be separated from their substance, changed though that substance was by consecration.32 As far as we know, John's discussion of quality without quantity was the only aspect of his teaching on the eucharist in his commentary on the Sentences that attracted adverse criticism. In a way this is surprising, because he opened himself to possible objections by reviving questions that had been discussed avidly in the later
•'" Glorieux, 'Memoire justificatif. . .' RSPT 18 (1928), p. 412. 51 Glorieux, ibid., pp. 412-3. >2 Ed. J. H. Martin, p. 215.
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twelfth century but were not any longer required of bachelors.03 For example, he enquired what had happened at the original last supper; did Christ eat his own body? (Maz. 889, fol. 82r-v) Did he give his body to Judas? (Maz. 899, fol. 82v) He also asked about the different modes of eating the sacrament and the problem of whether it was digested (Maz. 889, fol. 81v); and how Christ's body and blood could be present on so many altars at once (Maz. 899, fol. 83r). These rather crude questions mixed somewhat oddly with those inspired by pastoral duties, for example whether a priest was justified in allowing a man whom he knew to have committed sin to take communion (Mas. 889, fol. 82r), or whether fasting before taking the sacrament was mandatory (Maz. 889, fol. 81r). Pastoral advice and theological speculation coincided in the issue of what a priest should do if a fly or a spider fell into the chalice after consecration (Maz. 899, fol. 84v). The response, that he should transfer the wine to another vessel, continue with the service, then later wash the chalice, burn the fly, and put its ashes among the relics, constituted an answer to a practical problem, but also reflected John's Thomistic belief in the persistence of Christ's body and blood in the sacrament as long as the species remained unchanged.54 In introducing Book II of John's commentary on the Sentences, J.-P. Miiller contrasted John's enjoyment of speculative theology with his relative lack of interest in practical matters.55 But as might be expected, Book IV offered a better framework than books I or II for dealing with more down-to-earth problems. As was evident from his famous treatize De potestate regia et papali^ John had more than a passing acquaintance with the major sources of Roman and canon law of his period. In the Sentences commentary he frequently quoted from Raymond of Penafort's various works, from John the Teuton's Apparatus glossamm, and from Godfrey of Trani's Summa super titulos decretalium. He had particular opportunity to show his knowledge in the long section dealing with the sacrament of marriage (Maz. 889, fols. 91v-98r), which was more concerned with impediments than with the sacrament itself. The characteristics that were in the fourteenth-
53
See J. de Ghellinck in Dictionnaire de Theologie catholique vol. 5, pp. 1271, 1276-9; G. R. Evans Alan of Lille (Cambridge 1983), pp. 112-15. 54 G. Macy, 'Reception of the Eucharist', p. 31. 55 Vol. 2, p. xxviii. 56 Ed. J. Leclerq, Jean de Paris et I'ecclesiologie du XIIP siecle (Paris 1942).
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century to turn commentaries on Book IV increasingly into handbooks for the assistance of parish priests were already there in John's work. Typical of this legalistic approach, but also characteristic of John's ability to put ecclesiastical legislation into a broader context of divine and natural law,57 was his handling of indulgences (Maz. 889, fols 88r-v). He denied that these were valid only in church courts, not the courts of God. He explained the doctrine of the treasury of merits, remarking that, just as debts could be paid by a friend on the debtor's behalf, so could a sinner be pardoned by a prelate drawing on that treasury. He then recounted various conditions that had to be fulfilled before either an indulgence or a dispensation became valid, including the need for faith, charity and justice on the part of the dispenser, this last quality to be evidenced in waiving the contribution to church fabric or charities from those who could not afford it and yet were truly devoted. It is interesting that the practice that was later to trouble Luther was already causing comment at the end of the thirteenth century. Closer to John's personal interests was the discussion of mendicant rights to hear confession, intruded into a question on the powers of parish priests. The issue was very sensitive, because the papal legate Benedict Gaetani, on a visit to Paris in 1290, had silenced the secular clergy's objections to mendicant privileges as established by Martin IV's bull Adfructus uberes of 1281, but had also demanded the cessation of all debate on the subject. John was in breach of this prohibition by raising the matter at all.58 Quoting omnes utriusque sexus of 1215, the conciliar canon that had enjoined on all the faithful confession at least once a year to their 'own priest', John displayed his love of grammatical logic in offering a meaning for 'own' in this context. 'Own' could be defined either in contrast to 'other people's' or in contrast to 'something held in common.' A bishop, whose jurisdictional powers spread over many parishes, could be called 'a common priest'; since it would be absurd to suggest that a man should not confess to his bishop, it is clear that 'own' in the context of confession was intended to contrast with 'other people's'. The force of °7 Leclerq, Jean de Paris et I'ecclesiologie du Xllf siecle, pp. 69-70. 08 See Y.-M. Congar, 'Aspects ecclesiologiques de la querelle entre mendiants et seculiers dans le second nioitie du XIIP siecle', Archives d'histoire et litteraire du Moyen Age 2 (1961), p. 45.
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the word in omnes utriusque sexus was that men should confess to those who had jurisdiction over them, whether by ordinary power or by commission. John concluded: 'Unde dico quod fratres quibus commissum est a papa sunt proprie sacerdotes, nee oportet iterum alii sacerdoti confiteri qui eis est confessus nisi velit' (Maz. 889, fol. 87r). The last part of this question, as recorded in the reportatio, is assertion not argument. Either what John said has been much abbreviated or he did in fact try to be discrete. But his secular opponents would not have been convinced that friars in receipt of a papal commission had the same rights as parish priests; and many of them would still have believed in the validity of the claim, first made in 1287,59 that those who had confessed to and received absolution from friars were required to repeat their confessions to their own parish priests on the annual occasion enjoined in 1215. Since the issue of reconfession was not mentioned in ad fructus uberes, the mendicants of the period after Gaetani's intervention will have been nervous of permitting it to go unchallenged. But by mentioning the issue at all John was risking re-igniting the quarrel. The strength of his feelings can be gauged from his much later Determinatio de confessionibus Jratrum,60 written in 1304 to defend the Dominican pope Benedict XI's new privilege to the mendicants inter cunctas, which permitted very little room for manoeuvre to his secular opponents. The discussion on place in Aristotle's Physics aroused philosophical speculation about a topic that was also exciting imaginations in the thirteenth century,61 the geography of the next world. The more speculation there was about the stars and the planets, the more problematic it became to fit in the requirements of religion. When discussing the punishment of the damned, John took time to consider the location of hell. He argued that even philosophers concurred with all Christian opinion in postulating a great fire in the middle of the earth. Until the day of judgement all damned souls would remain there. What would happen then was a matter of dispute. Some believed hell would continue to exist in the centre of the earth, (an opinion John regarded as tenable despite the apparent overcrowding likely to result), while others thought that, in the course
59
60 61
CUP II, no. 543. Ed. L. Hodl, Mitteilungen d. Grabmann-Instituts 6, (Munich 1960). See J. Le Goff, La naissance du purgatoire (Paris 1981), p. 421.
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of the great upheavals of the time when the valleys were exalted and the hills made low, hell would be ejected completely from the earth (Maz. 988, fol. 98v). The catastrophe, the total reshaping of heaven and earth, the cessation of celestial movement, that would take place in the last days as foretold by Isaiah, was a theme to which John often recurred in the course of Book 4. John's commentary on the Sentences had an encyclopaedic character. It is almost as if he hoped to include all the questions that had ever been asked about the text in the century and a half since Peter Lombard produced it. Consequently he produced an intoxicating mixture of high speculative theology, pastoral teaching, up-to-date controversy, and bizarre notions. Discussion ranged from the timeless to matters of immediate relevance. Many of the themes he was later to develop were to be found in embryo in this, his first theological exercise. The commentary provided a showcase for his knowledge of cosmology, logic, canon and Roman law. Perhaps the most striking characteristics of the whole are the clarity with which the ideas it contains are set forth and the cornbativeness of John's style. These, at least as much as the content, will have been the grounds for its careful examination by the masters of theology.
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PETER AURIOL'S WAY WITH WORDS THE GENESIS OF PETER AURIOL'S COMMENTARIES ON PETER LOMBARD'S FIRST AND FOURTH BOOKS OF THE SENTENCES Lauge O. Nielsen
1. Introduction Many medieval commentaries on Peter Lombard's four books of the Sentences cannot but instil present-day readers with awe. They are monuments not only to their authors' capacity for intellectual work but also to their dedication to the quest for theological and philosophical truth. Commentaries by thinkers such as Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus are examples that readily spring to mind. Seen in this perspective, numerous commentaries by less wellknown authors deserve equal admiration, and this is not least true of those authored by the French philosopher and theologian Peter Auriol. Born around 1280, Auriol became a Franciscan at an early age and was sent to study theology in Paris shortly after the turn of the century. Upon completion of his preliminary studies he was charged with lecturing on the Sentences in the order's study houses in Bologna and Toulouse in the second decade of the century. Having distinguished himself by his scholarly abilities Auriol was appointed by the General Chapter of his order to the position of Franciscan lecturer on the Sentences in Paris, and from 1316 to 1318 he held the prominent post of baccalarius sententiarius in the French capital. The following two years he filled the office of magister regens or professor in the Parisian faculty of theology. Subsequently, he became provincial of the Franciscans in Aquitaine, and in 1321 he was consecrated as archbishop of Aix-en-Provence. That he ever had the opportunity to take on his new charge is highly doubtful inasmuch as he died early in 1322.1 1
For Auriol's biography, see Teetaert (1935) and Buytaert's introduction in Peter Auriol (1952), pp. VII sqq. The correct spelling of Auriol's family name is a moot point. The more common forms found in the manuscripts are "Auriolus" and
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From Auriol's hand we have commentaries on all four books of the Sentences, and together with his single Quodlibet they were published in Rome in 1596 and 1605 at the initiative of the learned Cardinal Sarnano.2 The commentary on the first book is nothing less than monumental and comprises more than 1100 densely printed pages. This work enjoyed a wide circulation in the later middle ages and was especially appreciated for its full accounts of the views of prominent thinkers of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, such as Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and John Duns Scotus.3 Auriol's commentaries on the second and fourth books are of more modest dimensions and, as far as the early printed edition is concerned, the commentary on book three is markedly smaller than either.4 The transmission of Auriol's commentaries is fraught with difficulties and has engaged scholars for almost a century. For various reasons the research has primarily focused on Auriol's commenting on the first book of the Sentences and addressed the questions posed by the far from unanimous testimony of the manuscript tradition. In the following, I shall first present and examine the more prominent attempts to come to grips with the problems raised by this part of Auriol's work. Secondly, Auriol's commentary on the fourth book of the Sentences will be examined, primarily because the transmission of this work is much less ambiguous and provides valuable insight into the process by which Auriol composed his commentaries. On this extended basis the investigation will return to Auriol's commenting on the first book with the aim of reaching an understanding of the main factors that were operative in the formation of this part of Auriol's literary legacy.
"Aureolus", while the correct vernacular spelling is "Auriol", according to Valois (1906), pp. 479 sqq.; cf. Teetaert (1935), col. 1811; and Tachau (1997), p. 205, note 1. 2 For the early printed edition, see Tachau (1997) as well as Nielsen (1997a), and the literature quoted there. For the sake of brevity, this edition will be referred to by way of the siglum "E"' followed by the year of publication of the particular volume. A list of the abbreviations used is found at the end of the chapter. 5 An early witness to the value of Auriol's commentary as a work of reference is Franciscus de Mayronis; see Teetaert (1935), col. 1833; and Brown (1997), p. 381. 1 The commentary on the third book is beset with special problems; sec Heynck (1969). Internal references indicate that Auriol lectured on the four books in the following order: I, IV, II, III; cf Teetaert (1935), col. 1832.
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2. Auriol's Commentaries on the First Book of the Sentences
2.1. The Longer and Shorter Commentaries
By its extraordinary thoroughness and elaborate structure Auriol's commentary on the first book bears several of the distinguishing features of a so-called ordinatio or scriptum, which is to say a commentary meticulously composed and published by a baccalarius sententiarius after the completion of his lecture series. For this reason, medieval historians in the first half of the twentieth century were convinced that the commentary on the first book found in the early printed edition was Auriol's ordinatio, and that it was written after Auriol had completed his Parisian lectures on the Lombard's Sentences in 1318. This conviction was not shaken by the—rather surprising—discovery of another and shorter commentary by Auriol on the very same book of the Sentences? To F. Pelster, who succeeded in identifying the work in no fewer than three manuscripts, it was immediately evident that the newly found commentary was a reportatio, and that it was based directly on Auriol's teaching in Paris. Accordingly, Pelster was of the opinion that the shorter commentary was closer to what Auriol had actually propounded in his Paris lectures, and that it antedated the longer commentary which was a polished literary work intended for publication.6 In 1948 Anneliese Maier challenged the late dating of Auriol's longer commentary on the grounds that it was in obvious conflict with the evidence provided by at least one of the manuscripts. The exquisitely produced and richly illuminated manuscript no. 329 in the Borghese collection of the Vatican Library contains Auriol's longer commentary on the first book and was, as Maier demonstrated, a gift from Auriol to Pope John XXII, to whom the work was also dedicated. In the explicit to the codex, the scribe, John of Frisia, recorded that he finished the copy on the 19th of May 1317 in Cahors.7 Since the production of the beautiful and impressive volume would have taken several months, Maier concluded that Auriol had finished the longer commentary sometime in 1316. Moreover,
:) 6 7
Valois (1906) was the first to perceive the existence of this work. See Pelster (1930), pp. 468, and id. (1931), p. 449. See Maier (1964), p. 65, note 60.
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since Jacques Duese was elected pope on the seventh of August 1316, and as in his letter of dedication Auriol made a point of stressing his benefactor's recent ascent to the papacy, Maier found it most likely that Auriol had already completed the longer commentary when he arrived in Paris in the late summer of that year.8 This meant that the relationship between an ordinatio and a reportatio was, in the case of AurioPs commentaries on the Lombard's first book, the opposite of what would ordinarily be assumed to be the case. On the other hand, why somebody would want to write a reportatio after having completed an ordinatio was a question to which Maier had no answer. Ten years later Maier had completed a more detailed examination of the manuscripts, and prompted by the discovery of a hitherto unknown manuscript she advanced a new and highly intricate theory on the questions posed by Auriol's commentaries on the first book. Before turning to this theory it will be useful, however, to briefly review the manuscript tradition of Auriol's shorter commentary. 2.2. The Transmission of Auriol's Shorter Commentary
Whereas the longer commentary, usually called the Scriptum? is known from more than a dozen manuscripts and is of indisputable authenticity,10 the shorter commentary is known from only three manuscripts. The most complete and uniform is Borghese 123 which is in the possession of the Vatican Library.11 In addition to the commentary, which occupies fols. 1-199, the volume contains a copy of Auriol's Quodlibet, which was made generally available in 1320, i.e., at the time when Auriol relinquished his professorship in Paris.12 8 See Maier (1964), p. 65, and id. (1964), pp. 144 sqq. Pelster (1954), p. 393, note 10, accepted Maier's correction. 9 Though the work is characterised as a scriptum already in the Vat. Borgh. 329 manuscript, it is not advisable to use this as its tide since the term is rather ambiguous. In this connection, this commentary will be referred to by way of the rather bland but totally accurate expression "the longer commentary on the first book", which, for the sake of brevity, will be abbreviated as the "LCI". Correspondingly, Auriol's shorter commentary on the first book of the Sentences will be referred to as the "SCI". 10 Not surprisingly, the presentation copy, Vat. Borgh. 329, is of superior quality, but this is not tantamount to saying that its text is absolutely flawless; cf. Schabel (1995), pp. 82 sqq.; and Friedman (1997), pp. 368 sqq. 11 In the following, this manuscript will be referred to by way of the siglum "V". 12 See Teetaert (1935), col. 1839, for references to the evidence provided by the manuscripts.
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The second manuscript is kept in the German State Library in Berlin where it bears the shelf number Cod. Theol. 536.13 This copy of the text is incomplete in several respects. In the first place, it does not carry Auriol's so-called collatio, which is a short laudatory speech on the Sentences as an authoritative text, and which a sententiarius was obliged to deliver before the start of his lectures on each book. In the second place, the manuscript is damaged through the loss of a single sheet between folios 25 and 2614 and no fewer than 6 sheets between folios 26 and 27. 15 Thirdly, from Distinction 33 right up to Distinction 48 this manuscript brings a text that is very much different from the one found in V. The scribe signalled this break by starting Distinction 33 on a new page and leaving the first fourteen lines of the page blank.16 The third manuscript is in the keeping of the Biblioteca Antoniana in Padua where it is designated as Cod. 292.17 Like B' it lacks the collatio and has a break immediately after Distinction 32. Again the break is signalled by a fresh start on a new page,18 and the latter third of the work appears to have been written in a different hand.19 Disregarding for the moment Distinction 33 which presents some very special problems, to which we shall have to return, the text of the latter third agrees roughly with the text in B'. Between folios 121 and 122 a sheet has been lost.20 That the SC1 is a work of Auriol's is quite firmly established. In V the work is characterised as "Brother Peter Auriol's Reportations" 13
In the following, this manuscript will be referred to by way of the siglurn "B"'. The text stops prematurely at the end of the quaestio unica in Distinction 4 and picks up again well into the second question of Distinction 5. 15 The text breaks off near the end of the third question in Distinction 5 and picks up again towards the end of the third question in Distinction 8. Though Maier (1964), p. 271, note 15, signalled the first loss, she missed the following and much larger gap. 16 B', fol. Sir. 17 In the following, this manuscript will be referred to by way of the siglum "P"'. 18 P', fol. 116r. 19 Cf. Maier (1964), p. 267, note 8. 20 The text stops at the very end of the fifth question in Distinction 42 and picks up again a few lines into the fourth question in Distinction 44. Maier noted this, though she had difficulty with determining the physical extent of the loss. Evidently, it is impossible to know with certainty how much text was lost in this way. On the one hand, there is the possibility that for this section of the work P' had a much fuller text than B'. On the other hand, it is equally possible that P' had several blank lines which had been reserved for future expansions. Based on what is generally true of the relationship between the texts provided by P' and B' in this latter third of the work, it would appear safe to assume that only one sheet has been lost, and that approximately one column had been left blank. 14
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by a medieval librarian.21 Though the work is anonymous in both the B' and the P' manuscripts, the catalogue of the Biblioteca Antoniana dating from 1449 attributes the work to Auriol and classifies it as a reportatio.22 Moreover, a manuscript preserved in the municipal library of Toulouse, cod. lat. 243, which contains Auriol's commentaries on the third and the fourth books, brings a list of the questions in Auriol's commentary on the first book. This index quaestionum agrees with the questions contained in V'.23 Furthermore, in the manuscript Vat. lat. 946 there is an abbreviation of what is claimed to be Auriol's questions on the Sentences, and for the first book, this abbreviation was obviously done on the basis of a text which must have resembled the version found in B' and P'.24
3. A. Maier's Revised Theory
The authenticity of the SC1 was further supported by Maier's discovery of a series of 56 questions in Vat. lat. 6768,25 which in the explicit are attributed to Auriol.26 These questions have close connections with his commentaries on both the first and the second book of the Sentences insofar as the first nineteen questions have obvious links to Auriol's SCI whereas the remaining thirty-seven questions have parallels in his commentary on the second book. No fewer than ten of the first nineteen questions were already known before the discovery of Vat. lat. 6768 since they are identical to questions which appear in the latter third of the commentary as transmitted in B' and P'.27 As for the remaining nine questions 21 V, fol. 198v; for the nature of this addition as well as the one found on fol. Ir (soil., "Reportationes Petri Aureoli"), see Maier (1964), p. 285, note 49. 22 See Pelster (1930), p. 465. 23 The volume was presumably the second in a two-volumes set of which the first volume was lost; at any rate, the index questionum found at the end of the volume covers all four books (Toulouse, Bibliotheque Municipale, cod. 243, fols. 124rb127vb). The manuscript was completed only one year after Auriol's death; see Brown (1995), p. 205. 24 See Maier (1964), pp. 278-279, and the references provided there. 2:5 See Maier (1964), pp. 273 sqq. They are at present contained on fols. 21—50, but originally these pages formed the beginning of the codex. 26 Vat. lat. 6768, fol. 49vb; cf. Maier (1964), p. 274, note 19. 27 Their affiliation with these questions is so close that they can be used to establish the texts. For the sake of brevity Auriol's questions in the Vat. lat. 6768 will be referred to as "VQ" (i.e., Auriol's "Vatican Questions").
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the situation is rather more complicated. With regard to subject matter, eight of the questions have close parallels in the SC1, but deal with their topics in a much more summary fashion.28 On the basis of this—now expanded—material Maier in 1958 reconsidered the thorny problems raised by AurioPs two commentaries on the first book. In order to find a way through the maze of confusing material she proposed to employ AurioPs relationship to Thomas Wylton as her Ariadne thread. Since Thomas Wylton, who was an English secular and professor of theology in Paris,29 was one of AurioPs principal opponents, Maier thought it reasonable to assume that Wylton's appearance in the different parts of AurioPs work would assist in establishing the relative chronology of the differing texts associated with AurioPs commentaries on the first book of the Sentences. As a premise for her argument Maier stipulated that Auriol and Wylton did not engage in personal debate, and that AurioPs claim that Wylton objected to his attempt to elucidate, e.g., the triune nature of God should be taken with a "grain of salt". To Maier it was equally evident that the same should be said of AurioPs relationship to his second main opponent, the Dominican Hervaeus Natalis, who was also a professor of theology in Paris at the time when Auriol lectured on the Sentences.™ What Auriol meant by saying that the two professors opposed his theories was merely that the theories of Wylton and Hervaeus were in conflict with what Auriol taught. In order to underpin her interpretation Maier maintained that this was true at least in Distinction 33 of the SCI. Here Auriol did not refer to what Wylton had propounded in oral discussion; he was merely quoting from the question De attributis in Wylton's Quodlibet.31 Wylton's Quodlibet was, as Maier had demonstrated on a previous occasion,32 generally available some time after 1315 and caused quite 28
VQ. 1: SCI, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1; VQ, 2: SCI, d. 8, q. 4; VQ, 3: SCI, d. 23, q. 2; VQ,4: SCI, d. 23, q. 3; VQ, 5: SCI, d. 27, q. 1; VQ, 6: SCI, d. 27, q. 2; VQ 8: SCI, d. 30, q. 1. On the other hand, the seventh question in the VQ, (Utrum agere sit in agente vel in passo) is closely associated with the LCI, d. 27, pars 1, a. 2 (£' (1596), cols. 597a sqq.; and Peter Auriol (1997), pp. 389 sqq.). 29 See Dumont (1998), and the references provided there. 30 See Guimaraes (1938), p. 65. 31 That Auriol refers to Wylton in the latter third of both of his commentaries on the first book was long recognised; cf. Teetaert (1935), col. 1839. 32 See Maier (1964), pp. 87 sqq. For the later discussions on the date of Wylton's Quodlibet, see Jung-Palczewska & Kuksewicz (1997).
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a stir in the academic community. In particular Wylton's interpretation of Aristotle's view of the relationship between the Unmoved Mover, the heavenly intelligences, and the celestial spheres became notorious. According to Wylton, Aristotle maintained that the Unmoved Mover did not produce the heavenly intelligences whereas the Unmoved Mover was the efficient cause of the whole material universe, and consequently of the material spheres.33 According to Maier, Auriol opposed this opinion in Distinction 42 of both his commentaries.34 On the other hand, when dealing in Distinction 3 with the possibility of proving God's existence on the basis of causality one would expect Auriol to make at least a passing reference to Wylton's idiosyncratic opinion. But, according to Maier, no such reference is to be found in either commentary. To Maier this implied that when writing the commentary on the third distinction Auriol was not yet familiar with Wylton's Quodlibet. Later on, when composing the questions contained in Distinctions 42 and 43 of both commentaries, Auriol had read Wylton's Quodlibet and was in a position to argue against Wylton's view.35 In other words, the first two-thirds of both commentaries should be dated before 1316, whereas the latter third in both versions was composed after 1316. This chronological examination Maier supplemented by several keen observations on the style of the commentaries and the state of the texts presented by the manuscripts. Thus she noted that there are indications that the SC1 was never finished since there are obvious gaps in the exposition transmitted in all manuscripts.36 On the other hand, she was convinced that the SCI had been edited by the author and, accordingly, was no raw reportatio of a series of lectures. As the result of her investigations Maier drew several conclusions. In the first place, she was convinced that the SCI was intended as an ordinatio that reflected no particular series of lectures, and that the same should be said of the LC1. Which of the two commen33
This is the upshot of the quotation in Maier (1964), pp. 28-29. Below we shall see that Wylton's stance was more ambiguous than this. 34 Maier (1964), pp. 283-284; here Maier's interpretation of Wylton is by no means exhaustive. 35 As regards the first question in Auriol's VQ, which deals with the topic of Distinction 3, Maier did not find any reference to Wylton either. Nonetheless, she was reluctant to draw any conclusions from this inasmuch as the only known manuscript contained merely a selection of questions, and as it is impossible to say how many questions were excluded. 36 See Maier (1964), p. 286.
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taries was written first is an issue which cannot be established on Maier's criteria,37 and this is not at all to be wondered at since the first two-thirds of both commentaries would antedate 1316, whereas the latter third in both commentaries would be posterior to that point in time. The VQ, on the other hand, should, according to Maier, be viewed as parts of a reportatio of AurioPs Paris lectures. The version of the text which is found in B' and P' and is attested to by the abbreviation in Vat. lat. 946, is a mixed version in the sense that it resulted from a juxtaposition of the pre-1316 part of the shorter commentary and the Parisian reportatio which was used to supplement the truncated main text.38
4. Examination of Maier's Theory
4.1. Stephen Brown's Opposition to Maier's Theory
Already in his 1964 dissertation Stephen Brown objected to Maier's theory. This opposition was based on the conviction that Maier's theory attached far too little importance to the evidence provided by the medieval tradition in favour of the reportatio character of the SCI. 39 In his recent introduction to the edition of the first two parts of the second distinction of AurioPs SCI Brown also maintained this. Thus he stressed that AurioPs commentary on the second book was seen as a reportatio in the medieval period, and that there was no noticeable difference in style or structure between this work and the SC1. Moreover, the list of questions for the first book which is found in the Toulouse manuscript clearly indicates that the SCI is a reportatio, and considering that the manuscript was written only one year after AurioPs death its testimony should not be disregarded.40 Maier's contention that the gaps in all of the available copies of the work
3/ Why Auriol would have wanted to write both a long and a short commentary on the same book and at the same time, bewildered Maier to no small extent, and the explanations she offered are not particularly convincing; cf. Maier (1964), pp. 285-287. 38 W. Dettloff, who is one of the few scholars to have worked on the basis of both the LCI and the SCI, accepted Maier's theory, but it does not seem to have been of importance to his investigation; see Dettloff (1963), pp. 24 sqq. 39 See Brown (1964), pp. 27 sqq. 40 Cf. above, note 23.
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seem to indicate that it is an edited work left incomplete, failed to convince Brown. As the latter underscored, this is equally true of AurioPs commentary on the fourth book of the Sentences as transmitted in the Toulouse codex. Finally, Maier disregarded the fact that the collatio of the SC1 fits in seamlessly with the collationes which introduce the commentaries on the second, third, and fourth books. All four collationes are built up around the word rota intended as a pun on the author's family name.41 Consequently, to Brown it is very likely that AurioPs SCI in its entirety is a reportatio based on AurioPs Parisian lectures in the latter half of 1316.42 4.2. The Relationship Between Thomas Wylton and Peter Auriol
In order to gauge the validity of Maier's elaborate theory it is clearly necessary to test the premises on which the theory rests. In the first place, Maier's claim that Thomas Wylton and Hervaeus Natalis did not oppose Auriol personally, is not plausible. This claim conflicts with AurioPs unequivocal statements to the contrary, and from Thomas Wylton's hand we have at least two texts in which he explicitly criticizes Auriol. It should be stressed that one of these texts was discovered by Francesco del Punta several years after the appearance of Maier's article,43 but this is certainly not true of the second text, which was signalled by Michalski already in 1926, and mentioned by Teetaert in 1935, and again by Pelster in 1954.44 Moreover, in his Bordeaux determinatio Wylton explicitly acknowledges that Auriol had objected to something that he had said "in another question".45 With regard to Hervaeus Natalis' criticisms of Auriol,
41
See Buytaert (1952), pp. XVII sqq.; and Heynck (1969), p. 70. Brown (1995), pp. 205-206. With regard to Auriol's VQ,, Brown (1995), p. 206, note 25, raises many questions and suggests that they may belong to Auriol's stay in Bologna. 43 This determinatio of Thomas Wylton's (Thomas Wylton (1987)) was identified in a manuscript kept in Bordeaux, Bibliotheque Municipale, cod. 416, and published in an appendix to the works of Giles of Rome. Henceforth this text will be referred to as "Wylton's Bordeaux determinatio". 44 See Michalski (1969), p. 70; Teetaert (1935), col. 1840; and Pelster (1954), pp. 398—399. An edition and a preliminary analysis are provided in Nielsen (2000). 45 Thomas Wylton (1987), p. 213. Auriol's contributions to the debate that Wylton refers to are—as Henninger (1990), p. 480, noted—not easily identifiable. In the near future I hope to be able to contribute to the charting of this debate. 42
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there can be absolutely no doubt that Auriol is the target of the very angry and harsh polemic found in Hervaeus' fourth Quodlibet.^ Secondly, there are grounds for disagreeing with Maier when she states that Auriol does not mention or allude to Thomas Wylton's idiosyncratic interpretation of Aristotle's view on the relationship between the Unmoved Mover, the separate intelligences, and the celestial spheres in Distinction 3 of the SC 1 and in the first question contained in his VQ. This particular question was of pivotal importance in Auriol's debates with Hervaeus Natalis and Thomas Wylton, and its principal arguments supplied many of the key topics for the later debate.47 Maier's claim does not bear closer scrutiny inasmuch as there are, in fact, very clear rejections of this view in both texts, SCI, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1 (V, fol. 32rb) VQ, q. 1 (Vat. lat. 6768, fol. 22ra) Et hoc modo loquitur Commen- Et ideo non est verum, quod aliqui tator, cum dicit, quod finis significat dicunt, quod intelligentia movens agens significatione perfecta, nam caelum iam invenit sic caelum fabquidam dixerunt, quod intelligen- ricatum et post accessisse ad movtia motrix caeli nihil facit cum endum, immo . . ,48 caelo nisi sicut figulus cum rota. 46 See, e.g., Guimaraes (1938), pp. 64 sqq.; and cf. Hodl (1955). Guimaraes (1938), p. 65, note 39, did not succeed, however, in matching Hervaeus' objections to the arguments that are ascribed to Hervaeus in Auriol's commentary on Book 4, d. 13, q. 2 (£' (1605), cols. 126b sqq.) The simple reason for this is that he focused on the wrong question in Hervaeus' fourth Quodlibet. The line of argument presented in Auriol's commentary is not reflected in the fourth question of Hervaeus' fourth Quodlibet, but in the eighth question; see Hervaeus (1513), cols. lOlva sqq. 47 This is particularly apparent in the sequence of three topics which appear in intimate conjunction in Auriol's text, viz.., the relationship between creatures and their Creator, the relationship of similarity existing between two white things, and the relationship of Father and Son in the divine Trinity. This sequence is echoed in Hervaeus Natalis (see Hervaeus Natalis (1513), cols. 92rb sqq.) as well as in Thomas Wylton's Bordeaux determinatio (see Thomas Wylton (1987), pp. 211 sqq. and p. 214.) 48 Auriol's exposition in the LCI (see Peter Auriol (1956), pp. 611 sqq.) is admittedly close to this passage in the VQ and the SC 1. However, the emphasis is slightly different in the LCI since here Auriol aims at defending the natural unity of the single intelligence and its proper sphere. In another of his determinations, which was also directed against Auriol, and which is preserved in the manuscript cod. 63 kept in Balliol College, Oxford, Wylton reveals that he had taken offence at Auriol's potter simile and paid back Auriol in kind. Thus he stated that Auriol's claim that logic is a practical science would make the logician into an intellectual shoe-maker; just like a shoe-maker carves out the different pieces of hide that go into making a shoe but produces nothing original, so, on Auriol's view, the logician would merely arrange the material supplied by one of the speculative sciences; Nielsen (2000), pp. 77—78.
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Now it might be argued that Auriol does not intend to target Wylton in this passage but merely reproduces Averroes' line of reasoning in the second chapter of the De substantia orbis.49 This would, however, be a rather superficial reading of the texts. With Averroes the discussion concerns the relationship of the Prime Being to the universe,50 while Auriol focuses on the pure intelligences, whose relationships to the celestial spheres he compares to the human soul and its formative influence on the human body and, in general, the relationship between the forms of animated substances and their corporeal figuration. Accordingly, there is some justification for assuming that Auriol was well aware of Wylton's view at the time of writing the first question in the VQ and Distinction 3 in the SCI. 51 On the other hand, the position which Auriol confronts in Distinction 42 of the LC1 as well as the SC1 is somewhat different. Here Auriol addresses an opponent who maintained that the Unmoved Mover produces only the primum mobile whereas each of the unproduced intelligences produces its proper sphere.52 That this is also a valid representation of Wylton's viewpoint is due to the fact that Wylton appears to have vacillated between the two positions.13
49
Averroes (1562), fols. 6vb-7ra. Wylton's exposition of this passage (see Thomas Wylton (1997), pp. 337-378) indicates that this was uncontroversial in AurioPs time. 51 Of course, it is true that in this passage—and this is particularly pronounced in the SCI version—Auriol intentionally plays on the Commentator's argument in his jibe against Wylton. 52 Auriol, LCI, d. 42, a. 1 (E' (1596), pp. 953b sqq.); Auriol, SCI, dist. 42, p. 1, q. 1., "Ad evidentiam primae propositionis sciendum est, quod doctor quidam modernus dicit Aristotelem intellexisse Deum producere primum caelum immediate, et mediante illo ut moto moveri haec inferiora. Dicit etiam quamlibet intelligentiam esse inproductam et quamlibet creare suum caelum, et quod caeli sint producti, patet, et non motores eorum, ponitur fuisse de mente Aristotelis et Commentatoris"; V, fol. 179va. 53 In his question on God's infinite power Wylton seems to maintain both positions. In the first place, he states that Aristotle and the Commentator believed that none of the celestial intelligences was produced, and that all corporeal beings were produced by the Prime Being as an efficient cause (Thomas Wylton (1997), p. 376; this is the passage quoted by Maier (1964), pp. 28—29). Later on Wylton elaborates on this by stating that, according to Aristotle and Averroes, the Prime Being endows the celestial bodies with their propensity for circular motion, their proper shapes and sizes, as well as their order (Thomas Wylton (1997), p. 378). In the second place, Wylton claims that, according to the Philosopher and the Commentator, there is a significant difference between the Prime Being's relationship to the primum mobile and the other celestial bodies; whereas the Prime Being is the efficient cause of the primum mobile, it is only an indirect cause of the remaining celestial bodies (Thomas Wylton (1997), p. 383). The reason for this is that each pure intel50
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Thirdly, Maier's claim that Auriol quoted from Wylton's question De attributis in Distinction 33 of his SGI is not substantiated by the sources. In the B' version of this distinction in the SCI Wylton is reported to have defended his application of the secundum quid distinction to the relationship between the divine essence and the divine persons against Auriol's objections by drawing a—hardly original— distinction between constituting parts and properties of perfection, Nee valet responsio, qua dicunt, quod quaedam est multitudo rationum componentium, quaedam rationum perficientium; prima repugnat simplicitati, secunda stat cum omnimoda simplicitate, quia quanto res perfectior, tanto pluribus modis sua perfectio exprimitur et habet in se omnes rationes perfectionales, quae exprimunt ex se rationem perfectionalem.54 The same distinction surfaces in the V version of Distinction 33 in Auriol's SCI. 55 In his question De attributis Wylton employed the very same distinction in order to defend his version of the formal distinction, Ad primum principale (sell., "Quod tollit a Deo summam unitatem non est ponendum in Deo. Sed quaecumque distinctio vel non-identitas rationum ex parte rei, si poneretur in Deo, tolleret ab ipso summam unitatem. Ergo etc."). Dicendum est ad maiorem distinguendo de unitate. Cum enim ratio unius sit ratio indivisi, 'indivisum' autem potest dici aliquid dupliciter, uno modo ex privatione partium componentium ipsum, quae partes ad invicem realiter distinguuntur, et per consequens, si faciant unum, hoc solum erit unitate compositionis realis. Alio modo ex privatione non solum huiusmodi partium componentium, sed ex privatione cuiuscumque multitudinis vel distinctionis modorum seu rationum perfectionalium, quae distinctio ex opere intellectus non causatur. Accipiendo unitatem primo modo maior est vera, et minor falsa. Accipiendo unitatem secundo modo <maior> est falsa, et minor vera.56 ligence brings forth its own celestial sphere and endows it with a size that is in proportion to its own motive power (Thomas Wylton (1997), p. 384). Whether Wylton's stance is, in the final analysis, consistent or not, is not of topical interest in this connection. What is important, though, is that Wylton's presentation of his interpretation of Aristotle's and the Commentator's view is not without ambiguity, and that this may serve to explain the difficulties that Auriol experienced in identifying the precise position of his adversary. As is often the case, a useful summary of the debate can be found in John Baconthorpe's commentary on the Sentences; see John Baconthorpe (1618), vol. 1, pp. 421 sqq. 54 B', fol. 90rb. 55 V, fols. 139rb-v. Maier (1964), p. 282, note 42, drew attention to this passage as well. 56 Thomas Wylton, Quodlibet, Vat. Borgh. 36, fol. 61vb.
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It is beyond doubt that Wylton's line of reasoning in this passage agrees with the report brought by Auriol. But is this tantamount to saying that Auriol's text quotes from Wylton's De attributis? In view of the fact that there are no close textual agreements between the two texts, and since the above "quotation" is as close as Auriol's Distinction 33 in both its B' and V versions of the SCI gets to Wylton's De attributis, it does not seem justified to answer this in the affirmative. On its own, the agreement in the general terms of the distinction does not warrant the assumption that Auriol had Wylton's text before his eyes when composing this part of the SC 1, or that Wylton's quodlibetal question played any significant part in Auriol's writing of this part of the SCI. That Maier could be led to the opposite conclusion was presumably prompted by her preconceived notion that Wylton as regent master and Auriol as a mere baccalarius sententiarius never opposed each other in person, and that Auriol never listened to Wylton arguing or determining a question.57 4.3. The Correspondence Between the SCI and the VQ
Maier's assessment of the relationship between Auriol's SC 1 and the VQ is also in need of critical examination. In this connection the first question in the VQ may suitably serve to illustrate the point at issue. According to her appraisal, the first question in the first part of Distinction 3 in the SCI antedates Auriol's arrival in Paris in 1316, whereas the first question in the VQ lies after this date and reflects Auriol's Parisian lectures on this part of the Sentences. In addition to dealing with precisely the same problem,58 the two questions are remarkably similar in overall structure. Both questions are divided into three sections of which the two first are built up around two conclusions posited by Auriol, whereas the third brings 57 An exhaustive comparison between, on the one hand, Auriol's Distinction 33 in both versions of his SC 1 mentioned above and, on the other, Wylton's De attributis yields no significant 'hits'. The two groups of texts agree only in set expressions like primo modo per se and omni opere intellectus circumscripto. This is not all that surprising since the topics put up for debate in these texts are anything but identical. 58 The tide of the question in the SCI is "utrum Aristoteles ponens unum esse finem omnium habuit ex consequenti ponere ipsum esse primum effectivum omnium mediate vel immediate"; V, fol. 30ra. The title of the first question in the VQ is "utrum Aristoteles ponens unum finem omnium ipsum Deum, sicut ponit, necessario habuit ponere ipsum esse principium omnium effectivum mediate vel immediate"; Vat. lat. 6768, fol. 21ra.
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several objections to Auriol's stance as well as Auriol's replies.59 Moreover, the correspondence between the two questions is so close that not only Auriol's propositions are identical but even the main arguments establishing these conclusions agree both in contents and in their relative ordering. As regards the third part of the questions the same situation obtains; the objections are the same in both questions as are Auriol's replies. On the other hand, this close correspondence between the two questions should not be taken to imply that in reality there is only one question of which one is either an abbreviation or merely a poor copy of the other. The situation is rather more complicated than this. In general, it is true to say that the arguments are more developed in the question in the SCI than in the one included in the VQ. But this is not universally true. Sometimes an argument shared by both texts is presented in a much more verbose form in the VQ than in the same question in the SC1. As regards Auriol's presentation of his material, it is noticeable that the question in its SCI version is much more fully developed than in the VQ, since in this version Auriol takes care to link the different parts together by way of short explanations of either what the following arguments are intended to support, or how many arguments he is going to adduce in favour of a particular line of reasoning. A few examples may serve to illustrate the complex relationship between the two texts. SCI, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1 (V,fols. 29vb-30m) Ad primam quaestionem arguo primo, quod Aristoteles ponens Deum esse ultimum et nobilissimum finem omnium habuit consequenter ponere ipsum esse effectivum omnium, quoniam secundum Commentatorem De substantia orbis, secundo tractatu, finis significat agens significatione necessaria sive perfecta.
09
VQ, q. 1 (Vat. lat. 6768, fol. 21ra)60 Quantum ad primam quaestionem arguo primo affirmative sic, Commentator, secunda parte De substantia orbis, finis significat agens significations perfecta. Item, Aristoteles, 3° Metaphysicae, in mathematids non estfinis, quia non est ibi bonum, quia nee motus. Tunc sic, qui ponit aliquid, a quo aliud non potest separari, necessario habet
In the first question in the VQ there are only two articles, whereas there are three in the SCI. This is, however, merely a surface phenomenon inasmuch as in the SCI each of Auriol's conclusions has been assigned to its own article. 60 In the present connection, the texts are presented as they appear in the manuscripts, and emendations have been kept to a strict minimum.
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Item, Aristoteles, 30 Metaphysicae, dicit, quod in mathematicis non est finis nee bonum, quid non est ibi agens. Igitur per Philosophum et Commentatorem nihil est finis, nisi sit agens. Sed secunduni Philosophum, 12" Metaphysicae, unus est finis omnium. Igitur et unus efficiens omnium. Ad oppositum. Illud non est necessario ponendum aliquo posito, quo circumscripto adhuc positum manet. Sed circumscripta activitate adhuc posset manere unus finis omnium. Igitur posito uno fine nobilissimo omnium non necessario oportet illud ponere esse effectivum. Probatio minoris, hodie Deus est finis omnium, et certum est, quod non est finis, quia ipsa sunt producta, immo ipse est finis entitatum, non actionum, eo enim ipso quod entitates tales sunt, in finem sunt ordinabiles.
ponere illud. Sed agens non potest separari a fine, quia finis significat agens significatione perfecta, et finis dicitur ex eo, quod movet efficientem. Ergo etc. Sed ipse posuit unum finem omnium Deum, 12° Metaphysicae, ubi concludit, unus ergo princeps. Ergo etc. Contra. Illud ponendum non est necessario ad alterius positionem, quo circumscripto adhuc illud manet positum. Sed activitate vel efficientia circumscripta adhuc manet Deus omnium finis. Ergo etc.
Maior manifesta. Minor, quia nunc est finis omnium rerum, non solum productionum, et tamen nunc non efficit. Probatio, quod nunc sit finis omnium, quia omnes res sunt in ipsum ordinabiles.
Even a superficial perusal reveals that there is a very strong similarity between the two texts, and that there are grounds for assuming some kind of dependence between them. That the text in the SCI repeats the thesis that is being affirmed is due to the circumstance that the announcement of the four questions to be dealt with in the first part of Distinction 3 separates the tide of the question from its principal arguments. Obviously, some of the variations between the two texts may be due to faulty copying, but this is certainly not the cause of the improvements in the second argument for an affirmative answer. Whereas the text in the VQ repeats what was already said in the first argument, the text in the SCI is brief and concise. In the argument for a negative answer the text of the SCI is kept in general terms, and 'God' is only introduced in the proof. In the VQ, on the other hand, the argument is focused on the case of divine causality, which, strictly speaking, is not required. Again the major has been much more precisely put in the SCI as compared to the VQ where the wording is not without ambiguity and might be read as governing what is prerequisite for the positing of something. The proof of the minor proposition in the VQ contains an ambiguity since it is not at all clear what the non solum
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productionum refers to. It may designate the divine production of created objects, or it may refer to what is produced by created secondary causes. On the first reading, the implication would be that God is not the ultimate final cause of creation solely at the time of first creating the universe but also after the first creation. This reading would, however, be rather ill suited to the context since this would involve the relationship between creation and conservation which is not up for debate in this question. For this reason, the alternative reading must obtain, and this is made explicit by the non actionum in the version of the text in the SCI. This reading makes clear that God is the ultimate goal of created beings in themselves—this is made manifest by the addition of eo enim ipso quod entitates tales sunt— and that the present discussion does not require considering whether the actions of created beings are ultimately directed towards God. That the question in the SCI represents the text in a more developed form than the version found in the VQ appears from numerous passages in the two texts. The following paragraphs provide a clear testimony, SCI, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1 (V, fol. 30rb) Ad cuius evidentiam, ut ratio sua appareat, notandum, quod fimdatur in duabus propositionibus. Prima est ista, quod universitas entium est ordinata et connexa, ita quod tota universitas entium habet bonum ordinis et connexionis. Ista propositio evidenter probatur. Da enim oppositum, sequitur, <1> quod universitas entium casualiter continetur sub ente. Sequitur etiam, <2> quod multitude entium nullam faciet universitatem, quia universitas importat ordinem. Sequitur etiam, <3> quod universitas entium careret bono, quia bonum consistit in ordine multitudinis, nam multitudo non allegata ordini manifestum est, quod est male disposita, sicut patet de politia, de qua Philosophus, 3° Politicorum, dicit, quod est ordo habitantium civitatem. Ista etiam propositio est sensatn, <4> nam videmus omnes res ordinatas
VQ, q. 1 (Vat. lat. 6768, fol. 21m) Et est prima propositio sua ad hoc probandum haec, multitudo omnium entium est connexa et ordinata et habet bonum ordinis et connexionis. Haec est nota per se, quia data multitudine sine ordine, non est universum, quia universum includit ordinem et connexionem. Item, multitudo entium esset casualis. Item, careret bono, quia bonum plurimum consistit in ordine ad aliquod unum. Ordo enim bonum est rerum ordinatarum.
Item, est manifeste sensata, quia omnia sunt ordinata secundum nobilius et ignobilius. Patet, quia mixta
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secundum nobilius et ignobilius. Gertum est autem, quod ignobilius ordinatur ad nobilius. Igitur bonum ordinis est sensatum in universe.
<sunt> nobiliora elementis, sensibilia nobiliora mixtis simpliciter, et rationabilia nobiliora illis. Ergo necessario est ibi ordo et connexio.
Many differences between the two texts spring to the eye, and they would all seem to indicate that the first question in the VQ antedates the question in its SCI version. In the text, as it appears in the VQ,, the proof of the proposition, which is said to be fundamental to Aristotle's line of reasoning, appears rather ill-placed inasmuch as the proposition is claimed to be per se nota and, consequendy, not subject to proof. Secondly, the three a priori proofs have been reordered in the SCI, and here they are also stated in a much more careful manner. In the VQ version of the text, the second proof (i.e., ) seems to amount to nothing more than the first (i.e., ): in a multitude without order there is no order, and everything relates to everything else by chance. This is, however, not the true meaning of the arguments, as the revised text in the SCI makes clear. The argument, which is placed second in the VQ opens the proof in the SCI (i.e., <1>) and concerns the essential order which would be nothing if there were no co-ordination between things. The second argument in the SCI (i.e., <2>) stresses that it would not be possible to consider the world as a whole, since this presupposes that it is an ordered multitude of things. In the SC1 the third argument (i.e., <3>) has been strengthened by the addition of a reference to Aristotle's Politics which, strictly speaking, is not required but underlines that Auriol's identification of the Stagirite's reasoning is confirmed by his writings. Finally, the concluding proof from experience (i.e., and <4>) shows the sometimes even verbose presentation of arguments in the first question in the VQ^ as compared to the text as transmitted in the SCI; presumably, there would have been scant reason for Auriol to explain the relative ordering of the elements, compounds, sensible, and rational entities to his audience. A third and final example will serve to confirm the relative order of the two texts under consideration, SCI, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1 (V\ fol. 32m) Et si quaeris, per quid fundant istum ordinem, dico, quod per propriam essentiam, non per productionem, sicut pes meus esset gratia mei et fundaret ordinem ad me dato, quod
VQ^, q. 1 (Vat. lat. 6768, fol. 21vb) Si quaeris, per quid, dico, quod per essentiam suam. Nee est alia causa quaerenda, sicut nee in albedine per quid fundet relationem similitudinis ad aliam albedinem et esse
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non esset productus. Et consimiliter dico, quod omnes particulares perfectiones fundant ordinem ad totalem perfectionem sicut ad finem. Nee oportet, quod ilium ordinem imprimat eis agens, quia vel est ipsamet natura vel ortum habet a natura. Exemplum autem de sagitta non est ad propositum. Ideo enim sagitta dirigitur in finem sive in signum, quia imprimitur sibi motus alius a motu proprio et ad partem aliam, quam moveatur motu proprio, movetur enim motu proprio deorsum, et ideo imprimitur sibi motus ad signum, quod est ipsam dirigi ad signum. In proposito autem nullus ponitur motus, sed tantum ordo quidam. Nee iste ordo ab alio imprimitur, sicut motus sagittae ad signum, sed natura illud habet de se, in quantum talis natura est.
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gratia illius, sicut pes meus gratia mei, etiam si non esset productus, nee ego nee pes. Sicut etiam omnes partes ignobiliores ordinantur ad nobiliores. Non oportet ergo dicere, quod sit illud directio rei in finem, nisi quia est talis gradus in entibus, quia imperfecta ordinantur ad perfecta, sic omnia entia ad aliquod subsistens, quod est nobilius in perfectione totali universitate. Exemplum de sagitta nihil valet, quia ibi non est aliud dirigere nisi dare motum sibi ad aliud. Sed hie non est nisi ordo quidam, ut dixi. Nee oportet imprimi ab alio isturn ordinem, quia se ipsis habent.
In the first question of the VQ it is not immediately apparent why the author — or speaker — refers to the similarity that exists between two instances of whiteness. The status of similarity as a relation would not seem to be immediately pertinent to the issue at hand, viz., whether the order of the universe arises from the very nature of things or is impressed on created beings as a secondary characteristic. However, earlier in the question the two issues are dealt with conjointly, and this is also true of the treatments provided by Thomas Wylton in his Bordeaux determinatio against Auriol and by Hervaeus Natalis. Moreover, in this connection Thomas Wylton treats rather thoroughly of final causality, which is also dealt with in both the first question of AurioFs VQ^ and the first question in Distinction 3 in the SC 1 .61 In other words, Auriol's mentioning of two white things being similar in this passage from the first question of the VQ is presumably due to simple association and seems to indicate that this question belongs to a time when he had already entered into debate with Thomas Wylton— and possibly also with Hervaeus Natalis. That there is no talk of this kind of relationship in the question as found
61
Cf. above, note 47.
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in the SCI, undoubtedly reflects Auriol's realization that similarity as such had no genuine connection with the question under discussion. That Auriol's two texts are related transpires not least from their common response to the arrow example which formed part of the argument advanced by Auriol's opponent. The argument attempted to establish that order is imparted to the universe in the same manner as violent motion is impressed on inanimate objects. In arguing this point the opponent focused on purposeful action which is based either on intellect and will or on an external principle of motion. Having established that intellect and will are not universal attributes, the opponent concluded that an external principle of direction is required. As an explanatory note to his argument the adversary contrasted man as a self-moving entity and an arrow that is directed by something external to itself, viz., the archer.62 Refuting this argument was, clearly, not difficult for Auriol. In this context, however, what is interesting about the argument is that the opponent's concluding and obviously trite illustration was omitted from the SCI whereas it appears in the VQ. It is well-nigh impossible to think that its omission from the SC1 was purely a matter of chance. This fundamentally superfluous example was included in the first question of the VQ for the sole reason that this version of the text is closer to what was originally presented; in the SC 1 the exchange of arguments was edited and brought to bear directly on the point of contention, and, consequently, the example was omitted. In the editorial process, however, Auriol made the mistake of elaborating on his answer to the adversary's explicatory example which he had cut from his later version of the argument. In other words, the appearance of this example in the VQ and its absence from the SCI are indicative of the relative order of the two versions of this particular question. 4.4. Evaluation of Maier's Theory
Summing up the results of our examination of the foundations of Maier's theory it must be said that her conception of the historical relationship between Thomas Wylton and Peter Auriol is not supported by the information available. Our evidence seems to dictate that the two theologians opposed each other directly and were very 62
"Exemplum in his potest sumi, quia homo dirigit se ipsum; sagitta autem ab alio "; Auriol, VQ, q. 1 (Vat. lat. 6768, fol. 21vb).
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much aware of the personal identity and viewpoints of their adversary. That Auriol should have relied exclusively on Wylton's published Quodlibet does not transpire from the pertinent texts. Of course, he may have—and presumably did—read what Wylton published but this does not preclude his listening to and objecting to Wylton viva voce. In fact, our current knowledge of Wylton's literary output seems to necessitate this assumption.63 As regards Maier's analysis of the relationship between the first question of Distinction 3 in AurioPs SCI and the first question of the VQ^ no less serious reservations must be made. Placing the VQ question after the corresponding question in the SCI would be the same as turning things upside down. As the three examples adduced above aptly show, there can be little doubt that the first question in the VQ^ antedates the corresponding question in the SC1, and that the latter was elaborated on the basis of the question in the VQ and, for this reason, was posterior to the VQ. At certain points the original question has been expanded quite substantially, but the structure of and the fundamental line of argument pursued in the original question has in no way been altered by the editorial process. Notwithstanding the readily discernible mistakes in the arguments that support Maier's theory, it should be stressed that her investigations into the transmission of Auriol's two commentaries are by no means without merits. Not only did Maier make a number of pertinent observations on the structure and general style of Auriol's SCI, she also identified Thomas Wylton as a reliable beacon when manoeuvring on the turbulent waters of Auriol's literary remains. Though Wylton's significance for the composition of Auriol's Parisian works is not the one that Maier envisaged, it is nonetheless true that it would be difficult to chart the chronological ordering of the differing parts of Auriol's literary opus without any reference to his two main opponents, viz., Thomas Wylton and Hervaeus Natalis.
5. The Analytic Approach
Our—far from exhaustive—study of the relationship between the first question in the VQ and the first question of Distinction 3 in 63 In the following we shall have to return to Wylton's role in Auriol's commentaries; see below, sections 6.3 and 7.1.
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the SCI has by no means falsified Maier's claim that the first question in the VQ is a reportatio. On the contrary, this seems a not at all unlikely suggestion. As a matter of course, this does not automatically make the SC1 into an ordinatio, and for this reason Brown's reservations vis-a-vis Maier's perception of the SCI are not to be dismissed. However, debating whether a particular work is an ordinatio or a reportatio only makes sense if it be granted that the two types are mutually exclusive. Unfortunately, things are rarely that clear-cut in the medieval period, and this is certainly true of Auriol's SCI. For this reason, one might be tempted to classify this work as a reportatio edita, which is to say student notes reviewed and corrected by the person whose lecture or determination was originally recorded. Though this label is sometimes attached to scholastic texts that do not easily fit into either of the two opposing main categories, this is ultimately not a satisfactory result: the ease with which such a tag is applied to a particular text is clearly matched by its equally low informative value. It does not explain what the original reportatio looked like, or in what circumstances it was taken down, just as it does not assist in the understanding of what or how the author improved on what had been recorded by his audience. Accordingly, characterising a scholastic text as a reportatio edita is in a certain sense a sign of resignation. Often enough such resignation is well grounded in the limitations of the surviving medieval material. But this certainly does not obtain in the case of Auriol's scholastic works. Doing justice to the extensive and varied sources that have been handed down and relate to Auriol's commentaries on the Sentences requires adopting an approach that remains close to the texts themselves and is both literary and critical. Instead of attempting to distribute the texts transmitting Auriol's Sentences commentaries on different series of lectures held at different locations or relating them to other external circumstances, what is called for is an analysis of the relationships that can be shown to exist between these texts. On this basis it may prove possible to discover a pattern to the multifarious transmission of Auriol's commentaries which reveals the main stages in the process by which these works came into being. In other words, this approach aims at deciding whether the surviving texts provide an insight into the process by which the author produced these works, and if so, what they disclose about the writing method of their author.
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6. Auriol's Commentaries on the Fourth Book in the Sentences
The version of Auriol's commentary on the fourth book of the Sentences, which is printed in the second volume of the Sarnano edition dating from 1605, is fully attested to in the manuscript tradition and has been preserved in its entirety in four manuscripts.64 Besides this version, which is here called the "common version",65 there exist two differing versions of the work, each of which has been handed down and is known from only one manuscript. One is preserved in the manuscript M 2295 in the University Library in Salamanca,66 and the other in the beautiful codex Plut. 32, dext. 12 in the Biblioteca Medicea-Laurenziana in Florence.67
64
The manuscripts are: Padua, Biblioteca Antoniana, cod. 160; Pelplin, Seminarium Duchowne VJ.e. 12; Toulouse, Bibliotheque municipale, cod. 243; Vicenza, Biblioteca Bertoliana, cod. 198. Stegmiiller (1947), p. 318, also adduces Mantua, Biblioteca Comunale, cod. E. IV. 19, as a possible source for the work, but this manuscript is a nineteenth-century exercise in calligraphy. In Vat. lat. 942 (fols. 51, 69, and 115) there is a copy of the very first question. Notwithstanding K. Tachau's ((1997), p. 215) claim to the contrary, the manuscript in Diisseldorf, Landes- und Staatsbibliothek, Ms. B. 159, contains Auriol's commentary on the second book, but not that on the fourth. 65 In the following, the version of Auriol's commentary on the fourth book of the Sentences attested to by the majority of the known manuscripts, and here referred to as "the common version", will be abbreviated as "CV4". 66 In the following this version of the commentary on the fourth book will be referred to as the "Salamanca version", which will be abbreviated as "SV4". In the manuscript the commentary is explicitly attributed to Auriol on fols. 50r and 103v. In quotations from this manuscript editorial corrections will be kept to an absolute minimum. In the Salamanca manuscript (henceforth referred to by way of the siglum "S"') Auriol's commentary on the fourth book of the Sentences is preceded by his commentary on the third book. Following Heynck's (1969) classification of Auriol's commentaries on the third book, it seems that the Salamanca copy follows the Ad evidentiam version up to Distinction 22 (S', fol. 37va); on the top of fol. 38r a new start is made in the middle of question 42 in the version of the commentary which— again, according to Heynck's terminology—may be called the Circa tertium, and which is also known as the pawae quaestiones, i.e., in John Baconthorpe's terminology; see John Baconthorpe (1618), vol. 2, col. 20b. The manuscript was already identified in the 18th century by the learned Franciscan John of St. Anthony, who had seen a copy of Auriol's commentaries on the Sentences "in bibliotheca Collegii Maioris S. Bartholomaei", where it had the shelf-mark "254"; see loannes a S. Antonio (1966), vol. 2, p. 435a. Since S' was once in the possession of this school, it is likely that this is the manuscript which Friar John saw. There is a minor problem with this identification, though. There are several surviving shelfmarks in S', and one of them is "S. Bart. 129", and this does not agree with the information provided by John of St. Anthony. There is reason to think, however, that John of St. Anthony made a mistake in his description of the manuscript he
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The reason why precisely AurioPs commentary on this book of the Sentences is of immediate interest is the fact that the Salamanca version of the text is complete and would appear to represent a stage in the development of the text that is earlier than the common version.68 Accordingly, it would seem highly likely that this work may provide particular insights into the process by which Auriol authored his commentaries. In the following, I shall attempt to establish the relationship that exists between the Salamanca version of the work and the common version, firstly by comparing their overall structure, and, secondly, by way of a closer analysis of selected parts of the work which are both representative and evenly distributed over the work as a whole, and which are well-suited for illuminating the factors that were of importance in AurioPs composing of this work. 6.1. The Overall Structure of the CV4 and the SV4
The structure of the CV4 is clear and uniform. After a collatio69 the treatment proper opens with an introductory question which deals saw. Subsequently, he describes a copy of AurioPs Breviarium Bibliorum (for this work, cf. Teetaert (1935), cols. 1835 sqq.) preserved in the same library, and this he also identifies as no. 254. Since Auriol's commentaries on the Sentences are not known to have been bound together with his Biblical works, there is every reason to think that either John of St. Anthony conflated two shelf-marks, or that the "254" assigned to the Sentences commentaries is a typographical error. 67 In addition to Auriol's commentary on the fourth book, this manuscript contains a copy of his commentary on the third book as well as a copy of his Quodlibet. 68 The text recorded in Florence, Biblioteca Medicea-Laurenziana, Plut. 32, dext. 12, is less easy to classify inasmuch as it seems to alternate between the version transmitted in the majority of the known manuscripts and the Salamanca version. It follows the SV4 until the middle of Distinction 8 (fol. 53vb), after which it switches to the common version. After having reproduced an incomplete version of the quaestio unica in Distinction 27 (fol. 82rb), the Florence manuscript joins the Salamanca version again and stays with this version up to the end of the commentary. Fundamentally, the Florence copy of Auriol's commentary on the fourth book is a patch-work of different versions, and in this respect it resembles the Salamanca version of the commentary on the third book. Nonetheless, this manuscript raises some interesting questions inasmuch as it does not completely agree with S' even in their common parts; the variations are admittedly minor but significant enough to merit further consideration. Moreover, the text presented by the Florence manuscript seems to be the most corrupt of all known copies, and this is true even of its copy of Auriol's Quodlibet. Taking the testimony of this manuscript into consideration in the present context is not possible since this would require a very detailed study of the patterns of variant readings in the transmission of Auriol's commentary on the fourth book. 69 The collatio is preserved in all four of the manuscripts that transmit the common version of the text. In addition to these it is also present in Florence, Biblioteca Medicea-Laurenziana, Plut. 32, dext. 12, fol. 4Ira.
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in a general way with the nature of the sacraments and their causality in bringing grace to believers. Except for Distinction 19, AurioPs commentary has questions for all the distinctions in the Lombard's fourth book. For each distinction there is a relatively short introduction which opens with a lemma from the Lombard's text, explains the nature of the main problem of the particular distinction, and lists the questions dealt with in this part of the work. Several distinctions raise so momentous problems as to require a great number of questions, and this prompted Auriol to split each of these distinctions into several parts. In such cases not only the distinction has an introduction, but also each part in the distinction. Except for the introduction to the second part of Distinction 8, none of the introductions to such subdivisions within a distinction brings a lemma from the Lombard's text. This manner of arranging the questions seems to have been AurioPs usual manner of organising his commentaries on the Sentences inasmuch as the same structure is discernible in AurioPs commentaries on the other books as well.70 In contradistinction to what is true of the CV4, the structure of the SV4 is by no means uniform. Though there are introductions to several distinctions, only few of these contain references to or quotations from the Lombard's text. Moreover, the introductions are quite laconic: they merely specify which distinction the following questions relate to, give the number of questions raised, and present the title of the first question. For subsequent questions in a particular distinction there is an indication of its number in the particular sequence of questions, after which follows the title of the question and its principal arguments. In the case of distinctions that have subdivisions the structure is not uniform. Sometimes the principal introduction to the distinction explicates how many parts there are to the distinction, but in other cases new parts are announced by a brief note explaining that the following questions concern the same distinction.71 In the middle of the commentary the distribution of questions /0
This is clearly the case in, e.g., the SCI. An illustrative example of this uneven structure is found in the very first distinction of the work. The general introduction is as follows, "Hie quaeritur de duobus, scilicet de causalitate sacramentorum et postea de definitione. Circa causalitatem ipsorum quaero quattuor. Primo utrum in sacramentis novae legis oporteat ponere virtutem aliquam creatam formaliter et inhaerentem ultra increatam ad hoc, ut possit esse causativa gratiae eo modo, in quo sunt causa". The beginning of the second part opens with the following, "Circa eandem distinctionem quaero quattuor. Primo utrum sacramentum possit proprie definiri." Rather surprisingly a third part 71
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on the Lombard's distinctions becomes somewhat opaque. Thus Distinction 14 has no fewer than 12 questions, and in the CV4 these are evenly distributed over Distinctions 14 to 16. In later parts of the commentary several distinctions are lumped together without any attempt to relate the associated questions to any particular distinction.72 In the middle of what is Distinction 43 in the CV4, the questions in the SV4 are no longer assigned to any single or even group of distinctions. The introduction to this part is practically without any informative value and merely says Circa distinctionem aliam quaero quattuor quaestioms. Prima quaestio est, . . ., after which follow no fewer than 27 questions. The difference in overall structure between the GV4 and the SV4 is equally apparent in the distribution of questions on single distinctions. The question that opens Distinction 2 in the SV4, belongs in the GV4 to the first Distinction. The first two questions in Distinction 5 in the SV4 have been moved to Distinction 4 in the CV4. The four questions which in the SV4 form the first part of Distinction 9, are in the CV4 to be found in Distinction 8, where the last three of these questions form the second part of this distinction, whereas the first question is located in the first part. In addition to this difference of position, two of the three questions have been united in the CV4 as to form a single question.73 In the latter third of the work, hardly any of the few divisions found in the SV4 have parallels in the much more elaborate structure of the CV4. On the basis of this noticeable difference in structure, one might be led to conclude that the two commentaries are, in fact, two different works, and that they are so far removed from each other
is then later on announced, "Circa eandem distinctionem quaero, utrum baptismus et circumcisio sint alterius rationis in conferendo gratiam", after which follow two additional questions. In later distinctions Auriol seems to have had an even less clear idea of how many parts there would be to the more complex distinctions. Here new parts are merely announced by the set expression "Circa eandem distinctionem quaero . . .". 72 The beginning of Distinction 32 illustrates this, "Circa alias quattuor distinctiones sequentes, scilicet 32am usque ad 35am inclusive, quaero quattuor quaestiones. Prima est, . . .", as does the introduction to Distinction 36, "Circa quinque distinctiones sequentes, scilicet 36am usque ad 40am, quaeruntur quinque questiones. Et est prima, utrum . . ." 73 Obviously, this leaves only two questions in the CV4 version of Distinction 8, part 2. Nonetheless, in the introduction to this second part most of the manuscripts specify that it will comprise three questions. For other instances of minor glitches in the organisation of the material in the CV4, see below, section 6.5.
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that few agreements should be expected on the level of its basic building blocks, viz., the questions. However, drawing such a conclusion would definitely be premature. 6.2. The Double Redaction of the Prologue in the SV4 and the CV4
Auriol's opening question in the commentary on the fourth book is divided into four articles or rather four inquiries. Since the prime objective of the question is to investigate whether the sacraments produce grace in the recipients of the sacraments, each of the four inquiries addresses the issue from a different perspective. The first deals with Aristotle's and Averroes' assessment of the concept of creation; the second asks whether creation requires infinite power; the third examines whether creative power is compatible with creatures; and the fourth and final—and by far the shortest—inquiry treats of the nature of sacramental efficacy. The ulterior objective of Auriol's treatment is the rebuttal of the Dominicans' view on the matter.74 In general, the two versions of the opening question in Auriol's commentary on the fourth book agree closely. This is true not only of the overall structure of the question and its division into articles, but also with regard to the line of argument presented. This correspondence can be observed in almost every paragraph of the question. For an illustrative example we may focus on the proofs of the principal argument in favour of an affirmative answer, CV4, q. 1 (E> (1605), col. 2a) SV4, q. 1 (S\ fol. 50ra) Et videtur, quod sic. Omnis namque Et videtur, quod sic. Omnis virtus potest virtus communicabilis est creaturae, et communicari creaturae, quam non oporper consequens sacramentis, quam let esse infinitam, quia omnis virtus non oportet esse infinitam, nam omnis finita est proportionalis creaturae. Sed finita potentia est proportionalis crea- virtus creativa non est nee oportet, quod turae. Sed virtus creativa non oportet, quod sit infinita. Ergo etc. sit infinita. Igitur communicari potuit sacramentis et eorum ministris. Minorem probo tripliciter. Si enim Primum sic probatur, si enim oportet, oportet, quod sit infinita, aut hoc est quod sit infinita, vel est hoc ratione terratione termini producti aut ratione mini producti vel modi producendi aut modi producendi aut ratione productio- production^ vel distantiae inter terminum nis vel ratione distantiae inter terminum a quo et ad quern,, scilicet inter nihil et
74
For this, see Nielsen (1997b).
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a quo et terminum ad quern productionis, scilicet inter nihil et ens. Sed primum non impedit nee exigit infinitatem, quia omnis terminus creationis finitus est. Nee secundum, cum omnis modus creationis finitus sit, cum sit aliquid extra Deum. Nee tertium, quoniam ipsa creatio est finita, cum sit in creatura ipsa. Nee quartum, quia nulla est ibi infinita distantia nee aliqua resistentia, immo maior distantia est inter contraria. Igitur nulla ratio apparet, cur potentia creativa poni debeat infinita. Secundo sic, mains est producere formam quam materiam. Sed virtus productiva formae non est infinita, cum sit in agentibus naturalibus. Igitur nee virtus productiva materiae oportet, quod sit infinita. Igitur nee per consequens virtus creativa, cum productio materiae non sit nisi per creationem. Tertio sic, virtus creativa et virtus annihilativa sunt aequales, quia non est magis ex nihilo aliquid facere quam aliquid reducere in nihil. Sed virtus annihilativa non est infinita. Quod patet, quia agens naturale corrampit formam et annihilat^ quia nee in se nee in potentia materiae manet, alias per agens naturale posset redire eadem numero, quia omni potentiae passivae naturali correspondet potentia activa naturalis. Similiter peccator annihilat gratiam suam, non enim ipsamet annihilat se ipsam, nee virtus divina annihilat ipsam. Igitur ipsemet peccator.
ens. Non primum, quia omnis terminus creationis est finitum. Nee secundum, quia modus producendi, cum sit aliquid extra Deum, est finitus. Nee tertium propter idem. Nee quartum, quia nulla distantia est inter ens et nihil positiva nee aliqua resistentia, immo inter contraria est maior.
Secundo sic, maius est producere formam quam materiam, cum sit nobilior et perfectior. Sed virtus productiva formae non est infinita, cum sit in agentibus naturalibus. Ergo nee virtus materiae productiva oportet esse infinitam. Et per consequens nee virtus creativa, cum materia fit per creationem. Tertio sic, virtus creativa et annihilativa sunt aequales. Sed virtus annihilativa non est infinita. Quod patet, quia agens naturale corrumpendo formam ipsam annihilat, cum in se non remaneat nee in potentia materiae, alias per agens naturale posset reduci idem numero, quia omni potentiae passivae correspondet virtus activa naturalis potens illam reducere ad actum. Similiter peccator per actum suum annihilat gratiam, quia Deus non annihilat ipsam, nee ipsa gratia se ipsam.
There are obvious differences between the two texts, but it can only be argued that these are due to copying provided that the copyist was the author himself. That the text in the SV4 is not an abbreviation of the text in the CV4 transpires from the two minor additions found in this text as compared to its counterpart in the CV4. Explaining that form is a more noble principle than matter ("cum sit nobilior et perfectior"), and that active forces actuate passive potencies ("potens illam reducere ad actum") would hardly be nee-
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essary in the present context, and, not surprisingly, these elementary principles are not voiced in the CV4 version of the argument. The latter text also reveals the author's great care at spelling out the conclusions—not only to the main argument but also to its three proofs— and careful consideration to detail. The number of proofs of the main argument is specified, and whereas prime matter is said in the SV4 to come into existence by creation, the corresponding statement in the GV4 is much more guarded.75 Furthermore, that the SV4 is not an abbreviated version of the text in the CV4 is supported by the following passage, CV4, q. 1 (E' (1605), col. 4b) Tertia ratio procedit ex ratione oppositi, scilicet ex annihilatione, et deducitur sic, annihilatio est impossibilis, igitur et creatio est impossibilis. Consequential patet. Probatio antecedentis, nam annihilatio nihil aliud est quam entis in nihil redactio. Sed manifestum est, quod hoc implicat contradictionem, in nullo enim genere oppositionis unum oppositorum reducitur in aliud. Patet inducendo in omnibus.
SV4, q. 1 (S', fol. 50vb) Tertia ratio procedit ex ratione oppositi, scilicet ex annihilatione. Annihilatio est impossibilis, ergo creatio est impossibilis. Consequentia patet. Probatio antecedentis, nam annihilatio non est aliud quam entis in nihil redactio. Sed manifestum est, quod hoc implicat contradictionem, non enim in aliquo genere oppositionis unum oppositum redigitur in aliud, nam caliditas non redigitur in frigiditatem in contrariis; nee in relativis paternitas in filiationem; nee in privativis lux in tenebras; nee in contradictoriis motum in nonSed tails redactio semper fit ratione sub- motum. Sed tails redactio semper jit strati, quod nunc est sub uno opposito, ratione substrati, quod nunc est sub uno nunc sub alio. opposito, nunc sub alio.
As is immediately apparent, the exemplification found in the SV4 is superfluous, and it has been aptly substituted by the Patet inducendo in omnibus in the CV4.76 Locating the main reasons for the changes that were introduced into the CV4 in comparison to the SV4 does not require an exhaustive investigation into the relationship between the two texts. Thus 75
Auriol was very circumspect when speaking about the possibility of prime matter to subsist by itself; cf. Maier (1964), pp. 274 sqq. In one of the sessions devoted to Auriol's thought and influence at the SIEPM meeting in Erfurt in August 1997, Dr. Martin Bauer, University of Stuttgart, presented an exposition of Auriol's conception of prime matter. 76 This type of correction is also observable in Auriol's editing of the first question in the VQj see above, section 4.3, for the weeding out of the trivial recital of the essential hierarchy.
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while many references to authoritative works quoted are often incomplete in the SV4, the blanks have been filled out in the CV4. The use of the same authoritative text in the first as well as the second article in the SV4 was avoided in the CV4 insofar as on the second occurrence a reference to the first article was inserted.77 Often arguments that are either not transparent or not fully spelled out in the SV4, are presented in the CV4 with greater precision and completeness. Some changes in the CV4 as compared to the SV4 seem to have been prompted by simple grammatical slips such as the improper use of the reflexive instead of the personal pronoun or even the occurrence of double negations. Occasionally, the author has made emendations merely for the sake of style. The following text serves to exemplify this, CV4, q. 1 (E' (1605), col. 6b) Quod autem haec repugnantia non sit in primo modo, patet, nam exitus rei in esse non potest esse formaliter et primo modo terminus oppositus, scilicet non-esse. Igitur si includit ilium, non includit in primo modo, et per consequens separatio istius non includit repugnantiam primi modi. Et cum etiam huiusmodi exitus non exigat subiectum nisi ratione termini, quia necesse est dare substratum suscipiens utrumque terminum, quod mutetur de subiecto in subiectum, patet manifeste, quod non includit subiectum in primo modo, ita quod subiectum non includitur de necessitate primi modi in productione rei de non-esse ad esse. Quapropter productio ex nihilo non est impossibilis impossibilitate primi modi.
SV4, q. 1 (S', fol 51va) Quod vero haec repugnantia non sit in primo modo, patet, quia manifestum est, quod exitus rei in esse non potest esse formaliter et in primo modo terminus oppositus, scilicet non-esse. Ergo inclusio non-esse per modum termini cum isto exitu non est in primo modo, et per consequens nee separatio talis termini, quia necesse est dare substratum recipiens utrumque terminum, et quod mutetur a termino in terminum, patet, quod non includitur subiectum de necessitate primi modi in productione rei in esse.
Obviously, an expression such as patet, quia manifestum est is something every author would like to avoid. Moreover, as is apparent, in revising the argument with a view to profiling the point aimed at,78 the author has put some effort into making the text more readable,
77 78
E' (1605), col. 5a; S', fol. 5Ira. For this, cf. Nielsen (1996).
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besides, of course, spelling out the conclusion of principal importance for the debate. 6.3. The Double Redaction of Distinction 13 in Auriol's Commentary on Book 4
The thirteenth distinction in Auriol's commentary on the fourth book in the Sentences is in many respects a somewhat odd case. In the SV4 it comprises four questions, whereas it has only three in the CV4. Of these questions only the last, which is common to both versions, deals with the topic of the Eucharist in a more than incidental sense; the preceding questions are, in fact, purely polemical and do not at all concern the theology of the Eucharist or transubstantiation—even though the word 'transubstantiation' is found in or implied by the titles of the questions. The following table lists the questions that appear in this part of Auriol's commentary on the fourth book, CV4, dist. 13 Quaestio la, utrum miracula, quae fiunt actione divina in hoc sacramento, sint contra propositiones per se in secundo modo.
Quaestio 2a, utrum transubstantiatio sit actio de genere actionis. Quaestio 3a, utrum non obstante indivisione accidentis cum subiecto Deus possit separare accidens a subiecto.
SV4, dist. 13 Quaestio la, utrum ilia miracula, quae Deus facit in isto sacramento, sint contra propositiones per se notas de secundo modo. Quaestio 2a, utrum Aristoteles concessisset transubstantiationem esse possibilem nee repugnare ex terminis. Quaestio 3a, utrum transubstantiatio sit actio de genere actionis. Quaestio 4a, utrum accidens possit separari divina virtute a subiecto supposito, quod faciat unum cum subiecto per indivisionem.
What transpires from these questions is that Auriol had met with fierce opposition to a number of his key ideas. In the first question, which appears in both the SV4 and the CV4, Auriol defends his view that divine action as stipulated by Christian faith conflicts with the common laws of thought governing human reason. In order to realise that creation from nothing is not a simple contradiction in terms it is, according to Auriol, necessary to go through a long process of analysis which, in the end, reveals that the key statements of faith are in conflict with a kind of secondary logical necessity (propositiones per se secundo modo] and not with primary logical necessity (propositiones
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per se primo modo), which according to Auriol is adequately defined by the principle of contradiction. The main opponent in this question is the Dominican professor of theology, Hervaeus Natalis, whose objections to Auriol are to be found in the ninth question of his fourth Quodlibet.19 The second question in the SV4 has been left out of the CV4. The topic debated is the same as in the first question of Distinction 3 in the SCI, viz., whether Aristotle as the paragon of human rationality perceived a necessary connection between the Unmoved Mover as the final cause of the universe and His being its efficient cause.80 The identity of Auriol's opponent in this question is not immediately clear; at one point Auriol replies to an objection launched by Hervaeus, but from the context it is unequivocally clear that the Dominican professor is not Auriol's primary interlocutor.81 In the second question of Distinction 13 in the C V4, which is the third in the SV4, Auriol's attempt at constructing a theory of action is at the centre of the debate. Again, the primary opponent is Hervaeus Natalis, whose idea of action as being identical with the produced form had been thoroughly refuted by Auriol when he lectured on Distinction 27 in the first book of the Sentences.82 Again Hervaeus' objections to Auriol have been preserved in his fourth Quodlibet.83 The final question in both versions is remarkable for its brevity as well as its having none of the distinguishing marks of a question. The text deals with God's ability to separate accidents from their proper subjects though, according to Auriol, there is no real distinction between accidents and their ontological foundations. In view of the fact that this topic had been dealt with extensively in previous parts of the commentary84 there seems to have been no strict 79
Hervaeus Natalis (1513), cols. 106rb sqq. In the near future I expect to return to Hervaeus' questions against Auriol with a view to charting the nature and course of their debates. 80 There are several reasons for Auriol's excluding this question from the CV4, and these I hope to be able to deal with in the near future. 81 Elsewhere I have argued that this opponent is the author of very fragmentary commentaries on the first two books of the Sentences that have been preserved in the manuscript 63 in Balliol College, Oxford; see Nielsen (1999). 82 Auriol developed this already in the LCI; for an edition, see Friedman (1997), pp. 371 sqq. 83 Hervaeus Natalis (1513), cols. l0lva sqq. 84 Auriol devoted no fewer than eight questions to this subject in Distinction 12; cf. E' (1605), cols. 108b sqq.; and S', fols. 72rb sqq.
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necessity for Auriol's recapitulating his opinions on this matter. Presumably the real reason for the inclusion of this short pseudoquestion is that it provides a very thin rationale for parading off these questions as a commentary on this particular distinction in the Lombard's fourth book. Disregarding the question which is not present in the CV4 as well as the final "question" we may focus on the two questions shared by the SV4 and the CV4. Both questions are cast in the same mould; they consist of three articles of which one (A) recites the objections raised against Auriol's opinion on the topic at hand; another (B) presents Auriol's view and his reasons for holding it; and yet another (C) contains Auriol's replies to the objections raised. In the SV4 the order of the articles is ABC so that Auriol's exposition of his proper view is wedged between the objections and his replies. In the CV4, however, the sequence of the articles is changed into BAC so that Auriol's exposition of his own opinion opens the discussion, after which follow the adversary's objections and Auriol's replies. By rearranging his material in this manner Auriol confers more weight to the exposition of his own viewpoint and avoids splitting the adversary's objections from his rebuttal. Though this reorganisation holds obvious advantages over the presentation in the SV4, it is not without its costs either. In presenting his own theory in what is the second article in the SV4 Auriol had done so with a view to the objections raised. This means that already the exposition of his viewpoint was in a certain sense intended as a reply to his adversaries. Now the version of the text as it appears in the CV4 was not revised so as to obliterate all traces of the original polemical context, and this means that Auriol's presentation of his own theory in the CV4 reflects objections with which the reader is not yet familiar. In revising the questions of the SV4 for inclusion in the CV4 Auriol has taken some care to remove features that point back to the original setting of the debate, CV4, d. 13, q. 1, a. 1 (E' (1605), col. 12Ib) Secundo, Euclides 1° libro suo ponit, quod lima recta cadens super lineam rectam constituit angulum rectum duplicem. Sed hoc Deus de facto immutat. Si enim ponantur duo corpora simul sive duae lineae, tunc linea recta ducta constituet quattuor
SV4, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2 (S', fol. 76ra) Item, Euclides 1° libro enumerans propositiones per se notas dicit, quod linea recta cadens super alteram lineam constituit duos angulos rectos et non plures. Contra istam Deus facit, quando facit duo corpora simul esse, quia facit quattuor angulos.
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angulos, duos quidem super unam lineam et duos super aliam. Probatio. Aut enim essent duo tantum anguli recti, et hoc est impossibile, quia tune passio unius subiecti erit in alio, quaelibet enim linea habet ex se, quod simul cum linea cadente super eam constituat angulum rectum
Ponamus, quod una superficies sit in pectore meo. Si corpus aliud est simul mecum, alia superficies erit ibi. Igitur linea cadens super pectus meum constituet duos angulos rectos ratione superficiei meae, et alios duos ratione illius corporis.
The debate which this argument forms part of, concerns the possibility of two bodies' occupying the same place through divine power, and this obtains in, e.g., the ascent of the glorified bodies through the solid celestial spheres. To Auriol it was evident that this kind of simultaneity confounded the laws of mathematics—as well as those of metaphysics and physics; but Hervaeus refused to recognise this, and he proceeded to supply an elaborate defence of the rationality of divine action and to launch a full-scale offensive against Auriol. The rather appealing picture of Auriol pointing to his own chest and stipulating that some other and coextensive body was in the same place, was purged from the question in the CV4 and substituted by a much less vivid but geometrically more acceptable example. The impression that the questions as transmitted in the SV4 are much closer to the original historical setting of the debate is also confirmed by the fact that in revising the questions in the SV4 Auriol abstained from referring to earlier debates between himself and Hervaeus. It would seem that Auriol's incentive for so doing was his concern that the revised text should not refer directly to what had gone on either in the classrooms or in the halls of disputation. The radical revisions done in following paragraph would seem to suggest this, CV4, d. 13, q. 1, a. 1 (E3 (1605), col. 122a) Aut per modum quantitativum intelligis contactum et commensurationem, et tune habeo propositum. Et praeterea, tune nugatur in respondendo, quia cum quaeritur, quomodo Deus potest facere duas quantitates simul sine contactu et commensuratione, respondes, quod ideo, quia quantitas est ibi sine contactu et commensuratione.
SV4, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2 (S', fol. 76m) Si autem intelligis per modum quantitativum habitudines quantitatis et comparationis ad aliam quantitatem, tune respondes mihi sicut de convertibilibus dicens sic, non contingunt se, quia non sunt ibi modo quantitative ambae quantitates, hoc est secundum habitudinem, quam habet ad aliam quantitatem praesentem. Ista enim habitude non
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est nisi iste contactus seu commensuratio inter alia. Et sic assignas mihi idem per idem. In this particular case, by referring to what Hervaeus had said de convertibilibus Auriol alludes to their debate on the nature of the Trinity, where one of his prime objectives had been to demonstrate that Hervaeus' conception was patently inadequate insofar as it did not address the real problem at issue.85 Another reference to their debate on the Trinity appears in the third article of the first question in the SV4, and this was also omitted from the version of the question found in the CV4.86 The same concern probably lies at the bottom of Auriol's rather unsuccessful attempt to modify the wording of Hervaeus' objections in order to make them fit into a new context. While in the SV4 Hervaeus is reported to have said sed per te actio est relatio, this is modified in the CV4 so as to read sed per me actio est relatio.87 However, when Auriol's quotes a dilemma which Hervaeus put to Auriol, and which stipulates aut loqueris proprie aut metaphorice, Auriol had no option but to retain the verb in the second person singular.88 On the whole, Auriol's account of Hervaeus' objections seems to be reliable.89 Nevertheless, Hervaeus' claim that Auriol's reasoning is frivolous appears to have been something that Auriol did not want to convey to posteriority. Whereas this rather damning characterisation is voiced on numerous occasions in Hervaeus' Quodlibet,90 and is also found in the first question in Auriol's SV4, it was omitted from the question as it appears in the CV4, where Auriol retained only the core of Hervaeus' argument.91 85
For this discussion, see below, sections 7.1 and 7.2. S', fol. 77vb; E' (1605), col. 124a. 87 S', fol. 77vb; E' (1605), col. 126b. 88 S', fol. 78ra; E' (1605), col. 126b. 89 Obviously, this is not the place for a detailed comparison between Hervaeus' vehement polemic against Auriol in the fourth Quodlibet and Auriol's manner of presenting Hervaeus' arguments. It would seem, however, that the veracity of Auriol's report of Hervaeus' opposition is in the main confirmed by Hervaeus' questions in the fourth Quodlibet. Nevertheless, it is also clear that Hervaeus edited his series of arguments for inclusion into his fourth Quodlibet. 90 Hervaeus Natalis (1513), cols. 90ra; 90rb et passim. 91 See S', fol. 75vb; and E' (1605), cols. 123a—b. The debate between Hervaeus and Auriol was particularly bitter, and Hervaeus went so far as to accuse Auriol of heresy; see Hervaeus Natalis (1513), cols. l00va—vb. In return, Auriol showed no remorse about ridiculing his adversary'. In the question included in Distinction 13 86
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Occasionally Auriol's revising of his text added valuable historical information to his exposition. An example of this is the following, CV4, d. 13, q. 1, a. 3 (E> (1605), col. 124b) Alii arguunt contra propositionem principalem, quia haec est in secundo modo per se "homo non est asinus", et tamen non potest Deus facere, quod homo <non> sit homo, et quod non sit non-asinus.
SV4, d. 13, q. 1, a. 3 (S'3 fol. 77ra) Dices, ego ostendo tibi, quod Deus potest facere, quod homo sit asinus. Probatio, quia haec non est in primo modo "homo non est asinus", sicut ista affirmativa, ergo potest oppositum facere.
The version of the text in the SV4 does not give any indication as to the identity of the subject for dices; in view of the circumstance that Hervaeus is Auriol's principal opponent in this question, one would be inclined to think that Hervaeus was also the originator of this objection. This would, however, be a mistake, as the alii in the text of the GV4 indicates. In fact, this objection belongs to Thomas Wylton, and it is found almost verbatim in Wylton's Bordeaux determinatio against Auriol.92 Auriol's care in making sure that his opponent is rightly identified may also be observed at the start of the first article in the third question in the SV4, which in the CV4 is the second article in the second question. Here the Salamanca version of the text merely says that "it was argued against me", while the majority version explains that "the reverend professor Hervaeus raised some objections", just as it is added that Hervaeus addressed what Auriol had said about action when commenting on the first book.93 By way of a general description of the relationship between the two versions of the questions which the SV4 and the CV4 have in common in Distinction 13, one would certainly be justified in saying that they are not as close as the two versions of the opening
of the SV4 but left out of the CV4, Auriol implied that Hervaeus constructed syllogisms like a donkey; cf. Nielsen (1999), note 33. 92 "Accipio istam "homo est non-asinus". Non est de primo modo dicendi per se. Igitur erit de secundo modo. Igitur per ipsum (sell., Aureolum) Deus potest facere hominem, qui non sit non-asinus, et per consequens hominem, qui sit asinus"; Thomas Wylton (1987), p. 212. Z. Kaluza (1987), pp. 295-296, is undoubtedly right in maintaining that it would be a mistake to look for a particular opponent behind every dices in a scholastic text since the dialogue form is used as a purely literary device; on the other hand, as this example shows, this observation is not of universal validity. 93 S', fol. 77vb; E' (1605), col. 126b.
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question of the commentary on this book. When relating objections that were raised against Auriol's viewpoints by either Hervaeus or somebody else, the two versions often agree verbatim., which is not to be wondered at since such objections seem to have been considered almost on a par with quotations. Nonetheless, it is remarkable that the CV4 reports several objections which are absent from the SV4. Whether these objections were forged by Auriol or derive from later stages in the debate, is not easy to decide.94 Literal agreements between the corresponding texts are less frequent in the sections where Auriol unfolds his views and replies to objections raised. This does not imply, however, that there is only a loose connection between the two versions in these sections. The overall line of argument as well as the single arguments and their relative ordering are the same in both texts. Consequently, it would seem well-nigh impossible that Auriol would have been able to compose or dictate the CV4 version of these questions without having had the corresponding texts from the SV4 before his eyes. 6.4. The Double Redaction of the Questions on Distinctions 43 and 45
In the latter part of Auriol's commentary on the fourth book of the Sentences the close correspondence between the two versions of the work is equally apparent. In both versions there are six questions to Distinction 43 and three that belong to Distinction 45. The topics put up for debate are the same in both versions as are the divisions into articles. Often the agreements between the two texts are quite literal though it is obvious that the exposition in the CV4 has been expanded in comparison to its parallel in the SV4. In the present connection the following example will have to suffice, CV4, d. 43, q. 1, a. 1 SV4, d. 43, q. 1, a. 1 (E> (1605), col. 190b) (S3, fol. 93rb) Propter primum sciendum, quod Punctus stat in hoc, quia quidam quaestio ista est praevia ad totam doctor in suo Quarto dicit, quod ideo materiam de resurrectione, et hoc resurrectio est possibilis, quia in homine ideo, quia ad videndum possibili- non est nisi materia prima cum una tatem resurrectionis, diversi posue- forma, quae est anima intellectiva, et
94 Dealing properly with this issue would require a very detailed study of the way in which Auriol and Hervaeus depict their discussions, and how the single arguments appear in both authors' works.
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runt varias imaginationes. Unus doctor, Thomas, in Quarto suo dicit, quod resurrectio est possibilis, quia in homine non est nisi una forma, scilicet anima intellectiva, et materia, quae manent, et ideo nullas hie patimur angustias ad videndum possibilitatem resurrectionis. Si vero in homine esset forma alia ab anima, quae corrumperetur, tune pateremur multas difficultates in ostendendo, quomodo posset forma ilia redire, quae erat prius corrupta. Sed ponendo, quod non sit alia forma, quicquid est in homine, manet, quia et materia et anima, non manent autem accidentia. Et ideo tota essentia hominis redit, quia tota salvata Juit. Non redeunt autem accidentia, nee etiam unio ipsa eadem numero, nee breviter aliquid, quod fuerit prius corrumptum. Unde in unione nova non fit nova hominis essentia, quia ilia remanserat tota.
ideo nullas patimur angustias, quas oportet pati, si esset ibi alia forma substantialis ab anima intellectiva, quia tune potest redire idem numero corruptum, quia quicquid est essentiale in homine, manet, quia materia et forma manent, licet non maneant acddentia. Ideo tota essentia redit eadem, quia nonjiiit corrupta. Sed non redeunt eadem numero accidentia nee unio materiae ad formam, quia ista fuerunt corrupta, scilicet unio ilia et accidentia, ideo non redeunt eadem numero, non autem essentia, quae tota salvatur. Nee in unione nova jit nova essentia hominis, quia tota remanserat. Haec positio ilia.
Again, the version in the CV4 is more precise in identifying the author referred to, and the argument as it appears here is clearer in its structure as compared to the version in the SV4. In the immediately following article Auriol advances his conclusions or propositions, of which the first is proved by three arguments whereas the second is underpinned by five arguments. These sequences of arguments correspond closely in the two versions of the text. The same relationship can be verified in the remaining questions associated with Distinction 43. One noticeable exception occurs in the third question which is not a real question but brings Auriol's replies to Hervaeus' rejoinders to the answers which Auriol had given in Distinction 13, and which addressed those of Hervaeus' objections that related to Auriol's view of creation as a concept fundamentally alien to human reason. This rather protracted exchange of objections and replies may be divided into the following steps, 1) Auriol's original presentation of his view, which is transmitted in the first question of the commentary on the fourth book; 2) Hervaeus' original objections and Auriol's first set of replies, which are both found in Distinction 13 of the same work; 3) Hervaeus' answers to
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Auriol's replies and Auriol's rejoinders to these, which are contained in Distinction 43 of the same work. A further step in this debate is indicated by the fact that there seems to be more than one layer of text in the third question of Distinction 43. In the CV4 we find replies of Hervaeus' and rejoinders from Auriol, that are absent from the text as it appears in the SV4. Moreover, the version of the question as found in the CV4 contains objections from other scholars as well as Auriol's replies to these, whereas they are absent from the SV4 version of the question. The two final steps in these exchanges of replies concern the relationship of creation to the Creator and the relation of similitude that exists between two white things; these additions may indicate a later stage in the debate with Wylton.95 In the questions assigned to Distinction 45 a completely parallel situation obtains. In the first two questions there is a strong correspondence between the twin versions. One of the more readily observable differences is found in the first question, where the structure of the question has been somewhat improved in the CV4. In the version of the question as found in the SV4 Auriol does not explain the relationship between his three conclusions and the single dubium that form the backbone of the question. On the other hand, in the CV4 version the first conclusion has been lifted to a position of primacy, and from this the two remaining conclusions are derived, whereas the dubium has been remoulded into a conclusion that is also said to follow from the principal conclusion. With regard to the third question a slightly different situation obtains. The CV4 version of the question has been substantially expanded in comparison to its parallel in the SV4. The reason for this expansion is not at all to be wondered at. It deals with the problem of whether separate souls possess memory, and this implies the issue of intellectual memory which raised serious problems within the framework of Auriol's epistemology. He wrestled with the problem for several years and does not seem to have reached a final solution until his Quodlibet from 1320.96 Nevertheless, even in this greatly reworked version of the last question there is nothing to invalidate or question the general observations that have been made so
95
See above, section 4.2, note 47. At the SIEPM meeting in Erfurt in August 1997, I gave a paper on the various stages in Auriol's deliberations on this question, of which I hope to publish an expanded version in the near future. 96
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far as regards the overall relationship between the two versions of the commentary on the fourth book. 6.5. The Nature of the Two Versions of the Commentary on the Fourth Book
In conclusion to this—strictly preliminary—examination of the relationship between the two versions of Auriol's commentary on the fourth book of the Sentences it is necessary to ask firstly about the nature of the Salamanca version. That it antedates the version found in the majority of the existing manuscripts is patent. Compared to the later version it is far less polished in its overall structure, and its arguments are not as carefully phrased as in the majority text. That it is somewhat shorter does not imply that it is an abbreviation but merely indicates that Auriol used it as the basis on which the majority text was composed. Furthermore, there is every reason to think that the Salamanca version reflects Auriol's lectures as baccalareus sententiarius in Paris. Auriol's discussions with Hervaeus Natalis, who is clearly the main opponent in this connection, as well as with Thomas Wylton took place in Paris, and we have no grounds for assuming that they were simultaneously present anywhere else during the years of Auriol's teaching career.97 Another obvious feature of the Salamanca version is that its different parts are not all on the same level of development as compared to the later version. Some questions, such as the long opening question, are so close to what is presented in the later version that the deviations between the two versions do not constitute a re-writing of the text but merely indicate that the earlier text was corrected. Moreover, there are hints that for some questions such corrections were entered into the text by way of deletions and marginal or inter-linear additions.98 For most parts of the work, however, the differences are of such an order that Auriol would have had to write—or dictate— whole questions anew, with the previous version in front of him. 97 It cannot be assumed that Auriol utilised material that derived from his sojourns in Bologna and Toulouse, since there are no indications in the sources to this effect. 98 Though I cannot go into a detailed description of the transmission of the text, it can be said that the manuscripts of the later version appear to be independent of each other. For this reason it is quite odd to find that on more than one occasion central elements in sentences, such as the finite verb, are absent from all known manuscripts of the later version but appear in the Salamanca version. Another note-
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Since our analysis indicates that the Salamanca version presents a kind of "snap-shot" of Auriol's commentary on the fourth book in the making, it is necessary to ask why somebody would want to copy an incomplete or unfinished work. Presumably, the answer to this is very simple: Somebody mistook the earlier version for Auriol's final version and ordered a copy of it. Such a mistake is easy enough to understand since the opening parts of the two versions are certainly so close as to invite such a mistake, and even the early version covers the whole of the Lombard's fourth book. This leads to another question, did Auriol ever finish the work? This is tantamount to asking whether the later version of the commentary presents the work in the form which Auriol intended. There are signs that this may not be the case. Particularly telling is the absence of the first question in the section covering Distinctions 28 and 29. Though the title of the question is specified in the introduction to the section, the question is missing from all known manuscripts; in one manuscript an alien text has been filled into what must have been a lacuna in the manuscript." A somewhat parallel situation obtains in the first part of Distinction 11, where a question appears to have been planned but was never composed.100 Moreover, an incongruence between the introductory sections and the ensuing questions is noticeable in several other cases.101 Whether such indications provide sufficient ground for establishing the unfinished nature of the CV4 is, however, a moot question; presumably it will remain so until the critical edition of the work may make it possible to reach a final answer.
worthy phenomenon is that every manuscript giving the later version of the text shares variants with the Salamanca version. In other words, where the later version and the Salamanca version clearly differ, any of the manuscripts of the later version may share a reading with the Salamanca version and by this deviate from the version which, otherwise, they transmit. Naturally, charting this in any greater detail will only be possible on the basis of a critical edition, but it would seem to indicate that the copying of the last version of Auriol's text was not at all without its problems, and that this was due to numerous marginal and/or inter-linear corrections. 99 Pelplin, Seminarium Duchowne, cod. VJ.e. 12, fol. 76vb. 100 -phis js tne third question in Distinction 10, part 1, which according to the introductory section should have dealt with transubstantiation and utrum sit actio positiva vel privativa; cf. E' (1605), col. 98a. 101 This holds good in the first and third parts of Distinction 10, which consist of fewer questions than are announced in the corresponding introductory sections. In Distinction 31 and 34, however, the inverse holds true; here questions appear that were not anticipated in the corresponding introductions.
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7. Auriol's Shorter Commentary on the First Book of the Sentences
7.1. The Earlier Questions on Distinction 33 in the SCI
Auriol's re-interpretation of the philosophical and theological legacy aroused opposition on numerous points. The issue where his novel stance provoked the fiercest opposition among his immediate contemporaries was undoubtedly his attempt to elucidate the nature of the divine Trinity. This topic he addressed already in the Prologue to the SCI, 102 and since this text reflects what he propounded in his principium in the early fall of 1316,103 Auriol appears to have been eager to make sure that his views on the matter were as widely publicised as possible and at the earliest possible occasion. From the Prologue it transpires that reactions from his fellow sententiarii as well as some of the theological professors did not tarry, and the surviving records reveal that this debate occupied Auriol right up to the end of his Parisian sojourn. The absolutely pivotal texts in this connection are Auriol's questions relating to Distinction 33 in the SCI, of which large parts are also present in his Quodlibet.m Fortunately, several versions of Auriol's treatment of Distinction 33 have been handed down. In the first place, we have a brief version in the manuscript P'. A considerably more elaborated version is found in the B' manuscript, and yet another version is to be found in the manuscript V. In addition to these three witnesses we have several questions in Auriol's Quodlibet which are intimately linked to the questions associated with Distinction 33 in the SCI.105 That P' and B' are closely connected was already observed by Maier. Her examination of the relationship between the two texts led her to the conclusion that P' is nothing more than an abbreviation 102 The Prologue to the SCI raises important questions of literary criticism of another order, we shall return to this text at a later juncture; cf. below, section 7.3. 103 See Nielsen (1999). 104 Auriol's views on the nature of the Trinity and his attempts at reconciliating the unitary essence with the ternary of persons is far from fully developed in the LCI. Accordingly, this work was not the source on which contemporary opponents generally based their attacks on Auriol. Instead they referred to what Auriol incorporated into the SCI and the pertinent questions in Auriol's Quodlibet. This is certainly the case with Hervaeus Natalis; cf. Hervaeus Natalis (1513), cols. 88va sqq. Petrus Thomae, on the other hand, appears to have had access to only the LCI; see Maieru (1991). 105 For the sake Qf Brevity we refer to the Quodlibet as Q' followed by the number of the pertinent question or questions.
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of B'.106 Arguments in favour of Maier's claim are not difficult to find. The text in P' is noticeably shorter than in B'; most of the text in P' is repeated verbatim in B'; the "titles" given to this distinction in the SC1 are almost identical in P' and B', and they are flagrantly inappropriate;107 and at the beginning of P', the scribe openly admits that he has omitted something of his exemplar.108 A closer investigation of the relationship between the two texts reveals, however, that things may not be as plain as they appeared to Maier. Several characteristics of the text in the P' version are remarkable. In the first place, it is obviously implied by the text itself that it is a reportatio; it ends with the following statement, "Who wants to know more about these indivisions should consult the other reports",109 which would be meaningless unless the present text belonged to this genre as well. Secondly, compared to the text as found in B', the P' version of the text ends in the middle of a dilemma of which only the antecedent of the first horn has been preserved.110 Thirdly, the rather high-handed attitude of the scribe
106 Maier (1964), pp. 268-269; she claimed that this is true of the whole of the latter third of the SC 1. 107 Both versions begin with a "Circa distinctiones 32am et 33am quaero/quaeritur" (B', fol. 8Ira; P', fol. 116ra) which is particularly ill-suited to the context inasmuch as Distinction 32 has been treated of immediately prior to this. Since there are no questions that relate to Distinction 34, one would have expected the following questions to deal with Distinctions 33 and 34. The version in V has separate groups of questions allotted to all three distinctions and is, in this respect, complete. 108 "Hie multa dixit, quae non scribo"; P', fol. 116ra. 109 "Qui vult plus de istis indivisionibus, quaerat in aliis reportationibus"; P', fol. 117rb. 110 SCI, d. 33, q. umca (B\ fol. 87vb) SCI, d. 33, q. unica (P, fol. 117rb). Ad secundam dico, quod eodem modo pro- Ad secundam dico, quod eodem modo probat processum in infinitum. Quaero enim de bat processum in infinitum. Quaero enim de non-identitate positivorum, quae ponitur prima non-identitate positworum, quae ponitur prima ad pluralitatem indivisionum, super quam ad pluralitatem indiuisionum. Aut enim funfundatur? Aut enim fundatur super all- datur super aliquid indifferens ad positwum quid indifferens ad positwum essentiae et pater- essentiae et paternitatis. nitatis, et tune ilia non-identitas erit indifferens et communis, et non erit non-identitas unius ab altero. Aut fundatur super proprium positivum alterius ut non-idem cum altero, et tune aliqua non-identitas praecedet in substratis illam primam non-identitatem, quam doctor ille nititur habere respectu negationum.
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at the start of the P' version of the text is not manifested in the body of the text. Reporting Auriol's replies to a series of five objections which were launched by Hervaeus Natalis, the scribe is very careful to correct an error for which he was responsible. Auriol's answers to the objections follow the order in which Hervaeus had presented them, and after having completed the answer to the fifth and final argument, the scribe stresses that the answer to the fourth objection as reported in the sequence did not originate with Auriol, and he goes on to bring Auriol's authentic rebuttal of Hervaeus' argument.111 What is implied by these observations? That the scribe was high-handed at the start of the text, extremely careless at the end of the text, but very conscientious in the middle? This is not at all a plausible suggestion, and it is by no means necessitated by the text. It is rather more likely that these few remarks go back not to a single scribe but to two scribes. The original scribe or reportator would seem to be responsible for the correction in the middle of the text; during a debate—or a lecture—he became confused and inadvertently attributed an answer to Auriol which had not been supplied by Auriol. On the other hand, the remarks at the start and the end of the text are better explained on the assumption that they belong to a person who copied the original reportatio or a copy of it.112 At that point the text had become truncated at the end, and for this reason the text stops in the middle of an argument. Apparently, the copyist realised that something had been lost and alerted the reader to this by inserting his note on the existence of other—and more complete—reportationes. Why the copyist left something out at the beginning of the text is not that easy to explain. In order to find an answer to this question it is necessary to undertake a more detailed comparison of the versions in P' and B'. That P' is no mere abbreviation of B' is not all that difficult to determine. In the first place, in view of the fact that P' brings almost the same text as B' in the passages that they share, it cannot be sustained that P' abbreviates the B' version of the text. It might be 111 "Ad illud vero, quod ponitur quartum, respondebat [respondetur P'] ipse, quia superior non fuit responsio eius. Et dicit, quod . . ."; P', fol. 117rb-va. 112 That the copyist remarked that he left out something that Auriol had "said", does not militate against this interpretation. The choice of the word "dixit" instead of "scripsit" does not necessitate stipulating that the scribe was present at the lecture or disputation, but merely indicates that he was aware of the fact that he was copying a reportatio, and, consequendy, that these were Auriol's spoken—and not written—words.
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argued—and slightly more plausibly—that P' consists of excerpts from B'. However, this suggestion does not do justice to the fact that several paragraphs in the P' version of the text have no parallels in the B' version.113 Finally, even in the places where P' and B' agree, there are minor variations which are not typical of abbreviations or excerpts. Thus it seems rather improbable that an abbreviator or excerptor would change a secunda propositio into a prima conclusio, or a quintus articulus into a quinta propositio.114 In order to come properly to grips with the relationship between the B' and the P' versions of Distinction 33 in Auriol's SCI it is necessary to form an overall picture of the main sections shared by the two versions and the parts that are present in B' but absent from P'. One of the immediately apparent differences between the two texts is that four problems are raised in B' whereas there is only one in P'. Furthermore, the text in B' has been divided into articles while the P' text has no such divisions. In both texts Auriol advances five propositions or conclusions, but the agreement between the two versions of this sequence of conclusions is only partial. The first proposition in B' is missing from P', while the following four propositions or conclusions and their main arguments are the same in both texts. The fifth proposition in P' is paralleled in B' by what is called an article, SCI, d. 33, q. unica (B', fol. 83vb) Quintum articulum sic ostendo, ostendo enim, quod impossibile est essentiam et relationem esse omnibus modis idem realiter excepto modo non-identitatis adaequatae vel convertibilis, immo est dare aliam nonidentitatem priorem. Nee per hoc possent dici aliquo modo non-idem, nisi esset dare priorem ista nonidentitate adaequata et convertibili. Et ilia prior necessario est ilia, quam teneo et praecedentibus articulis declaravi.
SCI, d. 33, q. unica (P', fol. 116rb) Quinta propositio est, quod ponens essentiam et relationem esse idem nonconvertibiliter necessario ponit aliam non-identitatem priorem, quam voco indivisionem. Haec conclusio probata est in prima quaestione per plures rationes.
113 Thus several arguments in P', fol. 116rb, were exchanged for other arguments in B', fol. 84va. 114 Cf. P', fol. 116ra, as compared to B', fol. 82va; and P', fol. 116rb, as compared to B', fol. 83vb. That these changes did not arise because of errors in copying transpires from the context.
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The point at issue in this passage is Auriol's contention that Hervaeus Natalis' principle of inconvertibility is not sufficient for avoiding contradictions in trinitarian theology. In P' there is no further report of Auriol's arguing this point, but only a reference to the first question in the SCI, i.e., to the first article in the quaestio unica of the Prologue, where this claim was put poignantly. In the B' version of the text, however, Auriol's stance is recapitulated and supported by several additional arguments. The point where the two versions of the text meet again, is in the rebuttal of several arguments by which Hervaeus had attempted to circumvent Auriol's line of reasoning. Disagreements between the two texts are equally apparent in their reports on the discussions between Auriol, on the one hand, and, on the other, Hervaeus Natalis and Thomas Wylton. In P' one finds only one series of arguments by Hervaeus against Auriol's point of view and only one set of replies by Auriol. In B', on the other hand, there are no fewer than four series of arguments by Hervaeus as well as corresponding sets of rebuttals by Auriol. Of these, the first set of objections and replies is identical to the series found in P'. As regards Thomas Wylton's altercation with Auriol, P' brings only one series of arguments and replies by Auriol, whereas there are two series in B', and, again, the first set of arguments and counter-arguments is identical to the one found in P'.115 Moreover, in B' there are several objections presented by Auriol's socii which together with Auriol's replies are without parallels in the P' version of the text. The beginning of the text in its B' version is much fuller in comparison to P'. Firstly, Auriol summarises several alternative solutions to the problem at hand, viz., how to avoid falling into contradiction when speaking of the divine Trinity, and after having disproved all of these competing solutions he presents his own theory. The second main part of the opening section, which is present in B' but missing from P', is an attempt to show that the notions upon which his solution builds, i.e., absolute and relative indivision or indistinction, can be verified in the created sphere. Whereas the first half of this introductory section was largely anticipated in the Prologue of the SC1, the second half presents new viewpoints and throws significant light on the issue. 115
It is possible that there are, in fact, three series of arguments and replies in the B' version of the text. By inserting a rather long passage of explanatory nature in B' Auriol has to some extent obscured the structure of the debate.
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On the basis of this—admittedly very sketchy—picture of the pattern of omissions in P', it is possible to reach a plausible understanding of the relationship between these two versions of Auriol's commentaries on Distinction 33. Since the text in P' has only two sets of objections, one by Hervaeus and one by Thomas Wylton, as well as Auriol's replies to these arguments, and since these passages are repeated almost verbatim in B',116 there is every reason to think that the omission in P' of Hervaeus' and Thomas Wylton's remaining series of arguments and the corresponding series of replies by Auriol is due to the circumstance that these parts of the discussion had not yet taken place at the time when P' was composed. Granted that this is an obvious and plausible cause of the "selective" nature of P', the implication of this for the B' version is no less patent: B' must be a patchwork of more than one reportatio. The subsequent exchanges of arguments and counter-arguments must have been recorded in other reportationes of later lectures or "determinations" which together with P', or a reportatio like P',117 were combined so as to make up B'. In other words, the relationship between P' and B' is, at least for Distinction 33, the precise opposite of what Maier thought. On this basis, it is, finally, legitimate to venture a guess at what the scribe of P' found at the beginning of his exemplar but chose not to copy. He felt justified in leaving out what would in all likelihood be the first part of the present introduction to the B' version of the text, i.e., the part that reiterates what had already been said in the opening question of the work. In other words, the scribe refused to reproduce what was merely a repetition on Auriol's part, but he was not so incompetent as to leave out something new and of principal significance.
116
The correspondence between the two versions of the text is in general so close that emendations in one can be done on the basis of the other. 117 There are indications that B' was composed on the basis of the reportatio of which P' is a copy, inasmuch as the ordering of Auriol's answers to Hervaeus' first series of arguments follows the rather odd sequence in P' where—as already mentioned—the fourth and the fifth replies have been switched around because of the scribe's mistake. Not surprisingly, B' has expurgated the spurious reply found in P'; cf. B', fol. 85rb.
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7.2. The Later Questions on Distinction 33 in the SCI and the Quodlibetal Questions
Having completed the B' version of the questions on Distinction 33 in the SC1, Auriol continued to struggle with expounding and defending his view of the relationship between unity and trinity in the divine. The results of his efforts are found in the V version of the questions on Distinction 33 as well as in the third and fourth questions of his Quodlibet}1* That this was a tortuous process transpires not least from the fact that these two long texts are very dissimilar with regard to both structure and manner of exposition. Some features are, however, common to both versions. In continuation of what can be observed in rudimentary form in B', they attempt to separate the general discussion on the nature of unity and plurality from the more specific debate on the relationship between unity and trinity in the divine.119 Secondly, they share a debt to the B' version of the corresponding questions. Broadly speaking, the Quodlibet version is much closer to B' than the version found in V. However, it is not immediately evident whether the questions found in V are prior or posterior to those in the Quodlibet, just as it is no easy matter to decide whether the continued influence of B' was mediated through a later elaboration or was direct.
118
It is beyond doubt that the B' version of Auriol's "exposition" of Distinction 33 is prior to the V version and the corresponding quodlibetal questions. This ordering can be established on several grounds and transpires not least from the fact that the latter versions show an obviously much improved structure as compared to B' and contain several arguments that are absent from the B' version. Admittedly, the fifth question in the Quodlibet also deals with this topic, but strictly speaking it differs somewhat from the questions associated with Distinction 33 in the SCI. It appears to have been written on another occasion, and there is an early version of this question in the collection of questions found in the manuscript 63 in Balliol College, Oxford. This collection consists of early versions of selected questions found in the Quodlibet. In the near future I hope to be able to publish these early versions together with an analysis of the light they throw on Auriol's manner of expanding relatively short drafts—or reportationes—into full questions. 119 The preserved texts reveal that it became clear at an early stage in the debates between Auriol, Hervaeus, and Wylton that their disagreement on how to address the speculative problems posed by the divine Trinity was matched by fundamental differences of opinion with regard to the nature of unity and plurality in the world of creatures, and that they entertained equally diverse perceptions of the relationship between substantial and accidental properties. This prompted Auriol to insert the second part of the introductory section in the B' version of Distinction 33 and to structure his later questions on these matters on a two-parts scheme.
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The overall structure of the questions associated with Distinction 33 in V is reasonably clear. Auriol's commentary is divided into two main parts of which the first part deals with identity or unity in general, whereas the second treats of unity in the divine. The first main part has again been divided into two subordinate parts, of which the first concerns the formal nature of unity, and the second elucidates the relationship between unity and its substrate. In all, there are nine questions of which the last four deal with unity in the divine. Unfortunately, this lucid structure is only a surface phenomenon.120 When one examines the way in which the individual questions have been constructed, it immediately becomes apparent that the author faced grave difficulties in the organising of his material. All of the questions are divided into articles but the articles are of quite different sizes; some are extremely brief, while some of the longer ones are remarkably complex and have themselves been split up into several parts.121 The ultimate cause of this complexity—or, some might say, confusion—is not difficult to diagnose. In these questions Auriol pursues the double aim of expounding his proper views on the matters at hand at the same time as relating and refuting his opponents' numerous objections. Compared to the V version of these questions, the layout of the parallel questions in the Quodlibet is considerably more easy to follow. The third question in the Quodlibet consists of three articles of which the first deals with the nature of unity and its relationship to being and plurality; here Auriol's primary adversary is Thomas Wylton. In the second article Auriol addresses the problem of unity and plurality in the divine. This section is introduced by a series of objections from Hervaeus, after which follow the principal exposition of Auriol's viewpoint as well as replies to Hervaeus' arguments. Subsequently, Auriol brings two series of counter-arguments by Thomas Wylton, each of which is accompanied by Auriol's answers. After these altercations follow a second series of objections by Hervaeus
120 In the second subordinate part of the first main part there is an "extra" question in the sense that the third question was not announced in the introduction to this part; cf. V, fol. 134ra. 121 This is true of the second article in question 2 of the first subordinate part of the first main part (V, fols. 132va-134ra), and of the second article in question 1 of the second subordinate part of the first main part (V, fols. 134rb~137va). Several of the articles are structured as individual questions.
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together with AurioPs replies, and two sets of objections launched by so-called alii and refuted by Auriol. Finally, in the third article, Auriol presents his determination of the question posed. The fourth question in Auriol's Quodlibet is chiefly concerned with demonstrating the inadequacy of Hervaeus' notion of inconvertibility as the key to the proper understanding of the numerical relationship in God. Now the remarkable thing about questions 3 and 4 in the Quodlibet is that they are so intimately linked to the version of the text in B' that very little of B' is not repeated almost verbatim in these questions. On the other hand, in the quodlibetal version of the text Auriol's reorganising of the B' version of the text was radical: the discussions on the general nature of unity were sharply separated off from the debates on the nature of unity in the divine, and Auriol's relentless attempts to demonstrate the inadequacy of Hervaeus' theory of inconvertibility were gathered from different places in the B' version and united into a separate question.122 Since the V version of these expositions is, broadly speaking, less close to what is found in B' it would be natural to assume that this version is a later effort of Auriol's. However, this suggestion is not particularly convincing inasmuch as Auriol's polemic against Hervaeus' inconvertibility theory was once again incorporated into the body of the discussion in V. This was done in such a manner that the fourth quodlibetal question was split up into two parts of which the first part became the first question in the second part of Distinction 33 in V, while the rest is found in the second article of the subsequent question in the V version of Distinction 33. Why Auriol would want to divide what he had previously and successfully united into a single unit is not easy to understand. Another feature of the quodlibetal questions is that they bring arguments by adversaries as well as replies to these arguments which are not present in V'.123 Since one of the predominant characteristics of Auriol as a writer is his
122 Auriol's restructuring in the quodlibetal questions of the material derived from the B' version was so comprehensive as to affect almost every part of the original. 123 An illustrative example of this is found in Question 3 where one of Thomas Wylton's arguments against Auriol is followed by Wylton's reply to one of Auriol's reasons for rejecting Wylton's view. Whereas Wylton's argument is present in both the V and the quodlibetal versions of the questions, Wylton's rebuttal of Auriol's argument has been transmitted only in the quodlibetal version; cf. V, fol. 141vb, and E' (1605), col. 40a. Perhaps needless to say, in the quodlibetal question Auriol takes some delight in refuting Wylton's rebuttal; cf. E' (1605), col. 42a.
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pronounced reluctance to renounce on completeness for the sake of simplification,124 these "extra" arguments in the quodlibetal questions would suggest that the questions in V had already been completed or put aside at the time Auriol became aware of these arguments. On the other hand, the textual variations that can be charted in the differing versions of these questions seem to indicate that V was, in fact, composed on the basis of the parallel quodlibetal questions. A highly telling testimony is found in the following passage, B',fol. 86vb
V, fol 134vb
Q', q. 3 (E' 1605),
col. 22b) Secundo sic in eadem via, Arguitur igitur primo Secundo sic in eadem via, substratum negationum sic, res substrata est substratum negation! prius est negatione non prior negatione non solum prius est negatione non solum natura, immo orig- natura, sed origine eo solum natura, immo et ine eo modo, quo dicit modo, quo Augustinus dicit, origine eo modo, quo dicit Augustinus, quod mate- quod materia est origine Augustinus, quia materia est origine prior forma. ria est origine prior forma. prior forma. Quaero igitur de indivi- Quaero ergo de indi- Quaero igitur de indivisione paternitatis, quae visione, qua A est in- sione paternitatis, quae posterior est illo, in quo distinctum in se, an posterior est illo, in quo fundatur, an sequatur quidem posterior est ipso fundatur. Quaero utialiquid indifferens ad rem A, in quojundatur. Quaero que, an consequitur essentiae et paternitatis et enim, aut fundatur in aliquid indifferens ad rem fundatur super illud indif- re ipsius A, ut est indif- essentiae et rem paterniferens, an sequatur rem ferens ad A et B, aut est tatis etjundatur super illud paternitatis nee est aliquo aliquo modo differens sive indifferens, aut consemodo differens et non-eadem non-eadem realitati B. quitur rem paternitatis, rei essentiae. Sed non potest dari pri- ut est aliquo modo differens Sed non potest dari pri- mum, quia tune indivi- et non-eadem rei essentiae. mum, quia tune non esset sio, qua A est in se Sed manifestum est, magis indivisio paterni- indistinctum, non magis quod non potest dari pritatis quam essentiae, quia esset propria A quam mum, quia tune non esset esset communis et indiffer- ipsi B, consequeretur plus indivisio paternitatis ens. Igitur necesse est dari enim hoc modo rem quam essentiae, sed esset secundum. Et habetur pro- omnino indifferentem indifferens indivisio et positum. ad A et B. Igitur communis. Igitur necesse oportet dari secundum. est dari secundum. Et Et per consequens habetur propositum, quia indistinctio propria indivisio paternitatis
124 This is a feature observable in many passages of AurioPs work. In these texts a fine example of this is found in the rather long sequence of arguments and counter-arguments inserted between the first and the second articles in question 3 of the second part in Distinction 33 of the SCI; cf. V, fols. 141va sqq.
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inveniet in substrata nonidentitatem priorem.
