Metonymy in language and thought

Metonymy in Language and Thought

HUMAN COGNITIVE PROCESSING is a forum for interdisciplinary research on the nature and organization ofthecognitive systems and processes involved in speaking and understanding natural language (including sign language), and their relationship to other domains of human cognition, including general conceptual or knowledge systems and processes (the language and thought issue), and other perceptual or behavioral systems such as vision and non-verbal behavior (e.g. gesture). 'Cognition' should be taken broadly, not only including the domain of rationality, but also dimensions such as emotion and the unconscious. The series is open to any type of approach to the above questions (methodologically and theoretically) and to research from any discipline, including (but not restricted to) different branches of psychology, artificial intelligence and computer science, cognitive anthropology, linguistics, philosophy and neuroscience. It takes a special interest in research crossing the boundaries ofthese disciplines.

EDITORS

Marcelo Dascal (Tel Avi11 Uniw:rsity) Raymond Gibbs (University of California Q1 Santo Cruz) jan Nuyts (University of Antwerp) Editorial address: Jan Nuyts, University of Antwerp, Dept. of Linguistics (GER), Universiteitsplein 1, B 2610 Wilrijk, Belgium, e-mail: [email protected]

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Melissa Bowerman (Nijmegen); Wallace Chafe (Santo Barbara, CA) Philip R. Cohen (Portland, OR); Antonio Damasio (lowo City, lA) Morton Ann Cernsbacher (Madison, WI); David McNeill (Chicago, IL) Eric Pederson (Eugene, OR); Fran~ois Recanati (Paris) Sally Rice (Edmonton, Alberto); Benny Shanon Oerusa/em} Lokendra Shastri (Berkeley, CA); Dan Slobin (Berkeley, CA) Paul Thagard (Wo~rloo, Ontario)

Volume4 Klaus-Uwe Panther and GUnter Radden (eds)

Metonymy in Language and Thought

Metonymy in Language and Thought

Edited by KLAUS-UWE PANTHER GUNTER RADDEN University of Hamburg

JOHN BENJAMINS PUBLISHING COMPANY AMSTERDAMJPHILADELPH lA

TM

00

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences- Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39·48·1984.

Ubrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Metonymy in language and thought f edited by Klaus-Uwe Panter, GUnter Radden. p. em. -- (Human cognitive processing, ISSN 1387-6724; v. 4)

Papers presented at a workshop held June 23-24,1996, Hamburg University. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Metonyms Congresses. 2. Cognitive grammar Congresses. I. Panther, Klaus-Uwe, 194211. Radden, GUnter. Ill. Series. 1999 PJ01.5.M49M48

401'.41··dC21 ISBN go 272 1356 4 (Eur.)

99-23468

/1

55619 204 5 (US) (alk. paper)

CIP

© 1999- John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. • P.O.BoK 75577 • 1070 AN Amsterdam • The Netherlands John Benjamins North America • P.O.BoK 27519 • Philadelphia PA 19118·0519 • USA

Acknowledgments

The present volume evolved from a workshop on metonymy held at Hamburg

University on June 23 and 24. 1996. This conference wa." probably the first international meeting of scholars from Europe. North America and Asia which

was exclusively devoted to the study of metonymy in language and thought. We would like to express our thanks to all of the participants of the conference. both presenters and audience. for making the workshop an intellectually stimulating and revealing event. The workshop was generously funded by the Deut.Khe Forsclrungsgemeinschaft and the Hansi.Khe Unh·ersitiit.utiftung, Hamburg. whose financial contributions are gratefully acknowledged. For their help in organizing the workshop and preparing the manuscript we are indebted to our secretary Elisabeth Himmler and our student assistants Elizabeth Matthis. Anatol Stefanowitsch and Sebastian Ross-Hagcbaum who devoted many long hours to the conscientious preparation of the volume. Without their dedication and suppon this volume would not have been possible. We also benefited greatly from the insightful comments given to us by two anonymous reviewers. Finally. we would like to thank lhe editors of the series Hwmm Cognitive Proces.\·ing for accepting this volume, in panicular Jan Nuyts. who kindly assisted us in all editorial matters.

Contents Introduction

Klaus-Uwe Panther and Giinter Radden

Part 1: Theoretical Aspects of Metonymy Towards a Theory of Metonymy Giinter Rudden and Zo/uin KOvecses

17

Speaking and Thinking with Metonymy Raynwml W. Gibbs, Jr.

61

Metonymy and Conceptual Integration

77

Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner Distinguishing Metonymy from Synecdoche

91

Ken-khi Seto Aspects of Referential Metonymy Bemrice Warren

121

Part II: Historical Aspects of Metonymy Frame and Contiguity: On the Cognitive Bases of Metonymy and Certain Types of Word Formation

139

Peter Koch

Co-presence and Succession: A Cognitive Typology of Metonymy Andrew~

Blatlk

169

viii

Contents

Metonymic Bridges in Modal Shifts Louis GoosJens

193

Metonymy in Onomastics 0/afJdke/

21 I

Part III: Case Studies of Metonymy Grammatical Constraints on Metonymy: On the Role of the Direct Object Richard Waltereit

233

Putting Metonymy in its Place Paul Pauwels

255

Conversion as a Conceptual Metonymy of Event Schemata Rem! Dirven

275

Opposition as a Metonymic Principle Christian VoHhagen

289

Metonymic Hierarchies: The Conceptualization of Stupidity in German Idiomatic Expressions Kurt Feyaerts The Potentiality for Actuality Metonymy in English and Hungarian Klaus-Uwe Panther am/ Linda Thornburg

309

333

Part IV: Applications of Metonymy "Mummy.llike being a sandwich": Metonymy in Language Acquisition Brigitte Nerlic:h, David D. Clarke. Za::}e Todd

361

Rccontextualization of Metonymy in Narrative and the Case of Morrison· s Song of Solomon Anne Pankhllnt

385

Col! tell I.\'

ix

List of Contributors

401

Subjccl index.

405

Author index.

417

Metonymy and metaphor index.

423

Introduction

Klaus-Uwe Panther and Gunter Radden University of Hamburg

1.

Background

Eighteen years after Lakoffand Johnson's (1980) seminal work on the role of metaphor in conceptualilation. which sparked a vast amount of research in cognitive linguistics. it has become increasingly apparent that metonymy is a cognitive phenomenon that may be even more fundamental than metaphor. We believe that the contributions give a fair view of the state of the art in metonymic research. although we are also aware of the fact that a great many questions about metonymy still remain unanswered, some of which will be addressed below. The cognitive understanding of metaphor and metonymy is certainly at variance with both naive and traditional scholarly views. which have strongly been influenced by centuries of rhetorical and literary studies. The cleavage between literal and figurative language. which was taken for granted by traditional rhetoric and linguistics, has recently been challenged by Gibbs (1994: 24-79: and this volume). Still. we owe the first basic insights into the nature of tropes toGreek.Roman and medieval scholars. modem literary critics and linguists. Many different classifications of tropes have been proposed. starting with Aristotle. who subsumed metonymy and synecdoche under metaphor, and more recently by the Gro11pe cle Lii!ge or Groupe Ji. which subsumed metaphor and metonymy under synecdoche (see Schafer and Rice 1977). Some of these ideas on metonymy definitely have a modem. cognitive tinge. Various contributors to this volume (Koch: Blank: and Nerlich. Todd and Clarke) link their cognitive approach to metonymy to this rhetorical tradition.

Klau.'i-Uwe Pa"ther cmd Giimer Radcle"

The authors of the contributions to this volume have different theoretical backgrounds and are affiliated with different disciplines: linguistics. psycholinguistics, psychology and literary studies. Many of them share the assumption that metonymy is a cognitive phenomenon underlying much of our ordinary thinking and that the use of metonymy in language is a reflection of its conceptual status. The conceptual framework within which metonymy is understood in most of these contributions is that of scenes. frames. scenarios. domains or idealized cognitive models (ICMs). Within these models, a metonymic link may be established between two conceptual entities in the broadest sense. This view supersedes the traditional assumption of metonymy as having primarily a referential function. a view which was still held by Lakoff and Johnson ( 1980). The papers read at the conference and collected in this volume address a wide range of topics related to metonymy. The papers have been grouped into four parts. Part I deals with theoretical aspects of metonymy as a cognitive process. Part 2 investigates historical aspects of metonymy within a cognitive framework. Part 3 contains a number of case studies on selected metonymies or aspects of metonymy. Part 4 explores the notion of metonymy in its application to language acquisition and literary criticism.

2.

Contributions to the volume

2.1. Theoretical aspects of metonymy Three papers address the role of metonymy in language and thought from a broader theoretical perspective. The issue of the conceptual nature of metonymy is investigated by GUnter Radden and Zoltan Ki:iv~ses in their paper "Towards a theory of metonymy." Their approach is based on the notion of idealized cognitive model (ICM) as proposed by Lakoff(l987). Metonymy is understood as a conceptual process in which one conceptual entity. the 'target,' is made mentally accessible by means of another conceptual entity. the 'vehicle.' within the same ICM.In principle. either of the two conceptual entities related may stand for the other. i.e .. metonymy is ba'iically a reversible process. There are. however, a number of cognitive principles which govern the selection of a preferred vehicle. These principles lead to natural. or 'default' cases of metonymy and oflen escape our awareness. These principles

Introduction may. however, be overridden by factors such as style. taboo or politeness and may lead to the creation of expressive. or 'non-default' cases of metonymies. In his contribution on "Speaking and thinking with metonymy:· Raymond Gibbs lays the foundations for the study of metonymy in ordinary language as well a<> literary discourse. He situates metonymy in a larger cognitive context and adduces evidence for the conceptual basis of metonymy. Thus. the Gricean notion of conversational implicature can be seen as being metonymically motivated; metonymic reasoning may also contribute to the establishing of coherence by means of 'conceptual anaphors.' Finally, Gibbs also shows how metonymy is operative in discourse and leads to a better understanding of contextually determined reference. indirect speech acts. and colloquial tautologies. Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner explore another conceptual aspect of metonymy. In their paper "Metonymy and conceptual integration,'' the authors investigate the interaction of conceptual blending and metonymy. They demonstrate that Lakoffs and KOvecses' unidirectional model of conceptual metaphor does not account for expressions such as smoke is comint: out of his ears. which can only be understood as resulting from 'blending' the source and the target domains. since.literally. there are no ears in the source domain and there is no smoke in the target domain. Fauconnicr and Turner's approach has far-reaching consequences for the theory of metaphor in that it may very well tum out that most metaphors involve conceptual integration. Also, conceptual entities may be metonymically linked in a blended space. In the well-known symbolic representation of death as The Grim Reaper. the input clements 'scythe.' 'cowl,' and 'skeleton' arc conceptually integrated. Thus the blend 'shortens' the metonymic distance between originally noncontiguous conceptual entities. Ken-ichi Seto's paper "On distinguishing synecdoche from metonymy" argues for a clear conceptual distinction between metonymy and synecdoche. Despite the current interest in these tropes, they have not yet been defined in a satisfactory fashion. According to Seto. the reason for this lack of precision resides in the confusion between taxonomies and partonomies. Taxonomies involve 'kind or relations in a hyponymically-structured conceptual domain (e.g., ct ham sandwkh is a kim/ offood). whereas partonomies involve 'part of relations in the physical world (as in an arm i.{ a part of the body). Seto calls the former rehnions. which are defined by semantic inclusion, C-relations (category relations); the latter relations, which are constituted by spatia-

Klaus-Uwe Pa,ther cmd Gii11ter Radcle11 temporal contiguity between entities in the physical world. are called Erelations (entity relations). Seto proposes to reserve the term 'synecdoche' for C-relations and 'metonymy' forE-relations. On the basis of this distinction. he develops classifications of metonymic and synecdochic relations. In herpaper"Aspectsofreferential metonymy," Beatrice Warren detects structural parallels between referential metonyms on the one hand and nounnoun compounds and denominal verbs on the other hand. These three constructions have in common that they involve two referents and an implicit link connecting them. In noun-noun compounds. the referring item is explicit. whereas it is implied in metonyms.Accordingto Warren. metonymy is basically an abbreviation device and, apart from finding the implicit referring item. il<> interpretation involves retrieving a relation. Metonymic relations are restricted to a small number of recurrent links. This makes the interpretation of metonymy less demanding. or even effortless. when compared to the open-ended interpretation of metaphor. which involves working out several matching links (of similar attributes) between the conventional and intended referents.

2.2. Historical aspects of metonymy The outstanding role of metonymy in triggering linguistic change has long been recognized and led to various classifications of types of metonymy. some of which are described in the papers below. The cognitive paradigm in linguistics offers a new analytic tool for analyzing historical data. Four papers are devoted to the operation of metonymy in historical processes of language. In his paper "Frame and contiguity: On the cognitive bases of metonymy and certain types of word formation," Peter Koch investigates metonymicallyinduced changes of meaning. He makes use of the conceptual networks provided by frame theory. Frames may be seen as conceptual gestalts and. in metonymic changes of meaning. a new sense is highlighted as the ·figure' while the old sense serves as its 'ground' within the frame. Figure/ground effects also account for the origin of metonymy in discourse. Koch distinguishes between three types of ad hoc metonymic innovation inducing a metonymic change: hearer-based inferential innovations such as the interpretation of 'fireplace' as 'fire.' speaker-based 'imprecise' innovations such as the sense of 'hip' for 'thigh; and expressive innovations such as 'skull' for 'head: Andreas Blank presents further argumenL" for a frame-theoretical approach to metonymy. His paper "Co-presence and succession: A cognitive

Introduction typology of metonymy" critically examines the classifications of metonymy that have been proposed. He claims that most typologies of metonymy are defective in that a number of metonymies do not fit into any of the categories proposed. He argues that all types of metonymic changes can be subsumed under two major types: relations between entities that are co-present within a frame. and those that are successive within one frame or two related frames. His typological model of metonymy comprises three levels of abstraction: the two domains of co-present and successive contiguity at the highest level. schematic types of contiguity at the intermediate level and concrete linguistic metonymies at the lowest level. A specific problem of semantic change is studied by Louis Goossens in his papcr"Metonymic bridges in modal shifts." He investigates the conceptual shift of the English modal must from a deontic to an epistemic meaning. This general shift, which also applies to other modal verbs, has been accounted for in two different ways: as a metaphorical mapping from the sociophysical world onto the epistemic world (Sweetser 1990), or. especially in grammaticalization studies, as a shift triggered by context-induced inference. Both synchronic and diachronic data on the usages of must suggest that the shift from deontic to epistemic is a gradual process. which can be accounted for by metonymic bridges. The metonymic approach to historical linguistics is also relevant to the discipline of onomastics. In his paper "Metonymy in onoma.,;tics," Olaf Jiikel investigates the cognitive motivation underlying naming patterns a.-. evidenced in the etymologies of German surnames. Apart from a number of surnames which are not motivated or whose motivation is obscure. surnames are coined by means of three principal patterns of naming: genealogy. profession and metonymy. Metonymic naming strategies make usc of three types of metonymy: 'utensil metonymy' (IMPORTANT UTENSIL FOR PERSON) as in Bohn.mck 'beanbag: 'quality metonymy' (SALIENT QUALITY FOR PERSON) as in Wwulerlich 'strange: and 'location metonymy' (PLACE OF ORIGIN OR RESIDENCE FOR PERSON) as in La11gacker 'long field.'

2.3. Case studies of metonymy A variety of case studies investigate the operation of metonymy on various linguistic and conceptual levels. One paper is concerned with metonymy in grammar (Wahereit); three papers look at selected lexical and semantic me-

Klaus-Uwe Panther (llld Giimer Rad(/en

tonymies (Dirven; Pauwels: Vo8hagen): one paper studies the metonymic slructure of a particular concept in its cultural context (Feyaerts). and another paper investigates the degree of exploitation of a particular metonymic principle in two genetically unrelated languages (Panther and Thornburg). Richard Waltereit's contribution "Grammatical constraints on metonymic reference: On the primacy of the direct object" demonstrates that metonymy also plays an important role at the level of grammatical relations. First. metonymic transfer can involve the insertion of a participant into a given thematic role such as Le 53 e.\'1 rentri 'No. 53 is back," where the number stands for a hotel guest. Second. it can also involve a transfer of semantically contiguous thematic roles as in Papa va balayer ta c:hambre 'Daddy will sweep your room' vs. Papa n'a pa,\· encore balayi /es dibrisde wrre 'Daddy hasn't swept up the broken glass yet,' where the container (the room) is semantically contiguous with the object contained (the broken gla'>s). Waltereit argues that. with regard to metonymic transfers, the direct object has primacy over the subject and other grammatical relations. The metonymically privileged status of the direct object is caused by three factors: it is semantically opaque and. hence. allows for a number of thematic roles to fit into the direct object slot: it is the argument that is semantically closest to the verb, which entails that its referential autonomy is somewhat weakened: and it is syntagmatically closer to the subject than other (oblique) arguments. In his lexical-semantic study "Putting metonymy in its place," Paul Pauwels investigates the metonymic structure of four related verbs: put ..~el. lay. and place. Pauwels' corpus-based investigation shows that the majority of examples were not of the traditional nominal or referential kind. In his corpus. metonymy often seems to function a'> a 'euphemistic avoidance strategy.' But it can also serve a.. a focusing strategy. which. in extreme cases, may result in dysphemism. The most frequent metonymic type Pauwels encounters in his corpus is based on a relation of inclusion. where a more general concept stands for a more specific concept. or vice versa. In his paper "Conversion as a conceptual metonymy of basic event schemata." Rene Dirven investigates the phenomenon which is generally known as conversion or zero-derivation, in particular. the conversion from nouns to verbs {e.g .. author vs. to author). He shows that the process of conversion is typically found in three event schemata: the action schema, the location and motion schema, and the essive schema. Conversion is regarded as a process in which one participant in the event schema is metonymically focused

l11trodllctio11

upon. but the whole event is conceptually involved. For example. in the action schema the participants patient (fish), instrument (hook), and manner (pearl jishi11g) are most frequently converted into new verbs (to jiJh, to f10ok. to ji.tlr pear/.{, respectively). Five participant types are regularly exploited to yield new verbs. In conclusion. Dirven raises the question if this selectivity is the result of sociocultural saliency or rather a matter of linguistic preference. Another semantic study. Christian VoRhagen's paper "Opposition as a metonymic principle,'' focuses on antonymy as a metonymic relation. This metonymy shows up in irony. where usually a positive concept metonymically stands for a negative concept. and in some conventionalized lexical items such as terribly in It was terribly wmui11g. As a rule. the metonymy applies to evaluative concepts, which are semantically scalar but are reinterpreted as complementary. In his paper "Metonymic hierarchies: The conceptualization of stupidity in German idiomatic expressions:· Kurt Feyaerts studies the metonymic structure of everyday expressions of stupidity. For example. an expression such as Dll hist wohl 11icht wm hier? 'You arc not from here. are you?' exemplifies the metonymic folk model OUTGROUP ORIGIN FOR STUPIDITY. Feyaerts shows that metaphorically and metonymically organized hierarchies have major structural characteristics in common. Higher-level metonymies tend to be cross-culturally valid. while lower-level metonymies are more culture-specific. Klaus·Uwe Panther and Linda Thornburg emphasize the importance of a cross-linguistic comparison of conceptual metonymies. In their paper"The POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy in English and Hungarian,'' they analyze the extent to which this metonymy is exploited across two genetically unrelated languages. English and Hungarian. They explore its operation in seven conceptual domains: sense perceptions. mental states and processes. hedged performatives. indirect speech acts. (extralinguistic) actions. character dispositions. and acquired skills. In some of these domains. the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy is much more productive in English than in Hungarian. The most striking contrast between the two languages emerges in the domain of sense perceptions: whereas English systematically exploit.~ the metonymy in sentences such as I can ta.~te lhe mnilla (for lla.we the mnilla). Hungarian systematically excludes the metonymy and resorts to a non-modal construction in the indicative mood. The authors also discuss the relationship between Griccan maxims. conversational implicaturcs and metonymy.

Klau.'i-Uwe Panther (llld Giinter Radden

2.4. Applications of metonymy Two contributions arc devoted to the significance of metonymy in language acquisition and literary criticism. The role of metonymy in language acquisition is investigated by Brigitte Nerlich. David D. Clarke and Zazie Todd. Their paper '"Mummy, I like being a sandwich': Metonymy in language acquisition" may in fact be the first study on the production and understanding of metonymy in this field. whereas studies on the production and understanding of metaphor in language acquisition proliferate. In child language the usc of metonymy serves two different functions: it is a means of extending the known stock of words to cope with increasing communicative needs and of exploiting ·natural pathways of meanings' creatively. The former use of metonymy is a pragmatic strategy which leads to 'compelled' overextension. Compelled overextcnsions arc typically found up to the age of 2;5, while by the age of four children start producing metonymy for creative purposes. This use of metonymy is referred to by the authors as 'creative metonymical shrinking.' Children's comprehension of metonymy is empirically studied using a group of 2-3 year-olds and a group of 4-5 year-olds. In her paper "Recontextualization of metonymy in narrative and the case of Morrison· s Song of Solomon:· Anne Pankhurst explores the function of metonymy in narrative fiction.ln the novel analyzed. the reader has to activate metonymic strategies in order to understand the impact of an apparently simple object. an earring. The earring serves several metonymic functions: it is. in particular. a means of identifying its wearer and. at a macro-structural level. holds together different episodes of the novel. Pankhurst argues that the complex use of metonymy in this narrative cannot be accounted for by a single theory. The most promising approach to understanding the complex processes of reference and recontextualization in this world of fiction arc provided by Riffaterre·s functional view of metonymy and Gibbs' metonymic models of thought.

3. Perspectives for future research The papers collected in this volume certainly contribute to a deeper understanding of the conceptual nature and function of metonymy. At the same time. the contributors are aware of the fact that many a
111troductio11

still poorly understood. Of the many remaining problems to be solved we will single out two and briefly discuss them here: (i} the nature of metonymic shift; (ii) the pragmatic function of metonymy.

3.1. The nature of metonymic shift We assume that metonymy is not. as ha'i often been taken for granted, merely a matter of the substitution of linguistic expressions but a cognitive process that evokes a conceptual frame. The notion of 'conceptual frame' is meant here as a cover term for what is variously called 'domain,' 'idealized cognitive model' (ICM}. 'schema.' 'scenario,' 'script,' etc. in the cognitive-linguistic literature (cf. also Blank. this volume; and Koch, this volume). The 'substitution view' of metonymy claims that the name of one thing is used in place of that of another thing to which it is related. As will be shown below. this view has serious draw-backs. Following Langacker (1993: 30), we ao;sume that "metonymy is basically a reference-point phenomenon [... )affording mental access to the desired target." Let us consider the conceptual frame of a straightforward case of metonymy as exemplified in: (I)

The first violin has the flu.

The concept 'the first violin' is part of a knowledge structure that it evokes. As a musical instrument, a violin is immediately associated with a violinist as the player of that instrument. Moreover. the first violinist is defined a.'i a member of a larger group of musicians. the symphony orchestra. Among the musicians of the orchestra, the first violinist is the most outstanding member. Finally, our knowledge of orchestras includes, among other things. the notion of music and its representation in scores. The predication ha.~ the flu as well as the attribute first trigger a non-literal interpretation of the noun phrase the first violi11. Thus. the metonymic reading in (I) involves a shift from the instrument to the musician a'i the most readily available element in the frame. Through this metonymic shift, the reference point ('the first violin') is backgrounded and the desired target ('the first violinist') is fore grounded. This conceptual shift is reflected in grammatical form: thus the second sentence of (2a), in which she anaphorically refers back to the target, is a felicitous continuation of (I). wherea." the second sentence of (2b), in which the pronoun is coreferential with the reference point. is not:

Klau.\"-Uwe Panther a11d Giimer Radtlen

10

(2)

a. The first violin has the flu. She cannot practice today. b. 'The first violin has the flu./t is a Stradivarius.

But now consider a situation described by the following sentence: (3)

My ex-husband is parked on the upper deck.

The expression my ex-lmsbaml evokes a rich mental script involving marriage, divorce, etc., all of which. however. do not seem to play a role in the metonymic interpretation of this uuerance. In contrast to (I). it is not the conceptual frame of the noun phrase that is exploited for the metonymic interpretation. but the predicate is parked on the upper deck. The predicate helps identify the target of the metonymic shirt. i.e .. 'my ex-husband's vehicle.' Concomitantly. the metonymic reference point ('my ex-husband') is foregrounded while the conceptual target ('my ex-husband's vehicle') is backgrounded. This analysis is corroborated by the linguistic fact that an anaphoric pronoun cannot refer back to the target expression as in (4a). but only to the reference-point expression as in (4b): (4)

a. 'My ex-husband is parked on the upper deck.// has a California license plate. b. My ex-husband is parked on the upper deck. He is taking the bus today.

On the basis of pronominal facts as in (4). Nunberg (1995: II I) claims that in sentences such as (3) it is not the subject that is used mctonymically but the predicate. which "contributes a property of persons. the property they possess in virtue of the locations of their cars." This type of analysis thus postulates that the metonymic shift is not achieved through the noun phrase but involves a "predicate transfer" (for a critique of Nunberg's theory cf. Kleiber 1995).11 is possibly more plausible and intuitively more satisfying, however, to view the metonymy in (3) as. an instance of referential shift, i.e .. to understand my ex-Jmsbuml in the sense of 'my ex-husband's vehicle.' We suggest that the choice of the pronoun might be governed by a general cognitive principle according to which humans take precedence over non-humans (see also Raddcn and KOvccses. this volume). This principle would account for the fact that the human entity in the frame seems to be forcgrounded irrespective of whether it is the reference point or the target. A further point in need of clarification relates to the relationship among the elements in the frame.ln the ca<;e of an artifact a-. in example (I). the user

Jmroduction

II

of the artifact is so tighlly integrated into the frame that the metonymic reading has become lexicalized and is listed as a separate sense in dictionaries. In contrast, with the exception of well-known individuals such as Shakespeare. Mozart and Einstein, who are closely associated with their artistic or scientific products. humans do not seem to be consistently tied to a frame which leads to lcxicalized metonymic senses. Thus it is highly unlikely that ex-Jmsbund would have 'car' as one of its conventional senses. This will even hold for human nouns such as car-dealer. which explicitly contains the concept of 'car' as an integral part of its frame. We believe that both reference point and target are always present as clements of the conceptual frame. but arc highlighted to different degrees. This can be shown by the following minimal pair which exemplifies two ways of highlighting frame clements: (5)

a. The harpsichord has the flu. His part ha'i been taken over by the grand piano. b. The harpsichord has the flu./ts part has been taken over by the grand piano.

In contrast to (2a). in which only the human target can be foregrounded. the sentences under (5) seem to allow the forcgrounding of either the human performer or the instrument. The possessive pronoun hi.\· in (5a) anaphorically refers to the musician who is mctonymically targeted by the horp.fichord. whereas the pronoun its in (5b) is grammatically congruent with the referencepoint expression. but conceptually relates to the part assigned to the harpsichord in the score. The car-parking situation described in (3), however. does not lend itself to similar highlighting of either the reference point or the target as in (5). It is much more difficult to foreground the target when the reference point is human and the target is non-human.lt seems. however, possible to say (6). in which the anaphoric pronoun they highlights the cars and not their owners: (6) ''My ex-husband and his girlfriend arc parked next to each other. They are both Fords. In this sentence. the noun phrases my ex-huJbaml and his girlfriend are mctonymically interpreted as 'my ex-husband's car' and 'his girlfriend's car,' respectively. i.e .. there is a referential shift from HUMAN to NON-HUMAN. The discussion thus far has looked at one area in which metonymic

Klaus-Uwe Panther and Gii11ter Radtlell

12

highlighting is reflected in grammar. There arc. of course. other grammatical phenomena such as number and gender agreement which may be adduced as further evidence that certain elements of a frame are given more prominence than others. These issues shall, however, not be pursued here (for discussion on this point see Nunberg 1995: and Kleiber 1995).

3.2. The pragmatic function of metonymy An issue which has received relatively little attention in the discussion of metonymy concerns the pragmatic function of metonymy in conversation: why is metonymy used at all? Why is 'literal' language not the prevailing means of communication? Part of the answer may lie in Sperber and Wilson's (1995: 158) principle of relevance: ''Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance." Sperber and Wilson (1995: 153) hypothesize that a linguistic expression is optimally relevant if it produces maximal contextual effects with a minimum of processing effort. As an illustration of the principle of minimal processing effort, consider a situation in which nurses talk about their patients ao; in (7a) and {7b): (7)

a. It's time for my gall bladder's medication. b. It's time for Randolph's medication.

Even when the patient's name is known as in (7b).the metonymic noun phrase my gall bladder may provide the easiest access to the targeted referent. To the personnel in a hospital. infonnation about a patient's ailments is in general more relevant than other attributes, such as the patient's bald-headedness. his level of education. etc. Hence. for the medical staff the metonymic wording such a" (7a) may be the most efficient way of identifying a patient. To persons outside the hospital context. however. such metonymic reference represents neither an economical nor an appropriate referential shortcut. The significance of the principle of maximal contextual effects is illustrated by example (Sa). which is routinely understood in the sense of (8b): (8)

a. The Chicago Bulls were able 10 nail dow11 their fifth championship in game 6. b. The Chicago Bulls nailed down their fifth championship in game 6.

Introduction

13

Litera11y. sentence (8a) states the ability of the well·known basketball team to win the championship, but metonymically this utterance implicates their actually winning the game. The metonymy involved may be described as a metonymic shirt from POTENTIAL TO ACTUAL (see Panther and Thornburg. this volume). Why should a sports commentator choose the metonymic predi· cation were able to nail down rather than nailed down, which. after all. seems to be the more economical wording of the two? Again. an explanation may be provided within the framework of relevance theory. Sentence {8a) triggers more contextual effects. i.e .. pragmatic implications. than sentence {8b). Both utterances convey the actuality or winning the championship. which is expli· citly stated in {8b), but only conversationally implicated in (8a). Yet, the metonymic wording in {8a) has the advantage of communicating additional information: in stating ability. the predicate were able to strongly implicates the notions of 'effort.· 'difficulty.· and 'positive achievement,' none of which is present in (8b). The greater length of {8a) is thus more than compensated for by the number of desirable contextual effects that it triggers. As examples (7) and (8) demonstrate, a metonymic expression is hardly ever completely equivalent in its pragmatic force to its 'literal" counterpart. Thus. these data provide more evidence against the traditional 'substitution view· of metonymy. In conclusion, this view of metonymy as a means of providing maximal contextual effects with a minimum of processua1 effort certainly opens new avenues of future research on the role of this as well as other figurative modes of thought.

References Gibbs. Raymond W .. Jr. 1994 The Poetin of Mind: Fig11rati1'e Tilo11ght, Langlla,.;e, a11d U11der.ucmdin,.;. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kleiber. Georges 1995 PolysCmie. transferts de scns et mCtonymie intCgrCe. Folia lJng11iJtim 29: 105-132. Lakoff. George 1987 Wmttt'/1, Fire, and Dcmgermts Things: Whm Categorie.t Re\'eal abom the Mind. Chicago: The Univen;ity of Chicago Press. Lakoff. George. Marlr. Johnson 1980 Mctaplmr.t We lil·c By. Chicago: The Univcrsily of Chicago Press. Langacker. Ronald W. 1993 Reference-poinl conslruclions. Co~nitil't' Unguistk.t 4: 1-38.

14

Klau.'i-Uwe Pan/her and Giinter Rodden

Nunberg. Geoffrey 1995 Transfers of meaning. Journal of Semantics 17: 109-132. Schofer. Peter, Donald Rice 1977 Metaphor. metonymy. and synecdoche revis(it)cd. St'miotica 21: 121-147. Sperber. Dan, Deirdre Wilson 1995 Rell'mnce: Comnumicatio11 and Cognition. Second edition. Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Sweetser. Eve 1990 From Etymology to Pragmatics: Metaphorical and Cultural Atpects of Semantic Struclilre. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Part I Theoretical Aspects of Metonymy

Towards a Theory of Metonymy

Gunter Radden University of Hamburg

Zoltan Kovecses Eotvos Lorfmd University, Budapest

1. The cognitive view of metonymy The aim of this paper is to propose a conceptual framework of metonymy as a cognitive process. 1 Unlike metaphor, metonymy has always been described in conceptual. rather than purely linguistic, terms. In analyzing metonymic relationships. traditional rhetoric operated with general conceptual notions such as CAUSE R>R EFFECT, CONTAINER FOR CONTENTS, CIC. Still, metonymy Wa'\ mainly seen as a figure of speech. i.e .. it was basically lhought of as a matter of language.especially literary or figurative language. This view of metonymy is reflected in standard definitions. which tend to describe metonymy as "a figure of speech that consists in using the name of one thing for that of something else with which it is associated" (WebMer's Third New lmemational Dictionary). These kinds of definition thus claim that metonymy operates on names of things. involves the substitution of the name of one thing for that of another thing and assumes that the two things are somehow associated. The cognitive view of metonymy espoused here makes different ao;sumptions: (i) Metonymy is a conceptual phenomenon; (ii) Metonymy is a cognitive process; (iii) Metonymy operates within an idealized cognitive model.

18

Giinter Radden and Zoltdn

Kii~·ecse.\'

1.1 . Metonymy is a conceptual phenomenon Metonymy is claimed to be not just a matter of names of things, but essentially a conceptual phenomenon. As already pointed out by Lakoff and Johnson (1980: Ch. 8). metonymy. lik.e metaphor. is part of our everyday way of thinking. is grounded in experience, is subject to general and systematic principles and structures our thoughts and actions (cf. also Gibbs 1994: 324-

333 and this volume). Lakoff and Johnson's example of the metonymy in She's just a pretty face illustrates the general conceptual nature of metonymy. We derive the basic infonnation about a person from the person's face.ln our culture, this is reflected in the tradition of portraits in painting and photography. The conceptual metonymy THE FACE FOR THE PERSON is therefore part of our everyday way of thinking about people. The conceptual nature of metonymy is even more clearly manifested in the structure of categories. In his discussion of metonymic models, Lakoff ( 1987: 79-90) demonstrates that a member of a category may stand for the whole category and thereby account for prototype effects. These salient members may not even have a name so that the metonymic transfer merely operates at the conceptual level. His example of the stereotypical subcategory 'housewife mother" illustrates this point: We tend to think of the category 'mother· in terms of this stereotypical member even if the submcmbcr remains unnamed. Since most categories have prototypical structure, we may conclude that basically all categories have metonymic structure. The use of metonymic expressions in language is primarily a renection of general conceptual metonymies and is motivated by general cognitive principles. We claim that all metonymies are ultimately conceptual in nature and that many, if not most. metonymies do not even show up in language.

1.2. Metonymy is a cognitive process The traditional view defines metonymy as a relationship involving substitution. This view is renected in the notation genenally used for stating metonymic relationships. namely. x STANDS FOR Y.ln the above example of She's just a pretty face. the name face is thus taken to be a substitute expression for person. so that the sentence is a'isumed to mean 'she is just a pretty person.' But this cannot be the whole meaning since She i.~ a pretty person does not mean that she is pretty 'all over.' but it suggests that. most importantly. she has a pretty face. This can be seen in the oddity of a sentence expressing a counter-

Toward.~

a Theory of Metonymy

19

expectation: 'She is a pretty per.wn but does not ha1•e a pretty face. The two metonymies. THE FACE FOR THE PERSON and THE PERSON FOR THE FACE. thus complement each other: A person's face evokes the person and a person evokes the person's face. Metonymy does not simply substitute one entity for another entity. but interrelates them to form a new. complex meaning. 2 To use Warren's (this volume) example: ..We do not refer to music in I like Mo:.art. but to music composed by Mozart: we do not refer to water in The bathtub is numing over. but to the water in the bathtub." Metonymic relationships should therefore more adequately be represented by using an additive notation such as x PLUS Y. as suggested by Radden (in print). For the sake of simplicity, we will keep the traditional formula x FOR Y with the proviso. however. that the metonymic process is not understood to be one of substitution. The metonymic process consists in mentally accessing one conceptual entity via another entity. This is the cognitive explanation Langacker (1993: 30) offers for metonymy. He conceives of metonymy as a reference-point phenomenon in which one conceptual entity, the reference point. affords mental access to another conceptual entity. the desired target. 3 We will refer to the reference-point entity as the ·vehicle' and the desired target simply as the 'target.' In the example of She'.~ a pretty face. the 'pretty face' serves as the vehicle for accessing the 'person· as the target; in the reverse description. She's a pretty person, the 'person' serves as the vehicle for accessing the person's 'pretty face' as the target.ln either construal. both the vehicle and the target are conceptually present. However. one of them is seen as being more salient than the other and is therefore selected as the vehicle.

1.3. Metonymy operates within an idealized cognitive model The notion of 'contiguity' is at the core of most definitions of metonymy.""' Traditional approaches locate contiguity relationships in the world of reality, wherea-. cognitive approaches locate them at the conceptual JeveP Lakoff and Johnson (1980) think of contiguity in terms of the whole range of conceptual associations commonly related to an expression, Lakoff ( 1987) accounts for metonymic contiguity within the framework of idealized cognitive models (ICMs), Croft (1993) deals with contiguity relations in terms of encyclopedic knowledge representation within a domain or domain matrix. Blank (this volume) and Panther and Thornburg (this volume) describe the network of conceptual contiguity by using the notion of frame and scenario. respectively.

20

Giinrer Rae/den atul Zt)/tdn Kiivecses

While all of these models are comparable with respect to claiming a cognitive basis. we believe that Lakoffs {1987) framework of 'idealized cognitive models' (ICMs) may capture metonymic processes best. The ICM concept is meant to include not only people's encyclopedic knowledge of a particular domain but also the cultural models they are part of. The ICM notion is not restricted to either the world of reality, the world of conceptualization or the world of language but. as will be shown in Section 2, may cut across these ontological realms. ICMs and the network of conceptual relationships characterizing them give rise to associations which may be exploited in metonymic transfer. The impact which ICMs may have on metonymic (and metaphorical) transfer shall be illustrated by way of the changes of meaning which the word hear.'ie underwent in the history of English. The semantic history of hearse may have proceeded in the following steps.6 In medieval farming, the word originally denoted a triangular harrow with pins and was then metaphorically applied to a triangular frame for supporting candles at church services. The new 'candle-frame ICM' evoked the functionally most salient part of it. the candles. Our general knowledge of the 'candle ICM." in its tum. gave rise to the metonymic focus on the process of burning. In the Middle Ages. candles were made of wax. were very expensive and were only lit for special occasions. This Medieval 'candle-burning ICM' explains why the burning of candles came to be metonymically associated with a special liturgical occasion. Tenebrae. the Holy Week before Easter. The Medieval 'Tenebrae ICM' accounts for a further metonymic step. In the church service of the Holy Week. all candles were gradually extinguished to commemorate the darkness at Christ"s crucifixion. The burning candle was a metaphor for man's life. and. as an entailment. its extinction a metaphor of man's death. The whole candleburning event was thus metonymically restricted to its final part. the extinction of the candle. The 'crucifixion ICM' was then metonymically extended to people's death in general. The 'death ICM' accounts for the metonymic highlighting of a salient part surrounding people's death, the funeral. The 'funeral ICM' involves several parts. many of which were described by the word hearse: the dead body. the coffin. the bier. the tomb. the funeral pall, the framework supporting the pall. and the carriage for carrying the coffin. Among these parts, the moving carriage eventually appeared to be the most salient element of the 'funeral JCM.' The sense development of hearse from 'harrow· to 'vehicle for conveying a dead person to the place of burial' is predominantly the result of different types of metonymic processes which

Toward.~

a Theory of Metonymy

21

operated within cultural or generallCMs. The metonymic stages in the sense development of hear.re involved. not only things. but also events: the burning of the candle. the extinction of the candle. death, the funeral and the procession. This is to be expected in view of the many possible relationships which may hold in an ICM. Metonymic processes are thus not restricted to reference: 7 they occur at the purely conceptual level (categorization. linguistic reasoning), at different levels of language (lexis. morphology. syntax, discourse). in different linguistic functions (reference. predication, speech acts). and as a linkage interrelating different ontological realms (concepts. forms. and things/events). In order to be able to describe such diverse phenomena in a unified way. we will adopt the widest possible view of metonymy. 1.4. Theoretical issues of metonymy

On the basis of the three cognitive properties of metonymy discussed above. we will define metonymy as follows: Metonymy i!> a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity. the \"Chide. provides mental acce~s to another conceptual entity. the 1Mget. within the same idealized cognitive model.

This working definition is useful in that it allows us to raise further important empirical and theoretical issues. We believe that. amongst others, the following questions need to be addressed in developing a theoretical framework. of metonymy. A first question we need to ask is where do we find metonymy? According to the above definition. metonymy may occur wherever we have idealized cognitive models. We have ICMs of everything that is conceptualized, which includes the conceptualization of things and events. word forms and their meanings, and things and events in the real world. We will refer to these types of conceptualization as 'ontological realms.' ICMs are not restricted to a single ontological realm. but may also interrelate ontological realms. For example, people tend to sec a close relationship between the two entities which establish a sign: the concept of a thing and its name. This ICM crosscuts two ontological realms and. as will be shown below .leads to metonymy. The notion of metonymy which follows from the conceptual definition given above thus has much wider application than that of traditional approaches. A second question which needs to be addressed relates to the 'mental bridge' which allows the conceptualizer to access the desired target. This

22

Giimer Raclden and Zoltdn Kbvecse.\'

question concerns the nature of the relationship between the vehicle and one or more targets. Metonymy tends to make use of stereotypical, or idealized. relationships within an ICM. Thus, certain places tend to be associated with events which typically occur at the place. For example, the expression to go to bed may. depending on the situation. evoke the metonymic targets 'to go to sleep: 'to have sex· or 'to be sick.' All these events arc stcreotypically associated with beds. irrespective of the particular context that triggers the situationally relevant target. More generally, we may describe the conceptual relationship between space and event as one that is entrenched and may be exploited by metonymy. The question that needs to be answered here is what types of conceptual relationships in an ICM may give rise to metonymy. A third question pertains to the choice of vehicle and target. Thus far, we have only considered conceptual relationships between two entities either of which may become the vehicle or the target as shown in the examples of She 'J a pretty face and She's a pretty penon. Unlike metaphorical mappings. which tend to be unidirectional. metonymic mappings arc in principle reversible. This was already implicitly noticed in traditional approaches by listing both directions of a metonymic relationship such as CAUSE FOR EfFECT and EFFECT FOR CAUSE. GENL:S FOR SPECIES and SPECIES FOR GENUS. etc. Such theoretically possible alternatives have to be distinguished from the speaker's choice of a particular vehicle as the 'entry point' into the ICM. We therefore need to ask if there are any preferred metonymic construals and. if this is the case. what 'cognitive principles' govern the selection of one type of vehicle entity over another. Such precedence principles were already hinted at by Langacker ( 1993: 30). To the extent that there are such preferred routes. these will define the unmarked. or 'default.' cases of metonymy. Given that there are such default routes. we need to ask. as a fourth question, if there arc any principles that determine the choice of a vehicle other than by default construal. If this is the case, these metonymic construals yield marked, or 'non-default,' instances of metonymy. The following four sections of this paper will be devoted to finding answers to these central questions which, for convenience. are summarized below: (i) What are the ontological realms in which ICMs and metonymic relationships may occur? (Section 2): (ii) What arc the types of conceptual relationships that may give rise to metonymy? (Section 3): (iii) Arc there any conceptual entities that can better direct attention to an intended target than others? If this is the case, are there any cognitive

23

Towards a Theory of Metoflymy

principles that govern the selection of such 'default' cases of metonymy? (Section 4): (iv) Are there any principles that override the preferred default routes and yield 'non-default' cases of metonymy? (Section 5).

2.

Ontological realms in which metonymy occurs

The following three ontological realms are distinguished for the present purpose: the world of 'concepts.' the world of 'fonns.' in particular. fonns of language, and the world of 'things' and 'events.' These realms roughly correspond to the three entities that comprise the well-known semiotic triangle as developed by Ogden and Richards (1923: II): thought. symbol and referent. The interrelations between entities of the same or from different ontological realms lead to various ICMs and possibilities for metonymy. An important distinction has to be made between ICMs which interrelate entities of different ontological realms within the same semiotic unit and lCMs which interrelate entities of different semiotic units within the same ontological realm or realms. The fanner situation of interrelated ontological realms gives rise to two lCMs: the pairing of a concept and a fonn establishes a sign and may be described a.-. 'Sign lCM': the pairing of a thing or event and a sign. fonn or concept establishes a referential situation and may be described as 'Reference ICM.' In as far as these ICMs lead to metonymy. the metonymies will be described a'\ 'sign metonymy' and 'reference metonymy." respectively. The latter situation of interrelated semiotic units involves concepts, typically in conjunction with fonns. These ICMs will be referred to as 'Concept ICMs.' and a metonymy ba.'\ed on a Concept ICM will be described a'\ 'concept metonymy.· Figure I illustrates the semiotic relationships which lead to the sign metonymy (I) and three types of reference metonymies (2H4) on the one hand and one type of concept metonymy (5) on the other hand. The arrows indicate the direction of the metonymic mapping which will be discussed below.

{3) / /

)'"~~%' {2)----~·--.....: ())

Ji.·------

Thing/Event

·---------------

"

ronn

(4)

FiRUrl' /. Siwr. referellct' mul com·ept me1mr.w11ie.'i

(5)

GUnter Raclden and Zoltdn Kiivecse.\·

24 2.1 . Sign JCMs and sign metonymies

The Sign ICM unites a form and one or more concepts. Thus. the word form dollar or the dollar sign$ arc intimately linked with the 'currency denomina-

tion of dollar.' 'currency.' or 'money· in general. As a rule. the form mctonymically stands for the concept it denotes. (I)

FORM FOR CONCEPT:

dollar for 'money'

The very nature of language is based on this metonymic principle. which Lakoff and Turner (1989: 108) describe as WORDS STANL> FOR THE CONCEPTS THEY EXPRESS. Since we have no other means of expressing and communicating our concepts than by using forms.language ar; well as other communication systems are of necessity metonymic. It is also for that reason that we fail to notice the metonymic character of language. This general FORM FOR CONCEPT metonymy has to be distinguished from a FORM FOR CONCEPT metonymy involving specific signs (sec (47)). The Sign ICM only seems to lead to the FORM FOR CONCEPT metonymy. but not to the reverse metonymy of CONCEPT FOR FORM. A metonymic situation of this kind is difficult to imagine. It may be said to occur in the 'tip of the tongue' experience. in which we have a certain concept but cannot think of the corresponding word-form. or in the context of foreign-language learning. where learners must find a form in the foreign language for a concept with which they are familiar.

2.2. Reference ICMs and reference metonymies Real-world entities may be related to signs. concepts or forms. We thus have three types of Reference ICMs and possible metonymies as shown in Figure Ia. In all three types of reference metonymies. the metonymic target is the real-world thing or event. The standard situation of reference involves signs. i.e., form-concept units. which stand for a thing or event referred to. We thus have the metonymy: (2)

fORM-cONCEPT FOR THING/EVENT:

word cow for a rea)

COW

Strictly speaking. the sign does not refer to the world of reality but to our mental model of reality. Frawley ( 1992: 20fl) illustrates the mismatch be-

Toward.~

a Theory of Metonymy

25

tween these two worlds by comparing the extensional and intensional meanings of the verb to pmu:ll. In the extensional world of reality. an event of punching involves a series ofsubcvcnts: folding one's fist, moving one's arm. bringing it into contact with an object, and recoiling it. A punching event thus has duration. Intensionally, however. to punch is a punctual verb and. as such. cannot be used to describe a durational event a'\ in ""It tookfi\'e minutes to punch him. The projected world we refer to by means of a sign thus only partly matches reality.H We do, however. firmly believe that words refer to the extensional world so that metonymy (2} has psychological validity. Signs can only be said to stand for things or events they refer to - the reverse metonymic situation, THING/EVE."'T FOR FORM-CONCEPT, is hard to imagine. A thing or event may evoke the word denoting it. but it certainly cannot be argued that when we sec a cow and the word cow comes to our mind. the thing 'cow' metonymically stands for the sign cow. The above folk theory of reference has two variants in which either the concept or the form of a sign is focused upon. Lakoff ( 1987: 168f) describes the former situation as "reference via meaning." and the latter as "doctrine of direct reference." According to the Reference-via-Meaning ICM. "words have inherent meanings (called intensiom) and designate objects by virtue of those meanings" (Lakoff 1987: 168f). In this view. the meaning associated with the word cow is assumed to stand for any cow in the world of reality - in contrast to the set-theoretic account. in which 'cow' denotes the set/class of cows. (3)

CONCEPT FOR TiliNG/EVENT: concept 'cow' for a real

COW

The reversal of this metonymic relationship. TI-liNG/EVENT FOR CONCEPT. may occur in special situ<:~tions. One such situation would apply to people who are associated with certain outstanding properties. For example, the former English soccer player Bobby Charlton may stand for the concept of sportsmanship. Another situation might be that of a game of chess in which a missing piece is replaced by an object such as an eraser or a button. At first sight. this situation might be seen as involving things in reality only, i.e .. TiliNG .. FOR THtNGH. This is. however, not the case. In assigning an eraser the function of. say, a white rook. we have the thing stand for the concept of a rook. The Direct-Reference ICM and the type of referential metonymy involved most dearly apply to the use of proper names for persons of that name. The name Jolm Smith directly refers to the bearer of this name. In our folk

Gilmer Rae/den mul ZtJ/tcin Kiivecses

26

theory of language, the Direct-Reference ICM also has a much wider metonymic application. Stephen Tylor ( 1978: 168) points out that in our common-

sense view of language words are names of things, not names of cla<>ses: ''There arc words and the things we speak of. The word 'cow' is the name of the object 'cow.' The word 'cow' stands for the object 'cow'

a.'i

a substitute for

it. and we know the meaning of the word 'cow' because we have a prior knowledge of the object it stands for." (4)

FORM FOR THING/EVENT:

word-form

COW

for a rea) COW

Also Ogden and Richards ( 1923) draw attention to people's tendency to see an

inherent connection between words and referents: Words are seen as pan of the thing and may even provide power over reality in superstition. magic and spells. The reversal of this metonymic relationship is hardly possible. A situation that comes closest to the llUNG/EVENT FOR FORM metonymy might be that of language learning, where a child or student points to an object and wants to be given its name.

2.3. Concept ICMs and concept metonymies Concept metonymies involve a shift from Concept,.. to Concept8 which may. but need not, be accompanied by a shift in form. The two concepts form pan of the same ICM and are related to each other in some specific way. The following four types of concept metonymies. (5)-(8). may be distinguished. (5)

FORM,..·CONCEPT,.. FOR FORM 8 -CONCEPT8 :

bus-'bus' for 'bus drivers·

bu.~

drivers·

The type of metonymy in (5) is the one commonly a'\sociated with metonymy. It involves the relationship between two form-concept pairings as shown in Figure I b.ln Lakoff and Johnson's (1980: 38) example The bu,\·e.wre ot1 l"trike. the conventional pairing of a word-form and its associated concept. b1ues, is used in place of another conventional form-concept unil. bu.\· drivers. Since the word bu.~ does not have as one of its lexicalized senses 'bus driver.' the metonymic shift is due to the pragmatics of the particular situation and our knowledge that both buses and bus drivers belong to the same JCM. They arc related to each other by the relationship of control: CONTROLLED FOR CONTROLLER. The controlled entity. bu.~es, is used to stand for the controlling entity. bus

drivers.

Towanls a Theory of Metonymy

27

The metonymic relationship may also appear in its reverse form. For example. the Control ICM may also give rise to the metonymy CONTIWLL.ER FOR CONTROLLED, as in I am parked over there. (6)

FORM-CONCEPT A FOR CONCEPT8 :

mother-'mother' for 'housewifemother'

The metonymic situation in (6) differs from (5) in that the target concept is not linked to a name. There may be different reasons for using this metonymy: The language may lack a word for the particular concept, the speaker may not be able to find a conventional name for the concept. or the speaker may not be aware of the different concepts. This is most likely to be the case in everyday communication. As already mentioned in Section 1.1 .. the word mother makes us think of housewife mothers, i.e .. the Mother ICM evokes the stereotypical member of the category of 'mothers.' The metonymic relationship here is. therefore. CATEGORY f'OR A MEMBER OF THE CATEGORY. It is not clear at the moment if the form of a category is required in order to perform the metonymic shift or if this metonymy can also operate at the purely conceptual level, i.e .• if. in thinking of a category like 'mother,' we arc really thinking of its member 'housewife mother.' The reversal of the metonymic relationship (6) is unlikely to occur. It would apply to a situation in which an unnamed concept such a." the stereotypical 'housewife mother' stands for the named concept. i.e .. the word mother. However. the specific metonymic relationship is reversible. i.e .. we have a type of metonymy in which A MEMBER OF A CATEC'.ORY stands for THE CATEGORY (see (16b)). (7)

FORMA·CONCEPTA FOR FORM~·CONCEPT 8 :

White House-'place' for White House-· institution·

The metonymic situation in (7) applies to polysemy. in which two senses of a word-form arc relatable within the same ICM. Polysemy is a common way in which metonymic concepts manifest themselves in language (see Lakoff 1987 and Taylor 1995). The metonymic concepts of a polysemous expression are lexicalizcd. i.e .. they arc. in contrast to the metonymic situation of (5). independent of a pragmatic situation. Thus. the expression White House is lexically polysemous between the senses of the 'building' and the 'executive branch of the US government.· The concepts of place and institution located at that place arc so closely interconnected in this ICM that the former is routinely

GUnter Raclden and Zoltdn Kiivecse.\·

28

used to stand for the Iauer. The metonymy PLACE FOR INSTITUTION thus accounts for our understanding of The White House did not inten-ene in the sense of 'the American government did not intervene.' Metonymic polysemics seem to take a preferred direction, but they arc in principle reversible. Thus. an institution may also be used to stand for a place. For example, Let'.{ /ta1,.•e an oy.~ter dish at Cemral Station illustrates the metonymy INSTITUTION FOR PLACE. (8)

FORMA-CONCEPTA FOR FORM8 -coNCEPTA:

UN

for

United Natiotu

In the metonymic situation in (8) the fonn of an expression changes while the concept roughly remains the same, which might also be indicated by a notation such as CONCEPT AlB' This metonymy applies to reductions of fonn as in the abbreviation UN. acronyms such as NATO. clippings such as exam for examination, modifications of fonn as in the euphemism What the heck are yo11 doi11g? for What the hell are you doin!(' and substitutions by pro-fonns and equivalence in translation, in which the language changes but the content is intended to be preserved. In all these cases, the fonn of language changes but, ideally, not ilo; conceptual content. The reversal of this metonymic relationship does not occur freely. In the case of abbreviations. this would imply that we understand a full expression such as United Nations as standing for its abbreviated fonn. UN. In the case of translation equivalence. however. either of the languages involved may of course serve as the vehicle or target.

2.4. Summary We can now summarize the observations made about the interaction of

ontological realms and metonymy. First. on the basis of the three ontological realms. we distinguished three basic types of ICMs. The Sign ICM and the Reference ICM interrelate entities of different ontological rcalms.the Concept lCM interrelates entities of different semiotic units. All of these ICMs give rise to metonymy. and there is. a priori. no reason why the notion of metonymy should be restricted to one of the types of concept metonymy only. Second, sign and reference metonymies demonstrate a preferred. or even exclusive, direction. This also holds true for concept metonymies (6). (7) and (8}, which also display a preferred direction. Concept metonymy (5). in which

Towanls a Theory of Metonymy

29

one sign stands for another sign, is the only type of metonymy that is in principle reversible; it is also the only type of metonymy that is characterized by a variety of conceptual relationships between vehicle and target - the other types of metonymic relationships carry very little additional content apart from interrelating vehicle and target. Both these factors have certainly contributed to focusing on this type of metonymy. Third. the direction of metonymization allows us to recognize a hierarchy for the preferred choice of an ontological vehicle. With sign metonymies (I). the form serves to access a concept: with reference metonymies, the formconcept unit (2), the concept (3) or the form (4) serves to access a thing or event in reality; and with concept metonymy (6), the form-concept unit accesses a concept. Three of the ontological metonymies. (5). (7) and (8), do not display a preferred directionality because they operate at the same ontological level. We therefore find the following hierarchy for the choice of a metonymic vehicle: form > form-co11cept > com:ept > reality

The cognitive motivation for these dircctionalities will be investigated in Section 4. Since this paper aims at providing an overall cognitive framework of metonymy. which finds its richest variability in metonymies involving language. its focus will mainly be on metonymies which most visibly. but not exclusively. manifest themselves in the shape of linguistic expressions.

3.

Types of metonymy-producing relationships

Conceptual relationships within an lCM which may give rise to metonymy will be called 'metonymy-producing relationships.· Thus, the conceptual relationship that holds between a container and the thing(s) contained may produce the metonymies CONTAINER FOR CONTENTS and CONTENTS FOR CONTAINER. However. not all relationships within ICMs can produce metonymies. One example of this is the ICM of the human face. A face has several parts that arc closely related in space. yet do not lead to metonymy. For example. the nose cannot stand for the mouth metonymically and vice versa. i.e., I llit him in the nose will not be understood to mean 'I hit him in the mouth.' On the other hand. we understand the utterance Can yo11 ans1o,·er the door? in a metonymic sense. in in

30

Giimer Rae/den mul Zoltdn Kijvecse:>

which the door is meant to refer to a person standing behind the door. Both examples involve a relationship of spatial proximity. but only the conceptual distinctness between objects and people in the latter example leads to metonymy. Metonymy may only arise when the intended target is uniquely accessible and "the addressee's attention is directed to the intended target"' (langackcr 1993: 30). The greater the conceptual contra'\t between vehicle and target. the better is a relationship suited to be exploited metonymically. Thus, a whole ICM is generally conceptually distinct enough from its pans to allow metonymic processes to operate freely from whole to part or part to whole. The distinction between whole and part is in fact of paramount importance for metonymic processes. Given that our knowledge about the world is organized by structured ICMs which we perceive as wholes with part.
Configuration (i) may lead to metonymies in which we access a part of an ICM via its whole or a whole ICM via one of its parts; configuration (ii) may lead to metonymies in which we access a part via another part of an ICM. This. of course. implies that the whole ICM is still present in the background. The following typology of metonymy-producing relationships and metonymies is not meant to be exhaustive. It includes those types that are most frequently listed in classifications of metonymies and seem to reflect the most entrenched metonymic routes. 3.1 . Whole ICM and its part(s) The relationship between a whole and a part typically applies to things and their parts. where the notion of 'thing· is to be understood here in the schematic sense of Langacker ( 1991 ). The prominent status which whole-part relationships have in our cognition has been demonstrated by Tversky and Hemenway ( 1984). who found that. in tasks involving attributes of basic-level items, subjects predominantly listed parts as attributes. This may have to do with the conceptually autonomous status which we attach to things. Things. in particular physical objects, are typically conceived of as forming a gestalt with well-delineated boundaries and as internally composed of various parts.

Towards a Theory of Metonymy

31

'Whole-part configurations' are also a.'isumed to underlie the Scale ICM. the Constitution ICM. the Event ICM. the Category-and-Member ICM, the Category-and-Property ICM. and the Reduction ICM. (i) Thing-and-Part JCM. This ICM may lead to the two metonymic variants: (9)

a.

WHOLE THING FOR A PART OF THE THING:

America for 'United States' b. PART OF A THING FOR THE WHOLE rntNG:

England for 'Great Britain' People often speak of America but mean one of its geographical parts. the United States: conversely. people. especially foreigners, often speak of England but mean Great Britain. including Wales and Scotland. The WHOLE FOR PART metonymy is widely found in situations which Langacker ( 1993: 31) describes a.'i "active-zone/profile discrepancies," where an entity's active zone is defined as comprising "those portions of the entity that participate most directly and crucially in that relationship." For example. in He hit me or The car needs washing. the profiled whole things he and the car may be said to stand for the active-zone parts 'his fist' and 'the car's body.' respectively. Even clearly separate things may be conceptualized as active-zone parts of an over-arching whole ICM. Thus, it does not strike us as unnatural to speak of lighting the Christmas tree for 'lighting the candles on the Christmas tree.· The use of a whole entity for an active-zone part comes so natural that it usually does not appear to us. including most scholars of metonymy. as metonymic.9 The PART FOR WHOLE metonymy has traditionally been given special attention and classified a..'i a type of its own under the name of 'synecdoche. ·w Synecdoches are less ubiquitous than WHOlE FOR PART metonymies and. hence. more likely to be noticed. This applies to deliberate metonymic usages such as Tlw.\·e are cool wheels you ha~·e there a.<; well as to the widespread usc of body parts such a.'i hand.face. head or leg for a person. 11 In such situations. the entity that is understood to be most crucially involved in the ICM is metonymically highlighted. Especially more abstract things such as 'hearing,' 'intellect' or 'control' tend to be metonymically expressed by one of their concrete parts: Thus. ear may stand for 'hearing." brain for 'intellect' and hand for 'control' as in Thing.\· got out of hand for 'things got out of control.' ( ii) Scale JCM. Scales arc a special class of things and the scalar units are

Gilmer Radden mul ZtJJtdll Kiivecses

32

parts of lhem. Typically, a scale as a whole is used to stand for its upper end and the upper end of a scale is used to stand for the scale as a whole: ( )Q)

a.

WHOLE SCALE FOR UPPER END 01' THE SCALE:

Henry iJ speedin~ a~:ain for 'Henry is going too fasl' b. UPPER END OF A SCALE FOR WHOLE SCALE: How fJ/d are yv11? for 'what is your age?' The expression speed defines the whole scale of velocity but we locate the velocity in (lOa) at, or even beyond. the upper end of the sca!e. Conversely, mention of the positive end of the scale in (lOb) evokes the whole scale.and it is only for the purpose of achieving special effects that the negative end of a scale may be used as in How ymmg are ym1? (iii) Co11stituticm /CM. This ICM involves matter. material or substances which are seen as constituting a thing. Properly speaking, such 'substance· things' do not have parts but arc constituted by their very substance. Sub· stances are. amongst other things. characterized as being unbounded and uncountable. 12 A substance or material may be metonymically conceived of as an object and is then construed as bounded and coded as a count noun a" in {II a). Conversely, an object may be conceived of as substance·! ike and is then construed as unbounded and coded as a mass noun as in (lib). {II)

a.

OBJECT FOR MATERIAL CONSTITl'TING THE OBJECT:

b.

MATERIAL CONSTITUTING AN OBJEC"r f-'OR THE OBJECT;

I .~me /I skunk. wood for "forest'

(ir) Ewmt ICM. Event'i may be metaphorically viewed as things which may have parts. Thus. one can speak of the theoretical and the practical 'parts' of a driving test. As with things, an event as a whole may stand for one of its subevents and a subevent may stand for the whole event. {12) a.

WHOLE EVENT FOR SUBEVENT:

Biii.WIIOked marijuana.

b.

SUBEVENT FOR WHOLE EVENT:

Mary speaks Spcmi.d1.

The event in (12a) involves as some of its subevents lighting a marijuana cigarette. taking it to one's lips. inhaling the smoke, etc. The inhaling part is probably felt to be the central and most important subcvent and the one that is metonymically meant. This is exactly the reason why Clinton needed to exclude that part when he argued that. as a young man. he smoked marijuana but did not inhale.

33

Towards a Theory of Metonymy

The habitual event in ( 12b) is understood to refer not only to Mary's spoken command of a language. but also to include the skills of comprehension. reading and writing. Many subevents serve as conventionalized expressions for an Event ICM as a whole. This applies in particular to successive subevents which metonymically highlight one of these temporal phases (see Lakoff 1987: 78f).'-' In They wellt to the altar, an initial subcvcnt stands for the whole Wedding ICM. and in 011r teacher had 100 e.uay.f to grade. a final subcvent stands for a larger Event ICM involving reading, correcting and eventually grading students' papers. Metonymies also operate in the Auxiliary system. Sentence (12b) illustrates the way metonymy affects the tense system. Habitual events occur in past. present and future time. but are described by use of the Present Tense. If we assume that the Present Tense ideally locates events in present time, its usc for habitual events is metonymic. Another time metonymy is found in the use of the Present Tense for future events a.-. in I am tljffor 'I will be off.' in French J'arrive for 'I am coming.' or in the robber's threat The money or you're a dead man. where the present moment figures prominently for the future event. We thus have the following PART FOR WHOLE time metonymies: ( 13)

PRESENT FOR HABITUAL:

(14)

PRESENT

I'OR

FUTURE:

Mary speaks Spanish. I am tJjffor 'I will be off

Metonymies may also affect an event"s grounding in reality or potentiality. Thus. we use simple tenses in describing both a real event such as The teacher is angry with me and a potential event as in He is em angry person. The latter situation with angry as an attributive adjective docs not describe a person's fit of anger at the present moment but his or her disposition to get angry potentially. 14 This metonymic relationship also occurs in its reverse form in which a potential event is described a.<> real. As Gibbs (1994). Thornburg and Panther ( 1997). and Panther and Thornburg (this volume) have shown. certain conditions of a speech act may be highlighted to stand for the intended speech act as a whole. for example. in using can in Canyoupa.u the .wit? the speaker highlights the precondition of ability for a directive speech act. Since such speech acts with can convey the notion of potentiality. Panther and Thornburg describe this metonymy as POTENTIALITY I-"OR ACruALITY. These two reverse metonymies may be stated as follows: ( )5)

a.

AcruAL FOR POTENTIAL:

He iJ an a11gry penon for 'he can be angry'

Giinter Rodden tmd Zoltd11

34 b.

Kii~·ecse.\'

POTENTIAL FOR ACTIJAL:

I can see your point for 'I see your point' (\')Category-and-Member JCM. A category and its members stand in a kind-

of relation. As shown by Seto (this volume). kind-of relations, on which 'synecdoche' is based. need to be distinguished from part-of relations, on which metonymy is based. The relations of taxonomy and partonomy. however. tend to be confused. This is reflected in the German term for 'subset' Teilmenge. literally 'part-set.' Taxonomic hierarchies may also be metaphorically seen as part-whole structures in which .. [e]ach higher-order category is a whole. with the immediately lower categories being its parts" (lakoff 1987: 287). We, therefore. feel justified in analyzing Category-and-Member ICMs as instances of the whole-part configuration. (16) a.

CATEGORY FOR A MEMBER OF THE CATEGORY:

b.

MEMBER OF A CATEGORY FOR THE CATEGORY:

the pill for 'birth control pilr aspirin for 'any pain-relieving tablet" A special type of this metonymic relationship is that between a generic type and a specific token: ( 17) a.

GENERIC FOR SPECIJolC:

Bo)'.\' don't cry·.

b.

SPECIFIC f'OR GENERIC:

The/A spider has eiRhtleR.L

The sentence in (17a) is a generic statement about boys, but it might be used in the specific situation of a boy's crying and. hence. is also understood specifically. Conversely. specific tokens may be used to stand for generic types. In the situation of 'generic reference' expressed in (17b). the definite article the or the indefinite article a is used to refer to spiders in general. As pointed out by Nonick ( 1981: 35), "any specific instantiation of a class calls forth the whole class." A single violin may stand for the class of violins and a musical note may stand for the musical key system as such. In language. the clearest cases of the SPECJRC FOR GENERIC metonymy are found in the use of proper names as common expressions as in Gibbs' (this volume) example He's goinR to OJ hi.~ way out of marriaRe. At a more general level, this metonymic relationship also underlies our interpretation of proverbs. As shown by Lakoff and Turner ( 1989: Ch. 4). proverbs such as Blind blame.~ the ditch describe a particular situation but convey a general understanding. which again is applied to a particular situation at hand. Lakoff and Turner analyze proverbs as

Towards a Theory of Metonymy

35

instances of the metaphor GENERIC IS SPECiflC. Since both the specific and the generic levels belong to the same ICM, however, we prefer to analyze them as instances of the metonymy SPECIHC FOR GENERIC. Subtypes of this metonymy are AN INDIVIDUAL (AS A TYPICAL MEMBER OF A CATEGORY) FOR A CATEGORY as in every Tom, Dick and Harry and SPECIFIC CASE FOR GENERAL RULE. which ''holds between laws and their concrete instantiations generally" (Norrick 1981: 37). This metonymic relationship is not. as claimed by Norrick. irreversible. One can easily think of situations in which a general rule is invoked in describing a specific situation as in I always leave my umbrella at home when it rains. (~·i) Category-and-Property JCM. Properties may either be seen metaphorically as possessed objects (PROPERTIES ARE POSSESSIONS) or metonymically as parts of an objecl. If categories arc intensionally defined by a set of properties. these properties are necessarily part of the category. Categories typically evoke. and metonymically stand for, one of their defining or otherwise essential properties and, conversely. a defining or essential property may evoke. or stand for. the category it defines (cf. Norrick 1981). (18) a. CATEGORY FOR DEHNtNG PROI'ERTY: jerk for 'stupidity' b. DEFINING PROPERTY FOR CATEGORY: blacks for 'black people' Most of the members of a category which Lakoff (1987: Ch. 5) discusses in connection with metonymic models are much rather characterizable as salient properties. For example. an ideal husband is characterized by the property of faithfulness as in Wilbertdoe.m't go to wple.\'.\' bars: he il· my husband. while a stereotypical husband is. amongst other things. characterized by the property of dullness as in Wilbert will stay at home; he i.f my llu.fband. Some categories conventionally stand for specific properties such a.o,; Judas for 'treacherous· or Cadillac for 'the best of.' Also. in referring to an upcoming star in linguistics as a seClmtl Cllom.fky. we have in mind his or her intellectual brilliance. Stereotypical properties are also evoked in our interpretation of 'colloquial tautologies' such as Boys •.rill be bop. Since a tautology is literally uninformative. it can only be meaningfully interpreted in the sense of a stereotypical property associated with the category. The tautology in Boy.f lt'ill be boys may. depending on the context. mean 'boys arc unruly' or 'boys arc cute and adorable' (Gibbs 1994: 345-351). All these examples arc instances of a WHOLE FOR PART metonymy, which may be characterized as in ( 19a); conversely. salient properties as parts of a category may stand for the category as a whole as in ( 19b):

36

Giinter Radden tmd Zoltd11

( 19)

a.

CATEGORY FOR SALIENT PROPERTY:

b.

SALIENT PROPERTY FOR CATEGORY:

Kii~·ecse.\'

Boys will be boys for 'unruly' How do I find Mr. Right? Reduction JCM. A final type of a PART FOR WHOLE metonymy is found in the reduction of the fonn of a sign. which was already alluded to under (8) FORMA·CONCEPTA FOR FORM 8 ·CONCEPTA. Its specific variant may be described as:

(\•ii}

(20)

PART OF A FORM FOR THE WHOLE 1-"'RM:

crude for crude oil

The reduction of fonns may involve sophisticated metonymic chains. For example. the abbreviation tg stands for a longer abbreviated fonn, tgif, which represents the whole expression Thank God, it's Friday; and even this exclamation may be seen as a part of the whole target sense: 'it's the weekend let's enjoy ourselves.' As already stated in Section 2.3., this ICM does probably not come in its reverse fonn. In our folk model of language. only a complete fonn seems to capture the essence of a concept properly. Fonn ICMs are thus different from all the other Whole-Part ICMs in that the whole cannot metonymically stand for one of its parts.

3.2. Parts of an ICM This configuration relates conceptual entities that function a..;; parts with respect to a whole ICM. While the relationship between a whole and its parts typically applies to things. the relationship between parts typically applies to entities within an event. Events are constituted by relations and participants. and PART FOR PART metonymies tend to build on the interaction between a relation and one of the things participating in the relation. Metonymy also arises when a relation is construed as a thing or a thing is construed as a relation. In English. such conceptua1 recategorizations are coded morphologically: relations which are recategorized as things show up as derived nominals (production). and things which are recategorized as relations show up as derived verbs (to beawify) or. without a derivational morpheme. a.;; conversions (to tiptoe) (see Dirven. this volume). The Part-Part configuration applies to various parts of ICMs and includes the Action ICM, the Perception ICM. the Causation ICM. the Production

Towcmls a Theory of Metonymy

37

ICM, the Control ICM. the Possession ICM, the Containment ICM. the Location ICM. the Sign and Reference ICMs and the Modification ICM. (iJ Action ICM. Action ICMs involve a variety of Participants which may be related to the predicate expressing the action or to each other. There are. thus. specific relationships such as those between an INSTRUMENT and the ACTION. the RESULT of an action and the ACTION. etc .• all of which arc parts of the Action ICM. These relationships may in tum be instantiated a'\ specific types of metonymy. The Action ICM includes the following types of metonymic relationships, the first four of which arc reversible: (21)

(22) (23)

(24)

a.

AGENT FOR ACTION:

b.

ACTION FOR AGENT:

a.

INSTRUMENT FOR ALI"ION:

b.

ACTION FOR INSTRUMENT:

a.

OBJELT fOR ACTION:

b.

ACTION FOR OBJECT:

a.

RESULT FOR ALI"ION:

b.

ACTION FOR RESULT:

(25) (26)

MANNER FOR ACTION:

(27) (28) (29)

TIME FOR ACTION:

MEANS FOR ACTION:

DESTINATION FOR MOTION: INSTRUMENT FOR AGENT:

to author a new book; to butcher the cow writer; driver to ski; 1lJ hammer pencil sharpener; screwdriver to blanket the bed: to dust the room the best bite.~: the flight is waiting to depart to laiU/scape the garden the production: tire product to tiptoe into the room He sneezed the tissue off the table. 15 1o summer in Paris to porch the newspaper the pe11 for 'writer'

With the exception of (29).JNSTRUMENT FOR AGENT. all the Action metonymies listed above involve predicates either as the vehicle or the target and typically also involve changes of their word class: Participants are converted into verbs and predicates arc nominalized. Noun-verb conversion and nominalization can therefore be seen as two complementary morphological processes leading to the two types of reversible metonymies. What makes these morphological derivations special types of metonymy. however. is their conflation of vehicle and target: the original word class describes the metonymic vehicle and the morphologically recategorized form expresses the target. The conflation process echoes the incorporation of elements in the verb described by Talmy (1985). The situations analyzed by him, however. are not metonymic. The

Giimer Radde11 mul Zt)/tdll Kijvecses

38

verb to swim as in to swim imo the cave semantically incorporates the elements of'motion' and 'manner.· as does Io riptoe in to tiptoe into tire room. The 'manner" element is. however. only present in the semantics of to swim. but it is visibly present in the morphological base of to tiptoe. As is wellknown. the processes of conversion and nominalization may result in meanings different from their bases. Thus, an act of hammering need not be performed with a hammer nor does a bite need to be bitten. The metonymic relationship operates at a more schematic level. But to the extent that the base form of the derivation is still recognizable, such morphological derivations may reasonably be treated as instances of metonymy. The metonymic relationships listed in (21 )-(28) are typically achieved by word-class changes. but are not restricted to these morphological processes. for example. the RESULT FOR ACTION metonymy may also arise within the same word class. Thus. the verb to win in Win afortlme! describes a result but is meant to metonymically invoke the action of gambling. (ii) Perception ICM. Perception plays such an outstanding role in our cognitive world that it merits an ICM of its own. Since perceptions may also be intentional. the Perception ICM may cross-classify with the Action ICM. This applies to the metonymies INSTIWMENT/ORGAN OF PERCEPTION fOR THE PERCEYfiON as in to eye someone and MANNER OF PERCEPTION FOR THE PERCEPTION as in She squinted through the mailbox. Non-intentional perceptions may produce the following reversible metonymies: (30)

a.

THING PERCEIVED FOR PERCEPTION:

There goe.~ my knee for 'there goes the pain in my knee' (Lakoff 1987: 511) b. PERCEPTION FOR THING PERCEIVED: .~ight for 'thing seen' (iii) Causation ICM. Cause and effect are so closely interdependent that one of them tends to imply the other. Moreover. their complementarity probably accounts for the fact that people often confuse causes and effects. In principle. the causation ICM may give rise to reversible metonymies: (31) a.

CAUSE FOR 1:1-H.CT:

healthy {'()mplexion for 'the good state of health bringing about the effect of healthy complexion· b.

Et-1-'ECT t-'OR CAUSE:

slow road for 'slow traffic resulting from the poor state of the road'

Toward.f a Theory of Metonymy

39

Effects more readily serve as a metonymic vehicle than causes. which is evidenced most clearly in the following subtypes of EFFEcr FOR CAUSE metonymies: IT:

(32)

STATFiEVENT FOR THING/PERSON/STATE CAUSING

(33)

EMOTION FOR CAUSE OF EMOTION:

(34)

MENTALiPHYSICAL STATE FOR OBJEC"T/PERSON CAUSING IT:

{35)

PHYSICALiBEHAVIORAL EFn:cr FOR EMOTION CAUSING IT:

She wa.f my ruin. She is my joy 'she makes me be happy' You are a pain;, the neck 'you give me pain' She waJ upset 'something made her upset"

A causal metonymy may also be seen in situations in which an action or a motion brings about, or is accompanied by. typical sounds which together eslablish an ICM. (36)

SOUND FOR EVENT CAUSING IT:

The car Jcreeched to a haft.

Here. the screeching noise results when the car brakes are applied. Similar metonymic situations are illustrated in The train whi.ftled into the .ftation; The fire truck.\- wailed fJUt of the firehouse and She rang the money i1llo the till. Causal metonymies also penneate the field of perception. A percept may stand for its cause (37a) and a cause may stand for lhe percept (37b): {37)

a.

SEEING SOMETHING DONE FOR MAKING SURE THAT IT IS DONE

b.

AIT OF FORMING A PERCEPT FOR PERCEPT

See that he gets his money. (lakoff 1987: 437) to take a look (Norvig and Lakoff 1987: 204) (iv) Production ICM. Production ICMs involve actions in which one of the

Participants is a product created by lhe aclion. The produclion of objects seems to be a particularly salient type of causal action. The Production ICM leads to various types of metonymic relationships in which the thing produced tends to be the intended target (38)

PRODUCER FOR PRODUIT:

I've got a Ford for 'car'

Due to our close association of artists with their artistic productions and inventors with their inventions, the metonymies ARTIST FOR HIS WORK as in They are playing Mozart tonight and INVENTOR t-·oR THE THING INVENTED as in

GUnter Rodden tmd Zoltdn Kiivecsel'

40

macadam establish particularly common subtypes of the PRODUCER FOR PRoDUCT metonymy. A producer and the thing produced are conceptually differ· ent enough to warrant clear identification of their roles. This a1so applies to an instrument used for producing something or the place of production: (39)

a.

INSTRUMENT FOR PRODUCT:

b.

PRODUCT FOR INSTIWMENT:

Did you hear the whistle? for 'its sound' to tum up the heat for 'the radiator" ( 40)

PLACE FOR PRODUCT MADE THERE:

china, moc·ha. camembert (v) Colllrof ICM. This ICM includes a controller and a person or object

controlled. It gives rise to reversible metonymic relationships: (41) a.

CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED:

b.

CONTROLLED FOR CONTROLLER:

Sc/nvan:kopfdefeatcd Iraq. The Mercedes ha'\ arrived.

Control ICMs seem to be naturally expressed by using the CONTROLLER FOR CONTROU..ED metonymy as in (41a), in which Schwart::.kopfstands for the US Army that did the fighting. Making the same statement using the CONTROLLED instead of the CONTROLLER. as in The US Army defeated Iraq. does not evoke the controller reading. The rnNTROLLED FOR CONTROLLER metonymy seems to apply only to situations in which the thing controlled is particularly salient or the controller is unknown as in (4lb). The notion of control blends into that of possession. For example, the user of an object is at the same time in control of the object used and possesses it. This situation gives rise to the metonymy OBJECT FOR USER OF THE OBJECT. as in Lakoff and Johnson· s ( 1980) example Mrs. Grundy frown.~ o11 blue jeans. where the expression blue jeans stands for wearers of blue jeans. (vi) Po.~session /CM. The Possession ICM may lead to reversible metonymies: (42) a.

POSSESSOR FOR POSSESSED:

b.

POSSESSED FOR POSSESSOR:

That's me for 'my bus'

He married motrey for 'person with money' There is a clear preference for choosing the possessor as the vehicle and an alienably possessed object as the target. The POSSESSOR FOR POSSESSED metonymy is well-entrenched and hardly noticeable. Compare expressions such

Towards a Theory of Metonymy

41

as/ am parked over there (for 'my car'): You have a flat tire (for ·your car') or Bill i.~ in the Guinnes.~ Book of RectJrds (for 'his name'). This is also reflected in the use of anaphoric pronouns, which, if they can be used at all. refer to the human vehicle as in Bill is i11 the Guinnen Book of Records; he is 011 page 7 and not to the target as in 'Bill i.~ i11 the Guin11ess Book of Records; it i.~ o11page 7. Conversely. anaphoric pronouns in POSSESSED FOR POSSESSOR metonymies refer to the human target as in Many big names have tumed up and he wcu one of them and not to the vehicle a.<; in 'Many big names have turned up am/ it wa.~ one of them. POSSESSED FOR POSSESSOR metonymies apply to both alienable possession (The ham .mndwich had a side dish of saltul) and inalienable possession (appendicitis for 'patient'). and in both cases they are somehow felt to be marked. (vii) Containment JCM. The image-schematic situation of containment is so basic and well-entrenched that it deserves to be treated as an ICM of its own among locationaJ relations. As a rule, we are more interested in the contents of a container than in the mere container so that we commonly find metonymies which target the contents via the container as in (43a) rather than the reverse metonymic relationship as in (43b). (43) a.

CONTAINER FOR CONTENTS:

b.

CONTENTS FOR CONTAINER:

The bottle

i.~

.wur for 'milk'

The milk tipped over for 'the milk container tipped over' (Norrick 1981: 58) (viii) Location JCMs. Places are often associated with people living there. 16 well-known institutions located there. events which occur or occurred there and goods produced or shipped from there (see (40)). Hence. we find the following metonymies: (44)

a.

PLACE FOR INHABITANTS:

b.

INHABITANTS FOR PLACE:

a.

PLACE FOR INSTITUTION:

The whole town showed up for 'the people' The French ho.~ted the World Cup Soccer Game.~ for •France' (45)

Cambridge won't publish the book for 'Cambridge University Press' b.

INSTITUTION t:OR PLACE:

/live

clo.~e

to tire University.

42

Gilmer Radden mul Zt)/tdll Kiivecses

{46) a.

PLACE FOR EVENT:

b.

EVENT FOR PLACE:

Water/(H) for 'battle fought at Waterloo' Battle. name of the village in East Sussex where the Battle of Hastings was fought

The relationship between places and people living there may also be. and often has been, seen as a situation of containment. which is supported by the use of the container preposition in in expressions such as /i\•e in New York. In this view. the metonymic relationship in (44) would be treated as a metaphorical extension of the container metonymy (43). The metonymic relationship in (46) comprises important events which occurred at a particular place as well as activities typically performed at a given place as its setting. Relating places with what is typically done there is part of our cultural knowledge.lt allows us to interpret the mention of the place in I was behind the wheel all day in the sense of the activity typically performed at that place. namely 'I was driving all day.' This subtype of metonymy may more adequately be described as PLACE FOR ACflVITY PERFORMED AT THAT PLACE.

(i:c) Sig11 and Reference /CMs. As shown in Section 2. Sign and Reference ICMs lead to metonymies cross-cutting ontological realms. In sign metonymy. a (word-)form stands for a conventionally associated concept: in reference metonymies. a sign. concept or (word- )form stands for the real thing. In each case, one part of an ICM stands for another part of the same ICM. Sign metonymy may also apply to particular instances of the relationship between the form and content parts of a sign and. just like the general fORM FOR CONCEPT metonymy, this specific metonymy is irreversible:

(47)

WORDS FOR THE CONCEPTS THEY EXPRESS:

a .~elf-comradictnry uttermu:e In (47). we understand the word form uttemm:e "as referring to the conceptual content expressed by the utterance'' (lakoff and Tumer 1989: 108). This metonymy also accounts for the compound expression four-letter word, which. however. involves additional metonymic steps. The formal property of 'four letters· stands for the category of 'swear words· and these types of words stand for the concept expressed by them. Since the expression four-letter word may also be used for swear words which have more or less than four letters such as as.~ho/e or bas/arc/. metonymy (16b), MEMBER Of A CATEGORY fOR THE CAT·

Towards a Theory of Metonymy

43

EGORY. a1so applies here. These members are. however, less central to the category of swearwords than genuine 'four-letter words' such a.'i .~hit andfuck. (x) Modification /CM. This ICM mainly applies to variant forms of a sign apart from reduction. Reduced forms were accounted for by the PART FOR WHOLE metonymy (20); variant forms stand in a Part-and-Part relationship of an ICM. More specifically, we may distinguish between genuine cases of modification as in (48) and substitution as in (49), both of which seem to be unique to language and only operate in one direction: (48)

MODIFIED FORM FOR ORIGINAL FORM:

effillt: for fuckint:

(49) SUBSTITUTE FORM FOR ORIGINAL FORM:

Do you still love me?- Yes,/ do.

3.3. Summary The discussion of a typology of metonymy-producing relationships in this section can now be summarized. First, the ICMs which include metonymy-producing relationships may be subsumed under two high-level conceptual configurations: (i) whole ICM and its part(s) and (ii) parts of an ICM. The whole-part configuration typica11y gives rise to metonymies involving things. while the part-part configuration primarily applies to metonymies involving predications in events and states. This may have to do with the conceptually autonomous status which we attach to things as opposed to the dependent status which we attach to relations. which require the presence of things to be related. Second. the conceptual relationships which hold in a particular ICM may be exploited metonymically. A number of conceptual relationships only admit metonymization in one direction. This applies to some relationships of Action ICMs (e.g .. (25) MANNER FOR ACTION), special situations of Causation ICMs (e.g .. (36) SOUND FOR EVENT CAUSING IT) and ICMs involving (word-)forms (e.g .. (48) MODIFIED FORM FOR ORIGINAL FORM). But also relationships which lead to reversible metonymies such a." (31a) CAUSE FOR EFflKI and (3lb) Ef'FECT FOR CAUSE tend to display a preference for one direction. For example. we routinely speak of containers when we mean their contents as in He picked up the t:laH and poured it into the pitcher. but situations in which we speak of the contents when we mean the container as in I'll put the ro.~es in water are very rare.lt is claimed that the metonymy CONTAINER FOR CONTENTS. i.e .. the choice of a container as a reference point. is more natural than the metonymy

Giimer Radde11 am/ Zoltd11

44

CO/I.'TI!NTS FOR CONTAINER.

Kii~·ecse.\·

i.e .• the choice of the things contained. Similarly,

metonymy (4la). CONTROLLJ:.R FOR CONTROLLED. is more

natural than

me·

tonymy (4lb), CONTROLLED FOR CONTROU..ER. Thus, Schwartz/wpf defeated

Iraq evokes the metonymic reading in which Schwart:kupf stands for the US Anny that did the fighting. The US Army tlefeated Iraq. however. does not evoke the controller rcading.lt is these metonymic preferences which will be explored in the following section.

4.

Principles governing the selection of the preferred vehicle

The choice of vehicle and 1arget in default cases of metonymy appears to be motivated or restrained by cognitive principles. The nature of such principles wa." pointed out by Langacker(l993: 30) in a very relevant observation on the function of metonymy: M~tonymy allows an efficient reconciliation of two conflicting factors: the need to be ace; urate. i.e .. of being sure that the addressee· s allen! ion is directed to the int~ndcd target. and our natural inclination to think and talk explicitly about those entities that have the greatest cognitive salience for us.

The former factor relates to communicative aspects and will be described here in terms of communicative principles. the latter factor pertains to cognitive aspects and will be described in terms of cognitive principles. Section 4.1. will be concerned with cognitive principles of relative salience. Since metonymic reference points are cognitive in nature. it is only natural to expect that these principles have a cognitive basis. Since metonymies also play a major role in communication. we may also expect communicative principles to contribute in determining the selection of a vehicle expression. Section 4.2. will briefly examine the issue of communicative principles of relative salience. The principles themselves arc assumed to have the status of preferential tendencies and will be stated in the form of x oVER y. 4.1. Cognitive principles

Some initial ideas concerning cognitive principles which determine the relative salience of an entity were developed by Langacker ( 1993: 30): "Other things being equal. various principles of relative salience generally hold: human> non-human: whole> part; concrete> abstract; visible> non-visible;

Towards a Themy of Metonymy

45

etc." Some of the semantic constraints which Cooper and Ross (1975) found to determine the fixed ordering of bipartite expressions are also relevant for default metonymies. 17 The cognitive principles which have been identified here relate to three general determinants of conceptual organization: human experience. perceptual selectivity. and cultural preference. which. however. tend to interact and overlap in several ways. 4.1.1. Human Experience Our bao;ic human experiences are derived from our anthropocentric view of the world and our interaction in the world. In this world. humans take precedence over non-humans, things are looked at from a subjective rather than objective point of view, concrete objects are more salient than abstract entities. things we interact with are selected over things we do not interact with. and functional things are more important to us than things which are nonfunctionaL (i) HUMAN OVER NON-HUMAN. This principle accounts for the default cases of the production. control and possession metonymies. namely (38) PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT (I've got a Ford). (41a) CONTROLlER FOR CONTROLLED (Schwartzkopf defeated Iraq) and (42a) POSSESSOR FOR POSSESSED(/ ha~·e a flat tire). (ii) SUBJJ:X.TJ\'f; OVER OBJECTIVE. Each person's experience is necessarily subjective and leads to a subjective view of the world. The principle SUBJECTIVE OVER OBJECTIVE determines the use of metonymy (30b) PERCEPTION FOR THING PERCEIVED ao; in What a beautiful .~ight for 'thing seen.· This principle may also account for the unidirectionality of the reference metonymies (2) FORM-CONCEPT fOR THING/EVENT and (3) CONCEPT FOR llHNG/EVENT. Here. we access the world of 'objective reality' by means of our subjective world of concepts. (iii) coNCRtTE OVER ABSTRACT. Our basic human experience relates to concrete physical objects, which have more salience for us than abstract objects. The cognitive principle CONCRt.TE OVER ABSTRACT accounts for why we speak of a book wrilten in a careful hand for 'carefully written' or having one's hands 011 sometlri11g for 'controlling something.' Body pans make panicularly 'good' objects. and we routinely access various abstract human domains by reference to our body. Special subcases of the CONCRETE OVER ABSTRACT principle may be described as BODILY OVER EMOTIONAL (heart for 'kindness'), BODILY OVER ACTIONAL (hold )'tJUr tongue for 'stop speaking').

Gilmer Radde11 mul Zt)/tdll Kiivecses

46

BODILY OVER MENTAL (braill for 'inteJJecf) and BODILY OVER PERCEPTUAL (good ear for 'good hearing'). Since concrete objects are visible and abstract

things invisible. the principle also entails VISIBLE OVER INVISIBLE, which is reflected in metonymies such as to .w~·e tme ·.~ .~ki" for 'to save one's life.' Visibility. in its tum. accounts for the default metonymy (43a) coi\ITAJNER fOR CONTENTS,

since things in a container arc typically hidden inside the container

and. thus, invisible. At a more general level. the CONCRETE OVER

ABSTRACT

principle also accounts for metonymies (I) FORM FOR CONCEPT. and (47) WORDS FOR THE CONCEPTS THEY EXPRESS, in which the concrete visual or acoustic shape of a sign stands for the abstract concept denoted by the (word~)form.

(iv) INTERACTIONAL OVER NON~JNFERACT/ON;\L. Our experience of the world mainly derives from our interacting in it. Entities we interact with form better reference points than entities with which we do not interact. We often interact with parts of a whole so that this principle provides a default motivation for PART FOR WHOLE metonymies. For example. the part we interact with in driving is the steering wheel so that we speak of sitting behind the wheel. We mainly use our hands in interacting with the world and hence speak of hamlon demotwration. we use our fingers in typing on the keyboard and thus speak of having the world at our fingertips when we log into the Internet. Our interaction with things is closely related to their function. (V) f"UNCTIONAL OVER NON·f"UN(T/ONAL. As shown by Tversky and Hemenway ( 1984). we attach particular salience to functional parts such as the engine of a car. There is a vested human interest in seeing things. in particular anifacts.from a functional point of view. Thus. the part of a TV-set that appears to be the most functional is its tllbe so that we speak of spending the whole day in front of the tube; the parts of a car that are functional to its driving are the wheels. the motor and the steering wheel so that we speak of a 24-wheeler, a motorway and sitting behind the wheel. Pans which are not important in driving such as the doors. the windshield wipers. or the fenders are. of course. highly unlikely to be selected as metonymic reference points for the car.

4.1.2. Perceptual selectivity A number of cognitive principles are relatable to perceptual salience. which, of course. also determines the way we experience the world as human beings. Our perceptual apparatus is geared towards things in our immediacy and presence. things which are large and big. and things which form good gestalts.

Towards a Themy of Metonymy

47

have clear boundaries and are specific instances. These foci of perceptual selectivity can be stated in the following principles of cognitive preference. (i) JMMEDIATf.' OVER NON-JMMEDJATE. This cognitive principle accounts for selecting stimuli in our spatial. temporal and causal immediacy. The metonymy in /'1/ answer the phone for 'I'll answer the person speaking at the other end of the line' is motivated by spatial immediacy. Metonymies (13) PRESENT FOR HABITUAL as in I alway.~ take the 9 o'clock train and ( 14) PRESENT FOR AITURE as in I am off for 'I will be off are motivated by temporal immediacy. Metonymy (33) EMOTION FOR CAUSE OF EMOTION. as in She i.~ my joy for 'she makes me be happy' is motivated by causal immediacy. Here. the emotion as an effect of some stimulus serves as the metonymic vehicle. In general. effects are more perceptible and affect us more than causes. The immediacy principle also accounts for many emotion metonymies in which physiological and behavioral responses produced by emotions are used to stand for the emotions themselves as in He got cold feet for 'he became frightened' (see KOvecses I 990). (ii) OCCURRf.'NT OVf;R NON-OCCURRENT. This principle reflects our preferential concern with real. factual. and occurrent experiences. It accounl
48

Giimer Radden and Zoltdn

Kii~·ecse.\·

ferred vehicle in metonymy and accounts for the wide-spread usc of humans and whole objects for their active-zone parts. Metonymy (9a) WHOLE THING FOR A PART OF THE THING as in The car need.f washin~ is thus well-motivated. Unlike the perceptual gestalt of things, the gestalt of events is exclusively conceptual in nature. The borderlines of evenls tend to be much fuzzier than those of things. A subevent of a larger event may no longer be understood as a part but may gain the status of an independent event gestaJt of its own. As a result. the metonymy SUBEVENT FOR THE WHOLE EVENT as in/ am ~:oing to the dcx:tor for 'I am seeing a doctor for medical treatment' is widespread and wellmotivated. An essential requirement of any gestalt is that it has clearly delineated boundaries. Consequently. the gestalt-perceptual principle entails as its subprinciple: (1•i) BOUNDf.V OVER UNBOUNDED. The productive metonymy (I )a) OBJECT FOR MATERIAL CONSTITUTING THE OBJECT allows Us to construe bounded things as substances as in We had chicken today. IL~ reverse metonymy (I I b) MATERIAL CONSTITlJfiNG AN OBJECT FOR THE OBJECT a'i in/ .w•nt you an e-mail is much Jess productive. (vii) .'iPKIFIC OVER GEN£Rtc. This cognitive principle relates to our preference for good gestalts as well as for concreteness. immediacy and occurrence. Specific and definite instances form better gestalts than general and unspecific entities. The cognitive principle underlies metonymy (17b) SPECIFIC FORGENERIC and its subtypes. At a purely conceptual level. this principle accounts for people's tendency to generalize. For example. OJ. Simpson's verdict of 'not guilty' was taken by many Americans as a verdict for all black people.

