Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: A Guide and Commentary

-Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception A Guide and Commentary . Monika M. Lan ger Associate Professor of Philosophy Un iversity of Victo ria, British Columbia

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Contents

© Monika M. Langer 1989 All rights reserved. No reproducti on, co py or trans m iss ion of thi s p u blica tio n m ay be mad e w itho u t written pe rm ission.

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First published 1989 Published by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS and Lo nd on Co m pa nies and rep resen tati ves th rou gh out th e wo rld

254285 Printed in Hong Ko ng Briti sh Library Ca ta log u ing in Pu blica tio n Data Langer, Monika M. Merlea u-Pon ty's ph en om en ology of per cep tion : a guide and co mmen ta ry . 1. Merl ea u-Pont y, Mau rice l. Title

194 B2430.M3764 ISBN ()-333-43634-2 (hardcover) ISBN ()-333-45291-7 (paperback)

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Acknowledgements

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INTRODUCTION: CLASSICAL PREJUDICES AND THE RETURN TO PHENOMENA 1 'Sensation' 2 'Association' and 'Projection of Memories' 3 'A ttentio n' and 'Jud gment' 4 The Ph en om en al Field

3 6 10 15

PART I: TIlE BODY Experience and Objective Thought: the Problem of the Body 23 27 1 Th e Body as Ob ject an d Mechanistic Physiology 2 The Experien ce of the Bod y an d Classical Psychology 36 3 Th e Sp atiali ty of th e Body Itself and Motility 39 4 The Syn thesis of the Bod y Itself and 5 Th e Body in its Sexua l Being 48 6 The Body as Expressio n and Speech 56 PART II: THE PERCEIVED WORLD The Theory of the Body Is Already a Theory of Perception 1 Sensing 2 Space 3 The Th in g and the Na tural World 4 Others an d the Hum an World

69 72 80 88 97

PART III : BEING·FOR·ITSELF AND BEING·IN·THE·WORLD 1 Th e Cogito 109 2 Tem poralit y 123 3 Freed om 133 CONCLUSION: A Critical Assessm ent of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception

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Bibliography

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Index

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Preface To dat e several comme ntaries have been published which de al with Merleau -Pon ty's philosophy as a whole or with some part icular aspect of his thought. Useful as many of these are in th eir own rig h t, th ey do not help th eir read ers to grapple spec ifically with th e notori ou s difficult ies of Merleau-Ponty's central work , the Phenomenology of Perception. Th is exegesis aims to meet that need . As Guerriero no ted in publish in g a tran slati on of th e analytical tabl e of conten ts of the Phenomenology of Percep tion, 'the reade r of the work need s all th e help he can ger'.' Even for the professional philosopher, Merleau -Ponty's text poses cons ide rable pro blems becau se its ph en om en ological analyses are extremely convolu ted and its style makes it d ifficu lt to di stingu ish th e au tho r's own po si tion from those wh ich he is cri ticizing . MerleauPonty's pench an t for explo ring related idea s and th em es renders his 'argume nt' elus ive, di sjoi nt ed , and some times eve n in complete. In add iti on , the text abo unds in obliq ue refere nces and assumes a thoroug h kn ow ledge of th e works of Descartes, Kant , Hu sserl, Heid egger and Sartre. Finally, th e English tran slation compounds the difficu lties wh ich Mcrleau-Ponty's rich pros e itself present s. Eve n the rev ised (1981) English editio n is freque ntly misleadin g and occasionally dow nri ght incor rect; at best it lacks th e nu an ces of the original. My exegesis th erefo re recon st ructs, clarifies and - where necessary - completes Merleau-Ponty's ph en om en ological ana lyses cha pter by cha pter. It exp lains the im port an ce of vario us chapters and shows the logic of th eir seque nce. Wh ere requisite, it pro vide s the relevant passages from the pr imary texts of other philosophers wh ose position s Merleau -Ponty is developing or criticizing, and explains just how he is doing so. Th rough out, it alerts th e reade r to probl em s of translation and wh en necessary, re-translates key term s or passages. Finally, it consid ers MerleauPen ry's ow n rese rvati ons about the wo rk and offers a critical assess ment of the Ph enomenology of Perception as a whole. In the lig ht of th e numerous d ifficultie s noted abo ve, th e rea de r may well wo nder wh eth er the Phenomenology of Perception actually vii

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warrants the effort whi ch is req uired to read it. Despite its pr obl ematic nature however , th e text is a classic of phenomenology and is especially relevant today. Since the original was published over fort y yea rs ago , the latt er point calls for elaboration . This introduction w ill serve to contextu alize th e Phenomenology of Perception and to establish its particular impo rtan ce for our own time. In his PREFACE Merleau-Ponty states th at ' the phenomen ological reduction is that of an exist ential philosophy'? We mu st therefore cons ider th e nature of existentialist philosophy and the meaning of th e ph en omenological reduction . Th ere is a continuing widespread tendency to reg ard existen tialist philosophy as outdated an d to relegat e it to the status of a brief episode in the hi story of modem thou gh t. Such a view is based on the so rts of miscon ceptions about exis tentialism which Sartre addressed in hi s famo us lecture 'Existentialism is a Humanism ', delivered in the same year that Merleau -Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception was published. Thi s is not th e place to reiter ate Sartre's defen ce of existentialism; ra the r, it will suffice to note some gene ral points abo ut existenti alist philosophy. The " latter encompasses a host of wide ly differing position s and no si ng le definition accom mo da tes all those wh o are ge nerally consider ed its representatives. Nonethe less, a commonalit y of concern s underlies the diversity of these thinkers. To detect that com mo na lity, it is helpful to recall the marv ellous sto ry which Ari stotl e related abo ut Her aclitus, and whic h "Heidegger retold in hi s 'Letter on Humanism'. A number of inquisitiv e strangers seek out Heraclitus in hop es, of w itnessin g someth ing extraord inary. Th ey arc surprised to find the fam ou s philoso pher simply ' warming himself at a stove'.3In failing to di scover anythi ng patently divorced from daily life, th e un announced vis ito rs arepuzzled and di sappointed; they arc sure th at a thinker warming himself at the centre of his ordinary hom e canno t be philosophizin g. As they ar e on the point of leaving, Her aclitus enco urages them to consid er more closel y the ordinary, concrete situa tion which they so swiftly dismissed as ins ig n ificant and irrelevant to th ou gh t. 'There are Gods presen t even here', says Her aclitus,' th ereby tacitl y urging his visitors to reflect on their ass ump tion th at philosophizi ng demands a turning asid e from daily life . I am not sugges ting that Heraclitus was an existen tialist; however, the littl e story cap tures perfe ctly the core of existentialist philosophy in it s emp has is on concrete thinkin g. In focus ing on

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the actua l human situation as the star ting point for any authentic ph iloso phy , thi s ancient an ecdot e impli citl y counters th e ass umption that ge nui ne thinkin g mu st be abs tract. It thus stresses th e central importance of pondering the meaning of our being-in-theworld and points out th e gene ral aliena tio n from suc h concre te ph iloso phi zing . Existentia list philosophy cha llenges th e con tention that philosophy is inher ently high-flown; tha t the search for truth req u ires a turn ing awa y from the world of our concre te experien ce, as Plato's cave allegory would h ave us be lieve. It reje cts the PlatonicCartesian-Hegelian id eal of eternal truth or absolute kno wledge on the one hand and, on the other, the positi vistic levelli ng which insists on objectivity and calculatio n.f Contendi ng th at both approaches are abstract and in ad equat e for an under stan ding of our being-in-the-world, exis tentia list philosophy seeks to aw aken us to an awarene ss of our fundamental involvement in a naturalcultural-historical milieu. It stresses that we are not neutral ob servers but rather, situated participants in an on going, ope nende d, socio-his torica l dram a. It claims that truth come s into be ing in our concrete co- existence w ith others and cannot be seve red from language and hi st ory. The existentialists declare th at a no n-s itua ted human being is inco nceiva ble, that th e ph iloso pher do es not survey the world, and that philosophy is firml y roo ted in a situa tion wh ich ha s a histori cal depth . Far from being th e unfo ldi ng of abs olute kn owled ge, ' philosophising starts with our situation' an d attemp ts to illumin ate it.6 The existentialist philosophe rs' centra l concern is to prom pt hu man s not to live thou ghtlessly but ra the r, to ha ve a keen aw are ness of their freed om and respons ibili ty in the shapi ng of a sit uation in wh ich they arc always alrea dy involved . Th e fund am ental features cha racteri zing the situation ana lysed by the major tw entieth-centur y existen tialist philosophers persis t to thi s day . If we are to appreciate the particular releva nce of Merlea u-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception for our ow n tim e, we m ust bear th ose features in mind. Already in 1931 Jasp er s, dr awi ng on Kierkegaard and Web er, pu blished a detailed phi losophical study of th e deracinati on and fun ctionalization of humans in mass society and warned that the attitude fostered by mod ern technology was profoundly dehumani zin g. He stressed that ' the reality of the world canno t be evade d' ; th at 'the sig nif iance of entering into th e world cons tit utes th e value of philosophy'; and

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that the latter 'is not to be regarded as th e obj ective valid ity of any so rt of knowled ge, bu t as th e cons ciousness of being ' in the world'? Following th e Second World War , jasp ers focused his attention on the horrific possibilities of the new milit ary technology and the utter inadequacy of the prevalent mod e of thin king to counter the threat of total annihilation. He warned that history had become a sing le global movement and that th e developed nuclear technology precluded any survivors in the event of ano the r world war. jasp ers emphasized the urgent need to recog n ize 'that technology , know-how , achi ev ements, arc not eno ugh', and that ' a new way of th inking' must repl ace th e all-pe rvasive pr obl em-oriented app roach . jaspers argu ed that only a new, non-op erational 'encompassing thinking', leading to a new, nonconfron tational politi cs, could avert a nucl ear holocau st. 'If we grow sure of our freed om , and thus of our resp on sib ilit y, there is a chance for . . . salva tion ', he con cluded." Heidegger too expressed his concern ab out th e na ture of mass socie ty, the de structiv e potential of modem technology, and the widespread lack of any non -operational way of thinking. He argu ed that ' calculative th in kin g' is indispensabl e in it s prope r sphere, but that it is in capabl e of preventing a total victimization of humans by technology. Heidegger contended that such thinking had its source in the seventee n th-cen tury revolution in fundamental concepts, and that by the mid-twentieth century it had tran sformed nature into 'a gigan tic gasolin e statio n'. The same ope rational approach was now being appli ed to humans themselves, resulting in an unpreced ented rootl essn ess coupled with the threat of a nuclear holocaust. Heidegger noted that genetic eng ineering was alread y on the horizon, but that there was a di sturb ing ab sen ce of thou ght devoted to the meaning of this utter tran sformation of human exis tence through technology. He arg ued that only by thou ghtful questioning could th e anni hilation of human life be forest alled and a new rootedness es tablishe d in the mod em world." For their part, Merle au -Ponty an d Sartre likewi se criticize d the prevalent mode of th in kin g and warned that attempts to evade the implication s of the concre te situa tion could only lead to disaster. Thus they decided to found their famou s journal Les Temps Modernes. In hi s ess ay 'The War Has Taken Place', whi ch appeared in the inaugural issu e, Merleau-Ponty d eclared : ' we ha ve learned hi sto ry, and we claim that it mu st not be forgo n en'." He,ur ged his

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readers to ren ounce Cartesian rationalism in favour of a gen ui ne ly concrete philosophy. Th e latter would not take up its abode in a realm alleged ly beyond th e viciss itudes of daily life. O n the contrary, th e ne w, wa y of philosophizin g would elucida te the impossibility of escaping one 's concrete co-existence with ot he rs, and wo uld stress the need to part icipate responsibly in sha ping the future. Give n the steadily increasing stockp iles of nuclear weap on s, th e gro wth of computer technology, the accelerated aut om ati on of the work place, and the on goin g expe rime nts in genetic en gineerin g, the specific concern s expressed by exis tentialist ph ilosophers regar di ng technological society are eve n more pre ssin g tod ay and the call for a non-op erati onalist thinking is becoming eve r more urgent : In a recent internation al conference on the twent yfirst cen tury held at the Un iversit y of Victoria , Professor Morri s Berman explicitly emphasized the need for 'a trul y embo died approach to th e world'. Arguing th at ' we are at a crossroad s now ', Berma n cautioned against a ' disembod ied and form alisti c' cybe rnetic thinking ' in our eagerness to reject the mechanistic science of the last 300 yea rs';' ! He noted that Merleau-Ponty, recog nizing ' the fallacy of misplaced concreteness', warned in hi s 1960 essa y 'Eye and Mind' that:

Th in kin g 'operationally' has become a so rt of absolute artificialism , such as we see in the ideo logy of cyberne tics.. .. If th is kind of th inking were to extend its reign to man and hi st ory; if, pretending to ignore wh at we kno w of them through our own situations, it were to set o ut to co ns truct man and hi story on the basis of a few abstract indicies . .. then . . . we enter in to . .. a sleep, or a nightmare, from wh ich there is no awak ening. Scien tific thinking, a th inking which looks on from above, and th in ks of the object-in-gen eral , mu st return to th e 't he re is' wh ich underlies it; to the site, the soil of the sen sible and o pened world such as it is in our life and for our bod y . . . that actual bod y I call mine. . , . Further , associated bodies mu st be brou ght forw ard along with my body . . .u It is not difficult , especially in light of the abo ve passage, to appreciate th e exceptional pertinen ce of Merleau-Ponty' s Phenomenology of Perception to our own tim e. As we have seen , exis ten tialist philosophy is highly crit ical of any ' thinking which look s on

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from ab ove'. The cred ibili ty of its critiq ue ultimately de pends up on its providing a comprehensi ve philosophical foundation for the latt er - and that is precisely what the Phenomenology of Perception does. In an add ress summariz ing and defending th e work sh ortly after its publicati on , Merleau-Ponty pointed out that 'the perceiv ed world is the always presupposed foundati on of all rationality, all value and all existence'. Alth ough 'th ere is a whole cultural world which cons titutes a seco nd level ab out perceptual expe rience' , percepti on is nevertheless ' the fund am ental basis wh ich cannot be ign ored '.':' The crit ique of our tw entieth-century cultural world as dehuman izing and destructive mu st therefore be based on a phenomen ological account of our perceptual experien ce. The phenomenological reduction is indispen sible for the disclosure of that pr imary experiential level. If we are to understand how Merleau -Ponty employs th e ph enomenol ogical reduction , we must situate his reducti on within its philosophical context. Descartes had been concerne d to es tablish the foundation for a universal scien ce based on reason alone . He att empted to secure a meth od whereb y fundamental self-ev id en t truths would serv e as axioms from wh ich other truths could be deduced so as to pr ovide an organi cally connec ted sys tem of scie ntifically establi sh ed truths. By submitting eve rything to syst ematic doubt, Descartes hoped to put knowled ge on an ab solutely firm foundati on . Th e intuitively appreh ende d exis tence of the finite self provided the found ati on - so Descartes thoughtfor th is comprehensi ve scie n tific philosophy. However, Husserl main tain ed that Descart es' method ological doubt had . not been radi cal enough. According to Hu sserl, Descartes' cogito ergo sum failed to put the res cogitans in ab ey an ce. This fail ure to ' bracket' th e 'I' as a psychological reality subverted Descartes' atte mpt to establish knowledge on a sure found ati on , argued Hu sser!. At the same tim e, he commended Descartes for att empting to find a firm ba sis for knowledge by sus pe n ding all affirma tions con cerning the everyday world and focusing on the world as it is given to con sciou sness. Hu sserl himself therefore so ught to provide an ab solutely certain ground for knowled ge by adopting and radicalizin g the Cartesian meth od . Like Descartes, Husserl began with a normative ideal of philosophy as a presuppositionl ess , rigorous science hav ing un iversal valid ity and formulat ing etern al truths. The reali zation of this id eal dem anded th e search for a foundati on , for a sphere in which

things give themselves absolutely, that is, w ith a clarity, distin'ctness and completen ess which renders them apo dictic . Husserl's pheno menological reduction bra cketed all belief in tran scendent existenCe and focused on transcendental subjectivity - that 'I' whic h Kant and Husserl claim ed was necessarily in volved in any act of consciou sness. Husser!'s ph enomenological reduction seemed to him to open up a realm of immanent experi en ce capable of serving as th e foundation for philosophy. Thi s realm did not contain psychical facts, events, or experiences , as had Descarte s'; rather, it consi sted of universal meanin gs or 'essences ' underlying these psychical entities. Instead of conce ntrating on any particular act of thinking or perceiving, for example, Hu sserl turned to th e essence of thinking as such, or th e essence of the perceiving as such. For Hu sserl in sho rt, the sphere ope ned up by the ph enomenological reduction consi sted of fund am ental stru ctures of conscio usness reduced to essences - that is, to universal, absolutely necessary meanings consti tu ted by th e transcendental ego. Th e task of phenom enol ogy was th e descriptive an alysis of these essences as th ey appeared to th e intellectual intuition of th e phe no menologist, wh o adopted a neutral position regarding th e status of the externa l world. Thus th e phenomen ological reduction, based on th e epocne (or suspe ns io n of judgem ents concerning the existential status of the ob jects of consciou sness), was the method whereby Hu sserl tried to return to cons cious ne ss as th e region of absolut ely certain kn owl ed ge. In his Cartesian Meditatiolls he asserted that the world was ' wholly cons tituted by the tran scendental ego '. Sin ce his philosophy dispen sed with Descar tes' psychical ego and showed up th e presupposit ions of th e various sciences, it seemed to Hu sserl to be truly rad ical. Th e sciences, he contended , never stop ped to con sid er what it mean s to observe, to perceive or to think - th ey presupposed these as given , It was th e task of phenomen ology - as Hu sserl conceived it - to examine suc h presuppositi on s and to de scribe the consti tutive role of the tran scendental ego . Th e other sciences remained naive in failing to examine their own presuppositi ons; w ith Common sense, they shared the natural attitud e to the world. Towa rds th e end of his life, Hu sserl began to qu estion thi s 'Cartesian Way to phenomenology' an d the ve ry noti on of philosophy as a rigorous scie nce; he came to con sid er the transcende ntal ego as 'apparently empty of content'. His theory of evi-

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den ce, hinging as it did on th e criteria of ab solute certainty and completeness, was thrown ope n to quest ion by hi s realization that ph en om en ological reflection is itse lf tempo ral; that subjectively lived time is the field of all conscio us acts and hen ce, that these conscio us acts th em selves unfold in tim e, rather than be ing given' immed iately and completely in one 'fell swoo p' to a disinterested, gaze. The last work s of Hu sserl therefore began to sketch out a ' new way to ph en om en ology' focu sing on a return to the lifeworld as the pre-given gro und of all practical and theoretical activities. Husserl fin ally design at ed th e field of perception as the very heart of the life-w orld. Hi s self-crit icism regarding the ' emptiness of the tran scendental ego was tak en a step further by Sartre wh o, in his Transcendence of the Ego, rejected the transcendental ego altogeth er ." According to Sartre, Hu sserl was profoundly mist aken in thinking that the existing world can be bracketed . Th e suspension of all affirm ati on s of exis tence beyond consc io usness leaves only 'a great emptiness', argue d Sartre, becau se consci ou sness has no contents; hence consciousness can never in fact be isolated from the existing world. The ' red uced, neutral stand po in t' of the Hu sserli an ph en om en ologist therefore had to be rejected in favour of a conce rn with the wo rld of o ur actual, lived expe rience. For Sartre, the reflectiv e study of consc ious ness becam e the study of human exis tence sit ua ted in the world . Th ou gh constituted by consciousness, all truths, values and meaning s we re declared to be outside conscious ness and in th e wo rld - hen ce they were contingen t. The ' natural attitude' thu s beca me a matter of living in ' bad faith '. In bringin g to light th e presuppositi on s of that natural att itude , th e ph en om en ological redu ction served to jolt consciousness ou t of its bad fait h by elimina ting th e Cartes ian-Husserlian escape-route. In the Sartrian pure reflection, 'the re are no more barriers, no more limit s, noth ing to hide consciousness from it self ' , Sartre's ph en om en ological red uctio n effectively plunges human beings ' back into th e world'. IS Like Sartre, Merleau -Ponty rejects Hu sserl's abs tract 'unive rsal essences' and tran scend ental ego . Merleau-Ponty's emphasis , how ever, is on that which Hu sserl had designated as the heart of the life-w orld, nam ely, perception. According to Merleau-Ponty, Hu sserl pointed th e way towards a descriptive study of the life-world , b ut failed to apprecia te its sig nificance . Thus the latter did not rea lize that th e intentionalit y of conscio usness is first and foremost a bo dily int en tion alit y. Merleau -Ponty points out that all

knowledge takes place within th e horizon s ope ned up by percep tion, that the pr im ord ial struc tures of perception pervade the en tire ran ge of reflectiv e and scie ntific expe rience, and that all forms of human co-exist en ce are based on perception . Phen om enology 's conce rn therefor e mu st be with th e pre-reflective wo rld which is the background of all reflection , the world in which human beings are already engaged pri or to reflection . MerleauPonty arg ues that the perceiver is not a pure thinker but a bod y-subjec t, and that any act of reflectio n is based on that prepersonal, anony mous consciousness whi ch is incarnate subjectiv. ity. There can be no sphe re of ab solutely self-sus tai ning thought; the only foundati on for kno wledge is our concre te inherence in the world. Th e entire universe of science is thus built up on the life-world which it takes for gra n ted. Merleau-Ponty cri ticizes the ' Cartesian Way to ph en omen ology' for failing to be trul y radical and in fact bein g a 'ph ilosophical lie'. The Cartesi an philosophy falls into dogm ati sm by masking the origi n of reflection. Conseq ue n tly, a ge nuine ly radi cal reflection whi ch recognizes the pre-reflective realm from wh ich it itself springs, is requ ired . Th is ' hyper-reflection', as Merleau -Ponty calls it, does no t dest roy reflection for th e sake of the unreflected experie nce ; rather, it is a matt er of taking accoun t of ' the total situation, wh ich involves referen ce from the one to the othe r' .!6 The relations hi p between th ou ght and its o bject mu st be situated withi n th at ope n ness to the world upon wh ich it res ts. It is not possi ble ever in fact to undo th e bond between the human being and th e world , and to rem ake it subseq ue ntly as ' the Cartesian Way' tried to do. Accordi ng to Merleau -Ponty, th e task of phe no meno logy is to help us to see the primordi al bond mor e clearly, to bring it to our atte n tion. As a trul y rad ical philosophy , ph en om enology should alert us, for exam ple, to the fact th at ideas are never absolutely pure thou ghts but rather, cultural objects necessarily linked to acts of expression wh ose so urce is the ph en om en al bod y itself as alrea dy prim ord ially express ive . In short, ph en om en ology must awaken us to an awa reness of consciousnes s as incarnate in a body and inher ing in a world . The notion of 'i nca rn ate subjectiVity' is th erefore centra l to Merleau-Ponty' s phe no me no logy . Merlea u-Pon ty points out in the PREFACE that :

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Seeking th e essence of consciousnes s will therefore not cons is t in develop ing th e Worthedeutung of consciousness and esca pi ng from exis tence into the uni verse of thin gs said; it will consis t in

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redi scovering my actual presen ce to myself. . . . Lookin g for the world 's essence is not lookin g for what it is as an idea once it has bee n reduced to a theme of di scourse; it is looking for wh at it is as a fact for us, before any th emarisation .'?

order to study it without its obscure roots, or alternatively, if we try to force that backgr ound itself to cease being a background so that we might circumscribe it completely, we onl y succeed in , distorting that fundam ental pre-person al movement of existence whic h are are and which our body continues to live despite our intellectual contortions. Ultimately, as Merleau-Ponty notes in th e 'Preface', 'we shall find in ourselves, and nowhere else, the unity and true meaning of ph en om en ology'. As genuinely radi cal reflection , phen om en ology recog nizes that our primordi al relati onship to the world 'is not a th ing which can be any further clarified by analysis'; the dynamic, intern al relati on between body-subject and world can only be brou ght to our atten tion. Thi s bringing to attention is itself, howev er, a 'creative act' which brings truth int o being by di sclosing behind reflection that mysteriou s perceptual realm which is our very 'access to truth '. 's Before cons ideri ng Merl eau-Ponty's step -by-step di sclosure of that pre-reflectiv e realm, it remains for me to alert the reader to a few stylistic points and to express my gra titude to those wh o helped to mak e this book possible. Regarding the former, th e reader will di scover that my exeges is makes extens ive use of th e masculine pronoun, th at my paragraphs are occasion ally rather long, and th at not all qu otat ion s are footnoted. After gi ving th e matter con siderable th ou ght, I decid ed th at it would be best to hav e my exegesis reflect Merleau-Ponry's own usc of language; hence the mascul ine pronoun predominates through out. MerleauPen ry' s parti cular manner of thinkin g found expression in extremely long paragraphs. In atte mpting to cap ture th e ess ence of that thinking in this book , it was not always pos sible to avoid somewhat len gthy paragra ph s mys elf. Since my exegesis is intende d to be read in conjunction with the Phenomenology of Perception, I felt.it was unneces sary to footnote those quotations whic h are d rawn from th e particular chapter under di scussion. Fina lly, I would like to thank all tho se wh ose support and labour made this work possible. For th eir unflagging en cou ragement, I tha nk my famil y and friends; for th eir many qu esti ons and oft stated wish for such an exegesis, I th ank my studen ts; and for her unfa iling good humour an d unstinting labour in transforming mess y inked pages into read able mach in e copy, I thank my secretary, Sandra Chellew. To all tho se wh o have felt fru stration in grappling with the Phenomenology of Perception, I dedicate thi s boo k. MO NIKA LANGER

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Inst ead of focusing on th e conditi ons for the possibility of expe rience as various tran scendental philosophies have done, Merleau-Ponty's ph enomen ology aims to d raw our atte n tion to th e always pr esupposed and actua lly present background of our actu al experie nce . It dispenses with the trad itional mystifications in so far as it refuses to regard expe rience as an en tity wh ich can be analysed into its compone nt parts, and refrains from co ns tru ctin g a basis for it in a transcendental sphere on the hither si de of all actual experience . For Merl eau -Ponty, expe rience is 'a process of transcendence'. Hi s phenomen ological reduction does not render us the given as it appears to common sen se or naive scien ce. The reduction subverts the reifi cations of the natural attitude by sho wing that th e given is cons titu ted in a pr imordial d ialogue between body-subj ect and world. The give n which is revealed by th is phe nome no logical/red uction has a hi story and is part of a wh ole network of relations; it is profoundly dynamic. Analytic reflection and scie nt ific induction are eq ually inadequat e for comprehen ding expe rience as di sclosed by the phenomen ological reduction . Mor eover, Merleau -Ponty himself appro aches the given obliquely, so to speak, by study ing an d describing th e di sturbances which arise from breakd owns in th e priinordial dialogue. As lon g as that di alogue proceed s smoo thly, we take its results for gra nted and consider th em a ' natural' world. It is wh en the di alogu e is distu rb ed th at its character as di alogue begins to eme rge and we sec that the subject's way of living its body is decisiv e for the manner in whic h it apprehe nd s the world. Merleau-Ponty's phe nome no logical de scription proceed s in a Hegelian fash ion : at each stage of his investi gati on, he summons th e traditional dogm atic positi on s and sho ws how th ey subvert them selves. Through the continual juxtap osition and di ssolution of these theories, Merleau-Pont y endeavo urs to establish that our experience is neither a mechanistically de termine d process nor a' pu rely fortuitous cons truc tion, and th at our va rious explicit relation sh ips with the world are subtended by a primordial background wh ich canno t itse lf eve r becom e en tirely explicit. If we attempt to tear our experience free fro m thi s background in

xvi i

j

xviii

Pref ace

No tes 1. Daniel Guem ere, 'Table of Contents of "Phenomenology of Perception": Translation and Pagination', Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology , vol. 10, no. 1 (j an . 1979) p. 65. 2. I have altered Colin Smith's translation to bring it closer to the French original, whi ch reads: ' . . . la reduction phenomeno logique es t celie d ' une philo sophic exis te n tielle' . (Ph enomenologique de la perception (Paris : Ed itions Ga llima rd, 1945), p . ix.) It is also worth noting that Merleau-Ponty equates phenomenology with 'concrete thinking' and the latter with 'what others propound under the name "existential philosoph y".' (See the 'Preface' of the Phenomenology of Perception and pp. 13:>-4 of Sense and Non-Sense (trans. Dreyfus and Dreyfus (Evanston, III. : Northw estern University Press, 1964)). 3. Martin Heidegger, 'Letter on Humanism' (trans. Edgar Lohne r; origi nal publish ed 1947) in The Existentialist Tradition: Selected Writings (ed . Ni no Lan giulli ), (New Yo rk: D oubled ay, 1974), pp. 237-8. My own interpretation of the story in the 'Preface' differs to some degree from Held egger 's. 4. lbid., p . 238. 5. See for example: Kierkegaard 's The Present Age, Niet zsche 's Twilight of the Idols, Jaspers' Man in the Modern Age, Marcel's The Philosophy of Existentialism and The Mystery of Being, Heid eg ger's Discourse on Thinking, Sartre's 'Existentialism is a Humanism' and Being and Nothingness, Camus', The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays, Merleau-Pont y's Sense and Non-Sense, Phenomenoiogv and Perception, Th e Prima cy of Perception and Other Essays and Signs. 6. Karl Ja spers, 'Philosophizing Starts with Our Situation', Philosophy, vol. I (trans . E. B. As hton; o rigi nal Ge rma n published 1932), reprinted in The Existentialist Tradition: Selected Writings, pp. 158--61. 7. Jaspers, Man in the Modern Age (tra ns. Eden and Ce dar Paul), (New York : Do ubleday, 1957) pp . 194-8. 8. Jasp ers, The Fu ture of Mankind (tra ns, E. B. As hton), (Univers ity of Chicago Press, 1961; o rig . pu blis he d 1958) pp . 330, 318, viii, 332, 333, vi i. 9. lI eidegger, 'Memorial Address' (originally given 1955), Discourse on Thinking (trans. Anderson and Freund), (New York: Harper & Row, 1969) pp. 43-57. 10. Maurice Merleau -Ponty, 'The War Has Taken Place', (original published October 1945), Sense alld Non-Sense (trans . Dreyfus and Dreyfus), (Evanston , III. : No rthwestern University Press, 1964, p.150. 11. Morris Berman, 'The Cybernetic Dream of the 21st Century', paper presented at 'An International Conference on Social and Technolo gical Change : The Uni versity into the 21st Century', University of Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, 4 May 1984, pp. 28--31. An expanded version of this paper was publi shed (under the same title) in the Journal of Humanistic Psychology vol. 26 no . 2 (spring 1986) \Cp. 24-51.

Prefa ce 12.

13.

14.

15.

16. 17. 18.

xix

Merleau-Ponty, ' Eye and Mind ' (tra ns . Ca rleton Dallery) in James M. Edie (ed .), The Primacy of Perception alld Other Essays, (Evan ston , lll .: No rt hwes te rn University Press, 1964) pp. 160-1. Quoted in 'The Cybern etic Dream of th e 21st Cen tury', p. 30. 'The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences' (trans . Jam es M. Edie), The Primacy of Perception and Oth er Essa ys, pp . 13, 33. My interpretation of Husserl is akin to Merleau -Ponty's : nevertheless, many Husserl scholars wou ld reject this reading of Husserl. For furth er di scussion, see Phenomenologu: the Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Its Interpretation (cd . Joseph J. Kockelman s), (Ne w York: Doubleday , 1967) pp. 194ff. Sartre , Th e Transcendence of the Ego : an Existentialist Theory of Consciousness (trans. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick), (New York: Noonday Press, 1957) pp . 32, 98- 105 (origin al text publish ed 1936-37). Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible: Followed by Working Notes (trans. Alphon so Lingi s and ed . Claude Lefort) , (Evans ton, Ill.: Northwestern University Pre ss, 1968) p . 35. 'Preface', Ph enomenology of Perception, xv. 'Preface', Ph enomenology of Perception, viii , xvii i, xx, xvi.

Acknowledgements Th e au th or an d p ublishers wi sh to thank th e following w ho have kindly given permission for use of copyrigh t material: Rou tledge & Kega n Paul Ltd and Humani ties Pr ess Intern atio na l, In c. for th e ex tracts fro m Phenomenology of Perception by Maurice MerieauPonty, English translation co py righ t © 1962 by Routledg e & Kegan Paul Ltd ; Philosophical Lib ra ry, Inc., New Yor k, for th e extracts from Being and Nothingness: a Phenomenological Essay on Ontology by Jea n -Paul Sartre , English translati on copyrig h t © 1956 by th e Philosophical Library, In c., Washingt on Sq uare Press ed ition published by arrangement with Phi losophical Library In c., 1966; North western Un iv ersity Pr ess for th e extracts from The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays by Ma urice Meri eau-Ponty (Eng lish transla tion copyrig h t © 1964 b y Northwes tern Uni versity Press), The Visible and the Invisible: Followed By Working Notes by Maurice Merieau -Ponty (Eng lis h tran slation copyrig h t © 1968 by No rth wes te rn University Press), Sense and Non-Sense b y Maurice Mer leau-Ponty (Engli sh tran slati on co py righ t © 1964 by North western Uni vers ity Press), Signs b y Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Eng lish translati on cop yrigh t © 1964 b y North we ste rn Un iversity Press ); Pr ofessor Mor ris Berman , for th e extrac ts from 'Th e Cyberneti c Dream of th e Twen ty-Firs t Century' by Morris Berman © 1984 b y Morri s Berm an , published in a n expa nded ;'ersion in the Journal of Humanistic Psychology, vo1.26 n o. 2 (sp rin g 1986). Every effort has been m ad e to trace all the copy righ t h olders but if any ha ve been ina d verten tly ov erlooked th e publish ers will be p leased to make th e necessary a rrangemen t a t th e first op po rtu n ity . I am ind ebted to Ms Ju d e Hall-Pa tch for h er assis tance in preparing the index for thi s bo ok. I am grateful to th e Un ive rsity of Victoria for provid ing timely gran ts to help me d efray ind exing an d cop yri gh t permi ssion expenses. MONIKA LAN GER

xx

Introduction: Classical Prejudices and the Return to Phenomena

1 'Sensation' Th e four chapters compris ing the ' Introd uc tion' of the Phenomenology of Perce ption are de signed to provid e a preliminary sketch of classical approaches to P erception which will subse q ue ntly be examine d in detail. In th ese introductory cha pters Merleau -Ponty indic ates wh y he considers the classi cal approaches prejudiced and wh y he deemed it necessary to go back to our actual expe rie nce. He also attempts to forestall possible misunderstandings regarding th e nature of hi s own inquiry. Merle au -Ponty begins with a criti cal exam ina tion of th e noti on of sensa tio n. 'At th e outset of the study of perception ', he says, 'we find in lan gu age the noti on of sensation, which seems immed iate and clear .' In the course of this first chap ter, that notion rev eals itself to be in fact 'the furthest removed from its origi nal source, and therefore the most unclear'. It is sig nificant that MerleauPanty turns to lan gu age in commencing hi s study of perception . He th ereb y alerts us to the fact that perception is not 'a primitive functio n' underlyin g cultural acquisitions, as o ur 'natural altitude' wo uld have us believe . On the contrary, what both commo n sense and th e scie nces mean by perception is itself a cultu ral con struct wh ich mi sses the ph en om enon of perception . Classi cal studies , Merleau-Ponty argu es, have attemp ted to understand perception by adopting an analytical approach . Th is approach has resulted in the notion of se nsation as th e funda mental building-block of perception, and hence in th e view that perception is th e summation of sensation s. Th e meaning of sensation varies according to the orientation of the theori sts. It may mean th e manner in which one is affected and the experi en cing of a stale of oneself. On such a view, sensation is an) ' impression' produced in a subject; to see red , for example, is t
4

Introduction: Classical Prejudices and the Retl/m to Phenomena

colour qu aliti es but to cause these to appea r in th e sub ject by affecting th e latt er in a particular way. To ma ke colou rs pu rely subjective, how ever, is to render them indi stin gu ishable, since differentiati on requ ire s a distancing - and hen ce, an objectifying - on th e part of the subject. Pure sen sati on thus becom es the experiencing of an instantaneous, undifferenti ated ' impact'. As such it is devoid of meaning and utterly for eign to ou r lived expe rience whi ch, no matter how eleme ntary , is always cha rged with meanin g. Just as the addition of zeros never ge ts us be yond zero, so the summation of meaningless ele'me nts nev er produces a me an in gful wh ole. Even the simplest sensory given has a figurebac kground struc ture, without which it could not be a senso ry giv en. Pure, undifferentiated 'impress ions ' are thus imperceptibl e; they cannot be part of any ima ginable perception . Con sequ ently, th ey have no place in an analysis of perception and their retention as a th eoreti cal construct only serves to obscure that which th ey are intende d to illuminate - nam ely, th e nature of perception . We will never understand perception by positing som ethi ng which in principle can have nothing to do with it. Th e o nly way to learn wh at it is to perceive is to examine the structure of our actua l perception. In th eir atte mpt to do exactly that, man y classical th eori sts rejected the notion of pure impression as an eleme n t of the perceiving consc iousness and substituted the noti on of d eterminate quality as a p rop erty of the perceived ob ject. On th is view , i red is not a sensa tion, but rather a quality of some th ing extern al to {\ the perceiv er. Th e error this time lies in mak ing the world an \ 'in -itse lf' in which eve rything is determined ; it is to replace one /' extreme with ano ther, to move from th e radi cally subjective and \', indeterminate to the radically objective and determinate. Such a mov e is no tru er to our actual experience; ins tead of att ending to the latt er, thi s app roach presupposes that th e objects of experie nce are solid 'ch unks' delimited by clear boundari es and se parated from one an other by physical voids. Percep tual experience is considered to be analago us and hence, to cons is t of isolat ed or isolable eleme nts which are themselves clear, det erminate and self-contained . Th is view pre-judges our actu al expe rience of perception, di sm issing in advance everything which fails to fit th e model. Ambiguities are discounted on the grounds that th ey are ' due to so me defici en cy in the perceiver - such as in attention rather th an to a positive indeterminacy in the object perceived.

'Sensation'

5

Hav in g mad e quality a property of th e ob ject, empiricism (to use Merleau- Ponty's label) feels called upon to explain how th at object can give rise to perceptual experience. It see ms initi ally th at common sense and physiology can com e to th e rescu e: common ) sense declares that , th e sens ory given is gras ped by the senses, while physiology su pplies a detailed an alysis of th e senses as instruments.[The result is a reduction of percep.tion to a caus all process in whi ch sensa tion is the immediate conse que nce o f an excitation . The perceiver becomes a physical system undergoin g '1 physico-chemical stim uli and respondin g in determinable ways. .J" Atoms of matt er stimulate the sense organs, and th e stimulatio n is transmitted via th e central ne rvous system to the brain wh ere it is recorded and deciphered to produce an exp erien ce corre spo nd ing to th e st imulus . Minute particles of colour qu aliti es, for example, are thus claimed to be at the origin of the expe rience of colours; hence the notion of sensation as inst antane ou s impress ion seems to have been rein stated on a firm physiological footing - even if only as an explana tory concept. Physiol ogy itself has in fact, however, be en forced to ren ounce its claim to have found an anatomical path connec ting the stimulus to the perceptual expe rience. Su ch a mod el is incap abl e of accounti ng for the blatant lack of corr esp onden ce between stimulus and ph enomenon which characteri zes so mu ch of our actua l experience. Variation s in pitch having to do with a so und 's intensity, th e perceiv ed ine quality of lines objective ly eq ua l, the gre y resulting wh en red and green are presen ted together, the change to a less differentiated structure following injuries to Sigh t are all cases in po int. Merleau-Ponty therefore argue..~ that tbm] ~hich is perceived by its ~~ ry nature ad mits Q 1 aifib iguitU nd belongs -!~n!eK!=Q0J.d
'A ssociation' and 'Projection of M emories'

2 'Association' and 'Projection of Memories' In the previous ch ap ter Merleau-Ponty pointed out the problems encountered by those who invoke the notion of sensation in analysing perception. Even tpe simplest sensory given, as .we. have seen, J.ll-ust have a figure-:-background structure, and such a structure is irreducible to that ab solu te coincidence of the perceiver with an impression or quality which defines sensation in its classical sense. In order to be perceived as. a figure, that which is perceived must stand out from a background, it must have a contour, an outline. If that outline were merely another sensation, it could not be an outline. We are then tempted to think that it must be a collection of atomic sensations v iewed simultaneously. Thus we conceive the outline as a line, and th e latter as the sum of indivisible points having no intrinsic connection themselves. But what makes the sensations arrange themselves in this way b efore us, and why do we say that we are seeing a red patch? The standard answer is that we recognize this particular distribution of sensations because we have seen similar distributions in the past and have learnedto use"the words"'red patch' with reference to them. This response, however, is itself open to the same question; hence, it has merely served to defer the problem rather than to resolve it. If sensory givens are themselves devoid of meaning, then something must be invoked which will endow their summation w ith the meaning of 'p atch ' . Empiricism assumes that th e ~.I' eal to association and the-PJ .Qi.e( .QQlLQ.UnemQri.es...wi!U\!Q!,ly s uch · J!Leaning. However, as Merleau-Ponty notes,t~eseoperations not o~all fOE- ~ ~c.Q!lsciousness..foLWhich _em.prri-cTsm -can n ot ) !s.elf acco~t they also presuppose that whic!ltheyare ~upp;;sed to explain, What could possibly "prompt the perceiver initially to make -of a conglomeration of 'pure impressions' the seeing of a triangle, for instance? If we are not to become entangled in an 6

7

infinite regress, association and memory mu st themselves be grounded in a perceptual experience which is already inbued with meaning. There must be something about the present perceptual data which prompts the p erceiver to put into pl ay a certain association, or call up a certain memory. The present perceptual data therefore cannot themselves be meaningless; for such neutral 'b u ildin g blocks' could never have any power to evoke others . A certain arrangement of lines on a paper is seen as a triangle becau se it itself has the same meaning as the figure which we formerly learned to call 'a triangle'. If this were not so, there would be no reason why a past experience of a circle rather than a triangle should not b e called up. There must be something about the p resent data which guides the evocation of memories. The appeals to association and memory presuppose the present recognition of a figure; conseque ntly, a.ss.gciation and · m emory \ . ca=t se \ye. as explanatory principles in the analysis of percep: J tion. N or can the empiricist thesis of sensation be retained if our experience is to be comprehensible. If we accept the idea that we have sensations, we commit ourselves to the view that all experience is sensation, as even the apprehension of spatial or temporal relationships must then be analysable into sensations. Knowledge itself becomes no .more than the anticipation of impressions, and - is itself constituted of such 'inexpressible impressions'. The segregation of our perceptual field into identifi- " able things and spaces becomes no more than the unstable configurations of extrinsically related qualities assembled by ·so me inexplicable'associative force' operating according to the contiguity and resemblance of stimuli. TQing~haye no inherent substanti- "\ ality as things, and owe thejr unity entirely to a consciolJsness- ~ itself unaccounted for - which constructs theIflQ"c)_"\Il~ basis oJpast experience. Once again, this merely transfers the problem from the present to the past; that which prompts us to recognize something as a thing in the first place, remains incomprehensible. By clinging to the notion of sensation, w e render ourselves incapable of going beyond it; we reduce the whole of experience to 'b lin d processes' consisting of m echanical recordings of, and reactions to, arbitrary arrangements of meaningless units. To add that these present processes are based on similar processes in th e past, in no way makes them any less opaque. Consequently, we must discard the theory of sensation and the postulates constructed to salvage it. There is no 'associative force' which operates

8

Introduction: Classical Prejudices and the Return to Phenomena

auto no mo usly as an efficien t caus e of expe rience ; and th e alleged ' p rojection of memories' is simply 'a bad metaphor' which obscures both th e imman ent meaning ['scns'] of the immedi ate experience and th e ma n ne r in which th e past is p resen t to it." The th in g perceived is not a conglomeratio n of se nsations and mem ories, th e latt er projecting themselves independe n tly upon th e . former. By retum in !l.!~r!,.ell~lIllena, we d iscov er 'a whole alrj'ady [ preg.!'a_ll~_wIlh~_i!~.c.~uci~le meaning': an d it is thi s whole, rather th an the allege d sensatio ns and memori es, which form s th e ' basic layer ' of all expe rie nce. Th e problem is thus no lon ger , as for empi ricism, one of explain ing how th e projection of a recollected forme r arrangement of meaningless sen sation s can rend er a similar grouping of present sensations m eaningful. Rather , it now becom es a matter of describing the way in which an inh erently meanin gful present experience at every moment has access to a past which 'en velopes' it. The relationship bet ween : pa st and present m ust th erefore be re-e xamined , and Merleau-Ponty in di cates th at th e past will need to be d escribed as a ' horizon' or 'a tmos p he re' or ' field' , instead of as a collection of d iscre te impressions or q ualities . He concedes th at th is d escription will be quite foreign to em pir icism and th at th e latt er can alw ays resist accepting it. Merl eau-Ponty' s discussion of thi s poi nt is im portant, as it is int ended to forestall mi sunderstandin gs abou t th e statu s of hi s phen om en ological investi gation of percept ion . Em piricis m rejec ts as obscure and inad equat e th e evidence such as th e horizon of th e past- rev eal ed b y phen om en ological reflection . Instead, it in sists on a theoretical recon struction of such evidence in terms of im pressions, which it regar d s as th e ultimate constituents of experience. Since any and all phenomen a ar e im med ia tely su bjected to th e same so rt of reco ns truc tio n, non e can serve to disprove empiricism. In gener al, one canno t refute thinkin g which rests on th e p rejudice of th e objec tive wo rld , by d escrib in g phen om en a. As Merleau-Ponty po ints ou t, to th ose already com m itted to an obj ectivist app roach ; physical or psychological or intellectu al atom s will invariably see m more real th an th e ph en om en a of experie nc e. Nevertheless , for th e phenomenologi st our experience is ' the ultimate co urt of appeal' . Rath er than refut ati on, Merleau -Ponty therefore sees his task as being one of I am retaining Merleau-Ponty's distinction between 'sens' and 'signification', by altering the translation wh ere nece ssary.

'Association' and 'Projection of Memories'

9

atte mp ting to make th ou ght aware of itself. Thi s will mean awakening it to its own prejudice and to an ap p recia tion of perception as th e first access to things an d th e foundation of all knowledge . As ju stifi cati on for the phenom en ological approach, Merleau -Ponty points to th e wealth of hitherto inaccessi ble phenom ena which becom e com p rehensible once it is ado p ted . Yet, as Merl eau -Ponty acknowled ges, empiri cism can always object ' that it does not understand' such phenomenolog ical d escription s. Th e only recourse for th e phenomenologist is ' to point out everything th at is mad e inco mp rehe nsible by empiricist constructions and all th e basic phen om ena which they conceal'. The su bseq uen t three parts of th e Phenomenology of Perception will provid e thi s sort of 'in ven to ry'; hen ce Merleau-Ponty contents him self w ith a short preview of major poin ts here. We have alrea dy seen that empiric is t construction s of perception d ep ri ve th ings of th eir in heren t subst antialit y and uni ty by d ep icting th ese as th e products of a consciou sness whic h ope rates accord ing to associatio n and projection of memories .. Now Merleau -Ponty draws our attention to th e fact th at em p iric st con struction s si milarly deprive 'the "cultu ra l world" or "h u ma n world" of its intrinsic cultu ral or human meaning - th er eb y destroyin g its su bstan tiality as a cultural or human world . The perception of a co- wo rker's emotions or the dist incti ve atmosphere of a parti cular city becom es merely th e products of tran sferen ces and p rojection s of memories by 'a n "acosrnic" th in kin g subject' . More over, by reducin g th e natural world to a su m of stim uli and qualities, empiricis m falsifies it too , and gives us u nde r th e guise of ' natu re' wh at is in fact a cultu ral object. Em pi ricis t cons tr uctio ns m ake in compreh en sible th e presence of th e perceived world - and th e loss of th at presen ce for the hysterical child . While retai n in g th e kernel of truth in empi ricis m, reflection will need to recon sider 'the whole problem o f the presence of th e object'. Th e natural and th e cultu ral world will need to be rediscovered and d escrib ed . As th at description progressively unfold s in th e su bs eq ue n t chapters, th e inade quacy of em piricis t construc tio ns will become increasingly evid en t. .

