METHODS OF NEGOTIATION RESEARCH
International Negotiation Series
Vol. 1 I.W. Zartman (ed.) Negotiating with Terrorists
Vol. 2 P. Carnevale and C.K.W. de Dreu (eds.) Methods of Negotiation Research
Methods of Negotiation Research edited by
P. Carnevale and C.K.W. de Dreu
MARTINUS NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS LEIDEN/BOSTON
This volume is reprinted from the journal International Negotiation, Volume 9 (3) and 10 (1), 2004–2005
ISBN 10 90 04 14858 2 ISBN 13 978 90 04 14858 1 © 2006 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishers, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. http://www.brill.nl All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the Publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill Academic Publishers provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. PRINTED AND BOUND IN THE NETHERLANDS
CONTENTS Contributors ................................................................................................
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Methods of Negotiation Research: Introduction ...................................... Peter J. Carnevale and Carsten K.W. De Dreu
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Methods of Negotiation Research II .......................................................... Peter J. Carnevale and Carsten K.W. De Dreu
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Chapter 1 The Joys of Field Research ........................................................................ James A. Wall, Jr. Chapter 2 How Much Do We Know About Real Negotiations? Problems in Constructing Case Studies .................................................... David Matz
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Chapter 3 Studying Negotiations in Context: An Ethnographic Approach .............. Ray Friedman
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Chapter 4 The Problem-Solving Workshop as a Method of Research .................... Ronald J. Fisher
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Chapter 5 Time-Series Designs and Analyses ............................................................ Daniel Druckman
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Chapter 6 Social Research and the Study of Mediation: Designing and Implementing Systematic Archival Research ............................................ Jacob Bercovitch Chapter 7 Reflections on Simulation and Experimentation in the Study of Negotiation .................................................................................................. Jonathan Wilkenfeld
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Chapter 8 Quantitative Coding of Negotiation Behavior ...................................... Laurie R. Weingart, Mara Olekalns, and Philip L. Smith
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Chapter 9 The Use of Questionnaires in Conflict Research .................................. Aukje Nauta and Esther Kluwer
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Chapter 10 A Multilevel Approach to Investigating Cross-National Differences in Negotiation Processes .............................................................................. Xu Huang and Evert Van de Vliert
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Chapter 11 Methodological Challenges in the Study of Negotiator Affect ............ Bruce Barry and Ingrid Smithey Fulmer
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Chapter 12 Comparative Case Studies ...................................................................... I. William Zartman
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Chapter 13 Discourse Analysis: Mucking Around with Negotiation Data ............ Linda Putnam
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Chapter 14 Field Experiments on Social Conflict .................................................... Dean G. Pruitt
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Chapter 15 Laboratory Experiments on Social Conflict .......................................... Peter J. Carnevale and Carsten K.W. De Dreu
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Chapter 16 Managing Conflict in the Literature: Meta-analysis as a Research Method .................................................................................................... Alice F. Stuhlmacher and Treena L. Gillespie Chapter 17 When, Where and How: The Use of Multidimensional Scaling Methods in the Study of Negotiation and Social Conflict .................. Robin S. Pinkley, Michele J. Gelfand, and Lili Duan
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Chapter 18 Markov Chain Models of Communication Processes in Negotiation .............................................................................................. Philip L. Smith, Mara Olekalns, and Laurie R. Weingart Chapter 19 All that Glitters is Not Gold: Examining the Perils of Collecting Data on the Internet ................................................................................ Yeow Siah Cha
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Chapter 20 The Method of Experimental Economics .............................................. Rachel Croson
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Chapter 21 Empirical Research in Law and Negotiation ........................................ Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff
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Chapter 22 Methodologies for Studying Personality Processes in Interpersonal Conflict .............................................................................. Lauri A. Jensen-Campbell and William G. Graziano Chapter 23 The Heart of Darkness: Advice on Navigating Cross-Cultural Research .................................................................................................. Catherine H. Tinsley Chapter 24 Disparate Methods and Common Findings in the Study of Negotiation .............................................................................................. Carsten K.W. De Dreu and Peter J. Carnevale Index ........................................................................................................
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Contributors Bruce Barry: Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37203 USA E-mail:
[email protected] Jacob Bercovitch: Department of Political Science, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand E-mail:
[email protected] Peter J. Carnevale: Department of Psychology, New York University, 6 Washington Place, Room 577, New York, NY 10003 USA E-mail:
[email protected] Rachel Croson: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 567 Huntsman Hall, 3730 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104–6340 USA E-mail:
[email protected] Carsten K.W. de Dreu: Organizational Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 15, 1018 WB, Amsterdam, The Netherlands E-mail
[email protected] Daniel Druckman: Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR), George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA E-mail:
[email protected] Lili Duan: Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 USA E-mail:
[email protected])
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CONTRIBUTORS
Ronald J. Fisher: International Peace and Conflict Resolution Program, School of International Service, American University, 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20016 USA E-mail: rfi
[email protected] Ray Friedman: Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37203 USA E-mail:
[email protected] Michele J. Gelfand: Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 USA E-mail:
[email protected] Treena L. Gillespie: Department of Management, California State University-Fullerton, P.O. Box 6848, Fullerton, CA 92834–6848 USA E-mail:
[email protected] Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff: New York University School of Law, Lawyering Program, 245 Sullivan Street, New York, NY 10012–1301 USA E-mail:
[email protected] Xu Huang: Department of Management & Marketing, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong E-mail:
[email protected] Esther Kluwer: Department of Social and Organisational Psychology, Utrecht University, P.O. Box 80, 140 NL 3508 TC Utrecht, The Netherlands E-mail:
[email protected] David Matz: Graduate Programs in Dispute Resolution, University of Massachusetts Boston, 100 Morrissey Boulevard, Boston, MA 02125 USA E-mail:
[email protected]
CONTRIBUTORS
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Aukje Nauta: TNO Work and Employment, P.O. Box 718, 2130 AS Hoofddorp, the Netherlands E-mail:
[email protected] Mara Olekalns: Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne, 200 Leicester Street Carlton VIC 3053 Australia E-mail:
[email protected] Robin L. Pinkley: Director of the American Airlines Center for Labor Relations and Conflict Resolution, Edwin L. Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist University, Fincher Building, P.O. Box 750333, Dallas, TX 75275 USA E-mail:
[email protected] Dean G. Pruitt: Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, 9006 Friars Road Bethesda, Maryland 20817 USA E-mail:
[email protected] Linda L. Putnam: Department of Communication, Texas A&M University, 4234 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843–4234 USA E-mail:
[email protected] Chayeow Siah: Department of Social Work and Psychology, National University of Singapore, 11 Law Link, Singapore 117570 E-mail:
[email protected] Philip L. Smith: Department of Psychology, University of Melbourne, Victoria, 3010 Australia E-mail:
[email protected] Ingrid Smithey Fulmer: Eli Broad Graduate School of Management, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824 USA E-mail:
[email protected]
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CONTRIBUTORS
Alice F. Stuhlmacher: Department of Psychology, DePaul University, 2219 N. Kenmore Avenue, Chicago, IL 60614 USA (E-mail:
[email protected]) Catherine H. Tinsley: The McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057 USA E-mail:
[email protected] Evert van de Vliert: Social and Organizational Psychology, University of Groningen, Grote Kruisstraat 2/I, 9712 TS Groningen, The Netherlands E-mail:
[email protected] James A. Wall, Jr.: College of Business, University of Missouri, Columbia, 506 Cornell Hall, Columbia, MO 65211–2600 USA E-mail:
[email protected] Laurie R. Weingart: David A. Tepper School of Business Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA E-mail:
[email protected] Jonathan Wilkenfeld: Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742 USA E-mail:
[email protected] I. William Zartman: School of Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University, 1740 Massachusetts Ave, Washington, DC 20036 USA E-mail:
[email protected]
Methods of Negotiation Research: Introduction PETER J. CARNEVALE and CARSTEN K.W. DE DREU
Main Entry: method Function: noun 1: a way, plan, or procedure for doing something 2: orderly arrangement from The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition A close look at the many methodological practices in the study of negotiation reveals a simple fact: there is no one best way, no one best plan, no single orderly arrangement that best produces understanding about negotiation. Indeed, the cornucopia of methods is impressive – as is the strength of the field. There are historical case studies, laboratory experiments, survey studies, archival data analysis, mathematical modeling – the diversity of method is extraordinary, but perhaps not surprising. After all, negotiation and social conflict span all levels of society, including interactions between nation states, small groups and organizations, people in close relationships, and even children on a playground. Its study reflects work in fields as diverse as political science, psychology, law, economics, communication, organization behavior, and anthropology. This diversity of method is clearly seen in the pages of International Negotiation, and in the many other journals that publish original research in the field. Yet practitioners and scholars, on occasion, may wonder if a particular research technique is remote and only distantly relevant. Practitioners in particular may not be inclined to appreciate the minutiae of method that often occupy the attention of their academic siblings. In as much as International Negotiation seeks to involve and support all aspects of a diverse audience, a special focus on matters of method is highly appropriate and desirable. This special issue of International Negotiation (as well the next issue, Vol. 10, no. 1) contains original essays on the topic of methods of negotiation research. We present here a focused thematic effort that reviews the state-of-the-art on research method in negotiation. Our goal in putting these special issues together is to provide a series of presentations that span both traditional and International Negotiation Series 2: P. Carnevale and C.K.W. de Dreu (eds.) Methods of Negotiation Research, 1–3 © 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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innovative methods, common and less than common, all that move the field forward. With these articles, we make the point that there is a wealth of methodological tools that negotiation and conflict researchers have at hand, and each has strengths and weaknesses. Our specific objectives include the following: provide an introduction to a variety of methods and their utility; identify issues and controversies with various methods; increase the accessibility of works in one empirical domain to readers in another, and thus broaden the scope of research and theory; improve communication between domains so the collective enterprise is improved; provide stimulus for yet unknown approaches and procedures that further contribute to the validity and vitality of research in this domain; and stimulate the application of a method used in one domain into another domain. Another goal that we have for these special issues is to extract valuable insights about conflict phenomena from data collected with diverse methods in different settings. Since there are synergies among the methods (multi-method approaches are greater in their impact than the sum of the parts), a synthesis is needed. To that effect, at the conclusion, we present a review article that highlights common features of effects in negotiation that have been obtained with diverse methodological tools. For example, many studies show that a forgiving strategy in negotiation can be exploited, and a tough strategy can backfire by producing a competitive response, and this has been obtained in both laboratory studies of university students and in studies of international disputes. There are of course many examples of such cross-domain consistency in effects, for example in work on aggression (Anderson & Bushman 1997). Our concluding article reflects Don Campbell’s notion that validity is achieved through triangulation, that is, by using a variety of methodological approaches and procedures. In navigation, triangulation is the technique where two visible points are used to determine the location of a third point. Applied to validity and reliability of measurement, triangulation is the use of multiple, different indicators in such a way that errors can be excluded and underlying constructs can be identified (Campbell & Fiske 1959). The concept applies quite well not only to measurement, but to all aspects of method. When two or more methods or data sources converge on a construct, we have greater assurance that our conclusions are not driven by an error or artifact of any one procedure. Each method has strengths and weaknesses, and to the extent they do not overlap, we can stand on more solid ground with conclusions about theory.
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The Author’s Task Each author was asked to write a paper about a specific methodological domain, one in which they are an expert. They also were asked to provide a general introduction and overview of the method as they understand and employ it, to identify its strengths and weaknesses, give noteworthy examples of it, and identify its potential. But mainly they were asked about their own experience in exercising that particular method, to write also about aspects of the methods they usually do not report in the method section of their research. We wanted the papers to come alive with the personal experience of conducting research in the given domain – the trials and tribulations and the tricks of the trade, so to speak, covering things like gut feelings about training coders for content analysis, implicit theories about which order of questionnaires works best, etc. We believe we have succeeded. Our hope is that this collection of essays will inspire new and established researchers alike to broaden and enhance their methodological practices. Additionally, we hope that this will stimulate new as yet unknown approaches and procedures that further contribute to the validity of research in negotiation and social conflict. Many people helped make this method special issue possible. We are grateful to the following individuals who provided reviews: Andy Schotter, Kathleen O’Connor, Andrea Hollingshead, Jim Wall, Dean Pruitt, Bianca Beersma, Ray Friedman, Ching Wan, Kees van Veen, Eric van Dijk, Bernard Nijstad, and Peter Molenaar.
References Anderson, C.A., & Bushman, B.J. (1997). “External validity of ‘trivial’ experiments: The case of laboratory aggression,” Review of General Psychology 1:19–41. Campbell, D.T., & Fiske, D.W. (1959). “Convergent and discriminant validation by the multitrait-multimethod matrix,” Psychological Bulletin 56:81–105.
Methods of Negotiation Research II PETER J. CARNEVALE and CARSTEN K.W. DE DREU
One aim of these special issues of International Negotiation on negotiation research methods – the 13 papers found here and the 12 in the previous issue (Vol. 9, no. 3) – is to illustrate the diverse methods being used today in the behavioral study of negotiation and social conflict. The 25 papers cover a lot of ground: general methodological techniques and approaches – field research, case studies, laboratory work, and so on – and some cover relatively narrow domains or statistical techniques, for example, multidimensional scaling as applied to negotiation data. The depth and breadth of the articles, we believe, reflect well on the application of the scientific approach to understanding conflict and negotiation. But space limitations led us to leave some areas out; we hope the reader will forgive us our omissions. One difficulty in putting this collection together was just how to organize the papers. As you can see, the collection is quite diverse with contributions from a broad array of scholars. At first, our inclination was to order the papers randomly – to avoid the imposition of an artificial scheme that would be more a procrustean bed than a way to facilitate analysis and thought. But a note from Dan Druckman led us to impose an order, or at least a rough order. He noted that there are three groupings of the papers, those that deal with experimentation of one sort or another (in the laboratory or in the field), analysis methods (for example, Markov analysis or discourse analysis), and “other settings” (e.g., cross-cultural, law, personality, internet). So, with thanks to Dan, this is how the papers are ordered within each issue for the most part. Our hope is that this collection of essays will inspire new and established researchers alike to broaden and enhance their methodological practices. Additionally, we hope that this will stimulate new and, as yet, unknown approaches and procedures that further contribute to the validity of research in negotiation and social conflict. We especially like the idea of papers that combine different methods (for example, a lab study together with an archival data study). As we mention in our concluding article, we believe it is triangulation and convergence of evidence that is the key to progress in the field. We wish to thank the many people who helped with this effort: Herb Kelman who inspired us early on in a conversation at the IACM meeting in International Negotiation Series 2: P. Carnevale and C.K.W. de Dreu (eds.) Methods of Negotiation Research, 5–6 © 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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San Sebastian, and Bert Spector who guided the entire effort. We are grateful to the many people who helped with reviews, including Bianca Beersma, Eric van Dijk, Ray Friedman, Andrea Hollingshead, Peter Molenaar. Bernard Nijstad, Kathleen O’Connor, Dean Pruitt, Andy Schotter, Donna Shestowsky, Kees van Veen, Jim Wall, Ching Wan, and several others who indicated a preference for remaining anonymous.
The Joys of Field Research JAMES A. WALL, JR.
A previous mission had been a disaster. My father’s B-17 squadron had put up 13 planes. Over Germany, the fighters came out of the sun and in 10 seconds eight planes – 72 airmen – went down, “like burning leaves.” The current mission had gone better; fewer comrades had been lost; and Dad’s bomber was somewhere back over England, but in a cloud bank, isolated from the other planes. Lost. And only one person knew they were lost, the navigator. As for the others, the crew was celebrating a completed mission, and the pilot was focused on the low fuel gauge. The compass wasn’t working; neither was the radio (B-17s seemed to be allocated to crews in alphabetical order and with a pilot named Wallace and a navigator named Wall, this crew usually drew a decrepit bomber). The pilot called back, “Navigator, report our current position, we have to land now!” “Give me a minute,” Dad said. As he stalled, the clouds parted for a moment to reveal the plane was directly over the base. “Bank right and take her down; we’re home”. Then, in relief, he threw up. Because of several experiences like this, my father does not like being lost, but his firstborn does. I enjoy being lost in the woods, mountains, caves and on rivers, lakes, and oceans (okay, maybe not on the ocean). I also like being lost when I conduct field research. It, along with mistakes, scientism, the participants, “stuckness,” and discovery are what I refer to as the “joys of field research.”
Lost When I refer to being lost in field research, I mean physically lost as well as conceptually lost. My first recognition that I liked “lostness” came on a blazing August afternoon in Nanjing during the mid-1980s. My translator and I were pedaling up and down countless hills through a laocoönian tangle of streets in the city, lost. We were seeking an inner-city community – a “street” – whose mediator had agreed to an interview, but we were hopelessly lost. I do not believe we ever found that mediator. Rather, my translator International Negotiation Series 2: P. Carnevale and C.K.W. de Dreu (eds.) Methods of Negotiation Research, 7–21 © 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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probably bribed a local mediator to talk with me. The entire search was, in retrospect, a great deal of fun. On a cooler day, a dozen or so years later, I was lost in Canada. I had driven across the U.S.-Canadian border on an expressway, traveling to Kingston, to find some Canadian peacekeepers. On the return trip, I could not find my way back into the U.S. “This is stupid,” I thought. If I came across the border on a four-lane highway, surely I can find my way back. But I could not, and as I spent hours exploring the back roads of Canada, I found it was enjoyable and concluded this was a fine physical representation – a metaphor – for being lost in field research. Usually, a field researcher is to some extent lost. You’re not always certain what the process is that you’re studying. An independent variable seems to be missing. There are a confusing number of dependent variables. Cause and effect are difficult to tease out. Results and conclusions are frequently contradictory. As for personal examples of being lost, my past is replete with them, but a current one is that I am lost as I consider the effects of conflict in business-to-business e-commerce. But I am having fun.
Mistakes Mistakes are somewhat akin to being lost. To me, conducting field research can be likened to rowing a single, a skiff. You are rowing backwards; therefore, you cannot see where you are going. If you attempt to overcome this inconvenience by looking over your shoulder, you will flip, because the boat is only ten inches wide, and very unstable. So in order to row well, you relax, look straight ahead (backwards), focusing on your stroke, your legs, and your speed. Conse-quently you run into obstacles such as rocks, boats, stumps, and shores only to find yourself in the cool water. That is, you make mistakes. It is a lot of fun. In field research, mistakes are not only fun; they also are instructive. A heart transplant surgeon emphasized this to me when I was interviewing leaders for my book Bosses (Wall 1986). “In my field,” he noted, “we obviously try to avoid as many mistakes as possible. But any mistake I make with one patient makes me a better surgeon with the next.” I agree. Each specific mistake teaches an individual lesson; moreover, mistakes in general are quite helpful because they eradicate – or at least lower – researcher hubris. In field research, arrogance is the researcher’s worst enemy. If you are overly confident, if you know that you are investigating the correct
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problem, from the correct perspective, with the correct procedure, with the correct sample, at the correct time – you will probably find yourself with a year’s worth of useless data. A few mistakes, early in the research, will bring you back to reality and reduce the long run costs. Mistakes also teach the field researcher that “good enough” is “good enough.” When the Russian general Kalashnikov was recovering from battle wounds and designing the AK-47, he remembered a local saying, “Perfection is the enemy of good enough.” Therefore, he designed his automatic rifle to be only good enough. It is not extremely accurate. Its bullets do not go as far as those of some other machines. The muzzle velocity is relatively slow. When it is fired, it sounds like a child rumbling through the kitchen pots and pans. But it always fires, under almost any condition; seldom does it jam; rust and abuse does not stop it or even slow it down, all because Kalashnikov designed its parts to fit together good enough, not precisely. Why did Kalashnikov design the AK-47 this way? I honestly do not know, but my guess is that he did not sit in a hospital room thinking, “I want to build a weapon that will fire under almost any condition and can easily be operated by a technological dummy.” My guess is that mistakes had taught him a lesson. Probably he, or his troops, had experienced weapons that did not fire when they became dirty or rusty or frigid – weapons that may have been too complicated to quickly disassemble and reassemble. For field researchers, mistakes usually have the same effect as the soldiers’ experience in that they teach the researcher not to be overly precise. I learned this lesson in a humorous experience. When in Nanjing, I found there was one mediator per 1000 citizens; therefore, in a city of two million there was a large potential sample. Awed by the number, my aspirations soared. As they did, I decided to precisely measure the techniques employed by Chinese mediators. I knew that self-reports by the mediators would be good enough, since this was the first empirical study of Chinese mediation. But I wanted precision. Accompanied by two translators and a pack of Marlboros (as a gift to the mediator), I begin my first observation. We – mediator, two disputants, two translators and I – sat at a very short, rough table. Initially, it went well; yet, a couple dozen faces soon peered in the open windows. As the mediator noted these, his voice grew louder. Then people started climbing through the windows and sitting on the floor; we were up to 25 spectators. Rising to the occasion, the mediator began mediating with gusto. As the floor space became inadequate, observers sat in the windows and three decided to join us at the table. Now the mediator stood, pointed his hand, addressed the audience and
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raised his shrillness about three octaves. After two hours of this, I expressed my appreciation, delivered the Marlboros, mounted my bike and muttered, “Self-reports should be good enough for this project.” Finally, and most importantly, mistakes emphasize the value of laboratory procedures. That is, mistakes make it quite obvious that a lot of variance is occurring, and you had better take it seriously. Therefore, you learn/relearn to keep the study as simple as possible. Control as many factors as possible and randomize the rest. Match within conditions and obtain as large a set of observations as possible.
Scientism Perhaps the major contribution and invigorating joy from field research is that it allows the researcher to engage in “scientism” which is a combination of empiricism and reason (Shermer 2002). When describing this term or process, Michael Shermer notes that it “embraces (these) twin pillars of a philosophy of life appropriate for an Age of Science”. He holds that scientism is/was practiced by Jacob Bronowski, Stephen Hawking, Carl Sagan, Stephen Jay Gould, and Jared Diamond, some of my intellectual heroes. While I doubt if I adequately understand this process or practice it as well as the above intellectuals, I do find it quite useful to focus, first, on my method of study and its results (empiricism), then shift to reasoning and return to the results. My best example of this centers upon the number 1.30. In a study on community mediation in India, I was examining the mediation techniques used by a formal mediation group, the panchayat (group of five). One of the techniques was a dictated agreement point, and the average use for this technique was 1.30. That is, this mediation group, on average, dictated about one and a third agreement points (or concessions) per mediation. Initially, I recorded this figure in a table, compared it to the average usage of individual mediators – an elder – in India and moved on with my writing. Then I started to use some reasoning. The average is 1.30 per mediation. If there are two or more disputants in each mediation, should not the average number of directives be about 2.00, with one side being told what to do and likewise, the other? In some cases, the panchayat could have issued one ruling that covered both parties (e.g., farmer A is to quit throwing dead rats into farmer B’s irrigation ditch), but still the 1.3 seemed too low. As I thought about this finding, it occurred to me that ideas about the settlement might be coming from the disputants as well as from the mediator – that self-direction might be supplementing mediator direction. So I examined
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the behaviors of the disputants instead of focusing solely on the mediation techniques. When I returned to the empirical arena, to read what the disputants had done, I found they occasionally proposed their own concessions so that panchayat dictates were not necessary. These, in eight of the panchayat proceedings, seemed to fall into two distinct categories. In four of these, the concessions were totally self-imposed: • A father paid a self-imposed fine of 2100 rupees to the temple because of his son’s indiscretions and said that God has brought his son to the right path. • An uncle, beaten by his nephew, paid 1100 rupees to the temple and gave a prayer that the nephew will be prosperous and have a noble life. • An employer, whose employee had stolen four pumps from farmers, reinstalled the pumps as a self-imposed penalty. And in four others, the disputants increased the penalty imposed upon them by the panchayat: • After being found guilty, a man paid an extra 500 rupees to the village temple. • After being told to give 25 percent of his land to the temple, a disputant did so and also agreed to build the entire temple. • After a judgment was made against him, a disputant thanked the panchayat for its speed and justice; then he gave 5000 rupees to the temple. • After being told to clean the temple every morning for a week, a poor man did so for three weeks. The number of voluntary concessions did not totally solve the mystery, but it did reveal an important facet of panchayat mediation. In many disputes, it is strictly inquisitional: it hears evidence, makes inquiries, and decides. But it can also (separately or in concert with its inquisition) provide a platform and motivation for the disputants – who wish to attain/maintain good relations with the panchayat or who seek to gain face in public – to settle the dispute themselves. Somewhat ironically, this powerful body empowers the parties to settle their own disputes.
Participants For me, the greatest joy in field research comes from the interaction with the participants, that is, with the individuals being studied. Here there is a brio because the participants are excited that you are studying them and what they
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do. You are interested! And you perhaps can help them improve. I vividly recall a conversation with an American appeals judge, who for years had been mediating in settlement conferences prior to trial. (A settlement conference is a meeting in which the judge, the plaintiffs’ attorney and the defendant’s attorney prepare the case for trial. Here points of agreement are noted, disagreements are acknowledged, points of law are discussed. If the judge wishes, he or she can attempt to mediate the case.) He noted he had been taking notes on how he mediated his cases for the last two years. His goal was to determine how his efforts affected the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ decisions on whether or not to settle out of court. When I told him that was exactly what I was studying, he beamed and devoted the rest of the day to delineating his mediations from the last few months. As we discussed these, he gave his opinion as to what he felt worked and what did not. Then he asked me for my opinion. Being asked for your opinion, to evaluate the performance of the people you are interviewing – judges, peacekeepers, CEOs, e-commerce directors, imams, panchayat leaders – and who usually are performing quite well is extremely invigorating. Even though this interaction occurred more than a decade ago, I still recall the emotional boost it gave me. A few months ago, a similar question from an experienced mediator produced the same effect. This mediator, whom I was shadowing, had mediated over 2000 cases and was currently fighting an uphill battle in a case where a 16 year-old girl had stepped into the side of a moving – speeding? – truck. About four hours into the ordeal, the mediator detoured me into a storage room and asked, “How am I doing?” Such interactions are not only invigorating, they also provide valuable information about the processes under study. For example, in a recent study of peacekeeping, Dan Druckman and I had predicted that a time constraint – in the form of impending darkness – would have an effect on peacekeepers’ mediations in a role-playing case presented to them. (Concisely stated, the prediction was that the time constraint would reduce the amount of the intervention.) After a dozen or so interviews, I concluded that the time constraint/ darkness manipulation was having no effect. So at the end of each interview I began to ask the peacekeepers (in the time constraint condition) if the looming darkness had any effect on their mediations. Some replied affirmatively, which was consistent with the theory and our previous field observations. Others said there was no effect because they and their subordinates were trained to operate 24/7 and were outfitted with night-vision equipment to do so. Most informative was the third group, who held that darkness would elim-
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inate the need to mediate. One peacekeeper from this group noted that darkness, rain, cold, wind and snow reduce the pressure. When these come, disputants go home and there is no conflict to mediate.
Stuckness Somewhere among the pages of Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (Pirsig 1974), Robert Pirsig discusses the value of being “stuck.” Stuckness, he notes, is the beginning of true insight because when you are stuck, and realize that this is the case, you will begin to analyze and understand the situation so as to get unstuck. This stuck-then-understand process is superior to erroneously concluding that you are not stuck and advancing in the wrong direction. Guided by Pirsig’s logic, I have attempted to develop a taste for stuckness. While it has improved my field research and while I have frequently been able to tolerate the condition, it does not bring me joy. This might seem odd – if not a bit inconsistent – for a fellow who likes to be lost. Consider though, when you are lost, there is a dynamic flow. You are moving around, looking, thinking, testing, and experimenting. Admittedly, these movements are accompanied by a touch of fear as well as slight chill or coolness and an odd feeling in the stomach. But overall, it is an enjoyable process. By contrast, stuckness brings me a sense of immobilization, of going nowhere as when I get my Forerunner stuck in deep snow or mud. And the emotion? It is one of impatience, irritation, and internal roasting. The difference here is worth explaining; therefore, let me give you a mundane comparison and then one from field research. First, the mundane. A few weeks ago my wife and I locked ourselves out of our house (the responsibility for this blunder will forever be disputed) which is rather burglar-proof. When I realized we were on the outside looking in, I felt lost – not stuck – because I knew that I would eventually find a way into the house. Feeling rather cool/calm but somewhat stupid, I enjoyed thinking about the problem from different perspectives. Initially, I thought like a thief; then I took the perspective of a mountain climber. Subsequently, I played John Nash and thought, “take the option that keeps the joint costs for you and your wife as low as possible.” As I was thinking this, I also approached the problem as a carpenter, who has a lot of wood, tools, and some skill. A strategy came to me: I cut a very large piece
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of wood from the doorframe (large pieces are easier to replace than are small ones) near the lock. This gave me direct access to the bolt which I slid over with a long putty knife. Later I repaired the doorframe. Total cost = 0. The time spent, including repair, was one hour. Compare this to an example of being stuck. One spring morning when I was a graduate student in Durham, I decided to mow the yard prior to taking a hike with my wife and our Irish Setter. First, I drove to get some fresh gasoline; secondly, I took out the grinder to sharpen the blade and picked out a 1/2-inch wrench to take off the blade. Then I started to pull the lawnmower out from under the house. Or I should say, that I started looking for the lawn mower, because it was not there. I was stuck; my face was hot and my feet felt stuck to the ground. Despite all of Pirsig’s advice – stare at the problem, push thoughts out of your mind, start over, go back to basics, write down your ideas, take a break, drink a cup of coffee, spend additional time thinking about the problem – I could not get unstuck nor develop a positive approach to the problem. So I quit looking and was irritable for the rest of the day. (A month or so later I discovered the mower in the garage of my wife’s mentor.) Now to an analogous comparison in field research. For me, the sensations of being lost and stuck both center upon the same set of variables: the techniques used by U.S. mediators as they handle disputes. As for being lost – and content – I feel this way when I broach the general question of what determines these techniques; that is, what are the independent variables that affect or determine which techniques (dependent variables) are used by U.S. mediators. Drifting, with this question in mind, I can contently review the literature, shadow mediators, interview disputants, ask mediators to recall mediations and discuss the question openly with professional and informal mediators around the country. For about five years, I have been lost but it has been great fun and currently I have some tentative answers. The first one is that we have in the United States high inter-mediator variation in the use of the techniques because there is no model of mediation in the U.S. that guides or reduces the variation among mediators. This contrasts with mediation in China where there is PLA-dictatorial model; in Korea, where there is a Confucian model; in Malaysia, which has an imam (Muslim) model; and in India where there is a panchayat (formal group of five) model. The second conclusion is that mediator power is important, because it affects how the disputants treat the mediator, rather than how the mediator treats the disputants. Finally, there is the role of reinforcement and superstition. Because about 80 percent of the mediations in the U.S. result in agree-
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ment, mediators here are reinforced for whatever approach they take. Therefore, they continue to employ the same techniques from mediation to mediation (i.e., there is low intra-mediator variation.) In addition, the mediators superstitiously associate the techniques they use with the successful settlement of the dispute. This combination of reinforcement and superstition gives rise to the various “styles” that mediators report and champion. Turning from “lost” to “stuck,” I find myself in the latter state when I treat the mediators’ techniques as the independent variable and attempt to investigate its effects on other variables (e.g., on rate of agreement). Specifically, I am most stuck and irritated that I have been unable to relate any single technique or group of techniques (e.g., a strategy) to disputant agreement. It is generally acknowledged that mediation (versus no mediation) does result in a higher level of settlements; yet, no one – including me – has been able to determine which techniques are responsible for the success. Here, I am stuck, and irritated. Having expressed my ire with stuckness, I will come full circle to admit that it does have its benefits in field research. It reduces one’s hubris. It makes one think; snuffs out mediocre ideas; eliminates false starts; and along with mistakes and being lost, it often underpins “discovery,” a major joy of field research.
Discovery Field research furnishes insights, perhaps because it allows me to observe people, places, events, and solid objects in five dimensions: length, width, height, time, and gravity. I cannot explain why insights come from observing concrete phenomena, but I can give a parallel example. There is a problem I give my class. They have an empty corked wine bottle, with a dime inside it. Their task is to remove the dime without damaging the bottle or removing the cork. When I give this problem to the class in written form, very few can solve it quickly. But when I haul in a lot of wine bottles with dimes in them, most students quickly “see” the answer. (The answer is at the end of the article.) For me, a similar process takes place in the field. I can, for example, review the mediation literature (e.g., Wall 1981; Wall & Lynn 1993; Wall, Stark & Standifer 2001), think about mediation while holed up in my basement office, or conduct laboratory studies about it (e.g., Arunachalem, Wall & Lytle 2000). Yet, I feel my best insights come when I am in the field. There I glean insights as I discuss their mediations with the mediators themselves,
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ask mediators to recall their mediations, observe mediations, review maps of locations where mediations took place, review court records of the results of mediations, disassemble a peacekeeper’s M-16, fiddle with his machine gun, look through night-vision goggles and hear one mediator being called “judge” while another is called “Bob.” The insights that come to me seem to be of two sorts: the crisp isolated insights and the more expanded patterns. One of my wife’s deductions provides a superb example of the former. She is a biochemist – a genetic engineer – who is very smart, even though she occasionally locks the keys in the house. In the lab, she works with a sulfatereducing bacterium, which has the nasty habit of devouring metal. It chews away metal only in the absence of oxygen, which is good for all the steel above ground. On the other hand it is very bad news for stainless steel cooling towers, and for subterranean water and oil pipes. While trying to find a way to eradicate this irritating characteristic from the sulfate reducer, my wife considered removing the gene responsible for the behavior from the microbe’s DNA. Good idea, but not the most impressive insight. Here is the insight: while laboring at this task, she reasoned, instead of trying to eliminate this corrosion affinity, why not transfer it to a bacterium that attaches itself to a metal we want to corrode, such as uranium. (When uranium is corroded, it becomes insoluble and therefore, does not enter the water supply.) Of course I am jealous of this insight because all of mine pale by comparison, but one I have had is that effective leaders are those who protect their subordinates from distractions, time-demands, and even danger from others. Another – unre-lated – insight is that the orders under which U.S. peacekeepers work screen out many of the techniques they would normally use. However, two of the orders – to prevent violence and to stay out of civilians’ problems – are so opposed to each other (i.e., often preventing violence entails becoming involved) that they give peacekeepers a great deal of flexibility in their approaches. Turning to patterns of discovery, they usually require more time to emerge and initially they are disheveled, but this state enhances the joy when a pattern finally comes into focus. It’s somewhat like watching the crystallization of a supersaturated solution or watching ice forming a glaze on your windshield as you drive down the expressway. Ronda Callister and I recently noted a pattern as we were attempting to study community mediation in Thailand. A study in Malaysia (Wall & Callister 1999) was quite successful because we had clear cut differences between the mediations of the imams (Muslim
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mosque leaders) and those of the ketua kampungs (village mayors). With the Malaysian model as a starting point, we attempted to compare the mediations of the temple monks in Thailand to that of the Malaysian village mayor or a respected elder. Unfortunately, the work with the monks was not proceeding smoothly. The data were odd and we were confused as to why. (I think Ronda was lost and I was stuck.) Then a pattern emerged for Ronda as she pieced together many of our observations: The monks seemed uncooperative or confused. Some insisted they did not mediate. Our interviewer seemed to be making no progress in asking people about disputes they took to the monks or in obtaining reports from the monks. The pattern/insight was that villagers were not taking important disputes to the monks because they did not respect them. In Thailand, most, if not all, young men are expected to be monks for a certain period of time and some of them continue as monks for a lifetime. As a result, monks are not generally perceived as wise, or as ones who should be asked to mediate a dispute. While the above pattern is simple and unwanted, the one currently forming in a study of legal mediation has more positive aspects. It is more complex because a chain of causation is involved, and it is beneficial in that it charts out the direction for future research. My beginning hypothesis in the study of attorneys and judges as mediators was that judges would mediate differently than attorneys. Specifically, they would reduce the clients’ perceived BATNAs (i.e., the outcomes from a trial) by citing their own experience on the bench and they would use their status to control attorney behavior. The emerging pattern, however, seems to have the causation coming from the opposite direction, from the clients’ and attorneys’ behaviors toward the judges. I noted that prior to any of the judge’s actions, the clients and attorneys paid substantial deference to him, in that they addressed him as judge (not by his first name), waited for him to shake hands, observed where he sat, and were quiet when he spoke. Occasionally the clients even asked the judge for his opinion as to what they should do. Over coffee breaks the attorneys told the judge how helpful he was in a previous case. These types of behavior by the clients and attorneys tended to shape the judge’s behavior, rather than vice versa. The specific pattern seems to be that the clients seek guidance from the judge, who supplies it in a professional way. In turn, the clients instruct the attorneys, who – after their own input – make their offers to the judge. Observing this causal chain, the judge realizes the client is in the driver’s seat; therefore, when an impasse is reached, or the concession-making slows, the judge addresses the clients. A related causation exists in attorney mediations, but the pattern and tone are different. Here the client views the mediating attorney as a lawyer who at
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best is neutral, but who teams up with the opposing lawyers against him or her. Therefore, the client does not want the mediator’s advice and their attorneys must proffer the offers and concessions. Noting this, the mediator concludes the attorney is in the driver’s seat and addresses him or her.