4.1.3. Cultural preferences The notion of 'cultural preference' as used here is mainly meant in the sense of the preferential status given to particular members of a category. Lakoff's work on metonymic models has shown that certain members of a category arc more salient than others with respect to certain dimensions. These dimensions arc more or less strongly determined by a given culture. (i) Sfi::RI::OITPICAL OVI:."R NON-STJ::RE01l'PICAL. Stereotypes probably provide the best cases of culture-bond concepts. We already came across the impact of stereotypes on metonymy in connection with categories such as 'housewife' and colloquial tautologies as in Boys will be boyJ. (ii) IDEAL OVER NON-IDEAL. Ideals provide powerful organizing principles

Towards a Theory of Metonymy

49

in a culture. Ideal cases are social constructs and defined with respect to desirability. Some concepts arc inherently defined as desirable by a culture such as 'ideal love' {see KOvecses 1988). others are represented by a paragon like Babe Ruth for 'ideal baseball players' (Lakoff 1987). Also. negative categories may have ideal examples that can stand for the whole category. When we say You are a Judas, we use an individual who is a betrayer par excellence in our culture to stand for betrayers and betrayal in general. (iii) TYPICAL OVI:'R NON-TYPICAL. Typical memben; of a category are often picked out when a category as a whole is described. Forexample.onc may talk about the symptoms of .mee:.ing and coughing in referring to a cold as in You've got a bad cough. (iv) cJ::NTRAL OVER PERIPHERAL. The cultural impact of centrality is nicely illustrated in Feyaens· (this volume) study of the conceptualization of stupidity in German. Expressions such as You are not from here, are you? demonstrate that people who arc characterized as stupid Jive on the periphery of a linguistic culture. Here, our folk understanding of inferior mental abilities is based on the metonymy OUTGROUP ORIGIN FOR STUPIDITY. (v) INITIAL OR FINAL ovt.·R MIDDLI:. In our conception of events. an initial or final phase may be seen as being more imponant than the central phase. To pulltl1e trigger for 'to shoot' focuses on an event's initial phase, to sign a contract for 'to make a contract' focuses on an event's final pha'ie. The etymologies of creed and ma.~.\· provide nice historical illustrations of the two aspects of this principle: creed derives from the fin>t word of the Apostles' Creed. Credo in mmm Deum 'I believe in one God.' while mass for 'service· goes back to a formula said at the end of medieval church services./te. missa est (c:ontio) 'go now. the meeting is dismissed' (Ullmann 1972: 219). (~·i) BASIC ovt.R NON-BASIC. This principle applies to simple and well-known 'ground' routines or affairs as in Lakoffs ( 1987: 880 generators and submodels and in our preference for basic level categories. The use of expressions such as I've told you a hundred time.~ for 'several times' may be said to exemplify a metonymy BASIC FOR NON-BASIC because a hllndred is a basic number. (vii) IMPORTAfoff OVt.'R Lf:SS IMPORTAfoff. This principle accounts for the Use of .~tage for 'theater' as the most important part of the Theater ICM. or the expression .\peaking a ltmguage for 'knowing a language' or the identification of a capital city with a country. (~'iii) COMMON OVER LESS COMMON and (ix) RARE ovt.·R u.-ss RARf;. Common members of a category are culturally

50

GUnter Raclden and Zoltdn Kiivecse.\·

given reference points and may be used metonymically such as aspirin for any pain-relieving tablet, while rare members stand out because of their uniqueness as in lakoffs (1987) example of a DC-10 crash. which people generalized to the extent that they refused to fly any DC-10. It is. without doubt. possible to identify more such cognitive principles which, however, partly overlap with the ones discussed above. Among these We would probably have to Jist UNEXPECfED OVER EXPECfED, NEW OVER OLD. and TRADITIONAL OVER NON- TRADITIONAL

4.2. Communicative principles At least two principles seem to contribute to detennining the default selection of a metonymic vehicle: the principle of clarity and the principle of relevance.

4.2.1. The principle of clarity The communicative principle that ensures maximal case of accessing the intended target via a metonymic vehicle m<:~y be stated in preferential terms as CUAR OVER OBSCURE. This principle is. of course, reminiscent of Grice's ( 1975) maxim of manner. which, amongst other things. requires the speaker to avoid obscurity. It might be assumed that clarity in communication is best guamnteed by use of literal speech.lnstances of metonymy which have a high degree of cognitive motivation. however. do not seem to require any more effort in directing the addressee's attention toward the intended target. Activezone metonymies are highly motivated by the WHOLE FOR PART metonymy and. hence. are understood clearly and effortlessly. In Langacker's example The dog bit the car. we effortlessly supply 'the dog's teeth' as the intended target. This metonymy is so natural that it cannot even be replaced by the expression of the intended target: *The dog's teeth bit the cat. Here, the metonymic mode of expression is clearer and more 'accurate' than the literal one.ln a vague expression such as They .~pem the 11ight together, however. the addressee cannot clearly access the intended target and so communicative success is not guaranteed.

4.2.2. The principle of relevance Sperber and Wilson's (1995: 158) principle of relevance, according to which "every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of it'> own optima] relevance." also applies to the use and interpretation of metonymy. As a communicative principle of preference, it may be stated as

Toward.~

a Theory of Metonymy

51

Rt;U:vANr ov~c:R IRREU:IIANF.

This principle. which could be described more precisely as SITIJATIONALLY MORE RELEVANT OVER SITIJATIONALLY LESS RELEVANT. underscores the situational and contextual relevance of a metonymic vehicle. As a rule. a cognitively salient vehicle is also relevant to the situation at hand. It is only when the principle of relevance is in connict with one or more of the cognitive principles that its impact comes to the fore. As pointed out in the Introduction to this volume. this is the case with in-group talks by nurses about their patients or waitresses about their customers. Thus.the much discussed metonymic example of the ham sandwich in reference to a customer is well-motivated by the principle of relevance since. to the waitress. the food served provides the best reference point for identifying a customer in the Restaurant ICM.

4.3. Competing motivations In light of the previous section. it can be suggested that the more cognitive principles apply. the greater the cognitive motivation of a metonymy. As a rule, more than one cognitive principle does in fact apply to a particular case of metonymy. For example. the metonymy ARTIST FOR HIS WORK as in We are rnuling Shakespeare (for 'Shakespeare's plays') is motivated by a bundle of cognitive principles: HUMAN OVER NON-HUMAN. CONCRETE OVER ABSTRACT, and GOOD GESTALT OVER POOR GESTALT. Most instances of metonymy. however, are not 'fully' motivated in the sense that not all cognitive principles converge. Rather. we have a continuum of motivation ranging from fully motivated default metonymies to weakly or unmotivated non-defauh metonymies. Consider again Lakoff and Johnson· s example The bu:'Oes are 011 strike for 'the bus drivers arc on strike.' Since passengers 'interact' with the buses and buses are more relevant to them than their drivers, the metonymy is motivated by the cognitive principle INTERACTIONAL OVER NON-INTERACTIONAL and the communicative principle RELEVANT OVER IRRFJ..EVANT. but it is inconsistent with the cognitive principle HUMAN OVER NON-HUMAN. The metonymy in /'II muwer the plume is consistent with the principle IMMEDIATE OVER NONIMMEDIATE. but is in conflict with the principle HUMAN OVER NON-HUMAN. The metonymic expression paper for 'essay on a subject' is motivated by the principle CONCRETE OVER ABSTRACT. in particular. VISIBLE OVER INVISIBLE. but, since paper is prototypically a mass noun. the principle BOUNDED OVER UNBOUNDED is reversed. In all these cases. conflicting motivations decrease the naturalness of the overall motivation of the metonymy.

GUnter Radden and Zoltdn

52

Kii~·ecse.\·

4.4. Summary In sum. there appear to be a number of cognitive and communicative principles that determine the default routes to intended target entities. The significance of these principles lies in the fact that they help us understand why we select certain vehicle entities to access a target and why certain vehicle-totarget routes have become conventionalized in the language. Many, or even most. of the default cases of the metonymies listed in the preceding two sections could be shown to be motivated by these principles. We are also able to offer an explanation for the hierarchy of metonymic vehicles cross-cutting ontological realms, which was presented in Section 2.4. as form >formconcept> concept > reality. Forms rank over concepts due to the principle CONCRETE OVER ABSTRACT. form·concepts occupy a natural intermediate posi· tion between the two, and concepts rank over reality due to the principle SUBJECTIVE OVER OBJECTIVE.

As a rule, several cognitive and communicative principles are involved in a given instance of metonymy. They may be. and often are. in conflict with each other and in this way decrease the naturalness of the metonymy. The following section will briefly investigate the nature of such overriding factors.

5.

Overriding factors

The use of metonymy may be motivated by a speaker's expressive needs or a given social situation. In the former situation. an individual speaker may want to achieve a rhetorical effect by deliberately violating one or more of the cognitive principles in his or her use of metonymy. The latter situation is governed by social norms and usually involves violating the communicative principle CLEAR OVER OBSCURE. Since the cognitive and/or communicative principles arc overridden deliberately. the resulting metonymy is usually also felt to be figurative. or, non·default.

5.1. Rhetorical effects Along with other figurative modes of thought. metonymy is commonly used to produce rhetorical effects as in humor.jargon,literature. persuasion. slang, poetry and the like. The rhetorical effects tend to derive from violations of

Toward.,· a Theory of Metonymy

53

default cognitive and communicative principles. For example, Chaucer's depiction of 'fright' as Myn ltene i.~ .wore afright and the slang expression get out ofmyface for 'leave me alone· violate the principle of GOOD GESTALT OVER POOR GESTALT in that a body part is used to stand for a person. The aesthetic effect of the metonymies in The pen is mightier than the sword derives from the deliberate reversal of the cognitive principle HUMAN OVER NON-HUMAN. Shakespeare's wording Let pride marry her and the journalist"s description Many American li~·e-'" were loJt for 'many Americans died' both violate the principle of CONCRETE OVER ABSTRACT.

5.2. Social-communicative effects Social considerations in a communicative situation may require speakers to override some cognitive or communicative principles. This is especially obvious in the use of metonymy-based euphemisms. in which considerations involving the hearer's 'face' prevent the speaker from using a clear expression. 1M This is the case in the British English expression redundancies for 'dismissals.' The euphemistic word redundancy refers to a precondition that may lead to a worker's dismissal. The metonymy deliberately reverses the cognitive principle CENTRAL OVER PERIPHERAL and, since the target is not clearly identifiable. also violates the communicative principle CLEAR OVER OBSCURE. The expression They clid it for 'they had sex· also overrides the principle CLEAR OVER OBSCURE. but here it is due to its violation of the principle SPECIAC OVER GENERIC. The euphemistic expressions to go to the bathroom and to wa.~h one's hand.~ (for 'to urinate/defecate') focus on the initial and final phases of a complex event and are, thus. motivated by the conceptual principle INITIAL OR ANAL OVER MIDDLE. Since going to the bathroom and washing one's hands are. however. only tangentially concerned with the central and relevant activity. the principles CENTRAL OVER I'ERIPHERAL. RELEVAI'IT OVER IRRELEVANT as well as CLEAR OVER OBSCURE are violated. The two expressions are no longer experienced as instances of metonymic vehicles. Thus, to go to the bathroom is no longer associated with its spatial meaning 'to transport oneself to the bathroom.' but evokes the target sense directly in expressions such as The dog we Ill to the bathroom 011 the living room rug. 1 '~ Metonymic expressions which are no longer felt to mystify a taboo topic tend to be replaced by new nondefault metonymies. This happened to the originally euphemistic word toilet.

GUnter Rudden and Zoltdn Kiivecse.\·

54

which wa'i replaced by bathroom and restroom, which in their tum were supplanted by expressions such a.;;, facilities and comfort station. Violations of the clarity principle also abound in officialese as in eq11al opportllllity employer and other areas that arc prone to using jargon. These types of 'vivid' metonymy have traditionally been studied in rhetoric and literary criticism. In the cognitivist view of metonymy presented here they now appear as non-default ca.~s. in which cognitive principles and/ or communicative principles are deliberately overridden. Since the primary goal of this paper is to isolate the principles which determine default cases. the issue of non-default metonymies shall not be explored any further.

6.

Conclusion

We have attempted to offer a relatively comprehensive and integrated outline of metonymy from a cognitivist point of view. As stated in the beginning, we believe that such a view involves doing at least the following: (i) identifying the ontological levels at which metonymy occurs; (ii) specifying the types of relationships that hold between elements in a

metonymic relationship: (iii) establishing those cognitive principles that explain the most conventionalized or most ·natural' vehicle-to-target routes; (iv) discovering the conditions under which non-default routes can be selected. The paper argues that metonymy is not restricted to language but is a cognitive process which operates within the same idealized cognitive model. Since ICMs may cross-cut ontological realms, we may also expect to find metonymy-producing relationships in and cross-cutting the three ontological realms of concepts, fonns and things/events. We have been able to identify eight ICMs which give rise to 'ontological metonymies.· The metonymy-producing relationships were subsumed under two general conceptual configurations: whole ICM and its part(s) and parts of an ICM. The fonner configuration typically gives rise to metonymies involving things, the Iauer primarily applies to metonymies involving predications. A small number of conceptual relationships only admit metonymization in one direction: the majority of conceptual relationships, however, lead to reversible metonymies.

Toward.~

a Theory of Metonymy

55

Generally. one of these metonymic construals is conceptually preferred. A number of cognitive and communicative principles govern the default selection of the preferred metonymic vehicle. The cognitive principles pertain to the areas of human experience, perceptual selectivity and cultural preferences. The communicative principles include those of clarity and relevance. These cognitive and communicative principles may be overridden for expressive or social reasons. Non-default metonymies. which arise through such overriding factors. violate one or more of the default cognitive and communicative principles, in particular the principle CLEAR OVER OBSCURE. We do not claim that we have carried out this project fully. On the contrary. what we have done here is just the beginning and we are certain that there are others who do not necessarily agree with us concerning either the details of our proposals or even our general claims. However. we believe that the four issues raised are important for understanding the nature of metonymy. If we can come to some consensus regarding these issues. we can address further ones that have not been discussed in the cognitive linguistic literature in the detail or depth they deserve. Among these are the following: I. 2. 3. 4.

5.

What is the precise nature of the relationship between metonymy and other figurative modes of thought. in particular metaphor? What is the function of metonymy. especially in comparison to that of metaphor? Why do people utilize metonymy? What are the restrictions on the use of metonymy? To use Taylor"s (1995: 123) example. why docs the PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT metonymy not apply to Mary was de/idem.\·, meaning by Mary the cheesecake which Mary made? What is the relationship of metonymic speech to literal speech?

To be sure, there are answers to each of these questions in cognitive linguistics. and some of them have been touched upon in the previous pages. However. in light of what we have found. it seems to us that much more can be done. And. indeed. the main goal of this paper was to point out some of the deeper issues concerning metonymy and bring these issues to the attention of the cognitive linguistic community.

Giinler Radden and Zoltdn Kiivec.fes

56

Notes This paper elaborates upon an earlier ver.;ion which appeared in C11KIIitil't' LiiiKIIisticv 91 ( 19911). We are grateful to our anonymous reviewers for their insightful and helpful comments. We also wish to express our thanb to Elizabeth Mathis and Gary Palmer for their valuable linguistic contributions to this paper.

2.

This view corresponds to Dirvcn's (1993: 14) charactcriznlion of metonymy ru; opposed to metaphor:-[ ... ] in metonymy the two domains both remain intoct. but they are seen to be in line. whereas in metaphor only one domain. viz. the target domain is kept. and the other domain. viz. the soun:e domain disappear.;. so to speak."

3.

The attraction of Langackcr's cognitive e,;planation of metonymy lies in the perva~ivc· ness of reference-point phenomena in language structure, in particular posscMive ex pres· sions. The view of mc10nymy a.~ a reference-point phenomenon i~. however. not unproblematic. The pmccs..~ of first making mental oontoct to a reference point before acce~~ing the target ~hould take longer than that of acces.~ing a conceptual entity directly. which. however. has not been confirmed experimentally in terms of proces.sing time (Gibbs 1993).

4.

Sec the discus.~ion of the notion of 'contiguity' in Koch (this volume). The notion of contiguity i~ also present in cognitive definitions a.~ in Croft'~ ( 1993: 347) definition of metonymy n.~ ··a shift of a word meaning from the entity it ~lands for to a ·contiguou~· entity."

5.

For similar views sec Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1987), Croft ( 1993) and Blank (this volume).

6.

The word htuut derives from Latin lhJirpiam 'large rake used a.~ a harrow' and Samnite (hJirpu.f 'wolf,' i.e .. the pins of the harrow were metaphorically related to the wolf~ teeth.

7.

In distingui~hing metaphor from metonymy. Lak.off and Johnson (1980: 36) and Lakoff and Turner ( 19!!9: 103) view metonymy a.~ primarily having a referential function. a.~ opposed to the function of undc~tanding as.~ociatcd with metaphor. But this view of metonymy is at odds with the many other areas in which metonymy is found.

8.

Frawley (1992: 19-20) illustrotcs the difference between the extensional world and thc mentally projected world by the well-known case of tautologies a.~ in George Bush is ThL~ sentence i~ meaningfully interpretable in an attitudinal sense. which may be made explicit by attitude predicates such as wondtr. do11b1. be 1martuin. etc. a.~ in I wondtr if Geor1w Bush is Gtorge B11sh. Gibbs ( 1994: 345-351) ha.~ shown that such tautologies are metonymic in that a category L~ used to refer to specific salient parts or attributes. This analysis is also adopted here (cf. 3.1.(vi)).

Gtorge Bush.

9.

Cf. Langackcr (1993: 31): "it [the octive-zone/profale discrepancy) ha.~ to be regarded a.~ natural and t.f~(·ud rather than pathological." Similarly, Hcrskovit~ (1985: 363) point~ out in her discussion of the salience principle that the metonymic shift to a salient pan "ha.~ come to be so naturulthat it is hard to think that it involves any special proces.~ such as metonymy." Langacker (1991: 191) even argue~ that "II is in fact quite difftcult 10 find convincing example~ [ ... ] where all aspects of the designated entity participate equally in a relationship."

Towards a Theory of Metonymy 10.

57

Cf. the careful distinction between metonymy and synecdoche made by Seto (this volume).

II.

On metonymies relating to the hand, see KOv«ses and SzabO (1996).

12.

S« Langacker (1991: Ch. 3). Prototypical sub.~taoccs are charucterized by intemaJ homogeneity and divisibility. prOI.otypical things are chan~.cterized by internal heteroge· neity and integration of its par1s into a whole.

13.

For a more general distinction between metonymies ba.'ied on co-presence and succes· sian, see Blank (this volume).

14.

The metonymy ACTUAL FOR POTE.,..TIAL aJso accounts for the development of the possibility sense of the modals am and may. The epistemic sense of ,.a,. may have developed from the original sense of 'koow' via 'knowledge how to do and 'being able to act' to

x·

'increased ~sibility of acting.' In a similar chain of sense development, the originaJ sense of may 'might. power' may have led to the modal sense of possibility. Studies on grammaticaJization have convincingly explained the steps involved in these semantic changes by implicature and pragmatic strengthening. discus.~ion

15.

Cf. Lakoff in the

16.

Objects and animals may. of course. also be as~iated with a place. A nice example of metonymic association is the proper name CtJnur;.·l.sftJnds. which goes back to the name Ca11aria given to it by the Romans on account of the many dogs SC(!n there and which later on provided the name for the bird ('anary, which the Spanish found on the islands.

on "Semantic Accommodation" in Cogling. May 7, 1994.

17.

The following semantic constraints

18.

Violation of the communicative principle CLEAR OVER a.~ nouting Grice's maxim of manner.

19.

Cf. Morgan (1978: 263). who anaJyzes this example. which goes back to Robin Lakoff. a~ convcntionaJized conversational implicature.

idcntif~ed by Cooper and Ros.~ (1975) correspond to the cognitive principles a.~ used here: Herr and Now correspond to IMMEDIATE ovat NON· IMMEDIATE, SiiiKllfar correspoDds to SPECIRC OVER GENDIC. AnimtJit' and Agelllil't corre· spond to HUMJ\.'J OVER NON·HUMAN. and C.mnt corresponds to BOUNDED OVER UNBOUNDED. Pos.~ibly aJso the remaining semantic constraints are relevant for metonymy.

OBSCURE

amounts to the same thing

References Cooper, William E. John Robert Ro.~s 1975 World order. Papers from the Para.fes.~ion on F1mctionalism. University of Chicago: Chicago Linguistics Society. 63-111. Croft. William 1993 The role of domains in the interpretation of metaphors and metonymies. Cogniti~·e UliRlli.wics 4: 335-370. Cruse. D. Alan 1986 Lexical Semanric.t. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

58 Dirven. Rene 1993

GUnler Radden and Zoltdn Kiivec.fes

Metonymy and metaphor: differcnl mental str.uegies of conccpiUalization. Leuven.fe Bijdrage11 82: 1-28. Frawley. William 1992 lingui.ftic SeiiUI/Ific.t. Hillsdale. NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Gibbs, Raymond W .. Jr. 1993 Processes and products in making sense of tropes. In A. Ortony (ed.), Metaphor and Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Second edition. 252-276. 1994 The Ponies of Mind: Figurative Tlwughr.LLltlglwf<:e a11d Understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Grice. H. Paul 1975 Logic and conversation. In P. Cole.J.L. Morgan (eds.).Symax and Seman· tics. Vol. 3: Spee•·h A1·u. New York: Academic Press. 41-58. Herskovits, Annette 1985 Semantics and pragmatics of locative expressions. Cogniti\'t' Scienc~: 9: 341-378. Jongen. Rene 1985 Polysemy .tropes and cognition or the non-Magriuian an of dosing curtains whilst opening them. In W. PaproiiC, R. Dirven (eds.), Tht: Ubiquity of Mnaphor (Currem /.uue.f i11 linguistic Theory 29). Amsterdam and Phila· delphia: Benjamins, 121-139. KOvecses. Zoltity Press. 1990 Emotion Concept.f. New York.: Springer-Verlag. Kfivecses. Zoltan. Peter Szab6 1996 Idioms: A view from cognitive semantics. Applied linguistics 17: 326-355. Kfivecses. Zoltan. GUnter Radden 1998 Metonymy: Developing a cognitive linguistic view. Cognith·e LJngui:stic.f 9: 37-77. Lak.off. George 1987 Women, Firf! and Dangerou.f ThingJ: What Cotf!gorie:s Re\'eof about tile Mind. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Lakoff. George, Mark Johnson 1980 Metaphors We Li\·e By. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Lakoff. George. Mark Tomer 1989 More than Cool Reo.mn: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. L.angack.er. Ronald W. 1991 Foundations of Cogniti1·e Grammar. Vol. II: Descripti\'e Application. Stanford. California: Stanford University Press. 1993 Reference-point constructions. Cogniti\'e LJnguistin 4: 1-38. Morgan, Jerry L. 1978 Two types of convention in indirect speech acts. In P. Cole (ed.). S)•ntax and Semamic.L Vol. 9: Pragmatics. San Diego: Academic Pres.~. 261-280.

Towards a Theory of Metonymy

59

Norr:kk, Neal R. 1981 Semiotic Principles in Semantic Theory. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins. Norvig. Peter. George Lakoff 1987 Taking: a study in lexical network theory. Proc·eeding,f of the Thirtef!llth Annual Meeting of rile Berkeley Linglli.ftic.f Society. Berkeley. California: Berkeley Linguistics Society. 195-206. Ogden, Charles A .. lvor A. Richards 1923 n1e Meaning of Meanin1;: A Stud.\" on the Influence of Language upon nwu1;ht and of rhe Science of Symbofi.tm. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Radden. GUnter in print How metonymic are metaphor..? In A. Barcelona (ed.). Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroads. Berlin. New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Talmy.leonard 1985 lexicalization patlerns: semantic structure in lexical fonn..\. In T. Shopen (ed.), Language Typofog_v and Syntactic Description. Vol 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 36-149. Taylor, John R. 1995 Ling11istic Ca/egori:arion: Pratotype.f in Ung11istic Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Second edition. Thornburg. Linda. Klaus-Uwe Panther 1997 Speech act metonymies. In W .-A. Liebert et al. (eds.). Discourse and Per.fpecth·e in Cognitive Unguistic.f. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins. 205-219. Tversky. Barbara, Kathl~n Hemenway 1984 Objects. parts and categories. Journal of Experimemal Ps').·cholog_\" 113: 169-193. Tylor. Stephen A. 1978 The Said and the Un.tuid: Mind, Meaning and Cull/Ire. New York: Academic Press. Ullmann. Stephen I 972 Semantics: An lmroductio11 to the Science of Meaning. Odord: Blackwell. Webster's Third New lnrernalional Dicticmary of the EngliJI! Language 1971 Edited by Philip B. Gove. Chicago et al.: Merriam Co.

Speaking and Thinking with Metonymy Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. University of California, Santa Cruz

1.

Introduction

The impulse to speak and lhink with metonymy is a significant part of our everyday experience. Traditionally viewed as just one of many tropes, and clearly subservient in most scholars' minds to the master trope of metaphor. metonymy shapes the way we think and speak of ordinary events and is the basis for many symbolic comparisons in art and literature. Consider, as one example. the French novelist Honore de Balzac. Like many 19th century fiction writers, Balzac provides wonderful examples of metonymic descriptions in which the concrete depiction of some object or person stands for or represents larger objects or domains of experience. For instance, in his novel Pere Goriot. Balzac opens with a long description of a boarding-house owned by Madame Vauquer (Balzac 1951: 33): Madame Vauquer is at home in its ~tuffy air. she can breathe without being sickened by it. Her face, fresh with the chill freshnes~ of the first frosty autumn day. her wrinkled eyes. her cxpres~ion. varying from the convenlional set smile of the ballet-dancer to the sour frown of the dismuntcr of bills. her whole per1>on. in short. pro\lides a due to the boarding-house.just as the boarding house implies the existence of such a person as she is.

The possibility of inferring something about the boarding-house from the description of just a few of the details of Madame Vauquer's face reflects a common metonymic mapping whereby the person stands for an object or place. Beyond this, as Balzac explicitly points out. our understanding of the boarding-house aJiows us via metonymy to recognize something about Madame Vauquer's philosophy of life.

Raymotld W.

62

Gibb.~.

Jr.

Our ability to draw metonymic inferences. where we infer whole from parts or parts from wholes. is one of the special characteristics of the poetics of mind (Gibbs 1994). My purpose in this paper is to briefly note some of the important features of metonymy in speaking and thinking.l have four specific aims. First. I illustrate some of the diversity of linguistic forms for metonymy in everyday and literary language. Second. I demonstrate how metonymy is not just a type of language but reflects a significant form of human cognition. Third.l describe the importance of psychologically-real processing principles for a cognitive theory of metonymy. Finally. I argue that metonymic principles underlie several other linguistic phenomena, especially conversational implicature. indirect speech acts. and colloquial tautologies.

2.

Distinguishing metonymy from metaphor

At first glance. metaphor and metonymy appear to be similar. because each describes a connection between two things where one term is substituted for another. Scholars disagree as to whether metonymy is a type or subclass of metaphor (Genelle 1980: Levin 1977: Lodge 1977: Searle 1979) or whether metaphor and metonymy are opposed because they arc generated according to opposite principles (Bredin 1984: Jakobson 1971). Yet metaphor and metonymy can best be distinguished by examining how each makes different connections between things. In metaphor. there arc two conceptual domains. and one is understood in terms of another. For example, in (I)

The creampuff was knocked out in the boxing match.

the term c:reampuff metaphorically refers to a boxer because the boxer is viewed as 'soft' and easy to defeat. On the other hand. metonymy involves only one conceptual domain, in that the mapping or connection between two things is within the same domain. or within the same domain matrix (Croft I 993). Thus. in (2)

We need a new glove to play third base.

the term t1 new ghJ\'e refers to a person who would play third base in a baseball game. One general, but not perfect. rule-of-thumb for distinguishing metaphor from metonymy is to employ the 'is like,' or 'X is like Y' test. If an expression makes sense in the 'X is like y· form, then it has metaphorical meaning. For instance. the sentence The boxer is like a creampuffmakes sense_ and thus is

Speakiflg ami Thit1kit1g with Metonymy

63

metaphorical. while Tire third basema" i.'i like a glow? does not. and thus is metonymic. Metonymy is related to synecdoche in that both tropes exploit the relationship of larger entities and lesser ones. Synecdoche substitutes the part for the whole as in (3)

They·re taking on new hands down at the factory.

where the term hat~ds stands for men. Metonymy also substitutes the token for the type or a specific instance. property. or characteristic for the general principle or function. For instance. in (4)

They prefer the bullet to the ballot box.

the term bullet represents armed conflict. while ballot box refers to peaceful democratic processes. Some linguistic expressions involve both synecdoche and metonymy. For instance. consider (5)

General Schwartzkopf had 400.000 fatigues at his command.

Herefatiglle.'i. the specific type of uniform worn by common soldiers, refers to soldiers. reflecting a part-whole relationship. or to warlike power. reflecting a token-for-type relationship. Moreover. many linguistic statements reflect both metaphor and metonymy (cf. Goossens 1990. this volume). A significant challenge for scholars is to discover some of the complex ways that metonymy interacts with other tropes, both within individual statements and across longer stretches of discourse.

3. The diversity of metonymy One problem with most discussions of metonymy is that metonymy is too often seen as simply one kind of linguistic phenomenon. But metonymy is quite diverse and exhibits itself in a variety of forms in language. Of course. metonymy is best known for its place in literature such as in Balzac's novels. David Lodge (1981) has argued that it is possible to map the literary history of the 20th century based on the movement back and forth between literature that is essentially metaphoric (e.g .. James Joyce and T.S. Eliot) and literature that is basically metonymic (e.g .. W .H. Auden and George Orwell) (cf. also Pankhurst. this volume). Moreover, our ability to understand poetry depends

Raymo11d W. Gibbs, Jr.

64

critically on the recognition of metonymy. For instance, consider Shakespeare's Othello where lago pledges total loyalty to Othello. He calls upon the stars to Witness, that hen: lago doth give up The execution of his wit. hands. heart, To wrong'd Othello's scrvi~:c~ (Ill. iii 465-466)

Wit. hand.<>. and heart are metonyms that stand for the familiar tripartite division of a human into mind, body. and soul. Like realistic novelists or biographers. poets. such as Shakespeare. rely heavily on synecdochic detail to evoke scene. characters, and cultural experience. The poet Philip Larkin. to take another example, evokes the past glories of race horses in the following stanza from "At Grass.. (Larkin, 1988). Silks at the start: against the sky Numbers and parasols: outside. Squadrons of empty can;, and heat. And littered grass: then the long cry Hanging unhushed till it subside To stop·press columns on the street.

Our understanding and appreciation of this poem depends on our ability to think metonymically. to recognize. for example. that .~i/b at the start refers to jockeys atop their mounts at the starting gate. Students often experience difficulty understanding poetry precisely because they cannot figure out the referents of metonymic terms. Although metonymy is primarily studied as a mode of discourse in literature and poetry, metonymy is an ubiquitous feature of everyday speech. One of the most important discoveries in the study of metonymy comes from cognitive linguistic analyses into the systematic character of metonymy in conventional language. Consider the following expressions: (6) (7) (8) (9)

Washington has started negotiating with Moscow. The White House isn't saying anything. Paris has dropped hemlines this year. Hollywood is putting out terrible movies.

These examples do not occur one by one. but reflect the general cognitive principle of metonymy where people use one well-understood aspect of something to stand for the thing as a whole or for some other aspect of it (Lakoff and Johnson I 980). All of the above expressions relate to the general

Speaking am/ Thinking with Metonymy

65

principle by which a place may stand for an institution located at that place. Thus. a place like Wall Street stands for the particularly salient institutions located at that place. namely the stock exchange and major banks. Various metonymic models in our conceptual system underlie the use of many kinds of figurative and conventional expressions (e.g .. OBJECT USED FOR USER. CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED. THE PLACE FOR THE EVENT, and THE PLACE FOR AN INSTITUTION LOCATED AT THAT PLACE).

Finally. there are thousands of ordinary verbs that are based on metonymy. Consider the main verbs in the following sentences (cf. Dirven. this volume): ( 10) (II) ( 12) ( 13) ( 14) (15) (16)

The librarian shelved the books. The scientists eyeballed the data. The maid dusted the table. The pilot du.~ted the crops. He boycotted the story. We can't stomm:h any more anicles on metonymy. Hetoedtheline.

People experience little problem interpreting these expressions, despite the fact that, for example. one could, in principle shelve books by hitting books with shelves. But our deep background knowledge of the typical relationship that shelves have with books allows us to figure out exactly which salient act one docs when shelving books. eyeballing data. and so on. In other cases. we can create novel verbs based on our knowledge of particular actions associated with specific people. called 'eponymous verbs.' Consider the case of a friend of mine who noted about another person we both knew (17) He's going to OJ his way out of his marriage. I immediately understood the rather complex meaning of this expression by drawing a metonymic inference about the salient acts associated with OJ (for the famous American football player and murder suspect OJ. Simpson). namely that one can murder one's wife to get out of the marriage (a comment that my friend intended sarcastically about the other person we knew). Again. our ability to think metonymically 'on the fly' enables us to make immediate sense of these novel phrases.

66

Raymotld W.

Gibb.~.

Jr.

4. Evidence on metonymy in thought Although metonymy is clearly understood as a special linguistic form. or trope, metonymy is now widely recognized as a particular type of mental mapping. again whereby we conceive of an entire person. object, or event by understanding a salient part of a person. object, or event (see Croft 1993; Fauconnier and Turner. this volume: Feyaerts. this volume: Radden and

KOvecses, this volume). Under this view. people think in metonymy. as illustrated in the way we use and understand language. and engage in a variety of cognitive tasks.

Some of the best evidence in support of metonymic models of thinking comes from experimental studies of prototype effects in cognitive psychology (Lakoff 1987). Extensive research demonstrates that participants judge certain members of categories to be more representative of those categories than other members. For instance. robins are judged to be more representative of the category BIRD than are chickens, penguins. and ostriches. Desk chairs are judged to be more representative of the category CHAIR than are rocking chairs. beanbag chairs, barber chairs. or electric chairs (Rosch 1978). The most representative members of any category are termed prototypical members and these often 'stand for' or represent the entire category. To give another example. consider some prototype effects for the MOTHER category (Lakoff 1987). People in our culture view housewife-mothers as better examples of mothers than non-housewife-mothers. This effect is due to metonymic reasoning where a salient subcategory (e.g .. 'housewife mother') has the recogniu.-d status of standing for the whole category. Various other subcategories of mother such as 'stepmother,' 'birth mother.' 'adoptive mother,' ·roster mother." and 'surrogate mother' deviate from the central case of the prototypical housewife-mother stereotype. The housewife-mother metonymically stands for the entire category of mothers in defining how people reason about mothers and motherly behavior. Everyday dialogue provides additional evidence for the conceptual basis of metonymy. Consider the following example: ( 18) A: How did you get to the airport? 8: I waved down a taxi. Speaker 8 means to infonn the listener A that 'I got to the airport by hailing a taxi, having it stop and pick me up, and then having it take me to the airport.' How does a listener infer that 8 actually found a taxi to take him to the airport?

Speaking and Thinking with Metonymy

67

Traveling from one place to another involves a series of actions where people find some vehicle to take them to the desired location, get into the vehicle. ride in it to the destination. arrive and get out. An idealized cognitive model (ICM) of this series of events includes the following (lakoff 1987): Preconditions: Embarkation: Center: Finish: End point:

You You You You You

have access to the vehicle. get into the vehicle and start it up. drive (row, fly. etc.) to your destination. park and get out. are at your destination.

It is conventional to use one part of this idealized model to evoke the entire model. Thus. people can simply mention either the Precondition. Embarkation, or Center to stand for the entire series of events that make up the travel scenario.ln the above brief exchange, speaker B mentions a Precondition (i.e .. getting access to a taxi by hailing one) to represent the entire travel scenario. Other possible responses that might work equally well specify other parts of the idealized model. such as: (19) (20) (21) (22)

I drove my car. (Center) I called my friend. (Precondition) I hopped on a bus. (Embarkation) I stuck out my thumb. (Embarkation)

By metonymically mentioning a subpart of the travel scenario to stand for the whole scenario, speakers get listeners to draw the right inference about what is meant. It is interesting. and significant. to note that many cases of conversational implicature arc understood via metonymic reasoning. Consider the following brief exchange from Grice ( 1975: 51): (23) A: Smith doesn't seem to have a girlfriend these days. 8: He ha.'i been paying a lot of visits to New York lately. Grice argued with this example that what B said only expresses part of what he meant by his utterance. Successful interpretation of B 's remark demands that the listener make this inference about what the speaker meant. Grice called this kind of inference a conversational implicature. Thus. although B simply stated a fact about Smith's recent visits to New York. B likely intended for A to understand that Smith has. or may have. a girlfriend in New York. Following Grice. we can say that B implicates the proposition just mentioned by

68

Raymfmd W. Gibbs, Jr.

virtue of what is said along with various background knowledge and beliefs shared with A. including maxims of conversation that participants in talk· exchange are mutually expected to observe (Grice 1975). In many instances, our ability to draw implicatures requires us to see how a speaker's utterance metonymically refers to a whole organized sequence of activities. Thus. suggesting one part of a likely scenario (e.g .• men often go to other places to be with their girlfriends) activates a whole scenario and implies other unstated parts (e.g .. that Smith actually has a girlfriend these days). Different psychological research. unknowingly, provides good evidence that people reason metonymically when understanding language. Consider the following pair of utterances (Gemsbacher 1991): (24) I need to call the garage (where my car was being serviced). They said they'd have it ready by five o'clock. Note that there is a plural pronoun in the second sentence. but not in the first. But antecedents of pronouns must agree in person, number. and case. Nonetheless. Gemsbacher ( 1991) has shown that people rate a'\ more natural and arc faster to understand the above pair of sentences with 'conceptual anaphors' than they do pairs of sentences with appropriate singular pronouns. This is so because the singular entity mentioned (garage) metonymically stands for some conceptual set (the people working at the garage). Plural pronouns are natural and easy to understand precisely because of our ability to think metonymically about people. places. events, and objects. We sec that the mention of the subpart metonymically stands for the whole event frame. Finally. our ability to conceptualize of people, objects. and events in metonymic tenns provides the basis for much of the way we reason and make inferences during text processing. Many studies show that people metonymically infer entire sequences of actions having only read some salient subpart in a story. Consider the following simple tale. (25) John was hungry and went into a restaurant. He ordered lobster from the waiter. It took a long time to prepare. Because of this he only put down a small tip when he left. When people hear this brief episode, they presumably activate their knowledge of the activities nonnally <~ssociated with eating in a restaurant and use this information to fill in the gaps to make the story coherent. This type of

Speakiflg ami

Thit~kiflg

with Metonymy

69

knowledge. called scripts by Schank and Abelson ( 1977). consists of welllearned scenarios describing structured situations in everyday life. A number of experiments show that people automatically infer appropriate script-related actions when these are not explicitly stated (Abbott. Black. and Smith 1985: Bower. Black, and Turner 1979: Gibbs and Tenney 1980; Graesser, Woll. Kowalski. and Smith 1980). This work on script-based text processing illustrates the importance of metonymic models in everyday thought. People's knowledge in long-term memory for coherent. mundane series of events can be metonymically referred to by the mere mention of one salient subpart of these events. We see that mention of the subpart metonymically stands for the whole event. In some versions of script theory, the most salient part of the script (i.e., its metonymic representation) is explicitly encoded as a 'scriptheader' in memory such that activation of the header accesses all the information encoded in the entire script (cf. Schank and Abelson 1977). This inference of a whole script from mere mention of a part facilitates our being able to assume unstated propositions about what writers mean and to make meaningful sense of seemingly anomalous and disconnected statements in texts. I have reviewed only a small part of the linguistic and empirical evidence demonstrating how people conceptualize of many people, objects, and events via metonymy which allows individuals to reason appropriately about what speakers intend to communicate. It is especially important to recognize how many of the linguistic examples I have considered here would not be normally judged as instances of metonymy by linguists and literary critics. Nonetheless. people utilize metonymic schemes of thought to reason appropriately about what is meant. In this sense. then. we must acknowledge a distinction between processing metonymic language (e.g .. understanding utteranr.."Cs like Paris has dropped hemlit~es this year) and metonymic processing of language (e.g .. understanding the gaps in narrative by inferring some rich source of information. like a script. from the simple mention of some salient part of that knowledge).

5.

How metonymy is understood

I have described some of the forms that metonymy takes in language and suggested that people understand many kinds of language. and not just metonymy per !>e. because of their ability to think metonymically about people.

70

Raymond W. Gibb.f, Jr.

objects. and events. Let us now consider in a bit more detail how it is that people understand metonymic language. Consider the following metonymy (Nunberg 1979): (26) The ham sandwich is gelling impatient for his check. Understanding this expression requires that a process of 'sense creation· must operate to supplement ordinary 'sense selection: One model. following the Gricean view. assumes utterances like (26) violate maxims of truthfulness. This 'error recovery model' assumes that sense creation is initiated only after conventional meaning has been found to be in error. On the other hand. a 'concurrent processing model" claims that sense creation and sense selection operate simultaneously, perhaps in competition with each other. To test these models. Gerrig ( 1989) had participants read stories ending with statements like The horse race was the most popular e\•ent. In conven· tional context. this phrase referred to a standard race between horses. In innovative context, this phrase referred to a unique situation where snails competed in a race that was the length of King Louis's horse. Readers took roughly the same time to read this statement in both kinds of context. Thus, the error recovery model seems incorrect. Instead. readers seem to be creating and selecting metonymic meanings at the same time (i.e .. the concurrent processing model). So. understanding metonymy does not require that listeners realize that this expression violates specific maxims of conversation. The ability to quickly employ both sense selection and sense creation processes is nicely illustrated in the following passage. One of the best examples of metonymy I know of comes from the American satirist Enna Bombeck, who once wrote in one of her newspaper columns about her daughter's difficulties finding a suitable roommate (Clark 1983). Consider what Bombeck says as she quotes her daughter: We thought we were onto a steam iron yesterday, but we were too late. Steam irons never have any trouble finding roommates. She could pick her own pad and not even have to share a bathroom. Stereos are a dime a dozen. Everyone's got their own sy~tems. We've just had a streak of bad luck. First. our Mr. Coffee flunked out of school and went back home. When we replaced her. our electric typewriter got married and split. and we got stuck with a girl who said she wa.~ getting a leather coat, but she just said that to get the room.

It seems odd. literally speaking. to talk about steam irons having trouble finding roommates or electri<: typewriter.~ getting married. Traditional theo-

Speaking and Thinking with Metonymy

71

ries of parsing will fail to handle many of these phrases even though we. for the most part, can ea
3.

Bombcck wants readers to recognize that she is using electric typewriter to denote an object used for typing. Bombeck wants readers to recognize that her a'isertion about getting married is the kind of thing that she has good reason to believe that on this occasion we can readily compute uniquely on the basis of our common ground such that this kind of thing has something to do with electric t)pel\'riten. Bombeck wants readers to recognize that she is using electric typewriter to denote the individual (one of her daughter's roommates) who owns an electric typewriter.

By inferring the lowest subgoal. (I). from the fact that the speaker is using the noun elecrric typewriter. we are to infer the next subgoal up. (2). from the fact that electric typewrirer is being used in connection with the verb married. Finally. we can infer the highest subgoal, (3). from our understanding of (2). Key among this list of goals is the assumption that the listener/reader will interpret the speaker's current utterance given what the speaker and listener at that moment mutually know (called their 'common ground'). Only by considering our common ground with Bombeck can we recognize when eleurk typewriter is to be construed as having a 'stands-for' relationship in which certain people. places, events, and things may stand for other people. places. events. and things. Many of the inferences required to understand what is meant in this pa<;.sage are fundamentally metonymic in that each of these contextual expressions requires readers to understand that the object mentioned (e.g .. steam irmu. stereos. Mr. Coffee. and elt•ctric typel,..-riter) stands for the

72

Raymot1d W. Gibb.f, Jr.

people who

OWO

these items (i.e.,

PEOPLE FOR THEIR POSSESSIONS).

Many

contextual expressions. but not all, will be readily understood when interpreted

in light of conventional metonymic mappings such as OBJECTS USED FOR nu~IR L'SERS, PEOPLE FOR THEIR POSSESSIONS, THE PLACE FOR AN INSTITUTION LOCATED ATTIIAT I'LACE. or PRODUCER FOR THE PRODUCT. These

'stands-for' relationships

reflect pre-existing patterns of metonymic thought that substantiaJiy constrain, in many cases.the kinds of inferences listeners are likely to draw to make sense

ofwhal speakers say. Some psycholinguislic research has shown that people can dctennine without great difficulty the appropriate referents for metonymic expressions in discourse (Gibbs 1990).

6.

Indirect speech acts and colloquial tautologies

Metonymic reasoning. where people infer wholes from parts and parts from wholes. is also important in acl'i of reference where speakers make requests of

listeners (cf. Panther and Thornburg. this volume). Consider the following

types of requests: (27) Can you shut the door? (28) I'd like the door shut. (29) Would you mind shutting the door?

(30) How about shutting the door? (31) It's geuing cold in here. Indirect speech acts arise when speakers plan a social transaction in which the speaker exchanges something with the appointed addressee for the desired information or action. To do this, the speaker must first assess what reasons there

may be for the addressee not to give the desired information. The speaker will then formulate an uuerance to deal with the greatest potential obstacles. By picking out salient obstacles, even ones that are more apparent than real. speakers ao;;sume that listeners can metonymically infer the entire sequence of actions that must occur for the transaction of goods to be completed. Research from both naturalistic and laboratory studies has shown that people formulate their requests to best specify the main potential obstacles for addresses (francik and Clark 1985; Gibbs 1986). Thus, in a situation in which the ability of the addressee to lend the speaker a blue sweater is salient, speakers prefer the expression Ca" you po.~sibly let~d me your blue sweater?

Speaking ami Thinking with Metonymy

73

over the request Would you mind lendi11g me your blue sweater? Reading-time experiments show that readers arc faster to comprehend indirect requests that specify addressees· projected obstacles (Gibbs 1986). Thus. what makes some indirect requests 'conventional' is the appropriateness of the sentence form in matching the obstacles present for addressees in a social context. These studies emphasize the importance of metonymic reasoning in people's use and understanding of indirect speech acts. Another version of metonymy that has become quite colloquial for speakers is to refer to aspects of people, objects. and events through tautological statements. Consider the following brief exchange between two parents (Gibbs and McCarrelll990). A mother asks her husband Did the childre11 ever clean up their rooms? The father shakes his head and responds Well. boys will be boyJ. At first glance. the father's response to his wife's question seems nonsensical. The phrase Boys will be boys is true by virtue of its logical form alone (as a nominal tautology) and. superficially. contributes no new information to the conversation. But the utterance Boys will be boys is readily interpretable and most listeners would agree that the father intended to convey a particular meaning. something like 'boys will be unruly and it is often difficult to get them to do what you want.' Nominal tautologies are found with surprising frequency in everyday speech. literature (e.g .. Gertrude Stein's famous line A rme i.~ a rose is a rose), and advertising (e.g .. Motor oil is motor oil). These expressions are metonymic because the speaker refers to a general category (e.g., boys) to refer to specific salient parts or attributes of that category (e.g .. unruly behavior) (Gibbs and McCarrell 1990). Interpreting colloquial tautologies requires metonymic reasoning. This ability to infer pans from whole also underlies the interpretation of expressions like (32) The New York Times is late for the President's press conference. where the speaker means that a reporter representing the New York Times is late for the news conference.

7.

Conclusion

My main argument in this paper has been that metonymy is a significant part of how people ordinarily think and speak. Although certain individuals, such as great poets and writers. often create spectacular poetic examples of me-

74

Raymotld W.

Gibb.~.

Jr.

tonymy. virtually all people are quite familiar with many conventional fonns of metonymy in both language and thought. I have suggested that several sources of evidence. ranging from work in linguistics to psycholinguistics. highlight the idea that people experience little difficulty thinking of, speaking of. and understanding metonymic language. At the same time, evidence from cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics raises the possibility that people also reason mctonymically (i.e .. inferring wholes from pacts and parts from wholes) to solve problems. and draw conversational inferem.:es about language that, strictly speaking. is not metonymic. The proper study of metonymy surely extends beyond looking at metonymic language alone. In this sense. the approach I advocate in this chapter extends beyond looking at metonymy as a lexical phenomenon, and seeks to discover the ways that patterns of metonymy in language reflect patterns of metonymic thought. More generally. my review of research from cognitive psychology suggests that different fonns of metonymic thinking can be found in experimental situations which did not set out to study metonymy at all. I believe that psychologists. and others. would benefit greatly from examining a wide variety of research findings in light of possible links to metonymic thought. The enthusia'im exhibited for metonymy in this article, and in the contributions of this volume. is encouraging and should greatly boast metonymy's reputation from its present status as a secondary trope below mctaphor.l must, nonetheless. raise a cautionary note. Linguists. philosophers.literary theorists. and psychologists. like myself. must be careful not to assume that a direct link exists between metonymy in language and metonymy in thought. People may, for instance. comprehend conventional metonymic language without necessarily drawing metonymic mappings given our experience with many familiar fonns of metonymy. Additional psycholinguistic studies must be conducted to detennine how and when conceptual metonymies arc inferred when understanding both metonymic and non-metonymic language. Furthermore. metonymy scholars must be careful not to assume that particular mental processes must operate for metonymy to be successfully understood. Thus. many scholars have incorrectly conjectured that metonymies can be understood only after some violation of a Gricean maxim has been recognized. an idea that is not consistent with the available psycholinguistic data. Most generally. as cognitive scientists from a variety of disciplines move forward to further pursue the topic of metonymy, we must acknowledge the limitations of our respective methodologies in drawing conclusions about the role that

Speaking and Thinking willr Metonymy

75

metonymy has in thought and language. What is certain, though, is that cognitive scientists from all disciplines must provide appropriate theoretical explanations for how people speak and think with metonymy.

References Abbou, Valerie. John B. Black. Edward E. Smith 1985 lbe representation of scripts in memory. Journal of Memory and Language 24: 179-199. Balzac, HonorC de 1951 Perc Goriot. Trans. M. Crawford. Hannondsworth: Penguin. Bower,G .. J. Black. T. Turner 1979 Script~ in memory for texts. Cognitil•e Psyc·hology II: 177-220. Brcdin, Hugh 1984 Metonymy. Poetk.f Toda,1· 5:45-48. Clark. Herbert H. 1983 Making sense of nonce sense. In F. Aores d'Arcais. R. Jarvella (eds.), The Proce.u of Undf'r.flanding Language. New York: Wiley. 297-332. Clark, Herbert H .. Richard J. Genig 1983 Understanding old words with new meaning. Journal of Vt?rbal Learning and Verbal Beha1•ior 22: 591--608. Croft, William 1993 The role of domains in the interpretation of metaphors and metonymies. Cognith·e Lingui.uics 4: 335-370. Fr.mcik. Ellen P .. Herbert H. Clark 1985 How to make requests that overcome obstacles to compliance. Jmmwl of Memory· and lAnguage 24: 560-568. Geneue. Gerard 1980 Narrati1·e Discourse: An E.uay in Method.lthaca. NY: Cornell University Press. Gemsbachcr, Monon Ann 1991 Comprehending conceptual anaphors. Lt.mguage a11d Cogtriti1·e Procr:.uf's 6: 81-105. Gerrig.RichardJ. 1989 The time-course of sense creation. MemtiT\' and Cognition 17: 194-207. Gibbs, Raymond W .. Jr. · 1986 What makes some indirect speech act~ conventional. Journal of Memory and lAnguage 25: 181-196. 1990 Comprehending figurative referential descriptions. Journal of £\perimental P.f_n·hology: Uaming, Memory. all(/ Cognition 16: 56--66. 1994 The Paf'ticJ ofMilld: Fig11ratil'e Th(mght, Ltmguage. a11d Understa11ding. New York: Cambridge University Press. Gibbs. Raymond W .. Jr .. Nancy S. McCarrell

76

Raymo11d W. Gibbs, Jr.

1990 Why boys will be boys and girls will be girls. Journal of P.fyclmlinguiJtic Re.rearch 19: 125-145. Gibbs. Raymond W .• Jr., Y. Tenney 1980 The concept of scripts in understanding stories. Journal ofP.f)"dwlinglli.uic Research 9: 275-284. Goossens. Louis 1990 Metaphtonymy: the interoo~.ction of metaphor and metonymy in expressions for linguistic action. Cogniti1•e Linglli.ftic.f I: 323-340. Graesscr, Anhur C., S. Woll, D. Kowalski, D. Smith 1980 Memory for typical and atypical actions in scripted activities. Journal of Etperimemal Psychology: Human L£orning and Memory 6:503-515. Grice. H. Paul 1975 Logic and conversation.ln P. Cole, J. Morgan (eds.).Sy11tluand Semantics, Vol. 1: Speech Acts. New York: Academic Press. 41-58. Jakobson, Roman 1971 Two types of language and two types of aphasic disturbances. In R. Jakobson (ed.). Selected Writings. Vol. 2. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 239-259. lakoff. George 1987 Women, Fire. a11J Dangermu TI1ings: Wlwt Categories Re1·eal about the Mind. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Lakoff. George, Mark Johnson 1980 Mewphor.f We Live By. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Larkin. Philip 1988 Philip Lnrkin: Collected Poems. Edited with an introduction by A. Thwaite. London: Faber. Levin. Samuel R. 1977 The Semantics of Metaphor. Baltimore:: John Hopkins University Press. Lodge. David 1977 Thl! Modes of Modern Writing. London: Arnold. 1981 Modernism, antimodemism. postmodemism. In D. Lodge, Working with SITIICturali.fm. London: Routledge and Kcgan Paul. 3-16. Nunberg. Geoffrey D. 1979 The non-uniqueness of semantic solutions: polysemy. Ling11istic.f and Phi· losoph,\· 3: 143-184. Rosch. Eleanor 1978 Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch, 8. Lloyd (cds.). Cognition and Categori::ation. Hillsdale. Nl Erlbaum. 28-49. Schank, Roger C .. Robert P. Abelson 1977 Scripts, Plans, Goal.f, and Under.uandi11g: All Inquiry into H11111011 Know{. edge Stmctllres. Hillsdale, Nl: Ertbaum. Searle. John 1979 Metaphor. In A. Ortony (ed.), Mt!taphor w1d TI!OURIIt. New York: Cambridge University Press, 92-123.

Metonymy and Conceptual Integration

Gilles Fauconnier University of California, San Diego

Mark Turner University of Maryland

1.

Conceptual integration

'Conceptual integration' -often called 'blending' -is a ba~ic and pervasive mental operation. It allows us to 'blend' two mental spaces to create a third that is not merely a composition of the first two but instead has emergent structure of its own. A typical conceptual integration network includes two input spaces. a blended space. and a generic space. The generic space has the structure taken as applying to both inputs. All conceptual integration networks have a partial cross-space mapping between the two input spaces and selective projection from the inputs to the blended space. The blended space inherits some structure from the inputs and also has emergent struciUre of its own obtained by elaboration and pattern completion. Detailed analysis of the mechanisms of conceptual integration and of the optimality constraints that guide it is provided in Fauconnier and Turner (1994. 1996. 1998a. 1998b). Turner and Fauconnier (1995, 1998. in print). Coulson (1996. 1997), Turner (1996). and Fauconnier ( 1997). Conceptual integration operates in many areas - everyday meaning construction. conceptual change. metaphor and analogy. scientific discovery. countcrfactual reasoning. grammar. action. and

78

Gilles Fauconnier and Mark T11mer

design. In the present paper. we restrict ourselves to the interaction of blending with metonymy. First, here arc some informal examples of the process. Coulson (1997) considers the case of children in a dormitory inventing a game. based on basketball. in which a player must throw a crumpled ball of paper into a wastepaper basket. This new game is a blend. One input is partial knowledge of basketball and the other input is the dormitory situation with crumpled-up paper. a wastepaper ba-.kct. and so on. The partial mental mapping connects a ball to crumpled paper. a basketball basket to a wastepaper basket, and players to children. In the new game. as defined by the blend. some properties are projected from the 'basketball' input (throwing the projectile into the receptacle). others are projected from the 'donnitory' input (the basket is on the floor. not high up in the air: the ball has specific properties of crumpled paper: etc.). Many other properties of the game will emerge from available aspects of the context (particular ways of throwing. conventions for scoring. fouls. etc.). The generic space is the more schematic situation of throwing some object into a container. It is taken as applying to both of the inputs. This very simple example illustrates central properties of conceptual integration. in particular the fact that it is creative (a new activity. different from basketball and different from throwing paper. is produced) and underspccificd (there is more than one way to project from the inputs and more than one possible emergent structure). Now consider a more intricate linguistic example. In the 1990s, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher - known as the Iron Lady - was popular in the United States. It was common to encounter claims that what the United States needed was a Margaret Thatcher. The response we are interested in is: "But Margaret Thatcher would never get elected here because the labor unions can't stand her." Thinking about this counterfactual requires bringing Margaret Thatcher together with American electoral politics. We must imagine Margaret Thatcher running for president in America. and we must develop enough structure to see the relevant barriers to her being elected. Crucially. the point of this rea'ioning ha" nothing to do with the objective fact that it is impossible for Margaret Thatcher to be elected, since she is not a citizen of the United States. is already head of state. has no interest in running, and so on. The speaker's point. right or wrong. is that the United States and Great Britain arc, despite the obvious similarities. quite different in their cultural and political institutions and will not choose the same kinds of leaders. This point is made by setting up a situation (the 'blend') that has some

Metonymy and Collcepmallntegration

79

characteristics of Great Britain. some characteristics of the United States, and some properties of its own. For example, in the blend. someone who has not yet been president but is running for president has already had the sort of experience with labor unions that can only be had by a head of state in Britain. The two inputs in this example are the political systems of the United States and Britain. linked by a generic frame of Western democracy. The novel integrated structure. or blend, has Margaret Thatcher campaigning in Illinois and Michigan and hated by the American labor unions. In that blend, Margaret Thatcher is defeated. Because the blend is connected to the rest of the network. the relevant inferences project back to the inputs. yielding the all-important conclusion that the speaker is stressing the disanalogy between the United States and Britain. amounting to the claim that the United States may need a certain kind of leader. but the intricacies of its electoral politics make it impossible for that kind of leader to be elected. There is a rich tradition of looking at counterfactual examples a'\ simply constructing a possible world that differs minimally from the existing world. but it is clear that this view is inadequate in the case of the Thatcher counterfactual, since these kinds of minimal changes (making Thatcher an American citizen. changing the Constitution to allow her to run, and so on) are beside the point. In the seemingly quite different rcaJm of action and technological design. consider computer interfaces. The most successful interface is known as the 'desktop' interface. in which the computer user moves icons around on a simulated desktop. gives alphanumeric commands. and selects options from menus. (The user also selects by pointing and points by manipulating a mouse or by pressing keys.) The reason for the success of the interface was that novices could immediately usc it at a rudimentary level by recruiting from their knowledge of office work. interpersonal commands. choosing from lists. pointing. and moving and handling objects. The entire activity is coherent and integrated. once learned. The user of the interface manipulates an integrated structure that derives some of its properties from different inputs - office work. commands. menus. bodily motion - but that has considerable emergent structure of its own - pointing and clicking buttons arc not at all part of office work or choosing from lists, having two-dimensional little squares disappear under other linlc squares is not part of giving commands or of putting sheets of paper into folders. The user is manipulating this computer interface neither as a set of separate modules nor as a template for constructing elaborate conscious analogies. but instead as an integrated fonn with its own coherent

80

Gilles Faucotmier ami Mark Tumer

structure and properties. From an 'objective· point of view, this activity is totally novel - it shares no physical characteristics with moving real folders, and it is novel even for the traditional user of a computer who has issued commands exclusively from a keyboard rather than from a mouse. Yet the whole point of the desktop interface is that the integrated activity is immediately accessible and congenial. The rea'\on. of course. is that a felicitous blend has been achieved which naturally inherits. in partial fashion, the right conceptual structure from various inputs. and then cuhivatcs it into a fuller activity under pressure and constraints from reality and background knowledge. 1 Conceptual structure contains many entrenched products of previous conceptual integration. In the Thatcher example. integration happens quickly and looks unremarkable. In the desktop example. there has been laborious design to develop an eflicient blend involving novel computer hardware. but once that blend was developed. users could work with it quickly, automatically. and productively.

2.

Metaphor and metonymy in blends

2.1. ANGER IS HEAT It is possible to lind in even the most studied of basic metaphors examples of blending and of the way blending interacts with metaphor and metonymy. Zoltcin Ktivccses (1986) and George Lakoff (1987) have provided an impressive analysis of metaphoric understanding of anger. This analysis reveals the required mapping between folk models of heat and folk models of anger. In this mapping. a heated container maps to an angry individual. heat maps to anger, smoke and steam (products and hence signs of heat) map to signs of anger. explosion maps to extreme. uncontrolled anger, and so on. This is renected in conventional expressions: He wa.~ sleaming. She was filled wilh anger. 1 had reached /he boiling pobll.l was filming. He exploded./ blew my lop. Kovecses and Lakoff also note the important basis for this metaphor in the folk theory that anger has physiological effects like increased body heat, increased blood pressure, agitation. and redness in the face. The metonymy linking emotions to their physiological effects allows expressions like the following to refer to anger: He gets luJ/ under /he collar. She was red with

Metonymy and Conceptual Integration

81

anger./ almost burst a blood vessel. The ANGER IS HEAT metaphor provides one set of counterparts. The metonymy linking emotions to their physiological effects provides another. When combined, they provide the following system of correspondences: Table I. Concepmal corre.tpondenceJ in the ANGER linkin~: emotion.t to phy.fiolo~:ical effects

IS

HF.AT metaphor and in the me1o11ymy

TARGET

SOURCE 'physical events'

'emotions·

'physiology'

container h
person anger sign of anger show extreme anger

person body heat perspiration. redness acute shaking. loss of physiological control

boiling point

highest degree of emotion

This system of counterparts can be elaborated in various ways: (I)

God, he was so mad I could sec the smoke coming out of his ears.

The cars are now mapped onto an orifice of the container in the source. Notice that in this example, and also in the more conventional ones like He exploded, the description of the emotion is presented as a physiological reaction of the individual. Something is happening to his body, e.g., smoke is coming out of his ears. But the 'content' of this physiological reaction is not obtained through the metonymy in the target. It comes from the 'source' (which concerns physical evenL'i pertaining to heated containers - smoke coming out. explosion, etc.). The phrase the smoke coming out of his ears does not describe anything directly in the source (where smoke comes out of inanimate containers and vessels like kettles. because they are on fire or because they are so hot that their contents are burning) or in the target (where people's physiology does not include internal combustion). There is selective projection from both inputs. leading to a novel frame in the blend: there are no ears in the source domain and no smoke in the target domain, but the organizing frame of the blend has both and they interact. In the conceptual integration network model. KOvecses' and Lakoffs important observation about the correlation of physiological reactions in the target domain with the source domain of heat and fire can be reOected

Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Tumer

82

theoretically. 'Explosion' cannot be a physiological reaction in the source (where there is no physiology) or in the target (where there is in fact not much heat), but it can be a physiological reaction in the blend. where a body can explode from anger.

In the blended space, we lind the people and their emotions projected from a target input space: we find the corresponding physiological reactions projected either from the source input of physical heat. explosion and boiling, or from the target input of the body physiology linked to the emotions. In the conceptual integration network that is ba.,cd on the ANGER IS HEAT metaphor. the following set of counterparts results: Tahfe Z. Carre.fpolldenceJ ;, the M'GER fS HF.ATconccptual integr.l.lion network SOURCE

BI.E.'ID

Input Space I 'physical events'

Blended Space

Input Space 2 'emotions·

Input Space 3 'physiology'

container orifice heat steam/smoke explode

person/container cars/orifice heat/anger steam/smoke explode

person anger sign of anger show extreme anger

person ears body heat perspiration, redness acute shaking, Joss of physiological control

boiling point

boiling/highest degree of emotion

highest degree of emotion

If the blend stood by itself. it could not be interpreted in the real world because anger docs not produce smoke or explosion. But in the network model, the blend remains linked to the inputs. A sentence like He was so mad I co11ld .{ee the smoke coming 0111 of his eon directly identifies the blend, not the inputs, but inferences in the blend can be projected back to the target input spaces. For example, in the blend. we infer from the smoke's coming out of his ears that he is extremely angry and showing physiological signs of it, because in the blend, smoke is a physiological sign of great anger. We project that inference back to lhe 1arge1 input space: he is extremely angry and showing physiological signs of iL (We do not project back to the target input space the specific nature of the physiological signs in the blend. where. e.g .• physiology includes emitting smoke.) Of course, the structure of the blend itself is highly dependent on the conventional metaphorical mapping of heat to anger. In addition. we find an explanation for the ac1ual grammatical structure of

Metonymy and Cmrcepmallmegration

83

an expression like He exploded; I could !iee the smoke coming out of his ear,\·. Specifically, we sec how vocabulary that picks out apparently incompatible conceptual elements from quite different domains (smoke should not go with coming out of Iris ears since smoke comes from fire but people cannot have fire inside them) can be used in a clause to evoke a 'single integrated scene.· That single integrated scene is available in the blend, even though it is unavailable from the source or the target. The blend provides a frame (seeing somebody in an abnormal and dangerous state, with corresponding emotions, etc.) not available in the source or target. Next. the blend can have a life of its own, not fully determined by the inputs. So. we can say, with some hyperbole: (2)

God. was he ever mad. I could sec the smoke coming out of his cars - I thought his hat would catch fire!

It is easy to sec how this works: in the blend. the hat on fire is a sign of even greater heat. hence even greater anger. emotions. etc. But there is no counterpart for the hat in the source: the elaboration is in the blend, where the frame of somebody on fire or at lea•;( very hot is used (not the boiling kettle anymore), and the existing mapping operates toward the source (greater heal) and toward the target (greater anger. but also greater loss of control. greater social danger, etc.). The analysis by KOvecses (1986) and Lakoff (1987) unden;cores the essential role of physiological reaction metonymies in the formation of the metaphorical system for emotions. The metonymic correspondem.-es are in the target - body heat. redness. etc. These map directly onto the blend. in the sense that in the blend (but not in the target), the physiological reactions are smoke, explosion. etc. This is done by mapping hot (in the target. for people. with a certain physiology) to hot in the source (for containers with quite different physical properties), and then from source to blend, where the new set of physiological reactions is constructed.

2.2. The Grim Reaper The representation of death as The Grim Reaper. a sinister skeleton-like character holding a scythe and wearing a cowl, is a complex integration (cf. Turner and Fauconnier 1995). The Grim Reaper arises by blending many spaces: (I) a space with an individual human dying: (2) a space with an

84

Gille.\' Fauconnier and Mark T11mer

abstract paucm of causal tautology in which an event of a certain kind is caused by an abstract causal element e.g .. Death causes dying. Sleep causes sleeping. Lust causes lusting. Sloth causes laziness. and so on (not surprisingly. these abstract causal elements arc frequently represented in world literature as blended anthropomorphic agents with special causal powers): (3) a space containing a prototypical human killer: and (4) a space with reapers in the scenario of harvest. This complex blend allows non-counterpans to be combined by exploiting metonymic connections in the inputs. For example. in the cross-space mapping, there is no counterpart connection connecting skeleton to reaper . .~keleton to killer, or .~keleton to death. But death as a cause is associated with skeleton as an effect. so there is a metonymic relation between them. There· fore. the reaper. death. the killer. and the skeleton can be combined in the blend. In the blend. the killer·reapcr is combined with the skeleton in a way that fits the frame in the blend (the killer-reaper is a person and a person has a skeleton). Similarly. death in the input space of human dying is metonymically associated with priests: priests arc stcrcotypically present at an event of death. and their institution is concerned with death and afterlife. This metonymy makes it possible to give The Grim Reaper the attire of a priest even though. in the cross·space mapping, reapers and priests are not counterparts. The me· tonymy between death and priests in the input is projected to a PART fOR WHOLE metonymy in the blend. The cowl. for example. pulled over the head of The Grim Reaper at once evokes both religious connotations of death and the impression of death as mysterious. unknown. solitary. and set apart from daily events in human society.

3.

Metonymy and optimality principles for blending

In Fauconnier and Turner (1998a) we offer evidence for a set of optimality principles on integration networks. These optimality constraints interact and compete. Here, we can do no more than stipulate them and give some illustration of their relation to metonymy: Integration: The blend must constitute a tightly integrated scene that can be manipulated as a unit. More generally. every space in the network should have integration.

Metonymy and Concepwallntegration

85

Web: Manipulating the blend as a unit must maintain the web of appropriate connections to the input spaces easily and without additional surveillance or computation. Unpacking: It is optimal for the blend alone to allow reconstruction of the inputs. the cross-space mapping. the generic space, and the network of connections between all these spaces. Topology: For any input space and any element in that space projected into the blend. it is optimal for the relations of the element in the blend to match the relations of its counterpart. GlJ()(/ rea.wm: All things being equal. if an clement appears in the blend, there will be pressure to find significance for this element. Significance will include relevant links to other spaces and relevant functions in running the blend.

There is a last optimality constraint that is the crucial one in a discussion of metonymy .It concerns the projection of metonymic links from inputs to the blend: Metonymy projection comtraint: When an clement is projected from an input to the blend and a second element from that input is projected because of its metonymic link to the first. shorten the metonymic distance between them in the blend. We saw above that blending can combine non-counterpart elements from a single input. such as death. the cowl of the priest. and the skeleton of the person who has died. The metonymic distance is large between abstract death as the general cause of all deaths and the cowl worn by a certain kind of participant in a ritual associated with particular deaths. But in the blend. the metonymic connection is direct: the cowl is the attire of death. Similarly, the skeleton that remains after the corpse has decomposed is a distant product of death. But in the blend,the skeleton is actually a body part of death. indeed the body part that provides the form of death. The fact that metonymy is preserved at all in such blends can be viewed a'i a consequence of 'topology': a metonymic relation in the input corresponds to a metonymic relation in the blend. The 'metonymy projection constraint' additionally specifics that metonymies get tighter under projection. Satisfying the metonymy projection constraint is not a matter of blindly projecting metonymic links. The internal integration of the blend provides opportunities for some acceptable metonymies but not for others. Since death

86

Gille.\' Fcmcmmier am/ Mark T11rner

is an active person in the blend, and active persons are known to have skeletons (although they arc not nonnally visible), the PART FOR WHOLE metonymy connecting a body to its skeleton becomes available as the counterpart of the distant metonymy in the input. Tightening metonymies as they are projected from input to blend can help optimize integration in the blend by

creating a tighter. more easily manipulated unit. Now consider some additional cases that show how metonymy projection operates. Consider a cartoon illustration of a report that a powerful newspaper company has succeeded in its hostile takeover of a weaker automobile company and will now sell off the automobile company's assets. thereby eliminating the company. The cartoon shows a giant screw-type printing press smashing a car. Obviously, the printing press represents the newspaper company. the car reprcsenb the automobile company. and the smashing of the car by the printing press represents the elimination of the automobile company by the newspaper company. This cartoon is a metaphorical blend: input one has a stronger object and a weaker object: input two has the contest between the two companies. The cross-space mapping is the basic metaphor that maps stronger objects destroying weaker objects to winning and losing. The strong heavy object is mapped onto the powerful newspaper company: the weaker object is mapped onto the weaker automobile company. But in the blend. we find the printing press as the strong heavy object and the car as the weak object. This is an efficient exploitation of metonymic connections: the printing press is a salient instrument of producing newspapers and cars are the salient products manufactured by automobile companies. In the input with the companies. the printing press is not an instrument of destruction. but it docs have a forcedynamic function that can be associated with a car-smashing machine of the sort used in recycling automobiles. In the blend. the printing press is fused with both the company and the car-smashing machine. What is going on here? The blend must achieve three goals. First. given that the cartoon is a visual representation. the blend must be concrete and specific. Second. it must fit the frame that has the stronger object and the weaker object. Third. these objects in the blend must be properly connected to the companies in input two. The companies in input two. being abstract. cannot in themselves provide the corresponding concrete elements in the blend. The weaker and stronger objects in input one are concrete but not specific. and so cannot in themselves provide the corresponding specific elements in the blend. But we can exploit internal connections in the inputs to

Metonymy and Concepwallntegration

87

make the elements in the blend adequate. The printing press and the car are concrete. specific objecLo; associated metonymically with the companies, and they can be fit into the frame of the stronger object destroying the weaker object. They fit this frame in part because a printing press is already framed as having force-dynamic structure that would make it capable of destruction even though it is not intended for destruction. and in part because we are familiar with car-smashing machines. In the blend. the two clements arc simultaneously (I) the two concrete. specific objects; (2) a stronger object destroying a weaker object; and (3) two companies. Clearly. such a blend is creative. Not just any connections will do. There has to be a search for elements that simultaneously satisfy a number of constraints. The printing press and car have topology in the blend (namely. the printing press crushes objects and the car is the patient of an event of crushing) that their counterparts in input two do not have (the press in input two is an instrument of making newspapers. not of crushing, and the car is a salient product of the automobile company. not a patient of an event of crushing). Additionally. the printing press and car in input two have no counterparts in input one. Interestingly, the printing press and the car, which arc the elements that did not project their input-topology to the blend, end up being the only objects in the blend. (That is. in the input with the companies. the printing press prinL<; and the car is a working, undamaged product; but this topology docs not project to the blend: in the blend the printing press docs not print, but rather crushes. and the car is not a working. undamaged product. but a crushed object.) The cartoon is remarkable because it is a case where integration and topology are maximized by recruiting special metonymic connections in input two. Because the topologies of strong and weak object on the one hand and competing companies on the other will match only at a very abstract level. we find that in addition to the companies. objects metonymically connected to them are projected to the blend in a way that closely matches and elaborates the topology in input one of strong and weak objects. This example emphasizes that conceptual projection is a dynamic process that cannot be adequately represented by a static drawing. Once the conceptual projection is achieved, it may look as if the printing press has always corresponded to the stronger object and the car to the weaker. But in the crossspace mapping. the printing press and the car play no role; they have no counterparts in input one. Rather, the cross-space counterparts are stronger object and newspaper company. weaker object and automobile company.

88

Gille.\' Faunmnier ami Mark T11mer

Under metonymy projection from input two. the printing press in the blend becomes the counterpart of the stronger object in input one. and the car in the blend becomes the counterpart of the weaker object in input one. This example also shows that identity is metonymy of zero distance. The metonymic relation in input one between company and commercial product is transformed into identity in the blend, where the printing press is identically both a printing press and the newspaper company to which it is. in the input. metonymically related as an imarumcnt. Suppose the cartoon now contained the newspaper magnate operating the printing press to sma'>h the car. which is being driven by the car magnate. Here the blend structure becomes elaborate through the recruitment to the blend of an additional adversaries-with-instruments frame in which adversaries fight with opposing instruments, and in which the winning adversary has the superior instrument. Now the printing press and car in input two have counterparts in the adversaries-with-instruments frame: in input two. the printing press is a symbol of a capacity for productivity that is an instrument of corporate competition, and the car is a product that is an instrument of corporate competition: these instrumento; in input two are the counterparts of the instruments in the adversaries-with-instruments frame. Now.the topology of opposing instruments in the blend matches the topology of opposing instruments in the adversaries-with-instruments frame. This frame has the useful property of aligning superiority of instrument with superiority of adversary. In this case. we see that exploiting special internal connections in input two makes it possible to recruit a frame that makes topology much stronger in the blend structure.

4.

Metonymy in an integrated theory of cognitive phenomena

It is curious that blending - a fundamental. indispensable cognitive operation, routinely employed in a variety of domains. commonly involved in other cognitive phenomena that have received extensive analysis - should have received so little systematic attention in the study of cognition and language. The routine and largely unconscious nature of blending may have helped it escape scrutiny. The many well-known spectacular blends - sirens. mermaids. chimerae. space aliens. cybernetic organisms. marionettes. Bambi may have made blending seem merely exotic.

Metonymy and Concept11allntegration

89

Given the structural and dynamic mechanisms of blending and the optimality constraint'> that guide it, metonymy plays an important role in constructing conceptual integration networks. Therefore. the various basic cognitive phenomena that are varieties of conceptual integration - e.g .. framing. provisional category extension. analogy. metaphor. the construction of counterfactual spaces, aspects of grammar - will interact systematically with metonymy according to unifonn principles.

Note We are p:ra1cful1o Dan Gruen for poinling outlhis eKamplc.

References Coulson, Seana 1996 The Menendez Brolhers virus: analogical mapping in blended spaces. In A. Goldberg (ed.). Conceptual Stmcturt:, Di.fcmtrse, and Wnguage. S1anford: Cenler for the Study of Language and lnfonnation. 67-81. 1997 Semanric Uup.f: The Role of Framt>·Jhifting and Conct>plual Blt>nding in Mt>aning Construction. Ph.D. dissertation, UC San Diego. Fauconnier. Gilles 1997 Mapping.f in Thought and Languagt'. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fauconnier, Gilles. Mark Turner 1994 Conceptual projection and middle spaces. UCSD Cogniti,·eScit:llce Technical ReptJrt 940/. San Diego. [Available from http:l/cogsci.ucsd.edu and from http://www.wam.umd.etlu!-mturn) 1996 Blending as a central process of grammar. In A. Goldberg (ed.), Discmtrse and cognition: Bridging the Gt~p. Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and lnfonnalion. 113-130. 1998a Conceplual inlegralion networks. Cogniti1·eSciena 2212: 133-187. 1998b Principles of conceptual integration. In J.-P. Koenig (ed.), Di.Kottr.fe and Cognitio11: Bridf(itlg the Gap. Vol. II. Stanford: Cenler for lhe Study of Language and Infonnation, 269-283 KOvecses, Zoltlin 1986 Metaphor$ tJ/ Anger, Pride 011d Lo1•t>: A Lexical Approoch to the StrUl'tllre of Concepts. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins. Lakoff. George 1987 Wome11. Fire. and Dullf(eroll.f Thillf(S.' Wltut Cut~:gorie.~ Re1•eaf ahof/1 the Milul. Chicago: The Universily of Chicago Press.

90

Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner

Turner. Mark 1996 The Literary' Mind, New York: Oxford University Press, Turner, Mark, Gilles Fauconnier 1995 Conceptual integration and formal expression. Ml'taphor and Symhofit· Acti\·itr 10/3: 183-203. 1998 ConcePtual integration in counterfactuals. In J.-P. Koenig (ed.). Di.~course and Cognitio11: Bridging the Gap, Vol.//. Stanford: Center for the Study of language and Information, 285-296. in print A mechanism of ucativity. Poetic.~ Today.

Distinguishing Metonymy from Synecdoche

Ken-ichi Seta Osaka City University

1.

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to address the essential nature of metonymy in relation to some other closely related concepts. particularly ·synccdochc.' 1 Despite the amount of interest shown in metonymy during the past two decades. no precise definition of metonymy ha.<; been offered yet: most definitions arc so vague that they might also cover other concepts such as synecdoche. metaphor. irony. etc. A typical definition of metonymy may be: A stands forB with which A is closely associated. This definition is hardly revealing because it may also hold true for metaphor and possibly any other rhetorical terms where meaning lransfcr takes place. What ncc.-ds to be clarified. however. is the meaning of 'closely associated' itself. (Note that 'stands for: unless otherwise restricted. will not characterize. even in part, metonymy either, nor perhaps anything else.) The following definition of metonymy (I) is meant to be broad enough to cover the rapidly expanding range of metonymy. linguistic or non·linguistic. and. at the same time. be narrow enough to exclude any other related concepts: (I)

Metonymy is a referential transfer phenomenon based on the spatiatemporal contiguity as conceived by the speaker between an entity and another in the {real) world.

The statement in (2) is an abbreviated fonnulation of (I): (2)

Metonymy is an E{ntity)-related transfer.

Ken-ichi Sew

92

Several terms in (I) and (2) need explanation: among others, 'E-related' or 'Erclation.' ·contiguity.' and 'entity.' In addition to these. there are two more terms that arc often used in defining synecdoche and metonymy: 'whole' and 'part.' Both these terms, which will inevitably come into play with the above

notions, also need to be precisely defined because their ambiguity has often caused confusion and misunderstanding in the discussion of metonymy and synecdoche. Not only this. but the ambiguity has contributed to the general supposition that synecdoche is a (mere) subtype of metonymy. It will be argued in this paper that synecdoche should be independent of metonymy. Traditionally. synecdoche is defined as a relation in which a part stands for a whole or a whole stands for a part and a genus for a species or a species for a genus. I will reserve the notion of 'synecdoche' to a C(ategory)-related transfer. while the notion 'metonymy' will be applied to an E(ntity}-related transfer. Synecdoche. as used in this paper. will be defined as: (3)

Synecdoche is a conceptual transfer phenomenon based on the semantic inclusion between a more comprehensive and a less comprehensive category.

This definition of synecdoche is abbreviated as: (4)

Synecdoche is a C(ategory)-related transfer.

Section 2 argues that the distinction between partonomy and taxonomy provides a firm ba'\is for the disambiguation of 'whole' and 'part.' and. ultimately. for the all-important distinction between E-relation and C-relation. Section 3 concentrates on the notion of 'contiguity.' the most important. but ambiguous. term used to characterize metonymy. Section 4 defines the notion of 'entity.' and identifies three different types: spatial,temporal. and abstract. Section 5 describes various types and subtypes of metonymy according to the three kinds of entities and other norms. Finally. Section 6. after discussing synecdoche briefly. concludes that synecdoche. which is C-rclated. should be independent of metonymy, which is E-related.

2. The ambiguity of 'whole' and 'part' It is of vital importance to distinguish the two different ways in which the terms 'whole' and 'part' can be (and. in fact. have been) used. Their theorcti-

Distinguishing Metonymy from Synecdoche

93

cal disambiguation is particularly urgent because (a) the whole-part relation in a properly restricted sense will tum out to be one of the major subcategories of theE-relation: (b) traditionally synecdoche has been regarded as a subtype of metonymy that is characterized by 'whole' and 'part': (c) the fact that there is no consensus about what the terms denote, at least in the discussion of metonymy and synecdoche. may ca'\t doubt on the validity not only of traditional studies but of more recent cognitive linguistic treatments of them as well; and (d) there arc reasons to believe that the disambiguation of the terms may prepare the way to a proper understanding of how our mind works in general in the interpretation of what is happening in and around us. Curiously enough. outside the discussion of metonymy and synecdoche. the ambiguity of the whole-part relation has been rather clearly recognized in terms of taxonomy and partonomy (mcronomy) a-. in Tversky and Hemenway (1984). Cruse (1979. 1986), and Tversky (1990). Although there remain problems about the demarcation and the characterization of taxonomy and partonomy (for more discussion. see Wierzbicka 1984). the basic distinction between the two is clear enough: taxonomy is a 'kind-of relation while partonomy is a 'part-of relation. In other words. taxonomy is the relation between a more comprehensive category and a less comprehensive one. while partonomy is the relation between an entity and its parts. such as the relation between a table and its legs. Nevcrtheless.these two relations can be confused. Consider Figures I and

2:

(.:\(.:\ ~~ Fif.II/Te 1. Ta:rmwmy (C-rdmitmJ

Fif.IIITI! 2. Partmwmy (£-rd(llitm)

Ken-ichi Seto

94

Figure I shows an example of taxonomy: a fir is a kind of tree. Figure 2 represents an example of partonomy: an ann is a part of lhe body .2 Partonomy is based on real-world constitutive relations: taxonomy is concerned with mental (re)classifications of categories. Whereas we have some. if not absolute. freedom to taxonomically (re)classify categories. we are not free to change constitutive relations in the world because the world is there just a.'i it is. Thus. the referent of an arm is. wholly or partially. connected physically with the body of which it is a part. On the other hand. firs could conceivably be reclassified outside the tree category at any time. without affecting the physical constitution of the world. These two classification systems are so obviously different from each other that it seems hardly possible to confuse them. However. the confusion is frequent. Why'! This is simply because the representations in Figures I and 2 (or any variations of these) look the same. Therefore. it might seem possible to say that firs are a part of the category 'tree,' as one says that an arm is a part of the body. And. in fact. not only might it seem possible. but the English language (and perhaps any other language) does permit speaking of the fir class as being a (proper) part of the tree category. But it should not be overlooked that Figure I (or a tree-like variation) is a mere diagrammatic representation of a class relation of which there is no corresponding form in the world. This is a spatial metaphor. Since there is no natural form given to the fir class. when we speak of it as being a part of the tree category, we are thinking metaphorically. In contrast, Figure 2 reflects the real world body-ann relation. Figure I depicts (metaphorically) a category; Figure 2 reprcsems a formal relation. To avoid theoretical confusion. the uses of 'whole· and 'part' should be restricted to partonomy, i.e., the whole-part relation in the world. The point is: partonomy is based on the perception of contiguity in the real world while taxonomy is based on the conception of categorical hierarchy (i.e .. hyponymy) in our mind. This clear-cut distinction between partonomy and taxonomy is missing in recent cognitive linguistics discussion. despite the cognitive significance of drawing a sharp line between the two modes of knowledge. For example. Lakoff and others define metonymy as follows: (5)

a. "We are including as a special case of metonymy what traditional rhetoricians have called synecdoche. where the part stands for the whole ( ... ]" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 36).

Dis1ing11ishing Metonymy from Synecdoche

95

b. "(A] part (a subcategory or member or submodel) stands for the whole category - in reasoning. recognition. etc. Within the theory of cognitive models. such cases are represented by metonymic models" (Lakoff 1987: 79). c. '"Metonymy is used primarily for reference: via metonymy. one can refer to one entity in a schema by referring to another entity in the same schema'" (lakoff and Turner 1989: 103). (5a) shows that Lakoff and Johnson ( 1980) follow the traditional definition of synecdoche, which. according to them. is a special case of metonymy. But. why so ·speciar? So far as the examples dealt with there (e.g .. We need some new blood ill the organi;:,ation). the whole-part relation can be interpreted as an ordinary referential relation. i.e .• partonomy. (5b). on the other hand, tells us that Lakoff extends the notion of metonymy to a categorical relation, and (5c) shows that metonymy is. again, meant to be a referential relation, but with the cautious qualification of 'primarily'! This uncertainty in defining metonymy in (5a)-{5c) may be resolved if a clear distinction between the referential relation and the categorical relation is made. To recognize partonomy as distinct from taxonomy would be a first step towards a properly restricted sense of metonymy.

3.

Partonomy and contiguity

The next step is to extend the notion of metonymy. since the referential transfer based on partonomy is just one kind of metonymy. Therefore it is necessary to clarify the sense of 'contiguity' introduced in (I) because partonomy is just one of seveml contiguous relations. Again. the tenn ·contiguity' has been used in a number of different ways. The best way to proceed is to delimit the notion of contiguity to 'spatia-temporal contiguity between two entities in the world.' 3 Contiguity in this sense covers a wider range of relations than partonomy. For instance. what is the relation between a kettle and the water in it? The water is not part of the kettle, but is just in contact with it. Yet. tire kettle can refer to 'the water' in it in sentence (6): (6)

The kell/e is boiling.

This example shows that contiguity is a notion wider in range than the wholepart relation.

Ken-ichi Seto

96

There is another reason for adopting contiguity as part of the characterization of metonymy and for rejecting the traditional concept of synecdoche as in (5a). Compare (7a) with (7b): (7)

a. Little Red Riding Hood b. Bluebeard

Both are metonymies. but there is a difference.lin/e Red Riding Hood refeP.> to the girl who always wears the hood so named. The hood is not a part of the girl. but just in contact with her. 8/uebeard. on the other hand, refers to the man who kills his wives. The beard is a real part of him. not just a false beard that he might wear. It is clear that the difference is factually negligible and theoretically trivial. Nevertheless. traditional rhetoric would judge that (7a) is a metonymy because the hood is not a part of the girl, and that (7b) is a synecdoche because the beard, a part. stands for the killer. the whole. Consider another example in (8):

(8)

Your tloJe is running.

Your 11o.~e refers to the mucus running out of the nose. The question is: is the mucus a part of, or just contiguous with. the nose? Here we run up against a difficulty. We arc obviously in an area of fuzziness, where a clear-cut distinction between part and non-part can no longer be upheld. All this shows that the traditional distinction between metonymy and synecdoche is not only unsustainable but also theoretically unrevealing.

4. What is an entity? Just as crucial in the definition of metonymy is the characterization of 'entity.· An entity is simply defined a" a bounded thing in the cognitive-linguistic sense of a 'bounded region' (cf. Langackcr 1987). For our purposes. one may distinguish three major kinds: spatial, temporal. and abstract things as in (9): (9)

a. spatial entities (a dog. a rh·er) b. temporal entities (a" earthquake. c. abstract entities (power. beauty)

wa.~lrinx)

'Spatial entities' are understood here in the sense of physical entities which have spatial extension. Thus a prototypical spatial entity is a thing that is

Dis1ing11ishing Metonymy from Synecdoche

97

bounded by a clear contour.located in a three-dimensional space. and is easy to recognize as an organic whole such as a person. a dog. a bicycle. etc. This last condition presupposes that the object is relatively constant as to its perceptual properties. Some physica1 entities have less clear contours, such as mountains, rivers. cities and countries. but usually we also recognize them as discrete objects by imposing a contour on them. sometimes physically (e.g .. by building a wall around a city) and sometimes mentally (by drawing a partly arbitrary and partly motivated line separating one thing from another). And it is known that our eyes can see a contour where there is no physical contour. The fact that we usually sketch the outline first when drawing may have something to do with this. Contours which we impose on temporal entities are metaphorical in nature. A temporal entity is bounded by a temporal frame. The term 'frame.' itself metaphorical. should give what occurs (or 'takes place') in time a beginning and an end, making it possible to capture the event as an identifiable whole. Given the status of entities. framed events can behave more or less like spatial entities: one temporal entity can thus be next to (contiguous with) another on the temporal axis. just as one spatial entity can be next to another in the three-dimensional world. Suppose. for example. an earthquake occurs. closely followed temporarily by another. Each is conceptualized as a unique event with its own beginning and end so that it is possible to say that there were two earthquakes in a row. The fact that we can enumerate temporal entities. such as earthquakes, is grammatically parallel to the enumcrability of ordinary spatial entities. An event. as a temporal entity. may have its own internal structure: preceding situation ('whatever precedes the following process"). process. and ensuing situation ('whatever comes out through the preceding process'). The following sentences show how the process-sense of washing in (lOb) extends metonymic ally to the senses of preceding and ensuing situations. respectively. in (lOa) and (IOc): (10) a. I saw a pile of dirty washing in the comer. (preceding situation) b. I must get the washing done tonight. (process) c. Hang the washing out to dry. (ensuing situation) This is a case of metonymic extension because. according to my theory. washing in the sense of process. which is assumed to be basic. is. as a temporal entity. contiguous with the other two temporal entities, which are the referents

Ken-ic·hi Sew

98

of the preceding and the ensuing situations.~ In the case of a temporal metonymy we are dealing with the referential transfer between two contiguous temporal entities. The third kind of entity is abstract. An abstract entity is typically a salient property of a thing. Although there are some properties perceptuaJiy so vivid (e.g .• 'red." 'redness.' 'height') that it may hardly seem right to call them abstract. the point here is that they can become abstract entities in the sense that they arc not bounded by either space or time. The existence of abstract entities is. a" it were. borne out by the ontologicaJ metaphor. For example. it is only through metaphorical reification that power in (II) can be the complement of has: (11) He has such a power.

What is important about the status of the three kinds of entities discussed above is that they exist. whether concrete or abstract. as individuals, not as a category. And when metonymy is in operation. these entities come into play as individuals. one referring to another which is in contiguity in the world with the referring entity. This is the essence of what the E-related transfer means.

5.

Kinds of metonymy

The above discussion has shown that there are different kinds of metonymy. depending not only on the kinds of entities (spatial. temporal. and abstract), but also on the types of reference. i.e., the way one entity refers to another (whole-part, container-contents. process-result. etc.). Figure 3 is a simplified diagram of major types of metonymy classified in terms of E-re lations. metonymy (E-n:lillion)

wholc-

~untaincr-

adjoccncy

whole

P"' sUbo.!\'CIII

FiRure 3: Types ofmetOIIJIII)'

prcr;cding-

object·

l'r:ISuing

property

Disting11ishing Metonymy from Synecdoche

99

In what follows, we shall sec how each major type organizes its subtypes and how they are related with one another.

5.1. Spatial entities The spatial metonymy provides a model for other types of metonymy. It has two major subtypes: the whole-part and the container-contents type. The whole-part subtype is represented by the relation between a physical object and its components such as the body and its parts. The typical example of the container-contents subtype is seen in the relation between a kettle and the water in it.

5.1.1. The wHOLE-PARr type There are quite a number of whole-part relations to be found in the external world. Metonymy exploits them. taking one entity (a whole or a part) to refer to another (a part or a whole). However. it is not always the case that all the whole-part relations guarantee a successful metonymy. The question, then. is what kinds of whole-part relations can be good candidates for the metonymic transfer. One can distinguish three major whole-part templates: (12) a. b. c.

(e.g .. a handle i.~ part of a cup) (e.g .. a j11ror is part of a jury) OBJEcr-MATERIAL (e.g., the cup i.~ made of porcelain) OBJEcr-cOMPONENT

ORGANIZATION-MEMBER

Among these whole-part templates, the object-component type. a relation between concrete count nouns. is prototypical. lending itself to metonymic exploitation quite easily: (13) a. The windmill is turning. ('vanes') b. He picked up the telephone. ('receiver') The second subcategory. the organization-member type, is sometimes subject to metonymic transfer: (14) The committee have decided to raise membership fees for nexl

year. (14) is metonymic if committee is to be interpreted to mean 'committee members' as is suggested by the plural verb agreement. The grammatical alternation between The government, who hm·e .. ., are ... and The govemment.