This text reproduces one of Thomas Wylton's arguments in favour of maintaining a positive cause of unity in contradistinction to Auriol's purely negative concept of indivision or indistinction. There are several indications that the version in B' represents the original on which the V and quodlibetal versions were composed. The quodlibetal version of the text, however, presents a problem, and this consists in its being situated in the third inquiry in the first article of question 3, which deals with the problem an alia et alia unitas sen indivisio absoluta praeexigat non-identitatem aliquam primam in substrata }K This implies that the argument should concern unity in general, but should not address problems raised by the Trinity. But this is precisely what it does.126 Apparently, Auriol realised the incongruence between the phrasing of the argument and the context, and he tried to remedy this deficiency in the V version by substituting the general markers 'A' and 'B' for 'paternity' and 'essence'. He missed, however, the paternitati (highlighted in the text above) in the final addition which is common to V and the quodlibetal question, and this is a sure sign of the origins of the passage. Without knowledge of the parallel text in the third question in the Quodlibet it would presumably be very hard to figure out the relevance of'paternity' to the argument.127 In other words, there are reasons for dating the V version of these questions after the quodlibetal version, but opting for the reverse ordering of these sets of questions is not without merits either. Anyway, reaching a final solution to this problem is not of major significance to the present investigation.128 125
Auriol, Quodlibet, q. 3, a. 1 (E' (1605), col. 22a). There are several other cases of a similar incongruence between arguments and their immediate context. An example may illustrate this: the first article of question 3 in the Quodlibet (E' (1605), col. 22a) is claimed to deal with the general relationship between unity and its substrate; yet in this context Auriol placed one of Thomas Wylton's arguments that deals explicitly with the nature of personal properties in the divine as the true basis of personal singularity. In the V version of Distinction 33 the very same argument is to be found in a more proper setting, which is to say in a specifically "trinitarian" question; see V, fol. 141vb. 127 Placing the V version of the questions relating to Distinction 33 after the corresponding questions in the Quodlibet is further supported by the fact that the number of authorities quoted in favour of Auriol's viewpoints is substantially higher in the V than in the Quodlibet version. 128 This question will be significantly easier to answer on the basis of the criti125
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What is of significance to our inquiry is the fact that the four versions of the questions that relate to Distinction 33 in the SCI give ample testimony to AurioPs scrupulous and extensive work on the questions that went into his commentary. In this particular case we can follow in outline how Auriol proceeded in composing his questions. On the basis of rather short reportationes, of which we are directly familiar with only one, i.e., P', Auriol assembled a draft version of the commentary that was to be assigned to Distinction 33.129 Later Auriol reorganised the material contained in this draft and supplemented it with new material which derived from his debates with his contemporary adversaries. Why Auriol went to the trouble of composing two versions of these questions is not immediately apparent. However, the difficulty of this question should not be exaggerated. Auriol had several good reasons for putting so much effort into precisely these questions, and they are not difficult to identify. In the first place, the topics examined and debated were of patently great importance not only to Auriol but also to his contemporaries. What was at stake was not just key metaphysical concepts such as those of unity and substance but also the proper understanding of the divine Trinity. Secondly, in both of these areas Auriol propounded new and radical viewpoints that were strictly at odds with the perceptions of the realist schools of thought. Finally, it should not be overlooked that Hervaeus had accused Auriol of entertaining heretical views on the Trinity, and that he could hardly abstain from defending himself against an accusation of such seriousness. In the final analysis, it is important to keep in mind that the two later versions of the questions relating to Distinction 33 are not in all respects on a par. The version which he inserted into his Quodlibet,
cal edition of the texts. It is unfortunate that the quality of the text transmitted in V is seriously flawed in several passages and will require numerous emendations. 129 That P' and B' introduce their versions of these questions by way of the same expression seem to suggest that it might go back to Auriol himself, and that he originally envisaged treating of Distinctions 32 and 33 in conjunction. This would correspond to the strategy pursued in the Salamanca version of the commentary on the fourth book of the Sentences; cf. above, section 6.1, note 72. On the other hand, the scribes of P' and B' may have known of other early versions of Auriol's works and realised that such an introductory expression would fit well with Auriol's "style". There is certainly no reason to think that Auriol is responsible for the way the SCI is constructed in P' and B'. In this respect these two versions of the SCI resemble the Florence version of the commentary on the fourth book and the Salamanca version of the commentary on the third book.
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was officially published, and this means that it was finished and approved by its author. However, the version which is found in the V version of the SCI is not known to have been made generally available, just as it is not at all certain that the SC1 was ever completed by the author. In this respect the testimony of the Prologue to the SC 1 is of pivotal importance just as it provides valuable insight into the process by which Auriol developed his work. 7.3. The Multifarious
Transmission of the Prologue to Auriol's SCI
The Prologue to Auriol's SCI deals with the questions that were generally raised in the opening part of commentaries on the Sentences, viz., the nature of theology and theological cognition. What is a characteristic of Auriol's Prologue in this commentary is the fact that it is highly polemical. The reason for this Auriol discloses already at the very outset, and he states that his choice of subject for this section of the work was prompted by his fellow lecturers, the so-called socii, and the topic that they chose for their principium debate in the late summer of 1316.130 In all, the Prologue is divided into four parts. While the manuscripts of the work are unanimous in the manner in which they transmit the two latter parts of this section, this is definitely not true of the two preceding parts. Here the problems are not primarily caused by the readily observable disagreements between the manuscripts but by the rather baffling fact that there is an underlying unity beneath the diversity. However, a clue to the cause of this diversity is provided by the texts themselves. In order to realise the fundamental problems raised by the earlier parts of Auriol's Prologue to the SC 1 it is necessary to view the first two parts of the Prologue from two different perspectives. In the first place, it is required to simply register which questions and other units of text are contained in the manuscripts as well as their relative order. Secondly, one needs to look at what the texts themselves claim should be there. Here, as elsewhere in his commen-
130 Auriol states this in no ambiguous terms in the Prologue to the SCI, "Quaesito igitur a sociis de theologia, an sit scientia, an sit necessaria, et an sit speculativa vel practica, et quomodo sit una, et quid sit subiectum in ea, frustratoriae autem essent inquisitiones istae, si materia divinorum certitudinem scientificam non compateretur in se et ex natura sui, idcirco haec inquisitio in nostro principio praeponatur"; B', fol. Ira; P', fol. Ira; V, fol. Iva.
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taries, Auriol took care to specify the number and titles of the questions in the introductions to the various parts, and this provides us with an opportunity to check whether that which has been transmitted is true to the author's intentions. Finally, an examination of the questions contained in these parts of Auriol's Prologue will enable us to decide whether they contain indications as to what should be present in their immediate context. The various versions of the first two parts of Auriol's Prologue to the SCI are summarised in the following representation, B' and V
F Pars Ia Quaestio unica, utrum natura divina compatiatur in se et ex sui ratione scientificam perscrutationem. Articulus l us , an natura divina habeat in se aliquam determinatam certitudinem ad alteram partem contradictionis, secundum quam patiatur scientificam perscrutationem (B', fols. lrb~3rb; V, fols. 2ra 4rb; P', fols. lrb-3vb) Instantiae contra opinionem Aureoli de distinctione essentiae et personarum in divinis, et responsio Aureoli (P', fols. 3vb-4vb) Articulus 2US, an notitia, quae est possibilis haberi de Deo per scientificam perscrutationem, possit communicari viatori mediante aliqua nuda et clara notitia deitatis, abstractiva tamen et quasi imaginaria (B', fols. 3rb-4va; V, fols. 4rb-6rb; P', fols. 4vb-6va) Instantiae contra opinionem Aureoli de distinctione essentiae et personarum in divinis, et responsio Aureoli (B', fols. 4va-5rb; V, fols. 6rb-7va) Pars IP Quaestio la, quid sit habitus scientificus in generali secundum rem (P', fols. 6va-7rb) Quaestio la, utrum in habitu the- Quaestio 2a, utrum in habitu theologiae per studium acquisito arti- ologiae per studium acquisito articuli fidei sint principia (B', fols. culi fidei sint principia (P', fols. 5rb-6ra; V, fols. 7va-8vb) 7rb-8rb) Quaestio 3a, utrum talis habitus sit faciens adhaerere vel non (P', fols. 8rb-9vb) Quaestio 2a, utrum talis habitus sit Quaerstio 4a, utrum talis habitus vere sapientia (B', fol. 6ra—va; V, sit vere sapientia (P', fols. 9vb—l0va) fols. 8vb-9va)
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The rather different make-up of the two first parts in Auriol's Prologue to the SCI is immediately apparent. Whereas B' and V, on the one hand, and P', on the other, agree on the first part with the exception of the proper location of a section of the text, which, in all other respects, is the same in both groups of manuscripts, there is a remarkable diversity in the transmission of the second part. In order to get some idea of what the author wanted to include in these sections it is necessary to look at the introductions to these parts. Auriol's introduction to the first part is unanimous in all three manuscripts and runs as follows, Ad quaestionem istam respondendo hoc ordine procedetur, primo enim inquiram de prima difficultate, an scilicet natura divina habeat in se aliquam determinatam certitudinem ad alteram partem contradictionis, secundum quam patiatur scientificam perscrutationem. Secundo an ilia sit possibilis communicari viatori intra viae terminos remanenti mediante quadam notitia abstractiva vel quasi imaginaria.131 The section reporting the objections brought against Auriol's view on the matter at hand132 as well as Auriol's replies is not at all mentioned in the introduction, and, accordingly, it would seem to be a section that was added at a later stage. In view of the fact that it is placed in different positions in P', on the one hand, and, on the other, in B' and V, it can be surmised either that the instructions of the author were ambiguous or that he changed his mind on where to put it. Since polemic is prominent in the first article as well, and as the inserted section reports the continuation of this debate, it would appear likely that its position in P' is more appropriate. On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out that placing this section after the inquiry into the nature of theological cognition is motivated by theoretical considerations and with an aim at putting the discussion into its proper perspective.133 The introductory section to the second part of the Prologue is quite different in the two groups of manuscripts. In B' and V it runs as follows, 131
B', fol. Irb; P', fol. Irb; V, fol. 2ra. This is the problem of how to solve the conflict between Aristotelian logic and the divine Trinity, viz., how to view the relationship between the unitary divine essence and the ternary of persons without either sacrificing fundamental logical principles such as the law of contradiction, or laying Christian theology bare to accusations of irrationality. 133 por Auriol's quite modest claims for theological cognition, see Nielsen (1999). 132
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Circa primum quaero quattuor quaestiones. Primo utrum in habitu theologiae per studium acquisito articuli sint principia. Secundo utrum talis habitus sit vere sapientia. Tertio utrum talis habitus sit faciens adhaerere vel non.134 Again, it is immediately apparent that something has gone missing from B' and V. In the first place, four questions are claimed to be included in this part of the Prologue but only the titles of three questions are supplied. Moreover, the third question inquiring into the ability of the science of theology to strengthening the faithfuls' adhering to the Creed, is found neither in B' nor in V. Confusion is rampant in the introductory section to the second part of the Prologue transmitted in P'. It is as follows, Circa primum quaero quattuor quaestiones. Primo de habitu scientifico in generali secundum rem quaero, quid sit habitus scientificus in generali secundum rem. Secundo de habitu theologiae nostrae in speciali. Secundo135 utrum in habitu theologiae per studium acquisito articuli fidei sint principia. Quarto utrum talis habitus sit faciens adhaerere vel non.136 That something has gone very wrong here is not a matter for dispute. In actual fact, the introduction lists only three questions since the secundo de habitu theologiae nostrae is obviously not the title of a question but an indication that the exposition will deal, firstly, with the general nature of scientific habits and, secondly, with the special characteristics of the habit of theology. In order to obtain four questions in the introduction to P'—which would fit with the actual number of questions present in the P' version of the second part— one might assume that much of the confusion is due to a simple omission by homoeoteleuton. On the basis of the text as found in B' and V one might suggest reconstructing the text in the following manner,
134
B', fol. 5rb; V, fol. 7va. The same questions are listed in the index quaestionum in Toulouse, Bibliotheque Municipale, cod. lat. 243, fol. 124rb. 133 The first secundo is abbreviated V in the manuscript, whereas the second is represented by a '2°'. The print of P' available to me is not sufficiently clear to rule out the possibility that the latter '2' may not be a '3' since these two numbers are difficult to distinguish in the hand of the scribe of P'; anyway, this is of only incidental significance in this context. 136 P', fol. 6va.
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Circa primum quaero quattuor quaestiones. Primo de habitu scientifico in generali secundum rem quaero, quid sit habitus scientificus in generali secundum rem. Secundo de habitu theologiae nostrae in speciali. Secundo utrum in habitu theologiae per studium acquisito articuli fidei sint principia. Quarto utrum talis habitus sit vere sapientia. Tertio utrum talis habitus sit faciens adhaerere vel non.
Accordingly, the cause of the omission would be the twin occurrence of the expression utrum talis habitus sit. This, however, leads to another problem, viz., that the listing of the questions is not in numerical sequence. On the basis of the observations made so far it is legitimate to conclude that the opening parts of the Prologue in the SC 1 are not found in a state that is likely to satisfy an author. The reasons for the confusion are, however, not all that difficult to identify once we examine the questions that are incorporated into P' but are absent from B' and V. Furthermore, pursuing this line of inquiry brings to the fore the tasks which Auriol faced when composing this part of his SC 1, and provides a valuable insight into the motives directing his efforts. The first question in the P' version of the second part of the Prologue is verbatim identical to the first article of the fourth question in the Prologue to Auriol's LCI. 137 That this insertion should be due to the initiative of some scribe or an editor of Auriol's work is not at all likely. In the first place, it would seem quite pointless inasmuch as the same effect could be achieved by the adding of a simple marginal note referring to the proper passage in the LCI. Secondly, this is the only place in the SCI where such additions are to be found, and this would hardly be the case if an editor had undertaken to supplement the SCI with material lifted from the LC1. Such an hypothesis would finally falter when it comes to explaining the variations found in the third question, according to the counting of P'. Here it would be necessary to stipulate not only an editor who inserted the "extra" texts found in P' and made the necessary additions to the introduction, but also a second editor who would be responsible for the B' and V versions by removing these "extra" texts whereas he would have forgotten to change the introductory section. Since Auriol avoided repeating himself literally in works
137
Auriol (1952), pp. 262-267.
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intended for publication, and as there are no scribal indications in the P' manuscript to the effect that the "extra" question is somewhat odd in the context of SCI,138 the more plausible explanation is that the occurrence of—at least—the first question in a totally new context indicates that Auriol may at some point have considered writing another version of the text with a view to including it in the SCI, and that he had inserted a copy of, or a reference to, this text in the appropriate place in his working copy of the SCI. 139 The third question in P'—the one that is announced in, but nonetheless absent from B' and V—is also shared with the LCI. Here it is placed at the very end of the work and constitutes its concluding section. This conclusion is appended as a "third article" to the commentary on Distinction 48. This position is distinctly odd since the concluding section has no immediate connection with the topic dealt with in this particular distinction; its subject matter is the nature of theology. The article consists of three parts, each of which presents a single conclusion and its proofs. The first conclusion and its arguments reject viewing the articles of Christian faith as principles from which further knowledge of the divine may be deduced (Cl). The second conclusion continues in the same vein and is an intransigent attack on the Dominicans' conception of theology as a subaltern science (C2). Finally, the third article establishes that the science of theology is essentially different from faith, and that theology may contribute to the strengthening of faith only in a very indirect manner (C3).140 The P' version of the SC1 does not carry the whole of this third and final article in Distinction 48 of the LC1. The idea of theology as a subaltern science had already been refuted in the immediately preceding question, and, consequently, the middle part (C2) of the third article in Distinction 48 of the LCI is absent from P'. What
138
Internal references in this "extra" question in P' reveal that it was lifted directly from the LCI. 139 In the composition of the final third of the SCI in the V version Auriol made a similar choice; he followed the exposition given in the LC 1 instead of basing his exposition on the reportationes of his Parisian lectures. Of course, this presupposes that the pertinent questions in B', P', and the VQ derive from this series of lectures. Moreover, on the same premises it would seem that Auriol's lecturing on the latter third of the first book in the Sentences must have been rather hurried and not very thorough. 14(1 For this, cf. Nielsen (1999).
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P' incorporates, is the first and the third conclusions and their proofs, but in reverse order as compared to their sequence in the LCI (C3, Cl). It is beyond doubt that Auriol needed a text like the third part (C3) of the concluding article of the LCI, i.e., a demonstration to the effect that the habit of theology is fundamentally different from faith and, for this reason, does not enhance or improve on the firmness of faith. This is attested to by the fact that an exposition of this kind is precisely what he had envisaged in the introduction to the second part of the Prologue in the SC1. But, we may ask, why would Auriol want to include the section that forms the first part (Cl) of the final article in the LCI? In the immediately preceding question in the SCI he had already rejected what he called the opinio communis, i.e., that the articles of faith function as principles of theological science, and this was precisely the point which he had driven home in this particular section of the final article of Distinction 48 in the LC1. Nevertheless there was one particular point where the text shared with the LC 1 made a significant contribution. Arguing in favour of viewing the articles of faith as principles, Auriol's adversaries maintained that the articles of faith conform to what is required of scientific principles within the Aristotelian framework. In the first section of the final article in the LCI Auriol took great pains to demonstrate the fallacies inherent in this line of reasoning, and he meticulously established the unsuitability of the articles of faith as scientific principles. On the other hand, the particular question in the SCI that explicitly addresses this issue—i.e., the first question in B' and V, which is the second in P'—contains no such demonstration, and this is all the more to be wondered at inasmuch as the opponents' line of argument is presented in the same manner in both works. In other words, Auriol appears to have needed to supplement the question appearing in the SCI, and what is found in the concluding article of the LCI is admirably suited for this purpose. On the basis of the inclusion of a question from the LC 1 as the first question in the second part of the Prologue to the SC 1 according to P', it would be natural to assume that the "extra" third question in the P' version of the second part of the Prologue to the SC 1 is nothing but a slightly modified copy141 of what originally belonged 141
The only editorial change is found at the beginning of the third question in P' where it is said "Ad tertiam quaestionem sine argumentis respondeo . . ." instead
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to the LCI. However, this cannot be taken for granted. In fact, there are good reasons for assuming that the opposite is the case, viz., that the P' version of third question antedates what appears in the LCI. In the Sorbonne manuscript of the LCI, which is now cod. lat. 15.363 in the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris, the third and final conclusion (C3) of Distinction 48 opens in the following way, Tertio quoque inferri potest aliquid ex praedictis, videlicet ad quartam quaestionem respondeo, quod habitus theologicus . . . (fol. 298vb)
The remarkable fact is that there is no fourth question to which Auriol could answer at this point in the LCI, and it is quite telling that the "videlicet ad quartam quaestionem respondeo" is absent from other manuscripts of the work. Consequently, it appears that the scribe of the Sorbonne manuscript inadvertently copied something from his exemplar that was meant to be left out. On the other hand, in the context of the Prologue to the SCI according to P' Auriol's referring to the fourth question makes excellent sense since here the introductory passage identifies this text as precisely the fourth question. Furthermore, in the P' version of the SC1 this part of the text, i.e., C3 according to the LCI, precedes what is the first conclusion (Cl) in the LCI, and thus there are indications to the effect that P' brings the text in its original structure. The further implication of this is, obviously, that Auriol was already engaged in composing the SCI at the time when he put the final touches to the LCI. 142 Accordingly, it is first and foremost the text provided in P'143 that reveals the close links between the concluding part of the LC1 and the opening section of the SCI. Moreover, these texts allow us a
of "Tertio quoque inferri potest aliquid aliud ex praedictis, videlicet. . ." as found in the LCI (£' (1596), col. 1124a). 142 There is, consequently, some textual support for Maier's thesis that the latter third of both commentaries were written during Auriol's stay in Paris in the second half of 1316. The critical edition of both texts will clarify this matter; these editions are currently being prepared by the editorial group which was presented in, e.g., Tachau (1997) and Nielsen (1997a). On the other hand, settling the issue of why Auriol wanted to proceed with the SCI when he had just finished the LCI, requires a much more detailed analysis of the contents of the two works. 143 The scribes of B' and V must have recognised that the texts shared with the LCI were not intended to be inserted into the SCI in their present form and, for this reason, they simply omitted them—that is, if they had not already been omitted from the exemplars from which B' and V were copied. However, the introductory section to the second part of the Prologue in the SC 1 was not properly purged of
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glimpse of the highly complicated process by which Auriol put together the Prologue to the SCI and conclusion to the LCI. In one case, i.e., the first question in the P' version of the second part of the Prologue to the SC1, he inserted material that was simply lifted from the LCI, and this text was presumably intended to serve as merely a reference text that should be rephrased; at any rate he needed a text of this sort in order to perfect the flow of his argument. In another instance, i.e., the third question of the P' version of the second part of the Prologue to the SCI, he had already restructured and inserted a part of the Prologue to the SC 1 into the conclusion of the LCI, and it is highly likely that he intended to retain the original mould of the exposition, and it is equally likely that he would have preferred to rewrite the text for the final version of the SC 1. Working on and co-ordinating two separate commentaries on the same book of the Sentences at the same time was presumably a quite unique situation in AurioPs writing career. Nevertheless, this part of AurioPs literary remains reveals not only the difficulties Auriol faced as a writer but it also sheds light on some of the ulterior reasons for the stunningly complex transmission of his writings.
8. Conclusion
AurioPs literary remains relating to his commentaries on Peter Lombard's Sentences have caused a good deal of confusion among historians. There is a very good reason for this inasmuch as the relationships between the differing texts are far from perspicuous and pose numerous problems. However, that the richness of sources has been viewed as more of an obstacle than a promising opportunity for historical and literary analysis is primarily due to two circumstances. In the first place, with the exception of V. Heynck,144 hardly anybody has focused on Auriol as an author and attempted to chart
references to these "extra" texts, and, accordingly, these manuscripts support the testimony of P'. 144 It is not to be wondered at that Heynck (1969) chose to focus on Auriol's commentary on the third book of the Sentences since the material relating to this work is extraordinarily rich and challenging. Nonetheless, tracing the genesis of this—undoubtedly—incomplete work is a demanding task which presupposes very detailed studies of the pertinent texts in their entirety. For this reason, this work has been disregarded in the present context.
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his very protracted and circumspect manner of composing his works. In the second place, approaching the numerous sources relating to AurioPs commentaries on the Sentences with an aim to identifying diverse versions and distributing them according to chronological and geographical criteria is definitely not to be recommended as long as the fundamental literary problems presented by these texts remain obscure.145 In Auriol's case, taking one's guidance from the distinction between an ordinatio and a reportatio does not greatly help in charting the relationships between the various groups of texts. As we have seen, these categories are far too coarse to grasp the complexity and subtlety of the issue, and only very few of the available texts fit readily into either category. The only reportatio we know of for certain is the version of the question for Distinction 33 in the first book as transmitted in P'. Here the reportatio nature of the text copied is all but spelled out. Equally, there are reasons for assuming that the questions preserved in Auriol's VQ are reportationes but, strictly speaking, we do not know whether or to what extent they were revised by the author. Secondly, the only ordinatio from Auriol's hand we can be absolutely assured of is, obviously, the LCI which was published.146 The only problem with this work being Auriol's ordinatio is that, in the main, it appears to derive from his preliminary lectures and not from his lectures in the capital of learning. Speculating on how many series of lectures are reflected in these texts does not hold great promise either. There is nothing in the texts to indicate that Auriol went from the version of the first question in the VQ, to the parallel question in the SC1 or from the SV4 to the CV4 by lecturing twice on the same material. On the contrary, the texts seem to militate against such an assumption. It is rather more plausible that the readily observable variations between corresponding texts reflect an editorial process that would seem to have been anything but simple and easy. Furthermore, in the texts that have been handed down there is nothing to suggest that they reflect or go back to Auriol's lectures in any other place than Paris.
145
This is presumably the point intended by Brown (1995), pp. 204-205 and p. 206, when he remarks that the discussion on Auriol's commentaries on the first book of the Sentences is in need of a broader as well as a more detailed foundation. 146 This is true of the Quodlibet as well. These two works appear to mark the boundaries of Auriol's career in Paris.
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Of course, some parts of the LC1 simply must derive from AurioPs lectures prior to his arrival in Paris. But so far it has not been possible to tie any part of the LC 1 to any particular place like Bologna or Toulouse. Settling for a much less ambitious—or, some might say, speculative—approach opens up new avenues of inquiry. By remaining close to the texts and focusing on the relationships that can be shown to obtain between them it becomes possible to draw a picture of Auriol as a writer and to reach a position from which it may be possible to explain why the preserved material relating to these works is of such diverse nature.147 As regards Auriol as an author there can be little doubt that he was remarkably punctilious in the composing of his commentaries on the Lombard's Sentences, and that he continuously strove to improve on what he had already written. From our—admittedly, highly selective and preliminary—analysis it appears that we can reconstruct the rough outlines of AurioPs manner of progressing in the constructing of his commentaries on the first and fourth books of the Sentences. Thus the testimony of the sources indicates that AurioPs basic building block was the question, and that this was a natural choice for him for the sole reason that the question formed the core of university teaching in its various forms. As a matter of course, it should not be assumed that AurioPs elaboration of each and every single question in his commentaries went through the same editorial process. Some questions obviously presented more demanding difficulties than others and, consequently, went through more editorial stages than others. Equally, it should not be ruled out that some of the questions included in, e.g., the commentary on the fourth book in the Sentences were purely literary products that had no roots in the world of university life.148 In general, Auriol would seem to have adopted as his starting point a reportatio of a lecture or a disputation, and in some cases he would fuse such a reportatio with reportationes of other lectures or dis-
147 Clearly, settling the momentous problems posed by the multifarious transmission of AurioPs works in a final way will be possible only after all the texts have been made available in critical editions. For this reason, the present investigation aims at nothing more than providing a provisional sketch of Auriol's editorial process. us Th^ is obviously true of many of Auriol's extremely short questions on marriage relating to Distinctions 30 to 42 in the commentary on the fourth book.
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putations that were either straightforward continuations of the first debate or lecture, or that were focused on closely affiliated topics. Though the material that we have examined in this connection only allows us to reconstruct this process for the material included in Distinction 33 in the SCI, it appears reasonable to assume that this holds good for other parts of the work as well.149 Having constructed such a patched-up question or having settled for working on the basis of a separate reportatio Auriol simply rewrote the whole question with a view to clarifying the exposition and the arguments presented. In some cases this rewriting involved nothing more than correcting elementary errors of grammar or logic as well as filling in the blanks in quotations, but in several other cases this rewriting involved substantial expansions of the original question. That Auriol found it necessary to introduce major alterations would seem to be due to either the inherent difficulty of the topic discussed or his particular preoccupation with the issue debated. lD° The final stage in the editorial process attested to by some of the texts preserved consisted in Auriol's going over the rewritten text with a view to catching unfortunate turns of phrases, profiling the points intended, and, in general, tidying up the exposition.131 This was, however, only one side of the task Auriol faced. The other was naturally that of fitting the single questions into meaningful sequences and groups, and making certain that the single questions did not repeat but complement each other. This concern is—not surprisingly—apparent in most parts of the commentaries. However, it stands out with particular lucidity in the Prologue question to the SCI for the sole reason that here Auriol's aspirations to present a well-formed and complete line of argument were frustrated.152 At the same time he had to face the task of distributing the questions on Peter Lombard's distinctions in the particular book he was or 149 Above we noticed that two questions in the SV4 had been united in the CV4; cf. above, section 6.1. A parallel to what is the case in Distinction 33 of the SC1 is presumably found in Distinction 43 in the CV4; cf. above, section 6.4. Moreover, it is highly improbable that major questions such as the opening questions in the commentaries on the first and fourth books should each reflect a single lecture or debate. IM This is obvious in question 3 of Distinction 45 in the CV4; cf. above, section 6.4. 131 So far our major witness to this is the introductory question in the SV4 and the CV4; cf. above, section 6.2. 132 Cf above, section 7.3.
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had been lecturing on. On the basis of the variations found in the structures of the SV4 and the CV4, it seems that Auriol undertook to co-ordinate his own groups of questions to the Lombard's distinctions at the same time as rewriting his questions.153 Moreover, it is quite clear that this task was anything but trivial and claimed a good deal of attention on the author's part. This transpires not least from the multifarious versions of the introductory sections which Auriol put at the start of each of the Lombard's distinctions as well as at the beginnings of subgroups of questions within the more complex distinctions. Since a long editorial process lies between the original reportatio and the finished questions as they appear in Auriol's commentaries it is necessary to ask, why the medievals styled Auriol's commentaries reportationes or questions that were based on reportationes? The obvious answer to this is, that they did so because this is precisely what they are. The important point here is that they are the literary counter-parts of the lectures which Auriol delivered in Paris, and in this sense they reflect Auriol's teaching in Paris. This should, however, not be construed as being tantamount to saying that these commentaries are raw or unedited reportationes. In fact, the vast majority of texts that have been handed down prohibit such an interpretation. The works in which these questions appear bear very clear marks of having gone through at least one editorial process. That there are strong indications to the effect that Auriol did not finish editing either of the two commentaries which we have looked at in this chapter, does not compromise the validity of this observation. Considering the fact that Auriol must have composed commentaries on all four books as well as a Quodlibet within a four-year period it is hardly to be wondered at that he did not manage to see all these works through their final stages.154 Finally, it is imperative to ask what role Peter Lombard's Sentences played in Auriol's Parisian lectures. On the basis of Auriol's texts in their various stages of development, it would seem that the Lombard's exposition was not of immediate importance in Auriol's lectures. They were strictly based on individual questions which were units 133 More detailed studies of the relationship between the SV4 and the CV4 are required before any final clarification can be reached on this point. 134 In addition these works he also composed works on Biblical matters such as the Breviarium Bibliorum mentioned above, section 6, note 66.
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in their own right. On the other hand, it would definitely be wrong to conclude that Peter Lombard's single books and their distinctions only gained in importance as Auriol progressed in the composition of his commentaries, or that they became of real significance only in the very last stages of the process. Already in his choice of topics for questions to be lectured on Auriol would have known that they were supposed to fall within a particular and well-defined field of study, and that long tradition dictated which topics were generally expected to be put up for examination. Equally, Auriol and his contemporaries realised that, in the main, these stipulations were set down in Peter Lombard's four books of Christian dogmatics. Presumably, this is the reason for Auriol's embarrassment in, e.g., Distinction 13 of the C V4 where none of the genuine questions have any links whatsoever to the Lombard's distinction, and where Auriol attempts to obfuscate this circumstance through the addition of a pseudo-question without any intrinsic merit.155 In other words, when dealing with any particular subject there was nothing improper about deviating from the Lombard. On the other hand, the Lombard's lasting achievement was the delineation of the field of theology and the establishing of the proper subjects for theological debate. In this respect his work remained an obligatory model for theologians, and to this Auriol did his very best to conform.
Acknowledgements
In preparing this chapter I have benefited from the kind assistance of several good friends and colleagues. I owe debts of gratitude to: Prof. Stephen F. Brown, Boston College, for letting me borrow his beautiful prints of one of the Auriol manuscripts, for a copy of his dissertation, and, last but not least, for his judicious comments on this chapter; Prof. Katherine H. Tachau, University of Iowa, for bringing the Salamanca M 2295 manuscript to my attention and giving me access to her microfilm; Dr. Cecilia Trifogli, All Souls College, Oxford, for letting me use her transcription of Wylton's quodlibetal questions; Dr. Russell L. Friedman., University of Copenhagen, for collaborating on the collation of Padua Ant. 292 as well as the first
55
See above, section 6.3.
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third of Berlin, Staatsbibliothek 536, and for his valuable comments on this chapter; Prof. Christopher Schabel, University of Cyprus, for letting me use his transcriptions of the last third of the SCI in the Berlin and Padua versions and of Auriol's Vatican Questions associated with the first book; his careful charting of the close correspondence between the V version of the latter third of the SC1 and the LCI saved me a trip up the wrong path; my friend and former colleague Torben Rybner, BSc. ComSc. and BSc. Econ., for developing a versatile and remarkably speedy computer program which identifies literal agreements between several texts, and without which the charting of Auriol's editorial efforts would have been a far more formidable task.
Abbreviations Used LCI SC 1 CV4 SV4 VQ, B' E' E' P' OJ S' V
Auriol's Longer Commentary on Book I of the Sentences Auriol's Shorter Commentary on Book I of the Sentences The Common Version of Auriol's commentary on Book IV of the Sentences The Salamanca Version of Auriol's commentary on Book IV of the Sentences Auriol's Vatican Questions preserved in Vat. lat. 6768 Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Cod. Theol. 536 (1596) The Sarnano edition of the LCI, 1596 (1605) The Sarnano edition of Auriol's commentaries on the remaining books of the Sentences and his Quodlibet, 1605 Padua, Biblioteca Antoniana, Cod. 292 Auriol's Quodlibet Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, M 2295 Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgh. 123
Bibliography A. Unprinted Sources
Peter Auriol, Commentarius Brevior in Primum Sententiarum. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Cod. Theol. 536; Padua, Biblioteca Antoniana, Cod. 292; Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgh. 123. Peter Auriol, Quaestiones Variae in Primum Sententiarum. Vatican, Vat. lat. 6768, fols. 21ra-26ra. Peter Auriol, Commentarius Prior in Quartum Sententiarum. Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, M 2295, fols. 50r-104v. Peter Auriol, Utrum virtus in quantum virtus sit ens per accidens. Balliol College, Oxford, cod. 63, fol. 19ra-va; edition in Nielsen (2000). Peter Auriol, Utrum habitus practicus et speculativus distinguantur ab invicem per esse principium activum et non esse principium activum in ipso sciente. Balliol College, Oxford, cod. 63, fol. 21ra-va; edition in Nielsen (2000).
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Thomas Wylton, Quodlibet. Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgh. 36, fols. 47r—l0lv. Thomas Wylton, Utrum habitus theologiae sit practicus vel speculativus. Balliol College, Oxford, cod. 63, fols. 19va-20rb; edition in Nielsen (2000). B. Printed Sources Averroes (1562), De substantia orbis (Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis, vol. 9). Venice, pp. 3r—14v. Hervaeus Natalis (1513), Quodlibeta et Tractatus. Venice. Reprint. Ridgewood, 1966. John Baconthorpe (1618), Quaestiones in Quattuor Libros Sententiarum et Quodlibetales. 2 vols. Cremona. Reprint. Farnborough, 1969. Peter Auriol (1596), Petri Aureoli Commentariorum in Primum Librum Sententiarum pars prima et secunda. Ed. Constantius Cardinalis Sarnanus. Rome. Peter Auriol (1605), Petri Aureoli Commentariorum in Secundum, Tertium et Quartum Sententiarum et Quodlibeti tomus secundus. Rome. Peter Auriol (1952), Petri Aureoli Scriptum Super Primum Sententiarum. Prologue—Distinction I. Ed. E.M. Buytaert. Franciscan Institute Publications. Text Series no. 3. St. Bonaventure. Peter Auriol (1956), Petri Aureoli Scriptum Super Primum Sententiarum. Distinctions II— VIII. Ed. E.M. Buytaert. Franciscan Institute Publications. Text Series no. 3. St. Bonaventure. Peter Auriol (1994), Petri Aureoli Scriptum super Primum Sententiarum. Distinctio 38-39. In Schabel (1994), pp. 435-577; also in Schabel (1995). Peter Auriol (1995), Petri Aureoli De Unitate conceptus entis (Reportatio Parisiensis in 1 Sententiarum, dist. 2, p. 1, qq. 1-3 et p. 2, qq. 1-2). In Brown (1995). Peter Auriol (1997a), Petri Aureoli Scriptum in Primum Sententiarum. Distinctio 27. In Friedman (1997), pp. 371-467. Peter Auriol (1997b), Petri Aureoli Scriptum in Primum Sententiarum. Distinctio 9. Pars I. In Friedman (1997), pp. 468-496. Thomas de Wylton (1987), Determinatio contra Petrum Aureoli. In Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia. I: Catalogo dei Manoscritti (239-293), 1/3* Francia (Dipartimenti) a cura di Francesco Del Punta e Concetta Luna. Unione Accademica Nazionale. Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi. Testi e Studi VI. Firenze. 1987, pp. 211 218. Thomas Wylton (1997), De infinitate vigoris Dei. In Jung-Palczewska (1997). C. Secondary Literature Brown, Stephen F. (1964), The Unity of the Concept of Being in Peter Aureoli's Scriptum and Commentarium. 2 vols. Institut Superieur de Philosophic. Universite Catholique de Louvain, 1964. Unpubl. Diss. Brown, Stephen F. (1965), "Avicenna and the Unity of the Concept of Being. The Interpretations of Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, Gerard of Bologna, and Peter Aureoli", Franciscan Studies, vol. 25, pp. 117—150. Brown, Stephen F. (1995), "Petrus Aureoli: De Unitate conceptus entis (Reportatio Parisiensis in 1 Sententiarum, dist. 2, p. 1, qq. 1-3 et p. 2, qq. 1-2)". Traditio, vol. 50. New York, pp. 199-248. Brown, Stephen F. (1998), "Chapter 15. Walter Burley, Peter Aureoli, and Gregory of Rimini". In Marenbon (1998), pp. 368-385. Buytaert, Eligius M. (1952), Introduction to Peter Auriol (1952). Cacciotti, Alvaro e Barbara Faes de Mottoni, eds. (1997), Editori di Quanacchi 100 anni dopo. Bilancio e prospettive. Medioevo, vol. 3. Roma. Courtenay, William J. (1987), Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England. Princeton. Dettloff, Werner (1963), Die Entwicklung der Akzeptations- und Verdienstlehre von Duns Scotus bis Luther. Mit besonderer Beriicksichtigung der Franziskanertheologen. Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters. Bd. 40. Minister.
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Dumont, Stephen (1998), "New Questions by Thomas Wylton", Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, vol. 9, pp. 341-381. Friedman, Russell L. (1997), 'In Principio erat Verbum': The Incorporation of Philosophical Psychology into Trinitarian Theology, 1250-1325. Unpubl. Diss. University of Iowa. Guimaraes, A. de (1938), "Herve Noel (f 1323). Etude biographique", Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, vol. 8, pp. 5—81. Henninger, Mark G. (1990), "Thomas Wylton's Theory of Relations", Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, vol. I, 2, pp. 456-490. Heynck, Valens (1969), "Die Kommentare des Petrus Aureoli zum dritten Sentenzenbuch", Franziskanische Studien, Bd. 51, pp. 1-77. Hodl, L. (1955), "Die Quodlibeta Minora des Hervaeus Natalis (| 1323)", Munchener theologische Zeitschrift, Bd. 6, pp. 215-229. Joannes a S. Antonio (1966), Bibliotheca Universa Franciscana. 3 vols. Madrid, 1732. Reprint. Farnborough. Jolivet, J., Z. Kaluza, and A. de Libera, eds. (1991), Lectionum varietates. Hommage a Paul Vignaux (1904-1987). Etudes de philosophic medievale, tome 65. Paris. Jung-Palczewska, Elzbieta (1997), "La question quodlibetique 'De infinitate vigoris Dei' de Thomas de Wylton", Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen Age, torn. 64, pp. 335-403. Jung-Palczewska, Elzbieta & Zdzislaw Kuksewicz (1997), "The Date of Wilton's Quodlibef', Studia Mediewistyczne, vol. 32, pp. 59—63. Kaluza, Zenon (1987), "La nature des ecrits de Jean de Ripa", Traditio, vol. 43, pp. 257-298. Maier, Anneliese (1947a), "Diskussionen iiber das aktuell Unendliche in der ersten Halfte des 14. Jahrhunderts", Divus Thomas, Serie III, Bd. 24, pp. 147-166 & pp. 317-337. Reprinted in Maier (1964), pp. 41-85. Maier, Anneliese (1947b), "Das Quodlibet des Thomas de Wylton", Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale, torn. 14, pp. 106-110. Reprinted in Maier (1964), pp. 87-92. Maier, Anneliese (1948), "Literarhistorische Notizen iiber P. Aureoli, Durandus und den 'Cancellarius' nach der Handschrift Ripoll 77bis in Barcelona", Gregorianum, vol. 29, pp. 213-251. Reprinted in Maier (1964), pp. 139-173. Maier, Anneliese (1949), "Wilhelm von Alnwicks bologneser Quastionen gegen den Averroismus (1323)", Gregorianum, vol. 30, pp. 265-308. Reprinted in Maier (1964), pp. 1-40. Maier, Anneliese (1958), "Zu einigen Sentenzenkommentaren des 14. Jahrhunderts", Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, vol. 51, pp. 369-409. Reprinted in Maier (1964), pp. 264-305. Maier, Anneliese (1964), Ausgehendes Mittelalter. Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Geistesgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts. Bd. 1. Storia e letteratura, vol. 97. Rome. Maieru, Alfonso (1991), "Logica e teologia trinitaria nel commento alle Sentence attribuito a Petrus Thomae". In Jolivet (1991), pp. 177-198. Marenbon, John, ed. (1998), Routledge History of Philosophy. Vol. Ill, Medieval Philosophy. London. Marmo, Costantino, ed. (1997), Vestigia, Imagines, Verba. Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (XII-XIV Century). Semiotics and Cognitive Studies, vol. IV. Turnhout. Michalski, Konstanty (1969), La philosophic au XIV siecle. Six etudes. Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Kurt Flasch. Frankfurt. Nielsen, Lauge O. (1996), "Dictates of Faith versus Dictates of Reason: Peter Auriol on Divine Power, Creation, and Human Rationality", Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, vol. 7, pp. 213-243. Nielsen, Lauge O. (1997a), "The Critical Edition of Peter Auriol's Scholastic Works". In A. Cacciotti & B. F. de Mottoni (1997), pp. 217-227.
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Nielsen, Lauge O. (1997b), "Signification, Likeness, and Causality. The Sacraments as Signs by Divine Imposition in John Duns Scotus, Durand of St. Pourcain, and Peter Auriol". In C. Marmo (1997), pp. 223-253. Nielsen, Lauge O. (1999), "The Intelligibility of Faith and the Nature of Theology— Peter Auriol's Theological Programme", Studio. Theologica, vol. 53, pp. 26—39. Nielsen, Lauge O. (2000), "The Debate between Peter Auriol and Thomas Wylton on Theology and Virtue", Vivarium, vol. 38, pp. 35-98. Pelster, F. (1930), "Estudios sobre la transmision de algunas obras de Pedro Aureoli O.F.M. (1322)", Estudios edesiasticos, vol. 9, pp. 462-479. Pelster, F. (1931), "Estudios sobre la transmision de algunas obras de Pedro Aureoli O.F.M. (1322)", Estudios eclesiasticos, vol. 10, pp. 449-474. Pelster, F. (1954), "Zur Uberlieferung des Quodlibet und anderer Schriften des Petrus Aureoli O.F.M." Franciscan Studies, vol. 14, pp. 392-411. Pelster, F. (1955), "Zur ersten Polemik gegen Aureoli: Raymundus Bequini O.P., und seine Quastionen und sein 'Correctorium Petri Aureoli', das Quodlibet des Jacobus de Apamiis O.E.S.A." Franciscan Studies, vol. 15, pp. 30-47. Schabel, Christopher (1994), The Quarrel with Aureol: Peter Aureol's Role in the LateMedieval Debate Over Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents, 1315-1475. Unpubl. diss. University of Iowa. Schabel, Christopher (1995), "Peter Aureol on Divine Knowledge and Future Contingents", Cahiers de I'Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin, torn. 65. Copenhague, pp. 63-212. Stegmiiller, Friedrich (1947), Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi. Bd. 1. Wlirzburg. Tachau, Katherine H. (1997), "The Preparation of a Critical Edition of Pierre Auriol's Sentences Lectures". In A. Cacciotti & B. F. de Mottoni (1997), pp. 205-216. Teetaert, A. (1935), "Pierre Auriol ou Oriol". Dictionnaire de theologie catholique, torn. XII,2. Paris, cols. 1810-1881. Valois, N. (1906), "Pierre Auriol, frere mineur". Histoire litteraire de la France, torn. 33, pp. 479-528.
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PARISIAN COMMENTARIES FROM PETER AURIOL TO GREGORY OF RIMINI, AND THE PROBLEM OF PREDESTINATION Chris Schabel*
With the further decline of written quodlibetal and disputed questions and of the independent theological treatise, the Sentences commentary became almost the sole genre of philosophical theology at the University of Paris between 1318 and 1344. Thus the history of the Sentences commentary at Paris in this period is a fairly clear reflection of the intellectual fortunes of the university's theology faculty itself, and fits in well with the currents in European intellectual history generally. After Peter Auriol completed his Paris lectures on the Sentences in 1318, Paris maintained its intellectual vitality and undisputed hegemony in theology for about a decade. Meanwhile, William of Ockham's Sentences lectures at Oxford in 1317—19 helped lay the foundations for the main English studium generated golden age of creativity and independence in theology in the late-1320s and 1330s. Parisian vigor in theology appears to have tailed off in these same years, only to reappear with renewed strength in the 1340s with Gregory of Rimini and others who absorbed many of the new Oxford developments. Unfortunately the historiographical tradition for this period at Paris is still immature. Despite a promising start in the works of such scholars as Pierre Duhem and Anneliese Maier,1 for the most part concentrating on science, much of the intellectual history of Paris in * I thank W. J. Courtenay, R. Friedman, E. Jung-Palczewska, L. Nielsen, B. Roest, and V. Syros. In what follows, AHDLMA = Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen Age. ' P. Duhem, Le Systeme du monde, 10 vols. (Paris, 1913-59). A. Maier has several works where Sentences commentaries figure prominently, in the five-volume Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spdtscholastik (latest editions Rome, 1952—68) and the threevolume Ausgehendes Mittelalter: gesammelte Aufsdtze zur Geistesgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts (Rome, 1964-77). Other important early studies include K. Michalski's collected works in La Philosophic au XIV' siecle: six etudes, ed. K. Flasch (Frankfurt, 1969), and H. Schwamm, Das gottliche Vorherwissen bei Duns Scotus und seinen ersten Anhdngern (Innsbruck, 1934).
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these years remains in the dark, with a few notable exceptions.2 Moreover, while historians have been looking closely at the purely scientific works of, for example, John Buridan and Nicole Oresme,3 until recently they have not continued the initiative of Duhem and Maier to use Sentences commentaries for scientific content, although John Murdoch has urged that, for this era especially, such texts are of crucial importance to the history of science.4 This is beginning to change, however. Recently scholars have used Sentences commentaries to investigate the Parisian debate over such topics as epistemology, the univocity of the concept of being, trinitarian theology, synchronic and diachronic contingency, divine foreknowledge, and cosmology. Moreover, our knowledge of who read and wrote on the Sentences and when, and what the procedure for choosing bachelors of the Sentences was, continues to increase, notably with the work of William Courtenay and Zenon Kaluza. Finally, the field has collectively undertaken the critical edition of all or parts of the Sentences commentaries of many theologians active at Paris between 1318 and 1344.5 Nevertheless the present discussion will necessarily be selective, because of the large amount of material to cover, and preliminary, because a comprehensive picture of the history of the Sentences commentaries in these decades will remain impossible until we have completed further historical investigations, critical editions, and doctrinal studies of individual problems over a period of years, without which groundwork one cannot gauge the originality or importance of any thinker. This chapter will divide the period in question into four unequal parts: first, the Franciscans in the period 1318 to 1333; sec-
2 For example, W. Dettloff, Die Entwicklung der Akzeptations- und Verdienstlehre von Duns Scotus bis Luther (Miinster, 1963). 3 One need only mention the Wisconsin series of critical editions and English translations of such works of Oresme's as De proportionibus proportionum and Ad pauca respicientes, ed. et trans. E. Grant (Madison, 1966), Tractatus de configurationibus qualitatum et motuum, ed. et trans. M. Clagett (Madison, 1968), Le livre du del et du monde, ed. A. Menut and A. Denomy, trans. Menut (Madison, 1968), and Tractatus de commensurabilitate vel incommensurabilitate motuum cell, ed. et trans. E. Grant (Madison, 1971). 4 J. Murdoch, 'From Social into Intellectual Factors: an Aspect of the Unitary Character of Late Medieval Learning', in idem and E. Sylla eds., The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning (Dordrecht, 1975), 271-348, esp. 274-280. 5 For studies of individual problems and critical editions, see notes below. For Courtenay's and Kaluza's works, see below and Z. Kaluza's chapter in volume II.
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ond, the non-Franciscans in those same years; third, the period between 1334 and 1343; and fourth, Gregory of Rimini. The most significant Sentences commentaries of these years were those of Peter Auriol and Gregory of Rimini, and they serve as landmarks, the background against which most other theologians at Paris developed their positions. In synthesizing and further articulating the critiques of his immediate predecessors on the ideas of, most notably, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, Peter Auriol effectively challenged many of the basic assumptions of the two most influential theologians from the decades before his activities as theologian. Gregory of Rimini was heir to both the Paris and Oxford traditions, which he synthesized, developed, and passed on to later thinkers. Lauge Nielsen treats Auriol's commentary elsewhere in this volume, and Pascale Bermon covers Rimini's. Continuing the doctrinal theme of Russell Friedman's contribution to this book, here I will consider all known Parisian commentaries of these decades with respect to the problem of predestination, since it involves a number of issues. Since the less significant theologians usually tended to adopt the positions of and even paraphrase the major commentaries, I hope that with this doctrinal discussion a picture of the ebb and flow of debates and influences may take shape. Auriol's main commentary on book one, the Scriptum, in fact precedes his Parisian lectures, but it was the various Parisian 'reportationes' of Auriol's lectures on books I-IV that made the biggest impact at Paris in the period before 1325. In both versions Auriol presented his new theory of predestination, which James Halverson has dubbed General Election (GE). As Friedman has stated in his chapter, the common views of predestination maintained that God is the sole cause of salvation, actively electing to save particular individuals purely out of mercy; there is no cause in those who are predestined. Since God's "elective purpose" is directed only to those who will be saved and not to those who will be damned, Halverson calls this Single Particular Election (SPE). In the case of the damned, the cause of their reprobation is in the sinners themselves, and so they are justly damned. Auriol considered this position inconsistent, and instead proposed that God, by His intrinsic, necessary, and immutable 'will of complacency', indifferently "wills all men to be saved," according to I Timothy 2.4. God, then, does not intrinsically and actively will that particular individuals be saved or damned. Rather, according
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to the General Election account, He sets up general rules regarding the criterion by which some will be saved, others damned: those with an 'obstacle to grace' (obex gratiae) will be damned, so that there is a positive cause of reprobation in the reprobate, as in SPE; but those without an obstacle will be saved, so that for Auriol's GE there is a privative, but not positive, cause of predestination in the predestined, contrary to SPE. It then occurs to God's intellect that Peter, for example, has no obstacle, and Judas does, and by His special and extrinsic 'will of operation' God actively confers grace and glory on Peter, but not on Judas, who is therefore damned.6 Peter Auriol is a truly pivotal figure. Friedman has shown above that in many ways Auriol's position, although new, is a culmination of trends in western theology from 1250 to 1316. His stance can also be seen as a starting point for a new debate, since on the subject of predestination, as in many other contexts, there was a strong reaction to Auriol at Paris, leading up to Gregory of Rimini's radical stance whereby God alone, ab aeterno, is the cause of each individual's predestination or reprobation (Double Particular Election, or DPE). We have many surviving Sentences commentaries from the period before 1333, and it is significant that most of these are Franciscan works, probably a reflection of the vitality of Franciscan theology at Paris in relation to that of the other orders. The fact that some of these commentaries defend more or less Scotistic positions or even fall into new 'schools of thought', and therefore could be considered somewhat conservative, suggests that we cannot rely solely on sheer numbers of extant works to evaluate the relative intellectual activity of individual orders. Moreover, no surviving commentary at all from these years can be assigned to any known Parisian secular theologian, who would have lacked the backing of a mendicant or monastic order. Thus non-intellectual factors may have played a role in bringing about the present situation. Outside the Friars Minor, the commentary of the Carmelite John Baconthorpe is still extant, as are those of the Augustinian Hermits Gerard of Siena and Michael of Massa and the Dominican Bernard Lombardi. Based on the num6 On SPE, Auriol, and GE, see especially J. Halverson, Peter Aureol on Predestination. A Challenge to Late Medieval Thought (Leiden, 1998), 1-10 and 76-108, who focuses on the Scriptum. Auriol's pertinent reportatio treatment is in e.g. d. 40, q. 1, of the Vat. Borghese 123 version.
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her of surviving manuscripts, which is in most cases the vast minority of those once extant, I will treat each of the most influential commentaries separately, first the Franciscans', then the rest.7
The Franciscan Response to Auriol in Paris, 1318-1333
Landulph Caracciolo, OFM
In the three academic years following Peter Auriol's lectures on the Sentences in Paris, while Auriol was still an active theologian at the university, the three Franciscan bachelors of the Sentences all responded to Auriol's challenging theories, soon attracted adherents of their own, and remained influential down to the end of the Middle Ages. It appears that after Auriol the Franciscans at Paris usually read the Sentences over a one-year period instead of two.8 The Franciscan Landulph Caracciolo, the Doctor Recollectus, probably lectured on the Sentences immediately after Auriol in the academic year 1318-19. Some are of the opinion, however, that Caracciolo read just after Francis of Marchia, in 1320—21 or in the following year. Since Francis Meyronnes was the Franciscan bachelor of the Sentences in 1320-21, and there was only one Franciscan at a time lecturing at Paris, 1321-22 is the more likely possibility. Perhaps a close comparison of Caracciolo's works with those of Marchia and Meyronnes can settle the question, although one can never be sure when or even where a Sentences commentary was begun or put into final written form. Still, the fact that Caracciolo incorporated sections of Hugh of Novocastro's pre-Auriol commentary into his own supports the earlier 1318-19 date.9
7 For a brief parallel discussion of Parisian commentaries between Auriol and Rimini, concentrating on future contingents and epistemology, see C. Schabel, 'Paris and Oxford between Aureoli and Rimini', in J. Marenbon, ed., Medieval Philosophy (The Routledge History of Philosophy III) (London, 1998), 386-401. Most of the observations in this chapter stem from my research for C. Schabel, Theology at Paris 1316-1345. Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents (Aldershot, 2000). 8 On this, see W. Courtenay, 'Programs of Study and Genres of Scholastic Theological Production in the Fourteenth Century', in J. Hamesse, ed., Manuels, programmes de cours et techniques d'enseignement dans les universites medievales (Louvain, 1994), 325-350, esp. 333-336. 9 For a discussion of the dates, see C. Schabel, 'Landulphus Caracciolo and a
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According to Stegmiiller and Doucet, there are twenty-five manuscripts containing at least one of the four books of Garacciolo's commentary.10 Book two was printed in Venice before 1500, in fact, and it has been the most used, notably recently in the works of Simo Knuuttila, who considers Caracciolo to have been a pivotal figure on the subject of change and instants of time and nature. Book one, for which the nicely corrected Wien, Osterreichische Nationbibliothek, Palatinus 1496 appears to be the best manuscript, has been the subject of investigations concerning grace, epistemology, and future contingents, where in each case Caracciolo responds to Auriol's position as presented in his Parisian reportatio represented by Borghese 123.11 As was his practice, Caracciolo attacked Auriol on the problem of predestination, which of course is closely connected to the issues of the divine will and foreknowledge, where Caracciolo opposed his senior Franciscan colleague vehemently. Caracciolo has a basically correct understanding of Auriol's doctrine of General Election (GE)
Sequax on Divine Foreknowledge', AHDLMA, 66 (1999), 299-343. S. Knuuttila and A. I. Lehtinen, 'Change and Contradiction: A Fourteenth-Century Controversy', Synthese, 40 (1979), 189-207, especially 196-197, support the earlier date, which A. Maier, Metaphysische Hintergriinde der spatscholastische Naturphilosophie (Rome, 1955), 127, had suggested as a possibility. V. Heynck, 'Der Skotist Hugo de Novo Castro, OFM', Franziskanische Studien, 43 (1961), 244-270, strongly supports the early date (252, 267), and mentions Caracciolo's borrowing from Hugh (263). As Heynck notes (248, 252-253), no matter how one looks at it, the 1295 statute of the Franciscan order's general chapter that every three years a friar from the French Province should be bachelor of the Sentences at Paris appears to have been ignored or bypassed, as allowed by the 1316 general chapter's statute. Thus the 1295 statute is not especially helpful in dating Franciscan Sentences commentaries. 10 To save space, references in this chapter will be to F. Stegmiiller, Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi (Wiirzburg, 1947) and to V. Doucet, Commentaires sur les Sentences (Florence, 1954), without page numbers, as they are arranged alphabetically. Much more work has been done since 1954, but I will note only that which makes a significant addition for our purposes. Landulphus' question on the immaculate conception was published by Scaramuzzi, 'L'immaculato concepimento di Maria. Questione inedita di Landolfo Caracciolo, O.F.M. (| 1351)', Studi Francescani, 28 (1931), 33-69. 11 For Knuuttila's opinion, see more recently his Modalities in Medieval Philosophy (London 1993), 160-162. On grace, see W. Dettloff, Die Entwicklung der Akzeptationsund Verdienstlehre, 192-196 (193—94 for Auriol's Borghese reportatio}. On epistemology, K. H. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics 1250-1345 (Leiden, 1988), 320-322 (on Auriol's reportatio, 322, n. 19). On future contingents and Auriol's reportatio, see Schabel, 'Landulphus Caracciolo and a Sequax', which determines the superiority of Wien, ONB 1496 and includes a critical edition of Caracciolo's / Sent., dd. 38-40, based on the six known extant MSS. H. Schwamm, Das gb'ttliche Vorherwissen, 276—289, treats Caracciolo on future contingents with respect to his Scotism.
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as presented in the latter's Borghese reportatio.12 In the context of future contingents, Caracciolo had decisively rejected Auriol's distinction between God's wills of complacency and operation, and also God's indifference, and Caracciolo here reiterates his arguments in summary form.13 Caracciolo gives what might be the first reaction to Auriol's doctrine of predestination. He claims that this obex gratiae must be original or actual sin. Since all people have original sin, and children dying before baptism have no actual sin, this obstacle can be neither of those. Moreover, if the lack of such an obex really is a privation, then it is nothing at all, and hence no cause. In any case, not presenting the obstacle appears to be meritorious and thus a positive cause, which is erroneous.14 Auriol's own rejection of previous positions may have driven Caracciolo into a corner, however. His position at first seems dangerously Pelagian when he claims that when people are actually saved and damned, there is a positive cause: those who are saved are saved because of merits, if they are adults, or because of Christ's passion, if they are children; if they are damned, adults are damned on account of actual sins, children because of original sin.15 This would be a misinterpretation, however. Caracciolo's position turns out to be traditional: God is the sole cause of predestination, and we are the sole cause of reprobation. After stating Scotus's maxim that one 12 Landulphus Caracciolo, In primum Sententiarum, d. 41, a. 1 (ed. C. Schabel, 'Landulph Caracciolo and Gerard Odonis on Predestination: Opposite Approaches to Scotus and Auriol', Franziskanische Studien z.u Theologie, Philosophic und Geschichte 65 (2002) forthcoming). In Borghese 123 Auriol had presented an instants of nature, or 'signs', account. 13 For Caracciolo's attack on Auriol on foreknowledge and the will, see Schabel, 'Landulphus Caracciolo and a Sequax', and idem, Theology at Paris 1316-1345, 138-147. His reiteration of some of his points is in I Sent., d. 41, a. 2 (ed. Schabel). 14 Caracciolo, / Sent., d. 41, a. 1 (ed. Schabel): "Aut iste obex in dampnandis est mere peccatum originale, aut peccatum actuale. Si primo modo, cum omnes homines preter Christum habuerint originale, omnes erunt presciti. Si secundo modo, cum parvuli ante baptismum morientes non ponant obicem peccati actualis, quia non habent usum liberi arbitrii, igitur non dampnarentur, quod est falsum . . . Preterea, si non-ponere obicem est causa predestinationis, aut ut est mere privatio—et sic non, quia sic est nihil; aut ut implicat aliquam bonitatem in substrato, et hec erit causa positiva. Preterea, non-ponere obicem grade est aliquod meritorium . . ." 15 Caracciolo, / Sent., d. 41, a. 1 (ed. Schabel): "Tertia propositio, quod in executione, quando Deus de facto premiat bonos et dampnat malos, causa est positiva in utrisque. Probatio: boni qui salvantur aut sunt adulti—et isti certum est quod recipiunt premium pro meritis, aut sunt parvuli—et istis acquirit premium passio Christi benedicta; sed qui damnantur, si sunt adulti, habent demerita, pyeccata moralia actualia; si parvuli, peccata originalia."
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wills the ends before the means, Caracciolo puts his Scotist position in terms of 'instants of nature', as Auriol had for his own stance in his reportatio. Because God's eternity does not consist of different instants of time, later medieval scholastics often turned to instants of nature as a way of explaining a logical ordering of events where no temporal sequence was admissible: In the first [instant] Peter and Judas are offered as indifferent to the divine intellect, because the divine will has determined nothing for them. In the second instant God determines that He will give grace and glory to Peter, but nothing to Judas. In the third [instant] Peter dies a good man and with merits, but Judas dies a sinner. In the fourth the one is predestined, the other reprobated. Nor does God do harm in not giving grace to Judas as He did Peter, because He is not obliged to anyone, but rather what He gives He freely and gratuitously grants.16 Although further research is required, studies done thus far suggest that Caracciolo's genius and significance are primarily in his arguments against Auriol, and not in the development of his own opinions, where he usually falls back on Scotus. Still, his attacks themselves are important. At the end of the fifteenth century Giorgio Benigno Salviati would cite Caracciolo frequently in the context of prophecy,17 and Caracciolo found a more immediate follower in this in the anonymous Franciscan author of a Sentences commentary on book one found in Wien ONB 1439, who probably lectured at Paris around 1324. This author cites Caracciolo twenty-one times, more than all other university scholars except Auriol (103 citations), Scotus (89), and Henry of Ghent (45); fifteen of those twenty-one citations explicitly refer to Caracciolo's arguments against Auriol. Moreover, on some issues the author's debt to Caracciolo is silent. In predestination, however, the author concludes his discussion by arguing that Auriol's obex gratiae solution is the same as Scotus's!18 Significantly, 16
Caracciolo, I Sent., d. 41, a. 1 (ed. Schabel): "Quinta propositio: oportet ymaginari 4 instantia ad evidentiam predictorum. In primo offertur intellectui divino Petrus et ludas indifferentes, quia voluntas divina nihil eis determinavit. In secundo instanti Deus determinat dare gratiam Petro et gloriam, lude autem nihil. In tertio occidit Petrus bonus et cum meritis, ludas autem peccator. In quarto unus predestinatur, alter reprobatur. Nee facit Deus iniuriam non dando gratiam lude sicut Petro, quia nemini tenetur, sed quod dat libere et gratiose donat." 17 See C. Vasoli, "Giorgio Benigno Salviati (Dragisic)," in M. Reeves, ed., Prophetic Rome in the High Renaissance Period (Oxford, 1992), 121-156, 122. 18 See Anon., I Sent., d. 41 (Wien, ONB 1439, f. 48ra): "Responsio: Sed ilia posi-
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we might infer on the basis of this author that Garacciolo did in fact lecture just after Auriol and before Francis of Marchia, since in one instance, immediately following Landulphus, the marginalia say contra arguit Franciscus de Marchia.^ Thus if Caracciolo did lecture just after Auriol, then his criticisms may have allowed his successors, such as Francis of Marchia, to be more creative. Francis of Marchia, OFM The Sentences commentary of the Doctor Succinctus, Francis of Marchia, may be the most important Parisian work of the kind from the period between Auriol and Rimini. Marchia lectured at Paris in 1319-20, but there are two versions of books one and two, and book four, at least, is a reportatio taken down by William of Rubio in 1323. Moreover, after 1324 Marchia was lector at the Franciscan studium in Avignon. The main versions of books one and two were probably also put into final form a couple years after Marchia's Paris lectures, although because of the existence of earlier redactions the citations of his Franciscan successors are not that helpful in dating or locating these final versions. His commentary was never printed, but Stegmiiller and Doucet report that about twenty-five MSS preserve at least one of the four books, and each book is very well represented. For example, the most popular version of book one, called a Scrip turn in one manuscript, survives in thirteen complete witnesses.20 About one fourth
tio realissime concordat cum positione Doctoris (i.e. Scotus), quia Doctor vult quod ex parte dampnati sit causa positiva, ut previsus obex, sed vult quod ex parte predestinati nulla sit causa positiva, sed quasi negativa possit esse." 19 For this commentary, on the first fifty folios of the MS, see R. Friedman and C. Schabel, 'The Vitality of Franciscan Theology at Paris in the 1320's: MS Wien, Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek, Palatinus 1439', AHDLMA, 63 (1996), 357-372. For a critical edition of the author's question on future contingents, see Schabel, 'Landulphus Caracciolo and a Sequax', 339-343. 20 The other is a reportatio from 1320. Vat. Lat. 943 contains the 'minor' version of book two. R. Friedman, '/« principio erat Verbum: The Incorporation of Philosophical Psychology into Trinitarian Theology, 1250—1325' (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Iowa, 1997), 573-591, provides (555-572) a preliminary edition of the Scriptum, d. 27, based on three MSS. Friedman includes long excerpts from d. 11 in 'Francis of Marchia and John Duns Scotus on the Psychological Model of the Trinity', Picenum Seraphicum, 18 (n.s.) (1999), 11-56. In the same volume, 57-95, and in volume 19 (2000), 3-55, see C. Schabel, 'II Determinismo di Francesco di Marchia', for a critical edition of the Scriptum dd. 35, 36, and 38, based on all known MSS, together with a probable stemma. Friedman and I, who are editing the Scriptum,
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of this version of book one has recently been published based on the best—although still imperfect and often incomplete—single manuscript: Vatican Chigi. lat. B VII 113.21 Although Marchia is often wrongly labeled a Scotist, something which may limit his appeal for further scholarship, in truth he shows remarkable creativity and independence of thought on a number of issues. Between 1328 and 1341 he was at odds with the church on the issue of apostolic poverty and as a follower of Michael of Cesena he had to take refuge with the Emperor Louis of Bavaria. This may explain why there are relatively few explicit citations of Marchia's work after 1328, because there is ample evidence that his influence was widespread and enduring, reaching his Franciscan contemporaries in Oxford, his Parisian colleagues and successors even outside his order, including Gregory of Rimini, and thinkers down to the end of the Middle Ages. Marchia is in fact well known already as a natural philosopher, based on his commentaries on books two and four of the Sentences, parts of which have been edited.22 In particular, historians have attributed an interesting theory of the cause of motion, especially of projectiles, to Marchia. This is the 'impetus' theory, in which Marchia appears to have helped initiate the fascinating discussions of motion to be found in the works of his famous Parisian successors John Buridan, Nicole Oresme, and Albert of Saxony. It is also significant will publish shortly a description of the versions of all four books and of the manuscripts in which they are contained, along with complete question lists, in 'Francis of Marchia's Commentaries on the Sentences'1, Mediaeval Studies 63 (2001). The Scnptum in book one ends with d. 40, but the Reportatio continues to the end, although in two redactions in this section of the book, one represented by a single witness and the other by two. 21 That is, 18 questions from book one and two questions from the main version of book two, also using Chigi. lat. B VII 113, supplemented with Vat. lat. 1096, in Francisci de Marchia sive de Esculo OFM Quodlibet cum quaestionibus selectis ex Commentario in Librum (sic) Sententiarum. ed. N. Mariani (Grottaferrata, 1997). The questions include nos. 1, 2, 14-16, 18, 20, 22a, 23, 24, 27, 28, 42-46, and 50 from Friedman's qq. list noted above, and qq. 3 and 25 of book two. 22 N. Schneider, Die Kosmohgie des Franciscus de Marchia: Texte, Quellen, und Untersuchungen zur Naturphilosophie des 14. Jahrhunderts (Leiden, 1991), besides the study, a good discussion of Marchia's life and influence, and a survey of the previous secondary literature, also has a critical edition of Marchia's book two, qq. 29~32 (and a small part of the question Maier edited; see note below) based on seven of the fifteen extant MSS, and includes a stemma. Recently, P. J. J. M. Bakker, La raison et le miracle. Les doctrines eucharistiques (c. 1250-c. 1400), vol. I (Nijmegen, 1999), 86-94 and 399-408, has provided copious passages from book four, d. 9, q. 1, and dd. 12-13, q. 1, from Paris, BN lat. 15852.
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to note that Marchia's works predate most of the provocative theoretical developments at Oxford in the 1320s and 30s.23 It is not only in these books that Marchia shows his attraction to natural philosophy. In book one he often emphasizes the natural laws of causation, and since book one deals mostly with God and His relationship with humans, Marchia takes this opportunity time and again to analyze the process of divine and human willing, along the lines of psychology. One need only point to Marchia's treatment of future contingents as an example, where Marchia claims that God can know future contingents through its contingent causes, i.e. the determinations of the human will de inesse, as they actually are in reality, the only real source, besides God Himself, of contingency in the world in its indetermination de possibili., i.e. with respect to what can be.24 A final general remark one might make is that, like Caracciolo, Marchia is very often concerned with Peter Auriol, usually in order to attack him. Also like Caracciolo, Marchia does not respond to Auriol's Scrip turn, but to a reportatio version of book one, in this case to that contained in fragmentary form in Vat. lat. 6768 and, for the last distinctions, in the Berlin (Staatsbibl., Theol. Fol. 536) and Padua (Antoniana 292 scaff. xiii) manuscripts, but perhaps also to the version represented by Borghese 123. We can see many of Marchia's interests and sources in his discussion of the cause of predestination. Marchia's treatment generally, and attack on Auriol and presentation of his own view in particular, are much more developed than Caracciolo's. In distinction 40 of the Scriptum, the last distinction of that version of his commentary, Marchia brings up and rejects two older views, then turns to Auriol and finally to Scotus, which is often Marchia's practice.
23
A. Maier, Zwei Grundprobleme der Scholastischen Naturphilosophie (Rome, 19683), 166—180, provides a transcription of most of the first question of book four, based on Vat. Chigi. lat. B VII 113, with corrections from Vat. lat. 943. 75% of this section (although including 20 lines elided in Maier) has been recently reedited, based on Chigi B VII 113, in Francisci de Marchia sive de Esculo OFM Sententia et compilatio super libros Physicorum Aristotelis, ed. N. Mariani (Grottaferrata, 1998), 66-77. For commentary on this question, concerning Marchia's impetus theory, see Maier, ibid., 180-200, and M. Clagett, The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages (Madison, 1959), 505-531, which contains (526-530) a partial English translation. 24 For his future contingents discussion, see Schabel, 'II Determinismo', and idem, Theology at Paris 1316-1345, 189-210.
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Marchia's presentation of Auriol's view appears to follow the Berlin/ Padua version of Auriol's reportatio more closely than Borghese. Thus Marchia relates Auriol's use of the sun's rays to describe general election, reaching everywhere unless an obstacle is placed in the way, and Auriol's preference in that version of the term resistentia gratiae over obex gratiae. Finally, Marchia describes Auriol's position in terms of syllogisms without Borghese's instants of nature: So it is said that there are two syllogisms. One syllogism is that God proposes to give grace to anyone who does not resist; but Peter did not resist; so He elected Peter. The other syllogism is on the part of the evil people, that God ordains punishment for whoever resists; but Judas resisted; so He damned him.25
Of course Marchia rejects Auriol's position, not perhaps without being influenced by it. He gives many of the usual Scriptural passages, before giving his reasoned arguments, all based on the Scotistic primacy of the divine will. For example, the determination of the divine will, the first cause, is prior to the determinations of human wills, second causes, and because both concur in acts of the human will, no resistance or non-resistance can be determined first in the human will.26 Thus Marchia's rejection of Auriol's stance does not involve a reliance on the destructive arguments of Caracciolo as much as a preference for his own position, which is part of his general system. This system is somewhat Scotistic in its divine voluntarism, but it is not Scotus's own. Hence Marchia goes on to present
25 Marchia's description of Auriol's position covers about seventy-five lines of Franciscus de Marchia, Scriptum in primum Sententiarum, d. 40 (ed. C. Schabel, 'La dottrina sulla predestinazione di Francesco di Marchia', Picenum Seraphicum 20 n.s. [2001], forthcoming): "Unde dicitur quod sunt ibi duo sillogismi: unus sillogismus est quod Deus proponit dare gratiam cuilibet non resistenti; sed Petrus non resistit; ergo Petrum elegit. Alius sillogismus est ex parte malorum quod Deus ordinal ad penam quemcumque resistentem; sed ludas resistit; ideo ipsum dampnavit." 26 Marchia, Scriptum I, d. 40 (ed. Schabel): "Item, ista opinio non videtur rationalis, quia quando ad unum effectum concurrunt prima causa et causa secunda, determinatio cause secunde non est prior determinatione cause prime, sed magis posterior; sed voluntas divina et voluntas creata concurrunt ad quemcumque actum voluntatis create; ergo nullus actus voluntatis create est prius determinatus in voluntate creata quam in voluntate divina. Sed si Deus eligeret aliquem propter nonresistentiam et alium non respueret propter resistentiam, tune ilia resistentia et non-resistentia prius esset determinata in voluntate creata quam in voluntate divina, quia si prius esset determinata in voluntate divina quam in voluntate creata, tune resistentia et non-resistentia prius veniret ex voluntate divina quam ex voluntate humana."
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and refute the Subtle Doctor's stance on predestination. Basically, perhaps because of Auriol's critique of Scotus, which Marchia must take into account, Marchia thinks Scotus has spoken a little loosely about the divine will's role in predestination. Moreover, Marchia maintains that when God first wills beatitude for the elect, He would not avoid willing it for the non-elect without there being something 'repugnant' in the non-elect. Otherwise God would be a deceiver in requiring certain behavior of all men. So Marchia begins his own determination by following Aristotle's discussion of voluntary, involuntary, and non-voluntary in book three of the Ethics.27 There are three senses of 'voluntary', which is the division under which God's predestination comes. First, there is voluntary mixed with involuntary, as when I wish to eat a piece of cake for the taste but I also nill it, or wish the opposite, i.e. not to eat it, because of the fat content. Then there is voluntary mixed with non-voluntary, as when I wish to eat the cake but I am not inclined to go to the kitchen, open the fridge, clean the plate, etc., even though I could. Finally there is pure voluntary, as when I just grab the cake and eat it, with no feelings of laziness or repulsion. Marchia gives Scriptural examples of God's willing in each of these ways, then applies the three-fold division to predestination. Auriol is right that ab aeterno "God willed all men to be saved," as it says in I Timothy 2.4. This was not mixed with involuntary, because God had not yet foreseen sins in men that He would nill.28 It was, however, mixed with non-voluntary, because "He could have removed all impediments to beatitude, but did not." By this will all men become sufficiently able to act well, that is they can act well de possibili. In order to act well de inesse, that is to really act well in reality, however, it is required that God will it by a completely unmixed volition: 27
For Marchia's solution, see Marchia, Scriptum I, d. 40 (ed. Schabel). Marchia, Scriptum I, d. 40 (ed. Schabel): "Dico quod Deus ab eterno prius quodam ordine ex parte obiecti, non ex parte Dei, voluit omnes homines creandos indifferenter sine aliqua distinctione salvos fieri, secundum illud Apostoli, prima Timotheum secundo, 'Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri et ad agnitionem veritatis venire,' antequam previderet in eis gratiam nee culpam, bonum usum nee malum liberi arbitrii, quia omnes per se ordinal ad beatitudinem, cum omnibus indiderit naturalem inclinationem ad ipsam; naturalis autem inclinatio est quidam ordo ad beatitudinem; igitur omne per se ordinal ad ipsam. Ista autem volitio non fuit permixta cum aliquo involuntario, quia nondum previderat aliquid repugnans in eis propter quod deberet habere actum positivum contrarium circa eos." 28
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And so, although God by a voluntary mixed with non-voluntary volition assists everyone generally to be able to act well, by which general assistance everyone is sufficiently able to act well de possibili, nevertheless He does not assist everyone with the special assistance by which they go forth de inesse in reality. Rather this assistance assists only the elect in the end. And in this case election comes from pure mercy, because the fact that He assists some de inesse and not the others does not come from their part but from God's gratuitous goodness. Nor is He unjust because of this, because He assists all with the general assistance by which they are able to act well de possibili. And so, that they do not act well is not from God's part, but from theirs, because from God they have it that they are able to act well. And in this the 'called' and the 'elect' are distinguished, because the elect and non-elect have enough ability that they could come to the supper (ad cenam) de possibili, but the elect also have it that they do come by coassistance to do what is good.29
Thus we see the emphasis on cause and the psychology of willing, the use of the de possibili/de inesse distinction, and Marchia's general creativity in his treatment of predestination. What should we make of his position? In a sense the solution has elements of the three main types of election, the traditional Single Particular Election (SPE), Auriol's General Election (GE), and Gregory of Rimini's Double Particular Election (DPE). It is like SPE in that God's mercy is the cause of predestination, but the reprobate can be considered the
29
Marchia, Scriptum I, d. 40 (ed. Schabel): "Sed voluit medio modo, scilicet voluntano permixto cum non-voluntario, quia cum potuerit removere omne impedimentuni beatitudinis, non removit. Et ex isto voluntario permixto cum non-voluntario, voluit etiam consequenter omnibus indifferenter gratiam et omnia disponentia ad gloriam. Et propter istud voluntarium permixtum omnes indifferenter fuerunt sufficientes ad posse bene agere, ita quod ex isto voluntario fuerunt positi in sufficient! dispositione ut possent exire in actum bonum de possibili. Sed non habuerunt ex isto voluntario precise quod exirent in actum bonum inesse. Sed ad hoc quod exirent in actum bonum de inesse supervenit voluntarium simpliciter impermixtum quo Deus voluit solum electos salvos fieri et eos in actum bonum finaliter exire. Et ita licet Deus omnibus generaliter ex voluntario permixto cum non-voluntario assistat ad posse bene agere, qua assistentia generali quilibet potest sufficienter bene agere de possibili, non tamen omnibus assistit assistentia speciali qua de inesse exeant in actum, sed ista assistentia assistit solum electis finaliter. Et in hoc electio est pure misericordie, quia quod istis assistat de inesse et non illis non venit ex parte istorum, sed ex gratuita Dei bonitate. Nec tamen ex hoc est iniustus, quia omnibus assistit generali assistentia qua possunt bene agere de possibili. Et ideo quod non bene agant non est ex parte Dei, sed ex parte ipsorum, quia ex parte Dei habent unde possunt bene agere. Et in hoc distinguuntur vocati et electi, quia electi et non-electi habuerunt sufficienter unde possent venire ad cenam de possibili, sed electi ultra habuerunt quod venirent per coassistentiam ad operandum bonum."
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cause of their own reprobation in that de inesse they sin. As in GE, however, God indifferently wills to help everyone to have the ability to do good and be saved de possibili, and Marchia even speaks of God's non-voluntary attitude toward removing the impedimentum to beatitude, like AurioPs obex or resistentia. Finally, the scheme is similar to DPE in which God is the cause of both salvation and damnation, because clearly God's will is the first cause of everything, and God decides whom He will assist to act well de inesse before any willing or foreseen willing on our part. Without this assistance, we will not actually act well de inesse, and we will be damned. Probably because of his creativity, Marchia developed a considerable following on certain issues, such as divine foreknowledge and future contingents. In Paris his fellow Franciscan William of Rubio, who was a student of Marchia's and his rapporteur in 1323, adopted his senior colleague's stance, with interesting modifications. Rubio's Sentences commentary on all four books does not survive in any known manuscripts, but fortunately it was printed in Paris in 1518. Although Rubio could have lectured any time between 1323 and 1332, something closer to the latter date is most likely: the written commentary is described as novum by a Franciscan commission that examined the work in May 1333, and Rubio replies to the Scriptum when he attacks Auriol.30 More research should shed light on his dates and connection with Marchia. This is also the case for Aufredo Gonteri Brito, OFM, who lectured at Barcelona in 1322 and then at Paris in 1325. His commentary on the first three books survives, in two witnesses for books one and two and one manuscript for book three. Gonteri read secundum Henry of Harclay on books one and probably two, since he literally absorbed almost the whole of Harclay's commentary into his own. Gonteri makes significant additions to Harclay, however, including many new questions. In his own material he often attacks Auriol in the latter's reportatio, and apparently Marchia to a lesser extent. In the context of future contingents and predestination, however, Gonteri, in his additions to Harclay's questions, follows Marchia in attacking Auriol
30
For the commission, set up by Gerard Odonis, see fol. i of the Paris edition. Dettloff, Die Entwicklung der Akzeptations- und Verdienstlehre, 196—200, touches on Rubio's doctrine of grace and declares his reliance on the Scriptum (p. 197). For future contingents, see Schwamm, Das gottliche Vorherwissen, 255-275, and Schabel, Theology at Paris 1316-1345, 210-214. For more on Rubio, see below n. 90.
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and in developing his 'own' position, although he does defend Scotus against Marchia's critique.31 Moreover, Gonteri's three 'new' questions on future contingents are actually paraphrases of those of Hugh of Novocastro, who lectured before Auriol and Marchia.32 Lecturing in 1330—31, the Franciscan William of Brienne has left us a brief reportatio on all four books that survives in only one MS, Prague, Universitni knihovna VIII. F 14, in which he also reveals Marchia's impact and appears to react to one of Auriol's reportationes, directly or only via Marchia. In his very short question for dd. 38—41 of book one, Brienne adopts Marchia's de inesse/de possibili scheme, although in relation to future contingents only, since he has no predestination discussion.33 The Augustinian Michael of Massa, treated below, also adopted Marchia's position on future contingents, although his questions on predestination do not survive, if they ever existed. Either directly or via Massa, Gregory of Rimini came to learn of Marchia's ideas at 31 In C. Schabel, 'Aufredo Gonteri Brito secundum Henry of Harclay on Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents', Disputatio, 2 (1997), 159—195, I discuss Gonteri and Marchia and present a composite critical edition of Harclay's / Sent., dd. 38—39 and Gonteri's additions, using Gonteri's MSS as well (Vat. lat. 1113 and Wroclaw, Bibl. Uniw. A 211 [formerly I.F. 184], which also contains book two; Pamplona, Catedral 5, preserves books II-III). Without noting the Auriol connection, M. Schmaus, 'Uno sconosciuto discepolo di Scoto. Intorno alia prescienza di Dio', Riv. Filos. Neoscol., 24 (1932), 327-355, edited Gonteri's book I, d. 41, q. 1, on predestination, from Vat. lat. 1113, and also transcribed parts of the questions I later edited. H. Schwamm, Das gottliche Vorherwissen, 187-206, analyzed Gonteri's stance in these and his additional questions in Vat. lat. 1113, although Schwamm and Schmaus were unaware of Gonteri's and Harclay's identities. Other studies of Gonteri's commentary, which also conclude that he was refuting, directly or indirectly, Auriol's reportatio, include Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 317-318 and 322-327, and Detdoff, Die Entwicklung der Akzeptations- und Verdienstlehre, 180-185. Detdoff follows V. Doucet, 'Der unbekannte Skotist des Vaticanus lat. 1113, Fr. Anfredus Gonteri O.F.M. (1325)', Franziskanische Studien, 25 (1938), 201-240, in naming Marchia (along with Auriol) as a major opponent (202). Doucet's article includes an edition of Gonteri's book I, d. 34, q. 3. An edition of Gonteri's book III, d. 3, is in J. Alfaro, 'La Immaculada Concepcion en los escritos de un discipolo de Duns Escoto, Aufredo Gontier', Gregorianum, 36 (1955), 590-617. 32 On Harclay and Hugh, see R. Friedman's chapter in this volume. An edition of Hugh's questions on future contingents together with Gonteri's paraphrases is forthcoming in R. Friedman and C. Schabel, 'Hugh of Novocastro's Questions on Divine Foreknowledge and Predestination'. Since more than one redaction of Hugh's commentary survives for other books, could Gonteri's paraphrases actually be a lost version of Hugh's book one? 33 Cf. Schabel, 'II Determinismo', n. 3. Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 333-334, treats Brienne in brief on intuitive and abstractive cognition, and concludes that he probably did not use Auriol's Scriptum.
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least on future contingents, and through Gregory much of the later Middle Ages. That is not to say that later thinkers did not read Marchia himself, because Fernando of Cordova borrowed directly from Marchia as late as 1470, without any attribution.34 Until more of Marchia's work is edited, however, we will not know the extent of his impact on later figures, who often did not cite their sources. Francis Meyronnes, OFM
The Prince of the Scotists, Francis Meyronnes, was well known in the later Middle Ages for a variety of writings, and also for disputations with his Benedictine socius of the 1320-21 academic year Pierre Roger, later Pope Clement VI.35 Not surprisingly, Meyronnes has left us one of the most popular Sentences commentaries of the period. The main version, the so-called Corrflatus, was printed several times in the Early Modern period, and Minerva in Frankfurt reprinted the Venice 1520 edition in 1966. Moreover, according to Stegmiiller and Doucet, the Conflatus survives in over one hundred manuscripts containing at least one book, book one being by far the most popular, and other versions are extant in a couple of dozen other MSS. This does not necessarily mean that Meyronnes's commentary is particularly innovative, however. In fact it may have been so popular because of its conservativism and Meyronnes's reputation from other treatises. Like most of his contemporaries, he opposed Auriol on various issues, and he was basically a Scotist in his commentary; in the fifteenth century a particular Meyronnist branch and school of Scotism was attributed to him, and his refutation of Auriol's stance on future contingents, for example, was remembered. This gives the impression, however, that he was not completely dependent on the Subtle Doctor for answers, and instead developed Scotus's theories, a hypothesis that appears to have been borne out by some recent studies.36 34
Cf. Schabel, Theology at Pans 1316-1345, 325-327. See J. Barbet, ed., Francois de Meyronnes—Pierre Roger: Disputatio (1320-1321) (Paris, 1961). We may yet find and identify Roger's commentary, or parts of it, with certainty. For a discussion of Meyronnes's commentaries and question lists from the unprinted versions, see H. Rossmann, 'Die Sentenzenkommentare des Franz von Meyronnes OFM', Franziskanische Studien, 53 (1971), 129-227. 36 E.g. Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 327-332, on epistemology, and Schabel, Theology at Paris 1316-1345, 149-155, on future contingents, where he attacks Auriol and defends Scotus (see ibidem, 327 and 330-331, for the reception of his treatment by Fernando of Cordova, Francesco della Rovere, and Cardinal Bessarion). Schwamm, 35
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In the context of predestination, Halverson concludes that Meyronnes is content to repeat the purely Scotistic account of SPE, including both the idea that in willing one wills the ends before the means, and also Scotus's instants of nature scheme for predestination. In fact, Meyronnes does not treat Auriol's position at all,37 which is further evidence for Caracciolo's lecturing before Meyronnes and Marchia. In this light, Meyronnes may not have seen any need to re-refute Auriol after his two senior Franciscan colleagues had just done it and so well. Indeed, with future contingents, Meyronnes aims with some brevity at the points that Marchia and Caracciolo had attacked in great depth. Among the imitators drawn by Meyronnes's clear exposition and defense of Scotus's opinions was the Franciscan Himbert of Garda, who probably lectured on the Sentences somewhere on the continent, perhaps in Italy, but probably not in Paris, although he had been a student of theology at Paris before 1320. Himbert's Reportatio on books I—III survives in Vat. lat. 1091, but he is almost certainly to be identified with the author of the commentary on book one in MS 1584 of the Jagiellonska library in Krakow, whose incipit matches a different redaction of Himbert's book one found in MS 23 of the municipal library of Chambery.38 In the Chambery-Krakow version,
Das gottliche Vorherwissen, 151—167, treats Meyronnes with respect to Scotus on future contingents, and M. Rossini, 'Scientia Dei conditionata: Francesco di Meyronnes e i futuri contingenti', Medioevo, 19 (1993), 287-322, looks afresh at Meyronnes's views, with reference to the stances of Peter of Navarre (see below) and Alexander of Alexandria. On Alexander, see R. Friedman's chapter in this volume. 37 J. Halverson, 'Peter Aureol and the Re-Emergence of Predestinarian Pluralism in Latin Theology, 1317-1344 (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Iowa, 1993), 211-213. 38 Books I and III are called reportationes in Vat. lat. 1091 (ff. 73v, 182r). Himbert refers to the time he "was in Paris," with Master Guido Terrena, the Carmelite, who left before 1320 (7r; cf. S. Dumont, 'New Questions by Thomas Wylton', Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 9 [1998], 341-379, 341, n. 2). Although he follows Meyronnes, he gives new examples in the predestination section that make it seem more likely that he was somewhere in the Empire than in, e.g., England. Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 318, n. 11, quotes a passage from Krakow 1584 (ff. 42vb-43ra), and it is found essentially verbatim in Vat. lat. 1091 (16v) but slightly rearranged. Krakow 1584 and Vat. lat. 1091 closely match in the context of predestination and, besides the prologue, the question lists (Krakow, ff. 106vb-108ra; Vatican, ff. 74r-75r) are also virtually identical, except that Krakow's d. 48, which ends book I, is placed between dd. 29-30 and dd. 31-32 in the Vatican MS, thus causing the explicits to differ, although the end of d. 47 is the same in both MSS. Moreover, their prologues, and hence incipits, also differ: Vat. lat. 1091 has five questions, and only the brief q. 2 (lOr-llr) and q. 5 (16r-) are
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Himbert follows Meyronnes, Aquinas is simply "Thomas," and Auriol is "magister" and presumably still alive, so perhaps it dates to 1321—22. It seems that Himbert soon began reworking the first two questions of the prologue into one large question, which has its own explicit, giving the appearance of a separate treatise. Indeed it is contained by itself in two other MSS, and in the Vatican MS it replaced the first two questions of the Chambery-Krakow version. Since Auriol is still "magister" (6v), perhaps it also predates his death. Himbert then changed two of the next three questions, and rewrote the rest of the commentary with minor alterations: Aquinas is now sometimes "Sanctus Thomas," but often the simple "Thomas" is left as it was. The proof that Himbert was studying theology in Paris before 1320 is contained in the new prologue, so it does not rule out the possibility that he lectured on the Sentences at Paris in 1321-22, as witnessed by Chambery-Krakow.39 Himbert's treatment of predestination in distinctions 37-38 paraphrases Meyronnes's distinctions 40—41, specifically question three, although he is a little clearer than Meyronnes about the severity of the problem: "Why did God create my soul after He knew that I would die in mortal sin and be damned in the end?" Meyronnes admits that it all boils down to the inscrutable will of God, but Himbert is more blunt, repeatedly stating that it is "Because He willed it," "Because He likes it," and "He willed it because it pleased Him." In other words, "Just because." Although Himbert still holds to a vague notion that sin is involved in reprobation, he is closer than most defenders of SPE to the double-predestinarian stance we shall find in Rimini.40 As we have seen, predestinarian views multiply after Auriol.
contained in Krakow, matching its q. 3 (40rb-41ra) and q. 5 (42rb—). Stegmuller, Repertorium I, 169-170, gives incipits, explicits, and questions from the Vatican manuscript, but notes that Vat. lat. 1091's large question one (lr—l0r) is contained by itself in two fragments (Assisi 659 and Paris BN 1010). He also gives the differing incipit of Chambery, Bibliotheque de la Ville 23. 39 For more details, see Schabel, Theology at Paris 1316-1345, 155-157. 40 Himbertus de Garda, / Sent., dd. 37-38, a. 2 (Vat. lat. 1091, f. 68v): "Cur Deus creavit animam meam postquam sciebat me mori in peccato mortali et finaliter dampnatum? . . . de hoc nulla causa est nisi voluntas divina . . . nisi quia vult . . . 'fecit quia voluit' ... sic placet. . . quia placuit sic voluit." A. 4: "Forte diceris, 'Quare Iudas non resurrexit a peccato sicut Petrus?' Dico quod non habuit voluntatem bonam. Ita enim potuisset sicut Petrus quantum ad liberum arbitrium. Unde dico quod licet predestinationis non sit causa, tamen reprobationis bene potest esse."
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A decade later, Meyronnes had a second proponent in the context of predestination: the Franciscan Pastor of Serrescuderio, who lectured on the Sentences at Paris in 1332-33. Pastor's commentary on all four books is preserved in MS St. Omer, Bibliotheque municipale 239, which William Courtenay has recently brought to brighter light.41 Although a successful adminstrator, Pastor seems to have been an unoriginal theologian, choosing to summarize Meyronnes's Conflatus. The only notable difference I can find between Pastor's abbreviated paraphrase and Meyronnes's original is that Pastor likes to add a fifth instant of nature to Meyronnes's four signs account. This seems to correspond, in a sense, to Peter Auriol's will of operation: in the fifth instant of nature, the "will wills," or, "the executive power, with foresight, carries out Peter's salvation in accordance with the determination of the divine will."42 Peter of Navarre and Peter Tliomae, OFM: Scotists at Barcelona?
The Parisian Sentences commentaries of several other Franciscans from the remainder of the 1320s and early 1330s survive, but in fewer manuscripts. Mention has already been made of Aufredo Gonteri Brito, William of Rubio, William of Brienne, the anonymous author of ONE 1439, and Pastor of Serrescuderio, but Himbert of Garda's is probably not Parisian. There are other possibilities, about which we are not so certain. It has been claimed that the anonymous com41 See W.J. Courtenay, 'Pastor de Serrescuderio (d. 1356) and MS Saint-Omer 239', AHDLMA, 63 (1996), 325-356, for a discussion of Pastor's career, a description of the MS, and a question list. The short Principium for book IV of Arnaud of Clermont, OFM, who lectured just after Pastor in the summer of 1333, is preserved in Paris, BN Lat. 5288 (ff. 107-111) and Vat. Ottob. Lat. 2520 (ff. 238-245). On Arnaud's work, see C. Trottmann, La vision beatifique des disputes scolastiques a sa definition par Benoit XII (Rome, 1995), 617-625. 42 Pastor's three questions for dd. 38-41, with 3, 3, and 5 articles respectively (Saint-Omer, ff. 42v-45v) follow various parts of Meyronnes's own dd. 38—41 closely. To Courtenay's list of articles, 'Pastor of Serrescuderio', 353, I add dd. 38-39, q. 1, a. 3 (43r): "Tertio videndum si intellectus divinus cognoscat ista futura contingentia"; and dd. 40—41, a. 5 (45r): "Quinto videndum si per acturn predestinandi obiectum habet aliquod esse volitum et intellectum differens ab intellectione (?) et volitione." In dd. 38~39, q. 2, a. 2 (44r): "Secundo principaliter videndum an actus intellectus preveniat actum voluntatis . . ." Pastor adds the fifth instant of nature: "Quinto potentia executiva exequatur providendo salutem Petri iuxta determinationem divine voluntatis"; and a. 3: "Tertio principaliter de infallibilitate divine scientie quomodo stet cum contingentia rerum ..." he again gives the fifth instant of nature (44v): "Quinto, voluntas vult."
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mentary on book one conserved in Pelplin 53/102 is perhaps Parisian from the mid-1320s, but because the author, almost certainly Franciscan, reads secundum Auriol, to such an extent that most of the material is merely a verbatim and slightly rearranged abbreviation of Auriol's Scriptum in primum, one cannot be sure about where or when, or even if, he lectured.43 In contrast, the first commentary contained in Barcelona, Archivo de la Corona de Aragon, MS Ripoll 77bis, is simply an abbreviation of questions from Auriol's commentary on book two.44 We run into further doubts when we look at the placing and dating of the commentaries of the two Iberian Franciscans Peter Thomae and Peter of Navarre. Only book one of Navarre's Scriptum survives, in five manuscripts, and in fact it is the only 'Parisian' Sentences commentary from the period between Scotus and Peter of Aquila to have received a modern critical edition.45 Only book one of Thomae's commentary survives as well, in this case in one, very unpleasant manuscript, Vat. lat. 1106. Although both of these commentaries are squarely in the Parisian tradition, and can therefore be loosely called 'Parisian', we have no secure evidence that they stem from Paris lectures. Along with Gonteri, both Navarre and Thomae studied at some time at the Franciscans' Barcelona convent. The relative dating of these three may necessitate our locating Navarre's and Thomae's commentaries in Barcelona or somewhere else outside of Paris. 43
I thus modify W. Senko, 'Quelques contributions a 1'histoire de la litterature philosophique de XIVe siecle d'apres le ms 53/102 de la Bibliotheque du Grand Seminaire de Pelplin', Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum, 11 (1963), 69-85, esp. 70-80, who described the commentary contained on folios 14ra-129vb, and included question and citation lists and a transcription of part of q. 19, "Utrum in omni alio citra Deum differat esse et essentia." Almost all of the entries in the question list match Auriol's question tides verbatim, and a close check of the commentary's q. 33, on the increase of grace, and q. 61, on future contingents, demonstrated that they were taken verbatim from Auriol's Scriptum, d. 17, pars 2, and d. 38 respectively. Moreover, all of q. 19 that Senko publishes on pp. 74—80 is taken verbatim from Auriol's d. 8, pars 1. In the first couple of questions, however, Auriol is actually cited by name and the verbatim copying is reduced, so that we can assume that the commentary is not an abbreviation of the Scriptum, but rather the product of someone reading secundum alium. 44 The MS also contains selected questions from Peter of Palude's commentary on books I III. In all cases, the text is slightly abbreviated and the author is referred to by name and in the third person, e.g. "magister Petrus dicit..." See also A. Maier, 'Literarhistorische Notizen iiber P. Aureoli, Durandus und den "Cancellarius" nach der Handschrift Ripoll 77bis in Barcelona', in eadem, Ausgehendes Mittelalter I, 139—173. 45 Doctoris Fundati Petri de Atarrabia sive de Navarra, OFM, In Primum Sententiarum Scriptum, 2 vols., ed. P. S. Azcona, OFM (Madrid, 1974).
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First some facts. Both cite Auriol's Scriptum, calling Auriol a doctor, a tide Auriol only received in 1318.46 On the other hand, Navarre cites Aquinas simply as Thomas, and not Saint Thomas, and so he supposedly finished the work before 1323, when Thomas was canonized. Likewise Thomae, in his Quodlibet where he cites his own Sentences commentary, also refers simply to Thomas. But Navarre also quotes Gonteri's Sentences commentary, thus appearing to have written after Gonteri's 1322 Barcelona lectures. In turn, Thomae cites Navarre's Sentences commentary in his own. If we try to save all of the phenomena, we get Gonteri lecturing in 1322, then Navarre and then Thomae all before 1323, each citing the previous lector. This is implausible. If we avoid using Thomas's canonization as a terminus ante quem for Franciscan authors, who obviously had mixed feelings about that rather political event anyway,47 we can have Gonteri lecturing in Barcelona in 1322, Navarre finishing his commentary in 1323, and Thomae some time later. The fact that they cite the Scriptum rather than the reportationes, which were more popular among Auriol's immediate successors at Paris, is in keeping with this scenario, but their use of the Scriptum could also indicate that they were not writing in Paris, but in Barcelona, where the reportationes may not have circulated. We could even ignore Gonteri's 1322 date, and maintain that at Barcelona Navarre had access to an earlier, perhaps written version of Gonteri's commentary. In any case, neither Thomae's nor Navarre's commentary is very exciting. In contexts like future contingents and predestination, where we would expect a reaction to Auriol, Navarre and Thomae appear to be ignorant of Auriol's the-
46 For Thomae, cf. A. Maieru, "Logica e teologica trinitaria nel commento alle Sentenze attribuito a Petrus Thomae," in J. Jolivet, Z. Kaluza, and A. de Libera, eds., Lectionum Varietates. Hommage a Paul Vignaux (1904-1987) (Paris, 1991), 177-198, with an edition of Thomae's / Sent., d. 2, q. 8, a. 4, dubia 9-10 (pp. 189-198), where (par. 2) Thomae quotes from Auriol's Scriptum. For Navarre's explicit citation, see Azcona ed., vol. I, p. 63, 1. 77. For the other dating information, see the introductions to both of these editions, and S. Dumont, 'The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Fourteenth Century: II. The De ente of Peter Thomae', Mediaeval Studies, 50 (1988), 186-256, esp. 187, n. 3, and 194, n. 34. G. Gal, 'Petrus Thomae's Proof for the Existence of God', Franciscan Studies 56 (1998), 115-151, includes an edition of / Sent., d. 2, q. 2 and a complete question list. 47 For example Doucet, 'Der unbekannte Skotist', 207, speaking of Gonteri, argues against Schmaus that the Aquinas-title criterion is no strong proof for dating. Buytaert is of the same opinion in Petrus Thomae O.F.M. Quodlibet, ed. M. R. Hooper and E. M. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, 1957), xii.
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ory, and simply fall back on Scotus.48 This also supports the theory that they lectured away from Paris and perhaps in Barcelona. Gerard Odonis, OFM
In contrast to the case of Navarre and Thomae, we know the Franciscan Gerard Odonis lectured at Paris. A dozen or so manuscripts, mostly containing one book each, preserve Odonis's commentary on the four books of the Sentences. His reputation now and in the Middle Ages rests perhaps more on his long and controversial term as Minister General of the Franciscans in a turbulent time (1329-1342), his support of John XXII in the dispute surrounding the Beatific Vision, and his philosophical works, which are now being critically edited.49 Indeed it is primarily his commentary on the Ethics, printed in 1500, that earned him the title Doctor Moralis. Still, his Sentences commentary had a part in earning Odonis his name, and is beginning to receive some attention. Exactly when Odonis gave his Parisian lectures is a matter of some disagreement. He supposedly became regent master in theology at Paris in 1326. Moreover, based on the supposition that Odonis was born around 1285, it has been suggested, following Teetaert, that Odonis may have been a bachelor of theology as early as 1315, and that the date given for his lectures in Valencia, Cabildo 200, "M°
48 On future contingents, cf. Schabel, Theology at Pans 1316-1345, 172-175 (I will publish Thornae's pertinent question in the near future). Navarre presents the Scotist stance on predestination, with the four instants of nature, in / Sent., d. 41, a. 2 (vol. 2, ed. Azcona, 934-935, 11. 60-75), and Thomae does the same in / Sent., d. 41 (Vat. lat. 1106, ff. 306r-307r). If Thomae and Navarre ignore Auriol, then we may have problems dating anonymous commentaries that do the same, treating Scotus but not Auriol. Examples are a commentary in Lyon, Bibl. de la ville 653, and Vatican Ottob. lat. 360 (see R. Friedman's chapter above), and a commentary found on ff. 166-189 of Vat. lat. 869. S. Dumont, 'The Scotist of Vat. Lat. 869', Archivum franciscanum historicum, 81 (1988), 254-283, dates other material in Vat. lat. 869 to before 1317 simply because the text omits Auriol in a context where Auriol was important (cf. pp. 272-273). But Navarre and Thomae do the same in the context of future contingents, an issue where Auriol's position was exceptionally notorious. Navarre looks to John of Bassol in this context, as he does quite frequently in his commentary (cf. R. Friedman's chapter above). Thus ignorance of Auriol is not a sure indication of someone's relative dates. 49 The first volume is Odonis's Logica, ed. L. M. de Rijk (Giraldus Odonis O.F.M., Opera Philosophica I) (Leiden, 1997); volume two, including de Rijk's edition of Odonis's Tractatus de esse et essentia, a question also in book I of the Sentences commentary, is forthcoming.
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CCC° XX° VIII0," could better be read as 1318.50 However, several other manuscripts' incipits and explicits support the Valencia MS, stating that Odonis was Parisian bachelor of the Sentences in 1326-28. There are also indications that Odonis knew Auriol's Parisian lectures, and he has at least one citation of the "venerable brother Francis of Marchia." There seems little reason to doubt that Odonis lectured in both academic years 1326-27 and 1327-28. The incipits and explicits imply that he lectured on books one and four in the first year and on books two and three in the second, although an internal reference suggests it was the other way around. Odonis probably became master of theology just afterwards.51 In any case, Odonis was by all accounts an interesting thinker. Odonis's commentary is best known for his atomistic views. Although atomism was never very popular, it may be no coincidence that in the 1330s Nicholas Bonet and Nicholas of Autrecourt came to hold similar positions in various works, although their Sentences commentaries do not survive.52 The first edition of part of the commentary, Odonis's book I, d. 3, on the univocity of the concept of being, shows that in expanding on Scotus, Odonis has a "clearer and more orderly" presentation, with some original arguments.53 In the con50 See A. Teetaert, 'Ot Guiral', Dictionnaire de theologie catholique 11 (1932), cols. 1658 and 1660, and Logica, ed. de Rijk, 1 and nn. 2-3. 51 The Marchia citation is in Madrid, BN 65, f. 188va, in the margin and in the text. For the dating and Odonis's relationship with Auriol, see C. Schabel, 'Non aliter novit facienda quam facta. Les questions de Gerard d'Odon sur la prescience divine', forthcoming, which contains a critical edition of d. 38 and d. 39, q. 1, based on the four known witnesses (for these questions, MS Valencia, Biblioteca del Cabildo 139 is the best). In d. 41 of book I, internal references state that Odonis "proved" something in book II, and that something "will be said" in book IV (see below, n. 59). On the dating, de Rijk himself finds it "remarkabl[e]" that Adam Wodeham, in a work on indivisibles written after 1323, does not discuss Odonis's atomism, a position that Odonis presents in his Sentences commentary. Cf. Logica, ed. de Rijk, 3, and n. 6. In de Rijk's 'Guiral Ot (Giraldus Odonis) O.F.M. (1273-1349): His View of Statemental Being in His Commentary on the Sentences', in C. Marmo, ed., Vestigia, Imagines, Verba. Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (Xlltk-XIVth Century) (Turnhout, 1997), 355-369, the Sentences lectures are dated to between 1326 and 1328. 52 Cf. the discussion of Odonis's book II, d. 2, q. 2, in V. Zoubov, 'Walter Catton, Gerard d'Odon et Nicolas Bonet', Physis, I (1959), 261-278. 53 G. Gal, 'Geraldus Odonis on the Unity of the Concept of Being', Franciscan Studies, 52 (1992), 23-51, remark on 23, edition on 32-51, based on two of the MSS. Father Gal kindly sent me his unpublished question list for Odonis's commentary. De Rijk is continuing his work on Odonis, including the Sentences commentary. See also J. Spruyt, 'Gerard Odonis on the Universal', AHDLMA, 63 (1996), 171-208, based on questions parallel to Odonis's I Sent., d. 19, qq. 1-2. Spruyt concludes that Odonis is basically a realist, in opposition to the moderni.
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text of future contingents Odonis's views are not Scotistic, but they are creatively odd. Silently accepting Auriol's doctrine that God abstracts from all differentiae of time, Odonis adopts John of Damascus's notion of divine infinity and seizes upon Augustine's dictum in City of God., book ten, ch. 12: "He does not know what is to happen differently from what has happened," concluding that not only can God have the same certitude about the future that He has about the past, in fact He can know the future as past.54 Odonis's theory of predestination is just as radical: it is almost semi-Pelagian. Contrary to all the Franciscans we have mentioned, except Auriol and perhaps Marchia, Odonis argues against SPE. This is immediately apparent in his opening arguments for the question "Is there any [meritorious] cause of predestination?" which are for the negative: predestination is purely from mercy, and God is the sole cause of both predestination and reprobation, because in Romans 9.13 Paul reminds us of what is written in Malachi 1.2: "Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated," which the Glossa ordinaria explains as "without merits, I loved one and reproved the other." Odonis, however, declares that there really is a meritorious cause, because Augustine, commenting on Romans 9.18, "He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will, He hardeneth," explains, "this will of God cannot be unjust, for it springs from deeply hidden merits." Based on yet another Augustinian dictum, Odonis concludes that "predestination and reprobation come from merits."55 Instead of concentrating on the role of God's mercy in predestination, the Moral Doctor applies God's justice to election, because glory is the just reward for merits. Of course, Odonis is not espousing a fully-Pelagian doctrine, because these merits are eternally foreseen by God. And so all his Scotist predecessors have argued "inanely" for the "inane" position that God wills the ends before the means, i.e. beatitude before the prevision of grace and merit. Odonis asserts 54
Cf. C. Schabel, 'Non aliter novit facunda quam facto'. Gerardus Odonis, / Sent., d. 41, q. 2 (ed. Schabel, 'Landulph Caracciolo and Gerard Odonis'): "De secundo arguitur quod predestinationis nulla sit causa rneritoria. Primo, quia 'non ex operibus iustitie que fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misercordiam salvos nos fecit' . . . Quarto, quia super illo verbo, 'lacob dilexi Esau autem odio habui,' dicit Glossa, 'Sine rneritis unurn dilexi et alium reprobavi.' Sed contra, quia secundum Augustinum, cum '"Deus miseretur cui miseretur et quern vult indurat", voluntas hec iniusta non est, quia venit de occultissimis meretis'; sed hec voluntas est predestinatio et reprobatio; quare predestinatio et reprobatio veniunt ex rneritis." 33
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that by God's "antecedent will," before any foreseen merits or demerits, "God wills all men to be saved," as in I Timothy 2.4. This will, obviously, is not efficacious, because not everyone will be saved; rather it is inefficacious and indifferent. Although as in the case of future contingents he derives support from John of Damascus, clearly Odonis has again silently borrowed from Auriol, adopting an important element of GE.56 However, since this antecedent willing of grace is for everyone, it is of course not on the basis of foreseen merits de condigno, or of foreseen good use of free will de condigno—otherwise it would not be grace—and so Odonis seems to avoid the condemned semi-Pelagian doctrine. Merit is merely the cause of predestination de congruo. Here Odonis seems to be in agreement with theologians such as Thomas Wylton who held that the foreseen good use of free will is the cause of predestination de congruo, but not de condigno, because de condigno good use is the effect of predestination and only good use de condigno is the cause of glory. The appearance is deceiving, however: Odonis and Wylton do not understand the same thing by condigno and congruo. This is clear in Odonis's examples of people who were in this state of grace and did not use their free will well, like Adam, and others who did use it well but did not persevere in this good use,
56 Odonis, I Sent., d. 41, q. 2, a. 2 (ed. Schabel): "Pono tres conclusiones: primam, quod voluntas qua Deus vult predestinatum glorificare habet rationem primam sumptam ex meritis previsis . . . Primam probo sic: omnis iusta voluntas reddendi premium alicui habet rationem sumptam ex meritis illius positis vel previsis—hoc patet ex duobus, primo quia voluntas est iusta, et secundo quia est voluntas reddendi, ex quibus sequitur quod premium secundum legem et regulam iustitie debeatur illi; sed voluntas qua Deus vult predestinatum glorificare est huiusmodi; ergo habet rationem sumptam ex meritis. Minor probatur, quia cum Deus de facto predestinatum glorificat, ipse reddit ei iuste premium secundum Apostolum, dicentem, 'reposita est mihi corona iustitie quam reddet mihi in ilia die iustus iudex,' secunda Timotheum primo. Quare voluntas glorificandi est iusta voluntas reddendi. Ex hoc autem apparet inanis esse quorundam ymaginatio dicentium quod Deus primo vult predestinato finem, scilicet beatitudinem, secundo ea que sunt ad finem, scilicet gratiam et merita, et per consequens includunt quod Deus predestinato vult beatitudinem ante voluntatem et previsionem cuiuscumque meriti. Quod autem istud sit inaniter cogitatum apparet, quia voluntas qua Deus vult alicui beatitudinem ante voluntatem et previsionem grade et meritorum illius est voluntas antecedens que non semper impletur, nam est communis bonis et malis. Tali enim voluntate Deus 'vult omnes homines salvos fieri,' secundum quod exponit Damascenus, et est voluntas inefficax, quia indeterminata. Non enim est determinata ad dandam gloriam sine meritis. Et si est determinata ad dandam gloriam propter merita, non est ilia voluntas que prior esse intelligitur quam previsio meritorum."
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like Judas. Thus it is true that this grace is not earned, and so it is not a reward, but although it is a necessary cause of salvation, it is obviously not sufficient. I interpret this grace as the grace of GE, God's general offer of grace to all men.57 Odonis requires that someone's foreseen merits be a cause of predestination de congruo, to preserve God's justice. Whereas the will by which God gives grace prior to foreseen merits is indeterminate and inefficacious, and hence applies to all men, including Judas and Adam, the will by which God actually gives glory, i.e. His determinate, efficacious will, is determined by merit. Thus Odonis's escape from semi-Pelagianism is narrow indeed: The will that predestines is consequent will, which is universally fulfilled and is the will proper to the good, namely the will by which God wills beatitude only to those who will be good in the end. And this will is efficacious and determined toward putting the effect into being infallibly. Hence the will that predestines is not the will taken in the way these [Scotists] have in mind, but it is simply the will of rendering a reward in accordance with merit.58
The good use of grace de condigno is obviously posterior (logically and temporally) to the grace itself, and so this grace cannot be a reward for merit. Because this grace is necessary for salvation, the Pelagian and semi-Pelagian positions are rejected. However, this grace is granted to everyone by God's indeterminate, indifferent, inefficacious, antecedent
51 Odonis, I Sent., d. 41, q. 2, a. 2 (ed. Schabel): "Pono tres conclusiones . . . secundam, quod voluntas qua Deus vult predestinatum iustificare per gratiam non habet rationem primam sumptam ex previsis meritis de condigno; tertiam, quod talis voluntas potest habere rationem primam sumptam ex meritis de congruo." Then later: "Ex hoc autem apparet inanis esse quorundam ymaginatio dicentium quod Deus dare vult et dat gratiam alicui quia scit eum bene usurum ea, et per consequens concludunt quod ille bonus et meritorius usus et previsus est ratio meritoria collationis gratie. Quod autem hoc sit inaniter cogitatum patet dupliciter. Primo quia sequeretur quod Deus nee daret nee dare vellet gratiam illis qui non sunt bene usuri ea, quod est falsissimum, cum constet Adam fuisse in gratia qui non est usus ea ut deberet. Item, ludas gratiam habuit et non perseveravit." For Wylton's position, it is easiest to see it as quoted verbatim in Johannes Baconthorpe, / Sent., d. 41, a. 2 (ed. Cremona, 1618, p. 394aE-bA). 58 Odonis, I Sent., d. 41, q. 2, a. 2 (ed. Schabel): "Voluntas autem predestinans est voluntas consequens, que universaliter impletur, et voluntas propria bonis, qua scilicet Deus vult beatitudinem solis illis qui erunt finaliter boni. Et est voluntas efficax et determinata ad ponendum infallibiliter effectum suum. Quare voluntas predestinans non est voluntas eo modo sumpta quo isti cogitant, sed est simpliciter voluntas reddendi premium secundum meritum."
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will, and so something else is also required for salvation, something on the part of people that differentiates between the elect and the damned: Every will to give a benefit when merits are posited in some people, which otherwise is not going to give it, has some basis taken from these merits. This is clear, because such a will to give determines itself according to those merits. But God's will by which He wills to give grace to men in the common course of events is of this sort. Whereby it appears to have some basis from those foreseen merits.39
Of course there are exceptions to this rule, as in the case of Christ and, especially, Paul, who even had actual demerits, so God is free to grant this saving grace to anyone regardless of merit. But there is no mistaking Odonis's position in general. In response to the opening arguments, he replies that when Paul says "God wills that all men be saved," "he speaks about the salvation of grace that is not given on the basis of the works of justice, but he does not speak about the final salvation of glory which is given to each person according to his works." And so to "Jacob I have loved, Esau I have hated": It must be said that God chose Jacob to assume the flesh from [his line] and He reproved Esau so that He would not assume the flesh from his seed, and each case was without merits. But the Gloss does not say that He elected one to glory and reproved the other to Hell without merits nor would it be speaking the truth if it were to say that.60
39
Odonis, / Sent., d. 41, q. 2, a. 2 (ed. Schabel): "Secundo, quia, ut probavi (!) libro secundo, omne meritum est prius suo premio et omne premium posterius est suo merito, sicut finis et ultimum; sed usus gratie non est prior ea, quare nullo modo habet rationem meriti respectu eius nee gratia rationem finis et ultimi premii respectu usus; restat ergo, sicut probatum est, quod voluntas dandi gratiam nullam habet rationem acceptam ex meritis de condigno. Tertiam conclusionem probo sic: omnis voluntas dandi beneficium, positis in quibusdam meritis et alias non datura, habet aliquam rationem sumptam ex illis meritis—hoc patet, quia talis voluntas ad dandum se determinat secundum ilia merita; sed voluntas Dei qua Deus vult dare gratiam hominibus secundum communem cursum est huiusmodi; quare videtur habere rationem aliquam ex illis meritis previsis. Maior patet, quia Deus de communi lege non dat gratiam liberalem nisi positis meritis Christi et ecclesie, fidei, sacramenti, et in vocatione trinitatis, ut dicetur in libro quarto (!)." 60 Odonis, I Sent., d. 41, q. 2, a. 2 (ed. Schabel): "Dicendum ergo ad primum quod Apostolus ad Titum loquitur de salvatione gratie que non datur ex operibus iustitie, non tamen loquitur de salvatione finali glorie que redditur unicuique secundum opera sua . . . Ad quartum vero dicendum quod Deus lacob elegit ut sumeret carnem ex eo et Esau reprobavit ne sumeret carnem ex semine suo, et utrumque
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Moreover, similar to Auriol's theory of the obex gratiae, reprobation occurs not because of a positive action, but because of an action of abstaining, either from the position of grace in the first place, or by the desertion of grace, as in Judas's case.61 Odonis's stance is remarkable for several reasons. In his refutation of the Scotists and the formulation of his own theory, as in the case of foreknowledge, Odonis betrays Peter Auriol's positive influence, this time with the basic statement of general election. But again as in the context of foreknowledge, Odonis employs an Augustinian passage to develop an even more radical position, which Auriol would have rejected. Auriol thinks that there is a negative cause of predestination in the predestined, the absence of the obstacle to grace, but Odonis believes that Augustine allows for a positive cause in human merit. Although this may be one reason why Odonis was called the Moral Doctor, a slim line separates this position from semi-Pelagianism, and an anti-Pelagian would not have been pleased by yet another abandonment of SPE. In his general attack on those with Pelagian tendencies, i.e. Auriol, Odonis, Thomas of Strasbourg, and perhaps Walter Chatton and others from England, Gregory of Rimini would include Odonis's use of Augustine.
The Reaction to Auriol outside the Franciscan Order, 1318-1333
The Augustinians: Dionysius de Burgo, Gerard of Siena, and Michael of Massa
In the period between Auriol and 1345, besides the Franciscans only the Augustinians had collectively a major impact on Parisian theology, with a half dozen surviving commentaries. Dionysius de Burgo Sancti Sepulchri was a socius of Auriol, lecturing at Paris in 1316-17.
fuit sine mentis. Sed quod unurn elegerit ad gloriam et aliurn reprobavit ad Gehennam sine meretis, hoc non dicit Glossa ilia, nee verum diceret, si diceret." 61 Odonis, I Sent., d. 41, q. 3 (MSS Valencia 139, f. 131va; Madrid 65, f. 195rb): "Quinta conclusio est quod reprobatio non est causa finalis iustitie per actionem positivam, set solum per actionem abstinencie. Hoc autem convenit fieri dupliciter: primo per non appositionem gratie, alio modo per desertionem apposite gratie. Exemplum de primo habemus de Tyriis qui remanserunt infideles. . . Exemplum de secundo habemus in illis qui fuerunt temporaliter iusti et postea lapsi sunt et in lapsu finaliter permanserunt, sicut ludas proditor ..."
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His commentary on books one and two of the Sentences survives in only one manuscript, but a question list has been published along with an analysis of the marginalia of Erfurt Amplon. 2° 131,62 and so it is worth looking at the state of his order at the beginning of our period. Not surprisingly we find that Dionysius supports Giles of Rome, "Our Doctor," often in relation to Aquinas, with whom Giles sometimes agreed and sometimes did not. Henry of Ghent figures prominently as an opponent, as does Durand of St. Pourcain. But marginalia and even explicit citations in the text can only tell part of the story. For example, in his distinctions 38 and 39, on future contingents, Dionysius in fact copies columns of Durand verbatim without any textual or marginal attribution at all. Of course this may only be to refute him briefly in turn, but this fact, while reinforcing the conservative nature of Dionysius's Sentences commentary, leaves doubts about the precise nature of that conservativism. We know considerably more about Gerard of Siena's Parisian Sentences commentary, from about 1323.63 Book one was printed in Padua in 1598, and survives in more than twenty MSS, while book two is extant in perhaps a half dozen. According to Doucet, we also have two witnesses for book three. Damasus Trapp's general analysis of the text and marginalia from Gerard's commentary on books one and two shows that Gerard is basically a close follower of Giles of Rome, and he defends him against Scotus primarily, followed by Henry of Ghent, Aquinas, and Auriol, who does influence Gerard.64 Trapp does not find much that is impressive in Gerard of Siena generally. Gerard's opposition to Scotus using Auriol's attacks, and his opposition to Auriol's position, show up in the context of future contingents. As usual, he ends up defending Giles, whose opinion in this case resembles Aquinas's.65
62 Cf. D. Trapp, 'The Quaestiones of Dionysius de Burgo O.S.A.', Augustimanum, 3 (1963), 63-78. The Parisian lectures of Henry of Friemar the Younger OESA, whose commentary on book four survives in over a dozen complete witnesses, may have taken place in 1318—19. Cf. A. Zumkeller, Die Augustinerschule des Mittelalters: Vertreter und philosophisch-theologische Lehre', Analecta Augustiniana, 27 (1964), (167-262), 207-208. 63 According to W. J. Courtenay, 'The Quaestiones in Sententias of Michael of Massa, OESA: A Redating', Augustiniana, 45 (1995), 191-207, 195. D. Trapp, 'Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century. Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions, and BookLore', Augustiniana, 6 (1956), 146-274, appears to put him in 1325-1326. 64 Cf. Trapp, 'Augustinian Theology', 160—163. 65 Cf. Schabel, Theology at Paris 1316-1345, 184-188.
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In the context of predestination, Gerard does not take Auriol's radical General Election opinion, with the obex gmtiae, into account at all, but instead concentrates on attacking Pelagians (like Odonis?) who posit a meritorious, positive cause of predestination on the part of the predestined. He does not ask about a negative cause, like the absence of an obstacle or resistance to grace. Gerard concludes by espousing the traditional view.66 Perhaps the popularity of Gerard's commentary is due to his defense of the Augustinian's teaching doctor, Giles of Rome, against the newcomers. By contrast with Gerard of Siena's, "Michael of Massa's Quaestiones in Sententias remain one of the richest unedited and, for the most part, unstudied texts of the fourteenth century."67 So writes William Courtenay, and this despite the fact that Massa's Sentences commentary survives in only a handful of manuscripts. Book two appears to come down to us in only one witness: Vat. lat. 1087. Book one, labeled a Scriptum, which unfortunately stops in mid-sentence in the second question for distinction 38 (and therefore before the distinctions concerning predestination), is extant in three manuscripts, of which the Naples BN VII C 1 witness goes only to distinction 8. Of the 'complete' manuscripts, the better of the two, i.e. Bologna, Collegio di Spagna 40, is physically missing about 60% of its folios, so only Bologna, Universitaria 2214 preserves the entire work. Despite this state of affairs, Massa's Sentences commentary deserves our attention. For one thing, book one was important enough to be abbreviated at least twice in the fifteenth century. Of greater interest is the fact that Massa's commentary on book two is a valuable witness to the reception of Ockham's thought at Paris, since depending on how one dates Massa's commentary Massa is the first or one of the first to mention the existence of "Ockhamists" at the University of Paris,
66
Gerardus de Senis, I Sent., d. 41, q. unica, a. 1 (ed. Padua, 1598, pp. 582a-583b). W. J. Courtenay, 'The Quaestiones in Sententias of Michael of Massa, OESA', 191. There have been some studies on Massa's thought in his Sentences commentary, e.g. Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 318—333, and Friedman, 'In Principio Erat Verbum', 347-349. On the manuscripts, see D. Trapp, 'Notes on some Manuscripts of the Augustinian Michael de Massa ( 1337)', Augustinianum, 5 (1965), 58-133, which has a question and citation list; Courtenay, 'The Quaestiones in Sententias'; and C. Schabel, 'Questions on Future Contingents by Michael of Massa, OESA', Augustiniana, 48 (1998), 165-229, which includes a critical edition of Massa's Scriptum, dd. 35, 36, and 38, and a discussion of the abbreviations. MS Florence, BN centrale C 8 794, turns out to contain an abbrevation, and not the full text, contrary to Stegmuller. 67
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an issue of some significance and controversy.68 Most importantly perhaps, there is evidence that Massa's commentary had an impact on Gregory of Rimini's own. It is most likely that Massa composed his Sentences commentary in the late 1320s, but only actually lectured on the Sentences at Paris after 1330. Unlike his near contemporary, Gerard of Siena, whom he often criticizes, Massa shows considerable independence from Giles of Rome. Like most of his contemporaries, however, Massa is preoccupied with Auriol. In the context of future contingents he shows himself to be a close adherent to the school of Francis of Marchia in distinctions 35, 36, and 38 of book one. Because Marchia had an impact on Gregory of Rimini, there is the possibility that Massa was the conduit by which Marchia's ideas reached Massa's junior Augustinian confrere. Moreover, like Rimini, Massa responded explicitly to AurioPs Scriptum on the first book. Evidence also suggests that Massa's own innovations in his attack on Auriol influenced Rimini, specifically Massa's defense of bivalence. Finally, since Massa's two 'complete' manuscripts are now found in Bologna, Rimini may have consulted them during his stay there before his Paris lectures. Rimini, however, cites neither Marchia nor Massa in this context, so we cannot be certain.69 John Baconthorpe, O.Carm.