'A ttention' and 'Judgment'

3 'Attention' and 'Judgment' At the beginning of thi s 'Introd uction' , Merleau -Ponty alrea dy pointed us ah ead to the pres en t chapter by noting that ' the notion of atten tion ... is no mor e than an auxiliary hy pothesi s, evolved to save th e prejud ice in favour of an objective world' . In th e preced in g cha pters, Merleau-Ponty criticized that prejud ice in hi s attack on empiricism. Now he proceeds to show th at despit e its ap pearance to th e contrary, intellectualism shares the sa me prejud ice and is eq ually in capable of accoun tin g for ou r perceptual experience. Empiricism takes the objective w orld as given and argues th at th is wo rld mu st impinge causally on the perceiver : th e sen se organs are stimulated in such a way as to receive and tran smit data which are th en so mehow decoded by th e brain so as to repr od uce a pic ture, or 'i mage', of th e orig ina l extern al stimulus. Th is th eory in volves th e ' constancy hypothesis', accord ing to wh ich th ere is ' in principle a poi nt-by -po int corr espondence and cons tant connection between the stimulus and th e elemen tary percepti on' .' As we have seen , how ever, this th eory fails to account for th e discrep ancies betw ee n th e apparen t and th e real size of ob jects, for the perception of grey resulting from the presentation of red an d gree n together, and so on . Th e sensory given thu s defies its defi ni tio n 'as the immed iate effect of an externa l stimulus'.' In stead of rejecting th e presupposit ion of a wo rld in it self, emp iricis m attempts to save th is prejud ice by appealin g to additional factor s. To accoun t for those cases in which the pe rcept obvious ly does not correspo nd to th e stimulu s, empi ricism therefore invokes the notion of 'attention'. It argues that the 'normal se nsa tio ns' are present in all cases , but that th ey occasio nally remai n unp erceive d becau se of.lack of atte n tion to th em. Like a torch, atte ntio n can be focused on th e sens atio ns to illum in ate them . Why atte ntion occurs in some cases but not in others - w hy some stimuli 'trigger off' th e 'searchligh t' while others do not - rem ain s un explained . 10

11

If th e relationship betw een perception and atte ntio n is an externa l one , then the question involves us in an infinite regress because th at which ' triggers off ' atte ntion must itself be ' triggered off ' by so me thi ng else, and so on ad infinit um . Sin ce empi ricism has only external relationsh ip s at its disposal, attention rem ai ns inexplicable . Just wh at attentio n adds to th e data so as to render confus ed or illu sory percept ions clear and viridical, is a mystery. As a pu rely gen eral power, or 'searchli ght', att ention presumably does not create anything new in th e data . Con sequentl y, the eleme ntary percept ion already contains th e structure req uired to make it an image of the extern al object. In that case , how can it appear confused? Moreover, si nce it deals with se nsation s, empiricis m is at a loss to accoun t for th is structure of percep tion - a struc ture which eme rges only with atte ntio n . In an effort to make of th is inco mprehe nsi ble emp iricis t position so me thing intelligible, psychol ogist s turn ed to intellectualism. Th us they argued that the consti tuting activity of consciousness creates the struc ture of th at which we perceive, and th at thi s struc tu re is th ere wh ether or not we believe that we see it. O nce agai n, attent ion mere ly illuminates what is already presen t; and if it is as ked what is gi ven prior to the structu rin g activity of consciousness, the answ er is 'chaos' or a Kantian ' nou rnenon'. Attentio n does not invo lve a progressive clarification because th ere is no indistinctness -there is only chaos or clarity. But as Merleau-Ponty poin ts out, if cons cious ne ss by its very acti vity produces structures, it mus t possess them; hence, it becom es inco mpreh ensib le how it can ever be deceived abo ut any th ing . Atte n tion thu s see ms unneces sary, and illusion s defy explanatio n. By the sa me token, con tingency is rul ed out ; there is no accoun ting for our expe rience of exploring so me th ing , of learn ing about the things which we perceive. If conscio us ness itself crea tes perceptu al struc tures , then it must alread y have them as soon as w e perceiv e wha t we take to be an obj ect - hen ce the re is noth ing more to explore or to learn. Nevertheless, our own experie nce tells us otherwise . When we see some thing indistinct, we atte mp t to make it more di stinct by paying atten tio n to it. In th is case, we are initially neither totally ign orant nor to tally cog nizan t of wh at it is we are seeing ; ye t empiricis m in effect post ulates the form er w hile in tellectualism postu lates th e latter. Both ru le out any in determi na cy by th eir dogmatic ad herence to tn at ' natural attit ude' shared by common sense and the sciences - an attitude which

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12

Introduction: Classical Prejudices and the Return to Phenomena

takes the existence of an objective world to be self-evident, either 'as a reality in itself ' or ' as the im manent end of kno wledg e'. Empiricis m offers us a world in itself wh ich impinges caus ally on the perceiver. Intell ectu alism cou nters th is abso lu te objectivity with an abs olute subjectivity which merely d upli cates the empirici st world by a con sciou sness conceived as sus taining it. Both approaches simply constru ct expe rience so as to fit the ir presu ppositi on s; neither is capa ble of gras ping the 'living nucl eu s of perceptio n'. Psychologist s th emselves began to challenge th is dogma tic be lief in th e world in its elf, wi th the discovery that patients suffering from cert ain d isord ers who se origin lies in the central nerv ou s system, canno t clea rly locat e a point on their body w hic h is be ing touched - yet th ey are no t totally ignorant of it eithe r. What we have he re is ' a vagllely located spot' w hich ove rturns the em piricist and intellectu alist notion of attention. In add itio n, Merleau -Ponty points out th at wh en infants begin to distingu ish detailed colours w here form erly th ey perceiv ed ' '' warm'' and "cold" shades' or, ev en ear lier, 'the coloured' and 'the colourless', wh at has cha ng ed is th e structure of their perception , the articulations of their visual field. It is not, as psychologists claim ed, that th e inf an ts in fact saw determ inate colours all alon g but me rely failed to pay atten tion to them . Attention is best und erstood on thi s mod el because, as Merleau -Pont y notes, paying atte n tion is not merely elucidating pre-existin g da ta. Attention pro gressively articulates wha t is initially give n as positively indeterminate, as a 's till ambiguous mean in g'. There is at th e start n eit her abso lute chaos nor pe rfectly di stinct q uali ties; nor is there complete tran sparen cy at the end of thi s developme n t. Att ention is crea tive, but its crea tivity is motivated by what is initially only ' an in determin ate horizo n'. These poin ts will b e discussed in far more detail by MerleauPonty in the body of his Phenomenology of Perception of course; the introdu ctory section merely serves to sketch ou t the direction s wh ich the subs eq uen t phe nom en ologica l de scription will follow. In th e same manner, Merleau -Ponty here men tion s the expe rimental man ipulations which make of attention the act of lookin g through a card board tub e or telescope . Su ch manipulation s fund ame ntally di stort our usu al perceptual expe rience, by pres u ppos ing a fully deter minate and precise world which is then broug ht about artificially. Believing th at thi s 'sleight of hand'

'Attention' and 'Judgment'

13

mu st not go unchallenged , Merlcau -Ponty here reitera tes th at 'consciousness must be faced wit h its own unreflective life in things an d awaken ed to its own hist ory which it was forgetti ng : such .isjhetru e part.that philosophical reflection has to play, and th us do we arrive at a tru e th eory of atte ntion' . We must not presuppose th at the analytic reflection employed by intellectu alism will lead us back to that unre flective life just because it goes contrary to the naive realism of the empiricist position . Merlea uPon ty is concern ed to show th at both miss the mark . As we have seen , neither empiricism nor intellectualism is able to assign any compreh ensible role to atte ntio n . Giv en the constancy hypothesis, it is not difficult to see tha t something is need ed to link up th e isolat ed qualiti es impressed upo n th e sen se organs , so as to prod uce an ima ge of an object rather than a host of discrete poin ts. Not only can it provid e jus t th e sort of co-ord ina ting function requi red here, but the faculty of judgement also seems to be able to supply an expl an ation of illusions and more gene rally, of any discrepan cies between our retin al ima ges and th e perceived ' o bject. When , for example, we declare that we see peopl e on th e street below our windo w even thou gh we objectively see noth ing but hat s and coats, intellectu alism explains that in fact we do not really see people below, but merely- judge that th ey are there. Percept ion thus becomes an intellectual construction which uses' bodily impression s as primitive da ta to be interpreted , elabora ted , or used as premises for the furthe r activity of drawin g a conclusio n. In this wa y, all sen sin g expe rience becomes an activity of judgement - all seeing or hearing becom es ~ judging th at we see or hear ' x'. This, however, runs contrary .to ou r actual expe rience, in wh ich there is a distinction between sens ing and jud gem en t. Int ellectu alism cannot account for the fact that a face or a landscape see n upsi de down is unrecogn izabl e. It is this sort of expe rience wh ich dictates the abandonment of the cons tancy hy poth esis. If we adopt intellectualism, the distinction be tween 'tru e' an d 'false' perception cannot ultimat ely be uph eld . Since seeing mean s. th inkin g or judging that we see , it is non sen s e to say that th e sufferer from- hallu c{nations thinks he sees somethi ng whic h lie does not really see, After all, to say he sees it on thi s th eoiy - already to say that h e thinks he sees it; hen ce we are forced to conclude that he thin ks he sees w hat he does not thin k he sees. If one argues that the su fferer from hallu cinations d raw s un warrant ed conclusi ons - that he judges in th e absence of adeq uate

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14

Introduction: Classical Prejudices and the Return to Phenomena

premi ses - the problem is merely pushed one ste p back. It will still be necessary to exp lain how wc are to dis tinguis h bet ween those impression s which are ade q uate an d those wh ich are no t. Th is will force the classical theori es to acknowledgc th e existence of an immanent sig nificance ('s ig ni fication') in the eleme ntary sensible - and that is precisely wha t they have already ru led ou t. The efforts to sav e th e prejudice in favour of an ob jective world crea te irresolvable dil emmas for bo th empiricis m and intellectualism . Merleau-Ponty will show that far from being the primord ially give n, sensory given s arc th e produ ct of a scientific ap proach to percept ion. We get no further if, like Kant, we focus on the conditio ns for the possibility of percep tion or if, like th e early Hu sserl, w e tum to th e abs tract essences of perceiving, th in king, and judgi ng . All these approaches rest on a do gm at ic belief in a determ inat e universe and in an absolu te truth. The overthrow of ' the natu ralistic notion of sensation' already implies the ruin of an alytic reflection which had ado pted it; and as Merleau -Ponty reminds us, it is th e task of philosophy to emba rk on th e 'a uthe n tic' or ' rad ical' reflection forcsha do wed in th e collapse of the classical the ories. Th is phe nomeno logical reflection w ill need to return to, and elu cid ate, the 'perceptual origins' of o ur actual expe rience ins tead of situa ti ng itself in the midst of a ' read y-made wo rld '. Such a new approach will req ui re con cept s (like motivation) wh ich are 'fluid' eno ug h to express a domain that is neither 'o bjective' nor 'subjective', where being is not fully de terminate an d significance not enti rely clea r, Merleau-Ponty ad mi ts that Car tesians will dismiss th is n ew approach as lackin g philosophica l import. Its vindica tion w ill req uire a th eory of reflectio n in which the facticity of consc io usness is sho wn - so that thou ght becom es cognizant of its inability to cut itself loose from percc ptual experience in order to g rasp itself absolutely. The cha p ter 'The Cogi to' will add ress itself explicitly to thi s task.

4 The Phenomenal Field In thi s final cha p ter of hi s 'Introdu ction ' Merleau -Ponty retraces bri efly the major points whic h have eme rged in th e previous chapters, d iscusses the need for th e type of ph en omenological descripti on which the subseque nt cha pters will pro vid e, an d sum ma rizes th e direction wh ich the latt er will take. By making sens ing the possession of an inert qu ality, emPiri-l cis m red uced the world to a spec tacle an d our ow n bod ies to mere mec ha nisms. Sen sing thereb y lost tha t vitality, that mysterious richness, which it in fact has in OU T common experience. Em p iri-" cis m rend ered incompreh en sible the primordial, pre-reflective sign ificancc which th e world has for us as in carnate subjects, wh ich makes of th at world not a spectacle but 'a famili ar setting of our life'. It has therefore become necessary to reco ns ide r th e natu re of sens ing and to tackle the pr obl em of describing it as ' tha t vita l communication with th e wo rld', that 'inten tio nal tissu e' wh ich und erlies and sus tains all thou ght. Sens ation, attention and judgement as construc ted by the classical philosoph ies can no lon ger be accepted: the eme rge nce of Sig nif icant groupings can no lon ger be reduced to a de facto co-existence or an intellectua l con nection of meaningless impressions. Perception can no longer be collapsed into knowled gc; nor can the creating of connec tions rem ain the perogative of th e underst anding. The prejudice of th e world in it self must be abando ned and, with it , man y of th e conce pts and distinctions employed by the classical ph iloso phi es. A ncw dimen sion calling for new conceptio ns is thus opened up , and Merleau- Ponty de si gn ate s it 'a phenomenal field' to indicate that it is no t a spectacle spread out be fore a di sembodied mi nd , but rathe r an ' ambiguous do main' in which persp ectival, inca r-"] nate subjects are situated . It is in this domain th at perceptual ) .>: experie nce can be redis covered. What place should thi s pe rcep tual experience be ass ig ned vis-a-vis scie ntific kn owl ed ge o n the o ne hand, and psycho logica l and ph ilosophical reflection on the o ther? Merleau -Ponty con-

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Int roduction: Classical Preju dices and the Retu m to Phenomena

tends tha t 'science and philosophy ha~e for centuri es been sus tain ed by unquestioning fait h in perception' . Beginning with a ( p reco nceived idea of th e world and a corresponding ideal of \ kno wledge, science con sid ered perception as provid ing access to \t hat wo rld and so paving the way for scientific kn owl ed ge. Conseq ue ntly, instead of exa mining our actual perceptual expe rience of phenomena, scie nce interp reted it with reference to the theoreti cal con structs of pure bodi es endowed with statistically determi ned chemical properti es and free from an y force. Geo metrical space and pure movem ent - bo th lacking any interna l relation ship to objects - replaced our lived experience of spac e and motion, while events becam e th e result of determina ble physical conditions. Objects w ere di vorced from their relati on sh ip to any " particular percei ver and th ereb y stripped of all perspectivity, , ambig uity or indetermin acy. At least in principle, the y were fully , determinate and identical for all perceivers, thus ruling o ut any irr esolvabl e contradiction s wi thin subjec tive or intersubjective experience . Since perception was not regarded as a di alectical \ process in which som eth ing comes into being, reflection cons idered a gei'ilaiogy of bein g unnecessary . Moreover, the being whic h scie nce defined becam e th e only conceivabl e bein g, irrespe ctive of the value assign ed to the principles of science. As a result, th e living body becam e an object like all th e othe rs , eq ually reducibl e to physico-chem ical properties and causa l relati on s. Emo tions and attitudes were tran slated into impression s of pleasu re and pain , and the latt er lin ked to processes of the nerv ou s \ system . Similarly, gestures and actio ns w ere resolv ed into object- . ive movem ents explicable in terms of nervous functioning . Sensing becam e a matter of sti mulus-respo nse: the body, reduced to an object , mechanically receiv ed , transmitted, and rep roduced qu aliti es of the external world . Since the living body has ceased to be the visible exp ressio n of ' o u r be ing -in -the-world and beco me in stead a ma chine, subjectivity lost its anchor and became a disembodied con sciou sness , survey ing the world. Percepti on of others 'and co-existence with them becam e impossible. Since the body of the other, like our , own, had been converted in to an automa ton, we could at best infer the exis tence of another conscio us ness which, like ours, was d isembodied (and hen ce lacked particularity). But thi s meant 1c onstitu ting the other consc ious ness - thus reducin g it to the ~'~tatus of an object in our world . Solips ism was un avoidabl e and

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The Phenomenal Field

17

th e conscio us nes s of th e scientist becam e the un iversal 'iQns titutin g subject for whom th e entire wo rld lay spread ou t. Iln sho rt'(' intersu bjectivity and percep tion collaps ed into solitary thou ght! th e self dissolved into the tran scendental subject. Ha vin g accepted V un criti cally the fundam ental assumption s of classical science , reflective philosophy found itself eq ua lly incapable of ass ig ni ng any status to th e empirical self."'J · . Scientific advances - such as those in quantum mechanics - and the expe rience of two world wars undermined the classical ap proach. Einstein's relati vity th eory and Heisenberg's un cert ain -l ty principl e challenged th e classical d ichotomy between a fully determ in ate world in itself and an intp;;rhal human observer Space and time lost their absolute inde pe ndence and an inhere~ unc ertainty replaced th e abso lute det erm inability of natu re, Th"J classical ass umption of an abso lu te stand point was no lon ger ten abl e; the perceiver's situa tion could no longer be ign or ed . Nature cease d to be a spe ctacle ; the perceiver becam e a participa tor and scie nce found itself forced to tolerate a measu re of indeterminacy. The notion of ' a truth in itself' had to be aba ndon ed in favour of a truth relat ive to a human knower . Science was compelled to discard its pure concep ts and reflective philosophy, wh ich had shared th e sam e assu mptio ns, had to follow sui t. Moreover, th ese theoretical challen ges were streng the ne d by the chaos of war, which overturned the classical conception of in tersu bjective life. As Merl eau- Ponty shows in his moving essay 'The War Has Tak en Place', the concrete experience of barbar ism shattered th e very premises of rati on alism . Irresolvabl e ambigu ities and contradictions could no lon ger be ruled ou t; human society could no longer be regarded as ' a communi ty of reason able minds'; history could no lon ger be dismissed as un essential. Th e actual experience of irration alit y and unfreedom revealed th e con tingency of reason and lib ert y, showing their dep enden ce on particular forms of human co-existence . Rationalism lost its alleged un iversality and beca me a philosophy rooted in a spec ific hi stori cal context which it ign or ed on principle. Similarly, the absolutenes s of classical scie nce was shattered, di sclosing the latt er as 'a form of perception ' which cons idered itself complete simply becau se it con veni entl y for got its own origins. It is therefore essen tial that we break with un critical perception a n ~ : the classical presupposition of deter minate being; that we go back I, to our actual experience of the world an d rediscover th e dialectical

18 Introduction: Classical Prejudices and the Return to Phenomena

The Phenomenal Field

process of living expe rience whereby we o urselves, other peopl e and things come into bein g. Merleau -Ponty designates thi s reawakening of percepti on and red iscovery of phenom en a ' the first philosophical act'. Merleau-Ponty cautio ns, however, that returning to ph en om en a does not mean emba rking on introsp ective ps ycholo gy nor intu itioni sm . Phenomen a are not 'states of consciousness', nor is the phe no menal field au ...JDnecworJd ' accessibl e to the individ ua"l subjec t alone. Merleau-Ponty's own posit ion mu st not be confused wi th that of th e psychologists who in cha lleng ing the vali d ity of an alysin g exp erien ce in terms of physical conce pts, non eth eless retain ed the presuppositi on of th e ob jective world . Th ey merely cons truc ted, inside that world, a rea lm of ' psych ic facts' and ' psychic energy' corres po nding to th e physical facts and mec hanical ene rgy assumed to exis t outside th e psyche. Sinc e extens ion characterized ph ysi cal data, non -extensio n became th e trait of their psychic coun terpa rts. Lackin g extension, the latter were perceiv able onl y by an act of in tuitio n whic h was by definiti on private and non-communicable ; impressi on s w ere beyond the reach of philosophical reflection ."'jhr contras t, the return to ph en ome na restore s o u r lived experien ce of intersubjec tivity and establis hes th e fou nd at ion for authentic phi10sophizing!The criticis m of the const an cy hyp othesis in volves th e rejection 'hot only of sensation but also of the theory of consc ious ness based on it - which Ryle so aptly described as 't he dogm a of th e Ghost in th e Machine' .3 Conscio us ness is th en no longer constructed of impressions an d th e appreh ension of ' mental life' - our own and that of o thers - ceases to be a matt er of 'some in expressibl e coinci de nce' . The dich otom y between 'intern al' and ' extern al' expe rience di sappears and, with it, th e conce ption of 'me ntal life' as a my steri ou s 'in ne r' counterpart of 'outer' behavi our. The imm ediate is no lon ger a meaningless atom of psych ic life, but rather the very structure of behavio ur - our own and o thers'whi ch is a whole satura ted with imman ent significance. O the rs' 'me ntal life' thu s becom es immediately accessible in th e un fold ing of their behaviour, rathe r than havin g to be in ferred by introspection . Moreover, in trospection ceas es to be a privil eged surveyi ng of allege d 'states of conscious ness' and becom es instead a rendering explicit of the meaning immanent in any behaviou r. Once w e reject the noti on that cons cious ness is a psychic entity e ncased in a machine, the body ceases to be a barrie r to conscio usness and

beco mes, on th e contrary, that which makes othe rs immedi at ely present to us in living experience. In breaking with th e psychological ato mism of intros pective psychology to de scrib e th e Gestalt's irreducible meaning, Ges talt psych ology made a sig nificant advance . How ever, Merleau-Ponty criticizes its tendency to treat consciousness as an assemblage of ' forms' and to adhere to th e ide al of an explana tory psychology. He wa rns th at uncri tical accep tance of Ges talt psycho logy can lead once agai n to the di stort ion s of classical tran scendental philosophies. Psychologists' reflection on the pr imacy of phen om en a prompts them to consi der th ese as cons titu ting the obj ective wo rld. From th ere, it is bu t a small step to the postulatin g of a univ ersal constituting age nt - the solitary thinking ego - whic h constitu tes not only the o bjective world bu t also that of living experience. The ph en om en al field thus turns into a transcen dental field; unreflecti ve experience loses its fundam ental facticity to becom e a mere antici pa tion of reflection and the latter achieves comp lete self-transparency. In short the wo rld, other pe opl e and we ourselves as ind ivid uals all collap se in to a Hegelian Reason, while the dogm ati sm of idealism replaces that of empiricism. Eve n Hu sser!' s transcendental ph en om en ology as desc ribed in works aating from hi s last period presents th is absorpti on of ' the "live d-through" wo rld' in to the tran scendental ego. Desp ite its clai ms to the contrary, such an approach is ultim ately uncritical. In coun tering it, Merleau -Ponty reminds us of th e me aning of phenomenology an d tran scendental field. Phe no menology does not stu dy th e actualizi ng of a pre-existing reason or the cond itions for the possibility of a world . Rath er, as th e word itself in di cates, phenomenology stud ies th e appearin g of bein g to con sciouness . Moreover, in de libe rately employi ng the wo rd field, phenom en ology emphasizes the irre d ucibility of th e wo rld and the persp ecti vity of reflection .r eflech 01 'thUS understoo d is not th e su rveyi ng of a world spreaaout as a pectacle for a di sembod ied , all-en com passin g Thinker. It is, rather, an activity of an ind ividual philosopher and is always condi tioned by the latt er 's concrete situa tion in the world . If it is to be trul y rad ical, phenome nological reflectio n will ne ed to reflect on itself, maintain a cons tant awaren ess of its own source in an unreflect ive experien ce and recogn ize that it inva riably transforms that unreflective experience in su bmitti ng it to reflection . .Philosophy becomes au the ntically transcen dental, or rad ical, by ques tioning the pres-

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llltroductioll: Classical Prejudices and the Retum to Phenomena

umptioll tha t reflection can, so to spe ak, 'catch it self by the tail ' and mak e knowledge completely exp licit. As Socrates understood so well, philoso phy 's core ' lies in th e perpe tual beginning of reflection , at th e poi nt where an individual life begins to reflect o n . itself ' , There is th us no unbridgeabl e chasm separating na ive consciousness from radical reflection ; however, 'the prejudice of th e objective world' mak es the naive con sciousness forget th at living expe rience in w hic h both it and philosophical reflection are roo ted . Stripped of psychologism , the psycho logical de scrip tion of the ph en omenal field can provide a br idge by revivi ng perceptual expe rience an d th ereb y eve ntua lly ind ucing consciousne ss to emba rk on a radical reflection.

Not es Phenomenology of Perception, p. 7. J. 2. Ibid., p. 8. 3. G ilbe rt Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Harmonds wo rth, Mid dlesex: Pen guin, 1976) p . 17.

Part I The Body

Experience and Objective Thought: the Problem of the Body

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As we hav e see n, objec tive th ou ght takes the form of realis m ('empiri cism ') or id ealism ('intellectualism ') . In thi s prefatory section, Merleau -Ponty ou tlines how it is that 'o bjective thought' arises at all and how space, time, and the bod y figu re in such thinking. He also points out the need for a description of 'the emergence of being' which will sho w th at objective thou ght is a mere mom ent of expe rience rather than its foundati on . Since our perception leads to objec ts, we tend to overlook the origin of th ese objects - the fact that they have their so urce ' at the very centre of our experi en ce'. Thus we neglect th e cruci al part which we in carnate subjec ts play in the constitu tio n of the objects of our perception , in their comi ng int o be ing as objects for us. Inst ead of recogni zin g our own role, we consi der them to be objects in them selves. Altern ativ ely, we go to th e opposite extreme by di storting our ow n contribution in percepti on so as to make of it a power of creating ex nihilo. In thi s way we ove rlook the fact that while objects are ' for us', they are so only as ' in-themselves for us '. Obj ects are not mere projection s or cons truc tions of our minds; rather, th ey are objects to be enco untered or di scovered . In short, they are th ings offering a cer tain resistan ce to our tou ch and a depth to ou r gaze. To indi cate how we are tem pted int o the mod alit ies of objective thou ght, Merleau -Ponty in vokes the exa mple of perceiving a house. We see the ho use next door as we wa lk past it to our own : we see it first from th e o ne side as we approach it, then from the front as we pass it and fin ally from th e othe r side as we wal k up the path to our ow n door. If we were to enter our neighbour's backyard, if we were to go in hi s front door and see th e in sid e of his h ou se, or if w e w ere to fly over hi s roo f in a heli copter w e would see th e house differen tly. Since th e hou se is se.!'-,:u:tifferJmJly from one ang le th an~,,-n o"~~.':r_."n d since we are nevertheless "a w areo fs eefnl r ' lhe same hou se from diffe ren t positi ons at different times, rathe r than six different hou ses, we all too eas ily

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Part I: The Body

conclude th at it itself is an ' in-itself ' - tha t it exis ts indep endently of any persp ective. How ever, such realism su bverts itself as soo n as we pau se to cons ide r its implicati on s. lf the hou se itself is indeed indep endent of any perspective then it mu st be a hou se 'seen from nowhere' o r, wh at amo un ts to the same thing, see n from all possible persp ectives simultaneo us ly; but that involves a contradictio n in terms. To see is, after all, 'always to see from somewhe re'; hence th e hou se allegedly 'seen fro m nowhere' or 'seen from everywhere' canno t be really see n - it must be invisibl e. Yet as we we re pro mpted to attrib ute autono my to the house itself, we continue to claim th at it exists. Conseq ue n tly, we have a hou se which, thou gh in visible, nonetheless exis ts; it mu st th en belon g to the realm of id eality rather tha n to that of reality. The hou se itself is now no lon ger a spatia-temporal th ing but an id ea . By a cur ious reversal, th e naive realism with which we be gan has tran sform ed itself into a full-bl own idea lis m. Merleau-Ponty therefore se ts him self th e task of tracin g both th ese position s back to their origi n in experience . As we ha ve see n, th e persp ectivity of vision was wha t prompted us to posit the hou se itself. Give n th at we could see the same house from different places at different times, we were led to conclude that the hou se itself exis ts independen tly of any perspective. In this bri ef introdu ction , therefore, Merleau-l'onty begins to exami ne the spa tio- tempo ral structure of pe rception. Th e key conce pts in thi s examination - persp ective, field and horizonare internally relat ed . The ado p ting of any part icular perspective can take place only in a perceptual field and th at field , in turn, is a field on ly insofar as it has horizons. When we pe rceive a house, w e percei ve it perspectivally and, as we have see n, by takin g up any part icular posit ion from wh ich to view it we imply the poss ibility of taking up others. In sho rt, th e hou se lends itself to exploratio n and invites our gaze to move around it. We can comply only insofar as the hou se is part.of a certai n 'setting' wh ose ultimate horizon is th e wo rld . Th e latter is the 'horizon of hori zons', the general se tti ng of all perceptual expe rie nces . In our example of the hou se, the particular hori zon may be the stree t, the . town in which it is located or the surro undi ng countrys ide . These are what Merleau -Ponty calls the 'outer' hor izon s of th e house; correlative ly, the 'inner' horizon s enable our gaze to explore the interior of the house from a variety of position s. How ever, we canno t simultaneous ly 'open up ' the outer and inner hori zons of

Experience and Objective Thought: the Problem of the Body 25 the hou se; focusing o ur gaze on any pa rticular object in evitabl y mean s allowi ng the o the rs to retreat to the fringes of our vis ual field to becom e part of th e backgrou nd . These surro undi ng objec ts nonetheless continue to count in our vision and we are free to draw any one of them in to the for eground if we choose to let th e o bject of our present focus retrea t to the periph ery. Thus we are never impri soned in a particular perspectiv e; nor need we fear that our concentration on any part icular objec t will entail the others' loss of identi ty. Moreover, those others have horizons in which th e ob ject of o ur present focus is implied, thereb y guaran teeing that thi s object too will retain its ide ntity while we explore its vari ous aspe cts. Such exp loration is not an intellectual o p era ~ tion and th ere is no need to kno w anythi ng abo ut th e eyes ' retinal stru cture for it to occur. Nor is th ere any need for exp licit recollection or conjectu re, since the objec t's ide ntity is not constru cted from images. Identity implies temporalit y; th erefore th e 'object-horizon struc ture, or the persp ective', is not merely spa tia l but spa tiotemporal. As such , it has an inhe rent openness wh ich ma kes it impossible for an object of expe rience ever to be absolute - for that would require the compressing of an infinity of different ·'Perspectives ' in to a strict coexistence '. This no tion of ' an absolute object' is based on the persp ectivism of expe rience; but in bringing in the idea of the co-exis tence of an infinity of different perspectives, we dest roy temporality - and th ereby the very ex pe~ rience underl yin g the noti on of an abso lute object. In place of that experien ce, thi s sor t of th in king subs titutes a recons tructio n ba sed on ' the prejudice of th e objective wo rld'. In th is ' freezin g of experi en ce th e living bod y is red uce d to an object amo ng o ther objects. Yet our bod y is in fact the eine qua nOll of pe rceptual experience and we thu s encou nter consi derab le difficulties in regarding it as an obj ect. Co nve rsely, th e objectification of our body is decisi ve in brin ging the objective world into bein g; hen ce th e collapse of the former lead s to the dow nfall of the latt er. To restore ' the perceiving subject as well as the perceiv ed world', Merle au-Ponty therefore begins the Phenomeno logv prop er with a critical exam ina tion of ' the bod y as object and mec ha nis tic ph ysiology' . Wh en th e body becom es ou r ' point of view up on the world' in stead of an objec t, the spa tio -ternporal structure of perceptual experience will be revi ved and ob jective thinking in ge ne ral undermin ed . The probl em s posed by objective tho ug h t will lead

26

Part I: The Body

us to recognize the body as a project rather th an an in- itself. Further, such a recognition will nec es sit ate a re-examination of those perceptual objects which form th e goal of the bodily transcendence . The result will be a radical modification in th e sub jectobj ect stru cture implicit in the very notion of a ' project' .

1 The Body as Object and Mechanistic Physiology

;

Objective thought, as we have see n, posited a world of objects in which different ob jects as well as di fferent pa rts of the same object were related in a purely extern al manner. Mechan isti c ph ysiology incorporated the livin g body into this causal sys tem by conver ting human beh avi ou r in to a pattern of stimulus-respo nse . Thus th e stimulus was thou ght to imp inge on a parti cular se nse organ which in turn tran smitted sensations to the brain and th ereby produced a pred ictabl e perception. However, neural physiology found itself forced to aba ndon this purely mech an ist ic approa ch when it becam e evid ent that da maging centres or cond uctors resulted in subjects' loss of discrimination - frequ entl y pr ogressive - amo ng stimuli rather than in an outrig ht loss of ' certain qualities of sens atio n or of certain sensory givens '. What was at stake in such injuries was the organization of the se nso ry fields, the modifi cat ion or collapse of figure-background struc tures . Conseque ntly, modern ph ysiology itself re placed th e mechan istic stimulus-respon se mod el with th e notion of an orga nism which meets and relates to stimulation in a variety of ways. Since th e stimulatio n of a se nse organ did not in and of itself inva riably produce a perception , it became necessary to speak of an 'att unin g', or di spositi on , of the organi sm to the exci tation and to regard perception as a ' psychophysical' rath er th an a purely physical an d ph ysiological even t. Nonetheless , adopting th is mor e soph isticated ' psychophysical' model did not necessarily mean di scardi ng causa lity and third person processes altoge the r. Th ere was a tenden cy to regard th e organism's sh ap in g of stim uli as the product of an objective bod y whose internal organs send messages to the brain . O ur experience of the body wa s thereb y reduced to a ' rep resen tation' or 'psychic fact' resu ltin g from objective eve n ts occurring in our ' real bod y'. Thus the model whic h began w ith a confus ing mixture of phys ical and psychol ogical factors - excit27

"'I

i:i

" "

29

Part 1: The Body

The Body as Object and Mechanistic Physiology

ation and 'attuning' - ended by collapsing the alleged psycholo-, gical aspect of the event back into complicated physiological processes. In doing so, it ultimately encountered the same problem which it had been designed to resolve - namely, the' problem of inadequacy in accounting for actual experiences, To illustrate the shortcomings of the traditional views, MerleauPonty discusses the phenomena of the phantom limb and anosognosia. A strictly physiological account fails to explain how a limb which in fact is no longer physically part of the body can nevertheless be experienced and, alternatively, how a limb which has become paralyzed can be systematically left out of account even though it is still part of the body and has not actually become anaesthetized. Nor can a purely psychological account elucidate the phenomena, since it cannot explain why the phantom limb disappears when the nerves to the brain are cut, or how the anosognosic evades his handicap without simply forgetting it or failing to see it. It must be remembered here that Merleau-Ponty's criticisms throughout the Phenomenology are directed against 'empiricism' and 'intellectualism'. The psychological account which is under attack above belongs to the intellectualist approach and seeks to explain phenomena in terms of the presence or absence of determinate mental contents. The phenomenon of the phantom limb is indisputably bound up with the personal history of the subjects in question, since such a limb can come into being through emotions or circumstances recalling those in which the injury occurred. Nonetheless, emotion and recollection are not to be understood as intellectual operations here but rather, as preobjective ways of relating to the world . Similarly, the personal history is irreducible to a collection of memories or brain 'traces', since that would preclude the disappearance of the phantom limb in the absence of brain injuries (which would presumably damage or destroy the brain's alleged contents). Explanations in purely physiological or purely psychological terms evidently cannot account for phenomena such as anosognosia and the phantom limb. Yet such phenomena can be related to both rl:w.siologicaland psychological conditions; consequently, it would seem that we co~;Ve- af an adequate explanation by mixing these conditions. However, such a hybrid theory likewise remains fundamentally unsatisfactory. If we begin with a radical distinction between the 'physiological' order on the one hand and the 'psychic' on the other, any subsequent attempt to establish an

intrinsic connection between the two is bound to faiL Given the complete antithesis between a being which is purely 'in-itself' and one which is exclusively 'for-itself', any meeting point is utterly inconceivable. Such a point of contact would require a combination of the essential features of being-in-itself and beingfor-itself; yet this sort of combination has already been ruled out in the very positing of these two fundamentally opposed kinds of being. Descartes' unsuccessful struggle to establish the union of body and soul (or mind) remains the most famous of such attempts to amalgamate mechanistic being and translucent consciousness. Since the Cartesian position is also the clearest instance of what Merleau-Ponty refers to throughout the Phenomenology as 'intellectualism', it is worth presenting Descartes' view in some detail at this point. Descartes '[begins] by observing the great difference between mind and body. Body is of its nature always divisible; mind is wholly indivisible'.' He notes that 'although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body: if one loses a limb one is 'not aware that any subtraction has been made from the mind'r' Thus Descartes is led to assert 'the total difference bet- I ween mind and body' and to 'observe that [the] mind is not ' directly affected by all parts of the body; but only by the brain, and perhaps only by one small part of that - the alleged seat of common sensibility'r' Moreover,

28

since any given disturbance in the part of the brain that directly affects the mind can produce only one kind of sensation ... man as a compound of body and mind cannot but be sometimes deceived by his own nature. For some cause that occurs, not in the foot, but in any other of the parts traversed by the nerves , from the foot to the brain, or even in the brain itself, may arouse the same disturbance as is usually aroused by a hurt foot; and I then pain will be felt as [though] it were in the foot, and there will be a 'natural' illusion of sense' That Descartes himself recognized the inadequacy of this account is evident from his correspondence with Princess Elizabeth. In writing in response to the latter's request for clarification regarding the soul's power of moving the body, Descartes acknowledges that he has 'said almost nothing' about it and tries again 'to explain ... the union of soul and body and how the soul has the

30

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,~I' !I !I' ,I

Part I: The Body

pow er of moving the body'.s That explan atio n consis ts of no more than the ob servation that the union in qu esti on is a ' primitive notion ' and that the soul's way of moving the body is to be conceived by an alogy with gravi ty." When Prin cess Elizab eth rep lies that she finds this res po nse incompreh en sible, Descart es can only an sw er that ' the si milie of gravity . . . . is lam e' , th at ' the human mind is incapable of di stinctly conc eiving both the di stinction between bod y and soul and their union, at one and th e same time'; and th at ' finally, it is jus t by means of ord inary life and conversation, by abs taining from meditating and from studyin g th in gs that exercise the im aginati on , that one learns to conc eiv e th e union of so ul and body' becau se ' what belon gs to the union of so ul and bod y can be underst ood only in an ob scu re way either by pu re intellect or even when th e intellect is aid ed by imaginati on , bu t is understood very d early by mean s of the senses'.' Desp ite rep eated attempts to do so, Descart es dearly found him self unabl e to reconcile hi s 'ordinary life' expe rience w ith his philosophical view of th e relati on sh ip between body and soul. The former forced him to admit 'that I am not present in my bod y merely as a pilot is present in a ship; I am most tig htly bound to it , and as it were mixed up with it, so that I and it form a un it'.' Descartes' ' meditating' prompted him to 'co nsider th e human body as a machine fitt ed together an d made up of bones, sine ws, mu scles, veins, blood and ski n' as opposed to 'a consciou s bei ng; th at is a mind , a so ul (animus), an intellect, a reason' i? Having recogni zed 'only two summa genera of realities : in tellectua l or mental (cogitatiuarum) rea lit ies, Le. such as be long to a mind or conscio us (cogitantem) subs tance; and materi al realities, i.e, such as belon g to an extende d substance, a bod y', Descart es necessarily faile d to es tablish 'a dose and intimat e un ion of body an d mind'." Traditio nal alte mp ts to explain the phenom en a of human expe rien ce in pu rely phys iological o r purely p sychological term s have sho wn th em selves to be inad equ ate, as ha ve those approa ches wh ich , like Desca rtes ', merely sought to mi x the two kinds of explanations whil e leavin g both fundam entally intact. Conse. q ue ntly, su ch efforts mu st be abando ned for a ph enomenological description which sit ua tes hum an exis tence between the 'physiological' and th e ' psych ic'. It is th is sort of description wh ich Merleau-Ponty him self endeavours to provide. By way of a prelimi nary step in thi s direction , he po ints ou t that eve n in referen ce to the non-human orde r the "physiological' has trad itionally been

The Body as Object and Mechanistic Physiology

31

conce ive d far too narrowly. At the level of the insect for example, it is blatantly ridicul ou s to speak of phen om ena suc h as ' repression', ' refusa l to accept mutiliati on' and the like . But he re too we cannot accou nt for the ph en om ena if w e regard th e ins ect' s body as an object obeying the laws of mechani stic physiology. Mechanistic ph ysi ology will never explain the in sect's subs tit uti ng a so und leg for a seve red one but not for a leg which h as only been tied . Altho ug h th ere is here no con sciou s su bstitutio n aimi ng at some goa l, there is no purely automa tic subs titution eit her. Even at this lowly level th erefore, it is necessary to de scrib e th e body - the in sect' s in this case - in a way wh ich transcends the tradition al alterna tives of 'physiological' and ' psychi c'. We mu st discard th e w ell-en tren ch ed idea that reflexes are 'blind processes'; ins tea d, at all levels of life we mus t speak of a cer tain manner of ' being-in-the-world' . In the case of th e insect, of course, it is a matt er of ' an a priori of th e species and not a personal choice', since in sects of the sam e species all resp ond to mutilati on in ro ughly th e same way - whereas at th e human level the res po nse is mu ch more varied and complex. In both cases, howev er, bodily in jury brin gs to light what can only properly be called a ' globa l' or bodily intelltionality ha ving to do with a pre-objective 'orientation toward s a " be havioural se tting" ' , Insofar as it is a pre-obj ective view , bei ng-in- the- wor ld is equally irred ucible to eit her of Descartes' ' two summa genera of realities' pure thought or extended bein g; as a result, being-in-the-world. can unify the 'Ebysiologic
•

,i

•

'-

33

Part I : The Body

The Body as Object and Mechanistic Physiology

wh o continua lly su bs tit utes his right arm for hi s crippled left arm d oes not eng age in deliberate de cisi on-makin g. Rath er, he continues to pr oject himself through his body towards hi s habitual world. From th is ph enomenological per spective, bodily expe rien ce is not red ucible to an actual mom ent ary intero ceptivity occu rring in a particul ar instant of the pr esen t. Th e ampu tee's ph antom leg and the anos og nosic's paralyzed arm bring to light a bod ily temporalit y which is not of the order of 'o bjective' tim e. Th e bod y is see n to com prise 'like tw o di stinct layers', the ' habitual bo dy ' and th e 'present body'. The form er signifies th e body as it ha s been lived in the past, in virtu e of which it has acq uired certain habitual ways of relating to the world . The 'ha b itua l bod y' alrea dy projects a habitual setting aro und itself, ther eby giving a ge ne ral struc ture to the sub ject' s situa tio n. Sinc e it o utlines , prior to all reflection, those obj ects whi ch it 'expe cts' to encounter at th e othe r pole of its proj ects, thi s body mu st be con sid er ed an 'anon ymous', or 'pre perso nal', globa l in ten tio na lity. As such, it draw s together a compreh en siv e past which it puts at th e d isp osal of each new present, thereby alread y laying down the ge ne ral form of a future it anticipate s. With its ' two layer s' th e body is th e meeting place, so to speak, of past, pr esent and future becau se it is th e carrying forward of th e past in th e ou tlin ing of a future and th e livin g of th is bodily mom entum as actu al present. Thi s is wh y th e an osognosic continues to p erceive objects as being manipulatabie for /r im although his han dic ap pr ecludes hi s manipulat in g th em any lon ger . Similarly, by projecting his cus to ma ry situation around him , th e amputee's habitual bod y may prompt him to try to walk on his missing leg. Usually, su bjects gradually accept th eir di sability as they build up a modi fied hab itu al body. Th e latt er then ceases to project th e form erly habitual se tti ng to which those subjects are now no longer abl e to respond effectiv ely . As Merleau-Ponty not es, th e very fact th at the ir habitual body - at least in itially - continues to outline a 'customary world' in which th ey can no longer act in their habitu al way , con tin ua lly reve als th eir handicap to th em . Yet that awa re ness need never be mad e explicit; it may well remain paradoxically pr esen t and ab sent si m ultaneously. Th anks to their custo mary bod y, su b jects may remain inde finitely ope n to a future which has in fact been ru led out by their injury. Ina smuch as th eir dail y activiti es were not preced ed by reflection in th e past, no reflection is now

requi red to keep th eir cus tomary world 'a live ' - and no explici t awa re ness will auto matically bring ab out it s collaps e. Experi en ces like those of anosognosics or those of perso ns wi th phantom limbs - or, in gene ral, those of patients with any of a wh ole variety of complexes - bring to light th e temporal struc ture which characterizes our existence as incarnate beings . The psychoanalyst' s pati ent typically suffers from a 'com plex' - such as a parti cular ph ob ia - whose origin lies in a traumati c experien ce in that patient's past. Because the expe rience was so painful for him, the patient 'repressed' his 'conscious ' awareness of it , thus banish in g th e mem ory of his exp erien ce int o the ' unconscious'. Alth ou gh ous ted from consciousness, th e experie nce thus continues to exist at th e un conscious level an d from th ere ove rshadows and poison s the patient's pr esent. He thus re ma ins th e prison er of hi s past , so that the structure of his su bseq uent expe rie nce is frozen even though it s content changes. In order to relea se him from the clutches of hi s past, the psychoa na lyst typically pr ompts th e pati ent to bring th e exper ien ce back into cons cious awa reness and by analysing it, to purge it of its traumatic aspec t. Thus the patient is fin ally abl e to leav e th e past exp eri ence behind him and become genuinely open to hi s actu al present: This haunting of the pres ent by a part icula r past expe rience is po ssibl e becau se we all carry our pa st with us in sofar as its . structures have becom e 'sedimented' in our habitual bod y. Th ere is th us an 'o rga nic repression' which is part of our human cond itio n and wh ich con stitutes so to sp eak 'an inborn com plex' . This 'o rganic repression ' underlies any more speci fic repressi on of the type di scussed above. To the extent that it is roo ted in biological exis tence, o ur personal existence is inherently pr ecarious; yet we hide thi s precariousness from ourselves by mostly rep ressing th e orga nism and reducing th e past to a collection of id eas or images. Such phenomena as th e ph antom limb can reawaken us to the actual character of th e past and thus to an apprecia tion of th e role which our body plays in our bein g-in-theworld . Si nce emotion and memory can bring abo ut the phen om enon of the phantom limb, it is ev ident that the pati ent is expe riencing 'a former present' rather than mer ely recollecting it or ha ving an id ea or image of it. Th e phantom limb is therefore an alogo us to th e repression of a traumatic experience d iscu ssed

32

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above; in both cases the su b ject remains emotion ally involvedin a particular past experience to such a de gree that it imposes itself on the actua l present. By reopening tim e memory evokes a certain pa st , inviting us to relive it - rath er than simply to im agine or rethink it . In responding to thi s implicit su mmons, the amputee can cause hi s missing limb to ap pe ar as 'q uasi-presen t', but thi s phen omenon is not to be con strued as involvi ng either a 'physiologi cal' or a ' psychic' caus ality. Instead, it is a matter of the pati ent's taking up an 'existential attitude' which ' motivates' th e ap pe ara nce of the missing limb. The fact that th e pati ent can no lon ger 'call up ' the limb if his afferent nerves are cut, confirms th e exten t to which being-in-the-world is based on bodily exis tence . As we ha ve seen, however, bodily exis tence is not reducibl e to th e law s of mechanistic physiology but is itself imbued with meaning by our being-in-the-world . Con sequ ently, it is not a qu est ion of join ing a so ul to a mechani st ic ob ject, as Descartes tried to do, but of recognizing the dialectic al movem ent of our existen ce. That movement cease lessly carri es anonymo us biological exis tence forward .Into person al exis tence in a cultural wo rld and converse ly, allows th e per son al and th e cultu ral to becom e sedime nted in general, anonymou s struc tures. This sed im en tati on is essential ins ofar as it frees us fro m the necessity of havi ng to pay strict atte ntio n to every si ng le thing we do, no matter how sim ple it may be. We thereby atta in the ' mental and practical space ' that ena bles us to build a per son al exis tence and a human world . On th e other hand as we ha ve see n, th e acquisition of ge neral struc tures by the habitual body opens the possibility of o ur becom in g fixated in a past expe rience. Thus th e di alectic of freed om and dependence is part and parcel of the di alectical . movem ent which characterizes our existence as incarnate beings. Since traditional appro aches have d istorted our exis tenc e by reducin g it to mechanisti c physiology or to intellectua listic psych ology, Merleau-Ponty endeavou rs to restore its di alectical nature by showing up the in adeq uacies of suc h approaches. Having exa min ed exist en ce via physiology in th is chapter, he proceed s to consider it by wa y of psycho logy in the next. !

The Body as Object and Mechanistic Physiology

Part I: The Body

35

Notes 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Desca rtes, 'Sixth Meditation', Meditations on First Philosophy in Elizabe th Anscomb e and Peter Thomas Geach (trans. and eds ), Philosophical W ritings (London: Nelson and Sons Ltd, Nelson's

University Paperbacks for The Open University, 1970) p. 121. Ibid., p. 121. Ibid., p. 121. Ibid., Pl" 122, 123. 'Letters illustrative of Descartes's Philosophy 163()-1647 ', Philosophical Writings, Pl'. 274-5. Ibid., Pl" 275, 276, 277. . lbid., Pl" 277-82. , 'Sixth Meditation', Philosophical Wri tings, p. 117. Ibid., p, 120; 'Second Meditation', Philosoph ical W ritings, p. 69. 'Extracts from Principles of Philosophy illustrating Descartes's Use of certain Terms and his Principles in Physics ', Ph ilosophical Writings,

Pl" xlviii, 190, 191.

The Experience of the Body and Classical Psychology

2 The Experience of the Body and Classical Psychology Classical psychology's own cha rac terization of th e body indicated crucial structura l differe nces between the latter and objects ; ye t becau se of th ei r com mitmen t to th e sta ndpoin t of a n impartia i observe r, psycho logists faile d to appreciate th e p hi losop h ical sign ifica nce of th ese fu n da mental d ifferen ces . Classical psychology recogn ized , for exa mple, th at the body itself has a perman ence w h ich is u nlike th at of objects. We estab lis h an objec t's perman en ce by exp lori ng it fro m d iverse perspectives in space and time and d etermin in g whe ther it persi sts through out the exploratio n. Mor eover, a n object can b e rem oved fro m our percep· tu al field altogether. We canno t, however, de tach ourselves from our body; he nce we can neither take u p va rio us pe rs pectives on it nor di slod ge it from our percep tio n. In sh ort, our bod y is pe rm an ently present for us wi tho u t our ever bein g ab le to observe it like an object ; th e ang le fro m which we perceive ou r body is unalt erab le. Yet th is permanen t and invariab le presence of our bo dy is w hat enables us to observe objects; it is th e prerequ isite for th e lallers' ~~Uity and p~~~ tial absence. O nce again , th e d ial!!£: tical relat i<:>!:'.~lp_b.et~een fr~.clQl1)...J!!1~_
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system all th e tim e w hereas objects would d o so o nly so me of the time. Th e body.'s.. pe~':!!Se..J.:u)ri ~ i.!'.l. and th ~Jack oU t inconcei vabl e. Si~i la.!:Iy'0!'~Y:~ perspective .constitu tes ..ou r., bond with th e ~orl d, ._our..fj~e.d_9 pen i ng .onto it, rather.. th an one. ~"-,o ng_~rtl: p,:!sp_e~ti~es s~'.:!~om s':Ill..!_ide~l. sta nd poin t ou t:. sioethe world, In sho rt, were It n ot for th e pe rma ne nce and :P§:~t~~iti~]iLo~i.'~ody: th~ _r~!!!.t ~ _ pc-;!!,~snce - ~nd th e " p..e!~p.ecl!Y[ ty. of. obJ ec t~..~o uld"b.e..ullerl y"jncon ceivabl e,_ M!,r1eau. P~~~_k!,':.~,,-~ges tJ:1at1Ne.:~..n_s~.e so.me pa rts ofo u r body with our eyes, th at m irror s ena b le us to see ourselve s fro m iop to toe as wellas-Tro m the rear, an d th at we can even see our. own"eyes oy"usiit-g- a m T':;or: 'Neve rtheless, thisdoes no t refute 1'JerJ.eau -Po n ty 'SC!airri1I1iit we ·can noto bSiiiw-·our- bod y asw-; Ob~C ( b ec~ey;;;-a .three7waY_'!!i!rOr -docs "n ot en able us to ke ep our b od y fixed whJ!~.£han g i!,g o.~.!: po i '!t..!)Lyi ew . Jvloreove.r, w~..saflll()t perceive our body perceiving; we can to uch with one hand _the .other.while .lhe latt er touches something else, but th e ~y_£!l<:>u chi.r' g _ca_n not itself be tou che~ . The touched ha_rtdis not ou r Ilan d..a ctua llyeng aged in touching so meth ing ; nor are th e eye s..seen in the mi rror our ow n eyes in the process of exploring the world. As Merleau · Ponty not es, we can neither see nor touch our body ' in so fa r as it sees or touches th e wor ld ;.Although we can. rega rd po-rto f our body as a n object, its active bein g thereby i§fape s~' --_.- "

can

an

a-

Classical psychology recognized our body's peculiar p ower to give us ' do ub le sensa tio ns'; it n ot ed th at th e bo dy can almost catch itself in action as it touches or sees. O u r han d s pr essing against each other rap idl y alternate back an d for th between touch in g and being touched , while our eyes looking at th e mirro r see th emselv es 'fro m th e ou tside' as it we re an d lik ew ise altern ate between loo king and bein g looked at- .y_~ t th e active an d passive rol~9f ~ur b~.2!~':..:r-5.9~I'lete!y .. c."~~ci?e~Moreover, as o"escarles alre ady conce ded , ou r relationship with our bod y is n ot like th at of a sh ip's pil ot who observes th e cond itio n of hi s ship . We feel pain in our foot when we ste p on a n ail - we d o not rega rd th e hurt foot as an ex ternal objec t which acts on our n ervous system so as to produce a n external impressio n. Accordi ng ly, in its descri ption of th e body, class ical psychology d istinguished th e latt er fro m ' external things' b y noting ' th a t th e body is an affec tive objec t'. In ad d ition, th is psychology invoked th e noti on of ' kin aesth e tic sensations' to indicate th e d ifference between mov ing our body

38

Pari I: The Body

and moving extern al objects. If we decide to move a particular book from the she lf to our desk we mu st first locate the book, reach for it, grasp it and tran sfer it from its former po siti on on the shelf to its new place on the desk. By contras t, we have no need to locate our arm and hand in order to reach for th e book; our decision to reach is immediately implemented since our body is not an external object to be located an d gras pe d like th e book. With the term ' kina esthetic sensations' classical psychology sough t to express this immed iat e awareness in which bodily movements are executed without the need of an y intermediate steps to link intention and actio n. The de scription wh ich classical psychology gave of our body thus already assi gn ed it a sp ecial status; nev erthele ss, psychologists either failed to di stinguish our body from objects or saw no philosophical im plications in making such a d istinction. Typically, their detached ap proac h led th em to regard the fundamental differences between obj ects and the body as no more than contingent peculi arities of o ur experience. The expe rie nce of our body they reduced to the status of a representati on - a psychological fact corresponding to the physical facts stud ied by the o ther sciences. Unl ike the othe r scien tis ts however, th e psychologists were ultimately stud ying th eir own expe rie nce in examining our experience of the body. Conseq ue ntly, th ey wer e in evitably led back from experi ence as a rep rese n tatio n - an object - to experience as a phen om en on , th at is , as our pre-obj ective presence to our body and to th e lived-through intersubjective world. In short, despite their attempt to consi de r human expe rience as an object, the psychologists' implicit awa reness of th eir own subjectivity invariably int erferred wi th their spec tato r's attitude. They were the su bject and object of th eir own study and th is eq ui vocal status of be ing both obse rve r and obs erved obliged them to rediscover the lived relationships underlying and an terior to any su bjectobject differentiati on. By noting the d istinctive features of the body, classical psychol ogy thus unwittingly pointed th e way for a 'return to experien ce'. In the following chapters Merleau-Ponty will examine in more detail th e features of our body which prompted th is return.

