Migrants and Identity in Japan and Brazil: The Nikkeijin

Migrants and Identity in Japan and Brazil

Economic and social difficulties at the beginning of the twentieth century caused many Japanese to emigrate to Brazil. The situation was reversed in the 1980s as a result of an economic downturn in Brazil and labour shortages in Japan. This book examines the construction and reconstruction of the ethnic identities of people of Japanese descent – the Nikkeijin – in Brazil up to the 1980s and then in Japan in the 1990s. The closed nature of Japan’s social history means that the effect of ‘return migration’ can clearly be seen. Japan is a unique sociological specimen, owing to the absence of any tradition of receiving immigrants. Daniela de Carvalho argues that mutual contact has led neither to a state of conflict nor to one of peaceful coexistence, but rather to an assertion of difference. It is claimed that the Nikkeijin consent strategically to the social definitions imposed upon their identities and that the issue of the Nikkeijin presence is closely related to the emerging diversity of Japanese society. This interdisciplinary book addresses issues such as migration, ethnic identity and ethnic community from the perspectives of both Japan and Brazil, and utilises a wide range of Japanese, Brazilian and English sources. It will be of interest to sociologists, social psychologists, anthropologists and East Asian specialists. Daniela de Carvalho graduated from the University of Sheffield and is currently Associate Professor of Social Psychology at the Universidade Portucalense, Portugal.

Migrants and Identity in Japan and Brazil The Nikkeijin Daniela de Carvalho

First published 2003 by RoutledgeCurzon 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003. RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2003 Daniela de Carvalho All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data De Carvalho, Daniela, 1956– Migrants and identity in Japan and Brazil: the Nikkeijin / Daniela de Carvalho. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Alien labor, Brazilian – Japan. 2. Return migration – Japan. 3. Japan – Emigration and immigration. 4. Brazil – Emigration and immigration. 5. Brazilians – Japan – Social conditions. I. Title HD8728.5.A2D443 2002 305.895′6081′0952 – dc21 2002026930 ISBN 0-203-22071-4 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-27552-7 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0–7007–1705–6 (Print Edition)

To John

Contents

Acknowledgements Terminology List of tables Introduction Conceptual framework

ix x xi xiii xvii

PART I

Japanese migrants and their descendants in Brazil

1

1

An overview of Japanese emigration

3

2

Japanese immigrants in Brazil

35

3

From Dekasegi Imin to Nikkeijin

52

PART II

Brazilian Nikkei migrants in Japan

77

4

The Dekasegi

79

5

The making of the Nikkei minority

115

6

Conclusion

145

Appendix A Japanese emigrants to Latin-American countries by period and country

154

Appendix B Number of Japanese emigrants to Brazil, 1908–1986

155

viii

Contents

Appendix C Distribution of Brazilian Nikkeijin by prefecture in 1998

156

Appendix D Research methodology

157

Glossary Notes Bibliography Index

159 166 186 201

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to many people. First and foremost, I owe thanks to Professor Camilo Cimourdain de Oliveira for his constant support, and to John Wilks, whose encouragement and assistance made this book possible. I am also grateful to Richard Jenkins for his comments and support. A number of ideas presented here were greatly influenced by conversations with him. My thinking has also benefited from discussion at the session on Multiple Identities at the Cross-Cultural Conference in Finland, July 1998. A special vote of thanks is due to Ian Neary for his comments on an earlier version of the text as a dissertation, and to James Grayson and Roger Goodman who encouraged its metamorphosis into a book. Acknowledgement must also be made to Masayoshi Tsurumi and Tadashi Okanouchi for their help during my fellowship at Hosei University in Tokyo. For different reasons during the period of research I received much cooperation, both in Brazil and Japan. I would like in particular to thank Ana Cristina Hori and her parents, Edson Urano, Lúcia Yamamoto and her family, Kyoko Michi, Teruko and Kuniharu Taira, Shotaro Hamura and Yasuko Kataoka, all of whom greatly assisted me in various ways. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the support of the following institutions: The University of Sheffield which partly funded the research in Brazil; the Japan Foundation Endowment Committee; and the Japan Foundation Fellowship Programme which enabled me to do research in Japan. The author and publishers would like to thank the following for granting permission to reproduce material in this work: Hosei University for permission to use material from ‘The Japanese Immigration Law Revisited’ by Daniela de Carvalho, Journal of International Studies, March 2000; The Afro-Asian Institute of Japan for permission to use material from ‘Burajiru ni okeru imim’ by Daniela de Carvalho, Azia Afrika Kekyuu, 39 (2) 1999 and The Japan Foundation for allowing us to reproduce material from ‘The Making of a Minority in Japan’ by Daniela de Carvalho, The Japan Foundation Newsletter, XXVII (3–4) March 2000.

Terminology

The term ‘Nikkeijin’ literally means people of Japanese descent. The Japanese character sei means ‘generation’. By adding a numerical counter as a prefix, as in Issei, Nisei and Sansei, first, second and third generations are designated. Mestiço is the term used by people of Japanese descent in Brazil to refer to the offspring of a mixed marriage between a Nikkeijin and a non-Nikkeijin. The term ‘Dekasegi’ (migrant) is also used in this book to refer not only to the Nikkeijin as migrants, but also to their spouses of non-Japanese ancestry who migrated to Japan. Both terms are used in the book as explained in Chapter 4. Unless otherwise specified, translations from Portuguese and Japanese into English are by me. Words and sentences that offer different interpretations are written in brackets or in endnotes in the original language. Long vowels in Japanese are written with an umlaut (e.g. ö). Exceptions to this rule are well-known words recognised in the English language. For reasons of privacy informants have not been named in full.

List of tables

1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 3.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1

Number of Japanese emigrants by destination country until 1939 Nikkei population by sex and age Distribution of Nikkei population by region Occupation of Nikkei population by sector and by area in 1988 Income by national population and Nikkei population in 1987 Language spoken at home, 1958 and 1988 Language used between parents and children by area in 1988 Rate of inter-marriage by year, generation and sex Inter-marriage by area in 1988 Religion of the Nikkei population by area in 1988 Nikkei population by degree of ‘Japaneseness’ (1987–1988) Number of South Americans residing in Japan in 1998 Number of registered Brazilians in Japan (1991–1998) Number of Dekasegi who suffered accidents at work in Japan by year Criteria for being ‘a Japanese’

4 27 27 38 38 40 40 42 43 44 73 80 89 98 119

Introduction

According to the 1990 revision of the Japanese Immigration Control and Refuge Law, only foreign nationals of Japanese descent (Nikkeijin) up to the third generation, or the spouses of such people, are permitted unrestricted rights of residence and employment. This new law has led to a significant increase in the employment of people of Japanese descent from South America, in particular from Brazil. The most recent figures available (1998) suggest that the number of Nikkeijin resident in Japan is approximately 274,691, of whom 81 per cent are of Brazilian origin. Japanese immigration policy is consistent with the image that the Japanese have formed of themselves as a racially and culturally homogeneous people. Underlying this image is the assumption that cultural traits are closely bound up with genetic traits and, therefore, Japanese ‘blood’ and culture are seen to be associated criteria. As a result, policy-makers appear to have assumed that migrants of Japanese descent would relieve the demand for labourers and their ‘ethnic ties’ would facilitate their adjustment to, and acceptance by, Japanese society. However, the Japanese who emigrated to South America and their descendants have a distinct past, a past constructed in a Latin American context, with Japan as a point of reference. Thus, while Japanese culture is not completely alien to them, at the same time they may not fully identify with Japan. Initially, the Nikkeijin presence was numerically insignificant. However, ten years later, at the time of writing, their numbers have expanded, and at present they constitute one of the largest ethnic groups in the country. There are, moreover, signs that many of them do not intend to return to Brazil. Increasing numbers are accompanied by their families and the number of those who re-emigrate to Japan from Brazil for the second time has also been on the increase. In the space of ten years they have effectively established their own distinct communities in Japan. The difficulties of incorporating foreigners into Japanese society have been illustrated by the experience of the Koreans and the Chinese. However, these South Americans now emigrating to Japan have Japanese lineage. Although they are officially welcomed by the government, a question remains as to whether they are equally welcome to the Japanese people. Although the issue has been frequently discussed, such discussion has been based on a virtual absence of empirical research. The extent to which people of Japanese descent can be fully integrated

xiv

Introduction

into Japanese society depends not only on government policy, but also on their encounters and relationships with the local population. Ultimately, the fundamental issue is one of ethnicity, but an ethnicity defined within the peculiarly local crucible of mutually perceived ethnic identities. Brazilian Nikkeijin do not acquire their ethnic identity (or identities) at the moment of their arrival in Japan. (Although the singular noun, ethnicity, is frequently used hereafter, it does not preclude the notion that identity is multiple.) Nikkeijin ethnicity was first created in the process of emigration to, and migration within, Brazil up to the 1980s, and then in the process of migration to Japan in the 1990s. Given this, it is necessary to examine how Brazilian Nikkei ethnicity has been constructed since the first Japanese emigrants settled in Brazil. Accordingly, this study commences with a survey of the first wave of emigration from Meiji Japan to Brazil, and terminates with an analysis of the Nikkei communities in Japan. The structure of the book is as follows. It opens with a discussion of the theoretical framework and overall methodology. The first part comprises three chapters, each of which examines the Japanese emigrants and their descendants in Brazil. The first chapter provides an historical overview of Japanese emigration and examines how government policies encouraged emigration to Brazil and ensuing settlement in that country. Similarly, the communities and the ethnic life of the Japanese immigrants at that time are analysed. Owing to its importance in the history of the Japanese emigration to Brazil, and in the construction of migrant ethnic identities, I am particularly attentive to the period that followed Japan’s defeat in 1945. Chapter 2 examines the integration of Japanese immigrants within Brazil. This is followed by an account of the reception of Japanese immigrants and their descendants within the context of Brazilian society, the attitudes of that society towards ‘race’, and its implementation of immigration policies based upon preferred racial categories. In Chapter 3, the process of immigration is analysed along with an examination of the construction of the Nikkeijin identity as it was refashioned and renegotiated within the shifting pattern of inter-relationships between the Japanese and their host society. In the second part of this study, the point of view shifts from Brazil to Japan, focusing on the relationship between Brazilian Nikkei migrants and the Japanese, and the mutuality of their cognitive adjustments and readjustments. Chapter 4 begins with an examination of Japanese immigration policy, the internal debates over foreign workers, and social attitudes towards them. This is followed by an account of the Nikkei migration to Japan. Following an overview of the ten-year period of migration, the creation of ethnic communities and the possibilities for, and implications of, long-term settlement are discussed. Chapter 5 examines the role played by ‘blood’ in the construction of Japanese identity; the definition of ‘Japaneseness’, and the normative criteria employed in such self-definition. I then discuss the various cultural representations of the Nikkeijin within Japan, supported by the findings from fieldwork designed to explore mutual perceptions and the implications of mutual contact between the Japanese and the Nikkeijin. To better understand the making of a Nikkei minority, the issue of discrimination against Nikkeijin is discussed, and a specific community in Japan is analysed. The second

Introduction

xv

half of the chapter examines the reconstruction of Nikkeijin identity in Japan, emphasising the diversity and plurality within the Nikkei population itself. The book concludes by arguing the point that the Nikkeijin consent strategically to the social definitions that are imposed upon their identities, selectively accepting or rejecting these controlling images in an attempt to make sense of themselves and of their place in the dominant order. As implied above, there exists a multiplicity of Nikkeijin identities, and Nikkeijin identity in Japan is merely one amongst other, partly optional, possibilities. Finally, it is concluded that the issue of the Nikkeijin presence is closely related to the emerging diversity of Japanese society.

Conceptual framework

The Nikkeijin experience a process of identity reconstruction as a result of their migration to the land of their ancestors. Yet, it has often been assumed that their ethnic identity is straightforwardly South American.1 The issue has been oversimplified as one in which such people bring their own cultural identities into juxtaposition with an alien culture. Admittedly, it is in Japan that many Nikkeijin become aware of their Brazilian identity and this heightened sense of identity becomes more important than it was in Brazil. However, though it might seem reasonable to think that, as second and third generations, Nikkeijin identity is based largely (but by no means exclusively) upon the society of origin, i.e. Brazil, it cannot be assumed that Japanese cultural forms are completely unknown to them. The Nikkeijin exist as an ethnic group in Brazil and as such are aware of sharing a common culture that is different from that of other Brazilians. Thus, we must take the ethnic past into consideration if we are to understand how ethnic identities have been formed in Japan. An overview of literature on the Nikkeijin suggests that their ethnic allegiances are very much taken for granted. These tend to be understood as a product of the cultural responses that they evolved in Brazil and subsequently put to use in Japan. What is seen to be at issue is culture or ‘blood’ and, accordingly, research questions are formulated in terms of ‘being Brazilian or being Japanese’; both identities are defined in mutually exclusive and oppositional terms.2 In this literature, ethnicity is viewed as a primordial ‘given’, assigned by birth or ancestry and therefore immutable. This concept of ethnicity fails to convey either the dynamic nature of identity or migration as an ongoing and creative process. Moreover, the manner in which migrants are received within the host society has a direct influence on their ethnic identity, a subject that has been neglected in the past. The assumption has been that the Nikkeijin brought their ethnicity with them. However, it would be truer to say that their ethnicity did not cross the ocean intact, but rather developed within the host society (i.e. Japan). Although interaction with the host society is actually rather minimal, the composition of Nikkei ethnic communities and their behaviour evolved in relationship with Japanese society at large rather than in isolation. Like their parents and grandparents before them, the Nikkeijin develop identities shaped by and suited to new contexts under new circumstances.

xviii

Conceptual framework

Another aspect that has been inadequately analysed is the misplaced research emphasis on ethnicity as an explanation for the Nikkeijin assertion of a selfconsciously Brazilian identity in Japan. Ethnicity alone does not provide an explanation for this. There are clearly other sociopsychological factors involved (e.g. as a way of advancing a positive social identity), and in addition there are also plainly interests that can be served through ethnic mobilisation. Moreover, the literature on the subject has tended to treat the issue of Nikkeijin migration as if it were a single movement from Brazil to Japan. Yet there are Nikkeijin who have reemigrated twice and even three times to Japan, and this multiple migration clearly has further implications for the way those involved see themselves. Another difficulty presented by this research is its underlying assumption that because a group of individuals have similar sociodemographic characteristics they automatically share the same ethnicity. This has the effect of downplaying the diversity amongst the Nikkei population itself, and thus ignoring important individual differences and the various ways in which people express themselves. Unless individual differences are recognised the question of their ethnic identity cannot be understood with much precision. Although the issue of Nikkeijin ethnic identity has been frequently discussed, this discussion tends to be supported by little in the way of empirical research, and what research does exist is of very recent date (e.g. Tsuda 1998).3 Apart from few exceptions, most of the literature available on the issue has been based on data drawn from social surveys and interviews that focus on general aspects of the Nikkeijin sojourn in Japan and include questions about ethnic identity (e.g. Watanabe 1995). The difficulties of ‘measuring’ ethnicity are well known but, most importantly, this kind of approach cannot give a full understanding of ethnic identities. Ethnicity is a complex phenomenon that is rooted in psychosociological, economic, and political factors, which, if ignored, prevent a full understanding of its organic nature (Abner Cohen 1996: 372). The study of the Nikkeijin ethnic identities needs to be interpreted in the light of a more complex conceptualisation than that informing the literature so far extant. This study intends to offer a new slant on the issue. In order to outline its central theme it is necessary first of all to establish a conceptual clarification and a working definition of ethnic identity. To achieve this, the more relevant theoretical orientations involved in the discussion of ethnicity will be examined. My intent therefore is not an extensive discussion of the available scholarship, but rather a survey of what is essential in the way of theoretical foundations.

Concepts of ethnicity An overview of the literature reveals two salient lines of thought: one that conceives of ethnicity as a primordial attachment, and another that conceives of it as a social construction. According to the former, ethnicity is an ‘instinctive’ predisposition or primordial attachment which stems from being born into a particular community (e.g. Geertz 1963). Or, according to the sociobiological approach, it is a matter of genes, an extension of the idiom of kinship (Berghe 1978a,b). Birth

Conceptual framework

xix

and ‘blood’ provide the grounds for ethnicity which, as a consequence, is seen as involuntary and immutable from cradle to grave. Against this deterministic view of ethnicity, a different perspective, pioneered by Barth (1969), developed. According to this view, the meaning of ethnicity does not lie in cultural content, but within a system of differences, expressed in and through the social boundaries between two or more groups. As Barth states, ethnicity is not about different peoples and cultures coming together and accommodating themselves to each other, but about what is needed to make ethnic distinctions emerge. This view emphasises the fact that ethnicity is by definition a relational construct. Ethnicity is conceived as happening at the boundary of ‘us’ in contrast with ‘them’. The criteria and the importance of differences depend on the circumstances. Ethnic boundaries are thus flexible and change according to pressures both from inside and outside the ethnic group. Individuals may find their way out of a given ethnic group, but the boundaries are maintained in some form or another (Wallmann 1999). The pragmatic side of ethnicity is stressed by some scholars. Among others, Glazer and Moynihan (1975) claim that there is an instrumental gain to be derived from ethnicity and people change their ethnic identity only if it is advantageous to do so. This view is endorsed by Adam (1971: 2), who argues that ethnic identifications should be seen as the result of efforts by underprivileged groups to improve their chances through collective mobilisation or the efforts of a super-ordinate group to preserve their privileges. In the same line of thought, Patterson (1975) concluded, on the basis of research in the Caribbean, that ethnicity is a strategy chosen to promote a given individual’s social and economic interests. This is illustrated by Jamaican and Puerto Rican people who move in and out of their ethnic identification merely by travelling from one of the two countries to the other. Along the same lines, Banton (1994: 5) argues that ‘ethnic definitions can lose ground to other social definitions, such as those of religion, class, nation or friendship. They can also weaken if self-interest is allowed greater legitimacy at the expense of social obligation’. According to the above-mentioned perspective, ethnicity is a resource that can be activated in specific situations when it is necessary to achieve ends, but at other times can be latent and passively ignored. However, it is clear that ethnicity cannot merely be reduced to interests, and social scientists have devoted some attention to the psychosocial dimension of ethnic identity. Changsoo and De Vos (1981) exemplify those who emphasise the subjective and affective aspects of ethnicity. Quoting Bell, they argue that ethnicity combines an ‘interest’ with an ‘affective’ tie. Nonetheless, ethnicity cannot be seen solely as an individual matter, and scholars have pointed out that there are political, economic and social constraints upon selfidentifications. Thus, individuals are often assigned ethnic identities regardless of their subjective feelings; far from being optional such definitions are largely imposed by the dominant society. Hegemonic discourses, both political and economic, together with media representations, are all variously implicated in the process of external categorisations. Similarly, academia is of course crucially implicated, particularly in the way the ‘talk of difference’ is theorised (Amit-Talai 1996: 107).

xx Conceptual framework As Nagel puts it, ‘Ethnic identities are the result of a dialectical process involving internal and external opinions and processes, as well as the individuals’ self-identifications and outsiders’ ethnic designations. In other words, ethnicity is what you think your ethnicity is versus what they think your ethnicity is (1994: 154, emphasis in the original). Furthermore, external designations have implications for such self-identifications and self-definitions. Thus, ethnic ‘identity is the practical product of an ongoing interaction of processes of internal and external definition’ (Jenkins 1994: 219). Within the framework of post-modernist ideas, and in the debate over assimilationism and pluralism, there have emerged new conceptions of ethnicity. These centre on the subjective aspect of ethnicity (the meaning of ethnicity for the individual) as an identification process. Ethnicity here is not considered as a primordial given or as an instrumental means to achieve political ends, but is understood as a social and cultural construction, changeable, invented and re-invented in response to the changing realities which affect the ethnic group and society as a whole (e.g. Hall et al. 1992; Hall 1996; Hutchinson and Smith 1996). This line of reflection emphasises the socially constructed and changeable character of ethnic identities. From the perspective of ‘post-ethnicity’, far from being inherited, ethnicity can be wilfully altered. In this view, ancestors cannot define nor impose ethnicity. A postethnic society would be characterised ideally by the equality of opportunity open to all citizens to select their own ethnic identities (although it is recognised that not everybody is in a position to choose, Waters 1990). From what has been said, it may be concluded that scholarly interpretations have shifted from perspectives that privilege biological and cultural ties, to perspectives that privilege interests and give due weight to the political, economic, and social aspects of ethnicity, whilst remaining alert to its subjective dimensions.

Identity Having examined different concepts of ethnicity, it is necessary to say a few words about the concept of identity. From its initial formulation by Erikson (1968), identity as a theoretical construct has undergone several interpretations. Thus, traditional formulations which centred on the idea of a continuous personal essence gave way, in the 1960s, to conceptualisations which radically challenged this idea. Identity is no longer seen as an immutable state of being; rather identities are said to be ‘de-centred’, dislocated or fragmented, constantly subject to negotiation in the varying conditions of (especially) modern life. One conceptualises oneself in many possible ways and may be characterised by several identities which become manifest according to the situation. In the words of Robin Cohen (1994: 204), ‘Gender, age, disability, race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, civil status, even musical styles and dress codes, are also very potent axes of organisation and identification. These different forms of identity appear to be upheld simultaneously, successively or separately, and with different degrees of force, conviction and enthusiasm’. There are thus two different views of identity: the Eriksonian conception of

Conceptual framework

xxi

identity as an inner continuity that endures through all the changes the individual undergoes; and the later understanding of identity as a process, continuously created and recreated in interaction with the social milieu. The parallels between the two views of ethnicity (the primordialist view and the social constructionist view) and the two views of identity are obvious (Gleason 1996). The constructionist conceptions of ethnicity and identity are, in the view of this writer, more descriptively relevant to the contemporary world, and theoretically more useful in examining the ethnic identities of migrants. Arguably, traditional approaches fail to provide an adequate understanding of ethnic identities in a world characterised by change and movement, aspects which are likely to be experienced most acutely by migrants themselves (on this issue, see Rapport and Dawson 1998). In this respect, a final point needs to be made. The use of the term ‘identity’ is grounded in the experience of emigration and immigration, Erikson having been himself a migrant. The process of separation from cultural origins and the experience of migration (with all its attendant awareness of belonging to a distinctive group, set apart from the larger society in terms of race, nationality, culture) tend naturally to accelerate the reconstruction of ethnic identities. This is because emigration involves a process of recreation, not only of oneself but also of one’s ethnic group.

This study: perspective and scope The perspective adopted in this study is that ethnic identity is not based merely on common descent and cultural tradition. Rather it is one aspect of social relations among and between social actors, who regard themselves, and are regarded by others, as being culturally distinct from the host society with whom they interact within a specific historical, political, social and economic moment. Moreover, individuals are involved in multiple identities and ethnic identity is but one of them. Like any other form of social identity, ethnic identity is a sense of belonging in relation to others, and need not imply a uniform signification for everybody; it may be exploited according to instrumental motives, but it may also be imposed by the dominant order. In this sense, ethnic identity is both socially constructed and situationally contingent.3 The main argument advanced in this book is that the construction of the Nikkeijin identity is a process of self-definition, mediated within the interplay of that definition with external definitions (in turn, reinforced positively or negatively by other definitions). Building on the above considerations, my purpose here is to give an account of the construction of Nikkeijin identities, examining the ways in which Japanese descendants saw themselves at the time of their emigration, how they were categorised in the receiving country, and how this fed back into their later selfperceptions. The study is organised according to five points of emphasis. First, Nikkeijin identities are responsive to, and shaped by circumstances (including those inherent in the migration process), and are thus adaptive to variables of time and space. Second, the behavioural significance of such identities cannot be fully understood

xxii Conceptual framework apart from a comprehension of the broader system. Third, Nikkeijin identities are the negotiated outcomes of multiple encounters with the host society. Fourth, an emphasis on ethnic allegiances as the most meaningful basis of identity depends both on the situation and self-interests at stake. Finally, and following on from this, there are important individual differences which in the fuller picture cannot be ignored. The research upon which this book is based was conducted in three phases. The first took place between 1992 and 1995 in Okayama Prefecture, and consisted of 50 interviews and a social survey on the living and working conditions of Nikkeijin in Japan, carried out amongst 345 respondents. The second phase covered two months, March and April 1997, in the Japanese community in Brazil (Metropolitan São Paulo and Promissão in the State of São Paulo). The third phase, March and April 1998, explored mutual and interacting perceptions of the Japanese and the Nikkeijin and the consequences of their mutual contact in three different prefectures: Aichi (Toyohashi), Okayama (Soja) and Shizuoka (Hamamatsu). This study was continued from September of the same year to February 1999 in Kanagawa Prefecture and Tokyo Metropolitan Prefecture (for a full account see Appendix D).4 Whilst authorial objectivity is probably an impossible ideal, some claim to narrative impartiality may be allowed by my ‘ethnic neutrality’. The fact that I am a Portuguese national permitted my access to Brazilian, Japanese and Nikkeijin discourses, without any obvious reasons for prejudging them.

Part I

Japanese migrants and their descendants in Brazil

1

An overview of Japanese emigration

During the modernisation and industrialisation of the Meiji period (1868–1912), Japan was affected by numerous socioeconomic problems, and a number of Japanese sought escape from poverty through migration. Between 1885 and 1923, half a million Japanese left Japan for reasons which variously included overpopulation and heavy taxes. Within Asia, the largest number went to Manchuria or to Korea. A smaller number went to the Philippines and to other Pacific islands. In 1883, the Japanese began to emigrate to Australia, but a majority went to Hawaii or to the United States mainland. The first wave of emigration to Hawaii occurred in 1868. After that recruiting agents from pineapple and sugar plantations went to Japan searching for workers, and between 1885 and 1894, a total of 29,132 Japanese emigrated to Hawai. By 1898, the Japanese constituted 40 per cent of the total population of Hawaii (Comissão 1992: 35). By 1910, 72,157 Japanese had gone to the west coast of the United States from Hawaii or directly from Japan (Shinpo 1995: 48). The first legal immigrants to Canada arrived in 1877, and between 1897 and 1901, a total of 15,280 Japanese settled there (Makabe 1981: 788–9). By 1938, these were 598,490 Japanese living abroad (Normano and Gerbi 1943: 11). Emigration had been prohibited during the Tokugawa period (1603–1867). However, Japan was now facing economic difficulties, and emigration came to be seen as a means of simultaneously overcoming problems of unemployment and overpopulation, and as a contribution to the nation’s wealth. In 1890, emigration companies received permission from the Japanese government to recruit emigrants. The first of these, Kishisa Imin Kaisha (the Kishisa Emigration Company), was founded in 1891 and the number of recruiting companies quickly multiplied. Some conducted their affairs on an ethical basis, others were seriously irresponsible; most of them, while evoking the cause of national interest, made good profits for themselves (Robert Smith 1979: 54). In 1891, Kaigai Ijü Döshi Kai (the Emigration Fellowship Society) was founded and was soon followed by other similar organisations. In 1896, the Emigration Protection Law was issued in order to regulate emigration. Under the terms of this law, emigrants could be recruited only by officially approved agents (Vieira 1973a). In 1917, the government merged all existing emigration companies to form the semi-official agency Kaigai Kögyö Kabushiki Kaisha (Overseas Industrial Company,

4

Japanese migrants in Brazil

hereafter KKKK). This was the first step taken by the Japanese government to control emigration. However, despite state encouragement to leave Japan, Japanese immigrants soon ceased to be welcome in their host countries. Australia, showing a preference for European immigrants, restricted Japanese immigration in 1901. Similarly, the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ in 1908 between the United States and Japan, and later the Quota Immigration Act of 1924, put an end to emigration to the United States and Hawaii. Canada, from 1895 onwards, tightened immigration controls, and the number of Japanese immigrants decreased substantially. Consequently, alternative channels of emigration had to be opened: in 1889 to Mexico, Peru and Bolivia; then in 1908 to Brazil; and later to Paraguay and other Latin American countries (Normano and Gerbi 1943; Moreno 1981). Table 1.1 shows the number of Japanese immigrants by country. Table 1.1 Number of Japanese emigrants by destination country until 1939 Country

Number

USA Manchuria Central and South America Asian countries Total

441,409 270,007 244,172 81,768

Source: Waga Kokumin no Kagai Hatten (The Expansion of our People).1

As Japanese immigrants faced strong resistance in other countries, and as Brazil had a shortage of labour, that country soon became their primary destination. By 1938, the Japanese community in Brazil was the second largest outside Japan (after Manchuria) and by the 1950s it had become the largest.2 As a result of Japanese action in World War II, public opinion in Brazil turned against them. Nevertheless, in 1952, the Japanese government negotiated a new treaty, regulating migration to Brazil, and arranged to open up new settlements in Paraguay, the Dominican Republic and Argentina. However, the number of emigrants who left Japan in the post-war period accounted for only 5 per cent of the total of Japanese emigrants to Brazil: 80 per cent of those went to Brazil and the rest headed for Argentina, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic and Paraguay (see Appendix A).

Brazil as an emigration destination With the severe curtailment of the Atlantic slave trade in 1850 and imminent prospects of the abolition of slavery, Brazilian coffee planters realised that an alternative source of cheap labour would have to be found for their plantations, and they looked to immigrants to provide it. In 1886, a group of coffee planters in São Paulo created the Sociedade Promotora da Imigração (Society for the Promotion of Immigration) organised with the purpose of recruiting European immigrants, in particular from Italy. This Society was initially financed by the treasury of the state

An overview of Japanese emigration 5 of São Paulo and, three years later, was taken over by the government of the state. The Society initiated a policy of subsidised immigration by means of the colono (contract labour) system, in which partial passage to Brazil, transportation from the port of Santos to São Paulo, lodging and food while a job was arranged, and then transportation to the place of employment was paid for by the state and federal governments. These measures resulted in an intense wave of immigration. Between 1880 and 1900, 1.6 million Europeans arrived in Brazil, over half of them from Italy and the rest from Portugal and Spain. Immigrants were taken primarily to the central and southern states. Although attracting a large number of immigrants, Brazilian employers soon acquired a bad reputation for exploitation. In 1902, the Italian government issued a decree forbidding emigration to Brazil, due to the large number of complaints of mistreatment reported by Italian colonos. The French and Spanish governments subsequently took similar action (Klein 1995; Nogueira 1973). While these sanctions did not lead to the complete cessation of European immigration, the immigrant numbers decreased substantially. Moreover, with many immigrants abandoning coffee plantations during the 1897–1906 coffee crisis, Brazil was facing a severe labour shortage. The importation of Chinese labour was considered, but was ruled out on racial grounds. Although the Japanese were not particularly well regarded, they had gained prestige through their victory in the Russo-Japanese war and, more importantly, the need to find a new source of labour may have contributed to the decision to recruit labour from Japan. Since 1894, several attempts had been made to bring Japanese immigrants to Brazil, but without success. Finally, on 6 November 1907, a contract was signed by the President of the Kokoku Shokumin Kaisha (the Empire Emigration Company) and the President of the São Paulo State Government, marking the beginning of officially approved emigration to Brazil. In 1914, the state of São Paulo temporarily suspended immigration subsidies and in 1923 abolished them for good. This action suggests that Japanese immigrants were no longer needed because the Europeans were starting to come back.3 Conversely, the socioeconomic difficulties experienced by Japan during the 1920s, coupled with restrictions on Japanese emigration imposed by other countries, resulted in increasing involvement by the Japanese government in the emigration of its citizens. In 1924, the Emigration Council, headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, having sent an exploratory mission to South America, decided to concentrate migration efforts on Brazil (Jirimutu 1994: 17, 42). Subsequently, the Japanese government assumed responsibility for making the Japanese aware of economic opportunities in Brazil, for the payment of transportation expenses to Brazil, and for arranging employment and housing in Brazil. Emigration became government policy (kokusaku imin) after 1925, and accordingly the government became more involved in the emigration process (Comissão 1992: 137). Recruitment was encouraged, and information on the possibilities afforded by emigration was transmitted by labour recruiters, national government

6

Japanese migrants in Brazil

agencies, such as the Ministry of Agriculture, and Prefectural authorities. Publications were disseminated, particularly in southern Honshu and in northern Kyushu. In 1927, the government issued the Overseas Emigration Act and requested that the prefectures create the Ijü Kumiai (Emigration Associations), an association of Japanese prefectures to recruit and provide guidance for the emigrants.4 A transit hostel was built in Kobe where the emigrants could stay free of charge and receive guidance prior to departure and the Japanese government enacted the Emigration Co-operative Act, with a view to intensifying the settlement of Japanese in Brazil. The Federation of Emigration Co-operative Societies was organised to recruit immigrants for settlement communities that were to be constructed on land purchased with the aid of several states in Brazil. With funds from the Japanese government, three sites were acquired in São Paulo and one in the north of Paraná. In March 1929, Burajiru Takushoku Kumiai (the Brazilian Colonisation Association, hereafter BRATAC), an agency of the Federation of Overseas Associations, was established in São Paulo in order to administer land.5 Complementing state involvement in emigration were private initiatives from Japanese investors. In 1926, for example, a company founded the Nomura plantation; in 1927, Tözan Kigyö, a subsidiary of Mitsubishi, acquired coffee plantations; and one year later, a group of Osaka investors founded Nippaku, a company that bought a plantation to cultivate coffee (Hatanaka 1993: 125). In 1930, an enterprise held a large concession in Amazon and an Institute was set up in Tokyo to train leaders for the colonisation of Amazon (Normano and Gerbi 1943: 42). In 1935, the Japanese Chamber of Trade went to Brazil on a private mission. The delegation was composed of eminent entrepreneurs, representing the interests of several sectors of economic activity covering commercial, spinning, mining and finance. This visit resulted in further investment, particularly in the spinning and exportation of cotton. In Osaka, the Brazil–Japan Cotton Society was established. Simultaneously, other industries related to the textile industry came to Brazil. The first emigrants subsidised by the Japanese government left Japan for Brazil in October 1924. Between 1908 and 1923, about 33,000 Japanese entered Brazil, subsidised by the state of São Paulo and by Japanese emigration agencies, both private and governmental. Under the sponsorship of the Japanese government, 150,000 persons entered Brazil between 1924 and 1941.6 From 1924 onwards, Japanese emigration to Brazil steadily increased, and nearly 60,000 Japanese went to Brazil between 1932 and 1934, about half the total emigration to Brazil. However, in 1934, the Brazilian government restricted immigration (the Restriction Act of 1934) to an annual quota of 2 per cent for all Japanese immigrants. The number of immigrants dropped below the quota with the outbreak of World War II, and the decline continued after the war. By 1940, there were 205,000 Japanese and Japanese descendants in Brazil, constituting 0.5 per cent of the total Brazilian population (41,160,000). Between 1942 and 1952, Japanese migration slowed to a trickle, and thereafter continued at a reduced rate. During this period, the Amazon region received 14,000 immigrants. Large-scale Japanese immigration re-emerged in 1953, and during the next ten

An overview of Japanese emigration 7 years, 53,555 Japanese came to Brazil.7 (See Appendix B for the number of Japanese emigrants to Brazil from 1908 to 1986.)

Japanese settlement in the pre-war period8 Japanese emigration to Brazil officially began in 1908. In that year, the ship Kasato Maru with 781 Japanese on board (165 families comprising 733 members, 40 single persons and 8 unaccompanied children) arrived at the port of Santos.9 The prefectures of Okinawa, Kumamoto, Hiroshima and Kagoshima supplied 60 per cent of this first group of immigrants, who were divided between six fazendas (plantations). Problems soon began. The immigrants complained that they were treated like slaves, and that the working and living conditions were very different from those that had been promised in Japan. Moreover, the emigration company had not returned the money that the immigrants had earlier deposited with the ship during the journey.10 As a result, the immigrants rebelled against the emigration company and many deserted the plantations. The plantation owners were not satisfied with the arrangements either, because many of the immigrants had no expertise in farming (Nogueira 1973: 65). The first group of immigrants proved to be a failure, but emigration continued. The second group, made up of 247 families (906 individuals) arrived in June 1910, and two years later a further 367 families (1,433 individuals) entered Brazil. They were the first of a total of nearly a quarter of a million Japanese who would enter the country during the next fifty years. They came as colonos for one year, under contracts drawn up between Japan and the State of São Paulo. The colonos Because unattached individuals did not stay long on the plantations, Brazilian immigration laws required immigrants to come in family units, with at least three economically active members from 12 to 50 years old available for work immediately after their arrival in Brazil. As a consequence, a number of families were artificially constituted (keishiki kazoku or kösei kazoku, literally, constructed or composed family) before the emigrants left Japan. Siblings or other relatives such as cousins or nieces, were adopted, and sometimes one or more people who were not even related to the family were included by means of adoption or simulated marriage. Many young people married purely for the purpose of emigration and split up after their arrival. In the 1958 census, 18 per cent of pre-war immigrants were reported to have been ‘incorporated family members’ at the time of their arrival in Brazil. Later, established households sent for single kinsmen. The Japanese who emigrated to Brazil in the pre-war period were largely from rural areas. According to Suzuki (1971: 386), among 19,729 households, 15,812 were jikosaku (owners of small farms) and 1,581 were kosaku (tenant farmers). They started their new life as colonos in coffee fazendas. The contract established between the immigrants and the plantation owners through the emigration agencies required the immigrants to work as colonos in a plantation for a specific term

8

Japanese migrants in Brazil

(usually one or two years). However, not all of them came as colonos. Some came as independent workers and settled in the cities, while others came to settle on land they had acquired while still in Japan. The colonos cleared the forests, prepared the land for coffee and grew the coffee plants. In the land between the rows of coffee plants, they cultivated cash crops. Moreover, they sold surplus food crops and did other jobs such as repairing fences and outbuildings to provide an additional source of income. As contract workers, they received a fixed sum per 1,000 plants planted and another sum per sack of coffee beans harvested. The salary, paid on a yearly basis, was much lower than that previously stated by the emigration agencies, and was worth only about one-fifth of the average wage then earned by a worker in Hawaii or the United States (Saito 1961). They soon realised that the information given by the agencies had been false and that they could not become wealthy as quickly as they had at first thought. Moreover, tropical diseases such as malaria killed many, while others died from malnutrition and exhaustion. A common reaction to these difficulties was to run away from the plantations and to search for better opportunities elsewhere. The average Japanese family would not stay for more than a few years. As a result, they gained a reputation for unreliability. Nevertheless, unlike many other immigrants (Italians and Portuguese, for example) they remained in Brazil, largely because they were unwilling to return to Japan empty-handed. Of those who deserted the plantations, the majority went to the cities and found jobs as textile workers, domestics, carpenters, and so forth. Others found employment in railway companies as construction workers, while others emigrated again to other countries. Those who remained on the fazendas had a very harsh life, but did not remain colonos for very long. Around 1918–1920, the Japanese began to leave the fazendas. Four years after their arrival, 70 per cent of Japanese immigrants had progressed from colono status to owning farms. This change occurred mostly in the 1920s and 1930s, at a time when expansion in the production of coffee was starting to decline in the state of São Paulo. The Japanese government and BRATAC made important contributions to this change, supporting other projects and thereby attracting Japanese immigrants who were working on the coffee plantations. Naturally, this was a source of concern to plantation owners (Fukunaga 1983: 58). The vast majority of immigrants arrived at a time when the acquisition of land was relatively easy. Following the abolition of slavery in 1888, coffee plantations had been subdivided into small lots and sold.11 Some colonos were able to acquire these lots with their savings. The land was often very poor, and because they did not have enough money to develop their land, many did contract labour while leasing or sharecropping their land to a second Japanese family. The highest percentage of independent farmers (54.6 per cent) was recorded in the Amazon region at the end of the 1920s (Fukunaga 1983: 41). On the land they purchased, in addition to coffee, Japanese immigrants produced new crops such as cotton, rice and potatoes. As cotton was a lucrative crop on the world market, and as production in São Paulo in the 1930s was booming, a

An overview of Japanese emigration 9 number of Japanese became involved in cotton planting. By the late 1930s, the Japanese were responsible for half of the total production in the state of São Paulo, and by 1935 they accounted for 80 per cent of the vegetable production of suburban farmers in the area surrounding São Paulo city. By the 1940s, Japanese immigrants had, in general, become economically well established. When a large labour force was needed during the harvest of cotton, coffee or other crops, they hired local people. Organised settlements: the colonias In the early years, Japanese immigrants lived on the fazendas together with other immigrants, but as they became independent farmers and as emigration to Brazil continued, they settled together and formed colonias (literally colonies, but in Brazil the word denotes a community of foreign origin). Colonias adopted either the name of the locality or a Japanese name such as Asahi (Rising Sun) or Toyö (Orient). The first communities date back to 1910, though expansion was most pronounced during the 1920s and 1930s. In the 1930s and 1940s, they numbered several hundred throughout Brazil, the majority of which were located in São Paulo. Various types of colonias were formed.12 a)

b) c)

d)

The planned communities ijü chi (immigration settlements) were founded with private capital, and with support from the Japanese government. Nearly all the immigrants who settled in these colonias intended to remain permanently in Brazil. Mogi das Cruzes and Mairipora in the state of São Paulo are examples of such communities which still exist today. The federal and state governments planned organised, official, colonial units, largely in the states of Bahia, Mato Grosso and Amazonas. The shokuminchi (colonies) were spontaneously established by the immigrants on land acquired in virgin forest. This was a common type of settlement in the states of São Paulo and Paraná. Usually, the immigrants grouped themselves according to their prefecture of origin, the ship they came on, their religion or other similar factors. There were also settlements formed by small organised groups of colonos in São Paulo and in the states of Amazonas and Pará. Prefectural affiliation, particularly in the case of Okinawa, was often integral to the formation of shokuminchi. In Campo Grande, in the state of Mato Grosso as well as on the south coast of the state of São Paulo, there was a large concentration of Okinawans.13 The Colonia Segredo and Bandeira are two examples of communities formed by people from Okinawa. The communities set up by the emigration companies founded with Japanese private capital. In this case, for the most part, the immigrants came directly from Japan to settle in these communities. The first community of this type was Iguape formed in 1913 (later called Registro) on the initiative of Ikutaro Aoyagi who saw in the creation of these colonias in Brazil an opportunity for Japanese overseas expansion (Castro 1994: 28. Aliança and Três Barras are examples of communities founded by BRATAC.

10

Japanese migrants in Brazil

BRATAC was not the only institution to establish colonias. The prefecture of Kumamoto founded the Colonia Vila Nova; the Shimane Overseas Association (Kaigai Kyökai) set up the Primeira Aliança colony; Tottori Prefecture set up the Segunda Aliança; and Toyama Prefecture established the Terceira Aliança. In these cases the immigrants purchased the land before leaving Japan and the basic needs of the community were provided for by BRATAC and the KKKK, who were seeking to attract immigrants and thereby encourage settlement. The Japanese conglomerates Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda provided the capital for settlement in the Amazon region, while the Kanegafuchi Spinning Company was active in Pará (Fukunaga 1983: 53). A company that belonged to the Kanebo financial economic group received 1 million acres and formed the Colonia de Acará. Japanese businessmen also obtained concessions. Social structure and community life Social structure within Japanese communities reproduced that of the mura (traditional rural Japanese community) whatever the type of colonia. In communities which had been spontaneously formed, Brazilians and other immigrants lived in the same territory but, in the official settlements, communities were composed only of Japanese. In these colonias the territory, was divided into ku (sections) and subdivided into han (fiefs) that made up the groups of neighbours. The social order followed traditional Japanese patterns. All Japanese living in the same area were expected to belong to the Höjin Shakai (the Society of the Japanese Nationals) and social controls were very effective. If someone disturbed the social order they would be mura hachi bu (literally ‘village eight part’, ostracised), though physical coercion was not used. Usually, the name of the offender would appear in the local Japanese newspaper and that would be enough to maintain social order (Comissão 1992: 92). According to Saito (1961: 217), apart from their role in maintaining social control the communities acted as mediators between the Japanese and the outside world. They identified themselves as Zaihaku döhö (compatriot residents in Brazil) or Zairyü (Japanese residents). The term ‘Höjin’ (Japanese nationals) was also used and ‘Gaijin’ (foreigner) was used to refer to white Brazilians and other immigrants. Very often they also called themselves ‘children of the Emperor’. The community served their social and economic needs. As foreigners, immigrants looked to the Japanese Consulate for the registration of births, deaths, and marriages, as well as for legal protection. The Consulate was accorded great respect and its importance was real. In each area where Japanese immigrants resided there was a vice-consul who had the task of guiding (and controlling) the communities (Mello 1972: 379). The immigrants also regarded BRATAC and the emigration company KKKK as paternalistic protectors and as representative authorities of Japan. These institutions, together with the Japanese Consulate in São Paulo, were referred to as go sanke, which literally means the three branch families of the Tokugawa house, a term which had previously been employed during the Tokugawa era to define the status of royal counsellor families.14

An overview of Japanese emigration 11 In the beginning, since their main concern was to accumulate as much capital as possible to return to their country of origin, the immigrants worked hard, saved as much as possible and endured poor living conditions. Social interaction with the Brazilians and other immigrants was very restricted. Handa (1987: 11) reports that they often hid themselves from the Brazilians, and it was common to refer to a Japanese living some distance away as a ‘next-door neighbour’, while ignoring the existence of nearby Brazilians. This was partly because they could not speak Portuguese. As children learned more easily, they soon served as unofficial interpreters. Life was difficult owing to poor living and working conditions, and also because of the cultural difference between Japan and Brazil. According to Handa, they even had to learn how to make coffee and after ten years in Brazil they still had not learned how to season Brazilian dishes. However, they could make miso (soya paste) and buy shöyu (soy sauce) in the cities. During their little free time on the fazendas, on Saturday evenings and rainy days, they had informal meetings to discuss their problems or they gathered together simply to eat and talk, to complain about their lives in Brazil, to reconstruct their past and to talk about the future. On Sundays, while other immigrants put on their best clothes and took the day off, the Japanese worked cultivating crops, either for their own subsistence or to earn extra money.15 Occasionally they had parties where they sang the following song (quoted by Handa 1987: 164): Whoever said that Brazil was good, lied. The emigration company lied. I arrived on the other side of the Earth, believing in Paradise, I found Hell. Japanese cultural traditions, customs and mores were reconstructed in the life of the community. Neighbourly interaction and the importance of reciprocity were as significant as they had been in Japan. The fulfilment of social obligations and neighbourly duties were a daily preoccupation. Köden (‘incense money’, a gift) at funerals, gosembetsu (farewell gifts), and a gift of mochigashi (beancurd cakes) to celebrate a birth all serve as examples of customs that were maintained. Emphasis was placed on social relations and the Issei tried to make their children aware of tatemae and honne (literally, front and rear or face and heart) and the importance of Japanese etiquette. Children were taught to say the proper greetings and all the formalities used on special occasions. Holidays were observed as in Japan, and festivals involved the whole community. Girl’s and Boy’s days, New Year festivities, obon (holiday in August) and others were celebrated. Undö kai (sports meetings) were very popular, but the most important social event was the tenchösetsu (the birthday of the Emperor). This event, uniting all immigrants, was organised by the Japanese Consulate; and representatives of the emigration companies and newspapers also participated. The event began by the reading of the Kyöiku Chokugo (Rescript on Education) that had been promulgated in 1890 (Handa 1987: 180–1).

12

Japanese migrants in Brazil

Koroniago16 As mentioned earlier, Japanese immigrants had problems with the Portuguese language.17 Gradually Koroniago (language of the colony) emerged from the fusion of several Japanese dialects, mainly from Kyushu and western Japan, and the Portuguese spoken in Brazil, particularly in rural areas. They adjusted the Portuguese language to suit their needs. The irregular verbs in Portuguese were simplified, and the verb suru was added to common Portuguese verbs in general. For example, sentar (to sit) became sentar suru (to sit suru), comer (to eat) became comer suru (to eat suru) and so on. In addition, the use of the Japanese or Portuguese language depended on the situation. For example, whenever there was not an exact equivalent in Japanese for a word in Portuguese, such as for feijoada (black beans, a typical Brazilian dish), the Portuguese word was used. Moreover, the use of words in Japanese or in Portuguese differed according to context. For example, the word yuban in Japanese, used to refer to ‘dinner’, implied a certain formality, while the equivalent word in Portuguese (jantar) was used for informal occasions. Some interjections were used as in Japan, such as yo at the end of sentences; others were in Portuguese. Since it is more complicated to express a refusal in Japanese, the Portuguese language was used on those occasions. Likewise, in situations which required skill in handling different levels of linguistic formality, Portuguese was preferred. Conversely, when words in Portuguese were difficult to pronounce they were replaced by the Japanese equivalent. The use of keigo (honorific forms) was almost abandoned. In some cases different meanings from the original were ascribed to certain words. An example of this is the word garantido (literally, guaranteed). The immigrants added different meanings to this word, such as reliability, good taste and so forth. For this reason, it became the nickname for the Japanese in Brazil. Not surprisingly, there was a positive correlation between acquisition of the Portuguese language and social advancement. The general trend of simplifying the Portuguese language that occurred during the first decades of immigration, diminished with social differentiation between the immigrants and the local population. However, Koroniago continues to be used among Japanese immigrants and their descendants. English words, frequently used in Japan, but unknown to the Japanese in Brazil, are not taken up and the Portuguese word is used instead. For example, ‘bus’ in Japan is ‘basu’ and in Brazil ‘onibus’. In short, the Japanese language was adjusted to the new environment, moving away from Japanese as used in Japan. Family life The traditional Japanese familial patterns were reproduced in Brazil, and were reinforced by the lack of contact with the host society. As in Japan, the family was based upon a hierarchy of authority through the male, and on a close interdependence of all family members. The family was grounded in Confucian values, such as respect for seniority and filial piety. The members of the family were united

An overview of Japanese emigration 13 whenever something needed to be done, and the traditional ie (family unit) served as a model. The custom of several generations living together under the same roof continued to be observed for a long time.18 The system of male primogeniture assured continuity in the family, but because the practice was not allowed under Brazilian law, the inheritance was passed on while the parents were still alive. The ideal was that the first son would work with the father, the second son would help them and the third son would study. The children who studied did not receive an inheritance (Maeyama 1979: 261). When a couple had no sons, a relative’s children or even an unrelated child could be adopted. The traditional system of muko yöshi (adoption) of a husband, who would take the family name of his wife, was commonly practised.19 The transmission of Japanese values was considered very important. Children were taught to respect status and authority, to be sensitive to others, and in turn to be self-aware, self-controlled, and to subordinate their individual interests to those of the family. They were warned not to imitate the ketö (pejorative term for foreigners; a Tokugawa term for ‘red-haired barbarian’ Handa 1987: 492). Emphasis was placed on ko (duty to parents), on (filial obligation of reciprocity) and giri (duty and responsibility). Although the pattern of traditional familial relationships underwent some changes with the urbanisation of the immigrants, it remained essentially the same for decades. Marriage As in Japan, marriage was a social and economic contract, rather than an agreement between individuals. It concerned all the family and was based on nakado (intermediaries) who would help with the miai (arranged marriage). As the brides represented a source of labour, their fathers asked the candidate for a price equivalent to their loss.20 When agreement was reached, the miai was settled. If the geographic distance between the couple was too great and they could not meet before marriage, they exchanged photographs. The marriage was registered with the Japanese Consulate, and rarely at the local registrar’s office. A marriage could be dissolved if it proved unsuccessful (Mello 1972). The ceremony followed the ritual of yuinö (exchanging gifts) and the san san kudo (drinking sake and exchanging glasses) as practised in contemporary Japan. Marriages were largely intra-ethnic. Issei resisted zakkon (mixed marriage). According to Robert Smith (1979) this was largely because most of them lived in rural areas among ‘uneducated people with dark skin’. Saito claims that the attitude of the family depended on the gender of the candidate for marriage. When the son wanted to marry someone without Japanese ancestry, the fact could be ignored. However, if the same happened with a daughter, very frequently she would be excluded from the community. Saito also reports cases of suicide due to family opposition to a love relationship.21

14

Japanese migrants in Brazil

Nihongakkö (Japanese schools) Although it has often been stated that the Issei were very concerned with teaching the Japanese language to the Dainisei (literally, great second generation), initially this was not their main concern. In fact, during the 1920s many parents were uncertain whether to educate their children within the Brazilian system or the Japanese system.22 In any case, they did not want to return to Japan with an illiterate and savage child, and schools administered by the Nihonjinkai (Japanese associations) were soon set up. The first Japanese school was founded in July 1915 (Taisho School in São Paulo). By 1932, the number of schools had increased to 352, and on the eve of World War II, had reached 486, with 30,000 students (Comissão 1992: 212). In 1957, there were 700 primary schools all over the country (Schaden 1980: 142). The Japanese government made an important contribution to the education of its immigrants. It promoted Japanese language teaching and subsidised the construction of schools through the Japanese Consulate.23 The leaders of the Nihonjin Gakkö Fukyö Kai (Association for the Diffusion of Japanese Schools), supervised education in Japanese schools according to the guidelines used in Japan. They received subsidies from the Japanese government and the consul-general of Japan in São Paulo gathered together Japanese teachers and Japanese schools’ representatives to discuss educational matters (Sant’Ana 1956, cited in Castro 1994: 110 and Comissão 1992: 212). During the pre-war years, teachers were, for the most part, Japanese, and in these schools the Nisei studied nothing but Japanese subjects, such as Japanese history and geography. The teaching was conducted in Japanese, but in some cases Portuguese was also taught, although it was not considered as important as any of the Japanese subjects. The curriculum had nothing in common with the Brazilian educational curriculum. This resulted in problems with the Brazilian authorities; however, as the Issei were not well informed about laws, they carried on their own education system for a long time. Each school displayed the go shinei (the portrait of the Emperor) and great emphasis was put on moral education, since this was seen as the best means to cultivate patriotic feelings for Japan. The purpose was to provide a Japanese education so that children would not have difficulties in Japan, and more than 70 Nisei were sent to receive their education in Japan. Japanese teaching methods were used and the school system followed the Japanese model of six years. The books were based on those used in primary schools in Japan. For this reason, teachers often had difficulties in explaining some subjects to students, in particular when students were also attending Brazilian schools (Comissão 1992: 125). In the 1930s, the nationalistic orientation of education towards the promotion of yamato damashii (the Japanese spirit) was strengthened. The Nisei were taught how to be ‘good Japanese’, and the Kyöiku Chokugo (Imperial Rescript on Education), retained as a ‘relic’, guided the education system.24 The vast majority of the Nisei growing up in the pre-war era were educated in the Japanese educational system at least until 1937, when the practice was prohibited by the Brazilian government,

An overview of Japanese emigration 15 although clandestine schools never disappeared and Japanese education continued for a long period.25 From the mid-1930s, extending into the post-war period, the tendency was to move to the cities in search of better educational opportunities. When the first child was about to finish primary school, the family often sent the child with the mother to the nearest town to attend the high school. When the eldest child was about to graduate from high school, arrangements were made to send him or her to the college or university in São Paulo to stay with relatives or family friends, or to kinshukusha (boarding school) also in São Paulo. In the 1940s, the number of those who went to the University of São Paulo increased. Newspapers The first Japanese language newspapers were founded in 1916, the Nanbei (South America) in January and the Nippak Shinbun in August. In the following year, the official journal of Ijü Kumiai (Emigration Association) the Burajiru Jihö (News from Brazil), was founded. These first newspapers reflected the owners’ points of view, and were not concerned with conveying objective views. They were ideologically very different and editorial arguments were frequent. In 1933, there were 5 newspapers and 15 magazines in addition to consular publications and co-operative and association bulletins. Initially, newspapers were published twice a week, but in 1938 they began to be published daily. In 1940, in the state of São Paulo, the four major newspapers had a circulation of more than 50,000. Books and magazines were also imported from Japan, and books in Portuguese were translated into Japanese. However, of all the publications, the most popular were the newspapers, particularly in São Paulo. They fulfilled a great social need, and the immigrants looked forward to reading the newspaper with enthusiasm. Articles were published on how to send remittances to Japan through the Yokohama Bank (later the Bank of Tokyo); there were classified advertisements for jobs, land for sale, missing persons, and other information about events organised by the Japanese associations; and deaths, births, marriages and scandals in the community were also reported. Articles covered all social events, explained agricultural techniques and included a literary section. Official communications such as notices from the Consulate were also published in the Japanese newspapers. Through the newspapers the immigrants were informed about Japan, about Brazil and about their communities. As the vast majority did not have access to the Brazilian media because they could not understand Portuguese, it was through the Japanese newspapers that they were connected with the outside world and with each other. Religious life When the Japanese arrived in Brazil they enjoyed freedom of religious beliefs and practices. However, Japanese organised religion was discouraged, and Buddhist

16

Japanese migrants in Brazil

monks and other religious specialists were refused entry to the country. For much of the pre-war period, exit papers were denied to all religious personnel seeking to go to Brazil although they were granted to those heading for Hawaii and the United States. Japanese officials interested in emigration, fearing that the emigrants would suffer because of cultural and religious differences, persuaded the emigrants to convert to Catholicism, arguing that it was the official religion of Brazil.26 From 1908 to the mid-1920s, only a few efforts were made to organise religious activities. Most of these efforts were made by isolated individuals who built cemeteries and Shinto or Buddhist temples. The immigrants were mainly Shintoist and Buddhist, and the cult of the ancestors was the most important religious observance.27 As in Japan, there was a widespread belief amongst immigrants that if the senzo (ancestors) were not propitiated and worshipped they would come to seek revenge (onryö). Nevertheless, the first funerals on the ships and on the fazendas did not observe traditional Japanese rituals. According to Maeyama’s interpretation, the first immigrants believed that the worship of the ancestors was the eldest son’s responsibility because the first-born son usually did not emigrate and would therefore take on this responsibility. When the immigrants returned to Japan they would pay their respect to their ancestors. In fact, they used to say that when a Japanese person died in Brazil his or her soul returned to Japan (Williams 1948: 92). For this reason, religion was not a very important matter in the host country. For Handa (1987: 725), this was largely because the majority of immigrants were involved in more profitable activities. In any case, the major sects of Japanese Buddhism made no effort to reach the Japanese in Brazil, and, from the mid-1920s to the outbreak of World War II, only a few sects sent representatives to Brazil and only a few temples were erected. Nevertheless, Japanese religious customs were maintained. For example, in the New Year, they made osonae (gifts) and offered omiki (sacred sake) to the gods. During the pre-war period, the existence of a religious syncretism, with Buddhist, Shinto and Catholic elements, was common. Within a household it was common to find kamidama (a Shinto altar) and butsudan (a Buddhist altar) together with images of saints and a crucifix. At funerals, candles and flowers were used along with Japanese incense and both the Catholic rosary and jyuzu (the Buddhist rosary) were placed in the coffin. Later, African religious elements and AfroBrazilian religions such as umbanda (cults of African origin) were also introduced. The Shinshükyö (New Religions) spread more widely after World War II, but in the pre-war period Tenrikyö, Omoto and Seicho no ie were already popular amongst the immigrants. After Buddhism and Catholicism, Seicho no ie was the most important religion among Japanese immigrants (Maeyama 1983: 190). In spite of the lack of a Christian background, many Japanese converted to Catholicism. This was not officially required, but Japanese children came under a lot of pressure to be baptised as Catholics. They were laughed at if they were not Catholic and, in some cases, they were even threatened with expulsion from schools (Saga 1988: 116). Since conversion to the Catholic religion was perceived as a source of social capital, many parents had their children baptised. Finding good

An overview of Japanese emigration 17 godparents who would facilitate this promotion further was also a source of preoccupation. The active proselytising of Christian denominations, particularly the Catholic Church, in the Japanese communities since the 1920s, has also contributed to the large number of conversions. Associations As Japanese immigrants became more economically stable, social life became increasingly varied and many social organisations were formed, basically through friendship and neighbourhood ties. All the Japanese living in the same territory had to be involved in these associations and non-Japanese were excluded. It seems, as Maeyama (1979) suggests, that these associations were not voluntary, but rather compulsory. Anyone who rejected membership would be referred to as ‘nonJapanese’ and ostracised. In 1932, there were 223 Japanese associations in Brazil, and by 1940 this number had more than doubled to 480 (Comissão 1992: 208–9). There were many types of Nihonjinkai: kumiai (producers’ co-operatives), dögyö kumiai (professional co-operatives), seinendan or seinenkai (youth associations), shojokai (girls’ associations), a baseball league, odori (Japanese dance) groups, parent–teacher associations, the go (Japanese game) club and the kukai (poetry club). There were also women’s associations such as haha no kai (the mothers’ association), which were formally organised with a definite membership and regular meetings. The Okinawans maintained a distinct set of associations known as Okinawa Kyökai of Brazil. There were also the tanomoshikö (financial mutual assistance societies).28 These organizations, created for the purpose of informally raising money, had been very popular in Japan since the twelfth century and were based on mutual trust. In Brazil, they began among pre-war Japanese immigrants of the same profession who experienced difficulty in sending remittances because of a lack of banks (Comissão 1992: 218). Immigrants in need of financial support could call upon these associations. There were different types of tanomoshikö. Some provided mutual financial assistance, others were intended to raise funds for the maintenance of the Nihonjinkai, and others simply provided a forum for social meetings. These associations were particularly popular among the Okinawans in the state of São Paulo (Ando 1973). Another type of economic organisation was the co-operative, similar to those which were very popular in Japan at that time. In Brazil, co-operatives were organised following the Japanese model, and the first co-operative was formed in 1919. In the 1920s, the co-operative movement spread among Japanese immigrants in Brazil. Cotia, which became one of the largest co-operatives in South America, was formed in 1927 by a group of immigrants residing on the outskirts of São Paulo (Ando 1973). For the Japanese immigrant minority, the co-operatives provided numerous advantages. They helped them to overcome the difficulties caused by their inability to speak Portuguese and their limited knowledge of local customs and commercial practices. Initially, the immigrants used the services of an interpreter

18

Japanese migrants in Brazil

and a mediator in order to conduct business. However, with the increase in their commercial activities, various problems with marketing had arisen, and these economic associations provided a means to overcome the difficulties presented both by the language barrier and the differences in commercial practices. It should be pointed out that in 1932, the Brazilian government granted tax relief to co-operatives. Furthermore, the Japanese government through the Consulate and immigration agencies encouraged the creation of co-operatives. An agricultural department which provided guidance for farmers was created in the Japanese Consulate. When the Ministry of Overseas Affairs was created in Japan in 1929, the department was incorporated within this Ministry and helped the farmers to create their own agricultural organisations. This led to the creation of co-operatives, eight of which were granted subsidies by the Japanese government. In 1934, when co-operativism was at its height, the consul promoted the foundation of an organisation that would integrate all of them (Comissão 1992: 220–2). Medical services Japanese immigrants often lived in very poor, unhygienic conditions. Many suffered from malnutrition, and diseases such as malaria, dysentery and tuberculosis caused many deaths. Although the Brazilian government took some initiatives to combat these problems, their efforts proved inadequate and before 1914 few colonos had medical services. Where they were available, it was in the communities organised by Japanese officials in the states of São Paulo and Pará. In 1923, the Japanese Home Office granted a subsidy to set up sanitary and medical services for immigrants. This subsidy was distributed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Japanese Consulate in São Paulo formed the Zai Burajiru Nihonjin Döjinkai (Association of Japanese Residents in Brazil). Subsequently, as a result of the Consulate’s initiative, a Japanese hospital was opened in 1939. The Japanese imperial family and the Japanese government contributed to the project. There were also other contributions from Japan and the remainder were supplied by the immigrants themselves (Comissão 1992: 216–17).