100

Ken-ichi Seto

which has ... , is ... may also be regarded as metonymic. The third subcategory. the object-material type. is slightly different from the other two in that the whole-part relation is partly temporal. Generally. material is processed to become a product (object). Thus the metonymic expression nylons for 'stockings' is potentially temporal just as well as .~tei" (from German Sreingllt 'stoneware. earthen ware') for 'beer mug' is. though materials are often. but not always, obvious in the final products. Here it may be worth mentioning Cruse ( 1986: Ch. 7), which along with Winston et al. (1987) is probably the most penetrating analysis ever made of the whole-part relation. But Cruse leaves some uncertainty with regard to the classification of collectives. He identifies three subcategories: groups (e.g .• tribe). classes (e.g .. proletariat). and collections (e.g .. heap). First. the group category. which corresponds to our organization-member relation. includes: tribe, team, cabinet, committee ,family. orche.ftra. jury. squad. audience. etc. (Cruse 1986: I 75). What is the exact relation between a group and its members? More generally. how is a group internally organized'?5 Let us replace the tenn 'group' with 'organization' because groups are largely restricted to associations of human beings. Thus. a university may be an organization consisting of a definite number of faculties. 6 Clearly. each faculty is part of the university. not a kind of university: the university as an organization and its faculties no doubt stand in a whole-part relation. hence in an E-relation. Although the university-faculty relation is abstract. this is only due to the very nature of organizations. Accordingly. the same level of abstrnctness should also apply to the relations observed in seemingly more human organizations. For instance, a committee usually has an internal structure; it is not an unstructured mass where all the members are simply put together. It may have some subcommittees which are parts of the committee. not kinds of committee. Or a committee may consist of a chairperson, some specially nominated members. and others. who are all partonomically organized just as the human body parts arc partonomically organized. It is for this reason that a special organization member is called the head (of a school. a corporation. a tribe. etc.). and another the right arm. an indication that there is a metaphorical parallelism between a man-made organization and a concrete human body or an organism like a tree. Now we are in a position to answer the original question about the relation between a group and its members. A group is a kind of organization whose internal structure is partonomically built up. and its individual mem-

Distinguishing Metonymy from Synecdoche

101

hers are minimum units of the structure. By a minimum unit it is meant that a constituent member belongs to an organization, not as a person per se, but, rather, as a role unit or a substitutable part. This reasoning may have support from the sense of substitute as in: ( 15) Coming on as a Cameroon.

.mb.~titute,

he scored four crucial goals for

A substitute has the same function a<> spare parts of. say. a motor because both are potential parts of a whole. one for a team, the other for a machine. Although a substitute is a metaphorical part and a motor part is non·metaphorical. the question is not whether a given part is metaphorical or real. but. if metaphorical, what it is compared to and how it is related with the thing to which it is compared. The group-member relation is a metaphorical wholepart, hence. an E·relation. Therefore, the entity·transfer based on the group· member relation or. more generally. the organization-member relation. is metonymy. Still. there may be a certain complication. which brings us to the second of the Cruse's three categories: classes. Cruse (1986: 179) refers to cases where, he supposes, "[a]ny taxonomy can be thought of in part·whole terms [ ... ]a class can be looked on a<> a whole whose parts are its sub-classes:· This is a dangerous step that might jeopardize the very concepts of, and the basic distinction between. taxonomy and partonomy. It has already been seen that the congruency of Figure I and Figure 2 is an illusion. But it may still be worth mentioning the difference between organizations and classes. building on insight gained from the two paragraphs above. so as not to fall victim to superficial similarities in the figures. Figure 4 shows an organization (a European-style university) with subclasses superimposed on its members at the same time. The column represents an organization: a (specific) linguistics depart· ment. The department. which itself is usually a part of a larger organization such as a (specific) faculty, may consist of one professor, three lecturers, and two assistants. They are all parts of the linguistics department. but at the same time each of them belongs to one of the three academic ranks: professor. lecturer, and assistant. These layers represent categories. The professor of the linguistics department is an element of the category 'professor.· The category 'professor.' on the other hand, may belong to a supercategory 'university teacher: It follows. then. that the particular professor has a double function:

102

Ken-ichi Seto

professor

lecturer assistant

university leacher FiRure 4. Or!!a11i:atim1 a11d das.~

one as a part (member) of the linguistics dcpartmcnt.thc other as an clement of the category 'professor.' Therefore. the organization-member relation is a whole-part relation. hence an E-rclalion. but the dass-clcmcnt (or the classsubclDss) relation is. unlike Cruse's supposition. not a whole-part relation, but a C-relation.7 The last of the three categories of collectives is collection. Collections. which are typically inanimate. arc exemplified by heap. forest. wardrobe ("collection of clothcs')./ibrarr ('collection of books'). and so on. Thus the relation between fim'.~t and tree is a collcction-mcmbcr relation. which. in 1um. is a whole-part relation. Allhough it is not our purpose to classify collectives. theE-relation and the C-relation may well offer a clear perspective on the matter. For instance. how is crowd conceptualized? Crowd is a concept fixed with respect to place and time. more specifically. co-presence and simultaneity. Co-presence is equal to spatial contiguity. and simultaneity to temporal contiguity. which. combined together. make the typical case of the E-rclation. Crowd is. then. an E-rclated concept. for persons away from a crowd. either spatially or temporally. arc not part of the crowd. Likewise. mere spectators arc not part of the demonstrators. Herd.flock. and (wolf) pack arc also E-relatcd concepts. In contrast to these. cattle is a C-relatcd concept because a small herd of cows kept away from the main body arc still cattle.~

Dislilrg11ishing Melcmymy from Synecdoche

5.1.2. The

103

CONTAINER-CONTENTS type

The cONTAINER-CONTENTS type is the second major category of the spatial metonymy. The transfer usually goes from the container to its contents. This type is different from the WHOLE-PART type because the container does not refer to the container plus the contents. but only to the contents as far a'\ the reference is concemed.ln the following example, /he clam refers to 'the water' in it: (16) The dam has dried up. The reason why we treat the CONTAINER-CONTENTS type not only independently of the WHOLE-PART type, but also separately from the other types of the spatial metonymy, is that this type, along with the WHOLE-PART type, penetrates deeply within a language and extends widely over languages, a fact that points to the cognitive importance of the category. Again, the example in ( 17) is a typical instance: ( 17) The kelfle is boiling. This sentence is translatable into many other languages word for word." There arc lots of examples of this metonymic type. from the most prototypical down to the marginal. Sentence ( 18) is another typical example: ( 18) He drank three bottles. The entities below arc less prototypical a'\ a container, but still they show the same transfer pattern of reference: (19) a. She (rc)arranged the bookshe/ftdoset. b. The cistern is running over. c. The lec·ture hall burst into laughter. It is important to note that here we are dealing. not with metonymy itself. but with what might be called the metaphor-metonymy complex (MMC) (cf. Goossens 1990). The question of defining the boundary of the CONTAINERCONTENTS metonymy is closely associated with the question of defining the boundary of the CONTAINER-cONTENTS metaphor. The metaphoricity of the 'in'-relation seems higher in the following metonymic example:

(20) The whole village rejoiced. The relation between a village and the villagers is. literally. not containercontents. but, still. the 'in'-relation applies to the pair. When we talk of

Ken-ic·hi Seto

104

negotiations between Washington and Moscow, the same MMC may be in operation (cf. Taylor 1995: 123). The metaphorical 'in'-relation has been well known since Reddy (1979) to be so prevalent in our daily language that it is hard to avoid it (cf. Lindner 1981: Talmy 1983: Herskovits 1986; also Weinrich 1964). Whereas it is beyond the present purpose to investigate the matter, it may be of some help for future study to note a few more marginal examples: (21) a. b. c. d.

Teddy ate the whole plate. I shall ask for questions from the floor. We eradicated TB from the street. The li"e ceased running at four p.m. on account of the heavy snowstorm.

The notion of container may be extended to flat objects like plate and floor, respectively. in (2la) and (2Jb). and perhaps further to .~treet and line in (21c) and (2 Id), respectively. Anyway. it seems that we are leaving lhe CONTAINERCONTENTS metonymy type and entering the miscellaneous category of metonymy that is only characterized by contiguity, or theE-relation.

5.1.3. Other spatial relations There are some recalcitrant examples that will resist a neat classification. For example. what does the pota/Oel· refer to in (22)? (22) Tum down the

potatoe.~.

The phrase must refer to 'the gas under the pan which contains the potatoes.' The potatoes stands in a CONTAINER-CONTENTS relation with the pan containing them. and lhe pan is in contact with the (burning) gas. thus the potatoe.~ is also connected with the gas by contiguity, though indirectly in a chain of metonymies. Another example is: (23) I had to go to the underground streets to find a vacant meter. Strictly speaking, meant modifies the parking space next to the meter. From our viewpoint, the meter metonymically refers to the space adjacent to it. Between the meter and the space is neither a WHOL!::-PART nor a CONTAINERCONTENTS relation; it is a relation only characterized by the spatial contiguity between lhe two entities (for discussion on modification, see Pustejovsky 1995: Pustejovsky and Bouillon 1995). And if Little Red Riditrg Hood is.

Distinguishing Metonymy from Synecdoche

105

strictly speaking, not part of the girl who wears it (sec example (7a)), it must be classified otherwise. together with the following examples: (24) a. The red cap who was on duty last night got drunk. b. He looked at his wrist. "I'd better get back to work." The relative pronoun who clearly indicates that the red cap refers to a person in (24a): in (24b) his wri.ff ought to refer to 'his wristwatch.' These examples may suggest the possibility of setting up a new category of metonymy. something like the possessor-possessed or. perhaps more generally. the CONTROLLER-CONTROLLED type. as some scholars in fact do (lakoff and Johnson 1980; Bredin 1984; Raddcn and KOvccscs.this volumc).l shall not pursue this issue here. Instead. let us briefly consider the implications that the following sentence. perhaps the most famous example of metonymy (Nunberg 1978: 22). may have in our context: (25) The ham sandwich is getting restless at table 20. In a restaurant situation, one waiter might say (25) to another. intending to refer to a customer who ordered a ham sandwich. What is, then, the relation between the customer and the ham sandwich? Is this spatial? In a sense it is; in another it is not. A ham sandwich means primarily something to eat, and its relation with the customer may be spatial even before it is brought to the table. However, a ham sandwich is also a name (fonn) that is conventionally associated with the referent so named (this association may be, again. metonymic as claimed by Radden and KOvecses.this volume). and the name may be functioning in (25) as a kind of label stuck on the customer who ordered the dish. In the latter interpretation. the lrllm .wndwicll in (25) can be a property. in fact. the most salient property in the restaurant situation. that characterizes the customer in question most effectively to a server. Perhaps this is one of the reasons that prompt some scholars to adopt broader definitions of metonymy. Thus Taylor (1995: 1230 suggests that the essence of metonymy resides in the po~sibility of establishing connections between entities which co-occur within a given conceptual structure (and notes that the) entities need not be contiguous. in any spatial sense. Neither is metonymy rcstri~:ted to the act of reference. On this broader view. metonymy tum~ out to be one of the most fundamental processes of meaning extension, more ba.~ic, perhaps. even than metaphor.

Ken-ichi Sew

106

Accepting this broader view of metonymy. however. may come at a cost because it would cloud the issue of distinguishing metonymy from synecdoche, or the E-relation from the C-rclation. Also. it might distract an analyst from the fact that lherc arc definitely recurrent paucms of metonymy. Still. it is true that metonymy is not restricted to the spatial transfer of reference alone. In the next section we shall see some kinds of temporal metonymy.

5.2. Temporal entities Temporal metonymy divides into two categories: one is based on the relation between a whole event and a subevent, and the other on the relation between a

preceding and an ensuing situation. 5.2.1. The type The whole

WHOLE EVENT-SUBEVENT

EVENT-SUBEVEm'

(26) He is

readin~

metonymy is exemplified by:

for the first degree.

ReadiiiR is part of studying, which. again. is {supposed to be) part of being a university student. Readi11~ is a subevent for the whole event of 'being an undergraduate student" in (26). The notions of the whole event and the part event(s) arc a metaphorical extension of the spatial meanings of whole and part the tenn 'event' is meant to be broad enough to include processes. activities, and states of affairs (situations). Thus, in the next example: (27) She can hardly gel out of bed. the subject is in a situation of being hardly able to get out of bed, which. as a subevent. metonymically refers to the whole event of 'being seriously ill.' In contrast, beifl~ up and abour will be a subevcnt of the whole state of 'having recovered from illness.' One further characteristic of the metonymy of this type is that the transfer from the whole to the part seems rare, with most examples restricted to the rART FOR WHOLE kind. This is probably because the subevent is more often perceptually and conceptually salient while the whole event. being abstract.lacks the perceptual salience that the spatial counterpart has. Instead of adding examples of the SUBEVENT FOR WHOLE EVENT type.let US tum to a somewhat different set of expressions which. nevertheless. might be grouped into the same category:

Dislinguishing Metonymy from Synecdoche

107

(28) Semis roared past me, laking lhe curves at fifty. The roar (sound) of the passing semitrailers may be thought of as a subevent of the whole event. i.e., an event accompanying the event of 'passing.· Similarly. hi.u in (29) may be regarded a~ a WHOLE EVEI'ff-SUBEVENT metonymy that refers to lhe whole reporting event: (29) '"Be quiet!" she hissed.

Likewise. it is possible to use metonymically roar. bellow, and shriek. or even nudge ("say with a nudge') as a (makeshift) reporting verb. Relevant to these is: (30) She grumbled all the way up the stairs. In general. the sounds. manners, gestures. etc. that accompany events can all be good candidates for the metonymy of this type.

5.2.2. The type

PRECEDING SITUATION-PROCESS-ENSUING SfTUATION

The PRECEDING-ENSUING type of metonymy is processual: (31) I felt fiercely proud of my mother for s1anding up for her righteous neighbors. The preceding event of slandiug up, which literally means just 'rising to an upright posture,' is often (but not always) a prerequisite for doing some activity (the following event). Thus standi11g 11p in (31) metonymically implies that the molher did something positive for her righteous neighbors. The referential relation between the preceding event and the ensuing event. however. seems to be more complex than this example may suggest. Figure 5 shows that the basic structure of the processual temporal metonymy is. in fact. tripartite. consisting of (a) a preceding situation. which by implicature may be interpreted as causal. (b) a process. and (c) an ensuing situation, which. again by implicature. may be interpreted as resullant:

Ken-ichi Seto

108

(•)

pra:edng~

(iii)

situation~

t

(ii)

(iv)

ensuing situation

(vi)

Figure 5. Te11'1'oral mewnymy

As the arrows in Figure 5 show. there are six different routes available for a metonymic transfer: (i) PRECEDING SITUATION TO PROCESS, (ii) PROCESS TO PRECEDING SITUATION, (iii) PROCESS TO ENSUING SITUATION, (iv) ENSUING SITUATION TO PROCESS, (v) PRECEDING SITUATION TO ENSUING SITUATION, and (vi)

Among them, the transfers from process to the preceding situation and from process to the ensuing situation are particularly frequent as is shown in what follows. The preceding situation means whatever precedes the process. and the ensuing situation means whatever comes out through the process, especially products and (new) slates. As to the preceding situation. four major factors need to be recognized: (a) material, (b) agent.(c) instrument,and (d) place. Thus the prototypical preceding situation involves an agent who (intentionally) docs something somewhere. using some material and some instrument. Keeping all this in mind.let us now tum to specific transfer patterns of temporal metonymy. (i) PRt:Cl.:OING S/Tl!AT/ON TO PROCESS. This transfer pattern is illustrated by the sentences in (32): ENSUING SITUATION TO PRECEDING SITUATION.

(32) a. He took off the uniform at last. b. Mrs. Djiak splJoned coffee into the pot.

Taking off the uniform in (32a) could metonymically mean 'retiring from an organization': it describes an event preceding that of retiring. Likewise, to open one·.~ purse could mean 'to spend money: Spoon in (32b) is a denominal verb. Clark and Clark (1979) examine denominal verbs and note that the instrumental verb, of which spoon is an example. is the most frequent and productive type, followed by locatum, location, goal. and agent verbs. These verbs can all be (re)interpreted as metonymic because, for example, spoon.

Distinguishing Metonymy from Synecdoche

109

which is an instrument as a noun. means as a verb a process ('to put coffee into the pot') in which the instrument is involved (cf. Dirven. this volume). (ii) PROCESS TO PRtXIWtNG SffUATION. This transfer pattern typically involves dcverbal nouns such as .mpplies, allurements,toothpick and walk in the following sentences: 10 (33) a. The only grocery stores are holes in the wall that also sell beer. liquor. and school supplies. (material) b. There are a lot of allurement,{ in big cities. (agent) c. The bartender chewed on a toothpick. (instrument) d. The Milford Track is the finest walk in the world. (place) Also derived nouns such as invitation belong to this group: (34) Have you sent out the im•itatimu· yet?

biVitations refers to 'invitation cards' (instrument) that arc used in inviting people (process). Another subtype of (ii) is the case of washing (process) referring to 'clothes that need to be wa-.hed' as in (lOa). The basic semantic function of -ing is assumed to indicate processes taken holistically (cf. Langacker 1991: 26). (iii) PROCESS TO f:NSVINCi SITUATION. This type is also productive: (35) a. b.

I carried the sheaf of printouts to a crowded table in the periodicals room. Anyone who came to work with a three-day growth, shoulderlength hair. and a dirty sport jacket hanging over jeans would be instantly slung into a black hole.

Printouts is a conversion from the corresponding verb. and growth is a derived noun; both mean the outcome of a particular process. Another subtype of the PROCESS TO RESULT type is characterized by the -ing-fonn: unlike the -ing subtype in (ii). it works the opposite way, from process to result: (36) My furni.{hing.f are Spartan gleanings from police auctions and resale shops. If we add more common examples like painting. lettering. clipping.etc. to this class. it will expand quickly. (iv) ENSUING srrVATION TO PRoct;ss. Regular examples of this class are found in dcnominal verbs such as to cash, to cripple. to group,etc. They refer

Ken-ichi Seto

110

hack. as verbs, to certain processes through which the corresponding nouns result. Sometimes it is difficult to decide which of the two senses involved, the one of result or that of process. is more basic. For example . .\'tatement is ambiguous between the result sense ('what is stated') and the process sense {'the process of stating'), knowledge is ambiguous between 'what is known' and 'the knowing of it,' perception is ambiguous between 'what is perceived' and 'the perceiving of this,' and so on. This phenomenon was originally referred to by Ogden and Richards (1956 [ 1923): 134) as '•utraquistic subterfuge." The same kind of ambiguity is observed in: (37) a. The building took a long time. (process)

b. The buildi11g is not old. (rcsuh) There seems to be no systematic way of deciding which sense is to be given priority for building or some other instances of the process-result ambiguity (cf. Wells 1977: Sorensen 1990; Warren 1995). By contrast. if, in an answerto the question of whether someone was angry or not. (38) is given: (38) He slammed the door very hard. then the questioner would reason that the person was very angry. It may also be taken as a case of the RESULT TO PROCESS metonymy. an instance of metonymic reasoning, though it must be admitted that the distinction between the RESULT TO PROCESS type and the RESULT TO PRECEDING SITUATION type is not very clear. (v) PRECEDING SrfUATION TO ENSUING .m'UATION. This metonymy involves the transfer from an earlier stage to a result Depending on the kinds of the earlier stage (material. agent. instrument. and place). there are four subcategories. The MATERIAL TO RESULT metonymy is exemplified by: (39) I squeezed her shoulder gently and offered to make her .wme eggs. Some eggs (material) will mean. for example. an egg dish like an omelet

(result). This type. given appropriate contexts, provides a lot of examples: linen ('sheets." 'towels." etc.). sih•er ('cutlery'), gla.fs ('drinking vessel'). glanes ('pair of spectacles'), ll)'lons ("stocking'), silks ('silk dresses'). malt ('whisky'). oils ('oil paintings'), plastic ('credit cards'). leathers ('leather clothes'). It may be possible to add to the list some more examples such as the Yellow Pages,tlre White Page.~. and perhaps also White Paper and paper as in I read a paper at the conjere11ce. Examples of the INSTRUMENT TO RESULT

Distinguishing Metonymy from Synecdoche

Ill

metonymy are also easy to find: the pen as in li1·e by the pen or The pen is mightier than the sword, and the bru.{h as in the bru.{h of Turner. As for examples of the PLACE TO RESULT (product) metonymy. there arc Bordeaux ('wine'), Scotc:h ('whisky'), and so on, where place names seem to function partly a" agents because they are closely connected with the local people who have inherited a special knowledge of the products there. This may be related to the fact that there are as many examples of the AGENT TO RESULT metonymy. which is exemplified by: (40) a. That was a truly beautiful Picas.m. b. I found myself whistling Mozart under my breath. Not only can persons be the cause (agent= producer) of valuable products, but companies can also be agents: (41) a. I pulled the cover from my mother's old 0/h·eui. b. I eat anything. Cold pizza. McDonald'J. you name it. (vi) ENSUING SfTUATION TO PRt:CWING SITUATION. Representative examples of this transfer panem arc: (42) a. She is my pride and joy. b. The news was a great satisfaction to all of us. c. Self-complacency is the death of the artist. Pride and joy in (42a) mean what causes them. Likewise. if the basic sense of satilfactitm is assumed to be 'the resultant state of being satisfied.' a (great) .mti,\faction in (42b) is a metonymic transfer from it. meaning 'what satisfies one.' Finally.deatlt in (42c) means 'cause of death,' just as death ('bullets') in Death fell in showerJ.

5.3. Abstract entities It has already been seen in (II) how a property can behave as an entity. Some

properties may be essential in the sense that they arc inherent attributes that characterize the whole entities in question; others may be accidental in the sense that their saliency is highly dependent on context. Clearly. there is a gradience of properties from the most essential to the most accidental. The essential end is usually conventionalized and wholly or partly lexicalized. which is exemplified by:

112

Ken-ichi Sew (43) a. The Prime Minister is here to see you. Your Majesty. b. She was considered a great beauty in her youth.

The case of abstract nouns (Maje.~f)·, beauty. etc.) st<~nding for concrete nouns ha-. been traditionally considered metonymy. but no rca..on has been offered as to why this semantic transfer can be regarded as a type of metonymy. nor as to how it can be related to other more obvious types of metonymy. In order to treat systematically the ABSTRAcr FOR CONCRETE type. it should be integrated into the PROPERTY FOR oBJECT metonymy. for what is important about Maje.tty and beallfy is not that they are abstract nouns. but that they denote essential properties of their respective referents. Whether a given expression is abstract or not is not directly relevant to the conditions of successful metonymy. Essential properties are, however, typically realized by adjectives. Some are given an independent lexical status: others, semi-independently, are given separate lexical senses within the same lexical items whereby they, as entities. refer to the objects that are characterized by the properties. Drrmks and multinational in ( 44) are such examples: (44) a.

b.

These old drunks eat up a lot of family time. You're all too naive to manage a multinational.

Some properties such a.<> u.mal in (45a) and nonprofit.~ in (45b) are less essential and more contextual. so that smaller dictionaries like the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (DCE) contain no entries for them: (45) a. "Your usual, boys?" she asked, grabbing a set of clean steins. b. Arcadia House, like most mmprofits. survives on a shoestring of grants and donations. Still less essential properties would have very little or no chance of being listed in dictionaries. In (46) a three-o'clock means 'a meeting at three o'clock': (46) I'll catch up with you downstairs. Charlie. to go over the Netherlands proposaL And Luke, we have a three-o'clock, don't we. to discuss the Bloomington plant. The next example shows how an accidental property can stand for the object of which it is a property: (47) When I mounted the rickety steps I saw Mrs. Polster drinking

Di.\·tingui.~hing

Metonymy from Synecdoche

113

something murky-brown out of a conugated glass. It might have been instant iced tea. but it looked as though it had been mixed with transmission fluid.( .... ] She finished the brown-murk and pulled a pitcher from the left side of the chair. (Sara Paretsky. Guardian Angel) 11

Tire brown-murk. which refers to 'something murky-brown." is the only contextual clue to describe the mysterious fluid that miglrt have bee11 imtallf iced tea. Of course. it is no Jess impossible to give brown-murk or murkybrow" a definite lexical sense that describes the apparent soft drink than to give three·tJ'c/ock in (46) the lexical sense 'three o'clock meeting.' Some properties are thus so context-dependent that. out of context. they would Jose the E-rclation they have with their referents. In summary. metonymy involves an E-related transfer, a referential transfer ba'ied on the contiguity between one entity and another in the (real) world. There are three kinds of E-relations: spatial, temporal, and abstract. The spatial E-relation has two major subtypes (the whole-part and the containercontents) and one miscellaneous class that defies any further classification (e.g .. tum dtJwnloff the soup). The temporal E-relation has two major subtypes: the whole event-subevent is static and the earlier-later is processual. and the latter is. more precisely, the earlier preceding situation-processensuing situation relation. The abstract E-relation is the property-object relation, where a lexically or contextually salient property. given the status of an entity. stands for the object that it characterizes. All these relations are linked by one common feature: contiguity in the world as conceived by the speaker. This is the essence of the E-relation on which metonymy is based. And it should not be confused with the C-relation that provides the cognitive basis for synecdoche, to which I shall tum next.

6.

Synecdoche and the C-relation

Traditional rhetoric has assumed that synecdoche describes the WHOLE FOR PART {or. more specifically. the PART FOR WHOLE) kind of metonymy. without distinguishing between the WHOLE-I' ART and the GENUS-SPECIES relations. Consequently, no meaningful distinction has been drawn between metonymy and synecdoche. More fundamentally. this is because the C-relation has never been clearly distinguished from the E-relation. Synecdoche is now defined as

114

Ken-ic·hi Seto

the C-rclatcd transfer. i.e., the categorical transfer based on the semantic inclusion between a more comprehensive and a less comprehensive category.

Thus defined. synecdoche becomes an internally consistent and externally independent category. However, questions remain about the status of synecdoche. Is it a category that should be comparable to metonymy. or is it a far smaller category of minor importance? Moreover, whereas metonymy is rich

in variety as has been demonstrated in Section 5. synecdoche in the sense defined above may look simple and poor in variety, because taxonomy exhausts the C-relation.lt is true. indeed. that synecdoche has no more than two

subtypes. but this fact should not in the least reduce the significance of synecdoche. The categorical transfer based on taxonomy is, in fact. so prevalent in our daily language that its importance in the cognitive system could not be overemphasized. The ubiquity of synecdoche in this sense is such that actual examples are easy to overlook. with the consequence that synecdoche has scarcely received the attention it descrvesP Logically. there arc two types of synecdoche: one is the transfer from a less comprehensive category (species) to a more comprehensive (genus): the other is the transfer from a more comprehensive (genus) to a less comprehensive (species). The SPECIES TO GENUS transfer is exemplified by walkman: it was and is the trademark for Sony's personal stereo. but the once proper name Walkman (species) has become a common noun, walkman (genus), for any personal stereo. Likewise. the proper name Spa became a common noun,spa. Another kind of example is pend/ case where pencil (species) means 'writing instruments' (genus). Bread as in to earn one's (daily) bread is a similar example. The transfer pattern from SPECIES TO GENUS is also observable in verbs: (48) If you wanted to bury. bum, or ship refuse in the Chicago area. you had to cut him in on the action.

Ship is an instrumental denominal verb. but the referential range of the instrument has been extended from marine vessels to any means of transportation. The second subtype of synecdoche is the transfer from GE..'IUS TO SPECIES: (49) a. b. c.

I have a temperature. ('fever') I got a ticket again. ('traffic ticket') My. my. you're certainly a sight. ('terrible sight')

Distinguishing Metonymy from Synecdoche

115

These are all general nouns used to convey more specific senses than they literally mean. We do not always have to specify the details of things: when the situation permits. we tend to use words with more general meanings that require less effort. This phenomenon may have something to do with the maxim of informativeness. the second of the Gricean four maxims (cf. Grice I 975). An extreme case of this sort is observed in: (50) Now that he's been promoted. he thinks he's really somebody. ('an important person·) Some -able adjectives also show the

GENUS TO SPECIES

pattern of synecdoche:

(51) Naperville is ringed by genteel tract houses on sizable lots. The adjective .~i:::abfe means 'rather large.' though whatever has a size, regardless of whether it is large or small. can be, literally. size-able. Readable. cmuiderable, etc. are of this type. too. Perhaps somewhat harder to notice arc verbal examples of the GENUS TO SPECIES synecdoche. For instance, suppose one fashion model criticizes another model's manner of walking on the stage by uuering: (52) She can't walk. Example (52) means 'she can't walk professionally (on the stage}.' Once it is understood that walk in (51) is an example of the GENUS TO SPECIES synecdoche, the number of the examples of this class become virtually infinite: any word can be used in a more specific sense than it normally means. Of course. the opposite also holds true. The English language (and probably any other languages) provides some metalinguistic devices to deal with the elasticity of meaning of this kind: strictly speaking,loo.~e/y speaki11g, real (e.g .. Mary·.\. husband is a real bachelor).fake,ctc. (Lakoff 1972: Taylor 1995) as well as in a narrow .~en.~e and i11 a broad senu. What should be stressed here is that practically all words (perhaps with a few exceptions) are capable of changing their own categorical range (within limits) with no assistance from any of the above devices. To limit ourselves to the GENUS TO SPECIES synecdoche, we could say, for example./ call 't sleep or You call 't hit, meaning. respectively. 'I can't sleep well' and 'you can't hit (a ball) well.' Or suppose a mother asks her son to go and buy a dozen eggs. then she would expect him to come back with a dozen chicken eggs, not a dozen reptile eggs. Sometimes professional people may take advantage of this type of synecdoche. For example,.ftone for "jewel.'

Ken-ichi Seto

116

thus involving a potential customer in the specialist knowledge of the word. All these examples show the same meaning transfer pattern: from a general to a specific sense.

7.

Conclusion

1 have discussed why the essential nature of the tenn 'metonymy' has not yet been agreed upon and given some suggestions for improving upon the present situation. One obstacle which has prevented a proper understanding of metonymy is the failure to distinguish the C-rclation from the E-rclation. The Erelation. which is the contiguous relation between one entity and another in the world. is quite different from the C-relation, which is the conceptual relation between a more comprehensive (more inclusive) and a less comprehensive (less inclusive) category. It must be stressed here again that a category and an entity are cognitively two different things. It is important to note this because confusing them is so frequent in the literature of metonymy (and synecdoche). Another obstacle. closely connected with the first, is the failure to notice the seeming ambiguity of the tenns 'whole' and 'part,' which led to the traditional view to treat synecdoche as a mere subtype of metonymy. In people's folk view, taxonomies ('kind of relations) tend to be equated with partonomies ('part of relations). It has been argued in this paper that synecdoche, if it is to be a consistent category. should take only taxonomy. leaving partonomy to metonymy because taxonomy is equivalent to the C-relation while partonomy is one type of the E-rclation. Therefore. it is concluded that synecdoche, which is C-rclatcd, should be independent from metonymy, which is E-related.

Notes Part of this paper wa.~ first read at the lith New Ualand Linguistic Society Conference (Victoria University. 19 May. 1995).1 would like to thank Claudia Brugman, Eliz.abeth Mathis. Giinter Radden. Jae Jung Song, Tomoko Tsujimmo. Kimihiro Yoshimura and Beatrice Warren for their valuable comment~ and suggestions on earlier versions of this papcr.l am especially indebted to Brigitte Nerlieh for a number of critical comments on the manuscriJ'(. My special thanks arc due to John Taylor for reading the entire draft and making helpful suggestions and constructive r.-riticisms.

Dis1ing11ishing Melonymy from Synecdoche

117

2.

A taxonomy might be bener represented a.~ a tree diagram and a panonomy a.~ a ring in a drele, but it is important to note lhat a tree diagram itself can also be interpreted in term.~ of partonomy, just a.s a braru:h is a pan of a tree in the world. On the other hand. a figure showing a ring in a circle, even if it is intellded to represent a panonomical relation. can also be interpreted in term.~ of a taxonomy just as easily. The choice of figures or representational fonnats does not affectlhe argument about Figure I aDd Figure 2. What is at issue is a dear distinction between pannnomy and taxonomy. and ultimately between E-relation and C-relation.

3.

This is nne, presumably the mo~t important. of the sever.~. I different senses that Jakobson {1956) gives to the tenn 'contiguity.' For some controversies concerning the characterization of metonymy in the da.\..~ical paper.cf. Cooper {1986: 34-37). Oirven {1993: 10). Warren (1995: 137[), and Nerlich (forthcoming).

4.

Washing in (lOa), which mean~ 'clothes to be washed,' may also be seen a.~ a ·material' cause. 'Material' can be one of the 'causes' which make the following process pos.~iblc.

5.

Note that I am not concerned wilh the relation between the group category and it~ subcategories. Thus a subcategory tribe is C-related with its supereategory grm'P (e.g .. tribes are a kind of (human) group).

6.

To repeat lhe same point. the category llllil"f'r.fi~- may be cla~ified into subcaiCgories such a.~ national 1mi1·ersi~·. Jtalf' unil"tr.fi~-- pri1•ate unil'f'rsi~·. and so on. Of coun;e, other subcategorizations (e.g .. wtmren's .,,.;,•ersity) are also pos~ible. All this is a C-ba...ed classifteatinn.

7.

Cruse {1986: 176) claim~ lhatprolf'tariat-lmrker is a claM-member relation. and that it is an example, though admittedly marginal. of the whole-part relation. In our tenns, prolf'tariut-worker is a du.-.s-element relation. which is nece~sarily C-relatcd, not a whole-pan relation. Compare lhi5 with the relation between a (specific) labor union and it" members. The laner i~ an organization-member relation. hence an E-relation (e.g .. a union member i~ a pan of the union). Also wo11h mentioning is that the existence of sentences like Fr;.-ing i.f part of!a t_\p~ (kind) of moking does not imply that sometimes the distinction between the E-relation and the C-relation geb blurred. but insiCad confinns that there are two different cognitive models. One model sees cooking as a series of prnces....es that are aligned along the temporal axis: Frying is one such process. i.e .. a (temporal) pan of the whole processes lfrying may come after •·hopping). 1be other model sees cooking a.~ a category of different cooking methods: Frying is one of the pos..~ible cooking methods as opposed to. say. boililllf. grilling. roosting. etc.

8.

N01e that the di~tinction between E-relation and C-relation does not correspond to the traditional distinction between extension and inten.,.ion because the latter tenn.~ are both concerned with categories. Roughly speaking, extension is concerned with a class of entities. and inten.,.inn is concerned with the defining propeny of the cla.~s (cf. Lyon ... 1995: 81). However, while the C-relation ha.~ to do with categories. i.e .. cla.~ses, theErelation ha.~ to do wilh the contiguous relation between indh·idual entities. not cla.~ses.

9.

Randomly chosen languages are: Japanese. Korean, Mongolian. Javanese. Turkish. and Ilillian. Though it is ton early to speak of universality (the German translation. forcxample. is only marginally acceptable). the one-to-one correspondence among several different languages in the relevant respect may hint that the container-content~ type as a metonymic template. not as a specific example. is a cross-linguistic phenomenon. This may be panly

Ken-ichi Se/o

118

confinned by the fact that all the examples in this section, like most of the metonymic examples in the other section~. translate acceptably into Japanese word for word.

10.

One may lind it difflcull to accept some of the following examples a~ instances of metonymy because the nominalization proces..~ itself causes the shift in meaning. II may be argued, however, that the meaning shift in the nomino.lization process ilo;clf is metonymic. ThlL" sllpf'li~s seems doubly metonymic: one from s11ppi)· (v) to .fupplit>.f (n); the other from .fupply (n) a~ in a r4:g11/ar supply of fr.-sh w·getobfeJ to .w1pplit>.f (n).

II.

Most melonymic exampks in this paper have come from Sara Parcbky's V.I. Warshawski series: G11ardian Angel, To.tic Shodt., Burn Marks, T111111el Visi11n. and lndt>mnity On/_1·. A few examples arc from dictionaries and other sources.

12.

In diachronk semantics synecd<Xbe in our sense ha.~ been known a.~ •generalization· and "specialization.' Thus Gccracrts (1994) refel'll to specialization. generalization. me· tonymy. and metaphor a.~ "the cla.~sical quartet.'" which I would like to call 'the cla.~sical trio' in term..~ of synecdoche, metonymy. and metaphor. Nerlich (forthcoming) is clear in appreciating the cognitive difference between metonymy and synecdoche along the line of the present paper. "Metonymy is based on our world·knowlcdge about space and time. cause and effect, part and whole. wherca.~ synecdoche is ba<~ed on our taxonomic or categorical knowledge. Metonymy exploits our knowledge of how the world is. synecdoche of how it is ord~r~d in our mind."

References Bredin. Hugh 1984 Metonymy. Po~tics Today 5:45-58. Clark. Eve V .• Herbert Clark 1979 When nouns surface as verbs.L:mguage 55: 767-811. Cooper. David E. 1986 Metaphor. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Cruse. D. A. 1979 On the transitivity of the pan·whole relation. Journal of lingui.ttic.t 15: 29-

1986

38. Lexical S~mamil's. London: Cambridge Univerllity Press.

DCE 1995 Dirven.Rene 1993

Longman Dictionary ofCont~mporary E11Kiish. Essex: Longman. Metonymy and metaphor: different mental strategies of conceptualisation.

LeUI'ensf' Bijdragf'n 82: 1-28. Geeracrts. Dirk 1994 Historical scntantics. In R.E. Asher (ed.). Thf' Encyclopedia of Lnnguaxe ami lJnguistics. Oxford: Pergamon Press. 1567-1570. Goossens. Louis 1990 Metaphtonymy: the interaction of metaphor and metonymy in expressions for linguistic action. Cognitil't' lingui.ftic.f I: 323-340.

Disling11ishing Melonymy from Synecdoche

119

Grice, H. Paul 1975 Logic and conversation.ln P. Cole, J.L. Morgan (eds.J,S.\'1/ta'C and Seman· tics. Vol. 3: Speech Acts. New York: Academic Press, 41-58. Hel"jkovits, Annene 1986 Um~:uaRe ami Spatial Cognition: An lmerdi.~cip/inary• St11dy of the Prepo· sitions in Engli.~h. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jakobsen, Roman 1971 11956] Two a.~pects of language and two types of apha.~ic disturbances. In R. Jakobsen (ed.), Roman Jakobson: Selected Writings. Vol. 2: Word and Umguage. The Hague, etc.: Mouton, 239-259. Lakorf, George 1972 Hedges: a study in meaning criteria and the logic of fuzzy concepts. CLS8: 183-228. 1987 Women, Fire, and Dangermu Things: What Categorie.t Re~·eul ubolllthe Mind. Chicago: The Univeo;ity of Chicago Press. Lakoff. George. Mark Johnson 1980 Metaphon We Li1·e By. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Lakoff, George. Mark Turner 1989 More than Cool Reason. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Langacker. Ronald W. 1987 Fmmdtllitm.t ofCognith·e Grammar. Volume 1: Theoretical Prerequisite.t. Stanford, California: Stanford Univeo;ity Press. 1991 Foundation.~ ofCoxnitiw Grammar. Volume II: De.tt·riptive Application. Stanford. California: Stanford University Press. Lindner, Susan 1981 A l...e.tico-Semamic Analy.tis of Enxlish Verb Partide Con.tlrllctions with OUT and UP. Bloomington: lbe Indiana University Linguistics Club. Lyons. John 1995 Lingui.ftic Semantk.f: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nerlich, Brigitte forthcoming Synecdoche: a trope, a whole trope, and nothing hut a trope. InN. Norrick, A. Burkhardt (eds.), Tropic Truth. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Bcnjamins. Nunberg. Geoffrey D. 1978 The PraRIIWtics of Refuence. Bloomington: The Indiana University Lin· guistics Club. Ogden. Charles K .. lvor A. Richards 195611923] The Meanilrg of Meani11g.london: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Puslejovsky, James 1995 The Ge11erati1·e Lexicon. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Pustejovsky. James, Pierreue Bouillon 1995 Aspectual coercion and logical polysemy. Journal of Semantics 12: 133162.

Ken-ichi Se/o

120 Reddy, Michael J.

1979

The conduit metaphor: a case of frame conflict in our language about language.ln A. Ortony (ed.), 1993. Mf'laphorand Thought. Sel;;ond edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 164-201. Sorensen. Roy A. 1990 Process vagueness. IJngllistic.f m1d Phifo.mpil)' 13: 589--618. Tal my, Leonard 1983 How language structures space. In HL Pick, Jr.. L.P. Acredolo (eds.). Spatial Orientation: Tht"of)', Reuarcl!. and Application. New York. etc.: Plenum Press, 225-282. Taylor. John R. 1995 linguistic Cmegori:.ation: Protol)pes in Li11gui.rtic Theory. Second edition. New York: Oxford University Press. Tversky. Barbard 1990 Where partonomics and taxonomies meet. In SL Tsohatzidis (ed.), Meanings and Prototypes: Studies in Lingui.rtic Catt!gori:.ation. London: Routledge. 334--344. Tversky. Barbara, Kathleen Hemenway 1984 Objects. parts. and categories. Journal of ExJNrimemal Ps.\'chology: Gen· em/113: 169-191. Warren. Beatrice 1995 Distinguishing between metaphor and metonymy. In G. Melchers, B. War· ren (eds.). Studie.f ill Anglistics. Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksclllntemalional. 137-151. Weinrich, Harald 1964 Typen der Gedachtnismetaphorik. Arcltil'fiir Begriff.~geschichle 9; 96-104. Wells. Rulon S. 1977 Metonymy and misunder.;.tanding: an a.~ pet:! of language change. In R. W. Cole (ed.). Currem /.Hill'S in linguistic· nu•ory. Bloomington: Indiana Univen;ity Press, 195-214. Wierzbicka, Anna 1984 Apples are not a kind of fruit: the semantics of human categorization. American Ethnologi.fl II: 313-328. Winston. Monon E .. Roger Chaffin. Douglas Herrmann 1987 A taxonomy of pan-whole relations. Cognitive Sdenct' II: 417--444.

Aspects of Referential Metonymy

Beatrice Warren Lund University

1.

Introduction

One of the most significant effects of Grice· s seminal paper in 1975 was that it highlighted the importance of implicitness in human communication. There is now general acceptance that the principle of compositionality is not sufficient to account for the interpretation of utterances. To specify the conditions which allow the unsaid to be communicated has therefore become an essential task of linguistic theory of today. The current interest in metonymy can be seen as concerned with a particular aspect of this very task. Some examples of metonymy discussed in more recent literature arc given in (I )--(6) below. (The metonymic expression is in italics; the interpretation taken to be intended is within square brackets.) (I)

It won't happen while I still breathe. (live] (Halliday 1994: 340)

(2)

A: How did you get to the airport? 8: I waved down a ta:ci. [A taxi took me there] (Gibbs 1994: 327)

(3)

She filmed pale. [was frightened} (KOvccses. quoted from Ungerer and Schmid 1996: 132)

Beatrice Warren

122

(4)

"Oh dear:· she giggled , ''I'd quite forgotten!'' [she said while giggling] (Goossens 1990: 328)

(5)

A customer at a parking lot handing a car key to the attendant: This is parked out there. [the car to which the key belongs[ (Nunbcrg 1996: 110)

(6)

She has her father's eye.L(eycs like those of her father] {Warren, in print)

In all these examples the speaker feels confident that the hearer will elaborate on what has been said or on a certain part of it in a certain direction and that the hearer will take these elaborations to be part of the conveyed message. The examples also have in common that that which triggers the inference is a saJient subpart of a state. situation or entity: in order to live one must breathe; getting from A to 8 in a taxi involves first of a11 getting it to stop: paleness tends to accompany fright: keys will go to some object with a lock. etc. Our ability to access an entire state, situation or object from the mention of some part is seen by some as the hallmark of metonymic thinking (cf. in particular Gibbs 1994: 319). It is this type of thinking that the speaker intuitively knows is common to all of us and which makes it possible for her/him to trust that her/ his message will be understood in the intended manner. However. a second look at the examples in (1)-(6) reveals that they are not quite equivalent from a conceptual point of view. For instance, breathing is a condition for living. whereas paling is not a condition for. but a common effect of. fear and keys are neither results of nor conditions for cars. Also from a linguistic point of view, there are differences. Some arc clearly propositional (notably (2)); others arc dearly referential ((5) and (6)). Above all. some violate truth conditions ((4)-(6)); others do not ((I )-{3)). Therefore, although I am prepared to accept the possibility that there is a common cognitive basis for the italicized expressions in (I H6). I suggest that there are different types of metonymy which have different constraints and which behave linguistically in different ways. Making subdivisions of metonymy should have the advantage of providing homogeneous sets of examples, which obviously makes it easier to work out the processes according to which the examples in question are formed and deciphered. In this spirit. the focus of the present contribution is the particular type of metonymy which I will refer to as referential metonymy.

Aspecl.~

of Referential Metcmymy

123

For anything to qualify as a referential metonym. the following applies: (i) it should have a referent. {ii) the intended referent is not explicitly mentioned 1 but its retrieval depends on inference. (iii) inference is made possible because there is some connection between the mentioned referent (the trigger) and the implied referent (the target) 2 deemed so well known that in the context in question the former will automatically suggest the latter. A study of recent sense developments (Warren 1992). a project involving idioms. a'i well as randomly collected instances have provided me with a corpus of 120 predominantly English examples which satisfy the above criteria. The analysis of these has inspired the hypotheses that will be presented in the following.

2.

The basic semantic structure of referential metonyms

It is possible to sec parallels as to semantic structure between referential metonyms and other linguistic constructions. in particular onomatopoeic words. eponyms. adjective-noun combinations. noun-noun compounds and dcnominal verbs (cf. Warren 1995: 137-150). Here I will restrict the comparison to referential metonyms. noun-noun compounds and denominal verbs. These constructions have in common that they involve two referents which are connected by an implicit link. In noun-noun compounds. the two referents are explicitly mentioned. one of which is the head. i.e .. the referring item (chair in armchair. for instance. because it is a kind of chair. not a kind of ann). In denominal verbs. the noun contained in the verb (the parent noun) will be connected implicitly to the grammatical object in the case of transitive verbs (as in to shelve boob 'put books on shelves'). In the case of intransitive verbs. the parent noun will be connected to the grammatical subject (as in the cow calved 'the cow produced a calf) or an adverb (as in we holidayed in Paris 'we spent our holiday in Paris'). In referential metonymy we have a referent which is mentioned and one which is implied and an implicit link connecting these (as in wagtail 'something that has a wagging tail'). It is the implicit referent that is the head and the referring item. If we investigate the nature of the links in these constructions. we will

Bemrice Warren

124 Table I. Recurrellllinh in

(a)

compound.~.

ml'lonym_v and denominal1·erbs

Composition and cross-classification3 (i)

.filw•rspoon

(ii)

.tih·er

'spoon made of silver' 'something made of silver" (cutlery)

SUBJECT·SET

(ii)

girlfrielld don

(iii)

to

(i)

dwperon sb

'friend who is a girl' [liancecj 'somcboc.ly who is a don' [Mafia leader] 'to be the chaperon of someone'

(b) Causation RESULT·C:AUSER

(i) (ii)

(iii)

tear gas l'C.I'tcl.f\'

to cal~·e

'gas which produces tears' [ga.~ used in riots. etc.) 'that which produces ecstasy' (a drug] 'to produce a calf [to give birth to a calf)

CAUSER·RESULT

(i) (ii)

(iii) fc)

'fever that is produced by hay· (allergic catarrh) 'that which is produced by the hand' [aid/applause) 'to do that which is done by bUichers' (kill to supply meat!

Possession (i) (ii) (iii)

armclwir 1\'agtai/ to clothe d1ildret1

'chair which has "arms.. ' (chair with annrestsJ 'something which ha.~ a wagging tail' (bini( 'to cause children to have clothes'

(i)

l1011serooj redpe11

'roof belonging to a house' ·pen with something red in it' (ink]

(ii) (d)

hayfew!r hand(n.) to butcher sth

Location in time and space (i)

.~ea

(ii)

ll'alkuboUI

porr

'port which is at the sea' 'place where .. walkabouts" are taken' [road!

OBIECT·PU.CE

(i) (ii)

(iii)

(e)

fo:rllole

date to .du~l1•e boob

'hole which has foxes in it' (abode of foxes! 'that which occurs at a date' (appointment! 'to put books on shelves·

Resemblance

COMPARANT•COMPARED

(ii)

clubfoot lrerfullu:r·.,e)'t'S

(iii)

tomotller.fb

(i)

'foot which is like a dub' [talipes] 'eyes which are like those of her father' 'to behave like a mother does towards sb ·

Aspecrs of Referemial Meumymy

125

notice certain recurrent patterns involving composition and cross-<:lassification. causation. possession. location and resemblance. Some representative examples arc offered in Table I. The first examples illustrate a compound noun (i). the second a referential metonymy (ii). and the third a denominal verb (iii). These recurrent patterns have been described in a number of studies. For English compounds. cf .. e.g .. Bergsten (1911). Levi (1978). Warren (1978) and Mellenius (1997): for denominal verbs, cf. in particular Clark and Clark (1979). Leitner (1974) and Dirven (this volume). Metonymic patterns have also been described, but in terms SUCb ac; PART FOR WHOLE, WHOLE FOR PART, CONTAINER FOR CONTENTS. GARMENT FOR PERSON. PLAn FOR INSTITl!TION. PRODUCER FOR PRODUCJ,INSTRUMENT FOR RESULT, MATIER FOR ARTIFALT, etc. For a detailed summary of metonymic patterns discussed in the literature, cf. Nerlicb et al. (this volume), Leisi (1985), Lipka (1988) and Radden and KOvecses (this volume). Table I requires some comments. First of all. it should be pointed out that the paraphrases within single quotation marks arc not meant to represent the meanings of the examples. These are given within square brackets. My hypothesis is that expressions of the type exemplified above are partially implicit descriptions of that which the speaker wishes to denote. The paraphrases attempt to represent the type of reconstruction that the speaker expects the hearer to make in order to be able to match the expression with the intended referent. Meanings. in the sense of definitions, are created by the perception of class-distinctive features. which in tum requires that the referent in question is seen as one of a kind. This explains it11er alia why most nounnoun compounds arc not compositional. Not all holes that have foxes in them are foxholes. for instance. As we will see. unlike compounds and denominal verbs. referential metonyms do not. however. supply 'names' for the unnamed very frequently. Secondly, for rea'ions of clarity the table leaves out many details. Above all. it ignores some relations. The justification for this bas been that they could possibly be considered as subtypes of those mentioned. The Causation relation. for example. subsumes the Purpose relation. alias GOAL-INSTRUMENT pattern (as exemplified in ball bat, to knife .wmebody), the ACTIVITY-ACTOR pattern (as in bu.\·ines.mum) and the ORIGIN-OBJECT pattern. which is common in reversative denominal verbs (dust the table (OBJECf-ORIGIN)) and pod peas (ORIGIN-oBJELT)). The Resemblance relation subsumes a relation paraphraseable with the verb represent as in Alice was Cinderella in the play (Cinderella 'the person who represents Cinderella').

126

Bemrice Warren

Finally. as just pointed out, the relations described arc not restricted to compounds. denominal verbs and referential metonymy, but occur also in other constructions. An important point to make in this connection is that not all relations occur in all constructions. There appear to be constraints, some of which are natural. whereas others are more intriguing. This. however, will have to be the topic of another paper. These omissions might be excused since the main purposes of Table I are to reveal the ba.
A.tpectJ of Referential Metonymy

127

why these relations recur so regularly in linguistic consuuctions may be that they are cognitively particularly salient. Psychologists and cognitive linguists have indeed pointed out the great significance of 'gestalt' in human perception. which involves discerning bounded entities and phenomena and their parts. constituent matter or position within a whole or an area. and they have pointed out that such distinctions are renected in the grammars of languages (cf. in particular Langacker 1991 ). The importance of being able to establish cause-effect relations among intelligent beings is also evident, as is the role of causation in grammar (consider. for instance. ergative and instrumental cases. or the fact that if there is an AGENT it is promoted to be the subject, or causative verbs and conjunctions of cause, means and result). The resemblance relation, however. is different. Whereas links of composition. possession.location and causation presuppose co-occurrence or contiguity. links of resemblance arc not dependent on closeness in time and space. This difference has significant consequences and probably explains the fact that, if there is a resemblance relation between trigger and target. it has traditionally been thought of as the basis of a different figure of speech. viz. metaphor. I will return to this issue in the final section of the article. My immediate concern. however. will be the function of referential metonyms.

3.

The rationale of referential metonyms

As has just been pointed out. I see strong parallels between noun-noun compounds and referential mctonyms. Both constructions involve at least two referents.~ and both involve an implicit link. The difference is that the referring item is explicit in compounds. whereas it is implied in metonyms. Consider a few examples: I am bugged We are just across the river Arc you in the printer?t'

(the place I am at) (the place we live/work in) (that which you have produced. i.e .. your paper} ( 10) The bathtub is running over (that which is in the tub. i.e.,the wa· ter) (I I) Answer the door! [the person at the door] (12) I like Mozart. (that which Mozart has produced. i.e., his 'muic) (7) (8)

(9)

128

Bemrice Warren

The analyses of these examples arc meant to demonstrate that referential metonyms are basically abbreviations. What is left out is something that 'goes without saying' in the context in question. but more importantly. that which is retained has, in its particular context, the greatest information value. In the examples above, it identifies the referent in question. ll is important that we realize that the traditional definition of metonymy. viz. ··substituting for the name of a thing the name of an auribute of it or something closely related" (OED) is not correct in that no substitution is necessarily involved. We do not refer to music in I like Mo::.urt, but to music composed by Mozart; we do not refer to water in The bathtub i.i nm,ing over. but to the water in the bathtub. I have so far concentrated on the interpretation of the metonym itself and ignored the interpretation of the utterance containing it. Also in the following I will restrict my attention in this way. but will here at lca'>t mention the distinction. Consider I am bugged in the sense of its paraphrase The piQ(·e I am Jtaying at iJ buggec/. 7 Both describe the same type of situation and have the same truth conditions. Yet their interpretations arc not quite equivalent. In I am bugged what is conveyed is not only that the place where the speaker happens to be is bugged. but that this is something that is of particular relevance to the speaker. Nunberg refers to this phenomenon as predicate transfer. My explanation for this effect of metonymy is that giving the nonreferring part of the mctonym the status of the grammatical subject makes it the topic of the utterance. that which the comment is about. In other words. the abbreviation may not only serve the purpose of saving words. but may also serve to achieve the information structure intended by the speaker. The rationale of metonyms in (7)-( 12) then appears to be different from that of compounds. which are mainly formed to name that for which we lack a name. This is not to deny that there arc metonyms that can be lcxicalizcd and become ·names.' Consider enta.{y, will (as in last will and testimony), glass, box. etc. There are also examples ofmetonyms which have rhetorical force as in she married money. the way of alljle.\·h.lreartthrob (for attractive girl) and as in the headline Brain.{ of Briti.~h Museum crack Cryswl Skull Riddle (the last example is from Nerlich et al.. this volume). It is naturally these latter types of metonyms that attract our attention, whereas the types exemplified in (7)-(12) tend to go unnoticed. In fact, it is easy to overlook such examples of metonymy. Consider the metonymic shift involved in the mctalinguistic uses of words. That is to say. the fact that the metalinguistic name for a word coincides in form with this word renders it a

Aspecl.~

of Referemial Metcmymy

129

natural metonym. possibly bao;cd on a compositional link. It is, in other words. natural to refer to the object language word cal with the metalinguistic name cat (as I just did). but few people think of this as metonymy. Although referential metonymy has a potential as a naming and/or rhetorical device and has mainly been discussed in this capacity, it should not be forgotten that it is a kind of semantic-syntactic construction. comparable to. for instance, compounding and genitive constructions. which the language user has to learn to interpret and form to reach full competcnce.M

4.

ANTECEDENT-CONSEQUENT

links and referential metonymy

One consequence of looking upon metonymy as basically a type of abbreviation is that utterances containing referential metonyms will be non-literal. This is so, sin<.'C the predication will superficially apply to that which is retained. which. I remind the reader. is not the referring part of the metonym. However. our interpretation shows that the predication applies in fact to the implicit target as well as the trigger. Hence in ( 10) it is not the tub that is running over. but the water in the tub. If we now reconsider our very first example (renumbered as (13)): (13) It won't happen while I still breathe. (live] (Halliday 1995: 340) we will notice that there is no violation of truth conditions and also that it is difficult to think of a paraphrase in line with the ones given in Table I. Instead the natural paraphrase connecting breathing with living is: if somebody breathes. s/he will live. That is to say, we find an ANTECEDENT-CONSEQUENT relation and we find that we have connected not entity to entity. but proposition to proposition. The fact that we have here an ANTECEDENT-CONSEQUENT relation between trigger (breathe) and target ([live]) is consonant with the fact that there is no violation of truth conditions in (13), since the truth of the consequent depends on the truth of the antecedent. Whereas in the examples of metonyms in Table I and in (7)-( 12) the trigger represents the modifier and the target the head which together pick out a referent. brearlre in (13) could not be looked upon a'> the modifier of [live). Instead we have an expression which suggests two co-ordinate notions: breathing and therefore living. Consider (14) and (15): (14) is an instance of

130

Beatrice Warrell

referential metonymy; ecstasy could not be taken to refer to both an emotion and a drug: (15), by contrast. involves an instance of propositional metonymy, as a result dark does suggest both 'not light" as well as 'closed.' (14) He uses ecstasy. !the drug] (15) The shops arc dark {closed] on Sundays in this town.

ANTECI::DENT-CONSEQUE.Vf relations qualify as instances of concomitance relations, as do the equative, compositional. possessive. causal and locative relations exemplified in Table I. Concomitance relations are traditionally considered to be criteria! for metonymy.l suggest. however. that we make a clear distinction between these two types of concomitance relations. ANTECEDENT-CONSEQUENT relations give rise to propositionaJ metonymy; the links specified in Table I give rise to referential metonymy. The differences a'i to paraphra,.ing. as to truth values and as to the relation between trigger and target (i.e .. subordination in one case and co·ordination in the other) indicate that we are dealing with two distinct, although related. cognitive operations.

5.

The resemblance relation and referential metonymy

As I have already mentioned, the difference between metaphor and metonymy is traditionally said to be that metaphor is based on resemblance relations. whereas metonymy is based on contiguity. I have also mentioned that resem· blance relations are not dependent on closeness in time or space. What is instead required is that at least one attribute of the target is perceived a'i reminiscent of an attribute of the trigger. Another requirement for the rescm· blance relation in metaphor is that target and trigger are members of different categories (or domains. as is the term that cognitive linguists would usc). Now let us reconsider the example given in Table I as an instance of referential metonymy based on resemblance. (16) Ann has her father'.~ eyes. !eyes like those of her father] It is possible to interpret the italicized phrase without knowing in what respect Ann's eyes are like her father's. Therefore. although I accept that resemblance is normally involved in metaphor I suggest that. provided it is solely the relation that takes us from the trigger to the target. it forms the basis of metonymy. Normally. however, if there is a resemblance relation between

Aspects of Referemial Meto11ymy

131

trigger and target. the hearer is expected to retrieve the feature or features that form the basis of the similarity. Consider the interpretation of ( 17): ( 17) Mary is the Ci11derella in the family. This involves working out some such features as 'unjustifiably neglected' and possibly also ·a person with qualities as yet not appreciated but which are superior to her siblings (or the equivalent) and which will eventually raise her above them in status.' Compare this interpretation to that of Cinderella in ( 18). which simply involves working out that Mary is the person representing Cinderella in the play. ( 18) Mary is Cinderella in the play. (the pe11'on representing Cinderella) My suggestion concerning the crucial difference between referential metonymy and metaphor is. therefore. that in the case of referential metonymy the link between trigger and target is a relation (and one relation only). whereas in the case of metaphor. it involves one or more attributes. Working out several links (i.e .. similar attributes) between trigger and target may cause the interpretation to be much richer. but also less straightforward than is the case of metonymy. Indeed interpretations of metaphors often vary with the interpreter. probably to a much greater extent than in the case of metonymy. This indefiniteness may in tum make metaphors enigmatic and interesting in a way that is not so common in the case of metonymy. Perhaps the most important difference between metaphor and metonymy is that metaphors often involve hypothetical thinking. When we interpret the metaphor in ( 19). for instance. we see inftmnaticm as if it were a fluid seeping through a container supposed to hold it (the White House). (19) Information about the matter leaked from the White House. Metonymy does not seem to involve hypotheses. Perhaps we can explain this difference by pointing out that metonymy is based on relations which presuppose actual coincidence, whereas metaphor. which involves finding a match for an attribute among all the mentally stored attributes. is freed from constraints of what could actually occur or coincide.

Bealrice Warren

132

6.

Conclusion

I have argued that. if our aim is to gain as precise an understanding as possible of the manner in which instances of metonymy are formed and interpreted. we should distinguish between different types of metonymy. Referential metonymy was singled out as the focus of the present contribution because of its similarity to. above all. noun-noun compounds. Both involve two nominal expressions, one of which is the modifier and the other the head and referring item. Also. in both cases. there is an implicit link. This led to the suggestion that there is a common basic structure of referential metonymy as displayed in Table 2: Table 2. Common

Implicit rererent

ba.~ic

.uructurl.' of referemialmeumymy

Implicit link

(large! and head) thai which

Explicit expression (trigger)

consists of

si/1·er

is in

barl!lllb

I!C.fla.~y

The speaker expects the hearer to be able to fill in that which is left implicit. which will result in a description of the intended referent. I have also suggested that metonymic links arc not quite as ad hoc as the much quoted example The ham sa"dwich is waiti"g for his check may suggest, but that there is a limited set of default relations which are of great linguistic relevance (cf. Radden and KOvecscs, this volume). This is evidenced by the fact that they are not restricted to metonymy. but are part of a set of unexpressed relations that arc important in the semantics of phrases and sentences. The illustration above also reveals that I look upon referential metonymy as a kind of abbreviation having potentiaJs as a naming and/or rhetorical device. I further argued that we should make a distinction between concomitance relations between propositions (i.e .. ANTECEDENT-CONSI:::QUI:::/'IoT relations) and concomitance relations between entities (i.e., relations such possession. location, causation. etc.). The former type of relation may be the basis of what is sometimes referred to as pragmatic meanings of words which do not cause violations of truth conditions and which may be cancellable. The latter type of

A.\pects of Referential Metonymy

133

relation may be the basis of non-literal uses of (primarily) nouns. I have suggested that the tenn referential metonymy should be restricted to sense shifts based on the latter kind of relation. 9 Finally, I suggested that the basic difference between metonymy and metaphor is that the interpretation of metonyms involves retrieving a relation, whereas the interpretation of metaphors involves retrieving at least one attribute shared by the conventional and intended referents. This means that even a resemblance relation can occasionally be metonymic, as in the phra."
Notes By "not explicitly mentioned" I mean that there i~ no morpheme which rould be taken to represent it. Primer, for instance, would not be considered a mctonym. since the suffix. er can be taken to fonnally - although opaquely - indicate the nominal statu~ of the expres~ion, reflected in the interpretation 'that which prints.'

2.

The tenns 'trigger' and 'target' are adopted from Fauconnicr (19115).

3.

The~

4.

are the Jinks involved in turning count nouns into non-count nouns and vice ver~a. as in tllere is egg on tlrt knife and two ,·offen. pletue. The fonner process is sometimes referred to ;1s 'grinding' and the Iauer as 'ehunking.' Cf. Copestakc and Briscoe (19%).

Nerlich et al. {this volume) sec an unconventional metonymic relation in the compound Tretll'lt people j11ice. fomJCd by her son Mall hew. The connection between Treadt andj11ic·c is that Mallhew wa.~ served a particular juice after having watched a TV play called ''lhc Treacle People.'' In my view,lhe connection fits quite well with the OBJECT·nME pattern: 'that which (practically) co-occurred with The Treacle People.' The expression is ~tmnge. however, in that the play will hardly affect the character of the drink, i.e .. be a salient )ubpartofit.

pet~ple

5.

The ba.~ic structure of both compounds and metonym~ can be expanded. Consider compound within compounds {cowboy IIUI) and metaphors within metonyms or metonyms within rnctaphor.; as in ydlow belly in the sense 'a native of the fens': ·~b who is like ~b who ha.~ a yellow belly {i.e .. a frog).' Cf. Warren {1992: 94-97).

6.

This b a tran~lation from Swcdbh, i.e .. from Ar del ti11Jom /igger i skrirare11?

7.

There are, of cour.;e, other bugs on me.'

H.

An increasing number of linguists do, however, approach metonymy in this spirit. cr. in particular Jackendoff (1997), Nunbcrg {1996), Fa.~s (1997) and Copestakc and Briscoe (1996).

9.

A terminological di~tinction of this kind is not infrequently made. Consider. for instance. Stem (1965). who refer.; to sense shifts developed from the fonncr type of relation as perm111ttlio11s.

pos~ible interpretation~

of {7). viz. 'I am irritated' or 'I have

Bealrice Warren

134 References Bergsten, Nils

1911 A Study of Compmmd Substalllil·es in EngliJh. Uppsala: Almquist and Wikscll. Clark, Eve V., Herbert H. Clark 1979 When nouns surface as verbs.lAnguage 55: 767-811. Copcstake. Ann. Ted Briscoe

1996

Semi·pnxlu~:tive

polysemy and sense extension. In J. Pustejo•;sky. B.

BogurdcV (eds.), Le.tical Semantic.f: Tile Problem of PoJ.v.fem.\'. Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 15-67. Fass.Dan 1997

Processing Metonymy and Metaphor. Greenwich. Connecticut. etc.: Ablex Publishing Corporation.

Fauconnier, Gilles 1985 Mental Space.f. Cambridge. Ma.">sachusens: The MIT Press. Gibbs, Raymond W. 1994 The Poetics of Mind: FiguratiW? TIJOJJgl!t. Langua!{e a11d Under.Utmdin~:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Goossens. Louis 1990 Metaphtonymy: the: interaction of metaphor and metonymy in expre~sions for linguistic action. Cognitive Linguistk.f I: 323-340. Grice, H. Paul 1975 Logic and conve111ation.ln P. Cole, J. Morgan (eds.),Symaxand Semantics. Volumt' 1: Spet'ch Acu. New York: Academic Press, 41-58. Halliday. Michael A.K. 1994 An Jmroductio11 to Funclional Grammar. London, Melbourne, Auckland: Edward Arnold. Jackendoff. Ray 1997 Tile Arcllitecwre of the UJnguage Fund~·. Cambridge. Massachusens: The MIT Press. langacker, Ronald W. 1991 Concept. Image and Symbol. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Leisi,Emst 1985 Praxi.f der Engliscllen St'malltik. Heide1bc:rg: Winter. Leitner, Gerhard 1974 Denomim1fe Verbt1fisienmg im Engfis£·11m. Tiibingen: Niemeyer. Levi. Judith 1978 The S)·nlcu and Semantic.f of Complex Nominal.f. New York. San Francisco, London: Academic Press. Lipka, Leonhard 1988 A rose is a mse is a rose: on simple and dual categorization in natur.d languages. In W. HUIIen, R. Schulze (eds.). Understanding tile Uxicon. TUbingen: Niemeyer. 355-366.

AspectJ of Referential Metonymy

135

Mellenius, lngmarie 1997 11u: Acquisition of Nominal Compounding;,, Swedish. Lund: Lund University Press Nunberg. Geoffrey 1996 Transferofmeaning.ln J. Pustejovsky. B. Boguraev (eds.),Lnical Semantics: The Pmblrm1 of Polysemy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 107-132. OED 1989 The Oxford Engli.fh Dicti0/101)'. Second edition. Odord: Clarendon Press Stem. Gustaf 1965 (1931) Meaning and Change of Me011ing. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Ungerer, Friedrich. Hans-lOrg Schmid 1996 An lmrodm·tion to Cogniliw• Linguistit·s. London. New York: Longman. Wam:n. Beatrice 1978 Semantic Pattern.f af Noun-Noun Compmmd.f. Gothenburg Studies in English41. 1992 Sen.fe Dew:lopments. Stockholm: Almquist and Wikselllntemational. 1995 Distinguishing between metaphor and metonymy. In G. Melchers. B. Warren (eds.). Studies in A11glistics. Stockholm: Almquist and Wiks.ell International. 137-151. 1998 What i.f metonymy? In M. Hogg. L. van Bergen (eds.). Historical Linguistics 1995. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins. 301-310.

Part II

Historical Aspects of Metonymy

Frame and Contiguity On the Cognitive Bases of Metonymy and Certain Types of Word Formation

Peter Koch University of TUbingen

1.

lntroduction1

II goes without saying that in a rhetorical perspective metaphor and metonymy are usually considered to be close relatives of each other. And in fact. they often get confused. not only by students. but - as to the application of these two theoretical notions - even by scholars. In general. it is metonymies that arc reduced to metaphors. All in all. metonymy appears to be a kind of parente pamu of metaphor (cf. Bredin 1984: 45): metonymy seems less interesting, Jess abstract and is supposed to demand a relatively minor intellectual cffon. Nevertheless, I am convinced that metonymy occurs much more frequently than metaphor and tells us a great deal about our cognitive equipment. So it is worthwhile studying its cognitive bases in some detaiL

2.

Ad hoc metonymy and metonymic polysemy

First of all. let me clarify a terminological problem that constantly arises in connection with metonymy. On the one hand. the term 'metonymy' denotes a rhetorical trope which is applied ad hoc to certain lexical material: compare for instance:

Peter Koch

140

(I)

Lat.

iam proximus ardet Uca/egon 'nearby,(the Jumse oJl Uca/ego11 is already burning' (my translationl (Verg. Aen. 2. 3llf. cit. Lausberg 1973: § 568, lc: my italics)

On the other hand, the term 'metonymy· is used to denote a specific semantic relation between two senses of a given polysemous lexeme. as for instance: (2)

Eng.

bar

<sense 1> <sense~>

<sense,> <sensej>

'counter' 'public house' (metonymic sense in relation to <.o;ense,>)

To keep things clear. it would be better to call cases like Eng. bar(with respect to its sense\} 'metonymic polysemy.· Nevertheless. there is a close relationship between ad hoc metonymy as illustrated in (I) and metonymic polysemy as illustrated in (2): just as polysemy in general develops through 'lexicalization' of a semantic change ultimately triggered by a contextual and/or expressive ad hoc use of a word in discourse. 2 metonymic polysemy also develops through lexicalization out of ad hoc metonymic usage in discourse - or put the other way around. metonymy constitutes an ad hoc innovation that can potentially induce a 'metonymic change' in the meaning of the lexeme concerned. which thereby becomes (metonymically) polysemous. I will come back to this issue in Section 9.

3.

Metonymy and contiguity

We have to look for the semantic basis of ad hoc metonymy in order to account for metonymic polysemy as well. Traditionally, metonymy (and especially ad hoc metonymy) belongs to the realm of rhetoric. To my knowledge. the earliest definition of metonymy (Lat. denominatio) as a rhetorical trope in its own right is to be found in the Rhetorica ad Heren11ium: (3)

Denominatio est, quae ab rebus propinq11i.f et finitimis trahit orationem. qua possit intellegi res. quae non suo vocabulo sit appcllata.

Frame and Comiguity

141

'Denominatio (i.e., ·metonymy') is a trope that takes its expression from near and clo.~e things and by which we can comprehend a thing that is not denominated by its proper word.' )my translation) (Her. IV: 32.43 =Anonymous 1894: 337; my italics). By re.~ propinquae et finitimae. the author of the Rhetorica ad Herenniwn virtually introduces an associative or cognitive element into his definition, namely the relation of closeness that might remind us of the atlcyyt'~· constituting one of the three relations Aristotle sets up to account for the process of remembering:

(4)

b\0 xui tO fq>E~11c;: Of}QEUo~EV vo~oavtEc;: (mO toU vUv ~ CiUou

nvOc;:. xai 'Of.lolou ~ ivavtlou ylyvnm 1i Uvc:'.t~tVf}Otc;:.

~

toU

atlvcyyv~.

bul toUto

'So we track down the sequence (of our ideas) by starting from the present moment or from something else and from something similar or opposite or close (to it). That is the way remembering comes about.' (my translation] (Aristotle. De memorict et reminiscentia, 45Jb: 18-22 =Aristotle 1975:300: my italics). In view of the fact that the theory of rhetorical tropes and the theory of remembering are, prinlll facie. two very different fields of investigation. the author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium was probably not in any way innuenced by Aristotle. And that is the way the story continued for a long time. On the one hand. we have the classical rhetorical conception of metonymy. more or less clearly involving a relation of closeness (or merely a constant relation of some kind). In the form of the notion of xu.rU.xrpJOt~.the rhetorical theory offers a device for coping even with lexicalized metonymic (or synecdochical or metaphorical) change of meaning (cf. Lausberg 1973: §§562 and 577: for metaphorical xu.TciX(!IJOI~ sec also Koch 1994: 203f. 207). Not very surprisingly. several 19th century historical linguists (Reisig. BrCal. Paul. Darmesteter. Nyrop. etc.) took up the rhetorical basis for describing metonymic (as well as other types of) change of meaning (cf. Nerlich 1992: Blank 1997a: 10-18). On the other hand. we have the modem thread of English sensualist philosophy and a<>sociationist psychology (Hobbes. Locke. Hume. James and John St. Mill. Bain. etc.) relying heavily on the relation of 'contiguity' and, to a lesser degree. on that of 'similarity.' This tradition does not go directly back to Aristotle·s views presented in (4) - despite partly analogous distinctions. 3

142

Peter Koch

A first resolute attempt to bridge the by now traditional associationist relations and the linguistic classification of semantic change (Wundt 1912: 459--627) unfortunately did not dearly outline just metonymy ... Meanwhile. Kruszewski had applied the two associationist relations of similarity and contiguity directly to the functioning of linguistic entities and. thereby, prepared Saussurc's (synchronic) two-axes theory. which opposed ·associative· relations (i.e .. thosc fanned by pure similarity. in absentia) and ·syntagmatic' relations (i.e., those fanned by contiguity. in prae.wmtiu) between linguistic entities (cf. Kruszewski 1884-90: Saussure 1916: 170--180; Holenstein 1975: 143-145: Happ 1985: 37-52). It was only LConcc Roudet ( 1921: 686--692). who. in a most straightforward account, took up as.'lociationist relations and Saussure's twu axes and thereby established the systematics of semantic change as illustrated in Table I. T11blc- I.

S.\·.~temaric.f

11[ .w.'malllif· dlllllf?t' f /...n)lln' Ramlt'rJ 1dea~

wonh

contiguity similarity

To my knowledge, it is here for the fin>ttime that the cognitive comptment of metonymy is explicitly stated in tcnns of associationist psychology (and in accordance with the classical rhetorical tradition): (5)

Chungemems rt!.wlrant d"wre as.wcimion par contigui~t! entre /es idies. Taus Jes changements que ron a appclCs changements par connexite ou par mCtonymie (devcnue inconsciente) appartiennent 3 cctte categoric. (Roudct 1921: 690)

Take our example (2)_ In a public house we nonnally find a counter across which liquor and food are served. Thus. there is a spatial contiguity between the ideas COUNTER and PUBUC HOUSE. Their contiguity must have triggered the metonymic change of meaning (from 'counter· to 'public house') that underlies the metonymil: plllysemy of Eng. bar ·counter: publil: house.' Now let us consider another example {cf. DHLF, s.v_pri.wn).

143

Frame ami Comiguity

(6)

OFr.

Ia priso11 'act of seizing," hence: ·captivity: hence: 'prison.' hence: (Mfr.) 'penalty of imprisonment'

BetWL.'Cn ACT 01' SEIZING and CAPTIVITY there is a temporal and a causal contiguity: and between CAPTIVITY and PRISON there is a spatial contiguity. a-. there is also between PRISON and PENALTY OF IMPRISONMEtfl. These contiguity relations are the cognitive basis of the corresponding metonymic changes {and of the resulting synchronic metonymic polysemies we observe in OFr. Ia pri.w11 'act of seizing: captivity: prison' and MFr. let pri.wm 'prison: penalty of imprisonment'). Roudet's diachronic considerations were not paid much attention to in the discussions of the following decades. which concentrated on synchronic and theoretical issues. A far more influential statement. including thoughts on the functioning of metonymy in general (but not on metonymic change!), is due tu Roman Jakobson (1956). who. inspired by Kruszewski and Saussure. put forward his two-axes theory with far-reaching overall correlations, paralleling contiguity- l')'lllllf:matic axis- {'omhillaticm- Broca ctphaJia- metonymy on the nne hand, and similarity - ptmuligmutic axi::i - selectioll - Wernickr aphasia - metaplwr on the other hand.s The oversimplifications inherent in these correlations have been criticized on several grounds (cf. the criticism in Holenstein 1974: H
Af.~oC'iatwn ll'.~t: ,f/Wmlu.~

'lmt' IRnmun

·positional' similarity (PARADIGMAnc relation)

Jakob.wml ·positional' contiguity (SYNTAGMATIC rdation)

'semantic' (-+ .. lmr/llo/11)

'semantic· SIMII.ARITY

t-+ ...

i.~ tl

poor lillie luJ/I.fe)

(<'ONTRAST)

In this way. Jakobson brings together the rhetorical-poetic notion of 'metonymy· and the semantic-associative relation of ·contiguity.'

Peter Knd1

144

From a psychological and anthropological perspective, contiguity (and similarity/contrast) seem to be absolutely fundamental a<>sociativc relationships (cf. also Raible 1981). But there remain some problematic points. especially with respect to language. First, a 'semiotic' problem: if we apply contiguity to metonymy. that is. to word semantics. which semiotic level do we have to aim at? This problem will be dealt with in Section 4. Second. a 'psychological' problem: is contiguity a well-defined relationship and what is it like? This question will be taken up in St.'Ction 5.

4.

Contiguity as a conceptual relation

Let us begin with the semiotic problem. As we have already seen (cf. quotation (5)). according to Roudct. melonymy is based on a contiguity between ideas. that is - in more up-to-date terms - ·conceptual' contiguity. In conlraslto this. Table 2 reveals that Jakobson·s authoritative two-axes theory does not deal with concepts. but with linguistic ·signs: So in Jakubson·s approach. metonymy seems to presuppose a (semantic) contiguity between linguistic signs. Similarly. in the period following. many scholars accounted for metonymy and metonymic change in tcmts of contiguity between the 'senses· of two 'words." Consider for instance Ullmann· s systematics of the ·essence· of semantic change. which only superficially seems identical to Roudel's system (Table 1). by which it has indeed been inspired (cf. Ullmann 1962: 211-227: Blank 1997a: 19f, 35-38). Tahlt' J. "Esunn•' ofJC'mantic dwllf{C (Stt>pllcll UlfnwrmJ

conllguity -~imilanty

As ·sense· probably corresponds to the Saussurian .~ignifii. we would have to explain metonymic change by contiguity between linguistic meanings. which is not easy to imagine in abstracto. On a more technicaJ level. contiguity between ·sememes· of wurds has been described in terms of operations on sets of semantic features. when treating. for example. rhetorical metonymies or metonymic polysemy (cf. Dubois et al. 1970: 106ff: Martin 1992: 75-86).

Frame and Contiguity

145

According to lhis approach. in our polysemous example (2), we would have to posit a semantic feature (counter} as figuring in the set of features that fonn the sememe 'public house' of the word Eng. bar. Things get even more complicated when we have to describe cases of metonymic change in which the original meaning has not survived - a situation that can occur, sooner or later. with any semantic change (cf. REW. s.v.focus): (7)

Clat. focus 'fireplace·> Vlat.foms 'fire' (d. Fr.feu: lt.fuoco: Sp.fuego, etc.)

Would we have to posit, in this case,a feature (fireplace] as still functioning in the sememic description of Fr. feu. etc.? Obviously, this cannot be a realistic approach to metonymy. Following this line of inquiry. we would be compelled to integrate into our linguistic description of a given lexical item all the infonnation necessary to explain whatever metonymy may occur in this lexical item in the course of - even future language history.ln most cases ofmetonymy.lthink. this method would yield a far too powerful and at the same time an 'overbrcd' linguistic description. Moreover. an intralinguistic solution for contiguity seems inappropriate from the outset. The metonymy Eng. bar 'counter: public house' is possible thanks to our knowledge of public houses and counters and not thanks to our knowledge of the word bar. Similarly, the metonymy Lat.focu.\· 'fireplace: fire' was possible thanks to lhe Romans' knowledge of fireplaces and fire. It is not our knowledge of words (and their semantic features). but our knowledge of the world that detennines contiguities. So metonymy is not a problem of linguistic structure, but a problem that concerns the relation between language and the extralinguistic world. Contiguity has to be considered as constituting a conceptual. extraJinguistic and not an intralinguistic relationship (see Le Guem 1973: 14, 25: Bredin 1984: 52f: Happ 1985: 129: Koch 1991: 284. 1993: 281; Blank 1993: 37, and lhis volume: also lhe notion cotopie simiotique developed by Bonhomme 1987: 46).

5. Contiguity and frames I now come to the psychological problem involved in contiguity relationships. According to Umberto Eco ( 1984: 147), 'contiguity" is a wishy-washy notion:

146

Peter Koch

e concetto abbastanza sfumato I ..)"' (cf. also Weinrich 1987: 107). Brcdin (1984: 47) calls it "a convenient but unrevealing metaphor." Originally. the term 'contiguity' (like Greek mivEyyv~ in quotation (4)) belongs to the conceptual domain of space. Applying it to other conceptual relations (like the temporal or causal one between ACT OF SEIZING and CAMWITY in (6)). seems to involve a metaphor on the metaconceptuallevel: by choosing exactly this term. we conceptualize. on the mctaconceptuallevel. different types of concepiUal contiguity in terms of spatial contiguity. But is this metaphor legitimate on psychological grounds? Or do we run the risk of unduly spatializing cognitive relations of any kind? 7 In my opinion. we can retain the term 'contiguity' because it actually covers a coherent range of cognitive relations. But we are not bound to retain the underlying spatial metaphor. An alternative model accounting for contiguity as a unitary kind of relationship is the 'frame· model. elaborated in cognitive psychology and linguistics in the last two decades (cf.. for example, Minsky 1975: Fillmore 1975, 1985: Tannen 1979: Barsalou 1992: Cordier 1993: 143-147; cf. also the notion 'schema' in Bartlett 1932: 197-214.300304, 311-314). By recurring to frames. we can easily understand metonymic phenomena because frames - and this is a point I would like to stress - are non-linguistic. conceptual wholes. When acknowledging the latter fact. we do not have to overproliferate linguistic-semantic descriptions only for the sake of metonymies. Contiguity is the relation that exists between elements of a frame or between the frame as a whole and its clements. Thus. PUBLIC HOUSE constitutes a frame (Figure I). one of whose clements is the COU/IITER (cf. (2)). '"1-.-1 Ia contiguita

Fig11re /. PUBUC HOU!'Wframe

Frame and Comiguity

With regard to example (7). there is a whose elements is obviously FIRE.

Fig11re 2.

147

FIREPLACE

frame (Figure 2). one of

FIREPUCEjramt'

Similarly, there exists a frame, say. DEPRIVATION OF UBERTY (Figure 3) comprising different elements such as ACT OF SEIZING, CAPTIVITY, PRISON, PRISONER, PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT, and SO on, that easily accounts for the metonymic changes of OFr. priso11 from 'act of seizing' to 'captivity· and thereafter to 'prison' (cf. (6)).

Figi4Te

3. DEPRIVATION Of" UBERTY fralllt'

Peter Koch

148

Consider also the following, more complex example. In certain cultures at certain times. we lind a MARRIAGE frame (figure 4),comprising elements such as BETIWTHAL,

AANCE(E), TRUST/ENGAGEMENT. SOMEONE who

('unites in matrimony') the

BRIDE

MARRIES 1

and the BRIDEGROOM. who MARRY 2 ('take

each other as WIFE/HUSBAND'), MARRIAGE CONTRACf. VOW/OATH, WEDDING. PRAYER, UNION OF WIFE AND HUSBAND. SET UP HOUSE, MOTIIERHOOD, and SO on.

On the basis of this frame. we can unitarily explain a series of quite different metonymies in different languagcs:M (8)

a. Lat. spon.sus,-a 'fiancC(e).' hence: 'bride(groom)" > VLat. 'husband/wife' (cf. Sp. espo.w.-a: Fr. epoux. -se) b. Du. trouwen 'to entrust s.o. to s.o.: hence 'to betroth.' hence 'to marry 1' (cf. MHG triiwen. NHG tra11en) c. OE weddian 'to engage.' hence 'to marry,· d. Lat. mta 'vows'> Sp. boda(s) 'wedding'Pol. .oilub ·vow,' hence: 'marriage' Goth./iugo 'marriage' (cf. Olr./u(i)ge, Cym.llw, Br./i 'oath') e. (OHG iwa 'law; contract'>) MHG i(we) 'marriage contract,' hence: ·marriage' (cf. NHG Ehe) f. OFr. marier 'to marry 1' =Eng. to marry 'to unite in matrimony.' hence: 'to take s.o. as husband/wife' g. Fr. mariage 'marriage', hence: 'union of wife and husband' and 'wedding' h. Lat. matrimmziw11 (originally) 'motherhood.' hence: 'marriage' (i.e., 'union of wife and husband') >It. matrimo11io 'marriage,' hence also 'wedding' > Sp. matrimonio 'marriage,' hence also 'husband and wife' VLat. casare 'to set up house'>! Sp. ca.wr 'to marry 1' j. Lat. oralio 'prayer'~ Br. eured 'wedding'

Frame and Conliguity

149

Figure 4. MARRIAGE frame

6.

Frames and prototypes

But there still remain some problems with contiguity and even with frames. The original paradigm of associationist philosophy and psychology (see Section 3), which leans heavily on contiguity, takes a rather mechanistic approach.9 Whenever there is contiguity, there has to be an associative link. But is not everything contiguous to everything else'! So why do we not associate everything with something or something with anything or everything'! Frame models seem to be more subtle because they represent non-accidental networks of contiguities. But even a frame model conceived as categorical (something is or is not in a frame: this is inevitable. I think, in Artificial Intelligence) would not serve our purpose. Quite on the contrary: We have to acknowledge (see (2)) that there are perhaps public houses without a counter, which we would nevertheless call bars. We have to acknowledge (see (7)) that there are fireplaces without a (burning) fire and that fire is not confined to fireplaces: and, nevertheless. speakers of Vulgar Latin would have used the word focus to denote FIRE.

Peter Koch

150

We have to acknowledge (sec (8)) that there arc marriages without a wedding. husbands and wives that were never fiance(e)s before. mar· riages without motherhood and vice versa. etc. Nevertheless. all the metonymic changes exemplified in (8) have taken place. So then we have to admit that contiguity relations only hold for ·salient' members of the conceptual categories involved. Frames and the contiguity relations constituting them have 'prototypical' charactcr: 10 A prototypical public house has a counter, and so we call it bar. Prototypically. a fireplace has a fire burning in it. and for Roman people. the prototypical fire may have been that of the fireplace; so they called it joCil.~.

A prototypical marriage begins with a wedding; in certain cultures at certain times. prototypical husbands/wives arc engaged before they get married. etc. It is on the basis of such prototypical frames and contiguities that metonymy works. This should not be misunderstood. Many prototype theorists speak of metonymic 'extension: reducing metonymic change to a prototypical effect within one and the same category. I do not adhere to this kind of purely semasiologically based. 'extended' prototype notion (cf. Fillmore 1982: 32f; Jongcn 1985: 126f: Lakoff 1987: 91-117. 416-461 and passim; Gceracrts 1988, 1997: 21f; Taylor 1989: 99-141; see the astute criticism of Kleiber 1990: 147-183; see also below. Section 7 .I., and cf. Warren 1992: 123; Koch 1995: 37-40.1996a: 129-131. 1996b: 231-234: Blank 1997a: 79-85. 1997b: 89-93). On the contrary .I would like to draw attention to the fact that, from an onomasiological point of view, PUBLIC HOUSE, for instance, although belonging to the same frame, is not a peripheral instance of the category COU!'ITER (nor vice versa). 11 So the two tenns of a contiguity relation. for instance COUI"'TER and PUBLIC HOUSE. are two distinct conceptual categories. both prototypically structured in themselves (figure 5). Strictly speaking. metonymic change involves prototypicality only inasmuch a-. the underlying contiguity relation would not hold but for the salient, prototypical members of one or both of the two categories concerned, and it is then generalized to these categories as wholes. Or, as Simon C. Dik (1977) puts it. these changes of meaning presuppose a sort of 'inductive generalization' (cf. also Geeraerts 1997: 68ft).

Fnmu· and Conriguit.r

151

ftS:III"<' 5 Crmlrgml\ t<'ialrmrl'<'/11<'<'11/'/ Hill /WI \f wul t 0/ Yllk

7.

Frames and gestalts

When \\e introdm:e notion!'! like ·prototype· and ·saliem:e· into frame theory. we recogniJ.e the ·gc!'!talt" character of !nunc!'! and cont1guitic!'!. 1 ~ It I !'I only h) leaning on ..;alil-nce c!Tect!'! within frame!'! that we can avoid the aporia!'! of a mechani!'!tic associati(mist approach tlr of categorical frame model!<.. More pred!'!d)". from a gestalt per..;pective. metonymy turn!'! out to he a "figurclgroumr effect. Con!<. iller r:igure 6 a!'! a trat..litional example of a pcrcep· tual hgurelground mn!'!tellation. In this figure. we can perceive a white cro!'!!'! on black ground. hut alternatively. it !'!CC!ll!'! to he a black cross on \\bite grount..l (d. Wittgcnstein 1958: 207).

f"is:ur.·

n. Figw·•·t s:1 mmd P<"l, cpllo/1

Peter Koch

152

Coming now to the conceptual level, we can claim that every concept designated by a given lexical item appears as a figure in relation to (at least) another contiguous concept that - for the time being - remains the ground within the same frame. But at some moment. while we are using the same lexical item, certain pragmatic. conceptual or emotional factors may highlight the ground concept so that figure and ground become inverted. That is what we call metonymy. Thus. in one of the senses of Ofr. prison ('captivity'; sec above (6)), CAMWITY was the figure and PRISON one possible ground (Figure 7a). By highlighting PRISON into the figure and backgrounding CAPTIVITY, prison was acquiring the new metonymic sense 'prison' (Figure 7b). According to Croft ( 1993: 348). we can interpret metonymy as a concep· tual effect of domain highlighting within one domain matrix (opposing it to metaphor as a conceptual effect of domain mapping across different domain matrices).U In the case of OFr.pri.wm 'captivity; prison: we shift. say. from the domain (HUMAN) CONDITION to the domain LOCATION within the domain matrix for pri.wm. Note. however. two significant differences between the domain·matrix approach and the frame approach proposed above: I. Frame-internal relations. in as far as they represent contiguity relations, exclude any similarity or taxonomic relations (relevant to metaphor and extension/restriction of meaning only). For domain (matrices) this is not so clear: the domain structure underlying the concept of the letter 'T.' for

DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY

e~ Figure 7a. Figure CAI'Tfvm·. !(rmmd PRISON

.,

Frame and Comiguiry

153

DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY

·~·e Fi~f/Tt' 7h. Fi~ure PRISON, ~rn1111tl C'APTIVm'

2.

8.

instance, contains relations like COMMUNICATION - HUMAN BEINGS, i.e .. contiguity relations, but a)so LIVING THINGS - HUMAN BEINGS, i.e .. taxonomic relalions (cf. Croft 1993: 340--342).1 think that the incorrect. but widespread tenn 'metonymic extension' (sec Section 6) results just from an insufficient distinction between contiguity relations and taxonomic relations (including 'soft.' prototype-based relations). The same holds, by the way, for the confusion inherent in the traditional notion of 'synecdoche' (sec Section 8). In general. domain matrices are defined semasiologically in relation to an existing lexical item (cf. also Croft 1993: 338). whereas frames. which are relevant not only to metonymies but also to certain types of word fonnation. can - and in fact. should - be defined onomasiologically, so that even cross-over links within one and !he same frame realized in different languages (cf. Figure 4 and examples (8)), concepts which have not yet been expressed. senses of a given word which do not yet exist. and new words which have not yet been fanned can all be provided for.

The range of metonymy

A frame-based interpretation of contiguity helps us to determine the notion of 'metonymy: whose range is not clear in all respects. According to rhetorical

154

Peter Koch

tradition, we can distinguish metonymy from synecdoche, but the latter often appears to be only a special case of the fanner (l..ausbcrg I 973: §§572-577: Bredin 1984: 45f). However. as Le Guem ( 1973: 36f0 has pointed out. synecdoche is not, in reality. a unitary trope (sec also Section 7 .I.): traditional synecdoche comprises (or rather: confuses) cases of taxonomic extension/ generalization (e.g .. bread 'foodstuff) or restriction/specification (e.g .. morwl 'man') on the one hand. which have nothing to do with metonymy. and cases of pars pro toto/totum pro parte on the other hand (e.g .• roof 'house': America 'USA'). In my opinion. we should integrate pars pro tottJ and tot11m pro parte into metonymy (cf. also Ullmann 1962: 212: Schifko 1979: 247: Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 36; Croft 1993: 350; Warren 1992: 64ff, 1995: Blank. this volume: Seto, this volume). Separating metonymy and panllotum 'synecdoche' would be artificial because the difference between pan!Iotum relations and (other) contiguities is often not so ea<>y to pin down. For instance. arc the relations COUNTER- PUBLIC HOUSE or flRE- AREPLJ\CE to be considered pars/ totum relations or relations of location? 14 Behind these possible differences and uncertainties, we nevertheless perceive a fundamental constant: the pars/ totw" tropes.like any metonymic trope. involve a figure/ground effect: in pars pro toto. the totum- as a ground that becomes the figure- is a whole frame. and the pars - as a figure that becomes the ground - is one of the concepts of this frame (and vice versa for totum pro parte). So we can retain our definition given in Section 5: contiguity is a salient relation that exists between the elements (or sub-frames) of a conceptual frame or between the frame as a whole and its elements. Consequently. metonymy implies a contiguity-ba'ied figure/ground effect between elements of a conceptual frame or between the frame as a whole and one of its elements (or vice versa). A new differentiation between two contiguity-based changes of meaning has been suggested by Warren. who distinguishes 'metonymy' from 'implication' (cf. Warren 1992: 51-72. tot, 1995). Metonymy (in her narrow sense of the tenn) is a non-literal usc of a word that causes an abrupt shift of meaning. restricted to a few. well-defined contiguity relations and - nonnally - to nouns. Implication, on the other hand. is the gradual development of novel. coexisting senses. based on if-then contiguities of any kind and occurring in adjectives. verbs, and nouns. I reject this differentiation on the following grounds.