The one Parisian Carmelite commentary to survive from this era is that of the Englishman John Baconthorpe, the Prince of the Averroists, who read the Sentences at Paris in 1319-20, or perhaps the following year, making him a socius of Marchia or Meyronnes. We have two redactions of his commentary on the first three books, and two separate commentaries on book four, the latest one, quaestiones canoni-
68
Brief treatments of Massa's references to "Occamistae" are in many of W. J. Courtenay's works, but see his 'The Quaestiones in Sententias for an important discussion of Massa's dates and the authenticity of Massa's commentary on book two in connection with the Ockhamist citation, and also Courtenay's 'Conrad of Megenberg: The Parisian Years', Vivarium, 35,1 (1997), 102-124. Cf. Schabel, 'Questions', for a review of the issue of dates. 69 For Massa's general tendencies, see also D. Trapp, 'Augustinian Theology in the 14th Century. Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions and Book-Lore', Augustiniana, 6 (1956), 146-274, on Massa 163-175; see Schabel, 'Questions', for Massa's relationship with Marchia and Rimini.
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cae, dating from as late as 1340. MS British Library, Royal 11 C. VI is the only manuscript witness for what might be a polished reportatio on the first three books, perhaps finished a couple of years after Baconthorpe's lectures. Four codices and fragments preserve the quaestiones canonicae, one of which contains twenty-two questions from the other version of book four, the quaestiones speculativae. An ordinatio redaction of the first three books, for which there are no manuscripts, was completed after 1325. This was published in Paris in 1484, and the quaestiones canonicae were published in the same place a year later. Several later printings and a 1969 reprint, sometimes differing in arrangement, combine the two Paris editions.70 Baconthorpe joined his contemporaries whose works are extant in making Peter Auriol his main opponent.71 In the context of future contingents and predestination, however, Baconthorpe simply copied the English secular theologian Thomas of Wylton's treatment as found in a recently discovered question on foreknowledge and predestination. This question, extant in one complete witness and another somewhat abbreviated one, almost certainly predates Auriol's writings on the matter. In Baconthorpe's first redaction in MS Royal 11 G. VI, we have in fact another witness, since Baconthorpe was content to reproduce Wylton's entire question and adopt his determinations on the two subjects. In the later ordinatio, however, Baconthorpe changed his mind and added a refutation of Wylton on future contingents! He deleted some of the Wylton material as well, and so only about three fourths of the ordinatio is Wylton. But Baconthorpe stayed faithful to Wylton on predestination, actually adding further arguments in support. Significantly, Baconthorpe copied an example of Wylton's involving the River Seine in the first redaction, but in the ordinatio it became simply "a river"; this suggests that Baconthorpe composed his ordinatio back home in England. It is significant that
70 On Baconthorpe's life and writings, see especially B. Xiberta, De scriptoribus scholasticis saeculi XIV ex ordine Carmelitarum (Louvain, 1931), 167-240, especially 177-183 for the Sentences commentary. On the epithet's applicability, see J. Etzwiler, 'John Baconthorpe, "Prince of the Averroists"?' Franciscan Studies, 36 (1976), 148—176. E. Borchert, Die Quaestiones speculativae et canonicae des Johannes Baconthorp uber den sakramentalen Charakter (Munich, 1974), provides a question list for the quaestiones speculativae, an edition of qq. 1, 4, 5, and 13 based on the sole MS, British Library, Royal 9 C VII, and an edition of dd. 4-6, 8, 17, and 24-25 of the quaestiones canonicae based on Baconthorpe's autograph, British Library, Royal 11 B XII. 71 Cf. Xiberta, De scriptoribus, 202-203.
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in both redactions Baconthorpe cited Wylton on foreknowledge, although only when presenting the latter's determinations, while Baconthorpe seems to have taken credit for himself on predestination. This being the case, we must be careful about attributing anything to Baconthorpe's originality without a close comparison between his text and those of his predecessors.72 Bernard Lombardi, OP
The one securely identifiable surviving Parisian Dominican Sentences commentary from the period between Auriol and Rimini is that of Bernard Lombardi, who lectured in 1327-28. Bernard's commentary on all four books comes down to us in six MSS, of which Leipzig, Univ. 542, contains books I—III. There is a published question list for the first three books, and a transcription of his book one, question 21, based on Leipzig.73 In this question, on being and essence, Bernard defends Aquinas against Henry of Ghent, Hervaeus Natalis, and Auriol, but over half of his text is copied verbatim from Durand of St. Pourcain and Auriol. His own position is close to Aquinas's, although Bernard has a different perspective from the
72 On Wylton and Baconthorpe on these issues, see Schabel, Theology at Paris 1316-1345, 52—63. See the very important recent article by Dumont, 'New Questions by Thomas Wylton'. Dumont (pp. 368-377) also discusses the Augustinian Prosper de Reggio Emilia's commentary, from the mid-1310s. This commentary, in Vat. lat. 1086, of which Stephen F. Brown has made a preliminary transcription, is a conscious collection of Parisian opinions on the material of the Sentences, mostly from the prologue and first couple of distinctions. It has tremendous potential value for identifying theological works, since there are a great number of marginal citations to theologicans active in the years before 1315 or so. I counted four dozen different names in a brief examination. 73 Both are in S. A. Porebski, 'La question de Bernard Lombardi concernant la difference reelle entre 1'essence et 1'existence', Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum, 17 (1973), 157-185. Parts of Bernard's book IV, lect. 21-22, from Munich, CLM 13501, have been published in L. Ott, Die Lehre des Durandus de S. Porciano O.P. vom Weihesakrament. Dargestellt nach den verschiedenen Redaktionen seines Sentenzenkommentars und nach der Diskussion der Dominikanertheologie des beginnenden 14. Jahrhunderts (Munich, 1972), 137-147. The commentary of the Dominican Henry of Liibeck, who most likely read the Sentences outside of Paris just after Auriol, probably does not survive, since the manuscripts that Stegmuller (p. 156) claimed contained this work apparently do not, although they do contain his Quodlibeta. Cf. W. Bucichowski, 'Le principe d'individuation dans la question de Henri de Lubeck "Utrum materia sit principium individuationis'", Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 21 (1975), 92. A commentary preserved in El Escorial (MS R. II 4, Stegmuller's anonymous #1008) may belong to the Dominican Durand de Aureliaco, who read the Sentences at Paris in 1330-1331.
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teaching doctor of the Dominicans.74 A look at Bernard's question 47, on future contingents, confirms this image, for like the Augustinian Dionysius de Burgo a decade earlier, Bernard chooses to copy large passages of Durand verbatim without citation, only to turn on him later in defending Aquinas.75 Bernard's question 51, article one, on the cause of predestination, is even more heavily dependent on Durand: in the Erfurt MS Bernard gives Aquinas's stance in 100 lines copying or paraphrasing Durand, copies Durand's refutation in 24 lines, and adds his own 16-line rebuttal and defense of Aquinas.76 Being the sole representative of his order in these decades, Bernard does not give much evidence that this was an exciting period among the Paris Dominicans.
Paris 1334-1343 I have already mentioned some commentaries from the early 1330s, probably Massa's and William of Rubio's, and definitely William of Brienne's and Pastor of Serrescuderio's, which are two of the least inspiring of the post-Auriol period. Although we do not have his Sentences commentary, Nicholas Bonet has left us his Natural Tlieology, which had a lasting impact on Franciscan thought and was printed in Venice in 1505. For the most part, however, the well appears to have run dry after 1330. 74 Porebski's edition is problematic, because although he is basically aware of the positions presented, he gives no indication of Bernard's verbatim borrowing, and hence Porebski attributes Auriol's text to an "auteur anonyme . . . dont les conceptions se rapprochent de celles de Pierre Aureoli et Durand" (Porebski, 'La question de Bernard Lombardi', 167). One oddity with Bernard's text is that although he copies down most of Durand's opening arguments, he fails to refute them, even though Durand had! For more details, cf. Schabel, Theology at Paris 1316-1345, 181-182. 75 See Schabel, Theology at Paris 1316-1345, 180-184. With I. Balcoyiannopoulou and R. Friedman, I am critically editing Peter of Palude's question on future contingents (in 'Peter of Palude and the Parisian Reaction to Durand of St. Pourcain on Future Contingents,' Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, forthcoming), which encompasses Durand's material from the apparently lost second version of book I. Bernard's (and Dionysius's) treatment of Durand is also critically edited from the three witnesses: Naples BN VII G. 98 appears to preserve a slightly reworked version of the text in MSS Leipzig and Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Bibl., C.A. 2° 368. On Durand and Palude, see R. Friedman's chapter above. 76 That is, Bernard's treatment in I Sent, q. 51, a. 1 (MS Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek C.A. 2° 368, ff. 123ra-124ra) = Durand, I Sent., d. 41, a. 2 (ed. Venice 1571, ff. 109vb- 1 l0vb), except Bernard's short rebuttal and a section of Durand on Aquinas that is paraphrased in Bernard.
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There are a number of possible reasons for the paucity of Sentences commentaries and, therefore, the relative poverty of Parisian theology in this decade.77 The coming of the Hundred Years' War, John XXII and the controversy over the Beatific Vision, and John's and Benedict XII's close watch for suspect opinions certainly played a role. Another factor may be John XXIFs actions against the Spiritual Franciscans, beginning in about 1318. As we have seen, the Franciscans appeared to dominate Parisian theology in the late 1310s and 1320s, and any negative effect on the Franciscan recruitment of top scholars would seem to affect Parisian theology in general. If the quality of Franciscan recruits did begin to tail off in 1318 or so because of young scholars' reluctance to join the order, we would not expect a major impact on Sentences commentaries until about 1330, when the number of surviving commentaries actually declines. Moreover, documents of the University of Paris78 show that toward 1330 John XXII became more and more involved in helping those Franciscans who did lecture on the Sentences go through the hoops more quickly, perhaps to reduce a backlog, and in promoting them to high ecclesiastical positions or sending them on various missions. They often had only a summer to lecture, and little or no time as regent masters after their lectures to revise reportationes into ordinationes. They were in any case often busy with their duties in the secular church hierarchy as bishops, archbishops, patriarchs, and cardinals, perhaps too busy to compose lengthy theological works. We are able to date only two Parisian Sentences commentaries with certainty to the decade 1334-1343: those of the Augustinian Thomas of Strasbourg and the Franciscan Peter of Aquila. Thomas Strasbourg, OESA
Thomas of Argentina, or Strasbourg, read the Sentences at Paris in 1334-35 at the latest.79 His commentary on all four books survives,
77 See C. Schabel, 'Paris and Oxford', 387—388, for a summary based much on Courtenay's works. 78 See various documents in H. Denifle and A. Chatelain, eds., Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, II (Paris, 1891); the possible 'backlog' problem is based on private communication with W. J. Courtenay. 79 See Z. Kaluza, 'Serbi un sasso il name: une inscription de San Gimignano et la rencontre entre Bernard d'Arezzo et Nicolas d'Autrecourt', in Burkhard Mojsisch
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and was printed five times in the Early Modern period, first in 1490, in Strasbourg itself, and finally in 1635 (there is a modern reprint). According to Stegmuller and Doucet, thirty-five manuscripts contain at least one book of his commentary, sometimes all four, and surveys of Polish libraries have uncovered a dozen more.80 Thus it is probably the most widely dispersed of such works composed at Paris after Meyronnes. It was so popular that the mid-fourteenth century Dominican Bishop Guy d'Ibelin of Limassol in far-away Cyprus had a copy in his library.81 As we have seen, however, popularity does not necessarily entail innovation. In fact, Strasbourg is usually considered, like Gerard of Siena, a close follower of Giles of Rome.82 Sometimes, however, he has appeared to be more independent, and perhaps even aware of contemporary Oxford theology, as in the case of future contingents. But there and in the context of epistemology, Strasbourg managed to avoid explicit references to Auriol's ideas altogether.83 Strasbourg's stance on predestination is interesting. We have seen that Auriol's immediate Franciscan successors attacked his idea of general election (GE), which claimed a positive cause of reprobation in the reprobate, i.e. the obex gratiae, or obstacle to grace, and a negative cause of predestination in the predestined, i.e. the absence of the obstacle. Caracciolo rejected this, as did Marchia, whose stance, however, allows for some GE interpretation. But a few years later Odonis adopted much of Auriol's theory and even went beyond it
and Olaf Pluta, eds., Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevii, vol. 1 (Amsterdam 1991), 437-466, esp. 460-462. 80 Eleven 'new' MSS were found in Krakow. See M. Golaszewska et al., 'Commentaires sur les Sentences, supplement au Repertoire de F. Stegmiiller', Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum, 2 (1958), 22-27. Another was located in the library of the convent of Jasna Hora; see an article of the same title by J. Rebeta, Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum, 12 (1967), 135-137. 81 Along with Aquinas's Summa Theologica, an anonymous Sentences commentary, Robert Holcot's, and one attributed to a "Bernadina," perhaps, as Jean Richard says, Bernard Lombardi, but just as possible the Cistercian, or Bernardine, John of Mirecourt, whose commentary was much more popular. For an inventory of Guy's library, see M.-H. Laurent and J. Richard, 'La bibliotheque d'une eveque Dominicain de Chypre', Archiuum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 21 (1951), 447-454 (reprinted in J. Richard, Les relations entre I'Orient et I'Occident au Moyen Age. Etudes et documents [London, 1977], article VI). 82 Cf. e.g. Paul de Vooght, Les sources de la doctrine chretienne (Versailles, 1954), 100-104, on Strasbourg and the nature of theology. 83 See Schabel, Theology at Paris 1316-1345, 259-262; K. Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 320.
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in asserting a positive cause of predestination in human merit. Odonis probably paved the way for Strasbourg, who also accepts GE.84 In contrast to Odonis, however, Strasbourg's account of reprobation follows Auriol closely, even in the analogy of the sun's rays and God's offer of grace, which Marchia also related. Like Auriol, Strasbourg uses the quotation from I Timothy 2.4, "He wills that all men be saved," and employs the term obex gratiae, which "resists" grace. Like Odonis, however, Strasbourg goes beyond Auriol in his doctrine of predestination. For Strasbourg, the absence of the obex gratiae in the predestined is not a negative cause of predestination, as Auriol holds, but a positive one, so that both reprobation and predestination have positive causes in the subject. Although of course God's general diffusion of grace is necessary for salvation, it does not "force" the predestined to accept it. Rather humans cooperate by actively accepting it, and thus people are a positive cause of their own predestination. Like Robert Holcot in Oxford, Strasbourg likens God's offer of grace to His knocking on everyone's door. All that we sinners need to do is open the door and accept grace, but opening the door is our action. This is really a striking position in the context of the Latin theological tradition, yet another abandonment of SPE in the direction of Pelagius. If one were already worried by Peter Auriol's defense of a mere negative cause of predestination in the predestined, and Odonis's insistence on positive merit in the predestined, one would be further upset over the implications of Strasbourg's concept of humans' active acceptance of grace as a positive cause. While God's general offer of grace in GE may have preserved Strasbourg from Pelagianism in his own mind, Gregory of Rimini would certainly not think so, as we shall see. Just as Thomas Bradwardine probably attacked Walter Chatton and Holcot in Bradwardine's De causa Dei, Rimini aimed to refute Auriol, Odonis, and Strasbourg. Peter of Aquila, OFM The last identifiable Parisian Sentences commentary before Rimini's that is known to survive is Peter of Aquila's. Aquila probably lec84 On Strasbourg and predestination, except for my references to Odonis, I follow Halverson, Peter Aureol on Predestination, 134-143, who compares Strasbourg's opinion with Holcot's.
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tured in 1337-1338, and his commentary on all four books was printed six times between 1480 and 1680, and most recently edited by Paolini in the beginning of the last century.85 Aquila's commentary survives in thirty-five or so manuscripts. The probable reason for Aquila's popularity is indicated by his nickname of Scotellus, or "Little Scotus," which rightly does not leave one to expect independence and originality. On predestination, this Scotist resembles the Scotist of the previous decade, Francis Meyronnes. As with cognition and future contingents, in the latter case following Hugh of Novocastro,86 Aquila is content to ignore Auriol, rehash and rerefute certain previous stances, and conclude that the traditional forms of Single Particular Election (SPE), both the Dominican version and the Scotist one with its instants of nature account, are orthodox.87 Looking back on the history of the Sentences commentary at Paris between Auriol and Rimini, one is tempted to conclude that the Franciscans were passing the baton to the Augustinians in the 1330s. Immediately after Auriol's lectures, his fellow Franciscans Caracciolo, Marchia, and, although not in predestination, Meyronnes, dominated the reaction to Auriol and the development of new positions or new defenses of old ones. A few more Franciscans of the 1320s are interesting, but in the 1330s and 1340s the Franciscans are really only represented by Aquila as a theologian of any popularity, not to say import, and even here he often ignores Auriol. The Augustinians, in contrast, are somewhat poorly represented in the 1310s and 1320s by Dionysius and Gerard of Siena, but with Massa and Strasbourg in the 1330s we see some new vigor. Their reaction to Auriol is fresh, and they display some awareness of contemporary Oxford thought. As we shall now see, Gregory of Rimini was to be the Augustinian culmination of both of these tendencies, and after him a number of his confreres and their Cistercian associates
85 Unfortunately Nicholas of Autrecourt's undoubtedly interesting commentary was burned in the 1340s. For the new dating of Aquila, see Z. Kaluza, 'Serbi un sasso il nome', 446 and n. 18. The edition is Petrus de Aquila, Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum, 4 vols. ed. C. Paolini (Levanto, 1907) (books I-III), (Levanto, 1909) (book IV), which contains no apparatus or information on manuscripts. 86 On epistemology, see Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 319, n. 14. On future contingents, see Schabel, Theology at Paris 1316-1345, 262~264, and Schwamm, Das gottliche Vorherwissen, 289-296, who points to Hugh's influence (289). 87 See Halverson, 'Peter Aureol and the Re-Emergence', 216.
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were to enrich the Parisian discussion for the next three decades. The Franciscans never again dominate Parisian theology in the same way.
Gregory of Rimini
The most interesting and influential Parisian Sentences commentary in the period after Auriol was that of the Augustinian Gregory of Rimini. Rimini's commentary on books one and two is, practically speaking, his only major work, which makes it clear that Rimini's later reputation and impact rests almost solely on his Sentences commentary. In the late Middle Ages Rimini's work was the frequent object of plagiarism, and his ideas spread via that route.88 Thus the twenty complete manuscripts of book one and eleven of book two can only begin to indicate his importance, although the half dozen or so early modern editions are more in keeping with his stature. Justifiably, Rimini and his commentary have received considerable scholarly attention in recent decades, a critical edition of his work is now available, and substantial portions are being translated into modern languages.89 Nevertheless, because historians have not always put Rimini into his Parisian context, there is still much work to be done to properly understand the Italian Augustinian. Rimini was born around the time of Scotus's peak, ca. 1300. He studied theology at Paris 1322 to 1329, and then taught at various Augustinian stadia in central and northern Italy, including Bologna, Padua, and Perugia. Almost certainly while in Italy, Rimini came into contact with theological works of Oxford scholars from the 1320s
88 See the chapter by Paul Bakker and myself in this volume. On Rimini, see also Pascale Bermon's chapter in this volume. 89 The secondary literature is too extensive to note here; see in particular the relatively recent H. Oberman, ed., Gregor von Rimini: Werk und Wirkung bis Z.UT Reformation (Berlin, 1981). The critical edition is Gregorii Ariminensis OESA Lectura in I et II libros Sententiarum, ed. D. Trapp, V. Marcolino, W. Eckermann, M. Santos-Noya, M. Schulze, W. Simon, W. Urban, and V. Vendland, six vols. (Spatmittelalter und Reformation Texte und Untersuchungen, vols. 6-11) (Berlin-New York, 1979—1984). MSS are discussed in vol. 1 (1981), xxMvi, and vol. 4 (1979), xi-xix, where ten additional partial MSS are listed along with twenty-six lost witnesses. Aside from German and French translations of single articles, there is Modality, Order, and Transcendence: Gregory of Rimini on God's Knowledge, Power, and Will. An English Translation of His Lectures on the Sentences, book 1, dist. 35-48, trans. R. Friedman and C. Schabel (New Haven, forthcoming).
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and 1330s, most notably William of Ockham, Adam Wodeham, Richard FitzRalph, and Walter Chatton. Rimini returned to Paris in 1342 to prepare to lecture on the Sentences, which he did in 1343—44. Rimini later revised his lectures, removing certain passages that until recently were considered later additiones. After his lectures Rimini continued to play an important role at Paris, and later became the Augustinians' prior general. He died in 1358. We can get an idea, but only a rough idea, of Rimini's main interlocutors from the direct and indirect citations that the editors of the critical edition found. For scholars after Scotus, Rimini has by far the most references to Auriol and Ockham, approximately 200 each. After this, Rimini cites theological works of Wodeham (66 times) and FitzRalph (34) most frequently, and the number decreases sharply after this. Although there are indications that William of Rubio had already made some use of Ockham's and Chatton's commentaries,90 Rimini was to a large extent introducing Oxford theology into the Parisian debate, and the number of Oxford citations may exaggerate Rimini's preoccupation with the English studium generale. Rimini may have wanted to show off the novel ideas, or perhaps they required more explanation to the Parisians. Accordingly, Rimini's reliance on Parisian theologians after Auriol was probably much heavier than a citation count shows, both because historians know less about these theologians and would not easily recognize such influences, and because Rimini may, in common scholastic practice, have been reluctant to give credit to his immediate Parisian predecessors. Again, more work is required for clarification on this point, but it appears to be true in the case of future contingents. What is certain is that Rimini marks the merging of the Oxford and Parisian traditions, and therefore opens a new era in Parisian theology. Rimini is much more than a combination of traditions, of course. He possessed a keen deductive mind, and his treatments of important subjects, while sometimes extreme, are often intellectually very satisfying. In general, one could characterize Rimini's theology along
90 On Rubio's connection with Chatton (as well as Ockham and Auriol), see J. M. Rubert y Candau, La filosofia del siglo XIV, a troves de Guillermo Rubio (Madrid 1952), e.g., pp. 16, 21, and 41, following Michalski. On Rubio and his Sentences commentary generally, see Rubert y Candau's, El conocimiento de Dios en lafilosojia de Guillermo Rubio (Madrid s.a.), esp. pp. 3-43, correcting on pp. 10-12 the 1333 date of its approval by the commission appointed by Gerard Odonis to 1334.
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the following lines: Rimini utilized a deductive methodology in theology, starting from scriptural passages as the undemonstrable and very true premises for his equally certain conclusions. His choice of biblical passages and his interpretation of them, however, were dictated by his rigid adherence to Paul and Augustine, although again he had his own sometimes-extreme interpretation of Augustine. Beyond this, Rimini's careful definition of terms and laying out of arguments make his Sentences commentary useful reading as a handbook and enlightening as a classic work of Christian thought. Rimini's treatment of predestination exhibits all of these characteristics, and provides us with clues about his opponents. Moreover, Rimini's reputation was to a certain extent built on his position on predestination, which earned for him his rather negative sobriquet 'the Torturer of Infants'.91 Rimini asks only one question for distinctions 40 and 41 of book one: "Has everyone been predestined or reproved by God from eternity?" The question takes up thirtyfive pages of the critical edition, however, over one thousand lines. Rimini's premises are scriptural passages from which he deduces his position. Of paramount importance is Paul's commentary, in his letter to the Romans, chapter 9, verse 13, on Malachi 1.2: "Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated." The entire question abounds with scriptural quotations (46), most often from the Apostle (32), especially Romans 9. These premises are interpreted, however, through the eyes of Augustine, whom Rimini quotes forty-three times, often at length. There are many other scriptural and Augustinian citations, of course. 'Additions', or more properly 'subtractions' 151-153 are included in the edition of dd. 40-41, and they show that Rimini reworked his commentary, clarifying and strengthening his position in moving toward Double Particular Election (DPE). The question has three articles, and the first one Rimini devotes entirely to defining his terms: What do 'predestination' and 'reprobation' signify? Rimini does not leave anything to chance, but starts from the beginning for his hearers and readers, in order to build his case.
91 In what follows I rely heavily on J. Halverson, Peter Aureol on Predestination, 143-157, and my own translation in Friedman and Schabel, Modality, Order, and Transcendence. Rimini's position has been discussed many times, but Halverson and I attempt to put it more in the Parisian context.
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The bulk of the question is article two, where Rimini begins by briefly outlining earlier opinions. It is immediately apparent that he is working primarily in the Parisian tradition, and he lays out five conclusions against the previous Parisian positions. These five conclusions are the focal point of Rimini's discussion, where he systematically builds his position, and they are followed by the usual refutation of objections and a third article summing up Rimini's answer to the question. The first conclusion is directed at Gerard Odonis's and Thomas of Strasbourg's modifications of Auriol's stance on predestination, although Rimini may also have had Walter Chatton in mind:92 No one is predestined because of a good use of free will, i.e. there is no positive cause of predestination on the part of those predestined. The second conclusion attacks Auriol, although Rimini interprets Auriol's stance in the way Caracciolo had: No one is predestined because it is foreknown that he will be without a habitual or actual obstacle to grace, which he later equates with original or actual sin. The third conclusion, against Auriol, Odonis, and Strasbourg, is merely Single Particular Election's (SPE's) account of predestination: It stems solely from God's mercy. It is with the fourth and fifth conclusions that, perhaps spurred on by Auriol and Strasbourg, Rimini breaks from the traditional SPE account. The fourth conclusion, against SPE and Strasbourg, is that no one is reprobate because of a foreseen bad use of free will, and the fifth, against Auriol, no one is reprobate because of a foreseen obstacle to grace. Auriol compelled Rimini to abandon the traditional SPE approach to predestination and reprobation by showing that it was inconsistent, on account of the asymmetry of the causes of reprobation and predestination. If the reprobate cause their reprobation, then the elect must cause their predestination, otherwise two different systems appear to be working. Rimini agrees with Auriol's critique. In Auriol's General Election (GE), however, the solution is that God offers grace universally to everyone, but only those with an obstacle to grace are damned. Rimini finds one major problem with Auriol's stance: it is Pelagian. To preserve consistency and avoid Pelagianism, Rimini thinks he must remove responsibility for both reprobation and predestination
92
On Chatton and predestination, see the chapter on Chatton and Wodeham in this volume.
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from the shoulders of people. Another important reason for Rimini's move, however, is his understanding of divine nature. Auriol stresses that God is completely simple, immutable, and necessary, because He is perfect. So because God is the way He is, He does not pick and choose individuals ab aeterno, before creation, for salvation and damnation, but rather makes a general, necessary offer of grace. Rimini, on the other hand, emphasizes that God is free, and does what He wills with different parts of His free creation, much as a potter does with different parts of his clay. The clay and the humans are otherwise indistinguishable with respect to meriting use here or there, or deserving hell or heaven. Rimini supports this reasoning with Romans 9, and Augustine's commentary on it: God predestined Jacob and damned Esau before the children were born, before they had done anything good or evil. He "that calleth" was the sole cause. Why? Because, as God said to Moses, "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy." Paul adds in 9.18, "Therefore He hath mercy on whom He will. And whom He will, He hardeneth." As the potter has "power over the same clay, or the same lump, to make one vessel unto honour and another unto dishonour," so does God who makes "vessels of wrath" and "vessels of mercy." Although for Rimini salvation and reprobation have nothing to do with our sinning, he admits that we still do not know why some in particular are saved and others damned. We do know that God actively wills to grant grace to the elect and deny grace to the reprobate. Human free will appears to have little scope for action, as Rimini also realizes, but this is of lower intellectual and theological priority for Rimini. In this as in many discussions, Rimini remained in the Parisian debate as recorded in the Sentences commentaries of the previous quarter century. He also knew the Oxford tradition, however, and in Rimini we can see the reunification of European theology after two decades of relative division. His treatment is an explicit reaction to Auriol, Odonis, and Strasbourg, but perhaps also to Ghatton. His criticism of Auriol's theory of reprobation echoes Caracciolo's much shorter refutation of Auriol. His own DPE could be seen as a harsh but very logical interpretation of Francis of Marchia's alternative, emphasizing the primacy of the divine will in both predestination and reprobation. In many ways Rimini's position is the most satisfying of them all intellectually. He had many followers on this
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issue, as in many other contexts. Some of his followers were quite influential, such as Pierre d'Ailly and Marsilius of Inghen. Like Auriol's theory of GE, Rimini's DPE survived to the reformation. As difficult as it is to find incontrovertible proof that Martin Luther and others knew Rimini's ideas directly, they certainly knew his name and his exact words, copied verbatim by Ailly and others.
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LA LECTURA SUR LES DEUX PREMIERS LIVRES DES SENTENCES DE GREGOIRE DE RIMINI O.E.S.A. (1300-1358) Pascale Bermon
I. Rappel biographique
Gregoire de Rimini, ne en 1300 a Rimini, est mort a Vienne (Autriche) en 1358, dans 1'exercice des fonctions de General de 1'Ordre des Errnites de Saint Augustin auxquelles il venait tout juste d'etre appele.1 Au cours de sa carriere, il fut envoye deux fois a Paris, ou il sejourna au studium generate de son ordre, d'abord de 1323 a 1329, puis treize ans plus tard, de 1342 a 1346. On retrouve ainsi deux sejours parisiens, entrecoupes d'un "retour au pays", dans la biographic de nombreux membres des ordres mendiants au XIVe siecle. De recentes remarques de W. J. Courtenay2 a ce sujet nous invitent a les dissocier 1'un de 1'autre: selon cet auteur, le premier sejour etait 1'occasion de recevoir une formation elementaire dispensee par 1'ordre pour pourvoir a ses propres besoins en enseignants; il n'avait done pas pour objet de preparer aux activites universitaires liees a 1'obtention de la maitrise en theologie, auxquelles est consacre le second sejour.3 1 Pour une biographie detaillee de Gregoire de Rimini, voir Marcolino (Venicio), "Einleitung", in A. D. Trapp, V. Marcolino (ed.), Gregorii Ariminensis OESA Lectura super primum et secundum sententiarum, De Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1981, t. 1, pp. xi-xvii ("Spatmittelalter und Reformation Texte und Untersuchungen", 6). Nous developpons les remarques qui suivent dans notre these, L'Assentiment et son objet dans le commentaire des Sentences de Gregoire de Rimini. Precede d'une etude sur la formation logique, philosophique et theologique du Docteur Authenticate, Paris, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Janvier 2000. 2 Courtenay (William J.), "The Instructional Program of the Mendicant Convents at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century", The Medieval Church: Universities, Heresy and the Religious Life. Essays in Honour of Gordon Leff, P. Biller, R.B. Dobson (ed.), Boydell, 1999, pp. 77-92. Voir aussi Ypma (Eelcko), La formation des professeurs chez. les ermites de saint Augustin de 1256 a 1354, Paris, Centre d'Etudes des Augustins, 1956. 3 Voir deja Lickteig (Franz-Bernard), The German Carmelites at The Medieval Universities, Rome, Institutum Carmelitanum, 1981 (c. 3: "The Studia Generalia and their incorporated Relationship with the Universities", pp. 77-110): "By the fifteenth century most of the studia generalia served a practical purpose as theological teacher-training
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Ainsi, Gregoire de Rimini venait a Paris en 1323 comme bon nombre de ses confreres pour y suivre, dans le cadre du studium generale de son ordre, une formation qui lui ouvrait la possibilite de retourner enseigner dans les studio, de sa province d'origine: apres 1329, Gregoire de Rimini fut lecteur a Bologne,4 avant d'etre envoye, a partir de 1338, a Padoue et a Perouse. En 1342, en revanche, il faisait partie du tres petit nombre de ceux qui, parce qu'on les destinait a de hautes responsabilites, avaient etc elus par le chapitre general de leur ordre pour commenter le livre des Sentences a la Faculte de theologie de Paris dans le but d'obtenir la maitrise. II prit alors part a la vie universitaire proprement dite: en 1342 ("annus expectationis"), il prepara ses lecons sur les Sentences, qu'il delivra en 1343-1344, avant d'obtenir la maitrise en theologie en 1345. Alphonse Vargas de Tolede (f 1366) lui succeda sur la chaire des augustins en 1344—1345. Son commentaire est un complement precieux a 1'etude de la pensee de Gregoire de Rimini.5 Toutefois, Gregoire de Rimini a pu coudoyer a Paris entre 1323 schools. After the successful completion of their lectorate of theology course, the new lectors were appointed as theology teachers in their own provinces" (p. 79). 4 Les membres de la Faculte des Arts de Bologne, en 1'absence d'une Faculte de Theologie qui ne fut fondee qu'en 1364 par I'eleve de Gregoire de Rimini, Hugolin d'Orvieto, venaient soutenir des disputes dans les studia des ordres mendiants de la ville. Ainsi, le bolonais Anselme de Cumes (Anselmus Guittus de Cumis), maitre es arts et medecin, vint-il disputer au studium des Augustins sous la responsabilite de Gregoire de Rimini, sur le sujet suivant: faut-il poser un ordre parmi les individus de la meme espece? Ms. Vaticano, Bav, Ottob. lat. 318 [XVe s.], f. I l l : "aliter respondit semel in Bononia magister Anselmus de Cumis sub fratre Gregorio de Rimini". Voir Maier (Anneliese), "Eine italienische averroistenschule aus der ersten Halfte des 14. Jahrhunderts", in Die Vorlaufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert. Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spdtscholastik, 2e ed. augmentee, Rome, 1966 ("Storia e letteratura. Raccolta di studi e testi", 22), pp. 251-278 (p. 256 et n. 13) et ibid., pp. 352 354; ainsi que id., "Die Bologneser Philosophen des 14. Jahrhunderts", [reimpr.] in Ausgehendes Mittelalter. Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Geistesgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts, t. 2, Rome, 1967 ("Storia e letteratura. Raccolta di studi e testi", 105), pp. 335-349 (p. 346). Sur le sejour de Gregoire a Bologne, voir aussi infra n. 64. 5 Alphonsus de Vargas, Lectura super primo Sententiarum, Thomas de Spilimbergo, Venise, Paganino de' Paganini, 1490; reimpr., The Meriden Gravure Co., 1952, ("Cassiciacum. Studies in St. Augustine and the Augustinian Order", 2 [American Series]). Une monographic deja ancienne est consacree a Alphonse Vargas: Kiirzinger (Josef), Alfonsus Vargas Toletanus und seine theologische Einleitungslehre. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Scholastik im 14. Jahrhundert, Munster, 1930 ("Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters", t. 22, Cahiers 5-6). Recemment, une comparaison des citations de saint Augustin chez, notamment, Gregoire de Rimini et Alphonse Vargas a ete tentee: Saak (Eric Leland), "The Reception of Augustine in the Later Middle Ages", in I. Backus (ed.), The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West. From the Carolingians to the Maurists, Leiden, Brill, 1997, t. 1, pp. 367-404.
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et 1329, dans le studium generate ou il sejournait, ceux de ses freres qui, a 1'epoque, donnaient leurs cours sur les Sentences et, au moins par eux, recueillir un echo de ce qui se disait a 1'Universite. Sa formation intellectuelle doit done certainement beaucoup au climat parisien des annees 1320.6
II. L'edition de la Lectura Nous disposons depuis peu d'une edition critique de la Lectura sur les deux premiers livres des Sentences de Gregoire de Rimini.7 Elle vient heureusement remplacer les editions parues au XVF siecle, auxquelles se referent tous les travaux publics sur Gregoire de Rimini avant les annees 1980. La tradition du texte de la Lectura presente une particularite qui a de lourdes consequences pour 1'interpretation de la pensee de Gregoire de Rimini. L'ensemble des manuscrits connus,8 ainsi que les premieres editions publiees a la Renaissance, conservent en effet la version definitive Q'"ordinatio"} des lecons du Docteur Authentique. Cette version definitive est le resultat d'une revision du texte posterieure a 1'annee universitaire 1343-1344. Elle doit dater de la fin de 1344 pour les lecons sur le premier livre, et au plus tot du debut de 1'annee 1346 pour celles sur le second livre.9 Elle integre telles quelles des disputes universitaires auxquelles Gregoire de Rimini a 6 Cette periode de la vie intellectuelle parisienne, que W. J. Courtenay, dans Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England, Princeton, 1987, a presentee comme une sorte d'eclipse, par contraste avec l'"age d'or" que connait 1'ecole anglaise a la meme epoque, fait actuellement 1'objet d'une devaluation positive. Voir notarnment: Schabel (Chris), Theology at Paris, 1316~1345. Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents, ed. Ashgate, Aldershot, Burlington (USA), Singapore, Sydney, 2000 ("Ashgate Studies in Medieval Philosophy"). A propos de Paris dans les annees 1320, rappelons par exemple que Nicolas d'Autrecourt, qui fut denonce en 1340 et condamne en 1346 pour avoir soutenu, entre autres, une these sur le signifie propositionnel attestant sa connaissance de la doctrine du "complexe significabile" avant que Gregoire de Rimini ne commence ses lecons, etait etudiant en theologie a Paris vers 1325-1326: voir Kaluza (Zenon), "Nicolas d'Autrecourt. Ami de la verite", in Histoire litteraire de la France, t. XLII, fasc. 1, Suite du quatorZieme siecle, Paris, 1995. 7 Voir supra, n. 1. L'edition Trapp comprend sept tomes, dont un volume d'index. 8 Liste et description des manuscrits aujourd'hui conserves: pour les lecons sur le livre I, dans Marcolino (Venicio), "Einleitung", in A. D. Trapp (ed.), t. 1, pp. xxi-xlvi; pour les lecons sur le livre II, dans Trapp (Adolf D.), Schulze (Manfred), "Einleitung", ibid., t. 4, pp. xii-xix. 9 Ed. Trapp, t. 1, pp. xv-xvi.
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participe a Paris entre 1343 et 1345, et transmet done un etat recent de son enseignement. Or en 1522 paraissait a Venise, chez 1'imprimeur Lucas Antonius de Giunta, une edition de la Lectura de Gregoire de Rimini preparee par les soins d'Augustin de Montefalco OESA. L'editeur y declare que le texte a etc "cum originali recognitus suaeque integritati restitutus. Cui etiam ex archethypis et veteri lectura multa necessaria nedum utilia addidit [. . .] quae in ceteris codicibus hactenus impressis (nescio qua causa) fuerant praetermissa".10 Augustin de Montefalco a du avoir acces aux pieces manuscrites avec lesquelles travaillait Gregoire de Rimini lui-meme, et qui sont aujourd'hui perdues. Son edition restitue en general un etat du texte anterieur a V'ordinatio", et demeure ainsi pour nous un temoin de premier ordre. Elle fournit des renseignements de deux types: des notes marginales dans lesquelles Gregoire de Rimini identifie les textes et les auteurs auxquels il fait reference; des passages entiers que Gregoire de Rimini a supprimes de \'"ordinatio", ou recrits, ou deplaces. Augustin de Montefalco considerait que la restitution qu'il faisait de ces passages representait une "addition" au texte jusque-la connu et edite. C'est pourquoi les editeurs contemporains continuent de les designer comme des "Additiones".u Le terme ne doit cependant pas faire illusion: les "Additiones" sont dans la plupart des cas des passages que Gregoire de Rimini a retranches en preparant 1'edition definitive du texte de ses legons.12 Elles appartiennent le plus souvent a une version de ces lecons anterieure a 1'annee 1343^1344, la "Vetus lectura", que Gregoire de Rimini a du preparer a Paris en 1342 pendant son "annee d'attente", et plus encore en Italic avant cette date.13
10
Ibid., pp. Ixv-lxxi. Sur les "Additiones", voir ibid., pp. xciii-xcvii. Dans 1'edition Trapp, il y a 170 "Additiones" aux lecons sur le livre I (t. 1 a 3), et 59 aux lemons sur le livre II (t. 4 a 6). 12 V. Marcolino, ibid., p. XCV, suggere que certaines des "Additiones", parrni les plus courtes, pourraient etre de veritables additions a \'"ordinatio", done posterieures a 1346. II avoue cependant ne pas etre en mesure d'identifier surement ces possibles "annotations marginales" a l'"ordinatio". 13 Les "Additiones" qui sont des morceaux retranches de \'"ordinatio" ne sont cependant pas toutes des fragments de la "Vetus lectura". Certaines, comme les "Additiones" 54-56 des lecons sur le livre II (ed. cit., t. 6, pp. 155-165 et pp. 170-173) appartiennent aux ensembles "parisiens", c'est-a-dire aux textes qui rapportent des disputes universitaires des annees 1342-1346, et que Gregoire a inseres apres coup dans son projet initial. 11
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La mise en perspective des "Additiones" et du "textus ordinarius" permet done generalement de saisir une evolution de la pensee de Gregoire de Rimini, et notamment d'evaluer avec precision dans quelle mesure son sejour parisien de 1342—1346 1'a amene a revoir la presentation de certains sujets. Elle fournit des informations de premiere importance sur la vie intellectuelle a Paris dans les annees 1342-1346, qui fut marquee par des interventions du magistere aujourd'hui largement connues: 1'interdiction d'Ockham a la Faculte des Arts en 1339 et en 1340,14 la condamnation de Nicolas d'Autrecourt en 1346,15 celle de Jean de Mirecourt en 1347,16 ainsi que la denonciation de I'engouement parisien pour les "doctrines sophistiques etrangeres" par Clement VI en 1346.17 II faut encore ajouter a ces interventions les listes d'articles condamnes a Paris vers 1347-1348,18 consignees par Hugolin d'Orvieto dans les statuts qu'il ecrivit en 1364 pour la Faculte de theologie de 1'Universite de Bologne. Quoique moins etudiees, elles sont cependant fondamentales, car Hugolin fut 1'eleve a Paris de Gregoire de Rimini.19
14 Sur le debat actuel autour de la signification exacte des statuts de 1339 et 1340, voir par exemple Courtenay (William J.), "The Registers of the University of Paris and the Statutes against the Scientia occanica", in Vivarium 29/1, 1991, pp. 13—49 (mise au point de la bibliographic anterieure p. 13, n. 1-2); et, pour un autre point de vue, Kaluza (Zenon), "Les etapes d'une controverse. Les nominalistes et les realistes parisiens de 1339 a 1482", in A. Le Boulluec (ed.), La controverse religieuse et ses formes, Paris, 1995, pp. 297-317. 15 Voir Kaluza, "Nicolas d'Autrecourt . . .". 16 Sur les circonstances de sa condamnation, voir Courtenay (William J.), "Pastor de Serrescuderio (d. 1356) and MS Saint Omer 239", in Archives d'histoire doctrinak et litteraire du Moyen Age 63, 1996, pp. 325-356. Sur 1'aspect doctrinal, voir notamment Genest (Jean-Francois) et Vignaux (Paul), "La bibliotheque anglaise de Jean de Mirecourt: "subtilitas" ou plagiat?", in O. Pluta (ed.), Die Philosophic im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert, In memoriam Konstanty Michalski (1879-1947), Amsterdam, 1988, pp. 275-301. " Voir Tachau (Katherine), Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics 1250-1345, Leiden, Brill, 1988, pp. 379-383. 18 Voir Genest (Jean-Francois), "Pierre de Ceffons et 1'hypothese du Dieu trompeur", in Z. Kaluza, P. Vignaux (ed.), Preuve et raisons a 1'Universite de Paris. Logique, ontologie et theologie au XIV siecle, Paris, Vrin, 1984, pp. 197-214 (pp. 198-199). 19 La Lectura d'Hugolin a etc recemment editee: W. Eckermann (ed.), V. Marcolino (coed. t. 3 et 4), Hugolini de Urbe Veteri OESA Commentarius in Quattuor libros Sententiarum, 4 t., Wiirzburg, Augustinus-Verlag, 1980-1988 ("Cassiciacum", Supplementbande viii—xi). Sur la pensee d'Hugolin d'Orvieto, voir W. Eckermann, B. U. Hucker (ed.), Hugolin von Orvieto. Ein Spdtmittelalterlicher Augustinertheologe in seiner Zeit, Cloppenbourg, 1992.
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III. La composition du texte
Cornme la plupart de ses contemporains, Gregoire de Rimini a compose son oeuvre sur les Sentences sans suivre d'abord un ordre logique et systematique, mais en juxtaposant des dossiers traitant de questions separees.20 C'est pourquoi nous preferons distinguer entre la presentation editoriale de la Lectura, qui est ordonnee et reguliere, et son contenu, qui est en realite tres composite. a. La presentation editoriale
La presentation editoriale que fait Gregoire de Rimini de ses lecons est celle qui est commune aux commentaires sur les Sentences: prologue,21 puis livres I et II.22 Le prologue appartient-il au commentaire du premier livre ou bien est-il une introduction generale a I'ensemble de la Lectura? Le systeme de reference adopte par 1'editeur contemporain23 suggere d'inclure le prologue dans le livre I, ce que faisaient deja les premieres editions,24 et, avant elles, au moins trois manuscrits du XIVe siecle.25 Cependant, Gregoire de Rimini place lui-meme son prologue dans le cadre du prologue du livre des Sentences de Pierre Lombard: "circa
20 Cette maniere de proceder explique, par exemple, que les questions 2 a 4 de la distinction 17 du livre I (ed. Trapp, t. 2, pp. 250-417) aient pu tres tot circuler a part, sous la forme d'un traite independant. Ce "tractatus de intensione et remissione formarurri" est recopie comme une ceuvre a part entiere dans les mss Oxford, Bodleian Libr., Canon. Misc. 177 [XIVC-XVC s.], ff. 109-122 et 136v-149v, et Venezia, BN Marciana, VI 160 (2816) [a. 1449], ff. 79-106v (voir V. Marcolino, "Einleitung", ed. Trapp, t. 1, pp. xxxi-xxxii et xl). 21 Ed. Trapp, t. 1, pp. 1-186. 22 Conformement a un usage devenu courant a Paris au XIVe siecle, Gregoire de Rimini n'a commente que les deux premiers livres des Sentences, en une annee. 23 "In 1 Sent prol q 1", etc. 24 Dans les editions Paris 1482, Valence 1500, Paris 1520 et Venise De Giunta 1522, le Prologue a pour explicit: "Explicit prologus primi libri sententiarum". 25 Mss Bordeaux, BM 158, f. 42v | | Explicit prologus primi sententiarum; Vaticano, BAV, Ottob. lat. 69, f. 19v et Oxford, Balliol Coll. 73, f. 22v | | Explicit prologus primi libri sententiarum. Ces trois manuscrits ne contiennent que les lecons sur le livre I, ce qui explique peut-etre qu'ils fassent du Prologue le Prologue du livre I. Le Ms. Troyes, BM 151 [ca 1350], qui contient le commentaire complet, place 1'incipit des lecons sur le premier livre (f. 1 Incipit lectura primi sententiarum) avant le debut du Prologue, incluant ainsi ce dernier dans le livre I. L'explicit du Prologue, au f. 18, est cependant neutre: || Explicit prologus libri sententiarum. Voir Marcolino, "Einleitung", ed. Trapp, t. 1, pp. xxiv, xxvii, xxx et xlv.
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prologum libri Sententiarum quaero primo . . ,".26 Dans le cours de son propre prologue, Gregoire de Rimini cite d'ailleurs une fois explicitement le prologue de Pierre Lombard.27 Enfin, juste apres le prologue, Gregoire de Rimini ouvre son commentaire du livre I par une reference a la premiere distinction du Maitre des Sentences: "circa primam distinctionem, in qua Magister loquitur defrui et uti, quaero primo . . .",28 indiquant par la qu'il quitte le cadre du prologue pour entrer dans la lecture du premier livre. II semble des lors preferable de considerer que le prologue de Gregoire de Rimini, comme celui du Lombard qui lui sert de pretexte, n'appartient pas au livre I, mais forme une unite litteraire independante qui sert d'introduction a 1'ensemble des Sentences.29 Le prologue est done plutot ici un genre litteraire qui reproduit conventionnellement la presentation editoriale du livre commente, a savoir les Sentences de Pierre Lombard, sans que cette parente de forme influence le contenu, qui demeure tres different, "quantitativement" et intellectuellement.30 Le prologue est ainsi bien distinct d'un "principium", c'est-a-dire de la seance solennelle et publique qui inaugurait officiellement, a une date determinee de 1'annee academique et selon un protocole fixe, la lecture de chaque livre des Sentences, et qui donnait lieu a des discussions entre les differents bacheliers sententiaires de 1'annee.31 Lors de la redaction finale de son commentaire, Gregoire de Rimini a d'ailleurs insere le rapport des discussions qu'il a cues avec deux de ses collegues sententiaires
26 Ed. Trapp, t. 1, p. 1. Le prologue du Lombard est un court texte de cinq paragraphes: cf. Magistri Petri Lombardi Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, Rome, 2 t., 1971 et 1981 ("Spicilegium Bonaventurianum", 4-5), t. 1, pp. 3-4. 27 En Prol. q. 1 a. 2, ed. Trapp, t. 1, p. 19, Gregoire de Rimini cite le § 2 du Prologue du Maitre des Sentences: "Quo [zelo] inardescentes, "fidem nostram adversus errores carnalium atque animalium hominum" Davidicae turris clypeis munire vel potius munitam ostendere [. . .] studuimus" (P. Lombard, ed. Rome, 1971, t. 1, p. 3). 28 Ed. Trapp, t. 1, p. 187. 29 Tel est le sens de 1'explicit du prologue donne par la plupart des manuscrits et repris par 1'editeur contemporain: "Explicit prologus libri Sententiarum [. . .]" (ed. Trapp, t. 1, p. 186). 30 Le prologue du Lombard fait cinq courts paragraphes (deux pages), celui de Gregoire de Rimini presque deux cents pages dans I'edition Trapp. Sur le prologue, voir notre these, Paris, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, 2000. 31 Sur les "principia", voir Glorieux (Palemon), "Sentences (Commentaires sur les)", in Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, t. 14, Paris, 1939, col. 1862 et id., "L'enseignement au moyen age. Techniques et methodes en usage a la Faculte de Theologie de Paris au XIIF siecle", Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen Age 35, 1968, p. 65-186 (pp. 138-141).
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pendant les "principia de l'annee 1343—1344. II a choisi a cet effet le cadre de la distinction 7 du livre II, non le prologue.32 A 1'interieur de chaque livre, le propos est articule en "distinctions", elles-memes subdivisees en questions et en articles. La numerotation des distinctions est faite en reference a celle que porte le texte du Lombard,33 meme si Gregoire de Rimini ne commente pas toutes les distinctions de ce dernier, mais opere parmi elles une selection, et pour certaines des regroupements.34 Enfin, comme nous 1'avons dit, Gregoire de Rimini n'a commente que les deux premiers livres des Sentences, centres sur Dieu et sur la creation,35 laissant de cote les livres III et IV, qui portent respectivement sur le Christ et sur les sacrements.36 En faisant ce choix, il se conformait a ce qui etait devenu une coutume a Paris.37 Gette habitude a certainement contribue a orienter sa reflexion vers des questions metaphysiques, au detriment de matieres plus exclusive ment theologiques.
32 Ed. Trapp, t. 5, pp. 118-149, In II Sent. d. 7 q. 3 a. 1 ("Utrum homo cognoscat per species"). Ibid., p. 119, Gregoire affirme: "Quamvis autem materia primi articuli sit aliqualiter pertractata in primo libro distinctione 3 quaestione 1, ad pleniorem tamen discussionem eius et propter collationem de ipsa habitam in Principiis librorum Sententiarum inter quosdam baccalaureos concurrentes mecum in Lectura et me, volo iterum aliqualiter earn hie tractare . . .". 33 La division en distinctions ne remonte pas a Pierre Lombard lui-meme qui s'etait contente de distribuer son texte en chapitres, elle parait avoir ete introduite par Alexandre de Hales dans les annees 1220. Voir Magistri Petri Lombardi Sententiae, ed. cit. supra n. 22, t. 1, pp. 143*-144* et Brady (I.), "The Distinctions of Lombard's Book of Sentences and Alexander of Hales", in Franciscan Studies 25, 1965, pp. 90—116. 34 Ceci explique les particularites numeriques que presente la serie des distinctions proposee par Gregoire de Rimini: pour le livre I, il commente regulierement les distinctions 1 a 13, regroupe en une seule distinction les distinctions 14 a 16 du Lombard, puis continue ainsi: d. 17, d. 19-20, d. 24, d. 26-27, d. 28~32, d. 33-34, d. 35-36, d. 38, d. 39, d. 40-41, d. 42-44, d. 45, d. 46-47, d. 48. Pour le livre I, Gregoire de Rimini commente done en 28 distinctions (en nombre absolu) les 48 distinctions de Pierre Lombard. Pour le livre II, la proportion est encore moindre: Gregoire developpe 18 distinctions (d. 1, d. 2, d. 3-5, d. 6, d. 7, d. 9-10, d. 11, d. 12, d. 15, d. 16-17, d. 18, d. 24-25, d. 26-28, d. 29, d. 30-33, d. 34-37, d. 38-41, d. 42—44), alors que le texte des Sentences en comprend 44. 33 Pierre Lombard, I Sent.: "De mysterio Trinitatis" (ed. cit. Rome, 1971, t. 1, p. 55); II Sent.: "De rerum creatione et formatione corporalium et spiritualium et aliis pluribus eis pertinentibus" (ibid., p. 329). 36 Pierre Lombard, III Sent.: "De Incamatione Verbi" (ed. Rome, 1971, t. 2, p. 23); IV Sent.: "De doctrina signorum" (ibid., p. 231). 37 Les Statuts parisiens de 1366 denoncent cette reduction du champ couvert par les bacheliers sententiaires: "Rursus statuimus ne sic super prologum et primum Sententiarum insistant, quin possint debite tractare materias secundi, tertii et quarti
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b. La diversite du contenu Dans le cadre que lui offre cette presentation conventionnelle, Gregoire de Rimini emploie des "materiaux" d'origine tres diverse. Nous distinguons trois categories principales de textes: les comptes rendus de disputes auxquelles a participe Gregoire de Rimini (textes ayant une origine orale); les dialogues avec le commentaire des Sentences ou une autre ceuvre d'un contemporain (reflexions ayant une source ecrite, mais "moderne"); les dossiers traditionnels (reponses aux arguments des "doctores antiqui").38 Parmi les comptes rendus de disputes existe egalement une certaine diversite. En voici quelques exemples, tous tires du commentaire sur le livre II: En II Sent. d. 7 q. 3 a. 1, comme nous 1'avons dit, Gregoire de Rimini rapporte la discussion qu'il a eue avec deux de ses collegues, Jean Rathe Scot39 et Frangois de Trevise,40 lors des "principia" de
Sententiarum" (Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. H. Denifle et E. Chatelain, t. 2, Paris, 1889, p. 700, § 1189). Voir Glorieux, "Sentences", col. 1875-1876 et Courtenay (William J.), "Programs of Study and Genres of Scholastic Theological Production in the Fourteenth Century", in J. Hamesse (ed.), Manuels, programmes de cours et techniques d'enseignement dans les universites medievales. Actes du Colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve (9—11 septembre 1993), Louvain-la-Neuve, 1994, pp. 325-350. 38 Bien des remarques ont etc ecrites sur 1'ernploi des adjectifs "antiquus" et "modernus" au XIVe siecle. Voir par exemple Courtenay (William J.), "Antiqui et modemi in Late Medieval Thought", in Journal of the History of Ideas 48, 1987, pp. 3-10. En ce qui concerne Gregoire de Rimini, il considere comme "modernes" tous les auteurs depuis les annees 1320: il comprend done sous ce terme I'ensemble de la production litteraire publiee depuis le debut de ses propres etudes. D'autre part, en ed. Trapp, t. 3, p. 154, par exemple, Gregoire de Rimini appelle Henri de Gand (| 1293) et Duns Scot (| 1308) des "anciens docteurs". Les termes de "modernus" et d'"antiquus" n'ont chez lui qu'un sens chronologique, sans particuliere connotation positive ou negative. 39 Jean Rathe Scot (| probablement en 1355) etait un maitre seculier ecossais: maitre es arts a Paris entre 1333 et 1337, il devint docteur en theologie en 1348, et eveque d'Aberdeen en 1350 (cf. Watt [D. E. R.], A Biographical Dictionary of Scottish Graduates to 1410, Oxford, 1977, pp. 465-466). Courtenay (William J.)'et Tachau (Katherine), "Ockham, Ockhamists, and the English-German Nation", in History of Universities, t. 2, 1982, pp. 53-95, supposent qu'il est 1'un de ces maitres es arts ockhamistes des annees 1330 que visaient les Statuts parisiens de 1340 et de 1341. Jean Rathe Scot est 1'auteur d'une determination Utrum Deus possit decipere aliquem, conservee dans les mss Paris, BN, lat. 16408, ff. 194v-195v et lat. 16535, f. 161rv, ou il reprend 1'argumentation de Gregoire de Rimini centre le Dieu trompeur: voir Genest (Jean-Francois), "Pierre de Ceffons . . .", p. 201, et p. 210, n. 32-33. Enfin, Alphonse Vargas de Tolede cite plusieurs fois Jean Scot: voir Kiirzinger, Alfonsus Vargas Toletanus . . ., pp. 102-104, et Schabel, Theology at Paris . . ., pp. 274-279 et 287. 40 Voir infra, n. 45.
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Pannee 1343-1344, au sujet de la necessite des especes ^species"}. Ce compte rendu vient se substituer dans Pedition definitive a une redaction anterieure, V'Additio 36"",41 dans laquelle Gregoire de Rimini s'opposait a Popinion d'Ockham sur les especes. En II Sent. d. 7 q. 4, il nous livre, semble-t-il, la substance de propos echanges avec le seul Jean Rathe Scot au sujet de la connaissance intuitive du non existant.42 En II Sent. d. 38-41 q. 1 a. I, 43 Gregoire de Rimini repond aux attaques qu'avait lancees centre sa definition de Pacte moralement bon le dominicain thomiste44 Francois de Trevise lors de ses vesperies.45 II est difficile de determiner Porigine des trois points que com41
Ed. Trapp, t. 5, pp. 98-117. Ed. Trapp, t. 5, pp. 162-193, In II Sent. d. 7 q. 4 ("Utrum aliquid non existens possimus naturaliter intueri sen intuitive cognoscere"). En t. 5, p. 162, Gregoire affirme: "quia [. . .] etiam tenui in Primo distinctione 3 quaestione 1 [quod non existentia non possunt nee a nobis nee ab angelis naturaliter cognosci in se ipsis seu intuitive], oppositum autem tenuit quidam valens baccalaureus mecum in Lectura concurrens, et de hac materia conferendo simul dicta sunt hinc et inde quam plura quae interseri huic operi utile iudicavi, idcirco nunc quaero, utrum aliquid non existens possimus naturaliter intueri [. . .]". Le debat sur la connaissance intuitive du non existant parait done avoir eu pour origine un echange de vues entre Gregoire de Rimini et Jean Rathe Scot. Ce debat a cependant pour point commun avec le precedent (II Sent. d. 7 q. 3 a. 1) de revenir sur les affirmations que Gregoire de Rimini a faites en I Sent. d. 3 q. 1. 43 Ed. Trapp, t. 6, pp. 283-296. 44 Ed. Trapp, t. 6, p. 286: "et secundum hunc doctoremmet ac Sanctum Thomam ibidem [i. e. In Eth 3,8], quern ipse in omnibus sequi velle se monstrat, adhuc finis circumstantia omnium generaliter principalissima est". Thomas d'Aquin avait ete canonise une vingtaine d'annees plus tot, en 1323: la date de sa canonisation est un moment important de 1'histoire de sa reception. Gregoire de Rimini, quant a lui, se dispense souvent de 1'honorer du titre de "saint" lorsqu'il le cite. 45 Concernant Francois de Trevise (alias Franciscus Massa de Belluno) O.P. (| 1354), nous disposons, en plus de deux commentaires bibliques, sur la Genese (MS Pavie, Bu, Aldini 168, ff. 27-37v) et sur Tobie (ibid., if. 1-25), de 1'inventaire de sa tres riche bibliotheque personnelle, temoin precieux des centres d'interet et de la culture que pouvait avoir un maitre contemporain de Gregoire de Rimini (edite par Grimaldo [C.], "Due inventari domenicani del sec. XIV tratti dalPArchivio di S. Nicole- di Treviso presso 1'Archivio di Stato in Venezia", Nuovo Archivio Veneto, n. s., 36, 1918, pp. 129-180). Voir Kaeppeli (Thomas), Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevii, t. 1, Rome, 1970, p. 390. Les vesperies etaient un moment de la ceremonie de reception d'un nouveau docteur en theologie, au cours de laquelle se deroulaient plusieurs disputes: voir Glorieux, "L'enseignement au moyen age . . .", pp. 144-145. Francois de Trevise, dont les vesperies ont eu lieu avant decembre 1345, avait pris position contre la description suivante de 1'acte moralement bon donnee par Gregoire de Rimini: "per actum moraliter bonum [intelligo] actum moralem conformem rectae rationi secundum omnes circumstantias requisitas ad hoc quod actus sit vere virtuosus" (ed. cit, t. 6, p. 284). Pour Francois de Trevise, une action n'a pas besoin d'etre absolument bonne pour etre bonne, elle peut etre 42
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prend la reponse de Gregoire de Rimini: plutot que la transcription de ce qu'il a lui-meme dit aux vesperies de Francois de Trevise, ils paraissent etre le developpement ecrit de preuves que Ton s'etait contente d'opposer sans les expliciter a 1'opinion defendue par le dominicain.46 Mentionnons pour finir les discussions qu'ont suscitees les prises de position de Gregoire centre le pelagianisme moderne, dans la distinction 26~28 du livre II. Gregoire de Rimini ne les insere pas a la suite de sa "prima lectio"47 sur la question (II Sent. d. 26-28), comme nous pourrions nous y attendre. II repartit le compte rendu de ces debats en deux endroits differents. D'une part, la polemique du docteur franciscain Guillaume de Bellomonte contre raffirmation, pourtant pleine de bon sens (!), que "nul acte coupable n'est moralement bon" (en II Sent. d. 26-28 q. 1 a. I)48 devient le "corollaire" de II Sent. d. 42~44 q. I. 49 D'autre part, les reactions du maitre dominicain Albert50 a II Sent. d. 26-28 q. 1 a. 1 cl. 251 et 352 forment, dans
legitimement bonne en ne I'etant qu'incompletement. Alphonse Vargas de Tolede nous rapporte aussi des extraits des vesperies de Francois de Trevise. Le theme de ses citations est different (la contingence du futur et la possibilite d'un Dieu trompeur), et il associe les prises de position de Francois de Trevise sur ce point a celles de Jean Rathe Scot: voir Kiirzinger, Alfonsus Vargas Toletanus . . ., p. 104, et Schabel, loc. cit. 46 Cf. ed. Trapp, t. 6, p. 289: "Ex his sequitur tertium, quod proponebatur probandum contra istam opinionem, scilicet quod . . .". 47 Ed. Trapp, t. 6, p. 161: "Secundo dico [...], sicut declaravi in prima lectione mea 48 Ed. Trapp, t. 6, p. 318: "illam tamen suppositionem [quam posui in 1 quaestione 26 distinctionis articulo 1] quidam doctor modernus negavit. Distinguens enim de triplici culpa [...], dixit quod . . .". L'origine orale de ce texte parait confirmee par le verbe "dixit". Le franciscain Guillaume de Bellomonte, par ailleurs inconnu, semble done avoir pris position contre un preliminaire ("suppositio") avance par Gregoire dans la d. 26 du livre II, q. 1 a. 1. Docteur en theologie, assistait-il aux lecons du bachelier sententiaire? II contesta en tout cas ce que Gregoire considerait comme une verite indiscutable: "praemittam aliquas suppositiones a quolibet catholico absque ulla contatione simpliciter confitendas. Quarum prima est quod nullus actus culpabilis est moraliter bonus" (ed. Trapp, t. 6, p. 24). 49 Ed. Trapp, t. 6, pp. 318-323. 50 Ed. Trapp, t. 6, pp. 135-173. Ce "Maitre Albert" semble par ailleurs inconnu. 51 Ibid., p. 135: "Et quia praedictus magister respondendo ad rationem quam feci supra ad probandum secundam conclusionem 1 articuli 1 quaestionis 26 distinctionis concessit . . .". La "prima condusio collatiua" de II S. d. 29 q. 1 (t. 6, pp. 135-153) est done une discussion de II S. d. 26-28 q. 1 a. 1 cl. 2 (t. 6, pp. 52-54). 52 Ibid., p. 156 ("Additio 55"): "hanc partem antecedentis, quae est tertia conclusio mea, ubi dicitur, probavi aliquibus rationibus, quas solvere sumpsit reverendus magister praedictus, tamen meo iudicio non sunt sufficienter solutae". La "secunda condusio collativa" de II S. d. 29 q. 1 (t. 6, pp. 153-171) a pour origine les affirmations
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la redaction finale, le contenu des deux conclusions supplementaires ajoutees a II Sent. d. 29 q. 1 a. 2. Ce dernier debat est du plus haut interet pour evaluer la portee exacte de la polemique anti-pelagienne de Gregoire de Rimini. Celuici y attachait une telle importance qu'il la poursuivit, semble-t-il, lors de ses vesperies. On sait par ailleurs qu'en Angleterre, Thomas Bradwardine s'attaqua lui aussi aux "pelagiens modernes", dans le De causa dei, qui est strictement contemporain des textes parisiens de Gregoire que nous examinons.53 Or, si Gregoire concut d'abord son attaque centre des franciscams anglais, Jean Duns Scot, Guillaume d'Ockham et Adam Wodeham,04 il rencontra a Paris un nouveau type d'adversaire: il nous presente maitre Albert comme un thomiste,33 qui utilise les propos du "saint Docteur" pour defendre des theses que Gregoire juge pelagiennes et anti-augustiniennes.56 Gontre
de Gregoire en II S d. 26 28 q. 1 a. 1 cl. 3 (t. 6, pp. 54-58). Toutefois, dans ce dernier cas, la discussion s'est, semble-t-il, poursuivie et developpee lors des vesperies de Gregoire: "ex auctoritate Augustini [. . .] quam allegavi in Vesperiis meis . . .", "et ego allegavi in Vesperiis meis", "ut recitavi in Vesperiis meis" (t. 6, pp. 160, 163 et 164. ''Additio 55"), si bien que la redaction finale (ibid., pp. 165—171) est une synthese qi.ri integre les differents moments du debat, que distingue encore la premiere prise de notes ("Additio 55", ibid., pp. 156-165). La fin du texte (pp. 171-173, "Additio 56"') devek-ppe quant a elle un ultime moment de la controverse entre Gregoire de Rimini el maitre Albert, posterieur aux vesperies de Gregoire: "Deinde iste reverendus magister. volens arguere contra primam conclusionem quam in Vesperiis meis posui, probat primo quod . . ." (p. 171). Nous pouvons done distinguer quatre moments: "lectio prime?' de Gregoire (II d. 26-28 q. 1 a. 1 cl. 3); intervention de maitre Albert ("Additio 55"); vesperies de Gregoire ("Additio 55" et textus ordinarius, t. 6, pp. 165-171); nouvelle intervention de maitre Albert ("Additio 56", pp. 171-173). Nous apprenons en outre dans cette derniere partie du texte que Gregoire a soutenu en d'autres circonstances une dispute quodlibetique sur la valeur morale des actes des infideles: "de actibus hominum simpliciter infidelium, utrum omnes sint damnabiles vel non, nihil dixi [in Vesperiis meis] [...]. Nam de hoc habui unam quaestionem in disputatione de Quolibet" (p. 171), qui forme peutetre la substance du "troisieme corollaire" a II Sent. d. 38-41 q. 1 a. 2 (ed. Trapp, t. 6, pp. 31 i-314: "Tertium corollarium [. . .] est quod nullus actus hominum simpliciter infidelium est moraliter bonus"). •" Sur Thomas Bradwardine, voir Genest (Jean-Francois), Predetermination et liberte creee a Oxford au XII" siecle. Buckingham contre Bradwardine, Paris, Vrin, 1992 ("Etudes de philosophic medievale", 70), ainsi que la contribution du meme auteur au present volume. °4 Ed. Trapp, t. 6, p. 18, n. 10; pp. 60-64 (discussion d'Adam Wodeham I Sent. d. 1 q. 10 a. 1); pp. 64-87, II Sent. d. 26-28 q. 1 a. 3 (discussion de Duns Scot, Ord. IV d. 14 q. 2, Ockham I Sent. d. 1 q. 2 cl. 1 et d. 17 q. 2, et Wodeham loc. cit.). 55 Ed. Trapp, t. 6, p. 166: "Hoc idem probo evidenter, contra eum saltern, quia non negabit doctrinam sancti Thomae". 06 Le texte le plus explicite est celui-ci: "Hoc dicere [scil. quod per peccatum primi hominis [. . .] nos cum vitiis nasci, propter quae, nisi iuvemur gratia dei, non
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ce "pelagianisme thomiste",57 Gregoire de Rimini dresse de longues listes d'autorites qui comprennent notamment des citations de saint Augustin, de saint Anselme et de saint Bernard,58 ainsi que le rappel de 1'article condamne a Paris en 1277: "Quod si ratio recta, et voluntas recta: error, quid contra glossam Augustini super illud "Concupivit anima mea desidemre etc", et secundum hoc ad rectitudinem voluntatis non est necessaria gratia, sed scientia tantum; quod fuit error Pelagii".59 Le commentaire des Sentences de Gregoire de Rimini comprend en outre de nombreux passages qui sont des dialogues que 1'auteur noue avec une oeuvre ecrite par Tun de ses contemporains. Cette categoric de textes est probablement la plus nombreuse chez Gregoire de Rimini, ce qui contribue a donner a sa Lectura Failure d'un ecrit "moderne". L'etonnante information du Docteur Authentique sur la litterature de son temps a deja etc maintes fois notee. II connait tres bien les principaux representants de la "nouvelle theologie anglaise", nee dans les annees 1320 de la discussion des pensees de Pierre
possumus agere virtuose] non est errare cum Manichaeo, sed est fideliter et catholice consentire [. . .] Manichaeorum ac omnium haereticorum destructori Augustino. Quod vero ulterius dicit ilia sua via media incedendum esse inter errores Manichaei et loviniani, ego non approbo. Nam ilia via videtur fuisse Pelagii. Sed alia est, qua docet incedere ecclesia et Augustinus, videlicet ut fateamur hominem posse peccare, contra lovinianum, et hominis naturam non malam [. . .] conditam fuisse [...], contra Manichaeum, sed tamen peccato primorum parentum [. . .] vitiatam [. . .] nee posse virtuose agere nisi adiutam [a deo] [...]; et hoc est contra Pelagium. Iste est modus quern tenet ecclesia, et absit ut oppositum ecclesiae vel sancto Thomae ego ascribam. Ipse vero reverendus magister videat quid dicat sanctum Thomam docuisse" (ed. Trapp, t. 6, p. 170). 57 Dont Francois de Trevise est peut-etre un deuxieme representant aux yeux de Gregoire de Rimini, cf. ed. Trapp, t. 6, p. 285: "Et ille tantum dicendus erit agere vitiose, qui agit quod non est agendum. Ac per hoc non ex circumstantiis actuum, sed praecise ex actibus ipsis et officiis erit sumenda distinctio virtutum et vitiorum, sicut opinabatur lulianus Pelagianista. Hoc autem est contra doctrinam sanctorum et philosophorum communiter". 58 Ed. Trapp, t. 6, pp. 40-51 et p. 165. 59 Chartularium Unwersitatis Parisiensis, t. 1, p. 551, art. 130, cite par Gregoire de Rimini en ed. Trapp, t. 6, p. 56 et 162. Les condamnations de 1277 avaient etc annulees en 1325 par Etienne de Bourret, eveque de Paris, "pour autant qu'elles touch [ai]ent ou [etaient] dites toucher a 1'enseignement du bienheureux Thomas" ("quantum tangunt vel tangere asseruntur doctrinam b. Thomae", in Chartularium . . ., n° 838, t. 2, p. 280 sq.). La discussion entre Gregoire de Rimini et maitre Albert montre que la decision d'Etienne de Bourret n'etait pas facile a interpreter, et qu'elle entretenait plutot la discussion sur le sens de 1'oeuvre de saint Thomas ainsi que sur la portee des condamnations de 1277. Voir Maier (Anneliese), "Der Widerruf der 'Articuli Parisienses' (1277) im Jahr 1325", Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 38, 1968, pp. 13-19 [reimpr. in Ausgehendes Mittelalter. . ., t. 3, A. Paravicini Bagliani (ed.), Rome, 1977 ("Storia e letteratura. Raccolta di studi e testi", 138), pp. 601-608].
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Auriol et de Guillaume d'Ockham, qui fait de nos jours 1'objet d'etudes tout a fait remarquables et novatrices:60 il cite notamment Gauthier Chatton, Robert Halifax, le "Monachus Niger", Richard Kilvington, Thomas Buckingham, mais surtout Adam Wodeham et Richard Fitzralph (appele aussi "Hibernicus").61 II est le premier a discuter le De causa Dei de Thomas Bradwardine.62 Sa dette a 1'egard de la pensee anglaise contemporaine est immense, comme en temoigne sa celebre lecon sur le "complexe significabile", qu'il emprunte en grande partie a la Lectura secunda d'Adam Wodeham, le secretaire de Guillaume d'Ockham.63 Gregoire de Rimini, quoiqu'Italien et sententiaire a Paris, se rattache ainsi en bien des points de son enseignement a 1'important courant de pensee qu'est la "theologie philosophique" postockhamienne anglaise. Ceci ne doit pas faire oublier qu'il entre aussi en dialogue avec certains de ses compatriotes, comme Jean de Lana64
50
Voir notamment Tachau, Vision and Certitude. . .; Courtenay, Schools and Scholars. ..; Genest, Predetermination et liberte creee. . .; et, tout recemment, les precisions sur la vie intellectuelle a Oxford dans les annees 1330 donnees en introduction par K. Tachau in Robert Holcot, Seeing the Future Clearly. Questions on Future Contingents, P. A. Streveler, K. Tachau (ed.), Toronto, Pontifical Institue of Mediaeval Studies, 1995 ("Studies and Texts", 119). Alphonse Vargas de Tolede percevait clairement 1'existence d'une ecole anglaise: il cite souvent l'"opinion de nombreux anglais" ("opinio multorum anglicorum"), sans autre precision. Gregoire de Rimini lui-meme utilise une fois ou 1'autre ce type d'expression: "Hoc etiam aliqui adhuc viventes doctores universitatis Anglicanae tenent. . ." (ed. Trapp, t. 3, p. 370). 61 Sur tous ces auteurs, voir, en plus des etudes citees dans la note precedente, Maier (Anneliese), Die Vorlaiifer Galileis. ... A. Maier fut la premiere a remarquer avec precision que Gregoire de Rimini heritait de problematiques oxoniennes des annees 1330 en bien des points de son enseignement. 62 Voir Genest, Predetermination et liberte creee. . ., p. 16, n. 49 et p. 22, n. 83. 63 L'article pionnier de Gal (Gedeon), "Adam Wodeham's Question on the Complexe Significabile as the Immediate Object of Scientific Knowledge", Franciscan Studies 37, 1977, pp. 66-102, fut suivi par un grand nombre d'etudes. L'edition recente de la Lectura Secunda d'Adam Wodeham met a la disposition des chercheurs une des principales sources de Gregoire de Rimini: R. Wood, G. Gal (ed.), Adam de Wodeham, Lectura secunda in Librum primum Sententiarum, 3 vol., St Bonaventure (N.Y.), St Bonaventure University, 1990 ("Franciscan Institute Publications"). 64 Piana (C.), "Student! agostiniani a Bologna negli anni 1381-1386", Analecta Augustiniana 40, 1977, edite des documents concernant le convent Saint-Jacques de Bologne au XIVe siecle, dont, p. 88, un texte attestant de la presence, le 25 fevrier 1333, au chapitre conventuel de: "fr. lohannes de Lana prior, fr. Dionysus de Mutina bacalerius, fr. Gregorius Arim. lector, fr. Humbertus de Senis lector . . .". Le prieur presidait le couvent, les lecteurs dirigeaient le studium. Gregoire de Rimini cite les Quaestiones de anima humana de Jean de Lana dans le Prologue de son commentaire, en ed. Trapp, t. 1, pp. 60-64. Sur le bolonais Jean de Lana, voir Gutierez (David), "De Fratre Johannes de Bononia qui dicitur de Lana Oesa (| ca 1350), baccalaureo Parisiensi", Analecta Augustiniana 19, 1943-1944, pp. 180-209.
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et Michel de Massa,65 et que Pierre Auriol surtout, mais egalement Durand de Saint-Pourcain, ou Thomas de Strasbourg font partie de ses references habituelles. La dette de Gregoire de Rimini a 1'egard des "modernes" pose cependant certains problemes methodologiques que nous voudrions ici clarifier. Premierement, il importe de distinguer entre la citation et 1'emprunt silencieux, c'est-a-dire le plagiat. Gregoire de Rimini cite beaucoup; autrement dit, il recite ("recitare"} souvent 1'opinion d'un auteur dont il donne le nom, en precisant generalement le titre de 1'ceuvre concernee. En revanche, sa Lectura est trop composite, elle revet une allure trop personnelle pour etre le plagiat inavoue d'un commentaire des Sentences ecrit par un autre.66 Deuxiemement, parmi les citations de modernes, certaines sont directes, d'autres sont indirectes. Dans ce dernier cas, Gregoire identifie 1'auteur d'une opinion, non pas parce qu'il a son texte sous les yeux, mais parce que sa source principale contient le renseignement. II est probable que 1'identification des citations indirectes reduirait legerement la liste des auteurs modernes connus de Gregoire de Rimini, c'est-a-dire effectivement lus par lui.
65 Sur Michel de Massa (f 1337), voir Courtenay (William J.), "The Quaestiones in Sententias of Michael de Massa, OESA: A Redating", Augustiniana 45/1-2, 1995, pp. 191—207. Gregoire de Rimini discute ses affirmations sur le statut de 1'opinion en ed. Trapp, t. 1, pp. 85-91. 66 Certains auteurs, dont K. Tachau, ont cru pouvoir soupconner "that Gregory of Rimini relies upon the commentaries of Holcot and Rodington despite Gregory's silence": voir Tachau (Katherine), "French Theology in the Mid-Fourteenth Century", Archives d'histoire doctrinak et litteraire du Moyen Age 51, 1984, p. 74 et n. 54. Pierre Duhem, dans ses Etudes sur Leonard de Vinci. Ceux qu'il a lus et ceux qui I'ont lu, II, Paris, 1955 (lere ed. 1909), pp. 385—403, s'etonnait deja de la ressemblance entre Gregoire de Rimini et Robert Holcot sur le theme de Finnni. Anneliese Maier, quant a elle, etait d'un autre avis: si Gregoire de Rimini et Robert Holcot presentent quelques similitudes, d'ailleurs toutes relatives, ce n'est pas en vertu d'une dependance directe de 1'un envers 1'autre, mais parce qu'ils heritent d'une meme maniere de poser les questions, celle de Richard Fitzralph et d'Adam Wodeham (A. Maier, Die Vorlaufer Galileis. . ., p. 172, n. 30). Holcot est peu original dans les matieres scientifiques et ne peut etre la source de 1'enseignement souvent novateur de Gregoire de Rimini (id. ibid., p. 210, n. 113 et Ausgehendes Mittelalters. . ., t. 1, pp. 81-82). La recente edition de la version complete de ce qui aurait du etre le Prologue de la Lectura d'Holcot sur les Sentences confirme que Gregoire de Rimini ne depend pas de lui: voir Grassi (Onorato), "II 'De obiecto actus credendi' di Robert Holcot. Introduzione e edizione", in Document! e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 5, 1994, pp. 487—521. Sur Jean de Rodington, voir Courtenay, Schools and Scholars. . ., p. 267 et n. 34.
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En outre, certains auteurs, comme Ockham ou Pierre Auriol, peuvent etre cites soit directement, soit indirectement: dans ce dernier cas, Gregoire de Rimini a sous les yeux un texte qui discute leurs opinions, et il cite les termes de la discussion avant de s'y meler. Ceci doit nous porter a considerer, une fois de plus, que Gregoire de Rimini s'exprime effectivement dans le cadre de la discussion que souleverent les pensees d'Ockham et de Pierre Auriol.67 II devait percevoir cette discussion elle-meme et les arguments qu'elle permettait de developper comme plus moderne encore que les auteurs qui en avaient fourni Poccasion.68 Enfin, nombreuses sont les citations patristiques, notamment de saint Augustin, qui interviennent dans le cadre de cette discussion "moderne". C'est deja le cas chez les auteurs anglais, qui, par exemple, se referent volontiers au De Trinitate. La connaissance etendue de saint Augustin dont fait preuve Gregoire de Rimini doit done etre appreciee pour sa capacite de renouvellement des debats souleves par la nouvelle "theologie philosophique", et non comme une reaction a celle-ci.69 Les "anciens docteurs" que cite Gregoire de Rimini sont principalement Thomas d'Aquin, Henri de Gand, Jean Duns Scot et Gilles de Rome. II en fait ses interlocuteurs dans des dossiers dont la problematique n'a pas etc renouvelee, comme dans la question du "sujet de la science", ou Duns Scot est le principal adversaire.70 Mais il
67 L'edition critique du commentaire des Sentences de Pierre Auriol, actuellement en preparation, devrait permettre d'apprecier a sa juste mesure 1'influence de cet auteur, que 1'historiographie a eu tendance a passer sous silence, souvent au profit de son confrere et contemporain Guillaume d'Ockham. Voir par exemple Halverson (James), "Franciscan Theology and Predestinarian Pluralism in Late-Medieval Thought", Speculum 70/1, 1995, pp. 1-25: 1'A. admet une dependance inavouee d'Ockham par rapport a Auriol sur la question de la predestination (p. 13, n. 30), et rappelle que c'est centre Auriol que Gregoire de Rimini prend position sur ce probleme en I Sent. d. 40-41 q. 1 (pp. 19-25). 68 Ainsi, c'est dans le cadre de la discussion des pensees d'Ockham et de Pierre Auriol qu'est apparu, par exemple, le theme nouveau du "complexe sigmficabile", auquel ni Ockham, ni Auriol n'avaient songe. Pierre Auriol, III Sent. q. 41, "de objecto fidei", MS Paris, BN, lat. 17484, f. 30 v, est ainsi cite a ce propos des le debut des annees 1320 par Gauthier Chatton, Reportatio et lectura super Sententias. Collatio ad primum librum et prologus, ed. Joseph C. Wey, Toronto, 1989 ("Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies. Studies and texts", 90), p. 20. 69 Sur 1'augustinisme du XIVe siecle, voir la recente mise au point de Grassi (Onorato), "L'agostinismo trecentesco", in G. D'Onofrio (dir.), Storia della Teologia nel Medioevo, t. 3, La Teologia delle scuole, Casale Monferrato, Piemme, 1996, pp. 605-643. 70 Prol. q. 4, ed. Trapp, t. 1, pp. 121-146. De meme, en I Sent. d. 42-44 q. 3,
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peut les faire intervenir pour garantir ou pour combattre une opinion nouvelle; leur nom et leur autorite deviennent alors un enjeu "moderne".71
IV. Les principaux themes
Ainsi, la Lectura de Gregoire de Rimini se presente principalement comme un repertoire de questions dont la discussion est apparue dans les annees 1320 (comme dans le cas du "complexe significabile"), ou bien a etc renouvelee a partir de cette epoque (par exemple, les "species"). Plusieurs ont fait 1'objet d'etudes, parfois approfondies, parmi lesquelles nous ne mentionnerons que les plus recentes. Ainsi, certaines opinions du Docteur Authentique ont eu une posterite dans la philosophic classique (XVIF siecle), qui leur a valu d'attirer I'attention des specialistes actuels. C'est le cas tout particulierement de la question du Dieu trompeur, et de celle, qui lui est liee, de la toute-puissance divine:72 1'etude de ces questions permet de se rendre compte que des themes tenus couramment pour "philosophiques" depuis I'age classique prirent en realite forme de maniere decisive dans le laboratoire d'idees qu'etait la "theologie philosophique" du XIVe siecle. Dans le domaine de la theorie de la connaissance, la notion d'evidence, celle d'"espece" ou d'idee,73 ont fait 1'objet d'etudes assez developpees.74 D'autres questions temoignent d'un souci scientifique pre-moderne, comme le "traite sur 1'intension et la remission des formes" que Ton Gregoire de Rimini discute encore le Quodlibet 7 de Duns Scot, a propos du mouvement du premier moteur: Maier (Anneliese), Metaphysische Hintergrunde der Spdtscholastischen Naturphilosophie, Rome, 1955 ("Storia e letteratura. Raccolta di studi e testi", 52), p. 245. 71 Voir supra, notes 44, 55-56 et 59, a propos de 1'interpretation de la pensee de saint Thomas. 72 Voir notamment Genest (Jean-Francois), "Adam et 1'Antechrist. Questions disputees sur la necessite du passe et la tromperie divine. Gregoire de Rimini", in O. Boulnois (dir.), La puissance et son ombre. De Pierre Lombard a Luther. Textes traduits et presentes. . ., Paris, Aubier, 1994 ("Bibliotheque philosophique"), pp. 357-390: presentation et traduction francaise partielle de I Sent. d. 42-44. 73 La mise au point sur le terme de "species" et ses differents sens, que Gregoire de Rimini fait en ed. Trapp, t. 5, p. 119, ne nous semble pas empecher la traduction en francais de "species" par "idee". /4 Voir notamment: Tachau, Vision and Certitude . . .; Maier (Anneliese), "Das Problem der Evidenz in der Philosophic des 14. Jahrhunderts", in Scholastik 38, 1963, pp. 183-225 [reimpr. in Ausgehendes Mittelalter. . ., t. 2, pp. 367-418].
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trouve en I Sent. d. 17 q. 2~4.75 La theorie gregorienne de Finfini en acte ou du "transfini" a donne lieu a d'excellentes remarques, deja anciennes.76 Par ailleurs, la presence de figures en marge des manuscrits, qui avait ete notee par D. Trapp,77 signale un gout prononce de Gregoire de Rimini pour la geometric. Beaucoup reste a faire en ce domaine et il n'est pas exagere de dire que la pensee scientifique de Gregoire de Rimini a jusqu'ici assez peu retenu 1'attention des chercheurs.78 Un autre groupe de questions connait un certain regain d'interet en raison, peut-etre, de leur affinite avec des developpements de la philosophic contemporaine: il s'agit principalement des elements de la theorie de 1'esprit, a savoir les chapitres sur l'"habitus", sur 1'assentiment, ou encore sur le langage mental,79 et des questions qui abordent des themes originaux, comme celui, bien connu, du "complexe significabile",80 ou encore celui de la connaissance intuitive du non-existant.81 La polemique contre le pelagianisme, qui permet a Gregoire de Rimini de traiter de maniere renouvelee de la liberte humaine, de la morale naturelle et de la grace a, quant a elle, surtout attire 1'attention des specialistes de la Reforme et de 1'augustinisme en general: on sait en effet que Luther, lui-meme ermite de saint Augustin, fit pour Gregoire de Rimini une exception lorsqu'il condamna la scolastique. Gregoire de Rimini est, dans cette perspective, presente comme 1'un des principaux artisans de la renaissance "humaniste"
75 Sur ce point, 1'influence d'Ockham sur Gregoire de Rimini a ete notee par Maier (Anneliese), Zyoei Grundprobleme der Scholastischen Naturphilosophie. Das Problem der intensiven Grosse. Die Impetustheorie, 3e ed. augmentee, Rome, 1968 ("Storia e letteratura. Raccolta di studi e testi", 37), p. 74. 75 Duhem, Etudes sur Leonard de Vinci. . ., II, pp. 385-399; id., Le Systeme du monde. Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platan a Copernic, t. 7, Paris, 1956, pp. 131—143; et Maier, Die Vorlaiifer. . ., pp. 172-177. 77 Voir Trapp (Damasus), "Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century: Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions and Book-Lore", Augustiniana 6, 1956, pp. 146-274. 78 Signalons tout de meme Smith (K. D.), Theories of Motion, Time and Place in Mid-Fourteenth Century France: Gregory of Rimini, Hugolinus of Owieto and Peter Cejfons of Clairvaux, these de 1'Univ. du Wisconsin, Madison, 1990. 79 Voir deja Eckermann (Willigis), Wort und Wirklichkeit. Das Sprachverstdndnis in der Theologie Gregors von Rimini und sein Weiterwirken in der Augustinerschule, Wiirzburg, 1978 ("Cassiciacum", 33); et recemment Karger (Elizabeth), "William of Ockham, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham on the Objects of Knowledge and Belief", Vivarium 33/2, 1995, pp. 171—196 (Gregoire de Rimini n'y est cependant aborde qu'en passant). 80 Pour une bibliographic complete sur ce theme, voir notre these, Paris, 1999. 81 Voir Tachau, Vision and Certitude. . . .
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de Paugustinisme au XIVC siecle.82 L'argumentation theologique que developpe Gregoire de Rimini sur le theme de la predestination parait enfin de nos jours attirer 1'attention de certains chercheurs.83 L'histoire de 1'influence du Docteur Authentique au moyen age, et au-dela du moyen age, est un vaste chapitre, dont bien des points sont encore a preciser.84 Un des moments les plus importants de cette histoire est sans doute celui ou fut prise la decision d'imprimer le texte de la Lectura. D'une maniere generale, la fin du XVe et le debut du XVF siecle furent, pour la litterature scolastique tardive, et specialement pour la litterature sententiaire, une periode faste qui, lui assurant le passage a 1'imprime, lui garantit du meme coup celui a la posterite. Les motivations des editeurs de la Renaissance ont etc fort peu etudiees. Rappelons ce que repondait Jean Mair, maitre en theologie a Paris au debut du XVF siecle, et editeur, en 1512, des Sentences d'Adam de Wodeham,85 aux humanistes epris des Anciens qui critiquaient son interet pour la scolastique du XIVe siecle: "N'avons-nous pas vu a notre epoque, Americ Vespuce decouvrir des terres qui etaient demeurees inconnues a Ptolemee, Pline et aux autres cosmographes? Pourquoi n'en serait-il pas de meme pour le reste? Si nul n'avait su ecrire mieux que les Anciens, lirions-nous encore aujourd'hui tant d'auteurs plus recents?".86
82
C'est la perspective adoptee par les etudes reunies dans H. A. Oberman (ed.), Gregor von Rimini: Werk und Wirkung bis z.ur Reformation, Berlin, New York, 1981 et H. A. Obermann, F. A. Ill James (ed.), Via Augustini. Augustine in the Later Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation. Essays in Honor of Damasus Trapp O.SA., Leiden, Brill, 1991 ("Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought", 48). 83 Voir Halverson (James), Peter Aureol and the Re-Emergence of Predestinarian Pluralism in Latin Theology, 1317-1344, these de "Ph.D.", University of Iowa, 1993. L'A. annonce la prochaine traduction anglaise de I Sent. d. 35-48: Modality, Order and Transcendence: Gregory of Rimini on God's Knowledge, Power and Will. An English Translation of His Lectures on the Sentences, Book I, dist. 35—48, trad. Friedman R., Schabel C., New Haven (a paraitre). Le traite de la science divine de Gregoire de Rimini (I d. 35-39) sera bientot disponible egalement en traduction francaise par Bermon (P.), in La science divine d'Abelard a Molina, J.-C. Bardout, O. Boulnois (dir.), Paris, PUF ("Epimethee"), a paraitre. Voir deja Vignaux (Paul), Justification et predestination au XIVe siecle: Duns Scot, Pierre d'Auriole, Guillaume d'Occam, Gregoire de Rimini, Paris, 1934. 84 Voir deja, Eckermann, Wort und Wirklichkeit. . . et Oberman (ed.), Gregor von Rimini. Werk und Wirkung. . . . 85 Dans la version abregee qu'en avait faite Henri Totting d'Oyta. 86 Jean Mair, preface du commentaire du quatrieme livre des Sentences (1509), cite par Elie (Hubert), "Quelques maitres de 1'universite de Paris vers 1'an 1500", Archives d'Histoire Doctrinal et Litteraire du Moyen Age 18, 1950-1951, pp. 193-243 (p. 210).
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OXFORD
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EARLY OXFORD THEOLOGY Rega Wood
Only three Oxford lectures on Peter Lombard's Sentences presented before 1280 survive.1 Two are by the Dominicans, Richard Fishacre and Robert Kilwardby; one is by the Franciscan, Richard Rufus of Cornwall. Delivered in the decade between 1245 and 1255, comparison of these closely related lectures tells us a great deal about early Oxford theology. These Oxford mendicants had all studied at Paris and knew Parisian theology well. As J. I. Catto correctiy emphasized in an earlier survey, they "belonged to international societies and their work was a contribution to an international discipline, cultivated above all at the University of Paris." Catto asked: "How far in these circumstances could [Oxford] foster an intellectual tradition of its own?" In his reply, Catto contrasted the early period (1245—1265) which concerns us here with the later period (1300-1320) in which the "originality and coherence of the thought of Scotus and Ockham surpassed that of their contemporaries anywhere." By contrast, Catto thought that what was novel in Rufus and Kilwardby's approach was due to ignorance. Between 1245 and 1255, "Richard Rufus and his colleagues were original for want of the latest Parisian teaching."2 The present survey shows that Catto's conclusion about the early period was mistaken. Rufus and his contemporaries did address characteristic Oxford concerns, but not for want of news from Paris. In fact, one of Kilwardby's principal sources was a record of the latest Parisian teaching, which was, as it happens, Rufus' 1253—1255 Sentences commentary.3 Still, though Catto's picture of mid-thirteenth century Oxford as an intellectual backwater cannot be correct, he is undoubtedly right to raise the question. British masters constantly moved between the
1 J. Catto, "Theology and Theologians 1220-1320," The Early Oxford Schools, The History of the University of Oxford I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 477. 2 Catto, "Theology," pp. 471, 516. 3 J. Schneider, in Robert Kilwardby, Quaestiones in librum primum sententiarum (Munich: Bayerische Akademie, 1986), p. 32*.
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two centers; their allegiance was to international Orders. "At every stage they were involved in the intellectual life of the senior university of Paris." So how could there be a distinctive Oxford theological tradition at all? In an attempt to answer this question, I have chosen to concentrate on subjects which interested Fishacre, Rufus and Kilwardby more than they did Bonaventure and Albert the Great. Summarizing previous work, I will begin by sketching Oxford views on the relation of systematic to biblical theology. Next I will consider another basic question central to Oxford theology: Can we hate the truth? Then in order to show how Oxford and Parisian theologians interacted, I will look at a topic in Trinitarian theology which concerned continental theologians of the period equally. Finally I will consider Oxford treatments of divine ideas, contrasting them with Parisian views, but focusing on a distinctively British question: Is matter intelligible? Richard Fishacre began the first of the three lectures in about 1245; Richard Rufus lectured in about 1250.4 The future Dominican Archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Kilwardby, commented5 on Lombard around 1255.6 4 Bacon, Compendium of the Study of Theology, c. 4 n. 86, ed. Thomas S. Maloney (Leiden: Brill, 1988), p. 86: "reprobatus Parisius propter errores quos invenerat [et] promulgaverat quando solemniter legebat Sententias ibidem, postquam legerat Sententias Oxoniae ab anno Domini 1250." 5 Schneider argues (Quaestiones, p. 22*) that Kilwardby's Quaestiones should not be regarded as a commentary. I agree with Schneider that there are gaps, and that this may well be a revised version of Kilwardby's lectures, but I see no reason not to regard it as a commentary. Since the questions Kilwardby raises are closely related to those raised by Rufus at Oxford, it is possible to determine which distinction Kilwardby is considering when. Oddly, Kilwardby considers only five or six distinctions. Like Rufus, he provides a generous prologue (qq. 1-17: 40 pp.) and a more modest treatment of distinction 1 (qq. 18 30: 25 pp.). But where Rufus most emphasizes proofs for God's existence in distinction 2, Kilwardby gives even greater weight to distinction 3 (qq. 43-71: 71 pp.): on the vestiges of the Trinity in creation. Distinctions 4—31 are not considered, and the commentary closes with distinctions 32 (q. 72: 20 pp.) and distinctions 35—36 (qq. 73-95: 71 pages): on divine ideas. Admittedly unusual and incomplete, this is still a commentary, presenting problems in the same order as the principal text and closely related to other commentaries on the same text. 6 Schneider (Quaestiones, p. 56*) dates Kilwardby's commentary after 1256, since it employs Rufus' 1253-1255 Parisian commentary. Previous authors have dated the work in 1255, 1254, or 1253. Cf. A. Judy, in Robert Kilwardby, De ortu scientiarum (Oxford: British Academy, 1976), p. xvi. Given the speed with which Parisian material reached Oxford, I prefer not to depart much from earlier consensus: about 1255. It seems to me entirely possible that Kilwardby saw Rufus' work in the same year it was done.
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The date of Fishacre's commentary is disputed, but it was probably presented in the biennium 1245-1246, slightly later than has sometimes been suggested. 1245-1246 is the approximate date of a letter from Grosseteste warning Oxford theology masters to restrict matutinal lectures in the hours reserved for ordinary or magisterial lectures to treatments of Holy Scripture.7 1245 is also the earliest possible date of a secret papal mandate from Innocent IV to Robert Grosseteste commanding the Bishop of Lincoln not to prohibit but to facilitate the Dominican Frater R's presenting ordinary lectures on Lombard's Sentences and not to put obstacles in R's way.8 Everyone agrees that the "Frater R" in question is Richard Fishacre, and no one has suggested that Fishacre lectured twice on the Sentences9 So if we assume further that Dominican diplomats needed and used a mandate this specific, then Grosseteste seemed likely to prohibit Fishacre's Sentences lectures, and the mandate was intended to assure their inception, continuance, or completion. Most likely, Grosseteste's warning was issued when the problem arose, shortly after magistral lectures on the Sentences began, and the papal mandate arrived shortly before they came to an end. Thus Fishacre was probably still lecturing when the papal mandate was issued—in September 1246, if Abbate's dating is correct. Fishacre also probably did not lecture much after 1246. For 1246 is the approximate date of Grosseteste's Ethics translations which 7
Roberti Grosseteste Epistola 123, ed. H. R. Luard (London: Longman, 1861), pp. 346-347, see below, n. 14. 8 Transcribed by R. J. Long, "The Science of Theology According to Richard Fishacre," Mediaeval Studies 34 (1972), 73, from Padua, Bibl. Antoniana 79, fol. 50r. "Mandamus quatenus dilectum filium fratrem R. de ordine Praedicatorum apud Oxoniam docentem in theologica facultate a lectione ordinaria libri sententiarum non debeas prohibere, sed potius inducas eundem ut secundum gratiam sibi datam continentiam profundam et veritatem necessariam ipsius libri auditoribus aperiat studiosis, cum in eo catholicorum doctorum inveniantur testimonia fide digna quae depulsa erroris calligine tenendam fidelibus asserant veritatem." First noted and dated about September 1246 by G. Abbate, "Lettere secretae d'Innocenzo IV e altri documenti in una raccolta inedita del saec. XIII," Miscellanea Franciscana 55 (1955), 317-373. Cf. A. B. Emden for the identification of Grosseteste as the recipient, A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500 (Oxford: OUP, 1957), II: 686. 9 Ginther calls into question both the reference of Grosseteste's warning and the number of Fishacre's lectures. He suggests that Grosseteste may have been warning Fishacre not to repeat bachelor lectures as a master or pressing the issue after his views had been disregarded. Either behavior seems less likely than his objecting to something ongoing. See J. Ginther, "Theological Education at the Oxford Studium," Franciscan Studies 55 (1998), 93-103.
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Fishacre does not cite. Both F. Pelster and R. James Long date the commentary before 1246: Pelster, because he supposed that Fishacre lectured as a bachelor;10 Long,11 on the grounds that we must leave time for subsequent works before Fishacre's death in 1248. Moreover, Long takes Grosseteste's circa 1246 translation as a solid terminus ante quern. But we can only speculate about how long older translations were in circulation or how many works could be produced in a single year. More compelling is the evidence provided by correspondence from two different sources indicating that the lectures were ongoing in 1246. So since there is no reason to believe that Dominicans went to the Pope after the controversial lectures were completed, we must reconcile ourselves to the view that Fishacre accomplished more using out-of-date materials than we would think likely.
1. The Primacy of Biblical Theology
A patron of the mendicant orders and a teacher at Greyfriars, Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln was the greatest thinker at Oxford University in the early 13th century as well as its concerned and active ecclesiastical superior from 1235 to 1253.12 It was his emphasis on biblical theology which set the stage for the first controversy which will concern us.13 Grosseteste tried to make sure that the main lectures of the day were on the Bible. As far as we know, Richard Fishacre was the first and only person to confront Grosseteste's opposition to putting lectures based on the patristic works or systematic,14
10
F. Pelster, "Das Leben und die Schriften des Oxforder Dominkanerslehrers Richard Fishacre (d. 1248)," Zeitschrift fur Katholische Theologie 54 (1930), 531. 11 R. James Long, "The Beginning of a Tradition: the Sentences Commentary of Richard Fishacre, OP," which appears in this volume, esp. pp. 348 49. 12 J. Ginther, "Theological Education at the Oxford Studium," Franciscan Studies 55 (1998), 93-97. 13 Among the first to notice the controversy was Beryl Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (Notre Dame, Ind.: U. of Notre Dame Press, 1964), p. 280. Stephen Brown has provided a very helpful article on the same subject with a slightly different perspective, see "Richard Fishacre on the Need for 'Philosophy'," in A Straight Path: Studies in Medieval Philosophy, ed. R. Link-Salinger et al. (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University, 1988), pp. 23-36. 14 Roberti Grosseteste Epistola 123, ed. H. R. Luard (London: Longman, 1861), pp. 346-347: "Lapides igitur fundamentales aedificii. . . libri sunt Prophetarum; inter quos et legislator Moyses non immerito est annumerandus; libri quoque Apostolorum et Evangelium. . . . Omni igitur circumspectione vobis cavendum est, ne inter fun-
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as opposed to Biblical, theology at the heart of the curriculum. Fishacre justified his practice by claiming that Lombard's Sentences were excerpts from Scripture, organized to permit students to understand difficult questions by intellectual means. The Sentences complemented the Bible which was structured to deal most effectively with moral questions and to appeal to the heart.15 Contrary to Fishacre, Richard Rufus strenuously affirmed the sufficiency of the Bible for theology and denied any identification of Lombard's Sentences with Scripture. There was no need to supplement the Bible with scholastic summaries and no justification for claiming that such scholastic supplements were biblical. Lectures on Lombard's Sentences, though useful, were not necessary to theology. Putting his point most provocatively, Rufus held that Lombard's Summa was neither theology nor part of theology, since by itself divine Scripture was perfect.16 Making the same point more temperately a little later, Rufus denied only that Lombard's work is any part of Scripture.17 His audience probably concluded that Rufus agreed with
damentales lapides, vel pro fundamentalibus, non fundamentales ponantur. . . . Tempus autem maxime proprium ponendi et disponendi praedictos lapides in fundamento, (est enini tempus fundandi, sicut et tempus aedificandi) hora est matutina qua ordinarie legitis; decet igitur vestras lectiones omnes, maxime tali tempore, legendas esse de libris Novi Testamenti vel Veteris . . . vestram discretionem omni qua possumus affectione et devotione rogamus, monemus et exhortamur in Domino Jesu Christo, quatinus omnes lectiones vestrae ordinariae hora legendi matutina de Novo sint Testamento vel Veteri. . . non alia quaedam velut horum media, aut ab hagiographis patribus superaedificata doctrinae, quorum est tempus aliud convenientius accomodandum." As the reader will see below, both Rufus and Kilwardby describe Lombard's Sentences as a useful collection of Patristic views. The phrase "hagiographis patribus" refers to Patristic authors who wrote on sacred subjects generally and specifically Scripture, not to saints' lives in this period. Cf. R. Lathem, A Revised Medieval Latin Word List (London: Oxford UP, 1965), p. 220. 15 Fishacre, Sent. Prol., ed. Long, "The Science of Theology," p. 97. 15 Rufus, Lectura Oxoniensis in Sent., Oxford, Balliol Col. 62, f. 6va: "Quibusdam placet hie quaedam generalia de ipsa theologia dubitare, et hoc gratia huius summae Magistri. Quod non videtur mihi necessarium, cum haec summa non sit ipsa theologia nec aliqua pars eius. Est enim divina Scriptura in se Integra, perfecta absque hac et omni alia summa, sed sunt tales summae elucidationes aliquae aliquorum quae in ilia obscure dicta sunt, propter nos utiles et adhibitae. Quia tamen mos est, aliqua et nos tangamus." Henceforth: SOx, B62. 17 Rufus, SOx Pr., B62.7va: "De dignitate et perfectione huius Scripturae in parte tactum est, cum non possit aliquid ei addi vel minui, et cum tanta sit eius auctoritas. Et cum hanc scripserit Veritas, unde nihil in ea falsitatis. Via, unde nihil erroris. Vita, unde nihil nisi salus. . . . Dividere autem sacram Scripturam propter
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Grosseteste on the practical question and favored presenting lectures on the Sentences in the afternoon rather than as official, ordinary lectures held in the morning hours.18 His students will not, however, have concluded that Rufus believed that scholastic lectures were not useful in the study of theology, or that Rufus was uninterested in the elucidation of the technically difficult theological questions facilitated by Lombard's Sentences. The crux of the disagreement was rather about whether the study of systematic theology is fundamentally different from Biblical theology. To justify including lectures on systematic theology in the ordinary, official lectures, Fishacre presented it as a form of Scriptural exegesis. This claim was more plausible in the medieval context, where all disciplines could be employed in expounding Scripture. Fishacre19 based it on the authority of St. Augustine, who in De doctrina Christiana stated that everything useful was included in the Bible.20 Though Rufus quotes this authority, he makes no use of it, and in fact, it is inconsistent with his position, which excludes systematic from biblical theology. Rufus holds that Lombard's Sentences are both different from Scripture and useful. They are useful for expounding what is obscure in Scripture and because they bring together in brief compass many difficult questions drawn from the Fathers.21 Seeking to resolve the question posed by Augustine's authority, and probably not faced with a practical question about the timing of lectures on the Sentences, Robert Kilwardby offered a compromise. He held that the special purpose of Lombard's Sentences—its first and immediate but not its primary function—was as a collection of Patristic authorities.22 But Kilwardby also held that the Sentences were part of officium assumptum ad praesens non euro. Non est enim praesens summa aliqua pars sacrae Scripturae, ut aestimo." 18 O. Weijers, Terminologie des Universites aux XIIF siecles (Rome: Edizioni dell' Ateno, 1987), p. 307. 19 Fishacre, Sent. Pr., ed. Long, pp. 83-84. 20 August., De doctrina Christiana 2.42.63, Patrologia Latina (henceforth: PL) 34: 64-65: "Quantum minor est a u r i . . . in comparatione divitiarum quas postea lerosolymae consecutus est ... tanta fit cuncta scientia quae quidem utilis est, collecta de libris gentilium, si divinarum Scripturarum scientiae comparetur. Nam quidquid homo extra didicerit, si noxium est, ibi damnatur; si utile est, ibi invenitur. Et cum ibi quis inveniert omnia quae utiliter alibi didicit, multo abundantius ibi inveniet ea quae nusquam omnino alibi. . ." 21 Rufus, SOx Pr., B62.7va~7vb: "In hac parte septima utilitatem huius operis assignat, et est quod in tam brevi volumine in tot et tarn difficilibus quaestionibus tot Patrum sententiae et determinationes in promptu inveniuntur." 22 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 10, ed. J. Schneider, p. 27.
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Scripture and shared its primary purpose: human salvation.23 Like Rufus, Kilwardby saw commenting on the Sentences as an exercise in Patristic theology. But unlike Rufus, Kilwardby regarded lectures on the Sentences as a part of scriptural studies, a distinct part, but not a different discipline from scriptural studies. To justify supplementing scriptural studies, Kilwardby offers a distinction: the Bible contains not everything useful, but everything useful for salvation. Disagreeing with Rufus, Kilwardby repeats the claim that Scripture contains everything useful "implicitly". Hence systematic theology is justified in part by the profound need of Scripture for exposition.24 Kilwardby agrees with Fishacre's suggestion that secular philosophy, speculative and ethical, must be part of theology. Citing Augustine's authority, Kilwardby claims, as Fishacre had, that secular sciences are ancillary to theology.25 Kilwardby considers and rejects the Parisian position stated in the Summa Halesiana, according to which secular sciences independently investigate truth as truth (as opposed to truth as good).26 Like Grosseteste, Kilwardby prefers the term 'wisdom' to 'science', terms Fishacre uses interchangeably, since properly understood, the sciences serve or are ordered to theological wisdom.27 As this dispute shows, the influence of Grosseteste on Oxford theology is pervasive.28 Many of Grosseteste's views were adopted. Kilwardby for example, when summarizing the Summa Halesiana''$ position on the relation of Scripture to the secular sciences restated it in terms of Grosseteste's distinction between intellectual aspectus and the volitional qffectus.29 Fishacre took from Grosseteste his account of man as an image of God.30 Rufus began citing Grosseteste even 23
Kilwardby, Sent. q. 7, ed. J. Schneider, p. 19. See also the previous citation. Kilwardby, Sent. q. 5, ed. J. Schneider, pp. 15-16. Kilwardby, Sent. q. 14, ed. J. Schneider, p. 35; Fishacre, Sent. Pr., ed. Long, p. 85. 25 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 14, ed. J. Schneider, pp. 36-37. Summa Halesiana, I n. 2 (Quaracchi 1924-1948, ut Summa Fratris Alexandri), I: 5. 27 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 13, ed. J. Schneider, p. 34; Fishacre, Sent. Pr., ed. Long, p. 79. 28 R. C. Dales, "The Influence of Grosseteste's 'Hexaemeron' on the 'Sentences' Commentaries of Richard Fishacre OP and Richard Rufus of Cornwall OFM," Viator 2 (1971), 271-300. 29 Grosseteste, Hexameron 1.5.2, 1.7.5, ed. R. C. Dales and S. Gieben (London, 1983), pp. 55, 58. Henceforth: Hex. 30 Grosseteste, Hex. 1.8.1-2, ed. Dales and Gieben, pp. 217-218; Fishacre, Sent. 2.16, Oxford Balliol 51, f. 113rb. 24
25
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before he started studying theology. In his Metaphysics lectures, he referred to Grossesteste not just as "someone", the normal way to refer to contemporary authors, but as vir excellentissimus.31 Of course, many of Grosseteste's views were rejected by his Oxford successors, even those endorsed by Fishacre. One such view deals with the different role of proof and understanding in theology and in the secular sciences. Following in the footsteps of Augustine and Anselm, Grosseteste holds that theological wisdom must be based on belief, without which its tenets cannot be understood. Christians accept their beliefs on authority, not because they have the appearance of truth. Grosseteste considers briefly the possibility that some Christian beliefs may be more certain than others; truths stated by the prophets, for example, may be less certain than those spoken by the incarnate Word. But Grosseteste chooses to emphasize the claim that all Christian beliefs rest on the same authority: God speaking through the saints. Consequently, Grosseteste holds that deductions have no place in theology. All the truths Christians believe are equally certain.32 Fishacre agrees, pointing out what Grosseteste had assumed— namely, that in the deductions of Aristotelian science, what is less evident is established on the basis of what is better known. So if the theses Christians accept are all equally certain, the truth of one does not justify our belief in others. Fishacre strengthens the claim that
31
Rufus, Dissertatio in Metaph. Aristot. 2, cod. Vat. lat. 4538, f. 4ra: "Ad illud respondebat vir excellentissimus in scientia ..." Henceforth: DMet, V4538. 32 Grosseteste, Hex. 1.2.1-2, ed. Dales and Gieben, pp. 50-51. In the Hexaemeron Grosseteste denies that theology is a science; in one of his Dicta (n. 118), he compares theology as a science with the secular sciences. How can this apparent contradiction be resolved? Possibly Grosseteste changed his mind using the term "science" more precisely after having read Aristotle's Posterior analytics. Just as likely, Grosseteste is using the term "science" precisely in the Hexaemeron and not the Dicta. The passage from "Dictum 118" is neither an endorsement of the new Aristotelian texts and methods, nor an assertion that theology is syllogistic in structure. It is rather a favorable comparison of theology with secular science: all sciences—probably, that is, all sciences in the broad sense which includes theology—are structured to gather the subjects of their investigation as in a net. But whereas secular sciences operate by drawing men down; theology draws them up. Like most of the rest of the texts Grosseteste considered under the heading of the Greek letter phi (philosophy), it reflects his reservations about secular science or philosophy, which he compares with muddy swamp water; noxious science requires purification. See S. Gieben, "Das Abkuerzungszeichen Phi des Robert Grosseteste," in Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter, ed. P. Wilpert and W. Eckert (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1963), pp. 526-527, 533-534.
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all Christian beliefs are equally certain by deemphasizing the role of human Scriptural authors. Not Moses, the prophets, and the evangelists, but God is the author of Scripture, a point on which Kilwardby and Rufus wholeheartedly agree.33 Despite holding that there is no place for demonstration in theology, Fishacre refers to theology as a "science". Fishacre justifies his practice from the certainty of theology; by contrast, students of physics make mistakes. Revelation is more certain than demonstration according to Fishacre, since we can be mistaken about scientific proofs. Proofs do not come with guarantees against deception, so no demonstration could be as infallible or as certain as Scripture.34 Rufus agrees that our human capacity for demonstration is fallible, but nonetheless argues for a role for demonstration in theology. In part this is because he does not understand demonstration as a structure of declining certainty, as Grosseteste had. For Rufus, first premises are not just manifest but basic, general, and prior in the order of explanation. In his Posterior Analytics commentary, he emphasizes degrees of generality in demonstration rather than certainty. Basic truths are logically prior to more specific truths.35 From the divine perspective, a theological demonstration would show the order of causality among things, from things close to the first cause, through intermediate causes, to things remote from the first cause. Even from our perspective there can be syllogistic reasoning in theology, as is clear from the Bible, which itself includes passages in which conclusions are inferred from premises. Specifically, Rufus allows logical investigation concerning the natural aspects of God's ministering word, in morals as far as is appropriate, and even in the rites of worship, regarding things necessary for its consummate
33
Fishacre, Sent. Pr., ed. Long, pp. 87-79. Rufus, SOx Pr., B62.7ra: "Est autem Deus auctor, ut dixi, et nulla creatura. Inventio enim naturalis ingenii quod naturae est non transcendit, ergo ad id quod mere gratiae est pertingere nequit, ad fidern scilicet et Verbi incarnationem ad quae nullus umquam angelus vel homo naturali inventione attingit, sed quibus divinitus fuerit revelatum. Quae si postea narraverint et aliis nuntiaverint, non horum sunt auctores sed tantum ministri et instrumental' Kilwardby, Sent. q. 9, ed. J. Schneider, p. 22: "Ergo solus auctor Deus est, et hoc concedendum. Angeli autem et homines sunt huius doctrinae promulgatores vel scriptores vel etiam compilatores, ut Magister Sententiarum ..." 34 Fishacre, Sent. Pr., ed. Long, pp. 83, 88-90. 35 R. Andrews and R. Wood, "Causality and Demonstration: An Early Scholastic Posterior analytics commentary," The Monist 79 (1996) 325-356.
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perfection. Rufus admits that errors are inevitable in the absence of the support provided by the Catholic faith, also that faith is necessary for understanding. But he will not exclude syllogistic reasoning from theology.36 Kilwardby offers compromise. Syllogistic reasoning, though employed by Lombard in the Sentences, is unnecessary to theology; it is offered on account of human weakness.37 Nonetheless reasoned arguments and disputations are useful to the church.38 And though theology does not demonstrate particulars from universals, its procedure parallels that of Aristotelian science. In metaphysics, we begin by grasping first principles and deducing conclusions; in theology, we begin with faith and proceed to understanding. Here Kilwardby is paraphrasing Augustine and Anselm, of course, but he is also anticipating Aquinas' claim that in theology, the credibilia function like scientific first principles (ST 1.1.6 & 2-2.1.7).39 Importantly, Kilwardby shows that the disagreement arises in part from differences between Augustinian and Aristotelian terminology. Augustine, but not Aristotle, describes what we believe with great certainty as science.40 As Kilwardby points out, theology offers a kind of certainty different from that of science. It is more certain than Aristotelian science, not only because its authority comes from God inspiring the minds of the faithful, but also because it appeals to our will not our intellect. The will of the lover adheres more firmly than her intellect.41 To summarize: Grosseteste's reservations about making systematics central to theological education prompted a debate at Oxford, seldom considered on the Continent. It was and is an important debate, to which Fishacre, Rufus and Kilwardby made interesting contributions: Fishacre most practically as an effective advocate of the teaching of Lombard's Sentences. Nonetheless, as a thinker, Fishacre
36
Rufus, SOx Pr., B62.7rb. Kilwardby, Sent. q. 7, ed. J. Schneider, p. 19. Kilwardby, Sent. q. 6, ed. J. Schneider, p. 17. 39 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 13, ed. J. Schneider, p. 33: "Et se habent in his fides et intellectus ut in demonstrativis intellectus et scientia. Intellectus enim est certior habitus quam scientia et inducit illam. Sic et in theologia se habet fides et intellectus ut patet." 40 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 12, ed. J. Schneider, pp. 30—31. See also q. 13 as cited above. 41 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 8 & q. 13, ed. J. Schneider, pp. 20 and 33. 37
38
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accepted Grosseteste's exclusive emphasis both on the Bible and on the place of authority in theology. He justified the Sentences on a narrow basis as organized biblical excerpts. Kilwardby, too, defended systematic theology as an aspect of Scripture studies. Only Rufus, who minimized the importance of systematic theology, clearly distinguished it from biblical theology. Unfortunately, though in fact the emphasis shifted to systematic theology, we do not find a defense of systematic theology as such here. Nonetheless crucial issues were raised for future discussion and important points were made. Kilwardby considered the comparative value of certainty and evidence and offered an important strategy for understanding theology as a science. Rufus argued for the role of logic even in stating, elucidating, and understanding biblical theology. After Robert Kilwardby had left academics to become successively Dominican provincial and Archbishop of Canterbury, Roger Bacon challenged his contemporaries to return to the Bible as the central theological text, urging them to follow Grosseteste's example. In his post-1267 Opus minus, Bacon asserted that the dominance of the Sentences was one the principal sins of contemporary theology. Bachelors of the Sentences got to lecture in the principal hours, to have secretaries, and to lord it over bachelors of the Bible; they acted as if they were already masters of theology. By contrast in the good old days, wise doctors such as Grosseteste and Adam Marsh limited their lectures to the Bible. Even Alexander of Hales, the first of the [old doctors] to lecture on the Sentences did so only rarely.42 Bacon's ill-tempered and unsuccessful protest reflects the fact that by 1245 lectures on the Sentences were reserved for bachelors at Paris as James Ginther has recently reminded us. But at Oxford as at Paris, it took a master to initiate what was to be fruitful practice: Richard Fishacre. It is unfortunate that the defense he offered depended on conflating biblical with systematic theology—unfortunate for both disciplines. For it is a defense which relegates Biblical theology to the consideration of morals and dismisses questions about its human authors.
42
Bacon, Opus minus, ed. J. S. Brewer, in Opera quaedam hactenus inedita (London: Longman, 1859), pp. 328-329. Ginther has suggested that Bacon may be referring to Alexander's activities as a bachelor, but that makes nonsense of the context, in which the bachelor's of Bacon's days are contrasted with the doctors of former days.
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Oxford theologians did better when they turned to a subject as much discussed on the Continent as in Britain: theology as science. Like Grosseteste, they had read the Posterior analytics carefully, but they disagreed somewhat with Grosseteste's well-reasoned denial that theology was a science. Rufus understands the structure of science differently, not primarily as the descent from the more certain to the less certain. Instead science is knowing the order of causes, from the more general to the less general. Kilwardby accepts that theology is not like an Aristotelian science, the causal demonstration of conclusions, but points to the parallels between theology and science.
2. Hating the Truth
Their own prologues on the nature of theology completed, Oxford theologians turned their attention to Lombard's proem, where Hilary's unfavorable remarks on the will as an enemy of truth are quoted. Even the most incontrovertible truths are exposed to constant attack when the will is not subject to reason.43 Fishacre (and Rufus following him) raised the problem this poses for the Aristotelian dictum "all men by nature desire to know" (Met. 1.1.980a21) in his Sentences commentary. Had Fishacre not done so, Rufus might not have considered the issue in his theology lectures, since he had considered and resolved the question earlier as a secular philosopher and did not find it problematic. Oddly, Rufus' response as a secular philosopher is more influenced by early thirteenth century Christianity than any of the others we will consider here. Rufus links "all men desire to know" (Met. 1.1.980a21) with "the good is desired by all" (EN 1.1.1094a3). What all men desire to know is the same as what they aim for: the first cause, in which knowledge and what is knowable are joined. Men's desire for truth prompts their love of the first cause.44 The dictum from the Metaphysics refers to "all men" rather than "every man" 43 Hilarius, De Trinitate 10.1 ut citatur a Petro Lomb., Sententiae in IV libris distinctae Pr. 3, ed. I. Brady (Quaracchi: Coll. S. Bonav., 1971-1981), I: 3-4. Henceforth: Sent. 44 Rufus, DMet 1, V4538.1vb: ". . . unum scibile est supra quod cadit praedictum scire et est Primum in quo est idem scibile, scitum et scientia, et istud est illud quod omnia natura scire desiderant et causa huius desiderii est ut cognitum ipsum diligant et laudent."