From 1930 to 1954 In 1930, a coup d’état led by Getúlio Vargas established an authoritarian regime (Estado Novo) in Brazil. This regime encouraged strong nationalistic feelings amongst native Brazilians, and immigrants came to be seen as a divisive influence in society. At the same time, Japanese military expansion in Asian countries was perceived as a threat by the Brazilian authorities. Beginning in 1931, as a consequence of the invasion of Manchuria, an officially sanctioned anti-Japanese campaign occurred in Brazil. Heated debates took place in the Parliament. It was argued, for example, that Japanese immigrants were an advance guard of an army of conquest. Miguel Couto, a famous academic, claimed that the same thing that had happened to Manchuria could happen to Brazil. Others argued that Brazil should adopt precautionary measures by controlling immigration, neutralising

An overview of Japanese emigration 19 foreign assistance for immigrants, and instituting a compulsory assimilation programme for the descendants of Japanese immigrants born in Brazil. The situation was exacerbated by the ‘discovery’ and subsequent publication in Brazilian newspapers of a map, supposedly made by the Japanese General Staff, establishing the Amazon region as a future naval base for operations against the United States. As a result of the atmosphere in the country, largely generated by the dictatorial regime in order to justify its repressive actions, legislation was introduced in order to supervise not only the Japanese, but also German and Italian immigrants (Fukunaga 1983: 79–85). In 1934, with the revision of immigration laws, a compulsory assimilation programme, designed to foment patriotism, was established. Education was standardised throughout the country, and courses in Brazilian history and geography were made compulsory. Teaching in foreign languages was strictly forbidden in 1937. Immigrants were not allowed to run schools, and the study of foreign languages was permitted only for children over 14. The Minister of Education and Health was given the responsibility of supervising the educational aspects of the assimilation programme (Comissão 1992: 247). In July 1938, the Ministry of Justice issued a directive that restricted the rights of foreign language publications. Newspapers in foreign languages were placed under censorship by the government in 1940. At first, they were required to produce half of their pages in Portuguese, but, later in the same year, their publication was banned entirely. Public gatherings of immigrants of the same origin were also prohibited, as was the use of foreign languages. With the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the programme of compulsory assimilation was replaced by even stricter wartime measures. Brazil severed diplomatic relations with Japan in 1942 and, from that moment, Japanese citizens were not allowed to travel within Brazil. Meetings consisting of more than three Japanese people were forbidden, and they were not permitted to speak Japanese outside their homes. The animosity towards Japanese immigrants was further aggravated when Brazil broke off diplomatic relations with Japan.29 Although these measures were intended to apply equally to all immigrant groups, they did not affect all of them in the same way.30 The Germans and the Japanese were more affected than the Italians who were not overtly harassed by the Brazilian authorities (Schaden 1980: 135–51). Moreover, although the number of Japanese was relatively small (estimated at 230,000 in 1942) the Brazilian authorities were more suspicious of the Japanese than of the Germans, who numbered 1 million (New York Times, 18 March 1942, cited in Fukunaga 1983: 121). It is by no means mere coincidence that calls for a ‘whiter’ Brazil and other such racial issues also resurfaced at this time, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2. By early spring 1942, it had become clear that special attention was being given to the Japanese. In March, suspected Japanese military spies were arrested in the states of São Paulo and Paraná, and special police units were created in São Paulo to handle ‘the Japanese problem’. The Departamento da Imprensa e Propaganda (the Government’s Press and Propaganda Agency) permitted the release of a bulletin to the press, claiming that a Brazilian of Japanese ancestry had informed the

20

Japanese migrants in Brazil

authorities of a plan, conceived in Tokyo, to launch a military attack to take control of São Paulo. According to the version of the story printed in the New York Times, 22 March 1942 (cited in Fukunaga 1983: 124) there was not only a plot to create ‘New Japan’ in the Amazon region, but also a suggestion that the port of Santos was already surrounded by a ring of Japanese subversives. Tokyo denied any hegemonic interest in Brazil. However, after this event, even closer attention was paid to Japanese immigrants, now increasingly perceived as potential enemies. The capture of alleged Japanese spies was frequently reported in the press. In the state of Amazon, a group of Japanese was accused of setting fire to a rubber plantation. Although this particular incident does not seem to have been verified, it should be noted that there were cases in which Japanese immigrants were involved in the destruction of crops (Fukunaga 1983: 135). The bombardment of Brazilian ships by German submarines in February 1942 aggravated the situation even further. Japanese houses were stoned and demonstrations against their presence in Brazil increased. As a result, Japanese company assets were confiscated or placed under government control. In May 1943, two Japanese bookshops had their stock confiscated (Hatanaka 1993: 41). The Banco América do Sul was obliged to include non-Japanese in management; BRATAC was placed under government supervision, and most Japanese businesses in Brazil were subjected to government control. The Japanese community of Acará (now Tome Açu) in Pará, in the Amazon, was converted into an internment camp for suspected Axis sympathizers in the area, most of whom were Japanese. There were reports of Japanese being arrested and tortured during the war, and some being beaten to death. Others were arrested for simply speaking Japanese, and one group of Japanese was fined for singing a patriotic song (Asari 1992, Comissão 1992: 41). As a consequence of these developments, Japanese immigration declined significantly. According to Brazilian governmental sources, a total of 4,230 Japanese entered the country between 1939 and 1941. This contrasts with the 60,000 who had arrived between 1932 and 1934. Furthermore, a number of Japanese left the country. During this period, 3,787 Japanese (or 4,172 according to another source) left Brazil, according to governmental sources (Fukunaga 1983: 110–11). As many Japanese were apparently anxious to return to Japan and its new possessions, the Japanese Consulate in São Paulo published in the newspapers a notice advising caution. The ministries of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Affairs in Japan supported this policy and published a document in April 1939 in which people were advised that ‘It is very important to reinforce the ties of friendship and, at the same time, the economic relations with Central and South American countries . . . Given this, we recognise that the emigration of our compatriots to that region is extremely important’ (Comissão 1992: 254, note 4). The principles that had guided emigration to Brazil in the past continued, and the Japanese authorities encouraged emigrants to establish permanent residence in Brazil. BRATAC developed a movement called Gatto Undö Aido Eiju (literally, enjoy the land; in Portuguese Gozar a Terra, abbreviated to GAT) while the magazine Bunka (Culture), published in São Paulo, encouraged the idea of permanent

An overview of Japanese emigration 21 residence in Brazil (Comissão 1992: 158, 256). However, Brazil broke off relations with Japan in 1942, and the staff of the Japanese Consulate abandoned the Consulate shouting Banzai (hurrah). The Consulate sent a message to the immigrants, on the behalf of the ambassador, exhorting them to behave with dignity (Comissão 1992: 261). Ostensibly, the Japanese acted in accordance with Brazilian regulations. However, an inspection conducted by the Conselho de Imigração e Colonização (Council of Immigration and Colonisation) in December 1939 and published in 1941 revealed that the Japanese were not complying with Brazilian laws. They found, for example, in a library in Bastos, that all the books were written in Japanese and that there was not even a Portuguese–Japanese dictionary, and also that Nisei were still being registered at the Japanese Consulate.31 Furthermore, when Japanese schools became illegal in 1938, clandestine schools were established, and when newspapers written in foreign languages were forbidden in August 1941, clandestine publication of the newspaper Burajiru Jihö continued for some time.32 Throughout the pre-war period the main focus of attention for Japanese immigrants had been on Japan. This was encouraged during the 1930s with the news of Japan’s continuous victories, and by 1939 patriotic movements were beginning to appear within immigrant youth associations. The immigrants felt proud of Japan and wanted to make their contribution.33 However, Brazilian nationalism repressed these patriotic manifestations, and this encouraged the formation of ultranationalistic secret societies.34 Such societies were fanatical in their support for Japan, and membership was commonly sealed by blood oaths. The largest and the most famous of all these organisations was Shindö Renmei (The Federation of Loyal Subjects). Repercussions of Japan’s defeat The defeat of Japan led to a serious internal crisis in the Japanese community in Brazil because it was not recognised by all immigrants. Throughout the country, Japanese immigrants and their offspring were split into two factions: the kachi gumi (literally, victory unit) and the make gumi (literally, defeat unit). The kachi gumi faction was made up of the clandestine networks of secret societies that existed before and during the war. The kachi gumi was organised immediately at the end of the war and utterly rejected the information transmitted by newspapers. At first they argued that the Americans were trying to change Japan’s dai shori, (the glorious victory) into their own victory, and later complete silence on Japan’s defeat became the rule. On the other side was the make gumi whose objective was to convince their compatriots that Japan had lost the war and to promote the idea that their homeland was now Brazil. According to research conducted by Izumi and Saito in 1952–1953, the victory group included 85 per cent of the Japanese in the south, the region where 96 per cent of the Japanese were located (Izumi 1957: 82). It was argued that, if Japan had been defeated, the Emperor and the political leaders would have been killed or committed harakiri (ritual suicide).35 Numerous rumours spread throughout the Japanese communities. A fictitious photograph

22

Japanese migrants in Brazil

showing President Truman flanked by United States naval officers bowing to the Japanese Emperor was even produced (Robert Smith 1979). Confusion swept the country. False promises were spread to the effect that the immigrants would settle in one of the new territories conquered by Japan in Asia where their experience in Brazil would be very useful. Acts of fraud were committed, such as the sale of return tickets to Japan, of land which had supposedly been occupied by the Japanese army, and of now worthless yen. Fortunes were made in this way by unscrupulous Japanese. It was claimed that the Emperor was so concerned about his loyal subjects in Brazil that he had sent a contingent of the Imperial Navy to take aboard those who wished to return to Japan. Hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of Japanese sold their possessions and travelled to the coast to wait for the ships. The rumour that 16 Japanese ships would arrive in Santos on 24 September 1945 led 2,000 Japanese to journey from the interior to the port of Santos. Later, when it was claimed that the ship would arrive in Rio de Janeiro, they changed direction to head for Rio instead (Comissão 1992: 274). Many in the interior of the country were waiting for Japanese military airplanes, and made Japanese flags so that they would be identified as Japanese subjects. Some reported that they had even seen a Japanese plane (Nakadate 1988: 576). These bizarre activities came to the attention of the Brazilian authorities who tried to convince Japanese residents and their descendants of Japan’s defeat. In fact, the defeat of Japan in August 1945 was acknowledged by Emperor Hirohito, and his speech was broadcast via short-wave radio, but it was not accepted by many Japanese in Brazil. A retrospective enquiry revealed that only 3 per cent of the Japanese cited Brazilian newspapers and radio as their primary source of information about Japan’s defeat; 64 per cent relied on orally transmitted information and 20 per cent mentioned clandestine publications or short-wave radio broadcasts (Izumi 1957). A number of attempts were made to convince die-hard loyalists that Japan had lost the war. In October 1945, the Red Cross circulated a copy of the Imperial Edict accepting defeat for distribution amongst Japanese communities throughout Brazil. A former director of the KKKK received the document and had it distributed to the largest concentrations of the Japanese, but this initiative did not meet with much success. Representatives of Japanese communities were called to a meeting with prominent members of Brazilian society. At the meeting the Imperial Edict was read and the terms of the surrender were explained in detail. However, this formal meeting also failed, and was soon discredited. The Brazilian government appealed to the United States for further corroboration. At least one delegation of Issei was dispatched to Japan and the Japanese government was allowed to send emissaries to persuade skeptical Japanese immigrants of the reality of the defeat. The Japanese Emperor’s statement renouncing his divine status was distributed by the Brazilian media, but was interpreted as ‘black propaganda’ (Comissão 1992: 302). With these failures, tension increased within the Japanese community and in 1946 a wave of violence broke out, with a number of reported assassinations. In

An overview of Japanese emigration 23 fact, the violence had already begun during the war, when Brazil was asked by the United States to increase the production of mint and silk, necessary raw materials for armaments and parachutes. As 90 per cent of this production was in Japanese hands, some Japanese immigrants organised themselves into a secret society in order to prevent increased production which was seen as an act of treason against Japan. Even so, producers of both silk and mint become wealthy during the war (Comissão 1992: 243). In 1943, the Tenchugumi (Unit of Divine Punishment) set fire to a farm where silkworms were being raised. Later, in February 1944, as membership increased, the same groups founded the Kodösha (Imperial Way Society). One year later, when the name of this society was no longer felt to be appropriate, it was changed to Shindö Renmei. Within Shindö, groups were formed such as the Kesshitai (Suicide Unit) and the Tokkötai (Special Attack Unit, a term also used to refer to kamikaze).36 The major objective of Shindö Renmei was to unite all people of Japanese descent within an ultranationalistic system under the paternal control of the Emperor. It was deemed to be essential to turn the Japanese in Brazil back into ‘real Japanese’ through worship of the Emperor and the preservation of Shintoism (Handa 1987: 673). Its leaders insisted that emigration to Brazil had never been a fundamental policy of the Japanese government, but a temporary and desperate attempt to ease the pressure of overpopulation at home. Therefore, all Japanese in Brazil were expected to return to the country of their ancestors. They also suggested that Japanese who were born outside Japan and had the nationality of the country where they were born should revert to the nationality of their parents. Shindö members identified with the shishi (patriots of the Bakumatsu era). They circulated the idea that soon all the Japanese living outside Japan would become part of the Dai Töa Kyöei Ken (the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere), and called upon all Japanese to prepare for their undertaking. They were advised to speak nothing but Japanese, to help each other and to work enthusiastically. The easy lifestyle of Brazil was held responsible for the degeneracy of the Japanese and their descendants. Particular emphasis was placed on children’s education. They should learn the yamato damashii (the Japanese spirit) and how to be a ‘Japanese’ (Comissão 1992: 303). The rhetoric used was that of Japanese militarism and expansionism, and the expression hakko ichiü (placing the eight corners of the world under one roof) was often used to inspire patriotic activities. Although Shindö members called on Japan for support, no evidence was found to suggest that Japan was directly encouraging the activities of this movement. It should also be noted that Shindö Renmei at one time had the support of 90 per cent of all Japanese residents in Brazil, and that this movement was not limited to first-generation Japanese. The Tokkötai in particular was made up specifically of second-generation Japanese.37 The activities of this movement caused serious disturbances within the Japanese communities throughout the country. Several terrorist attacks occurred against those Japanese and their descendants who supported the idea that Japan had been defeated. From around April 1944, fires were started and attacks on mint and silkworm producers were carried out by the Tenchugumi (Comissão 1992: 263). Within

24

Japanese migrants in Brazil

a short period of time 15 Japanese and 1 Brazilian were killed, and 11 injured by the Tokkötai. On 7 March 1946, the director of the Cotia co-operative in Bastos was killed. In April of the same year, the editor of Nippak Shinbun and former general secretary of Nihonjin Kyöiku Fukyü Kai (the Society for the Diffusion of the Japanese Language) was murdered (Comissão 1992: 263). Soon after that, the owner of a banana plantation was attacked. Between 7 March 1946 and 6 January 1947, a total of 49 criminal assaults were reported, among them murders, attacks on homes, explosions, and fires (Hatanaka 1993: 89). Between September and December 1946, 170 Japanese were expelled from Brazil or were held in detention on the island of Anchieta. It is worth noting that neither the Brazilian nor the Japanese governments wanted to accept financial responsibility for their deportation. The reaction of the Brazilian public to these events was puzzlement, followed by anger, as is reflected in the following headlines from editorials: ‘Japanese Gestapo organised in São Paulo’; ‘Japanese fanaticism’; ‘The Japanese government must be held responsible for the belief in Japan’s victory upheld by its subjects living overseas’.38 Common stereotypes were reinforced. In this regard, it is interesting to note how often the word ‘yellow’ was used at that time in the Brazilian press. When an arms cache was discovered, the general opinion was that there was no doubt that a Japanese invasion was being planned. Since it was not possible to expel all the Japanese because of their numbers, it was necessary to prevent them from grouping together in associations (Correio Paulistano, 5 April 1946, cited in Hatanaka 993: 65). In Parliament the issue of Japanese immigrants was once more taken up. The disputes that took place after the end of the war were seen as a fulfilment of the prophecy that Japanese immigrants would be a danger to Brazil, and the argument that ‘after all the yellow danger was real’ was evoked in the Parliamentary debates over the continuation of Japanese emigration to Brazil after the war (Comissão 1992). As anti-Japanese sentiment spread, attacks on Japanese homes increased. Slogans such as ‘kill the Shindö’, and ‘fanatic yellows’ were often heard. The most serious incident occurred in July 1946, in Osvaldo Cruz where, after an argument that degenerated into a riot, a Japanese killed a Brazilian. The Brazilians, shouting ‘let’s finish with the Japanese’, attacked Japanese homes and wounded many Japanese (Kumasaka and Saito 1973: 458). It was only not until 1947 that the Brazilian authorities put an end to terrorist activities. Even so, in 1950, the police discovered a terrorist conspiracy and arrested 60 Japanese people with weapons. Between 1950 and 1952, there were a number of attempts to resuscitate Shindö Renmei, and Izumi reports that in 1955 the two factions were still in dispute.39 Even today, there are still traces of the rupture that occurred within the Japanese communities. For instance, in Promissão (São Paulo State) there are two separate Nihonjinkai, each directly descended from one of the two factions. In March 1947, the leaders of the victory faction organised Nihon Sensai Döhö Kyuen Kai (the Committee for the Relief of War Victims in Japan) to send money and goods to help people in Japan. The intention was to reunite the Japanese community, and their efforts constituted the first organised activity within the

An overview of Japanese emigration 25 Japanese community during the post-war period. According to Handa (1987: 743–5), only 10 per cent of the Japanese joined the campaign, which ended in July 1950. In 1954, in response to a request by the São Paulo government, the Japanese colonias contributed to the fourth centennial celebrations of the foundation of the city of São Paulo by a Jesuit priest. The Japanese government also contributed 225 million yen towards the event. The celebrations were a success. The factionalism which had so deeply divided the Japanese in Brazil seemed to have been overcome.

Emigration to Brazil in the post-war period As previously stated, a number of Japanese eventually returned to Japan after the war. But, having repatriated 6.3 million Japanese from overseas territories, the Japanese government sought to revive the policy of emigration to Brazil.40 However, as result of the unrest that had occurred in the Japanese colonias, the Brazilian authorities, and the state of São Paulo in particular, were not willing to receive more Japanese immigrants, and it was officially stated that there was no longer a need for immigrants of any kind. Nevertheless, as immigrants’ relatives were still allowed to enter the country, Japanese immigration to Brazil did in fact continue. This came to be known as o caminho dos parentes (the relative’s way) or reunião familiar (family reunion). More than 50 per cent of the total number of post-war immigrants came to Brazil in this way.41 The other 50 per cent came by means of the intervention of Japanese officials, co-operatives and other organisations set up by Japanese immigrants in Brazil. Japanese agencies, governmental and private, continued to provide subsidies for immigrants, and the Kenjinkai (Prefectural Associations) worked together to welcome the immigrants. In January 1954, the Japanese government organised the Federation of Overseas Associations, part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was to be in charge of the recruitment and selection of emigrants, and to oversee the complete process of emigration. One year later, the Kaigai Shinkö Kabushiki Kaisha (Overseas Emigration Development) was set up to buy land and establish new colonias. In Brazil, two local organisations were created to assist immigrants in the way BRATAC had functioned during the pre-war period. Post-war emigration to Brazil was resumed before the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries. In fact, a new treaty regulating Japanese emigration to Brazil was signed only much later, in 1960. The post-war immigration legislation was the same as that of July 1934, prescribing a quota of 2 per cent, although this quota system had never been seriously put into practice (Comissão 1992: 389, 391). In 1953, the Brazilian government restructured immigration and, after negotiations, authorised the entry of Japanese immigrants into certain areas, and also set quotas for them.42 Between 1951 and 1955, individuals and associations were active in bringing Japanese immigrants into the country. The first group arrived in January 1953. The majority were young, single men, but there were also young women, nicknamed noivas para o sul (brides for the south, Handa 1987: 769). On 30 January

26

Japanese migrants in Brazil

1953, the newspaper Paulista reported that 51 Japanese immigrants had entered the country together with 90 Japanese who had gone to Japan after the end of the war and who, after ‘seeing Japan’s defeat with their own eyes’, had decided to go back to Brazil (Comissão 1992: 370). In 1954, the São Paulo Society de Sericultura (São Paulo Society for Sericulture) received 1,251 workers from Japan, and applied for a second group of 500 families, but, after 1960, the number of candidates decreased dramatically. Two individual projects also brought immigrants from Japan to the Amazon region and to Mato Grosso After the San Francisco Peace Settlement in 1952, the co-operative of Cotia started negotiations with the Brazilian government with a view to receiving immigrants from Japan. Young Japanese would be received by Japanese farmers who were members of the co-operative, and Nökyö (the Central Association of Agricultural Co-operatives of Japan) would be in charge of the bureaucratic part of the emigration process. The negotiations were successful, and the first group arrived in September 1955. The Sangyö Kaihatsu Seinentai (Groups for Industrial Development) also promoted immigration (Comissão 1992; 384–7). Therefore, Japanese agencies, both governmental and private, continued to provide subsidies for post-war emigration. Besides São Paulo and Paraná, immigrants were sent to the Amazon region and to the northeast and Ssouth of the country. Many of the immigrants came from former Japanese colonies, with the intention of settling permanently in Brazil, and went to live in these regions (Saito 1980: 83). The peak of post-war immigration occurred between 1959 and 1960. There is no consensus among researchers on the precise number of immigrants who entered Brazil after World War II, though the official figure is 53,555 (Comissão 1992: 423). In 1958, fifty years after the arrival of the first group of Japanese immigrants in Brazil, a country-wide census was conducted by a commission of Japanese immigrants. According to this census, there were a total of 430,135 Japanese living in Brazil, of whom 32 per cent were first generation (Issei) and 68 per cent were secondgeneration (Nisei). Some 76 per cent of them resided in the state of São Paulo. In this census, 40 per cent of the total Japanese population was under 15 years old. The Japanese government remained interested in emigration to Brazil for a long time. However, the underlying philosophy changed. In 1962, the Council of Overseas Emigration, which had been created in 1935 by the government, expressed this new orientation, stressing the importance of developing the potential of Japanese people to contribute to the development of the host countries and the well-being of the world. Furthermore, emigration ought not to be considered as a mere transfer of the workforce, but as a transfer of developmental capacities to the host countries, where immigrants would settle permanently. In spite of these intentions, immigration was already in decline. In August 1978, all the organisations connected with emigration were merged by the Japanese government to form Kokusai Kyöryoku Jigyö Dan (Japan International Co-operation Agency, hereafter JICA).43 JICA organised the system of emigration, and until the 1970s there were JICA branches in every prefecture to carry out counselling and recruitment. All the organisations that had been set up to receive

An overview of Japanese emigration 27 immigrants in the late 1960s and 1970s were converted into cultural associations (Comissão 1992: 368, 408). The last immigrant ship, with 285 immigrants aboard, arrived in 1973 (Comissão 1992: 434). With the economic development of Japan, emigration for economic reasons had ceased. During the years of the ‘Brazilian miracle’, Japanese investment in Brazil triggered an internal migration, with many of the descendants of the early Japanese immigrants moving to the new centres that were rising out of Japanese investment. Nationally, the number of Japanese working in Japanese companies on 1 October 1977 was 7,102, and this number has been increasing ever since (JICA survey, cited in Comissão 1992: 425). The most recent demographic data on the Japanese and their descendants, a three-year survey published in 1990, reports that the total number of Japanese immigrants and their descendants living in Brazil for more than three months was 1,228,000; equivalent to 0.8 per cent of the national population. This number was made up of 13 per cent Issei (first-generation), 31 per cent Nisei (second-generation), 41 per cent Sansei (third-generation), 13 per cent Yonsei (fourth-generation) and 0.8 per cent Gosei (fifth-generation, Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros 1990: 20–1). Tables 1.2 and 1.3 show the distribution by age, sex and region. Table 1.2 Nikkei population by sex and age (%) Age

Male

Female

Total

00–15 16–30 31–45 46–60 >61 No information

29.95 23.84 20.16 15.72 9.65 0.68

33.61 21.87 18.88 14.73 9.84 1.07

31.54 22.71 19.40 15.13 9.68 0.86

Source: Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros (1990: 28, table 2.14).

Table 1.3 Distribution of Nikkei population by regions (%) Region

Percentage

North Brazil Northeast Southeast South Centre and West Other

2.68 2.32 73.25 11.69 3.98 7.12

São Paulo city Metropolitan São Paulo São Paulo State

26.55 13.84 31.84

Total São Paulo

72.23

Source: Adapted from Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros (1990: 20–1, table 2.5).

28

Japanese migrants in Brazil

From Zaihaku Höjin (Communities of Compatriots) to Nikkei Colonias Communities in the post-war period The 1954 commemoration of the foundation of São Paulo was a landmark in the official history of Japanese emigration to Brazil. The conflict that had so deeply divided the community was gradually overcome, and appears to have been followed by a period of peace and prosperity. However, in the 1950s and 1960s, there were still many quarrels between the pre-war and the post-war immigrants on the one hand and between the immigrants and the Brazilians on the other (São Paulo Shinbun, 18 June 1985: 6). The Committee for the Celebration of the 400th Anniversary Ceremonies of the Foundation of São Paulo city became the first Nikkei organisation. A pavilion was constructed along the lines of the Katsura Palace in Kyoto which constituted a watershed in the history of Japanese emigration to Brazil. The Zaihaku Höjin Shakai (the Communities of Compatriots) became Burajiru Nikkei Koronia (Brazilian Nikkei Communities). Half a century after the arrival of the Kasato Maru, the immigrants wanted to make a fresh start. In order to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the beginning of immigration, events were organised across the country and new organisations were set up. The São Paulo Nihon Bunka Kyökai (Japanese Cultural Association) was created in December 1955 for the purpose of widening knowledge of Japanese culture and intensifying ties between Japan and Brazil. Books were published, and a first survey of Japanese immigrants and their descendants was conducted. This was the first significant attempt to gather information on Nikkei population. Six thousand researchers participated in the project, which also involved the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Brazilian Ministry of Education. The survey was financially supported by the Japanese and Brazilian governments, and by other sources (Comissão de Recenceamento da Colonia de 1958, 1964). In 1956, a cultural organisation, Aliança Cultural Brasil–Japão, was founded in order to strengthen ties between Brazil and Japan by promoting Japanese language teaching, organising conferences, conducting research, publishing books and introducing Brazil and Brazilian culture to the Japanese who visited the country. Within two years this organisation began receiving subsidies from the Japanese government (Comissão 1992: 405). In the meantime, the Kenjinkai continued to reinforce their relationships with Japanese prefectures and, later in the 1970s, started to send Nikkei scholarship students to Japan. Burajiru To Dö Fu Kenjinkai Rengökai (the Federation of Associations of Japanese Prefectures, hereafter Kenren) started its activities in 1966. Six years later, after negotiations with the Japanese government, Kenren succeeded in organising travel and accommodation for the older immigrants who wished to visit their country of origin. Since then, every year, 20 Issei have gone to visit the place of their birth. In the 1970s, the number of Issei going to Japan on their own initiative increased, and as a result the number of regular flights between the two countries

An overview of Japanese emigration 29 also increased. In the same year, A Casa do Imigrante (the House of the Immigrant) was created, and received subsidies from the Japanese government. One year later, Nihon Imin Engo Kyökai (the Association of Mutual Assistance for Japanese Immigrants) was established, and later became Nippaku Engo Kyökai, abbreviated as Enkyö (Beneficiência Nipo-Brasileira in Portuguese). Nippaku Bunka Kyökai (Societies of Japanese–Brazilian Culture) still exist throughout the country (Comissão 1992: 405). The most important event in the colonias in the 1970s was the reception of the Japanese heir to the throne and his wife in May 1967. A total of 25,000 people of Japanese descent went to greet them at the airport. The coming of the royal couple was, for many Issei, the most important event of their lives (Handa 1987: 778–9). The 70th anniversary of the beginning of immigration was also celebrated, and again honoured by a royal visit. In order to preserve Issei memories, a museum to commemorate Japanese emigration to Brazil was constructed. In 1975, a monument was built to pay tribute to Japanese immigrants, and the Deputy Prime Minister (later Prime Minister) Takeo Fukuda, came to Brazil for the inauguration. Japan also sent a special delegation for the 80th anniversary of the beginning of immigration, and the immigrants received a visit from the Japanese prince. Numerous books were published, and films were produced about the life of Japanese immigrants in Brazil. Two films are particularly noteworthy: Os Caminhos da Memória (literally, The Ways of Memory) which incorporated the testimonies of the Issei about their lives in Brazil; and the film Gaijin: os Caminhos da Liberdade (Gaijin: the Ways of Freedom), which told the life-story of an Issei woman, following her from the fazendas to the city.44 The 1980s were characterised by migration to Japan. In 1988, 30,000 people of Japanese origin (30 per cent of them Issei) migrated to Japan and sent US$12 million in remittances and much more as anguramane (underground money) (Comissão 1992: 454). This precipitated major changes within the Japanese communities in Brazil, as will be discussed in Chapter 4. Post-war Nihonjinkai Even today, in São Paulo and in other cities in southern Brazil, there are numerous associations. They continue to function as socialising mechanisms, providing places for making friends and for recreation and, for this reason, they are often referred to as ‘dating agencies’ (Maeyama 1973: 273). The participation of Nisei and Sansei has been decreasing in the last decades, but the social role of these associations is still important, especially in rural areas. In 1958, it was reported that 52 per cent of Issei farmers and 42 per cent of non-farmers were affiliated to Japanese associations (Cardoso 1995: 126). The figures in 1988 were 50 per cent for urban areas and 56 per cent for rural areas. According to Cardoso (1973), Japanese associations have a clear socialising aim, and seek to create conditions conducive to Nisei social promotion. These aims have been criticised. As early as 1953, the Portuguese page of the Jornal Paulista, 9 May 1953, contained violent criticism of these associations. By highlighting the

30

Japanese migrants in Brazil

advantages of professional and political connections, these associations were accused of isolating the Nikkeijin from society at large. The editors of the Portuguese page organised meetings with directors of these associations in support of the view that the Nisei should socialise and interact more with the Brazilians (Vieira 1973a: 332). Two decades later, the issue continued to provoke discussion. For example, Gonçalves argued that ethnic associations were nothing more than mechanisms of control used by the Issei and by those who were less integrated into Brazilian society (Jornal Página Un, 2 September 1979. Although these associations no longer have the importance they had before the war, most of them still do not include people of non-Japanese descent. Migration to Japan strongly affected the Japanese associations, and many are now helping Japanese companies to recruit labourers for Japan (Asari 1992: 92). Post-war Nihongakkö45 Not surprisingly, education during the post-war period took a very different form from that of the pre-war period. However, although this change did not occur abruptly, it generated much controversy, and the way of thinking characteristic of the pre-war period still has its adherents today. For the most part, the general education of people of Japanese descent follows the national model, and Japanese schools play a secondary role, complementing this education. In 1970, there were 350 Japanese schools with about 22,000 students and 400 teachers (Comissão 1992: 450). The typical school in the 1980s had about 60 pupils and one or two teachers, but in São Paulo they were larger than those in other localities. While some offered nursery school facilities plus six grades, fewer than half of the pupils enrolled progressed beyond the second grade, and twothirds of all pupils were under 11 years old (Robert sSmith 1979). At the present time, there are hundreds of Japanese language schools in the south of Brazil, one third of which are located in São Paulo. The goal of these schools is to teach the Japanese language and Japanese culture, and to provide training in ‘good behaviour’. According to the co-ordinator of projects for the Japan Foundation in São Paulo, there are about 500 Japanese schools in the state of São Paulo, nearly all of them run by women who, on their own initiative, also teach the children how to be obedient, honest and persevering. However, pupil attendance is of short duration and it seems that teachers have a tendency to favour reading and writing over conversation. In many schools both teachers and children use Portuguese as the most efficient means of verbal communication. These schools also promote Japanese cultural activities and athletic meetings. However, older children are reluctant to take part in these activities and drop out of Japanese schools as they enter their teens. The number of Japanese language schools in 1992 was 319, of which 95 were in Metropolitan São Paulo, 111 in the state of São Paulo and 54 in the state of Paraná. The total number of students was 18,782 (8,732 male and 10,050 female). São Paulo city itself accounts for 6,916. As shown in Figure 1.1 the number of Sansei stands out.

An overview of Japanese emigration 31 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

First

Second

Third

Fourth

Fifth

Figure 1.1 Number of Nikkeijin attending Japanese schools by generation (%) Source: Nihongo Fukyü Sentä (Centre for the Diffusion of Japanese Language) (1997).

The Japan Foundation has promoted research into improving teaching methods, and the findings resulted in the creation of the Centre for Japanese Language Studies in February 1988, which unified different organisations in charge of Japanese language teaching. The Burajiru Nihongo Gakkö Rengö Kai (Federation of Japanese Language Schools) organises courses for teachers. Japan’s economic success generated a new interest in learning Japanese, and migration to Japan increased this interest even further. The number of Brazilians of non-Japanese descent who want to study the language has been on the increase since the 1980s. In 1992, of 18,782 students attending Japanese schools 6 per cent (952 students) were not Nikkeijin. There are numerous exchange programmes between Japan and the Japanese community in Brazil in a number of areas from scientific research to agricultural and technical areas. A large number of grants and scholarships are available to the Nikkeijin provided by the Japanese government, prefectures and various institutions. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through Kenren (Federation of Association of the Prefectures) offers scholarships, and each of the Japanese prefectures offers a scholarship to study in Japan to the descendants of the Issei born in that prefecture. The Japan Foundation sends Japanese language teachers to Japan and subsidises students who want to improve their Japanese, or who are conducting research on Japan. JICA offers technical training in various fields. Post-war newspapers Newspapers continue to play an important role in the Nikkei communities. After the end of the war the decree prohibiting Japanese newspapers was rescinded. The law requiring one page to be written in Portuguese, however, remains in force. This is not the result of governmental imposition, but simply because the law was never revoked. In 1997, the Japanese colonia had three daily newspapers: São Paulo Shinbun, was founded in October 1946, and published its first issue without making any

32

Japanese migrants in Brazil

reference to the end of the war; the Jornal Paulista, founded in January 1947, opened with the title ‘90 per cent of Japanese do not believe in Japan’s defeat’. This newspaper was intended to help Japanese immigrants to accept that Brazil was their home. The two newspapers were, therefore, ideologically opposed and traces of the early divergence still remain. Diário Nippak, founded in January 1948, has been more directed towards cultural and sporting events rather than political issues. The Jornal Paulista and Diário Nippak merged in 1998. The newspapers continue in essentially the same form as those from the pre-war period, with one page in Portuguese and the other seven or eight in Japanese. They compete amongst themselves and their audience is progressively declining. As few in the Japanese community are prepared to write Japanese for a low wage, reporters tend to be young Japanese trainees who go to Brazil for two or three years and practice the so-called hasami press (scissors press) method, with news clipped from newspapers published in Japan. The percentage of people able to read Japanese is diminishing exponentially and as a result, the survival of the pages in Japanese is threatened. This has become an important issue in the community. For Célia Abe, editor of Diário Nippak, the market is insufficient to support three newspapers. This is also the opinion of the editor of São Paulo Shinbun, who thinks that once the Issei have passed away there will be no need for the newspapers to continue in circulation. This is not, however, the opinion of the director of the Jornal Paulista, Paulo Ogawa, for whom the fact that the number of readers is decreasing does not necessarily mean that the colonia will disappear, because youngsters are becoming increasingly interested in Japanese culture. This also seems to be the opinion of the owner of Diário Nippak, Raul Takaki, who opposes any increase in the number of pages written in Portuguese, and views with optimism the possibilities for enlarging the market. In any case, development projects have been carried out and new publications appear. Revista Nippak, written in Portuguese, is one example of a publication produced by Diário Nippak which is aimed at the younger generation. Notícias do Japão, the most recently established newspaper, does not compete with the other newspapers because its features are very different. It was created to inform the Japanese communities in Brazil of the Nikkeijin in Japan. Notícias do Japão is written in Portuguese, and its contents include news from the International Press (a Nikkei newspaper in Japan), news from the colonias and world news. For the editor, Celso Mihara, migration to Japan is both an economic and a social issue, and as such the newspaper has the social role of supporting people of Japanese origin who are working as migrants in Japan, as well as their families in Brazil. Accordingly, its contents are addressed to people involved in emigration to Japan. It has a list of desaparecidos (missing persons) which has been equally popular and successful. This was created as a result of a suggestion by a young reader who wanted to know about her father who had gone to Japan and had not been heard of since. The newspaper also includes advertisements for jobs in Japan, and information on Japanese legislation regarding migration, work and security. It also provides other useful information and guidance for people who want to migrate to Japan.

An overview of Japanese emigration 33 In the last ten years, publications have been progressively oriented towards those who have migrated to Japan. Japão Aqui, written in Portuguese, published its first issue in April 1997 and is directly addressed to the Nikkeijin who have been in contact with Japan. The first issue included articles on Japanese emigration to Brazil, on the Nikkeijin in Japan, on being a Nikkeijin and on Japan in general. Ninety years after Japanese immigrants settled all over the country and developed differently, according to the region in which they found themselves. However, despite the lack of research into a systematic comparison between the different regions, there is evidence that the Japanese communities from the Amazon region to Santa Catarina in the south of the country have numerous things in common. With the increased upward mobility amongst the immigrants, the traditional tight communities have partly dissolved into the larger society. It might be expected that the Japanese communities’ borders will eventually disappear; however, the end of a little Japan in Brazil cannot yet be foreseen. Indeed, the opposite is more possible. Japan and Japanese culture became fashionable in the late 1980s, and Liberdade (the Japanese quarter in São Paulo) attracts not only the Nikkeijin, but other Brazilians interested in Japan. Japanese restaurants have become very popular, and while the owners may be Nikkeijin, the waiters are usually non-Nikkeijin. Shops selling all sorts of Japanese articles continue to prosper, and Liberdade retains its Japanese atmosphere. As already mentioned, the majority of Japanese immigrants started as contract labourers and, within 50 years of their arrival, both their social and economic status has risen. Nevertheless, the difficult economic situation in Brazil, particularly in the 1990s, has prompted the descendants of Japanese immigrants to journey back to the land of their ancestors. The Japanese community in Brazil is the largest in the world, and about 10 per cent of this population is now in Japan. The present life of Japanese colonias in Brazil revolves around 90 years of Japanese immigration and settlement in Brazil and 10 years of migration to Japan. From the historical overview of Japanese emigration to Brazil, the involvement of both the Japanese government and Japanese business in the migration of Japanese citizens and their settlement in Brazil stands out. Emigration was seen as a means of solving problems in Japan, and as such was greatly encouraged. The Japanese government assisted the emigrants upon their arrival by founding and financing settlement projects, and providing financial, medical and technical assistance. Furthermore, the Japanese government encouraged the maintenance of Japanese culture through Japanese language schools, newspapers and other institutions. The social organisation of the Japanese communities in Brazil was from the beginning under the guidance and control of Japanese representatives (Japanese Consulate, BRATAC and KKKK). Such official support continued after the war (albeit in different terms) and has been maintained through a variety of exchange programmes and other initiatives. Partly as a result of this policy, the Japanese in Brazil have remained attached to Japan over many decades, and ties with Japan have been sustained up to the present.

34

Japanese migrants in Brazil

Nonetheless, this process of migration and settlement did not depend solely on the sending country. The receiving country also played a determining role in shaping the circumstances in which Japanese immigrants recreated their ethnic identities in Brazil. As part of the search for cheap labour, Brazilian government and coffee planters promoted the immigration of Japanese citizens after the abolition of slavery and whenever the flow of European immigrants decreased. Indeed, the logic of substitution was such that, during the period when Japanese immigrants worked in fazendas, they were treated like slaves. In the 1930s, with the advent of compulsory assimilation measures and Brazilian nationalism, they were repressed and discriminated against. Animosity towards Japanese immigrants was further aggravated during World War II, and by the events that took place within the Japanese communities following Japan’s defeat. The officially condoned hostility to the Japanese in Brazil between 1939 and 1954 was crucial to the development of the Nikkeijin identity. Until the 1950s, Japanese immigrants defined themselves as the Zaihaku döhö or Höjin (the compatriots) and their communities as Japanese, but, with the growth of individual differentiation, they became known as Nikkeijin, and their communities became Nikkei communities. In the 1980s, the economic difficulties in Brazil and the labour shortages in Japan precipitated migration to Japan and opened a new chapter in the history of the Nikkeijin. Ebbs and flows in both Japanese and Brazilian migration policies shaped the circumstances and determined the possibilities for immigrant self-identifications. This chapter has focused on both the emigration and immigration processes, and provides the context for the chapters that follow. We now turn to a discussion of the integration of the Japanese immigrants within the host country.

2

Japanese immigrants in Brazil

It is commonly asserted that, since the Japanese in Brazil have in general achieved economic and social success, they no longer constitute a minority.1 However, this apparently successful adjustment should not be taken at face value. The previous chapter provided a factual account of Japanese emigration to Brazil and the subsequent settlement of immigrants. My purpose here is twofold: to assess the degree of integration necessary to characterise the Nikkei population as an ethnic group, and to describe Brazil’s approach to migration and race. In both cases the larger aim will be to further an understanding of the process of social categorisations implicated in the self-definitions of the Nikkeijin. We need to start by defining the terminology. In much of the literature on Japanese immigrants in Brazil the term ‘assimilation’ is used. This term is problematic, largely because it implies that attachment to one’s ethnic community and full participation in Brazilian society are mutually exclusive. Furthermore, assimilation is seen as a one-way process, and the migrant as a passive agent, subject to it. Owing to this, the word will not be used here, except in quotations from other sources. There are difficulties in choosing a term appropriate to examining the insertion of Japanese immigrants into Brazilian society. The term ‘acculturation’ may be more appropriate since it refers to a process whereby the immigrant and the native become more alike as a result of interaction, while maintaining distinctive cultural identities. ‘Adaptation’ is a term used to refer both to the strategies undertaken during acculturation and to its outcome; ‘integration’ is one of the strategies in the process of acculturation, and implies a degree of voluntary co-operation.2 In this study the term ‘integration’ is used. Nevertheless, it should be admitted that there are also problems associated with the term ‘integration’ in this context. The first is that ultimately it is the receiving society that defines integration, and therefore integration says more about the host country than about the immigrants themselves. A second difficulty is its lack of precision, with definitions varying from author to author. In this study the term will be interpreted as participation in the Brazilian socioeconomic system, assessed by an examination of the following variables: the index of permanent residence and naturalisation; occupational distribution and social mobility; educational attainment; inter-marriage; language acquisition; political participation and religious affiliation.

36

Japanese migrants in Brazil

Integration of Japanese immigrants into Brazilian society Permanent residence and naturalisation It has been widely emphasised that when the Issei left Japan they expected to remain in Brazil only temporarily (e.g. Robert Smith 1979: 55). It has also been pointed out that the percentage of those who settled was lower in Brazil than the United States (Comissão 1992: 191). Admittedly, many of them wanted to return since they had left their children and their property with relatives, to whom they sent remittances; but they wished to return richer, rather than poorer. However, not all of them came with the intention of short-term residence. As mentioned earlier, the Issei who came directly from Japan to the ijü-ichi (immigration settlements) came with the intention of staying permanently. As discussed in Chapter 1, these communities were set up specifically for permanent settlement, and on the eve of the Pacific War already contained 2,500 families, of which 1,000 had embarked directly from Japan (Comissão 1992: 157). After 17 years, 70 per cent still remained in Brazil. Wako (1939), in the introduction to his book, reports that, out of 12,000 Japanese interviewed, 85 per cent wanted to return to Japan. An examination of his findings seems to indicate the following: that amongst those wishing to return, there were many Nisei who had never been to Japan; that among those who desired permanent residence in Brazil (10 per cent) were many newly arrived immigrants; and that of those wishing to return, 60 per cent were born in Brazil or were Junnisei (born in Japan and brought up in Brazil). Wako concluded that the history of 30 years of immigration could be summarised as a pattern of making money and returning to the homeland. If this was the case, however, the acquisition of land by the Issei cannot be interpreted as a desire to remain in Brazil, but rather as a better short-term investment than working exclusively as colonos. The number of those who actually returned to Japan is not known.3 Brazilian sources indicate that 17,250 Japanese left that country, whilst for their part Japanese sources report 2,000 persons as having returned to Brazil during the pre-war period (Fukunaga 1983: 72). It is recorded that in 1939, the number of those who returned to Japan (2,011 individuals) surpassed the number of those who arrived in Brazil (1,546 individuals, (Comissão 1992: 251). The percentage of Japanese immigrants taking up permanent residence in Brazil between 1908 and 1939 was over 93 per cent (Comissão 1992: 236). Flourishing economic conditions in Brazil between 1925 and 1941 must have contributed to the decision to stay. In any case, this percentage was extremely high in comparison with other immigrant groups, a fact that can be interpreted as indicating a wish to stay in Brazil.4 However, after this period, particularly between 1939 and 1941, many Japanese immigrants either returned to Japan or expressed the intention of doing so.5 In 1939, the number of Japanese who left for Japan (2,011) was higher than those who went to Brazil (1,546). In the post-war period,

Japanese immigrants in Brazil 37 the number of Issei who returned to Japan increased after 1970, and particularly after 1985 (Comissão 1992: 251, 423). Of the 144,523 Japanese reported to be resident in Brazil by the Brazilian government census of 1940, a total of 3,830 (2.6 per cent) were reported as being naturalised Brazilian citizens. It should be noted in this context that the number of naturalisations during the period 1889–1939 is low for all immigrant groups.6 The 1958 census reported that there were 1,804 naturalised Issei among the almost quarter of a million immigrants who had entered the country. In 1977, the number of Issei with dual nationality was 18 per cent of the 765,710 people of Japanese origin, and it is estimated that 131,142 Issei possessed Japanese nationality.7 The number of Issei returning to Japan increased after 1970, particularly after 1985 (Comissão 1992: 423). Occupational distribution and social mobility Between 1908 and 1941, 99 per cent of Asian immigrants in Brazil (Japanese accounted for 99 per cent of all Asians) were classified as farmers, but after 1954, the percentage of Japanese farmers declined. In a nation-wide survey in 1958, farming was found to be the major occupation of only 59 per cent of the economically active Issei and 53 per cent of the Nisei (see Suzuki 1969, 1971: 94–5). As a consequence of urbanisation during the 1930s, many Issei moved to São Paulo and other cities, seeking educational opportunities for their children. During the following decades urbanisation continued apace, and the number of those engaged in industrial and commercial activities increased accordingly. In 1934, there were 62 factories (making shöyu, sweets, furniture, etc.) owned by Japanese, employing a total of 405 workers. In the 1940s, a mere 3 per cent of the Japanese were employed as industrial labour. This percentage increased to 7 per cent in 1958 and, by 1988, to 16 per cent of the total. Businesses considered to be typically Japanese in Brazil were in the laundry, retailing and hairdressing sectors. In the 1940s, of the 1,500 laundries in São Paulo, two-thirds had Japanese owners; 18 years later the Japanese owned 4,356 laundries (Comissão 1992: 334, 541, Maeyama 1973: 262). By the 1960s, the differences in occupational structure between immigrants and their children were even greater. The overall trend in employment can be summarised as follows: the number of farmers decreased while the proportion of craftsman and clerical workers increased; there was also a slight increase in the number of people engaged in the transportation, communication, and service sectors among the Nisei (Jirimutu 1994). Striking differences can also be found between immigrants who entered Brazil before and after the war. Of pre-war immigrants, 81 per cent were either employers or self-employed, while only 29 per cent of the post-war immigrants fell into this category (Jirimutu 1994). Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show employment by sectors of activity and income compared with the national population.

38

Japanese migrants in Brazil

Table 2.1 Occupation of Nikkei population by sector and by area in 1988 (%) Sectors of activity

Urban

Rural

Primary sector Secondary sector Tertiary sector Without information

7.38 19.53 66.18 6.84

80.79 4.37 14.56 0.20

Source: Centro de Estudos Nipo–Brasileiros (1990: 5, table 3.12).

Table 2.2 Income by national population and Nikkei population in 1987 (%) Incomea

Brazilian population

People of Japanese descent

1 minimum salary 1–5 salaries 5–10 10–20 More than 20

12.0 9.9 9.7 0.3 5.7

3.26 9.85 0.47 5.49 16.09

Source: Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros (1990: 54, table 3.16). Note aSalary refers to the minimum income of a Brazilian citizen; the amount is not specified in the source.

According to Jirimutu’s research into the socioeconomic standing of the three colour groups in Brazil, which used 3 per cent of the sample data of Metropolitan São Paulo from the 1980 census, Asian Brazilians (in effect, Japanese) fare better than white and black Brazilians in all key indicators. These indicators comprise fertility levels, child mortality, school attendance rates, educational attainment, level of income and occupational distribution. The results of a study on social mobility reveal that the average earnings of Japanese males was 61 per cent higher than that of white people, while 32 per cent of Japanese were self-employed, compared with 19 per cent of white people. As noted above, there is little doubt that upward mobility was a practical possibility. Within a few years the majority of Japanese were able to purchase land and raise their status, in spite of initial poverty and other disadvantages. In 1988, some 55 per cent of the population of Japanese descent in Brazil considered themselves to be middle class. On the other hand, as Maeyama (1973: 246) remarks, none identified themselves as upper class. In this respect, it should be pointed out that according to the Brazilian social structure the term middle class does not include manual workers. Likewise, owning laundries or shops does not carry social prestige, nor are these occupations considered middle class in Brazil. Educational attainment The literacy rate of Japanese immigrants was one of the highest amongst all groups of immigrants when they arrived. However, it should be noted that literacy was measured in terms of their ability to read and write Japanese, and was graded

Japanese immigrants in Brazil 39 by the immigrants themselves. Of the pre-war Issei aged over 15 years, 74 per cent had between 6 and 8 years of schooling, while the average was 9 years for post-war Issei (Kawei 1980: 158). During the period in fazendas, when it was difficult to educate the Nisei, the illiteracy rate was higher for children than for their parents. The census in 1958 reported an illiteracy rate of 1.5 per cent for all immigrants, 3 per cent for their descendants living in urban areas and 4 per cent for those living in rural areas. Not all the children enjoyed equal educational opportunities. According to Cardoso (1995: 73) the child who studied was usually the one who had the best academic results, even if she/he was the first-born child, which suggests that the family invested in education in the hope of reaping benefits later. In 1950, ten people of Japanese descent graduated from São Paulo University (Sakurai 1993: 94). By the 1960s the Nikkei population numbered 3 per cent of the population of São Paulo (13 millions) and 10 per cent of this population was enrolled in colleges and universities (Kumasaka and Saito 1973: 462). In 1985, of 7,788 students who were enrolled at São Paulo University, 973 (13 per cent) were of Japanese descent, along with 47 per cent of the teaching staff (Miyao 1980: 96). According to Shimidu (1973: 484), who conducted a study of 1,000 Nisei enrolled in the universities in São Paulo, academic preferences show a tendency towards subjects leading to materially rewarding careers rather than courses traditionally associated with social prestige. With Japan’s economic success and the migration to Japan, the number of Nikkeijin enrolled in Japanese language courses in São Paulo University has increased, together with the number of post-graduate dissertations produced on Japan. It is perhaps significant that in 1997 Japanese Studies (Language and Literature) is the course showing the most significant presence of Nikkeijin. Language Mastering the dominant language of a country is the most useful vehicle for participating in its social and economic system. In general, the second generation has problems with both its parental mother tongue and the dominant language. This is true for the pre-war Nisei and, in particular, for those who were educated during the war who could speak neither Japanese nor Portuguese properly. Many of them grew up in rural areas and they used the Portuguese spoken in these regions. Usually amongst immigrants the shift to the dominant language is completed by the third and fourth generation, but according to Kanazawa and Loveday (1988: 428), who examined the language behaviour of different generations of the Japanese in Brazil, the shift to Portuguese took longer than is usual for other immigrant groups. In 1958, some 20 per cent of the Japanese descendants used Portuguese at home. In the 1970s, the situation was as follows: the Issei spoke in Japanese, their children learnt first Portuguese then Japanese; that is to say, parents spoke to their children in Japanese and their children replied in Portuguese (Cardoso 1973: 369). By 1988, about 36 per cent of the Nikkei population used both languages in daily

40

Japanese migrants in Brazil

conversation, and 33 per cent knew no Japanese, while 45 per cent used Portuguese at home. In urban areas, 66 per cent used only Portuguese as against 47 per cent in rural areas. According to the same findings, 40 per cent of couples used Portuguese and 51 per cent of parents addressed their children in Portuguese. Not surprisingly, there is a high correlation between age and the use of language. Older people tended to use Japanese, whereas younger people used Portuguese. Of those aged over 40 years, 80 per cent used Japanese, while those who lived in urban areas were more likely to use Portuguese. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show the language spoken at home and the language used by parents. In analysing them we have to keep in mind that the use of Japanese is only an indicator of ethnic retention if interviewees or respondents indicate that such use is voluntary; otherwise it can be interpreted as correlated with family obligations as Gans (1997: 879) suggests. Table 2.3 Language spoken at home, 1958 and 1988 (%) Language spoken

Portuguese Japanese Portuguese–Japanese No information

1958

1988

Urban

Rural

Urban

Rural

18.7 44.9 36.4 –

11.4 60.5 28.1 –

66.25 6.04 22.33 5.38

47.38 21.67 28.70 2.24

Source: Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros (1990: 51, table 3.12).

Table 2.4 Language used between parents and children by area in 1988 (%) Language

Urban

Rural

Portuguese Japanese Portuguese–Japanese No information

59.77 3.81 14.81 21.61

48.13 20.93 16.14 14.80

Source: Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros (1990: 92, table 4.16).

Koroniago remains widely spoken in the Japanese communities. Language problems were reported as amongst the most difficult that the first Japanese immigrants had to overcome, and 90 years later language is still a problem. There are many Issei in their sixties and seventies who are unable to speak Portuguese. Even today, there are many instances in which communication between children and their parents is conducted by means of a mixture of Portuguese and Japanese, or else the parents talk in Japanese and children respond in Portuguese. Thus there are numerous cases of grandchildren who cannot communicate with their grandparents owing to the lack of a common language. The percentage of those who mainly or exclusively use Japanese is diminishing exponentially, while by contrast the number of those wishing to learn Japanese is increasing, albeit slowly. It is interesting to observe that, as stated in Chapter 1, the

Japanese immigrants in Brazil 41 number of registered Japanese Language Schools in 1992 was 319, attended by 18,782 students. For a population of 1,228,000, this number is not very high. Motives for learning Japanese are various: 76 per cent reported that they had been obliged to do so by their parents, 55 per cent foresaw a possible need for it in the future, 50 per cent wanted to visit Japan and 32 per cent saw this as a means of easing communication with their grandparents.8 A group of Japanese teachers placed in Brazil by JICA and interviewed in March 1997 reported that the number of students who dropped out of Japanese classes was very high. According to them, this could be explained by the fact that many of the students were not learning Japanese voluntarily, but because they were forced to by their parents. In fact, even though the maintenance of the Japanese language is closely associated with the economic success of Japan in the last decades, and with migration of Nikkeijin to Japan, the number of people enrolled in Japanese courses with the explicit purpose of emigrating to Japan is apparently low.9 Inter-marriage Inter-marriage is considered by many researchers as a major index of integration, on the assumption that it reflects an abandonment of a preference for one’s own ethnic group.10 However, there are other reasons for selecting a spouse outside the ethnic group: mixed marriage can be as Vieira (1973b: 315) claims, a means by which to challenge the traditional family system or to achieve social promotion. Nevertheless, it remains important to examine the specific attitudes of the immigrants and their descendants towards inter-marriage. As discussed in Chapter 1, during the early years of immigration the Issei were clearly opposed to mixed marriage. It should be noted, however, that resistance to inter-marriage was not peculiar to the Issei. It is reported that, for example, people of Portuguese descent were reluctant to accept a spouse of Japanese descent.11 The attitude towards the issue is well illustrated by a story published by the magazine Yomimono in March/April 1951. The plot centred on a young Issei who, in spite of his love for a Brazilian woman, could not marry her because of attachment to his ethnic group (Handa 1987: 713). Yuri, in love with a Brazilian, but engaged by miai (arranged marriage) to a Nikkeijin, is another hero of a more recent novel dealing with Japanese immigrants, written by Murayama (1988). Attitudes towards endogamy after the war were closely related to Japan’s defeat and the resulting events that occurred in the Japanese communities. In the first decades of the post-war period, inter-marriage appealed to many Nisei who were eager to ‘erase’ their Japanese traits, as will be discussed later in Chapter 3. Accordingly, in the 1950s and early 1960s, there was a slight increase in rates of Japanese inter-marriage with the local population. According to Saito (1961: 218), families accepted inter-marriage more easily in the case of sons, but not when it involved daughters.12 Nonetheless, even with sons, their opposition was firm regarding the first-born. Cornell (1983, cited in Reichl 1988: 352) reports that the Issei were opposed to inter-marriage with the Brazilians partly because it meant ‘marrying-down’.

42

Japanese migrants in Brazil

With the move to the cities the incidence of inter-marriage increased, but as late as the 1960s, marriages tended to follow Japanese tradition (arranged marriages) and the Issei did not want their children married to non-Nikkeijin. Research conducted by Vieira in Marilia in the state of São Paulo (1964–1965) amongst 414 families revealed that only 7 per cent of them were in mixed marriages, and that more than half of the households (61 per cent) had a negative attitude towards inter-marriage. Analysing the cases of inter-marriage, she found that all had faced opposition from the community, except when the family was already separated from the ethnic group for other reasons. In all cases the opposition was formulated in terms of the undesirability of mixing races. Some argued that the Brazilians did not treat women well, whilst others mentioned the dark skin of Brazilians.13 It appears that parents do not mind if their children date non-Nikkeijin, although when it comes to marriage their reaction is very different. There are still prejudices in particular towards black people,14 but socioeconomic factors probably play a more important role than the stigma of colour. Mello (1972) points out that parental opposition to inter-marriage is highly related to the candidates’ social position. The status (in terms of family background) of the non-Nikkei woman who marries a Nikkei man is usually equal or superior to that of her husband. In the rural areas the status of the husband who marries a Nikkei woman is often inferior to that of his wife. There is also evidence that suggests a high positive correlation between the level of education and the rate of inter-marriage. Table 2.5 shows the number of inter-marriages between 1958 and 1962. Table 2.5 Rate of inter-marriage by year, generation and sex (%) Year

Generation

Rate for men

Rate for women

1908–1958

Issei Descendants Issei Descendants

2.57 7.57 2.70 18.36

0.38 1.57 4.55 7.63

1958–1962

Source: Adapted from Comissão de Recenceamento da Colonia de 1958 (1964: 356, table 276).

The inter-marriage rate in 1979 was about 25 per cent of all Nikkeijin and about twice as many Nisei men married non-Nikkeijin as did Nisei women (Robert Smith, 1979). Interviews conducted by Asari in 1988 in Assai (São Paulo state) revealed that only 28 per cent of respondents considered inter-marriage as natural, even after decades in Brazil (Asari 1992: 74). Seventy students interviewed in the city of São Paulo by Vieira approved of inter-marriage, but not for themselves. The directors of the Nihonjinkai were clearly in favour of mixed marriages in principle, although none of them had themselves converted principle to practice, nor seemed prepared to do so (Viera 1973b: 338–9). Of 1,000 Nisei students interviewed by Shimidu (1973: 485), a large majority preferred to date Nikkeijin. It should be noted that interviews with non-Japanese revealed that they also tend not to date Japanese descendants. In the 1960s and 1970s, the issue of inter-marriage was widely debated within

Japanese immigrants in Brazil 43 Nikkei communities. Nowadays, such discussion is less often heard, and there is a tendency to accept the probability that the Nikkeijin will prefer to marry Nikkeijin. Nisei of different ages interviewed in São Paulo in 1997 admitted that they felt more comfortable dating or getting married with someone from the same cultural background.15 Eight decades after the arrival of the first Japanese immigrants in Brazil, articles are still devoted to the question of marriage between Nikkeijin and nonNikkeijin, and miscegenation continues to be evoked as proof of the integration of Nikkeijin into Brazilian society.16 Table 2.6 shows the inter-marriage rate in Brazil according to region and density of Nikkei population. Table 2.6 Inter-marriage by area in 1988 (%) Region North Northeast São Paulo Metropolitan São Paulo São Paulo Statea Sub-totalb South Centre and West Other TOTAL

Density of Nikkei population

Marriage with Nikkeijin

Marriage with non-Nikkeijin

2.68 2.32 26.55 13.84 31.84 71.23 11.69 3.98 7.12

37.5 100.0 57.3 61.5 57.4 52.3 76.7 30.8 –

62.5 00.0 42.7 38.5 48.6 47.7 23.3 69.2 –

100.02

54.1

45.9

Source: Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros (1990: 21, table 2.6, 87, table 4.12). Notes aExcluding São Paulo city and Metropolitan São Paulo. bSub-total for the state of São Paulo.