Frame ami Co,tiguiry

155

first of all, it can easily be shown that metonymies (in this narrow sense) are possible even with verbs and adjectives: (9)

Fr.

desce,dre 'to go down,' hence: 'to take down· (with many parallels in other languages: cf. Koch 1991: 294; Haspelmath 1993:92-94. 101.104. I 12-120: see also our example Eng. marry in (Sf))

( 10) Eng.

.md 'distressed.' hence: 'distressing· (with many parallels in other languages: cf. BDE, s.v. scul)

Secondly. we have to acknowledge that a frarne-ba'icd figure/ground effect is present in 'implications' as well as in 'metonymies· (in the narrow sense). I would claim that the difference resides rather in the pragmatic_ referential and expressive conditions in which these metonymies (in the broad sense) emerge in discourse, as we will see in the next section.

9.

The origins of metonymy in discourse

In Section 2 I said that metonymic change of meaning is induced by ad hoc metonymies. The first step is always a figure/ground effect in discourse. We ~:an imagine at lema three possible types of ad hoc figure/ground effects for metonymy in discourse. Consider. first of all. a putative reconslruction of the ad hue figure/ground effect underlying (7) and illustrated in Table 4. Table 4. Metonymic innomtinfl tlrrouf:l' inference: FIN#-.-

This kind of frequently occurring ligurc/ground effect is due to a situational context in which both interpretations are pragmatically indifferent, which may in tum give rise to an almost surreptitious conceptual reinterpretation of the

156

Peter Km·h

lexical item. Traugott and KOnig call this process 'pragmatic strengthening' or ·conventionalization of conversational implicatures/infcrences.· In this cao,;e, it is the hearer (as a virtual speaker) who triggers the metonymic innovation which induces a metonymic change later on (cf. KOnig and Traugott 1988;

Traugott and Konig 1991: 193f0. A similar analysis probably applies to one of the steps of semantic change in our example (6). which may be represented as in Table 5. Table 5. Meto/1.\'Riic innoration tl!rollf.lh illferl'nce: PRtSD.'•'

I suppose that this type of figure/ground effect is the one Warren calls 'implication.· A second type of ad hoc figure/ground cffL'CI is triggered by the speaker. as illustrated in Table 6. A Latin speaker wanL'\ to refer to the thigh of a person. but instead of using the 'exact' lexical item (Lat.fenmr). he imprecisely recurs to another item (coxal which designates a contiguous concept. namely HIP (cf. Blank 1997a: 3880. Tahfe 6. Mnm•.vmk inmll'(ltion through •mprt>ci.fiOII.' THIGH

The third type of ad hoc metonymy corresponds to metonymy a.o; a rhetorical trope. •s A Latin speaker. in a very emotional setting. wants to refer to the head of a person he or she dislikes or is angry with. So the speaker does not use lhc neutral word cap11t. but he chooses a more expressive lexical means. the word tesltl 'skull.· It is the figure/ground effect between sKULL (as a salient part) and HEAD (as the whole) that produces expressiveness here (Table 7).

Frame a11d Comiguiry

157

Note the pragmatic differences between these three types of metonymic innovation (irrespective of the fundamental figure/ground constant). In the examples in Tables 4 and 5. it is the hearer (qua virtual speaker) who brings about the innovation, whereas in the examples in Table 6 and in Table 7 it is the speaker. In the cases described in Tablc::s 4 and 5 and in Table 6. the "oddness· of the innovation can be "repaired' on the basis of Grice· s ( 1975) conversatiunal implicatures. whereas in the case described in Table 7 the metonymic trope is meant to be striking and not intended to be "repaired.' Later on, by conventionalization through lexicalization, it loses its striking effect and. hence, its expressiveness.

10. Contiguity, gender change, and word formation So far I have been looking at the role of contiguity in relation to metonymic change of meaning. which. by producing metonymic polysemy. constitutes an important contribution to lexical diversification. Now it is interesting to note that contiguities within frames also enable us to explain other types of lexical diversification. Recall the frame DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY (Figure 3) that Comprised concepts such as All" Of SEIZING. CAPTIVITY. PRISON. PRISONER. PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT. etc. and allowed for an explanation of our example (6): as we have seen, several clements of this same frame were designated one after the other by the polysemous item Fr. lc1 priso11 (with feminine gender). Now I would like to draw your attention to lhe item /i pri.wns (with masculine gender). which in Old French enabled speakers lo designate yet another concept. namely PRISONER:

158

Peter Koch

(6') Ofr.

Ia prison 'captivity"-+ li pri,\'OIIs 'prisoner'

This new possibility of designation is ba'iCd once again on a contiguity relation within the same frame. However. it is not simply a case of change of meaning. but the creation of a new lexical item identical with the original one (Ia prison). except for the gender. We have to conclude that frames and contiguities not only account for metonymic change and polysemy. but also for other lexical processes such as gender change. In this area. besides gender change. which is of minor importance, we especially have to think of certain types of word fonnation. Ofr.li prisom (6') has not survived in Modem French. but in competition with it. there existed the item U prisonier.\· 'prisoner." which has survived in Modem French: (6'') OFr.

Ia prison 'captivity' -+ li pri!wniers 'prisoner·> MFr. le prismmier

Semantically. the item pri.wmnier belongs to a type of derivation called 'Ausgriff by Gauger ( 1971: 66--74).1n my analysis. this type of derivation is also founded upon contiguity within frames: a new concept is 'grasped' (and a new word is formed) by 'reaching out' from a contiguous concept designated by a word which already exists. 16 This is a most important insight. Frames and contiguities represent a very fundamental cognitive principle underlying several lexical processes which considerably differ from each other. The processes are: metonymic change of meaning (without any morphological change). gender change. derivation of the · Ausgriff type. and. as we will see in a moment. even a certain type of compositionP Let us consider. as a final example, the f'RUIT-TRI:.E frame (cf. Koch. in print). Ba'icd on the contiguity between FRUIT and TREE. in Italian. we find within this frame the following metonymic change of meaning and the resulting metonymic polysemy: (II) a. It.

limcme 'lemon·. hence: 'lemon tree'

In Spanish and English. on the other hand, we have word formations that arc based on exactly the same contiguity between FRUIT and TREE: (II) b. Sp. limc11l 'lemon'-+ limonero 'lemon tree' (derivation) c. Eng. lemon-+ lemon tree (composition) As (lie) shows. there exists in English a - by the way, very importanttype of nominal composition N 1 + N 2 • in which the concept designated by N 1

Frame and Conliguiry

159

(LEMON FRUIT) and the concept designated by N 1 + N 2 (LEMON TREE) are contiguous (whereas the relation between the concept designated by N, (TREE) and the concept designated by N 1 + N 2 (LEMON TREE) is that of tax~nomic subordination). A purely semasiological approach (see Section 7 .2.) may be able to reconstruct examples like (!Ia), but it would not account for the fundamental cognitive principle underlying examples (!Ia), as well as (lib) and (lie). whose essential conceptual homology can be elucidated only by an onomasiological frame approach.

11. Conclusion In conclusion. when trying to grasp the mechanisms underlying metonymy. it may be useful to integrate four different traditional and non-traditional paradigms of ·cognitive' research: the associationist paradigm, gestalt theory. frame theory, and prototype theory. In certain cases (see Section 9). it is stimulating to take KOnig and Traugotfs (1988) pragmatic strengthening theory into account as well. It is only the integration of these different approaches that enables us to appreciate the nature and the relatedness of frames and contiguities. The salient links between elements of a given frame - as constituting a prototypical conceptual gestalt - are what we call contiguity relations. Along these contiguities, people can produce the figure/ground effects underlying metonymies. But frames and contiguities extend considerably beyond the realm of metonymy: they also help us to understand certain types of gender change and word formation. So. metonymy is a very important - though not the only - rhetorical and lexical device that gives us a clue to the fundamental role of frames and contiguities.

Notes I express my gr.llitude 10 Mary Copple (Berlin) for !he stylistic revision of !his paper. 2.

Concerning !he in1ima1e link belween M!manlie change and poly:-cmy. cf. Br~al (1921: 143ff. 2H4-2117). Wenh (1974: 3710. Koch (1991: 2113). Blank (1993: 31). for me-

Peter Koch

160

tonymy. sec especially Schifko {1979: 148-251). The lexicalization step~ for metaphor are described in Koch ( 1994: 203-209): a general fmmewol'k for lexicalization (and delexicalization) processes within sc:mantic change ha.~ been established in Blank (1997a: 116-130). Note the imponant difCerence between 'innovation' and 'change'

proposed by Coseriu (19511: 44--46). 3.

Cf. Amin (1973: 19-81.espedally 38). The first to explicitly lake up Aristode seem~ to be the Scot~man Thoma.~ Brown, who occupies a somewhat particular position with respect to as.'IOCiationism (cf. ibid.: 12).

4.

Cf. the critical outlines ofWundt's approach in Roudet (1921: 681-686); Nerlich (1992: 77-80): Blank ( 1997a: ISO.

5.

From

Hjelm.~lcv onward.~.

Saussure's rather open concept of 'associative' relation

i.~

replaced by the technical, more specifiC concept of 'pamdigmatic' relation (EiniERI OR-relation of substilution in a given syntagmatic environmenl): cf. Hjelmslev (1963: 33-40); Happ (1985: 52-59). 6.

Cf. Jakob...on (1956: 90f): Holenstein (1974: 81-91); Happ (19115: 75-79. 130--139). According to Raible (1911l),the distinction between semantic(-parodigmatic) contiguity (hilt -thatch) and (semantic-Jsyntagmatic contiguily (/lilt- b11m1 out) is es.<;ential for

preferences in human verbal

asSIX'iation~.

7.

Ra.~tier ( 1997: 140-145) undcn;cores the undeniable tendency of cognitive linguistics to spatialize irs object~ of description.

8.

Cf. BDE.s.v. marry; DCECH, s.vv. boda,t·asar, espruo;D£, s.v. Ehe; DELL. s.v.mater; DHLF. s.vv.lpoltx. marier; DSSP/L, s.vv. 2.33 marry. 2.34 marriage; REW. s.vv. msa,

9.

Cf. the critical observations in Amin (1973. especially 39-42, 111-115).

10.

For prototype theory. cf. Rosch (1973); Fillmore (1975); Taylor ( 1989); Kleiber (1990): Cordier (1993).

II.

Sec also Geernens ( 1997: 741). Concerning the difference between s.alience effects within a frame and prototypicality effects within a category. cr. Cordier (1993: 122-124, 135149).

12.

For gestalt theory in general. d. for example Wenheimer (1922123): KOhler (1947): Metzger (1986). Amin (1973: 97-155. 201() stresses the hoiL~tic char.acter of gestalt psychology a.-. opposed to the mechanistic a."sociationist approach. but he nevenheless does not definitively exclude .a synthesis of association and 'gestalt' (cf. also Raible 1981:

13.

Cf. also Taylor (1989: 90). For the notions 'domain' and 'domain matrix.' cf. Langacker (1987: 147ft). - As to the totally different character of metaphor. cf .. for instance. Bilhler (1965: 342-350): Black (1954: 1977); Lakoff and Johnson (1980): Bredin (1984: 57): Lieben (1992: 28-82): Koch (1994: 209-214).

so.

14.

Cf. also Cordier (1993: 123). Within the type of contiguity called ·co-presence' by Blank (this volume), there are several relations that can hardly be distinguished from pt~rsl tfltlun: n'PICALASI'ECT- ACTIVITY, TYPICAL II.SI'ECT- FRAME, TYMCAL ASPECT- OBJI!(T, FUNcrtON -OBJECT. OBJECT- PLACE. On the Other hand. Blank's distinction between

Frame and Conliguity

161

"co-prc~ence" (including parsltntt11n) and ·succession· (excluding pursftnwm) seems rather dear-cut.

15.

We could speak here of ·everyday rhetoric" (A/Itagsrhnorik) in Stempel's sense (cf.. for example, 191!3): cf. also Koch and Ocstem:icher (1996: 61!-74. 79f); for the metonymy presented in Table 6 (and its many polygenctic par.allels), cf. Koch (1997: 23lf. 236).

16.

Different type~ of contiguity relations involved in certain Italian derivation processes have been described by Schwarze ( 1995) in tenns of several conceptual models that are in part frame models (the 'activity model.' ibid.: 500-506; the 'object con.~titution model,' ibid.: 506-509, etc.)

17.

cr. also

Schifko 1979.252-257 (unlike Schifko.l would not apply, however. the term 'metonymy· even to ca.o;es of derivation ('Ausgriff) and composition).

Abbreviations for languages

""

CLat. Cym.

D". Eng.

F•. Golh.

h. Lat. MHG

Breton Cla.~sical Latin Cymric Dutch English French Golhil: Italian Latin Middle High Gennan

MFr. NHG OE OFr. OHG Olr. Pol.

Sp. VLat.

Modem French New High Gennan Okl English Old French Old High Gennan Old Irish Polish Spanish Vulgar Latin

References Amin.Ismail 1973

A.uo:.iationsp.fyclwlogie und Gestaltpsyclwlogie: Eine prohlemge.n-hicht· fiche Studie mit bt'sonderer Bt'rlichidlligung der Berliner Schult'. Bern. Frankfurt!M.: Lang.

Anonymous 1894 Aristotle 1975

/ncerti auctoriJ De ratione dicendi ad C. Herennium lihri IV. Leipzig: Teubner (reprint Hildesheim: Olms. 1966) Aristotle in Twentl··TI1ru Volumt>s. VIII: On the Soul. Pan·a Naturalia. 011

Breath. With an English translation by W.S. Hen. Cambridge. MA. London: Harvard University Press. Barsalou. Lawrcnl:e W. 1992 Frames, concepts. and conceptual fields. In A. Lehrer. E.F. Kiuay tcds.),

Peter Koch

162

Frames. Fields, and Contra.~ts: N~w Es.mys in Semantic and Uxicaf Organi:arion. Hillsdale, NJ.london: Erlbaum, 21-74. Bartleu, Frederick Ch. 1932 Rememberinx: A Smd_,. i11 Erpt'rimemal. Soda/ Ps_wlwlogy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. BDE 1988 The Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology. Robert K. Barnhart, New York

Wilson. Black. Max 1954

Metaphor. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 55: 273-294. More about metaphor. Dialectica 31: 431-457.

1977 Blank. Andreas 1993 Polysemie und scmantischc Rclationen im lcxikon. In W. BOmer. K. Vogel (eds.), Worachat;; 1111d Fremdsprachenuwerb. Bochum: AKS. 2256. 1997a Prin;;ipien de.~ lexikali.fchen Bedemungsii'OIIclf!i.f am Beispiel der romani.fchen Spradren. TUbingcn: Niemeyer.

1997b II scnso di una semantka dci prototipi e dei 'frames': osservazioni decostruttivc e ricostruttive. In M. Carapezza et al. (eds.). IJn~:uagt:io e cogni;:ione. Atti del XXVIII Congre:uo della SocietiJ di IJnguistica Italiano, Palermo, 27-29 ottobre 1994. Roma: Bulzoni, 89-103. Bonhomme, Marc 1987 Linguistique de Ia mitonymie. Bern: Lang. BrCal. Michel 1921 Es.fai de simantique (science des si~:nificatiolls). Fifth edition. Paris: Hachette. Bn:din. Hugh 1984 Metonymy. Poetics Today 5:45-58. Bi.ihler.Karl 1965 SprUi'htheorie: Die Dar.ftelfung.ifunktion der Spraclle. Second edition. Stuttgan: Fischer. Cordier, Fram;oise 1993 Les reprhentatimls COKIIitil•e.f pril'iligiie.f: Typicaliti et ni1·emt de base. Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille. Coscriu. Eugenio 1958 Sincronia, diucrm1ia e historia: El problema del cambia lingiifstico. Uni· vcrsidad de Montevideo. Croft. William 1993 The role of domains in the interpn:tation of metaphors and metonymies. Cognitil'e l.ingui.ftic.f 4: 335-370. DCECH 1980-83 Diccio11ario crltico etimo/Ogico castellano e /Jispdnico. 5 vol. Second edition. J. Coromina.~. J.A. Pascual (eds.). Madrid: Gredos. DE 1989 Duden. Etymologie. HerklmftswOrterbuch der deurschen Sprache. Second edition. G. Dro~owski. Mannheim: Dudenverlag.

Frame and Conliguity

163

DELL 1951

Dictimmaire hymologique de Ia langue lati11e: HiJtoire des mou. A. Ernout. A. Meillet (ec.ls.). Paris: Klincksieck.

DHLF 1992 Dictio11naire Hi.uorique de Ia Lnngue Fra11raiu. 2 vol. Alain Rcy. Paris: Dictionnain:s le Robert. Dik, Simon C. 1977 Inductive generalisation in semantic change. In P J. Hopper (ed.).Studies in Descriptil·e and Hi.~torical Lillfi:Uistic.~. Festschrift for W.P. Lelmwr111. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins. 283-300. DSSPIL 1971 A Dictionary· of Selened Syno11pn.f in the Pri11cipallndo-Euro~an Languafi:e.~: A Comriburion to the HiJtory of Ideas. Third edition. C.D. Buck. Chicago: The University ofChigaco Press. Dubois, Jacques, Francis Edeline, Jean-Marie Klinkenberg. Philippe Minguet. Fran~ois Pin:. Hadel in Trinon 1970 Rllitorique 1:iniralr. Paris: Larousse. Eco, Umbeno 1984 Semiotica I' filosofia del lillgua!{fi:iO. Torino: Ein:.~.udi. Fillmore. Charles J. 1975 An alternative to checklist theories of meaning. ProceedingJ of the Amwol Meeting of tile Berkeley Ungui.fli("S Snciety 1: 123-131. 1982 Towards a descriptive fmmeworX for spatial dei:~;is. In RJ. Jarvella. W. Klein (ec.ls.), Spcech, Place, Action: Studies ill Deixis, Related Topin. Chichester: Wiley, 31-59. 1985 Frames and the semantics of understanding. Quaderni di Semantic a 4: 217240. Gauger. Hans-Martin 1971 Durch.fichti11e WOrter: "h.tr TI1eorieder Wonbild1mg. Heidelberg: Winter. Geer...erts, Dirl;. 1988 Prototypicality as a prototypical notion. Communication and Cognition 21: 343-355. 1997 Diachronic Protot)'pe Semantic.f: A Contribution to HiJtorical Uxicofogy. Oxford: Clarendon. Grice, H. Paul 1975 Logic and conversation. In P. Cole. J.L. Morgan (eds.).Sylllax and Sema11· tic.f. Vol. 3: Spee£"11 Al"ts. New YorX: Academic Press. 41-58. Happ. Heinz 1985 'Paradigmati.fd!' - '.fyntagmati.fch ': Zur Brstimmung und Kliirung ::weier Grundbegriffe der Sprachwisunschaft. Heidelberg: Winter. Ha~pelmath, Martin 1993 More on the typology of inchoative/causative verb alternation.~. In B. Comrie. M. Polinsky (eds.), Cau.mti\"eJ and Transiti•·ity. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins. 87-120.

Peter Koch

164

Hjelmslev, Louis 1963 ProleJlomena ro a Theory of lAnguage. Second edilion. Madison: Univcrsily of Wisconsin Press. Holenstein. Elmar 1974 Die zwei Achsen dcr Sprachc und ihre Grundlagen. In E. Holcnstcin (cxl.), 1976. Lingui.rtik - St>miotik - Hermeneutik: Pliidoyers fiir eine stmkturale Phiinomenologie. Frankfurt!M.: Suhrkamp, 76-113. 1975 Roman Jakob.fons phiinomenologischer Strukturafi.tmus. FrankfurtJM.: Suhrkamp. Jakobson, Roman

1956

Two a.o;pects of language and two types of aphasic disturbances. In R. Jakobson, M. Halle. 1971. Fwu/amt?ntals of l.LJnguage. Den Haag. Paris: MoUion, 67-96

Jongen. Rent 1985

Polysemy. !ropes, cognition or the non-Magrittian art of closing curtains whilst opening them. In W. Paprotte. R. Dirven leds.). The Ubiquity of Metaphor. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins, 121-139. Kleiber. Georges 1990 La .fimamique Ju protol)pe. Catexories et sellS fe.ticaf. Paris: Presses Universitaircs de France. Koch. Peter 1991 Semantische Valenz, Poly~emie und Bedeutungswandel bei romanischen Verben.ln P. Koch, T. Krefeld (eds.), Cmmexiones Romanicae. Dependenz und Valen: ;, romanischen Sprachen. Tiibingen: Niemeyer, 279-306. 1993 Kyenbl - tyonbo. Wurzeln kreolischer Lexik. In C. Foltys, T. Kotschi (eds.). Berliner Romanistiuhe Studien: Fiir Hor.ft Oclue. Berlin: lnstitut flir Romanische Philologie der Freicn Univcn.itiit, 259-287. 1994 Gedanken zur Mctapher- und zu ihrcr Alltii.glichkcit. In A. Sabban. C. Schmitt (cds.). Spraclllicher Alltag: LiiiRIIi.ftik- Rhetorik- literamrwis· senschaft. Fe.fl.fd!Ti/1 filr Wolf-Dieter Stempel. TUbingen: Niemeyer, 201-

225. 1995

Der Beitrag der Prototypcntheorie zur Historischcn Semantik: cine kritischc Bestandsaufnahme. Romanistisches Jahrbllc·h 46: 27-46. 19961!. Le prototype entre signifiC. dCsigne et n5fCrent. In H. Dupuy-Engelhardt (ed.), Questions de methode et de dilimitation e11 simalllique /exit-ale: Actes d'EUROSEM 1994. Reims: Presses Universitaires de Reims, 113135. 1996b La semantique du prototype: semasiologie ou onomasiologie? Uit.fl·hrift for fran:Osische Spral'he 1111d IJteramr 106: 223-240. 1997 La diacronia quale campo empirico della semantica cognitiva. In M. Carapezza et al. (eds.).Lingua~:gio e cogni::.ione.Atti del XXVIII Conxre.f.fO della Societil di LinRIIi.ftica ltaliana, Palermo. 27-29 ottobre 1994. Roma: Bulzoni. 225-246. in print TREE and FRUIT: A cognitive-onomasiological approach. Studi ltaliani di Lingui.uit-a Teorka ed Applicata.

Frame and Contiguity

165

K()l;h, Peter. WulfOesterreicher 1996 Sprachwandel und expressive Miindlichkeit. Zeitschrift fiir l.iteraturwis· senschaft w1d l.itJguislik 102: 64-96. Kohler, Wolfgang 1947 Gestalt P.f)"Cholog_\': An Introduction to New Concepts i11 Modern P.f.\"chof· og_\'. New York: Liveright. KOnig. Ekkehard, Elizabeth C. Traugott 1988 Pragmatic suengthening and semantic change. In W. Hiillen. R. Schulze {eds.). Under.ftandinx the Lexicon. Tiibingen: Niemeyer, 110-124. Kruszewski. Mikolaj 1884-90 Prin.zipien der Sprachentwick1ung. /nurnarimrale Zeitschrift fiir allgemeine SprachwiHenschaft 1: 295-307: 2: 258-268: 3: 145-187: 5: 133144. 339-360. Lakoff. George. Mark Johnson 1980 Meraphor.f We Liw 8)'. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Lakoff. George 1987 Women, Fire, and Da11gerous Things: What Categorie.f Re\·eal abour the Mind. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Langackcr. Ronald W. 1987 Fmmdation.f c:if CoRIIitiw!' Grammar. Vol. 1: Theoretical Prerequisites. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. Lausberg. Heinrich 1973 Handbuch der literari.fchetl Rherorik. Second edition. Mi.inchen: Hueber. Le Guem. Michel 1973 Simantiq11e de Ia mitaphore t:t de Ia mitonymie. Paris: Larousse. Lieben, Wolf-Andreas 1992 Metaphernberl'iclre der deut.fclle/1 Allmgsspraclre: Kogniti\·e linguisrik und die Per.fpt>bi\'e/1 einer Kognith·e11 l.e.fikographie. Frankfun!M.: Lang. Manin, Roben 1992 Pour une logique du sens. Second edition. Paris: Presses Universitaires de Fr.mce. Metzger. Wolfgang I 986 Ge.ftaltp.f)'Chologie: Au.fgewUhlte Werke au.f den Jahre11 1950 bi.f /982. M. Stadler. H. Crabus (eds.), Frankfun!M.: Kramer. Minsky. Marvin 1975 A framework for representing knowledge. In P.H. Winston (ed.), The P.fychologyofCompurer Vision. New York: McGr.tw-Hill. 211-277. Nerlich, Brigitte 1992 Semantic Theorie.f in Europe /830-1930: From Erymolog_\'lo Comexrualiry. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins. Raible. Wolfgang 1981 Von dc:r Allgegcnwan des Gegensinns (und c:iniger andercr Rclationen). Strategien zur Einordnung semantischer lnfonnationen. Zeitschrift fiir Romanisclle Pllilologie 97: 1-40.

166 Ra.~tier.

Peter Koclr Franr;ois 1997 De l"antinomie spatio-temporelle aux zones anthropiques. In H. DupuyEngelhardt. M.-J. Montibus (eds.). L 'orgw1i.mtion le:rkale et cogniti\·e di!J dimension.~ spmiafe t>t temporelle. A£·tes d'EUROSEM /996. Reims: Presses Universitaires de Reims, 139-153.

REW 1992 Romani.fches erymo/ogisr:hc>s Wi:irtt>rbuch. Second edition. W. MeyerLi.ibke. Heidel~rg: Winter. Rosch. Eleanor 1973 On the internal structure or perceptual and semantic categories. In Th.E. Moore (ed.). Cognitive De,•efopmem and tire Acquisition of Lant.:uage. New York: Academic Press, 111-144. Roudet. Uoncc 1921 Sur Ia classification psychologique des changements semantiques. Joumal de P.f)Tiwlogie normafe et patllofogique 18: 676--692. Saussure, Ferdinand de 1916 Cour.f de linguistiq11e ginirale. Paris. Lausanne: Payot. Schifko. Peter 1979 Die Metonymic als universaJes sprachliches Strukturprinzip. Gra:.a Lin· guisti.f('he Studien 10: 240-264. Schwarze.C. 1995 Grammatik der italie11i.fchen Sprache. Second edition. Tilbingen: Niemeyer. Stempel. Wolf-Dieter 1983 'lch vergesse alles·. Bemerkungen zurHyperbolik in der Alltagsrhetorik. In M. Faust et al. (eds.), Allgemeine Spradlwissensdwft, Spradltypologie 11nd Textlinguistik. Fe.ftsdtrift fUr Peter Hartmann. Tilbingen: Narr, 87-98. Tannen. Deborah 1979 What's in a frame'? In R.O. Freedle (ed.). New Directimu in Di.fcour.fe Prtx'es.fing. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 137-181. Taylor. John R. 1989 Linguistic Categori:.ation. Prototypes in Lingui.ftic Theory. Oxford: Clarendon. Traugon. Elizabeth C .. Ekkehard KOnig 1991 The semantics-pro~.gmatics of gr.tmmaticalization revisited. In E. Traugon. B. Heine (eds.),Approac·he.f to Grammaticuli:.lltitm. 2 vol. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins, 189-218. Ullmann, Stephen 1962 Semantics: All Introduction to the Science of Meaning. Odord: Blackwell. Warren, Beatrice 1992 Setue Oe\·elopmellls: A Comrastil•e Study of the Dn·elopmem of Sla11g Senses a11d Nm·el Sta11dard Senses ill English. Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksel. 1995 What is metonymy'? Paper read at the 12th ICHL. Manchester, August 1995.

Frame and Conliguity

167

Weinrkh. Hanlld 1987 Zur Definition tier Metonymic und zu ihrer Stellung in tier rhetorischen Kunst In A. Arens (cti.). Text·Ef)·mologie: Ulllersl!chmrgen zu Textkiirper unci Textilrhaft. Fe.~tschrift fUr Heinrich Ulusberg :um 75. Geb11rWag. Stungart: Steiner. 105-110. Werth. Paul 1974 Accounting for semantic change in current linguistic theory. In J.M. Anderson. Ch. Jones (eds.), Historical linguistic.~ 1: S·ynta..t and Morphology. lntemal and Comparatil·e Reconstruction. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 377-415. Wenheimer,Max 1922/23 Untersuchungen zur Lchre von tier Gestalt. PsychologiJC!u: Fors<·hun· gen l: 47-58. Wittgenstein. Ludwig 1958 Philosophical lnve.~tigotion.f. Second edition. Odord. Cambridge: Blackwell. Wuodt, Wilhelm 1912 [1900] Viilkerp.f.\"Chologie: Ei11e Umersucl11mg der Elltwicklung.fgeset:.e \'On Sprache, Mythu.f unci Sitte. Bc/.11: Die Spradre. Third edition. Leipzig: Engelmann.

Co-presence and Succession A Cognitive Typology of Metonymy

Andreas Blank University of Marburg

Mewnymy may in fa~:t be more ~:ommun than metaphor[ ... ]. And not only i~ it not widely ~tud­ ictl, but most accounb of it arc unsmisfactory. (Brcdin 1984: 45)

1.

Introduction

Over a decade ago. Hugh Bred in ( 1984) complained about the marginal status of metonymy studies up to that timc. 1 And in fact. typologies of metonymy from Fontanier( 1968(1830]) to Schifko (1979) or Lakoffand Johnson (1980) lack consistency in that there are usually metonymies remaining that do not fit

into any category. Especially. the widely accepted tripartition into ·spatial.· 'temporal' and 'causal' metonymies (cf. Ullmann 1962: Duch
OE .\'ct'lil: 'blessed' >ModE .\'illy 'stupid' OGr a~:ge/o.\· 'messenger'> ·angel'~ Arab al wa:::ir 'minister: 'mayor' > Sp algullcil 'lower law-court official'

The main concern of the following rencclions is how metonymies can best be classified. In Section 4 I will introduce a couple of older and more recent

Andreas Blank

170

typologies. some of which also include synecdoche or parts of this tropc.3 First, however,( will investigate the psychological foundation of metonymy (Section 2) and sketch its cognitive background (Section 3). These rcncctions arc intended to contribute to a typology of metonymy in light of cognitive linguistics (Section 5).4 As we will see. a cognitive basis is necessary for a better understanding of the metonymic process.

2.

The psychological background of metonymy

In ancient rhetoric. metonymy was already seen as the transfer of a word to a "closely related or neighboring thing" (Anonymous 1954. Rhetorica ad Herrenium IV: 32. 43).5 A similar interpretation is found in modem rhetoric manuals: Fontanier ( 1968 (1830]: 79) calls the different types of metonymy "tropes by correspondence.·· which designate an object by the name of another object, Lausberg (1960: § 565) sees a "real relation" between the meanings of the two words. and Mortara Garavelli (1988: 149) speaks of ··a connection of reciprocal dependency ."6 What kind of relation is this? What gives rise to metonymy? According to Stephen Ullmann (1962; 218ft) the underlying relation is "contiguity of senses." i.e .. an association between (intralinguistic) semantic features of two words. In contrast with metaphor. says Ullmann (ibid.). "metonymy ( ... J arises between words already related to each other.·· This definition. however, raises two serious questions: I. How can semantic features or scmcmes ever be contiguous to each other? The only possibility is to put them next to each other in a representation of word fields. but if we call this contiguity we are confusing the way we conceptualize things with the way they really arc, or - as Coseriu might put it - we arc making a "transitus ab intellccto ad rem" (cf. Blank 1993: 34; for the quotation cf. Coscriu 1958: 9). 2. The second problem is that often there arc not two words being related, but only one lexicalized word which is metonymically used to give a name to an object or an idea that has not been verbalized before. as in (2) or in: (4}

Lpecunia 'cattle (a" a kind of currency}'> 'money'

But even when a concept ha'l already been verbalized. a new metonymy shows

Co-pre.~ence

and Successitm

171

another facet of the old meaning. as in (I} OE sadix 'blessed' > ModE silly 'stupid,' which of course. initially. was intended to be a euphemistic synonym of OE dumb or contemporary synonyms. In all cases. the metonymy relies on extralinguistic world knowledge (cf. Blank 1993.1997a; Warren 1995; Koch, this volume): cattle served as money in former times, angels are God's messengers, and the most positive thing to say about a stupid person is that he or she is blessed by Jesus. 7 Thus. the associative relation is rather between the two concepts BLESSED -STUPID. MESSENGER- ANGEL or CATTLE- MONEY. It is important tO point out that this conceptual contiguity exists before the metonymic transfer is done (cf. Section 3.1.). As Hugh Bredin (1984: 57) says,"( ... ) metaphor creates the relation between its objects. while metonymy presupptJJe,\' that relation." Ullmann's interpretation goes back to a scarcely known article by Leoncc Roudet ( 1921 ). who appears to be the first to have brought the term.'> 'contiguity' and 'similarity' (Roudet says 'resemblance') into historical linguistics. Roudct (1921: 688f) distinguishes between semantic change due to an association "par contigune entre les idees," "par ressemblance entre les idees" as well as "changements resultant des rapports syntagmatiques entre les mots."~ The last type of change is generally called 'ellipsis,' the second 'metaphor· and the first 'metonymy' (cf. Blank 1997b: 157-190, 230-269, 281-302). Roudet's view of an association between 'ideas' is more plausible than Ullmann's 'contiguity of senses' according to our conception of the psychological grounding of metonymy:~ More popular than Roudet' s lucid classification became Jakobson · s ( 1971) application of the terms 'contiguity' and 'similarity' to linguistics (cf. Koch.this volume). The major point of Jakobson"s paper is the construction of a parallel between communicative strategies of aphasic speakers and both metaphor and metonymy. He begins by stating that any linguistic sign can either be 'combined' with other signs or be 'substituted' by others. The first ''mode of arrangement" is called "combination" and is based on the in prae.\·entia contiguity of signs in an utterance. the second is named "selection.. and is based on an in absemia similarity of concepts in a paradigm (1971: 74f). He further states that one type of aphasia (Wernicke and amnesic aphasia) is characterized by a loss of semantic knowledge. the mode of selection being disturbed. These speakers often have recourse to syntagmatic strategies, e.g .• they give a paraphrase of the word they cannot find - or create a metonymy. The other major type of aphasia(Broca) is characterized by a loss of syntactic knowledge.

172

Andrea.f Blank

Thus. syntagmatic combinations become difficult. while selection still works, enabling speakers to give synonyms for the words they want to express and even

create new metaphors (cf. Jakobson 1971: 77-89). According to Jakobson. a disorder in combination leads to strategies based on selection/similarity, which he calls the "metaphoric way.'' whereas a disorder in selection leads to strategies based on combination/contiguity. i.e .. the "metonymic way .. (1971: 90). Thus, by analyzing the strategies employed by aphasic speakers, Jakobson creates a strong interdependence between paradigmatic a-.sociation.

similarity and metaphor on one side. and syntagmatic association, contiguity and metonymy on the other. However. in light of more recent studies on aphasia. Jakobson's view is clearly too simplistic (cf. Happ 1985: 72-89).• 0 Jakobson himself seems to have noticed that his twofold linear interpretation wa-. insufficient. as. in the last chapter of his article. this structure undergoes a fundamental correction from one page to the next here he not only distinguishes between different types of semantic similarity and contrast (such as synonyms. antonyms. metaphors). but he also interprets metonymies such as tlratclr .litter or pm•erty in the sense of 'hut' as a combination of "the positional similarity (i.e .• ·selection': A.B.) with semantic contiguity" (1971: 91). In other words. Jakobson ends up by interpreting metonymy as relying on a ·paradigmatic' association by contiguity! This correction means in every respect a return to Roudet's threefold typology. 11 Both paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations in language can theoretically be combined with the three psychological a"sociations of similarity. contrast and contiguity (cf. Blank 1993: 32ff: 1997b: 131-156).1 2 Contiguity can therefore be realized 'syntagmatically' between words (in a complex word, a phrase or a sentence) and 'paradigmatically' as an association between concepts in the mind. The first combination is the basis for ellipsis (e.g .. notebook comp11ter > notebook), the second can give rise to metonymy. 11

3.

The cognitive and communicative backgrounds of metonymy

3.1. Concepts, frames, scenarios and contiguity In the preceding section. I claimed that the relation upon which metonymies are based is a conceptual one. and that these concepts are contiguous to each

Co-prese11a a11d Sun·essioll

173

other. The nature of this conceptual contiguity has yet to be explained. In metonymy. target and donator (or vehicle) concepts. rather than being isolated, arc quite often parts of greater conceptual networks that have been described as 'frames,' 'scenes,' 'scenarios," 'domains,' etc. (cf. Minsky 1975: Fillmore 1975. 1977. 1985: Croft 1993: for the terminology d. Andor 1985). Frames. scenes or scenarios arc static or dynamic mental representations of typical situations in life and their typical elements. 14 Concepts within frames are related by 'conceptual contiguity." 15 As will be shown later (Section 5.1.). the difference between dynamic and static conceptualizations is of fundamental relevance for a cognitive typology of metonymy. The content and the shape of a frame depends on our everyday experience. on our world knowledge. Beings. things. processes. and actions that generally or ideally occur together are represented in the mind as a frame. A frame is formed by an 'inductive generalization' of extra-linguistic knowledge (cf. Dik 1977: 283: Koch. forthcoming: Section 6.2, this volume). This does not imply that all the concepts of a frame arc to be realized every time it is activated. it is sufficient that they usually are. Figure I shows two typically related English frames, which allow several observations important for the understanding of frames:

FiRure I. Tile EIIRiisll breakfaJI and ltmdt frameJ

Concepts within frames can build a complex network. of contiguity (e.g .. TOAST- BlJITER - HAM - EGG - MILK). but they arc also related to the frame itself (BREAKFAST) and to other contiguous frames (LUNCH). There are even 'intersections' (DRINK. SALT. KETCHUP). When a specific frame is opened or accessed. all concepts that by convention belong to this frame are simuhaneously activated. 1 ~

Andreas Blank

174

Furthermore, this example shows that frames and their contents arc entirely culture-dependent: they not only differ from one linguistic community to another but they can also vary even within the same community. An English breakfast, for example, typically includes bacon and eggs, buttered toast. etc .. whereas in Scotland porridge made of oats is an important part of brcakfast. 17 Finally. these two frames show that even strong contiguity between concepts in a frame does not automatically lead to metonymy .111 Framerelations and frame-networks only build the cognitive foundation necessary for a metonymic transfer. In this case, a salient conceptual relation is highlighted (Croft 1993: 348) and the target concept is verbalized by the word usually related to the concept that serves a'\ donator. As Langacker ( 1993: 30f) puts it, the donator concept serves as a 'reference point' for accessing the target. The metonymic innovation may remain a hapax legomenon or lead to 'lexicalized metonymy· by semantic change when being adopted by a group of speakers or the whole speech community. 19 Thus, we can say that metonymy is a linguistic device ba'\ed on salient conceptual relations within a frame-network. In this frame-network, three fonns of conceptual contiguity are relevant for metonymy: 20 I. Relations between concepts within a frame. as in (5): (5) 2.

(6) 3.

Lpraeco 'messenger'> OSp pregdn. OPt pregiio 'message'

Relations between concepts and the superordinate frame. as in (6): OF travail 'pain'> MF 'work'; ME tramil 'pain' >ModE travel 'journey'

Or even relations between related frames. as in (7): (7)

OF cli.~ner 'to have the first meal of the day'> ModF diner 'to have lunch'> 'to have dinner.'

3.2. The communicative efficiency of metonymies and their lexicalization

Metonymies show a clear-cut cognitive background, which enables us to produce and understand them easily. because the only thing speakers have to share are the same conceptual relations, common world knowledge about how

Co-pre.fena and Succession

175

life is typically organized and how the 'things of life' arc interrelated. This makes metonymies very efficient tools for resolving different ta'iks in communication.21 As we have already seen. metonymies can express new concepts which have not been verbalized before but which are closely related to other concepts in a frame; this was the ca.'ie in examples (2) and (4). We have also learned that they can be used for euphemistic. attenuating speech. This caused the metonymic transfers in (I). (6) and also in (3). where a more prestigious expression was used in addressing an inferior person in order to please him. In time. it became impossible for Spanish speakers to address the 'lower lawcourt official' in any other way than by calling him alguacil. A third possibility offered by metonymy is to renect changes in reality and. consequently. in the conceptual representation of the real world. This was the case in (7). When. in the 16th century. the upper cla'ises of Paris became used to getting up late. they shifted the first (and most important) meal of the day from the middle of the morning to noon. The tcnn diner. however. was kept. The same thing happened a century ago. a'\ people increa.. ingly had to stay away from home all day in order to work and. consequently. moved the most important meal to the evening. Metonymy is further used to tum deverbal nouns into more prototypical nouns, as in: (8)

L prehetnio ·act of seizing someone' > F prison 'captivity' > 'prison'

(9)

F bdtiment 'uct of building'> 'building'

( 10) L civita.f 'citizenship'> 'community of citizens'> OF citt!.I ciuii, Sp ci~tdad, Pt cidade 'town,' 'city' As in the above examples. we often find that names for localities are created by metonymic processes (cf. Koch 1997). Finally. we find that quite often two concepts are strongly related in the speech context so that a single word can accidentally refer to either of them. The shared speech context enables us to understand utterances like The ham sa11dwich i.~ waiting for l!iJ check (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 35). where a waiter refers to a customer by the dish the customer has ordered. When this conceptual constellation satisfies the communicative needs of a defined group of speakers or the whole speech community. the metonymy or the type of

Andrea.'i Bltmk

176

metonymy (cf. Section 4) becomes conventionalized, as in (5) or in the following examples: (II) Lparare 'to prepare,· 'to arm'> Jtparare. Ptparar 'to ward off. to

repulse' (12) a. Lpficare 'to fold'> Rum a pleca 'to leave' b. Lplicare 'to fold'> Sp 1/egar 'to arrive· (13) F de.ifier 'to break the vassal's oath'> 'to defy'

In (I I) PREPARATION is considered a precondition for REPUL'>ING an enemy; in ( 12a) fULDING THE TENTS in the Balkan shepherd society was connected with LEAVING, while in the marine culture of Spain FOLDING THE SAILS was linked to ARRIVAL.In (13) we can easily imagine that an uucrancc like OF je \'OS desfie, said by the vassal to his lord, pragmatically implied the illocution of DEFYING this lord. Here a performativc meaning is generated by metonymy.22 Linguistic (and even non-linguistic) communication can be seen as a process whereby people try to maximize their communicative success by minimizing their linguistic effort (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1986: 46: Keller 1994: 142f). Metonymy is a response to both dcmands.lt can support communicative success when we use euphemism and it minimizes linguistic effort when we use the same word for concepts that are closely relatedP The selection of the convenient donator concept for expressing the target in question is governed by a number of cognitive principles. GeneraJly. concepts that more closely correspond to our knowledge. that are more salient and/or more concrete. are preferred to less bounded, less important or more abstract concepts (cf. Langacker 1993: 30f: Radden and KOvecses,this volume).

4. Typologies of metonymy Having discussed some of the psychological and cognitive bases of metonymy. we can come to a classification of the different types of metonymy. Let us first consider some traditional and more recent typologies. One approach to classification that can be found throughout ancient and modem rhetoric is to give more or less complex lists of types of metonymy. like INVENTOR FOR THE THING INVENTED, CONTAINER FOR CONTENTS, etc. (cf., e.g.,

Co-prese11a and Sun·essioll

177

Quintilian. JnstitUiionis oratoriae; Dumarsais 1818: Fontanier 1968 [1830); Lausberg 1960: Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Bredin 1984). Another traditional way of classifying has already been referred to in Section I: several types of metonymy are subsumed under a more general type of contiguity, i.e., SPATIAL, TEMPORAL and CAUSAL CONTIGUIIT. Typologies of this kind have been proposed, for example. by Ullmann ( 1962), DuchiiCek (1967) and Schifl:.o (1979). As said above. the problem with this more general typology is that there remain types of metonymy which do not rely on temporal. spatial or causal contiguity. Ullmann ( 1962: 218ft) and Duch3.Cck ( 1967: 123-129) resolve this problem by simply listing those remaining cases. such as KINSHIP REU TIONS. REU TIONS BETWEEN A PERSON AND AN OBJECf, AN INDIVIIJUAL A!'ID A GROUP. A WHOLE AND ITS PARTS and AN ACTIVITY AND RELATED PHENOMENA. Certainly. it has to be questioned whether such a particular list could ever be complete.2"' but a more important problem seems to be the following: temporal. spatial and causal relations are very general"types of contiguity:· which comprise several more specific types: the rest of the list contains. in fact. such specific types! Duch3.Cek and Ullmann thus combine different levels of abstraction. Schifko ( 1979: 245f) groups cases such as these in an extended "causal dimension," which comprises relations like CAUSE INSTRUMENT, AGENT- ACTIVITY, ACTIVIIT -

AF-l·'ECTED OBJECT, ACTIVIIT -

PRODUCT.

It is interesting to note that the types of metonymy in Schifko's "causal dimension" rely on certain case roles (cf. Fillmore 1968) substituting for each other by means of the metonymic process. The idea that metonymy is a caserole substitution is elaborated on by Dan Fass (1991: 43fand Appendix 8) and can also be found implicitly in Warren (1992: 66). Fass analyzes the types of metonymy given by Stem ( 1931) and Lakoff and Johnson ( 1980) and states that substitutions can be bidirectional but that they lead to different resuhsP and that one role (PATIEh"T) can even be substituted for an instance of the same role (e.g .. in PART-WHOLE relations). From the point of view of case role or valence semantics. this is a valid approach. The problem with this theory is that. in order to see the ca-.e-role effect, we need concrete sentences that must contain verbs. Lexicalized metonymies. however. show this metonymic sense without being syntactically actualized. Thus. we can only state that a case-role substitution might have occurred during the past.26 Fass also docs not give a complete list of all metonymic types resulting from case-role substitution. Warren (1992: 65ff. 1995: Section 3, this volume) distinguishes five

178

Andreas Blank

types of contiguity. each of which comprises several subtypes: COMPOSITION > 'sheets'), CAUSATION (e.g., ecstasy 'strong emotion. exaltation'> 'drug'). POSSESSION (e.g .. sceptre 'emblem of regal or imperial power' > 'sovereignty'), LOCATION {e.g., wwn 'densely populated area' > 'town dwellers'), REPRESfNfATION (e.g .. univer,{ity 'building· > 'staff). These five types seem indeed to cover the field of metonymy except for the ASPECT - AITRIBUTE relation. which in Warren (1992: 51--63) is separated from metonymy and called 'implication.' The necessity of this distinction, however. remains opaque, given the fact that the psychological foundation of both is conceptual contiguity, and so it seems more logical to me to subsume 'implication' under metonymy. 27 In summary. we can say that there is a certain tendency to reduce the different types of metonymy to a sma11er number of more general types of contiguity. What is generally lacking in these typologies is an integrated cognitive framework that covers all possible contiguities. Without such a framework as a basis. all lists of types of contiguity and of the corresponding metonymies remain purely empirical. (e.g .. linen 'type of fabric'

5. A cognitive typology of metonymy In this section. I shall try to integrate the theoretical issues on contiguity and frames. as introduced in Section 3, into a typologica1 approach to metonymy different from the taxonomies presented above. Instead of listing types of conceptual relation. the focus will be set on two rather abstract conceptual frameworks that derive directly from the two fundamental ways of conceptualizing real-life situations. viz. as .{tatic frames or as dynamic scenarios.

5.1. Co-presence and succession A typology of metonymy somewhat different from those presented above has been suggested by Marc Bonhomme ( 1987: 58-65). who distinguishes between 'mCtonymies situatives' and 'mCtonymies actancielles,' the Iauer also working on the ground of case-role substitution. What is interesting in the distinction he makes. is that the concepts related in the first group arc spatially and/or temporally 'co-present': they rely on the synchronism of their element'\. The concepts in 'metonymies actancielles' stand in a causal, instru-

Co-prese11a a11d Sun·essioll

179

mental. final or consecutive relation, that is to say, they arc 'successive in time,' although Bonhommc does not explicitly characterize them in this way. With this distinction Bonhommc does not describe actual metonymies. but offers a framework to classify them, or to be more precise: to classify types of contiguity according to the temporal status and the perspectivization of their conceptual relation. This fits in very well with our understanding of the cognitive background of metonymy. We have co-presence in a frame. temporal succession in a dynamic scenario, or even succession between two related frames. 'Co-presence' and 'succession' are two very general issues that hang closely together with two fundamental models of human conceptualization: I. the 'synchronic' model. in which all aspects of a given situation or a ·system' are equally present and where time is excluded; 2. the 'diachronic' model. where the processual. consecutive character of things and events is highlighted. These two 'domains of contiguity' each contain a considerable number of more specific types of contiguity. The latter involve conceptual relations which give rise to concrete metonymies. At first glance. the choice of copresence and succession as superordinated domains of contiguity seems to be arbitrary. I feel. however. that these two meta-conceptual models arc philosophically (cf. Aristotle, CategorieJ 12 and 13) and cognitivcly well rooted (cf. the distinction made in Section 3.1. between frames and scenarios). Their main advantage consists in integrating all possible types of contiguity without any remainder. Co-present relations exist between the ACTORS (people, animals. institutions) interacting in a frame. their ACTIVITY. 1!'-ISTIWMENTS. TOOLS, AFI-"ECil:D OBJECTS or PRODUCTS, the PLACE where an activity takes place. and the TIME at which this activity usually occurs. Another group of co-present relations are typical (essential or implicated) ATIRIBliTES and ASPECTS of persons, objects and activities as well as distinguishable PARTS of persons. bodies. objects and activities. The latter are, in rhetoric, usually subsumed under synecdoche as PART-WHOLE and WHOLEPART relations. But together with the implicated ASPECTS they are psychologically grounded in conceptual contiguity. The difference between this type and other types of contiguity is the fact that here distinct concepts are not just related. but that they 'build' the whole and that the whole 'consists' of them. furthermore, INDIVIDUAL REPRESENTATIVES of a COLLECTIVE BODY and finally

Andreas Blank

180

the

as a whole arc co·presenttypcs of contiguity. Figure 2 shows the co· present conceptual relations detennined so far.

FRAME

FRAME. ACTIVITY and an important STATE OF THINGS appear in the center because ACTIVITY or STATE often build the core of a FRAME and sometimes coincide with the latter. The ensuing list gives examples of metonymic semantic change based on co-present conceptua.J relations.

Examples: OBJECT: L praeco 'messenger' > OSp preg611. OPt pregiio 'message'; F courrier 'postman'> 'mail' (b) INVENTOR - PRODUCT: G Zeppelin 'proper name' > 'long, cylindrical,

(a)

ACTOR -

dirigible balloon filled with gas' 211 (C) ACTOR- TYPICAL ASPECT: QE .~a'Jig 'blessed'> ModE silly 'stupid': OGr aggelos 'messenger'> 'angel' (d) OBJECT" - TYPICAL ASPECT: L pecunia 'cattle (as a kind of currency)' > 'money' (e) OBJECT- FUNcnoN: E target 'linle round shield'> 'object to be aimed at in shooting· (f) ACTIVIIT- OBJECT: L \'estis 'act of dressing'> 'clothes' (g) ACTIVITY -TIME: It \'endemmia 'gathering of grapes'> 'vintage (season)' (h) ACTIVITY- PLACE: F comidie 'comedy'> 'theater (building)" (i) STATE- PLACE: OF prison 'captivity'> 'prison' (j} TYPICAL ASPECT- ACTIVITY: f baiser 'to kiss'> 'to make love' (k) TYPICAL ASPECT- FRAME: ME travail 'pain'> ModE trave/'joumcy'

Co-prnence and Successitm

181

Lfocus 'fireplace'> F feu 'fire' 'tongue'> 'language' INSTRUMENT- ACTOR: f plume 'pen'> 'author' PART- WHOLE: Ptpalavra 'word'> E pala~·er 'talk,' 'conference'; F dme 'soul'> 'human being' (p) PART- PART: L bucca 'check'> VL boc:c:a 'mouth' (q) OBJECT - COLLECTIVE BODY: L civitas 'citizenship' > 'community of citizens' (r) COLLECTIVE BODY- STAll:: L ci\>itas 'community of citizens' >Of cittf 'city'

(I)

PLACE- OBJECT:

(m) (n) (o)

TOOL- OBJECT: L li11gua

Successive relations exist between a STATE and its PREVIOUS and CONSECUTIVE STATE, between an ACTIVITY or a PROCESS and its PURPOSE or AIM, its CAUSE or PRECONDITIONS, or its PRODUCTS or RESULTS. Other succes.o;ive relations exist between PERIODs, different PLACES and,last but not least, related FRAMES. The conceptual types of these successive relations are shown in figure 3. As above. the figure is followed by a list of examples.

PURPOSE AIM

INSTRUMENT

TOOL

PERIOD 1 - - PERIOD 2 - - PERI003 PLACE 1 - - PLACE 2 --PLACE 3 FRAME 1 - - FRAME 2 - - FRAME 3

Figure 3. Succt'J.fion

Andrea.f Blank

182 Examples: (a)

(b)

(c)

(d) (c) (f} (g)

(h) (i)

(j) (k)

ACTIVITY- CONSECUTIVE ACTIVITY: l p/icare 'to fo)d' >Rum a pfeca 'to leave,' Sp 1/egar ·to arrive· ACTIVITY- RESULT: F desfier 'to break. the vassal's oath' > 'to defy'; L prehemio 'act of seizing someone' > F pri.wm 'captivity' > 'prison'; F bcltiment 'act of building'> 'building' ACTIVITY- AIM: F pour 'for (exchanger> 'in order to' CAUSE- AIM: It perchi. Sp porque 'because' > 'in order that" RESULT- CAUSE: L reus 'accused'> Rum rtiu 'bad' PRECONDITION -ACTIVITY: L parare 'to prepare.' 'to arm' > It parare, Pt parar 'to ward off, to repulse'; E to reali:.e 'to make real'> 'to recognize' MATERIAL- PRODUCT: E horn 'hom of an animal' > 'wind-instrument' INSTRUME/'IT- PRODUCT: f plume 'pen'> 'style (of an author)' PERIOD - PERIOD: Sp. mllflana, ME mon,,e, morrow 'morning' > 'the following day· PLACE- PLACE: OL *loukos 'clearing. open space·> L Iucus 'grove.' 'woOO' FRAME - FRAME: OF disner 'to have the first meal of the day' > ModF diner 'to have lunch'> 'to have dinner'

5.2. Three levels of abstraction The two lists of contiguity types arc certainly incomplete. as one might always find metonymies grounded on conceptual contiguities other than those mentioned here. Up to now. however. every type of metonymy I have found belongs to one of the two superordinate domains of conceptual contiguity. as the underlying concepts are either co-present or successive to each other. 29 The typology of metonymy proposed here involves three levels of abstraction (cf. Figure 4): two superordinate 'domains of contiguity' (co-presence and succession). a principally open list of 'types of contiguity' or ·contiguity schemas' (or even 'conceptual metonymies·: cf. Raddcn and Kovecses, this volume).and finally- on the level of the language- concrete metonymies. In our everyday life we observe. experience and Jearn concrete contiguities and we arc subsequently learning and using metonymies that result from this knowledge. For speakers it is important to know which types of contiguity are salient and which are usuaJJy realized by metonymy. This knowledge is

Co-prese11ce a11d Succes.~ilm

183

not only necessary to understand existing metonymies but it is very useful for producing new ones. The rather abstract 'domains of contiguity' are less relevant for speakers than for the purpose of linguistic description. They are kinds of 'meta-frames' which show the same level of abstraction as the conceptual meta-frames behind some types of word formation. 30 Meta-frames generally highlight a more general aspect underlying and structuring different sorts of frames, as shown in Figures 2 and 3.Jl

Fi1.;11re 4. A typofo!{y

ofmetouymie.~

The 'types of contiguity' can best be compared to the 'image schemas' underlying metaphors (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980: Johnson 1987), which are highly recurrent and conventionalized. but nevertheless build on an open list. These 'contiguity schemas' are extremely important for the production and understanding of concrete metonymies. The more embodied a certain type of contiguity is in our conceptual knowledge. the more it can be used in concrete metonymies and the higher the chances are that such a metonymy is communicatively successful and perhaps becomes lexicalized within a specific group of speakers or the whole speech community (cf. Section 3.2.). In certain cases. it is only the type of contiguity in question that becomes conventionalized for a group of speakers. e.g., waitresses or waiters. as in the case of ORDERED DISH - cusTOMER. On the other hand. no special dish (not even the famous 'ham sandwich') seems to have become lcxicalized yet in the sense of 'customer.' Some contiguity schemas have restrictions concerning the group of speakers: others have restrictions on the objects that can be metonymically expressed. As Taylor ( 1989: 123) points out. it is. for example. rather uncom-

Andreas Blank

184

mon to use the contiguity schema AliTHOR -

PRODUCT

for referring to a cake by

the name of the baker (in a sentence like Mary wa.~ delidous).n The three lraditional types of metonymy a" mentioned in Section 4 (spatial, temporal and causal relations) arc so to speak "transverse' to the two superordinate types of conceptual contiguity. In both domains we can find spatial relations (e.g .• PART- WHOLE VS. CO!\ITIGUOUS PLACES).

tions (e.g ..

temporal rela-

ACTIVITI -TIME WHEN THE ALnVITY OCCURS VS. PREVIOUS STATE-

CONSECLmVE STATE) and causal relations (e.g .• ACTIVITY - AA-"ECTEU OBJECT VS. PROCESS OF PRODUCTION- PRODUCT).

6.

Conclusion

In this paper I have tried to show that a theory and typology of metonymy first of all has to define the cognitive background within which it works. Furthermore it has to be made clear what is understood by 'contiguity.' Considering this. I come to the following conclusions: I. Metonymy as a linguistic device is the transfer of a word to another concept on the basis of conceptual contiguity between a donator and a target concept. Any spontaneous metonymy can be adopted by the speech community and thus become lcxicalized. 2. Conceptual contiguity results from a relation between these concepts within cognitive frames. between a concept and the frame itself or between two related frames. 3. The conceptual relations in these frames and between frames arc represented as types of contiguity. Any concrete metonymy is rooted in such a conventionalized contiguity schema. 4. All conceptual relations relevant to metonymy are either co-present or successive in time. These two very fundamental aspects in human conceptualization constitute meta-frames which contain typical conventionalized contiguity schemas. The co-presence and the succession domains arc mentally stored abstractions from the schcmas behind actual metonymies. Frame theory and the three-level conception of metonymy make metonymy a very powerful and efficient tool in communication and semantic change. To highlight a given concept we only have to apply the appropriate contiguity schema to the frame in question. In contra'\! to metaphor. no new relation

185

needs to be established (by the speaker) and interpreted (by the hearer), as both frames and contiguity schema.<; already belong to our knowledge.

Notes I express my gratitude to Mary Copple for the stylislic revision of lhis paper.

2.

A semantic loan of a mc10nymy in Hebrew (m'l'k).

J.

Indeed. most of the newer typologies of metonymy mentioned in this paper integrate I'AkT-WHOLE. WHOLE·I'ART and CYCO I'ART-PART relations, which in rhetoric usually fall within the bounds of synecdoche (cf. Dumarsais I SUI: 115: Lausberg 1960: § 572: l..c Guem 1973: Garcia Arancc 1979: Ruwet 1983). In facl synecdoche is a highly problematic category a~ it comprises contiguity-based types like those already mentioned (e.g., E soul 'spirilllal pan of man'> 'human being'). and similarity-based transfers like E brtud 'food made out of flour or meal'> 'food.' where the relalion is between the more specific and the general {cf. Nerlich, fonhcoming: Section 5: Seto, this volume).

4.

A cognitive foundalion of metonymy and o1her contiguily-based phenomena in the Je:~;icon akin 10 mine i~ discussed in detail in Koch, !his volume. Focusing in my contribution on !he cognitive roots of metonymy is nevenhelcss necessary for a bener comprehension of !he typology suggested in Section 5.

5.

''denominatio est quae ab rebus propinquis et jinitimis !rahit orationcm. qua possit in!ellcgi res quae non suo vocabulo sit appellata." (Rht'ttJtku ud Herrnni11m IV: 32. 43: my italics).

6.

"( ... ) dCsignation d'un objel par lc nom d'un auue objet qui fait comme lui un tout absolument a part, mais qui lui doit ou a qui i1 doitlui-mCme plus ou moins. ou pour son Clistence, ou pour ~ mani~re d'Cu-e" (fontanier 1968: 79). - "Die Metonymic verwendetj ... ) ein Won in der Bedeutung cines andercn Wones. das semantisch mit dcm verv.·endeten Won in einer rt'tllrn Br~ielmn~: stcht" (Lausbcrg 1960: §565: my italics). "( ... ] entitill qualsiasi mediante il nome di un'altra entiiA chc stia alia prima come Ia causa sta all'cfTctto e viccversa. oppure che le conisponda per legami di reciproca dipendenza'' (Monara Garavelli 19811: 149).

7.

Allusion to 111r Sermon 011 lhr Mount (Matthew 5.3).

8.

A founh category, changes rcsuhing from "rapports assodatifs entte lcs mots.' semantic change in word fonrullion.

9.

The same direction had already been taken some years earlier by KristofTcr Nymp ( 1913: 80): "Unc chose ne sc prCscnle jamais a l't!tat isolt!, clle est toujours acL-ompagnee de difTt!rcntes circonslances qui Ia comp~tent ou I'Clpliqucnt: elle pmvoque des associations d'idees. dues;\ des rappons de ressemblance, de contigunt!. de cau:o~e a effct etc.''

10.

For semantic disorders in aphasia. cf. Gurd and Marshall (1993): for syntactic disorders, cf. De Bleser and Bayer (1993): for a L'Ontemporary dcfinilion of the different types of apha.~ia. cf. Huber eta!. (1989: 107-132).

Andrea.'i Blank

186 II.

lakobson·~ iniCrprelalion of melonymy a.~ relying on syntagmatic cnnliguily ha~. how· ever, innuenccd severn! scholars studying metonymy,c.g .• Lc Gucm (1973: 23-2K). who tries 10 explain metonymies as typicizcd kinds of ellipsis. To be seen in the same lnldilion is Bonhomme's (1987) division in 'mc!tonymics actancidlcs.' which are grounded in a kind of deep predicate structure. However, here again lhe synlagmatic relation is less cvidcnl than the conceptual (paradigmatic) rela1ion. Cf. also Sccrion 5.1.

12.

Tbc other possibilities leading 10 semantic innovalions are 'parodigmaric conlra~l' (E bt1d 'not good' > E Slang 'very good': see Vo6bagen, !his volume) and 'forma] (phonclic) similarity' n( 1wo words: combined wilh paradigmati~: similarity or contiguity lhe Iauer may lead to popular c1ymology (MHG kr11m· 'jug· > 'pub' (NHG Km~) under the influence of MLG krikh ·pub'). Formal and syntagmatic cnnrrast are the ba~is of aU semiotic system~. Cf. Raible (191U: 6-26): Blank (1997b:l31-156).

13.

Contiguity a~ an as.sociative principle also works in several processes of lexical change other than semantic change. a~ for example in word formation and in the creation of idioms. Cf. Blank (1996. 1997a: 96f. 1998. fonhcoming): Koch (fonhcoming: Section 6.4 .. this volume).

14.

In this sense - but only in this sense - a frumc i~ a prototypical phenomenon (cf. Fillmore 1977: 56; Koch 1995: Section 7), but. in contra~t to Lakoffs theory of ICMs ( 1987: 77-90). I would not ~y that one more or less prominent concept in a frame could be considered a~ a prototypical instance of this frame. In other words: a metonymic transfer like OGr u~gdos ·messenger' > 'angel' docs not occur because an angel i~ the prototype of a messenger. but because 'being a messenger (of God)' is a salient aspect of angels.

IS.

It is obvious that in many ca<~es this relation also exists between the 'things' themselves (cf.thc definition given in Section 2). but this is not a necessary condition.

16.

This is - grosso modo - what Fauconnier (19H4) calls an 'espace mental.' and. with a slightly different accentuation. what Langacker ( 1984) describes as an 'active zone.'

17.

The famous Dr Johnson observed that oats is "a grain, which in England is genemlly given to horses. but in Scotland support,. the people" (Johnson, 17KS, s.v. tHII,f).

I K.

One of the rare metonymies in this domain is BritE t~a 'drink,' ·meal eaten after the middle of the afternoon' (cf. G (infonnal) K"ffr~ 'breakfa~t').

19.

For a detailed description of the metonymic process, cf. Blank (1997b: 242(). For recent approaches to the metonymic rransfer, cf. Croft ( 1993); Lungacker ( 1993: 29ft): Koch ( 1995: 40(): Raddcn and KOvecses (lhis volume).

20.

Radden and KOvecses (this ~·olume. esp. Section 2) have a more general understanding of 'frame' (which they call, following Lakoff !9K7, 'ICM.' e.g .. 'Constirution ICM.' 'ContainmentiCM.' etc.). 1be point they have in common with my interpretation is that they too distinguish between conceptual relations within ICMs und between a whole ICM and its pan(s).

21.

For funher details sec Blank (1997b: 375-404).

22.

Koch (1993: 270() calls lhis type of metonymic transfer 'delocutive semantic change.'

23.

After lcxicalization. metonymic polysemy may cause misunderstandings. a~ was the case

Co-presem.:e and Succes.~ion

187

for OSp preg1in and OPt pregiio. In this case. one of the two meanings tends to be expres!ied by olher means. a~ for example by derivation: NSp pregom·m. NPt pregotiro 'mes.~enger.·

24.

Cf. Bredin's (1984: 45) critique oflhis kind of typology: "For what is pre!iCnted [ ... ]is not a true definition. but an enumeration of instances."

25.

E.g .. Ni.wn bombed Vii'IIUIIII i~. according to Fa~s. an AGENT FOR INSTIIIJMENT substitution. which highlighL~ the agent responsible. while E.uon Jws raiud its prin•s tiJ:Uill is an INSTRIJMEI'.'T RlR AGENT substitution.

26.

Indeed. the idea of case-role substirutioo in sentences could suggest that metonymy relies on syntagmatic contiguity. This is clearly not the ca..e: in sentences such a.~ Tht bu.u!stlu 011 strike the syntactic position of the subject remains the SD.me. Only lhe lie mantic role of this subject ha.~ been replaced by another role taken out of the paradigm.

27.

Warren's typology is a good example of how underestimating lhe importance of the underlying as.-.ociations can lead to confusion in distinguishing different types of metonymy. but also metonymy and metaphor: cf. Warren (1992: 64f): "( ... ]it is difficult to see exactly what the difference is between metonyms and metaphors. or indeed between metonym.~ and implications:·

211.

As proper names do not have meanings. transfers ba.o;ed on this conceptual relation are simple ·namings· and not !iCmantic changes.

29.

Take. forexample.the ACTOR (tN"VENTOR.etc.)- PRODL'CT relation: at the moment of initial production it belongs of course to the co-pre!ience domain. but later moves to the succession domain. As is the ca...e with much in language. it all depends on perspective.

30.

Cf. the ·conceptual models' of Italian word formation as described in Schwarze ( 191111): cf. also Blank ( 1997a: 96f. and 1998).

31.

An example from Schwarze (191111: 4311-443) is the 'T;itigkeiL~modcll' ("model of activity"[. which introduces different types of affixation as being conceptually centered (if not to say "derived") around the concept Acnvrrv.

32.

Gilles Fauconnier. however. has drawn my anention to the fact that in very specific contexts - for example in a cookery contest - this metonymy would be easily understood.

References Anonymous 1954

Ad C. Herennium. de ratione dicendi (Rhetorica ad Herennimn}. London: Heinemann. Andor.J6zscf 1985 On the psychological relevance of frames. Quodemi di Semamicu 6: 212221.

Andrea.'i Bla11k

188 Arislotle 1958

Kategorien.l.Lhre vom Sat:. (Organon/!11). Translaled and edited by Eugen Rolfes. Hamburg: Meiner.

Blank. Andreas 1993

Polysemie und scmantische Relationen im Lexikon. In W. BOmer. K. Vogel (eds.). Waruchat:. 1111d Fremd.fprm·he11erwerb. Bochum: AKSVerlag, 22-56. 1996 T.\'Jon e.ft a11x anges- Zur Semantik franzOsischer Funktionsverbgeflige. Zeitschrift fiir fran:.O.fische Sprad1e mrd Literatur 106: 113-130. 1997a II senso di una semantica dei prototipi e dei fr.:.mes: osservazioni decostruuive e ricoslrultive. In M. Carapezza, D. Gambarara. F. Lo Piparo (eds.), Linguaggio e cow•i:.ione. Rom: Bulzoni. 89-103. 1997b Prin:ipie11 de.f lnikaliJchet! Bedelltlmgswandels am Beispiel der romani.fchel! Spl'achell. TUbingen: Niemeyer.

1998 Kognilive ilalienische Wortbildungslehre./tali~niJch~ Studim 19:5-27. forthcoming Pathways of lexiealization.ln M. Haspelmath etal. (cds.).Longuag~ Typology and Uni1·ersafs: An /nt~mationaf Handbook. Berlin. New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Bonhomme. Marc 1987 Linguistiqu~ d~ Ia mitonymie. Bern, Fr.mkfurt: Lang. Bredin. Hugh 1984 Metonymy. Potties Today 5:45-58. Coseriu, Eugenio 1958 Sincron(a, diacronia ~ histnria: £1 problema d~l cambin lingiiistico. Montevideo: Universidad de Ia RepUblica. Croft. William 1993 The role of domains in the interpretation of metaphors and metonymies. Cogniti1·~ Litlguistic·s 4: 335-370. De Bleser. Ria. Joseph Bayer 1993 Syntactic disorders in Aphasia. In G. Blanken et al. (cds.). Litlgfli.ftk Disordrrs mrd Pathofogi~.f: An lntemati011af Handbook. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 160-169. Dik. Simon C. 1977 Inductive generalisation in semantic change.ln P J. Hopper (cd.),Studi~s i11 Descriptil·~ tmd Historical Linguistics. Festst·hriftfor Winfred P. Lehmann. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins, 283-300. Duchal:ek, Otto 1967 Prici.f de simamiqu~ franrais~. Brilnn: Univ. J .E. Purkyn~. Duman;ais. Cisar Chesneau 1818 Les Tropes. Edited and commented by Pierre Fontanier. Paris: Belin-lePrieur (Reprint Geneva: Slatkine 1967). Fass,Dan 1991 Metonymy. case role substitution and sense ambiguity.ln: D. Fa.~s et al. (eds.), Proceeding.f of the /JCA/-91 Workshop 011 Computational Ap· proach~.f 10 Non-Literal Language (S.vdll~)'. Au.~tralia). Boulder, CO: Uni· versity of Boulder, 42-51.

Co-presenc·e and Sm:cession

189

Fauconnier. Gilles 1984 £spaces memaur: Aspects de Ia construction du St!ll.f dans Irs lanJ:IIt!S natllrelles. Paris: Editions de Minuit. Fillmon:, Charles 1968 The case for case. In E. Bach. R.T. Harms (eds.), Ut1h·ersa/s in Linguistic Theon-. New York: Holt. Rinehart & Winston. 1-90. 1975 An aliemative to checklist theories of meaning. Proceeding.f of the l.ft Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Lingui.ftia Society. Berkeley: Berkeley Linguistics Society. 123-131. 1977 Scenes-and-frumes semantics. In A. Zampolli (ed.). Lillguistit· Structures Processing. Amstenlam and Philadelphia: Benja.mins. 55-81. 1985 Fr.unes and the semantics of understanding. Quademi di Semalltil"a 6: 222254. Fontanier. Pierre 1968 (1830) Lesfigure.f du disco11rs. Paris: Aammarion. Garcia Arance. Maria del Ro.~ario 1979 Semantica de Ia metonimia y de fa sinecdoque. Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid. Gurd. Jennifer M.. John C. Marsha]! 1993 Semantic disorders in apha.~ia.ln G. Blanken et al. (cds.). LinJ:ui.ftic Di.mr· der.f and PatholoJ:ie.f: An fnlemalional Handbook. Berlin. New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 153-160. Happ. Heinz 1985 'Paradigmati.rclt'- '.f)"lltagmatiscll': Zl1r Be.ftimmung tmd KfiiriiiiR ::wt'ier Grundbegriffe der Sprachwis.fenschaft. Heidelberg: Winter. Huber. Walter. Klaus Pocck, Dorothea Weniger 1989 Aphasie. InK. Poeck (ed.). Kfinisc/Je Neurops)-dwfogit:. Second edition. Stuttgart. New York: Thieme.89-137. Jakobson. Roman 1971 (1956) Two a.~pects of language and two types of apha.~ic disturbances. In R. Jakobsen. M. Halle. Fundamentals of Language. Second edition. The Hague, Paris: Mouton. 67-96. Johnson, Mark 1987 771~: Body i11 tht: Mind: 17w Bodif}' Basis of Rl'a.Jon and Imagination. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Johnson, Samuel 1785 A Dictitmary rif the En~:lish La11guagt:: /11 Wllicil the Word.f Are Ded11ced from Their Original.f, a11d Jllu.uratt'd in Their Oifft'rl'lll SiJ:IIijicatimr.f. 2 vols. Seventh edition. London. Keller.Rudi 1994 Sprachwandel: Von du 1msidJtharell Hand in dt:r Sprache. TUbingen: Francke. Koch, Pc1cr 1993 Kyenbi- Tyo11bo: Wurzeln kreolischer Lexik. InCh. Foltys. Th. Kotschi (eds.), Berfillt"r Roma11i.fli.n·he Arbeiten. Fiir Horst Ocl!u. Berlin: Freie Universitat. 259-287.

190

Andrea.'i Blank

1995

Der Beitrag der Prototypenlheorie zur Historischen Semantik: Einc kritischc Bestandsaufnahme. Romani.ftiJche.f Ja!Jrbuch 46: 27-46. D"oU viennentles substantifs spatio-locaux? In H. Dupuy-Engelhardt, M.J. Montibus (eds.), L"organi.mti(m lexictlfe et mgnitil'l! deJ dimemimi.T .fpatiale et tempore/Je. ActeJ d'EUROSEM 1996. Reims: Pres~s Univenitaircs de Reims. 107-122. forthcoming Ein Blick auf die unsichtbare Hand: Kognitive Univenalien und historische romanischc Luikologie. In Th. Stehl (ed.), Un.fichtbare Hand und Sprecllenmlll: Typologie und Pro:esse de.f Sprachll'andel.t in der Romania. Tilbingen: Na:rr. Lakoff. George 1987 Women, Firl' and Dangerou.f TllingJ: Wllat Categories Rel·eal about tile Mind. Chicago: The: University of Chicago Press. Lakoff. George, Malk Johnson 1980 Metophor.f We Lil'f' B_v. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 1984 Active wnes. Proc·eedings of tile lOth Annual Meeting of tile Berkel!!)' Linguistics Society. Berkeley: Berkeley Linguistics Society, 172-188. 1993 Reference-point constructions. Cognitil'e Ling11istic.f 4: 1-38. Lausbcrg. Heinrich 1960 Handh11dl der literariJchm Rhetorik. Mi.lnchen: Hueber. Lc Guem. Michel 1973 Simantiqlle de Ia mbapllorl! et de/a mltonymie. Paris: Larous~. Minsky, Marvin 1975 A framework for rcpre~nting knowledge. In P.H. Winston (cd.). The Ps)'C'holog_\·ofComputer Vi.fion. New York: McGraw-Hill, 211-277. Monara Garavelli, Dice 1988 Manuafe di retorica. Mailand: Bompiani. Nerlich. Brigitte forthcoming Synecdoche: a trope. a whole trope. and nothing but a trope? InN. Norrick, A. Burkhardt (eds.), Tropic Truth. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Nyrop. Kristoffcr 1913 Grommaire l1istoriq11e de fa fang11e franraiJe. Vol. 4: Simamiq11e. Kopen· hagen: Gyldc:ndal. Quintilian, M. Fabius 1886 IIIJtitmioni.f oratoriae. Edited by Ferdinand Meister. Leipzig: Freytag. Raible. Wolfgang 1981 Von der Allgegenwart des Gegensinns. Uit.n·hrift fiir Romani.fclll! PIJilologie 97: 1-40. Roudet. Uonce 1921 Sur Ia classification psychologiquc des changements sc!mantiques. Journal de Psycllologie 18: 676-692. Ruwet, Nicolas 1983 Synckdochcn und Metonymicn.ln: A. Haverkamp (ed.). Theorie der Meta· 1997

Co-prnence and Succession

191

plu:r. Dannstadt: Wissenschaftlichc Buchgesellschaft, 253-282 (Original: 1975, Synekdoques et metonymies. Poitiques 6: 371-388). Schifko. Peter 1979 Die Metonymic als univen;ales spmchliches Strukturprinzip. Grazer Ling11istisc·he Sc·hriften 10: 240-264. Schwarze. Christoph 1988 Grammatik der italieni.fchen Sprache. Ti.ibingen: Niemeyer. Sperber. Dan, Deirdre Wilson 1986 Relevance: Communication and Cognilion. Oxford: Blackwell. Stem, Gustaf 1931 Meaning and Change of Mea11i11g. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Taylor. John R. 1989 Lingui.uic' Ca!egori:ation. Oxford: Clarendon. Ullmann. Stephen 1962 Semantics: An Introduction to the Scie11ce of Mea11ing. Oxford: Blackwell. Warren, Beatrice 1992 Sense De\·efopments: A Comrasti\'e Study of tfle Del·dopment of Slang Sell.fU a11d No\·ef Standard Senses ill English. Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell. 1995 What is metonymy? Paper read ad the Xllth ICHL. Manchester 1995.

Metonymic Bridges in Modal Shifts Louis Goossens University of Antwerp

1.

Introduction

1 .1. Some background This paper will be concerned with the development of the English modal must from dcontic modality to epistemic modality. more particularly with the

way(s) in which this development came about. This shift is not restricted to mu.~t. of course. or to English. for that matter. As Bybee et al. ( 1994: Ch. 6) have pointed out. the more general shift is one from agent-oriented to epistemic modality. and it is attested in modals in a large number of languages English

across the world. The development can be interpreted as involving: (a) a metaphorical shift (cf.. for example. Sweetser 1990 for a mapping of the

socio-physical domain onto the epistemic domain). (b) a context-induced interpretation (Heine I 995) or the conventionalization of an implicature (Traugott 1989). As Heine has observed. the two interpretations differ in level of abstraction: (a) is a macro-level view of the change, (b) is to be situated at the micro-level.

1.2. Metaphor from metonymy In Goossens (1990) and also in Goossens et al. ( 1995) I have argued that there is considerable interaction between metonymy and metaphor. The most frequent pattern is what I have called 'metaphor from metonymy.' which is exemplified in {I).

194 (I)

·'Oh dear.'' she giggled. "I'd quite forgotten.''

In the metonymic interpretation she gigRled denotes a state of affairs (if you wish. a scenario) in which the subject said something lightheartedly 'while' giggling. Giggled thus expresses the complex 'giggled+ said lightheartedly.' In the metaphorical reading, on the other hand, we take it that she said something lightheartedly 'as if giggling; thus giggling is mapped onto lighthearted linguistic action. But also in the metaphorical reading. we arc aware that it has the metonymic interpretation as a possible basis. This can be

represented as in Figure I. In the ellipse on the left. two domains. A and 8, are intertwined in one complex matrix domain. This symbolizes the metonymic interpretation. On the right·hand side, the two domains are discrete: A ('giggling") is mapped onto B ('say in a lighthearted tone"). As the broken arrow signals. however. there is still a conceptual link with the possibility that the two domains (or actions) may be intertwined in one complex domain (the combination of the actions of giggling and light·hearted speaking). Applying this to the modal shift under discussion, the compromise be· tween the context·induced and the metaphorical interpretation can be viewed similarly. As Figure 2 indicates. there is a metonymic conceptualization in which the deontic sense (D) and the epistemic one (E) are intertwined. The metaphorical interpretation is shown on the right with the deontic domain being mapped onto the epistemic one. But. at least initially. there must have been an understanding that the two domains could be relevant together (a.'\ the broken arrow indicates).

c®>---C>-C) Fi~:11re

I. Mewplwr jmm metonymy

c®>---C>-C) Fi~:11re

2. From denmic

w epi.wemic

Metonymic

2.

Bridge.~

;, Modal Shifts

195

Research question

With respect to English nuut. the question arises whether there arc sufficient grounds to consider the development of iL'i epistemic sense as a metaphor from metonymy. In the following quotation. Traugott and KOnig clearly argue that the change was induced from contexts which are open to both a deontic and an cpistcmic interpretation and which would therefore give it a metonymic basis: ( .•• ) llllfll in the epistemic sense of 'I conclude that' derived from the obligative sense of 'ought to' by strengthening of conversational inferences and subjectification.lf I say Slle mfl.f/ f,(.' married in the obligation sense, I invite the inference that she will indeed get married. This inference is of course epistcmic. pertaining to a state of affairs that is anticipated to be true at some later time. (1991: 209)

Bybee et al. ( 1994: 196) generally favor the thesis that the overall change from agent-oriented to epistemic "involves the conventionalization of an implicature, by which the inferences that can be made from the meaning of a particular modal become part of the meaning of that modal.'' Also here. in the terminology adopted. we find acceptance of the metonymic origin. In the specific case of English must, however, they are opposed to such an origin: Since the cpistemic usc of 111/W arises in contexb with aspectual interpretations dbtinct from the obligation uses. it appears that metaphor may be at work in this change. Metaphorical change involves a ~hift to a different domain - in this t:ase from the domain of ~ocial obligation~ and physit:al net:essities applied to an agent, to the epi~temic domain that speaks of the necessary conditions under which a proposition can be true. (Bybee et al. 1994: 201)

The argument focuses on the essential difference between a state of affairs that combines with deontic must. which is typically dynamic or at least controlled, whereas for epistemic must we need a 'State.' that is. a state of affairs conceived of as non-dynamic and non-controlled.' As I have pointed out in Goossens ( 1987). the qualification of a controlled/dynamic nuclear predication by such aspcctual notions as Imperfective/Progressive or Perfect gives it a State-character. Traugott and KOnig's example would seem to indicate that there are contexts which are compatible with both the deontic and the epistemic interpretation. But then their example is clearly a constructed one. It remains to be demonstrated whether language use actually provides contexts in which the

196

Louis Goo.Uelfs

two interpretations are simultaneously relevant. and more generally. what the precise basis for the development may have been. In what follows. I will study contexts which arc relevant to a bcucr understanding of this modal shift in must. first in contemporary English (Section 3). then in older language stages (Section 4).

3.

Metonymic bridges for contemporary English must

3.1. The data I have analyzed samples of mu.rt in context from three contemporary data bases: Brown. Lancaster-Oslo-Bergen (LOB), and London-Lund (LOLU). 2

The first two are written corpora (American English and British English. respectively). the third is a spoken British English corpus. Table I arranges these data into five categories:

Decmtic!Nece.uity: This comprises instances which express an obligation (deontic uses) a'i well as a more general necessity. The deontic uses include instances in which the obligation is imposed/backed by the speaker (which is the rule) and instances in which this is not the case, but we have not separated them in our analysis.

Inferable nece.~.\·ity: Another label could be 'objective epistemic' or 'objective inference' (mll.~t expresses an inference which is not defeasible: the speaker draws a 'logical" conclusion: the context contains the necessary information for the hearer to arrive at the inference presented by the speaker). Tramitional: These are indeterminate uses (especially with respect to the difference between deontic and epistemic: the context permits the interpretation to go either way). Epi.~temic: 'Subjective epistemic' or 'subjective inferential' uses: the inference is the speaker's: the hearer cannot be assumed to have the (contextual) information to arrive at this inference 'objectively.'

Undecidable: The context does not permit any conclusive interpretation: these are incomplete utterances from the spoken corpus: instances of this kind arc listed under'?' in the last column of Table I.

Metonymic Bridges in Modal Shifts

197

Tahll' I. Mu.u i11 three comemporary data hauJ

Dcontic/Nct-essity Inferable

Transitional

Epistemic

BROWN (1111/.f/.69)

54

"

48

15

LOB (tmm,75)

2

(11111.ft110t.2)

LOLU (lllll.ft,l21)

60

(111/l.WIIOt.29)

23

52

Before we tackle the instances that are directly relevant to our purposes. allow me to make a number of preliminary observations. For obvious reasons the undecidable ("?')cases do not receive any further discussion. As far as the deontic/necessity examples are concerned. they outnumber the epistemic ones in all the samples (but more clearly in the written ones). Among them there were 23 instances of must not in the spoken data. but only two in the written samples (more specifically in LOB). Of special interest are the four cases of must not which I have assigned to 'subjective epistemic,' because we do not expect epistemic readings of must to occur with twt (cf. Coates 1983: Section 4.1.3). They are all in the interrogative-negative (three out of four come in tags) and have the effect of trying to elicit agreement of the addressee with an inference of the speaker: (2) is a case in point. Neither this instance.however. nor the other examples of this type. are relevant to the issue that concerns us here. (2)

I like to think of those days# and how tough it wa.'i #for the average Englishman#. what a hard life they must have had#- and mustn't there be #. endless stories about this mansion # - 3

It is the 'inferable necessity' and the 'transitional' uses that are our focus. They will be discussed in the next subsection.

3.2. Bridges As can be observed in Table I. there were 19 instances in our sample (out of a total of 296) which somehow provide us with bridges between the dcontic and

198

Louis Goo.Uelfs

the (subjective) epistemic uses. Of these. 9 are examples of 'inferable necessity' while 10 are 'transitional' uses. Let us lirst consider the instances in which both a deontic and an epistemic (inferential) reading are relevant (the 'transitionar uses). As it happens. they all occur in the British English samples. though I do not think that any further significance should be attached to this. (3) and (4) exemplify such transitional uses. (3)

(LOLU)



and conversation. went like this. this sort of conversation (m- have you noticed president II. that. (m- the boiled eggs # at Sunday *breakfast• -always *(laughs)* hard- and president said- ah well- the simple truth is that. if you're going to boil eggs. communally # they must be



hard (4)

(LOB)

''Well, I cannot say that I approve. You must remember that I am

taking your aunl"s hospitality. and. if your plans go right. on entirely false pretences.[ .. .)" In (3) they

m11st

be hard is compatible with an interpretation 'one has to/must

make them hard' (which is dcontic) and with an epistemic reading 'they will of necessity be hard.· The epistemic interpretation is objective rather than subjective (the inference follows from the fact that the eggs are boiled communally. which is contextually also available to the hearer: it is in that sense not a subjective/speaker inference). In (4). you nuut remember can be paraphrased as 'I want you to remember' (deontic). but also as Tm sure you will remember' (subjective cpistcmic: in this case the inference is to be assigned to the speaker). On the other hand. there are bridging instances of a different kind. as illustrated in (5) and (6). (5)

(LOLU)

what Fan didn ·t realize not being a lawyer#. or a Jawyer·s wife #that apparently the wife was put on probation II so that Fan didn't realize that# that she must also have been up before the court# you can·t be put on probation II not unless you're guilty

Metonymic (6)

Bridge.~

ill Modal Shifts

199

(BROWN)

Rossi and Ferguson have been across the street. talking to the kid. They've found some sort of new evidence. a bundle of clothes or something. and it must link the kid even stronger to the crime. Why won't you accept facts? The two kids were together a lot. they ( ... ] Both (5) and (6) present an inference for which the evidence is available contextually. so that the hearer can arrive at the same conclusion as the speaker - although it remains the case that it is the speaker who draws the conclusion (since he/she does the talking). Some five percent of the data have to be accounted for in this way. Although these instances are not metonymic bctw~.--en dcontic and epistemic a-. the 'transitional' cases are. they may nevertheless be considered as stepping stones to the full-scale subjective epistemic use which is typical of present-day English. The diachronic data to be discussed in Section 4 will confirm the transitional character of this type of usage toward a full-scale (subjective) epistemic use of English m11M. The following conclusions can be drawn from this brief discussion: (i) Although the normal understanding of 'epistemic' implies that it is a subjective inference of the speaker (this is. for instance. what is indicated by 'subjectification' in the above quotation from Traugott and KOnig). we also have to consider that inferences may be 'objective.' i.e .. the inferential ground is understood to be available to both speaker and hearer. a'i in instances (5) and (6). Without claiming that these 'objective epistemic' instances provide us with a metonymic bridge between the deontic and the epistemic usage. I would like to hypothesize that somehow they must have played a part in the shift to the full epistemic sense typical of contemporary epistemic Jmlst. (ii) Occasionally an utterance/sentence with must is compatible with both a deontic and an objective, or subjective. inferential reading. A condition for such a 'dual' interpretation is that the state of affairs represented can be taken to be both non-controlled or controlled (or at least controllable). This is the ca'ie for remember in instance (4) (something may spontaneously come to mind. or may be the result of a conscious effort to recall it); the normal interpretation of be hard in (3) is that it is a State. but in the deontic reading assigned to it above this is viewed as controllable (the subject will (have to) treat them in such a way that they become/are hard). Uses like these could be regarded as the metonymic bridge we have been looking for. Armed with these synchronic observations let us now move on to some diachronic data to see whether and how the rise of epistemic 11111.{1 confirms the

Umis Goossen.\·

200

picture that both 'inferable necessity' and 'transitional cpistemic/dcontic' instances play a part in the development of an epistemic sense of English mu.,·t.

4.

'Metonymic bridges': older language stages

4.1. The data Using the categories that proved to be relevant in our investigation of the present-day English data. we have looked at the instances of ""m (mote. mooste, ...) in successive samples of the Helsinki Corpus of English Texts. Obviously the Helsinki samples are too restricted to provide us with the very first instantiations of the new development in focus here (which. moreover. may be expected to have occurred in unrecorded spoken language anyway). but it may reasonably be assumed that such an analysis will help us to understand how obligational/necessity mwil came to develop an epistemic sense.

4.2. Beginnings of epistemic must As it happened. the first clear uses of subjective cpistemic muM were found in sample Early Modern English 3 (1640-1710). The four instances found arc listed here as (7HIO). (7)

(CEDIAR3B'. 457-461) (EMOE3) That was opposed & spoke against with such vchemency by my L. Clarendon (her owne Unkle) as putt himm by all preferments, which must doubtlesse, [{have{] been grcate. as could have ben given him 5

(8)

(CEOFRC3. 180-184) (EMOE3) The manner of doing it. so unsought for and unexpected, must take. with any good mind, more then the thing itselr. and I am sure the sense must always last with mee.

(9)

(CEPRIV3. 1200-1204) (EMOE3) [ ... ] I did thinke never to imploy him, but he being all your tailors I have altered my resolution; beleev I must not have a gown again this scaven yeare this cost soc much: four pound four shillings the outside cost me ready mony [ ... ]

Metonymic

Bridge.~

ill Modal Shifts

201

(10) (CETRAV3B. 342-346) (EMOE3) [ ... )were put to such stress. that had not their Annadocome to their relief. they must have desisted their Enterprize: Upon arrival whereof the new recruits gained so much on the Arab Governors. that[ ... ] In (7). (8) and (9) the epistemic reading is underscored by other epistemic expressions: doubtles.~e in (7),/ am sure in (8}. and be/eel'[= 'I believe') in (9). ( 10), and (7) in its emended version. are counterfactual. For ( 10) the paraphrase may be either would have desi.~ted or would have had to desi.ft: in the second paraphrase the epistemic reading still contains a necessity ingredient, but that does not invalidate the fact that the reading is also the expression of a subjective inference. In all cases the combining state of affairs is non-controlled: in instance ( 10) a~ a result of the qualification by the Perfect aspect. In our search for stepping-stones towards this infrequent, but already finnly established, usage of an epistemic sense in EMOE3. let us now first provide a general survey of the uses of must in EMOE3. as well as in the four samples before EMOE3. viz. EMOE2 (1570-1640). EMOEI (1500-1570). EME4 (1420-1500) and EME3 (1350-1420).