3 'The Spatiality of the Body Itself and Motility* ' In the previou s chapters we sa w how th e pr obl ems encountered by mechanistic physiology an d the ob servation s mad e by classical psychology prepar ed th e way for a phenomenological description of the body. Merleau -Ponty now pursu es th at description with an investigati on of spa tiality, since ' the primary cond itio n of all living perception' is spatial existence. Our exp_~!i~~J:t~h~.!.he par~~ .QLou r):!Q!!y_are not r-,,!at.e!! to one another as objec ts occupying a place in objective space. It would be biz.;rrCiOspeako f eig htee n i nch~s to the left of th e o ther, o r of our head as being three feet abo ve our knees. In performing an au topsy on a corpse, we might regard the latter as a collecti on of limbs and organ s, but we do not experi ence our body as being su ch an assemblage. If for some reason we regard our body in the manner of a corpse or of an intricat e machine, such a view remain s en tirely ab stract; it is no more than an intellectual cons truc tio n or a manner of spe aking which leaves untouched th e lived pr esen ce of th e bod y its elf. Th e body is immediately pr esent to us becau se we are our bod y; but how is this immediacy to be understood ? We kn ow where our limbs are without havin g to look for them , becau se we possess 'a body image' which includes them all. Th e meaning which Merleau-Ponty gives to this noti on, however, need s to be di stinguish ed from that assigned to it by traditional psychol ogy. Initially psychologist s used the term ' body image' to desi gnate the habitual associati ons of images accom pa nying va rious stim uli and bodily mov em ents. Built up in the course of recurrent expe-

oiiearmasbeing

It sho uld be n oted that Merlea u -Pon ty used the word 'motricite' rather th an 'm otilite': ne vertheless, I have decid ed to follow Colin Smith in tra ns lating 'm otricite' as 'm oti lity', sinc e th e alterna tive 'molarity' is so un common . However , I ha ve tran slated 'le corps p ropre' as .Jb~_had~1f I, since thi s cap tures Merleau -Ponty's meanin g bett er tha n does 'on e's own body' or 'the ~ers on al body' . •

39

40

Part I: The Body

riences, th e bod y image was a de facto totalit y of impressions which ind icat ed the locati on of local stimuli and the positio n of all parts of on e's bod y at every in stant. Thus underst ood , it was in adequate to explain disorders such as th e referral of se nsa tions to the wrong par t of the bod y or the ph en om en on of the pha n tom limb. Psychologist s them selves we re th erefor e prompted to go beyon d th e assoc iationis t d efin iti on of th e body image to invoke th e noti on of 'a compre he ns ive bod ily purpose', thereb y rend ering th e bod y image inheren tly dy na mic. In the psycho logists' investigatio n of the ph ant om leg and th e paralyzed arm, it becam e clear that th e bod y image can include a limb which has become actually non-exist ent or omit a limb st ill extan t. The decisive factor in su ch case s was th e project in w hic h the sub ject felt eng aged; he nce the body ima ge proved to be irreducibl e to a mere copy of the objective bod y or to a global awareness of its exis ting parts. The psychologist s themselves failed, however, to draw an y philosophical conseq ue nces in implicitly develop ing thi s notion of the body image as in carnate intentionali ty. It was incu mbe n t on Merleau -Ponty therefor e to take up the de veloped definition of the body ima ge and point out its philosophical implicati on s. Th e implicit cha nge in the noti on of bod y image from a mosaic of asso ciatio ns to one's awarene ss of the body as incarnate intentionality , im plies a cruc ial shif t from th e bod y as object to the bod y as expe rie nced. The lall er - the 'lived bod y' - cannot be divorced from th e world as expe rie nce d, because th e notion of incarnate int ention alit y alrea dy impli es th e pole of that global bodily purpose. As the se lling of actua l and potential tas ks to be accomplish ed , th e world canno t be left out of account; it is the hori zon always already outline d in the very man ner in which the body exis ts. Underlyin g the va rio us part icular p rojects which I implicitly or exp licitly se t myself is the comprehe ns ive prepersonal project of the bod y as ~!:.i ng:i n : the~world . The latter gives my part icular persona l projects th eir sty le and they in tum pla y th eir part in shapi ng it. Th e body image pr ovides me with a ; pre:reflective knowle~ge of th e locati on of my limbs, but this locati on is not a positi on in objective space. Rath er, it is a location with reference to th e way in which my limbs en ter in to my projects ; th us it is not ' a spatiality of position but a sp atiality of si tuatio n'.

Th e lived spa tia lity of the body as an orga nic unity polarized by tasks, constitutes th e basis of th at objective space wh ich ha s to do

The Spatiality of the Body Itself and Motility

41

with external coo rd ina tes and determinate position s such as 'front', 'back', 'bottom', 'inside', 'outside', 'left' and 'ri ght'. ,h.§. _

Merleau-Pon!y' showed~rl ier chapters, perception is always PE sEectiyaI an.'thas.lo_wit h iigur~bai:Kgro und stru ctures.J:o_sepj eg jl.'e.bod y_:ovitlu eferen ce.to extern al objects. Thu s J~ e hou,s_e across the..s tree t from my kitchen window for example, and my positi on in my kitche n can be. specified pre" Clsely; yet it is th elived-bo d y which enables me to take upsuch a position ' in~j !:.ci iv~iE.ace .. It.Is.this. ph en om en al body.which r§ke~.!!"~ J:>0u s!Oyta!:'d..9 ut)0.r. me aga ins t the background of th e sky or , aItern~'y'elY,_e~ bles me to sh ift my gaze to a bird flying a cross my visual field sotha t the bird mo me ntarily becom es the f§ u re while t':ti h ou s,e r ecedl"_t()f'?'111 the backgrou,:,d·.§!."Eel D s the very con4liion.for the.possibility of.figure-background..s.tru ctures coming into exis tencefor me at all, the lived bod y .can not its elf be- an oth'er one of these structur."s-,Hence it is what Merleau Ponty calls ' the th ird term , always tacitly underst ood , in th e figure-background structure, and every figure stands out against th e double horizon of externa l and bodily space'. Bodily spa ce . envelop s my limbs in such a way that I know wh ere they are without havin g to thi nk about th em or look for th em . Mor eover, my awa reness of my body is insep arabl e from th e world of my perception . IThe things whic h I perceiv e, I pe rcei ve always in reference to my body, and th is is so only becau se I have ad. immediate awareness of my body itself as it exists 't owards th em'.1 The body imag e thus in volves a primordial, pre-reflectiv e orie n ta ~ *: tion and motility inso far as I am immed iately aware of where my: ' limbs are as my body projects itself towards th e wo rld of its tasks . Ii am always already situa ted in the wor ld and it is my man ner of engaging in particul ar projects wh ich reveals most clearl y th e i nature of my bodily spa tia lity. An an alysis of motility conse- \ quently serves to elucida te the ph enom en ological description 0!J spatial exis tenctil Normally we take for granted the basi c 'pow er of projection' which form s suc h an integral part of our pre-reflective expe rience. Indeed, th e nature of thi s funda mental motility tends to elude us if we conce ntrate exclu siv ely on th e be havio ur of norm al su bjec ts. Merl eau-Ponty therefor e turns his alle ntio n to an examina tion of pathological mo tility in order to illuminate our usu al mode of orienting ourselves in the world. Gelb and Golds tein's case study

42

I

!~

,"

;;1

Part 1: The Body

of Schne ide r prov ides a convenien t starting point for the di scussio n of impaired motility. Since bein g injured at the back of th e he ad by a shell splinter, Schneide r has suffered from a who le va rie ty of disord ers including visual, motor and intellectual disturban ces. Hi s visual data are un structu red, 'almost am orphous p atches ' among which he d ist in gu ish es pe opl e from cars for example, by the fact th at th e former look lon ger and thinner. In or der to recogn ize things, Schneide r mu st sketch in their contours by moving his body in va rious ways. He has no difficult y performing concrete movem ents suc h as blow in g his nose o r cu tti ng the leather which he u ses in hi s job as a wallet manufacturer, and can do these things even with his eyes closed . Ne ve rtheless, he cannot form an y ima ge of objects not actually in sight. and ha s great d ifficult y in performing ab stract movements (suc h as rais ing hi s arm on command) if ordered to keep his eyes shut. Schnei der su cceeds in perfo rming th ese movem ent s ' which are not relevant to any actu al situa tion' only if he is allowed to watch hi s limbs or to engage in preparatory movement s involving h is en tire body. He cannot desc ribe th e pos ition of his limbs, id entify characteristics of objects placed again st h is flesh or det erm ine wh ich part of his body is being tou ch ed ; yet he has no p roblem slappi ng a mosquito which b ites h is chi n . If ordered to point to his ch in, Schneide r can comply only if allowed to gras p it. Hi s va rio us difficulties make it clear that there mu st be a difference between ' bod ily space as the matrix of [on e's) habitual action' and bodily space as a determinate place in th e obj ective world. Schneide r has a body image in so far as he goes abo u t his daily activities w ith out having to search for his limbs, and can immediately slap a mosquito wi thout reflecting or need ing to locate eit her his chin or hi s hand in obj ectiv e space. Here he d irectly experiences hi s chi n as itching and hi s hand as h avin g th e potential to ass uage th e itch ; hence he has not entirely lost the pre-reflective awareness of his bod y as a pow er, as in carnate intention ality. For his dail y tasks, his famili ar se tting serves to mobilize his limbs; th e cus tomary concrete situa tion calls for certain mov em ents in the int eres t of th e task to be performed , and the ph enomenal body res po nds with it s habitu al gestures . y~ curious ly eno ugh ,Sc h nei der do es not feel himself to be th e au tho r o ( his activ ities; instead they~;;;' tohim to be Jriggered off ' by t he situatio n. As he says , h e 'exper iences hi-;melf and hi s m ove-m.e~ts~ ~e~';ely~a lin k;;:; the who le· process' of e vents . Whe n i'.L

The Spatiality of the Body Itself and Motility

43

rest, hi s bod y. is a formless mas s. Not only abs tract m<;>yem<;.n!s but ima ginary situa tions P2.~_tr_"-It:!end~pJ:~b lems for ~c!mei d~r, precisely becau se he does not expe rience hi s bod y as a .' po we r.of actiori' iThus alth<;>ugh.heS I,,-:rr!y.!!nde rstands:wha t he is to do, he can not'convert the thouglll.<;>fa.m.ovementi n to actu'a l movement'. His only...! e.':o urs,e is to set h is bod yjn motion blindly until di stinctions take sha pe in its ,'amorp,I)ous mass', bringing his limbs Into obj"-c!iv~,,-,,i~!enceJQr._him and fortuitously producing an app roxima tion of th e req ues ted gesture. AsJJl.J!l mted ,earlier, Dlle'S experi~ce of ..th<: , bo.
45

Part I: The Body

The Spatiality of the Body Itself and Motility

cesses performed by his bod y app rehe nded as an object in obj ectiv e space. No rma l person s, on the othe r hand, neither feel coerced in concrete movements nor require laboriou s mental deduction s and blind physical motions to perform abstract movements. Th ey are ope n to ab stract and im aginary situa tions. Their bod y im age ha s a ' ho rizon of possib ilities ' because th ey experien ce the body as a ' mo tor intentionality'; and for them every mov ement is in sep arably con sciousness of mov em ent and mov ement. It is not a matt er of a position al con sciou sness of th e w orld and the body, but of a motor sig nifi cance whic h 'speaks to' their body. Their pr e-reflective experience of th e bod y as a 'power of action ' ena bles them to transcend th e give n and struc ture thei r world in accordance with person al plans, or to lend their bod y freely to the realm of the imaginati on . N orm al persons, in short, pro ject around them selve s th at human space which Schneid er lacks. Neither empiricis t nor in tellectualist psychology is able to elu cid ate this fundamental po we r of projection which di stin gu ish es norm al from pathological motility. Their failure here on ce aga ins calls into quest ion th e psychologists' relian ce on either posit ivi stic induction and cau sal explanati on , or on p urely ration alisti c an alysis and reconstruction. Emp iricis t psych ology typ ically tries to explain the behaviour of pat ient s like Schneider by regarding it as a fun ction of so me defi cien cy in one or othe r of th e senses. Sch neider's diffi cult y in recogn izing objects or perform in g abstract movements with his eyes closed , prompts the em piricists to assign primacy to visual representation and to attrib u te th e motor d isturbances to a loss of vis ua l qualiti es. But what about th ose pa tie nts wh o, while kn owi ng how to kn ock at a door, cannot perform the action on comma nd if th e do or is o ut of th eir reach - even though th ey arc looking direc tly at it ? It wo uld see m then that tactile perception rat he r th an visual representati on ough t to be considered primary, and morbid motilit y explained by a loss of 'the se nse of potential tou ch'. However, neither explanation is conclusive; it is just as plau sible to maintain that the door mu st be within these pa tien ts' reach precisely beca use a deficien cy in the ir sight renders visio n in ad equate to provide by it self the requisit e backg round for action , thus mak in g touch necessary as well. Wh ich of th e two - visu al repr esentation or tactile perception - is to be deem ed the cause of abstract movement in normal persons? The qu estion is unansw erabl e defi ni tive ly w ithin the

emp iricist fram ework, and it is tot ally misconceived from th e vie wpoint of exis ten tial analysis . As Merleau-Ponty not es, in the stud y of human behaviour 'it bec om es clear th at th e facts are amb iguou s, that no exp eriment is decisive and no explanation final'. Emp iricism's approach is fault y in that it atte mpts to juxtapose th e sens es, focu ses exclusively on th eir cont ents which it reduces to collections of sense data, and cons iders th e pat hology to be caused by a deficiency in one sense deemed prim ary. As a res ult, empiricism obscures the central phenomen on - namely, the power of p rojecti or?- which is irreducibl e to any sense or inne r sen sibil ities, although manifested in all. Existential analysis, dra wing on the insights of Ges talt psych ology, shows that content can not be divorced from form and reduced to collection s of se ns ible qu alit ies. Moreover, the variou s senses cannot be isolated from each oth er and related to behaviour as variables to a function . Instead, th ey are mutually implicatory and inseparably in teg rated; as suc h, they est ablish a spatial organizatio n. The norm al subjects' way of structu rin g the ir enviro nmen t differs from th at of patients, an d in both cases we are dealing with an expe rience wh ich canno t be reduced to a summation of sensory contents. Con sequently, as Merleau-Ponty says, 'p sychological bli nd ness, deficien cy of sense of tou ch and motor di sturbances are th ree expressions of a more fundamental di sturbance throu gh which they can be understood and not three compone nt factor s of morb id behavi ou r'. As w e have seen, that fundamental di sorder has to do with a power of projection wh ich determines one's entire way of bein g- in -thewo rld . Intellectualism , for its part, obscures thi s power of pro jection by focus in g exclusively on form and seeking to establis h 'a reason or int elligible cond ition of possibility' for the patien t' s vari ou s dis turbances. In positing an entirely transparent consciousness , the intellectu alists are forced to red uce erro r and illness to mere appearance. Such an intellectu alist approach distorts even intellectual activity itself as it is found in th e no rmal subject. Intellectualism cons iders thi nking to be prim arily a categorial ope ration ; but ' living thou gh t' in normal perso ns does no t cons ist in performing purely logical operations . On the contrary, the need to engage explicitly in such operatio ns is precisely what di stinguish es im paired th ought like th at of Schneide r from norm al th inking. Healthy person s are obj ect-ori entated bo dy-subjects wh o have an alread y acquired 'world of thou ghts ' at their disposal and can use

44

46

r

,..

Part I: The Body

this acq uis ition sp ontan eously in or de r to express someth ing new in the course of a conversa tion, without needing to re-synthesi ze con cept s and judgem ents contin ua lly. Unlike Schneider, normal person s do not perceive almos t-amo rp ho us pa tches to which they then lab oriously assi gn sign ifica nces through an act of th e understandin g. Rath er, th ey discover a sig n ificance which permeates the object and th ey eng age in an ong oing 'su bject-object di alogue'. Schne ider can arrive at intellectual sig nificances by his painst akin g analyses, but he lacks th at 'prim ary [significan ce] reached through coexis tence'. Hen ce, despite the fact that he possesses th oughts and words, h e can no t us e th ese freely to arrive at reli gi ous or political opi nions; nor can he speak extempora neously. He is totall y caught u p in the prese n t, and canno t con sid er hi s past as a wh ole nor envisage his future as an ything more than a 's h ru nken' extension of the present. Thus it is the entire ' intentional arc' which ha s gone limp in Schne ider. This intentional arc is nei the r that reflex arc posited by mech an istic physiology nor tha t pure pow er of rep resentation invoked by intellectualist psychology. It is an ter io r to th e traditional di stinctions, being inseparabl y vision, comp rehension and motion . lt is the liv in g body wh ich at thi s primordial level projects, apprehends and understands sign ifica nces; and it does so in th at fundamental diale ctic between bod y-subject and wo rld of wh ich Merl eau -Ponty sp oke in th e ' Preface'. At the dawn of percep tion in ea rlies t infa ncy the living bod y, which is an ano ny mo us sy n thesis of sens ori-motor powers, outlin es those 'inde terminate horizon s' which sig nal the eme rge nce of a world for us. As fundam ental project our body ha s a temporal struc ture enabling it to carry th is prim itive acquisition of horizon s along, so that a more de terminate world of objec ts can begin to exist. The intellectua lis t analysis completely misses the being of thi s living bod y by insisti ng on an 'a ll or nothing' app roach . If sign ifican ce is ent irely on the si de of conscio usness con ceived as 'Mind ', then th e bod y can be no more than essentially mean ingless matter. Disorder s of the so rt di scussed ab ove be com e in compreh en sible since conscious ness doe s not admit of degrees. Consciou sness eith er categorizes data - in which case th e per son is healthy - or it ceases to exist altogether ; patients becom e mechanistic objects. The intellectualist in terpretatio n of human exis tence (as an activity of pure thought so me how in formin g a bodil y mechanism ) must th er efore be rejected.

The Spatiality of the Body Itself and Motility

47

Th e rej ection of em pi ricism on th e one hand and intellectualis m on the other, docs not of course di ctate an un critical ad herence to common sense . The world is no t ready -made as common sense su pposes it to be; rat her it is 'bu ilt u p', and the d ialect ical movement wh ereby it takes sha pe can no t be broken apa rt into so ma ny self- contain ed fragm ents. Th e consideration of hab its reveals this es peci ally w ell. As Merlea t1cPonty points out , to learn to tyP.~P.!?y a.~ir.:s!ruIn".~t, t~ be.~ome accu.s.to_Ill!~.t.o~~£hicle or a cane "or...a Je~ th ered _l)at, -:is..t.9_be tra!,spla-n..t!,d ,.in to_ !hem, or .c~y.jlLincorp.QrateJbmLi_n.\.oJh.eJ>t'.IIsPl.!he bodyitself'." Acquiring .suc!:l.h abits .Isncither .a matter of intellectual .an alysis and reconstruction nor a.mechanical recording of impression s, as the_adi!,-sl!U.e!!t .ioJ;iL~nfamilia~. car or key board makes eviden t. It is a question, ,rather, of th.~ bodily comprehensio n of a motor significance",wh ich . enables me .to lend myself completely. to expressing th ' .'.Imsic w ith out having to th ink about th e positio n of iny fi~ger~, or. to. man oeuvre . m y car successfully through ,,' na rrow stree t without having to com pare th e width of my veh icle with that of the d riving lan e. Merleau-I'onty's exist ential analysis ~ q 9 f habits thus draws our atte ntion to a new meaning of both V 'knowled ge' and ' meaning' which eludes th e traditional app roaches. ~.~ily kn.?,,:l".~g,,-and bo d ily significan~e which become evide nt in the study of h ab its re veal' th at 'th e bod y is esse ntiallY.~n__~ie·~sive .sp'a~e '. in virtue of which particular expressive sp~ces (such as those of the pian o which I h aY.£.leamed to play and th e typewriter wh ich I ha ve mastered) can come into exis tence and be in~~rporated into it. BodilY,spatialit y, inherentl y dynamic, is the very cond it ion for the comi';g Into being-o f a mea ningful world . Thus it su bten ds ou r entire existen ce as human bei ngs. ..- ... --- -

c:.;v

taO oJ J

• I have altered Colin Smith 's translation in accordance w ith the French text.

The Sy nthesis of the Body Itself . . .

4 The Synthesis of the Body Itself* and

5

:;! ;iii

",.,

.-

The Body in its Sexual Being

'''.

1" ,

1"\:; In

itself '.

me previous cn apter,

1

have translated 'le corps propre ' as -'the body

48

49

a to-and-fro mov em ent of an as-yet anonym ou s existence which is . the living body and which comes into bein g as a bod y only in th is very movement. Thus the living body is first of all an orga nic unity of sens ibilities wh ich already point beyond th em selves in so far as the y imply that whi ch can be sensed and are alrea d y drawn towards it. Merleau-Ponty speaks of a 'fo rce', ' momentum' or ' mo tivation' here. Th e bod y, as synthetic unity of se nsory pow ers , solicits that which can be sensed and is itself attracted by the sens ible as that in which these sensory powers are actua lized. Bodil y existen ce is th us already primordial transcendence tow ards some thi ng ; and it implies both spatiality and temporality. As primitive project, bodily existence is precis ely th at movem ent which lays down spatio-temporal axes with referen ce to which pa rticular se ns ibles are ori ented. Bodily spa tiality is not an acq uired characteris tic but rather, the very 'way in w hich the body comes into bein g as a body'. Existence is never utterly blind; th ere is alwa ys already an amo rphous pre-p ersonal awa reness of thi s prim ordial mov ement of the bo dy towards th e world. The body expe riences itself to the exten t that it perceiv es so methi ng else; and thi s ano nymo us self-reference . is wh at makes possible th e more explicit selfreferen ce of specifically personal existence. The lived bod y is a sys tem of eq uivalences . This means that its part s - or powersare not externa lly but rather internally related through mutual implication. They do not mechanically trigger each o the r off, nor are th ey coordina ted in some intellectual fashi on. Each power is a pow er only in virtue of its position in th e bodil y sche ma; thus each pow er is alrea dy inheren tly related to all th e others. The actualiza tio n of anyone power implies an y of a vari ety of ways in whic h the others can re-group them selv es accordingly. Th e unity of the bod y inv olves an ' implicatory struc ture' in which pow ers can spo ntaneously compensate for - th ou gh not entire ly replaceeach other if the need ari ses. If my gaze is attrac ted by a vase on my desk , for example, the way in which my eyes mov e in exam in ing it already indicates the manner in w hich my fingers can explore it; moreover, th e former solici ts the latt er. If my fingers resp ond to thi s so licitatio n, the rest of my bod y spo n taneous ly re-a rranges itself aro und th is new task - for example, my tor so moves forw ard and my right arm straigh tens out as it reaches across the desk. Alternatively, if my arm is br oken and in a plaster cast, my left arm can do th e reaching; or I can stand up, walk

50

J iH: ":I;

~

I

.'''' P' ,

Part I: The Body

aroun d to the other side of my desk , reach down and pick the vase up. A description of suc h actions , or of habitu al ones like pickin g up a pen to write, elucidates the general synthesis of the bod y. Ne vertheless, such a descrip tion in de alin g with o ur cus tomary world fails to illuminate th at 'primary process of sig nification' wh ereby th e world comes into being for us . Any descrip tion of th e bo dy 's relationship to th ings in the world tends to pr esent those things as already constit uted , as existing in them selves in dep endentl y of an y bodily tran scenden ce. Thus the relatio nship betw een bodily transcenden ce and the thing is all too eas ily red uced aga in to an epistemo logica l problem - namely, th at of det erm ining how th e human su bject know s an already constitu ted object. Min d and bod y, su bject and wo rld, cons eq u en tly fall ap art into the tradition al du alism s. We mu st th erefore ask ou rselves whethe r the re is any area of OU T experience in which we can recapture that funda mental dialectic wh ereb y something begins to exis t for us, beg ins to have meaning for us to th e exten t that ou r bod y is a pow er of tran scenden ce towards it. At thi s primitive level th ere is a primordial flow of exis tence in which something becom es significant to the extent that it attrac ts our body in a movem ent tow ard s it, and our bod y com es into existence as a body in th is very movem ent, so that th e significance of the th ing an d th at of th e bod y come in to existence together and imply one ano ther . The bod y shows us thi s fund am en tal d ialectic most ade qua tely if we cons ider it in its sex ual be ing. It is a commonplace that a bein g who attracts us, who has for us a sex ual significance, may not have such a Significa nce for someone else. Consequ entl y w e are less tempted to consid er the significance here as being already cons titu ted, as belonging to th at being in the manner in which hair belon gs to the bod y. We will see here that the sexual sig nifica nce of that bein g comes into existence for us and by us, rather than ex nihilo; but it does so only insofar as it is already o utline d th ere in th at being. The being wh o allrac ts us is a pow er of projection appealing to o ur incarnate subjectivity. In sexuality we are therefore be st able to appreciate that sig nificance is neither so mething given, or in ert, in the manner of a tradition al sense-datum, nor something simply con. ceived and imposed by a pur e cons cious n ess. Sexual significance is created in a livin g di alogu e in which my body begin s to exis t for me in a new way in respondin g to ano ther incarnate subjectivity. An y causa l account of sexuality distor ts the ph enom en on. To the exten t tha t a being appeals or beckons to me , th at being canno t be

The Synt hesis of the Body ltselj . . .

51

utterly inert; and to the extent th at I feel myself dra wn towards th at bein g, I cannot be a pure conscious ness. Th e in ves tigation of hu man sex uality will therefore bring to light the bod y as neither passivity nor activity but a th ird sort of bein g, by and for w hom a th ird so rt of significance comes to exist. We will then be in a better position to un de rstand human relati on sh ip s in gen eral and, by extension, the life of society and th e meaning of hi sto ry as it ceaseless ly comes into being by and for human beings. In focu sing on the body in its sexual being we sha ll not lose wha t has already been gained up to this point - namely, the synthe sis of th e body, its implicatory stru cture . Quit e the con trary will be the case, for in sexua lity the 'gearin g' of tactile, visua l an d moto r powers into on e ano the r eme rges more clea rly than before. As usu al, Merleau -Pon ty p roceed s by an examinat ion of the breakdown of th e body's sexual bein g, in or der th at th e normal bod y's sexual being might be thrown into relief for us. Our subject again is Schneider, whose troubles ultimately arise from an injury at th e back of his head. If we ad opt a mechanisti c-physiological view of sex uality and conc eiv e it as an autonomous reflex apparatus - a ma iler of th e st imu lation and response of a sex orga n anatomically de fined - it is difficult to accoun t for th e breakdo w n of sexuality in Schn eider. Sin ce hi s genit als are intact, it is ha rd to see why a head injury sho uld inhibit se xual activity. As Merlea uPonty notes, one would in fact expect th e oppos ite - heighten ed sex ual activity - to occur insofar as any intellectual cons traints have become inoper ative. O n the othe r ha nd, if on e ado pts a more sop histicated mechanisti c-ph ysiological view , on e mi ght argue that sexua lity is not a mailer of an autono mous reflex appa ratus , but rather in volves a more complicated circuit going to th e brain and havin g someth ing to do wi th the back of the skull. However, on th is account one would expect all forms of sexual activ ity to break down completely in Schnei de r. It thus be comes d ifficult to account for such phen om en a as nocturnal emiss ions or to und erstand how Schneider can still take part in intercourse and eve n ach ieve orga sm, provided that his par tner takes all the initiat ive. A purely phy siological account could only explain eithe r a heigh tening of sexual activity or a complete cess ation of such activity. It is at a loss to accoun t for a fund amental cha nge in th e very struc tu re of erotic ex perie nce, such as we find in Schne ider's case . If we therefore ad opt the intellectualist rather th an th e physiologica l view of human sexuality and emphas ize the role of representations, we find ourse lves no more capable of un derstanding iii

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Part I: The Body

The Syn thesis of the Body Itself . . .

Schnei der's cond ition . We ma y argu e, for exa mple, th at sexua lity is primarily a mailer of associating psychological or emo tional states like pleasure and pa in, with certain id eas or repr esentations, su ch that the latt er can call up the form er. An id ea or mental image of an erotic objec t or situati on would then brin g into exis tence the ero tic pleasure with which - it ha s formerly been associated. However, apa rt from accounting for th e phen om en on of association itself, thi s int ellectu alist approach run s into difficulty as soo n as it tri es to argue th at what Sch nei der ha s lost is a cer tain collectio n of im ages or representations roug hly lab elled 'sexua l'. Th e probl em here is th at we can present Schneider with wh at he has su p posedly lost- we can show him obscene pic tures or nude bodies; we can present him with erotic film s; we can pr esent him with 'sexua l' ideas by talking to him ab out sexua lity - but non e of thi s has the power to aro us e sexua l desire in him. Th e fact is that Schne ide r for exa mple still sees a nude wom an and still feels th e tou ch of her lips as she kisses him; but what he sees an d feels no longer has the same meaning for him - it lacks a sexua l significance . The fema le body no longer attracts him; he no lon ger ap prehe nds it as an ap pe al. This happen s precisely to the extent that Sch ne ider's own bodily being ha s ceased to be an active tran scenden ce. For Sch ne ide r, fem ale bodies are indistinguish abl e physically; and to th e extent that he cons iders a wom an attractive , -it is"n:,erely a mail er of her ch aracter. This in d icates to us that no rma l hu ~~.n_sexl§lity involves a phy~~aJ. al.l ra wh ich makes it irr educibl eto .a n i ntellectu~~ignifi9illce . For healthy pers ons. all ' bodies do not have th e same significan ce, despite the fact that they all hav e roughly the same physiological features. Sexua l sig nifi- . cance must th erefore be inseparable from , but irr educibleto, the phys icalit y of the h uman bogy. For norm al per son s, that bod y is sub tende d by a strictly in divid ual 'sexua l sche ma'. In so far as sexua l sig nificance is not a given d atum for a d isembod ied consciousness, its apprehe nsion requ ires that we not rest in the actua l, in the already cons tituted realm of th ings, but that we active ly project ' o urse lves - in ou r bodily being - beyond th e given in orde r to endo w it with significance . As we have seen, Schne ide r ha s lost thi s ab ility to use hi s bo dy freely to project aro und himself a situa tio n into whic h he can th row hi mself. Si nce he 'can no lon ger put him self into a sex ual situa tio n', he canno t apprehe nd such a situatio n either, beca use tran scend en ce and app rehens ion are inseparable mo ments of a fundamen tal di alectic.

We are now in a position to understand what Merleau -Ponty mean s when he says that the body is com£!lIabl.e,t()..!'_'Yor~_'?f..!'..':!­ beca use expression .and what is expressed are indis!in gui sh abl e in both cases. The sexua l si gn ificance of th e body is a certain style of booBy existence and is irred ucible to any intellectu al concep tio n. \ In an ana logo us fashion , Significance perv ad es a painting or ./ mu sical com position and comes into being for us if we use our eyes or ear s respectively in such a wa y that the colours or notes ass ume th eir unique style. Similarly, th e sexual sig nificance of ano the r body comes into being for us only inso far as we use our sens ibilities in such a w ay that that body's features ass ume for us a certain sexua l style. The ap prehension of sexua l significa nce thus requ ires an active transcend ence in which the various sensi bilities of the bod y-subject participate; hence it mi ght be objec ted that Merleau -Pont y's account makes sexual significance syn on ~ with existential sig nificance in general, and absorbs sexuali!y' into eXIstence. Yet as Merl eau-Ponty himself not es, impaired sexua lity does not rul e ou t an effective political life for example, nor does technical vi rtu osity in sex necessarily imply any part icular perfection or vigour in o the r area s of one's life. S ~ty is not reducib)e to existe nce, nor exis tence reduc~~exua1ity . Existence is a moregeneral cu rren~C whi ch structures itself in variou s ways, and ' thesexua l life is a sec tor of our life bearing a special relation to the exis tence of sex'. As we have seen, th ere can be no questi on of reduc ing sexuali ty to th e genital or rele!>atiDg.JLto a psyche understood as pu re _consc iousness or Sp..!.'i!. Ind eed, Merleau -.,,-") Ponty's ph enomenoli;gi cal-description oT the body has shown us ! th e need to repl ace such concep~ions as th e ' pure.'- )' bodily' an d [ ' ' purel}'.P5 ch!.S w it h the notion of an inca rna te su bjectivity in \ who m all sec tors of expe rience ' interfus e' in such a way that each I rem ain s di stinctive while non e is en tirely isolable. Th e tradi tional \ noti on of the uncon scious has no place here; incarnate exis tence is not a mail er of 'd istinct representations' su p ported and explai ne d by ' unco nsc io us repfesentatio~fhe bod y is the expressio n of exis tence , but this does not mean that the former is a mere accompani me nt to the latt er, or that either is ' the origi na l of the human bein g'. Each pr esupposes the other in that primary process whe re by meaning comes into being and an orig ina l style emerges. As a form of thi s primary process, sexuality is a pa rticular d ialectic exp!~~g ._exis tence . Merleau-Ponty bases himself on S,i iffe's' di scu ssion of bein g-for-others in Being and Nothingness to

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dr aw our att enti on to th e nature of thi s dialectic and its metaphysical sign ificance. In th e experience of sha me as Sartre shows, we are uncomfortabl y awa re that ano the r person ha s reduced us to the status of an object by hi s look. Th e fact that we have a body makes such o bjec tification an ever present possibility on the one hand and, on th e othe r, ena bles us to brea k free and reassert our subjectivity by su bmitti ng th e other person to a similarly aliena ting gaze. But as Hegel noted, th is master- slave dialectic is inherently self-su bve rti ng in so far as only ano ther su bject can accord us the kind of recog nitio n we seek. Sexua l desire di splays the same di alectic to th e exten t th at we use our body to fascinate the other, only to discover that wh at we desire eludes us. We want to possess ' n.ot just a bod y, but a body brou ght to life by conscio usnes~:; ye t the e HOrtto ga in posses51on strips the o the r of that very conscio us ness in reducin g him to the status of a thing to be gras ped. Sexual life thu s brings to light the fundam ental ambi gu ity of th e human bod y and exp resses those as pec ts of freedom and dependen ce whic h cha racteiiz.e..human existence in gen..':!"J. Exist en ce can' absor b itself to a grea ter or lesser degree in thebody, as shown by Merleau -Ponty's example of th e pati ent wh o lost her voi ce when forbidden to see her lover, or as sho wn in attempts to mak e oneself into a fasci na ti ng object in order to en tice and ens nare the othe r's freedom . How ever, th e body can never shut its elf off from the world altogethe r, or becom e completely reduced ,1,0 an object. As a sy nthesis of po wers the bod y is always already to \ Some exten.L!'.~l}s~."nde!!,c e, a pE!iect in which existence, body j and world are inseEarable. Th e bod y is a bo dy ins tea d o!a \'Orpse l OnlybeCa~se' e~;S'ten cc anima tes it and conve rsely, exis tence must incarnate itse lf and in 50 doi ng it already brin gs about an incarnate meaning. Incarnate existence is cha racterize d by an inherent ambigu ity, a bas ic indeterm in acy, becau se it is a contin ually compo sed synthesis of powers, 'a nexus of livin g [significan ces]' . Th e bo d ily project always in volves the com ing in to being of meanings which canno t be sepa rated o ut beca use they are mutually implicato ry an d already point beyo nd the mselves. The ambiguity and indeterminacy of in carnate exis tence is especially evide nt in sexuality wh ere, as we have seen, an inhe rent ins tabi lity characterize s our experience of the body as bo th a subjec t for us and an object for someone else. Sexual sig n ificance man ifests itself in th e whole manner of th e bod y-subj ect - in the bearing, th e gesture s, the movement s, the voice - and the interfusion of vis ua l, motor,

The Synthesis of the Body Itself . . .

55

aud ito ry, and tactile aspects is si ng ularly evident in its coming int o bein g. Yet for the most pa rt, that sig nifica nce is not clear-cut but rathe r exists as 'a n ambiguo us atmos phe re' which lends itself to a va rie ty of sign ifica nces in that d yn amic co-exis tence which is the ve ry fabric of hum an life. As we have seen , the apprehe ns ion of a sexua l significance presupposes th e ability to put ourse lves into a sit ua tion ; this funda me ntal pow er simultaneous ly enables us to take up and tran sform a de facto situation, so th at 'w hat had only a sexua l meaning assumes a mo re ge neral sig nifica nce'." However, as transcend ence, incarnate existence never outs trips that which it tran scend s; neithe r is it ever red ucibl e to th at which is transcended . In either case , tran scenden ce wo uld cease to be transcendenc e - bu t si nce exis tence is tran scen den ce, thi s would in fact spell dea th. It is in thi s sense that Merleau -Ponty contends that ' no one is saved and no one is totally lost '. Becausewe ar e boay:sub jects, we can-neitliei leave beh ind our bodily bein g nor d iscard our subjectiv ity . Furth ermor e, bodily being is not a purely factu al ph ysicality, and subjectivity is not a purely translucent conscious ness. We are not an un easy alliance of matter and mind, but a third kind of bein g. Salvation would mean a d efinitive escape from ambi gu ity; ye t in so far as our exis tence is di alectical, ambiguity is of its essence. Damnat ion, on th e othe r hand, wo uld in volve th e permanent sealing of our exis tence into one definitive sig nificance. This too is rul ed out in so far as op enness is part and parcel of tran scenden ce; as movem ent beyond, transcendenc e is incom patible with reduction to any given X, It is alway s an act in volving relati on and incorp orati on - thus a conti nual transfor mation of the given . In shor t, th e ap pre he ns ion of any significance wh atsoever presupposes ex istence as transcen denc e, and tran scend en ce always already tran sforms everyth ing with which it is present ed - precisely becau se it takes it up an d ass igns it a place in the gene ral di alectic of exis tence . Mor eover, as the phenom en ological account of th e body in its sexual being has shown, tran scenden ce is not a solitary project. Human existence is essentially co-existence ; there is a web o f interacting tran scenden ces eliciting , apprehending and carrying forward multi-faceted meanings in all dimen sion s. Now th at we have cons idered sex uality as an express ion of existence , we mu st examin e expression itself more closely. I have altered Colin Smith's translation to bring it into line wit h the orig inal text.

>I-

The Body as Expression and Speech

6 The Body as Expression and Speech If we exam ine our pre-reflective lived experience, so Merleau!!!~ ~

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Ponty has arg ued, We realize that our bo dy is no t a sys tem of externally related par ts but rather, that it d isplays a spo ntaneou s synthesis of pow ers, a bodil y spa tia lity, a bodil y unity, a bodily intention ality, wh ich di stingu ish it radically from th e scie n tific object posit ed by trad itio nal schools of thou ght. In the last chap ter Merleau- Ponty describ ed how the ap prehe nsio n of sexual sig nificance rev eals a pre-r eflective bodily int en tion alit y such that something begins to exis t for us precisely to the exten t that the body is a power of transcenden ce towa rds it. One might still contend , non eth eless, that thi s talk of a bodily intention ality is really no more th an a metaph or based on a genuine in ten tiona lity which is to be found exclusively in th e rea lm of thou ght. O ne wo uld insist that after all We should turn our atten tion to th e fact tha t we are thinking abo ut our lived experience. We will see then, so one might arg ue, that th ere is a rea lm of subjec tivity q uite di stinct from that of our bodily experience, and th at this rea lm of thought, or conscio us ness , or reflection is the realm of significance and intention ality in th eir proper se nse. The domain of su bjectivity will thus be de clared to be q uite d ist in ct from that ot her realm of the bod y, or objec tivity. We th ereb y return to the tradi tion al idea of an ' inner life' conti nge n tly lin ked to th e bod y - in sho rt, to the old mind-bod y or su bject-object dualism . Merleau- Ponty mu st therefore sho w that the realm of thou ght is 'of a pi ece' with the pre-reflective experience of the bod y. O therw ise, his phen om enological descrip tions up to th is point might be tak en' to indicate merely that there is no body-world dich otomy , bu t not that the tradition al distinction between min d an d bod y is inappropriate. The bod y would th en take up its tradition al position am on g things in th e world and th ou ght would once more becom e the proper realm of philosophical in vestigation. To rule thi s out, Merleau56

57

Ponty must be able to point to an interna l, or essen t ial,1el~tion~ ship between thou ght and the bo~ . It is usually conce ded that there is such an essen tia l .~el a tio~l1i r between hearing and the eard rums, or between speaking and the vocal cho rds, and th at th~ikewise plays a cruc:!~ rart in . such communication . Most of us thus have no d ifficult y in granting that hearing and speaking have to do with th e body. The problem comes wh en ~cp ns i d er the relati on sh ip betw eeil' thought and.J habocty, becau se we usuall y ass ume the existence of an ' inner life', or rea lm of pure tho ught, and con~iger th e connec· tion of thiS with wh at is spo ken or heard to be one of translation or interpretation. In sho rt, most of us tend to th in k th at to speak is to translate our thou ghts into words, wh ile to hear is to interpret th e words of anothe r so as to arrive at an unde rstandi ng of th e thoughts lying beh ind them. We allegedly attemp t to 'figure out' what others 'have in min d' by in ference based on the words which we hear them say. It is evidenttha t thi s sor t of.pos itio n .res ts on a fundamental mind -bod~~m . !t thus calls for a reexam in~!ion ; and since sp",aking j m d , hea ring incontestabl y involve language, it is lan guage itself whichMerleau-Ponty mu st recon sid er in th e present chapter. Th e in adequ acy of tradition al approaches once aga in eme rge s most clearly throu gh th e study of I'a tho logica l cases. Psychologist s initially arg ue d th at ,amnesia in volved the loss of ph ysi cal or psychi c ' traces' of words imprinted on the bra in or psyche in the course of lingu isti c experience. Possessing suc h 'verbal im ages' constituted possessing lan gu age; and ar ticulatio n wa s produced automa tically by a purely ph ysical stimulus-res po nse circuit which revived the ve rbal image, or th rough acq uired me ntal asso ciati on s. Both view s redu ced speec h to a th ird person phe no menon consisting of a stream of wo rds whic h we re them selves bereft of meanin g o r pow er. Such mech an istic th eories faile d to account for the fact th at patients who readily produced the requisit e word s in the con text of 'concrete lan gu age' , failed to find those same words in 'gratuitous language' when confronted with exercises lackin g emo tiona l or vital im port. Most cases of aphasia proved to be inexplica ble in term s of th e loss of verbal images; rather, th e decisive factor seemed to be th e fun ction of th e wordswhe the r they served as instru me nts of actio n or were called upon simply for di sinterest ed specification . Psychologists fur the r di scovered that patients who could no t ptod uce the nam es of colours

Part I: The Body

The Body as Expression and Speech

with which they were confronted, likewise were ,!nabk1os~ the colours when requested to sort samples. The problem thus seemed to lie in a disorder of th inking which restrict ed these patients to 'the cQncreJe_aHitud7 -=-;;;;;king it virtually i~rc;~sible for·· them-to · tr~nscend th ':- individual sensory given, so ~s to recognize it as subsumable under a category and to name it accordingly. This disturbance of thought could not itself be explained as resulting from a loss of verbal images; therefore it seemed that language must depend upon thought; accordingly, psychologists constructed intellectualist the"r.",_ollangaag-e,md sought to explain the divers cases ,of a~.ia as resulting from a breakdown of the categorial operation- Words became merely the external tra~~ of an internalthinking: once again, the words the1i1Selves had no meaning or power. Language was simply a contingent container into which the thinking subject poured thought and it was thought which had the meaning. Everything rested on the categorial activity of thinking; articulation remained an involuntary action - the product of a physiological or psychic mechanism. In th e intellectualists' view, as in the case of the empiricist psychologies, there was no speaking subject. Language was now only the accompaniment of a purely cognitive operation which it presupposed and which was essentially self-sufficient. However, whereas empiricism had been perplexed by patients' inability to find in gratuitous language words available to them in concrete situations, intellectualism was bewildered by cases in which patients were unable to categorize colour samples while nonetheless able to name the colours. Merleau-Ponty goes beyond the empiricist and the intellectualist theories by declaring that' the word has a meaning'; in place of the traditional positions, he outlines a phenomenological approach and develops what he calls 'an existentialist theory of aphasia'. Despite its appearance to the contrary, intellectualism was no more satisfactory than was empiricism in accounting for various forms of aphasia; moreover, neither approach provided a theory of language which was true to our actual experience. Merleau-Ponty points out that thought does not itself suffice for recognizing things; nor does speech presuppose thinking. In fact, there can be no pure thought prior to speech. Lacking all supports, such thought would vanish instantly and we could never be aware of it. OUf experience shows us that even familiar objects appear indeterminate until we remember their names; consequently, naming is recognition. In our actual denomination of objects, we

do not have in mind a concept under which we would subsume them; instead, the names themselves bear the meaning and we are aware of reaching the objects in imposing their names. We ourselves do not know our own thoughts until we formulate them in 'internal or external speech'; hence, it is evident that speaking accomplishes thought rather than merely translating an already accomplished thought. Authentic speech is the presence of thought in the world - not its garment, but its body. Communication with others would be impossible if authentic expression were not identical with thinking; unless the listener can learn something from the speaker's words themselves, communication becomes an illusion. Yet our own experience belies the view that others' words are merely mechanisms for arousing thoughts which we ourselves possess all along. It is true, of course, that cO~J.!luf!icati9.!!_pr~~!Jp--p_o.s.es-_a shared language; but such a language must itself have come into exfstence at some time - it is not a natural endowment. If we are to avoid an infinite regress - which would make the actual existence of a common language incomprehensible - we must acknowledge that originating speech possesses an immanent 'gestural [significance]'. To bring this significance to light, Merleau-Ponty draws our attention to the experience of saying and thinking, or hearing, something new. The speaker does not precede or accompany his speech by thought; he neither visualizes his words nor conceptualizes their meaning. He simply uses a common language in such a way that a new significance comes into being as he speaks. His speech is not a sign of some internal operation; rather, it is his thought. Likewise, the listener neither decodes signs nor conceptualizes what he hears; he understands the other's new significance as it emerges and unfolds. There is no thinking paralleling or following his listening; his listening is his thinking. Speaker and listener are subjects inhabiting a shared linguistic world; and just as they have no need to visualize either their limbs or external space in moving around in the natural world, so they have no need in communication to visualize the words located in their linguistic world. In both cases they are situated in a world and their activity realizes a potential use of their body. The consideration of authentic speech thus alerts us to the existen tial significance which underlies the conceptual significance of language. This existential significance permeates the words themselves and is imparted by them, just as the musical significance of a concerto inhabits the sounds which bring that significance into

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ParI 1: The Body

The Body as Expression and Speech

being for the concert goer. Despite the fact that speech is uniquely capable of constituting 'a n acq uis itio n for use in human relati on ships', it is just as erroneou s to regard thought as divorceabl e from its express ion in speech, as to regard music as detachable from its expression in sounds. Spe ech is no more an envelope or 'outer covering' of thought than are th e note s of the music or the marks made by the brush on th e canvas merely external accessories of the con certo or the landscape pa inting respectively. In speech, as in mu sic or painting, it is success ful express ion which brings a new significance into being and ope ns up new possibiliti es for our experience. Our usual tenden cy to regard speech as incidental to an auton omous thought, arises from our failure to distinguish ad equat ely between ori ginating speec h and 's econd order' lan guage. That which we commonly consi der silence or ' pure thought' is in fact replete with words. The so-called 'sile nt inner life' is actually a monologue in which we formulate our thoughts by emp loying the already cons tit uted significances created by form er acts of expression - wheth er our own or those of others. Unlike first o rde r expression, our eve ryda y speech remains within the circu it of acquired sig nificances; it does not elicit any new thoughts, but merely reinforces th e already existing on es . Second orde r sp eech thus conc eals from us the phenomen on of authe n tic expressio n by giving us th e illusion that we po ssess thoughts wh ich do not depend on any words whatsoever. If we are to appreciat e the nature of originating speech, we mu st go beyond the realm of constituted spe ech and becom e 'aware of that inchoa te primordial silence from which th e latter once arose. Merleau-Pon ry insists th at the 's po ken word is a genu ine ges ture, and [th at] it contains its meaning in the same way as the ges ture con tains its'. Modern psychologists have sh own that contrary to what had been thought, the understanding of gestures do cs not in fact require any introspection. Moreover, such intro spection would fail to furnish an associati on between the alleged inner states and their outward manifestations, because the lalter elude the actor. Besides, our experie nce reveals that we do not apprehend gestures as signs of psychic facts. For example, gestures do not for th e viewer rep resent concea led emotions; th ey are those emo tions . The fist sh aken under my nose does not prompt me to think of anger; it is the an ger and I immediately apprehe nd it as such. Thi s is not to say, how ever, that we perceive th e meaning of gestures as we perceive colo ur qualities, since we fail to und er-

stand th e ges tures of animals or even of people belonging to a very diffe rent culture. The meaning of ges tures is underst ood , rath er than bein g given like a physical ph en om enon. Communicati on and compreh ension of a ges ture are achieved through the es tablis hing of a reciprocity betwe en the othe r' s intention and my own . Neither his inte9tion nor min e is th ematized; in both cases it 'inhabit s' our body.Our interaction involves neither a mech anical pr ocess nor an intellectual ope ration, but a pre-reflective act of struc tur ing the world on the pa rt of one body-subject and a correspo nd ing pre-reflectiv e act of recapturing the mean ing of that stru cturation on the part of the other incarn ate subjes:t:'What we hav e here is a pre-reflective di alogu e involving an /invitation to conc ur with a certain wa y of perceiving th e world, and a respon se to that invitation by an adjus ting of the body's pow ers so as to overlap the intentional ob ject outlined by the other's gesture . In the case of o rig inatin g sp eech, the list en er's compreh en sion thus inv olves a modulation of hi s own being in respon se to th e speaker's 'se ns e-giving int ention ' ['I'intention si gnifi cative']. Ne ithe r one knows just where the speech will lead, since what is bei ng crea ted and communicat ed is precisely not a read y-mad e con ten t. The speaker feels the need to speak without kn ow ing exactly wh at he will say , and th e listen er takes up this intention by adjus ting hi s own being to th e spea ker's style of being-in-th eworld. Expression and compreh en sion are achieved throu gh th e body first and foremost; any intellectu al clarification comes later. Communica tion thus understood is no more mysterious than is th e perception of objects, for in both cases we experience a ' bo d ily presence ' which is pr ior to any scienti fic conception of the event. Merleau -Ponty acknowled ges that, given the plethora of exis ting lan gu ages, the connection between the word and its signif icance see ms purely arbitrary. Trad itiona lly, speech has th erefore been di st inguished from ges ture by desi gnating the former ' a conve ntio nal sign ' and the latt er ' a natu ral Sign' . How eve r, if we go beyond the conceptual to the emo tio nal - or gestural - meaning of word s, we discover that they too possess an imman ent sig nificance . In poetry we sec most rea dily that the words th emselves express th e emotional essence of th at which they design ate. Different lan gu ages express different ways of being-in-the-world ; hen ce the nuances - ' the full meaning' - of on e cannot be rendered by an oth er, as translators kno w only too well. The meaning is inseparable from the particular lan guage; this is not , how ever, to

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ParI 1: The Body

The Body as Expression and Speech

ado p t th e opposite extrem e of th e tradition al con cep tion o f language by d eclaring it to be a system of natural sign s ins tea d of mer e con ven tio n . In fact, it is neither for th e si mple rea son th at both conce p tio ns mi ss th e essence of th e human world . Th e d awn of langu age lies in emotiona l ges ticu latio n; but th e latter - con trary to popular belief - is itself not 'na tu ral' in the sense of being give n with th e struc tu re of th e hu man bod y itself. As Merleau-Ponty points out, a com parison of a Japan ese with an Occiden tal shows th at ' it is no more natu ral, an d no less conv en tio na l, to sho u t in anger or to kiss in lov e th an to call a table " a tabl e" ', Ne it he r th ou ght nor emotion is di vorceabl e from the body; yet bo th are irreducible to its anatom ical makeu p. There is no transp arent, self-s u bs isten t thought tra ns lata ble into divers lan gu ages ; nor is th ere a pure emo tio n d isclosabl e b y id entical or differen t gestu res . Th ou ght and emotion arc mod es of being-in-the- world, and th e d ifferen ces between th e langu age and ges tures of one peo ple and th ose o f anothe r testify to th eir d ifferen t ways of perceiving stim uli and resp onding to situations. Thus ' the d ifference o f behavi ou r corre sponds to a di fferen ce in th e em oti on s th emselves', altho ug h any att em pt to se parate the one from the other is fundament ally wrongh ead ed . The biolog ical body does not come eq ui p ped with a ready-m ad e, immutabl e human nat ur e; th ere is no ' na tura l' behaviour su b tendi ng cultural 'conv en tio ns '. A fun damental am biguity di st inguish es h um an life from anima l life, such th at everything in the former is sim ultaneous ly ' natu ral' and 'cultural' - nothing is absolu tely indep endentof 'p u rely biological being' , yet everything transcends it. Like the sign ifican ce of othe r for ms of behaviour, th e significance of sp eech is both im ma ne n t and tran scendent - it is imman ent in the behaviour itself, but irred uci ble to the an atom ical apparatus as such. Like every thing else , speech is a way of liv in g one 's body in the world, and it too invo lves a simultaneo us mo d ulatio n of both. Our usual conce ption s of necessity and con tinge ncy are inadequate to cap tu re th e being of ve rbal gesticulat ion , just as they are ina p prop ria te for comp re he ndi ng the cha racter of sexual being. In bo th cases, it is a qu esti on of appropriating and transforming a giv en si tua tion by a kind of 'escape' which ensures our freed om - while precludin g its eve r bein g a bsolu te. Nothing in human exis tence is u tte rly fortuitou s or tot ally condition ed , and d espite th eir a ppearan ce to th e con trary, neither lin guist ic nor othe r gestu res cons titu te exceptions .