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since it must be understood collectively not distributively;45 desire for knowledge is predicated not of each and every man, but of humankind understood collectively. The phrase 'by nature' indicates that it is men as men who desire to know—that is, men made in the image of God.46 The same phrase excludes men whose disposition is unnatural, since such men may very well not care about God as the supreme object of knowledge.47 If it is objected that different men are concerned with different forms of knowledge, Rufus replies that the different sciences, which concern them, do so as a path toward knowledge of a single first and maximal object of knowledge.48 Turning to consider how it can happen that men while remaining men can fail to seek the supreme good, Rufus offers two options. God is good both in his justice and his mercy. Wicked people may choose God's mercy but not his justice. Alternatively, though the desire for truth is innate in everyone, it may not be actualized; in such cases the desire for knowledge is habitual but not actual.49 Problem solved, Rufus is ready to consider whether metaphysics is the science which most leads to knowledge of the supreme being.50
43
Rufus, DMet 1, V4538.1vb: "Ad aliud quod melius dicitur 'omnes homines natura' etc. quam 'omnis homo'. Li 'omnis' enim in plurali numero collective tenetur. Unde li 'omnis' optime respondet veritati illius scibilis, supra quod cadit scire . . . Non tamen bene dicitur 'omnis homo natura' etc., quia li 'omnis', ibi non tenetur collective, sed distributive." 46 Rufus, DMet 1, V4538.1vb: "Ad aliud: quod per hoc nomen 'natura' intelligitur natura per quam homines sunt homines, et est natura per quam factus est homo ad imaginem Dei." 47 Rufus, DMet 1, V4538.1vb: "Cum enim homo est in naturali dispositione, illud scibile scire desiderat, cum autem innaturali dispositione exsistat de hoc scibili non curat." 48 Rufus, DMet 1, V4538.1vb: "Ad aliud quod omnes scientias natura desiderant homines. Scire desiderant enim istas natura scire inquantum sunt viae ad unum et primum quod est scientia et sic maximum scibile." 49 Rufus, DMet 1, V4538.2ra: "Sed illud est intelligendum habita quadam distinctione. In ipso enim Primo est multipliciter bonum. In ipso enim est iustitia quae est bonum et similiter misericordia, quae est bonum. Mali autem homines diligunt et optant misericordiam in ipso, sed non iustitiam. Unde diligunt bonum." "Intelligendum est optare habitualiter et non actualiter, hoc est ex natura innata omnibus hominibus, sive bonis sive malis optare bonum etsi quidam, utpote mali, actualiter non optant. Unde in ipsa propositione sumitur optare habitualiter, in secunda actualiter." 50 Rufus, DMet 1, V4538.1vb: "Sed modo circa propositionem 'omnes homines' etc., potest quaeri: Cum enim scire cadat supra unum (?) scibile, et non solum supra illud, sed supra omnes scientias inquantum sunt viae in illud scibile, quae illarum scientiarum . . . maxime [est] via in cognitionem illius scibilis?"
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So at least before he began to study theology, Rufus was confident he knew what the dictum meant and how to resolve apparent difficulties. Surprisingly, in his theology lectures Fishacre advances an entirely different interpretation of the dictum "all men by nature desire to know" (Met. 1.1.980a21) which he understands distributively, so that it contradicts the claim that some men hate the truth. A definition of truth is the key to Fishacre's solution to the apparent contradiction: the adequation of thing and understanding. As presented by Avicenna and William of Auxerre, this is a definition of the truth of speech not the truth of things.51 But Fishacre takes it to be a general definition of abstract truth. Proceeding from this dictum, he claims that no person could will that words should fail to correspond to things; indeed, that would be unintelligible.52 Here Fishacre is not talking about actual written or spoken language, but about mental language. He distinguishes both between mental words and spoken words and between duplicity and falsity. Duplicity he defines as the failure of spoken words to correspond to mental words; falsity, as a relation between words and things.53 To make his point, Fishacre provides an example: Suppose someone traveling home sees smoke and correctly infers that her house is burning. That person may wish that things were otherwise, that the house were not burning, but she does not will that smoke should fail to be a sign of fire.54 Since truth is the relation of things and
51 Guillelmus Altissiodorensis, Summa aurea I tr. 9 c. 3 q. 5, I: 196: "Sed potest dici quod duplex est veritas: est enini veritas rei qua homo verus e s t . . . et veritas dictionis quae est adequatio intellectus ad rem." The dictum is often attributed to Aristotle, but the wording more resembles Avicenna, Metaph. 1.8: "Veritas autem quae adaequatur rei, ilia est certa" (Avicenna Latinus I: 55). 52 Fishacre, Sent. In Pr., Vat. Ottob. lat. 294, f. 3ra: "Sed certe re exsistente hoc verbum non conformari huic rei est non intelligibile, et ideo volitum esse non potest. Et ideo veritas omnino odiri non potest, quae est adaequatio rerum et intellectuum vel conformitas eorum." Henceforth: Ott294. 53 Fishacre, Sent. In Pr., Ott294.3ra: "Ad primum notandum quod verbum vocale est signum verbi mentalis et verbum mentale signurn rei. Et ubi verbum mentale et vocale non conformantur sed discordant, dicitur duplicitas; ubi verbum mentale et res, dicitur falsitas; et veritas est quando conformatur. Et ideo sicut conformitas est utriusque conformantium, sic veritas rei et verbi, et dicitur falsitas quia fallit eum cuius est verbum, sicut duplicitas eum ad quern fit verbum." 54 Fishacre, Sent. 1.32, Ott294.3ra: "Similiter, nuntiatur alicui revertenti ad domum suam quod domus eius accensa est. Videt fumum ascendere displicet ei coniunctio ignis cum domo." "Item, displicet ei eius signum—scilicet, fumus—sed nunquam ,
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their mental signifiers, it is not an object of hatred. Instead what we hate are states of affairs—in which, for example, houses burn—or propositions signifying those states of affairs.53 Rufus reports Fishacre's position accurately, but he does not really engage it, probably because he took the dictum to refer a desire to know the significates of true propositions—the truth of things, not speech, as William of Auxerre would put it. Accordingly, Rufus says in reply to Fishacre only that the principal significates of truth and a true proposition are the same.36 In Fishacre's example, if the truth is that my house is burning, that burning is also the principal significate of any true proposition describing the situation. So if I hate the truth about the house, I will also dislike its signification. And if I cannot hate the truth of the proposition, neither can I hate what it truly signifies. Rufus refuses to believe that 'truth' in this Aristotelian dictum is restricted to the right relation of words to their significates. He thinks Aristotle believes we all want to know the essences of things, not just the relation between mental language and its significates. Rufus even raises doubts about Fishacre's "universal truth." He thinks that perhaps wicked people do not even really "desire" the conformity of mental language and the things it signifies. If they really desired even this truth, they would be on the path to truth, which they are not.57 As in his earlier discussion, Rufus considers the dicta from the
rebus sic se habentibus, displicet ei conformitas naturalis inter ignern hunc et fumum. Certe non. . . . Velles quidem quod hoc compositum in verbo mentis non respondet composite in re. Et tune fateor esset verbum falsuni sed hoc nihil est nisi nollem rem esse." 55 Fishacre, Sent. In Pr., Ott294.3ra~rb: "Solutio: Hie videndum primo quare veritas non oditur et falsitas amatur, secundo quare verbum verum oditur et falsum amatur. . . . Ad primum autem contra respondeo quod propositio vera odiri potest et falsa amari, non tamen veritas odiri et falsitas amari." See also the previous note. 56 Rufus, SOx Pr., B62.8rb: "Ad hoc dicunt quidam quod veritas odiri non potest, verum tamen odiri potest et falsum amari. Et cuius causa est quod veritas est ipsa conformitas rerum et intellectuum, sive verbi mentalis et rei exterioris." "Sed eiusdem iudicii videntur veritas et verum. Principale enim significatum est idem in utroque, et ideo si veritas non potest odiri, nec verum in quantum huiusmodi." 57 Rufus, SOx Pr., B62.8rb: "Item, non est satis clarum propter quid non possit ipsa conformitas odiri, et hoc dico ab iniusto et iniquo. Refert enim hanc quaestionem quaerere in iusto et in iniusto, sapiente et stulto. Non enim a sapiente et iusto revera odiri potest, sed nee ab iniquo et stulto diligi? Non enim meliori modo adquiritur veritas quam diligendo, igitur si earn diligeret sufficienter et congruenter earn haberet."
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Metaphysics and from the Nicomachean Ethics together: "All men by nature desire to know," and "the good is desired by all," but in his theology lectures there is no mention of the first cause, as the ultimate object of knowledge and desire. Rufus justifies treating human desire for the truth and for the good together explicitly by reference to Augustine, who claims that we all desire beatitude which is rejoicing in the truth.38 Implicitly, Rufus also relies on Aristotle's claim that the act of contemplation is the best and most pleasant (12.7.1072b24). Not surprisingly related things are said about the two problems. No one can love the bad or hate the good completely. The wicked love the good weakly and inordinately—that is, less than other things; they understand it not simply but obscurely. Even when the good is actually present to their wills and intellects, it is not purely or clearly present. Every bad person is ignorant.39 Similarly, falsity cannot be loved as such or entirely; nor can truth be hated as such or entirely. That is because desire must have a motive; but only what is at least apparently good can move the will to love it; only the apparently bad can be rejected. An object of love must have something positive about it. Pure truth which entirely lacks defect cannot even appear false.60 That being the case, everyone must love the truth. Rufus agrees that this is so, but adds that only the wise love the truth sufficiently.61 What happens may be that only the wise love the truth in the proper circumstances, looking for it where it is, while the fatuous look where it is not.62 Or alternatively fools, though they do not seek to obscure
58 Rufus, SOx Pr., B62.8rb: "Adhuc circa eandem quaestionem ex sententia bead Augustini insistitur. Quaerit enim ipse in libro X [23] Confessionum, 'cur veritas parit odium' etc., cum ametur beata vita, quae non est nisi gaudium de veritate." 59 Rufus, SOx Pr., B62.8vb: "Cum enim ipsum bonum a nullo omnino odiri possit, nee ipsa malitia (pura privatio) diligi. Ergo nee virtus nec iustitia a quovis iniusto simpliciter odiri potest. Diligit ergo earn quoquo modo omnis iniustus, sed inordinate et tenuiter. Nam et quiddam aliud magis diligit, cuius causa ipsam deserit. Intelligit etiam earn quoquo modo, non simpliciter, sed obscure. Omnis enim malus ignorat. Cum ergo earn actu cogitat, est ipsa quoquo modo apud eius aspectivani, est et apud affectivam, sed pure et limpide apud neutram." 60 Rufus, SOx Pr., B62.8rb. 61 Rufus, SOx Pr., B62.8rb-va: "Numquid ergo ab omni amatur? Videtur quod sic. . . . Hoc est dicere quod aliqua dilectione, sed diminuta—minori, scilicet, quam sit diligenda diligitur ab omnibus—sed a solis sapientibus dilectione sufficiente, tanta scilicet quanta necesse est earn diligi." 62 Rufus, SOx Pr., B62.8rva: "Quid mihi in his verbis insinuatur nisi duplex responsio ad quaestionem propositam? Una scilicet quod etsi quoquo modo ab
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the truth itself and prevent it from manifesting itself, do try to hide their sick souls and prevent the truth from making their shortcomings manifest.63 To explain how this can happen, Rufus turns to Augustine. Augustine teaches that though the body is completely subject to the soul, the soul cannot altogether control itself. The soul does not entirely will what it knows is good; it neither totally commands nor entirely wills the good. Arising from the sickness of the soul, this combination of partial willing and partial rejection results in a situation which is like having two wills, both of which are incompletely determined.64 Augustine also sharpens the problem for Rufus, who quotes long passages from The Confessions in which Augustine says that the only cause of his actions was malice; he loved not the things for the sake of which he committed crimes, but the faults themselves.63 So how can it be true that we love only the good or the apparently good? Augustine, himself, provides the answer. Utter depravity is a perverse imitation of divine omnipotence.66 Thus even the greatest wickedness imitates goodness.67 Here Rufus provides an orthodox Aristotelian solution to the problem which takes seriously some of the Christian texts which most radically challenge it, describing human nature as capable of wickedness for its own sake. Also from Augustine, Rufus takes a plausible psychological explanation. It is not so much weakness of the will as
omnibus diligatur veritas, a quibusdam tamen sub debitis circumstantiis, scilicet ubi ipsa est et quod ipsa est etc., ab aliis vero etsi quoquo modo diligatur, non ubi ipsa est, sed potius ubi ipsa non est, diligitur." 63 Rufus, SOx Pr., B62.8va: "Alia est responsio quod ab insipiente sub una condicione diligitur sub alia oditur. In quantum enim ipsa se ipsam iudicat et manifestat diligunt earn, odiunt vero in quantum se ipsos ilia iudicat et manifestat. Animus enim humanus, cum sit languidus, caecus, turpis et indecens, latere vult se, tamen ut ipsa veritas lateat non vult." 54 Rufus, SOx Pr., B62.8va: "Hanc quasi duplicem dilectionem idem Augustinus, libro VIII Confessionum sub quadam distinctione voluntatis insinuat, dicens: 'Imperat animus corpori et paret statim; imperat animus sibi, et resistitur. Imperat animus ut velit animus, nee alter est, nee facit tamen.' Non ergo ex toto vult, nee ex toto imperat, non in tantum imperat in quantum vult, et in tanturn non fit quod imperat in quantum non vult, igitur partim velle est partim nolle. . . . Unde quasi duae voluntates sunt, quarum una tota non est, et hoc adest uni quod deest alteri." 65 August., Confess. 2.4.9, PL 32: 679. 66 August., Confess. 2.6.14, PL 32: 681. 67 Rufus, SOx Pr., B62.8vb: "Ex hac Augustini sententia patet quod omnes qui recedunt a Deo quoquo modo et perverse imittantur eum."
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sickness in the soul that accounts for bad choices and rejection of the truth. Unfortunately, Rufus' exploration of the Christian challenge to Aristotelianism had little influence, at least in Continental Sentences commentaries. Immediately influential were only the distinctions he developed to explain what happens: the truth is rejected as it manifests the fatuity of the soul, the good is understood obscurely not simply. Thus Bonaventure, who devotes only two paragraphs to the problem, explains that those who act badly do not dislike the truth in so far as it illuminates their minds; it offends them only as it manifests their wicked deeds. They do not dislike the truth simply but only in so far as it is obscured by their contentious fantasies.68 Rufus himself provided only a short summary of his views when he lectured at Paris. What he quotes from his Oxford lectures is only the framework of the question and the two alternate explanations of how falsity is chosen—namely, if truth is desired conditionally (not if it judges the soul itself) or if truth is sought in improper circumstances.69 Kilwardby states the question as Rufus had at Oxford, asking both about truth and goodness, and quoting Augustine's claim that beatitude is rejoicing in the truth. His basic solution to the problem is simply stated. No one hates the truth per se but only accidentally in so far as it offends. How can we be offended? Either on account of the insufficiency of our understanding or the inordinacy of our wills, Kilwardby answers. His example of insufficiency is a person whose friend dies; she hates hearing that truth, since she is not yet
68
Bonav., Sent. Pr., dub. 6-7, I: 24-25. Rufus, Lectura Parisiensis in Sent. Pr., Vat. lat. 12993, f. 5ra-rb: "Responsio ad quaestionem propositam: Una scilicet quod ab omnibus diligitur veritas, sed a quibusdam sub debitis circumstantiis—scilicet ubi ipsa est et quod ipsa est etc.; ab aliis vero non ubi ipsa est sed potius ubi ipsa non est diligitur. Unde earn desiderant esse ubi ipsa non est, et non esse ubi ipsa est. In ubi igitur potest ab insipiente odiri, simpliciter autem pura et abstracta non potest." "Alia est responsio quod ab insipiente sub una condicione diligitur et sub alia oditur. Inquantum enim ipsa se ipsam iudicat et manifestat diligunt earn, inquantum vero illa se ipsos iudicat et manifestat oderunt earn. Animus enim humanus, cum sit languidus, caecus, turpis, latere vult secum." "Ex his patent omnia. Concedendae enim sunt primae rationes, et quae obiecta sunt in contrarium intelligenda sunt non simpliciter sed cum condicionibus aliquibus et cum circumstantiis." Henceforth: SPar, VI2993. 69
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in the state of perfection, in which she will be entirely given over to divine justice. Kilwardby's example of inordinacy is sexual: If we are bent on fornication, we will be irritated when we are truthfully scolded, since what we want is peace and a place of refuge in which to enjoy ourselves.70 Here again Oxford theologians have addressed a problem not much considered on the Continent. Neither Alexander of Hales, the Summa Halesiana or Albert the Great treated it. Presumably that is in part because it belongs as much or more to a discussion of metaphysics or ethics as theology. Treated as Rufus treated it, as an exploration of the challenge Christian concepts of human nature present for Aristotelianism and as preliminary to a discussion of the nature of truth, there is a good reason to include it in theological lectures. Prompted by Rufus' interest, Bonaventure does discuss it, but very briefly. The almost equally cursory discussion provided by Kilwardby probably seemed a bit out of place to his audience. To summarize: Fishacre deserves credit for introducing the topic to the Oxford audience, which seems to have been much interested in potential conflicts between Aristotelianism and Christian doctrine. Not only did Fishacre present a novel treatment of the topic, but he took the conflict seriously. More characteristic of theology at Oxford than at Paris, probably this is another sign of Grosseteste's influence. In so far as there is a distinctive Oxford tradition in thirteenth century theology, critical consideration of Aristotelianism is undoubtedly part of it. Though the issue of human sin is resolved in favor of Aristotelianism, it does get heard. Its most satisfactory resolution comes from Richard Rufus, undoubtedly in large part because of his great knowledge of and commitment to Augustine. Rufus makes sure that his students heard a lot of Augustine, and like Kilwardby,71 he is concerned that their knowledge of theological authorities be accurate. On more than one occasion when summarizing Lombard, he replaces a paraphrase with a direct quotation.72
70 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 15, ed. J. Schneider, pp. 38-39: "Propter insufficientiam, cum offenditur ex malis poena . . . nondum es in statu perfectionis tuae ubi addictus erit totaliter divinae iustitiae. . . . Per inordinationem, cum offenditur quis in malis culpae. Verbi gratia amas fornicari. . . et latibulum et pacem in tua delectatione." 71 Catto, "Theology," p. 517. 72 See for example SOx 1.42D, B62.95va, a citation of Hugh of St. Victor.
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3. Understanding the Third Person of the Trinity
If hating the truth became a scholastic problem with the advent of Aristotelian metaphysics in the thirteenth century, the analysis of Trinitarian problems goes back to the Fathers. The problem which concerns us here is the question: Do God the Father and God the Son love in virtue of God the Spirit? In what sense is the Spirit the expression of divine love. Is there more than one kind of love in the Trinity, so that the Father's love for himself or for the Son differs from his love of creature? The distinction between personal, notional, and essential love helped 13th century theologians answer these questions. It also served to maintain the distinction between the persons of the Trinity. For if God's being is the same as his understanding and his wisdom,73 why not also say that it is the same as his love? But if God's being is his love, and God loves by the Spirit, how can God the Father be different from God the Spirit? This topic was fully debated in the late twelfth and early thirteenth century. Alexander of Hales' early Gloss on Lombard's Sentences cites the views of Praepositinus, Peter of Poitiers, Simon of Tournai and William of Auxerre. Writing at about the same time as Fishacre, Albert the Great dubbed it an ancient question.74 Even so, Aristotelian notions of efficient and formal causation played a role. But unlike the first two problems, it concerned continental theologians like Albert and Bonaventure as much as Oxonians. Moreover, Oxford theologians took their statements of the problem from their Parisian predecessors. Discussion of this deservedly obscure topic is so complicated and convoluted that describing it will surely try the reader's patience. However, it provides the best evidence we have so far on British interaction with the Continent. Since our British theologians themselves found the interpretation forced, readers who find the complications distasteful might wish to skip to the section on Rufus' Paris lectures where he jettisons many of the traditional distinctions. Fishacre Richard Fishacre accepted the proposition, 'the Father and the Son love each other by the Spirit' (FSLES), which could be stated either 73 74
Anselm, Monol. c. 29, ed. C. Schmitt, Opera Omnia I: 47-48. Albert, £raf. 1.10.7, ed. Borgnet, Opera Omnia 25: 321.
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with a prepositional phrase (per Spirituni) or an ablative (Spiritu). But Fishacre was unclear as to the meaning of FSLES, possibly as a result of considering lots of opinions. He probably believed that Augustine and Lombard held that the love in question was essential, not personal or notional. That is, it was an expression of the will of all three members of the Trinity, not one (personal) or two persons (notional).75 He also believed that Simon of Tournai had interpreted Lombard and Augustine correctly: they understood the phrase 'by the Spirit' ostensively, so that FSLES should be glossed: the Father and the Son breathe forth or cause the Spirit as a sign of their great love.76 However, Fishacre also believed that this position could be refuted. It seems more likely that the love in question was notional or personal and that the correct exposition of 'by the Spirit' was not ostensive. Rather the prepositional phrase, 'per spiritum\ should be understood in terms of authority. Thus FSLES means that the Spirit loves the Son by the Father's authority.77 Following Praepositinus, Fishacre claimed that the preposition 'by' (per) when used with transitive verbs indicated an authority relationship as in 'The king rules the city by or through a prefect'. Just as the prefect's authority comes from the king; the Spirit's love of the Son is authorized by the Father.78
75 Fishacre, Sent. 1.32, Gonville & Caius 329-410, fol. 340rb-va: "Sic ergo videtur velle Magistrum, licet nihil dicat expresse, quod Pater diligit Spiritu sancto . . . et etiam amore qui est essentia . . . Et cum dicit eo quo diligit Pater est, de diligere quod est notionale est falsum, sed de eo ut est essentiale est verum." Henceforth: G&C. 76 Fishacre, Sent. 1.10, G&C 34vb: "Videtur ergo Magister, immo Augustinus, affirmare opinionem eorum qui ponebant cum dicitur Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu sancto, quod li 'Spiritu' non est formalis sed magis dicit signum, ac si diceret quod Spiritus procedit ab utroque signum est dilectionum eorum sicut dicitur de aliquibus diliguntur se . . . et haec fuit opinio Tornacensis." 77 Fishacre, Sent. 1.10, G&C.34va-vb: "Et nota quod 'per' aliquando dicit circumstantiam causae formalis, et hoc maxime quando adiungitur verbis significantibus actum intrinsecum, ubi unicus est agens. Et ideo cum dicitur 'diligit' vel 'intelligit' per illud 'per' dicit circumstantiam causae formalis. Aliquando causae efficientis maxime quando adiungitur verbo significantibus actum extrinsecum, quia tales actiones possunt habere duplicem agentem ut penes unum sit principaliter, penes alia non; et in talibus potest 'per' notare auctoritatem in suo casuali vel subauctoritatem. . . ." /8 Fishacre, Sent. 1.10, G&C.34va: "Ad aliud vero—scilicet, quare Pater non dicitur sapiens sapientia genita—diceret quod haec praepositio 'per', quando adiungitur cum verbis transitivis significantibus operationem, notat subauctoritatem in re nominativi respectu sui causali, ut: Rex regit civitatem praeposito vel per praepositum, id est praepositus regit, et hoc habet a rege. Similiter Pater
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The entire subject seemed so difficult to Fishacre that he states his opinion only on a very restricted topic, claiming that in FSLES the word 'love' is an expression of cause and effect.79 The rest of his position has to be pieced together from replies to other views. So, for example, it seems likely that he thought love was notional, since he leaves that view unchallenged.80 Certainly, he opposed a personal interpretation, since he attacks that view; but he may have entertained an essential interpretation of the word 'love'.81 Fishacre was probably most influenced by William of Auxerre, whose view he states last, but Fishacre seems to have agreed most with Lombard and Augustine's suggestion that the problem was insoluble or rather too elevated to be solved by human ingenuity.82 Albert the Great By contrast, Albert the Great, though he tackled the subject twice, did not find it particularly difficult.83 First, like Fishacre, he treated diligit Filium per Spiritum Sanctum, id est Spiritus Sanctus diligit Filium, et hoc habet a Patre." 7y Fishacre, Sent. 1.10, G&C.34vb: "Responsio. [Nota marginalis: 'Opinio propria']. Dicit ille quod hoc verbum 'diligit' ibi dicit dilectionem quae est Spiritus sanctus. Sed multis modis contingit aliquid praedicari—scilicet, secundum habitudinem identitatis, et haec praedicantur de subiecto ut quid de quo; vel per modum inhaerentiae, et haec praedicantur de quo; vel per modum effectus et causae, et haec praedicantur ut a quo; vel ut signum, sed hie modus praedicandi in hac materia non invenitur, quia divina essentia nulli est signum. Hic autem 'diligere' praedicatur ut a quo; est enim a Patre et Filio." i!u Fishacre, Sent. 1.10, G&C.34vb: "Alii dicunt quod cum dicitur 'Pater et Filius diligunt se', sine ablative li 'diligunt' significat divinam essentiam; sed addito ablativo significat notionem, id est communem Patris et Filii, scilicet spirationem." "Et respondet ad primum quod est ibi aequivocatio, quia cum dicitur diligere et esse sunt idem, 'diligere' significat essentiam, sed in hac 'Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu sancto' significat notionem.'' 81 Fishacre, Sent. 1.10, G&C.34vb: "Sed quaeritur ab eo quern eorum significaret hoc verbum 'diligit' ibi. Si essentialem, ergo Pater non diligit Filium Spiritu sancto sed essentia sua. Si personalem, et illa [dilectio] significavit inesse Patri diligenti (quia huiusmodi verba significant per modum inhaerentiae, quia adiectiva sunt), ergo dilectio illa quae proprie Spirito sancto inest Patri. Sed quidquid est in Patre est Pater excepto quod relative dicitur. Ergo Spiritus sanctus est Pater, ergo 'diligit' non dicit ibi personalem dilectionem, ergo nusquam, ergo non est nisi una dilectio essentialis." 82 Lombard, Sent. 1.10.1, I: 233. 83 Though Albert's lectures were given before he became a master in 1245, the record of those lectures we have is an ordinatio which was not completed until after March 1249. See J. Weisheipl, "Life and Works of St. Albert," in Albertus Magnus and the Sciences, Toronto 1980, p. 22.
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it at Sent. I, distinction 10, considering at least six aspects of the problem, including not just the proper interpretation of the verb ('love': diligere] and the ablative ('by the Spirit': Spiritu) but the pronoun ('each other': se). His position is a compromise between those of Alexander of Hales and William of Auxerre. From Alexander he accepts the view that the love in question is notional, not personal.84 From Auxerre, he accepts the view that the ablative should be understood quasi formally and that FSLES was stated literally by Augustine.85 Unlike Alexander of Hales and the redactors of the Summa Halesiana, Albert rejected the suggestion that Augustine never literally asserted FSLES (which is, however, true)86 or that Augustine rejected a similar claim about wisdom and the Son (which is also true).87 For the most part, however, Albert follows Alexander. Indeed, he accepts Alexander's suggestion that 'the Father and the Son love each other by the love which is the Spirit' is more proper than FSLES,88 perhaps because that is what Augustine says. Like Hales, Albert thinks that FSLES means little more than that the Spirit proceeds from the other members of the Trinity. Hence the Son loves the Father by the Spirit should be glossed as follows: From the Son proceeds the Spirit, in whom the Son is connected with the Father.89 Finally, Albert takes from Alexander the claim that love and procession differ as modes of a single notion.90 84 Albert, Sent. 1.10.7 ed. Borgnet 25: 324; Hales, Glossa l.l0.l0h, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica 12: 134. Henceforth: BFS. 80 Albert, Sent. 1.10.7, ed. Borgnet 25: 326. Guilklmi Altissiodorensis Summa aurea 1.8.7, ed. J. Ribaillier, Rome: Coll. S. Bonaventurae, 1980, II: 146, 151. 86 The texts usually cited are: August., De Trinit. 6.5.7, PL 42: 927-928: "Spiritus sanctus etiam Patri et Filio aequalis in omnibus. Quapropter etiam Spiritus sanctus in eadem unitate substantiae et aequalitate consistit. Sive enim sit unitas amborum, sive sanctitas, sive charitas, sive ideo unitas quia charitas, et ideo charitas quia sanctitas, manifestum est quod non aliquis duorum est quo uterque conjungitur, quo genitus a gignente diligatur, generatoremque suum diligat, sintque non participatione, sed essentia sua, neque dono superioris alicujus, sed suo proprio servantes unitatem spiritus in vinculo pacis (Ephes. IV, 3)." Cf. August., De Trinit. 15.19.37, PL 42: 1086: "Et si charitas qua Pater diligit Filium, et Patrem diligit Filius, ineffabiliter communionem demonstrat amborum; quid convenientius quam ut ille dicatur charitas proprie, qui Spiritus est communis ambobus? Hoc enim sanius creditur vel intelligitur, ut non solus Spiritus sanctus charitas sit in ilia Trinitate, sed non frustra proprie charitas nuncupetur." 87 August., De Trinit. 7.1.2, PL 42: 935. 88 Albert, Sent. 1.10.7, ed. Borgnet 25: 326; Hales, Glossa 1.32.2a, BFS 12: 319. 89 Albert, Sent. 1.10.7, ed. Borgnet 25: 324; Hales, Glossa l.l0.l0h, BFS 12: 134. 90 Albert, Sent. 1.10.7, ed Borgnet 25: 325; Hales, Glossa 1.32.2h, BFS 12: 321-322.
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Returning to the subject once more at distinction 32, Albert retains Alexander's claim that 'The Father and the Son love each other by the love which is the Spirit' is more proper than FSLES.91 He continues to hold that the verb ('love') in FSLES is notional while the ablative ('by the Spirit') is quasi formal; he adds that the pronoun ('each other') is retransitive. But in the course of a lengthy discussion he modifies his interpretation of the quasi formal ablative.92 Albert appears to have changed his mind at least in part as the result of reflecting on Fishacre's discussion. Like Fishacre, Albert advances five or six opinions. But where Fishacre was dissatisfied with all views, Albert finds a way to save most of them. Albert begins by listing the same first three opinions listed by Fishacre, in the same order, often using terminology similar to Fishacre. First, there's Peter of Poitier's opinion93—namely, that FSLES is false: Fishacre:94 "Quidam dicunt hanc falsam 'Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu sancto' et consimiles, et dicunt quod tales, licet dixerit Augustinus, retractat tamen eas in consimili, scilicet in retractando hanc 'Pater est sapiens sapientia genita'."
Albert: "Sunt quidam qui dicunt omnes hujusmodi locutiones esse falsas et in suo simili retractatas. Unde sicut Pater non est sapiens sapientia quam genuit, ita non diligit dilectione quae ab ipso procedit."
Next, there is the view most plainly stated by the Summa Halesiana95— namely, that FSLES is true only improperly, in so far as the triune love is appropriated to the Spirit:
91
Fishacre: "Alii concedunt earn sed quasi impropriam. Sic earn exponunt 'Pater et Filius . . . Spiritu sancto', id est caritate cuius nomen appro-
Albert: "Secundum dicunt quod est vera sed non propria, et reducunt ad proprietatem: Pater et Filius diligunt etc., id est dilectione . . . quae
priatur Spiritui sancto."
appropriabilis est Spiritui sancto."
Albert, Sent. 1.32.2, ed. Borgnet 26: 127-128. Albert, Sent. 1.32.122-126, ed. Borgnet 26: 127-128. 93 Cf. Petrus Pictavensis, Sent. 1.21, PL 211: 871-875. 94 Fishacre, Sent. 1.10, G&C.34rb; Albert, Sent. 1.32.1, ed. Borgnet 26: 123. 95 Summa Halesiana 1.460, I: 657. Hales, Glossa 1.32.2f, BFS 12: 321. The Summa Halesiana was redacted between 1235 and 1245. Most of it was completed between 1238 and 1240, but one section at the end of book I was added very late: after 1250. See the "Prolegomena" pp. 306 and 355. 92
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Simon of Tournai's view conies third.96 FSLES is true properly speaking, but loving 'by the Spirit' refers to the love of which the Spirit is a sign. Fishacre: "Magister Simon Tornacesis dicit quod haec est vera proprie 'Pater et Filius diligunt Spiritu sancto', sed iste ablativus non regitur ex vi causae formalis, sed ponitur in designatione signi."
Albert: "Sunt autem tertii qui sequuntur Simon Tornacensem, qui dicunt quod est vera et propria: sed cum dicitur 'Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu sancto' ablativus construitur in designatione signi."
Since Albert seems to have taken the statements of the opinion from Fishacre, it is odd that Albert does not bother with Fishacre's replies. The objection to Simon, for example, seems to come instead from Alexander or the Summa Halesiana:97 Summa Halesiana: "Sed contra hoc obicitur: similis est ratio in hac 'duo amid diligunt se amore' et in hac 'Pater et Filius diligunt se amore'; sed non est ratio signi ibi denotata; ergo nee hie . . . habitudo sit notata non causae formalis sed quasi formae."
Albert: "Contra hos autem iterum objicitur: Cum dicitur 'isti duo amid diligunt se amore qui ab eis procedit', construitur ablative 'amore' formaliter. . . ergo a simili et hie cum dicitur 'Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu sancto vel amore qui est Spiritus sanctus, construitur in habitudine quasi causae formalis."
According to the objection, we do not understand the sentence, 'two friends love each other by love', ostensively but in some sense causally— not efficiendy but as it were formally or in virtue of a formal relationship. Presumably the claim is that the form of the attachment is love. After finding a way to salvage Simon's interpretation, Albert skips over Fishacre's fourth opinion, perhaps because it is a confusing conflation of the views of Praepositinus, William of Auxerre, and the Summa Halesiana. In place of Fishacre's opinion four, Albert states William of Auxerre's view, but in his own words. Opinion five is entirely new. It includes a long quotation from Hugh of St. Victor, from whom most of the initial arguments are also taken. In Hugh's opinion, FSLES should be glossed: 'The Father
96 Cf. Simon Tornacensis, Summa, ed. M. Schmaus, Recherche de theologie ancienne et medievale 4 (1932), 297. 97 Summa Halesiana 1.460, I: 656-7. Hales, Glossa 1.32.2c, BFS 12: 320. Albert, Sent. 1.32.1, ed. Borgnet 26: 123-124.
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is the author and origin of the love by which the Son is loved and the Spirit exists.' For Hugh 'by the Spirit' means 'by the effect of the Father breathing forth the Spirit'. Albert's is the sixth opinion, a combination of the fourth and fifth interpretations of the ablative 'by the Spirit', interpreting it both quasi formally (Auxerre) and effectively (Hugh). Hugh's view is rendered: 'The Father loves the Son by the Spirit as a principle which is the effect of love'. 'Quasi formal cause' gets a new gloss. Love can signify in five modes corresponding to five different kinds of form. Excluded are two interior forms (substantial and accidental), also two external forms (place and exemplar). There remains a form which unites persons. It is in that sense that the Holy Spirit causes the love of Father and son, as a quasi-formal cause.98 Rufus at Oxford
Like Albert, Richard Rufus borrows from Fishacre. But unlike Albert, he is not confident that he will be able to resolve the difficulty. And, if Rufus has seen Albert's treatment, he does not use it. Rufus is very conscious of the need for interpretations which will not be linguistically tortured. He begins by quoting all of Fishacre's opinions and also most of Fishacre's objections to them, many of which he finds persuasive. In the case of the confused fourth position, Rufus separates what was mistakenly conflated." To Fishacre's list of six opinions, Rufus adds two more: One is from Hugh of St. Victor, whom he quotes extensively at second hand from Alexander of Hales, probably using what is now the London manuscript of Alexander's Gloss.100 The other is from the Summa Halesiana. The view Rufus considered at greatest length,101 it is closely based on, but less cautiously stated than, Alexander's Gloss.102 Rufus summarizes the position in six points:103 98
Albert, Sent. 1.32.1, ed. Borgnet 25: 124-126. Rufus, SOx 1.32D, B62.73va-74ra. Rufus, SOx 1.32D, B62.74rb. Alexander, Glossa 1.32.15, BFS 12: 329-330. 101 Rufus, SOx 1.32D, B62.74ra-rb. 102 Summa Halesiana 1.460, I: 656-657, which is taken for the most part from Hales, Glossa 1.32.2a, BFS 12: 319-321. 103 Rufus, SOx 1.32D, B62.74ra: "Alicui videtur quod [1] Spiritus sanctus est amor quo Pater et Filius diligunt se invicem; nee tamen sequitur quod diligunt se Spiritu sancto." "Quia [2] Spiritus sanctus est nomen proprium personae, amor autem est nomen appropriable." Et [3] sunt quasi "unius condescensionis 'diligere' 99
100
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1. The Spirit is the attachment (amor] whereby Father and Son love (diligere} each other, but FSLES does not follow, since. 2. 'Attachment' (amor] is an appropriable description, but not a proper name for the Holy Spirit. 3. Love (dilectio) and attachment (amor) pertain to a single affection (condescensio), so that if one is essential, so is the other. 4. From 'the Father and Son love each other by attachment (amoref, it does not follow that they love each other by means of attachment (per amoreni), since the preposition 'per' always signifies a causal principle, and the Spirit does not cause the love of the other members of the Trinity. 5. 'By attachment' (amore) indicates that the relation not of a formal cause, but a quasi form existing in those to whom it pertains; it is a bond or connection which has the character of a form. 6. FSLES is false. Rufus begins his own theological discussion with Alexander's observation that FSLES is not found in Augustine. He adds that both Augustine and FSLES can be understood in many ways. Initially, Rufus is tempted to Summa's conclusion—namely, that we should simply deny FSLES,104 but not if that means glossing over Augustine's words. Rufus carefully reviews what Augustine has to say. Augustine once states that "the
Spirit makes known to us the common love by
which the Father and the Son love each other."105 That statement was the basis for Alexander's claim that what Augustine really meant was that Father and Son love each other by the love which appropriately describes the Spirit as an epithet though it cannot be equated
et 'amor'. Si enim dicatur diligere notionaliter, et amor notionaliter dicetur; et si essentialiter, et amor essentialiter." "Isti dicunt [4] quod non sequitur 'diligunt se amore, ergo diligunt se per amorem'. Quia haec praepositio 'per' semper notat rationem principii in suo casuali respectu alicuius positi in sermone ut 'Pater operatur per Filium', li 'per' notat rationem principii respectu operati.—Haec regula falsa est, ut videtur..." "Isti etiam dicunt [5] quod "habitude notata in ablativo non est habitudo causae formalis, sed quasi formae exsistentis ab his quorum est quasi forma. Vinculum enim vel nexus cedit in rationem formae eorum quorum est vinculum vel nexus." "Sexto, sicut dictum est, isti plane negant hanc 'Pater et Filius diligunt se invicem Spiritu sancto', et tamen concedunt quod Spiritus sanctus sit amor quo Pater et Filius diligunt se invicem." 104 Rufus, SOx 1.32D, B62.74rb: "Quid ego in tam difficilibus dicam? Nescio, nisi forte tales absolute sunt negandae 'Pater diligit Spiritu sancto', 'Pater et Filius diligunt Spiritu sancto'. Nec has nec harum aequipollentias in Augustino invenio. Quid ergo de hac 'Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu sancto' dicamus?" 105 August., De Trinitate 15.17.27, PL 42: 1080, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 50A: 501; Lombard, Sent. 1.10.1, I: 110.
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with the Spirit. Rufus thinks Fishacre's reply to this position is adequate. If this is what Augustine meant, then substituting 'seeing' for 'loving', we might just as well say that by seeing only Peter, we see Paul, since Peter is an Apostle, and by itself the title 'the Apostle' refers to Paul.106 Moreover, as Rufus points out, Augustine also says that the Spirit is that whereby the progenitor loves and is loved by his offspring, their consubstantial union.107 Since he believes that Augustine always intends by the name Spirit to refer to the mutual love and conjunction of Father and Son, Rufus accepts FSLES and adopts this conception of love as his first conclusion. In all, there are six conclusions:108 1. The love in FSLES is mutual. 2. The word 'love' signifies passively the union and connection which are signified actively by the word 'Spirit'.109 3. The love in FSLES is notional, not essential.110 4. In the Godhead, love is said relatively in respect of the third person—namely, as love proceeding or as a gift. 5. 'By the Spirit' indicates how (quo) Father and Son love, not whose (cuius) love it is. 6. Everything that the Father loves, he loves by the Spirit.111
106 Fishacre, Sent. 1.10, G&C.34va: "Contra: si esset haec vera, video Paulum me vidente tantum Petrum, quia video apostolum quod Paulo appropriatur." 107 Rufus, SOx 1.32D, B62.74ra-rb. 108 As in the case of the Summons six points, some of these conclusions are clearly numbered in the text, others are not. 109 Rufus, SOx 1.32, B62.74va: "Dicatur ergo, si placet ut dicere incepi, quod [1] Pater et Filius mutuo se invicem diligunt Spiritu sancto, et hoc verbum 'diligunt' in hac essentiale non est sed notionale. [2] Significat enim hic ipsam mutuam dilectionem Patris et Filii, quod est ipsa eorum unio et connexio passive dicta, et ablativus 'Spiritu sancto' significat connexionem quasi active dictum. Ilia connexio passive dicta communis notio videtur esse Patris et Filii. Et non videtur mihi quod sit omnino eadem spirationi communi, sed quod ex ista ducat originem. Unde non videtur mihi haec concedenda 'Pater et Filius spirant Spiritum sanctum Spiritu sancto'. Nam non est idem intellectus huius notionis et illius—et ecce, non euro de numero notionum." 110 Rufus, SOx 1.32D, B62.74va: "Ex dictis apparet quod non tenetur ibi essentialiter li 'diligere' et etiam quod per hanc praepositionem 'per' vel per ablativum non notatur subauctoritas." See also the previous note. 111 Rufus, SOx 1.32D, B62.74vb: "Ex his et talibus tandem videtur [4] quod in divinis hoc ipsum 'diligere' relative dicatur respectu tertiae personae, scilicet doni sive dilectionis procedentis. Refertur, dico, [5] ut quo, non ut cuius vel quorum. Et donum dicitur relative ad Patrem et Filium, ut quorum. Dicitur etiam relative ad diligere, ut quo diligit omnis persona diligens et diligitur omne quod diligitur." "Sexto, dicatur: Pater diligit Spiritu sancto <scilicet (?) B> omne quod ipse diligit et simpliciter."
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Following Auxerre, Rufus, like Alexander and Albert, allows that the ablative is quasi-formal, a description which he gives a different sense. Like Fishacre and unlike the Summa, Rufus gives causal sense to the relationship. The Spirit is like the heart of the Father; it is the proper virtue of loving or liberality as it relates to the lover.112 Also, unlike the Summa, Rufus seems to accept the view that 'love' names the Spirit. But, of course, Rufus cannot accept the view that the Spirit effectively causes the Father's love. The Father's nature, not the Spirit, effectively causes his love; in that sense each member of the Trinity causes his own love. Contrary to Praepositinus, Rufus holds that neither the ablative (by the Spirit) nor the prepositional phrase (by means of the Spirit) signifies that the Spirit acts by the authority of the Father. Nonetheless, Rufus agrees that divine love is authorized by the Father. At Oxford, Rufus not only accepts the basic constraints of Trinitarian theology, which assure us that the Father causes his own love and authorizes all Trinitarian love, but he also agrees with his confreres that the love described by FSLES is notional. Nonetheless, Rufus' opinion is very different from those whose views most influenced him, and his attitude toward FSLES is much more positive. Moreover, he is able to give FSLES a quite natural exposition and one with religious significance: the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit who is, as it were, the Father's heart, just as the Son is the Father's word.113 So the issue arises: Did Rufus' view have any influence? Bonaventure At least at first glance, Rufus seems to influence Bonaventure, who appears to reject the Summons view. Bonaventure holds that FSLES is true if 'love' is understood notionally; false, if understood essentially. Bonaventure describes this position as intermediate between
112 Rufus, SOx 1.32D, B62.74vb: "Videtur ergo praecise quod ille ablativus notat circumstantiam virtutis propriae diligendi ad ipsum diligentem vel propriae liberalitatis ad diligentem. Nam alia est circumstantia 'diligo dilectione', 'diligo corde'. Spiritus sanctus est quasi cor Patris quo diligitur Pater; 'diligitur ergo Pater dilectione', et est circumstantia quasi formalis. 'Diligit se Patre', quia non ab alio accipit suum amorem. Diligit sua dilectione, hoc est dilectione de se procedente, et est tertia circumstantia." 113 Rufus, SOx 1.32D, B62.74vb, as quoted above.
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the positions of Peter of Poitiers and the Summa Halesiana, both of whom deny that FSLES is true properly speaking, so it would be interesting to see how Bonaventure interprets FSLES. But the closest we get is a gloss on 'the Father and the Son love each other' which signifies that the Father loves the Son, and the Son loves the Father, and the two are connected by the Spirit which is the love connecting Father and Son. This gloss indicates that Bonaventure's position was influenced at least as much by the Summa Halesiana as by Rufus. Like Hales and like the Summa, and unlike Rufus, Bonaventure holds that love and Spirit are different modes of the same notion.114 The only distinctive theses Bonaventure borrows from Rufus are an emphasis on the mutuality of the love and the claim that as the connection between Father and Son, the Spirit should be understood actively.115 Like Albert, Bonaventure prefers compromise, and indeed Albert's appears to be the single strongest influence. Bonaventure describes the same five opinions as Albert. Unlike Albert, however, Bonaventure does not posit a sixth opinion, but this difference hardly seems major. Compromising between William of Auxerre and Hugh of St. Victor, Albert claims that the ablative ('by the Spirit') is understood quasi formally and the verb ('love') is understood as a quasi effect. Bonaventure describes his position as Hugh's view, rather than a compromise with Hugh's views. But Bonaventure, in fact, follows Albert's compromise: the ablative is understood as a formal effect.116 Distinctive positions taken from Albert are the claim that the form involved is union, and that the pronoun (each other) should be understood retransitively.117 Both positions are so complicated that it is hard to see what they would signify for religious discourse. Finally, though Bonaventure redoes the prose quite thoroughly, there is even some slight evidence of verbal dependence on Albert in the arguments against Auxerre's quasi formal solution:118
114 Bonav., Sent. 1.32, I: 556-568. By contrast, Rufus holds that they may not be the same notion. See above in the statement of Rufus' first thesis in SOx. 115 Bonav., Sent. 1.32, I: 560. 116 Bonav., Sent. 1.32, I: 556-561. 117 Bonav., Sent. 1.32, I: 558 and 561. 118 Albert, Sent. 1.32.1, ed. Borgnet 25: 124. Bonav., Sent. 1.32, I: 560.
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Albert: "Item, forma secundum rationem est ante actum ilium cujus ipsa est principium', ergo amor est ante diligere amore. Sed hoc fahum est, quia diligendo procedit amor qui est Spiritus sanctus . . . ergo ..."
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Bonaventure: "Item, omnis forma est ante illud cuius est forma; ergo si Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu sancto formaliter, amor ilk praecedit diligere Patris et Filii. Sed hoc falsum est, quia dilectio producitur; ergo etc."
Rufus at Paris
Rufus lectured for a second time on the Sentences. This time at Paris, basing himself on Bonaventure's lectures. In these lectures Rufus retains Bonaventure's views as far as possible, supplementing them with brief summaries from his own Oxford lectures, and critiquing them only where necessary. Regarding the Holy Spirit as divine love, Rufus considers that Bonaventure has presented a competent statement of common opinion. By contrast, Rufus characterizes his own views as credible and liberating.119 They are certainly radical, since in the course of presenting excerpts from Oxford, he makes one major change. He gives up the view that he had shared with Albert, Bonaventure, and virtually every other thirteenth-century theologian120 who stated a position—namely, that the love in FSLES is notional; instead Rufus considers it essential. Characterizing love as notional is a response to the major problem in Trinitarian theology and with FSLES in particular—namely, understanding properly the distinctions between the three persons of the Trinity. From Anselm (Monologion c. 32) came the claim that God's understanding (intelligere) and his wisdom (sapientia) were identical with his being (esse).m That raised questions about God's speaking (dicere) and God's loving (diligere). If speaking were identical with God's being, then God's speaking and his Word would be not just consubstantial but identical, and the distinction between Father and Son would collapse. Similarly, if the Spirit is God's love, and FSLES is true, then
119
Rufus, SPar 1.32 V12993.81vb: "Sed quamvis iste modus sit probabilis et expeditus, tamen communis opinio distinguit praedictam locutionem, eo quod 'diligere potest teneri notionaliter vel essentialiter'." 120 The exception is William of Auxerre who thinks that the love in FSLES is personal; it pertains to the person of the Spirit. See the Summa Aurea 1.8.7, ed. J. Ribaillier, II: 149. 121 Anselm, Monol. c. 29, ed. C. Schmitt, I: 47-48.
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Father, Son, and Spirit cannot be distinguished. Even supposing personal non-identity can be maintained, FSLES raises problems for the relations in the Trinity. Loving by, or in virtue of the Spirit, seems to imply the Spirit is the origin or cause of love. Yet, it cannot be asserted the Father's love of his Son is caused by the Spirit. Distinguishing notional or personal properties from essential divine properties is partly an attempt to meet these difficulties. Spiration is notional, and being is essential; they are predicated respectively of two and three persons, so that we do not have to affirm that God's spiration is his being, and the distinction between Father and Son can be maintained. This works well enough for the relations of origin, the relations it was primarily designed to handle. But it is not clear what to do about the statements like 'The Father speaks by the Word' and FSLES, though as we have seen the common view suggests that it is a notion pertaining to Father and Son. In this theological debate, there are two important pressures: one is to permit the understanding of love as essential, since all members of the Trinity love, and the other is to provide parallel treatments of the problems of love and speech. Stating the common view, Bonaventure allows a sense of 'love' which is essential, but also distinguishes a notional sense of love. He treats 'speaking' and 'loving' as parallel actions, connecting them to the relations of origin in the Trinity. Generation can be signified either by emanation or by a mode of emanation to which expression is added; the word 'generation' corresponds to the first; 'speaking' to the second. Spiration, too, is both an emananation and a mode of emanation; 'breathing' and 'loving' are the corresponding verbs, such that 'loving' connotes concord and connection in addition to breathing. When the Father speaks, he not only generates the Word, but thereby expresses himself. 'The Father bespeaks himself by the Word' means the Father by expressing himself generates the Word.122 It seems to follow that FSLES means that the Father and the Son by loving each other breathe forth the Spirit. By making 'speaking' and 'loving' secondary to generation and procession, Bonaventure avoids a series of problems. Whatever is said about the persons of the Trinity is reduced to their relations of orgin, thereby maintaining Trinitarian orthodoxy. This solution also allows Bonaventure a reply to an additional problem Rufus had raised for FSLES, because it seems to imply the 122
Bonav., Sent. 1.32, I: 558.
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following statements which were commonly rejected: 'The Father loves himself by Spirit' and 'The Son loves himself by Spirit'.123 What Bonaventure's solution does not do is permit a common sense understanding of FSLES; a further disadvantage is that it posits different kinds of love in the Godhead. Rufus, by contrast, claims at Paris that all divine love is essential,124 and he suggests a common sense interpretation of FSLES. It means that the Spirit is the natural faculty whereby God loves.125 Rufus meets the Trinitarian problems by distinguishing between essential predicates which are and are not transitive. From 'being and being wise are the same in God', Augustine infers that if the Father were wise by generated wisdom, then the Father would be generated wisdom, which is false. Rufus accepts this inference for wisdom, because wisdom is intransitive as well as essential, but rejects it for speaking and loving. Love is essential to God because it is common to every member of the Trinity, but love is also transitive, related to the Spirit in a special way, just as speaking is related to the Son in a special way which makes the Son the Father's Word.126
123 Rufus, SOx 1.32D, B62.74rb: "Tu iudica an haec sit multiplex. Nam unus potest esse sensus 'Pater diligit se Patrem Spiritu sancto, et Filius diligit se Filium Spiritu sancto'. Et hae falsae <sunt B> sicut et praedictae. Unde et haec integra, secundum hunc sensum, falsa 'Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu sancto'." 124 Rufus, SPar 1.32, V12993.81va-vb: "Hie respondent diversi diversimode. Quidam modo simili praedicto in alio problemate qui videatur sequi opinionem Hugonis. Dicunt ergo quod omnes istae verae sunt simpliciter 'Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu sancto' et 'diligunt Spiritu sancto' et 'Pater diligit se Spiritu sancto', 'Pater diligit Spiritu sancto'. Similiter 'quaelibet persona diligit' et 'quidquid diligit diligit Spiritu sancto'." "Dicunt ergo quod hoc ipsum 'diligere' sit essentiale, tamen dicitur "relative respectu tertiae personae—scilicet, doni sive dilectionis procedentis. Refertur, dico, ut quo, non ut cuius. Donum ergo dicitur relative ad Patrem et Filius, ut quorum. Dicitur etiam relative ad hoc ipsum 'diligere', ut quo diligit omnis persona diligens et diligitur quod diligitur," sicut praehabitum est de hoc verbo 'dicere' quod dicitur relative ad verbum, et tamen essentiale est." Note that Rufus states his view in the third person plural here. 125 Rufus, SPar 1.32, V12993.81ra: "Sed quae circumstantia denotatur cum dicitur 'Pater Verbo dicit'," sicut praehabitum est a Gregorio: "Os Dei Filius Dei dicitur'. Sicut ergo nos ore loquimur, sic quoquo modo et Pater Verbo loquitur. Non tamen Pater dicit Verbo sicut per organum, sed per naturalem Patris virtutem et dicendi propriam. Et sicut Verbum dicitur operativa potentia Patris respectu creaturarum, sic et Verbum dici potest naturalis et propria virtus dicendi. Et potest haec circumstantia quoquo modo reduci ad genus circumstantiae causae formalis." For the statement that this treatment of the Son pertains to the Spirit see the next quote. 126 Rufus, SPar 1.32, V12993.81vb: "Et respondeat ad primum contra quod non
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Rufus posits three kinds of relation in the Trinity: There are the relations of origin, which justify saying that only the Father speaks by his Word, since in the case of speaking, the relation of possession (ut cuius) refers only to the Father. Then there is a formal relation (ut quo): the natural faculty, whereby God speaks, is the Word. It refers to the Son, but unlike an ut-cuius relationship, an ut-quo relationship is not the property of one person; both the Father and the Son speak by the Word. Finally, there is the relation to the things made by the Word (ad ilia), which is God's operative power exercised externally.127 Robert Kilwardby
By the time Robert Kilwardby addressed this problem, it had grown yet more complicated.128 There were two different expositions of
sequitur. Quia hoc ipsum 'diligere' in divinis relative dicitur ad Spiritum sanctum, sicut 'dicere' ad Verbum. Unde penitus eodem modo respondeat hic et in praedicto problemate." "Et sic videntur sancti loqui et Magister Hugo qui dicit quis habens amorem proprium illo amore non diligit. Omnis ergo diligens, ut dicunt, diligit omnino dilectione procedente aut dilectione de se procedente, Unde Pater diligit suo amore, quia amore de se procedente; similiter Filius. Spiritus vero sanctus diligit se amore procedente sed non suo amore, quia ipse de se non procedit." See also the following note. 127 Rufus, SPar 1.32, VI2993.8Ira: "Alii ergo dicunt quod primae verae sunt: 'Pater dicit Verbo' etc. Et respondent ad obiecta quod ilia forma argumentandi tenet in essentialibus et pure absolutis sicut sunt esse et sapere. Sed ubi unum simpliciter essentiale et absolutum, et alterum vero relatum et transitivum, non tenet; tale autem est hoc verbum 'dicere'. Et ideo in esse et dicere non tenet ilia forma argumentandi." "Isti addunt quod hoc verbum 'dicere' licet essentiale sit et cuilibet personae conveniat, tamen relative dicitur et refertur ad Verbum iuxta illud Anselmi: 'Quod dicit Verbo dicit'." "Et dicunt quod Verbum dicitur relative ad plura correlativa. Dicit enim relative et ad-aliquid ut cuius, et haec est eius principalis relatio, et secundum hanc ad Patrem solum refertur. Solius enim Patris est Verbum. Unde et solus Pater dicit suo Verbo; quia et ipsum Verbum dicit Verbo sed non suo Verbo; dicit et Spiritus sanctus Verbo sed non suo. Habet et aliam relationem ad hoc ipsum dicere ut quo dicit dicens et dicitur quod dicitur. Et quia uno et eodem Verbo possunt plures dicere et plura dici, Pater unus tamen solus suo verbo potest dicere et dici. Ideo secundum hanc relationem Verbi non est necesse quod eius correlativum—scilicet, 'dicere'—sit proprium alicuius unius personae. Habet et tertiam relationem sive respectum ad illa quae per Verbum facta sunt. . . operativa potentia." Rufus again states his view in the third person. 128 Not surprising, the structure of Kilwardby's question is correspondingly complicated. Since we will not follow his structure, it may be helpful to others to out-
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Bonaventure's position: one roughly followed Bonaventure in identifying love as spiration, but added that this was active spiration; the other, perhaps following a hint from Rufus, advocated passive spiration. There were even those who posited mixtures of notional and essential modes.129 So perhaps it is not surprising that Kilwardby chose to follow Rufus and simplify the situation by holding that loving by the Spirit was always to be understood as an essential activity of the Trinity. His sense of relief is evident when he writes that this is an "easier" reply to the problem than common opinion supposes.130 He rejects the common opinion because it seems to him inconsistent and complicated; its advocates cannot provide a perspicuous rule for how to distinguish the senses of the word 'love'. Moreover, its interpretation of FSLES is violently distorted.131 Having adopted Rufus' view, Kilwardby provides a much more thorough defense of it than Rufus had. Kilwardby supplements Rufus' explanation of what essential activities can be related to particular
line it. 1. Statement of the problem, of the common opinion and its reply to the principal objections to FSLES, taken for the most part from Bonaventure (pp. 209-210). 2. Eight arguments against distinguishing a notional sense of 'love' and replies to those arguments from two somewhat different Bonaventuran positions (210-216). 3. Rejection of both Bonaventuran positions, together with the statement of six further arguments against distinguishing a notional sense of love (216-218). 4. Three replies to the principal argument against taking 'love' essentially, together with new responses to the principal arguments against FSLES (218-220). 5. A doubt about construing the ablative 'Spiritu' formally based on five arguments raised and answered (220-224). 6. Replies to six other questions raised by Kilwardby's position (stated on p. 221 and answered on pp. 224-228). 129 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 72, ed. J. Schneider, pp. 211-215. Bonav., Sent. 1.32, I: 558. Rufus, SOx 1.32D, B62.74va: "Significat enim hie ipsam mutuam dilectionem Patris et Filii, quod est ipsa eorum unio et connexio passive dicta, et ablativus 'Spiritu sancto' significat connexionem quasi active dictum." 130 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 72, ed. J. Schneider, pp. 209 & 219: "Multae a praedecessoribus hie datae sunt responsiones. Moderna tamen quae communiter tenetur . . . quod dilectio . . . tripliciter sumitur, scilicet essentialiter et notionaliter et personal!ter." . . . "Si haec vera sunt sicut apparent, facilius quam prius responderi potest ad quaestionem praemissam." 131 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 72, ed. J. Schneider, pp. 214, 216, 217: "Sed duo sunt quae movent contra hanc determinationem, unum quod nimis violenter videntur fieri expositiones . . . aliud quod superius in hac quaestione dixerunt quod ... in verbo diligendi intelliguntur duo actus, unus notionalis et alius essentialis. Et nunc hie dictum e s t . . . partim essentialiter et partim notionaliter . . . quare non utrobique eodem modo accipitur." "Planam autem et sufficienter circumquaque determinationem non vidi ab istis nee audivi ..." ". . . in processu praemisso multae sunt expositiones quasi violentae ad sustinendum distinctionem dilectionis, quod magis vitandum esset, si esset possibile."
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persons and how.132 And unlike, Rums, Kilwardby also provided detailed arguments against the common view. There is the frequently repeated general rule: no notion is common to three persons. But there is also a claim Bonaventure had not anticipated: no notions are reciprocal or describe mutual relations. Many and weighty authorities are cited, and there are also appeals to reason. For example, if we accept the common view, love is in some sense personalized or notionalized; but if that is so, the diety's memory or intelligence can also be personalized or notionalized.133 In his reply to the crucial objection which suggests that if love is essential, and Father and Son love by the Spirit, then Father, Son and Spirit cannot be distinguished, Kilwardby employs strategies taken from Rufus. He argues first that not all essential acts can be God's mode of being, since the act of creation is not. Creation must be an essential act since it pertains to creatures, and all such acts were considered essential.134 Yet God does not exist by creating— no more than he exists by loving.133 Another argument is based on the formal distinction, as stated by Rufus:136 Even if we allow that loving and being are the same as far as the thing which they designate is concerned, nonetheless they differ by formal predication. Thus though God loves by his love, he exists by his essence, not by his love. Since essence and love are formally distinct, the following inference is invalid: the Father loves by Spirit, therefore the Father
132 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 72, ed. J. Schneider, p. 218, Si quis dicatur (causatur Schneider) and p. 224, Ad secundam. 133 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 72, ed. J. Schneider, pp. 210-211 & 216-217. 134 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 72, ed. J. Schneider, p. 211: "Nomen vel verbum de Deo dictum respectu creaturarum vel denotans effectum in creatura essentialiter tenetur. Haec est regula in hac materia." Rufus, SOx 1.22, B62.61va: "Est etiam regula: omne nomen quod dicitur respectu creaturae, praedicat essentiam, et cum hoc connotat effectum in creaturis, praeter <prae B> ea quae pertinent ad unionem." 135 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 72, ed. J. Schneider, p. 218, Quod non videtur. Cf. Rufus, SOx 1.32F, B62.75va: "De illo alio 'Patrern operari per Filium', puto quod licet 'operari' essentiale sit, tamen non hoc est Deo esse quod operari, nam hie plus aliquid connotatur, scilicet effectus in creatura. Propter hoc non sequitur: operatur per Filium, ergo est per Filium vel per ilium." 136 That is, in terms of formal predication, cf. G. Gal, "Viae ad exsistentiam Dei probandam in doctrina R. Rufi OFM," Franziskanische Studien 38 (1956), 189; "Opiniones Richardi Run a Censore Reprobatae," Franciscan Studies, 35 (1975), pp. 142—144. Cf. F. Pelster, "Die alteste Abkiirzung und Kritik von Sentenzkommentar des hi. Bonaventura," Gregorianum, 17 (1936), pp. 218-219; G. Gal, "Viae ad exsistentiam Dei probandam," p. 182: "En Celebris distinctio formalis, non solum adumbrata, sed iam nomine appellata."
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is by the Spirit. Kilwardby also modifies and adds to the argument. Thus he speaks of different modes of designation as well as the formal distinction.137 In dealing with a variety of paired predicates— being and love, being and discerning (sapere}, and understanding and speaking—Kilwardby argues not just for Rufus' distinction between absolute and transitive modes of signifying, but for a compound distinction between absolute quiet states (in quiete) and transitive processes (in fieri}, with emphasis on the latter: the distinction between steady states and progressive processes.138 Kilwardby finds both Bonaventure and Rufus useful. Where they agree, Kilwardby often joins them. Thus all three authors agree that 'by the Spirit' should be understood formally. From Bonaventure, Kilwardby takes the description "ex vi effectus formalis."139 But given this description, unlike Bonaventure, Kilwardby concedes, as Rufus did at Paris (but not at Oxford) that everything the persons of the Trinity love, they love by the Spirit.140 This unusual position is very much a departure from common opinion which forcefully denies that the Father loves himself by the Spirit. In certain respects, however, Kilwardby departs from both Rufus and Bonaventure. Most importantly, he rejects the claim that speaking by the Word and loving by the Spirit should be treated in the same way. Here, Kilwardby is more sensitive to Biblical authorities 137 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 72, ed. J. Schneider, pp. 218-219: "Item, quod idem sit Deo esse et sapere conceditur propter modos similes significandi. . . quia esse significat absolute et in quiete . . . Sed diligere significat transitive et ut in fieri, qui sunt oppositi modi <modis Schneider> essencti. . . . " "Item, dato quod idem sit in Deo esse quod diligere, non videtur argumentum valere quod facit sic: Pater diligit Spiritu Sancto, ergo est Spiritu Sancto, quia licet idem sit diligere quod esse ratione rei designatae, non tamen sunt idem secundum praedicationem formalem, quia formaliter loquendo alio est et alio diligit; est enim essentia et diligit dilectione." 138 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 72, ed. J. Schneider, pp. 218, 224-225. 139 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 72, ed. J. Schneider, p. 220, Ad tertium. Bonav., Sent. 1.32, I: 560. 140 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 72, ed. J. Schneider, pp. 219-226: "Ad secundum . . . Non est enim inconveniens quod Pater diligat se Spiritu Sancto ... sic igitur omnes personae divinae et ipse Deus Trinitas diligunt Spiritu Sancto sive amore procedente formaliter intelligendo, et hac omnia quae diligunt." Bonav., Sent. 1.32, I: 558: "Pater et Filius diligunt se . . . et tune non licet inferre ergo Pater diligit se Spiritu sancto." Rufus, SOx 1.32D, B62.74va: "In aliis praedictis tenetur li 'diligere' essentialiter, et ideo falsae sunt 'Pater diligit se Spiritu sancto' et consimiles." Rufus, SPar 1.32, V12993.81va: "Dicunt ergo quod omnes istae verae sunt simpliciter. . . 'Pater diligit se Spiritu sancto', 'Pater diligit Spiritu sancto'. Similiter 'quaelibet persona diligit' et 'quidquid diligit diligit Spiritu sancto'."
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than Rufus and Bonaventure. Unfortunately, however, this modification detracts from Kilwardby's effort at simplification, since it involves interpreting speech as a notional act. This leaves Kilwardby with the same problem his contemporaries had faced—namely, how to provide rules for what meaning of 'speech' to use when.141 Kilwardby's suggestion that though all divine love is essential, not all love is outgoing or processional (procedente) has similar effect. He claims that everything God and the persons of the Trinity love, they love both by processional and non-processional love. This, he suggests, is similar to our situation, since we know both by faith and intellect, and we love both freely and naturally. What work the analogy is supposed to do is not clear, but again we are left with the problem of determining how non-processional love differs from processional love.142 These considerations take up little space, however. Kilwardby spends most of his time explaining and strengthening positions first advocated by Rufus. Not only does Kilwardby seek thoroughly to discredit the contrary position, but he provides a much more complete exposition than Rufus had. Kilwardby also raises and answers quite a number of difficult objections—for example, how can one correlative be the form of another.143 So whatever success Rufus' position encountered is doubtless due in large part to Kilwardby's advocacy. To summarize: in this more typical case, a theological problem interested Oxonians and Parisians equally, and they borrowed freely from each other. Fishacre and Rufus were both heavily influenced by Alexander of Hales, and both probably also knew the Summa Halesiana, a work which was also familiar to Kilwardby as we saw in section 1. The contributions of both Fishacre and Rufus were known and appreciated at Paris by Albert and Bonaventure. Bonaventure in turn influenced Rufus' second lectures and also those of Kilwardby. As Catto indicated, Oxford theology was part of a universal European discipline, not a narrow insular pursuit. But even in a case which had been discussed in depth and at length on the continent, our British theologians made an important contribution. They acknowl141 142 143
Kilwardby, Sent. q. 72, ed. J. Schneider, pp. 218, 226-227. Kilwardby, Sent. q. 72, ed. J. Schneider, pp. 226-227. Kilwardby, Sent. q. 72, ed. J. Schneider, pp. 220-224.
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edged the difficulties, offered a fresh and exciting solution, and argued for it cogently. Even at midcentury, theological problems were as vigorously and thoroughly argued in thirteenth century Oxford as at Paris. Students hearing lectures in theology from Fishacre, Rufus, and Kilwardby at Oxford were not at the center of things, but neither was their education second rate.
4. Understanding Matter
Like hating the truth, understanding matter is a problem Aristotle poses for Christian theologians. In the Metaphysics (7.10.1036a8), Aristotle states that matter as such is not knowable. But on the Christian account God creates matter, and theologians cannot affirm that he does so ignorantly, without understanding what he creates. So since God created matter, it must be intelligible, and he must have an idea of it. In theory, Continental theologians might have been just as concerned with the problem as British theologians. But, in fact, they generally held that God's simplicity required that we posit only one divine idea.144 Since they denied that there were many ideas in the mind of God corresponding to his different creations, they seldom concerned themselves in particular with the question whether there was a divine idea of matter. Those who were concerned employed a variety of strategies. Initially, the issue was whether matter was created prior to form or simultaneously with form. Lombard preferred the opinion of Gregory, Jerome and Bede, according to which unformed matter was created first.145 By contrast, Philip the Chancellor and many other theologians accepted Augustine's view that matter and form were simultaneously created.146 On this basis, they argued that since matter never existed without form, it need not be intelligible apart from form. Either matter was intelligible only in relation to form147 or as the privation of 144 R. Wood, "Distinct Ideas and Perfect Solicitude: Alexander of Hales, Richard Rufus, and Odo Rigaldus," Franciscan Studies 53 (1993), 7-46. 145 Lombard, Sent. 2.12, I: 384-385. 146 Philippus Cancellarius, Summa de Bono, ed. N. Wicki, Bern 1985, p. 120. 147 Albert, Sent. 1.36.11, ed. Borgnet 25: 101: "Unde materia prima per ipsam privationem quam habet, habet ordinem ad formam . . . et sic habet aliquo modo speciem in appetitu speciei et ordine ad ipsam."
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form.148 This was Fishacre's view. But we cannot begin our discussion of this problem with Fishacre, since one of the views he considers and rejects is probably a version of Rufus' opinion as stated in his Contra Averroem, written about a decade before Fishacre's theology lectures. When Rufus first encountered the problem, he simply followed Aristotle. In his first Metaphysics commentary, Rufus held that matter is not intelligible per se and that this is a consequence of the fact that matter cannot be named or signified.149 In his Physics commentary, Rufus explained further. When Aristotle said that matter was a relative [Phys. 2.2.194bl2], he was referring to its need for form; it depends for its being on form.150 That is why it can be known only though form. Averroes agrees: matter is intelligible only though form.151 Rufus soon changed his mind, however, as is clear from his second Metaphysics commentary and from Contra Averroem, questions 5 and 7.152 Contra Averroem explains his reasoning. Of the two arguments
148 Fishacre, Sent. 1.36, G&C.93vb: "Quidam enim sic dicunt sicut dicit Aristoteles in principio Physicorum 3a: Sunt principia naturalia—scilicet, materia, forma et privatio. Et deinde haec tria reducit ad duo, privationem reducens ad materiam. Et sic patet quod materia prima habet in se privationem; privatio autem cognoscitur per id cuius est privatio; sic igitur materia per formam cognoscitur." 149 Rufus, Memoriale quaestionum in Metaphysicam Aristot. 7.13, Erfurt, Quarto 290, f. 49rb: "Dicendum quod si materia per se esset intelligibilis, per se esset nominabilis, et tune posset adeo vere nomen imponi a materia, sicut nunc imponitur a forma. Sed non est sic, sed omne quod est per suam formam intelligitur, et per formam nominatur et non per materiam." Henceforth: MMet, Q290. l50 Rufus, In Physicam Aristot. 2, Erfurt, Quarto 312, f. 3va: "Ipsa enim materia non est in se aliquid absolutum, sed est quaedam natura quae non est in se finita, sed indigens et inclinata ad formam. Hanc ergo naturam dependentem dico, cum dico materiam esse ad aliquid. Similiter dicimus cum dicimus manum vel pedem esse ad aliquid. Talis enim dependentia potest esse in substantia. Manus enim hoc quod est dependet ad aliquid. Similiter pes et huiusmodi; et huius signum est quod cum merit manus abscisa, non amplius est manus." "Ex iam dicto possumus videre quare materia scibilis est per formam, et etiam quod materia est per formam non solum in composite, sed etiam ut est aliqua natura differens a forma. Hac ratione quod est dependens ab alio capit esse ab alio." Henceforth In Phys., Q312. 151 Averroes, In Aristot. Metaph. 7.35, ed. apud Junctas, Venice 1550, 8: 187v. 152 Rufus, DMet 7, Q290.17ra: "Individuum est vera substantia, compositum ex materia et forma, et ista sunt intelligibilia, ergo compositum ex his est scibile et intelligibile." Rufus, Contra Averroem 1, Ad 4-5, Erfurt, Quarto 312, f. 84vb: "De quaestione quarta et quinta, quaerentibus de individuis et de substantia materiae primae, an sint simpliciter quantum est de se intelligibilia, an non: patet in trac-
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previously advanced against matter's intelligibility, Rufus retains the premise of the first argument. Though he changed his mind about matter's intelligibility, he continued to maintain that it could not be named, since names are based on forms. But though matter cannot be signified by name, it can be signified. As an uninformed absolute, the part of speech which best designates matter is a pronoun. Specifically, Rufus suggests that we consider using the demonstrative pronoun 'this' to designate matter. Though at this point his claim appears only as the third horn of a trilemma, Rufus ultimately concludes that the case of matter requires us to give up our adherence to the view that everything which can be understood can also be signified by name.153 The initial alternative—that matter may be unintelligible—Rufus clearly abandons as we noted above. He is more unsure about the second alternative which identifies matter and form. Indeed, this is the position which Fishacre seems to attribute to him.154 But if we examine the discussion as a whole, we will see that although Rufus does not explicitly deny that matter is form, he does argue for the contrary position. Rufus begins question five by refuting the common view—namely, that matter is intelligible as the privation of form. For matter is a
tatu illarum quod sunt intelligibilia, et in tractatu quintae et septimae quo modo sunt intelligibilia et quod ideas habent in intellectu recipiente immediate receptas." Henceforth: CAv, Q312. 153 Rufus, CAv 1.5, Q312.82ra: "Item, et numquid omne per se intelligibile est nomine significabile, quo enim nomine significares rem materiae in se consideratae? Si ipsa sit simpliciter quantum est de se intelligibilis, et quomodo nomine aliquo omnino earn significares, nisi illa sua res forma sit, cum omne nomen imponatur a qualitate vel forma? Unde nee hoc nomen 'materia' ipsam rem absolute designat sed forte aggregatum ex ilia re et hac differentia potentia vel aliqua alia proprietate. Potissime ergo videtur ilia res absoluta parte orationis quae est pronomen designari, et 'haec' considera. Ilia vero res diversis propositionibus condicionata et variis nominibus designata. Ex dictis iam patet quod res materiae absoluta aut [1] non erit simpliciter et per se intelligibilis; aut [2] si erit, erit et nomine aliquo earn significabilis, et tunc esset forma; aut [3] non omne intelligibile nomine significabile [est]." Cf. etiam, Rufus, CAv 1 Ad 1, Q312.84va: "Quare nomina non habeant ipsa materiae substantia et particularia substantia materiae forte? Eo enim quod forma non est, nomine significabilis non est, alia tamen parte orationis significabilis, utpote per pronomen." For a sophisticated discussion of Rufus on names, see E. Karger, "Richard Rufus on Naming Substances," Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1998), 51-67. 154 Fishacre, Sent. 1.36, G&C.93vb: "Alii his et aliis coacti dicunt quod eiusdem naturae sunt materia et forma, et ideo potest materia cognosci sicut forma. Ponunt enim materiam etiam [cognosci per] formam."
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nature prior to its privation. Since matter is a nature distinct from form; it cannot be accidentally understood by the absence of a form. Indeed, no nature can be understood as the privation of another, different nature.155 Rufus establishes that matter is a nature from the possibility of its lacking a form. Anything which can be the subject of privation must be a nature.156 But matter is a nature in a restricted sense. Principally, it is form, not matter, which is nature. Matter is a nature only equivocally as its subject, just as motion is a nature in that it leads to form or nature.157 Rufus asks himself what the absence of form means for matter's being. Does it posit matter in being, does it negate its being, or does it do neither? The first alternative Rufus rejects as impossible. The second he neither accepts nor rejects, though he states its consequence—namely, that matter would be intelligible and matter and form would be the same thing. The third alternative (which Rufus ultimately prefers) is left standing without comment.158 Rufus argues for the third alternative—that form neither posits
155 Rufus, CAv 1.5, Q312.81vb-82ra: "Attende quid de ipsa substantia materiae. Nonne ipsa vere res et natura est? . . . Ergo in se considerata per se intelligibilis est, licet sic vestita vel condicionata forte per accidens solum sit intelligibilis sicut patet.. . ." "Item, nulla natura est intelligibilis per privationem alterius naturae. Sed privatio alicuius naturae intelligitur per accidens, per privationem formae vel habitus. Si ergo quidditas et substantia materiae non est privatio, licet sic considerata est formam non habens, non erit per accidens intelligibilis per privationem formae." 156 Rufus, CAv 1.5, Q312.82ra: "Item, nonne statim sequitur quod, si est privata, quod sit vere natura. Nihil enim privatur nisi ens et natura. Privatio enim non privatur." 157 Rufus, CAv 1.5, Q312.82ra: "Vel si utrumque dicitur natura, scilicet materia et forma, sed aequivoce, utrumque altero prius natura erit; sed aequivocatur natura. Est enim forma prius et principaliter dicta natura. Materiae autem attribuitur hoc nomen per attributionem eius—id est, materiae—ad simpliciter naturam—id est, ad formam. Dicitur enim materia natura, eo quod ipsa fit subiectum naturae, et motus dicitur natura, eo quod ipse sit via in naturam." 158 Rufus, CAv 1.5, Q312.82ra: "Item, numquid privatio formae ponit rem materiae creatae? Non; rem enim omnino non ponit. Ergo ex sola privatione formae, nee per se nee per accidens erit intelligibile quidditas et substantia materiae." "Item, ipsa privatio formae aut ponit rem materiae aut negat, aut nee ponit nee negat. Si negat rem materiae, ergo positio formae esset positio rei materiae. Et tune duo sequerentur—scilicet, quod si forma intelligibilis per positionem, ergo et res materiae; et aliud, quod idem esset res materiae et res formae, quia una privatio non est nisi unius rei et naturae. Privatio si ponat rem materiae, ergo privatio naturae erit naturae positio quod non est. Nullius enim naturae non exsistentia causa est inducens alterius naturae exsistentiam."
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nor negates matter's being on the grounds of matter's priority. Matter is prior both to having (positio) and not having (privatio) form. How can matter be prior to form which is more noble than matter? Basing himself on Augustine, Rufus argues that it is prior by generation or origin.159 Having established the sense in which matter is prior to form, Rufus returns at the end of question five to the second alternative left open, asking whether matter and form are one thing or two. As far as the topic of question five is concerned, it does not make any difference what the answer is. Matter is intelligible in either case. If matter and form are the same thing, then clearly matter is intelligible, since form is intelligible. But if they are two things, as the priority pertaining to matter means that they must be, then there's at least a potential problem. Rufus claims that just as form is intelligible apart from matter, so matter is intelligible apart from form. Assuming that this is so, Rufus explores further the relation between matter and form and the sense in which matter is prior to form. He asks: what is the primary subject of the differentiae, act and potency? It cannot be form, he says, since every form is actual, therefore form as form denies potency. But matter excludes neither act nor potency, therefore it is matter to which both act and potency pertain.160 As a glance at the text shows, Rufus concludes this argument (and the section by defending the intelligibility of matter as whole) with 159 Rufus, CAv 1.5, Q312.82ra: "Quo autem modo prioritatis sit materia prior forma. Puto quod secundum beatum Augustinum prior generatione dicatur materia. Forma autem prior materia nobilitate et dignitate." 160 Rufus, CAv 1.5, Q312.82ra: "Ipsa res materiae nec defindit actu habere formam nec ponit habere formam, quia ambo complectitur. Ergo in se sua res et substantia prius est his utrisque differentiis. Ergo quantum est de se intelligibilis est ante has differentias. Ergo ante privationem formae. . . ." "Item, res formae [et] res materiae aut sunt res et res, aut sunt res una tantum. Si secundo modo, ergo sine dubio si res formae simpliciter est intelligibilis, et res materiae similiter erit. Si autem primo modo, ergo sicut res formae in se aliquid est praeter hoc quod est in materia, et ita prius in se intelligibilis quam prout est in materia, similiter res materiae in se est prius aliquid quam sit sub forma, et ita prius in se intelligibilis quam ipsa substantia formae secundum quod huiusmodi. Sed si sint res et res, substantia et substantia, cuius unius primo erunt hae differentiae actus et potentia? Formae enim primo non erunt hae differentiae. Omnis enim forma aliquis actus est. Ergo forma iam defindit unam harum differentiarum. Sed res materiae, ut dictum est, neutram harum defindit. Ideo eius—id est, rei materiae—videntur hae differentiae primo. Quod si verum est, una est res materiae et formae et una radix et essentia."
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the statement that if matter is the primary subject of the differentia, act and potency, then "there is one thing of matter and form and one root and essence." This statement, which requires interpretation, was probably the basis for a misunderstanding by Fishacre. At first sight it seems to conclude from the premise that matter and form are two things that they are one, which cannot be what Rufus intends. Rufus cannot mean that matter and form are numerically the same thing. Rather the claim is that since matter is equally subject to act and potency and also prior to form by generation, matter and form have the same ultimate origin—presumably, matter as such, the something which is prior to act and potency. In this sense matter and form share "one root and essence," though they are two things. Form cannot be the same as matter in the usual sense, since form posits act. Still, given the way Rufus states his conclusion, it is not difficult to see how Fishacre could characterize this position as claiming that matter and form were the same. That Fishacre cannot be right is clear from both Rufus' defense of the view that matter is prior to form and from his response to the seventh question, in which having argued that matter is intelligible, he explains how. What he sets out to do is to specify how matter can be understood as a thing apart from form, not how matter is intelligible by understanding form. Question seven starts by reminding us what an idea is—namely, a form received in the intellect in virtue of which we understand an external thing. Hence ideas either are the external thing we understand in virtue of them or they are abstracted from an external thing. Abstracted ideas cannot exist apart of the intellect which receives and considers them. By contrast, the first cause, which is also an idea, exists independently of any receiving intellect.161 Supposing that the substance of matter is independently intelligible, its idea must fit into this scheme. Either matter must be imme-
161 Rufus, CAv 1.7, Q312.82va: "Quid autem nomine 'ideae' praecise intelligam facile est videre: scilicet formam rei quae res se ipsa et immediate in intellectu recipi non potest—formam, dico, per quam cognoscitur ipsa res extra, non ex qua cum materia constituitur compositum extra, sed forma dicta ratio exemplaris rei extrinsecae. Unde causa prima et idea dici potest (ut videtur), et omnis causati species per quam speciem ab intellectu recipiente ipsum creatum intelligitur et idea dici potest. Idea autem quae est causa prima per se ipsam exsistit et non indiget aliquo alio recipiente in quo sit; idea autem abstracta a creatis semper indiget aliquo recipiente, scilicet intellectu speculo."
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diately received in the intellect or its idea must be extracted from an external nature. But only the first cause is immediately intelligible, rather than by means of an abstracted idea or species, so matter is not immediately intelligible. But what if matter were understood simply, by means of one idea, which was the idea of the first cause? If it were, matter would be the noblest of things, the thing nearest the first cause, which is preposterous, and other absurdities would also follow.162 Having established that the idea of matter must be abstracted from matter, Rufus asks what ideas are primarily extracted from, and he offers four alternatives: entity, form, matter, or composite. Initially, he is concerned only to eliminate alternatives that would be inconsistent with abstracting an idea from matter—namely, form or composite. According to Rufus, ideas do not pertain to composites as such, since that would mean that only composites were intelligible. But common opinion suggests that ideas do pertain principally to forms. Here Rufus counters that being a form as such adds nothing to the essential description of the subject he wants to describe precisely, which is 'having an idea'. That description pertains to form only in so far as it is also a nature. But matter is also a nature, and therefore it, too, has an idea. Rufus concludes by saying that ideas primarily pertain to created nature as such—to matter as matter, as well as to forms and composites.163 162
Rufus, CAv 1.7, Q312.82va-82vb: "Redeamus, posito quod substantia materiae sit intelligibilis, simpliciter quantum est de se, ab intellects recipiente, cum omne sic intelligibile vel ipsum se ipso immediate est receptum et unitum cum ipso intellectu recipiente, vel habet speciem aliquam quae sic recipiatur. Et substantia materiae ibi per se ipsam recipi non potest. Si enim posset, possent et omnes naturae omnino. Et ideo forte dixit Philosophus si non esset materia, esset vere balneum in anima. Cum hoc, inquam, ita sit, necesse est et substantiam materiae ideam aliquam habere." "Item, si ipsa est simpliciter intellecta, et nullam tamen habeat ideam nisi solam causam primam; omnis autem forma-natura de genere alicuius praedicamenti necessario habet ideam abstractam a se, cum ab intellectu recipiente intelligitur; igitur secundum hanc positionem erit substantia materiae nobilior omni tali forma, propinquior enim est causae primae. Est enim ipsa in ordine idearum abstractarum, et etiam sequitur quod ab intellectu recipiente non possit ipsa omnino intelligi nisi mediante idea primi." 163 Rufus, CAv 1.7, Q312.82vb: "Item, quaero cuius praecise sit idea abstracta? Aut entis in eo quod ens—et voco 'ens', ut prius, quod est extra intellectum nec est intellectus—aut formae secundum quod forma, aut materiae secundum quod materia, aut compositi secundum quod compositum. Si entis, in eo quod ens, ergo cuiuslibet entis, ergo materiae. Si autem formae secundum quod forma, hoc non potest stare; idem enim forma et species et idea. Per accidens autem est formae
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The rest of the seventh question is comprised of replies to objections. Rufus' reply to the initial objection importantly extends the explanation. Here the objection suggests that if an idea can be abstracted from matter, then matter must be a composite. Rufus concedes that he is committed to this consequence. He finds the consequence acceptable on Boethius' authority: in everything short of God quod-est is distinguished from quo-est.164 So in this sense, matter is composite. By its created nature, matter is a quod-est; a quo-est, by its idea.165 In reply to the obvious objection, Rufus denies that the absence of absolutely simple components will lead to an infinite regress. For matter is not truly composite, since its quod-est and quo-est components are not different things, but the same thing in different
forma si est; non est igitur formae idea secundum quod forma; si autem materiae, habeo propositum. Si autem compositi secundum quod compositum, ergo solum compositum esset ab intellectu recipiente intelligibile, non ergo quaelibet compositi pars." "Forte dicet quod praecise est idea formae-naturae secundum quod forma-natura— dico 'naturae creatae' sive formae entis secundum quod forma est ens. Contra: in hoc praecise aggregantur haec duo 'forma-natura', quorum alterum, scilicet forma, nihil confert ad receptionem proprietatis quae est 'habere ideam'. Si enim formae secundum quod est forma non est idea, tunc hoc ipsum forma nec est causa, nee pars causae propter quam alicui debeatur hoc praedicatum 'habere ideam'. Non ergo confert additio eius quod est forma; immo magis repugnat, ut visum est. Reliquitur ergo solum quod naturae secundum quod natura vel naturae causatae sit praecise idea. Et si hoc, cuiuslibet naturae causatae, ergo materiae." 164 Boethius, De Trinitate 2 ed. Stewart, Rand & Tester, Loeb Classical Library 74 (Cambridge, Mass., 1973) 10-12. Boethius, Quomodo Substantiae ed. Stewart, Rand & Tester, LCL 74: 40-42. Cf. Hales, Glossa 1.3.46b, BFS 12: 64: "Boethius dicit: 'In omni eo quod est citra primum differt quod est et esse.'" 165 Rufus, CAv 1.7, Q312.82vb: "Ad oppositum: si substantia materiae ideam habeat, simpliciter non erit, ut videtur. Idea enim abstracta prius fuit in eo a quo est abstracta. Igitur videtur ipsa materia esse composita ex sua idea abstractibili et sua re et natura." "Item, accidet, ut videtur, infinitas nisi sit ponere substantiam materiae primae simpliciter. Quamvis enim 'in omni eo quod est citra primum differat quod-est et quo-est', et ita substantia materiae primae aliquo modo composita non videtur posse fugi infinitas." "Procedam enim: et in ipso quod-est et in ipso quo-est ipsius materiae. Et simili modo quaeram de idea abstracta, cum ipsa sit aliquid citra primum, differrent in ea quod-est et quo-est et sic erit composita. Aut considera quod materia est quod-est, et idea non est quod-est sicut nee verum. Igitur in omni eo quod est differt quod-est et quo-est, verum est, hoc est in omni natura causata vel videtur [in] omni ente causato. Et hoc est forte dicere quod omnis talis natura vel tale ens ideam habet et naturam, et est quod-est per suam naturam, quo-est est per suam ideam. Unde forte congrue exponeretur in omni eo quod est citra primum etc., id est differt natura vel ens ab idea."
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modes of being; the same thing in its spiritual (quo-est) and natural being (quod-es£).]66 This position is as complicated as it is interesting. The claim that matter has an idea is restricted; it may pertain only to matter as considered by the metaphysician, not to matter as considered by the physicist.167 The claim that matter absolutely, or as such, is indifferent to act and potency is similarly qualified; it may not refer to what we call matter. The word 'matter' may not refer to matter absolutely speaking, which is prior both to act and potency, but only to matter in potency.168 The very subtlety of the position Rufus states in Contra Averroem makes it difficult to decide whether he retained or revised it. There is some evidence that suggests a retreat from the claim that matter is indifferent to potency and act. While arguing that matter is neither one nor many, in his Parisian theology lectures, Rufus identifies matter exclusively with potency.169 But the treatment is too brief to be sure. Fishacre's response to what was probably Rufus' Contra Averroem suggests that at least initially the complexity of Rufus' position led to its being misunderstood. Following Aristotle,170 Fishacre describes matter as a relative. Fishacre understands this to mean that matter is a correlative of form. The relation is neither accidental nor symmetrical.171 166 Rufus, CAv 1.7, Q312.82vb: "Sed numquid accidit infinitas eo quod sic ponitur substantia materiae aliquo modo sit composita? Non, ista enim non est proprie compositio. Forte enim id idem est sed alio modo se habens natura obiecta et propria idea abstracta, esse scilicet aliquo modo spirituale et esse naturale vel materiale habens." 167 Rufus, CAv 1 ad 7, Q312.85ra: "In eiusdem septimae tractatu perpenditur quod eius scilicet substantiae-materiei absolutae sit idea et quod individuorum et cuiuslibet naturae causatae vel entis causati et non privationum. Unde forte materiae prout cadit in consideratione physici in quantum huiusmodi non est idea, nee in quantum talis est ipsa simpliciter intelligibilis, sed aut sicut privatio vel natura privata secundum quod est privata. Est enim materia in physicis privatione et appetitibus contrariis ad formas contrarias determinata." 168 Rufus, CAv 1.5, Q312.82ra: "Unde nee hoc nomen 'materia' ipsam rem absolute designat sed forte aggregatum ex ilia re et hac differentia potentia vel aliqua alia proprietate." 169 Rufus, SPar 2.3, V12993.145vb: "Aliter posset et forte securius hie dici quod unum et multa sunt differentiae entis in actu. Et ideo proprie loquendo materia primodialis nee dicenda est unum nee multa, sed sicut ipsa est ens in potentia, sic et unum in potentia et multa in potentia, nunquam tamen erit actu unum vel actu multa." 170 Aristot., Phys. 2.2.194b9. 171 Fishacre, Sent. 1.36, G&C.93vb: "Dico ergo quod sicut supra ostensum est,
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Thus matter cannot exist or be understood without form, but form exists and can be understood without matter. Contrary to Rufus, Fishacre claims that there is no sense in which matter is prior to or independent of form. 172 Hence it cannot be known apart from form. Though like Rufus, Fishacre holds that matter is intelligible, unlike Rufus, he denies that it is intelligible by itself. According to Fishacre, we can understand matter only in virtue of something other than matter. In sum, though by itself it is unintelligible, matter is not altogether unintelligible, since it can be understood in virtue of something else—namely, form.173 Fishacre's position is not dogmatic. He asserts nothing; he asks God to illumine his heart to other possibilities.174 And he must have been aware that his own position was open to the objection he posed against the common view, how can we know a nature different from form in virtue of form?175 Not surprisingly, in his Oxford theology lectures, Rufus rejects Fishacre's position, which he summarizes as the claim that matter is relative to form by reason of its potency, though the converse is not the case, and hence matter can be known only by form. That is, matter is known by what it is not. According to Rufus, that posidist. 26, quod ipsa substantia materiae est relativa et refertur ad formam non relatione aliqua quae sit accidens, ne esse accidens sit ante substantiam—sed relatione quae est sua substantia. Ipsa eius substantia est relativa ad formam. Et ideo nee mirum sicut relatum non potest esse sine suo correlario, sic nee materia sine forma. Nee tamen forma est relata ad materiam, cuius signum est quod potest esse sine materia quoquo modo. Habet enim esse in intellectu secundum quosdam quod non est esse in materia. Hinc patet quod materia non est prius etiam natura quam formam. Relativa enim sunt natura simul." 1/2 Fishacre, Sent. 1.36, G&C.93vb: "Sed forma est prior natura quam materia. Prius enim fuit in intellectu quam esset in materia. Cum ergo unum relativorum non cognoscatur nisi per alterum, patet manifeste quod ipsa substantia materiae non est cognoscibilis nisi per formam. Forma tamen quia non dicitur relative ad materiam, potest cognosci non per materiam. Hoc ergo modo cognoscibilis est materia et ab intellectu create et ab intellectu increato." 173 Fishacre, Sent. 1.36, G&C.93vb~94ra: "Ad primum dico quod ubi multum est de materia, minus est intelligibile per se; et ideo ubi totum est materia, sequitur quod non est intelligibile per se sed per aliud. Non sequitur quod sit omnino non intelligibile." 174 Fishacre, Sent. 1.36, G&C.93vb: "Ego autem fateor me nihil hic scire, sed sufficit mihi aliquid probabiliter dicere, nihil tamen asserere. ... Si autem alio modo, non vidi adhuc. Illustret Deus cor meum." 170 Fishacre, Sent. 1.36, G&C.93vb: "Cum materia—scilicet, eius substantia—sit quaedam natura et non sit ipsa nihil et tota privatio, fateor quod id privationis quod in ea est per formam cognoscitur. Sed id positionis quod in ea est qua ratione per formam cognoscetur cum sit natura alia a forma?"
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tion is no different from the view Fishacre had rejected—namely, that God does not know matter except by privation.176 Contrary to Fishacre, Rufus argues that in a certain way matter is prior to every created mode. Citing Augustine, as he had in Contra Averroem, Rufus claims that matter is prior by generation; it is, Rufus says, the first of creatures.177 Rufus adds an argument for the view that matter must be a nature. If God created prime matter from nothing, then it cannot itself be nothing, but must be something.178 Rufus does not attempt, however, to explain how there could be an idea of matter. Instead, he argues that there can be no reason not to posit an idea of matter in God, given that everyone agrees that matter is not nothing. Every creature, every "something" created by God, is assimilated to God in some mode. And every creature has an idea in God to the extent it is so assimilated. In his theology lectures, assimilation is the key to the argument. Every thing that really has being—everything that is, and is neither bad nor a privation—is like God in some limited respect and hence has a divine idea.179 As is obvious, when lecturing for theology students at Oxford, Rufus presented a view that was open to fewer objections than the subtle theory he had explored in Contra Averroem. He did not grapple with the many philosophical problems consequent on the position, but he also did not fail to remind his students how difficult the issue was to resolve. At the end of the distinction, he warned them: "These things are difficult, and I do not [claim to] settle them."180 176 Rufus, SOx 1.35, B62.79va: "Hie dicunt aliqui quod ipsa natura materiae ratione suae potentiae dicitur relative ad formam, sed non e converse. Unde cognoscitur materia per formam tantum. Sed secundum hoc non aliter cognoscit Deus materiam quam per privationem." 177 Rufus, SOx 1.35, B62.79va: "Item, primordialis materia suo quodam modo prior est—scilicet, generatione—omni forma creata. Unde et 'in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram' [Gen. 1.1], id est materiam rerum spiritualium et materiam rerum corporalium. Ita enim exponit Augustinus. Igitur si materia prima creaturarum est, si iterum prior est, deinde forma creata, intellectus materiae non dependebit ab intellectu formae." 178 Rufus, SOx 1.35, B62.79va: "Ex his dicamus quod quando Deus fecit et creavit materiam primam ex nihilo, ipsa non nihil est, sed aliquid est, et natura est." 179 Rufus, SOx 1.35, B62.79va-vb: "Non video igitur quare non habeat materia suo quodam modo ideam propriam in Deo, in tantum scilicet in quantum ipsa quoquo modo ei assimilatur in hoc quod quoquo modo esse habet et non pure nihil est. Sic enim videtur quaelibet creatura ideam habere in Deo, in quantum scilicet ei quoquo modo assimilatur." 180 Rufus, SOx 1.35, B62.79va: "Ecce, difficilia sunt haec et non definio in illis."
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Kilwardby frames the question as Fishacre and Rufus had. In Fishacre, Kilwardby found Augustine's authority cited for the claim that God does not create ignorantly; in Rufus, the citation of De natura boni, Augustine's defense of the view that God creates matter as something good.181 Like the principal arguments, the contrary arguments also come from Fishacre and Rufus. There is Fishacre's "the more material something is, the less intelligible"; but prime matter is entirely material; hence unintelligible. And there is Rufus citation of Augustine's claim that prime matter has no species, from which one might infer that matter can have no idea.182 Kilwardby's own opinion comes most directly from Bonaventure, who briefly considered the issue.183 According to that opinion matter as essence has an idea, while matter as privation does not.184 It assumes that matter can have an essence without a form. It is hard to imagine a competent thirteenth century Aristotelian philosopher making such a claim without a strong theological authority. That authority comes from an unacknowledged citation from the Pseudo Augustinian Hypomnesticon which is quoted by Rufus but not by Kilwardby or Bonaventure. The Hypomnesticon states that whatever God makes has an essence.185 Though he quotes the authority, Rufus does not initially adopt this terminology.186 Still, allowing for the 181
Kilwardby, Sent. q. 79, ed. J. Schneider, p. 253. Fishacre, Sent. d. 36, G&C 93vb: "Item, nihil ignorans fecit. Unde Augustinus . . ." Rufus, SOx 1.35, B62.77va: "... Deus fecit et creavit materiam primam . . . Unde Augustinus in libro De natura boni, de materia ait quod ipsa malum dicendum non est..." 182 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 79, ed. J. Schneider, p. 253. Fishacre, Sent. d. 36, G&C 93vb: "Quanto quid minus habuit de materia tantum est magis intelligibilis . . ." Rufus, SOx 1.35, B62.77va: . . . Augustinus, 83 Quaest. 54: "Materia prima, quoniam caret omni specie, recte nihil dicitur." 183 Bonav., Sent. 1.36.3, I: 629: " . . . c u m quaeritur utrum imperfecta habeant ideam in Deo, hoc dupliciter potest intelligi ... Si ratione imperfectionis, cum irnperfectio sit privatio, et privatio non dicat ens, nee aliquid a Deo, nec assimilabile, sic non habet ideam. Si autem ratione eius quod subest, sicut materia dicitur quid imperfectum, et materia aliquam essentiam dicit, sic habet ideam . . ." As one would expect given his commitment to the unicity of the divine idea, this is a relatively minor point for Bonaventure. 184 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 79, ed. J. Schneider, p. 253: "Materia dupliciter considerari potest scilicet secundum essentiam, et sic habet ideam, vel secundum privationem et imperfectionem et sic non habet." 185 Ps. August., Hypomnesticon 1.4.5, PL 45: 1616. Rufus, SOx 1.35, B62.77va: "Sed ait Augustinus, Hyponosticon c. 1: "Quidquid Deum fecisse dicimus, habet essentiam." 186 Rufus first uses "essence" in this context at Paris as far as we know. Whether he was pleased about making the change to Bonaventure's terminology is hard to tell. There is some sign of defiance, since Rufus only picks up the term after quoting from the Hypomnesticon a passage which justifies the use of the term "nature".
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difference in terminology, where Bonaventure prefers 'essence' to Rufus' 'nature', Bonaventure has adopted the same view Rufus had maintained since Contra Avenoem I: Prescinding from privation, defect, and turpitude, matter is an essence or nature, and therefore intelligible.187 Both Bonaventure and Kilwardby follow Rufus in making assimilation to God the key defense of the position.188 But clearly Kilwardby preferred the neatness of Bonaventure's position and accordingly adopted a modified form of his terminology, sometimes referring to matter's essence, sometimes to its 'entity', but never to its 'nature'. Kilwardby's reply to Fishacre's contrary argument is twofold. First Kilwardby declares a related major premise invalid: "the more material something has the less entity it has." Entity does not track actuality. Prime matter lacks actuality but not entity and hence it is not unintelligible.189 Second, apparently taking off from a marginal note in Rufus' Oxford commentary,190 Kilwardby distinguishes our knowledge of matter from God's. God knows everything equally; it is only we who understand less about more material objects. For the human, though not for the divine, intellect, Kilwardby concedes that matter is known only accidentally and by privation.191 Rufus himself does not reply to the contrary argument he adduces. Kilwardby supplies the omission by allowing that prime matter entirely lacks actuality, but denying that that makes it nothing.192 Since it has entity, though not actuality, prime matter is intelligibile by God.
See Rufus, SPar 1.36.6, V12993.91rb: "Responsio: Materia prima ratione essentiae suae aliquid est et opus Dei est et ideam habet in Deo; ratione vero privationis quae nulla est, non." This passage immediately follows a citation of Ps. August., Hypomnesticon 4.1.1, PL 45: 1639: "Omne enim malum natura non est. . . Quamobrem quod natura non est Deus non fecit, quia natura est omne quod fecit." 18/ Rufus, CAv 1, Q312.81vb: "Ergo, quantum est de se simpliciter est intelligibile. Circumscribendo enim privationes ipsius materiae et defectus et turpitudines, quae non videntur esse de substantia materiae . . ." 188 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 79, ed. J. Schneider, p. 253: "Ex hoc patet responsio . . . unde materia est unum genus entium et habet essentiam, inde Deo assimulatur . Unde autem imperfectum ens vel diminutum vel mutabile vel huiusmodi, non assimulatur." 189 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 79, ed. J. Schneider, p. 253. 190 Rufus, SOx 1.35, B62.79va. Nota marginalis: "Istud videtur esse intelligendum in nobis, quomodo scilicet a nobis intelligatur materia prima. Nam haec est alia quaestio et forte de hoc vero alias dicetur, nam non puto quod Deus intelligat materiam primam tantum sicut intelligit privationes et defectus." 191 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 79, ed. J. Schneider, p. 254. 192 Kilwardby, Sent. q. 79, ed. J. Schneider, p. 254.
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This British theological defense of the claim that matter is intelligible, at least by God, is an important part of the tradition from which the later Franciscan claim that matter possessed a limited actuality came. It differs from the views of later theologians, like John Duns Scotus, however. For though it claims that prime matter is something, it denies actuality to matter. Most interestingly, for Rufus, prime matter is prior to both actuality and potency. Unfortunately, between 1245 and 1255 the trend was away from considering seriously the philosophical problems posed by the claim that matter is intelligible. They are taken most seriously in about 1235 by Rufus in a philosophical work probably not addressed to students. First among British theologians to raise the issue in about 1245, Fishacre still demands a sophisticated awareness of Aristotelian philosophy from his students. But beginning with Rufus' theology lectures, the focus is on the theological commitments which dictate the claim that matter has an idea. At least in lecturing to theology students, the attempt to explain how matter could have an idea ceased with Fishacre. By Kilwardby's time even the warning that this was a very difficult problem was absent, so there was not much grappling with the problem. Nonetheless, this is a case in which British theology raised an important philosophical and theological issue, which was considered only minimally at Paris, and was to have far reaching consequences in the history of ideas.
Conclusion Medieval Oxford was an important center of theological reflection in the middle of the thirteenth century, second only to Paris. But it did not seriously challenge the dominance of Paris which lasted for centuries. Bearing this caveat in mind, let us return to Catto's question: Given that theology was an international discipline, how could there be an independent Oxford tradition? The answer seems to be that Oxonians raised and discussed some important issues not much considered at the University of Paris. They also critically considered influential theological views of distinguished masters at the senior university, stated by Alexander of Hales, the Summa Halesiana and St. Bonaventure. Of course, we cannot tell which Parisian views went unreported and unconsidered at Oxford. But we do know that considered reflection often led to rejection of Continental views. For exam-
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pie, Kilwardby rejected the Summa Halesiana on the relation of theology to the secular sciences. On the subject of the Spirit as trinitarian love, Fishacre rejects William of Auxerre and Alexander of Hales. Rufus and Kilwardby reject not just the Summa Halesiana, but Bonaventure and the entire thirteenth century tradition describing this love as notional. Of course, Fishacre, Rufus, and Kilwardby are different from each other in many respects. The three theologians do not have the same frame of reference, the same philosophical styles and abilities, or the same theological stance. Fishacre still has the wider knowledge of classics found in twelfth century authors, which makes it natural for him to quote Terence on an ethical topic.193 Rufus is particularly interested in the views of Hugh of St. Victor, whose works he consulted at Paris.194 Kilwardby and Rufus share a special focus on Anselm.195 Fishacre is very clever at devising arguments as is obvious from his argument for the claim that we cannot hate all truth.196 Also amusing is his suggestion that if ostensive interpretation of the Spirit's love were true, we could see Peter by seeing Paul since he is the paradigmatic 'apostle'. But not surprisingly, Fishacre's understanding of Aristotle is not very sophisticated, as is evident from his original but not very plausible interpretation of Aristotle's dictum: all men by nature love the truth. Rufus understands Aristotle thoroughly and advances brilliant arguments on topics as diverse as interpreting the Spirit's love and understanding matter. But his treatments are often brief, just where full articulation and careful counter-argument are required. Kilwardby, though not as original as either Fishacre or Rufus, is thorough, well-organized, and fully explicit. Making explicit the different definitions of science at stake in deciding whether theology was a science served him well. Comparing the two concepts,
193
Fishacre, Sent. In Pr., Ott294.3ra. Rufus, SOx 2.17, B62.145vb. This is easy to see in Kilwardby's treatment of trinitarian questions. See Sent. qq. 36-39, ed. J. Schneider, pp. 93-127. 196 Fishacre, Sent. In Pr., Ott294.3ra: "Item, si potest odiri veritas universaliter, esto quod aliquis odio habeat earn. Sic dico ei 'tu odisti veritatem omnem, ergo verum est te odire veritatem omnem. Hoc verum aut non odisti, et tunc non odisti veritatem omnem; aut odisti, et tunc odisti te odire veritatem omnem. Sed quod odisti non vis. Ergo non vis odire veritatem omnem. Sed si non vis odire, non odisti cum sit voluntas libera a coactione. Ergo non odisti veritatem omnem . . .'" 194 195
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led him to draw the parallel between faith in theology and first principles in Aristotelian science, which was to be so fruitful. As fond of detailed distinctions and compromise as St. Bonaventure, Kilwardby is also more continental in the confidence of his theological stance. Rufus and Fishacre are modest in their claims, hesitant to define, and eager to express their humility. So, for example, Fishacre introduces his own opinion on divine ideas with the words: "I confess, however, that I know nothing here."197 Possibly a sign of the fervor of early English friars, this attitude has dropped away by Kilwardby's time. The differences between these early English theologians should not be allowed to obscure the things they have in common, however. Devoted to the Fathers, they emphasize accuracy in Patristics citation. Their sensitivity to the biblical text is considerable, as is clear from Kilwardby's unwillingness to claim that the Spirit is God's love as the Son is his Word. Most importantly, they are acutely aware of the potential for conflict between Christian theology and Aristotelianism. Robert Grosseteste's influence probably accounts for these similarities. Grosseteste developed elaborate methods to facilitate accurate and frequent reference to the Fathers. He emphasized Scriptural studies. He was among the most critical of Aristotle's thirteenth century readers. The awareness of potential conflicts between Aristotelianism and Christian dogma shared by Fishacre, Rufus, and Kilwardby prompted their consideration of distinctive theological topics. We have seen two examples: examinations of the human desire for truth and the intelligibility of matter. These issues arise because Christian views on sin do not harmonize well with human nature as conceived by Aristotle. Also Aristotelian views on the divine intellect compromise theistic claims for divine omniscence and solicitude, as well as being incompatible with Augustinian views on divine ideas. The different concerns these Oxford theologians brought to Lombard's text not only led them to consider unusual topics but to advance powerful and original philosophical and theological ideas. Some, like their views on the nature of matter and the formal distinction, were adopted by subsequent Oxonians to good effect. So, in a sense what is distinctive in Oxford theology between 1245 and 1255 was the basis for its brilliance at the turn of the century.
197
Fishacre, Sent. 1.36, G&C.93rb.
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The sensitivity of our three midcentury theologians to the Biblical text, like their dedication to accuracy in patristic citation dropped away after 1255, as humility had disappeared earlier. But Oxford's critical, and distinctively Christian approach, to Aristotle persisted and flourished. Early Oxford theology had a great impact on high scholasticism: From Kilwardby came the comparison of tenets of faith to the premises of a demonstration, so influential in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. William of Ockham's admission of the possibility that human beings may reject the enjoyment of the divine has its roots in Rums' efforts to account for human depravity: hating the truth for its own sake. Finally, the Franciscan tradition of attributing limited actuality of matter is anticipated by both Rufus and Kilwardby. John Duns Scotus' formal distinction is explicitly attributed by him to these "ancient doctors." In short, early Oxford theology was in many ways both a brilliant and an influential chapter in the history of Western theology.
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THE BEGINNING OF A TRADITION: THE SENTENCES COMMENTARY OF RICHARD FISHACRE, OP R. James Long
The Sentences Commentary composed by the English Dominican Richard Fishacre occupies a unique place in the history of the genre. It was, to begin with, the first such work written at Oxford,1 and that fact alone invites special attention. In addition, Fishacre's project aims to graft the peculiarly English empirical tradition onto the scholastic theology being developed at Paris and elsewhere on the continent. Lastly, Fishacre's Commentary represents in a quite singular fashion a blend of theoretical or doctrinal theology with practical or biblical or moral theology. Nicholas Trivet reports that Fishacre was from the diocese of Exeter in Devonshire,2 and indeed a search of royal and administrative records, both local and national, has turned up over one hundred and sixty references to the name Fishacre, beginning with a Martin Fishacre in the twelfth century. In addition, there are three places that bear the name: Fishacre Barton, Combefishacre, and Coleton Fishacre—all in the same vicinity of south Devon. The reasonable assumption therefore would be that the name is toponymic, that is, de Fishacre. However, the places with the name Fishacre attached to them do not appear in the written records until after 1228, almost a century after the first appearance of the surname. The more likely story, therefore, is that it was originally a nickname applied to a Norman knight-turned-landowner who used fish to fertilize his fields: hence, fish-acre; and as the family grew in importance their name became attached to places which they held over several decades, even for more than a century. In the course of the fifteenth century
1 Perhaps the earliest evidence is provided by a scribal note on the flyleaf of Oxford, Oriel College MS 43 (B 4.3): Fishacre primus doctor de ordine predicatorum qui scripsit super librum Sententiarum. See Daniel Callus, Introduction of Aristotelian Learning to Oxford (London, 1943), p. 32. 2 Annales Sex Regum Angliae, ed. Thomas Hog (London, 1845), p. 229 and n. 4.
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it appears that the male line died out and with it the name, and the Fishacre holdings passed to the families of the female heirs.3 It is likely as well that Richard went up to the schools at Oxford with the intention of studying for the diocescan priesthood, but there came into contact with the Dominicans, perhaps in the person of Jordan of Saxony himself, who preached there in 1229,4 and decided to embrace the Dominican rule. As a student at the first Oxford Blackfriars, he would have come under the tutelage of Friar Robert Bacon, the first Dominican regent master in theology at the young studium and the uncle of the better-known Roger. Bacon was already master when he "converted" to the Preachers,5 and in fact it was for this reason that he was dispensed from the novitiate.6 We do not know when Fishacre incepted in theology, but it was probably by 1240. Although commenting on Peter Lombard's Four Books of Sentences was eventually required of all candidates for the degree of master of theology, becoming therefore the exclusive province of bachelors, the evidence suggests that Fishacre's Commentary— like the Sentences Commentaries of Alexander of Hales,7 Roland of Cremona,8 and probably Hugh of St. Cher9 before him—was the 3 I am grateful to Dr. Maura O'Carroll for unearthing this new information. A more complete account can be found in her article entitled "'The Fishacre Tribe': the Family Origins of Richard Fishacre OP," in .New Blackfriars 80, no. 941/942 (July/August 1999), 324-53. 4 Jordan of Saxony, second master general of the Dominicans, on that occasion expressed his hopes for a good catch of recruits, a hope which seemed to be realized a decade later when a letter from the Oxford prior, William of Thetford, revealed that the priory had forty novices; see K. W. Humphreys, "Three Letters of William of Thetford, O.P.," Journal of Ecclesiastical History 5 (1954), 203. Cf. C. H. Lawrence, The Friars. The Impact of the Early Mendicant Movement on Western Society (London-New York, 1994), p. 74, and M. W. Sheehan, "The Religious Orders 1220-1370," in The History of the University of Oxford, vol. 1, ed. J. I. Catto (Oxford, 1984), p. 199. 5 Beryl Smalley, "Robert Bacon and the Early Dominican School at Oxford," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (4th series), 30 (1948), 1. 6 See Thomas of Eccleston, who records it with a sniff of disapproval: "Consueverunt enim ipso die ingressus sui, si vellent, profiteri, sicque fecit bonae memoriae frater R. Bacun," Tractatus de adventu Fratrum Minorum in Angliam, ed. A. G. Litde, 2nd ed. (Manchester, 1951), p. 81. 7 Alexander de Hales, Glossa in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, ed. pp. Collegii S. Bonaventurae (Quaracchi, 1951), 1:66*. 8 M. Michele Mulchahey, "First the Bow is Bent in Study. ..." Dominican Education before 1350 (Toronto, 1998), p. 60. 9 Until we have a critical edition of Hugh's Commentary, of which there are extant at least a dozen witnesses, the question of whether it is a magisterial work will remain a matter of conjecture. The DTC asserts without the offer of evidence that Hugh lectured on the Sentences in 1230 as a master. Principe has dated the
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work of a master.10 He writes the work under obedience, he says in the prologue, though infirm in mind and body11—a protestation more credible coming from a master than from a student. Had the Sentences been a part of the theology curriculum, and hence expected of every student volens nolens, the mention of obedience would have been redundant. Furthermore, his reference in the same prologue to his work on the "other part of theology,"12 which was moral theology or Scripture, is probably to his commentary on the Psalms. Although no extant copy has been discovered, its publication was attested by the earliest bibliographies.13 That the work achieved written status, however, suggests that its author was a master; the fruits of the cursor biblicus were seldom published. Lastly, a bachelor would not have had the authority to introduce an innovation such as the Sentences Commentary represented at Oxford. The editors of the Commentary of Alexander of Hales, the first at Paris, had reached the same conclusion with respect to the Alexandrine Glossal In fact, the first Oxford statute regarding the Sentences as part of the theology curriculum does not appear until 1253, and even then the aspirant to the grade of master was given a choice between lecturing on a book of the Bible or Lombard's Sentences or Comestor's Historia.15
written form of the work c. 1230-1232 (Hugh of St. Cher's Theology of the Hypostatic Union [Toronto, 1970], p. 14), but that does not tell us when he lectured on the Sentences or even whether it was before or after his entry into the Order. I thank Simon Tugwell for reviewing the scanty evidence for me. 10 Pelster in his final word on the subject placed the beginning of Fishacre's regency in ca. 1245 and therefore the Commentary shortly before 1245, without however giving the reasons for his position other than the assertion that bachelors read the Sentences ("Das Leben und die Schriften des Oxforder Dominikanerslehrers Richard Fishacre [d. 1248]," Zeitschrift Jur katholische Theologie 54 [1930], 530-31). 11 Sed ad tantam sublimitatem imperfection meum viderunt oculi vestri—et non unicorn imperfectionem sed duplicem, scilicet imperfectionem scientiae in mente et virium in corpore. Tamen oboedientiam nee valens nee volens declinare, confidentiam habeo in eo de quo dicitur ECCLUS. 15: 'Quoniam multa est sapientia Dei et fortis in potentia,' in R. J. Long, "The Science of Theology according to Richard Fishacre: Edition of the Prologue to his Commentary on the Sentences" Mediaeval Studies 34 (1972), 97. 12 Ibid. 13 See Trivet, p. 229; J. Quetif & J. Echard, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum (Paris, 1719), 1:118; John Leland, De Rebus Britannicis Collectanea, ed. T. Hearne (London, 1774), 4:38; and Thomas James, Ecloga Oxonio-Cantabrigiensis (London, 1600), 1:9. Franz Pelster claims he searched in vain for the work ("Das Leben," p. 522). 14 Alexander de Hales, 1:66*. 15 Statuta antiqua universitatis Oxoniensis, ed. S. Gibson (Oxford, 1931), p. 49.
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As to the dates of Fishacre's Commentary, the most solid terminus a quo is provided by a reference in the third distinction of the second book to a proposition condemned by the bishop of Paris in 1241: Novi multos modernorum magistrorum morulam cum Magistro hie ponere, in tantum etiam ut quidam sententiam excommunicationis intulerint in illos qui suae potestati ordinariae subditos dixerint in eodem instanti creationis angelos peccasse et cecidisse.16
A marginal note to this text in one of the manuscripts makes clear the reference: Nota quod ita fuerunt magistri parisienses: sibi deficientes argumentis per excommunicationem arguunt opinionem suam.17
The terminus ante quern is less firm. Fishacre's citations of the Mcomachean Ethics are to the older translation, the so-called Vetus, not to the translation made by Grosseteste.18 Since Fishacre would surely have made use of the new (and more complete) translation, and since Gauthier dates the Grosseteste translation between 1246 and 1247,19 the Fishacre Commentary would have been finished before the latest version of the Ethics arrived on the scene. A more compelling case can be constructed from the time required for writing other works. There is considerable evidence that Fishacre composed several smaller treatises, which were either incorporated into the body of the text or appended thereto in some codices containing the Commentary.20 Among these are four quaestiones, perhaps argued in the schools, which find their way into later copies of the Commentary.21 These include a question on light,22 on the eternity 16 Fishacre, In II Sent., dist. 3, cap. 4. This passage has been edited from six manuscripts and will appear in an edition being prepared under the auspices of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences. 17 London, BL Royal 10.B.VII, f. 105va. 18 See e.g. In II Sent., dist. 27. cap. 1. 19 Aristoteles Latinus, 21/1-3, fasc. 3 (trans. Grosseteste: Textus purus), ed. R. A. Gauthier (Rome, 1972). 20 A reader's guide to these extracurricular writings is provided by marginal notes in a Cambridge witness of the Commentary (Gonville & Caius Coll. MS 329/410 [henceforth C], f. 170vb and f. 175va), which assert that the questions which are missing in this codex are to be found in a quaternus, which also contains the treatise on heresies found at the end of the Vatican manuscript (see n. 24 below). These notes are very possibly in the hand of Fishacre himself. 21 The former pair are found in only two of the manuscripts, the latter two in four of the manuscripts. The only manuscript which contains all four questions is Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. MS 15754, which belonged to the Parisian master Gerard de Abbeville, who bequeathed it to the library of the Sorbonne upon his death in 1271. 22 I have published this question as an appendix to an article I wrote with
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of the world,23 on the nature of the heavens, and finally on the division of the waters (Genesis 1,6—7). In addition, there exist unique copies of a treatise on heresies and a question on the Ascension of Christ, which are appended to a Vatican manuscript containing the Fishacre Commentary.24 These appear to be the disputational works of a mature scholar, written after the completion of the work on the Sentences. Allowing a productivity rate of a question or treatise per semester, three years must be allowed for their composition, supposing no prolonged period of incapacitating illness before his death in 1248.25 This pushes the date for the completion of the Commentary back to 1245. With the information currently available to us we cannot claim more than that Fishacre's Commentary was roughly contemporaneous with the issuing at Paris of Albert's Sentences Commentary and the Summa fratris Alexandri. The investigation of possible Fishacrean influences on Albert's work and the Alexandrine Summa awaits the publication of Fishacre's Commentary.26 There are, however, several pieces of evidence to suggest that the two Parisian works found their way across the Channel within a very short time. First, there are three marginal additions in the Cambridge witness of the Fishacre Commentary mentioned above from two Albertine treatises, the De poena parvulorum and the De peccato originali,27 both dated circa 1246 Professor Timothy Noone: "Fishacre and Rufus on the Metaphysics of Light: Two Unedited Texts," in Roma, magistra mundi. Itineraria culturae medievalis. Melanges offerts au Pen L. E. Boyle a I'occasion de son 75e anniversaire. Textes et Etudes du moyen age (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1998), pp. 517-48. 23 I likewise published this question as Appendix A in my article: "The First Oxford Debate on the Eternity of the World," Recherches de Theologie et Philosophie medievales 65,1 (1998), 52-96. 24 I.e. Vatican, Ottob. lat. MS 294 [henceforth V], ff. 287r-296r. I have published both these works: "Richard Fishacre's Super S. Augustini De haeresibus adnotationes: An Edition and Commentary," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age 60 (1993), 207-79; and "Richard Fishacre's Quaestio on the Ascension of Christ: An Edition," Mediaeval Studies 40 (1978), 30-55. 25 A colophon in an incomplete witness of the Commentary (viz. Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. MS 16389, f. 90V is either a commonplace or an expression of the scribe's awareness that Fishacre's constitution was not the strongest: Rogo te, lector, qmcumque es, ut roges Deum pro fratre Richardo de Fixacre, qui hoc opus edidit, ut eum Dominus nunc et semper in anima custodiat et in corpore vires praebeat, ut residuum operis ad jinem prospere perducat. Amen. 26 An international team of scholars (Stephen Brown, Alexander Eichinger, Joseph Goering, Gerhard Leibold, Maura O'Carroll, Klaus Rodler, and me) are currently at work to produce a critical text, which will be published by the Bavarian Academy of Sciences. 27 See lib. 2, dist. 30, cap. 1 (C, f. 237r) and cap. 5 (C, f. 238r) and dist. 33. cap. 2 (C, f. 244r).