4.3. Must in five successive Helsinki samples Table 2gives the distribution of the different uses of must.classifying them into the categories used for the analysis of the present-day items (deontic/necessity. inferable necessity. transitional. and (subjective) epistemic). For the Middle Tabfe 2. M1ut in fil·e .fucce.ui1·e periods (Helsinki CorpusJ

Wish ME3(1350-1420J (Total: 63) ME4(1420-1500) (Total: 78) EMOEI(I500-1570) (Total: 88) EMOE2( 1570-1640) (Total: 191) EMOE3(1640-1710J (Total: 173)

Deonticl Nel:essity

Inferable Necessity

43

t8

Transitional Epistcmic

70

71

15

174

15

131

22

16

Lo11i.~

202

Goos.wms

English data we need an additional category 'wish.' This usc builds on the older

permission sense: it is clearly recessive in Middle English and disappears completely in the EMOE samples. As such, it will not concern us any further. A first observation is the absolute predominance of the category Dcontic/

Necessity. which is much more pronounced than in present-day English. As pointed out above, it also includes instances which as such do not express an obligation. (II) and (12) illustrate this more general necessity use. (II) (CMGAYTRY. 360-364) (ME4) (... ] for-thynkyngc J>at we hafc of oure syn, with-owtten will of thoghte to tume agayne to it. And l>is sacrament must hauc thre thynges:- Ane es. sorowc in ourc hcrte )lat we hafe synncdc.f ... ] (12) (CEBOETH2. 304-308) (EMOE2) [... )All that is so. long must last & holde togither, as it is one. but must needes perish & decay, whan so it leaves to be;( ... ]

In addition. note that in ME3. ME4 and EMOEI instances, in which the speaker can be assumed to be in authority, or at least strongly associates himself/herself with some other authority/necessity source. are markedly lower in frequency than those where this is not the case. Among those that do

not involve speaker authority. m11M is still regularly used in instances where it is a past tense (is used in past time main clause contexts). a usage which decreases as we come closer to present-day English. The most important observations to be made. however. relate to the other

three categories (inferable necessity. lransitional and cpistemic). As was pointed out in the preceding section, the fully (subjective) epistemic usage does not come in until EMOE3 (four instances). The 'transitional' usage is found from EMOEI onwards, but is lacking in the ME samples. Inferable necessity, however. is well established from our earliest sample (ME3) onwards. and remains so in all the subsequent ones. It is there that inferential must finds its starting-point. as I will try to demonstrate in the next section. 4.4./nferab/e necessity: a 'bridge' to inferential must

Let us first offer a few instances of 'inferable necessity.· one from each period. (13) (CMBOETH. 375-379) (ME3) But I have wei concluded that blisfulnesse and God ben the sovereyn good: for which it mote nede be that sovereyne blisfulnes is sovereyn devynite

Metonymic

Bridge.~

ill Modal Shifts

203

(14) (CMCAXPRO, 348-352) (ME4) The fruytes of vertue ben lmmortall/ Specyally whanne they ben wrapped in the benefycc of hystoryes/ Thenne it muste followe/ That it is mooste fayre to men Mortalle to suffre labours and payne/ for glorye and fame Jnmortalle (15) (CESCIEIB. 729-733) (EMOEI) Also the third square which is N.H.L.P. must ofnecessitee be equal to the square of C.D. and F.B .. bicause those lines be so coupe led that cuery couple are equall in the scucrall figures (16) (CEEDUC2A. 503-507) (EMOE2) I do fully see the evidence of all which you have said. and therefore I must needs be pcrswaded of it. I do heartily thanke God for it,[ ... ) (17) (CEHAND3B. 312-316)(EMOE3) and consequently the bud inoculated in the morning. must be more likely to grow. having the whole days plenty sap to invite it to unite with All these instances of must present a conclusion of some sort. an inference drawn objectively, rather than a subjective epistemic assessment of the combining state of affairs. The state of affairs is a State in (13). ( 15). and (17), a Process6 in ( 14) and (16). Note that supporting adverbials underscore the inferential character: nede in ( 13). ofneces:oitee in ( 15). therefore and 11eeds in (l6).comequemly in (17). where in addition the participial construction adds a reao:;on for drawing the conclusion. Given my claim that 'inferable necessity' provides us with the interface between the categories 'deontic/necessity' and '(subjective) epistcmic,' two questions must be asked next: (i) How do we go from 'deontic/necessity' to 'inferable necessity'? In other words, what is the contextual - the metonymic. if you wish -bridge between these two categories? (ii) What is the transition like from 'inferable necessity' to '(subjective) epistemic'? We tackle these questions in Sections 4.5. and 4.6 .. respectively. 4.5. From 'deontidnecessity' to 'inferable necessity'

Within the category 'deontic/necessity' it is not instances of mu.~t expressing obligation, but rather those in which must expresses a more general type of necessity not rooted in the field of social pressure that must be our startingpoint. The following examples, again one from each sub-period, illustrate this

Umi.~

204

Goossens

type of general necessity. (18) (CMCTPROS, 567-571) (ME3) Wherto and why burieth a man his goodes by his grete avarice.and

knoweth wei that nedcs moste hy dye? For deeth is the cnde of every man ( ... ]

(19) (CMSIEGE, 447-451) (ME4) ( ... (for ~r is no wattur ner i'e cyty t>en flem Jurdane. And when J>ey fynd no freche watur, )>ey most nedys fle, and we wyl folio and sley )'erne all (20) (CEFICTIB. 434-438) (EMOEI) ( ... ] rebuking a wyld roge because he went idclly about. he shewed me that he was a beggar by inheritance - his Grandfather was a beggar. his father one, and he must nedes be one by good reason. (21) (=(12)) (CEBOETH2, 304-308) (EMOE2) ( ... (All that is so. long must last & holde togither. as it is one. but must needes perish & decay, whan so it leaves to be; ( ... ] (22) (CESERM3A, 565-569) (EMOE3)

But now a very acute and scholastical man that would argue that God must needs have done whatever he fancies convenient for the World should be done, might[ ... ] None of these expresses an obligation, at least in the sense that no clear authority source is involved. The states of affairs range from State (in (20); but 'being a beggar' can be taken to be controllable as well as non·controllable) to Process ((18) and (21)) and Action ((19) and (22). but note that in (22) this Action is qualified by Perfect and that as a result the overall state of affairs qualifies as a State). Although none of these is a good instance of an (objective) inference either. I would nevertheless like to argue that an inferential ingredient. be it to varying degrees. can be read into them. In that sense they provide us with stepping stones from '(dcontic )/necessity· to 'inferable necessity.' In all of the instances we find the adverb needs (nedes, IJedy.\·, ueecle.\·). which we also found in some of the 'inferable necessity' cases. In (18) the general necessity expressed is a subclause argument of 'he knoweth'; it is as if this general necessity is presented as inferable from our, as well as the matrix clause

Metonymic Bric/ges ill Modal Shifts

205

subject's, knowledge of the world. In (19) the necessity for them to nee can be inferred from the absence of fresh water (mentioned in the preceding clause). In (20) the necessity for the subject to be a beggar follows 'by good rea-.on' from the fact that he belongs to successive generations of beggars, as is made explicit in what precedes. Also (2 I) and (22) come in a context in which a reasoning is presented. General necessity instances like the ones discussed here can therefore be taken to offer a natural transition between necessity and objective inference/ inferable necessity. 4.6. 'Transitional' uses: from (inferable) necessity to epistemic usage

As wa-. pointed out in Section 4.3., instances which are transitional towards (subjective) epistemic usage do not occur until the EMOE samples, and only sparingly in EMOEl and EMOE2. The following instances are representative of the kind of transition we came across: the first (EMOEI) instance is from an educational treatise. the second (EMOE2) from The Trial ofSir Walrer Raleigh. and the other two (EMOE3) from Pepy.';'s Diary and Tire Earl of £.,·sex's Corre.~pondence, respectively. I add a brief discussion to each instance.

(23) (CEEDUCIB. 71-75) (EMOEI) A childe shall Jeameofthc better of them, that, which an otherdaie. if he be wise. and cum to iudgement. he must be faine to vnleame againe Contrary to what the reader may have been led to expect on the basis of Section 4.4., (23) docs not build on an inferable necessity, but rather on a general necessity with a deontic tinge. since the speaker can be assumed to give his backing to this necessity. Note in this respect that be faine to vnleame againe is a process that may come about in an uncontrolled a-. well as in a controlled way. At the same time. the example can be interpreted epistemically. but the best paraphrase in that interpretation is will rather than mu.~t. In contemporary English. the instance with will would be predictive rather than inferential.

(24) (CETRI2B. 73-77) (EMOE2) Nay, I will prove all: thou art a Monster; thou hast an ("English") Face. but a ("Spanish") Heart. Now you must have Money: ("Aremberg") was no sooner in ("England") (I charge thee ("Raleigh")) but thou incitedst ("Cobham") to go unto him.f ... F

206

Lmtis Goo.uetu

In (24).11ow you must haw Mo11ey is pan of an argumentation in a trial: 11ow indicates the next step in this argumentation. M1ut is used to express the speaker"s inference (as such it is subjective). but the speaker later goes out of his way to give the grounds for his inference. which gives the inference an 'objective' backing. In other words. 'inferable necessity' supports the speaker's inference. (25) (CEDIAR3A. 312-315)(EMOE3) We were full in discourse of the sad state of our times. And the horrid shame brought on the King's service by the just clamours of the poor seamen. And that we must be undone in a little time. This is a nice mixture of inferable necessity and epistemic use (again predic· tivc: here the paraphrase is would rather than lt'il/ because this is reported speech or. more specifically. erlebte Rede 'semi-indirect speech'). A deontic/ general necessity reading is out of the question here. (26) (CEOFFIC3. 735-739) (EMOE3) ( ... ) although in a matter so nice as this yr Excellency must needs bee ye best Judge. I believe ye Parliament is like to sin longer{ ... ] On the one hand. this may express the speaker's (subjective) judgment. but can also be interpreted as expressing a more objective necessity (in line with the presence of the adverb needs). On the other hand we can take it as expressing the speaker's advice. which gives it a (speaker-backed) deontic overtone. Summing up. these transitional uses confirm that the epistcmic usage of must typically builds on inferable necessity 1111m: this is illustrated by (24). (25) and. be it less obviously. in (26). However. there arc transitional cases which exhibit other features. Besides the subjective epistemic ingredient. a deontic interpretation proved possible in (23) and perhaps also in (26). Note also that in three out of four instances. m11st is rather prospective and paraphrasable in contemporary English by will/would. The conclusion at this point seems to be that the rise of epistemic must is rooted in the 'inferable necessity' uses. but that complexes of dcontic and epistemic uses may have played a supportive role. In the next section we add another factor that appears to have been operative to complete this picture.

Metonymic Bridge.\· in Modal Shifts

207

4.7. Subjectification

A factor signaled by Traugott and KOnig (cf. the quotation in Section 2.) is subjectification. For Langackcr this is a crucial ingredient in the semantic make-up of the present-day modal auxiliaries of English: it is this subjectification that turns them into 'grounding predications' (Langacker 1990 and 1991: 6.3).8 Although a detailed account of how must develops into a subjectified item is outside the scope of this paper. I would like to confirm the basic correctness of the claim that subjectification played a part in the rise of epistemic must. More particularly. it can be argued that it is subjectification in the deontic area which paved the way forepistemic must, which, as we have defined the category. is necessarily subjectified (it reflects the speaker's subjective inference). An initial analysis of the deontic/necessity uses in our data revealed that. although speaker-backed deontic uses are already firmly established in the ME samples, it is not until we reach EMOEl that those subjectified deontic instances begin to outnumber the non-subjectified ones in this category. and that in EMOE3. where the first clear instances of epistemic must occur. the ratio is roughly 75% (for the speaker-backed deontic uses) a" opposed to 25% (for the 'not-speaker-backed' deontic/necessity instances). There is no doubt, it seems to me. that the increase and, finally. the predominance of subjectified uses in the deontic area, made the rise of an essentially subjectified epistemic/ inferential must possible.

5. Conclusion (i) The rise of epistemic mu.~t took place against the background of a gradual meaning development of must from a general necessity sense to the expression of inferable necessity. which amounts to an objective. non-defeasible inference. Early instances which are transitional to epistemic muM still show clements of an objective inference. On the other hand. another type of transition is found in instances where a deontic and an inferential interpretation are possible simultaneously. In those ca'\es. however. mu.{t is prospective and parapharasable by present-day English will, rather than tmut. Although they must have contributed to the rise of epistemic mu.{f and indicate that we cannot explain everything in terms of a

Loui.~

208

Goosu11s

single pattern of contextual shift.lhey arc less essential for our understanding of how present-day inferential must developed. What is crucial. however, is

the marked increase in subjectification in the deontic senses. This was an essential factor in the development of subjectified infcrential/epistemic must. (ii) With respect to the research question fonnulated in Section 2. it is clear that our empirical findings speak strongly against a purely metaphorical shift hypothesis. The shifts that we have observed are minimal nnd very gradual. There is no evidence that there was at any given point in the develop-

ment of English mu.~t a single conceptual shift whereby an element from the sociophysical domain was mapped onto the epistemic domain. (iii) More importantly. at least from the point of view of a collective volume whose focus is on the workings of metonymy. the view that must extended its meaning by way of contextualizations in which the deontic and the epistemic sense are intertwined (in other words. the view that the change from deontic to epistemic must is a case of conceptual metonymy) cannot be upheld either. The concatenation that we have witnessed is one that involves shifts that do not reach a cognitive salience which can be interpreted as the conceptualization of one 'clement" in terms of another within the same (complex) domain. Moreover. more than one type of minimal shift appears to have contributed simultaneously. (iv) Finally. we have emphasized the important contribution of a more global shift. namely that of subjectification in the deontic area. This is a conceptualization and grammaticalization operation which eventually affected the inferential domain that had become part of the semantic make-up of muM. This process of subjectification is in need of further investigation. but beyond the scope of what I set out to clarify in this paper.9

Notes My terminology for the differentiation into Furu:tional Grammar (d. Dik l9K9J. ~:oll~ted

state~

of affain; is in line with that of

2.

The samples were and 1996).

randomly by Ludo Lejeune. For details. cf. Lejeune ( 1995

3.

The quOiations from LOLU arc presented in a somewhat simplified form. The diacriti~: sign~ retained arc II. whi~:h marks intonation units. • •, which signals overlap. and those that indicate pauses of varying lcn~ths.

Metonymic Bridges in Modal Shifts

209

4.

The abbreviations for the different texts are taken over from the Hel~inki Corpu~. 1he sources. in the order of their fint occurrence in the example~ quoted a.~ {7H26), are a~ follows: CEDIAR3B =Evelyn, The Diar:r of John El't/yn: CEOFFIC3 = Lctten. Nonprivate: CEPRIV = Lctten, Private: CETRAV38 =Fryer, A Nrw AtTOUfll of &m l"dia: CMGAYTRY = Gaytridge, Dan Jon GaytridKr·.~ Srromn: CEBOETH2 = Elizabeth. Bonhi11.~: CMBOETH "' Oumcer. BO('thi11s: CMCAXPRO = Caxton, The Prologurs and Epilo~:•ws: CESCIE I 8 "'Record, thr Path-way ... of GtmMtrit: CEEDUClA = Brinslcy. Ludw; Literarill:s or thr Grammar Sd1oolr: CEHAND3B = Langford. Plain untl Ftdl lfutrut"lion.~ to Rt~i.ft All Sm1.~ tJf Fruit-trres: CMCTPROS =Chaucer. Tlrt> Par.fOII 's Talr: CMSJEGE"' The SitKt of Jmuulem in Pro.fe: CEACTIB =Hannan. A Cm·eat ... for Conu11..n Cunetors: CESERMJA "' TilloL~on. Srrmmu: CEEDUCIB "' Ascham, tM St·holemustrr: CETRI2B = Tire TrialtJf tht Earl of Em?:c; CEDIAR3A ::: The Diary of Samurl Prpys. For funher details. see KytO (1993).

5.

The notation 1{ .....} J indicates an italicized emendation in the source tell!. Note that the tellt makes sense with and without the emendation; without the emendation we have to read /wen as the equivalent of Modem English IN.

6.

Again in the terminology of Functional Grammar. i.e .. dynamic. but not controlled. Note that in (16) the Process character is the result of pa.~sivization.

7.

The notation (A ..... A) in the Helsinki font in the source text.

Corpu.~

indicates a typographical shift from the basic

8.

For a critical discussion with respect to contempornry m1m, cf.

9.

This

proce~s

Goossen.~

(1996: 2.33)

of subjectification is in focus in Goossens, fonhcoming.

References Bybee. Joan, Revere Perkins. William Pagliuca 1994 Tht> Evolution of Grammar: T~nu. Afprct, and Modality i11 thr Umguaxr.f ofthf' World. Chicago: The Univer..ity of Chicago Press. Coates. Jennifer 1983 The Semamit·s of the Modal Auxiliaries. London: Croom Helm. Dik. Simon C. 1989 Th~ Theory of Functimwl Grammar. Part 1: Tllr Strut·ture of thr Clause. Dordnx:ht. Providence: Foris. Goossens, Louis 1987 Modal shifts and predication types. In J. Van der Auwerd. L. Goossens (eds.), ln.f and Ouu of the Predication. Dordrccht, Providence: Foris. 2137. 1990 Metaphtonymy: the interaction of metaphor and metonymy in expressions for linguistic action. Cogniti\'e Linguistics I: 323-340. (Also in Goossens et al. (1995). 159-174.) 1996 English Modals and Fum·tio110l Models: A Confrolllation. University of Antwerp. UIA. Antwerp Papers in Linguistics 86.

210

Lo11is Goossens

fonhcoming Panems of meaning extension, ··parallel chaining;· subjectification, and modal shifts. In A. Barcelona (cd.). Metaphor and Metonymy at the Cro.uroods. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruytcr. Goossens. Louis.Paul Pauwels, Brygida Rudzka-Ostyn, Anne-Marie Simon-Vandcnbcrgcn, Johan Vanparys 1995 By Word of Momh: MetatJhor. Mnrmymy and Ungui.~tic Action in a Cogniti1•e Per.fJ~c·til'e. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins. Heine, Bernd 1995 Agent-oriented vs. epistcmic modality: some observations on German modals. In J. Bybee. S. Reischman (eds.). Modality and Grammar in Discouru. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Bcnjamins, 17-53. KytO. Merja {cd.) 1993 The Hebil•ki Corpu.f of English Te:rts. University uf Helsinki. Dcpanment of English. Langacker. Ronald W. 1990 Subjectification. Cogniti\'e Linguistic.~ 1: 5-38. 1991 Foundation.~ ofCogllitil·e Grammar. Volume II: Descripti\·e Application. Stanfonl. California: Stanfonl University Press. Lejeune. Ludo (ed.) 1995 Databases for the Study of EtiRiisl! A1uiliarie.f. Volume 1: The Modal.~ i11 Outline. Wilrijk, Dcpartemcnt Gennaanse UIA. 1996 Database.fJor tile Smd.\· ofEngli.dr Au.tiliarif'J. Vol11me II: The Modals in Spoke~~ British En~:li.th, Wilrijk. Departemcnt Gennaanse UIA. Sweetser, Eve 1990 From Etymo!OJO' to Pragmatic's. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Traugon, Elizabeth C. 1989 On the rise of epistemic meaning: An example of subjectification. LJ11· gua~:e 65: 31-55. Traugott. Elizabeth C., Ekkehard KOnig 1991 The semantics-pragmatics of grammaticalization revisited. In E.C. Traugott, B. Heine (eds.), Apprnache.f to Grammatkali:otion. Volume I. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins, 189-218.

Metonymy in Onomastics

Olaf Jakel University of Halle

1.

Introduction

How are surnames generated in German and in other languages? Are there

principles or patterns after all in the realm of anthroponymy? Or can we at best reconstruct the etymology of each single name. finally to establish overall arbitrariness? Like all proper names. surnames belong to a special class of linguistic expressions that is in marked contrast to appellatives. Unlike these. their semantic function lies not in Lhe categorization of objects or in descriptive conceptualization. but in the naming and identifying of individuals. With several people bearing the same first name in one community. unambiguous reference to a ccnain person became a problem. The solution was found in giving by-names, e.g., 'James .fOil of Zebedee.' 'John the Bapti.\·t: 'Richard Uonheart.' 'Erik the Red." or 'Thomas Aquinas.' 1 In bynames like these lies the origin of surnames as we know them, as Adolf Bach confirms: "Our surnames arc by-names inherited from ancestors .. (Bach 1952: 231: cf. Reaney 1967: 190.2 The custom of hereditary surnames did not spread over Germany until the twelfth century. taking almost five hundred years until complete proliferation: ''The custom of bearing a surname was not generally established in Germany until the year 1600 .. (Gottschald 1982: 47). In the field of onomastics. the notion of semantic motivation has always been more than a mere working hypothesis.lt is simply regarded as a ··fact that proper names, at least at the time of origin. are more or less motivated" (Naumann 1987: 16). Any original motivation. though. may later vanish from the conscious knowledge of the linguistic community.' This is why. from

0/afliikel

212

today's point of view. most onomasticians sec proper names as having etymological meaning rather than lexical meaning:' It is this etymological meaning of surnames that we will be dealing with in the following account of various naming principles. All surnames used as examples in this paper have been taken from the Hamburg Telephone Directory of 1993/94 (Deutsche Bundcspost Telckom

1992). which served as corpus material in this investigation. Aflcr a short glance at surnames motivated by 'genealogy· or 'profession· (Section 2) we will tum to metonymic strategies of surnaming after certain 'utensils' or 'qualities· (Section 3). Section 4 focuses on surnaming motivated by 'location

metonymy.' which shows a rich structure of subtypes that can be analyzed profitably from a cognitive linguistic perspective. Section 5 presents a sum· mary of the suggested taxonomy of motivated surnames. As a final point, the evidence of this onomastic investigation is brought to bear on the controver· sial discussion of the role of metonymy currently taking place among cogni· tive linguists.

2.

Motivated surnames

At the outset of an investigation of motivated names it must be noted that in German there is quite a number of common surnames which have to be regarded as semantically unmotivated: (I)

Grw1lf. Techert. Voel;:, Guhr. etc.

Even with the help of etymological research. the history of these and many other surnames remains pretty much in the dark. Though working on the general assumption that all surnames were once motivated. onomasticians find it impossible to reconstruct the original motivation of a number of names:~ The reasons must be seen in multiple naws of diachronic transmis· sion involving articulation or pronunciation. auditory understanding, and spelling. This supplies us with a residual category for those names whose semantic motivation is not provided by any of the naming strategies discussed in what follows. As this investigation is mainly concerned with the 'principal patterns' of naming. we will deal with surnames which do not necessitate longwinded reconstructions of etymological meaning. The naming patterns demonstrated

Metonymy in Onomastics

213

by these examples surely account as well for surnames whose etymology is less transparent. Detailed analyses of such names, though. can be found in the specialized onomastic literature (cf. References). Probably the oldest strategy of motivated surnaming makes use of the descent of the name~bearer. This 'genealogical' naming simply gives the first name of the father as a surname to his son: (2)

Werner. Thomas, Stephan. Christopher. Paul, Hein:.. Heinrich. Karl. Fran:, Jcma.\·, Lore11:, Martin, etc.

This group also comprises some supposedly unmotivated names such as Arendt (
Jan.ten. Friedrichsen. Michelsen. Thomsen. John.mn, Andenson. Svet~.wlm. Paulsolm

These examples represent an old German tradition with mainly patrilinear inheritance of names from fathers to both sons and daughters.ln comparison. surnames after the first name of the mother are extremely rare (cf.• among others, Matthews 1966: 70: and Reaney 1958: xvfO. The Scandinavian languages. however, have an autonomous way of surnaming daughters by suffix~ ing the morpheme ~dOrrir to the father's first name." The use of professions. occupations. or offices held as surnames has produced some of the most widespread family names of today. The following list of common examples may evoke a vivid picture of life in medieval communities: (4)

MUller 'miller.' Maier 'mayor,' Schul:.e 'bailiff,' Vo~:t 'sheriff/ bailiff.' Schmidt 'smith.' Bauer'fanner,' Fischer'fishennan.' Jiiger 'hunter.' Schiifer 'shepherd,' Hirr 'herdsman.' Schneider 'tailor.' Weber 'weaver,' Schuster 'shoemaker/cobbler.' Schreiner 'joiner,' Zimmermann 'carpenter.' Radmacher 'wheelmaker.' BOttcher 'cooper.' Seiler 'ropcmaker.' Tiipfer 'poucr.' Biicker 'baker,' Flei.<:eher 'butcher,' Knecht ·farm hand,' OchJenknecht 'stable lad,' Koch 'cook.' Pfeiffer 'piper.' Geiger 'violinist,' Fiedler 'fiddler,' Meister 'master,' Kriegsmann 'mercenary,' Kaufmann 'merchant,'

Olaf liike/

214

FOrster 'forester,' Kohler 'charcoal burner,· Riner 'knight.' Riclrter 'judge.' Rath 'councillor.' Schreiber 'writer/clerk," GlOckner 'bell ringer.' Kirchner 'sexton.' KU.~ter 'sacristan' 7 By means of this 'professional' naming strategy. a Thomas with the by-name der Miil/er 'the miller' became a Thomas MUller. who would pass on this surname to his descendants. no matter if they carried on his trade or changed professions.M

3.

Metonymic strategies

In addition to the genealogical and professional naming patterns exemplified so far. there are also metonymic strategies of naming.'~ These shall be our prime concern in the remaining parts of this paper. First of all, we find a host of surnames that are identical to common meaningful nouns in the language: (5)

Wolf' wolf.' Hase 'hare,' Hering 'herring,' Amsel 'blackbird,' Fink 'finch,' Hahn 'cock." Panther 'panther,' Hasenbein 'hare's leg'

(6)

Dorn 'thorn,· Kir.\'Ch 'cherry,' Wur:::el 'root/carrot,' Koh/'cabbagc'

(7)

Nagel 'nail,' Keil 'wedge.' Hose 'trousers.' DtMe 'box/can.' Bod(•n 'ground/floor/bottom.' S1eit1 'stone,' Kreis 'circle,' Ti.w:hbein 'table-leg.' Mlutbaum 'mast.' Bohn.wck 'beanbag,' Wintermamel 'winter coat'

(8)

Momag 'Monday,' Wimer 'winter,' Mai 'May.' Hundertmark 'hundred marks'

These are names or compounds from the animal (5) or plant (6) kingdom. for concrete objects (7) or abstract entities (8). whose use as surnames is in all probability motivated metonymically. The immediate problem with names like these is that in most ca'ics the particular kind of metonymy or alternative motivation is up to speculation. Is a person called Heriug because of an objective similarity (like slimness). or because the name-givers meant to insult him, i.e., as a derogatory term, or as a term of endearment? Then the name would not yet be motivated metonymically. Instead, it would have to be regarded as a straight metaphorical comparison. drawn with more or less good

Metonymy;,

Ononwstic.~

215

rea~ons. and with more or less friendly intentions. But what if the bearer acquired his surname because he worked as a fishmongcr.orbecause he was a famous fisherman. or because he was a notorious lover of smoked herring. or because he once had an accident or a unique encounter in which a herring played a special part? Then. though in most ca.o;es the precise motivation might be difficult or impossible to confirm (cL Naumann 1987: 28: Bach 1952: 284: and Dorward 1995: x). we would be fully justified in calling this metonymy proper. namely of the type IMPORTANT UTENSIL FOR PERSON. But the precise motivation of naming can also be more transparent. In the following examples, adjectives have been converted into surnames:

(9)

Klein ·short,' GrojJ 'tall.' Latrger 'long'+ deriv. morph. 'person.' Starke 'strong.' SchOn 'pretty,· Treu 'faithful.' Alt 'old.' Jung 'young.' Schwar:; 'black.' Bra1111 'brown.' Roth 'red,' Lustig

'merry.' Wunderlich 'strange' Most of these cases exemplify the metonymic mapping SAUENT QUALITY FOR PERSON. The same sort of adjectives can also enter into compounds with the morpheme -mann ·man': (10) Dickmann 'fat man.' Hartmann 'hard man,' Klugmann 'wise man.' Bangemantr 'scared man' Furthermore. salient qualities of the original name-bearer can even be expressed by regular synecdoche (II). or hyperbolically (I 2): (II) Kahlkopf'bald head,' WeijJhaar 'white hair,' Langnese 'long nose' (Low German), Krummbein 'crooked leg' (12) Rie.w! 'giant,' Wic-ht 'midget' Examples such as those in (II) name a salient part of the body (like 'bald head.' 'white hair,' 'long nose,' 'crooked leg') that stands for a person as pan pro toto. The hyperbolic terms ('giant,' 'midget') in examples (12) obviously refer to the height of the original name-bearer.

4.

Location metonymy

With utensil metonymy and sometimes also with quality metonymy. we are on fairly slippery ground a.o; far as the particular details of motivational diagnosis

0/afldkel

216

are concerned. With another important metonymic relation, the reconstruction of each particular motivation is far less speculative:

PLACE (OF ORIGIN) FOR

P!::RSON. This 'location metonymy' proves an enonnously productive pattern in the creation of surnames.lf a tenn originally designating a locaJity becomes a surname, it probably referred either to the current place of residence or to the place of origin of the name-bearer (cf. Reaney 1958: xiii: Cottle 1978: 17-21; and Dorward 1995: viii).

To provide an overview of location-metonymic surnames we can subcategorize them according to their morphological structure (see Figure I). The majority of them are compounds whose head denotes a (geographical) landmark. The prefixed modifier can either define the precise location in relation to that landmark - in most ca.o;es by means of a preposition. sometimes by means of a cardinal point - or it specifics the landmark by means of an adjective or another noun. The landmarks serving as heads in those location-metonymic surnamecompounds cannot be subcategorized further on formal grounds. But to obtain a general idea we can subdivide them into 'natural' versus 'man-made' localities (see Figure 2). which is not to be read as a clear dichotomy. The subtypes given in both groups simply list the varieties that were found in the empirical corpus study. It is interesting to note that with the more supraregional of those manmade landmarks, the necessity of compounding decrea.-.es. Towns or cities, regions or counties as well as whole countries make good surnames even without any morphological modification (the reason for this will be discussed in Section 4.5.).

Compounds

~ AttribUie/ Head

~I

Localion in rellllion lolandmark

~ Cardinal point

Prepo~ition

Fi1:11re I.

Mnrplwln~:y-/xlsetl

Spccificalion of landmark

Landmark

~ Noun

Adjective

subcotegori:.atimr of loccuitm-metmrymic .wnrames

Metonymy in Onoma.ftics

217

(Geogmphical) Landmarks

~ namral man-madt> - Landscapes/areas - Lakes and river:; -Woods and copses

-Farmland - Fords and dikes -Buildings - Sculemenls ~-Towns

and cities Regions/counties -Countries

.mtJrare~:ional--------

Fi~:ure

2: Landmarh that ('an un·e as heads in location·meton.wllic s11n1ame compoundJ

The structure emerging from these attempts at subcategorizing location-metonymic surnames will also guide our following presenlalion. which has subsections dealing with Prepo.fitioll.f as modifiers (4.1.), Cardinal points as modifiers (4.2.). Heads: naturallandmarh (4.3.). Head.f: man-made landmarla (4.4.), and ends wilh Supraregionallandmarkx (45.).

4.1. Prepositions as modifiers The finding that surnames can be formed by combining a (geographical) landmark as head with a preposition as modifier allows a certain predictability. Going through the limited number of prepositions, one is bound to find appropriate entries in ordered Iisis of names (e.g .. telephone directories). Most of the following surnames clearly designate the place of residence of their bearers. The first modifiers we find are the simple spatial prepositions an 'at" (13).auj'on' {14), bei 'at. by' {15) and in 'in' (16) along with their historical or dialectal variants: (13)

a. Amberg 'at the hill' b. Ambach 'at the brook'

c. Amthor 'at the gate' d. .Amende 'at the end' ( 14) a. Aufl:lerheide 'on the heath,' A11j dem Kampe 'on the open plain,' (Middle Low German) b. Aufdem Garten 'on the garden' c. Uphus 'on the house' (dial.), Uphoff 'on the farm/yard' (dial.)

218

Olaf Jdkel

(15) a. b. c. d. c.

Beiderwieden 'by the pasture/meadow· (dial.) Beimgraben 'by the ditch,' Biedebach 'by the brook' Bienwald 'by the wood' Biedenwcg 'by the path· Biederstadt 'by the town' (dial.)

(16) a. /mwalde 'in the wood,' /mholz 'in the copse.' /ndcnbirken 'in the birches· b. Imhof 'in the yard' As heads of these compounds we find natural landmarks like landscapes or areas (e.g .. 13a, 14a), lakes or rivers (13b. ISb) and woods or copses (15c. 16a) as well as man-made landmarks like farmland (14b). certain paths (I 3d. 15d). buildings (13c. 14<:. 16b). or settlements (15e). Surname-compounds arc also formed by the group of prepositions mr 'in front of' (17). hinter 'behind' (18), and iiber 'across' (19). Mountains or hills arc clearly preferred as heads by this group (17a. 18a. 19a). The reason must be that these prepositions require a point of reference with some highly salient vertical dimension. (17) a. Vormberg 'in front of the hill." Vormstcin 'in front of the rock' b. Vormwald 'in front of the wood' (18) a. Hinterberger 'behind the hill'+ deriv. morph. 'person' b. Hinterland 'behind the land/hinterland' (19) a. Ueberberg 'across the hill' b. Bobenhausen 'across the houses/upper houses' (dial.) While neben ·next to. beside. by' (20) is only sparsely used in surnames, ::.wische11 'between' must be even more unusual, as it does not appear at all in the corpus. Instead. mille/ 'middle' (21) appears in combination with almost any conceivable landmark: (20) Nebendahl 'next to dale/side-dale' (dial.) (21) a. b. c. d. e.

Miuelbcrg 'middle hill' Miuelbach 'middle brook' Mittfeld 'mid field.' Mittelfeld 'middle field' Miue/straB 'middle street' Miltendorf 'mid village.' Mitte/Jdorf 'middle village,' Miue/stadt 'middle town' (dial.)

Metonymy;,

Onomastic.~

219

Directional prepositions are also represented in the corpus, with zu 'to, towards' (22) probably defining a place of residence 'on the way to' the landmark in question, and vo11 'from· (23) in contrast referring to the place of origin of the name-bearer (cf. the discussion in Section 4.5.): (22) a. Zumsande 'towards the sand' b. Zumwaldc 'towards the wood,' Zumholz 'towards the copse,' Zumbusch 'towards the bush' c. Zum Felde 'towards the field' d. ZunnOhle 'towards the mill' (dial.) (23) a. vo11 der Heide 'from the heath' b. vo11 der Lippe 'from the Lippe' (river name) Um 'around' is rare (24), probably because this preposition defines only a very imprecise location. By contrast, auflen 'outside' is quite frequent as a modifier in compound surnames (25).

(24) Umland 'around land/surrounding land' (25) a. Aufletrdorf 'outside/outer village.' UtetrdOrfer 'outer villages' (dial.) b. Utermfihle 'outer mill' (dial.) c. Butenhoff 'outside fann/yard' (dial.) d. Blltendeich 'outside the dyke' (dial.) The last example (25d) in particular goes to show how important the in/outorientation in relation to certain landmarks was at the time of surnaming. In settlements owing their existence to huge dikes around low-lying land prone to flooding. the unprotected area 'outside the dike' was the place of residence of the underprivileged. Thus the surname Butell(/eich 'outside the dike' is quite frequent in the southern parts of Hamburg by the river Elbe and especially on the island of Finkenwerdcr.

4.2. Cardinal points as modifiers Very similar to prepositions, cardinal points can also function as modifiers in compound surnames like the following examples: (26) Nordbruch 'north fault/quarry'

Olaf liike/

220 (27) a.

We.~te11holz 'west copse' b. Westhoff 'west farm/yard' (dial.)

(28) a.

o.~rwald 'ca~aem

'east wood.' O,{terwald 'eastern wood,' Osterholz

copse'

b. Os/erfeld 'eastern field' c. Osterhus ·eastern house,' O.fterhof 'eastern fann/yard' Ostendorf 'cast village' (29) a. Sudholz 'south copse· (dial.) b. Sudenfeld 'south field' (diaL) Though woods and copse.f seem to be prominent (27a, 28a. 29a). almost any natural a.<> well as man-made landmark can serve as head in these compound surnames. The function of the cardinal points may be either to specify the landmark (e.g .. 'the eastern wood'), or to define a location in relation to it (e.g .. 'to the east of the woo
4.3. Heads: natura/landmarks Natural landmarks functioning a'i heads in compound surnames can be subdivided into groups denoting landscapes or areas. lakes or rivers, and woods or copses (cf. the overview in Figure 2). Of landscapes or areas. mountains (30a) arc most prominent in the corpus, but smaller hills (30b) and valleys (30c) are also represented. On the other hand. meadows (30d) and open plains (30e) are far less frequent. presumably because these do not really make salient landmarks.

Metonymy in Onomastics

221

(30) a. Ltittenherg 'small mountain' (dial.), Stoltenberg name + 'mountain,' Stauffenberg name + 'mountain,' Kirchberg 'church hill.' Eulcn.ftein 'owls' rock' b. Wiesehiige/'mcadow hill' c. Wiesenta/'meadow dale/valley.· Hacketa/'pick dale/valley' d. Wettera11 'weather meadow' e. Feldkamp 'field plain' (Middle Low German) At all times. lakes and rivers have provided important geographical orientation. Quite naturally they also contribute to location-metonymic surnaming. The corpus yields brooks or streams (31a), but also lakes (31b): (31) a. Graubach 'grey brook,' Kirchbat·h 'church brook,' Renden/mch name+ 'brook.' Schn.3.delbacll name+ 'brook' b. LtiUemee 'small lake· (dial.) Very often a distinctive copse or a wood provides the name to identify a person living there: (32) Grotcwold 'big wood' (dial.), Maiwald 'May wood.' Rhcimvald 'Rhine wood,' Buchwald 'beech wood.' Mickenhagen 'small wood'< Middle High German lrac '(enclosed) wood'

4.4. Heads: man-made landmarks As mentioned above, the distinction between rather natural and rather manmade landmarks should not be overrated. The only relevant criterion for location-metonymic surnaming is that the locations should be proper landmarks. i.e., distinctive, fairly unmistakable points prominent in the landscape. As subgroups of man-made landmarks we find fannland. certain paths. fords and dikes, buildings, and larger settlements (cf. Figure 2). Farmland. which is clearly demarcated, can serve better than the open plain (sec above, examples 30d and 30e) to pinpoint residents. Quite frequent as heads of surnames are fields (33a. b), pastures (33c). and gardens (33d): (33) a. Grothefeld 'large field' (dial.). Grtinfe/d 'green field.' Sommerfeld 'summer field,' Wtistcfe/d 'desert field,' Strohfeld 'straw field' b. l..angacker 'long field.' Dbelacker 'bad field'

Olaf Jiike/

222

c. Hagclweid 'hail pasture' d. Baum.~:artetl 'tree garden,' Weingarte11 'vineyard'

Baum.~:art

'tree garden' (abbrev.),

Surnames can tell us that at the time of naming. those landmarks having to do with river control were of utmost importance: dikes (34a). fords (34b). or bridges (34c) are more frequent in the corpus than simple streets (34d).

(34) a. Grothendiek. Grouendiek both: 'large dyke' (dial.) b. Stein/llrth 'rock/stone ford," Osscnjorr 'oxen ford' (dial.) c.

Ossenbriigge 'oxen bridge' (dial.)

d. Kirchgiifltler 'church street/lane'+ deriv. morph. 'person· Certain houses (35a). (fann)yards (35b) and castles (35c) are buildings distinctive enough to supply further surnames: (35) a. Backl!aru 'bakery,' Grotha11s 'big house.' Kirch 'church· b. Neuhoff 'new farm/yard.' Eickhoff 'oak farm/yard' (dial.), Diekhoff 'dyke farm/yard' (dial.). Kirchlwf 'church yard.' Grothe~ullz 'large fann · (dial.) c. Oldenbur~:. Ollenburg both: 'old castle' (dial.). Nienbur~ 'new castle' (dial.)

Depending on their size. castles might already figure as larger settlements. Other members in this group of surname sources are villages (36a) and towns (36b):

(36) a. Niendorf'new village' (dial.). Rahmst/orfname +'village' b. Hofsiadier 'farm/yard/court town· + deriv. morph. 'person.' HlL\"Iedi 'farm/yard/court town' (abbrev.)

4.5. Supraregionallandmarks While most of the location·metonymic surnames discussed so far owe their existence to rather regional landmarks, we have already moved into the supraregional dimension with town names. For a town name to become a surname distinguishing a 'Dietrich (von) Bern' from another 'Dietrich (aus) BELtielmde,' both persons must have been named as incomcrs in a third place. In fact. such naming after place of birth or origin is one of the most common strategies: "In the Middle Ages. and in particular in towns,thc custom spread

Metonymy;,

Otronlllstic.~

223

of naming inhabitants who had moved there after their origin'' (Gottschald 1982:48: cr. Smith 1950:47: and Reaney 1967: 36ft). Thus, incomers could be named after their pla(.'C of birth. but also afler their native region or county. and even country or nationality. From a distance. all these supraregionallandmarks are distinctive enough to serve ao; surnames without further specification. This is why there are hardly any compounds in this group. However. the development of town names to proper and lasting surnames usually included a phase in which they were preceded by the preposition votr 'of, from' (37a) (see also example (23)), which in most cases was dropped later (37b) (cf. Reaney 1958: xiv f). Furthermore. the derivational morpheme -er 'person' could be suffixed to a town name to create a surname for an incomer (37c). (37) a. wm Coel/n b.

c.

Berlin, Utrecht, Bem, Buxtehude Bremer, Achner

While in German surnames comprising regional associations or counties are quite common (38). reference to countries or nationalities (39) is rarer. Presumably this is because during the centuries of active surnaming. international influx into the German provinces was low. (38) Friese 'Frisian.' Bayer 'Bavarian.' PreujJ 'Prussian.' Biilune 'Bohemian.' Hesse 'Hessian' (39) Deut.n·her 'German.' Holliinder 'Dutch.' Ntmveger 'Norwegian' (40) Ausliinder 'foreigner.' lit.: 'out-land-er.' Undeul.fch 'un-German' In this connection. the examples under (40) certainly are a renection of the mentality of the name-givers. If somebody is named Ausliinder 'foreigner' or even Umleut.n·Jr 'un-German.' the intention - then as now - is clearly not so much to characterize the name-bearer precisely, but to brand him as excluded from the community. 10 The final example (41) provides confirmation ex negativo of the importance of location metonymy for surnaming: (41) Wanderer 'wanderer' Here it is exactly the 'non-locatability' of the person named which to the name-givers seemed significant enough to identify and distinguish him from more settled first-namesakes.

Olaf Jiikel

224

5.

Summary and conclusion: metonymic strategies in onomastics

In our corpus study based on the 1993/94 Hamburg Telephone Directory, we have investigated the most important surnaming patterns in German. Metonymic strategies in particular were found to play a leading role in the creation

of surnames. The following overview (Figure 3) presents a taxonomy of

naming strategies proposed as result of this investigation. Before we come to some final considerations of the role of metonymy in

onomastics. the general naming pauems found in our investigation can be

summarized: (a) Genealogical naming: (b)

Profes.~ional

naming:

(c) Metonymic naming: Utensil metonymy: Quality metonymy: Location metonymy:

after descent (patronymic) by reference to profession. occupation or office

IMPORTANT UTENSIL f'OR PERSON SALIENT QUALITY FOR PERSON PLACE (OF ORIGIN OR RESIDENCE) FOR PERSON

The surnames generated according to these five patterns can be conslrued as allemative ways of answering the same ba.'\ic question 'Which George do you mean?: namely: 'George. the son of.w·atul·so' (genea/iJgical) 'George. the linguist' (profes.~ional) 'George (with the) straw hat' (lltensil-metonymic) 'George (with) the pa11nch" (qllality·meumymic) 'George from California' (iomtion-metonymic) Surnaming

~

{;:~:~::~e:ot rccoverc:d)

/K

~ ~:enealof(ical

I

profeHional

----..__ metonymic

~ Qua/if.\" Lonllirm

Uten.~il

metonym_v Fif(ure

.~.A

metollym\"

ta.wmomyofthe e.uemia/.ftrCitt'f(ies ofsumamillf.:

1114-'trmymy

Metonymy in

Ononlllstic.~

225

To a great extent. our results arc in line with the vast body of expert knowledge represented in the standard onomastic literature. A slight divergence in classification results from the fact that nowhere in the standard literature is metonymy recognized as an important motivating principle in surnaming. The classification that has become the standard for German onomastics comes from Adolf Bach (1952). who distinguishes surnames after 'first names' (Ruftwmen). 'place of origin' (Herkunfl). 'place of residence· ( WohnMiitte). 'occupation and status' (Benif und Stllml). and 'nicknames' (Obemamen). Among English onomasticians, the subdivision of surnames into the four classes of 'local.' 'occupational; 'patronymicar (or 'relational') and 'descriptive' (or 'nicknames') is consensual since the work of Elsdon C. Smith (Smith 1950: 44: cf. Reaney 1958: xii and 1967: 20: Cottle 1978: 9: and Dorward 1995: vi). 11 What is correct in these traditional classifications is preserved in our suggested taxonomy of surnaming strategies. which also has some additional advantages. The incorporation of metonymy as a motivating principle in surnaming will certainly not revolutionize onomastics. Yet it seem~ desirable to differentiate between utensil metonymy, whose analysis remains speculative, and the much clearer quality metonymy .In traditional onomastics. surnames of both patterns are jumbled up in that huge and ill-defined residual category of 'nicknames." which is usually left completely unanalyzed. Another nontrivial result is the finding that surnaming after place of residence and after place of origin is based on the same location-metonymic principle. Our discussion has shown the immense productivity of this principle in the generation of surnames. The surnaming patterns investigated here on the basis of German names also account for English surnames (this was shown in Jakel 1996). In fact. English and German surnames do not only follow the same motivationaJ patterns. but they even share most of the morphological details discussed above. Our taxonomy of naming strategies was even found to apply to NonIndo-European languages like Hungarian and Japanese. 12 As reganls the relevance of the results of our investigation for the controversial discussion of the general role of metonymy currently taking place among cognitive linguists. our claims are modest. With our results we have supplied firm evidence to corroborate the view that metonymy - in contrast to metaphor - is basically a 'naming strategy: To distinguish metonymy from metaphor. which has primarily an 'explanatory function' (sec

Olaf Jiike/

226

Jakel 1997). Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 36) state: "Metonymy, on the other hand. has primarily a referential function. that is, it allows us to use one entity to .~rand for another." 13 And that this referemial function really is about the 'naming of individuals' can be confirmed by two quotes from Lakoff (1987). There. metonymy is defined as follows: ''With respect to naming. A stands for 8'' (Lakoff 1987: 19). And in the context of his theory of 'idealized cognitive models· Lakoff (I 987: 85) explains: "Most metonymic models are, in fact, "ot models of categories: they are models of individuals." Yet again. this should not be misunderstood. Metonymic structures can definitely have cognitive status (this point is also made by Lakoff 1987: 90). They just do not have it as strategies that enhance conceptual understanding or offer conceptual explanations. but as principles for the naming of individuals. Humans obviously have a strong cognitive need for distinctive yet economical naming. Nowhere can this be seen more clearly than in the supposedly antiquated domain of onomao;tic research. And that metonymic patterns of various k.inds are at work. in exactly this of all domains is no coincidence: just because of its general naming function there is a vao;t field of operation for metonymy in onomastics.

Notes h will be seen later that these by-names anticipate all known strategies of surnaming.

2.

This and all remaining quotations from German soun:es arc given in translation by the author.

3.

Cf. Acischer (1962: 30): "Atlhe moment of a name's origin the relation is prescnt.laler to congeal."

4.

This is stated explicitly by Debus ( 1966: 14) and at lea.~t implicitly held by many onomasticians: for example, :.ec Bach (1952: 206ff). Fleischer ( 1962: 30f0. Wilkowski { 1964: 51). Cottle (1978: IOf[J. arxl Dorward ( 1995: Jtvi). Cf. also Lyons (1977: 223).

5.

Sec Matthews ( 1966: 71 ): "But lhere always remain at least three or four per cent about which the honest investigator can only stale'. 'I don't know'." Another problem which cannot be considered here is the pos.~ibility of alternative reconstructions for one and the same name. For a treatment of this issue see e.g .. Bach ( 1952: 235) and Matthews ( 1966: 71[).

6.

Note that in the Scandinavian tradition the surname does not carry the ~e weight as in German. lb character is still more like that of a by-name. Concerning Icelandic in particular. d. Wiktorin (1991: 57): "Unlike our common practicc,lcelandic gives more prominen~;;c to the first-name. ] ... ] It is only logical lhat in the Icelandic telephone directory entries arc ammged alphabetically according to first-names."

Metonymy in Onomastics

227

7.

Of course the spelling of these surnames may vary. Thus, Sc·hmidt is more frequent than Schmitd. 80tlgtr is found as well a.~ 80ttchtr. and KOJttr alongside KiiJttr. to name but a few e~r.amples.

8.

See Wimmer (1973: 27(), who analyses this development appellative u.~e of Miifftr to a proper name Mijfltr.

9.

That professional surnaming should not be counted among metonymic ~trategies is confinned by Norrick (19111). Although he proposes no less than 17 different metonymic principles. he deems no special metonymic principle necessary if occupation stands for perliOn: "[ ... ] the theory of reference [ ... ] predicts that one can refer to a person by identifying his role and conversely" {Norrick 19111: 100). This distinguishes professional naming from those strategies discussed below as truly metonymic. However. other authors who subscribe to a more eKtensive notion of metonymy {e.g .. some of the contributions to this volume) would notch up even profes.~ional and genealogical naming patterns under metonymic strategies.

10.

For a synchronic analysis of the concept · Au.~liinder' and its current motivation see Jakel (1993).

I I.

a.~

the

tran.~ition

from an

Matthews (1966: 69) confinm this consensus:"( ... ] nearly all writer.; on the subject of surnames have classified them into the four types of Locality, Relationship. Occupation and Nicknames." And Smith ( 1950: 45) even pronounces the unive~ statu.~ of this fourcla.~sification: "In general, surnames in all countries originate in one of the above four ways if they are not consciously adopted."

part

12.

I thank Zoltan Kovecses for providing infonnation on Hungarian surnames, and Ken-lchi Seto for hi.~ detailed explanation of Japanese surnames. According to his estimate. no les.~ than 90 ~ of Japanese surnames are of the location-metonymic type, which is much more than in German or English.

13.

But cf. Taylor (19119: 122ff), who .oieem.~ to be taking the other side, though without voicing any convincing examples or argument~ to support his view. For more controversial position.~ on the status of metonymy. see the other contributions in this volume.

References Bach. Adolf 1952

Dtuuclre Namenkrmde. Bd. 1: Die deutschen Per.mnennamtn. Second edition. Heidelberg: Winter.

Cottle. Basil 1978

The Penguin Dictionary of S11rnamt's. Second edition. Hannondswonh: Penguin. Debus. Friedheim 1966 Asptku ::um Verhiiltnis Name- Wort. Groningen: Wolters. Deutsche Bundespos! Telekom (eds.) 1992 Amtfiche s T elt'fonbuch dt'r De11tscht'n B11nde.tpo.u Tdekom, OrtJnetz.bereich Hamburg. /993194 edition. Frankfurt a.M.

Olaf Jiike/

228 Dorward. David 1995 Scotli.fh Sumames. Glasgow: Harper Collins. Aeischer. Wolfgang

1962 Zur Fragc dcr Namcnfdder. In W. Fleischer (ed.). Name tmd Text. Tilbingen: Niemeyer. 25-42. Gottschald. Max 1982 Dellt.fche Namt'lfkunde: U11.tere Familiemrame11nacil il!rer Enwel11mg mrd Bede11ttmg. Fifth edition. Berlin. New York: Mouton deGruyter. Jakel. Olaf 1993 Wer oder was ist eigentlich ein Auslander? Anmerkungen zu einer sellsamen Kategorie. In Presscstelle der Universitiit Hamburg (eds.), Uni hh

2:44. 1996

Metonymy as a cognitive principle in onoma.o;tics. Paper presented at the XIXth International Congress of Onomastic Sciences, University of Aberdeen. Scotland, August 4-11. 1996.

1997

Metaphem in abstrakten Diskur.f·Domiinen: Eine kognitil·-lingllisrisclu: Umer.mchunR anlland der Bereklle Gei.~testiitigkeit, Wiruclwft 1mcl Wissenschaft. Frankfun a.M.: Peter Lang.

Lakoff. George 1987 Women, Fire, and Dangerous Tiling.~: What Cate,-:orie.~ Re~·eal about the Mir1d. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Lakoff. George. Malk Johnson 1980 MetOJJhor.f We Lil't' B.r. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Lyons, John 1977 Semamic.f. Volume I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Matthews, Constance M. 1966 English Sumames. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Naumann. Hon;t (ed.) 1987 Familiennamenhuch. Leipzig: Bibliographisches lnstitul. Norrick, Neal R. 1981 Semiotic Prindple.f in Semantic Theory. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins. Reaney. Percy H. 1958 A Dictionary· of Briti.fh Sumames. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1967 The Origin of English Surname.f. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Smith. Elsdon C. 1950 TheSwry•ofOJIT Names. New York: Harper. Taylor. John R. 1989 Linguistic Categori:_ation: Protorype.f in Lill/{lli.uic Theory·. Oxford: Clarendon. Wiktorin, Karl 1991 Island erfallrer•: Reiseiliformationen. Eichstiitt: Lundipress. Wimmer, Rainer 1973 Der Eigenname im Deum·hen: Ein Beitrag :u uiner linRuistiscl1en Be.n·hreibung. Tilbingen: Niemeyer.

Metonymy;,

Ommwstic.~

Witkowski. Teodolius 1964 Gnmdhewifft> der Namet1bmde. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.

229

Part Ill

Case Studies of Metonymy

Grammatical Constraints on Metonymy On the Role of the Direct Object

Richard Waltereit University of Tiibingen

1.

Introduction

While significant results have been achieved in the study of metonymy on a conceptual basis (cf. LeGucm 1973: Lakoff 1987: Croft 1993; Nunberg 1995: Blank 1997). relatively little work ha.o; been done on investigating metonymy

from a grammatical point of view (d. Langacker 1993). 1 In this paper I want to venture into the theory of metonymy by asking whether or not there arc grammatical constraints on metonymy. In particular. the question will be addressed as to whether there are arguments (subject. direct object. etc.) that arc particularly suited to metonymic phenomena. It will be argued that the direct object (or. in terms of semantic roles. the 'theme') is. in a very particular way. privileged in this respect. This is claimed to be true for French but it is likely to ex; tend also to other European languages. The problem of grammatical constraints on metonymic reference has been alluded to in Jackendoff 1992. He describes a fictive situation: we visit Mme Tussaud's wax; museum in London and see Ringo Starr looking at his own wax; statue. Now let us imagine the narrator reporting the following: (I)

All of a sudden. I accidentally bumped into the statues. and *Ringo toppled over and fell on himself. (Jackendoff 1992: 5)

As Jackendoff notes. the only pragmatically available understanding is that the statue hits the real Ringo. but this reading is apparently blocked grammati-

Richard Waltereit

234

cally. Grammatically. the only possible reading is that the real Ringo hits the statue. One has to consider the relation between the person (Ringo) and his physical representation (the statue) a metonymic one. Now, the possibility of metonymic reference relation is clearly dependent on the grammatical context, as (I) shows. The nature and the fonn of this dependency are far from obvious. In this paper, I hope to shed some light on these questions. but it will of course be impossible to study the issue exhaustively. As for the theory of metonymy. I assume that metonymy is a device for reference that exploits a contiguity relation between two entities (cf. Koch. this volume: as for non-referential approaches to metonymy, cf., e.g., Radden and KOvecses. this volume; Feyacrts. this volume: Panther and Thornburg. this volume: and Pankhurst. this volume). Contiguity can be a relation of spatial vicinity, a PART-WHOLE relation, a CO!'.TAINER-COI\TE..'ITS relation, an AGENT-ACTION relation, etc. It seems less important to try to enumerate the possible types of contiguity than to acknowledge that contiguity is a relation of experiential 'togetherness,' where experience is to be understood in the broadest sense. Given this assumption. contiguity can take virtually any form. provided speakers construe a relation between the entities involved and take the relation as communicatively relevant (Nunberg 1995). To the extent that the respective contiguity belongs to a relatively stable relation, it can be addressed as part of a frame (taking this notion a'i a cover term for what has been called 'domain." 'script,' 'scene.' etc.) (cf. Koch. this volume).!

2.

Two levels of metonymy in verbal semantics

In order to clarify the notions that will be used throughout this paper. a basic distinction with respect to metonymic relations in verbal semantics has to be introduced. Consider (2) and (3): (2)

a. b.

(3)

a. b.

La soupe aux. poissons n'a pas donne de pourboire. 'The fish soup didn't leave a tip.' Michel n'a pas donne de pourboire. 'Michel didn't leave a tip.' lis ont enfin scrvi Ia soupc aux. poissons. 'They finally served the fish soup.' lis ont enfin servi Michel. 'They finally served Michel.'

Grammatical Constrain/.\' on Me/Onymic Reference

235

In (2a) we deal with a metonymy of the classical type: the subject noun phrase does not actually refer to the fish soup. but of course to the guest who ordered it. We gra.'ip this immediately because the predicate n'a pas donntf de pourboire normally requires a human subject (as is the case in (2b)). The selection restrictions of the predicate are therefore violated in (2a).ln order to get an appropriate referent for the actual subject the hearer has to search for some entity that meets the 'human· requirement and that is at the same time semantically contiguous with the actual subject noun phrase. There is clearly a contiguity of the 'guest' and the 'ordered dish' in restaurant communication that makes it easy to choose the guest as the appropriate referent. That is the way metonymies usually work: the given noun phrase violates the verb's selection restrictions. and this violation has to be accommodated by contiguity-based reference. The selection restrictions of the predicate tell the hearer what kind of linguistic expressions would ordinarily be expected in the given syntactic slot; the contiguity relation ensures that the expression will nevertheless be correctly understood. I will refer to this as a metonymy on the 'insertional level' (because here we are dealing with lexical insertions into subcategorization frames). Now, things are quite different in (3). The verb sen•ir is polysemous, as is its English counterpart to .~erve. ll allows two different thematic roles in the direct object position. or rather two different classes of objects: the 'served dish' and the 'served person.' These are two semantically contiguous roles. and their relation is the same as in (2). But this time. there is no metonymic reference. It is really the dish and really the person. respectively, that are served. In order to understand (3a) and (3b) it is not necessary to activate a metonymic reading. Rather. the contiguity relation of the served dish and the served person is lexically encoded. The two different thematic roles are part of the verb's lexical content. I will refer to this phenomenon as contiguity on the 'role level.' The verb permits two different thematic roles in the direct object position without formally indicating this variation. This state of affairs entitles us to regard the verb as polysemous. Polysemy means that a lexical item ha." two separate but related meanings compatible with the same surface manifestation. Furthermore, a polysemy is always a form of lexical ambiguity that is not predictable from grammatical or other rules. A polysemy of a word is always an individual. 'accidental' phenomenon; ultimately. it is the result of a diachronic semantic change (this was already noticed by BrCal 1897):' This leads us to the next crucial a.'isumption: role-level contiguities arise

Richard Waltereit

236

diachronically from insertional-level metonymies. The occasional metonymic use is likely to be fixed later as a new meaning of the verb. when a metonymic shirt is no longer involved and the new meaning becomes lexicalizcd (cf. Blank 1997: 103-130). This can be shown. for example, for the French verb

.w:n·ir. On the one hand. we have the reading 'scrvir quelqu'un de quelque chose' (with the beneficiary in lhe direct object position. corresponding to example (3b)). This reading is very old and has been in use since Old French."' On the other hand. we have the reading 'scrvir quclquc chose a quclqu'un.' corresponding to example (3a). which has only been attested since the 17th century. It is plausible to a-.sume that the more recent reading has arisen out of a metonymic usc of the older reading. In the remainder of this paper I will present some arguments supporting the claim that on both levels of contiguity-based phenomena, the direct object ha'\ a certain primacy over all other arguments. as is represented in the hierarchy (4 ): (4)

Direct object> .mbject >other

This hierarchy makes two claims: firstly. verbal polysemies of the kind exemplified in (3) concern the direct object (if there is one). otherwise the subject. In very few cases they may affect other arguments. Secondly. syntactic constructions that inherently involve contiguity allow metonymic reference more easily for the direct object (if there is one) than for the subject. Note that the hieran::hy does not make the general claim that the object sustains metonymic reference better than the subject. I do not intend to affirm that. say, a subject cannot sustain metonymic reference if it appears in a transitive sentence. Already the example (2a) makes obvious that this would not be the case. The following sections will explain the hierarchy (4) in more detail.

3.

Role-level contiguities: verbal polysemy

Let us begin with role-level phenomena. They cruciaJly involve thematic alternations insofar as the roles selected by the verb are modified. As will be seen. any kind of polysemy-based thematic alternation observes the following order: if there is a direct object. the polysemous alternation applies to the direct object. If there is no direct object. the alternation nearly always applies to the subject. In the entire French valence dictionary of Busse and Oubost (1983), I have found only one counterexample to this rule. 5

Grammalical Consrrainls on Me/onymic Refere"ce

237

3.1. Frame-based alternations

Let me exemplify my hypothesis with the following data: (5)

a.

Marc va balayer ta chambre. 'Marc will sweep your room.' b. Marc n·a pas encore balaye les debris de verrc. 'Marc hasn't swept up the broken glass yet.'

Here we have a container-contents polysemy in the direct object: the things that are swept up and the room that becomes thereby cleaned. (6)

a.

Lc public a bisse cette chanson. 'The public called for an encore of that song.' b. Les spectateurs ont bisse sans succes le fameux groupe de rock. 'Without success, the spectators called the famous rock group back for an encore.'

With this verb, too, the direct object allows semantic variation: the artist who is supposed to give an encore and the song slhe is supposed to sing. These roles are semantically contiguous, but neither of them activates a metonymy in the sense that they have to be understood non-literally. Accordingly, the verb hisser can be treated as polysemous.6 The same kind of alternation of roles in the direct object position shows up in the following sentence pairs: (7)

Contiguity of game and player: a. Elle a gagne Ia partie. 'She has won the game.' b. Elle m'a gagnC. ·She has beaten me at the game.'

(8)

Contiguity of observation and looked-out object: a. Elle a epiC tcs all&!s et venues. 'She has spied upon you.' b. Je pao;se mon temps a Cpier une occasion favorable. 'I spend my time on the lookout for a good opportunity.'

(9)

Contiguity of dangerous action and endangered thing: a. Elle allait risquer une demarche fatale. 'She was going to risk taking a fatal step.'

Richard Waltereit

238

b. Vous devriez nc pas risquer votrc reputation. 'You should not risk your reputation.' ( 10) Contiguity of sound and resounding room: a. Ta voix rCsonne dans lc couloir. 'Your voice echoes in the corridor.' b. Cette salle rCsonne trop. 'This hall resounds too much.·

An extreme example comes from English to teach: to teach (mathematic.~/ SumlaJ· school/little children/third grade) (Langacker 1987: 269f), where we are confronted with the fourfold contiguity of the 'school subject,' the 'institution: the 'type of Ieamer." and the 'school grade' in the direct object. If there is no direct object but nevertheless two semantically contiguous thematic roles in the verb's argument structure, then this contiguity nearly always applies to the subject. as is the case of the intransitive predicate in ( 10). The roles of the sound and the resounding room arc contiguous. This results in a verbal polysemy with respect to the subject. The contiguity in all these cases relates to the respective verb's frame or domain (cf. Croft 1993; Koch 1997 and this volume). The sound and the resounding room are entities that belong to the encyclopaedic knowledge activated by the verb rhmmer 'to resound: Why do verbs have these polysemies? A scmantic·pragmatic motivation for the polysemy in. e.g .. (9) could run like this: the 'endangered thing." the 'dangerous thing' and an 'actor' are likely to co.occur whenever people speak of some dangerous action. We may call this the 'frame of the dangerous action: Now, people may wish to verbalize only part of this frame. It is therefore natural that languages should provide them with tools that enable this partial construal. One of these tools is apparently verbal polysemy. The verb allows two different construals. each selecting different entities from the respective frame. The contiguity of the 'dangerous thing' and the 'endangered thing' ensures successful communication and provides the motivation for the polysemy. This is the overall picture emerging from examples (5) to (IO).In these examples, we arc dealing with a contiguity relation between two kinds of thematic roles. The contiguity relation in question is a very specific one, as defined by the verb. 'Specific' means that the contiguity crucially relates to particular properties of the frame activated by the verb. It does not. or not primarily. relate to general properties of action verbs. process verbs. etc. As the semantic nature of these alternations hinges to a large extent on the frame

Grammatical Constrain/.\" on Me/Onymic Reference

239

embodied by the respective verb, we do best to calllhem frame-based ahemations.

3.2. Locative alternations Regularities of a slightly different kind are found with the locative and 'swann"-altemations that have received a lot of attention especially in the generative literature (cf. Fillmore 1968; Anderson 1971: Baker 1988; Olsen 1994). These can always be reduced to some kind of 'local' relation. Locative alternations are of the type illustrated in (II) and ( 12): ( II) a. b. ( 12)

lis ont charge du charbon sur le bateau. 'They have loaded coal onto the ship.' lis ont charge le bateau de charbon. 'They have loaded the ship with coal.'

II faut substituer ce chiffre par un autre. "You have to replace this number with a different one.' b. II faut substituer ce chiffre a un autre. ·You have to put this number into another number" s place.'

What is aJtemating in lhese alternations? The object position sustains two different semantic roles. These two roles arc clearly contiguous to each other. they establish a (be it metaphorical) CONTAINER-CONTENTS relation. This is obvious in (II). where the ship and the coal are actually regarded as a container and its contents. It is less obvious but nevertheless plausible in ( 12). The verb suh.f/it11er 'to substitute' evokes the idea of a base from which the substituted thing is detached as a profile (in the sense of Langacker 1987: 183189). The highlighted profile is part of the base: one can only substitute parts in wholes. The PART-WHOLE relation is in tum a relation of 'topological inclusion.' a CONTAINER-CONTENTS relation (Winston et al. 1987: 431-435). Note that in these cases it is only possible to speak of polysemy with respect to the direct object position. Only in the direct object position are there alternating contiguous roles without any surface indication of the alternation. The oblique objects (.mr le ba1ea11 "onto the ship.' de charbon 'with coal.' etc.) present alternating roles that are in a relation of contiguity, too, but formally indicate the semantic variation by a varying preposition. The formal marking of the oblique object prevents these from being semantically ambigu-

Ric/rani Waltereit

240

ous: and ambiguity would be a prerequisite for polysemy. The ambiguity condition is indeed crucial for my argumentation. Only if an argument of a given verb is ambiguous with respect to its thematic interpretation can it be analyzed as the diachronic resuh of an insertional metonymy. Recall from Section 2 that role-level contiguities are considered as lexicalizations of a non-

literal (metonymic) reading of a detenninatc thematic role. The contiguity of the oblique objects (sur le bateau. de charbon. etc.) cannot be the direct diachronic result of a metonymic interpretation. because their semantic relation to the predicate is formally marked and is therefore unlikely to result from

a non-literal reading.

3.3. The 'swarm'-alternation The so-called 'swarm'-altemation owes its name to the famous example Bees are swarming in the garden/The garden is swarming with bees. The point of this alternation is that two thematic roles can be coded either in the subject position or in a prepositional phrase. Interestingly. the contiguity relation between the two roles is usually a CONTAINER-CONTENTS relation: (13) a. L'eau dCborde de Ia baignoire. 'The water is flowing over the bathtub.' b. La baignoire debordc d'eau. 'The bathtub is overflowing with water.· In (13) there is clearly a contiguity between the contents, the water, and the containcr.thc bathtub. (14} a. La pluie ruisselait sur lcs murs. 'The rain was streaming down the walls.' b. II ruisselait de cold-cream. de sueur ct de vin. (Flaubert) 'He was streaming with cold cream. sweat and wine.' The CONTAINER-CONTENTS relation is less obvious here. but at any rate we arc dealing with a relation of local contact with some surface. The 'container' is, so to speak. 'flat.' With both verbs. the subject can express both the contents and the container. This flexibility has to be explained by polysemy. For a monosemous interpretation to be possible. we would have to lind one label that would appropriately characterize the selection restrictions of the subject. But this

Grammatical Constraints on Mellmymic Refere"ce

241

turns out to be impossible. We cannot identify a reasonable criterion that would integrate both, say. the <.:ontainer and the contents of the diborder-type of verbs. We therefore have to assume a kind of polysemy: again, we have two semantically contiguous roles available for the subject. Now this may appear to challenge the claim that these kinds of polysemies always apply to the direct object. However. it does not. because there is no direct object in these verbs and my prediction was that if there is no direct object. the polysemy concerns the subject, which here is indeed the case. Again regarding these verbs. one meaning arose diachronicaJiy out of the other one: misseler has been lexicalized with the 'place· as subject only since 1658. With diborder it was the other way round. Only since the end of the 19th century has the 'contents' been available a-. a possible subject of the verb. Now let us take a look at some other verbs which superficially display the same phenomenon: (15) a.

Les oiseaux piaillent dans l'arbre. 'The birds arc cheeping in the tree.' b. Tout l'arbre piaille d'oiseaux. 'The tree is cheeping with birds.'

( 16) a.

II y a des souris qui couinent dans le grcnier. 'There are mice squeaking in the attic.' b. Le grenier couine de souris. 'The attic is squeaking with mice.'

Again.there is a CONTAINER-coNTENTS relation concerning the subject, but this time we are not dealing with a polysemy. The (b) sentences in (15) and (16) represent uses of the verb that are not lexicalized. They arc highly marked; it is very unusual to speak of a 'squeaking attic.' We will not fmd these uses in a dictionary, yet they arc possible and attested. They represent what I have caJied insertional metonymies (cf. Section 2.1.). The subjects in (15b) and ( 16b) apparently violate the selection restrictions. Yct. this violation is accommodated by a metonymic interpretation. Maybe one day the insertional metonymy will become fixed as a polysemy. as is the case in the standard 'swann'-altemation (cf. (13) and (14)). This kind of alternation leads us to phenomena involving reflexives and possessives. which will be considered in the next section.

242

4.

Richard Waltereit

Insertional metonymies: syntactic constructions

One might think that there is no usc looking for syntactic restrictions in the area of insertional metonymies. because any constituent can in principle be affected by a metonymic shift. This is truc,of course. One would be surprised to find, for example. that a dative phrase cannot be metonymic. And. of course. I will not put forward such a claim. There arc, however. plausible arguments in suppo11 of the hypothesis that also in this domain the direct object has certain privileges. Certain 'marked' syntactic constructions that inherently involve contiguity relations allow metonymic reference for the direct objt..-ct but less naturally or not at all for other arguments. A construction, in this sense. is a specific arrangement of syntactic 'slots' which can be filled from an open set oflexical items. It may be restricted to a certain class of lexical items but its properties are not entirely deducible from that cla<>s. The construction types involved here include renexivc cliticization and some types of inalienable possession constructions. 4.1. Reflexive clitics Renexive cliticization. with the renexive clitic pronoun being a direct object. is a construction that is particularly suitable for metonymies. In (17) and (18) I present some examples where the renexive clitic allows metonymic reference and a corresponding lexical direct object which docs not: (17) a.

Pierre s'tconomise pourCtre en fonne le jour du match. (ZribiHenz 1978) 'Pierre saves his energy in order to be in fonn on the day of the match.' b. *L'entraineur I'Cconomise pour qu'il soil en fonne le jour du match. 'The coach, saves his1 energy for him1 so that he1 will be in fonn on the day of the match.'

In (17a) the renexive is clearly metonymic, because Pierre will surely not save himself. but rather something about himself, i.e., his energy. This metonymic relation only works with the renexive: we cannot have a non-renexive pronoun in the same slot. The asymmetry is the same in ( 18).

Grammtllical Constraints on Metonymic Reference

243

( 18) a. Je ne me suis pas racontC dans ce roman. 'In this novel. I didn't relate myself.' b. *Jc n'ai pas racontC mon perc dans cc roman. 'In this novel. I didn't relate my father's life.' This kind of metonymic reference only works with the direct object reflexive. not with the indirect object reflexive. Furthermore, there is a much cited phenomenon with certain psychological verbs that do not permit direct object reflexivization (cf. Belletti and Rizzi 1988: 296; Grimshaw 1990: 152-158): *Je, mc[XI preoccupc (but cf. Mm1jils me prioccupe) 7 Tm worried.' b. *EIIe se00 choque. 'She shocks herself.·

( 19) a.

What is wrong here? In my view. the subject in these sentences has to be understood metonymicatly. By sayingje me prioccupe I mean that something about me, perhaps my health. is worrying me. This should be a metonymy. Now it seems that the metonymy on the subject cannot work because it is somehow blocked by the direct object reflexive. This again strengthens the idea that the direct object is privileged with respect to metonymy: if there is a direct object in the reflexive construction. the other arguments cannot be interpreted mctonymically. On the other hand. if the reflexive is an indirect object. the subject can very well support metonymic reference: (20) II se 10 plait. 'He is pleased with himself.' (literally 'He pleases himself) Here again, the subject ha'\ to be understood metonymically: it is always something about that person that he is pleased with, e.g .• his handsomeness. But this time. the reflexive is a dative. It is therefore plausible to assume that the metonymy of the subject works because there is no direct object to intervene and block the metonymic interpretation. The overall picture arising from this discussion is that in a canonical reflexive construction there is a PART-WHOLE relation holding between the subject and the direct object. the subject being the whole. This asymmetric relation cannot be inverted.x Inversion of the PART-WHOLE relation. as inje me pritJCCIIpe, yields an ungrammatical utterance, a<> is represented schematically in Figure 1:

Richard Woltereit

244

je me mnudu· 'I blow my nose'

'je me priocmpe 'I'm worried'

Fit.:ure I. P IIRT-li'HOlF.. relmimu in reflt:xiw: 1'0/Uir/ICiimu

The reflexive 'object' seems to be a particularly suitable candidate for a metonymy, while the 'subject" of the reflexive construction seems to be a rather reluctant one. The PART-WHOLE relation being a contiguity relation. it becomes clear now that lhe reflexive construction inherently involves contiguity. What is more.the reflexive construction not only inherently involves the contiguity of its referents, but also a contiguity of the reflexive and its antecedent in the cllai"e parlie. Reflexive elements enforce a syntagmatic co-occurrence of referents; thus.their grammatical functioning relics on contiguity. Maybe it is because they rely on contiguity for their grammatical and their referential basis that they facilitate metonymic shifts more readily than other types of pronouns and noun phrases.

4.2. Inalienable possession Inalienable possession constructions are a topic of special interest to many syntacticians and semanticists. In many languages. one finds the particular phenomenon that possessive relations involving the 'personal sphere' (body parts, clothes. personal belongings. sometimes even relatives, etc.) allow codings that are unlike those in other possessive relationships: (21) a. Jean a lave Jes pieds de son fils. ·Jean has washed his son's feet.· b. Son fils, Jean lui a lave les pieds. 'Jean has washed his son's feet.' (22) a. Jean a lave lc toit de sa voiture. ·Jean has washed the roof of his car.' b. *Sa voiture.Jean lui a lave le toil. ·Jean has washed the roof of his car.·

Grammatical Constraint.f on Metonymic Reference

245

The syntax is the same in the (a) sentences and (b) sentences, respectively. Both possessive relations (human being-feet vs. car-roof) may be coded in the 'ordinary' type of construction with the adnominal phrase. as (21a) and (22a). But only with the BODY-PART relation in (21 b) may the possessor (the son) be coded in a dative phra.'ie. Only the possessive relations that are intuitively con1.-eived of as 'highly dense,' 'inaJienable' permit this marked construction type. (The precise semantic restrictions of the construction in French cannot be investigated here; cf. Spanoghe 1995; KOnig and Haspclmath 1998 and references cited therein for analyses.) Now, the relation between a possessor and an (inalienable) possession is clearly a contiguity relation. because they belong to the same domain (the human body): a foot. for example. is semanticaJly contiguous to its bearer, because people know that people usually have feet. This contiguity has, in this case. even been solidified as a grammatical rule of French insofar as the possessor may be coded as a dative phrase. The traditional term 'inalienable possession' is misleading. because it tells us little about the nature of the relation in question. What is traditionally thought of as inalienability boils down to a special instance of contiguity. Therefore. inalienable possession is another marked construction that inherently involves contiguity. The contiguity relation of the kind in question may give rise to a genuine metonymy. There is a construction where the whole slides metonymically into the syntactic slot initially reserved for a part. In French it is possible to say (23a) as an alternative to (23b): {23) a. Sylvie est jolie des yeux. (Frei 1972(1939)) b. Lcs yeux de Sylvie sont jolis. 'Sylvie's eyes are beautiful.' (23a) really says something about Sylvie's eyes. but it is the entire person that appears in the subject position. We are dealing with a kind of PART-WHOLE metonymy in which a part (the eyes) is replaced by a whole (the entire person). In Relational Grammar this is referred to as 'possessor ascension' (cf. Blake 1984). In French and other contemporary European languages this construction is only available for intransitive predicates. Only the subject can be affected by such a metonymy. as KOnig and Haspelmath 1998 have noted. So once again. the hierarchy of arguments is confirmed: the subject is affected only if there is no direct object. Now it would be nice. of course. to have examples

Richard Waltereit

246

where possessor ascension applies to the direct object in order to have even better evidence for the hierarchy. Here I draw again on the study carried out by KOnig and Haspelmath. There are languages where other arguments are implied, and in most cases it is the direct object: (24) a.

Homeric Greek (KOnig and Haspelmath 1998: 564) t6n rh. ebalen kephalen hupCr oliatos this.one PAST-hit head above ear oxei khalkOi javelin:DAT of.bronzc 'He hit his head above the ear with the bronze javelin.' b. Sierra Popoluca (Mixe-Zoque. Mexico) (Blake 1984: 437) Slwan a-ku?d-a?y an-sik John me-cat-indirect my-beans 'John ate my beans: c. Korean (KOnig and Haspelmath 1998: 562)

acessi-ka sikcy-lul

cwul-ul

kochi-ess-ta

uncle-NOM watch-Ace chain-Ace repair-PAST-INIJ

'The uncle repaired the watch-chain." (24b) literally says; 'John ate me with respect to my beans: This is the same kind or synecdochic relation as illustrated in the French example (23a). but this time the direct object is concerned. As KOnig and Haspclmath report. this kind or construction involving possessor ascension most often occurs with the subject or the direct object. All their examples with possessor ascension affecting the subject contain intransitive predicates. With the transitive predicates they report it is always an object, never the subject. that is affected by the metonymy. This seems to provide fairly good evidence for the claim that possessor ascension preferably applies to direct objects.

4.3. A counterexample? The shift from agent to instrument There is an alternation that seemingly provides evidence against the claim that metonymies privilege the direct object. As is well-known. action verbs allow the agent role to be replaced by the instrument role: (25) a.

Marie ouvre Ia porte avec Ia cle. 'Marie opens the door with the key.'

Grammtllical Constraints on Metonymic Refere"ce

247

b. La clC ouvre Ia porte. 'The key opens the door.· {26) a. Jean a facilement coupe le pain avec le couteau aigu. 'Jean has cut easily the bread with the sharp knife.' b. Le couteau aigu a coupe Je pain facilement. 'The sharp knife ha~ cut the bread easily.' These alternations metonymically exploit the contiguity of agents and instruments. Their semantic relation is mediated by the general frame of actions (actions always imply an agent and many of them also an instrument). And the alternations always affect the subject. They cannot affect any other argument. at lea~t in active sentences. because in these, agents are always represented by subjects (Giv6n 1984: 1391). Hence we arc dealing with transitive sentences that present a metonymically mediated alternation in the subject position. This seems to challenge the claim of the direct object's privileges with respect to metonymy. However. I want to argue that my general claim is not contradicted by these data. because these alternations can be shown to be a (systematic) insertional metonymy which docs not instantiate a particular construction: therefore. they fall under the gcneraJ caveat mentioned at the beginning of Section 4. How is this alternation to be classified with respect to the role vs. insertion distinction that I have proposed in this paper? The alternation represents a contiguity of thematic roles in a broad sense, but it is not a role-level contiguity in the sense of a verbal polysemy a" defined above. It seems implausible to analyze this alternation as a polysemy. given that it is apparently so regular and so systematic. With any action verb. the agent can be replaced by an instrument (provided the respective action actually implies an instrument). Hence the alternation is predictable from the mere fact that the verb is an action verb. Its predictability strongly suggests that it is not the result of an individual semantic change. Rather. it is a general grammatical process independent of individual verbs. Therefore. it cannot be considered an instant of polysemy, according to the definition given in Section 2. Nor does the AGENT-INSTRUMENT alternation instantiate a specific construction. because the characteristics of the alternation seem to depend on the general properties of action verbs, i.e .. on the properties of a determinate lexical class. They do not depend on a specific syntactic arrangement. To conclude, the AGENTINSTRUMENT alternation is a regular alternation that is neither an example of

Richard Waltereit

248

polysemy nor a specific construction. Therefore it cannot be considered a counterexample to my general claim.

5.

Conclusion: Why the direct object?

The obvious question now is: why should the direct object - in an accusative language like French - be so vulnerable to metonymic interpretation? I am unable to offer a completely satisfying explanation. but here are some possible suggestions. Firstly, the direct object belongs - with the subject - to those arguments that are semantically opaque. Oblique functions (dative. locative and temporal adjuncts. etc.) are most often semantically transparent, i.e .. their preposition- or case-marking permits only one thematic role (or few of them). The dative phra'\C usually has to be interpreted as an experiencer or a beneficiary argument; locative prepositions clearly mark locative arguments. etc. Subjects and direct objects. on the other hand. arc wide open as to their thematic interpretation. the exception being that the direct object cannot mark an agent (cf. Giv6n 1984: 135-185). Clearly. ambiguities in verb arguments arc only possible within the range permitted by the overt marking of each particular argument. It is therefore unexpected that verbs display a polysemy that relies on an ambiguity of an oblique object. But subjects and direct object-. should easily facilitate contiguity-based polysemies. because these argument'i allow for a wide range of thematic interpretations.9 (The same can also be seen in the examples of metonymy given in Fass 1991.) This point clearly argues for the supremacy of the subject in relation to verbal polysemy. even over the object. But perhaps the following argument makes us understand why the subject is outranked by the object in the end. The 'outranking of the subject by the object' only concerns transitive sentences. because only in transitive sentences is there both a subject and an object. The object in transitive sentences and the subject in intransitive (unaccusative) sentences arc most often "themes' (according to common inventories of thematic roles}.lt seems natural to assume that their sharing this property should be relevant for an explanation of the hierarchy (4). Now, the roles of individual verbs labeled "themes' generally seem. in a very particular sense. semantically more 'specific" than roles which are eligible for subjects in transitives (agents. instruments. experiencers). Whereas it is possible to have

Grammatical

Constraint.~

on Metonymic: Referellce

249

an idea of what an agent. an instrument or an experiencer is even without thinking of particular verbs. the 'theme' is a very abstract notion whose interpretation is maximally dependent on the respective verb's content. Already Fillmore ( 1968: 24) recognized this problem and considered his "objective .. case "the semantically most neutral case." This means, in tum. that in order to have an appropriate characterization of the theme of a given verb it is necessary to provide a more detailed description of that role than would be necessary for an appropriate characterization of. e.g., the actor of a given verb. 10 As an example. recall the alternation of risquer in (9). To describe its subject, it was sufficient to speak of an 'actor: which is a valid attribute for any action verb. To describe ilo;; possible objects. however. it was necessary to choose the more specific attributes 'dangerous action' and 'endangered thing.· These are specifications of what could also be called the theme of risquer. That is. the semantic change yielding the polysemy of risquer could switch the direct object from the entity 'dangerous action' to the contiguous entity 'endangered thing.' But no such specific contiguous entity would be available for the 'actor.' In other words. the argument bearing the theme (direct object or subject) can undergo semantic change more easily than arguments bearing other roles. The semantic specificity of themes might be a reao;;on for their inclination to fonn contiguity-based polysemies.

Notes I am indebted to Andrea~ Blank. Mary Copple. Ulrich Detges. Paul GCvaudan. Manin Haspelmath. Hendril.:je Scholl. and two anonymous reviewers for useful commenb on earlier versions of this paper. 2.

The relevant literature on frames includes Fillmore 1975. 1976. 1977. 1985: Tannen 1979. Schank and Abelson 1971: Barsalou 1992.

3.

As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer. it is sometime~ difficult to determine whether we are dealing with two alternating roles of one predicate or whether the different interpretation.~ merely reflect a poly).Cmy of the entire predicate.ln fact. both analyses are normally possible. Therefore the decision is less an empirical than a theoretical one. h coiTCsponds to what is known a~ the ·predicate-independent" vs. the ·predicate-dependent" approach to thematic roles. Given that this paper focuses on argumcnL~. not on predicates. it seems reasonable to opt for the predicate-independent approach. i.e .• to assume that different interpretations of a verb as in (3a) and (b) actually point to alternations of thematic roles and not to differences of predicates. of which role alternations would only be ·renexes.· But note that the polysemy approach adopted here forces us to consider roles not in isolation. but as pans of the verb they are employed with. Only

250

Richard Waltereit verbs. by vinuc of being lexical items. can be polysemous. Roles alone cannot. because they are not lexical item.~. In shon. lhe alternation in (Ja) and (b) is a verbal polysemy with respect to the direct objecfs interpretation.

4.

The historical dma used in this paper are drawn from U RlJINrt Historiq11~.

S.

Cf .. c.g .• hlriter dt> qurlque dU)sddl' quelqu'm• 'inherit slhJ10 be s.o.'s heir.' In this case. the contiguity of the inheritance and the heir applies to a prepositional object.

6.

An anonymous reviewer objected that these ahemations might simply boil down to active-zone phenomena (Langackcr 1984). Standard examples of active zones are We all trlullfJtt or Don't 1'\"f'r belie\'f' Gl'fald. The semantic content of their direct objects does not precisely coincide with lhe entity designated by these object~. which participates most directly in the process. A more 'literal' version would be WI' all lll'ard lht' sound of tire lrrunpel or Dmr'l e\'t•r ht'lien• what Gt'rald says. Consequently. activezone phenomena overlap with metonymies (cf. Langacker 1993: 31). But there is a crucial difference between active-zone phenomena and the alternations (S) to (10): wherea~ active-zone examples are felt a~ non-literal speech and can be paraphra~ed by a synonymous 'literal' sentence {a~ in the cited examples), frame-based alternations cannot. Take examples (Sa) and (b): the variant~ of hula.'''-'' present slight but important differences in meaning. &layer 'to sweep' in (Sa) ha~ an incremental theme {the cleaned room. place. etc. gets clean 'step by step') and this necessarily implies duration. 1be variant {Sb). however, ha~ a holistic theme (thing.~ may be swept up 'all in one go') and it does not necessarily imply dumtion. Accordingly. it is not always possible to replace the variants one for each other {which again indicates that they actually differ in semantic content). On the one hand, someone who has 'swept up something' ha~ not always thereby 'swept a place: On the other hand, someone who has cleaned an already clean place (i.e., without ~weeping up anything). can nevertheless claim to 'have swept it.' hf'ard the

7.

This (ungrammatical) construction nJUst, of course, not be confused with the impeccable one u prltrn·uper dt: qudq11t: d~tm! 'to worry about something.·

II.

The I'AMT·WHOLE relation is even iconically reflected in the reflexive clitic's slight morphological and phonetic weight. as was suggested to me by Peter Koch. Even on the level of linguistic form, the reflexive's antecedent is bigger than the refle:ooive ibelf.just a~ the whole is bigger than one of ib part.~. Interestingly ,the a~ymmetry between the refle:ooive and its antecedent fades away a.s the reflexive marker grows in phonetic shape (which again confmns the iconic nature of the part-whole relation in question). Prion·uper-type constnr.ctions arc sometimes bencr with a strong reflexive than with a reflexive ditic:fr mt' rlmq11t: moi-mime is bcner thanjt' me t·hoqur 'I shock my !>elf {cf. Bellcni and Rizzi 191!1!: 297f for analogous examples in Italian).

9.

Languages may differ considerably with re~pect to the semantic range permitted by the ~ubjcct and the direct object. Clearly. argumcnb such a~ ~ubjcct and direct object are language-specific categories. The semantic spectrum of a given argument is therefore highly dependent on particularities of the language's grammar which could not be studied hcre.e.g .. lhc case system, won! order rules. elc. The flexibility for metonymic reference is also part of 1hese language-specific propenies. Cf. Hawkins ( 1986: S3-73J for differences of this kind between English and Gennan. and MUIIer-Gotama 1994 for a cro.~s­ linguistie study on semantic transparency in argument linking.

10.

Koch 19111 offers an articulated theory on abstractness vs. concreteness of descriplion of themalic roles.

Gramnullkal Constraints on Metonymic" Reference

251

References Anderson, Stephen 1971 On the role of deep structure in semantic interpretation. Foundation.f of UJnguage 1: 387-396. Baker. Mark 1988 Incorporation: A Tlreory of Grammatical Function Changing. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Barsalou, Lawrence W. 1992 Frames. concepts, and conceptua1 fields. In A. Lehrer, E.F. Kittay (eds.). Fromt's, Fields. and Cm1cepts: New Es.m_\"S in Semantic and l..Lximl Orga· ni;;;ation. HillsdaJe: Erlbaum, 21-74. Belletli. Adriana, Luigi Rizzi 1988 Psych-verbs and -theory. Natural Lnngrwge and Um:ui.wic Tht'ory 6: 291352. Blake, Barry J. 1984 Problems for possessor aM:ension: some Austr.:alian ex.amples. Ungui.~tic.f 22: 437-453. Blank. Andreas 1997 Prin:Jpien des le.tikalischen Bedeutung.nmndeb am Beispiel der roma· ni.n·l!en Spra,·hen. Tilbingen: Niemeyer. Busse, Winfried, Jean-Pierre Dubost 1983 Franzfisischt'.f Verhk1·ikon: Die Kon.~truktion der Verhen im Franzfisischen. Second edition. Stuttgart: Klett. Brtal. Michel 1897 Essai dt' simantiq11e. Paris. Croft, William 1993 lbe role of domains in the interpretation of metaphors and metonymies. Cognitive Ungui.rtit's 4: 335-370. Fa.~s. Dan 1991 Metonymy, case role substitution and sense ambiguity. In D. Fa.~s et al. (ed~.). Proct'edings of the /JCA/-91 Worbhop on Complllationol Appr()(lc/res to Non-literal Lnnguage. Boulder, Colorado {Technical Report CU-CS-SS0-91). 42-51. Fillmore, Charles 1968 The case for ca.~.ln E. Bach, R.T. Harms (eds.). Unil·ersals in Ungui.Jtic Throry. New York: Holt. Rinehart and Winston, 1-88. 1975 An alternative to checklist theories of meaning. Proc~t'dings of the First Confert'nce of the Berkeley Ungui.Jtic.r Sociery·. Berkeley, California: BLS, 123-131. 1976 Frame semantics and the nature of language. Annab of the New York Academy of Science.f 280: 20-32. 1977 Scenes-and-frames semantics. In A. Zampolli (ed.), Unguistic Struclllre.J Proce.uing. Amsterdam: Nonh-Holland, 55-81.

252

Richard Waltereit

1985 Frames and the semantics of understanding. Quaderni di Semantica 6: 222254. Frci.Henri 1972(1939) Sylvie est jolie des yeux. In A. Sechehaye (ed.), Mllange.f de lilrguistique offeru il Clrarle.'i Ball)·. Geneva: Slatkine. 185-194. Giv6n, Talmy 1984 Syntax: A Fum·timrai-T.\'pologicallmroductimr. Vol. /. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins. Grimshaw, Jane 1990 Argumem St11cture. Cambridge, Massa~:hussets: The MIT Press. Hawkins. John A. 1986 A Comparatil'e T_1·pology of English and German: Unifi.o'ing the Contra.m. London: Croom Helm. Jackendoff. Ray 1992 Mme Tussaud meets the binding theory. Na111ral Language and Lingui.uic Theory 8, 1-31. Koch. Peter 1981 Verb-Valen::-Verfiigung: Zltr Sat::semmrtil.:. mrd Valen::frmr:.Osischer Verben am Beispiel der Verfogllnf{s-Verbnr. Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitiitsvcrlag. 1997 La diacronia quale campo empirico della semantica cognitiva. In F. LoPiparo (ed.), Unguaggio e t·og~riz.ione. Alii dl.'l XXVIII Congre.uo. Rome: Bulzoni, 225-246. KOnig, Ekkehard, Martin Haspelmath 1998 Les constructions a possesseur exteme dans les langues de J'Europe. In J. Feuillct (ed.). Actancl.' et \'alenct.' dans les langue.f de /'Europe. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 525-606. Lakoff. George 1987 Women, Fire, and Dangerous Tiring.'i: What Cmegorie.t Re}·eal about tire Mind. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 1984 Active zones. Proceeding.f of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Unguistics Society. Berkeley. California: BLS, 172-188. 1987 Foundations ofCognitil·e Grammar. Volume 1: Theoretical Prerequisites. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 1993 Reference-point constructions. Cog~riti1•e Unguistics 4: 1-38. Le Guem. Michel 1973 Sbnantique de Ia mlwphore et de Ia mitmrymie. Paris: Larous...e. L.e Robert Historique 1992 Dictionnaire historique de Ia langue franrai.re. Paris: Dictionnaires Le Robert. Miiller-Gotama, Franz 1994 Grammatical Relatio11s: A Cross-linguistic Per.'ipectil·e on Tlrt.'ir S.\'nlax ami Semantics. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyler.

Grammalkal Conslrainls on MeiOnymic Refere"ce

253

Nunberg, Geoffrey D. 1995 Transfers of meaning. Journal of Semantics 12: 109-132. Olsen, Susan 1994 Lokativaltemationen im Deutschen und Englischen. Zeit.idrrift fijr Sprat·flwisuriSclwft 13: 201-235. Schank, Roger C .. Robert P. Abelson 1977 Script.f, Plall.f, Goals, and Undf'r.uanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowlf'd!{e Structures. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Spanoghe. Anne-Marie 1995 La syma:re de l'appartenarlcf' illalii11ab/e enfrallrais, en espaxnof et en portu~;ais. Frankfurt a.M.: Lang. Tannen. Debor.!h 1979 What's in a fr.amc? Surface evidence for underlying expectations. In R.O. Freedle (ed.). New Diret"tions in Di.fcaurse ProCI'.uing. Norwood, NJ: Ablcx, 137-181. Winston, Morton E .• Roger Chaffin, Douglas Herrmann 1987 A taxonomy of pan-whole relations. Co~;11itire Science II: 417-444. Zribi-Henz. Anne 1978 Economisons-nous: A propos d'une cla.sse de formes Jtflexives mCtonymiques en franc;:ais. Langue Franraise 39: 104-128.

Putting Metonymy in its Place

Paul Pauwels KVH Antwerpen

1.

Characterizing Metonymy1

When Lakoff and Johnson (1980) put figurative language at the top of the agenda. claiming that it involved basic cognitive processes rather than deviant usage, their work gave an enonnous boost to metaphor research, but not to the study of metonymy. After all. they did call their work Metaphors We Live By. and in devoting only a single chapter to metonymy. they seemed to imply it was a minor process in comparison. Moreover. they mainly defined me-

tonymy in comparison with metaphor. Metaphor is principally a way of conceiving one thing in terms of another. and its primary function is understanding. Metonymy. on the other hand. has primarily a referential function. that is. it allows us to usc one entity to .uand for another. But metonymy is not merely a referential device.lt also serves the function of enhancing understanding. ) ... ) determine~ which a:.pe~1 we are focusing on. (Lakoff and John~on 1980: 36)

It is this focusing behavior which gives metonymy its special cognitive status. Examples (I) and (2) illustrate what is meant by 'focusing.· (I)

The Times hasn't arrived at the press conference yet.

(2)

We need some good heads on the project.

In (I), which follows the WHOU:. t-'OR PART pattern (institution for member of the institution). the metonym is said to focus on the status of the reporter thus referred to. In (2). the (body)part which is selected to refer to the whole person. focuses the intelligence of that person as a particularly relevant

256

Paul Pauwels

characteristic. The grounding of figurative expressions is, for Lakoff and Johnson. more obvious in the case of metonymy than in the case of metaphor since it "usually involves direct physical or causal associations"' (1980: 39). Metonymy is clearly the poor member of the family here: it only 'focuses an aspect.' and it is also more obvious and less creative - hence presumably less worthy of the researcher's attention. Lakoff ( 1987) approaches the difference between metaphor and me-

tonymy against the background of an already more elaborate cognitive framework. using the notions of(cognitive) 'domain' (any sort of conceptualization relative to which semantic structures are characterized) and 'idealized cognitive model' (a kind of gestalt which gives structure to reality). For Lakoff. "a metonymic mapping occurs within a single conceptual domain which is struciUred by an ICM:· whereas "metaphoric mapping involves a source domain and a target domain" (1987: 288). The ''direct associations" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 39) which characterize metonymy arc here (re)defined in terms of membership within a single cognitive domain. The central clement differentiating metaphor and metonymy seems to be the greater cognitive distance (to put it in spatial terms) between the concepts involved in metaphor. Taylor (1989) remarks that metonymy has received little discussion in comparison to metaphor. He takes a broad view of metonymy which not only encompasses conventionalized metonymy as in (I) and (2) above, but which also accommodates situationally sanctioned examples like Lakoff and Johnson's famous 'ham sandwich' example and common contextual modulations of meaning as in (3): (3)

a. He opened the door. b. He walked through the door.