Conclusion A balanced article would follow the discussion of the joys of field research with a delineation of the costs, subsequently compare the two, and announce the net benefits or costs. As you might expect, this is not to be a balanced article. I do not make cost-benefit analyses when considering field research, and I am in good company: Michelangelo didn’t consider the costs and benefits of sculpturing “David;” rather he took a chisel to the marble and chipped away everything that did not look like David. Bruce Springsteen does not think like an accountant when he chooses to belt out, “This Gun’s for Hire.” Al Pachino probably did not conduct a cost-benefit analysis as he starred in “A Scent of a Woman.” Bill Cosby and Robin Williams certainly do not choose to continue in stand-up comedy routines because of the net benefits. And John LeCarre, just as Stephen King, writes because of the passion for the art, not because the benefits outweigh the costs. Likewise, I have a passion for field research. When I first begin a project, I think about it continually – day and night – with a resultant number of sleepless nights. Then I begin to investigate to subject, losing more sleep because of my excitement. Excitement grows as I fiddle with a real-life phenomenon that I can see, hear, smell, and feel, interacting with participants who are similarly excited that I am studying them. They want a better understanding of their activities; they want to improve them and usually they want me to be successful. This initial excitement, cultivated by the interaction with the participants, tends to flow toward a passion as my waywardness, mistakes, and stuckness give way to discovery and progress. Yet, experience has shown me that this zeal for field research – like most passions – must be guided with several cautions so that it serves research rather than making the researcher its victim. With this goal in mind I proffer the following admonitions: 1) Do not get excited for the sake of excitement; because if you do, you will waste a great deal of time and energy. When I was a graduate student, I asked my mentor, Stacy Adams, how a social scientist maintains excitement about social phenomena for a lengthy period of time. The leathery wrinkles of his right cheek indicated that I had asked the wrong question and his response verified
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my conclusion. “I’m very surprised you asked that question,” were his exact words.
I had posed it because we, at the time, were studying personal space, which was a dull topic to me. Concluding that I had asked the wrong question which perhaps indicated some laziness on my part, I knew I had to offset these with a “born again” excitement in the project. So I became excited and then wasted about a year on a dull topic instead of moving to boundary role and negotiation research, where I had a truly exciting dissertation (Wall & Adams 1974). 2) The second admonition is to avoid believing that a topic is important because you have a passion for it. Cognitive dissonance explains why each of us believes there is high value in what we do. Yet it can lead us to self-delusion; that is, we can be studying something that is unimportant, but we think it is important.
Let me be more precise. Studying unimportant phenomena is fine, because there is a possibility that the unimportant will become important. Are we not glad, for example, that Flemming’s mentor did not tell him to quit fooling around with mold and to move on the something bigger? Also, it is acceptable to study unimportant phenomena when it is fun to do so. To me, this perquisite – along with not having to maintain a fixed schedule in the office – is a major luxury of our trade. Personally, I enjoy studying unimportant phenomena, such as the electron-microscope images of the protein crystals that my wife has isolated from some of her bacteria. The crystals are bright orange and more interestingly have the same angles as a large calcite crystal on my desk. I enjoy studying the interaction between cats and snakes. A female cat, I have noted, will cautiously avoid a snake or a rope that moves like a snake; however, she will very contently observe her kittens’ playing with a snake. I enjoy studying BATNA levels. In tinkering with these, I have found that negotiators do not abandon a negotiation when the BATNA exceeds the probable net outcome of the negotiation. Rather, the BATNA level must be about 11/3 times the negotiation outcomes. Returning to my admonition, from these odd examples, I contend it is appropriate to be excited about unimportant phenomenon because it is fun and may eventually be fruitful. But it is inappropriate to believe that a phenomenon is important simply because you are excited about it. To engage in such delusion sacrifices one’s professional objectivity. 3) As a third suggestion: Abandon some projects. Admittedly, I am better at advising this than doing it, but I know that for some field research projects there comes a time for abandonment, because, for example, the phenomenon cannot be understood or a process cannot be divided into manageable parts. It is too
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complex or so simple that it’s trivial. The process unfolds so quickly that the independent variables and dependent variables seem meshed. The participants are uncooperative. There are an inadequate number of research sites. You run out of money, or the project quits being fun.
How do you do it? My approach is to put all my notes, articles, books, and data on the project into some Xerox boxes, walk to the nearest dumpster, toss them in and go for a long hike. Two activities allow you to make such a clean break. One is a back-up field project. Always have two or more projects going at once so that you can abandon one – without remorse or panic – when it is necessary. The second activity is teaching. This is not only a service to students and probably your major contribution to society. It also provides you with emotional backing when you must abandon a field project. 4) As a final area for caution, do not get so excited about the subject matter that you are sloppy in writing it up for publication. Because most readers, reviewers and editors are not as excited about your project as you are, they need to be convinced. Their conversion requires that you get their attention, explain why the phenomena under study is important, present lucid details on what you did find and tie up the package neatly at the end. Moreover, remember that writing is – as Stephen King puts it – “work.” Set aside adequate time for writing because it takes ample time. Then focus, revise your work, have young colleagues review it, and then revise, revise, revise. Lay it aside for a month, then revise, revise, revise.
In closing, I shift from the four cautions back to my major theme: Field research not only allows scholars to contribute to our knowledge pool; it can also be a lot of fun. So, relax – or get excited – and enjoy it.
References Arunachalem, Vairam, Lytle, Ann and Wall, James (2001). “An evaluation of two mediation techniques, negotiator power, and culture in negotiation.” Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 31: 951–980. Pirsig, Robert (1974). Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. London: Head. Sherman, Michael (2002). “The shamans of scientism.” Scientific American, June, p. 35. Wall, James (1981). “Mediation: An analysis, review, and proposed research.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 25: 157–180. Wall, James (1986). Bosses. Lexington, Mass.; D.C. Heath. Wall, James and Adams, Stacy (1974). “Some variables affecting a constituent’s evaluations of and behavior toward a boundary role occupant.” Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 11: 390–408. Wall, James and Callister, Ronda (1999). “Malaysian community mediation.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 43: 343–365.
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Wall, James and Lynn, Ann (1993). “Mediation: A current review.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36: 160–194. Wall, James and Druckman, Daniel (2003). “Mediation in peacekeeping missions.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 47: 693–705. Wall, James, Stark, John and Standifer, Rhetta (2001). “Mediation: A current review and theory development.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45: 370–391.
How Much Do We Know About Real Negotiations? Problems in Constructing Case Studies DAVID MATZ
How do we know what occurs in a real negotiation? We know that laboratory-generated data about negotiations are at some remove from what occurs in the field (Pruitt 1981). But do we know enough about behavior in the field to understand the size of that remove? It is common understanding that our methods of gathering field data on any topic do not promise complete accuracy (Bernard 1994), and that we must be content with something less. It is the point of this note to suggest that gathering case study data about negotiation presents problems even beyond the usual, and that as a result our teaching and theory building may be working with some faulty materials. Most of this essay is a summary of how these questions came most forcefully to my attention, and how I have sought to answer them. In the fall of 2000, the Israelis and the Palestinians had just returned from the Camp David II mediation which had not produced an agreement. In September, the second Intifada began as the two sides were still trying to negotiate. Prime Minister Barak’s government was disintegrating, leading him in December to call for new elections. His opponent emerged as Ariel Sharon who promised an end to the negotiations and the concessions that Barak had been offering. By January, three weeks before the election, Sharon was far ahead in the polls. The Israelis and Palestinians decided to try one more round of negotiation. Each side sent a full negotiating team (without the head of government from either side) to Taba, an Egyptian resort. The negotiation ended six days later with a joint statement to the press which said that “The sides declare that they have never been closer to reaching an agreement and it is thus our shared belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged with the resumption of negotiations following the Israeli election” (Enderlin 2003). At that point there were nine days left before the election. As things stood there was no practical chance that Barak would win that election, and I was astounded. How could the parties walk away from the negotiating table if they were really making such progress? Convinced that the newspaper accounts could not be accurate I decided to use an upcoming sabbatical in Israel to learn what actually happened at Taba. What I learned was indeed at odds with International Negotiation Series 2: P. Carnevale and C.K.W. de Dreu (eds.) Methods of Negotiation Research, 23–37 © 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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the published reports. The parties in fact were much closer to agreement than reported, and many of the negotiators believed that with four more days of negotiating a framework agreement on most – though not all – of the major issues could have been reached. The newspaper account of modest progress had thus muted what, in my research, became the central question: Who ended the negotiation and why? Elsewhere, I have written about the actual results of the negotiation and my conclusions about what ended it (Matz, 2003a, 2003b). Here I want to focus on some of the problems I encountered in learning about those results. My research began eight months after Taba ended. There were by then two memoirs and several newspaper interviews and analyses by and with mostly Israeli participants (Beilin 2001; Sher 2001); there was also one scholarly account, done by an Israeli with strong contacts among the Palestinians (Klein 2001). There were twenty eight participants at Taba; I interviewed seventeen, of whom 11 were Israeli. The Palestinians were harder to reach because some were traveling out of the region, and because the politics in the fall of 2001 made travel difficult. (One telephone interview proved to be an unsatisfactory solution.) Interviewees from both sides were equally forthcoming about issues in the negotiation process, but the Palestinians were much more circumspect when asked about the larger context. This imbalance of sources certainly made me wary of imparting bias to my results, but my practice of crosschecking within teams and between teams gives me some assurance that this weighting did not itself lead to errors in my narration or interpretation.
Why It Is Hard To Learn What Really Happens In Negotiations Almost all negotiations experience the tension between publicity and secrecy. Occasionally, as at Oslo, the entire process including its very existence was secret until it is completed. This is rare. Nonetheless, negotiators most often work to keep most of their moves out of the public eye during the negotiation period itself, and sometimes permanently. Privacy is an essential component of good negotiating (Pruitt 1999). The tension exists because of the pressure applied by a negotiator’s constituencies or audiences, groups that may hold a range of views about the negotiation, from full support to full hostility. Privacy blunts the capacity of these constituents to shoot down a component of an agreement before it can be presented in the flattering light of a full agreement. Privacy, moreover, allows negotiators to explore in a tentative, testing manner, what the other side will offer and accept. It allows either side to hint at a willingness to change position, without committing itself to such a change.
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Privacy thus enables the parties to use, even create, their own subtle communication process. Taba negotiators told me that “in four eyes” (i.e. in private conversation) they knew what the other side was willing to do, though there was no specific sentence uttered by the party in question to which such an inference could be attached. In an interview in Haaretz eight months after Taba, Shlomo Ben Ami (Israeli Foreign Minister under Barak) described a meeting with Abu Ala (chief Palestinian negotiator at Taba), using telling phrases to explain how he had inferred receptivity among the Palestinians: “they showed readiness,” “the feeling was,” “it could be assumed” (Ben Ami in Haaretz 2001)). Though this process of inference is vulnerable to misunderstanding and duplicity, exploration without commitment is nonetheless essential for good negotiating. And only privacy enables this to occur. One result of this secrecy is that scholars and journalists are dependent in large measure on what the negotiators are willing to tell. And negotiators have a number of incentives not to tell the public the truth. In addition to the usual problems of faulty memory, self serving perspectives, and scores to settle, recollections of negotiations raise special problems. Whatever the collaborative energy in a negotiation, no such process can be free of competition. It may be that people drawn to negotiation have already a well developed competitive sense, and it may be that the negotiation process (with its inevitable supply of omniscient Monday-morning-quarterbacks) further exaggerates that sense. (Perhaps, the act of memoir writing enhances the competitive spirit yet further.) Whatever the cause, a perusal of negotiator memoirs makes clear that competition does not end with the negotiation (see Kissinger 1982). Negotiator’s memoirs often exhibit an apparent need to show superiority to the other side and frequently to one’s own teammates; to show that one was not duped, and to show that one did the best that anyone could. These incentives exist with all negotiations, but they are especially strong when the negotiation, as at Taba, is one chapter in an on-going process. Participants’ efforts to communicate what happened in a negotiation are not made easier by the subtlety of the forms of communication inherent in the artof ne gotiation, as suggested above. Body language, tone of voice, pacing, energy level, the impact of humor all have much to do with negotiating success, but they are extremely difficult for authors to recapture after the event. The bold judgment (“He never wanted a deal.”) or the quoted dialogue (“When he said that to me, I told him that. . . .”) have an impact on the reader that can overshadow what may have been a more significant flow of communication at the table. On some occasions the competition between negotiating teams is subordinated to the competition between the negotiators on the one hand and the audiences each negotiator needs to face on the other. Whatever the degree of
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hostility and distrust between two sides, negotiators need each other and this often creates strong bonds of allegiance between them. One upshot can be a collaborative falsification to the public. Oslo is of course one such instance in which both sides conspired to hide from, and lie to, the press. Another occurred at the press conference closing Taba where the leadership of both sides agreed explicitly to tell the press, falsely, that the sides would not budge on the Palestinian commitment to a right of return and the Israeli resistance to it. In reality, they had reached most of an agreement. Attempting to learn what actually occurred in a negotiation is influenced by the availability of writings produced during the negotiation. Sometimes there are position papers and proposals, drafts and redrafts. But often these do not exist or are not available. At Taba there was a marked aversion to putting anything in writing. As negotiating progress was made, the idea of drafting proposals was proposed and was usually shot down, by both sides at different times. But some writings were produced. Since the location of particular boundaries was a central part of the negotiation, the use of maps would seem to have been inevitable. But which maps were put on the table has been a matter of assertion and denial. Though there has been much talk of various maps, only half of one Palestinian map has so far “as of 2001” been allowed into the public light (Klein 2001); the Israelis put one map on the table, though this has been disputed by the Palestinians (Enderlin 2003). One group of negotiators at Taba – those dealing with the refugee questions, – did produce a great deal of writing, mainly in the form of proposals and counter proposals, some drafted by one side, some drafted jointly. There would appear to have been at least four such documents, and there are suggestions that there were yet more. Of these, only one has appeared in print, showing up in Le Monde, eight months after the negotiation ended (2001). In short, scholars and journalists have no direct access to what occurs in a negotiation, important documents may be misleading or missing, and the eye witness participant/reporters have numerous incentives to distort their reports. Of course, cross checking of sources (interviews, documents, memoirs) when there is a high level of consistency does allow one to develop a reasonably reliable picture of at least some portions of the negotiation. But inconsistencies in the sources are frequent, and thus unsurprisingly one is rarely free of the need to use a standard of plausibility as well as one’s imagination. Let me now give an account of one episode in the Taba negotiation in which inconsistency of reports raised questions, and then describe how I have tried to determine what really happened.
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Crosschecking and Detective Work: Some Examples The Taba negotiation began on a Sunday evening, and for two days things went very well. On Tuesday afternoon however, two Israeli restaurant owners visited a Palestinian town and were killed by Palestinians. Prime Minister Barak then made the decision to recall the cabinet ministers on the negotiating team. Gilad Sher (Barak’s chief of staff, and one of the Israeli heads of the negotiation delegation) describes a dinner on Wednesday evening at which he, two other members of the Israeli delegation (both former members of Israeli security services), Abu Ala (head of the Palestinian delegation) and Mohammed Dahlan (head of Gaza security and member of the Palestinian delegation) attended (2001). The dinner occurred at a fish restaurant 10 miles south of Taba. Sher makes clear that no one else, other than some Egyptian coordinators, knew of the dinner, and no one (other than Barak and Arafat) was told of the dinner after it occurred. Sher reports that the purpose in arranging the dinner was to learn if Arafat was prepared to reach an agreement. The Israelis offered Abu Ala an airplane to fly immediately to Arafat for an answer. According to Sher, Abu Ala answered: “The master of the house does not want an agreement.” Reading of this dinner I was puzzled. Sher presented himself as having seen Taba, from the time it was first proposed, as a somewhat empty negotiating effort (too little too late), at best an opportunity to “freeze dry” the positions of the parties for use in later, presumably much later, negotiations. With such a pessimistic view, why call a melodramatic meeting? In our interview Sher sloughed off any inconsistency and said it had made good sense to have the dinner. A week or so later I interviewed Israel Hasson, one of the Israeli former security officials present at the dinner. Even before my first question, Hasson volunteered to tell me of the dinner, but never mentioned Sher’s presence, though I asked him directly about it. Hasson described the dinner in almost the identical words used by Sher. When this difference in attendance surfaced some weeks later Hasson called to say that he, Hasson, had initiated the dinner, and after Abu Ala had answered as quoted above, Abu Ala asked to have Sher join them. Hasson then contacted Sher, who drove down and had the same dialog again. The issue of who was present at the dinner is not in itself important for the issues raised by the Taba negotiation, but this conflict in the testimony does support skepticism about some of the versions of what actually happened at this dinner. In an interview, Abu Ala recalled the dinner but could not recall who was there. When asked about the “master of the house” comment he said that Arafat had told him the night before Taba began that if Abu Ala could reach
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an agreement and would recommend it, he, Arafat, would sign it. Since one of the core questions at Taba and throughout all Israeli-Palestinian negotiation – does Arafat want a deal? – is raised by this event, the question of what Abu Ala said at the dinner justifies some scrutiny. There are, I think, three possible interpretations of these accounts. One is, that the Israelis invented Abu Ala’s admission altogether in order to blame Arafat should the negotiation fail. A second is that, the Israelis may have asked a question about Arafat’s intent, the Palestinian leader, a master of the shrug, may have responded with a physical gesture, and the Israelis may have interpreted this to mean Arafat would sign nothing. And third is that, the story occurred just as dramatically as the Israelis told it. What to do with the various contradictions? Though in retrospect, Sher presents a blasé account of his own expectation of Taba and of his own performance there, on Monday evening Sher saw that some agreements at Taba were possible. He called Barak and told him so. (On Tuesday some Palestinians were also seeing agreement possibilities and called their Ramallah headquarters asking for additional staff.) On Wednesday, following the killings, Barak left open whether he would be willing to re-start the talks. But for Barak to end the talks would have left the blame for termination solely on him (though he of course could in turn blame the terrorists and thus Arafat). As such, an “admission” from Abu Ala that Arafat would accept no agreement would be handy to balance the blame. An alternative – but not inconsistent – Israeli goal for the dinner would have been to see if the professional intensity of the Palestinian negotiators at Taba (commented on by several Israeli negotiators at the time) reflected a directive from Arafat to reach a deal. However, asking Abu Ala the question directly would have risked falling into a trap of their own devising: if the answer had been that Arafat was open to a deal that week, any failure in the negotiation would have fallen more heavily on Barak. It is possible that the Israelis did raise the question of Arafat’s intent, though perhaps indirectly. What is not plausible is that Abu Ala, with Dahlan sitting there, would answer it in the blunt, explicit way he is quoted. As a constant in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations has been the need to blame the other side for any failure, how likely is it that the head of the Palestinian delegation in the middle of the negotiation would tell major players on the other side that his chief wants no agreement? What could he gain by such an admission? Though tensions within the Palestinian team were so intense that anyone at some moment might have blurted out anything about anyone even Arafat, I think it unlikely that Abu Ala, a very experienced professional, would do so. Also, why would Sher and Hasson keep such a striking admission secret from the Israeli negotiating team for the rest of the
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week, and from the press even after Taba was over? Considering the importance of blame in the negotiations, this silence is striking. The story showed up in public only in Sher’s memoirs published 8 or 9 months after Taba. My view is that at the dinner in the desert the Israelis opened the topic of Arafat’s intentions and Abu Ala responded with a shrug. Since Taba ended without a mutual blaming orgy – as there had been after Camp David – this story stayed in Sher’s notes until he came to write his memoir. In the writing, as is not uncommon, the narrative became less ambiguous than the original event, i.e. the shrug became a speech. With what clarity Sher conveyed the story to Barak at the time of Taba is uncertain, though Barak’s failure to mention it to me when it would have been useful (see below) suggests that Sher did not relate it to Barak in as stark a way as he did in his memoirs. I would like now to turn to a more central concern of my research. There are two generally accepted and inconsistent understandings about where the parties stood when Taba ended. According to one, they made progress and ran out of time; according to the other, no progress occurred because the only goal of Taba negotiators (shared by both sides) was to make Barak look good for some voters in the coming election. My understanding, based on interviews and on piecing together the various accounts, is far more optimistic than either story. I asked the negotiators: “If you had four more days in which to negotiate, could you have reached a framework agreement on your topic?” On all issues, except two very important ones, the answer was affirmative. (The two exceptions were control of the holy places in Jerusalem, and the process for ending the conflict.) This assessment was created by matching each side’s estimation, issue by issue, of what a settlement could look like.1 It was also supported, if obliquely, by the joint zeal of the parties in keeping secret the documents and maps produced at the negotiation. Such systematic secrecy can be explained only by assuming that these papers contained serious concessions. Even I, however, optimist-in-chief for the Taba negotiation, have to acknowledge several qualifications. A negotiator’s inference from the behavior of his opposite number that an agreement was possible leaves open the possibility – as had happened before Taba – that the negotiator was reading the signals incorrectly, that his opposite number would change his mind, or that the other side was intentionally deceptive. Even if the signals were read correctly, no one on either side had, when the negotiation ended on Saturday, yet pulled together all the potential agreements and reviewed the entire package. This process would have been full of politics, drama, and guessing about what the other side would do. In short, it would have been unpredictable. Perhaps most importantly, no one believed that an agreement on the holy places was possible, and this failure was so significant that it could have
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derailed everything else. Nonetheless, I believe the evidence shows that the parties at Taba were much closer to an agreement than is generally believed, and that a framework agreement was possible with a few more days of negotiating. Since the record is consistent that the negotiation ended on Saturday at the initiative of the Israelis with the uncomplaining concurrence of the Palestinians, the question is: Why?
Inferences About Intentions Indeed, in studying negotiation, the question we frequently ask is “Why?” We all want mightily to know an actor’s intention. It is a base for measuring a negotiator’s success. More generally, it is a major source from which we create meaning and the foundation for understanding what might otherwise seem an arbitrary set of negotiation moves. Knowing a negotiator’s intention also goes a long way toward satisfying our need for good guys and bad guys, a matter not to be taken lightly as many a negotiation is assessed as a play of moralities. The conundrum arises because rarely can we answer the “why.” The question indeed is an invitation into quicksand. Intentions are always many, multileveled, morphing, floating, dissolving. A serious reflection to determine our own intention for one (relatively) simple task (e.g. writing an article) is itself a humbling experiment. Moreover, there is the evidence problem. Negotiators, like all public players, have considerable incentive to describe (in memoirs, interviews) their motives and goals as virtuous and reasonable. In the case of negotiators we again have some special problems. The significant role in negotiation of ambiguity, hints, feints, and various kinds of pretence, make the development of patterns of behavior into evidence very problematic. Even a negotiator with some limited means of testing for his/her opponent’s intention is often unsure. It is, indeed, inherent in all negotiating that each side is suspicious of the other, and reads the evidence with a worry about being duped. One might think that long standing knowledge of one’s opposite number would make the decoding of intent more plausible. But when Yossi Beilin, among the most pro-negotiation of the Israeli leadership, entered the first plenary session at Taba, and faced people he had long known and long worked with, he nonetheless wondered whether “the people before us (are) terror operatives or those trying to prevent it” (Beilin 2001). Or, we can take an example from the refugee negotiations – an issue which was discussed with a considerable fund of trust between the parties. Nevertheless, the Israelis wondered whether the Palestinian insistence on a reparation plan that put
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the emphasis on individual Palestinian applications for compensation wasn’t “really” a way to keep the refugee question open “forever.” Thus there is a deep conflict between our passion to know intention and the near impossibility of reliably knowing it. The common way out of this dilemma for scholars is to ignore it: impute an intention, offer no (or some highly selected) support, and move on. This approach can be seductive, satisfying the reader’s desire to know the inside story; but it generally substitutes narrative skill for evidence in the effort to present a persuasive account. To take a prominent example, Robert Malley and Hussein Agha in the summer of 2001 wrote a now much cited article analyzing the Camp David II mediation. Malley was present at Camp David as staff to President Clinton, and Agha is a long time consultant to the Palestinian leadership. In the course of a six page essay, they inform the reader no less than twelve times about what Arafat wanted, what Barak was thinking, or what either was driven by. They offer little evidence for their mind-reading, but because Malley was present and Agha is well connected their assertions about intent are passing via footnotes into scholarship on the subject. Recognizing the conundrum did not exempt me from it: I wanted to know why Barak and Arafat ended a promising negotiation four or five days before they had to. I began by interviewing Barak. I explained my purpose and finally asked: With an agreement at least possible and with at least four days left to negotiate, why did you end the negotiation on Saturday? He was equally direct: “Because that was the day the Palestinians brutally killed two Israelis and further negotiation was impossible.” When I pointed out that there were no terrorist killings on Saturday or Friday, he said, “Oh, right, but that was the day that Arafat made that horrendous speech calling us fascists, and there was no way to negotiate with someone who spoke like that.” When I pointed out that that speech was made the day after Taba ended, he said, “It doesn’t make any difference why I ended it. It had to end because it wasn’t going anywhere.” When I told him that my piecing together of interviews and memoirs suggested that a framework agreement was at least possible with a few more days of negotiating, Barak simply denied it. This of course may represent precisely how he saw things on the last day of the negotiation. In the swirl of an election campaign, with a somewhat loosely managed negotiation, and with little effort made to coordinate the various negotiators working on different issues, it is possible that Barak did not know how close the negotiators were to reaching agreement. Indeed it is possible that no single person at the negotiation was aware of this larger picture either. In any event, Barak rebuffed further effort to discuss what he knew at the time. It was significant that Barak did not take the easy, conventional way out, saying that Arafat
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wanted no deal. That he did not mention the Wednesday night meeting in the desert is a hint, as suggested above, that he had not been aware of it at the end of Taba, and perhaps, if he had not read Sher’s memoir, he was not aware of it at all. Believing that there was more to learn about Barak’s thinking than I could get directly from him, I decided to ask some experts. I began a tour of people who claimed to be Barak insiders, people who knew his mind. From these sources I gathered thirteen explanations for why he ended the Taba negotiation. • His wife did it. She never liked the idea of Taba and finally persuaded Barak that it was a political mistake. • His political advisor, James Carville, did it. He convinced Barak that an agreement at Taba would cost him any chance at the election. • Even before Taba began, he had lost the conviction that a historic breakthrough was possible. He instead focused on negotiation only as an electoral ploy. • He had a history of getting cold feet when an agreement started to look possible. That’s what he did with Syria and he did it several times with the Palestinians. Put more positively, when he got very close to an agreement, the concessions made him worry deeply for the future of Israel. • His characteristic pattern as prime minister had been the zigzag: move toward a goal and then away from it. Who knows why? • He really wanted an agreement with the Palestinians but was so maladroit as both politician and negotiator that he missed opportunity after opportunity. (This item has many examples and subcategories.) • He had wanted an agreement at Taba, but having learned (on Wednesday night) that Arafat didn’t want a deal, he changed his focus to one of making the world understand Arafat’s real intent. • He decided that no deal was possible at Taba and that negotiations would have to continue later, before and after the election. • Ben Ami (Israeli Foreign Minister) and Abu Ala (Head of the Palestinian delegation) agreed at Taba that any further progress in negotiating would require breakthroughs at a leader-to-leader summit, and this advice convinced Barak. • His negotiators at Taba were too desperate to achieve an agreement and were giving away the store. They were making deals neither he nor the Israeli public could or should accept. • Individual Israeli negotiators were making what amounted to private deals and he was not sure what they were. He felt himself to be losing control of the process, worried that he would be trapped with whatever they agreed
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to, and thus ended the negotiation to avoid being responsible for a situation he had not anticipated and could not control. • The Israeli public would never accept any deal from Taba and a negative popular vote would clearly present Israel as the reason for no peace. • If the Israeli public approved an agreement by a small margin, it would create a storm of opposition from the nationalist right wing that could lead Israel into civil war. What does one do with this motivational smorgasbord? Each has at least some inherent plausibility, each can claim someone up close who says its true, and each has some smattering of facts that can be adduced to support it. Selecting a few elements of the context in which Barak made his decision may help. We know that Barak expressed no optimism about sending a team to Taba in the first place. He seems never to have given his negotiating team one clear mandate, and his various utterances were thus interpreted by different negotiators according to their own predispositions. Pulling back his main negotiators on Tuesday suggests a softness in his commitment to reach an agreement at Taba; still, though he could easily have let the negotiation end right there, he let the team return to Taba on Thursday. Many of the negotiators at Taba were important to his election campaign and, being at Taba, were not able to carry out their campaign functions. Some of those negotiators recalled the pressure to “get back to work.” Pulling this together into an interpretation of Barak’s thinking on that Saturday, I would conclude that he just wore out. His optimism and drive to reach an agreement were not enough to overcome the pessimism and skepticism all around him, and in him. Put differently, nearly everything on the above list weighed on him. Perhaps we should not choose from the list, but rather see it as an array of lures beckoning Barak not to negotiate further at Taba. Taken together (even where they are inconsistent with each other) they describe a climate resisting further negotiation, impacting his viewpoint and thus his decision. In this climate it would have taken a leader of extraordinary strength, willing to take larger risks, with something larger than Barak’s tiny and diminishing base of popular support, to continue the negotiation and push for agreement. It is thus not surprising that Barak would see it as prudent to adopt the conventional campaign stance: assert that he had done everything possible for peace. About Arafat’s intentions I have less evidence. Abu Ala says that Arafat was willing to sign an agreement. Arafat sent a good negotiating team, a team that clearly thought agreements were possible and that worked diligently throughout the week, a team that tried to keep the Israelis at the table on Tuesday
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afternoon when Barak was calling his cabinet ministers back from the negotiation. On the other hand, we have the puzzling account of the Wednesday night dinner that might suggest Arafat’s lack of commitment. And we have, finally, the ready acquiescence by the Palestinian leadership on Saturday to the Israeli decision to end the negotiation, suggesting that the Palestinians too – whether reflecting Arafat or not – did not choose to negotiate further. Arafat’s vicious speech in Switzerland the day after Taba ended attacked Barak and the Israelis, and made no mention of Taba. When I asked Palestinians close to Arafat what they made of this confusing picture and why he seemed willing to end the negotiation, they professed no insight into his intentions. As Arafat is a master of the masked motive, I take their confession seriously and can only echo it.
Conclusions One goal for this essay has been to identify special problems in understanding what happens in a negotiation. The imputation of motive is one concern. Another is the necessity of comparing many sources (interviews, memoirs, documents) to learn what happened, of cautiously accepting a consensus of sources when there is one, and of assessing inconsistent accounts by explicitly stated tests of plausibility. Any account that seems to rely on one source, or that does not identify differences among sources is, I would suggest, suspect on those grounds alone. These are hardly novel insights, but they have not necessarily been the rule in studying negotiations. Let me close with two examples, from other negotiations, of (mis)understandings that have become part of our scholarly lore. Social Conflict (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim 1994), in its analysis of “interests,” cites the example of Henry Kissinger mediating the provision of food and medicine to Egyptian troops surrounded by Israeli troops after the Yom Kippur War. Kissinger in this account “after careful analysis. . . . concluded that Israel wanted actual control of the road, whereas Egypt wanted only the appearance that Israel did not control it. . . . A bridging solution was found that involved stationing Israeli soldiers unobtrusively on the sides of the road (so that they actually controlled it) and having UN checkpoints on the road itself (to give the impression of international control).” The authors cite Golan (1976) but Golan actually provides a rather different picture, especially when supplemented by the report of that negotiation done by the the Insight Team of the London Sunday Times (1974). First, on a minor matter, Kissinger’s “careful analysis” came after he was told by an Israeli aid that the solution
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lay in separating the issue of control of the road from allowing aid through to the Egyptian army (Golan 1976). More importantly, this part of the negotiation was, as described by Golan and The Times, a four way power fight. The parties were Israel, Egypt, the US, and the UN, and the topic was the control of the road to the Egyptian soldiers. Egypt gave in early in the process, recognizing as Golan saw it, the limits of its power. Kissinger first proposed that the UN control the road, and Israel objected. Then he proposed one UN inspection station and Israel agreed. Kissinger later converted that to three UN stations and pressed Israel very hard to take it, though there is no indication that Sadat sought this (Brecher and Geist 1980).2 Furthermore, as the checkpoints were being constructed there were fist fights between Israeli and UN soldiers over their construction (Sunday Times 1974). The result of these various tussles was that Israelis were in the UN checkpoints inspecting whether the material being sent to the Egyptian soldiers was only humanitarian in nature. Moreover, according to Kissinger what made these concessions effective was that, as part of the package the Israelis achieved the return of their prisoners (Kissinger 1982). In summary, the “bridging solution” gave Israel everything it had originally sought, gave Kissinger a deal that allowed the process to go forward and gave him much of the credit for achieving it, gave the UN a hollow role that might charitably be called symbolic, gave Sadat not so much a fig leaf as the barely visible appearance of a fig leaf, and can, with no undue cynicism, be seen as a conspiracy among the Egyptian, Israeli, and US governments to fool the Egyptian people. The term “bridging solution” suggests that each side used problem solving technique to satisfy it’s “interests.” I think it accurate to say that this “bridging solution” was a thin cover that reflected perfectly the power relations of the parties. To focus now on a later chapter in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, the 1978 Camp David negotiations dealt with the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. In their account in Getting To Yes, Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1981), contrast the parties’ opening positions (Egypt wanted all the Sinai returned and Israel wanted to keep a part of it) with the negotiated result (Egypt got full sovereignty, but with limits placed on where Egypt could put any weaponry). This development is used to illustrate the value for seeking a settlement of “interests”, Israel’s being security, Egypt’s being sovereignty. The difficulty here is that the basic principles that satisfied these interests (limits on the use of weapons, demilitarized zones, U.N. control of yet other areas) were already in place on the ground when Camp David began. It was the formula the Egyptians and Israelis had agreed to with Henry Kissinger as mediator in 1974. Significant modifications of the plan were indeed negotiated at Camp David, including moving the lines separating the parties, substitution of an
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international force for the UN, and most contentiously the time table for phasing out this plan. But the concepts were already in the note books of President Carter’s mediating team before the summit began, and it is difficult to believe that the two sides had not themselves anticipated the Carter team proposal in their own planning for the negotiation.3 Again, this was not problem solving and an exploration of interests. It was taking an obvious solution staring the parties in the face and modifying it to fit the situation. These examples, and the Taba account more generally, raise the question of what we know about what goes on in real negotiations. They suggest that we may well know less than we have assumed. As a result we may need to review some of our theory to see how much of it may be based on such assumptions.
Notes 1. The negotiation concerning Maale Adumim provides an illustration of how this matching process can be done. Maale Adumim is a large Israeli settlement (25,000 people) situated east of Jerusalem which blocks much north-south traffic for a new state of Palestine. The Palestinians had been intensely fearful that a Palestinian state would be divided by Israeli lands and roads, leaving it without a coherent land mass, and Maale Adumim raised this specter. Nonetheless, at one point, the Palestinian negotiators conceded that Maale Adumim would be annexed to Israel as part of the overall agreement. Israel argued for more area around the settlement, and connection to other settlements, and the Palestinians then rescinded their concession. “Unofficially” however, the Palestinians acknowledged that Maale Adumim could be part of the annexation if the parties could work out the scope of the surrounding area. Thus, when the negotiation ended, the official Palestinian position refused Israeli annexation of Maale Adumim, but unofficially negotiators on both sides saw the trade that would have reversed that position (access roads for the Palestinians – which the Israelis would grant – and limited growth space for Maale Adumim – which the Palestinians would grant). 2. Brecher confirms Kissinger’s own interests in getting the results he thought best for the US. 3. Compare Quandt, W. (1986) Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution (p. 382) with Kissinger’s Years of Upheaval (p. 839.) Supplemented with an interview with Herman Eilts, then U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, who was present at Camp David.
References Asfour, Hanan (2001). “Ben Ami’s Occupation Syndrome.” Haaretz Magazine, October 19. Beilin, Yossi (2001). Manual For a Wounded Dove. (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Miskal-Yidioth Ahronoth Books and Chemed Books. Ben Ami, Shlomo (2001). “End of a Journey.” Haaretz Magazine, September 14.
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Bernard, H. Russell (1994). “Methods Belong To All Of Us,” in Robert Borofsky, editor, Assessing Cultural Anthropology. New York: McGraw-Hill. Brecher, Michael, with Geist, Benjamin (1980). Decisions in Crisis: Israel 1967 and 1973. Berkeley, California: University of California. Eldar, Akiva (2001a). “How to Solve the Palestinian Refugee Problem.” Haaretz, May 29. Eldar, Akiva (2001b). “Sir, If You Please, Tear Down Your House.” Haaretz, May 31. Enderlin, Charles (2003). Shattered Dreams. Paris. The Other Press. Fisher, Roger and Ury, William and Patton, Bruce (1991). Getting To Yes. New York. Penguin. Golan, M (1976). The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger. New York. Quadrangle. Holbrooke, Richard (1999). To End a War. New York. The Modern Library. Insight Team of The Sunday Times (1974). The Yom Kippur War. Garden City, New York. Doubleday. Kissinger, Henry (1982). Years of Upheaval. Boston, MA. Little Brown and Co. Klein, Menachem (2001). Shattering a Taboo: The Contacts Toward A Permanent Status Agreement in Jerusalem 1994–2001. (Hebrew.) Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. Malley, Robert and Agha, Hussein (2001). The New York Review of Books. (August 9) Matz, David (2003a). “Trying To Understand The Taba Talks.” Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture 3. Matz, David (2003b). “Why Did Taba End?” Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics and Culture 4. Pruitt, Dean (1981). Negotiating Behavior. New York. Academic Press. Pruitt, Dean (1999). “Secrecy, Ripeness, and Working Trust at Oslo,” in Deborah Kolb, editor, Negotiation Eclectics. Cambridge, MA. PON Books. Quandt, William (1986). Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics. Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution. Rubin, Jeffrey, Pruitt Dean, and Kim, Sung Hee (1994). Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, second edition. New York. McGraw-Hill. Schiff, Ze’ev (2001). “What Was Obtained at Taba Regarding Palestinian Refugees.” Haaretz, September 12. Sher, Gilad (2001). Just Beyond Reach. (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Miskal-Yidioth Ahronoth Books and Chemed Books.