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by the Cologne editors.28 There is in addition a lengthy passage in the Vatican witness, apparently in the hand of the original scribe, from the Swnma Alexandria What I infer from these instances is that Fishacre had not seen these works at the time he was committing his Commentary to writing, but that scribes (or in the case of the Cambridge manuscript, possibly Fishacre himself) were aware of the pieces early in the history of the text's transmission. Since the critical edition of the Fishacre is still in process, what can be said here regarding the sources of the Commentary will be preliminary and provisional. It can, however, be safely asserted that in addition to the usual array of patristic sources that were invoked by the scholastic theologians of the High Middle Ages, Fishacre was particularly open to the newly translated sciences of Aristotle and the Muslim commentators. As Daniel Callus noted a half century ago: It would certainly be an exaggeration to claim Fishacre as an ardent Aristotelian. But there is no doubt that his knowledge of the new learning, compared with that of many of his contemporaries, was astonishingly wide. This is, perhaps, why Matthew Paris praises him, not only as a pre-eminent theologian, but also as a scientist, in theologia et aliis scientiis. His commentary on the Sentences is ... the first Oxford commentary in which Aristotelian learning was introduced in theological speculation.30
More recent studies have expanded the non-Christian sources to include such figures as Avicenna, Averroes, Moses Maimonides, Ptolemaeus, Alpetragius, and Alhasen (whom Fishacre knows simply as auctor Perspectivae).31 How deeply Fishacre penetrated these sources is a further question.32 Theologians of Fishacre's generation, raised as they were on the tra28
Albertus Magnus, Quaestiones, eds. Albert Fries, Wilhelm Kiibel, and Henry Anzulewicz, in Opera omnia, XXV, pars II (Aschendorff, 1993), p. xxvii. 29 See V at lib. 2, dist. 18, cap. 5, ff. 235v-236r. 30 Callus, "Introduction," pp. 31-32. Cf. Pelster, "Das Leben," pp. 536-37. 31 E.g. Principe, "Richard Fishacre's Use of Averroes", Mediaeval Studies 40 (1978) 349—60; idem, "Early Explicit Use of Averroes by Richard Fishacre with respect to Motion and the Human Soul of Christ," Actas del V Congreso International de Filosofia medieval (Madrid 1979), 1127-1137; Brown, "The Reception and Use of Aristotle's Works in the Commentaries on Book I of the Sentences by the Friars Preachers in the Early Years of Oxford University," in Aristotle in Britain During the Middle Ages, Proceedings of the international conference at Cambridge 8—11 April 1994, ed. J. Marenbon (Turnhout, Belgium 1996), 351-69; and Long, "The Reception and Use of Aristotle by the Early English Dominicans," ibid., 51-56. 32 Fully a third of the references to Aristotle in Book Two, for example, can be
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dition of Christian Neoplatonism first forged by Augustine, simply did not have the hermeneutical tools wholly to absorb the new learning. It is not surprising therefore that Fishacre is often electic in his approach and not infrequently falls victim to a false syncretism.33 Among the modems, that is, those of Fishacre's own generation and that of the immediately preceding, the list of sources includes Simon of Tournai, Praepositinus of Cremona, William of Auxerre, Hugh of St. Cher, and Alexander of Hales. However, the single most important influence—saving perhaps that of his mentor, concerning which we have no measure, is that of Robert Grosseteste. Although the fact of Grosseteste's authority has long been known to scholars,34 its extent has through the editing process come more fully to light.35 The extent of the influence of Fishacre's Commentary is yet to be plumbed and in large measure awaits the appearance of the critical edition. Scholars have discerned his influence on Simon of Hinton's work, on an R. de Stavington and a Magister Galienus, on Franciscans William of Melitona and Bonaventure, and on Kilwardby, who may or may not have been a student.36 In a negative sense, Fishacre's most direct and penetrating influence was on his Franciscan contemporary, Richard Rufus of Cornwall. Scholars in found in a florilegium edited by Jacqueline Hamesse (Les Auctoritates Aristotelis [Louvain 1974]), which suggests that Fishacre's acquaintance with certain dimensions of Aristotelian philosophy—namely, the psychology, the ethics, and the metaphysics— remained on the aphoristic level; see Long, Reception, 54-55. 33 In Book Two, for example, Fishacre cites with approval the Aristotelian aphorism that all of our knowledge begins in the senses, then embraces an Augustinian noetic of divine illumination; the two positions are simply incompatible. 34 See e.g. R. C. Dales, "The Influence of Grossteste's Hexaemeron on the Sentences Commentaries of Richard Fishacre, O.P., and Richard Rufus of Cornwall, O.F.M.," Viator 2 (1971) 271-300; McEvoy, J. G., Gli inizj. di Oxford. Grossatesta e i primi theologi. Milan, Jaca Book, 1996, pp. 72-78; and Hedwig, K., "Sphaera Lucis. Studien zur Intelligibilitat des Seienden im Kontext der mittelalterlichen Lichtspekulation," in Beitrdge N.F. 18 (1980), cap. 5: "Robert Grosseteste: Sphaera Lucis." 35 See e.g. Long and Noone, "Metaphysics of Light," pp. 518-19; Long, "Richard Fishacre's Treatise De libero arbitrio" Moral and Political Philosophies in the Middle Ages, Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (Ottawa, 17-22 August 1992), ed. B. Carlos Bazan, Eduardo Andujar, Leonard Sbrocchi (Ottawa 1995), 2:879-85; idem, "The First Oxford Debate on the Eternity of the World," RTPM65,l (1998), 54-64; and idem, "The Cosmic Christ: The Christology of Richard Fishacre OP," Christ Among the Medieval Dominicans. Representations of Christ in the Texts and Images of the Order of Preachers, eds. Kent Emery and Joseph Wawrykow (Notre Dame IN 1998), pp. 335-37. 36 Callus, "Introduction," pp. 32-33, and NCE 12:479. For the many parallel doctrines with Kilwardby see the introduction to Quaestiones in librum primum Sententiarum, ed. J. Schneider (Miinchen 1986), 26*, 29*, 38*-45*, 53* and 55*.
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recent years have been chronicling the several Fishacrean teachings with which Rufus took issue, sometimes emphatically so,37 and it is expected that even more will come to light.38 What effect, if any, Fishacre's work had on his younger confrere Thomas Aquinas is uncertain. Until further investigation, we are left only with a tantalizing marginal note in a Toulouse manuscript of Bernard Gui's De quattuor in quibus: F. Ricardus Fissakre natione Anglus tempore S. Thomae, et eo antiquior, qui super sententias profundissime scripsit, cuius scripta S. Thomas desiderabat habere.39
More than simply being the first out of the gate, the Fishacre Commentary is unique because it seeks to effect a relationship between speculative theology and the already rich English tradition of science, which went under the rubric of philosophy.40 In the rich and dense Prologue already referred to Fishacre borrows imagery from the book of Genesis to illustrate the affiliation: Abraham according to the biblical account is obliged to have sexual relations with Hagar, the slave woman, before he is able to impregnate Sarah. The aspiring theologian, in other words, must have commerce with the worldly sciences, before he can with any hope of being productive enter the chambers of the queen of the sciences.41
37 Peter Raedts, Richard Rufus of Cornwall and the Tradition of Oxford Theology (Oxford 1987), pp. 27-9, 140-46, 150-54, 157, 160, 163-64, 189, 208-20, 234, and Long and Noone, "Metaphysics of Light," pp. 517-48. 38 The project to edit all of Rufus's extant works has been undertaken by Dr. Rega Wood and her associates. 39 Quetif-Echard, 1:118. 40 See e.g. Long, "The Science of Theology," 71-98; and Brown, "Richard Fishacre on the Need for 'Philosophy'," in A Straight Path: Studies in Medieval Philosophy and Culture. Essays in Honor of Arthur Hyman, eds. R. Link-Salinger, J. Hackett, M. S. Hyman, R. J. Long, & C. Manekin (Washington DC, 1988), pp. 23-36. For a more detailed study of how this methodology impacts on his theology of the created world see Long, "The Role of Philosophy in Richard Fishacre's Theology of Creation," Miscellanea Mediaevalia 26, eds. Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer (Berlin 1998), 571-78. 41 Long, "Science of Theology," p. 85. The aphorism of the schoolmen Non est senescendum in artibus is here echoed in Fishacre's warning that those who pursue the sciences exclusively have grown so old in the embraces of their mistress that when
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The science of theology has two parts, Fishacre claims: the one focuses on God as the supreme goodness, the other on God as supreme truth. The former is concerned with instruction in morals, the latter with the more difficult questions concerning the faith. Though both parts are contained indistinctly (indistincte) in the sacred text, modem masters treat the former part in their commentaries on Sacred Scripture; the latter and more difficult part is extracted from the holy canon and placed in the book called the Sentences.*2 Thus in his Commentary Fishacre treats systematically of all the doctrinal questions raised by the Lombard text, and even some that are not. Sometimes this treatment is in the nature of a simple gloss on the Lombard text, sometimes the reader is treated to the full apparatus of a scholastic disputation, with arguments for and against and a solutio. This methodological device, new for the Oxford studium, was of crucial importance in the evolution of scholastic thinking. For thinkers to reach the heights of speculative theology that was the glory of the High Middle Ages they had to break free of the restrictions of textual commentary and engage the philosophically interesting questions that the text suggested. Eventually the questions became free-standing, either as disputed or quodlibetal questions, or questions that became the building blocks of the great summae.43 This division of theology into two parts, a Parisian import, seems to have been a departure from the views of the former Oxford magister sacrae paginae and currently Bishop of Lincoln, Robert Grosseteste. The earliest documented evidence of such opposition is in the form of a letter from Grosseteste to the Oxford masters,44 insisting that all their lectures (vestras lectiones omnes), especially those in the morning hour, the time set aside for what were called the ordinary lectures,45 be based on the books of Sacred Scripture. Instead, continued Grosseteste, the hora matutina was being given over to unspecified books (the
they finally go in to the lady of the house, they are unable to father children owing to their advanced age, just as the elderly David slept with Abisag but knew her not; ibid., p. 86. 42 See Long, "Science of Theology," 96-98. 41 See Artur Landgraf, "Sentenzenglossen des beginnenden 13. Jahrhunderts," Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale 10 (1938), 55. 44 See Roberti Grosseteste quondam episcopi Lincolniensis Epistolae, ed. H. Luard, Rolls Series, 25 (London: Longman, 1861), no. 123, pp. 346-47. Luard suggests a date of 1246, based on its location in the manuscripts (p. cxxix). 43 Since only masters lectured ordinarie, this reference provides yet another argument that Fishacre's Commentary was a magisterial work.
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Sentences are not mentioned by name), which were not, like Sacred Scripture, foundational.46 James Ginther has recently made the case that there is no evidence in Grosseteste's letter that he was opposed to the "new theology" but simply to its preeminent place in the curriculum.47 Certainly it was legitimate and even praiseworthy for Grosseteste to exercise his pastoral responsibilities with respect to the Oxford studium, which was within his jurisdiction. It is likewise true that he nowhere in his letter mentions the Sentences by name. Nevertheless, Grosseteste's letter certainly does not represent an endorsement of the kind of speculative theology represented by the Sentences commentaries. Quite the contrary: the bishop's letter seems rather unambiguous that all lectures be based on Scripture, which for him was theology. Hard on the heels of the Grosseteste letter, in fact, came a sealed letter, an epistola secreta, issued by Pope Innocent IV and addressed to the self same bishop of Lincoln. After some general comments about the difficult vocation of the theologian, he gets to the point of the letter: We send word to you (mandamus) not to prohibit our beloved son, friar R. [Fishacre presumably] of the Order of Preachers, teaching at Oxford in the theology faculty, from lecturing ordinarie on the books of the Sentences, but rather encourage the same in order that he might lay bare to his attentive listeners, in accord with the grace bestowed on him, the profound contents and necessary truth of that book, since in it are to be found testimonies by Catholic teachers, worthy of belief, which assert the truth that must be adhered to by believers when the darkness of error has been dissipated.48
Since the papal letter follows the bishop's letter by a year or less, it is difficult not to reach the conclusion that the former was a response to the latter's veiled attack on Fishacre, since the Dominican master was the only one—to the best of our knowledge—who was lecturing on the Sentences at the Oxford studium.49 Rightly or wrongly, 46 The word foundational ('Jundamentalis') occurs no fewer than nine times in a relatively short letter. 47 James Ginther, "Theological Education at the Oxford Studium in the Thirteenth Century: A Reassessment of Robert Grosseteste's Letter to the Oxford Theologians," Franciscan Studies 55 (1998), 83-104. 48 See G. Abate, "Lettere secretae d'Innocenzo IV e altri document! in una raccolta inedita del saec. XIII," Miscellanea Franciscana 55 (1955), 347, n. 149. 49 Though it does not fit his thesis, Ginther is at a loss to provide an alternative explanation for the pope's letter; see "Theological Education," (p. 103).
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at some point Grosseteste's letter to the masters seems to have been interpreted as hostile to a theology other than one based directly on the sacred text. Hence the pope's intervention on Fishacre's behalf.
There is a final noteworthy feature of the Fishacre Commentary: namely, that having made the distinction between moral and speculative theology in his prologue, with the promise of isolating the difficult questions concerning the faith for students already instructed in the moral message of the Scriptures, Fishacre time and again turns aside from the speculative considerations prompted by the Lombard text to draw some moral lesson for his reader. The Fishacre Commentary, in short, is replete with these moralitates.50 When discussing the immutability of God in the first book, for example, Fishacre finds occasion to inveigh against religious who, owing perhaps to a harsh word on the part of a prelate, change convents or, even worse, change religious orders. The topic of God's simplicity in the same distinction urges the reader to adhere to the Simple, that is to God, who is without fold (sine plica). Fishacre recalls St. Paul's warning that he who cleaves to a harlot becomes one body with her; the same holds true for those who cling to their possessions, to their cattle, horses, lands, villas, and to their gold and silver—attachments that are even more egregious. The man in the parable [Luke 12,19] who says: "My soul, you have plenty of good things laid by for many years to come; take things easy, eat, drink, have a good time" Fishacre condemns as one who enjoys his plenty at the expense of those who want even the necessities of life. And so forth throughout the Commentary. Since many of these excursions are obtrusive and break up the flow of the argument, one has to wonder what Fishacre is up to. Was he trying to minimize the difference between the Bible as locus of moral instruction and the Sentences as locus of the more difficult 50 Many of these lessons, at least from the first two books of the Commentary, were gathered together by an enterprising scribe, perhaps a Cistercian monk (judging by the provenance of the manuscript, which was Fountains Abbey in Yorkshire), and issued separately. I have edited this text and published it under the title "The Moral and Spiritual Theology of Richard Fishacre: Edition of Trinity Coll. MS O.1.30," Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 60 (1990), 5-143.
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speculative issues—indeed, minimize the difference between Scripture and the Sentences? Had the opposition of Grosseteste come to his attention even as he was fleshing out the theological project he had sketched in his prologue? Or did he simply anticipate the kind of objection that a more traditional theologian might raise? Whatever the answer, it is clear that Fishacre's Commentary delivered more than it promised, and the result was an integrative work of theology that is rare, if not unique, in the genre of Sentences commentaries.31 What is also a matter of historical record is that the new theological methodology eventually triumphed. At mid-century Richard Rufus wrote what was probably the first Sentences Commentary by an Oxford Franciscan, reflecting in the proemium what was certainly Grosseteste's view of theology, which is that it was conterminous with Scripture: At this point some people like to raise certain general questions regarding theology itself, and this thanks to this summa of the Master [Lombard]. This does not seem to me to be necessary, since this summa is not theology itself, nor even any part of it. For the divine Scripture is whole in itself, perfect quite apart from this and every other summa. . . . Nevertheless because this is the custom, we too will touch on some of [these issues].52
Rufus was, however, fighting a war that was already all but lost. Although there is no evidence that Simon of Hinton, Fishacre's successor as Dominican regent, lectured on the Sentences, Robert Kilwardby did, and so apparently did every Dominican bachelor thereafter. The statute of 1253, referred to above,53 seems in retrospect to have been an attempt at compromise, coming as it did in the year of Grosseteste's death. By 1267, however, Oxford had capitulated to the Parisian custom and mandated use of Lombard's Sentences as the text to be covered in the theology faculty.54
Dl See Long, "The Integrative Theology of Richard Fishacre OP," in the special commemorative volume of New Blackfriars 80, no. 941, 1942 (July/August 1999), 354-60. 52 Oxford, Balliol Coll. MS 62, col. 3. 53 See n. 13. 54 I take 1267 as the terminus ante quern from Roger Bacon's philippic in that year against the modern theologians who had abandoned the source of Christian truth, the Bible, in favor of novelties; Opus minus, in Fr. Rogeri Bacon Opera Quaedam Hactenus Inedita, ed. J. S. Brewer (London, 1859; reprinted, Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1965), p. 329.
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Even after Friar Thomas d'Aquino had found the Sentences wanting as a theology text for beginners and composed his own, the Dominicans themselves continued to mandate use of the Lombard in their convents.55 It was not until the sixteenth century, in fact, that the Summa theologiae would replace the Sentences as the friars' standard textbook of theology.56
55 56
See Mulchahey, p. 156. Ibid., pp. 165-66.
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OXFORD FRANCISCANS AFTER OCKHAM: WALTER CHATTON AND ADAM WODEHAM Chris Schabel*
Franciscans played a leading role in the development of English theology in Oxford's Golden Age, the quarter century between William of Ockham's Oxford lectures on the Sentences (ca. 1317—19) and the release of Thomas Bradwardine's Summa de causa Dei in 1344. From the latter half of the 1330s alone, the Sentences commentaries of at least six named Franciscans lecturing at English studia, survive: Robert of Halifax (Oxford), Roger Rosetus (Roseth, Oxford or Cambridge), Adam of Ely (Adam Junior, Oxford or Cambridge), Haverel (Norwich), John Went (Oxford), and Alexander Langeley (Oxford). Of these, both Halifax and Rosetus have deservedly drawn scholarly attention. The slightly earlier commentary of John of Rodington, OFM, who lectured ca. 1328-29, also survives and has been studied.1 The most significant English Franciscan sententiarii in the period immediately following Ockham, however, were Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham,
* I thank W. Courtenay, W. Duba. G. Etzkorn, and R. Friedman. 1 For brief notices with bibliographical information on these scholars, see e.g. W. J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England (Princeton, 1987), especially 267-275. Sara Puglioni has been working on an edition of part of Halifax's work, Olli Hallamaa is critically editing Rosetus's commentary (see idem, 'The Lectura super Sententias of Roger Roseth, OFM', in A. Cacciotti and B. Faes de Mottoni, eds., Editori di Quaracchi, 100 anni dopo. Bilancio e prospettive [Medioevo 3, Rome 1997], 239-243), and R. D. Edwards is preparing an edition of Langeley. For editions of questions by Rodington, see M. Tweedale, 'John of Rodyngton on Knowledge, Science, and Theology' (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1965) (book I, prologue q. 2), and B. Nardi, Soggetto e oggetto del conoscere nella Jilosofia antica e medievale (Rome2, 1952), 74-92 (book I, d. 3, q. 3). John of Reading, a Franciscan whose revised Sentences commentary, surviving in one manuscript, dates from after 1320, read the Sentences at Oxford slightly before Ockham and is not here considered. Cf. S. J. Livesey, Theology and Science in the Fourteenth Century. Three Questions on the Unity and Subaltemation of the Sciences from John of Reading's Commentary on the Sentences (Leiden, 1989), 3—7. G. Etzkorn, 'Codex Latinus Monacensis 8943: Mediaeval Potpourri, Contemporary Consternation', in R. Almagno and C. Harkins eds., Studies Honoring Ignatius Charles Brady, Friar Minor (St. Bonaventure, 1976), 247-268, guesses (267) that the Franciscan Henry Costesey, who lectured at Cambridge, might be the author of the questions on book III contained in CLM 8943, ff. 93r-117r, dating from ca. 1325-1330.
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both of whom had personal connections with the Venerable Inceptor, played a major role in the criticism and transmission of their senior colleague's thought, and developed important reputations as theologians in their own right. Moreover, their careers as theologians were closely intertwined.2 Walter Chatton was probably studying theology at Oxford during Ockham's tenure as bachelor of the Sentences. In any case, while lecturing on the Sentences in 1321—23, probably at the Franciscans' London studium, Chatton attacked Ockham's reportatio. Also present at the same convent during this period were Ockham himself and Adam Wodeham, a beginning student of theology and, perhaps, Ockham's secretary. Wodeham drafted a no-longer-extant reportatio of Chatton's lectures, and in one instance Ockham wrote a response to Chatton in the margin of Wodeham's manuscript. In 1323-24, with Ockham still active in London, and Wodeham still in attendance at Chatton's lectures, Chatton read the Sentences again at London, from which lectures may stem the extant Reportatio on all four books. Perhaps during the same year, Chatton began revising his (earlier?) reportatio into an ordinatio, the Lectura, but he only completed it up to distinction 17 of book I.3 The Lectura prologue did replace the reportatio prologue in the sole witness for the early section of the reportatio. Also in 1323-24 Ockham answered Chatton's
2
In the chronological discussion that follows, I rely on W. J. Courtenay, Adam Wodeham: An Introduction to His Life and Writings (Leiden, 1978), 7-38 and 160-182, who sifted through the various versions and redactions of Wodeham's commentary; S. F. Brown, 'Walter Chatton's Lectura and William of Ockham's Quaestiones in Libros Physicorum Aristotelis', in W. A. Frank and G. J. Etzkorn, eds., Essays Honoring Allan B. Wolter (St. Bonaventure, NY, 1985), 81-115; K. H. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Semantics 1250—1345 (Leiden, 1988), 180-181, 207-208, and 275-278; J. C. Wey, 'Introduction', in Walter Chatton, Reportatio et Lectura super Sententias: Collatio ad librum primum et prologus, ed. J. C. Wey (Toronto, 1989), 1-3; R. Wood, 'Introduction', in Adam de Wodeham, Lectura secunda in librum primum Sententiarum, ed. R. \Vood and G. Gal, vol. 1 (St. Bonaventure, NY, 1990), 9*-13* and 30*-38*, considerably modifying earlier views; W. J. Courtenay, 'Ockham, Chatton, and the London Studium: Observations on Recent Changes in Ockham's Biography', in W. Vossenkuhl and R. Schonberger, eds., Die Gegenwart Ockhams (Weinheim, 1990), 327-337, which shows that Ockham's and Chatton's being in London is not a certainty; and K. H. Tachau, 'Introduction', in Robert Holcot, Seeing the Future Clearly: Questions on Future Contingents, ed. P. A. Streveler and K. H. Tachau (Toronto, 1995), 16-27, with further changes. See the bibliographies of these works for the extensive writings on Chatton and Wodeham. 3 Courtenay (Schools and Scholars, 266) has a small typo, writing "dist. 7" instead of "dist. 17."
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critique in his Quodlibetal questions, perhaps having access to Chatton's developing Lectura, and Ockham even modified his opinion at times. Before 1329 or 1330, Wodeham himself lectured on the Sentences in London. The written version of those lectures, the so-called Lectura prima, is apparently no longer extant. Wodeham read the Sentences again at Norwich between 1329 and 1332, whence survive parts of a reportatio, the so-called Lectura secunda, in which he vehemently criticizes Chatton and his attacks on Ockham. Since Chatton is indicated as regent master at Oxford in 1329 and remained there until he left for Avignon in late 1332, he may have had an opportunity to respond in his Quodlibetal questions. By then Wodeham had begun his own reading of the Sentences at Oxford, i.e. 1332-34, whence comes the main, ordinatio version of Wodeham's lectures. It would seem, then, that Wodeham was to have the last word. This seems to be the chronology of Chatton's and Wodeham's activities as bachelors of the Sentences, although with the progress of the edition of their theological works we may change our assessment. For Chatton, this process is well underway. At present Girard Etzkorn is finishing the critical edition of Chatton's Reportatio for book one, surviving in two manuscripts (but only one of them includes the first seventeen distinctions); the late Joseph Wey completed the Lectura/ Reportatio up to the end of the Prologue.4 There are two manuscripts of the incomplete Lectura.5 For Wodeham, the Oxford Ordinatio survives in many manuscripts and in various redactions. Henry Totting of Oyta made a popular abbreviation of the Oxford lectures around 1375, and John Major printed this abbreviation in Paris in 1512.6 4 I.e. Chatton, Reportatio et Lectura super Sententias: Collatio ad librum primum et prologus, from three MSS and one fragment. Etzkorn is finishing the Lectura. The reportatio is in Paris, BN lat. 15887. At d. 17, Florence, Bibl. naz. conv. soppr. C.5.357, joins it, having contained the Lectura until that point. Since Etzkorn's work will soon supercede editions of individual questions from Chatton's Reportatio in primum, I will not mention them here. K. H. Tachau edits book II, d. 4, qq. 1-4 in 'Walter Chatton on Sensible and Intelligible Species' Rivista critica di storia della Jilosofia, 40 (1985), 711-748. 5 Paris, BN lat. 15886, and the Florence MS. Editions of questions from the Lectura, aside from the prologue, include book I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1 and q. 2, a. 1, ed. S. F. Brown, 'Walter Chatton's Lectura'; I, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2: ed. F. Kelley, 'Walter Chatton vs. Aureoli and Ockham Regarding the Universal Concept', Franciscan Studies, 41 (1981), 230-249; I, d. 3, q. 2: N. Fitzpatrick, 'W. Chatton on the Univocity of Being. A Reaction to Peter Aureoli and William Ockham', Franciscan Studies, 31 (1971), 90-126; and I, d. 17, q. 1: ed. G. Etzkorn, 'Walter Chatton and the Controversy on the Absolute Necessity of Grace', Franciscan Studies, 37 (1977), 32-65, text 38-54. 6 Five manuscripts contain parts of the Ordinatio, but a further seven have parts
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Rega Wood and Gedeon Gal have edited the Lectura secunda, which goes up to book I, d. 26, and survives in only one manuscript: Cambridge, Gonville and Caius 281/674.7 I should note two things before proceeding: First, the structure and content of the commentaries of Wodeham and Chatton, separated as they are by up to a decade of fruitful theological debate at Oxford, differ considerably. Second, aside from Ockham, each other, and of course John Duns Scotus, the modernus who most influenced Chatton and Wodeham was the Parisian Franciscan Peter Auriol. Thus, to elucidate the structural and methodological differences between Chatton's and Wodeham's Sentences commentaries, on the one hand, and their doctrinal differences in the on-going debate with Scotus's, Auriol's, and Ockham's positions, on the other, this chapter will deal with two persisting issues, that is, respectively, predestination and epistemology.
Predestination Structurally, Chatton's and Wodeham's treatments of predestination highlight several trends in Oxford theology in the 1320s and 1330s,8 but in terms of content they differ from contemporary Oxford treatments, most notably in their familiarity with Auriol. First, Oxford theologians gradually departed from the structure of Peter Lombard's text. With Chatton this is not so noticeable; his discussion of predestination appears in distinctions 40-41 of book one, i.e. in the traditional place, immediately after foreknowledge, and corresponding to the Master of the Sentences's discussion of the issue. By Wodeham's
of different redactions of it, and five more contain other fragments and versions. Moreover seventeen manuscripts preserve parts of the Oyta abbreviation, fourteen containing all four books. This brings the total to thirty-five witnesses, including the printed edition. See Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, 183-234, who also has detailed question lists of all traditions. Editions of questions from the Ordinatio include I, prol., q. 1, a. 2; q. 2, a. 2; d. 1, q. 1, in: O. Grassi, 'La conoscenza di Dio in Adam Wodeham', Medioevo, 8 (1982), 89-136; III, q. 1: A. Combes, Textes phiksophiques du Moyen Age, 8 (Paris, 1961), 401-419; IV, q. 10: M. Adams and R. Wood, 'Is to Will It as Bad as to Do It? The Fourteenth-Century Debate', Franciscan Studies, 41 (1981), 5-60. 7 Adam de Wodeham, Lectura secunda in librum primum Sententiarum, ed. R. Wood and G. Gal, 3 vols. (St. Bonaventure, NY, 1990). 8 For these trends, see especially Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, 252—264.
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Oxford lectures things had changed considerably, and Wodeham's attempts to follow the Lombard are really only superficial. Unusually, Wodeham's main treatment of foreknowledge and predestination appears in book three, questions 2—5, in what corresponds to Lombard's section devoted to Christology. A second trend, also present to some degree at Paris, is the increasing frequency of the explicit citation of contemporaries, not only in the margins, but even in the text itself. This suggests that direct disputation with one's socii and senior colleagues was playing an increasingly important role in Sentences lectures. Already in Chatton's section on foreknowledge and predestination we find that the discussion centers around Scotus, Ockham, and Auriol,9 who are explicitly cited in the text. By Wodeham's time this is even more prevalent, although in book three, qq. 2~5, it is again Ockham and Auriol who receive the most explicit attention. We also have a reference to a certain 'Walter', presumably not Chatton, since 'opinio Cathonis1 is also cited in this section, as we might expect. A third movement in Oxford Sentences commentaries is the reduction of the number of questions asked and topics covered, with a corresponding emphasis on a limited range of issues. There is also, with the exception of Wodeham, a reduction in the overall size of commentaries. Within the context of foreknowledge and predestination in particular, the tendency is to focus more and more exclusively on foreknowledge, especially future contingent propositions, with a focus on revelation later on. Predestination declines as an independent topic in Oxford commentaries. Thus in Wodeham's Oxford Sentences commentary, in contrast to Chatton's from a decade or so earlier, revelation is a major theme, along with future contingent propositions and modal questions.10 In addition, Wodeham's treatment follows the trend in being much larger than Chatton's. Perhaps most telling of the changes is the fact that a discussion of the causes
9 There are citations of Auriol in, for example, d. 38 (MS Paris, BN lat. 15887, f. 73rb) and dd. 40-41, q. 1 (f. 75rb and 75vb). The Florence MS has at least one other explicit citation in this context. Thus we can make more precise Courtenay's remark (Schools and Scholars, 189) that Chatton referred to Auriol only indirectly. 10 For Wodeham on future contingents, see the frequent references in J.-F. Genest, Predetermination et liberte creee a Oxford au XIV siecle: Buckingham contre Bradwardine (Paris, 1992), M. J. F. M. Hoenen, Marsilius of Inghen: Divine Knowledge in Late Medieval Thought (Leiden, 1993), and C. Schabel, Theology at Pans 1316-1345. Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents (Aldershot, 2000), 242-243 and 250-251.
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of predestination is entirely absent from Wodeham's questions, and what there is on predestination (question three) is subsumed under larger modal issues and prepositional analysis.11 The nature of the debate has changed so drastically that some original concerns have completely disappeared in Wodeham's work. Chatton, writing at an earlier stage, still includes a treatment of the causes of predestination, but he devotes more attention to modal questions and to the analysis of future contingent propositions. He had already treated these topics in distinctions 38-39 of book one,12 before turning to distinctions 40—41, where he asks two questions. The second, "Whether it is the case at one and the same time (simul) that God wills necessarily that something come about and that nevertheless it comes about contingently?" departs from the usual material of these distinctions, whereas the first, "Whether the mystery of the divine incarnation was for the merit (fuerit meriturri) of human predestination?" is more traditional.13 Nevertheless, even here the first of the two articles is "Whether this man is contingently predestined?" and the discussion turns immediately to future contingent propositions and modal questions. It is only with the second article, "Whether Christ's act is in any way the merit (meritum) of this man's predestination?" that we find what look like the traditional foci. Even here, however, Chatton first deals with Ockham's opinion in brief, and the text turns to propositions. Then, in what appears to be the first explicit Oxford treatment of Peter AurioPs position on predestination, Chatton gives a short account of Auriol's theory of General Election:14 Now with respect to the second article, which is to respond to the form of the question, I will relate another opinion, namely that of Peter Auriol, who posits that God's predestining [is] His willing to
11 Thus J. Halverson's remark, in Peter Aureol on Predestination: A Challenge to Late Medieval Thought (Leiden, 1998), 112, n. 4, that Wodeham entirely omits the topic must be qualified. Rather H. Oberman is correct that in Wodeham's "doctrine of predestination also the whole stress is on God's prescience" (cited in Halverson, ibid.). 12 For Chatton on this topic, see H. Schwamm, Das gottliche Vorherwissen bei Duns Scotus und seinen ersten Anhdngem (Innsbruck, 1934), 318—321; Genest, Predetermination et liberte creee, 39 and 137; Hoenen, Marsilius of Inghen, 193; Schabel, Theology at Paris 1316-1345, 231-240. 13 I would like to thank Girard Etzkorn for letting me see a preliminary version of his edition. 14 On Auriol's and Ockham's positions, see R. Friedman's chapter in this volume.
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confer beatitude [on someone if] he does not place an obstacle (obicerri). And so he says that there is no positive cause of predestination, but only a negative one, namely not placing an obstacle . . . Concerning the cause of reprobation, they say that it is a positive cause, namely the placing of an obstacle, for just as God predestines whoever does not place an obstacle, vice-versa He reprobates whoever does place an obstacle.15
Ghatton briefly gives some arguments for and benefits of Auriol's position,16 but then he has an unusual way of rejecting Auriol. In distinction 38 Chatton had already ostensibly refuted Auriol's position on future contingent propositions, in which Auriol denied their truth and falsity and instead posited their neutrality. Here in distinction 40-41 Chatton simply declares that since Auriol denies that a proposition about the future is determinately true, then 'God will give this man beatitude' is not determinately true, and hence God would not have been able to predestine him ab aetemo.17 So even when the contexts seems to demand a detailed treatment of the causes of predestination, Chatton turns to propositions. Most of the remainder of the article continues in the same vein, concerning future contingent propositions and divine foreknowledge, and also prophecy, which connects the two issues and which later becomes a particularly important topic at Oxford. Hence, in his later
15 Walter Chatton, Reportatio in primum librum Sententiarum, dd. 40-41, q. 1, a. 2 (ed. Etzkorn, forthcoming): "Modo quantum ad secundum articulum, qui est respondere ad formam quaestionis, recitabo aliam opinionem, scilicet Petri Aureoli, qui ponit quod Deum praedestinare <est> velle conferre beatitudinem, <si> non ponit obicem. Et ideo dicit quod praedestinationis non est aliqua positiva causa sed negativa tantum, scilicet non ponere obicem ... De causa reprobationis, dicunt quod est causa affirmativa, scilicet ponere obicem, nam sicut Deus quemlibet praedestinat qui non ponit obicem, ita ex opposite, quemlibet reprobat qui ponit obicem." 16 Chatton, Reportatio I, loc. cit. (ed. cit.): "Primo, quia lex universalis est quod quilibet non ponens obicem salvabitur. Secundo, quia agens universale agit in quolibet, nisi impedimentum sit; sed impedimentum in voluntate non est nisi ponere obicem; igitur ponere obicem tantummodo est [in] causa quod iste non salvetur; igitur ex opposito. Item, per istum modum melius salvatur iustitia simul cum misericordia. Item, omne positivum sequitur praedestinationem, et est effectus praedestinationis. Item, isto modo melius salvatur dictum Magistri quod provenit ex occultis meritis, negative ponendo, quia non demeretur . . . <pro reprobatione:> Item, agens universale, ubi ponitur impedimentum, non agit, sed hie ponere obicem est impedimentum." " Chatton, Reportatio I, loc. cit. (ed. cit.): "Sed non oportet nisi quod istud sit clare dictum. Primo, quia tenent quod propositio de futuro non est determinate vera, haec non est determinate vera: 'Deus dabit isti beatitudinem'. <Secundo>, non est verum quod Deum praedestinare istum sit ab aeterno velle isti beatitudinem, quia haec non est vera: 'iste habebit beatitudinem'."
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Quodlibetal question 28, perhaps from around
1330, Chatton asks
"Whether the certainty of revelation concerning future contingents holds along with their contingency?"18 One can deduce Chatton's own stance on predestination,
how-
ever, from scattered remarks and from his relatively short conclusion to the article. Already in his later arguments against Auriol, Chatton implies that, on the one hand, there is a positive cause of predestination in the predestined and, on the other, there is sometimes a negative cause of reprobation in the reprobate, although here Chatton is merely speaking of sins of omission, which Auriol might have called positive.19 Chatton is more explicit in his refutations of the principal doubts at the end of the question, where one can see AurioFs positive influence on Chatton's stance: One can say this in another way, that predestination includes two conditions. The first and more important is that God in general willed all good men to be saved in the end (finaliter), and [all] bad men to be reprobated in the end. And this part of predestination does not come from works, but solely from mercy . . . But the other part, that God agrees that this man for time A will be good in the end, or for time A is good in the end, this is on account of works. And so because of your good works He gives beatitude to you, who are good in the end, rather than to someone else, and He foreknew that you, and not the other man, would have beatitude. But it is not like this in the case of reprobation. So why is there predestination for you and reprobation for the other man? Because of evil deeds. But what is the difference in the two cases? Because there is no general reprobation without works, because He wills punishment for no one except on account of sin. And in what way are good works the cause of predestination? I say that they are like the fulfillment of a condition under which someone is promised beatitude.20
18 I hope to complete Girard Etzkorn's edition of Chatton's twenty-nine quodlibetal questions, but see Etzkorn's question list for Chatton's Quodlibet in 'The Codex Paris Nat. Lat. 15,805', Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, 80 (1987), 321-333, on 332-333. 19 Chatton, Reportatio I, loc. cit. (ed. cit.): "Item, probo quod sit aliqua positiva causa praedestinationis, quia quilibet tenetur, non solum \itare et omittere vitanda, sed similiter adimplere ilia ad quae obligatur per praecepta affirmativa, igitur implere ista etiam est causa quare iste salvabitur. Item, quilibet tenetur baptizare, vel aliquis saltern; quo facto, si statim moriatur, salvatur; igitur baptizari passive est aliqua causa praedestinationis et salvationis istius. Item, quilibet salvandus indiget incarnatione et passione Christi, igitur est aliqua causa positiva praedestinationis suae. Item, quod causa reprobationis non semper sit positiva probo, quia non solum damnatur aliquis quia facit illicita, sed quia omittit implenda, et istud valet, ponendo maxime quod peccatum omissionis non oporteat quod includat aliquem actum positivum." 20 Chatton, Reportatio I, loc. cit. (ed. cit.): "Aliter potest homo sic dicere, quod
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Chatton agrees with Auriol that there is some sort of general rule involved in salvation and damnation, but adds that part of the general rule is God actively willing the bad to reprobation. Since God does not have to admit the good beforehand, His doing so is pure mercy. The fact that the rule is based on God's free will, and not on some eternal notion of fair play, is perhaps Chatton's defense against extreme Pelagianism. Where Chatton differs strongly from Auriol on salvation is that Chatton thinks that God, foreknowing a person's good works, offers him beatitude on that basis, having mercifully set up the general rule beforehand. This is a purely positive cause on the part of the predestined, unlike Auriol's lack of an obstacle to grace, a negative cause. There is still a positive cause of reprobation, but it is sin and not an obstacle to grace. Since God's general rule is not aimed at reprobation but at predestination, it appears that God's general rule of mercy is not a cause of damnation, but merely our sinning. That is, there is no general reprobation per se. This looks more Pelagian than almost any other contemporary Oxford position, certainly more so than Ockham's and, later, Holcot's, who provide much more extensive treatments. Perhaps Bradwardine even had Chatton in mind in some parts of his Summa de causa Dei where the Doctor Profundus attacks Pelagians on predestination.21 We must be careful, however, not to judge Chatton's opinion without taking into account his complex theory of future contingent propositions, which takes up most of the space in Chatton's distinctions
praedestinatio includit duas condiciones. Prima et principalior est quod Deus in general! voluit omnes finaliter bonos salvos fieri, et finaliter malos reprobari. Et ista pars praedestinationis non est ex operibus, sed ex misericordia rnera . . . Sed alia pars, quod Deus assensit quod iste pro A foret finaliter bonus, vel est pro A finaliter bonus, hoc est propter opera. Et ideo propter opera tua bona est quare plus tibi finaliter bono quam alteri dat beatitudinem, et praescivit quod tu, et alius non, haberes beatitudinem. Sed de reprobatione non est sic. Unde enim illud quod tibi est praedestinatio, alteri est reprobatio? Propter mala opera. Sed quae est diversitas hic et ibi? Quia nulla est reprobatio generalis sine operibus, quia nulli vult poenam nisi propter culpam. Et in quo genere sunt bona opera causa praedestinationis? Dico quod sicut aliqua impletio condicionis sub qua alicui promittitur beatitudo." Near the beginning of a. 2 there is another passage to this effect. 21 On Ockham, Holcot, and Bradwardine in connection with Auriol, see J. Halverson, Peter Aureol on Predestination, 111-133. The fact that Chatton elsewhere opposes Ockham in defending the de facto necessity of grace should not detain us, if grace is offered to all humans, or if it is a reward for foreknown merit, in which case the merit would still lie in the predestined. On Chatton and grace, see Etzkorn, 'Walter Chatton and the Controversy on the Absolute Necessity of Grace'.
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38—41.22 It is this sub-topic, as was stated above, that becomes the almost exclusive concern of Wodeham a decade later. Where one might expect a strong response to Chatton's theory of predestination, Wodeham instead shifts the focus even further from soteriology.
Epistemology The issues surrounding divine foreknowledge and predestination serve to illustrate several trends in Oxford Franciscan Sentences commentaries in the 1320s and 30s, but the state of our knowledge of the opinions of Chatton and Wodeham on these issues does not yet permit an accurate and at the same time brief portrayal of their views. For that we await further critical editions of texts. With the problem of epistemology, however, the status quaestionis is much more mature, and an examination of this topic allows us to delve deeper into the ideas of the two figures in their Sentences commentaries, and to consider their contributions to medieval thought.23 To do so it is necessary to take a brief look at their main interlocutors, Auriol and Ockham, both of whom worked against a Scotistic backdrop. For John Duns Scotus, when the human intellect considers an extramental object, intuitive cognition occurs when the object is present and existing, and abstractive cognition happens when the object is absent. According to Scotus, intuitive cognition is the basis for humans' existential certitude. Peter Auriol redefines the notions of intuitive and abstractive cognition as mental processes independent of objective reality. For Auriol, intuitive cognition occurs when the intellect considers its object as present and existing, while in abstractive cognition the intellect considers its object as absent. He then shows that an extramental object is not necessary for there to be intuitive cognition by introducing eight experiences that lead to false cognitions. For example, one experience is our perception of the motion of trees on the shore when our boat is drifting; another is a circle produced in the air when a burning stick is twirled. To explain these phenomena, Auriol consid-
22
See Schabel, Theology at Paris 1316-1345, 231-240. Unless otherwise noted, this discussion will follow Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 85-112 (Auriol), 113-153 (Ockham), 180-208 (Chatton), and 275-312 (Wodeham), who absorbs the sometimes extensive previous literature. 23
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ers that the object of the intellect is esse apparens, or 'apparent being'. The only difference between true and false cognition is that, in the former case, there is an extramental object that corresponds to the apparent being considered by the intellect. Thus, Auriol asserts that God could maintain an intuitive cognition in existence even after the extramental object has ceased to exist. Auriol does not maintain that intuitive cognition is the basis for human certainty; nevertheless, he does not seem to have doubted that we can have certitude. To his opponents, however, who take intuitive cognition in the Scotistic sense of being the guarantor of certitude, Auriol's position appears to undermine that certitude if not to be simply skeptical. William of Ockham had limited knowledge of Auriol's position, and so he rejected Auriol's esse apparens as he did sensible and intelligible species, on the grounds that they were superfluous. Instead Ockham proposed that vision is an example of action at a distance between object and sense, requiring no medium nor intermediary, clearly indicating that he understood Auriol's esse apparens to be such. In vision a merely "impressed quality" is in the sense. Likewise, a "habit" suffices for abstractive cognition. Intuitive cognition does not occur naturally without the object's presence, although God could effect such an intuition without the object. While this may appear uncontroversial, Ockham goes on to state that not only does intuitive cognition provide evidence for the existence of extramental objects, evidence upon which we base our judgments, but it also does so for the non-existence, not simply non-presence, of such objects. That is, Ockham repeatedly declares that intuitive cognition is that "by means of which it is known that A exists when it exists, and that it is not when it is not." Moreover, as if to circumvent God's absolute power, Ockham claims that in a case where God causes an intuitive cognition without the extramental object, we would not judge the object to exist. Finally, Ockham admits that errors in judgment can occur, as in the case of Auriol's experiences, because of "equivalent apprehensions," e.g. the trees' moving away and our moving away on the ship produce equivalent apprehensions, on the basis of which we assent correctly or incorrectly to the proposition, the object of scientific knowledge, "The trees are moving." Nevertheless, and without explanation, Ockham declares that in fact "many, seeing the trees, would judge and know that they do not move ... on account of the intellect, which judges that trees do not move." Although Walter Chatton responds to other figures, such as Richard
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Campsall, his main opponents in this context are Auriol and Ockham. Chatton's own stance appears rather conservatively Scotistic to his English readers, because he reaffirms Scotus's definition of intuitive and abstractive cognition and stresses the former's important epistemological function. Nevertheless these followers appreciate Chatton's refutations of his senior Franciscan confreres. Chatton knows substantially more of AurioPs Scriptum than Ockham did, as is clear from his treatment, but he does not see the chain of reasoning that led Auriol to postulate apparent being. Auriol takes naturally occuring intuitive cognitions of non-present or non-existent extramental objects, such as the motion of the trees on the shore, as phenomena that must be somehow explained, and apparent being is the answer. For Ghatton, Auriol's point of departure is apparent being, which is then used to show that there are such erroneous intuitive cognitions. Chatton in turn understands apparent being as a mediating cause of vision and a fictum created in the intellect, and as such it is a superfluous entity. Marshalling an argument from theology, Chatton suggests that such afatum is undesirable also because, according to Auriol's schema, in the beatific vision the beati would see an esse apparens rather than God. Although Chatton appears to understand neither Auriol's notion of apparent being nor the process by which Auriol arrived at it, Chatton's English successors often saw Auriol through Chattonian lenses. The same can be said for Auriol's understanding of intuitive cognition. Assuming incorrectly that Auriol views intuitive cognition as Scotus did, as the basis of human certitude about the extramental world, Chatton appears to be the first theologian in England to come to the conclusion that Auriol's theory in fact endangers certitude altogether, since on Auriol's account one can have an intuitive cognition naturally of an object that is no longer present or existing. In this case one could not trust one's senses at all, because one would never be certain that a particular intuitive cognition corresponded to a present extramental object. Chatton's alternative explanation for Auriol's 'experiences', however, fails to contribute to the refutation of Auriol and instead makes his own position subject to his objections to Auriol's. Chatton, as we shall see, supports the traditional perspectivist account of vision by the multiplication of species in the medium. Chatton here admits that species, "on account of their intensity," do in fact remain for a short time in vision when the object is no longer present, thus
OXFORD FRANCISCANS AFTER OCKHAM
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implying that these species can cause the same erroneous intuitive cognitions. Adam Wodeham apparendy made this objection early on. Chatton also maintains, along with Auriol, that God can cause one to have a vision of an object without the existence of an extramental object corresponding to the vision. Luckily, this will not happen naturally, because although: For the time during which vision can remain when the visible object has receded, certainty is not had. Nevertheless, since such vision does not endure for long after the removal of the visible object, after [the vision ceases], one can be certain whether the object really exists, because it will be obvious to [the viewer] whether the vision lasts awhile.
Moreover, the very fact than one has such a vision, and that species are present, means that the object itself was present immediately beforehand. Turning then to Auriol's experiences, Chatton is able to explain them with sensible species and the faulty judgment of the observer: One does not prove through any of these that vision is caused without the presence of the visible object, because in the first example I maintain that the eye does not see the motion of the tree on the shore, but it sees the tree itself, and consequently the thing is seen. Along with this it is the case that there is such an ordering of visions and there are such visions that the superior power judges that something is there which is not there . . ,24 The [experience] proves only that when the [observer's] eye and the water move in this way, the trees on the shore thus continuously cause successive visions in such an order that the immediately superior judgmental faculty is insufficient for judging what is the case; hence it will err, because it will not realize how else these visions might be caused than they would be if the trees actually moved.
Chatton is apparently not worried about the severity of judgmental errors, and is content to stress with Scotus that intuitive cognition via sense perception is the source of human certainty in this life. Chatton's presentation of Auriol's opinion was not entirely accurate, and in turn this inexact portrayal influenced Chatton's understanding of Ockham's position. He does quote Ockham correctly that intuitive cognition is that "by virtue of which it can be known whether the thing exists or not." He also quotes Ockham's statement 24
So far my translation, from text cited in Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 192, n. 43.
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about divine intervention: "if by divine power a perfect intuitive cognition of a now-existent object were to be conserved, by virtue of this incomplex cognition one would know evidently that the object did not exist." Of course Chatton rejects both of these points. After these correct quotations and a propos objections, however, Chatton conflates Ockham's theory with Auriol's conception of intuitive cognition. Specifically, Chatton argues against Ockham: "you posit that intuitive cognition is that by means of which a thing appears not to be when it is not." The resultant position includes Auriol's stress on appearance and Ockham's claim about intuitive cognition of non-existent objects. Chatton's conflation deepens when he states against Ockham, "if by means of intuitive cognition a thing should appear to exist, then [the thing] is constituted in some 'apparent being' by [intuitive cognition], which you deny." But Ockham says nothing about appearing. Chatton's further objections to Ockham's idea of intuitive cognition of non-existents are more on the mark. While Chatton admits that we know immediately that an object is present when it is, the object's absence is known only as a result of discursive reasoning. In that case we are no longer talking about intuitive cognition, but rather abstractive, says Chatton. By extension intuitive cognition of an object's non-existence is even more absurd. Chatton's own view of intuitive cognition is the traditional perspectivist theory of the multiplication of species. Chatton here turns what is known in the historiography as 'Ockham's razor' against Ockham, claiming that Ockham's 'impressed qualities' and 'habits' are superfluous in explaining a process that involves merely species. Chatton also maintains that we do not need intellectual intuitive cognition to know sensible objects; sensitive intuitive cognition is enough. On more than one occasion in this context Chatton faults his senior Franciscan colleague for positing more entities in an explanation when fewer suffice. Still, Ockham does reject species on similar grounds, and it appears that his and Chatton's theories are simply irreconcilable because of their different points of departure via-a-vis the perspectivist tradition and the psychology of vision, in which Ockham, unlike Chatton, showed little interest. Chatton is more persuasive when it comes to criticizing Ockham's theory of concept formation. Chatton recognizes that while Ockham asserts that a proposition is the direct object of scientific knowledge, Auriol maintains that a proposition is the object of faith. Since propo-
OXFORD FRANCISCANS AFTER OCKHAM
373
sitions, or complexa, are composed of concepts, if those concepts have nothing but 'objective being' in the soul, or are mental fata, as Ockham admits, then how is our scientific knowledge ever grounded directly in extramental reality? In Ockham's scheme, the object of scientific knowledge of the external world, the proposition, would be composed of fata. Chatton apparently persuaded Ockham to change his mind in later writings and instead to identify concepts with the incomplex intellectual acts by which we grasp extramental things. In his later view, then, Ockham no longer held that concepts were mental fata, which would be superfluous anyway. Thus Ockham gets rid of his hated mediator. For Chatton, however, some mediators are acceptable, such as species. In scientific knowledge, likewise, the mental proposition is a mediator. Just as the object of cognition is not the species, but rather the extramental object that the species represent, so also the proposition is not the object of complex knowledge, but rather the proposition's significate. The proposition is the means by which that object is known, not the object itself. It is important to stress that Chatton does not claim that the object of complex knowledge, i.e. the significate of the proposition, is a state of affairs. Rather the object is really a thing (res): The thing in external reality is cognized through the subject and the predicate and the copula, because these terms are the cognitions of the thing in external reality. Therefore, throughout the entire time in which a proposition signifying the thing in external reality is formed in the mind, the thing in external reality is cognized, sometimes through the subject of that proposition, sometimes through the copula, sometimes through the predicate. But because these terms are not cognitions of the entire proposition itself, it does not follow from the fact that these terms are in the mind that the entire proposition itself is cognized.25
One does, however, assent to propositions, but only after giving assent to the significate: Assent to a proposition itself necessarily presupposes assent to the thing signified by the proposition, because I assent that 'thus it is in reality as is signified by the proposition' before I assent that the proposition is true. Hence the first assent which the intellect has in forming the
2j
My translation, from text cited in Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 206, n. 88.
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proposition does not have the proposition itself for an object but [instead] the thing or things signified by means of [the proposition].
In the context of future contingents, Chatton makes absolutely clear that what is signified by the proposition is not a state of affairs or, to use Wodeham's terminology, a complexe significabile. Besides reiterating what he said earlier, Chatton also stresses that there is no difference between the significates of contradictory propositions, such as 'Socrates is sitting' and 'Socrates is not sitting'.26 Thus Chatton does not distinguish between negative and positive states of affairs or complexe significabilia. Because, however, when we assent to the extramental thing, we do so by way of a complexum, which is either affirmative or negative, there is a way in which for us the negative and positive states of affairs do differ.27 Adam Wodeham, on the contrary, was to make the complexe significabile a major element in his epistemology. Wodeham was Ockham's student and he read Auriol more carefully than any previous theologian in England on this matter. His clearest and largest discussion, in the Lectura secunda, is an "unprecedented examination of psychology and epistemology spanning the six questions of the prologue and three of the first distinction," which reminds us of the superficiality of Wodeham's faithfulness to the Lombard's text. While Wodeham's treatment of the complexe significabile in the more popular Oxford lectures is very limited, the corresponding section of the Lectura secunda, "overtly designed to be systematic," focuses on it.28 Rimini knew the work at Paris, and passed on the doctrine of the complexe significabile to his successors, but because of the Lectura secunda's relative obscurity, the complexe sigmficabile was originally associated with Rimini in the historiography.29
26 Cf. e.g. Chatton, Reportatio I, dd. 40-41, q. 2, a. 1 (ed. Etzkorn, forthcoming): "Secundo, suppono quod illud idem quod significatur per istam, 'Sortes sedet', significatur per istam, 'Sortes non sedet', aliter non essent contradictoria." And a. 2: '"Sortes sedet', 'Sortes non sedet', significant eandem rem." 27 Cf. Chatton, Reportatio I, loc. cit, a. 2 (ed. Etzkorn, forthcoming): "Assensus in nobis causatur mediante complexo, et variatur et numeratur sicut complexa; et ideo idem assensus non aequivalet contradictoriis." 28 Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 277. 29 For a new look at Wodeham, Rimini, and the complexe significabile, see J. Zupko, 'How It Played in the rue de Fouarre: The Reception of the Complexe Significabile in the Arts Faculty at Paris in the Mid-Fourteenth Century', Franciscan Studies, 54 (1994-1997), 211-225.
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Like Chatton, Wodeham uses 'Ockham's' razor against Scotus, Ockham, and Auriol, denying the need to posit intellectual intuitive cognition when sensitive suffices. He also confirms that Ockham maintains that an intuitive cognition of a non-existent object was possible and provided certainty of its non-existence. In addition, he reports Ockham's claim that we can discern when God is maintaining an intuitive cognition without the object. His arguments against these positions improve on Chatton's. He even gives a possible defense for Ockham, stating that seeing Socrates' corpse, we would be certain of his non-existence. Since, as Wodeham knows, Ockham did not mean this, and it would not be intuitive cognition but rather discursive reasoning anyway, the example serves only to ridicule Ockham's position further. Wodeham also has an example that clearly demonstrates Ockham's weakness: when an object slowly recedes from us, as a man walking on a road, eventually it disappears from our vision. According to Ockham we would then judge it not to exist! Wodeham understands Auriol's position fairly well, and he knows where Ockham and Chatton have incorrect interpretations. He insists, however, that Auriol's eight experiences can be better explained without resort to the superfluous esse apparens, which Wodeham, for the first time in England, rightly knows is a product, not a mediating cause of vision. Nevertheless, Wodeham does not see how Auriol can avoid the conclusion that the esse apparens is in fact a cloaking mediator, since it and the extramental object are indistinguishable. As for the experiences, when the experience concerns an absent or non-existent object, Wodeham counters that what is conserved is the species of a once-present object, which Wodeham sees as immaterial remnants, qualities, or similitudes of the object. This is not, for Wodeham, vision itself, and Chatton is foolish to concede that vision could be conserved momentarily in the absence of the object, for he thus jeopardizes all certainty. For Wodeham, most of the other experiences can be explained nicely by the perspectivist theory of the multiplication of species. The supposed motion of the trees on the shore is more complicated. Here Wodeham asserts that the trees are not seen to move, but merely appear to move, and the appearance is a mistaken judgment caused by vision, and not vision itself. Following Ockham Wodeham stresses that there is no motion in the eye or anywhere else in the viewer. The error is in the common sense, in fact, and here Wodeham agrees
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with Ghatton although with greater support from previous authorities. It is the problem of this erroneous judgment that leads Wodeham to his most conspicuous contribution to the later-medieval epistemological debate: the complexe significabile. Evident assent to a mental proposition as the object of scientific knowledge is for Ockham sufficient for certainty. If, however, different propositions, such as "the Earth rotates" and "the heavens revolve around the Earth," are equivalent in describing the same phenomenon, then one can assent to either proposition regardless of whether it "signifies reality as it is." Moreover, no single intuitive cognition of the thing suffices for immediate assent to one of the propositions. Wodeham posits that instead we know by experience that one often assents directly to the thing signified by the proposition, and via discursive reasoning; the thing signified, by itself or along with the proposition, is also the object of scientific knowledge.30 Contrary to Chatton, however, the thing signified is not merely the subject term or predicate term of a proposition, but the state of affairs signified by the proposition, something only complexly signifiable, i.e. with a complexum or proposition. That is, we often assent "not just to the being of things, but also to things being in a certain way":31 The immediate object of the act of assent is the total object of the complex necessitating the assent—speaking of absolutely evident assent. [But] speaking more generally, the immediate total object [of the act of assent] is the total object or total significate of the proposition immediately conforming to it, concausing [the act of assent] and necessarily presupposed by it, or the total object of many such propositions.32
For Wodeham it is clear that individual things or propositions made up of terms, contrary to Chatton and Ockham, cannot be the object of scientific knowledge by themselves. Only direct assent to what is only complexly signifiable can be scientific knowledge. Adam Wodeham's theory has been called a "default position" and a "via media between Chatton and Ockham," although it stems also in part from his reaction to Auriol's eight experiences. The theory was to be adopted in modified, or "mutilated," form in Paris by
30
Zupko, 'How It Played on the rue de Fouarre', 214-215, states this nicely. To use Zupko's words, 'How It Played on the rue de Fouarre', 214. Zupko, 'How It Played on the rue de Fouarre', 216, n. 19, and 217, modifying Tachau's translation (cf. Vision and Certitude, 307-308). 31
32
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Gregory of Rimini in his Sentences commentary, and through him it passed to the next generation of Parisian theologians, who employed it in a wide range of topics, thus changing the direction of debate. This is a common path taken by many of the ideas in the Sentences commentaries of the Oxford Franciscans on their way to becoming permanently established in the intellectual tradition of Europe.
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THEMES AND PERSONALITIES IN SENTENCE COMMENTARIES AT OXFORD IN THE 1330'S Raymond Edwards
Introduction
In this paper I shall discuss a number of the typical themes found in, and personalities associated with, Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard produced in Oxford in the 1330's. Before embarking on any substantive discussion, however, I shall address three preliminary questions. First, what is a Sentence Commentary; secondly, why are those from this town and this decade especially interesting; thirdly, how many such texts survive, and where they can be found. (1) A Sentence Commentary is, as the name suggests, a commentary written on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, a text that, from the time it was compiled in the twelfth century onwards, was both the central textbook of theological study in the universities, and, probably as a direct consequence of this, the subject of many extensive commentaries. By the late thirteenth century, such a commentary, given as lectures, was one of the formal requirements for candidates for the doctoral degree in theology at both Paris and Oxford. Most exist as copies made from the officially taken lecture-notes, the reportationes; when subsequently looked over by the author and lightly revised, they are known as reportatio examinata. Occasionally, a prominent theologian (such as Duns Scotus or Adam Wodeham) thoroughly revised and expanded his commentary. Such texts are called ordinationes. In essence, though, we are dealing with medieval doctoral theses. During the thirteenth century, and for the first quarter of the fourteenth, it was usual to lecture on the Sentences for two years, and to do so comprehensively, treating each of the Lombard's distinctions in turn. By the 1330's, however, this changes in two ways. First, the time of reading (at Oxford, at least) is reduced from two years to one; second, probably pardy as a result of this reduction, authors no longer comment on each distinction in turn, but rather discuss a smaller number of more specific questions at greater length, still
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however drawing their inspiration and subject matter from the Lombard's text. This development seems to be unique to English theologians, and has been called the "English essay" style of Sentence Commentary.1 Despite the unkind insinuation often made that these texts become nothing more than a collection of excurses on the fashionable intellectual themes of the day, in my experience they retain a surprising degree of formal unity. (2) To turn to the second preliminary question: why the 1330's? In brief, this is the time when Oxford as a university, and particularly as a centre for theological study, demonstrates its unquestioned dominance over the University of Paris, formerly the place where every theologian of note studied. This means that Oxford theology of the period was the best in (Western) Christendom. Already in a strong position by 1330 because of the extraordinary influence of Scotus (who however pursued most of his career at Paris) it had received new impetus from the work of William of Ockham, whose legacy is taken up and vigorously debated by a younger generation of theologians. One of these younger men, Richard FitzRalph, is chancellor of the University from 1332-1334, and it is clear that Oxford theology flourished under his influence. The outbreak of the Hundred Years' War in the middle of the decade only assisted this process, since the flow of English students to Paris was much curtailed. Interestingly, the transmission of personnel, or at least of manuscripts, did not stop entirely, for we find evidence of wholesale plagiarism of Oxford Sentence Commentaries of the 1330's in Parisian Commentaries written in the next decade.2 William Courtenay has well described the twenty years before the Black Death as "the Golden Age of English Scholasticism". Now, although the achievements of Oxford philosophy of this time is well-known, since the efforts of Anneliese Maier and others first brought the Mertonian school and the so-called "calculators" to the notice of the academic public, the theology of same period has been very little studied. This is curious, in that philosophy was as ever seen as propaedeutic to theology, and theological work of the 1330's makes very extensive use of the newest philosophical techniques. 1 See W. J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth Century England (Princeton 1987) 42. 2 See Genest, Jean-Francois, and Vignaux, Paul "La bibliotheque anglaise de Jean de Mirecourt: subtilitas ou plagiat?" in O. Pluta, ed. Die Philosophie im 14 u. 15 Jahrhundert. In Memoriam Konstanty Michalski (1879-1947). (Amsterdam 1988).
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(3) This relative neglect is not due to a lack of material. The following table gives a brief—but, I hope, complete—bibliographical guide to Oxford Sentence Commentators of the 1330's. Commentators in Sententias at Oxford c.1330—c.1340^ Name
Date as Sententiarius
Editions (if any)
Ed. F. Hoffmann, 19884 Manuscript: "fragments only"'1 3* William Chitterne OFM 1331-1332 Not apparently extant6 4 Robert Holcot OP 1331-1333 (I-IV) Eds. 1497, 1518, Lyons; Q2 aa.7-10 ed. Tachau, Streveler 19957 5* John Grafton OP Quodlibeta only extant8 1332 1333 6 Adam Wodeham OFM 1332-1334 (I-IV) Ed. John Major, 1512, Paris;9 full text in manuscript only10 7 Thomas Bradwardine (M) c.1333 One question ed. J.-F. Genest;11 more possibly in manuscript12 1 William Crathorn OP 2* Thomas Felthorp
3
1330-1332 (I) c.1330-1332
Abbreviations in this bibliographical section are as follows: Stegmiiller: F. Stegmuller Repertonum Commentanorum in Sententias Petn Lombardi (Wurzburg, 1947); Doucet: V. Doucet Commentaires sur les Sentences: supplement aux repertoire de M. Frederic Stegmiiller (Florence, 1954); Sharpe: Richard Sharpe A Handlist of the Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland before 1540 (Brepols, 1997); Courtenay 1987: W. J. Courtenay Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth Century England (Princeton, 1987); Courtenay 1978: W. J. Courtenay Adam Wodeham (Leiden, 1978); BRUO: A. B. Emden A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to 1500 (Oxford, 1957-1959). 4 Crathom. Qudstionem zum ersten Sentenzenbuch, ed. F. Hoffmann (Munster 1988) (Beitrdge z.ur Geschichte der Philosophic und TTieologie des Mittelalters, new series, 29). StegmuUer no. 179, 78; Sharpe no. 2029, 762-763; Courtenay 1987 269 n. 38; BRUO no. 511. 5 Sharpe no. 1745, 655; Courtenay 1987 270 n. 42; BRUO no. 676. See Z. Kaluza in Freiburger zeitschrift fur Philosophie und Theologie 30 (1983) 189-199. Cited by Adam Wodeham in his Tractatus de Indivisibilibus (see Franciscan Studies 26 (1966)). 6 Known only by references in Holcot (III q. 1 a.8). See Tachau, Streveler 17, 25, 47, 50-52 (q.v. next footnote). ' As Seeing the Future Clearly (Toronto 1995). Stegmiiller no. 737, 360—3; Sharpe no. 1475, 555-6; Courtenay 1987 268-9; BRUO no. 946-7. 8 See Tachau, Streveler, 15-17. 9 As abbreviated by Henry Totting of Oyta. 10 For example, MS BAV Vat.lat.955 (Reportatio), Paris Bibilotheque Mazarine MS 915 (Ordmatio). 11 "Le de Futuris Contingentibus de Thomas Bradwardine" in Recherches Augustiniennes 14 (1979), 249-336. 12 MS Paris Bibl.Nat. 15805. See J.-F. Genest, K. Tachau in Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age 65 (1990), 301-06 and Genest's article in this volume.
382 8 9* 10 11
RAYMOND EDWARDS Richard Kilvington (O) Roger Gosford OP Robert Halifax OFM Thomas Buckingham (M)
12 Roger Roseth OFM 13 Monachus Niger OSB 14 John Went OFM
15 Alexander Langeley OFM
Manuscript only13 Not apparently extant14 Manuscript only15 Ed. 1505, Paris;16 QJ ed. A. R. Lee17 1335-1337 Manuscript only18 c. 1335-1 341 Manuscript only19 1336-1337 Q2 a2, Q17 edKennedy, Romano 1987;20 remainder manuscript only21 c. 1335 1340 (I III) I: ed. R. D. A. Edwards, 1999;22 II III: manuscript only23 c. 1333-1 334 (I) 1333-1335 1335-1340 (I-II) 1335-1340 (I-IV)
OFM Ordinis Fratrum Minorum, Franciscan; OP Ordims Praedicatorum, Dominican; OSB Ordims Sancti Benedicti, Benedictine; (M) Fellow of Merton; (O) Fellow of Oriel. Roman numerals (I-IV) are books of the Sentences covered (where known). Asterisks mark authors whose Commentary is not extant. 13 MSS Erfurt WAB F.I05; BAY Vat.lat.4353; Paris Bibl.Nat lat. 15561, and others (Stegmuller no. 715, 347; Sharpe no. 1346, 485; Courtenay 1987 271-2; BRUO 1050-1051). 14 See Tachau, Streveler 13-14; Courtenay 1978 96. 15 17 MSS: including Assisi Comunale MS 161, BAY MSS Vat.lat.l 111; Vat.lat.4353; (Stegmuller no. 736, 359-360; Sharpe no. 1470, 552; Courtenay 1987, 272; BRUO 851). See above, p. 359, n. 1. 16 Printed under the name of Johannes Bokinham. 17 "Thomas Buckingham. A critical edition with commentary of the first question of the 'Quaestiones Super Sentences'" [sic], B.Litt. thesis, Oxford 1975. 15 MSS: including BN MSS lat. 15888, lat. 16400, Erfurt, MS Amplon. F.369 (Stegmuller no. 899, 415-16; Sharpe no. 1713, 645-6; Courtenay 1987, 273-4; BRUO no. 298-9). 18 Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale, MS 173; Brugge, Stadsbibliotheek, MS 192; Brussels, Bibliotheque Royale, MS 1801-1803 (cat. 1551); Kassel, Landesbibliothek, MS 2° theol.53; Oxford, Oriel College, MS 15; Padua, Biblioteca Antoniana, MS 238 Scaff.XI; BAY MS Chigi B.V.66 pt.l; BAY MS Vat.lat. 1108; Seville, Biblioteca Capitular y Colombina, MS 7-7-29 (Stegmuller no. 730, 357; no. 752, 369; Sharpe no. 1584, 594; Courtenay 1987, 272-3; BRUO no. 1094). See above, p. 359, n. 1. 19 MSS: Fribourg, Bibliotheque Cantonale et Universitaire, MS Cordeliers 26; Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Allgemein Bibliothek, MS Amplonian F. 132; Florence Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale MS A.3.508. (Courtenay 1987, 274. Not in Sharpe, Stegmuller, Doucet). There is no positive evidence that the Black Monk read at Oxford rather than Cambridge. 20 "John Went, O.F.M., and Divine Omnipotence", in Franciscan Studies 47 (1987) 138-170. 21 MSS: Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale dell'Archiginnasio, MS A.939; BAY MS Chigi B.V.66 pt.4 (Stegmuller no. 505, 248; Sharpe no. 971, 344; Courtenay 1987, 274; BRUO no. 2015). 22 As "An Edition of Alexander Langeley O.F.M. Reportatio Super Librum Primum Sententiarum" (Oxford D.Phil. thesis 1999). Henceforth cited as Edwards, "An Edition". 23 Ghent Rijksuniversiteit MS 702; BAV MS Vatican latin 13002. (Doucet 15-16; Sharpe no. 100, 15; Courtenay 1987, 274-275; BRUO no. 1094).
SENTENCE
COMMENTARIES AT OXFORD IN THE I33O'S
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From this, it can be seen that of eleven sententiarii of the decade whose commentaries survive, or have been identified, only two can be found in extenso in modern editions (although I believe the Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure may be editing Adam Wodeham's Oxford Lectures. His Norwich lectures, already printed, are alas largely irrelevant to debates at Oxford). In addition we have three more Sentence Commentaries from the decade in early printed editions of uncertain reliability. Also notable about this list is the number of Franciscans amongst the authors: six of the fifteen names, five of the eleven extant texts. I recently completed an edition of the first book of Alexander Langeley's Commentary; what follows is an attempt to give, on the basis of what I have found in Langeley and two related authors of the decade, a taste of what as yet remains in manuscript. I shall do this by exploring debate over one area much traversed by these Oxford theologians, namely, that around the question "How much should we love God?".
How much should we love God? At first sight, for a Christian the question "how much should I love God" seems scarcely a controversial one: the scriptural response is clear both in Deuteronomy (6 v.5) and the synoptic Gospels of Mark (12 v.28) and Luke (10 v.27). Nevertheless at least three (and probably more) of the theologians listed above made it the foundation of elaborate argument. I shall consider here the views of two Franciscans and a secular: Richard Kilvington, John Went, and Alexander Langeley. The debate begins with the lawyer's (or scribe's) question in the Gospel "what must I do to win eternal life?" The answer is well known: "you must love the Lord your God with all your heart and all your mind and all your strength; and love your neighbour as yourself". At first sight, this seems straightforward enough, albeit dauntingly so; but one may reasonably ask further questions, such as "what does it mean to love God with all my heart soul and strength; and, if this is something that I do, must I do it all of the time, or just for some of it; and, how does my loving God relate to my loving my neighbour, or indeed to my loving myself, since that is the standard by which my love of neighbour is measured?" Matters can soon become very complicated, particularly when treated by fourteenth
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century theologians. Moreover, since the love of God is the foundation for all aspects of the Christian life, the Sentence commentator may touch them all in discussing it. It is interesting that this topic seems to have received little attention from theologians before this decade (although there are hints in exchanges between St. Bernard of Clairvaux and disciples of Peter Abelard);24 the Ordinary Gloss says nothing to the point in its analysis of the several passages of Scripture, and I am too little conversant with fourteenth century Gospel Commentaries to be aware of any parallels there. It may be that this interest in theological topics with a more obviously scriptural base is related to the apparent change that took place over this decade in the time allotted to read the Sentences at Oxford, from two years to one. Perhaps this shift in emphasis arose from an effort to make the study of the Sentences cohere more with the study of scripture that was the subsequent curricular requirement for the doctoral degree; but this is guesswork. For the purposes of this paper, then, I shall limit myself to a specific part of the question, although perhaps the central one. Roughly speaking, it is this: if "loving God above all things" is an act I can perform, how intense does that act have to be, and for how long must I continue it, if I am to obtain eternal life? Is there a minimal act that will satisfy this requirement, and in what terms may we define it? I turn first to the earliest of the three figures under examination, Richard Kilvington.
Richard Kilvington
The only secular amongst the figures considered here, Kilvington, bastard son of a Yorkshire priest, was successively Fellow of Oriel (by 1333) and later Dean of St. Paul's from 1354 until his death in 1361. He was chronologically senior to Langeley, and many of the younger man's interests can be traced to hints in Kilvington's work. The first question of Kilvington's Sentence Commentary asks "is God to be loved above all things?", and outlines six more or less plausible objections to this view. In his reply to the third of these, Kilvington
24
See D. E. Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard (Cambridge 1970).
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touches on the topic we are discussing. He argues that loving God must always be meritorious; and that there is no possible maximal act of love for God that can be illicit. A commandment that bound us to love God to a specific degree, and no more, would not be rational.25 Kilvington is less explicit than we shall find Langeley to be on the subject of the minimum act necessary for salvation, but at one point he states clearly that no specific degree of love is necessary to merit eternal life: suppose any degree of act you like, he says, and a smaller one will be enough to gain salvation.26
Alexander Langeley OFM
Apart from his extant Sentence Commentary (in fact the second series of lectures he gave on the text; the first, either lost or unidentified, was probably given at a Franciscan custodial school as preliminary to lecturing at Oxford) we know almost nothing about Alexander Langeley. We do know that he was in Oxford in 1332, for in January of that year the Warden of the Oxford Greyfriars put him forward to the Bishop of Lincoln to be licensed to hear confessions in that diocese, in which Oxford lay. Internal references in his Lectura Secunda date that text after 1334. Apart from this, Langeley himself is a mystery to us; he might conceivably be connected to the Langley family who are prominent landowners in Warwickshire and later Kent, and who in the fifteenth century are associated with the London Greyfriars: but this is purely speculative.27
20 Richard Kilvington Lectura in Sententias Q.I, ad 3m principalem (MS Erfurt Amplonian F. 105 f. 138rb). Tertia conclusio: quod preceptum non esset rationale quo preciperetur dilectio Dei usque ad cerium gradum et non ultra, nee possibile est de lege ordinata; quia tune in casu dilectio Dei super omnia foret peccatum, et ita per illam non mereretur sic diligens vitam eternam: quod est contra primam conclusionem (f. 138ra) Prima conclusio: quod omnis diligens Deum super omnia meretur vitam etemam de lege ordinata. 26 Richard Kilvington Lectura in Sententias Q.I ad 6m principalem (MS Erfurt Amplonian F. 105 f. 147ra). Sexto Conclusio: quod omnem dilectionem meritoriam quam habet aliquis, liceret illam augere in infinitum si posset, (f. 147va) et tune quando arguitur sic, si nullus sit gradus medius inter speciem dilectionis Dei, et speciem quam debet quis habere respectu sui ipsius; igitur per nichil precise tenetur quis diligere plus Deum quam seipsum; et hec(?) potest concedi conclusio, quia ad nullum gradum dilectionis Dei tenetur homo; quia quocumque data, minor sujficeret ad salutem eternam. Et idea sicud nullus gradus precise, nee aliquod precise requiritur de necessitate salutis ad meritorie diligendo Deum; ita nichil plus precise requiritur ad dilectionem Dei quam proximi. 2/ For a full account of the evidence, see Edwards, "An Edition" 1-5.
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Langeley treats our topic extensively in the first question of his Lectura Secunda, entitled "Does loving God with the love of enjoyment merit eternal life?".28 At the outset, we should note a crucial difference between Langeley and Kilvington: whereas Kilvington believes that any act of love for God will merit eternal life, Langeley restricts this to such acts performed by one in a state of grace: it is possible to love God above all and for such an act to have no merit whatever, if the one loving God is not possessed of the created habit of grace that is the formal sign of the indwelling Holy Spirit.29 Langeley makes this point because he is convinced that reason teaches us that God is eminently lovable, and that our wills are enough under our control to elicit an act in accordance with reason. Nevertheless, he believes, anything we can do of ourselves has value only if God's grace inform it. But we cannot more than touch on this aspect of the question without becoming involved in the fascinating but enormous topic of fourteenth Century Pelagianism (so-called).30 To return to the matter in hand: the first article of Langeley's question refines the issue further: does the general commandment to love God bind us to any specific degree of act of love for Him? It is very important to understand the phrase "degree of act" (gradus or latitude actus). This is a way of expressing the variability of a subject between certain maximal limits: it is borrowed from Mertonian natural philosophy, although, ironically, the Mertonians themselves took it first from discussions of the increase of grace.31 As with most medieval technical terms, its usage varies maddeningly between one author and another. In this case, it is enough to know that acts of one agent may be more or less intense. The more intense acts are 28 The phrase "loving with the love of enjoyment" translates the Latin frui, an Augustinian term meaning "to rest in an object with love", as opposed to uti, literally "use", technically "employing as a means of ascent to a higher good patient of the love of enjoyment". For our purposes here, we need note only that fruitio (the noun of action derived from frui} designates an activity whose only appropriate object is God. See further Oliver O'Donovan "Usus and fruitio in Augustine, de Doctrina Christiana 1" in the Journal of Theological Studies 33 (1982); and A. S. McGrade, "Enjoyment at Oxford after Ockham: Philosophy, Psychology, and the Love of God" in Hudson, A. M., Wilks, Michael (eds.) From Ockham to Wycliff. Studies in Church History, Subsidia 5, (Oxford, 1987), 63-88. 29 See Edwards, "An Edition", 25-27. 30 For a discussion of Langeley and "modern Pelagianism" see Edwards, "An Edition" 21-29, 67-73. 31 See Edith Sylla "Medieval Concepts of the Latitudes of Forms: the Oxford Calculators" in Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age 40 (1973).
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said to be acts of a greater degree, or to possess a greater latitude; less intense acts, are acts of less degree, or possess a smaller latitude. As we shall see, it is even possible for there to be an act of no degree (degree zero). Langeley's answer to our question is that the General Commandment to love God binds us to no specific degree of act of love for Him (ad nullum gradum actus): any act, however small, will do, as long as it is perceptible by the will.32 Langeley argues that any act of the will must by definition be perceptible; if not, we could hardly speak of it as an act, and so any and all acts satisfy the commandment. He uses the analogy of sight: we cannot talk of an act of sight being present unless something is in fact seen. In just the same way, no act of will can be said to occur unless the will can perceive itself having it. Whatever we may think of Langeley's reasoning here (and he certainly contradicts Aristotle on this point)33 we may question what this act with nullus gradus—no degree, not just a minimally small one—would look like. Langeley is saying that the Commandment to love God above all things is satisfied by an act of degree zero, which however is still perceptible by our will. How can we be said to perceive something that has (as it were) no extension? 32 Alexander Langeley OFM Reportatio in Sententias Q.1 a.l (MS Vat.lat. 13002 f. 175ra) Pro ista questione pono quattuor articulos. Primus est <ari> ad aliquem gradum dilectionis Dei obligetur quis ex communi precepto Dei de diligendo Deo. Secundus: si licite sit certificate de jinali perseverantia mile dissolvi statim et esse cunt Christo [Phil. 1 v.23] [fol. 175rb] Tertius: si frui Deo sine gratia sit possibile. Quartus: si aliquis ex condigno mereatur vitam eternam. (Primi Articuli prima conclusio) Pro solutione istius articuli ponuntur conclusiones. Prima conclusio est quod preceptum de diligendo Deo ad nullum gradum obligat generaliter quando quis ad solum actum interiorem tenetur nisi forte ex voto vel causa [MS adds ex] equipollenti. Prima conclusio probatur sic: quelibet [MS quilibet] latitudo dilectionis Dei perceptibilis a voluntate viatoris sufficit ad impkndum generale preceptum de dilectione Dei. Sed quelibet [MS quilibet] est huius<modi>; igitur quelibet sufficit; igitur ad nullum cerium obligatur. Maior patet, tamen, quia statuta penitentialia sunt restaurenda [MS restaurengenda(?)] sed preceptum de dilectione Dei est penitentiale, quia nisi dilexis pro certo tempore, lues eternaliter fenimf, quia aliter de habente tempus et delictionem actualem de diligendo Deum, esset desperandum; quia propter resistentiam fomitis nullum gradum meritone dilectionis potest voluntas subito elicere, quia quandocumque agens naturale, quantumcumque forte, ex modicissima resistentia agit successive; sed talem habet voluntas proportionem ad suum effectum, qualem agens naturale ad [MS ad naturale] suum. Minor probatur: quia quelibet latitudo est perceptibilis et c. quia quelibet latitudo appetitus sensitivi est perceptibilis experimentialiter a potentia sensitiva, aliter talis remittitur continue et successive per appetitum intellectivum usque ad non gradum, sicut [MS item] visio in oculo corporali, quia talis remittitur continue per elongationem visibilis; igitur quilibet gradus visionis experimentaliter percipitur [MS precipitur] quia operacio non potest ponere in esse nisi experiatur; igitur similiter in voluntate de actu suo. 33 de Sensu et Sensibil. C.6; where however Aristotle says that the view he rejects coheres if atomism were true.
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This analogy with an extended body, made inevitable by the very terminology of degrees and latitudes, suggests where to look for the answer. In the Third Question of Langeley's Commentary, he discusses whether the blessed can know an actually infinite number of things (Aristotle famously denies that an actual infinity can exist). Langeley's answer to this question is however affirmative: the blessed, both human souls and angels (and presumably a fortiori God) can know an actual infinity.34 His proof to this position is revelatory. We know this is so, says Langeley, because the blessed can see all parts of a continuum such as a line, otherwise they would not be able to find its mid-point.35 This line of reasoning can only yield the conclusion "therefore the blessed know an actual infinity" if two further things are true: (1) that there are an infinite number of "parts" in an extended, finite, continuum; and (2) that each of these parts is an unextended point (punctus). The combination of these premisses means that Langeley here believes that an extended finite body is made up of an infinite number of indivisible points, each of which has itself no extension. This position, known as atomism or indivisiblism, is firmly rejected by Aristotle, who argues (perhaps not unreasonably) that two unextended points cannot be contiguous without becoming identical. It is nevertheless held, albeit against very vocal opposition, by a number of medieval thinkers, including Henry of Harclay, Walter Chatton, and John Wyclif.36 We must, it seems, now add Alexander Langeley to that list.37 34 Alexander Langeley OFM Reportatio in Sententias Q.3 (MS Vat.lat. 13002 f.!84vb) Quinta conclusio est: quod infinita distincta non communicantia diffinitive videbunt in patria. 35 Alexander Langeley OFM Reportatio in Sententias Q.3 (MS Vat.lat. 13002 f.185va) Quinta conclusio probatur, quia angelus distincte vidit omnes partes continui igitur et c. Antecedens patet, quia aliter nesciret invenire punctum medium finfinitif distincte nee fanimaf dividere, nee lineam per medium, nee faceret angulum equilaterum. Item per Philosophum: intelligentia non est obliviosa [Metaphysica 12 c.8]; igitur cum intelligentia per eum novit orbem celestem girando per infinitos dies, sequitur quod omnium istorum dierum potent recordari vel omnes novit habitualiter, per mentem philosophorum. 36 For medieval indivisiblism, see John E. Murdoch in N. Kretzmann, A. J. P. Kenny, J. Pinborg (eds.), the Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 1982), 564-591, and the Introduction to Adam Wodeham Tractatus de Indiuisibilibus, ed. Rega Wood (Dordrecht and Boston, 1988), 3-13. 3/ Langeley's indivisiblism is also evident elsewhere, for instance in his doctrine of free choice. It is closest in technical details to that advocated by Harclay. He gets around the contiguity of points leading to identity objection by saying that two instants or points can be immediate to one another "in a chainlike, not a glue-like way"—linked together rather than bonded (catenate non cementate—MS Vat.lat. 13002 f.!76va). See Edwards "An Edition" 116, 372-378, 463-4, 479.
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What is important for the issue at hand is that Langeley in Question Three explicitly states that it is possible for a created being to know a point with zero extension, an indivisible atom constitutive of a line. I suggest that he must have a similar concept in mind when talking of the love of God in the first question's first article. The act of no degree which is nevertheless perceptible, and which satisfies the commandment, must surely be an indivisible-of-act: an unextended atom of willing, that thus is properly described as having "no degree" or degree zero, which is yet a real and perceptible act. Indeed, an act with a specifiable degree will be made up of an infinite number of these indivisibles of act. Langeley later describes the relations obtaining between the omission of an act of some specific degree and one of no degree: the former, he says explicitly, infinitely exceeds the latter.38 Thus Alexander Langeley: we satisfy the First Commandment, and gain eternal life, if we can elicit an indivisible, infinitely small act of Jruitio, (that is, love for God above all things), for just a moment (an indivisible of time or instant, naturally). We must not expect, however, that this on examination rather unusual position passed without contemporary comment; and for this we may now turn to Langeley's fellow Franciscan, John Went.
John Went OFM Unlike Langeley, we know something of John Went's career and character outside of what can be gleaned from his Sentence Commentary. He is recorded as the 64th Lector at the Oxford Greyfriars c.l 339-1340, presumably after he had lectured on the Sentences. He was later 20th Minister Provincial of the English Franciscans, from around 1340, possibly until his death in 1348. He was buried at the Greyfriars Convent in Hereford. Moreover, in Emden's words, "his character for holiness caused him to be credited with miracles in his lifetime",39 a reputation unparalleled amongst Oxford Franciscan Sentence Commentators, with the possible exception of John Duns Scotus (beatified in 1993). In the sixteenth century John Bale, renegade Carmelite and sedulous protestant, was characteristically less enthusiastic: 38 39
See Edwards, "An Edition", 356-360. BRUO no. 2015
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I shall say nothing [says Bale] about his [that is, Went's] speechifying and wordy brawlings, in which one finds nothing of Christ, nothing of salvation, but only an ostentatious shew of cleverness.40
The anonymous author of the Sentence Commentary in MS Miinster Univ. Bibl.164 considered Went unusual in regard to the issue we are considering. Whereas Scotus and "Adam" (presumably Wodeham) said that no one was obliged to love God above all except quocumque gradu (a position superficially close to Langeley's), Went (the anonymous author says) believed that one could be obliged to a more intense degree of love for God above all than one could, in actual fact, evoke. This obligation, however, was sub obligacione congrui not sub obligacione neccesitatis: as a matter, that is to say, of a meritorious act enjoined as an evangelical counsel, not an absolute requirement for salvation.41 If we consult Went's actual text (taken here from the Vatican MS Chigi B.V.66) we find a rather more complicated picture. The fourth article of the second question of Went's Sentence Commentary asks "if a wayfarer [that is, a viator, a human being in this life] is bound to any mode or measure of love for God?".42 He resolves this with four conclusions: first: under the present dispensation, an adult can fail to love God with actual fmitio, and yet merit eternal life by other acts. This is to allow for extraordinary circumstances under which someone may love God virtually (by means of good works done out of natural piety) without at any point explicitly rising from this to loving God directly. Second conclusion: if an adult is aware of God and of the Christian revelation, however, and is not otherwise hindered, he is obliged to love God with fmitio for some quantifiable time. These two conclusions are relatively uncontroversial (although
40
ut interim taceam condones eius ac verborum pugnas, in quibus nihil Christi, nihil salutis, sed sola ingenii ostentatio quaerebatur. Quoted by Emden, BRUO no. 2015. 41 For Miinster Univ.Bibl.MS 164 see J. Lechner "Kleine Beitrage zur Geschichte des englischen Franziskaner-Schriftums im Mittelalter", Philosophische Jahrbuch 53, (1940) 376-378. 42 John Went OFM Lectura in Sententias Q2 a4 (BAY MS Chigi B.V.66 f.!42r) Quartus articulus est utrum viator teneatur ad aliquem modum vel mensuram dilectionis Dei, et intelligitur articulus de mensura temporis vel per mensuram intencionis. Et hie ponuntur conclusiones. Prima conclusio: quod stantibus(?) legibus communibus, potest adultus per totam vitam suam non Jrui Deo actualiter et libere, et tamen per alicos actus mereri vitam etemam. Secunda conclusio: quod adultus sciens Deum et non habens impedimentum, tenetur pro alico tempore Jrui Deo. Tertia conclusio: quod nulla dilectione ????e nullo gradu dilectionis diligere Deum viator tenetur. Quarta conclusio: quod alico gradu dilectionis diligere Deum viator tenetur.
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Langeley would disagree with the second). The third and fourth however at first sight seem contradictory. The third runs: that a viator is obliged to love God with a love of no degree; the fourth, that a viator is obliged to love God with a love of some degree.43 Went explains that, taken in the sensus compositus (that is, considering all parts of the proposition at once and as a unity) the fourth is true, in the sense "I must love God to some degree"; but taken in the sensus divisus (by which parts of the proposition are analysed apart from each other) it yields the sense "I must love God to some specified degree", in which sense it is false, and the third conclusion true. The third is only true, however, in the sense "there is no specified degree of act I am bound to have". In all cases, then, Went, in opposition to Langeley and very possibly in reaction to him, argues that we must love God with an act of some degree, not one of no degree (nullus gradus). Why he believes this can be discovered, I suggest, by examining a reply he makes to an objection to the fourth conclusion (I shall for convenience refer to this argument as W]).44 Surely, the objector says, the fourth conclusion is false, because it would mean that we are bound to have a degree of act, to which we are not bound. He explains this as follows: if I am bound to love God to some degree, presumably a smaller degree than any given one will also do, given that such a degree may be perceived (note the verb). Now, suppose that God increases my powers of perception, so that I can perceive yet smaller and smaller things. For any given degree of act, then, I can always perceive a smaller one (Went here seems to accept Langeley's view that any act that is, is perceptible. This adoption of
43 John Went OFM Lectura in Sententias Q2 a4 (BAY MS Chigi B.V.66 f.!42r) Et utraque vera est ad modum(?) intellectum. Primus(?) est modus quod hie quarta conclusio distinguenda est; scilicet, conclusio (et dicendum senso composite) est ista(?): alico gradu dilectionis diligere Deum tenetur viator—id est, ad verificandum istam propositionem, "alico gradu dilectionis diligo Deum", tenendum(?) viator, et iste sensus verus est. Sensus divisus est "alico certo gradu dilectionis tenetur diligere Deum", et iste sensus falsum est, et ita potest distinguere tertia conclusio. 44 John Went OFM Lectura in Sententias Q2 a4 (BAY MS Chigi B.V.66 f.!43r) Item: ex ista responsione sequitur quod aliquo gradu dilectionis tenetur quis diligere, quo non tenetur diligere. Consequens falsum, et consequentia probatur, quia si alico gradu diligere tenetur, et minor posset sibi sufficere, sicut supponitur, quocumque ei gradu data, minorem potest percipere. Ponatur [MS adds si(?)] quod ita perficeat Deus suam potentiam perceptivam, quelibet ergo gradus ab eo perceptibilis sibi sufficeret, ergo tenetur diligere maiori gradu quam posset sufficere, et ultra sequitur quod illi gradu maiori non tenetur diligere, ex quo minor sufficere posset, et ultra sequitur conclusio: quod alico gradu tenetur diligere, quo non tenetur diligere, eodem modo sequitur quod maiori gradu tenetur diligere, quam tenetur diligere.
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an unusual position strengthens the case for Went's dependence on Langeley here). So, it makes no sense to say that I am bound to love God to some degree, given that I am not in fact bound to that degree but always to a potentially smaller one. Went replies to this by noting the obvious sophistry: it is not to any specific degree that man is bound, but just to some degree—any old degree, as long as it's a positive one. We can only talk about a degree-smaller-thanthis-one if the commandment obliges us to this specific one.45 This answer, however, is hardly satisfactory. Went doesn't tell us what the minimal act is, only that the necessary act is not a fixed one. Wi is again important here. Went there argues that, given a sufficiently perfected perception, one can always see an act smaller than any given one: he clearly accepts no minimum quantity of act. He is obviously therefore not an indivisiblist, but a continuist. Whereas, for Langeley, there is a basic atomic constituent of an action—the nullus gradus actus—beyond which we cannot perceive, since there is nothing smaller, for Went this is not so, and he is forced into an unconvincing resort to paradox,46 because he cannot tell us what is the least perceptible act (which, remember, means also the least possible act) would be. In this light, perhaps Langeley's unfashionable and admittedly problematic atomism has unexpected virtues after all. Incidentally, if I am correct in supposing that Went specifically answers Langeley (given the amount of unedited material from the decade, this could only be a tentative conclusion at this stage) this would certainly narrow Langeley's possible date-range as Sententiarius pretty much to the years 1335-1337. It also, given Went's own dates, raises the intriguing possibility that they may have read the Sentences together, and responded directly to one another's arguments: in two separate places in his Lectura, Langeley refers to the arguments of an
45 John Went OFM Lectura in Sententias Q2 a4 (BAY MS Chigi B.V.66 f.143v) Ad tertium enim dicitur, quod tune aliquis alico gradu diligendum teneretur, quo diligere non teneretur. Dicitur quod in sensu composito hie est vera, et non in sensu(?) ; ulterius, quod, eodem modo, maiori gradu tenetur diligere, quam tenetur diligere. Dicitur quod consequentia non valet, et conclusio ilia est simpliciter falsa, quia implicat aliquod esse gradum ad quod homo teneretur, quia preparacio(?) et excessus est semper respectu alicuius termini(?). Contra: tenetur diligere Deum alico gradu, quo non tenetur diligere: aut, ergo, maiori, aut minori, aut equali. Dicitur, negando consequentiam, quia neque sic neque sic, cum nullus sit certus gradus ad quod tenetur. 46 Whilst he certainly would have allowed that we could see unextended points, they don't in fact exist outside our minds—there is for Went in nature no indivisible thing.
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unnamed socius or adversarius'?1 could these be from John Went's own lectures? I have as yet to ascertain this.
Conclusion After all this, one may reasonably ask "what, then, is the point?" I have suggested above a practical reason for this particular emphasis in speculative theology, namely to make it a closer companion to biblical exegesis, especially of the Gospels. It has also been suggested to me by one with experience in such matters that Langeley's argument, that only a minimal act of loving God above all is necessary for salvation, is an invaluable one in a pastoral context. We should not forget that the only external reference we have to Langeley portrays him as a man hearing confessions; presumably scrupulous consciences were at least as common then as now, especially in a university town. And, to make a wider point, we should not forget that theological education in the schools explicitly aimed to meet a pastoral need by producing articulate and sympathetic priests to preach the Gospel and administer the sacraments. If it does not seem too absurd, may we explain, at least the direction taken by this wildly complicated theology as an attempt, at some level, to take scholastic theology back to the people?
47
MS Vat.lat. 13002 ff.!79ra, 188rb.
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LES PREMIERS ECRITS THEOLOGIQUES DE BRADWARDINE: TEXTES INEDITS ET DECOUVERTES RECENTES Jean-Francois Genest
Alors que les lectures sur les Sentences constituent notre principale source d'information sur 1'evolution de la pensee theologique au XIVe siecle, Thomas Bradwardine doit sa celebrite a un monument litteraire tres different, a premiere vue, de ces exercices academiques. Certes on a toujours su., puisque l'auteur lui-meme raffirme dans sa preface, que le De causa Dei est issu, au moins en partie, de legons donnees in castris scholasticis militando.1 Mais naguere encore, on ignorait a peu pres tout de ce qui avait pu preparer cet ouvrage, d'ailleurs longtemps neglige par les historiens et dont 1'insertion dans les courants intellectuels de 1'epoque etait mal perdue. Or cette obscurite se dissipe peu a peu. Les textes qui nous livrent quelque chose du premier enseignement theologique de Bradwardine a Oxford n'ont pas tous disparu. La liste s'en est allongee au cours de ces dernieres annees. Sans doute est-il temps de les presenter. Au prealable, il convient de rappeler quelques donnees chronologiques.2 C'est le 5 septembre 1333, quand il recoit par provision papale un canonicat a Lincoln, que Thomas Bradwardine apparait pour la premiere fois dans un acte officiel avec le titre de bachelier en theologie. II avait done a cette date acheve sa lecture des Sentences, qui a du occuper 1'annee academique 1332—1333. Une serie d'indices concordants montre qu'il a interrompu provisoirement ses etudes de theologie aux alentours de 1335. Son nom figure pour la derniere fois dans les archives de Merton College en octobre 1334. 1
De causa Dei, ed. H. Savile, Londres, 1618 (= DCD), f. a 6. Nous suivons ici les conclusions du P. Brian Fleming S.J. dans sa these inedite de 1'Universite catholique de Louvain (1964), Thomas de Bradwardine, Oxford Scholar, Royal Servant and Archbishop of Canterbury. Malgre la decouverte de textes nouveaux, ce travail reste fondamental pour une etude de la biographic et de la carriere du Doctor profundus. Voir aussi J. A. Weisheipl, 'Repertorium Mertonense', in Mediaeval Studies, 31 (1969), 177-183 et A. B. Emden, BRUO, I, 244-246; Add. and Corr., ibid., Ivii; III, xv—xvi. 2
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Quelques mois plus tard, en decembre 1335 et Janvier 1336, il se trouve vraisemblablement a Avignon, ou les registres pontificaux le qualifient toujours de bachelier. Le 19 septembre 1337 il recoit la charge de chancelier de Saint-Paul de Londres: a cette occasion le registre de 1'eveque Stephen de Gravesen ne fait aucun etat de ses grades universitaires. Or cet office ne pouvait etre confere qu'a un maitre en theologie ou a un bachelier dont Yinceptio se ferait dans 1'annee suivant sa nomination. Ce dernier cas devait etre celui de Bradwardine. S'appuyant sur les clauses des statuts de Saint-Paul de Londres relatives a la residence des chanoines, B. Fleming a propose une reconstruction ingenieuse de cette partie de sa carriere: Bradwardine aurait reside a Londres un an comme novellus, de la Saint-Michel (29 septembre) 1337 a la Saint-Michel 1338, puis il serait retourne a Oxford pour y terminer son cursus theologique, ce qui permettrait de placer son inceptio au debut de 1'annee universitaire 1338-1339.3 II aurait acheve a Pete 1340 son temps obligatoire de regence et serait ensuite retourne a Londres, ou il est appele sacrae paginae professor dans un acte du 17 decembre 1340. De ces investigations chronologiques retenons ici que 1'enseignement de Bradwardine a Oxford s'est deroule en deux periodes separees: 1'une de 1332 a 1334, pendant laquelle il etait bachelier; 1'autre de 1338 a 1340, correspondant a sa regence, pendant laquelle il a compose, au moins dans leurs grandes lignes, les deux premiers livres du De causa Dei. Ces calculs permettent de preciser d'autre part la chronologic des ecrits d'un de ses eleves et futurs adversaires, Thomas Buckingham, issu lui aussi de Merton College. Buckingham, comme il le signale lui-meme, etait respondens, c'est-a-dire dans sa septieme annee d'etudes theologiques, celle qui precedait immediatement la lecture des Sentences, alors que Bradwardine enseignait comme regent,4 done en 1338-1339 ou 1339-1340. Par consequent, Buckingham a du lire les Sentences en 1339-1340 ou 1340-1341. Cette datation s'accorde bien avec ce que Ton sait de son inceptio, qui n'a eu lieu qu'apres la publication du De causa Dei (1344). 3 Fleming, Thomas de Bradwardine, 114-129. Cette date est certainement preferable a celle de 1336 que nous avions proposee dans Predetermination et liberte creee a Oxford au XIV siecle. Buckingham contre Bradwardine (Paris, 1992), 15, ne serait-ce qu'en raison de 1'exactitude pointilleuse du registre de Stephen de Gravesen, qui n'aurait pas manque de mentionner que Bradwardine etait maitre en theologie si tel avait etc le cas. 4 Cf. Predetermination et liberte creee, 28-30 et 90-93.
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I
Bradwardine bachelier en theologie: Retour sur une collection de questions recemment decouverte II y a moms d'une dizaine d'annees, on ne connaissait qu'une seule oeuvre theologique de Bradwardine anterieure au De causa Dei., la question Defuturis contingentibus., transmise par deux manuscrits et editee integralement en 1979.5 Un progres decisif fut realise en 1990 avec la decouverte d'un troisieme temoin de ce texte, copie au milieu d'une serie de questions anonymes dans un recueil du XIVe siecle provenant de 1'ancienne Sorbonne (Paris, BnF, lat. 15805, f.40ra-49vb). En efFet, une inspection rapide du contexte permit de conclure que deux autres questions au moins de cette collection devaient etre restituees a Bradwardine, notamment I'enigmatique question de peccato, a laquelle renvoyait le De futurist Est-il possible aujourd'hui d'aller plus loin et de formuler un jugement d'authenticite sur l'ensemble? Les questions sont au nombre de neuf. Rappelons-en la liste: 1. Utrum in entibus possit esse aliquod infinitum (f. 40ra-41rb). Probatur quod sic. Primo in quantitate continua . . .; des. dick in libro De bona fortuna quod Deus scit omnia. 2. Utrum per discursum rationis humane possit sciri aliqua veritas in divinis (f. 41rb—41vb; marg. questio secunda principalis). Quod non, quia syllogismus expositorius nihil valet in divinis . . .; des. si est Pater, Filius est Pater. 3. Utrum in Deo sit tantum trinitas personamm (f. 41vb 43rb; marg. questio 3a principalis). Quod sic patet, quia hoc tenet Ecclesia catholica . . .; des. indivisibiliter, non indivisibilitate continui et discreti. 4. Utrum personalis proprietas sit persona (f. 43rb~43va; marg. questio 4a principalis). Quod sic, quia aliter esset aliud a persona . . .; des. Item tune generantes. 5. Utrum scientia Dei sit causa cujuslibet sciti ab eo (f. 43va-45ra; marg. questio 5a principalis). Quod sic: 12. Metaphysice, commento 51. Item Magister, libro primo, dist. 39 ...
5 J.-F. Genest, 'Le Defuturis contingentibus de Thomas Bradwardine', in Recherches augustiniennes, 14 (1979), 249-336 (= DFC). 6 J.-F. Genest et K. H. Tachau, 'La lecture de Thomas Bradwardine sur les Sentences', 57 (1990, paru en 1991), in Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du mqyen age, 301-306. Le manuscrit avait deja etc signale par Girard J. Etzkorn, 'The Codex Paris Nat. Lat. 15805' in Archwum Franciscanum Historicum, 80 (1987), 321-333, mais c'est Katherine Tachau qui, en reconnaissant le Defuturis contingentibus aux f. 45-47v, a joue dans cette decouverte le role de premier rnoteur.
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— Hie sunt opiniones (f. 43va—43vb; marg. Primus articulus: recital opiniones). Una opinio est quod scientia Dei sit causa cujuslibet sciti. . . — Utrum voluntas Dei habeat aliquam causam (f. 43vb—44rb; marg. 2US articulus principals questionis). Quod sic, quia scientia Dei est ejus causa . . . — Utrum voluntas Dei sit causa peccati (f. 44rb—45ra; marg. 3US articulus principalis questionis). Quod sic, quia vult Antichristum peccaturum . . .; des. in quantum sunt a propria iniquitate. - Nunc respondetur ad ipsam et presentem questionem . . . (f. 45ra); des. sicut fuit causa omnium rerum posteriorum illius voluntatis, etc. 6. Utrum Deus habeat prescientiam omnium futurorum contingentium ad utrumlibet (f. 45rb~47vb; marg. 6a questio principalis). Quod non, quia sic posset scientia Dei falli. . .; des. determinatur actu prius naturaliter per Deum. 7. Utrum cujuscumque actionis meritorie sit cantos principium effectivum (f. 47vb 49ra; marg. questio 7a principalis). Quod non, quia nihil est alicujus efficiens, quo posito aut non posito non minus fit illud . . .; des. licet non immediate efficiat actionem meritoriam. 8. Utrum Christus potuit in merito profecisse (f. 49ra—49va; marg. questio 8a principalis). Probatur quod sic, quia ita profecit, igitur, etc . . .; des . . . secundum naturam assumptam, non simpliciter. Ad 2um patet et ad 3um. 9. Utrum quodlibet meritum sit debite premiandum (f. 49va—49vb; marg. .ix. principalis). Quod non, quia non quodlibet bonum meritum . . .; des. aut non intellecta dimittit, aut intelligere facit. La collection commence par une question sur la possibilite d'un infini cree, Utrum in entibus possit esse aliquod infinitum. Or dans la question 8, dont 1'authenticite, on le verra, est hors de doute, Bradwardine renvoie par trois fois son public a des conclusions qu'il a demontrees anterieurement "dans la question de irifinito". S'agit-il bien du meme texte, ou a-t-on quelque raison de croire que le compilateur de la collection ait substitue a la question de Bradwardine une question traitant du meme sujet, mais due a un auteur different? Apres examen, rien ne permet de retenir cette hypothese hypercritique. Les references donnees par Bradwardine concordent avec la teneur de la question, qu'il s'agisse de Pinfini syncategorique7 ou du merite du
7 A propos de la peine due au pecheur per instantia infinita, Bradwardine precise dans la q. 8 qu'il faut entendre cet infini non simpliciter, mais secundum quid, comme il a ete dit dans la question sur 1'infini; c'est-a-dire comme plus grand que toute quantite finie. "Dicitur quod non meretur penam per instantia infinita simpliciter, ut dictum est in questione de infinito, sed secundum quid, scilicet contra omnem numerum finitum" (f. 49va). Or cette conception coincide avec la doctrine developpee dans la q. 1, ou il n'est admis d'infini que syncategorique: "Concedo quod infinitas unitates habet aliquis numerus syncategorice, id est sine fine" (f. 4Ira).
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Christ.8 D'autre part, le conterm doctrinal est en harmonic avec les theses defendues ulterieurement par Bradwardine dans le De causa Dei.9 Certes, les ressemblances quasi-litterales entre les deux oeuvres font defaut, contrairement a ce que Ton peut observer pour d'autres questions de la collection, mais les conclusions fondamentales sont identiques: rejet de Tinrini actuel, aussi bien dans 1'ordre de la quantite (que celle-ci soit discrete ou continue), que dans 1'ordre qualitatif. Comme il est de regie a Pepoque, le paradoxe des infinis inegaux est au centre de la question. Etant admis, a titre d'axiomes, 1° que tous les infinis sont egaux, 2° que la partie est plus petite que le tout, 1'hypothese d'infinis actuels fait apparaitre que certains d'entre eux seraient plus grands que d'autres, qui sont des parties des premiers. D'ou 1'on conclut que 1'hypothese est contradictoire. Cette argumentation etant courante, c'est dans la maniere de 1'illustrer qu'il faut rechercher quelque originalite. Ainsi de 1'exemple suivant, qui ne semble pas avoir etc emprunte a un stock d'arguments deja en circulation: Imaginons une infinite d'hommes portant chacun une couronne sur la tete. Soit A la multitude des hommes, B celle des couronnes. A et B sont egaux, car a tout homme correspond une couronne. Or que cela soit impossible, en voici la preuve: on depose les couronnes, puis on les reprend, mais cette fois a raison d'une sur deux. A la fin, tous les hommes sont de nouveau couronnes, mais il reste autant de couronnes laissees de cote qu'il y a d'hommes. II y a done davantage de couronnes que d'hommes, contrairement a 1'hypothese, qui s'avere ainsi contradictoire. Bien entendu, on peut faire varier le nombre des couronnes sans que la conclusion en soit modifiee, et le meme raisonnement s'appliquerait a la mise en correspondance d'une infinite d'ames et d'une infinite de corps.10 8 Le merite du Christ, comme tout acte cree, est necessairement fini. These rappelee dans la q. 8: "Item Christus vel habuit statim meritum infinitum intensive, vel tantum finitum. Non infinitum, patet per dicta in questione de infinito" (f. 49ra). Plus loin: "Nullus actus creatus Christi fuit infinitus. Omne meritum Christi fuit actus ejus creatus. Igitur, etc. Major patet ex questione de infinito" (f. 49va). De fait, on trouve dans la q. 1 cette affirmation: "Ad aliud, anime Christi gratiam, dico quod nulla est infinita in anima Christi, nisi aliquis velit quod persona Christi est gratia unionis." (f. 41ra). Meme distinction dans le De causa Dei: "Sciendum quod gratia Christi est duplex, una dilectionis, alia unionis. Gratia dilectionis est habitus creatus . . . et haec videtur finita. Gratia unionis . . . quodammodo est infinita." (II, 3, 463C). 9 DCD, I, coroll. pars 40, 120-134. Voir aussi I, 7, 184-187, ou les apories concernant 1'existence de multitudes infinies sont examinees relativement a la science que Dieu en aurait. 10 Je resume 1'argumentation, dont voici la teneur: "Item sint aliqua infinita consequenter entia, et alia infinita accidentia inherentia eis, vel infiniti homines cum
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La derniere remarque est importante, car c'est precisement cette variante de 1'argument que Bradwardine donne dans le De causa Dei, ou d'ailleurs une bizarrerie d'expression montre que, sous sa forme initiale, 1'argument reposait sur la mise en correspondance biunivoque de deux series de corps.11 Autre ressemblance notable entre les deux textes: leur polemique commune centre 1'hypothese d'une infinite de mondes, dont Bradwardine avait lu dans saint Augustin et dans Jean de Salisbury qu'elle avait ete formulee par Democrite ou Epicure.12 Dans ce cas, en effet, il suffirait de prendre dans chacun de ces mondes un etre unique—le Phenix, par exemple—et de les reunir pour construire une sphere de diametre infini qui, a elle seule, remplirait tout 1'univers.13 Au Phenix, le De causa Dei substitue un corps quelconque, mais la demonstration est identique.
Ces rapprochements, joints a 1'argument tire de 1'exactitude des references internes signalees plus haut, paraissent suffisants pour conclure a 1'authenticity de la question 1. En revanche, pour les questions 2, 3 et 4, consacrees a la theologie trinitaire, on ne dispose d'aucun texte de comparaison, ni dans le reste de la collection, ni dans le De causa Dei, ou Bradwardine n'aborde jamais ce sujet. Tout ce qu'on est en droit d'affirmer, a infinitis coronis in capitibus suis ... Sit A multitude hominum, B coronarum. A et B sunt equales, quia omni homini correspondet corona. Sed quod hoc sit impossibile, probo: quia demantur corone et ponantur juxta; et ponantur et capiantur corone alterne, et ponantur super capita hominum secundum processum continuum. Tunc in fine sunt omnes homines coronati et adhuc sunt corone alie quot homines sunt, igitur corone plures quam homines. Item adhuc possunt de novo | coronari dictis coronis duabus, ternis, quaternis, etc. Item eodem modo arguitur de animabus hominum et de corporibus" (f. 40rb-40va). 1 ' "Ponantur igitur ilia corpora infmita . . . secundum unam seriem consequenter . . . Disponantur et animae contra sua corpora correspondenter omnino; et sit A tota multitudo omnium animarum et B tota corporum multitude . . ." (DCD, I, 1, 121D-E). La formule "disponantur animae contra sua corpora" semble bien etre une reprise du "ponantur juxta" figurant dans 1'argument des hommes couronnes. - Bien qu'il n'y soit pas question de couronnes, ce n'est peut-etre pas, non plus, par hasard que dans une variante de 1'argument Bradwardine met en scene un peu plus loin une autre serie infinie, celle des papes ou des empereurs, qui sont justement des hommes couronnes (122 C). 12 DCD, ibid., 124-125. 13 "Item ponatur ista positio que ponit mundos infinitos. Quod hoc sit impossibile, probatur, quia adhuc fenices sole omnium mundorum possent omnes mundos replere. Quia cumulentur sperice circa unum punctum: iste cumulus non stabit, quia omnes fenices essent finite, igitur cum istis fenicibus non possent esse alia corpora; immo, minime partes earum replerent totum universum infinitum." (f. 40rb).
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partir d'une allusion aux opinions regnantes, c'est que la question 4, au moins, vient d'un studium anglais, probablement d'Oxford.14 On sait en outre que le sujet de la question 2, Utrum per discursum rationis humane possit sciri aliqua veritas in divinis, retenait particulierenient 1'attention dans les annees 1330. II est donc impossible de prouver directement I'authenticite de ces trois questions; mais elle pourrait etre inferee de leur presence dans cet ensemble si tout le reste emanait surement de Bradwardine. Avec les questions 5 et 6, qui ont conserve leur ordre de succession originel, on aborde un premier bloc de textes provenant indubitablement de Bradwardine. ILs ont pour theme commun le probleme de la science et la prescience de Dieu. En fait, la question 5, Utrum scientia Dei sit causa cujuslibet sciti ab ea, traite simultanement et indissolublement de la science et de la volonte divines. G'est en effet 1'intervention de cette derniere qui est a la source de la distinction entre les deux ordres de scita et de volita en Dieu, Fun necessaire et naturellement premier par rapport a la science et a la volonte divines, 1'autre contingent et issu du libre vouloir de Dieu. Aux scita et volita naturaliter priora appartiennent les verites du type "Deum esse Deum, Deum esse veracem et veritatem . . .", tandis que la totalite du cree releve des scita et volita posteriora, ou la science de Dieu est cause des choses15 et sa volonte regie de toute justice.16 La discussion annonce nettement, et parfois litteralement, la doctrine qui sera developpee dans le premier livre du De causa Dei, tout au long des chapitres 16 a 21. On y trouve deja 1'essentiel des theses "volontaristes" qui constituent la meilleure arme centre les pretentious pelagiennes. 14
"In ista questione sunt opiniones ..." (cinq, dont la quatrieme est ainsi presentee) "Alia est opinio Oxonie . . ." (f. 43rb). Cf. un peu plus loin: "Item nato filio Rome et patre existente in Anglia ..." 15 "Dicendum quod ilia scientia non est causa scitorum priorum naturaliter volitione sua, sed e converso ilia sunt cause scientie sue. Sed scientia Dei est causa effectiva omnium posteriorum volitione sua, que sunt creature. Que quidem scientia est scientia approbationis . . ." (art. 4, f. 45ra). Cf. BCD I, 18, 220-224: Distinguit. . . scibilia compkxa in priora quodammodo et posteriora voluntate divina. 16 "Quoad omnia sequentia ejus voluntatem naturaliter, justitia est sua voluntas . . . Sed quoad omnia precedentia ejus volitionem naturaliter et omnia consequentia ex illis, cujus sunt Deum esse, Deum esse dominum omnium si creature sint, et hujusmodi, justitia est recta ratio, quia ilia non sunt recta quia sunt tantum volita; quia si per impossible non essent volita, adhuc non minus forent justa . . ." (art. 2, f. 44ra). Cf. DCD, I, 20, 227-228: Distinguit similiter valuta in priora et posteriora voluntate divina; I, 21, 228-234: Distinguit rationabile et justum per prius voluntate divina, per posterius et per mixtum.
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Donnons-en seulement un exemple. Dieu, dit-on, n'agit pas sans raison. Ainsi, il veut sauver les justes a cause de leurs merites, propter merita. Mais ici propter ne designe aucune causalite, meme finale, a laquelle Dieu serait soumis. Ge terme indique seulement 1'ordination du cree a une fin qui n'est autre que Dieu lui-meme. Dieu veut pour lui-meme le salut des justes, comme leur existence; leurs merites ne sont que le moyen ordonne par lui a leur beatitude.17 La meme analyse vaut pour la parole de 1'Apotre sur la "couronne de justice" (// Tim. 4, 8). Nous ne sommes pas ici dans I'ordre des recta et justa per se, mais dans celui de la promesse et de 1'acceptation divines.
C'est tout naturellement dans le cadre de cette question que prend place 1'article 3, Utrum voluntas Dei sit causa peccati. D'ordinaire on dit: Dieu ne veut I'acte mauvais qu'en tant qu'il est etre, non en tant qu'il est peche, d'autant qu'il n'est sous ce rapport que privation de justice, c'est-a-dire pur neant. Cette reponse traditionnelle ne satisfait pas Bradwardine, qui prefere dire que Dieu veut I'acte mauvais indirectement et relativement, secundum quid et ex consequenti tandis qu'il veut directement, simpliciter et absolute, I'acte bon. La discussion, longue et serree, contient 1'essentiel des arguments qui seront exposes au livre premier, chapitres 33 et 34, du De causa Dei.18 Comme on le sait, la question 6, la plus copieuse—elle a les dimensions d'un veritable petit traite—a circule separement sous le titre de futuris contingentibus, ce qui lui a permis d'etre la premiere connue et jusqu'a present la seule editee. On 1'a donc comparee, et surtout opposee, au De causa Dei, mais sans confronter systematiquement les deux textes. Esquissons ici ce parallele, en suivant I'ordre des matieres traitees dans la question de jeunesse. Celle-ci commence par la critique de huit opinions. Aux sept premieres (§ 1-20) correspondent, dans un ordre legerement different, les chapitres 12 a 18 du livre III. La huitieme opinion, principale cible du De futuris contingentibus (§ 21—38), est ausi celle a laquelle le livre III du De causa Dei reserve 1'essentiel de ses attaques, car elle est la plus repan17 "Ad 2um distinguitur hec secundum amphiboliam 'Deus vult homines salvari propter merita', eo quod li 'propter' potest denotare circumstantiam cause finalis vel alterius cause, et sic iste sensus est falsus. Vel li 'propter' potest denotare meram tendanciam ad finem, scilicet ad beatitudinem, propter quam quodammodo voluit et vult bonos salvare, et iste sensus est verus, et sic accipit Apostolus li 'propter', scilicet denotando ordinem et non causam, quando dicit: "Propter quod exaltavit ilium" (Phil. 2, 9). (f. 43vb). 18 DCD, I, 33, 289-294: Quod respectu cujuscunque est Dei permissio, est et ejus voluntas; I, 34, 294-307: Si, et quomodo Deus vult et non vult peccatum. Nous avons releve au moins une vingtaine de passages paralleles.
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due a I'epoque, surtout en Angleterre: communior etfamosior apud moderniores philosophos atque theologos, praecipue apud nostrates (c. 26). Elle affirme que la verite des futurs (et par suite la science que Dieu en a) est purement et simplement contingente, tandis que les presents et les passes sont necessaires. Nous avons tente ailleurs d'identifier les principaux representants de cette opinion, que Bradwardine attaque inlassablement.19 Entre autres griefs, il lui impute celui de rendre impossible la revelation des futurs contingents (question aprement controversee a I'epoque) et d'ouvrir la voie a 1'hypothese d'un Dieu trompeur. Dans le Defuturis, cette accusation est presentee en neuf arguments (§ 24—32); dans le De causa elle n'occupe pas moins de seize chapitres (c. 33—48). Pour eviter cette difficulte, certains soutiennent que seuls les futurs reveles arriveront necessairement: these eclectique, ecartee comme incoherente (De futuris § 39; De causa, c. 49). La reponse personnelle de Bradwardine repose sur la distinction, en Dieu et en 1'homme, des deux puissances, absolue et ordonnee (§ 41-45). La premiere designe le vouloir dans son mdetermination radicale, la seconde 1'envisage au meme instant dans son ordination, c'est-a-dire dans sa determination a 1'un des partis. L'une fonde la contingence des futurs, 1'autre leur necessite, qui n'est que relative (comparata et conditionatd), non absolue. La distinction des deux puissances sera pareillement rappelee et expliquee a la fin du De causa (c. 52), ou elle apparait comme une piece essentielle du systeme.20 En raison de la hierarchie des causes, la volonte humaine n'en est pas moins determinee ellememe par Dieu (§ 45). Les objections (notamment celle qui est tiree de la distinction classique entre necessite de la consequence et necessite du consequent) occupent, avec leurs reponses, la plus grande partie de la responsio propria et se retrouvent dans les chapitres 28 et 29 du De causa. Un corollaire de cette doctrine est la these de 1'egale contingence et de 1'egale necessite des trois moments du temps: elle permet d'affirmer en quel sens Dieu peut faire, c'est-a-dire vouloir, que ce qui est passe n'ait pas ete21 (De futuris, § 61; De causa, c. 30 et 52).
Si rapide qu'elle soit, cette comparaison montre que le De futuris contingentibus contient deja la plupart des themes longuement developpes une dizaine d'annees plus tard dans le livre III du De causa. La plupart, mais non pas tous, et ces lacunes sont peut-etre ce qu'il y a de plus instructif. La principale—et la plus inattendue—touche au vocabulaire. Dans le De causa Bradwardine use constamment du 19
Cf. Predetermination et liberte creee, 33-60. Ibid., 76-86. 21 Sur le sens de cette doctrine (a partir du De causa Dei), voir Predetermination et liberte creee, 52—60 et 82~86. Voir aussi le remarquable livre de Michael Sylwanowicz^ Contingent Causality and the Foundations of Duns Scotus' Metaphysics (Leyde, 1996), ch. vin, Can God undo the past? An application of contingent causality, 220—236. 20
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terme necessite antecedente (ou precedente) pour designer Faction de Dieu sur la volonte creee. II la definit comme une cause active dont la position, toutes les conditions prealables a son action etant reunies, entraine necessairement et infailliblement celle de son effet.22 Placee en tete du livre III (au chapitre 2), cette definition domine le reste de la discussion. Or dans le De futuris, ce role de fil conducteur est joue par la distinction des deux puissances, qui ouvre la responsio propria. II en resulte qu'a premiere vue, et contrairement a ce qu'on dit souvent,23 c'est le De causa et non le De futuris qui, a tort ou a raison, donne 1'impression d'etre le plus "necessitate". Dans la question du bachelier le terme de necessite antecedente n'apparait qu'une fois,, et seulement a 1'occasion d'une objection dirigee centre lui,24 soit que Bradwardine a ses debuts ait hesite a reprendre a son compte un terme unanimement rejete depuis saint Anselme pour designer Faction de Dieu sur les volontes libres, soit qu'il ait ulterieurement precise et approfondi sa conception de la necessite. La simple comparaison des vocabulaires montre done Finteret qu'il y aurait a suivre, d'un texte a Fautre, la genese de cette notion, qui a fait la celebrite de Bradwardine et surtout sa legende noire. L'authenticite de la question 7 est plus difficile a etablir. Elle traite de la charite: Utrum cujuscumque actionis meritorie sit caritas principium effectivum. Or il existe un second temoin de ce texte a la Biblioteca nazionale de Florence (ms. Conventi soppressi A III 508, f. 109vb~ 113va); mais cette fois la question vient en tete d'un groupe de deter-
22
"Unde et potest elici talis definitio necessitatis naturaliter praecedentis, quod ipsa est causa activa, qua posita cum omnibus suis dispositionibus sufficientibus naturaliter praeviis quibus causat suum causatum, necessario et indefectibiliter sequitur fflud causari." (BCD III, 2, 646E). 23 I. Backus, 'Liberte divine et liberte humaine chez Thomas Bradwardine', in G. Bedouelle et O. Fatio (eds.), Liberte chretienne et libre arbitre (Fribourg, Suisse, 1994), 103—114. Quoi qu'il en soit de la cornparaison entre les deux oeuvres, il convient de ne pas la fausser d'emblee en parlant de necessite absolue (106) la ou Bradwardine affirme une necessite relative ("necessitas comparata" § 43d), ni de contrainte (107, 109, 112) la ou il rappelle expressement le contraire: "voluntas non potest cogi" (§ 5la, cf. § 35a, 55b). 24 "Ad nonum principale, quando arguitur sic: sequitur quod Anselmus non diceret verum in libro De concordia, nee Boecius . . . qui dicunt quod in futuris non est necessitas antecedens, sed consequens . . . Respondetur . . . Hoc non est contra me, quia ego non sic accipio necessitatem antecedentem, sed accipio necessitatem antecedentem et priorem voluntatem Dei, que vult illud fore, ut illud quod est presens sit presens, et illud quod est futurum sit futurum, et illud quod est preteritum sit preteritum . . . (DFC § 56a-56b).