Political participation In their first years in Brazil, the Nikkeijin were uninterested in politics. This lack of interest continued after World War II, but gradually they became more involved in the political process. Until 1974, the colonia had the right to elect their own representatives, and Nikkei candidates relied on the votes of fellow Japanese and their descendants.17 Once they were elected, they rewarded those who voted for them. This was reversed in the 1974 elections, when the best-known of Nikkei politicians in the colonia failed to get elected and new candidates, less well-known, but in receipt also of Brazilian votes, were elected in their stead. The first politicians were the leaders of Japanese associations. In January 1948, the first town councillor of Japanese descent was elected in São Paulo (Comissão 1992: 376). Since then the number of politicians of Japanese ancestry has been increasing. These are concentrated in the states of São Paulo and Paraná, where 90 per cent of the Japanese community is located (Miyao 1980: 98). In 1997, there were five Nikkei deputies in the federal government, four in the state of São Paulo

44

Japanese migrants in Brazil

(one of them was elected in April 1997 as President of the Parliament) and three in the city of São Paulo. Of all the indicators of social integration, political participation is the one that best suggests the acceptance of a minority; however, it is perhaps not merely a coincidence that politicians of Japanese descent have been increasingly successful in South American countries as the economic importance of Japan has grown. Religious affiliation Immigrants often feel divided between their traditional beliefs and the aspirations they have for their children. Some undergo religious conversions out of a desire to be accepted and achieve success, rather than for spiritual reasons. Japanese immigrants had strong incentives to convert to Catholicism, as has already been demonstrated in Chapter 1. In the 1958 census of the Japanese in Brazil, 15.5 per cent of the Issei, 58.7 per cent of the Nisei and 70 per cent of the third and fourth generations were identified as Catholics (Saito 1973). By contrast, in the 1960s, 70 per cent of Issei who were more than 50 years old were Buddhists (Schaden 1980: 144). Table 2.7 shows the situation in 1988. Table 2.7 Religion of the Nikkei population by area in 1988 (%) Religion Roman Catholic Other Christian Japanese religions Other No religion

Urban 60.79a 2.71 23.36 2.29 10.85

Rural 45.54a 6.61 38.17 0.88 8.77

Source: Adapted from Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros (1990: 97). Note a In the original.

Since the 1960s, the so-called New Religions, particularly Tenrikyö, Omoto, Seicho no ie and Sekai kyuseikyö, have proliferated among the population of Japanese descent. Some of them are identified with macumba (or umbanda), the black magic cults of African origin, very popular in Brazil. Actually, one of these religions is even known in Brazil as macumba japonesa (Japanese macumba, Robert Smith 1979). It is noteworthy that large numbers of Brazilians are members of this sect.18 There are also Shinto shrines with ties to Japan, but others are purely indigenous. Asakusa Kannon, Ise Dai Jingu and Izumo Taisha have branches in Brazil. Smith reports the existence of a cult in the macumba tradition headed by an Issei woman. The altar was adorned with the usual array of Christian and yoruba images and a statue of the Buddha. The ritual and the adherents were almost exclusively Brazilian.19 Maeyama suggest a close correlation between religious affiliation and ethnicity, arguing that the cult of the Emperor still survives in Japanese New Religions.20 He

Japanese immigrants in Brazil 45 goes on to say that when the Japanese decided to stay in Brazil, Japanese New Religions gave them an ideological basis upon which to identify with their ethnic group. For Saito (1973: 214), the enrolment in religious sects such as Seicho no ie functions as a compensation for the disappearance of the world of the older immigrants. However true these interpretations may be, they do not explain why, at the time of writing, the large number of people of non-Japanese descent who have converted to those religions exceeds the total of Nikkeijin converts. The syncretism of the first wave of immigrants continued in an amalgamation of aspects of Asian beliefs and practices, mixed with Christian ideas and AfroBrazilian influences. For example, there are cases of Nikkeijin who, believing they have been victims of macumba, go to Buddhist temples to seek a cure (Saga 1988: 214). The most popular religious sect among the Nikkei population in Brazil is Seicho no ie, a group that emphasises the cult of ancestor worship; in 1966, there were 553 associations with 15,630 members (Maeyama 1973). Considering the fierce competition among different sects in Brazil this number is very significant. According to Maeyama (1973: 240), traditional Japanese religious beliefs are strongest in the rural areas, while Catholicism is more dominant among the urban middle class. Celebrations of the anniversaries of Japanese immigration involve Buddhist ritual.

Attitudes towards the receiving country If successful integration is defined by the extent to which the second- or thirdgeneration immigrants have shifted away from the occupation and employment patterns of their parents or grandparents, then the Nikkeijin can be counted as an example of integration. In terms of employment, levels of income and education, equality with the nationals has been achieved. The thesis most generally offered to explain their success is that Japanese traditional principles and the structure of the community sustained their aspirations, while minimising deviant behaviour.21 For example, Lowell (1990, cited in Jirimutu 1994) explains this success mostly in terms of their natural ability and their cultural values. In novels written by immigrants, the concept of gambaru (to persevere) appears as the Japanese virtue most responsible for their success (Sakurai 1993). Although cultural explanations have been emphasised, other key factors include the economic growth of Brazil and the industrialisation of São Paulo. Makabe (1981), comparing the experiences of the Japanese in Canada and Brazil, concludes that the major reason for their success in Brazil was the lack of competition from indigenous workers and other immigrant groups. Material support and incentives from Japan also undoubtedly played an essential role. As we have seen in Chapter 1, immigrants received financial and technical support from Japan, whilst the Japanese government and private companies financed various settlement projects, promoted land ownership and provided information and technical assistance in farming, thereby increasing agricultural productivity. ‘Immigration not only has its history, it has its historiography’ wrote Marcus Lee Hansen (1996: 206).22 Since the end of the 1980s, many of the Issei in Brazil have

46

Japanese migrants in Brazil

been writing their autobiographies and memoirs. The number of publications on the topic of Japanese immigration to South America has also been rising significantly over the last two decades. There are many factors that may account for this. One is Japan’s enhanced status in the world. In addition, the migration of the Nikkeijin to Japan has also drawn attention to the overall subject of Japanese immigration to Brazil. Fujimori’s election as President of Peru has also contributed to a broadening of interest in Japanese immigrants. It is not possible to elaborate here on all the conference proceedings and publications concerned with the issue of the social integration of Japanese immigrants and their descendants. To summarise, however, all conclude that: (a) the immigrants were well accepted by Brazilian society; (b) Japanese values gave them the strength to fight against adversity and all the indicators of integration show that they have done very well. These conclusions are also evident in the ‘official’ history of immigration in Brazil, in all celebrations of Japanese immigration anniversaries, and in nearly all popular publications and research studies on the topic. The symposium organised by the Centre for Japanese–Brazilian Studies in São Paulo, 12–13 October 1978, as part of events held to commemorate the 70th anniversary of Japanese immigration, provides an illustration of what has been said on the issue. An exception was Hossoe who remarked that during the symposium no mention had been made of the psychological problems, conflicts and crises experienced by the Nikkeijin.23 The Issei tend to claim that they have been free from prejudice and discrimination, and scholars in general tend to deny the existence of racism directed against the Japanese. To give an example, few references are made to the anti-Japanese movements in Brazil of 1930 and 1945. If there is any reference to the hostility met by Japanese immigrants in Brazil it is usually interpreted as limited to ‘bitter arguments’ (e.g. Nakagawa 1983). The restrictions placed on immigration in 1934, which were apparently directed against the Japanese, form the most striking example. Although it was generally recognised that the law affected the Japanese more than other immigrant groups, it was not seen as discrimination against the Japanese per se. This was confirmed in the scholarly debate that took place at the symposium organised to celebrate the 70th anniversary of Japanese immigration. Participants emphasised the tolerance of Brazilian society as having contributed greatly to the success of Japanese immigration. Sumi Butsugan claimed that the problems that Japanese immigrants had to face were not created by Brazil, but by the rest of the world. Along the same line, Hiroshi Saito and José Ushiro among others, attributed the ‘easy adaptation’ to the ‘friendly attitude of the Brazilian population’. Judge Kazuo Watanabe argued that Brazil was a ‘salad bowl’, like the United States, but in Brazil the mixture had been much more successful (see the proceedings edited by Saito 1980). Novels written by immigrants present the process of the migration as being devoid of major conflicts, except for those personal conflicts that necessarily constitute the plot. According to Sakurai (1993), the Japanese are seen as being well accepted, though there is no exploration of the interaction between Brazilians and Japanese. Perhaps the best illustration of this attitude is represented by Izumi’s

Japanese immigrants in Brazil 47 findings in 1952–1953. In response to a question concerning difficulties encountered during World War II, only 29 per cent of the respondents admitted that they had experienced hostility; 34 per cent reported that they had not encountered any problems. These findings are relatively surprising if it is remembered what happened (school closure, suppression of Japanese language, etc.) during this period (Izumi 1973, 361–85). This attitude has been explained by the traditional Japanese feelings of gratitude – Osewa ni natte iru (feeling grateful). As guests they have an obligation to be grateful, even where they have undergone hardships.24 Although, as shown above, it is believed that Japanese immigrants in Brazil would not have achieved what they did in a short time if they had been subjected to discrimination, in what follows some evidence of discrimination in Brazil will be presented.

The receiving country Brazil was officially ‘discovered’ in 1500, and remained a Portuguese colony till 1822. The immensity of the territory and the sparseness of the Portuguese settler population led first to the enslavement of indigenous peoples and later to the importation of African slaves. Although few in number, Europeans wielded economic and political power within a system based on slave labour. Colonial society was made up of a few Portuguese from Portugal, together with Portuguese born in Brazil, indigenous Indians, mestizos and black people.25 Paraphrasing Freyre (1946), there were the lords and the slaves, with a scanty filling of free people sandwiched in between. Since the territory of Brazil suffered from both underpopulation and serious labour shortages, the concession of land to non-Portuguese was allowed as early as 1808. In 1819, the first group of immigrants arrived and, between 1874 and 1957, a total of 4,993,565 immigrants entered Brazil (Departamento Nacional de Imigraçao e Colonização, cited by Lynn Smith 1972: 121). The largest national immigrant group was the Italians, followed by the Portuguese, the Spanish and the Germans. When the Japanese arrived, Brazil was already a country of immigrants. ‘Racial democracy ’ and ‘whitening’ ideology Owing to the heterogeneous origins of its population, Brazil is a racial and a cultural mosaic. It has been often referred to as a cauldron where different cultures and races have melted in a successful process of social integration, free from prejudice (e.g. Willems 1949: 402). This idea has been reinforced by contrasts drawn between Brazil and the ‘racially tense’ society of the United States, a contrast frequently explained as a reflection of different national characters. According to this explanation, Brazil’s flexible national character has made possible a harmonious solution to ‘racial problems’; usually no reference is made to the fact that Brazilian society has its roots in slavery.26 Nonetheless, Brazil has a very complex and elaborate system of racial classification, with a different term for each colour shade, hair texture and facial feature.

48

Japanese migrants in Brazil

Harris has enumerated 492 different categories.27 This classification was not merely descriptive, and there is much evidence to show that the European type enjoyed the highest status, and that mulatto status was superior to that of ‘pure black’. Landowners were white, or occasionally light mulattos, but were never coloured, and in general upward mobility was less easy for people of colour. Indeed, there is little doubt that the social formation of Brazil was based on colour, although there existed no laws linking civil and political rights to racial origins, as in the United States. The preference for white immigrants was clearly enunciated in the following statement made in 1910: ‘We are not sympathetic to yellow immigrants. We prefer that the white races come to settle in our country’ (Gil Vidal, quoted in Skidmore 1974: 130). Even active abolitionists shared this opinion. An example of this is Nabuco, who refused a proposal from a group of coffee planters to accept Chinese workers to replace the slaves in the 1870s on the grounds that a whiter Brazil was needed. The ‘Chinese race bastardises and makes our race degenerate’ (Menezes e Sousa, translated and quoted by Skidmore 1974: 25). Such a view was at least semi-official. Similar arguments to those used to prevent the entry of Chinese labourers were deployed to exclude Japanese immigrants. Early on the Japanese were even regarded as inferior to the Chinese in Parliamentary debates (Comissão 1992: 43). To a certain extent Japanese victories in wars with China and Russia in 1894–1895 and 1904–1905 altered this perspective, but Asian immigrants were generally seen as a threat. This was clearly reflected in the following statement of a Congressional deputy, Bezerra, reminding his colleagues of the recent waves of immigration to the United States, Canada and Australia. The presence of ‘yellow cysts’ in Brazilian society would be as much a danger to Brazil, as the concentration of Asians in California was to the United States (Skidmore 1974: 193–4). Numerous articles were published conveying an image of the Asians as incapable of assimilation, having a strong tendency to commit suicide and so forth.28 There were dissenting voices, but they were a clear minority. Although racial issues were less important whenever the need for labour was particularly acute, ‘whitening’ was the ideal of the Brazilian elite between 1889 and 1914. ‘Whitening’ was a ‘theory’ of which the main assumption was that because ‘white genes’ were stronger, miscegenation would naturally produce a lighter population. It was believed that the ‘bleaching’ of the darker population would progress rapidly and white immigration would reinforce this tendency. The admission of Asian and African immigrants was seen as a threat to this natural process that would solve the racial issue in Brazil, which would in turn become a model for the world.29 ‘Whitening’ was a convenient adaptation of contemporary European and North-American racist concepts within Brazilian society which included many mulattos.30 As white immigrants would accelerate the ‘whitening’ process, Brazilian politicians made numerous attempts to recruit European immigrants, but their efforts met with little success. This was because Brazil was competing with other countries of the New World (United States, Argentina, etc.) who were also trying to attract the same immigrants.

Japanese immigrants in Brazil 49 Immigration policy These prevailing views on the subject of ‘race’ were naturally reflected in immigration legislation. An overview of this legislation gives further evidence of the preferences of the Brazilian ruling elite and provides clearer insights into the country that received Japanese immigrants. Prior to 1808, immigration policy was one of total exclusion, but this changed between 1822 and 1889, when attempts were made to attract colonists, either by giving concessions to the settlers or by granting them favours. With the establishment of the Federal Republic in 1889, these responsibilities were delegated to the various states. Legislation in 1890 prohibited Asians and Africans from entering the country without special authorisation, declaring that: ‘Free entry by persons healthy and able to work and not subject to any criminal prosecution in their own country . . . except natives of Asia and Africa, who can be admitted only by permission of the National Congress and in accordance with the stipulated conditions . . . The diplomatic and consular agents of the United States of Brazil will prevent by all means at their disposal the dispatch of immigrants from these continents . . .’ (Skidmore 1974: 137, Skidmore’s translation). Another article added that the port police would prevent the disembarkation of such individuals. On the other hand, the same legislation stated that any landowner who desired to settle European immigrants on his property could enjoy all the special incentives granted under the law (Comissão 1992). In 1892, the Monteiro Barros Law was approved, allowing the Chinese and the Japanese to enter the country, providing they had no criminal convictions. When the Japanese began arriving under this new law (Decree of 6 November 1907), they no longer required special approval (Carneiro 1950). However, during the 1920s and 1930s, political arguments about immigration were based on the assumption that the Brazilian population was whitening, and would continue to do so. Fidélio Reis, general deputy, presented to the Federal Parliament the first anti-Japanese bill on 22 October 1923, and the new law of 1924 which resulted from this virtually prohibited Japanese immigrants (Handa 1987: 707, Nogueira 1983: 140). When Getúlio Vargas came into power in 1930, through a fascist coup d’état, a strong nationalism was promoted, and the debate over the Japanese was reopened, as discussed in Chapter 1. The arguments used were by no means new, and the debate was based on both eugenic and national security preoccupations (the ‘yellow peril’). Discussion in Parliament was further intensified during World War II when Japanese immigrants came to be considered a national security problem. It was argued that the Japanese were racially and culturally different from other immigrants; that is, ‘different and distinct from the people who can be included in the circle of white race . . . everything in them is different and antagonistic to our way of being’.31 In 1934, the Ministry of Work, Industry and Commerce established a commission to study the immigration issue, which concluded that the Japanese could not be assimilated (Hatanaka 1993: 19). Accordingly, the legislation was changed. The quota principle was incorporated into the Constitution of 1934 (article 121, section

50

Japanese migrants in Brazil

6) in the following terms: ‘The entry of immigrants into the national territory will be subject to restrictions necessary to guarantee the ethnic integration and the physical and legal capacity of the immigrant; the number of immigrant arrivals from any country cannot exceed an annual rate of 2 per cent of the total number of that nationality resident in Brazil during the preceding fifty years’.32 Because the number of Japanese immigrants in the country was lower than that of other immigrant groups, the quota system affected Japanese immigrants more than any other immigrants. The same nationality quotas were later specified in the Constitution of 1937 (article 151). Moreover, in 1937, the fascist government issued an important decree, stipulating that immigrants should be admitted in conformance with ‘the necessity to preserve and develop the ethnic composition of the population, the more desirable characteristics of European ancestry’ (Skidmore 1974: 197). Under wartime conditions subsequent legislation tightened controls over immigration in general, but the preoccupation remained explicitly eugenic.33 The restrictions imposed on the Japanese in the 1920s and 1930s continued during the 1940s. In 1940, the notion of Brazilians moving closer to the European ideal, further removed from African and Asian people, was reiterated by the Minister of Education, Gustavo Capanemin. One year later the Minister of Justice, Francisco Campos, expressed the same view, interpreting the Japanese presence in Brazil as a threat to Latin America in general (Hatanake 1993, Moraes 1942). With the break in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan in August 1941, the controls over Japanese and other Axis immigrants intensified. After World War II, and more particularly, after the events which occurred in the Japanese community in São Paulo and described in Chapter 1, the Japanese again became a topic of discussion in Parliament. A bill was presented which stated the following: ‘regardless of age and birth place, all Japanese immigrants are prohibited from entering the country’. Only the chairman’s vote (Minerva vote) prevented the passage of this bill (Comissão 1992). The Constitution of 1946 did not explicitly deal with immigration, specifying instead that it would be regulated by parliament (Skidmore 1974). Concluding remarks To conclude, it should be noted that the alleged lack of discrimination in Brazil and the virtues of Brazilian ‘race’ relations in comparison with the allegedly racist system in the United States was not corroborated by UNESCO-sponsored research on race relations in Brazil in the 1950s. Indeed, a very different picture of Brazilian ‘racial harmony’ emerged. It seemed clear that the darker the colour a Brazilian happened to be, the more likely he or she was to be found at the bottom of the socioeconomic scale (UNESCO 1957). Brazilian society has its roots in slavery, and the arrival of European immigrants aggravated the discrimination and prejudice on which the system was based (Fernandes 1990: 122–42). There is evidence that, even if Brazil has never had a policy of legal discrimination, Brazilians tend even now to be very conscious of

Japanese immigrants in Brazil 51 physical appearance, and as already mentioned, there is in Brazil a wide and very elaborate nomenclature to designate all colour shades. Racial labels have never been merely descriptive, and stereotypes ascribing particular characteristics according to colour remain a feature of contemporary Brazilian society.34 What has been argued above may appear to be at odds with ‘the tolerant ethos of Brazilian society’ (Shinpo 1995: 50) and political discourses which represent it as a ‘racial democracy’ or ‘racial paradise’. Brazilians are fond of a saying that ‘money bleaches’, a phrase often used to argue the case that discrimination is based more on social class divisions than racial distinctions. Although racial discrimination has never been legalised and racial conflicts may have a lower profile in Brazil than in the United States or South Africa, as Pierre van den Berghe (1978: 7) remarks, a racial syndrome exists that simply cannot be dismissed as class prejudice. This seems to be especially true in the large urban centres of southern Brazil (Rio and São Paulo), where the majority of people of Japanese descent reside. From what has been said, it can be concluded that Brazilian society has not accepted the Japanese immigrants without some prejudice, although this has seldom been acknowledged, and the immigrants themselves play down the antagonism directed against them. Though initially welcomed when labour shortages were particularly serious, they were also seen as a threat to the ‘whitening’ of the country. The racism of the pre-war period continued in the form of anti-Japanese feeling up until the 1950s, when the discourse changed, and the presiding terminology of ‘race’ was replaced by ‘national character’; only then could the Japanese be incorporated into the definition of the Brazilian national identity. This chapter has examined in some detail the integration of Japanese immigrants within Brazilian society, and, in so doing, has provided further insights into the Nikkeijin identity. Indicators of occupational distribution, educational attainment and political participation suggest that people of Japanese descent in Brazil now fully participate in the Brazilian socioeconomic system. However, it should by no means be concluded that they are completely deracinated from their Japanese origins, nor that they have disappeared as an ethnic group. This can be seen in the attitudes towards intra-marriage (see Table 2.6) and will be further discussed in the following chapter.

3

From Dekasegi Imin to Nikkeijin

Migration and ethnicity: theoretical considerations Migration and ethnicity are concepts which require some theoretical discussion, and it is to this that we now turn. Awareness of ethnic identity is heightened when people migrate to a new culture and immigrants rewrite their identities during the process of integration into the host society in response to specific social and historical circumstances. These processes tend to be conflictual, involving transformation and resistance. This idea forms the starting point for this chapter, in which the settlement of the Japanese in Brazil is examined, building on the previous two chapters in order to understand the construction of Nikkeijin identity. I will begin by discussing the literature dealing with the question of the ethnicity of Japanese immigrants in Brazil. Much of this literature assumes their ethnicity to be a primordial attachment that stems from being Japanese or of Japanese descent. It has focused on the assimilation of Japanese immigrants into Brazilian society, emphasising attachments to their country of origin, whilst largely underestimating the role played by factors related to the receiving society.1 For example, researchers rarely address the racial aspects of the issue and the possible existence of discrimination against the Japanese, both by native Brazilians and by immigrants of European origin. Likewise, few references are made to the constant intervention of Japanese officials and their role in the reinforcement of pre-existing ties with Japan and Japanese culture. The creation of co-operatives by the immigrants is a good example of such lacunae. In much of the literature, this is explained by the co-operative spirit, so deeply rooted in traditional Japanese society. However, what is missing from this view is any reference to the incentives provided by the Japanese government that played an important role in the creation of these co-operatives.2 In general, the continuous and strong intervention of Japanese authorities in the emigration process of Japanese citizens and in their settlement in Brazil is rarely mentioned, and much less analysed. Immigrants may feel some ambivalence between being absorbed into the larger society and maintaining their culture, but in practice quite often choose the strategy that will enable their children to climb the social ladder.3 However, the role of behaviour conducive to social promotion has been neglected or interpreted as an

From Dekasegi Imin to Nikkeijin

53

index of assimilation. For example, conversion to Catholicism has seldom been analysed as a strategy to obtain social promotion, and is presented more as an indication of assimilation into Brazilian society.4 Another aspect that has been inadequately analysed is the emphasis placed by the Issei on the acquisition of the Japanese language by their children, an emphasis which has been mainly explained by their attachment to Japanese culture. Admittedly the Issei, as the first generation of immigrants, had every interest in maintaining continuity with their origins. However, if it is accepted that to be economically successful, it is necessary to learn the host language, then certainly the Issei wanted their children to succeed. In addition, there is much evidence that they wanted the Nisei to learn Portuguese.5 The insistence on problems of assimilation and attachment to Japan underestimates the role of social, political and economic factors, and plays down the historical context. Similarly, it underestimates the role of the ideologies that shaped Japanese immigration to Brazil – the ideology of Meiji Japan and the ideologies of ‘whitening’ and of the Brazilian ‘melting pot’. Therefore the issue cannot be reduced simply to an assimilation problem. Although Japanese immigrants to Brazil have received much attention since the 1980s, an approach which incorporates the policies and the ideologies of the originating and receiving societies is still lacking. Although immigration is a continuous process of transformation, it can be divided chronologically for analytical purposes. Broadly speaking, we can consider three main periods in the history of Japanese immigration to Brazil. The first two are separated by the period of conflicts within the Japanese community that followed Japan’s defeat in World War II. The first period is characterised by separation from the host country; the second by a movement towards integration into the larger society, whilst the third starts with the migration of the Nikkeijin to Japan.

The first period: isolation and the creation of ethnic ‘enclaves’ As discussed in chapter 2, Japanese immigrants were more often than not seen as unassimilated, and referred to as a ‘cyst’ in the social body. An illustration of this is given by Norman and Gerbi (1943: 39) who state that ‘The population of their centres varies from 300 to 6–7000, in cities, towns and large fazendas, but have always remained “in atmosphere and surroundings completely Japanese”.’ Apparently, the isolation of the Issei from the dominant society occurred to some extent all over Brazil. The clustering into enclaves that are cultural extensions of the mother country is typical of immigrant groups. Immigrants tend to seek out their fellow immigrants with whom they share a common language and culture in order to cope with the stress of being in a strange land. Migration is a stressful process, aggravated when the cultural heritage of the immigrants is very different from that of the host country, or when they have to face hostility. Although there existed in Brazil a demand for labourers, the Brazilian authorities and the public in general were not

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very sympathetic to Asians. This, in turn, will have increased the tendency to enclose themselves within their in-group. Not only did the Japanese isolate themselves from Brazilian nationals, but also from other immigrant groups. As previously stated, Brazil opened its doors to immigrants in 1808 and from that year on received a large influx, three-quarters of whom belonged to the ‘cultural Latin Catholic complex’ (Maeyama 1973: 242). The Japanese were classified as non-Catholic, which meant exclusion from the group defined as ‘civilised’ people.6 Aside from the huge cultural distance between Japanese and European immigrants, it is important to recall that prejudice was initially exacerbated by visibility. Since there were very few other Asians, the Japanese naturally stood out. Physical and cultural differences attracted attention, and there is evidence that European immigrants found the Japanese strange, and may have kept their distance.7 On the other hand, the very isolation of the Japanese reinforced the suspicion of other groups. This seems to be the opinion of Tsukamoto (1973: 25), who claims that their awareness of being rejected played an important role in the animosity they felt towards immigrants of other nationalities, and may have contributed to their isolation.8 There is some research comparing the Japanese immigrant experience with that of other immigrant groups (e.g. Kawaii 1980, Willems 1948). Not surprisingly, some experiences were found to be common to all groups, but the differences were much more striking. Thus, for example, the experience of cultural distance was not the same for all immigrants, with those from Europe, particularly from Southern Europe, enjoying a greater acceptance by Brazilian society than Japanese immigrants. Nor, as mentioned earlier, did World War II have the same consequences for all the Axis immigrants. Separation from the society at large was made possible by the self-sufficient structure of their communities. The colonias helped them by providing social support, together with appropriate conditions for entrepreneurs to develop businesses and overcome linguistic and cultural barriers. As Saito (1973: 213) puts it, the Japanese communities were like protective shells, without which the Japanese would be like homeless crabs. Ethnic communities are simultaneously a source of support and coercion, and the Japanese community, whilst protecting the immigrants, controlled their lives. The role of ethnic associations Japanese immigrants tended to use their country of origin as their frame of reference, and as noted previously, their communities were modelled on Japanese villages, with associations that were a reproduction of those existing in Japan. Associations played an important role in the cohesiveness of the community, and were clearly ethnically oriented. The boundaries were maintained through a shared system of in-group values that excluded those who did not have Japanese ancestry. As Staniford (1973: 39) points out in relation to co-operatives, ‘the sense of Japaneseness outweighs any feeling of common citizenship’ and is reinforced by

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the Brazilian tendency to group all Japanese together. Separatism is maintained because the Japanese think that Brazilians do not want to join them. In fact, almost no effort is made to recruit them. Since the greater the degree of in-group interaction and cohesiveness the more likely it is that the integrity of the culture of origin is maintained (see Levine and Campbell 1972) all the values and social norms the Issei brought with them remained unchanged for a long time. Furthermore, as mentioned above, family, Japanese schools and associations were united in transmitting traditional Japanese social patterns to the Nisei. The social system was linked to Japan, and the bonds with Japan were reinforced by the paternalistic attitudes of the Japanese officials and the incessant propaganda of the Dai Nihon Teikoku (the Great Empire of Japan). The role of Japanese officials If the creation of ethnic enclaves was not unique to Japanese immigrants, the external interest of the government of the country of origin was unusual. There is evidence, however, that this was operated more to promote Japan’s international prestige than out of concern for the wellbeing of the immigrants.9 Whatever the reason for the concern of the Japanese government for its subjects, it is a fact that since the 1880s, emigration occupied a crucial role within the context of territorial expansionism, and the immigrants were regarded as ‘the spearhead of an expanding nation’ (Jansen 1995: 325). As discussed in Chapter 1, emigration was seen as a solution to the country’s surplus population and as a contribution to the nation’s wealth and strength. Business circles were also interested in investing overseas, and acted in accordance with government policy.10 Emigration was consistently encouraged, and even sponsored in the case of Brazil. That Japanese immigrants were aware of this is illustrated by the following episode. In the south of Brazil the Issei often referred to themselves as kimin (unwanted, abandoned persons) or gisei imin (sacrificial immigrants). Most claimed that they emigrated in a spirit of sacrifice (geiseiteki seishin) for the good of Japan. They had go to Brazil as hadaka ikkan (without resources), they were mabiki imin (impoverished immigrants). Just as farmers thin out young rice plants and throw away the surplus, so they had been thinned out in order that those who stayed in Japan could succeed. They had left their home country so that pressure on Japan’s limited resources might be reduced and they could show the world what Japan was capable of doing. But they also recognised that the ‘real’ Japanese stayed. For them, Nihon ni shitemo shöganai – there would have been no way of making a good living in the home country even if they had stayed.11 ‘When the government sent us immigrants to Brazil, it seemed it was for good’ (Nakamura, quoted in Sakurai 1993: 83). Japanese officials played an active role in the settlements of immigrants. Although it has often been argued that only after Japan’s defeat were the Japanese encouraged to settle permanently in Brazil, there is much evidence that this encouragement began in the 1930s. After the financial crisis of 1927, the Japanese government began to think about definitive emigration, and promoted the creation

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of permanent settlements. For this reason, the governor of Nagano Prefecture, Toshi Hanna, proposed that the term ijü (change of residence) should be used to distinguish this kind of migration from Dekasegi which was assumed to be temporary (Comissão 1992). There was moreover a negative image of the Dekasegi konjö (literally ‘this life’, but it suggests a disposition to be merely a temporary worker abroad according to Maeyama 1973: 443). As stated in Chapter 1, the Japanese emigration companies had a fundamental role in ensuring that the composition of immigrant communities was ethnically homogeneous. In this regard, it is perhaps significant that during the 90 years of Japanese immigration to Brazil many colonias sprang up and disappeared just as quickly, but the communities organised by emigration companies remained.12 Japanese communities were also connected to Japan through the Japanese Consulate in São Paulo which played an active and important role in the life of these communities. This was reflected in the fact that when, in 1942, consular personnel in São Paulo left Brazil, ‘the immigrants felt abandoned to their fate and it is only then that Brazil became an enemy’ (Comissão 1992: 260). The Japanese policy of promoting emigration and settlement overseas implied the support of Japanese immigrants. Japanese officials were interested in maintaining ties with the immigrants, and the debate on pre-war overseas schools and the question of whether the Japanese living overseas should remain Japanese or assimilate into their new culture is suggestive of this interest. Some argued that they should maintain their ‘Japaneseness’ overseas and avoid losing their ‘higher culture’; others counter-argued that they should respect the countries to which they had emigrated (Kojma 1981, quoted in Goodman 1990: 200). The fact is that during the pre-war period, Japanese schools in Brazil followed the Japanese educational system. Because it was predictable that the second and third generations of overseas Japanese might face problems of identity (Dower 1986: 278), for immigration purposes, it would seem more advantageous to represent the Japanese in ethnic national terms, rather than in terms of state interests (which excluded Japanese naturalised in their countries of immigration) or racial terms (which would equate them with other Asians). In this way, Japanese living overseas would not be excluded from its embrace (Doak 1996: 84–5). Their continued identification with Japan should therefore be encouraged by Japanese officials. The Japanese and the others: views of ‘race’ In the early years, immigrants worked in the plantations and ‘. . . they were shocked to discover that the population they had to interact [with] closely – other agricultural workers – were for the most part not only dark-skinned but illiterate’ (Robert Smith 1979: 56). For this reason, they felt they had to preserve the Japanese spirit against ‘Brazilianisation’ and protect themselves from the dark-skinned ‘barbarians’. Japanese immigrant discrimination against the dark-skinned Brazilians on the grounds of ‘race’ has its roots in Japan; thus, it might be illuminating at this stage

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to examine Japanese views of race. It has often been pointed out that there has been in Japan a traditional preference for Western somatic features, manifested in the fact that the Japanese never describe themselves as yellow (see Kozakai 1991). There is a long tradition of valuing whiteness in Japan, clearly illustrated in the Tale of Genji, an eleventh century romance. The heroine of the romance, Lady Naiji, is described as very white, and there are 47 positive references to whiteness of skin tone in the tale (Wagatsuma 1967). On the other hand, since the first recorded arrivals of blacks in Japan in the sixteenth century, attitudes towards them have been deprecatory (Wagatsuma 1967: 435, Russell 1991: 418). While ‘whiteness’ is associated with purity, ‘blackness’ is symbolically associated with evil things; black people in Japan are seen as simple-minded natives. Of course, this view is by no means limited to Japan, and there is evidence that it was partly shaped by Western influence. But the fact is that the racial hierarchy pre-existent in Japan, together with its prevailing racial discourses, were reproduced in Brazil. Maeyama (1979; 592) argues that after the immigrants’ arrival in multiracial Brazil, having a Japanese identity became far more important than it had been in Japan. It was therefore only at this point perhaps that they became fully aware for the first time of being ‘Japanese’. This may be true in that ethnicity emerges from an interaction between immigrants and natives; however, a sense of the importance of being Japanese was instilled in large part before their departure through exposure to the ideology of ‘Japaneseness’ which was constructed during the Meiji period. Thus, we must turn to Meiji Japan (1868–1912) to understand the social and ideological background to the attitudes of the Japanese immigrants. The ideology of ‘Japaneseness’ As mentioned before, Japanese emigration commenced during the Meiji era, a historical juncture which marked the end of feudalism and the emergence of a modern nation. This era brought with it a desire for ‘civilisation’, to ‘catch up with the West’. To achieve this, an ideology was necessary which would foster a sense of nation, since the creation of national unity was deemed necessary to carry out the reforms of the Meiji period. Drawing on values from the past and the present, an ideology was created with the emperor at its centre. The Tennösei ideology (the ideology of the Emperor system) was meant to make people conscious of their roles both as Kokumin (citizens) and Shinmin (subjects) (Gluck 1985). Accordingly, the Japanese were told that Japan was the land of the gods, inhabited by a people uniquely superior in the world, who lived together as a single family under the guidance of a divine Emperor. The propagation of this ideology resulted in a outburst of nationalism in the late 1880s and 1890s, which was further unleashed after the Japanese victories in the wars against China and Russia (1894–1905 and 1904–1985). The nationalist mood was further exacerbated for expansionist purposes during the late 1930s and 1940s with the promotion of ‘The Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ (Gluck 1985: 121).

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Drawing the boundaries Immigrants to Brazil experienced considerable hardship and suffering, particularly in the early years when they were treated like slaves and the discourse of ‘Japaneseness’ was incongruent with their disadvantaged status and the treatment they received in Brazil. For this reason the two successful Japanese incursions into China and Russia around the turn of the century met with considerable enthusiasm from the Japanese immigrants. Labouring as they were in a hostile environment, the Japanese ethnocentric discourse was gratifying to their lowered self-esteem. They thus achieved a more positive image of themselves as Japanese by identifying with their country of origin, and this was reinforced by the attitudes of Japanese officials. Furthermore, it is arguable that the Issei might have segregated themselves voluntarily from the host society as a defence mechanism. This seems to be the view taken by Handa (1987). According to him, in the pre-war years, the Japanese learned to look down on their Brazilian neighbours as a survival strategy in the new society after initial disappointments, drawing in the process very sharp distinctions between themselves and the Brazilians, especially with regard to ethical codes and values. They referred to Brazilians with whom they had contact as yabanjin (savages) or genshijin (primitives, Staniford 1973: 47). Racism serves a psychological function in terms of self-image, and certainly the shared belief in an inherent racial and cultural superiority helped them to overcome discrimination and other difficulties.13 It should be noted however that there existed other than purely racial concerns in drawing ethnic boundaries. Koyama (1980: 18), for example, states that the immigrants ‘were at risk of being exposed to cultural degeneration because of their contact with caboclos (mestizos)’. Yet he also draws attention to some exceptions amongst those so exposed: ‘those who, by luck or effort, succeeded in interacting with social groups of a high social status [upper class]’. This is also the opinion of Schaden (1980: 148), who considers the ethnocentric attitude of the Japanese to be produced only by contact with the lower classes (caboclos or caipiras, mestizos). Thus there were different categories of Gaijin that caused a ‘sense of inferiority’ or a ‘sense of superiority’, according to their skin colour and social position. The encounter with a multi-ethnic situation led the Japanese to draw sharp boundaries between Nihonjin (themselves) and Gaijin (Brazilians and other immigrant groups) and to organise their ethnic identities in such a way that enabled a retention of self-esteem. The reaction to Japanese defeat The fact that 90 per cent of the population with Japanese ancestry was predisposed not to accept Japan’s defeat in World War II deserves special attention. In much of the literature on the subject, interpretations are centred upon both ethnic attachment to Japan and assimilation difficulties which were aggravated during the period when compulsory assimilation policies were in effect.14 This view is

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endorsed by Saito, and many others. Willems and Saito (1974) interpret Shindö as a ‘cultural shock’ and a reaction against Brazilian policies. Similarly, Maeyama (1979) claims that Shindö was an expression of anti-acculturation. Handa (1987) shares the same view, and explains the pro-victory group in terms of an attachment to the past and to the ‘Japanese spirit’. Admittedly, the immigrants had been caught between Japanese nationalist discourse and Brazilian assimilation policies. Under the pressure to assimilate into Brazilian society it was only natural that Japanese immigrants and their descendants should feel resentful towards imposed restrictions, such as not being allowed to speak their mother tongue, and this manifested itself in expressions of Japanese nationalism. Moreover, because they initially occupied a very low social position in Brazilian society they were able to find support in the Japanese propaganda continuously promoted by Japanese officials. Conversely, to recognise the defeat implied the destruction of their beliefs and dreams, in particular for those who had organised their lives around the idea of returning to Japan. This was mirrored in the fact that thousands of Japanese immigrants sold their possessions and went to the coast to await the ships that the Emperor would dispatch to Brazil to take onboard his loyal subjects who wished to return to the mother country, as discussed in Chapter 1. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that those who supported the victory faction were completely unaware of Japan’s defeat. Although interaction with the dominant society was actually reduced, it is possible that they learnt about Japan’s surrender and preferred to ignore it. This can be interpreted as a case of cognitive dissonance: Japan’s defeat was dissonant with their fixed conceptions of Japan.15 Secondly, ideas are more readily accepted as valid amongst group members when they originate internally rather than externally, while the so-called majority effect also has to be considered. Moreover, the ground was fertile for this dissonance: uncertainty increases anxiety and stress, which in turn enhances transmission of rumours. The poor broadcast quality of the Emperor’s acknowledgement of defeat might have contributed to increasing doubts about its truth, in addition to the fact that the majority of immigrants had never heard his voice before (Castro 1994: 95). Furthermore, although by the end of 1946 it is reported that 90 per cent of people of Japanese descent in Brazil had understood that Japan had been defeated, the conflict of opinion continued (Comissão 1992). The resentment was too deep to vanish easily and inter-group conflicts tend to be self-replicating. The above considerations, however, do not take into account the economic and social relations that existed within the Japanese communities. In spite of their apparent harmony, conflicts existed long before the war. In the 1920s and 1930s, there were many conflicts between the wealthiest Japanese residents in São Paulo, who formed a group called ue machi (upper city) and the less prosperous, the shita machi (lower city). Indeed, the conflicts were so numerous that the Consul General of Japan, in order to put an end to them, made unsuccessful attempts to create an association of all the Japanese residing in the city of São Paulo (Comissão 1992: 228).

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In fact, not all immigrants prospered equally. Differences in social promotion and distribution of resources became more obvious during the 1930s and 1940s, when there was a reorganisation of the immigrants’ economic activities. The small retailers disappeared and commerce became concentrated in the hands of a few individuals connected with the co-operatives. With the outbreak of war there was a significant rise in the price of silkworm products, and those involved with these products became wealthy. Business profits related to silkworm products accrued in large bank deposits, and between 1930 and 1941 the number of agencies run by BRATAC-affiliated financial institutions increased from 15 to 35, in spite of Brazilian nationalist policies (Comissão 1992: 264, 335). The Banco América do Sul, BRATAC, Cotia and sericulture production were thus closely related (Hatanaka 1993: 127, note 45). It is plausible that those who had been economically and socially successful were those who were interested in acknowledging and spreading the news of Japan’s defeat. On the other hand, those who had nothing to gain from Japan’s defeat wanted to retain their image of Japan as a source of ‘symbolic wealth’. In what follows, I shall present some evidence and examples that support this idea. The attitude of Cotia, the most important co-operative, gives an idea of the attitudes of big business towards the issue of Japan’s defeat. Suffice it to say that the decision to release intelligence of the Imperial Edict had been made in a meeting held at the Cotia co-operative and this co-operative used its distribution network to spread the news of Japan’s surrender (Comissão 1992: 285). The targets of attacks selected by Shindö Renmei further mirrors this. Their list of persons to be killed included the president of the Cotia co-operative, members of the KKKK, traders, retailers and pub owners. There are no references to poor farmers having been persecuted. The justification given by one member of the kachi gumi faction for refusing to accept the Imperial Edict of Japan’s surrender highlights the importance of class divisions in the community. Arguing that members of the Cotia co-operative had translated the Edict incorrectly, he used the following terms: ‘You Sirs, who belong to the upper class of the Japanese community in Brazil, translated for your own ends the Imperial Edict’.16 Other examples of social inequalities were expressed by Shindö members during their trial. There were numerous references to both the greed and individualism of those who proclaimed Japan’s defeat and to the exhortation of Japanese traditional values which attached little importance to material wealth. Those who got rich during the war were ‘bad Japanese’ and they did not deserve the honour of being called Japanese; ‘If the Japanese people valued only money, Japan would have disappeared’.17 Graffiti on the walls with the words ‘traitors’ and ‘Jews’ (a reference to the stereotypical association between Jews and money) were frequent. From this and other evidence, it seems that ethnic attachment to Japan or acculturation difficulties alone cannot adequately explain the events that occurred immediately after the war. However, the method used by the Brazilian police to identify suspects and to obtain confessions shows how deeply the Japanese nationalistic ideology was inculcated and how complex the issue was. In order to interrogate suspects, the police used the Japanese flag and a photograph of the

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Emperor. The prisoners were ordered to step on the photograph and to clean their shoes with the flag. If they refused to perform one of these acts, they would be suspected of belonging to Shindö Renmei. It seemed at the time natural to expect that attachment to Japan meant a rejection of Brazil. However, this was not the case. During the trials of the accused of membership of Shindö it was clear from the statements of prisoners that they did not have a hostile attitude towards Brazil. Their loyalties may have been to Japan, but their emotional attachment to their country of origin did not cause them to forget their gratitude towards their host country, as the following quotation illustrates: ‘In spite of being our second home, Brazil became an enemy of Japan. However, the governmental authorities’ magnanimity and the Brazilian people’s friendliness must never be forgotten by Japanese residents in Brazil’ (quoted in Hatanaka 1993: 105). To conclude, it is important to note that there is no evidence to suggest that Japan in any way encouraged the activities of Shindö. In this regard, reference should be made to a telegram sent in July 1946 by Shigeru Yoshida, then Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister, which was attached to the Imperial Edict, explaining the situation in Japan: ‘We hope that the Japanese in Brazil live in peace and contribute to the construction of their country of adoption, Brazil’ (quoted in Comissão 1992: 300). It is clear from this message that immigrants were not called upon to return to Japan. Indeed, the case was quite the opposite: they were expected to remain in Brazil. Japanese immigrants and their descendants continued to be strongly attached to Japan, not only because of the continuous support and encouragement of its government and officials, but also due to the hostile reaction of their host society, particularly between 1930 and 1940. Furthermore, the social and historical context involved intersecting nationalisms: on the one hand, the Japanese nationalist discourse, and on the other Brazilian nationalism. Nevertheless, reduction of the conflict to ethnicity neglects sociopsychological aspects, and does not adequately account for the role played by power and money in the communities, which were important in determining the inter-group conflict that divided people of Japanese descent in Brazil immediately after the war. The language of those times was patriotic, but the issue was not merely a question of nationalism and ethnicity. Ethnicity was indeed mobilised by all of those who conducted business in the name of the Japanese spirit. The situation allowed a lot of money to be made by those who sold land in the ‘Co-Prosperity Sphere’ and tricked the immigrants into buying devalued yen at inflated rates. Loyalty to Japan and the Emperor alone could not explain this. Certainly, ethnicity was an important issue, but not the only one. It is always difficult to assess the importance of all the factors that contribute to a social phenomenon. However, an understanding of the conflict that divided the Japanese in Brazil is surely only possible if we take due account of the complex mix of economic and social forces at work in their communities as well as the historical context that shaped their lives for much of the pre-war period.

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The second period: the construction of Nikkeijin identity In the early years of migration, Japanese immigrants were committed to the idea of eventually returning home, while Brazil was seen as an alien country. As time passed, they realised the impossibility of becoming wealthy in the short term originally envisaged, and therefore created communities isolated from society at large. They began instead to see themselves as long-term Japanese residents in Brazil and formed the Zaikoku Höjin Shakai (Society of the Compatriot Residents in Brazil). Nevertheless, the integration process took place amongst them at different times and in various ways. Some (probably the more successful in the dominant society) began to regard themselves as Brazilian residents sooner than others, who continued to see themselves as immigrants for a longer period. At their own various paces, immigrants organised their lives in Brazil and reconstructed their ethnic identities. Japan’s defeat was an important stage in this process, but ethnicity was not the major issue which divided the Japanese in Brazil. Equally important was the arrival of post-war Japanese immigrants, which led to an ethnic crisis. When the newcomers arrived, the old immigrants reacted by assuming that they had lost all the qualities of being Japanese, and had already been transformed into another ‘race’, as Handa (1987: 770–2) reports. The new immigrants seemed to them to be the personification of the old immigrant’s nostalgic image of Japan. They had white soft skin in contrast with their own, tanned as it was by the Brazilian sun, and they spoke good Japanese, having only just left their homeland. However, pre-war immigrants were disappointed in some ways by the newcomers, and their attitudes towards them were a mixture of disillusion and fascination. In spite of this ambivalence, many pre-war immigrants wanted to see their children married to the newcomers (Handa 1987: 773). Their mutual perceptions reflected the differences of the two worlds. For the newcomers, the old immigrants spoke a strange dialect, full of unknown words. They were also surprised by their dark skin. As Handa puts it, the old immigrants were already ‘Brazilianised’. As soon as they arrived they were somewhat perplexed by the old immigrants who were waiting for them on arrival. On the other hand, the Japanese who had left Japan decades ago were confused because the others did not fit their idea of what constituted the Japanese. Faced with the fact that newcomers did not correspond to their ideal of ‘Japaneseness’, the pre-war immigrants had to redefine themselves as Japanese. The Issei did not see themselves as Brazilians, but could not recognise themselves in the newcomers either. It was at this point that the pre-war immigrants began to assert the notion that the Japanese were more traditional in Brazil than the Japanese in Japan, that celebrations of the Emperor’s birthday were better in Brazil than in Japan, and that the ‘real’ Japan was in Brazil. Furthermore, after the war, it became clear that they would remain in Brazil despite not ‘feeling Brazilian’. The hostilities that divided the Japanese colonias were reduced and eventually ceased, but Japan’s defeat and in particular the

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terrorist activities within the Japanese communities generated a feeling of shame at being Japanese. As a result, relationships with the receiving society changed, and Brazil gradually came to be viewed as an adoptive country. Maeyama reports that some of the immigrants he interviewed went to Japan after 40 or 50 years in Brazil to return the ashes of their ancestors.18 However, the issue of the ethnic identity of Japanese immigrants cannot be summarised by the simple assertion that in the 1950s the immigrants abandoned the idea of returning and began to live out their identity as Brazilian–Japanese, as distinct from the Japanese in Japan, as has been often suggested. While it may be true that the period after Japan’s defeat was very important in terms of ethnicity, the question of Nisei ethnic identity had already been raised. For example, on 1 January 1947, the newspaper Jornal Paulista (which supported the make gumi faction) published a statement in Japanese on the front page: to the effect that ‘The most important thing is to keep in mind that the Nisei are Brazilians’. Even earlier, in 1935, during the period of Brazilian nationalism, Cassio Shimomoto wrote in the newspaper Gakusei Renmei (Students Union), founded in 1934: ‘How can we love the country of our ancestors if we don’t even know it? At most we can respect our parent’s country but never love the country of chrysanthemums [Japan]’. This statement led to a serious incident in the Japanese community which came to be known as the ‘chrysanthemum incident’ and required the intervention of the Japanese Consulate.19 As Handa (1987: 623) remarks, through the ‘chrysanthemum incident’ the Nisei were defining their ethnic positions. It is also indicative of Nisei concerns about identity that the newspaper Gakusei, founded in 1935, had the following headline ‘What we would like to be’: ‘We want to strengthen contacts with our colleagues [Brazilians] and write in this beautiful language that is the language of Camões [a Portuguese writer]’ (quoted in Comissão 1992: 175). In April 1939, the journal Gakusei was replaced by the magazine Transição (Transition). The leading article in the first issue opened like this: ‘We Brazilians, children of Japanese, we are a transition. A transition between the past and the future, transition between East and West . . . We unite the antipodes’ (quoted in Comissão 1992: 176). Identity dilemmas also manifest themselves in the novels written by immigrants. For instance, in Murayama’s novel (1988: 146), the main character says : ‘The Brazilians think I am Japanese and the Japanese think I am ‘Brazilianised’. It is hard! Of course I feel myself very much Brazilian, but in certain aspects I need to agree with my father.’ References to such chameleon-like20 switches of personality are present in Nisei discourses dealing with identity. On one hand, there are the ethnic roots (often equated with family ties), and on the other there is the ambition to climb the social ladder. Yuri, a character of Nakamura’s novel (1988) further illustrates the constant preoccupation with being Brazilian and feeling Japanese: ‘we need to integrate completely into Brazilian society. I do not want to belong to a minority group. At school with the Brazilians, it is necessary to follow Brazilian patterns. At home, it is necessary to follow Japanese patterns’. While Nisei saw themselves as in a process of transition, the Issei were Gaikokujin ni natta Nihonjin (Japanese who became foreigners) or ‘ex-Japanese’. Yamamoto

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(1994: 131) defines the conditions of being an ‘ex-Japanese’ in the following way: being an ‘ex-Japanese’ consists of retaining the original mental structure of a Japanese, but thinking like a Brazilian. According to him, ‘the Nikkei is an amphibious animal. Nobody knows if he is a Brazilian or Japanese. Sometimes he looks Brazilian, at other times Japanese’. Speaking of himself, he adds ‘with Japanese I express myself as Japanese, when Brazilians criticise Japan or the Japanese, I defend them. This causes surprise because they think I am Brazilian . . . In any case I take the most comfortable position, I take the easiest way out. I am like an amphibious animal’. These concerns over identity are best summarised by Handa (1987: 806) in the epilogue to his main work: ‘. . . the immigrant is neither Brazilian nor Japanese and yet is both of them. . . . [but] Man can not live eternally in contradiction and conflict’. It can be seen that the ethnic identity of the Issei was not actually taken for granted. Many Issei experienced concerns with their ethnic identity. In the first decade after the war, whilst a minority of Issei and Nisei from the pre-war period remained attached to Japanese traditions and made efforts to preserve their ‘purity’, the majority of the Japanese and their descendants underwent an ethnic identity ‘crisis’, which continued into the following decades.21 Owing to the war and the terrorist acts in the Japanese communities in Brazil, the image of the Japanese at this time was negative, and they demonstrated a distinct out-group preference. In schools, according to many accounts, children of Japanese descent were teased by other children with words such as ‘Japonês’ (Japanese) or ‘Japão’ (Japan), ‘olho puxado’ (slant eyes). There was increasingly a wish not to feel like ‘false nationals’. Many wanted to turn their back on their Japanese roots and their ‘Japaneseness’ as part of their aspiration towards social advancement. They wanted to ‘de-Japanise’ themselves and marry outside their own ethnic group. Since they did not want their children to have Asian features the rate of intermarriage also increased during that period.22 Being Japanese meant belonging to a minority group, separated from mainstream society. ‘Brazilianisation’ was now seen as a means to obtain social promotion, with the reference group being the middle class Brazilian of European descent. Not speaking Japanese was particularly important, and although almost all Nisei had attended Nihongakkö (Japanese schools), they did their best to forget what they had learned or to pretend they had never learnt Japanese. It was believed that despite physical differences, not speaking Japanese and knowing little about Japanese culture would mean being identified (and accepted) as entirely Brazilian.23 The issue of ethnic identity remained very much alive in the 1970s and early 1980s, when the Nikkeijin identity came to be more openly discussed. A group of young Nisei wrote articles on the subject in the journal Página Um.24 The main preoccupation was still to be accepted as a member of the larger society. The individuals who had more prestige in the ethnic community were those who had succeeded in the dominant society. Nevertheless, the main reference points continued to lie within the ethnic community. According to Vieira (1973b: 342), the Nikkeijin thought of themselves as members of the Japanese colonia, and ‘were

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aware of their own limits and racial superiority, and [did] not feel the barriers that exist against miscegenation, because they [did] not want to break those barriers’. For Shimidu (1973), the endogamous character of the Nikkei communities was reinforced by the cultural antagonism (albeit concealed) of the dominant society against the Japanese. This is the opinion of the psychologist Júlia Saito, and in the same vein, the psychologist Toshiaki Saito claims that the sense of cultural tradition was so strong that the Nisei, the Sansei and even the Yonsei, could not escape from it sufficiently to be fully merged into Brazilian society. The Nikkeijin looked at Brazilian society with suspicion, insecurity and fear, and this drove them to search for security within their own ethnic group.25 By the late 1980s, the situation remained relatively unchanged. According to Maeyama (1990: 208–21), the Nikkeijin are still identified as a distinct ethnic group, which leads to a sense of exclusion from the ‘melting pot’ of Brazil. Within the Japanese colonia, according to Cardoso (1995: 139–40), there exists a field of potential relationships, defined by physical and cultural characteristics, that allows ethnic identification. It is through these characteristics that its members are identified by Brazilian society. In fact, for the dominant society, their ‘Japaneseness’ has never been erased. The Nikkeijin may be culturally, ethnically and linguistically Brazilian, but very often they are seen as ‘false nationals’. This stands in marked contrast to the discourse on the establishment of Nikkei communities that represents the Japanese and their offspring as having been fully assimilated into Brazilian society. Susumu Miyao, director of the Centre for Japanese Brazilian Studies in São Paulo claims that reference to a Nikkei community is just a name without any real existence. For Katsumori Wakisaka, vice-president of the Centre, ‘The consciousness of Nikkeijin identity is quickly vanishing’. In the same vein, Watanabe Kazuo argues that ‘the Nikkeijin are Brazilians with different physical characteristics’ and there is not a Nikkei community in Brazil that incorporates all the Japanese and their offspring’.26 In this sense, it is important to consider how the Nikkeijin are perceived in Brazil. Japanese immigrants and their children in Brazil are regarded as a successful immigrant group which has achieved middle class status by virtue of hard work and educational merit, values which are often claimed by the immigrants themselves. Nevertheless, the stereotype of the Japanese and Nikkeijin in Brazil in broadcast commercials and as characters in Brazilian soap operas is of characters who are constantly smiling and bowing, speaking Portuguese haltingly and looking foolish. This has been criticised by many Nikkeijin who feel offended by such images. With the economic success of Japan the image has altered, but the Nikkeijin are still presented in the Brazilian media as ‘foreigners’ and not as Brazilians.27 In general, traits ascribed to the Nikkeijin are socially positive: they are seen as reliable, reserved, honest, quiet, respectable and hard-working people. Their selfimage is, of course, affected by the traits ascribed to their ethnic group, and they tend to act according to social expectations.28 Research conducted by Toshiaki Saito (1986) on the psychological profile of people of Japanese descent shows that stereotypical traits ascribed to the Japanese continue to be used. It is interesting to note that the adjectives used to describe the Nikkeijin (hard-working, reserved,

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responsible, etc.) were those least chosen to describe the Brazilians. In this regard, it should be noted that many Nikkeijin do not like being identified with the stereotype, however positive, precisely because it contrasts with the stereotype of the Brazilians (extroverted, cheerful, relaxed, etc.).29 Nevertheless, to be Japanese prior to Japan’s economic success was one thing; to be Japanese after Japan had become an economic giant (and Brazil a third world country), was another. The transition of the image of Japan from ‘yellow peril’ to ‘yellow power’ produced a movement away from the repression of ‘Japaneseness’ to the reassertion of this identity. Being Nikkeijin now became important; a powerful element in this is that the Nikkeijin can work legally in Japan, attracting millions of dollars in remittances to Brazil. The enthusiasm for Japanese ethnic roots among the Nisei and the Sansei in Brazil since the late 1980s may be interpreted as a return of the repressed desires of those Nisei who were children during the war or born after it. We can assume that in fact their ‘Japaneseness’ had been ‘always there’ though it remained unexpressed. Research conducted by Asari and Ferreira (1986) in 1978–1979 in Londrina reveals that 54 per cent of the Nikkeijin perceive Japanese descent as an advantage, mainly because it merited much respect since Japan’s transformation into an economic powerhouse. However, 54 per cent of the respondents acknowledged that social and racial prejudice still existed in Brazil (15 per cent did not agree) and this was seen as a disadvantage of being of Japanese descent. Whether the prejudice which is responsible for discrimination is based on ‘race’ or it is more dependent on socioeconomic variables remains a matter of debate. Asari (1992: 73) suggests that discrimination is more related to economic conditions than to physical ones. It is said that ‘money bleaches’ in Brazil, and negative opinions about the Japanese and their descendants very often coincide with the discrimination against less prosperous Japanese by more prosperous Brazilians. Although people of Japanese descent are no longer isolated from the wider society, it has been reported that the Nikkeijin still tend to group together (Cardoso 1995, Asari and Ferreira 1986). In fact, it is sufficient to visit places frequented by Nikkeijin in São Paulo to confirm this. It seems this behaviour pattern occurs amongst Nikkeijin of all generations, and it is rare that a Nikkei child plays in the playground with a non-Nikkeijin child (Asari 1992: 73). However, it should be noted that to be Nikkeijin in areas where there are large concentrations of people of Japanese descent is different from being Nikkeijin in areas where there are few Nikkeijin. As might be expected, where such concentration is low, they are less likely to gather together and they are more ‘visible’.30

The Nikkeijin The term Nikkeijin As previously stated, the term ‘Nikkeijin’ means people of Japanese descent. In Brazil it was often used interchangeably with the term ‘Nisei’, and became current as the number of generations increased. Japanese citizens who emigrated from

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Japan and were naturalised in their adopted countries are rarely referred to as Nikkeijin. In the United States, the term used is ‘Japanese–American’; in contrast, however, the term Japanese–Brazilian has seldom been used in Brazil. People of Japanese descent in Brazil call themselves ‘Nikkei’, call the Issei ‘Japanese’, and the Japanese in Japan ‘Nihonjin’. The use of these terms is not prescriptive, and both the Issei and the Japanese in Japan are often referred to as Japanese (Japonês). Often they refer to themselves as Brazilians, but when talking about Brazilians they do not include themselves; neither do they when talking about the Japanese. This is particularly important since words reflect the underlying concepts in people’s minds. The use of the term ‘Nikkeijin’ is not confined to Brazil. The Nikkeijin throughout the American continent object to being called Japanese, arguing that only 10 per cent of people of Japanese descent currently living in the continent were born in Japan. They stress their autonomy in relation to Japan, and try to define their identity according to what they have in common. They promote meetings amongst Americans of Japanese descent and organise various activities that allow them to stay in contact with each other.31 On being Nikkeijin As previously stated, ‘race’ has been the central concept in debates about the Japanese in Brazil, and the immigrants themselves have been aware of this. Evidence drawn from interviews conducted in São Paulo in 1997 reiterates the centrality of ‘race’ in determining ethnic identity, as can be seen in the following examples: ‘When you look Japanese you have to be Japanese’; ‘When you have a Japanese face you are expected to behave like a Japanese’; ‘You can do very well but the face does not help’; ‘They [non-Nikkeijin Brazilians] don’t call me by my name. They call me Japonês (Japanese). I understand, it is easier to identify me’. In multi-racial Brazilian society physical characteristics establish differences. Robert Smith (1979: 58) claimed that however Brazilianised, they remained visible ethnics. To the Brazilians, they were ‘amarelos (yellow), olhos puxados (slant-eyes) or simply Japão (Japan)’. This is still true more than two decades later, and the category Japonês (Japanese) persists in Brazilian society. The Nikkeijin also associate ‘yellowness’ with themselves. The preoccupation with Asian physical features is illustrated by the character of a novel whose Sansei daughter does not accept her Asian face and wants cosmetic surgery on her eyelids to achieve a more western look (Sakurai 1993: 92). The Nikkeijin feel superior to the dark-skinned caboclos, but their ideals of beauty are based on European features. The Nikkeijin say that they are different from the Brazilians in that they have taken in Japanese culture with their mother’s milk. However, they are also perceived as distinct from the Japanese in Japan. For the psychiatrist Décio Nakagawa and the psychologist Yoko Nakagawa, Nikkeijin identity does exist. According to them, the Nikkeijin are not Japanese, to the extent that physical differences exist between them. Perhaps owing to diet, the bodies of the Japanese and those of the Nikkeijin are different and for this reason, the Nikkeijin cannot wear the same clothes as the Japanese. Many of the Issei and pre-war Nisei, on the other hand, feel

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themselves to have retained the original Japanese culture and language. The Japanese in Brazil are said to be ‘more Japanese than the Japanese in Japan’, because Japan was occupied by the Americans while Japanese communities in Brazil have not been exposed to American influence. They speak a ‘pure’ Japanese, because they do not use English words and do not use the katakana syllabary. Nikkeijin identity has developed from the recognition of the shared personal experiences of people of Japanese descent, including that of being ‘racially’ labelled as Japanese by the dominant society, of growing up hearing their parents and grandparents speak in Japanese, dating Nikkeijin, attending Nihongakkö, going to balls and so forth. For some, this identity flows mainly from being of Japanese descent. For others, it derives largely from personal experience – the possession of physical features in a society with few Asian people. The meaning of being Nikkeijin varies according to age, personality, and life experiences among other factors, and changes during the lifespan. As many interviewees put it ‘there are phases’ – periods in which they feel more attached to their Japanese ancestry; periods in which they want to deny their roots; and yet other periods when other identities matter more than the fact of being of Japanese descent. Moreover a Nikkeijin may be a Nisei or Sansei of Okinawan or other regional descent, and each of these identities has a different meaning, depending on the situation. The following example illustrates this. A Nisei of Okinawan descent was invited to participate in a debate on ethnic minorities in Brazil. Organised by the newspaper Folha de São Paulo, it included a Nikkeijin as well as representatives of African, Jewish and indigenous Brazilian descent groups. The latter asked the opinion of the Nisei about the acquisition of land belonging to the indigenous people by the Japanese. The Nisei replied that this had nothing to do with him since he was Brazilian. On the other hand, he acknowledged later that discrimination against people of Okinawan descent increased his self-perception as an Okinawan. In his own words, in the same evening he was Brazilian, Japanese and Okinawan.32 There were, however, a number of common themes: all the interviewees agreed that being Nikkeijin has inescapably to do with having a Japanese face, that Nikkeijin identity has been redefined by differentiating from Nihonjin, and that Japanese descendants define themselves in terms of ‘Japaneseness’. In the following paragraphs there are some sample definitions of being a Nikkeijin, drawn from interviews conducted in Brazil in 1997. For Kobata, a Nisei now in his forties, who helped to lead the debates in the 1970s over Nikkeijin identity, being Nikkeijin consists in having the eyes of a Brazilian and the feelings of a Japanese. According to Yoshioka, an Issei who worked in the centre established by the Japanese government to aid those who want to migrate to Japan, being Nikkeijin is being of Japanese descent, but not Japanese. For Abe, editor of the Journal Diário Nippak, a Nisei in her early fifties whose parents were pre-war immigrants, being Nikkeijin is to do with having one’s eyes turned to Japan. From the point of view of the director of the Jornal Paulista, a Nisei in his late fifties who participated in the post-war debates about being a Japanese in Brazil, being Nikkeijin is having ‘Japanese blood’ and living outside Japan. For the editor of Jornal

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Paulista, Tsukumoto, a 30-year-old Nisei, being Nikkeijin is having the privilege of living in two cultures and having the possibility of being both Japanese and Brazilian. For Kawabata, a 54-year-old Nisei woman who had returned to Brazil after two years of migration in Japan and was going back to Japan, being Nikkeijin is a matter of pride in one’s Japanese ancestry. For Yamamoto, a 28-year-old Sansei, to be Nikkeijin is to know one’s origins and to understand Japanese cultural traits, such as how to eat with chopsticks. For Yamashiro, a Nisei in his eighties, who participated in the ‘chrysanthemum incident’, being Nikkeijin is a transitional state somewhere between being Japanese and Brazilian. According to Yamase, a 25year-old Nisei woman who returned to Brazil after five years of migration in Japan, to be Nikkeijin is to have the kimochi of a Nihonjin (feelings of a Japanese). The opening article of the first edition of two magazines addressing the new generations of Nikkeijin show that the search for their self-definition is still an issue ‘We are not yet defined’ (Japão Aqui, April 1997: 98) we are all Brazilians and we are proud of that, but we must not forget that we are of Japanese stock (‘a nossa condição de descendentes de Japoneses’ Revista Nippak, 6 April 1997). From the above, one can conclude that the Nikkeijin consider themselves neither Japanese nor Brazilian, and they conceive of themselves as having an identity that, properly speaking, resists definition. I shall expand on this point in the remainder of this chapter.