Studying Negotiations in Context: An Ethnographic Approach RAY FRIEDMAN
Ethnographic research methods have provided powerful insights into the way negotiations and dispute resolution occurs. It was through the use of ethnographic methods that Walton and McKersie (1965) developed their insight that there are four dimensions of labor-management negotiations: integrative bargaining, distributive bargaining, attitudinal restructuring, and intra-organizational bargaining. In my work, ethnographic observations led me to see the importance of rituals in labor negotiations, and the way those rituals derive from the role structure within which negotiators have to work (Friedman 1994; Friedman & Gal 1991). In a study of mediation, participant observation enabled Kolb (1983) to see how mediators brought particular frames to their work, rather than choosing frames based on the particular situation. Close observations of mediators led Silbey and Merry (1986) to distinguish between bargaining and therapeutic styles of mediation. Merry’s (1989) use of anthropological reports allowed her to distinguish between the legalistic model of American mediators and the more socially-embedded structure of mediation common to non-industrial societies. This approach to negotiation research stands in sharp contrast to the more frequently-used experimental method for studying negotiation. While experiments are designed to isolate specific phenomenon of interest and “control” all other factors, ethnographic research looks at behavior in the total negotiation context. While experiments can be done with naïve negotiators, ethnographic research targets experienced negotiators who carry with them communal norms, ongoing relationships, and detailed knowledge about the institutional context. While experiments are done in brief periods of time, ethnographic research follows real negotiations over natural periods of time – often weeks or months. Experimental research can teach us a great deal about, for example, psychological biases (Neale & Bazerman 1985), the effects of personality (Barry & Friedman 1998), or the influence of social motivations (De Dreu, Weingart, and Kwon 2000). But what we can not learn from these experiments is how experienced negotiators and mediators act in real, complex situations. Nor do experiments, as Hopmann (2002) points out, “capture International Negotiation Series 2: P. Carnevale and C.K.W. de Dreu (eds.) Methods of Negotiation Research, 39–48 © 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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some of the most important, albeit subtle aspects of negotiation [such as]. . . . identify formulation (p. 73).” For five years, I studied labor negotiations by sitting in negotiation sessions, attending caucuses on both sides, debriefing lead bargainers after negotiation sessions, interviewing participants, and following the negotiations over weeks and months (Friedman 1994). This process has several significant disadvantages – it takes a great deal of time (in classic studies, such as Whyte [1934] and Suttles [1968] researchers spend years living in the communities they studied), and does not produce data of a type preferred by many journal editors. Nonetheless, ethnographic research can generate unique insights into negotiation that can not be gained in any other way. Consider, for example, the issue of constituent pressures. We know from experimental research that when negotiators are observed by and accountable to constituents they are more aggressive in their negotiation style (Carnevale 1985), at least within the U.S. (Gelfand & Realo 1999). But the relationship between constituents and negotiators is far more complex and subtle. Lead bargainers can control external pressures through appropriate choice of team members. One union negotiator reported that he puts his most difficult constituents (what he calls the “bomb tossers”) on the committee: They are the guys that stand in the back of the meeting and they throw the bomb out there that gets everybody riled up and then they sneak out of the meeting when it comes to the strike vote. You grab them and you put them on your team and you put them on the committee, put them on the hot spot. Get the guys with the biggest mouth. Put them on the committee; put them on your side.
Another union negotiator talked about the need to continually test her ability to control her side through “saber rattling”: It is not rattling sabers to scare an employer. It is doing two things: one is testing my organization to make sure I have the power. I want to know if I have the power or not. My bottom line is going to be affected by how much membership support there is for those issues. The other reason is to remind the employer that this is not my agenda, it is our member’s agenda.
The relationship between a negotiator and his or her constituents requires careful management and relationship building. As one other negotiator put it: You have to feel it. Each committee is different. Have they worked with me before? A lot of it is trust. If they trust you, then they trust you to lead them. You find that most rank and file people don’t want to say anything at the table, so you give them all the freedom they want and you tell them that they are encouraged to speak and most won’t. Yet if I am talking about a custodian issue, it is far more effective hearing it from the custodian than it is for me.
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Yes, constituent pressures do affect negotiators, but that is just the starting point. By studying real negotiators in context, we see how they manage those pressures. Similarly, we know that relationships affect negotiators, with different tactics being used for friends and strangers (Sondak, Neale and Pinkley 1999). We must bear in mind again that relationships between negotiators are very complex. It is not just that you care more about the other side when you know them well, but also that you have more tactical options if you know the other side well. One negotiator used his relationship with the other side to reign in an overly aggressive lawyer: “John – a manager – called, and he said ‘this is b.s.’ I said ‘I know, but no one told the lawyer that.’ He said, ‘go back to work and I’ll settle the rest.’ I did. Then we got one of our best contracts.” If there is a strong relationship, there is more trust in both the validity of the proposals made and less need for formal contracting. Two negotiators explained: Summers – he knows me, I know him. Whatever he can extract from the company he puts on the table as a final proposal. This is a guy I would trust implicitly. We will not bull shit each other. Friedrich and Lambert’s CEO is Tom O’Brian. If he says this is what we agreed on, I’d sign it tomorrow. If I have a question about a clause I can call him and he’ll fix it. He has integrity.
Relationships can be a source of leverage, and provide alternative avenues for communication. One union lawyer reported, discussing a particular management labor lawyer, said “I have only dealt with him myself one or twice I think. He tends to be very legalistic actually. But the nice thing is he has a client who is open to a getting-to-yes style. So you can kind of get around Fred sometimes by convincing his principal. Fred is much more likely to say don’t do that, it will get you in trouble.” Yes, relationships matter, but what is also important is how negotiators assess the quality of relationships, the fact that relationships with the other side may include both good and bad relationships, and how negotiators depend on and use good relationships in negotiations. As these examples show, we gain insights from ethnographic research that can not be obtained through experimental methods. Before proceeding, I should be clear about what is distinctive about ethnography. Ethnography has four features (Friedman & McDaniel 1998). First, ethnography requires direct observation of the activity being studied – in the case of negotiations, sitting in on some or all of the preparation meetings, negotiations, and caucuses. Second, it requires that the observation be in a natural setting so that the researcher can “uncover special languages, unique and
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peculiar problems, and, more generally, distinct patterns of thought and action (Van Maanen 1983: 13).” Natural observation also allows the researcher to see how people manage in situations where there are multiple, concurrent pressures. Third, ethnography gives prominence to the words, interpretations, and experiences of the people studied. Ethnographers want this information because it allows them to “examine the cultural knowledge, behavior, and artifacts that participants share and use to interpret their experiences (Schwartzman 1993).” Fourth, observations of how people behave, and how they interpret their experiences, are shared with the reader. The goal is to enable the reader to experience the situation much as the negotiator does. That being said, ethnography is not at all the most common approach to the study of negotiations. Ethnographic methods are very time consuming, and require a different set of research and data analysis skills. The rest of this article will be devoted to explaining some of the challenges in studying negotiations ethnographically. What I will report is my own personal experiences and research strategies.
Research Steps and Strategies Gaining Access The main problem with gaining access is that fact that you, the researcher, pose risks for the negotiators. Typically, information is tightly controlled in labor negotiations (and, indeed, most negotiations; see Hopmann [2002] who explains that there is often a legal responsibility to maintain confidentiality in negotiations). If you were to reveal to the other side what you hear in caucuses, you could cause enormous damage to the negotiations. While revealing information will certainly not be a researcher’s intention, there are usually social opportunities (such as when everyone gathers to get coffee before negotiations begin). On such occasions, an inadvertent comment could reveal something, or one’s body movement and facial expression during negotiations might reveal information. Also, the very act of having an observer present may change behavior, making people self-conscious or hesitant to say what they want. For these reasons it takes a tremendous amount trust to gain access to a negotiation. Negotiators will want reassurances about confidentiality and one’s credibility as a researcher. Further complicating the situation is the fact that, in labor negotiations at least, many people are involved. On several occasions, a lead bargainer approved my study, but I had to explain myself all over again when I first met
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additional members of the bargaining team. In two cases, a union negotiator approved my presence and presumed that since they had the right to form their own bargaining team they also had the right to bring whomever they wanted. The company’s lawyers did not agree and insisted that I not be allowed to return. In another case, the company’s CEO approved the project but would not force any individual to participate. In that case, one plant manager refused to let me enter, fearing that my asking questions about a previous bitter negotiation would increase anger among employees. Entry into negotiations is never really settled – it requires constant renegotiation. Given natural sensitivities to the flow of information, access will usually be on one side or the other (I was able to access both side’s caucuses in only one case). Therefore, it is important to access multiple negotiations. Only then will you be able to see both sides of the negotiation process. Being Unobtrusive Once negotiations begin, great care must be taken not to attract too much attention. On the one hand, it is impossible not to develop relationships with people. You are with them for weeks or months, and they will want to get to know you and ask your opinion and advice. Indeed, one of the really fun parts of ethnographic research is that you encounter very interesting people. Also, you do want to keep track of how they see the situation, what their goals are, and how they interpret negotiating tactics on both sides. Still, the more you interact, the more you risk becoming an actor rather than an observer. If you take stands on issues or strategies, participants may not be as open and accepting of your presence. Another way that you may get unwarranted attention is through note-taking. It is already an intrusion for you to be present, but when they see you suddenly whip out your pen and pad and start scribbling, that reminds them that they are being watched. Some ethnographers prefer to wait until after a meeting before taking notes, or go to the backroom frequently to write down quick reminders. I prefer to take notes at the bargaining table, but I try to take notes continuously – even if nothing is really note-worthy at the moment. If I am seen as just writing all the time, them my note taking gets less attention. What to Observe During observation, the researcher monitors two parallel levels of behavior. At one level, I try to record what happened, including what was said and
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what proposals were made. In some cases this is factual, while in other cases it is interpretive. Fred may tell the other lead negotiator that the company can not provide a certain level of benefits, but it is also important to note the intensity of this comment (is it matter-of-fact, or with great passion?), who Fred is looking at when he is making that comment (is it just the other lead bargainer, or each member of the union team?), and the reaction of the other team (do they appear surprised or angry?). At the second level, I am recording my questions and analysis. Why is Fred making this comment now? It seems that he is trying to change the topic because he wants to avoid another difficult issue for the moment. He is suddenly taking a new approach that is different than his plan expressed in caucus – maybe the union’s prior comment really was a surprise? So, notes can be very extensive, and one eye is always on data gathering while the other is on interpretation. Tracking What You Observe The biggest challenge of ethnographic research is to keep track of the data you collect and the ideas you develop. Unlike experimental research, where data is clean, structured, and fairly limited, ethnographic research produces endless amounts of data. It is critical to carefully note the day, time, and place for all notes, and to fill out your notes right away. As you take notes, you will inevitably have sentences that are not complete, or ideas that are scribbled quickly. At the time, you fully understand what you are writing, but a week or month later it may be incomprehensible. Therefore, each night go back to your notes and fill them in. Also, unlike experimental research where the theory is known before data is collected, in ethnographic research you are building theory from your observations. This means that, with each new day of study, you may have extended or developed your tentative ideas, or created new ones. Spend some time each day actually writing out your evolving conceptual ideas. One method that I like is to go over notes (or transcripts, if I was lucky enough to be able to use a tape recorder) and write down the concept or idea related to that part of my notes. This helps me to see what concepts are emerging, and how best to interpret the data. Later, I reorganize the data around concepts. For example, for my book I had one file filled just with comments related to “trust.” This eventually came to include about 100 quotes and observations, each of which had a code identifying which negotiation or interview it came from, and what page in my notes it came from. Writing was often based around these conceptually-organized files (most computer programs designed for qualitative analysis, such as Aquad, have functional equivalents of these files).
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The Scope of the Study Nearly all of the focus in traditional experimental studies of negotiation is on the actual process of the two parties meeting. For labor negotiations, or other large-scale negotiations, much of what matters happens away from the bargaining table. In preparation for negotiations, people may meet for months collecting information about constituent goals and desires, deciding between priorities, and developing a bargaining strategy. In several cases, I was able to begin attending meetings long before the negotiations actually began. There is a limit to how much you can cover, but “if possible” it is advisable to get involved in the negotiation process as early as possible. During negotiations, there are frequent caucus discussions and meetings between individual bargainers. These should also be covered. In addition to caucuses, I have been able to glean much information simply by walking to the parking lot with negotiators after the sessions were over. Perhaps there had been a key phone call between the lead bargainers that morning or a conflict between key people in management that was affecting who in the bargaining team had more power and influence. Getting this type of information requires getting people to trust you and simply being there enough that you get to hear what is going on. I also gathered a great deal of information from interviews. While I could see what was being said during a negotiation session or caucus, I could not necessary discern the strategies and intentions of the parties. In one-on-one meetings with key people, I could ask why a certain approach was taken, or what the goal was of making a given statement within a caucus meeting. I could ask how they interpreted the other side’s behavior, and what concerns they had that shaped what their plan was for the next day. I could hear about coalitions within a bargaining team, and the effect they might have on support for key issues. These personal interviews were invaluable as a complement to actual field observations. While I tried to get greater depth of understanding from additional meetings with key negotiators, I also tried to get greater breadth of understanding by meeting, if possible, with constituents. I tried to meet with workers and union members, or with managers who were not at the bargaining table. How did they view the negotiation process? What signals did they see? How strongly did they feel about key issues? What was the reputation of the bargaining committee members? As you can see, ethnographic research requires a great deal of time. It reaches out, if possible, to include all the parties relevant to a negotiation and all the places where decisions are made and coalitions built, not just acrossthe-table bargaining. In also can extend out over weeks or months. This can
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be a logistical problem, since real world negotiations do not happen within the confines of university teaching schedules or summers. Also, since access can be problematic, you may only be able to access a negotiation in a different city, which makes the logistics even harder (and the costs even greater). Reporting Results Unlike more traditional research methods, there are few established conventions for reporting ethnographic research results. Van Maanen (1988) says that much of it comes down to an ability to tell a compelling story. A compelling story both makes the situation clear to the reader and makes the reader more likely to trust the findings – a good story is hard to tell if there is not real, in-depth knowledge of and understanding of a situation. As Golden-Biddle and Locke (1993) put it, one must convince the reader that the research was authentic, and that the interpretations are plausible. Validity depends not on Alphas or Chi-squares, but in-depth explanation and clarity of writing. The challenge is finding a way to use observations, quotes, and stories in such a way that it leads towards a conceptual argument. Good ethnographic work should lead to new theories. In their book, Walton and McKersie (1965) used their field observations to build a conceptual model of negotiation processes, and connected their ideas to social science theory. In my book, I focused on the ways role constraints affected attempts to change how people negotiate. Kolb’s (1983) study builds towards a model explaining factors that influence mediators’ choice of mediation strategy. Note, however, that ethnographic work tends to be seen most often in books, not articles. It often takes more room to provide the data for an ethnographic study than for a statistical study, and many journals and their reviewers seem to be less accepting of ethnographic data than survey data. There has been some publishing of ethnographic studies of organizational issues in top journals (see, e.g., Barley 1996), but I do not know of a single ethnographic study of negotiation in either OBHDP or JAP, two of the leading journals for negotiation research. Scholars typically write books, or look for alternative outlets for their work.
Conclusion Traditional research methods for the study of negotiation can be very powerful, but that research has been criticized for “decontextualizing” conflict (Barley 1991). Ethnographic research offers an alternative approach which can provide insights into the types of complex situations that negotiators really
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face. This approach is not easy – it can be more time consuming, costly, and difficult than other research methods – but the payoff comes from the way these in-depth studies challenge scholars to develop new ideas and theories, based on what really happens in negotiations rather than on the logical next step in a series of experiments. Hopefully, this article will serve to encourage others to venture down this path, and provide them with a few more ideas for managing their ethnographic study of negotiations.
References (* included general references for ethnographic research that are not cited) Barry, B. and Friedman, R. (1998) “Bargainer characteristics in distributive and integrative negotiation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(2): 345–359. Barley, Stephen R. (1991) “Contextualizing conflict: Notes on an anthropology of dispute and negotiation.” In Max Bazerman, Roy Lewicki and Blair Sheppard (Eds.) Handbook of Research on Negotiation, v. 3, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 165–199. Barley, Stephen R. (1996) “Technicians in the workplace: Ethnographic evidence for bringing work into organization studies.” Administrative Science Quarterly, 41(3): 404–441. Carnevale, Peter J. (1985) “Accountability of group representatives and intergroup relations.” In E.J. Lawler (Ed.), Advances in Group Processes, 227–248, Greenwich, CN: JAI Press. DeDreu, Carsten, Laurie Weingart, and Seungwoo Kwon. (2000) “Influence of social motives on integrative negotiation: A meta-analytic review and test of two theories.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 75(5): 889–905. Friedman, R. (1994). Front Stage, Backstage: The Dramatic Structure of Labor Negotiations. Cambridge: MIT Press. Friedman, R. and Gal, S. (1991) “Managing around roles: Building groups in labor negotiations,” Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 27(3): 356–378. Friedman, R. and McDaniel, D. (1998) “In the Eye of the Beholder: Ethnography in the Study of Work.” In R. Callus, G. Strauss, and K. Whitfield (Eds.) Researching the World of Work: Strategies, Methods, and Critical Views. Ithaca: ILR Press, 113–126. * Garfinkel, Harold. 1967. Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Gelfand, M.J. and Realo, A. (1999) “Individualism-collectivism and accountability in intergroup negotiations.” Journal of Applied Psychology, 84(5), 721–736. * Glaser, B. G. and Strauss, A.L. (1967). The Discovery of Grounded Theory. New York: Aldine. Golden-Biddle, K. and Locke, K. (1993) An Appealing work: An investigation of how ethnographic texts convince. Organization Science. 4(4): 595–616. * Hammersley, M. and Atkinson, P. (1995) Ethnography: Principles in Practice. London: Routledge. Hopmann, P.T. (2002) “Negotiating data: Reflections on the qualitative and quantitative analysis of negotiation processes.” International Negotiation, 7:67–85. Kolb, D. (1983) The Mediators. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Merry, S.E. (1989) “Mediation in nonindustrial societies.” Pages 68–90 in Kressel & Pruitt, Eds., Mediation Research: The Process and Effectiveness of Third Party Interventions, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
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Neal, M.A. and Bazerman, M.H. (1985) “The effects of framing and negotiator overconfidence on bargaining behaviors and outcomes.” Academy of Management Journal, 28(1): 34–49. * Schutz, A. (1967) The Phenomenology of the Social World. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Silbey, S.S. and Merry, S. 1986. “Mediator settlement strategies,” Law and Policy, 8: 7–32. Suttles, G.D. (1968) The Social Order of the Slum, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sutton, R. (1994) The Virtues of Closet Qualitative Research. Stanford University: Draft. Schwartzman, H. (1993) Ethnography in Organizations. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Sondak, H., Neale, M.A., and Pinkley, R.L. (1999) “Relationship, contribution, and resource constraints: Determinants of distributive justice in individual preferences and negotiated agreements.” Group Decision and Negotiation, 8(6): 489–510. * Van Maanen, J. (1988) Tales of the Field. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Van Maanen, J. (1983) “The Fact of Fiction in Organizational Ethnography.” Pp. 37–56 in J. Van Maanen, ed., Qualitative Methodology. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Walton, R.E. and McKersie, R. (1965) A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations: An Analysis of a Social Interaction System. New York: McGraw-Hill. Whyte, W.F. (1943) Street Corner Society, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
The Problem-Solving Workshop as a Method of Research RONALD J. FISHER
Introduction The problem-solving workshop is one of the best known methods in the rapidly developing, interdisciplinary field of conflict resolution. Indeed, the problem-solving workshop was one of the first innovations that helped to define and operationalize the field in the 1960s. The genesis of the approach at the intercommunal and international levels is attributed to John Burton and his colleagues at University College London who drew upon social casework, human relations, intergroup problem solving in organizational settings, and other practices of the time (Mitchell 2001). The definition and characteristics of the method were initially captured by Burton (1969), Fisher (1972), and Kelman (1972) among others. Simply put, the problem-solving workshop involves bringing together unofficial yet influential representatives of parties (states or groups) involved in destructive conflict. The parties are brought into intense, face-to-face discussions, facilitated by a third party team, that focus on an analysis of the conflict and possible options for de-escalating and re-solving it. Initially, the approach was seen primarily as a prenegotiation method, which could help prepare the way for productive negotiation. It has since become increasingly clear that problem-solving workshops can make contributions at all stages of conflict resolution, as proposed by Kelman and Cohen (1976). The problem-solving workshop was intended by most proponents as a method of practice, and not as a method of research. However, some of the early writings in the field identified its potential role in learning about the phenomenon of conflict and in testing concepts and models of conflict causation, escalation, and resolution. Subsequently, the problem-solving workshop has also been identified as an action research intervention, and as a component of a wider program of action research on violent and protracted conflict. Unfortunately, the use of the problem-solving workshop as a method of
Author’s Note: The author wishes to thank Herbert Kelman and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. International Negotiation Series 2: P. Carnevale and C.K.W. de Dreu (eds.) Methods of Negotiation Research, 49–59 © 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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research has been severely limited, and the potential of the approach in this domain has not been realized. This article will identify the ways that the problem-solving workshop can serve as a research method, and identify the issues that must be addressed to increase its usage and utility in this direction.
The Workshop Method The initial conceptualization by Burton (1969) identified the method as “controlled communication.” This was in order to emphasize the necessity of the third party influencing the interaction of the participants toward an open, analytical discussion of their conflict, leading to increased mutual understanding, followed by the joint creation of ideas for resolution, which would be injected into official negotiations. The label of “problem solving” came in later in order to distinguish the new approach from traditional diplomatic practices and to better capture the nature of the enterprise (de Reuck 1974). The term “problem-solving workshop” has been elucidated most clearly and consistently by Kelman, who served as a third party panel member in one of Burton’s first workshops, and went on to develop his own approach of “interactive problem solving” (Kelman 1972, 1986). My own contribution was to define this method as a form of “third party consultation” in order to emphasize the central role of the intermediary in organizing and facilitating the problem-solving discussions in an impartial, nondirective, noncoercive, and nonevaluative manner (Fisher 1972). Regardless of the label applied, the workshop method evidences a number of essential characteristics (Kelman 1972; Kelman & Cohen 1976, 1986). A small group of individuals from both sides (usually three to six) are invited by a third party team (usually three to five) to engage in low risk, noncommittal, off-the-record discussions over a period of three to five days in a neutral and secluded setting conducive to a relaxed atmosphere and devoid of intrusions. The participants are typically influential individuals in their communities who are not in official policy-making roles, but have access to the political leadership. Some variations involve officials, but in a private, unofficial capacity. The role of the third party is to facilitate the discussions in an impartial manner and to suggest conceptual tools that might be useful to the participants in analyzing their conflict. The objective is to create an informal atmosphere in which participants can freely express their views while respecting those of the other side. The atmosphere also encourages them to move from adversarial debate to a joint analysis of the conflict and the creation of problem solutions that might help address it. Following agreement on ground
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rules, the third party provides a rough agenda for the sessions, starting with an initial exchange of perceptions. The third party then moves on to an analysis of the attributions, interests, and needs underlying incompatible positions and escalatory interactions. Next, the participants engage in application and development of insights and models of understanding and the creation of ideas for peacebuilding and resolution. Finally, the third party urges participants to consider the constraints and resistances to these options. In other words, the workshop follows the sequence of problem solving (with recycling as required), which is common in many forms of human endeavor. Casting the workshop as part of a research enterprise with an academic base was part of the initial rationale that invited the participants into the role of conflict analyst and collaborator in problem solving (Burton 1969; Kelman 1972). Subsequent to the initial explications, more detailed and systematic guides have been developed for organizing and facilitating problem-solving workshops (Burton 1987; Mitchell & Banks 1996). What has been largely ignored in the press to develop the theory of practice for conducting workshops is their investigative potential for validating and creating theoretical notions about protracted and violent conflicts, and for operationalizing a form of action research with implications for social change.
A Method for Applying and Generating Theory The academic base of early problem-solving workshops was compatible with the organizers casting the work as a research enterprise, in which the third party would facilitate analytical discussions focusing on the nature of the conflict in question (Burton 1969; Kelman 1972). To assist in the analysis, the third party would suggest concepts, models and research results from the scholarly literature on conflict for the parties to apply to their joint problem, thus hopefully illuminating some of the counterproductive processes that had brought them to their present predicament. Inherent in this analysis would be a field testing of the theoretical notions applied, allowing the third party to judge their validity and scope of applicability. Thus, for example, in Burton’s early Cyprus workshop, the third party injected the conflict spiral model of escalation to help illuminate the development of the conflict. However, one participant questioned its validity in explaining the conflict, because the parties did not possess nuclear weapons, as was the case with the superpower escalation on which the model was developed (Kelman & Cohen 1976). In a later workshop dealing with the same conflict organized by the author (Fisher 1997), the concept of the security dilemma was applied to the conflict with
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the general agreement of the participants that it was helping to fuel the arms buildup on the island. Thus, a generic third party intervention identified by Kelman and Cohen (1976) is the provision of theoretical inputs to enrich the analysis, a function identified as diagnosing the conflict in my model of third party consultation (Fisher 1972). Moreover, one of the objectives in this initial model was the study of conflict, by which the members of the third party team could learn about the nature of escalated and destructive conflict, partly as it is portrayed in the analysis and interaction of the participants. This learning can include the development of new understandings or new applications of concepts from other domains to the study of conflict. For example, in one of the Cyprus workshops I organized, a member of the third party team developed the notion of an identity dilemma, which the Greek and Turkish Cypriot participants appeared to be exhibiting in their discussions. While there was a joint appreciation of the importance of supporting and exhibiting their shared Cypriot identity, movement in this direction put them into potential conflict with their Greek or Turkish identity. Thus, if becoming more Cypriot meant becoming less Greek or Turkish, this left them vulnerable to charges by nationalists in both communities that they were compromising their primary cultural identification. On a grander scale, it appears that the motivation to apply and develop human needs theory, which arose mainly in international development, to the study of conflict occurred because participants in workshops repeatedly revealed such needs when asked to engage in conflict analysis. In other words, when asked to go beneath the surface positions and interests in the conflict, participants would typically move to a discussion of needs for security, recognition of identity, distributive justice, and so on that paralleled the typologies of basic human needs developed in sociology and elsewhere. Thus, the frustration of these fundamental requirements for human development and their related fears (e.g., over a lack of security), came to center stage in the theoretical analyses of protracted or deep-rooted, i.e., intractable, conflicts offered by theorists such as Burton (1990) and Azar (1990). Human needs theory is now regarded as an essential element of conflict theory and a common tool for conflict analysis in problem-solving workshops. Problem-solving workshops have been seen from the beginning as a useful complement to negotiations between conflicting parties, assuming that transfer effects occur between the unofficial and official tracks. Kelman and Cohen (1976) initially outlined the ways in which workshops could make contributions at all stages of negotiation – from encouraging parties to enter negotiations, to working on issues that are hampering negotiations, to discussing long
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range issues that need to be addressed once a settlement is reached. Within this context, workshops have been regarded primarily as a prenegotiation supplement that aids parties in making the cognitive shift that moves them into negotiation and helps prepare them for successful negotiations by improving relationship qualities such as understanding and trust (Fisher 1989). The experience of the past forty years is summarized by Kelman (2002): Binding agreements can be achieved only through official negotiations. The very binding character of official negotiations, however, makes it very difficult for certain other things to happen in that context – such as the exploration and discovery of the parties’ basic concerns, their priorities, their limits. This is where problem-solving workshops – precisely because of their nonbinding character – can make a special contribution to the larger process of negotiation and conflict resolution. . . . What we try to facilitate is not the process of negotiation itself but communication that helps the parties overcome the political, emotional, and at times technical barriers that often prevent them from entering into negotiations, from reaching agreement in the course of negotiations, or from changing their relationship after a political agreement has been negotiated (p. 83).
What occurs in problem-solving workshops is partly an analysis of the cognitive and emotional barriers and resistances that hamper parties from entering into negotiations or negotiating effectively when they do so. Black and white mirror images, selective and distorted perceptions, self-serving attributions, blame, hostility, and mistrust lie embedded in the parties’ thinking and their relationship. Surfacing and working through these residues of destructive conflict allows the participants to experience and to communicate with others a different and more complex picture of the other party and the relationship. This revised view then supports negotiation as a preferred strategy in comparison to unilateral attempts to prevail and punish. Therefore, the problemsolving workshop provides a unique and powerful tool for learning about the many resistances parties develop to negotiation as well as about how to reduce these barriers so that cooperative action can occur. While there is some literature on the resistances that hamper negotiation (e.g., Ross & Stillinger 1991), there has been little inductive theorizing based on the problem-solving experience. A valuable exception occurs in the work of Kelman on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, which has documented the resistances to negotiation in that conflict over time, and proposed strategies and principles for dealing with them, a number of which were represented in the Oslo Accords (Kelman 1978, 1982, 1987).
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Workshops as a Form of Action Research If the problem-solving workshop is cast as a method of social research, it should be that of action research. Pioneered by Kurt Lewin (1948) and others, this research method engages the social scientist as a collaborator with concerned citizens in the process of investigating and addressing a social problem in their environment. Action research is seen as a cyclical process in which information is gathered about the problem situation, a social intervention is planned and carried out to address the problem, and further information is then collected to evaluate the intervention and plan future ones (Fisher 1982). This form of research is carried out in field settings and is directed toward social change, which the researcher and his/her collaborators deem is desirable in order to address the identified problem. To illustrate how the problem-solving workshop serves as a form of action research, I will first draw on my experience in organizing a series of workshops on the Cyprus conflict in the early 1990s through the now defunct Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (Fisher 1997). CIIPS became interested in the conflict through Canada’s longstanding contribution to peacekeeping on the island, and organized a project consisting of a series of academic style seminars that discussed the many issues that made movement toward a settlement difficult. At the last seminar, interest was shown by influential Cypriots in official roles for a follow-up project that would take a problem-solving approach to the conflict. To assess interest in possible workshops and to initiate a project if interest was shown, I made three site visits to the island and met with a wide range of concerned and influential Cypriots on the two sides of the Green Line. There was generally wide support for such an unofficial, low-risk, exploratory venture, and tacit approval from the two leaderships was forthcoming. Further discussions worked to clarify expectations about the workshop and to develop a written outline that was shared with gatekeepers and potential participants. A “pilot workshop” was held in Canada with leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities who maintained close contact with the situation and in some cases had connections to the two leaderships. This workshop served to build the credibility and experience of the third party team and provided some valuable analysis of the conflict. During the later site visits, participants were selected and invited with the assistance of key associates in each community, and the location and timing of the event was decided. The main intervention of the project was a four-day workshop held in the neutral location of England with four influential but unofficial participants from each side working with a four-member third party team. Given the intractable
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nature of the dispute, the focus was on the issues that seemed to be sustaining the conflict, both in terms of making it very difficult to resolve and in terms of being resistances in the negotiation process. The agenda also included the underlying needs and fears of the two communities, acknowledgements and assurances that would assist in moving into a shared future, the principles and qualities of a renewed relationship, and the development of peacebuilding activities that would support a shift from peacekeeping to peacemaking. By all accounts, the workshop intervention was a success in terms of both process and outcomes. As a result of the workshop, a series of cross-line meetings and joint committees of business leaders were initiated, a bicommunal art exhibit was launched for a period of several years, and the seeds were sown for the organization of a bicommunal committee to organize peacebuilding activities, including training in conflict resolution (Diamond & Fisher 1995). The third party was established as an acceptable and competent facilitator of intercommunal cooperation, and two further workshops were held before funding dried up in the aftermath of the closure of CIIPS. To evaluate the effects of the workshop as a social intervention, a variety of indictors were used. Closing comments and post-workshop questionnaires evidenced high levels of satisfaction and perceived utility. Participants indicated that they had increased their understanding of the perspectives, rationales, and sensitivities of the other community, and that the third party team had facilitated the interaction and injected new ideas that helped them better understand the difficult issues in the conflict. Pre and post-workshop questionnaires indicated that the increased understanding and respect led to increased involvement in intercommunal contacts. Follow-up interviews one and a half years later demonstrated that participants had maintained positive evaluations of the workshop, and that most had continued their engagement in bicommunal peacebuilding activities. In addition, six of the eight reported that they had conveyed a positive evaluation of the workshop project to their respective leaderships. This outcome was likely critical in garnering continuing support for the workshop project. Conceiving of the workshops as a form of action research was useful in conceptualizing the project and in understanding its place in the ongoing context of the conflict. It also assisted in supporting the importance of evaluation, both formal and informal, at each step of the way, so that future actions could be planned in a collaborative and effective manner. For example, discussions at the main workshop and site visits following it were instrumental in deciding to hold further workshops focusing on the role of education in helping to maintain the conflict and its potential for helping to de-escalate it and rebuild the relationship between the two communities (Fisher 1997).
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The stance taken here is strongly supported by the work of Kelman, who describes problem-solving workshops as the central tool in his program of action research on the Arab-Israeli conflict (Kelman 1979). In this context, the goal of the workshops is to understand and overcome the psychological barriers to change, to create new possibilities for negotiation, and to contribute to reaching a settlement at the political level. According to Kelman: Our work can best be described as an action research program, which combines and integrates efforts at conflict resolution in the Middle East with unique opportunities to observe and learn about the dynamics of the Middle East conflict and of international conflict in general. Our action is designed to contribute to conflict resolution by creating opportunities for communication between influential Arabs and Israelis under the auspices of our group of social scientists (1979, p. 104).
In addition to workshops, the program of action research involves site visits to the region, interviews with a variety of individuals, organizing and attending conferences, and other activities to learn about the conflict and to establish the action researcher role. Although the program involves both action and research, Kelman (1986) notes that the action requirements have taken precedence over the research requirements. In other words, the procedural and ethical necessities of organizing, implementing, and evaluating workshops are given priority, because these ensure the viability of workshops and their contribution to conflict resolution. For example, Kelman precludes manipulating workshop procedures in order to test the effects on participants. Nonetheless, the research aspect is critical to the enterprise. As Kelman observes: . . . it is our role as researchers that provides the rationale and legitimacy of our action involvement and that allows representatives of conflicting parties to interact with each other under auspices in ways that deviate from the norms generally governing their relationship . . . Thus our action requires involvement in a research program just as our research requires involvement in an action program. The unique advantage of this type of research is that it provides us the opportunity to make rich, detailed observations of ongoing processes of conflict and conflict resolution, which would not be accessible to us unless we were engaged in an action program (1986, p. 297).
The outcome of this form of action research for Kelman and his colleagues is that it produces learning that support negotiations in a variety of ways and at all stages of the negotiation process. For example, in 1986, Kelman noted that Israeli and Palestinian participants had gained insight into each others’ perspectives (concerns, areas of flexibility, constraints, priorities), had learned that there was someone to negotiate with, and had learned of positive changes in the adversary and how they could promote further change through their
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own actions. These kinds of lessons are clear contributors to the prenegotiation process that helped pave the way to the Oslo accords (Kelman 1995).
Concluding Issues It is unfortunate that the problem-solving workshop is not used more systematically as a method of research to study the complex phenomenon of social conflict. As the field has developed, the predominant institutional base of conflict resolution work has shifted from academia to non-governmental organizations (Fisher, in press). While this shift entails advantages in terms of greater flexibility and variety of funding sources, it does tend to support practitioners who have less interest and expertise in the application and induction of theoretical ideas about social conflict. Thus, the use of the method to study conflict is compromised, although some practitioners demonstrate commendable scholarship in inducing theories of practice. Saunders and his colleagues, for example, have produced a very useful model of the problem-solving stages of sustained dialogue, based on the experience of the Dartmouth Conference task force on regional conflicts (Chufrin & Saunders 1993; Saunders 1999). More recently, Saunders and Slim (2002) have articulated a detailed description of the role of the third party moderator who organizes and leads such sessions. Unfortunately, such work does not substitute for helping to build a theory of understanding about social conflict based on the cumulative experience of problem-solving workshops. Casting the problem-solving workshop as an action research intervention highlights the inadequate attention that is typically devoted to the evaluation of such interventions (Fisher, in press; Rouhana 2000). Most documentation of workshops is anecdotal and self-serving, and more complex research techniques beyond case study description are typically not applied to evaluate the process or the outcomes of workshops. Practitioners surely must attempt to develop an awareness of the effectiveness of their work, based on feedback from participants and others involved in the conflict, but the application of more objective and comprehensive measures is woefully absent. A fuller application of the action research model would encourage third party intervenors to use a variety of indicators to gauge the effectiveness of their work. There are of course many practical and ethical reasons for constraining the intrusion of evaluation procedures on workshop practice, but with more creativity and investment, the action research model could be better implemented. Such developments would allow the workshop method to develop its full potential as a method of research in addition to one of practice.
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References Azar, Edward E. (1990). The Management of Protracted Social Conflict. Hampshire, UK: Dartmouth Publishing. Burton, John W. (1969). Conflict and Communication: The Use of Controlled Communication in International Relations. London: MacMillan. Burton, John W. (1987). Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict: A Handbook. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Burton, John W. (ed.) (1990). Conflict: Human Needs Theory. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Chufrin, Gennady I. and Saunders, Harold H. (1993). “A Public Peace Process.” Negotiation Journal 9, 2:155–177. de Reuck, Anthony V.S. (1974). “Controlled Communication: Rationale and Dynamics.” The Human Context 6, 1:64–80. Diamond, Louise and Fisher, Ronald J. (1995). “Integrating Conflict Resolution Training and Consultation: A Cyprus Example.” Negotiation Journal 11, 3: 287–301. Doob, Leonard W. (ed.) (1970). Resolving Conflict in Africa: The Fermeda Workshop. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Fisher, Ronald J. (1972). “Third Party Consultation: A Method for the Study and Resolution of Conflict.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 16, 1:67–94. Fisher, Ronald J. (1982). Social Psychology: An Applied Approach. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Fisher, Ronald J. (1989). “Prenegotiation Problem-Solving Discussions: Enhancing the Potential for Successful Negotiation.” In Janice G. Stein, editor, Getting to the Table: The Process of International Prenegotiation. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Fisher, Ronald J. (1997). Interactive Conflict Resolution. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Fisher, Ronald J. (In Press). “Interactive Conflict Resolution.” In I. William Zartman, editor, Peacemaking in International Conflict (rev. ed.). Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. Kelman, Herbert C. (1972). “The Problem-Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution.” In Robert L. Merritt, editor, Communication in International Politics. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Kelman, Herbert C. (1978). “Israelis and Palestinians: Psychological Prerequisites for Mutual Acceptance.” International Security 3, 1:162–186. Kelman, Herbert C. (1979). “An Interactional Approach to Conflict Resolution and its Application to Israeli-Palestinian Relations.” International Interactions 6, 2:99–122. Kelman, Herbert C. (1982). “Creating the Conditions for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, 1:39–75. Kelman, Herbert C. (1986). “Interactive Problem Solving: A Social-Psychological Approach to Conflict Resolution.” In William Klassen, editor, Dialogue Toward Inter-Faith Understanding. Jerusalem: Ecu-menical Institute for Theological Research. Kelman, Herbert C. (1987). “The Political Psychology of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: How Can We Overcome the Barriers to a Negotiated Solution?” Political Psychology 8, 3:347– 363. Kelman, Herbert C. (1995). “Contributions of an Unofficial Conflict Resolution Effort to the Israeli-Palestinian Breakthrough.” Negotiation Journal 11, 1:19–27. Kelman, Herbert C. (2000). “The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution.” International Studies Perspectives 1, 3: 273–288.