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minations attributes a Richard Fitzralph: "Hie incipiunt determinationes Ybernici."23 On ne peut toutefois ecarter a priori Fhypothese d'une erreur du copiste, car dans le manuscrit la lecture du theologien irlandais sur les Sentences precede immediatement les determinationes. Encore faudrait-il, pour corriger cette attribution, que 1'examen du texte permette d'y deceler la marque de Bradwardine. Est-ce le cas? Pour en juger, il faut bien voir 1'enjeu de la discussion: ce n'est rien de moins que la conception augustinienne de la grace et de la charite, battue en breche par des theories plus recentes. Soutenir, comme certains modernes, que la charite n'est pas a proprement parler cause efficiente de 1'acte bon, mais qu'elle se borne a lui ajouter sa valeur meritoire, n'etant par elle-meme que le signe de 1'acceptation divine, revient a admettre que I'homme peut, par les seules forces de sa nature, observer les commandements. Centre cette these, qui renouvelle 1'erreur de Pelage, Bradwardine multipliera les attaques dans le De causa Dei.26 Or c'est aussi ce que fait 1'auteur de la question, avec des arguments souvent semblables. Si la charite ne fait rien, comment parler, avec le Maitre des Sentences, de grace operante et cooperante?27 Si elle ne produit pas 1'acte bon, comment pourra-t-elle arreter 1'acte mauvais?28 Pourquoi aurait-elle dans son ordre moins de force que les simples vertus morales?29 La vehemence
20 V. Doucet, Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplement au Repertoire de M. Frederic Stegmueller (Quaracchi, 1954), 74-75, n° 72la. Cf. G. Leff, Richard Fitzralph Commentator of the Sentences (Manchester, 1963), 192. Ces determinations sont encore inedites et n'ont fait 1'objet d'aucune etude particuliere. 26 "Si nempe gratia non esset causa efficiens proprie actus boni, posset homo ex naturalibus propriis sine ipsa implere Dei mandata et perficere quemlibet actum bonum ... Si enim habens gratiam efficit quemlibet actum suum gratia nihil penitus coagente, sic posset et ipsa remota. Non enim removeretur causa efficiens totalis, nee etiam partialis."(DCD, I, 40, 364B). Tout le chapitre (pp. 364-370), intitule Quod gratia, quae est habitus gratis datus a Deo una cum voluntate humana est causa efficiens proprie cujuslibet boni et meritorii actus sui, est dirige centre cette these. 27 "Item male nuncupatur gratia operans et cooperans si nihil facial, sed tantum sit signum acceptationis divine . . ." (f. 48ra). Cf. DCD, I, 40, 365D-366A. 28 "Item si caritas non efficiat actum bonum, non reprimit actum malum" (f. 48ra). Cf. DCD, I, 40, 367C: "Quomodo etiam gratia ligat et reprimit concupiscentiam repugnantem, si penitus nihil agat?" 29 "Item virtus moralis est causa efficiens virtuose actionis, igitur virtus supernaturalis a multo fortiori . . . Item 6° Ethicorum, c. 16°: Virtus facit electionem rectam." Cf. DCD, loc cit.: "Item virtutes theologicae et supernaturales non sunt minus efficaces similium actuum quam virtutes naturales, morales et intellectuales; sed hae omnes efficiunt proprie actus suos" (364B). "Item gratia seu charitas facit intentionem rectam . . . sicut et in moralibus facit virtus moralis teste Philosopho . . ." (364D).
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de cette refutation, ou le recours aux autorites est rehausse chaque fois par une interrogation emphatique, evoque irresistiblement le De causa Dei. D'une oeuvre a 1'autre, les autorites citees different, mais le mouvement oratoire est le merne, au service de la meme cause. Q. 7
DCD, I, 40
Quomodo accendit hominem, si non efficiat aliquem actum? . . . Quomodo diffunditur caritas, si actum non efficiat aliquo modo? ... Quomodo excitat gratia, nisi aliquid efficiat? . . . Quomodo flagramus caritate, si caritas nihil efficiat? . . Quomodo aliquid vincitur igne amoris, si amor nihil agat? . . . Quomodo tolerat facile omnia amor ibrtis, si nihil agat? . . . Quomodo est (homo) impavidus, nisi virtus efficit actum quo resistit talibus timoribus? . . . (f. 48ra passim\
Quomodo (cupiditatem) reprimit, minuit et superat charitas, si penitus nihil agat? (365A) . . . Quomodo (charitas) viva, si nihil vividi operis sive fructus germinet aut producat? (365G). . . Quomodo sterilis, cum sit mater? Si autem sit faecunda, quomodo nihil parit? (366G) . . . Quomodo etiam gratia ligat et reprimit concupiscentiam repugnantem, si penitus nihil agat, sicut superius tangebatur? (367G).
Cette conclusion etant acquise,30 il reste a preciser comment la charite est cause de 1'acte meritoire. Certains pensent qu'elle le produit immediatement, en venant ajouter son efficace propre a celle de la volonte; mais cette opinion se heurte a des difficultes insurmontables, dont la principale est que 1'acte meritoire sera compose de deux parties dont aucune n'est par elle-meme meritoire. On evite ces inconvenients en reconnaissant a la charite une causalite seulement mediate: son role est de faciliter et d'augmenter la puissance de la volonte.31 Tel est 1'enseignement de la question. Dans le De causa
30
Elle a pour corollaire que 1'homme peut savoir s'il est en etat de charite: "Probabiliter potest concedi quod homo potest scire ex effectu se esse in caritate, scilicet in amicitia Dei" (f. 48vb), these que Ton retrouve dans le De causa Dei, I, 39, 338B: "Est mini probabile quod homo verisimiliter potest scire, saltern secundum praesentem justitiam, se esse in gratia et dignum Dei amore". Cette affirmation est dirigee implicitement contre Duns Scot, qui tirait argument de 1'Ecclesiaste (9, 1), "Nescit homo utrum amore an odio dignus sit" pour soutenir qu'il existe une charite naturelle indiscernable de la vertu theologale (Oxon. Ill, dist. 27, q. 1, n. 14), ce qui ouvrait la voie a un neo-pelagianisme. 31 "Sequitur tertia conclusio, scilicet quod caritas est medium efficiens meritorie actionis, et intelligo mediationem talem quod caritas disponit voluntatem sic quod . . . possit voluntas facilius et fortius velle objectum rationis quam sine ilia; et isto modo efficit actionem meritoriam proprie intelligendo efficere." (f. 48rb).
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Dei., cette distinction entre causalite mediate et immediate n'a pas de place. La reponse aux memes objections est a la fois plus simple et plus ferme, dans la ligne de saint Bernard: 1'acte meritoire est tout entier 1'oeuvre de la grace et de la volonte, ces deux causes agissant non separement, mais conjointement, non successivement, mais simultanement.32 Que conclure de cette comparaison? Dans Petat actuel des recherches, il nous semble que les affinites doctrinales et stylistiques entre la question et le chapitre du De causa deja cite plus haut (I, 40) 1'emportent sur les differences et constituent de fortes presomptions en faveur de Bradwardine. Peut-etre 1'examen des autres determinations attributes a Fitzralph dans le manuscrit de Florence (et aussi celui de sa lectura, toujours inedite) permettra-t-il de lever les derniers doutes.33 Un autre argument non negligeable en faveur de 1'aumenticite de cette question pourrait etre tire de sa place dans la collection. Les deux questions suivantes continuent en effet de trailer du merite, quoique sous d'autres aspects. Or elles sont incontestablement de Bradwardine. La chose est manifeste, comme nous le notions deja en 1990, pour la question 9. Elle ne Test pas moins pour la question 8, a laquelle renvoie la question 9.34 La question 8, Utrum Christus potuit in merito profecisse, aborde en realite deux problemes distincts, mais connexes: Est-il possible de meriter en un instant? Le Christ, considere dans son humanite, a-til une capacite finie? La reponse affirmative que donne Bradwardine a la premiere interrogation montre sa dependance a 1'egard de Duns Scot.35 Le De causa Dei ne reviendra pas sur le probleme. La seconde
32
"Tarn gratia quam voluntas efficit ipsum totum (actum) et quamlibet ejus partern non divisim sed conjunctim, non successive sed simul, sicut Deus et voluntas, sicut etiam duo homines trahunt navim. Unde Bernardus De gratia et libero arbitrio, vicesimo tertio . . .", etc. DCD, I, 40, 369D. 33 Nous n'avons pu consulter pour le moment qu'un microfilm incomplet de ces "determinationes Hibernici". 34 "Omne peccatum actuale mortale meretur omnem penam possibilem sibi infligi, et omne veniale omnem penam temporalem possibilem . . . Antecedens patet in precedenti questioned (q. 9, f. 49vb). Cette these etait effectivement affirmee dans la q. 8: "Aliter respondeo magis theologice et dicitur quod pene peccatoris sunt arbitrarie, ita quod pro quolibet peccato mortali actuali potest Deus juste infligere quantamcumque penam eternam, et pro quolibet peccato veniali quantamcumque penam temporalem." (f. 49va). 33 Sur le sens de cette problematique, voir 1'ouvrage de Sylwanowicz deja cite (supra n. 21), ch. IV, Choice at an instant and contingent causality, 85-102.
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interrogation recoit une reponse nuancee et se prolonge par des considerations sur la capacite de tout etre humain a progresser en grace et en merite. Les conclusions sont ici substantiellement identiques a celles que donnera le De causal Au passage, la gratuite de la recompense celeste est fortement rappelee: non seulement nul ne la merite de condigno, mais, quel que soit le don de Dieu, il passe toujours le merite; bien plus il est, en toute rigueur, immerite.37 Ces remarques sont reprises et expliquees dans la derniere question, ou Ton demande si tout merite appelle sa retribution comme un du, Utrum quodlibet meritum sit debite premiandum. Mais de quelle dette et de quelle retribution parle-t-on? II y a une retribution essentielle, fondee sur le seul accomplissement de 1'acte (ex commisso): en ce sens la recompense de 1'acte juste n'est autre que la justice. Ne la confondons pas avec la retribution accidentelle, comme 1'accroissement de charite qui suit 1'acte bon, ou la vie eternelle qui couronne la perseverance finale: cette recompense-la n'est due qu'en vertu de la promesse (ex promisso). En effet, tout surcroit de grace est lui-meme une grace. Or que dit 1'Apotre? "Si c'est par grace, ce n'est pas a raison des ceuvres; autrement la grace n'est plus grace" (Rom. 11, 6). A plus forte raison est-il impossible de meriter en toute rigueur le Royaume. Que signifie du reste cette pretention a recevoir de Dieu quelque chose comme un du, alors que nous ne pouvons meme pas lui rendre ce que nous lui devons? Quiconque a recu un bienfait est tenu de rendre a son bienfaiteur autant qu'il a recu, sinon davantage: telle est, au temoignage du Philosophe et de Seneque, la regie de la justice commutative.38 Or Dieu nous a donne nous-memes a nous-memes et s'est donne lui-meme a nous par son incarnation, sa passion et sa mort: ce don surpasse infiniment I'homme.39 Et quand bien meme Dieu
36
Cf. DCD, I, 39, 362-363. "De merito dico econtra quod nullum gaudium celeste omnino potest quis mereri de condigno et de rigore. Item quantumcumque modicum Deus det sibi pro quantocumque merito temporali vel instantaneo, plus habet quod meruit, ymmo nullam partem illius meruit." (f. 49va). 38 "Quilibet beneficiatus sine omni exactione tenetur ex gratitudine benefactori ad equale vel majus, vel saltim ad illud quod potest. Patet 8° Ethicorum 13°, 14°, et 5° Ethicorum 8° quod hoc est quedam species justitie commutative secundum proportionalitatem, et per Senecam De beneficiis quasi per totum." (f. 49vb). Toute cette partie de la question a ete reprise et amplifiee dans le De causa Dei, I, 39, 344-345. 39 "Item non possumus reddere Deo quantum debemus, igitur non mereri ex debito de rigore. Antecedens patet. . . Deus dedit homini seipsum hominem totum, 37
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1'exempterait de cette dette, I'homme n'en serait que davantage term envers lui, puisque ce serait ajouter un nouveau bienfait aux precedents.40 Entre le Createur et la creature la lex gratitudinis etablit done un lien indestructible. On voit poindre ici le paradoxe auquel le De causa Dei donnera sa forme extreme et qui suscitera chez Bradwardine stupeur et ferveur: plus l'homme s'efforce de combler sa dette, plus il 1'accroit, puisqu'il ne peut rien donner en retour qu'il n'ait deja recu.41 La collection s'acheve sur ce rappel de la liberalite divine. Au total, sur six questions pour lesquelles on dispose de textes de comparaison (les q. 2, 3 et 4 n'entrant pas en ligne de compte), quatre sont indubitablement de Bradwardine (q. 5, 6, 8 et 9); quant aux deux autres, leur authenticite est vraisembable (q. 7) ou quasi-certaine
(q. i). D'autre part, les references internes prouvent que la reunion de cinq au moins de ces questions ne doit rien a un eventuel compilateur, mais remonte bel et bien a 1'auteur lui-meme, qui renvoie parfois ses auditeurs et ses lecteurs a telle ou telle "question precedente". C'est ce qu'il fait dans le De futuris (q. 6) pour le De peccato (q. 5), 42 et dans la q. 9 pour un passage tire de Pactuelle q. 8.43 La meme question 9 contient, on 1'a vu, trois references a la question de infinite, auxquelles s'ajoute un rappel de la question de peccato.^ L'ordre dans lequel ces questions se succedaient a Porigine n'a done pas etc bouleverse.
et omnes potentias et operationes earum; igitur hec omnia debet Deo. Item Deus dedit homini seipsum incarnatum, passum et mortuum, quod excedit quemlibet purum hominem infinite; igitur homo quilibet debet Deo infinitum plus quam sit ipse, vel saltern quantum potest." (f. 49vb). 40 "Si non exigat, plus facit pro homine, quia dimittit eum liberiorem, igitur plus tenetur, vel saltim tantum." (ibid.) 41 "Quod videtur mirabilissimum, et tamen verissimum atque gratissimum, quanto quis amplius retribuerit Domino et amplius solverit gratitudinis debitum, tanto amplius ei debet et amplius obligatur. O admirabile gratitudinis vinculum et gratae obligationis ligamen, quod nee creatura, nee Creator solvere plene potest! . . . Nam secundum praemissa quicquid retribuimus Deo, accipimus prius ab eo; quare et pro retributione quacunque amplius ei tenemur." (DCD, II, 34, 634D et 635C). Ce chapitre ("O magne et mirabilis Deus noster . . .") sur lequel s'acheve le livre II, a parfois etc copie separement sous le titre de Meditationes. II forme le sommet spirituel de toute 1'oeuvre. 42 " Ut predictum est in questione de peccato, quid est causa peccati, an voluntas Dei, etc." (f. 46rb = DFC § 35q); "quod Deus non est auctor mali, nee Deo auctore fit homo deterior, patet per dicta superius in questione precedent^ (f. 47rb = DFC § 52f.). 43 Voir plus haut, note 34. 44 "Premium est duplex, essentiale et accidentale, sicut pena, ut dictum est in questione de peccato." (f. 49vb). Cf. DCD, II, 3, 459B-C.
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A quelle epoque remontent ces questions et dans quelles circonstances ont-elles ete composees? En donnant 1'edition integrate du De futuris contingentibus, nous avions signale deux indices permettant de conclure que 1'auteur n'etait encore que bachelier: 1'allusion aux objections d'un socius et la reserve apportee a 1'expression d'une these, "quia illam materiarn non bene studui adhuc", modestie comprehensible de la part d'un bachelier, mais surprenante si elle venait d'un maitre. Les materiaux nouveaux contenus dans le ms. lat. 15805 fournissent un indice supplementaire, d'ordre chronologique. Au detour d'une discussion destinee a montrer que toute permission implique un certain vouloir, done un disposition providentielle, Bradwardine tire argument de la titulature donnee au pape dans les lettres qui lui sont adressees: "Et sic habetur in littera pape: Johanni divina providentia, etc."45 Dans ce genre d'exemples, on mentionne habituellement le nom du pape regnant. Comment ne pas en conclure que les questions sont anterieures a la mort de Jean XXII (4 decembre 1334)? Bradwardine, il est vrai, se sert un peu plus loin du meme nom, Johannes, pour designer un prelat quelconque.46 Mais s'agissant du pape, ce choix eut ete aberrant apres 1'election de Benoit XII (20 decembre 1334). Les questions doivent done dater de 1'une des deux annees academiques 1332—1333 ou 1333—1334. Bradwardine etait alors bachelier. A ce titre et bien qu'il subsiste quelques doutes la-dessus,47 il ne pouvait normalement presider et determiner des questions disputees; encore moins en fixer la liste. Or I'ampleur des matieres traitees, la coherence avec laquelle elles
45 Au lieu de "Johanni" le manuscrit (f. 44vb) porte "Johannes", mais cette lecon est une faute du copiste, car les lettres pontificales, dont la titulature est immuable depuis Gregoire le Grand, commencent toujours par la formule "N. episcopus, servus servorum Dei". Par "littera pape" il faut donc entendre non une lettre du pape, mais une lettre au pape, et la formule citee par Bradwardine est en effet celle dont usaient les chancelleries princieres ou ecclesiastiques dans leurs relations avec le Siege apostolique. 46 "Tertio decimo sic. Frustra scriberent prelati in litteris suis: Johannes talis permissione divina, quia debet scribi: voluntate divina." (ibid.) Dans les passages paralleles du DCD (I, 39, 29IB et 293C), tout nom propre a disparu, seul subsiste talis. 47 W. J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England (Princeton, 1987), 45; K. H. Tachau, 'Robert Holcot on Contingency and Divine Deception', in L. Bianchi (ed.), Filosqfia e teologia nel Trecento, Studi in ricordo di Eugenia Randi (Louvainla-Neuve, 1994), 157-196 (164-165). A noter que 1'auteur de la q. 7 rappelle en ces termes une opinion emise anterieurement par lui: "... cum non sit prirnum instans meriti, ut alias dixi determinando, non tamen asserendo" (f. 48va); mais determinare pris au sens large et courant peut s'appliquer a une conclusion soutenue lors d'un exercice quelconque, y compris la lecture des Sentences.
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se succedent et la frequence des references internes font penser a un cours systematique plutot qu'au pele-mele des disputes. En tout cas, ces questions sont trop nombreuses pour etre celles que devait soutenir un bachelier forme a 1'occasion de son inceptio^ (celle de Bradwardine a d'ailleurs eu lieu nettement plus tard, aux environs de 1338). Une hypothese assez plausible est que Ton se trouve ici devant une partie de sa lecture des Sentences; Fabsence de toute reference a telle ou telle distinction dans 1'intitule des questions n'a rien d'exceptionnel a 1'epoque en Angleterre. Toutefois, on ne peut aller au-dela de la probabilite, car certains points restent obscurs. Pourquoi la collection est-elle si courte? Dans quelles circonstances et sous quelle forme Tun des socii a-t-il critique les theses de Bradwardine sur la necessite des futurs (§ 62f), amenant celui-ci a completer sa reponse en examinant a la fin de la question (§ 59-62) des objections absentes du Sed contra (§ 47)? Enfin, s'agissant toujours du meme sujet, de quelles lecons ou questions, aujourd'hui perdues, viennent certains passages cites par Richard de Kilvington, dont la lecture sur les Sentences a du suivre de peu celle de Bradwardine?49 La question sur les futurs contingents, ou Ton a vu bien a tort un exercice sans originalite,50 est au contraire celle qui a le plus frappe les contemporains par sa nouveaute. De fait, en soutenant que les futurs sont necessaires de potentia ordinata et les passes contingents de potentia absoluta, Bradwardine renversait entierement les bases de 1'opinion recue. Sur ces points son enseignement fit sensation, sinon scandale, et fut aprement attaque bien avant la publication du De causa Dei. Mais les theses critiquees par les contemporains etaientelles tirees exclusivement de la question sur les futurs contingents qui
48 On salt qu'a Paris, par exemple, le nombre des questions disputees pour les actes de maitrise n'excedait pas quatre (deux aux vesperies, deux a 1'aulique). 49 Kilvington critique une conclusion de Bradwardine qui n'apparait pas dans la question Dejuturis contingentibus, non plus que les autorites sur lesquelles elle s'appuie: "Ad tercium respondet Bradwardin dicens ornne evenire de necessitate, et concedit quod Deus deserit prius hominem quam homo deserat Deum. Probat multipliciter . . ." (Paris, BnF, lat. 14576, f. 163ra). 50 "His inexperience in dealing with complex philosophical and theological questions . . . Nothing very original to offer. , . Essentially uncritically . . . Posed challenging questions about time and contingency, but found himself unable to answer them . . ." E. W. Dolnikowski, Thomas Bradwardine. A View of Time and a Vision of Eternity in Fourteenth-Century Thought (Leiden, 1995), 159, 160-161, 163. A la racine de ces jugements se trouve 1'idee fausse qu'a 1'epoque du De futuris Bradwardine n'avait probablement pas encore commence ses etudes theologiques: "Although he probably had not yet begun his theological studies when he wrote the De futuris contingentibus . . ." (150).
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nous est parvenue? Ou bien une partie d'entre elles au moins venaitelle d'autres ecrits, apparemment perdus aujourd'hui? Pour repondre a cette interrogation, on dispose de trois temoignages particulierement precis et interessants. Le premier est celui d'un franciscain peut-etre originaire d'Ely, connu sous le nom d'Adam junior pour le distinguer de Wodeham, et dont la lecture sur les livres III et IV des Sentences se place entre 1338 et le debut des annees 1340. Traitant du libre arbitre dans sa q. 6, Adam mentionne 1'opinion d'un magister modernus selon qui omnia quae erunt, inevitabiliter erunt et necessario necessitate ordinata, et il en reproduit de longs passages, pris in quadam reportatione de dictis suis. Or ce maitre (dont Adam n'adopte d'ailleurs pas les vues) n'est autre que Bradwardine et les passages cites sont des extraits du Defuturis contingentibus.51 La question a done circule de bonne heure a Oxford et peut-etre dans d'autres studio. d'Angleterre. Les deux autres temoignages sont ceux de Thomas Buckingham et d'Alexandre Langeley. On a vu plus haut que Buckingham a probablement lu les Sentences en 1339-1340 ou en 1340-1341. Quant a la lectura de Langeley—franciscain qui a connu une certaine celebrite a Oxford avant de tomber dans un oubli complet52—elle doit dater des alentours de 1340; en tout cas, elle ne peut etre posterieure a 1342-1343, car Jean de Mirecourt, qui lisait les Sentences a Paris en 1344-1345, 1'a largement pillee.53 C'est tres probablement par la question Defuturis que Buckingham et Langeley ont pris connaissance de 1'opinion de Bradwardine sur la contingence des passes ("potest preteritum non esse preteritum", DFC § 61b), qu'ils critiquent d'ailleurs a contresens.54 Mais quand 01 DFC, 269—271. Bradwardine etant qualifie de magister par Adam, le terminus post quern de cette lecture doit etre abaisse a 1'annee 1338-1339, date proposee plus haut pour Yinceptio de Bradwardine. Adam cite d'autre part des extraits anonymes de Kilvington en qualifiant ce dernier de modemus doctor (Troyes, BM 1477, f. 29rb); or Kilvington a du acceder a la maitrise vers la meme epoque que Bradwardine. 52 W. J. Courtenay, 'Alexander Langeley O.F.M.', in Manuscripta, 18 (1974), 96-104; et 1'article de R. Edwards dans ce volume-ci. 53 J.-F. Genest et P. Vignaux, 'La bibliotheque anglaise de Jean de Mirecourt: subtilitas ou plagiat?', in O. Pluta (ed.), Die Philosophie im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert, In memoriam Komtanty Michalski, 1879-1947 (Amsterdam, 1988), 275-301. Les extraits de Langeley n'ont pas etc inseres apres coup par Jean de Mirecourt, car on les trouve dans des manuscnts tres proches de 1'enseignement oral, mentionnant, par exemple, au beau milieu d'un developpement, la fin de la lecon quotidienne: "Hec pro ista lectione" (Lilienfeld, Stiftsbibl. 148, f. 117rb). 54 Genest, Predetermination et liberte creee, 88-89.
LES PREMIERS EGRITS THEOLOGIQUES DE BRAD WARD INE
413
ils s'en prennent, et plus vivement encore, a sa doctrine de la necessite des futurs, il est manifeste qu'ils ont aussi sous les yeux un autre texte de Bradwardine que la question De futuris contingentibus.^ Tous deux, en eflfet, connaissent la doctrine de la necessite precedente (ou antecedente) formulee par Bradwardine apres le De futuris. Langeley y fait allusion en ces termes: Probatur quod de facto Deus necessitat voluntatem ad actus suos liberos, <non> necessitate que excludit liberum arbitrium, sed necessitate precedente naturaliter proveniente a causis superioribus. (Vat. lat. 13002, f. 198rb).
Buckingham est encore plus precis dans ses citations: Necessitas antecedens est causa activa qua posita cum omnibus aliis circumstantiis necessario sequitur suum effectum produci. (q. 3, art. 2; ed. Perez de Olivano, Paris, 1505, fol. f v v°).
Puisque 1'expression "necessite antecedente" n'apparait qu'incidemment dans le De futuris, et jamais accompagnee de cette definition, il faut bien que Buckingham et Langeley aient eu acces a un ecrit plus recent, lequel, toutefois, ne peut etre le De causa Dei, achieve seulement en 1344. Si ce texte pouvait etre retrouve, on disposerait d'un chainon intermediaire entre la toute premiere question de jeunesse et le grand ouvrage de la maturite. Or, par chance, ce texte a survecu, mais il est reste jusqu'a present totalement meconnu.
II Une determinatio inedite prefigurant le De causa Dei En 1946 P. Glorieux affirmait, sans autre precision, que le ms. Vat. lat. 13002 contenait aux f. 2~79 des extraits d'un commentaire sur le second livre des Sentences attribue a Bradwardine.56 Cette indication fut reprise par Stegmtiller, puis corrigee par Doucet, qui nota que la partie due a Bradwardine se limitait aux f. 74~79v et en donna le signalement suivant:57
D5 36 57
Comme nous 1'avions note dans notre edition du DFC, 268. P. Glorieux, 'Thomas Bradwardine' in Dictionnaire de theologie catholique, xv—1, 767. F. Stegrmiller, RS n° 898, 2; Doucet, Supplement, n° 1348a.
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JEAN-FRANCOIS
GENEST
Utrum Deus possit creare corpus infinitum. Quod non, quia nee potest creare corpus infinitum secundum quid . . . Expl.: volunt sed nequeunt. Explicit determinatio vyadvaldius (! Bradwardini) etc. L'attribution a Bradwardine laissa sceptique Brian Fleming, qui pour la lecture de ce manuscrit a Pecriture difficile ne disposait que d'un microfilm mediocre. II remarqua neanmoins que la question sur Pinfini s'achevait au f. 75v, comme 1'avait deja signale Marshall Clagett, et que le passage devait done comprendre plusieurs questions.58 C'est bien, en eflfet, ce que revele un examen attentif du manuscrit. Les f. 74—75v sont occupes par une question sur Pinfini cree: Utrum Deus possit creare corpus infinitum. Quod non, quia nee potest creare corpus infinitum secundum quid . . .; des. quia minus majore specie potest intendi ad A intensionem majoris. La question comprend six conclusions: Nul corps n'est, ni ne peut etre infmi (1° ni secundum quid, 2° ni a plus forte raison simpliciter). 3°, 4° et 5° Nulle multitude d'entites existantes ne peut etre infinie. 6° Dans Pordre de la qualite ou de Pintensite, il ne peut y avoir d'infini.59 Ce texte pourrait bien etre de Bradwardine: il ressemble, en plus bref mais en plus methodique, a la question de infinite du ms. BnF lat. 15805 et, surtout, on y retrouve a Pappui de la troisieme conclusion (f. 74vb) le paradoxe des hommes couronnes.60 A la suite se trouve une determination sur les futurs contingents (f. 76ra-79vb), accompagnee du nom de Pauteur:
58
140.
B. Fleming, Thomas de Bradwardine, 142-143; M. Clagett in Manuscripta, 2 (1958),
59 Concl. 1: "Nullum corpus est vel esse possit infinitum secundum quid . . . " Concl. 2: "Quod nullum corpus sit vel esse possit infinitum simpliciter." Concl. 3: "Nullus numerus aliquorum per se existentium recto ordine vel recta linea positorum est infinitus secundum quid." Concl. 4: "Nullus numerus aliquorum per se existentium ... est infinitus simpliciter." Concl. 5: "Nullus numerus aliquorum per se existentium ... est infinitus". Concl. 6: "Nihil potest esse infinitum qualitative vel intensive" (f. 74ra). 60 "Tertia conclusio . . . probatur sic. Quia si posset esse talis numerus, ponatur quod sint infiniti homines positi versus orientem et habeat unusquisque coronam in capite. Tune sic: numerus coronarum est equalis multitudini hominum, quia cuilibet homini correspondet una corona. Et tamen quod una multitudo sit major alia multitudine in infinitis, probo: quia ponantur singule corone coram singulis hominibus, et accipiat tune primus homo secundam coronam, et secundus homo quartam coronam, et tertius sextam, et sic in infinitum . . . Tune sic: ... multitudo coronarum existentium in capitibus humanis est equalis multitudini hominum, quia cuilibet correspondet una corona, et tot sunt unitates in uno numero quot in reliquo, et adhuc remanent tot corone non accepte quot accepte." (f. 74vb).
LES PREMIERS ECRITS THEOLOGIQUES DE BRADWARDINE
415
Circa necessitatem futurorum contingentium premittuntur due suppositiones. . .; des. volunt sed nequeunt. Explicit determinatio Vyadvaldius etc. Vu le contenu du texte, "Vyadvaldius" est manifestement une deformation du nom de Bradwardine ("Bradvaldus"), d'ailleurs facile a expliquer paleographiquement.61 Le plan de la question est radicalement different de celui du De futuris contingentibus. On peut y distinguer deux parties. La premiere (f. 76ra—77ra) comprend deux presupposes (suppositiones) suivis d'une vingtaine de conclusions, dont chacune donne lieu a une breve demonstration. Les presupposes sont tres exactement ceux sur lesquels s'ouvrira le De causa Dei: Circa necessitatem futurorum contingentium premittuntur due suppositiones: prima quod Deus est ita perfectus quod perfectior esse non potest; secunda quod in entibus ordinatis non est processus in infinitum. (Cf. DCD, I, 1). Quant aux conclusions, on constate, non sans surprise, qu'elles correspondent presque toutes aux titres des principaux chapitres du livre Ier du De causa Dei ou de leurs subdivisions: Determinatio
De causa Dei
[76ra] Istis suppositis, ponuntur quatuor conclusiones, quarum prima est hec: Deus est omnium entium necessarius conservator. Item secunda est hec: quod nulla res creata sufficit aliam rem creatarn conservare. Tertia, quod Deus immediate conservat omnia.
Quod Deus est omnium aliorum necessarius conservator. Habet corollarium habens tres partes. (I, 2) Quod nulla res creata sufficit aliam conservare (ibid., corollarii pars 1). Quod necesse est Deum per se et immediate servare quamlibet creaturam (ibid., coroll. pars 2). Quarta, quod Deus immediatius Quod necesse est Deum servare conservat res creatas quam una res quamlibet creaturam immediatius creata conservat aliam rem crea- quacunque causa creata (ibid., tam. coroll. pars 3). [76rb] Quatuor alie conclusiones probande sunt: 51 Le copiste a pris la hampe du b, sans doute legerement inclinee a gauche dans le modele, pour le premier jambage d'un v, et il a vu un y dans le r fourchu et plongeant sous la ligne des ecritures anglaises de 1'epoque. La forme "Bravaldus" est attestee dans un manuscrit perdu de Citeaux (DFC, 273-274, n. 113 et 115).
416
JEAN-FRANgOIS GENEST
Prima, quod Deus est necessaria causa efficiens omnium, sic scilicet quod est causa necessario requisita ad producendum quemcumque effectum. Alia conclusio, quod nulla creatura sufficit aliam creaturam producere. Tertia conclusio, quod Deus est immediata causa cujuslibet effectus. Quarta, quod Deus est immediatior causa cujuslibet effectus quam aliqua creatura. Alie quatuor conclusiones sunt iste: Prima, quod Deus est necessarius motor omnium mobilium. Secunda, quod nulla creatura sufficit aliam creaturam movere. Tertia, quod Deus est immediatus motor, et [76va] quarta quod Deus immediatius movet quam creatura. Alia conclusio, quod est omnino immobilis. Alia conclusio, quod Deus scit omnia. Alia conclusio, quod Deus habet voluntatem respectu omnium. Alia conclusio, quod voluntas Dei est necessaria causa in causando, ad istum intellectum quod, scilicet, non potest impediri. [76vb] Ex dictis sequitur alia conclusio, scilicet quod omnia que evenient, evenient ex providentia Dei. Alia conclusio, quod scita a Deo non sunt causa scientie Dei.
Quod Deus est necessaria causa efficiens cujuslibet rei factae. Habet corollarium habens tres partes. (I, 3).
Quod nulla res potest aliquid facere sine Deo. (ibid., coroll. 1). Quod nulla res potest aliquid facere, nisi Deus per se et immediate faciat illud idem, (ibid., coroll. 2). Quod nulla res potest aliquid facere, nisi Deus faciat illud idem immediatius quolibet alio faciente. (ibid., coroll. 3). Quod qualibet creatura movente, Deus necessario commovet. Habet corollarium 4 partium. (I, 4). Quod nihil potest quicquam movere sine Deo idem per se et proprie commovente. (ibid., coroll. 1). Quod nihil potest quicquam movere sine Deo idem movente immediatius alio motore quocunque (ibid., coroll. 3). Quod Deus non est mutabilis ullo modo (I, 5). Quod Deus habet distinctam scientiam omnium. (I, 6). Quod Deus habet volutionem et amorem communiter et specialiter ad quaecunque. (I, 8). Quod voluntas divina est universaliter efficax, insuperabilis et necessaria in causando, non impedibilis nee frustrabilis ullo modo. (I, 10). Quod omnia a providentia divina eveniunt. (I, 27). Quod res scitae non sunt causae divinae scientiae. (I, 15).
LES PREMIERS EGRITS THEOLOGICWES DE BRADWARDINE
Alia conclusio, quod futurorum scientia non est in Deo nisi per suam voluntatem. [77ra] Alia conclusio, quod Deus est necessarius efTector omnis voluntatis vel volutionis create.
417
[Cf. I, 18].
Quod cujuslibet actus voluntatis creatae Deus est necessarius coeffector. (II, 20).
La suite de la question, presque deux fois plus longue car elle touche au coeur du sujet (f. 77rb~79vb), ne comprend qu'un nombre restreint de conclusions, mais cette fois c'est aux premiers chapitres du livre III qu'elles correspondent: [77rb] "Alie conclusiones sunt iste: Una, quod Deus potest necessitare voluntatem creatam ad actum suum. (DCD, III, 1). Alia, quod Deus de facto necessitat voluntatem ad actum suum liberum et ad omnem actum. (DCD, III, 2). Tertia, quod evenient de necessitate precedente omnia." (cf. DCD, III, 3-11 passim). "Alia conclusio, quod necessitas et libertas stant simul. (cf. DCD III, 10-11) Alia conclusio, quod scilicet meritum et demeritum stant cum necessitate." (ibid.}
La demonstration de ces conclusions et les reponses aux objections forment I'essentiel du developpement, ou apparait dans sa forme achevee la definition bradwardinienne de la necessite precedente: Necessitas precedens naturaliter est causa talis qua posita cum omnibus circumstantiis naturaliter requisitis ad causandum effectum, necessario sequitur ilium effectum produci. (f. 77va).
A parcourir les premieres lignes du texte, on se croirait devant une compilation du De causa Dei, mais une lecture suivie montre tres vite qu'il n'en est rien. L'intitule final indique qu'il s'agit d'une determinatio au sens strict du terme, c'est-a-dire d'une question disputee proposee et tranchee par un maitre, et c'est bien ce qui ressort de 1'examen du contenu. Le texte a tous les caracteres d'une reportatio: le redacteur substitue souvent "arguit" a "arguitur", "dicit" a "dicitur"; il note 1'insistance de 1'orateur sur tel ou tel argument: "Preterea et illud ponderat" (f. 77vb, 78vb); parfois meme il se fait temoin de la dispute: "Secunda ratio fuit hec . . .", "Preterea arguebat sic iste magister . . . Dixit iste respondendo ad illud argumentum . . ." (f. 79ra). Un long excursus de physique ("ponatur quod aliqua caliditas intendatur per horam . . ."), occasionne par une objection, n'a aucun
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GENEST
repondant dans le De causa Dei. Enfin, il existe une preuve decisive que cette determination est anterieure a 1344 et que, sous la forme meme ou elle se presente, elle a bien Bradwardine pour auteur direct, comme raffirme le manuscrit: c'est que ce texte est precisement celui que visent Buckingham et Langeley quand ils attaquent Bradwardine. En effet, quoique Buckingham s'attache plutot au sens des arguments de Bradwardine qu'a leur litteralite, certains passages montrent clairement qu'il se refere a la determinatio de son ancien maitre: Buckingham, Lectura
Bradwardine, Determinatio
Contingens ad utrumlibet est effectus proveniens ex causa qua posita cum omnibus circumstantiis necessario requisitis . . . cum quibus producit effectum, non sequitur effectum produci. (Ed. cit, fol. f v, v°) Ad idem arguo sic ... Deus potest necessitare voluntatem ad actum liberum, quia aliter Deus non esset omnipotens. (fol. f vii).
Gontingens ad utrumlibet est effectus proveniens a causa qua posita cum omnibus circumstantiis naturaliter precedentibus <cum quibus> ilia causa producit effectum, non necessario producitur effectus ille. (f. 77va). Quod Deus potest necessitare voluntatem, etc., probatur sic: quia si non posset, sequitur quod non esset omnipotens. (f. 77rb).
On savait que Buckingham avait attaque Bradwardine des sa lecture des Sentences, mais on ignorait quel texte de son ancien maitre il visait precisement. On dispose maintenant de ce texte. Ainsi se trouvent eclaircies les conditions dans lesquelles s'est deroule le premier acte de la polemique entre les deux hommes. Le second acte aura lieu quelques annees plus tard, au moment de la publication du De causa Dei (1344), centre lequel Buckingham dirigera cette fois sa propre determinatio magistrale lors de son inceptio. Quant a Langeley, il est manifeste que les multiples citations de Bradwardine contenues dans la question 8 de sa lectura, "Utrum ex Dei ordinatione et prescientia sequatur quod omnia futura necessario eveniant" (Vat. lat. 13002, f. 194rb-199va) ont ete prises dans la determinatio. En voici quelques echantillons; il serait facile d'allonger la liste. Langeley, Lectura
Bradwardine, Determinatio
Probatur quod Deus potest necessitare voluntatem creatam ad actum suum liberum, quia aliter non esset omnipotens. Probatur consequentia, quia ponatur quod
Quod Deus potest necessitare voluntatem, etc., probatur sic: quia si non posset, sequitur quod non esset omnipotens. Consequentia patet, quia ponatur quod Deus
LES PREMIERS EGRITS THEOLOGIQUES DE BRADWARDINE
Deus faciat quantum possit et vellet quod voluntas produceret actum suum liberum. Aut igitur voluntas potest facere quod non sit, aut non. Si non, propositum. Si sic, igitur potest frustrare Dei voluntatem. (f. 198ra). Aliter probatur quod de facto Deus necessitat voluntatem ad actus suos liberos, non necessitate que excludit liberum arbitrium, sed necessitate precedente naturaliter proveniente a causis superioribus. (f. 198rb).
Aliter arguit sic: servare honorem suum cadit sub omnipotentia Dei, igitur potest necessitare voluntatem creatam ad actum suum. Consequentia patet, quia <esset> contra honorem suum quod de nobilissimis creaturis, scilicet habentibus liberum arbitrium, non posset disponere sicut sibi placet; igitur. (f. 198rb).
419
faceret quantum posset et vellet efficere quod voluntas produceret actum . . . Vel igitur voluntas potest facere quod non sit, vel non. Si non potest, sequitur quod necessitatur ad ilium actum liberum. Si potest in oppositum, igitur potest frustrare Dei voluntatem (f. 77rb). Alia conclusio quod de facto Deus necessitat voluntatem ad actus suos liberos, non tali necessitate que excludit liberum arbitrium, sed necessitate precedente, secundum quam necessitatem omnia que evenient, evenient de necessitate precedente naturaliter et proveniente a causis superioribus . . . (f. 77va). Preterea servare honorem suum cadit sub omnipotentia Dei. Sed si non posset isto modo necessitare voluntatem, esset contra honorem suum. Probatur: quia de nobilissimis creaturis, scilicet habentibus libertatem arbitrii, non posset disponere sicut sibi placet, (f. 77rb).
De toute evidence, Langeley avait par-devers lui une copie de cette question de Bradwardine quand il a redige sa lecture des Sentences. Ce n'est sans doute pas par hasard que les deux textes se trouvent reunis dans un seul et meme manuscrit, le Vat. lat. 13002, recueil encore mal explore, mais qui reflete les interets intellectuels du stadium franciscain d'Oxford dans le second quart du XIVe siecle.62 La question est qualifiee de determinatio: c'est done un acte magistral et il n'y a aucune raison d'en douter, puisque dans le cours de la dispute le reportator donne a 1'auteur le titre de magister. Par consequent elle a ete soutenue par Bradwardine lors de sa regence a Oxford, c'est-a-dire, si la chronologic proposee plus haut est exacte, au cours de 1'une des deux annees academiques 1338-1339 ou 1339-1340.
62
Courtenay, 'Alexander Langeley', 104.
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JEAN-FRANC; OIS GENEST
Son importance est considerable. Elle montre d'abord Pinteret persistant que Bradwardine portait au probleme des futurs contingents, sujet aprement discute a Pepoque, mais aussi point sensible de sa doctrine, constamment attaque et sur lequel il estimait necessaire de revenir. Elle temoigne aussi du progres de sa pensee, au moins dans sa mise en forme et peut-etre aussi sur le fond. C'est en tout cas, dans Petat actuel de notre documentation, le premier texte emanant de lui ou apparaisse Fexpression "necessite precedente" accompagnee de la definition specifique que Bradwardine lui donne; elle sera reprise sans modification dans le De causa Dei. Plus frappante encore est la construction de la question. En effet, le libelle et Penchamement des vingt premieres conclusions annoncent deja le plan du livre Ier du De causa Dei. D'autre part, la discussion qui vient ensuite sur la necessite des futurs et qui constitue la partie la plus dense de la determinatio sera reprise et amplifiee dans les onze premiers chapitres du livre III, tandis que le De futuris contingentibus servira de trame au reste du meme livre (chapitres 12 a 52): ainsi s'expliquent la suture assez maladroite entre les deux parties de ce livre et 1'existence de certains doublets.63 Du meme coup, le concept de necessite precedente domine toute la discussion, tandis que 1'opposition entre potentia absoluta et potentia ordinata, qui fournissait la cle du De futuris contingentibus, n'apparait pas ici.64 Enfin, d'un point de vue purement formel, cette question offre un interet particulier. On s'est interroge recemment sur le sens et 1'origine de la structure hypothetico-deductive qui donne au De causa Dei une physionomie singuliere;65 or cette methode "geometrique" est deja a 1'ceuvre dans la determinatio, mais sous une forme a la fois plus simple et plus lisible en raison du nombre limite de conclusions et de la relative brievete du texte; elle parait ainsi s'enraciner, mieux qu'on ne 1'aurait cru au premier abord, dans les methodes d'argumentation courantes a 1'epoque. Ces breves remarques definissent un programme de recherches plutot qu'une conclusion.66 II suffira de noter pour le moment les principaux resultats de cette enquete: 1° Une partie de Penseigne63
Cf. Predetermination et liberte creee, 24. Mais on la retrouvera dans le De causa Dei (III, 52). 65 M. Sbrozi, 'Metodo matematico e pensiero teologico nel De causa Dei di Thomas Bradwardine", in Studi medievali, 31 (1990), 143-191. Cf. A. D. Conti in G. D'Onofrio (ed.), Storia della teologia nel Medioevo, III, La teologia delle scuole (Casale Monferrato, 1996), 656-660. 66 Nous esperons y revenir en publiant prochainement le texte de la determinatio. 64
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ment donne par Bradwardine alors qu'il etait bachelier en theolo gie (1332-1334) nous a ete transmise par la collection de questions inedites qui occupe aujourd'hui les f. 40ra-49vb du ms. lat. 15805 de la BnF. Le De futuris contingentibus se rattache a cet ensemble, qui pourrait etre une partie de sa lecture des Sentences. 2° La plupart des themes anti-pelagiens qui seront developpes dans le De causa Dei sont deja presents dans ces questions. 3° Un texte au moins nous est parvenu de la periode ou Bradwardine enseignait comme regent (1338-1340): c'est une determination magistrale, egalement inedite, sur les futurs contingents (Vat. lat. 13002, f. f. 76ra~79vb). 4° Ge texte a eu un retentissement certain. On y reconnait 1'oeuvre a laquelle devaient se referer, aux alentours de 1340, quelques-uns de ses opposants les plus resolus, comme Buckingham et Langeley. 5° Par sa structure et son contenu, cette determinatio prefigure deja le livre Ier du De causa Dei, ainsi que le debut du livre III. Les historiens disposent done aujourd'hui de documents nouveaux pour retracer la genese de ce grand ouvrage.
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OTHER CENTRES
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SENTENCES
COMMENTARIES OF THE LATER FOURTEENTH CENTURY
Paul J. J. M. Bakker and Chris Schabel
1. Introduction
The second half of the fourteenth century is among the less studied periods in the historiography of medieval theology.1 As a consequence, very little is known about the developments of the commentary tradition on Peter Lombard's Sentences in the years between 1 Journal titles are abbreviated according to the scheme given above, p. 4In. The most important recent studies on the history of theology in the second half of the fourteenth century are the following: W. J. Courtenay, Adam Wodeham. An Introduction to his Life and Writings (Leiden, 1978) (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, 21), 137-52 (concerning Paris, 1349-1400, from the viewpoint of the reception of Wodeham's Sentences commentary), Id., Schools and Scholars in FourteenthCentury England (Princeton, New Jersey, 1987), 338-48 and 359-65 (concerning Oxford, 1350-1400) and Id., 'Theology and Theologians from Ockham to Wyclif, in J. I. Catto and R. Evans, eds., The History of the University of Oxford, vol. 2, Late Medieval Oxford (Oxford, 1992) (The History of the University of Oxford, 2), 1-34; D. Trapp, 'Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth Century. Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions and Book-Lore', Augustiniana, 6 (1956), 146-274. Of paramount importance are the contributions by V. Marcolino on Angelus of Rome, Conrad of Ebrach, Dionysius of Montina, Stephen Gaudet and Simon of Cremona, in W. Eckermann, Schwerpunkte und Wirkungen des Sentenzenkommentars Hugolins von Owieto O.E.SA. (Wiirzburg, 1990) (Cassiciacum, 42), 323-52, 353-65, 377-414, 415-30 and 431-66. The more specific studies by Z. Kaluza, 'L'ceuvre theologique de Richard Brinkley, O.F.M.', AHDLMA, 56 (1989), 169-273, and M. J. F. M. Hoenen, Marsilius of Inghen. Divine Knowledge in Late Medieval Thought (Leiden, New York, Koln, 1993) (Studies in the History of Christian Thought, 50), contain important information on the developments in theology during this period. Studies on individual Sentences commentaries from this period include, for Augustinians: D. Trapp, 'Angelus de Dobelin, Doctor Parisiensis, and His Lectura', Augustinianum, 3 (1963), 389-413 (Paris 1374-75); Id., 'Simon de Cremona, OESA Lectura super 4 II. Sententiarum MS Cremona 118 ff. lr-136v', Augustinianum, 4 (1964), 123-46 (Paris 1365). For Franciscans, K. H. Tachau, 'French Theology in the Mid-Fourteenth Century: Vatican Latin 986 and Wroclaw, Milich F. 64', AHDLMA, 51 (1984), 41-80. Unfortunately, the recent Storia della Teologia nel Medioevo, ed. G. d'Onofrio, vol. 3 (Casale Monferrato, 1996), contains very little information on the post-1344 period.—Among the older studies, the works by F. Ehrle, Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia des Pisaner Papstes Alexanders V. Ein Beitrag zur Scheulung der Schulen in der Scholastik des 14. Jahrhunderts und zur Geschichte des Wegestreites (Miinster, 1925) (Franziskanische Studien, Beihefte, 9) and A. Lang, Die Wege der Glaubensbegrundung bei den Scholastikern des 14. Jahrhunderts
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the lectures of Gregory of Rimini (1344 45) and the Great Schism (1378—1417). What we do know, however, is that Sentences commentaries continued to be the most important vehicles of theological doctrine in this era, at least in Paris and at the newly founded universities of Central Europe.2 In the existing scholarly literature on late fourteenth century Sentences commentaries, the following five features are regularly mentioned in order to characterize these works. First, the emphasis, sometimes overwhelming, is placed on Peter Lombard's book I (and to a lesser extent on book II). Second, the size and the formal structure of the commentaries change: as a rule, post-1344 commentaries are considerably shorter than pre-1344 commentaries, and they tend to ask a few large questions rather than a great number of shorter ones. This seems to imply that post-1344 commentaries are generally more "specialized," whereas pre-1344 commentaries are more "encyclopedic." The third feature is the influx of English theological doctrines from Oxford's Golden Age between William of Ockham (1317-19) and the Black Death (1348-49). The fourth characteristic is the greater frequency of explicit and detailed citations of other scholastics, either in the margins or in the text itself. The fifth feature is the widespread tendency to copy verbatim or to paraphrase passages of one or more previous commentaries with or without attribution. Finally, with the exception of this fifth attribute, it has been claimed with some justification that all of these common features of later fourteenth century Sentences commentaries, and not simply the third, owe something to Oxford works from the Golden Age.3 The first feature (the emphasis placed on book I) can be observed in virtually every commentary from the second half of the fourteenth century, and indeed both Pope Gregory XI and Jean Gerson criti-
(Miinster, 1930) (Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophic des Mittelalters, 30/1-2) are still very useful.—Two important theological issues from the second half of the fourteenth century are relatively well studied, namely ecclesiology (with respect to the Great Schism) and the controversy over the Immaculate Conception; for both issues, see the study of B. Guenee, Entre I'Eglise et I'Etat. Quatre vies de prelats franfais a la Jin du Moyen Age (XIIIe~XVe siecle) (Paris, 1987) (Bibliotheque des Histoires), and in English, Between Church and State: the Lives of Four French Prelates in the Late Middle Ages, trans. A. Goldhammer (Chicago, 1991). 2 However, a quantitative decline in the number of Sentences commentaries emerging from the University of Oxford in the years after 1360 has been shown by Courtenay, e.g. Schools and Scholars, 359-61. 3 See Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, 251^64.
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cized the neglect of the other books.4 The extreme emphasis on book I can already be noticed in Oxford commentaries from the 1320s, but even at Paris book I had been privileged before, and in some significant cases only book I of a theologian's commentary survives.3 Given the prominence of book I (at least in a quantitative sense), it is not surprising that the vast majority of historians of later medieval theology have concentrated their attention almost exclusively on this part of the commentary tradition on the Sentences. More surprisingly, the results of their inquiries are generally supposed to hold, not only for book I, but also for books II, III, and IV. Against this background, our aim is to evaluate the above mentioned features two, three, four, and five from the perspective of our research into the
4 For a statute that Gregory imposed on the University of Paris, see Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. A. Denifle and H. Chatelain, vol. 2 (Paris, 1891), n. 1189, § 37, p. 700: "Rursus statuimus ne sic super prologum et primum Sententiarum insistant, quin possint debite tractare materias secundi, tertii et quarti Sententiarum ad distinctiones pertinentes." Cf. a letter by Jean Gerson from April 1, 1400 (ed. P. Glorieux [Paris, 1960] [CEuvres completes, 2], 27-8): "Item monendi viderentur magistri nostri, specialiter qui dederunt occasionem, quatenus suos baccalaureos et scolares monerent fugere aut dimittere vanissimas doctrinas, inutiles et steriles, nec approbando, nec morose aut curiose reprobando sicut jam, Deo propitio, sophismata fere sunt expulsa a theologia; et quod materiae secundi, tertii et quarti Sententiarum magis tractarentur, quia vix legitur nisi primus, occupando tempus in praemissis doctrinis." Gerson's letter was written to Peter of Orgemont, and not to Pierre d'Ailly as Glorieux thought; see A. Combes, Essai sur la critique de Ruysbroeck par Gerson, vol. 4 (Paris, 1972), 240—3. Examples of later commentaries focusing on book I include Henry Totting of Oyta's Quaestiones Sententiarum which consist of 13 questions relating in the following manner to the four books of Peter Lombard: 10, 1, 1, 1; see A. Lang, Heinrich Totting von Oyta. Ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte der ersten deutschen Universitdten und zur Problemgeschichte der Spdtscholastik (Miinster, 1937) (Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 33/4-5), 70—72; A. Maieru has edited q. 8, a. 2, in 'Logica aristotelica e teologia trinitaria. Enrico Totting da Oyta', in Id. and A. Paravicini Bagliani, eds., Studi sul XIV secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier (Rome, 1981), 496—512. Pierre d'Ailly, not including principia, has 21 questions split thus: 14, 0 (!), 1, 6 (ed. Paris, s.a.). The commentary of Alphonsus Vargas of Toledo (OESA) on book I, with 50 questions, is apparently the only one to survive (ed. Venice, 1490; reprint New York, 1952 [Cassiciacum, American Studies, 2]). Less striking are Michael Aiguani's and Marsilius of Inghen's commentaries: Aiguani (OCarm) asks 135 questions distributed as follows: 51, 22, 15, 47 (ed. Venice, 1622). Marsilius's consists of 99 questions divided as follows: 47, 24, 15, 13; see M. J. F. M. Hoenen's contribution to the present volume. The quantitative importance given to book I of the Sentences was also noticed by P. Glorieux, 'L'enseignement au Moyen Age. Techniques et methodes en usage a la Faculte de Theologie de Paris, au XIIP siecle', AHDLMA, 35 (1968), 65-168, esp. 116-17. D For the earlier Oxford commentaries, see Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, 256. For Paris, Meyronnes, Auriol, Odonis, and many others demonstrate the focus on book I, and for Peter Thomae and Peter of Navarre, for example, book I is all we have.
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commentary tradition on Peter Lombard's book I (Schabel) and book IV (Bakker).6
2. The Structure of the Commentaries
Most scholars agree that post-1344 Sentences commentaries are generally shorter than pre-1344 commentaries, and that they tend to abandon the traditional distinctiones structure of Peter Lombard's work, asking a few large quaestiones instead of a great number of smaller ones. This development can also be observed in Oxford commentaries from the 1320s-30s, which are often shorter than contemporary commentaries from Paris, and in which the link with Peter Lombard's distinctions is getting more and more loose.7 Even in Paris, however, one can see a similar desire to treat fewer topics accomplished by different methods: Francis of Marchia, for example, devoted three consecutive distinctiones to the issue of divine foreknowledge, although Lombard had treated several other problems in those same distinctions. Concerning post-1344 commentaries, it is
6 Our observations concerning book I are mainly based on the sections on divine foreknowledge and future contingents; see C. Schabel, The Quarrel with Aureol: Peter Aureol's Role in the Late-Medieval Debate over Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents, 1315-1475, Ph.D. thesis (University of Iowa, 1994). Our observations concerning book IV are principally based on the sections on the Eucharist; see P. J. J. M. Bakker, La raison et le miracle. Les doctrines eucharistiques (c. 1250-c. 1400). Contribution a I'etude des rapports entre philosophic et theologie, Ph.D. thesis (Nijmegen, 1999). 7 For the distinctiones structure of Peter Lombard's work, see I. Brady, 'The Distinctions of Lombard's Book of Sentences and Alexander of Hales', Franciscan Studies, 25 (1965), 90—116, and the Prolegomena to Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, vol. I/I (Grottaferrata, 1971) (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 4), 143*-4*.— For the size of Oxford commentaries from the 1320s—30s, see Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, 253. For example, the Sentences commentary of Richard FitzRalph consists of 25 questions (see G. Leff, Richard FitzRalph, Commentator of the Sentences. A Study in Theological Orthodoxy [Manchester, 1963], 194-7); that of the Dominican Robert Holcot, 19 questions (In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones [ed. Lyon, 1518, repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1967], fols. ii-iv); that of the Carmelite Osbert Pickingham, 20 questions (see B. M. Xiberta, De scriptoribus scholasticis saeculi XIV ex ordine Carmelitarum [Louvain, 1931] [Bibliotheque de la revue d'histoire ecclesiastique, 6], 247—50); that of the Franciscan Roger Rosetus a mere five questions (see O. Hallamaa, 'The Lectura super Sententias of Roger Roseth, OFM', in A. Cacciotti and B. Faes de Mottoni, eds., Editori di Quaracchi 100 anni dopo. Bilancio e prospettive [Rome, 1997], 239—43).—The diminished size of commentaries may be due to the reduced period of lecturing on the Sentences (one year instead of two); see Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, 42.
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indeed true that most of them adopt a question structure, and that they usually organize their material in a relatively limited number of questions.8 However, this does not always imply a reduction in size. The commentaries of, e.g., the Cistercian James of Eltville (f 1393), the Franciscan Peter of Candia (f 1410), the Carmelite Francis Bacon ( 1372), and the secular theologian Marsilius of Inghen (f 1396) are indeed very extensive, considerably more so than Oxford commentaries from the first half of the fourteenth century. Moreover, in post-1344 commentaries, the organization in a small number of large questions is often merely a surface structure. Beneath this surface structure may He a far more complex organization, which leaves space for a number of smaller questions and sometimes for a classical expositio textus. As a result, post-1344 commentaries may treat roughly the same variety of questions as pre-1344 commentaries, but in a different way. Whereas in pre-1344 commentaries most of the problems treated appear on the surface of the text either as a separate question or as a distinct article, in post-1344 commentaries an important part of the treated problems is more or less hidden within large questions. There are at least four different ways in which various "minor" problems can be inserted into one single "major" question. First, some commentators use the traditional method of subdividing each question into a series of articles.9 Second, in other commentaries, which follow a practice that had earlier origins, the so-called
8 It should be noted here that one of the rare expositio commentaries of the late fourteenth century, Oyta's Lectura textualis super libros Sententiarum (Prague 1369-71), follows in fact a double procedure. That is, within each distinctio, Oyta divides his commentary in two parts, first a "divisio textus" which consists of a very brief schematical outline of the commented text followed by some explicative notes, and second a series of very short questions. These questions sometimes adopt the classical tripartite structure of arguments quod sic /quod non and in contrarium, a determination, and a reply to the rejected arguments. More often, however, they are introduced by a formula such as "Dubitatur utrum . . .," "Diceres . . .," or "Sed nunquid . . .," followed immediately by the answer. 9 This procedure was followed by some Prague commentators, e.g. Menso of Beckhusen and Conrad of Soltau; see Bakker, La raison et le miracle, II: 139-40 and 151-64. For the former, see M. Markowski, 'Poglady filozoficzne Andrzeja z Kokorzyna', Studio Mediewistyczne, 6 (1964), 55-136, esp. 59, n. 28. For the latter, see H.-J. Brandt, 'Universitat, Gesellschaft, Politik und Pfriinden am Beispiel Konrad von Soltau (| 1407)', The Universities in the Late Middle Ages, J. IJsewijn and J. Paquet, eds., (Louvain, 1978) (Mediaevalia Lovaniensia, 1/6), 614-27, and Id., 'Konrad von Soltau', New Deutsche Biographie 12 (Berlin, 1980), 531b-2b. Both Menso and Conrad depend heavily, though in differents ways, on the Sentences commentary of the Augustinian Thomas of Strasbourg; see below.
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"conclusiones" and "corollaria" are used to introduce new topics, which do not necessarily have anything to do with the main topic of the question.10 Third, a commentator may insert a new problem in an almost concealed way, by formulating subordinated questions introduced by expressions such as "Sed nunquid . . ." or "Diceres . . ."H Fourth, a commentator may put in a series of dubia}"1 By using one or more of these methods, most of the post-1344 commentaries accomplish a sort of hierarchisation of the treated problems rather
10 This can be observed in John Hiltalingen of Basel's Sentences commentary (Paris 1365-66). Hiltalingen proceeds "more geometrico" often with three corollaria per question subdivided by three conclusiones each; see Bakker, La raison et le miracle, II: 37-40; and Schabel, The Quarrel with Aureol, II: 798-807, with an edition of book I, dd. 38-39. For Hiltalingen's life and works, see D. Trapp, 'Hiltalinger's Augustinian Quotations', Augustiniana, 4 (1954), 412-49; Id., 'Augustinian Theology', 242-50; A. Zumkeller, 'Die Augustinerschule des Mittelalters. Vertreter und philosophischtheologische Lehre', Analecta Augustiniana, 27 (1964), 167-262, esp. 231-3; Id., 'Der Augustinertheologe Johannes Hiltalingen von Basel ("f 1392) liber Urstand, Erbsiinde, Gnade und Verdienst', Analecta Augustiniana, 43 (1980), 57-162. The critical edition of Hiltalingen's commentary has been under preparation for decades; V. Marcolino is currently in charge. The relation between Hiltalingen and the English Franciscan Richard Brinkley has been studied in detail by Kaluza, 'L'oeuvre theologique de Richard Brinkley', 196-212. Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, 141, n. 70, has observed that the dating of Hiltalingen's commentary by Trapp and Zumkeller (Paris 1365—66) is not without problems. For Hiltalingen cites Conrad of Ebrach, whose bachelor lectures were given at Bologna in 1368—69. Furthermore, Hiltalingen cites John of Braculis, who read at Paris in 1370-71. Finally, another Augustinian, Simon of Cremona, read at Paris in 1365-66. In the end, Courtenay maintains Trapp's and Zumkeller's dating, while suggesting the possibility that Hiltalingen's commentary was revised and expanded around 1375.—With regards to the so-called "conclusiones," it should be noted here that they are not conclusions in the familiar sense of final propositions of a syllogistic argument, but rather theorems put forward to be further developed (by the so-called "corollaria"), demonstrated (by "probationes"), and tested (by "dubia" or "dubitationes"). Indeed, they can even be mere divisions of the question. According to W. J. Courtenay, Covenant and Causality in Medieval Thought. Studies in Philosophy, Theology and Economic Practice (London, 1984) (Variorum reprints), Villa, 224-56, esp. 243, n. 46, the technique of organizing Sentences commentaries around series of "conclusiones" had its origins in the academic generation of 1315-25; a good example of this is Landulph Caracciolo's Parisian commentary (edition in C. Schabel, 'Landulphus Caracciolo and a Sequax on Divine Foreknowledge', AHDLMA, 66 [1999], 299-343). After 1340, the vast majority of Sentences commentaries use this technique. 11 This procedure was used by Henri Totting of Oyta in his Lectura textualis and very abundantly by Francis Bacon (Paris 1364-65); see Bakker, La raison et le miracle, II: 93-94 and 197-225. For Bacon, see Xiberta, De scriptoribus scholasticis, 241-84. 12 This procedure was used by Marsilius of Inghen; see Bakker, La raison et le miracle, II: 263-301.
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than a genuine reduction, as seems to be the case in the Oxford commentaries of the first half of the fourteenth century.
3. The, Influence of English Theology As we have seen, although English theologians from Oxford's Golden Age had little impact on their continental contemporaries, beginning with Gregory of Rimini these English scholars show up with increasing frequency in Parisian Sentences commentaries, often the objects of "plagiarism." In the case of book IV, insofar as an influence of English authors can be observed, their texts are generally used as sources for objections (and their corresponding answers), not as a source for the condusiones, corollaria, and probationes. Perhaps because of the English emphasis on book I, the role of English doctrines in book IV is very limited. If we look below the surface for book I, however, we find that the new English ideas and emphases themselves penetrated deep into continental theology. With respect to the popular topics in England, prophecy, for example, was a major issue in Oxford treatments of future contingents in the 1330s from Richard FitzRalph onward, but it only comes to play a significant role in Parisian discussions after Rimini, with such figures as Hugolino of Orvieto, who lectured in 1348-49.13 Hugolino also exemplifies the influx of English ideas, for example employing Adam Wodeham's complexe significabile in the same context, referring to the content of God's foreknowledge: what it is, whether it can increase, etc. After Rimini the complexe significabile and the concomitant 'prepositional analysis' found their way into many other issues in Parisian theology, cognition being perhaps the most obvious; thus we see the Oxford discussion between Chatton, Wodeham, and others continued on the continent. To cite a wellknown example, we observe this general application in the Sentences
13 For FitzRalph and prophecy, see J.-F. Genest, 'Contingence et revelation des futurs, la Quaestio Biblica de Richard FitzRalph', in J. Jolivet, Z. Kaluza, and A. de Libera, eds., Lectionum Vanetates, Hommage a Paul Vignaux (1904-1987) (Paris, 1991), 199-246. Hugolino's Sentences commentary has been critically edited: Hugolinus de Urbe Veteri, Commentarius in quattuor libros Sententiarum, 4 vols., ed. W. Eckermann (Wiirzburg, 1980-8) (Cassiciacum, Supplementband 8-11).
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commentary of Andreas de Novocastro, a Franciscan who lectured at Paris in 1358-59.14 Another English or Oxford tendency in theology that found an audience on the continent in the 1340s and afterwards was the employment of mathematical and geometrical "measure language."15 Here the influence of the Oxford Calculators in logic and natural philosophy is felt in theology. For example, procedures used and even the questions asked in these thinkers' treatments of sophismata were adapted with very little modification into Sentences commentaries. In this way, topics like the intension and remission of forms, which already involved questions of the continuum, indivisibles, and the infinite, were wholly given over to these subissues and the theology tended to become a veneer. The Franciscan Roger Rosetus, lecturing at Oxford in the 1330s, presents an excellent example of this trend. Most of his Sentences commentary turns out to be almost pure philosophy.16 The incorporation of Oxford ideas and ways of speaking into Parisian commentaries led some theologians to make ill-sounding statements and to show off their new knowledge, which in turn pro-
14 For Chatton, Wodeham, and the complexe significabile, see above, pp. 372-77, and H. Elie, Le complexe significabile (Paris, 1936). Andreas de Novocastro's commentary on book I was printed in Paris in 1514 and studied into the 17th century. On the commentary, see K. H. Tachau, 'The Quaestiones in primum libmm Sententiarum of Andreas de Novocastro, OFM', AHDLMA, 59 (1992), 289-318, for surviving mss. and a question list. R. Friedman, 'Andreas de Novocastro (fl. 1358) on Divine Omnipotence and the Nature of the Past: I Sentences, Distinction FortyFive, Question Six', Cahiers de I'institut du moyen age grec et latin, 64 (1994), 101-50, presents a critical edition of a text that influenced John Major. See also Andrew of Neufchateau OFM, Questions on an Ethics of Divine Commands, ed. and trans. J. M. Idziak (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1997) (Notre Dame Texts in Medieval Culture, 3), which includes an improved reprint and facing page English translation of d. 48, qq. 1-2, which do not survive in ms. form. 11 On this generally, see especially J. Murdoch, ' Subtilitates Anglicanae in FourteenthCentury Paris: John of Mirecourt and Peter Ceffons', in M. Cosman and B. Chandler, eds., Machaut's World: Science and Art in the Fourteenth Century (New York, 1978), 51-86; and Id., 'From Social into Intellectual Factors: An Aspect of the Unitary Character of Late Medieval Learning', in Id. and E. Sylla, eds., The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning (Dordrecht, Boston, 1975), 271-339 (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 26; Synthese Library, 76). 16 See O. Hallamaa, 'Continuum, Infinity and Analysis in Theology', in J. A. Aertsen and A. Speer, eds., Raum und Raumvorstellung im Mittelalter (Berlin, New York, 1998), 375-88 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 25); and Id., 'On the Borderline between Logic and Theology: Roger Roseth, Sophismata, and Augmentation of Charity', D&S 11 (2000), 351-74.
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voked a conservative reaction and condemnation. To some extent this was Nicholas of Autrecourt's problem. In 1347 he had to retract statements, such as "God and a creature are nothing," which could be interpreted in a harmless way by those who understood Wodeham's use of complexe significabile. Such propositions appeared harmful at first, however, both to the more elderly members of the Parisian scholarly community and, perhaps, to the younger students of theology, whom Autrecourt may have intended to shock. Autrecourt was censured and his writings were burned as a result: his Sentences commentary does not survive. The condemnations annoyed the Cistercian Pierre Ceffons, a socius of Hugolino of Orvieto lecturing at Paris in 1348-49. Ceffons accepted Wodeham's innovation, although he used it more cautiously than had Autrecourt. Thus purged of its danger, or accepted with the passage of time, it became common intellectual property on the continent.17 The desire to show off applies more precisely to the Cistercian John of Mirecourt, who lectured on the Sentences at Paris in 1344-45 along with Alphonsus Vargas, OESA, and Paul of Perugia, OCarm, whose commentaries survive. Mirecourt's commentary was quite popular; all four books survive in a total of about 20 manuscripts. It has been shown, however, that the commentary is sometimes a pastiche of Oxford passages stolen without attribution, an example of the type of "plagiarism" to be discussed below.18 The mere fact that he did this suggests that he was out to impress his audience. He too had trouble with the authorities, for example for defending ill-sounding
17 The story is well-established. See K. H. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Semantics 1250^1345 (Leiden, 1988), 377-83, and Z. Kaluza, Nicolas d'Autrecourt. Ami de la verite (Paris, 1995) (Histoire Litteraire de la France, 42.1). Ceffons' commentary on book I survives in ms. Troyes, Bibliotheque municipale 62. On Ceffons, see D. Trapp, 'Pierre Ceffons of Clairvaux', RTAM, 24 (1957), 101-54, which includes texts. 18 See J.-F. Genest and P. Vignaux, 'La bibliotheque anglaise de Jean de Mirecourt: subtilitas ou plagiat?' in Die Philosophie im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert. In memoriam Konstanty Michalski (1879-1947), O. Pluta, ed. (Amsterdam, 1988) (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie, 10), 275-301. At the moment M. Parodi and L. C. Dominioni are preparing to put the edition of Mirecourt's commentary on the internet. Parodi had been working with the late E. Randi on the project, and had managed to publish book I, qq. 13-16: M. Parodi, 'Questioni inedite tratte dal I libro del commento alle Sentence di Giovanni di Mirecourt (qq. 13—16)', Medioevo, 3 (1977), 237-84, and (Part II), 4 (1978), 59-92. There is also A. Franzinelli, 'Questioni inedite di Giovanni di Mirecourt sulla conoscenza (2-6. L. 1)', Rivista critica di storia Jilosofia, 13 (1958), 319-40 and 415-49.
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propositions that, with confusing uses of modals, appeared to say that humans can make it so that God did not know the future, or that God can undo the past. Mirecourt was forced to retract many propositions, and Gregory of Rimini himself was a member of the committee involved, "three old witches," as Mirecourt's confrere Pierre Ceffons called them. Unlike Autrecourt, Mirecourt was allowed to explain himself in writing and his commentary survived.19 Later theologians would remember these and other condemnations of the years immediately following the influx of the new English ideas, like the condemnations aimed indirectly at the Franciscan John of Ripa, who lectured at Paris around 1350. It is questionable, however, whether they had any longterm suppressive effects.20
4. Citation Practices and the History of Theology: the Historico-Critical Attitude
According to Damasus Trapp, another characteristic of some later fourteenth century Sentences commentaries (at least Augustinian com-
19 For the text of Mirecourt's defense, see F. Stegmuller, 'Die zwei Apologien des Jean de Mirecourt', RTAM, 5 (1933), 40-79, 192-204. For the issue of the modal status of the past in Mirecourt, see W. J. Courtenay, John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini on Whether God Can Undo the Past', RTAM, 39 (1972), 224-56, and 40 (1973), 147-74. 20 Friedman, 'Andreas de Novocastro', 119-28, gives a list of Novocastro's citations of the new condemnations. Not all of the later condemnations at Paris were due to Oxford ideas. In 1362 some 'Scotist' articles of Louis of Padua were condemned, but as later theologians such as John Hiltalingen of Basel recognized, John of Ripa was also thereby implicated. For Ripa's works, in written form from ca. 1355, see Z. Kaluza, 'La nature des ecrits de Jean de Ripa', Traditio, 43 (1987), 257-98, explaining the writings edited by A. Combes: Quaestio de gradu supremo (with P. Vignaux, second part of principium) (Paris, 1964) (Textes philosophiques du moyen age, 12); Lectura super Primum Sententiarum: Prologi quaestiones I et II (Paris, 1961) (Textes philosophiques du moyen age, 8), and Prologi quaestiones ultimae (with F. Ruello) (Paris, 1970) (Textes philosophiques du moyen age, 16); Jean de Ripa, I Sent., dist. XXXVII: De modo inexistendi divine essentie in omnibus creaturis. Presentation de P. Vignaux: Immensite divine et infinit spaciale' (with F. Ruello), Traditio, 23 (1967), 191—267; Conclusiones (Paris, 1957) (Etudes de philosophic medievale, 44); from his period as master, Determinationes (Paris, 1957) (Textes philosophiques du moyen age, 4). Much of book I remains to be edited, although Hermann Schwamm, Magistri loannis de Ripa OFM Doctrina de praesdentia divina. Inquisitio historica (Rome, 1930) (Analecta Gregoriana, 1), offers a detailed analysis of dd. 29, 38—39, and 44-48 with copious quotations. See also F. Ruello, 'Le projet theologique de Jean de Ripa OFM (XIV™ siecle)', Traditio, 49 (1994), 127-70.
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mentaries), connected in some ways to the practice of "plagiarism" discussed in the next section, is the appearance of more frequent, detailed, and accurate citations and quotations of sources from the recent past. The vague "quidam" or "aliqui" was eventually replaced in the text by the name of the scholastic author and the tide and chapter of the work quoted or cited. This had always been the case for patristic authors like Augustine and later authorities like Anselm, but now it is seen for contemporary thinkers, socii, lists of condemned articles, etc. It has been suggested, moreover, that this trend began with such English authors of the 1320s as Walter Chatton, Robert Graystanes, and Adam Wodeham, and reached Paris with Gregory of Rimini, culminating in the works of John Hiltalingen of Basel.21 Both claims, however, must be qualified.22 The example of Peter Auriol's Scriptum on book I, completed in 1316, proves that accurate citations in the text itself can be found in Sentences commentaries even in Paris before Oxford's Golden Age. Another example is the Carmelite John Baconthorpe, who lectured at Paris around 1320. Baconthorpe's citation of Auriol's work in particular approaches modern practice; for example: "In this conclusion Auriol, book one, distinction two, question two, article two, proposition three, appears to agree with me."23 Auriol and Baconthorpe are the exception rather than the rule, however, whereas after 1344 there is a general tendency to provide frequent and detailed citations of modern theologians. If we look at the best of both periods John Hiltalingen of Basel far surpasses Auriol from the perspective of modern scholarship. Although Baconthorpe could match Hiltalingen on occasion, normally he did not, and sometimes the Carmelite lapsed into verbatim copying without attribution. In addition to accuracy in citation, Trapp also showed that Augustinian theologians after Rimini often took an historical approach to
21
See D. Trapp, 'Hiltalinger's Augustinian Quotations', and Id., 'Augustinian Theology'. For the English origin, see Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, 254. 22 The following relies on C. Schabel, lHaec Ilk: Citation, Quotation, and Plagiarism in 14th-Century Scholasticism', in I. Taifacos, ed., The Origins of Modem Scholarship, forthcoming. 23 It should be noted that this citation comes from within the text of the version of Baconthorpe's commentary that survives in manuscript form only (ms. London, British Library, Royal 11 C. VI, f. 105rb). Thus the marginalia of the commentary that survives in printed form can also be attributed to Baconthorpe himself and not to the early modern editor. On Baconthorpe, see above, pp. 252~54.
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their sources. Examples of commentaries from outside the Augustinian order show that this historical attitude was common practice. As we shall see, the secular theologian Pierre d'Ailly's Parisian commentary on book I from lectures of 1376—77 is heavily dependent on Gregory of Rimini's. Nevertheless, d'Ailly's lack of originality in theology does not entail that he entirely lacked historical sense or scholarly integrity; rather he appears to report others' ideas as would an historian. Thus d'Ailly cites Rimini at least a dozen times in question 11, involving divine foreknowledge, and the nature of many of the references reinforces the impression that he is an historian: "As concerns the first [article], it should be known that according to some great doctors, namely William of Ockham and Gregory [of Rimini], Aristotle's opinion in Peri Hermeneias book I ..." "But Gregory wonders how a certain intelligent man thinks that Aristotle did not hold this." "Master Gregory proves this extensively." "Gregory responds to this extremely well." "Gregory fashions many other arguments ..." It would not be difficult for the reader to realize that d'Ailly is presenting the via Gregorii as a commentator or historian would. The commentary of the secular theologian Henry of Langenstein, or of Hesse, most likely stems from Parisian lectures in the 1370's although it was probably put into final form later; it is represented by a sole witness in the context of divine foreknowledge.24 Like d'Ailly, Langenstein is heavily dependent on Rimini in this context, but his method of citation is more exact. Indeed, implicit references in Rimini (which perhaps were in the marginalia) become explicit references in Langenstein's text. Thus in one place where Rimini and Langenstein present a position, Rimini says that a certain doctor argues against it, that another doctor refutes those arguments, and finally that the second doctor is wrong. Langenstein, however, states that the first doctor is Scotus, the second "Auriol in distinction 38, first question," that "Master Gregory [of Rimini] proves that this is no defense," and finally that "Master Gregory's opinion recited in the preceding lecture is not sufficient." His Rimini citations can also be exact: "From
24 Alencon, Bibliotheque de la ville 144. A less complete MS is Vienna, ONE 4319. See M. Shank's "Unless You Believe You Shall Not Understand". Logic, University, and Society in Late Medieval Vienna (Princeton, 1988), esp. 127—9, and R. Damerau's edition of books II—IV from the Vienna MS: Der Sentenzenkommentar des Heinrich von Langenstein. Lateinische textkritische Ausgabe (Marburg, 1979-1980) (Studien zu den Grundlagen der Reformation, 15 and 17).
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this conclusion one could infer against Master Gregory in distinction 38, question two, third article, in the response to the second principal argument. ..." The culmination of the historical approach may come with the Franciscan Peter of Candia, who lectured on the Sentences at Paris in 1378-80; his work survives in dozens of manuscripts.25 Candia's procedure in his treatment of divine foreknowledge is made explicit at the outset: First I shall recite the Philosopher and his Commentator's way along with their reasoning. Second I shall object against it and I will respond to their arguments. Third I shall precede, in [this] second article, according to the ways of doctors of the Faculty of Theology. And fourth, in sure conclusions, the more secure way of speaking will be chosen.
Soon afterwards we are informed that these doctors are Scotus, Auriol, and John of Ripa. Candia's recitation of these former positions is not at all done verbatim or even in paraphrase, but it is very faithful indeed, as he himself suggests: Now it is time to explain God's knowledge with respect to future contingents in accordance with the view of Master John of Ripa, and to explain this I lay down some conclusions. Whether they are true or false I don't much care: I just aim to show his understanding.
When Candia gives arguments against these positions, he usually takes them from the authors themselves, but not verbatim. When,
25 The standard work on Peter of Candia is Ehrle, Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia. Editions of parts of Candia's Sentences commentary include A. Emmen, Tetrus de Candia, O.F.M. De immaculata Deipame conceptione'', in: Tractatus quatuor de immaculata conceptione B. Mariae Virginis (Quaracchi, 1954) (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica, 16), 235-359 (book III, q. unica, a. 2); S. F. Brown, 'Peter of Candia's Sermons in Praise of Peter Lombard', in: Studies Honoring Ignatius Charles Brady, Friar Minor, eds. R. S. Almagno and C. L. Harkins (St. Bonaventure, NY, 1976) (Theology Series, 6), 141-176 (text from convocation sermons); Id., 'Peter of Candia's HundredYear 'History' of the Theologian's Role', Medieval Philosophy and Theology, 1 (1991), 156-190 (q. 1, a. 1 of prologue to book I); Id., 'Peter of Candia on Believing and Knowing', Franciscan Studies, 54 (1994-1997), 251-276 (q. 2, a. 2 of prologue to book I); Id, forthcoming articles on abstractive cognition (from prologue to book I) and eternal creation (from book II); C. Schabel, 'Peter of Candia and the Prelude to the Quarrel at Louvain', Epeterida ton Kentou Epistemonikon Erevnon, 24 (1998), 87-124 (from book I, q. 6, a. 2); and Bakker, La raison et le miracle, II: 231-250 (excerpts from book IV, q. unica). Bakker, La raison et le miracle, I: 422-430, also provides extensive passages from book II, q. 1, a. 2.
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however, there is another source, Candia provides an accurate citation: "Therefore Ockham argues, in the first book On the Sentences, distinction 38 ..." and "I reason with arguments made by Brother Richard Brinkley in the first question of his Lectura ..." In the end Candia attempts to give the "more secure way" in a series of conclusions against these positions, but without really determining the question at all. In fact he concludes by leaving the choice of solution up to the reader. The value of Candia's Sentences commentary, therefore, sometimes lies in his work as historian of theology. Indeed, in the late fifteenth century Peter de Rivo would use it in this way, claiming that Candia presented Auriol's position more clearly than had Auriol himself.
5. The question of "Plagiarism"
This awareness of previous work did not always lead to more accurate citation or an historical approach, however. The pioneering studies of Damasus Trapp also show that the practice of copying verbatim or of paraphrasing passages of one or more previous commentaries, often without attribution, was very widespread in late fourteenth century Sentences commentaries. Trapp referred to this phenomenon by the technical term "lectura secundum alium," thus generalizing current formulas such as, e.g., "respondeo secundum sanctum Triomam" and "dicendum secundum Doctorem Subtilem."26 Concerning these "lecturae secundum alium," three general observations should be made. First, as far as we know, the term "lectura secundum
26 Trapp, 'Augustinian Theology', 250-5. Trapp identified nine authors whose commentaries, in one way or another, fall under the category of "lectura secundum alium": the Cistercians (1) Conrad of Ebrach (secundum Hugolinum [of Orvieto]), (2) Godescalc of Nepomuk (or Pomulcz) (secundum Gregorium [of Rimini]), and (3) James of Eltville (secundum Johannem [Hiltalingen of Basel]), the Augustinians (4) Angelus Dobelin (secundum Klenkok et Hiltalingen), (5) Berthold of Regensburg (secundum Hiltalingen), (6) Dionysius of Montina (secundum Conradum [of Ebrach]), (7) Peter of Gracilis (secundum Hiltalingen], and (8) Simon of Cremona (secundum Hugolinum [of Orvieto]), and finally (9) the commentary secundum Jacobum [of Eltville] read by the secular theologian Henry of Langenstein to the monks of Eberbach.—For some features of medieval plagiarism in general, see J.-F. Genest and P. Vignaux, 'La bibliotheque anglaise de Jean de Mirecourt', and Z. Kaluza, 'Auteur et plagiaire: quelques remarques', in: Was ist Philosophic im Mittelalter?, eds. J. A. Aertsen and A. Speer (Berlin, New York, 1998) (Miscellanea mediaevalia, 26), 312-20.
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alium" is not used as such in any medieval source, but seems to be a neologism formed by Trapp. Moreover, recent scholarship has shown that the phenomenon noticed by Trapp is not proper to late fourteenth century Sentences commentaries, but can also be observed in late thirteenth and early fourteenth century Franciscan and Dominican Sentences commentaries. Indeed, in Parisian commentaries of the 1310s and 1320s, this practice was followed to some extent in perhaps half of the surviving texts, with representatives from each of the four main mendicant orders.27 Second, Trapp's observations, which are almost exclusively based on a study of books I and II of the commentaries concerned, appear not to be applicable without problems to all sections of those books, let alone to books III and jy 28 Third, Trapp merely noticed the fact and the quantitative
27
For some examples of late thirteenth and early fourteenth century "plagiarism," see Bakker, La raison et le miracle, I: 94—116 (James of Metz and Durand of Saint-Pourcain), and II: 8-22 (William de la Mare and Nicholas of Ockham). For the 1310s and 1320s at Paris see Schabel's chapter on Paris in this volume; Id., 'Haec ille', and Id., I. Balcoyiannopoulou, and R. Friedman, 'Peter of Palude and the Parisian Reaction to Durand of St. Pourcain on Future Contingents', Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, forthcoming. V. Marcolino, 'Der Augustinertheologe an der Universitat Paris', in Gregor von Rimini Werk und Wirkung bis zur Reformation, H. A. Oberman, ed. (Berlin, New York, 1981) (Spatmittelalter und Reformation, 20), 127-94, esp. 161, n. 26, suggests that the practice of reading the Sentences "secundum alium" may be a development grown out of a practice of authors from the religious orders in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, namely that of composing "Abbreviationes," which came to be used as manuals in the studio. A similar suggestion has been made by W. J. Courtenay, 'Programs of Study and Genres of Scholastic Theological Production in the Fourteenth Century', in Manuels, programmes de cours et techniques d'enseignement dans les universites medievales, J. Hamesse, ed. (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1994), 325-50, esp. 346-7. The number of manuscripts of the so-called "Abbreviationes Bonaventurae" (see F. Stegmuller, Repertorium, 61-7, nrs. 122-61) suggests that this practice was particularly widespread in the Franciscan order. For the "Abbreviationes Bonaventurae," see Z. Alszeghi, 'Abbreviationes Bonaventurae. Handschriftliche Ausziige aus dem Sentenzenkommentar des heiligen Bonaventura im Mittelalter', Gregorianum, 28 (1947), 474-510. It should also be noted here that the phenomenon of compiling new texts out of earlier texts also occurs in the commentary tradition on the works of Aristotle; see e.g. R. Imbach, 'Notule sur le commentaire du 'Liber de causis' de Siger de Brabant et ses rapports avec Thomas d'Aquin', Freiburger ^eitschrift fur Philosophic und Theologie, 43 (1996), 304-23, and F. del Punta, 'The Genre of Commentaries in the Middle Ages and its Relation to the Nature and Originality of Medieval Thought', in Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Aertsen and Speer, eds., 138-51. 28 A case in point is the commentary of Godescalc of Nepomuk, who, according to Trapp, 'Augustinian Theology', 251-2, read secundum Gregorium. Now, this can only be true for the first two books of Godescalc's commentary, since Gregory of Rimini's commentary, at least in the form as we now know it, does not cover books III and IV.
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importance of the practice of what we would call "plagiarism," but he did not describe in detail the different methods and literary techniques involved in composing a commentary "secundum alium." In what follows, then, we shall concentrate on some commentaries which, in one way or another, fall under Trapp's category of "lectura secundum alium." In particular, we shall try to account for some of the different techniques in which these commentaries have been composed out of other commentaries. Trapp's concept of "lectura secundum alium" seems to cover a wide range of very different commentaries. For example, it refers to commentaries that depend on one single other text. In this category fall the commentaries of Menso of Beckhusen (Prague, 1382~3) and Conrad of Soltau (Prague, 1382-3). Menso's commentary, at least book IV, seems to be a mere abbreviation of the commentary of Thomas of Strasbourg, whose name is mentioned virtually nowhere. As a rule, Menso copies verbatim and respects conscientiously the order of the text of the Augustinian. The main differences between Thomas's commentary and Menso's are the following. First, whenever the former lists four or five arguments, the latter chooses two or three out of them. Second, Menso merely takes over Thomas's conclusions, while leaving aside most of the references to alternative opinions.29 Conrad of Soltau's commentary is also highly dependent on Thomas of Strasbourg's. However, the relation between Thomas's text and Conrad's is more complex than the relation between Thomas's commentary and Menso's, for in Conrad's commentary on book IV we can observe at least three different ways in which it relates to Thomas's, (a) In some sections, Conrad's text looks like an abbreviated version of Thomas's, (b) In other sections, however, Conrad rather gives some sort of free paraphrase of the corresponding text by the Augustinian. These passages show an indisputable link between the two texts, but, under Conrad's pen, Thomas's text has been thoroughly reshaped, (c) In still another section, Conrad merely takes over the Augustinian's divisio quaestionis. Here, the four questions, which make up Conrad's article, correspond neatly to the four articles introduced by Thomas, so that the basic structure of Conrad's text is taken over from Thomas. Within this structure, however,
29
See Bakker, La raison et le miracle, II: 139—150.
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Conrad proceeds quite independently by formulating conclusions that are at odds with Thomas's. In sum, Conrad adopts at least three different techniques in compiling a text, which can be considered to be a "lectura secundum Thomam de Argentina."30 Perhaps one of the most sophisticated examples of the heavy use of one text comes from Pierre d'Ailly. D'Ailly was quite famous, and he has drawn the attention of many modern scholars. Accordingly, d'Ailly's Sentences commentary was popular, receiving three printings already in the fifteenth century and surviving in about ten manuscripts, although almost all are in Paris, a testimony to the increasing fragmentation of learning during the Great Schism. We must be careful, however, in assuming that d'Ailly's popularity entails that he was an innovative thinker. All indications point to d'Ailly's heavy reliance on Gregory of Rimini or, in some contexts, William of Ockham, at least for d'Ailly's 14 questions for book I. Thus Paul de Vooght, speaking of part of question one, states that "this is the idea, and almost the words, of Gregory of Rimini." For his re-edition of question three, article one, Ludger Kaczmarek was forced at one point to give Ockham's text in parallel columns. For question nine, William Courtenay remarks, "These conclusions are typically nominalist and can be found in almost identical form in Ockham, Gregory of Rimini, and Gabriel Biel." On question 12, James Halverson concludes, "Pierre d'Ailly (whose doctrine of predestination was one of the most widely read in the later Middle Ages) explicitly endorse [s] and cite[s] nearly verbatim Rimini's version of D[ouble] Particular] E[lection]."31 Finally, for question 11, almost every passage has been paraphrased or taken verbatim from Rimini, as the following table shows: 30 See Bakker, La raison et le miracle, II: 151-164. The medieval library catalogue of the Carthusian monastery Salvatorberg (Erfurt) observes with respect to Soltau's commentary: "(E)t sunt questiones magistrates et breves et videntur hee questiones sumpte ex scripto Thome de Argentina ordinis b. Augustini, quern prefatus dominus Conradus pluries allegando nominat magistrum suum" (see Mittelalterliche Bibliothekskataloge Deutschlands und der Schweiz., II, P. Lehmann, ed. [Mtinchen, 1928], 330, nr. 15). 31 P. de Vooght, Les sources de la doctrine chretienne d'apres les theologiens du XIVe siecle et du debut du XV avec le texte integral des XII premieres questions de la Summa inedite de Gerard de Bologne (f 1317) (Bruges, Paris, 1954), 235; L. Kaczmarek, '"Notitia" bei Peter von Ailly, Sent. I, q. 3. Anmerkungen zu Quellen und Textgestalt', in Pluta, ed., Die Philosophic im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert, 385—420; W. J. Courtenay, 'Covenant and Causality in Pierre d'Ailly', in Id., Covenant and Causality, 103; J. Halverson, Peter Aureol on Predestination. A Challenge to Late Medieval Thought (Leiden, 1998) (Studies in the history of Christian thought, 83), 164.
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D'Ailly, I Sent., q. 11 (ed. Paris, s.a.)
Rimini, I Sent., dd. 38-39 (or remarks)32
f. 156vb, 1. 19-157ra, 42 157ra, 43-157rb, 3 157rb, 8-30 157rb, 30-37 157va, 2-41 157vb, 32-1 59ra, 22 159vb, 41-160ra, 26 160ra, 26-1 6 Iva, 8 161va, 8-163vb, 6 163vb, 6-164ra, 12 164ra, 12-25 165ra, 24-40 165ra, 40-1 65rb, 5 165rb, 5-14 165rb, 25-1 66ra, 18 166ra, 18-167va, 12 167va, 12-167vb, 45 168vb, 45-169rb, 12 169rb, 32-169vb, 8 169rb, 12-169rb, 31 169vb, 30-170rb, 42 170rb, 42-1 70vb, 18 170vb, 18-17 Ira, 38 171ra, 39-171va, 12 17 Iva, 12-174va, 21 17 Iva, 2 1-17 Iva, 27 171vb, 15-1 72ra, 28
beginning of question, opening points p. 237, 11. 3-4 238, 23-239, 7 239, 21-25 243, 16-244, 7 245, 27-257, 12 258, 5-31 259, 1-271 (end d. 38, q. 1) dd. 42-44, q. 1, a. 2 (pp. 361-389) 274, 16-275, 14 276, 1-11 276, 12-277, 4 277, 6-12 277, 12-17 278, 16-284, 28 312, 19-319, 30 (d. 39) 284, 30-286, 22 290, 4-291, 13 291, 22-293, 7 273, 19-274, 2 293, 8-294, 31 305, 21-307, 5 307, 13 308, 28 295, 6-296, 20 296, 33-297, 13 298, 1-5 end of question, closing points
It should be noted that there are some small gaps in the table where d'Ailly's text is not found in Rimini, and otherwise Rimini's text has been radically rearranged in d'Ailly, so d'Ailly's procedure is quite complex. Moreover, we have seen that, unlike Menso's attitude toward Thomas of Strasbourg, d'Ailly often explicity mentions Rimini. Nevertheless, under such circumstances of "plagiarism," in the words of Zenon Kaluza, "it is hard to speak of [d'Ailly's] original ideas with confidence until there is a critical edition of his writings and their sources have been established."33 32 Trapp-Marcolino edition, vol. 3 of Rimini's Lectura super I et II Sententiarum (Berlin, 1984) (Spatmittelalter und Reformation, 8). 33 Z. Kaluza, 'Late Medieval Philosophy', in Medieval Philosophy, J. Marenbon, ed. (London, 1998) (Routledge History of Philosophy III) (426-51), p. 438.
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Trapp's concept of "lectura secundum alium" is not restricted to commentaries that depend on one source for each context, but it can also refer to works that rely on several texts in the same context. One of the most fascinating commentaries of this category is that of the Cistercian James of Eltville (Paris, 1369-70).34 Although Trapp claimed that Eltville read secundum John Hiltalingen for books I and II, in distinctions 38 and 39 of book I there is no evidence for Hiltalingen, but there are entire columns copied verbatim from Alphonsus Vargas, other material from Rimini, and some paraphrasing of Auriol.35 Moreover, Eltville's question on the Eucharist (IV, q. 13) is a compilation of fragments of at least three different commentaries in addition to Hiltalingen's, namely Robert Holcot's, Osbert Pickingham's, and Thomas of Strasbourg's. The fragments taken over from the two English commentaries and from John Hiltalingen are copied verbatim and invariably without identification. Most of the passages taken from Thomas of Strasbourg, on the other hand, surface in Eltville's text in the form of a paraphrase and sometimes with an attribution. Furthermore, Eltville uses the four commentaries in several different ways. The two English commentaries are used exclusively as a source of the objections, by which Eltville "tests" his conclusiones and corollaria. The following example may suffice to illustrate the role of these two commentaries. In examining the thesis according to which the Transsubstantiation consists of a real change of the substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ, and not of the annihilation of the substance of the bread, Eltville introduces the following objection, which is taken over almost verbatim from the Dominican Robert Holcot:
34 For Eltville's biographical data, see E. Brouette, 'Jacques d'Eltville', in Dictiannaire des auteurs cisterciens (Rochefort, 1977), 391-2, and R. Borucki, 'Jakob von Eltville', in Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters. Verfasserlexikon, K. Ruh, ed., vol. 4 (Berlin, New York, 1983), 473 4.—Some of Eltville's doctrinal positions are discussed by K. Michalski, "'Krytycyzm i sceptycyzm w filozofji wieku XIV—(Le criticisme et le scepticisme dans la philosophic du XIVe siecle)', Bulletin international de I'Academie Polonaise des sciences et des lettres (Krakow, 1925), 41-122, esp. 81-2 (reprint in: La philosophie au XIVs siecle. Six etudes, K. Flasch, ed. [Frankfurt, 1969] [Opuscula philosophica,!], 67-149, esp. 109-10), and by R. Borucki, 'Studie iiber die Gnadenlehre des Jakob von Eltville (Nach I Sent., q. 15)', Cistercienser Chronik, 43-44 (1958), 1-24. 35 For book I, dd. 38-39, see Schabel, The Quarrel with Aureol, I: 322.
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Holcot, Sent. IV, q. 337
(fol. 259rb) Contra terciam partem conclusionis arguo sic: si fieret conuersio panis in corpus Christi, hoc foret per consecracionem; sed consecracio non fit nisi sacerdos intendat; igitur requiritur intencio sacerdotis. Pono ergo quod sacerdos habeat coram se octo hostias de quibus non intendat consecrare nisi duas; et ita cogitet penes se: 'tantum duas de istis uolo consecrare'. Quo posito, quero an consecrauit uel non. Si dicitur quod non—contra: quia ibi est materia debita, forma debita, et intencio consecrandi quod ecclesia consueuit. Item, si non, hoc non foret nisi quia intencio (fol. 259va) talis uidetur nimis generalis uel uaga et indeterminata; sed hoc non impedit, nam, dato quod sacerdos determinate intendat consecrare hanc hostiam, oportet concedere quod intendat consecrare infinitas partes ita indistincte quod non potest intendere distincte istam consecrare ista intencione, et aliam alia intencione, et sic in infinitum; ergo sufficit generalis intencio et indeterminata. Similiter, sacerdotes
(fol. Oiiiira) Quinto ad principale; si sic, hoc foret per consecrationem; sed consecratio non fit nisi sacerdos intendat consecrare; ergo requiritur intentio sacerdotis. Pono ergo quod sacerdos habeat coram se octo hostias de quibus non intendat consecrare nisi duas; et ita cogitet penes se sic: 'duas tantum de istis volo consecrare'. Quo posito, quero utrum consecrauit an non. Si non—contra: hic est forma debita et materia et intentio faciendi quod ecclesia facere consueuit; ergo etc. Item, si non, hoc non foret nisi quia intentio talis videtur generalis vel vaga vel indeterminata; sed hoc non impedit; nam dato quod sacerdos intendat distincte consecrare hanc hostiam; oportet necessario concedere quod ipse intendit consecrare infinitas partes istius hostie distincte; quod non potest intendere distincte, cum non possit consecrare vnam vna intentione, et post aliam alia intentione; et sic in infinitum; igitur sufficit generalis intentio et indistincta. Similiter, sacerdos communiter die pasce consecrat multas vel centum vel mille;
36 Eltville's question bears the following title: Utrum corpus Christi in sacramento eucharistiae sub speciebus panis et vini realiter existat cum suis dimensionibus. In his answer, Eltville formulates the following three conclusions (all references are given according to the MS Besan9on, Bibliotheque municipale, 198): (fol. 258va) Prima conclusio: quamuis per posse Dei inmensum quodlibet creatum sic transubstanciare possit in aliud, et nichil in Deum, panem tamen sine omni totali anichilacione in corpus Christi est uerum; nee tamen hoc racione naturali sufficienter est ostensum. . . . (fol. 261rb) Secunda conclusio sit ista: quamuis, a sacerdote consecracione facta, accidencia stent et manent sine subiecto, actiua tamen sunt et passiua ac si subiecto inhererent proprio. . . . (fol. 263ra) Tercia conclusio: quamuis corpus Christi contineatur realiter sub speciebus panis continencia presenciali, ipsum tamen localiter et commensuratiue esse sub speciebus non est ponendum, nee modo dimensionali." 3/ Holcot's question bears the following title: Quaeritur utrum in sacramento eucharistiae sub speciebus panis vere et realiter existat corpus Christi. All references to Holcot's commentary are given according to the Lyon 1518 edition.
COMMENTARIES OF THE LATER FOURTEENTH CENTURY
in die pasche consecrant [inter] multas hostias, scilicet centum uel mille, et non possunt simul cogitare de qualibet distincte; igitur sufficit intencio generalis. Si dicatur quod tantum duas consecrauit de illis hostiis—sed non est maior racio quare has duas quam illas; uel ergo consecrauit omnes uel nullas; non omnes, quia intendebat contrarium illius; ergo nullas; quod est propositum.
445
sed non potest simul cogitare de qualibet distincte; igitur sufficit intentio generalis.
Si dicatur quod consecrauit—contra: tantum duas de istis intendebat consecrare; sed non est maior ratio quare has duas consecrauit quam illas; igitur vel consecrauit omnes, vel nullas; non omnes, quia intendebat contrarium illius.
Immediately following this objection, Eltville presents four other arguments, which are taken over from the Sentences commentary of the English Carmelite Osbert Pickingham. Eltville, Sent. IV, q. 4
Pickingham, Sent. q. 738
(fol. 259va) Secundo sic: si panis conuerteretur in corpus Christi, hoc maxime esset uirtute uerborum sacramentalium.—Gonsequencia patet, quia uirtute illorum uerborum fit mutacio panis in corpus, ut dicit canon De consecracione, distinctione secunda, 'panis in altari', ubi dicitur sic: 'sermone Dei hoc conficitur sacramentum, quia sermo Christi creaturam mutat; et sic ex pane fit corpus Christi, et uinum cum aqua mixtum in calice fit sanguis consecracione uerbi celestis'. Sed consequens falsum, quia tune quilibet sacerdos proferens uerba consecracionis cum intencione debita conficeret. Cuius oppositum apparet prima, questione prima, 'opponitur' ubi dicitur quod,
(fol. 65va) Item ad principale: tune hoc foret uirtute uerborum sacramentalium.—Patet consequencia, quia uirtute illorum uerborum fit mutacio panis in corpus, ut dicitur in canone De consecracione, distinctione secunda, 'panis in altari', et allegatum fuit in proximo principali; et per consequens quilibet sacerdos proferens uerba consecracionis cum intencione debita conficeret; quod est falsum, ut apparet prima, questione prima, 'opponitur', ubi dicitur quod, suspenso uel deposito sacerdote, nulla relinquitur ei potestas; ergo nullus talis habet potestatem conficiendi; ergo etc.
38 Pickingham's question bears the title: Utrum in sacramento altaris sub speciebus panis et vini sit verum corpus Christi. All references to this question are given according to MS Reims, Bibliotheque municipale, 494. For more information on Pickingham, see Xiberta, De scriptoribus, 241-284, esp. 241-250. For the date of his commentary on the Sentences (before 1348), see Courtenay, 'Theology and Theologians from Ockham to Wyclif, 30-31, n. 96.
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PAUL J. J. M. BARKER AND CHRIS SGHABEL
suspense uel deposito sacerdote, nulla ei relinquitur potestas; ergo nullus tails habet potestatem conficiendi. Tercio sic: aut uirtute illorum uerborum foret illic totus Christus, idest anima et corpus, uel corpus solum. Si corpus solum, tune esset ibi corpus sine anima; et ita sequeretur quod adhuc corpus Christi mortuum esset, quia non aliter dicitur Christus mortuus fuisse nisi quia, corpore existente in sepulchre, fuit anima in inferno; sic eadem racione, corpore existente sub sacramento et anima non, diceretur corpus mortuum.
Et hoc patet ex alio, quia eadem racione qua Christus diceretur uiuus, quia anima Christi coniuncta corpori est in celo, diceretur esse mortuus, quia in terra corpus exanime est, et anima a corpore separata; ergo uirtute uerborum sacramentalium non est ibi solum corpus (fol. 259vb) Christi exanime. Nee uirtute eorundem uerborum est ibi totum coniunctum ex corpore et anima, quia uirtute uerborum sacramentalium non fit conuersio panis nisi in corpus precise, nee uini nisi in sanguinem precise; igitur cum uirtute uerborum non sit aliquid nisi in quod substancia panis et uini conuertitur, sequitur quod uirtute uerborum sacramentalium sit ibi non sic aliquod coniunctum ex anima et corpore.—Probatur assumptum, scilicet quod uirtute uerborum non fit conuersio panis nisi in corpus precise etc., per Magistrum, libro quarto, distinctione undecima, capitulo duodecimo, ubi dicit quod, licet sub utraque specie
Item, tune uirtute illorum uerborum aut foret ibi totus Christus, id est anima et corpus, aut corpus solum. , quia esset ibi corpus exanime; et ita sequeretur quod adhuc Ghristus mortuus esset. Consequencia patet, quia non aliter dicitur Christus fuisse mortuus in triduo nisi quia, corpore existente in sepulcro, fuit anima in inferno; ergo eadem racione, corpore existente sub sacramento, et anima non, dicetur esse mortuus.—Item, tune totus Christus non sumeretur in Sacramento; contra: Magister, libro quarto, distinctione undecima, capitulo duodecimo.—Et hoc idem eciam patet aliter sic: quia eadem racione qua dicetur Christus esse uiuus, quia anima coniuncta est in celo corpori, eadem racione dicetur mortuus, quia in terns corpus exanime est, et anima a corpore separata; hoc magis patebit ex sequentibus; ergo uirtute uerborum sacramentalium non est ibi solum corpus Christi exanime. Nee uirtute eorundem uerborum [non] fit conuersio panis nisi in corpus precise, nee uini nisi in sanguinem precise; ergo, cum uirtute uerborum non sit ibi aliquid nisi illud in quod substancia panis et uini conuertuntur, sequitur quod uirtute uerborum sacramentalium non sit ibi aliquod coniunctum ex anima et corpore.—Probatur assumptum, quod uirtute uerborum non sit conuersio panis nisi in corpus precise nee uini nisi in sanguinem, per Magistrum, libro quarto, distinctione undecima, capitulo duodecimo, ubi dicit sic quod, licet sub utraque specie totus Christus suma-
COMMENTARIES OF THE LATER FOURTEENTH CENTURY
totus Christus sumatur, tamen non fit conuersio panis nisi in carnem, nee uini nisi in sanguinem. Item, si uirtute uerborum fuisset ibi totus Christus, tunc ita fuisset in cena—quando illud sacramentum primitus fuit institutum—quod ibi fuit sub speciebus tam corpus quam anima, idest totum coniunctum; et per consequens, si hostia illa sacramentalis fuisset reseruata usque post mortem, adhuc fuisset ibi totum coniunctum; et per consequens non fuisset Christus mortuus in cruce; quod est falsum. Et consequencia patet, quia si anima fuisset coniuncta corpori in sacramento per triduum mortis sue, tunc Christus non uere fuisset mortuus; aut idem fuisset mortuum et uiuum; quod est falsum.
Item, si uirtute uerborum etc., tunc si quis discipulorum in triduo protulisset illa uerba cum intencione consecrandi, adhuc uere confecisset. Consequencia probatur: quia uerba consecracionis non sunt maioris efficacie modo quam fuerunt ab inicio constitucionis ecclesie; ergo eadem racione qua nunc conficiunt sacerdotes, et tune discipuli poterant conficere. Probo falsitatem: quia tunc corpus Christi perfectius habuisset esse in sacramento et in specie aliena quam in propria; quod non est uerisimile; ergo.
447
tur, tamen non fit conuersio panis nisi in carnem, nec uini nisi in sanguinem. Item, si uirtute uerborum foret ibi totus Christus, tunc ita fuisset in cena—quando illud sacramentum primitus erat institutum—quod ibi fuit sub speciebus tam corpus quam anima, id est totum coniunctum; et per consequens, si hostia illa sacramentalis fuisset reseruata usque post passionem, id est usque ad mortem, adhuc mansisset ibi totum coniunctum; et per consequens non fuisset mortuus Christus in cruce. Consequens est falsum, quia tunc non meruisset nobis apericionem ianue nec (fol. 65vb) additum regni, quia illa non meruit nobis ante passionem, ut dicit Magister, libro tercio, distinctione octaua decima, capitulo duodecimo (?); ergo si non fuisset uere mortuus, illa non essent nobis debita propter meritum eius; quod est falsum. Et prima consequencia patet, uidelicet quod, si anima fuisset coniuncta cum corpore in sacramento per triduum mortis sue, tunc Christus non fuisset uere mortuus, quia si sic, tunc idem fuisset uiuum et mortuum. Item, si uirtute uerborum foret ibi corpus Christi etc., tunc, si aliquis discipulorum in triduo protulisset illa uerba cum intencione consecrandi, adhuc uere confecisset. Consequencia probatur: quia uerba consecracionis non sunt maioris uirtutis modo quam tunc fuerunt, nec eciam ab inicio institucionis istius sacramenti; ergo eadem racione qua nunc conficiunt sacerdotes uirtute uerborum illorum, eadem racione et tunc confecissent. Sed consequens est falsum, quia tunc perfectius habuisset esse in sacramento et in specie aliena quam in specie propria; quod non est uerisimile.
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PAUL J. J. M. BARKER AND CHRIS SCHABEL
Eltville's solutions to these five objections are also taken over from Holcot (the first) and Pickingham (the remaining four): Eltville, Sent. IV, q. 4 va
(fol. 260 ) Ad primam contra terciam partem ('si fieret conuersio panis' etc.) concedo. Sed cum dicitur: 'consecracio non fit nisi sacerdos intendat consecrare', concede quod intencio requiritur. Ad improbacionem ('habeat sacerdos octo hostias' etc.) potest dici probabiliter quod sacerdos in tali casu non consecrat, quia actus consecrandi requirit intencionem determinatam circa materiam istam, quia, sicud argumentum concludit, (fol. 260vb) uel omnes hostias consecraret, ymo mille si essent, uel nullas [duas] consecraret, nec aliquam simpliciter. Quando dicitur in probacione quod ibi est materia et forma et intencio, dico quod non est intencio que sufficiat. Et quando arguitur quod intencio indeterminata sufficiat, quia sacerdos consecrans hostiam consecrat infinitas partes etc., potest dici quod ymo habet intencionem determinatam consecrandi infinitas partes, quia ista hostia est infinite partes, et hanc intendit determinate consecrare. Et non est simile ad casum argument! primi, ut notum est. Similiter, quando sacerdos in die pasche consecrat multas hostias simul, non est necesse quod sciat numerum hostiarum; et tamen consecrat, quia sufficit hic intencio consecrare hanc multitudinem. Vnde intencio formata per copulam mentalem, uel uocalem que equiualet copulatiue, sufficit; sed intencio formata per disiunctiuam mentalem non sufficit, quia ilia intencio est uaga, et cum ea stat quod nullam intendat consecrare.
Holcot, Sent. IV, q. 3 (fol. Oviiiva) Ad quintum principale, quando arguitur de intentione sacerdotis habentis coram se sex hostias, dico probabiliter quod pro tunc non consecrat, quia actus consecrandi requirit intentionem determinatam circa certam materiam. Vnde cum dicitur quod ibi est intentio, dico quod non.
Et cum arguitur quod intentio indeterminata sufficit, quia, cum sacerdos consecret hostiam, consecrat infinitas partes, quia ista hostia est infinite partes, dici potest quod habet determinatam intentionem consecrandi infinitas partes hostie, quia illa hostia est infinite partes, et istam intendit determinate consecrare etc. Similiter, quando sacerdos consecrat multas hostias sicut in die pasce, non requiritur quod sciat numerum hostiarum, sed sufficit intentio consecrandi multitudinem istam. Vnde intentio formata per copulatiuam mentalem vel vocalem que equiualet copulatiue, sufficit; sed intentio formata per disiunctiuam mentalem non sufficit, quia illa est intentio magis vaga, cum qua stat quod nullum panem vel hostiam intendit consecrare.
COMMENTARIES OF THE LATER FOURTEENTH CENTURY
Eltville, Sent. IV, q. 4 vb
(fol. 260 ) Ad secundam ('si panis' etc.): concede. Ad improbacionem ('quia Tung quilibet sacerdos proferens uerba cum intencione' etc.): concede. Et quando adducitur canon (?) 'opponitur', , questione prima, ubi dicitur quod suspensus et degradatus nullam habent potestatem etc., dico quod quilibet sacerdos quantumcumque degradatus uel depositus, si proferat uerba cum intencione faciendi quod ecclesia facit et intendit, uere conficit. Et dico quod ilia autoritas canonis intelligenda est sic: nulla tali relinquitur potestas, idest, nulla relinquitur ei potestas ordinata, quia etsi habeat potestatem conficiendi, cum execucio est sibi interdicta, [et] ita de iure sibi non relinquitur. De facto tamen conficit, si uerba proferat super materiam debitam et cum intencione debita, licet de iure non debeat. Et licet Magister opposite sit opinionis, tamen, quia in hoc passu a doctoribus (fol. 261ra) communiter non tenetur, ideo, conformando me multitudini, teneo uiam istam.39
449
Pickingham, Sent. q. 7 (fol. 69ra) Ad aliud principale, cum dicitur 'si in sacramento altaris sub speciebus panis et uini sit uerum corpus Christi, tune hoc foret uirtute uerborum sacramentalium', hoc concede, sicut elicit canon allegatus, quia uirtus uerborum est uirtus diuina, que operatur in uerbis. Sic dicuntur uerba ilia mutare creaturam uirtute diuina, sicut agens instrumentale agit uirtute agentis principalis, ita quod eadem est uirtus agentis instrumentalis et agentis principalis. Et cum arguitur quod non, quia tune quilibet sacerdos proferens uerba consecracionis cum intencione debita consecraret et conficeret, et hoc saltim si haberet materiam subiectam debitam; et cum arguitur quod non per auctoritatem Augustini, prima, questione prima, 'opponitur', ubi dicitur quod, suspenso uel deposito sacerdote, nulla ei relinquitur potestas, et per consequens depositus uel degradatus non potest conficere, dico quod quilibet sacerdos proferens uerba consecracionis cum intencione debita consecraret et conficeret—hoc concede, saltern si habeat materiam subiectam debitam; et dico quod ilia auctoritas canonis intelligenda est sic: nulla tali relinquitur potestas etc., id est nulla ei relinquitur potestas ordinata, quia <et>si habeat potestatem conficiendi, tamen execucio
39 The opinion, which is here attributed to Peter Lombard, can indeed be found in the list of "opiniones minus probabiles librorum Sententiarum, quas non sustinent doctores," edited by E. A. Synan, 'Nineteen Less Probable Opinions of Peter Lombard', Mediaeval Studies, 27 (1965), pp. 340-344, esp. 344, nr. 14: "Quarta est quod haeretici, ab ecclesia praecisi vel excommunicati non habent potestatem consecrandi; distinctione 13, capitulo illi vero." See Peter Lombard, Sententiae, lib. IV, d. 13, c. 1 (72), nr. 4, 312.
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est sibi interdicta, et ita de iure non sibi relinquitur; de facto tamen conficit si uerba proferat supra materiam debitam et cum intencione debita, licet de iure non debeat. Et licet Magister sit contrarie opinionis in textu, ut uidetur distinctione tercia decima, capitulo secundo, tamen doctor Subtilis super quartum, distinctione tercia decima, questione ultima, hoc tenet expresse, et allegat auctoritatem canonis; alii (fol. 69rb) doctores eciam tenent. Ad terciam ('uel uirtute uerborum Ad aliam formam, cum dicitur foret in sacramento torus' etc.) dico 'Tung uirtute uerborum foret ibi quod uirtute uerborum est ibi totus aut totus Christus, scilicet anima Christus, tam anima quam corpus; et corpus, aut ipsum corpus solum', eadem enim est uirtus uerborum, dico quod uirtute uerborum est ibi quia uirtus diuina <est> que ope- totus Christus, tam anima quam ratur in uerba; et ideo ilia corpus; eadem enim est uirtus ueruerba dicuntur esse uerba saluato- borum que uirtus diuina, ut predicris, seu creatoris, et operari uirtute tum est; et ideo illa dicuntur esse spiritus sancti, sicud dicit Augus- uerba creatoris et operari uirtute tinus in quodam sermone de cor- spiritus sancti, sicud dicit Augustipore domini, et ponit Magister in nus in quodam sermone de corpore littera, libro quarto, distinctione domini, et allegat Magister, libro tercia decima, capitulo primo: 'intra quarto, distinctione tercia decima, catholicam ecclesiam in ministerio capitulo primo: 'intra catholicam corporis et sanguinis domini, uel ecclesiam in ministerio corporis et a bono maius uel a malo minus sanguinis domini nichil a bono perficitur sacerdote, quia non in maius uel a malo minus perficitur merito consecrantis, sed in uerbo sacerdote, quia non in merito conperficitur creatoris, et uirtute spi- secrantis, sed in uerbo perficitur ritus sancti'; ideo concede quod creatoris et uirtute spiritus sancti'; eciam uirtute uerborum est ibi tam et ideo concede quod in uirtute anima Christi quam corpus, et uerborum est ibi in sacramento totum coniunctum. Et quando di- tam anima domini quam corpus, citur quod non, quia uirtute uer- et totum coniunctum. Et cum arborum non fit conuersio panis nisi guitur quod non, quia uirtute uerin corpus, concede, ut dicit Ma- borum non fit conuersio panis nisi gister, distinctione undecima; et ex in corpus, nec uini nisi in sanhoc non sequitur quod uirtute uer- guinem—hoc concede, sicut dicit borum non sit ibi coniunctum ex Magister, distinctione undecima, anima et corpore, nisi ita esset quod capitulo duodecimo; et ex hoc non nichil foret in sacramento nisi illud sequitur quod uirtute uerborum precise in quod substancia panis non sit ibi coniunctum ex anima
COMMENTARIES OF THE LATER FOURTEENTH CENTURY
et uini conuertitur; quod est falsum, quia etsi panis non conuertatur nisi in corpus, et uinum nisi in sanguinem, uirtute tamen diuina, que istam conuersionem operatur, fit ibi totum coniunctum ex anima et corpore.
Ad aliam racionem ('si uirtute uerborum') concede quod fuisset in cena. Et quando dicitur 'ergo si hostia Tung consecrata fuisset reseruata usque ad passionem et mortem, adhuc mansisset totum coniunctum', concede. Quando dicitur 'ergo Ghristus non fuisset mortuus in cruce', nego consequenciam, quia etsi anima fuisset coniuncta cum corpore in sacramento, tamen talis coniunctio non fuisset sufficiens ad uiuificandum corpus, nee ista unio fuisset uita; ideo ibidem potuisset fuisse totum aggregatum ex anima et corpore, licet non fuisset uiuum. Exemplum est quod angeli, tarn boni quam mali, assumunt sibi corpora ad eorum ministeria (fol. 26l rb ) explenda, et uniuntur ipsis corporibus aliquo modo, non sic tamen quod ex eis et corporibus fiat unum suppositum uere. Ymo sic nauta unitur naui, ex quo tamen et naue non fit unum suppositum, ita potuit anima Christi in triduo fuisse unita corpori mortuo proprie, tam eciam in sacramento quam in sepulchro, [et] absque hoc quod ipsum corpus uiuificasset; et ideo argumentum non procedit. Ad ultimam, quando dicitur 'tune si quis discipulorum' etc., concede. Et quando dicitur 'tune Christus habuisset esse perfectius in sacramento et in specie aliena' etc., nego consequenciam, quia, ut est dictum,
451
et corpore, nisi ita esset quod nichil ibidem esset in sacramento nisi illud precise quod in substancia panis et substancia uini conuertuntur; sed hoc est falsum, quia etsi panis non conuertatur nisi in corpus, et uinum in sanguinem precise, uirtute tamen diuina, que illam conuersionem operatur, fit ibi presens totum coniunctum ex anima et corpore. Ad aliam formam, cum dicitur 'si uirtute uerborum foret ibi totus Christus, tune in cena ita fuisset, quando illud sacramentum fuit primitus institutum', hoc concede. Et cum arguitur quod tune, si hostia ilia fuisset conseruata usque ad passionem et mortem, adhuc fuisset ibi totum coniunctum, hoc eciam concede. Cum arguitur ex hoc quod tune Christus non fuisset mortuus in cruce, nego consequenciam, quia etsi anima fuisset coniuncta corpori in sacramento, non tamen talis coniunctio fuisset sufficiens ad uiuificandum corpus, nee illa unio fuisset uita; ideo ibidem potuit fuisse totum aggregatum ex corpore et anima, licet non fuisset uiuum. Et exemplum est quod angeli tarn boni quam mali aliquando assumunt sibi corpora ad eorum ministeria explenda, et uniuntur corporibus ipsis, non tamen sic quod ex ipsis et corporibus fiat uere unum suppositum, ita potuit anima Christi in triduo fuisse unita corpori tarn in sacramento quam eciam in sepulcro absque hoc quod ipsum corpus uiuificaret; et ideo non procedit argumentum. Ad aliam formam ('Tung, si aliquis discipulorum protulisset uerba consecracionis in triduo, fuisset ibi consecracio et confecis'set'), concede. Et Tung, cum arguitur quod Tung Christus habuisset esse perfectius
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etsi ibi fuisset anima cum corpore, non sequitur quod corpus fuisset uiuum, nec Christus; et ideo argumentum non procedit.
in sacramento et in aliena specie quam in specie propria, nego consequenciam, ut dictum. Et si ibidem fuisset anima simul cum corpore, non sequitur quod ipsum corpus fuisset uiuum, nee quod Christus fuisset uiuus; ideo argumentum non procedit.
Contrary to the two English commentaries, John Hiltalingen's commentary is used by Eltville primarily to compose his lists of corollaria. There are at least two interesting features of Eltville's way of using Hiltalingen's commentary. First, only some of the numerous names mentioned by the Augustinian are taken over by the Cistercian, whereas other names (e.g. Giles of Rome and Hugolino of Orvieto) are (deliberately?) left out. Second, the passages, which Eltville presents as one set of connected propositions, are found in very different parts of Hiltalingen's question. In other words, Eltville does not preserve the order of Hiltalingen's text, but forces Hiltalingen's arguments to fit his own context. As an illustration, we cite the list of six corollaria to Eltville's first conclusio, five of which are taken over from Hiltalingen:
40
Eltville, Sent. IV, q. 4
Hiltalingen, Sent. IV, q. 740
(fol. 258vb) Ex conclusione infero primo quod conuersio panis qua corpus Christi sic translatur nec actiue nec ex ui sacramenti ad assenciam diuinam terminatur. Patet, quia panis in illud quod terminatur transubstanciatur; sed panis non potest in Deum transubstanciari, ut dicit secunda pars conclusionis; igitur. Secundo infero: quamuis talis conuersio non terminetur ad diuinitatem uel animam Christi conuertibiliter, tamen terminatur ad ista inseparabiliter et concomitanter, quia nullibi
(fol. 76vb) Primum correlarium: quamuis talis conuersio non terminetur ad diuinitatem uel animam Christi conuertibiliter, tamen terminatur ad ista inseparabiliter
Hiltalingen's question bears the following title: Utrum Christus, cum post cenam sacramentum eucharistiae et eius fonnam institmt, auctoritatem solis apostolis et sacerdotibus in ipsorum personis commisit. All our references to this question are given according to MS. Toulouse, Bibliotheque municipale, 248, controlled against MS Miinchen, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 26711.
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est corpus Christi nisi sit animatum; igitur nullibi est corpus quin sit ibi anima eius. Et sic simili modo de diuinitate et sanguine Christi est dicendum.
Tercio infero: quamuis Deus plus creaturis quam una alteri possit intimari, non tamen potest in aliquam creaturam conuerti uel transubstanciari. Prima pars patet, quia Dominus cuilibet creature illabitur, et nulla creatura tanta unione sicud est illapsus unitur aut uniri potest, extremis remanentibus; ergo ilia pars uera. Secunda pars patet, quia minus esset impossibile creaturam in Deum transubstanciari quam Deum in creaturam; sed primum est impossibile; ergo et secundum. Quarto infero quod inter supremum et infimum omnium creatorum uigore inmenso non est difficilior transitus transubstanciatiue quam terre et materie prime in se mutuo conuersiue. Patet correlarium, (fol. 259ra) ex prima parte conclusionis et eius probaciones.