For him "the essence of metonymy resides in the possibility of establishing connections between entities which co-occur within a given conceptual structure" (1989: 123f). In this view. it is not surprising that "metonymy turns out to be one of the most fundamental processes of meaning extension, more basic. perhaps, even than metaphor" (1989: 124). In reaching this conclusion, Taylor is supported by Goossens (1990. 1995). Looking at diachronic evidence. Goossens comes to the conclusion that metonymy is much more central in our conceptual apparatus than is usually thought.and. on top of that. it is often at the basis of metaphor. The following examples arc taken from Goossens (1990):

Putting Metu11ymy in it.f Place (4)

257

''Oh dear;• she giggled. Td quite forgotten."

(5)

have a word in someone's ear

(6)

I could bite my tongue off.

In cases like (4), for example. it is not clear whether the domain of giggling and that of (light-hearted) linguistic action are conceived separately. We are still aware of the metonymic basis in the metaphorical interpretation. a fact that Goossens (1990: 328) calls 'metaphor from metonymy.' In these cases. the difference between metonymy and metaphor lies in the distinction between a 'while'-interpretation and an ·as if-reading, respectively. In most such cases it seems the 'as if reading is most likely. although the metonymic basis cannot be discounted completely. This is illustrated by (5): speaking privately with someone may involve whispering into his/her ear. but the expression can be used to conceptualize situations where this is not actually happening. Another 'blend' Goossens distinguishes is 'metonymy within metaphor,' where a shared clement bridges the gap between the metaphor's source and target domain. functioning metonymically in the target domain. as in (6). Tongue is used literally in the source domain. but in the framework of the metaphorical usage (depriving oneself of one's speech as some kind of punishment) it functions as a metonym for the speech faculty. It should be clear from the foregoing that, in actual usage. the line between metaphor and metonymy is not always easy to draw. Against this background, Croft (1993) can be read as an attempt to come to a more narrowly defined concept of metonymy. Like Taylor. he discusses the difference between metaphor and metonymy against the background of other processes of meaning extension. He relies on Langacker's notion of 'domain matrix,' i.e .. the situation which occurs when the base against which an expression is profiled refers to the intersection of several domains (which is the case for most expressions). Lakoff's (1987) distinction is rephra
At the same time. he notices a similarity between metonymy and other. nonfigurative. kinds of lexical ambiguity. Unlike Taylor ( 1989) Croft does want

258

Paul Pauwels

to differentiate between the two. The shift in (7a) and (b). for example. docs not involve figurativeness, since there is no 'shift of reference,' while there is such a shift in (8a) and (b). (7)

a. This book is heavy. (in the literal sense. i.e .. weighs a Jot)

(8)

a. The Times is owned by R. Murdoch.

b. This book is a history of Iraq.

b. The Times hasn't arrived yet. (7a) and (7b) highlight different primary domains of the concept book. viz. the object-domain in (7a) and the contents-domain in (7b): the difference between (8a) and (8b). on the other hand. lies in the fact that only (Sa) highlights a primary domain - focusing the newspaper a'i a company - while (8b) highlights a secondary domain - focusing the newspaper as an entity which can be represented by a correspondent. So far. the characterization is relatively straightforward. Croft then considers further examples. In a footnote he describes Goossens' example (4) of metaphor from metonymy as a case of domain mapping. which is complicated by the fact that the source domain (sound) is one of the domains "which happens to be in the matrix of the target .. (speaking)- hence the appearance of being metonymy (1993: 367). Here. Croft's argument is not as convincing. Within the domain matrix of linguistic action. there obviously is a subdomain relating to the manner of speaking. In some cases. this manner can indeed involve giggling (in a way which would not be possible for say 'barking; or indeed. 'thundering' which do not describe human sound in their prototypical meaning - which is Goossens' point). In those cases. the use of RiKRie would simply be the highlighting of a secondary domain. i.e .. metonymy. In situations where the manner of speaking is conceived in tenns of giggling. i.e .. speaking in a particular way as if it were giggling, though actually no giggling is involved. there is domain mapping and metaphor. The difference between such cases of metonymy and the more central ones like (8b) above is twofold. First of all. these cases are situationally invoked: there is no pennancnt link between the concepts involved. Secondly - and this may relate to the first difference - the metonym deals with a conceptualization expressed by a verbal expression which has a different (probably more complex) kind of domain matrix than a conceptualization involving a nominal expression. As things stand. Croft docs not seem to want

Putting Metu,ymy in it.f Place

259

to make room for overlap between metonymy and metaphor in his model. In what seems to be a further move away from recognizing distinctness of domains in metonymy, he even questions the relation between metonymy and highlighting. II may not be the ~:ase that domain highlighting within the domain matrilt of a word is involved in all cases of metonymy. In some ~:ases the shift in domain prominence in the matrix is quite subtle. and sensitive to the semantics of the associated words.l ... lll)t appears that no domain selection is involved. (Croft 1993: 350)

In example (9), which contains a metonym of the type is no novel domain selection: (9)

PART FOR WHOLE,

there

We need a couple of strong bodies for our team.

The domain of the body is subsumed under the domain of the human being. and if one subscribes to the encyclopaedic view on meaning. this means there is no domain selection. but a "subtle shift in domain prominence"' (Croft 1993: 350). Summarizing, Croft distinguishes five possible cases: distinct domains and mapping between them (metaphor); distinct domains of which one hap· pens to be in the matrix of the other. and mapping (metaphor); single domain matrix and highlighting of a secondary domain (metonymy); single domain matrix and a difference in domain prominence (metonymy); and single do· main matrix and highlighting of a different primary domain (literal lexical ambiguity). Finally. using Langacker's ( 1987: 300) distinction between 'dependent predications' (which depend on other predications for their elaboration) and 'autonomous predications' (which elaborate the dependent ones). Croft offers an explanation for the high incidence of nominal examples in most discussions of metonymy. He suggests highlighting occurs on autonomous predications, while mapping occurs on dependent ones. He takes care. however. to empha· size that metonymy is not restricted to nouns - the autonomous predications par excellence - but that also verbs can behave autonomously with respect to adverbs. and that nouns can behave as dependent predications with respect to other nouns. In most of the above.thc issue seems to be the way to distinguish between the working of metaphor and metonymy. Lakoff and Johnson ( 1980), Lakoff (1987) and also Croft (1993) draw the line by referring to the distinctness of domains, while Goossens ( 1990. 1995) wants to accommodate overlap. The

260

Paul Pauwels

notion of domain matrix and the composition of domain matrices seem to play a crucial role in all analyses. In a ret.-cnt paper. Langack.er (1994) comments on the importance which distinctness, as opposed to continuity. plays in conceptualization. In his view, most phenomena which have been described as continuous will yield to an alternative analysis in terms of discrete categories upon further research. There may be an exception. though. which is highly relevant to the present discussion: An important aspc(;l of linguistic semantics is our ability to construe one structure against the background provided by anothcr.) ... JI wish to cmpha· size a parameter that may well be continuou~: the salience of the background struciUre. i.e. its level of activalinn in the construal of the target. tl994: 17)

This could be taken to mean the discussion as to whether a particular ex pres· sion is metonymic or metaphorical is in some cases academic since it depends on the perceived salience of the domains involved. which is undoubtedly also influenced by contextual factors, and not just by the nature of the expression.

2.

Getting a grip on the issue

The present investigation takes a." its starting point a corpus of utterances containing one of four related verbs of manipulation, i.e .. p11t. set. lay and place. Out of an overall corpus of 3,125 examples based on the LOB Corpus (Johansson et al. 1978) and the Leuven Drama Corpus (Geens et al. 1975). some 220 examples were selected as relevant to metonymy. This represented approximately 10% for put. set and place. and 28% for lay. Using a corpus structured around one central domain (manipulation). it was thought. would help us shed more light on the types of relationships between the domains involved in these examples of metonymy. Since. moreover. the corpus provides us with examples of utterances in context. we can also try to gain more insight into the motivation for different metonyms. In Pauwels and Simon·Yandcnbergen (1995) it has been shown that a Jot of metaphors carry value judgments and that this may be the way in which they 'enhance our understanding.· Here we will look for similar func· tions and motivations for metonymy. Finally. taking a restricted corpus of 3.125 examples a." our starting point has allowed us to ca.o;t the net wide. We will also be exploring the boundaries of metonymy. and try to find clements in

Pu"ing Meto11ymy ;, it.f Place

261

the corpus which allow us to see what is more central and what is more marginal to metonymy. In our discussion we will refer to the notions of 'cognitive domain; ·source· and 'target domain.' 'domain matrix," ·mapping' and "highlighting." and 'dependent' and 'autonomous predications.' as characterized above. We will also make use of Langacker"s ( 1987: 231 ff) distinction between 'trajector' (TR) and 'landmark' (LM) to describe the profiling of the state of affairs in the sentence. In our corpus of manipulation verbs, the prototypical pattern is a three-place predicate profiling two TR-LM relationships. as in (10). (10) He put the book on the table. (II) The constable put the spade in once. (12) Adams was lighting and placing candles. (II) and ( 12) are common alternatives. In (II) the secondary LM is not expressed. or hidden. while in ( 12) the verb is used a.<; a two-place predicate profiling only one TR-LM relationship.

3.

Variation in the corpus

A preliminary survey of the corpus already yields a quite varied set of metonyms based on relationships of varying complexity. It is clear that metonymic relations do not only occur at the level of the lexicalized concept, but also at the level of the more abstract unit of a state of affairs. (13) She continues to Jay tea. ( 14) She has put your tea out. (15) (Croupier:) "Place your bets. please. ladies and gentlemen!'' Examples (13) and (14) can still be considered as a fairly straightforward case of nominal metonymy. where the tension between the verbs lay and p111 which conceptualize a manipulation of objects and lea which conceptualizes a drink is resolved by invoking a PART FOR WHOLE metonymy. The drink which is central to the meal which is being put on the table. is taken to refer to the whole. The metonym has the function of focusing the status of the meal. An example like ( 15) is already more complex. The relationship between

Paul

262

Plmwe/.~

the concept of bet and the actual object which is being placed is of a more complex nature. The bet is created by the act of placing money in a certain space on the table. The relationship can be described as that between the result of an action and an object which is instrumcntaJ in achieving that result. with the standing for the INSTRUMENT. By referring to the result, the metonym focuses lhe function of the action. Similar examples were found in pul 011 a disgui.\·e.lay bait and place an order. In the latter. however. the physical act of placing is already much less central in the process. so much so. even. that the example would preferably be analyzed as a metaphor from metonymy. where there is a mapping from the domain of manipulation to the domain of ordering goods. RESULT

(16) Father? Put your heart into it. Love me. come on. Have a shot at filial devotion. (17) I'm putting it aside for my old age. (18) a. I do put my foot down about discussing them. b. Just the once. I had to put my foot down there. Examples (16)-{18) provide further illustration of the interpenetr<:~tion of metonymy and metaphor. (16) is a case of metonymy within metaphor: making an effort to feel is metaphorically described as putting in. i.e .. an act of manipulation. while heart refers metonymically to the effort in which it is crucially involved. Examples ( 17) and ( 18). although metaphorical to all intents and purposes, have a metonymic basis: in both cases. situations where the describing and the described act co-occur arc easily conceivable indeed. it is probable that such situations are at the basis of the expressions which makes them typical cases of metaphor from metonymy. Examples (I 7) and ( 18) are different from the foregoing in another respect: they could also be taken literally. In ( 17) and ( 18a). however, there is still an element inside the sentence pointing to the need for a reinterpretation in figurative terms. In ( 17) there is the prepositional phrase introducing the clement of long-tenn planning. and in ( 18a) the activity is linked to linguistic action by a prepositional phrasc.ln (18b). however. the figurative interpretation depends on the wider context. ( 19) The power of life and death - no need of other vices. If you've once put on the black c<:~p. everything else tastes like wax fruit.

Pulling Metonymy in its Place

263

(20) The board is laying a cable along a seven mile route in Surrey. (21) The church has no views on drains, gasworks or bricklaying. Examples (19}-(21) clearly demonstrate that also pure metonymy can be context induced.ln all three cases. the act of manipulation is a necessary part of the action complex for which it stands: an 'as if interpretation is ruled out. The metonyms are at the same time referential and clarifying. since they focus on the most visually salient aspect of the action complexes. In (20) there is even a further metonym which, to put it in Croft's terms. is induced by the dependent predication (laying a cable) on the autonomous one (the board): the board is the institution responsible for the action but is not the actual agent. Most of the above examples (13}-(21) are characterized by a tension between the concrete/specilic and the abstract/general. In (13) and (15) there arc two factors contributing to this tension. First. there is the fact that the verbs profile only one TR-LM relationship. which means there is an inherent vagueness in comparison to the fully descriptive pattern (exemplified by ( 10)). The less tangible character of the LM (bet.f, tea) outside the domain of manipulatable objects is the second element. In (14), which is closer to the fully descriptive pattern. the secondary LM is hidden. which again creates vagueness, and the primary LM (tea) is again less tangible. In (19), a hidden secondary LM combines with a primary LM which is marked as generic by the definite article (the black cap). and in (20) the indefinite article introduces indeterminacy into the primary LM (a cable). while a second metonym makes the TR more abstract. (21) is probably the most striking example of the shift towards abstraction. since the specific description has been turned into a (necessarily) more general concept. The ·exceptions' are (16)-(18), where metonymy and metaphor interact.

4. Salient source domains This section focuses in more detail on the relationship between frequently occurring source domains and their targets and describes the extent to which, and the level of abstraction at which. there is interpenetration of domains. At the same time the grouping together of similar expressions may provide further insights into the motivation for such metonymies and their function.

Paul Pa11we/.\'

264

4.1. Manipulating body parts A first salient source domain involves the manipulation of body parts. In all. some 60 expressions containing references to hand, ji11ger, fist, foot. knee, and heart were found.

eye.~ .face

(22) She ha." gla-.ses of whisky standing around at vantage points. to which she would put her lips when so disposed. (23) He was unlikely ever to set foot in his kingdom again. (24) a. I'd strangle any man as much as laid a hand on her. b. The first person who sets a finger on anyone of his family ...

c. Trouble is I'm practically certain I've never laid eyes on you, mate. (set) d. I'lltie a lovers' knot with his anns and throw him in the Tiber if I ever lay my tentacles on him. In (22) drinking is described in tenns of an action preparatory to the drinking. The effect is to draw attention to the behavior of the person, rather than to the actual drinking. Whether she is just wetting her lips or whether she is drinking hard is left to be inferred. The effect is euphemistic. but there is of course the irony added by the first part of the sentence. It is probably best to consider ca'\es like (23) as metaphorical in presentday usage; the means of entering a country are so diverse and the prototypical case of bodily movement is now only used in a context of overstatement. There is a similar connotation of ovcrst<~tement about the examples in (24). In (24a) and (b) assaulting someone is referred to in terms of physical contact - even the slightest touch is prohibited. In (24a) the overstatement is as much the effect of the intensifier til' much as, as of the description lay a ha"d (not even two hands); (24b) minimizes the extent of contact (not even a complete hand) to achieve a similar effect. Seen in the context of(24a) and (b). (24c) describes an even more tenuous kind of contact. The expression derives its value from the tension between the laying of a body part which would seem to indicate physical contact. and eyes which. in this case. denotes a greater distance. In (24d) the overstatement runs in the other direction: rather than minimize the extent of physical contact as in the threats (24a) and (b) or the disclaimer (24c). the extent of physical contact is maximized for effect. Again. there is a shift away from the metonymic origins - these arc still clearly

P11tting Metonymy in

it.~

Place

265

present in an example like (24a). in so far as the hands are the prototypical means of assault. (24c) and (24d), however, should be considered as pure metaphor. In (24c) 'seeing' is grasped in tenns of physical contact. with eyes as a metonymic bridge (a case of metonymy within metaphor), while in (24d) getting hold of someone with the aim to innict physical harm is described in terms of the octopus's, usually unwelcome, attentions. In sum. roughly 50 of the examples on this domain carry a connotation of euphemism or, conversely. of overstatement. This connotation is often contextually supported. and the sentences often contain conditionals or markers of exceptionalness (if e\'er, the first wlw. the fir.~t time, as .won a.~. (neg+) before. once. everything, ... ).The recipient domains in most ca.'ies refer to socially unacceptable behavior such as excessive drinking, suicide/killing, fighting. hara">sing, anger, or shame. Again we note the tension between specific and general in most examples. In (23) there is a difference in 'scale' between the primary LM (fiJot) and the secondary LM describing its target-location (ki11gdom). It could be argued that this case is an exception: in other examples like i11 thi.,· hou.fe, in this room the tension is less obvious. Still. the fact remains that literal descriptions usually have as secondary LM either a physical object. a substance. or a surface. Similarly. in (24).there is a tension between the primary LM (body part) and the secondary LM (person a.'i a whole), while in literal descriptions the focus is more narrowly on the contact between body parts as in lay a hand on .wmeone·.,. arm. It is this tension which is resolved in the metonymic interpretation. In (22) the tension is between the specificness of the description of the contact between the lips and a glass. and the frequency suggested by the plural glaue.~ in the antecedenl. 4.2. Manipulating human beings A second subset with approximately 20 examples describes human beings as manipulated entities. It should be clear from the start that babies. children. unconscious persons. bodies and willing adults can indeed be lifted. transported and fait/, set, put and placed in a literal sense. In the examples. however. the manipulation stands for a more elaborate kind of interaction. Motivations for these uses can be found in euphemism or. conversely. dysphemism.

Paul Pauwe!J

266

(25) I can lay a woman any time I want.

(26) Lucy's laid him out in his dress uniform. (27) a. She laid him out flat. (cold) b. She was out cold but still breathing.

(28) I ought to put you across my knee. Try it. You take one step towards me and I'll... (29) "But I always put my babies on pots straight away." said old Mrs. Harford. reprovingly. In (25) the sexual act is referred to by means of the prototypical position of the participants (i.c .. lying down). On the one hand the expression is quite graphic - which accounts for the selection of lay to function metonymically. On the other hand. the use of the verb as a two-place predicate without profiling a secondary LM results in a certain vagueness. At the same time the causative aspect in the verb is stressed. The overall effect seems to be one of dysphcmism. which is probably a consequence of the focus on the physical and causative aspects of the interaction. Vagueness and euphemism are apparent in (26), where the preparation of a body for burial (not only a disagreeable topic, but also one which is 'shrouded' in mystery for most people. one can presume). is referred to by invoking the resultant state of a body stretched out. Again the action of bringing the body in this state is a necessary part of the complete process. Example (27a).though similar at lirst sight. is the result of a completely different kind of meaning extension. Here. the usage is based on a metaphorical usage of mtt (cold/flat). as exemplified by (27b). This usage is at the basis of expressions like knock someone Ollt. which is here being metaphorized by means of lay someone out flat/wid. which focuses the result rather than the means by which this result is arrived at. The causative aspect of lay is again foregrounded by this usage. In how far the scene in (26) is invoked in the sanctioning of (27a) is a moot point - that there are possible bridges is obvious. The final two examples (28) and (29) are at the same time vague the really disagreeable bit is not mentioned - and explicit - there is no doubt as to what is being referred to. They probably originated as euphemism, but they can also be used as dysphcmism. In all of the above. the metonyms focus on one stage of a sequence which is characterized by unity of place. time, and participants in the interaction not unlike Fillmore's scenes. The events referred to (having sex. preparing a

P11tting Metunymy in it.f Place

267

body. spanking. toilet-training) are (or used to be) taboo topics. The subdomain of manipulation is not only selected because it avoids the taboo; there is also the concreteness of manipulation which provides the necessary salience. and the focus on the control exerted by one participant over another. which is a central element in the event.

4.3. Manipulating instruments In the following, a selection from 35 examples. more prototypical scenes of manipulation are involved in metonymic patterns. A first set of expressions. with lay as a central element. has 'stopping' as a target domain. (30) It is not difficult to lay down The Conque.~t of Pem or Volume 2 of The Cambridge Mellieval Hi.ftory. once it has been taken up; but it is not so easy to feel altogether happy about never taking it up again. (31) Carpentry is an occupation that lends itself to being laid down at will, either temporarily or permanently. (32) Ron. dcmobbed from home guarding. gladly laying his rine aside. built me a fruit cage. In (30), to stop reading is referred to by means of laying down a book - a physical activity which indeed entails the more general complex of activities. and which seems intrinsically bound up with it. This is in contrast with (3 I). which should probably be considered as metaphor pure and simple: the very general activity of stopping is here being conceived in terms of stopping to manipulate. There still is a metonymic link in the background. since carpentry is prototypically a manual job which requires manipulation of tools and objects. In (32) as well. the link between source and target is less strong: soldiering and rine-carrying are of course related. in so far as one of the main aspects of being a soldier (in the public mind) is the obligation to 'take up· arms, but it is not inconceivable for a soldier never to carry anns. Moreover, there is no 'entailment' relationship between source and target as is the case in (30). (33) Plant plastic gnomes where you walk and even. perhaps. put pen to paper and relate your experiences in the force. (34) I'll cook something, you can wash your hair, you can relax. we'll put on some records.

268

Paul Pauwe/J (35) a. If that'll be all sir, I'll let her in and put a kettle on. b. I'll put on an egg.

A second set of examples. where put is the central verb. all involve the starting up of a process. In (33) the act of writing is referred to by means of the manipulation of the prototypical instrument involved. or rather the first movement of that instrument. In so far as this expression is used to refer to 'manual' writing, it can be considered as metonymy. If it were used. consciously, to refer to writing by means of other instruments. this would be a case of metaphor from metonymy (cf. also Pauwels 1995: 150). Similarly. in (34). a fairly simple act of manipulation which occurs at the beginning of a sequence

of activating a recordplayer and playing a record. is used to refer to the complete sequence. In this case. the metaphorical potential is possibly greater. for two rea..ons. For one. the classic turntable is on its way out and being replaced by the CO-player. where the record is not put on in the literal sense.~ On top of that. this might activate another path via which the usage can be sanctioned, i.e., the metaphorical put wr as in put 011 tire radio. Example (35a) falls into the same pattern as the above. with both the potential of a metonymic reading ('on the stove') and a metaphorical reading ('electric kettle'). An example like (35b) clearly demonstrates a further shift away from the literal, descriptive usage. since the instrument involved in the boiling of the egg (indeed. boiling. rather than any other way of cooking an egg. is referred to thus) is not mentioned. In cases like the above. the metonyms appear to be mainly referring devices. Referring to a complex activity by means of its fairly concrete first or last stage is basically a time-saving strategy. Rather than focus on a specific aspect, or euphemistically avoid another (the main strategies encountered so far). this type of metonymy tends toward imprecise language usc, exploiting Grice's maxims. one of which states one need not be more specific/precise than necessary. The fact that quite a few of these examples involve closely scripted events undoubtedly plays a role here. The selection of lay to conceptualize 'stopping' and put to conceptualize 'starting' relates to the prototypical meanings of these verbs (sec further Section 6) - a full discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. Not all the examples of manipulating instruments are of the same type. however. Example (36) is clearly much more closely linked with the examples in the previous sections as far as the motivating factor behind the metonym is concerned.

Putting Metunymy in

it.~

Place

269

(36) ''Put a pillow on his face and get him out of it,"' said Paul to himself. Although the actual act of putting a pillow on someone's face falls into the pattern of referring to the start of a scripted sequence of actions, there is, in this ca'\e, an additional a.'>pecl of euphemism which provides further motivation for the partial selection. This is also true of (37). which is however even more complex. since there is a complete interpenetration of metaphor and metonymy on different levels. (37) Wipe that smile off your face and get up. before I put you on the governor's report. At the highest level. this is again a case of the first stage in a sequence standing for the complete sequence: writing someone's name down in an official register is used to refer to the consequent punishment. However. the writing down itself is metaphorized in terms of manipulation. where that which is written down is referred to metonymically. The result of the complete sequence is a 'demetonymization' (cf. also Goossens 1990: 335) since in the end the person is literally the affected entity.

5.

Target domain linguistic action

In this section I will take a closer look at the nature of the link between source and target domain from the perspective of the target domain. Of the examples found in the corpus. quite a few. with put a.'\ the central element. have already been discussed in some detail in Pauwels ( 1995). Also. examples from previous sections fit in here. (18) a.

I do put my foot down about discussing them.

(30) It is not difficult to lay down The Conquest of Pem or Volume 2 of The Cambridge Medieval History, once it has been taken up: but it is not so easy to feel altogether happy about never taking it up again. (33) Plant plastic gnomes where you walk and even, perhaps. put pen to paper and relate your experiences in the force. (37) Wipe that smile off your face and get up. before I put you on the governor's report.

Paul Pauwe/.\'

270

(38) The draft was laid before parliament. (39) Let me put your mind at case and say that Gregory has certainly no intention of wanting to marry me. The source domain of {18a). i.e .. manipulating body parts. is not only related to the larget domain of linguistic action (LA) by virtue of the coalescing in time of the two actions. The body is used frequently in non-verbal communication. and it is this background - the communication domain - which supports this metaphor from metonymy. In (30) and (33). the specific subdomains of reading and writing centrally involve the manipulation of instruments. The source domain is clearly in the

matrix of the target. This is also true of special cases of making official statements, where the introduction of a topic to an audience is usually accompanied by the introduction of a written document at the same time. as in (38). Since the addressee is orten not only the listener. but also the undergocrof an LA. it is not surprising that metonyms involving the person addressed/ affected are often embedded in LA metaphors. Especially metaphorizations involving the source domain of manipulation are prime candidates. as is clear from (37). (39) is slightly different. since the metonym does not highlight the 'whole' person, but rather the mind-'part'. In summary. there appear to be three types of metonymy from the target domain point of view. There are two types of event-metonymy. one in which source and target domain are both subsumed by the more general domain of non-verbal communication. as in (18), and a second one where the source domain is subsumed by the target domain of LA. as in (30), (33) and (38). The third type are nominal metonymies embedded in LA-metaphors which activate a more general domain. as in (37), or a more specific domain. as in (39).

6.

Metonymy, generalization and the extension of verbal meaning

In quite a few of the examples of metonymy discussed above where the metonym was invoked to resolve tension at the sentence level between the dependent predication and the autonomous one. the origin of the tension could be traced to a discrepancy in the scale or level of abstraction of the concepts involved. Indeed, the most pervasive patterns of metonymy are those which

Pu"ing Meto11ymy ;, it.f Place

271

have traditionally been described as PART FOR WHOLE or WHOLE FOR PART. Looking at. for example. Lakoff and Johnson's list ( 1980: 38f) it is clear that most of their cases can be construed as more specific kinds of these two basic types. PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT, OBJECT USED FOR USER, CONTROLLER FOR CO!>mtOLLED. INSTITUTION FOR PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE, PLACE FOR INSTITUTION. PlACE FOR EVENT can all be characterized by invoking a 'container· relationship between two domains: a superordinate one and a subsumed one. In analyzing these examples as metonymy. the stand-for relationship is taken to resolve the semantic tension. However, the tension can be, and. judging from the evidence. often is. resolved in another way. Take example (40). which can be described as a straightforward case of metonymy, where table stands for the objects which are being laid on it.

(40) I'll just lay the table. (LET/Ayckbourn) The autonomous predication (table) is the locus of the effect induced by the dependent one (lay). This is however not the full story: the preferred status of goal-objects appears to have resulted in an accommodation of this fact in the semantics of the verb. which has resulted in a generalization. Rather than 'manipulate,'/ay can be taken to mean 'arrange. fix. prepare or make ready.· In other words, the meaning of the dependent predication appears to have shifted as well. Also. the syntax of the verb has been affected by this: rather than profile the primary LM of the lay-prototype (the goal-object which is being moved. a<> in example (12)). this two-place predicate only profiles the secondary LM of that prototype (the location involved in the movement). That this pattern has proved productive. should be clear from the list of examples under (41). (41) set the table, set the alarm, set a fuse, set the thermostat. set a watch. set the oven to the required temperature ... Frequencies in the corpus seem to indicate that set has evolved furthest in this direction. There are some examples with lay in this pattern. but no examples at all for put and place. For put, this could be explained by the fact that the original prototype concerns bodily movement (pushing. shoving) rather than manipulation. In this prototype. the secondary LM with respect to which the movement can be characterized is the agent her/himself. The use of p11t to profile manipulation of an object with respect to a location is a later. extended use, and in this literal meaning put needs the presence of at least a hidden

272

Paul Pauwels

secondary LM, which can then not move up in the hierarchy, so to speak, to take the place of the primary one. Place, finally, is a much more recent addition to the language: set and lay are attested in OE, put from late OE onwards. while piClce is a 15th century loan from French.

7. Conclusion The previous sections have tried to present a survey of metonymy as it occurred in a specific corpus. From the survey. it soon became clear that the majority of the examples were not of the 'traditionar nominal kind. If anything, it seems like most nominal metonyms occur inside metaphors. Metonymy often seems to function as a kind of 'avoidance strategy.' for reasons of euphemism perhaps. Conversely. it also serves as a 'focusing slratcgy,' which in extreme cases results in dysphemism. The relationship between the domains involved in metonymy seems to be one of inclusion, with either a more general concept standing for a more specific one. or vice versa. There will always be a difference in scaJe or level of abstraction. which is not the case for metaphor. Finally, it should be clear that metonymy cannot be investigated without looking at other processes of meaning extension to which it relates in actual usage. Goossens' (1990. 1995) work demonstrates how metonymy interacts with. gives rise to. and is embedded in metaphor. Furthennore. it appears that generalization and specification are also often related to metonymy - a conclusion which should not surprise us, given the interaction between general and specific inherent in metonymy.

Notes This paper benefited from 2.

~:ommcnts

on an earlier version by L. GoosM:ns.

In thb actual example. taken from a corpus of English from the 196(Js. the 'CD· iniCrprctation · b of course not open; present-day English however eontmues to refer to 'pulling on· a CD; further illustrations of the generali1..ation which has occurred arc provided by 'put on a ca~scue· and 'put on a song."

P11ning Me/Onymy in its Place

273

References Crofl, William 1993 The role of domains in the interpretation of metaphors and metonymies. Cogniti1·~ Lingui.~tic.~ 4: 3.15-370. Geens, D., L.K. Engels, W. Martin 1975 Leuven Dmma Corpus and Frequency List. PAL. KU Leuven. Goossens, Louis 1990 Mctaphtonymy: the interaction of metaphor and metonymy in figurative ex.pressions for linguistic action. Coxnith·~ LinRuistin I: 323-340. 1995 From three respectable horses' mouths: metonymy and conventionalization in a diachronically differentiated data ba-.c.ln L Goossens ct aJ. (eds.). By Word ofMowh: Mnaplwr. M~tonym)' and Linxuistic Action in a Cogniti1·~ P~rsp~t·til·~. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins, 175-204. Johansson. Stig. Geoffrey N. Leech. Hellen Good.luck 1978 Lancll.liter-OslofBergcn Corpus of British English, for use with digital computers. Ukoff. George 1987 Women. Fire ami Dangerous Tlrings: What Cat~gorie.f Re1•eal abolll the Mind. Chicago: 'The University of Chicago Press. Lakoff. George. Mark Johnson 1980 M~tapl10r.f W~ Lil·~ By. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Langacker. Ronald W. 1987 Foundation.f of Cognitil·~ Grammar. Vol11m~ 1: Theoretical Preuquisite.f. Stanford. California: Stanford University Press. 1994 The limits of continuity: discreteness in cognitive semantics. In C. Fuchs, B. Victorri {eds.), Contimtity ill Li11guistic Semalllic.f. Am~terdam and Philadelphia: Bcnjamins. 9-20. Pauwels, Paul 1995 Levels of metaphorization: the t:ase of pill. In L Goos.-.ens ct al. (eds.), By Word of Mouth: Meraphor, Metonym_\' and Lingui.uic Action in a Cogniti1·e PeTJpectil·e. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins. 125-158. Pauwels. Paul. Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbcrgen 1995 Body parts in linguistic action: underlying schemata and value judgements. In L Goossens eta!. (eds.), B)· Word of Mouth: Metaphor, Meton.mt)" and Li"guistic Action ;, a Cogniti•·e Perspecti•·e. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins. 35-70. Taylor, John R. 1989 Ling11istic Caregori::arim1: Prototype.f ill lJngui.ftic Theory•. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Conversion as a Conceptual Metonymy of Event Schemata

Rene Dirven Gerhard Mercator University of Duisburg

1.

Definition

As a conceptual process of locating a reference point, metonymy belongs to the wider set of strategies of finding a point in the common reference space between a speaker and a listener that can serve as a bridge or link to the intended referent (cf. Langacker 1991: 170f0. One possible strategy used for this purpose in English is the genitive. as in I'll take Dad'.\· mr. whereby Dad is the link known to the son and his girlfriend for identifying the car. In a restaurant scene where the waiter speaks about one of the customers in mct(mymicalterms as the hamburger. we find the same communicative need of identification as with Dad's car. Only now the context docs not provide an identity marker. since the customer's name is unknown and his place in the restaurant may not be a salient one. An alternative would be to give tables and customers numbers. But even then the waiter would not necessarily say ( Ia). but might equally well say (I b). (I)

a. The customer at table 13 is complaining about his hamburger. b. Table 13 is complaining.

If no numbers arc available. the waiter can only take the most relevant feature in the given link between the institutional context of the restaurant and the rea.'ion why people go there. i.e .. in order to get food. Since people tend to take different dishes. these become a salient means of identifying customers. In fact. in the case of the referencing use of metonymy as in the restaurant scene.

Reni Dirven

276

the hamburger ordered or eaten by the customer serves as the identifying description. The only identifying link that the waiter ha" with the customer is by means of the food he has ordered. Notice that the very same process of referencing occurs in other institutional contexts. too. Hospital nurses frequently refer to their patients in terms of the organ affected or the illness they suffer from. Thus. one may hear things like (2): (2)

a. The liver is still waiting outside. b. I'll now take the by-pass back to his room.

Although this metonymical strategy for the sake of referencing is ubiquitous - or perhaps because it is so ubiquitous - we are no longer aware that we apply it constantly. But it is always used in the context of picking out referents in a somewhat amorphous or anonymous setting. For example. teachers usc it with their students (the striped sweater). spectators wilh referees (tire black one) or football players (the red one.the bald one), musicians (the ''iolins, the tuba). pigeons (various shades of gray. or. in some languages. colors), salespersons usc it with customers in a nower shop. not at the counter but in the back room (the fuchsia, the geranium woman). But even if we already have a name for identifying an institution. the tendency to refer to it by way of metonymy remains very strong especially with employees referring to their workplace, which is orten indicated by the street or quarter. This is perhaps a sign of distancing and neutralizing emotional ties and commitment signals which might be contained in using the real name. Thus. Dutch teachers tend to refer in Dutch to their schools as the High Street (Hoogstr<~at), Cattle Market (Veemarkt) or lhe village n<~me so that we may get metonymies such as: (3)

a.

The High Street is now losing ground to the Cattle Market (i.e .. lhe one school is losing pupils to lhe other). b. The Cattle Market has gone co-educational now.

Whatever the communicative need triggering lhis referential use of metonymical expressions. it is clear from these examples that lhe syntactic/ semantic frame is determined by the intended referent (humans/institution) and not by the supporting reference point (inanimate object, place. organ. or disease. etc.). Hence we cannot say *The /i,·er is Jtill waiting out,{ide. but it'J nearly its tum. where the pronoun it is supposed to be corefercntial with the antecedent noun phrase the firer.

Com•er.fimr as a Conceptual Metonymy of Event Schemata

277

2. Application to conversion Metonymy as illustrated in Section I operates at the discourse level. Given its ubiquity, it can be expected to operate at all levels of linguistic structure. The present paper will concentrate on the morphological level. more particularly on conversion. In its most productive form. conversion gives rise to new verbs. The process is usually analyzed ao; a categorical change of a lexical item from the status of a noun or an adjective to that of another word class. The adjective clean, already used in its present meaning in Old English. was converted into the verb to clean in the 15th century (OED). But situating the conversion process at the word level is relatively naive and simplistic, as if such processes occur in ab.~tracto.It is now beginning to become clear that conversion is not merely a process at the word level. but rather at the predicate-argument level. which we shall henceforth ca11 the 'nucleus' level. Thus to clean is a transitive verb implying a case frame containing an agent. a patient. and possibly an instrument. a manner and a result. This linguistic configuration can in fact be seen as an iconic renection of a conceptual configuration, in which an agent ao; the energy source transmits energy to an object which is affected by the energy. This is obviously the case in X make.\·tlre table clean, where the adjective clean denotes the resultant state of the energy transmitted by the agent. Since the resultant state is the most salient element in this whole action schema. it comes to stand for the whole event in X cleaned the table. At the same time.the entire action schema remains implicitly present in the resultant state. which now metonymically denotes the action schema as such. This particular process of conversion may also offer an explanation for the fact that all conversions from adjective status to verb status are of this 'resultant state' type. We may wonder whether this type of metonymical processing is still relatable to the 'referencing· need of the HAMBURGER FOR cusTOMER metonymy discussed before. What. in other words. is similar and what is different in the two metonymical sentences in (4)? (4)

a. The hamburger left without paying. b. The waitress cleaned the table.

The reference-supporting usc of the hamburger for the person who ordered and ate a hamburger is based on a similar schema as in someone made the table clean. But in the HAMBURGER metonymy the patient becomes the identity

Reni Din•en

278

feature for the agent, which can only be realized at the clause or sentence level. Statistically. this referencing function seems to be intimately related to the agent function, or at least to the subject function. Indeed, the HAMBURGER metonymy is far less likely in direct object or indirect object position. (5)

a. ·'I asked the hamburger to pay at the counter. b .. , I showed the hamburger the way to the station.

This suggests that even the referencing type of metonymy cannot occur in every possible context. but that it is highly constrained to one prototypical configuration. i.e., one in which the agent/subject function. at least for humans, is salient. Conversion differs from this agent/subject or referencing type of metonymy in that it docs not apply at the sentence or clause level. but rather at the predicate-argument or nucleus level. Any of the participants in an action schema or in any other event schema, except the agent/subject. can become the bearer of the saliency feature in the appropriate configuration and then serve as input for the conversion process. Thus in reporting a soccer game. we can describe certain ways of handling the ball with the head as He headed the ball into the goal, whereby the exact timing of the ball-to-head cont<~ct and the exact force and direction given to the ball by the head arc of paramount importance.ln the total action schema The player .~end.f the ball into the goal with lri.f heud the instrument participant witlr the head is so salient that it can stand for the action itself. This docs not mean, however, that the instrument slot in the action schema disappears. Although instrument verbs like 1o kick, to lreud,lo hammer.etc. do not normally require an instrument, they can take one - if it is sufficiently specified: (6)

a. He kicked the ball with his left foot. b. He headed the ball with the back of his head. c. He hammered the nail into the wall with his shoe.

This means that the conversion process does not necessarily delete the participant role which is denoted by the converted lexical item in the total action schema. Since the type of metonymy that we find in the conversion process takes place at the nucleus level. it cannot become a means of referencing as metonymy at the clause level does: indeed. a nucleus is by definition not grounded in communicative space. Whatever differences there may be between these two processes of

Com•er.fimr as a Conceptual Metonymy of Event Schemata

279

metonymy (reference metonymy, event-schema metonymy). they do have one thing in common. i.e., they single out a salient participant to become either the identity marker for an unknown or unnamed referent (reference metonymy) or the main designation for the event itself (event-schema metonymy).

3.

Types of event schemata serving as input for conversion

It is highly interesting to note that. in traditional grammar, very few classes of verb conversion were distinguished: in fact no more than four. Thus Zandvoort gives the following "paraphrasing" relationship for the ··meanings expressed in regard to the nouns from which they arc converted" (Zandvoort 1961: 267): (7)

a. to make usc of or to treat with (to motor, Io efboll', 10 gun) b. to act as. to behave like (to ape.to dog, to mother) c. (sometimes in the case of animals) to bring forth (to kitten. to goat, to lamb)

d. to remove (to d1ut.

to

.fki11,

to

weed)

Marchand ( 1969: 367f0 also only distinguishes four major syntactic-semantic classes of conversion. although he proposes many subclasses for each of his main classes: (8)

a. Predicate-Subject Complement (to b11lly: to be a bully) b. Predicate-Object Complement (to knight: to make someone a knight) c. Predicate-Adverbial Complement (to anger: to provoke to anger) d. Predicate-Object (to cal\'e: to bring forth a call)

Whereas Zandvoort's analysis is still situated at the word level. Marchand's approach constitutes a major step forward in that he is implicitly perfonning his analysis at the nucleus level. which - because of the lack of casegrammatical categories - he labels with sentence-level categories like Subject. Object, Object Complement. Adverbial, etc. It is only thanks to the insights of case grammar that it was possible for researchers to handle the semantic relationships involved with converted verbs in tenns of semantic-conceptua1 roles such as patient. instrument. man-

Rent Din•en

280

ner.goal or source and essive roles (e.g .. Kastovsky 1974, 1977: Leitner 1977; Clark and Clark 1979). Elaborating on this previous research. I proposed five cla<>ses of converted verbs based on underlying semantic roles holding between a putative predicate and a semantic role (Dirven 1986: 321ff):

(9)

a. object verbs (toft.~h. to crew, 1o anger) b. instrument verbs (to harpoon, to head. to ~·t'lo) c. manner verbs (to queue, to balloon, to spoon) d. locative verbs (to bottle, to sheil•e, to record) c. essive verbs (to author, to nune. to kniglll}

As was already suggested in Section 2. these five categories can be seen as labels which summarize a full-fledged event schema in which several partici-

pants operate on each other. There are three canonical event schemata underlying conversions: the action schema, in which an agent acts upon a patient, often using an instrument and involving a certain way or manner of doing this as in to fish: (ii) the location or motion schema. in which the agent may perform an action aiming at a localized effect as in to bottle: (iii) the essive schema. or the schema for 'bcingness,' in which the status of class membership or an auribute is assigned to an entity. These three event schemata will now be analyzed in more detail. whereby the semantic role selected is seen as the element responsible for the metonymy underlying the event schema as a whole. {i)

4.

Metonymic focus within the action schema

The action schema conceptually synthesizes the flow of energy from an agent to a patient via an instrument in a certain manner. In the instantiation of someone trying very patiently to catch fish with a fishhook. each of these semantic roles, except for the agent itself. can be focused upon, assume a predicate's relational function of linking the semantic roles. and in the process highlight one aspect of the action schema. but always imply the whole of it. Thus the patient itself. the instrument. and in some contexts. the manner. can come to stand for the whole action schema as in ( 10):

Conversiotl as a Concepwal Metonymy of Event Schemaia

281

(10) a. He was fishing (salmon). b. He was luring fish. c. He was fishing pearls. In (lOa) the patientfi.\·h is the metonymic focus of the whole action schema and, as a converted verb. it normally docs not require the patient to be further specified, although this is always possible by way of specifying a particular type of fish.lt is also noteworthy that only the basic-level tennfish can be the input for a conversion, and that this is not possible with subordinate-level terms such as salmon (*He was salmoning). Obviously. this has an experiential motivation. When fishing, people do not always know what the catch might be and hence this specific level could not be focused upon. In the few cases where the type of fish to be caught is predictable as with salmon or carp. one could imagine that in the jargon of some fishermen these conversions could occur. The instruments used to catch fish such as a lure. a hook. a harpoon. a net. etc. are purposely and intentionally employed and the nouns describing them are readily converted into verbs. The way or manner in which fish are caught may be transferred to other domains closely related to the same domain of trying to catch things in the water (of the sea). The example in (IDe). to fish pearl.~. is paraphrased in CED as 'to take pearls from the bottom of the sea like one takes or catches fish.' Basically, no fishing as such is involved here so that only the manner or circumstances in which fish are caught in the sea is of real relevance: just as one must wait patiently for fish to bite and thus get caught and removed from the water. one must search for pearls at the bottom of the sea patiently and then remove the 'catch' from the water. A theoretically important question is where to draw the dividing line between metonymic uses of object. instrument, or manner verbs such a." to fish, to harpoon, to hook, and their metaphorical ex.tensions.lt is interesting to note that in the expression to fish pearls. there is clear contiguity with the same domain as in to fish herring.~: in both cases we remain in the domain of catching things in the sea. Once we leave this domain and apply the search to people. their behavior. or to some abstract domain. we are in a totally different domain.lt is remarkable to note the different syntax. (addition of a preposition) that correlates with a usage in a more abstract domain. (II) to fish for information/for a rich man

Rene Dirven

282

In these metaphorical uses of to jiJh the preposition of purpose for precisely denotes the as yet unrealized accomplishment, i.c .. the absent target or at least the not yet spotted target, which is also found in to look for. to grope for. to .H!arch for, to wait for, etc. And after one has fished long enough for a rich man. one may hook him. These metaphors are very far away from the metonymic expression to ft.\·h pearls. in which the transitive verb plus a direct object construction iconically reflects the closer proximity between the agent's action and the patient affected by the action.

5.

Metonymic focus within the motion schema

In its simplest form.the motion schema comprises a moving patient and one or more elements of the motion· s trajectory. i.e .. source, path and goal. Given the fact that in the human sphere of interest. goals are more salient than sources (lkegami's 1987 goal-over-source principle). it need not surprise us that locative verbs resulting from conversion processes are predominantly goal verbs. It is, moreover. not astonishing that the natural topography of the goal also determines the type of arrival. The type of physical end-point of the motion determines the specific meanings of each converted verb as contextualized in the following sentences:

(12) a. b. c. d. c. f.

The tide had gone out.leaving the boat stranded on the rocks. Before going home. the fisherman beached his boat. On the cruise we'll first land in CasaBlanca. The plane was forced to land in Cairo. The submarine surfaced again. The plane was grounded there for 24 hours by the hijackers.

The metaphoric expression lea~·e .wmebody or .wmethiiiK stranded. as in ( 12a), historically relates to the now obsolete noun stmnc/, meaning 'the land bordering a sea.lake.orriver' -i.e .. the coastline or margin. be it rocks.sand. etc. (still found in the name of a street in London. i.e .. The Stram/). Thus. for example. a boat which has run aground during a storm has been left helpless and unable to move. Since no successful arrival wa~ achieved. the boat got 'stranded.' The type of arrival denoted by Ju beach is different, as ( 12b) shows. The Dh:tionary of Ccmtemporary Engli.\·h defines the meaning of the

Com•er.tion as a Concept1wl Metonymy of Event Schemata

283

verb as 'to pull a boat onto the shore away from the water.· Thus. if we leave a boat on a beach, by running or hauling it there. we howe 'beached" the boat. It is only when we reach the land. as opposed to the sea or the air. that we have 'landed' a.o; in (12c, d). In each of these instances. the physical strip or area of land which constitutes the goal stands for the motion as a whole. Likewise to .mrface in (12e) picks out the top of the water as its goal and 10 ground in (120 takes the earth seen in opposition to the air as its goal. These instances of conversion may also show that in the conversion process there is never a purely physical goal. but that the goal also stands for the circumstances surrounding the scene. This also applies to their metaphorical senses. Thus to strand evokes and reflects the shipwreck scene or a situation in which a child is left unattended in a strange place. To beach brings to mind a spontaneous situation in which, for example. the people jump out of the boat a.o; it reaches the beach. haul it up onto the sand anywhere away from the water and just leave it there. To land suggests a purposeful arrival. either from the sea or the air.as well as in the phrase 'landing a job.' To surface calls up an image of a swimming or underwater-motion scene. as well as. metaphorically. the coming to light of scandals or lies. To ground evokes a scene of forced contact. which can also be noted in the metaphorical usage of 'grounding a naughty child.' In other words. the use of metonymy is not restricted to the aspect of motion as such. but it also encompasses the wider experiential scene of which it is one specific facet. This wider experiential scene is in fact the real motivation for locative conversion verbs - and probably for all conversions. For locative verbs such as 10 bottle. to box. to can. etc., it is the scene of food preservation that provides the context. Other more 'abstract' goals may be shelter a." in to house, to jail, or to lwrbor: display as in to bench or to field: or else giving things a specific shape or fonn as in to bundle, ttJ pile, or to .flice. Even purely abstract mental motion leading to a new artifact involves the motion schema as in to book. to map or to register.

6.

Metonymic focus within the essive schema

In the essive schema. a patient is assigned class membership status or an attribute. In converted cssive verbs such as to author, to wlunteer, to nurse. etc., we only find an implied remnant of class membership. In its prototypical usc. the noun nurse has the more general meaning of 'a person, usually a

Rene Dirven

284

woman. who tends the sick. injured. or infinn' or the more specialized meaning of 'a woman employed to breast-feed another woman's child' (CED). The six: meanings of the converted verb to nurse can be neatly associated with either of these two meanings: (13) a. b. c. d. e.

f.

Mary nursed the sick soldiers(= to tend an injured person) Mary nursed her father's ailment (= to tend the wounds) Cathy nursed the crying child in her arms(= to clasp) Cathy nursed the baby five mornings per week (= to care for) Gilly nursed the baby since the baby's mother could not breastfeed her child (= to breast-feed) The baby nursed at the woman's breast(= to suckle)

To put it in a somewhat simplistic way. we could say that one need not be a nurse in order to do all the 'nursing acts' described in {13).1ndced. the verb's meaning is far more general than that of the corresponding noun. The two domains covered by to nune arc 'tending sick or injured people' and 'taking care of young children.either as a care·giver or else in the breast-feeding role.' The far richer meaning of the verb to n11ne as compared with the noun nurse also reveals another aspect of the metonymic nature of the conversion process. Whereas the noun can only denote more or less fixed categories or classes and their members, the verb is far more flexible and somehow breaks the constraints imposed by the boundaries of the noun's cla<>s membership meanings. Thus the conceptual entity ·a nurse' can only. in her profession. tend sick or injured people or breast·feed another woman's child. But the looser con· ceptual entity of ·a person who nurses· can do both: tend sick or injured people or breast·feed young children. When nursing young children. she can be imagined in a specific act such as holding a child in her arms. in her overall assignment. or in her 'technicaJ' role of brca'\t-fceding a child. In fact, it is again the various overall scenes that may be associated with her work as a nurse that arc conceptualized in the conversion process. We can also combine the cssive schema with the action schema: for example. an agent may tum a patient into a member of a class. Thus. in to kni~:ht. the action schema and the essive schema combine to express the institutionalized act of elevating a person to knighthood. This is, however. a very unproductive pattern. The third type of essive relationship is that of assigning an attribute to a patient. This relationship is only exceptionally expressed by nouns.the typical

Com•er.tion as a Concept1wl Metonymy of Event Schemata

285

word class for this purpose being adjectives. Here again, the essive schema combines with the action schema as in to clean the table, which is a highly productive pattern in English.

7.

Why only these (five) classes of conversion?

As pointed out already. English descriptive linguistics traditionally posits a small number of main classes of converted verbs. But a question that has - as far as I know - never been asked is: why are there so few classes of converted verbs and why do we have the ones we have? Of the 16 semantic roles listed below. the nine italicized ones occur in converted verbs: (14) Event schemata and associated semantic roles

a. Action schema:

Agent, Patiem, butmment, Manner b. Experiencing schema: Expcriencer. Stimulus Possession schema: Possessor, Possession d. Transfer schema: Recipient. Beneficiary c. Location/Motion schema: Plaa, Source, Path, Goal f. E.
The overall pattern may become clear as a result of this survey: the conversion process is mainly applied to non·human participants such as patient (as object), instrument. manner. locative and attribute. Although. in the class of essives, the cla'\s·membership group only contains human entities such as to author. to nurse, or to volullleer, they arc all assigned to patient roles. In other words. as long as human referents are not treated differently from non-human referents they can become the input for conversion processes. But if human referents are treated in their typically human agent and dative roles, they are unlikely to become involved in a conversion process. These facts may find an explanation in the cognitive principle of anthropocentrism. Since human beings are already the focus of attention in most linguistic structures, they cannot be focused upon again in the conversion process. at least not in the agent or dative roles. which arc prototypically human roles. This generalization would explain why an expression such as to police a

Rene Dirven

286

district can never mean that people arc turned into 'police officers of a district' (essive relation), but rather it can only involve the patient role, i.e .. that you put a sufficient number of policemen in a district so that it may become safe again. Here the police arc not understood as agents. but as patients, or instruments that in an atmosphere of street violence may restore a neighborhood's feeling of safety. The deeper explanation for the fact that typically human roles such as agents or datives do not enter into conversion processes may have to do with the clash between two cognitive principles, i.e .. the principle of anthropocentrism and the principle of metonymic focusing. Conceptually. it is indeed very difficult to see how a human being could be part of some larger configuration to which it could stand in a metonymic relationship. Whereas the opposite relationships abound. i.e .. a book being referred to by means of its author or a customer being referred to by the food he ate, a metonymic relationship of humans to some higher conceptual category is hardly imaginable and, hence. agents and dative roles do not easily enter into conversion processes.

References Clark. Eve V . Herben H. Clark 1979 When nouns surface as verbs.l..aiiJ:IIOge 55: 767-81 I.

CED 1979

Coflins Dil'tiollary· of the EIIJ:Iish

l..ang•w~:e.

London, Glasgow: Collins.

DCE 1995 Dirven. RenC 1986

Dit-tioiiOI)'OfComemporary·

Et~~:lish.

Harlow: Longman.

Can case grammar cope with conversion. Amwles Uni1·ersitati.~ SciemiaTI/111 Budop,•stinen.fi.f Sec/is Linguisica 17: 315-335. Ikegami. Yoshihiko 1987 'Source' vs. ·goal': a case of linguistic dissymmetry. In R. Dirven. G. Radden (cds.). Concepts of Case. TUbingcn: Narr. 122-146. Ka.-.tovsky. Dieter 1974 Word-formation. ca.-.c grammar. and denominal adjcrtives. Anglia 92: I54.

1977

Problems of word-formation. InCh. Gutknecht (cd.). Grundbegriffe und Haupt.ftriimullgen der Lingui.uik. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe. 301335. Langacker, Ronald W. 1991 F01mdati01u of Co~:nifil·e Grammar. Volume II: Descripril·e Applkation. Stanford. California: Stanford Univer.-ity Press.

Conversion as a Conceptual Metonymy of Event Schemata

287

Leitner, Gerhard 1977 Zur Vorhersagbarkeit von Derivation: Teil von Nomina als Bascn. In H.E. Brekle. D. Kastovsky (eds.), Pers1Jekth•e11 der Wortbifdung.ifor.~clrung. Bonn: Bouvien-Verlag Herben Grundmann. 140-154. Marchand. Hans 1969 Tire Categorit:'.{ and Types of Present-Day Engli.tlr Word Formation: A Synclrronic-Diachronif- Approat·h. Milnchen: Beck. OED 1994 nre Oxford English Dictionary·. Second Edition on Compact Disc for the IBM PC. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zandvoon. Rainard W. 1961 A Handbook of English Grammar. Groningen: Wolters.

Opposition as a Metonymic Principle

Christian VoBhagen University of Hamburg

1.

Introduction

This paper discusses the notion that forms of language use in which something is uttered to convey its opposite are metonymic. In this view. a conceptual

entity can be used to provide mental access to its opposite, which is closely associated with it within a conceptual structure. The basis of this discussion is lhc observation that opposites generally form part of one conceptual domain. and that mappings which occur within such domains involving opposites are influenced by factors that also influence

other metonymic mappings. Such factors include conceptual contiguity. salience. social factors. idealized structuring of conceptual domains. and the highlighting function of metonymies for expressive purposes. These factors will be discussed as motivations of metonymic mappings of one concept onto its opposite in figurative language including euphemism, socially motivated reversals. irony. and expressive use of negatives to convey positive evaluations.

2.

Opposition of meaning and metonymy

Speakers frequently use. and make sense of. expressions which involve saying one thing and meaning the opposite. These expressions often contain adjectives and seem to be used in two general ways. First. something positive can stand for something negative. as in the following example:

Christian Vliflhagen

290

(I)

Y has been cheated by her friend X and says: '"X is a fine friend.''

Here. the adjective fine conveys a negative. ironic meaning. Second. some-

thing negative can stand for something positive. A well-known example of this is the adjective bad in its usc in slang: (2)

bad a. 'eminently suitable or appropriate: excellent; wonderful ( .. )' (Wentworth and Aexner 1967):

b. 'a simple reversal of the white standard, the very best' (Major 1971):

c. 'good. Originally from the terminology of the poorest black Americans. either as simple irony or based on the assumption

that what is bad in the eyes of the white establishment is good for them( ... )' (Thome 1990). These processes lead to the following. related phenomena. First. expressions can be ambiguous between a litera] and its opposite meaning. as illustrated in the following description given by an African American speaker (Folb 1980: 205): (3)

"Like 'funky' - it kin be really good or really bad. All depends. You kin tell by d' way dude say it- watch his face. move his body certain way. Like. 'He's funky man!' Move way from d' dudehe stink! 'Hey. dude's funky!' Nigger be smiling. make d' fistdude's okay!"

Second. expressions can acquire a meaning that is the opposite of their original meaning. The adjective terrific with its now commonly accepted positive meaning is an example of this. This paper regards instances of figurative speech of this kind as manifestations of a widespread metonymy: A CONCEPT STANDS FOR ITS OPPOSITE.

In this view. using an expression in order to convey its opposite falls under definitions of metonymy such as the one formulated by L.akoff ( 1987: 84): -

There is a "target" concept A to be understood for some purpose in some context. There is a conceptual structure containing both A and another concept 8. 8 is either part of A or closely associated with it in that conceptual structure. Typically. a choice of 8 will uniquely determine A. within that conceptual structure.

Opposition a,{ a Metonymic' Principle

-

291

Compared to A, 8 is either easier to understand. easier to remember, ea.'iier to recognize, or more immediately useful for the given purpose in the given context ( .... 1

In this paper I assume that metonymy is conceptually grounded (cf. Lakoff 1987: Radden and KOvecses. this volume). and that linguistic metonymies have to be regarded a" manifestations of general conceptual metonymies. 1 argue that (i) opposites belong to one conceptual domain (cf. Cruse 1986: 198f0 and that (ii) the relation between opposites is one of close mental contiguity. In linguistic semantics. opposition of meaning is often treated as a purely lexical relation. Although. in contrast to this view. opposition is seen as a conceptual phenomenon here. some insights from lexical semantics will be taken up in this paper when they are compatible with my view and help to clarify the arguments presented. The following section distinguishes between two types of opposition: antonymy and complementarity. In contrast to many lexical approaches, however. opposition is considered to be a conceptual relation holding within one domain. Sections 4 to 7 discuss different a'ipects of this conceptual view. addressing the general questions of how conceptual contiguity between opposites is reflected in language and what conditions give rise to the metonymic use of an opposite term for a more 'literal' term. Section 4 is concerned with the concept of markedness. It discusses salience and evaluation as perceptual and social factors determining markedness and metonymic usc of expressions. Section 5 briefly discusses how social and pragmatic factors may influence the use of one term to stand for its opposite. Section 6 proposes an idealized instance of opposition which serves as a cognitive model that may underlie some forms of opposition of meaning and influence metonymic mappings. Section 7 discusses the influence of emotional factors on the use of opposition-metonymies for expressive purposes.

3.

Semantic opposition in lexical and conceptual structure

Opposition is without doubt one of the most basic semantic relations (cf. Cruse 1986: 198; Deese 1970: 102). A vast number of lexical items are related by opposition. In contrast to other relations distinguished in semantics, opposition is readily comprehended by speakers and is among the first semantic relations children learn to distinguish accurately (Landis, Herrmann and Chaffin 1987).

292

Christian Voj3hage"

It is also a very ba.o;ic associative relation. Word·association experiments, as conducted by Deese ( 1962) and others. have consistently shown that words which have an opposite are frequently associated with the opposite term (cf. also Esper 1973; Aitchison 1987).1n a similar way. substitution errors involving the utterance of another word than the intended one. committed both by impaired and non-impaired speakers, often involve not only relations such as synonymy or hyponymy. but frequently opposition of meaning (fromkin 1973: 262: Garman 1990: 161). All these findings support the claim made above that the relation between opposites is one of close mental contiguity. However. relations of opposition such as antonymy are usually treated as purely lexical relations, and the association of a word with its opposite is often seen a-. resulting only from linguistic factors such as co-occurrence in spoken and written texts. Such arguments do not explain why antonymic pairs should ever co-occur so frequently in texts. Psycholinguistic research suggests that the relation of opposition is based on conceptual rather than lexical association (cf. Murphy and Andrews 1993). For example. speakers tend to give different antonyms for a given lexeme depending on whether it is presented to them in isolation or in different contexts. This finding is relevant in that it suggests that knowledge about the relation is independent of the way opposites are represented linguistically. The conceptual view of metonymy adopted in this paper implies that it is not the metonymic expression that provides access to its opposite. but the concept it expresses that provides access to another concept. As an illustration, consider the following example. Here, a negative expression conveys a clearly positive meaning. but none of the senses can count as the lexical opposite of wicked; still. the figurative usc involves a clear opposition between positive and negative evaluation: (4)

wicked 'excellent in any way; potent; strong: capable' (Wentworth and Aexncr 1967)

Among the classes of lexical items related by opposition, adjectives constitute an important group. The examples given so far show that they are also used figuratively. A distinction between different kinds of adjectival opposition which is also important for the present discussion is made in lexical semantics between 'antonymy' and 'complementarity' (cf. Lyons 1977: Lehrer 1990; Cruse 1986).1 Antonymy involves pairs such a.-. big-small. good-bad, happy-.md.

OpptJsition as a Metonymic Principle

293

terrible-wondeifu/ and pertains to concepts that are gradable. denote different degrees of intensity. and have a kind of 'neutral area· between them. They may be said to constitute opposing portions of a scale. Figure I illustrates this situation for the antonyms good and bad and the 'neutral area' (the simple quotation marks indicate that the expressions represent concepts. not lexical items):

- ' b a d ' - - ' n c u t r a l ' - - 'good'--

FiRIIre I.

Conn'fJt.~

of ei'Cdllatil't' alltrlll.\'11/.f

The labels 'neutral" and ·o· imply that there is a portion of the scale where neither of the concepts applies; thus. it is possible to say something is neither good nor bad. For the same reason. negation of one pole does not necessarily imply a-.sertion of the other - it is possible to say something is not good. but not bad either. The arrows at the ends of the scale indicate that both concepts are graded and can be intensified: thus. it is possible to say something is very good or very• bad. In the analysis that follows. I would like to suggest a differentiation between two groups of antonyms: 'evaluative antonyms.' exemplified by good-bad, and antonyms belonging to the domain of 'physical measurement,' exemplified by big-small. The difference between these groups can be seen in comparing Figures I and 2: 0--·small'--·ncutral'--'big'Fig11re 2. Concepts denoted by pllyskal-mea.mremem adjecti1•es

With evaluative antonyms. a lack of the quality of evaluation common to both antonyms - represented by '0' in the figures - coincides with the neutral. intermediate value on a scale that leads from a high degree of negative evaluation to a high degree of positive evaluation. The scale for physical measurement antonyms, on the other hand, is unidirectional. a total lack of the quality (in this case. size) marks one end of the scale, a large amount of it marks the other. Complementarity is exemplified in pairs such as married-unmarried or dead-ali~·e and involves concepts which are not gradable, do not express degrees ofintensity.and have no intermediary terms between them. Anything

Christian Voj3hage11

294

which belongs to the conceptual domain of complementaries is either the one or Lhe other (cf. Cruse 1986). This situation is represented in Figure 3 for dead and alive:

'dead'

Fi1:11re 3. Complementary concepts

From a logical perspective. there are only two values possible in the conceptual domain of, say. 'organisms' - not alh·e implies 'dead,' not dead implies 'alive.' This may be called a 'two-valued organization' of the domain.

4.

Asymmetry of opposite pairs: salience. markedness, and

evaluation The two groups of evaluative antonyms and physical measurement antonyms have one property in common: they arc asymmetrical. In the ca.o;;e of physical mea.'\urement antonyms. this property has already been addressed: one end of the scale constitutes an absolute zero point. whereas the other end corresponds to a large amount of the denoted quality. This asymmetry has an interesting consequence. Physical measurement adjectives denoting the greater amount of the quality involved. such as big. are 'semantically unmarked' - they can be used to denote the quality common to the pair. In asking How big i.~ it?. a speaker does not necessarily imply any notion about the size of the object in question. wherea'\ in asking How .~mall is it?. there is a strong implication that the object is relatively small. This preference for one member of the pair is conditioned by perceptual salience (cf. Giv6n 1978; Cruse 1986): the more salient member of the pair affords better mental access to the conceptual domain than the less salient one. This situation is metonymic: an easy-toperceive and well-understood aspect of a conceptual domain - the more salient one - stands for the domain as a whole (Lakoff 1987). or, more specifically. THE POSITIVE Ef'D OF A SCALE STANDS FOR THE WHOLE SCALE (Radden and KOvecses. this volume). Thus, the phenomenon of markedness shows that opposite concepts arc

OpptJSition as a Metonymic Principle

295

closely associated within a conceptual domain. and that one of them can be used as a reference point affording mental access to a target (Langacker 1993). The target is. in this case. the conceptual domain that includes both concepts. The systematic occurrence of this phenomenon in language supports the claim made in the previous section that contiguity between opposites is not only conditiont.-d by lexical association. It can be argued that just a.'\ the adjective denoting the larger amount of the quality is linguistically unmarked, the corresponding salient concept is perceptually unmarked with regard to its opposite. making it both "simpler.. (Cruse 1986: 248) and ··more basic.. (Lakoff 1987: 60). Evaluative concepts show a different kind of asymmetry. Whereas the markedness of physical measurement antonyms is perceptually motivated. evaluative antonyms involve what may be said to be a socially motivated markedness. The adjectives that express a socially desirable. positive concept may be called unmarked. whereas those that express a negative. socially undesirable concept may be regarded as marked. As an illustration of social markedness. consider the following euphemism: (5)

pretly ear

'an car deformed from being hit repeatedly; a cauliflower ear' (Wentworth and Flexner 1967) The adjective prelty is used to denote something that may well be described in terms of its antonym. ugly. Mention of the negative. socially marked term is avoided. and its opposite is used instead to stand for the undesirable quality. The motivating factor is not perceptual salience. but is closely connected with social-pragmatic factors such as politeness. In the following section, other social factors will be shown to motivate metonymic mappings onto opposite concepts.

5.

Opposition of attitudes: social factors and irony

"Social markedness' as discussed above sometimes coincides with formal or morphological markedness. Consider the pair :wne-in.wne: the negative. marked member is also formally marked. But as can be seen in the following example from African American slang, ituane can nevertheless be used to stand for the positive. unmarked concept:

Christian Voj3hage11

296 (6)

in.~a11e

'positive. healthy state of mind' (Major 1971) Why do speakers avoid a positive. unmarked expression like .wne and usc a negative, marked one to access the positive concept? A plausible explanation resulls if conflicting social or cultural attitudes are considered as a motivating factor. For example. the slang use of bad as illustrated in example (I) gains its metonymic sense from what might be called a negative attitude. Dictionary

definitions speak of a 'reversal' and, more specifically. of the assumption that what is bad for one social or ethnic group must be good for the other. When social attitudes differ .linguistic expressions may take on different, but related meanings that correspond to these attitudes. When the attitudes are opposed. linguistic cxpres!'.ions may take on opposite meanings. Thus. the adjective bad had a conventionally accepted negative. marked meaning for white mainstream culture, and a positive one for many African American speakers who opposed the attitudes of the dominant group. In this sense. the metonymic use of expressions like bad. wicked. etc .. is motivated by social opposition. A similar motivation seems to underlie other cases where the opposition is not necessarily between ethnic groups, but between subculture and mainstream culture. as in the following examples (all from Wentworth and Flexner 1967): (7)

nasty 'excellent; "wicked'' I ..

r

(8)

'[ ... ) psychologically exciting. satisfying. and exhaustive; Mean the be.\'t: the greateJt' (9)

e~·il

'wonderful; specifically. thrilling. very satisfying ( ... Jimplie.\· that, like .~ex, that whkh is really thrilling and Jatisfying i.\' considered sinful by puritanical people.' As will be shown below. there are many expressions, especially in American slang. that reverse attitudes of mainstream culture. Along with other factors, this aspect of social evaluation seems to be a ba'\ic motivating factor for this kind of metonymy.

Opposition a,{ a Metonymic Principle

297

There is another phenomenon that seems to be based on opposing attitudes and which is commonly defined as 'saying something and meaning the opposite': irony. Consider the following examples: (I 0) big deal

'anything important. satisfying. exciting. interesting, lavish [ .. ) Sarcastically. anything or anyone believed to be unimportant, uninteresting. or unimpressive( .. .)' (Wentworth and Flexner 1967) (II) bigidea

'an unwelcome suggestion. proposal. or action' (Wentworth and Flexner 1967) (12) lwtshit

'wonderful; auractive; handsome: channing[ ... ) Alwa.n 1ued in the lleRalive { ... / Thu.~. through ironical use, the term has come to {mean/ conceit· (Wentworth and Flexner 1967) (13) fat

'[ ... )Poor. slight. slim; usu. in "a fat chance"= little or no chance [ ... ]'(Major 1971) These expressions have acquired an additional. negative sense through ironical use. In the case of hiR deal and fat chance, the negative is even the predominant. or more usual, sense of the expression according to 30 native speakers of English I infonnally asked. Big. hot and fill thus have a conventional ironic sense, with the positive standing for the negative. 2 In many cases. irony involves uttering something positive where a negative judgment is to be expected or can be inferred. However, it clearly involves more than just saying the opposite of what is meant. or meaning the opposite of what is said. As convincingly argued by Sperber and Wilson ( 1995). irony rather involves implying. or hinting at, an 'incongruence' between some statement or social nonn echoed or mentioned by the speaker and what is actually the case in the pragmatic context of the utterance. This can be achieved in very subtle ways and need not involve uttering a positive expression and letting it stand for a negative concept. For example. if a person steps on the foot of another person in an elevator and this person politely, but ironically asks.

Christian Voj3hagen

298

( 14) Could you step on your own feet? it is dirficult to determine what would be the opposite of this statement. A possible opposite of this ullcrance. for example. Could )'Oil step on my feet agai11?. would itself be ironic and therefore would not state the intended meaning of the ironic utterance (14). In this case, there seems to be an opposition between the polite request uttered by the speaker and a less polite non-figurative utterance or speech act that could be expected in the speech situation. It is thus not possible to reduce irony to a form of metonymy. Irony is a more complex phenomenon. In my opinion. it is better accounted for in approaches like mention theory or pretense theory, which recognize that it involves a reference not only to the referents a speaker is talking about. but also to other persons who might really mean what is stated ironically (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1995: Clark and Gcrrig 1984). According to these theories. an ironic speaker 'echoes· what another person said or might have said.or 'pretends' to be a person who said or might say (and mean) it. Nevertheless. an opposition of positive and negative attitudes is often the basis of irony. just as in the case of the socially detennined oppositions mentioned above.lnstances such as (9), (10) and (II) show that the ironical meaning can be the exact opposite of the original. positive one. suggesting that an opposition between the positive statement and the negative target concept is at least a very typical fonn of irony. But it has to be emphao;ized that the crucial factor here is a social-pragmatic opposition between auitudes, not a semantic opposition between literal and target concept. which can be considered a 'byproduct.' As an illustration of this. consider the following verbal exchange from Edward Albee's Who'.f Afraid of Virginia Wooif(l965: 32). The protagonists, the married couple Martha and George, are constantly struggling throughout the whole play. and in this scene they have just been having an open fight in the presence of their guests. Honey and Nick. Now George and Nick are sitting together in the living room. their wives have gone upstairs. ( 15) George: MARTHA! !No answer] DAMN IT! ( ... ] Martha: WHADD"Y A WANT' George (to Nick}: Isn't that a wonderful sound?

OpptJsition as a Metonymic Principle

299

Although it is plausible to interpret George· s last. ironic comment ao; conveying something like 'I think that is an awful sound.' this interpretation also relies on the background knowledge that he has been fighting with the person whose utterance he is commenting upon. and that the negative attitude he communicates with his utterance is not so much towards her tone of voice, but towards her. Thus, the basic opposition here is between a positive attitude represented by the literal utterance. and a negative attitude being communicated.

6.

Two-valued orientation

The examples given so far show that both negative and positive concepts can stand for their opposites. In euphemism and irony. positive concepts tend to stand for their negative opposites; in expressions motivated by opposition of social or cultural attitudes. negative concepts stand for their positive opposites. It is remarkable that such non-literal uses of language always seem to involve evaluative oppositions such as between good and bad rather than oppositions such ac; between big and .\-mall. which may be called denotative in contrast. Opposition metonymies only seem to apply to evaluative (connotative). not denotative oppositions. 3 Thus. a more specific formulation of the metonymic principle suggested here could be AN EVALUATIVE CONCEPT MAY STAND FOR ITS OPPOSITE.

This further specification is necessary because evaluative opposition often seems to be conceptualized in 'non-semantic' terms by speakers, which sometimes results in an instance of opposition being seen as absolute. not scalar. Hayakawa (1978: 211) described this phenomenon with the following words: In the expression "We must listen to both sides of every question."" there is an assumption. frequently unexamined. that every question has two sides- and only two sides. We tend In think in opposites, to feel that what is not good must be bad and what is not bad must be good.( ... ) This penchant to divide the world mto two opposing forces - ''right"" vel'lius "wnmg."" '"good" versus "evil" - and to ignore or deny the existence of any middle ground, may be tcnncd the two-valued orientation.

Hayakawa was mainly thinking of the world of politics. but as the following examples and observations illustrate. two-valued orientation is a much more general phenomenon:

Chri.'ilian Vofthagen

300

Speakers often interpret the negation of one evaluative term as an a-.ser· lion of its opposite although the intermediary term is equally possible. In answering the question Is it a good movie?, the reply with No tends to be understood in the sense of 'It is a bad movie; although it may be neither good nor bad (cf. Lyons 1977: 278). (ii) In irony. speakers often make use of the opposite. positive pole in order to state something negative rather than using intermediary terms. (iii) In euphemism. the positive opposite of an avoided expression is often (i)

used instead of a neutral term. Consider the following examples from Italian, French, and English, in which the use of euphemisms is motivated by religious taboo:

( 16) bet1edetto 'maledetto' (Kainz 1965 1: 255) ( 17) sacred animal

'cursed beast' (ibid.)" ( 18) a holy terror '(sl.) ( ... )mischievous. embarrassing child' (Hornby 1974) (iv) An expression that literally denotes something salient can be metaphorically used to convey both something very negative and something very positive, but nothing in between. which leads to an abrupt transition from positive to negative in the dictionary entries: (19) smash

'A total failure( ... ) a popular success: 1 ..1 a hit( ... )' (Wentworth and Aexner 1967) (20) tough

'great, wonderful, difficult. terrible' (Major 1971) (v) Two-valuedness can be seen in a very interesting way in the following slang expression: (21) laugh at the other side of cme'sface

'to cry: to change one's mood from happy to sad[ .. ]' (Wentworth and Aexner 1967)

Laugh stands for 'cry,' positive and negative emotions are treated as two sides

Opposition a,{ a Metonymic Principle

301

of one thing, i.e., the negative side is the other side of the positive rather than detached or separated from it. All these examples point to a general human tendency to think of evaluative concepts in terms of opposites. This view is also reflected in the expressions cited by Hayakawa and in folk notions such as the two side.{ of a .{tory, there are two .{ides 1o everything, there is a thilr line between love and hate,s or in the common metaphor to think in black and white rather than in .~hade:• of gray. Two-valued orientation in domains of evaluation seems to be a basic conceptual phenomenon. an idealized kind of opposition. There is thus a discrepancy between semantic and conceptual opposition. Semantically. an opposition between gradable terms involves a whole scale. including a neutral. middle ground: on the conceptual level, however, it may only involve the two opposite tenns. This state of affairs is represented in Figure 4:

Figure 4. /deali::ed oppo.tition of emluatil'e concept.t

This figure illustrates that, under certain conditions, the relation between evaluative scalar concepts may be similar to that between complementary ones (cf. Figure 3). Just as either of the complementary concepts 'dead' or 'alive' applies in the domain of organisms, either of the concepts 'good' or 'bad' applies in the evaluative domain. Therefore.the two-valued orientation reduces the number of potential meanings of evaluative expressions: they are either meant literally or are understood metonymically in the complementary sense of their opposites. Such mappings seem to occur much more frequently in domains of evaluation than in others. That is. whereas it would be very strange to say big and mean 'small' in a purely descriptive, non-ironic context. it is both possible to utter a positive tenn in order to convey a negative concept (as in irony and euphemism), or to utter a negative tenn in order to convey a positive concept, as in the socially motivated reversals discussed in Section 5. A further form of metonymic usc of negative concepts that seems to be motivated by factors other than those mentioned so far will be discussed in the following section.

Christian Vtijlhagen

302

7. The expressiveness of negative concepts In Section 4. asymmetry was described as a general property of evaluative conceptual opposition that is determined by social markedness. There is a factor that reverses this asymmetry in evaluative conceptual domains, making negative concepts suitable for the expression of positive concepts even when there seems to be no social motivation. as in the positive use of bad. As a first illustration. consider the following conventional expressions:

It was terribly amusing. (23) He was a»fllll)' plca~ed.

(22)

(24} That"sfrightfully

neat.

These examples show that originally negative expressions can be used adverbially to intensify positive ones without creating contradictions. The crucial meaning component here seems to be not the negative value of the concepts, but their intensity. They are comparable in meaning to very. although they convey a higher degree of intensity. Cases like these can be described in terms of Croft's (1993) notion of 'domain highlighting." which emphasizes the communicative function of a metonymy which makes primary an aspect of something that is secondary in the literal meaning.ln these cases. it seems that mention of the negative concept has the primary function of highlighting the aspect of intensity connected with it. As the following examples show. negative expressions can even be used to express positive concepts: (25) mad

'( ... ] exciting: remarkable: pleasing: excellent' (Wentworth and Aexner 1967) (26) frantic-

r

'exciting: satisfying; wonderful: cool( .. (Wentworth and Flexner 1967) In these examples. the sense of 'excitement' is an element of the positive meaning. I would like to suggest that the arousal that is connected with negative concepl'i is paradoxically made use of when speakers want to express how significant and/or exciting they regard a positive quality. In that sense, the negative expression partly fulfills the function of an interjection like wow!

Oppm·iticm as a Metonymic: Principle

303

Note that this interpretation is inconsistent with an interpretation in tenns of ironic understatement. where the literal interpretation of the statement does not figure in the intended. figurative interpretation. and where the pragmatic function of the utterance is to convey the complete inappropriateness of the literal interpretation. In the interpretation suggested here. an important clement of the literal meaning remains 'active.' or appropriate. in the figurative interpretation: the significance or excitement that is attributed to the target concept by the speaker. Interestingly, this interpretation is consistent with an observation made by Wilhelm Wundt (1912) in connection with a related phenomenon. People sometimes use swear words in order to express affection. They often use them as pet names, for example. in mocking speech between lovers. For Wundt, this was "a transition in affective speech onto the negative emotional side that is used in a positive sense for the sake of its greater intensity" (ibid.: 576: my translation). Wundt's observation about the intensity conveyed by such expressions is crucial because it implies that negative concepts are not employed in this way although they are negative. On the contrary, they seem to be employed because they are negative and therefore more intense or prominent. Consider another example from Wlto 's Afraid of Virginia Woolf (Albee 1962: 41). The two couples are sitting together. and as before. the whole interaction is dominated by the struggle between Martha and George. (27) (George takes from behind his back a short-barreled shotgun, and calmly aims it at the back of Martha's head. Honey screams ... rises. Nick rises. and, simultaneously, Martha turns her head to face George. George pulls the trigger.) George: POW!! [Pop! From the barrel of the gun blossoms a large red and yellow Chinese parasol. Honey screams again. this time less. and mostly from relief and confusion.] You're dead! Pow! You're dead! Nick [laughing]: Good Lord. [Honey is beside herself. Martha laughs too ... almost breaks down. her great laugh booming. George joins in the general laughter and confusion ... ) Honey: Oh! My goodness! Martha (joyously]: Where'd you get that, you ba'itard? ( ... (

304

Christian Vtijlhagen

George [a trifle abstracted]: Oh. l"ve had it awhile. Did you like that? Martha (giggling]: You ba.\·tard. ( ... ( George (leaning over Martha]: You liked that. did you? Martha: Yeah ... That was pretty good. [softer( C'mon ... Give me a kiss.

The expression bastard is clearly not intended in the sense of a swear word in this dialogue: Martha giggles when she utters it and then expresses the wish to be kissed. In this case, Martha uses this term to express affection. For Wundl.

the main motivation for using language in this way is expressiveness: "It is only the wish to emphasize the emotion in the strongest possible way that leads to this result.. (Wundt 1912: 576: my translation). In a very similar context. many native speakers of English find it perfectly natural that a mother says You hrm.' to her child in a tender tone of voice. There does not really seem to be a conflict between the intended positive message and the negative semantic content of the utterance. It may be that a negative emotion concept such as anger or fear can afford mental access to. and vivid expression of, a positive emotion concept exactly because it is perceptually or conceptually more prominent and because it therefore allows the speaker to focus on the intensity of the target concept. Modem inquiry into the nature of emotions has found that every emotion. positive or negative. has its own specific effects and intensity. and most importantly. that certain negative emotions are experienced more intensely than positive ones; in particular. physiological effects such as heart rate seem to increase more in the negative emotions fear and anger than in the positive emotion happiness (cf. Ekman et al. 1983): Following Wundt's suggestion noted above. it might be said that negative emotion concepts are. paradoxically. very suitable for the expression of highly positive concepts. There seems to be a general difference between cases like these and cases in which something positive stands for something negative. PosiTIVE FOR NEGATIVE. as in an utterance like Oh, excellem.you idiot.'. always seems to involve an ironic intention of the speaker. When something negative is used to stand for something positive, this is not the case. Among the numerous negative slang expressions that arc used to stand for something positive, there is a very interesting group in which expressions

Opposition as a Metonymic Principle

305

originally connected with 'fear' are used to stand for something 'pleasant.' Consider the following entries from slang dictionaries: (28)

'[ ... ]a pleasant surprise' (Major 1971): "Wow. what a .\'C·are.''' (29)

(30)

panicky 'extreme plea.<;ure or excitement' (Major 1971): 'excellent, very satisfying or exciting· (Wentworth and Aexncr 1967) terrible 'wonderful; great: the best; the most[ ... ] "Terrible -the best; the (Wentworth and Flexner 1967)

grea/e.~t."'

In these instances the negative concept is used to afford mental access to its positive opposite because it is more expressive in that it highlights the aspect of excitement. I would like to argue that these are expressive metonymies, which accounts for the motivation of the slang expressions mentioned earlier as well as for the more conventional instances of opposition such as the adjective terrific mentioned at the beginning.

8.

Conclusion

I have tried to argue that opposition can be regarded as a conceptual metonymic relationship. suggesting that there are certain regular factors conditioning the use of concepts to convey their opposites: conceptual contiguity. salience, social factors, the existence of idealized conceptual structures which people use in organizing the respective conceptual domains. and the function of metonymies in highlighting certain a.'ipects of these domains. The relation of evaluative opposition cannot be accounted for in purely semantic tenns. The contiguity between opposites that provides the conceptual basis for metonymic mappings is not merely based on lexical association, but on speaker's encyclopedic and contextual knowledge. Such situational and general knowledge also enables speakers to make sense of utterances that would simply be contradictory in isolation, and explains why the choice of one concept uniquely detennines our understanding of another concept without creating confusion. In this paper I have attempted to justify the claim that ca...es in which one thing stands for its opposite fall under the definition of

Christian Vtljlhagen

306

metonymy referred to in the introduction of this paper. The discussion has shown that especially the notions of speaker purpose and context mentioned in

this definition arc crucial. The metonymic use and understanding of evaluative concepts is highly influenced by such extralinguistic factors. For example. social or interactional factors determine which negative concepts are to be avoided and which euphemistic positive concepts are to be used instead. They account for the fact that negative concepts are used to stand for positive ones as a sign of protest against the altitudes of other social groups, and they allow us to use positive concepts to stand for negative ones in irony in order to convey disagreement. Moreover. perceptual and emotional factors account for the use of negative emotional concepts in place of positive ones because of their greater intensity and expressiveness. The metonymic principle of opposition allows people to make sense of such apparently contradictory utterances. Their two-valued orientation provides the disposition to conceive of sc<~les in tenns of polar opposites and the conceptual contiguity between opposites provides the ground for metonymically accessing one opposite tenn via the other tenn. Our metonymic understanding of an expression as its opposite is triggered by extralinguistic factors and gives rise to certain evaluative interpretations such as irony or intensity of expressions.

Notes Antonymy and complementarity are not the only kinds of lexical opposition that arc distinguished in lexical semantics. but they constitute two very basic groups and the difference between them corresponds largely to the distinction in logic bcwteen contradiction and contrariness (cf. Lyons 1977: 271). 2.

The positive senses or these expressions arc also metaphorically motivated: salient. positive physical mea.~urcment antonyms have obviously acquired a positive sense through metaphorical usc.

3.

This is not meant to deny that evaluative contra.~L~ arc also denotati\·e: r.uhcr. evaluative or connotative opposition exists in many conceptual domains in addition to denotative opposition.

4.

In the same context. Kainz (1965) poinL~ out that the word tubutJ iL-.clf could mean both ·holy· and ·cursed" in its original usc by native Australians: the same holds for Latin

5.

This expression

wa~

used in a preview of a thriller on American TV.

Opposition

a.~

a Metonymic Principle

307

References Aitchison, Jean 1987 Word.~ in the Mind. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Albee. Edward 1962 Wlro's Afraid oJVirRinia Woolf. Hannondswonh: Penguin. 1965. Clark, Herbert C .. Richard Gerrig 1984 On the pretense theory of irony. Journal of Experimmtal Psychology: General113: 121-126. Croft. William 1993 The role of domains in the interpretation of metaphors and metonymies. Co~:11iti~·e IJn~:uistics 4: 335-370. Cruse.D.A. 1986 LL:cictJI Semantic.t. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Deese,James 1962 On the structure of associative meaning. P.tychologic·al Re1•iew 69: 161175. 1970 Psycholinguistics. Boston: Allyn and Barno. Ekman, P.. R.W. Levenson. W.V. Friesen 1983 Autonomic nervous system activity distinguishes among emotions. Science 221: 1218-1220. Esper, Erwin A. 1973 AnDiogy and A.uociation in Unguistic.t and Psychology. Athens: University of Georgia Pres.~. Folb, Edith A. 1980 Runnin' Doll'n Some Une.t: The Language and Culture of Black Teenagers. Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press. Fromkin. Victoria 1973 Speech Error.t as Unguistic E1•idence. lbc Hague: Mouton. Garman, Michael 1990 P.t_w:holingui.{tic's. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Giv6n, Talmy 1978 Negation in language: pragmatics, function, ontology. In P. Cole (ed.), S)·ntax lJiul Semalllics. Vol. 9: Pragmatin. London: Academic Press. 69112. Hayakawa, Samuel I. 1939119781 Language in Tl!ouglrt and Ac·tion. Fourth edition. New York: Harcoun Brace Jovanovich. Homby.Aiben S. 1974 Oxford Admnced I..Larner'.t Dictimwry ofComemporary English. Oxford: Oxford Univer.;ity Press. Kainz. Friedrich 1965 Psycllologie der Sprache. 4 vols. Stuttgart: Ehmke.

Chris/ian VojJhagen

308 lakoff. George

1987 Women. Fire, and Danxerous Thing.f: Wlrat Cute~:ories Rew·al abo11t the Mind. Chicago: 'The University of Chicago Press. Lakoff. George. Mark Johnson 1980 Metaphor.f We IJW! By. Chicago: 'The University of Chicago Press.

Landis. T.Y .. DJ. Hcmnann. R. Chaffin 1987 Developmental differences in !he comprehension of semantic relations. Uit.tchrift filr P.tydmlo~:ie 195: I 29-139. langacker, Ronald W. 1993 Rcfercnce-point constructions. Cognitiw: l.Jnguistics 4: 1-38. Lehrer. Adrienne

1990

Polysemy. conventionality. and the structure of the lex.icon. Cognith·e Lingui.ttic.t 1: 207-246.

Lyons, John

1977

Semantics. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Major, Clarence 1971 Black Slang. London: Routledge.

Murphy.George L .. Jane M. Andrew 1993 The conceptual basis of antony my and synonymy. Joumul of Memory· aJUJ Language 32: 301-319. Sperber. Dan. Deirdre Wilson 1995 Relemnce. Second edition. London: Ba.o;il Blackwell. Thome. Tony 1990 Dictio11ary· of Contemporary· Slang. London: Bloomsbury. Wentwonh. Harold. Stuard Flex.ncr 1967 Dictionary· of American Slang. New York: Crowell. Wundt. Wilhelm 1912 VO/kerpsydmlogie. Band 2. Leipzig: Engelmann.

Metonymic Hierarchies The Conceptualization of Stupidity in German Idiomatic Expressions

Kurt Feyaerts University of Leuven

1.

(Kut - KULAK)

Introduction

One of the tenets of cognitive semantic is the focus on figurative language usc as a central topic of cognitive semantic rcscarch. 1 As opposed to structuralist linguistic approaches. where phenomena like metaphor and metonymy are considered mere rhetorical or semantically peripheral devices. cognitive se~ mantics demonstrates that metaphor and metonymy are essentially 'conceptual phenomena' which show up only secondarily in linguistic expressions. Up until now. the field of cognitive semantics has witnessed an overwhelming interest in the role of metaphor as a conceptual mechanism structuring large parts of our knowledge. Although the notion of metonymy was never entirely absent. it was mostly relegated to the secondary status of being introduced or mentioned in an essentially metaphorical context. However. re<.-ent years have seen an increao;ing interest in the role metonymy plays in the structuring of our conceptual system. Several studies seem to indicate that metonymy is catching up to metaphor as a relevant area of study in the field of conceptual structure. This article fonns part of this renewed interest in metonymy. Its purpose is to extrapolate the notion of 'metaphoric hierarchies' to metonymy. thus showing that there are also large-scale metonymic structures to be found in which several individual metonymies take part. I illustrate this with Gennan idiomatic expressions which all designate some kind of stupidity. It will

310

Kurt Feyaerts

become clear that most of the expressions in this domain involve a metonymic relationship between source and target structure. This paper is structured a<> follows. First. in Section 2. I will situate this topic within the context of my larger research projccL In Section 3. I will briefly bring to mind some major characteristics of metaphoric hierarchies.ln Section 4. I will discuss some theoretical aspects of metonymy which are related to the kind of material examined in this study. Finally. Section 5 will concentrate on some examples of metonymic hierarchic structures as they appear in this material.

2.

Preliminary remarks

For a better understanding of the theoretical discussion about metaphor and metonymy (Sections 3 and 4) as well as the analysis of the data (Section 5). it is essential to first address a few general theoretical and methodological issues of my research. Section 2.1. describes the nature of the data collected as well as the methodological basis on which the corpus was put together. An elaborated example illustrates the kind of semantic extension patterns that will be analyzed in this study. Section 2.2. concentrates on the epistemological status of the structures analyzed. Refening to observations of the cognitively inspired person perception psychology, I will argue that the object of a cognitive semantic study can only be of a strictly conceptual. non-objectivist nature. 2.1 . Background and material

Within the overall cognitive semantic framework as it appears, amongst others, in the writings of lakoff and Langacker. this article must be situated against the background of my investigation into the conceptual structure of STUPID in approximately 500 idiomatic German expressions. What allows these expressions to be categorized as members of a single category is the fact that they all profile a schematic concept. sTUPID. which I define in a rather broad way as 'a negatively valued. non-pathological deviance from the norm in the domain of mental abilities.' For present purposes. I abstract from several kinds of stupidity like ignorance, credulity. narrow-mindedness. etc .. which all represent different elaborations of this schematic notion. The database consists of more or less fixed expressions. most of which

Metonymic Hierarchies

311

are collected from phraseological dictionaries. As a consequence of this methodological approach. native speakers of German may not be familiar with some of the material presented here. However. from a cognitive semantic. usage-based point of view. it is important not to restrict the description to an arbitrary set of familiar. well-established expressions. Instead, an adequate description of the conceptual structure of a particular concept requires that as many relevant expressions a-. possible be taken into account. 2 The expressions in (1)-(3) represent examples demonstrating a metonymic extension to the target concept snJPID. (I)

Du bist wohl nicht von hier? 'You are not from here, arc you?'

(2)

Du bist wohl aus der Paddenga<;se? 'You are from the Toad Alley. right?' (Street in Berlin)

(3)

lch komme nicht aus Buxtehude! 'I don't come from Buxtehude!' (Town near Hamburg; 'I am not stupid')

These expressions all instantiate the metonymic pauem oUTGROUP ORIGIN FOR snrPJDIIT. This low-level. conceptually rich metonymy elaborates a more schematic extension pattern. namely A SALIENT PROPERTY FOR A LESS SAUE!IIT ONE.-1 This schematic metonymy plays a central role in the conceptual structure of the target concept. It appears that a mental property like STUPID is most often structured in terms of physical or social properties. which, in comparison to the abstract feature snrPJD, are easier and more 'objectively' perceived. Regarding this particular conceptual metonymy. it has been pointed out by Christie Davies ( 1987. 1990) that this extension shows up in many cultures. She observes that the people who are the object of stupidity jokes are generally (a) groups living on the periphery of a linguistic culture. where (b) people speak a marked variety of the standard language used in that culture. Consequently. 'outgroup' origin has to be understood as 'not belonging to the central group.· An excellent example of this cultural pattern are the Belgians since they are called stupid in two respects. This may be explained by referring to Davies' theory combined with the fact that Belgium is divided in two major regions: Dutch-speaking Aanders and French-speaking Wallonia. On the one hand. Aemings live in the southern part of the Dutch-speaking culture and speak a variant of standard Dutch. Walloons, on the other hand, occupy the

Kurt Feyaerts

312

most northern part of the French-speaking culture and speak French with a heavy regional accent. Belgians are consequently called stupid by the Dutch as well as by the French. What makes the double use of this metonymic model with respect to Belgians particularly interesting is the fact that it hides another metonymy according to which. in both cases. the whole stands for one of its parts. Accordingly. the Dutch as well a.'\ the French envisage in their stupidity jokes the Belgians and not the Flemish or the Walloons, respectively. Of particular interest for the present purpose is the observation that in this cognitive-cultural model for stupidity. a functional relationship is established between people's origin on the one hand and their mental abilities on the other. To put it in linguistic terms. in (1)-(3) both properties arc 'conceptualized' as being contiguous. ln this case contiguity is realized as a kind of causal relationship according to which stupidity is determined (or caused) by a specific origin. In this construed relationship. stupidity is linked to another property as its effect or manifestation.