A multiplicity of Nikkeijin It has been commonly asserted that the groups of Japanese emigrants were culturally and ‘racially’ homogeneous, which was reinforced by their isolation in Brazil (e.g. Comissão 1992: 440). Nevertheless, the fact is that since their arrival they constituted a heterogeneous group. As Peterson argues, there were strong regional patriotisms in Japan and ‘these divisive attitudes persisted overseas while Japanese communities developed some types of their own’ (quoted in William 1971: 227). Japanese immigrants came from different parts of Japan, bringing with them differences in dialect and customs. They arrived during different periods, and with different expectations. Moreover, the process of immigration to Brazil reinforced existing differences and created others. Therefore, although the term ‘Nikkeijin’ refers to anyone of Japanese descent, in fact it covers a diversity of groups of people and identities. I will begin by showing the differences within the Issei. The Issei In a foreign land every affinity with compatriots has a tendency to be emphasised, and as the trip from Japan to Brazil took at least 40 days, immigrants who came in the same ship (dösensha) shared the same troubles and anxieties, and developed friendship ties. Once they arrived they tended to stick together. Those who worked in the same plantations and onaji kama no meshi o kü (ate from the same pan) also felt united because they underwent the same difficulties (Maeyama 1973: 432). In

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addition, common geographic background (furusato, the ancestral locality) served as a source of unity and dökenji, immigrants from the same ken (prefectures) usually remained together. Common dialect and cultural practices, and even shared prejudices, were an important basis of their union, and the Kenjinkai (Association of Prefectures) performed an important role in the lives of the Issei. The Kyüimin and the Shinimin There were huge differences between the pre-war immigrants (Kyüimin) and the post-war immigrants (Shinimin) since they came from an altered Japan. Relations between the two groups contained the potential for antagonism, as already discussed.33 Pre-war immigrants tended to think of themselves as representing the best of the Japanese character, the ‘truly Meiji’ men and women. On the contrary the post-war immigrants, coming from a Japan in ruins, lacked the same pride in being Japanese, and were often considered by the others as ‘non-Japanese’. In general, the latter were often better educated and less preoccupied with Japanese etiquette (Robert Smith 1979). The post-war immigrants were termed Japão novo (New Japan) by the old immigrants who in turn were called Brazil boke (senile) by the newcomers (Handa 1987: 716–17). Initial impressions soon hardened into stereotypes: ‘The Japão novo do not know how to work, we can’t trust them’; Japão novo is worse than the Nisei; the Issei are ‘the real Japanese’. For the newcomers, the old immigrants were considered ‘true relics from the Meiji era’. Differences between the two groups of immigrants continued for a long time. Rural and urban Nikkeijin Whatever the generation, residing in rural or urban areas was a determining factor in establishing differences among the Nikkeijin. The rural Nikkeijin were in general more attached to Japanese traditions than those who live in urban areas.34 Besides the above categories, in Brazil immigrants reproduced the dichotomies existent in Japan. There were the Japanese from Kyushu, Honshu and Shikoku, and the Okinawans; there were also distinctions between the Japanese and the Burakumin. The Okinawans Discrimination against the Okinawans has a long history in Japan.35 Okinawan immigrants caused trouble, and consequently were forbidden to emigrate for a certain period, and were later required, for instance, to speak Japanese and not to have tattoos.36 In spite of these problems, because Okinawa was very poor, the immigrants who came from that region by 1941 formed the large majority of Japanese immigrants. Once onboard ship, the Okinawans formed a separate group, and today they still emphasise the boundaries between the Japanese of Okinawan origin and other Japanese. Cohesion and solidarity among Okinawans (Uchinanchü) is expressed in opposition to the Naichijin (the other Japanese), and in valuing cul-

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tural differences. They describe themselves as cheerful and relaxed while the ‘others’ are sad and tense; Okinawan men and women are more attractive than those from the ‘mainland’; Shintoism in Okinawa is more natural than in other Japanese islands, and so forth. Many still resent having been discriminated against by mainland Japanese. ‘The Okinawans were last but one in the Japanese social hierarchy; if it were not for the Koreans it would have been worse’, said a Nisei director of the Okinawan Association of Araraquara (São Paulo State). The same idea was conveyed by another Nisei from Mato Grosso: ‘Here in Brazil, the Japanese community discriminated against people from Okinawa because we were poor, but nowadays things are different because we are not poor any more’. Indeed, many Okinawans own businesses and are well represented in politics and other sectors of activity. However, there is evidence that discrimination against people of Okinawan descent continued. Vieira (1973a: 75–9), on the basis of fieldwork conducted between 1964 and 1996, reported that in Mogi das Cruzes (São Paulo state), where there is a large concentration of people of Japanese descent, Okinawan children were the target of bullying by other Nikkei children. The Okinawans are said to belong to a different ‘race’ and stereotypes abound: they are said to be dark, ugly, hairy and unreliable. One Nisei in Marilia, a leader of several Japanese associations commented that ‘the Okinawans are for the Japanese what the Japanese are for the Brazilians’. The Okinawans have had their own associations since the beginning of Japanese immigration to Brazil. The Okinawa Kyökai do Brasil (Association of Okinawans in Brazil) has 3,600 member families (about 130,000 individuals) and 47 branches throughout the country, with a representative from Okinawa in charge of administrative services. The directors of each branch have regular meetings in São Paulo and, since February 1996, the bulletin Utina’s News (Okinawa news) is published monthly to inform readers of the activities of the communities and associations. The majority of the pages are written in Portuguese since, although the Issei still speak Okinawan dialect, most Nisei and Sansei speak neither Okinawan dialect nor Japanese. Since 1990, a festival has been organised in Okinawa, inviting Okinawans from overseas so that all the relatives can get to know each other. This event is intended to take place every five years. In 1995, some 800 Okinawans from Brazil joined in the festivities.37 The Burakumin The Burakumin are the descendants of the untouchable caste group of the Tokugawa system, the Eta. They were emancipated after the Meiji Restoration in 1871. Nevertheless, discrimination continued and being Burakumin was worse than being Okinawan.38 In Brazil the term ‘Eta’ is more often used than the term ‘Burakumin’. The Issei brought with them prejudices against the Burakumin, which have not yet completely disappeared. ‘Better to get married to a Brazilian than with someone who is of Eta descent’, said a Okinawan Nisei; ‘If a person does not want to talk

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about Japan we may suspect he/she is Eta’, said another Nisei (quoted in Vieira 1973a: 87). For obvious reasons it was not possible to get data or information on the Burakumin in Brazil. Of all the groups of Japanese who went to Brazil, the Eta were perhaps the most eager to ‘disappear’ into the wider society. The Nisei The Japanese place considerable emphasis on the importance of generational distinctions. They have a different term for each generation removed from Japan, and each generation is assumed to have different characteristics. However, an actual generation may be further subdivided, as Mannheim argues. The Nisei may, therefore, be subdivided into several units because, although they ‘share the same generation location, [they] were not born within the same historical and cultural region’.39 Despite the fact that both the second generation of pre-war and post-war immigrants are designated by the term ‘Nisei’, the discrepancy between the two periods is enormous. Moreover, there were differences between those born in the same historical period. Japanese children born in Japan and those who were born in Japan and brought up in Brazil (the Junnisei, literally quasi-Nisei) arguably share more similarities than the second generation of the pre-war and post-war periods born in Brazil. Those who went, by their own will, or their parent’s will, to fight for Japan in the war as volunteers, and those who went to study in Japan, differed from those who had never been to Japan, or those who came to Brazil after World War II. The only thing they have in common is that all of them are children of Japanese immigrants. Differences existed even within the same family. Usually, younger children studied, spoke Portuguese and were Catholic, while the eldest son who helped the father remained much more attached to Japanese tradition. In spite of differences among the Nisei, it is possible to say that the world of the pre-war Nisei was wholly confined to their ethnic community. They had Brazilian nationality imposed on them by jus soli and Japanese nationality by jus sanguinis.40 They were considered by the Issei as not ichi nin mae (not complete persons) and the term ‘Nisei’ was a synonym for impurity and submission.41 The Nisei were largely the product of what their parents and teachers in Nihongakkö taught them about Japan and Japanese culture. The essence of their moral and social education was based on obedience, and therefore the Nisei were expected to be submissive and to respect the Issei as well as to conform to Japanese etiquette. Changes occurred as a consequence of the war, when the Nisei continued to be described as ‘behaving like the Japanese’ despite their ‘Brazilianised’ look. The typical Nisei is still characterised by ‘the enryo syndrome’ (behavioural reserve).42 However, it would, of course, be misleading to generalise and assume that all Nisei have these traits. Furthermore, the fact that the Nisei were for the most part educated according to Japanese ideals does not mean that all of them adhered to these norms. In any case, unlike their parents, the Nisei are not immigrants and, as second-generation immigrants, they are sandwiched between their ethnic communities and the dominant society.

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The Sansei Studies examining the relationship between integration and inter-generational differences tend to show that the more removed a person becomes from his or her ancestral roots and the greater the contact with the dominant culture, the more he or she is acculturated into this society. Accordingly, the Nisei have been found to be ‘more Japanese’ in their attitudes than the Sansei. Highly suggestive of this are the generational differences in command of the Japanese language: 56 per cent of Brazilian Nisei were found to have a command of Japanese, while only 12 per cent of the Sansei possessed a similar level of fluency (Institute of Statistical Mathematics 1992). However, as shown in Chapter 1 (Figure 1.1), the current number of Sansei learning Japanese is higher than that of other generations. It has been frequently observed, however, that whereas first-generation immigrants seek to preserve their cultural identity, the second generation wants to be integrated as quickly as possible, whilst the third returns to the ancestral traditions. This can also be observed in Brazil. What many Nisei wished to forget many Sansei desire to remember.43 Whereas the Nisei had to prove that they could be Brazilians, the Sansei are more secure in their Nikkeijin identities. Furthermore, Japan’s economic success led to a resurgence of interest in their ethnicity, and the Sansei seek others who share a common ancestry, looking for their cultural roots. However, the ‘roots’ which the Sansei may return to are very different from those of their grandparents. What has been said about the Sansei can be applied to the Yonsei, but Mestiços or Konketsu (Mestizos, mixed offspring of a Nikkeijin with a non-Nikkeijin) form a different group. It should be noted that the term ‘Mestiço’ is not used to refer to descendants of other immigrant groups. As can be seen in Table 3.1, a degree of ‘Japaneseness’ was calculated in 1990 by the Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros (the Japanese Brazilian Studies Centre) taking full Japanese as 1 and non-Japanese as 0. For example, a child whose parents are both Japanese is 1 and a child of a mixed marriage is 1⁄2. Table 3.1 Nikkei population by degree of ‘Japaneseness’ (1987–1988) ‘Japaneseness’

Male1

Female

Urban

Rural

Total

1 1 ⁄2–1⁄4 1 ⁄4–1⁄2 0–1⁄4 No information

76.22 22.09 2.06 1.86 0.79

70.03 24.90 2.04 1.61 1.41

70.62 24.33 .09 1.80 1.15

80.42 16.67 1.51 1.00 0.40

71.58 23.60 2.03 1.71 1.08

Source: Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros (1990: 29).

To summarise, I have attempted to show how factors relating to Japan and Brazil were important in setting parameters for (and in this way shaping) the way in which the Nikkeijin constructed their ethnic identity during the 90-year period of immigration to Brazil. The point of the discussion has been to argue that the

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construction of the Nikkeijin identity in Brazil has resulted from a complex interplay of self-made and externally imposed definitions. The important point to make is that both the sending and receiving countries played important roles in the construction of Nikkeijin identity. The Japanese policy of supporting the immigrants settled in Brazil was consistent with the initial policy of promoting their emigration. Most importantly, such constant assistance and protection had direct implications for how they identified themselves. Largely because of it, they continued to see themselves as Japanese for much of the pre-war period. Whenever this idea was challenged, as happened with ‘the chrysanthemum incident’, it was subject to repression by the ethnic community and Japanese officials. On the other hand, there was corresponding Brazilian social pressure to abandon their ‘Japaneseness’. As a result, they both isolated themselves and were isolated by the natives and other immigrant groups. In the pre-war period they found refuge in the Japanese nationalist discourse which provided them with a positive self-image. Caught thus between two nationalisms they nevertheless chose to maintain their ties with Japan. The support generated from within the ethnic communities and the protection of Japanese officials together permitted them to achieve economic success and simultaneously to maintain the country of origin as a framework in which they could do so. This situation changed with the end of World War II and the events that followed as a result of Japan’s defeat. Reaction to defeat revealed not only the extent to which the immigrants had absorbed the Japanese nationalist ideology but disclosed also a complex of power and economic relations within the communities themselves. As we have seen, immigrant post-war loyalties were separated, not only along ethnic lines, but also along economic and other interests. Japan’s defeat shook their identities as Japanese which were put further into question by encounters between the pre-war and post-war immigrants. At this stage, they began to redefine themselves in different terms. The pride of ‘being Japanese’ and the in-group preferences of the pre-war period were gradually replaced by clear out-group preferences in the post-war period, particularly for those Nisei who were more in contact with the wider society and wanted social promotion. This trend was negatively reinforced by the society at large, for whom they continued to be ‘os Japoneses’ (the Japanese). They have since continued to constitute an ethnic group and are still identified by their physical characteristics. For there is little doubt that ‘race’ has played an important role in how the Japanese immigrants have been perceived and treated in Brazil. Categorised as ‘the Japanese’ they are aware of the characteristics they do not share with other Brazilians, and this is reflected in how they speak about themselves. By the same token, Japan’s economic importance in the world brought about an enthusiasm for Japanese ethnic roots, particularly amongst young Nisei and Sansei, which may be interpreted as ethnic revival. It also brought migration to Japan with its inherent changes. Furthermore, this chapter has made the important point that the Nikkeijin do not constitute a homogeneous group. There are intra-group differences amongst them, some of these having been transported from Japan to Brazil, and some created in

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Brazil itself. These differences matter in Brazil, where sometimes being of Okinawan descent takes priority over Brazilian or Japanese descent. This chapter may be seen as bridging what has heretofore been an emphasis on the Japanese in Brazil, and what follows as we now shift our attention to the Nikkeijin in Japan. As already mentioned in Chapter 1, the difficult economic situation in Brazil has prompted many Nikkeijin to go to the land of their ancestors. The next chapter will give an account of the 10-year period of their migration to Japan.

Part II

Brazilian Nikkei migrants in Japan

4

The Dekasegi

Labour shortages, legislation and foreign workers Japan has faced labour shortages since the expansion of the Japanese economy in the 1970s, particularly in sectors reliant on unskilled labour. Small manufacturing firms have been amongst those most affected by the scarcity of labour. Lacking access to capital, they can neither invest in labour-saving equipment, nor invest overseas in cheaper labour markets as can larger firms. Moreover, they were not able to recruit employees during the expansion period because they could not offer the same employment conditions as larger firms. The situation has been especially serious in the construction and the rapidly expanding service industry. Japanese immigration legislation Since the 1970s, foreign workers were used to cope with the problem of labour shortages, even though such use was prohibited under the terms of the Immigration Law. The great majority of these workers were from Asian countries and their influx had a profound impact upon the Japanese, who suddenly saw foreigners all over the country. This remarkable increase in the number of illegal workers during the 1980s led to an amendment of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Law in 1989. The main points of the legal amendment on immigration, which came into effect in June 1990, were as follows. First, the number of foreign professionals and skilled workers permitted to stay in Japan for two to three years was enlarged from 18 to 28 categories of resident. Second, Japanese descendants up to the third generation and their spouses were permitted entry for an indefinite period. Although the visa governing this category is not strictly a working visa, it grants holders the right to work without restraint, together with the status of residents, providing they can document their ancestry. Third, sanctions on illegal workers were intensified. Employers who recruited illegal workers were made liable to penalties which included a fine of up to two million yen and/or a maximum three years of imprisonment. Fourth, an on-the-job training system was recognised under certain conditions. Finally, immigration formalities were accelerated by specifying immigration requirements in detail.1

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The amendment to the law created incentives for workers of Japanese ancestry, who were now legally permitted to perform unskilled jobs for which other foreign workers were not eligible. This resulted in an increased demand for Nikkeijin labour. One might say therefore, that the immigration control policy was based on the idea that foreigners of Japanese lineage should have privileged treatment. This policy may be interpreted in the dual aspects of honne and tatemae: whilst officially the motives invoked were to defend history and culture, in reality they were more to do with controlling the number of workers from China and other Asian countries. The policy of favouring people of Japanese descent, however, is not new, and had been used prior to the revision of Immigration Law, when they were granted special permits by the Minister of Justice. These enabled them to enter Japan for the purpose of visiting relatives on a 90-day visiting visa, but they frequently overstayed their visas and took up employment. At first, the status of ‘child of Japanese national’ was limited to a person whose four grandparents had Japanese nationality and, later, the requirement was for the applicants to have a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity who could guarantee their status as such. The introduction of the category of ‘long-term resident’ in 1989 was, therefore, a continuation of this line of thought. In this regard, it should be noted that Japanese citizenship and naturalisation laws follow the principle of jus sanguinis. Before the 1980s, only a limited number of second- and third-generation descendants of Japanese immigrants in South American countries, who had Japanese or dual nationality, came to work in Japan. With the amendment of the law, and the socioeconomic problems faced by many South American countries, the number of South Americans coming to Japan significantly increased. In 1991, the population of registered South Americans, mostly from Brazil, Peru, Argentina, Paraguay and Bolivia, was estimated at 88,201. Six years later, their number was estimated at 248,780 (a 12.1 per cent increase over the previous year).2 In 1998, estimated numbers stood at 274,442, of whom 81 per cent were Brazilians as shown in Table 4.1. Table 4.1 Number of South Americans residing in Japan in 1998 Country Brazil Peru Argentina Bolivia Colombia Paraguay Other Total Source: Japan Immigration Association (2000).

19980 222,217 41,317 2,962 3,461 1,965 1,411 1,109 274,442

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As a consequence of the legal amendment on immigration, which requires Japanese ancestry, the Nikkeijin have emerged as the largest group amongst foreign workers. However, the number of visa overstayers has not decreased as a result. In fact, since 1991, the number of detected undocumented foreign workers has been on the increase. In April 1994, the number of people who overstayed amounted to 296,751 (Ministry of Justice, cited in Mori 1997: 24, table 1.7); the number of those permitted to enter as artists, students and company trainees, but who are doing unauthorised work has been estimated at 70,000 (Komai 1995: 4). Although the exact figure remains unkown, the conclusion we must draw from this is that many companies are still employing undocumented workers. Such workers may enter as tourists and remain after the expiry of their tourist visas. Others enter originally as students, most of them from Asian countries. Although these foreign students are permitted to work for a maximum of 20 hours a week, many exceed this limit in metal working, welding and plating and electrical machinery firms. Most of the young females, particularly from Thailand and the Philippines, work as hostesses in bars and nightclubs. Other foreigners enter the country with trainee visas and work for companies as trainees (kenshüsei). As mentioned previously, the ‘on-the-job training system’ was recognised in 1990, and the work training program was inaugurated in April 1993. Under this system, foreigners are allowed to work temporarily. After completing a nine-month training period and passing a skills test, they receive wages and are entitled to be treated as Japanese workers. The training period lasts two years and cannot be extended. Participants numbered about 40,000 in 1992, according to the immigration statistics; however, a survey of smaller companies suggested a much greater number. Trainees from Asian countries, mainly China, Thailand and the Philippines, account for 90 per cent of the total. If the revision of the Immigration Law did not prevent illegal immigration, it certainly created a dual market structure of foreign workers: the legally employed descendants of Japanese emigrants on the one hand, and illegal workers, mostly Asians, on the other. This stratification of foreign labour is reflected in income differentials. Wage rates for illegal workers are between 20 and 50 per cent lower than those for Japanese workers, with, according to Komai (1995: 4) and Hatsuse (1992: 35), the Pakistanis at the bottom and the Nikkeijin at the top of the hierarchy. Amongst the Nikkeijin themselves, the Peruvians tend to receive less than the Brazilians, owing to the prevalent suspicion that many of them are not authentically of Japanese descent. Analysis of trends in the labour economy conclude that, in the future, the Japanese economy will be confronted by labour supply constraints brought about by a rapidly ageing population. Japan has the fastest-ageing population of any industrialised country, and the birth rate keeps falling every year. Figures released in March 2000 show that children under 14 accounted for only about 15 per cent of the country’s population in 1999 against 35 per cent in 1949. Japan’s birth rate fell in 1998, the last year for which figures are available, to a record low of 1.38 for each woman’s lifetime. The situation is so severe that the United Nations warned Japan that the country would need 609,000 immigrants each year for the next 50

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years to maintain its working population at its 1995 size. On current projections, Japan’s population would otherwise fall from 127 million at present to 105 million by 2050 (Financial Times, 23 March 2000: 5). On the other hand, as a result of the prolonged recession, the overall unemployment rate is at its post-war high of 4.9 per cent, and is expected to remain at this level. Companies are continuing to dismiss workers, and this increases the concern over rising employment and mounting bankruptcies. Owing to this trend, companies are increasingly using part-time workers, and lowering wages and bonuses, eliminating seniority-based pay.3 However, regardless of the state of the economy, the unemployment rate is still low compared with other industrialised countries, and labour shortages are expected to occur in the service sector, including the care of the aged, and construction industries.4 It is therefore to be expected that Japan will continue to depend on migrant labour, in some areas at least. The issue of foreign workers has been the focus of much attention, both because the labour shortage problem is likely to persist in the long run, and because the legal requirement of Japanese ancestry has attracted criticism on the grounds that the policy aims to maintain ethnic purity. This question will be discussed in Chapter 5. The debate over foreign workers It has often been argued that Japan has, throughout its history, been closed to foreigners. In fact, the number of foreigners resident in the country is still rather small compared with other industrial countries, but it has lately been on the increase. Foreign residents in Japan now account for just over 1 per cent of the population of the country, and according to the Japan Immigration Association in 1998 there were 1,482,707 registered foreigners in Japan. In a breakdown of numbers by nationality, North and South Koreans (645,373, i.e. 43.52 per cent) rank first, Chinese second (252,164, i.e. 17.0 per cent) and Brazilians third (233,254, i.e. 15.7 per cent). The number of North Americans and Europeans is low (Japan Immigration Association 1998b: 142–3). The alleged historical lack of a foreign presence in Japan and the increasing flow of foreign workers has generated debate in the media, parliament and among scholars about the consequences of accepting foreign labour. The issue is seen as a ‘problem’, and opinion is deeply divided between those who seek a more ‘internationalised’ Japan and those who want to preserve the ‘homogeneity’ of Japanese society. Proponents of acceptance argue that: (1) hiring foreign workers provides Japan with an opportunity to internationalise and solve the problem of labour shortages in certain industries; (2) once these workers have been accepted, Japan as an economic power has an obligation to protect its international labour force, and illegal migrants should therefore have their status legalised so that their rights may be protected. Opponents argue against these views on historical and cultural grounds: (1) because foreigners do not understand Japanese culture it is thought to be difficult to accommodate them (often cited is the argument that

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Japanese society is a classless and homogeneous society different from European and American societies); (2) since the cause of Japan’s economic success stems from this homogeneity, a clash of peoples with different cultural backgrounds could lead to ethnic strife. In general, their conclusions are that foreign workers may have a negative social impact on Japanese society, and consequently they should not be admitted. As for the authorities, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry have carried out surveys on the issue of foreign workers. The Ministry of Justice has called for tighter control, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although proposing that improvements should be made in the treatment of illegal foreign workers, has also called for the strengthening of immigration controls. The Ministry of Labour is concerned with the increased social costs involved in the settlement of foreign workers, and the risks of their unemployment during economic recession. Therefore, it too is opposed to the use of immigrants to combat labour shortages, and has called instead for an increase in automation.5 There is evidence that companies and management in general tend to favour a policy of accepting foreign unskilled workers. For instance, in surveys conducted by the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce (5,000 member firms) and the Osaka Chamber of Commerce (2,762 member firms), only a minority of respondents did not support the acceptance of foreign workers.6 Employers see many advantages in employing them because they accept lower wages and working conditions than the Japanese would tolerate. While some employers tacitly accept undocumented labour, they nevertheless prefer to employ people of Japanese descent rather than illegal workers from Asian countries. As far as trade unions are concerned, opinions range from clear opposition to cautious admission. RENGO (Japan Trade Union Confederation), the central national trade union organisation, although concerned about the working conditions of foreign workers, is opposed to their free and unconditional entry. Japanese unions in general are opposed to the employment of unskilled foreign workers. Their main argument is that they force down wages and cause job losses for Japanese workers (Herbert 1996: 81). In short, the issue of migrant labour shows a split of opinion, with a narrow majority favouring the acceptance of foreign workers. According to Lie (1997: 228–300), the debate on foreign workers in Japan is a paradox. On the one hand, there are discussions about the ‘problem’ of foreign workers, while on the other there is no objective cause for alarm, owing to the absence of economic competition. The fact is that the debate has not been simply economic in nature. The general conclusion of the Conference on Japan and International Migration, held in Tokyo in 1992, illustrates the more general, social concern raised by this issue: ‘. . . by far the most central issue of concern among Japanese participants was uncertainty as to whether Japanese people were willing or able to recognise and understand the issues posed by the presence of foreign workers and to identify and implement appropriate measures’ (Appleyard and Stahl 1993: 214).

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Social attitudes towards foreigners The attitudes of the Japanese are central to the settlement prospects for the Nikkeijin and other immigrant groups and, as mentioned above, the perceived difficulties over the incorporation of foreigners into Japanese society have been a central topic in debates and publications on this issue. Let us turn now to Japanese social attitudes towards foreigners in general. There has in fact been no systematic study of Japanese perceptions concerning the presence of the Nikkeijin in Japan, but some work has been done on the acceptance of foreign workers, on the so-called Zainichi (permanent residents, Koreans and Chinese) and on undocumented foreign workers. Care must be exercised in interpreting the results of these surveys because of the absence of methodological or statistical controls in most of the studies (Herbert 1996: 87). However, an account of their findings throws some light on social attitudes towards foreigners. I will begin with an overview of public opinion surveys concerning the acceptance of foreign workers in Japan. An examination of the polls conducted by the Prime Minister reveals that the percentage of people who want to deregulate immigration laws increased between 1961 (15 per cent) and 1980 (42.4 per cent), and decreased again by 1988 (34.6 per cent, Herbert 1996; 146). Another poll in 1990 revealed that, for 39 per cent of the respondents, foreigners should be allowed to fill positions regardless of occupation, and for 57 per cent, foreign labourers should be admitted with restrictions (on time period and conditions); and for 15 per cent, they should be treated on equal terms with the Japanese and be permitted to work without legal constraint.7 In public opinion polls conducted in 1990 and 1991, foreigners were seen as ‘undesirable but unavoidable’.8 In the Yomiuri Shinbun poll in May 1991, 22.1 per cent of people surveyed thought that foreigners ought not to be employed. One year later, this percentage had risen to 37.4. The NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corp.) survey in 1991 revealed that, for 33 per cent of respondents, foreign labourers should be accepted freely. In a survey conducted one year later, 56 per cent of the participants agreed that foreign workers should remain restricted to the current level, while 32 per cent disagreed (JPoll 1999). The Yomiuri Shinbun survey in 1992 reveals that 61 per cent ‘somewhat approved’ the acceptance of foreign labourers and 71 per cent approved their permanent residency. The NHK survey in 1993 discloses that for 65 per cent of the participants, foreign labourers should be allowed into Japan; however, 53 per cent thought at the same time that this would increase unemployment among Japanese people. This latter apprehension was less evident in the findings of an NHK survey in 1995: 32 per cent disagreed with this view, whilst 4 per cent agreed. The survey conducted in 1997 by Yomiuri Shinbun on changing restrictions on hiring foreigners as civil servants reveals that 22 per cent of the respondents agreed that hiring foreigners would reduce job opportunities for the Japanese and 18 per cent felt uncomfortable with the idea of foreign workers as public administrators. It is important to bear in mind that the findings presented here refer to foreign workers in general and, as already mentioned, no studies have been conducted up to this point specifically on the Nikkeijin.9

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From the above we can see that findings of public opinion surveys conducted so far are rather inconclusive. Nonetheless, conflicts between Japanese and foreign residents appear to have been on the increase since 1988. In 1989, the University of Tsukuba, with the co-operation of the municipalities, carried out a study of the attitudes of local residents. Findings revealed that in Toshima Ward, 60 per cent of town leaders had received complaints from local residents. As for the nature of the complaints, the majority alleged that foreigners did not know how to dispose of the garbage (53.5 per cent) and that they spoke in loud voices (26.3 per cent). In a survey conducted in 1990 within Tokyo, Saitama, Chiba and Kanagawa, where many foreigners live, 40 per cent of the residents responded that the non-Japanese residents in their neighbourhood were a cause for concern. From an overview of recent surveys it becomes apparent that the degree of tolerance has decreased. Foreign and Japanese workers living in the same community sometimes come into conflict. On such occasions anonymous callers will often ask police to take steps against foreigners. The Immigration Control Bureau in Tokyo receives 20,000 letters and telephone calls per year denouncing foreigners, and according to Komai (1995), this tendency is rising. Asians are a particular target. Real estate agents are unwilling to let flats to foreigners, particularly those of Asian origin (Herbert 1996: 222). Polls also show public anxiety regarding the alleged criminal activities of foreigners. Worries over increasing crime, fear felt by women walking alone late at night and so forth were stated as causes of apprehension. Such apprehension thrives upon rumour. For instance, in Möka (Tochigi), a town of 61,000 inhabitants in which a number of Nikkeijin, mainly Peruvian, had worked, a rumour that a group of foreigners entered a house and raped a woman, though never confirmed, received much publicity (Herbert 1996: 226). Similar rumours that Japanese women were being attacked by foreigners have appeared in other parts of the country (Komai 1995: 231). As early as 1991, graffiti had begun to appear on walls – ‘Foreigners go home’ (Gaikokujin kaere). This can be attributed to the recession, and the situation has changed for the worse since 1992 (Herbert 1996: 80). In Tokyo and Osaka, notices with ‘Gaikokujin okotowari’ (No foreigners) were found hanging on doors of certain establishments, and pamphlets which associated foreigners with germs (Gaikokujin byögenkin) and AIDS were disseminated, increasing Japanese fears about possible contamination (Hiragana Times, February 1993: 14, 22). In July 1998, a swimming pool was closed to foreigners in Gunma Prefecture (Nikon Keizai Shinbun, 6 September 1999: 29). The reaction of the Japanese people and the authorities against the Sunday gatherings of Iranians in Yoyogi Park in Tokyo further illustrates the level of intolerance towards the presence of foreigners in Japan. Although there is a marked absence of studies concerning the criminal activities of foreigners, it has been reported that the number of crimes involving them has been increasing in recent years (Herbert 1996). In 1994, a total of 13,321 crimes of this nature were reported (up 4.3 per cent from 1993). In Aichi Prefecture the increase was 6.2 per cent for the first semester of 1996 compared with the previous year. Here there were 8,250 cases of crime, of which 3,112 were committed by nonJapanese (Noticias do Japão, 8–14 March 1996). In 1997, non-Japanese committed a

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total of 17,955 crimes. Analysis of crime conviction rates by nationality revealed that 16,014 were committed by Asians and 1,020 by South Americans.10 It should be noted that the positive correlation between concentrations of foreigners and criminal activities is by no means unique to Japan. The tendency to criminalise outsiders is universal, and crimes committed by them are highlighted by the media and by the attitudes of the police. According to Herbert (1996: 163–83), the increase in crime rates is, in fact, disputable. But perhaps more significant is the underlying assumption that foreigners endanger public safety. From this perspective, Japan’s reputation as one of the safest nations in the world results in a hypersensitivity about personal security, not only amongst the authorities, but also amongst the general public. From the above, it might be assumed that the Japanese feel that they experience social contact with foreigners to a greater extent than they actually do. Inquiries concerning the degree of actual contact and acquaintance with foreigners from western countries reveal that only 5 per cent have regular contact, and 49 per cent merely see them on the street (Herbert 1996: 154). In a survey carried out in 1990 by the police in 80 regions where foreign workers were concentrated, 68 per cent of the participants stated that they had neither heard of nor seen such people engaged in ‘unskilled’ labour. Only 11 per cent declared that they kept company with foreigners or even exchanged greetings with them. Of those in direct contact, 72 per cent said that this consisted merely of a short greeting. Moreover, only 1.5 per cent of the total sample had been in any kind of contact with foreigners, whilst 74 per cent felt some reluctance towards getting to know or associating (tsukiai) with foreigners at all. In a Tokyo Metropolitan Government opinion poll in 1992, some 30 per cent of those questioned indicated a definite aversion to making the acquaintance of foreigners (Herbert 1996: 155). Other surveys give a similar picture (see Komai 1994 for a more detailed account). A survey conducted by the Prime Minister’s Office in 1994 discloses that, while 47 per cent of the respondents had no wish to make friends with a foreigner, 38 per cent wanted such contact. In 1996, the incidence of positive and negative responses towards befriending foreigners was measured at, respectively, 45 per cent wanting, as against 42 per cent not wanting, such contact.11 According to these findings, contact between the Japanese and foreigners living in their midst has been very limited. Of the 615 people surveyed in 1998 by this researcher, 56.9 per cent claimed to have had some contact with a foreigner, but for 44.5 per cent of them this merely consisted of a greeting. Similarly, contact with the Nikkeijin has also been very limited. Of the 615 respondents, a mere 14.6 per cent claimed ever to have met any Nikkeijin.

The Dekasegi Historical overview It was in the context of labour shortages, increasing numbers of undocumented foreign workers and the legal reforms of 1989–1990 that the new Dekasegi made

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their way to Japan. The term ‘Dekasegi’ has been used since the Tokugawa period (1600–1867) in Japan, originally to describe the practice of Japanese labourers temporarily leaving their native areas to work elsewhere, eventually to return home. The Dekasegi were usually the second or third children of farmers, who did not inherit land. Frequently they were uneducated and occupied a low social position. In a later period emigrants to the Americas were referred to as Imin Dekasegi. In Brazil the term ‘Dekasegi’ was used to refer to the Issei, and by the mid-1980s, was used to denote people of Japanese descent who migrated to Japan.12 They have been referred to as Nikkeijin or just Nikkei (e.g. Mori 1997), ‘racial Japanese’ (e.g. Lie 1997), ‘ethnic immigrants’, Japanese–Brazilians (e.g. Yamanaka 1996), ‘return migrants of Japanese origin’, ‘Japanese returning from overseas’ (e.g. Nikkeijin Koyö Sentä 1995) or ‘ethnic Japanese’, in contrast to ‘sociological Japanese’ and ‘national or native Japanese’ (Kajita 1995). However, these terms being in various ways inappropriate, I have confined myself to using ‘Nikkeijin’ and ‘Dekasegi’ throughout. The former is used to emphasise ethnic aspects, and the latter to denote the Nikkeijin as migrants, and applied also to their Brazilians spouses, where appropriate. The catch-all term ‘Brazilians’, although imprecise, has recently crept into the Japanese press, and for conciseness, I have adopted this usage in those sections which deal with the media representation of the Dekasegi. The Dekasegi have received increased attention from the Press since the amendment to the immigration legislation was enacted. The past four or five years have seen an enormous research effort directed at migrants from South America. Some of this work has been undertaken by independent researchers and some by local governments or research teams sponsored by companies. The main purpose of this chapter is to provide an account of the ten-year period of the Dekasegi immigration within Japan, developing less well-known points, and drawing both on existing literature and on the researcher’s fieldwork conducted both in Japan (1992–1995 and 1998) and São Paulo (1997). I begin by tracing the Dekasegi movement since the 1980s. In 1986, one company in São Paulo started recruiting workers specifically for the automobile industry in Japan, marking the opening of the current phase of migration to Japan. By 1988, employment conditions had improved and, after completion of two years employment in Japan, the company paid the worker’s return passage back to Brazil. There was a gradual and substantial increase in the number of recruitment advertisements directed towards the Japanese community in São Paulo, all of which were originally in Japanese. In March 1989, the president of a Japanese civil construction company went to Brazil to recruit workers, and one year later, another Japanese company organised a conference in a hotel in São Paulo with the same purpose (São Paulo Shinbun, 18 February 1989). Working conditions in Japan were as follows: men were paid US$1,900 a month and women between US$1,200 and 1,300; two to four hours of overtime work was expected; accommodation with TV, fridge, washing machine and ‘everything that a Japanese employee gets’ was provided (Japão Agora, 23–29 August 1990). Information on the company and the job to be performed was provided, though it was not always accurate. In the same month, Isuzu Motors set up an office in São Paulo to recruit temporary workers.

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During the 1980s, while Japan was experiencing the so-called bubble economy, the Dekasegi filled vacancies created by expanding production and a tightening labour market. Job-brokering agencies intensified their efforts in order to recruit workers for work in Japan and, since arranging such jobs in Japan proved to be good business, the number of brokers in Brazil acting as travel agencies multiplied. These emigration brokers earned about US$1,300 for each worker recruited, and formed networks which became deeply rooted in the Japanese community in Brazil. In July 1989, underground job brokers in Brazil and Japan were denounced as illegal and the authorities carried out arrests. As a result, in 1990, small and medium-sized companies from Öizumi, Ota and Kiryu started to recruit labourers directly from Brazil. The organisation responsible for issuing medical documentation (Beneficiência Nipo-Brasileira, Enkyö) at that time dealt with an average of 50 persons per day, with an increasing number of young people and graduates (São Paulo Shinbun, 15 February 1989). After the 1990 legal reforms in Japan, companies started to offer better working conditions in order to retain their legal foreign workers and the number of working visa applications grew five-fold in January 1990 (Japão Agora, 29 March–4 April 1990). Many young women were recruited for such jobs as golf caddies while older women fluent in Japanese were recruited mainly for geriatric hospitals or as housekeepers (kaseifu). In order to offer vocational counselling and job placement for foreigners of Japanese ancestry, the Ministry of Labour, created the Kaigai Nikkeijin Kyökai (Association for Overseas Nikkeijin) in Tokyo, and opened various public employment agencies (Nikkeijin Koyö Sabisu Sentä, the Employment Service Centre for Nikkeijin) in those prefectures which had higher concentrations of Dekasegi. In 1992, an agreement was scheduled to be signed by the Japanese and Brazilian governments to eliminate illegitimate mediating practices and the CIATE – Centro de Informação ao Trabalhador (Workers Abroad Information Centre) was launched in São Paulo (Herbert 1996: 124). This is a non-profit-making organisation subsidised by the Japanese government and also supported by Nikkeijin Koyö Sabisu Sentä, Ueno (a Tokyo ward), with the purpose of providing information on jobs in Japan. During the same period, Brazil was going through a downturn, which the economic plan of President Collor only exacerbated. With an inflation rate of 1,200 per cent and increasing unemployment, the numbers emigrating to the country of their ancestors increased exponentially (The Economist, 7 December 1991: 1–22). However, according to article 206 of the Brazilian Penal Code, emigration was prohibited. This article was removed in July 1993, but the bureaucracy involved in visa applications delayed the process, and many of the Dekasegi eager to migrate left for Japan on tourist visas which they changed upon arrival. Although this practice continues, since 1994 the Japanese authorities have tightened the control of tourist visas, and many Dekasegi have been arrested at Narita Airport and deported (O Estado de São Paulo, 15 February 1995). Others have succeeded in staying, thus enlarging the number of illegal Brazilians residing in Japan. At the end of the decade, according to the Brazilian Consulate in Tokyo, 90,000 Brazilians were resident in Japan (Noticias do Japão, 3–9 January 1997). However, the

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number of visas issued in Brazil and São Paulo decreased in May 1993, and from that year on has been decreasing by about 5,000 each year, owing to the economic recession in Japan, especially in the manufacturing sector. The reduced demand for labour, however, has not affected the service and construction industries. In 1995, with the reconstruction of Kobe, the number of job offers for the Nikkeijin in fact increased. The preference was for Japanese or Issei males who had already worked in Japan. In 1996, according to the owner of the longest-established recruitment agency in São Paulo, the number of job vacancies in Japan outstripped the number of Nikkei candidates (Noticias do Japão, 6–12 December 1996). This situation continued in 1997. Most stay as ‘long-term residents’ or ‘spouse of a Japanese national’, but some overstay their short-term visa and others (a minority) have Japanese nationality. In 1999, the number of registered Brazilians stood at 224,299 (Ministry of Justice 2000). Table 4.2 Number of registered Brazilians (1990–1999) Year

Number

Year

Number

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

56,429 119,333 147,803 154,650 159,619

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

176,440 201,795 233,254 222,217 224,299

Source: Ministry of Justice (1990–2000).

In order to accelerate immigration formalities, Prime Minister Ryutarö Hashimoto in 1996 agreed new arrangements which established the requirement for a working visa before Nikkeijin enter the country. Accordingly, since September 1996, the Japanese Consulate in São Paulo has taken responsibility for issuing working visas. Before this resolution, visas for Sansei workers had to be issued in Japan, and the whole procedure could take more than three months. Following the recent agreement, the Japanese Consulate in São Paulo has been able to reduce this to just one week, according to Masahiro Ohashi, director of CIATE.13 As legal employment opportunities in Japan are thus limited to people of Japanese descent or their spouses, some people try to ‘acquire’ Japanese ancestry. It has been reported that passports and documents (certificates of Japanese origin and registers of descent) have been sold for up to US$2,000. In other cases, especially in Peru, some people undergo surgery to acquire Japanese physical traits. In Brazil the most common method of qualifying for a visa is to marry someone of Japanese descent. In just one day there were 150 advertisements by Nikkeijin who offered themselves as spouses for people who wanted to work in Japan.14 Profile of the Dekasegi The profile of the Dekasegi population entering Japan has changed over the ten years of migration. Between 1985 and 1988, it was mainly composed of Issei male

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farmers who possessed Japanese nationality. Since 1990, the Dekasegi population has included more second- and third-generation Japanese, and in more recent years the proportion of Sansei as well as the number of women coming alone has increased. The number of Mestiços has also been rising, as well as the number of young students coming to Japan during their vacation, and those who have interrupted their studies to migrate to Japan.15 The proportion of women coming to Japan on their own or with the family has gradually increased, and currently constitutes about 50 per cent of the Dekasegi population. According to research carried out on Dekasegi,16 the overwhelming majority of Brazilians doing unskilled jobs in Japan are in their twenties and thirties, and are from the second and third generation. It was revealed that half of them had attended secondary school and about 25 per cent were university graduates.17 Surveys also indicated that the previous occupations of many of them were in the white-collar and liberal professions (lawyers, dentists, engineers, teachers, etc.). Still others (about one-third) came from rural areas and had been farmers (Mori 1996: 32). It should be noted that the population mix of the Dekasegi is very heterogeneous, although this has rarely been acknowledged. Initially, few Dekasegi came to Japan accompanied by all or part of their family. In some cases the father and the children migrated to Japan while the mother remained behind in Brazil; in other cases, the couple migrated and the children were left behind with relatives or neighbours. However, the typical Dekasegi migrated for a short period, at most two or three years. Subsequently, this changed, and the proportion of those who are accompanied by their families has risen in recent years to one in three, though the exact number is not documented statistically, whilst many couples break up after migration. As already mentioned, the number of single Sansei and Nisei women on their own in their forties and fifties has also increased. In recent years it has not been uncommon for whole families, and circles of neighbours and friends to reunite in Japan. As for Japanese language ability, a low percentage rated themselves as fluent, according to the same sources.18 As they have unskilled jobs, language is not a serious handicap in their work. However, for daily life language skills are crucial. Particularly in the early years of migration, there were many instances of misunderstandings and cases were reported of people who bought pet food by mistake in supermarkets because they could neither read nor speak Japanese. Surveys have revealed that the majority nowadays tend to be keen to learn Japanese and attend Japanese classes provided by local governments, Japanese volunteers, companies or brokers. Often these classes do not actually meet their real needs and they do not have the time (or the energy) to study, and give up easily. Until 1993, there were no Japanese textbooks in Portuguese, but this situation has improved. In general, however, textbooks and Japanese language teaching are still not appropriate to workers with only a few hours to devote to the study of the language. For the majority the main motivation in migration to Japan has been financial – a bid to escape economic difficulties in Brazil. The common aspiration is to save money in order to buy a house, a car and start a business, in that order.19 Although

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their motivation is largely economic, interviews revealed that many of the Dekasegi want to experience life in a First World country, ‘the country of technology’; others wish to acquaint themselves with the land of their ancestors, meet their relatives and visit their ancestors’ graves; some, especially young people, want to know more about Japan and Japanese culture; others have personal reasons, such as trying to change their lives by migrating; and still others are encouraged to go by relatives, friends and acquaintances who are already working in Japan or intend to go and want company. Finally, it should be noted that, when the Dekasegi temporarily return to Brazil, they tend to emphasise the positive points of their experience in Japan. In some cases their accounts are true (though in others they may be exaggerated) and this often encourages other Nikkeijin to try their luck in Japan. Apparently kinship is not an important factor in determining migrant destination in Japan, a fact borne out in the case of Okinawa, a prefecture that has provided many emigrants. A survey conducted by the Japanese Statistics Research Institute revealed that Okinawa does not attract many Brazilian Nikkeijin. Their geographical distribution in Japan is closely related to the location of manufacturing industry. The Dekasegi are concentrated particularly in areas where manufacturing subcontractors for large companies operate. In recent years they have spread throughout the country. According to the Employment Service for the Nikkeijin in Tokyo, the Dekasegi are moving into areas such as Fukushima and Hiroshima. Although present in all Prefectures, the largest communities in 1998 are in Aichi Prefecture, where 42,917 Dekasegi resided and Shizuoka Prefecture with 32,202, followed by Kanagawa (15,434), Nagano (14,676), Gunma (13,933), Mie (12,433), Saitama (12,226), Gifu (11,818), Tochigi (8,757) and Ibaraki (9,216). The largest concentrations are to be found in Hamamatsu (Shizuoka Prefecture) and Öizumi (Gunma Prefecture). (See appendix C for details). As for returning to Brazil, the results of surveys, although inconclusive, suggest that the majority plan to return when they have the money and the situation in their country improves.20 The original plan may be to stay for two years, but more often than not this period is extended. The Issei are obliged to return to Brazil within two years so as not to forfeit their right to permanent residence. As will be discussed later in this chapter, for the last three years the number of people who reemigrate is on the increase. In the early years of migration, especially, homesickness and feelings of loneliness were the most common complaints, while the lack of linguistic skills was often presented as the most difficult handicap to life in Japan. According to the centre that gives assistance to the Nikkeijin (Nikkeijin Kyökai no Nikkeijin Södan Sentä), between August 1992 and February 1993, a total of 2,040 Brazilians sought assistance, the majority of them with general problems related to living in Japan (Komai 1994). As far as health is concerned, the majority of the Dekasegi do not see this as important. However, the stress involved in adjusting to a new environment and to long working hours has caused numerous mental and physical problems. Cases of patients admitted to hospital with mental disorders, particularly paranoid tendencies, have been reported.

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Brazilian Nikkei migrants in Japan

The situation for the Dekasegi has changed greatly since the 1980s, both because of the development of networks and the improvement of conditions for foreign residents in Japan. After ten years of migration to Japan there is much more information available. This means that before they leave for Japan, prospective migrants have some idea of what to expect. However, once in Japan their reactions differ according to such factors as age, personality, region of origin (rural/urban) and level of expectations. For many, it is in Japan that they earn their first wage. This is especially true for women in their forties and fifties and young Sansei. According to the survey conducted monthly by the Ethnic Media Press Centre in 1996 (Roda Viva, 7 December 1996), the Dekasegi have on average an income of 250 thousand yen (50 thousand more than other unskilled foreign workers). Of this they spend on average 110,680 yen on food, 15,900 on clothes, 10,000 on cosmetic products, 5,000 on national telephone calls and 16,800 on international calls. They save between US$1,500 and 2,000 per month: the average bank balance in Japanese branches of the Bank of Brazil is US$25,000 (A Folha de São Paulo, 30 October 1994, O Estado de São Paulo, 13 March 1996). Dekasegi consumption habits have attracted the attention of some researchers, as they were found to spend more money than other migrants. Although there is little hard evidence of this, the consumption of electronic goods and cosmetic products indeed seems high among Brazilians in Japan. Their consumption increases significantly before their return to Brazil. They buy mainly hi-fi, videos, TV sets, computers and other kinds of electronic goods. Finally, many Dekasegi apparently ‘disappear’. Though the exact number is not known, the newspaper International Press reports on average seven to ten missing persons per week. Most inquiries are from wives whose husbands have ‘disappeared’ in Japan, while others are from children in search of their parents. Every week the Brazilian Consulate receives an average of two requests for information concerning missing Dekasegi (Noticias do Japão, 8–14 March 1996). Some are found, but refuse to contact their families in Brazil, while others do not want to be found because they have a second family in Japan. Recruitment The Dekasegi are recruited by Japanese and Brazilian job-brokering agencies in Brazil, directly by companies, or through networks of friends and relatives working in Japan. However, there are also ‘official’ recruiters, both in Brazil and in Japan. There are more than 630 official employment agencies all over the country that provide up-to-date information and counselling on jobs. The Employment Service Centre for Nikkeijin was established to help them in finding jobs, but between 1991 and 1992 only 1,002 Dekasegi used this service (Komai 1995). Similarly unpopular, apparently, is the Employment Service Centre established in São Paulo (CIATE, Workers Abroad Information Centre) in 1993 in co-operation with the centre in Tokyo. Of all the people who made enquiries between April 1996 and March 1997 (a total of 1,239), only 59 actually went to Japan. This number is surprisingly low considering the number of Dekasegi who actually migrate to Japan per year.21

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In addition, there is also direct recruitment by Japanese companies. The Overseas Nikkeijin Association survey revealed that 35 per cent of migrants were directly recruited by their company. In the north of Paraná (Londrina and Maringa) directors of Japanese companies or their representatives conduct meetings with prospective Dekasegi. At these meetings information on companies, working conditions and job descriptions is presented. These companies pay the contractees’ passage to Japan, which is later deducted from their salary over a sixmonth period. When workers stay for one or two years with the same company the return passage to Brazil is also paid. Job-brokering agencies are still the most popular method of recruitment. More than 60 per cent are recruited and employed by labour contracting agencies, many of which also operate as travel agencies (Revista USP 1995: 27). These companies make a profit of US$20 million per month according to the São Paulo Police (Asari 1992: 122). The majority of these agencies are located in Liberdade, the Japanese quarter in São Paulo. They contact workers through advertisements in Japanese community newspapers, the national press and radio programmes. In order to locate potential candidates, some of them use the telephone directory to write to all people with Japanese surnames; others contact members of Japanese associations in areas where there are large concentrations of people of Japanese descent. Prospective Dekasegi go to these labour agencies to make inquiries and to obtain information (very often inaccurate) on companies, job availability, wages and working hours. There they are sometimes shown videos of Dekasegi daily life in Japan. At other agencies they may be shown catalogues with photographs of workplaces. The job contractors apply for visas and other documentation, and arrange flights. In some cases a Brazilian agency representative who deals with the paperwork accompanies the Dekasegi recruits to Japan. In other cases (the precise number is not known), an agent meets them at the airport and transports them to their places of work, where they are informed about their new company. In such cases, accommodation arrangements are also made by the broker in Japan. However, in many cases where the worker does not have a relative, friend or acquaintance in Japan, he or she has to manage alone. The Dekasegi depend on job brokering agencies, not only to get a job, but also to obtain the required documentation. Rates vary according to the agency. Many cases of exploitation by brokers have been reported. Some charge exorbitant fees, and many of the recruits arrive in Japan with considerable debt as a consequence of brokers’ charges. Many complaints have been reported, such as the confiscation of workers’ passports and/or return tickets as a method of securing workers, deductions of 40–50 per cent from wages, with some agencies fining employees who want to change jobs. A frequent complaint is that the working and living conditions the Dekasegi encounter in Japan are different from those previously agreed upon in Brazil. However, not all brokers exploit the Dekasegi. Some provide a good service and assist workers after their arrival. Many of these more satisfactory agencies have a Brazilian Nikkeijin in charge whose job is to provide assistance to the Brazilians employed by the broker. They act as interpreters, teach them Japanese, accompany

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them to the hospital and city hall for registration procedures, deal with daily problems, and so forth. Actually, some of these Brazilian Nikkeijin working in jobbrokering agencies complain that workers are very demanding and feel especially burdened by the demands of their compatriots. A Brazilian Nikkeijin in charge of 190 Brazilians for a job contractor in Gunma complained that his phone rings all night and that there was even one Dekasegi who asked him to take his pet to the vet. Similar complaints were made by a Brazilian in charge of 400 Brazilians in Toyohashi (Aichi), who explained that on one occasion he was called in to settle a couple’s marital rows. A Sansei in charge of the Dekasegi in Soja (Okayama Prefecture) also complained of the burden of taking responsibility for everything, from work problems to the daily lives of all the recruits placed in different factories by the agency. Jobs in Japan are advertised in the newspapers addressed to the Nikkeijin, both in Brazil and Japan. Frequently, details of overtime and potential earnings for female and male workers are provided. In 1990, advertisements specified healthy people between 18 and 49 years old. One year later, the upper age limit was increased to 65 years and wages were lowered. In recent years, a basic knowledge of Japanese is required for many jobs, and in some cases the job interview is conducted in Japanese. Other jobs require a driving licence.23 The preference is for Nisei, whilst the Mestiços are the least desirable. In the newspapers of the Japanese communities in Brazil the number of advertisements addressed to the Dekasegi have multiplied. There are job advertisements, advertisements for the investment of their savings and ‘marriage’ advertisements from people who are not of Japanese ancestry, but want to work in Japan. In 1997, in spite of the Japanese recession, the number of job offers showed no sign of any significant decrease. The newspaper Noticias do Japão (21–27 March 1997) carried classified advertisements for more than 180 jobs. Analysis of the advertisements in International Press (28 March 1998) revealed an increased demand for 35- and 40-year-old women, and for couples. Wages depend on the company and the prefecture. For example, wages in a sweet factory in Yamanashi Prefecture amounted to 850 and 1,000 yen per hour for women and between 1,100 and 1,200 for men. In a food factory in Gifu Prefecture, wages were 1,200 yen per hour for men and 950 for women. A manufacturing company in Aichi Prefecture offered 1,500 yen per hour to men and 1,000 to women, while in a obentoya (take-away food service) in Tokyo women were paid 900 yen per hour and men 1,200. To sum up, between 1990 and 1993, the preference was for men and women born directly of Japanese emigrants, between 18 and 49 years old, and the wages offered were US$5,000 for men and US$3,000 for women. Between 1998 and 1999, the preference was for couples, childless or with families, who were themselves second- or third-generation descendants of Japanese emigrants, and wages amounted to US$3,500 for men and US$3,000 for women (Veja, 1 September 1999: 63). Employment conditions As stated earlier, following the revision of the immigration law, managers in manufacturing industry promoted the employment of the Nikkeijin in an attempt to

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secure a legitimate workforce. This policy has been supported by municipal governments in regions where many factories are situated. As a consequence, the number of Brazilians in some companies has become a significant part of their workforce. Analysis of the occupational structure of Brazilians in Japan reveals that the majority (141,548) are employed in factories and as general workers (craftsmen and production workers). The rest are clerical workers, students and housewives. It is assumed that the labour force participation rate among Brazilians is very high (Japan Immigration Association 1998: 140–1). They tend to be employed by small to medium-sized enterprises and by subcontractors processing work for larger firms in the construction, metallurgy, manufacturing, auto and electrical industries. In more recent years they have been employed in the service sectors (hospitals, hotels, supermarkets, restaurants) and are becoming essential in some areas (Asahi Shinbun, 7 January 1998). According to the Employment Service Centre for the Nikkeijin, in 1993, 51 per cent worked on assembly lines in manufacturing, 25 per cent in construction and 13 per cent in the service industry. More recently, the employment pattern has been changing and the Dekasegi have been moving to other sectors of the economy, as already mentioned. The Dekasegi, like all migrants, usually take the jobs unwanted by the locals. Firstand second-generation women, who are fluent speakers of Japanese, are usually employed as kaseifu (househelpers) in hospitals and private homes. Such fluent speakers are also used as interpreters by companies and job-brokering agencies to deal with other Dekasegi. Young Sansei work in ski stations, obentoya and other similar jobs. Many Brazilian men or women married to Nikkeijin and Mestiços also work in nightclubs. The majority of the Dekasegi are recruited by brokers, who also deal with hiring and firing. The employer usually pays the wages to the broker, who deducts his fee and pays the worker. Workers placed by brokers have deductions from their salaries of between 15 and 30 per cent (Revista USP 1995: 29). The use of brokers implies additional costs to the employers, but on the other hand places less responsibility on them for recruitment. When large companies need to hire substantial numbers of workers for a short period, they prefer to recruit through brokers. If the use of brokers is not always in the best interests of workers it is convenient for companies. Although prohibited in Japan, there do exist cases of Brazilian minors working in factories. Some of them do so as a result of being unhappy in Japanese schools and prefer to join their parents at work. Others came to Japan to visit relatives and end up working with them, or indeed came with this purpose in mind. The Dekasegi, like other migrants, are accepted as temporary workers outside the system (which includes lifetime employment and other benefits), and therefore are directly affected by an economic downturn. Many companies are increasingly reluctant to renew contracts, and the number of unemployed South Americans has risen since 1992. Although it cannot be said that the Dekasegi are being pushed into a situation of extensive unemployment, the employment situation has certainly worsened in the last couple of years.24 According to the Nikkeijin Service Centre in Tokyo, between December 1997 and

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February 1998 there were 599 job offers addressed to Nikkeijin by 121 companies. In the previous year, there were 1,546 job offers by 164 companies (Noticias do Japão, 20–26 March 1998). In March and April 1998, headlines in the Nikkei press focused on the Japanese economic recession and the rise in the unemployment rate among the Brazilians. In this regard, it should be noted this is a normal occurrence in the first two months of the financial year. But because the situation in Brazil is even worse than in Japan, as many interviewees have remarked, those unemployed tend to remain in Japan, moving from one locality to another looking for jobs.25 Wages The available data indicate that Dekasegi income and working conditions are the same as for Japanese national workers (Herbert 1996: 9). However, in the early 1990s, it was not uncommon for the Dekasegi to get higher wages than Japanese workers. This was because of the greater number of hours they worked and because what they earned was not subject to tax. Even now they tend to earn more, owing to an average of two hours of overtime worked. Men can earn hourly wages of between 1,100 and 1,400 yen and women between 900 and 1,000. Female workers are paid much less, and gender wage differentials have been a reason for complaint although Japanese female workers are also often paid much less. Proficiency in Japanese also brings a significant difference in wage rates. Given the same job, the linguistically capable worker is often paid more for interpreting the employer’s directions to colleagues. Workers usually receive 25 per cent extra per hour for overtime work. In some companies, workers receive a regular attendance (assiduity) bonus of 10,000 yen twice a year, in addition to free meals and accommodation. The majority of the Dekasegi are contracted on a yearly basis. In many cases they cannot read the contract because it is written in Japanese, and in some cases it is not clear either how monthly salaries are calculated; there are also cases where no written contract exists (more prevalent in the early 1990s than later, see Onitsuka 1992: 82). Although the wage rate reflects labour demand, it is in general higher than that available to illegal foreign workers and about the same as for Japanese part-time workers with no bonus. The recession in Japan has affected wages, but they are still four or five times higher than those in Brazil. As temporary workers they are not usually paid the bonuses that Japanese workers receive, although some companies are exceptional in this respect. However, they are entitled to receive other benefits such as transportation, Japanese classes, accommodation and meals, the cost of the latter two items being deducted from their salaries. Usually meals taken during overtime are offered free of charge. Working hours Although it has been suggested that they are obliged to work long hours, the truth is that usually the Dekasegi volunteer and compete amongst themselves for overtime, and many cases of open conflict have been reported. On average they work for 10

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or 11 hours per day, including 2 hours of overtime. A normal working day is from 08:10 to 18:30, with five-minute rest breaks at 10:00 and 17:00. Many Dekasegi work from 15 to 19 hours a day. On average they do 145 hours of overtime per month and cases have been reported of Dekasegi who ceased working only in the shögatsu (New Year) and obon holiday periods. Some will work during the week in factories, and at weekends do secondary jobs such as hairdressing or selling products within the South American community, or alternatively washing up in restaurants, working in obentoya and other arubaito (part-time jobs). The economic recession led to a significant decrease in overtime work. With the increase in numbers of Brazilians in Japan, many Brazilian workers have left the factories and started their own businesses. Welfare According to their legal status, the Dekasegi are entitled to Employment Insurance against loss of job, workers’ Accident Compensation Insurance, National Health Insurance or Health Insurance and National Pension Insurance (e.g. Mori 1997: 192). Despite these entitlements, many of the Dekasegi remain uninsured. In some cases employers fail to make the necessary contributions and in other cases the Dekasegi themselves object to the contributions being deducted from their wages. In some localities, the Nikkeijin are not required to pay their share of health insurance which is paid by the city hall.26 Not all the Dekasegi are covered by the public medical insurance, and a great number have no more than tourist insurance. It should be noted however, that the contribution to the workers’ compensation insurance (to compensate for injuries, diseases, disabilities or death) is paid entirely by employers. Other contributions, such as Social Security Insurance, are shared by employers and employees.27 Lack of knowledge and a dependency on brokers are also responsible for this situation. In this context, it should be noted that the main Nikkei newspapers have sections informing the Dekasegi about insurance and taxes. Usually this information is provided by official centres that provide various types of assistance to the Nikkeijin.28 Since 1995, the Nikkeijin have been entitled to receive a national retirement pension. In that year, the Japanese government approved a law, according to which foreigners who work in Japan have a deduction made from their salaries for retirement. If they do not stay in Japan long enough to retire they are entitled to a lump-sum reimbursement when they leave the country. Job turnover The voluntary turnover rate of workers was very high in the early 1990s. About 78.4 per cent had changed jobs according to the JICA survey (1992), and the Sansei were found to change more often than the Nisei. The high mobility of these workers was mainly motivated by wage differentials. Because they came to Japan to accumulate savings the Dekasegi were always on the search for a better income, and a network of relatives, friends and brokers

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provided the necessary information to find new jobs. When a more attractive job was found, many of these workers would just leave without informing their company. Employers often complained about massive changes of personnel. This situation caused problems for both companies and brokers, who suffered considerable losses, and consequently employers tended to recruit Dekasegi who were accompanied by their families, since they were assumed to be less mobile. Although employers have complained of frequent job changes among the Dekasegi, surveys document that their employment is much more stable than that of some other groups. In fact, among three categories of foreign workers (foreign students, clandestine workers and Dekasegi), the Dekasegi have the lowest labour turnover. While 7 per cent of them had had four jobs, the corresponding figure for clandestine workers was 20 per cent. Whatever the case, the recession has made it much more difficult to change jobs, and the Dekasegi have been forced to accept lower salaries. Accidents at work As is the case for foreign workers, the Dekasegi tend to have more accidents at work than Japanese workers, although nationwide data are not available. Apart from deficient safety measures, the main causes of accidents are said to be the lack of training and knowledge of safety rules, and exhaustion due to long working hours, sometimes without a break. Another obvious reason is that they perform unsafe jobs such as manipulating dangerous machinery. Communication problems, due to their lack of proficiency in Japanese have also been reported. This is illustrated by the case of a Dekasegi whose supervisor asked him to stop the machine saying ‘tomare’ (stop). As he could not understand Japanese and his workmate translated the supervisor’s command as ‘faster’, he accelerated the machine instead of stopping it and nearly had his fingers cut off (Noticias do Japão, 4–10 April 1997). Table 4.3 Number of Dekasegi who suffered accidents at work in Japan by year Year Number

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

244

338

689

844

817

847

986

Source: Notícias do Japão (7–13 March 1997: 7A).