Quinto infero: quamuis conuersio panis in corpus Christi habeat positiuam et priuatiuam terminacionem, tamen est una mutacio, quia termini habent colligacionem et connexionem. Secunda pars satis
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et concomitanter. Prima pars patet ex dictis. Et secunda pars probatur: quia secundum dominum Egidium in tractatu De corpore Christi, anima Christi non est ibi ex ui sacramenti, sed concomitanter; ergo correlarium uerum. Patet racio, quia nullibi est corpus quin sit animatum; ergo nullibi est corpus quin ibi sit anima eius; ergo. Secundum correlarium: quamuis Deus creaturis plus possit intimari quam una alteri, non tamen potest in aliquam conuerti uel transubstanciari. Probatur correlarium: quia minus esset inpossibile creaturam in Deum transubstanciari quam Deum in creaturam conuerti; sed primum non est possibile; ergo nec secundum.41
Tercium correlarium: inter supremum et infimum omnium creatorum uigore inmenso non est difficilior transitus transubstantiue quam terra et materia prima sint conuersiue a Deo in se mutuo. Probatur correlarium ex dictis, quia plus indiget supremum Deo quam infimum et eque faciliter subtrahit sibi influenciam conseruatiuam sicut enti infimo uel minimo. (fol. 77 rb ) Secundum correlarium contra magistrum Hugolinum, ubi prius: quamuis uersio panis in corpus Christi habeat positiuam et negatiuam uel priuatiuam terminacionem, tamen est una mutacio [ne]
41 Compare also the following passage by Hiltalingen: (fol. 76lb) "Prima conclusio: quamuis Deus possit plus intimari creaturis quam creature sibi inuicem, extremis remanentibus, una alteri, nulla tamen in Deum sicut creaturam potest transubstanciari. Prima pars patet, quia Deus cuilibet creature illabitur, et nulla creatura tanta unione sicut est illapsus alteri unitur uel uniri potest, extremis remanentibus; ergo conclusio pro illa parte uera."
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PAUL J. J. M. BARKER AND CHRIS SGHABEL
patet, quia conuersio panis in corpus Christi est una mutacio, et non plures. Primam partem probo: quia sint tres panes, quorum primus anichiletur, secundus in lapidem conuertatur, tercius in corpus Christi transubstanciatur; Tung sic: quam uere primus habet racionem termini priuatiui, tam uere quilibet alius; sed certum est quod primus habet; ergo quilibet alius. Si dicitur: igitur eciam alii anichilantur sicud primus, uel detur racio quare primus et non alii, cum utrobique sit priuatiua racio terminatiua;— dico quod propter dicta sanctorum debemus dicere quod non fit anichilacio, sicud patet per Hugonem, De sacramentis, libro 2, parte 8, ubi hoc dicit expresse. Et Damascenus, libro 4, capitulo 5, uidetur hoc dicere. Sed queris: que sit racio? Dico quod ibi non sit terminus pure priuatiuus, sed super hoc intellectiuus et positiuus; igitur non dicitur anichilacio. Vnde est ibi panis desicio et corporis Christi posicio. Vltimo infero quod homini racionali non plus est elicere transubstanciari in angelum supremum quam in brutum. Patet, quia equaliter utrobique ipse totus desinit esse; ergo quidquid hec (?) sequitur, eque indifferens erit sibi.—Ex quo sequitur contra Albertum in tractatu De exposicione misse, quia, si panis esset intellectiuus qui conuertitur in corpus Christi, maiorem deberet habere dolorem de sua conuersione quam gaudium. Patet, quia nullum bonum sequitur sibi, [ergo] ymo malum. Secundo sequitur quod magis est elicere conuerti in Christum mentaliter quam in corpus eius transubstanciari essencialiter. Patet, quia primum fit cum
et termini habent colligacionem et connexionem. Prima pars patet ex primo correlario. Et posset confirmari: sint tres panes; unus annichiletur, alius in lapidem conuertatur et eciam annichiletur, et tercius in corpus Christi transubstancietur; Tung sic: quam uere primus habet racionem termini priuatiui tam uere quilibet alius; sed certum est quod primus habet; igitur et quilibet alius. Et si dicitur: igitur alii annichilantur sicut et primus, uel dicitur racio quare primus annichiletur, et non alii, cum utrobique sit priuatiua racio terminatiua;—ad istud quod propter dicta sanctorum et doctorum debemus dicere quod non sit annichilacio, sicut patet per Hugonem, libro 2, parte 8, capitulo <9>, ubi hoc dicit expresse. Et Damascenus, libro 4, capitulo 5, uidetur dicere hoc idem. Sed que racio? Dico quia non est ibi terminus pure priuatiuus, sed super hoc illatiuus et positiuus; ergo non dicitur 'annichilacio'. Tercium correlarium: homini racionali non plus est eligibile transubstanciari in angelum supremum quam in animal brutum. Patet, quia equaliter utrobique totus desinit esse; igitur quidquid hec sequitur, eque indifferens sibi erit. Primum quod sequitur ex hiis est contra Albertum in tractatu suo De missa, quod si panis esset intellectiuus qui conuertitur in Christum, maiorem deberet habere dolorem de sua conuersione quam gaudium. Patet, quia nullum bonum sequitur sibi, sed malum. Secundum quod sequitur: magis est eligibile conuerti in Christum mentaliter, quam in corpus eius transubstanciari essencialiter. Patet, quia primum fit cum
COMMENTARIES OF THE LATER FOURTEENTH CENTURY
eius utilitate simpliciter eligibili, secundum cum dampno; ergo.
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eius utilitate simpliciter eligibili, secundum cum dampno; igitur etc. Tercio sequitur quod pars affirmatiua questionis est uera.
The role of the Sentences commentary of Thomas of Strasbourg in Eltville's text is different from that of the commentaries of Holcot, Pickingham and Hiltalingen. Thomas's commentary is used for the following three purposes. First, it is used as a source for some of the corollaria formulated by Eltville. Second, it is used as a source for the arguments ("probationes") by which Eltville demonstrates his conclusiones. Third, it is used as a source of objections (and of their respective answers). In some passages, the Cistercian mentions Thomas's name, even though most of the fragments copied from Thomas's commentary lack an attribution. The following three examples may illustrate Eltville's use of the Augustinian's commentary. (a) For some of his corollaria, Eltville uses Thomas's commentary as his source. A case in point is Eltville's third conclusio according to which the body of Christ is really present in the consacrated host, not by way of a local or quantitative containment, but by way of a so-called presential containment. In developing this conclusio, Eltville attacks the opinion of Berengar of Tours, which reduces Christ's presence in the sacrament to a form of "figurative" presence. Eltville's text paraphrases rather loosely a passage of Thomas of Strasbourg. Eltville, Sent. IV, q. 4 ra
(fol. 263 ) Ex ista conclusione infero
Thomas, Sent. IV, d. 10, q. 2, a. 1 (fol. 89rb) Patet etiam De consecra-
primo quod corpus non realiter esse tione, distinctione 2, 'Ego Berensub speciebus, sed significatiue so- garius', vbi Berengarius de ista lum, uel figuratiue, erroneum est opinione errorem suum publice simpliciter, et dissonum catholice confitetur coram papa Nicolao et fidei. Patet ex prima parte conclu- aliis 113 episcopis. Etiam contra sionis. (fol. 263rb) Eciam patet illud istius erroris palliationem qua diDe consecracione, distinctione secun- citur Christum locutum fuisse figuda, 'Ego Berigarius', ubi Berigarius, raliter cum dixit 'hoc est corpus qui tenuit oppositum correlarii, er- meum', est beatus Augustinus, 83 rorem suum coram Nicholao papa Quaestionibus, vbi ait: "vniuersaliet multis aliis episcopis publice ter intellectus verborum Christi, an confitetur. Ex quo patet quod pe- loquitur figuratiue an non, colligi riculose errauerunt dicentes istam potest ex praecedentibus et conseproposicionem, <cum> Christus quentibus ibidem, vel ex aliis locis dicebat: 'hoc est corpus meum', so- scripturae. Vnde cum Christus ait lum fuisse ueram significatiue sicud 'ego sum vitis vera' subiunxit: 'et
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PAUL J. J. M. BARKER AND CHRIS SCHABEL
eciam ista: 'ego sum uita uera', uel figuratiue, sicud ista: 'petra enim erat Christus', quia hoc Berigarius in forma reuocauit dicens: 'bene possum scire quod iste locuciones fuerunt figuratiue uel significatiue, et ista non: 'hoc est corpus meum'. Dico quod ad hoc sciendum habemus regulam a beato Augustino, 83 Questionum 69, ubi dicit: "uniuersaliter intellectus uerborum Christi, an loquebatur figuratiue, an non, colligi potest ex precedentibus et sequentibus ibidem, uel ex aliis locis scripture. Vnde cum Christus ayt 'ego sum uitis uera', subiunxit: 'et uos palmites'; constat autem quod discipuli non erant palmites naturales, sed solum figuraliter. Sed cum dixit 'hoc est corpus meum', subit: 'quod pro uobis tradetur'; cum eciam dixit 'hic est calix sanguinis mei' <subdit>: 'qui pro uobis et multis effundetur'; sed planum est quod corpus suum Christus uniuersaliter pro nobis tradidit, et sanguinem uerum suum naturalem effundit pro nobis; ideo, licet figuraliter loqueretur cum dixit: 'ego sum uitis uera', tamen non sic loquebatur, sed realiter, cum dixit: 'hoc est corpus meum'."
vos palmites'; constat autem quod discipuli non erant palmites naturales, sed tantum figuraliter. Sed cum dicit 'hoc est corpus meum' subdit: 'quod pro vobis tradetur', cum etiam dixisset 'hie est calix sanguinis mei' subdit: 'qui pro vobis et pro multis effundetur'; sed planum est quod Christus suum verum et naturale corpus tradidit pro nobis, et suum naturalem sanguinem efrudit pro nobis; ergo licet figuraliter loqueretur cum dixit 'ego sum vitis vera', tamen non loquebatur figuraliter, sed realiter, cum dixit 'hoc est corpus meum'."
(b) The importance of Thomas's commentary appears more obviously in the arguments by which Eltville demonstrates his conclusiones. The following passage represents Eltville's demonstration of his second conclusio, according to which the Eucharistic accidents subsist without a subject while conserving their proper operations. Again, Eltville paraphrases Thomas. Eltville, Sent. IV, q. 4
Thomas, Sent. IV, d. 12, q. 1, a. 2 and 3
(fol. 26lrb) Primam partem (sc. conclusionis) probo: quia si accidencia
(fol. 100va) Prima (sc. conclusio) est quod omnia accidentia in eucharis-
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inhererent alicui subiecto, uel hoc esset substancia panis uel uini, uel corporis Christi, uel aeris circumstantis; nullum potest dari; ergo. Non primum ex dictis in prima conclusione, quia post consecracionem non remanet substancia panis nee uini. Nee secundum, quia corpus Christi non est in sacramento quantitatiue; ergo non potest esse subiectum accidencium que in sacramento apparent modo quantitatiuo et extenso.
Nee in acre propinquo et confuso, quia aer propter sui raritatem non potest esse subiectum coloris, asperitatis et duriciei et aliorum multorum accidencium que apparent in sacramento; ergo.
Secundo probatur illud autoritate Magistri, quarto, distinctione duodecima (fol. 261va) ubi sic dicit: "si autem queritur de accidentibus que remanent in quo subiecto fundentur, michi pocius dicendum esse uidetur existere sine subiecto quam esse in subiecto, quia ibi non est substancia nisi corporis et sanguinis dominici que non afficitur illis accidentibus; non enim corpus Christi talem in se habet formam,
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tia apparentia sunt sine subiecto primo, quia nullum illorum accidentium inhaeret alicui substantiae; ergo omnia accidentia in eucharistia apparentia sunt separata a subiecto primo. Consequentia patet ex iam dictis. Probo antecedens: quia si inhaererent alicui substantiae, vel hoc esset substantia panis et vim, vel substantia corporis Christi. Non primum, quia opinio hoc ponens est superius improbata, distinctione 11, quaestione 1, articulo 2. Nee secundum, quia, vt superius probaui, distinctione 10, quaestione 2, articulo 1, corpus Christi non est in sacramento altaris quantitatiue, seu modo quantitatiuo; et per consequens ipsum non potest esse subiectum istorum accidentium quae in sacramento apparent modo quantitatiuo et extenso. Sed contra istam conclusionem est quaedam antiqua opinio ponens quod huiusmodi accidentia sint subiectiue in acre circumfuso. (. . .) Sed ista opinio primo assumit falsum, cum dicit huiusmodi accidentia subiectiue fundari in aere circumfuso, quia aer propter sui raritatem non potest esse subiectum coloris, asperitatis et duriciei, et multorum aliorum accidentium quae apparent in ipso sacramento.
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PAUL J. J. M. BAKKER AND CHRIS SCHABEL
sed qualem in iudicio apparebit. Remanent ergo ilia accidencia per se subsistencia." Tercio probo secundam partem, quia obiectum potencie sensitiue uere agit in potenciam; sed accidencia, quamuis separata a substancia, uere retinent omne illud quod pertinet ad obiectum potencie sensitiue, quia qualitates sensibiles in sacramento sunt coniuncte quantitati, et per consequens possunt agere in sensum. Nam licet sensibile proprium, puta color, non possit actualiter mouere uisum sine sensibili communi, puta sine magnitudine, quia albedo separata a magnitudine esset indiuisibilis, tamen quando ista sunt simul iuncta, uere possunt agere in sensum; et sic est hie.
(fol. 101ra) Quantum ad tertium articulum dicendum quod, licet illud quod petitur in articulo isto ab aliquibus vertatur in dubium, tamen hoc faciunt absque necessitate, quia obiectum potentiae sensitiuae vera actione agit in huiusmodi potentiam; sed ista accidentia, quamuis sint separata a substantia, tamen vere retinent omne illud quod spectat ad obiectum potentiae sensitiuae, quia qualitates sensibiles sunt in ipso sacramento coniunctae quantitati, et per consequens actualiter possunt agere in ipsum sensum. Nam licet sensibile proprium, puta color, non possit mouere actualiter visum sine sensibili communi, puta sine magmtudine, quia albedo separata a magnitudine esset indiuisibilis, nee econuerso sensibile commune sine sensibili proprio; nunquam enim magnitude vel figura, que sunt sensibilia communia, separata ab omni qualitate possunt immutare sensum, quia vt sic essent res mathematicae, quae abstractae sunt a sensibus; tamen quando ista sunt simul coniuncta, tune vere possunt agere in ipsum sensum.
(c) The most remarkable role of Thomas's commentary in Eltville's question is that of being a source of objections and their corresponding answers. The following example is very interesting. As an objection to an element of his first conclusio (God is capable of changing every created substance into another), Eltville presents the following argument, which is taken, not from Thomas of Strasbourg, but from John Hiltalingen: Eltville, Sent. IV, q. 4 rb
(fol. 259 ) Secundo arguitur principaliter contra secundam partem, quia ad hoc quod Deus sit terminus alicuius transubstanciacio-
Hiltalingen, Sent. IV, q. 7 (fol. 76rb) Et arguo primo quod questio sit falsa. Quia Deus potest aliquid in se conuertere uel transubstanciare; igitur sequitur quod questio sit falsa.
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nis <non> sequitur aliqua mutacio in ipso; ergo potest esse etc. Consequencia uidetur satis nota, cum inmutabilitas uideatur et sit maxima causa quare hoc de Deo negatur. Antecedens probatur: quia nulla uariacio est in corpore Christi propter hoc quod panis in ipsum transubstanciatur.
Secundo sic: non uidetur magis inconueniens quod diuina essencia sit terminus transubstanciacionis quam incarnacionis; sed persona est terminus illius; ergo.
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Patet consequencia. Et antecedens probo: quia ad hoc quod Deus sit terminus alicuius transubstanciacionis non sequitur aliqua mutacio in ipso; ergo Deus potest esse terminus transubstanciacionis. C onsequencia uidetur satis nota, cum inmutabilitas diuina sit maxima causa quare hoc de Deo negatur. Antecedens patet, quia nulla uariacio est in corpore Christi propter hoc quod panis in ipsum transubstanciatur; igitur antecedens uerum.—Turn secundo: quia non uidetur magis inconueniens quod essencia diuina sit terminus transubstanciacionis, uel persona, quam incarnacionis; sed persona est terminus illius unionis uel incarnacionis; ergo etc.— Turn tercio: quia si Deus non posset esse terminus alicuius transubstanciacionis, hoc esset propter hoc, secundum quod doctor Subtilis dick in ista 11 distinctione, questione 2, quia nichil potest conuerti, nee ut terminus a quo nee ut terminus ad quern, nisi cuius esse et non esse totale subest totaliter uirtuti et potencie conuertentis; sed nichil intrinsecum Deo est in potencia ipsius ad esse et non esse; ergo. Sed hoc non ualet, quia maior est falsa. Aliter enim nunquam creaturam unam in aliam posset transubstanciare; quod est falsum, sicut patet in alchimia ubi ferrum in aquam transubstanciatur; et sic de multis aliis conuersionibus miris; igitur.
The answer, however, is taken over from Thomas. Here, Eltville starts by openly presenting the Augustinian's solution and then goes on by copying silently a rather lengthy passage from his commentary: Eltville, Sent. IV, q. 4 ra
(fol. 260 ) Ad secundum ('corpus non potest transubstanciari in spiritum' etc.) nego antecedens. Ad
Thomas, Sent. IV, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1 (fol. 92vb) Ad primum, cum dicitur quod ista conclusio est contra Augustinum, nego. Ad probationem
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PAUL J. J. M. BARKER AND CHRIS SGHABEL
probacionem dicit Thomas de Argentina quod Augustinus et Boecius non loquuntur de potencia Dei, sed de potencia creature, quia de potencia creature corpus mutari aut conuerti non potest in spiritum; et hoc bene conceditur. Dices: si loquebantur de potencia creaturarum, tune non debebant dicere esse impossibile corpus conuerti in spiritum, uel e contra, quia eciam uirtute creata non potest corpus conuerti in corpus; nulla enim uirtus creata posset conuertere celum in terram, aut e conuerso; nee forte adhuc corpus (fol. 260rb) aliquod potest uirtus creata in aliud conuertere, quia licet uirtus creata possit unum corpus de spera actiuorum et passiuorum generare ex altero, non potest tamen unum conuertere in aliud.
Respondeo quod sicud in esse possibili est dare gradus, sic in esse impossibili, sicud dicimus illud esse possibilius quod habet plures gradus congruencie, uel modos, ad hoc quod ponatur in esse, sic dicitur illud impossibilius quod habet plures modos repungnancie ad hoc quod ponatur in esse. Supposito ergo quod impossibile sit uirtute creata unum corpus generabile et corruptibile conuerti in aliud, loquendo de conuersione prout prescindit a generacione et corrupcione, tamen minus est [im]possibile uirtute creata celum uel aliud corpus incorruptibile taliter conuerti; et hoc magis subterfugit uirtutem creatam, quia celum uel non habet materiam partem sui, uel non habet materiam cum priua-
dicendum quod Augustinus et Boetius cum dicunt spiritum nullo modo posse conuerti in corpus, non loquuntur ibi de posse seu potentia Dei, sed de potentia creaturae. Forte dicetur quod si isti sancti loquuntur ibi de potentia creaturae, tune non solum debebant dicere esse impossibile spiritum conuerti in corpus, quia etiam virtute creata non potest conuerti corpus in corpus. Nulla enim potentia creata posset coelum conuertere in terram, nee e conuerso, immo forte nee aliquod corpus potest virtus creata conuertere in aliud corpus, quia licet virtus creata possit vnum corpus de sphaera actiuorum et passiuorum generare ex altero, tamen non potest vnum conuertere in alterum, sicut hie loquimur de conuersione quae nee est generatio nee corruptio. Respondeo quod sicut in esse possibili est dare gradus, sic in esse impossibili, quia sicut illud dicimus possibilius esse quod plures modos congruentiae habet ad hoc quod ponatur in esse, sic illud dicitur impossibilius quod habet plures modos repugnantiae ad hoc quod ponatur in esse. Supposito igitur quod impossibile sit virtute creata vnum corpus generabile et corruptibile conuerti in alterum, loquendo de conuersione prout praescindit a generatione et corruptione, tamen minus est possibile virtute creata coelum in aliquod aliud corpus conuerti, quia hoc magis subterfugit potentiam creatam, quia coelum vel non habet materiam partem sui, vel, dato quod habeat materiam, tamen non habet earn cum
COMMENTARIES OF THE LATER FOURTEENTH CENTURY
cione annexa[m]; et per consequens nee celum potest generari, nee uirtute creata corrumpi. Et super hec omnia uidetur impossibilius uirtute creata spiritum conuerti in corpus, quia omnibus predictis hec manifestior uidetur repugnancia, quia spiritus caret omni materia, siue habeat priuacionem annexam siue non; caret enim quantitate et corporalibus accidentibus; propter quod minor est conformitas ad spiritum quam corporis ad corpus. Et per consequens impossibilius est uirtute creata spiritum conuerti in corpus quam quodcumque corpus conuerti in aliud corpus, dato tamen quod utrumque sit impossibile. Istam ergo impossibilitatem pluribus modis contingentem uolunt exprimere isti sancti cum dicunt quod nullo modo etc. Vnde illud signum uniuersale negatiuum non distribuit uniuersaliter potenciam, quia tune dixisset 'nulla potencia potest' etc., sed distribuit modos impossibilitatis respectu potencie create, sicud patet ex forma uerborum, quia dicitur 'nullo modo'.
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priuatione annexa; et per consequens coelum nee potest corrumpi nee generari per creatam virtutem. Et super hec omnia impossibilissimum esse videtur virtute creata spiritum in corpus conuerti, quia omnibus praedictis hec maior apparet repugnantia, quia spiritus caret omni materia proprie dicta, siue habeat priuationem annexam, sicut est materia corporum inferiorum, siue separata sit ab omni priuatione, sicut est materia corporum superiorum; caret etiam quantitate et caeteris accidentibus corporalibus; propter quod minor[em] <est> conformitas spiritus ad corpus quam corporis ad corpus. Et per consequens impossibilius est virtute creata spiritum conuerti in corpus quam quodcumque corpus in aliud corpus, dato bene quod vtrunque sit impossibile. Istam igitur maiorem impossibilitatem pluribus modis contingentem volunt exprimere isti sancti cum dicunt quod nullo modo potest corpus conuerti in spiritum. Vnde istud signum vniuersale negatiuum non distribuit vniuersaliter potentiam, quia tune dixissent 'nulla potentia potest corpus conuerti in spiritum', sed distribuit modos impossibilitatis respectu potentiae creatae, sicut etiam patet ex forma verborum, quia dicitur 'nullo modo' etc.
The foregoing discussion of James of Eltville's system of borrowing should serve as a warning to those who wish to investigate the Sentences commentaries of the later fourteenth century, although the same warning applies to the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries: a thorough familiarity with the pertinent texts of previous writers is required in order to sort out a given scholar's sources before evaluating the originality of his thought. Moreover, in some cases any innovation will turn out to lie in his selection and arrangement of previous material, rather than in the material itself.
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PAUL J. J. M. BARKER AND CHRIS SGHABEL 6. Conclusion: Sentences Commentaries ca.
1400
This complex use of previous material, a nightmare for the modern scholar seeking to establish a critical edition in a little-studied era, continued past 1400. Perhaps the most extreme example comes from 'the Vienna group', a new generation of theologians at the University of Vienna who were heavily influenced by the major scholars among the "founders" of the University: Henry Totting of Oyta and Henry of Langenstein.42 The Vienna group, Nicholas of Dinkelsbiihl, Peter of Pulkau, Arnold of Seehausen (OCarm), and John Berwart of Villingen, lectured on the Sentences in the first decade of the fifteenth century. Many parts of the commentaries of the Vienna group, and of John Wuel de Pruck and Thomas Ebendorfer de Haselbach from the next scholarly generation (ca. 1420), are virtually identical. Moreover, the Vienna group's collective Sentences commentary is probably almost entirely a cut-and-paste work of sections of Langenstein and Oyta. This appears to be the case in the context of divine foreknowledge (we have not seen Seehausen's commentary), except that in some instances Villingen adds, subtracts, or rearranges small sections. For example, the title of Langenstein's book I, question six is the same as that of the Vienna group: "Whether every future contingent is eternally foreknown by God and determined toward coming about," and the texts of the Vienna group are identical to the first folio and a half of Langenstein, consisting of his principal arguments. Immediately following their principal arguments, the texts of the Vienna group match the first folio of Langenstein's article two. Interestingly, this section in turn is also the same as Gregory of Rimini's treatment of the possible ways God could know the future, a passage that is in part a paraphrase of Peter Auriol in the first place, and which is also found in d'Ailly. In their reliance on Oyta and Langenstein, the Vienna group remained in the doctrinal tradition of the mid-fourteenth century, with the ideas of such figures as Rimini and Adam Wodeham. At the same time that the Vienna group were lecturing on the Sentences, however, there was already a conservative trend elsewhere to turn Sentences commentaries into defenses of the great masters of the thir-
42
On this group generally, see Shank, "Unless You Believe", 117-22. On foreknowledge in particular, see Schabel, The Quarrel with Aureol, I: 367-70.
COMMENTARIES OF THE LATER FOURTEENTH CENTURY
463
teenth century against their fourteenth century attackers. For example the Dominican Thomas Claxton, lecturing at Oxford around 1400, represents the English revival of Thomism.43 Two examples will suffice to show that the two trends, "secundum alium" and the defense of old masters, could be mixed: Peter of Nugent and John Capreolus, both of whom appear to have seen Peter Auriol as the greatest threat to their respective doctors, Scotus and Aquinas.44 When Nugent (Paris 1403-04)45 asks his question on future contingents, he follows Scotus closely, but at one point he discusses Auriol's position in a full eight columns of the Pamplona manuscript. Indeed, this material is a quotation of most of book I, distinction 47, article one, of Auriol's Scriptum. Of course, Nugent goes on to refute Auriol on Scotist lines. While Nugent championed Scotus, the Parisian Dominican John Capreolus was the Thomist defender par excellence. Capreolus's first part of his Defensiones theologiae TTiomae Aquinatis, as his Sentences commentary is called, includes the distinctions on future contingents and was written after 1408, and probably ca. 1422. Capreolus's principal adversary on most topics dealing with God's nature (book I) was Peter Auriol, and sometimes when Capreolus has to defend Aquinas against Scotus or others, his source for the ideas of Aquinas's attackers is still Auriol. In the problems of divine foreknowledge, future contingency, and predestination, Auriol is again the main opponent.46 Of Capreolus's book I, distinction 38, 600 lines are quoted verbatim from Auriol, 500 to give Auriol's position, and 100 to give the positions of others, including Scotus—in effect, Capreolus's commentary is almost another witness to Auriol's text. Thus Capreolus used Auriol's text as a source that summarized the positions opposed
43
According to Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, 360. On Oxford commentaries in this period, see J. I. Catto, 'Wyclif and Wycliffism at Oxford 1356-1430', in Late Medieval Oxford, Id. and R. Evans, eds., 175-261, esp. 178-81. On Claxton, see my forthcoming article. 44 See Schabel, The Quarrel with Aureol, I: 352-63. 45 For Nugent's dates, see the Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis IV, H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, eds. (Paris, 1897; reprint Brussels, 1964), p. 98, which lists Nugent as "actu legend Sententias" on 21 October 1403. Interestingly, the Carmelite William of Domqueur (Vat. lat. 1090) read secundum Nugent at the studium in Angers in 1466; see V. Doucet, Commentaires sur les Sentences, 69-70. Domqueur's MS thus supplements Nugent's: Pamplona, Biblioteca de la Catedral 36. 46 The edition used is Johannes Capreolus, Defensiones theologiae TTiomae Aquinatis II, eds. Ceslaus Paban and Thomas Pegues (Tours 1900; reprint Frankfurt, 1967).
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PAUL J. J. M. BARKER AND CHRIS SGHABEL
to that of Aquinas that were developed between the time of Aquinas' death and Auriol's Scriptum. For Nugent and Gapreolus, then, the task of the historian and editor may actually be made easier by their procedure, especially when their sources are already available in print. When the same student of medieval theology turns to the period between 1350 and 1400, however, a great challenge awaits, the job of untangling the complex web of influences and borrowings. Perhaps for this reason, basically no modern scholar has devoted a career to this period, but by the same token, such a career would reap a rich harvest.
THE COMMENTARY ON THE SENTENCES OF MARSILIUS OF INGHEN Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen
Marsilius read his commentary on the Sentences at the University of Heidelberg toward the end of his career in 1392—1394. He was the first theologian to be admitted to the degree of doctor of theology at this University, founded only shortly before in 1386: "primus in theologica facultate promotus in hoc studio".1 Although he finished his theological studies in Heidelberg, he began them in Paris, about 1366, four years after his inception as a Master of Arts.2 His commentary is his most extensive and probably his final work; many items on which he had touched in his treatises on logic, natural philosophy and metaphysics are treated again and integrated into his theology.3 The large number of themes discussed and the many different sources used make the commentary a useful epitome of late medieval thinking and an important document of intellectual history. Compared to the first part of the fourteenth century, light still needs to be shed on various aspects of the second part. Many theologians no longer seemed to be concerned with the publication of their writings (far fewer commentaries on the Sentences from the second part of the century have come down to us) and in the writings that have survived the authors pursued a synthesis of traditional knowledge rather than the application of newly discovered theological 1
He earned his degree between June 17, 1395, and June 23, 1396, and died on August 20, 1396. See G. Topke, Die Matrikel der Universitdt Heidelberg von 1386 bis 1662, Heidelberg 1884, vol. 1, 3 (note 6). The quotation is taken from registrum librorum recorded in the matricula, ibid., 678. On the date of his reading the Sentences, see W. J. Courtenay, 'Marsilius of Inghen as Theologian', Marsilius of Inghen. Acts of the international Marsilius of Inghen Symposion, ed. by H. A. G. Braakhuis and M. J. F. M. Hoenen, Nijmegen 1992 (Artistarium Supplementa, 7), 39-57, esp. 39 note 1. 2 G. Ritter, Studien am Spdtscholastik 1: Marsilius von Inghen und die okkamistische Schule in Deutschland, Heidelberg 1921 (Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Jahrgang 1921, 4. Abh.), 11. 3 The most recent catalogue of his writings is provided by M. Markowski, 'Katalog dziel Marsyliusza z Inghen z ewidencja rekopisow', Studia Mediewistyczne, 25 (1988), 39-132.
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MAARTEN J. F. M. HOENEN
methods, as was the case with the logico-semantic approach earlier.4 To be sure, the semantic analysis of propositions still played a role in theological writings. But increasingly its application became restricted. The limits of its use in theology were felt. There was a growing sense that theology and logic pursue different aims with different methods and that theology as scientia pietatis should follow tradition as approved by the doctors of the church and not human logic, since that may lead to superstition and errors. In the wake of this view, there was a tendency toward traditionalism. The use of logic in theology as developed in the first half of the fourteenth century became the target of criticism. Marsilius belonged to the diminishing group of theologians who published their commentaries on the Sentences. In his commentary he entered into the discussion of the relationship between philosophy and theology and the use of philosophical methods in theology on many occasions, especially in his treatment of the trinity and divine knowledge.5 There he used logical tools which he borrowed from Adam Wodeham, Robert Holcot, and Gregory of Rimini. But he was anxiously concerned not to go against tradition. He thought that Adam Wodeham and Robert Holcot had pushed the matter too far in their use of logic in theology. What they maintained might be true according to the rules of logic, but was opposed to tradition and therefore should not have been put forward without further explanation, since it might offend those outside the university. A similar point was maintained by John Gerson, who in his De duplici logica (1402) distinguished between the logic of faith and ethics on the one hand and that of traditional logic and metaphysics on the other.6 Marsilius's commentary allows modern research to study further this view on the nature of theology, which soon culminated in the Reformation. This, however, presupposes a reliable textual basis and a discussion of the work's authenticity, the nature of the text, the manuscript tradition, and the sources used. The following
4
This development is studied in Philosophie und Theologie des ausgehenden Mittelalters. Marsilius von Inghen und das Denken seiner £eit, ed. by M. J. F. M. Hoenen and P. J. J. M. Bakker, Leiden 2000. 5 See my Marsilius of Inghen. Divine Knowkdge in Late Medieval Thought, Leiden 1993 (Studies in the History of Christian Thought, 50). 6 John Gerson, De duplici logica, ed. P. Glorieux, Paris 1962 (Oeuvres completes, 3), 57-63, esp. 58.
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467
study will provide and discuss the materials necessary for securing the textual tradition.
1. Authenticity
The authenticity of the commentary has never been a matter of doubt. It is secured by the manuscripts. Unfortunately, not all manuscripts mention the author. But those that do, attribute the commentary to Marsilius of Inghen. As far as the first book is concerned, three out of four manuscripts refer to him as the author (For descriptions of the manuscripts and sigla, see below section 5): J
K
L
fol. 345: "Quaestiones primi libri Sententiarum venerabilis magistri Mercilii de Inghen". This attribution is given in the explicit by Gerald of Castrikum, the scribe of the text, who matriculated at the University of Heidelberg in 1411.7 The outside and inside front cover of the manuscript also attribute the text to Marsilius, but the hand is different from that of the scribe. fol. 10r: "Quaestio circa principium primi libri Sententiarum ordinata a venerabili magistro Marsilio". The ascription to Marsilius concerns only the first question and is written at the top of the page in a hand different from that of the scribe who wrote the question. Since this question is the same as that in the other manuscripts and is also followed by the same questions, there is no reason to assume that this attribution is meant to refer only to the first question, to the exclusion of the others. fol. 1': "Marcilius Heydelbergensis universitatis". Written at the right top of the page in a hand different from that of the scribe; this is perhaps the hand that corrected the manuscript.
The evidence of Marsilius's authorship as given in the manuscripts is corroborated by other contemporary data. Firstly, in the list of books that Marsilius bequeathed to the University of Heidelberg in 1396 the following description is found: Item (433) questiones magistri Marsilii super sentencias in duobus voluminibus.8 7 On Gerald of Castrikum (Diocese of Utrecht), see Topke, Die Matrikel der Universitdt Heidelberg, vol. 1, 115, and vol. 2, Heidelberg 1886, 371 and 373. 8 Die Rektorbucher der Universitat Heidelberg, Band 1: 1386-1410, Heft 2, ed. by J. Miethke, Heidelberg 1990, 478, and Topke, Die Matrikel, vol. 1, 680 (Anhang IV). The list was made in 1396 under the rectorship of Johannes de Noet. It begins
468
MAARTEN J. F. M. HOENEN
This reference is the earliest evidence that the lectures given by Marsilius on the Sentences of Peter Lombard were written down and preserved as Quaestiones. The same title, again with the attribution to Marsilius but now with the addition that the text was written by Marsilius himself, was listed in the library inventory of 1466 and mentioned in the Annals of the Arts Faculty in 1489.9 Secondly, in a number of places the author refers the reader to his earlier writings, using expressions such as 'ubi probavi' or 'ubi solvi'. Such expressions occur in the first book, as well as in the others. They refer to treatises of which we know Marsilius to be the author and thus confirm the authenticity of the commentary on the Sentences. The following examples, taken from the first and the second book, mention his commentaries on Aristotle's Physics and Metaphysics. In the first column of the table the relevant quotations from the commentary on the Sentences are given, next to it the places in the works referred to by Marsilius: Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum, Lib. 1, qu. 1, ed. Santos, 38
Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, Lib. 1,
Nam esse rei est ipsa res, ita intelligere eiusdem rei est eadem res. Istud consuevit probari in 1 Physkorum, ubi probavi, et 7 Metaphysicae etiam idem probavi.
Ultima conclusio: quod hominem generare est homo generans et generare est generans.
Wien, ONE, GVP 5437, fol. 83vb
Quaestiones super Metaphysicam, Lib. 7, qu. 4, Wien, ONE, GVP 5297, fol. 90ra Tertia conclusio: Ipsum et esse ipsum sunt omnimode idem.
Abbreviations super octo libros Physicorum, Lib. 1, ed. Venice 1521, fol. 5ra Quinti dicunt quod hominem generare est homo generans et creare est creans et ita in aliis. Et videtur mihi quod haec est probabilior opinio.
as follows, Die Rektorbucher, ibid., 475: "Registrum librorum in theologia, quos venerabilis vir magister Marsilius de Inghen bone memorie sacre pagine professor egregius primus in theologica facultate promotus in hoc studio universitati eiusdem dereliquit." See also Topke, ibid., 678. 9 Heidelberg, Universitatsbibliothek, Heid. Hs. 47, fol 43r: "Quaestiones magistri
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469
Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum, Lib. 2, qu. 1, ed. Strasbourg 1501, fol. 204vb
Abbreviationes super octo libros Physicorum, Lib. 8, ed. Venice 1521, fol. 34rb and fol. 37ra
Septimo, quia implicare videtur mutationem Dei quod mundus sit productus, ergo non est productus. (. . .) Ad hoc possunt adduci rationes Philosophi 8 Physicorum. Sed quia in Physica solvi consueverint et in Abbreviatis eiusdem octavi eas solvi, ideo de eis supersedeo (. . .).
Quarto: Utrum a motore immutabili et aeterno possit provenire actio nova. (. . .) Ex his infertur sexta conclusio quod primum movens est simpliciter immobile.
The authorship of the Abbreviationes libri Physicorum is certain. The authenticity of the other commentaries on the Physics ascribed to Marsilius still remains doubtful.10 We therefore used the Abbreviationes also to ascertain the reference to the commentary on the first book of the Physics. Most probably, the Abbreviationes were compiled when Marsilius was in Paris, as can be concluded from the many references to Paris.11 The Quaestiones super Metaphysicam
were composed at a later
date, when he was in Heidelberg, as is clear from the introduction, in which he says that he is writing "ad honorem (. . .) studii universitatis Heydelbergensis".12
Marsilii propria manu ipsius conscriptae super tertio et quarto Sententiarum in papiro. Quaestiones magistri Marsilii propria manu ipsius conscriptae super primo et secundo Sententiarum in papiro" and Heidelberg, Universitatsbibliothek, Annales Universitatis III, fol. 300r: "(. . .) Quaestiones Magistri Marsilii de Ingheym super quattuor libros Sententiarum manu ipsius conscriptas (. . .)." 10 Th. Dewender, 'Einige Bemerkungen zur Authentizitat der Physikkommentare, die Marsilius von Inghen zugeschrieben werden', Marsilius von Inghen. VVerk und Wirkung. Akten des zweiten internationalen Marsilius-von-Inghen-Kongresses, ed. by S. Wielgus, Lublin 1993, 245-269. For the manuscripts and early printed editions of the Abbreviationes, see Ch. Lohr, 'Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors: Johannes de Kanthi—Myngodus', Traditio, 27 (1971), 251-351, esp. 328f. For the Quaestiones super libros Physicorum I have used the manuscript Wien, ONE, CVP 5437. This manuscript attributes the first book, which is the book to which Marsilius refers in his Sentences commentary, to Marsilius, fol. 89rb: "(. . .) et hoc de quaestionibus libri primi reverendi magistri Marsilii de Inghen." 11 G. Ritter, Studien zur Spatscholastik, 71. 12 Quaestiones super Metaphysicam, Lib. 1, Wien, Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek, CVP 5297, fol. l ra ~ b .
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MAARTEN J. F. M. HOENEN
Finally, some passages from the commentary of Marsilius appear in the work of other authors. The majority of these quotations date from the Early Modern period and go back to the printed edition of 1501.13 They are therefore only of limited use here. More interesting for our purpose are the quotations from the Middle Ages. Thomas of Strampino adopted large parts of the first question of Marsilius's Sentences commentary in his first Principium, which he held in Cracow in 1441. In the second (1441) and third Principium (1442) he used Marsilius's work extensively, too.14 Unfortunately, however, he did not mention Marsilius as his immediate source. Some years later, Gabriel Biel quoted from the same first question of Marsilius in his Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum, as part of his treatment of the divine ideas. He mentioned Marsilius as a defender of the view that the divine ideas are really (realiter) the same as the divine essence and cited his commentary on the Sentences almost verbatim, yet with some adaptation and changing of the order of arguments. In the table below the passages by Gabriel Biel and Marsilius are juxtaposed. Especially the second piece shows how Gabriel changed the structure of the praemittenda and conclusions, so that they would better fit his own reasoning. The conformity of both passages and the attribution of the text to Marsilius support the claim of the authorship of Marsilius based on the other sources discussed. There can be no doubt that Gabriel Biel had a manuscript copy of the Sentences commentary of Marsilius on his desk.
13 Important in this respect are the writings of Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, Luis de Molina, and Francisco Suarez. 14 These Principia are preserved in the manuscript Krakow, Biblioteka Jagiellonska, Cod. 1199. Thomas of Strampino earned the degree of magister artium in 1427 and became Master of theology in 1443, both at the University of Cracow, of which he was also rector (1443/4). He died in 1460. For futher details and quotations of the relevant passages, see M. J. F. M. Hoenen, 'Einige Notizen iiber die Handschriften und Drucke des Sentenzenkommentars von Marsilius von Inghen', Recherches de Theologie ancienne et medievale, 56 (1989), 117-163, esp. 122-128. '
THE COMMENTARY OF MARSILIUS OF INGHEN
Gabriel Biel, Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum, Lib. 1 dist. 35, qu. 5, ed. Werbeck, 647
471
Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum, Lib. 1, qu. 1, ed. Santos, 15
Inter istos sic opinantes magis conformiter principiis prioribus loquitur Marsilius. Ideo secundum opinionem istius est prima conclusio 'Creatura producta vel producibilis non est idea.' Probatur. Quia idea est ratio cognoscendi rem vel exemplar producendi, prout sonant auctoritates; sed res productae vel producibiles, non sunt ratio cognoscendi vel producendi divinae essentiae, cum ipsa producendo ad nihil extra se respicit.
Sed contra hanc opinionem (sc. ipsius Ockham) volo probare hanc conclusionem, quod creatura producta vel producibilis proprie non est idea. Probatur sic: Hoc est idea quod est formalis ratio cognoscendi rem vel exemplar producendi, ut sonant omnes auctoritates bead Dionysii De divinis nominibus, quas ponit de ideis, et beati Augustini 5 De civitate Dei et 6 et in libro 83 Quaestionum quaestione De ideis; sed res producta vel producibilis non est proprie formalis ratio rem producibilem vel productam cognoscendi vel etiam producendi, prout notum est, igitur.
Ibid., 648
Ibid., 20-23
Tertia conclusio: In Deo non sunt plures et distinctae ideae rerum creatarum vel crea.nda.rum formatter et intrinsece, licet plures dici possint obiectaliter et extrinsece. Pro huius conclusionis intellects est praemittendum quod plures ideas esse in Deo potest intelligi dupliciter: Uno modo formaliter et intrinsece, ita quod huiusmodi ideae non sint inter se idem, sed una realiter distinguitur ab alia. Quo modo in intellectu humano cognitio distincta Petri est realiter alia a cognitione distincta Pauli.—Alio modo obiectaliter et extrinsece. Tale autem est aliquid in se penitus indistinctum. Est tamen plurium obiectorum et cuiuslibet distincte.
Quinto praemitto quod plures esse ideas in Deo sumi potest dupliciter: Uno modo formaliter et intrinsece, alio modo obiectivaliter et extrinsece. Formaliter autem et intrinsece voco plura quae non sunt idem inter se, scilicet quorum unum non est aliud vel quorum unum est alia res in essentia sua quam aliud, ut in intellectu humano formaliter et intrinsece alia est idea parietis et alia domus, vel alia capucii et alia vestis. Extrinsece autem et obiectivaliter plura dico, quod licet in se sit penitus idem, tamen plura et penitus distincta est obiecta extra. His praemissis sit prima conclusio haec: Nullae ideae sunt in Deo distinctae intrinsece et realiter sive formaliter.
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MAARTEN J. F. M. HOENEN
Secunda conclusio: In Deo sunt infinitae ideae extrinsece et obiectivaliter.
2. The Title of the Commentary
There is no disagreement among the sources about the title of the commentary. They all refer to the work as 'Quaestiones'. None of them use terms such as 'Commentum', 'Commentaria', 'Lectura', or 'Scriptum'. The only exception is the printed edition of 1501, which added to the explicit of the first book: (fol. 200va) "Primum scriptum libri Sententiarum venerabilis Marsilii finit feliciter". This addition is not found in the manuscripts. Also at the end of the second and third book the term 'scriptum' is used: (fol. 347vb) "Finit secundum scriptum libri Sententiarum clarissimi Marsilii Inguen" and (fol. 472vb) "Finis tertii script?', but again without a parallel in the manuscripts or in any other known sources. It is a unique case and therefore should not be taken into consideration any further here.15 The earliest manuscript which has an indication of the title is J. The explicit in which the term 'Quaestiones' occurs has been quoted above. Also at other places in the manuscript the term 'Quaestiones' is used. The explicit of the second book has: J
fol. 595: "Quaestiones secundi libri Sententiarum magistri Mercilii de Inghen".16
The same title comes up on the inside front cover of manuscript Ansbach, Regierungsbibliothek, Ms. lat. 62, which contains the commentary on the second (partially) and third book: "quaestiones Marsilii super secundo et tertio Sententiarum". The other manuscripts give no information on the title of the work. Yet, we can be sure that
lD
Generally, the term 'scriptum' is used to indicate that the text is not a collection of students' notes or a report of the lectures given in the classroom, but composed by the author himself. Compare Rega Wood's introduction to Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda in librum primum Sententiarum, prologus et distinctio prima, ed. by R. Wood, ass. by G. Gal, St. Bonaventure, New York, 1990 (Franciscan Institute Publications), 9*. 16 In addition, the outside front cover has in a handwriting of the fifteenth century, "Quaestiones venerabilis magistri Marsilii super primum et secundum Sententiarum". Again in a handwriting of the fifteenth century, the title is repeated on the inside front cover: "Quaestiones primi et secundi Sententiarum Marsilii".
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473
Marsilius's Sentences commentary was known under the title of 'Quaestiones' from the very moment of its publication, since the book catalogue of 1396 gives that title as well.17 Also, the library inventory of 1466 and the Annals of the Arts Faculty of 1489 mention the same title.18 Furthermore, the register of the library of the University of Erfurt, which in the late fifteenth century had manuscript copies of all four books of the commentary originating from Heidelberg, used the title of 'Quaestiones': 11. Questiones primi sentenciarum Marsilii quas una cum questionibus 2. et 3. et 4. fecit emi facultas arcium et apportari de Studio Heidelbergensi pro 16. florensis. 12. Questiones secundi sentenciarum Marsilii. 13. Questiones tertii sentenciarum Marsilii cum una questione Petri de Gandia circa primum. 14. Questiones quarti sentenciarum Marsilii et breviloquium Bonaventure.19
These later sources make evident that Marsilius's commentary continued to be known as 'Quaestiones'. The title 'Quaestiones' is perfectly in agreement with the character of the commentary. Marsilius shaped his discussion of all four books of Peter Lombard's Sentences in separate questions, without adding any 'divisio textus' or partial 'lectura textualis'. This format with the corresponding title was also used in other contemporary commentaries on Lombard. In the manuscripts, the Sentences commentary of Conrad of Soltau, who was among the first theologians at the newly founded University of Heidelberg, has the same format and bears the same title of 'Quaestiones'.20 The sources differ as to the words added to 'Quaestiones'. Some just annex the books concerned in the genitive case: 'Quaestiones
17 18
See above. See above.
19 Mittelalterliche Bibliothekskataloge Deutschlands und der Schweiz, vol. 2, ed. by P. Lehmann, Munchen 1928, 143 and 189. That the fourth book appears together with Bonaventure's Brevoloquium is not surprising. In the fourth book, as in the others, Marsilius quotes Bonaventure often. 20 Stuttgart, Wurttembergische Landesbibliothek, Cod. Theol. Fol. 118, fol. 172vb: "Expliciunt quaestiones compilatae et compositae per venerabilem magistrum Cunradum Soltanem". On Conrad of Soltau, who came from Prague and arrived in Heidelberg early in 1387, see J. Miethke, 'Marsilius von Inghen als Rektor der Universitat Heidelberg', Marsilius of Inghen. Acts of the international Marsilius of Inghen Symposion, ed. by H. A. G. Braakhuis and M. J. F. M. Hoenen, Nijmegen 1992 (Artistarium Supplementa, 7), 13-37, esp. 22.
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MAARTEN J. F. M. HOENEN
primi et secundi Sententiarum' (J). Others use the preposition 'super' with the books concerned either in the ablative case: 'Quaestiones super secundo et tertio Sententiarum' (A), or in the accusative case: 'Quaestiones super primum et secundum Sententiarum' (J). The last form is used in the facsimile reprint of the 1501 edition and has been adopted in modern research. It finds its roots in the manuscript tradition and has been used for the modern edition.
3. Reportatio, lectura, or ordinatio? The information given in the tide that the work consists of 'quaestiones' does not say anything about the editorial nature of the text, whether it is a transcript based on the lectures given by Marsilius in the classroom (reportatio), the text used for the lectures (lectura), or a revised version which he prepared for final publication (ordinatio). In the Middle Ages, the tide of 'Quaestiones' was used for different texts alike. Ockham's commentary on the second book of the Sentences has come down to us as a reportatio. The commentary of Conrad of Soltau is an ordinatio. Both were called 'Quaestiones'.21 In the case of Marsilius, however, it is almost certain that his 'Quaestiones' were an ordinatio. Firstly, there is the note on the top of fol. 1 Or in manuscript K that the first question was revised (ordinata] by Marsilius. This first question is not different in structure and style from the other questions. Therefore the other questions of the first book might be considered as 'ordinatae' as well. Secondly, the printed edition of 1501 says on fol. lra of the first book that the text is 'edita'. The word 'edita' does not mean 'published by making a copy', but 'prepared for publication by the author'. This meaning can be inferred from its use in the manuscripts, also those with works by Marsilius. In these manuscripts a distinction is made between the act of publishing by Marsilius (edere) and the act of writing by the scribe (scribere): "Expliciunt questiones Porphirii et 21
The same goes for the third and fourth book of Ockham's commentary, which were also reportationes. Only the first book of Ockham's commentary is an ordinatio. It is indicated in the manuscripts as 'scriptum'. See the introduction to William of Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio. Prologus et distinctio prima, ed. by G. Gal and S. Brown, (Opera theologica, 1), 11*-17*. Occasionally, the first book of Ockham's commentary (the ordinatio) is referred to as 'Quaestiones' as well. See Ockham, ibid., 14* (Codex F).
THE COMMENTARY OF MARSILIUS OF INGHEN
475
Predicamentorum Aristotelis, edite a magistro Marcilio de Inghen, scripte per manus Nicolai de Moguncia partim" and "Expliciunt questiones super librum De generatione et corruptione Aristotelis, edite a magistro Marsilio de Almania, scripte sunt per fratrem Johannem de Coloriia".22 More important are the following observations. In the first book several smaller passages have been preserved slightly differently in the manuscripts and in the printed edition of 1501. These sections mainly concern the rationes principales and the answers to these rationes. The versions do not differ so much as regards content. Rather, the one seems to be a textual revision of the other. Apparently, the text has been redrafted. The following passages may serve as examples: Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum, Lib. 1, qu. 13. (ad rationes principales) J, fol. 60vb-61ra (collated with K, W, L)
Ed. Strasbourg 1501, fol. 65va
Ad septimam dicitur secundum rectarn logicam, quod 'principium' et 'causa' terminum, quern regunt a parte post, faciunt appellare suam rationem. (. . .)
Ad septimam respondetur secundum rectam logicam, quod ly 'principium' et 'causa' sunt termini causativi appellationis rationis in terminum quern post se gerunt. Faciunt enim talem se sequentem appellare suam rationem. (. . .) Ad nonam (. . .). Quamvis enim antea non fuerit tempus verum, fuit tamen aeternitas, qua nobiliori et digniori modo fuit quam si aeternitate temporis, quae etiam modo nobiliori et digniori praecedit Filium quam aeternitas temporis, etc.
Ad nonam (. . .). Quamvis enim ante non fuit tempus verum, tamen ante fuit aeternitas, quae nobiliori modo et digniori praecedit Filium quam aeternitas temporis.
Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum, Lib. 1, qu. 16. (rationes principales) J, fol. 67vb-68ra (collated with K, W, L)
Ed. Strasbourg 1501, fol. 72vb-73ra
Quinto, si differunt generatio et spiratio, vel hoc est seipsis, et hoc
Quinto, si differant generatio et spiratio, vel ergo seipsis vel aliis.
22 Quoted according to Markowski, 'Katalog dziel Marsyliusza z Inghen', 45 (Erfurt, Bibliotheca Amploniana, 4° 246, fol. 90rb) and 99 (Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Z VI 12la (2557), fol. 96rb).
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MAARTEN J. F. M. HOENEN
non, quia emanationes non distinguuntur seipsis, sicut nee sunt a seipsis. Vel aliis, et hoc vel essentia, quod non potest dici, eo quod est unica; vel personis, et hoc non, quia earum videtur esse distingui non distinguere; vel notionibus, et sic notionis esset alia notio et esset processus in infinitum.
Non seipsis, quia emanationes non seipsis distinguuntur, sicut nee a seipsis sunt. Nee aliis, eo quod nee essentia, nee personis, nee notionibus. Non primum, quia unica est essentia. Neque secundum, quia earum esse distingui non videtur. Neque tertium, quia sic notionis esset alia notio, et sic esset processus in infinitum.
Probably in close connection with this occurence, in the first and second book a number of answers to rationes prindpales are absent. This goes for all textual witnesses. In the manuscripts of the first book these places are marked by blank columns and pages, which obviously had their origin in the original manuscript. Presumably, they were left empty to add the lacking passages at a later occasion.23 The printed edition of 1501 has no empty columns at these places, but inserts two different notes indicating that because of his death Marsilius had not been able to rewrite and definitely formulate the answers to these questions, the draft of which he had crossed out in his manuscript.24 There is no reason to question the correctness of the information in the edition, which may go back to notes added in the original manuscript possessed by Marsilius. If this information is indeed correct, then Marsilius was working on his commentary until his death in 1396. This means that the commentary which has been preserved is no reportatio or lectum of the lectures on the Sentences, which he delivered in 1392-1394, but an ordinatio, the text of which he was amending and preparing for publication, without being able to finish it definitively. The existence of different text versions referred to above may then be explained by the fact that the text was copied not only after, but already during
23 I discussed the problem of these empty columns and pages in my 'Einige Notizen', 148-153. 24 Quaestiones, ed. 1501, Lib. 1, qu. 41, fol. 175rb: "Marsilius hie dimisit fere totum folium contemplatione solutionum obiectionum contra quaesitum factarum. Nee tamen ab re. Quippe, qui optimi viri vestigiis inhaerens maluerit huiuscemodi rationum ad tempus suspensam tenere sententiam qua(m) temerario ausu quicquam a sese positum iri, verum, proh dolor, invisa praeventus morte, id quod sibi certum erat, haud quaquam executus est." and ibid., qu. 42, fol. 182vb: "Marsilius noster itidem efflagitat expurgationem."
THE COMMENTARY OF MARSILIUS OF INGHEN
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the time in which Marsilius made his revisions. The one copy preserved the original text, while the other represents the revised version.25 Finally, there is still another indication that the text was redrafted. The opening questions of the first, second, and third book present themselves as the quaestiones determinandae of the principia, the lectures with which the sententiarius began his commentary on the respective books of the Sentences.2** Compared to other contemporary principia, however, these three questions are significantly different. They contain no discussion with the fellow students, the socii, as is normally the case.27 As to the first principium, the absence of the discussion with the socii might be explained by the fact that perhaps Marsilius inserted the text of his actual lecture when he was still uninformed about the views of his fellow sententiarii. But that is unlikely. Marsilius must
25 As to the question of the manuscript or manuscripts used for the edition of 1501, see p. 490 below. 26 Marsilius mentions the three parts which were characteristic of the principium right at the beginning of the first question of the first book. See Quaestiones, ed. Santos, 1: "Primis itaque duobus, videlicet divini nominis invocatione et brevi sacrae scientiae commendatione, de Dei misericordiae expeditis, venio ad tertium, videlicet ad quaestionis seu dubii propositionem collocutionis gratia cum aliis patribus et magistris meis." For the first question of the second and third book, see Quaestiones, ed. 1501, fol. 201ra and fol. 349ra. On the characteristics of a principium, see B. C. Bazan in Les questions disputees et les questions quodlibetiques dans les facultes de theologie, de droit en de medecine, Turnhout 1985 (Typologie des sources du Moyen Age Occidental, 44/45), 103—105. I discussed the problem of the principia in the Sentences commentary of Marsilius in my 'Neuplatonismus am Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts. Die Prinzipien zum Sentenzenkommentar des Marsilius von Inghen', Marsilius von Inghen. Werk und Wirkung, ed. by S. Wielgus, Lublin 1993, 165-194. 27 In the principia, the socii discussed their opinions. See the oath the sententiarius had to swear according to the statutes of the University of Heidelberg, edited in E. Winkelmann, Urkundenbuch der Universitat Heidelberg, vol. 1, Heidelberg 1886, 21: "Ego N. iuro (. . .) in quolibet libro faciendo principium contra dicta et conclusiones eius vel eorum, qui mecum concurrerint legendo, instare." An interesting example of such a discussion is given by Peter of Candia, who in his principium reacts against the criticism of his socius Francis of Saint Michael, who for his part had reacted against the earlier criticism of Peter of Candia. The relevant passage is edited in F. Ehrle, Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia des Pisaner Papstes Alexanders V. Ein Beitrag zur Scheidung der Schulen in der Scholastik des vierzehnten Jahrhunderts und zur Geschichte des Wegestreites, Miinster 1925 (Franziskanische Studien, Beiheft 9), 45: "(. . .) secuntur due propositiones correlative contradicentes propositionibus positis per venerabilem magistrum meum Franciscum de Sancto Mychaele in suo secundo principio pro responsione ad argumentum meum primum factum contra decimam propositionem declarativam quarte conclusionis sui principii (. . .)." The discussion among the socii is also documented in Franfois de Meyronnes-Pierre Roger, Disputatio (1320-1321), ed. by J. Barbet, Paris 1961 (Textes philosophiques du Moyen Age, 9).
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have known the opinions of at least one of his socii by then, since he refers to Heilmannus Wunnenberger as socius and baccalarius formatus huius almae universitatis.28 The addition baccalarius formatus indicates that Wunnenberger had already given his third principium and that therefore he was in the second year of reading the Sentences.29 According to the Statutes, the coming sententiarius was allowed one year of preparation before delivering his lectures on the Sentences, but during that time he had to attend official lectures such as the principia.30 Marsilius began reading the Sentences in 1392. He therefore must have known what Wunnenberger had put forward in the principia to the first and second book, which he had read in the preceding year (1391).31 But there is no discussion with Wunnenberger in the version of the principa which has been preserved in the Sentences commentary, neither in the opening question of the first book, nor in those of the second and third book, although by the time Marsilius started commenting on the second and third book, he surely must have been familiar with the reactions of his socii against the statements of his first principium?2 It is only in the fifth question of his first book that he mentions the views of Heilmannus Wunnenberger, but without any relation to the subject of the first principium.33
28
See Quaestiones, ed. Santos, qu. 1, 6. This is evident from the oldest Statutes of the Theological Faculty, edited in Winkelmann, Urkundenbuch der Universitat Heidelberg, 21: "Item ordinatum et statutum est quod faciens principium ordinate in tercium sententiarum sit et reputatur baccalarius in theologia pro magistro formatus." 30 Ibid., 21: "Postquam quis cursum (sc. in theologia) finiverit, vacabit per unum annum, in quo ad legendum sententias se diligenter preparet, nichilominus tamen tenetur tune visitare scolas et actus publicos et semel respondeat ac predicet ad minus anno eodem." 31 In Heidelberg, reading the Sentences took two years (see Winkelmann, Urkundenbuch der Universitat Heidelberg, 21). That Wunnenberger began reading the Sentences in 1391 can also be inferred from the fact that he was legens cursus suos' in theology in 1387, see Die Rektorbucher der Universitat Heidelberg, Band 1: 1386-1410, Heft 1, ed. by J. Miethke, Heidelberg 1986, 161 n. 86. Reading the Scriptures took two years (1387-1389). He then had a year of preparation for his commentary on the Sentences (1390), which he began delivering in the following year. 32 That Marsilius expected reactions from his socii is documented by the following remark, see Quaestiones, ed. Santos, 52: "(• . .) ideo prolixe scripsi, ut reverendis magistris meis praeberem materiam me informandi subtilibus imaginationibus suis et rationibus in contrarium faciendis." See also, ibid., 6: "(. . .) quandoque corollarie arguam cum reverendis magistris meis et patribus (. . .)" and 24: "(. . .) expectans instantias magistrorum meorum (. . .)". 33 See Quaestiones, ed. Santos, 127. 29
THE COMMENTARY OF MARSILIUS OF INGHEN
479
The only plausible explanation for the absence of the discussion is, therefore, that these questions do not represent the actual principia he held, but that they were rewritten and that during the process of rewriting Marsilius dropped the debate with his socii, for reasons that are unclear.34 Since the original principia of Marsilius are lost, it is impossible to determine what exactly he omited and altered.30
4. Problems concerning the date of composition Since Marsilius kept on redrafting his text up to his death, it is difficult to determine the exact date of composition. The only fixed points are the reading of the Sentences at Heidelberg in 1392-1394 and the year of his death (1396). It is not unlikely that Marsilius wrote down parts of the commentary already during the preparatory year allowed to the sententiarius in Heidelberg. Also, he may have started collecting material even earlier, perhaps in Paris where he began to study theology about 1366, or he may have used material put forward in other writings and disputions in Paris.36 Some observations seem to point to these possibilities. Firstly, Marsilius mentions no authors from the period after 1370. He only rarely enters into discussions with his contemporaries.37 Especially striking are his principia, which in the existent version discuss the same problems as treated in the principia of Parisian theologians such as Hugolino of Orvieto, John of Ripa, Stephen Gaudet, Peter of Candia, Gerard of Kalkar, and Bonsembiante Badoer.38 Marsilius takes issue with the views of Hugolino of Orvieto and John of Ripa, not with those of his socii. This seems to suggest that in
34 However, he did not succeed in completely erasing the traces of the debate (cf. note 32 above). 35 The original principia of Marsilius appear as a separate item on the book list of 1396. See Die Rektorbiicher der Universitat Heidelberg, 477: "(98) Item (420) principium suum super sentencias cum aliis sexternis", and Topke, Die Matrikel, vol. 1, 679 (Anhang IV). 36 It was usual for the sententarius to do preparatory work in advance. See V. Marcolino, 'Der Augustinertheologe an der Universitat Paris', Gregor von Rimini. Werk und Wirkung bis zur Reformation, ed. by H. A. Oberman, Berlin 1981 (Spatmittelalter und Reformation, 20), 127-194, 150f. 37 Courtenay, 'Marsilius of Inghen as Theologian', 52. 38 See my 'Neuplatonismus am Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts', 172f.
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MAARTEN J. F. M. HOENEN
the final draft of his principia he may have used materials collected as a student in Paris. Secondly, in the Sentences commentary of the Parisian theologian Angelus Dobelin composed about 1375 a view is attributed to Marsilius which can be found in his commentary on the Prior analytics and in his commentary on the Sentences. By that time Marsilius's opinions therefore must have been well-known among the Parisian theologians. And although it is not clear whether Angelus Dobelin is quoting from Marsilius's commentary on the Prior analytics or from (a draft version of) his commentary on the Sentences, since the same view is defended in both, at least it proves that Marsilius put forward opinions in the commentary on the Sentences which he had already defended in Paris about 1375.39 These two observations seem to imply that Marsilius used materials which date back to an early stage of his career. However, it remains unclear when he started editing this early material and began writing the text, which was to become his Sentences commentary. The narrowing down of the terminus a quo must therefore be left open until new evidence is found.
5. The manuscripts and the printed edition of 1501
The first book of the Sentences commentary has been preserved in four manuscripts and in the printed edition of 1501. Although this is not a rich textual tradition, none of the other books has so many witnesses. Of the fourth book, only one manuscript is known to date.40 The manuscripts contain only Marsilius's commentary, with the exception of Tubingen, Wilhelmsstift, Gb 336b, which in addition to the fourth book also has the commentary on the Decalogue by Henricus de Frimaria.41 In what follows, only the manuscripts of the first book are described.
39
On this issue, see Courtenay, 'Marsilius of Inghen as Theologian', 48-52. On the the manuscripts and the printed edition, see M. J. F. M. Hoenen, 'Einige Notizen', 117-163. 41 Incipits of Latin Works on the Virtues and Vices, 1100-1500 A.D., ed. by M. W. Bloomfield e.a., Cambridge, Mass., 1979 (The Mediaeval Academy of America Publication, 88), 59-60, no. 0526: "Audi, Israel, precepta Domini (. . .) In verbis propositis (. . .)." 40
THE COMMENTARY OF MARSILIUS OF INGHEN
J
481
Isny, Nikolaikirche, Hs. 48, fifteenth century, 310 x 220 mm, paper and parchment, two columns per page, written by one hand (Gerald of Castrikum), no foliation but modern pagination counting each side (except for the first page; only the even pages bear page numbers), pag. 611. Incipit of the first book, pag. la: "Primis itaque duobus, videlicet divini nominis invocatione et brevi sacrae scripturae commendatione (. . .)". Explicit of the first book, pag. 345b: "Aliae duae rationes arguunt pro dictis in septima conclusione. Hoc de quaestione. Et sic est finis primi. Benedictus Deus. Amen. Parcant mihi lectores et corrigant et emendent. Non plus potui brevitate temporis et alias impeditus. Expliciunt quaestiones primi libri Sententiarum reverendi magistri Mercilii de Inghen sacrae theologiae professoris eximii. Scriptae per magistrum Gheraerdum Gasterkem propria manu." The same addition to the explicit "Parcant (. . .) impeditus" can be found in manuscript K. Incipit of the second book: pag. 354a: "Circa secundum librum Sententiarum movendo et disputando quaestionem primam et continuando materiam de perfectionibus in primo principio meo tactam formo quaestionem talem (. . .)". Explicit of the second book: pag. 595b: "Ad rationes pro quaesito dicitur quod auctoritas Apostoli Ad Romanos 13 vult primas duas quaestiones secundi articuli. Hoc de quaestione. Expliciunt quaestiones secundi libri Sententiarum magistri Mercilii de Inghen sacrae theologiae professoris eximii scriptae per magistrum Gerardum Casterkem propria manu. Deus daret vitam omnibus nobis sacra eloquia delucidantibus. Deo gratias." Outside front cover, by a hand of the fifteenth century: "Quaestiones venerabilis magistri Marsilii super primum et secundum Sententiarum". Inside front cover, again by a contemporary hand: "Quaestiones primi et secundi Sententiarum Marsilii". Initials. Occasionally initials are absent but room is left for their inclusion. Marginal notes indicating the structure of the text and marginal annotations. Quotations and the structure of the text are highlighted by underlining. A number of columns and pages are blank (italics are used where they correspond to absent rationes principales}:42 294b (partially) through 296a, 309b (partially) through 312, 345b (after the explicit), 346 through
42
On these absent rationes principales, see section 3 and the reference in note 23 above.
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MAARTEN J. F. M. HOENEN
353, 383" (partially) through 383b, 443a (partially), 46l a (partially), 560a (partially) through 561, 596 through 607, 610.
A complete table of the questions treated in the manuscript is given on pag. 608: "Sequuntur tituli quaestionum primi libri Sententiarum" and pag. 609: "Sequuntur tituli quaestionum secundi libri". In all probabablity, J is the oldest manuscript of the first book and has its origin in Heidelberg. It was written by Gerald of Castrikum, who was in Heidelberg between 1411 and 1419.43 It is not unlikely that he copied the commentary of Marsilius during his stay in Heidelberg. If this supposition is correct, J dates from the second decade of the fifteenth century. Marsilius of Inghen and Gerald of Castrikum, who originated from the diocese of Utrecht, were compatriots. The manuscript is now part of the collection of the library of the Nikolaikirche at Isny. In the fifteenth century a fair number of students came from Isny to Heidelberg. On their way back to Isny they carried manuscripts copied in Heidelberg with them.44 It is not known who carried the Sentences commentary of Marsilius to Isny. The manuscript is clearly written and has a good textual quality, with a minimal number of omissions. K
Krakow, Biblioteka Jagiellonska, Cod. 1581, fifteenth century, 310 x 205 mm, paper, written by several hands, fol. 322. Incipit of the first book, fol. 10r: "Primis itaque duobus, videlicet divini nominis invocatione et brevi sacrae scripturae commendatione (. . .)". Explicit of the first book, fol. 316r: "(. . .) Aliae duae rationes arguunt pro dictis in septima conclusione. Hoc de quaestione. Et sic est finis primi. Benedictus Deus. Parcant mihi lectores et corrigant et emendent. Non plus potui brevitate temporis et alias impeditus etc." Incipit of the second book, fol. 316r: "[CJirca secundum librum sententiarum. Disputando quaestionem primam et continuando materiam de perfectionibus in primo principio meo tactam formo quaestionem (. . .)".
43 He became Dean of the Arts Faculty in 1419. See Topke, Die Matrikel, vol. 2, 373. When exactly he left Heidelberg is not known. 44 One of the manuscripts (Isny, Nikolaikirche, Hs. 49) was copied in Heidelberg in 1447. See K. O. Muller, Die Handschriften der Bibliothek der Nikolauskirche in Isny (typescript 1936), 49: "Hs. n. 49, Albertus Magnus, De laudibus Marie, fol. 187. (. . .) Expliciunt laudes b. Virg. Marie et finite sunt per me Johannem Frantz de Leypphain in studio Heydelbergensi anno etc. (14)47 in vigilia Pasce."
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Explicit of the second book: fol. 32 lv: "(• • •) haec creatio non est possibilis sequitur ex principio philosophiae naturalis. Igitur haec non potest probari ex puro lumine." On the first fly leaf, a later hand attributes the text wrongly to Marsilio Ficino: "Marsilius Ficinus in primum Sententiarum." On the top of the first text page (fol. 10r) a contemporary hand wrote: "Quaestio circa principium primi libri Sententiarum ordinata a venerabili magistro Marsilio sacrae theologiae professore in studio Heidelbergensi." Initials. Occasionally initials are absent but room is left for their inclusion. Marginal notes indicating the structure of the text and marginal annotations by several hands. Quotations and the structure of the text are highlighted by underlining. Some pages are blank (italics are used where they correspond to absent rationes principales): 9V, 254V through 262V, 274r (partially) through 275", 283r (partially) through 285" (partially), 322™. A table of questions is given on fol. l r -9 r .
This manuscript contains not only the text of the first book, but also a small part of the second. The text of the second book ends abruptly on fol. 32l v with the words "ex puro lumine" and continues in the catch words at the bottom of the page "26. naturali. Maior patet", but the next fol. 322r is blank. It is unclear, whether or not the continuation got lost or was never written. There are two more manuscripts with books of the commentary of Marsilius in the Biblioteka Jagiellonska. Cod. 1268 contains the second book and Cod. 1580 the third book. All three manuscripts contain marginal notes and a table of questions written by the same hand, which has been identified as that of John of Dabrovka.45 He earned his degree as a Master at the Theological Faculty of Cracow before 1437 and might have read the commentary of Marsilius as a student. This, however, is uncertain and cannot be used for dating the manuscript. Only his death in 1471 (Palacz) or 1472 (Stegmuller) is an undoubtable terminus ad quern here.46
45
M. Golaszewska, J. B. Korolec, A. Poltawaski, Z. K. Siemiatkowska, I. Tarnowska, Z. Wlodek, 'Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplement au Repertoire de F. Stegmuller', Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum, 2 (1958), 22-27, esp. 25. The hand of John of Dabrovka also wrote marginal notes in Biblioteka Jagiellonska, Cod. 521, which contains the Tractatus de contractibus of Henry of Oyta. See A. Lang, Heinrich Totting von Oyta. Ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte der ersten deutschen Universitaten und zur Problemgeschichte der Spatscholastik, Minister 1937, 102 (n. 23). 46 Biographical notes on John of Dabrovka are provided by R. Palacz, 'Les manuscrits du Policraticon de Jean de Salisbury en Pologne', Mediaevalia Philosophica
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MAARTEN J. F. M. HOENEN
In 1441 and 1442 Thomas of Strampino used the commentary of Marsilius for the preparation of his principia, which were held in Cracow. But it cannot be ascertained whether or not he used the manuscripts which are now in Cracow. If he did, their terminus ad quern is fixed by the date of these principia. Interestingly, Thomas extracted only passages from the first three books of Marsilius, not of the fourth, which is still absent in Cracow today.47 Manuscript K has a good textual quality, almost comparable to that of manuscript J. Both J and K have far fewer omissions than manuscripts W and L. Also, they have the same scribal note "Parcant (. . .) impeditus" at the end of the first book. Obviously, they go back to a common source. Yet, there is no immediate connection between the two manuscripts. W Stuttgart, Wiirttembergische Landesbibliothek, Cod. Theol. 2° 113, fifteenth century, 320 x 215 mm, paper, two columns per page, written by several hands, modern foliation (eighteenth century?), fol. 298. Incipit of the first book: fol. 2ra: "Primis itaque duobus, videlicet divini nominis invocatione et brevi sacrae scientiae commendatione (. . .)". Explicit of the first book: fol. 294vb: "Aliae duae rationes arguunt pro dictis in septima conclusione. Hoc de quaestione." Generally, initials of the quaestiones and the standard introductory phrasing of the articuli are missing, but room is left for their inclusion. At the beginning now and then marginal notes indicate the structure of the text. There are also smaller annotations (fol. 5ra: "secunda pars articuli contra Okam"). Later on these are almost absent. The structure of the text is highlighted by rubrication. Some columns and pages are blank (italics are used where they correspond to absent rationes principales): lra~vb, 249m (partially) through 25GFa, 26r (partially) through 263va, 295va through 298vb. Summaries of the first six quaestiones on fol. 294vb-295rb. The first and the second quaestio are summarized at some length.48 Of the sixth quaestio only the title is given. These summaries are written in a hand of the fifteenth century.
Polonorum, 10 (1961), 55—58, esp. 57, and F. Stegmiiller, Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi, vol. 1, Wiirzburg 1947, 200. 47 For further details, see note 14 above. 48 The summary of the first quaestio is given in section 6 below.
THE COMMENTARY OF MARSILIUS OF INGHEN
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This manuscript belonged to the Benedictine Monastery of Wiblingen (Southern Germany), as is indicated at the top of fol. 2r (later hand): "Monasterii Wiblingen". Similar notes can be found on the first text page of the manuscripts Tubingen, Wilhelmsstift, Gb 336a, and Tubingen, Wilhelmsstift, Gb 336b, which contain the second and fourth book of Marsilius's commentary respectively.49 These three manuscripts belonged together, as can also be inferred from the summaries they contain, which are written in the same hand. It is difficult to determine whether or not these manuscripts were written in the monastery. At the end of Tubingen, Wilhelmsstift, Gb 336b, the scribe of the Decalogue commentary of Henricus de Frimaria wrote: "scripta (. . .) per dominum Michaelem Slesitam". The hand of this scribe can be recognized in parts of the preceding Sentences commentary of Marsilius. Unfortunately, he is not on the list of the scribes of the monastery, who are known by other sources.50 That he characterized himself as 'dominus' indicates that he probably was not a member of the monastery community itself, since the monks called themselves 'frater' in the colophon of the writings they copied. Yet, the manuscript bears the characteristic design and layout of the manuscripts that were produced in Wiblingen.51 The date of the manuscript is uncertain. The watermark makes plausible a date of sometime between 1436 and 1440.52 This would coincide with the flourishing of the writing activities in Wiblingen, which only really began after the Melk Reform in 1436. Already in 1450 the library probably possessed about 200 volumes.53 The manuscripts are not on the book list composed in Wiblingen between 1432 and 1450. This does not mean, however, that they 49 Tubingen, Wilhelmsstift, Gb 336a: "Monasterii Wiblingen", and Tubingen, Wilhelmsstift, Gb 336b: "Monasterii Wiblingensis". These manuscripts are not foliated. 50 A list of scribes is given in Mittelalterliche Bibliothekskataloge Deutschlands und der Schweiz, vol. 1, ed. by P. Lehmann, Miinchen 1918, 431-450, and H. Hummel, 'Bibliotheca Wiblingana. Aus Scriptorium und Bibliothek der ehemaligen Benediktinerabtei Wiblingen', Studien und Mitteilungen zur Geschichte des Benediktiner-Ordens und seiner Zweige, 89 (1978), 510-570, esp. 521. 51 Compare Hummel, 'Bibliotheca Wiblingana', 516-517 (description of the design and layout of the manuscripts copied in Wiblingen) and 520. 52 G. Piccard, Die Ochsenkopjwasserzeichen, Findbuch II/3, Stuttgart 1966, Abteilung XII. Piccard identified the watermark in the manuscript Stuttgart, Wiirttembergische Landesbibliothek, Cod. Theol. 2° 113, as Ochsenkopf XII 185/6, and dated the copying to between 1436 and 1440. His analysis of the manuscript can be consulted in the Wiirttembergische Landesbibliothek. 53 Hummel, 'Bibliotheca Wiblingana', 555.
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MAARTEN J. F. M. HOENEN
were not already part of the library, since this list gives the accessions and loans only. Their first appearance is on the list of 1736: "Marsilii subtilis alemanni Quaestiones super 1. sent, in fol. Lit. M. n. 79. Eiusdem super 2. sent, in fol. Lit. M. n. 43. Eiusdem super 4. sent, in fol. Lit. M. n. 44."54 After the disintegration of the library of Wiblingen in the beginning of the nineteenth century, the manuscripts of the collection went to several other libraries. The first book of Marsilius's Sentences commentary arrived in Stuttgart in 1808, the second and fourth book went to Tubingen. Why they were split up is not known. Interestingly, however, they were separated in the catalogue of 1736 as well, as is clear from the shelf marks. The first book is listed as M. n. 79, whereas the second and fourth are numbered successively M. n. 43 and M. n. 44. In 1757 the library was transferred to another room. Then all three books were numbered successively: IB 16, I B 17, and I B 18. These shelf marks are still to be seen on the inside front cover of the manuscripts. The textual quality of the manuscript of the first book is rather poor. There are serious misreadings and omissions. Many of these omissions can also be found in manuscript L. But there is no direct connection between these manuscripts, since both contain omissions which are unique. L
Leipzig, Universitatsbibliothek, Cod. 568, 310 x 215 mm, fifteenth century, written by several hands, paper, fol. 364. Incipit of the first book, fol. lr: "Primis itaque duobus, videlicet divini nominis invocatione et brevi sacrae scientiae commendatione (. . .)". Explicit of the first book, fol. 363r: "Aliae duae rationes arguunt pro dictis in septima conclusione. Haec de quaestione etc." Inside front cover: "Iste liber comparatus est sub decanatu magistri Melchioris Lodivici de Freynstadt anno salutis nostre Ixxxviii." On the top of the first folio (l r ): "Marcilius Heydelbergensis Universitatis".
54 See Bibliotheca Wiblingana sen catalogus librorum in HI tomos divisus, torn. Ill: Manuscripta, Stuttgart, Wurttembergische Landesbibliothek, HB XV 109 c, fol. 24r. The earlier list of 1687 Catalogus omnium librorum bibliothecae Wiblingensis, which has been preserved in Rottenburg (Diozesanbibliothek, F. 356), only mentions printed editions.
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Initials. Occasionally initials are absent but room is left for their inclusion. Marginal notes indicating the structure of the text and marginal annotations. Quotations and the structure of the text are highlighted by underlining. On several folios underlinings and marginal notes are absent, especially towards the end of the manuscript. The text was corrected. As in the other manuscripts, some folios are blank (italics are used where they correspond to absent rationes principales): 3Iff (partially) through 310u, 324u (partially) through 326v, 363r (partially, after end of text). There is a table of questions on fol. 363V-364V.
As is evident from the note on the inside front cover, the manuscript was purchased and came to Leipzig in 1488.55 Melchior Lodivicus of Freynstadt (Freistadt) was dean of the Arts Faculty in the winter semester of 1487/88.56 This means that the manuscript was written before that time. The Arts Faculty or a member of that Faculty bought the manuscript. Probably, the reputation of Marsilius as Master of Arts induced the acquisition of his Sentences commentary. The marginal notes show that the manuscript was used intensively, although not all questions equally. Especially the first part was studied. A table of questions is added to the manuscript. According to Ritter a separate table of questions to the first book has been preserved in Leipzig, Universitatsbibliothek, Cod. 1090, fol. 47.57 The manuscript has a poor textual quality, with many misreadings and omissions. As indicated above, some of these also appear in manuscript W, without a direct relationship. f
Strasbourg, Martinus Flach Junior 1501, fol. al bl0, fol. 593, two columns per page, 2°. Incipit of the first book, fol. l ra : "Glarissimi viri domini Marsilii Inguen super libros Sententiarum edita in studio Heidelbergensi incipiunt feliciter ordine optimo quasi mathematicali certissimo. In nomine tuo, Jesu Christe, etc. Primis itaque duobus, videlicet divini nominis invocatione et brevi sacrae scientiae commendatione (. . .)". Explicit of the first book, fol. 200va: "Aliae duae rationes arguunt pro dictis in septima conclusione. Hoc de quaestione. Et sic est
50
'Comparatus' here means 'purchased' and not 'completed' or 'finished'. See Die Matrikel der Universitdt Leipzig, vol 2, ed. by G. Erler, Leipzig 1897, reprint Nendeln, Liechtenstein 1976, 299. 57 Ritter, Studien zur Spatscholastik, 192. 56
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MAARTEN J. F. M. HOENEN
finis prirni. Benedictus Deus. Primum scriptum libri Sententiarum venerabilis Marsilii finit feliciter." Incipit of the second book, fol. 201ra: "Circa secundum librum Sententiarum disputando quaestionem praeviam et continuando materiam de perfectionibus in primo principio meo tactam formo talem quaestionem (. . .)". Explicit of the second book, fol. 347vb: "Sed ad rationem pro quaesito dicatur quod Apostoli auctoritas Ad Romanos 13 velit primas duas conclusiones secundi articuli. Hoc de quaestione. Et sic per Dei gratiam est finis secundi. Finit secundum scriptum libri Sententiarum clarissimi Marsilii Inguen." Incipit of the third book, fol. 349ra: "Clarissimi viri domini Marsilii Inguen super tertio Sententiarum profundissima clarissimaque disputata in studio Heidelbergensi edita incipiunt feliciter, Jesu Christe, in nomine tuo. Circa tertium continuando materiam de perfectionibus semper in principiis tractatam sit prima quaestio talis: Utrum regnum increatum (. . .)". Explicit of the third book, fol. 472vb: "Ad omnes auctoritates post oppositum patet quod sint pro dictis singulae pro suo articulo. Hoc de quaestione. Finis tertii scripti." Incipit of the fourth book, fol. 473ra: "In nomine tuo, dulcis Jesu. Circa quartum librum continuando materiam cum dictis in quaestione initiali primo quaeritur: Utrum sicut sacramenta (. . .)". Explicit of the fourth book, fol. 593vb: "Ad auctoritatem Magistri post oppositum patet quod sit pro primis duabus conclusionibus. Hoc de quaestione." On the titlepage (fol. al r ): "Quaestiones Marsilii super quattuor libros Sententiarum. In Marsilium Tetrastichon. Quam superat Phaebus (. . .) Heidelbergensis lux et origo scolae. In Marsilium distichon. Inspice Marsilium quid scripserit (. . .) quod fructu non vacat iste liber." (fol. aP): "Ad lectorem. Marsilius de Inghen (. . .) Vale in Christo candide lector." Epigrammata on the second page (fol. a2 r-b ): "In laudem Marsilii poema (. . .). (. . .) Dicite, Marsilio pellitur error ingens." Tabula alphabetica on fol. a3ra-b8vb. Incipit (fol. a3ra): "Repertorium alphabeticum in quaestiones librorum quattuor Sententiarum Marsilii Inghen clarissimi doctoris incliti studii Heidelbergensis institutoris (. . .)". Explicit (b8vb): "Finit repertorium alphabeticum in quaestiones librorum quattuor Sententiarum Marsilii Inghen doctoris clarissimi." Tabula quaestionum on fol. b9ra-b9rb. Incipit (fol. b9ra): "Tabula generalis omnium quaestionum in hoc opere contentorum. Quaestiones primi Sententiarum (. . .)." Explicit (b9rb): "Finit tabula generalis totius operis."
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Colophon on fol. 593vb: "Divi Marsilii Inghen doctoris clarissimi in quattuor Sententiarum libros opus praeclarum summi Dei munere gratioso sic reductum in lucem finit feliciter. Ex officina Martini Flach iunioris civis Argentinensis 4 Kal. Septembris Anno Domini 1501. Laus Deo caeli Dominoque terrae. Throughout the edition marginal notes indicating the structure of the text. Literature: Panzer, VI, 26, 1; Hain/Copinger 3885; L. Polain, Catalogue General des Incunables des Bibliotheques Publiques de France, vol.
11, Liechtenstein 1970, 7569a d.
The edition was published in two volumes. The first volume contained the first and second book, the second volume the third and fourth. The numbering of the folia, however, was continuous. The tabula alphabetica and the tabula quaestionum were printed in the first volume preceding the text of the commentary. They covered the text of both volumes with references to the folia. This means that both volumes were printed before the compilation of the index and that the whole must have been released about the same time. In a number of libraries only the first volume has survived, which has no colophon or other indication of the printer's identity. This caused confusion as to the date and the origin of the volume. References in the literature to editions printed in Strasbourg in 1490 or in Hagenau in 1497 have their roots in this confusion.58 The text of the edition differs at two points from the text of the manuscripts. Firstly, the Latin is more in accordance with the rules of classical Latin. Where the manuscripts have indicativus praesentis or indicativus perfecti in indirect speech or final clauses after ut, the printed edition has coniunctivus praesentis or coniunctivus perfecti. This may be due to emendations by a corrector. In 1501 Matthias Schurer was corrector at the workshop of Martinus Flach Junior. In 1508 he became a printer of classical and humanist writings. He may have adapted the medieval Latin of Marsilius to standards of classical Latin.59 Secondly, in a number of smaller passages the printed edition has a version of the text which diverges from that which has survived 58
For further details, see my 'Einige Notizen iiber die Handschriften und Drucke', 153-157. 59 On Matthias Schiirer, see J. Benzing, Die Buchdrucker des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts im deutschen Sprachgebiet, 2nd edition, Wiesbaden 1982 (Beitrage zum Buch- und Bibliothekswesen, 12), 440. The editions printed by Schurer are listed in J. Muller, Bibliographic Strasbourgeoise, vol. 2, Baden-Baden 1985, 174-206.
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MAARTEN J. F. M. HOENEN
in the manuscripts.60 This raises the question of the origin of the manuscript or manuscripts used for the edition, which preserved a different redaction of the text. Possibly, Marsilius's autograph was used. The University of Heidelberg lent the manuscript to Florentius Diel de Spyra and a certain Hermannus in 1489. These two masters had expressed their wish to have the text copied and printed with a printer in Mainz (impressor in Maguntia)?1 They were unsuccessful, however. The commentary of Marsilius was never printed in Mainz.62 Perhaps the manuscript or a copy went to Strasbourg and eventually was printed by Martinus Flach Junior. But there is no positive evidence of this. The autograph is now lost. It is not in the list of the Codices Palatini Latini which was compiled in the late seventeenth century and which mentioned the books that went to Rome in 1623. A number of poems printed in the edition of the Sentences commentary had appeared earlier in Ad illustrissimum Bavariae Ducem Philippum Comitem Rheni Palatinum et ad nobilissimos filios epistola, a defense of nominalism issued by masters of the University of Heidelberg, which was printed by Peter of Friedberg in Mainz in 1499.63
6. The tabulae quaestionum and the summaries preserved in the manuscripts
The different tabulae quaestionum, the summaries, and the marginal notes which have been preserved in the manuscripts reveal how the
60
See above p. 475f. Heidelberg, Universitatsarchiv, Annales Universitatis, III, fol. 300: "Ultima mensis septembris in sacrastia ecclesiae Sancti Spiritus concessit universitas ex inferiori liberaria ad Maguntiam honorabilibus magistris Florentio Diel de Spyra et Hermanno quaestiones magistri Marsilii de Ingheym super quattuor libros Sententiarum manu ipsius conscriptas ad rescribendum et imprimendum, sic tamen quod libri maneant integri et infra anni spatium sine macula et absque ullo damno remittantur. (. . .) Addixerunt dicti magistri sponte quod vellent loqui impressori in Maguntia quod universitati postquam imprimaverit daret unum librum pro remuneratione." The University Library has a copy of the Sentences commentary (Sign. Q, 1601) printed by Flach in 1501. But this copy came to Heidelberg later. It is not the copy mentioned in the Annales Universitatis. 62 See my 'Einige Notizen iiber die Handschriften und Drucke', 143-144. 63 Compare I. Hubay, Incunabula der Staats- und Stadtbibliothek Augsburg, Wiesbaden 1974, 314, n. 1367. 61
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text of Marsilius was read and which parts were given attention to. Two examples may illustrate this here. Manuscript K contains a tabula quaestionum compiled by John of Dabrovka. His indexing of the first question is not complete. He mentions the different articles, but omits five out of six parts of the second article, which is very extensive, and only gives the dubia of the sixth article, again omitting the fourth dubium. The indexing of the second article, however, is complete. Interestingly, the wording shows that he used the divisio quaestionis which Marsilius gave at the outset of the question. The addition to the second article "(. . .) et quomodo distinguitur ab habitibus assensivis aliorum studiorum" is quoted verbatim, not from the second article itself, but from the divisio quaestionis given by Marsilius: "Secundo, ut removeatur ignorantia negationis, videbitur, quid sit theologia et quomodo distinguitur ab habitibus assensivis aliorum studiorum".64 A transcription of the first part of the tabula is given below. Krakow, Biblioteka Jagiellonska, Cod. 1581, fol. lr (tabula quaestionum}: Utrum ex diversitate idearum existentium in regno increato sumatur diversitas perfectionum productorum entium in regno create. De ideis. Utrum res dependentes difTerant inter se et sua essentiali perfectione. Utrum materia sit perfections entitatis quam formae qualitativae. Utrum in composito forma sit perfectior materia, cum materia sit perpetua et forma in multis sit corruptibilis. Utrum compositum sit perfectius sua materia et forma. Utrum ex diversitate idearum existentium in Deo sumenda sit diversitas perfectionum rerum dependentium. Utrum theologia sit scientia una de Deo tamquam de subiecto proprio.
[qu. 1]
[art. 1] [art. 2] [a. 2, p. 6, du. 1] [a. 2, p. 6, du. 2]
[a. 2, p. 6, du. 3] [art. 3]
[qu. 2]
64 See Marsilius, Quaestiones, ed. Santos, qu. 2, 64 (divisio quaestionis). The beginning of the second article has a different phrasing, Quaestiones, ed. Santos, 71: "Quantum ad secundum articulum, videndo quid sit theologia, sciendum est quod notitia assensiva capitur dupliciter (. . .)."
492
MAARTEN J. F. M. HOENEN
Quis modus generationis notitiarum in nobis et divisio communis notitiae. Quid sit theologia et quomodo distinguatur ab habitibus assensivis aliorurn studiorum. Utrum theologia sit scientia. Utrum theologia sit una scientia. Utrum Deus sit subiectum in theologia. (...)
[art. 1] [art. 2] [art. 3] [art. 4] [art. 5]
The same phenomenon of using the divisio textus for compiling the summary can be seen in the abstract of the first question which has been preserved in manuscript W. In the summary of the second article, the second 'secundo' is superfluous: "Articulus secundus est de secundo supposito, quia supponit [sc. quaestio] secundo rebus dependentibus varias perfectiones inesse." The addition of the second 'secundo' becomes clear, however, if the text is compared with the divisio textus Marsilius had given at the beginning of the first question: "(. . .) Primo enim supponit diversas ideas in Deo esse. Secundo rebus dependentibus varias perfectiones inesse."^ The compiler of the summary took the text from there, without dropping the 'secundo'. The summary in manusript W shows that the compiler was selective and had a specific interest. Of the many points which Marsilius discussed in dealing with the position of Ockham, he only quoted the view that according to the latter, there are two different ways of calling something eternal: "Item, aliquid dicitur aeternum dupliciter secundum Ockham". The complete text of the summary is given below: Stuttgart, Wurttembergische Landesbibliothek, Cod. Theol. 2° 113, fol. 244vb: 1. Utrum ex diversitate idearum existentium in regno increato sumatur diversitas perfectionum productorum entium in regno create. Per regnum creatum intelliguntur creaturae. Per increatum Deus. Tres sunt articuli. Primus est de primo supposito, scilicet de diversis ideis in Deo. Quid sit idea, de modis loquendi idearum Platonis, Augustini et Ockham. Item, aliquid dicitur aeternum dupliciter secundum Ockham. Item, Plato tria attribuit Deo. Item, prima pars Evangelii lohannis primo est reperta in libris Platonis.
55
See Marsilius, Quaestiones, ed. Santos, qu. 1, 1.
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Item, duodecim conditiones quae attribuuntur ideis. Item, inter conditiones ilia est prima: Nullae ideae sunt in Deo distinctae intrinsece et realiter. Secunda: In Deo sunt infinitae ideae extrinsece et obiectivaliter. Articulus secundus est de secundo supposito, quia supponit [sc. quaestio] secundo rebus dependentibus varias perfectiones inesse. Praemittuntur primo suppositiones. Secundo, quae sunt rerum perfectiones. Quid in re. Quod duplex sit perfectio. Et est quaedam accidentalis, quaedam essentialis. Due Ponuntur conclusiones et bona correlaria. Tertio, quod perfecciones sunt inaequales. Quarto, diversae considerationes de perfectione. Gorrelarium: Angelus est essentialiter perfectior homine. Requiris varias conclusiones. Et est septima: Sol, stellae, etiam seclusa intelligentia, quodlibet istorum quolibet animali irrationali est perfectius. Et ponitur probabiliter probaturque multipliciter. Quinto penes quid attendendae sunt perfectiones. Sexto de perfectionibus variis comparationes. Dubitatio prima: An materia prima sit perfections entitatis quam formae qualitativae. Dicitur inter cetera quod animae beatorum habent tendentiam ad sua corpora, ideo magis formae accidentales. Secunda dubitatio: An in composito forma sit perfectior materia. Et dicitur quod sic. Tertia dubitatio: An compositum sit perfectius sua forma et materia. Et dicitur quod non saltem copulatim. Quarta dubitatio: Quanto essentialiter compositum est perfectius sua forma. Et dicitur quod precise in tanto quanta est perfectio suae materiae. Articulus tertius est de quaesito, scilicet utrum ex diversitate idearum existentium in Deo sumenda sit diversitas perfectionum rerum dependentium. De hoc multae ponuntur conclusiones. Videas ad rationes ante oppositum.
7. Method and style
Sentences commentaries of the fourteenth century vary in organization, in length, and in their division of Lombard's text. Some follow Lombard very closely and comment upon every distinction. Others make a selection or rearrange the topics, as is the case in a number of English commentaries (Wodeham, Robert Holcot).66 The commentary 66
Adam Wodeham does not discuss all the distinctions, but makes a selection. See the listing of the questions of his different commentaries on the Sentences in
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MAARTEN J. F. M. HOENEN
of Marsilius is of the first type and is thus in line with the traditional form employed by Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century and by Durand of St Pourcain and Thomas of Strasbourg in the fourteenth century, to mention only a few examples. Yet, there is no complete one-to-one correspondence between Lombard and Marsilius. The commentary of Marsilius is not divided into distinctions, which were introduced in the text of Lombard in the early thirteenth century, but into questions.67 Generally, these questions deal each with a separate distinction. But there are a number of exceptions. Occasionally, distinctions are put together and discussed in one question. Sometimes, however, it is just the other way around and several questions are devoted to one distinction. This clustering of distinctions is not an isolated phenomenon. In the commentaries of Thomas of Strasbourg, Gregory of Rimini, and Hugolino of Orvieto the same procedure can be observed.68 In the first book, all distinctions of Lombard are discussed by Marsilius. This can easily be determined, since Marsilius mentions the distinctions with which his questions are concerned. In the following three books, however, things are different. Distinctions are skipped or grouped together, especially in the fourth book devoted to the sacraments. The emphasis is clearly on the first book, which also is the most extensive. Marsilius carries forth the tradition of many commentaries of the first half of the fourteenth century, which reveal an equal preference for the first book. The shift towards the fourth book with its emphasis on matters of practical theology, as it has been observed for the fifteenth century, is not yet manifest in
W. J. Courtenay, Adam Wodeham. An Introduction to his Life and Writings, Leiden 1978 (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, 21), 183-214 (Appendices 1-3). Robert Holcot selects as well. He also transposes problems that are traditionally dealt with in the first book to the second. This is the case with the question of divine foreknowledge, which is no longer discussed among the divine attributes (first book), but as part of the problem of creation (second book). 6/ As to the origin of the distinctions, which were not used by Lombard, see I. Brady, 'The Distinctions of Lombard's Book of Sentences and Alexander of Hales', Franciscan Studies, 25 (1965), 90-116, and the Prolegomena to Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, vol. 1/1, Rome 1971 (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 4), 143*-144*. 68 An interesting example of the clustering of distinctions is provided by the twelfth question of the second book. There Marsilius gives as the reason for his putting together the distinctions their thematic unity. See Quaestioms, ed. 1501, fol. 251vb: "Inde quaeritur duodecimo circa distinctionem decimam septimam secundi libri et tres sequentes, quae sunt de statu naturae integrae."
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the commentary of Marsilius. He omits the discussion of matrimony and holy orders, which are usually dealt with in the fourth book. The following table shows which of Lombard's distinctions (d.) are dealt with in Marsilius's questions (q.). It provides insight into the theological concerns of Marsilius. In the seventh question of the third book, there is also the interesting phenomenon that two distinctions are discussed in one question in such a way that distinction seven is treated as the supposition of question seven and distinction eight as quaesitum of the same question. First book q. q. q. q. q. q. q. q. q. q. q. q.
1 = principium 2 = prologus 3 = prologus 4 = d. 1 5 = d. 2-3 6 = d. 2-3 7 = d. 2-3 8 = d. 4 9 = d. 5 10 = d. 6 11 = d. 7 12 = d. 8
qqqqqqqqqqqq-
qqqqqqqqqqqq-
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
q. 7 = d. 9-11 q. 8 = d. 12 q- 9 = d. 13 q- 10 = d. 14 q- 11 = d. 15-16 q- 12 = d. 17-20
q. q. q. q.
13 14 15 16
qqqq-
5 6 7 8
qqqq-
5 = d. 7 6 = d. 8-9 7 — d. 10 8 = d. 11
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
= = = = = = = = = = = =
d. d. d. d. d. d. d. d. d. d. d. d.
9 10 11-12
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 19-20
21
22 23 24 25 26 27-28 29 30 31 = d. 32 = d. 32 = d. 33
qqqqqqqqqqq-
37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
= = = = = = = = = = =
d. d. d. d. d. d. d. d. d. d. d.
34 35-36 37 38-39 40-41 42-43 44 45 46 47 48
17-20
21 22 24-25 26-27 28-29
qqqqqq-
19 20 21 22 23 24
= d. = d. = d. = d. - d. = d.
30-33 34(?) 35-37
q. 9 = d. 11-12 q. 10 = d. 13-14 q. 11 = d. 15-17
qqq-
13 = d. 21-22 14 = d. 23-25 15 = d. 26-34
q-
13 = d. 43-44
= = = = = = = = —
d. d. d. d. d. d. d. d. d.
= = = = q. 17 = q. 18 =
d. d. d. d. d. d.
Second book q. q. q. q. q. q.
1 2 3 4 5 6
= = = = = =
principium
d. d. d. d. d.
2 3-4 5-6 7 8
38 43-44 44
Third book q. 1 = principium q. 2 = d. 1-2 q. 3 = d. 1-2 q. 4 = d. 3
= = = =
d. d. d. d.
4 5-7 7-8 9-10
q. 12 = d. 18-20
Fourth book q. 1 =
p
q. 2 = d. 1-2 q. 3 = d. 3-4 q. 4 = d. 5-6
q. 9 = d. 12-13 q. 10 — d. 14 q. 11 = d. 15-16 q. 12 = d. 14-16
Marsilius considers his text as a close commentary on Lombard. This is clear from his mentioning the relevant distinctions of Lombard at
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MAARTEN J. F. M. HOENEN
the beginning of each question and his occasional use of phrases such as 'accedendo ad litteram', to indicate that he returns to the text of Lombard.69 As is customary in commentaries that consist of questions, there is no summary or paraphrasing nor any division (divisio textus) of Lombard. Only seldom is the content of the distinctions referred to briefly.70 The many questions of the commentary are structured uniformly. The original question is divided into at least two subquestions, one of which investigates the presuppositions of the orginal question (the supposition), while the other is concerned with the subject itself (the quaesiturri). The rationes principales and the articuli are distinguished according to the subquestions. A first set of rationes principales gives arguments for and against the suppositum, whereas a second set brings arguments for and against the quaesitum. One or more articuli discuss the suppositum, others discuss the quaesitum. Sometimes a separate article with dubia is added. The question ends by responding to the rationes principales.11 The articles are designed according to the distinction between suppositiones, notabilia, and conclusiones. The suppositiones and notabilia precede the conclusiones and are intended to support the conclusiones and to add materials for their proof. The conclusiones are no inferences or deductions, but statements which present the basic ideas and steps of the argument. They are also called propositiones. The central statement is called conclusio responsalis or propositio responsalis. It provides the answer to the question posed in the suppositum or quaesitum. Frequently, the conclusiones are followed by a set of corollaria, which develop the ideas put forward in the conclusiones.n
69 See, e.g., Quaestiones, ed. 1501, Lib. 3, q. 4, fol. 372vb: "Quarto tractatis dubiis circa unionem quaeritur, accedendo ad litteram, circa distinctionem tertiam utrum
( • • 70 •)•" See the reference in note 68 above and Quaestiones, ed. Santos, 205: "Circa distinctiones secundam et tertiam, in quibus declarat Magister unitatem essentiae et trinitatem personarum, quaeritur quinto loco, utrum sit tantum unus Deus." 71 In the modern edition (ed. Santos) the division of the questions is highlighted by the use of titles. 72 Constructing the argument by the use of suppositiones, notabilia, conclusiones, and corollaria is typical for commentaries since the second quarter of the fourteenth century, not only in theology (Gregory of Rimini, Hugolino of Orvieto, John of Ripa, Peter of Ailly), but also in natural philosophy and metaphysics (John Buridan, Marsilius of Inghen). Compare the oath of the sententiarius in Heidelberg (Winkelmann, Urkundenbuch der Universitdt Heidelberg, 21): "Ego N. iuro (. . .) legere sententias (. . .) et textum totaliter per conclusiones legendo et exponendo."
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The use of suppositiones, notabilia, conclusiones, and corollaria conveys the impression of a commentary, which in its rigor is comparable to a mathematical treatise. For this reason the editor of the printed edition of 1501 added that the commentary was designed according to an "ordo optimus quasi mathematicalis certissimus".73
8. Sources and authors discussed Marsilius possessed a large library of over 230 volumes, some of which contained several items.74 He bequeathed this collection to the University of Heidelberg, as Conrad of Worms and Conrad Gelnhausen had done before him.75 In 1396, the titles of the books were listed in the first volume of the matricula, in which the property of the University was specified. This practice was started during the rectorship of Berthold of Dieburg (1395/96). The matricula have survived together with the property catalogue. A contemporary copy of this catalogue has come down to us in the Acta Universitatis.76 This catalogue provides insights into the composition of Marsilius's library. Unfortunately, most of its books cannot be traced and are perhaps lost. In 1623, they moved to Rome as part of the Bibliotheca Palatina. Only 29 volumes of the Vatican Library have been recognized as belonging to the original collection of Marsilius of Inghen.77 The 1396 catalogue shows the diversity of the books collected by Marsilius. All fields of late medieval intellectual culture are represented.78 The rubrics of the catalogue distinguish between theologia (with a great number of commentaries on the Sentences), ius, meditina,
73
Quaestiones, ed. 1501, Lib. 1, fol. l ra . See, e.g., Die Rektorbucher, 476: "Item (391) plures libros beati Bernhardi in eodem volumine" and ibid., 477: "Item (407) multi tractatus et sermones beati Bernhardi, Amselmi (!), Richardi et aliorum in uno volumine." 75 On the library of Marsilius, see D. Walz, 'Marsilius von Inghen als Schreiber und Buchersammler', Marsilius von Inghen. Werk und Wirkung. Akten des zweiten intemationalen Marsilius-von-Inghen-Kongresses, ed. by S. Wielgus, Lublin 1993, 31—70, esp. 32. 76 See Die Rektorbucher, 466f. 77 Walz, 'Marsilius von Inghen', 50-59. 78 See Topke, Die Matrikel der Universitdt Heidelberg, vol. 1, 678—685. Another example of a medieval scholarly library covering all fields of medieval learning is studied in M. J. F. M. Hoenen, Speculum philosophiae medii aevi. Die Handschriftensammlung des Dominikaners Georg Schwartz (f nach 1484), Amsterdam 1994 (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophic, 22), esp. 135-138. 74
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metaphysica, moralia, philosophia naturalis, mathematica, logica, and grammatica. Also, the doctrinal scope of the collection is large. It contains writings of Plato, Cicero, Ovid, Seneca, Augustine, Bernard of Clairvaux, Richard of St Victor, Alan of Lille, Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, John of Jandun, John Buridan, Adam Wodeham, Robert Holcot, Gregory of Rimini, Thomas of Strasbourg, and John of Ripa. The diversity of the collection is mirrored in the commentary on the Sentences, where Marsilius quotes a great variety of sources. In addition to thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century thinkers such as Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, Giles of Rome, Peter Auriol, Durand of St Pourcain, and William of Ockham, he also refers to theologians of later date such as Bradwardine, Thomas af Strasbourg, Adam Wodeham, Gregory of Rimini, Hugolino of Orvieto, and John of Ripa. Remarkably, no theologians writing after 1370 are quoted by name, with the exception of Heilmannus Wunnenberger and Johannes Holszadel, who are mentioned as socii at the beginning of the first book. Even Conrad of Soltau, with whose work Marsilius was surely familiar, is not mentioned anywhere. The same pattern is found in the works of other theologians, especially at the beginning of the fifteenth century. In the commentary on the Sentences of John Capreolus (written 1409-1432), for instance, practically no theologians of the second half of the fourteenth century are mentioned, with the exception of John of Ripa. The same holds true of the commentary by John Bremer (1429), who mostly quoted Bonaventure and Scotus, and sometimes also later theologians such as Peter of Candia.79 Although there are many places in which Marsilius mentions his sources, he also quotes them without attribution. In this case only a comparison of the texts involved can show which passages from the works of others he adopted. In particular he used the commentaries on the Sentences by Durand of St Pourgain, Thomas of Strasbourg, Adam Wodeham, and Gregory of Rimini without attribution. That he had the works of others at his desk while composing his writings has already been established by earlier research, not
79 See John Capreolus, Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis, vol. 1—7, ed. C. Paban and Th. Phegues, Tours 1900-1908, and L. Meier, 'Der Sentenzenkommentar des Johannes Bremer', Franziskanische Studien, 15 (1928), 161-169, esp. 167 (with a list of authors cited by John Bremer).
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only regarding his commentary on the Sentences, but also with respect to his commentaries on Aristotle, in which he follows Buridan closely and takes over many of his questions and conclusiones.80 A study of which sources are used provides insight into the process of textual composition. In the following tables a number of cases in which Marsilius silently borrowed from the works of others has been put together. These tables show that he used these works in all parts of his questions: the rationes principals, the notabilia, the conclusiones, and the objections or dubia. Also they give an impression of the wide range of sources employed. In the cases collected here Marsilius adopted passages from Robert Holcot, Durand of St Fountain, Adam Wodeham, and Thomas of Strasbourg. 8.1. Rationes principales That Marsilius used the writings of others as a source for the rationes principales is not exceptional. Yet it raises the question of the nature of these rationes. Since they are taken over almost verbatim, it may seem that they go back to the written version only and were not put forward during the oral lectures on the Sentences. But this is difficult to determine. Disputations have survived in which the respondent and opponent made out their cases with arguments verbally extracted from the Summa theologiae of Thomas Aquinas.81 Arguments which are borrowed from the works of others may therefore have been put forward orally. They may have been collected in advance and afterwards used as part of the disputation. The rationes quoted below relate to the discussion as to whether or not the unity of the divine essence is consistent with the trinity of the divine persons. In Marsilius, the one argument immediately follows the other. In Holcot, however, they are dispersed and serve as the fourteenth and third argument for the view that the three divine persons do not differ but are one with the divine essence without any distinction.
80 See W. Mohler, Die Trinitdtslehre des Marsilius von Inghen. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Theolagie des Spatmittelalters, Limburg/Lahn 1949, and M. J. F. M. Hoenen, Marsilius of Inghen. Divine Knowledge in Late Medieval Thought, Leiden 1993 (Studies in the History of Christian Thought, 50). 81 For an interesting example, see my Speculum philosophiae medii aevi, 114-130.
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Robert Holcot, In quatuor libros Sentmtiarum quaestiones, Lyon 1518, Reprint Frankfurt am Main 1967, Lib. 1, q. 5, fol. fl rb , e8va:
Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum, Lib. 1, qu. 6, ed. Santos, 226:
Praeterea, haec est vera: trinitas est unus Deus. Ergo trinitas est unitas. Sed non est Pater, neque Filius, neque Spiritus Sanctus. Ergo est quarta res in divinis.
Secundo sic: Si concedit catholicus in Deo trinitatem, tune habet hanc concedere: trinitas est unus Deus. Consequentia nota est. Et ultra: ergo trinitas est unitas. Sed trinitas non est Pater, nee Filius, nee etiam Spiritus Sanctus', ergo est quarta res', ergo in Deo erit quaternarius. Quod non est concedendum.
Praeterea, Deus et trinitas sunt omni modo idem quo simpliciter est melius esse idem quam non idem. Sed esse idem essentialiter et personaliter est simpliciter melius quam non esse sic idem. Igitur Deus et trinitas sunt idem essentialiter. Maior patet per Anselmum Proslogion 15: Tu es itaque iustus, verax et beatus et quidquid est melius esse quam non esse. Minor patet etiam, quia quicquid convenit Patri est melius simpliciter ipsum quam non ipsum, igitur etc.
Tertio sic arguitur: Deus est illud quod melius est esse quam non esse; sed esse idem personaliter et realiter est melius quam tantummodo esse idem essentialiter, igitur etc. Maior patet Proslogion capitulo 5: Tu es itaque iustus, verax et bonus et quidquid est melius esse quam non esse. Minor probatur, quia quidquid convenit Patri est melius ipsum quam non ipsum; modo Pater est idem esentialiter et personaliter.
8.2. Notabilia The notabilia are the tool for solving the questions posed. Because of their instrumental character it is obvious that they may have their origin in methodological distinctions which had proved to be useful in the writings of others and thus had become part of the common knowledge of how to deal with certain traditional questions. In the following example three forms of theology are distinguished. Marsilius borrows these distinctions from Durandus and adds a fourth one (not quoted here) of his own.
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Durandus of St Pourgain, In Sententias commentariorum libri ///, Venice 1571, Reprint Ridgewood, New Jersey 1964, Lib 1, prol., qu. 1, fol. 2va:
Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum, Lib. 1, qu. 2, ed. Santos, 72-73:
Quantum ad primum notandum est, quod theologia videtur posse accipi tripliciter: Uno rnodo pro habitu, quo solurn vel principaliter assentimus his, quae in Sacra Scriptura traduntur, et prout in ea traduntur. (. . .)
Tertio est notandum, quod theologia potest capi tripliciter vel quadrupliciter: Uno modo pro habitu vel actu vel utrisque simul, quo vel quibus assentimus his, quae in Sacra Scriptura traduntur, prout in ea traduntur. (. . .)
Secundo accipitur theologia pro habitu, quo fides et ea quae in Sacra Scriptura traduntur, defenduntur et declarantur, ex quibusdam principiis nobis notioribus. Et sic accipit earn Augustinus (. . .).
Secundo modo theologia dicitur habitus, quo per huiusmodi revelata nota et credits fides et ea, quae in Scriptura Sacra traduntur, defenduntur contra haereticos et declarantur apud simpliciores indigentes, quo modo capit earn beatus Augustinus (. . .).
Tertio accipitur theologia communis (nescio si verius) pro habitu eorum, quae deducuntur ex articulis fidei, et ex dictis Sacrae Scripturae, sicut conclusiones ex principiis (. . .).
Tertio modo theologia dicitur habitus alicuius conclusionis vel propositionis deductae ex articulis fidei sive ex dictis Sacrae Scripturae, vel pro omnibus habitibus in mente alicuius existentibus hoc modo acquisitis, sicut habitus conclusionum in geometria deductarum dicuntur scientia geometriae. (. . .)
8.3. Conclusiones The conclusiones are the heart of the late medieval question. Here the author lays down the solution to the problem, mostly in several steps. Since they are so important, it may seem unusual that they have been taken over from the works of others. But this would be a wrong impression. At several other occasions in his commentary Marsilius borrows them from others as well.82 The same goes for his commentaries on Aristotle, where many conclusiones are taken almost verbatim from the works of Buridan. This means that the conclusiones in the writings of Marsilius are not to be considered as strictly individual 82
For example in his discussion of the divine attributes; see my Marsilius of Inghen, 56-61.
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expressions of the author's opinions. The emphasis is not on the author, but on the content or sententia of the conclusions. They give expression to the opinions to which the author adheres, also when they are not originally his own. In the example given here, the conclusiones concern the discussion of the divine trinity and are taken from the same question as the rationes principales quoted above.83 Adam Wodeham, Ordinatio, Abbreviatio Henrici de Oyta, Paris 1512, Lib. 1, d. 33, q. 1, fol. 73va-74ra
Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum, Lib. 1, qu. 6, ed. Santos, 237 241:
Dico primo quod divina essentia Hoc praemisso sit prima conclusio non distinguitur realiter a persona, talis, quod essentia divina non distinita quod essentia non sit persona guitur realiter a persona, sic scilicet vel non sit res quae est persona vel quod non sit persona seu quod non sit econtra. (. . .) res quae est persona. (. . .) Secunda conclusio essentia divina non realiter distinguitur a proprietate personali sive ista sit relatio sive aliquid aliud. (. . .)
Secunda conclusio: Essentia divina non distinguitur realiter a proprietate personali, sive ista proprietas sit relatio vel aliqua alia res. (. . .)
Tertia conclusio quod essentia et Tertia conclusio, quod essentia divina proprietas non sunt in eadem per- et proprietas personalis nullo modo sona distinctae formalitates eius- sunt distinctae res in persona, cuius dem rei, ita scilicet quod fiat una ipsa est proprietas, sive illae res res, non tamen eadem formalitas, distinctae vocentur distinctae formased multae formalitates ex parte litates, sive distinctae perfectiones, vel rei vel perfectiones et formales distincti modi reales eiusdem rei, sive rationes distinctae, vel modi reales formaks rationes distinctae, vel distinceiusdem rei a parte rei distincti vel toe quidditates vel quolibet alio modo, distinctae quidditates vel quovis quo placet huiusmodi distincta quoalio nomine appellentur. (. . .) modolibet appellare. (. . .) Concede igitur absque haesitatione Corollarium: Quod essentia et proprialiqua quod essentia et proprietas etas personalis Patris non plus sunt forpersonalis Patris non plus sunt for- malitates inter se distinctae quam distinctae malitates inter se distinctae quam res, (. . .) distinctae res. Gum igitur non sit concedendum quod proprietas per- Secundum: Quod cum proprietas personalis sit res distincta ab essentia sonalis non sit distincta res ab essentia divina, igitur nee est formalitas ab divina, etiam non formalitas ab ea disea distincta. tincta. (. . .) 83
Marsilius seems to have used the Oyta Abbreviatio, not Wodeham's Ordinatio itself, which has a slightly different text here. Compare Adam Wodeham, Ordinatio, Paris, Bibl. Mazarine, Cod. 915, fol. 101vb-102ra.
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8.4. Dubia The final example concerns a dubiwn which has been inserted in the text. It deals with the divine causality of evil and has been taken from Thomas of Strasbourg, an author whose commentary on the Sentences is often employed by Marsilius, although he does not always follow his views.84 The use of a source for formulating a dubium is not unusual. Sometimes Marsilius takes them from Lombard's Sentences. This should make the modern reader aware of the fact that the problems put forward in the dubia do not always express contemporary debates, but may have been standardized. Thomas of Strasbourg, Commentaria in HII libros Sententiarum, Venice 1564, Reprint Ridgewood, New Jersey 1965, Lib. 1, dist. 2, qu. 1, fol. 28ra:
Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum, Lib. 1, qu. 5, ed. Santos, 218:
Et ex dictis eorum (sc. haereticorum) multipliciter potest argui. Primo sic: Tale per participationem praesupponit tale per essentiam. Sed est dare bonum et malum per participationem. Ergo est dare bonum et malum per essentiam. Sed quod est tale per essentiam, hoc ipsi dicunt Deum. Ergo etc.
Si dicatur: Est dare malum per participationem; ergo est dare malum per essentiam, quia videtur quod omne per participationem dictum reducatur ad aliquid quod per essentiam est tale.
Praeterea, ubicumque est dare causam secundam, ibi est dare causam primam, quia secundum non dicitur, nisi in ordine ad primum. Sed est dare secundam causam moventem ad malum. Ergo et primam. Et hoc erit Deus malorum.
Item, in malis est dare causam secundam moventem ad malum. Quare ergo non primam? Quia omne secundum dicitur per respectum ad primum', modo primum in malis videtur esse primum principium malorum.
84 Compare the dubium edited in M. J. F. M. Hoenen, 'The eternity of the world according to Marsilius of Inghen. Study with an edition of the dubium in II Sent. q. 1 a. 2', Marsilius of Inghen. Acts of the international Marsilius of Inghen Symposion, ed. by H. A. G. Braakhuis and M. J. F. M. Hoenen, Nijmegen 1992 (Artistarium Supplementa, 7), 117-142, esp. 137. The Sentences commentary of Thomas was very influential and was used as a textbook at some universities. Conrad of Soltau followed it very closely in his own commentary on the Sentences. On Thomas of Strasbourg and his influence see A. Zumkeller, 'Die Augustinerschule des Mittelalters. Vertreter und philosophisch-theologische Lehre', Analecta Augustiniana, 27 (1964), 167-262, esp. 212-214.
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Bibliography Editions of the Commentary on the Sentences of Marsilius of Inghen Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum, ed. by M. Flach, Strasbourg 1501, Reprint Frankfurt am Main 1966. , ed. by G. Wieland, M. Santos Noya, M. J. F. M. Hoenen, M. Schulze, vol. 1: Super primum, Quaestiones 1—7, ed. by M. Santos Noya, Leiden 2000 (Studies in the History of Christian Thought, 87). , ed. by G. Wieland, M. Santos Noya, M. J. F. M. Hoenen, M. Schulze, vol. 2: Super primum, Quaestiones 8~21, ed. by M. Santos Noya, Leiden 2000 (Studies in the History of Christian Thought, 88). Reference works Benzing, J., Die Buchdrucker des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts im deutschen Sprachgebiet, 2nd edition, Wiesbaden 1982 (Beitrage zum Buch- und Bibliothekswesen, 12). Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, 4 vols, ed. by H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, Paris 1998-1897, repr. Brussels 1964. Die Rektorbiicher der Universitdt Heidelberg, Band 1: 1386-1410, Heft 1 and 2, ed. by J. Miethke, Heidelberg 1986 and 1990 (Die Amtsbiicher der Universitat Heidelberg, A). Golaszewska, M., J. B. Korolec, A. Poltawaski, Z. K. Siemiatkowska, I. Tarnowska, Z. Wlodek, 'Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplement au Repertoire de F. Stegmiiller', Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum, 2 (1958), 22~27. Hoenen, M. J. F. M., 'Marsilius von Inghen Bibliographic. Appendix zu der geplanten Edition der wichtigsten Werke des Marsilius von Inghen (f 1396)', Bulletin de Philosophie Medieval*, 31 (1989), 150-167. , 'Marsilius von Inghen Bibliographic II. Erganzungen', Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale, 32 (1990), 191-195. Markowski, M., 'Katalog dziel Marsyliusza z Inghen z ewidencja rekopisow', Studia Mediewistyczne, 25 (1988), 39-132. Mittelalterliche Bibliothekskataloge Deutschlands und der Schweiz, vol. 1 and 2, ed. by P. Lehmann, Miinchen 1918 and 1928. Muller, J., Bibliographic Strasbourgeoise, vol. 2, Baden-Baden 1985. Miiller, K. O., Die Handschriften der Bibliothek der Nikolauskirche in Isny (typescript 1936). Stegmiiller, F., Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi, 2 vols, Wiirzburg 1947. Topke, G., Die Matrikel der Universitdt Heidelberg von 1386 bis 1662, 3 vols, Heidelberg 1884-1893. Winkelmann, E., Urkundenbuch der Universitdt Heidelberg, 2 vols., Heidelberg 1886. Secondary literature Bos, E. P., 'Marsilius of Inghen on Theology as Science', Marsilius of Inghen. Acts of the international Marsilius of Inghen Symposion, ed. by H. A. G. Braakhuis and M. J. F. M. Hoenen, Nijmegen 1992 (Artistarium Supplementa, 7), 81H36. Braakhuis, H. A. G., and M. J. F. M. Hoenen, 'Marsilius of Inghen: A Dutch Philosopher and Theologian', Marsilius of Inghen. Acts of the international Marsilius of Inghen Symposion, ed. by H. A. G. Braakhuis and M. J. F. M. Hoenen, Nijmegen 1992 (Artistarium Supplementa, 7), 1-11. Brady, I., 'The Distinctions of Lombard's Book of Sentences and Alexander of Hales', Franciscan Studies, 25 (1965), 90-116.