2.2. Non-objectivist folk models Before I continue the analysis one point needs to be made very clear. What I am aiming at here is the description of a 'folk model' for stupidity as it appears in linguistic expressions rather than the verification of these models from the point of view of observing experts. Logically. one knows that this kind of functional link between geographic origin and mental ability is not generally 'true' or justifiable. lnstead.l aim to find the conceptual structures which are activated (un)consciously in the spontaneous categorization of a person as STUPID. In this description I thus abstract from people's reflection over this value judgment. Lakoff (1987: 850 describes these culturally determined conceptual patterns as 'social stereotypes.' which he classifies as a subcategory of metonymically structured cognitive models: (... )they define cultural expectations. they arc used in reasoning and especially in what is called 'jumping to conclu~ions." However,they arc usually m:ognized a~ not being accurate, and their usc in rea~oning may be overtly challenged.

These social stereotypes function as cognitive models and they reflect culturally established preferences and nann concepts which play a decisive role in people· s judgments about typical properties of all kinds of personality types. As an example of a contemporary American stereotype. Lakoff describes the

Metonymic Hierarchies

313

stereotypical politician as ''eonniving,egotistical.and dishonest" (ibid.).ln this article I will try to reveal some aspects of the German stereotype for stupidity. Lakofrs theoretical description of social stereotypes functioning as culturally determined interpretation models is supported by observations of person perception psychology. As a matter of fact. these observations provide a general cognitive. culturally independent grounding for this kind of cultural model.~ According to person perception theory we are inherently engaged in a constant and mostly unconscious process of observing and comparing people with each other and with ourselves. It is this continuous process of comparison in which we use our own socially determined norm system as a frame of reference that underlies our value judgments.5 Of great importance for the present purpose is the observation that we always encounter another person primarily in his/her most salient aspects. Obviously. most prominent arc those characteristics which can be sensorially perceived like general appearance. behavior. clothing, color of skin, but also aspects like sex. age,language usc (lexical choice. accent, speed of speech, body odor, etc.). Also other objective. more external personal 'facts' like place of residence. origin. profession. membership in a social class. etc. belong to this category of salient characteristics. Properties like these play a determinant role in our first. spontaneous judgments about other people on the basis of which we often draw farreaching inferences regarding someone 's stable personality traits. This implies that value judgments like for example Xi.~ stupid. hone.~t. 11ot reliable, which aim at characterizing someone in terms of a stable personality trait. are essentially to be interpreted as generalizations made by the conceptualizer on the basis of salient. but mostly partial knowledge. In their description of the perception process Bruner et al. (1958: 277) refer to this dynamic nature of human observations: In forming impressions of a person, we usually ~tart with partial information [ ... ].These circumscribed bits of evidern.:e generate none the less a host of inferences about a person. inferences that arc made with varying degrees of certainty. One 'knows' more about a person than what seems to be immediately connoted by the acts one has witnessed or the information one has gained about him. To 'know' is not used here in the sense of 'know correctly.'

This implies a conceptualizer who actively construes the conceptual structure of his environment according to his/her interaction with it. As Heider (1988: 336) puts it: "perception is basically a constructive act rather than a receptive or simply ana1ytic one."

Kurt Feyaerts

314

In sum, one can say that cognitivcly oriented person perception theory does not provide any grounding for the specific linking of conceptually elaborated properties with each other. Instead, its value for the present analysis must be situated on a more schematic and structural level where it provides experiential grounding for the conceptualized contingency between two or more seemingly unrelated properties. ll" specific importance for the present purpose is its function as a grounding principle for the metonymic structure of the target concept STIJPID.

3.

Metaphoric hierarchies

Before I concentrate on metonymy. I frrst bring to mind some principal characteristics of conceptual metaphoric structures. As to its most fundamental characteristic. metaphor is defined as a 'conceptual· pattern underlying and motivating individual lexical expressions. This pattern involves the mapping onto each other of two concepts belonging to different knowledge domains. a<> a result of which one concept {the target) is structured in terms of the other concept {the source). The aspect which attracts my special attention in this context is the integration of single conceptual metaphors into larger hierarchically organized structurcs.6 Take. for example. Figure I. which focuses on (parts oO the conceptual structure of the metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY. This mapping can be described as an elaboration of at least three higher schematic mappings. Two of these mappings (TIMES ARE ntiNGS and ST A TESf AITRIBlJfES ARE THINGS) arc characterized by what Lakoff ( 1993: 218) calls 'duality structure: which means that these metaphors can be realized in a location/ object pair (compare the duals {or pairs) TIMES ARE MOVING OBJECfS VS. TIMES ARE LOCATIONS). In this example I draw special attention to the location structure of both duals. With respect to the third schematic metaphor. EVENTS ARE AcrtoNs, I realize that LIFE and JOURNEY represent summary scannings of an event {LIVING) and an action (TRAVELING) respectively and that strictly speaking they do not elaborate this schema in a direct way, but in order to not complicate the schematic representation unnecessarily I will maintain this conceptual shortcut. (In my figures. full lines represent patterns of elaboration and schcmatization. capitals indicate conceptual structures and italics are used for linguistic instantiations.) This representation of the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor as part of a larger

315

Metonymic Hierarchies EVENTS ARI! ACTIONS

A

TIMES ARE ENTITIES

STATES/ATIRIBUTES ARE THINGS

~

STATIO!> ARE

ATTRIBUTES

OBJECTS

I

I

I

FUTURE IS ENTITY MOVING

I

Tlrrrimr<>f lrm·in/l"rlls"an

LINE OF CONDUCT IS A PATH /Hrll<'lo/frlrrnRirrrrodcl

OBJECT

(MIS)FORTUNE IS A PATH 1!>'/rr rrrr iaw lrodluc~J

Hrlrasl<>srlris

I

/Hrnr<JI'rdw rlrrmlrrr11·mfJ; Hrp
FiJ:flre I. Concept!tal.~lmclflre nfllle Uft: IS,\ JO/JRNEY melapllor

conceptual system allows for three major structural observations to be made with regard to the overall metaphoric organization of our knowledge structures. A first characteristic concerns the different 'levels of schematicity' on which a particular concept or mapping of concepts can be described. Lakoff (1993: 222) observes this in tenns of 'inheritance hierarchies· in which '"lower· mappings in the hierarchy inherit the structures of the 'higher· mappings:· The relationships between the concepts in this hierarchy can be basically detennined in tenns of schcmatization and elaboration. The lower a concept or mapping is situated in a hierarchy .the more elaborated and specific it is. On the lowest level. this process of specification finally results in concrete linguistic instantiations. A second structural observation concerns

Kurt Feyaerts

316

the 'patterns of overlap' that show up throughout these hierarchies. This means that a particular mapping may elaborate more than just one schematic structure. thus incorporating an overlap between the schematic structures which are involved.ln this example. LIFE IS A JOURNEY elaborates both STATES ARE LOCATIONS as well a'i TIMES ARE LOCATIONS.7 With regard to the overlapping target conccpts.lifc can be considered a state one is in (alive or dem[) as well as a period of time (compare: a lifetime). On the side of the source domain. a journey implies directed movement along multiple locations towards a final destination. Vis-3.-vis these two observations. Lakoff (1993) correctly points out that "metaphorical mappings do not occur isolated from one another" (ibid.). Referring to the representation in Figure I. one could further specify this by saying that they are isolated from one another neither vertically (in tenns of schematization and elaborations) nor horizontally (in tenns of overlap). Finally, a third observation points out the different nature of metaphorical mappings on different levels of abstraction. Lakoff (1993: 224) indicates that ''the metaphors higher up in the hierarchy tend to be more widespread than those mappings at lower levels." According to this correlation. it seems that highly schematic metaphors arc of a more general-cognitive nature than lower level metaphors which tend to be more culture-specific.M

4.

Defining metonymy

4.1. General characteristics Before I look at similar metonymic hierarchies. I will explain my interpretation of metonymy as a conceptual phenomenon. It is not my purpose here. however. to provide a full account of the various interpretations of metonymy. In the relevant contemporary literature two major global approaches may be distinguished. A first approach describes metonymy in tenns of 'contiguity' and thus focuses on the nature of the relationship between the concepts involved. It finds its origin in traditional structuralist theories, in which linguistic meaning is seen as adhering to the objective reality. In this view. the notion of contiguity is basically limited to an observable, real-world relationship between two referenl.,. The second approach was developed only recently in cognitive semantics and describes metonymy in tcnns of the conceptual range of the extension

Metonymic Hierarchies

317

involved. More specifically, it defines metonymy as a conceptual extension taking place within the boundaries of a single domain matrix (cf. Croft 1993: 348. who speaks of 'domain highlighting') which is accompanied by a referential shift (compare. among others, Lakoff 1987; Croft 1993: Langacker 1993: Goossens 1995). A domain matrix is defined as the whole of knowledge structures which are activated in multiple domains as the conceptual background of a profiled concept.

4.1.1. Metonymy as conceptualized contiguity An a'ipect that attracts my special interest in the contemporary approach to metonymy is the conceptual reinterpretation of the notion 'contiguity.' Taylor ( 1989: 1231) observes rather vaguely that the ''essence of metonymy resides in

the possibility of establishing connections between entities which co-occur within a given conceptual structure:· The basic 'conceptuaJ' nature of metonymy is emphasized more strongly by Schmid ( 1993: 94; "konzeptualisierte Kontiguitat," 'conceptualized contiguity') and Dirven (1993: llfl). In this respect. I fully subscribe to the following claim made by Dirven (1993: 14) according to which contiguity cannot be based on any form of objective or 'natural' contiguity. This ha.o; the far-reaching implication that contiguity must be taken to mean ·conceptual contiguity· and that we can have contiguity when we ju~t ·sec· contiguity between domains.

This view describes metonymy in a radical departure from a mere rhetorical trope as an experientially determined product of 'conceptualization,' i.e .. a'i a contiguity relationship between 'interactional,' non-inherent properties. entities. etc. This approach expresses the cognitivist view of reality as a domain which docs not exist independently of human understanding. knowledge and belief. Within this cognitive framework. I identify metonymy in tenns of the nature of the conceptual relationship rather than the range of the extension vis3.-vis the boundaries of a domain matrix. More specifically. I oppose contiguity as the essential feature of metonymy in the same way that a relation of similarity is taken to characterize metaphor. There are different kind" of functionalassociative relationships like CAUSE-EFFECT. OBJECT-PROPERTY. CONTAINERCONTENTS. etc. which can be categorized as contiguous. It is not my purpose, however.to present an extensive overview of the different kinds of contiguity relations in an attempt to find a schematic definition for this concept (see.

318

Kurt Feyuerts

however, Raddcn and Kiivccscs, this volume). My focus will be restricted to just a few relationships which are typical for my data. In this respect.l brieny refer to argumentation theory where this kind of conceptual relationship is denoted as 'reasoning by association· which "consists in unifying elements into a single whole by bringing together elements which were previously regarded

as separate.. (van Eemcrcn ct al. 1996: 106).01 Interestingly. as prominent examples of rea.o;oning by association, van Eemercn et al. (1996) describe argumentation models based on the relationship people draw between clements

like 'cause' and 'effect,' 'a person x· and 'X's actions.' 'the essential' and 'its manifestations: etc.ln the course of this article. it will become clear that this kind of contiguity is of major importance for the conceptual structure of the target sruPID.

4.1.2. The 'domain matrix' approach What makes the second approach to metonymy somewhat problematic is the usc of the notion 'domain matrix' as the key clement for the distinction between metaphor and metonymy. According to this approach. metonymy is defined in terms of a conceptual extension which docs not cross the bound· aries of a domain matrix. It must be clear that there can be no doubt about the importance of the notion of domain matrix for a cognitive theory of meaning. However, the question regarding which conceptual structures are activated as the conceptual background for the meaning of an expression (a profiled concept) essentially pertains to the 'psychological reality' of the conceptual networks we use to represent the structure of our knowledge. Bearing in mind the cognitive semantic tenet that meaning (semantic structure). which is in principle equated with the rich conceptual structure. is experientially based and consequently to a large extent individually determined, it is doubtful that this conceptuaJ structure can be described accurately from an external theoretical perspective. 10 One must then try to determine the criteria that precisely motivate which conceptual structures belong to a domain matrix and which concepts do not. Drawing distinct boundaries around a domain (matrix) always reflects an arbitrary intervention by a linguist. As such, this observation does not pose such a big problem since no linguistic research can ever escape this kind of subjective interference. However. it does raise a methodological problem when the distinction between two conceptual phenomena is based on the arbitrary delimitation of a domain matrix. especially when independent support is not sought. 11

Metonymic Hierarchies

319

Consider, for example, the conceptual relationship between the concepts KNOWING and SEEING. which is traditionally described a" a metaphoric one (KNOWING IS SEEING). The question is, however. how can it be demonstrated in a convincing way that a concept like VISION or, more schematically, sENSORY PERCEPTION does not belong to the domain matrix of an expression which profiles a concept like MENTAL PERCEPTION/KNOWING'! The answer to this question would have to explain that one does not experience sensory/visual perception as causally or conditionally linked to knowledge. Allhough I do not think that this would be an adequate representalion of the conceptual structures that get activated as a conceptual background for KNOWING, finding a correct answer to this question is not my major concern. What I am aiming at is this: who can say whether and why a particular description of a domain matrix is correct or not'! Intuilively. I experience the conceptual relationship between SEEING and KNOWING to be of a different order than. for instance. the relationship between LIVING and TRAVELING, which essentially reduces to a structural comparison ('life is like a journey'). Allhough I admit that both concepts can be slructurally mapped onto each other, involving ontological. image schematic and logical structures. I claim that this description does not exhaust the conceptual relationship between both concepts. An important aspect of this relationship is the causal-condilional contiguity of both experiences, which indicates that a metonymic extension (PERCEPTION !'OR RESULT OF PERCEPTION) can be identified as well. This observation seriously questions the hypothesis of two different domain matrices being involved in this extension panem. This example shows that on a theoretical level 'domain matrix' is a notion too malleable to serve as a criterion for distinguishing important conceptual phenomena. Another problem which further questions the efficacy of 'domain matrix' as an adequate criterion and which develops within the logic of the domain matrix approach itself, is the definition of metaphor as "a mapping between two domains that are not part of the same matrix" (Croft 1993: 348). The question raised by this definition is whether the mere crossing of a boundary of a domain matrix by an extension represents an adequate and exhaustive characterization of metaphor as a conceptual phenomenon. As a matter of fact, one cannot exclude metaphoric mappings taking place within the boundaries of a domain matrix. Consequently. my claim is that metaphor primarily depends on something different than a crossing of domain boundaries. To illustrate this,l take an example used by Goossens ( 1995) in his analysis of the conceptual structure of LINGUISTIC ACTION:

320

Kurt Feyaerts

(4)

·'Oh dear:· she giggled. "I'd quite forgotten.''

Goossens rightly distinguishes two possible interpretations for the verb to giggle in this sentence. The first one is clearly metonymic ('to say something while giggling') with a part referring to the whole. whereas the second one ('to say something as if giggling') is mainly metaphoric. Goossens ( 1995) characterizes this second interpretation as an example of 'metaphor from metonymy' because in the metaphoric reading, ''the conceptual link with the metonymic reading is still present" (ibid.: 164). In both interpretations. the domain (HUMAN) SOUND

functions as the source domain. Notably. Goossens argues that in

the metaphoric reading an extension is taking place between two separate domains which do not belong to a single domain matrix. I do not see any reason. however. to conclude that in this interpretation the domain (HUMAN) SOUND does not belong to the domain matrix of the profiled concept LINGUISTIC ACIION.In my opinion. this auditory experience represents an essential aspect of every linguistic utterance. Again. the question is. how can it be motivated on independent grounds that SOUND is not activated as part of the conceptual background of the meaning 'speaking a.{ if giggling.· What makes example (4) particularly interesting is the reasoning used by Goossens to demonstrate the metaphoric status of this extension. The crossing of domain boundaries is presented as a secondary feature depending on the nature of the conceptual relationship between source and target which is described in tenns of a comparison ('as if'): "(a)nother way to interpret it is that she said this as if giggling; hence (my emphasis: K.F.] there is a crossing of domain boundaries. we have a metaphor" (ibid.: 164). This observation seems to support my view that the primary and decisive criterion for the distinction between metonymy and metaphor resides in the nature of the conceptual relationship (contiguity vs. similarity). The metaphoric status of this semantic extension is also clear without the reference to a domain boundary appearing ex nihilo. This docs not mean. however. that the notion of domain matrix has no importance at all in this question. In fact. defining metonymy in tenns of conceptualized contiguity entails the criterion of an extension taking place within a single domain matrix. The construal of two concepts or domains as being contiguous implies that both structures "are seen to be in line" (Dirven 1993: 14), which means that the restriction of a metonymic extension to a single domain matrix is to be considered an inherent effect of construing two conceptual entities as contiguous.

Metonymic Hierarchies

321

4.2. Hyperbolically used metonymies Before I consider some ex:amples of metonymic hierarchies, I want to draw attention to a specific aspect of the expressions found in my material. Since they all profile a negative value judgment, it is not surprising that most of these expressions display a high degree of expressiveness. A stylistic/rhetorical device which is often used in this material is hyperbole. which "involves the exaggerated expression of a negative or positive appreciation of something" {Geeraerts 1994: 2823). Hyperbolic expressions represent a typical example of figurative language use. 12 Compare for example the following expressions: (5)

Er kann nicht bis drei ztihlen. 'He cannot count to three:

(6)

Sic glaubt. Gott heiBe Gerhard. 'She believes God's name is Gerhard.'

(7)

Er weill nicht. daB cs zwei Arten von Menschen gibt. 'He does not know that there are two kinds of human beings."

Expressions like these are clearly metonymic in nature. The concepts which are involved in each of these expressions are associated by some kind of a causal relationship according to which. for example. 'a person's inability to count' is presented as a prominent manifestation of the essential property of 'stupidity.· The schematic metonymy which is elaborated in these examples is EFFECT FOR CAUSE. Hyperbolic expressions are commonly treated as typical examples of figurative speech, which raises the question whether a distinction should be made between 'literal' and 'figurative' metonymy. At first glance, there seems to be a difference between expressions as in (5)-(7) and the examples which are commonly presented as metonymies. II appears that the examples in most studies on metonymy arc mostly of the 'literal' kind. where the semantic extension can be interpreted as an objectively verifiable, referentially 'realistic' contiguity relationship. Compare. for example, the different metonymies mentioned by Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 380: PART FOR WHOLE PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT OBJECT USED FOR USER CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED

Get yo11r h11tt over here! I'll have a l..iiwe11hrii11. The .\'CU" has the nu today. Nixo11 bombed Hanoi.

Kurt Feyaerts

322

INSTilliTION FOR PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE THE PLACE FOR THE INSTITUTION THE PLACE FOR THE EVENT

Ex.xmr has raised its prices again. The White House isn't saying anything. Remember the Alamo.

Expressions pointing to an imaginative, 'non-realistic' contiguity relationship arc only scarcely mentioned. although precisely in this kind of relationship the conceptual status of a metonymic extension becomes very clear. The conclusion that we are dealing with two different types of metonymy. i.e., 'literal/ realistic' vs. 'figurative/imaginative' metonymy, cannot be maintained. In both cases. the conceptual-semantic relationship involves two interactional (auributcd) properties. Accordingly, even a contiguity relation which is experienced as being 'realistic; inevitably pertains to a conceptually mediated reality. This understanding is not unimportant for an adequate analysis of metonymy as a conceptual mechanism. It shows that in both cases a contiguity relationship, which is to be considered the conceptual basis of metonymy. is involved. Of central importance for an adequate analysis of examples such as in (5H7) is the insight that phenomena like hyperbole and metonymy are situated on two different semasiological dimensions. Metonymy, on the one hand, concerns the contiguity relationship between two semantic structures and thus basically pertains to the 'conceptual-semantic' level. Compare, for example, the relationship between the semantic source structure 'unable to count to three' and the target structure 'stupid' in (5). The observation that a property like 'unable to count to three· is 'not realistic,' is of no relevance for the purpose of this study. since the relationship I am interested in involves nothing but attributed semantic structures. Hyperbole, on the other hand, arises from the 'inappropriate' use of a linguistic expression in a particular situation and thus primarily concerns a specific 'referential' aspect of a semantic structure. To be more precise. the experience of an utterance being hyperbolic has to be understood against the background of a narrow interpretation of the concept of reference as ·correct reference': "if the meaning of the expression is a true description of the thing it indicates, then the expression refers correctly" (Geiger 1993: 278).1n normal everyday communication, we expect (most of the) utterances to be referentially true. but in using hyperboles. we deliberately violate this communication principle for stylistic. argumentational or other reasons. This narrow concept of reference is of no

Metonymic Hierarchies

323

interest to a semantic analysis, where lhc notion of truth does not play a prominent role. Accordingly. in describing metonymy. my attention is drawn by the relationship between two semantic structures. regardless of whether these semantic values are 'true' or 'real' for a referent or not. Lyons (1977: 184) points out that the search for truth should be left to philosophers: philosophen> are professionally concerned with the explication of the notions of truth. knowledge. belief and existence. The fundamental problem for the linguist. a.~ far as reference is concerned. is to elucidate and to describe the way in which we use language to dmw allention to what we are talking about.

In light of these observations, it docs not seem appropriate to make a distinc· tion between two kinds of metonymy. This distinction would implicate that a phenomenon like hyperbole interferes with the semantic (metonymic) struc· ture of an expression. I have tried to show that this is not the case. Therefore I prefer to speak of 'hyperbolically u,,·ed metonymies.·

5.

Metonymic hierarchies

On the basis of this characterization of metonymy .I can now tum to some largescale metonymic structures that generalize over several linguistic instantiations. I will show that metonymic hierarchical systems display similar structural characteristics to the ones I described for metaphoric hierarchies (sec above). First, I will discuss two specific examples and then I will present a schematic picture of the conceptual structure of STIJPID which will demonstrate the structural role metonymy can play as a pervasive conceptual mechanism. (8)

Er steht da wic der Ochse vor dem Scheunentor. 'He stands there like the ox in front of the bam-door.'

This example concerns the conceptual background of a non-conventionalized expression which profiles stupidity in tenns of a particular behavior: a person who is doing nothing else than just standing there like an immobilized object (NOT MOVING). More specifically. an expression such as (8) incorporates an overlap between the two concepts DEVIANT BEHAVIOR and DEVIANT APPEARANCE. A deviant behavior in its tum elaborates both concepts DEVIANT SOCIAL PROPERTY and DEVIANT PHYSICAL PROPERTI. On a higher schematic level, these latter concepts are schematized as SALIENT DEVIANT HUMAN PROPERTY. This

K11r1 F eyaerts

324

conceptual hierarchy is represented in Figure 2. which mainly focuses on the internal structure of the source concept. Accordingly. the metonymic extension to the target is mentioned only once, namely on the level of the linguistic expression (STIJPID). The metonymic relationship involved here can be paraphrased as 'stupidity shows up in deviant behavior: (Broken arrows are used to indicate metonymic extensions.) With respect to the three structural characteristics I distinguished for metaphoric hierarchies. it is obvious that conceptual metonymy can be described on different levels of abstraction as well. Profiling stupidity as a particular way of standing can be subsumed under the highly schematic pattern in which a salient property stands for (expresses) a less salient one, since physical and social properties can be perceived more easily than an abstract mental property. As already mentioned above. conceptual/linguistic metonymies also display patterns of overlap between higher schematic structures. Not surprisingly. the third characteristic applies to metonymically organized systems as well: metonymies of a higher. more schematic level tend to be of a more universal. purely cognitive nature. Lower metonymies on the other hand. appear to be more culturally restricted .

•

I STUPID I Fi~:ure

2. Hierarchical .ftruc·ture of the DEl//ANT BFJIA.l'IOR FOR STIJP/DfTY metonymy

Metonymic Hierarchies

325

I want to illuslfate this cultural dependence with a second example which refers to a typical German social stereotype in which stupidity plays a major role: (9)

Mantafahrer! 'Manta-driver!'

This metonymic model gets its name from a particular kind of car (Opel Manta) which can be characterized as having a sporty look. a low and aerodynamic profile. a powerful engine. etc. Moreover. it is a relatively cheap car which made it a big commercial success. At the same time, however. this popularity ha.'i 'degraded' it to an ordinary car everyone can afford. To (re)gain some exclusiveness many people equip their Opel Manta with fancy, aggressive-looking accessories like chrome spoilers. muscle tires. rally scat belts, high-beam headlamps, racing colors. etc. All these elements contribute to a typical image of this car as an 'ordinary car dressed up with kitschy gadgets.' What is particularly interesting in this context. is the cultural (German) model in which this car is associated with a typical kind of people owning and driving it. This social stereotype characterizes a Manta-driver as macho, having a blond girlfriend or wife. belonging to a lower social class. driving fast and aggressively, and also as not very intelligent but rather stupid. Calling somebody a Mamafahrer thus can be interpreted in a particular context a-. 'he is stupid.' This conceptual extension is clearly metonymic in that salient properties like deviant behavior. appearance and possession (i.e .. the car itself) are conslfued as manifestations of stupidity. Accordingly. these concepts all take part in the source domain structure which serves as the conceptual base for profiling the target STUPID. To put it another way. these source concepts overlap in any stupidity expression that instantiates this Mamafalrrer-modcl. This model is represented schematically in Figure 3. This hierarchy shows how. in its metonymic extension (broken arrow) onto the target concept STUPID. the culturally specific Malllajahrer-concept elaborates (full lines) several schematic concepts. Figure (4) presents a global representation of the schematic conceptual structure of the target domain. The difference between this and previous figures is that in this case I have brought together the most important source concepts in a single system. The many broken arrows indicate that STUPID is essentially metonymically structurcd.u Presented in this figure are only the most schematic levels of the conceptual structure. Not included are several

Kurt Feyaert.\'

326

~

"''.""~'""''

"".""'~"""" MANTAFAIIRER

I STjPID I FiRure 3. Hierard1ict1l strlt£'fllre of till! MtiiiiO/Clllrer·nwdel

lower-level

schema.~

which further elaborate parts of this structure. Notice that

I consider the target structure STUPID as an elaOOration of DEFICIENT MENTAL ABILmES and that. normally. one would expect the abstract and undifferenti-

ated concept STUPID to appear right below this schema. In order to keep this

figure as clear as possible, however. I moved it to the bottom. The numbers between brackets refer to instantiating expressions which correspond to examples mentioned below or elsewhere in the text. An interesting observation concerns the complex source structure which can be observed in (5). On the one hand. not being able to count to three elaborates both mental as well as practical abilities. On the other hand. however. this deficiency also relates metonymically to little children who are not able to count properly so that this notion - albeit not very prominently also takes part in the conceptual structure or the source domain. It thus appears that - in applying the theory or complex conceptual networks - a complex source domain structure may consist or schematically·related. as well as (metonymically) extended concepts. A similar conceptual pattern underlies the expres..'\ion in (10). which instantiates a deviant appearance (the most prominent source structure) and at the same time metonymically refers to a small (newborn) child (DEVIANT AGE) which typically has this kind or appearance. Both conceptual relationships combine into the complex source structure which metonymically stands for the target STUPID.

Metonymic Hierarchies --------------------~

Fi~11re 4. General nmn?J'Iflal JIT/1('/IIre of STUPI{)

(10) Er ist nicht trocken hinter den Ohren. 'He is not dry behind his ears.' (II) Sic hat nicht aile Sinnc bcisammen. 'She does not have all senses together.' {12) Er hat Wasser im Kopf/Er hat ein weiches Gchim. 'He ha" water in his head.' I' He has a weak brain.' (13) Sie ist nichl so dumm wie sie aussieht. 'She is not as dumb as she looks.·

327

328

Kurt Feyaert.\' (14) Da.\· i.~l 11och mrterdem Naclllwiidrler JEr isl ein geisliger

Untergefreiler.

'That is even below the night watchman."/'Hc is an intellectual "'under-corporal".' (I 5} Er ist zu dumm, urn eincn Eimer Wasser umzustoBcn. 'He is even too stupid to knock over a bucket of water.· Most of these examples speak for themselves. except perhaps for ( 13). which is not an expression that profiles stupidity in a direct way. On the contrary, it profiles a positive mental property. However, the image which is used confirms the social stereotype according to which mental ability can be inferred from somebody· s appearance ('appearance as a manifestation of mental abilities·). from a more profound analysis of the data. it follows that the prototypical schematic source structure for STUPID is DERCIENT HEAD/BRAIN (compare ( 12)}. More than the other source structures this schematic concept hides a complex network of multiple interacting conceptual relationships. Correspondingly. this conceptual source domain displays the highest instantiation rate. With regard to a structural comparison between metaphorically and metonymicDIIy organized conceptual hierarchies. it seems that both systems have major structural characteristics in common. Although I am aware of the different conceptual strategies which are involved in both mechanisms (cf. Dirven 1993). figure 4 clearly shows that generalized metonymy,just like its metaphoric counterpart. operates on different levels of schematicity ('first similarity feature'). At the same time this broader focus allows one to identify more easily the patterns of interplay and overlap between different metonymies in the hierarchy ('second similarity feature'). In this respect I have briefly discussed some interesting examples (compare (5). (8). (9). (10)) that profile stupidity on the basis of a complex source domain. Such patterns of overlap can be described as a complex structure situated somewhere in conceptual space. defined by different relationships with other conceptual structures and activated as (part of} the source domain matrix of the profiled concept. The examples cited above display two possible patterns of overlap between concepts/metonymies. The first one resides in the elaboration of two schematic structures. whereas the second one consists of a metonymic association with another concept. With this description. I apply Langacker's ( 1987} view on schematic networks as the organizing principle of our knowledge structures. Accordingly, the conceptual background (domain matrix) of a profile requires "specifications in numerous domains" (ibid.: 163). All these

Metonymic Hierarchie.\·

329

specifications relate in one way or another to the conceptual entity which is profiled by the expression. The entity designated by a symbolic unit (its profile: K.F.) can therefore be thought of a.~ a point of accc:.~ toil network. The ~mantic value of a ~ymbolic unit is given by the open-ended set of relations - :.implc and complex, direct and indirect - in which this access node participates. (ibid.)

Not all domains/concepts which constitute the conceptual background of a profile are activated with the same degree of intensity (cf. also Croft 1993: 344f). Although in this context I did not deal with that issue explicitly, I mentioned that some concepts which are metonymically related to the source structure may be less directly involved in the definition of the profiled concept STUPID. Compare. for example. the association of a concept like MARKED AGE (CHILD) with the conceptual structure which is directly instantiated by the expression in (5). A similar observation holds for the association of a low social class with the central aspects of the Mantafahrer-stereotype. As to the 'third similarity feature.' finally. I have demonstrated that specific, low-level metonymies like the German Mamafahrer-model tend to be culturally more specific with a correspondingly restricted use. Higher-level metonymic mappings on the other hand are more widespread in their use because of their general cognitive. culturally unrestricted nature.

6.

Conclusion

Conceived in a cognitive semantic framework. this article raises two major points concerning the nature and structure of metonymy. First. it is argued that on both a theoretical and methodological level. the notion 'domain matrix· is not precise enough to be used as the primary criterion for the distinction between metaphor and metonymy. The essence of metonymy resides in the nature of the relationship that connects two concepts with each other. Accordingly, I have defined metonymy in terms of a conceptualized contiguity relationship between two entities. Hence. metonymy is categorized primarily as a conceptual rather than a strictly referential phenomenon. Consequently. the main interest of this contribution is to be situated on the level of conceptual structure. In this perspective. the analysis of the data demonstrates the crucial role metonymy plays in structuring our knowledge system. From the examples provided here. it follows that metonymy represents a sophisticated and robust

Kurt Feyaerts

330

conceptual mechanism which must be treated on a par with metaphor. II was also shown, second, that metonymically motivated idioms may cluster into higher-level conceptual metonymies in a similar way that metaphoric expressions do. This comparison has led to the conclusion that both

types of conceptual organization have three major structural characteristics in common. The extrapolation of the notion of multi-level hierarchies of conceptual patterns from the study of metaphors to the sludy of metonymies represents the specific theoretical contribution of this paper to the cognitive semantic study of metonymy.

Notes I wi.~h 10 thank Dirk Gecracrts for valuable help with the prepara1ion of 1he 1alk on which !his anicle is based, GUnler Radden for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper and Jessica Dobratz for proofreading major pans of the text. This aniclc pre~up­ poses a cenain acquaimancc with basic theses and tenninology of cognitive semantics and of the Lakovian theory of metaphor in panicular.

2.

Compare KOvecses (19M9: 44): "each and every expres~ion related to a concept ha.~ to be examined if we wish to uncover the minute details of the coocept." but sec also Geeracrts and Gmndelaers (1995: 174ff).

3.

In this respect I refer to Langacker"s (1993: 30) char.~eteri7.ation of metonymy in tenns of reference poinl~; "( ... [ a well-chosen metonymic expression leL~ us mention one entity that is salient and ea.~ily coded. and thereby evoke - essemially automatically - a target that is either of lesser interest or harder to name.[ ... ) Other things being equal. various principles of relative salience generally hold: human > non-human: whole > pan: concrete> abstract: visible> non-visible: etc."

4.

The cognitive basis of person perception makes it a di!!Cipline of great interest for cognitive semanticisl~: ··1n dealing with person perception we arc concerned with it a.~ it occurs in the layman. as a process affecting ordinary human interaction. and not with the person a.~ an object to be diagnosed by the expert" (Tagiuri 19511: xii).

5.

Cf. Heider (191111: 341): ··our main concern is n01 the exact mea.~ure of onc·s own ability. but right away the relation to others. If somebody would tell us exactly what our ability measures. we still would a~k: but how do others do"!'" studie~

6.

Cf. Lakoff(l993) and Kiivec:.cs (1995a) for recent

7.

Several examples illustrate that UFE ts ,, JOURNEY also elaborates the object dual of both schematic metaphors which are involved here. Compare. for instance. expressions like Ht- /n~l hi.~ /ifr- (l'MANGI'. OF STATE IS MOVEMf.NT m· POSSES.~W OBJELI) or Hi.f youth h1.1s

in this respect.

II.

Set- also Ki:i\'CCses (1995b: 193). who distinguishes between a generic. mainly physiologiully motivated coJK.-eptuallevel and a specific. mainly ~:ulturally detcnnined conceptual level.

abundoned him (TIME I'ASStNG IS MOVING E..'ITITY).

Metonymic Hierarchies

331

9.

Argumentation theory providl!s a good basis for an adequate de~cripcion of the conceptual relationships underlying these expres~ions. Crucially, the kind of argumentation (or conceptual linking) involved here is situated on a rfletoriul rather than a strictly logical level.

10.

Obviously. a.~ this theoretical pcr.;pective is inherent in any linguistic research, no linguistic analysis can ever claim to reflect the mental richness of a conceptual structure in full detail.

II.

I refer to Sandra and Rice ( 1995), where the is.~uc of the psychological reality of theoretical notions such a.~ 'domain' is discus.wd in greater detail.

12.

According to Dirven (1993: 18), figurative meaning ··only arises- or atlea.~t can arise - if lhe conceptual distance between the two (sub )domains or things referred to is large enough.'"

13.

In order not to complicate the picture too much, not every relationship between rourcc and target or between one rource concepc and another can be explicated in one single figure. for example.the contiguity relationship and potential metonymy (CALTSE/EFFECT) among the source concepts DEFICIENT SENSORY Al'f'ARATIJS, DEACIEm' HEAD/BRAIN and DI:ACIENT (PRACTICAL) ABIIJnE.~ is not represented in this schema.

References Bruner. J.S .. D. Shapiro. R. Tagiuri 1958 The meaning of tmits in isolation and combination. In R. Tagiuri, L. Petrullo (eds.). Per.wn Perceptimt and Jmerper.wnal 8f'ha1·ior. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 277-288. Croft. William 1993 The role of domains in the interpretation of metaphor.; and metonymies. Cognitive li11gui.~tics 4: 335-370. Davies. C. 1987 Language, identity and ethnic jokes about stupidity./lllernatiollallmmtaf of the Sodo/Of(\' of Umguage 65: 39-52. 1990 Ethnic Humor around thf' World: A Comparati1•e Analysi.L Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Dirven, RenC 1993 Metonymy and metaphor: different mental strategies of conceptualization. l.etll"eme Bijdragen 82, 1-28. Eemeren. F.H. van, R. Gmotendorst. F. Snoeck-Henkemans 1996 Fundamenta!J of Argumentation Theory: A Handbook of Hi.~torical Ba,·k· grounds and Comemporary Developmem.~. Mahwah. NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Geeraerts. Dirk 1994 Nondenotational semamic change. In R.E. Asher. J.M.Y. Simpson (eds.). Tile Enc·yclopedia of Language and linguistics. Vol. 5. Oxford: Pergamon Press. 2823-2824.

332

Kurt Feyaerts

Geeraens, Dirk, S. Grondelaers 1995 Looking back at anger: cultural uaditions and metaphorical patterns. In J. Taylor, R.E. MacLaury (eds.), Lang11age and th~ Cognitiw: Con.flrllol of the World. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 153-179. Geiger.RA. 1993 Metacognitive a'ipecls of n:ference: assessing referential coi'Teetness and success. In R.A. Geiger, B. Rudzka·Ostyn (eds.), Conn•pmalizmio11s ami Mental Pmce.uing ini.Ang11age. Berlin: MoUion de Gruyter. 267-289. Goossen.~. Louis 1995 Metaphtonymy: the interaction of metaphor and metonymy in Cltprcssions for linguistic action. In L. Goossens et a!. (eds.), B)· Word of Momh: Metaphor, Mt>tonymy, and lingt1istic Al·tion in a Cognitiw: Per.fpec·ri~·e. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins. 159-174. Heider. F .. M. Benesh-Weiner(ed.) 1988 Thl' Notl'books. Vol. 2: Percl'ption. Miinchcn: Psychologic: Verlags Union. Ktivecses. Zolt3n 1989 Emotion Cmlcl'pls. New York: Springer. 1995a American friendship and the scope of metaphor. Coxlliti\"t' l..ingui.uics 6: 315-346. 1995b Anger: its language. conceptualization. and physiology in the light of crosscultural evidence. In J. Taylor. R.E. Maclaury (eds.). Languugl' and thl' Cog11itil'l' C.mstmal of till' World. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 181-196. Lakoff. George 1987 Womm. Firl', and Dangt'rous Thin~:.~: What Catt'f:OFil'.f Rl'\'1'01 abo11t till' Mind. Chicago: 'The University of Chicago Press. 1993 The contemporary theory of metaphor. In A. Onony (ed.). Metaphor and TlwuRht. Second edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 202-251. Langacker. Ronald W. 1987 Fomulations of Coxnitil"l' Grammar. Vol. /: Thl'oretical Prerequi.~iii'S. Stanford. California: Stanford University Press. 1993 Reference-point constructions. Cognitive l..ingui.uics 4: 1-38. Lyons. John 1977 St'mamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sandra. Dominick, Sally Rice 1995 Network analyses of prepositional meaning: mirroring whose mind - the linguist's or the language user's? Cot-:nili\"1' Lingui.fli("S 6: 89-130. Schmid, Hans-JOrg 199.' CotJagt' 1111d Co .. idt'a. starrl'.f. begin: Dil' Katt'gorisierungals Gnmdprin:ip l'iner differm:il'rtl'll Bt'dt'lltung.fht'schrl'ibrmg. Ti.ibingen: Niemeyer. Tagiuri. Rcnato 1958 Introduction. In R. Tagiuri, L. Petrullo {eds.). Person PI'I"CI'ption a11d lnterpt'rsonal Beharior. Stanford: Stun ford University Press. Taylor. John 1989 l..ingui.uk Categori:tttio11: Protot)pl's in Lingui.~tit' Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

The Potentiality for Actuality Metonymy in English and Hungarian

Klaus-Uwe Panther University of Hamburg

Linda Thornburg E6tv6s Lorand University, Budapest

1.

Introduction

In a recent paper (Thornburg and Panther 1997) we postulated and exemplified some general metonymies used by speakers of English. e.g .. the metonymies FORM FOR COt\TENT. EFFECT FOR CAUSE, POTENTIALITY FOR MOTIVATION, NECI::SSITY fOR MOTIVATIOI" and I'OTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY. the latter being one of the most pervasive. A natural extension of this research is to investigate the function and exploitation of metonymies across languages. In this paper. we single out the POTENTIALITY FOR Am:AUIT metonymy and explore how it functions in two genetically and typologically unrelated languages. English and Hungarian.

1. 1. Metonymy Metonymy is traditionally regarded as a figure of speech that involves a process of substituting one linguistic expression for another. i.e .. me10nymy is viewed as a relation in which one linguistic expression 'stands for' another. The bcst·known cases of metonymy in this lraditional sense arc expressions that are used for the purpose of indirect referring. For example, there is a convention that the referential noun phrase

Klaus-Uwe Panther am/ Unda Thornburg

334

( 1)

the White House

can be used to refer to the executive branch of the government of the United States, a spokesperson for that branch. or even the President himself but is not synonymous with any of these. More recently. with the advent of cognitive linguistics. it has been recognized that the traditional view of metonymy is too narrow and that metonymy, like metaphor. is a conceptual tool that operates within 'idealized

cognitive models' or 'domain matrices' (e.g .. Lakoff 1987: Croft 1993: Kovecses and Raddcn 1998; Raddcn and Kovecses, this volume). In this view metonymy is "[ ... 1 ll cognitive process in which one nmcepllwl entity, the vehicfe.provides memal acceu to another conceptual emity,the target. within the same idealized cognitive modef' (Radden and KOvecses, this volume). The cognitive approach to metonymy is not necessarily incompatible with the traditional view. At some level the vehicle and the target are equivalent, although they are not semantically synonymous. On the one hand. the metonymic substitution of one expression for another creates a relation of pragmatic equivalence between the substituting and the substituted expression: on the other hand. in accordance with Radden and Kovecses (this volume), we a'sume that both the vehicle and the target are conceptually present when a metonymy is used. We thus consider metonymy to be both a property of conceptual structure and of language usc, with varying degrees of conventionalization in the linguistic system. In this chapter. we will focus on metonymic phenomena that have a nonreferential function. By way of example. consider the propositions expressed in the assertions in (2a) and (2b): (2)

a. She was able to finish her dissertation. b. She finished her dissertation.

Just as the noun phrase vehicle in (I) does not have the same meaning as any of its metonymic targets. sentences (2a) and (2b) arc not semantically synonymous. It is possible to assert (2a) and to deny (2b) without contradiction. Yet on many occasions of usc the speaker of (2a) pragmatically conveys the same propositional content as that expressed in (2b). In this sense the statement (2a) can be used to 'stand for' the statement {2b). the only difference being that in the first case the speaker predicates the ability to finish the dissertation of the subject she. whereas in the second case the speaker predicates the actuality of finishing it. In pragmatic terms. (2b) is a (generalized) conversational

The Polenlialilyfor At·lllalily Melonymy in Engli.~h and Hungarian

335

implicature induced by (2a) (see Grice 1975). In contra•it to the referential metonymy in (I). statement (2a) is an instance of what we call 'prcdicational metonymy' and exemplifies the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTL:ALITY metonymy. A second type of non-referential metonymy is found in the domain of communicative actions. We call this type of metonymy 'speech act metonymy· wherein one illocutionary act stands for another illocutionary act, as, e.g .. in the statement or assertion (3)

a.

I don't know where the bath soap is.l

which may metonymically stand for the question or inquiry (3)

b.

Where is the bath soap?

Utterance (3a) has the direct illocutionary force of an assertion about what the speaker does not know, but in many contexts it is used with the indirect illocutionary force of a question (for the identification of speech acts in conversation. cf. Panther and Thornburg 1998). Searle (1975) hypothesizes that indirect speech acts involve the performance of two illocutionary acts: the secondary illocutionary act relies on the literal force of the utterance whereas the primary illocutionary act corresponds to its intended force. in the case (3a) that of an inquiry. Searle's claim that two illocutionary acts arc performed in an indirect speech act is just another way of saying that both the metonymic vehicle (the secondary illocutionary act) and the target (the primary illocutionary act) are conceptually present in the speaker's mind. In conclusion then, it is obvious that the phenomenon of metonymy is not restricted to its well-known referring function but is much more pervasive in ordinary language usc. In addition to referential metonymies. at least two more types of metonymic relations exist and can be shown to be linguistically relevant. To summarize, we propose the following pragmatic typology of metonymic functions: (4)

a.

propositional metonymies: (i) referential. (ii)predicational: b. illocutionary metonymies.

All of these metonymic functions may co-occur in a single utterance. as in (5): (5)

I don't know whether the first violin was able to pass her driver's test.

Klaus-Uwe Panther am/ Unda Thornburg

336

which contains the metonymic types presented in (6): (6)

a.

propo!~itional:

the noun phrase the first violin may stand for the person in an orchestra playing the first violin: (ii)predicational: the propositional content that The speaker doe.\· not know whether the first violin was abk 10 pass her driver'.\· tes1 may stand for the propositional content that The speaker does not know whether the first \•iolin passed her driver's test; b. illocuticmary: the assenion I dmr 't know whether the first violin was able 10 pw:.\· her driver's te.~t may stand for the question Was the first \'iolin able to pass her driver's te.ft? (i) rejerelllial:

In this paper, we concentrate on the operation of the POTENTIALITY FOR AcruAUTY metonymy in the predicational and the illocutionary domains across two languages. 2

1.2. The scenario approach to metonymy In accordance with recent cognitive approaches to semantics, we assume that meaning. including propositional and illocutionary meaning. is fruitfully analyzed in terms of scenarios consisting of parts which can bear metonymic relations to each other and the whole of the scenario (cf. Blank. this volume).3 Applying this part-whole analysis to speech acts in our prior paper (Thornburg and Panther 1997: cf. also Searle 1969. 1975) we proposed. among other things, the scenario for directive speech acts given in (7): (7)

Scenario for Directive Speech Acts (i) the BEFORE: H can do A. S wants H to do A. (ii) the CORE: S puts H under a (more or less strong) obligation to do A. the RESULT: His under an obligation to do A (H must/should/ ought to do A). (iii)the AF-TER: H will do A.

The scenario approach allowed us to show two things: ( 1) that indirect speech

The Pote"'ialityfor Actuality Meton_vmy in

Engli.~h

and Hungarian

337

acts (and related phenomena) yield to an explanation in terms of general metonymies and (2) that their linguistic forms are highly motivated. To illustrate. an indirect request such as that given in example (8): (8)

John, you will take out the garbage.

instantiates a 'part' of the Directive Scenario. namely the AFfER condition, which metonymically stands for the CORE of the requcstive speech act scenario or the scenario as a ·whole.' Moreover. the form of (8) is motivated since the prospective future action of the hearer is an integral component of that scenario.

1.3. The state-of-affairs scenario From the scenario given in (7) for the specific illocutionary type 'directives' we can abstract a more general State-of-Affairs Scenario. Speech acts are just special instances of what we call 'states of affairs.' e.g., states, events. processes. and actions, which, of course, include linguistic actions. We assume that the distinction between BEFORE conditions. the coRE. the immediate RESULT or Ef-VECT of the core. and the AFfER. which we have already posited for the Directive Speech Act Scenario in (7), also holds for states of affairs. Thus. we propose the scenario given in (9) for propositional contents that describe existing (actual) states of affairs. (9)

The State-of-Affairs (SoA) Scenario (i) the BEFORE: necessary preconditiom: motivations, potentialities. capabilities. abilities. dispositions. etc .. which can bring about the SoA (ii) the CORE: the exiMingltrue SoA the EFFECTs: necessary conseq11ences immediately following from the SoA (iii) the AfTER: mm-necenary col/.{eqllellces of the SoA

As an example of a state of affairs. consider a description of the act of opening a window. such as in ( I0): (10) Mary opened the window. A necessary pre-condition (a BEFORE condition) for the existence of the state of affairs described in sentence (10) is Mary's ability to bring it about. An even

338

Klaus-Uwe Panther am/ Unda Thornburg

more basic BEFORE condition would be that it is at all possible (for anyone) to open the window. Other BEFORE conditions which might be regarded as specific subcases of the ability condition would be. e.g., that Mary has the strength, the time. the patience, etc. to open the window (sec Panther 1981). If Mary is not able to open the window or is not strong enough or docs not have the time to open the window, then the window-opening simply docs not come about. Certain mental states also count as BEFORE conditions in our account. e.g .. the desire or intention to open the window. which can be regarded as motivations for the action. The cORE of the state of affairs is the actual performance of the action. The immediate Err""Ecr of a successful act of opening the window is another state of affairs. that is, that the window is open. An intended but not necessarily following consequence of opening the window (the AfTER) might be that fresh air flows through the window. An unintended consequence might be that flies come through the open window. In general, the Al-TER is only loosely associated with the CORE, whereas the EFF-r:cr is a necessary part of it:~ The SoA Scenario can be metonymically exploited just like the more specific Scenario for Directive Speech Acts. For example. in answering the question (II a) with (lib) the answerer B may exploit the metonymy EA-""ECT FOR CORE:

(II) a. A: Did you open the window? b. B: The window is open. Thus, in some contexts, interlocutor B might wish to convey that she actually has opened the window although. literally, she only states the result of the window-opening.

2. The POTENTlAUTY FOR ACTUAUTY metonymy in English and Hungarians In Section I. we exemplified a metonymic principle that is based on the conceptual contiguity of the modality of possibility and its actualization. It is an empirical question whether and to what extent the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTIJALITY metonymy is operative cross-linguistically, possibly as a universal cognitive principle. As a first step towards answering this question we undertook a comparative analysis of two genetically and typologically unrelated

The Potemialityfor Actuality Metonymy in EngliJh and Hungarian

339

languages, English and Hungarian. We investigated the linguistic relevance and distribution of the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy in seven conceptual and communicative domains: perceptual events, mental states and processes, hedged performatives, indirect speech acts, (extra-linguistic) actions. character dispositions, and acquired skins. The analysis revealed interesting contra•ils between the two languages in the exploitation of the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTIJALITV metonymy. As will be demonstrated below. this metonymy is used much more systematically in English than in Hungarian.

2.1. The sense perception metonymy (ABILiTY ro PERCEM FOR AauAL PERCEPnON)

The first conceptual domain that we analyze concerns perceptual events like seeing. hearing. feeling, tasting, and smelling. All the English sentences from (12)-(20). apart from examples (15) and (16), are about actually occurring sense perceptions although. literally. they either question or assert what we call the BEFORE condition of the Sense Perception Scenario. i.e .. they question or assert the ability for the particular sense perception. For example. in (12) and ( 13) the speaker wants to know whether the hearer actually sees someone or something. In ( 17) the speaker actually heard the sneering laughter .In (I 8) the gambler actually has a sense of being lucky. In ( 19) and (20) the taste and smell arc actually experienced. In each of these English examples the ability for the sense perception 'stands for' the actual perceiving. Thus the POTENTIALITY FOR A<.IUALITV metonymy is fully exploited for the expression of sense perceptions in English.6 (a) see (12) Ca11youseehim? Ltitod? (Keresztes 1992: 34) see-2.SG .PRES.IND.DEF. (13) Ca11 you see well? 161/dts:.? (Keresztes 1992: 34) well see-2.SG.PRES.IND.INDEF. (14) I ca11'1 see the movie screen while you have that hat on.

(Searle 1975) Nem ldtom a mozivc'isznal a kalapodt61. not see-1.sG.PRES.IND.DEF. the moviescreen-ACC. the hat2.sG.POSSESS.-FROM/WITH

Kluu:;;-Uwe Panther ami linda Thornburg

340

(15) The whole town can be seen from the window. Az ablakb61 az egCsz v3.ros ldthattJ. (Keresztes 1992: 106) the window-FROM the whole town see-POSS.-PART. (' . .is available for viewing') (16) It can be ,'feen that..

Ldthat6, hogy ... (Kercsztes 1992: 106) see-ross.-PART that ('(It) is available for seeing that.. ') (b) hear

( 17) I co11ld hear his sneering laughter as her anns canied me off through the fire of oblivion. I can hear it yet. (L08}7 .. Jrallottam .. ... hal/tJm . ... hear-I.SG.PAST.IND.DEF ..... hear-l.SG.PkES.IND.DEF.

(c) feel (18) I'm on the right streak tonight. I can feel it. (LOB) Ma este j6 Uton j
(d) taste

(I 9) I ('CUI taste the vanilla. Erzem a vannia r::et. feel-l.SG.PRES.IND.DEF. the vanilla taste-Ace. (e) smell (20) I can .mre/1 the garlic. Erzem a fokhagyma szogtit. feeJ-l.SG.PRES.IND.DI::F. the garlic Smeli-ACC. Although the POTE/'
The Potemialityfor Ac:t11ality Meton_vmy in EngliJ/1 and Hw1garian

341

be counterexamples to what we have just claimed. The verb ldt is affixed by the 'possibility' morpheme -har-; however, the verb appears in a participial fonn without a human subject who actually experiences the sense perception.~ Sentences (15) and (16) arc thus not metonymic; rather, they focus on the ability or possibility of something being available to vision without metonymically implying that an actual event of seeing has occurred. The sense perception verbs in (17) and (18) - Hungarian hall meaning 'hear' in ( 17) and ire: meaning 'feel' in (18) - behave analogously to /cit 'see.' Only slightly different are the sense perceptions of smelling and tao;ting exemplified in (19) and (20). which are expressed with nominal fonns for the concepts 'smell' and 'taste' plus the verb ire: 'feel.' Nevertheless, the verb ire:. occurs without a modality marker. To summarize these observations then, the POTENTIALITY FOR AcnJALITY metonymy is systematically exploited for the expression of sense perceptions in English. even conventionalized. For Hungarian. however. our (indings indicate the opposite. namely that the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy appears to be excluded in this conceptual domain. suggesting an important typological difference between the two languages. At this point we can only state this contrast as an interesting linguistic fact about English and Hungarian without venturing into any speculations about the reasons for this difference. We now go on to examine predications involving mental processes and states. which exhibit a similar contrast between the two languages.

2.2. The menta/ process/state metonymy (ABILITY

TO PROCESS FOR AGUAL

MENTAL PROCESS)

In the conceptual domain of mental processes and states. English again fully exploits the POTENTIALITY FOR AcnJALITY metonymy. as can be seen in sentences (21H24). The second sentence in (21) strongly implies that the speaker is actually in a state of understanding. In (22) the speaker actually remembers the past event. In (23) the speaker conveys his actual belief that Steve i.~ guilty and in (24) he actually imagines how it llappeuetl. (a) sec(= ·understand') (21) I can't let her down just like that, yet one day it will have to come. I can !iee that now. (LOB) ... Most mar ldtom . . . . now already see-).SG.PRES.IND.DEF.

Klaus-Uwe Panther am/ Linda Thornburg

342

(b)

remember

(22) I can remember when we got our first TV. Emlihzem, mikor .. remember-l.sG.PRES.IND.DEF. when ...

(c) believe (23) Mary can't believe that Steve is guilty, but I c:a11. Marl nem hiszi. bogy Pista bUnos. de en igcn.

Mary not believe-3.SG.PRES.IND.DEF. that.. (d)

imagine

(24) I can imagine how it happened. El tudom kipzelni, hogyan .. PRT able-l.SG.PRES.IND.DEF. imagine-JNF. how .. For the limited data we have for Hungarian the situation is less clear. Although

the Hungarian sentences in (21) and (22) have no modality markers. (24) does contain the modal verb tml 'be able' in the Present Indicative. Sentence (24)

thus instantiates the POTENTIALITY

FOR ACTUALITY

metonymy. Example (23) is

unclear because in the English sentence can is negated. Our Hungarian informants opted for a translation without a modality marker but they also told us that reversing the sequence of the clauses to I can believe that Steve is guilty. but Mary car,.t would allow the modality affix -het- 'possible' in the relevant metonymic sense. To conclude this section of our analysis regarding the mental process/state verbs, the English examples strongly suggest that the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy is again fully exploited to render the pragmatic effect of actuality. However. for Hungarian. despite the fact that the modality markers co-occur with some verbs of mental states/processes and apparently have the relevant metonymic function. the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy seems to operate in this conceptual domain only to a limited extent. We now tum to what we call speech act metonymies: the first type we consider is 'hedged performatives,· i.e .. explicit performative utterances that are hedged by modal or modal-like expression (cf. Fraser 1975: Bach and Hamish 1979).

The Potemialityfor Actuality Metonymy;,, Ettg/i.{h and Hungarian

343

2.3. Speech act metonymies

2.3. 1. Hedged performatives It is common in English to perfonn an illocutionary act by combining a perfonnative verb with modal 'hedges' such as can. must, would like to, etc. Thus it is possible to actually assure someone that she will be paid by saying I can a..uure you that you will be paid. It is possible to actually invite someone to a pany by saying I would like lo im·ite _\'1111 to my part)'. It is possible to actually a"k someone to leave by saying I must ask you to leave .9 The existence and pervasiveness of hedged perfonnatives in English and other languages suggests an even more general metonymic principle than the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy, which might be called the VIRTUALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy, where 'virtuality' includes other modalities apart from potentiality, e.g .• necessity. obligation, and pcnnission. and mental attitudes such as desires or wishes. We hypothesize that the class of pcrfonnative verbs that are sensitive to the POTENTIALITY FOR ACI1JALITY metonymy usually denotes positive and/or non-face-threatening illocutionary acts. Thus promising is usually regarded as a positive speech act. whereas asking is a potentially face-threatening act. Within the subclass of 'positive' performative verbs in English the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy is systematically exploited a" can be seen in (25H28). (a) testify (25) I cw1 testify that. seen from the surrounding heights. it is a fairyland of lights ... (LOB) Tamisfthatom. hogy a kOmyezO magaslatokr61 nezve ... testify-ross.-I.SG.PRES.IND.DEF. that. .. (b) recommend (26) I can recommend this type of cage. a" it is impossible for the birds to throw out seed husks ... (LOB) Ajcinlhatom ezt a fajta kalitk3t.. recommend-ross.-I.SG.PRES.IND.DEF. this-Ace. the type cage ..

Klaus-Uwe Palllher ami linda Tlwmburg

344

(c) give one's word (27) I can give you my word that he is not at home. Szavamat aclhatom. bogy nines ouhon. word-J.SG.POSSESS.-ACC. give-POSS.-l.SG.PRES.IND.DEF.

(d)

that ...

promise

(28) I can promi.fe you I'll be home. Mexfgt!rhetem neked, bogy otthon lcszek. make-a-promisc-ross.-l.sG.PRES.IND.DEF. to-you ..

In Hungarian the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy is also systematically exploited for hedged perfonnatives. Performative utterances can be realized in Hungarian, as in English, either by using the perfonnative verb in the I st Person Present Indicative or by hedging the performativc verb with a modality morpheme. Thus the illocutionary act of testifying can be carried out by using the form tami.sfthlltom (as in (25)): it is possible to achieve the speech act of recommending by using the modalized verb form ajcinllwtom (as in (26)): in the same vein. a speaker can felicitously give her word by saying szammat adhalom (as in (27)) or accomplish the speech act of promising by uttering megigirhetem (as in (28)). To summarize. in both English and Hungarian the 'actuality effect' of the POTENTIALITY FOR ACfUALITY metonymy is very strong with hedged performatives. 2.3.2./ndirect speech acts We now tum to the pragmatic phenomenon which is usually referred to as 'indirect speech acts' (cf. Searle 1975). In a recent paper (Thornburg and Panther 1997) we analyzed indirect speech acts as exemplifying PART-WHOLE metonymies in which part of the speech act scenario. for example a preparatory condition for an offer. as in (29), stands for the whole scenario. Here we undertake to reduce speech act metonymies to more fundamental metonymic principles. We will present data for 'commissives.' 'directives' and 'imprecations' to see to what degree they can be analyzed a..;; instances of the POTENTIALITY FOR AcruALITY metonymy .ll will be seen that some interesting asymmetries arise among these different speech act types. Commi.uives.ln examples (29) and (30) the modal construction I can VP instantiates it.;; systematic use in English for conveying indirect offers, a type

The Pmemialityfor Actuality Mewn.vmy in

Engli.~h

and Hungarian

345

of commissive speech act Although these sentences do not immediately strike one as cases of the POTENTIALIIT FOR ACTUALITY metonymy, the I can may stand for future actuality. i.e., I am VP metonymically may stand for /will VP. How does this metonymy come about? We propose that those contexts in which it is assumed that the speaker not only can do the action but also wants to do the action, lead to the inference that she will do the action. In such indirect commissives the metonymic link between c<m and will is fairly strong and normally not cancelable. a-. we have indicated in parentheses in (29). We still have not answered the question why (29) and (30) are commissives. Our reasoning is: given that S catt do A in a context where S wams 1o do A leading to the inference that Swill do A, three components (two BEFORE and one AfTER component) of the Commissive Scenario are present. which together suffice to metonymically evoke the Commissive Scenario a-. a whole. (29) John, I can make breakfast while you get dressed ('but I won't). Jani. en megc.~indlhatom a reggelit ... John, I PRT.-make-POSS.-I.SG.PRES.IND.DEF. the breakfast-ACC .. (30) When you come to Budapest, I can be your translator. .. .lehet-eklnik a tolmcksod . . . . will-bc-POSS.-I.SG.PRES.IND)COND. translator-your The same analysis appears to apply to the Hungarian examples in (29) and (30): the modality affix -hat-1-het- is systematically used for conveying indirect offers. 10 Moreover. in both languages, the future actuality effect (and thereby the offer interpretation) is canceled when it is assumed that the speaker's want is absent. The absence of the speaker's want leads to a literal interpretation of ability. Thus there are contexts in which it is possible both in English and Hungarian to have utterances of the following sort: Of course, I can make breakfast, hill/ won't (because you behaved .w badly), where the implicated future actuality is explicitly canceled by the speaker. Directiw.>s. In examples (31)-(35) we see the nearly grammaticalized use of the modal construction can you/you can VP for conveying indirect requests. By 'nearly grammaticalized' we mean that it is still possible to cancel the request interpretation in certain contexts (cf. Searle 1975). Interestingly. in these indirect requests. the metonymic link between ccm and will. i.e., between potentiality and future actuality. is much weaker than in the commissives just analyzed. Why should this be so? Perhaps the reason lies in the fact that

Klaus-Uwe Panlher am/ Unda Thornburg

346

utterances like (3 ))--{35) normally occur in a context in which the speaker wants the hearer to carry out the action and assumes the hearer's ability to do so. But because the speaker cannot safely assume the hearer's want to carry out the action nor the ensuing future actuality of the action, the metonymic link between potentiality and actuality in directives is much weaker than in commissives. Yet given the fact that both hearer's ability and speaker's want are present. two parts of the Request Scenario are supplied and license a request interpretation. (31) Can/could you pass the salt? a. Ide Jud-odlndd adni a s6t? to-here able-2.SG.PRES.IND}COND.DEF. the salt-ACC.

b. ldeadhatndd a s6t. pass-POSS-2.SG.PRES.COND.DEF.

(32) Can/could you pleao;e open the window? a. Ki tudncid nyitni az ablakot? OUI-PRT. able-2.SG.PRES.COND.DEF. open-INF. the windOW-ACC. b. Kinyithatncid .. PRT.-open-POSS.-2.SG.PRES.COND.DEF ..

(33) I'll take a shower and you C(lll/could make breakfast. En lezuhanyozom. tc addig megc.\·imilhat-odlt~cid a reggelit. ... you until-then PRT.-make-POSS.-2.SG.PRES.IND./ COND.DEF. the breakfast-Ace. (34) Mary, you ,-all peel the potatoes: John. you call set the table. Mari. te megpucolhamcid a krumplit, Jani, te megterfthetnid az asztalt. Mary you PRT.-peel-ross.-2.sG.PREs.cmm.oEF. the potato-Ace.: John, you PRT .-SCI-POSS.-2.SG.PRES.CONO.DEF. the table-ACC. (35) You can forget it. Eljelejtheted. PRTAorgct-ross.-2.sG.PRES.IND.DEF. The same analysis holds true for Hungarian but with one distinction: the grammaticalization of the modality marker -hat-1-het- is much stronger in Hungarian than that of ca11 in English. This means that no literal ·ability' interpretation is available in Hungarian; in other words. the request interpreta-

The Potentiality for Ac:luality Metonymy in

Engli.~h

and Hungarian

347

tion is not cancelable. As a result. in examples (3lb) and (32b). neither question intonation nor question mark punctuation may occur. 11 In examples of this kind. the possibility marker -hm-1-het- has acquired the grammatical function of signaling a requestive reading. which can neither be suspended nor canceled - a clear case of grammaticalization. For an ability interpretation to be available. the verb tud 'be able. know how· must be used. as in examples (31 a) and (32a). This does not mean. however. that a request interpretation is not pragmatically possible with tud- it is. and it is cancelable. lmprewtion.~. Imprecations with yo11 can are a highly conventionalized kind of indirect speech act. Their imperative force is not cancelable: you cannot say You can go to hell and insist on a literal interpretation of ability at the same time. In both English and Hungarian the imperative and modal constructions are in free variation as (36a. b) and (37a. b) exemplify. Since the hearer's want that the propositional content be realized can definitely be ruled out in these uueram:cs, the link between potentiality and actuality is even less available with imprecations than with indirect requests. In conclusion. the ca11 and -hat-1-het- in these constructions have become completely grammaticalized as markers of imprecation, just as -hat-1-het- has become completely grammaticalized in Hungarian requests. (36) You can go to helL a. Men} a pokolba. ('Go to hell') go-2.SG.IMP. the hell-INTO b. Elmehets:. a pokolba. ('You can go to hell') away-go-ross.-2.sG.PRES.IND.INDEF. the hell-into (37) You can take this job and shove it. a. Edt/ meg az
2.4. Action metonymies

(ABILITY

TO AU FOR AU/ON)

We now tum to the domain of non-linguistic actions. The examples in (38) and (39) arc clear instances of the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy. Quite regularly, the expression of abilities to act arc used to stand for the corresponding actions themselves. For the English and Hungarian sentences

Klaus-Uwe Panther am/ Linda Thornburg

348

in (38) where ability occurs in a past time frame. actuality is strongly implicated. though in some contexts it is cancelable. For the English and Hungarian sentences in (39), where ability occurs in a future time frame. the metonymic link between potentiality and actuality is less strong. In Hungarian the verb tud in (39a) focuses on the ability reading in contrast to (39b), which according to one informant. focuses on the commitment of the speaker to a future action. In other words, the actuality effect in (39a) is very weak and easily cancelable. whereas in (39b) it is fairly strong: and therefore difficult to cancel (cf. 'commissives' in Section 2.3.2.). In fact the Hungarian sentences in (39a, b) can be conjoined without an effect of redundancy. The pragmatic sense of the resulting conjunct is paraphra:.;;eablc as I can come to your party and I will. (38) John was able to fini.~h his paper before the deadline. John a hat;iridO e!Ott be tudwfejezni a dolgozatlit. John the deadline before PRT. able-3.SG.PAST.IND.DEF. finish-INF. the work-Ace. (39) I can come to your party on Friday. a. Eltudok )Onni a penteki bulidra. PRT. able-I.SG.PRES.IND.INDEF. comc-INF. the friday-ADJ. partyYOUR-TO b. Eljbhetek .. PRT.-comc-POSS.-l.SG.PRES.IND.INDEF ..

2.5. The character disposition metonymy (DISPOSITION

FOR OCCASIONAL

BEHAVIOR)

The domain of 'character disposition' is different from other types of the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUAUTY metonymy we have considered thus far in that the relationship between vehicle and target is one between potential behavior and occasional actualizations of this behavior. The sentences in (40)--(42) are judgments about character traits that have an empirical basis. They can be paraphrased by means of existential quantification over times or events, e.g .. Dog,\· can be danxerou.o; means that there are times when dogs display dangerous behavior. The metonymy is systematically exploited in both languages. The alternate Hungarian forms in (40a, b) are reported to be synonymous. but in more general use is the form in (40a). (41) and (42) with the modality verb

The Pote"'ialityfor Actuality Metonymy in EngliJh and Hungarian

349

tud,lhe focus particle is, and the infinitival form of the verb lenni 'to be.' The metonymic effect of occasional actuality is not cancelable. e.g .• it is impossible to assert at the same time that Dogs ca11 be dangermu but have never been observed to be dangerous. (40) Dogs can be dangerous. a. A kutyak ve:ozilyesek is tudnak lenni. the dog-PL. dangerous-PL. PRT. able-3.PL.PRES.COND.INDEF. beINF. b. A kutyilk w:o::.ilye,{ek lehetnek. the dog-PL. dangerOUS-Pl. wiJI-be-POSS.-3.PL.PRES.COND.JNDEF. (41) He can be very unfriendly.

Neha nagyon bardt.{dgtalan is tud lenni. sometimes very unfriendly PRT. able-3.SG.PRES.IND.INDEF. bc-INF. (42)

She call be very genermu. Nagylelkl1 is tud lenni. very-generous PRT. able-3.SG.PRES.INDJNOEF. be-INF.

2.6. The acquired ski/Is metonymy (SKILL

FOR DISPLAY OF SKILl)

The last metonymy that we brieOy explore in this paper and illustrate in (43}(45) concerns skill.:; or acquired abilities. This metonymy is similar to the character disposition metonymy in that the link between potentiality and display of behavior is restricted to certain occasions. Since skills arc acquired and tend to be exercised. we expect to find in language use a strong metonymic link between the ability to exercise a skill and its actual use. For example. if you can speak five languages then. by implicature. you will probably actually speak them. In English this metonymy is systematically exploited but seems to be only partially exploited in Hungarian. (43) Can the baby walk now? Jdr mar a baba? walk-3.SG.PRES.IND.INDEr'. the baby (44) Mary can.{peak five languages. Mari Ot nyelven bes::.il. Mary five language-<JN speak-3.sG.PRES.IND.INDEF.

Klaus-Uwe Palllher ami linda Thornburg

350 (45) I can swim fifly laps. Tudok 1is:::ni 50 hosszt.

able-l.SG.PRES.IND.INDEF ..

3. Results The results of our analysis are summarized in Tables I and 2. The tables include the modality forms. infonnation for each conceptual domain regarding whether or not and to what extent the POTENTIALITY FOR ACfUALITY

metonymy is exploited. and how strong the metonymic link from potentiality to actuality is. We describe the degree of exploitation as ranging from 'systematic.' 'weakly exploited,' 'not exploited.' to 'not exploitable.' The strength of the metonymic link is also indicated in scalar tcnns: from 'enforced." i.e .. non-cancelable and grammaticalized; 'strong,' i.e., cancelable in some contexts; 'fairly strong': 'weak'; to 'zero.' With regard to indirect speech acts. the tables also present the degree to which the modal has been grammaticalized as a marker of illocutionary force. Interesting contrasts in exploitation and de~ grce of metonymic link are highlighted in bold face. Two major contrasts between English and Hungarian emerge from our study. The most important difference can be seen in the conceptual domains of sense perceptions and mental states/processes. First,the degree of exploitation of the POTEf'ITIALITY FOR ACTUAUTY metonymy in these two domains is nearly opposite: English exploits the metonymy systematically. whereas in Hungar~ ian it is either systematically blocked (not exploitable) or only weakly ex~ ploitcd. Second. the metonymic link between potentiality and actuality is very strong in English, i.e., almost not cancelable. whereas in Hungarian. it is either non-existent (zero) or only weakly present. Another contrast, more subtle yet highly interesting. occurs in the domain of indirect directives. In both languages statements or questions containing modality markers for ability/potentiality are systematically used as requests. However. an important difference between the two languages is that in Hun~ garian this practice has become grammaticalized, whereas in English there is still the possibility of canceling the request reading (cf. Searle 1975). As we have shown in Section 1.2. (also see Thornburg and Panther 1997). the hearer's abilil)' to perform the requested actio11 is a BEFORE condition in the Request Scenario and can stand for the whole scenario or other parts of the

The Pote"'iality for Actuality Metonymy in

Engli.~h

and Hungarian

351

Table I. £\p{oitatioll of the I'OTEl\71ALITY FOR ACTU.4UfY metonymy in E111:fi.fh

CONCEPTUAL DOMAIN Sense Percepllon Mental Stales/Processes Hedged Performatives Indirect Speech Acts (iJ Commissives

Linguistic Fonn

lcalllctml

Exploitation

Metonymic Link

systematic syslemalk systematic

strong strong strong

systematic

actuality effect fairly strong: commissive reading strong actuality effect weak: request reading strong actuality effect nonexistent; imprecation reading enforced strong enforced strong

(ii)Dircctivcs

you can I call you systematic

(iii) Imprecations

you ca11

not exploited

ablelt·u11

systematic systematic systematic

Aclions Character Dispositions Acquired Skills

Table 2. £:rploiwtio11 of the I'OTf:t•mAUTY FOR ACTl!AUIT metonymy ill H11111:0rian

CONCEPTUAL DOMAIN

Linguistic Fonn

Exploitation

Metonymic Link

Sense Perceptions

-hat- I -het-, md

Mental States/Processes

excluded sometimes tud

weak

-hat- I -het-

not exploilable weakly exploited systematic

-hat- I -l!et-

systematic

{ii)Oircctives

-luu- I -l1et·

systematic

(iii) Imprecations

-hat- I -het·

not exploited

tml (-har-1-het·J md (-hat- I -hei-J md (-hat- I -het- J

systematic systematic weakly exploited

Hedged Perrormalives Indirect Speech Acts (i) Commissives

Actions Character Dispositions Acquired SkiDs

strong actuality effect fairly strong: commissive reading strong actuality effect weak: request reading enforced actuality effect nonexistent; imprecation reading enforced 5trength varies enforced strong

352

Klaus-Uwe Pamher ami linda Thornburg

scenario such as the AfTER condition that the hearer will actually perform the action. Notice. however. that the metonymic link between potentiality and actuality for indirect directives is relatively weak. Unlike commissives, whose satisfaction is guaranteed by the speaker, requested actions are hearer-dependent. i.e .. not under the speaker's control. and therefore not guaranteed.

4.

Conceptual metonymy and conversational maxims

In this section we will briefly touch upon the problem of how the POTENTIALITY FOR Ac:n.JALITY metonymy relates to two well-known pragmatic principles, namely Grice's (1975) First and Second Maxims of Quantity: Make your contribution as informath•e a.~ is required (jor the cw-rent purpose of the exchange) and Do not make your ccmtrihlllion more informative than i.~ required. The POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy seems to be in conflict with the first maxim. The first maxim triggers the implicature that if a speaker says that something is potential or possible then it is not actual. A speaker saying for example (46) Professor Smith may be in her office. conveys that she cannot make the stronger statement (47) Professor Smith is in her office. In such cases the First Maxim of Quantity seems to take precedence over the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy. In other Words, the route from potentiality to actuality is barred: may he definitely cannot stand for is because the first quantity maxim triggers the implicature that the speaker is not certain about the actuality of the proposition. However. in a sentence like (48) I could hear him rummaging around in the basement. the POTEr<.JIALITY FOR ACTIJALITY metonymy licenses the interpretation 'I heard him rummaging around in the basement." This interpretation can also be derived in a Gricean framework. namely. via the Second Maxim of Quantity (cf. what Hom 1989: 194ff calls an R-bascd implicature). The problem of which maxim takes precedence in cases of conflict is a complex issue that is beyond the scope of this papcr(cf. Hom 1989: Chs. 3fffordetailed discussion).

The Pote"'ialityfor Actuality Metonymy in Eng/i.{h and Hungarian

353

There arc however ca.'ies where the First Maxim of Quantity and the metonymy (or Grice's Second Maxim of Quantity) are not in connie! but seem to interact. Consider (49) (from Sweetser 1990: 70):

POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUAUTY

(49) He may be a university professor. but he sure is dumb. Sweetser remarks that, despite the modality. the first clause states. or rather concedes, that the subject is a professor. 11 ln our tcrminology.the POTENTIALITY r·oR ACTUALITY metonymy is operative in example (49). Yet the first clause of the utterance additionally conveys a reservation, which the non-modal predicate is a uniwrsity professor would not imply. That is. to make the actuality statement (50) He is a university professor ... is to evoke stereotypical professorial attributes in the mind of the hearer. e.g., that professors arc highly educated. intelligent, well-read. etc .. which can then be canceled by a subsequent bur clause. However. in using may be, as in (49). the speaker signals from the very start. within the initial clause. that some stereotypical implicaturc(s) such as 'he is intelligent' or 'he is well-read' cannot be anticipated. Thus. in contrast to the actuality predicate is a professor, the use of may he a profes.wr contravenes a possible conclusion that would be warranted on the basis of the stereotypical assumptions held about professors. In the first clause of (49) the POTE!IfllALITY FOR ACTIJALITY metonymy sanctions the conclusion that the subject actually is a professor. whereas the First Maxim of Quantity licenses the inference that he is a professor to less than the fullest extent. an interpretation which is confirmed by the hut clause. Likewise, in the conventionalized metaphorical use of ue 'understand' the potentiality marker can in sentences like (51) I can see your point. seems to have the same dual function. On the one hand, the POTENTIALITY FOR AcruALITY metonymy yields the interpretation 'I see your point,' on the other hand. since the stronger statement /.{ee your point has not been made. the First Maxim of Quantity licenses the implicature ' ... but I have reservations.· In uttering I ccm see your poirtl the speaker gives to understand that she cannot make the stronger statement I see your poim because understanding to the fullest possible extent has not occurred.

354

Klaus-Uwe Palllher ami linda Thornburg In examples like (49) and (51) the conflict between the First Maxim of

Quantity and the POTENTIALITY FOR

Acn.JALIIT

metonymy is resolved in a

compromise: actuality is conceded but not to the fullest extent. In general then, utterances with a potentiality marker like cau - even when they are used mctonymically to evoke actuality - seem to be weaker than their correspond-

ing non-modal counterparts. To summarize. the relationship between conceptual metonymies and Griccan implicaturcs is far from being clear at the present stage of research.

5.

The pervasiveness of the

POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY

metonymy

In recent work KOvecses and Radden ( 1998) and Radden and KOvecscs (this volume) have proposed that the choice of metonymic vehicles for accessing various targets is not random. They postulate default metonymies that repre· sent the normal. i.e .. preferred, way of indicating an intended target. In their framework the cognitive principle ACTIIALITY OVER POTENTIALITY is a default case whereby 'actual' vehicles are selected to access 'potential' targets rather than the other way around. They interpret our data from indirect speech acts as exceptional to their default principle since these data instantiate a metonymy that links a 'potential' vehicle to an 'actual" target. They argue that these ·exceptions' result from a conventionalized flouting of their principle CLEAR OVER LESS CLEAR, a flouting that they claim is motivated by social nonns such as politeness. In this way they preserve the primacy of their cognitive default principle ACTUALITY OVER POTENilALITY. However, our research calls into question the validity of the proposed default principle ACTUALITY OVER POTENTIALITI. As we have amply demon· strated in this paper. in addition to indirect speech acts, at least six other cognitive domains exist in which the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy is Jptematically exploited in English and to varying degrees in Hungarian. Unlike indirect speech acts. the tokens of POTENTIALITY FOR ACTI!ALITY in these other domains cannot be accounted for in terms of social conventions. in particular. politeness principles. The use of an utterance such as I can smell the garlic over I smell the garlic is not motivated by rules of politeness. The pervasiveness of the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy in both English and Hungarian. its systematic exploitation. and its degree of conventionaliza. tion below the level of conscious awareness pose a serious challenge to a

The Potentiality for Actuality Mewnymy in English and Hungarian theory that posits such a defaull cognitive principle as

355

ACfUALITY OVER

POTENTIALITY.

6.

Conclusion

Our pilot study was motivated by a curiosity to see how conceptual metonymies are realized in two very different languages. By using a scenario approach to describe states of affairs and choosing one basic metonymic principle. the POTENTIALITY FOR ACfUALITY metonymy. we were able to determine (i) that this particular conceptual principle is more systematically exploited in English than in Hungarian in various cognitive domains and (ii) that it is pervasive in disparate cognitive domains. a finding that suggests it is a default rather than a non-default cognitive principle. We believe that future research should cover a larger sample of languages in which additional conceptual metonymies and cognitive domains are explored. Moreover. such an extended research program should elucidate the relationship between Gricean implicatures and the kind of metonymic inferences discussed in this paper.

Notes Note that in this eao;c the propositional content alMJ changes . .,

For reasons yet to be determined the from the referential domain.

3.

One anonymous reviewer pointed out that our usc of 'part" docs not coincide with the tmditional sense of metonymy bao;cd on referential comiguity and that we confuse conceptual contiguity (as a metalinguistic concept) with referential contiguity. We claim. however. that even referential (spatial) contiguities. e.g .. the set of body part~ are themselves conceptual constructs. As such they arc also entities in conceptual space. Just as a prototypical body is conceptualized as having a head, trunk. arms. legs. etc .. we propose that a prototypical directiw speech act ha~ the components listed in (7). In this ~cnsc it seems perfectly legitimate to refer to the felicity conditions of a speech act a.~ "par1s" of lhc speech at:t scenario.

4.

In Thornburg and Panther (1997) these concepts are explained more fully, especially the difference between the pragmati'" result (cffct:t) of a speech act and the result (effect) of a non-linguistic action.

5.

In collecting our data. we presented native

POTE.,TIAUT't"

speaker~

FOR ACTUALITY seems to be excluded

of Hungarian with English scntcnt:cs

Klau:o-Uwe Panther and linda Thornburg

356

which instantiate the POTENTIAun' FOR ACTIJAUTY metonymy and a.<>ked them to give a natural translation in Hungarian. With one exception - the sentence in (38) with be ablt' - the English data occur with the modal auxiliary n.m: the Hungarian translations contain. where pos..'iiblc, either the affix -llat-1-ht't-. which denotes possibility in a general sense, or the verb tud, which is roughly equivalem to 'be able. know how.' In particular, we wanted to know whether the 'possibility' and 'ability" modality markers -Jwt-1-hetand md conveyed the same metonymic effect (i 1!., implicating actuality) as in the English examples. We would like to thank various friends, colleagues and students for their time and assistance in providing most of the Hungarian data: Andrea Szinnai, Eva SzabO, Balaz.'i Uivenbcrg. Zoltan KOvecses. and especially Rita Brdar-Szabt'i. who supplied many helpful grammatical points.

6.

For the glosses oflhe Hungarian examples the following conventions will be used: word~ are separated by a space: morpheme boundaries are indicated by a hyphen: grammatical functions arc indicated in small capitals. 1bc abbreviations used arc: ACC = accusative. ADI =adjectival suffix. coso= conditional. DEF= definite conjugation.IMP =imperative. IND = indicative. L~DEF = indefinite conjugation. PART= p311iciple. l'l = plural. POSs = possibility. POSSESS= po&o;essive. PRES: present tense. PRT = p311icle. so= singular.

7.

The abbreviation LOB stands for

8.

In examples (15) and (16) lhe -ltutO complex may be regarded a~ an adjective-forming suffix deriving 'possibility-pa.
9.

Tbe faclors !hat determine whelher a hedged performative can aclually be uiiocd to perform the illocutionary act denoted by the perfonnative verb arc complex and will not be dealt with in any detail. Suffice it to say that I nm usk you 10 lt>a1·e does not con..~titute an acl of a.~king nor does I must pmmist> to /J(' lht>rt' constitute a promise.

10.

With indirect commissives (offers) like (30). our Hungarian language consultants oflen preferred the more indirect conditional over lhe plainer indicative mood for rca~ons of polileness. This preference also holds for indirect direclives.

Lanca~ter-Oslo-Bcrgcn

Corpus.

II.

We are grateful to Rita Brdar-Szab6 for making this poinl dear to us.

12.

This is an example of what Sweelser calls 'speech act modality.' Unlike (46). utterance (49) is nol available a~ a topic-introducing or discourse-initiating device and seems 10 be restricted 10 a reactive slol in a discourse.

References Bach. Kent. Robert M. Hamish 1979 Lingui.ftic Communication and Speech Acu. Cambridge. Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Cmfi.William 1993 The role of domains in the interpretation of metaphors and metonymies. Cogniti\'e lingui.ftics 4: 335-370.

The Potentiality for Ac:luality Metonymy in

Engli.~h

and Hungarian

357

Fra.o;er,Bruce 1975 Hedged performatives. In P. Cole. J. Morgan (eds.). Syntax and Semanti('S, Vol. 3: Speech Act.L New York: Academic Press, 187-210. Grice, H. Paul 1975 Logic and conversation.ln P. Cole. J. Morgan (eds.),Syntaxand Semantics. Vol.3: SpeechAct.L New York: Academic Press,41-58. Hom, Laurence R. 1989 A Natural Hi.nory ofNe~atiott. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Keresztes, UsziO 1992: A Practical Hungarian Granunar. Ikbrccen: Ikbreceni Nyari Egyetem. KOvecscs. ZoltAn. GUnter Radden 1998 Metonymy: developing a cognitive linguistic view. Co~nitil't' Lingui.uic.f 9: 37-77. Lakoff. George 1987 Women. Fire and Dan~ero/1.{ 11tin~s: What Categories Re1•eal abom the Mind. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Panther, Klaus·Uwe 1981 Indirect speech act markers or why some linguistic signs are non-arbitrary. In R.A. Hendricks et al. (eds.), Papen from rhe Se1·emeemll Regional Meetill~. Chicago Linguistic Society. April 30- May I. 1981. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society. 2:95-302. Panther, Klaus-Uwe. Linda Thornburg 1998 A cognitive approach to inferencing in conversation. loll rna/ of Pra~nwric.f 30: 755-769. Searle. John 1969 Speech Act.c An £ua_\' in the Philo.mphy of La11guage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1975 Indirect speech acts. In P. Cole, J. Morgan {cds.), Syma.r and Semantic.t. Vol. 3: SpuclrActs. New York: Academic Press. 59-82. Sweetser. Eve 1990 From Erymology to Pragmatic.f: Metaphorical and Cufmral Afpel"ts of Semamic Strucmre. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thornburg, Linda. Klaus·Uwe Panther 1997 Speech act metonymies. In W.A. Liebcn ct al. {eds.). Disc·m,·se a11d Per.fpecti\•e.f ill Cogllitil'e LinguiJtics. Am.<>terdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins, 205-2:19.

Part IV

Applications of Metonymy

"Mummy, I like being a sandwich" Metonymy in Language Acquisition

Brigitte Nerlich, David D. Clarke University of Nottingham

Zazie Todd University of Leicester

In order to recognise how mccmings arc ar· rnngcd in our heads. the surest way is to sec how they got in there in the first place. (Brtal 1991[1884): 149)

1.

Introduction

The first usc of the term ·metonymy' can be found in ancient Greek philosophy, and more specifically in the famous debate about the arbitrariness or naturalness of signs. In his account of Plato ·s contribution to linguistics, Fred Householder ( 1995: 93) points out that Dcmocritus (as quoted in Produs· commentary on the Crut_\"fll.r 16) offered four arguments (with four specially coined names) in favour of arbitrariness: (a) "homonymy· or "polysemy.' i.e .. thc same sequence of phonemes may be a~:.ociatcd with two or more unrelated meanings: (b) 'polyonymy' or 'borrophy.· i.e .. the existence of synonyms: (c) 'metonymy.· i.e .. the fact that words and meaning:- change: (d) 'nonymy.' i.e .. the non-existence of single words for simple or familiar ideas.

362

Brigitte Nerlich. Da\•id D. Clarke and Za:ie Todd

In Chapter 21 of his Poetic.~ Aristotle distinguished between four classes of ·metaphors.' which included what was later to be caJied ·metonymy' and 'synecdoche." As Peter Koch (this volume) and Andreas Blank (this volume) have pointed out, the first real definition of metonymy was given in the Rhelorica ad Heretmium which is sometimes attributed to Cicero: "denominatio est quae ab rebus propinquis et finitimis trahit orationem. qua possit intellegi res quae non suo vocabulo sit appellata" (Anonymous (Ciccro)l954: IV. 32. 43). In classical rhetoric. metonymy became a figure of speech distinct from metaphor. It normally excluded shirts of meaning based on PART-WHOLE relations, which were attributed to synecdoche. Nowadays, shifts of meaning based on PART-WHOLE relations are included in metonymy and arc actually regarded as the most basic metonymical relations. This was already stressed in 1925 by the French linguist Gao;;ton E'l.nault. E-.nault distinguished between metaphor. metonymy and synecdoche on modem lines. now advocated for example by Ken-ichi Scto (in press. and in this volume). However. in his definition of metonymy Esnault ( 1925: 29) referred to Democritus. He wrote: "The meaning of the word melaphor is transfer, that of metonymy change (of name). and that of synecdoche amrexation.'' Thus, Esnault agreed with traditional rhetoric, but as a semanticist he pointed out: Metaphor is not a transfer of a word from one sense to another. it is an intuition that gcll>transponed: metonymy is not a change of a name imposed on a thing. it is an objective relation conceptualised in shonened form: synecdoche is not a larger or smaller logical intension imposed on a word. it is a change in its logical extension. (Esnault 1925: 29)

And he returned to this topic of 'shortening' when he remarked: Metonymy doesn't open up new paths to follow as metaphorical intuition docs: instead it hurries over the stages in paths that arc too well known and shonens the distances so as to facilitate the rapid intuition of things that we already know. (ibid.: 31)

Whal is important here is that metonymy enables us to say things quicker. to shorten conceptual distances. This function of metonymy as an 'abbreviation device' has also been stressed by Warren (this volume). Metonymy is a universal strategy of cost-effective communication. In young children we can observe overextensions bao;;ed on the metonymical stretching of the meaning attached to the few word forms children have acquired ('compelled metonymical overextcnsions'). Later on we can observe 'creative metonymical

'Mummy, I Like Being a Sandwich'

363

shrinking' despite the fact that the children could express the same meaning with the words they know. Later still, in adults. we can observe the use of metonymies in. literally speaking, cost-effective communication. as for example in headlines like "Brains of British Museum crack Crystal Skull Riddle" (The Observer 26/6/96). After England's victory over Holland in the Euro 96 football championship one could read: ''Our Boys done Gouda" {The Sun. June 1996). We understand these headlines instantly.and yet they require a lot of linguistic. contextual and conceptual 'unpacking.·

2.

Typologies of metonymies

Gaston Esnault distinguished between 38 types of metonymy. some of which are well-known from the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), some less so. However, Esnault and Lakoff and Johnson were not the only ones who established typologies of metonymies or classifications of types of metonymies. In this century alone (and this means leaving out all that has been written in the traditional treatises devoted to rhetoric), we have found at least nine taxonomies which were developed in relative isolation: Nyrop ( 1913 ). Esnault ( 1925 ). Stem (1931). Ullmann (1951). Norrick (1981). Sappan (1987). Yamanashi (1987). Fass ( 1991 ). Radden and KOvecses (this volume) (additional typologies can be found in Andreas Blank's and Ken-ichi Seto's contributions to this volume).lt was only recently. in 1991, that Dan Fass actually reviewed past analyses of metonymy and compared the work done by Stem, Lakoff and Johnson. and Yamanashi. However. he overlooked Nonick · s typology. which to us seems to be the most complete and coherent classification of types of metonymies. Norrick distinguished the following types of metonymy and correlated them with 18 metonymic principles:

I.

II.

Cause -effect I. Cause -effect 2. Producer- product 3. Natural source- natural product 4. Instrument - product Acts and major participants I. Object - act 2. Instrument - act 3. Agent - act 4. Agent - instrument

364

Brigitte Nerlich, Dm>id D. Clarke and 7A:.ie Todll

III. Part - whole I. Part - whole 2. Act- complex. act 3. Central factor- institution IV. Container- content I. Container - content 2. Loca1ity - occupant 3. CosiUme - wearer V. Experience - convention I. Experience - convention 2. Manifestation -definition VI. Possessor - possession I. Possessor- possession 2. Office holder -office

To analyze and compare these various typologies would require a separate paper. In what follows. we shall see how one can use these classifications for the study of metonymy in language acquisition.

3.

Compelled metonymical overextensions

Studies of how children produce and, especially. how they understand meta-

phor. proliferate in the literature on language acquisition in general and semantic development in panicular. However. no work has been done up to now on metonymy in language acquisition, and the possibility or having metonymic overextensions in child language has hardly ever been noted berore (cf .• however. Melissa Bowerman's work. e.g .• Bowerman 1978: Gibbs 1994). Our first hypothesis was that metonymical relations might be exploited in overextensions produced by children up to age 2:5. We called these 'compelled metonymical overextensions· because they are based on the ract that at this age a child's vocabulary, category and conceptual systems are still relatively small and unstructured. This scarcity compels them to extend already known words to cope with increasing communicative needs. to comment on what they sec and to request what they want. A good overview or the research done on over- and underextensions is provided by Eve Clark in her book The Lexicon in Acqui.fition. She writes:

'Mummy,/ Like Being a Sandwich'

365

Children do not start out already knowing the meanings of the words they are auempting to pronounce and use. They must first a.~sign some meaning to them. and that takes time. In fact. children's earliest mappings of meanings onto forms diverge from adult usage in a variety of ways. (Clark 1993: 32)

One of the most important ways of mapping the meaning a child want" to express onto a fonn which he or she has already acquired is overextension, that is, by applying a word to members of the adult category and to members of other categories that are perceptually similar, conceptually contiguous or spatio-temporally related. Consider these examples: ( I)

a. ball for balls of all kinds. and also for round hanging lampshades. doorknobs. and the moon (based on perceptual similarity) b. door for corks, jar-lids. box-lids. and gates when wishing to have the relevant object opened or closed (based on functional similarity!

Eve Clark distinguishes between two types of overextensions: (i) ·overinclusions.' where children extend a tenn to other entities from the same taxonomy, e.g.: (2)

a. dada used for both father and mother b. baby used for self-reference and all children c. apple for apples and for oranges

and (ii) 'analogical extensions,' where children use a tenn for objects from other taxonomies on the basis of perceptual similarity, e.g.: (3)

cotty-bar.~ for abacus on the wall and picture of a building with a columned fac;adc b. wmb for centipede

a.