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Kelman, Herbert C. (2002). “Interactive Problem Solving as a Tool for Second Track Diplomacy.” In John Davies and Edy Kaufman, editors, Second Track/Citizens’ Diplomacy: Concepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Kelman, Herbert C. and Cohen, Stephen P. (1976). “The Problem-Solving Workshop: A SocialPsychological Contribution to the Resolution of International Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 13, 2:79–90. Kelman, Herbert C. and Cohen, Stephen P. (1986). “Resolution of International Conflict: An Interactional Approach.” In Stephen Worchel and William G. Austin, editors, Psychology of Intergroup Relations (2nd ed.). Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall. Lewin, Kurt (1948). Resolving Social Conflicts. New York: Harper. Mitchell, Christopher (2001). “From Controlled Communication to Problem Solving: The Origins of Facilitated Conflict Resolution.” International Journal of Peace Studies 6, 1:59–67. Mitchell, Christopher and Banks, Michael (1996). Handbook of Conflict Resolution: The Analytical Problem-Solving Approach. New York/London: Pinter. Ross, Lee and Stillinger, Constance (1991). “Barriers to Conflict Resolution.” Negotiation Journal 7, 4:389–404. Rouhana, Nadim N. (2000). “Interactive Conflict Resolution: Issues in Theory, Methodology, and Evaluation.” In Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman, editors, International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Saunders, Harold H. (1999). A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and Ethnic Conflicts. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Saunders, Harold H. and Slim, Randa M. (2002). “Moderating Sustained Dialogue in Tajikistan.” Paper presented at Conducting Dialogues for Peace: A Symposium on Best Practices, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, November. Walton, Richard E. (1970). “A Problem-Solving Workshop on Border Conflicts in Eastern Africa.” Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 6, 5:453–489.
Time-Series Designs and Analyses DANIEL DRUCKMAN
Negotiation is a dynamic process that can be analyzed as a time-series of events, decisions, or moves that occur through the course of a defined time period. The changes take the form of trends that can be charted for different parties making offers and counter-offers in a negotiation or for different nations responding to each other’s policy initiatives. The family of time-series techniques allows for a variety of types of negotiation process analyses include that: describing patterns of reciprocity among parties, forecasting concessions or decisions, evaluating impacts of mediation and other conflictsettlement interventions, estimating probabilities of future events such as the likelihood of coups or wars, changes in policies corresponding to historical time periods, and paths taken by negotiators or dialogue participants from initial conditions through a stream of decisions or actions leading to outcomes. These examples are discussed in this article. Each application illustrates how time-series analysis contributes in important ways to our understanding of conflict management or resolution processes and outcomes by capturing the dynamics of unfolding processes. The time series usually consists of a sequence of events accumulated over a relatively long period of time in the context of a case. It has several features including, (a) the analysis of variation in chronological events that occur within cases referred to as diachronic variance, (b) a focus on trends that may reveal patterns or shapes of change, (c) the opportunity to compare trends for two or more cases with the same or a different number of data points, and (d) the frequent use of regression and correlational statistics, taking into account the correlations that exist among the data points themselves, referred to as autocorrelation. This type of analysis is similar in many ways to measuring subjects’ responses over time in experiments. A difference, however, is that within-subject responses (or repeated measures) are part of an experimental design; unlike case time-series, these data are analyzed as part of the error-term in the analysis of variance. Several types of time-series designs are presented in this article, including examples of both quantitative and qualitative analyses. I focus attention primarily on the way the analysis was done in the context of the overall study International Negotiation Series 2: P. Carnevale and C.K.W. de Dreu (eds.) Methods of Negotiation Research, 61–78 © 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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design. For technical details on calculations for many of these techniques, see the chapters on forecasting in Frei and Ruloff (1989). The first section shows how time-series data can be used for post-diction with correlation and regression techniques. The next section presents the idea of interrupted time-series analysis. The following section on Bayesian approaches to analysis includes examples of the way that the calculations are done. The final section provides examples of several qualitative time-series analyses of conflict-resolving processes. Each of these applications addresses a research problem in the analysis of negotiation and related interactions. Together, the examples call attention to the range of applications afforded by time-series techniques.
Post-dicting Events with Time Series Data Perhaps the most popular application of time-series techniques is to predict outcomes retrospectively. For negotiation analysis, the value of this approach is to understand the processes that preceded – or led to – a known outcome. Several examples of this type of analysis are presented in this section. When an analyst is interested in predicting known outcomes in completed or historical cases, he or she is doing post-diction, which is sometimes referred to as retro-diction. This type of analysis is performed for several reasons. One is that an investigator is interested in learning about the antecedents of particular events such as crises. Another is that an analyst desires to recreate a path of events leading to an outcome. A third reason is to evaluate the plausibility of alternative explanations or theories for the occurrence of an event. For each of these reasons, it is advantageous to know – or to have control over – the outcome. The question of interest is, what process or pattern unfolded prior to the event of interest? This question can be addressed from either an inductive or a deductive perspective. An example of each approach to post-diction – on the same research issue – is presented. A negotiation occurred in 1975 between the governments of Spain and the United States to renew the military base rights granted by Spain to the U.S. during the previous five-year period. These talks were regarded by U.S. policymakers to be routine. Previous agreements provided the framework for the terms of a new agreement. However, the negotiation process defied these expectations. It was not at all smooth. Spain’s demands were extraordinary – including a demand to be admitted to NATO – and the U.S. delegation was not prepared for them. A bilateral agreement was reached in 1976, a year and a half after the talks began. The impasse during this period was punctuated with several crises including walk-outs by the delegations. Three research questions
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were asked: Was there a pattern in the events that preceded the crises? How were the impasses resolved? Was there a pattern in the events that occurred following impasse resolution? Time-series analysis was used to address the first and third questions. Statements made by both delegations during the sessions were coded into categories reflecting hard and soft negotiating rhetoric. The categories were from a coding system known as bargaining process analysis (BPA). Designed originally by Walcott and Hopmann (1978), the BPA is intended to facilitate analyses of verbal behavior in international negotiation. Ratios indicating the percentage of the total statements made by a delegation during a session (total of 22) within a round (total of 10) were calculated and summed for an aggregate score for each delegation by session. The aggregate scores were then plotted in two dimensions, percent hard statements (plotted on the vertical dimension as the sum of retractions, commitments, threats, and accusations) and sessions (the horizontal dimension). The resulting trends provided a time series for each delegation. By placing each of the six crisis sessions on the graph, it was possible to analyze patterns of verbal behavior before and after the event. Correlational analyses revealed distinct patterns of behavior before and after the crises. Succinctly stated, the pattern took the form of a gap between the delegations in percent hard during the session before the crisis. The gap was closed by the “softer” delegation. It increased the number of hard statements, matching the “harder” delegation, resulting in mutual hardness and an impasse. This pattern was discovered through inductive analysis rather than as a test of an hypothesis. It became known as comparative responsiveness and formed the basis for further research with multiple cases to be discussed below. It also corroborated a pattern of reciprocity found in earlier bargaining research with children (Druckman & Bonoma 1976). (The base-rights study also investigated the way these crises were resolved and the patterns of behavior that followed resolution; for details see Druckman 1986.) A companion study reported by Stoll and McAndrew (1986) investigated patterns of responsiveness through ten years (1969–1979) of talks between the Soviet Union and the U.S. on strategic arms limitations (SALT). Performed with a deductive approach, these investigators evaluated the fit of three alternative models of reciprocity, referred to as directional, trend, and comparative reciprocity. Each of these models predicts the reactions to concessions made by the other negotiating team. The directional model specifies that negotiators will either match (a concession for a concession) or mismatch (a retraction in response to a concession) the other’s move. The trend model indicates that negotiators will either increase or decrease their concession in response to a
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previous increase or decrease by their opponent. The comparative model posits that negotiators will compare their own with the other’s moves made in the previous round, increasing or decreasing their concessions in response to a higher or lower concession made by the opponent in the previous round. This study illustrates a use of time-series analysis for evaluating different assumptions about the way information is processed and used during negotiation. Several time series were used to assess these models. These included the round-by-round moves made by the Soviet and US delegations during SALT I (November 1969–May 1972), at Vladivostok (June 1972–November 1974), in SALT II (January 1977–June 1979), and across the entire set of rounds from 1969 to 1979. The results showed that the comparative model provided the best fit to the concession data: In technical terms, the highest correlations between the expected and actual responses from one round to the next occurred for the comparative model in 5 of the 8 analyses (four data sets for each national delegation). These results are consistent with those obtained in the base-rights study. A key difference between the studies, however, is between an inductive discovery (Druckman 1986) and a deductive evaluation of alternative hypotheses (Stoll & McAndrew 1986). The deductive time-series work was extended to an evaluation of additional models with more cases of international negotiation. In this study, ten models of reciprocity were evaluated with time series of round-by-round moves in seven negotiations. The directional model was compared to five versions of the trend and four versions of the comparative model: The five trend models consisted of different lags (varying in terms of the number of previous rounds included) and weightings for more recent and more distant rounds; the four comparative models consisted of different combinations of the comparative and trend models. The negotiation cases varied in terms of the length of the time series from 8 rounds (the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact) to 22 rounds (post-war disarmament talks between the Soviet Union and the U.S.). The actual moves made by the delegations from one round to the next were correlated with the moves made in the same or earlier rounds by the opposing delegation. The data used for the calculations of correlations were specified by each model: for example, response to the immediately previous concession for the directional model, an increase or decrease in concession from t – 2 (two rounds earlier) to t – 1 (one round earlier) is correlated with the change in the other’s concession from t – 1 to t for the trend model. Goodness-of-fit for the various models was evaluated by the relative size of the correlations. The strongest correlations occurred for the comparative model (9 of 14 correlations were significant). Thus, the comparative model produced a better fit to the data than the 9 alternative models, including the various
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combinations of comparative and trend models. These time-series findings corroborate and attest to the generality of the results obtained in the two 1986 studies described above. They tell us that professional negotiators are attentive and react to any difference that exists between the moves made by their own and the other delegation. For most of the negotiating delegations in this sample, the reactions follow a comparison of moves made in the immediately previous round. (For details, see Druckman & Harris 1990.) Another example of post-diction illustrates how multiple and partial correlations are used together to detect how national representatives respond to each other in a multilateral negotiation over conventional troop reductions. The time series consisted of eight rounds of statements made by each of seven national delegations. The delegations were divided into two alliances, a Western and Eastern bloc. The statements were coded according to the BPA categories. These statistical techniques allow an analyst to gauge more precisely the influence between any pair or trio of nations controlling for the effects of any other national delegation or delegations in the talks. We discovered, for example, that the effect of moves made by the leader of one alliance had a stronger impact on the moves made by the leader of the other alliance in the next round when the influence of a key ally in the former alliance was removed. This ally attenuated the lagged correlation (from moves made in round t – 1 to those made in round t) between the alliance leaders. In technical terms, a bivariate lagged correlation of .47 increased to .63 when the ally’s influence was controlled through the use of a multiple-partial correlation. The importance of these sorts of analyses is that they parse out influences between pairs of nations in highly interdependent interactive systems like multilateral negotiations. They allow an analyst both to infer causation through the use of lagged correlations and to reduce spuriousness of relationships with partial correlations. (For more on the use of these techniques for inferring causation, see Blalock 1960.) A slight variant on the theme of post-diction is interrupted time series analyses. This approach adds an element of “control” to the time series. By doing so, an analyst can make a somewhat stronger case for causal inference. An example of a recent analysis serves to illustrate this feature in the next section.
Interrupted Time-Series Analysis The variables used in the correlational analyses above are measured as changes in postures or concessions over time. The computations illustrate the use of correlational techniques, including ways of attempting to infer
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causation. Another way of evaluating a time series is to examine the impact of decisions or events that occur at a particular juncture in a sequence of moves made by the parties. For example, an external event may occur abruptly at the beginning of a middle round of the talks. Assuming that the event is attended to by the parties, it interrupts the course of the negotiation. The question of interest is, what impact does the event have on the negotiation process? It is answered by comparing the trend of concessions prior to the event with those that occurred following it. The comparison is evaluated with significance tests rather than with correlational techniques. A data set of events collected during a six-year period of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territory known as Nagorno-Karabakh provides an example of the way an interrupted time-series design is implemented. The case provides an opportunity to examine whether various attempts to mediate a serious conflict were effective. Hypotheses about timing and readiness were examined by the investigators. A total of 3,856 events spread over the six-year period were coded on a scale ranging from most peaceful (+3) to most violent (–3). Average monthly scores were calculated for analyses of trends before and after each of six attempts to mediate the conflict. In addition, the impact of another event, intensive warfare occurring between April 1993 and February 1994, was examined by comparing the average violence scores six months before and six months after the event. Thus, seven types of interruptions or interventions were analyzed; six mediations and the military combat. This approach to analysis follows the logic of experimentation rather than modeling or regression. Regarding both the mediations and combat as “treatments,” similar to independent variables, the conflicting parties’ behavior is compared from before to after the treatments. The data set then consists of dependent variables – averaged violence scores calculated on a scale ranging from +3 (action taken toward peace) to –3 (violent actions) – evaluated in a sequence of beforeand-after quasi-experimental designs without control groups (see Cook & Campbell 1979). Since the mediations and combat are treatments, rather than dependent variables, neither the mediators’ behavior nor the combat casualties during the period of warfare were included in the events data set. Significance tests were used to assess the changes from before to after an intervention or event (mediation, combat) in a manner similar to the way data would be analyzed from a laboratory experiment. A difference however is that it is possible to establish control groups in laboratory experiments. The results showed that changes in violent behavior, assessed by the various before-to-after comparisons, occurred only as a result of the combat.
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None of the six mediations was effective in changing the parties’ behavior. The mediators did not create opportunities for settlements by reducing the violence and bringing about the conditions for a ceasefire. On the other hand, the combat did provide the condition for reduced violence and a ceasefire agreement. Escalation proceeded to the large-scale use of military force, resulting in a mutually-hurting stalemate followed by a period of de-escalation (Zartman 2000). Reasons for this outcome are discussed in Mooradian and Druckman (1999). Although this study provided insights into a question that has both theoretical and practical implications, it is a weak experimental design. The differences found between the mediated interventions and the combat suggest that the latter had a stronger impact on violent behavior than the former. It does not suggest that escalation (combat) caused de-escalation (reduced violence). A causal interpretation of these findings would be more plausible if a comparable case without the interruptions (mediations, combat) was included in the design; for example, de-escalation occurs only following combat in timeseries that compare cases with and without combat that includes casualties. By limiting the analysis to the single case of Nagorno-Karabakh, these sorts of inferences are unwarranted. By extending the analysis to another case, they become more plausible. This extension is made in the context of focused or matched case comparisons. (See, for example, Faure 1994 for discussion of the approach.) The idea that interruptions are treatments suggests that they have certain characteristics. These include being relatively abrupt, although not necessarily sudden, relevant to an ongoing process, attended to by the parties involved in the process, and hypothesized to have an impact on that process. Other kinds of interruptions may consist of worker strikes, government or company collapse, a natural disaster such as an earthquake, the insertion of a peacekeeping force, a summit conference among national leaders, an influx of foreign economic aid, or an entirely new insight into the source of a conflict. The key point made in this section is that planned or unplanned events can interrupt an ongoing process, turning it towards or away from agreements. The impacts of the interruptions can be evaluated with before and after quasiexperimental designs, allowing causal inferences to be made. This discussion concludes our treatment of quantitative retrospective analyses. We turn now to an approach that examines the way changing situations can alter the estimates of probabilities for future (unknown) events.
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Bayesian Analysis Another type of analysis that captures change over time, invented by Reverend Thomas Bayes in the eighteenth century, is based on assumptions about how the past and the present can be used to estimate probabilities about the occurrence of future events. Bayes’ theory of probability is described in an essay published posthumously in a 1764 issue of the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. It was sent to the Royal Society by Richard Price who wrote: I now send you an essay which I have found among the papers of our deceased friend Mr. Bayes, and which, in my opinion, has great merit. In an introduction which he has writ to this Essay, he says, that his design at first in thinking on the subject of it was, to find out a method by which we might judge concerning the probability that an event has to happen, in given circumstances, upon supposition that we know nothing concerning it but that, under the same circumstances, it has happened a certain number of times, and failed a certain number of times (for more on Bayes see the web page, “Bayes Ways to Gaze into the Future . . . and how it pays” (at www.vma.bme.hu/mathhis/Mathematicians/ Bayes.html).
The analysis consists of evaluating alternative hypotheses about the occurrence (Hi) or non-occurrence (Hj) of an event, for example, whether or not a coup will occur within a defined period such as one year. The first estimates consist of initial probabilities that a coup will (p[H1]) or will not occur (p[H2]). These probabilities can be estimated from statistics on coups that have occurred in the country over the last 30 years. The next estimate is referred to as a conditional probability and consists of the chances that an event (coup or no coup) will occur if a particular symptom is present (p[EHi]). Examples of symptoms related to coups, which are listed in Frei and Ruloff (1989), are cabinet reshuffling (.4 that coup will occur, .3 that it will not occur if there is reshuffling), call for free elections (.6 that a coup will occur, .5 that it will not occur), and purges (.1 and .8 respectively). The estimates for symptoms often come from experts or from expert panels. When the conditional probabilities are taken into account, a revised initial probability results (p[HiE]) as calculated by the following formula: P(HiE) = P(Hi).P(EHi)/ S (P[Hi],P(EHi])
By inserting the initial (.25, .75) and conditional probabilities for reshuffling (.4, .3) into this formula and performing the calculations, the result is .31 that a coup will occur in the next year and .69 that it will not occur. Note that the initial probability for a coup, based on past evidence, increases somewhat when the symptom of reshuffling is taken into account (from .25 to .31).
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Similar calculations can be made for each of the other symptoms, free elections and purges. An example more closely related to negotiation is the chance that a peace agreement will hold through time. Suppose that past experience suggests that peace agreements have held for at least five years in one-third of the cases examined; thus, p(Hi) is .33 and p(Hj) is .67. Suppose also that an expert panel decided that there are five factors that affect the longevity of agreements. They assigned conditional probabilities to the factors as follows: factions of spoilers (.1 supporting Hi; .6 supporting Hj), schisms within the parties (.2 and .4), regime continuity (.5 and .3), international pressure (.7 and .2), and availability of arms (.2 and .5). The effect of the symptom referred to as spoilers is to reduce the chances of sustaining the agreement from .33 (initial probability) to .08 (revised probability). Schisms reduce the chances for longevity from .33 to .21. Regime continuity increases the chances from .33 to .46. International pressure has the strongest positive impact on longevity, from .33 to .63. And, arms availability reduces the chances from .33 to .17. When the conditional probabilities of all five symptoms are combined in the formula the revised probability is .30, roughly the same as the initial probability of .33; apparently the symptoms are off-setting with two favoring longevity – regime continuity and international pressure – and three jeopardizing the agreement – spoilers, schisms, and availability of arms. Bayesian analysis is an example of time-series analysis that focuses on changes in the probabilities of events (revised probabilities) due to circumstances. It can also be understood as an alternative to regression for forecasting events. The beta weights that derive from a regression analysis are estimates of the relative importance of variables – which may be symptoms in a Bayesian analysis – in predicting a dependent variable (an event in Bayesian terms). When used for forecasting, the regression equation is a linear extrapolation of past trends, considered as the initial probabilities or “priors” in a Bayesian analysis. Unlike regression, Bayesian forecasts are updated probabilities for events that take both past (initial probabilities or “priors”) and present (conditional probabilities of symptoms) into account. The updating can be continuous as a result of monitoring situations on a regular basis. Expert judgments can also be refined as new information becomes available to analysts. Regression is backward-looking in the sense of relying on a past which cannot be changed, although memories of the past are often adjusted. Bayesian analysis is an attempt to capture present events or processes, focusing attention on changes which have implications for forecasts. Despite its appeal, Bayesian techniques have rarely been used in addressing problems in negotiation or conflict resolution.
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A key point made in this section is that it is important to monitor situations in order to detect possible changes that have implications for future events or states. Bayesian techniques provide a systematic framework, based on probabilities, for performing these kinds of analyses. They take into account the ongoing situational changes ignored by techniques that rely only on the past for forecasting the future. This concludes our discussion of quantitative timeseries analysis. We turn now to a variety of qualitative analyses performed to depict changes more difficult to capture with numerical codes.
Qualitative Time-Series Analysis Qualitative approaches can provide insight into patterns of interaction over time that are difficult to measure with precision. An example is Lepgold and Shambaugh’s (1998) analysis of Sino-American relations from 1969 to 1997. These researchers attempted to explain the causes and consequences of reciprocal exchanges between the two nations during this period. Their typology of four distinct patterns of exchanges was used to depict changes in the bilateral relationship. The types were defined in terms of expectations about time horizons and the degree to which national decision-makers anticipate a reliable stream of benefits from the relationship. Various time periods within the three decades were depicted in terms of one of four cells: short or long time horizons and low or high expectations of benefits. The results showed that when American and Chinese perceptions of their time horizons and the likelihood of reliable streams of benefits diverged, the country that had a longer time horizon or perceived more benefits from the relationship was able to drag out negotiations until a preferable outcome had been achieved. These variables are also shown to influence bargaining strategies, for example whether the parties engage in specific reciprocity (exchanges are precisely matched in terms of equivalence or contingency), diffuse reciprocity (exchanges are not precisely matched), or a mixed strategy. The time series in this study consists of the three decades of interactions between these governments. The analysis consists of distinguishing periods within the time series in terms of the four-fold typology and related reciprocity strategies. It sheds light on the sources and consequences of various types of expectations by each party over time. Leng’s (1998) analysis of 12 recurring militarized crises between post World War II rivals (U.S. and Soviet Union, India and Pakistan, Israel and Egypt) provides an example of a mixed qualitative-quantitative time series design. The qualitative analyses consisted of characterizing each of four crises within
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each rivalry in terms of the dominant influence strategy used by the two nations. The strategies were bullying, reciprocating, trial and error, and stonewalling. For example, the four crises in the U.S.-Soviet relationship with corresponding strategies and outcomes are as follows: Berlin Blockade, 1948–49 (Soviet bullying, U.S. reciprocating leading to a U.S. victory); Berlin Wall, 1961 (Soviet bullying, U.S. reciprocating leading to a stalemate); Cuban Missile, 1962 (Soviet trial and error, U.S. bullying leading to a U.S. victory), and Middle East Alert, 1973 (Soviet trail and error, U.S. reciprocating leading to a U.S. victory). The other two rivalries relied primarily on bullying strategies leading usually to wars or, in one crisis over Kashmir, stalemate. Based on these patterns, Leng concluded that reciprocating strategies are the most effective means of promoting cooperation in militarized crises. These findings are consistent with quantitative time-series analyses, calculated as weekly average hostility scores during the period of the crisis, also performed by the author on these three rivalries, as well as with the author’s earlier findings based on a larger sample of crises occurring between 1816 and 1980 (Leng 1993). These are particularly interesting findings in light of the selection of cases. They challenge a prevailing assumption that the most effective means of prevailing in interstate militarized disputes is through the use of escalating coercion. They also reinforce the value of combined analyses for bolstering confidence in findings obtained by only one approach. Process Tracing A qualitative analogue to time-series analysis is known as process tracing. This is a technique that consists of searching an historical record of events for evidence about whether a postulated process did or did not occur. The record is usually, but not always, developed from bounded cases such as the periods of crisis used in Leng’s analysis or from negotiation or mediation interactions. The analysis is facilitated when the choice of events is guided by a framework as in Druckman’s (2001) study of turning points. In that study, a path of events that occurred in each of 34 cases of negotiation was developed in terms of a three-part framework: precipitants, departures, and consequences. Precipitants are regarded as causes of changes in the negotiation process; they can be external or internal to the process. An example of an external precipitant in the talks over strategic arms limitations (SALT I) is when the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal approached parity with the United States. Departures are changes that occur in the process; they may be relatively abrupt or non-abrupt and are regarded as turning points. In reaction to the Soviet nuclear arsenal development (precipitant), domestic pressure increased
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for a bilateral agreement to suspend further weapons development. This was a rather abrupt departure from a public that placed little pressure on the US administration to seek an agreement. Consequences can be escalatory, leading away from agreements, or de-escalatory, leading toward agreements. The deescalatory consequence of the departure in this case was that bilateral talks between these nations began, leading to a treaty in 1972. The path is depicted in the following form: SALT I: external precipitant → abrupt departure → de-escalatory consequence
Another example of process tracing comes from the global environmental talks leading to the signing of the Montreal Protocol in 1987. The procedural or internal precipitant was a succession in the presidency of the conference from the United Kingdom to Belgium. This led to a departure in process taking the form of European Community support for a U.S. plan. The consequence was an agreement on banning the production of certain types of CFCs. The path takes the following form: Montreal Protocol: procedural precipitant → non-abrupt departure → de-escalatory consequence
These kinds of paths were constructed for each sampled case of international negotiation in three issue areas, security cases (13), trade cases (10), and political/environmental cases (11). For most cases, paths were constructed for early, middle, and late time periods in the talks; several turning points occurred in most cases. The case paths were then aggregated for each type of negotiation, security, trade, and political, resulting in a “typical” path. A typical security cases’ path, which includes longer-term consequences (at time t + 1) takes the following form: Security cases: external precipitants → abrupt departure in the process → deescalatory consequences at time t → de-escalatory consequences at time t +1.
Another application of process tracing comes from my research on situational levers of flexibility. Using experimental techniques, an attempt was made to identity the situational variables that had the strongest impact on flexibility in each of four stages of a simulated environmental conference on ozone depletion. Paired-comparison judgments made by the negotiators provided weights for each of several aspects of the situations manipulated in the experiment. (Guilford [1954] provides a description of the paired-comparison procedure in chapter 7.) The paths consisted of the aspect (or variable) with the largest weight. Separate paths were constructed for the sessions that produced an
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agreement and those that concluded with an impasse. An example of an agreement path is as follows: Friendly relations (pre-negotiation stage) → peripheral location for the talks (setting-the-stage) → limited media coverage (bargaining stage) → limited media coverage (endgame stage).
An example of a stalemate path is as follows: Being the delegation’s primary representative (pre-negotiation stage) → central location for the talks (setting-the-stage) → wide media coverage (bargaining stage) → wide media coverage (endgame stage).
Note that the critical variables in these paths are location and media coverage. They appear in stages two, three, and four of both paths. The variables identified in each stage influence a process toward an outcome. Together, these influences are considered to be trajectories (or levers) toward eventual agreement or stalemate. (See Druckman 1993; and Druckman & Druckman 1996, for details.) The negotiation or related process can be thought about as a kind of backward tracing from a particular event or outcome through a series of earlier decisions or events arranged chronologically. This can be done with documented cases by developing a chronology of events. Examples of chronologies can be found in the Pew-sponsored case studies on international affairs (1999); a detailed chronology of a negotiation that occurred in 1986 between the Philippines Aquino regime and an insurgent group is shown in Druckman and Green (1995). It can also be done with observational data by developing a category system for verbal statements and nonverbal behavior as these occur through the course of an interaction. Carstarphen’s (2003) analysis of a dialogue about racial prejudice provides an illustration. The dialogue occurs among a group of men from different backgrounds. It is presented in the wellknown documentary film, “The Color of Fear.” She used these interactions to investigate shifts that occur at the individual, relational, and group levels of analysis. The focal event of interest was a shift in relationships at the group level. Moving backward from this outcome, she captured the unfolding group dynamics at each of several points in time. Those dynamics take the form of the following path, culminating in the focal event. Lee Mun Wah’s question to David (D): ‘What keeps you from believing?’ → D’s lack of understanding produces an impasse in the discussion → facilitator intervention → D reflects on his own experience and resistance to change → D’s reframing → D’s new self awareness → D’s acknowledgement of his own prejudices and that racism exists → other members’ changed
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attitudes toward D → African-American member acknowledges D’s acknowledgement → group shift in D’s relationship with the other members (focal event). This path illuminates the group’s reaction to a “deviant” member, the role played by the facilitator, change at both emotional and cognitive levels, and the role of acknowledgement in changing relationships within the group. It consists of sequential observations or a chain of events, including a conflictresolution intervention, that lead to a particular outcome. It is a more complex, process-oriented, time series of causation than many correlational analyses involving only a few variables. (For more on the methodology of process tracing see George and Bennett [2004] and Stern and Druckman [2000].) Another example of process tracing comes from Pruitt’s (2004) analysis of the negotiation process between Israel and the PLO in Oslo. He traced the process through four stages by depicting a chain of communication among various official and unofficial actors. Stage I depicts the chain before the talks began as the mediator, Larson, got both sides to the table. It looks like this: I. Arafat ← → Mediator ← → Israeli Professors ← → Israeli diplomat
Stage II is the situation that obtained during the first five sessions. The Israeli Foreign Minister, Peres, was added at one end of the chain and the mediator was dropped in the middle. The mediator sat outside the meeting room ready to provide assistance without becoming involved in the discussions. II. Arafat ← → PLO delegates ← ← → Israeli Foreign Minister
→ Israeli Professors ← → Israeli diplomats
Stage III is the situation that obtained in the last seven sessions, when Israeli diplomats took over from the professors, who stayed on as advisors. III. Arafat ← → PLO delegates ← Foreign Minister ← → Rabin
→ Israeli diplomats ← → Israeli
Stage IV is a final telephone conversation between Arafat and Peres, in which the details of the agreement were hammered out. They did not however talk directly but through interpreters. IV. Arafat ←
→ Israeli Foreign Minister ← → Rabin
The progression from Stage I to IV shows how intermediaries drop out of a chain as optimism grows. The progression from Stages I to III shows how unofficial (Track II) diplomacy involving the mediator and professors, was replaced by official (Track I) diplomacy, involving government officials on both sides.
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The process tracings illustrated here have several features in common. Each depicts a linear process through chronological time. They all proceed toward an outcome that serves to conclude a process. And, each involves a relatively small number of actors or parties. Of interest is the question whether the technique can be used to depict non-linear interactions among many actors in situations where the process does not conclude with a single outcome. An example is the problem of coordination among different intervenors (or NGOs) working to reduce conflict in the same region. Data collected by Allen Nan (1999) on the activities of many organizations operating in three former Soviet republics make evident the difficulty of constructing paths to outcomes. For this problem, multiple paths involving various types of intervenors and interventions converged and diverged toward or away from reduced levels of conflict: There were too many actors, activities, and varieties of coordination and complementarity to discern a path proceeding from initial to end states. This sort of complexity is captured better by frameworks that show the interplay among the actors, activities, and processes, including recursive relationships between them. (See, for example, Allen Nan 1999: Figure 8.8.1.) Both process tracing and framework construction are examples of ways to envision information to enhance understanding of social processes. A variety of qualitative time-series analyses were illustrated in this section. They included the use of typologies for depicting relationships and influence strategies used at different points in time, tracing of processes that occur in simulated and actual negotiations, and extended interactions between multiple parties or organizations through the course of staged peace processes or nonlinear activities intended to address ongoing conflicts. All of these examples illuminate the value of using frameworks or category systems for longitudinal analysis. They capture changes through time that would be missed by crosssectional (same point in time) comparisons and complement the quantitative analyses discussed earlier. This concludes our treatment of the family of timeseries approaches. We turn now to a summary of the applications discussed and an idea for combining several of the techniques.
Conclusions Several types of time-series designs were discussed in this article. When a researcher is interested in explaining an historical outcome, he or she may analyze the course of events or processes leading to that outcome. The question of interest is whether the known outcome can be “predicted” from information about those processes. Another purpose served by these analyses is to
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evaluate alternative explanations for a process that occurred in historical cases. The availability of detailed information about these processes enables a researcher to code the events or moves made by the actors. Examples from correlational studies of negotiation show how these analyses are done. Sophisticated analyses that use lagged, partial, and multiple correlations provide a basis for inferring causation from time-sequenced events. Time-series data are shown also to be used in quasi (or field-) experimental evaluations of interventions. Impacts of interventions such as mediation can be assessed with before-and-after comparisons of trends. Although these are often weak designs, especially because they do not include control groups, they have the advantage of focussing an analyst’s attention on events that can alter a process in important ways. The process-altering features of particular events are also the focus of Bayesian analysis. This form of forecasting entails monitoring situations on a regular basis. It highlights the role played by indicators of key events such as coups, wars, or the unraveling of a peace agreement. Like regression, it takes the past into account. Like interrupted time series, it pays attention to key events. Unlike both of those approaches, however, Bayesian analysis revises probabilities based on past events with information from indicators or “symptoms” in the present that may signal a possible future event. Alternatives to the precise coding needed to perform the quantitative analyses of time series data are qualitative approaches. These approaches are particularly useful for analyzing complex interactions among many parties or settings where detailed information is not available. Theoretically-inspired typologies or frameworks replace coding systems as analytical tools. They have been shown to distinguish among patterns of exchange between nations, bargaining and influence strategies, and the kinds of events and decisions that precede turning points in negotiation or shifts in group processes as well as the consequences of those changes. When it is feasible to depict events in the form of a traced path in chronological time, these analyses suggest causal processes involving many more elements than is usually measured by correlation analyses. It would seem that these advantages of qualitative time-series analysis complement those of the quantitative techniques. Further analytical specificity can be achieved by combining the various time-series techniques within a study. With regard to a particular negotiation, the analytical challenge is to forecast an event – such as tabling a key proposal – that can alter the process (Bayesian techniques), evaluate the impact of the proposal on that process (interrupted time series), and, then devise a path of the events and decisions that led to its occurrence or to an outcome that emanated from it (process tracing). This multi-method analysis leads to
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conclusions about the likelihood that the event will occur, its impact on a process, and the way it emerged from a sequence of prior events. These are the facets of analysis that contribute to the goal of explaining the way that negotiation processes unfold toward outcomes. (See Irner 2003 for an example of a multi-method analysis of negotiation process-outcome relationships.)
References Allen Nan, S. (1999). “Complementarity and coordination of conflict resolution efforts in the conflicts over Abkhasia, South Ossetia, and Transdniestria.” Unpublished doctoral dissertation, George Mason University. Blalock, H.M. (1960). Social Statistics. New York: McGraw-Hill. Carstarphen, N.M. (2003). “Shift happens: Transformations during small group interactions in protracted social conflicts.” Unpublished doctoral dissertation, George Mason University. Cook, T., and Campbell, D.T. (1979). Quasi-Experimentation: Designs and Analysis Issues for Social Research in Field Settings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Druckman, D. (2001). “Turning points in international negotiation: A comparative analysis,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45:519–544. Druckman, D. (1993). “The situational levers of negotiating flexibility,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37:236–276. Druckman, D. (1986). “Stages, turning points, and crises: Negotiating military base rights, Spain and the United States,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 30:327–360. Druckman, D., and Bonoma, T.V. (1976). “Determinants of bargaining behavior in a bilateral monopoly situation II: Opponent’s concession rate and similarity,” Behavioral Science 21:252–262. Druckman D., and Druckman, J.N. (1996). “Visibility and negotiating flexibility,” Journal of Social Psychology 136:117–120. Druckman D., and Green, J. (1995). “Playing two games: Internal negotiations in the Philippines.” In I.W. Zartman (Ed.) Elusive Peace. Washington, DC: Brookings. Druckman, D., and Harris, R. (1990). “Alternative models of responsiveness in international negotiation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 34:234–251. Faure, A.M. (1994). “Some methodological problems in comparative politics,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 6:307–322. Frei, D., and Ruloff, D. (1989). Handbook of Foreign Policy Analysis. Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff. George, A.L., and Bennett, A. (2004). Case Study and Theory Development. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Guilford, J.P. (1954). Psychometric Methods. New York: McGraw-Hill. Irner, C.G. (2003). The promise of process: Evidence on ending violent international conflict. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, GeorgeMason University. Leng, R.J. (1998). “Reciprocity in recurring crises,” International Negotiation 3:197–226. Leng, R.J. (1993). Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816–1980: Realism versus Reciprocity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lepgold, J., and Shambaugh, G. (1998). “Rethinking the notion of reciprocal exchange in international negotiation: Sino-American relations, 1969–1997,” International Negotiation 3:227–252.