The phenom en ological ap proach thus reveals sp eech to be a pa rticu lar form of that fund am ental project which th e previou s cha p ters have already sho wn to d efine ou r very exis tence as human beings in the world. Th is primordial power of tran scen de nce in volve s th e apprehend ing of the crea ting and communicating of a m eaning which com es from nowhere and is irr educibl e to anyt hi ng else. The primacy o f th e lingu ist ic meaning has to do with its ab ility to becom e sedimen ted int o an intersubjecti ve acq uis itio n for fu ture u se in th e q uest for truth - a never-endin g ques t whose origi n lies in speech itself. Th e open -ended natu re of experience which the very not ion of tran scendence alrea dy impli es, is perhaps nowhere mo re evi de n t than in linguistic exp res sion - and d isorders affecting such exp ression mo st readil y b ring it to o ur atten tio n. The mod em theory o f a phasia , d eveloped by such psychologists as Grii n ba um an d Gold stein, confirms thi s ph en om en ological con ception of lan guage and overcomes th e problems enco u n tered by the empiricist and in tellectua list acco u n ts. Accor d ing to Merleau-Ponty, th ese mod ern psychologi st s are in fact attemptin g to formulate what he calls ' an existen tial th eory of ap hasia' in which external lan gu age and th ought are cons idered m an ifest ati on s of th e fundamental project describe d above. In aphasia th ese p he no me na lose th ei r exis tential sign ificance for the pati ent, th ereb y indica ting a b reakd own in th e basic activity of tran scendence it self. Earlier we saw th at pa tie n ts sufferi ng from am nesia rega rdi ng colour nam es are likew ise unabl e to classify colo ur sa mp les. Int ellectualism conside re d the di sturbance in cate gorial activity to signal a di sord er of th ought, which it deem ed primary . The exis ten tia l theory of ap hasia goes be yond thi s sort of explanation by basing itse lf o n th e mod ern psychologi sts' concrete d escription s of suc h cases. Th e latt er reveal th at the disorder has to do w ith th e very w ay in which the pat ients relate themselves to the wo rld and accordingly, wi th th e style or shape of th eir experie nce itself. This prompts us to recogn ize th at the categorial acti vity is not simply or primaril y a matter of th in kin g or judgin g. Prior to it s being a th ou ght or a form of cog nit ion, it is a way of situati ng oneself in th e world and conco mitantly, structuring one's experience. Whereas the normal su bjec ts' pe rception organizes itself in to fig u re-background struc tu res in keeping with th e req uired task, th e patients' perce pt ion re ma ins essen tially passive - with th e result that each item stays shu t up in its own indivi dual being. Co nsequen tly, for the latt er

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Part I: The Body

The Body as Expression and Speech

obj ectiv ely similar colou r samples need not appear to be similar at all; th e pati ents' gaze might be arres ted by th e degree of warmth in one sa mple and by the basic shade in anothe r. The patients' entire attitude tow ards the world differs from that of normal su bjects; unlike the latter, th e forme r fail to detect any int ention in th e perceptible world. As we have see n, th e loss of thi s pow er to apprehe nd an existen tial signific ance correspo nds to a breakdo wn , in the patients' pow er to crea te and comm un icate such sig nificance. The basic intention ality of the body itself has bogged down; and the di sturbances of speech and thou ght are not an ultimate fact but rather, are th em selves rooted in thi s princip al in erti a. The psychologists' stud ies di sclose that man y patients wh o are unable to classify colours are neverth eless abl e to repeat th e colour names and associ ate id eas. It therefore becom es evide nt that their difficulty in catego rizing colours is not du e to a loss of w ords or extrinsic connec tio ns of meaning but rather, that it has to do with a loss of that living meaning which norm ally inhabits words. Thus the real link between lan guage and thou ght becom es severed, leaving pati ents with colour nam es which no lon ger signify any thing for them . By contras t, normal subjects' catego rial behaviour and use of words point to a radically different manner of bein g-in-the-world. Unlike th e psycho logists' pa tients, they exp eri en ce a bodily intentionality whi ch ope ns th em to the perceptible world, ena bling th em to di scern it s sig nificance and to stru cture it according to present dem ands. Thi s pre-reflectiv e incarnate inten tionality furth er allows normal subjects to project themselves towards a world of ' the mind' or th e imagi nati on , and to participate actively in cultural life. Lan guage is in sep arable here from this ba sic activity of tran scenden ce, so th at their language is th eir ' taking up of a position' in thi s 'mental' or cult ural world. Merle au-Ponty stres ses th at just as for norm al subjects a pattern of th eir bodily beh aviour in vest s the surro undi ng objects with a particular sig nificance for them selves and o thers, so their ' phonetic "gesticulation" , - their speech - brin gs abo ut a certain intersubjectiv e co-o rdina ting of experience. Th e ana lysis of apha sia and th e norm al experience which it brings to light by contrast, mak e it clear that speech is not red ucibl e to either motility or intelligen ce. Inst ead it is both simultaneous ly, and is itself part of that fund am ent al pow er whereby norm al human beings transcend a de facto sit ua tion and project them selves tow ards othe r people.

As we have see n, lin gui sti c diso rders take a wh ole vari ety of forms , so me times affecting only a pa rticular aspect of lin guisti c expe rience (the vis ual o r the conceptua l or the verbal) but some tim es altering the struc ture of expe rience in its entirety. Yet no matter how specific or how gene ral th e d isturbance, it always tou ch es th e meaning of lan gu age and involves some so rt of cong ealing of exis tence, thus impairing or dest royin g the normal open ness of experi ence. In Schneide r's case thi s congelation manifests itself in all are as: he canno t th row him self into an imaginary orcreative si tuation, he cannot init iate sexual activity, he cannot u se lan gu age to describe a merely possible expe rience, he cannot becom e involved in di scussion s on religiou s or political topics, he cannot spea k unl ess he has pre pared his speech , and he never expe riences any need to speak. In sho rt, he is in cap able of an act of authe ntic expression - he canno t create any opening in being becau se hi s own expe rience totally lacks ope nness; for him, it is characterized by 'self-evide nce and self-sufficiency'. Th e striking contrast between the closed cha racter of Schne ider's expe rience and the essential ope nnes s of norm al expe rience, parallels the radi cal differen ce between the tradition al Cartesian conception of the bod y and soul on the one hand, and the phenomenological notion of incarnate su bjectivi ty on th e other. Indirectly draw in g to our atte ntion th e enig ma tic nature of the body it self, th e con sideratio n of speech and express ion ha s definitively undermined the old view of th e body as an agglome ration of self-encl osed particles or a network of thi rd person process es . Speech and mute ges ture s have ad mittedly always been recogni zed as tran sfiguring the bod y; yet such tran sfigurations w ere deemed to be a disclosin g of th e thou ght or soul, wh ich w as itself conside red to be es sentially incorporea l. Tho ug h so to spe ak shining throu gh th e bod y and illuminatin g it , mind or so ul w as not of th e body and was at best a temporary resident within it. As Merleau-Ponty points out how ever, speech or gesture could never express thou ght unl ess th e bod y itself were that thought rather th an its merely externa l indicato r. In the absence of any immanent meaning, th e bod y wo uld be utterly in cap abl e of projecting and communica ting meaning. The Cartesian tradition has tau ght us to juxtapose thou ght and bod y, and to pu rge them of all ambigu ity. We have thus lon g persu aded ourselves that we are composed of a tran sparent conscio us ness and a mech an ist ic object, bo th being entirely clear and self-e nclosed yet someho w extrinsically linked

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together. Nevertheless, we have seen that even Descartes himself was ultimately at a loss as to how to conceive the union of mind and body thus defined; moreover, he clearly recognized the tremendous disparity between his own dualistic thesis and his actual experience of the body. Religious belief prompted Descartes to ascribe primacy to the former rather than the latter, and to rest his case on a non-deceiving God. For Merleau-Ponty, such an uncritical approach is quite unacceptable. Instead, he urges us to bring our conception of thought and the body into line with our pre-reflective experience. If we tak e seriously the phenomenological rediscovery of the body itself, we will be forced to recognize a third kind of existence which the Cartesian analysis systematically excludes. As soon as we relinquish OUf stubborn adherence to the Cartesian id ea of the body and reconsider the lived body itself, we are compelled to acknowledge 'an ambiguous mode of existing' which overturns the traditional subject-object or mind-body catego ries. We must then discard the idea of causal connections among bodily functions on the one hand, and between the body and the 'external world' on the other. In place of such connections, we will be prompted to recognize fundamental relations of mutual implication having their roots in that central phenomenon of incarnate signification which the phenomenological description has brought to light. Mind or thought and body are themselves abstract moments of this central phenomenon. In abandoning the traditional procedure of detaching mind from body and subject from object, we reinstate the embodied subject as one who is 'never hermetically sealed' but rather, always already intentionally related to the world in some measure. Consequently, the rediscovery of incarnate subjectivity will lead us to revise as well OUf conception of the sensible world as a whole.

Part II The Perceived World

The Theory of the Body Is Already a Theory of Perception

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Merleau-Ponty's ph en om en ological description of the bod y has sho wn us the need to break with the entrenched dogm ati sm s and to recogn ize the bod y itself as inherently exp ressive of exis tence as a wh ole. We have traditionally tended to ado pt either of two approaches : we have detached subjectivity fro m th e bod y and mad e of th e latt er an object exis ting in -it self and reducibl e to th e sum of its part s; or we have put the primacy on a thou ght whi ch strips the body of its persp ectivity and , in an allegedly clear and disti nc t idea, offers it up as an ab solute ob ject to the disin terested gaze of a di sembodied consciousness , In eithe r case, we have byp assed our actua l experience and have chosen to ign ore th e fact tha t the body is ourself. By th e same tok en , we have reflectively ejected ourselves fro m th e p erceived world and consi dered th e latter a collectio n of self-enclose d obj ects exis ting indep endently of any perceiver; o r we have purged th e perceived world of its ap pea rance and allege dly captured its reality in the clear and dis ti nct ideas of an incorp oreal, non-p ersp ectival subject. Both vie ws funda men tally d istort our actual exp erien ce of being-in-the wo rld; but ins tea d of reno uncing these th eor ies, we have for the mos t part chosen to di scredit our expe rience. Ho we ve r, the difficulties which arose in atte mp ting to account for vario us diso rders have pro mpted us to questi on thi s tradition al di sp aragement of experie nce and to revise our traditi on al concep tions . We have been led, for example, to transform the notion of bo dy image so as to, accommodate th e findi ngs of the psychologists, th ereby relinquishi ng the idea of the body as mech ani st ic ob ject and recog nizing a bod ily intentionality whose pole is the perceived wo rld . We have thus rein st ated the essentia l lin k between our bod y and th e world ; furth er, ou r study of sexua lity, expression and speech has induced us to restor e su bjectiv ity to the bod y itself. Since the perceived wo rld ha s eme rge d as a pole of bodily experience , and since the su bject has recovered its bo dy , th e vit al connec tio n between bod y-subject and world has alread y impli-

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citly been re-est ablish ed . As th e title of th is int rod uctory section indicates, ' the theo ry of the bo dy is already a theory of percep tion '; cons eq ue n tly, we will need to revise explicitly o ur view of the perceived wo rld so as to bring it into line wi th our ame nde d conceptio n of the bod y itself.l!:Jeither bod y nor wo rld are extrins ic to the pe rceiver; rather, these terms are mut ually im pli catory. The un ity of the percept ual wo rld an d the identity of any part icular object see n from d iffere n t perspectives succes sively, dep end on th e pre- reflectiv e awareness of our mo tility as perceiv ers, and of our bodily ide n tity th rou gh that motility. The very noti on of obj ects hav ing a pos itio n and an identity presupposes our bodily exp eri ence. Moreover, th e latter is not a poor approximation of a comprehe nsive intellectu al gras p of the objec t - on th e contrary, su ch an all-encompa ssing gra sp is an extravaga nt pretension predicated on that very experience itself.t]'rior to any in tellectual conce p tio n of it , we expe rience the uni ty of the obj ect as correlated'<" to that of our body; an d we exp erie nce our bein g in th e world before we eve r arrive at the idea of an external world:l Altho ug h it might se em that we dest roy the o bjectivity of the object by reintegrat ing it in to our bodily experience, thi s is in fact not so . It is tru e that we never experience all sides of a cube as eq ual - but th is does not mean that the ' real' cub e elude s our expe rience and that the latt er mu st be inter preted in order that an intellectual recon stru ction might render us the cube as it really is . Nor is the cube's mea ning to be arrived at by a pu rely in tellectual cons ide ration. An y atte mpt to detach the object from th e condition s under wh ich we actua lly perceive it, is fatally flawed; the so- called 'real' cu be consisting of six simultaneous and equa l sides would be utterly inconceivable in the absence of our perceptual expe rience as embodied subjects. Underlying that reflective procedu re w hic h tear s th e subj ect away from it s body and it s world, we find a pre-reflective experience in wh ich our bod y, things and the world are immed iately present and interrelated in a ' living con nection ', just as are th e pa rts of our bod y itself. O ur concep tion of the thing and of the wo rld ult imately rests on their perceptual self-evide nce, and th e latter is in tum insep arable from our pre-reflective awarene ss of the bod y itself. The pre-reflective sy nthesis of the bod y itself brin gs ab o ut the synthesis of the perceived object prior to any reflective recon struction ; moreover, th ese tw o syntheses are not two separa te acts, but rather two asp ects of a sin gle act of percept ion . The stru cture of th e ph eno-

The Theory of the Body Is Already a Theory of Perception

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men al body already implies the stru cture of the enti re perceptual field . It remains for us to suspe nd our trad ition al d etach ed know ledge of th e th in g and the world in ord er that we may beco me aware of our actua l perceptual experi ence.

Sensing

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Empi ricism and intellectu alism pr esup pose a read y-made wo rld in th eir analyses ; conseq ue ntly, both are oblivio us to th e subject of pe rcep tion . The empiricis t regards perception as merely one even t am ong othe rs occurring in the wo rld, its locus being th e perceiv er. In stud ying th e sensa tions which make up th is occurren ce, the empiricist adopts an im personal approach - th ereb y totally neglecting th e fact that he lives perception and is the perceivi ng subject even in hi s ver y stud y of percepti on itself. Th is detached app roach which relegates percep tion to th e status of a fact in an objective world , fails to recognize that percep tion is on th e contrary the cond ition of th ere being any facts for us at all. The empirici st analysis belies th at upon wh ich it itself rest s - namely, th e lived tran scen dence which crea tes an ope ning in being and th ereby bri ngs abo ut the pr esence of a perceptual field . Wh ereas th e em piricist overloo ks his own role in hi s analysis of perception , the intellectua list accords him self a role wh ich makes hi s lived percepti on eq ua lly incompreh ensi ble while dep ending upon it just as surely . The empiricis t leaves no room for consciousne ss ; the intellectu alist subo rdina tes eve rything to a uni versal cons ti tutin g ego . The seco nd posit ion merely reverses the first in rep lacing bein g- in- itself by being-for -itself. The transcendent al ego is not itself involved in pe rceptio n; in cons tit uting th e world it rem ains beyon d that world rather than w ithin it, and es tablis hes causal connec tio ns among the world, th e bod y, and the empirical self. Since these are spread out before the thin ker, th e in tellect ua list canno t account for their never actually being perfectly explicit or co mplete fo r us. Like empiricism, in tellectua lism misses the pe rceiving subject and rul es ou t percep tion as we actually live it. Ind ucive psychology can help us to rein state the latt er by challeng .. Like Gu erriere, I have d ecided to translate 'le Sentir' as 'Sensing', rather than as 'Sense Experience'. (See [ou mal of the British Society for Phenomenology, vo l. 10, no . 1 (Ian . 1979) p. 67.)

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ing bo th th e empi ricist and the intellectualist view s of sens ation as, resp ectively, a state or q uality, and the cons cio usness of suc h a state or qu ality. As we might expec t, the tru e nature of se nsa tion eme rges most clearl y throu gh th e study of expe rime n ts in volvin g pat ients su ffering from disorders - in thi s case, ' diseases of the cerebellum or th e frontal cortex'. Psychologists discovered th at alterat ions in the colour of th e visu al field brou ght ab out correspond ing changes in th e amplitude, direction, and accuracy of th e pa tients ' arm movements. Th e outward sw ee p or inwa rd bend , the smoothness, the speed and so on , varied according to the colour - each colour alw ays giving ri se to the same ten den cy. O ne mi ght be tempted to inv oke a causa l explanation, red ucin g th e motor reaction to an effect mechani cally prod uced by a ph ysical phen omenon imp inging on th e objective body. How ever, such an explanatio n is precluded by the fact that colours wh ich were created by contra st, possessed the same mo tor valu e as their actual colour coun terparts. Yet th is does not autho rize us to ado pt th e oppo si te approach and decare that co nscious ness cons titutes th e colour's motor phy siog nomy out of so me so rt of mental stuff, or 'hyle', In the lalt er case, th e influ en ce of colour on beha viour becom es in expli cab le, as does the finding th at the sub ject may be qui te unaware of such influen ce even while reactin g to it. A constituting con scio usne ss would by definit ion be aware of wh at it was const ituting and wo u ld presu mab ly counteract any poten tial effect on beh aviou r; thus the cons ti tu ting activity of cons ciousne ss not only renders the actua l findi ngs inexp licab le, but is itself in comprehensible. We must cease to cons ide r colour a purely ph ysical ph en om en on or an intellectual cons truction; inst ead , we mu st recogni ze sensation as a living dialogu e between the bo dysubject and its existe ntial environment. Colour prompts th e pre-reflective adoptio n of 'a certain bodily alt itude'; the amplificatio n or contraction of move ments is pa rt of that altitude and ind icative of the particular hu e. The terms of this dialogu e are neith er mutually extern al nor red ucible to one an other. Colour is a certain mann er of being-i n-the -wo rld which implies th e actual presen ce of a part icu lar atmos phe re and th e body -subject's pow er of res po nding to it. Conseq uen tly, the presentati on of a colour does no t mechanically trigger off th e ad opting of the correspo nd ing bod ily disp osi tion; nor does the taking up of a particular bodily atti tude suffice for see ing the

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Part II: The Perceived World

colour if th e environment fails to offer the solicitation . Sensing is not an ine xpressible coincidi ng with a sensible or an in vasi on by th e latt er ; nor is it a purely subjective creating of an appearance or an intellectual pos it ing of a mean ing. Th e bodily in ten tionality whic h we have already encountered in previ ous chapters manifes ts itself here: it is not a d isemb od ied o bserve r but rather, a body-subject wh o sees and hears and tou ches th e sens ible. Sens in g is neither a passive registering nor an active impos ing of a meaning; to sense so me thing is to co-exi st or 'commune' with it , to ope n oneself to it and make it one's own pr ior to an y reflection or specifi cally person al act. If we ins ist on regard in g th e world as pure matter and th e subject as tran sp arent con sciousness, the phenomen ological descrip tion of sensation as a form of coexis tenc e, or comm unio n between a bo dy-subjec t and a be ing located beyond it , will seem confused at best. But as we have see n , it is th e tradition al dich otom y between being-in- itself an d b ein gfor-i tself which, give n the find ings of psychology and our own experie nce , is itself unintelligible. If we suspe nd o ur philosophical prejudices, we will ackno wledg e readily enoug h that there is no thinker stand ing beh ind o ur ea rs or han ds w hen we hear or touch something, or when we stretch out o n the grass or the sand and lose ourselves in the azu re sky overhead . Who among us has not had the experience of be com ing on e with th e sky or the sea on a clear summe r's day? Why sho uld we d ism iss that expe rience as a confusion or an illusion? Th e su bject of sens ation is not that pe rsonal self which has opini on s and makes decision s; rather, it is th e pre-persona l livin g bod y wh ose se nse -p owers are them selves so many 'natural selves '. By virtu e of having a bod y, we are already in possession of sensory fields - that is, we ope n onto a sens ible wo rld wi thin whose horizon s all parti cular se nso ry givens are located , len ding th em selves to un end ing exploration . Sen sing is thu s an ano nymou s ope n-end ed activity anterior to, and presu pposed by, spe cifically person al existence . We commo nly distingui sh amo ng the different sens es, relegat ing vis ion to the eyes , audi tion to the ears, olfaction to the nose, taste to the taste buds of the tongue, and tou ch prim arily to the han ds. Ind eed , Merlea u- Ponty hi mself. ass er ts th at ' the self which sees or the self which hears is in som e way a spe cialize d self ' , Do the vario us senses non et heless com municate, and is there a uni ty of the se nses? As we have seen, intellectu alism subo rdina tes every thi ng to a constituting con-

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sciousness; in doing so, it effectively transcen ds the plur ality of the senses. Although it distin gu ish es co ntinge nt matt er from necessary form in ana lyzing knowledge, intellectu alism cons iders matt er to be inseparable from form in the actual act of kno w ing. On thi s view, kn owl edge is always kno wledge of objects - broadl y spe aking - and sp ace is ' the 'form of objecti vity'. Co ns eq ue ntly, the sen ses are all spati al since they provide access to objec ts; moreover, each sens e open s onto th e sam e all-e mbracing space. Th e absence of such a commo n space wo uld preclud e the plen titude of th e object - an d hen ce, it s very being as an ob ject for consciousness. In attem ptin g to refut e thi s position , emp iricism presupposed its own con clus ion th at the senses are separate. On th e ba sis of expe rime nts usin g sub jects afflicted w ith psychic or real blindn ess it declared , for examp le, th at vision is spatial w hereas tou ch by itself is not . In doing so, th e empiricis ts ass umed th at th e patients' diso rde r had left th eir tactile expe rience unchanged - but this ass ump tion presu pposed that the alleged ly ' pure data' of each sense can be sepa rated out from the total expe rience. As Merleau Ponty points o ut, no expe rime nt wh atsoever can be invoked aga ins t th e intellectualis ts' view of the spatiality of the sens es, for th e si mple reason that all experi me nts alread y invo lve an interp retati on of the ' facts' w hich colours the conclus ion. The issue must therefor e be deci ded at the level of reflection . Th e traditional intellectualis t reflection however - such as that presented by Kant - is it self based on presuppositions in its thematizing of consciousn ess and the object. The former, as we have seen , thereby becom es pure being-for -itself wh ile th e latter, as pure bein g- initself, b ecom es universally accessib le. But why sho uld we ass ume that there is such a tran slucen t subject and plenary object, and 'that th e world must be capa ble of being th ou gh t' as Kant claims ? A genuine ly rad ical reflection is therefo re requ ired. Inst ead of beginn ing with an idea of the subject and object, we must retu rn to the pre-reflective expe rie nce und erlying,our ideas and mu st see k to describ e its actua l featur es by our reflectio n . Kant himself began hi s Critique of Pure Reason with the declaration that 'there can be no do ubt that all our kn ow led ge begins wi th expe rie nce'; however, he we nt on to say that we can 'eliminate from our experien ces everything whi ch belon gs to th e senses' and arrive at 'knowledge ab solutely indep end ent of all expe rience'. This a priori know ledge, accordi ng to Kant, gives us 'true u nive rs-

"'" I .1 ,., ':I

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,

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Part II: The Perceived World

Sensing

ality and strict necessit y, su ch as mere emp irical knowledge canno t supply' .' The phen omenological reflection challenges th ese claims conce rn ing a priori knowled ge th us defin ed , by pointing ou t th at if expe rience is the start of knowl ed ge - as Kan t declared - then it is impossible to di st inguish bet ween factua l truths and a priori tru th s, between ' what is' an d what 'must necessarily be so, and not otherwise' i? Prior to thi s cha p ter, Merleau -Ponty alerted us to th e need to revise our ordinary noti on s of contingenc y and necessity; now, he elaborates th e ph enom en ological definitio n of the a posteriori and a priori as resp ectively, ' the isolated an d implicit fact' and ' the fact understood, mad e explicit, and followe d throu gh into all the conseq uences of it s latent logic'. The traditional d istinction between content and form clearly d isap pears here and wi th it, any pretensi on to a kn owled ge utterly ind ependen t of expe rience. Radi cal reflection thus begins w ith th e recognition of our actua l inhe rence in bein g. Instead of citing , as does the crit ical reflection, the conditio ns which render the worl d thi nk able, the phenomenological reflection expresses our pr imord ial contact with th e de facto world whi ch envelopes us and which is the only one that can be thou gh t about conseq ue ntially. It becomes impossible to cut our know ledge loose from th at primordi al perceptual expe rience in w hich it is rooted ; for the phenom en ologist there is no necessity external to our senses wh ich dictates their unity. Sensation ceases to be so me in er t q uality or state, or th e consc io usness of these, and becomes a struc ture of our being-in-the-w orld ; hen ce spatia lity is insepara ble from sens ation an d it becom es un int elligible to regard any of the se nses as no n-spatial. Ph en omenological reflection on o ur actual senso ry expe rience reveals the unity and diversit y of OU T se nses in that co-exis tence w ith the sens ible wh ich is prior to any reflection. Instead of po siting a sing le space as th e necessary cond itio n wh ich makes qualiti es thi nkabl e, th e rad ical reflection d raws our attention to th at lived sp atia lity whi ch is inseverabl e from our expe rie nce of qualities as particul ar modes of being -in the-w orld . In sens ory experience, as we have see n, th e sensi ble beckon s to the incarn ate subject and th e latter resp on ds by sha ping exis tence accor di ngly, thereb y absor bing itself to a greater o r lesser degree in one of th e se nses. The d iversi ty and un ity of the senses are thus two as pec ts of se ns ing ; each sense has it s own peculiar wo rld while also gea ring int o th e larger world of OU T integ rated experience .

O ur rootedness in a single all-em bracin g space as incarn ate su bjects ope ni ng onto th e de facto world, is what ena bles us to shift from the spa tiali ty cha racterizing on e sensory realm to that of ano ther and back aga in w ithout losing our hold on the world . Th us we can take up our abode in visual spac e and then, by simply closi ng o ur eyes, abandon ourse lves to th e vastness of auditory space as we settle back to enjoy the sy mpho ny in the co ncert hall, kno wi ng full well th at we can move back into visu al space when the mu sic ends - or earlier if we so desire. Likewi se, blind persons who see for the fir st time follow ing th e rem oval of th eir cataracts, thereby enter a visu al realm whose spatiality differs from th at of th e tactile or auditory realm s to which th ey have been accusto med . Yet the in ter play of the variou s senses makes it clear th at while each is spatia l in a uniq ue way, all contrib ute to a sing le comprehe nsive s pace. After th e cataract op eration , convalescents typ ically initially reach ou t th eir hands towards any objects shown th em and may try to to uch eve n a sunbeam falling across th eir p illow. Evide n tly th eir tactile expe rience must be spatial - else they would not reach out to touch whatever is present ed; at the same tim e it is appa rent that the structure of th eir world has differed from that of sighted perso ns. As they learn to use their eyes, the convalescents br ing abo ut a restructuring of their expe rience and grad ually estab lish an int ersensory world in which th eir. visi on com municates directly with th eir tou ch. In normal expe rience th en , all the senses co-exist and interact so th at the con tribu tion of each becom es ind istinguishable in the total configuratio n of percep tion . Sen sory expe rience is fore ign to natural percep tio n and inheren tly un stabl e, in sofar as it requires an extremely particularized approach to expe rie nce the sens es separately o r to ma ke a definite sens ible q uality stand out from the perceptu al field. Such an approach makes us ob livious to that 'primary layer ' of sensi ng wh ich is anterior to any separati on of th e senses . Und er the influen ce of mescalin , th is original syna esthetic experience becomes d ramatically prominent b ecau se th e dr ug prompts it s us er to sus pe nd that ana lytic attitude w hic h atomizes the wo rld and instead literally to see so unds, hear colours, and feel these vibra te in h is own bod y. If we in sist on retaining the cons tancy hypoth esis (w hi ch restricts eac h stimulus to a single sens ation) then such experience remains incomprehensible. Yet we must ende avo ur to account for it , becau se syna esthetic perception is not uniqu e to

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Part 1/: The Perceived World

mescalin users; the scie ntific alti tud e of our times has merely mad e us unaware that su ch perception is in fact the rul e rather than the exception . By dra wing our atte ntion to the ph en om enal bod y, which is the actua l su bjec t of pe rceptio n, ph en om en ological reflection prompts us to red iscover the true nature of percep tion prio r to any scientific recon struction of our exp erien ce. If we sus pe nd objective thou gh t and exam in e our actua l expe rience, we discover an intercommunication of the senses wh ich our precon ceptions had ruled o ut. Wh en we cons ider, for example, a glass vase, a knife blad e, a birch bran ch, or a fold in red velve t, we reali ze that an obj ect' s form and th e brilliance or dullness of its colour are indicative of its texture, its flexibility, its warmth or cold ness, its wei ght, it s mann er of lending itself to movem en t, its so no rity when struc k, and so on. In its own way, eac h of the se nses rev eals the object's inner core, or struc ture, and thereb y commu nicates with the other senses as well, However, we mu st gua rd agains t th e temptation to red uce th e obje ct' s essential natu re to a Kantian noumenon. The perceptual synthesis whi ch accomplis hes the un ificati on of our sensory experiences is fundam entally different from an intellectual syn thesis and must not be regarded as being merely a step on th e way to the latter. Th e perceptual syn thesis is akin to binocular visio n's gr asp of a Single object. O ur actual expe rience of tran sferring our gaze from a dist ant object to one nearby, shows that bin ocular vision is neith er an automatic physiologica l process no r a ment al sy nthesiz ing of images. The conv ergence and merging of two mon ocular ima ges in to the si ng le object see n, is the ou tcome of a bodily intention ality; it is th e ph en om enal body which expe riences diplopia as im balan ce and whic h focuses its eyes so as to achie ve visual eq uilibriu m. It is not a matter here of an epis temo logica l syn thesis effected by a tran sp arent consciousness . The perceptual synthesis is roo ted in th e prelogical unity of the body itself an d neither th e latt er nor th e tran scendent object which in vit es its gaze is ever completely laid bare. Just as there is no thinking subject which stands beh ind the synthesis of double images in no rma l vis ion, so there is no tran scendental ego which subs umes the senses and th ereb y effects their unity. The unificati on of the Senses comes abo ut th rou gh th eir ong oi ng integration into th at sy nergic sys tem whi ch is the ph en om en al body itself. Hearing colours or see ing so unds is no more - and no less - mysterious or mirac ulous than is the collabo ra tio n of the two eyes in no rma l vision. As Merleau -Ponty

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observes, we can become abru ptly awa re of the interaction of th e senses in perce p tion wh en the sound of a film we are wa tch ing breaks down mom entarily, th ereb y congealing the gestures themselves and altering the wh ole ten or of the spectacle. The intercommunication of the sen ses in experience is based on 'a project towards move me nt' which is in separable from the very exis tence of th e bo dy itself as primordi al expression. Th e ph en om enal body gives meaning even to cultural objects such as wo rds , as shown by experi ments in which subjects who were present ed with words too briefly to rea d th em , nevertheless ado pted th e corresponding bo d ily alti tude. The body thus generally symbo lizes the worl d and enables us to com preh en d th e latt er pri or to any con ceptualizati on o n our part. At th e primary layer of sens ing, we discover the un ity and opacity of the temporal su bject and th e intersensory unity of th e transcendent object. In accom plishi ng th e perceptual syn thesis, th e body-subject crea tes ti me by bring ing a past and future int o existence and uniting th em with a present. If we are to appreciat e the imperson al nature of perception , we mu st give up the critical alt itude which o bjec tifies sensation and purges consciou sn ess of its essential opacity. In place of such intellectualist reflection we must engage in th at trul y radical reflection which recove rs the unreflected experience underlyin g any positing of objec t or subject. Such radical reflection recognizes sens atio n as being ' the most rudimentary of percep tio ns ' and restor es it to th e perceptual field, while simulta neo us ly reinstating primitive perception as a non-positing, pre- ob jective, prepersona l experience.

Notes 1. 'Introduction', Critique of Pure Reason, Norm an Kemp Smit h (trans.), (New York: SI. Martin's Press, 1965) pp. 41- 3 . 2. Ibid ., p. 42.

Space

2 Space

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In the p reviou s cha p ter, Merleau-Ponty overtu rned th e traditional conce p tio n of objec tivity by bringing to our atte n tio n th e phen omen al body as 'a natural self' and as ' th e su bjec t of perception '. We have see n tha t th e experi ence of th e bod y itself is in separ abl y th e ou tlini ng and percei ving of a certai n sort of world in whic h eac h bod ily se nse has a spatial realm whi ch overlaps, b u t d oes not coinci de, with the othe rs . In thi s chapter, Merleau -Ponty exa mi nes more closely th e meaning of such spa tial realm s which form a whole human , or cultura l, world around a se nsi ble core . Tradition ally, space ha s been reg ard ed as a con tai ner for, or a commo n characteristic of, the objects of experie nce. Altern ativ~Iy', . it has been conce ive d as th e fo rm which, cons tit u ted by a tr't'nscen~ d ental subject, m akes external exp eri en ce possibl e;In sho rt, space ha s been considere d to be either objective or su bjective - eithe r part of th e ' real' world 'o u t th ere' , or a principl e of J'rillit'a'n"tln ' in' th e su bject of experience. f'!erleau -Ponty's phen om en ological ~I.i d escnp d ""car'" '.'5 . no . ns, h owe ver, h ave I revea e t h at s u biject to b e an m ir nate su bjec tiv ity; rather than a transcen d ental ego, th e su bject of experie nce is th e ph en om enal body insepar abl y bo u nd up with the world. It is obvious, th erefore, th at the tradi tional noti on of space will need to be re tho ug h t, and th at th e unity of experience can no lon ger be consi dere d to lie 'o u t th ere' o r ' in here' b ut must, rather , origina te in th at dynamic relat ion sh ip between bod ysubject a nd worl d through which 'o bjects' and 'SUbjects' come into being for us. / Con sequently, that relati on sh ip itself m us t be pre-obj ective; a nd if we ,w ish to retain th e terms' 'o bjective' and 's ubjective' at thi s p~rnib!'
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lish ed noti on of th e world and to red iscover th e actua l prereflecti ve expe rie nce fro m which it arises. The fina l ' cou rt of ap peal' conce rni ng th e being of space can be no othe r th an our re-awak en ed experie nce of space/In our everyday lives, th e primo rdial expe rie nce of space is already overlaid by its own ~qiilsr\ions; hen ce ou r i!,vestigation mu st no t stop th ere7If we are to cap tu re th.?*'h"'e'si~~pace, we must consi der breakdowns of our normal experie nce becau se - as we have seen in earlie r cha p ters - it isin such d isturbances th at o ur already cons titu ted world di sintegrates, revealing the thread s wh ich compose th e fabric of our ordi nary experience/Merleau -Ponty conseq uen tly exa mi nes th e findin gs of experim en ts lik e th ose of Stra tto n, in which spec ial glt':ses ,are used to make a su bject see' without th e normal re tina l inv~r!ifSRjfn this case , th e su bject init ially expe riences ob jects as inverted and unreal, th en beg in s to see ob jects right-sid e-up agai n b ut experiences hi s bod y as in verted , and finally - especially when active - experien ces both objects and bod y as real and right-sid e-up. What are we to make of th ese findin gs? Neither in tellectua lism nor empiricism can provide a satisfactory acco u nt for Stratto n's findings .lFor th e in tellectualis t, spa tial position is si mp ly th e result of a transparent cons titu ting activ ity; hence it lies exclus ively on th e sid e of th e su bject. Th e in tellect ua lis t is th erefore at a loss how to expl ain th e su bjec t's actual expe rience of inversion: 2.Lf!ce he knows that he is wearing correc tiona l glasses, th e su bject should (in th e in tellectua list accou n t) make allow,mce for this when cons tit u ti ng th e form of hi s vis ua l field . Th us he sho uld con tin ue both to see objects and to experie nce hi s bod y as ' real' and as right-side-u p .jf'he em pi ricis t, on th e o the r hand, is at a loss how to explai n th e fact th at everything gra d ua lly rights itself even th ou gh th e su bjec t continues to wear th e cor rectio nal glasses. Accor d in g to em pi ricis m every thi ng sho uld rem ain i nverted~~w;. ,;p_a~e is "..Ep ertJo:.~th~ ' rea l external' world and, as such , impmges 01} th e subjec t in the ~;"~ayf~r-ih~-du rat ion of the experiment/ Stratt on's fin di ngs raise a crucial qu esti on regarding the meaning of inversion: w ith refere nce to w ha t d oes th e su bject experie nce th e vi su al field to be either inve rted or upright jIt will not do to answer th at it is th e sta ble..pQint_of orien tation, objec tive bod y whic h provides becau se th e bod y is itself experie nced, at least for a time, as inverted. EViden tly, space is not simply provid ed together with

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th e conten t of se ns ing; it is neither an objective relat ion sh ip passively registered by th e retina, nor an intellectual construction by a non -sp atial ego/ The exp erim ent rev eals that th e content of expe rience is not orien tated in itself; however, if ' up' and 'dow n' are relat ive, then to what are th ey relative and how is it th at we ever com e to expe ri ence direction s like these at all! What is that 'absolute with in the sphere of the relative' which enables the subject of Stratton 's experiment to characterizin g his own body and his surroundings as eithe r upright or invert ed ?jAs Merleau Ponty po ints out, this ab solute mus t be a th ird kind of sp at iality underlying a ny dj~.til'cc_ti-"-i!-be~~e."n-·fo~m ~it9- content/ Wertheimer's exp erim ent involving a mi rror which tilts the room in whi ch

a subject is located , shows that directions can be redistributed almost immediately even in the abse nce of any motor explor ati on on the part of the subject; and thi s new ori entation is not th at of the body aXis/In such cases and in general, wh at counts is not th e body as an object occup ying objective space; rath er, it is th e bo dy as potentia lity of actions and vehi cle of one' s being-in-the-w Q,dd . The situati on and task defin e the exist ential ' place' of th is phenomenal bod y; hence, th e tilt ed spectacle rights itself even for an immobile subjec t as Soon as he experien ces it as makin g"

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demands on him /His body gea rs itself to thi s new world in such a wa y that he experiences th e forme r as the comprehens ive potenti ality of th e latt erfAn short, th e su bject begins to inhabit hi s new ~c world and, instead of feelin g him self in the world of hi s actu al aI" body, he ' feels th at he has the legs and arms he would need to walk and act in the reflected room' j Nagel's expe rimen t wi th variations in mu scular toni...city reveals the o the r side of (his bod y-subject and world dialectic, by showing th at if the sp ectacle rem ains st atio nary while bod y ton icity is changed, the su bject modifies hi s bodily position accordi ng ly/I nstead of a mechani st ic deterministi c relatio nship of causality, v./e have an organic relation

of motivation betw een subject and world, S\le!.;. th at th e bod y possesses th e world in a certain way while ge~ri n g itself to th at world/In ~or~al dail y expe rie::',7l', .(lUra ctual body is at on" _witb...~.ur virt!:,-"IJ~,<@Y - th e latt er bein g th e one whi ch th e spectacle requi res - an dtheactua ) spec tacle is at one w ith the sett ing wh ich 0llr bodil y attitusI". projes t§:AiOJJ:n
Space

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h b o d y h as in anc hori ' a power Whiic h te OrI ng itse If In world, in dem anding 'certain preferen tial plan es'. The body is a potentiality of movem ent, and th e perceptual field is an invitati on to action ; by resp onding to th is invitation, the in carnate subject receives wh at Merleau-Ponty calls ' the en joyment of spi'.£~ throu gh the exis ten tial constitution of 'a spatia l level'.jrhe criterion fo r this di alectic lies in th e 'maximum sharp ness of perception and action' ; hen ce, the iitdfo'St'Poss ible variation and clarity of articulation in th e spectacle perceived, and th e world's confiriW~llY;n of th e bod y's unfoldin motor intention s, E ind icate the gearing of the body to the world/This reciprocal hold of the body on th e world and the world on the body, is that perceptual ground, that ab solute within relati vity, from which pa rticular direction s like 'up' and ' down' ultimately springlro as k why clarity and richn ess of perception and actio n requireaii ;;;;en tated "~hen o l"e n al space, is to adop t the positi on of a non situa ted spe2tit~ floating so mewhere above a world in it self alread y absolutely orien tated / This sort of qu esti on presupposes th at subject and world are essentially indifferent to space and merely happen to be orientatedfn fact, however, our perceptual experience di~~'ses"1hat to be I S to be situated; th at our primord ial co-existence with the wo rld ' magnetizes' experience and ind uce s a direction in it /rhe double meaning of th e French word 'sens' is si gnificant in this connec tion : if there is to be meaning, there must be direction ; me aning and direction go hand in hand ./ By virtue of being incarnate sub jectivitie s, we thus always alread y find ourselves in a w orld which is primordially mean ingful pri or to any explicit takin g of a stand by the personal self. We saw in the last chapter th at objectivity has its genesis in a pr e-objective dialectic which overturns th e trad itional con cep tion s; and it now becomes evide nt that thi s coming to be of objectivity is th e coming to be of or1entated bein g/ To be an obj ect is to be ~~ch for a ~~i1l rg'a~ or grip~p-"ti~direction is no t a merely con'fJ7lgeAt traN of an objec t but rath er, th e means for recog nizing it and being conscious of it as an object.jrhis is so becau se the subject of perception is the phenom en al body, wh ich can stru ctur e the wo rld into figure-background configurations only insofar as it has a grip on th ings - and thi s taking of a gr ip is possibl e only ins ofar as things have a gen eral direction ) All perceiv able and all conceivable being (the latt er always based o n th e former) is ori entated; we can never get beyond orientated

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being in order to provide it with a non-orientated foundation/Our express perception can never reach and thematize that primordial laying down of directions whereby we become situated in the world.;Jobe.aware ofourselvesas incarnate subjectivity is always to find our'i~!ves alrea~ sit;;ated - that is, already orientatedz' Reflection y enco\lltt'ers a spatiality which~ is'-;;jr~;;dy acquired, indicating' that there must be a pre-personal existence underlying our personal history/This pre-reflective existence can only be that of our body as a generalized, anonymous, natural self. / Of course, this is not that ' momen tary body' of our personal decisions but rather, the 'customary' or 'habitual body' of which Merleau-Ponty has already had occasion to speak/'[he IJrimordial communication~i~l:0l.'~ world which the habituaI j,;;d"yin\%""'" gurates and perpetuates, opens up a realm of freedom and a . Id In ' Whiic h re flecti '!# (,~"' sped f~~IIy h uman war ection can take up . ,Its-f>,v-amla~iYet that primordial contact itself, being nothing other than our facticity, remains radically impenetrable for reflection. Merleau-Ponty's disclosure of primordial spatiality as inseparabl~ from our very being in the world, enables us to comprehend why the awareness of our contingency prompts giddiness, loss of secure foundations, horror, nausea (as described in Sartre's famous novel of the same title) and - if it engulfs us sufficiently long - the schizophrenia which finds everything ' amazin g, absurd, or unreal'. Between the disorientation of madness and the unquestioned security of the natural attitude to the world, lies the realm of philosophical interrogation which attempts to understand both without succumbing to either. The natural attitude of course is not entirely closed in upon itself - if it were, interrogation could never even begin. Now in the case of spatiality, philosophical interrogation finds for its inquiry a foothold , so to speak, in the notion of depth. As Merleau-Ponty points out, depth is more 'existential' than the other spatial dimensions because it clearly is neither simply a property of the object nor. an intellectual construct; therefore its consideration prompts us more directly to repudiate our preconceived notions and re-discover the primordial experience of the world. Traditional theories attempted to reduce depth to breadth seen from the side, but this so to speak 'flatten ed it out' and failed to account for our lived experience of depth. Even these traditional theories thus could not dispense with the notions of distance, relationship, size and motion in their analyses of depth. To say

tmralia'GJ

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that depth is merely breadth seen from the side, is to acknowledge that the breadth is further away from me 'wh en I take a frontal view of the object in question. Even here therefore, distance from a perceiver is already included. Moreover, if we ask how we become aware of distance, the reply will be that objects change in apparent size as they move closer to or further away from us. Here, just as in the case of verticality, the question of an absolute criterion arises : with reference to what are objects to be judged bigger or smaller? It cannot simply be a matter of ascertaining size with reference to other objects in our visual field , for that would involve us in an infinite regress. As Merleau-Ponty shows, the absolute here is that which our earlier discussion of space already revealed to us - namely, that 'gearing of body-subject and world which brings about the maximum richness and clarity of perception. Distance is not an external relationship between things; rather, it is a dialectical relationship between the phenomenal body and its world. To say that something is close, is to say that the body has a 'full' or 'complete' grip on it; to say that it is further away is to say that it is slipping from our grip; and to say that it is distant, is to say that our gaze now has merely a 'loose and approximate grip' on it, such that the object's richness is no longer clearly articulated and that it lends itself less to our exploration. In this lived distance, motion and temporality are already implied insofar as the body is a power of exploration. To say that something is either no longer or not yet clearly visible, is to invoke temporal horizons of past and future around a field of presence; and it is to disclose the overlapping, interlocking style of being which characterizes these temporal dimensions. To say that something becomes smaller or larger, increasingly indeterminate or determinate, only makes sense if that thing has an identity - if it is not a matter of constant creation ex nihilo or radical disappearance. Merleau-Ponty therefore examines the traditional accounts of motion, for it is motion which encompasses simultaneously position, temporality and identity. The examination of the classical logical and psychological conceptions of motion reveals a more primordial, pre-objective motion which is nothing other than a variation of the phenomenal body's hold on the world. Since primordial spatiality is that pre-objective experience in which the body-subject fastens itself on to its environment, and since primordial motility is a modality of that grip on the world, it becomes evident that spatiality and

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motility are int ern ally related, being mutually implicatory. The bi rth of movem ent for us is part of the ge nes is of the ph enomenal world; consequen tly, the ph en om en ological description of the latt er inv olves th at of th e form er. As usu al, the sho rtcoming of the tradition al approaches lies in their un crit ical acceptance of the prejudice of the objective wo rld . In the case of the logician s, it is a matt er of presupposing an ob ject in- itself wh ich remains the same wh ile moving fro m one objective locati on to ano ther. On this acco unt, moti on is merely an intellectu al judgem ent and Ze nos fam ou s parad oxes becom e un avoid abl e. We have a perception of a static object occupying success ive positi on s but never really movin g. And yet, we actua lly have an expe rience of movement when we dan ce or walk or use our bod y in so me othe r way ; hence movem ent canno t be merely an ad di tio n of static points in space and tim e. The logician argues th at th e perception of moveme nt req uires an external land mark relative to which an object is judged to be in motion - tha t is, to cha nge its position . How ever , o ur ow n pre-reflective bodil y experience of moti on refutes the logician's claim. My body is not fo r me an object in-it self; I canno t jump outside it in .order to see it occupy success ive positions in obj ectiv e space. Stroboscopic movem ent also discloses that the perception of movement does not require an identical moving objec t or an externa l landmark. The psych ologist th erefore ma intains that the awa reness of 'g lobal movem en t' in volves neither a moving object no r a parti cular posi tion of such an object. Yet in discarding all ide nti ty and all relati vit y, th e psychologist forgets that moti on is perceived by someone who lives through it. Th e perception of movem ent can no t enti rely dis pe nse with th e notion of ide nti ty; bu t th e latter is not the id entity of an already totally de termi na te ob ject und erlyin g the phases of mo tio n. Movement is no t an accide ntal prope rty of an essen tia lly static object; instead , th ere is a mobil e bein g whose identity lies in the movem ent rath er than be nea th it. As Mcrleau-Ponty notes, ' it is not becau se I find the same stone on th e gro und th at I believe in its identity th rou gh out its movem ent. It is, on th e contrary, becau se I perceived it as id enti cal during th at movem ent . .. that I go to pick it up and recover it' . This identity is pre-ob jecti ve; it is not the persist en ce of a cluster of determinate attributes, but a style of exis tence cha racteri zi ng a pre-ob jectiv e enti ty which is experi enced by a relati ve, pre-p erson al subject. Relat ivity here must not be supposed to indicate an externa l relati on ship b etween

two term s, it being a ma tte r of ind ifferenc e whi ch ter m is varied . Moti on is, rather, a struc tural ph en om en on havin g to do wit h th e ar ticulation of our perceptual field into figure-background ; and the way in which th e bod y, as subject of perception, establishes its relation with the world is what determ ines part of the perceptual field to count as th e background and ano the r part to count as a mov ing objec t. Th e context in which the phe no me na l bod y anchors itself and whi ch it inhab its, becomes th e background agains t which movem ent can stand out; consequently, movem ent pre supposes that inhe rence in th e wo rld whi ch is estab lishe d and maintained by the hab itual bod y. It is this pre-logical gearing of subject and w orld which p rovid es the fou ndatio n for th e absolute or 'global movem en t' dep icted by the psyc ho logis t - but th e latter's prejudice precl udes th e recogn iti on of thi s 'primordial anc ho rage'. The an choring of th e bo dy as a ' natural se lf' in stitutes a phys ical or ' natural' space and th ereb y ope ns up a ' human space' which enco mpasses th e wo rld of emo tio ns , dr eam s, myths and madness, as we ll as th e world of reflection . Th e description of thi s human space overturns our traditi on al distin ction s - such as tho se between form and content, clarit y and ambigu ity, reality an d appea rance - and revo lutionizes the role of philoso phy itself.