Under the law, workers, regardless of nationality, are required to be covered by work-related accident insurance, and all accidents have to be reported. Despite the high risk of accidents, the majority of job brokers do not pay this type of insurance. In such cases, when the Dekasegi has been recruited by a broker recruitment and suffers an accident he or she does not receive any compensation. Many cases have occurred in which the worker spends all his or her savings and cannot pay the return fare to Brazil. In more dramatic cases, a relative will go from Brazil to work in Japan in order to provide assistance. There are also cases in which the company offers a token compensation to the worker, which is accepted, notwithstanding the fact that by law the compensation should be higher (Watari 1996).

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According to Japanese legislation on safety at work, an injured worker has the right to receive medical treatment and compensation. There are, however, cases of Dekasegi who had been injured and did not receive the due treatment and compensation although they possessed work insurance cover. The majority of work-related accidents are cases of bone fractures, amputation of limbs or fingers and burns. Some cases of serious injury have also been reported. Many of those who suffer an accident cannot find a job afterwards because of their disability. Labour problems and labour associations The majority of labour problems relating to foreign workers involve those from Brazil. The governmental centres set up to assist them receive daily complaints. Thus in Aichi, the majority of the complaints received by the Ministry of Labour in 1996 in Aichi were filed by Brazilians.29 In fact, various kinds of labour problems have arisen all over the country. Some cases are related to the non-payment of wages and to problems with job contractors, such as those already mentioned. Some of these cases involved physical coercion. The most frequent cases relate to illegal dismissals and unpaid overtime work. There are numerous cases of workers receiving neither work compensation nor wages (205 cases in Aichi Prefecture in 1996), in addition to suffering accidents at work (85 in Aichi Prefecture). In some instances, workers receive just 15 per cent extra for overtime work instead of the 25 per cent required by law. In recent years the number of lawsuits instituted against job brokers and companies by the Dekasegi has been increasing (Noticias do Japão, 21–27 February 1997). It should be noted that, in 1994, infringements of labour laws decreased by 22 per cent for all foreigners except Brazilians. The number of cases involving Brazilians increased more than two-fold compared with the previous year (Noticias do Japão, 8–14 March 1996). In 1998, the Committee of Citizens in Tokyo, headed by the Brazilian ambassador, compiled a guide, intended to help the Dekasegi with useful information and to alert them to certain situations involving risk, such as giving up one’s passport and signing work contracts. This guide was distributed by airlines operating between Japan and Brazil, by radio programmes in Portuguese and to Nikkei communities, both in Japan and Brazil. The situation of Brazilian workers in Japan also attracted the attention of the Central Union of Brazilian Workers (CUT), and at the Congress of the Union in 1994, it was suggested that the union create a branch in Tokyo to support Brazilian workers in Japan (A Folha de São Paulo, 22 May 1994). The Nikkei press in Japan and Brazil, especially the newspapers International Press, Journal Tudo Bem in Japan and Noticias do Japão in Brazil, have been playing an active and important role in denouncing cases of employment abuse and informing the Dekasegi of their rights. It is also important to mention the existence in Japan of a network of movements to protect foreign workers, composed of human rights activists and lawyers working on issues of human rights, who provide free legal assistance. For instance, the Osaka Bar Association provides assistance to foreign workers, giving free legal

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counsel by telephone, and distributing a brochure on employment rights. This service also exists in other Prefectures, such as Aichi, Nagoya and Okayama among others. The lawyers who work with LAFLER (Lawyers for Foreign Labourers’ Rights Association) receive their fees when the cases are resolved . Latin-American migrants attract particular attention, both because of their legal status and their numbers, and organisations attentive to problems have been on the increase. For example in Hamamatsu, the Dekasegi formed a Christian group (Hamamatsu Overseas Labourers Solidarity) in order to deal with workers’ problems and CATLA (Comissão de Apoio a Trabalhadores Latino-Americanos, Latin America Support Committee) was set up in 1990 to assist Latin-Americans with cases of work-related accidents or exploitation by brokers. This organisation has counsellors and lawyers to help those with claims. The FLU (Foreign Labourers Union), affiliated to Zenrokyö (the Japanese Central Union), currently has 70 members, 20 per cent of them Brazilians (Noticias do Japão, 21–27 February 1997). Of the 50 participants in the meeting that took place on 15 December 1996, no less than 10 were Brazilian. In the opinion of one member of the committee, Hiroshi Kawasaki, Brazilians should organise themselves. This is also the opinion of a leader of the Brazilian community in Hamamatsu (Shizuoka Prefecture), who claims that the Dekasegi should stand up for their rights and demand more return for the taxes they pay (A Folha de São Paulo, 14 March 1996). Currently, Latin-American workers are organising an association for collective bargaining. In Narita (Chiba Prefecture) a labour association (kumiai) was organised in 1996 by a group of foreign workers, mainly Nikkeijin, working at the airport, who had anxieties over their unstable working situation and the problematic renewal of their visas. Since then the number of members has increased (Kiyoji Tanaka 1997: 4). An organisation, Fundo Mútuo de Auxílio dos Trabalhadores Latino-Americanos (literally, Mutual Fund for Assistance to Latin-American Workers), created through the initiative of a former Japanese Consul in Brazil, Yasuyuki Suzuki, also gives assistance with labour problems. Assistance from local government Since 1990, in a bid to improve conditions for foreign residents, certain municipalities have established programmes and advice centres to help foreign residents, especially those from South America with Japanese ancestry.30 These centres are intended to assist them with problems of living in Japan, and some of them employ Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking staff. They provide information and counselling on welfare, medical treatment, labour rights and how to dispose of rubbish. Municipalities with a large concentration of manufacturing companies can provide better assistance to foreign residents because of the substantial tax revenues received from the workers. In some municipalities Japanese language classes are also provided at a nominal fee (usually 300 yen per class), and carnivals and football matches are also organised. The city of Hadano (Kanagawa Prefecture) has organised Portuguese classes

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for employees, who also have the opportunity to learn about Brazilian culture. In 1991, a water company in Hamamatsu (Shizuoka Prefecture) organised an extensive training programme for employees in Portuguese. An identical initiative was introduced by the Centre of Work Administration, Commerce and Industry in Shizuoka Prefecture, with the purpose of making public employees aware of the problems that Brazilian migrants face while living in Japan. Brochures and books intended to help with life in Japan have also been translated into Portuguese and Spanish. An example is a handbook on maternal and child health, already published in several languages, which has been translated into Portuguese and distributed by the government of Tokyo. The Kaigai Nikkeijin Kyökai (Association for Overseas Nikkeijin) in Tokyo offers an advisory service to help the Nikkeijin, and publishes useful information in both Portuguese and Spanish. Housing After their arrival in Japan, and until they find accommodation, many Dekasegi stay with relatives, friends and acquaintances with whom they were in contact before migration. Finding accommodation is not easy because they are required to have a Japanese national guarantor. In most cases accommodation is found by brokers or employers. Some job-brokering agencies have their own furnished flats to rent to the workers they have recruited. When accommodation is provided by the broker, and the occupants are sacked or no longer want to work for the broker agency, they are frequently required to find new accommodation at very short notice. Most Dekasegi live in company dormitories or in apartments rented by the companies or job-brokering agencies, not very far from the factories where they work. There are also Dekasegi who live in municipal housing. In many cases a small flat is shared by three or even more workers, with an outside toilet and bath. Even small apartments are expensive. The quality of accommodation depends on how much the worker wants to pay, ranging from very poor to relatively comfortable. Organisations to assist Dekasegi The presence of Dekasegi and other foreigners in Japan has generated a myriad of international associations in recent years. One such is the International Association of Toyota (Aichi Prefecture), which offers counselling services on different issues (visa, taxes, daily problems, etc.) on Saturdays. Another is a centre established in Gunma, in 1997, that offers legal and health assistance by professionals, with Portuguese and Spanish interpreters. The Seishönen Södansho (literally, Younger Generation Consultation Office), an organisation in Toyota, gives support to parents whose children have problems at school. The Association of Friends of Brazilians in Hamamatsu (Shizuoka Prefecture) gives lectures on different issues for Japanese who are interested in learning more of their Brazilian neighbours. Other initiatives are promoted by individuals who want to help South Americans in Japan, such as the director of Central R&D Laboratory Toyota in Nagoya, Takatoshi Suzuki, who teaches Japanese to the Dekasegi on a voluntary basis.

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The role of the Catholic Church in helping workers from South American countries deserves a special mention. In the early years of migration, the Catholic Church was almost their only source of support. Throughout the country, Catholic churches offer Catholic services in Spanish and/or Portuguese at least once a month. In addition to religious services, Catholic missionaries, priests and activist groups have established a network to assist Latin-Americans in Japan, helping with personal and labour problems, providing services such as raising money to pay the return passage of those who cannot afford it, providing clothes and other items for newcomers or the unemployed, promoting meetings among LatinAmericans in Japan, and so forth. It should be noted that the network formed to help foreign workers also involves other Christian denominations. Another aspect worthy of attention is church attendance. Brazilian attendance at church in Japan is insignificant compared with the attendance of other LatinAmericans, but interviews revealed that, amongst those attending church, few had done so in Brazil . This apparently ‘acquired religious’ behaviour is mainly motivated by feelings of despair due to the stress of living in a foreign country, separated from relatives and friends. It is also an opportunity to socialise with other LatinAmericans, following the church service, when tea, coffee and biscuits are served. On occasions such as Christmas and Easter attendance is even higher. As we saw in Chapter 1, although many Nikkeijin are baptised as Catholics, the Catholic Church does not have the religious monopoly in Brazil that it has in other Latin-American countries. This also explains the great variety of religious sects (Assembleia de Deus, Estudo do Apocalipse, Cultos Evangélicos, Missão Apoio, etc.) that were brought to Japan by the Dekasegi. As the years have passed and the number of Dekasegi residing in Japan has increased, the number of facilities and organisations set up by the Dekasegi themselves has also risen. A good example is the helpline to assist Latin Americans (Linha de Assistência a Latinos) which was organised by volunteers. In February 1996, the Conselhos de Cidadãos (Committees of Citizens) were established in Nagoya and Tokyo in order to help the Brazilians in Japan. Some Issei and Brazilians studying in Japan often act as interpreters. Assistance with documentation and translation of documents at a nominal fee is also provided by companies that sell telephone lines and mobile phones.31 Another support organisation, Kyödai (literally, sibling), was set up first to help Peruvians in Japan, and later extended its activities to Brazilians; it now has 5,050 members with offices in São Paulo and Tokyo. This volunteer organisation assists Dekasegi to send parcels, remittances and flowers to Brazil, helps with translation of documents, and is available 24 hours a day. The publication in recent years of various books on Japan for Dekasegi include those written from personal experience by members of the community.32 In localities with a large concentration of Dekasegi there are Brazilian restaurants, karaoke bars in Portuguese, specialist travel agencies, beauty parlours, and shops selling all sorts of Brazilian products, ranging from food to jeans. Most of these shops have been set up by the Dekasegi and offer a great variety of services, such as legal advice, translation of documents or travel agency services, all aimed at LatinAmericans. Usually it is possible to find everything in the same shop: videos, books

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and magazines in Portuguese and Spanish, imported meat and other food, clothes, mobile phones, toiletries, to name but a few. The quantity and variety of products from Brazil have increased with time. In the beginning imports were limited to food. Now almost everything can be found in Japan, from cookers imported from Brazil to semi-precious stones. Nowadays there are Brazilian shops all over Honshu, but in addition to normal retail outlets, Latin-Americans can buy all sorts of products from their home countries by catalogue and from mobile shops. There are trucks selling Brazilian items which reach areas where there are few Brazilian shops, or none at all.33 Much of this business is not subject to any legal regulation. It should be noted however, that it is not only Brazilians who are active in this trade. Some of the business addressed to them is in Japanese hands, including a number of shops and job-brokering agencies. It seems that, as a president of a company that sells mobile phones in Hamamatsu (Shizuoka Prefecture), pointed out, ‘The big business is in Japanese hands and the small is in Brazilian hands’. Nikkei Media in Japan The most important newspapers amongst the Nikkeijin in Japan are International Press and Jornal Tudo Bem, weekly newspapers in Portuguese with a circulation of 50,000. International Press was set up in 1991 and Jornal Tudo Bem two years later. On average, their pages cover the following subjects: news from Brazil, news from Japan and world news; news about South American workers in Japan and their communities; information on labour laws, factory safety rules, labour problems; lists of missing persons; readers’ comments on various issues such as life in Japan; sports; social events taking place in Japan; and advertisements. Other newspapers are Nova Visão, founded in 1993 and Folha Mundial, founded in 1995. There are also local newspapers addressed to the Dekasegi, such as Arigatö, founded in 1995 in Gunma Prefecture. In addition to newspapers and magazines imported from Brazil there are other publications in Portuguese. IPC Shupan publishes Manga (cartoons) in Portuguese, Jozo, a magazine with words for karaoke in Portuguese, and Cheque, a magazine similar to Playboy. Nova Revista International Press is a current affairs magazine. The number of publications addressed to the Dekasegi has risen in recent years, for example, the magazine Made in Japan, which was launched in 1998. The Dekasegi also have access to Latin-American television with IPC TV (cable TV, channels 333 and 334). There is one channel in Portuguese with programmes from Brazilian television and another in Spanish with programmes from other Latin-American countries. There are also several local radio programmes. Health assistance In localities with large concentrations of Dekasegi, brochures in Portuguese and Spanish with instructions on how to use hospitals and medical services are distributed. There are also some nurses who have studied Portuguese in order to assist their Brazilian patients. However, these individual efforts have little impact at

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a national level, and many Dekasegi, unable to speak Japanese, face various difficulties when they have to visit a doctor or go into hospital. Usually they are advised to go accompanied by an interpreter. Some cities such as Hadano (Kanagawa Prefecture) provide interpreters who accompany Brazilians to hospital. Some companies and brokers also provide this service, although a patient who cannot understand Japanese and who does not have anyone to help may still face difficulties. To assist patients in this situation, physicians and nurses have received ‘phrase-book’ brochures in Portuguese. One such entry, reading ‘It is better to go to your country’, caused controversy amongst the Dekasegi. In July 1992, Disque Saúde (literally, Dial Health) was established, with Brazilian physicians in the Brazilian Consulate in Nagoya acting as intermediaries between Brazilian patients and the Japanese medical system. Between 1 July and 30 December, 1,434 Latin-American patients used this service (Noticias do Japão, 14–20 March 1997). The Association of Brazilian Health Professionals in Japan, with the support of the Brazilian Consulate and the sponsorship of the Bank of Brazil, also gives assistance to the Dekasegi. In addition, Brazilians studying medicine or dentistry in Japan provide help to their compatriots working in Japan. Medical care provided for foreigners in Japan is also offered by voluntary associations. For instance, Dekasegi with AIDS can receive assistance free of charge through an organisation known as Colourful. Child education The number of Brazilian children born in Japan has been increasing. More than 13,000 children were born between 1991 and 1997.34 In 1994, the number of foreign children registered in primary and secondary education was 10,450. Of this total, 39 per cent (4,056 children) were Brazilian.35 In 1998, the number of Brazilian children aged between 5 and 19 years was 29,000 (Japanese Ministry of Education, quoted in Made in Japan, 1(7) March 1998: 34). The Japanese Ministry of Education has expressed concern about foreign children studying in Japan, but has not yet established a policy to integrate them into Japanese schools.36 Some teachers in charge of South American children have been making an effort to assist them, either by learning some Portuguese themselves, or by having Japanese textbooks translated into Portuguese. A number of textbooks used in Brazilian schools have also been translated into Japanese. In some cases it has been possible to form classes composed exclusively of Brazilian children. Examples of this can be found in Shizuoka (Hamamatsu), Gunma, Kanagawa and Okayama (Soja) Prefectures. Since 1996, schemes have been developed in the prefecture of Aichi, where 847 Brazilian children are registered in 66 schools, to improve the situation of Brazilian pupils. In some localities, such as Hamamatsu, private volunteer organisations offer language classes. An increasing number of schools and boards of education have also launched Japanese language classes for the children of Dekasegi. These programmes do not receive any funding from the central government. Japanese teachers are in general not accustomed to foreign children. As a

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consequence, some teachers have problems in dealing with Brazilian pupils, although others do their best to help them. They tend to express concern for their future because Brazilian children are often left unsupervised while their parents are doing overtime. The first meeting of people interested in the education of children of Dekasegi, took place in Yokohama in November 1994, and since then the number of such seminars and meetings has increased. The first symposium on education was held in Tenri (Nara) in November 1997, when it was decided to create a council to meet the educational needs of the children of Dekasegi. A programme of distance learning was launched in Brazil in 1995 as well as the Ceteban Educational Project (Centro de Ensino Tecnológico, Brasília and Universidade Bandeirante de São Paulo), which is recognised by the Brazilian Ministry of Education. A course organised for television by the Roberto Marinho Foundation also provides for the educational needs of Brazilian residents in Japan. In 1998, a primary school in Hamamatsu (Shizuoka Prefecture) was inaugurated. The owner of this school is Brazilian, and teaching will be in Portuguese. A Brazilian school (Colégio Drumond in Curítiba) has already expressed an interest in opening a branch in Japan. In areas where there are large concentrations of Dekasegi there exist nursery schools for their children, usually run by Brazilians. A variety of courses are also available to satisfy the needs expressed by many Dekasegi. There are courses on photography, films, computers, foreign languages, massage and so forth. According to Shinoda (1995), a Brazilian teacher, the children of the Dekasegi in Japan face various problems at school. They cannot fully follow classes in Japanese, do not eat certain meals, cannot change their clothes in front of their class and cannot obtain parental help with homework. In addition to this, parents have no well-defined plans for the future, and therefore it is difficult to organise the formal education of their children. Moreover, the Brazilian and Japanese educational systems differ in their aims and methods, and this produces further problems. In Japan, the child is placed in a class according to age rather than ability, resulting in many cases of children who cannot follow classes. However, of all the difficulties that Brazilian children have to face, probably the worst is ijime (bullying). Japanese children are not used to foreigners and often laugh at them, tease them and call them ‘baka Gaijin’ (stupid foreigner) or ‘henna Gaijin’ (strange foreigner). They also subject them to physical harassment, such as tearing the earrings off Brazilian girls, for example. Though children in Japan are subject to this kind of bullying by their schoolmates, teachers do little to prevent it, or to tackle the attitudes of the bullies. Problems with Nikkei children have often been reported in the Press.37 In this regard, it should be noted that bullying in Japan is a common practice, not necessarily involving foreign children.38 In spite of these problems, a proportion of children succeed in adjusting themselves quite well, though others refuse to attend school. Some teenagers drop out of school and join the workforce in factories or run errands for gangsters, committing thefts and other crimes.39 Children who were born in Japan or came as babies have in general a very poor command of Portuguese, and in such cases Japanese becomes their main language, since their parents are too busy working to spend much time with them.

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According to Nakamura, a Brazilian teacher of Brazilian children in Hamamatsu, there are already cases in which parents cannot communicate with their children. The importance of the Portuguese language was neglected in the early years of migration, but with the increase both in the number of Dekasegi living in Japan and their overall length of stay, an effort has been made (largely by individual initiatives) to assist children in the study of Portuguese. The 1994 publication of ‘Primeiros Passos na Lingua Portuguesa’ (First sSteps in Portuguese) by Shinoda was a move in this direction. The publication was sponsored by the Bank of Brazil, the newspaper International Press and other organisations. In Hamamatsu, where many Dekasegi reside, 40 children (6–11 years old) study Portuguese in two rooms prepared for that purpose every Sunday. Classes are taught by a retired Brazilian teacher who came to join her Dekasegi family. The course is free of charge and was organised by Masuko, who has been a Dekasegi for six years. The Committee of Tokyo Citizens, headed by the Brazilian ambassador, considered that one of the most urgent needs was the teaching of Portuguese. Accordingly, the Committee is planning to set up a Portuguese language course in Tokyo, and has already distributed videos and brochures on Brazil to Japanese teachers in Kanagawa Prefecture. The Brazilian Ministry of Education in 1998 created a committee to study the situation of Brazilian children in Japan (Jornal Tudo Bem, 24 October 1998: A6). However, such problems do not disappear when the children of the Dekasegi return to Brazil. Since many children have been raised in Japan and have an inadequate command of Portuguese, they are unable to follow lessons and are placed in a lower class than the one they attended in Japan. This is regarded as unacceptable by some parents, who consider that since their children studied in a First World country they should attend a more advanced class. Deviant behaviour The number of crimes involving Brazilians has been on the increase in recent years.40 In 1994, there were 587 reported cases, an increase of 17 per cent on the previous year (Noticias do Japão, 8–14 March 1996). The number of adolescents committing crimes is also on the increase, although the figure for arrests is uncertain. However, in 1997, in the Kurihama reform school in Kanagawa, there were ten Brazilian teenagers and in Nagoya two (International Press, 6 December 1997). In January 1996, about 30 Brazilians were awaiting trial and two years later, 27 cases were receiving support from the Brazilian Consulate.41 Crimes include shoplifting, car theft, robberies of pharmacies, pachinko parlours and job contractors, burglaries, sexual assaults and rapes, forgery of documents (driving licences, passports, etc.), violent acts, drug dealing, infringement of labour laws, and the daubing of graffiti in Portuguese. Car accidents involving Brazilians also occur very frequently. Teenagers are arrested over problems with their driving licences, and several cases of Brazilians driving without a valid licence have been reported. In areas where there are large concentrations of Dekasegi, gangs of young Brazilians have been formed, sometimes leading to street fights. In other cases

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conflicts are with young Japanese gangs, but there are also cases of gangs made up of both Japanese and Brazilian youngsters. Many of these crimes are committed by young people who are unemployed or who have dropped out school or by people who have overstayed their visa. Some crimes are committed just days before returning to Brazil. There was a case of a Brazilian father of three who robbed a post office of $40,000 in Niiharigun (Ibaraki Prefecture) in December 1995. He intended to return to Brazil after the robbery, but was apprehended by the police (Noticias do Japão, 8–14 March 1996). There are also cases of people who steal from shops because they are unemployed and in need. This seems to have been the case of a 25-year-old Brazilian man who was arrested for having stolen food to the value of US$2 (International Press, 4 April 1998). Maeda was the first Brazilian Dekasegi known to be convicted in Japan. He was accused of having murdered a Japanese neighbour in 1991. The explanation for the crime presented by the police and the media was that he could not communicate with anybody, owing to his poor command of Japanese. As a result he developed paranoid tendencies and became mentally unbalanced. According to a rumour, he was the scapegoat for the Yakuza (Japanese Mafia). The fact is that although he signed a confession in Japanese and was jailed as a result, there was no corroborating evidence to his confession. The Japanese legal authorities were evidently unprepared for such a case, involving the trial and prosecution of a foreigner. He was not allowed to receive assistance while in detention and it proved impossible to find a lawyer who could speak Portuguese; thus the first trials were conducted in Japanese and he was unable to defend himself. This case was much publicised through the Nikkei media and had a great impact on the Nikkei communities. However, the situation has improved since then. Brazilians who are accused of committing an offence can be assisted by interpreters, though Japanese police are far from prepared for dealing with foreign prisoners.42 On the other hand, according to a journalist from International Press who has been covering the judgements in cases involving Brazilian people in Shizuoka Prefecture, many problems are exacerbated by the defendants. Some do not want interpreters and so cannot follow the trial, and others behave in a disrespectful way during the trial. Drug offences have also been reported, some of which involve teenagers who could not adjust to Japanese schools and dropped out. Already in 1992, there were cases of accomplices in cocaine trafficking who intended to establish drug trafficking routes between Japan and Brazil, but were arrested in both countries. Those arrested in Brazil were related to Yakuza. Cases of Brazilian Dekasegi arrested as drug dealers have also been reported. In at least one case, the drugs had already been sent from Brazil (A Folha de São Paulo, 23 March 1994, International Press, 19 July 1997). Homicides have also been reported, some of them of a shocking nature. For the purpose of illustration some headlines in the press are quoted. ‘A 39-year-old Dekasegi was strangled in his house by a 26-year-old Sansei’ (A Folha de São Paulo, 23 May 1991. ‘Mother killed her five year old daughter’ (Noticias do Japão, 4–10 April

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1997); ‘Nikkeijin killed his wife and two daughters and then tried to kill himself with a knife in Inuyama (Aichi)’ (International Press, 25 May 1997); ‘A Brazilian Dekasegi was decapitated by a workmate, a 23-year-old Brazilian Dekasegi’ (International Press, 19 July 1997). Analysing, for example, the newspaper International Press (28 March 1998), the number of crimes reported stands out: ‘Judge condemns the robbers of a pachinko parlour’; ‘Three minors arrested in Hamamatsu’; ‘The police are pursuing the burglar: a Brazilian man is accused of a burglary (Toyota)’; ‘The police arrest seven Brazilians accused of robbing cars and car components (Okazaki and NishioAichi)’; ‘More burglaries in the area’; ‘Job contractor agencies get together to discuss problems of the community: walls with graffiti, cars and lifts on fire’; ‘A flat is burgled for the second time’; ‘The police in Toyota are distributing the identikit picture of a Brazilian accused of robbing a convenience store with a kitchen knife’. It is a fact that the number of crimes committed by Brazilians has increased and for this reason, in 1998, the Brazilian Consulate set up a programme to fight delinquency amongst the young Brazilians residing in Japan (Jornal Tudo Bem, 30 December 1998). However, it should be noted that the Brazilians tend to be worried about crime which is a serious problem with Brazil. The crime rates are very low in Japan compared to Brazil, but there exists a constant preoccupation with crime that results in a general self-restraint and the adoption of preventive measures amongst the Brazilians in Japan, who apparently have little trust in their own compatriots.43 Cases of suicide have also occurred with some frequency. In 1989 a Brazilian Dekasegi committed suicide because he could not return to Brazil (A Folha de São Paulo, 16 May 1989). In 1996, a 23-year-old Dekasegi killed three people and then committed suicide (Jornal Paulista, 24 December 1996). A 19-year-old Dekasegi who lived with his father and brother, apparently unsatisfied with his job, took his own life (Noticias do Japão, 13–19 December 1996). The sex trade, traditionally dominated by Korean and Philippine women has now been augmented by Brazilian women. In 1994, some 30 per cent of the advertisements in pornographic magazines were contributed by Brazilians. Interviews with women who had been working as ‘entertainers’ revealed that many of them were Dekasegi who became unemployed. Others are non-Nikkeijin who married Nikkeijin in order to get a working visa. Usually, they begin as dancers and end up as hostesses (A Folha de São Paulo, 3 April 1994). The number of Brazilian homosexuals working in the Japanese sex trade has also increased (Noticias do Japão, 14–20 March 1997).

Coming ‘home’ The costs of migration and its impact on the Nikkei communities Migration is a disruptive process at both the individual and family level. Because of this, migrants are often vulnerable to psychological disturbances and families are

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particularly prone to divorces as well as disruptions in the education of children. During the migration process people change in their adaptation to new circumstances, and it is not uncommon that divorces occur after a return to the country of origin. Perhaps for women such changes are more radical, whether they migrate or stay in Brazil. For many who get used to independence and having their own money it is difficult to resume their previous role. For children the situation is no easier, particularly for those who are left behind with relatives or neighbours. The long absence of parents in Japan makes children feel alienated, and teachers report problems at school.44 For the older Issei, the situation is also problematic. They resent getting older without the company of their children. Some think that they are being punished for what they did to their own parents when they left Japan to migrate to Brazil. On the other hand, it is also the case that many Dekasegi report feelings of closeness to their parents and grandparents who had also been Dekasegi in the past. The researcher met Sansei who wanted to learn Japanese after returning to Brazil in order to be able to communicate with their grandparents, who had also been Dekasegi.45 Dekasegi remittances are also of huge importance to both the Nikkei communities and Brazil. Their investments in Brazil represent a significant contribution to the Brazilian economy and have led to a boom in the real estate market in São Paulo, Assai, Urai, Suzano, Mogi das Cruzes and other places. Their importance as investors has been acknowledged by the Brazilian government which in 1994 planned to offer special treatment to Dekasegi (A Folha de São Paulo, 28 August 1994). The Bank Banespa created an information service for the Dekasegi (Disque Dekasegi, Dial Dekasegi), and Banco do Brazil instituted a similar service (Brazil Desk) offering investment advice. They have also been offered assistance in setting up their own businesses. SEBRAE (Serviço de Apoio às Micro e Pequenas Empresas, Service to Assist Small and Medium Enterprises) established a branch in Tokyo in 1993 in order to provide information to the Dekasegi who want to invest in Brazil, and other initiatives have been undertaken in order to support (and encourage) them. It should be noted that with the Japanese economic recession the flow of remittances has decreased, and many of the companies created in Brazil aimed at Dekasegi customers have closed. The ‘return syndrome’ ‘And when I returned, Brazil had changed. Even the currency had changed’ (Kikushi 1997). Returning home is not as simple as it sounds, and, on arrival in Brazil, many Dekasegi undergo a psychological crisis. The person who left is often not the same as the one who returns. Many personality transformations occur during the process of migration, and each individual responds differently to the experience. Since 1986, the number of Dekasegi in need of psychiatric assistance has been increasing. Apparently, the serious cases involve hallucinations and a common trait is paranoia. This syndrome has been wrongly diagnosed as schizophrenia, according to the psychiatrist Nakagawa, who has been involved in treating these patients. It originates in Japan, but emerges either on arrival in Brazil or about

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three months later. It is characterised by symptoms such as anxiety, lack of concentration, self-destructive tendencies and a wish to return to Japan. Apparently work conditions in Japan are an important factor in triggering the psychiatric crisis. The number of cases increased between 1986 (2 cases) and 1994 (48 cases). Some of these patients re-emigrate to Japan in spite of medical warnings. These patients reported a constant fear of being robbed in Brazil. Although this fear may be exaggerated by paranoid tendencies, the fact is that the Dekasegi have been a target for criminals. It should be noted that there are often gangs waiting for the Dekasegi at São Paulo airport, and many are robbed on their arrival. Others are robbed shortly after their return. Success stories When the first group of Dekasegi left Brazil there was clear opposition to their migration in the Nikkei communities, particularly on the part of the Issei, who interpreted migration to Japan as evidence of their failure in Brazil. However, when the Dekasegi returned from Japan with money and stories of success, public opinion quickly changed. Yet for the Issei migration to Japan is still identified as a sign of their failure in Brazil. According to interviews with Issei who had migrated to Brazil in the post-war period and worked in Japan as Dekasegi in the 1990s, migration to Japan was experienced as humiliating in both countries.46 Those Dekasegi who succeeded economically have certain features in common. They came to Japan during the economic boom, worked on assembly lines for some years, saved as much as they could and invested their savings well in Japan or Brazil. A few examples will suffice. Nakamatsu, a 31-year-old Nisei, migrated to Japan in 1986 and worked for three and a half years in a factory for 14 hours per day, including weekends, until he saved enough to start a business. Today he is the owner of the Ipanema Corporation and has been economically successful. He was one of the first Dekasegi to see the consumer potential of the Brazilians and other Latin-Americans already in Japan. He began to sell the canned beans essential to cooking a typical Brazilian dish, then organised entertainment activities which would interest the Dekasegi, such as tours, balls, karaoke in Portuguese, a Brazilian restaurant and finally a job recruitment agency. Another very successful case is Muranaga. He migrated with his parents to the Amazon region at the age of 17, just after the war. He began as a farmer, but started many ventures in Brazil, and when the Dekasegi movement increased he came to Japan and realised that his fellow workers were a potentially large market. He created a media empire which included International Press (published in Japan), Noticias do Japão (in Brazil), IPC Shupan and IPC TV (in Japan) and Euro-Brasil (in Europe). A similar case is Shoji. He emigrated to Brazil at the age of 18 and came to Japan with the Dekasegi. He also created a media empire: he owns JBC books, JBC Communication, JTB Publicidade (a publicity company), in addition to the newspaper Jornal Tudo Bem and the magazine Made in Japan. Both of them have kept their Japanese nationality.

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Other Dekasegi invested their savings in Brazil. Minei worked in Japan for five years, and on his return opened a drugstore and bought two houses. A couple by the name Midori and Merlin aged 30 and 32 respectively, saved US$60,000 in Japan over two and a half years between 1992 and 1994 in Shiga Prefecture. When they returned to Brazil they bought an apartment, some land and a video shop. However, cases of failure are also abundant. Some went to Japan already burdened with debt, and could not save enough money to make their stay in Japan profitable; others had accidents and as a result of not receiving the proper compensation, returned owing more than when they left; while others, owing to bad investments or high levels of consumption, lost all their savings. Re-emigration to Japan The Dekasegi often state that in Japan one can earn money, but the best place to live is in Brazil. Many of them do however re-emigrate to Japan. Poor investments of savings, the success of the previous migration, ambition to earn more money, dependence on a certain income, consumerism and the consequent attraction of the material prosperity of Japan, high crime rates in Brazil and nostalgic feelings for the security that Japan provides, and finally difficulties in readjusting to their country of origin are some of the diverse reasons given for this decision. As Gardner (1995: 63) remarks, migration is often a gamble: ‘Like a game of roulette, the possibility of huge gains tempts households again and again to try their luck’. The decision to re-emigrate in the ‘migration chain’ linking Japan to Brazil is extremely significant. Much has changed since the early years of migration, and, because of the existence of networks, the process of migration (and re-emigration) to Japan has become self-sustaining. Finally, we have to consider the transformations resulting from the experience of migration. It has been suggested that in Brazil the Dekasegi undergo a reverse cultural shock, but what has been interpreted as a cultural shock may be just awareness of inner changes and changes from what they left behind. Furthermore, the relationship with both their country of origin and the host country has evolved. Japan is no longer seen as an alien country and Brazil too is perceived differently. For many, it is not clear where ‘home’ is any more. The meaning of Japan and the meaning of Brazil have been renegotiated through the process of migration.

Prospects for settlement Since 1990, the Brazilians have accounted for the largest proportion of the foreign labour supply to Japan, although the economic recession led to a fall in the number of migrants from Brazil by the first half of 1992, compared with the same period over the previous year. This contrasts with the increasing number of those who reemigrate to Japan, a trend which has raised the question of their possible settlement in Japan. In order to discuss the future of the Dekasegi in Japan, we have to consider the

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process of immigration itself. Initially, immigrants in general tend to regard themselves as guest workers, and their commitments are to the countries of origin. As time goes on they usually realise that it is not possible to become as wealthy as they had first thought or in so short a space of time. Often it is at this stage that family reunion occurs. Cultural links to the home country are maintained while a better adjustment to the host society is sought. It is also at this stage that the immigrants tend to get more involved in the society of adoption. They set up shops where they can buy products from the home country, schools for their children, ethnic associations and the like. The final stage is that of permanent settlement, which, depending on the migration policies and the social response of the receiving country, leads either to integration and eventual citizenship or socioeconomic marginalisation. Based on these considerations, it seems reasonable to say that some Dekasegi have progressed to the middle stage in the migration process. As to their intentions of returning, results of surveys on this issue have been inconclusive, as mentioned earlier. Different findings are reported over the question of intentions, not only because of different methodological approaches, but also because migration is a dynamic and constantly evolving process. According to some researchers it is likely that the Dekasegi will settle down in Japan, or at least continue to re-emigrate (e.g. Kajita 1994, Komai 1995). Their conclusions are essentially based on the following arguments. First, huge economic disparities between Brazil and Japan will tend to induce a reluctance to return to their country of origin. Those who re-emigrate, in particular, are more aware of the differences between the two countries. Second, their communities and other social networks in Japan fulfil most of their needs. Third, modern communications shorten the perceived distance between their country of origin and Japan. In addition to this, children who were born or grew up in Japan may sense an attachment to that country; parents, too, may think that Japan offers better opportunities for their children. Against all these incentives, the main obstacle is likely to be the difficulties associated with the education of their children. Researchers have based their prediction of the likelihood of permanent settlement on the part of Dekasegi on conventional indicators, such as the fall in remittances, consumption habits, establishment of networks and family reunification. I shall now examine these indicators. One of the most significant is the fall in the flow of remittances since 1994.47 It is generally assumed that the flow of remittances is suggestive of migrants’ attachment to their mother country, hence the greater the degree of settlement, the lower the tendency to send remittances home. While this may be true, other factors may account for the change in remittance flows, namely the yen devaluation in 1996 and the consequent rise in the price of Brazilian products; the economic situation in Brazil; fluctuations in earnings due to the decrease in overtime and lower wages; the creation of new families and/or family reunification, which implies both increased expenses and a lessening of the perceived urgency to send money to Brazil. Finally, the rise in consumer taxation in Japan should also be mentioned. Another predictive indicator is the rise of consumption levels, which are closely related to remittance flows. South American workers residing in Japan were found

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to demonstrate patterns of conspicuous consumption which does not fit the conventional image of the frugal migrant. It is true that some Dekasegi buy cars and houses in Japan. However, according to interviews conducted by International Press (6 December 1997), such acquisitions were not explicitly motivated by intentions to settle, although the interviewees mentioned that having children growing up in Japan was an important factor in determining purchases. The fact that rents in Japan are very high, almost equal to mortgages, was emphasised as the main reason for buying a house. As for social networks, it is a fact that the Dekasegi have established communities over a very short period of time. They have their own media, restaurants and shops where they can buy food and Brazilian products, and associations that provide services, from sending remittances to sending flowers to Brazil. All this undoubtedly facilitates their lives in Japan and may attract other Dekasegi as well. In addition, one may assume that employers, over time, will tend to become more reluctant to dismiss them, and that therefore their work situation may become more stable, though this is by no means true of all Dekasegi. It is perhaps also safe to assume that the economic and social situation in Brazil will not improve much in the near future. The possibility of ‘circulating’ between Brazil and Japan should also be considered a likely phenomenon. Interviews conducted in São Paulo with Dekasegi who had returned to Brazil revealed that the social and economic situation in Brazil makes them hesitant to remain for good, but prepared rather to re-emigrate.48 Migration cannot be reduced to a simple cost–benefit analysis, and does not always involve a conscious decision. It needs to be analysed as a social process with its own dynamics, involving the migrant as well as the sending and receiving societies. From this it follows that the likelihood of settlement may depend more on the treatment received from the Japanese government and Japanese society generally than on individual wishes. The Nikkeijin were initially welcomed by the Japanese government and apparently they continue to be well received. Family unification has not been discouraged, and it is well known that this induces permanent settlement. Moreover, the Japanese government could, if it so decided, control entry and tighten visa procedures to make their entry more difficult. So far it has not yet implemented any such measures, though some sources report that controls have become stricter. Furthermore, as noted earlier, they receive institutional support and efforts continue to be made to promote their employment and integration within the localities that contain a large concentration of Dekasegi.49 It should also be noted that under the Nationality Law, the Nikkeijin can, if they wish, become Japanese citizens. According to the Japanese Naturalisation Law, the requirement for naturalisation for a child of Japanese descent is continuous residence in Japan for three years.50 Policy makers appear to have assumed that migrants of Japanese descent would relieve the demand for labour whilst their ‘Japaneseness’ would facilitate their adjustment to, and acceptance by, Japanese society. Nevertheless, the fact that the Nikkeijin are welcomed by the Japanese authorities does not guarantee their acceptance by Japanese people in general.

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To consider this question we have first of all to look at the labour market, since migrants are everywhere unwelcome when social and economic conditions are difficult. However, although the recession in Japan continues to be serious and the unemployment rate has increased, this has not significantly threatened the position of the Dekasegi. This is attested by the number of job offers addressed to them, and may be attributed to their willingness to perform jobs that nationals do not want. Moreover, as already discussed, Japan’s economically active population is expected to decline in the next decade. Also important are the social costs and benefits resulting from the presence of the Dekasegi in Japan. Although there is no agreement on this issue, it is argued that, in addition to their importance as labourers, the Dekasegi make a contribution to the Japanese economy by paying taxes to central, prefectural and local governments. However, it should be noted at the same time, that many Dekasegi do not pay taxes. Dekasegi also contribute more to social services and take out less than the average for the population as a whole because of their relatively young age.51 Moreover, they are valued as consumers and their presence has also promoted business, not all of it in the hands of the Dekasegi themselves. However, one incident illustrates the fact that, despite their common ancestry, a favourable attitude towards the Nikkeijin by the Japanese should not be taken for granted. In the cities of Hamamatsu and Hamako (Shizuoka Prefecture), where there are large concentrations of Nikkeijin, a pamphlet campaign against them was reported (Watari 1996: 158). In 1995, posters in the streets read ‘Brazilians get out’. Comments by the mayor of Hamamatsu city (Shizuoka Prefecture), Juichiro Yanagawa, encouraging foreign workers to return to their home countries also suggest that not everything is going smoothly for the Nikkeijin.52 This chapter has examined the circumstances in which the Nikkeijin have been migrating to and settling in Japan. In furtherance of this, the Japanese labour market, immigration law and attitudes towards foreigners have been discussed. From this analysis we may conclude that the Japanese labour market is still in need of unskilled labour, but the introduction of foreign workers as a means of solving this problem has been controversial, and studies of public opinion remain inconclusive. The amendment to the immigration law that allows people of Japanese descent to work in Japan can be interpreted as an attempt to meet this situation. An overview of the 10-year period of immigration in Japan suggests that the Dekasegi population has been changing, as have the conditions in which they migrate and the manner of their social and ethnic organisation once settled. Whilst in the beginning, the influence of brokers was a dominant factor, now, after 10 years, their communities and networks are largely self-sufficient and under their own control. It may also be inferred that at least some Dekasegi will settle in Japan. Regarding the prospects for their settlement, it has been argued that much depends on the Japanese labour market, and on the treatment they receive from the Japanese government and Japanese society. To consider this question and to analyse Nikkeijin self-identifications in Japan, we have first to look at how they have been perceived within that society. This will be the topic of the next chapter.

5

The making of the Nikkei minority

As the previous chapter has surmised, whilst some Nikkeijin will eventually return to Brazil, others will not do so and still others may delay the decision. For children who were born or raised in Japan and for those who married nationals, Japan is felt to be their own country.1 As we have seen, it is therefore likely that many will settle in Japan, although precise numbers cannot be predicted at this stage. However, a decision to reside in Japan does not necessarily imply full integration into Japanese society. This at any rate seems to be the opinion of researchers and commentators who foresee the possibility that the Nikkeijin may well go through the same experience as other minority populations in Japan (e.g. Kajita 1994, Komai 1995, Yamanaka 1993). In other words, they may be compelled to assimilate behaviourally to Japanese cultural norms, without actually being accepted into the mainstream of society. In this event, the Nikkeijin would be confined to a marginal position as a source of available labour subject to industrial needs. They would thus suffer the fate common to many migrants in the world who are accepted merely as second-class citizens. That these concerns have some foundation will become evident in the following pages. However, the making of a minority is a collusive process depending on the active participation of both the majority and the minority concerned. In this chapter the implications of potential Nikkeijin settlement within Japanese society and the possibility of their becoming a new minority within it are discussed. Because ethnic boundaries are invariably negotiated bilaterally, the main argument advanced here is that the Nikkeijin experience in Japan is the result of encounters with the local population, and depends as much on themselves as on how they are perceived and treated by society at large. Since the Nikkeijin issue is closely related to the concept of ‘Japaneseness’, the chapter opens with an analysis of the construction of Japanese identity and the dominant contemporary discourse. This is followed by an analysis of the kinds of issues that determine what it is to be a Japanese and an examination of the ways in which the Nikkeijin have been perceived in Japan and represented by officials, researchers and media. The possibility of discrimination in Japan is then discussed, and a town with a large concentration of Nikkeijin is examined. In the second half of the chapter the making of a Nikkei minority will be discussed in the light of data collected during fieldwork. This is seen to be a process of constructing differences between the majority and minority.

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Japanese identity The role of ‘blood’ in the construction of Japanese identity Immigration laws define nationality, and current immigration and naturalisation laws discriminate in favour of people of Japanese descent. The preferential treatment enjoyed by the Nikkeijin has generated controversy, especially in relation to that accorded to other Asian immigrant groups, and the Japanese government is blamed for giving preference to ‘blood’. This argument is so obvious as to make comment unnecessary; however, it should be noted that the government position is consistent with a tradition of valuing ‘blood’. National identity is artificially created and, in the Japanese case, is grounded in the idealisation of consanguineous relationships. Given this, it is necessary to examine the political construction of ethnic identity in Japan and the role played by ‘blood’. The importance of kinship in the construction of national identity is grounded on the birth myth of Japan, which explains the origin of the nation and the people as the product of a relationship between sister and brother (Izanami and Izanagi). From this incestuous relationship was born Amaterasu, the sun goddess, from whom the Imperial House is said to descend (Hingwan 1996: 60, Yoshida 1992: 53–8). Furthermore, the construction of the state in Japan was based on the idea of the nation as a family. Japan was unified between 1534 and 1582, and the Tokugawa government (1600–1867) consolidated the unification, and made attempts to create an ‘ethnic state’ (Yoshino 1992: 83–5, 90–1). In the Meiji era (1868–1912), ideological efforts were made to create and promote a ‘sense of nation’, and the state came to be represented as a kazoku kokka (family state, Gluck 1985). The word kokka, which means both nation and state, consists of two characters meaning ‘family’ and ‘country’ and, as Yoshino (1992: 235) remarks, this illustrates the historical process in which the state came to be identified with the nation. By the 1930s, the view of the nation as a family sharing racial and cultural characteristics had become the dominant ideology. In 1937, the Ministry of Education published Kokutai no Hongi (The Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Japan) stating that ‘Our country is one great family nation, and the Imperial Household is the head family of the subjects, and nucleus of national life’.2 Many changes occurred after World War II, but the idea of Japanese identity as coterminous with common ancestry was consistent with the image of Japan as a homogeneous country. According to Dale (1988a: 92), ‘uniform country’ and ‘homogeneous society’ are post-war euphemisms for racial purity. There is a tradition in Japanese scholarship which claims that the Japanese are of unmixed ‘blood’. This idea was widely disseminated during the Meiji Restoration when there was a conscious effort to preserve Japanese ‘purity’. The ideology of ‘blood’ purity in contemporary Japan has not diminished in discursive power, perhaps because it is endorsed by prominent Japanese scholars. An example of this is the anthropologist Ishida (1974), who claims that endogamy has been favourable to Japan. The significance of the ‘homogeneity of blood’ (ketsueki no döitsusei) in modern

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Japan has been well documented by Hayashida (1976). Pure blood ideologies are still employed to distinguish people in Japan, and blood lineage inquiries are conducted before marriage by private detective agencies (koshinjö and tanteisha).3 From the above one may conclude that Japanese national identity was drawn from the idea that Japan was a community sharing a common ancestry, and that Nihonjin no chi (Japanese blood) retains a strong social meaning for the Japanese. According to Yoshino (1992: 25–6), ‘Japanese blood’ is, first and foremost, a case of the social construction of difference; it is a boundary marker used to separate the Japanese from the non-Japanese. Before we move on to analyse who is and what it means to be a Nihonjin (Japanese), it is necessary to speak briefly of what has been the dominant ethnic discourse in Japan since the 1950s. Nihonjinron and the importance of being Japanese Seven hundred titles on Japanese culture or on the Japanese were published between 1946 and 1978 (58 per cent of them after 1970, Mouer and Sugimoto 1986). This genre of literature is called nihonjinron, literally ‘discussions on the Japanese’. It is an attempt to define the specificity of Japanese identity. Three themes stand out, according to Dale (1988a): the Japanese are culturally and socially homogeneous; they are sui generis different, not only from Westerners, but also from Asians; they are consciously nationalistic; and they cannot be fully comprehended by non-Japanese because they are unique. This nihonjinron discourse is based on a set of self-reflexive racial, linguistic, sociological, philosophical and psychological ideas which are assumed to be self-evident. Japan’s identity is conceived of as the collective essence of a nation of homogeneous people with little experience in dealing with foreigners and which, owing to a long period of seclusion, developed a unique social culture.4 It follows from this discourse that it is necessary to be born Japanese in order to understand the Japanese (Yoshino 1992: 115). Both because of the ‘special’ nature of the Japanese language and because communication is said to be contextual and unique, only a Japanese can have an empathetic understanding of and for a fellow national. This is in turn possible only because they share a common racial background.5 Nihonjinron presents Japan as a community of people who ‘embody a heritage of certain innate emotional and psychological traits which exist together with acquired characteristics imposed by geography and the cultural environment. That combination is further moulded by outside stimuli to create what we can identify as the national character’ (Ishihara 1976: 76). In the same vein, Yamamoto Shichihei, a major nihonjinron theorist, claims that ‘Japanese society functions on the basis of a quasi-blood community’ (quoted in Wolferen 1990: 266). Intertwined with the belief in Japan as an extended family is the image of Japanese society as a harmonious entity, an image intended for both domestic and international consumption. A form of nihonjinron existed already in Meiji period,6 but the ideas referred to above gained in importance with Japanese economic growth, and it is perhaps no

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coincidence that Japan’s unique social culture is associated with Japan’s economic success, a source of national pride. As Hall points out, we need to look at the functions of ethnicity in the dominant discourse and in this regard, it is interesting to note that businessmen are important diffusers and recipients of nihonjinron.7 By stressing the uniqueness of the Japanese, nihonjinron raises the consciousness of being Japanese and thereby cultivates ethnic feelings. Given this, it has been interpreted as a way of recovering from the cultural identity crisis generated by the war and the threats to that identity posed since then by westernisation and rapid social change (e.g. Befu 1992). Nihonjinron has also been seen as an ideology that promotes the interests of the ruling elites (e.g. Mouer and Sugimoto 1983: 267–97). While this is probably true, nihonjinron has undoubtedly become a ‘cultural orthodoxy’ and academics in Japan (and elsewhere) draw uncritically on nihonjinron discourse, and the average citizen takes nihonjinron ideas for granted. This is well illustrated by the fact that the majority of the participants in Yoshino’s (1992: 130) survey on nihonjinron expressed ‘Japanese identity in terms of well-formulated theories even though they were not professional thinkers’. Indeed, nihonjinron ideas are frequently offered to foreigners in Japan by the average citizen as explanations of Japanese society. This was also remarked on by Goodman (1987), and was observed on many occasions by the author during her stay in Japan. The nihonjinron discourse can, of course, be dismissed insofar as it is grounded upon serious theoretical and methodological errors; however, the question of whether this discourse is true or false is less important than whether it is effective in practice. The fact is that ‘these imagines mundi and their parochial logic (Dale 1988b: 53) condition the way in which many Japanese people perceive themselves. Particularly important for this study is that nihonjinron promotes the idea of Japan’s social and racial homogeneity. ‘Japaneseness’ Having dealt with the dominant discourse, I shall now examine the kind of criteria used to define a Nihonjin (Japanese) and what this status means to those eligible to claim it. As Changsoo and De Vos (1981: 209) remark, ‘Even in scholarly writing . . . the term ‘Japanese’ is almost invariably used to connote a mythical race of people, rather than to denote people who in reality are bona fide members of Japanese society . . .’. In the same vein, Hayashida (1976: 18) argues that racial considerations continue to play a major role in shaping the modern definition and identity of the Japanese people. A kika shita hito (naturalised person) can never therefore be said to be a Nihonjin. The anthropologist Ishida (1979: 22) claims that ‘Japanese people are those whose mother tongue is Japanese, who grew up within its context and who assimilated the Japanese culture through the medium of the Japanese language’. Hoshino (1982, cited in Goodman 1987: 106) elaborates these ideas, and sets up 16 possible variables of ‘Japaneseness’ which are based on self-definition, definitions of other Japanese, racial background and upbringing. Some empirical work has been done on Japanese ideas of ‘Japaneseness’. A

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research survey conducted by Hayashida revealed that 48.5 per cent of the 313 questioned thought that national character (Nihonteki kokuminsei) was the most important condition of ‘Japaneseness’, followed by blood relations (Nihonjin no chi no tsunagari) and citizenship. As for the least important condition, 43.7 per cent of the participants chose ‘birth in Japan’ and 28.7 per cent ‘language fluency’. The importance of ‘blood’ was therefore substantiated in this survey.8 According to Yoshino’s findings, the majority of the interviewees used the phrase Nihonjin no chi (Japanese blood) to refer to what they considered to be the most immutable aspect of Japanese identity, and tended to express Japanese uniqueness in terms of ‘underlying culture’, namely, ‘linguistic and communicative culture’ and ‘social culture’. They also tended to perceive race and culture as significant indices of national identity, and to claim that ‘the social and racial homogeneity’ of the Japanese was an important aspect of Japanese identity.9 A survey was conducted by Manabe et al. to investigate criteria taken from nihonjinron discourse on what it means to be Japanese.10 Participants were asked to choose the degree to which they believed each criterion was thought to be a necessary component of full identity. Half of the participants thought that ‘blood’ was important and the number of respondents who agreed with the statement that ‘Those who have Japanese blood can understand each other’ outnumbered those who disagreed. The influence of shared ‘blood’ in social, cultural and linguistic competencies was corroborated in this study. A similar survey was conducted by the author, exploring what is perceived to be respectively the most and the least important criterion for being Japanese.11 As in Hayashida’s survey, findings revealed that ‘national character’ was considered the most important defining condition for 32.8 per cent of participants. This was in turn followed by the criterion of ‘blood’. Some 42 per cent of the participants thought that physical characteristics, such as black hair and yellow skin, were the least important criteria. This is significant since the Japanese are phenotypically similar to other Asians. Findings are shown in Table 5.1. These findings do not cast doubt on the importance of what are seen as exclusive characteristics of the Japanese as a perceived measure of identity. ‘National character’ and ‘Japanese blood’ were chosen by 50 per cent of the respondents, although admittedly, further research is needed to clarify these results. Table 5.1 Criteria for being ‘a Japanese’ (%) Criterion ‘National character’ ‘Blood relations’ Citizenship Japanese physical appearance Command of Japanese language Birth in Japan Other Total

Most important

Least important

32.8 17.2 9.6 2.5 11.9 15.9 10.1

07.1 09.1 14.1 42.2 42.2 20.0 2.0

100.0

100.0

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‘Blood’, Japanese culture and language So far I have attempted to sketch out the basic ideas which underpin the concept of ‘Japaneseness’. It might well be concluded that the possession or not of Japanese ‘blood’, Nihongo (the Japanese language)12 and culture are at the heart of what it means to be Japanese. It is necessary, therefore, to analyse the importance attributed to these factors as measures of Nihonjin identity. ‘Blood’ As already discussed, Japanese descent is an important consideration in defining Nihonjin identity. Hence, while the second and third generation of Korean residents in Japan are culturally Japanese and their mother tongue is Japanese, the fact remains that they are not regarded as Nihonjin.13 This applies even to those who are naturalised. Also not considered entirely Japanese are children of mixed marriages: because of their mixed blood they are assumed to be incapable of being fully assimilated.14 This explains why Yoshino’s participants foresaw no difficulties for Japanese–Americans in integrating culturally in Japan, because, though born and brought up in the United States, they had ‘Japanese blood’. The phrase ‘Japanese blood’ is used in popular speech to refer to the one quality seen as immutable by the Japanese. One will always be Japanese by virtue of ‘blood’ (Yoshino 1992: 118, Dikötter 1997: 211). For Changsoo and De Vos, ‘whether one is Japanese is almost invariably a matter of blood in the genetic sense, and rarely a matter of culture and nationality’. They illustrate this claim by quoting an article in a magazine about an American of Japanese ancestry: ‘She was born in Japan but raised in Hawaii. Her nationality is American but no foreign blood flows in her veins’ (Terebi Zaido, 3 December 1976, quoted in Changsoo and De Vos 1981: 296). Before moving on to an analysis of the importance of Japanese culture, it should be stressed that the ideas of culture, ethnicity and ‘race’ have been, in historical terms, discursively related. It should also be noted that this association between ‘blood’ or ‘race’ and culture is by no means unique to Japan.15 Culture Japanese culture, like Japanese ‘blood’, is considered to be the exclusive property of the Japanese.16 On this point, the dominant perception of Japanese expatriate employees and their families once they return to Japan deserves special mention. As a result of having lived outside Japan, the returnees are considered as ‘incomplete’ Nihonjin. They are henna Nihonjin (strange Japanese), han Japa (half-Japanese) or chütohanpa no Nihonjin (half-baked Japanese, Goodman 1990). Allegedly, they face ‘cultural’ problems on their return, and are teased and bullied. They are seen as having lost their ‘Japaneseness’. For White (1988: 2), they have been away too long to be trusted. They need to be ‘re-Japanised’. Inui and Sono (1977, cited in Goodman 1990: 218) use the terms ‘nihonka’ (Japanising) and ‘somenaoshi’ (redyeing)

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for this process, while Befu (1983: 247) uses the suggestive term ‘gaikoku hagashi’ (peeling off foreignness). Several studies of their alleged non-adaptation have been conducted, and the results seem merely to reflect the researchers’ assumptions. As Goodman (1990) clearly demonstrated, the Kikokushijo are an example of a socially constructed problem. By exaggerating the problem of returnees out of all proportion, the uniqueness of Japanese culture and society is reiterated. ‘National culture functions as a source of cultural meanings, a focus of identification, and a system of representation’ (Hall 1992: 296). Furthermore, it is a way of unifying differences and internal divisions. It is not surprising, therefore, that national culture is highly valued everywhere. However, in the Japanese case, culture has played an overwhelming role. The phrase Nihon bunka (Japanese culture) began to be popularised during the 1920s and, with the rise of nationalism, the interest in Japanese culture developed. The expression bunka kokka (cultural nation-state) was popularised in the 1950s by Minister Yoshida Shigeru to characterise post-war Japan and, particularly after the acceleration in economic development, Japanese culture came to occupy an important position in national life.17 Furthermore, the promotion of Japanese culture coincides with the recent ‘internationalisation’ of Japan. This is reflected in the Ministry of Education guidelines in 1989, which stress the need to prepare students for the ‘age of internationalisation’ and strongly emphasise the need to cultivate national identity (Yoshino 1992). These aims may not be as paradoxical as they seem at first. ‘Internationalisation’ is not opposed to ‘Japanese culture’. As Robertson (1997: 114, 118) suggests, both are a product of, and central to the ongoing formation of, Japanese cultural identity. According to some researchers ‘internationalisation’ is a deliberate political manipulation of Japan’s cultural barriers in order to promote Japanese interests.18 ‘Japanese culture’ has been invoked to serve present needs, and research has shown that what is referred to as Japanese culture is in fact the result of political and economic processes; thus Goldstein-Gidori (1997) demonstrates how the invention and production of Japanese tradition in weddings has been used for the purpose of promoting consumer demand. Also suggestive of the importance ascribed to Japanese culture is the widespread conviction among the Japanese that foreigners are unable to understand or absorb Japanese culture. Culture has thus the capacity to both include and exclude. This is also illustrated by the leading proponent of a restrictive policy regarding the admission of foreign workers, Nishio Kanji, who argues that, in the long run, the problem of foreign labour has to be dealt with as ‘a defense of culture’ (Herbert 1996: 214–15). Nihongo The essence of ‘Japaneseness’ is seen as closely related to native possession of the Japanese language. Suzuki Takao claims that ‘to be a Japanese, at the same time that it means being a member of the Japanese race, also means speaking the Japanese language’ (quoted in Miller 1982: 144). In the same spirit, Watanabe Shöichi (1974, quoted in Yoshino 1992: 29) observes that the Japanese language

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(yamato kotoba) is ‘as old as our blood’ and Hayashi and Kuroda (1997: 17) propose a theory ‘that Japanese language embodies the basic characteristics of Japanese culture’. According to Miller (1982: 144), ‘the fallacious identification of language with race and race with language’ survived from the Kokutai no Hongi and ‘is still quite as alive and well as it ever was’. For him, the myth of Nihongo has an existentially defensive function: ‘the Japanese language has gradually been elevated to the position of one of the major ideological forces sustaining Japanese society; at the same time it helps that society to close its ranks against all possible intrusions by outsiders. Miller demonstrates this idea by analysing what kind of Japanese is recommended by government authorities as appropriate to teach to foreigners.19 Somewhat paradoxically, there exists research in Japan which seems to corroborate this idea, showing that the more proficient a foreigner is at Japanese, the less adjusted and the more marginalised he or she becomes (Tanaka et al. 1994). Though there might be other causes for this (if true), what is perhaps more significant for the credibility of such research is that it is widely believed in Japan that foreigners cannot properly learn the language, and that if they succeed (however imperfectly), life in Japan becomes difficult for them since they are no longer treated like guests. It has also often been observed that no matter how long foreigners reside in Japan, how well they speak the language, and how much they know about Japanese culture, they are always perceived as ‘outsiders’. Finally, it is important to note that Kikokushijo are said to experience problems with the Japanese language on their return to Japan (Goodman 1990). An insufficient command of the Japanese language and a lack of understanding of the ‘special’ nature of Japanese society supposedly make life difficult for Japanese who have lived abroad. For foreigners the situation is therefore assumed to be still more difficult. However, there exist different categories of foreigners: the Zainichi Gaikokujin (Chinese and Korean residents), the Rainichi Gaikokujin (those who come to Japan), the Gaijin (a white westerner, usually a European or North American foreigner), the Ashianjin (Asians) and the Nikkeijin. A social survey was conducted by the author in order to examine Japanese perceptions of which groups of foreigners would find it easiest to live in Japan. Findings show that Asians are not seen as able to adapt easily to Japan, and reveal a split of opinion as to which group of foreigners would be easier to get on with: 31.8 per cent of the respondents chose Korean and Chinese residents; whilst 29.4 per cent chose the Nikkeijin. As for the conditions required for accepting foreign workers, ‘being Nikkeijin’ was chosen only by 6.2 per cent of the respondents. This percentage is about the same for Asian people (6.7 per cent) and less than for Öbeijin (European and North American foreigners) (9.4 per cent). Regarding more specific criteria for accepting foreign workers, the largest majority of respondents chose ‘an understanding of Japanese language and culture’ and ‘having legal eligibility for residency’. Thus knowledge of language and culture were chosen by 44 per cent of the respondents as the most important conditions to work in Japan, followed by the principle of legal eligibility for residency. Japanese descent does not seem to be an important

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condition for working in Japan; however, the Nikkeijin, together with the Zainichi, are seen by the majority (60 per cent) of the respondents as having the greatest potential to adapt to Japan.20 This survey shows tolerance on the part of the Japanese population, and appears to contradict the views of Miller, and other authors from the 1970s, about the close-mindedness of the Japanese. Keeping in mind the limitations of the social survey (e.g. the size of the sample), what is perhaps most significant is that findings are in accordance with the importance ascribed to ‘national character’ and ‘Japanese blood’. As we have seen, culture and race have been discursively related in the historical construction of Japanese identity. The concepts of ‘blood’, Japanese culture and Japanese language have become inextricably linked entities, and have been used to determine who is (and can be) a Japanese. The Nikkeijin as a category dismantle this concept, sharing the ‘blood’, but not the commonalities of Japanese culture and mother-tongue. What is then at issue is how Japanese people come to terms with the great importance attached to Japanese ‘blood’ on the one hand, and the belief, on the other, that people raised in another culture are different from those raised in Japan. What people perceive and use for making distinctions depends more on what is socially defined as important than on what stands out. In the absence of clear phenotypical differences, other characteristics or criteria (e.g. cultural) can be made to play the same role in distinguishing a group (Miles 1982: 64). The Koreans provide a good example of this. They are culturally Japanese, physically indistinguishable and yet, even though most have been born and educated entirely in Japan, are regarded as distinct from Japanese people. In the last analysis what is perhaps most important is the attribution of significance to differences (observed or imagined). Research must, therefore, focus on people’s perception of a sense of difference in relation to others who are thought of as being ‘not us’. In Barth’s terms, groups and their officials, researchers and commentators, construct the boundaries of discursive difference. Thus, it is essential to examine what has been written about the Nikkeijin and the different views expressed in such writing.