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Mooradian, M., and Druckman, D. (1999). “Hurting stalemate or mediation?: The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, 1990–95.” Journal of Peace Research 36:709–727. Pew Case Studies in International Affairs (1999). “The ISD compendium of case study abstracts and indexes,” the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. Pruitt, D.G. (2004). “Escalation, readiness for negotiation, and third party functions.” In I.W. Zartman and G.O. Faure (Eds.) Escalation and Negotiation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Stern, P.C., and Druckman, D. (2000) “Evaluating interventions in history: The case of international conflict resolution,” International Studies Review 2:33–63. Stoll, R.J., and McAndrew, W. (1986). “Negotiating strategic arms control, 1969–1979.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 30:315–326. Walcott, C., and Hopmann P.T. (1978). “Interaction analysis and negotiating behavior.” In R.T. Golembiewski (Ed.) The Small Group in Political Science. Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press. Zartman, I.W. (2000). “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond.” In P.C. Stern and D. Druckman (Eds.) International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Social Research and the Study of Mediation: Designing and Implementing Systematic Archival Research JACOB BERCOVITCH
Introduction How exactly do we explain politically significant events? How best to make sense of complex patterns of behavior in international relations? Scholars of political science have wrestled with these issues and debated the merits of case studies versus statistical studies, experimental studies versus field studies for many years now. The debate has been as passionate as it was lively and acrimonious. Each side has held to its opinions with remarkable ferocity. Each has believed that the path to truth was with their adherents only. Each was convinced of the irrelevance of the other. Nowhere was this schism more apparent than in the study of conflict resolution in general and mediation in particular. When it came to conflict resolution there was a widespread feeling that only by gaining an intimate and personal knowledge about a conflict, can one say anything meaningful about its management. Conflict was seen as so aberrant a phenomenon that only an in-depth study of a selected case could be expected to yield any insights. Any attempt to go beyond the single case and the discursive, qualitative method was to be frowned upon as an example of scholarly irresponsibility. Nowhere was this logic more evident than in the study of negotiation and mediation. The result of such a belief was that, despite its popularity, longevity, ubiquity, and importance, we seem to know far less about mediation than we imagine, and what we know is mostly of an ideographic nature. Systematic, archival analyses of mediation cases in the real world have been all too rare. Mediation has for too long been studied through single cases or quasirealistic frames. Little wonder that the phenomenon remained so poorly understood for so long. The difficulties and obstacles of this form of research meant that scholars often looked for answers where “there was some light” (e.g., experimental studies) rather than where the real phenomenon of mediation was buried. I strongly believe that we should not succumb to the allure of obtaining easy yet not always realistic data. We should instead work with International Negotiation Series 2: P. Carnevale and C.K.W. de Dreu (eds.) Methods of Negotiation Research, 79–92 © 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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reports of real events, by real mediators and negotiators, in real conflict situations, and use that data in a systematic fashion to develop useful theories, and answer real questions on the process and outcomes of mediation. To do otherwise would be to mistake our wishful thinking for a complex reality. Mediation is practiced in a variety of fields, ranging from domestic disputes through legal conflicts and community disputes to international conflicts. Thus, mediation may be studied by sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, anthropologists, economists, and others. These scholars borrow concepts and methods from each other. Whichever approach or discipline one adopts, the study of mediation is something of a research puzzle for which we must find less than perfect answers through the analysis of data. Some of the questions that make up the mediation puzzle include the following: • When should a mediator enter a dispute? Should one wait till a certain threshold of violence has been crossed, or is it better to intervene before the parties engage in openly hostile behavior? • Should a mediator be, neutral (could a mediator be neutral)? Would a biased mediator be acceptable to the parties under some conditions? Would a biased mediator be successful? • What exactly do mediators do when they intervene in a dispute? Are there some recognizable patterns of behavior, and are such patterns associated with any measure of effectiveness? How do mediators even choose one strategy over another? Do they have an identifiable decision calculus? • Which disputes are more amenable to mediation? • What factors or conditions affect the process and outcome of mediation? Can any of these be changed so as to help mediation? • Are some mediators more likely to achieve their objectives than others? Are factors such as personal attributes, rank, position and prestige related at all to mediation outcomes, and if so how? • Do mediated outcomes endure? Do they satisfy the parties’ basic needs, or do they merely provide an interlude for the parties to regroup, marshal resources and engage in further aggression?
Experimental and Case Study Approaches How best can we organize our research efforts, answer these questions, and resolve the puzzle? Several approaches may be identified. A significant part of the literature dealing with mediation and purporting to answer these questions has been largely descriptive, relying mostly on single cases. The best exemplars of this approach (e.g., Princen 1992; Touval 1982; Touval and
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Zartman 1985) used analytical frameworks and examined their chosen cases with great care. However, it was, and is, difficult to draw general inferences from these studies, no matter how carefully crafted they may have been. Descriptive approaches make good sense of idiosyncratic situations, they encourage policy makers and practitioners to publish their memoirs, but they do have too wide a diversity of focal points, and it is impossible to generalize from them or assess their validity. All that we can know is what happened in the specific case and why mediation failed or succeeded. To answer the questions above, we need to treat mediation as a class of public events, not as a unique set of circumstances. An approach that has attempted to answer broad questions and deal with issues of causes, effects, and outcomes in a large number of cases is the experimental approach. Experimental approaches have universal rather than particular goals. Experimental approaches, frequently conducted in laboratory settings, test for causal relations. They permit one to manipulate values of independent variables and determine how each affects the dependent variable. Above all, they offer the possibility of replication and reinterpretation. Some of the best studies in this tradition (e.g., Brookmire & Sistrunk 1980; Carnevale 1986; Carnevale et al. 1989; Kochan & Jick 1978; Pruitt and Johnson 1970. For a fuller review see Rubin 1980) exemplify how a phenomenon can be studied scientifically, and done so in ingenious ways using exciting research designs and challenge some of our basic notions about the process. Experimental approaches represent a systematic way of collecting information about the world. We usually know how the data is recorded and generated. We know the hypotheses tested and the causal inferences made. We know that when more data is needed, further experiments may be undertaken to improve data quality. What we do not know is how we can overcome the sense of artificiality that inevitably characterizes these studies. In other words, the data is real, but the real world is so very different form the data. To conduct an experiment with undergraduate psychology students in any university on the validity of threats under conditions of multilateral deterrence may tell us very little indeed about the behavior of policy-makers in hostile countries with nuclear weapons at their disposal. There is a considerable leap of faith required of us if we are to presume that the micro processes observed by social psychologists, under quite well controlled situations, resemble the stressful, often chaotic, and usually unpredictable political environment of international relations. Experimental approaches offer the prospect of excellent data collection methods, but their reliability and external (not internal) validity is at best doubtful.
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Archival Data Analysis; Some Possible Benefits The reality of negotiation and mediation is made up of numerous particular events; particular negotiators, particular individual mediators, particular conflict situations and so forth. What we are trying to do is to go beyond the particulars of each case, describe these events systematically, search for the best data or information, and offer knowledge that can help us achieve a better understanding of some general acts pertaining to human behavior in conflict. As political scientists we are trying to study real events, be aware of the relationship between them, be as precise and realistic as possible in describing them, and hopefully be in a position to say something meaningful about the class of events that is of interest to us. To do so, I strongly believe we should rely only on available data, both public and private, systematically collected, as the only form of data that give us the ability to get as close as possible to a first hand account by the parties directly involved. In comparison with available archival or observational data, other forms of data seem manufactured at best. Available data may be in several categories. It may be in the form of public and official records and documents, newspaper accounts, private memoirs, or social science data archives. Studying puzzles by relying on available, usually archival, data is the most unobtrusive, non reactive way of getting information. This form of research is particularly suited to the study of mediation. It has a number of advantages of other ways of colleting and interpreting data: • Archival research emphasizes naturalness of the setting, behavior, and event. Archival sources provide researchers with the best, perhaps the only, way of studying past occurrences. There is simply no substitute for naturalness in the design of research. • Archival data enable a researcher to study contextual information and features of larger social units (experiments of field studies rarely study the group as the unit of analysis). • Archival data is spontaneous. By this I mean it was produced without subjects or participants being requested to do so. • Archival sources provide high quality information that can be easily summarized and expressed in terms of different values or variables. • Archival sources permit us to conduct research over long spans of time. The analysis of archival data is well suited to studies of trends, change, and traditions. Archival research permits systematic studies of processes. • The use of archival data may permit us to study large samples of cases. Using archival sources one may study thousands of families, hundreds of conflicts and numerous mediators. The larger the sample of cases, the greater our confidence in our findings and interpretations.
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• Archival research is quickly available and easily accessible, thus saving much on cost, time, and personnel in research. I believe the systematic use of archival data offers the best opportunity to study mediation in the real world. Archival research offers a flexible and powerful form of research with the strongest measure of external validity. In the sections below I hope to show how I approach the puzzle of mediation and try and answer the basic questions in the field by working with a very large data set of mediation events.
Describing the Data Set Before embarking on archival research it is important that we have strong theoretical framework and a proper research design. What I propose to do is to examine all cases of international conflict since 1945, and all the cases of international mediation in these conflicts. The project is an extension of my early work on theories of international mediation. With this project I use extensive archival sources, take the theory as my starting point and engage in a thorough data search and empirical analysis. The project is not predicated on some inductive grounds of empiricism, but on a theoretical understanding of mediation and other forms of conflict management mechanisms. I am guided throughout by concepts, ideas and theories, even though much of the work is empirical in nature. Prompted by dissatisfaction with previous studies on mediation which have rested mostly on ideographic, normative, or experimental approaches, this project was established with the aim of utilizing archival data to demonstrate the soundness of our theoretical framework. The theoretical underpinning of the project are to be found in the so called contingency framework developed by Bercovitch (1986). At its simplest, the framework is a dynamic, timedependent theory that regards the outcome of mediation or negotiations as dependent, or contingent, upon a number of contextual, process and personal variables. These variables have different values and the manner of their interaction affects how mediation is conducted, and how successful it is going to be. I believe we can now answer many of the questions about mediation and move closer toward solving the puzzle of mediation.
Defining the Relevant Population The first challenge in undertaking archival research is to identify the population of cases to be studied. To start with, we examined existing sources of
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information on international conflicts, (e.g., Small & Singer 1982: Butterworth 1976: Tillema 1991; Wallensteen 2002). International conflicts are relatively rare events, but most of these publicly available sources had different numbers of conflicts since 1945. Where each project uses different dimensions to define conflict, different thresholds (that is, number of fatalities incurred before an event can be described as an international conflict), and focuses on different categories of conflict (e.g., within or between states), neither comparability nor generalizations are possible. An approach to data collection on international conflict which does not define conflict primarily in terms of violence, and is more concerned with conflict termination than with its causes, was clearly needed. We decided, at the very outset of the project, to dispense with the notion of a threshold of fatalities. A situation could be one of conflict even in the absence of 100 or 1000 combat fatalities. We define conflict operationally as a state of organized hostilities and exchange of threats between two or more states which may or may not result in violent beahvior and fatalities. With this definition in mid, we scanned numerous archival sources (e.g. existing data, newspapers accounts, World Factbooks, etc.) and identified 309 conflicts from 1945 to 1995 (see Bercovitch & Jackson 1997). Each conflict was studied for its history, duration, issues at stake, intensity, and manner of termination. Information about the parties in each conflict (e.g., nature of political system, power resources, etc.) was also collected. Our interest of course has been with the occurrence, trends and characteristics of mediation events in the real world. Very little systematic information was ever collected on mediation events. Such information that does exist contains very few numbers of cases (e.g., Northedge & Donelan 1971), or deals mostly with mediation and peacekeeping by the United Nations (e.g., Zacher 1979). Here there was a real need to collect information from scratch. Having thus identified our population of conflicts, we studied each and every one of them in terms of the conflict management methods used in these conflicts and the outcomes of each method. Each conflict management method was studied for such dimensions as timing, manner of performance, and impact. Of the 309 conflicts, 190 experienced some form of formal mediation. Some conflicts, such as the one in the Middle East or the conflict in the former Yugoslavia (186 different mediation efforts from 1989–1995) experienced many mediation efforts by different mediators. Other conflicts had very few, if any, mediation efforts. In these 190 conflicts we had a total of 2194 actual international mediation cases, (this does not include offers of mediation offers that were rejected). A total of 559 different mediators were involved in these
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efforts. These ranged from individuals to groups, to regional organization, officials of a state or representatives of international organizations. Each mediation effort was studied in terms of many independent variables to capture the features of their identity, composition, resources, strategy etc. Table 1 below gives some idea of the range and distribution of conflict management events in international conflict. Table 1. Conflict management activities; 1945–1995 No conflict management activity in 61 out of 309 international conflicts (20%) Conflict Management Strategy Mediation Negotiation Arbitration Referral to an International or Regional Organization Multilateral Conference Total Number of Conflict Management Strategies
Number of times used 2194 (58.7%) 1249 (33.4%) 29 (0.8%) 166 (4.4%) 38 (1.0%) 3737 (100%)
Information on each conflict management activity was collected from four main archival sources dealing with events data; The New York Times Index, The Times Index (London), Reuter’s Online News Service, and Keesing’s Archives (renamed Keesing’s Record of World Events.) These news sources are widely regarded as offering the best and most comprehensive information on political events since 1945. Our quest for reliable archival data was supplemented by searching other public documents such as personal memoirs of leading politicians and mediators, organizational publications on mediation, and other data sources.
Coding the Data Once we have identified our archival sources and information, we need to delineate which precise aspects are of interest to us. Basically, we collected data that pertained to six main dimensions of conflict and its management:
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• start and end dates of the mediation attempt; • details of those present at the attempt (e.g., names of disputing parties – negotiators, names of third parties – mediators, rank and organizational position held); • the location of the attempt (e.g., neutral territory, in disputed territory or a disputant’s territory); • strategies perceived to be in use by the mediator (e.g., communication-facilitation, procedural or directive strategies); • the outcome of each mediation attempt (e.g., agreements, cease-fires, full settlements and the durability of such outcomes); and, • numerous contextual observations (e.g., presence of ongoing hostilities, system era, dispute issues and the disputant’s political environment). All these aspects have been coded into a total of 219 independent variables (see Table 2 below on how the independent variables were organized) thus providing a us with an original and much needed resource for analyzing all aspects of the process and outcomes of international mediation. Objectivity has been maintained, as much as possible, by comparing data from one source with several other sources. As Bercovitch and Houston explain, “data were collected and cross checked over four main sources and between coders and achieved an intercoder reliability across the variables of 95%” (Bercovitch & Houston 2000: 185). The vast majority of variables coded are, by nature, objective and gathered from factual observations e.g., dates, times, attributed organizational ranks and calculated disputant power ratios. Probably the three most criticized variables are mediator strategy, conflict issues, and outcome (success or failure). While inter-coder reliability brings consistency to the overall coding of the data, these variables may require further evaluation. Table 2 . Categories and Listing of Independent Variables Characteristics of the Dispute
Characteristics of the Parties
Conflict Management Variables
Dispute Start/End Date Duration
Party Initiator in Previous Disputes Identity Party A & B
Start/End Date Type, Negotiation, Mediation, Referral to INO, Arbitration/ adjudication, multilateral conference
Fatalities
Party Alignment
Third Party Identity
Dispute Intensity
Member of UN – Party A & B
Mediator Rank
Highest Action
Power A & B (GDP, Military budget etc.)
Strategies-Primary
Hostility Level
Parties Previous Relations
Supplementary Strategies
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Table 2 (cont.) Characteristics of the Dispute
Characteristics of the Parties
Conflict Management Variables
Reciprocity
History Disputes with Other Parties
Previous Relationship of Parties With Mediator
System Period Dispute Start
Party Political System, Openness/Democracy, Closedness/Autocracy, Polity Type and Change
Previous Attempts Med/Neg this Dispute
Geographic Region
Leadership change during the dispute
Previous Attempts this Mediator
Geographical Proximity of Parties
Number Parties Supporting the Disputants
Timing (grouped)
Issue One
Characteristics of Previous Disputes between the parties – Initiator, Issues, Balance of Power, Highest Hostility Level, Outcome, Temporal Proximity to previous dispute, United Nations Operations
Timing (raw)
Issue Two
Dispute Phase Conflict Management
Issue Three
Initiated by
Final Outcome
Environment
Re-emergence of Dispute
Outcome
Type of Conflict
Hostilities Reported
Number Mediation Efforts
Durability Outcome
UN Involvement
Rank Negotiator Party A
Type of Superpower Involvement
Rank Negotiator Party B
UN Peacekeeping/ Sanctions/Embargos
Number of Mediators Acting
Enduring Rivalries
Functional Mediator Identity
Characteristics of Ethnic Conflict – Ethnic Groups, Ethnic War, Revolutionary War, Abrupt/Disruptive Regime Change, Genocide/ Politicide, Ethnic Issues, Origin and Internationalization of Ethnic Rivalries
Mediation Type
Dispute Initiator
Mediator Experience
Type of Power Initiator
UN Mediator
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The original intention of the project was to build up as complete a data-set of mediation in international conflicts as is possible, using many archival resources. Subsequently the project sought to encompass not just mediation but other forms of conflict management such as: negotiation, arbitration, multilateral conferences, and referrals to international organizations. Information was collected on (a) factors relating to the dispute, parties and issues in conflict, (b) factors relating to mediation performance and identity, and (c) factors describing the consequences or outcomes of mediation. Initially the project begun in the mid 1980’s with an examination of 72 international conflicts and 210 cases of mediation (see Bercovitch 1986). Today the project contains significant information on 309 international conflicts and 3737 cases of conflict management.
Some Findings Making use of available data, we now have close to one million observations on mediation and other forms of conflict management over a fifty year period. Acquiring knowledge about any form of social relations may not be easy. Acquiring knowledge about a process that is usually conducted behind closed doors, where stakes and loss of face may be high, is particularly difficult. In trying to understand the reality of mediation, we do, I believe, encounter fewer difficulties in constructing and validating hypotheses with this form of research than any other form. We are less likely to err with our inferences and interpretations when our knowledge is grounded in incidents and records of real human behavior. A good research design and systematic use of archival data (which after all are explicit and public) maximize internal and external validity and our ability to demonstrate real patterns, replicate them, or refute them. Better data are almost always a precursor to better theories. As social scientists we usually have to make the best of what data we have. In the case of mediation and negotiation, I doubt we have better data than that which may be obtained through archival research. Once colleted and codified, the data are arranged in the form of a large matrix, with rows containing information about our units of analysis, mediation events, and the columns with different bits of information about each of the independent variables. At this stage we can engage in a variety of quantitative or qualitative procedures to examine distribution of the data, relationships between two or more variables, and develop causal inferences and models, and answer the questions or puzzles posed above. Some of the most important findings of the project are highlighted below:
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Nature of Conflict Many studies posit a relationship between a given conflict and mediation outcomes. We found that conflict intensity impacts adversely on mediation effectiveness (Bercovitch 1986). High fatalities and high intensity conflicts are not really amenable to mediation. Issues in conflict showed a marked effect on mediation, with tangible issues such as resources and territory showing a much higher likelihood of successful mediation than intangible issues, such as identity or sovereignty (Bercovitch & Houston 1996). Conflict complexity, examined as numbers of issues per conflict, also showed a strong relationship with ineffective mediation. Nature of the Parties In a series of studies we were able to show that who the parties are has a great impact on how a conflict is likely to be mediated. Democratic parties are more likely to use mediation and achieve a positive outcome than nondemocratic parties (Bercovitch & Houston 1996). Similar patterns were found between economically developed countries and mediation. Domestic observance of human rights and respect for liberty correlate very highly with successful mediation, as does the level of internal homogeneity (Bercovitch & Houston 2000). Parties of equal power resources or small states make the most of mediation services offered to them (Bercovitch 1986). Mediation is not a method suited for conflicts involving superpowers. Nature of Mediation and Mediator In a series of studies we were able to show that mediator neutrality, that old chestnut in the literature, is far less important than mediator ability, experience and resources (Bercovitch & Houston 2000). We were also able to show that the best time to initiate mediation is some months after a conflict had manifested itself (Bercovitch 1986). The most prominent mediators in international conflicts are not regional or international organizations, but states, and larger states at that. The most successful mediators are not private individuals but high ranking mediators (Bercovitch & Schneider 2000). A neutral environment is highly conducive to successful mediation, as is the use of an active intervention strategy (Bercovitch & Houston 2000). This kind of archival analysis, based on a sound theoretical design, in which the data has been carefully and consistently checked, where we deal with a large number of case studies, and where we try and offer as complete a description of each case by examining as many explanatory variables as we
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can, helps us considerably in trying to resolve the puzzles of mediation. Archival research, supplemented by detailed case studies, provides a sound recipe for empirical research into the conditions and manifestations of mediation.
Conclusion The maturity of an academic discipline is based on the rigor of its findings, the number of its practitioners, its capacity to impact, and its acceptance of different paradigms and research methods. Conflict and its resolution encompass an array of methods, findings, and paradigms that are not easily grouped into a single set of beliefs or theories. At times we may be critical of each other’s ideas, approaches, or findings, but we can still engage in a creative dialogue, and learn much from our diverse perspectives. Such is the strength and vibrancy of our discipline. With this in mind, my objective here was to argue, not from dogma but from disciplined thought, the advantages of analyzing mediation and negotiation by using available, public information. The sources of such information may include vital national statistics, UN documents, data archives, newspapers, letters, and survey reports. Archival research is best suited to the analysis of large and complex structures. It permits us to identify a whole range of mediation events and specify all the factors and dimensions which might affect its manifestation and outcomes. Archival research is also cumulative. Much of what is reported above is built upon foundations laid by other scholars. Each succeeding phase of research builds a larger data set, analyzes events using ever more sophisticated computer programs, and increases our understanding of how mediation works and how to improve it. The study of conflict resolution in general and mediation in particular is an intellectual endeavor that tries to describe and understand some complex events in the real world. As a field of study, mediation has developed over the last three decades diverse philosophical underpinnings and different frameworks of analysis and methods, all designed to capture the range, complexity and diversity of mediation. Yet every scholar, method, or approach labors under some limitations of knowledge, insights, or mistakes. No person, or team of scholars, nor any approach can explain or control the numerous factors involved in mediation, ranging from individual variables to systemic considerations. This is why we have to see the many approaches not as competing but as complementary paradigms, looking at the same problem from different vantage points. Archival research tells us much about the structure of mediation. To understand something about the parties’ decisional calculus and choices of behavior we need to pose different questions and use different
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methods. All research contains elements of compromise and creative intuition. It is time scholars from different traditions look seriously for that second dimension of research. The present volume makes a step in that direction.
Acknowledgements I would like to thank Judith Fretter and Robert Trappl for all their help. This article has benefited considerably from the comments of Peter Carnevale and an anonymous reviewer.
References Bercovitch, J. (1986). “International Mediation: A Study of Incidence, Strategies and Conditions of Successful Outcomes,” Cooperation and Conflict 21(3):155–168. Bercovitch J., and Houston A. (1996). “The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence.” In J. Bercovitch (Ed.) Resolving International Conflicts. Boulder. Westview Press. Bercovitch, J., and Jackson, R. (1997). International Conflict: Encyclopedia of Conflicts and their Management, 1945–1995. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly. Bercovitch, J., and Houston, A. (2000). “Why Do They Do It Like This? An Analysis of the Factors Influencing Mediation Behavior in International Conflicts,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44:170–202. Bercovitch J., and Schneider, G. (2000). “Who Mediates: The Political Economy of International Conflict Management,” Journal of Peace Research 37:145–165. Brookmire, D., and Sistrunk, F. (1980). “The effects of perceived ability and impartiality of mediator and time pressure on negotiation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 24:311–27. Butterworth, R.L. (1976). Managing Interstate Conflict, 1945–1974. University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, PA, USA. Carnevale, P. (1986). “Strategic choice in mediation,” Negotiation Journal 2:41–56. Carnevale, P.J., Conlon, D., Hanisch, K., and Harris, K. (1989). “Experimental research on the strategic choice model of mediation.” In K. Kressel and D.G. Pruitt (Eds.) Mediation Research: The Process and Effectiveness of Third Party Intervention. San Francisco: JosseyBass, Inc. Kochan, T.A., and Jick, T. (1978). “A theory of public sector mediation process,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 22:209–240. Nortehdge, F., and Donelan, M. (1971). International Disputes: Political Aspects. London: Europa Publications. Pruitt, D.G., and Johnson, D.F. (1970). “Mediation as an aid to facesaving in negotiation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 14:239–246. Princen, T. (1992). Intermediaries in International Conflict. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Rubin, J.Z. (1980). “Experimental research on third party intervention in conflict,” Psychological Bulletin 87:379–391. Small, M., and David Singer, J.D. (1982). Resort to Arms Beverly Hills: Sage.
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Tillema, H.K. (1991). International Armed Conflict Since 1945. Boulder: Westview Press. Touval, S. (1982). The peace brokers – Mediators in the Arab-Israeli conflict 1948–1979. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Touval, S., and I.W. Zartman, (1985). (Eds.) International Mediation in Theory and Practice. Boulder: Westview Press. Wallensteen, P. (2002). Understanding Conflict Resolution. London: Sage. Zacher, M. (1979). International Conflict and Collective Security. New York: Praeger.
Reflections on Simulation and Experimentation in the Study of Negotiation1 JONATHAN WILKENFELD
For almost 20 years, the International Communications and Negotiations Simulations (ICONS) project has been at the forefront of delivering network-based distributed foreign policy-oriented simulations in a variety of educational settings (Starkey & Blake 2001; Starkey & Wilkenfeld 1996; Wilkenfeld & Kaufman 1993).2 Those of us involved in the development of that simulation approach were almost totally absorbed with the technical and pedagogical issues, and it was many years before we began to think of the use of this type of simulation for pure research purposes (exceptions to this included the work of Torney-Purta [1992, 1996, 1998]). Building upon experience with the ICONS Project, my recent work has increasingly involved the use of simulation and experimental approaches for the study of foreign policy decision-making in general, and negotiation and mediation in particular. It is my adventures, and in many cases misadventures, in this new realm that I want to focus on in this article. I begin with some background on experimentation in political science in general, and in international politics in particular. This will be followed by the story of how I became involved with this approach in the first place. Finally, in order to examine what experimentation can and cannot do for us, I will present some preliminary findings that extend our knowledge on one particular phenomenon in international politics, the process of mediation in international crises.
Experimental Design in Political Science While experimentation remains largely outside the mainstream of international relations research, and of political science in general, efforts have been made in recent years to bolster the acceptance of experiment-based research designs within the field. Kinder and Palfrey (1993: 1) offer a treatise on why experimentation should be integrated into political science as a way to “supplement, not replace, traditional empirical methods.” What is it that experiments offer political scientists? Experimentation allows researchers to isolate a crucial International Negotiation Series 2: P. Carnevale and C.K.W. de Dreu (eds.) Methods of Negotiation Research, 93–103 © 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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independent variable by providing the means to control extraneous factors. It allows analysts to look at the effect of that variable by comparing the results of those who were exposed to the variable with the results of an unexposed control group (Campbell & Stanley 1963). Experimentation provides researchers a precise view of a certain phenomenon, a certain relationship. It is this quality that makes experimentation valuable: It is the most reliable means of examining and understanding the nature of a causal relationship, of demonstrating the internal validity of a theory in political science (Laponce 1972; Bositis 1990; McGraw 1993). Experiment-based research provides insights into relationships that are difficult, if not impossible to observe, in any other way. Snyder (1963: 7) argues that the insights and depth of understanding which experimentation can uniquely provide make it an important heuristic tool in the “discovery phase of sciencebuilding.” Because the results of experiments can enlighten analysts’ understanding of how and why a relationship exists and functions, this type of research allows for the refinement of general or preliminary theories in a way distinct from examinations of large-n (quantitative) or small-n (qualitative) empirical data (Brody 1969; Kinder & Palfrey 1993). Without the empirical data that generate initial hypotheses and theories, there is no starting point for experimental research. But experimental research allows for the continued evolution and the “better articulation” of existing theories (Franklin 1996). Some political scientists have come to appreciate the potential benefits of experimentation and have applied it to their research. Bositis records that while only nine articles using experimental research designs appeared in major political science journals between 1924 and 1950, 104 such articles appeared from 1980 to 1989 alone (Bositis 1990: 65). McGraw (1993), too, sees experimentation as a methodology “on the rise” in political science, especially in the areas of public opinion, collective action, public policy, and – relevant to our study – of decision-making. In international politics, the origins of experimental simulation work can be traced to the early work of Geutzkow and his associates beginning in the late 1950s (Guetzkow et al. 1963). His InterNation Simulation set a precedent – all too often forgotten by scholars of international relations – for how experimentation can be used to inform and improve international relations.
The Crisis and Negotiation (CAN) Research Group About 15 years ago, I began a lengthy collaboration with Sarit Kraus, a computer scientist specializing in Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI). (I had
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barely heard of Artificial Intelligence at that point). Kraus had been working on developing an automated agent capable of participating with other automated agents or with human players in the Diplomacy board game. With a strong interest in modeling the negotiation process from a bargaining and game theoretic perspective, she was directed to me by her associates at the University of Maryland Institute for Advanced Computer Studies, some of whom had heard of my work on ICONS. It was apparent from the beginning that although we had very different training, we had a joint interest in better understanding how humans (in my case) and machines (in Kraus’s case) negotiated in difficult (crisis) situations in order to reach mutually beneficial agreements. Whereas my objective was to understand the conditions under which negotiations ended without resort to violence, Kraus’s objective was to understand how intelligent agents (machines) could be endowed with negotiation skills such that they could share scarce resources (tools like printers, Internet access, etc.) or cooperate to perform tasks. In both cases, negotiations are employed in situations where time is critical to some or all parties, resources are scarce, and tasks may require cooperative behavior. We wanted to minimize the amount of time spent on negotiation, and maximize the likelihood of reaching mutually beneficial outcomes (Kraus et al. 1995; Kraus 2001; Wilkenfeld et al. 1995). Our experimental work has been characterized by several features that tend to set it apart from other experimental work in foreign policy analysis (see Geva and Mayhar 1997; Mintz, Geva, Redd, and Carnes 1997; Tetlock & Belkin 1996). First, we have focused exclusively on behavior in crisis (Brecher & Wilkenfeld 2000), with a particular emphasis on the effects shortness of time and high level of threat have on crisis dynamics and outcomes. Second, our subjects had access to an elaborate Decision Support Systems (DSS) which, when properly used, could provide information on the utilities associated with various outcomes and hence enhance the subjects’ ability to maximize expected utility, even under conditions of incomplete information.3 Third, all communications among the participants have taken place in controlled network environments, allowing for detailed analysis of the types of tools they consulted as well as the content and form of their interactions during the negotiation. Together, these features provide a rich environment in which experiments can be run and their results assessed.4 At the core of our experimental work to date is the development of a strategic model of negotiation with an accompanying decision support system (DSS) based on three different scenarios: a hostage crisis involving an Indian plane hijacked by Sikh separatists and forced to land in Pakistan (see Kraus, Wilkenfeld and Zlotkin 1995, Wilkenfeld, Kraus and Holley 1999), a fishing
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dispute based on the Canada-Spain dispute of 1995 (Wilkenfeld et al. 1999 and forthcoming), and the Ecuador/Peru Border Dispute of 1981 (Wilkenfeld et al., forthcoming, and below).
Experiments in the Study of Mediation in International Crises Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille (1991) define mediation as “a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law” (1991: 8). Bercovitch and Langley (1993) note that this behavioral definition is most useful because of its emphasis on the key components of mediation – the disputants, the third party, and the specific conflict resolution context. While there is no general consensus, the literature on mediation seems to have converged on three basic roles that mediators can play in a negotiation, and most authors agree that the roles change as the mediator and disputants gain information and skill (Princen 1992: 65). The first role is of the mediator as communicator or facilitator (Touval & Zartman 1985; Burton 1984; Hopmann 1996), serving as a channel of communications between two parties when a stalemate has been reached or when communications have broken down and face-to-face negotiations are not possible. This type of mediation is also referred to as third-party consultation (Fisher 1972; Keashly & Fisher 1996; Kelman 1992) good offices, or process facilitation (Hopmann 1996). The second role defined by Touval and Zartman is mediator as formulator. Here the mediator provides a substantive contribution to the negotiations in order to assist the conflicting parties in conceiving of a way to resolve their dispute when the parties reach a rigid impasse in the negotiation process. Hopmann (1996) suggests that this role is particularly effective when the parties’ emotions are running high. He highlights certain processes that the mediator as formulator may use to propose solutions: asking the parties to brainstorm, suggesting that issues be fractionated or linked together, inventing new solutions, and so forth. The third role is that of the mediator as manipulator. In addition to formulating solutions, this type of mediator uses its domestic, regional, or international position and its leverage – “resources of power, influence, and persuasion” – to manipulate the parties into agreement (Touval & Zartman 1985: 12). The mediator as manipulator becomes a party to the solution, if not the dispute itself,5 and often needs to augment the appeal of its solution by using carrotand-stick measures (adding and subtracting benefits to/from the proposed
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solution) (Touval & Zartman 1985, Zartman & Touval 1996). Hopmann indicates that only a powerful mediator can play this role, and he cites two modes of mediator involvement as manipulator: Influencing the direction of the negotiation process by raising the costs of disagreement and the rewards for agreement; Manipulating the international environment to push the parties toward agreement. From the experimental perspective, the question to be explored is how different types of mediation, as opposed to no mediation, impact the utility maximizing behavior of negotiators, the pace of crisis abatement, and the satisfaction with mediation.6
Experimental Findings on Mediation in International Crises The experimental environment in which mediation in international crisis was studied consists of a generalized decision support system for individual decision-makers, a crisis simulation scenario, and a communications system for both negotiators and mediators.7 A scenario loosely based on the Ecuador/Peru border dispute of 1981 was developed for the simulation. This case, part of an ongoing protracted conflict that began in 1935 and ultimately terminated in 1998 produced a total of five international crises.8 It involved an historical instance of successful mediation by the Organization of American States (OAS), which called upon the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to intervene. Four possible outcomes were built into the simulated negotiation: territorial division, cease fire, arbitration, and status quo. In part, we sought to establish the reliability of our experimental environment through our ability to replicate in broad general terms the outcome of this historical case. 212 students enrolled in international relations courses at the University of Maryland during 2000 and 2001 participated in simulations of a one-on-one crisis negotiation between Ecuador and Peru. Half of the students negotiated on behalf of Peru while the others represented Ecuador.9 The experimental research uncovered a relationship between mediation and the achievement of agreement, while also revealing that mediation leads to greater satisfaction with the crisis outcome. While we consider these effects of mediation to be consistent with the goals of crisis management and with the negotiators’ expectations of the effect of mediation, our subsequent analyses of mediation style demonstrate that it is necessary to attach some caveats to a general endorsement of mediation in crisis management. While both facilitative and manipulative mediation are conducive to generating agreements, and agreements that are considered satisfactory to negotiators, only manipulative mediation has a positive effect on the level of benefits
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associated with crisis termination and on the duration of a crisis. Data from the Ecuador/Peru simulations indicate that only manipulative mediation meets the negotiators’ expectations of leading them to a more beneficial outcome than they could have otherwise secured, while facilitation may actually lower average benefits – a situation that could lead to discontent among disputants and, possibly, recurrent crises. In addition, the more rapid conclusion of a crisis – brought about only by manipulation – is an essential component of crisis management, given the relationship between prolonged crisis negotiations and the likelihood of escalating violence and war. We conclude that manipulative mediation, as compared with facilitation or no mediation, is an effective means of crisis management. Our endorsement of manipulation must be tempered, though, by at least two factors that need to be explored more rigorously in the future. First, our analysis has only looked at the two extreme styles of mediation: facilitation and manipulation. It may be the case that formulative mediation, which falls between these two extreme styles, is an even more effective management tool under certain circumstances. A second concern with manipulative mediation is about both the short – and long-term implications of solutions developed and forced upon parties by an outsider, fearing that these situations can lead to feelings of alienation and resentment of the mediator, of the process of negotiation, and even of the other parties involved in the negotiation (Princen 1992; Kelman 1992; Keashly & Fisher 1996). While our findings on negotiator satisfaction do not reveal resentment of manipulation vis-à-vis facilitation, greater consideration of the unintended consequences that could accompany the adoption of manipulative mediation as a crisis management tool is necessary before we can conclude that manipulation is an appropriate – perhaps the most appropriate – means of managing international crises. Our current findings, though, do indicate that manipulation shows potential as a key approach to mitigating the violence and instability associated with international crises.10
Prospects and Limitations for Experimental/Simulation Work in the Study of Negotiation Foreign policy analysis is plagued by a combination of relatively small n = s and relatively large numbers of variables potentially contributing to the foreign policy decision-making process. On the surface, experimental work can successfully address both of these issues. With a more or less unlimited supply of willing undergraduates as subjects, our n is virtually limitless. By care-
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fully constructing our simulation models and controlling our experimental environments, we can limit the number of variables we have to consider in any given experimental run. If this is the case, why are there not more eager scholars flocking to the simulation laboratories, and why are those of us who are there having so much trouble? First, I would argue that the transition from simulation environment, whose primary application in political science is for instruction and training, to the experimental laboratory, is not a simple one. First and foremost, most of us lack any real training in experimental design (how many graduate programs in political science offer courses in this area?). What to the experimental psychologist seems natural requires of the political scientist a very real investment of time and energy, and a lot of trial and error. Thus, even with the prospects of great advancements in knowledge seemingly at our fingertips, too few of us venture into the unknown terrain of the experimental laboratory. Moreover, once in the lab, we are faced with a host of other seemingly insurmountable obstacles. Consider our subjects: typically college freshmen (a few months out of high school), or, if we are lucky, upperclassmen. Cluttering their brains on any particular day are the aftermath of the previous evening’s indiscretions and plans for tonight’s, swarming hormones, extreme hunger, thirst, and a strong need for a cigarette (if not worse), not to mention their at best neutral positions – if not downright hostility – toward having to participate in the experiment in the first place. Combine that with their relatively uninformed position on the nature of the international system in general, and foreign policy decision-making in particular, and you are lucky if you can get anything that resembles replicable results.11 That is not to say that real-world decision-makers do not have extraneous things on their minds, but at least we know that some of their attention is focused on policy issues. Even if these two problems could somehow be neutralized, the issue of the simulation itself remains. We know from the simulation literature that a model should be detailed enough to represent the important aspects of the reality it is meant to represent, but not so detailed as to overwhelm the participant with information (even though we know that that is exactly what happens to real-world decision-makers, particularly in crisis). This turns out to be an extremely difficult undertaking. In our own case, we have some evidence to suggest that in a previous round of experiments involving a model of a fishing dispute roughly resembling the dispute between Canada and Spain in 1995, we not only packed the model with excessive detail, but then superimposed an elaborate mediation process. The results showed that the subjects were not coping, and were therefore making decisions based on only partial use of the decision support tools they had available to them. If you add to all this the
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expense and time involved in the design and execution of a series of experiments, it is not surprising that relatively few political scientists venture into this domain. Given this rather bleak picture, where do I see simulation and experimental design fitting into the array of approaches now dominating the study of foreign policy analysis and negotiations? At the level of political psychology, there are simply some characteristics of decision-makers and decision-making that we are never going to be able to study systematically with anything approaching a large enough n to allow for careful statistical work. It is here, under controlled laboratory environments, that we can begin to make progress in understanding how decision-makers cope with and process information in crisis versus non-crisis environments, how third parties can impact the course of and outcomes to contentious situations, how actor attributes such as power (of various sorts) and willingness to compromise affect their negotiation strategies and behavior, and the circumstances under which violent strategies are chosen. While nothing can substitute for the data we can glean from in-depth comparative case studies, the experimental environment – when properly specified – can help us fill in the gaps in our knowledge and ultimately allow us to generalize. But in order to do this right, we must begin to properly train the next generation of political scientists in simulation and experimental techniques. This is not everyone’s cup of tea, nor should it be. It does offer an important alternative to the cross national and case study approaches that dominate the field of foreign policy analysis today. But we lack the experimental infrastructure, the culture of the laboratory, and perhaps most importantly, the channels by which experimental results can become important sources of information as we seek to better understand the behavior of political decision-makers. And perhaps most importantly, we need to be able to demonstrate more convincingly that results obtained in experimental simulation environments can help us better understand the behavior of real decision-makers in critical situations. Much work remains to be done on this front.