The Th ing and the Natu ral W orld

3 The Thing and the Natural World We saw in the last chap ter that space has tradition ally be en cons idered to be a form gene rated by the subject as the conditio n of there bein g any objects at all; or , on the reali st side, that it has been rega rde d as a giant con tainer in which things are located. Merleau-Ponty rejected both these traditional conceptions of space and described the genesis of space in a dynam ic pr e-ob jective, pr e-logi cal int eracti on of bod y-subject and world. The foundation or g round of spatiality therefore shifted from the con stituting activity of a tran scend ental ego po sited by intellectualism , to the reciprocal hold of th e phenom enal bod y and world as de scribed by ph en omenology. It eme rged th at obj ects are neither purely con struc ted by the su bject nor simply encou ntered as ab solutely independe nt existents. Rath er, there is a genesis of obj ectivity in an anony mo us body-world di alectic, such th at objectiv ity comes to be only as orien tated bein g for a bodily gaze or 'g rip' . In short, w e saw that lived spa tiality is insep arabl e from obj ectivity, sin ce such spati ality is th e means wh ereby we recogni ze and are aware of ob jects as ob jects. We saw that obj ects are alw ays ob jects for us - but that thi s 'us' refers first and forem ost to the body as natural self and subject of perception , through whose activity objects come in to being. Since th e tradition al con ception s of space as transcendental form or in -itself containe r have been thus overturned, it is encumben t on Merleau-Ponty to giv e an account now of that which was enco mpassed by , or contai ned in , th e traditional space. Th e conceptio n of th e world as a totality of th ings contained in space will therefor e need to be questi on ed - and what better way to begin thi s interroga tion th an by examining wh at it means to be a th ing? Merleau-Ponty's rejection of th e traditional conceptions of objectivity and hi s attempt to develop a new approach to it in hi s description s of se ns ing and space, would seem at first glance to

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rul e out objectivity or 'thi ng ho od' altogether. Ha s Merleau-Ponty des tro yed the independen ce of th e thing and abs orbed it into the subject of perception by making ob jectivity the outcome of a bo dy- wo rld dialectic whose found ation is the bod y-subject's pow er of anchoring itself in a pre-objective world th rough th e exercise of its sen sory organs? In having collapsed th e notion of space as transcen dental form or in- itself container, has he not in fact collap sed everything in that container and precluded the unity and objectivity of the world? In havin g rejected th e notion of identity as a collection of determinate characteris tics which persi st as prop erties of th e thing despite continge nt changes of time or place, and in h aving described id entity as a dynamic 'style of existence', has Merleau-Ponty not sacrificed the ve ry existence of anythi ng whatsoever? Ha s he not substitu ted a radi cal sub jectivism in place of the tradition al po sitions? Merleau-Ponty himself is only too aware of such qu estions and th e dangers to which they refer. In this chapter he th erefor e add resses himself directly to di sp ellin g such fears. Traditionally, ' things' have been con sidered to have stable properties which give them th eir reality as things. If, for example, a tree tw ig is put under a magnifying glass, or dropped into a glass of water, or flood ed with red light we say that it appears success ively as huge, ben t, and strangely dark or coloured . Despite these appe arances, we say th at 'in reality' th e twi g is tiny, straigh t and dull brown ; in o the r word s, it ha s its size, its shape , it s colour, all of wh ich remain despite th e apparent chan ges brou ght on by th e magnifyin g glass, water, and coloured light. Once th ese are removed, the twi g can agai n be see n as it ' really' or ' tru ly' is; in short, the thing which we call 'the real tw ig' is consi de red to have a con stanc y of size, sh ap e, colour, and so on. Merleau-Ponty therefor e sets him self th e task of describi ng the ph en omenon of reality via a phenomenological in vestigation of th e ph enomen on of perceptual con stanc y. As usual, he proceed s by examining the trad ition al approaches to the qu estion. Psych ology cons iders 'co nstan t' or 'true' size and shape to be a conve ntion, argu ing that no single size and shape is tru er than others , since they all va ry according to on e's perspective. For th e sake of convenience, it is si mply ag reed that th e obj ect's siz e wh en it is within reach, and its shape wh en it is in a plan e parallelin g the frontal elevati on, will be called its 'true' or ' real' 'size an d shape . However, despite the fact th at psychology acknow ledg es

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the body's active role in the production of sizes and shapes, this sort of approach presupposes precisely what needs to be examined. Psychology begins with the assumption that the given is a collection of already determinate sizes and shapes, and then tries to explain why a particular one is regarded as 'real' or 'constant' in preference to all the others. Yet what needs to be shown is how a determinate size or shape can become crystallized in our experience - that is , how constancy comes into being for us, or in short, how there can be objectivity at all. It should be noted here that the question is not why, but how; for to ask why our experience crystallizes at all, would be to adopt an acosmic stance and pretend that experience would still be experience in the absence of all objectivity. Merleau-Ponty has already criticized this sort of question - most recently, in his discussion of space, where the questioner assumes that orientation is m erely an accidental attribute. The psychologist presupposes objectivity and hence fails to describe its genesis in our lived experience. The in tellectu alist' s approach fares no better than does the psychologist's. In an effort to avoid the latter's problem of deciding which of a whole series of appearances is to be called the object's reality, intellectualism tries to evade the issue of objectivity altogether. Instead of underlying the object's various appearances, the 'real' object is considered to be the totality of all its actual and possible appearings. Thus, to appear is to be - being is appearing; however, this is not a reduction to any Single appearance but rather, the sum total of all possible appearances as these are foreshadowed in any actual, specific appearance. By thus collapsing the distinction between the object and its appearances, intellectualism renders appearance as appearance imcomprehensible. In its attempt to get beyond the traditional dichotomies of crude realism, it becomes itself enmeshed in an infinite regress, as Sartre explained in Being and Nothingness.' What, after all, is it that is appearing? What is the being of that appearing? Is it an appearing? If so, then what is the being of that appearing? The intellectualist thus gets caught in this infinite regress and never manages to show what it is to appear. Nevertheless, this position has a positive insight in stipulating that there is a 'tightly knit system' of phenomena and the body, and that shape and size have to do with 'the relations between th e parts of the phenomenal field '. However, intellectualism di storts this insight by conceiving these relations as being mental on es ; thus it considers the con stancy of

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real size or shape to be merely an a priori law governing the variations of apparent size relative to apparent distance. In treating appearance, distance, and orientation as variables in a constant law, the intellectualist assumes that these are already determinate; consequently, intellectualism brings us no further in understanding how determinate shapes and sizes come into being for us. By reducing perception to thought, intellectualism blinds itself to our pre-scientific experience and fails to account for it - while covertly presupposing that pre-thetic experience in its own ' analyses. More specifically, it cannot account for our actual experience of perceiving the object either far away or up close. Intellectualism is forced to regard an apparently small object at a great distance as indistinguishable from the same object seen up close as large, because for it the object is the constant product of the apparent size multiplied by the distance. Yet in our lived experience, the object at a distance is not as real and present as it is when close to us. Far from a neutral ratio, our lived experience reveals distance as tension, orientation (of the object) as the balance between inner and outer horizons, and variations in appearance as articulation . Intellectualism cannot account for the experience of tension, or imbalance or unclarity; nor can it make comprehensible the fact that there is one culminating point of the perceptual process 'which simultaneously satisfies these three norms'. According to the intellectualist position, no one perception is more crucial than any other; hence there can be no optimum distance and orientation which provide the perceiver with maximum visibility. Nonetheless, we know perfectly well that when looking at pictures in an art gallery, for example, we move forward or backward a few paces for each picture which we really wish to view. Our body h ere understands that there is for each picture an optimum distance and direction from which to see it. As usual, moreover, the intellectualist approach reverses the actual relationship of ' Fundierung' ; thus it reduces the thing to constant relationships, in stead of recognizing that the latter are themselves based on the perceptual self-evidence of the thing. It is the thing's self-evidence in our lived experience which must therefore be de scribed . We have already seen that the primordial ground of spatial directions lies in the comprehensive, reciprocal hold of the phenomenal body and the world. Th is anchoring of the body-subject in a

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world , and the ano ny mo us body-world dialectic to which it ceas eless ly gives rise, is th e so urce of o bjectivity. Since we are in volved in th e wo rld through our bod y, the appearance of objects is always in sep arabl e from a parti cular bo dily attitude. Th e cons tancy of th ings can no lon ger be regarded as a mech ani cal or intellectual fun ction , but must be ackno wledged to be insep arabl e from the fund amental dialectic wh ereby the incarnate subject assumes hi s place in the world. Th ere is a ielos or decisive perception in the perceptual process precisely because that p rocess has to do with the way in wh ich the body gea rs itself to th e world so th at, as Merleau-Ponty says, 'sizes and sh ap es merely provide a mod ality for th is comprehe nsive hold on th e world. The th ing is bi g if my gaze cannot fully take it in, sm all if it does so eas ily' . In th e past chapter, we saw tha t th ings appear unreal wh en the primordial, ano nymo us bod y-world dialectic is di stu rb ed with the aid of correc tional glasses or mirror s, and that reality is re- es tablishe d wh en the body adj us ts its hold on the wo rld in accordance with the req ui remen ts of the altere d situation . It is th is comprehensive gri p on the world whi ch bri ngs a perceptual field into being, so tha t th e ancho ring of the body-subject in the world is simultaneo us ly fini tude , in completen ess, and ope nness. In short, to have a hold on an obj ect through one' s compreh en sive grip on th e world, is to be perspectival -thou gh not sea led in to any particular perspective, because o ne is a comprehe nsive power of world-mod aliti es (that is, a power of cease lessly mod ifyin g th e specific form s whic h tha t primordial hold of the body on the world takes). In the pr esent cha p ter, Merleau -Ponty ene avours to sho w that the self-evidence - and hen ce the cons tancy - of th ings is roo ted in tha t of the bo dy itself as a compre he n sive hold on a wo rld . A thing's constancy has to do not only wi th its size and shape, but also with features such as colour; hen ce it is important to consi de r what it means for a colour to be 'real'. What does it mean to say that an obje ct has its own colour, wh ich it retains th roughout 'a pparent' tran sform atio ns br ou ght abo ut by cha nges in position or lighting, for example? It is not eno ug h to say that the ' real' or 'co ns tant' colou r of an object is simply th at colour whic h it 'normally ' assum es - in dayli ght , at a ce rtain distance, etc. - and tha t th e perceiv er rem embers this colour when viewing th e object under .othe r conditions . Thi s so rt of position ag ain presu pposes pr ecise ly th at which calls for elucida tio n; namely, how a colour

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comes to crystalli ze in our expe rience at all. Th e ap peal to mem ory ass umes that determinate colours are give n, and chooses one of these to be con signed to memory for futu re reference. Such a proce d ure once more reduces perception to thou ght about percep tion - and from our earlier discussion we are already acquainted with the fallacie s invo lved in ado pting th is kind of approach. In red ucing colour to a fixed q uality, empiricism and intellectu alism bo th di stort the ph en om en on of colour in our expe rience. Colour cons tancy is not a matter of such a quale cons truc ted by reflection post facto; rather, it has to do with a colour-function. Th e latt er is not an inciden tal coati ng added to a colourless substratum; it is, ins tea d, th e way in which th e thing dr aw s th e incarn ate subject's gaze, the sort of res ista nce which it offers to visual explorati on. Phys ics and ps ychology have distorted thi s colour- func tio n by di ssectin g colour into ' atoms' or 'patches' of colour. It is tru e that we can see colou red areas by sq uinting our eyes or en ga ging in experimental man ipul ation s of vi si on ; how ever, the colourfun ction cha nges in such cases so that th e objectivity, or reality, of th e coloure d thing is lost. Beside s, coloured areas are only one of the many possible struct ures of colour - others, such as glow, gloss, the colour of tran sparent things or of lighti ng, are omitted in such an account of colour. No more than spa tia l directi on is colour an inert comp one nt of an abso lu te obj ect. To show this, Merleau Ponty embarks on a detailed discuss ion of lighting. Lighting has usu ally been regarded as so me thi ng essentially ins ubs tantial, while colour has been cons ide red part of an object in itself. However, tradition al painting reveals th at lighting itself solidifies in to a th in g as soo n as it is focuse d up on in stead of bein g taken for gra nted . If it is to fun ction as lighting, it must not itse lf be the object of our gaze but rath er, that which draw s our gaze in such a way as to see the rest. In the previo us chapte r, we saw that in order to apprehe nd mo vem ent, th e perceiver mu st focus on the figures rathe r than on th e background of his ph en omen al field. We see now that the rev erse is true of the structu re lighting-obj ect lighted : in orde r to appreh en d ligh tin g as ligh ting, the perceiver mu st not seize on it with his gaze, but must allow it to stay in the ba ckg round . In its fun ction as lighting, light has a d irec tion and meaning ('se ns ') which th e body un derstands and to w hich it responds wi thout any need for reflectio n. Merleau-Ponty showed in hi s earlier di scussion of spee ch that meaning is not a property of discrete words or speech eleme nts but rather, that

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word s have a meaning only in sofar as they form part of an organ ically related sys tem. The same is true of colour: things have a colour not because they are isolated in -itselfs, but becau se they are esse n tially related to one ano the r as parts of a perceptual fie ld. Alread y in the ' Preface' and the ' Introd uction' to his Plrenomenology, Merleau -Ponty pointed out that perception as such requires figure-background art icul ation s; moreover, from th e last chap ter we know th at such articulations in volve spatial dimen sion s like depth, w hich have th eir so urce in th e lived spa tiality of th e ph en om en al body. In th e present cha p ter, w e becom e aware of th e role play ed by lighting in the articulation of th e perceptual field. Lighting is that which enables coloured things to stand o ut, or figure, in our vision ; hen ce it is itself prior to ' the d istin ction between colours and luminositi es' (be ing that wh ereby these come into being for us). In the previou s chap ter, w e saw that th e distorti on s of spatiality ind uced by glasse s or mirrors do not cease to be d istorting until the subject begins to inha bit the new spec tacle through the adjusting of spatial levels. Th e sa me ap plies now to lighting: to fun ction as suc h, lighting mu st ceas e to be an object confronting us and beco me instead our environment in which we take up our positi on. When lighting is allowe d to fun ction in this manner, a ne w colour level is established . If we switch on our electri c lamp, the light initially appears yellow; however, it soon assumes the function of lighting and thus creates a 'new atmos phe re' in which colours are distribu ted in accorda nce with th e degree and kind of resi stan ce which th e var io us o bjects offer. A blu e paper looks blue in gaslig ht even thou gh it tran smits exactly the same mi xture of rays to the retina as are transmitt ed in daylight by a brown paper. Far from bein g give n as fixed qu aliti es, colours come to be determinat e in relati on to a level consti tuted by th e pheno me non of lightin g; moreover, that level is itself va ria ble, being th e struc turing of o ur visu al field in one of a wh ole va rie ty of ways. Th e genesi s of determinate colours therefore dep ends o n colourfunctions which enable colours to become determin ate in relatio n to a level of lighting. As Merleau -Ponty stresses, ' the lev el is laid down, and with it all the colour values dep endent up on it , as soon as we begin to live in the prevailin g atmo sphere and re-a llot to objects th e colours of the spec tru m in accordance with the requirements of thi s basic convention'. The only way of inha biting thi s new setti ng is through ' a bodi ly op era tion ' which directs our gaz e,

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via th e agency of lighting, in such a way that we appreh end th e thi ng as ' real'. Lighting end ow s th in gs with thei r ' tru e' colours throu gh an interaction of all pa rts of the vis ual field ; con seq uently, lighting is not in cid ental, but essen tial to vis ion. Th e ' log ic of lightin g' is wha t makes possibl e th e emerge nce of a cohe rent spectacle. We have seen that colour is not first and foremost a determin ate qu ality, bu t the way in which an objec t modulates light in coming into bein g as an object for us. Since such modulati on has to do with a total confi guratio n inv olving all th e other ob jects in our vis ua l fie ld, it is clear th at colour constancy is inseparable from th e constancy of things and, further, from ' the primor di al consta ncy of the world ' as the horizon of o ur visual field and, of course, of all ou r experiences. Colour con stancy - and mo re generally, pe rcep tual constancy - is not a matt er of a th in g's po ssessing stable cha racteristics . Rather, it is th at self-evide nce in which th e thing as ' intersensory unity' speaks to our pe rcep tual powers in such a way that we, as incarnate subjectivi ties, understand its style in an apprehens ion which simultaneou sly gives us a certain clarity and a certain richness of perceptual detail. In orde r to appreciate the sign ificance of this conclusion , we mus t cons ider more closely th e meaning of modulating ligh t. We have seen that Merl eau-Ponty speaks of this modul ation in terms of the resistance which the object offers to light. It is th erefore readil y understand abl e that the modulati on of light, whic h brin gs about th e stru cturation of a visual field , ha s to do wit h th e texture of the th in g. Colour and texture are conseq ue n tly inse pa rab le; th e visual and tactile powers of the perceiv ing subject are mutually implicatory and gea r in to one ano the r. In th e case of touch, th e part pla yed by movem ent and time is mor e apparent than in th e case of vision, because in see ing we ha ve th e illusion of atta in ing every th ing simultaneo us ly and ins tanta neously whereas in tou ching we are aw are of th e time unfold ed in the mov eme nt of our hand ove r th e tactile ob ject. It is importan t to notice, moreover, that the noti on of resistance already im plies the other sensory realms as well - for example, the th in g's textu re offers a cer tai n resistance to sound (muffled or not) and con no tes a certain smell and taste. In short, the th ing has an in tersensory unity co rresponding to th at synthetic totality of sensory powers w hich is the inc arnate su bject. Th at balan ce of clarity and richness which w e encountered with reference to vi sion, mu st therefore be

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exten ded to include the other se nsibilities. Thu s th e thing is selfev ide nt or ' real' when th e body, as comprehensive syn the si s of interse nsory powers, has a hold o n the thing as inter sensory object. Th er e is therefore a general perceptual op tim um whic h has to do w ith the bal ance of clarity and richness in all the sensory fields as the y gear into one ano the r. Fina lly, it should be noted th at althoug h the th ing is inseparable fro m th e perceiver - being constituted as a thing in the latt er's grip on the world - ne verthe less , it is a thing in- itself for us. The th in g has a resistance, in dica ting a no n- h uma n core whic h preven ts its ever being absorbed into th e perceivin g su bject. lf we take serio usly the var iou s sensory res is tances of the thin g d iscus sed above, as well as the intersen sory unity of th e thin g, th en we will ha ve no di fficulty in countering id eali sm . Further, we mu st di spense with th at preju dice accordi n g to which objectivi ty is eq ua ted with completen ess. The coming into being of th e th in g for the pe rcei ver involves a mod ulatio n which is incomprehe nsible in the ab sen ce of time . Merlea u- Ponty th erefore sho ws that the thi ng's objectivity is inse parable from its ope n-ende d natu re, and hen ce also from th at fu nda me ntal ambigu ity which is involved in the richness of percept ion.

Notes 1.

Sartre, 'Introduction': 'The Pursuit of Being', Being and Nothingness: a Ph enomenological Essay on Ontology, Hazel Barnes (trans .), (N ew

York: Washington Square Press, 1966) pp. 3ff.

4 Others and the Human World* In th e pr eviou s chapters of th is part of the Phenomenology , Merleau-Ponty has pr esented a deta iled phen omenological descrip tion of th e genesis of o bjectiv ity . We have see n th at far fro m be ing given, objec tivity comes into being through a bod y- world dialog ue whose foundat ion is the body-subject' s primor di al power of ancho ring itself in a pr e-ob jective world th rou gh the exercise of its sensory orga ns . We have see n that things become 'real' whe n the body-subject, as a comprehe nsive intersen sory power, has a g rip on th em as inters ensory objects. We have seen that th is ' hold ' involves a gea ring of the bod y to th e worl d and moreover, that it implies moti on , tem poralit y, incompleteness and ambiguity. We have seen th at altho ugh things are in sep arable fro m th e perceiver, being constituted in the latter's hold on th e wo rld , they are nonetheless objec tive . Th in gs thus ha ve an in depe nde nce - but not an absolute indep en dence; they are inthe mse lves for us . Th ings have a constancy, an id entity; yet we hav e seen tha t it is not a matt er of their possessing stable ine rt p rop erties. Rathe r, the thing's id entity is a dyn amic 'style of exis tence ' wh ich emerges in the way in whic h that thing in vit es, and res po nds to, perceptual exp lora tio n . Th us colour, for example, is no t a fixed quality; in st ead , colour constancy has to do with the manner in which the thing dr aws th e bod y- subject's gaze an d th e kind of resistance it offers to visu al exp lora tio n . We have seen th at the thi ng 's way of modulating light is also ind icative of its texture, its flexib ility, its weight, and its so no rity when struck. The th ing 'speaks' to the variou s sensory pow ers without eve r collapsing into the perceiver; obj ectivit y and perceptual experience arc simultaneo us ly in separable and irred ucib le. Thing and perce iver .. In an e ffort to remain as d ose as possibl e to the original text, I am translating 'Autrui' as 'Others', rather than as 'Other Selves'.

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gear into one another without either becoming ab sorbed into th e othe r. Far from being found ready-made, determinate sizes, sha pes and colours com e into bein g from a general atmosphere established by those 'levels' which the body-subject lays down in taking anchorage in a world. The eme rgence of obj ectivity requires the inhabiting of thi s ge ne ral atmosphere by the ' natural self' . Since our perception is not restricted to things and th e natural world, however, it is not eno ugh to show that obj ectivity is the outcome of a pre-person al dialogue whose term s are the phenom en al body and the pre-obj ective world . In thi s final chapter of 'The Perceived World ', Merleau-Ponty th erefore examines Our perception of othe rs and the cultural world. It is now a qu esti on of describing the ge nes is of subjectivity - that is, of sho wing how specifically cultural objects and other peopl e come into bein g for us , how they manifest themselves in our reawaken ed experience. We will find the same basic features in th e phenom en on of subjectivity th at we have already discovered in the ph en omenon of obj ectivity; and if we have understood the latt er, th en the former will not pose any diffi cult y for us. Th e transiti on is readily apparent: we are proceeding from a consi de ration of how we 'perceive 'objects, to a consideration of how we perceiv e cultural objects - how , despite their 'no n- human core', o bjects can manifest an eleme nt of humanity. Thi s will bring us to the more general questi on of how humanity com es into being for us - that is, how other subjectivities make their appearan ce in our expe rie nce . Traditionall y, the entire issu e ha s been dealt with as ' the problem of other minds'; and in the very way in wh ich thi s has been phrased we can alread y det ect the source of the d ilemmas to which it ha s given rise. If subjectivity is reduced to mind - or con stituting consciousness - th en the existence of any subjectivity o the r th an one's own becom es utt erly incomprehensibl e. It is of no avail to prote st that th e ego can posit other con sciou sn esses as simultaneous ly en gaged in cons tituting the world ; for its very positing of those consciou sn esses renders th e ego su preme by collapsing the others into mere moments of its own activity. Solips ism is therefore th e pri ce one pa ys for reducing su bjectivity to mind which, as a cons titu ting cons ciousness, is characterized by transparency and completen ess. However, solipsi sm is an untenable position because its very articulation req uires the use of an intersu bjective lan guage which belies th e claim s it is

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propo undi ng. Besides, the pre-reflectiv e experien ce and the behaviour of the declared solipsi st con tinually subvert hi s alleged solips is m - thereby making it not o nly an untenable po sition but also a dish on est one, in sofar as it always alread y surre p titio us ly presupposes that which it attempts to deny. How, th en , has traditional philosophy tried to account for o ur actual experience of living in a world with other subj ectiviti es? The typical approach ha s been to invoke the 'argume n t from analogy', according to which I deduce th e existence of others from the behaviour of the bodies which I perceive, by reasoning via analogy from the correlation between my own 'conscious st ates' and th e behaviour of my bod y.' As we might expect, th ere are several problem s in seeking to base intersubjectivity on an alogy . Since the argument is predicated on th e old mind-body dualism , it falls prey to all the difficulties of du alism which Merleau-Ponty has already di scussed in detail in his earlier chapters. At the core of these diffi culties, as w e have see n, is the lack of any commo n gro und between conscious ness conce ived as pure 'for-itse lf ' an d body cons ide red as pure ' in-its elf '; moreover, the argument from analogy presupposes what it se ts itself to explain. Th e argu me n t is formulated in language and pr esented for someone; hen ce, it tacitly presupposes the exist en ce' of others . In addition , the comparison of othe rs' emotional expressio ns with our ow n ass umes that self-pe rception is anteri or to, and the basis for, th e perception of o the rs; ye t the reverse is in fact the case. Conse q ue ntly, self-pe rce ption cannot serv e as th e foundation for an argument abo ut th e exis tence of 'othe r minds'. Merleau-Ponty's referen ce to th e behavi our of small children is es peci ally relevant here. As he points out, a fifteen-month- old baby ope ns its own mouth if so meo ne pretends to bite one of its fingers. Clearl y, it is not a matter of th e baby's first perceivin g its own expr ession on the occasio n of intending to bite so me thi ng, then perceiving th e exp ress ion of the body whose mouth is movin g towards its finger, and finall y, reas oning by analogy that there is behind thi s approac hi ng mouth a con sciou sn ess with intent to bite. Instead of such an elabo rate reasonin g procedure by a transparent, selfsufficie nt con sciousness, w e have here an incarnate su bject who, as incarnate inten tionality, percei ves other incarnate intentio nalities directly because it and they are int ernally relat ed . In th e chap ter 'The Body as Expression and Spee ch ', we saw that intention s are not mental entities essentially indep endent of a

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Others and the Human World

mechan isti c body; we discovered instead a bodil y inten tionality wh ich 'speaks to' othe r phenomenal bod ies and is comprehe nde d by them pri or to any reflection on either side . Thus in th e present example, the baby does not thematize its own int entions but perceives them directly in its body - it simply feels its mouth as an appa ratus for biting. By the same token , the bab y neither posits the exis tence of othe rs nor deduces their intention s by ana logy with its ow n; rather, it perceives oth ers' bodies with its ow n ph en om enal bod y an d th ereby directly perceives th eir intentions. O the rs' int enti on s and its own form a sing le pre-reflectiv e intersubjec tive system in which there is no ne ed for any tran slat ion. Of course , it is always possible for the adult to engage in reasoning by anal ogy; bu t such reason ing is the exception rather than th e norm and is employed precisely when the in ters ubjective world somehow breaks down or is deliberately put in abeyance. For th e child, there is no 'problem of other minds' becau se th e int ersubjective world is self-evide n t; in fact, the ch ild's exp erien ce is at the oppos ite extreme insofar as he is totally oblivious to th e persp ectivity of incarn ate consciousness and to th e meaning of private sub jectivity. It is impo rtant therefore to describ e the genesis of subjectivity in terms of th e emergence of human personality from that pre-p erson al exis tence of th e body whi ch is its foundation. The noti on of 'bo dy ima ge ' pla ys a crucial role in th e ph en omenological descripti on of th e pre-person al realm of our exis tence. As we saw in th e first part of th e Phenomenology, classical psychology has employed the term to design ate a representation of th e va rious points of the body as a sys tem of externa lly related parts ('partes extra partes'); however, this mechanisti c conce ption proved to be at odds with our actual experience as highlighted by th e breakdowns whic h Merleau-Ponty con sidered. Co nseq ue ntly, the noti on of body image had to undergo a rad ical tran sformation in volvin g a di stinction between the ' customary' or ' habitual body' and th e bod y lived at a particular mom ent on the basis of such an acquired body. Thus the habitual modes of interacting w ith the world were show n to sediment themselves in th e bo d y and becom e that cruc ial acq uis ition w ithout whi ch th e freedo m th at is character istic of person al existence would be precluded . For phenom en ology, the bod y ima ge wa s not a mental representati on of the ph ysiological body cons idered as a mech an isti c sys tem merely extern ally related to its env ironmen t. On th e contrary, ph en orne-

nology di sclosed the body image as the pre- person al awareness of the ph en om enal body polarized by the w orld of its habitual tasks. In the present ch apter, we see that this revi sed body image encompasses not only the natural world, but also othe r human bein gs and the cultural world. Th e child is alread y situated in an intersubjective cu ltu ral world and from infancy on de velops habitual modes of relating to thi s human world through his bodily powers. It is in and through s uch pre- reflective interaction that the child grad ua lly develops a con cep t of subjectivit y. Language is an important part of thi s human world and th e child appropriates it before eve r using it consciously to ar ticulate his selfhood . Further, as Merleau-Ponty emphasizes here , pre-personal existence - wh eth er that of th e child developing into a person or that of the adult sit ua ting himself in the pre -reflectiv e realm of hi s tasks - is cha racterize d by dial ogu e. Others and the cultural world become part of the body image and are understood prior to any reflection. We hav e already seen th at the body is primordially expressiv e, and it is so by and for human beings. It is th e phenomen al body which comprehe nds, appropriates. and sediments the human ~orld into its own d yn ami c struc ture. Moreover, th e appreh en sion of the intersubjectiv e world poses no more problem at the pre-reflective level than do es th e app rehe nsion of on e' s own limbs; for jus t as th e body's di fferent sensory realms gear into one anothe r and op en onto an interse nsory field , so the intersen sory field s of different individ uals gear into each other and op en onto an intersubj ective world . Since personal existence, being inherently temporal, is frau ght with ambiguity and opacity, the opacity and amb iguity of int erpersonal life should come as no surpris e. Just as I am o utru n by my own pa st and future and supported by an an onymou s bodily existence, or 'n atural se lf ', so too I am outrun by othe rs and th ey by me. Thus the ' kern el of tru th ' in th e solipsist posit ion is that of non-c oincidence - I am unable eve r to coincide with othe rs, to experie nce their experiences as th ey themselves do. But on th e other hand, I never entirely coincid e with myself either, because self-awareness on principle implies a dis tanci ng and because my ow n expe riences are continually rem ad e by time. All atte mpts to recon struct my own past as I actuall y lived it, are doomed to failure; hen ceforth that pa st eludes me and can exis t only in an 'ambiguous pr esence '. Yet in both cases - and th is is

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O thers and the Human World

wh at th e solipsist fails to acknowled ge - I am essentially open ; I am open to my own past and to other people, I exist with othe rs in a commo n world in which my experi en ce inte rweaves with theirs. It sho uld be noted that the refutati on of solips ism does not in and of itself suffice to es tablish thi s primord ial recip rocity with o the rs in an "interw orld' which we all in ha bit. Sar tre, for example, rejects solipsism but presents a ph en om en ological description of our 'concrete relations with others' wh ich contrasts sha rply with that prov ided by Merleau-Ponty. Sartre declares th at th e expe rience of conflict with th e other is th e basis of our conscious ness of others. Far from bein g 'a n ontological struc ture of hu man -reality', th e experience of being-with-others (th e 'we ') is merely 'a certa in particular experience which is produced in special cases' and is based on th e prior experience of being objectif ied by othe rs or of objectifying them by o ur look. Th e experie nce of communi ty is an inhe rently un stabl e and derivative expe rie nce for Sartre, and it is sig nificant that he cons ide rs ' the be st example of the "we" [to] be furn ished us by th e spe ctator at a th eatri cal pe rfor mance ' who is non -theti cally awa re of ' being a co-spec tato r of the spec tacle' . Sartre concl udes th at ' the very nature of th e We-subject implies that it is made up of only fleeting expe riences wi tho ut metaphysica l bea ring '; that the experience of bei ng with othe rs is a ' fragmentary, strictly psychological' expe rience wh ich 'reveals no th ing particular; it is a purely subjecti ve Erlebnis' rath er than 'the revelation of a dimension of real existe nce'. In short, according to Sartre it is 'useless for human-reality to seek to get out of thi s d ilemma: one mu st either transcend the O the r or allow o neself to be transcended by him. Th e essence of the relati on s between consciousnesses is not the Mitsein; it is co nflic t,.2 For Merleau -Ponty, it is on th e con trary the experience of con flict wh ich is deri vative, while th at of community ha s ontologica l priority and indee d reveals an essen tial dimen sion of our real exis te nce as we have see n . Merleau-Ponty poi nts ou t (witho ut mentioning Sartre by name) that the 'i n human gaze' by which othe rs o bjectify me, an d I them, presupposes o ur withdrawing from our pre-reflective inter-active presen ce, 'into the core of our thin kin g nature' and in to an ' inactive' existence . Thi s withdraw al is experien ced as such ; th ereb y confirming the existence of that wh ich it ha s chosen to ab andon . Thus the alienating look of the ot her di sturbs me, wh ereas the gaze of a dog or cat does not, precisely beca use th e former replaces potential communication

with a repudia tion, w hich itself remain s 'a form of communication '. The so urce of th is fundamental differen ce between the pos ition of Sartre and th at of Merleau-Ponty, lies in the fo rm er's failure to provid e any ' third term' between conscio usness and bei ng (be tween 'le neant' or ' pour-sci ', and 'l'etre' or 'en-soi' L'' Sartre ultimately misses the ph enomenon of inca rna te subjectivity _ that inheren ce of conscious ness in the bod y and the world whic h is th e cent ral th em e of Merleau -Ponty's entire Phenomeno logy . In th e abs ence of suc h a body-subject, Sartre can no t es tablish th at bodily intentiona lity w hi ch links my expe rience dia lectically with th at of ano the r bod y-subject so that we arc able to find th e prolongat ion and fulfilm en t of our intention s in each othe r prior to any reflectio n and th ereb y bec ome mutually enr iched . Merleau Ponty's ph en om en ological description of the bod y and of the pe rceived world cons titutes a refutation of th e kind of view which Sar tre presents rega rdi ng my perception of the other's bod y and the na ture of our relation sh ip. Sartre must th erefore be consi dered wron g in claiming that th e primary relation is not one between my bo dy and that of th e othe r; that such an inter-corpor eal relati on wo uld be 'purely externa l' ; that th e other's bod y is merely 'a secondary st ruc tu re' for me, an 'episode' in my project of ' making an objec t of th e O the r' ; that ' th e Other's bod y is ... the tool which I am not and which I utilize (or wh ich res ists me, w hich amou nts to th e same th in g). It is presented to me originally wi th a certai n objective coefficie nt of utility and of ad versity" Merleau -Ponty's phen om enological de scription docs no t, of course, ru le out th e possibility of utilizing th e othe r's bod y as a mere tool; how ever, that possibility is based on a prior development of subjectivity through a sustaine d interaction of an entirely different so rt with o the r people. I am not first an d forem ost a spec tacle for an alien consc ious ness, or a spectator of others; rathe r, as a bod y-subj ect I enjoy an anteri or orga nic relations hi p to the n atural an d th e human world. My body's insertio n int o th e wo rld is the condit io n of my interacting with other people. As we have see n, my bo dy is always perspectival- I never h ave an allenco mpassing hold o n the world; there is th erefore room for othe r inca rna te subjectivities , and their po ints of view comp leme nt my own . The ir bod y expresses th eir intention s and I perceiv e th ose intentio ns with my ow n bod y; ins ofar as my bod y take s up th e othe r's intentions, there is an internal relation betw een our bo dies . It is thu s first of all the body which opens itself to o thers

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and responds to them; there is a mutual presence of in carnate subjects which precedes any alienation. The hold on the world which others have - and which they are - enriches me by enabling me to achieve a more comprehensive view of the world than is offered by my own hold alone. Far from being mutually exclusive, these multiple modes of being-in-the-world are internally related and form a social world. Just as in the perception of objects our perspectives 'slip into' each other and are brought together in the thing, so my perspective and that of other people 'slip into' each other and are brought together in a shared social world. Like the natural world, the social world is not 'a sum of objects' but a 'permanent field ' with which we are in contact by the simple fact of existing, prior to any objectification or judgement about it. Merleau-Ponty points out that although I can turn away from the social world, I cannot 'cease to be situated relatively to it'. We already have an internal relation to the natural world in virtue of our possessing sensory functions and, as we have seen, it is impossible to sever the natural and the social, or to declare the one a 'lower layer'. The ambiguity which characterizes the phenomenal body therefore also pervades the social world; however, this ambiguity is not a defect to be deplored, since it is the very condition of our being human at all. Like the thing, the interworld lends itself to unending exploration, unending articulations, and ever fresh discoveries. Nonetheless, like the thing and the natural world, others and the human world are the very stuff of that pre-logical certainty which Merleau-Ponty will describe more fully in the next chapter.

Notes 1. It should be noted that modern philosophers have approached ' the problem of other minds' from various angles and have developed several different arguments to refute solipsism. For a discussion of the argument from analogy, behaviourism, the two-meanings view, the expression theory, the criteriological view, and the identity theory, see for example The Philosophy of Mind, V. C. Chappell (ed.), (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1962). 2. Sartre, 'Concrete Relations With Others', Being and Nothingness: a Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, pp. 534-59. Admittedly, there are passages in Being and Nothingness in which 3. Sartre seems to go beyond such a Cartesian dualism to a view of incarnate consciousness more like that which Merleau-Ponty sub-

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sequently developed in the Phenomenology of Perception . In this connection, one might mention Sartre's own criticism of Cartesian dualism (for example, see 'Introduction: The Pursuit of Being', pp. 3ff) as well as parts of his discussion of 'Th e Body', such as: 'Being-for-itself must be wholly body and it must be wholly consciousness; it can not be united with a body ... '(po 404); 'We know that there is not a for-itself on the one hand and a world on the other as two closed entities ... ' (p. 405); 'The point of view of pure knowledge is contradictory; there is only the point of view of engaged knowledge ... ' (p. 407); 'The body is nothing other than the for-itself an engaged contingent being among other contingent beings for the for-itself, to exist and to be situated are one and the same ' (p. 408); , ... the very nature of the for -itself demands that it be body . . . ' (p. 409); 'My body is co-existive with the world, spread across all things, and at the same time it is condensed into this single point which I am without being able to know it ... ' (p. 420): 'The body is lived and not known.' (p. 427); , . . _glasses, pince-nez, monocles, eic., which become, so to speak, a supplementary sense organ' (p. 433); 'The body is the totality of meaningful relations to the world' (p. 452); 'Thus my perception of the Other's body is radically different from my perception of things' (p. 453). 'These frowns, this redness, this stammering ... these do not express anger; they are anger .... Thus it is not necessary to resort to habit or reason by analogy in order to explain how we understand expressive conduct. This conduct is originally released to perception as understandable; its meaning is part of its being just as the color of the paper is part of the being of the paper' (p. 455). Yet despite these and similar passages, Sartre's position remains fundamentally dualistic and thus lacks that 'third term' which forms the nucleus of Merleau-Ponty's entire philosophy. It seems to me that the latter is essentially correct in his assessment when he declares that Sartre is 'a good Cartesian'; that 'in Sartre there is a plurality of subjects but no intersubjectivity': that 'the apparent paradox of his work is that he became famous by describing a middle ground . . . between consciousness and things - the root in Nausea, viscosity or situation in Being and Nothingness . . . - and that nonetheless his thought is in revolt against this middle ground and finds there only an incentive to transcend it'; that 'contrary to appearances, being-far-itself is all Sartre has ever accepted, with its inevitable correlate: pure being-in-itself .... there is no hinge, no joint or mediation, between myself and the other'; that 'there is an encounter rather than a common action because, for Sartre. the social remains the relationship of "two individual consciousnesses" which look at each other'; that 'commitment in Sartre's sense is the negation of the link between us and the world that it seems to assert; or rather [that] Sartre tries to make a link out of a negation'; and that if, unlike Sartre. one recognizes a genuine "in terwo rld ", then it is no longer a question of 'either him or me,' or an 'alternative of solipsism, or pure abnegation', because the relation-

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Part II: Th e Perceiv ed W orld ships 'in private [and] in public history ... are no longer the encounter of two For-It selfs but are the mesh ing of two experie nces which, wi thout ever coinciding, belong to a single wo rld.' MerleauPanty, Adventu res of the Dialectic, Joseph Bien (tran s.), (Evans ton, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 1973) pp. 147, 158-9; 205, 137, 142, 152, 193, 200. Sar tre, 'The Bod y', Being and Nothingness, pp . 445-7.

Part III Being-for-Itself and Being-in -the- World

1 The Cogito

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As we en ter the final part of the Phenomenology, it is useful to recall briefly the major points of Merleau-Ponty's phenomen ological description so far. Already in the ' Preface', we learned th at Merleau -Ponty's basic endeavour in th is work is to awaken us to an awareness of our existence as incarnate subjects inh ering in the world. Reflection on our lived experience revealed that the bod y itself is not a system of externally relat ed parts but rather, that it is a dynam ic synthesis of mutually implicatory powers. As a comprehen sive proj ect of such internally related powers, the bod y itself alread y outlines the fundam ental features of the world in which the se pow ers continually find th eir realization. Neither the bod y nor th e world towards which the form er is a transcendence, can be comprehended in isolation . The body is only a body in so far as it is thi s tran scendence towards a world and by the sam e token , the world is only a world in sofar as it is thi s polarization of bodily powers. Non etheless, neither term is reducible to th e othe r, because tran scendence - as surpassing towa rds - implies objectivity, while objectivity comes into bein g only for a subject polari zed tow ards it, and that subject is most immediately the body as a 'natu ral self ' , The re is thus an internal relationship between the bod y and the world ; and it is with in thi s relati on sh ip that all meaning eme rges . Things are real wh en the body-subject has a hold on th em as intersensory objec ts; and that inevit ably in volves a measu re of ambiguity and inco mpleteness. Further, there is a genesis not only of objectivity, but also of subjectivity; and both po les of th is body- world di alectic man ifest a resistance to abso rption which renders them relati vely (but never ab solutely) indepe nde nt. The ge nes is of meaning was most directly shown to us in the chapter 'The Body as Expression and Speech', where we saw th at th e body-subject as a sp eaking sub ject find s itself alread y situa ted in a lan gu age which, as ve hicle of sed imented meanings, can be used to bring into being a new meaning. To speak of lan gu age is 109

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of course to enter th e realm of co-ex istence and culture. Merl eauPonty followed up hi s pr eli mi nary di scus sion of thi s realm with a more detailed descrip tion of the wa y in which not only things and the natural world, but also othe rs and the human world come in to being for th e incarna te sub ject. lt eme rged th at in sofa r as th in gs are apprehended within an alrea dy human context, th e natural and th e cultural orders merge into one anoth er an d are ultim ately inseparabl e. It would see m then that there is no need to d iscu ss the cogito - since the natural and the human world has been describe d, th er e wo uld see m to be nothing furth er to say. Wh y d oes Merl eau -Ponty nevertheless find it nec essary to prov id e a d iscu ssi on of the cogito? Is he simply so to sp eak ' paying his dues' to th e tradition which he has been criticizing th rough out th is work? I think not; on the contrary, it seems to me that the cha pter on the cogito is ab solutely cruc ial in establishing the ph ilosophical status of Merleau-Ponty's phenomeno logical description. Up to this po int, read ers of th e Phenomenology migh t well th in k that they can accept Merleau-Ponty's description of the bod y as the ' th ird term ' lying bet ween the extremes of mech ani sti c physiology and in tellectua lis t psychology. Th ey mi ght be prepared to agree w ith Merleau-Ponty th at there is a bodily synthesis in wh ich th e parts of our bod y are g iven to us immedi ately as already oriented towards th e perform an ce of tasks and the per ception of th ings in the world . Further, reader s might acknowled ge that there - is a bod ily spatiality of the so rt describe d by Merleau -Pon ty and that our perception of thi ngs has to d o with intern al and extern al horizons wh ich rul e out abs olutely exhaustive or unamb igu ous pe rcep tio ns. Fin ally, read ers migh t be pr epared to ad mit th at our perception of others is characterized by th e sa me o paci ty and am bi guity ; that our ges tures and our spe ech are neither cons truc ted no r sim ply 'triggered off' an d that our d ialog ue with others is not to be understood as th e translating and decod in g of rea d y- mad e thou ghts. All th is, then , may be conceded ; however, read er s may argue that th e description so far really belon gs to the d om ain of psycho logy and sociology - that it deals merely w ith the ma nner in which we live our d aily lives , ou r way of relating to thin gs, to our cultural heritage, and to others with whom we come in to con tact in our daily affairs. It may be said that of course we d o not preface our actions, our perce ptions, or our conve rsations with reflectio ns concerning the position of our limbs and the locati on of ob jects, or the sig n ifi-

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cance of the words we are abou t to utt er. It is perfectly obvio us that for the most part we carry o n our lives at a pre-reflective level. But does no t all thi s merely und er line - so it may be argue d - th e rad ical d isti nction between lived expe rie nce and reflection? Does it not empha size the peculia r natu re and tas k of a gen u ine ph ilosophy? O ur daily life, our perso nal existen ce might well be fra ught with am biguity, un certaint y and ob scur ity; for tun ately however, in doi ng philosophy we can transcend th ese elements and enter the realm of pure reflection . It is precisely th e task of phil osophy to clarify, to d isp el uncertainty an d amb iguity. Althou gh we do not in our daily exchanges with others translate read y-made thou ghts into sp eech , th is in no wa y in d icates - so it may be pointed out - th at we cannot take refuge in a domain of pure thou ght. In fact, it is precisely our failure to do th is which renders our pre-reflectiv e life opa q ue and am biguo us . How ever, if we pause to engage in reflection, we enter a realm of co nscious ness in which we can att ain the ki nd of clari ty essential to certai nty and tru th; and th is is surely the do main of any phil osophy worthy of the nam e. The pr esent chapter on the cogito add resses exactly these sorts of conce rns , which read ers of the Phenomenology mig ht well have at this point. The very attempt to es tablis h a realm of pure thou gh t as in dubitable grou nd of all kno wled ge or truth is therefore now sub mitted to investigatio n. The un derlying question is wh ether there can in fact be such a realm of pure ide as, of th ou gh ts lackin g all temporality or contin gency; wh ether there can be an ab solu te interior ity in wh ich cons cious nes s is utterly tran sparent to itself so that nothin g eludes its gras p . Like Descartes , Merleau -Pont y begins the invest igat ion with pe rceptio n and the recognition that 'our se ns es sometimes decei ve us'. Nonetheless, despite th e fact th at what I take to be an ash-try may tu rn out on closer in sp ection to be a paperweight or even just a sha dow cas t on the table by the sunlig ht filtering in to th e room, it would see m that m y act of perception itself - unlike its ob ject is abso lutely indubitable. Su rely I canno t be mist aken in thinking that I see an ash -tray; surely I can be in error only in sofar as I asse rt th e actu al existence of the ash- tray. Steeped as we are in th e Ca rtes ian trad ition of detach ing th e su bject from the ob ject, we ge ne rally consider su ch a separating of per ception from the pe rcept to pose no problem . How ever, at the con clusio n of th e chapter 'The Body as Expression and Speech ', Merleau-Ponty

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explicitly cautio ned us against ado pting thi s approach. We saw that the bod y itself is not an ob ject, nor o ur awareness of it an idea; moreover, we di scovered that the ambig uity inheren t in th e bo d y' s mod e of exis tence is not rest ricted to the bod y it self but 'spread s to the perceived wo rld in its entire ty' . Not only th e bod y, bu t things and othe r peopl e come into being for us; and our awa reness of th em is ultimately inseparable from that an on ym ou s dy na mic in terac tion with th e world which we find at th e level of p re-reflective life. In submitt ing the perceived wo rld to a trul y radical reflection , we found that th e object of perception is not a read y-mad e exis tence but rathe r, one pol e of a pre-p ersonal bodily expe rience; and hen ce, th at the traditional di stinction between the object's ap pea rance and its reality is funda men tally wrongheaded. In makin g expli cit th e the ory of perception which is already implicit in the phe no me nolog ical theory of th e body ima ge, th e previou s cha pt ers have made it clear that perception cannot be divo rced from it s object, because th e very structure of th e act already implies the exis tence of th at toward s which it is polari zed . Th e Cartes ian position which dissociates the actua l exis tence of th e th ing seen from our conscio usness of seeing it, is therefor e unten abl e. As Merleau-Ponty points out, 'if [ sec an ash -tray, ill the full sense of the word see, th ere mus t be an as h-tray there'. At thi s stage it might be retor ted that perception does not lead us into th e realm of pure thou ght because pe rception is a peculi ar sort of activi ty; an d th at we mu st th erefore adopt a different point of departure for our voy age in to the interior realm. Perceptio n - so it may be argued - inherently in volves the risk of error becau se it has to do w ith figure-background struc tures, wi th perspectives which canno t all be given Simultaneous ly. It is after all easy eno ug h to see that our perception of a tabl e, for example, always has to do with a cer tain ang le of the table - I see th e top of it while the bottom is hidden from me, or vice vers a. Conseq uently, there is a built-in un certainty abo ut pe rception which - so it may be claimed - ine vitably renders our thought ab ou t perception du bit ab le too . We therefore turn from pe rceptio n bea ring on ob jects in the world , to perception havin g to do exclusively with our ow n psyc hic states - we tum from 'outer' to 'inner' pe rception. Here, surely, conscious ness will be com pletely tran sp arent to itself and there will be no possibility of error. Our awaren ess of our psych ic

states will surely coinci de with their actual existence; we canno t after all be dec eived regarding our own feelin gs - to feel sad is to be sad and to love is to be conscio us of loving. We might thus argue that the circu it of our own subjec tivity constitu tes a sphere of absolu te cert ainty. As Merleau-Pont y shows, howev er, this is not the case ; we do in fact di stinguish be tween ' true ' and 'false' emo tions . Love, for example, can be mi staken or illu sory; hence, far from bein g tran sp arent to itself, it is profoundly amb iguous . This ambig uity is eve n more apparent in cases of hysteria: to ma intai n that th e pa tient is delib erately making an error with resp ect to his own emotions or that he is feign in g them , is to miscons tru e his experience; but on the other hand, th e patient readily recognizes the dif ference between the terror he feels when confro nted with a rea l weapon, an d that wh ich he feels in face of the insubstantia l dagger called up by his hall ucination s. Thou gh tempting, it is useless to inv oke an unconsciou s here, as Merleau-Ponty po ints out.! Like external perception, interna l perception is always incomplete, alw ays ope n -ended , becau se it also is a tran scendence of the human bei ng towa rds th e world . Our emo tio ns cannot be isolated from the world; the consciousness of lovin g is th e consciousness wh ich we have of situating ourselves in the world in a particular w ay. Our contact with our emo tions is therefore always 'achieved only in the sphe re of amb iguity' . If even our 'inner states' are thus open to illusions, does not illusion itself become a meaningless term? How are we ever to desc ribe an y of our psychic states as authentic in the absence of any invaria ble criterio n or measu rin g rod, any abso lute truth agai ns t which our ' inner' and 'o uter' perception s can be judged to be ge nuine or illusory? In short, do we not condemn ou rselves to endless doubt if we accept thi s analysis of inner and ou ter pe rce ptions? In an effort to avoid such a situation, we may turn to the underst an ding in a fin al atte mpt to ach ieve th e abs olute self-coincide nce of thought. The understanding after all deals with the so rts of proofs an d truths whic h would see m to preclu de th e o paci ty and ambiguity encountered so far . Merleau -Ponty th erefore examines th e kind of truths with wh ich geome try deals, and reveals that th e geo me ter's thought does not in fact coinci de with itself. The geo me ter's thinkin g never manages to tran scend pe rceptual conscious ness altoge the r, beca use it is ultimately based o n

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Partlll: Being- f ar-It self and Being- in-the- w orld

th e geo me ter' s experience of real trian gles . The truths of geometry ar e rooted in the sp ati ality and motility of th e geometer 's ow n bod y. The truths of geomet ry ar e therefore sus taine d by the o rigi nal intentionality of the body; they arc in fact expression s based on the bod y-subject as primordi ally exp ressive. The geom eter alread y ope rates within a uni verse of d iscourse which he takes for gran ted . His truths ar e not pure self-sustaining thou ghts but rather, cultural objects whic h are necessarily linked to conc re te acts of expression . Merleau -Pont y conse q uen tly turns to a reexamina tion of language and of the rela tionsh ip between thou ght and sp eech . Thi s examinati on reveals that there is in fact no pu re tran scend ent thought beh ind lan gu age but rather, that 'lang uage tran scends itself in speech' . Expression is inherently tem poral and always ret ain s ' its coefficient of facticity'. No an alysi s can rid lan gu age of it s fundam ental ob scurity; the search for a rea lm of pure th ou ght, of ab solu te etern al tru th , has tu rn ed out to be a doomed effort. Every thou ght abo ut thou ght has shown itself to be ultimately rooted in perceptual consc ious ness, thereby leavi ng us with 'a temporal thi ckn ess', wit h a contingency wh ich cannot be con jur ed away. Noneth eless, what has to be reali zed is that thi s obsc uri ty, thi s ambiguity, is not the index of any defect or d eficien cy but rather, that it is the very cond ition of Our access to knowl edge, self-evid ence, certainty and truth. Th ere is, finally, no realm of self-sustain ing thou ght, no realm of 'p ure reflection ' in the trad iti onal sense, to which philosophy could withdraw . And ye t, our extern al and in tern al percepti on s are self-affirm in g; 'there are tru th s, just as th ere ar e perception s'. lt is up to the philosop her to bring to O U T awareness O U f fundam ental 'being-in-truth', to reveal the realm of d iscourse u pon whic h the sp oken cogito d raws and to point to th e un sp oken - or tacit- cogito which forms its prim ord ial background . Let us cons ider th e cogito itself in more detail. Th e cogito is first of all a thou ght formed at a part icular tim e in a particular place by a parti cular philosopher - Descartes - who was h imself situa ted in a particul ar cultural orde r and th in king within a particul ar ph ilosoph ical tradition . That th ought, em bod ied in Descart es' writings, itse lf became part of the cultural- philosophical acq u isition of su bseq uen t thinkers - such as Merleau-Pon ty. The cogito is ther efore 'a cultural be in g' wh ich can be taken up and rethought; and our own tho ught, in reach ing out to it, th ereby itse lf re-e nacts

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th e cogito and can subsequently su bmit its own act to reflection . Desca rtes believed the cogito to be etern ally true ; in reflecting on his cogito and our own via Merleau-Ponty's phen om en ological descrip tion we will con sequently need to recon sid er th e nature of tru th. We have seen th at th e ' natural atti tude to things' makes us oblivious of th e incarnate su bject' s contribu tion to th e perceived world ; moreover, we ha ve seen th at realism goes on to claim that th in gs and id eas exist in th em selves. In calling for a return to the su bject, the Cartes ian cogito thus em bo dies a valid insight. O ur experience of th ings as transcend ent in di vidual objects and our recognition of id eas as id eas, req uire th at we proj ect ourselves towards them in a certain way; thei r exis tence for us as things and ideas resp ecti vely, depends upon our actualizi ng our primord ial power of know in g them as such. Th eir existence as tran scendent beings implies, however, that we do not know them exha us tive ly and w ill never acq uire an all-enco mpassing grasp of th em. This inherent measure of ign orance in our awareness of things and ideas raises the Socratic pr obl em of how we can sim ultan eously know something sufficiently to seek it and to recognize it whe n we encoun ter it , yet not know it, so as to prompt us to seek it. The ph enom en ological response to th is classic problem consis ts in sho wing - as Merleau-Pont y has don e in th e pr evio u s chaptersthat o ur relationship to th e world and to ourselves is n ot an 'all or not hing' affair; neither do we simply invent things by endowing th em wit h wh atever we su bsequently asc ribe to th em , nor do we run u p aga inst them as en tit ies exis ting en tirely in them selves w hich we merely observe. O ur per cepti on and reasoni ng arc neither blind nor transparen t; instead, as we have seen, there is a knowing wh ich lies between the trad it ion al extremes of realism on the o ne han d and idealism on the other. Its parti al va lid ity notwithstand ing. the Cartesian return to the self mi sses this th ird kind of knowing and it s po sit ing of clear and di stinct ideas, or 'eternal essences ', exis ting in a translucent, timeless mind - the th in kin g ego. The latter 's absolute se lf-possession rul es out receptivit y as well as any sor t of inheren ce in the world - includi ng eve n its own personal hi story. Thus the Cartesian consciousn ess is ultima tely God ; moreover, its ab solute thought precludes th e existence of any oth er cons ciousn ess, thereby condem ni ng it to a so lips istic ex istence. We saw in the last cha pter why ' the constitu ting consc io us ness is necessaril y unique an d uni versal' and why a philoso ph y whi ch