Perceptions of the Nikkeijin: ‘blood’ versus culture There are two competing ‘narratives’ about Japanese emigrants which convey contrasting attitudes. According to one version, Japanese emigrants were traitors who abandoned their country in crisis. According to a different interpretation, they were obliged to leave Japan and by doing so, helped the country by sending remittances, actions for which they and their offspring ought to be respected.21 Different accounts follow from this. Some report that, traditionally, Japanese nationals have tended to treat the Nikkeijin as inferior, even as traitors, and as such they have a harder time in Japan than other foreigners because there is less tolerance towards them. There are, indeed, reports of unpleasant experiences suffered in Japan by North Americans of Japanese descent (e.g. Donahue 1994). Similarly, a comparative research survey conducted in the 1970s, between people of Japanese

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and Japanese descent in Hawaii, revealed differences to the extent that a Japanese researcher exclaimed ‘Japanese–Americans [in Hawaii] are not Japanese but ‘we Japanese, are Japanese’ (quoted in Donahue 1994: 53). In other accounts, the ‘Japanese aspects’ of the Nikkeijin are emphasised. For instance, according to Tsunoda (cited in Changsoo and De Vos 1981: 300), they are always Nikkeijin or Nihonjin (Japanese) and this matters more than their nationality. For Hayashida (1976: 17, 143), they are referred to as Nihonjin and ‘the Japanese sense of a racial bond with the Nisei and Sansei is often great enough to overlook their linguistic handicaps’.22 However, the above claims refer to North American Nikkeijin, whose presence has never been significant in Japan. In analysing how Brazilian Nikkeijin are perceived in Japan, we have also to consider the image of South America in Japan. This is more often than not associated with Indians, samba, carnival, and drugs, plus the international inventory of stereotypes attached to poverty, elements of which tend to accrue to the Nikkeijin.23 It is important to mention that, with the migration of Nikkeijin to Japan, Japanese emigration has been ‘discovered’ and reconstructed. Since then the number of articles and documentaries on Japanese emigration has increased. The fact that the Nikkeijin are children of emigrants has been emphasised, and in Japan there is a tendency to think that it is a matter of shame that the Japanese emigrated at all (Kajita 1994: 156). That opinion was sometimes unfavourable on this score can be seen in the following quotation.‘[The Japanese who emigrated] were condemned as virtual traitors, outcasts, scum’ [by their compatriots] (Matsubara Hisako 1982, quoted in Goodman 1990: 198). The case of Alberto Fujimori deserves special mention. The election of the Peruvian President received much attention in the Japanese media, and this attention increased when the guerrilla group Tupac Amaru occupied the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Lima (from December 1996 until April 1997). His intervention in the rescue operation was highly praised and the three largecirculation daily newspapers (Yomiuri, Mainichi and Asahi Shinbum) carried editorials very favourable to the Peruvian President. Although identified as a Nikkeijin, and thereby distinguished from Japanese nationals, his Japanese ancestry was stressed. Kazuya Fukuda (1997: 7–8), a professor at Keio University, illustrates this, claiming that ‘Fujimori seemed to know how a samurai leader should act before his followers’. Incidentally, Fujimori invoked his Japanese ancestry during his presidential campaign, claiming that only Asian values could save Peru.24 Officials The attitude of the Japanese authorities towards emigration in general and emigrants to Brazil in particular, should also be considered. As we saw in Chapters 1 and 3, Japanese emigration was officially seen as a means of solving problems in Japan, and as such was greatly encouraged. Emigration to Brazil received special support, and Japanese communities in Brazil during the pre-war period developed largely under Japan’s influence. Ties with Japan remained after World War II,

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although in a different form. Furthermore, in the pre-war period, the representation of Japan in ethnic national terms was done in such a way that it included overseas Japanese, as has already been discussed. This perhaps explains why many Brazilian Nikkeijin believe that Japan adopted jus sanguinis criteria for accepting immigrants to ensure that the children of the Japanese who were born overseas were treated as Japanese (Comissão 1992: 454). Current official Japanese views of the Nikkeijin seem to be consistent with the past in that they are seen simultaneously as the children of Japanese emigrants deserving of special treatment, and also as foreign workers. This is illustrated both by the revision of the Immigration Law and by subsequent statements made by ministers and other officials. To give just two examples, the Foreign Ministry claimed in 1990 that visits to Japan by Brazilian Nikkeijin for the purpose of work should be facilitated. In the same vein, two years later, the Japanese Immigration Council (cited in Takenaka 1997: 319) argued that the government should support the emigrants who were sent to Latin America, and their descendants down to the third generation. Four years later, a representative of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brazil claimed that the support provided by the Japanese government to the Nikkeijin (‘who, in principle, are foreigners’) is seen as evidence of its continuing support to Japanese emigrants (Watari 1996: 36–46) The same idea is expressed in the LDP’s monthly magazine. Here, the Special Committee on Foreign Workers, in an article by Nojima Toshihiko, (quoted in Yamanaka 1996: 77), claimed that ‘. . . In the past, many Nikkeijin left impoverished Japan as kimin [abandoned people] and underwent great suffering in Brazil. Japan, incomparably affluent today as compared with those pre-war days, should repay them by opening its gate [sic] to them’. Therefore, ‘the Nikkeijin were acceptable [as foreign workers] because, as relatives of Japanese, they would be able to assimilate [sic] into Japanese society regardless of nationality’ (quoted in Yamanaka 1996: 76). The Japanese Emperor expressed a somewhat similar idea on the occasion of his visit to Brazil and Argentina in June 1997, when he was interviewed regarding his views on Japanese descendants. He stated that they were first of all Brazilians and Argentinians, and that he was proud to see that people of Japanese descent were contributing to their own [Brazilian and Argentinian] societies. ‘However’, he added ‘there is a feeling of intimacy with these people who share the Japanese blood’. As for the Nikkeijin working in Japan, he expressed a hope that they enjoyed a good sojourn whilst they were there (International Press, 25 May 1997: A5). Researchers and commentators Recent years have seen an enormous research effort directed at studying the Nikkeijin, usually under the title ‘the ütan or yütan (U-turn) phenomenon’ or ‘the return of former Japanese emigrants’.25 Some of this work was undertaken by researchers, some by local governments and some by research teams sponsored by companies. Most of it consists of statistical accounts; some takes the form of essays

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based on individual interpretations, illustrated with field studies or examples from the Press. I am not going to present here an exhaustive review of all the literature, but rather present typical examples of how the Nikkeijin have been perceived. In general, researchers and commentators tend to emphasise the fact that the Nikkeijin were not raised in Japan and are ‘culturally Brazilians’. Consequently, they are represented as unfamiliar with Japanese culture, unable to understand Japanese and unable to behave as Japanese nationals expect them to. Cultural differences are particularly emphasised, as well as the possible ‘problems’ that can result from them. The Nikkeijin are said to identify, both socially and culturally, with their country of origin and are sometimes referred to as an ‘invisible minority’ and ‘cultural aliens’. The terms ‘ethnic’ and ‘blood’ are widely and interchangeably used. Such commentary also tends to criticise the requirement of Japanese ancestry introduced in the revision of the Immigration Law and the ‘use’ made of the Nikkeijin in the labour market. For the purpose of illustration some examples will now be presented. Hiroshi Komai (1995: 202), author of several books on foreign workers in Japan, refers to the Nikkeijin as ‘people in Brazil with some Japanese blood’. In his opinion, ‘with regard to the Nikkeijin, it must be pointed out that the idea of allowing people with Japanese blood to work legally and forbidding those without this blood is an example of racism based on monoethnicism’ (Komai 1995: 257). According to him, the Nikkeijin presence in Japan has generated two issues: the destruction of the Nikkei communities in Latin America, and the mounting criticism that the Nikkeijin are the only foreigners who have an unlimited right to work in Japan. Another author on foreign workers in Japan, Takamichi Kajita, wrote a chapter entitled ‘Nikkeijin mondai wa Nihon shakai ni nani o motarasu ka’ (What effect does the Nikkeijin problem have on Japanese society?), claiming that problems may arise because the Nikkeijin cannot understand Japanese, have few contacts with the Japanese and want to maintain a Brazilian lifestyle.26 He argues that Japan is socially unprepared for this. According to him, ‘foreigners must understand the Japanese language and culture and acquire Japanese citizenship if they hope to be incorporated into Japanese society’ (Kajita 1995: 4). For him, the Nikkeijin are ‘ethnic Japanese’ while Koreans are ‘sociological Japanese’. He adds that Japanese emigrants were cut off from their families and this ‘weak family bond relativizes the principle of jus sanguinis as it applies to Japanese citizenship’. He concludes that the Nikkeijin represent a ‘new category of foreigners’ (Kajita 1995: 7,9, 21). In the same vein, Keiko Yamanaka, author of a number of articles on the Nikkeijin, questions the fairness of the current Japanese immigration policies and labels the Nikkeijin ‘an ethnic minority and political construct’. Furthermore, she claims that: ‘Upon arrival, most appeared to be suitably Japanese, but on closer acquaintance they proved to be distressingly alien: Latin-Americans in language, culture, personality and behaviour. The attempt to maintain a familiar and homogeneous workforce failed even as it brought in a new and disturbingly anomalous minority whose presence was permitted by legislation’ (Yamanaka 1996: 68). Similarly, Myron Weiner (1995: 22) of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, author of articles and editor of a book on the subject of migration to

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Japan, claims that ‘although welcomed by the government the Nikkeijin experience difficulty in becoming absorbed into Japanese society’. He adds: ‘it is noteworthy that in this instance the barriers to absorption are not racial but cultural’. Looking at a slightly different aspect of the issue, Wolfgang Herbert, who conducted research on foreign workers in Japan, sees the Nikkeijin as a ‘safety-valve’ for the labour market, and interprets the favouritism towards the Nikkeijin as grounded in ‘a deep-rooted quasi-racist obsession with blood-line’. He also observes that employment in Japan is determined by ‘the thickness of Japanese blood’ which explains why it is easier for Brazilian Nikkeijin to get jobs than it is for Nikkeijin from other countries. For him, ‘the Nikkeijin who have been socialised into different habits, and many of [whom] no longer speak Japanese, are exposed to discrimination after returning to Japan’ (Herbert 1996: 122, 329). Many other researchers making the same point may be cited. For example, Hiromi Mori (1996: 41) claims that the ‘long-established identity of Nikkei in their country restricts their adaptation in the host country’; John Lie (1997: 294), citing Hinago Akira, claims that the Nikkeijin are often considered inappropriately equipped for living and working in Japan. Books on the Nikkeijin, particularly those published recently, in general stress their ‘Brazilian aspects’. One of the most conspicuous examples of this is the book by Keiichi Honma in 1998, depicting the Nikkeijin according to the stereotypical image of Brazilians and, by consequence, stressing their ‘foreignness’. In contrast, according to the book ‘Samba no Machi’ (City of Samba), it is significant that the Nikkeijin look Japanese, speak some Japanese and are culturally closer to the Japanese than other foreigners (Chinese, Bangladeshi, etc.). In any case, it is said that Japanese residents feel uneasy because of the increasing numbers of Nikkeijin (Jömon Shinbunsha 1997). Media The Nikkeijin have been the subject of increased media coverage since the amendment of the law in 1990. As a result of this the arrival and settlement of substantial numbers of Nikkeijin was widely acknowledged. In 1992, the main topics on television relating to foreigners, focusing on Nikkeijin items in particular included the Nikkeijin working in factories and Peruvians who had acquired a forged family register. According to Herbert (1996: 329, note 10), with the recession the press began to highlight the ‘buffer-function’ of the Nikkeijin, who were the victims of a sluggish economy. In recent years, the Japanese media have been covering Nikkei communities, and articles have been published by the daily Press, emphasising their increasingly numerous presence in the country (e.g. Mainichi Shinbun, 11 July and 19 October 1996). Other articles report interviews with the Nikkeijin or focus on a particular issue, such as their ethnic media, and frequently they are discussed in the context of Gaikokujin rödösha (foreigner workers, e.g. Mainichi Shinbun, 14 July 1996). The Nikkeijin are often referred to as Nikkeijin, Nihon de hataraku Burajiru Nikkeijin (Brazilian Nikkeijin working in Japan), Zainichi Burajirujin (Brazilians residing in Japan) or Nihon

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ni sumu nanbei shusshin no Nikkeijin (Nikkeijin from South America living in Japan). Less frequently they are also referred to as Burajiru kara Dekasegi (Migrants from Brazil). It should be noted that the use of each term has changed over ten years. Within the last few years they are often referred to as Brazilians, as noted in Chapter 4. Television documentary coverage of Japanese emigration, particularly to South America, has been frequently screened, and different programmes have been presented on the issue. An example of this is the NHK series on Japanese emigration to Brazil, specifically the NHK Special ‘Nodojiman’ programmes on 5 and 12 April 1998. NHK organised a karaoke competition (‘Nodojiman’), among people of Japanese descent in Brazil, and used the programme to present details of the life of each of the participants.27 On 4 July of the same year, Asahi TV ran a documentary on the Dekasegi in Japan. The fact that the Nikkeijin were raised in a different culture is more often than not emphasised by the media. However, it must be said that news about them is usually informative and does not express any opinion.28 In this respect, the programme TBC-Terebi News, 23 (8 April 1998) deserves to be mentioned. It focused on the relationship between the Nikkeijin and the Japanese residents in Öizumi. In this programme, Japanese housewives expressed their views on their immigrant neighbours. In general, they maintained that they did not have much contact with them, and complained that the Nikkeijin were nosy and did not dispose of the garbage as they should. The Nikkeijin were also interviewed and expressed their views. The case of a young Brazilian boy who was killed in Hamamatsu by a Japanese gang in a dispute was also presented and his parents were interviewed as part of the programme. On 16 May 1998, in Nagoya, a Brazilian Nikkeijin who had robbed a convenience store was shot dead by the police. The same day, on TV news (Dekigoto MMT-Miyagi Terebi News, 23:30) the incident was reported without any mention of the fact that he was a Brazilian Nikkeijin. However, in contrast, the Asahi Shinbun (17 May 1998) did report that the man was a Nikkeijin. Generally, in recent years, in areas where there are large concentrations of the Nikkeijin, news of crimes committed by them has been increasingly publicised in the local press (e.g. Shizuoka Shinbun). According to the reporters from the International Press and Folha Mundial in Hamamatsu, articles usually highlight the fact that the crimes were committed by Brazilians of Japanese descent, and have titles such as the following: ‘Burajiru Nikkeijin’ or ‘Nisei murderer . . .’. For example, ‘Hannin wa tonari no Nikkei Sansei’ (The murderer was a Sansei neighbour) (Jomo Shinbun, 24 May 1991). There have also appeared articles on Nikkei children at Japanese schools which emphasise the presence of increasing numbers of children from South America in Japanese schools (e.g. Mainichi Shinbun, 11 March 1996). These articles also tend to identify the inability of Nikkeijin to speak Japanese as a reason for being bullied, and acknowledge the lack of measures taken by the Ministry of Education (e.g. Yomiuri Shinbun, 3 April 1997). Others focus on other issues, such as teaching Japanese to the Nikkeijin (e.g. Daily Yomiuri, 30 April 1993). An analysis of the news on the Nikkeijin (or related to them) published in 1996 by

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the Asahi Shinbun gives an idea of how the Nikkeijin have been presented in the press. On 16 February, the need for special classes for foreign children was featured. An article appeared on 11 March on the subject of foreign children in schools, in which teachers claimed to see a relationship between mastering Japanese and having Japanese friends. On 6 June, there was an article about the exploitation of Brazilian Nikkeijin by job-brokering agencies in Osaka. The visit of the imperial couple to South America and the Nikkei communities in Brazil was reported on 14 August. On 10 September, a Japanese researcher in the Amazon jungle claimed that it was important to invest in South American countries for research purposes. This happened during the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister to South America. An article about an American Nikkeijin who refused to undergo fingerprinting for alien registration in Japan was published on 22 August. An article appeared on 26 September about the problem of pirate videos that circulate in Brazilian communities. On 19 October, it was reported that the number of Brazilian residents in Öizumi (Gunma) had increased, and many Brazilians had exchanged their jobs in factories for work in commercial activities. On 7 November, there was an article about the end of the economic recession and its consequences for the labour market. The Nikkeijin were looking for companies that provided more overtime. A week later (14 November) an article was published about ethnic television in Portuguese and Spanish aimed at Latin-Americans in Japan. On 23 November another article reported an increase in the number of foreign workers in Japan, the majority of whom came from Latin-America. On 30 November, there was a report on the celebration in Paraguay of the 60th anniversary of Japanese immigration. An article appeared on 3 December about two job-brokering agencies that recruited Nikkeijin which were accused of tax evasion. Finally, on 23 December, there was an article on the invasion of the Japanese embassy in Peru. This caused reactions among Japanese people who turned against the Peruvian Nikkeijin who were working in Japan. For example, stones were thrown at a shop for Peruvian customers in Isazaki (Gunma) and some Nikkeijin were attacked verbally. Articles in the Press paint a remarkably similar picture. According to this, the Nikkeijin go to Japan merely to earn money. It may be illuminating to provide some examples drawn from different sources: ‘Although looking Japanese many speak only Portuguese’; ‘whereas Japanese expect unusual behaviour of those who can be recognised as foreigners they are surprised, and not always pleasantly, when Japanese–Brazilians distinguish themselves’ (Look Japan, October 1991: 40). In the same vein, under the title ‘Latin-America’s Nikkei flock “home” to the land of the rising yen’, it is said that ‘few Nikkei feel at home in Japan’ (Far Eastern Economic Review, September 1990: 34–6). Similarly, under the title ‘Looking for the better life: Why Brazil’s Japanese left home and [why] they are coming back’, the claim is made that ‘Brazilians with Japanese features’ come to ‘the land of milk and honey; . . . with a primitive knowledge of Japanese [they] are often misunderstood, deceived by their employers and rendered homeless and helpless when deprived of jobs’ (Insight Japan, 1993: 7–8). In Intersect (June 1993: 36–42) an article presents the Nikkeijin issue from both sides, quoting two Japanese: On the one hand, ‘the revised immigration law was good common sense. The Nikkeijin, because

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they are part-Japanese, adapt more easily to our system than other Gaijin [foreigners]. They have less cultural shock [sic]’ (this from an executive for an automobile parts subcontractor). On the other hand, ‘The concept that because someone two generations ago had a Japanese relative and is therefore more Japanese is ludicrous’ . . . Linguistic and cultural barriers can still be formidable, even for a ‘foreigner of Japanese blood’. In The Nikkei Weekly, 21 October 1996) one headline proclaims ‘Samba and sushi coexist in industrial town’, while another reads ‘Japanese–Brazilians have fitted in to Öizumi so well that one cannot envisage the town without them’, however the subtitle reads: ‘Overcoming problems’. In the same vein, The Japan Times (19 August 1997: 3) had the following headline ‘Do traditional bon and samba mix?: Gunma town struggles to embrace Japanese– Brazilian returnees’. To conclude this survey with some random selections from manga (Japanese comics or cartoons) ‘Garcia kun’ deserves special mention, although it does not refer specifically to Brazilian Nikkeijin. Takeuchi Akira, creator of this manga, depicts the life of a Colombian worker who has come to Japan to earn money for his family in Colombia. The protagonist attracts sympathy. He is very honest and hard-working and never complains, even when he is discriminated against. Actually, the character more closely resembles an Asian rather than a South American persona. This is not surprising since the author does not know any South American people and has never been overseas. It should thus be noted that the image that he has of foreigners is based entirely on the media (Mangajn, September 1993). In the above accounts, which are addressed to different audiences, the Nikkeijin are described as having ‘Japanese blood’ and being ‘culturally non-Japanese’. The focus is therefore on ‘blood’ versus culture, and the presumed inability of the Nikkeijin to adjust to Japanese society, together with the difficulty on the part of Japanese society of coping with their ‘cultural differences’, is implicit. It may be asserted with some confidence that problematising the presence of the Nikkeijin in Japan certainly helps to construct them as the ‘other within’. It has also been suggested in these accounts that the Nikkeijin have been subject to discrimination in Japan. Whether or not this is true it is an important point in analysing the situation of the Nikkeijin in Japan. Hence it is to this subject, not so straightforward as is sometimes construed, that I now wish to turn.

Are the Nikkeijin discriminated against? According to some accounts, the Nikkeijin have been subject to serious discrimination in their daily lives. To give an example, according to Yamanaka (1996: 84 and 92, note 20), the Nikkeijin feel ‘systematic discrimination’ owing to ‘ethnic prejudice and discrimination in the workplace based on differences in language and culture’. Their co-workers expect them to behave like Japanese, and ‘perceive the Nikkeijin as being slow and lazy in their workplace and rude in personal interactions’; they are considered to be ‘ignorant foreigners from a backward country’; they are seen as inferior, poor, uncivilised, untrustworthy; they are classed as ‘second-rate Japanese’ and subject to verbal abuse. In addition, Yamanaka quotes an article

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from the New York Times (13 November 1991) in support of her claim that they are treated with suspicion while shopping in stores. Admittedly, reports of discrimination against the Nikkeijin are not infrequent. Cases of children being bullied at school have been reported in the press. It also happens that in the workplace Japanese personnel tend to blame the Brazilians for faulty workmanship. The researcher was told by a young Sansei who worked in an obentoya in Tokyo that whenever a hair appeared in the kitchen, a Brazilian would be held responsible, even though all the workers were exactly similar in having black hair. In areas with a large concentration of Nikkeijin, as for example in Hamamatsu, problems have been reported with the local population over the last few years. In July 1998, it was reported that some shops in Hamamatsu were reluctant to accept Brazilian and Peruvian customers, apparently because of their behaviour in the shops.29 In the same year, a notice with ‘Japanese only’ written in English and Portuguese in a shop in Toyohashi (Aichi) attracted attention. The owner explained his attitude by saying that he had experienced problems with foreign customers (including Brazilians) and preferred not to have such customers unless they could speak Japanese.30 A similar attitude was taken by the owner of a video rental shop in Choshi (Chiba). According to him, many customers do not return the videos and that when they are foreigners it is difficult to track them down (Made in Japan, November 1998: 46). The first lawsuit by a Brazilian customer was filed by a female Brazilian non-Nikkeijin in August 1998 against a jewellery shop in Hamamatsu. Apparently, when she entered the shop the owner talked to her in English, but on realising she was Brazilian threw her out. The case of Herculano, a 14-year-old Brazilian Nikkeijin who was beaten to death in 1997 by a Japanese gang in Komaki (Aichi), deserves special attention. There have been attempts to present the young boy as a victim of discrimination on the part of Japanese society, but this was not always how the situation was interpreted.31 Brazilians who were interviewed in Toyohashi (Aichi) tended to blame Brazilian parents in Japan who leave their children on their own, and to remark that Brazil is a country of violence. For example, a Brazilian woman in Toyohashi explained that Brazilian youngsters in Japan reproduced the fights between gangs in Brazil. According to her, the difference was that these gangs did not use guns in Japan. Whilst it is true that the Nikkeijin are often presented as suffering from discrimination, research conducted so far has not clearly shown this to be the case. Watanabe and colleagues interviewed a group of Nikkeijin on this subject (among other subjects) between December 1990 and March 1991 in different localities. Few interviewees reported any clear experience of discrimination. Some women complained that they earned less than men despite performing the same work; other people interviewed reported subjective impressions of discrimination such as ‘Sometimes I feel that they [the Japanese] look at me strangely’ or ‘they [the Japanese] are cold and treat as Gaijin even those who have a Japanese face’ ‘It seems that the Japanese do not like the Brazilians’.32 The JICA survey in 1992 reveals than half of the respondents had some kind of

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complaint, such as being forced to do harder work than their Japanese workmates; however, the same survey reveals that only 3.7 of the respondents found difficulty in adjusting to Japan. The findings of the social survey conducted in the same year in Hamamatsu revealed that 59 per cent claimed that they sometimes experienced discrimination. However, when asked if they were more discriminated against than other foreigners, only 27 per cent answered yes. It should be noted that what precisely was meant by discrimination was left unspecified (both surveys cited in Chapter 4). In 1997, Tsuda conducted 28 interviews with Japanese people who had daily contact with Nikkeijin. His findings indicate that, in general, although there were negative evaluations of the social and cultural characteristics of the Nikkeijin, overtly prejudiced behaviour was unusual. He concluded that, despite their behavioural patterns and language, there was a strong sense amongst the interviewees that the Nikkeijin could somehow be comprehended within the social order (Tsuda 1998). Very few Nikkeijin interviewed by the author (1992–1995 and 1998) had actually experienced any discrimination. On the contrary, they tended to think that the Japanese had a good opinion of them. Furthermore, a survey conducted in Soja (1992–1994) did not support the idea that the Nikkeijin felt discriminated against in the workplace, as the following findings suggest.33 Participants were asked about their perception of the treatment received in the companies where they worked. About 66 per cent of them felt that they were treated the same as their Japanese coworkers. Moreover, nearly 64 per cent of the participants reported that their supervisors understood the difficulties faced by foreign workers, and 81 per cent held a favourable opinion about their experience of working in Japan. On the basis of the above findings it might be concluded that the majority of the participants were not unsatisfied; however, it should not be assumed from this that there were no problems. Interviews held in Aichi, Okayama and Shizuoka Prefectures clarified some aspects of these findings. One aspect which seemed to emerge more clearly was that being from a Third World country may account as much for a sense of discrimination as not being able to behave as a ‘proper Japanese’. Informants often complained that Brazil was associated with poverty and crime, and that the Japanese looked down on them whereas they admired the Americans and Europeans. An aspect that cannot be underestimated in analysing feelings of discrimination is the sense of alienation and loss of social status that migrants often experience in performing unskilled jobs that they would not do in their home countries in order to earn the money that they could not earn there. Working in a factory is for many Nikkeijin a new experience. Their co-workers often have little awareness of different cultures. This can be illustrated by the questions put to the Nikkeijin by their workmates. For instance, it is common for the Nikkeijin to be asked whether they wear shoes in Brazil, if there are buses, and even if they have their bodies painted. This cannot always be interpreted as teasing behaviour. It may well be that such impressions are fostered through documentaries on the Amazon region and other wild areas in Brazil, frequently shown by the semi-public broadcaster, NKK. The fact that they perform low-prestige jobs that national workers tend to avoid

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may account more for discriminatory attitudes than the reasons often cited. For the Nikkeijin themselves the work is perceived as resulting in a loss of status since the majority did not work in factories in Brazil, and they are therefore quick to identify any instance of discrimination. However, the effect on the Nikkeijin from middle class backgrounds working in blue-collar jobs is not as strong as might be expected, owing to the high levels of unemployment in Brazil. It should also be noted that the large majority of them are from working class families and are not considered middle-class according to the Brazilian social system. The fact that their parents and/or grandparents were immigrants may further reinforce their sensitivity to discrimination. Thus, it is unclear whether they are actually discriminated against, or merely imagine themselves to be so. According to a social psychologist who conducted in-depth interviews with a group of Nikkeijin in Japan from different backgrounds between 1992 and 1995, feelings of being discriminated against are related to expectations of being treated as a ‘Japanese’ (Yamamoto 1995). Feelings of discriminatory treatment and identity questions are closely related. Many Nikkeijin go to Japan expecting to be treated as relatives and subsequently realise that, not only are they not treated as such, but they are also perceived as being different from the Japanese. This dissonance may result in sensitivity to discrimination. It should also be observed that personal background and experience, both in Brazil and in Japan, are important factors in determining how the individual feels he or she is treated. Related to this is the more general point that there are individual differences in how discrimination is perceived. Suffering discrimination is partly a subjective perception which varies according to many factors, such as age, gender, personality and so forth. This is clearly expressed in the different responses given to the question: ‘can you tell me whether you have experienced discrimination in Japan, and if so could you elaborate on the circumstances?’ The author was told by a young third-generation girl in Japan that she felt discriminated against in trains because people looked at her strangely. An interesting finding is that discriminatory attitudes on the part of the Nikkeijin have also been reported. A Brazilian of African descent married to a Nikkeijin complained of being discriminated against by his compatriots rather than by the Japanese (Noticias do Japão, 28 February–6 March 1997). The Nikkeijin from other Latin-American countries also occasionally report an awareness of discrimination on the part of the Brazilian Nikkeijin. It should be noted that much has changed since the early years of migration. Initially, everything was difficult. As many of them say, even making a phone call was problematic. Just as conditions are continually changing, so too did the life of the Nikkeijin over a period of ten years. Life became easier, in particular because of the emergence of networks and ethnic communities. ‘When we came eight years ago there was nothing and we were discriminated against by the Japanese. Everybody was staring at us – maybe because of the way we dressed. I think they were afraid or they did not like us. It happened sometimes that we were not served in shops. Now it is different because the number of Brazilians has been increasing and they value our consumer power. Now it is better to live but not to save.’34

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It is difficult to assess what has actually been happening but, whilst it is probably true that discrimination does exist, it would be misleading to exaggerate its extent and to assume that it is absolute. I do not want to reject the idea that the Nikkeijin face difficulties in Japan. I do, however, challenge the idea of the inevitability of conflict, and suggest that what happens between the Nikkeijin and Japanese society as a whole depends on how they negotiate their encounters. Some of the relevant issues can be explicated in reference to an actual Nikkei community, a practical instance of which I shall attempt to evoke now.

Nikkei communities in Japan Despite institutionalised efforts to ‘integrate’ the Nikkeijin, up to the time of writing they have mixed almost exclusively with their compatriots. According to Kitagawa’s survey in 1990, 64 per cent of the Nikkeijin had very little contact with the Japanese. This percentage amounted to 52 per cent (24 per cent having had no contact whatever) in 1994 (Jömon Shinbunsha 1997). As discussed before, during the first stage of immigration there is, as a general rule, a tendency to preserve attachments to the country of origin and to create enclaves that are cultural extensions of the country of origin. It is only natural that immigrants should tend to seek out people with whom they can share their own language and culture in order to cope better with the stress of being in a foreign country. This is usually aggravated by the cultural distance that separates immigrants from the native population. In this regard, considering the history of Japanese communities in Brazil, it seems unlikely that the majority of the Nikkeijin had absolutely no previous contact with Japanese habits and customs, although it is a fact that the majority do not speak Japanese. Whatever the case, it has become increasingly apparent that they are creating their own communities, isolated from society at large. The instance of Öizumi (Gunma Prefecture) deserves special mention as it has been referred to as a ‘a model case of how Japanese and non-Japanese can co-exist’, ‘the best example of the integration of the Nikkeijin’ (The Nikkei Weekly, 21 October 1996, Made in Japan, August 1997).

Öizumi Öizumi has been called ‘The most Brazilian town in all Japan’, ‘the town of the Brazilian Nikkeijin’ and ‘Samba no Machi’ (the City of Samba). Located in the Gunma Prefecture, Öizumi is one of hundreds of small towns in Japan that depend on foreign labourers. There are 200 small- and medium-sized contractors in Öizumi, employing about 4,000 foreign labourers. The town has had a chronic labour shortage since the war, and the situation worsened with the Japanese economic expansion. In May 1987, an automobile parts manufacturer employed six Pakistanis (Look Japan, October 1991: 32). In 1989, soon after the amendment to the immigration law, an association of smalland medium-sized companies from Öizumi city and two neighbouring towns in need of labourers set up an organisation to recruit overseas labourers. According

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to the book ‘Samba no Machi’, companies started to recruit the Nikkeijin and also Chinese trainees because of a reluctance to depend solely on one source of labour. They were also thought to have recruited children of Japanese descent in Manchuria. However, this policy was abandoned for political reasons; thereafter, it was decided to concentrate efforts on Japanese South Americans, offering them good living and working conditions. Öizumi has the highest concentration of foreigners of all the municipalities, and nearly 80 per cent of them are from Brazil. In 1986, there were no Brazilians in Öizumi, but by 1990, there were 821 of them, working in 63 companies within the Tomo Area Association for the Promotion of Stable Employment. Six years later, 3,273 inhabitants of Öizumi had been born in Brazil.35 On Saturdays and Sundays, the number of Brazilians is three times larger because of the temporary influx of friends and relatives from other regions in Japan who go to visit or just to sample the atmosphere. There are more than 50 Brazilian-owned businesses, and a shopping centre that attracts some 4,000 customers every weekend, the large majority of them Brazilians. There is a pharmacy which labels its products in both Japanese and Portuguese. There is also a samba school and, although the Brazilians participate in Öizumi’s matsuri (festival), they do not dress in the yukata (summertime cotton kimono) and do not dance the bon odori (Japanese dance). Instead they prefer to dance the samba and other Latin American dances and wear carnival costumes. Officials in Öizumi have sought to make the samba group a major tourist attraction and references to Öizumi are often associated with samba and carnival, ‘symbols’ of Brazil. A total of 15,000 tourists from all over the country go to see the festival. In 1997, half of the babies born in Öizumi were Brazilians. The increase in numbers of children created a new market, and the number of Brazilian nurseries and schools has also increased. The presence of a Brazilian population has promoted all sorts of new businesses and the owner of the shopping mall is a good example of a Dekasegi who enriched himself in Öizumi. In addition to the shopping mall he also owns the discotheque ‘Made in Brazil’ and two restaurants. The owners of shops serving the Brazilian population tend to be Nikkeijin who came earlier than the others, are fluent in Japanese and are in contact with the local Japanese. However, the owner of the ‘Plaza no Komaki’ shopping centre, opened in April 1998, is a Japanese and is also the president of a conglomerate that employs Brazilians (about 97 per cent of the personnel). For businessmen, it is important that ‘although the Nikkeijin were not born in Japan, they are like the Japanese’, and companies have promoted initiatives to help their legal foreign workers (Jömon Shinbunsha 1997). In this regard, the representative of an industrial organisation, Genshiro Kouchi, claims that Brazilians tend to stay longer in Öizumi, partly because they are invited to bring their families (The Nikkei Weekly, 21 October 1996). Companies have been buying and distributing videotapes of a film made by a Brazilian Nikkeijin about the life of Japanese immigrants in Brazil, and in this way make the population aware that the Brazilians who are in the city are the descendants of Japanese emigrants. The policy of the authorities deserves special mention. The mayor carried out

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a campaign to get citizens to accept South Americans of Japanese descent as relatives who have returned after a long absence (Oka 1994: 57). Apparently, the campaign was successful and Öizumi is seen as an example of successful co-existence between foreigners and Japanese nationals. Öizumi has a reputation of being open to foreigners and the determination to integrate foreign residents dates back to 1992. At that time the town already offered Japanese language classes and Japanese–Portuguese-speaking staff to help in translations. The city planning department claims that the government ‘treats Japanese and foreign citizens [Nikkeijin] as equals’ (Look Japan, February 1994: 6). According to the mayor, the Brazilians are helping Öizumi because few Japanese want to work in assembly lines. He has his business cards written both in Japanese and Portuguese and, in his opinion, co-operation in everyday life between the Japanese and the non-Japanese will contribute to the development of the town. The Nikkeijin tend to be aware of their importance in the local labour market and to assert the claim that they saved Öizumi from bankruptcy. They also say that they feel comfortable in Öizumi and they are ‘westernising’ the city, rewriting the history of their ancestors in Liberdade (Japanese quarter in São Paulo, Made in Japan, August 1997: 53). Not everybody agrees with these views, and some local residents remark that instead of ‘co-existence’ the Nikkeijin remain aloof from the Japanese people, and the native population in general demonstrates a concern with the increase in the numbers of Nikkeijin. ‘I feel a foreigner in my own city’ said a local Japanese. There are also Nikkeijin who will remark that their own people do not understand that the rules in Japan are different, and behave as if they were in Brazil (Made in Japan, June 1998: 2). Öizumi provides a clear picture of the situation of the Nikkeijin in Japan. They are needed to supply the local labour market, and accordingly, there have been efforts on the part of the officials and business people to ‘integrate’ them whilst recognising their cultural ‘differences’. Partly as a consequence of these efforts they have increased in numbers in recent years and have established their own networks and ethnic communities. Whilst the local population acknowledges their presence, but largely ignores them, the Nikkeijin for their part re-create a version of the ‘Brazilian lifestyle’ in equal indifference to their surroundings. From what has been argued so far, and on the evidence that has been presented, I suggest that circumstances have evolved in Japan conducive to the formation of a minority, and that the Nikkeijin do in fact constitute a new minority. In the following section, the process of creating this minority is analysed in detail for it is in a minority–majority context that the reconstruction of the Nikkeijin identity in Japan takes place.

Constructing ‘differences’ A minority is formed when two groups are brought together in social interaction and establish ‘differences’. The general result of this nexus of ‘differences’ depends largely upon the attitudes of both the majority and the minority. For while it is the majority (in this case, the Japanese) who exert a major impression upon the

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formation of an immigrant underclass, two entities acting and reacting upon each other are needed to complete the process of making a minority. With this in mind, we now focus on the Nikkeijin as a minority. As mentioned earlier, the Nikkeijin have created their own communities which are isolated from the larger society. An analysis of findings from fieldwork shows how mutual contact has led to a process involving the assertion of differences. It is to these findings that we now turn. Brazilian Nikkeijin are said to be physically indistinguishable from their Japanese hosts, but in dress and behaviour they are visibly ‘different’. In a society that places a high value on uniformity, their foreign mannerisms attract attention. Their distinctive appearance, with long hair, colourful clothes and casual style of dress, their relaxed posture, swaying gait and loud conversations in Portuguese are means of asserting their foreign identity. But perhaps the most striking marker is the contrast between looking Japanese and an inability to speak the Japanese language. The communities often portray themselves, and are themselves portrayed, as dancing samba half-naked on the streets, according to the stereotypical image of Brazilians. They eat Brazilian dishes, they buy products ‘made in Brazil’ and wear imported Brazilian clothes, such as jeans and underwear on the grounds that Japanese sizes do not fit Nikkei bodies. By the same token, Japanese hairdressers are said to be unable to cut their hair, and cakes for their parties must be made by Brazilians. There are many other significant examples of how the Nikkeijin attempt to differentiate themselves from the national Japanese. The Nikkeijin cultivate the ‘Brazilian flair’ (jeitinho Brasileiro) supposedly characteristic of Brazilian people. The slogan is often repeated: ‘The most important thing is to take a cut’, that is, to gain a personal benefit or advantage from every situation. They bargain in shops and allegedly do not respect rules, both uncommon phenomena in Japan. Most Nikkei informants were familiar with Japanese tradition. However, they thought their knowledge of ‘correct Japanese behaviour [to be] insufficient’. As one interviewee remarked, ‘The Brazilians think that they can get what they want by smiling and tapping on the shoulder of a person, ignoring the fact that in Japan physical and close contact is not acceptable’. Another said, ‘by the way we dress, talk and walk, it is clear for the Japanese that we are Brazilians. This is our time to be Brazilians’. ‘Even if I didn’t want it, it is in everything I do’, said one young Nisei of her identity. Treated like foreigners, they sometimes find this suits them: as a 35year old Nisei put it, ‘I am a foreigner. My hair is long, I have a beard, I gesticulate, my meishi (business card) is written in katakana. There are no doubts that I am a foreigner who lives in Japan’. Samba is the clearest symbol of how they attempt to assert themselves as Brazilians. Although in Brazil few Nikkeijin actually dance samba or participate in carnival, in Japan any occasion is used to express their ‘Brazilianness’ through these customs. Apparently, the Japanese also expect them to behave in this way, and events organised for the Brazilians always include samba and Brazilian Carnival.36 In Öizumi, carnival has become almost an official date in the calendar, the Nikkeijin do their best to reproduce their own version of this festival. However, it may be

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added that Öizumi is not unique in this and carnival has been celebrated in other localities where the Nikkeijin reside. Inquiry into the reason for this assertion of differences has provoked various responses. Some informants claimed that it was an assertion of ethnicity. Others said that it was an emotional response to their perceived negative valuation by Japanese society. Indeed, pride in the exaggeration of difference is more often than not a reaction to an attributed negative social identity, and a way of making that identity more positive.37 Allegiance to Brazilian culture may therefore express a desire to return to a past, before they became immigrant returnees with a subordinate status, and thus may be interpreted as an effort to raise the value of their social identities. Nikkeijin criticisms concerning Japan and the Japanese can also be interpreted as a way of positively enhancing an ascribed social identity, and interviews revealed the existence of a tendency to criticise the host culture. As an example of this, Japan was said to lack the appearance of a First World country and to be far behind the United States and Western Europe in developmental terms. A common topic expressed was the lack of joy in Japan, in contrast with Brazil; ‘Japan is fading away’, said one interviewee. While Japan was usually referred to as ‘the land of our ancestors’, Brazil was referred to as the ‘beloved country’ (‘Pátria adorada’) and described as a poor, but a happy country. ‘They [the Japanese] may have money but do not have Ayrton Senna, Pélé or Maradona; they do not have idols’. They do not have ‘the Brazilian talent’ for football, said a young Nisei. The Nikkeijin interviewed tended to take much pride in their influence on Japan: ‘Because of us [the Brazilians] now the Japanese drink Guaraná (a Brazilian soft drink) and eat pãezinhos de queijo (bread rolls made with cheese). They also eat more meat. Shops and restaurants run by Brazilian people are also frequented by Japanese people.’ The main source of pride was the presence of Brazilian footballers in the Japanese league. Likewise, interviewees tended to describe themselves positively by contrast with the Japanese. Some answers are worth reporting: ‘The Japanese do not have opinions, and that is why they need us, the Brazilians’; ‘We, Brazilian Nikkeijin, are here to liven up Japan because it is a half-dead country’. Such statements need not be taken at face value, but may well be interpreted as a way of coping with their frustrations and advancing a positive social identity, as mentioned above. In some, however, this takes the form of a more qualified selfaffirmation, as, for example: ‘The Brazilians have an unshakably high opinion of themselves’ (‘Os Brasileiros têm a mania que são bons’); ‘The Brazilians want to impose their own way. They think God is Brazilian, and the rest of the world does not think like that’; ‘The problem is that the Brazilians want to teach, but the Japanese do not want to learn’. The Issei tended to be reluctant to express their opinions. They often compared their experience in Brazil with that of the Dekasegi in Japan, and concluded that the Nikkeijin did not go through the same hardships as the Japanese underwent in Brazil. According to a 60-year-old Issei, the Dekasegi were now receiving better treatment than the Japanese received when they first emigrated to Brazil, and therefore had no cause for complaint.

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An overview of the Nikkei press in Japan confirms the content of these interview findings, and offers important insights into how the Nikkeijin perceive both Japan and themselves. In Nikkei newspapers, articles are published expressing the opinion of readers, and frequently express bitter criticism of Japan and the Japanese. In one article it is claimed that ‘the Japanese men are empty, empty . . .’. Other articles are ironical: speaking about garbage disposal, one reader called it ‘the Japanese art of disposing of domestic waste’; ‘What sort of country is this?’ Cash machines do not work 24 hours a day and the bank employees are not efficient’ (A Folha Mundial, 5 April 1998: 2). In another article the Japanese custom of offering money at funerals and marriages was severely criticised – ‘I have never seen such a materialistic people! How they do like money!’ wrote the author. In an article on education in the same issue of A Folha Mundial, one reader criticised the Japanese educational system and concluded that, in this respect, Japan was a little behind Brazil. Further evidence of this critical attitude towards Japanese society can be seen in the following comment on discrimination: ‘Ijime (bullying) has its roots in the way the Japanese see the world. For them the world has just one colour; it is a world without difference’. Strong expressions of discontent were not, however, frequent during the interviews. ‘Here everything is easy, the only problem is the language,’ said the president of a company that sells telephone lines in Hamamatsu. For others, language was not a problem. ‘We have everything here, even camdoblé ’ (a magic cult), said a young Sansei. Discontent concerning social exclusion was usually phrased in terms of not being treated like relatives: ‘We are foreigners in the land of our ancestors’; ‘We are blood of their blood, and we are treated like foreigners’. On the evidence of interviews it seems therefore that they share the Japanese preoccupation with ‘blood’. As mentioned earlier, very few informants had actually experienced overt discrimination. Nevertheless, expressions of disappointment were common when they talked about their first contact with Japan: ‘I had a different image of Japan’; ‘I never thought Japan would be like this’; ‘I thought Japan would be a clean country and the Japanese very polite and after all . . .’. Their images of Japan prior to migration were usually based on what they heard from their relatives and the Brazilian media. The majority of Nikkeijin had an image of Japan associated with advanced technology and high buildings, and yet they often found themselves living in the suburbs of a small town, working in small factories. Moreover, the majority of the Japanese they were in contact with were their workmates who likewise did not fit the image the Nikkeijin have of the Japanese. Faced with a situation they did not expect to find in Japan they tend to situate themselves as foreigners in relation to it, though this move is not accomplished without difficulties. For, while is clear that they do not feel like ‘nationals’, it is also clear that they do not feel truly ‘foreign’ either. Illustrative of this point are some of the more interesting entries in the literary contest organised by the newspapers Jornal Tudo Bem and International Press in Japan. The attitudes which emerge are well summed up in an essay by Agaki (1997) under the suggestive title ‘Depois do Carnaval’ (After Carnival):

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Brazilian Nikkei migrants in Japan I was the Japanese [in Brazil] . . . I was brought up as a weird Brazilian . . . in a world where there were us [the Nikkei] and the Gaijin [other Brazilians] . . . I was a Brazilian eating beans (Brazilian dish) with misoshiru (Japanese soup) . . . We, the Nikkeijin, arrive in Japan and we face a reality that confuses us even more: we are Brazilians . . . To be Dekasegi is to know how to cope with the stereotype of being Japanese . . . and not have to apologise for not being able to behave like a Japanese.

As illustrated by the following examples the daily Nikkei press contains many articles expressing dilemmas such as: ‘To be or not to be . . . without alienation . . . Physical traits do not allow the Nikkeijin to deny their origins’ (International Press, 10 January 1998: C2).‘Between karaoke and samba I won’t choose. I want to keep the best of both’ (Jornal Tudo Bem, 28 March 1998). From this it may be deduced that, however people might want to maintain identities or indeterminate identities, the dominant society forces them to choose from amongst its available categories (to be Brazilian, Gaijin, or to be Japanese). As one Nikkeijin put it succinctly, ‘there is no point in choosing, but the Japanese see everything either as black or white’. Naturally there have been changes in self-image during the 10 years of Nikkei migration to Japan. ‘In the early years of migration to Japan, to be called a foreigner was an insult, however, now it is different. Now we know we have to put up with two stereotypes: that of being Dekasegi (migrant) and that of being Gaijin (foreigner)’. It is important to note that the Nikkeijin in general think that the Immigration Law that gives them the right to work in Japan is fair and ought not to be extended to other foreigners.38 This was confirmed in interviews. Even the Sansei and Mestiços, who stressed that they had little in common with the Japanese, thought that they ought to have the right to work and live in Japan. The common argument used was that the Brazilians of Portuguese descent are able to work in Portugal and those of Italian descent can work in Italy, therefore it was only natural that Brazilians of Japanese descent should be able to work in Japan. Brazilians tend to concentrate in the same areas and to spend their leisure time together. They get together to feel at home in shops where they buy beer and sit and chat for hours as they do in Brazilian snack shops. This is sometimes a nuisance for the shop owner, not used to such a custom, since Japanese customers usually leave the shop immediately after paying for their purchases. In general, they have few contacts with their Japanese neighbours, although conflicts with Japanese residents are said to be on the rise. Unlike undocumented foreign workers who have reasons to behave as discreetly as possible, the Brazilians have few reasons to fear the authorities, and often their neighbours will complain about the noise. As we have seen, garbage disposal is very often a point of dispute; the Nikkeijin react by complaining in turn about their Japanese neighbours and their strict attitude towards garbage. Many confess that they cannot really understand why Japanese housewives separate the garbage, and nickname them ‘patrulhas do lixo’ (garbage patrols). Informants had little idea of how they were perceived by the Japanese. According to some, ‘they [the Japanese] treat us well, but they don’t really care’; for

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others, ‘they treat us well, but they prefer the Americans’; ‘The Japanese are cold’; ‘Nobody knows what they think, we cannot trust them’; ‘They do not like foreigners, no matter what the officials say’; ‘the Brazilians speak in a loud voice and gesticulate, and this frightens the Japanese’. In general, informants thought the Japanese had a good image of them as workers, and claimed that Japanese workers were jealous of the Nikkeijin because they worked much better. Others though differently, and tended to blame the Japanese media and the Brazilians for the bad image they might now possess in Japan. ‘The Brazilians cause many problems, they do not pay, they steal, they fight and quarrel, they have car accidents; problems began with the garbage but now there are criminal cases every week’, explained a Journalist of International Press in Hamamatsu, a town containing the largest number of Nikkeijin. Such isolation from the wider society is not due solely to avoidance by the local population; neither does it necessarily mean that the Nikkeijin are protecting themselves from a hostile society. Several factors account for the lack of interaction with the local Japanese. Poor command of the Japanese language is probably the most important factor. Another is that many of them tend to see themselves as living temporarily in Japan (despite many years of residence) and act as if they are not fully present. It should also be pointed out that there are often practical reasons for taking refuge in ethnic communities. Communities provide a space of familiarity and social support which is otherwise absent. They help the Nikkeijin to overcome linguistic and cultural barriers, to obtain employment, and also provide a shelter for newcomers. By the same token, the more such communities satisfy their own needs internally the less their members tend to come into contact with the local population. Moreover, the Nikkeijin are conscious of differences between themselves and the Japanese, and tend to withdraw from situations that might demand interaction with them. As often happens in minority–majority contexts, whereas Nikkei communities accentuate differences vis à vis the Japanese, they tend at the same time to display in-group homogeneity, and de-emphasise the differences that mattered in Brazil. However, there are tensions within the communities, and a frequent complaint is that the Brazilians exploit their fellow countrymen. Apparently, bounds of common nationality are often overcome by self-interest. For example, those who master the Japanese language charge high fees for translation and interpretation services and the Nikkeijin compete with each other for overtime work. Some informants expressed a negative opinion about their compatriots, claiming that the Brazilians in Japan are becoming increasingly isolated, closing themselves off in a circle of meanness and intrigue. A priest who lived for seven years in Komaki (Aichi) where 2,769 Brazilians reside, said that, while in the beginning the Brazilians were not accepted by the Japanese, the problem now is the lack of unity amongst the Brazilians themselves (International Press, 4 April 1998: C1). Indeed, some informants expressed ambivalence towards Nikkei communities. They felt on some occasions repelled by their compatriots, and drawn towards the Japanese. This was particularly the case when informants felt comfortable in Japan. Not surprisingly, the more successful were those who felt more satisfied.

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Partly as a result of awareness of their low social position, the Nikkeijin follow a behaviour common to subordinate groups elsewhere, and assert their distinctive customs. Nevertheless, boundaries are incessantly being crossed. As Banton (1994) remarks, self-interest, expressed in saving money or gaining social status, or ties to a friend, neighbour or fellow worker, is often more effective than ethnic identification. Their ethnic loyalties depend on a multitude of factors that range from their socialisation and ethnic past, to expectations and future plans. While some want to preserve their attachment to their country of origin, others aspire to ‘pass’ as ‘native’ and accordingly their reference group is the Japanese. Some see Japan as providing them with means to their own ends, and see no need to learn new behaviour; they confine themselves to their communities, turn their backs on the host society and avoid contact with the nationals. Others want to be involved with Japanese society, to make demands on the system and to work at developing positive social images. In any case, with the passage of time, the lifestyle of many Nikkeijin will change and, although they may continue to define and assert themselves as ‘Brazilians’, their actual practices may become more similar to those of the native Japanese.39 The attitudes conducive to isolation on the part of the Nikkeijin are encouraged by the local Japanese who seldom come into contact with them, even when living nearby or working together with them. However, the host society attitude does not regard the Nikkeijin with fear or suspicion, and no direct hostilities or social tensions between the Nikkeijin and local Japanese have developed to the point of causing open conflicts. The attitude is more one of avoidance. When the interviewer asked why this should be the case, cultural differences (ways of thinking, lifestyle) were pointed out as the main reasons for the separation.40 Cultural distance was pointed out by emphasising their Brazilian upbringing, but cultural incompatibilities were never explicitly expressed. Social distance was also pointed out by some who argued that an immigrant is by definition a poor and under-educated person. It should be noted that interviewees expressed neither dislike nor curiosity in regard to the Nikkei communities in Japan. The majority of Japanese people interviewed and surveyed seem not to have had any close experience of the Nikkeijin beyond occasional neighbourhood or commercial relations. They tended to believe that, as people of Japanese descent, they must have inherited some Japanese characteristics. As one Japanese man put it, if their parents were Japanese and they were brought up as Japanese probably they have the heart of a Japanese (Nihonjin no kokoro). Owing to this belief, most Japanese interviewed felt that it would be easier to be closer (shitashiyasui) to the Nikkeijin than to other foreigners on grounds of common ancestry. ‘They look Japanese and this puts us at ease’; ‘We feel closer to the Nikkeijin because they look like Japanese. The Iranians and other foreigners do not look like us’. Perceptions depended to a large extent on personal experiences, but the general image of the Nikkeijin tended to be positive. Claims were sometimes made such as ‘they tend to be laid back’, ‘they are noisy’, but the more typical comment was that they were diligent and hard-working (kinben-na hito), honest and serious-minded people (majime-na hito), ‘They came to Japan to work and they do work’. However,

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people interviewed in Hamamatsu and Toyohashi cities tended to mention the number of crimes committed by Brazilians. In general, interviews revealed that, while for some the Nikkeijin were relatives (albeit distant relatives) and as such they could adjust well to Japanese society, others clearly stated that there was nothing in common between Japanese citizens and the children of immigrants who left Japan many years ago. Informants who had more contact with the Nikkeijin tended to say that, whilst they may have ‘Japanese blood’, their way of thinking is Brazilian. As one Japanese man interviewed put it, ‘the Nikkeijin are like one of the family, but yet not of the family, they are Brazilians with Japanese blood’. There of course exists a diversity of attitudes concerning the Nikkeijin, but the prevailing attitude revealed by the survey was that they were South Americans, and since they were in Japan they had to respect the Japanese norms. Different generations were seen as having graduated ‘rights’ to belong to Japan, and interviewees made a distinction between the second generation Nikkeijin and those of the third generation and the mixed ‘blood’ Mestiços. The second-generation was considered to be closer to the national Japanese, particularly if they could speak Japanese. A commonly held assumption was that the Nikkeijin would eventually return to their country. When they were told that Japan needed foreign workers, Japanese interviewees tended first to give evasive answers and then to argue that Japan was a small country (semai kuni) and that the Japanese economic recession did not offer good prospects. When they were told that the Nikkeijin could legally, if they so wished, remain in Japan, interviewees tended to say that in that case they should be allowed to work in Japan. The general attitude of Japanese people interviewed to the Nikkeijin presence amongst them was clearly summarised by one of them: ‘It would be better if they [the Nikkeijin ] did not have to come here, but since they are we may as well accept them.’