Notes 1. This work has been supported by the National Science Foundation under grant IIS0208608, and the US Institute of Peace (under grants SG-35–95 and SG-52–00). Parts of this paper are drawn from Wilkenfeld (2002) and Wilkenfeld, Young, Asal, and Quinn (forthcoming). 2. For additional information on the ICONS simulations, see http://www.icons.umd.edu. 3. For a discussion of decision support systems in general, and their application to negotiation in particular, see Wilkenfeld et al. 1995.
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4. For details on our experimental procedures, see Santmire et al. (1998). 5. Hopmann (1996) qualifies the notion of the manipulative mediator being a party to the dispute by stating that this mediator Aalmost@ assumes the role of a disputant in the negotiation process. 6. In the simulations conducted thus far, only facilitation and manipulation are examined. 7. The experimental environment is described more fully in Santmire et al. (1998), Wilkenfeld et al. (1995, 2001). 8. For a discussion of these crises in detail, see Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000). The scenario and decision support systems, developed by Kathleen Young, David Quinn, and Chris Frain, are available from the author upon request. A more extended discussion of this research project appears in Wilkenfeld, Young, and Quinn (2001). 9. For details on the experimental procedures, see Wilkenfeld, Young, Asal, and Quinn (forthcoming). 10. For a more extended discussion of these experiments on mediator style in international crises, see Wilkenfeld, Young, Asal, and Quinn (forthcoming). 11. I am reminded of one of the very first works I became familiar with in simulation, the study by Hermann and Hermann (1967), which used the Inter-nation Simulation (INS) to attempt to replication the conditions leading to the outbreak of World War I. They checked for seemingly everything, yet curiously they couldn’t get war to break out. As it turned out, the student playing one of the key roles was an avowed pacifist, and simply wouldn’t go to war under any circumstances.
References Bercovitch, J.J., Anagnoson, T., and Wille, D.L. (1991). “Some conceptual issues and empirical trends in the study of successful mediation in international relations,” Journal of Peace Research 28 (1): 7–17. Bercovitch, J., and Langley J. (1993). “The nature of the dispute and the effectiveness of international mediation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37(4): 670–99. Bositis, D.A. (1990). Research Designs for Political Science: Contrivance and Demonstration in Theory and Practice. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Brecher, M., and Wilkenfeld, J. (2000). A Study of Crisis. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, paperback with CD-Rom edition. Brody, R. (1969). “The Study of International Politics qua Science: The Emphasis on Methods and Techniques.” In K. Knorr and J.N. Rosenau (Eds.) Contending Approaches to International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 110–128. Burton, J.W. (1984). Global Conflict: The Domestic Sources of International Crisis. Brighton, Sussex, Great Britain: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd. Campbell, D.T., and Stanley, J.C. (1963). Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research. Chicago: Rand-McNally. Fisher, R.J. (1972). “Third Party Consultation: A Method for the Study and Resolution of Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 16:1:67–94. Franklin, A. (1996). Experiment, Right or Wrong. New York: Cambridge University Press. Geva, N., and Mayhar, J. (1997). “The Cognitive Calculus of Decisions on the Use of Force.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.
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Guetzkow, H., et al. (1963). Simulations in International Relations: Developments for Research and Teaching. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Hermann, C., and Hermann, M. (1967). “An Attempt to Simulate the Outbreak of World War I,” American Political Science Review 61:406–416. Hopmann, P.T. (1996). The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press. Keashly, L., and Fisher, R.J. (1996). “A Contingency Perspective on Conflict Interventions: Theoretical and Practical Considerations.” In J. Bercovitch (Ed.) Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 235–261. Kelman, H.C. (1992). “Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner.” In J. Bercovitch and J.Z. Rubin (Eds.) Mediation in International Relations. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 64–96. Kinder, D., and Palfrey, T. (1993). “On Behalf of an Experimental Political Science.” In D. Kinder and T. Palfrey (Eds.) Experimental Foundations of Political Science. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1–39. Kraus, S. (2001). Strategic Negotiation in Multiagent Environments. Cambridge: MIT Press. Kraus, S., Wilkenfeld, J., and Zlotkin, G. (1995). “Multiagent Negotiation under Time Constraints” Journal of Artificial Intelligence 75:297–345. Laponce, J.A. (1972). “Experimenting: A Two-Person Game between Man and Nature.” In J.A. Laponce and P. Smoker (Eds.) Experimentation and Simulation in Political Science. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. 3–15. McGraw, K. (1993). “Political Methodology: Research Design and Experimental Methods.” In R.E. Goodin and H.D. Klingemann (Eds.) A New Handbook of Political Science. New York: Oxford University Press. 769–786. Mintz, A., Geva, N., Redd, S., and Carnes, A. (1997). “The Effect of Dynamic and Static Choice Sets on Political Decision Making,” American Political Science Review 91:553–566. Princen, T. (1992). Intermediaries in International Conflict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Santmire, Tara, Wilkenfeld, J., Kraus, S., Holley, K., Santmire, Toni, and Gleditsch, K. (1998). “The Impact of Cognitive Diversity on Crisis Negotiations,” Political Psychology 19(4):721–748. Snyder, R. (1963) “Some Perspectives on the Use of Experimental Techniques in the Study of International Relations.” In H. Guetzkow et al. (Eds.) Simulations in International Relations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 1–23. Starkey, B. and Blake, E. (2001). “Simulation in International Relations Education,” Simulation and Gaming 32(4): 537–551. Starkey, B. and Wilkenfeld, J. (1996). “Project ICONS: Computer-assisted Negotiations for the IR Classroom,” International Studies Notes 21(1):25–29. Tetlock, P., and Belkin, A. (Eds.) (1996). Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Torney-Purta, J. (1992). “Cognitive Representations of the Political System in Adolescents: The Continuum from Pre-Novice to Expert,” New Directions for Child Development 56:11–24. Torney-Purta, J. (1996). “Conceptual Change Among Adolescents using Computer Networks and Peer Collaboration in Studying International Political Issues.” In S. Vosniadou et al. (Eds.) International Perspectives on the Design of Technology Supported Environments. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 203–219. Torney-Purta, J. (1998). “Evaluating Programs Designed to Teach International Content and Negotiation Skills,” International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice 3(1): 77–97.
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Touval, S., and Zartman, I.W. (1984). “Introduction: Mediation in Theory.” In S. Touval and I.W. Zartman (Eds.) International Mediation in Theory and Practice. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 7–17. Wilkenfeld, J., and Kaufman, J. (1993). “Political Science: Network Simulation in International Politics,” Social Science Computer Review 11(4):464–476. Wilkenfeld, J., Kraus, S., and Holley, K. (1999). “The Use of Decision Support Systems in Crisis Negotiations.” In Kent, A. (Ed.) Encyclopedia of Library and Information Science. New York: Marcel Dekker. Wilkenfeld, J., Kraus, S., Holley, K., and Harris, M. (1995). “GENIE: A Decision Support System for Crisis Negotiations,” Decision Support Systems 14:369–391. Wilkenfeld, J., Kraus, S., Santmire, Tara, and Frain, C. (1999). “The Role of Mediation in Conflict Management: Conditions for Successful Resolution.” Paper presented at the annual meeting, International Studies Association. Wilkenfeld, J., Young, K., Asal, V. and Quinn, D. (Forthcoming). “Mediating International Crises: Cross-National and Experimental Perspectives,” Journal of Conflict Resolution. Wilkenfeld, J., Young, K., and Quinn, D. (2001). “Mediating International Crises in the 20th Century.” Paper presented at the International Studies Association Meetings Hong Kong. Zartman, I.W., and Touval, S. (1996). “International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era.” In C.A. Crocker and F.O. Hampson with P.A. all, Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. 445–461.
Quantitative Coding of Negotiation Behavior LAURIE R. WEINGART, MARA OLEKALNS and PHILIP L. SMITH
We have spent most of our academic careers studying negotiation processes directly. Why? Because we are crazy? Because no one else will do it? Perhaps, but we like to think we study negotiation processes because the approach provides unique insights into how negotiations unfold. Direct examination of negotiation processes provides information about what negotiators actually do, rather than what they planned to do or what they thought they did. The resulting data can be used to capture general strategies employed by negotiators (through frequency analysis), how they employed those strategies (through sequential analysis), and when they did so (through phase analysis). Besides gaining a better understanding of the negotiation process itself, this information can be used to predict whether negotiators reach agreement as well as the quality of their agreements, and to determine how negotiators can be better trained to effectively negotiate. Much of our research has been carried out using an experimental paradigm designed to test the relationships between the negotiation context, negotiation behaviors, and outcomes. We videotape dyads and groups negotiating in roleplay exercises. The videotapes then become our primary source of data. In this article we review the steps that extract usable data from these videotapes and the lessons we have learned along the way. In this article, which builds on previous discussions of studying group (Weingart, 1997) and negotiation (Brett, Weingart, and Olekalns 2004) processes, we review our experience working with one large negotiation dataset, Towers Market II, to illustrate two steps within the larger research process: developing a coding scheme and coding the data. We then go on to discuss some of the issues that need to be resolved before data analysis begins.
Coding Scheme Development The first step in studying negotiation processes is to determine what types of behavior are theoretically relevant. This step is not to be taken lightly, as it has a profound influence on one’s ability to test and support hypotheses. International Negotiation Series 2: P. Carnevale and C.K.W. de Dreu (eds.) Methods of Negotiation Research, 105–119 © 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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For example, in our early research, we somewhat surprisingly found little or no relationship between information-sharing and quality of agreements (Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman, and Carroll 1990). We realized that this may have occurred because we had not distinguished between different types of information. Subsequent studies proved us correct: Priority information exchange positively influenced the quality of agreements whereas information about preferences and positions negatively (or neutrally) influenced them (Hyder, Prietula, and Weingart 2000; Olekalns & Smith 2000; Olekalns, Smith and Walsh 1996; Weingart, Hyder, and Prietula 1996). In this section, we consider the choices a researcher interested in negotiation processes must make in developing a coding scheme. In making these choices, researchers need to consider three questions: Should the scheme focus on task or relational aspects of process? Should it be theory – or datadriven? What steps should we take to ensure reliability? For more general discussions regarding how to construct a coding scheme see Folger, Hewes, and Poole (1984), Hewes (1979), Poole, Folger, and Hewes (1987) and Trujillo (1986). Level of coding When coding negotiations, we can focus on two aspects of behavior: their impact on outcomes and their impact on the underlying relationship. These aspects of behavior are not mutually exclusive. Rather, the issue is one of relative emphasis. Whereas coding schemes that evolved from negotiation theory emphasize outcomes, those that evolved from communication theory emphasize the relational aspects of strategy choice. Ultimately, there is considerable overlap between the kinds of tactics that researchers working from these two perspectives code for. The approaches differ in that coding schemes based on negotiation theory have been developed bottom up, with functions inferred from tactics, whereas schemes developed based on communication theory have been developed top-down, with functions driving the identification of tactics. The more important decision, for researchers, is which level of analysis best suits their needs and how extensive their list of tactics should be. Coding schemes stemming from negotiation theory have their origins in work by Pruitt and colleagues in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Carnevale, Pruitt, and Seilheimer 1981; Pruitt 1981; Pruitt & Lewis 1975) and Bales’ work in the 1950s (Bales 1950). These schemes focus on the substantive aspects of negotiation: value claiming and value creation. Such schemes code for specific tactics such as threats, offers, questions regarding preferences and prior-
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ities, creative solutions, and information seeking. These specific behaviors can, however, be linked to one of two strategic orientations – integrative or distributive – and so convey implicit information about the underlying relationship. The scheme that we developed for our Towers Market research is an example of this type of coding scheme (see Table 1 for the list of coding categories). Table 1. Towers II Negotiation Behaviors in Strategy Clusters Strategy
Behaviors included in strategy cluster
Integrative Information
States issue preferences States issue priorities Asks questions about preferences Asks questions about priorities Off-task comments (relationship building)
3 4 8 9 33
Create Value
Makes multi-issue offer Shows insight Notes general differences Notes general similarities Makes positive comments Suggests compromise Suggests package trade-offs Other process suggestions
2 13 17 18 21 24 25 30
Distributive Information
Facts Asks for bottom line Asks about others’ substantiation (attack arguments) Asks miscellaneous task related questions Notes differences Negative reactions Suggests discuss one issue
7 10 11 12 15 22 23
Claim Value
Makes single issue offer Refers to bottom line Substantiates Position Refers to mutual interests to influence other party Threats Refers to power Suggests creative solutions to meet own interests
1 5 6 14 19 20 31
Push to closure
Time checks Notes similarities
29 16
Process management
Suggests using reciprocity Suggests vote Suggests to move on
26 27 28
a
Numbers correspond to those in Figure 1.
Category Numbera
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Figure 1. Towers II Correspondence Analysis Results 2.5
Distributive information 15
2
23 16
1.5
Push to closure
12
7,10
1
29
22 11
0.5 17
21
0 –0.5
24 30 18
13
–1
Create Value
–1.5 –2
20 2 25
19
6,1,5 31
14
Claim Value
33,9 4,3 Integrative 8 information
28
26 27 Process Management
–2.5 –3 –2.5 a
–2
–1.5
–1
–0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Numbers correspond to those in Table 1.
Communication theory based schemes start by considering the relational functions served by communication: either to highlight similarities and bring people together or to highlight differences and to push people apart. In the context of negotiations, this has led to the identification of three categories of negotiation behaviors, integrating, attacking and defending, and a set of specific tactics that fit within these categories (e.g., Donohue, Diez and Hamilton 1984; Putnam & Jones 1982). Unlike early schemes derived from negotiation theory, those derived from communication theory code not just for substantive tactics but also for relational tactics (e.g., showing support for the other party). In addition, communication researchers hypothesize that communication can serve two functions: one is to provide a response to the other party; the other is to cue the other party’s subsequent behavior. Thus, it is possible to code any speaking turn twice, thereby capturing both aspects of communication (see, for example, Donohue et al. 1984; Olekalns & Smith 2000). Such an approach is especially useful when speaking turns are long and incorporate several different tactics.
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Developing and refining the coding scheme Coding schemes can be either theoretically derived (e.g., Weingart et al., 1996) or developed using a more grounded approach, derived from observation of negotiations themselves (refer to Putnam’s chapter in same volume). However, the distinction between traditional theory-driven approaches and more data-driven approaches is necessarily blurred in practice. Human behavior is typically too complex for a researcher to be able to anticipate all relevant behaviors without some direct experience of how people interact. Coding schemes and their associated manuals should be considered living documents, open to revision and clarification during the development process, but then locked in when coding begins. We have used a hybrid strategy of coding scheme development in order to capitalize on the benefits of both approaches. For example, when we initially developed the Towers Market coding scheme (Weingart, Bennett, and Brett 1993) we used negotiation theories and textbooks as well as existing coding schemes to identify theoretically important negotiation behaviors (e.g., Lewicki, Saunders, and Minton 1985; Pruitt 1981; Pruitt & Carnevale 1993; Walton & McKersie 1965). These yielded a set of task-specific behaviors such as information exchange, offers, tradeoffs across issues, and argumentation. Because we were also interested in how group members managed the process, we added several different types of process statements. After developing the categories, we tested them out on some sample transcripts. Some categories worked, others did not, so we altered the coding scheme accordingly. The next step involves refining the coding scheme. This is best done by having your coders independently code sections of transcripts and then checking for ease of usage and agreement. This will help reveal categories that are too broad (when types of behavior that seem quite different are similarly classified), and others that are too narrow or too similar to other categories (when deciding between two categories for a given behavior is repeatedly a problem). Relevant questions include: Can coders differentiate between the categories when applying them? Are there categories for all relevant behaviors? Can the scheme be applied reliably (discussed below)? If not, is it because of problems in training the coders or in the design of the scheme? Coding data In parallel with developing this coding scheme we developed a coding manual, that is, a set of application rules/guidelines for the coders, including identification of the unit to be coded (thought, sentence, speaking turn), category
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labels, definitions, and rules of thumb for distinguishing between categories and using context (i.e., statements surrounding the unit of interest) to interpret meaning. Our coding manuals typically include general rules about unitizing and coding as well as definitions of content categories, examples, and exceptions to the rules. This manual is used to train coders and to identify problems in applying the coding scheme. In particular, if disagreements about the application of a particular code appear to be haphazard and difficult to resolve, then the problem may reside in the design of the coding scheme itself. Categories might overlap or be missing. These definitional issues need to be resolved before coding proper begins. There are two discrete steps in coding process data: 1) unitizing the data, or identifying the unit of analysis to be coded, and 2) content coding the data, or applying labels to units as a means of capturing what occurred. Next, we discuss issues of unitizing and unitizing reliability, followed by a discussion of content coding reliability and validity. Unitizing Coders must first identify the unit of analysis for coding. This can vary from a single utterance to an interaction between two individuals. Speaking turns, that is, units that include all actions and/or statements made by an individual while he or she holds the floor, are often used when studying negotiation because they allow us to examine how one negotiator responds to another. Speaking turns can be subdivided into acts, that is, identifiable ideas or thoughts, which can be used when interested in the content of the dialogue said rather than the interactive nature of the negotiation. In the Towers II data, we unitized at the level of acts, that is, we coded each identifiable idea, but also retained information about speaking turns to maximize our flexibility. Note that one speaking turn can be made up of several thought units. Decisions regarding choice of unit type must be linked to the research question being asked, with special emphasis on the appropriate level of analysis and to the question of where in action and speech relevant meaning resides. Meaning can be lost if we select too small a unit, because the individual statements convey a different meaning to that conveyed by a speaking turn. We can also add redundancy as a result of separating immediate restatements, that which simply repeat previous tactics rather than adding new information. In contrast, by selecting too large a unit, information can be lost. If multiple categories of statements are made during a speaking turn, the researcher must decide which code best represents the behavior within a given unit. Dominance schemes, which identify the kinds of behavior that are expected to have the greatest impact on the interaction, can be developed to
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provide rules of thumb for these decisions (e.g., Weingart et al. 1993). Alternatively, the first or the last code within the unit might be retained. Regardless of the approach that is used, the risk of losing valuable information remains. Coders must meet two criteria of reliability: unitizing reliability and interpretive reliability. In both cases, the level of reliability places an upper bound on a coding scheme’s predictive ability. Unitizing reliability, the degree of agreement regarding identification of the units to be categorized, is needed to ensure that multiple coders of the same interaction will be coding from the same set of units. Unitizing reliability is most typically assessed using Guetzkow’s U, which calculates the difference between the number of units identified by an independent coder and the “true” number of units (the average of two coders’ estimates) using a simple equation U = (O1 – O2)/(O1 + O2 )
where U * 100 is the percent of disagreement and O is the observer or coder (Folger et al. 1984; Guetzkow 1950). For example, if coder 1 identified 75 units and coder 2 identified 85 units in the same transcript, Guetzkow’s U = (85 – 75)/(85 + 75) = .062, meaning that there was a 6% discrepancy between the number of units identified by either coder and the “true” number of units. Interpretive reliability refers to consistency in applying labels to the units and is typically measured across coders. That is, multiple coders independently code the same text, and their assignment of categories is compared for consistency. Thus, consistency of interpretation is assessed in terms of the reliable application of interpretive rules. It is also useful to obtain consistency measures within coders across time to check for drift in application of the coding scheme. The most common and complete global measure is Cohen’s Kappa (1960), which determines the level of agreement corrected for agreements due to chance. Cohen presents the following formula to calculate Kappa: Kappa = (P' – PC)/(1 – PC)
where P' is the observed percentage agreement among coders and PC is the proportion of chance agreement. Assuming that each unit to be coded has the same probability of accurate classification, then the probability of chance agreement (PC) is 1/k, where k is the number of categories in the coding scheme (Folger et al. 1984). For example, if there are 5 categories and the coders agreed on 75% of the codes assigned (P' = .75), then Kappa = (.75 – .2)/(1 – .2) = .6875. Additional details for how to calculate Kappa can be found in Cohen’s original article (1960). More detailed discussions of Kappa can be found in Fleiss (1971) and Folger et al. (1984).
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Our experience suggests that, to ensure high interpretive reliability, it is best to conduct unitizing and coding in separate passes through the data. Doing both simultaneously may result in a disagreement about what code to apply because coders have unitized (identified the speaking turns) slightly differently rather then because they are using the codes differently. This might occur because some coders treat back channels (“uh-huh,” “okay,” or “I see”) as substantive breaks in the flow of conversation and so unitize around them whereas others do not. This problem can be avoided by completing the unitizing first, checking for unitizing reliability, and then content coding from the same set of pre-unitized tapes or transcripts. Interpretive validity Interpretive validity refers to the degree to which a coding scheme taps into the information it was designed to obtain. Different approaches have been used to validate coding schemes, depending on the goals of the research. Poole and McPhee (1994) identify three types of claims that might be made in an attempt to demonstrate validity of a coding scheme. These claims are linked to the source of interpretation of the actions being studied: 1) observerprivileged: where the researcher seeks to explain interaction from the outside without reference to subjects’ perspectives, 2) generalized subject-privileged: focusing on shared meanings for members of a culture, and 3) restricted subject-privileged: with the goal of identifying idiosyncratic meanings for people in a particular group or relationship. As one moves from observer to restricted subject-privileged approaches, more input from participants and more intimate knowledge about the work group (as might be experienced by a group member) is required.
Issues to Resolve before Analyzing your Data So far, we have provided a “how to” for coding data. Having gotten this far, the obvious question is “what next?” Before one can start analyzing the data, there are still a number of issues that need to be resolved. How this is done will be determined, in part, by the kinds of research questions that one is asking. In this section, we consider three related issues: aggregating data, level of analysis and time segmentation. Aggregating data The first issue to consider is whether to focus on individual behaviors or to aggregate over individuals and focus on the dyad or group. Is it theoretically
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important to know how many times each negotiator in a dyad or group uses a specific tactic (e.g. making a demand) or can the hypotheses be tested by knowing, overall, the number of times that demands were made in a negotiation? In our research, we have largely focused on behaviors aggregated to the level of the dyad or group. This has enabled us to provide a global description of regularities in negotiators’ behaviors and the relationships between the negotiating context, negotiators’ behavior, and their outcomes. It allows us to ask whether, in general, integrative outcomes are associated with different kinds of strategies rather than distributive outcomes or impasses. It also enables us to question whether, in general, cooperatively-motivated negotiators behave differently from individualistically-motivated negotiators. Our experiences suggest that while this level of analysis captures many important aspects of negotiators’ behavior there are circumstances under which an individual level analysis is important, for example when negotiators differ in terms of power (Giebels, DeDreu, and Van de Vliert 2000) or social motives (Weingart, Brett, and Olekalns 2002). In our research, we have manipulated the composition of negotiating dyads and groups. At the level of the dyad, this means that two negotiators can have similar attributes, for example, both are cooperatively-motivated, or they can have mixed attributes, that is, one negotiator is cooperatively motivated while the other is individualistically motivated. An interesting question is how dyad or group composition affects negotiation processes: Do cooperatively-oriented negotiators behave the same way regardless of the characteristics of the other negotiator or do they adapt their behaviors? To answer questions such as this, it is necessary to shift from analyzing dyadic or group behaviors to individual behaviors within those groups. Independent of the content of the coding scheme, researchers need to decide how detailed their coding scheme should be. The answer to this question again depends on the level of your theory – whether global or specific behavior is of interest. If your hypotheses are about integrative or distributive behavior generally, you might want to classify comments using those broad categories. We find it is more effective to use more detailed coding categories and then aggregate these categories to the more general level during the analysis phase. This approach makes it less likely that two functionally different behaviors will be subsumed under one code. However, the more detailed the coding scheme the more likely we are to see coding errors and low reliability. Increasing the number of categories also means that the frequency of each category decreases, resulting in sparse data sets that create problems for most statistical methods. There are several approaches for aggregating tactics into more general groupings. You may choose to adopt a theory-driven approach, aggregating
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behaviors that theories classify as integrative or distributive. A pitfall for this kind of approach is that it neglects actual usage and so may group behaviors that are not associated with each other in actual negotiations. Empirical analysis thus provides an important test of our theoretical assumptions about the function and use of specific tactics. For example, we have found that the use of positional information (i.e., information about what outcome a negotiator desires on a given issue) clusters with a focus on offers and concessions, whereas argumentation clusters with threats and demands (Olekalns & Smith, 2003). In a more theoretically-driven approach, we likely would have combined positional information and argumentation into one category (distributive information exchange) and offers, demands, and concessions into a second category (offer management). To empirically determine clusters of tactics, we use correspondence analysis (Greenacre 1993). This analysis establishes relationships between tactics, based on their frequency of use. It is conceptually similar to factor analysis, but developed specifically for use with count (frequency) data. Figure 1 shows the output from a correspondence analysis of Towers II data (the mapping of data points in the two-dimensional space) with six clusters identified and interpreted. There are no hard and fast rules for the interpretation of this output. Visual inspection determines clusters based on (a) physical proximity and (b) thematic fit. Some categories were mapped in unexpected places. We had to go back to the transcripts and consider what negotiators were actually doing to help us decide how to cluster those behaviors. For example, in Figure 1, asking questions about priorities (category 9), and references to power (category 20) were mapped near one another but negotiation theory would suggest the former is an integrative behavior and the latter a distributive behavior. Rather than put these two categories of behavior in the same cluster, we looked for other proximal behavior that might cluster with each theoretically. As a result we were able to identify theoretically meaningful and proximal clusters of negotiation behavior. Levels of analysis The second issue concerns the level of analysis. In analyzing your data, you can frame your hypotheses in terms of the frequency with which strategies are used, how they are sequenced or how strategies evolve over time. Each of these levels of analysis answers slightly different questions. In this section, we provide a brief overview of the issues associated with each level of analysis (see Brett, Weingart and Olekalns, 2004; Weingart & Olekalns, 2004). Our other article, to be published in the next issue of International Negotiation
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(10-1), considers the modeling of sequences in greater detail (Smith, Olekalns and Weingart). These three approaches should not be considered as mutually exclusive. Rather, each provides different kinds of information about negotiation processes and helps build a more complete picture of what negotiators do (e.g., Olekalns & Smith 2000). Looking at the frequency with which negotiators use specific strategies is by far the most common approach to analyzing negotiators’ interactions. Using this approach, one simply counts the number of times that a given strategy (for example, a threat), is used. Focusing on the frequency with which strategies are used tells us about the global approach used by the negotiator(s). The major shortcoming of this approach is that it reflects a static view of negotiation processes: counting the number of times that types of strategies occur does not tell us about how negotiations unfold over time. Therefore, while we can draw very broad conclusions about the relationship between external factors and strategy choices, as well as between strategy choices and outcomes, we cannot learn about the patterning of strategies over time. Analyzing frequencies helps us to answer questions such as: Does the negotiating context affect the kind of strategies that are used? Are specific strategies linked to different kinds of outcomes? There are two approaches that allow us to better capture the dynamic nature of negotiations. The first focuses on how one negotiator responds to another, that is, on how strategies are sequenced. Studying sequences allows us to examine patterns in negotiators’ interactions at two levels: sequence structure and sequence content. For example, we ask whether negotiators match (reciprocate) or mismatch (fail to reciprocate) each other’s behaviors. This tells us whether negotiators are attempting to sustain or redirect the prevailing strategic orientation. A second layer of information is provided by examining the content of these sequences. Analyzing content tells us about the causes and consequences of matching, and helps us to understand how negotiators break off distributive spirals or derail integrative processes. This approach also helps us to develop more complex models of negotiators’ interactions: It provides insights into how negotiators constrain each other’s actions and into how they direct the negotiation towards obtaining their preferred outcomes. One important insight that we have gained from this type of analysis is that sequences that are influential in determining the outcome of negotiations often incorporate strategies that are not frequently used in their own right. This level of analysis thus complements rather than duplicates frequency level analyses. Our paper on Markov chain analyses provides an introduction to analyzing strategy sequences (Smith, Olekahns, and Weingart, forthcoming).
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Although sequences incorporate a temporal dimension, the focus on immediate actions and reactions means that the analysis is of short-term effects. Analyzing negotiation phases also captures the temporal aspect of negotiations. However, the time frame for examining the consequences of strategies is a longer-term one, allowing consideration of the ebb and flow of the negotiation over time. There are two approaches to analyzing negotiation phases. The first, a stage model approach, treats negotiations as divisible into discrete time segments and considers how the frequency of different strategies changes across segments. The second approach, called an episodic approach, looks for naturally occurring phases: Phases are clearly identifiable interaction sequences with explicit beginnings and ends (Baxter 1982). They are defined on the basis of ‘runs’ of strategies (i.e., the continuous use of a single strategy) with transitions between phases identified on the basis of interruptions to extended runs of the same strategy. In the following section we consider the methodological and empirical issues associated with adopting either of these approaches. Comparing sequence and phase analyses can highlight negotiations in which these temporal aspects of negotiation work together and reinforce each other and those in which they work in opposition. Time segmentation Researchers who want to examine negotiation phases are faced with a choice between a stage model and an episodic model. The principal advantage of a stage approach is that it ensures comparability across research; its principal disadvantage is that, by arbitrarily determining when stages begin and end, it is likely to miss naturally occurring shifts in the negotiation process. If one chooses to work within a stage approach, one still needs to make several decisions. The first is how many stages in which to divide the negotiation. Negotiation theory identifies anywhere between three and 12 stages. In our research, we have used six stages as the number of segments that provides a reasonably fine-grained analysis of negotiation while maintaining a reasonable number of observations within each segment (e.g., Olekalns, Smith and Walsh 1996). The second is how to determine these stages. You can do this either on the basis of time (divide each negotiation into, for example, five minute intervals) or on the basis of speaking turns (for example, if the negotiation is made up of 300 speaking turns, then each 50 speaking turns become a stage). The principal disadvantage of a time-based segmentation is that negotiations do not all take the same amount of time. You may thus find yourself comparing strategies that occur in the 10–15 minute interval and which represent the midpoint for one negotiating dyad but the endgame for another. We there-
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fore use segmentation based on speaking turns. We prefer this approach as it means that we are comparing comparable segments of the negotiation: midpoint to midpoint and endgame to endgame.
Conclusion In this article, we have provided an overview of the decisions that researchers need to make when they embark on an analysis of negotiation processes. Whether you choose to use an existing coding scheme or to develop one that meets your needs, you will need to make decisions about the level at which to code data, whether to aggregate tactics into broader strategies and on the level at which to analyze your data. You will need to decide whether to focus on what strategies negotiators use, how strategies combine to facilitate or inhibit goal attainment, or how negotiations move from beginning to end. We have found that each level of analysis brings with it unique insights into the negotiation process. We would be less than honest if we did not conclude by saying that this is a labor-intensive and time-consuming process. However, we believe that those of you who persevere will find the richness of your data to be its own reward.
References Bales, R.F. (1950). Interaction process analysis: A method for the study of small groups. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley. Baxter, L.A. (1992). “Conflict management: An episodic approach,” Small Group Behavior 13:23–42. Brett, J.M., Weingart, L.R., and Olekalns, M. (2004). “Baubles, Bangles and Beads: Modeling the Evolution of Negotiating Groups over Time.” In M.A. Neale, E.A. Mannix, and S. Blount-Lyons (Eds.) Research in Managing Groups and Teams: Time in Groups (Volume 6, pp. 39-64). New York: Elsevier Science. Carnevale, P.J.D., Pruitt, D.G., and Seilheimer, S.D. (1981). “Looking and competing: Accountability and visual access in integrative bargaining,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 40:111–120. Cohen, Jacob (1960). “A coefficient of agreement for nominal scales.” Educational and Psychological Measurement, 20, 37–46. Donohue, W.A., Diez, M.E., and Hamilton, M. (1984). “Coding naturalistic negotiation interaction,” Human Communication Research 10:403–425. Fleiss, J.L. (1971). “Measuring nominal scale agreement among many raters,” Psychological Bulletin 76:378–382. Folger, J.P., Hewes, D.E., and Poole, M.S. (1984). “Coding social interaction.” In B. Dervin and M. Voight (Eds.) Progress in communication sciences (Vol. 4, pp. 115–161). Norwood: Ablex.
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Giebels, E., De Dreu, C.K.W., and Van de Vliert, E. (2000). “Interdependence in negotiation: Effects of exit options and social motive on distributive and integrative negotiation,” European Journal of Social Psychology 30:255–272. Greenacre, M.J. (1993). Correspondence analysis in practice. London: Academic Press. Guetzkow, H. (1950). “Unitizing and categorizing problems in coding qualitative data,” Journal of Clinical Psychology 6:47–58. Hewes, D.E. (1979). “The sequential analysis of social interaction,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 65:56–73. Hyder, E.B., Prietula, M.J., and Weingart, L.R. (2000). “Getting to best: Efficiency versus optimality in negotiation,” Cognitive Science 24(2):169–204. Lewicki, R.J., Saunders, D.M., and Minton, J.W. (1985). Negotiation. Irwin: Boston. Olekalns, M., and Smith, P.L. (1999). “Social value orientations and strategy choices in competitive negotiations,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 25:657–668. Olekalns, M., and Smith, P.L. (2000). “Negotiating optimal outcomes: The role of strategic sequences in competitive negotiations,” Human Communication Research 24:528–560. Olekalns, M., and Smith, P.L. (2003). “Testing the relationships among negotiators’ motivational orientations, strategy choices, and outcomes.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. Olekalns, M., Smith, P.L., and Walsh, T. (1996). “The process of negotiating: Strategies, timing and outcomes,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 67:61–77. Poole, M.S., Folger, J.P., and Hewes, D.E. (1987). “Analyzing interpersonal interaction.” In M.E. Roloff and G.R. Miller (Eds.) Interpersonal processes: New directions in communication research (pp. 220–256). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Poole, M.S., and McPhee, R.D. (1994). “Methodology in interpersonal communication.” In M. Knapp and G.R. Miller (Eds.) Handbook of interpersonal communication. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Pruitt, D.G. (1981). Negotiation behavior. Academic Press: New York. Pruitt, D.G., and Carnevale, P.J. (1993). Negotiation in social conflict. Pacific Grove: Brooks/ Cole. Pruitt, D.G., and Lewis, S.A. (1975). “Development of integrative solutions in bilateral negotiation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 31:621–633. Putnam, L.L., and Jones, T.S. (1982). “The role of communication in bargaining,” Communication Monographs 3:262–282. Smith, P.L., Olekalns, M., Weingart, L.R. (in press). Markov claim Models of communication processes in negotiation. International Negotiation. Trujillo, N. (1986). “Toward a taxonomy of small group interaction coding systems,” Small Group Behavior 17:371–394. Walton. R.E., and McKersie, R.B. (1965). “A behavioral theory of labor negotiations,” McGraw-Hill: Boston. Weingart, L.R. (1997). “How did they do that? The ways and means of studying group processes.” In L.L. Cummings and B.M. Staw (Eds.) Research in organizational behavior (Vol. 19 pp. 184–239). Greenwich: JAI. Weingart, L.R., Bennett, R.J., and Brett, J.M. (1993). The impact of consideration of issues and motivational orientation on group negotiation process and outcome. Journal of Applied Psychology 78(3):504–517. Weingart, L.R., Brett, J.M., and Olekalns, M. (2002). Conflicting social motives in negotiating groups. Paper presented at the 62nd Annual meeting of the Academy of Management, Denver, Colorado.
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Weingart, L.R., Hyder, E.B., and Prietula, M.J. (1996). “Knowledge matters: The effect of tactical descriptions on negotiation behavior and outcome,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 70:1205–1217. Weingart, L.R., and Olekalns, M. (2004). “Communication Processes in Conflict and Negotiation.” In M. Gelfand and J. Brett (Eds.) The Handbook of Negotiation and Culture: Research Perspectives. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Weingart, L.R., Thompson, L.L., Bazerman, M.H., and Carroll, J.S. (1990). “Tactical behavior and negotiation outcomes,” The International Journal of Conflict Management 1:7–31.