Part III: Being-for-Itself and Being-in-the-World

The Cogito

affirms th e existence of such a consciousness falls into irresolvable difficulties. We mu st therefore resolutely abando n th is ab solute cogito whi ch ejects us from the world, blocks int ersubjectivity and dest roy s temporality; instead , we mu st pu rsu e the ph enomenological description of our relations hi p with things, othe rs, id eas and ourselves, so as to arrive at a cogito compa tible with our lived expe rie nce. In sho rt, we mu st elaborate the natu re of th at ' hold ' on th e world and on ourse lves which makes our expe rience possible while preventing its eve r becom ing completely tran sp arent for us. Earlier, we saw that our percepti on by its very natu re adheres to the world, and that Descartes was funda me n tally mi sgu ided in etle mpting to seve r th e tw o term s by tran sform in g perception into an ind ub ita ble th ou ght w hile declaring th e actua l exis tence of the perceived world to be un certain .' The prev ious cha pters showed u s that percept ion is not a third person process or psych ic fact occurring in ·us, and that our co nscious ness of percepti on is not a ' passive noting' of a self-contai ned eve nt. Nor is the awareness of perception pure construc tion by an all-inclusive con stituting consci ousness; rather, we have seen that percepti on is the transcending of a bod y-subject towards a wo rld and that thi s action always involves an ambig uo us se lf-awa reness . The certai nty of see ing or hearing is insepa rabl e from th at bodily project wh ich is the act of seei ng or the act of hearing; hen ce th e pheno me no logical cogito unlike its Cartes ian counter pa rt - is the recog nition of that pri mordial project of tran scenden ce whic h is ou r very bein g. Far from ab sorbing ph enomen a in to pr ivat e psychi c states or decl aring them th e possession of a tran slucent tho ught, th e ph enomen ological cogito di scloses the ind issolu bility of th e link between our being and tha t of the wor ld; it affirms our prereflectiv e ' hold' on ourselves as 'being-in-the-world'. The fact th at we are primordially situa ted in th e wo rld preclud es our ever enjoying the self-transpare ncy of the Cartes ian conscious ness ; in stead , it renders o ur con tact with ourselves and the world inherently ambiguo us . Th e phrase ' being- in- the-world' expresses an exis ten tial relationship havin g an exis tential sig n ificance, rather th an a mental or mech ani cal relatio n ha ving a purely in tellectual or mechan istic mean ing. Conseque ntly, our own emotion s, for example, a re nei ther drives concea led from us in an uncon sci ou s realm, nor objects spread out for a disinterested ment al vie wi ng . On the contrary, our emo tions are lived ambiguously as an inextricable pa rt of our pre-reflectiv e ' relationship

with th e world '; th ey are neither noted nor cons tituted, but expe rie nce d. Th e ph enomen ological cogito thu s recognizes 'a middle course ' lyin g bet ween un conscious drives or representations on the one hand, and pure ideas or explicit knowl ed ge on the othe r. The middle course wh ich ph en om en ology take s describes human existence as 'actio n or doing' - and hen ce, as perpetual self-transcendi ng . On the ph en om en ological view , we therefore neither elude nor possess ourselves completely. In Being and Nothingness Sartre sho ws that th ere mu st be a non-positional self-consciousness an terior to th e Car tes ian cogito:

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If we wish to avoid an infinite regress, the re mu st b e an immed iate, non- cognitive relati on of th e self to itself The immediate conscio usness which I have of perceiving does not know my perception , docs not posit it; all that th ere is of intenti on in my actual consciousness is directed toward the outside, tow ard the world. In tum , thi s spo ntaneo us consciousness of my perception is constitutive of my perceptive conscio usness. . . . Thus reflection has no kind of primacy over the conscio us ness reflected -on. It is not reflection wh ich reveals the consc ious ness reflected -on to itself. Q uite the contrary, it is the non-r eflectiv e conscio usness which rend ers the reflection possibl e; there is a pre- reflective cogito which is the condition of the Cartesian cogito. 3

Without actu ally referring to Being and Nothingness, Merleau-Ponty follows th e Sartrian position here in elabo rating the meanin g of exist en ce as action . Mere thou ghts abo ut thin kin g, dou bting, perceivin g or feeling do not as such establis h ou r certain ty of exis ting; rather, th e certainty of our th ou ghts rest s on that of our actions . Our kno wledge of ourse lves is inhe rently mediated by our relationship to th e world; hen ce ' inner percep tion ' is not selfsus taining , but dep ends up on our actually involving ourselves in expe riences such as seeing some thing or do ubting so me thi ng or lov ing so meone . In th e abse nce of such actual perform an ce, or ' doing', our ow n existence wo uld be entirely in substantial, or 'unreal' - or rather, we wo uld no t even exist beca use, as Sartre po in ts out, ' what is trul y unthin kable is passive exis tence '.' In orde r to make ou rselves the object of our th ou ght, we mu st first of all exis t as being-in -the -wo rld ; moreover, th e act of

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objectification itself escapes ob jectif ication - we can never, so to speak, 'catch o u rse lve s by th e tail '. Underlying an y th etic knowled ge of ourselves or th e world is th at pre-reflective a nonym ous exis tence of a body-subject pol ari zed by a worl d, which earlie r cha p ters of th e Phenomenology ha ve d escri bed . As Merleau Ponty stressed in the ch ap ter 'The Th eory of the Bod y is Already a Th eory of Percept ion ' , 'we are our bod y . . . b y thus re making con tact with the bod y and w ith th e worl d, we shall also rediscov er ou rself . . .' , We have seen that th e pre-personal su bject- wo rld dialogue bri ngs abo u t th e syn thesis of th ings th rou gh the prereflective syn thesis of the body it self; tha t th ese syn theses are m u tua lly implicatory ; th at neither sy n thesis is ever exhaustive. Primordi al expe rie nce is thus inherently o pe n-end ed - b u t that does not rend er it uncertain ; like 'external perception ', our 'internal percepti on' is simultaneous ly in complete and selfaffir m ing . O u r percep tion of the world and of o urse lves is fraugh t with amb iguity; yet no t only are we op en to illusion and to trut h abou t th e world and abo u t ourselves, but w e ca n and do di stingu ish truth from illusio n in both cas es b y the kind o f ' hold' w hic h we hav e on th e respectiv e p he nomena. It is th is whi ch th e ph e nomenologi cal cogito recogn izes and affirm s. Far from red uci ng existence to th ou ght a bo u t existence, thi s cogito reintegrates thou gh t in to the total project which is ou r existence as being-in th e-wo rld. As Merleau-Pon ty points ou t at the conclusion of his chap ter 'Sensing' , ' reflection does not itself gras p its full mean in g [' sen s'] unl ess it refers to the unreflective fu nd of expe rie nce w hich it presu pposes, upon which it draws, and which cons tit u tes for it a ki nd o f orig ina l past'. Th e cognito recognizes that ou r fun dament al inhe rence in th e world is th e so urce of all certain ty; in terpreted in thi s way , the cogito is at the very core of th at trul y radi cal reflection wh ich sim ultaneo usly resto res thou gh t to th e inca rn ate su bject a nd the in carnate su bject to th e world . The cogito of the Cartesian philosophy is bou nd u p with Descartes' clai m s that we rea lly perceive only wit h ou r int ellect , th at 'for a perception to be a possible fou ndati on for a certain and ind u bi table judgm e nt , it m ust be not on ly clear bu t also d istinct', th at whateve r we 'clea rly and di stinctly percei ve is necessarily true' and th at th e en tire fou nd ation for ' the certain ty a nd truth of all kno wledge' is o ur ' awareness of the tru e God '.s MerleauPan ty's ph e nomen ological d escription h as called these claims in to

q uest ion ; conse q uen tly, it is encumbent on Merlea u-Po n ty to provid e an alte rn ative concep tion of tru th fo r h is cogito, and he d oes so in d iscussin g Descartes' example of a triangle. In h is Fifth Meditat ion Descartes argues that

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when I im agi ne a trian gle, it may be th at no such figure exists anywhere outside my consciousnes s (cogita tionem), o r never has exis ted ; b u t th ere certainly exist s its d eterminate na tu re (its essence , its form), whic h is unchangeabl e and eterna l. Th is is no figme n t of min e, and does not depend on my mind, as is clear from th e following: vario us properties can be p roved of this trian gle. . . . All th ese p roperties are true, since I perceiv e them clearl y

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We saw earlier th at th is atte m p t to sever id eas from ou r bei ng-i nth e-w orld is fu ndamen tally flaw ed ; hence th ere can no t be a 'fo rmal essence' o r 'pure id ea' of a triangle. In fact, its retrospective natu re proves th at formal th ou ght is based on in tu itive th ought and it is at th e lev el of th e latter that all our certain ty and truth emerge. In th e absence of any concrete experience of things and de facto truth, we would be u nable eve n to form ulate mathem atical or scie n tific hyp otheses and to formalize relation s in d efiniti on s. The essence o f th e trian gle forma lizes a parti cular way o f relat in g ou rse lves to th e wo rld an d is th erefore d yn am ic; moreover, it is impli ed in ou r ge ne ral ' hold on th e worl d ' and presupposes that space w hich is b rough t in to being by the p rim ord ial motili ty of the bod y-su bject. The th ought of the geom eter is pa rt of a cultu ral wo rld wh ich is based on th e in carnate su bject' s pre-personal transcen dence towards a pre-objective world. As we have se en, thi s tran scenden ce is o f its very nature ongoing , ope n-e nded, incom plete and am biguo us becau se it is synonymous wi th ou r very existence itself. The a pparen t clari ty and com pletion o f th e geom eter's tri an gle is p redi cated on th e taci t assu m p tion th at the p h ysical triangle o f percep tu al con sciou sn ess can be com pletely synthesized ra nd this assumption of course in volves the concom itan t assu mp tio n tha t th e synthesis of th e bod y itself can be com pleted. Like any othe r typ e of th ink ing, mathem ati cs is histo rically and geog rap hically situa ted an d in nowi se exp resses eternal truths. The p roperties w hich Descart es declares necessarily tru e of all trian gles, in fact char acterize only th ose belonging to a certain type of spac e - as the adv en t of no n- Euclid ean geo me try showed.

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Part Il/: Being-for-Itself and Being-in-the-World

The Cogito

Our ability to modulate ou r hold on th e world renders Euclidean space contingent and makes othe r typ es of space possible. Within the fram ew ork of a particular view of the world , vari ou s truths will strike us as being se lf-evide nt; how ever, eve n these truths are never un challen geable - as we di scover wh en we cha nge our hold on the world and th ereby tran sform th e 'ground ' for our thoughts. Because being-in-th e-world means bein g situated - and thus being persp ectival without ever being sea led into an y single perspective - cert ainty is inherently cond itio nal. To protest that su ch certain ty is no certa in ty at all, is to mi sunderstand the nature of certainty and to forge t Merle au -Ponty's ad mo ni tion that we must revis e our usual noti on s of contingency and necessity. It is, moreover to neglect or di sm iss th e ph en om en ological critique of Cart esi an thinking. As w e sa w abov e, only an abs olute cons cio us ness could have an un challengeable cer tainty; but such a non -p erspectival con sciousness would be un situated and thu s, non -human . In fact, it would be no con sciousness at all becau se, lackin g any transcendence, it would collapse and ceas e to exis t (as Sartre's detailed arguments in the The Transcendence of the Ego and Being and Nothingness demonstrate). There is neither a di sembodi ed consc iousne ss nor a domain of abso lu te truth ; since we inhere in the world and in time, ou r truths always retain their eleme nt of facticity - th ey are th e truths of a perspectival, temporal bein g and like the latt er, they are essen tially dynamic and ope n-ende d . Contrary to our common conception of the matter, it is therefore ult imately impossible to distinguish between ' tru ths of fact' and ' tru ths of reason'; their relationship is one of ' Fundierung' , In virtue of existing as a fundamental project, we always alrea dy ' take up ' truths of fact; and in carrying them forward and makin g th em explicit, we transform th em into truths of reason without th ereby severing them from our bein g-in -the-w orld . Truths of reason becom e sed ime nted into th e cultural tradition and thu s in tum become part of the presupposed foundati on for our th ou ghts. In being born into a natu ral and cultural world , we are conseq ue ntly born into a particip ation in truth; moreov er, jus t as it is impossible to free ourselves from any ' inherence in the world', so it is im po ssible to su rveyor to ' bracket' all our presuppositi on s so as to atta in Hu sserl's dr eam of an abso lute (pres uppos itio nless) eviden ce. Ab solute knowl ed ge is forever preclu ded bec ause our experie nce of truth is insep arable from our bein g in a situation; however, abso lute falsity is ruled out by the same token . The

phenomen ologi cal conce ptio n of truth goes beyond both do gmatism and scepticism by show ing that '''being -in -truth'' is indi stinguishable from being-in -the-world '. To say that truth is never un condit ional, is not to reduce it to being merel y the effect of our ow n particula r psycho-physiological makeup. Nor is it to divorce the phenom en on from bein g and to decl are the latter ina ccessible ' to us. For ph en om en ology, the phenomen on is not ' mere appea rance', because being is ' that which appears'; moreover, the appea ring of being is inseparable from the being to which it appear s - that is, from incarnate consciousness. Once again, it is a matter of recognizing the primordial dial ogu e in which things, othe r peopl e and the natural and cultural world as a whole, begin to exis t for us prior to any reflection. There is no ontological - n or logical - necessity governing this pre-reflective genesis of being on wh ich all our thoughts (including our ideas of truth) are ba sed. And yet, thi s does not mean our thou ght, our self-evide nt truth is merely 'one fact among others'; rather, it is 'a value- fact which envelops and condition s every other possible one'. Necessit y and possibility are themselves based on the primord ial fact of ou r exis ting as perceiving, thinking be ings. No matter how we may doubt or err, our basic hold on th e world ens ures that we rem ain op en to certainty and truth for the entire duration of our exis tence ; moreover , our errors and illusion s, wh en recogn ized as such, becom e truths and contribute to the never-ending process of forgin g ever more complete truths. Wh ereas the Cartes ian cogito purport s to put us into direct contact with an int elligible realm of truths in themselves, while neglecting even to mention th at concrete w orld of discou rse wh ich sus tains and condi tions it from star t to fin ish, the phenom en ological reflection d raws our attentio n not only to Descartes' 'spoken cogito', but also to th at 'silent cogito' from which it springs . Radical reflection recognizes that its thinking is inextri cabl y embo d ied in a lan gu age and rooted in a hi story. It reminds us, in reflectin g on the Cartes ian cogito, that explici t subjectiv ity and th in kin g abo ut thou ght presuppose an ' indeclinable subjectivity' which is sy no ny mous with our very being-inthe-world. Prior to any philosophizin g, there is that comprehens ive, pre- person al expe rience in which the bod y-subject comes into being by simultaneo us ly graspi ng the wo rld and itself. Th is purely generalized , pre-reflective cogito is the founda tion of all our truths; and a genuinely rad ical reflection se ts itself the tas k of bri ng ing it to our awa reness.

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N otes 1. For a fulle r discussion, see also Sartre 's The Emotions: Outline of a

Theory, Bernard Frechtman (trans.), (New York: Philosophical Lib-

2.

III ;11

::1 ", ", :;

rary, 1948). The French origin al predates Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception, and the latter's view of the emotions is in many respects analogous to that presented by Sa rtre, At the conclusion of his 'Second Medi tation ' Descartes states : 'I now know that even bodi es are not really perceived by the sense s or the imagin ative faculty, bu t o nly by the intellect; that they are perce ived , not by bein g to uched or seen, but by bei ng understood; I thus clearly recogni ze that no thing is more eas ily or mani festly perceptible to me than my own mind .' In the 'Third Medi tatio n' Descartes adds: 'N ow ideas conside red in themselves, and not referred to some thing else, cannot strictly speaking be false . . . . Only judgm ent s rema in; it is here that I must take precauti on agains t falsehood. N ow the chief and commo nest error that is to be found in this field co nsis ts in my taking ideas wit hin mys elf to have similarity o r co nformity to some external o bject . . .' , In the 'Fourth Meditatio n' Descartes says: 'Now wh e n I do not perceive clearly and disti nctly eno ugh w hat the truth is, it is clear that if I abstain from judgm en t l do rig ht and am not deceived.' In the 'Fifth Meditation ' Descartes summarizes his 'criterio n of truth': 'But now I have disce rned that God ex ists, and have und erstood at the same time that everything else depen ds on him , and that he is not deceitful; and from this I have gathe red that w hatever I clearly and distinctly perceive is necessarily true.' (Ph ilosophical Writings, A n -

scornbe and Geach (trans. and eds) pp. 75, 78, 98, 107.). Finally, it is wo rth no ting that in his Principles of Ph ilosophy Descartes says : '[The mind] finds w ithin itself ideas of many thi ngs; and so lon g as it merely co ntemp lates these, and neith er asse rts nor deni es the existence of so mething like them o utsid e itself, it cannot be in

error: (Ibid" p. 184).

4.

Sartre , Beingand Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, pp. 12-1 3. See also Sa rtre 's Th e Transcendence of the Ego: an Existentialist Theory of Consciousness. lbtd ., p. 16,

5. 6.

Descartes, Philosophical Writings, pp. 75, 190, 107, 108. Ibid" p, 102.

3.

J

2 Temporality Commo n sens e d ivorces the world from the su bject and the latt er's th ou ght fro m its bod y, In proc eed ing fro m th e body and th e perceived world to the cogito, our inves tigation has overturned this division an d juxtaposi tion of the 'external' and ' intern al' by showin g th em 10 be in sep arabl e. We have see n th at su bjectivity can no t be detached from the bo d y itself; that th e latt er, as a primordial pro ject, is inextricably tied to the perceived world ; and fina lly, th at thou gh t itself is never ' pure' but rather, pr esu pposes perceptual conscio usne ss and rernain s insevera ble fro m it. Thought, su bjectivity , bod y and wo rld are therefore rnutually implicat ory; they form a sing le com pre he nsi ve system in which eac h term can be eq ually des igna ted as ' inside' or 'outside' h en ce Merleau -Ponty was ab le to declare at the conclus ion of the last chapter th at ' the world is wholly insi de and I am who lly outside my self ', In reflectin g on the being of each aspe cl of the su bject-world sys tem, we have alread y encountered temporality at vario us points becau se perception, bein g inhere ntly per spectiva l, is of it s very nature temporal. Perceptio n rnoreover requires th e synthesis of th e body itself; and th is syn the sis involves a spatiality and motility whose existence implies that of tim e. We hav e see n that th e perceived world comes int o bein g for a bodil y transcenden ce; and it would be a contrad iction in ter ms to declare transenden ce non-temporal. Th us temp orali ty has been implicit in Merleau-Ponty's enti re phen om en ological descripti on of pe rcep. tion ; however, the bein g of time must now be exami ne d explicitly so that we may achieve a bett er un derst anding of the su bjectivity which the cogilo revealed. In add it ion , the analysis of tim e will ena ble us to resolve th e probl em s raised by objective th ou ght rega rd in g the relati on of bod y to so ul and se lf to others, as well as th e quest ion of what the world wa s like prior to the eme rge nce of humans. The com mon conception of time liken s it to the Ilow in g of a river - a metaphor wh ose frequen t use has led us gen erally to

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accept its applicability without realizin g its confus ion . Flow ing implies chang e of place - for example, th e river flows from its source in the mountains down into the sea - but change implies a situa ted observ er without wh om there can be no 'do w n' or 'from' or ' to' and , in sho rt, no flow . Not only is there no flowing river existing in-itself, bu t its alleged temporal seq ue nce is also pro foundly m isleading. Whe reas the metaphor assumes that the river flows out of the past towards the future, th e tacit introd uction of the necessary observer reverses the temporal seq uence. As Merleau-Ponty points out, th e water passing the obs erver surreptitiously statione d on th e riverbank, is not pu sh ed towards the future but rath er, sinks into th e past. Similarly, for th e observer tacitly assumed to be swe p t alon g by the curre nt, the landscapes lying ah ead are the future and the course of time is not the river itself but rather, the landscap e rolling by. Since it presupposes a perspective, tim e is neither ' a flowin g su bs tance' nor a third person process to be recorde d; on the contrary, tim e comes into being from our relati on shi p to the world and has no exis tence apart from that relati on. Further, since subjectivity is the act of transcendence tow ards a world which th ereby comes into being as world, we can say that we ourselves are tim e. Radical reflection thus brings us to a vie w of time wh ich is the opposit e of that suggested by the river metaphor ; non eth eless, th e analogy is justified in so far as it precludes breaking tim e into a succession of discrete mom ents or reducin g it to a juxtapositi on of objective positions which we occupy in turn. In comparing it to a fountain in which th ere is a sing le thrust of water inst ead of a .series of sepa rate wav es, common sense recognizes the essential unity of time. Unf ortunately how ev er, it undermines thi s in sight by objectifying tim e - wh ich is not to say, of course, th at the Kantian approach is any more valid in po siting tim e as a pure form . Once again, both realism and idealism mu st be aba ndo ned if we are to understand the ph en om en on - in thi s case, that of tim e. Ironically, comm on sense congeals time in making it into a being comparable to a riv er or fountain exis ting in-itself. Thus it sugges ts th at the water which will soo n flow by is now making its wa y down th e mountain , for example, while that which has just flowed past is pre sently furth er downstream . It is not a matter here of collapsing time by arg u ing - as is frequently done - that neither th e pa st nor th e futu re actually exists and that the present, strictly defined , is absolutely in stantan eou s and henc e, being

totally without extension, likewi se is non -exist ent. On th e contrary, by making the futu re pre-exist, th e present exist and the pa st survive , the common sense view rend ers them all present in the objective world so that , conceived as exis ting in-itself, the world is completely full of ' instances of "now" ' , Commo n sense of course implies that the latter form a seq uence ; how ever, there can in fact be neither a ' now' nor a seq ue nce once the subject has be en removed . The notion of a present which is not present to anyone, is profoundly incon sist ent - as is th at of a success ion which occurs in the absence of an y subject. Being-in- itself is utter plenitude; and since future and pas t req uire non -b eing, th e objective world effectively excludes tim e. By divorcing it from sub jectivity, commo n sense loses any possibility of introducing nothingn ess into th e world ; hen ce it canno t sus tai n temporal dimensions and is left with th e solid ity of bein g which simply is what it is. In his criti cism of objective thou ght, Merleau-Ponty here bases himself on Sartre's detailed ph en om en ological analysis of beingin -itself, nothingn ess and temporalit y - an analysis wh ich, in turn, ow es mu ch to th e work s of Hu sserl and Heid egger. ' In Being and Nothingness Sartre states that we canno t compre he nd be ingin-the-world by breaking th is synthe tic relati on apa rt or reducin g it to either of its terms. He argu es th at being-in-it self is solid plenitude wh ich on principl e for bid s becoming an d ' is not subject to temporality' . He sho ws that nothingn ess comes into the world through th e human bein g and that th e latt er's very bein g must be temporality. Sartre argues that tempor ality is neith er a con tingent quality of consciousne ss nor a summation of instants; and that any att empt to break tim e into static eleme nts is doomed to fail. He show s that th e temporal d imen sion s are int ern ally related ; that the for-it self temporalizes itself by existi ng as a p roject and that it must simultaneo usly exist in all its dim en sions . Transcend en ce, or surpassing, implies that whic h is bein g surpassed and that towards which the proj ect is surpassing: the form er is th e past and the latter is the future; moreover, the past and future are always those of a ceriain present. Sartre goes on to argue th at reducin g the pas t to a collectio n of present memori es not only pre supposes ' the being of the past' , b ut also precludes our comprehe nding the 'pastness' of the pa st - its ' being back there'. Similarly, divor cin g the past from the present deprives the form er of its ' pastness' and, by turnin g it into a th ing, once agai n destroys tim e. Pas t, present

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and future can neith er be redu ced to , nor se ve red from, one an other; th ey are inex tricably rela ted in that si ng le upsurge of con sciousn ess exis ting as bein g-in -th e-w orld . Tacitly taking up Sartre's arg ume n t, Merleau -Ponty elaborates the fallaciou sness of attempting to acco un t for our consciousness of pa stness and futu rit y by recourse to th e possession or projection of mem or ies. It matters littl e wheth er such attempts are couche d in ph ysiological or in psychological terms (for example, 'e ngrams' or ' psyc hic traces' ); both approaches offer no more than ' a simple factu al prese nce' while presupposing a sense of the past and the future. In and of them selves, p resent data are totally incapable of ope ning a past or a future for us; th ey canno t prompt either reco llection or anticipa tion in th e abse nce of any direct con tact with th e temporal dimen sion s. In sho rt, mem ory an d projection pre suppose precisely th at whi ch th ey are intended to explain . Th e being of past , pr esent an d future is not id entical; none of the three dimen sion s can be 'explained' o r cons truc ted out of the others and non e can exis t without the o the rs. As lon g as we insi st on locating it in things them selv es or in 'states of co nsciousne ss', we will misunderstand the bein g of tim e. Tim e is neither undergon e nor constit uted by us, becau se it is itself our living relati on ship with th e world . Conseq ue ntly, we can no more encompass time than we can circumscribe our own life; and by the sam e token , we can ne ver be sealed into any Sing le temporal dimen sion , but always exis t as a living syn thes is of all three. How th en arc we to describ e 'tru e tim e' - th at primordial exp erienc e of time which unde rlies our noti on s of transience, duration and etern ity? Merleau -Ponty sugges ts th at it is in our 'fi eld of presen ce' broadly speaking th at we learn th e int errelation of th e temporal dim en si on s. When w e rem ember an incid ent that happen ed so me yea rs ago , for example, we do not call up an idea or ima ge of it ; rather we 'reopen time' and carry ourselves back through the chain of interv ening years to the tim e wh en it was part of our field of presen ce. As such, that field had its horizons of th e future and the immedi ate past; but subseq ue ntly, of course , th at future becam e prese nt, the incid ent itself becam e part of an immedi ate past and wha t had been the imm edi ate past become more remo te. The n th e future wh ich had becom e present becam e in its turn th e immed iate pas t - and so on. In return ing to th e field of presen ce, we th erefore see that the present and fut ure are not pushed by th e past as th e river me tapho r lead s us to believe. On

th e con trar y; we see in cons ulting our ow n expe rience that the future slides ' into th e present and o n into th e past ' and thus, th at a formerly futu re hori zon becom es closed and a form erly pr oxim ate past becomes ever more di stant. Non e of the temporal dimen sions is posited ; rather, we expe rience the future as being ahead of us and th e past as being behind us as we pursue our present task. Th e impending future weigh s on us whil e th e im med iat e past recedes from us with the arri val of each fresh prese nt. The latt er, moreover, not only brings abo ut a tran sformati on in its pred ecessor, but help s to determ ine th e sha pe of its own successor . Drawing on Hu sserl 's Phenomenology of Internal TimeConsciousness, Merleau-Ponty emp hasizes th at int entionalities (Husserl's 'protentions' and ' reten tions' ) connect us to th e future and th e pa st, th ereby ancho ring us to our en viro nme nt. Far from be ing a line compos ed of di screte in stants or preserved pi ctu res of events, tim e is a network of overlapping int entionalities whose cen tre is none othe r than the bod y-subject itself as primordial int entionality. Th ere is neither a mechan istic cau sality nor an int ellectualist syn thesis at work in th e ge nesis of tim e, becau se time is quite simply the project whi ch we ourse lves are - that 'ek-stase' of wh ich Hei degger spo ke in Being and Time. We temporalize ourselves by exis ting ; hen ce there is no need for any explicit unification or sy n thesis o f d imen sions. As w e have seen in earlier chapters, we hav e a pre-p ersonal, pre-reflective ' ho ld' on the world and on ourselves ; and in virtue of thi s primordial grip, we have a past and future wh ose existence requ ires no more verifi cation th an does that of the world or of ourselves . We are able to reach ah ead to our future in an ticipation or back to our past in recolle ction , becau se o u r present is not closed in up on itself; rather, it 'ou tru ns itself ' in both direction s. We do not kee p the same hold on our pa st as it loses its immedi acy and reced es below an ever increasin g temp oral thickness; non eth eless, we do not become totally seve red from it eithe r - it remains potentially retrievabl e. True temporality is not so meth ing which we concei ve or ob serve; it is the process of living our lives and there is a se nse in which our present is not o nly this mom ent or this week, but our entire life. Primary temporality is a dy na mic unit y wh ose dimen sions overlap one anothe r with out ever co inciding: the future is an impendin g present wh ich w ill become past in du e course ; th e present is 'an impending past and a recent future'; and ' the pa st is ,

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a former future and a recent present'. Time is therefore not a se quence of 'external events' or 'internal states' but rather, a chain of interlocking ' fields of presen ce'. If we are to avo id an in fin ite regress , w e must recognize that there is an immediate, non cognit ive aw aren ess of temporalit y - which should com e as no surprise, sin ce we have alr ead y seen that th ere is such a non-theti c consciousne ss of su bjectivity and that tim e is th e sub ject itself. Once again, OU T pre- reflective aw areness is not un ambiguous; just as the per sp ectivity of perceptu al conscio usness precludes our eve r perceiving every thing si m ultane ously, so that of our tempor al consciousnes s rules out our ev er having an all-encompassing grasp of tim e. There is thus no defect in our tem poral persp ectiv e inso far as it gives us a present wi th its horizon s, while pr eventing our simultan eou sly in habi ti ng other fields of presen ce. We have a hold on our past through a contin uous chai n of interlocked retentions, but we can not juxtapo se the links of that chain so as to gras p th e wh ole of our pa st with equal clarit y. Time synthesizes itself in that cease less slidi ng of the future into th e present and on int o the past, thereby giving us the illu sion of etern ity. Yet a timeless time is a contradiction in terms ; and the unity of time is not some thing which comes abo ut in spite of the temporal dim en sions. Past , present and future compose an indivisible proj ect; and to eliminate the di stinctiveness of those dim ension s would be to destroy th e project - in shor t, to abolish tim e altogether. Th is phen om enolo gical descrip tio n of tem poralit y elu cid ates the nature of su bjectiv ity, and helps us to resolve other pr obl ems encountered in our sustained criticism of objective though t. Merleau-Ponty's re marks regarding tem porality and su bjectivi ty are initially puzzling; and it is tempting to conclude that he is simply gui lty of a rath er glaring in consist ency in declaring both th at th e su bject is to be ' ide ntified with temporalit y' (likewise, th at 'w e must under stand ti me as th e subject and the subj ect as tim e') and th at the sub ject is situa ted in tim e (' time exis ts for me only because I am situated in it') . Such an alleged inconsist ency, howe ver, arises only if we insist on retaini ng a traditional idea of time and of th e su b ject - be it emp irical or tran scen dental. Th us, if we conce ive the su bject as an essentially closed enti ty, provided th at we do not accord it absolute status, we might con sider it situated in time like a straw carrie d along by a river. Yet on such a view, We w ill find Merleau -Ponty's id entificati on of su bjectivity w ith temporalit y q ui te incomprehens ible. lf we conceive the

subject as a constituting consci ousness or transcendent al ego, we might succeed in id entifying it very loosely with tim e considered as a succession of states of consciousness. How ever, we will then find Merleau -Ponty's insistence on situating the su bje ct in tim e to be ve ry problem ati c because - as we have seen - such a Cartesian (or Kan tian) subject is necessar ily absolute and hen ce, canno t be si tuated . Merl eau -Ponty's phen om en ological accoun t of th e cogito and of tempor alit y is precisely desi gn ed to make us relinqui sh th ese traditional conceptions . As long as we clin g to the tran scendental ego, for example, we will render ourselves incapabl e of comprehend ing our actu al expe rience. We have see n that such a thinkin g su bject must be abso lu tely tran sp ar ent and hen ce, that it cannot ' in he re in th e world or have even a personal hi story . In an effort to account for our experience of positing or becoming aware of ourselves in time , we may su pplemen t the con stituting su bject with an emp irical self; but the latt er, being an object constituted by the form er, canno t in fact be a se lf. As soon as we put asid e such a concep tion of su bjectivity on the other hand , the contrad iction in self-positi ng di sap pears. As Hu sserl 's fam ou s d iag ram shows, each fresh presen t tran sforms th e en tire temporal network. Thi s ong oing tran sformation is not a matter of external causality, since the new present and th e who le chain of preceding field s of presence are bu t a single compreh ensive movemen t, which is the project of a life in process of unfolding. Self-posit ing is therefore of th e essence of primo rd ial temporalit y: tim e as a pr ojecting ('thrust') affects itself as tim e alread y un folded ; an d th is 'dehiscence of th e present toward s a future' is su bjectivi ty. The self is both affecting and affected - it is self-affecting , rathe r th an unchanging selfid en tity. As Sartre sho ws in Being and Nothingness, th ere is an inherent dualit y at th e heart of consc iousness wh ich is not to be confused with d ua lism .' Con seq uently, our reflection on tim e is itself sit uated in tim e; our reflection on su bjectivity is itself part of our subjectivity . We can ne ver coincide with ourselves - and ye t we are presen t to o urselves precisely because we have the distanc e of non-coincidence. To ma ke the su bject into an ego which co ns titutes its experie nces, is to eliminate that crucial di stance and hence, to de stroy conciousness . Tem porality not only establish es the essentia l non-coin cid en ce of subjectivity, but by the same token, en sures its openness to othe rs and its par ticip ation in the common creating of meanin g.

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Temporality

Sartre stresses the sheer spo ntaneity of consciousness as a co ntinual wrenching of consci ou sness aw ay from itsel f, and cons ide rs thi s se lf-d iremption as the source of temporality. Merleau -Ponty, on the othe r hand, emphasizes th at spontaneity is itself a primary acquisition, and that temporalization is inseparably passivity and activ ity. Thus subjectivity is tem porality, but th e subject do es not person ally initiate temporali zation any more than it chooses being born. As temporality, th e subject find s its elf always alread y situa ted in the world; ye t the world does not come into bein g as a world in the absence of a subject pr ojected tow ards it. Te mporality is the basis of our spontaneity - rathe r than vice versa - becau se we are given to ourselves as a pre-p ersonal pr oject already in process, that is, as a temporalit y already temporalizing itself. Our existence as temporality precludes our being an abso lute conscio us ness; rather, our own temporal perspectiv it y opens the way for othe r equally persp ectival subjects and for th e genesis of meaning in our intersubj ective experience. As Merleau -Ponty notes, th e common con ception of tim e implicitly id entifies mean ing and temporality insofar as it con siders everything which is meanin gful for our present concerns to be 'part of our present', O nce we id entify subjectivity with temporality, w e more over rule out a meanin g created by an abso lute reason. Thus we sa w that th e commo n conception of time as a river slips in the assumption of a situated perceiver without wh om the stream could not even have a direction. Temporality is th erefore in separable from bein g-in -th eworld ; and meaning is in sep arabl e from the primary directionality wh ich th at primordial inheren ce in the world implies. The French word 'sens' captures especially well thi s interdependen ce of direction alit y and meaning. Having ide ntified temporality as subjectivity, we can th erefore go on to identify these with meaning and thus to declare that temporality is the meaning ('seils') of our exis tence. Once aga in, we are br ou ght to the realizati on that subject and world are in sep arably connec ted through th e primordi al proj ect and that th e alternative of realism or id ealism mu st be rejected in favour of a phe no me no logical description of our bein g- in-the-world. In light of our phenomen ological description of temporal ity as self-affecting subjectivity wh ich is primordially self-aw are, we are now abl e to recognize that subject and object are 'abs tract "moments'" of a unique concrete totality which is 'presence', The probl em s raised by obj ective thought th erefore resolve themselve s

definiti vely. For example, the struc ture of 'p r esence' replaces the Car tesian dil emma of a mech an ist ic body inc ompreh en sibly caus ally connected to an immaterial so ul. Once th at ' the wo rld " ill itself'" is identified with the temporal hori zons, and th e 'foritself' with ' the hollow in wh ich tim e is formed', th e d ichotomy of the forme rly irreconcilable terms is replac ed with the sing le indivisible project of tempor alization. And just as th e future is inhe rently th at of a certain present, so the for-itself (or, co nsciousness) is inhe rently that of a certain actually existing bod y. O ur actua l expe rie nce of being present in the world discl oses th at our ph en om enal body is ess entially a kllowillg body; thus the tradition al body-soul problem vanishes. Similarly, the id entificati on of temporality with subjectivity undercut s the qu est ion reg ard ing the nature of th e world pri or to the evo lution of human conscious ness. Given our earlier rem arks abo ut the interdep enden ce of temporality, subjectivity and meaning, it is evident that th is so rt of qu est ion is, strictly spea king , meaningless. As w e have seen , the world is in separable from a human perspective and to pre tend otherwise is invariably to reint roduce the human subject ' by the back door ', so to sp eak. Finally, the identification of tim e and the subject ope ns us to other peopl e. We saw earlier that we are lin ked to othe rs via behaviour, th at is, by wi tnessing th eir 'p resence in the world '. In virtue of our fuller understanding of th e meaning of 'presence' (as being simultan eou sly presence to ou rselves and involvement in the world ), we aT C now in a position to appreciate how othe rs are present to us, an d we to th em. We have see n that our ow n self-awareness is inevitabl y fraug ht with ambiguity, th at we are present to ourselves without ever coinciding completely with o urselves . It con sequentl y becom es comprehe ns ib le that others can be present to us, th at th e projects wh ich we are can interw eav e in an intersubjectiv e field of presence. The preobjecti ve world in which we are always already involved is th us a soci al world; and since we have renoun ced the solipsistic supremacy of the tran scendental ego , we will need to recon sid er the actua l extent of our freed om .

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Notes 1.

Se e Sartre. Being and Nothingness: a Phenom enol og ical Essay all Ontology, 'Introduction': 'The Pursuit of Being': 'Being -In-Itself,

3

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Freedom We have seen th at our experience of 'presence' p reclu des our being caus ally con nec ted to ou r body, world or society; h en ce we hav e alre ady undercut det erminism and tak en our sta nd on th e side of freed om. Bu t how are we to describe this freed om ? At first glance it would see m th at we have unwittingly co mm itted ourselves to th e Sartria n view of free do m articu la ted in Being and Nothingness. Sartre 's account rejects th e transcendental ego in favour o f a n on-coincid in g , sit ua ted, temporalizing su bjectiv ity w hic h ha s a bo dy an d find s it self engaged with other s ' in an already m eani n gfu l wo rld '. This being- in-the-world involves co ntingency , am bigu ity and objective lirnits.! Nevertheless; Sartre 's posi tion is fund amentally at odds with that of Me rleau-l'ont y, since th e Sartria n su bjec t is a n absolute freedom confronting o thers in a sit ua tio n o f in evitabl e a nd inescapab le atienauon? No t su rp risin gly, th erefor e, Merleau -Ponty's ch ap ter on free do m co mp rises an extens ive critique of Sartre's positi on . Merl eau -Ponty opens hi s analysis with an in vestiga tion of th e p heno me non of 'presence' which emerged as p ivotal in th e last cha p ter and wh ich Sartre himself considers req uisite for freedom' In Being and Nothingness Sartre argues th at consciousness canno t be self-iden tical p len titu de becau se that wo u ld relegat e it to th e or der o f th e in-itself, or non -conscious b eing. If it is to exis t a t all, consciousness must be self-consci ousness even at the prereflective level; in short, conscio usness mu st exist 'as a prese nce to itself ' , Besides bein g-fa r-itself, cons cious ness exis ts as bein g-for othe rs, as its experience of shame indica tes; moreover, these two modes of exis te nce arc eq ua lly fundam ental for Sartre . In its very upsurge as for-itself, co nsciousness find s itself in the prese nce of others . Bein g-far-itself an d being-fa r-othe rs are in commen su rabl e however, and consciousness remain s incapable of relating what it is in th e intima cy of its own presence to itself wi th what it is for others ." For itse lf, consciousness ' escapes all objectifica tion becau se its being as conscio us n ess is an ti the tica l to th e being of

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obj ects . In reflectio n, consc ious ness the refore discovers a prepersonal unqualified flux, a limitless ge ne rality, a pure spo n taneity unfettered by any cha racter istics wh at soever. For itself, con sciousness is absolute; it is pure presen ce - neith er a male, nor a clerk, nor a Jew , nor French, nor crippled, nor ugly, nor sophis ticated . Th ese variou s characteristi cs are conferred by othe r people who - precisely becau se th ey are othe r - inevitably impos e an external perspecti ve, th ereb y reducin g cons cious ness to the status of an object endo we d w ith determin ate qu aliti es. Of course, the being-in-itself which it is for othe rs presupposes that consciou sness exists ' as bod y in th e mid st of the world '; moreover, Sartre ackn owl ed ges that th e for-itself can regard itself as having spe cific traits by ado pting th e objectifying view of an other. Nevertheless, its very aw aren ess prevents it from ever simply being that being. Since it finds it self in a world inhabited by othe r peopl e, th e for-it self canno t ge t rid of its being-for-oth ers - but it alone cho oses its att itu de tow ards the latter . Sartre contends th at the for-itself can alwa ys dest roy the o the r's aliena ting look by ob jectifyin g the other with its look. It thereb y ga ins the advantage over the o the r, albe it never definitively becau se the o the r can reassert its freed om at any time. Yet th e mere fact that it apprehe nds th e o ther as threaten ing indicat es th at the for-itself freely posit s the other's freed om . Even the masoch isti c atte mp t to restrict its elf to being solely an objec t for th e o the r is a choic e in which the for-itself reaffirm s its own exis tence as frced o m' Sartre's account is by no means easy to refute, as Being and Nothingness in its en tirety cons titu tes an intricate argume n t for the absolut e freed om of human reality ; moreover, Sartre himself anticipates and counters a num ber of objectio ns . To those who would challenge th e allege d abso luteness of freed om , he responds that only things can be acted up on . Sartre argues that qu esti oning presupposes the q ues tio ne r's ab solute freed om ; conseq ue ntly, critics already subve rt their argume nts aga ins t such a freedom in questi oning h is pos itio n. Sa rtre's point is th at ' a nihilating withdrawal' from the give n is the necessary cond ition for all qu estions wh atsoev er - an utter id entity of th e q uesti on er with th e question ed would preclu de any qu esti on eve r ari sin g. In qu estionin g, the questi on er detach es himself from the bein g wh ich he is questi oning and thus is not sub ject to its causa lity. Th e qu estioner 'w renches' him self fro m the q ues tioned ' in orde r to be abl e to bring out of him self th e possibility of a non -b ein g' - for example,

the po ssibility that Sar tre's account is not correct. This non-being is indescribable becau se nothingn ess is not a thing, but it supposes being becau se it is always the nothingn ess of so me thing . As being-in-itself is 'full posit ivit y', it canno t be the orig in of nothingness; instead , the latter mu st come to the world through a be ing wh ich is its own nothingn ess - othe rwise we fall into an infin ite regre ss. A cons ideration of the mean ing of qu esti on ing reveals that th e qu esti on er brings noth ingn ess to the world. Sartre concludes that th e human bein g - the bein g wh ich qu esti on smust be freedom . Sartre's reasoning is that the human bein g must 'secrete' its own nothingn ess if it is to be th e bein g through which nothingness com es to th e world . Secreti on of nothingn ess req uires ruptu re with th e causa lity of bein g-in-it self and this rupture is freed om. Further, th e hum an bein g canno t firs t exis t and then becom e free; on the con trary, freed om mu st be the very bein g of human reality.6 To postul ate a potential or parti al freed om is to rul e it out altoge the r by making human realit y being- in-itself - in short, a thing rath er th an a bein g wh ich is present to itself. At th is stage the read er ma y be strong ly tempted to di smiss Sart re' s account and Merleau -Ponty's subseq ue nt crit iq ue, on the grounds that the form er has simp ly mi ssed th e point of the traditional deb ates concerni ng free will versus determinism. It is therefore important to note that Sartre himself anticipa tes such an objection and reverses it in response. As he sees it, the cus tomary di scus sions are tireso me and superficial because they stop short of the fundam ental qu esti on. By way of illustr ati on Sartre observes that the advoca tes of free will look for decision s wh ich lack a preceding cause, or for delib erati on s abo ut two antithe tical but equally possible acts wh ose causes and moti ves are of exactly eq ual weight. For th eir part , th e determinists retort th at all actio ns are caused and that eve n th e most trifli ng ges tures refer to causes and motives from which they derive th eir sig nificance. In den ying thi s, th e free will advocates dest roy th e necessary intention al stru cture of the act and render actio n absurd . The determinist s on the o the r hand fail to investiga te the int ention ality of action - they content them selves with de sign ating causes and motives without botherin g to inquire how these 'can be cons tit uted as such '.' Sartre therefore un dert akes a close ph enom en ological analysis of causality and moti vati on . In light of the explication provided earli er, it is clear th at he rejects any notion th at there are extern al or internal factor s which simp ly impinge on human reality.

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According to Sartre, something which is not experienced as a cause cannot be a cause. Yet although he repudiates the traditional conceptions of causality and motivation, Sartre retains the terms 'cause' and 'motive' and incorporates them into his position. Thus he agrees with the determinists' contention that any act must have a motive, but he rejects their conclusion that the latter causes the act. Instead, Sartre argues that by its very upsurge as freedom the for-itself organizes undifferentiated being-in-itself into a world, and any particular act is an expression of this fundamental project. By its choice of end, the act 'carves out' the world's particular objective structure and effects the emergence of a cause; for the latter is simply 'the objective apprehension' of that situation as it is disclosed in light of the particular end as 'able to serve as the means for attaining this end'. The cause in no way determines the action, since it is 'only in and through the project of an action' that it appears at all, and the same can be said for the motive. As consciousness must be present to itself, the consciousness of a cause must be non-thetic self-consciousness. Sartre declares that 'the motive is nothing other than the apprehension of the cause in so far as this apprehension is self-consciousness', and he concludes that cause, motive and end are inseverable terms of a project which is itself a particular way of being-in-the-world - in short, a freedom. " Commonly we consider causes and motives as external and internal givens, respectively. Thus, for example, we speak of being forced to do one thing and prevented from doing another, or being inclined to take a certain decision and prompted to abandon another. Sartre clearly rejects these reifications. Being forced or prevented is tantamount to being acted upon, and such passive existence of a for-itself is unthinkable. Similarly, inclinations and promptings cannot act on us in any way, for that would convert us into things. Action is the being of human reality; moreover, action must be strictly autonomous if it is to be action rather than mere movement. The for-itself is 'a nihilating spontaneity'; as such, its determination to action must itself be action and the latter must be a ceaseless 'surpassing of the given ' toward a chosen end. Consequently, motives, feelings, passions, temperament or character cannot exist as givens in human reality. Contrary to common conceptions, consciousness does not admit of any contents, nor freedom of any attenuation. Since freedom is the very being of human reality, it is as senseless to speak of degrees of freedom as it

is to predicate degrees of existence. Sartre explains that feelings and passions are not things but ways of being-in-the-world, while temperament or character belongs to the for-itself's being-forothers - which in turn depends upon the for-itself 's freely chosen mode of relating to those others. We usually regard choice as a decision following a voluntary deliberation in which we assess the relative weight of various motives; but Sartre argues that such a conception is quite misleading. In fact, deliberation is itself a chosen conduct, and the resulting reflective decision is a secondary choice within the fundamental choosing which is our very existence as freedom. This primordial project causes the emergence of motives and determines their weight, while deliberation merely serves to bring them to our attention. Thus the commonly alleged weakness of our will in no way undermines our'original, ontological freedom' - on the contrary, the former is simply a manifestation of the choice which we make of ourselves. 9 Are there then no obstacles or limits, and are we to conclude that freedom is pure caprice? Sartre explicitly warns against such a misinterpretation by pointing out that freedom could not exist without obstacles or limits, and that a capricious freedom would be no freedom at all. As a nihilating spontaneity, the for-itself clearly requires that there be something to be nihilated; or to put it somewhat differently, a perpetual surpassing of the given supposes that there be a given to be surpassed. By its very structure as project, choice precludes instantaneity and rules out the possibility of our existing without a past. Sartre readily concurs with common sense in maintaining that our past commitments weigh on us - even to the point of 'devo urin g' us - and that a prisoner is evidently not always free to leave the prison, nor a paraplegic to get up and walk. In Sartres estimation however, common sense errs when it goes on to equate freedom with the ability to obtain one's chosen ends. Physical, social, political and religious freedoms are in fact supported by ontological freedom, and Sartre's analysis concerns itself exclusively with the latter. Ontological freedom, that is, 'autonomy of choice', is indistinguishably choosing and acting; but Sartre insists that choosing does not mean wishing or obtaining. In failing to uphold the difference, the common sense conception of freedom inadvertently collapses the distinction between our waking life and the nocturnal world of our dreams. Instantaneous transformations of ourselves and the world typically occur in our dreams, giving

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Part III: Being-for-Itself and Being-in-the-World

th em th eir air of unrealit y - thu s ou r merest wish suffices to p roduce th e desi red objec t or to annihilate a ny a ppa ren t obstacle. O n wakin g howev er, we find ourselves once more in th e real wo rld with all its su bs tan tial restrictions. Sartre contends th at these restriction s are essential, because an unrestricted cho ice would be no choice at all; moreover, it woul d be abs urd to m aintain th at free do m sim ply creates its own obstacles . O u r freed om is in fact parad oxical: ' there is freedom only in a situation, and th ere is a sit ua tion onl y through freed om '. Every where we enco unter resistances and obstacles wh ich we have not created, but it is we ou rse lves who confer m eaning on th em by ou r very exis tence as freedom . Sartre's fam ous example of the crag illu strates th e po int: the rock face re veal s it self as un climbabl e only with in a project o f climbing. For th e injured or wo uld- be mountai neer it presents an obs tacle; for the season ed climber it provides an op po rtu nity to se t a new record, while for th e ai rbo rne tour ist it offers th e cha nce to tak e a striking phot ograph. Of course, not eve ry crag will lend itself to being climbed - th at d ep ends o n ' the brute being ' of th e crag - but it can di sclose its resistan ce only within th e con text of a human project. Thus ' there is no obs tacle in an abso lute se nse'; nor can we ever separate out what comes from ' the brute give n' and what from freedom in any part icular case. Without th e brute 'quid ', freedom could not exist; but by its very upsurge, freed om endows the brute being with meaning and valu e acco rd ing to th e choice which it mak es o f itself. Any limits which freed om e nco u n ters with referen ce to its past, its bo dy, its place, its env iron me n t and other people, are th erefore ultima tely self-i m posed. Altho ug h it is not free to not be free , ' freedom is tot al an d infinite: lO As Merleau -Ponty sees it, such a concep tio n utterl y destroys freedom . If freed om is ou r very being, so th at it is th e sa me no matter wha t we do or how we feel , th en it becom es impossi ble to di scern its ap pearance any where. A freed om whic h is infinite and omn ipresen t lacks any background of non-freed om from wh ich to stand ou t; hen ce it can no t be anywhere. If all acts are free, th en effectively non e is free and the very id ea of choice and action d isappears . Th ere is nothin g to acquire if freed om is prim ordial and every in st ant finds us eq ually free; conseq ue n tly, th ere is no thi ng to choose an d nothing for us to do. Free do m cannot come int o play any where or find expression in a nythi ng . If freed om is actio n as Sartre -clai ms, then it is necessary that our decis io ns

Freedom

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acco mplis h so me thi ng and set a directi on for th e fu ture, rather tha n.leavin g us ' just as indeterminate' th e next inst ant. This does not mean of co urse that we renounce our power to interrupt and se t a new di rectio n - but th at power implies ou r power to com m en ce. Sar tre him self rejects the notion th at consciousness is reducible to a series of ins tants; moreover, he stresses that there mus t be a past, resis tances and 'a comm encement of realiza tio n in order that th e choice may be d istinguish ed fro m th e d ream and the wish ,.n Yet arc th ese stipulations not ulti m ately in co mp atibl e with th e noti on of a p ri mordial, total and infinite freed om ? How can such a freedo m have an abod e and a field in which to reali ze its objectives? In short, how can we ever expe rie nce freedom? While agreeing with Sar tre 's criticism of th e classical conce p tio n of free will , Merleau-P onty d etects an unresolv ed di fficulty in th e Sartria n noti on o f a g lobal cho ice of oursel ves and ou r whole way of bein g-in -the-w orld. If, as Sartre in si sts, th at choice is sy no nymo us wit h our very u psurge in the world, th en it is unclear how it can be cons idere d to be our choice at all. Th e very id ea of such an initi atory choice is contradictory, inasmuch as choice implies an an tece den t commitment. If, on the other ha nd , th e Sartria n globa l choice is gen ui ne ly a cho ice of ou rselves, th en it must be a tota l modification of o ur existence which, once agai n, presupposes a prior acq uisitio n to be converted by th at cho ice. Sartre's d efinition of free dom as perpetual ru pture or sec reti ng of nothingn ess is the refore mer ely th e negative feature of ou r global com mi tmen t to, and in volve men t in , a worl d . Sartre contends th at freed om can no t be 'a simple undeterm ined power' but rather, th at it mu st determ ine ' itself by its ve ry u psurge as a " do ing " '. " Neverthe less, Merlea u-Po n ty con cludes th at this ' rea dy -ma de freed om ' redu ces itself ' to a power o f in itia tive' which must take up one of th e world's p ropositions in order to becom e a d oin g. Merlea u-Po n ty maintain s that 'concrete and actual freed om' lies in this transform atory excha nge. Th e very noti on o f an exchange precludes Sar tre's concep tio n of an en tirely cen trifugal sign ification . Sartre d eclares that hu man rea lity confers mean in g on th e brute gi ven, and that ' noth ing comes to it ei the r from the outside or from withi n which it can receive or accept' . Further, he asserts that 's ince freedom is a be ing-withou t-support and without-a- springboard , th e p roject in order to be must be cons tan tly ren ewed . I choose myself perpetually . . : .13 Charging th at Sartre's po sition is ulti ma tely in-