Conclusion The main argument advanced in this chapter is that what happens to the Nikkeijin in Japan depends not so much on endemic cultural differences as on the dynamic relationships continuously negotiated between themselves and the Japanese. Because the Nikkeijin issue is closely related to the concept of ‘Japaneseness’, the construction of Japanese identity has been examined as well as its defining criteria. As we have seen, Japanese identity has been based on the idea of family, and this has been promoted in contemporary Japan by the nihonjinron discourse. The concepts of ‘blood’, Japanese culture and Japanese language have become inextricably linked, and have been used both to include and exclude. Except in relation to ‘blood’, the Nisei and Sansei do not fulfil any of the criteria that have in the past been used to define what it is to be Japanese. Yet, the perceived importance of ‘blood’ in acquiring Japanese social, cultural and linguistic competencies has been corroborated by recent empirical research. An analysis of perceptions by Japanese officials, media and researchers suggests that Nikkeijin ‘differences’ from the nationals continue to be emphasised.

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Nevertheless, while researchers tend to focus more on their ‘Brazilian’ aspects, officials (and businessmen) tend to focus more on their ‘Japanese’ aspects. Media representations have been changing over the 10 years, and increasingly references are made to them as Brazilians, and attention given to their ethnic communities. However, no definitive conclusions may as yet be reached as to whether they are being discriminated against in Japan. Findings of the fieldwork suggest that mutual contact has led neither to a state of conflict nor to one of peaceful co-existence, but rather to an assertion of mutual differences. They also suggest that common ancestry may not necessarily imply the affinity that the Immigration Law assumes. However, it should not straightforwardly be concluded from this that they are seen (or see themselves) as foreigners. Rather, they are seen as presenting a combination of familiarity and foreignness, and this feeds back into how they perceive themselves. They are a minority and their ethnicity has increasingly expressed itself in terms of ‘Brazilianness’.

6

Conclusion

The reconstruction of Nikkeijin identity in Japan The Nikkeijin clearly go through a process of reconstruction of their identities along with their experience as immigrants in the land of their ancestors. As discussed earlier, the issue of their ethnic identity has been oversimplified as one in which they bring with them their own cultural identities and confront an alien culture. However, it cannot be assumed that Japanese culture is completely alien to them and that their ethnic identities are fashioned exclusively within the remembered society of their country of origin. Furthermore, the quest for identity proceeds through the assertion of differences and recognition by others. In some situations, the identity in question assumes more importance and is more salient. The criteria and the importance of differences vary with circumstances, but are always a function of the situation or context. When identity is under threat in the context of inter-group relations, it is usually redefined by the accentuation of (or a search for) ‘difference’. The Nikkeijin go to Japan expecting to rediscover their roots, but upon arrival, the claims of their ancestry are called into question. Through this changing experience of migration the Nikkeijin re-invent themselves in relation to the ways they are represented and addressed in Japan in everyday situations. Many Nikkeijin say ‘I am a bit of a chameleon’. Confronted with the choice between ‘Japanisation’ and ‘deJapanisation’, responses depend very much on the personality of the individual and his or her circumstances. For many, their response is an expression of ambivalence towards Japan. Playing down their Japanese ancestry is a form of retaliation for the difficulties experienced in Japan, and they strive towards an idealised conception of ‘a Brazilian’, and behave accordingly. Some give up their ‘Brazilian identity’ and try to assume one which is wholly Japanese, hoping to be rewarded for giving up their foreign identity. Still others prefer rather to assert their ‘Brazilian identities’ than attempt to become ‘incomplete Japanese’. Moreover, claiming a right to be Brazilian, they contest the ‘Japaneseness’ against which they are measured. Some claim a dual right to be both Japanese and Brazilian as a ‘gesture of insubordination’.1 Still others take the most comfortable position according to the situation and others just want to ‘be themselves’. People draw partly, but not exclusively, on kinship or on country of birth as a

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source of identity; and in this way ethnic definitions can give place to other social definitions, sometimes consciously manipulated. The Nikkeijin are not simply and uniformly Nikkeijin. They belong to more than one group, and their identities cannot be reduced solely to nationality or descent. They possess other identities which are manifested according to context.2 As Robin Cohen (1994: 205) argues, ‘Like a player concealing a deck of cards from the other contestants, the individual pulls out a knave – or a religion, an ethnicity, a lifestyle – as the context deems a particular choice desirable or appropriate’. There thus exists a multiplicity of social circumstances in which the Nikkeijin are forced to make choices. Nikkeijin identity can take precedence over all other identities on some occasions. On other occasions, Brazilian identity will take precedence, while in still others the identity of ‘migrant’ matters more. In a Japanese factory, their identity as migrants tends to be imposed upon other available identities. Illustrative of this point are the entries in the literary contest organised by the Nikkei newspapers where what stands out clearly is that the issues of most salience to the writers are related to their identity as Brazilians and people of Japanese descent, and as Dekasegi (migrants). However, not all accept their immigrant identities so readily, and in such cases will emphasise that they did not go to Japan merely to earn money, but rather to discover their roots. The Nikkeijin often say (both in Japan and Brazil) that they carry the East and the West in their souls, and claim this to be a privilege. Indeed, Nikkeijin identity has developed in a complex interaction of similarity and difference in relation to Japanese and Brazilian alternatives. ‘Differences’ between them need to be defined as a function of systems of social relations. Thus Nikkeijin identity grew up out of historical, economic and social circumstances, not merely as a result of cultural bonds with Japan. Moreover, it has been refashioned throughout the history of Japanese immigrants in Brazil in their continuing relationship with Japan. Because of this we need to situate Nikkeijin identity in specific historical situations and within specific discourses. As shown in the first part of this book, Japanese emigration was actively encouraged. The Japanese government and financial interests saw in the creation of colonias in Brazil an opportunity for overseas expansion, and accordingly involved themselves closely in the emigration process. Besides planning and assisting in the process of emigration, the Japanese government financed various settlement projects, promoted land ownership and provided financial and technical assistance, thereby supporting the emigrants. The social organisation of the Japanese immigrants was conducted under the guidance and control of Japanese government representatives in Brazil. Furthermore, the Japanese government encouraged the maintenance of Japanese culture through Japanese language schools, newspapers and other institutions where the number of immigrants was significant. There was thus an official preoccupation to define the immigrants and their descendants as Japanese, even though there was no expectation they would ever return to Japan. Largely owing to this policy, immigrants continued to define themselves as Japanese over an extensive period of time, and ties with Japan have never in fact disappeared, although they were maintained on different terms.

Conclusion 147 The receiving country also played an important role in their ethnic reconstruction. As shown in Chapters 1 and 3, Brazil was desperately in need of labourers to replace the slaves, but has never favoured Asian immigration. The ideal was to make Brazil an extension of Europe, and there was a hostile reaction towards Japanese immigrants who were seen as a threat to this ideal. Although hostility was particularly manifested during the 1930s and 1940s, it had been latent since their arrival. Their phenotypical traits and cultural differences were targets of criticisms, exacerbated by their encapsulation in ethnic communities. Such hostility was further aggravated as a result of Japan’s actions during World War II and the events actuated by the non-recognition of Japan’s defeat by the Japanese immigrants. It would be an error to think that the racist assumptions of ‘whitening’ were limited to a specific historical period. ‘Race’ still matters in contemporary Brazil, and this is reflected in the label ‘os Japoneses’ (the Japanese). However, Japan’s enhanced status in the world, particularly after the 1980s, led to a change in the image of Japan and hence of people of Japanese descent. The economic situation in Brazil and labour shortages in Japan reversed the situation further, and the Nikkeijin became Dekasegi. As shown in Chapter 4, Nikkei emigration to Japan started in the mid-1980s with many Issei and a few Nisei, but in 10 years the number of Nisei, Sansei and Mestiços surpassed the number of Issei. This change in size and composition of the Dekasegi population as well as the establishment of community networks, brought about changes and modifications in terms of their social and ethnic organisation. In a few years Brazil was made to seem closer as a cultural presence, and life in Japan easier. Although during the early years they referred to themselves as the Nikkei and the Dekasegi, these selfdesignations were gradually replaced by the term ‘Brazilians’. As discussed in Chapter 5, the host society initially tended to regard the newcomers as the children of Japanese emigrants (the Nikkeijin), allowed thus to work in Japan on grounds of their ancestry. This idea was promoted by Japanese officialdom and business interests. News of them in the media was rare, but increased over time. Progressively they became the focus of attention of scholars and commentators who tended to view them in the context of foreign workers in Japan. This had the effect of simultaneously heightening their ‘foreign aspects’ and intensifying the criticism of their privileges based on ‘blood’. Increasingly, they were designated as foreign workers from Brazil or Burajirujin (the Brazilians). As a consequence of differing internal and external circumstances, the defining term ‘Nikkeijin’ has not always been invested with the same meaning. As shown in Chapters 1 and 3, Japan provided the dominant frame of identity for the emigrants during the pre-war period. After World War II they forged an identity, distancing themselves from Japan and, although the reference point continued to be centred in their ethnic communities for a long period, gradually the movement towards integration into the larger Brazilian society increased. Some wished to preserve Japanese traditions and to be ‘pure’ Japanese. The majority sought social promotion, and a move to ‘de-Japanise’ themselves was seen as essential to accomplish this. However, as demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 3, the Nikkeijin are not (and have never been) completely separated from their Japanese roots.

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With economic prosperity in Japan and the ensuing increase in numbers of third-generation Nikkeijin, being of Japanese descent acquired a new meaning for those in Brazil and many asserted their identities specifically as such. However, Japan had in the meantime changed beyond recognition from the country their ancestors had left 90 years ago, becoming in the interim a rich and modern country in need of labour. In the late 1980s, when they began actively to respond to this labour shortage, the Japanese immigrants and their descendants were reminded of their roots and Japan became for them the ‘promised land’. As such, the Nikkeijin have from the outset brought to Japan expectations and certain preconceptions concerning Japan which have affected and been affected by their experience of migration. Once in Japan, things turned out to be more complex than they had expected. Actual contact with Japan and the Japanese has had a profound effect in making the Nikkeijin aware of features of themselves which they had previously taken for granted. Whereas in Brazil they were ‘the Japanese’, in Japan they have become ‘the Burajirujin’ (the Brazilians). They feel their identity fragmented as between Japanese and Brazilian selfhoods, and in order to extricate themselves from this dilemma, they ‘rewrite their identity as Nikkeijin’, to borrow a phrase from Kondo (1990: 17). This new self-definition obliges them to come to terms with their Japanese identity without at the same time losing their Brazilian one. Thus the same group of people behave and define themselves differently according to varying external circumstances and social relationships. As we saw in Chapter 3, differences amongst the Nikkeijin matter in Brazil, but not all these differences are transported to Japan. Many of them, whilst not completely forgotten, become attenuated by what they have in common. The term ‘Nikkeijin’ is therefore a homogeneous label constantly subject to renegotiation in both Japan and Brazil.3 In Brazil they are unable to erase their ‘Japaneseness’, but in Japan the first thing thrown at them is their lack of ‘Japaneseness’, especially if they do not speak Japanese. They thus constitute a paradox: Japanese but yet not Japanese, Brazilians and yet not Brazilians. As Kondo (1990) remarks, they are a conceptual anomaly. They are, in this sense, ‘racially’ Japanese without Japanese ‘cultural competence’. In Brazil, ‘there is something strange about the type of a person who speaks and behaves like us but does not look like us’; in Japan, ‘how can someone look like us but not behave and speak like us?’ Nikkeijin identities are to be understood in the context of a constellation of forces that determine their position in the society in which they find themselves. Paraphrasing Ang (1994), it can be said that they possess identities appropriately framed by the possibilities and limits offered wherever they happen to be. In Brazil they see themselves as a successful group of immigrants. In Japan they work in factories and are treated as ‘incomplete Japanese’ from the Third World. In Japan they refer to themselves as Brazilians; in Brazil as Nikkei. From what has been argued above, to be Nikkeijin is always to be Japanese by descent, sometimes Japanese by consent. When and how these alternatives operate depends to a large extent on the situation, that is, on the context and forces operating locally (Aug 1994: 18). The Nikkeijin continually strive to redefine themselves

Conclusion 149 on their own terms. There is a multiplicity of Nikkeijin identities, and the Nikkeijin identity produced in Japan is one of many possible alternatives. Therefore, the experience of coming to Japan is for them not so much a so-called return to their roots, but rather a ‘coming to terms’ with those roots.4 I have tried to give some idea of the diversity amongst the Nikkeijin and I would like to insist that the community is composed of many and diverse voices, and that these are constantly subject to change. Identities are thus ‘about questions of using the resources of history, language and culture in the process of becoming rather than being’ (Hall 1992: 4).

The Nikkeijin as a minority As we have seen, Nikkei or Brazilian communities in Japan are an expression of ‘foreignness’ on the part of both the Nikkeijin and the national Japanese. They are an example of how a sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is socially constructed with some reference to culture.5 Faced with the difficulty of being of Japanese descent and belonging to Japan, the Nikkeijin position themselves by stressing an adherence to their ‘Brazilian communities’, and these communities reinforce their sense of not belonging to Japan. On this point, the majority (host society) definition deserves special mention. As shown in Chapter 5, there is a discursive ambivalence in relation to the Nikkeijin: on the one hand, there is a demand for the Nikkeijin to ‘integrate’, but on the other there is always the denial of this possibility since cultural difference, transient status and foreign origin are continually emphasised. Scholars and commentators have already outlined ‘the Nikkeijin social problem’ as one in which they will eventually suffer the same hardships as other minorities in Japan. Japan has a long history of segregation and therefore it is pertinent to think that the ‘cultural differences’ of the Nikkeijin could acquire social significance. This being the case they could be considered a case of ‘racism’ without ‘race’. The findings of my fieldwork do not point in that direction, but even were this to be the case, racialisation does not necessarily entail racism. Admittedly, there is some concern over their numbers in areas of high settlement, and some local Japanese express apprehension lest this trend continue. It is also true that the native population does not in general interact with them, and by and large ignores them. Data also suggest that common ancestry may not necessarily imply the affinity that the Immigration Law assumes. In this respect, it should be pointed out that the reaction of Japanese society to the Nikkeijin presence is not in the least homogeneous. Studies indicate that discursive constructions are often detached from everyday experiences and face-to-face interaction, and interviews clearly show that the dominant discourses tend to structure the perceptions of the Japanese people. This may explain why the responses of Japanese interviewees who had little contact with the Nikkeijin were consistent with official views. Fragments of the nihonjinron discourse were often used to explain why the Nikkeijin were more closely attuned than other foreigners to understanding Japanese society. People who were in contact with them tended to point out the ‘differences’, but ‘cultural incompatibilities’ were

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never explicitly expressed, although they were suggested through references to cultural distance. It is significant that the arguments typically representing Japan as a small and closed country, together with the Japanese recession, were more often invoked than cultural problems as explanations of why the Nikkeijin should return to their countries. Moreover, it seems that the low status of the Nikkeijin accounts as much as (or more than) cultural differences for the social distance between them and the Japanese people. It is difficult to distinguish between ethnic and class prejudices, but one has to take into consideration that the Nikkeijin are immigrants and as such, their social relations with the Japanese are based on material relations of production.6 This is a point that has been neglected. A 10-year period is probably insufficient to afford definite conclusions, but this study does not find evidence that the Nikkeijin are a target of harassment for Japanese citizens. As for the Nikkeijin, they want to maintain differentiation, as demonstrated in Chapter 5. However, to identify with a minority is to attribute to oneself the characteristics associated with that minority and to accept the condition of belonging to a minority. There are costs involved in alienation from the majority. Inability to speak Japanese, although not necessarily an obstacle to employment, affects the job advancement prospects of the Nikkeijin and their relationships with Japanese society. In a Japanese-speaking economy, where the attainment of higher-status jobs is regulated by higher educational achievements, the Nikkeijin are at a disadvantage. On the other hand, contrary to popular belief, there may be advantages to minority status. On this point, it is important to mention the flourishing businesses that the Nikkeijin have promoted, many under their own ownership and control. They have also succeeded in setting up their collective organisations to promote their own social and economic interests. As stated in Chapter 4, many Brazilian workers have abandoned factory work and started their own businesses, while others run a business as a sideline. There are also the hidden benefits of being ‘out of the system’. Much of the business conducted by the Nikkeijin in Japan is not subject to taxes or any other legal procedure. It should be noted, however, that many national Japanese have also prospered as a result of their presence. It would be worth studying the network of different interest groups, both in Brazil and in Japan, which are connected in some way with the Nikkeijin in Japan. It is interesting to note that institutional sympathy towards the Nikkeijin has not resulted in any dependency on the host country to solve their problems. They rely more on their own social networks than on institutional support. It is significant that the Nikkeijin tend largely to ignore governmental support. For example, as mentioned in Chapter 4, intending migrants often bypass the official recruitment centre established by the Japanese government in São Paulo, preferring to be recruited by job brokers despite official recommendations to the contrary. Many Nikkeijin seem to be comfortable in their communities. They have the advantages of living in a clean, safe country and at the same time they are able to obtain what they want from Brazil. In this regard, it should be noted that the gravitational pull of such communities is not determined merely by cultural orientation. Compatriots are not the same as fellow ethnics, as discussed in Chapter 5. Finally, it is important to keep in mind that migration is a dynamic process in

Conclusion 151 which the identity and lifestyles of groups are constantly changing, and therefore much of the work produced on the Nikkeijin rapidly becomes out of date. As to whether or not their experience will turn out to be similar to other minorities, it seems likely that if they continue to prefer their own group and asserting their differentiated identities they will continue to feel and be seen as foreign. Also to be expected is a resulting further isolation from the local Japanese, although this is by no means true for all of them. By not integrating and by dealing with the Japanese culture on equal terms, they challenge the Japanese way of life, and it is here that problems may arise. It also seems probable that they will constitute a subordinate group for some time. One must remember that immigrants are almost always in a disadvantaged position compared with natives, but this does not necessarily mean that their subordinate status will be perpetuated. Moreover, as already mentioned, it is difficult to foresee whether the Nikkeijin as a minority will be targets of discrimination and prejudice merely because of their cultural allegiance to Brazil. The bases of discrimination are not grounded in ‘differences’, but on the conditions that allow the attribution of meaning to ‘differences’. In the context of labour shortages, foreign workers are welcome. They only become an issue when they cease to be needed anymore. In this regard much depends on the Japanese labour market. Even if it is unclear whether the Nikkeijin benefit from affinities with the Japanese, their legal status certainly grants them working conditions similar to the natives. Ultimately, the question whether or not their experience will turn out to be similar to other minorities in Japan depends very largely upon the destiny of Japanese society as a whole.

Politics of identity, immigrants and national identity National boundaries are artificially created, and nations differ in their criteria for the admission of individuals. Some, such as France and the United States, do not require common descent. Others, including Germany and Japan, are tied to common ancestry.7 Whatever the criteria, ‘the processes of exclusion and rejection uncover and reveal and become constitutive of the national identity’.8 As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the Japanese Immigration Law and the special treatment accorded to the Nikkeijin have been seen as an opportune method by which the Japanese government has used ‘race’ in order simultaneously to satisfy labour demands and to control the numbers of undocumented foreign workers, most of them from Asia. This idea has foundation. For decades the official view of Japan has been one of a homogeneous and closed (non-immigrant country), and this ideology makes the Nikkeijin most nearly appropriate as candidates for immigration to Japan.9 Nonetheless, the current Japanese Immigration Law does not reflect only racial and social concerns. It is much in agreement with the principles that first guided emigration to Brazil. As shown in Chapters 1 and 3, there was a preoccupation on the part of Japanese officialdom to support and protect emigrants in Brazil, and this policy implied supporting them in maintaining their ‘Japaneseness’. From this

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point of view, the privileged treatment that the Nikkeijin receive according to the Law can be seen as a return on investment. The basic framework that has determined Japanese immigration legislation has been maintained from 1899 to 1999 (Nawrocki 1999). Nonetheless, continual economic, political and social changes are taking place. ‘Foreign workers’ (although their numbers are still small) have thus become a part of the political agenda. Some politicians whip up popular anxiety about the social costs of accepting foreigners; others want to promote a ‘multicultural’ Japan. The integration of the Nikkeijin and other foreigners has been a matter of much debate among scholars. ‘Assimilation policies’, which demand the abandonment of distinctive social identities, have been recently rejected in favour of ‘integration’, that is, a recognition of diversity. Furthermore, the dominant discourse has changed. Since the 1980s, there has been considerable political and economic investment in the ‘internationalisation’ of the country, as mentioned in Chapter 5. The media promotes an interest in foreign cultures, and Press articles are often published appealing for greater acceptance of foreigners. ‘Multiculturalism’ and ‘globalisation’ have become an important part of the official, academic and media discourse.10 Although this effort is far from producing practical results, it has resulted in an increase of interest in foreigners and foreign cultures. In addition to this (and perhaps partly because of it), Japan’s relationship with the rest of the world and its minorities has been changing, albeit at a slow pace. A proof of this is the fact that the Chief Cabinet Secretary of the former Prime Minister, Keizo Obuchi, a powerful politician in the government, was from an area known as ‘dowa’ (Burakumin area) and has a background very different from that of other politicians.11 It is also important that the right of Korean residents in Japan to participate in municipal elections is now a matter of national debate (Takenaka 1997). The results of the survey also suggest that Korean and Chinese residents are seen as being capable of integration. The bill approved in the Lower House in March 1999 abolishes the use of fingerprinting for foreigners and although the liberalisation of Japanese citizenship regulations is not yet an issue, it may soon become one. We should also consider the possibility that Japanese self-confidence, which in the post-war period has been based largely on economic achievements, may have been shaken by the current economic and financial crisis. This may challenge the way the Japanese see themselves and their nation. Most importantly, the actual pattern of immigration is somewhat different from the objectives of immigration policy, as stated in Chapter 4. Acceptance of the Nikkeijin has not in fact stemmed the inward flow of other foreigners of nonJapanese ancestry, and migration to Japan shows no signs of coming to an end. On this point it must be observed, as Lie (1998: 542–3) remarks, the issue of foreign workers in Japan is no longer just a political debate between cosmopolitans and xenophobes. Filipino entertainers and Iranian telephone card sellers have become recognisable character types in Japan. This is particularly important in a country where the ideal of homogeneity, however illusory, has been highly valued. Japan, like any other industrial society, will sooner or later be confronted with cultural diversity. Moreover, the post-colonial trend that promotes differences and

Conclusion 153 a pluralistic conception of nationality has had a global impact on the question of national identities, and consequently it is reasonable to suppose that, as Japanese society becomes more diverse, it will be more tolerant towards its minorities, and eventually will accept its multiple identities. National identity ‘is not something passed down, but something discovered and re-invented’ (Fischer 1986: 232–3). It is continuously constructed and reshaped in its interaction with outsiders, and particularly with immigrants. The Nikkeijin and other minorities challenge the dominant national identity. They generate a need to rethink ‘Japaneseness’ as an identity rather than as a product of historical contingencies. Therefore, I should like to conclude by suggesting that ultimately the issue of the Nikkeijin is profoundly implicated in the larger redefinition of Japan’s national identity. Traditionally defined ‘Japaneseness’ has been partly deconstructed by the presence of the Nikkeijin. Given this, the Nikkeijin may well contribute to reshaping a new Japanese ethnic identity, while reconstructing their own. The purpose of this book has been to understand how the Nikkeijin construct their identities, redefining ethnicity within the peculiarly local crucible of mutually perceived ethnic identities. To achieve this purpose the study has focused on the contingent processes which have shaped Nikkeijin identities in terms of a social interaction within the Brazilian and Japanese contexts. The experience of the Japanese immigrants and their descendants, and the strategic identity shifts that result from this experience, have been analysed in terms of reconstruction(s) and renegotiation(s) which emphasise a multiplicity of identities and difference.

Appendix A

Japanese emigrants to Latin American countries by period and country Country Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Cuba Dominica Mexico Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela Others

1899–1941

Post –1945

5,398 202 202,025 a 519 229 686

12,066 6,357 53,555

b000

14,476 415 521 33,070 18 12 4

b000 b000 b000

1,390 671 – 9, 612 2,615 b000 b000

161

Total 17,464 6,559 255,580 519 229 686 1,390 15,147 415 10,133 35,685 18 12 165

Sources: Adapted from Waga Kokumin no Kagai Hatten in Comissão (1992: 33, 424). Figures for the postwar period are drawn from Tsuchida (1995). Figures for Brazil are from the Japanese Consulate, quoted in Saga (1988: 19) and Comissão (1992: 424). Notes Numbers vary according to the source; according to Comissão (1992: 424) the number is 196,737. b No information. a

Appendix B

Number of Japanese emigrants to Brazil, 1908–1986 Year

Number

Year0

Number

Year0

Number

Year0

Number

Year0

Number

1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923

830 31 948 28 2,909 7,122 3,675 65 165 3,899 5,599 3,022 1,013 840

1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939

2,673 6,333 8,407 9,084 11,169 16,648 14,074 5,632 11,678 24,494 21,930 9,611 3,306 4,557 2,524 1,414

1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955

1,268 1,548 0 0 0 0 6 1 1 4 33 106 261 1,928 3,119 4,051

1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971

4,912 6,147 6,586 7,123 7,746 6,824

1972 1973 9174 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Total

352 492 239 254 1,126 682 584 500 562 417 329 289 261 258 363 225,580

a00

895

a00

2,124 1,138 903 937 1,070 597 496 435 452

Source: Japanese Consulate, quoted in Saga (1988: 19). Note No information; No information in the original table, but according to the KKKK list in Yoshioka (1995: 3) the figure is 1,087; however, according to Comissão (1992: 424) it is 1,225. a

Appendix C

Distribution of Brazilian Nikkeijin by prefecture in 1998 Hokkaido Tohoku Aomori Iwate Miyagi Akita Yamagata Fukushima Kanto Ibaraki Tochigi Gunma Saitama Chiba Tokyo Kanagawa Chubu Nigata

417 136 150 663 68 609 1,637 9,216 8,757 13,933 12,226 6,759 5,301 15,434 1,671

Fukui Ishikawa Toyama Yamanashi Nagano Gifu Shizuoka Aichi Mie Kansai Shiga Kyoto Osaka Hyogo Nara Wakayama Chugoku Tottori

Source: Japan Immigration Association (1998a:136–7).

2,508 1,731 3,489 4,122 14,676 11,818 32,202 42,917 12,433 8,407 932 6,142 4,544 1,136 359 133

Shimane Okayama Hiroshima Yamaguchi Shikoku Tokushima Kagawa Ehime Kochi Kyushu Fukuoka Saga Nagasaki Kumamoto Oita Miyasaki Kagoshima Okinawa

545 1,918 3,984 309 138 566 204 46 287 34 69 143 122 47 139 177

Appendix D

Research methodology The first phase of the research took place between 1992 and 1995 in Soja city, an industrial town in Okayama Prefecture. A total of 345 South American Nikkei respondents working in factories completed a fixed-choice questionnaire (in Portuguese and Spanish) that examined job satisfaction. The sample was representative in terms of demographics and occupational characteristics of the Nikkei population in Japan at that time. The study tested the hypothesis that there was a relationship between the command of Japanese language, generation and overall job satisfaction which was measured by a nine-item scale. The questionnaire included a section on working and living conditions. The social survey was complemented by interviews. Fifty interviews were conducted in different sets, inquiring into the life of South American Nikkeijin in Japan. This research provided the background for the subsequent research. The second phase of the research was conducted during March and April of 1997 in Brazil (São Paulo city and Promissão, a village in São Paulo State). This phase consisted of interviews conducted within the Japanese communities in São Paulo. Informants in the communities were contacted through friends who worked in Nikkei newspapers, and with whom the researcher lived during fieldwork in Brazil. Interviews were conducted with staff of the Nikkei newspapers, members of the main institutions of the Japanese communities in Brazil (Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros, Aliança Nipo-Brasileira, Museu da Imigração, Japanese associations, etc.). The ‘snowballing’ social network method was used to build the sample of Nikkeijin subjects to be interviewed. An interview schedule was developed to address the following topics: the meaning of being a Nikkeijin; the experience of being Nikkeijin in Brazil; how being Nikkeijin affects attitudes to life in Brazil; how the Nikkeijin are treated and how they are perceived in Brazil; Nikkei communities in Brazil and ethnic life; images of Japan and pre-migration wishes and expectations. The following topics were discussed variously with three groups: Nikkeijin who had returned to Brazil after some years in Japan, Nikkeijin who had never been to Japan, and Nikkeijin who intended to return to Japan for the second time after spending some time in Brazil. For the group who had been to Japan other issues

158

Appendix D

were surveyed, including recruitment, working and living conditions. Interviews were also conducted among first-generation Japanese immigrants about their lives as immigrants in Brazil. The third phase of the research was conducted in March and April 1998 in Aichi, Okayama and Shizuoka Prefectures and from September 1998 to February 1999 in Kanagawa Prefecture and Tokyo Metropolitan Prefecture. This phase focused on mutual and interactive perceptions of the Japanese and the Nikkeijin. Interviews in Japan with the Nikkeijin were a continuation of those in Brazil, and the topic of being a Nikkeijin in Japan was once again pursued. In addition to this, the following topics were discussed: the experience of being Nikkeijin in Brazil; pre-migration wishes and expectations; migration experience; being Nikkeijin in Japan; how being Nikkeijin affects life in Japan; how the Nikkeijin are treated and how they are perceived in Japan; experiences of being discriminated against; life in Nikkei communities in Japan. Informants were chosen according to a large number of variables (age, education and occupational backgrounds) and priority was given to intensive work with informants with different backgrounds and in different situations. Interviews with the Nikkeijin were conducted over a period of six years in different sets, and more than 100 Nikkeijin were interviewed, chosen by the ‘snowballing’ social network method. In addition to the above methods, participant observation was conducted. The researcher had the opportunity of living with a Nikkei family in Toyohashi (Aichi Prefecture). Some members of this family had been interviewed in Brazil and invited the researcher to stay with them in Japan. A questionnaire was administered to 615 Japanese subjects in order to explore notions of ‘being a Japanese’ and the perceived importance of Japanese descent for acceptance as a foreign worker in Japan. The questionnaire asked participants (non-random, convenience sampling) for their opinions concerning the following: the most and the least important criteria for being a Japanese; an assessment of which group of foreigners would find it easiest to live in Japan; which conditions ought properly to be required for accepting foreign workers in Japan. The second part of the questionnaire gathered sociodemographic data and explored the degree of previous contact with foreigners and acquaintance with Nikkeijin. A group of 25 Japanese subjects in the five prefectures were interviewed in order to explore their perceptions of the Nikkeijin. The interview sample was constructed in different ways: apart from geographical differences, respondents were chosen according to differences in educational and occupational background, age, contact with foreigners and the Nikkeijin. Interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed, except when respondents refused to be tape-recorded, and in those cases the information was taken in note form. Interviews were intended to complement the questionnaire survey. Data was analysed in two ways. The information content of the interviews was analysed with the aim of articulating the salient themes of each individual experience as they related to ethnicity. Answers to the questionnaire were analysed by conventional statistical analysis.

Glossary

Ainu early inhabitants of the Japanese Islands called Hokkaido Amarelos yellow Anguramane underground money Arubaito part-time job Ashiajin Asians Baka gaijin stupid foreigner Beneficiência Nipo-Brasileira Nippaku Engyökai, abbreviated to Enkyö, Japanese–Brazilian Social Assistance Bon odori Japanese traditional dance BRATAC abbreviation of Burajiru Takushoku Kumiai, the Brazilian Colonisation Association Brazil boke (senile) term used by the post-war immigrants in Brazil to refer to the pre-war immigrants Bunka kokka culture nation-state Bunka culture Burajiru Brazil Burajirujin the Brazilians Burajiru Jihö News from Brazil, newspapers of the Japanese community in Brazil Burajiru Imin Kumiai the Brazilian Emigration Society Burajiru kara Dekasegi migrants from Brazil Burajiru Nihongo Gakkö Rengö Kai Federation of Japanese Language Schools Burajiru Nikkei Koronia communities of people of Japanese descent in Brazil Burajiru To Do Fu Kenjinkai Rengökai Federation of Associations of Japanese Prefectures, abbreviated to Kenren Burakumin literally ‘hamlet people’, descendants of the outcast Eta, literally full of impurity. The Eta during Edo period (1603–1868) occupied the lowest place in the society Butsudan a Buddhist altar Caboclos mestizos Camdoblé Brazilian magic cult of African origin

160

Glossary

CATLA abbreviation of Comissão de Apoio a Trabalhadores Latino-Americanos, LatinAmerican Support Committee Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros Japanese–Brazilian Studies Centre Centro de Informação ao Trabalhador Workers Abroad Information Centre, abbreviated to CIATE Chrysanthemum incident the controversy within the Japanese communities in Brazil caused by an article written in the newspaper Gakusei Renmei (Students Union) in 1934 Chügokoku Kojishijo Japanese orphans left in China at the end of World War II Colonos migrant labourers Conselho de Imigração e Colonização Council of Immigration and Colonisation Conselhos de Cidadãos Committees of Citizens Cotia the most important co-operative created by Japanese immigrants in Brazil Dai Nihon the great Japan Dai shori the glorious victory of Japan Dai Töa Kyöei Ken the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Dainisei literally ‘great second generation’ Dekasegi imin migrant labourers Dekasegi konjö literally ‘this life’, but suggesting a disposition to work away from home Departamento da Imprensa e Propaganda the Brazilian government’s Press and propaganda agency during the Vargas regime Disque Saúde literally, Dial Health, medical assistance for Brazilians in Japan Dögyö kumiai professional co-operatives Dowa Burakumin areas Dökenjin immigrants from the same prefecture Dösensha immigrants who came to Brazil on the same ship Enryo syndrome behavioural reserve Fazendas coffee plantations Feijoada black beans, a typical Brazilian dish Fundo Mútuo de Auxílio dos Trabalhadores Latino-Americanos Latin-American Workers’ Mutual Found Furusato the ancestral locality Gaijin abbeviation of Gaikokujin, foreigner, usually used to refer to western foreigners Gaikokujin ni natta Nihonjin literally ‘Japanese who became foreigners’ Gaikokujin rödösha foreign workers Gambaru to persevere Garantido literally ‘guaranted’, nickname for Japanese immigrants in Brazil. Gatto Undö Aido Eiju literally, enjoy the land, in Portuguese Gozar a Terra, abbreviated to GAT Geiseiteki seishin emigrated in a spirit of sacrifice Genshijin primitives

Glossary

161

Giri duty and responsibility Gisei imin sacrificed immigrants Go sanke the three branch families of the Tokugawa house. In Brazil the term was used to refer to the Japanese Consulate, BRATAC and KKKK Go shinei the portrait of the Emperor Gosenbetsu farewell gifts Guaraná Brazilian soft drink Hadaka ikkan without resources Haha no kai the mothers’ association Hakko ichiü placing the eight corners of the world under one [Japanese] roof, a Japanese wartime slogan Han fiefs Harakiri ritual suicide Heinin commoners Hen-na Gaijin strange foreigner Hibakusha survivors of the atomic bomb Höjin shakai The Society of the Japanese Nationals Höjin Japanese nationals Honne one’s real feelings, heart Ichi nin mae not complete persons Ie family unity Ijime to bully Ijü Kumiai Emigration Association Ijü-ichi immigration settlements, permanent Japanese communities in Brazil Issei first generation Japão Novo New Japan, term used by pre-war immigrants to refer to post-war immigrants Japão Japan Japonês Japanese Japoneses the Japanese Jeitinho Brasileiro Brazilian flair Ji kosaku owners of small farms JICA abbreviation of Kokusai Kyöryoku Jigyö Dan, Japan International Co-operation Agency Junnisei literally quasi-Nisei. Term used to refer to the Nisei born in Japan and brought up in Brazil Jyuzu the Buddhist rosary Kachi gumi literally, victory unit Kaigai Ijü Döshi Kai the Emigration Fellowship Society Kaigai Kogyö Kabushiki Kaisha Overseas Industrial (development) Company, abbreviated to KKKK Kaigai Kyökai Overseas Asssociation Kaigai Nikkeijin Kyökai Nikkeijin Assistance Overseas Association Kaigai Shinkö Kabushiki Kaisha Overseas Emigration Development Kami god(s)

162

Glossary

Kamidama a Shinto altar Kasato Maru the first ship with Japanese emigrants to Brazil Katakana syllabary used to write foreign words Kazoku kokka nation as a family Keigo honorific forms Keishiki kazoku or kösei kazoku literally ‘constructed or composed family’, artificially constituted families Ken Japanese prefecture Kenjinkai Prefectural Associations Kenren Federation of Association of the Prefectures Kenshüsei trainees Kesshitai Suicide Unit, a group of Shindö Renmei Ketö literally ‘white man’, a Westerner; a pejorative term used by some Japanese immigrants to refer to the local Brazilians; a Tokugawa term for ‘red-haired barbarian’ Ketsueki no döitsusei homogeneity of blood Kichisa Imin Goshi Kaisha Kishisa Emigration Company Kikokushijo returnee schoolchildren Kimin unwanted, abandoned person Kinben-na hito diligent, hard-working Kinshukusha boarding school Kita shita hito naturalised person KKKK abbreviation of Kaigai Kögyö Kabushiki Kaisha, Overseas Industrial Company Kö filial piety Köden ‘incense money’, a money gift at funerals Kodösha The Imperial Way Society Kokka state, country, nation Kokoku Shokumin Kaisha the Empire Emigration Company Kokugo mother tongue Kokumin Kenkö Hoken National Health Insurance Kokumin citizens Kokusai Kyoryoku Jigyö Dan Japanese International Co-operation Agency, abbreviated to JICA Kokusaika internationalisation Kokusaku imin governmental policy of emigration Kokutai no Hongi the cardinal principles of the national entity of Japan Konketsuji literally ‘mixed blood’, offspring of a Japanese and a non-Japanese Koroniago language spoken in the Japanese communities in Brazil Koseki töhon document with information on the family in Japan Koshinjö and tanteisha detective agencies that conduct blood lineage inquiries before marriage Ku sections, divisions in Japanese communities in Brazil Kukai poetry club Kumiai labour union and also producers’ co-operatives

Glossary

163

Kyöiku Chokugo Imperial Rescript on Education Kyüimin pre-war immigrants Kyüyö Kyökai a predecessor of the Association of Okinawa Liberdade literally freedom, the name of the Japanese quarter in São Paulo Linha de Assistência a Latinos helpline to assist Latin-Americans Mabiki imin thinned out immigrants. Macumba (umbanda) Brazilian magic cults of African origin Majime-na diligent, hard-working Make gumi literally defeat unit Manga Japanese comic Meiji era period between 1868 and 1912 Meishi business cards Mestiço people of mixed marriage. Amongst the Nikkeijin the term refers to the offspring of a Nikkeijin and non-Nikkeijin Miai arranged marriage Miso soya paste Misoshiru soya soup Mochigashi beancurd cakes Muko yöshi adoption of a husband, who takes the family name of his wife Mura hachi literally ‘village eight part’, ostracised Mura village, traditional Japanese community Nachijin Japanese not from Okinawa Naködo intermediaries in arranged marriages Nanbei South America NHK Japanese Broadcasting Corporation Nihon Bunka Kyökai Association of Japanese Culture Nihon bunka Japanese culture Nihongakkö (Nihonjingakkö) Japanese schools Nihon Imin Engo Kyökai Association of Mutual Assistance for Japanese Immigrants, later Nippaku EngoKyökai, abbreviated as Enkyö Nihon ni sumu nanbei shusshin no Nikkeijin Nikkeijin living in Japan from South America Nihon Sensai Döhö Kyuen Kai the Committee for the Relief of War Victims in Japan, organised in 1947 by the leaders of the victory faction Nihon Japan Nihongo Japanese language Nihonjin Gakkö Fukyö Kai Association for the Diffusion of Japanese Schools Nihonjin Kyöiku Fukyü Kai Society for the Diffusion of the Japanese Language in Brazil Nihonjin no chi no tsunagari blood relations Nihonjin no chi Japanese blood Nihonjin no kimochi feelings of a Japanese Nihonjin no tokusei the special characteristics of the Japanese Nihonjin the Japanese Nihonjinkai Japanese associations

164

Glossary

Nihonjinron literally ‘theories of the Japanese’ Nihonteki kokuminsei national character Nikkei colonias communities of people of Japanese descent in Brazil Nikkeijin Koyö Sabisu Sentä the Employment Centre for Nikkeijin Nikkeijin Kyökai no Nikkeijin Södan Sentä centre that provides assistance to the Nikkeijin Nikkeijin people of Japanese descent Nippak Shinbun a newspaper of the Japanese community in Brazil Nippaku Bunka Kyökai Societies of Japanese–Brazilian Culture Nippaku a company Nisei second generation Noivas para o sul brides for the south Nökyö the Central Association of Agricultural Co-operatives of Japan O caminho dos parentes literally, the relative’s way, family reunion Öbeijin Europeans and North Americans Obentoya Japanese take away food services Obon holiday in August to celebrate the ancestors Odori Japanese dance Okinawa Kyökai do Brasil association of people of Okinawan origin in Brazil Okinawans inhabitants of the Southwest Japanese islands of Okinawa Olho puxado slant eyes Omiki gift of sacred sake to the gods On filial obligation of reciprocity Onaji kama no meshi o kü eat from the same pan Onryö the spirit of revenge Osewa ni natte iru feeling grateful Ossonae a gift of rice cakes Pãezinhos de queijo bread rolls made with cheese Patrulhas do lixo literally garbage patrols Rainichi Gaikokujin foreigners who go to Japan RENGO Japan Trade Union Confederation Reunião familiar family reunion San san kudo drinking sake and exchanging glasses at wedding ceremonies Sangyö Kaihatsu Seinentai Groups of Young people for Industrial Development Sansei third generation São Paulo Nihon Bunka Kyökai Japanese Cultural Association SEBRAE abbreviation of Serviço de Apoio às Micro e Pequenas Empresas, service to assist small and medium-sized entreprises Seinendan or seinenkai youth associations Semai kuni small country Senzo ancestors Shiheimin new citizens Shishi patriots in the last days of the Tokugawa regime (1603–1867)

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Shinshukyö New Religions, for example, Tenrikyö, Omoto and Seicho no ie Shindö Renmei the Federation of Loyal Subjects Shinimin post-war immigrants Shinmin a subject; Nihonshimin, a Japanese subject Shita machi lower city Shojokai girls’ associations Shokuminchi literally colonies, one type of Japanese settlements in Brazil Shöyu soya sauce Sociedade Promotora da Imigração Society for the Promotion of Immigration Sociedade de Sericultura de São Paulo São Paulo Society for Sericulture Soto outside Tanomoshikö financial mutual assistance societies Tatemae literally ‘front’, what is shown, face Tenchösetsu the birthday of the Japanese Emperor Tenchugumi Unit of Divine Punishment, one group of Shindö Renmei Tennösei the Emperor system of Japan To Dö Fu Kenjinkai Rengökai the Federation of Associations of Japanese Prefectures (the metropolis and districts), abbreviated to Kenren Tokkötai Special Attack Unit, a term also used to refer to kamikaze; a group within Shindö Renmei Tokugawa era (or Edo period), period between 1603–1867 Tözan Kigyö a subsidiary of Mitsubishi Transição transition Uchinänchu the Okinawans Ue machi upper city Umbanda Brazilian religion of African origin Undö kai sports meetings Ütan or Yütan U-turn Yabanjin savages Yakuza Japanese organised crime Yamato damashii the Japan spirit (soul) Yamato kotoba the Japanese language Yökoku adoptive country Yöshi adopted child Yuinö exchanging gifts at wedding ceremonies Yukata summertime cotton kimono Zai Burajiru Nihonjin Döjinkai Association of Japanese Residents in Brazil Zaihaku Döhö compatriot residents in Brazil Zaihaku Höjin Shakai the Community of Compatriots Zainichi Burajiru Brazilians residing in Japan Zainichi literally residents in Japan, Chinese and Koreans residents Zairyü imin Japanese residents Zakkon mixed marriages

Notes

Introduction 1 This will be discussed in Chapter 5. Two examples will suffice here: ‘. . . they [the Nikkeijin] are culturally and linguistically Brazilians and Peruvians.’ (Yamanaka 1993:79); ‘Latin Americans in language, culture, personality and behaviour.’ (Yamanaka 1996:68); ‘The long established identity of Nikkeijin in their country [Brazil] . . .’(Mori 1996: 41). 2 For the purpose of illustration here are two examples: ‘Are the Nikkeijin Japanese?’ (Yamanaka 1996:73); ‘Japonês ou Brasileiro: como se sente o jovem Nikkei’ (Japanese or Brazilian: how do young Nikkeijin feel?) (Japão Aqui, 1 (3) July, 1997). 3 Identity can be understood as the sum of social identities used by a person to define himself or herself. Social identity is defined by Tajfel (1982:17) as ‘the process of locating oneself, or another person, within a system of social categorization, or as a noun, to any social categorization used by a person to define him or herself and others’. 4 In 1997, the number of Nikkeijin in the five areas were as follows: Aichi Prefecture 42,917; Kanagawa Prefecture 15,434; Okayama Prefecture 1,918; Shizuoka Prefecture 32,202; Tokyo Metropolitan Prefecture 5,301 (Japan Immigration Association 1998). 1 An overview of Japanese emigration 1 Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten (The Expansion of Our People) was published by the Foreign Ministry Consular and Emigration Affairs Department and Emigration Statistics 1952–1989 (Comissão 1992: 33, table 1). According to Japan Office Statistics in Normano and Gerbi (1943:11), there were 142,395 Japanese immigrants in North America and 200,820 in South America. 2 According to Normano and Gerbi (1943:11, table 2), by 1938, the Japanese community in Brazil numbered 95,116 and that in Manchuria numbered 233,842. According to a census conducted in 1958, there were 430,135 Japanese living in Brazil. 3 The following reasons were given: Japanese immigrants had a high mobility, were not good at farming and could not be easily assimilated into Brazilian culture. It was also argued that it was far more expensive to bring immigrants from Japan than from Europe because of the distances involved. Moreover, as immigrants from European countries had fewer adaptation problems, it would be a better investment to subsidise those immigrants (Comissão 1992; Handa 1987; Nogueira 1973). 4 Comissão 1992: 156 and Normano and Gerbi 1943: 29. This association had already been founded by the prefectures of Hiroshima and Kumamoto in 1915, but was now extended to all prefectures. 5 Fukunaga (1983: 33). The primary purpose of BRATAC was to found communities and to develop the necessary infrastructures for the settlement of the immigrants. This organisation financed the immigrants, opened roads, set up schools and provided medical services for the immigrants. In 1937, BRATAC widened its activities from

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agriculture to commerce, industry and exports. It founded the Casa Bancária Bratac which later became Banco América do Sul, the most important financial institution of Japanese immigrants (Comissão 1992: 535). Jirimutu (1994:17). According to Moreno (1981:36), 156,340 entered the country between 1924 and 1941. Figures from 1924 onwards are from Suzuki (1969, 1971). Figures depend on the source. Here figures are from Comissão, 1992: 33, 191. The most basic data on the characteristics – size, distribution and composition – of the Japanese population since the beginning of emigration to Brazil are not available in Brazil. The first population survey of Japanese people living in Brazil was carried out in 1958, by a committee organised within the Japanese community in São Paulo, as one of the commemorative programmes marking the 50th anniversary of Japanese emigration to Brazil. Information on pre-war settlement has been drawn mainly from Comissão (1992); Fukanaga (1983); Handa (1987); Jirimitu (1994); Makabe (1981); Nogueira (1973, 1983); Reichl (1988); Rezende (1991); Saito (1961); Staniford (1973); and Suzuki (1969, 1971). Numbers do not tally, and vary according to the author. For example, according to Reichl, there were 772 individuals and 167 families. For Jirimutu, the number was 781 individuals and 158 families. Here I chose the number presented by Comissão (1992: 63). According to Rezende (1991), some days before the departure, the Minister for Foreign Affairs had demanded a deposit of 100,000 yen as a guarantee. Mizuno, the president of the emigration company, did not have the money. He had borrowed 50,000 yen however, and as this amount was not enough, he had asked the immigrants to deposit the money in the ship’s safe, arguing security reasons, and had used it to pay the guarantee. According to Vieira (1973a: 78), in many cases the owners of plantations gave away the land or sold it for a nominal price. Unless otherwise indicated, data for the following were drawn from Cardoso (1973, 1995); Comissão (1992); Handa (1987); Saga (1988); Saito (1961); and Vieira (1973a). In 1920, the number of families in Campo Grande was 50, and only one of these was not from Okinawa. In 1958, the number was 600 and only 25 per cent were from other prefectures (Comissão 1992). Maeyama (1979: 595). According to Comissão (1992: 578), go sanke was composed of the KKKK, the Japanese Consulate and the Bunkyö Fukyükai (Association for the Diffusion of Education/Culture). All overseas Japanese communities exhibited similar patterns. In Peru, Japan’s official policy on emigration also played a significant role in establishing communities and supervising them (Normano and Gerbi 1943). For the United States, see Conroy and Miyakawa (1972). For a detailed account of the daily life of the immigrants, see Handa (1980, 1987); see also Matsuno (1929). The following discussion of the use of the Japanese language is based on Handa (1973, 1987: 498–9), Kanazawa and Loveday (1988) and on fieldwork conducted in Brazil. Interpreters had been sent ahead of or with the emigrants by the emigration companies. Some immigrants studied in the evening with the interpreter’s help, but the interpreter was not a qualified teacher, and explanations were difficult. In 1917, the newspaper Burajiru Jihö published Portuguese lessons, but the Portuguese taught by the newspaper was very different from the Portuguese they heard in daily life and they thought these lessons had mistakes. Since 1958, the proportion of households with two generations living together diminished from 70 to 58 per cent, but the percentage of the population of Japanese origin who live with their parents or parents-in-law is much higher than the rest of the Brazilian population (Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros 1990). Although it was legally impossible under Brazilian law, the system of muko yöshi was made possible through the Japanese Consulate. The majority of yöshi are from the post-war period (Vieira 1973a). The registration of births, marriages and deaths was performed by the Japanese Consulate until 1924, when the Japanese government

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proclaimed a new decree, according to which the children of Japanese people residing overseas would be registered as Japanese citizens, provided that they were registered in the Consulate fourteen days after their birth (Mello 1972: 379). This came to an end after 1941 with the breakdown in relations between Japan and Brazil. As a Japanese saying puts it ‘urimono, atotori, yojinbo’ (goods for sale, heir and bodyguard). Daughters were goods, the eldest son the heir, and the third the bodyguard (Fututake 1964, quoted in Maeyama 1979: 258). Saito (1953, 1961: 218). Japanese traditional customs persist particularly in rural areas, and the practice of miai is still in use in some areas. There are professional agencies that function like naködo (intermediates) in São Paulo. On the subject, see Mello (1972) and Maeyama (1973). Comissão (1992: 212) and Handa (1987: 114). It should be noted that, although Japanese immigrants tried to educate their children, in many cases this was not possible, and there was a period during which parents were more educated than their children. Comissão (1992: 125). The Japanese government encouraged the maintenance of Japanese culture through Japanese language schools, newspapers and other institutions in all countries where the number of Japanese immigrants was significant. This attitude is by no means unique to Japan because, to a certain extent, other countries did the same for their emigrants, although probably not to the same degree. In the course of the late Meiji period the Imperial Rescript on Education (1890) was gradually enshrined at the core of national education, where it remained until 1946. The origin of the Rescript was the premise that national education should serve the state. In Meiji Japan loyalty and patriotism were joined to a social ethic, since shared moral values were considered the surest means of promoting national unity. For a fuller explanation see Gluck (1985). However, it should not be assumed that this education was not criticised. The editor of Nippak Shinbun is an example of someone who criticised the educational system in the Japanese schools in Brazil. In the editorial of the newspaper Nippak Shinbun on 31 July 1925, he stressed that there was an important difference between teaching the Japanese language and the Japanese spirit (Hatanaka 1993). Incidentally, the controversy between Miura of Nippak Shinbun and the owner of Burajiru Jihö, who was oriented to Japanese tradition and Japanese nationalism, led eventually to the expulsion of the latter from Brazil. In the time of the Empire which lasted until 1822, all residents in Brazil were required to be Roman Catholics but after that religious freedom was recognised. However, Japanese authorities did not allow preachers to emigrate to Brazil until the post-war period, arguing that it was an ‘intelligent measure for the future development of our people’ (Noda 1926, cited in Comissão 1992: 564). Buddhism and Shinto are the dominant religions in Japan. Buddhism is closely associated with the family. Daily observances within the family, especially involving rites performed at a family shrine, are more frequent and important than visits to temples. The memory of the ancestors is preserved in the butsudan (Buddhist altar). When a member of the family dies, a tablet with her or his name is placed there. In Japan people travel across the whole country to visit the homes of their birth and their ancestors. Obviously, immigrants could not continue this practice, but, once a year, obon was celebrated to remember the departed ancestors. There is evidence that there were tanomoshikö in Japan as early as the Kamakura era (1185–1333) (Vieira 1973a: 220, note 179). Similar associations were founded by the Japanese in Peru (Clubes de Ahorro) and in Hawaii. However, it should be noted that the economy of the Japanese communities was not only based upon a traditional mutualism. During the early years, the emigration companies financed the immigrants, but later on financial instituitions were set up. Yokohama Bank, predecessor of the Bank of Tokyo, was established in 1919 in Rio de Janeiro and from 1935 onwards financed the immigrants. BRATAC opened its financial institution in 1937 and in the same year the Bank Kaiko was established (Comissão 1992: 535).

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29 Brazil broke off diplomatic relations with Japan on 29 January 1942, and on 6 June 1945, declared war on Japan. 30 Measures employed against the Axis foreigners in 1942 included prohibition of travel without permission; banning of manufacture or possession of firearms and explosives; dissolution of associations; the freezing of funds and the closing of commercial houses and banks owned by immigrants of German, Italian and Japanese descent. According to Fukunaga (1983: 119), Japanese immigrants were not singled out for any special treatment like their counterparts in the United States, but they were subjected to the same tactics that were employed elsewhere, such as relocation and internment. 31 According to Normano and Gerbi (1943: 52–3), the investigators concluded that the Japanese resisted any attempts to assimilate them into Brazilian society. 32 It has often been claimed that, of all the measures imposed on the Japanese, the most painful was the closing of Japanese schools, because through these schools Japanese values were inculcated and the Japanese traditional system preserved. It is highly suggestive of this preoccupation that Chibata Miyakoshi, an influential leader of the Japanese community and a representative of the KKKK, published in 1941 an essay on the situation of Japanese immigrants and the measures imposed by the Brazilian authorities. In this essay, he encouraged immigrants to worship their ancestors, because now that Japanese schools were not allowed, the responsibility of the future of the Zaihaku Höjin (the Japanese in Brazil) lay with the family (Comissão 1992). 33 During the Sino–Japanese and Russo–Japanese wars (1894–1905), Japanese immigrants had already exhibited their patriotism. The same happened in Hawaii and in the continental United States. Many Japanese immigrants sent money to Japan and others returned to fight for their country (Satsuma 1990). With the occupation of Manchuria the nationalistic campaigns developed further, and the rhetoric used in Japanese overseas communities was the same as that in Japan. In Peru, a fund-raising campaign was organised among Japanese residents in support of Japan. The same kind of campaign and chauvinistic fervour were in evidence within the Japanese community of Brazil, and some Nisei who had been sent to Japan to study and had Japanese nationality, or dual nationality were called on to fight for Japan during World War II (Comissão 1992: 239). 34 There were many associations in São Paulo and Paraná, claiming to promote unity among Japanese immigrants: The Nippon Kokumin Zen Eitai (the Guard of the Great Empire of Japan), Kiyöei Kiyökai (the Mutual Prosperity Association) Aikoku Rengo Niponjinkai (the Patriotic Association of the Japanese), Kokusui Sennen Dan (the Nationalistic Group of Youngsters), Aikoku Seika Fujinkai (the Association of Japanese Patriotic Ladies). 35 Seiijiro Mihara of the newspaper Burajiru Jihö was found to be involved in promoting the idea that immigrants, as Japanese subjects, should commit harakiri (or seppuku, literally belly). Since its foundation on the day of the Japanese Emperor’s birthday, Burajiru Jihö was ideologically very nationalist and supported the kachi gumi (Comissão 1992, Hatanaka 1993). 36 Comissão (1992: 302). Shindö Renmei had 80 branches and more than 100,000 adepts, 87 per cent of them in the state of São Paulo and Paraná (Vieira 1973: 255). According to one leader, Hekisui Yoshii, in his manuscript of memories of his imprisonment in 1948, Shindö was born when the members of the Japanese Consulate ‘abandoned the immigrants to their luck’ (quoted in Comissão 1992: 262). For a detailed account of the trial of the members of Shindö Renmei, see Neves (1960). 37 Maeyama (1979), Comissão (1992). Not all Nisei were on the side of the kachi gumi. A group of Nisei expressed a willingness to fight for Brazil. Some Nisei such as José Yamashiro and Kenro Shimomoto served as volunteers against the government of Getúlio Vargas in 1932. It should also be noted that the Journal of the Gakusei Renmei (Students Union), created in 1934, defended the right of the Nisei not to identify themselves with Japan. The war put an end to the activities of the Union in 1941.