The Use of Questionnaires in Conflict Research AUKJE NAUTA and ESTHER KLUWER
Conflict is an important theme to study, both in organizations and in close relationships. In organizations, conflict may hinder productivity and job satisfaction. In close relationships, conflict can be a threat to relationship satisfaction and even to the endurance of the relationship. It is therefore important to study conflict empirically by gathering data on its appearance, causes and consequences, and on the emotional, cognitive, motivational and behavioral aspects that accompany it. These insights have both theoretical and practical value. For example, they can be used to teach people how to handle conflicts better and prevent conflicts from escalating into destructive outcomes. Unfortunately, it is far from easy to study conflict empirically. It is especially difficult to organize settings in which conflicts are acted out naturally, either in field settings or in the laboratory. Field settings are often too threatening for participants and too uncontrollable for researchers, whereas laboratory settings have limits regarding external validity (i.e., the extent to which experimental results can be generalized to real-life settings; Cook and Campbell 1979). In addition, observing real conflict is time-consuming and expensive. An alternative to studying real-life conflict is the use of questionnaires. Questionnaires – whether administered as paper-and-pencil surveys or as (telephone) interviews – can be useful alternatives for laboratory or observational studies on conflict when researchers know how to avoid possible pitfalls. Sometimes they may even be the only way to demonstrate certain phenomena. For instance, Pruitt, Peirce, McGillicuddy, Welton, and Castrianno (1993) used questionnaires to measure how people in a court-based mediation center felt about the quality of the agreements just after a mediation session as well as 6 months later. They found out that long-term success of the mediation (compliance, improved relations, and absence of new problems) was determined by the degree to which participants had perceived the mediation as fair just after the session. However, the quality of agreements appeared not to be related to long-term success. In order to demonstrate effects like these, questionnaires are required because attitudes such as procedural fairness and assessments of relationships can best be assessed through self-reports.
International Negotiation Series 2: P. Carnevale and C.K.W de Dreu (eds.) Methods of Negotiation Research, 121–133 © 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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Many books and articles have been written about conducting questionnaire research (Belson 1981; De Vaus 1991; Dillman 1978; Kidder & Judd 1986; Schuman & Scott 1987; Shaughnessy, Zechmeister & Zechmeister 2000; Tanur 1992). For example, Schaughnessy and colleagues (2000) write that the wording of questions can be a threat to validity, because how a question is phrased has implications for how that question is answered. Good questionnaire items are short (20 or fewer words), simple, direct, clear, specific, and familiar to all respondents. Furthermore, they do not involve leading, loaded or double-barreled questions. Other issues that Schaughnessy and colleagues (2000) deal with is questionnaire design (e.g., attractiveness), ordering of questions (e.g., interesting questions first), and enhancing response rate in a mail survey (e.g., mail one or more follow-up questionnaires). Despite the attention for questionnaire research, books and articles on general research methods pay little attention to the specific challenges encountered when studying conflict. In this article, we will therefore discuss the strengths and weaknesses of using questionnaires in conflict research. We do not aim at completeness in summing up all the challenges. Instead, we will restrict ourselves to some strengths and weaknesses that we have encountered when performing our own research on conflict in organizations and in close relationships. The main focus is on measuring conflict behavior, although there are many other relevant aspects to conflict, such as conflict issues, causes, and outcomes (De Dreu, Harinck & Van Vianen 1999; Van de Vliert 1998), as well as the motives, emotions, and cognitions that accompany conflict (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003). We believe conflict behavior is a key factor of the conflict process because it largely determines the (positive or negative) consequences of conflict. At the same time, conflict behavior may be one of the most difficult conflict features to measure through questionnaires, because questionnaires by definition measure perceptions of current or past behavior instead of the actual behavior itself. We will address five issues concerning the use of questionnaires in conflict research. The first is that conflict is a highly sensitive topic, which has consequences for the acquisition of participants and the response to surveys. The second issue concerns the validity of conflict behavior questionnaires. Third, we will discuss self-serving bias (i.e., the tendency to perceive oneself as more positive than the opponent), which poses a specific threat to validity that deserves special attention. Fourth, we will address the fact that conflict surveys usually entail correlational, and often cross-sectional, designs that prohibit conclusions about causality. The fifth and last issue concerns the fact that data on conflict behavior are by definition dyadic in nature; we discuss
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the practical and methodological problems that go along with this. We will illustrate these issues with our own research on conflict in organizations and in close relationships and include recommendations for doing questionnaire research.
Sensitivity Conflict is a sensitive subject. People generally do not like to admit that they have conflicts with others because it is associated with negative consequences, as Nauta experienced when interviewing employees in organizations about conflict and negotiation (Nauta & Sanders 2000, 2001; Nauta, De Vries, and Wijngaard 2001). Because of this sensitivity, people are often reluctant to participate in research on conflict. For example, Nauta (2003) tried to recruit four different Dutch organizations for a study on organizational determinants and consequences of conflict. Although several organizations showed an interest in the project, many organizations ultimately refused to participate due to their fear of launching discussions and dissatisfaction among their employees. Instead of speaking about conflict in the introduction of the study, Nauta therefore chose to frame the research more positively by stressing how organizations could improve interpersonal and inter-team collaboration. This prevented participants from experiencing some of the unpleasant connotations that may accompany conflict such as “fighting” and “violence” and “aggression,” facilitating the decision to participate in the study. The fact that conflict is a sensitive topic may cause another research problem as well: Response may be low, due to the fear of participants that their answers become public. For example, in the same research project described above, Nauta (2003) performed a survey in a medium-sized organization that measured several biographic variables like gender, age, education, and organizational unit. Some participants remarked that their anonymity was not guaranteed by asking these specific background questions. For other participants, this may have been a reason not to return the questionnaire, because of their fear of being recognized. Perhaps people who experienced relatively frequent and severe conflicts were less likely to return the questionnaire, resulting in a selective sample of participants. When using a questionnaire to study organizational conflict, it is therefore important to ask as few demographic questions as possible. Also, researchers must promise (and hold their promise) that individual data will never be made available to the management of the organization. Moreover, careful attention must be paid to the introduction of the research and further communications
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about the research. Researchers must be clear about the goals and expected results of the research, in order to motivate people to participate. Nevertheless, questionnaires can also have an important advantage when studying a delicate subject. For example, in research on close relationships, questionnaires are often chosen deliberately to study topics that are sensitive, such as relationship problems, sex, and conflict (e.g., Kluwer, Heesink, and Van de Vliert 1996). People generally feel more comfortable filling out an anonymous questionnaire rather than talking face-to-face to an interviewer or a researcher about these topics.
Validity The second issue is whether questionnaires produce valid measures of conflict behavior. In other words, do we really measure what we want to measure (i.e., construct validity; Cook & Campbell 1997)? Van de Vliert (1997) and De Dreu et al. (2001) discussed the validity and reliability of several questionnaires that measure the five-part typology of conflict behavior as described by Blake and Mouton (1964), Thomas (1992), Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim (1994) and many others. This typology distinguishes between forcing (trying to force a solution upon the other party that meets own goals and interests, but not those of the other party), yielding (accepting what the other wants and reaching a solution that meets other’s but not own goals and interests), avoiding (withdrawing from the conflict, either temporarily or definitely), problemsolving (actively searching for a solution that meets both own and other goals and interest), and compromising (striving for an even distribution of the pie, without trying to enlarge it). Throughout the years, several questionnaires have been developed to measure these types of conflict behavior. The oldest is the Conflict Management Survey (Hall 1969). Although the CMS is still very popular in conflict management training settings, researchers have criticized and replaced it with other measures because of disappointing psychometric qualities (Landy 1978; Thomas & Kilmann 1978; Shockley-Zalabak 1988). Substantial improvement was reached by the development of the Rahim Organizational Conflict Inventory (ROCI-II). However, this scale still lacks optimal psychometric properties (see De Dreu et al. 2001; Rahim & Magner 1995). Other instruments worth noting are the Organizational Communication Conflict Instrument (OCCI; Putnam & Wilson 1982) and the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument (TKI; Thomas & Kilmann 1974). The TKI is, like the CMS, often used for individual purposes. It is available on the internet, where individuals can fill
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it out for free and directly receive the results on their preferred mode of conflict management, compared to a reference base. A questionnaire that is widely used in the Netherlands is the Dutch Test for Conflict Handling (DUTCH; Euwema & Van de Vliert 1990; Janssen & Van de Vliert 1996; Van de Vliert 1997; see Table 1). De Dreu et al. (2001) showed that self-ratings on the DUTCH in a role-playing experiment correlated highly with both ratings of the opponent and observer ratings. However, the correlations for avoiding behavior were not significant. Avoiding behavior is difficult to observe, especially in the laboratory, because participants are not likely to avoid conflict when they are asked to act out a conflict. In addition, avoiding is ambiguous behavior open to multiple attributions. For example, someone who consistently downplays the importance of the conflict issue may do this in order to avoid the issue and to reduce interaction to a minimum. The opponent, however, may perceive such behavior as a cunning way to get one’s way, to buy time, and to impose one’s will on others (i.e., forcing). Perhaps avoidance – more than any other conflict behavior – involves acts that are difficult to judge, which in turn makes accurate understanding of underlying intentions more important. Because individuals have better knowledge about their own intentions than opponents and neutral observers do, convergence between self-reports and other-reports of avoiding is likely to be low. Nevertheless, it is still a question whether conflict questionnaires such as the DUTCH really measure behavior in all circumstances. In the study by the Dreu et al. (2001), the DUTCH was administered immediately after the roleplay was over. Participants thus reflected upon the behavior they had just exhibited. However, in field studies, the DUTCH is generally used to measure the behavior one ‘usually’ or ‘generally’ shows when engaged in conflict. In this setting, the DUTCH appears to measure a general intention to certain conflict behavior or even a general style, instead of actual behavior. A possible solution to this problem is the critical incident method (Flanagan 1954; see also Kluwer 2000), in which participants are asked to recall a recent conflict and answer questions about this particular incident, including behavioral measures. This yields a more valid measure of actual conflict behavior and participants find it easier to answer questions about their behavior in a specific real-life situation than questions about their general behavioral style (see for example, Kluwer 2000). Nevertheless, one must realize that the answers may be influenced by the specific context in which the critical incident took place. Another option is to use vignettes or scenarios. For example, Kluwer, De Dreu and Buunk (1998) asked participants to read a scenario, in which they
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Table 1. The Dutch Test for Conflict Handling (DUTCH) When I have a conflict at work, I do the following: Yielding I give in to the wishes of the other party. I concur with the other party. I try to accommodate the other party. I adapt to the other parties’ goals and interests. Compromising I try to realize a middle-of-the-road solution. I emphasize that we have to find a compromise solution. I insist we both give in a little. I strive whenever possible towards a fifty-fifty compromise. Forcing I push my own point of view. I search for gains. I fight for a good outcome for myself. I do everything to win. Problem-solving I examine issues until I find a solution that really satisfies me and the other party. I stand for my own and other’s goals and interests. I examine ideas from both sides to find a mutually optimal solution. I work out a solution that serves my own as well as other’s interests as good as possible. Avoiding I avoid a confrontation about our differences. I avoid differences of opinion as much as possible. I try to make differences loom less severe. I try to avoid a confrontation with the other. Note. Items could be answered on a five-point scale (1 = not at all, to 5 = very much). Items are translated from Dutch and are usually presented in a random order.
described a conflict between the participant and an opponent. After reading the scenario, participants were asked to what extent they would use cooperative tactics (e.g., try to collaborate in each other’s interest) and competitive tactics (e.g., show distrust). Although these are still intentions to evince one type of conflict behavior or another rather than actual conflict behavior, those intentions are likely to be associated with real behavior because participants had to imagine themselves in a specific situation rather than a generalized conflict situation. Furthermore, the use of vignettes enables researchers to manipulate certain characteristics of the conflict. For example, in their research on relationship conflict over the division of labor, Kluwer (1998) and
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Kluwer, Heesink, and Van de Vliert (2000) used vignettes to manipulate the topic of the conflict (housework, paid work, or child care) and each partner’s role in the conflict (complainant versus defender of the status quo; see Table 2 for an example). Table 2. Example of a Conflict Scenario (Kluwer, Heesink, and Van de Vliert 2000) “You are dissatisfied with the time your spouse spends on household tasks. For example, you are dissatisfied with how much attention your spouse pays to housework, how often your spouse tidies the house, cleans, does the dishes, does groceries, or the way your spouse carries out chores, etcetera. In other words, you want a change in the time your spouse spends on housework. However, your spouse is satisfied with the situation as it is.”
Self-serving and Social Desirability Biases Whenever researchers measure conflict behavior, chances are high that they will find some sort of self-serving bias, that is, a tendency to see one’s own conflict behavior as more constructive and less destructive than the conflict behavior of one’s opponent (De Dreu, Nauta & Van de Vliert 1995; Kluwer et al. 1998; Nauta and Van Sloten 2003). Although it is an interesting theoretical phenomenon, self-serving bias is a threat to validity, because participants report biased perceptions of their own and their opponent’s behaviors. Self-serving bias may also imply that the measures are influenced by a general tendency towards social desirability, which is more likely to occur when one rates one’s own behavior than when one rates other’s behavior. This may also occur when measuring conflict frequency, for example in close relationships. People are generally reluctant to admit that they have relationship conflicts, because it might imply that their relationship is in trouble. In addition, happy couples tend to distort their appraisal of their relationship in positive ways (e.g., Murray & Holmes 1997). Hence, people may not admit that they have conflicts with their partner due to social desirability biases or they may not report conflict due to positive illusions they hold about their relationship. For both reasons, measures of absolute conflict frequency are likely to be unreliable. A possible solution to biased measurements of conflict behavior and conflict frequency is to measure these concepts from different perspectives: Self reports, opponent reports and observer reports of conflict behavior and conflict frequency. When interrater reliability is high, it can be assumed that the average of these three perspectives is an accurate (intersubjective) measure.
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Cross-sectional Data Conflict data that are gathered through questionnaires are often correlational in nature, which prohibits conclusions about causality. For example, Nauta, De Dreu and Van der Vaart (2002) examined whether social value orientations predicted the degree to which employees paid attention to the goals of their colleagues working in other departments, which in turn would lead to problem-solving behavior during interdepartmental conflicts. Although they used multiple methods (i.e., questionnaires and oral interviews), it was still difficult to conclude whether a pro-social orientation indeed led to a higher concern for others’ goals which in turn resulted in problem-solving behavior. They could not rule out that a fourth variable (e.g., altruism or differences in the tendency to give socially desirable answers) explained why respondents scored either high or low on pro-social orientation, goal concerns, and problem-solving behavior. A solution to the problem of causality is to use experimental designs. When this is not possible in the field, quasi-experimental designs as described by Cook and Campbell (1979) (e.g., the use of vignettes or scenarios) are a good alternative. A general recommendation is to use multiple data collection methods (e.g., both observation and self-report) or longitudinal designs. However, many practical arguments that have to do with time, energy, and money hinder researchers from using these designs. Still, we recommend the use of at least one extra measurement method. For example, in their study on conflicts about working relationships between employees and their superiors in ten different organizations, Nauta and Van Sloten (2004) used questionnaires, together with data from personnel files about absenteeism. Moreover, they distributed surveys among both employees and their superiors, which enabled them to aggregate data of superiors about determinants of conflict behavior to the organizational level, and then examine whether these organizational variables (like communication culture, perceived common ground) predicted the conflict behaviors of employees.
Dyadic Data The last issue that we address concerns the dyadic nature of conflict data. By definition, conflict is an interpersonal concept: Conflict is experienced when one feels frustrated or hindered by some other party (Van de Vliert 1998). It is therefore interesting to study both sides of the conflict. However, in organizations, it is often difficult to couple data of two conflict parties while at the same time guaranteeing anonymity. Therefore, studies of dyadic conflict
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require careful introduction, implementation and reporting to the organization. When studying close relationships, coupling data is not only much easier but also more necessary. Partners in romantic couples are not randomly paired and they will be similar or at least influence each other on various dimensions. Therefore, we cannot simply perform statistical analyses on groups of husbands and wives because this violates the assumption of independent observations. In this case, researchers have to deal with a methodological problem concerned with the dependency of data (cf. Kenny & Kashy 1991; Kenny 1995, 1996). Kenny (1996) presents three models of non-independence that may be considered when choosing a strategy for the statistical analysis of couple data. The first assumes a partner effect: A characteristic of partner A influences another characteristic of partner B. For example, partner A’s conflict behavior influences partner B’s report of relationship satisfaction and vice versa. The second model assumes mutual influence: A characteristic of partner A influences the same characteristic of partner B. For example, partner A’s reported conflict behavior influences partner B’s reported conflict behavior and vice versa. The third model assumes common fate: Partner A and B are exposed to the same causal factor. For example, the mutual conflict behavior of the couple influences their mutual report of relationship satisfaction (see Kenny & La Voie 1985). The choice of the appropriate model depends on the theory that is used and the particular model determines the type of statistical analysis that is performed (Kenny 1996). Kluwer, Heesink and Van de Vliert (1997) used a different method in a study on conflict interaction patterns in close relationships. They measured both spouses’ perceptions of several conflict interaction patterns that occurred between husband and wife (as opposed to individual behaviors). Positive intraclass correlations indicated that the dyads, rather than the individual dyad members, accounted for significant variation on the marital interaction variables (Kenny & La Voie 1985). They then computed the mean of the husband’s and the wife’s scores (Acitelli & Antonucci 1994; Christensen & Heavey 1993; Kluwer et al. 1996). In this case, there is no need to use the models of non-independence that assume two hierarchical units of analysis (individuals nested in dyads.) Instead, the couple is the only unit of analysis. Measures of joint conflict interaction patterns are couple constructs, as opposed to husbands’ and wives’ reports of their own, individual conflict behaviors. This approach improves the reliability or “robustness” of conflict measures, because assessments stem from two sources instead of one. Although computing the mean of both conflict parties’ perceptions of conflict interaction patterns can provide a valid measure of what goes on between the parties, we emphasize that this technique does not approach reality any more
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than observing actual interaction. It simply measures both parties’ joint perceptions regarding interaction patterns that occur during conflict. A weakness of this approach is that information about spouses’ individual perceptions is lost by aggregating to the dyad level. One way to use information at both the individual level and the dyadic level is to use multi-level analysis (Raudenbush & Bryk 1986; Snijders & Bosker 1999). With multi-level analysis, it is possible to examine the impact of variables at both the dyadic and the individual level upon a dependent variable at the individual level. Moreover, multi-level analysis takes into account that individuals within dyads are interdependent. Multi-level analysis is comparable to regression analysis: Its goal is to build a model that expresses how the dependent variable can be explained by multiple independent variables. An important difference, however, is that the variance in the dependent variable is split up into variance at the individual level and variance at the dyadic (or group) level. This variance is explained by both variables at the group level (e.g., dyadic means on conflict behavior) and variables at the individual level (e.g., individual measures of conflict behavior). In sum, we recommend that, when it is theoretically necessary to couple data of both sides of a conflict, researchers should use analytic techniques that take into account the nested structure of the data.
Conclusions In this article, we have described some of the issues that researchers may come across when they examine conflict through the use of questionnaires. We discussed the sensitivity of conflict as a research topic which may hinder the recruitment of participants. Nevertheless, questionnaires may sometimes be more suitable to measure touchy subjects than more confrontational research methods such as face-to-face interviews. Furthermore, we discussed the validity of conflict questionnaires and the fact that conflict behavior is easily confounded with behavioral intentions. Specifically, we noted that questionnaire measures of conflict behavior are likely to be biased, because participants tend to give self-serving and/or socially desirable answers. In addition, we discussed the correlational nature of most questionnaire research designs. Finally, we described that conflict data are often dyadic in nature, which leads to specific methodological problems due to the dependency of dyad members. We would like to conclude with a few recommendations to conflict researchers who want to use questionnaires. First, conflict research generally needs
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careful introduction, implementation and reporting to participants. In order to get enough participants, it may be helpful to avoid using the word “conflict” and stress that one wants to examine correlates of collaboration and interpersonal relationships. Second, validity problems may be solved by using existing conflict questionnaires and by using multiple data sources (e.g., self reports combined with opponent reports and/or observer reports). Not only are these measures of behavior less confounded with intentions, they are also less biased due to self-serving or social desirability tendencies. A third and last recommendation is to couple data only when theoretically necessary and use appropriate techniques to analyze dependent data. Although there are issues to be taken into account when using questionnaires, we believe that questionnaires can be a very appropriate method to study conflict. It enables researchers to approach large samples, both in the field and in the laboratory, and when administered appropriately, it is possible to gather reliable and valid data on conflict in real-life settings.
References Acitelli, L.K., and Antonucci, T.C. (1994). “Gender differences in the link between marital support and satisfaction in older couples,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67:688–698. Belson, W.A. (1981). The design and understanding of survey questions. Aldershof: Gower. Blake, R., and Mouton, J.S. (1964). The Managerial Grid. Houston, TX: Gulf. Christensen, A., and Heavey, C.L. (1993). “Gender differences in marital conflict: The demand/withdraw interaction pattern.” In S. Oskamp and M. Constanzo (Eds.), Gender issues in contemporary society. London: Sage. 113–141. Cook, T.D., and Campbell, D.T. (1979). Quasi-experimentation. Design and analysis issues for field settings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. De Dreu, C.K.W., Evers, A., Beersma, B., Kluwer, E.S., and Nauta, A. (2001). “A theory based measure of conflict management strategies in the work place,” Journal of Organizational Behavior 22:645–668. De Dreu, C.K.W., and Carnevale, P.J. (2003). “Motivational bases of information processing and strategy in conflict and negotiation.” In M.P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. Vol. 35. New York: Academic Press 235–291. De Dreu, C.K.W., Harinck, F., and Van Vianen, A.E.M. (1999). “Conflict and performance in groups and organizations.” In C.L. Cooper, and I.T. Robertson (Eds.), International Review of Industrial and Organizational Psychology. Vol. 14. Chichester, UK: Wiley. 376–405. De Dreu, C.K.W., Nauta, A., and Van de Vliert, E. (1995). “Self-serving evaluation of conflict behavior and escalation of the dispute,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 25, 2049–2066. De Vaus, D.A. (1991). Surveys in social research. London: UCL Press/Allen and Unwin. Dillman, D.A. (1978). Mail and telephone surveys: The total design method. New York: Wiley. Euwema, M.C., and Van de Vliert, E. (1990). “Gedrag en escalatie bij hiërarchische conflicten [Behavior and escalation in hierarchical conflicts],” Toegepaste Sociale Psychologie, 4:28–41. Flanagan, J.C. (1954). “The critical incident technique,” Psychological Bulletin 51:327–359.
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Hall, J. (1969). Conflict management survey. Conroe, Tex.: Teleometrics International. Janssen, O., and Van de Vliert, E. (1996). “Concern for other’s goals: Key to de-escalation of conflict,” International Journal of Conflict Management 7:99–120. Kenny, D.A. (1995). “The effect of nonindependence on significance testing in dyadic research,” Personal Relationships 2:67–75. Kenny, D.A. (1996). “Models of non-independence in dyadic research,” Journal of Social and Personal Relationships 13:279–294. Kenny, D.A., and Kashy, D.A. (1991). “Analyzing interdependence in dyads.” In B.M. Montgomery and S. Duck (Eds.), Studying interpersonal interactions. New York: The Guilford Press. 275–285. Kenny, D.A., and La Voie, L. (1985). “Separating individual and group effects,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 48:339–348. Kidder, L.H., and Judd, Ch.M. (1986). Research methods in social relations. New York: CBS College Publishing. Killman, R.H., and Thomas, K.W. (1977). “Developing a forced choice measure of conflict handling behavior,” Educational and Psychological Measurement 37:309–325. Kluwer, E.S. (1998). “Responses to gender inequality in the division of family work: The status quo effect,” Social Justice Research 11:337–357. Kluwer, E.S. (2000). Procedural and distributive justice in close relationships: The moderating role of gender. Paper presented at the 10th International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Personal Relationships, Brisbane, Australia, June–July. Kluwer, E.S., De Dreu, C.K.W., and Buunk, B.P. (1998). “Conflict in intimate versus nonintimate relationships: When gender role stereotyping overrides biased self-other judgment,” Journal of Social and Personal Relationships 15:637–650. Kluwer, E.S., Heesink, J.A.M., and Van de Vliert, E. (1996). “Marital conflict about the division of household labor and paid work,” Journal of Marriage and the Family, 58, 958–969. Kluwer, E.S. Heesink, J.A.M., and Van de Vliert, E. (1997). “The marital dynamics of conflict over the division of labor,” Journal of Marriage and the Family 59:635–653. Kluwer, E.S. Heesink, J.A.M., and Van de Vliert, E. (2000). “The division of labor in close relationships: An asymmetrical conflict issue,” Personal Relationships 7:263–282. Landy, F. (1978). “Conflict management survey.” In O.K. Buros (Ed.), Eight mental measurement yearbook. Vol. 2. Highland Park, N.J.: Gryphon. 1173–1174. Murray, S.L., and Holmes, J.G. (1997). “A leap of faith? Positive illusions in romantic relationships.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 23: 586–604. Nauta, A. (2003). “Perceived influence in team decisions: The more, the better for conflict management and health.” Paper presented at the 2003 Conference of the European Association for Work and Organizational Psychology, Lisbon, Portugal, May. Nauta, A., and Sanders, K. (2000). “Interdepartmental negotiation behavior in manufacturing organizations,” International Journal of Conflict Management 11:135–161. Nauta, A., and Sanders, K. (2001). “Causes and consequences of perceived goal differences between departments within manufacturing organizations,” Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology 74:321–342. Nauta, A., and Van Sloten, G. (2003). “Successfully dealing with imbalance at work [Succesvol omgaan met onbalans in arbeidsrelaties].” Manuscript submitted for publication. Nauta, A., De Dreu, C.K.W., and Van der Vaart, T. (2002). Social value orientation, organizational goal concerns and interdepartmental problem-solving behavior. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 23, 199–213. Nauta, A., De Vries, J., and Wijngaard, J. (2001). “Power and biased perceptions of interdepartmental negotiation behavior,” Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 4:263–270.
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A Multilevel Approach to Investigating Cross-National Differences in Negotiation Processes XU HUANG and EVERT VAN DE VLIERT
A successful instance of international negotiation is largely dependent on the extent to which the negotiating parties are capable of understanding the negotiating patterns of their counterparts who come from another culture (Brett 2000). Analogously, the cross-national validity of a negotiation theory is largely dependent on the extent to which scholars are capable of understanding and incorporating differences in negotiation processes across oceans and borders. Those observations add a national level of analysis to the commonly used individual and dyadic level in negotiation and conflict research. By far the greatest number of studies on cross-national negotiations are concerned with how national context shapes the psychological states of the negotiators (Brett & Okumura 1998, Fu & Morris 2000; Gelfand & Christakopoulou 1999), the social conditions of the negotiations (Carnevale, Pruitt, and Britton 1979; Graham, Kim, Lin, and Robinson 1988), and the behavior of the negotiators (McCusker 1994). In the same vein, many researchers have observed that the impact of the psychological states of the negotiators (e.g., motives and biases of judgment), the social conditions of the negotiations (e.g., constituencies and negotiator relationships), and the behavior of the negotiators (e.g., tactics and communication) on the outcomes of negotiations systematically differ from country to country. They have proposed several theoretical models examining the moderating effects of national contextual variables on such negotiation processes (Gelfand & Dyer 2000; Morris & Fu 2001). However, only a few models of this kind have been empirically tested (e.g., Gelfand & Realo 1999; Tinsley & Pillutla 1998). A common feature of these studies is that the moderating effects of national contextual variables, such as cultural individualism, were tested at the level of individual workers. This was done by measuring cultural individualism at the individual level. However, the meaning of a construct measured at the individual level may differ from that of a construct represented by its aggregated scores at the country level (Van de Vijver & Poortinga 2002).
International Negotiation Series 2: P. Carnevale and C.K.W de Dreu (eds.) Methods of Negotiation Research, 135–148 © 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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Consequently, it remains problematic to generalize the individual-level findings to an explanation of cross-national differences in negotiation processes. To tackle this problem, we propose a new approach to research on crossnational negotiations, the cross-level approach, which integrates country-level analysis and individual-level analysis. We demonstrate that, using multilevel modeling, a statistical technique designed for relating distinct levels of analysis in a holistic analytical model, researchers are able to more accurately and directly test the moderating effects of country-level variables on individuallevel relationships. As a result, we may develop a better understanding of why the psychological states of the negotiators, the social conditions of the negotiations, and the behavior of the negotiators impact differently on negotiation outcomes across countries. In the following sections, we first briefly review the major methodological problems of individual-level examinations of the moderating effects of national variables on the negotiation processes. Then, based on a series of crossnational research projects that used multilevel modeling, we delve into how recent methodological developments contribute to a more refined cross-level approach to investigating the moderating effects of national contextual variables. Finally, we discuss the valuable methodological contributions of this cross-level approach and how they may instigate new perspectives on theory building in international negotiation research.
The Nation-As-Moderator at the Individual Level Cross-cultural differences in negotiation processes abound. For instance, Graham (1983) found that the role of the negotiator was the most important predictor of negotiation outcomes in Japan, deceptive tactics were the most important predictors of outcomes in Brazil, and cooperative tactics were the most important predictors in the U.S. Although such facts are certainly interesting, scientifically they are of no great help as they do not offer theorybased explanation of such cross-national variations. In order to address such variations in negotiation processes on a theoretical basis, various attempts have been made to specify country-level conditions that change the links between negotiation phenomena. For instance, Shapiro and Rognes (1996) used national culture to understand why the perceived orientation to dominate of the opponents was positively linked with joint outcomes among Americans, but negatively linked with joint outcomes among Norwegians. Using Hofstede’s (1991) framework, the authors explained that Americans, having a more individualistic culture than the Norwegians, tend to
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socialize their inhabitants to be more comfortable with the dominating behavior of their opponents. Although Shapiro and Rognes’s method does provide a crude theoretical explanation of cross-national differences in negotiation processes, a major weakness of this inference-based approach is that, in the absence of concrete statistical evidence, it is hard to rule out rival explanations (e.g., Lytle, Brett, Barsness, Tinsley, and Janssens 1995). Gelfand and Realo’s (1999) recent work was among the first to statistically test the moderating effects of national contextual variables on negotiation processes. The model they used can be referred to as the nation-as-moderator model. Their findings showed that the well-known link between accountability to constituents and negotiation outcomes was moderated by cultural individualism, which was measured at the individual level. More precisely, accountability was found to be negatively related to joint profit among individualists, but positively related to joint profit among collectivists. The authors reasoned that, among individualists, accountability activated competitive construals and behavior, and resulted in lower outcomes. By contrast, among collectivists, accountability activated cooperative construals and behavior, and resulted in higher outcomes. However, cultural individualism and collectivism measured and analyzed at individual level do not necessarily equate to individualism and collectivism at the country level (Van de Vijver & Poortinga 2002), with the effect that the implications of Gelfand and Realo’s (1999) study were in fact limited to the individual level. Even if a cultural dimension measured at the individual level is structurally equivalent to its aggregation at the country level, there is still a serious potential problem with estimating the contextual effect at the individual level; that is, individuals living in the same country are influenced by the same national context, which may be reflected in the within-country statistical interdependence of their responses. Yet, testing the moderating effects of cultural dimensions measured at the individual level will largely ignore such within-country between-subject interdependence, leading to an underestimation of standard errors and an overestimation of effect sizes (Bryk & Raudenbush 1992; Kreft & De Leeuw 1998; Snijders & Bosker 1999). To sum up, the above method of examining the nation-as-moderator model at the individual level has three major problems. First, cultural or other national dimensions measured at the individual level may have meanings that are different from those of their aggregations at the country level. Second, testing the moderating effects of national contextual variables measured and analyzed at the individual level ignores the statistical dependence of individuals who share the same culture, and leads to an underestimation of standard errors. Third, rival national moderating variables cannot be statistically
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controlled. Therefore, in the following section, based on a series of crossnational research projects, we discuss a way to tackle the above problems by employing multilevel modeling, a statistical technique that can be used to test the nation-as-moderator model across levels of analysis.
Cross-Level Nation-As-Moderator Model A series of cross-national studies on job satisfaction and motives for volunteer work have contributed to a more sophisticated analytical model that permits a systematic and quantitative examination of cross-national differences in the theoretical relationships at the individual level. The common thread of those studies is that the national context can be statistically treated as a moderator of the link between two variables at the individual level in a cross-level model. This cross-level nation-as-moderator model integrates two levels of analysis, country-level analysis and individual-level analysis. Statistically, the integration of the two levels of analysis can be achieved by using multilevel modeling. Multilevel Modeling Multilevel modeling or hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) is designed to analyze data with a nested structure, such as people nested within countries. It is particularly useful to combine two levels of analysis in a single multilevel model. Data analyses are usually performed using Mlwin or HLM/2, which are computer packages for multilevel modeling (Bryk, Raudenbush, and Congdon 1994; Goldstein et al. 1998). For example, Mlwin produces an estimate for each predictor variable along with the associated standard error. These estimates are comparable to the unstandardized regression coefficients in ordinary regression analysis, and their significance level can be tested using t-distribution tests. Moreover, Mlwin produces a statistic called the deviance, which indicates how well a given model fits the data. If two models are nested, the difference in the deviances of the two models has a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the number of parameters estimated. A formal chi-square test can then be performed to examine whether the more general model fits significantly better than the simpler model. In addition, Mlwin or HLM/2 splits the total variance of the dependent variable into two residual variances – in our case, the residual variance at the individual level and the residual variance at the country level. Thus, independent variables from the individual level and country level can be entered into the model to “explain” the residual variances at both levels, respectively.
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These residual variances will decrease if the independent variables from the two levels have a significant impact on the dependent variable. Mlwin can further split the country-level residual variance of the dependent variable into the residual variance of intercepts and the residual variance of slopes. The residual variance of intercepts (cf. means) refers to the variations in the level of the dependent variable across nations. The residual variance of slopes (cf. correlations) refers to the cross-national variations in the relationship between an independent variable and the dependent variable. The residual variance of slopes will also decrease if a cross-level interaction term has a significant impact on the dependent variable. Job Satisfaction Research In this section, we describe a recent large-scale cross-national research project that has led to useful insights into how the cross-level nation-as-moderator model can be applied in research. Moreover, we illustrate that some variants of the cross-level model can be developed further to deal with specific theoretical issues in cross-national research. By employing a cross-level nation-as-moderator model (Figure 1), we (Huang & Van de Vliert, 2004) conducted a study on how the relationship between job level and job satisfaction is contingent on a national contextual variable, that of cultural individualism. Individualism, one of Hofstede’s (1991) cultural dimensions, was measured at the country level, while job level and job satisfaction were measured at the individual level. We based our analyses on data from around 100,000 workers employed in 39 countries. The data were drawn from a survey conducted in a multinational company in 2000. All of the items were translated into the languages of the countries under investigation by professional translation agencies in those countries. The questionnaires were administered to employees through the management. Employees were told that the answers would be kept completely anonymous and that the management would not be able to identify the individual respondents. The response rate was about 75 percent. The sample contained 52 percent blue-collar workers, 48 percent white-collar workers, 62 percent males, and 38 percent females. The average age was 36 and the average length of tenure was 10 years. The multilevel analyses were conducted using an Mlwin computer package. The findings contradict some long-held beliefs, principally the myth of the universal positive association between intrinsically motivating jobs and job satisfaction (e.g., Locke 1976). First of all, we confirmed the expectation that job level (blue-collar workers versus white-collar workers) is positively related to job satisfaction in individualistic countries, but is not significantly associated with job satisfaction in
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collectivistic countries. We reasoned that more intrinsically motivating whitecollar work is more likely to engender more job satisfaction in individualistic countries because in those countries workers are socialized to place more emphasis on self-actualization needs and self-esteem needs. In collectivistic countries, however, more intrinsically motivating white-collar work does not necessarily produce more satisfaction than less intrinsically motivating bluecollar work due to the fact that, in collectivistic countries, self-actualization and self-esteem are not ranked as higher-order needs by workers (e.g., Stigler, Smith, and Mao 1985; Page & Cheng 1992; Chiu 1993; Diener & Diener 1995; Diener, Diener, and Diener 1995). It should be noted that the above analysis was conducted after the main effect of national wealth and its interactive effect with job level had been controlled for. This was done by entering national wealth (in terms of income per capita) and the interactive term of national wealth and job level in the very first step of the analysis. The effect of national wealth was controlled because national wealth correlates strongly with cultural individualism (Hofstede 1991). In addition to the simple cross-level two-way interaction model, we also explored the more complex cross-level three-way interactive effect of cultural individualism, job level, and opportunity to use one’s skills and abilities on job satisfaction. Presented in Figure 1 is the corresponding hypothetical path diagram, which depicts a national contextual variable (cultural individualism) and an individual-level organizational variable (opportunity to use skills and abilities) jointly influencing the link between job level and job satisfaction. From a somewhat different perspective, national culture was expected to be systematically associated with cross-national variations in the individual-level two-way interactive effect of job level and opportunity to use skills and abilities on job satisfaction. One of the interesting findings shown in Figure 2 indicates that, in collectivistic countries, blue-collar work versus white-collar work and job satisfaction were strongly negatively linked where there was little opportunity to use one’s skills and abilities in the job (simple slope: b = –.18, p < .01), but were moderately positively linked in case of many such opportunities (simple slope: b = .11, p < .05). We argued that a possible explanation is that white-collar workers in collectivistic countries may generally have a higher level of education, and thus be more easily influenced by the individualistic values of the West (cf. Inglehart 1997), to the extent that they miss the highly valued intrinsic rewards of opportunities to use one’s skills and abilities more than do blue-collar workers. Apparently, the crosslevel nation-as-moderator model seems very useful in quantitatively testing crossnational variations in even more complex individual-level relationships.