Part Ill: Being-far-Itself and Being-in-the-World

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dis ting uis ha ble from classical idealism, Merleau-Ponty rejec ts the noti ons of exclus ive ly centrifugal signi ficatio n and perpet ua l choice. Since Sartre's own dis tinction between d ream in g and waking life attes ts to th e fact that free dom requires a fie ld, signification must be both cen tripe tal and centrifu gal. MerleauPonty th erefore reconsid er s Sar tre's exam ple of th e crag to sho w how this can be so . He acknowledges that on ly the prese nce of a human bein g and a project of scaling can confer attributes such as ' unclim bable' on the rock . However , Sartre himself ad mits that g ive n a project of scaling, some rocks will prove mo re favo ura ble th an othe rs. Consequently, it is in vir tue of my freed om th at there are obstacles and mean s in gene ral, but my freedom does n ot det er min e the world's part icu lar conto urs. Merleau-Ponty draws atte ntio n to the fact that irrespecti ve of any sp ecific intention to scale th em , these crags wi ll strike me as being high sim ply ' because th ey exceed my bod y's power to take th em in its st ride'. Althou gh I may imag in e myself a gi an t, th e ' na tural self' prevents my actuall y makin g the mountains minute for me. Besides, eve n 'my express intention s' are ev iden tly mod elled on the pr e-reflective experi en ce of those 'general inte ntions' whic h m y natural self sus tains aro und me and which affect my environme n t ind ependently of any decision on my part. These bodily intentions are ge ne ral in th at they hold for all simila rly organized 'psycho-physical su bjects' and 'constitu te a system' wh ich si mu ltaneously includes 'all possibl e objects' - for exampl e, if th e crag looks hi gh and straight, the pine looks small and be nt. Th us Ges talt psychology has been able to demonstrate tha t there are particular shapes which othe r peopl e and I especially favour. In ad d itio n, there are various am big uo us shapes sugges ting perpetua lly shifting significan ces, whi ch elici t our 'spontaneous eva lua tions'. A pure consc ious ness or an absolute freed om cou ld not sustain such ambiguity , but wo uld immed iately coinc id e w ith the objects of it s intentions wi thou t ever expe rienc ing the ir di stan ce in a sha red wo rld . O bs tacles come to be such not by any acosm ic conferring of mea ning, but by a pre-reflective excha nge be tween 'our incarn ate existe nce' and the world. This exchange, which con sti tu tes th e ba sis for all deliberate acts of sig nificatio n, is not restricted to 'extern al perception ' but in forms any evaluation wh atsoever. Sartre is therefore correct in arg ui ng tha t far from acting on my free do m as causes, sufferi ng and fatig ue have a mean ing and exp ress my man ner of be ing- in-

th e-w orld . Moreover, if th at origina l cho ice involves a refusa l to tolerate suffe ring and fat igu e, th en a decision to continue hikin g des pite my pain and weariness will exac t a cons idera ble pri ce - for it will require a different way of exis ting my body and thus, 'a rad ical convers ion of m y bein g-in -the-world'. Noneth eless, Sartre's rep eated insistence on the importan ce of th e past does not suffice to sho w how a fre q ue ntly confirme d attitude comes to acq ui re 'a favoured status', so that the ado ption of an oppos ite att itude becom es increasingly improbable." Since th e Sartrian freed om is absolute, an y habitual mod es of being-in-the-w orld mu st be eq ua lly fragile at every mom ent. Conseq ue n tly, habits can not be com e sed imen ted in our life and any complexes wh ich we hav e d eveloped over tim e can always be read ily di sp elled in an in stant by our freedom . Probab ility ther efore becomes mean in gless - at best, it is reduced to a matt er of statis tics. Howev er, thi s betray s our actual experien ce of ha ving committed o urselves to so me thi ng which subsequently weigh s on us and lends a certain atmosphere to our present. Besides, w e have already enco un tered probability and generality as ph en om en a of the perceiv ed world which eme rge through an interaction of the natural self and the world . In that exchange, a hu man level and a field of possibl e actio ns come into being. We mu st therefore reject Sartre's claim ' that two so lutio ns and only two are possible: eith er man is who lly determined ... or else man is who lly free'. We must refuse the Sartrian alte rna tive of 'a nihilating sponta ne ity' on the o ne hand, and 'mec hanic al processes' on the o ther, 'each onc in its incommu nicable so litude'.!S Instead , we mu st describe how our free do m gears itself to our situation and how that open situatio n summo ns , but does not di ctate , esp ecially favou red forms of respon se. A consideratio n of how we relate to history will di sclose the sa me need to go beyond the Sartrian altern ative of absolu te free do m or mechanistic causa lity to a third type of exis tence , whi ch is that of an incarn ate su bjectiv ity . In hi s effort to refut e determi nism , Sartre argues that reflection reveals that in m y pu re presen ce to myself, I am an impersona l, ' pre-h uman flux' witho ut any qualities whatsoever. Alth ou gh I can su bs eque ntly consi de r myself a worker, for example, I can never fully be a worker. My awa reness of being a w orker remain s seco nd order; for myself, as opposed to my being-for-others, I am a pure consci ous ness free ly eva lua ting itself as prol etari an. A study of history shows that my ob jective place in production never suffices to ki nd le class-

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conscio us ness an d th at revolt is therefore not the result of objective cond itio ns . O n the contrary , the worker evaluates th e present th rou gh his ' free project for the future ', and becomes a proletarian by d ecid in g ' to will revolu tion '. Hi s decisi on req uires ' a pure wrenching away from himself and the world ', wh ich ena bles him to 'pos it his suffering as unbearabl e sufferi ng and conseq ue ntly [to] make of it the motive for his revolution ary action'. The wo rke r 'wrench es' hi mself away from his past in order to evalua te it in th e light of th e future and 'confer on it the mea ning whic h it has in terms of th e project of a meaning whic h it does not have" 6 However, Sartre 's pos itio n seems to dep riv e history it self of any meaning save that wh ich our w ill confe rs. Thu s hi s criticis m of objective th ou ght takes the form of an idealist reflection which likewi se overlooks the ph en om en a. Wh ereas objec tive thought makes class-con sciou sn ess th e pro d uct of objective condi tions, Sartre's anal yt ic reflection makes the objective cond itions de pendent on a cons tituting consciousness, so that 'be ing a wo rkman' becom es reduced to the awareness of being one . Both objective thought and idea lis t reflection deal with abs trac tions which mi ss our actual exis tence ; conseque ntly, Merleau-Ponty invites us to embark on a truly existen tial approach to the ph en om en on of class-con sciousness. At th e outse t, Merleau -Pon ty cautions us not to seek either the causes of class-consciousness or the cond itions which make it possible. As Sartre emp has izes, no external cause can act on a con sciousness; furthermore - as Sartre un fortunately fails to see it is a mail er of discerning th e condit ions wh ich actually elicit class-conciousness , rath er than those of its mere possibility. Using 'a genuinely existential me tho d ', we discover that my awa reness of being a wo rker or a bo urgeo is is no t si mp ly a function of th e fact that [ mar ket my labou r or that [ have a vested in terest in cap ita lism . Nor do [ becom e prol etarian o r middle class the day I decid e to regard history fro m the persp ecti ve of the class struggle. Instead , it is first of all a matt er of existing as proletari an o r middle class; and this way of int eracting w ith society and the world

ge ois. Wh at makes me the o ne or the o ther is my manner of being- in- the-w orld within a socio-economic orde r wh ich I expe rie nce and live. Merlea u-Pon ty provid es a detailed example of the genesis of class-con sciou sness by conside ring th e lives of a factory wo rke r, a ten ant farme r and a day-labourer. Without any choice or explicit evalua tion, th ose doin g th e same sor t of job under comparable conditio ns 'co-exist in the same situa tio n' and feel a certain kin ship. Thi s can simply conti nue wi tho ut developing into classconsciousness and revolu tionary activity or alternativ ely, various even ts can help to bring about such a tran sform ation. The new s of a factory wor kers' strike elsewhere and the res ulting wage hike here, may sharpe n the factory worker's perceptio n of th e established orde r. Seei ng pri ces rise and feeling his ow n livelih ood thus becom e precariou s, th e day- labo urer may blam e the town worker s, so that class-con sciou sness fails to emerge. If such co nsciousness arise s, it is not because the day-labourer decid es to turn into a revolution ary and thereb y bestows ' a valu e up on hi s actu al cond ition', but becau se he has perceived concretely that his own life gea rs into that of the town wo rkers and that th ey all part icip ate in a common condition. For his part, th e ten ant farmer may begin to identify with th e factory wo rkers on learning that the ow ne r of his farm sit s on the boa rd of various industrial enterprises. In th ese ways, a sphe re of the exploited begin s to eme rg e in th e socia l space and a regro up ing beyond ideological and occupational identit ies becom es increasing ly ev ide n t. Thi s, th en , is the coming -into-b ein g of class -consci ousness , and wh en th e dif ferent segmen ts of the pro letariat experience th eir objectiv e connec tion as a common impedi ment to each one' s existence , a revoluti onary situatio n obtains . Merleau -Ponty, im plicitly tak ing Sartre to task, insists tha t at no point is there a need for 'a representation of revo lutio n', for each prol etari an to th ink of himself exp res sly as such, for any delib erate evalua tion or any 'explicit pos iting of an end'. It suffices th at th ere be a feelin g of solidarity amo ng th e various peasants and workers, and a sense of being invo lved in tryin g to change th in gs. Both the establi sh ed order and its destruction ' are lived throu gh in ambigu ity' - which is not to say that the proletaria ns and peasants un con sciously produce revolu tion, or th at the latt er is the result of 'blind , "e lementary forces" manipulated by a han dful of sly agita tors. In rea lity, th e alleged rabble-rou sers' sloga ns are eagerly

motivates my revolutionary or counter- revolutionary projects, as

well as my express judg emen t tha t I am a proletarian or a bourgeois. Motivation does not mean causation however; the refore, it is im possibl e to ded uce my projects and judgemen ts from my life-style or vice versa. Ne ither impersonal forces nor an unm otivated in tellectual exercise rend ers me a wo rker or a bour-

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taken up in a revolutionary situa tion ' because th ey crystallize what is latent ' in the wo rkers ' lives at large. In ma ny respects, the making of a revo lution is akin to the crea ti ng of an artis tic wo rk: both are neither blind nor transpare nt activities but rather, am biguous undert akings wh ose meaning develop s as the activity unfolds and w hos e outcome is neither foreseeable nor ever explicitly posi ted in adv an ce. Both the artisti c work and the revolutionary m ovem ent are intentions which create their own instrum ent s and mod es of expression . Th e revolution ary project ma tures at the pre- reflective level of my interactions wit h other people and my relations to my job, lon g before it becomes ar ticulated and lin ked to objec tive goa ls. Thus wh en 1 take a stand vis-a-v is a possible revo lution, thereby recognizing myself as a proletarian or a bo urgeois, the ado pting of that position is neither an automa tic effect of my class status nor an in stantan eou s eva lua tion ex nihilo, In Merleau -Ponty's judgement, Sartre's er ror lies in his exclusive focu s on in tellectual projects to th e neglect of the existen tial project. As a conseq uence, Sartre's an alysis ove rlooks all the rich am biguity in th e emergence of class-con sciou sness from th e enigmatically live d- thro ugh exp erience of it s prospective me mbers. The unrepresen ted, ambiguo usly appreh en ded ob jective tow ards which their lives are polarized , stands in stark contrast to the thought object of the Sartrian cons ti tut ing conscious ness. In makin g class-consciou sn ess the product of a decision and choice, Sartre dis rega rds ge nuine intentionalit y an d effect ive ly de clares th at problems are ins tantly resolved . As Merlea u-Ponty notes how ever, th e int ellectu al project is itself the outcome of an existentia l project and express es a parti cular ma nner of be ing -in the -wo rld. Like the proletarian or th e peasant, the in tellectu al is in fact firmly roo ted in co-existence, and the meaning, direction and future wh ich he gives to his life spring fro m th e way in wh ich he lives that co -exis tenc e. Any conceptualiza tion on his part comes fro m the sa me source; he nce all attempts to deri ve actual exis tence from acts of consciousness are profoundly misg uide d . Being a bourgeois or a proletarian is not merely be ing aware of bein g th e forme r or th e latt er. It mea ns ide n tifyi ng oneself as the one or the othe r th rou gh a tacit or exis ten tia l proj ect whic h blends with one 's manner of struc turing the world and co-existing w ith othe rs. Sartre wo uld of course counter th is critiq ue of hi s position by pointi ng ou t that wh ile my being- fa r-o thers includes attrib utes such as proletarian or bourgeoi s, I am si mply a pure consciousness

for myself and can regard myself as proletarian or bourgeo is only by ado pting an outside r's perspective. Furth ermore, it is im possible to ded uce the other's presence from th e on tologica l struc ture of bein g-far-my self (the for-itself), for th at wo uld destroy the other's othe rness as a su bjectivity irr educible to min e. Th e othe r's presence is th erefor e an orig inal fact, and my experience of being in sympathy or community wi th others (the Mitseill) presupposes my experience of bei ng in confro ntation wi th them .' In short, being-wi th-o thers is based on being-far-others, and 'conflict is the original meaning of be ing-far-others'. The experience of ' we' is 'ex tremely unstable', continually giving way again to th e aliena ting experience of being-far-others. Fundamentally, my relation w ith othe rs is one in which I attempt to 'enslave' them while they sim ultaneously see k to 'ens lave' me Y Merlea u-I'o nty an ticipates such a rejoinder and endeavours to forestall it. He arg ues that Sartre's rad ical di chotomy be tween being-far-m yself and bein g-far-others precludes my ever experienci ng the other. I can never recognize anothe r subjectivity unl ess my bein g- formyself already incor porates the structures of my bei ng-far-others. In any case, the Sartrian bein g-for-others canno t accoun t for all the features of my actua l expe rience which an exist ent iali st analysis brings to ligh t. Ot her peopl e are neither necessarily, nor ever entirely, objec ts for me; more over, ab solute subjec tivity is pu rely an abs traction, and ' the-other-as-object' is an inau thentic characterizati on of o thers. A ge nuinely radical reflection sho ws th at from th e sta rt, I mu st be awa re of being so me ho w cen tred 'ou tside myself ', of havin g an aura of generality abo ut ' my abso lute indivi d uality'. With out th ere being suc h a prim ordial ' atmosphere of "sociality" , around my pres ence to myself, attrib utes such as male or bou rgeois could have no meaning for me. Unless there were a primordial background of bein g- fa r-ot hers, being-formyself could not emerge as such and hen ce, I could not be. There mu st be a meaning beyond that which I consti tute; th ere must be an int ersubj ectivity; and I must be anonym ou s in th e doubl e sense of bei ng w ho lly indivi dual and completely general. lf we ado pt Sartre's account as opposed to Merlea u-Po nty's. we effec tively rul e out any mean ing, direction or truth of hist ory - we ru le out s ituatio ns altoge ther. lf becoming a wo rke r or a bourgeois were a matter of pure ini tiative, hi story would lack any sha pe or structure, revolution ary situa tions or times o f retrenchment wo uld not exist, up risings could reasonably be expec ted at any mom ent

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and sta tes me n wo uld be indistingui sh abl e from ad venturers . In his eage rness to di sprove th e me chan isti c view of hi st ory, Sartre overlooks th e fact th at his tory must have a meani ng whic h is not simply conferred on it by human fiat - that it mu st be 'liued through', The meaning of eve nts is nei th er a men tal cons truct nor the inad ver tent conseq uence of th eir simultane ity; rather, it is th e actu al intersu bjective ' project of a fut ure' whic h is prepared w ithin ano nymous co-existence prior to any personal decisio n. Significa tion is thus at once cen tri fug al and centripe tal: we bestow h istory 's meaning, but it itself puts th at meanin g forward. The ind ividu al is not th e director of history; ye t at a certain mom ent of its genesis, an indi vid ual can take up an d carry forw ard the meaning wh ich has been maturin g in soci al co-ex istence . Since hi story offers a mean in g to be taken up , we can di scern h istorical truth and di st inguish bet ween the adven turer and the statesman. The individu al is born into a world in which sig nificance s alread y fashioned qualify him as male and bour geois, for exa mple, eve n in his presence to h imself. More over, what ha s trad iti on ally been cons ide red a strictly individual experience - for instan ce, the see ing of a colour or the thinking of an id ea - is only apparently uniq ue; in actua l fact, it dr aws on th e soc ial world. My concrete interactio ns with others familiarize me with ' a world of colours', so that a certain one stands out from a background for me. Co nseq uently, even in colour percep tion I do not ap prehe nd myself as a pre-h uman flux. My allegedl y private thou ght similarly feeds on intersu bjective life in that it suppo ses a part icular cultural wo rld . I am therefore not an inaccess ible sub jectivity but rather, ' a field of presence ' - to myself, other people and the world . Sartre's notion of freedom as the secre ting of no thingness is ultimately hyp ocritical, for such a global refu sal depen ds con tinuo usly o n an acceptan ce: it is itself a certain way of being-in -th e-world which is firml y roo ted in a particular cultura l traditio n and particip ates in socia l co-ex is tence . Sa rtre' s claim about the orig in of nothingness can thu s be suppleme nted: ' it is through the world that nothi ngness comes into being'. Far from being per petually withou t suppo rt, my freedom is alwa ys bu tt ressed by othe rs; and my global commitme nt in co-ex istence sus tains my power to effect a perp etu al ru pture. Nor is that pow er tantam ount to perp etual cho ice - for suc h cho ice wo uld preclude th e ambig uity and ge ne rality wh ich an exis tentialis t appro ach discloses.

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Sartre's fundam ental error cons ists in opposi ng the for-itself to the in-itself, w ith no med iato r between them. He thu s dis rega rds our primordia l bond wi th the world - ou r bein g not only in the wo rld but also of it. It is no t a matter of having to choose between deter mini sm on th e one ha nd and abso lut e freed om on th e othe r, because we are neith er things nor pure consciousnesses but instead, incarnate su bjec tivities inh ering in a situation w hich we assu me and modi fy. By way of a further example, Merleau-Ponty counters Sartre's d iscussion of the torturer and his victim. Sartre emphas izes that the tortured man 's response ' is a spo ntaneous production'; tha t, utterly alone before h is torment or, th e victim is abs olutely free to choose th e mom en t when h e will 'beg for mercy'.I. Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, stress es that th e victi m's refu sal to submit to th e torturer's demands is buttressed by h is con tinuing expe rience of being-w ith -others and of being in volved in a joi nt struggle. It is no t a case of a pure conscio us ness coming to a solitary decision, but rather, a matt er of a pri son er with his loves, memories and felt commitments, livi ng-throu gh a situatio n. In con clusion, Merleau- Ponty notes th at freedom requ ires so me power, that th at power is sus tained by our commitments, and th at no commitme nt can originate or issue in absolute freedom. We are thus always committed , bu t never ab solutely so ; and we live our commitme n ts ambig uo us ly before we eve r thema tize them . O ur exis tential analysis of the ph enomen on of presen ce has revea led, mor eover , that we are in fact the very synthesis which Sartre rul ed out as an impossi bility - namely, that of being-in-and -for ourselves. Along wit h our existence, we all receive a particular style which figur es in eve rything we th in k and do. O ur past, our tem perament and o ur env ironment are aspec ts of the .total psychological-h istor ical struc ture which we are, and it is th anks to thi s structure that we can be free at all. As an ' intersubjective field ' we are, as Sai nt-Exupery noted, 'but a network of relatio ns h ips '; and it is by assuming those relation ships and carry ing th em forwa rd , that we realize our freedom .

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Notes 1. Sartre, Being and Nothingness: a Phenomenological Essay on On tology , pp. 121, 59811., 61611., 64111., 655, 678, 705. 2. Ibid., pp. 473, 474, 67111., 700. 3. Ibid. , pp. 124-7, 24111., 250, 568. 4. Ibid. , pp . 120-6, 298, 301-3, 474. 5. Ibid., pp. 47111. 6. Ibid., pp. 33--6, 56--61, 70, 71, 84, 116, 120-6,615-16. Note that Sartre uses the following terms more or less interchangeably here (although he does specify that consciousness is 'the instantaneous nucleus' of the human be ing): consciousness, being-for-itself, the for-itself, the human being, human reality, man. 7. Ibid., pp. 559, 563-4. 8. Ibid. , pp . 56411., 57511. 9. Ibid., pp. 16, 56711., 58111., 59411., 61211., 62011., 70511. 10. Ibid. , pp. 61911., 62511., 63511., 64511., 67511. 11. Ibid., pp. 59911., 61811., 622, 63711. 12. Ibid. , pp. 567ff., 616, 624. It is interesting to note that Sartre says (p.568): 'Human -reali ty is free because .. . it is perpetually wrenched away from itself and because it has been separated by a nothingness from what it is and from what it will be.' 13. Ibid., pp. 56&-9, 617, 652. 14. Ibid. , pp. 58411., 597-8, 637-47. 15. Ibid., pp. 570-1. 16. Ibid. , pp. 56111. , 64011., 65411., 66611. 17. Ibid. , pp. 30111., 34011., 47111., 53411., 65411. (See particularly pp. 472-5, 536-7, 553, 656.) 18. Ibid. , pp. 52311.

Conclusion: A Critical Assessment of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty's central concern in the Phenomenology of Perception is to prompt us to recognize that objective thought lundamentally distorts the phenomena 01 our lived experience, thereby estranging us from our own selves, the world in which we live and other people with whom we interact. Such thinking is not confined to a single discipline or to a particular philosophical tradition. On the contrary, not only is it common to the sciences, social sciences and humanities, but it underlies both realism and idealism and leeds on common sense itself. In exposing the bias of objective thought, Merleau-Ponty seeks to re-establish our roots in corporeality and the perceptual world, while awakening us to an appreciation of the inherent ambiguity of our lived experience. The body is commonly deemed to be the locus of experience; hence Merleau-Ponty investigates traditional conceptions of the body, draws OUf attention to their inadequacies and urges us to abandon these classical objectifications. In place 01 the traditional approaches, he proposes that we regard the body as a dynamic synthesis 01 intentionalities which, by responding to the world's solicitations, brings perceptual structures into being in a ceaseless dialectic whereby both body and objects are constituted as such. Since this ongoing dialectical movement effects the emergence 01 cultural as well as natural objects, Merleau-Ponty proceeds to consider our experience 01 other people. The latter, he contends, are not inaccessible minds incomprehensibly inhabiting impenetrable mechanisms whose functioning induces us to infer the existence of other subjectivities confronting our own. To this traditional philosophy, Merleau-Ponty opposes a phenomenological description of the direct, pre-reflective communication of body-subjects sharing a perceptual field . Concluding that private 149

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subjectivity is itself rooted in this primordial dialogue of incarnate intentionalities, Merleau-Ponty enjoins us to reject the entrenched notion of an original, self-enclosed, self-sustaining subjectivity. He further submits the traditional absolute cogito to a radical reflection, thereby revealing an underlying tacit cogito and rein tegratin g thinking into an existential project. According to Merleau-Ponty, the temporalization implied in such a project transcends the traditional passivity-activity dichotomy and again discloses the body-subject as a third kind of being. Consequently, the freedom of that incarnate subjectivity is neither non-existent nor absolute, but features the same dialectical structure that already emerged in the phenomenological analysis of our most rudimentary perception. Merleau-Ponty radicalizes phenomenology and offers a profoundly positive phenomenological-existen~l. philosophy in tracing intentionality back to its source in corp<3real subjectivity and showing the latter to be part of a continuous dialectical exchange with the world and other incarnate subjectivities. By acknowledging a spontaneous accord between sensing and understanding, and a non-conceptual harmony among subjects in aesthetic experience, Kant's Critique of Judgement already pointed the way beyond the Cartesian bifurcation of human reality with its consequent restriction of intentionality. As Merleau-Ponty notes in his 'Preface', Husserl's subsequent distinction between 'operative intentionality' and 'intentionality of act' developed Kant's insight and, in broadening the notion of intentionality, enabled phenomenology to 'become a phenomenology of origins'.' Nevertheless, Husserl stopped short of establishing the origin of intentionality in the situated body-subject, with the result that his own philosophy remained insufficiently radical. Other philosophers in the phenomenological or existentialist tradition similarly failed to undertake a truly radical reflection that is, their thought did not reach the actual roots of experience and thus involved unacknowledged assumptions. Hegel, for example, declared in his Phenomenology of Mind that 'sensecertainy is unaware that its essence is the empty abstraction of pure being'; that 'for us (tracing the process) or in itself, the universal qua principle, is the essence of perception; and as against this abstraction, both the moments distinguished - that which perceives and that which is perceived - are what is non-

essential'; that spirit is the content of experience and that the goal of its process of embodiment 'is Absolute Knowledge or Spirit knowing itself as Spirit'r' Heidegger's philosophy likewise failed to put the primacy on human reality, as is evident from his assertion that 'the essence of man is essential for the truth of Being, and apart from this truth of Being man himself does not matter'.' Thus Heidegger stressed that 'the essence of man rests in Being-in-the-World'; but by 'World' he meant 'the clearing of Being, wherein man stands out from his thrown essence'." For their part, Kierkegaard, Jaspers and Marcel sternly criticized traditional philosophy as remote from concrete human life and emphasized, by contrast, the need to focus on actual experience and to recognize the philosopher's participation in a situation. Their attempts to articulate a genuinely concrete philosophy fell far short of this goal, however, because all three called for a leap of faith to an absolute designated, respectively, as 'God', 'the Encompassing', and 'transcendence itself ' or the 'presence' which makes itself felt in 'mystery' and whose recognition is 'only possible through a sort of radiation which proceeds from revelation itself ,5 While firmly rejecting any leap of faith and achieving concreteness, the philosophies of Nietzsche and Camus, in turn , lacked comprehensiveness; and though attaining the latter as well, that of Sartre was flawed by dualism. In avoiding all these pitfalls, Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception stands as a remarkable achievement. By drawing attention to the serious shortcomings of objective thought and discussing these in detail, Merleau-Ponty encourages us to abandon the traditional approaches and return to the phenomena of our concrete experience. The Phenomenoloy not only provides a method whereby such a return can be accomplished, but also undertakes that return itself in its phenomenological-existential analyses of the body, objectivity, subjectivity, thought, time, intersubjectivity, freedom and history. MerleauPonty's treatment of these perennial issues suggests that we are primordially of the natural world and therefore fundamentally at home in it; that we similarly enjoy a pre-reflective bond with others and the human world; that by our daily lives we participate in shaping our world and determining the course of our joint history; that our commitments are never completely unsupported since our freedom is always interwoven with that of other people; and

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th at the carn ality and fundamental ambiguity of our being-inthe- world are by no means impediments to reflectio n or to com mu nication with othe rs. To ap precia te the full im port of th e Ph enomenology's ori entati on , it is in structi ve to recall Sartre's thesi s in Being and Nothingness by way of compa riso n . Sartre contends th at the phe no me no n of presence is a fall, a degeneration of the in-i tse lf; that an y sy nthesis of a 'nih ilating spo nteneity' and ' mechanical processes' is im possibl e; th at the for-itself is th rown into exile in an utterly indifferent in-itself; that 'ad versity and utili zabl e in strumentalit y' is the primary meaning of things; that the for-itself 's sit ua tio n is one of inevitable separation from things and aba ndo nme nt in a wo rld which it seeks to appropriate by various techn iques in a vain att empt to gi ve itse lf a foundation ; that the inher ent contrad ictio n in its fundam ental project of appropriati on render s the for-it self an utterl y ' useless passion' and dooms all its activities to equivalence, so that so litary drinking and lead in g a coun try amou nt ' to the same th in g'; that th e basic proj ect of appropria tio n likewi se characteri zes the for-itself 's relations with others and in evit ably im prisons it a circle of seeking to enslave and to esca pe such enslavement itself; th at the for-itself 's selfness requires negating the o the r; that unity with others is theoret ically and pr actically unrealizable; that th e very essence of relatio ns with o the rs is insecurity, danger, confrontation and conflict; th at othe rs in evit abl y .impose an alien meaning and limit th e for-itself 's free do m ; th at th e mere exis tence of othe rs lends an indefeas ibl e ' d ime nsion of alienation' to th e for- itself 's situation; th at an inescapable alienation thus characterizes all si tuations; that ' the very mean in g' of freedo m is to surge up in the world as ' confron ting othe rs' and to cause the e mergence of a situation wh ose 'essen tial characteristic ... is to be alienated '; that, fin ally, the for -it self 's alienated be ing (its be ing-for-othe rs) is its link with others ." Sartre 's not ion of on tological freed om forms the core of his position ; conseq ue ntly, by uncovering th e inher ent contra d ictio n in th is pivotal conce pt. Merleau-Ponty effecti vely dem olish es the very founda tion of Sartre's philosophy. Althou gh Merle au -Ponty devot es the final cha pter of his Phenomenology to an ana lysis of freed om , hi s critiq ue of Sartrian freed om actua lly cons titutes a recurrent th em e th rou gh the en tire wo rk. Of course, he frequently d ocs not use th e term 'freed om', but we have see n that at each stage of the inq uiry Merl eau-Ponty d ra ws atten tion to the in so-

luble dil em mas in curred by reducing reali ty to a pr odu ct of pure cons tructio n or mechani sti c causality. In focus ing on the unde rlyin g prejudice commo n to both approaches and on th e need to recog ni ze a third kind of existence which both reject, MerleauPon ty sys tematically undermines Sartre's id ea of a for-itself whose very being is freedom . He th ereby simultan eously inst itutes a new way of thinking which , being more radical, d iscerns the der ivative nature of the Sar tria n notion p f alienation and goes beyon d it to dis close our primo rd ial QQncLwith the natural and human wo rld. We have see n in th e previ ous chapter s th at th e d ichot om y of in-itself and for-itself is fatally flaw ed and that th e Sartrian nihilati on is itself roo ted in a more basic tacit affirma tio n . Far from being cu t off and paralyzed by an ind ifferent being-in-it self, we are p rim ordially related to, and animated by, a pr e-obj ective world which so licits our se nsi bili ties and ena bles us to actua lize and develop them . Being-in -the-world is th er efore not an exi le; and altho ug h we can indeed regard things as d iscreet , adver se entities to be seize d throu gh th e application of techn iques, such an attitude toward our envi ronment depends on the anony mo us di alectical moveme nt in which the body- subject is int erv olved with pr e-obj ective be ing anterior to an y separatio n. As it is not primordially apa rt fro m the world but rather of it and in fecund interaction with it, in carnate subjecti vity is not inherently doomed to seek th e app ropriation of a founda tion - nor are it s activities condemned to equivalence. Moreov er, its incarnate intentio nality alrea dy opens the body-subject to other inca rna te su bjectivi ties and inaugura tes a pre-pers on al d ialog ue whic h is mutually enrichi ng . A fun damental mutual com pr ehe nsio n thus su b tends any su bseq ue nt misunderstandings, so that our basic relati on s with othe rs are not one s of confronta tio n but of coope ra tio n. Prior to any refu sal of others, our bod ily being establis hes a pre-perso na l un ity with th em ; and it is in vir tue of such unity that selfhoo d can develop at all. Whil e it is tru e that othe rs can impose alie n meanings on us , th ei r ability to do so an d ours to ap prehe nd them as alien, suppose a positive, pr e-reflectiv e reciprocity which rul es ou t the alleged inevitability of alienation . Th e importan ce of thi s radi cal rever sal of the Sartrian position canno t be over-es tima ted . Far from being part of the human condition, alie natio n, con fron tation, mi sund erstand ings, conflic ts, terror and a Hobbesian state of war th er eb y become contingent tran sformati ons of a ba sic h armony which impugn s any cava lier

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di smissal of calls for global co-o pe ration as mere pipe-dream s. Th e perv asiv e sense of aliena tio n in the western world tod ay becomes, by implicatio n, a ph en om en on calling for critiq ue and rectifi cation based on a re-awaken ed apprecia tion of primary perceptual reciprocity. The Phenomenologv pro vid es just th e sort of comprehensive groundin g which such a critiq ue requ ires if it is to be philoso phically compelling . Merleau-Pont y's step-by -step di sclosu re of our prim ordi al inheren ce in th e world also lays the foundati on for an explicitly ecological approach to our enviro nme nt and an accompanying de velopment of an app ropri ate techn ology . Our fund am ental belon gin g to, and di alectical interaction with, the natural worl d mean s tha t our neglect or dest ru ction of th e latter carri es that of ou rselves in its wake. Merleau -Pon ty's criti q ue of ration alism calls into q uestion ' the placin g of spirit in an axiological dimen sion havin g no co mmon measure with nature' and promp ts h im ' to prep are th e subs tructure of livin g experience without which reason and liberty are emp tied of th eir con ten t and wither awa y'." By rest orin g our rooted ness in th e perceived world and in pre-p erson al co-existence wi th others, th e Phenomenology pav es th e w ay for a concrete mo rality which is ade q uate to th e dem ands of our age. An y allegatio n that such a claim involves th e na tura listi c fallacy, falls prey itself to Merleau -I' onty's critiq ue of th e trad iti onal fact-value d istinction . The perceiv er is neither an isolated , passive recipient of an in -itself datum nor a solitary, ab solu te artificer of a perceptual struc ture but instead, an incarnate su bjectivity relating si multaneo us ly centrifuga lly and centripetally to an intersu bjective, eme rge n t world. Th e ceaseless , di alectical co-stru cturing of a d yna mic, percep tual field is already pr e-reflectively valu.\::Ja den and its ph en omen ological descriptio n brings to light value-facts which defy the classical dich otom y." Th e recogni tion of thi s inextricabl e intertwining of facts and values in lived expe rience precludes ou r taking refuge in any ab stract moralit y. As Merleau-Ponty ind icates in h is 1946 add res s defending the Phellomellology before the Societe [rancais de philosophie, hi s text effective ly puts us ell ro llie to creating an eth ics of gen uine rega rd for othe rs in th e conc reteness of ou r specific situation :

its making, then mor ality cannot cons ist in the pr ivate ad he ren ce to a sys tem of values . ... Th us we cannot rem ain in differentto the as pec t in which our acts appear to o thers. . . . It is the very dem and of rati on alit y whi ch im po ses on us the need to act in suc h a way that our action cannot be cons ide red by others as an act of aggress io n b ut, on th e contrary, as gene rous ly meeting th e other in th e very par ticularity of a given situa tion Just as th e perception of a thing ope ns me up to bein g the percepti on of th e othe r found s morali ty . . .9

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If we admit th at our life is inherent to the perceive d wo rld and

the human world , eve n wh ile it re-creates it and contributes to

The social- political impli cati on s of that remark are on ly too eviden t; and whilst the very stru cture of perceptio n preclude s guarantees , Merleau -Po nty's descriptio n of percep tual experience does indicate that success ful co-exis tence is ge nuinely possible. In ov ert urn ing the Sar trian concep tio n of freedom, the Phellomenology implicitly appeals to us to realize our resp onsi bili ty in actively seeking harm ony with o the rs in all as pec ts of our ex istence .

In rad icalizin g the phen om en ological reduction and implemen ting it in a comprehensive investi gation of perception , MerleauPonty succeeds in uncovering the tacit assump tions in traditional mod es of th in king. In ad dit ion, he offers us a new way of phi losophi zin g whose imp licatio n s are clearly very far-reaching. The Phenomenoiogv of Perception th erefor e cons titutes an inv aluabl e contri bution not only to the phil osophi cal d iscourse bu t also to that of related di sciplines. Despi te its sign al ach ievements however, Merleau -Ponty's extraord inary text poses a num ber of problem s. Before proceedin g to cons ide r them, it is essen tial to fores tall potent ial miscon cep tions conce rn ing the nature of such an examination . There is a way of readin g the Phellomenology fro m the outsi de, so to spea k, wh ich merely serves to confirm us in our prejudic es. Such an approach typ ically deplores the ge ne ral am biguity of the wo rk as we ll as its lack of precise definit ion s, succinct explana tions , telling refutation s, straightforward argume nts, convin cing proo fs o r un e qu ivocal demons tration s . A.t its ex treme , such an 'external' read ing di smi sses the entire text as un intelli gible - an extended exercise in ' muddled thinki ng'. In it s more moderate form, th is mode of critiq ue atte mpts to sift out and trans late ' the interesting bits' int o unambigu ou s philosoph ical term ino logy be fore submitting th em to closer scrutiny. In eithe r case, th e crit ic operates with a wh ole host of precon cep tion s about

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the meaning of 'good' philoso ph y and th e criteria for its eva lua tion. Th e moderate critic furthermore takes for gran ted that in philosop hy, as opposed to poetry, content can be se pa ra ted from form - Ni etzsche notwithstand in g. Such a modus operandi is profoun dly uncritical, and it misses the very ess en ce of th e Phenomenology altogethe r. Merl eau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception calls into q uesti on our traditional conce ptio n of philosophy, o ur habitua l catego ries and criteria, even our es tablished conce ptua l framework itself. In the pr ocess of doin g so, moreover, the Phenomenology is de ve lopin g a fresh d iscourse, an in novative ph ilosophy; consequen tly, we m ust firm ly res ist th e temptation to tailor it to th e old cons tructs if we are to appreciate what it is saying. In orde r to un derstan d and assess it, we mu st leave our various ass ump tio ns behind and ope n o urse lve s to the text itse lf. We will also do well to keep in mind Mer leau -Ponty's ow n cau tio nary remarks about the sta tus of th e work in his ' Introd uctio n' to the Phenomenology . Throughou t the book , he implicitly stresses the in sep arability of form and conten t by contin ually drawin g our attention to the weaknesses of both th e intellectualist and the em piricist red uctio ns, and the conseq ue n t need for a th ird kind of being. In the cha pter 'The Spa tiality of the Body Itself and Motility' Merleau -Ponty says expli citl y that matter and form stan d in a rela tionsh ip of ' Fundierung', that ' form int egrat es within itself the content until the latter fina lly appears as a mere mode of form itself ' and that exis tence is a 'd ialectic of form and content' i!" It is accord ingly mi sgu id ed , to say th e least , to assume that Merleau -Pon ty's own philosophy can be deta ched from its form; furth erm ore, we saw in the cha pter 'The Bod y as Expression and Speech ' wh y the trad itional theories of language are ultimately un tena ble. O ur pr ed ilection for d ivo rcin g the bod y from the mind and the ob ject from th e su bject, prom pts us to regard lan guage as detach ab le from thou ght an d meaning as exclus ively on the side of the latt er. Merleau -Pon ty's phen om en ological ana lysi s of lan gu age aims to awa ken us to the phen omenon of incarnate sign ification which rules out any such divi sion and imbues word s with s ignificance. As in the case of th e in nova tive spe aker, the philosopher wh o breaks new ground brin gs a novel mean in g into be ing in the very act of articulat ing it, and its express io n - wh eth er verbal or written - is as inseparable from that meaning as are the wo rks of poets, mu sician s or pain ters from thei rs. Through th e style of

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writing and choice of wo rd s, the creative ph ilosopher gives bir th to an exis tential significance which inhabits the words th emselves instead of lying som ewh ere behin d them . The word s themselves, in sho rt, are essential - th ey cannot simply be stripped aw ay and othe rs su bs tituted to expose the phil osop her 's ' real' meaning. If that is the case, then our readi ng of th e Phenomenology must not be a matt er of unwrappin g or decod ing Merleau-Ponty's thought but ra the r, of re ndering ourselves gen uine ly pr esent to its presence in the text itself. As Mer lea u-Po nt y not es, we 'begin to understand a ph ilosophy by feeling [our] way into its existential man ner, by reproducing th e tone and accent of th e plulosopher'." Even the sum marizing of an au th entic, or originatin g, philosophy is therefore fraugh t with diffi culty and any assessment of tha t philoso phy mus t be made strictly on its own terms. An excellent starti ng point for evalu ating th e shortcomings of th e Phenomenology lies in Merleau -Ponty's own estimatio n of the work sho rtly before his deat h. In on e of h is 'Working No tes' da ted July, 1959 we find th e following startlin g judgement: 'The pro blem s posed in Ph.P. arc insoluble becau se I start there from th e "conscious ness't-vobject" di stinction __ , . 12 By w ay of elab oration , Mer lea u-Pon ty says (in the same note) that the en tailment of a globa l disturbance by a certain physiological injury (as in the case of Schneider) remains incompreh en sib le given the aforementi oned di stinction , and that the purport ed 'objective COnd ition . .. is a wa y of exp ressi ng and noting an event of the order of brute or wild bein g wh ich , ontologically, is primary. Th is eve nt is that a given visible properly d isposed (a bod y) ho llows it self out an Wha t are we to make of th is cryptic in visible sense ['sens') not e? Has no t Mer leau -Ponty at every ste p of hi s ana lysis in the Phenomenology endeavou red prec isely to overturn the trad itional di stin ction be tw een 'consciousness' and ' object' by discl osin g incarn ate subjectiv ity as a third kind of being which is irreducible to eithe r consci ou snes s or o bjective bod y? Has he not rei terated that th is third term is primordially of the wo rld? Has he not take n pain s to sho w - in his an alysis of h abit ual beh aviour , for exa mple - that the bod y-subject incorporates the world's stru ctures into its own space? Has he not insis ted th at the wo rld is no t to be regarde d as a totality of objects, nor the su bject as a sp ectator consciousness surveying the lot ? Has he not em phasized repeatedl y in the Phenomenology that ther e is a genesis of su bject and object in pre-reflective percep tual expe rie nce? Has he not through out hi s

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study of perception dr awn atte ntio n to the distortions stemming from our ad he rence to the class ical distinctions? Has he not con sistently attempted to illuminate the primordial experience which antedates an y suc h d istinction s? As th e ans wer to all these qu esti on s cannot but be affirmat ive, it would see m th at MerleauPonty's own assessment of the Phenomenology mu st be di scounted. Upon further reflection how ever, we shall see that this conclusio n is too ha sty - for th e iss ue itself is far more complex th an the foregoing wo uld sugges t. In th e Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty is conce rne d to sho w that perception is not imposition - whether of an ob jective datum on a passive subject o r a subjective structure on an external object - but rather, pre-reflecti ve communication ('d ialogu e') between th e percei ved wo rld an d the percei vin g bod y-subject. Merleau -Ponty's cho ice of title is sig nif icant in th is regard , for his study encompasses perceiving and the percept - as the double meaning of 'percep tion' ind ica tes ; moreover, hi s phe no me no logy reveals th at these tw o term s are inex tricably and d ynami cally interrelated in perceptual expe rience. We have see n, further , that Merleau -Ponty's ph en om en ological description of perception stresses th e phenomen al bod y's pr imordial anchorage in and bond with , the pre-objective world . Th is means that th e perceiver is sim ultaneo us ly part of th e perceived world and sufficien tly apart from it for dialogue between them to ari se . The perceiver is concurrently perceived and pe rceiv ing - but not in the sense of th e Sartrian 'look' , as is evide nt from th e precedin g cha pters. Thi s would suggest that in belon gin g to the perceived world, th e perceiv er sha res its fundam ental texture while ret ain ing th e distin ction of existing as a perceivin g being - and a human o ne at th at . Fu rther, Merleau-Pon ty's tracin g of me aning to a prereflectiv e exchange between inca rnate sub jectivity and preo bjective being sugges ts that the emergence of meaning has to do with th is parado xical d ifference-in-sam en ess, th is tran scendence in immanen ce, which is the ve ry essence of perception as perceived -p erceiv in g. Yet all th is is - for th e most part - laten t in th e Phenomenology, as Merleau-Ponty concentrates on awa keni ng us to an awareness that all OU f so-called 'external' and 'in ternal' perception s - even our ' innermost' feelings and see mingly se lfsubsisten t thoughts - are' the product of a cease less dialectical interac tio n between th e ph en om en al bo dy and the pre-obj ective wo rld . The focus here is on the exis tence of th at fund am ental

di alogu e and on the way in which it st ruc tures th e lived experie nce wh ich sub tends reflection itself. The aforesaid paradox which ena bles the dialogu e to eme rge at all and the act ua l birth of meanin g thu s remain largely un explored . In a very rea l sen se, then , Merleau-I'onty's phen om en ological description of perception starts fro m th e everyday world of already acq ui red meanings and from the conscious ness of an es tablished, meaningful world . In its ' na tural attitude' to the world _ as we have see n - consc ious ness regards things as simply external en tities, that is, as objec ts. Beginning w ith th is everyday di st in ction of 'co n scious ness' and 'o bjec t', Merleau-Ponty see ks to alert conscio us nes s to it s primord ial in he rence in a bod y and strives to di sclose the pre-reflectiv e excha nge whereby objects are' constituted as such. Since this incarnate con sciousn ess is an already perceiving, sp eakin g, thin kin g subject situated and engaged in an already me ani ngful world, the origin of mean in g rem ains perplexing - as does the exac t nature of conscious ness's inheren ce in bod y and world, given the dichotomou s starting point which Merleau-Pon ty himself acknowled ges in the note cited earlier. As he admits th ere, th e profound tran sformati on which a given brain injury in trod uces into one's bein g-in-theworld accordi ng ly remains pu zzling in the Phenomenology. Non etheless, at various point s in th e work, Merleau-Ponty does begin to pro be the birth of mean in g and the paradoxical character of our being-in -the-w orld . In his st udy of th e body's sexual being, for instance, he explores the coming into existence of sex ual sign ificance and the con sequent need to reject the classical dichotom y of passivity and activity in describ ing the phen om en al bod y. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty's ph en om en ological investi gati on of expression and speech d raw s our atten tion to th e differen ce between origi na ting expression and everyday speech, and to th e amo rpho us pr imordial silence fro m whic h a radically new meaning is born. The inception of a novel linguistic sig nificance indicates the inadequacy of th e traditional necessity-contingen cy and immanence-transcende nce distinctions for und erstanding our actual manner of b ein g- i n ~th e - wo rld. In th e sa me cha pter, Merleau -l'onty notes th at there is an 'ever-recreated ope ning in th e pleni tude of being' which con di tio ns aUauthe ntic exp ress ion; fur ther, he liken s this 'func tio n whic h we intuit through langu age' to 'a wave', describe s it as bein g 'its own foundation ' and characterizes origi nating expression as a 'miracle'.14 Else whe re he

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de scrib es how the ph enomenal bod y ad jus ts to lighting in orde r to see , and how it tran sp lants its elf in to things wh ich it uses habitually (suc h as musical instru men ts, orthopaedic devic es, item s of clothing or transport vehicles) or how, by th e same token , it incorporates the lat ter into its own bul k. Th ese descriptions cons titute implicit explorations of our parad oxical bo nd with th e primiti ve, or uni versal, Being me n tioned abo ve . The ope ning and closing sections of the Phenomenologv are also sig nifican t in thi s respect, as they fores had ow th e mo tifs of Merleau -Ponty's last writings. In his 'Pre face' to the book, we learn that the ph en om enologist strive s to recapture th e ' primitive con tact with the world ' so as to give it a philosophical standing ; that ph enom en ological reflection discloses th e world ' as parad oxical'; that ' the phenom enological wo rld ' is the mean ing which shows th rough at the intersection of experien ce ; that express ion and language o rigi nate in 'the sile nce of primary consciousness'; th at philosophy and art both endeavour to gras p the com ing into bein g of meani ng; th at bot h are acts crea ting tru th ; th at the world is ' the only pre-e xisten t Logos' and th at we ourselves are a ' ne two rk of relationships' iP The concluding ' Freedom' chapter rei terates that we are but suc h a networ k, and stresses th at our pr imo rdi al bond and exchang e wi th the world reveal the need to di scard the tradition al passive-active dic ho tom y so that we may comprehe n d our bein g-in-the-world . If we are to determine whether Merleau-Ponty's failu re to dev elop th ese them es mo re fully significantly weaken s hi s phenomen ological description of perception , we mu st consi de r th e nature of his final writings. At the tim e of his deat h, MerleauPont y was in the midst of worki ng on a boo k whi ch was in tended to be an ontology of 'wild' or 'bru te' Being and Logos. Amon g his 'Working Notes' of January 1959 th ere is one in whi ch he makes it clear th at he meant to reconsider, deepen and rectify the PheuomeIlo logy in th is ontological i nvestigation.l? As it is, the project was brutally in terrupted , leaving us only the following frag me nts : a half-fin ish ed manuscript predatin g 1952, wh ose third cha p ter appeared in mod ified form as the essa y ' Le langage indi rect et les voi x du silence' (' Indirect Lang uage and the Voices of Silence'), wh ile the man uscript itself wa s published posthumously und er the titl e La prose du mOllde (The Prose of the World);17 the 1960 ess ay 'L'CEil et l'Esprit ' ('Eye an d Mind ') which, accord ing to M. Claude Lefort, provid es 'a preliminary statem ent' of ideas to be developed

in th e prosp ective ontology." a ma nuscript compris ing the introd uctory first pa rt of Merleau-Ponty's projected book ; and so me wo rking notes. Th e latter manuscrip t and a selection of th e no tes were published posthum ously as Le visible et I'illvisible: suivi de notes de travail (The Visible and the Illvisible: Fo llowed By Workillg Notes). Merleau -Pon ty's 1960 ' Preface' (' Int rodu ction ') to Signes (Siglls) also contains many of the themes wh ich he planned to elabo rate in his ontology. Although it is of course impossible to ascertain how the latter would actually have unfold ed , we can detect th e gene ral di rection of Merleau-Ponty's later thou ght in th ese pieces. Earlier, I suggested that in the Phellomellology Merleau -Ponty endeavours to draw ou r attention to the existence of a pr eobjective world underlying our scien tific and common se nse views, a bod y-subject subtend ing our tradit io nal conce ptio ns of the self, and a primary in teraction persi sting be tween th is prereflectiv e self and pre-objective world . Accordingly, Merleau Ponty traces the trad itional cogito to a bodily, tacit cogito ope rative at the pre-reflective level of perceptual experien ce. In hi s later work , he delib erat ely abandons this tacit cogito" and tries to reach the level of silence below th e distinc tion of ' consciousness' from ' in ten tional ob ject' wh ich eve n a tacit cogito implies. Hi s aim is to discl ose the very eme rgence of meani ng from 'bru te' llein g through th e wave- like ' coiling over' which mak es our own flesh 'seli -sensing' , Merleau-Ponty po ints out that th is will require ' an elu cid ati on of philosophical exp ress ion itself .. . as the expressio n of what is befor e expression and sustaill s it from behilld'. As sensi ble we belon g primordially to 'the flesh of th e wo rld', whilst as sen tient we hollow ou t a mea ni ng wi thout tearin g any hole in the tissu e of brute Being; and ' all this is finally possible and mean s some thing onl y becau se there is Bein g'. Th e latter, how ever, is not in -it self but rath er, comprises th e whole perceptual worl d including ourse lves. Th at world encompasse s not only th e visible, but also its invisible su bs tru cture of brute Bein g - th at dimen sion of silence on:which we draw in any act of authen tic exp ression ." Meaning is itself invisible; yet 'it appears only within' the visibl e and is its 'secret counterpart'. In order to understand it, we must comprehend the relation of si len ce to Logos, or origina ting exp ress io n, in which tru th 'speaks it self ' .21 To illu mi na te th at relation to Being wh ich ' [forms] itself wilhill Beillg', Merlea u -Ponty returns again and again to the study of lan gu age and of art. He

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attempts to show th at far from bei ng congealed inside or on top of the words, mean ing inhabits them in such a way th at the unity of spo ken lan gu age is a unity of d ifferences, a cohe rent sys tem of ' de term ina te gaps' w hic h is continually being res ha ped by the network of speaking subjects. The latt er bring new meanings into being from wit hin th e lingu ist ic field by a move me n t of tran scen den ce wh ich mod ifies that field wi tho ut eve r leaving it behind.F Similarly, painters tran sform the visi ble fro m within it th rou gh a see ing which is at the chiasma of eye and mi nd . Th e painting of a self-portrait is an example par excellence of th e 'coiling ove r' of vis ion which ena bles a n ew meaning to emerge from vertical Being. Sim ultaneous ly see r and seen, the pa in ter belon gs to the fabric of th e visible and folds th at fabric ove r so that a fres h meanin g is ho llowed out. The pai nter's vision is a seeing from within the visi ble itself - as such self-portraya l most readily sho ws . It thus becomes understanda ble that our ow n vision likew ise ' installs' itse lf in th ings and tha t its power to do so poi nts to a funda me ntal unity in th e very tissu e of Being . Merleau- Ponty puts it as follows in a note of Sep tember, 1959 in wh ich he considers how best to describe pre- reflective Being.

a detailed di scussion of th e matter lies beyond th e scope of th is chapter, o ur evalua tion of the Phenomenology's shortcomings suppo ses an apprecia tio n of the problem at iss ue. Briefly, the less defin ite the aforeme ntione d di stinction s are, the more sign ificant is Merleau-Ponty's subseq ue n t philosophizing in showi ng up ina deq uacies in his ph en omen ological description of perception. Th e ' Preface' to the Phenomenology in fact ope ns with the questi on , ' What is ph en om en ology?' and the ens uing ackno wledgement that an an swer is in order. The en tire ' Preface' cons titutes Merleau-Pont y's reply. Thu s we learn that phe no meno logy is indeed ' the study of essences ' - such as ' the essence of percep tion ' - but th at it begins w ith our 'facticity' and reintegrates essences into exis tence. As a transcende ntal ph ilosoph y it brackets th e claims spri ngi ng from ' the natu ral att itude' to th e wo rld ; yet it recogn izes the pre-reflective presen ce of th e world and devotes its wh ole efforts to re-est ablishing a 'primitive con tact' with it and d irectly d escrib ing our actua l experience. Merleau -Ponty ad mi ts that ph en om ology ap pea rs to say everything and to be incapable of defin ing its purvi ew, but notes that it 'can be practised and identified as a manner or style of thinking' which is attai nable solely via ' a phenom en ological method '. The latt er, as we have see n, esche ws scien tific explana tion an d analytical reflectio n in favour of a descrip tion designe d to re-awaken th e pri mordial expe rience underlyin g all our reconstruction s of the world . By putti ng in abe yance our com mon sense certainties and natural attitude, phenomenological reflec tion enables us to beco me aware of our presupposition s and resto res a sense of 'wonder' vis-Ii -vis the world 2 ' Th e phen omen ological red uction rev eals ' the un motivated upsurge of the world', its 'lived' un ity an d the impossibility of a th ou ght wh ich woul d enco mpass everything including itself. Since it discloses th e irred ucible facticity of bo th th e wo rld and our own reflection , ' the ph en om en ological red uc tion is that of an exis tential philosoph y' and - as we saw ea rlier - ph en omen ology becom es ' a ph en om en ology of origins' which seeks to describe 'the core of exis tential [significan ce)', th e uniq ue style of exis tence exp ressed in the objec ts of its radi cal reflection .25 Merlea u-Ponty summarizes th e nat ure of phenomen ology and aga in explicitly eq ua tes it wi th exist entia l philosophy in a 1947 essay on film and p sych ology:

Take up agai n the ana lysis of the cub e to say that I have a view of it is to say tha t, in perceiving it I go ou t of myself in to it. I, my view, are caugh t up in the same carnal wo rld with it; i.e.: my view and my body themselves emerge from th e same bein g wh ich is, among othe r things, a cube . . . It is hen ce fin ally th e massive un ity of Being as th e enco mpassi ng of myself an d of th e cube , it is the wi ld, non -refin ed , ' vertical' Being th at ma kes there be a cube. With th is examp le grasp the upsurge of pure 'signification ' _ _23 Th e above passage shows just how far Merlea u-Pon ty has gone beyon d his ph en om en ological descripti on in the Phenomenology of Perception. Wha t, if any , are the implica tions of th is adva nce for an assessme n t of the Phenomenology? The answer hinges on wha t we tak e the task of phe no me no logy to be and that, in tu rn, depends to a conside rab le degree on whether - and how - we dist inguish p he no me no logy fro m ontology , metap hysics and 'concrete' or existential ph ilosophy as a whole. Unfortuna tely, Merleau-Pon ty's ow n :vritings are rath er unclear on these crucia l points. Although

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Phenomenological or existential philosophy is largely an expression of surprise at this inherence of the self in the world and in others, a description of this paradox and permeation, and an attempt to make us see the bond between subject and world, between subject and others, rather than to explain it as the classical philosophies did by resorting to absolute spirit." Such a philosophy is synonymous with 'concrete thinking' and with a metaphysics which ' is the opposite of system'. Thus understood, metaphysics becomes the lucid awareness and description of our paradoxical being-in-the-world. Instead . of constructing concepts to conceal the paradoxes of lived experience, metaphysics as Merleau-Ponty defines it rediscovers the 'fu n d amental strangeness' of the objects of our experience 'an d the miracle of their appearing' 2 ? As he points out in the 'In tro d u cti on ' to Signs, this type of philosophy is the very antithesis of a 'Go d -li ke survey' and even of an allegedly 'higher point of view'. Instead of soaring over a world spread out beneath its gaze, 'it plunges into the perceptible', 'seeks contact with brute being' and - 'in regaining the "vertical" world' - discloses the 'chiasma of the visible'.28 Is not that, however, the task of his projected ontology as Merleau-Ponty outlines it in what has become The Visible and the Invisible: Followed By Working Notes? It is true that he insists on the impossibility of defining this ontology prior to the actual carrying out of his project and that he staunchly refuses to specify in advance either the nature of the inquiry or even its methodologyexcept to say what his interrogation 'mu st not be ' and to caution that it 'requires a complete reconstruction of philosophy' . The notion of 'flesh', which ' h as no name in any philosophy', is to be central in this reconstruction. Despite a note suggesting that his prospective d efinition of ontology would restrict the latter to an elaboration of key notions while that of philosophy would include the consideration of philosophy's own procedure, the bulk of Merleau-Ponty's unfinished manuscript and notes dealing with his intended ontology makes no such distinction between it and philosophy.i" Notwithstanding his resolve to avoid any predetermination of its contours, moreover, those writings do in fact . indicate that the intent of M erleau-Ponty's mature ontologyphilosophy is of a piece with that of his earlier Phenomenology.