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Courtenay, W. J., Adam Wodeham. An Introduction to his Life and Writings, Leiden 1978 (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, 21). , 'Marsilius of Inghen as Theologian', Marsilius of Inghen. Acts of the international Marsilius of Inghen Symposion, ed. by H. A. G. Braakhuis and M. J. F. M. Hoenen, Nijmegen 1992 (Artistarium Supplementa, 7), 39-57. , 'Marsilius von Inghen (f 1396) als Heidelberger Theologe', Heidelberger Jahrbucher, 32 (1988), 25-42. Ehrle, F., Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia des Pisaner Papstes Alexanders V. Ein Beitrag zur Scheidung der Schulen in der Scholastik des vierzehnten Jahrhunderts und zur Geschichte des Wegestreites, Miinster 1925 (Franziskanische Studien, Beiheft 9). Heitmann, Ch., 'Der Glaube bei Marsilius von Inghen', Marsilius of Inghen. Acts of the international Marsilius of Inghen Symposion, ed. by H. A. G. Braakhuis and M. J. F. M. Hoenen, Nijmegen 1992 (Artistarium Supplementa, 7), 59-79. Hoenen, M. J. F. M., 'Der Sentenzenkommentar des Marsilius von Inghen (f 1396). Aus dem Handschriftenbestand des Tiibinger Wilhelmsstifts', Theologische Quartalschrift, 171 (1991), 114-129. , 'Einige Notizen iiber die Handschriften und Drucke des Sentenzenkommentars von Marsilius von Inghen', Recherches de Theologie ancienne et medievale, 56 (1989), 117-163. , Marsilius of Inghen. Divine Knowledge in Late Medieval Thought, Leiden 1993 (Studies in the History of Christian Thought, 50). , 'Neuplatonismus am Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts. Die Prinzipien zum Sentenzenkommentar des Marsilius von Inghen', Marsilius von Inghen. Werk und Wirkung, ed. by S. Wielgus, Lublin 1993, 165-194. , 'The eternity of the world according to Marsilius of Inghen. Study with an edition of the dubium in II Sent. q. 1 a. 2', Marsilius of Inghen. Acts of the international Marsilius of Inghen Symposion, ed. by H. A. G. Braakhuis and M. J. F. M. Hoenen, Nijmegen 1992 (Artistarium Supplementa, 7), 117-142. Hummel, H., 'Bibliotheca Wiblingana. Aus Scriptorium und Bibliothek der ehemaligen Benediktinerabtei Wiblingen', Studien und Mitteilungen zur Geschichte des Benediktiner-Ordens und seiner Zweige, 89 (1978), 510-570. Marsilius van Inghen. Kennis, wetenschap en theologie, ed. and transl. by E. P. Bos, Baarn 1987 (Geschiedenis van de Wijsbegeerte in Nederland, 3). Marsilius von Inghen. Werk und Wirkung. Akten des zweitm intemationalen Marsilius-vonInghen-Kongresses, ed. by S. Wielgus, Lublin 1993. Miethke, J., 'Marsilius als Rektor der Universitat Heidelberg', Marsilius of Inghen. Acts of the international Marsilius of Inghen Symposion, ed. by H. A. G. Braakhuis and M. J. F. M. Hoenen, Nijmegen 1992 (Artistarium Supplementa, 7), 13-37 [also in Ruperto Carola, 76 (1987), 110-119]. Mohler, W., Die Trinitatslehre des Marsilius von Inghen. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Theologie des Spatmittelalters, Limburg/Lahn 1949. Pelster, F., 'Der Heidelberger Magister artium und Baccalarius theologiae Heilmann Wunnenberg als Lehrer des Marsilius von Inghen und Erklarer des Sentenzen', Theologische Quartalschrift, 125 (1944), 83-96. Philosophic und Theologie des ausgehenden Mittelalters. Marsilius von Inghen und das Denken seiner £eit, ed. by M. J. F. M. Hoenen and P. J. J. M. Bakker, Leiden 1999 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) (forthcoming). Ritter, G., Studien zur Spdtscholastik 1: Marsilius von Inghen und die okkamistische Schule in Deutschland, Heidelberg 1921 (Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Jahrgang 1921, 4. Abb..). Santos Noya, M., 'Schrift, Tradition und Theologie bei Marsilius von Inghen, Marsilius von Inghen. Werk und Wirkung, ed. by S. Wielgus, Lublin 1993, 73—91. Schulze, M., 'Die psychosomatische Theologie des Marsilius von Inghen', Marsilius von Inghen. Werk und Wirkung, ed. by S. Wielgus, Lublin 1993, 93—118.
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Vignaux, P., Luther, commentateur des Sentences (Livre I, Distinction XVII), Paris 1935 (Etudes de philosophic medievale, 21). Walz, D., 'Marsilius von Inghen als Schreiber und Biichersammler', Marsilius von Inghen. Werk und Wirkung. Akten des zweiten internationalen Marsilius-von-Inghen-Kongresses, ed. by S. Wielgus, Lublin 1993, 31-70.
CONCLUSION Russell L. Friedman*
Theology underwent a profound development during the twelfth century. This development had several key elements, including the gradual creation of an institutional framework in which a relatively regulated course of study was followed, but also a growing awareness of theology as a discipline, with its own aims and methods.1 As Ludwig Hodl notes in his chapter above (p. 27), the unconditional prerequisite for the formation of a genuine discipline of theology was a theological textbook. Towards the middle of the twelfth century, in Paris, the center of theological study, Peter Lombard wrote what would become the textbook for advanced theological training, increasingly in the last half of the twelfth century, and nearly exclusively for more than three centuries thereafter: Quatuor libri Sententiarum. In this work, Lombard collected passages from the Church Fathers over a vast spectrum of theological issues, and organized the material into four books (on respectively God, creation and creatures, Christ and the virtues, and the sacraments and last things) each subdivided into chapters focused on well-defined topics.2 Lombard's Sentences did not immediately win universal approval. On the contrary, several of his views were contested by significant figures—witness e.g. Pope Alexander Ill's attempt to eradicate Lombard's interpretation of the hypostatic union in 1170 and the
* Thanks to Lauge Nielsen and Chris Schabel for comments and suggestions. This work has been supported by a grant from the Danish Research Council for the Humanities. 1 This idea can be found in the works in M. D. Chenu, La theologie au douzieme siecle (Paris, 1957; partial English translation: Nature, Man and Society in the Twelfth Century [University of Chicago, 1968], trans, by J. Taylor and L. K. Litde), and has been pursued by, e.g., M. Colish, 'Systematic Theology and Theological Renewal in the Twelfth Century', Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 18 (1988), pp. 135-56. 2 Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, 3rd ed., L Brady, ed., (Grottaferrata, 1971-81; = Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 4-5). See on Peter Lombard and his Sentences especially Marcia Colish's monumental Peter Lombard (Leiden, 1994).
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same pope's outright condemnation of the view in 1177, 3 as well as Joachim of Fiore's famous attack on Lombard's Trinitarian theology that prompted the Fourth Lateran Council to take Lombard's side in 1215.4 Despite such occasional resistance to Lombard's theology as expressed in his Sentences, the work became influential very soon after it took final form between 1155 and 1157.5 There are a variety of explanations for just why Lombard's work became so influential and so quickly—its superior and extremely clear organization, its judicious use of authoritative passages, its frequent use of philosophy and grammatical theory, its rather personal theological statement—but it is a fact that the Sentences quickly outdistanced its many competitors as a textbook in systematic theology.6 As a result, the ideas contained in it were discussed on a regular basis throughout the second half of the twelfth century and the beginning of the thirteenth.7 This discussion is sometimes to be found in the context of glosses on Lombard's Sentences, the earliest of which date from soon after the Sentences itself was available.8 By the early thirteenth century a work appeared that was no longer simply a literal gloss on the Master's work, explaining Lombard's words and intentions, but was, in the words of its editor, "the first Sentence commentary of early scholasticism", that of Stephen Langton.9
3 See Ludwig Hodl's chapter above (p. 34) and L. O. Nielsen, 'Logic and the Hypostatic Union; Two Late Twelfth-Century Responses to the Papal Condemnation of 1177', in S. Ebbesen and R.L. Friedman, eds., Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition (Copenhagen, 1999), pp. 251-79, and the literature referred to there. 4 On this, see, e.g., F. Robb, 'The Fourth Lateran Council's Definition of Trinitarian Orthodoxy', Journal of Ecclesiastical History 48 (1997), pp. 22-43. 5 For the date, see Colish, Peter Lombard, p. 25; Prolegomena to Sententiae (ed. cit. n. 2), pp. 122*-129*. 6 For a discussion, see Colish, Peter Lombard, 33-90. 7 For a discussion of "Lombardian theology" in the later twelfth century, see M. Colish, 'The Development of Lombardian Theology, 1160-1215', in J. W. Drijvers and A. A. MacDonald, eds., Centres of Learning in Pre-Modern Europe and the Near East (Leiden, 1995), pp. 207-16. More generally on the period, see A. Landgraf, Introduction a I'histoire de la litterature theologique de la scolastique naissante, ed. francaise par A. M. Landry & L. B. Geiger, (Montreal-Paris, 1973; this French translation updates the German edition published in 1948 under the title Einfiihrung in die Geschichte der theologischen Literatur der Friihscholastik). 8 For an overview of this early Gloss material, see esp. Landgraf, Introduction (cit. n. 7), pp. 130-48; also idem, 'Problemes relatifs aux premieres Closes des Sentences' in Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale 3 (1931), pp. 140-57; L. O. Nielsen, Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century (Leiden, 1982), pp. 279-86. 9 A. Landgraf, ed., Der Sentenzenkommentar des Kardinals Stephan Langton. (Miinster i. W., 1952; Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophic und Theologie des Mittelalters
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Thus, when Alexander of Hales (d. 1245) wrote his glosses on the Sentences at the University of Paris sometime between 1223 and 1227,10 he was continuing a tradition of using Lombard's work as the basis for teaching and research, but he was initiating a new phase in the reception of the work: a university phase. Alexander was important for the future of the Sentences for several reasons. First, it was he who organized the books of the Sentences according to the 'distinctions' best known to those studying Sentences commentaries.11 Second, his entering the Franciscan order in 1236/37 gave the Franciscans their first chair of theology, and in a sense laid the foundation for the Franciscan intellectual tradition, which would be the source of some of the most significant Sentences commentaries throughout the rest of the Middle Ages. Finally, his use of the Sentences as a textbook in his ordinary lectures seems to have been emulated by several masters of theology who have left us written commentaries, first at Paris with Hugh of St. Cher, and later at Oxford by Richard Fishacre.12 While lecturing on the Sentences (as opposed to the Bible) was not universally favored—e.g. Roger Bacon thought that Alexander had contributed to the ruin of theology by introducing this novelty, and Robert Grosseteste rebuked Fishacre for doing just this13—nevertheless lecturing on the Sentences soon became a traditional part of the requirements for advanced theological students to gain their master's degree. While early university statutes call for bachelors of theology to lecture on either Lombard's Sentences or a book of the Bible or
37.1; Rpt, Miinster 1995); see idem, 'The First Sentence Commentary of the Early Scholasticism', The New Scholasticism 13 (1939), pp. 101-32. Riccardo Quinto thinks it likely that this work was completed during the first fifteen years of the thirteenth century; see his 'Hugh of St.-Cher's Use of Stephen Langton', in Medieval Analyses (cit. n. 3), p. 284. For more on Langton's commentary see below, at and around n. 26. 10 See the introduction in the first volume of the critical edition: Alexander of Hales, Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica medii aevi 12; Grottaferrata, 1951), pp. 110*-16*, esp. 116*. 1 ' See on this, I. Brady, 'The Distinctions of Lombard's Book of Sentences and Alexander of Hales', Franciscan Studies 25 (1965), pp. 90-116; also Prolegomena to Sententiae (ed. cit. n. 2), pp. 143*-44*. 12 On Hugh and Richard, see Long's chapter above, pp. 346-47; Quinto, 'Hugh of St. Cher's Use (cit. n. 9), p. 284, claims there are at least two redactions of Hugh's commentary, but that it seems to have been finished by 1231—32. 13 For Bacon's attack on Alexander's use of the Sentences, see Glossa (ed. cit. n. 10), pp. 24*-26*; for the context, see Long's chapter, p. 356, esp. n. 54. On Grosseteste and Fishacre, see above, Wood's chapter, pp. 290—92; Long's chapter, pp. 353-55.
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Peter Comestor's Historia Scholastica,H de facto the Sentences became the theological textbook upon which every bachelor of theology on the road to his master's degree had to give lectures, from the mid 1240's right through the Reformation of the sixteenth century. From the earliest glosses to the texts of the Reformation period, the character of commentaries on the Sentences changed dramatically, with respect to ideas found in the commentaries, to the structure and organization of the commentaries, to the place of the commentaries in the curriculum vitae of the individual commentator and in the medieval educational system. The present volume is a contribution to the charting of these and other developments in commentaries on Lombard's Sentence. The chapters are organized chronologically, but are also subdivided geographically into sections on 'Paris', 'Oxford', and 'Other Centres'. Taken as a whole, however, the chapters fall into roughly two complementary categories. There are four broad survey chapters, examining many commentaries written over a longer period of time and discussing the ways the Sentences commentary changed and developed over that time period; there are also more narrowly focused studies, concentrating on one or at most a few commentaries in a relatively delimited time period, and going into greater detail. Chapters that fall into the first category are Russell Friedman's survey of the Sentences commentary from 1250—1320, Chris Schabel's overview of Parisian commentaries in the period between Peter Auriol and Gregory of Rimini (ca. 1318-1345), and Schabel and Bakker's chapter on later fourteenth-century commentaries (including Sentences commentaries from roughly Gregory of Rimini to the end of the Great Schism). All three of these chapters provide not just descriptions of many of the time period's Sentences commentaries and their authors, but also a sense of the structure of the commentaries and the doctrine contained in them, and the way that these developed over the course of the period under discussion. The chronologically and geographically most comprehensive survey chapter is Stephen Livesey's "Lombardus Electronicus", a description of an ambitions pro-
14 See Long's chapter above p. 347; also, e.g., W. J. Courtenay, 'Programs of Study and Genres of Scholastic Theological Production in the Fourteenth Century', in J. Hamesse, ed., Manuels, programmes de cours et techniques d'enseignement dans les universites medievales (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1994), pp. 325-50, p. 334 and n. 21.
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ject to create an electronic database cataloguing all known commentators on the Sentences (and on the works of Aristotle), along with a presentation of some of the statistical fruits that have emerged from the project thus far. The remaining chapters fall into the second category, the focused studies. Chronologically speaking, the topics studied range widely. Ludwig Hodl examines what seems to be the first gloss on Lombard's Sentences, the important twelfth-century Pseudo-Poitiers Gloss, and the way in which the Gloss reflects the teachings of Peter Comestor and Odo of Soisson, who while teaching at Paris clearly took issue with some of Lombard's ideas. Thus, the Pseudo-Poitiers Gloss gives us a glimpse into the living debate in the school of Peter Lombard when the Sentences were still young. On the other end of the chronological spectrum, Maarten Hoenen examines the Sentences commentary of Marsilius of Inghen (written ca. 1392~96), rector of the University of Heidelberg, showing, among other things, how Marsilius' commentary influenced Gabriel Biel's late fifteenth-century Sentences commentary. In between these two chronological extremes, there are studies of the very earliest Sentences commentaries emerging from the University of Oxford (around 1250) by Rega Wood and R. James Long; studies of several commentaries from Oxford in the 1320's and 1330's by Chris Schabel, Raymond Edwards, and Jean-Francois Genest; as well as studies of several Sentences commentaries composed by Parisian theologians in the late thirteenth and first half of the fourteenth century: John of Paris (Dunbabin), Peter Auriol (Nielsen), and Gregory of Rimini (Bermon). As a whole, then, this volume can provide a fairly comprehensive overview of the state of the research on Sentences commentaries between around 1250 and around 1400, with several chapters that take a closer look at particular figures, and an excursion to the very earliest Sentences literature.15 Further, several rather understudied figures are foci in a number of the chapters: Richard Fishacre (Long, Wood), Peter Auriol (Nielsen; Friedman; Schabel, 'Parisian' and 'Oxford'), and Gregory of Rimini (Schabel, 'Parisian'; Bermon). Moreover, there
13 The volume, then, supplements and updates P. Glorieux' overview article 'Sentences (Commentaire sur les)', Dictionnaire de theologie catholique, vol. 14, coll. 1859-83, without offering the type of unitary vision of the development of the Sentences commentary as a genre found in Glorieux' seminal work.
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are several themes running through the volume and addressed from various angles in different papers, which gives the volume a further unity. These themes include the following. Doctrinal variety: Why do we study Sentences commentaries and what can a Sentences commentary reveal about medieval thought? Towards the beginning of the university phase of the Sentences commentary, the Sentences were a youthful endeavor, often superceded by a theologian's later, magisterial writings. But during the later thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, the Sentences commentary became increasingly the preferred vehicle of theological expression, with scholars such as John Duns Scotus, Durand of St. Pourcain, Alexander of Alexandria, and Peter Auriol returning to the Sentences as a framework in which to express their, often mature, thought (see pp. 97—100). Moreover, as written Quodlibetal disputations and independent theological treatises become rarer, at times Sentences commentaries are very nearly the only works to have survived from the faculty of theology, as at Paris between 1318 and 1344 (Schabel, 'Parisian', p. 221) and during the later fourteenth century (Bakker and Schabel, p. 426). Thus, the Sentences commentary is important at least because it represents a major—sometimes the exclusive—source for what theologians were thinking and writing. This is true, of course, across a broad spectrum of subjects with which medieval theologians engaged. It goes without saying that Lombard's Sentences., in its conception a textbook of speculative theology, raised questions of a theological nature. But Sentences commentaries are works of systematic philosophical theology, and as such they display in full measure—to adapt John Murdoch's apt phrase—the "unitary character of scholastic learning",16 where theology, philosophy, and science/natural philosophy are so closely related that they are often indistinguishable, and the study of one cannot be undertaken fruitfully without knowledge of the others. While the chapters in this volume cannot begin to exhaust the diversity of doctrinal topics that the Sentences commentary offers, nevertheless they do explore a variety of theological and philosophical 16 'From Social into Intellectual Factors: An Aspect of the Unitary Character of Late Medieval Learning' in J. E. Murdoch and E. D. Sylla, eds., The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning (Dordrecht, 1975); and see the comments by Stephen Livesey, above p. 16.
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issues, and often show the interrelationship between various positions. In some cases the chapters here deepen and broaden our knowledge on a subject that has already received close scholarly attention. For example, Friedman and Schabel ('Parisian' and 'Oxford') have coordinated their presentations to focus on the topic of predestination. As a result, the reader can follow the development of the debate on this matter (as it is found in the era's Sentences commentaries) from c. 1250-1345; in many cases Friedman and Schabel give views of medieval theologians whose ideas on the subject have never been studied before. Sometimes the study of doctrine has produced some surprising results: on the basis of his discussion of Richard Kilvington, Alexander Langeley, and John Went on the subject of how much we should love God, Raymond Edwards can add Alexander Langeley to the (rather short) list of medieval atomists, and indeed shows that Langeley held that acts of the will are atomic in character (pp. 388-89). The same type of unexpected result can be seen in Rega Wood's study of the early Oxford discussion of whether matter is intelligible (pp. 327—40); Wood finds that not only was there a lively, distinctively Oxonian debate concerning this issue, but that one of the participants in this debate, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, held the interesting view that matter was prior to both actuality and potentiality. A final example: Jean Dunbabin (pp. 144-46), examining John of Paris' unedited commentary on book IV of the Sentences, points to its concern with practical matters, in some ways anticipating fifteenth-century developments in which book IV of Sentences commentaries at times became regular handbooks for parish priests (cf. Hoenen, pp. 494-95); this is interesting inasmuch as John's Sentences commentary is best known for its rather speculative bent. That such surprises are rather common should not be wondered at, for, when it comes to Sentences commentaries (as is the case with most medieval scholarly literature), we are dealing with litde studied works, often still in manuscript. Manuscripts and editions: Despite more than a hundred years of historical interest in medieval Sentences commentaries, with some notable exceptions, to do research on a Sentences commentary is to do manuscript research. There are certainly some medieval Sentences commentaries that have received satisfactory critical editions, and most of these are mentioned in the chapters here. An even larger group exists in (often unsatisfactory) early modern editions. But in the vast
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majority of cases, one either has to go immediately to the manuscripts, or at the very least correct the problematic early editions with manuscript readings in order to arrive at reliable texts. Thus, it is not by chance that the two works that are inextricably associated with the Sentences commentary as a literary genre are manuscript catalogues: Friedrich Stegmuller's Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi (2 vols., Wiirzburg, 1947) and Victorin Doucet's Commentaires sur les Sentences: supplement au repertoire de M. Frederic Stegmueller (Florence, 1954). Some fifty years later, these are still the essential tools of the trade. Over the last fifty years, however, a tremendous amount of manuscript research has uncovered new commentaries and identified new copies of commentaries already known to Stegmuller and Doucet. A great deal of this work has appeared in various supplements to Stegmuller, but quite often it has appeared in articles or books that have no obvious relation to Stegmuller.17 This fact points to an urgent need for a "new Stegmuller", pulling together all of the last fifty years' research in one well-organized book. While the present volume cannot fill this need, nevertheless it goes some of the way in that direction: every chapter in the volume deals in one way or another with manuscripts that preserve Sentences commentaries. Especially for the period 1250—1400, the reader can find in the chapters below references to, e.g., the most recent list of manuscripts containing, or questions contained in, a commentary, when these exist.18 One inescapable impression that is left after reading this volume is that progress in our study of medieval philosophy and theology will require a determined effort to investigate and edit a great number of Sentences commentaries. If manuscript research is the nearly inescapable lot of those undertaking the study of Sentences commentaries, the ideal in order to determine a medieval theologian's doc-
17 For a survey of the literature modifying Stegmuller's Repertorium, see Livesey's chapter, pp. 1-4; on the supplements to Stegmuller, see esp. p. 2, n. 9 and p. 4, n. 13. There are several modern catalogues of medieval authors that are useful for information on manuscripts and editions of Sentences commentaries; see for some of these catalogues, Friedman's chapter, pp. 42—43, n. 1, to which should be added: R. Sharpe, A Handlist of the Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland before 1540 (Turnhout, 1997). 18 See especially the following: Friedman, esp. pp. 44^84; Schabel, 'Parisian Commentaries', passim; Schabel, 'Oxford Franciscans', esp. pp. 359-62; Edwards, esp. pp. 381^83; Bakker and Schabel, passim.
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trine, sources, and influence is the critical edition. Unfortunately, the vast majority of modern editions from Sentences commentaries are piecemeal, a question here and a distinction there. These piecemeal editions are important not only for making texts generally available to scholars: the introductions to these editions often present the only studies of the manuscripts containing the commentary in question, that is to say our only guide to further work with the manuscripts. Thus, many of the chapters in the present volume also give references to editions of texts from the commentaries discussed, again giving the reader the state of the question on editions from many Sentences commentaries from the years 1250-1400. Moreover, several of the chapters in the volume take their point of departure in projects to edit one or more medieval Sentences commentary, e.g. Long's work on Richard Fishacre and Wood's on Richard Rufus of Cornwall, Nielsen's on Peter Auriol, Edward's on Alexander Langeley, and Hoenen's on Marsilius of Inghen. Ludwig Hodl even publishes an edition of I Sentences, d. 25, c. 3 from the Pseudo-Poitiers Gloss (pp. 37-40). Types of texts and their composition: Many, perhaps most, Sentences commentaries were in their origin lectures, held either by baccalarii Sententiarum at a studium generate in pursuit of their master's degree or by members of one of the religious orders teaching at a theological studium. One of the themes in this volume, taken up by several of the chapters, is the relationship between oral lecture and written commentary, or more generally how the process of composition has influenced the text that we have today, This type of question is of the utmost importance for the study of medieval scholastic literature in general, and the Sentences commentary in particular, because how much weight we can give to a text as a reliable witness to the author's thought will be in part contingent upon the way the text came into being. We have a tendency to classify our texts on the basis of their place in an idealized "composition process": we call student reports of lectures, untouched by the "author's" hand, reportationes; student reports that have been moderately reworked by the "author", reportationes examinatae or reportationes editae', and works that have been thoroughly reworked by their author, ordinationes (sometimes known as scriptd). In some cases, classifying texts according to these categories is a rather cut and dried affair. The Sentences commentary of John of Paris, for instance, can be proven to be a reportatio of Parisian lectures held sometime between 1292 and 1296
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(Dunbabin, pp. 132-33; Friedman, p. 58 and nn. 39-40). On the other extreme, we have quite a number of commentaries that have been so thoroughly reworked by their author that they clearly fit into the category of ordinatio, e.g. Durand of St. Fountain's commentaries (Friedman, pp. 71-72, 121-24), Adam Wodeham's Ordinatio (Schabel, 'Oxford', p. 361; Edwards, pp. 381, 383), or Marsilius of Inghen's commentary (Hoenen, pp. 474-79). Problems begin to arise with the broad middle group of texts, the reportatioms editae. How do we classify, for example, the Sentences commentaries of, e.g., William of Ware or James of Metz (Friedman, pp. 63-65, 69-70), where it may well be that the reworking of original reportatioms of Sentences lectures was undertaken not by the "author" but rather by his students? This is just one of many examples that show that the way a text came into being has an impact on how we should approach that text. Pascale Bermon discusses a famous example of how the mode of composition affects the texts we now possess: the additiones found in Gregory of Rimini's Lectura, which are in fact parts of an earlier version of Rimini's work that Rimini expunged from its later form (see esp. pp. 270—71). On the basis of some additiones and Gregory's own remarks, Bermon can further trace in Rimini's commentary four distinct "moments" in a continuing dialogue between Gregory and an otherwise unknown Dominican master 'Albert' (pp. 277-78, esp. n. 52). Bakker and Schabel discuss at some length (pp. 438-61; also Hoenen, pp. 497-503) the subject of medieval "plagiarism" (especially in the later fourteenth century), and describe various types of techniques by which a later scholar could incorporate into his own text (with or without attribution) the work of an earlier scholar. What are we to call the wholesale lifting of passages by one scholar from an earlier work? What about a whole group of authors who in essence share a common Sentences commentary (much of it taken from earlier thinkers), like 'the Vienna Group' that Bakker and Schabel describe (p. 462)? How can we evaluate originality in such situations? This is a question that Bakker and Schabel's material shows to be of the utmost importance. Several chapters deal nearly exclusively with these issues of textual composition. Take Lauge Nielsen's chapter on the composition of Peter Auriol's commentaries on I and IV Sentences. Several versions of these texts survive, and the relationship between the various versions is far from clear. In studying the texts, Nielsen advocates what he calls an "analytic approach" (pp. 169-70, 210-12), analyzing specific passages from the versions in question to find evi-
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dence for the relationship between these versions, and especially for temporal priority among the versions. Nielsen paints a picture of Auriol as author, going through an apparently laborious process of composition, reformulating and correcting his text in response to his own stylistic requirements and in response to external criticism (notably from Hervaeus Natalis and Thomas Wylton). On the basis of his study, Nielsen calls into question whether a term like reportatio edita says anything meaningful in a situation as complex as that with Auriol (pp. 170, 214). Jean-Frangois Genest tackles some of these same issues, but with regard to the prominent Oxford secular theologian, Thomas Bradwardine, Bradwardine is well known for a number of important scientific and logical treatises, as well as his monumental Summa de causa Dei of 1344.19 Genest takes a group of unedited questions that have been tentatively attributed to Bradwardine, and through a painstaking doctrinal and textual analysis both internal to these questions and in comparison to the De causa Dei, Genest argues 1) that these questions belong to Bradwardine and 2) that they most likely are drawn from his Sentences commentaries of 1332—34, Genest also identifies a reportatio of a magisterial determination by Bradwardine (composed 1338—40), closer in form to the De causa Dei than to the Sentences questions, a determinatio used in the discussions of future contingents in the Sentences commentaries of both Thomas Buckingham and Alexander Langeley. Thus, as Genest notes, we now have the tools to follow the genesis of Bradwardine's thought on certain issues. Schools of thought: While Ludwig Hodl discusses the Lombardian school in Paris in the years following Lombard's death as well as the reception of his thought in that school, throughout most of this volume, when schools or schools of thought are mentioned, these are synonymous with Thomism and Scotism. Several chapters deal with the way that Thomism and Scotism affected the content of Sentences commentaries. For example, John Quidort of Paris was described by Grabmann as "the most versatile and most distinctive figure of the old Parisian Thomist school at the end of the thirteenth century",20
19 See most recently Sharpe, A Handlist, nr. 1707, pp. 642~44, for a list of Bradwardine's writings. 20 M. Grabmann, 'Studien zu Johannes Quidort von Paris O.Pr.', in Sitzungberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschqften (Munich, 1922; reprinted in idem, Gesammelte Akademieabhandlungen, vol. 1 [Paderborn 1979], 69-128), p. 3.
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and so it is not surprising that Jean Dunbabin, in her chapter on John, examines the nature of his Thomism, finding in her examination of several aspects of John's thought that his reputation as a Thomist is well deserved, although he certainly did not always agree with the Angelic Doctor and was influenced by such later thinkers as Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome, and Godfrey of Fontaines (e.g. pp. 138-44). What is the background to John's Thomism? Through a study of the period's treatments of predestination, Friedman examines how aptly the terms 'Scotism' and 'Thomism' apply to theologians from the end of the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth century (pp. 110-13); while there is good reason to use the term 'Thomist' of Dominican theologians from this period, a recognizable Scotism is only found in the Sentences commentaries of Henry of Harclay and Hugh of Novo Castro. Further, however, the period 1250-1320 (and especially after the mid-1280's) saw the development of broad theological traditions, a Franciscan tradition (of which Scotus was a part) and a Dominican tradition (heavily influenced by Thomism), and one can see some of the consequences for Sentences commentaries of the competition (often antagonism) between these traditions: for example, anti-commentaries (Sentences commentaries written with the express purpose of rebutting another Sentences commentary), and the Thomist criticism of Durand of St. Pourgain, which resulted in the three redactions of his Sentences commentary that we have today (pp. 116-28). While Thomism is not easy to find in Schabel's chapter on Parisian commentaries between Auriol and Rimini, probably because few Dominican commentaries exist from these years at Paris (although see Bernard Lombardi, pp. 254-55), Scotism is quite visible among Franciscans of the period. Thus, on the issue of predestination, among others, Landulph Caracciolo, Francis of Meyronnes, the Spaniards Peter of Navarre and Peter Thomae, and Peter of Aquila are all described by Schabel as varying degrees of 'Scotists', although this still leaves quite a few Franciscan Sentences commentaries which are not particularly Scotistic, e.g. those of Francis of Marchia, William of Rubio, and Gerard Odonis. Scotism is more difficult to identify in the later part of Schabel's period than in the former, and this probably has a great deal to do with the fortunes of the intellectual programs of the religious orders, as Schabel makes clear. He finds that in these years the intellectual predominance of Franciscan at
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Paris is giving way to that of the Augustinian Hermits (pp. 255-56, 259): witness the prominent contributions in the 1330's of the Augustinians Michael of Massa and Thomas of Strasbourg and the string of Augustinian thinkers in the 1340's starting with Gregory of Rimini and Alfonsus Vargas of Toledo. In the later fourteenth century, schools of thought become much more difficult to trace, as Bakker and Schabel show. Simple lines of influence summed up in such words as 'Thomism' and 'Scotism' are replaced by, as we have seen, complex schemes of "plagiarism", unacknowledged borrowing from earlier thinkers; by reading the Sentences secundum alium (lifting almost exclusively from just one other commentary);21 and by eclectic historical discussions of topics as those found in, e.g. John Hiltalingen of Basel and Peter of Candia (pp. 434-38). Gregory of Rimini's Sentences commentary seems to play an important role in the period (e.g. in the Sentences commentary of Pierre d'Ailly), but also the ideas and words of earlier thinkers like Robert Holcot, Osbert Pickingham, and Thomas of Strasbourg are borrowed. Hoenen also shows Marsilius of Inghen's Sentences commentaries to be a part of this eclectic wave (pp. 497-503). But towards the beginning of the new century, a new conservatism brings with it a renewal of the schools of thought, Scotism and Thomism, as the Scotist Peter of Nugent and the Thomist John Capreolus witness (Bakker and Schabel, pp. 462—64). Thus, as Zenon Kaluza has recently noted, John Gerson was in tune with his times when in 1400 he advised young theologians to study the great scholastics of the thirteenth century.22 Oxford and Paris: One major theme running through the volume is applicable to far more than just the period's Sentences commentaries, rather it extends to all of the scholastic production of the time before about 1350: the relation between the thought that emerged from Oxford (and more generally England) and from Paris. The received
21
Examples of reading secundum alium are already found in the early fourteenth century; see e.g. the case of Aufredo Gonteri Brito and his reading secundum Henncum de Harclay (Triedman, pp. 73-74; Schabel, 'Parisian', pp. 235-36; for more on secundum alium, see Bakker and Schabel, pp. 438-43); of course, plagiarism itself is nothing new to the later fourteenth century, see Bakker and Schabel, p. 439 n. 27. 22 See Z. Kaluza, 'Late medieval philosophy, 1350-1500', in J. Marenbon, ed., The Routledge History of Philosophy, vol. 3, Medieval Philosophy (London-New York), pp. 426-51, esp. p. 442.
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story runs like this: Oxford from the middle until around the end of the thirteenth century was basically dependent upon Parisian thought, and indeed only contributed in a significant fashion to international theology when it lacked Parisian material as a basis on which to work. Even though in the early fourteenth century English scholars like William of Ware, John Duns Scotus, Henry of Harclay, and William of Alnwick were showing that England could produce some top notch scholars, every bit as influential as their Parisian colleagues, nevertheless most of these theologians worked at Paris a considerable portion of their academic careers. It was only in the period after William of Ockham's English career that Oxford experienced a "Golden Age", basically divorced from Paris (due in part to the Hundred Years War) and proceeding on new and extremely fruitful lines of inquiry, including what has been dubbed the New English Theology, heavily influenced by innovative logical and mathematical concepts and reflecting a strong interest in natural philosophy. In the same period, roughly 1325-40, Paris was in a slump, tellingly described as its 'dormition'. The fruits of English thought were first integrated into Parisian theology by the Augustinian Hermit, Gregory of Rimini, who exhibits in his commentary on I-II Sentences an impressive knowledge of the Golden Age of English theology. After Rimini, the English thought became common property on the continent.23 Nearly every part of this scenario is tested in this volume. Rega Wood, for example, in her chapter on "Early Oxford Theology" deals explicitly with this topic. Although Wood's chapter is ostensibly a study of the three earliest Oxford Sentences commentaries, those of Richard Fishacre, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, and Robert Kilwardby, nevertheless in the course of her examination of their discussions of theology as a science, the possibility of hating the truth,
23 See for the early part of this scenario: J. I. Catto, 'Theology and Theologians 1220-1320' in The History of the University of Oxford, vol. 1, The Early Oxford Schools, J. I. Catto, ed. (Oxford, 1984), pp. 471-517. The description of the period after 1320 has been created nearly single-handedly by W. J. Courtenay; see, e.g.: 'Theology and Theologians from Ockham to Wyclif', in The History of the University of Oxford, vol. 2, Late Medieval Oxford,]. I. Catto and R. Evans, eds. (Oxford, 1992), pp. 1-34; idem, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England (Princeton, 1987); idem, 'The Role of English Thought in the Transformation of University Education in the Late Middle Ages', in Rebirth, Reform and Resilience: Universities in Transition, 1300-1700, J. M. Kittelson and P. J. Transue, eds. (Columbus, OH, 1984), pp. 103-62.
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Trinitarian theology, and matter theory, she not only includes many other works of these three authors (including Rufus' Parisian Sentences commentary), but also compares the Oxford thought to contemporary Parisian works by, e.g., Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas. Wood's conclusion is that, far from being creative simply because they lacked the newest Parisian material, the Oxford theologians had somewhat different concerns and sensibilities from those of their Parisian contemporaries. She attributes at least some of this different theological and philosophical focus to the extremely important influence of Robert Grosseteste on Oxford theologians (e.g. p. 342). This analysis is confirmed by R. James Long in his study of Fishacre's Sentences commentary, which gives the most up-to-date description of this, the earliest Oxford Sentences commentary (c. 1245; see Long, pp. 347-50; cf. Wood, pp. 291-92). Both Wood and Long stress the interest that Oxford theologians from this early period had in Aristotelian thought and its relationship (and sometimes incompatibility) with Christianity (Wood, pp. 307, 342; Long, pp. 350-51), and Wood maintains that this early period laid the foundation for Oxford's later acknowledged brilliance (pp. 342-43). It is now a nearly received opinion that roughly after Peter Auriol, Parisian dominance in theology passed decisively to Oxford. There is absolutely no doubt that Oxford in the 1320's and 1330's was at a highpoint, boasting such important scholars as William of Ockham, Walter Chatton, Robert Holcot, Adam Wodeham, Thomas Bradwardine, and Thomas of Buckingham. Chris Schabel discusses Chatton and Wodeham in his chapter on Oxford Franciscans, and reports how in the areas of predestination and epistemology they were both extremely indebted to the Parisian, Peter Auriol; but he also describes how at least with regard to the fundamental idea of the complexe significabile (the object of knowledge and belief), Wodeham influenced Gregory of Rimini, who in turn passed on this Oxford innovation to Paris and the new continental universities (pp. 375-77; see also Bermon, p. 280; Bakker and Schabel, pp. 431-34). Raymond Edwards picks up where Schabel leaves off, by providing a convenient overview of the extraordinarily active period in Oxford theology comprising the 1330's. As Edwards shows very clearly, despite these being the years in which Holcot, Wodeham, Bradwardine, and Buckingham worked, few of the large number of Sentences commentaries that have survived from these years have been
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studied, and even fewer have been edited. To begin to give the period a personality, Edwards looks specifically at three little studied figures, Richard Kilvington, Alexander Langeley, and John Went, on the subject of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and shows that some of the concerns that the New English Theology is famous for—e.g. the use of mathematical language and a preoccupation with questions of continuum and indivisibles—are definitely present. In the studies here, Oxford in this period indeed seems to live up to its reputation as having had a Golden Age of theological and philosophical thought. But were things as bad on the other side of the channel as we have been led to believe? Can the period from roughly 1325-40 legitimately be called "the dormition of Paris"? This is precisely the question that Chris Schabel brings up in his chapter on 'Parisian Commentaries'. Through his study of predestination, Schabel can indeed show a great deal of interesting activity in this period; and yet he ends with concluding that sometime after 1330 Paris did run out of steam. In part, Schabel speculates, this may have to do with the passing of the intellectual baton at Paris from the Franciscans— extremely dominant in the period 1300-1330, boasting such names as Scotus and Auriol, but also Francis of Marchia (read Sentences 1319-20) and Gerard Odonis (read Sentences 1326-28)—to the Augustinian Hermits (pp. 255-56). While Augustinians like Michael of Massa and Thomas of Strasbourg were obviously significant scholars working at Paris in the late 1320's and the 1330's, nevertheless it is only with Gregory of Rimini that the Augustinian Hermits really come into their own at Paris in the fourteenth century. So there seems to be something of a theological vacuum at Paris in the 1330's. One thing that no one seems to question is the central importance of Gregory of Rimini and his Sentences commentary. Gregory is the first serious conveyer of the new English thought, initially to a Parisian audience and then to the rest of continental Europe. We saw this already with the example of the complexe significabile. But on subject after subject, Rimini shows a close familiarity with English thinkers from the preceding 20 years: major ones, like Ockham, Chatton, Wodeham, Holcot, and Richard FitzRalph, but also more minor ones, like the "Monachus Niger" and Robert Halifax (see esp. Bermon, pp. 279-81). But if Rimini's being the transmitter of English thought is certain and correct, this does not exclude Rimini's being an heir of a specifically Parisian intellectual tradition. In this regard,
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Pascale Bermon (pp. 268—69) points out that Rimini received his basic theological education at Paris in 1323—29, years of intense and fruitful discussion of especially Peter Auriol's provocative philosophy and theology. Moreover, Schabel ('Parisian') can show, against the backdrop of his examination of all Sentences commentaries surviving from Peter Auriol to Gregory of Rimini, that, on the issue of predestination, Rimini was in fact influenced by such Parisian theologians as Francis of Marchia, Gerard Odonis, and Thomas of Strasbourg— little more than names today, but influential and interesting in this supposedly rather stuffy period at Paris. On the whole, after Rimini, English thought from the Golden Age becomes well integrated into continental thought. As Bakker and Schabel show (pp. 431-34), some Sentences commentaries from the later period used the new ideas in interesting and innovative ways (like that of Hugolino of Orvieto) others seemingly were more of a pastiche of views lifted directly from the exciting new works coming from across the Channel (like John of Mirecourt's). The unity and evolution of the Sentences commentary as a genre: One question that is rarely explicitly asked in the chapters contained in this volume, but for which they certainly offer ample food for thought is: what exactly is a Sentences commentary? How should we define it? What makes the genre of the Sentences commentary one genre? One fact that emerges from reading the chapters contained in this volume is the immense variety that the term 'Sentences commentary' comprehends, and concomitantly the flexibility of the Sentences commentary as a literary genre. The most obvious answer to the question of the genre's unity, and an answer that must be true at some level or another, is that Sentences commentaries must have something to do with Peter Lombard's Sentences. But the chapters in this volume leave the distinct impression that even this most basic criterion is not nearly as fixed as one might expect: the Sentences commentary evolved heavily over the more than four centuries of its widespread use. As mentioned above, the original "commentaries" on Lombard's Sentences were usually glosses,24 whether marginal glosses or glosses 24 There were also quite a few abbreviations of Lombard's work. See, e.g., A. Landgraf, Triihscholastische Abkiirzungen der Sentenzen des Lombarden' in Studia Medievalia in honorem R. J. Martin (Brugges, 1948), pp. 171-99.
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that stood on their own but explaining more or less literally words or phrases in Lombard's text. This type of gloss is featured in Ludwig Hodl's study of the Pseudo-Poitiers Gloss in the present volume. Glosses are characterized by staying quite close to Lombard's text and by focusing on issues raised directly by Lombard, although, as Hodl's chapter shows, even the literal gloss can display the individuality of the glossist. The gloss on Lombard's Sentences was a developing genre, however, and probably the single most important innovation in the genre was the development of the quaestio-style commentary, in which less emphasis was placed on just what Lombard said and how that was to be interpreted, and more on the theological and philosophical ramifications of the issues raised.25 Artur Landgraf called Stephen Langton's work on the Sentences the "first Sentence commentary of Early Scholasticism" precisely because he considered it to be the first gloss on Lombard to exhibit a quaestio format, with all of its opportunities for individual expression.26 One finds a mixture of question and gloss styles in early university Sentences commentaries, as Long in his chapter points out about the commentary of Richard Fishacre (p. 353), but as is also true of e.g. Alexander of Hales' Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi. By the time we reach the commentaries of Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure, there is a relatively fixed format to the quaestio, comprising the following elements: opening arguments, sed contra, author's response, and rebuttals of the opposing opening arguments (see Friedman, pp. 84-87). This quaestio structure develops into something more complex around the turn of the thirteenth to the fourteenth century. The new structure is characterized by focusing on a number of positions, each described at some length and supported by a number of arguments, and each used as a foil for the author in arriving at his own position (pp. 92-94). The development of the quaestio structure continued into the fourteenth century, as scholars found ways to structure extremely large "quaestiones" into a number of sub-topics through the use of, e.g., conclusiones and corollaria. This 25
See Glorieux, 'Sentences' (cit. n. 15), coll. 1873-75. Landgraf is explicit about this; see his 'The First Sentence Commentary' (cit. n. 9), pp. 120, 126, 132; the introduction to Landgraf, ed., Der Sentenzenkommentar (cit. n. 9), pp. XXXVII-XXXVIII; Landgraf, Introduction (cit. n. 7), p. 169. On the development of quaestio commentaries in the early thirteenth century, see A. Landgraf, 'Sentenzenglossen des beginnenden 13. Jahrhunderts', in Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale 10 (1938), pp. 36-55. 26
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type of tactic is found quite often in works from the later fourteenth century (Bakker and Schabel, pp. 428-31; cf. Hoenen 496-97). It was not only the structure of the quaestio that was evolving throughout the period 1250-1400. A profound development also took place with regard to how closely the authors adhered to the doctrinal arrangement and topical selection found in Lombard's Sentences. This is, of course, intimately related to the adoption and development of the quaestio, which was used in part to free the author from the strict adherence to Lombard's text that is characteristic of the literal gloss. In the second half of the thirteenth century, the commentaries (e.g., those of Aquinas and Bonaventure) are extremely comprehensive in the topics discussed and hold fairly close to Lombard's overall organizational scheme; indeed, they often include a number of individual questions in each of the "distinctions" that Alexander of Hales had introduced to organize Lombard's Sentences. Beginning in the late thirteenth-century theologians begin to become much more selective in the topics they take up for discussion, as is the case with, e.g. Duns Scotus or Peter Auriol (Friedman, pp. 84-97; also Nielsen, pp. 214-15). Here there are most often no more than one or two questions per distinction, and some distinctions are ignored altogether. This trend towards selectivity is true of some Parisian scholars in the period after 1320 (Schabel, 'Parisian'), but is far more marked in the English commentaries from that period, where they begin to lose contact with Lombard completely. Thus, Schabel calls Adam Wodeham's attempts to follow Lombard "only superficial" (Schabel, 'Oxford', pp. 362-63), and Edwards also mentions that, possibly because the time allotted for Sentences lectures was reduced from two years to one, Oxford authors from the 1330's no longer comment on Lombard in the same exhaustive way as thirteenthcentury theologians did (pp. 379-80). Indeed, the very division of the books of the Sentences into distinctions is dropped entirely in some of these later commentaries, which are organized only by questions. There are some extreme examples of this: for instance, Roger Roseth (read Sentences at Oxford 1335-37) asked only five questions in his entire Sentences commentary (Bakker and Schabel, p. 428 n. 7). In general, the later fourteenth century keeps to this selective approach to the Sentences, e.g. Pascale Bermon mentions Gregory of Rimini's selectivity (p. 274) and Bakker and Schabel give further examples (pp. 428-31). The cutting down of main topics asked and abandonment of the distinctiones structure in Sentences commentaries is partially
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offset by the development of the more complex structure of the quaestiones that was mentioned above, so sub-topics could be broached that did not necessarily have any overt link to the main question being discussed (Bakker and Schabel, pp. 429-31). That not all later fourteenth-century commentaries are highly selective, however, but that some stay rather close to Lombard's original work, is illustrated by the Sentences commentary of Marsilius of Inghen (Hoenen, p. 493). On the whole, however, the trend holds good that during the fourteenth century, the commentaries become more divorced from the actual text of the Sentences, treating fewer issues often at greater length than was typical in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Another candidate for what makes a Sentences commentary a Sentences commentary might be suggested: the unity of the genre might be found in the relation of the Sentences commentary to the lectures all bachelors of theology held on the Sentences in order to achieve their master's degree. But this does not hold. While it is true for most of the university period of Sentences commentaries that all bachelors of theology lectured on the Sentences in order to receive their master's degree, nevertheless the written commentary on the Sentences might be totally divorced from the actual lecturing requirement. Thus, it is indisputable that many masters continued to work on their commentaries long after they had been awarded their license to teach (e.g. Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, Durand of St. Pourgain); many of the ordinationes on the Sentences that we have probably exhibit only a loose link to the lectures that they may have been based upon. Other theologians, e.g. Peter Auriol, produced Sentences commentaries before ever having lectured as a partial requirement for the master's degree (Nielsen, p. 211). Indeed we have Sentences commentaries from figures who appear never to have attained their doctorate at all, for example Peter John Olivi, William of Ware, James of Metz, and William Ockham. Multiple redactions of Sentences commentaries and the use of the Sentences by those already in possession of their doctorate are just another indication of the fact that from the later thirteenth century the Sentences commentary became a preferred—perhaps the preferred—vehicle of theological expression (see, e.g., Friedman, pp. 97-100). Thus, while these two criteria—link to Lombard's Sentences and, to a much lesser extent, some relation to university bachelor lectures—are about the closest one can get to defining characteristics of Sentences commentaries as a genre, nevertheless even in these basic
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features there is so much variety in the surviving commentaries, from the earliest glosses to the late fourteenth-century quaestio commentaries, that even they can only be applied in a qualified way.
And this is perhaps the most striking thing about the literary genre that we call the Sentences commentary: the immense variety of works that fall under the category. This variety can be seen in everything from the organization of the commentaries, to their doctrinal content, to their place in the author's theological career. Thus, in the Sentences commentaries, works emerging from a vibrant tradition of theological education over more than four hundred years, we get a clear vision of the tremendous diversity of medieval theology. In this sense, the Sentences commentary may well be the genre that best represents at least later-medieval theology.
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INDEX OF NAMES (index compiled by Russell L. Friedman) All medieval authors and all places mentioned in the book are included in the index of names, while modern authors are generally included only in cases in which their works or ideas are actually discussed. Medieval authors (before ca. 1500) are alphabetized according to their first names, modern authors according to their last names. Medieval authors are most often indexed under their English names (e.g. William of Ockham, Henry of Ghent); exceptions involve lesser known authors referred to by their Latin names and authors whose foreign language names are in common use in English (e.g. Hervaeus Natalis, Nicole Oresme, Pierre d'Ailly). All medieval works mentioned in the text are included in the index as sub-entries to their authors; works by unknown authors are listed as 'Anonymous'. References in the index to Sentences commentaries are usually to discussions of the commentary itself and not to ideas contained in the commentary (which are listed under the author). The index of manuscripts aims to be exhaustive. Manuscripts are listed under the town and library in which they are now held, both spelled according to local usage.
Aaron, Old Testament figure, brother of Moses 26 Abbate, G. 291 Abraham, Old Testament figure 352 Adam of Ely, III-IV Sentences 359, 412, 412 n. 51 Adam Marsh 299 Adam Wodeham 244 n. 51, 261, 263 n. 92, 278, 280, 281 n. 66, 285, 359-60, 360 n. 2, 361-63, 363 n. 10, 364, 364 n. 11, 367-68, 368 n. 23, 371, 374, 374 n. 29, 375-76, 379, 381, 381 n. 5, 383, 390, 412, 425 n. 1, 431, 432 n. 14, 433, 435, 462, 466, 493, 498-99, 516, 521, 525.—Lectura prima (London) 361— Lectura secunda (Norwich) 280, 361-62, 374, 383—Ordmatio (Oxford; also abbreviation by Henry Totting of Oyta) 361, 361 n. 6, 381, 381 nn. 9-10, 383, 502, 502 n. 83 Adams, Marilyn McCord 93 n. 139 Aegidius Romanus: see Giles of Rome Aertsen, Jan 85 n. 122 Aix-en-Provence 83, 149 Alan of Lille 137 Albert of Saxony 9, 230 Albert the Great (Albertus Magnus) 9 n. 28, 44, 105, 136, 277, 290, 307-08, 310-14, 317-19, 326, 498, 521.—De peccato originali 349—De
poena parvulorum 349—Quaestiones 350 n. 28—Sentences commentary 311 n. 83, 349 Albert, Dominican master, opponent of Gregory of Rimini 277-78, 277-78 nn. 50-52, 516 Albumasar (Abu Ma'Shar), Mains introductorium 137 Alexander III, Pope (Roland Bandinelli) 11 n. 35, 34-36, 507-08 Alexander V, Pope: see Peter of Candia Alexander of Alessandria 74, 74 n. 90-91, 75, 91, 91 n. 132, 96, 98, 112, 112 n. 174, 238 n. 36, 512.—Sentences commentary, first version 74; 74 n. 90—Sentences commentary, second version 74, 74 n. 91, 91 n. 132, 96, 112, 112 n. 174 Alexander of Hales 44, 88, 105, 107 n. 159, 274 n. 33, 299, 299 n. 42, 307-08, 311-15, 317-18, 326, 340-41, 346, 347, 350, 509, 521, 524-25.—Glossa in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi 44, 88, 308, 334 n. 164, 346 n. 7, 346, 347, 347 n. 14—see Summa Haknsis Alexander Langeley 359, 382~87, 387 n. 32, 388, 388 n. 37, 389-93, 412-13, 418-19, 421, 513, 515, 517,
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INDEX OF NAMES
522.—Reportatio in Sententias (Lectura Secundd) 385-86, 387 n. 32, 388 nn. 34-35, 392, 412, 418-19 Alfraganus (al-Farghani) 135 Algazel 137 Alhazen (Alhasen, auctor Perspectivae) 137, 350 Allan of Lille 137, 498 Alliney, G. 80 n. 110 Alpetragius (al-Bitrugi) 137, 350 Alphonsus Vargas of Toledo 268 n. 5, 280 n. 60, 433, 443, 519.—In primum Sententiarum 268, 268 n. 5, 427 n. 4 Americ Vespuce (Amerigo Vespucci) 285 Andreas de Novocastro, Sentences commentary 432, 432 n. 14, 434 n. 20 Angelus of Camerino 10 n. 32 Angelus Dobelin, Sentences commentary 425 n. 1, 438 n. 26, 480 Angelus of Rome 425 n. 1 Anonymous (Bernard of Auvergne?), Impugnationes contra Aegidium Romanum contradicentem Thomae super primum Sent. 119 n. 190 Anonymous, Notabilia super Sentencias I—III secundum Cowton et Thomam 76 n. 96 Anonymous, Sentences commentary (Miinster Univ. Bibl. 164) 390 Anonymous socius or adversarius of Alexander Langeley (= John Went?) 392-93 Anselm of Canterbury 125, 279, 296, 298, 319, 341, 435.—Monologion 308 n. 73, 319, 319 n. 121 Anselm Guittus of Cumis (Anselme de Cumes) 268 n. 4, 279 Antonius Andreas, Sentences commentary 80 n. 110 Antonius Niger 7 n. 20 Aquitaine, Franciscan province of 62 Aristotle 4, 14-16, 134, 136, 156, 159, 160 nn. 52-53, 160-61 n. 53, 166, 175, 180, 296, 298, 300, 303-04, 307, 327-28, 335, 341-43, 387, 387 n. 33, 388, 52\.—APost. 15—APri. 15—Cat. (Praedicamentd) 15, 475—De an. 15 n. 43, 136—Ethics 15 n. 43, 233, 291-92, 300, 304, 348, 348 n. \9-Libn naturaks 137—Metaph. 15 n. 43,
136, 300, 302, 304, 327, 468—PAju. 15 n. 43, 136, 146, 328 n. 148, 335 n. 170, 468—Po/. 15, 15 n. 43, 166—De sensu et sensibil. 387 n. 33 Arius 29 Arnaud of Clermont 240 n. 41 Arnold of Seehausen 462 Arnold Woestefeldes 6, 8, 9 n. 27, 20 Arnoldus from Einbecke 9 Arnstadt, Germany 10 n. 29 Auer, J. 53 n. 27, 54 n. 30 Aufredo Gonteri Brito 73, 73 nn. 88~89, 74, 78, 78 n. 105, 240-42, 242 n. 47.—Sentences commentary 73, 235-36, 236 nn. 31-32 Augustine of Hippo 28, 29, 30, 31, 39 nn. 44 & 46, 93, 245, 249, 262, 264, 279, 279 n. 56, 282, 294-96, 298 304-07, 309-11, 315-16, 321, 327, 331, 337-38, 400, 435, 498.—De bono naturae 338, 338 n. 181—City of God 245—Confessions 304 n. 58, 305, 305 nn. 64-66— Contra Maximinum 29-30—De doc. christ. 28, 294, 294 n. 20—In loan. 31—De Tnn. 39, 282, 311 nn. 86-87, 315 n. 105—55 Quaest. 338 n. 182—see Hypomnesticon (Ps.-Augustinian) Augustine of Montefalco 270 Augustinus Triumphus, Sentences commentary 81, 81 n. 112, 91, 91 n. 133.—Summa de potestate ecclesiastica 81 Averroes (The Commentator, Ibn-Rushd) 137, 160, 160 n. 49 n. 52, 160-61 n. 53, 175, 252, 328, 350.—In Anstot. Metaph. 328 n. 151 Avicenna (Ibn-Sina) 134, 137, 302, 350.—Metaphysics 302 n. 51 Avignon 6, 71, 83, 121, 229, 361, 396 Azcona, P. S. 79 nn. 106-07 Backus, I. 404 n. 23 Bad Wimpfen, Germany 9 n. 28 Bakker, P. J. J. M. 52 n. 25, 230 n. 22, 260 n. 88, 428 n. 6 Balcoyiannopoulou, I. 255 n. 75 Bale, John 389 Balic, C. 65 n. 68, 73 n. 87, 74 n. 88 Bamberg 26 n. 3, 30 Barcelona 235, 240-42 Basel, Custody of 77
INDEX OF NAMES
Batafflon, L.-J. 52 n. 24, 53 n. 28 Bauer, Martin 177 n. 75 Bede, Venerable 327 Bell, James 89 n. 131 Benedict XI, Pope 146 Benedict XII (Benoit XII), Pope 256, 410 Benedict Gaetani, Papal legate 145 Benedictus Tancredi Perusinus 10 n. 32 Berengar of Tours 455 Berlin 232 Bermon, Pascale 223, 260 n. 88 Bernard of Auvergne 57 n. 36, 119 n. 190.—Quaestiones in I Sententiarum 57 n. 36—see Anonymous, Impugnationes. . . Bernard of Clairvaux 384, 407, 498 Bernard Gui, De quattuor in quibus 352 Bernard Lombardi 71, 72 n. 81, 224, 254, 254 n. 73, 255, 255 nn. 74-76, 257 n. 81, 279, 518.— Sentences commentary 254-55 Bernard Sylvester 137 Bernard of Trilia 58 n. 41, 136. Quaestiones in tractatu de Sphera Johannis de Sacro bosco 135-36 Berthold of Dieburg 497 Berthold of Regensburg 438 n. 26 Bessarion, Cardinal 237 n. 36 Beumer, J. 51 n. 20 Bible (Scripture) 13, 14, 292-99, 347—Exod. XIX 26—JohannesEvangelium 31—IV Kg. 2: 31— Paul's letter to the Ephesians 86 Biel, Gabriel: see Gabriel Biel Bischoff, B. 33 n. 31, 35 Black Monk: see Monachus Niger Boethius (Anicius Manlius Severinus) 36, 334.—Quomodo substantive 334 n. 164—De Trin. 36, 334 n. 164 Boisville-la-St.-Pere 10 n. 30 Bologna 6 n. 17, 80, 82, 99, 149, 212, 252, 260, 268, 430 n. 10 Bombolognus of Bologna 49, 49 n. 14, 50 n. 16, 88 n. 127, 96-97, 108, 108 n. 163.—Sentences commentary 49, 49 n. 14, 88 n. 127, 96-97, 108, 108 n. 163 Bonaventure 41, 44, n. 3, 45-47, 49-50, 52 n. 24, 54, 54 n. 30, 55, 55 n. 31, 74, 84-85, 86 n. 125, 87-97, 97 n. 145, 100-04, 104 n. 156, 105-06, 106 n. 158, 107
531
n. 159, 108, 108 n. 163, 109-10, 114-16, 120, 127, 149, 290, 306-08, 317-21, 323-26, 323 n. 128, 338-42, 351, 494, 498, 521, 524-26.—Sentences commentary 44 n. 3, 45, 47, 84-89, 97 n. 145, 100, 103, 107, 127, 319 Boniface VIII, Pope 66 Bonsembiante Badoer 479 Borchert, E. 253 n. 70 Bougerol, J. G. 44 n. 3, 88 n. 126 Brady, I. 28 n. 10, 33 n. 32, 50 n. 18, 51 n. 22, 52 n. 24, 85 n. 121 Brown, S. 150 n. 3, 154 n. 23, 157, 157 n. 39, 158, 158 n. 42, 170, 211 n. 145, 254 n. 72 Burr, D. 54 n. 30, 60 n. 53, 62 n. 59, 106 n. 158 Buytaert, Eligius 2, 149 n. 1, 158 n. 41, 242 n. 47 Cahors 82, 151 Callus, Daniel 350 Cambridge 44 n. 2, 65 n. 68, 66, 359, 359 n. 1, 382 n. 19 Canterbury 51 Catto,J. I. 44 n. 2, 111 n. 171, 289-90, 326, 340 Chenu, M. D. 50 n. 17 Cicero 498 Clagett, M. 414, 414 n. 58 Clarenbald of Arras, In Boethium De Trin. 36 Clement V, Pope 71, 121 Clement VI, Pope: see Pierre Roger Coburg 9 Coleton Fishacre, south Devon, England 345 Cologne (Koln) 6, 66, 74 Combefishacre, south Devon, England 345 Combes, A. 427 n. 4, 434 n. 20 Commentator, the: see Averroes Conrad of Ebrach, Sentences commentary 425 n. 1, 430 n. 10, 438 n. 26 Conrad Gelnhausen 497 Conrad of Soltau, Sentences commentary 9 n. 27-28, 10 n. 31, 429 n. 9, 440-41, 441 n. 30, 473-74, 498, 503 n. 84 Conrad Wimpina 9, 9 n. 27, 21 Conrad of Worms 497 Courtenay, W. J. 48 n. 10, 98
532
INDEX OF NAMES
n. 146, 116 n. 184, 126 n. 204, 222, 240, 240 n. 41, 251, 252 n. 68, 256 n. 77, 256 n. 78, 267, 360 n. 2, 362 n. 6, 363 n. 9, 425 n. 1, 426 n. 2, 430 n. 10, 439 n. 27, 441 Cracow: see Krakow Creytens, R. 48 n. 10 Cyprus 257
Decker, B. 49 n. 14, 58, 58 n. 40, 42, 59, 59 n. 43, 59 n. 48, 67 n. 71, 110 Democritus 400 Denzinger, H. 34 n. 35, 35 n. 40 Dettloff, W. 74 n. 91, 78 n. 106, 157 n. 38, 235 n. 30, 236 n. 31 Dionysius of Burgo Sancti Sepulchri 71, 72 n. 81, 81 n. 112, 249-50, 255 n. 75, 259.—Sentences commentary 249-50 Dionysius of Montina 280 n. 64, 425 n. 1, 438 n. 26 Dolnikowski, E. W. 411 n. 50 Domingo de Soto 470 n. 13 Dominicus of Cremona 10 n. 32 Dominioni, L. C. 433 n. 18 Doucet, V. 2, 53 n. 26, 54 n. 30, 74 n. 90, 80 n. 110, 226, 226 n. 10, 229, 236 n. 31, 237, 242 n. 47, 250, 257, 413, 413 n. 57, 514 Duhem, Pierre 221-222 Dumont, Stephen 67 n. 72, 99, 111 n. 171, 155 n. 29, 242 n. 46, 243 n. 48, 254 n. 72 Dunbabin, J. 72 n. 82, 94 n. 142 Durand of Aureliaco 254 n. 73 Durand of St. Pourcain 10 n. 32, 67 n. 71, 69-72, 70 n. 79, 71 n. 80, 72 n. 83, 83, 91, 91 n. 135, 94, 97, 99-100, 105, 110, 111 n. 17, 114, 114 n. 180, 121, 121 n. 197, 122-23, 123 n. 200, 124, 126-27, 250, 254-55, 255 n. 74-76, 281, 439 n. 27, 494, 498-500, 512, 516, 518, 526.—Sentences commentary 70 n. 79, 99, 121, 126, 498— Sentences commentary, first redaction 71, 71 n. 83, 99, 110, 121— Sentences commentary, second redaction 71, 71 n. 83, 99, 121—Sentences commentary, third redaction 71-72, 71 n. 83, 91, 91 n. 135, 121 n. 197, 123-24, 501 Durandellus, Evidentiae contra Durandum 123, 123 n. 201
Eastern Europe 2 Egidius Romanus: see Giles of Rome Einbecke, Germany 9 Emery, K. 48 n. 11 England 238 n. 38, 249, 253, 375, 431 England, Franciscan province of 51, 53 Epicurus 400 Erfurt (including University) 441 n. 30, 473 Ernst, J. Th. 54 n. 30 Etienne de Bourret, Bishop of Paris 279 n. 59 Etzkorn, G. 72 n. 85, 359 n.l, 361, 364 n. 13, 366 n. 18, 367 n. 21, 397 n. 6 Fernando of Cordova 237, 237 n. 36, Fishacre Barton, south Devon, England 345 Fleming, Brian 395 n. 2, 396, 396 n. 3, 414 Florence (Firenze) 6 n. 17, 60, 361 n. 5 Florentius Diel of Spyra 490 France 66, 99 n. 147 France, Dominican province of 69, 122 Francesco della Rovere (Pope Sixtus IV) 237 n. 36 Francis Bacon 429, 430 n. 11 Francis of Marchia 115, 225, 229-30, 230 n. 22, 231, 231 n. 23, 232-33, 233 n. 27, 234-36, 236 n. 31, 237-38, 244 n. 51, 245, 252, 252 n. 69, 257-59, 264, 428, 518, 522-23.—Sentences commentary (reportatio and Scriptum [ordinatio]) 229-30, 229-30 nn. 20-22 Francis of Meyronnes (Mayronis) 150 n. 3, 225, 237, 237 n. 35, 238, 238 nn. 36, 38, 239-40, 240 n. 42, 252, 257, 259, 427 n. 5, 518.— Sentences commentaries (Conflatus et al.) 237, 237 n. 35, 240 Francisco Suarez 470 n. 13 Francisco de Vitoria 470 n. 13 Franciscus de Tarvisio (Franciscus Massa de Belluno, Francois de Trevise) 275-76, 276-77 n. 45, 279 n. 57.—Lectura super Genesim 276 n. 45—Lectura super Tobiam 276 n. 45 Frankfurt 237
INDEX OF NAMES Friedman, R. L. 51 n. 20, 106 n. 158, 113 n. 178, 123 n. 200, 124 n. 202, 152 n. 10, 180 n. 82, 223-24, 230 nn. 20-21, 236 n. 32, 238 n. 36, 255 n. 75, 364 n. 14, 432 n. 14 Gabriel Biel, Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum 470-71, 511 Gal, G. 242 n. 46, 244 n. 53, 362 Galienus, Magister 351 Gauthier, R.-A. 141, 348 Geiger, L.-B. 34 n. 33 Gelber, H. G. 126 n. 205 Genest, Jean-Francois 55 n. 31 Gerald Castrikum 467, 481-82 Gerard of Abbeville 348 n. 21 Gerard of Cremona 135 Gerard of Kalkar 479 Gerard Odonis 235 n. 30, 243-244, 244 n. 51, 53, 245-49, 257-58, 258 n. 84, 263-64, 427 n. 5, 518, 522-23.—Commentary on the Ethics 243—Logica 243 n. 49—Sentences commentary 243-44—Tractatus de esse et essentia 243 n. 49 Gerard of Siena 224, 249-52, 257, 259.—Sentences commentary 250 Germany 2, 9, 10 n. 30 Geyer, B. 27 n. 7 Giles of Rome 55, 55 nn. 33-34, 56, 56 n. 35, 59, 59 n. 43, 96-97, 108, 108 n. 165, 110, 116 n. 185, 118, 124, 126, 132, 138-39, 141, 250-52, 257, 282, 452, 498, 518.—Apologia 55 n. 32—Sentences commentary (Ordinatio and reportatid) 55-56, 55-56 nn. 34-35, 81 n. 112, 96-97, 118 Gillon, L.-B. 48 n. 10 Gilson, Etienne 45 n. 5, 141 Ginther, James 291 n. 9, 299, 299 n. 42, 354 Giorgio Benigno Salviati 228 Giusberti, F. 33, 33 n. 31, 35, 35 n. 38 Glorieux, P. 58 n. 41, 88 n. 127, 413, 413 n. 56, 427 n. 4, 511 n. 15 Glossa ordinaria 384—Exod. XIX: 26—IV Kg. 31 Godescalc of Nepomuk 438 n. 26, 439 n. 28 Godfrey of Fontaines 119 n. 190, 139, 141-43, 150—IV Quodlibet 142, 518
533
Godfrey of Trani, Summa super titulos decretalium 144 Golaszewska, M. 257 n. 80 Gottingen 9 Grabmann, M. 49 n. 14, 141 Gregory I (the Great), Pope 327 Gregory of Nyssa 27 Gregory of Rimini (Gregoire de Rimini) 115, 221, 223-24, 225 n. 7, 229-30, 234, 236-37, 239, 249, 252, 252 n. 69, 254, 258-60, 260 n. 88, 262, 262 n. 91, 263-65, 267-85, 374, 374 n. 29, 377, 426, 431, 434-36, 438 n. 26, 439 n. 27, 441-43, 462, 466, 494, 496 n. 72, 498, 510-11, 516, 519-23.—Lectura super primum et secundum sententiarum 269-74—Tractatus de intensione et remissione formarum 272 n. 20 Gregory XI, Pope 426, 427 n. 4 Greifswald 8 Guido Terrena 238 n. 38 Guillaume de Bellomonte 277, 277 n. 48 de Guimaraes, A. 69 n. 75, 155 n. 30, 159 n. 46 Guy d'Ibelin, Bishop of Limassol, Cyprus 257 Hadrian VI, Pope 11 n. 35 Hagar, Old Testament figure, slave woman 352 Hagenau 489 Hallamaa, Olli 359 n. 1 Halverson, James 102, 105 n. 157, 107 nn. 159-60, 109, 113, 113 n. 179, 115, 115 n. 181, 223, 238, 258 n. 84, 262 n. 91, 364 n. 11, 367 n. 21, 441 Hannibaldus of Hannibaldi, Sentences commentary 49, 49 n. 13 Haverel, lectured at Norwich in 1330s 359 Hechich, B. 76, 76 n. 95, 119 n. 192 Heidegger, M. 26 Heidelberg 465, 467, 470, 473, 479, 482-83, 488, 490, 497 Heilmann Wunnenberger 478, 498.—Sentences commentary 478 Helmstedt, Germany 9 Henninger, M. G. 158 n. 45 Henricus de Frimaria, author of commentary on the Decalogue 480, 485 Henry Costesey 359 n. 1
534
INDEX OF NAMES
Henry of Embecke 9, 10 n. 29 Henry of Freimar the Younger 81 n. 112, 250 n. 62.—Additiones in libros Sent. 81 n. 112—IV Sentences 81 n. 112, 250 n. 62 Henry of Ghent (Henri de Gand) 41, 59, 67 n. 72, 77, 93, 93 n. 139, 112, 119 n. 190, 125, 139, 141, 150, 229, 250, 254, 275 n. 38, 282, 498, 518.—Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum 67 n. 72 Henry of Harclay 67 n. 71, 73, 73 n. 87, 79 n. 105, 80, 81 n. I l l , 94, 112, 112 n. 172, 127, 235-36, 236 nn. 31-32, 388, 388 n. 37, 518, 520—Quaestiones 73, 127—Sentences commentary 73, 73 nn. 87-88, 127, 236 n. 31 Henry of Langenstein, Sentences commentary 436, 436 n. 24, 438 n. 26, 462 Henry of Liibeck, Quodlibet 254 n. 73 Henry Totting of Oyta 285 n. 85, 361, 362 n. 6, 381 n. 9, 429 n. 8, 430 n. 11, 462, 502.—Lectura textualis super libros Sententiarum 429 n. 8, 430 n. 11—Quaestiones Sententiarum 427 n. 4 Hereford, Greyfriars Convent 389 Hermannus, at Heidelberg 490 Hervaeus Natalis (Herve Nedellec, Herve Noel) 69, 69 n. 75, 70, 70 n. 79, 91, 94, 97, 105, 110, 111 n. 170, 121-22, 127, 155, 159, 159 n. 46-47, 167, 169, 180, 180 n. 79, 83, 182-83, 183 n. 89, 91, 184, 184 n. 91, 185, 185 n. 94, 186 87, 190 n. 104, 192, 194-95, 195 n. 117, 196 n. 119, 197-98, 201, 254, 517.—Comctorium of James of Metz' I, II, and IV Sentences 121—IV Quodlibet 159, 159 n. 46, 180, 183, 183 n. 89—Sentences commentary 69, 91 Heynck, V. 51 n. 19, 21, 62, 62 nn. 59-60, 63, 63 n. 62, 77-78, 150 n. 4, 158 n. 41, 171 n. 66, 210, 210 n. 144, 226 n. 9 Hilarius of Poitiers, De Trin. 38 n. 42, 300 n. 43 Hildesheim 9, 10 n. 29 Himbert of Garda, Sentences commentaries 238, 238 n. 38, 239 Hocedez, E. 53-54
Hodl, Ludwig 63-64, 64 n. 64, 70 n. 79, 118 n. 188, 159 n. 46 Hoenen, M. J. F. M. 118 n. 188 Holy Roman Empire 238 n. 38 Hugh of Novo Castro 77-79, 78 n. 105, 79 n. 107, 91, 91 n. 134, 94, 112, 112 n. 173, 225, 236, 236 n. 32, 259, 259 n. 86, 518.—Sentences commentary 77, 77 n. 101, 91, 91 n. 134 Hugh of St. Cher 346, 351.—Sentences commentary 346, 346-47 n. 9, 509 Hugh of St. Victor 307 n. 72, 313-14, 318, 341 Hugolino of Orvieto 268 n. 4, 431, 431 n. 13, 433, 438 n. 26, 452, 479, 494, 496 n. 72, 498, 523.— Commentarius in quattuor libros Sententiarum 271 n. 19 Humbert of Prouilly, Sentences commentary 57 n. 36 Humbertus de Senis 280 n. 64 Huning, Alois 61, 61 n. 55, 63 n. 62 Hurter, H. 1 Hypomnesticon (Ps.-Augustinian) 338, 338 39 nn. 185-86 Innocent III, Pope 11 n. 35 Innocent IV, Pope 291, 354 Innocent V, Pope: see Peter of Tarentaise Isny, Germany 482 Isidore of Seville, Etymologies 134 Italy 62, 99, 99 n. 147, 238, 260 Jacob of Carcetto (Quesnoy) 62 Jacobus Capocci de Viterbio 11 n. 33 Jacobus de Jutirboc 7 nn. 20-21 Jacobus de Teramo 10 n. 32 Jacques Duese: see John XXII James of Ascoli, Quodlibet 76 n. 95 James of Eltville, Sentences commentary 429, 438 n. 26, 443, 443 n. 34, 444, 444 n. 36, 445-61 James of Lausanne, Sentences commentary, versions one and two 68 n. 74, 73, 73 n. 86, 111 n. 170 James of Metz 69-70, 70 n. 79, 91, 91 n. 135, 99, 110-11, 121, 127, 439 n. 27, 516, 526.—Sentences commentary, versions one and two 69, 70, 70 n. 78, 79, 91, 91 n. 135, 110, 127
INDEX OF NAMES
James of Viterbo 57 n. 36, 70, 119 n. 190 Jasna Hora, convent, Poland 257 n. 80 Jean de Lana (lohannes de Lana) 280, 280 n. 64.—Quaestiones de anima hwnana 280 n. 64 Jerome, Church Father 327 Jesus Christ 36 Joachim of Fiore 508 Johannes Briselotus 7 n. 20 Johannes of Colonia 475 Johannes Holszadel 498 Johannes Kleine 8 Johannes Ottonis de Munsterberg 9 n. 27 Johannes Tongrensis 7 n. 20 John XXII, Pope (Jacques Duese) 61, 82-83, 123-24, 151-52, 243, 256, 410 John Baconthorpe 161 n. 53, 171 n. 66, 224, 247 n. 57, 252-53, 253 n. 70, 254, 254 n. 72, 435, 435 n. 23.—Quaestiones canonicae 252-53—Quaestiones speculativae 253—Sentences commentaries (ordinatio and reportatio} 161 n. 53, 252-53, 253 nn. 70-71 John of Bassol 78-79, 79 nn. 106-07, 99, 112, 243 n. 48—Sentences commentary 78-79, 99, 112 n. 175 John Berwart of Villingen 462 John of Berwick 75 John of Braculis 430 n. 10 John Bremer 498 John Buridan 222, 230, 496 n. 72, 498-99, 501 John Capreolus, Sentences commentary (Defensioms theologiae Thomae Aquinatis) 46, 463-64, 498, 519 John of Dabrovka (Johannes de Dabrowka) 9 n. 26, 483, 491 John of Damascus (Damascene) 2, 245, 246.—Defide orthodoxa 134 John Duns Scotus 41, 46, 59, 59 n. 47, 62 n. 59, 64, 65 nn. 67-68, 66, 66 n. 70, 67 nn. 71-73, 68, 68 n. 73, 73, 73 n. 87, 74, 75, 75 n. 94, 80, 80 n. 107, 88-93, 93 n. 140, 95, 99, 105, 106 n. 158, 108-14, 119-20, 126, 126 n. 205, 127, 149, 150, 223, 227-29, 231-33, 236-37, 237 n. 36, 238, 241, 243-44, 250, 260-61, 275,
535
275 n. 38, 278, 282, 340, 343, 362, 368, 370-71, 375, 379-80, 389-90, 406, 406 n. 30, 436-37, 463, 498, 512, 517-20, 522, 525.— Additiones magnae 79 (see also William of Alnwick)—Lectura (Sentences commentary) 65 n. 68, 66, 99—Ordinatio (Sentences commentary) 65 n. 68, 66, 76, 79, 88-90, 94, 99, 109, 109 n. 169— Quodlibet (q. 7) 283 n. 70—Reportatio 1A (Reportatio examinatd) 66, 66 n. 70, 73 n. 87 John of Erfurt 10 n. 29, 61-62, 61 n. 58, 62 n. 59, 99 n. 147, 108 n. 166.—Sentences commentary 61-62, 62 n. 59 John of Erfurt, author of the Tabula utriusque iuris 61, 61 n. 58 John of Frisia 151 John Gerson 426, 427 n. 4, 466, 519.—De duplici logica 466 John Grafton, Quodlibeta 381 John Hiltalingen of Basel 430 n. 10, 434 n. 20, 435, 438 n. 26, 443, 452-55, 452 n. 40, 453 n. 41, 455, 458—59, 519.—Sentences commentary 430 n. 10 John ofJandun 498 John of Lichtenberg, Sentences commentary 60 n. 48 John Lutterell 83 John Major (Jean Mair) 285, 361, 432 n. 14 John of Mirecourt 257 n. 81, 271, 433, 433 n. 18, 434, 523.—Sentences commentary 412, 412 n. 53, 433, 433 n. 18 John of Paris (Quidort) 57, 58 nn. 39 & 41, 59, 59 n. 43, 96, 110, 111 n. 170, 117, 127, 131-47, 511, 513, 515, 517.—Correctorium "Circa" 58, 117, 140—Determinatio de confessionibus fratrum 146—De modo existendi corporis Christi in sacramento altaris 141—De potestate regia et papali 57, 144—Sentences commentary 58, 58 n. 39-40, 96, 96 n. 144, 127, 131-47 John Pecham 51, 51-52 n. 22, 52, 107, 107 n. 161, 127.—I Sentences 51, 52 n. 22, 107, 107 n. 161, 127 John Rathe Scotus (Jean Rathe Scot) 275, 275 n. 39, 277 n. 45.—
536
INDEX OF NAMES
Determinatio "Utrum Deus possit decipere aliquem" 275 n. 39 John of Reading, Sentences commentary 80 n. 110, 359 n. 1 John of Ripa 434, 434 n. 20, 437, 479, 496 n. 72, 498.—Sentences commentary 434 n. 20 John of Rodington 281 n. 66.— Sentences commentary 359, 359 n. 1 John of St. Anthony 171 n. 66, 172 n. 66 John of Salisbury 400 John of Sterngassen 58—59, 59 nn. 42-43, 70 n. 79, 110, 110 n. 170, 111 n. 170, 127.—Sentences Commentary 58, 58 n. 42, 59, 59 n. 43, 110, 127 John the Teuton, Apparatus glossarum 144 John Went 359, 382-83, 389-92, 392 n. 46, 393, 513, 522.—Sentences commentary (Lectura in Sententias) 382, 382 n. 21, 389-90, 390 n. 42, 391 n. 43-44, 392 n. 45 John Wuel of Pruck 462 John Wyclif 388 Jordan of Saxony 346, 346 n. 4 Joshua (Josue), Old Testament figure 26 Jung-Palczewska, E. 155 n. 32 Kaczmarek, Ludger 441 Kaluza, Zenon 184 n. 92, 222, 259 n. 85, 442, 519 Karger, E. 329 n. 153 Kelley, F. E. 117 n. 186 Kent, B. D. 45 n. 5, 106 n. 158 Knuuttila, Simo 226, 226 n. 11 Koch,J. 70 n. 79, 72 n. 83, 122, 122 n. 198 Kohler, Th. 70 nn. 77-79 Kolobrzeg, Poland 10 n. 30 Krakow (Cracow) 9 n. 26, 13, 257 n. 80, 470, 483 Kraml, Hans 52 nn. 23-25 Kuksewicz, Z. 155 n. 32 Landgraf A. M. 33, 33 n. 33, 353 n. 43, 508-09, 524 Landry, A. M. 34 n. 33 Landulph Caracciolo 78, 78 n. 105, 225-26, 226 nn. 9-10, 227, 227 n. 13, 228-29, 231-32, 238,
258-59, 263-64, 430 n. 10, 518.— Sentences commentary 225-26, 225-26 n. 9-10 Laurent, M. H. 48 n. 10, 257 n. 81 Laurentius Anglicus, phantom author 3 Laurentius of Bononia (Laurentius Opimus of Bononia) 3 Le Puy-en-Velay, France 71 Lechner, J. 63 n. 63 Leipzig 6, 8-9, 9 nn. 27-28, 20-22, 254, 487 Lemaigre, B. M. 45 n. 4 Limassol, Cyprus 257 Limoux 71 London 83, 360-61 Long, R. James 292 Longere, J. 34 n. 34, 36 n. 41 Lotharingia 77 Lottin, D. O. 26 n. 2, 27 n. 7, 28 n. 9, 48 n. 10 Louis of Bavaria, Holy Roman Emperor 83, 230 Louis of Padua 434 n. 20 Low Countries 10 n. 30 Lucas Antonius of Giunta 270 Luis de Molina 470 n. 13 Luna, Concetta 55 n. 34, 56 n. 35 Luther, Martin 145, 265, 284 Magdeburg 9 n. 28, 33 n. 31 Magister Galienus: see Galienus, Magister Magnus Hund de Magdeburg 9 n. 27, 22 Maier, Anneliese 74 n. 88, 151, 151 n. 7, 152, 152 n. 8, 153 n. 15, 153 n. 19, 154, 154 n. 21 & nn. 24-26, 155, 155 n. 32, 156, 156 nn. 34-36, 157, 157 n. 37, 158-59, 160 n. 53, 161, 168-70, 177 n. 75, 190-91, 191 n. 106, 195, 208 n. 142, 221, 221 n. 1, 231 n. 23 Maieru, A. 190 n. 104 Mainz 10 n. 29, 490 Marcolino, V. 425 n. 1, 430 n. 10, 439 n. 27 Mariani, N. 230 n. 21, 231 n. 23 Marrone, S. 53 n. 27 Marsilio Ficino 483 Marsilius of Inghen (Marsilio of Almania) 9 n. 26, 10, 10 n. 30, 23, 265, 427 n. 4, 429, 430 n. 12, 465-506, 511, 515-16, 519, 526.—
INDEX OF NAMES
Commentaries on Aristotle 501— Commentary on the Prior analytics 480—Questiones super librum De generatione et corruptione Aristotelis 475— Quaestiones super Metaphysicam 468-469—Quaestiones super libros Physicorum 468-469—Quaestiones Porphirii 474—Sentences commentary 427 n. 4, 465-503 Martin IV, Pope 139, 145 Martin of Alnwick 63 n. 63, 108 n. 166, 127 Martin Fishacre 345-46 Martinus Flach Junior 489 90 Martin, R. M. 26 n. 2, 5, 48 n. 10 Masters of the University of Heidelberg, Ad illustrissimum Bavariae Ducem Philippum Comitem Rheni Palatinum et ad nobilissimos filios epistola 490 Matthew of Aquasparta 53, 53 nn. 26—27, 96.—Sentences commentary 53, 53 n. 27, 96 Matthias Schiirer 489 Mauritius of Sully, Bishop of Paris 28 Maximinus, Arian Bishop 29-30 Meaux, France 71 Meister Eckhart 131 Melchioris Lodivici of Freynstadt 486-87 Melk 485 Menso of Beckhusen 429 n. 9, 440 Mertonians 386 Michael Aiguani, Sentences commentary 427 n. 4 Michael of Cesena 230 Michael of Massa 224, 236, 249, 251-52, 252 nn. 68~69, 255, 259, 281, 519, HI—Sentences commentaries (Scriptum and abbreviationes] 251 n. 67 Michaelis Slesitam 485 Michalski, C. 76, 158, 158 n. 44, 221 n. 1 Monachus Niger (Black Monk) 280, 522.—Sentences commentary 382, 382 n. 19 Montpellier 62, 80 Moses, Old Testament figure 26, 297 Moses Maimonides 350 Miihlhausen, Thiiringen, Germany 10 n. 29 Mulchahey, M. M. 98 n. 146, 357 nn. 55-56
537
Muller, J.-P. 58, 58 n. 40, 132-33, 136, 141, 144 Munich 83 Murdoch, J. 15 n. 43, 222, 512 Naples 6 n. 17 Narbonne 60 Narcissus Pfister de Augusta 7 n. 20 Neuberg 77 Neufchateau 77 Newcastle 7 7 New Testament: see Bible Nicholas of Autrecourt 244, 259 n. 85, 271, 433-34 Nicholas Bonet 244, 255.—Natural Theology 255 Nicholas of Dinkelsbiihl (Dinkelspiihl) 12, 462.—Lectura Mellicensis 12— Quaestiones communes 12—Quaestiones magistraks 12 Nicholas of Moguncia 475 Nicholas of Ockham 52 n. 25, 54, 54 n. 30, 108, 108 n. 165, 251, 439 n. 27.—Sentences commentary 54, 54 n. 30 Nicholas Trivet, Annales Sex Regum Angliae 345, 345 n. 2, 347 n. 13 Nicolaus de Luthomyssl 9 n. 27 Nicolaus de Orbellis 7 n. 20 Nicole Oresme 222, 222 n. 3, 230 Nielsen, L. 150 n. 2, 158 n. 44, 159 n. 48, 175 n. 74, 178 n. 78, 180 n. 81, 184 n. 91, 190 n. 103, 204 n. 133, 207 n. 140, 209 n. 142, 223 Nijmegen 10 Nordhausen, Germany 10 n. 29 Norwich 359, 361, 383 Oberman, H. 364 n. 11 O'Carroll, Maura 346 n. 3 Ockhamists 251, 252 n. 68 Odo of Ourscamp 25, 29, 29 n. 16, 32-36 Odo Rigaud, Sentences commentary 44 n. 3, 88 n. 126 Odo of Soisson, Cardinal 33-34, 511 Old Testament: see Bible Ordinary Gloss on the Bible: see Glossa ordinaria Osbert Pickingham 428 n. 7, 443, 445-47, 445 n. 38, 449-52, 455, 519.—Sentences commentary 428 n. 7, 445 n. 38 Osnabriick 10 n. 29
538
INDEX OF NAMES
Ovid 498 Oxford (including University of Oxford) 13, 44 n. 2, 50-51, 54, 63, 63 n. 63, 64 n. 64, 66, 80, 83, 98 n. 146, 99, 221, 223, 230-31, 257-58, 259 n. 1, 261, 264, 289-343, 354, 356, 359, 360-68, 374, 377, 379-81, 382 n. 19, 385, 425 n. 1, 426, 426 n. 2, 427, 427 n. 5, 428, 428 n. 7, 429, 431-33, 434 n. 20, 435, 463 Oxford Greyfriars 292, 389 Oxford, Greyfriars, Warden of 385, 389 Padua (Padue) 250, 260, 268 Palacz, R. 483 Pannenberg, W. 105 n. 157, 108 Paolini, C. 259 Paris (including University of Paris) 6, 9, 10, 13, 23, 25, 28, 44, 45, 48-49, 51-54, 55 n. 31, 57 n. 36, 58, 59, 62-64, 66, 69-74, 76, 76 n. 95, 78-83, 92, 99, 115-16, 118, 121, 149, 151-52, 162, 190, 208 n. 142, 211-12, 214, 221-25, 225 n. 7, 226 n. 9, 228-31, 235, 238-41, 243-44, 249, 251-53, 254 n. 73, 255, 256-58, 259-61, 262, 262 n. 91, 263-64, 267, 289-90, 299, 306, 319, 326-27, 340, 345, 347, 349, 356, 361-63, 376-80, 425 n. 1, 426-27, 427 nn. 4-5, 428, 430 nn. 10-11, 431-32, 432 n. 14, 433-34, 434 n. 20, 435-37, 441, 463, 465, 479-80 Parodi, M. 433 n. 18 Pasiecznik, M. 78 n. 106 Pastor of Serrescuderio, Sentences commentary 240, 240 nn. 41-42, 255 Pattin, A. 138 Paul of Perugia 433 Paul of Venice 9 n. 27 Paul, St. 355, 396 Pelagius 101, 258, 279 n. 56, 405 Pelster, F. 49 n. 14, 151, 151 n. 6, 152 n. 8, 154 n. 22, 158 n. 44, 292, 347 nn. 10 & 13 Peppermuller, R. 35 n. 37 Perugia (Perouse) 260, 268 Peter Abelard 32, 384 Peter of Aquila 78, 78 n. 103, 241,
256, 258-59, 259 n. 85, 518.— Sentences commentary 258-59, 259 n. 85 Peter Auriol (Aureoli) 41, 68, 72 n. 81, 78 n. 106, 81-82, 82 nn. 113-15, 83-84, 94, 99-100, 102, 105, 111 n. 171, 113, 113 nn. 178-79, 114, 114 n. 180, 115, 119, 126-27, 149-219, 221, 223-24, 224 n. 6, 225, 225 n. 7, 226-27, 227 n. 13, 228-29, 231-32, 232 n. 25, 233-36, 236 n. 31, 237, 237 n. 36, 238-41, 241 n. 43, 242, 243 n. 48, 244-46, 249-54, 254 n. 73, 255, 255 n. 74, 257-61, 263-65, 280-82, 362-63, 363 n. 9, 364, 364 n. 14, 365-66, 366 n. 18, 367 n. 21, 368, 368 n. 23, 369-71, 374-75, 427 n. 5, 435, 437-38, 443, 462-63, 498, 510-12, 515-17, 521-23, 525-26.—Breviarium Bibliorum 172 n. 66, 214 n. 154—Commentaries on III Sentences (including Pawae quaestiones] 171—72 n. 66— Commentaries on IV Sentences 150, 170-89, 201 n. 129, 202, 210 n. 144, 211, 211 n. \45^Quodlibet 152, 172 nn. 67-68, 187, 190, 190 n. 104, 196, 196 n. 118, 197-98, 200, 200 nn. 125-128, 201-02, 211 n. 146, 214, 216—Reportationes on I-IV Sentences 82 n. 115, 83, 236, 223, 226, 228, 235, 232, 242— Reportationes on I Sentences 151-69, 190-215—Scriptum (ordinatio on I Sentences, LCI) 82, 82 n. 114, 119, 151-52, 152 n. 9, 155-57, 206-212, 223, 231, 235, 235 n. 30, 236 n. 33, 241, 241 n. 43, 242, 242 n. 46, 252, 370, 435, 463-464 Peter of Candia (Pope Alexander V) 10 n. 32, 11 n. 35, 429, 437-38, 473, 479, 498, 519.—Sentences commentary 437, 437 n. 25 Peter Ceffons (Pierre), Sentences commentary 433, 433 n. 17, 434 Peter Comestor (Peter Manducator) 25-26, 30-31, 31 n. 24, 32, 510-11.—Historia scholastica 26 n. 4, 31 n. 24, 347 Peter of Friedberg 490 Peter of Gracilis 438 n. 26 Peter John Olivi 60, 60 n. 49, 61,
INDEX OF NAMES
63, 99 n. 147, 108 n. 166, 127, 526.—Sentences Commentaries 60-61, 60 nn. 51-52, 127 Peter Lombard 25-26, 28-29, 29 n. 13, 30, 30 nn. 18 & 20, 31 nn. 22 & 25, 32, 32 n. 27, 34, 35 n. 36, 38 n. 42, 39 n. 43, 43-44, 85, 85 nn. 121-122, 87, 89-90, 93, 149, 173-74, 214-15, 272-73, 307, 309-10, 327, 353, 362-63, 374, 379, 425-26, 427 n. 4, 428, 428 n. 7, 449 n. 39, 473, 493-96, 503, 507-08.—Sentences 87, 89, 99, 272, 293-95, 300 n. 43, 347, 379—1 Sentences 28, 29 n. 13, 30 nn. 18-20, 31 nn. 22-25, 32 n. 27, 38 n. 42, 39 nn. 43, 46—III Sentences 35 n. 36—IV Sentences 33 n. 29 Peter Manducator: see Peter Comestor Peter of Navarre 78 n. 106, 79, 238 n. 36, 240-42, 242 n. 46, 243, 243 n. 48, 427 n. 5, 518.—Sentences commentary (Scriptum) 79, 79 n. 107, 241-42 Peter of Nugent, Sentences commentary 463, 463 n. 45, 464, 519 Peter of Orgemont 427 n. 4 Peter of Palude 72, 72 nn. 82-83, 85, 73, 91, 91 n. 135, 94, 94 n. 142, 97, 110, 122, 127, 241 n. 44, 255 n. 75.—Sentences commentary 72, 91, 110, 127 Peter Plaout de Palma, Sentences commentary 72 n. 85 Peter of Poitiers 28, 50, 308, 312, 318.—Sent. 312 n. 93—see Ps.-Poitiers Gloss Peter of Pulkau 462 Peter of Rivo 438 Peter of Tarentaise (Pope Innocent V) 11 n. 35, 47-49, 51 n. 21, 52, 54, 54 n. 29, 95-97, 106-08.—Sentences commentary 48, 48 n. 10, 95, 97, 106-08 Peter Thomae 190 n. 104, 240-243, 242 n. 46, 243 n. 48, 427 n. 5, 5\8.—Quodlibet 242—Sentences commentary 240-243, 242 n. 46, 243 n. 48 Peter of Trabibus 61, 61 n. 55, 62, 63 n. 62, 96, 99, 108 n. 166.— Sentences commentary (Ordinatio and reportationes on II-III Sent.} 61, 61 n. 58, 63 n. 62, 96, 108 n. 166
539
Philip IV (the Fair), King of France 66 Philip the Chancellor 327.—Summa de bono 327 n. 146 Philosopher, the: see Aristotle Pierre d'Ailly 10 nn. 31-32, 92, 265, 436, 441-42, 462, 496 n. 72, 519. Sentences commentary 92, 427 n. 4, 441 Pierre Roger (Pope Clement VI) 11 nn. 33 & 35, 237, 237 n. 35, 271 Piron, Sylvain 60, 60 n. 49, 61 Pitra, J. B., Cardinal 33, 33 n. 30 Plato 134, 498 Plotnik, K. 70 n. 79 Porebski, S.A. 254 n. 73, 255 n. 74 Porphyry, Isagogue 15, 474 Praepositinus of Cremona (Prapositinus) 28, 308-09, 313, 317, 351 Prague 9, 10 n. 29, 429 nn. 8-9, 440 Principe, W. H. 346-47 n. 9, 350 n. 31 Prosper of Reggio Emilia, Sentences commentary 76, 81 n. 112, 254 n. 72 Ps.-Poitiers Gloss 26, 27, 28, 29, 29 n. 12, 30, 31, 32, 32 nn. 26, 28, 36, 511, 515, 524 Ptolemy 134, 350.—Almagest 135 Puglioni, Sara 359 n. 1 del Punta, F. 56 n. 34, 158 Putallaz, F.-X. 55 n. 31, 106 n. 158 R. de Stavington 351 Radulphus Brito, Sentences commentary 68 n. 74 Rambert of Bologna (or Primadizzi) 118 n. 188 Randi, E. 433 n. 18 Raymond Bequini, Correctorium of Auriol's Scriptum 118-19 Raymond Lull, Quaestiones super Sentencias 57 n. 36 Raymond of Penafort 144 Rebeta, J. 257 n. 80 Reims 79, 99 Richard, Jean 257 n. 81 Richard Brinkley 430 n. 10, 438 Richard of Bromwich, Sentences commentary 68 n. 74, 98 n. 146 Richard Campsall 369 70 Richard Carew, Sentences commentary 55, 55 n. 31
540
INDEX OF NAMES
Richard Fishacre 290-300, 302-03, 307-10, 312-14, 316-17, 326-29, 332, 335-42, 345, 348 n. 20, 350, 352-53, 355, 509, 511, 515, 520, 524.—Sentences commentary 290-92, 345-57—Quaestio on the Ascension of Christ 349, 349 n. 24— Quaestio on the division of the waters 349— Quaestio on the eternity of the world 349, 349 n. 23—Quaestio on light 348, 348-49 n. 22—Quaestio on the nature of the heavens 349—Super S. Augustini De haeresibus adnotationes 349, 349 n. 24 Richard FitzRalph (Hibernicus) 261, 280, 281 n. 66, 380, 405-07, 431, 431 n. 13, 522.—Sentences commentary 405, 428 n. 7 Richard Kilvington 280, 382-86, 411, 411 n. 49, 412 n. 51, 513, 522.— Lectura in Sentential 384, 385 nn. 25-26 Richard Knapwell 50, 50 n. 17, 100 n. 148, 117.—Correctorium "Quare" 50, 117 n. 186—Notabilia super I Sententiarum 50, 50 n. 17, 100 n. 148—Quaestio disputata de unitate formae 117 n. 186 Richard of Mediavilla (Richard of Middleton) 53, 53 n. 28, 54, 54 n. 29, 61, 97, 97 n. 145, 108, 108 n. 165, 114, 114 n. 180.—Sentences commentary 53, 53~54 nn. 28-29, 54, 97, 97 n. 145, 108 Richard Rufus of Cornwall 289-90, 293-308, 314-43, 351-52, 356, 513, 515, 520.—Commentary on the Prior Analytics 297, 297 n. 35— Contra Averroem 328, 328-29 nn. 152-53, 330-34 nn. 155-63, 334-35 nn. 165-68, 335, 337, 339, 339 n. 187—Dissertatio in Metaph. Aristot. (Second Metaphysics commentary) 296, 296 n. 31, 300-302 & nn. 44-50, 328, 328 n. 152—Memorial* quaestionum in Metaphysicam Aristot. (First Metaphysics commentary) 328, 328 n. 149—Oxford Sentences Commentary 290, 356—Parisian Sentences commentary (later Sent. commentary) 289-90, 291 n. 6, 319—In Physicam Aristot. 328, 328 n. 150 Richard of St. Victor 498
Richard Snetisham 76 Richter, V. 65 n. 68, 73 n. 87 de Rijk, L. M. 243 n. 49, 244 n. 51 Rimini 267 Ritter, G. 487 Robert Bacon 346 Robert Cowton 76 nn. 95-96, 76, 77-78, 80 n. 107, 89, 89 n. 130, 94, 112, 112 n. 176, 119, 119 n. 192, 126.—Sentences commentary 76, 76 n. 95, 77, 89, 112 n. 176, 119, 119 n. 192—see also Anonymous, Notabilia . . . Robert the Englishman, commentary on the Sphere of Sacrobosco 135-36 Robert Graystanes 435 Robert Grosseteste 291-300, 307, 342, 348, 351, 353-56, 509, 521.— Epistolae 291 n. 7, 292 n. 14, 353 n. 44—De natura locorum 135— Hexaemeron 295 nn. 29-30, 296 n. 32—Sphaera lucis 351 n. 34— Translation of Aristotle's Ethics 291-92, 348, 348 n. 19 Robert of Halifax, Sentences commentary 280, 359, 359 n. 1, 522 Robert Holcot 257 n. 81, 258, 258 n. 84, 281 n. 66, 366, 367 n. 21, 381, 381 n. 6, 443-45, 444 n. 37, 448, 455, 466, 493, 498-99, 519, 521-22.—De obiecto actus credendi 281 n. 66—In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones 428 n. 7, 500 Robert Kilwardby 48 n. 9, 289-90, 293 n. 14, 294-95, 297-300, 306-07, 322-27, 338-43, 351, 351 n. 36, 356, 520.—De ortu scientiarum 290 n. 6—Quaestiones in IV libros Sententiarum 48 n. 9, 290, 290 nn. 5-6, 351 n. 36 Robert Orford 117, 118, 118 n. 190.—Correctorium "Sciendum" 117—Reprobationes dictorum a fratre Egidio in primum Sententiarum 118 n. 190 Robert of Waldby 11 n. 33 Robert of Walsingham, Quodlibet 76 n. 95 Roger Bacon 52, 299, 299 n. 42, 356 n. 54, 509.—Opus minus 299, 299 n. 42, 356 n. 54—Compendium of the Study of Theology 290 n. 4 Roger Gosford 382
INDEX OF NAMES
Roger Marston, De emanatione aeterna 124, 124 n. 202 Roger Rosetus (Roseth), Sentences commentary 359, 359 n. 1, 382, 382 n. 18, 428 n. 7, 432, 525 Roland Bandinelli: see Alexander III, Pope Roland of Cremona, Sentences commentary 346 Rolandus, Magister 11 n. 35 Roman of Rome 49-50, 108, 108 n. 164.—Commentary on I II Sentences 50, 50 n. 15, 108, 108 n. 164—Cursory commentary on the Sentences 50 n. 15 Rome 6, 82 n. 114, 490, 497 Rossini, M. 74 n. 91, 238 n. 36 Rossmann, H. 237 n. 35 Sabellius 29, 38 Sacrobosco, The Sphere 135-36 Salvatorberg (Erfurt), Carthusian monastery 441 n. 30 Saragossa 121 Sarah, Old Testament figure 352 Sarnano, Cardinal 150, 171 Schabel, C. 78 n. 105, 113 n. 178, 152 n. 10, 236 n. 31, 428 n. 6 Schleusingen, Thuringen, Germany 10 n. 29 Schmaus, Michael 73, 119 n. 193, 236 n. 31, 242 n. 47 Schneider, J. 48 n. 9, 120 n. 193, 290 nn. 5-6 Schneider, N. 230 n. 22 Schonmetzer, A. 34 n. 35, 35 n. 40 Schwamm, H. 226 n. 11, 236 n. 31 Scotism/Scotists 111-13, 224, 230, 232, 237-38, 240, 243 n. 48, 245, 249, 259, 368-70, 463, 517-19 Seneca 498 Senko, W. 241 n. 43 Senner, W. 58 n. 42 Siena 6 n. 17 Simon of Cremona, Sentences commentary 425 n. 1, 430 n. 10, 438 n. 26 Simon of Hinton 356 Simon of Lens, Sentences commentary 55 n. 31 Simon of Tournai 137, 308-09, 313, 351.—Summa 313 n. 96 Sixtus IV, Pope: see Francesco della Rovere
541
Spruyt, J. 244 n. 53 Stegmiiller, F. 1, 16, 55 n. 31, 171 n. 64, 226, 226 n. 10, 229, 237, 254 n. 73, 257, 483, 514 Stephen Gaudet 425 n. 1, 479 Stephen Langton, Sentences commentary 508, 508-09 n. 10, 524 Stuttgart 486 Summa Halensis (Summa fratris Alexandri, Summa Halesiand) 107 n. 159, 295, 295 n. 26, 307, 311, 312 n. 95, 313, 313 n. 97, 314, 314 n. 102, 315, 316 n. 108, 317-18, 326, 340-41, 349, 350 Sweden 10 n. 30 Sylwanowicz, M. 403 n. 21 Tachau, K. H. 150 n. 1, 171 n. 64, 209 n. 142, 236 n. 33, 238 n. 38, 368 n. 23, 396 n. 6, 432 n. 14 Terence, Roman comic dramatist 341 Teetaert, A. 149 n. 1, 150 n. 4, 152 n. 12, 155 n. 31, 158, 158 n. 44, 172 n. 66, 243 Theissing, H. 120 n. 193 Thijssen, J. M. M. H. 55 n. 33 Thomas Anglicus (Thomas of England) 105, 119-20, 119-20 n. 193.—Liber propugnatorius 119, 119 n. 193. Thomas Aquinas 41, 44-45, 45 n. 3-4, 46, 46 n. 7, 47, 49, 51 n. 20, 52, 54, 56-59, 59 n. 48, 60 n. 48, 67 n. 72, 69, 80 n. 107, 84-86, 85 n. 122, 86 n. 125, 87-93, 93 n. 138, 95-97, 97 n. 145, 100-03, 103 n. 154, 104, 104 n. 156, 105-06, 106 n. 158, 107 n. 160, 108, 110-12, 115-16, 116 n. 185, 117-18, 118 n. 188, 119-20, 120 n. 193, 121-24, 127, 132, 137, 139-40, 149, 223, 239, 242, 242 n. 47, 250, 254-55, 255 n. 76, 276 n. 44, 279 n. 59, 282, 298, 352, 356, 463-64, 494, 498, 517-19, 521, 524~26.—Sentences commentary 45, 45 n. 4, 46, 84-87, 89, 97 n. 145, 100, 117, 122-23, 127, 356—Summa Theo. 46, 104, 103 n. 154, 117, 122, 134, 257 n. 81, 298, 357, 499—see also Anonymous, Notabilia . . . Thomas Bradwardine 258, 278, 280, 367, 367 n. 21, 381, 395-421, 498, 517, 52\.—Determinate 413-21
542
INDEX OF NAMES
Meditationes 409 n. 41—Quaestiones super Sententias (including De futuris contingentibus) 395-421—Summa de causa Dei 258, 280, 359, 367, 395-421 Thomas Buckingham 55, 55 n. 31, 280, 382, 396, 412-13, 418, 421, 517, 521.—Sentences commentary 382, 382 nn. 16-17, 412 Thomas Claxton, Sentences commentary 463, 463 n. 43 Thomas of Eccleston, Tractatus de adventu Fratrum Minorum in Angliam 346 n. 6 Thomas Ebendorfer of Haselbach 462 Thomas Felthorp, Sentences commentary 381, 381 n. 5 Thomas of Strampino, Principia 10 n. 31, 470, 484 Thomas of Strasbourg (Thomas of Argentina) 117, 249, 256-59, 263-64, 281, 429 n. 9, 440-43, 455-61, 489-90, 494, 498-99, 503, 503 n. 84, 519, 522~-23.—Sentences commentary 256-57, 503 Thomas of Sutton 119, 119 n. 192, 120 n. 193.—"Cowton critique" 119, 119 n. 192—Quaestiones ordinariae 120 n. 193 Thomas Wylton 81 n. I l l , 155, 155 n. 32, 156, 156 n. 35, 158-62, 158 nn. 43 & 45, 159 nn. 47-48, 160 nn. 50-51, 160-61 n. 53, 167-69, 169 n. 63, 184, 184 n. 92, 187, 194-95, 196 n. 119, 197, 198 n. 123, 200, 200 n. 126, 246, 246 n. 57, 253-54, 254 n. 72, 517.— Bordeaux determinatio 158, 159 n. 47, 167, 184—Quaestio de attributis 161-62, 162 n. 51—Quodlibet 155, 155 n. 32, 156, 161 n. 56, 169— Sentences commentary 81 n. Ill Thomism 110-11, 116-26, 463-64, 517-19 Torrell, J.-P. 45 n. 4, 46 n. 7, 85 n. 122 Toulouse 6 n. 17, 59, 62, 82, 99, 149, 212 Trapp, D. 250, 250 n. 62, 430 n. 10, 434-35, 438, 438 n. 26, 439, 439 n. 28, 440 Trifogli, C. 56 n. 34 Trottman, C. 141 Tubingen 480, 486
Utrecht 482 University of Heidelberg 511 University of Oxford 511, 519-23 University of Paris 519-23 Valois, N. 150 n. 1, 151 n. 5 Vatican 2, 238 n. 38, 239 Venerable Inceptor: see William of Ockham Venice 226, 237, 255, 270 Vienna 6, 13, 267, 462 Vignaux, P. 108 Vital du Four 62-63, 62 n. 61, 63 n. 62, 99.—Sentences commentary 62-63, 63 n. 61 Vollert, C. 69 n. 74 Volz, W. 78 nn. 105-06, 79 n. 107 de Vooght, Paul 441 Walter of Bruges 50, 50 n. 18, 51, 51 n. 20, 52, 107, 107 n. 162.— Sentences Commentary 50-51, 50 n. 18, 51 n. 19, 96-97, 107 n. 162 Walter Chatton (Gauthier) 249, 258, 261, 261 n. 90, 263 n. 92, 264, 280, 282 n. 68, 359-60, 360 n. 2, 361-63, 363 n. 9, 364, 364 n. 12, 365-67, 367 n. 21, 368, 368 n. 23, 369-76, 388, 431, 432 n. 14, 435, 521-22.—Lectura (Ordinatio) 282 n. 68, 360-61, 361 n. 5—Quodlibetal questions 361, 366, 366 n. 18— Reportatio 282 n. 68, 360-61, 361 n. 4 Warwickshire 385 Weisheipl, James A. 45 n. 4, 85 n. 122 Wey, Joseph 361 Wiblingen, Benedictine Monastery 485 Wieland, G. 25 n. 1 Wielockx, R. 55 nn. 32-33 Wilhelmus Buser de Huesden 10 William of Alnwick 79, 79 n. 108, 80, 80 n. 110, 89, 89 n. 130, 112, 113 n. 177, 127, 520.—Additions magnae 79—Determinationes 79—80, 127—Sentences commentary 80, 80 n. 110, 127 William of Auxerre 302-03, 308, 310-11, 313-14, 317-18, 319 n. 120, 351.—Summa aurea 302 n. 51, 311 n. 85, 319 n. 120, 341
INDEX OF NAMES
William of Brienne, Reportatio on the Sentences 236, 236 n. 33, 240, 255 William Chitterne 381, 381 n. 6 William Crathorn, Sentences commentary 381, 381 n. 4 William of Domqueur 463 n. 45 William of Macclesfield 68 n. 74, 75, 117.—Correctorium "Quaestione" 117— Sentences commentary 68 n. 74 William de la Mare 46, 52, 52 nn. 23 & 25, 53, 56, 57, 107, 107 n. 161, 117, 117 n. 186, 439 n. 27.—Correctorium fratris Thomae 46, 52, 56, 117, 117 n. 186, 124—Sentences commentary 52, 52 n. 23, 107, 107 n. 161, 127 William of Melitona 351 William of Nottingham 75, 75 nn. 92-93, 76, 89, 112, 113 n. 177.— Sentences commentary 75, 75 n. 92, 76, 89, 113 n. 177 William of Ockham 46, 81 83, 83 nn. 117-18, 84, 94, 105, 111 n. 171, 114-15, 115 n. 181, 123, 221, 261, 271, 276, 278, 280, 282, 359, 359 n. 1, 360-64, 364 n. 14, 366, 367 n. 21, 368, 368 n. 23, 369-76,
543
380, 426, 436, 438, 441, 484, 492, 498, 520-22, 526.—Ordinatio on I Sentences 83, 83 n. 118, 127— Reportationes on II—IV Sentences 83, 360, 474 William Peter Godinus 59, 59 nn. 43-44, 70 n. 79, 71, 99, 100, 110.—Sentences commentary (Lectura Thomasina) 59 William of Rothwell, Sentences commentary 48-49 n. 11 William of Rubio 229, 235, 240, 255, 261, 261 n. 90, 518.—Sentences commentary 235 William of Ware 63, 63 n. 63, 64, 64 nn. 64-65 n. 66, 68, 75, 89, 96-97, 96 n. 143, 99, 108 n. 166, 125, 127, 516, 520, 526.—Sentences commentary 63, 63 n. 63, 64, 64 nn. 64-65, 96, 96 n. 143, 97 Wood, Rega 362 Worms 10 n. 29 Wiirzburg 1 Zavalloni, R. 54 n. 28 Zumkeller, A. 430 n. 10 Zupko, J. 376 n. 31
INDEX OF MANUSCRIPTS
Alencon Bibliotheque de la Ville 144: 436 n. 24 Ansbach Regierungsbibliothek lat. 62: 472 Assisi Biblioteca Comunale 129: 51 132: 53 n. 26 137: 65 n. 68 161: 382 n. 15 162: 55 n. 31 173: 382 n. 18 659: 239 n. 38 Augsburg Universitatsbibliothek Maihingen Fiirstlich OettingenWallerstein'sche Bibliothek II. lat. 1, Fol. 1: 68-69 n. 74 Bamberg Stadtbibliothek Cod. lat. Patr. 128: 26 n. 3, 32 nn. 26 & 28, 37(-40) Barcelona Archivo de la Corona de Aragon Ripoll 77bis: 73 n. 86, 241
Biblioteca Universitaria
753 (1506): 49 n. 14, 108 n. 163 755 (1508): 49 n. 14 2214: 251 Collegia di Spagna 40: 251 Bordeaux Bibliotheque Municipale 158: 272 n. 25 416: 158 n. 43 Brugge Stadsbibliotheek 192: 382 n. 18 491: 68 n. 74 Bruxelles Bibliotheque Rqyale Albert I 1801-1803 (cat. 1551): 382 n. 18 Cambridge Gonville and Caius 281/674: 362 300/514: 75 324/378: 112 n. 176 329/410: 309 n. 75 ff., 348 n. 20, 349-50, 349 n. 27 Trinity College O.I.30: 355 n. 50
Basel Offentliche Bibliothek der Universitat B.II.21: 111 n. 170 B.III.13: 132
Casale Monferrato Biblioteca del Seminario Vescovile B.2: 73 n. 88
Berlin Staatsbibliothek (Preuflischer Kulturbesitz) Cod. Theol. lat. 536: 153, 216, 231
Chambery Bibliotheque de la Ville 23: 238, 239 n. 38
Besancon Bibliotheque Municipal 198: 444 n. 36
Diisseldorf Landes- und Staatsbibliothek B. 159: 171 n. 64
Bologna Biblioteca Comunale dell'Archiginnasio A.939: 382 n. 21
El Escorial Real Biblioteca R.II.4: 254 n. 73
INDEX OF MANUSCRIPTS Erfurt Wissenschqftliche Allgemeinbibliothek CA F.105: 382 n. 13, 385 nn. 25 & 26 CA F.131: 250 CA F.132: 382 n. 19 CA F.368: 255, 255 nn. 75-76 CA F.369: 382 n. 17 CA Q,.246: 475 n. 22 CA Q.290: 328 n. 149 ff. CA Q.312: 328 n. 150 & n. 152 ff.
1199: 470 n. 14 1268: 483 1580: 483
1581: 482-83, 491-92 1583: 60 n. 48 1584: 238, 238 n. 38
Biblioteka Kapituly Katedralnej 111: 68 n. 74 Leipzig Uniuersitatsbibliothek 542: 254 568: 486-87 1090: 487
Firenze Biblwteca Medicea-Laurenziana S. Croce Plut. 32, dext. 12: 171,172 nn. 68-69, 201 n. 129 S. Croce Plut. 33 dext. 1: 64 n. 64 S. Croce Plut. 30, dext. 2: 77 n. 101, 112 n. 173
Le Mans Bibliotheque Municipal 231: 121 n. 196
Blblioteca Naz.ionale Centrale Conv. Soppr. A.3.508: 382 n. 19, 404 Conv. Soppr. C.5.357: 361 nn. 4-5,
Lilienfeld Stiftsbibliothek 148: 412 n. 53
363 n. 9
Conv. Soppr. C.8.794: 251 n. 67 Conv. Soppr. D.6.359: 61 Conv. Soppr. G.4.854: 52 n. 22, 107 n. 161
Conv. Soppr. G.5.858: 54 n. 30, 108 n. 165
Conv. Soppr. G.5.1348: 3 Fribourg Bibliotheque Cantonale et Unwersitaire Cordeliers 26: 382 n. 19 Gent Rijksuniversiteit 702: 382 n. 23 Heidelberg Universitatsarchiv Annales Universitatis, III: 490 n. 61 Isny Nikolaikirche 48: 481
London British Library Royal 9.C.VII 253 n. 70 Royal 10.B.VII: 348 n. 17 Royal ll.B.XII: 253 n. 70 Royal ll.C.VI: 253, 435 n. 23 Lubeck Bibliothek der Hansestadt MS theol. lat. 2° 116: 77 n. 103 Lyon Bibliotheque de la Ville 653: 113 n. 178, 243 n. 48 Madrid Biblwteca Nacional 65: 244 n. 51, 249 n. 61 Magdeburg Domgymnasium 178 (lost): 33 n. 31, 35 Maihingen: see Augsburg
Kassel Landesbibliothek MS 2° theol. 53: 382 n. 18
Manchester John Ryland's Library 198: 3
Krakow Biblioteka Jagielknska
Mantova Blblioteca Comunale E.IV.19: 171 n. 64
521: 483 n. 45
545
546
INDEX OF MANUSCRIPTS
Miinchen Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Clm 8943: 359 n. 1 Clm 13501: 254 n. 73 Clm 22288: 32, 33 Clm 26711: 452 n. 40 Miinster Universitatsbibliothek 164: 390, 390 n. 41
Paris Bibliotheque de I'Arsenal 379: 132 Bibliotheque Mazarine 889: 132 898: 91 n. 135 915: 381 n. 10, 502 n. 83 Bibliotheque Rationale de France
lat. 1010: 239 n. 38 Napoli Biblioteca Nazionale VII C 1: 251 VII C 2: 52 n. 22 VII C 14: 37(-40) VII G 98: 255 n. 75 Niirnberg Stadtbibliothek Cent. II 6: 70 n. 79 Oxford Balliol College
51: 62: 63: 73:
295 293 159 272
n. 30 ff. n. 16 ff., 356 n. 52 n. 48, 180 n. 81, 196 n. 118 n. 25
Bodleian Library Canon. Misc. 177: 272 n. 20 Magdalen College 56: 50 n. 17
lat. lat. lat. lat. lat. lat. lat. lat. lat. lat. lat. lat. lat. lat. lat. lat.
5288: 240 n. 41 14576: 411 n. 49 15363: 209 15754: 348 n. 21 15805: 381 n. 12, 397-414, 421 15852: 230 n. 22 15864: 112 n. 173 15880: 382 n. 13 15886: 361 n. 5 15887: 361 n. 4, 363 n. 9 15888: 382 n. 17 16389: 349 n. 25 16400: 382 n. 17 16408: 275 n. 39 16535: 275 n. 39 17484: 282 n. 68
Pavia Biblioteca Universitaria 168: 276 n. 45 244: 68 n. 74
Merton College 134: 54
Pelplin Seminarium Duchowne 53/102: 241 V.J.e.12: 171 n. 64, 189 n. 99
Oriel College 15: 382 n. 18 43 (B 4.3): 345 n. 1
Praha Knihovna Metropolitni Kapituly C 27: 69 n. 74
Padova Biblioteca Antoniana 79: 291 n. 8 160: 171 n. 64 238 (Scaff.XI): 382 n. 18 239: 51 292: 153, 154, 215-216
Ndrodni Knihovna (formerly Uniuersitni Knihovna) 1568 (VIII.F.14): 236 2297 (XIII.D.5): 57 n. 36, 62
Pamplona Biblioteca de la Catedral 5: 236 n. 31 36: 463, 463 n. 45
Reims Bibliotheque Municipale 494: 445 n. 38 Saint-Omer Bibliotheque Municipale 239: 240, 240 nn. 41-42
INDEX OF MANUSCRIPTS
Salamanca Biblioteca Unwersitaria M 2295: 171, 201 n. 129, 216 Sevilla Biblioteca Capitular y Colombina 7-7-29: 382 n. 18 Stuttgart Wiirttembergische Landesbibliothek Cod. Theol. 2° 113: 484, 492 Cod. Theol. 2° 118: 473 n. 20 Todi Biblioteca Comunale 95: 62 n. 61 122: 53 n. 26 Toulouse Bibliotheque Municipal 243: 154 n. 23, 157, 158, 171 n. 64, 205 n. 134 248: 452 n. 40
Troyes Bibliotheque Municipale 62: 433 n. 17 151: 272 n. 25 296: 81 1477: 412 n. 51
Tubingen Wilhelmsstift Gb 336a: 485 Gb 336b: 480, 485 Valencia Biblioteca del Cabildo 139: 244 n. 51, 249 n. 61 200: 243 Vaticano, Citta del Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Borgh. 122: 91 n. 135 Borgh. 123: 152, 216, 224 n. 6, 226-227, 231-232 Borgh. 311: 91 n. 132, 112 n. 174 Borgh. 329: 82 n. 114, 151, 152 nn. 9-10 Borgh. 346: 74 n. 88 Chigi. B.V.66: 382 nn. 18 & 21, 390, 390 n. 42, 391 nn. 43-44, 392 n. 45 Chigi. B.VI.94: 107 n. 162
547
Chigi. B.VII.113: 230, 230 n. 21, 231 n. 23 Ottob. lat. 69: 272 n. 25 Ottob. lat. 294: 302 n. 52 ff., 349-50, 349 n. 24 Ottob. lat. 318: 268 n. 4 Ottob. lat. 360: 113 n. 178, 243 n. 48 Ottob. lat. 445: 35 n. 37 Ottob. lat. 623: 54 Ottob. lat. 1430: 50 n. 15 Ottob. lat. 2520: 240 n. 41 Palat. lat. 331: 50 n. 15, 108 n. 164 Palat. lat. 373: 91 n. 135 Ross. 252: 74 n. 90 Vat. lat. 869: 243 n. 48 Vat. lat. 943: 229 n. 20, 231 n. 23 Vat. lat. 946: 154, 157 Vat. lat. 955: 381 n. 10 Vat. lat. 985: 70 n. 79 Vat. lat. 1086: 81 n. 112, 254 n. 72 Vat. lat. 1087: 251 Vat. lat. 1090: 463 n. 45 Vat. lat. 1091: 238, 238-39 n. 38 Vat. lat. 1092: 111 n. 170 Vat. lat. 1095: 62 Vat. lat. 1096: 230 n. 21 Vat. lat. 1106: 241, 243 n. 48 Vat. lat. 1108: 382 n. 18 Vat. lat. 1111: 382 n. 15 Vat. lat. 1113: 236 n. 31 Vat. lat. 1114: 59 n. 48 Vat. lat. 1118: 70 n. 79 Vat. lat. 4353: 382 nn. 13 & 15 Vat. lat. 4538: 296 n. 31 ff. Vat. lat. 6768: 154, 154 nn. 26-27, 162 n. 58, 216, 231 Vat. lat. 12993: 306 n. 69 ff. Vat. lat. 13002: 382 n. 23, 387 n. 32, 388 nn. 34-35 & 37, 393 n. 47, 413-21 Vat. lat. 13687: 73 n. 88 Venezia Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana VI 160 (2816): 272 n. 20 Z VI 121a (2557): 475 n. 22 Vicenza Biblioteca Bertoliana 198: 171 n. 64 Wien Osteneichische Nationalbibliothek lat. 1397: 112 n. 176
548
lat. lat. lat. lat. lat. lat. lat. lat.
INDEX OF MANUSCRIPTS
1439: 228, 240 1468: 68 n. 74 1496: 226, 226 n. 11 1542: 69 n. 74, 111 n. 170 4319: 436 n. 24 4593: 68 n. 74 5297: 468 5437: 468, 469 n. 10
Worcester Cathedral Library F.139: 68 n. 74 Wroclaw Biblioteka Uniwersytecka A. 211 (formerly I.F.184): 236 n. 31