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Research on Motives for Doing Volunteer Work In another study, we (Van de Vliert, Huang, and Levine, 2004) investigated reasons for doing volunteer work. We included 33 countries whose residents’ reasons for doing unpaid voluntary work had been assessed through the 1990–1993 World Values Survey (World Values Study Group 1994). The surveys were carried out through face to face interviews by professional researchers, with
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a sampling universe consisting of all adult citizens, aged 18 and older (after a listwise deletion of missing values N = 13,584; M = 412 per nation; Mage = 40, SDage = 15.2; 47 percent female; 65 percent with paid jobs). There are two kinds of reasons for doing voluntary work. People may take up volunteer jobs for either self-serving or egoistic reasons, or for other-serving or altruistic reasons, or for both. We argued that the two types of motives might cooperate or compete with each other depending on national contextual variables. In particular, in rich nations, self-serving and other-serving motivations might well be positively linked because self-sacrificing is a way of ‘establishing one’s self-identity, confirming one’s notion of the sort of person one sees oneself to be, and expressing the values appropriate to this self-concept’ (Katz & Kahn 1978: 361). By contrast, in poor nations, volunteer workers might have to make a relatively serious choice between serving their own interests and acting out of altruistic or humanitarian concerns. In addition, as people have to consume more resources to cope with extremely cold or hot climates, we hypothesized that, in countries with more demanding cold or hot climates, national wealth produces competition rather than cooperation between self-serving and other-serving motivations. In countries with more temperate climates, however, the degree of national wealth was supposed to have less influence on the cooperative or competitive nature of the complex motivation to engage in volunteer work. Depicted in Figure 3 is the path diagram of the variant of the cross-level nation-as-moderator model that represents those expectations. A stepwise multilevel analysis was conducted to predict other-serving motivations for doing voluntary work. In step 1, country-level individualism was controlled for because this cultural dimension is positively associated with both colder climates and national wealth. In steps 2 and 3, the individual-level motivation to serve one’s own interests was entered (the degree of self-serving motivation in step 2, the cross-national variation in the relationship between self-serving motivation and other-serving motivation in step 3). Step 4 contained average climatic temperature, temperature-squared and gross national income per capita. The two-way interactions followed in step 5, and the threeway interactions in step 6. The analysis revealed that cultural individualism at the country level does not play a part (step 1), that self-serving motivation at the individual level is positively related to other-serving motivation (step 2), and that the link between self-serving motivation and other-serving motivation varies considerably from one nation to another (step 3). The most important finding, in step 6, represented in Figure 4, showed that a voluntary worker’s self-serving and other-serving motivations tend to be positively linked in high-income regions
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Figure 3. Country-Level National Wealth and Climatic Temperature as Joint Moderators of the Individual-Level Link between Self-Serving and Other-Serving Motives for Volunteer Work
with cold or hot climates (e.g., Scandinavia), tend to be unrelated in high – and low-income regions with temperate climates (e.g., Southern Europe and the southern part of South America) and in low-income regions with hot climates (e.g., West Africa around the Gulf of Guinea), and tend to be negatively linked in low-income regions with cold climates (e.g., Baltic States). We concluded that, in depressed countries where the financial resources are minimal and the climatic demands maximal, volunteering seems to be experienced as subordinating self-serving reasons to other-serving reasons for doing unpaid work. Some scholars think that such a multilevel approach is unnecessarily complicated, and does not add much value. As a case in point, one of the reviewers of our paper made the following comment: “I have no objection to Multilevel Modeling, but an alternative is to use the correlation between the two motives (after a Fisher transformation) as the dependent variable. A countrylevel ordinary regression can then be performed on this variable with income, temperature, and their interaction as predictors. This analysis is much easier to follow, and it is not clear to me in what way the current analysis based on Multilevel Modeling is superior to this country-level regression analysis.” This is not an isolated opinion. What is more, others have actually used the method proposed by this reviewer. Diener and Diener (1995), for example, used 31 within-country correlations to show that the link between self-esteem and life satisfaction varies substantially across nations. They reported that the correlation between self-esteem and life satisfaction was .60 for people from North America, but less than .01 for people from India. Across the 31 countries the size of the correlation coefficients correlated .53 with cultural individualism. Viewed from our perspective, Diener and Diener (1995) used multilevel analysis, but did so in a sequential rather than simultaneous fashion. By conducting two subsequent analyses, first at the individual level and then at the country level, they demonstrated that the cross-national variations in a
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particular psychological relationship, the link between self-esteem and life satisfaction, is systematically related to cultural individualism. However, this two-step approach neglects the problem of differential reliability. Differential reliability occurs when the number of respondents varies considerably across the nations under investigation. Oishi, Diener, Lucas, and Suh (1999) pointed out that the number of respondents in Diener and Diener’s (1995) study ranged from 29 to 985. Consequently, the correlation coefficient computed in Cameroon with 29 respondents is less reliable than the correlation coefficient obtained in Canada with 985 respondents. Oishi et al. (1999) further argued that multilevel modeling resolves the problem of differential reliability caused by directly relating correlation coefficients drawn from separate countries to the national characteristics of these countries. In multilevel analysis, the differential reliability becomes less problematic because regression lines instead of correlation coefficients are used as dependent variables. In short, the studies on job satisfaction and motives for volunteer work discussed in the preceding paragraphs demonstrate that each of the variants of the cross-level model shown in Figures 1 and 3 can be used to tackle specific issues in cross-national research. More importantly, by linking national characteristics with the cross-national variations in individual-level relationships in a cross-level model, one can predict and explain the variations in these individual-level relationships across nations. Last, but not least, using multilevel modeling, researchers can control for a number of rival explanatory variables at the country level, and can even examine the joint effects of different country-level variables on individual-level relationships.
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Implications for Research on Negotiations In this article, we challenged the methodological approaches used to investigate and explain cross-national differences in the links between the psychological states of the negotiators, the social conditions of the negotiations and the behavior of the negotiators, on the one hand, and outcomes of negotiations, on the other. We pointed out that there are three major problems in existing methods of testing the nation-as-moderator model at the individual level. Using the results of large-scale cross-national studies on job satisfaction and motives for volunteer work, we illustrated that multilevel modeling allows researchers to establish a more statistically rigorous cross-level nation-asmoderator model, which can help resolve or mitigate the three problems. First, as shown in Figure 5, researchers can directly use the country-level variables in a multilevel model of the negotiation processes; thus avoiding the problem of the cross-level construct equivalence of the cultural variables (Van de Vijver & Poortinga 2002). Second, multilevel modeling yields more accurate estimates of standard errors than do zero-order correlation analysis and ordinary regression analysis conducted at the individual level, because it takes into account variances at both the country level and the individual level. Lastly, several country-level variables, representing rival explanations, can be controlled and analyzed at the same time in a multilevel model. Cultural individualism is just one of the national contextual variables that may exert a significant influence on the negotiation processes. Other national contextual variables such as political rights, civil liberty, and dominant religion may also influence processes of negotiation (Bercovitch & Elgström 2001). Figure 4, for example, suggests the crude hypothesis that negotiators living in more demanding climates experience more interdependence between concern for their own goals and concern for the other party’s goals, and that this interdependence is of a more positive nature in wealthier countries. In other words, using multilevel analysis, researchers can test the joint impact of two national characteristics on individual-level negotiation processes. Additionally, in reality, individuals are subject to the influence of variables from different levels, such as the team level and organizational level. Multilevel modeling allows researchers to build a three-level model – individuals are nested within teams that are nested within nations – to examine how national contexts and team contexts jointly influence individual-level negotiation processes. Despite all of these virtues, the application of multilevel modeling to crossnational research has some limitations as well. To test a cross-level model by using multilevel modeling, a minimum of 25 countries is usually required (Snijders
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Country Level
Individual Level
National Contextual Variables e.g., Individualism Power Distance Political System
Negotiators’ Psychological States Social Conditions of Negotiation Negotiators’ Behavior
Negotiation Outcomes
Figure 5. Multilevel Model of Cross-National Differences in Negotiation Processes
& Bosker 1999). However, in practice, it is costly to collect data from such a large number of countries. Another limitation is that only rather simple individual-level relationships can be tested. As shown in the studies reported above (Huang & Van de Vliert, forthcoming; Van de Vliert et al., 2004), multilevel modeling only allows for tests of the moderating effects of national contextual variables on a single individual-level relationship or on an individual-level two-way interaction effect. As a rule, negotiation models proposed by various researchers are characterized by a rather complex structure (Gelfand & Dyer 2000; Morris & Fu 2001). It is difficult to test these negotiation models using multilevel analysis. Lastly, the research model proposed here can be used to study and explain cross-national variations in negotiating behavior and outcomes, but not the behavior and outcomes of people from different countries during negotiation. These limitations notwithstanding, the cross-level nation-as-moderator model may bring about new perspectives on theory building. The basic assumption of the cross-level model is that the impact of the negotiators’ psychological states, social conditions of negotiation, and behavior of the negotiators on negotiation outcomes may systematically vary across nations. In some nations, some strategies may have a positive effect on outcomes; in others, there may be no effect at all. There may even be a negative effect in certain nations. These cross-national variations may exist in a systematic manner. And this systematic variation may well be explained by some national contextual variables. Put in a different way, using multilevel modeling, we can predict the applicability of certain theoretical relationships across nations. The cross-level nation-as-moderator model permits researchers to generalize about the cross-national applicability of individual-level negotiation processes. We
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call this higher level of generalization of theories, a meta-theoretical perspective. In a nutshell, the cross-level approach discussed here may not only offer an alternative and a more statistically rigorous way of testing crossnational variations in the effectiveness of negotiation practices, but may also offer an alternative theoretical perspective for researchers to map and explain cross-national variations in negotiating behavior.
References Brett, J.M. (2000). “Culture and Negotiation,” International Journal of Psychology 35(2): 97–104. Brett, J.M., and Okumura, T. (1998). “Inter – and intracultural negotiations: US and Japanese negotiators,” Academy of Management Journal 41: 495–510. Bryk, A.S. and Raudenbush, S.W. (1992). Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data Analysis Methods. London/New Delhi: Sage. Bryk, A.S., Raudenbush, S.W., and Congdon, R.T., Jr. (1994). Hierarchical Linear Modeling with the HLM/2L and HLM/3L Programs. Chicago: Scientific Software International. Carnevale, P.J., Pruitt, D.G., and Britton, S.D. (1979). “Looking tough: The negotiator under constituent surveillance,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 5: 118–121. Chiu, L.H. (1993). “Self-esteem in American and Chinese (Taiwanese) children,” Current Psychology: Research and Reviews 11: 309–313. Diener, E., and Diener, M. (1995). “Cross-cultural correlates of life satisfaction and selfesteem,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 68(4): 653–663. Diener, E., Diener, M., and Diener, C. (1995). “Factors predicting the subjective well-being of nations,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 69(5): 851–864. Fu, H.Y. and Morris, M.W. (2000). “Need for closure fosters adherence to cultural norms: Evidence from cross-cultural studies of conflict resolution choices,” Stanford GSB Research Paper, #1649. Gelfand, M.J., and Realo, A. (1999). “Individualism-collectivism and accountability in intergroup negotiations,” Journal of Applied Psychology 84(5): 721–736. Goldstein, H., Rasbash, J., Plewis, I., Draper, D., Browne, W., Yang, M., Woodhouse, G., and Healy, M. (1998) A user’s guide to Mlwin. University of London. Graham, J.L., Kim, D.K., Lin, C.Y., and Robinson, M. (1988). “Buyer-seller negotiations around the Pacific Rim: Differences in fundamental exchange processes,” Journal of Consumer Research 15: 48–54. Hofstede, G.H. (1991). Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. London: McGraw-Hill. Huang, X., and Van de Vliert, E. (2004). “Job level and national culture as joint roots of job satisfaction,” Applied Psychology: An International Review, 53: 329–348. Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 societies, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kreft, I., and De Leeuw, J. (1998). Introducing Multilevel Modeling. London, Thousand Oaks; New Delhi: Sage Publications. Locke, E.A. (1976). “The nature and causes of job satisfaction.” In M.D. Dunnette, (Ed.) Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology. Chicago: Rand McNally College Publication.
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Lytle, A.L., Brett, J.M., Barsness, Z.I., Tinsley, C.H., and Janssens, M. (1995). “A paradigm for confirmatory cross-cultural research in organizational behavior,” Research in Organizational Behavior 17: 167–214. Maslow, A.H. (1954). Motivation and Personality. New York: Harper & Row. McCusker, C.R. (1994). “Individualism-collectivism and relationships in distributive negotiation: An experimental analysis,” Unpublished Dissertation. University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign. Oishi, S., Diener, E.F., Lucas, R.E., and Suh, E.M. (1999). “Cross-cultural variations in predictors of life satisfaction: Perspectives from needs and values,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 25(8): 980–990. Snijders, T.A.B., and Bosker, R.J. (1999) Multilevel Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Multilevel Modeling. London: Sage. Stigler, J.W., Smith, S., and Mao, L. (1985). “The self-perception of competence by Chinese children, Child Development,” 56: 1259–1270. Van de Vijver, F.J.R. and Poortinga, Y.H. (2002). Structural equivalence in multilevel research, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 33: 141–156. Van de Vliert, E., Huang, X., and Levine, R.V. (2004). “National wealth and thermal climate as predictors of motives for volunteer work,” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 35: 62–73. World Values Study Group (1994). World values survey, 1981–1984 and 1990–1993. Ann Arbor: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICSPR).
Methodological Challenges in the Study of Negotiator Affect BRUCE BARRY and INGRID SMITHEY FULMER
The role of affect is theoretically and empirically underdeveloped in the literature on conflict and negotiation. Although negotiation can be construed as “a natural setting for the study of affect” (Brief & Weiss 2002: 295), negotiation research with its emphasis on cognition “has ignored most emotion-relevant variables” (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, and Valley 2000: 285). Beginning with a trickle of papers in the late 1980s, rising to the level of a modest stream by the mid to late 1990s, the subject of affect in negotiation has begun to attract substantial attention from negotiation researchers. Still, the overall volume of completed research in this area is sufficiently small that a new review chapter (Barry, Fulmer and Van Kleef, 2004) was able to descriptively review virtually every published study in a handful of pages. Affect is used here to refer to the constellation of responses that comprise both emotions and moods. Emotions are said to be more differentiated and of shorter duration, whereas moods are more enduring and pervasive, if generally of lower intensity (Forgas 1992; Park, Sims and Motowidlo 1986). Emotions and moods are interdependent: moods influence the likelihood that emotions will be triggered, while emotions are able to elicit particular moods (Davidson 1994). Affect captures ephemeral responses that are situationally driven (state affect) as well as stable tendencies to experience emotion or mood states that are dispositionally based (trait affect; e.g., Watson, Clark and Tellegen 1988). This article examines methodological issues that are posed by attention to affective processes in bargaining and negotiation. As a starting point, we must recognize that the role of affect in negotiation can be said to have both experiential and strategic components. The experience of affect speaks to the genuine emotional responses that negotiators encounter as they react to interaction at the bargaining table. The strategic component captures the affective stances and reactions that negotiators consciously bring to bear on their opponents as ploys designed to influence the other party’s perceptions and/or actions within the encounter (Barry 1999). Both perspectives raise challenging methodological issues.
International Negotiation Series 2: P. Carnevale and C.K.W de Dreu (eds.) Methods of Negotiation Research, 149–164 © 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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In the pages that follow, we first briefly review existing research on affect in negotiation with particular attention to methodological approaches taken in empirical studies. We then point to methodological issues raised in these studies and consider possible remedies. The latter discussion is organized around the distinction between affective experience and affect strategy in negotiation. Our objective is to augment the likelihood that researchers can capture the “real” emotions that individuals experience, express, mask, and strategically deploy within the negotiation encounter.
Existing Research on Emotion in Negotiation Following Barry et al. (2004), we can divide studies of affect in negotiation into three categories: (a) research examining the effects of pre-existing mood states or emotions on negotiation – these are studies where emotion is treated as a predictor of process or outcome; (b) investigations of emotion experienced during or following negotiation – these are studies where emotion is an experienced consequence of interaction with a negotiation counterpart; and (c) researching exploring the tactical use of emotion within the bargaining encounter and its strategic value for achieving negotiation aims. Affect as Predictor (Anterior Mood/Emotion) Research exploring the predictive role of affect in negotiation has been grounded methodologically in the practice of mood induction. A long line of experimental research has shown that moods have a priming effect on various cognitive and information processing behaviors related to altruism, flexibility, problem interpretation, information use, problem solving, and reward allocation (for reviews see Barry & Oliver 1996; Forgas 1998; Isen 1987). In studies of negotiator mood, participants in a laboratory or classroom setting are typically exposed to an experimental manipulation of mood, and then asked to role-play participation in a simulated (typically mixed-motive) negotiation exercise. Researchers have induced positive pre-negotiation moods by using humorous cartoons and small gifts (Carnevale & Isen 1986), and humorous videotapes (Kramer, Newton, and Pommerenke 1993), finding that positive mood is subsequently related to enhanced joint outcomes. Kramer et al. also found that positive moods distort negotiators’ perceptions of performance, increasing pre-negotiation confidence and post-negotiation self-ratings of performance.
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Baron (1990) also attempted to manipulate positive mood, but with an ambient approach to induction; he exposed subjects to a pleasant odor. Negotiators exposed to pleasant odors had higher pre-negotiation aspirations and made more concessions than negotiators not exposed. Forgas (1998) took a broader approach to mood (and different approach to experimental induction), using false-feedback on a test of verbal ability to induce moods. In the positive mood condition, experimental participants were led to believe that they had achieved above-average performance on a difficult test. In the negative mood condition, participants believed that they had performed poorly on an easy test. A control group received no cues about test difficulty and no feedback on performance. Positive-mood negotiators were more likely to plan to be cooperative before the negotiation, used more cooperative negotiation strategies, achieved better outcomes, and were more inclined afterwards to honor the deal they reached. This study also explored the effect of mood on negotiators’ opponents, finding that negotiators in positive moods elicited more cooperative behavior and post-negotiation compliance with agreed-upon deals from their opponents. One study focused exclusively on the manipulation of negative affect: Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, and Raia (1997) generated perceptions of the negotiation opponent’s culpability for actions as a way to induce opponent-directed anger. Following a simulated job contract negotiation, participants with these perceptions reported less regard for opponent’s interests, diminished accuracy of their judgments of the other party’s interests, lower joint gains, and diminished desire for future interaction with the other party. We are aware of one study that examined the effects of actual (rather than laboratory manipulated) affective states and traits on conflict resolution behaviors. Rhoades, Arnold, and Jay (2001) had employed individuals complete measures of mood and affective disposition, and document experiences of workplace conflict over three successive workdays. They found that positive mood and positive dispositional affect were associated with more concern for the other party, collaboration, and problem-solving during the resolution of organizational conflicts. Negative mood and negative affectivity were associated with higher concern for self and competitive behavior. Mood mediated the effects of disposition: affective disposition had no effect on motivation and behavior independent of mood. Affect as Consequence (Experienced Emotion) Here we are concerned with investigations of the post-negotiation or intranegotiation emotional reactions experienced by negotiators. As with studies
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described above exploring moods as predictors, the prevailing empirical paradigm is the use of laboratory negotiation simulations. O’Connor and Arnold (2001) found that negotiators who failed to reach an agreement in a simulated two-party employment negotiation experienced more anger and frustration than negotiators who reached agreement. Self-efficacy moderated this association: more confident negotiators experienced less negative emotion following impasse. In a study of e-mail-based negotiation, Moore, Kurtzberg, Thompson, and Morris (1999) manipulated group affiliation and self-disclosure. Although this study was not oriented around emotion per se, findings indicated that a context favoring a personal relationship (negotiation with someone in one’s own group with self-disclosure of personal information) yielded expressions of positive affect within the interaction that increased rapport and decreased the likelihood of impasse. A study by Hegtvedt and Killian (1999) explored the connection between justice perceptions and post-negotiation emotion following a pay allocation task. Negotiators who saw the bargaining process as fair were more likely to experience positive emotion and less likely to express negative emotions such as agitation and resentment afterwards. Perceptions of the fairness of one’s own outcome increased satisfaction and decreased disappointment and resentment; outcome fairness was, however, also positively related to guilt. (Perceptions of the fairness of the other party’s outcomes had no effect on emotional reactions.) Pillutla and Murnighan (1996) used an ultimatum game to explore perceptions of anger and unfairness, and spiteful reactions in a correlational study. Findings indicated that perceptions of unfairness were substantially related to subsequent anger, particularly when individuals responding to a take-it-or-leave-it offer had complete information about the size of the resource being divided. As Pillutla and Murnighan put it, “Respondents expect fairness: When they perceive that an offer is unfair, many react angrily and spitefully reject beneficial offers” (1996: 220). A few studies have examined negotiator affect in non-simulation contexts. Scanzoni and Godwin (1990) investigated marital negotiations through retrospective recall of couple decision-making (a critical incident technique). After recalling and reconstructing incident details, husbands and wives each separately completed an “epilogue questionnaire” that included a measure of perceived affect toward the partner. Findings indicated that bonds between spouses that existed before negotiation predicted post-interaction affect. Also, past cooperative behavior by husbands was associated with wives’ report of affect, but curiously the converse was not found. In the communication literature, an exploratory study of crisis negotiation utilized a combined measure of language intensity and message valence as a marker for negotiator affect
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(Rogan & Hammer 1995). Transcript analyses of professional negotiator and perpetrator speech patterns during three authentic crisis negotiations (suicide threat, domestic/hostage situation, and mental instability situation) suggested that affective responses often proceed through predictable phases, and that speech patterns may be related to successful versus unsuccessful crisis resolution. Affect as Tactic (Emotion Strategically Deployed) The strategic use of emotion as a tactical gambit in negotiation has been a recurrent theme in the theoretical and applied analysis of negotiation (see Lewicki, Barry, Saunders and Minton 2003), but has not been systematically addressed in the empirical negotiation literature. Studies of tactical communication behaviors by negotiators tend to emphasize cognitive, information-processing maneuvers, with attention to emotionally-oriented gambits as an isolated or peripheral matter. For example, Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband and Carnevale (1980) examined tactics of information exchange, heuristic trial and error, and distributive behavior. The use of threats and put downs, which could be construed as emotionally manipulative in some circumstances, was pooled with other actions (commitments; extraneous arguments) into a factor describing distributive behavior. Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman and Carroll (1990) examined the relationship between negotiated outcomes and tactics, including a category labeled “negative reaction,” which in turn included what the authors called “negative affect statements” by a bargainer. Subsequent studies by Weingart and her colleagues, however, addressed only cognitive tactics related to the exchange, evaluation, and substantiation of information and offers (e.g., Weingart, Bennett and Brett 1993; Weingart, Hyder and Prietula 1996). One study that indirectly considered the tactical role of emotion was Barry’s (1999) investigation of the relative perceived ethical appropriateness of emotionally deceptive negotiation tactics compared with other (cognitive) deceptive tactics such as bluffing or misrepresentation. Emotionally deceptive tactics include the false expression or suppression of either positive or negative emotion. Although results suggest that people are substantially more approving of and express more self-efficacy in their ability to deploy emotionally deceptive tactics as compared to other tactics of informational deception, methodological challenges (to be discussed at length later) have limited researchers’ ability to study these tactics in the laboratory or classroom.
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Summary The most prevalent empirical technique for the study of affect in negotiation is the manipulation or measurement of affect as a precursor to interaction. Typically the form of affect that is induced or measured is a diffuse mood state (rather than a more ephemeral and intense emotional state). A few studies have assessed affect that arises within the negotiation encounter or as a consequence of a negotiated outcome. There has been almost no empirical attention to the use of emotion strategically as a negotiating gambit.
Methodological Issues and Remedies Theoretical treatments have offered up a rich variety of roles and mechanisms regarding affective processes at the bargaining table, few of which have been tackled empirically. Barry and Oliver (1996), for example, proposed that emotion states are relevant at multiple points within a negotiation encounter: (a) anticipatory emotion states resulting from ambient conditions, prior exchanges, and dispositional affect; (b) affect experienced within the negotiation that follows from offers, concessions and tactics; and (c) post-negotiation affect that results from outcomes and outcome-related attributions. Morris and Keltner (2000) proposed a social-functional model that identifies relational problems which trigger particular social emotions. These emotions, in turn, give rise to interaction behaviors within the negotiation encounter. In a related vein, Lawler and Yoon (1995) modeled relational development that emerges from the emotional consequences of repeated negotiations between the same parties. Thompson, Nadler, and Kim (1999) discussed processes of emotional transmission among negotiating parties, including emotional “contagion” (the transfer of emotion from one party to another) and emotional “tuning” (the construction of messages designed to control or regulate the other party’s emotional responses.) Allred (1999) proposed a model of retaliatory conflict describing how parties perceive each other’s harmful behavior, and either retaliate or defuse tensions, depending on the nature of cognitive appraisal and attribution. Taken together, the models just identified consider a broad and deep set of phenomena related to emotion in negotiation, yet few of the ideas embedded within them have been examined directly in empirical research. Arguably, the methods that have prevailed to this point are not well suited to testing these
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kinds of models. In the following sections, we discuss methodological constraints and possible remedies. A Major Problem: Capturing the Experience of Affect Outside the Laboratory Negotiation researchers have been relatively successful in making the case that simulations (together with incentives like extra credit or token cash payments) generate sufficient mental engagement among study participants to justify the generalizability of laboratory findings conducted in the cognitive domain. But when it comes to the study of emotion in laboratory-type settings, “. . . the ecological and external validity of laboratory paradigms and measures can sometimes be uncertain” (Cacioppo & Gardner 1999: 193). Researchers restricted to the laboratory or classroom are limited in the range of meaningful outcomes and social complexity of negotiations that can be studied. Real-world negotiations may involve substantial financial risks, are often conducted with people with whom one shares a significant ongoing personal relationship, and sometimes are related to major life events (divorce, child custody, judicial proceedings, etc.), all of which heighten outcome significance and potentially result in intensified emotional responses. Furthermore, protracted real-world negotiations may introduce an element of time that could either serve to dampen emotions or, conversely, facilitate the intensification of emotions via the opportunity for rumination. And not least of all, contextualized negotiations often involve the expectations and emotions of multiple negotiators and constituencies simultaneously. Such scenarios are difficult to reproduce in the lab. It is in precisely these types of high-stakes, grueling negotiations, however, that one is presumably likely to observe the strongest manifestations of emotion, and also perhaps the greatest strategic use of emotion. An additional consideration is that lab studies and classroom simulations effectively impose a particular situation on the participant, who voluntarily agrees to take part. While offering the advantage of control, this approach eliminates the situational effects of choice and of coercion. Individuals in real-world settings often have some choice about the negotiations into which they will enter, and sometimes even about their negotiation counterparts. As a result, one might observe either more or less emotional response in the field than in a corresponding lab study because the negotiator has chosen to engage a negotiation where he or she would be more or less likely to become emotional, depending on his or her personal preferences, (e.g., Goates, Barry, and Friedman [2003] provide evidence that negotiators vary in the extent to which they “prefer” emotion-laden bargaining encounters). On the flip side, although most university human subjects committees frown on the use of coercion to
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force participants to participate in laboratory negotiation studies, in the real world, individuals may sometimes feel compelled to negotiate when they would really rather not do so (e.g., spouse asks for a divorce), or to negotiate using particular tactics, including emotion tactics such as pretending to be happy about some turn of events when one is not (e.g., “emotional labor” [Hochschild 1983] in negotiations with important business clients). Such circumstances may result in differential emotional experiences and/or use of emotion tactics, and correspondingly different negotiation outcomes. Another Problem: The Disingenuous Expression or Suppression of Affect With respect to the strategic side of affect, one issue (among others) is whether the tactical use of emotion can be reliably detected and measured. Content coding of audiotapes, videotapes, or transcripts has been used to study negotiation tactics and process (e.g., Brett, Shapiro and Lytle 1998). While there is evidence that coders can reliably code facial emotional expression (Kring & Gordon 1998), it is less certain that coders can accurately detect whether emotion is being systematically suppressed, exaggerated or simulated as a tactical ploy. Another problem arises when we consider that the duration of genuine emotions and mood states varies considerably. Measuring the life span of individual emotions is difficult but probably necessary in order to study their effects on negotiation processes. As difficult as it is to measure the persistence of genuine emotion, establishing the temporal boundaries of strategically generated expressions of affect through observation is even more challenging. Remedies So what are researchers to do? It seems that a shift toward the study of context-rich negotiation is not only inevitable, but also crucial to the advancement of knowledge about the role of emotion in negotiation. The discussion that follows offers examples of several approaches that have been utilized successfully in other research domains, and which may prove adaptable to the study of affect in negotiation. The remedy that is probably most straightforward to imagine but rather more difficult to implement is to place a greater emphasis on the observational study of live (not simulated) negotiations. As with all field studies, gaining access to observe such negotiations is half the battle. Some targets for observational studies might include: organizations with departments or employees whose primary function involves negotiation (e.g., sales, purchasing, customer service, employee recruitment/hiring, labor relations), community mediation
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centers, judicial settings (e.g., plea negotiation conferences, small claims court mediation), and other nonprofit or governmental agencies where disputes are frequently negotiated or mediated. For the observational approach to bear fruit, one must accept that a researcher can accurately detect and reliably classify the experience of emotion by interactants. As we mentioned above, there is evidence that observers can reliably assess visible emotional expression – but expression and experience are not the same thing. As studies of affect in retrospectively constructed episodes (Scanzoni & Godwin 1990) attest, recall techniques can elicit from interacting parties a sense of affective experience that occurred in the past. Clearly, however, the veracity of recalled emotion states is likely to be enhanced to the extent that the temporal distance between emotional experience and recall is diminished. A tool that has been employed to address this problem is experience sampling methodology (ESM) (also referred to as ecological momentary assessment or augmented diary methods). Study participants are asked to report on their current mental states (cognitive and/or emotional) at frequent intervals (randomly, episodically, or at particular time intervals prompted by signals from the researcher) over some time period (Bolger, Davis, and Rafaeli 2003; Kubey, Larson, and Csikszentmihalyi 1996). For example, Weiss, Nicholas, and Daus (1999) used an ESM approach to study the dynamic relationships among affect, expectancy theory-based job beliefs, and job satisfaction. They utilized written questionnaires (Current Mood Report, Larsen & Kasimatis 1990) and beepers to prompt responses, finding that average mood contributed to job satisfaction over and above job beliefs and dispositional tendencies toward happiness. Ilies and Judge (2002) explored the longitudinal interrelationships among mood (positive and negative affect), personality and job satisfaction. Four times a day over a 19-day period, participants completed a web-based mood adjective questionnaire; other measures of personality and job satisfaction were also collected at the same time (responses were prompted by email). They found that level and variability of mood predicted level and variability of job satisfaction, and that within-person, these varied together over time. Given issues with compliance when paper diaries are used (e.g., Feldman Barrett and Barrett 2001), electronic devices such as cellular telephones, personal digital assistants or palmtop computers are being used to collect questionnaire responses in ESM studies, particularly in health studies (e.g., Collins, Kashdan, and Golnish 2003; Kamarck, Shiffman, Smithline, Goodie, Paty, Gnys and Jong 1998). Bolger, Davis and Rafaeli (2003) and Feldman Barrett and Barrett (2001) discuss practical and technological considerations related to use of such electronic devices in ESM.
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Limitations of ESM include intrusiveness and potential for self-selection bias (not just anyone would participate in such a study) (Alliger & Williams 1993). In addition, given the frequency with which participants are asked to respond in such studies, ESM approaches often use questionnaires or checklists that solicit responses to predefined discrete emotional states. While convenient, the use of questionnaires potentially constrains the range of emotions reported to those that fit neatly into discrete categories. Feldman Barrett found that people seem to vary in how they discriminate among their emotions (global pleasantness or unpleasantness of emotions versus distinct affective states), a situation that “present[s] a certain challenge to researchers who focus their research efforts on discrete emotions while using self-report inventories” (1998: 596). ESM approaches in conjunction with more open-ended emotion diaries (Oatley & Duncan 1992), although too time-consuming and intrusive for some negotiation settings, could provide the kind of richer information on the breadth and dimensionality of the emotional landscape that would be desirable for theory development. For example, Oatley and Duncan’s emotion diary not only asks people to categorize their mood, but also to describe the length of time that the emotion lasted, cause, and whether the feeling was a “mixed” emotion (where two emotions were occurring at the same time). Bolger, Davis, and Rafaeli note that “advances in voice recording and recognition as well as in linguistic analysis technology allow the inclusion of verbal reports into diary research” (2003: 599), which may enable the use of more openended questions. ESM utilizing such emotion diaries could prove especially useful in conjunction with corroborating data (facial observation and/or physiological data) as a means of studying tactics of emotional deception. Another approach to studying emotional responses in real-time involves the physiological monitoring of emotional arousal. Experimental studies in various fields have explored the emotional arousal responses of the autonomic and central nervous systems utilizing measures of physiological activity (including facial and vocal responses) (for reviews see Cacioppo, Berntson, Larsen, Poehlmann and Ito 2000; Hagemann, Waldstein and Thayer 2003; Lane and Nadel 2000; Russell, Bachorowski and Fernandez-Dols 2003). There has been relatively little use of these approaches outside the laboratory, however, primarily due to their invasiveness and lack of portability in many cases. A recent exception is found in a study by Lo and Repin (2002), who used portable equipment and biofeedback software to collect data on skin conductance, pulse, heart rate, EMG, respiration rate and body temperature from a pilot group of ten professional foreign exchange and derivatives traders. They simultaneously collected real-time data on market events to
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which the traders were responding, and found, among other things, preliminary evidence suggestive of experience effects (i.e., experienced traders seemed to be less emotionally sensitive to certain market changes than less experienced traders). A recent health psychology study combined ambulatory physiological monitoring and electronic experience sampling methods to examine the effect of everyday stress and emotion on blood pressure (ABP) (Kamarck et al., 1998). One hundred twenty participants wore ABP monitors that inflated and took blood pressure readings every 45 minutes during the day for six days; when the cuff inflated, respondents also responded to questionnaires (Diary of Ambulatory Behavioral States) on palm-top computers. Although the effects of negative affect and emotional arousal on blood pressure were generally modest, researchers noted substantial individual differences in blood pressure responsiveness to emotion.1 Realistically, the collection of physiological data is probably not feasible in all field studies of emotion, but as the data collection process becomes technically easier to do, collecting at least some basic physiological data from negotiators could provide additional insights into the biological processes that accompany negotiators’ emotional responses. At the present time it is not clear that physiological data (including brain imaging) are precise enough to differentiate among different discrete emotions; they are better at distinguishing between broad positive and negative emotions (Cacioppo et al. 2000). However, these approaches may be useful in conjunction with other approaches to further corroborate whether emotional arousal was indeed experienced physiologically, which could prove especially valuable in detecting the use of suppressive emotion-based tactics. In situations where negotiation transcript data are available, techniques of natural language analysis may be useful. On the one hand, some researchers urge caution in using counts of emotion words to study emotion: From an evolutionary perspective, language did not emerge as a vehicle to express emotion. In natural speech we generally use intonation, facial expression, or other nonverbal cues to convey how we feel. Emotional tone is also expressed through metaphor and other means not directly related to emotion words. Taken together, it is our sense that emotion researchers should hesitate before embarking on studies that rely exclusively on the natural production of emotion words (Pennebaker, Mehl and Niederhoffer 2003: 571).
On the other hand, there is preliminary evidence (Rogan & Hammer 1995), that patterns of language intensity (use of metaphors, obscure words, profanity statements, qualifiers, etc.) and valence may reflect negotiator affective patterns and be related to crisis negotiation outcomes.
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Shifting from the quantitative end of the research design spectrum to the qualitative end, we discover still more tools for exploring the role of emotion for the negotiator-in-context. A hallmark of ethnography and related forms of qualitative research is the ability to collect data unconstrained by prior expectations about the information that can be acquired and the variables that can be examined (Becker 1996/2001). Emotion is arguably more socially and culturally embedded, and more contextually influenced than cognitive processing and so may lend itself more to qualitative methods in order to obtain sufficiently rich or “thick” description (Geertz 1973) about how emotion manifests itself in vivo. Ethnographic methods such as interviews and participantobservation are particularly well suited to this task, with researchers acting both as observers of interaction and as interviewers regarding the emotional tenor and experience of interaction that has just occurred. Friedman’s (1994) study of labor negotiations is an example of the extensive application of ethnography to negotiation. Other examples of this approach used to study emotion-related phenomena (although not in negotiation contexts per se) include: the work of Thoits (1996), who utilized participant-observation to study how people manage the emotions of others in support groups; a study of emotional contrast strategies of bill collectors that employed interviews and participant-observation (Rafaeli & Sutton 1991); and an interview-based study of reciprocal emotion management by paralegals (Lively 2000). Open-ended interview methods could conceivably be applied to laboratory negotiations as well, with experimenters poised to debrief subjects about the affective components of the interaction just experienced, perhaps in the form of verbal protocol analysis that accompanies a replay of a tape of the interaction – although again, one is mindful that the range of emotional experience in the lab may be constrained by the artificiality of the task or its attendant incentives, risks, and consequences. Still, there are a strong basis to infer from the literature on the psychology of emotions that individuals can do quite well at reporting their own emotions during and following events that elicit emotional experience and expression (e.g., Kring & Gordon 1998). Given the strengths and limitations inherent in each of these approaches, it may make sense to consider the application of several methods in the same study. This could be accomplished by simultaneously combining several quantitatively oriented approaches such as self-report measures and/or physiological monitoring (e.g., Kring & Gordon 1998). Taking advantage of the full spectrum of research approaches, negotiation researchers might also consider utilizing “mixed-methods” approaches that combine, either sequentially or concurrently, both quantitative methods and qualitative approaches (see Creswell 2003, for a review of mixed methods research strategies).
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Conclusion The position taken in this article can be distilled to six observations: (1) emotion is fundamental to the negotiation encounter; (2) research on negotiation has focused on cognitive processes and underemphasized the role of emotion; (3) emotion is relevant to the negotiation encounter as anterior, experiential, and strategic phenomena; (4) conceptualizations of how emotion fits into negotiation are far out in front of empirical investigation in terms of sophistication and complexity; (5) prevailing methods in the empirical literature on negotiation are not well suited to the investigation of emotional processes; and (6) creative new methods (in the sense of being novel to research on the psychology of negotiation) are needed to do empirical justice to the subject of affect in negotiation. In this article, we survey a variety of research approaches already used to study emotion in other fields that might also be adaptable to the study of affect in context-rich negotiation. We encourage negotiation scholars to consider the use of multiple methods and varied techniques such as those described here as we progress toward the testing of existing theories, and as a stepping stone toward future theory building regarding the role of emotion in negotiation.
Note 1. See Bolger, Davis and Rafaeli (2003), for more on physiological data collection in conjunction with diary studies.
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