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38 Headlines from Folha do Norte, 1 April 1946, O Estado de São Paulo, 4 April 1946, Correio Paulistano, 4 April 1946 quoted in Hatanaka (1993: 60–3). 39 Izumi (1957: 13–127), who conducted fieldwork from October 1952 to February 1953 in the states of São Paulo, Paraná, Pará and Amazonas with 636 interviews, most of them from rural areas, reported that in 1955 the conflict still existed. 40 Emigrants who had gone to overseas possessions were obliged to return to Japan, and special resettlement communities were created for them in rural areas. National and prefecture officials encouraged them to move away. Some of them re-emigrated to South America. See, for example, Staniford (1973). 41 Of the 16,191 who came between 1952 and 1959, 14,124 arrived in this way (Comissão 1992: 424). 42 Sims (1972, cited in Jirimutu 1994:20) reported that the Brazilian government authorised the entrance of Japanese immigrants to certain areas, and set quotas. These quotas remained in place until 1966, when the Japanese–Brazilian Joint Committee was established and quotas were abolished. 43 JICA is a governmental organisation, intended to implement programmes and projects to provide international technical assistance for developing countries. Brazil is the sixth largest country receiving assistance from this organisation (Notícias do Japão, March 1997: 7). 44 There are plans for a sequel to this film, Gaijin 2, about Nikkeijin migrating to Japan. 45 The information on Japanese language schools was drawn from interviews in 1997 with the secretary and the director of Nihongo Fukyü Sentä (Centre for the Promotion of Japanese Language) and the survey conducted by the the centre in 1994; the co-ordinator of projects of the Japan Foundation in Brazil; teachers in charge of Japanese language education in Aliança Cultural Brasil–Japão in São Paulo. 2 Japanese immigrants in Brazil 1 For example, this view is taken by the president and the director of the Centre for Japanese Brazilian Studies in São Paulo. See Chapter 3. 2 Following Berry’s model (1990), four strategies are considered in the process of acculturation. Namely, assimilation through moving into the wider society and abandoning the culture of origin in favour of the receiving culture; integration, which implies a degree of voluntary co-operation and also maintenance of the cultural identity of the immigrant group, while moving towards the dominant culture; marginalisation which implies little voluntarism on the part of the acculturating group and the group loses contact with both its traditional culture and the wider society; maintenance of the traditional way of life outside full participation in the dominant society. In the last case, segregation is the term used when the distance is imposed by the dominant group, and separation when it is desired by the acculturating group. 3 According to a report written by Kumaki Nakao, an immigrant who during 50 years recorded what happened to a group of 40 immigrant families (139 individuals) after their arrival in 1914, out of the 139, a total of 23 returned to Japan in the first 20 years, 14 because they had succeeded economically and 9 because of failure (cited in Saito 1961: 209). 4 The index of permanence in the state of São Paulo for the period 1908 to 1939 by nationality was the following: Japanese 93.3 per cent; Turks 53.2 per cent; Spanish 51 per cent; Portuguese 24.4 per cent; German 24.4 per cent; Italians 12.8 per cent; others 0.69 per cent (Boletim do Serviço de Imigração e Colonização 51 and 52, 1941). Percentages are slightly different according to other sources. 5 Many Japanese immigrants were willing to return to Japan or Japanese colonies in East Asia, particularly Manchuria, or to fight for Japan. The Japanese Consulate in São Paulo took initiatives to discourage them (Comissão 1992: 251–3). 6 IBGE, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 1956. The number of naturalisations does not merely reflect their allegiance to Japan or a desire for integration. There are

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many reasons of a practical nature to change nationality, related to, for example, business and political interests. Moreover, the number of naturalisations also reflects the immigration policies of the receiving country. In this respect, except for the period of the Vargas regime, Brazil was largely indifferent to the naturalisation of its immigrants (Fukunaga 1983: 69). In any case, we have to be careful in interpreting the number of naturalisations. During fieldwork in Brazil the researcher met an Issei man who had sought naturalisation, but had given up due to bureaucratic problems. One Issei living in the interior of the state of São Paulo (Promissão) told her that his application forms and other documents had been lost during the process. This figure was calculated on the basis of the findings of the survey conducted by JICA and reported in Comissäo (1992: 425). It should be noted that in 1924 the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in order to avoid problems with receiving countries, sent a notice to Japanese diplomatic representatives and consulates regarding the prevention of dual nationality. However, until World War II dual nationality was possible. This survey was conducted by the Nihongo Fukyü Sentä (Centre for the Diffusion of the Japanese Language) in São Paulo in 1994. Respondents could give more than one reason for learning Japanese. This information was supplied by the director of the Japanese language courses of Aliança Japan–Brasil. In Brazil, the inter-marriage rate is often presented as an indication of the integration of the Japanese and their descendants into Brazilian society (e.g. Saito 1980). Schaden (1980: 149). According to a survey conducted among Brazilian students in São Paulo, only 6 per cent of them admitted the possibility of having a Japanese member in their family (Schaden 1980: 520). However, according to research conducted by Butsugan (1980: 110), the Issei did not mind so much in the case of their daughters, but did care in the case of the son, since for Japanese tradition the first son and his family live with his parents. The low intermarriage rate in Brazil is not unique to this country. The pre-war immigrants in Peru also tended to avoid inter-marriage. In the United States, in 1924, only 2 per cent of Japanese were married to non Japanese; in 1948, the percentage was 12 per cent; in 1954, 20 per cent, and in 1972, 49 per cent (Kitano 1976:190–1). Vieira (1973b). It is interesting to note the position on this matter of the man who wrote most on the integration of Japanese immigrants into Brazilian society, Hiroshi Saito. According to his son, Saito used to talk much about miscegenation, nevertheless if ‘one of us [his children] wanted to marry a Brazilian person, I believe he would oppose that marriage’ (quoted in Castro 1994:146). Racial concerns underlying the attitude of opposition are well illustrated in the following remark made by a Nikkeijin interviewed by Vieira: ‘When in a family all the members get married with Brazilians without any opposition we may suspect they are Eta [Burakumin]’ (Vieira 1973b: 311, note 199). On Burakumin, see Chapter 3. One of the interviewees, a Nisei in his early forties and director of a Brazilian publishing company, who actively participated in the debates during the 1970s on the integration of the Nikkeijin in Brazil, mentioned an empathic feeling that was only possible between Nikkeijin. Other interviewees, both Nisei and Sansei, expressed the same idea. The rate of intra-marriage increased in the 1990s within the Nikkei communities in Japan. For example, the magazine Nipo-Brasileira, December 1988. The following title in a more recent article is also suggestive of the preoccupation with showing that intermarriage is increasing: ‘Já é comum a união entre Nikkeis e Gaijin’ (Unions between Nikkeijin and Gaijin are already common) (Noticias do Japão, 4–10 April 1997: 6A). After 1974, the right to elect their own representatives ceased and a Nikkei politician could no longer be elected solely with Nikkeijin votes. Indeed, the number of sect members who are not of Japanese descent is larger then that

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of the Nikkeijin. In this regard, it is important to point out that although Brazil is officially a Catholic country, throughout its history it has always had numerous religious sects, most of them of African origin. It should also be noted that in the United States many of the adherents of the Japanese New Religions are not of Japanese ancestry. These sects also exist in other countries, for example, in the United Kingdom (Kopping 1997). Robert Smith (1979). The yorubano cult or candomblé is a black magic cult, very popular in Brazil. Maeyama (1979) argues that New Religions were closely related to ethnicity and that in 1966–1967 the followers were almost 100 per cent Japanese. Although this might have been the case in the 1960s, the current situation is very different. First, as already mentioned, the number of Brazilian members of these religions actually overtook that of people of Japanese descent. Secondly, according to Kopping (1997), these New Religions are more related to social than ethnic issues. The idea of Asian immigrants as a model minority is widespread, and cultural explanations have been used to explain the achievement of Asian immigrants in the United States and Canada. The literature on Asian immigrants suggests that they share common characteristics, which have contributed to their success: ethnic enclaves; ownership of small businesses and ethnic economies and kin-based enterprises; the structure of the family and values such as obligation and loyalty to the family unit; commitment to education; and social networks based on kinship. However, it should be noted that the success of Asian minorities is controversial. On the issue, see Stacey (1996). In this respect it is interesting to note that in February 1997, when the organisation Aliança Cultural Japão–Brasil launched a word-processing course, the majority of the applicants were old Issei who wanted to write about their life-stories in Brazil (information supplied by a journalist on the newspaper Jornal Paulista in March 1997). Proceedings of the symposium edited by Saito (1980). Migration is a disruptive process and as such is often accompanied by mental disorders. In this regard, Japanese immigrants were no exception. Psychiatric disorders, suicides, rapes, murders, robberies and so forth, though not so widely acknowledged as other more positive aspects of the immigration process, have been frequently documented (see Saito 1953, Schaden 1973). This attitude was expressed by the Issei and pre-war Nisei interviewed in the state of São Paulo who used the sentence ‘Osewa ni natte iru’ to explain the attitude. The first African arrived in Brazil in 1538. With the ‘importation’ of Africans, black people soon outnumbered whites and mulattos. In the first census of 1872, the population was 9,930,479, of which 1,510,806 were slaves, 3,787,292 were whites and 3,801,782 were mulattos and mestizos. The situation changed in the twentieth century with the large-scale immigration of Europeans (Azevedo 1950: 31–4). The nonexistence of racial discrimination has been traced back to the Portuguese, as the scholar Freyre (1946: 41) explains that ‘the Anglo-Saxon regards an individual as being of his race only when the latter is of the same physical type as himself and the Portuguese regards as his equal the one who has the same religion’. For example, negro, mulatto, cafuso (offspring of Indian and Negro), brancarão (light-skinned mulatto) caboclo (Indian–white mixture), cabrocha (dark-skinned mestizo), mina (light skinned woman), mameluco (offspring of white and Indian), and so on (quoted in Winston 1992). The arguments used against Japanese colonos were extended to their dress and morality. This is illustrated by the deputy João Faria’s claims in 1924 that it was not possible to understand their language; their costumes were very exotic, their physical appearance was not good and their morals were strange because they did not respect contracts. Their houses were not well organised, they slept on the floor and men and women bathed together. Given this, he concluded that Japanese people were of an inferior race. According to him, Brazil had already been sacrificed through miscegenation with black people, and therefore should avoid repeating the same mistake with yellow people (Jornal do Comércio, April–June 1942).

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29 In spite of the popularisation of the ‘whitening’ ideology, there was no unanimity of opinion, as can be seen from results of a survey on the attitudes to immigration of 161 prominent Brazilians conducted in 1926 by the National Agricultural Society. Most of them were rural landowners or linked to agriculture from all major regions. In response to the question ‘dDo you favour oriental immigration?’, 79 said no and 75 said yes (7 had no opinion). Some respondents criticised Asian people (in practice Japanese), but with less frequency than they criticised black people. The Japanese were considered inferior to white people, but better than black people (Saito 1961:128). 30 The Brazilians borrowed from the theories of racial differences and adapted them, discarding two assumptions: the innateness of racial differences and the degeneracy of mixed blood, in order to formulate their own theory. At that time ‘race’ and culture were considered inseparable. After that period, as the ‘whitening’ ideology could no longer be maintained as white racial superiority, it was described as a process of ‘ethnic integration’. For a full explanation of this theme see Skidmore (1974). 31 Jornal do Comércio, April–June, 1942. For a full account of the parliamentary debates, speeches and official documents for the period 1930–1934, see Valente (1990). 32 The 2 per cent law came to be known as the Miguel Couto Law, after the name of a leading Japanophobe. The Portuguese were also given a quota, but a later resolution (22 April 1939) by the Conselho Nacional de Imigração e Colonização (National Council for Immigration and Colonisation) rescinded the provision. The quota system was never actually put into practice for any nationality. 33 It is important to note that, although the faith in the ‘whitening’ process continued, Brazil rejected Nazism and the German racist policies, therefore the discourse changed. Since then it has been described as ‘ethnic integration’ and the country was very proud of not being seen as having racial problems. By the mid-1950s, the discourse of race was replaced by the discourse of national character. The following statement describes this shift in thinking: ‘Let’s resign ourselves to being cafusos (mixture of black and Indian) or curibocas (mixture of white and Indian), trying to honour our blood by the dignity of our style of men, instead of boasting about heredity we haven’t got’ (Gilberto Amado in 1948 quoted in Skidmore 1974: 165). After World War II, a new law was passed, making discrimination a criminal offence. 34 It should be noted that, despite evidence of racial prejudice in Brazil, apparently there is great reluctance to assume an open and public attitude of racial discrimination. An explanation is that the ‘official view’ on racial issues prevails over dissident views. On the issue of racism as a taboo subject in Brazil, see Guimarães (1999). 3 From Dekasegi Imin to Nikkeijin 1 For example, Maeyama (1979) and Saito (1961). Much of this literature makes use of Park’s theoretical framework. Park developed the thesis that all inter-ethnic relations go through an invariable and irreversible cycle of four stages: contact, competition, accommodation and assimilation. Progress along this line would be inevitable and immigrants would eventually ‘disappear’ into the majority. According to the assimilationist model, it takes three generations for immigrants to become ‘native’, (see Park 1950, Gordon 1964). Saito (e.g. 1961: 223) defends Park’s position, and argues that in the beginning the receiving society shows curiosity and sympathy towards the immigrant; the second stage is characterised by competition and hostility; this stage is eventually overcome and the immigrants reach the stage of assimilation. According to Izumi (1957), the last stage of assimilation is defined as a complementary fusion of two heterogeneous cultures. An alternative model to the assimilationist position claims that ethnic identities emerge in response to shared experiences, such as discrimination, and this is related to the larger society (see Yancey et al 1976). 2 See Chapter 1 on Associations. The fiscal benefits given by Brazilian law have also been neglected, though they were an important factor in establishing co-operatives.

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3 As already noted, the concept of assimilation has become an increasingly controversial one, but the controversy between retention of ethnicity and acculturation continues. Gans (1997) claims that ethnic retention is compatible with assimilation. However, other authors (e.g. Sollors 1989) disagree, arguing that every immigrant family carries ethnic practices from the country of origin, but negotiates and re-creates them in the host country. Gans argues that what looks like reconstruction to one school may amount to the same thing as acculturation to another. 4 The convenience of the conversion to Catholicism was acknowledged in the Press. For example, in 1927, the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo published an article on conversion to Catholicism as being the shortest route to assimilation (Comissão 1992: 570). 5 In 1918, in Ribeirão Preto, where the largest concentration of Japanese were located, not one of the 1,000 families interviewed was interested in Japanese language education. On the contrary, parents wanted their children to learn Portuguese (Comissão 1992: 21). Attitudes towards the Portuguese language changed with the rise of Japanese nationalism in the 1930s, and later with Japan’s defeat. Izumi (1973: 364) conducted a study from October to September 1953 in the states of São Paulo, Paraná, Pará and Amazonas, with 637 respondents, who were divided according to their attitude towards Japan’s defeat. According to the findings, 47.6 per cent of those who supported Sindö Renmei prohibited their children from speaking Portuguese, while 10.7 per cent of those who accepted Japan’s defeat did the same. 6 The importance of being Catholic was great since it was believed that Catholicism was the cement of Brazilian unity, as Freyre (1946: 41) claimed, and conversion to Catholicism was seen as necessary to be considered fully assimilated by Brazilian officials. 7 In this respect, see for example, Comissão (1992) and Handa (1987). It should be noted that manifestations of ‘racial tensions’ between Poles, Japanese, Syrians, Lebanese, Germans and Italians were frequently reported (Ianni 1972: 242). 8 This is also the opinion of Ando (1976: 188). According to him, the Japanese immigrants felt inferior to the Southern European immigrants. Feelings of inferiority are also mentioned by Saito (1973: 25). 9 According to Daniels (1972: 80–1), ‘Certainly in the entire history of immigration to the United States no other nation evinced so much and so lasting concern for its countrymen’. It seems that the concern of the Japanese government for the Japanese working in the plantations in Hawaii had nothing to do with their discriminatory treatment, but with the desire to protect the prestige of Japan as a nation. 10 The expansion of trade was an important consideration in promoting emigration to Brazil. In addition to being a potential market for Japanese products, this country was seen as a source of raw materials needed for Japanese industry in development. It is interesting to note that the peak of Japanese trade with Brazil was reached between 1937 and 1939 (Normano and Gerbi 1943: 14, 16, 45). 11 Staniford (1973: 12–14) and Robert Smith (1979: 55). Another expression used was ‘we began as yoi don’ (literally, the early bang, a sign to begin an athletic game) according to Maeyama (1973: 260). This has been interpreted as a reflex of the rhetoric of national interest used by the emigration companies to recruit emigrants in Japan. 12 Cardoso 1995:130. A survey of overseas Japanese communities suggests that when Japanese immigrants were not governed by Japanese agencies, and also when the Japanese interacted with the host society, the speed with which isolation of the community declined was accelerated (Lyman 1972: 155). 13 The importance of a positive self-image is acknowledged by William (1971: 226) who claims that one reason why Japanese Americans overcame difficulties is that they believed that they were innately superior to other people. He compares them to the Jews’ self-appraisal as the chosen people. According to the Social Identity Theory, individuals are motivated to achieve a positive self-image by a positive evaluation of one’s own group by comparison with out-groups. As Rupert Brown (1995: 170) puts it, ‘the

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achievement and maintenance of a satisfactory identity requires that group members will search out various forms of positive distinctiveness from their in-group’. See, for example Saito and Willems (1974: 133–52). Vieira has a different approach, and emphasises the emergence of a new organisation of immigrants and new patterns of leadership, along with an increase in the gap between rural and urban immigrants. Cognitive dissonance theories claim that cognitive inconsistency is unpleasant to the holder, therefore the individual will be motivated to reduce dissonance by changing one or more contradictory beliefs so that the set as a whole will be in harmony. Several strategies are possible. For example, the individual can change his or her own position so as to be closer to others; or conversely he or she can try to influence others so as to move their position nearer to themselves. In this case, the cognition that Japan was a country that could not be defeated and their pride in being Japanese was dissonant with Japan’s defeat. Reinforcing the belief in Japan’s victory would be a way of reducing the dissonance. On this subject see Festinger (1957). Quoted in Comissão (1992: 287), my emphasis. The Red Cross in Brazil had distributed the Imperial Edict with the preamble written in French and the Edict in English. Chibata Miyakoshi, former director of the KKKK, and others, decided to translate it into Japanese. Quotations from the magazines Shu hö, Shindö Renmei, 24 February 1946, Shu hö, Shindö Renmei, 17 March 1946, in Hatanaka (1993:141-2). Incidentally, it is interesting to note that the word yökoku (adoptive country), frequently used by immigrants to refer to Brazil, is not used in Japan according to Maeyama (1973: 444). The expression ‘país dos crisântemos’ (country of chrysanthemums), used to refer to Japan, was considered to treat the Japanese Emperor in a disrespectful manner and in consequence, the members of the Union were called to the Japanese Consulate to explain themselves. Under the social pressure from the Japanese communities, the author of the article resigned as president of the Students Union (Comissão 1992: 171). This expression is used by Sone (1989) to describe the Nisei in the United States. Hiroshi Saito provides an example for the dilemmas of the Issei. He was a community leader, director of the Centre of Japanese–Brazilian Studies, and the most prolific researcher on Japanese immigrants in Brazil. He wrote much on how the Japanese immigrants and their descendants were assimilated into Brazilian society. However, even though he arrived in Brazil at the age of 14, he retained Japanese nationality despite a frequently expressed intention to become a naturalised Brazilian. Moreover, he registered his first son in the Japanese Consulate, making him a Japanese citizen (Castro 1994:163, 166). Negative self-images, feelings of inferiority and attempts at ‘deracialisation’ by marrying a white person have been reported in work carried out on different minorities. Both the Nisei and the Sansei interviewed in São Paulo referred to the fact that as Japanese descendants the Nikkeijin were expected to know how to speak Japanese, not only by members of the Nikkei community, but also by society in general. The fact that they chose not to know how to speak Japanese is suggestive of their ethnic attitudes. On the subject of the importance of not speaking the language see Ang (1994). Personal life experiences should also be mentioned as they have a strong influence on the maintenance of ethnic ties in general. A example of this is a Nisei who, having been humiliated in his childhood by a teacher for writing in Portuguese using Japanese word order, did not subsequently allow his children to learn Japanese. ‘A identidade em pesquisa: os descendentes e o bilinguismo’, (Identity into question and bilinguism) Journal Página Um, suplemento do Diário Nippak, 56, 13 June 1981, p. 6. It is interesting to note that an article on a Nikkeijin, who joined a guerrilla group against the military dictatorship in Brazil in the 1960s, is considered to be the first article written in a Nikkei newspaper that was not confined to the ethnic community, according to Henri Kobata, one of the journalists of this newspaper.

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25 Júlia Saito and Toshiaki Saito in Pan-American Convention of Nikkeijin held between 25 and 28 July 1985 and published in 1986 under the title O Nikkei e a sua Americanidade (The Nikkeijin and their ‘Americanness’). 26 Boletim Informa, Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros (1994), AGT; Revista USP, Dossier Brasil–Japão (1995: 23); and interviews conducted in São Paulo in April 1997. 27 On this subject, see ‘A cara do Nikkei na TV Brasileira’ (The face of the Nikkeijin on Brazilian television), International Press, 10 January 1998, D3. 28 The Nikkei community has always been worried over ‘the Nikkei image’, and people belonging to the community are expected to behave ‘properly’. The following case reported by Vieira (1973b: 175) illustrates this. In 1966, a policeman found a lost vagrant who seemed to be Japanese. A representative of the local Japanese colonia was called to the police station to identify the man. However, the man was not identified as being Japanese because he did not bow when the representative of the Japanese community came in, ate bananas instead of rice, and most importantly, the representative denied that a true Japanese would ever be in this situation. The good image of the Nikkeijin is still today taken for granted. This can also be seen in the fact that a gang of thieves in the streets of São Paulo, which included a Nikkeijin gang member, was able to rob many Nikkeijin since they could not believe that a Nikkeijin could be involved in such activities. 29 Interestingly, one interviewee remarked that black people probably would not be despised if there was a developed country in Africa (Asari 1992: 223). 3 0 Unpleasant experiences have been reported by Nisei and Sansei born and brought up in areas where few Japanese immigrants settled. One Nisei said that he bought sunglasses to travel to a city in Minas Gerais in order to hide his Asian eyes. Nevertheless, he became an attraction for people of the city who came to see him just because he looked different. This case was reported in the debate on the social integration of the Issei and Nissei organised by the Association of Okinawa in Brazil on the occasion of the celebration of the 80th anniversary of Japanese immigration to Brazil and published in 1988 by the association. 31 In 1981, the first Congress of the Nikkeijin (Convenção Panamericana Nikkei, Pan-American Convention of Nikkeijin) took place in Mexico. Two years later, it was held in Lima, and in 1985, in Brazil. Every year a meeting of Nikkeijin living overseas (Kaigai Nikkeijin Taikai) also takes place. 32 Oshiro, in the debate over the social integration of the Issei and Nissei organised by the Association of Okinawa in Brazil on the occasion of the celebration of the 80th anniversary of Japanese immigration to Brazil and published in 1988 by the association. 33 Newcomers depended completely on the old immigrants, and many cases of exploitation were reported. This was so obvious that a Japanese commentator who came to Brazil in 1954 remarked that the old immigrants treated the new immigrants with the spirit of kashikan (i.e. in the manner of Japanese army sergeants towards new recruits). The newcomers were also seen as competitors. They were competing for positions that the descendants of the pre-war immigrants wished for and, as they were unlikely to marry Brazilians, they competed for Nikkei mates as well. On this subject, see Handa (1987). 34 According to Shimidu (1973), those who tend to keep their distance from Japanese traditional patterns are younger and from urban areas. 35 The southernmost islands of Japan, Okinawa, (the Ryükyü Kingdom) were annexed by Japan in 1879 and, since then, the Okinawans have been subjected to repressive policies and considered of inferior status. Partly as a result of their own history and partly as a response to the discrimination, they have historically experienced an Okinawan (Uchinanchu) identity, developed in contrast to the Japanese identity. On this issue see, for example, Taira (1997). 36 In 1913, the emigration of people from Okinawa was prohibited by the Japanese government. This measure was temporarily suspended in 1916, but was resumed between 1920 and 1926. Thanks to the efforts of Okinawans resident in Brazil the ruling was eventually revoked (Comissão 1992:145).

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37 This account is based on interviews conducted in March and April 1997, at the Association of Okinawa in São Paulo. Interviews were conducted with the president of the Association, Mino Nakagawa, a staff member of a parliamentary group, Shinji Yonamine, and other directors of several branches of Okinawan associations in Brazil, on the occasion of the national annual meeting. 38 The Burakumin were still living in ‘special’ areas as late as 1950. With the formation of the Buraku Liberation League in 1955, and the political mobilisation of the Burakumin, their situation has gradually improved, but differences between them and the average Japanese citizen are still perceived as significant. On this issue, see Neary (1997). 39 Mannheim (1952: 304) postulates that ‘groups within the same actual generation which whorl up the material of their common experiences in different specific ways, constitute separate generations’. 40 As already mentioned, before World War II they were allowed to have dual nationality. This policy changed after the war, when all Japanese children born in Brazil became Brazilian citizens. 41 Sant’Ana (1956), cited in Castro (1994: 82). See also Handa (1987), Saito (1957) and Vieira (1973a). 42 ‘Enryo syndrome’ is an expression used by Kitano (1976) to refer to the behavioural reserve of many Nisei. Several studies have reported the following as typical of Nisei: indirect speech used in conversation, noncommittal answers, use of euphemisms, selfimposed limitation on disclosure, concealment of feelings and opinions, and avoidance of persons and situations that are likely to evoke embarrassment. 43 According to Hansen (1996), ‘what the son wishes to forget, the grandson wishes to remember’. Several empirical studies have attempted to verify this hypothesis, but it remains controversial. 4 The Dekasegi 1 Information based on Japan Institute of Labor (1990: 6–7) and Herbert (1996: 159). 2 Figures for June 1991 are from the Ministry of Justice (1997). Figures for 1997 are from the Japan Immigration Association (1998). Figures for 1998 are from the Japan Immigration Association (2000). 3 An article headlined ‘Outlook bleak as Japan’s economy worsens’ Financial Times (29–30 April, 2000); see also Financial Times (10–11 March, 2001: 6). 4 The unemployment rate in December 1998 was 4.3 per cent in Japan, 11.5 per cent in France, 10.7 in Germany, 4.6 in the United Kingdom and 4.3 per cent in the United States (Nomura Shöken Kingyüö Kenkyüsho, March 1999). 5 Information drawn from: Prime Minister’s Office (1991), Minister of Foreign Affairs, cited in Hatsuse (1992: 237), Ministry of Justice, cited in Komai (1995: 208) and Ministry of Labour, cited in Weiner (1995:11). 6 Komai (1995: 212–13). The Nikkeiren (The Japan Federation of Employers’ Associations) showed a cautious attitude up to 1988, but in May 1992, proposed the creation of a trainee system to accept unskilled foreign workers. 7 Prime Minister’s Office (1991). According to a Yomiuri Shinbun survey in carried out in 1991 (released in 1993), 61 per cent of the respondents thought there was a need for restrictions (JPoll, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research 1999). 8 Prime Minister’s Office (1991) and Asahi Shinbun poll in Mainichi Shinbun (26 June 1991). 9 To my knowledge, none of the surveys on foreign labourers acknowledges the legal acceptance of the Nikkeijin. An example of this is the following question from a survey conducted by the Prime Minister’s Office in November–December 1990, after the revision of the Immigration Law: ‘Currently, Japan is not permitting foreigners without any professional knowledge or skills into the country to work. How do you feel about this policy?’ (JPoll 1999).

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10 Criminal statistics from the National Policy Agency, Asia Crime Prevention Foundation 1997. 11 Prime Minister’s Office, Shin Jyöhö Center 1997 (release date) (JPoll). 12 In Brazil, the term ‘Dekasegi’ refers to Brazilian Nikkeijin who go to work in Japan. As the term ‘Dekasegi’ is associated with images of poverty, a group of migrants called for its replacement by the term ‘satogari’ (to visit the homeplace) at the International Congress on Dekasegi, held in Londrina in 1995. This was not accepted, partly because the term Dekasegi was widely used and also because this request made sense only for the first generation, who in fact form a minority of this migrant group. This information was supplied by the psychiatrist Décio Nakagawa, who attended the Congress. 13 Interviewed in São Paulo in 1997. The documents required by the Japanese Consulate to obtain a working visa are the following: a birth certificate; a document proving parents’ identity; a certificate of parents’ marriage; proof of income or temporary work contract with the salary and job to be performed in Japan; a letter from a relative in Japan showing the degree of consanguinity; statement of employment, income and residence. Relatives in Japan apply for the ‘certificate of eligibility’ for the spouses of the Nikkeijin, and take responsibility for the couple. The Sansei are required to present the same documents as the Nisei, plus the identity of their grandparents and their marriage certificate, a genealogical tree of the family and a financial statement proving that they have the necessary means to live in Japan. Visas for the Nisei are for a period of three years and for the Sansei one year. Each entry to Japan requires a new visa. The price paid for a visa in the Japanese Consulate was US$29 in 1997 and the multiple entrance visa for one year was US$59. The visa can be renewed in Japan indefinitely. 14 A Folha de São Paulo, 28 August (1994). The Nikkeijin from South America are not the only ones to falsify documentation to migrate to Japan. It has also been reported that some Nikkei Zanryü Chukokujin (children of Japanese and Chinese people), who are also migrating to Japan, falsify their birth certificate or use the name of Japanese relatives in Japan (Asahi Shinbun, 6 January 1998). 15 Researchers have been engaged in classifying the Dekasegi population. For example, Koshi Mori (in Ninomya ed. 1992) gives four categories: the ‘saving type’, the ‘experience type’, the ‘enjoy type’ and the ‘escape type’; Toyoie Kitagawa found three divisions: ‘the permanent resident’, ‘the branch resident’ and ‘the repeaters’. It appears that these categories give little insight about individuals, and therefore they are not used in this book. 16 For this section I have drawn on the most relevant literature on Dekasegi, particularly the following: Herbert (1996); Komai (1994, 1995); Kajita (1994); Mori (1997); Ninomya (1992, 1996); Onitsuka (1992); Shinoda (1995); Kyoji Tanaka (1997); Watanabe (1995); and Watari (1996), Watkins (1996); Yamanaka (1993, 1996); Yoshioka (1994, 1995); as well as the Proceedings of the Congress on Dekasegi held in São Paulo in November 1991, the first International Seminar of Dekasegi held in Londrina in October 1995 and the Symposium on Work and Family Life of International Migrant Workers held at Nihon University in Tokyo in December 1994. Findings reported here were also drawn from various surveys on Nikkeijin in Japan: JICA (Kokusai Köyöryoku Jigyödan), Report on the Survey of the Nikkeijin Working in our Country 1992; Japan Statistics Research Institute, Statistical Research Reference on Brazilian Nikkeijin Employment and Living Conditions; Nihon Tökei Kenkyüjo, Hosei University 1993; HICE (Hamamatsu Shi Kikakubu Kokusai Köryüshitsu) A Survey on the Living Conditions of Foreigners in Hamamatsu City 1993; Institute of Comparative Economic Studies of Hosei University, First Report of the Survey on the Nikkeijin Residents in Japan 1998; and survey conducted by Varig (Brazilian Air Lines), Bank of Brazil and the newspaper Jornal Tudo Bem 1998. Information has also been drawn from research conducted in 1992–1995 by the author and reported in The Bulletin of the University of Science of Okayama 1995, 1997; research conducted in the Japanese community in São Paulo and in Promissão (State of São Paulo) in 1997; and in Aichi, Kanagawa and Okayama prefectures in 1998. Finally,

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information has been drawn from Japanese daily newspapers: Yomiuri Shinbun and Asahi Shinbun; Nikkei newspapers in Japan: International Press, Jornal Tudo Bem, Folha Mundial, Japão Agora, Japão Aqui; Nikkei newspapers in Brazil: São Paulo Shinbun, Jornal Paulista, Diário Nippak and Notícias do Japão. Brazilian newspapers: A Folha de São Paulo and O Estado de São Paulo. It has been emphasised that the Nikkeijin are well educated, but this is not always the case. Moreover, findings are based on what the respondents say, and the level of education is measured by Brazilian standards. The percentage of Nikkeijin with a high educational background is 25 per cent according to Mori (1996: 32). According to Komai (1995: 22), the Pakistanis and Filipinos have higher educational attainments than the Nikkeijin. However, the JICA survey (1992) reports that the percentages of people with relatively high ability in hearing, speaking, reading and writing Japanese were 43.5 per cent, 27.9 per cent, 14.0 per cent and 11.2 per cent respectively. The number of people with no ability at all was 14.1 per cent, 12.3 per cent, 14.0 per cent, and 24.6 per cent for the same categories. This has been changing with the changes in the composition of the Dekasegi population. According to research conducted by Sebrae, the Bank of Brazil and Varig Airlines on a sample of 3,293 Dekasegi, for 59 per cent the greatest wish is to buy a house in Brazil; for 35 per cent it is to start a business in Brazil; for less than 1 per cent it is to save enough money for travel during old age (O Estado de São Paulo, 19 January 1995). There are no statistics available about average length of stay of Brazilian Nikkeijin in Japan. Results of surveys differ widely, depending not only on the methodology used and how questions are formulated, but also on factors related to the individual and the date of the survey. The same individual may give different answers at different times. The number is 40 for the period 1995–1996 and 19 for 1994–1995. This information was provided by the CIATE in São Paulo. According to the director, Masahiro Ohashi, Japanese companies do not want families, while the Dekasegi prefer to go with their families. This would explain the low number of Dekasegi who make inquires of the official organisation set up by the Japanese government to recruit them. It has been reported that US$1,900 pays for air fare and recruitment services (A Folha de São Paulo, 21 January, 1995). Some agencies charge US$1,417 and others US$2,500. Cases of Dekasegi who paid US$3,800 have been reported (Japão Aqui, May 1997). Prices for visa and koseki töhon (document with information on the family in Japan) are between 60 and 125 US$. Usually, the air fare has to be paid by the worker in four or five instalments. Usually companies require the following documents: koseki töhon, which can be supplied by the company, providing that the applicant submits the certificate of parents’ marriage and a passport; a letter from a guarantor in Japan, a financial statement from a bank proving that the candidate has 50,000 Cruzados Novos (in 1997 the Cruzado Novo was about the same value as the US dollar); four photographs, a medical certificate with blood type, blood and urine tests and chest X-ray (Asari 1992: 120). According to Komai (1995), who looked at the number of people seeking work at the Employment Service Centre for the Nikkeijin in April 1992, out of a total of 1,253 people, those unemployed as a result of being laid off accounted for just one-third. According to journalists on Jornal Tudo Bem, the Dekasegi are doing well in spite of the economic recession because they do all sorts of work. This is also reported by Made in Japan (1998) and Jornal Tudo Bem (30 December 1998). Nevertheless, ten cases of homelessness in Hamamatsu were reported in 1998. Health Insurance is managed by the government, but the National Health Insurance covering foreigners residing in Japan for one or two years is managed by local governments, and does not receive contributions from employers. In some localities, the Nikkeijin do not have to pay their share of the insurance. This used to be the case in Hamamatsu, but the policy changed and they now have to make their contribution,

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together with the employers. There is a movement (Grupo Justiça e Paz, literally Group for Justice and Peace), formed in 1997 to persuade the mayor not to change the system. Contributions depend on the kind of work performed. For a blue-collar worker, the worker pays 0.4 per cent of his wage and the employer 1.15 per cent. There are different taxes in Japan: kenkö no hoken (health insurance), koseinenkin hoken (retirement), koyö hoken (unemployment), jideo teate (family help), rosai hoken (work accidents). Besides this, the worker must pay income tax at 4.75 per cent (Reimei 1994: 109). For example: Sangyö Koyö Antei Sentä (Centre for Employment) (ed.) Nikkeijin Koyö no Kisochiki (Basic Knowledge about the Employment of the Nikkeijin) 1992; Nikkeijin Koyö Sentä (Nikkeijin Employment Centre), Koyö Ippan Jyöhö (General Information Related to the Employment of the Nikkeijin) (1995); Guia para Trabalhadores Nikkeis (A Guide for Nikkei Workers) (1996). Noticias do Japão (14–20 March 1997) and Japão Aqui (May 1997). In 1989, Japan Helpline received 40 phone calls per day from the Dekasegi who complained about job contractors and lack of medical assistance (São Paulo Shinbun, 20 June 1989). In some municipalities the concentration of Brazilians is very high as already mentioned. Therefore, although the services are set up for all foreigners, it should be expected that the Brazilians would make more use of them than other foreigners. This is not always the case. For example, in Hadano (Kanagawa) with a foreign population of 2,046, in 1996, of the 448 foreigners who used the services, only 32 per cent were Brazilians (Noticias do Japão, 21–27 February 1997). For example, SA & BRA in Hamamatsu offers this service. In 1998, prices were as follows: certificate of Japanese descent 2,000 yen, visa 1,000 yen; translation 50 yen. ‘Sonhos que de cá segui’ (literally, Dreams I had when I left; in Portuguese the last part of the phrase sounds like Dekasegi) deserves a special mention because it is the first novel written about the Dekasegi. The book tells the life of a young couple who migrate to Japan with their two children. It was written by a Nisei architect, Silvio Sam (1997), who worked in Japan as a Dekasegi. It is based on his experiences and those of other Dekasegi with whom he was in contact while working at a job-brokering agency. Although the book is a work of fiction, it gives a description of daily life for many Dekasegi. A survey revealed that 93 per cent of the Brazilians resident in Japan buy Brazilian products. Presquisa da Sorte, conducted by Varig, Bank of Brazil and Jornal Tudo Bem. Between 1991 and 1997, a total of 8,373 children were registered in the Brazilian Consulate in Tokyo, and between October 1994 and June 1998, there were 5,470 children registered in the Consulate in Nagoya (information was supplied by the consulates). Immigration Office in Noticias do Japão (3–9 January 1997). This number does not include children who do not attend any school (12.9 per cent). Yomiuri Shinbun (3 April 1997). The Japanese government admitted that the assistance provided to foreign students is not sufficient. Of 83,000 foreign students only 13,700 attended special classes. The situation is worse in primary schools, where 12,300 foreign children do not understand Japanese. In secondary schools there are 4,900 foreign pupils. The majority of foreign children in Japanese schools are Brazilians (43.15 per cent), followed by Chinese (30.3 per cent, Jornal Tudo Bem, 28 March 1998). Several cases of Brazilian children who were the target of bullying have been reported by the press, both in Japan and Brazil. For example, ‘A little girl was harassed at school’ (International Press, 16 February 1994); ‘[Brazilian] Children are badly treated in Japanese schools’ (Jornal Paulista, 4 April 1979). A Brazilian child who was the only foreigner in a class of 35 children was bullied by his schoolmates. His father complained and he was placed in a special class with a Peruvian child and two Japanese children who also had problems of adjustment; these children were never in fact given any classes and the Brazilian child left that school (Yomiuri Shinbun, 3 April 1997). In Japan, cases of bullying in elementary and junior high schools occur frequently. Cases of children who are unable to bear the bullying directed at them and commit suicide are not uncommon. According to a survey conducted by the Special Council on

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Bullying, 30 per cent of children in elementary school, 20 per cent of children in junior high school and 10 per cent of children in high school suffered some sort of bullying. Experts say that these figures are far from the truth since schools tend to report the fewest possible number of cases. There are many cases of Brazilian youngsters who drop out of school and join gangs. However, successful cases should also be mentioned. For example, one Brazilian was admitted to Osaka University and another one to Kyoto (Noticias do Japão, 13–19 March 1998: 8A). This information was supplied by journalists on the newspaper Jornal Tudo Bem and the magazine Made in Japan. Watkins (1996). It is not possible to know the exact number of Brazilians who have problems with the law in Japan. The Brazilian Consulate in Nagoya estimates that the number is three times bigger. According to reporters on the newspaper Jornal Tudo Bem, criminal cases are not usually reported to the Consulate. A poll by Osaka Bar Association revealed that the mother tongue of the accused is often ignored in Japan. Interrogations are often conducted in Japanese or with the help of a translator whose ability in the foreign language is insufficient. English is the predominant language used for interrogation of foreigners and criminal procedures are far from correct (Herbert 1996: 243). Albeit slowly, the situation has been improving, and in April 1995 there were 1,378 interpreters for foreigners accused of crimes, of whom 35 were Portuguese speakers and 129 Spanish speakers (Look Japan, September 1995: 7). It should be noted that many restaurants and shops for Brazilian and Peruvian customers have been robbed. This explains why shops in the Plaza shopping mall in Öizumi mainly for Brazilian customers are equipped with alarm systems. According to Kondo, a journalist on the newspaper International Press in Hamamatsu, criminal cases committed by young Brazilians are reported every week. Efforts have been made to help the Dekasegi who return to Brazil. The Kaeru (to return) project was organised by the psychiatrist Décio Nakagawa, the psychologist Kyoko Nakagawa and three more psychologists in collaboration with the teacher Carlos Shinoda. This project is especially addressed to children, both to those who accompany their parents and to those who were left in Brazil. The CAD (Centro de Atendimento a Dekasegi, Centre to Assist Dekasegi), an organisation offering support to Dekasegi, also gives assistance with the support of JETRO (Japan External Organisation). It offers guidance and counselling on how to reintegrate into Brazilian society and how to start a business. This organisation also promotes courses on Japanese culture and Japanese language for the Dekasegi who go to Japan. It also provides assistance during their sojourn in Japan (Noticias do Japão, 13–19 March 1998). This section is based on interviews carried out in Brazil with Dekasegi who had returned from Japan after a few years away, and people in Japan with relatives who had migrated. Interviews conducted by the author in the state of São Paulo with Issei who had migrated to Japan and returned to Brazil. Remittances were US$1 billion in 1990, 1.6 billion in 1991, 2 billion in 1992, 2.4 billion in 1995 and 2 billion in 1996 (Banco Central do Brasil, reported in Noticias do Japão, 3–9 June 1997). Interviews conducted in São Paulo with Dekasegi who had returned to Brazil revealed that crime in Brazil was a very important factor in persuading them to re-emigrate to Japan. Some Dekasegi had been robbed as soon as they had arrived; others were cheated in business, and all of them complained about the lack of security in Brazil. According to Komai (1995: 23–4), when the Ministry of Labour became aware of many cases of Nikkeijin being dismissed, it issued a circular to local governments, instructing them to prevent companies from sacking their Nikkei workers. Since the Nationality Law was enacted in 1950, the acquisition of Japanese nationality has been on the basis of jus sanguinis. The Nationality Law of 1898 recognised nationality by marriage, acknowledgement of paternity or child adoption. Prior to

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amendment of the law in 1984, nationality should be ascribed primarily through paternal lineage. It should be noted that there are other qualifications to be met to obtain Japanese citizenship and even when a person qualifies the application for naturalisation is subject to approval by the Ministry of Justice. 51 There are different opinions on the social costs and benefits of the presence of foreign workers. According to Clifford (1970), an average migrant family contributes more in taxation than it receives in benefits. Because migrants tend to be young they take out less from the social services than the average level for the population as a whole. The Employment Stability Bureau advisory committee in charge of a study on the effects of foreign workers on the Japanese market found in 1992 that the acceptance of foreign workers would outweigh the revenues (Komai 1995: 209). 52 The comments of Mayor Yanagawa, on the issue of the kokumin kenkö hoken (national health insurance) were as follows: ‘I am not sending you away to other cities, but it would be a favour if you could go back gradually to your countries’ (International Press, 25 May 1997: 2). 5 The making of the Nikkei minority 1 In recent years, there has been a great increase in the number of marriages between Japanese men and Brazilian Nikkei and non-Nikkei women. For Japanese mixed marriages 47 per cent are with South Americans, followed by Asians at 45.3 per cent (Ministry of Health and Welfare, reported in The Nikkei Weekly, 26 May 1997). 2 Yoshino (1992: 92) Kokutai no Hongi (Fundamentals of our National Polity) was an ideological tract produced by the Japanese Ministry of Education in 1937 and distributed as a manual for patriotic education. 3 There is an active interest in contemporary Japan in blood types, and studies linking personality and blood types are very popular, and receive attention from Japanese psychologists. Highly suggestive of this interest in blood types is an article produced by an electronics company and published by one of the largest Japanese newspapers: ‘Only those with blood type AB were organised to launch a project which plans the development of and sales strategies for new facsimile machines (Asahi Shinbun, 21 November, 1990, cited in Ando 1995:5). 4 Doi (1973) created the concept of amae (to seek for indulgence, to be passively loved) to explain the special characteristics of the Japanese. 5 These ideas are not unique to the Japanese. An example of this is provided by an article in Wisden Cricketers’ Almanac in 1995, which claimed that the desire to play for England was a ‘matter of biology’. The piece was entitled ‘In the blood’ (Jones 1997: viii). 6 There is evidence that a form of nihonjinron existed in Meiji Japan, and Japanese nationalism has long been centred around the idea of the uniqueness of the Japanese. The period between 1868 and 1911, when westernisation took place, saw the development of an intellectual movement of preserving the ‘national essence’ (kokusai hozon). The same happened after the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) and after the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). On this issue see Gluck (1985). 7 Hall (1992). On the diffusers of nihonjinron see Befu (1983, 1992) and Yoshino (1992). 8 The survey was conducted in 1973, within the Tokyo area and in the Akita Prefecture with 313 respondents. 9 Yoshino (1992: 112–14) conducted interviews with 35 educators and 36 businessmen between October 1986 and September 1988. Yoshino defines ‘underlying culture’ as ‘the more intangible aspects of culture, referring to cultural ethos, national character or modes of thinking and behaving that exist and are believed to exist behind objectified institutions and practices’. 10 The survey was conducted in Nishinomiya (between Osaka and Kobe), with 944 respondents. The criteria taken from the nihonjinron discourse on what it means to be Japanese were the following: Japanese citizenship; both parents being Japanese; having

Notes

11 12 13

14 15 16

17 18 19 20 21

22 23 24 25 26 27

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a Japanese father or mother; being born in Japan; growing up in Japan in the formative period; living in Japan for some length of time; Japanese linguistic competency; Japanese name; and Japanese physical appearance. For all the criteria, the percentage of respondents who said ‘makes no difference’ did not exceed 50 per cent (Manabe et al. 1989: 52). As stated in the Introduction, the survey was conducted in Aichi, Kanagawa, Okayama Prefectures and Tokyo Metropolitan Prefecture in 1998, with 615 participants. ‘Nihongo’ is the term used for the Japanese language for foreigners; kokugo, literally mother tongue, is the term used for the Japanese. Among foreign groups, the Koreans are a large minority, numbering 645,373. Most are descendants of labourers brought to Japan from Korea before 1945, and historically they have been subjected to diverse forms of discrimination. Today they are permanent residents: more than 90 per cent of them are Japanese-born and most speak Japanese as their mother tongue. However, only very recently have Korean residents been excused from the requirement to undergo compulsory fingerprinting as part of registration, and to carry alien registration documents. The Konketsuji (literally, mixed blood children) who have only one Japanese parent have been discriminated against (see Strong 1978). The ideas of culture, ethnicity and race have also been combined in other countries. For China, see Dikötter (1997). ‘Culture is here broadly defined as patterns of thinking, feeling, and behaving, acquired in early childhood and shared by people of a collectivity. There are, of course, cultural differences within a nation; however, what matters in this study is the relationship between culture and ethnicity. This relationship is very complex, but it can be said that culture gives content to ethnicity. Morris-Suzuki (1995: 761). It should be noted that Japan’s economic success has been associated with its culture. For a fuller explanation see Yoshino 1992. Japanese culture has in fact served many purposes. For instance, it has been used in international relations in the context of trade and other disputes in order to respond to foreign criticism (see Mouer and Sugimoto 1986). Miller (1982: 283). Japanese academics placed in charge of implementing the government-sponsored effort to teach Japanese to foreigners (in March 1978) concluded that no programme would be capable of producing fully competent users of the language. It was not possible to compare the findings from this survey with other findings because of the absence of a similar survey. Interestingly enough, the Nikkeijin who were interviewed thought that the Japanese saw their parents and grandparents as traitors. However, the majority of Japanese people who were interviewed referred to Japanese emigrants as having helped Japan by sending remittances, or as victims of a difficult economic situation. Hayashida, 1976: 17 and 143. Befu (1983: 257–8) has a different opinion. As a result of the belief that Japanese linguistic competence is ‘in the genes’, the Nikkeijin are supposed to speak Japanese. The social anthropologist Robert Levine was quoted by Tajfel (in Brown 1986: 595) as saying ‘Describe to me the economic inter-group situation and I shall predict the content of stereotypes’. The Japan Times (4 February 1997). The slogan of Fujimori’s campaign ‘dedication, honesty and technology’ reflects the image of Japan in South America, and suggests an association with Japan. The use of the term ‘U-turn’ is misleading. In English it means to go back in the opposite direction and, as such, does not acknowledge the fact that the majority of them are not Japanese, but the descendants of Japanese. Kajita (1994). The word ‘mondai’ can be translated either as ‘problem’ or ‘issue’. Looking at the tone of the chapter, the word problem was seen as more adequate. I am grateful to Sue Preston at the University of Sheffield for her help in translating this sentence. This karaoke competition was an important event for the Nikkei communities in Brazil

184

28 29

30 31

32 33

34 35 36

37 38

Notes

and gathered 3,500 Nikkeijin from all over the country. In Japan, the event was also important, and Brazilians from Gunma went to Tokyo to support the singer Edson Tonaki, scantily dressed, as if for carnival in Brazil. It should be noted that Japanese journalists do not express opinions, and usually news is similar in all newspapers. On this subject see, e.g. Tasker (1987). It was reported that Brazilian and Peruvian customers behaved in a way that interfered with the service of other customers (International Press, 11 July 1998). It is of course difficult to know if this true; however, the researcher witnessed this kind of behaviour in a sports shop in Hamamatsu where Brazilians did not wait to be served as is customary in Japan, but instead opened the boxes and tried on the items. The notice in the shop read: ‘Japanese Only. We do not have translators. If you cannot speak Japanese come with someone who can’. This case attracted attention both from the Japanese and Brazilian media. The case was reported by the newspaper Jornal Tudo Bem as following. On 5 October 1997, two Brazilian minors intentionally damaged a car belonging to members of a Japanese gang. On the following day the Japanese gang went to take revenge at the Melody Park where Herculano Reiko Lukosevicius and his friends were at the time. They were beaten and Herculano died in the hospital some days later as a result of having been wounded by a knife. On 26 November, the police arrested the suspects. Eleven Japanese young men were accused of being involved in the crime and six of them were accused of aggression. Of these six, only one is an adult (20 years old). The Japanese who killed Herculano with a knife is a minor. The final trial took place on 5 March, 1998. According to the Judge Manabu Sato, Herculano was killed because he was a Brazilian (Jornal Tudo Bem, 10 October 1998: A4). An article in Made in Japan drew attention to other crimes committed by young Japanese with the same type of knife (butterfly) (Made in Japan, 1 (8) April 1998). In the Japanese press some articles were published interpreting the case as ‘Racism no mondai`(a problem of racism). For instance, ‘Zainichi Gaikokujin to Jinken’ (Foreign Residents and Events), Kodomo to Kyojasho Zenkoku Netto 21 News, 1998; ‘Nihonshakai no Hageshi’ (Violence of the Society), ‘Minzoku Sabetsu Hökö Jikken’ (Racial Discrimination Event); ‘Burajiru Shönen wa naze Korosareta ka’ (Why was the Brazilian Young Man Killed?’), (Sekai, September 1998: 220). ‘Supa de Nihonjin no tannin no me ya fuinki ga sukoshi okashi to kanjiru koto ga aru’; ‘Kaisha no Nihonjin Burajiru no koto wa kirai mitai. Nihonjin tsutometai Nihonjin no kao wo shite itemo gaijin tsukai suru’ (Watanabe ed.,vol. 2, 1995: 298). The social survey was conducted with a sample of 345 of the 500 Nikkeijin workers in factories in Soja, a small industrial town in Okayama prefecture, between April 1992 and February 1994. Results were reported in The Bulletin of the Okayama University of Science, 1995 and 1997. Ikemi, 20 years old and Suzuki, 52 years old. Both have been working for a metallurgic company in Okayama for the last eight years. This figure is for 31 December 1996 (Jömon Shinbunsha, 1997). In Akasakasa (Tokyo) there is a samba festival in August. Samba groups have Brazilian names, but are constituted only by Japanese people. There is also a contest, and Brazilians in Japan also vote. This festival has been held for 17 years and therefore is not related to the Nikkeijin presence in Japan. It is said to have been organised by a shop owner who wanted to increase business. Usually the festival attracts 3,600 participants and more than 500,000 assistants (Made in Japan, November 1997). For a detailed explanation of the topic see, for example, Roger Brown (1986) and Rupert Brown (1995). For example, for Yoshioka of the official centre for the recruitment of the Nikkeijin in São Paulo, the choice of the Nikkeijin was a strategic one, both because they are a docile workforce, and because of kinship ties with the Japanese. According to Asari (1992), a Brazilian Nikkei researcher, the Japanese companies see the Nikkeijin as more likely to adapt successfully to the demands of work and the customs of the country, and for these

Notes

185

reasons they will neither experience nor cause many problems during their stay in the country. 39 It has been reported that many young Brazilians in Japan dress and behave like Japanese youngsters (Made in Japan, March 1998). 40 According to a report in Made in Japan (August 1997), what shocks the Japanese most are the habits of the Brazilians of kissing each other on the streets, listening to loud music, gathering in groups and lack of punctuality. 41 An exception was a woman in Soja (Okayama) who often socialised with the Nikkeijin and was learning Portuguese in order to communicate with them. According to her, the Brazilians (as she referred to them) were very different from the Japanese, but some of the Nisei were not that different. 6 Conclusion 1 This expression is borrowed from Gilroy (1993: 147) who claims that demanding the right to be both black and English is a gesture of insubordination. 2 Some authors speak of multiple selves. However, this is misleading. One can conceptualise oneself in many possible roles and circumstances, but it is still essentially the same self that is maintained in all of these, as Baumaister (1995) remarks. 3 This discussion is based on Ang’s (1994) reflections on being an overseas Chinese. 4 This phrase is borrowed from Gilroy (quoted in Hall 1992: 4) who used it in connection with British people of Caribbean descent when they go to the Caribbean. 5 Jenkins (1997: 818). It should be noted that in the last two or three years, the term ‘Brazilian communities’ has been more often used than the term ‘Nikkei communities’ amongst the Nikkeijin in Japan. 6 In analysing the relationships between majority and minority there is a risk of overestimating the weight of ethnicity and neglecting other factors. According to Irving Howe, ethnicity has become the new clothes for the emperor class, an expression of conservatism’s answer to the Marxist proletariat (quoted in Sollors 1996: xiii). 7 It is worth pointing out that more countries apply the principle of jus sanguinis than jus solis for granting citizenship. According to Nomoto (cited in Silverman 1989), 30 countries follow jus solis and 93 countries follow jus sanguinis. 8 Robin Cohen (1994:198). According to Cohen, immigration officers, the media, Home Office ministers and other politicians, as well as social and political movements that seek to influence the ideological and legal parameters of nationality and citizenship, are ‘frontier guards’ of the national identity. 9 In this regard, Japan is by no means unique. For example, the arguments to explain why Britain is a culturally homogeneous country are similar to those used in Japan, namely the island status that kept the country isolated from other countries for centuries. Similar notions of breeding, ‘blood’ and a sense of history used in the discourses on ‘Japaneseness’ can also be found in discourses on ‘Englishness’. On this subject see Banton (1994) and Miles (1993). 10 It should also be noted that right-wing revisionism is also of rising importance. 11 There is a rumour that the former Chief Cabinet Secretary, Hiromu Nonaka, has Burakumin origins, but this has never been proved. Nevertheless, he had to endure discrimination for having been brought up near a Burakumin area. His experience of discrimination led him to run for local office, determined to eradicate prejudice. He succeeded in being a powerful politician in spite of his background (The Japan Times Weekly, 1 May 1998: 5 and an article by Valerie Reitman in the Los Angeles Times, 17 April 1999). Another example of these changes occurring in Japan is the election of Arai Shökei, a Korean Zainichi, naturalised Japanese, who was elected to the Diet in October 1996.

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Index

Abe, Célia 32, 68 accidents at work 98–9 Adam, Herbert xix Akira, Hinago 127 Appleyard, Reginald 83 Asari, Alice 66 assimilation 19, 35, 58–9, 115, 152 associations: of Dekasegi in Japan 101–3; of Japanese in Brazil 17, 29–30, 54–5 attitudes of Nikkei towards Brazil 45–7

community life: in Brazil 11, 28–9; in Japan 134 Consular services: Brazilian (in Nagoya) 89, 104, 108; Japanese (in São Paulo) 10, 18–21, 56 co-operatives 17, 60 Couto, Miguel 18 crime 106–10 cultural distance 54, 134 cultural identity xxi, 121

Banton, Michael xix, 142 Barth, Fredrik xix, 123 Befu, Harumi 121 blood ties 116–123, 143 Brazil: discovery and early development of 4–7, 47–51, 147; Japanese settlement in 7–27; see also Nikkei population Brazilian Colonisation Association (BRATAG) 6, 8, 10, 20 ‘Brazilianisation’ 56, 62, 64 ‘Brazilianness’ of Nikkeijin 137–8 Brazilians registered in Japan 88–9 bullying 105 Burakumin, the 71–2 Butsugan, Sumi 46

Dale, Peter 116–17 De Vos, George xix, 118, 120 Dekasegi 86–114; assistance provided by local government 100–1; associations 101–3; contribution to Japanese economy 114; deviant behaviour 106–8; employment and labour relations 94–100; housing 101; prospects for settlement in Japan 111–14; recruitment of 92–4; re-emigration by 111–12; returning to Brazil 108–9; social networks 113; successes and failures of 110–11; welfare provision for 97 ‘differences’, construction of 136–43 discrimination against Nikkeijin 130–1, 144, 151

Campos, Francisco 50 Capanemin, Gustavo 50 Cardoso, Ruth 29, 39, 65 Catholic Church 102 Changsoo, Lee xix, 118, 120 ‘chrysanthemum incident’ 63 Cohen, Robin xx, 146 Collor, Fernando 88 colonias 9–10, 54, 65 colonos 5–8 commentators’ perceptions of the Nikkeijin 126–7

education and educational attainment: in Brazil 14–15, 21, 30–1, 38–9; in Japan 104–6, 128–9 emigration from Japan 3: to Brazil 5–6; destinations other than Brazil 4 Emperor of Japan see Hirohito enclaves 53, 134 Erikson, Erik xx–xxi ethnicity: concepts of xiv, xvi–xxi, 61–4, 145; and migration 52–3 exchange programmes 31 ‘ex-Japanese’ 63–4

Index family life 12–13 foreign workers in Japan 81–3, 122–3; social attitudes towards 84–6 Fujimori, Alberto 46, 124 Fukuda, Kazuya 124 Fukuda, Takeo 29 Gardner, Katy 111 Gerbi, Antonello 53 Glazer, Nathan xix Goldstein-Gidori, Ofra 121 Goodman, Roger 118, 121 Hall, Stuart 118, 149 Handa, Tomo 11, 16, 24–5, 58, 62–4 Hanna, Toshi 56 Hansen, Marcus Lee 45 Hashimoto, Ryutarö 89 Hatsuse, Ryuhei 81 Hayashi, Wataru 122 Hayashida, Cullen 116–19, 124 health care see medical services Herbert, Wolfgang 86, 127 Hirohito, Emperor 21–3, 59 housing 101 identity: concept of xx–xxi; construction of 62; see also cultural identity; national identity; social identity immigration and ethnicity 52–3 immigration law: Brazilian 7, 46, 49–50; Japanese xiii, 79–82, 116, 151–2 integration: concept of 35, 151–2; of Japanese immigrants into Brazilian society 36–45, 62; of the Nikkeijin 134, 149 inter-marriage 41–3 investment by Japan in Brazil 6, 10, 27 Ishida, Eiichirö 116, 118 Issei, the 69–70 Izumi, Seiichi 46–7 Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA) 26–7 Japanese language 121–3; see also Koroniago language ‘Japaneseness’ 56–8, 65–8, 74, 113, 115, 118–20, 143, 153; criteria for 119; degrees of 73 ‘Japanisation’ 145 Jenkins, Richard xx Kaigai Kögyö Kabushiki Kaisha (KKKK) 3–4, 10 Kajita, Takamichi 126

201

Kanazawa, Hiroki 39 Kawasaki, Hiroshi 100 Kazuo, Watanabe 65 Keiichi, Honma 127 Komai, Hiroshi 81, 85, 126 Kondo, Dorinne 148 Koroniago language 12, 40 Kouchi, Genshiro 135 Koyama, Tsuguo 58 Kuroda, Yasumasa 122 Kyüimin, the 70 labour relations in Japan 99–100 labour shortages 79, 151 language and language teaching 30–1, 39–41, 53, 105–6; see also Japanese language Lie, John 83, 127, 152 literacy 38–9 Loveday, Leo 39 Maeyama, Takashi 38, 44–5, 57, 59, 63, 65 Makabe, Tomoko 45 Manabe, Kazufumi 119 marriage 13, 41–3 media coverage of the Nikkeijin 127–30, 139–40, 144 medical services: in Brazil 18; in Japan 103–4 Mello, Lúcia 42 Mihara, Celso 32 Miller, Roy 122–3 Miyao, Susumu 65 Mori, Hiromi 127 Moynihan, Daniel xix Murayama, Célia 63 Nagel, Joane xx Nakagawa, Décio 67 Nakagawa, Yoko 67 Nakamura, Hiroko 63 national identity 116–17, 151–3; Japanese 33, 116–23, 143 nationalism 61 naturalisation: in Brazil 37; in Japan 113 newspapers: in Brazil 15, 19, 31–3; in Japan 103 Nihongakkö schools 14–15, 30–1 Nihongo myth 122 nihonjinron literature 117–18 Nikkei population in Brazil: associations for 17, 29–30, 54–5; attitudes to the host country 45–7; characteristics of 67–9; construction of identity 62;

202

Index

Nikkei population in Brazil – continued education 14–15, 21, 30–1; income distribution 38; marriage and family life 12–13; medical services 18; occupational distribution 37–8; political participation 43–4; population statistics 27; in postwar period 28–9; religious affiliation 44–5; social structure and community organisations 10–11; urban and rural 70; variety of 69–75 Nikkei population in Japan xiii–xiv, 134; discrimination against 130–1, 144, 151; as a minority group 115, 136–7, 149–51; perceptions of 123–30 Nikkeijin, use of term 66–7, 147–8 Nisei, the 72 Normano, João 53 Obuchi, Keizo 152 occupational distribution: in Brazil 37–8; in Japan 95 officials, Japanese, role of 55–6, 124–5 Ogawa, Paulo 32 Ohashi, Masahiro 89 Öizumi 134–6 Okinawans 70–1 Patterson, Orlando xix political participation 43–4 race relations: in Brazil 47–52, 56–8; in Japan 147, 149 Reis, Fidélio 49 religion 15–17, 44–5, 102 remittances 109, 112 Robertson, Jennifer 121 Saito, Hiroshi 46, 59 Saito, Júlia 13, 41, 45, 54, 58–9 Saito, Toshiaki 65 Sakurai, Célia 46 Sansei, the 73–5 Schaden, Egon 58 schools see education Second World War, reactions to Japan’s defeat in 21–5, 58–60, 62, 74 Shichihei, Yamamoto 117

Shimidu, Amélia 39, 65 Shimomoto, Cassio 63 Shindö 59–61 Shinimin, the 70 Shinoda, Carlos 105 Shöichi, Watanabe 121 Smith, Robert 13, 44, 56, 67 social identity 138 social structure 10–11, 38 Sousa, Menezes e 48 Stahl, Charles 83 Staniford, Philip 54 subsidised migration 6, 25–6, 146 Suzuki, Takatoshi 101 Takaki, Raul 32 Takao, Suzuki 121 terrorism 23–4 Toshihiko, Nojima 125 Truman, Harry 21–2 Tsuda, Takeyuki 132 Tsukamoto, Tetsundo 54 turnover of labour 97–8 Ushiro, José 46 values, Japanese 13 van den Berghe, Pierre 51 Vargas, Getúlio 18, 49 Vidal, Gil 48 Vieira, Francisca 41–2, 64–5, 71 wages in Japan 96 Wakisaka, Katsumori 65 Wako, Shungoro 36 Watanabe, Kazuo 46 Watanabe, Masako 131 Weiner, Myron 126–7 ‘whitening’ 48, 51, 53, 148 Willems, Emilio 59 working hours in Japan 96–7 Yamamoto, Lúcia 64 Yamanaka, Keiko 126, 130–1 Yanagawa, Juichiro 114 Yoshida, Shigeru 61 Yoshino, Kosaku 116–20