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In light of the manifest impossibility of compartmentalizing MerIeau-Ponty's philosophy into segments labelled, respectively, 'p h en om enology', 'm etap h ysics ' and ' on tolo gy', we are unable to discount his final fragmentary ' on tolo gy ' as irrelevant for an assessment of his 'p h en om en olo gy ' of perception, or to dismiss as inaccurate Merleau-Ponty's own assertion - made in on e of his 'Working Notes' - that the Phenomenology ' is in fact ontology'r'" No matter how tempting it might be to do so, it thus becomes impossible to argue, for example, that Merleau-Ponty's conception of phenomenology's proper task confines phenomenology to a description of the perceptual world, whilst metaphysics or ontology rightly probes the Being which is its source. The various passages which have been cited show, on the contrary, that we are dealing with an integral, existential philosophy. When judged on its

own terms, this philosophy consequently proves to be insufficiently radical in the Phenomenology of Perception. The very notion of perception already suggests distinctions beyond 'our brute or wild experience' - such as that between seeing and thinking. If it is to be truly radical, the description of our lived, or 'p rim itive' , experience must go back to what is given to us originally ' in an experience-source'r" But how are we to accomplish such a return to genuinely 'brute' experience? Are we not perforce condemned to draw those minimal distinctions which philosophical inquiry itself implies? As Merleau-Ponty acknowledges, not even the most radical reflection can recapture immediate experience as such - for that would require a coincidence, a fusion, which reflection itself precludes. The experience to which reflection returns is inevitably an experience mediated by that very reflection. Radical, or ' con cre te', philosophy is thus a profoundly paradoxical undertaking.F This does not mean, however, that it is of its very nature doomed to failure or that it constitutes a futile endeavour. Indeed - ironically enough - it is its own paradoxicalness which provides reflection with the requisite key to penetrate the sedimentation of acquired significances so as to elucidate the very genesis of meaning in the paradoxical nature of our lived inherence in Being. To appreciate that the Phenomenology's failure to trace meaning to its origin in our self-sensing hold on brute Being is indeed a shortcoming, it is important to indicate how such a radicalized inquiry might proceed.

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A rectification of the Phenomenology's descriptive analysis could well take th e latt er's conclus ion as its ow n point of departure. We have seen that Merlcau-Ponty's ph enomenol ogical de scription of temporality as primordially self-awa re, self-affecting subjectivity, reveals the stru cture of presen ce; and that hi s subseq ue nt investigation of freed om involves an extens ive crit iq ue of the Sartrian opposition between being and nothingn ess. Tha t crit iq ue leads Merl eau-Ponty to conclude that we mu st from th e start be aware of being someh ow centred outside ourselve s, that we are not inaccessible subjectivities but rather, an intersubjectiv e ' field of presence' and that our freedom do es not consist in a secreting of nothingness, but in a transformatory excha nge with wh at is. 1£, like Sartre, w e th en examine our philosophical int errogati on itse lf, we will find that qu esti oning does indeed defin e our very being; nonetheles s, we will go beyond Sartrc 's accou nt by expos ing - as in the Phenomenology - th e tacit presupposit ion in hi s contention that th e fundam ental relat ion which rev eals itself in an y qu estion is one of rupture and op pos itio n. Inst ead , we will see that the 'encounter be tween " us " and "what is" - these words being tak en as simple indexes of a meaning to be spec ified ' - is one of pr esen ce in which our very o pe nness up on wh at is, test ifies to our primord ial bon d wi th it and brings to lig ht a commo n ' flesh'. Reflection on our philosophical inquiry will disclose that prima ry coiling or foldin g ove r, which in stalls us beyond ourse lves in what is, and allows a novel significance to eme rge in the hollow which that reflecting creates. P Our reflection necessarily rest s on lan gu age; yet it thrusts us out of th e alrea d y established signi ficances so th at - in authentic philosophizing - we experience the coming to ar ticulatio n of mut e Being w ithi n our own phil osophical di scourse, in our ve ry att empt to regain con tact with immedia te expe rience . In endeavouring to di sclose and describe th e miraculou s bi rth of meaning in pre -reflect ive experie nce , reflection so to speak be nds back over that experi en ce and , in failing to fuse with it, creat es the open ing which enables the same miracle to occu r in philosophical expression itse lf. Thi s parad ox at th e core of philosophy's creativity mirrors that of our overall being-in -th e-w orld ; hen ce o ur reflection on the former can re-aw aken us to an app reciation of the nature of our primord ial presen ce to brute Being . Authe ntic philosophical exp ress ion emerges in the flesh of lan gu age from th e 'pregnan t silence' wh ich is its inv is ib le infras tructure and, in

crystallizing int o speech, takes its place in the world of alrea dy acquired significances. Th e tran sform ato ry excha nge between the latter and th e as-y et mute intention, restructures the lin gui st ic field so that it becom es the spring bo ard for furth er acts of expressi on. Thus philosophical inquiry int errogates Being from within and, in doing so, continually es tablis hes new relationships with it. In general, then , the 'se lf-se ns ing ' cha racter of o ur own flesh opens us to what is and links us with it, while ena bling us to thrust up new signif icances wh ich resh ape th e primary given and, in tum, draw us on to ever fres h efforts of expression. In failing to focus on th is chias ma of th e visible and th e invisible, this inters ecting of our flesh and th at of brut e Bein g, th e Phenomenology ultimately misses th e dimen sion of nascent meaning and thus falls sho rt of Merleau-Ponty's express intentio n to offer a trul y radical description . Neve rthe less, its failu re to un cover the very roo ts of our lived experience does not an nul the work's worth or rende r it incap abl e of providing the sort of foundati on sug ges ted in o ur cons ide ration of its contempo rary relevanc e. It does, however, mean th at philosoph ical reflection mu st coil back over the ' phenomenological' description of perception so as to pu sh itself beyond the latter's results to a ge nuine ly radical articulatio n of our parad oxical presen ce to what is. The foregoing has sugges ted that altho ug h the Phenomenology of Perception cons titutes a very Significant ad vance in ph en om en ological-existential philosophy, it does not go far eno ug h in describing the primordial expe rience wh ich anteda tes all our trad itional distinctions an d th eories. Thi s insuffi cient radica lizatio n is th e Phenomenology's central weakn ess; non eth eless, the wo rk's additional, far le ss se rio us , shortcomi ngs mu st now also be consi de red . Th e first is not actually a defect in so far as it has to do with th e very nature of 'concrete' ph iloso phy - namely, its descriptive characte r. As we saw ea rlier, Merleau -I'ont y himself alerts his readers to thi s matter and po in ts o ut that those wh o are firml y committed to the classical ap proaches w ill find his account con fused, un convincin g an d philosophically insigni ficant. Th ei r ow n theoretical co ns tructs will strike such critics as infin itely more real than th e' ph en om en a of expe rience described in th e Phenomenology. Th e latt er's fluid concep ts will deem inco mprehe ns ible to them and, despite Merleau -Ponty's de n ial, they w ill dee m simply a product of id iosyn crati c introspection the ambiguo us dom ain which he protrays. Th ese readers wi ll di smi ss hi s cond itio nal

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certain ty, pers p ectiva l tru th and pr e-reflective bodil y knowl edge as not being any certainty, truth or kno w led ge at all. Merl eau-Ponty cannot co unter suc h allegations by bringin g forward so me definitive expe rime nt, unchallen geable fact, telling argumen t or clever proof. From the pe rspective of 'concrete' phil osophy, these conventional rejoinde rs are pred icated on an accep tance of the scientific precon ception of the universe an d th e conco mita nt ideal of knowled ge. Th e rebu tta ls are therefore th emselves thorough ly uncrit ical. Concre te phi losophy critic izes thi s presupposed ad here nce to an objective, unam biguous, pr ecisely kn owable world; consequently, it must for ego th e philosophical tactics w hich are based on what it cons iders to be a prejud ice. Having rejected on principl e th e possibility of phil osoph ical refutat io n, Merleau -Pon ty' s only recourse - as he readily ackno wledges - is to ende avo ur to re-awaken his critics to thei r own experience and induce them to aband on their ass umptions by di sclosin g the plethora of previo us ly incompreh en sib le phenomena made accessib le th rou gh his ap proach. Thi s so le resort is unfortunately eve n more problematic than Merleau -Pont y declares it to be. After all, th e dogmatic read ers will d oub tless regard th e Phenomenology' s description of those phen ome na as more - no t less - unin telligible than th e trad itional accounts, notwi thstan ding th e latters' lacu nae. Buttressed by bot h commo n sens e and science in their belief in th e objective wo rld, suc h cri tics can hard ly be expec ted to render th em sel ves suf ficie ntly present to th e text so as to ena ble th em to find Merleau Ponty's position genuin ely convinci ng. Give n th eir protrac ted adhesion to ' the na tural attitude to things' and the requisite habitual tailoring of thei r own expe rience accordingly, how are those read ers to di stinguish their 'actual' experi en ce from its cus tomary distortion? Furthermo re, in light of the enormo us prestige of science and th e conse q ue n t pressures to discredi t any expe rience that fails to fit the tacitly pr escribed fram ew ork, what is to prompt them to sus pe nd that ' na tura l attitude' whi ch conforms with the basi c ass umption s of scie nce? Why should they qu est ion th e va lidi ty of long estab lish ed criter ia for judging reality? Why sho uld th ey renounce th e usual recourse to auxiliary hyp othesis to rectify any allege d in ad eq uacies in the traditional th eori es ? Why sho uld they conside r the Phenomenology 's account of experience to be more inclusive than the rendi tio ns offered by the classical approaches - why not simply bring forward phen om en a and

expe rime nts which th e Phenomenology does no t di scuss? What is to prevent read er s from reversin g Merleau-Ponty's charge that they ar e the victi ms of 'a kind of mental blindness' r" by re to rting that on the contrary, his st ubborn rejection of d istinc tions su ppo rted no t only by com mon sense but also by science, eviden tly stems from a peculiar mental blindspot? Wh y no t add - for goo d measure - th at despi te his insisten ce on the contingency of reflection , Merleau -l'onty's failure to examine th e concrete ori gin of hi s own tho ugh t unfortuna tely keeps him from discovering his glaring in tellectu al block?! Merleau-Ponty calls th e trad iti onal mo des of phi losophizin g in to quest ion ; henc e, he lacks an y recognized recourse agai nst the crit icis ms of those who refu se to di sp ense with the es tablis he d ways of doi ng and ass essin g philosop hy. It is of litt le ava il to declar e experience the fin al jud ge and to inventory phen omena wh ich pass the test of exp er ien ce, if detractors pe rsist in d isputing the na ture of th at experien ce or cha lleng ing the credenti als of th is ' judge'. In the abs en ce of all the classic philosophical comebacks to th e vario us objections, Mer leau -Pon ty must su pply mo re tha n the few sca tte red commen ts wh ich he proffer s rega rd ing the cha racter of his approach. If those who are not alrea d y committed to such a mod e of phil osophizing are to be induced to su sp end thei r pr econcepti on s su fficiently so as to heed their own underlying experience - as Merleau-Pont y evide ntly hopes - then the inheren t diffi cu lty in wha t has come 10 be known as 's hifting paradi gms' mu st be addressed directly and trea ted in cons ide rably gre ater detail th an it h as been in th e Phenomenology . In addi tion, the read ers m ust be alerted to th eir own role in accomplish in g suc h a shift of thei r ent ire ph ilosop hical framework . If he is to succeed in re-aw aken in g his readers from th eir 'dog ma tic slumber' - to use Kan t's famo us phrase - MerleauPonty must preface hi s ' phe no me no logic al' description of percep tion wi th a di scussio n of th e relations hi p between the read er and the text. This wou ld in duce the read ers of the Phenomenology to reflect at the outset on their own function in di sclosing th e phen om en a which the text describ es. Ha vi ng been d uly sens itize d to various ways of approaching a philosophical work, they would be more apt to recog nize and to bra cket their ass umptions in stead of autom atically discrediting whatev er resi sts the usual categori za tions . As it is, Merl eau -l'on ty's bri ef remarks abo ut taking up and rethinking Descartes' th ou gh t as embod ied in th e latt er 's

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writings, implicitly point in the direction of a fuller discussion of reading - but Merleau-Ponty fails to provide it .35 Nor does it suffice to discuss the nature of bodily expression and comprehension, as he presents it in the Phenomenology, without focusing specifically on the question of how to read the text, In the absence of such an examination, Merleau-Ponty's sparse comments about the impossibility of producing proofs to support his description are likely to have very little impact on his readers. To make matters worse, Merleau-Ponty warns his readers that there can be no conclusive experiment because all experiments involve interpretations which already colour their conclusions; yet he himself occasionally makes use of experimental findings - such as those of Nagel, Stratton and Wertheimer - in a way that would suggest precisely the opposite, by speaking as if the results definitively authorize his own conclusions. Whilst there can be no question of dispelling the problems attending any philosophy which criticizes the established modes of thinking instead of philosophizing from within the traditional framework, a thorough exposition of those problems and a concomitant consideration of the readers' task, would go a long way in encouraging those who are wedded to the classical approaches to relinquish their tenacious hold - at least enough to appreciate the import of Merleau-Ponty's description of perception. Regrettably, the Phenomenology fails to offer such crucial assistance. The requisite discussion of the relationship of the reader to the text could consist of a development of some key points of Sartres study of literature. For example, Sartre contends in What is Literature? that reading is neither a mechanical registering nor an impartial contemplation of marks printed on paper. Thus if one were to read each word of a text separately, its meaning would fail to emerge because the latter is not the sum of words but rather, the organic whole. Writing and reading are dialectically correlated and constitute the two moments of what is effectively a joint venture. In seeking to disclose some truth, the prose-writer embarks on a project of communication which requires the reader's participation for its realization. Only writing and reading together can bring it about that something is revealed, as a revelation is only such for someone. Consequently, the writer implicitly appeals for the reader's collaboration. In order to comply, the reader must go beyond a merely 'abstract consciousness' of what the writer is saying. Reading is therefore 'directed creation'; but the reader is

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free to reject the writer's appeal by refusing to take part. Such a refusal prevents the text from actually becoming a disclosure - at least as far as that reader is concerned. As Sartre puts it, ' to write is thus both to disclose the world and to offer it as a task to the generosity of the reader'.'" Undoubtedly, Merleau-Ponty's development of these themes would have differed significantly from their presentation in What is Literature?; in themselves, however, they are in keeping with the description of perception in the Phenomenology. If the latter is to achieve its stated objective of reawakening the reader to an appreciation of the lived experience subtending both the 'natural attitude' and all the theoretical reconstructions of the world, then - despite Merleau-Ponty's evident presumption to the contrary - that study cannot in fact dispense with an explicit examination of the sort of themes outlined here. Merleau-Ponty's recurrent heavy reliance on the results of studies dealing with pathological behaviour - particularly those of Goldstein and Gelb pertaining to Schneider - also considerably weakens his description of perception. In the absence of any adequate discussion of the difficulties inherent in the very nature of his philosophy and the kind of approach which its comprehension requires on the part of the reader, it is especially tempting for the latter to dismiss the Phenomenology. The grounds for such dismissal might well be that Schneider's experience proves nothing because it is too individual and in any case, too different to throw any possible light on normal experience. Further, the reader might challenge the conclusions stemming from Merleau-Ponty's assessment of Schneider's reported behaviour, by arguing that they are mere theoretical constructions of alleged experience and that Merleau-Ponty is himself guilty of tailoring observations to fit his own preconceptions concerning the nature of our normal experience. The reader can thus simply level at Merleau-Ponty the latter's own charge against the classical theorists -that they are fundamentally uncritical in their interpretation of human experience. To forestall such objections, Merleau-Ponty would need to discuss in much greater detail the meaning of 'facts', 'data' and observations; the philosophical status of experiments; the issue of interpretation and his own use of experimental findings. For him, of course, it is not a matter of proving anything but rather, of describing the phenomena as he sees them upon putting his

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Conclusion

' natural attitud e' in abey ance. Ultimately, his rea ders m ust judge for th em selves whe ther th at descri pti on adeq ua tely captures the lived struc tures of their own pre-refl ective experience . In o rder to be in a positi on to make that judgement, however , th ey mu st first re- awaken to an awarene ss of their actual experience. Given the diff iculty of achieving such awaren ess, Merleau -Ponty quite rightly examine s beh avioural breakdowns to draw atten tion to their normal counterpart. After all, the recogn iti on of illn ess alrea dy im plies a conce ption of health; hen ce, a close cons ide ration of the forme r can indeed bring to light the unacknowl edged preconc epti on s in the latter, thereby en abling us to put th ose aside and see our experience as it really is. It is un fortunate, ther efore, th at Merleau -Ponty ha s not su pplied the necessary method ological d iscu ssi on for thi s ap proach. Merleau -Ponty's method in the Phenomenology clearly also involves a contin ua l ju xtaposition of the 'em piricist' and ' in tellectualist' approache s; consequently, it is ess en tial to cons ide r wh ether that perpetual juxtaposition in any way weaken s th e Phenomenology. On first consideration, it may seem that MerleauPanty has erected straw pins whose toppling req uires littl e effort, for neither pos ition is consistently id entifiabl e with the works of an y single philosopher or psycholo gist. Th is does not mean , however, that either of these posit ions is an artificially created stance . Merleau-Po nty's ow n referen ces to vario us writings, su pplemented by the so urces cited and di scussed in th is exeges is, in di cate th at the positions are by no mean s artificial - although they are extreme . Non etheless , it mi ght sti ll be arg ued that few of today's philosoph ers ado p t such po siti on s, most preferring to take a less extre me, more flexible stand . Th at may indeed be th e case ; yet it does not follow th at Merleau-Ponty's critiq ue of 'em piricism' and ' intellectualism' ther eby loses its force and becom es mer ely of histori cal in ter est. We must remember that Merleau -Ponty also d iscu sses h ybr id s of th e two positions and shows that th ey share the same basic assumptions; moreover, in the Phenomenology w e have seen the sam e fun damental preju dice un derlyin g both extremes. Despite th eir ap parent differen ce, th e majority of existing ap proach es contin ue to rest on that bias. There is nevertheless a sense in which Merleau -Ponty's persi stent focus on 'em piricism' and ' intellectualism' does indeed weaken hi s description of perception . His manner of prese nti ng and crit icizing th e extremes frequ ently makes it excee d ingly

diffi cult to di scern Merleau -Ponty's own position on th e part icular iss ue und er consi deratio n. More import antly, his preoccupation w ith ' em piricism' and ' intellectualism' is no doubt at least partiall y res po ns ib le for the relative lack in developm ent of hi s own posit ion. Th e bulk of hi s efforts is devot ed to exposing the inadeq uacies of the traditional approach es, thereb y freq ue ntly leaving hi s res po nse beyond their critique largely a matter of implication. As a result, Merleau-Ponty' s own key conce pts receive far too littl e elaboration and the issu es which he add resses rem ain ve ry undev elop ed . There is all too little d iscussion, for exa m ple, of th e meaning of notions such as field , hori zo n, ambiguity, certain ty, truth, ra tio nality, compreh en sion , kn owl ed ge, fact, 'value- fact', motivation , sedimentation, necessity, continge ncy, intentionality, power, nature, culture, 'interworld', significance and 'mean ing ' itself. This is most unfortunate, as Merl eauPanty indicates that we are not sim ply to assign their usual meani ngs to these pivot al terms. Nor is hi s own usc of them alw ays enti rely consistent - especially in th e case of ' meaning', 'sign ificance', ' nature' and ' culture' . A number of cru cial questions regarding th e meanin gs, im port and interrelati on s of th e vario us noti ons thus remain unanswered in the text. For example, Merleau-Ponty's own use of the terms ' nature' and 'cu lture' is some times very narrow - yet occasionally quite bro ad . His remarks about the primacy of perception, as well as the approach which he actua lly employs in describing it in the Phenomenologv, would sugges t that th ere is a level of 'culture' above th e level of perception and th at th e fundamental structures of the latt er can be eluci da ted whilst bracketin g any con siderati on of th e former. Yet as Merleau -Ponty him self acknowledges at various po ints, it is ultimat ely impossible to maintain a distinction between ' nature' and ' culture' and to consi de r them as ' lower' or ' higher' layer s, resp ectiv ely. It would see m th at our perception is alwa ys alrea dy imbued with ' cultural' mea nings and values, so th at it is in fact mislead in g to imply that we can examine perception without at the same tim e in ves tigating questi on s of ' rationality' and 'value s' . As MerleauPanty's ow n di scu ssi on of expressio n and speec h indicates, our per ception is inhe re ntly lad en with 'cultural' influences. Just as the questi on of wh at th e world was like before the appear an ce of . human s, is meanin gless and a world w ithout a human per sp ecti ve inconceivable, th e q uestion of the bein g of bodily experie nce

174

Conclu sion

anterior to any cultural influence is also meaningless, and the absence of the latter inconceivable. This would suggest that bodily experience can n ot be adequately studied in abstraction from the belonging of the body-subject to a particular cult ure; hence, the d escription of perception might well n eed to be much more cu lturally sp ecific than Merleau-Ponty 's d es cription in fact is . Th ere can be no question of resolving this extremely com p lex issue here; n evertheless, it must at least b e noted that even the notion of 'p ercep tion' is not adequately consider ed in the Phenomenology. Then too, there are broader questions which remain substantially unresolved in the text - such as the meaning and implications of an absolute within the rela tivity of our experience, or the parameters of this sort of philosophy and the need for a much more radical departure from the traditional philosophical terminology in order to articulate the novelty of approach. On the other hand, it is important to keep in mind that Merleau-Ponty at no time considered h is Phenome nology to constitute a definitive statement; on the contrary, he explicitly as serted his intention to undertake subsequently the n ecessary stu d ies of 'cu lture', languag e, intersubjectivity, philosophy, truth and the like. 37In his own eyes, therefore, the Phenomenology was a preliminary investiga tion whose various themes were to be pursued in more d epth upon its completion. As w e have seen, those subsequent studie s were n ev er fin ished. Consequently, the many questions which the Phe nome nology implicitly raises but leaves unanswered, call all the more urgently on the readers' own resources to take up and carry forward Merleau-Ponty's uncompleted inquiry. In its sustained attempt to re-awaken its read ers to the enigmatic richness of their ow n lived exp erien ce, the description of p erception provides the requisite tool s for embarking on such an endeavour. Despite it s preliminary nature, it s lacunae and insuffici ent radicality. Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception thus makes a very su bstan tia l con trib u tio n to the philosophical discourse of our time.

Concl usion

175

Notes

_~

1.

Phenom enolog y of Perception, xvi i-xvii i.

2.

G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind (trans. J. B. Baillie), (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp . 162- 3, 177, 800ff.

3.

Heidegger, ' Letter on Humanism', The Existentialist Tradition : Selec ted Writings, p. 229.

4.

Ibid. . p. 233.

5.

See, for example, Kierkegaard, The Present Ag e (tr ans. Alexan der

Dru), (New York: Harper & Row, 1962) pp . 56f£., 62; Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling an d The Sickness Unto Deat h (trans. Walter

Lowrie), (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1954) pp . 30ff., 208ff.; Jasper s, Reason and Existenz (trans . William Earle), (New York: Noonday Press, 1955) pp. 51- 77, 137fl.; Marcel, The Philosophy of Existent ialism (trans . Manya Haran ), (N ew York: Citadel Press , 1966)

pp 15fl., 46, 94f£. 6.

Being and No th ingness: a Phenomenologi cal Essay on Ontology,

pp. 126, 377,472-7, 555, 568-70, 617, 647, 651-7, 671-4 , 784, 797. 7. 8.

10.

'Th e Ph enomenal Field', Phenom enolog y of Percep tion, pp. 56-7. Merleau -P onty's notion of 'value-fac t' is a modality of that m ediating ' th ird term' which is lacking, for exam p le, in Sar tre's an alysis of our being-in-the-world. It ch allen ges - so it seems to me - Sar tre's strict demarcation b etween ontology and eth ics . (See, for example, Being and No th ingness: a Ph enome nological Essay on Ontology , p. 795.) 'The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences' , The Prim acy of Perception and O ther Essays, pp. 25-6. See also p. 39 re garding Merleau-Ponty' s re fus al to sep arate h is phenomenological de scription from hi s conclusions pertaining to the practical realm. Phen ome nology of Perception , p. 127.

11.

Ibid ., p. 179.

12.

Merleau-Ponty, Th e Visib le and the Inv isible: Follow ed by Working No tes (ed . Claude Lefort and trans. Alp h onso Lin gis), Evanston: Northwest ern University Press, 1968) p . 200. Ibid., p . 200. (Note th at Merleau-Ponty is n ot cons isten t in cap italiz in g 'Being ' and ' Log os' . Occasionally, as in this cas e, he fails to do so.) Phenom enolog y of Perception, p . 197. Ib id. , vii, xiv, xv, xx, xxi. The Visibl e an,d the Invisible: Followed by Working Notes, p. 168. La prose du mo nde (ed. Claude Lefort), (Paris: Gallimard, 1969); English tran slat ion by John O 'Neill , The Prose of the Wo rld (Evanston, Ill. : Northwe stern Un ivers ity Press, 1973). For a d iscussion of the relationshi p between this wo rk and Merleau-Ponty 's The V isible and the Invisible, see Clau de Lefo rt' s 'Av ertissem en t' / ' In trod uc tion' to the former . His 'For eward' to The Visible and the Inv isible is also ve ry helpful, as is the 'Tr an slat or's Preface'. ' Eye and Mind ' , Th e Primacy of Percep tion and O ther Essays, p. 159. As th e translator n otes, th is es say w as the final w ork published in Merleau-Ponty's own lifetime. It firs t appeared in Jan. 1961.

9.

13.

14. 15. 16. 17.

18.

176 19.

20. 21. 22.

23. 24. 25. 26.

27.

28.

29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

34. 35.

36.

Conclusion

Conclu sion ' Wo rking Not es', TIle Visible and the Invisible: Followed by Working Notes, pp. 170-1 , 175-6, 17ll-9 . The Visible and the Invisible: Followed by Working Notes, pp. 13ll-4 0, 146, 167, 170, 202-3, 224, 250-1. Ibid., pp. 185, 215-6. For a very use ful 'sketch' of Mer leau -Ponty's philosop hy of language , see Jame s M . Ed ie's ' Forw ard' to Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language by Merlea u-Ponty, tran slat ed by H ugh Silverman (Evanston , Ill.: N orthw estern University Press, 1973) pp. xi-xxxii . Once again , the 'Translator's Preface ' is also helpful. ' Wo rking No tes', The Visible and the Invisible: Followed by Working Notes, 202- 3. 'Preface', Ph enomenology of Perception, pp. vii-ix, xiii- xv. Jb id ., xiv, xvii- xix. 'The Film and the New Psycho log y', Sense and Non-Sense (trans. Hubert L. Dreylus and Pa tricia A. Dreyfu s), (Evanston, 111. : Nort hwestern Un iversity Press, 1964), p. 58. ' Marxism and Ph ilosophy', Sense and Non-Sense, pp. 13:>-4; 'The Meta physical in M an', Sense and Non-Sense, pp. 92-8. MerleauPenry's 1961 lecture notes on ' ph ilosop hy and non -philoso ph y' testify to his unflaggin g concern that phil osophy be 'concrete' . See, for example, ' Merleau-Pon ty : Philosoph ic et non-philosophie depuis Heg el - Notes d e cours (II)' , Textures, 10-11 , 1975, pp. 16:>-4. Mer leau-Ponty, ' In trod uction', Signs (trans. Richard C. McClearly), (Evan ston , III.: No rthwes tern Universit y Press , 1964) pp. 20-2, 157-8. The Visible and the Invisible: Followed by Working Notes, pp. 139, 147, 15ll-9, 167, 179, 193, 259. Ib id ., p . 176. lbid ., pp. 15ll-62. lbid.. pp. ssrr., 44-6 , 102, 122-9, 15ll-62, 174, 197. A close reading of The Visible and the Invisible: Followed by Working Notes suggests that Merleau-Pont y intend ed to take the so rt of approach w hich I have ou tlined to radicalize his earlier description of perception . See, fo r examp le, pp. 3lff., 50-95, 99--104, 119-29, 156-62 ,197. See also th e ' Introd uctio n', Signs, pp . 14-22 . Phenomenology of Perception, p. 25. The following cursory remarks w hich Merleau-Ponty makes in his chapter on 'The Cogtto' are esp ecially interesting for a discussion of the relationship between the text and its reader: 'This book, once begun, is not a certain se t of ideas; it constitutes for me an open situation, for wh ich I could not possibl y provide any complex formula, and in wh ich I struggle blindl y on unt il, miraculously, thoughts and w ords become organi zed by themselves.' (Phenomenology of Perception, p. 369) and: 'It is I who reconstitute the historical cogito, I wh o read Desc artes' text, I wh o recognize in it an und yin g truth, so that finally the Cartesian cogito acquires its {meanin g] only through my ow n cogito . . .' (lbid ., p. 371). Sart re, What is Literature? (trans. Be rnard Frechtman), (Lond on : Met huen, 1950) p p. 10-13, 29-32, 39-44, 51. Note th at a crucia l

-7'37.

177

ph rase is mis sin g on p. 30 of this translation . The French original read s: 'Aussi les cent mille mots alignes dans un livre peu vent etre Ius un a un sans que les se ns de l'ceuvre en jaillisse; Ie sens n 'est pas la somme des mots , il en .est la total ite organique.' (Sart re, Qu'est-ce que la littirature? (Paris: Ga llimard, 1948) p.56.) As we might expect, there are a number of funda menta l point s in Sartre 's What is Literature? which are at odds wi th Merleau -Ponty's position. In fact, Sartre refers to the Ph enomenology in his opening pages and explicitly rejects the notion that there is any paralle lism between literature on the one hand , and the art of the painter, sculptor or musician on the other. Merleau-Ponty, for his part, evi nced substantial disa greem ent with Sartre 's book and intended to un dertake a de tailed study of literature in rep ly. Unfortunately, that project did not materialize beyond his unfinished manuscript The Prose of the World and the essays on language . In any case, such a detailed treatment would - obviously - have been too late and too long for incorporation into the Ph enomenology. What the latter so rely lacks, however, is at least some explicit consideration of its readers' relation ship to the text - somewhat along the lines I have ind icated. (Those poi nts do harmoni ze wi th the Ph enomenology.) For further con sideration, see the first two pages of Sartre's What is Literature?, as well as Claude Lefort's "Avertisscmen t' to La prose du maude (vii- viii ) and Bernard Pingaud 's article 'Merleau-Ponty, Sartre et la Iitterature ', L'ARC, no. 46 (1971) pp. 80-8. ,An Unpu blished Text by Maurice Merleau-Ponty: a Prospectus of Hi s Work', The Primacy of Perception, pp. 3-11.

Bibliog raph y

Bibliography Please No te: As my book is directed primarily at Englis h s p ea k in g re a d e rs , I am lis tin g th e English tran slati ons o f w orks w hen these are availab le , ra th er tha n th e o rig in a l te xt s . Berman , Morris, 'The Cybe rnetic Dream o f the 21st Cen tury'. Paper pre sented at 'An Internati onal Conference o n Social and Technologi cal Chan ge : The Un iv ersit y into the 21st Ce n t u ry' University of Vic toria, Briti sh Columb ia, Ca nada, 4 May 1984. Ch appell, V. C. (ed. ), The Philosophy of Milld (Englew ood Cliffs, N .J.: Prentice-H all, lnc., 1962). Descartes, R' Meditations on First Philosophy in Philosophical Writings (trans . and eds Elizabeth An scombe and Peter Thom as Geach), (London: Thom as Nelson and So ns Ltd., Nelso n's Uni versit y Paperbacks for The Open University, 1970). Edie, James M ., 'Forw ard', Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language by Merleau-Pon ty (trans . Hugh Silve rman and ed. James M. Ed ie), (Evan s ton , III .: Northwestern Unive rsity Press , 1973). C u err iere, Daniel. 'Table o f Contents of "Phe no me nology of Perception:" Translat ion and Pagination ', Joumal of the British Society for Phenomenology , vol. 10, no. 1 {jan . 1979). He gel , G. W. F., The Phcnomenologv of Milld (tra ns , j . B. Baillie), (New York: H arper & Row , 1967). Heidegger. Martin , Being and Time (trans. john Macqu arrie and Edward Robinson), (London: S.C. M. Press, 1962; Libra ry of Phil osophy and Theol ogy). Heldegger , Martin , 'Letter o n Humani sm ' (trans . Edgar Lohner) in The Existentialist Tradition: Selected Writings (ed. Nino Lan gi ulli), (New York: Doubleday, 1971). He ide gger, Martin, 'Memo rial Address ', Discourse on Thinking (trans. Ander son and Freund ), (New York: Harper & Row, 1969). Husserl. Edmund, Th e Idea of Phenom enology (trans . Willi am P. Als ton and Geo rge Na khn ikia n), (The H agu e: Mart inus Nijhoff, 1964). Hu sserl, Edm und, The Phenomenology of lntemal Time-Consciousness (ed . Martin Heid egger and trans. jam es S. Church ill), (Indi ana Uni versit y Pre ss, 1964). H usserl, Edmund, Ideas: General Introductio,r to Pure Phenomenology (tran s. W. R. Boyce Gibson), (Londo n : Co llie r-Macm illan, 1962). Husserl, Edmund, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy: Philosophy as Rigorous Science and Philosoplly arid the Crisis of European Man (trans. Quentin Lau er), (N ew York: Harper & Row , 1965). Husserl, Edmund, Cartesian Meditations: an Introduction to Phenomenology (trans. Do rion Cai rns), (The Hagu e, Marti nus Nijho ff, 1960). Jasp ers , Karl, The Future of Ivtankind (tra ns . E. B. Ashton ), (Un ivers ity of Ch icago Press, 1961). I

I

178

179

Jaspers, Karl, Man in tire Modem Age (trans . Eden & Ceda r Paul), (New York : Doubleday, 1957). jasp ers , Karl, 'Philoso ph izing Starts w ith Our Situatio n'. Ph ilosophy , vo l. I (trans . E. B. As hton) in The. Existentialist Tradition: Selected Writings. Jaspers, Karl, Reason and £xisteuz (trans . William Earle), (New York: Noonday Press, 1955). Kant, I., 'In trod uctio n'. Critique of Pure Reason (trans . Nor man Kemp Sm ith) , (New York: SI. Martin 's Press, 1965). Kierkegaard, S., Fear and Trembling and The Sickness Unto Death (trans . Walter Lowrie), (New York: Dou bleday & Co ., 1954). Kierkegaard , S., The Present Age (trans. Alexander Dru), (New York: Harper & Row , 1962). Kock elm ans, Joseph J. (ed .), Phenomenology : tile Philosophy of Edm und Husserl alld Its lnterpretation (Ne w York : Doubled ay, 1967). Lefort, Claude, 'Introduc tion'. The Prost' of the World by Merleau -Ponty (trans . john O'Neill), (Evanston, Ill.: Northwes tern Unive rsity Press , 1973). Lefort , Claude , 'Fo rward', The Visible and tlie Invisible: Followed by Working Noles by Merl eau -Ponty (trans. Alpho nso Lin gis and ed . Claude Lefort ), (Evans to n, II I.: No rthwe s tern University Press, 1968). Lingis, Alph on so, 'Translato r's Preface', The Visible and the Invisible:

Followed by Workil'g Notes. Marcel, Gabriel, The PhiiosoplJY of Existentialism (trans . Manya Haran ), (N ew York: Ci tade l Press, 1966). Merleau-Pon ty, Maurice , Phenomenology of Perception (trans . Colin Smith), (Londo n: Rout led ge & Kega n Paul, 1961i reprowith trans lation revi sions 1981). Merleau- Pont y , Maurice, ' Merleau- Pon ty: Ph ilosophie et nonphilosophie depuis Hegel - Notes de CO UTS (II)', Textures, 10--11 (1975). Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 'Eye and Mind', 'An Unpublished Text By Maurice Merleau-P ont y: a Prosp ectu s o f Hi s Work', 'The Primacy of Perception and Its Phil osophical Conse q ue nces'. The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays (ed . Jam es M. Edie) , (Eva nston, III .: Northwestern University Press, 1964). Merleau-Pont y, Maurice, Signs (trans . Rich ard C. McCleary), (Evans ton, Ill.: North western Un iversit y Press, 1964). Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, The Visible and the Invisible: Followed by Working No/es (trans . Alph on so Lingis and ed . Claud e Lefort), (Evans ton, III.: Northw es tern Uni versit y Press, 1968). Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 'The War Has Taken Place', 'Marxism and Phi losoph y', 'The Metaphysical in Man ', 'The Film and th e Ne w Psych ology '. Sense and Non-Sense (trans . Hu bert L. Dreyfu s and Patricia A. Dreyfu s), (Evans ton, Ill.: No rthwe s tern Unive rsity Press , 1964). Merleau-Ponty, Mauri ce, Adventurers of the Dialectic (trans . joseph Bien ), (Evansto n, Ill.: No rthwestern Unive rsity Pres s, 1973). Merl eau-Pont y, Mau rice, The Prose of tile World (trans . Joh n O'Neill), (Evan ston, Ill.: No rthwestern Unive rsity Press, 1973). Pingaud , Bernard, 'Merlcau-Po nty. Sartre et la litteratu re'. L'ARC, no.46 (1971).

180

Bibliograph y

INDEX

Ryle, G ilb ert, Tile Concept of Mind (H armon dsworth , M id d lesex: Pen guin , 1976) .

Sartre, Jean -Paul, Being and Nothingness: a Phenomenological Essay on

Ontology (t ran s . H azel Barnes), (New Yo rk : Washin gt on Sq uare Press , 1966).

Sartre. jea n-Paul, The Emotions: Outl ine of a Theory (trans. Berna rd Frec h tma n) , (New York : Philosophica l Libra ry , 1948).

Sartrc, Jean -Paul , The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness (trans . Forrest Willi am s and Robert Kirkpatr ick), (New York : Noon day Press , 1957).

Sartre. Jean -Pa ul, What is Literature? (trans. Bernard Frechtma n), (Londo n: M ethu en, 1950).

ambigui ty, 4-5, 16, 31, 45, 54-5, 62,65-6, 104,109-11, 173 a m nesi a, 57. 63

anal ysis, 29-31, 34, 66 co git o, 114-1 8, 121, 176 co nce pt and tradition, 65 co nce pt of bod y a nd so ul, 29,

an ch o rage, prim ord ial, 87

anosognosia, 28, 31-2 a phasia, 57-8 ex is ten tial th eory of, 58, 63-4 m od ern theo ry of, 63-64 Aristotle, viii associati o n , 6-9 att en tio n , 10-1 4

65 critici sm of, xii-xvi me thod , Ca rtes ia n , xi i d istance, 85--91 dream s, 87, 137 Ed ie, James M" xix, 176

ego p syc hi cal, xii i solips is tic su pre macy of, 131,

Berm an, Morri s. xi, xviii

body, 21-66, 149 as expressiv e s pace, 47

133 transcen d ental, xii i-xiv , 19,

as expression and speech ,

72, 78, 80, 88, 129

56-66 ge ne ra l synth esis of, 50 h ab itu al, 32-3, 84 image - philosoph ica l im pli cation s of, 39-4 2, 44,

Ein stein , Albert , relati vit y theory, 17 Elizabeth, Pr in ce ss, 29-30 emotions, 9, 16, 28, 60, 113,

116

101 object ified, 27-35 a nd se xuality , 48-55 Ca m us , Albert xv ii t, 151 Chappell, V. C , 104 class conclous ness. 141-4 cogi to, 109-22, 150, 161 Descart es, xii, 114-18, 121, 176 colour s, 3-5, 12, 57-8, 64, 73, 78, 89, 92-5, 97-8 , 146 alte ra tio ns in , 73 as re al, 92-3 co nsciousness, xii , xlti, xlv, xv, 9, 11, 13, 16, 18-20, 75, 98, 111-13,120, 129,133-4, 157, 159, 161 intentio nality of, xiv co ns tan cy, 89-90, 92-3, 95, 97 . abando n me n t of, 13 hypot hes is, 10, 13, 18, 77 culture, 173-4 cybe rne tics, xi

m em o ry a nd , 28, 33 thought and , 62 empiricism, 5-6, 8-15, 28, 45, 58,

72,75, 172- 3 aphasi a a nd , 58 attenti on and , 10-13 morbid motility an d, 44-5 pe rception and, 72 rejection of, 47 sensation a nd , 7, 8, 75 spa tia l position , 81 epoch e, xiii esse nce, xi ji, 151, 163 ab st ract, 14 of co nsciousness, xv Husserl an d , xiii-xiv e ternity , 126, 128 experi ence, xv, xvi , 4-5 , 7-8, 14-1 5, 18-19, 33, 36-8, 39, 71,

99, 149, 154-5, 157- 9, 164, 167- 9, 171-4 closed a nd o pe n, 65 phen om en a of, 8, 167, 171

depth , 84 Desca rtes, Rene , vi i, xii- xiii, 3, 29-30,34-5,37,66, Ill , 122,

169

fie ld , xiv, 5, 8, 24, 167, 173 of p erce pt ion , 36, 71, 79 phenomen al, 15-20

181 \

182

Index

fi eld cont'd 'o f prcse nct." , 126, 12B-9, 146, 166 se ns ory, 27 tran scend e ntal . 19 visual, 25, 73 freedom, 36. 133-48, 152, 166 depen de nce a nd , 34, 36 e xiste n tialis m and , ix Ge lb, Sch n eid er case stud y , 4 1~2 , 171 Ges ta lt, 19, 45, 140 ges tu res, 60-2 co m mu n ica tio n an d co mprehe ns ion of, 61- 2 ' p hone tic', 64 sp eech a nd , 65 Go lds tein, Sch nei der case stud y, 41 ~2 , 171 aph as ia, 63 G run ba um, modern theory of ap hasia, 63 Cue rrie re. Da niel, vi i. xviii. 72

Index

perceptio n of e mo tio n an d, 113 truth an d , 118, 12 1 in tellec tua lis m, 10- 14, 28, 45-6, 63,72, 75, 90-1. 172~3 atten tio n and , 10-13 Des car tes , 29 la ng uage, theo ries o f, 58-63 morb id motili ty and , 45---6 o b jectivity, 90-1 pe rce ptio n and , 72, 74-5 in psychology, 28, 34" se xuality and, 51-2 sp ati al positio n , 81 in ten tio nal are, 46 in ten tio nality, 40, 127, 149-50, 173 bo d ily, xiv, 31, 40, 42, 64, 150 bo dy im age and , 40, 42 of co nscious ness, xiv H usserl, xiv, 127, 150 intro sp ection , in psychology, 18-19 in tu itio nis m, 18

ha bits, existen tia l a na lys is of, 47~

ha llucin ation, 13, 113 Hege l, Geo rg Wilhe lm Fri ed rich , ix, xvi , 54, 150, 175 Hegelian Rea so n , 19 Hei degger, Martin , vii- viii, x, xv i ii, 125, 127, 15 1, 175 Hei se n be rg, Wern e r, unc e rtainty principle of, 17 He raclitus, viii hi story, ix- x, 17, 51, 121,1 41- 2, 145, 146 ex isten ti alis m and , ix horizo n, xv, 24, 173 do ub le, of ex tern a l a nd bod ily spa ce, 41 indeter m in ate, 46 pa rticular , 24 o f the p ast , 8 of po ssib ilit ies, 44 H usse rl, Edm und , vii, xii- xix, 14, 125, 127, 129, 150 a bsolu te e vide nce , 120 phenomenology, xtv, 19

jaspers, Karl, ix- x. xv ii i , 151, 175 ju dgmen t, 10-14 Kant , Imm an uel, vii, xi ii, 11, 14, 75-<>, 78,79, 124, 129, 150, 169 Kier kega ard . Sa ra n, ix, xvi ii. 151, 175 knowledge, xl i, xv , 7, 15, 20, 40, 168, 173 absolu te, ix. 120, 151 Kock lem ans . jose ph J., xix langu ag e, ix, 3, 57-9, 61, 101, 156, 162, 166-7, 174, 177; (see also speec h) ex isten tia l s ign ifica nce o f, 59-60 existen tia lism and , ix stud y of, 161 la ng uage, tho ugh a nd , 59--61, 64, 114 Le for t, M. Claud e, xix, 160, 175,

177 id ealism, 19, 23-4 , 149 id eas, xv-xvi , 115, 121 illus io n

ligh ting, 93-5 mod ulati on o f, 95 Locke, Joh n , 3

Ma rce l, Gabriel, xviii, 151, 175 m emo ry, 6-7, 33-4 em ot ion and, 33 p rojec tion of, 6-9, 126 meta p hysi cs, 162, 164-5 m oti lit y, mo rb id , 41, 43-4 mo vem ent, 42, 44-86 Na ge l, 82, 170 nat ur e, 154, 173 N iet zsche , Fri edrich Wilh elm , xvi ii, 151, 156 obj ectivity, ix, 12 on tology , 160, 162, 164-5

183

radical, xv, xvi i, 14, 19, 20, 75-<>, 121, 124, 150, 163, 165 re pressio n, organ ic Ryle, G ilber t, 18, 20 Sa rtre, Jean -Pa ul, vii-viii , x, xiv, xvi ii- xix, 84, 90, 96, 102-6, 122, 126, 130, 151, 166, 170-1, 175-7 Being and Nothingness, 54, 105, 117, 120, 125, 129, 132, 134, 148, 1 52~3 cog ito, 117 freedom, p osit ion of, 133-47, 152~3

pe rce pt ion , 12- 13, IS, 17,70-2 8 9~90 , 98, 155, 1 5 7~9 , 163, 165, 1 7~ Hu sserl , 14 str uc tur e of, 11-12, 154 ph en om e nology, xv. xvi i- xvt fi, 19, 165 Ca rtes ian Way, xi ii, xv m ea ning of, xv ii, 162- 3 task of, Merlea u-Pon ty. xv, 162, 163 ph iloso ph y, exist e ntia list, vi i i- Ix, xi, xvii , 162- 3, 165 ph ysiology, S, 27, 34 me cha nis tic, 25, 27-35, 39, 46 mode rn , 27 se xua lity, ap proa ch to, 5 1 Pin gau d , Berna rd , 177 Plato, ix ' p rese nce' , 9, 39, 130-1, 133 psy cho logy , 34, 39, 46, 89-90 class ical, an d th e bod y, 36-8, 39 Gesta lt, 19, 45, 140 in trospec tive , 18-19 quality , 3--5, 76 ra tio na lism, xi, 17 realis m, 13, 23--4, 115, 149 red uction , p heno me nological, vii i, xi i-xiv , xvi , 155, 163 Husserl and Mer leau-Ponty, xii-xv i Ser tr e, xiv reflectio n , xiv-xv, 8-9, 14, 19-20, 32, 76, 78, 160, 165-6, 169 hyper-, xv

re la tions w ith othe s, 102- 3, 152 schizo ph re nia, 84 Sch ne ide r, 42--6, 51- 2, 65 mo tili ty , 'im pa ired, 42- 5 sex u ality, inh ibit ed, 46, 51- 2, 64-5 se nsa tio n, 3-6 kinaes th etic, 37-8 unifi cat io n of se nses, 77-8 sexua lity, 53 bod y and , 48-55 intellec tua lis m approach to, 5 1~2

physiological,51 Sch ne ide r, 46, 51-2, 64-5 s ign ifica tio n, 13~O, 146, 156 primary process of, 50 Sm it h, Colin, xviii, 39, 47 Soc ra tes , 20, 115 solipsism, 16, 98-9, 101- 2, 104-5, 115, 131. 133 sp eech , 56-61 (SI' t' a/so langu ag e ) a uthe n tic, 59, 159, 161, 166, 167 firs t and second o rde r of , 59-60, 159 'gestural significance ', 65 Stratton, 81, 170 subj ectiv ity , 12, 16, 38, 98, 150, 166 in ca rn ate , xv , 15, 53, 84, 147, ] 50, 154, 1 57~8 tra nscen den tal, xii i technology , x, xi, 154 m ilit ary , x, xi mode rn , ix.-x

184 tech nology conI'd nuclea r, x-x i th ought , xv aw are of it self, 9 calculative , x emotio n and , 62 p ur e (s ile nce ), 60 s peech and , 59, 64. 114 truth, ix, xii, xvii . 17, 122, 151, 160, 168, 17J-4 ab so lu te, 14

Index eternal, ix, xii of fact an d rea son , 120 an d illu si on , 118

Weber, Max, Ix Wert h eim er, 82, 170 wo rd s, a nd mean in gs, 58, 156-7, 162 Zeno , 86

I