Whereas analogical overextensions are based on recognizing and construing similarities (and can therefore be regarded as the training-ground for use of metaphors). overinclusions are based on both perceptual similarity and conceptual contiguity (we shall later call them synecdochical overextensions, and they are the basis for the construction of taxonomies). That is.the words being elltended arc applied to instcmces of other categories within the same or an adja~;ent conceptual domain. For example. a child may over-extend a term within the domain of animals. as when hone is applied to goats. cows, and sheep or within the domain of vehicles. as when rruck is applied to buses.tractors, and vans: or within the domain of clothing, as when lrar is applied to a crown. (Clark 1993: 34)

Brigitte Nerlich, Dm,id D. Clarke and 7A:.ie Todll

366

However. it seems to us that Eve Clark should have discussed in more depth a third type of overextension ba'\ed not so much on conceptual contiguity. but on spatia-temporal or functional contiguity. As we shall see. such contiguities are based on visual perception and are therefore the precursors to actual metonymies. This type of overextension has been studied from Piaget and Vygotsky onwards under the heading of 'complexive associations: Those studying complcxive associations have claimed that object names initially encode complexive groupings that incorporate actions or locations associated with objects (cf. Huuenlocher and Smiley 1993: 240). Even the words themselves are said to be initially just auditory features of situations where they habitually occur ( ... ].In short, it has been suggested that young children group their experiences in a fundamentally different way than older children or adults - in tenns of co-occurring aspects of situations and that object names, rather than standing for particular types of objects. are just another type of associate. (ibid.: 222)

Huttenlocher and Smiley contest this claim and argue that the extension of children's early object words match those of adults to a large extent. However. after distinguishing more clearly between a word's extension or meaning and its usc, they found that in certain cases other than naming contexts, such as comments or requests. such ·overextensions' did occur: as when a child said toy when seeing a certain bag which habitually contained toys. or when a child said slroe when she saw a foot (ibid.: 2260. This means that children usc certain 'metonymically' based pragmatic strategies. just as adults do. so as to achieve certain communicative effects. When a child comprehends a word correctly but overextends it in production. Clark (1978) concludes the overextension is not the result of an immature or nonadult word concept but is rather a deliberate attempt to communicate concepts for which the appropriate word cannot be remembered. (Pease et al. 1989: 113)

By contrast, the children's semantic system as well as their systems of concepts and categories. although not altogether different from the adult ones. are as yet incomplete and unstructured and will have to be adjusted and modified in the years to come. Overextcnsions are therefore pragmatic strategies which are not completely different from aduh communicative strategies. They are based on three types of relationships which also give rise to polysemy historically. structure

'Mummy./ Like Being a Sandwich'

367

meanings synchronically and allow adull speakers to vary word meanings contextually. These relationships arc metaphorical ones. metonymical ones and synecdochical ones, all three based on Seto 's cognitive triangle. It seems that even very young children begin to see similarities. connections and cla'isinclusions. and that with age they gradually adjust to the way the adults categorize and form associations and restructure their linguistic and conceptual systems accordingly. After this initial training in seeing and understanding similarities, connections and class-inclusions. they can later exploit these connections more creatively. We can therefore distinguish between three types of overextensions: synecdochical: overinclusions exploiting relations such as conceptual contiguity inside a taxonomy (e.g .. GENUS-SPECIES, SPECIESSPECIES and SO on). 1 (ii) metonymical: overextensions based on perceptual, spatia-temporal and functional contiguity. (iii) metaphorical: analogical extensions based on perceptual similarity. (i)

It should be stressed that in the case of compelled metonymical overextcnsions words are not overextended to label an object for which the child ha'i already acquired a more appropriate name. For example, as soon as the right word for 'horse' has been learned. the use of woof or do~-: for 'horse' stops. In the process of language acquisition,the extensions of words are adjusted until the lexical field (and the categorical domain) to which they belong has subdivided in just the same way ao; that of the adult caretakers (cf. Barrett 1982). All this is not the case in creative metonymical shrinking where the metonymically used words may replace an already known word and cut across subdivisions within lexical fields and even across lexical fields. In short. compelled metonymies are used by children to cover up gaps in their tiny lexicons. whereas creative metonymies arc used to express something new by not using the aJready available words in their lexicons. In order to determine which types of metonymy are used in compelled metonymical overcxtensions, we looked at the examples accumulated in Barrett (1982) and the examples we could find in the corpus assembled by Braine (1976). Barrett ( 1982: 322ff) reports on some of the ovcrextensions produced by Hildegard as reported by Leopold (1939, 1949) at the one-word stage. These are of three types: synecdochical. metonymical and metaphorical overexten-

368

Brigitte Nerlich, Dm,id D. Clarke and 7A:.ie Todll

sions. We shall provide a selection of examples for each type: (i)

Synecdochical ovcrextensions:

(4)

a.

Papa for father,grandfather, mothcr(l;O); any man ( 1;2); more appropriate lexical items learned; Mama (I :3). Mwm (I ;.5)

b. Ball for balls (1:0): balloon/ball of yam (1;4); observatory dome (I :8): balls of tin foil and paper (called paper-ball). marbles/ovoid ball (called egg-balf)la spherical bead (called ball-beads) (I; II); more appropriate lexical items learned: balloon ( 1;10). beads ( 1;9) (ii)

Metonymical ovcrextensions:

(5)

a.

Wheel for a wheelbarrow wheel (1:8): a wheelbarrow (1:10): toy wagon/a ring (I ;II); more appropriate lexical item learned: wheelbarrow (I; II) [ba.;ed on part-whole relationship} b. Choo-choo for trains (I ;7); bradyscope (I :9); airplane/wheelbarrow (1;10); streetcar/a trunk (;I 1): more appropriate lexical item learned: airplane (I; II). streetcar {I: 11 ). wheelbarrow (I; II) (based on the relationship between the noise associated with an object and the object itself - one could call this 'onomatopoeic metonymy'}

(iii)

Metaphorical overextensions:

(6)

a. Boatfortoysailboat(I:IO):airship(l:ll) b. Milkbollle for milkbottles (I; 10): bottle containing white toothpowder (I; 10)

We also looked at a corpus of two-word utterances collected by Braine (1976). At this stage in acquisition. overinclusions seem to diminish. whereas compelled metonymies seem to increa.~. In the examples in (7) we indicate the metonymical relation that is exploited. as well as the illocutionary force of the utterance. (7) a. b. c.

David (I ;9}: want pocket. (container-contained} {request} David (1:10): here fix it. (action-object} {comment} David (1;10): here hello. (words-object} {comment} Situation: indicating or identifying toy telephone (cf. also example 81)

'Mummy, I Like Bei11g a Sandwich' d. e. f.

g. h.

j. k.

369

David (1;10): here more book Iinstrument-action 1{request} David (1:10): that hello. (see above) Situation: indicating the toy telephone David (1;10): want more spoon. (instrument-actionl{request} David (1;10); gimme that blow. [instrument-action){requcst} Situation: wants to blow the match out David (I :10): u [=?you) hello. [sec above) Situation: David is instructing me to talk on his toy telephone, there is imperative intonation David (1:10): more put in. [action for place) {request} Situation: has been putting tinker toys in their box, apparently wants to put somewhere the pieces the adults are using Jonathan (I :11.15): more book. (instrument-action) {request} Jonathan ( 1:1 I .15): all gone blow.[instrument-action) {comment} Situation: the match box is empty. i.e .. there arc no more matches to blow out. Jonathan (2;0); daddy eat. (action for object) {comment} Situation: occurred twice in the apparent sense of daddy's food. once it referred to a piece of bread he had taken from my plate

As one can sec. children with limited lexicons focus on one object or attribute of an object to achieve certain speech acts in a metonymical way. They focus on one salient feature in a set framework or frame of repeated interactions with the caregiver or parent. They say book if they want to read, blow when referring to a match. they say hello for telephone, and so on. Gradually. through interaction with the caregiver or parent who grants their request~. the children elaborate on their comments. Finally. the metonymical ovcrextensions, which function as place-markers in the interactional and conceptual framework. will be replaced by the 'proper' words allocated them by the adults, such as read, match and telephone.

4.

Creative metonymical shrinking

Compelled metonymical overextensions normally peter out by the age of 2:5. although they can still occur as the vocabulary continues to develop. Between age 4:0 and 5:0 one can begin to notice a more creative exploitation of the natural pathways of meaning which are metaphor and metonymy. These new

Brigitte Nerlich, David D. Clarke and ZA:.ie Todll

370

metonymies are based on what we call ·creative metonymical shrinking,· as they are usually produced in order to communicate new ideas with the least verbal effort. In contradistinction to compelled metonymical overextension. these metonymies arc produced despite the fact that the message could also have been conveyed using conventional linguistic signs and syntactic constructions. Metonymical shrinking occurs in a wide variety of linguistic forms (nouns. derivations. compounds), as described in Section 4.1 .. and conversion of nouns into verbs as described in 4.2. The following examples are based on Mauhew (Brigitte's son). For the purpose of the collection of examples we have used the concept 'metonymy' in a broad sense, including not just strictly lexical metonymies, but also ·morphological metonymies,' that is. derivations and compounds based on metonymic associations.

4.1.

Creative metonymies (8)

a.

Mauhew (4:11) (The 'Title story") Manhew started S(:hool in January. At first we thought he might eat the S<:hool dinners. But he didn'tlike them and insisted on bringing his own lunch box like most of his friends do. So in the end we relented and. walking to s~,:hool in the morning. he brandished his lun~,:h bo:t saying to everytxxly he met: "I love being a lunch box." Then he thought a bit and said: "I love being a sandwkh. I really like being a sandwich" - one could really see the metonymical chain e:ttend from his ann through the lunch bo:t to the sandwich and ba!.:k. What he meant by this metonymical utterance was that he liked to be part of the children who were allowed to bring a lunch-box (i.e .. a sandwich) to school and were not forced to have this horrible stuff like potatoes and veg served at the school dinner~

b. Mauhew (5:0) Matthew was wearing a pullover that went down to his knees - we laughed and said it was a mini-dress, whereupon he pretended to be a girl and started to curtsey. As he wa.~ not very good at it. he practiced all afternoon. At bed-time he pulled off the pullover and said "I have enough of it. I have been wearing this curtsey all day:·

c.

Mauhcw (5:1) Manhew was playing with his Playmobil operating theater. He was

'Mummy, I Like Being a Sandwich'

371

asked by a doctor-friend ··oo you want to become a doctor in an operating theater.that is a surgeon like meT' -"No:· he said. "I don't like the breathing-in-stuff (anesthesiologist). I would rather be a listen-to-your-heart-doctor" (physician).

d. Matthew (5: I) While eating cheese on biscuits, he said: "I am eating a bone-sandwich." - "Why?" - "Because cheese is good for your bones."

e.

Matthew (5;3) We were in Germany. Easter-Sunday. Matthew was trying to find his chocolate eggs. r-.1bbits. toys. etc. Having filled up his basket to overnowing. he looked round and said: "Are there any more Easters to find?" Later he repeats the same sentence in German: 'Sind da noch cin paar OstemT'

f.

Manhew (5;3) We were at home. Matthew tried to push me out of the house and said "Uff:· then "I uffed you really hard."' and a bit later "I am pushing you." JU!fis a German interjection eltpressing effort.)

g. Manhew (5;4) We were playing postman. Matthew told me to go into the living room and close the door so that he could post a letter to me underneath it. I forgot to close the door. Matthew came in with his letter and shouted: "Mummy. where's your door?"

h. Matthew (5;4) Despite all our erforts to prevent such 'utterances· - here it is: Holding out his finger as a gun. Matthew said "Mummy. I want to have a toy gun. I don't want the baddies just to be fingered." And. on a similarly macabre line. playing with a police car and a fire engine, he said: "I'll put the hose there so that I can spray people with water to see if they wake up when they are not dead" and "I'll put this (a different hose attachment] on the police car to gun people."

Mallhew (5;4) Matthew watched Daddy build a climbing frame. First came the nonnaJ nuts and bolts. then the dome nuts. whereupon Matthew said "Oh dear, now you have to do another lot of nulling."'

Brigitte Nerlich, David D. Clarke and ZA:.ie Todll

372

j.

Matthew (5:4) After watching a program called "The Treacle People," we concocted a drink for him, consisting of or.mge, apple and pa.-.sion-fruit juice. plus orange squa.~h. plus water which Mauhew then baptized ''Treacle-people juice.·· And he now refers to this kind of juice quite commonly in sentences like "Mummy. not treacle-people juice again!" ..

k. Matthew (5:4) Matthew was making 'potions.' that is, mixing various juices and water and filling them into pots. The lir.;t was a potion against ear.1che. the sc~.:ond, he decided, was "another earacher :·

Matthew (5:4) This spring was the coldest one on record, so when I dared to wear a T -shirt one Saturday instead of a woolly jumper. Mall hew looked at me with big eyes and said: ''Mummy why ru-e you ;~.II summered?"' Later in the day. he put on aT-shirt himself and said: "look, I am ;~.II summered too now~"

Matthew (5:5) Playing with Lego. building a film studio. using a fire engine extension ladder as a camera stand, he said: "They want to camera them."

n. Mauhew (5:5) Matthew was listening to pop music on the radio. started jumping around. waving hands and feet. and said: "Mummy, I am drumming and guilaring at the same time."

4.2. The metonymical 'verbing' of nouns Whereas Matthew's metonymies based on nouns. such as curtsey for pullover. can be regarded as creative and novel, his metonymies based on verbs are rather run of the mill for children - almost like saying He gived me that instead of He gave me that (cf. Clark 1982: Gibbs 1994: 4220. This mclonymical 'verbing' of nouns is usually based on the metonymical relation of CAUSE-EFFECL

However, although common in young children. Matthew's verbal metonymies are not 'just' overcxtensions. They are not based on the fact that he has gaps in his lexicon which he has to fill somehow (as in I died that spider.

'M11mmy, I Like Being a Sandwich'

373

which he produced when he was about I :II). Let us look more closely at lhe example to g11n. He knew the verb to kill. However, he did not want to use it because he knew it is bad to kill somebody. This is one rea-.on why he used what one could call a metonymical euphemism. Another reason is the fact that to kill is a bland and arbitrary everyday word. To use to g11n instead is at one and the same time avoiding the use of to kill and using a word with a much more concrete and realistic motivation. And finally. the most obvious rea-.on for using 10 gm1 instead of to kill seems to be that he is holding the object in his hand. The concrete relationship between object and hand is the direct metonymical trigger.ln contrast. Matthew would quite happily say ''I am going to kill you'' when running around without such an object in his hand! Using metonymies is lhereforc.even in child language, a case of figurative remotivation based on Clark's 'principle of transparency.' which we also find in adult language. As pointed out in Nerlich and Clarke (1988). there are two fundamental movements in the evolution of language. one toward arbitrariness. the other toward remotivation. Through metaphor the conventional or symbolic aspect of a sign is remotivated in the direction of iconicity (ba-,;ed on a relation of similarity). through metonymy it is remotivated in the direction of indexicality (based on a relation of contiguity). Metaphor and metonymy can therefore be interpreted as meta-icons and meta-indexes respectively. in adult as well as in child language (ibid.: 80). In the ca-,;e of to finger and to filii, the verbal metonymies arc somewhat more creative and really based on what we have called metonymic shrinking. Why say "I don't just want to use my finger and pretend that's a gun so as to shoot the baddies'' when you can say "finger the baddies,'' or why say ''Daddy has to put another lot of nuts in" when you can say "a lot of nutting"? Mauhew's noun-based metonymies arc all creative and ba-.ed on verbal and conceptual shrinking. Instead of being based on one type of classical metonymical relation, such a-,; CAUSE-EFFECT .these metonymies exploit quite a number of ad hoc metonymic relations. best exemplified in the nonce-creation of Treacle-people juice. where a relation between watching a certain program on TV and making a new sort of drink is exploited in a linguistic act of baptism.

Brigitte Nerlich, David D. Clarke and ZA:.ie Todll

374

5. Understanding metonymies As Gibbs (1994: 422) has pointed out, [~:)hildrcn clearly hear various kinds of metonymic c:\pression in daily conversation. Parents, in speaking to children, might usc metonymical utterances like The b11n•s are otl .{trike[ ... ] and children appear to comprehend these expressions. No empirical research has specifically investigated children's ability to under.;tand such conventional metonymic utterances( ... ). Yet there is evidence on children's production of novel lexical items and on their understanding of indirect speech acts that suggest they possess some ability to think metonymically.

Although we would in no way dispute the fact that children have "some ability to think metonymically :· there seems to be a gap between the production and understanding of metonymies (a well·known asymmetry in language acquisi· tion). As far as the observation of Matthew can be regarded as evidence. we found that he was quite happy to produce metonymies.lirst in overextensions (although that was before his utterances were recorded), then in a more creative way. but that he did not readily understand conventional or dead metonymies or accept novel metonymies uttered by adults. At an older age. the following examples of his non·comprehension were noted:

(9)

a. Matthew (4;5) When Matthew was 4;5 the trains were on strike. On our way back from the childminder we used to walk over a milway bridge and watch the trains rush through the tunnel. However. in the autumn of 1994 we were standing there and nothing came. When Brigitte realized what was going on she said: "The lrains are on slrike." Mauhew then a.<>ked ''What are they doing. can you explain?"

b. Matthew (4;1) At around the same time Brigitte read a story to him entitled "Jake and the jumble panic:· This time Brigitte asked him: "Did you understand this?'" and he said that he did not. so she explained to him what "I am Electrical" meant (i.e .. I am the man that sells the electrical goods) and now this is one of his favorite stories, he really savors it.

c.

Matthew (4:1) Matthew came home from school and announced that there would be a table-top sale on Saturday morning - and he would like to go there because he really could do with another table top (the week before we

'Mummy,/ Like Being a Sandwich'

375

had just bought him a 'table-top.' that is, a very wide shelf that can also serve as a drawing-tahleJ. In this case he had not learnt the meaning of a dead or conventional metonymy yet. In the nex.t case he understood. but did not accept a novel metonymy.

d. Matthew (4:4) Mallhew came home from school. I said: "Wow. you have ealen your whole lunch box~·· Matthew burst out laughing and said: "Oh Mummy.you got that wrong ~ it's: You have eaten everything oul of your lunch box.!"

Our hypothesis is that children produce compelled metonymical overextensions until about age 2;5. We are not quite sure what happens then, but by about age 4;0 they start to produce metonymies quite naturally to express things more quickly (creative metonymical shrinking). They learn conventional metonymies or what one could call dead metonymies in the same way a-. they learn any other word. some more readily than others (e.g., "Let's sec how many mouths there arc to feed." uttered by Mummy at a party). However. they resist relatively novel or innovative metonymies. That is. they resist metonymical shrinking when it comes from the grown-ups, here following what Clark has called the 'principle of conventionality.' They seem to assume implicitly that what grown-ups say ha'> to be right, has to follow the rules. because the grown-ups are the ones that set the rules and establish the norm. But this also means that they should always stick to the rules. too. As comprehension is centered around rule-governed input. children censor their parents' output by what they believe should be the parents' input. And yel in their own production. in unsupervised, uncensored output, children produce metonymies which deviate from the adult norm. To return to comprehension. when introduced gradually. children find metonymies quite funny. This sign of early metalinguistic awareness may foster true understanding at a later date. From age 7. we think, one could get them to see what is actually going on in the use of metonymies. and later still. at around age 10, when they arc fluent readers. one could make them discover the wonderful things metonymies achieve in newspaper headlines (e.g .. "Italy beats Germany in cup final"' or "She drinks lager and cats McDonald's" (about an anorexic-looking model. The Times 31/5/96) (cf. David Weiss, New York,

e-mail4 May 1996).

376

Brigitte Nerlich, Dm•id D. Clarke and 7A:.ie Todll

5.1. Experimental study The examples given above tell us a Jot about one child's development of metonymy comprehension, but it is critical also to collect experimental data from a larger group of children. An embedded story framework was used to

test the comprehension of metonymy by children in two age groups, and to see whether the presence of clues in the text would help to improve understanding.

5 .1.1. Method The participants in this experiment were sixteen children at the local university play group. Ten children were in the two and three-year-old group, and six

in the four and five-year-old group. There were approximately equal numbers of girls and boys. and only children whose first language was English took part in the study. Two short stories were used as stimuli. One was "Jake and the Jumble Panic."' taken from a 'Ladybird' book by Joan Stimson (Stimson 1992). This story was selected because it contained four metonymies. The second story was about some pirates and a treasure hunt, and was written especially for the experiment. Although this story contained a total of sixteen metonymies. only six were used a'i test stimuli in the experiment. Both stories were deemed suitable for the age group. and none of the children had heard them before. The metonymies in the stories were independent. such that failure to under· stand one would not in itself cause problems in understanding the others. A copy of the Pirate Story can be found in the Appendix. Children were tested in small groups of two or three. The experimenter read the two stories. pausing each time one of the metonymies was reached. Children were then asked to point to which of two pictures showed what was happening in the story. One of the pictures was always a literal (incorrect) interpretation of the metonymy. while the other picture correctly depicted the story. The pictures were presented concurrently. with each taking up half of a sheet of writing paper. The ordering of the pictures was random so that children could not consistently point in the same direction to give the correct answer. The pictures were presented in such a way that no child could see which picture the other child had chosen, i.e .. they had to make the choice for thcm
377

'M11mmy. I Like Beilll? a Sandwich'

5.1.2. Results and discussion The means show that the two and three-year-olds gave the correct answer 4.5 times out of ten. which is approximately equal to chance performance. The means for the four and five-year-olds was 6.5 out of ten. The distribution is slightly skewed by the fact that one two-year-old got seven metonymies correct. No children got all answers correct. however one child in the older age group got nine out often. A Mann-Whitney test showed that the four and fiveyear-olds pcrfonncd significantly better than the two and threc-year-olds (U = 47. p< 0.05). These results are shown in Figure I.

•("un"ttbc-n<-ltlll

2·.1)"'""'

4·5)car>

'~"'

'~"'

Fix11re I. Re.wd1s ftn· meumymy comprdlellsion 111.1·k

A second analysis was carried out based on the story construction. In '"Jake and the Jumble Panic." a clue was always present in the text before the metonymy itself appeared. For example: ( 10) Jake found himself by a lady selling sweaters and cardigans. 'Tm looking for Wilfred." he said. "Over there!" boomed Cardigans. In this case there was a direct hint in the text that he was talking to a lady selling cardigans. which may have helped the children to understand the metonymy. This was not the case for the Pirate Story, in which the metonymies were all 'stand-alone.' i.e .. without any preceding clues. The data for all

378

Brigitte Nerlich. Dcn•icl D. C/arkt• and Zl1:ie Todd

children were therefore analyzed according to whether or not there were clues present in the text. There were four metonymies with dues. and six without. The results showei.J that on average 72% of the metonymies were understood when clues were present. compared to 40.5% when there were no clues. A Wilcoxon test (Wilcoxon T = 9. p < 0.01) showed that there was a significant improvement in comprehension for the metonymies for which clues were available in the text compared to 'stand-alone' metonymies. A graph showing these results can be found in Figure 2.

• Cootprehcn.'>ion

No

due~

CluQ.

Figw·e 2. CompreiU'n.fimr by tt•xt ()1Jt' for both agt• groupJ

This experiment shows that the four and fivc-ycar-olds have a significantly bencr understanding of metonymy than the two and threc-yeur-olds. which is what might be expected from what has been said elsewhere in this paper and from experimental studies of metaphor comprehension (e.g .. Vosniadou 1987). In addition this experiment shows that children arc able to use clues in the text of a story to help them to understand metonymies. More evidence would be needed to establish whether clues such as this enable children to develop some understanding of metonymy in the first place. or if they are just used in some instances once children already have some basic knowledge of how metonymy works. One observation that could be worth following up is that for the metonymy Twemy sailor hat.~ were marching down the gangphmk. most of the children who correctly selected the picture of

'Mumm.v, I Like Being a Sandwich'

379

sailors pointed to the sailors hats rather than another part of the picture. The children may have realized that hats cannot march on their own and used that as the basis for selecting a picture (although clearly there are many children's cartoons and books in which it is possible for inanimate objects to march. walk and even talk). ll may be that children's general cognitive development or understanding of the real-pretend distinction is as important as any understanding of metonymy itself. Further experiments could also be carried out to investigate other aspects of metonymy comprehension and in particular to see if there are links between development in comprehension of metaphor and metonymy.

6.

Conclusion

Understanding the use and comprehension of metaphor and metonymy in language acquisition has important implications for language teaching, especially for reading and comprehension and later on for writing and composition. Without the knowledge of how to understand and use words with multiple meanings. how to exploit subtle shades in meaning to their advantage, and how to multiply the meanings of words themselves, children's chances of acquiring literary skills would be severely reduced. It is necessary to build on what Gibbs has called the 'poetic minds' of children to enhance and develop their semantic competence.

Note An example of a (rather rare) SI'H'IE.~ R>R Gf.NL'S synecdoche can be found on a toy recemly bought at a "Scalife Centre."" It consists of a plastic dolphin. whale. shark or alligator which you put into water where it expands 200 times in size. On the package it ~ays: "PUI scalife imo a pan, sink or pool.. " ··Scalife can grow to 22 inches. wei'' (on ~ynccdoche in general. cf. Nerlich in print and Ncrlich and Clarke in prinl).

References Anonymous [Cicero) 1954 Ad C. Herem1i11m. de ratione tlic·encli (Rhetorim ad Herenllium}. london: Heinemann.

380

Brigitte Nerlich. David D. Clarke and Zazie Todtl

Barrett. Martyn 0. 1982 Distinguishing between prototypes: the early acquisition of the meaning of object names. In S.A. Kuczaj (cd.).IAIIRUOflt' Ot'\'elopment. Vol. 1: Sylllax and Semantics. Hillsdale. NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 313-334. Bowerman, Melissa 1978 Systematizing scmanlic knowledge: changes over time in the c:hild's organization of meaning. Child De\·dopmelll 49: 977-987. Draine, Martin D.S. 1976 Cllildren'.t Fir.tt Word Combinations. Monographs of the Society of Resean:h in Child Devclopment41 (Serial No. 164).

BrCal. Michel 1991 (1884) How words are organized in the mind. In G. Wolf (ed.), The Beginnings of Senumtic.f: Es.my.t. Ucmre.t and ReviewJ. London: Duckworth. 145-151. Clark. Eve V. 1978 Strategies for communication. Child Development 49: 953-959. 1982 Th~ young word maker: a case study of innovation in the child's lexicon.ln E. Wanner. L.R. Gleitman (eds.). Language Acqui.filion: Till.' Stale of the Arr. Cambridge. Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 390-428. 1993 The Uxictm in Acqui.fition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. E.o;nault, Gaston 1925 L 'imaginalion populaire: Mitaphores occidenlales. Paris: Presses Univer· sitaires de France. Fass.Dan 1991 Metonymy, ca.-;e role substitution and sense ambiguity. In D. Fass et al. (cds.). Proceedinxs of the /JCAJ Wori.:.Jhop ml Computational Approaches to Non-lJteral Language: Metaphor, Metonymy, Idiom, Speech Act.f and /mplicawre. held at the Twelfth International Joint Conference on Anificial Intelligence (24 August 1991. Sydney, Australia). 42-51. Gibbs, Raymond W. 1994 The Poetics of Mind: Figurati1•e Tlroughl, Lnnguage, and Under.ftondinx. Cambridge: Cltmbridge University Press. Hous~holder. Fred W. 1995 Plato and his predecessors. In E.F.K. Koerner. R.E. Asher (eds.), Conci.fe History of the Wnguage Scienas. Oxford: Pergamon, 9-93. Huttenlochcr. Janellen. Patricia Smiley 1993 Early word meanings: the case of object names. In P. Bloom (ed.). l.an· guage Acquisition. New York: Harvester and Wheatsheaf. 222-247. (First published 1987) Lakoff. George, Mark Johnson 1980 Metaplror.f We Li1·e By. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Leopold. Werner F. 1939 Speech De1•elopment of a Bilingual Child: A Lingui.f(.f Remrd. Vol. 1: Vm:abulary Growt/1 in the First Two Yean. Evanston, IL: Nonhwestcm University Press.

'Mummy,/ Like Being a Sandwich'

381

Spuch Devdopmem of a Bilingual Child: A Lingui.u".f Ret·ord. Vol. 3: Grammar and General Problems i11 tile First Two Years. Evanston. IL: Nonhwestem University Press. Nerlich. Brigitte in print Synecdoche: a trope. a whole trope. and nothing but a trope? InN. Norrick. A. Burkhardt (eds.). Tmpil-af Trutlt. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benja· mins. Nerlich. Brigitte, David D. Clarke 1988 A Dynamic model of semantic change. Joumal of literary Semtmlin 17: 73-90. in print Synecdoche as a cognitive and communicative strategy. In A. Blank. P. Koch {eds.), Hi.florical Semami1·s and Cognition. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Norrick, Neal R. 1981 Semiotic Principles in Semamic Theory. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins. Nyrop, Kristoffer 1913 Gran111wire Hi.florique de fa Langue Franrai.fe. Vo/4: Sbnatttique. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel Nordisk Forlag. Pease, Deborah Myers. Jean Berko Glea.'iOn. Barbara Alexander Pan 1989 Gaining meaning: semantic development. In J.D. Gleason (ed.). The De••ef. opmem of Longua~:e. Second edition. Columbus. etc.: Merrill, 101-134. Sappan. Raphael 1987 The Rhetoricai-Lngica/ Cla.uification of Semantic Changes. Braunton: Merlin Books. Seto, Ken-ichi in print Metonymy and the cognitive triangle. Stem. Gustaf 1968 (1931] MeaninR and ChanRe of Meaning. Bloomington: Indiana Univer· sity Press. Stimson. Joan 1992 Jake and the Jumble Panic.ln J. Stimson, Bedtime Stories for Under Fives. Paignton: Ladybird. Ullmann. Stephen 1957 ( 1951} The Principle.f of Semantic.f. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Vosniadou, Stella 1987 Children and metaphors. Child Development 58: 870-885. Yamanashi, Masa·Aki 1987 Metonymic interpretation and a.o;sociative processes in naturo~.llanguage.ln M. Naga (ed.), LonRIIOge and Artificiol/ntelligena,/nternationaf S·ympo· .fillm on Language and Artificial Intelligence ( 16--21 March 1986, Kyoto. Japan). Nonh Holland: Elsevier Science Publishers, 77-86. 1949

382

Brigitte Nerlich. David D. Clarke and Za:ie Todd

Appendix The Pirate Story used in the comprehension experiment: 'The metonymic treasure hunt.' Tom and Mary had been promised a special adventure for their binhday. For one day they would be able to live and work on a pirate ship. When they came to the harbor. drcs~ed up

as pirates, there she wa~. the Black Princess swaying gently on the waves. "What a beauty." said Tom. ''But where arc the pirates?" asked Mary. And there they came twenty sailor hats were marching down the gang plank, stood in a row before them and saluted them. Mary and Tom wanted to greet them. but then they reali1.cd that they didn't know their name!>. "What are your names?" asked Tom. "Har-har, my dcars,this is the first mystery you have to solve." said the captain of the ship. who had just stepped in front of the pirates as if from nowhere. "My name is Captain Halty, by the way." announced the Captain. Look at the sailors closely and try to find out what their names are. Peggy (-leg) (Eye) Patchy Stripy Dotty Tatty and Fatty Now the children knew the names of the pirates and everybody went aboard. "All hands on deck:' cried the captain. "set sails!" And off they went. The Black Princess was heading for adventure. When it was lunch time. the ship's cook shouted "Twelve bells. Twelve bells," come and eat your grub. Everybody sat down in the tiny galley. The cook. Fatty. brought the meal. and looking mund. he said jokingly: "Oh dear. there are two more mouths to feed. Let's hope we have enough fish fingers!" To celebrate the arrival of Tom and Mary. the captain got out a bottle of lemonade and everybody got a glass. But just as they were about to speak a toast. the ship wobbled a bit and the lemonade tipped over. but what was worse. the treasure-map. that the captain was just about to show to the children. :.lid on the floor and got a bit dirty. Quickly. Tom jumped up and saved it before it got all dusty. The captain took it and nailed it down on the table. to be on the safe side. After a few days they arrived on a de~n island. Everybody got off the ship and explored the beach. Tom had brought a camera and said to Mary. "Stand there between the rocks and do a Captain Hook for me!" Then they all went into the deep dark jungle. The sun shone down and everybody got thirsty. Mary said: ··1 wish I could have a Ribena." "No Ribena here my deary." said the captain. "you'll have to do with this nice fresh spring water." They all had a drink and went on. Finally they arrived at the spot where there was a cross on the treasure map and started digging. They dug and they dug. But they couldn't find anything. Then Tom had a look at the map that Dotty had pinned to a tree and said: "But it's upside down!"lbc captain took Dotty by his collar and shook him.saying "Don't you have any brain! We have wasted half a day now. let's have a rest. before we start the search again:· They all put their heads down for an hour and then started looking for the treasure again - this time in the right spot. And after a lillie digging. the whole crew shouted: "There it is!" They could all sec a

'M11mmy, I Like Bein~: a Sandwich'

383

huge treasure chest. They opened it and found gold coins, jewels and, what a surprise,toy~ for Tom and Mary. Everybody was very pleased. They went back to the ship and sailed home.

Recontextualization of Metonymy in Narrative and the Case of Morrison's Song of Solomon

Anne Pankhurst University of Edinburgh

1.

Introduction

Metonymic referentiality in narrative fiction is associated with a number of powerful effects. achieved by recurring references to a concept. experience or object. The scope of a referent is extended from a single episode to the entire text, assisting in the development of a communicative linguistic interface between writer and reader. Poetic thought processes like metonymy arc fundamental to our way of thinking. so the daim that we understand poetry by means of our everyday experiences (Lakoff and Turner 1989: Gibbs 1994) is also relevant to the consideration of poetic clements in narrative prose fiction. The reader then activates cognitive strategies which facilitate access to the new context or world of experience proposed in a text. In the case of Toni Morrison·s novel Sottg of So/omo11 (1977 (1989)). scene. plot and characters are opaque to readers unfamiliar with the social and ethnic background to the fictional narrative. Among various means used by Morrison to make this world credible are recurring references to an earring made and worn by the central character. Pilate. The apparently simple object described in the text is a means of identifying its wearer. enabling us to answer the question: who is Pilate? The answer is available within the fiction and at

Amre PwrkhurJt

386

the same time evokes the real world of the reader's experience. It is more than a description. The earring has numerous features which refer the reader to more than one concept. This metonymy also has a number of meta-narrative functions serving to structure the overall development of thematic material in the text. Its recurrence in new contexts is an important element of the narrative. It reactivates the reader's memory and highlights important episodes.

2.

Theories of metonymy in narrative

2 .1 Jakobson on metonymy Theories of the functions of metonymy in narrative arc of interest to the analysis both of literature and of oral narrative, e.g .. Propp's (1928) analysis of Russian folk-tales, Labov's (1972) account of natural narrative. Here. I shall limit the discussion to literary narrative in prose fiction. and to the wellknown theories of Jakobsen and Riffatcrrc. Starting with the linguistic analysis of text, both theories select metonymy as a regular semantic principle of substitution which extends beyond a given linguistic domain and the syntagmatic organization of a sentence. While Jakobsen is concerned with extending the semantic principle of contiguity to the syntactic structure of discourse. Riffaterrc emphasizes the conceptual contiguity created by repetition of a metonymic association once it has been recognized. Jakobson (1956) proposed a theory in which the nature of discourse is defined a<; either metaphoric or metonymic. To this bipolar theory of language he added an important proposal. that the usc of metonymy characterizes realist prose fiction. In this type of discourse, metonymy rather than metaphor structures the sequence of events, occurring a<; a structural element of discourse as well as a one-word substitution based on semantic principles. The realist author "follows contiguous relationships. metonymically digressing from the plot to the atmosphere and from the characters to the setting in space and time" (Jakobsen 1956: 82). Prose is said to be "forwarded essentially by contiguity" in the sequence of event'i. But the realist writer is also "fond of synecdochic details" (Jakobsen 1956: 78) which lend verisimilitude to a scene or to the depiction of personal characteristics. Metonymic clements in the text are seen a'i belonging both to description and to narration of events. thus working at two levels. The first function fills out the details of a given

Morri.wm 's Song of Solomon

]87

moment. using short·cuts or metonymic reductions as well as synecdoche to convey intended meaning. while the second moves the text forward by a metonymic relation of contiguity between events} Clearly. different objects can serve in this way as both elements of description and motivators of further narrative action. In Song of Solomcm Morrison highlights an earring. This is apt. since jewelry is understood in many cultures as a metonymic means to identify a person. and as a marker of personal status (Hoebel 1972). Because of its visual prominence. it becomes a means of establishing social and personal identity and can therefore serve to define its owner's domain of influence. There is a particularly strong associa· tion between jewelry and more abstract concepts such as power and social status, whether that power is acquired by wealth. magic or religion. The regular semantic principle which allows substitution of a costume for its wearer is thus extended when an item of jewelry is an intrinsic part of a person's whole identity. or a means of identifying the whole by the outward part (Norrick 1981). When used in a fictional narrative. however. the very familiarity of the concept provides more than a simple means to jog the reader's memory about the characteristics of the person whom it represents. Perception and interpretation of a character's role in different episodes of the narrative are facilitated by the references already established through general or encyclopaedic knowledge.

2.2. Riffaterre's theory of metonymy in narrative Riffatcrre's (1990) analysis of the functions of metonymy expands on Jakobson's theory considerably and will form the framework for evaluating the effects of this particular oBJECT FOR OWNER metonymy in Son~: ofSolomon. The theory, as I shall show. is primarily concerned with explicating textual features as linguistic and structural elements. but moves towards recognition of the role of the reader's cognition. In this respect Riffaterre 's approach to the inferences drawn from metonymy underpins the view that literature is under· stood through real·life experience. The creation of subtexts is. in Riffaterre's theory. one of the major functions of metonymy. Subtexts arc recurring elements (not episodes) of a narrative. serving to identify characters. scenes or themes at different points. If this is true. metonymy clearly departs from being the poetic embellishment expressed in the words of Gibbons (1969[1767]: 70). "[metonymy] gives a

388

Anne Pmrkhunt

vast scope and liberty to the fancy: it both adorns and invigorates our style ... But metonymy retains its rhetorical function of persuasion. In this case. it persuades the reader of who Pilate is. and what the earring is, in the domain of physical appearancc.lt also plays an important part in marking and extending associated conceptual domains within her person. This well-known literary device can be related to the reader's understanding of what is intended through an interface that ha.~ to be structured if new elements are to be satisfactorily communicated. Many repetitions may be needed before metonymies "develop into subtexts that mirror the whole of the text in which they are embedded and facilitate the text's interpretation'' (Riffatcrrc 1990: 21 ). There must be a prolonged sequence. dispersed through· out the narrative and weaving in and out of it, fonning part of the referential frame of the text.ln this case. the development of the earring as a subtext is a partial explanation of its effect. The interpretation of what has been under· stood also depends on the reader recognizing that the conceptualization moves through different contexts of experience while preserving its unity of domain. How is this achieved? The metonymic reference is extended from its immcdi· ate context to the whole textual structure. by means of recontextualizations. For Riffaterre. repetition of a linguistic device is an indicator of its importance in the narrative. but it is also more than that. It enables positive or negative marking of the episode in which it occurs. The earring, for example. is described as 'foolish' in Macon's negative view: but also as ·wonderful: when Pilate's dominance is unquestioned. There are affective as well as cognitive effect<;. The attempt to create reality or at least a possible world in fiction requires a more complex function for metonymic references. which arc known to be 'two-faceted." The inference that the true referent of an earring is not the object but its wearer (or indeed further implied characteristics of either the ornament or the person) is relevant to this discussion. The fictional world must have ito; own consistency or truth. understood by the assumed reader in tenns of a real experienced world and a rich personal encyclopedia of knowledge and beliefs (cf., e.g .. langacker 1987). The single word 'earring' contains a potentially rich chain of associations. Through a series of links. initially following the metonymic pathway which allows substitution of POSSESSOR FOR rossFSSION. the earring represents the person wearing it. The earring attracts attention by its unusual fonn (a brass box) and therefore its function as a container. standing for the personal treasure contained, is made salient.

Morriso" 's So"g of Solomo"

389

Riffaterrc raises a further question in claiming that without metonymy, metaphor and other tropes it would be impossible to differentiate between verisimilitude (the imitation of truth in fictional discourse) and factual reporting of events. Distinction between real life and fiction makes the presence of tropes a special. literary phenomenon. Metonymy can lead to the construction of symbolic value. for example. the usc of pe" to refer to both the profession of writing and an author's power of description and composition: Let other pens dwell on guill and misery. (Jane Au!>ten. Mcm.ifield Parle 420)

Metonymy also may have allegorical functions when it is consistently used to structure the events of a fictional narrative intended to represent a real-world situation (cf. John Bunyan. Pilgrim's Progre.,·!i}. But metaphor and metonymy are pervasive in everyday discourse as well as literature and cannot be distinguishing markers of literary a~ opposed to non-literary style (Lakoff and Turner 1989; Ortony 1993; Gibbs 1994; Steen 1994). In addition to metonymic relations between events (Jakobson's 'forwarding by contiguity'}, fictional narrative requires characters to be represented with enough depth and credibility for a reader to understand them as authentic. This can be achieved by means of 'synecdochic detail.' the purpose of which is to foreground the characteristics of fictional personae. It is part of the 'mock reality' {Leech and Short 1981) or 'fictional truth' {Riffaterrc 1990) which deals with credibility. authenticity. objectivity and vividness in creating verisimilitude. and without which a reader does not understand the world or domain in which the writer's intended meaning is realized. In an earlier discussion of the functions of metonymy. Riffaterre made a general point which extended the sense of PART FOR WHOLE synecdoches and is relevant to the consideration of the earring a'i a potentially real object: In the novel,the trend has been to di~solve or di~pcrse the image of a character into surrounding objects or to ~uggest a state of mind or the significance of a dramatic situation through physicaJ details that invite certain deductions nr inferences on the part of the reader. (Riffatem:- 1982: 273)

Thus. an inferential reading of a lext can be triggered by just those details which create an apparently real world within the fiction. If a physical feature or an object closely associated with a person stands for a non-physical quality or an abstract idea, il constitutes an extension of meaning, moving possibly towards metaphor {Dirven 1993). This intention to extend meaning is assumed. and justifies the reader's inferential process. Just such complex ex ten-

390

Anne Pankhurst

sions of meaning are to be seen in the functions of Pilate's earring in Song of Solomon.

3. A case study: Song of Solomon 3.1. The earring and the identity of Pilate The first point examined here is the actual description of the earring and the question of its complexity. Metonymy requires that an object stand for something with which it has dose associations. but this earring is more than a simple decorative object. It is known to contain a special piece of paper on which the name 'Pilate' is wrillen. It was the only word her illiterate father ever wrote and is the only family document known to exist. II is therefore a container for an important legacy and may be read as a means of accessing the past. The earring is first mentioned in an account of how members of the family acquired their names. Macon Dead II recalls the birth and naming of his sister. Pilate, and his father's insistence that the name randomly chosen and copied from the family Bible should be kept. And it did stay there. until the baby girl turned twelve and took it out. folded it up into a tiny knot and put it in a little brass box. and strung the entire contraption through her left earlobe. {Son~: of Solomon: 21)

The earring is the vehicle of Macon Irs ambivalent feelings about his sister. Pilate. once ''the dearest thing in the world to him" and now "odd, murky. a regular source of embarrassment." Her "foolish earring" (Son~: of Solomo11: 22) derives from her ragged clothes and disreputable lifestyle. transferring the foolishness of the woman to the object by the epithet. Her poverty contrasts with her brother's material success and a'ipirations. Macon tells his son. Milkman. the secret of the earring's contents in warning him to stay away from Pilate who "can't teach you a thing you can use in this world" (Song of Solomon: 53). Since Pilate is Macon's sister and Milkman's aunt. our curiosity focuses on trying to understand why both object and wearer are 'foolish,' and we therefore infer that there is a special motivation for this attitude yet to be discovered. Wearing the earring is a metonymy for Pilate's physical appearance. but it also stands for her family's origins. It encapsulates her respect for her father.

Morrison's Song of Solomon

391

her power over her brother and nephew, and her status as matriarch. To account for it as synecdochic detail. a part for the whole. is insufficient. The known implications expand the temporal and conceptual domains to include the pa'it. and other people's memories besides those of Pilate herself. Within this frame. the earring acquires the properties of a special message·bearing objecl. symbolically representing the history of the wearer's family. Riffaterre invokes psychological plausibility in claiming that the impor· tance of an object as a poetic device is heightened by repetitions. which confer authority on it. As it is recontextualized. the cumulative effect becomes stronger. In this case, Macon II narrated briefly the making of an earring out of a brass box. A second mention of the earring, in another episode. permits the reader to access another character's experience and point of view. Pilate's single earring enhances her role and status. in the eyes of outsiders a.;; well as to her own family. but it is of particular importance to her nephew. When the boy is brought to see her by his friend. Guitar, she has an overwhelming effect on him. She will exercise great power and become the instrument for Milkman's rebellion against social common sense and his father's wishes. The earring. although only one of the striking elements of Pilate's appearance, is the salient feature of an extraordinary woman. As they came closer and :.aw the brass box Jangling from her car, Milkman knew that what with the earring. the orange and the angled black cloth. nothing - not the wisdom of his father or the caution of the world - could keep him from her. (S0111: of Solomm1: 36)

While it could be argued that the earring is only one of the ways in which Pilate influences Milkman in that episode (others involve food. story·telling. assumption of seniority and the right to direct him). it is the highlighted element. The consequences of this visit motivate much of the subsequent narrative. within the theme of family origins.

3.2. The earring as family history At a later stage of the narrative the account of the making of the earring is expanded with a larger number of details of past history. after the potentially dangerous relations between Pilate and Milkman have been established. The story·teller is again Pilate's estranged brother. Macon II, who relates family history to Milkman (Macon Dead III). The brother and sister had been made to abandon their father's farm when it wa.'i forcibly acquired by white fanners

392

Anne Pankhurst

who killed their father. Macon Dead I (Jake). Pilate created the earring herself during a period of isolation when she and Macon II were hidden for their own safety by a woman called Circe. The stay in the house, with its intertextual allusion to the stay of Ulysses and his sailors with the enchantress Circe. is exile and imprisonment for the two children, deprived of the Edenic environ· ment of their home. The repetition recreates and expands Macon Irs memory of the past, but the negative marking of the earring as foolish is absent. Before they left the farm she'd taken the st:rap of brown paper with her name on it from the Bible, and after a long time trying to make up her mind between a snuffbox and a sunbonnet with blue ribbons on it. she took the little brass box that had belonged to her mother. Her miserable days in the mansion were spent planning how to make an earring out of the box which would hou~e her name. She found a piece of wire but couldn't gel it through. Finally. after much begging and whining. Circe got a Negro blacksmith to solder a bit of gold wire to the box. Pilate rubbed her ear until it was numb. burned the end of the wire, and punched it through her earlobe. (San~: of Sofomo11: 167)

The choice of this special container for the word ensures that by inferential association the reader will understand that it has several levels of importance both for the characters in the story. and for the reader. Because the name Pilate wa" given by her father. unlike their surname 'Dead.' which was allocated officially and meaninglessly. the name will remain in the box as a record of her true family history. Like a phylactery or amulet. it is bound to its wearer and contains a special reminder that justification for power and identity can be contained in one single word. Pilate's action of creating the earring preserves her identity and is her self-affinnation against powerlessness. Paradoxically. lexical values in the phrases - the scrap of brow" paper and the little bra.u box - indicate that before the night. the paper and the box were of no special significance. They became valuable in the state of exile to which Pilate and her brother were condemned. and which is structured by using the earring as a mnemonic device. Up to this point in the narrative. the earring has been no more than an object by which Pilate can be identified. As the relationship between the boy and his aunt grows. the earring acquires still greater significance. The different implications combine the person with her symbolic role. Pilate is identifiably different from all other people by the fact that she wears this single earring. As metonymy, in the relationship of physical and mental contiguity within the domain of the person. it stands for her sense of family and ancestry. her love for her dead father. her strangeness in society's eyes and her personal identity

Morriso" 's So"g of Solomo"

393

as a vivid. flamboyant character with a strong self-will. The earring has therefore a number of potential referents, each made salient in tum in the recontextualizations.

3.3. The earring as encapsulation of folk memory Temporal sequencing of a fictional world is a problem for the reader's understanding of what is happening at any given point of time. The existence of the earring serves as a point of reference. and a stable element. in the nonsequential account of the lives of different characters. The history of the earring matches its owner's development as she changes in the course of the narrative. In different episodes she is an orphaned girl. an abused itinerant worker. a marginalized but powerful woman in her city neighborhood. then a magnetic attraction for her nephew and a trigger for his own search for his family origins. Running parallel to Pilate's story, but without the need for flashbacks to retell the past. is Milkman's story. After his childhood in the City. he decides to find the family's roots. in the rural South. During this journey of discovery the earring subtext is again woven into the narrative as a point of reference. Milkman is near the place where Pilate's father (his grandfather) was killed and the house where the earring was made. He hears another account of its creation from the Rev. Cooper. which confirms to him and to the reader the truth of Macon II' s account. [Milkman] had walked right by the place where Pilate's earring had been fashioned,the earring that had fascinated him when he was little, the fixing of which informed the colored people here tlrutthe children of the murdered man were alive. And this was the living room of the son of the man who made the earring. tSon~: of Solomon: 231)

Through Milkman's experience. which verifies the truth of the family stories. the reader understands that the earring and its contents exist in the past, present and future of the narrative time. Given the complex spatia-temporal digressions in this story. it functions as a necessary unifying or connective device for the various concepts it contains (cf. Fauconnier and Turner. this volume).

3.4. The earring as sign of matriarchal power The power of the earring as a referential frame to the text develops more with each episode. notably at critical moments in Pilate's family history. The most

Anne Pcmkhunt

394

significant is at the funeral of Pilate's granddaughter. Hagar, who died after Milkman ended her relationship with him. Pilate bursts into the service shouting "Mercy!'', asserting her matriarchal right to express her grief in a traditional song. The dramatic effect of her entrance is highlighted through the viewpoint of the mortician. who is overwhelmed and dazzled by the authority contained in the earring. She tilled her head and looked down. Her earring grazed her shoulder. Out of the total blackness of her clothes it blazed like a star. The monician tried to approach her again. and moved closer, but when he saw her inky. berry-black lips. her doudy, rainy eyes. the wonderful bmss box hanging from her ear. he stepped back and looked at the noor. (SOtiR of Solomon: 317)

At this point, the focalizing view of an anonymous mortician generalizes the effect of the metonymy. The earring, still the means of identifying Pilate. acquires a number of new attributes which enhance its special function. It bla:ed like a star. it is the nYmde1ji.tl brass box against a grief-stricken background of IOta/ blackness of her clothe.~ and her inky, berry-black lips. her cl01uly. rainy eyes. The prominence of the earring recalls the figurative significance already created both in the case of its influence over Milkman, and its function as container for Pilate's name. but it now has wider social and personal meaning, standing for the power of the matriarch. At this point in the narrative it might be argued that the earring is no longer metonymy. but has moved into a new. abstract domain of personal power. becoming a metaphor. In the reader's understanding. the power of the object to blaze like a star gives access to a new aspect of its wearer. an enhancement of her status. The character called Pilate develops from being an outsider with rather unusual personal characteristics into a model of empowerment. From the reader's point of view. however, the expert identification of this transition to metaphor could be less important than the function of the earring as a complex figurative marker within the text. Immediate interpretation of its significance bypasses linguistic and rhetorical analysis.

3.5. The destruction of the earring The theories of Jakobson and Riffaterrc. which have so far provided a frame to the consideration of metonymy in fictional narrative. do not attribute a special role to closure. Yet it is plausible to assume that communication with the reader must be influenced by the nature of the ending. whether it is open or

Morri.wm 's Song of Solomon

395

closed, happy or tragic, predictable or surprising. At this moment of Song of Solomon. the subtcxt of Pilate's earring is again woven into her fate. engaging the reader's attention and providing an ironic comment from which inferences may be drawn. As we have seen. the earring contains Pilate's desire to preserve the past by means of the word. the specially-given name. the sole legacy of happiness and home origins. Ironically. the earring is stolen by birds at the close of the narrative. After Milkman has successfully found the family's roots. Pilate buries the earring along with her other treasure, a bag of bones. ll is stolen from the shallow grave by a bird. At the same moment Pilate he13elf dies, murdered by Guitar. The figurative value of the earring is lost as it becomes an indefinite. devalued something shi11y, a mere object in a bird's beak. From this, the reader may infer that the earring's special functions as keeper of Pilate's name and mark of her identity in this narrative have ended. "Should we put a rock or a cross on it?' Milkman asked. Pilate shook her head. She reached up and yanked her earring from her ear, splitting the lobe. Then she made a little hnle with her fingers and placed in it Sing's snuffbox with the single word Jake e\·er wrote. [.... 1Twn nfthe birds circled round them. One dived into the new grave and scooped something shiny in its beak before it flew away. (Son~-: of Solnmo11: 335 J

This event returns the earring to the realm of the literal. but does not negate its metonymic value. Although depersonalized and demythologized. it still has a function in the structure of the narrative, insofar as it now could motivate either of two potential outcomes. Because the metonymy has carried an important amount of reference in the narrative. the first inference drawn is that the closure is clear and dramatic. The earring is no longer defined as a treasure: it is a shiny. ownerless thing. The move to anonymity is meaningful in the thematic context, demonstrating to the reader that the writer's intention has been to focus only on Pilate's life by means of the metonymic refcrentiality of the earring. In this sense. the metonymy has a meta-narrative function as a mark of fictionality. The other potential outcome is open-ended. We do not know what has become of the earring. but we can speculate as to its new functions in some other narrative yet to be constructed.

396

4.

Anne Pankhurst

Discussion

In Song of Solomon the earring is part of the physical description of its wearer, always present and salient in her appearance. therefore she can be identified by mentioning it. As a part for the whole. within the domain of the person. it is

a synecdochic detail of self-presentation. Its function is not. however,limitcd to loca1 use.ln the macro-structure of the narrative. the caning is highlighted by different focalizing voices at dramatic moments. It ha'> been created during the children's flight from persecution in their home. it creates the bond

between Milkman and Pilate. it is the focus of Pilate's matriarchal power during the funeral of Hagar. It confirms Milkman's discovery of his family's origins. and disappears at the death of Pilate. It becomes a short cut to our understanding of Pilate's importance for her family and reactivates memory of previous events both for characters within the narrative and for the assumed reader. Thus. it is evidence of a rich conceptual domain extending beyond the person to family. race and social disempowenncnt. The complex use of metonymy in this fictional narrative cannot be accounted for by a single theory. Iakobson proposed that metonymy. retaining its character as a figure defined by contiguity. facilitates forward movement of the narrative when seen in a macro-context. This is not enough to explain how the reader comes to the understanding that the single word ·earring' has the property of multiple rcferentiality. The other part of Jakobson's theory. the provision of synecdochic detail. is also oriented towards exegesis of the text rather than the reader's process of understanding and interpretation. A more satisfactory analysis is provided if we follow Riffaterre's view that metonymy is instrumental in creating subtexts which by force of repetition are crucial to the reader's grasp of the fictional world and may provide the basis for an allegorical reading of the narrative. Riffaterre defines subtext as a means of creating an actual or potential relationship between the fictional world and the real world. achieved through multiple references. When recontextualized. subtexts have a meta-narrational function. They hold together disparate elements within the macrotext by a network of inference because the patterns set up match existing patterns of cognition (cf. Black 1993 for a discussion of similar effects generated by metaphor). The availability of complex yet coherent multiple reference is of great importance for the systematically cohesive development of longer narrative (Miller 1985: Schulz 1992). If the fictional world is to be perceived as

Morri.wm 's Song of Solomon

397

true, albeit possessing fictional truth. the reader requires a number of entry points into this world. created by means of reactivating what is already known or believed in the real world. Understanding is, after all, an interactive process involving the reader. "Narrative truth is a linguistic phenomenon experienced through reading, a performative event with participation on the reader's part'' (Riffaterre 1990: xiv). The cognitive theory of metonymy (Gibbs 1994) addresses the importance of metonymic models of thought. Metonymy. as well as having linguistic realizations. is a universal cognitive process which enables understanding to take place. So in a very general way. it can be used in any kind of communication for specific purposes. to express meaning, and will be understood automatically. People's knowledge in long-term memory of coherent. mundane series of events can be metonymically referred to by the mere mention of one salient subpart of these events. We sec that the mention of the subpart metonymically stands for the whole event. (Gibbs 1994: .HOf)

If this is generally true. it applies as much to narrative fiction as to everyday spoken communication. As we read this narrative, we assume that it has been created by Morrison with the intention of capturing a real or potentially real world. We have inferencing power. and we share a number of experiences and beliefs with the author and the characters. But the world of Pilate and her family cannot be interpreted unless we recognize them. Metonymic reference through everyday objects is crucial in creating new concepts. The mention of the earring acts as a trigger for a complex series of references because it is a salient subpart of the woman's physical appearance. and we understand also that it plays a vital role in the reconstruction of her family history and can therefore stand for it. To sum up. in the case of Song of Solomon we can use two conceptualizations typical of metonymic thinking. The object serves to identify its wearer. and the narrative recontextualization of the object stands for potential, more abstract, interpretations. Its function is to help the reader's management of long tcx.t. working as a poetic device to help the reader's memory .2 By metonymic extension of the original referent. through conceptual links. transition from physical to abstract domains is effected in a way similar to the processes used in accessing an unknown world in real life. In understanding. appreciating and teaching literature this is valuable.

Anne

398

Pwrkhur.~t

Notes I.

Jakobson's theory of metonymy has been developed by other literury critics, nmably

2.

This function is not cx.clusivc to metonymy. In a longer narmtive. both metaphor and metonymy can function as underlying slrUCtoral devices in a text (Lodge 1977: Werth

Lodge

(1977) who argued strongly for the co-presence of metonymy and metaphor in post-modernist fiction.

1~)-

References Austen. Jane 1990 (1814)

Mansfield Park. london: Penguin.

Black, Elizabeth I 993 Metaphor, simile and cognition in Golding's n1e Inheritors. Long11age and Lilerature 2: 37-48. Bunyan. John 1974(1678)

A Pil~:rim'.f Progres.f. London: Collins.

Dirvcn. Rene 1993 Metonymy and metaphor: different mental strategies of concepiUalization. l...euvense Bijdrage11 82: 1-28. Gibbons. Thomas 1969 (1767) Rhetoric. Menston: The Scolar Press. Gibbs, Raymond W .• Jr. 1994 The Poetics of Mind: Figllrati1•e Tho11ght. l..tJng11age and Understandin,;. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hoebel. Edgar 1972 Anthropofog_}'.' The Sllldy of Mall. New York: McGraw Hill. Jakobson. Roman 1956 Two aspects of langurat11re. London: Edward Arnold.

Morri.wm 's Song of Solomon

399

Miller.J.Hillis 1985 Introduction to Bleak Hou.te. London: Penguin. Morrison. Toni 1977 [ 19891 Sonx of Solomon. London: Picador. Norrick. Neil 1981 Semiotic Principles in Semantic Theory. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Bcnjamins. Ortony. Andrew 1993 Metaphor and nwugllt. Second edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Propp. Vladimir 1928 Morphology of the Folk Tale. Austin: Univen>ity of Texa.o; Press. Riffaterre. Michael 1982 Trollope's metonymies. Ninetuntll Century Fiction 37/3: 272-292. 1990 Fictional Truth. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Schulz, Victor 1992 'Deep structure signals' in fiction. In D. Stein (cd.). Co-operatill[l with Written Tt>xt.t. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 335-360. Steen. Gerard 1994 UnderstandinR MetatJhor in Literature. London: Longman. Werth. Paul 1994 Extended metaphor, a text-world account. WnR11age and Literature 3/2: 79-103.

List of Contributors (Present addresses)

Andreas Blank Philipps-Universitiit Marburg.lnstitut fUr Romanische Philologie Wilhclm-Roepke-Str. 60. D-35032 Marburg. Germany E-mail: [email protected] David D. Clarke University of Nottingham, Dept. of Psychology University Park. Noningham NG7 2RD. UK E-mail: [email protected]

Rene Dirven Gerhard-Mercator-UniversiHit Duisburg. Fachbereich 3. Sprach- und Litcraturwisscnschaftcn Postfach 10 15 03, D-47057 Duisburg, Germany E-mail: [email protected]

Gilles Fauconnier University of California, San Diego. Cognitive Science Center La Jolla. CA 92093. USA E-mail: [email protected] Kurt Feyaerts KU Lcuven, Dept. Linguistiek Blijde-lnkomststraat 21, B-3000 Leuven. Belgium E-mail: [email protected] Raymond W. Gibbs. Jr. University of California. Santa Cruz, Dept. of Psychology Santa Cruz, CA 95064. USA E-mail: [email protected]

402

Li.st of Contributors

Louis Goossens Univcrsitaire lnstelling Antwcrpcn, Dept. Taal- en Lettcrkundc: Germaanse talen UniversiteiLo;;pJcin I, B-2610 Antwerpcn (Wilrijk), Belgium E-mail; [email protected] Olar Jakel Matin-Luther-Universitat Halle-Wittenberg, Fachbereich Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaftcn, lnstitut filr Anglistik und Amerikanistik D-06099 Halle (Saale), Gennany E-mail: [email protected] Peter Koch Ebcrhard-Karls-Univcrsitat Ttibingen, Romanisches Seminar WilhelmstraBc 50. D-72074 Til bingen, Gennany E-mail: [email protected]

Zolt
Brigitte Nerlich University of Nottingham, Dept. of Psychology University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK E-mail: bn@psychology .nottingham.ac .uk Anne Pankhurst University of Edinburgh. Dept. of Applied Linguistics 14 Buccleuch Place. Edinburgh EH8 9LN. UK E-mail: [email protected] Klaus-Uwe Panther Universitat Hamburg, Seminar ftir Englische Sprachc und Kultur Von-Melle-Park 6, D-20146 Hamburg, Germany E-mail: [email protected] Paul Pauwels Katholieke Vlaamsc Hogeschool St. Andricsstraat 2. B-2000 Antwcrpen. Belgium E-mail: [email protected]

List of Contributors GUnter Raddcn UniversiUit Hamburg, Seminar fUr Englischc Sprachc und Kultur Von-Melle-Park 6. D-20146 Hamburg. Germany E-mail: [email protected] Ken-ichi Seto Osaka City University. Faculty of Literature 3-3-138 Sugimotocho. Sumiyoshi-ku. Osaka, Japan 558 E-mail: [email protected] Linda Thornburg EotvOs Lor3.nd University. Dept. of American Studies Ajt6si DUrer sor 19-21, H-1146 Budapest. Hungary E-mail: [email protected] Zazie Todd University of Leicester. Dept. of Psychology University Road, Leicester LEI 7RH, UK E-mail: [email protected] Mark Turner University of Maryland. Dept. of English Language and Literature 1102 Francis Scott Key Hall, College Park, MD 20742 E-mail: [email protected] Christian VoBhagcn Universitat Hamburg. Seminar fUr Englische Sprache und Kultur Von-Melle-Park 6. D-20146 Hamburg. Germany E-mail: [email protected] Richard Waltereit Ebcrhard-Karls-Universitat TUbingen. Romanisches Seminar WilhelmstraBe 50. D-72074 Ti.ibingen. Germany E-mail: [email protected] Beatrice Warren Lund University, Dept. of English Helgonabacken 14. S-22362 Lund, Sweden E-mail: [email protected]

403

Subject index A Action ICM J6-37, 43 action schema 277-278. 280-281. 284285 active zone 31.250 ad hoc metonymy 1.39-140. !55 AFTER condition 337 agent 246-249,163, 277-278. 280. 285286 alternation frame-based 237.239.250 locative 239 wle 237-238.249 'swarm' 240-241 thematic 236 ambiguity 2JS.2.l9-240. 2-1-!1. 250 anaphoric pronoun 10-11. 41 anthropocentrism 285-286 anthroponomy 211 antonomy 291-293,295.306 apha.<>ia 171-172 argumentation theory 318 association 172. 187. 256, 292. 318, 366.390 metonymic .'\70, 38tl associationist psychology 141-142. 149, 159-160 associative relation( ship) 142-144 altitude 296-299, 343

8 backgrounding 153 basic-lcvcltenn 281 BERJRE condition 337-339. 350 beneficiary 285

blcnd(ing) 71-80. 84. 88-89 metaphorical 86 blended space 77. 82 body pan 264-265. 270 bridge. metonymi~: 193. 196. 19Q-200. 265 bridging 197-198,202 by-marne 211.214

c Ctategory)·rclated transfer 92 C-rclation 92. 113, 117 caseframe277 case grammar 279 case role 177 tsec also role, .femamicl Category-and-Member ICM 34 Category-and-Property ICM 35 Causation ICM 36, 3M change semantic 158, 140, 142, 144. 15b. 160, 174, 184, 187,247 metonymic 140. 142-143. 1~5. 147. 150. 155-156, !58 clarity 50 clas~

incluston 367 mem~rship 283. 28S co-presence 160-161. 1119. 178-180, 182, 184 cognitive domain 355 fr.:tme 184 model312 colloquial tautology 35. b2. 72 Commissive Scenario 345

Subject index

406 commissin 344-346, 348, 351 indirect356 communicative efficiency 174 principle 44, 50 compelled metonymic overextension 362. 364, 367. 369. 375 complementarity 291-294. 306 composition 158, 161

compound 123-125. 127. 1:\2-133.214-

216.218,220 ..'70 compound surname 219-220

comprehension 376

ConceptiCM 23. 26,28 concept metonymy 23. 26. 2!1-29 concurrent processing model 70 Constitution ICM 32. 186 constrainl. grammatical 233 Containment ICM 37. 41. I 86 context-induced interpretation 193

contextualeffect!J contiguity 19,92.95,117, 130.1:\9146. 149-151. 15.~-154. 157-160. 170174. 177-180. IK2, 184-185, 187, 234-236. 238-240. 2..W-245, 281. 291. 295. 316-317' 320, 322. 329, 367. 387. 39fl conceptuall44. 146, 171.173-174. 178-179. IK4, 289, 305-306, 338, 366-367. 386 referential.155 relation 242. 244-245 schema 182-184 !1patiall42-143. 1-16 !~patio-temporal 95 temporal and causal 171 contradiction 306 contrurincss 306 contrast 172 ContmiiCM 27. 37 . .W conventionality 375 conventionalization 156-157 of conversational implicature 156 conver!>inn 37. 275, 217-281, 283-286. 370

core 337-338 corpus 212, 219. 221. 224, 260-261, 271-212 countcrfaclual 79 cultural model 313

D dativc285 dead metonymy .H5 default relation 126 demetonymization 269 denominal verb 123-125 dcontic (also see neassity) 194, 196197.201-203,207 derivation 158, 161. 187,370 direct objectl33, 236-237,239,241, 243. 2~5-246. 2411, 250 Direct-Reference JCM 25-26 Directive Scenario 337 directive indircct356 speech act 336, 3-W-346. 351 disL-ourse 155 di.'ltance, metonymic 85 domain 9, 160, 173, 234, 256, 258-263, 2fl5, 270, 289. 295, 301' .\05 boundacy 320 conceptual 305,350-351.3811 highlighting 153,302 mapping 153 matrix 153, 160.257-258. 2fl0-261. 317-320, 328-329, H4 dysphc:mism 265-266

E effect rhetorical 52 social-communicative 53 E-rclation 92-93, 91!., 117 ellipsis 142. 1-14. 171-172 encyclopaedic knowledge 238 enrailment 267 epistemic 193-206 eponymous verb 65 error TCCOVel)' modcJ70

Subjecl index essive role 280 M:hcma 280. 283-285 euphemism 264-266. 269. 272. 289. 295,299-301.306 metonymic 53. 37] evaluation/evaluative 292. ::!94-296. 301-302.306 Evem ICM 32-33 event schema 275.278-280.285 expcricncer 248-249, 285 experiencing schema 285 expressive 140, 155-156 extension(al) 25. 153-154,270.317. 320-321. 325 ..165, 367 analogical 365. 367 ~netaphorical 28 I metonymic 150. 153 ..125

F face-threatening act 343 figurative language 309 figure/ground 151-152. 154-157, 159 focusing. metonymic 286 rolk model 212 force-dynam1c structure 87 Fonn ICM 36 rrame 9. 139, 145-155, 157-160. 172175. 178-180. 185.234,238, 276,369 generi~;: 79 frame model/theory 149. 151, 159 function of metonymy, pragmatic 12 G gender change 157-158 generalization 118.270 generic space 77 genitive 275 genus 114 gestalt psychology 151. 159-160 goal 280, 282. 285 goal-over-source princ:iplc 282 grammaticalizatiun 126. 346-347, 350 Grice's maxims 268

407 H hapax legomenon 174 head 220-221 hedged pcrfonnntivc 342-344. 3:51. 356 hierarchy conceptual.'28 metaphoric 309-310, .'14. 324 metonymic 309, .U I. 323 of grammatical relations 236, 248 or metonymic vehicles 29, 52 highlighting 11.153.174.184,258-259. 270. 280, 302. 305 hyperbole 215 •.121-JB hyponymy 94

ICM lldcalizcd Cognitive Mode)) 9, 17, 19-23. 26·29. 67. 186.256 ..H4 iconicity 250. 277. 282. 37.' idiomatic expression 309-310.334 illocution 176 illocutionarv act .H5, .343-344. 356 force 350.368 image schema 3 19 implication 154-156, 178, 187 pragmatic 13 implicaiUre 193, 195 ..149, _,5_l-.l55 conversational 62.67.156-157.334 imprecation 344 inalienable possession 242, 244-245 indexicality 373 indirect object 243 indirect speech 72 indirect speech act62, 72, 3.'5-.B6. 344, 347.351 inference 155, 198-199, 203. 205·206. 345 metonymic 62. 355 inheritance hierarchy 315 innovation, metonymic 156-157. 174. 375 input !>pace 77 input-topology 87 mstrumcnt 246-249. 267-268. 277-281.

Subject index

408 285-286 integmtion (network) 77-78,81-82.84, 89 irony 289-290. 295. 297-301. 306

K knowledge structure 317. 328

L landmark eLM) 216-223.261.265.271 language acquisition 361, 364. 367 lexicalization 140. 157, 160. 174. 186,

141.261 linguistic action 319-320 literal langultge 12 Location ICM 37.41 ltx:ationlmotion schema 285

locative verb 280, 283 M manner 277. 27Q-281 manner verb 280-281 mapping 78, 256-257.159. 261-262. .101, 31+-315, 329 cross-space 77, 84

metaphorical 21 . .' 16 metonymic 22.289 markedness 291,294-295.302 maxim of conversation 68 of informativeness 115 of quantity 352-353 maximal contextual effect 12 meaning extension 257. 266, 272 mental bridge 21 motion 283 mention theory 298 meronomy 93 metaphor62. 80, 130-131. 133,139, 143-144. 146, 153. 160. 170-172. 1!13-184. !K7. 225.255-257. 259. 262, 2ft9, 272. 301. 309. 314. 316317 •.129. 334, 362. 365-369. 373. 379 metaphor from metonymy 193-195. 257.

262. 268, no ..no metaphor-metonymy complex (MMCJ 103-104 metonymy as abbreviation 128-129. 132 conceptual 17-18, 182 creative 370 default 22-23, 44 ..154 definition 9, 17, 62, 92. 128, 138, 236 expressive 305 illocutionary 335 innovative 375 insertional 235-2.16, 240-242.247 lexicalized II. 174, 177 morphological 370 non-default 22-23 predicational 335 propositional 130.335 range 153 referential25. 122-123, 125, 127-133. 276,335 reversible 25-27.38 subslitution view 9. 13 within metaphor 257, 262. 265 minimal processing effort 12 modal shift 193, 196 Modification ICM 37. 43 mndifier 216-217.219-220 morphology 216 motion schema 280. 282-283 motivation 211-212.214.224,260.265. 289. 302. 306 competing 51

N naming Mrategy 225 necessity 197-198. 201-207. 343 infemble 196.202 network. conceptual 326 nominalization 37

0 obje1.:t 279. 281 obligation 196. 3-B oblique object 240

Subject index obstacle potential 72 projected 73 onomasiological 150. 153. 159 onomastics 211 ontological realm 2 I -23 opposition 229. 2!!9. 291. 294-296. 301. 305 optimality constraint R9 principle 84 overextension 362. 366-369. 372 lll('taphorical 368 metonymic 368-369 synecdochical 365. 368 overinclusion 367 overstatement 264--265 p part 92-93 an ICM 30. 36 partonomy IJ2-95 path 282. 2K5 patient 277. 279-281. 285-286 perception 313 Perception JCM 36, 38 perception theory 314 perceptual selectivity 46 perfect (aspect) 201. 204 pcrfonnative verb 343-344 pennission 343 person perception p~ychology 313 politeness {principle) 295. 354. 356 polysemy 140. 151!. 235-241.247-250, 361.366 contiguity-based 248-249 metonymic 139-140. 142. 144. 157158. 186 popular etymology 144 po:.session 285 JCM37.40 schema285 possessive 241. 245 poSSC!.Mlf 245, :!85 ascension 245-246

or

409 potentiality 343 predicate 235. 238. 246. 24Q, 259. 261.

266 transfer 10. 128 predication 263.270-171 preferred directionality 19 vehicle 44-52 preposition 216-219.139,248 pretense theory 198 process 204 Production ICM 36, 39 projection constraint 85 proper name I 87 prototype 149-151. 15.'. 175,186.258. 261.264.266-268,271 effect 66. 150. 160 prototypical member 150 psychological reality 318 R recipient285 recomextualization 388 Reduction ICM 36 reference 234. 275 contiguity-based 235 ICM 23-24. 21! mewnymy 23-24, 279 metonymic 233-234, 236, 242-243. 250. 385. 388, 397 reference point 9-11. 174.275-276 expres.~ion 10-11 phenomenon 9. 19 Reference-via-Meaning ICM 25 referencing 276 rcferentialily in niliTo~tive fiction. metonymic 385 reflexive (ditic) 241-244.250 Relational Grammar 245 relationship. con<.-eptual .'19-.'\20 relevance 50-51 Relevance Theory 13 remotivation 373 Request Scenario 346, 350 Restaur.mt ICM 51

410 resuh 277 rhetoric 179. 185,362 role. semanlic 233. 239. 280. 285 role~. conliguous 235. 241

salience 150-151.154, 159, 174. 176. 215. 2:!0, 260.263,275,278.282. 289.291.294-295,300,313 relative salience 44 scale 270, 272, 293. 301. 306 ScaleiCM31 scenario9,69, 172-173.17!1-179 •.'36 scene 173.234.267 schcma9. 146 s~:hematicity 328 schemalization 315 script 9, 69, 234. 234 selection restriction 235.241 semimic triangle 23 Sense Perception Scenario 339 sensualist philosophy 141 shift metonymic 9-10. B, 242.244 refen:ntiall0-11.258,317 shortcut, referential 12 shrinking creative rru=tonymical .l62, 369-370, 375 metonymic 367. 373 sign 21 Sign and Reference ICM 37. 42 sign and reference metonymy 28 Sign ICM 23-24. 28 sign metonymy 23-24. 29 similarity 141-144. 15.~. 171-172.214. 317.320.365.367 slang 290. 295-296. 300. 304-305 source 261. 280. 282. 285, -~ 10 ..no source domain 270. 316. 326, 321! specialization 119 species 114 specification of landmark 216 speech act metonymy (also sec me· tonymy. i/ltKIItioiJary·)

Subject index speech act scenario 344, 355 ~tate-of-affairs scenario 337 stereotype. sociaJ 3 I 2. 325. 328 stereotypical propeny 35 stimulus 285 strategy metonymic 227 pr.agmatic 366 strengthening. prd.gmatic 156, 159 stupidity 309-310. 312. 328 subject 233, 235-236. 2-H, 243-245, 247-250. 279 subjectification 199,207-208 subordinate-level tcnn 28 I succession/successive relation 161, 169. 178-179. 181-182. 184. 187 surname 211-216. 218. 220-221. 223225 synecdoche 63. 91-92, 113. 153-154. 179. 185.215,362.379 synecdochic detail 386, 389, 391. 396

:ns.

T taboo 5.~. 267 target 9-1 I. 19. 21-22. 29, 130-132. 258, 261, 282. 295, .'<'13·304. 310. 320, 334 domain 269-270 metonymic 24 tautology _,5, 73 taxonomy 92-94,212.224-225.367 tension 263-265,271 thematic role 235, 238, 247-250 (aJso see <·asc role. role ..femumic) theme 233. 248-249 Thing-and-Pan ICM 31 topology 85, 87 tmjector261 trajectol)' 282 transfer schema 285 trigger I 30-132 metonymic 373 !rope metonymic 154. 157 rhetorical 139-141. 156, 317 two-vaJued orientation 299. 301. 306

Subjec/ index typology of metonymy 173, 176. 178, 182. 185,363

411

u

vehicle 19.21-22.29 ..l34, 354 vehicle-to-target mute 52 violation of cognitive and communicative principles 52-54

unden>tatement 303 unpacking 85

w

v vaguene~s

266 valence semantics 177 value judgment 3 I 3 variation 261

web85 Whole ICM and its part(s) 30 Whole-Part ICM 36 word formation 139, 153, 157-159, 187 world knowledge 173-174 (see also ellcyclopuedic k1ww/edge)

Author index

A Abbon. Black. and Smith 69 Aitchison 292 Albee 298. 303 Amin 160 Anderson 239

Broca 171 Brown 160 Bruner 313 BUhler 160 Bunyan. John 389

Arance 185

Busse 236 Bybee 195 Bybee et al. 193

Aristotle I. 141. 160, 179,362 Audcn, W .H. 63

c

Andor 173

Clark 70. 71. .164, 365. Jn. 37.3 ..175

B Bach211.215,226

Clark and Clark 108. 125.280

Bach. Adol£ 211.225 Bach and Hamish 342 Rain 141 Baker 239

Clark, Eve 366 Coates 197 Cooper 117

Balzac. HonorC de 61. O.' Barrett 367 Barsalou 146, 249 Bartlett 146 Belletti and Rizzi 243. 250 Bergsten 125 Black 160, J96 Blake 245, 246 Blank 141. 144. 145. 150. 159. 16(), 170. 171.172.186,187.23.~.236 Bombe~:k 70 Bonhomme 145. 178. 179. 186 Bower, Black. and Turner 69 Bowennan 364 Braine 367, 36fl BrCal 141. 159.235.361 Bredin 62. 105. 139. 145, 146. 154, 1611.

!69. 171. 177, 187

Clark and Gerrig 71 , 298

Cooper and Rms 45, 57 Copestake and Briscoe 133 Cordier 146, lbll Coseriu 160. 170

Cottle 216.225.226 Coulson 77. 78 Croft 19. 56. 62, 66. !53. 154. 173. 17.&. 186.233. HR. 257.258. 259.263.302. 317.319.329.334 Cruse 93, 100. 101. 117,291. 292.294. 295

D Darmcstcter 141 Davies311 De Bleser and Bayer 185 Debus 226 Deese 291. 292 Dik 150.173.208

Author i11dex

414 Dirv~n

56.117.280,317.320. 32fl. .BI.

389

Dorwanl215. 216.225.226 Dubois 144 Dubost 236 Duch
Dumarsais 177. 1!15 E Ecu 145 Ecmcren et al. 318 Ekman et al. 304 Elim. T.S. 63 Esnault 362. 363

Gibbs and McCarrell 73 Gibbs and Tenney 69

Giv6n 247, 248. 294 Goossens 63. 103. 121. 193. 195. 209. 256.257.258. 259.269.272.317, .1 IQ,

.no

Goossens ct al. I 93 Gottschald 211. 223 Graesser. Woll. Kowalski. and Smith 69 Grice 50. 57, 67, 68, 115. 121. 157, 26!1. 335.352 Grimshaw 243 Groupe de Liege I Gurd and Marshall 185

Esper 292 F Fa~s

133. 177.248 ..163 Fauconnier77. 133. 186 Fauconnier and Turner 77. 84 Fauconnier, Gilles 187 Fillmore 146. 150. 160. 173, 177. 186. 239.249.266 Aeischer 226 Fontanier 169, 170, 171.185 Fr.mcik and Clark 72 Fraser 342 Frawley 24. 56 Frei 245 Fromkin 292 G Garavelli 170, 185 Gannan 292 Gauger 158 Geens 260 Geeraerts 118. 150. 160,321 Geeraens and Grondelaers 330 Geiger 322 Genelle 62 Gemsbacher 68 Gerrig 70 Gibhons 387 Gibbs I. 8, 18, 33, .15,56, 62, 72, 73, 121, 122.364. 372.374 ..H9, 385, 389. 397

H Halliday 121. 12Q Happ 142, 1-B. 145. 160, 172 Haspelmath 155 Hawkins 250 Hayakawa 299 Heidcr313. 330 Heine 193 Hemenway 30 Herennium,auc10rad 140-141.170, 185, _,62 Herskovits 56. 104 Hjelmslcv 160 Hobbes 141 Hocbel387 Holcn:.~ein 142, 143. 160 Hom 352 Hornby 300 Householder 361 Huber ct al. 185 Humc 141 Huttcnlochcr and Smiley 366

Ikegami282

Jackcndoff 133,233 Jlikel225.226.227 Jakobson 62. 117. !43. 144. 160. 171.

A111hor index

415

172. 186,386,387 ..W6, 398 Johansson 260 Johnson 183. 186.255. 2S6 Jongen 150 Joyce, James 6.1

K Kainz 300, 306 Kastovsky 280 Keller 176 Kleiber 10, 12. 150. 160 Koch 141. 145, 150. 155, 158, 159. 160.

161. 173.

17~.

186,238,250

Koch and Oesterreicher 161 KOhler 160 KOnig 195 KOnig and Ha~pelmath 245, 246 Konig and Traugott 156, 159 KOvecses 3, 48,49. 80. 81,1B. 121,330 KOvecses and Radden 334, 354 KOvecses and Szab6 57 Kruszewski 142, 143 KytO 209

L Lahov 386 Lakoff2, 3, 19. 10. 25.17, 33, .15 ..18. 39.

49, SO, 56. 57, 66. 67. 80, 81. lB. 94, 95, 115. 150, 186,226.233,255.256, 257.259. 290, 291.294,295.310, 312. 313.314.315,316.317, .HO ..134 Lakoff and Johnson I. 2. 18. 19. 26. 40, 51' 56, 64. 94, 95, 105. 154, 160, 169, 175. 177. 183, 226.255, 256.259, 271, 321.36.1 Lakoff and Turner 24, 34, 42. 56, 95, 385, 389

Lee(;h and Short 389 Lehrer 292 Leisi 125 Leitner 125. 280 Lejeune 208 Leopold 367 Levi 125 Levin 62 Liebert 160 Lindner 104 Lipka 125 Locke 141 Loc.lge 62, 63, 398 Lyons 117, 226. 292, 300, 306. 323

M Major 290.2%.297.300,305 Marchand 279 Manin 144 Matthews 213.216. 2:!7 Mellenius 125 Metzger 160 Mill. James and John St. 141 Miller396 Minsky 146, 173 Morgan 57 Morrison. Toni 385. 397 Mtiller-Gotama 250 Murphy and Andrews 292

landis. Herrmann and Chaffin 291 Langacker 9, 19. 30. 31. 44, 56, 57, Q6,

N Naumann211.215 Nerlich 117.118.1-U.I60,J85.379 Nerlich and Clarke 373. 379 Nonick 34. 35. 41. 127, 363, 387 Norvig and Lakoff 39 Nunberg 10. 12. 70, 122. 128. 133, 23.1. 234 Nyrop 141, 185,363

109.126,127,160.174.176.186.207, 2.33. 238, 239.250.259,260.261. 275. 295.310.317.318 ..uo ..\88 Larkin. Philip 64 Lausbcrg 141. !54. 170, 177. 185 Lc Guem 145, 154. 185. 186.233

Ogden and Ric::hants 23. 26. 110 Olsen 239 Ortony 389 Orwell. George 63

0

416 p Panther and Thornburg HS Paretsky 113. 118

Paull41 Pauwels 268, 269 Pauwels and Simon-Vandenbergen 260

Author index Steen 389 Stein, Gertrude 73 Stempei16J Stem IJJ. 177. 36.~ Stimson 376 Sweetser 5, 193,353.356

Pcascet al.366 Piaget 366

Propp 386 Pustejovsky 104 Pustejovsky and Bouillon 104

Q Quintilian 177 R Raible 144. 160. 186 Rastier 160

Reaney 211.213.2:16.223.225 Reddy 104

Reisig 141 Ricc331 Riffaterrr 8, 386. 387. 381!. 389. 391. 3%,397 Rosch 66, 160 Roudetl42. 143, 144. 160. 171,172 Ruwct 185

Sandra 331 Sappan 36.~ Sam•sure 142. 143, 160 Schank and Abelson 69, 249 Schifko 154. 160, lbl. 169. 177 Schmid 317 Schofcr and Rice I Schulz 396 Schwurzc 161. 187

Searle 62.335 ..H6 ..'\44, .'\45, _,50 Seto 367 Shakespeare 64

Smith 213.223,225.227 Sorensen 110 Spanoghe 245 Sperber and Wilson 12. 50. 176.297.298

T Tagiuri 330 Talmy 37. 104 Tannen 146. 249 Taylor 27. 55. 104. 105, 115, 150, 160, liB. 227.256,257,317 Thornburg and Panther 33. 333, 336, 344. 350, 355 Thome 290 Traugott 193, 195 Traugou and KOnig 156. 195. 199,207 Tumcr77 Turner and Fauconnier 77, 83 Tversky 30, 93 Tversky and Hemenway 46,93 Tylor 26

u Ullmann 49, 144, 15~. 169, 170, 171. 177.363 Ungerer and Schmid 121

v Vosniadou 378 Vygotsky 366

w Warren 110. 117. 122. 123. 125. 133. 150. 15~. 171. 177. 178, 187 Weinrich 104. 146 Wells 110 Wentworth and Flexner 290, 292. 295, 296. 297. :mo. 302. 305 Wernicke 171 Werth 159.398 Wertheimer 160 Wien:bicka93 Wiklorin 226

Autllor index Wimmer227 Winston 239 Winston eta!. 100 Witkowski 226 Wittgenstein 151 Wundt 142 ..~OJ-304

417 y Yamana~hi

363

z Zandvoon 279

Metonymy and metaphor index

A ability to act for action 347 ability to perceive for actual perception 339 ability to process for actuaJ mental procCS!.

341

abstract for concrete 112 act of forming a percept for percept 39 action for agent 37 action for instrument 37 action for object 37 action for result 37 activity - affected object 177, I !14 activity -aim 182 activity- consecutive activity 182 a~:tivity- nbject 180 activity -place ISO activity- product 177 activaty -result 182 activity -time 180

activity -time when the activity occurs 184 a~:tivaty -actor 125 actor - object 180

actor -typical a.~pect 180 actor (invcntnr. etc.)- product 187 at:tual for potential 33. -17. 57 actuality over potentiality 354 agent- activity 177 agent for action 37 agent for instrument 187 agent to result Ill agent - action B4 agent - instrument 247 anger is heat RD. 81. R2 antecedent-COn!>eqUent 129, DO, ll2

artist for his work 39. 51 aspect - attribute 178 authur - product 184

8 basic for non-ba~ic 49 ba.-.ic over non-ba.-.ic 49 hlcssed - slupid 171 bot.lilv over actional 46 bo<Jil). over emotional 46 bodily over menial 46 bodily over pcn:cptual 46 body- part 245 bounded over unbounded 48. 51. 57

c category for a member of the category 27.34 ca1egory for defining property 35 category for salient pm~ny 36 cattle - money I 71 cause- aim 182 cause - instrumenl 177 causcfordfect22.38.43 cause- effect 317. 372. 37J causer - rcsull 124 (.'Cnlml over peripheral49, 53 change of state is movcmenl of possessed object 330 clear over less clear 354 dear over obscure 50. 52. 53.55. 57 collective body - state 181 common over less common 49 communication- human beings 153 comp;lfant -compared 124 concept for form 24

420 concept for its opposite 290 concept for thing/evcnt25.4ti concrete over abstract46. 51. 52. 53 container for contents 29, 41. 43, 46, 125. 176 container- contents 103, 104, 234. 239,

Meto11ymy ami metaphor index fram~

-

fram~

182

function- object 160 functional over non-functional46

controller - controlled 105 counter - public house 154

G garment for person 125 generic for specific 34 generic is specilic 35 genu~ for species 22 genus to species I 14, 115 genus- species I 13.367 goal- instrument 125 good gestalt over poor ge:.talt 47. 51,53

D

H

defining property for category 35 destination for motion 37 deviant behavior for stupidity 324 disposition for occa.-.ional behavior 348 dominant over less dominant47

hamburger for customer 277 human over non-human 45. 51.53, 57 human to non-human II

2-10.241,317 contents for container 29, 41,-14 controlled for controller 26. 40, 44 controller for controlled 27, 40,4-1, 45.

65,271.321

E effect for ~:ause 22, 38. 39. 43. 321. ~33 effect for core 338 emotion for cause of emotion 39,47 ensuing situation to preceding situation 108. Ill ensuing siiUation to proces~ 108. 109 evaluative concept for its opposite 299 event for place 42 evem- subcvent 106 events are actions .H4

..

faeefortheperson 18.19 fire - fireplace 154 form for concept 24, 42. 46 form for content 333 form for thing/event 26 form-concept for thing/event 24, 46 form-conceptA for conceptS 27 formA-conceptA for fonnA-conceptB 27 formA-conceplA for formB-conceptA 28,36 formA-conceptA for formB-conceptB 26

ideal over non-ideal48 immediate over non-immediate 47. 51,

57 important over less imponam 49 important utensil for person 215, 224 inhabitants for place 41 initial or final over middle 49. 53 institution for people responsible 271.

322 institution for place 28. -*I instrument - actor 181 in:.trumem - product 181 instrument for action .\7 instrument for agent 37. IH7 instrument for product 40 instrumem for result 115 instrument to result 110 instrument/organ of perceptmn for the perception 38 interactional over non-inter.actional46. 51 inventor - product 180 inventor for the thing invented 39, 176

K knowing is seeing 319

Metonymy and metaphor index L life is a journey 314. _;16, .BO Jiving things- human beings 153

M manner for action 37 . .J] manner of percep(ion for the perception 38 material - product I 82 material constituting an object for the object 32. 48 material to result 110 mallerforartifact 125 means for action 37 member of a categm:y for the category 21. 34.42 mentaUphysical state for object/person causing it 39 messenger - angel 171 modified form for original form 43 more over les~ 47

N necessity for motivation .U3 new over old 50

0 object -collective body 181 object - function 180 {lbject - typical aspect 180 object- place 160 object for action 37 object for material constituting the object 32.4!1 object for owner 387 objt.-ct for user of the object 40 object used for user 65, 271. 321 {lbject - component 99 object - material 99 object- origin 125 object - place 124 object - property .\17 object~ used for their users 72 occurrent over non-occurrent 47 ordered dish - cul>tomcr 183

421 organization - member 99 origin- object 125 outgroup origin for stupidity 49. J II p pars pro toto 154 pan- pan 181 pan- whole 181. 184 part for part 36 part for whole 31. 36, 43 . .J6, 8-1-.86. 106, 113. 125.259.261.271..'21.389 pan of a form for the whole form .~6 pan of a thing for the whole thing 31 part- pan 185 part- whole 124. 179. 185.234,239. 243, 244, 245, 250 ..~44. 362 passing of time is moving entity 315 people for their possessions 72 perception for result of percc..'Ption 319 perception for thing perceived 38,45 period - period 182 person for the face 19 physical/behavioral effect for emotion causingit39 place - object I 81 place - place 182 place (of origin or residence) for person 216.224 place for activity performed at that place

42 place for event42, 65,171. 322 place for inhabitants 41 place for institution 28, 41. 65, 72 125. 271.J22 place for an institution located at that place 65,72 place for product made there 40 place for the event65. 322 place for the institution 322 place to result Ill place -object 124 positive end of a scale stands for the whole scale 294 positive for negative 304 possessed for pos.~ssor 40.41

422 po.~sessor

for posse~scd 40,45 possessor for possession 388 potential for actual 34 potential to actual 13 potentiality for actuality 33, 3]3, 3]5, 3.\6, 3.~8 ..3.'\9, 340,341.342. 3-B. 344 ....145. 347 ..148. 350. 351. 352, 353 . ...15-l-, 355 potentiality for motivation 333 preceding situation to ensuing situation 108 . . 110 preceding situation to process 108 preceding situation - pnx:es.~ - ensuing situation 107 preceding - ensuing 107 precondition - activity 182 present for future 33.47 presem for habttual 33.47 previous state - consecutive stale I M4 process of production - product 184 process to ensuing situation 108, 109 process to preceding situation 108. 109 process to result 109 producer for product 39, 40. 45, 55, 72, 125.271 ....\21 product for instrument 40 propenics are possessions 35 pmpeny for object 112

R rare over less rare 49 relevant over irrelevant 51. 53 result 262 result- CIIUse 1!12 result for action 37. 38 result to preceding situo~~tion 110 result to process 110 resuh- causer 124

salient propeny for a less salient one 311 salient property for category ...16 salient quality for person 215, 224 seeing something done for making sure

Meto11ymy and metaphor index that it is done 39 situationally more relevam over situationally less relevant 51 skill for display of skill 349 sound for event causing it39, 43 source - result 124 species for genus 22. 379 species to genus 114 species- species 367 specific case for general rule 35 specific for generic 34 . . 35,48 specific over generic 48, 53,57 state - place 180 state/event for thinglpersonlstate causing it ...19 states are locations .116 . states/attributes are things 314 stereotypical over non·stereotypical48 subevent for whole event 32, 48. 106 subject - set 124 subjective O\'er objective 45.52 substitute form for original form 4...1

T thing perceived for perception 38 thing/event for concept 25 thing/event for form 26 thing/event for form-concept 25 time for action 37 time passing is moving entity 330 times are locations 314, 316 times are moving objects 314 times are things 314 tool- object 181 totum pro parte 154 traditional over non-traditional 50 typical aspect- activity 160. IRO typical aspect- frume 160 . . 180 typical aspect- object 160 typical over non-typical 49

u unexpected over expected 50 upper end of a scale for whole scale 32

423

Metonymy and metaphor b1dex

v virtua!ily for actuality 343 visibl(! OV(!t invisible 46, 51

w who)(! event for subevent 32 whole ev(!nt- subcvent 106. 107 whole for part 31.."\5, :D. 113, 125,255,271

whole scale for upper (!nd of the scale 32 whole thing for a part of the thing 31. 48 whole- part 99, 103. 104, 113, 124, 179. 1!15 words for the concepts they (!Xpress 24,

42.46

In the series HUMAN COGNITIVE PROCESSING (HCP) the following titles have been published thus far or arc scheduled for publication:

I, NING YU: The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor. A perspective from Chinese. 1998. 2. COOPER, David l.: Lingui$tic Anractors. Tl1e cognitive dp~amics of language acquisition

and change. 1999. 3. FUCHS, Catherine and Stephanc ROBERT (eds.): Language Diversity and Cognitive Representations. 1999. 4. PANTHER. Klaus-Uwe and GUnter RADDEN (eds.); Metonymy it! Language and Tho11ght. 1999. 5. NUYTS, Jan: Epistemic Modality, Lmguage, and Conceptualization. A cognitivepragmatic perspective. 2001. 6. FORTESCUE, Michael: Panen1 and Process. A Whiteheadian perspective on ling11istia. 2001. 7. SCHLESINGER, Izchak, Tamar KEREN-PORTNOY and Tamar PARUSH: T/1e Structure of Arguments. n.y.p. 8. SANDERS, Ted, Joost SCHILPEROORD and Wilbert SPOOREN (eds.): Text Repu$entatioll. Linguistic and psycholing11istic aspects. n.y.p.