MILTON AND TOLERATION
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MILTON AND TOLERATION
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Milton and Toleration Edited by
SHARON ACHINSTEIN and
ELIZABETH SAUER
1
1
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York the several contributors 2007 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available Typeset by Laserwords Private Limited, Chennai, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd., King’s Lynn, Norfolk ISBN 978–0–19–929593–7 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2
Contents Notes on Contributors List of Abbreviations
vii xi
1. Introduction Sharon Achinstein and Elizabeth Sauer
1
I . R EV I S I N G W H I G AC C O U N T S 2. Milton and the European Contexts of Toleration Nigel Smith 3. Toleration and the Specter of Heresy in Milton’s England David Loewenstein 4. John Milton, Roger Williams, and the Limits of Toleration Thomas N. Corns 5. Milton, Marvell and Toleration Nicholas von Maltzahn
23 45 72 86
I I . PH I LO S O PH I C A L A N D R E L I G I O U S E N G AG E M E N T S 6. Libertinism and Toleration: Milton, Bruno and Aretino James Grantham Turner 7. Milton, Natural Law, and Toleration Jason P. Rosenblatt 8. ‘A Taken Scandal not a Given’: Milton’s Equitable Grounds of Toleration Victoria Silver 9. Milton and Antitrinitarianism Martin Dzelzainis 10. Milton and Catholicism Andrew Hadfield
107 126
144 171 186
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Contents I I I . P O E T RY A N D R H E TO R I C
11. Toleration and Nationhood in the 1650s: ‘Sonnet XV’ and the Case of Ireland Elizabeth Sauer 12. Toleration in Milton’s Epics: A Chimera? Sharon Achinstein 13. Intolerance and the Virtues of Sacred Vehemence Paul Stevens 14. Secularizing Conscience in Milton’s Republican Community Lana Cable 15. Milton, Islam and the Ottomans Gerald MacLean Afterword Ann Hughes Index
203 224 243 268 284 299
305
Notes on Contributors Sharon Achinstein is Reader in Renaissance Literature at Oxford University, and author of Literature and Dissent in Milton’s England (Cambridge, 2003). Her Milton and the Revolutionary Reader (Princeton, 1994) won the Milton Society of America’s James Holly Hanford Prize, and she has edited a special issue of Women’s Studies on Literature and Gender in the English Revolution (1994), and published numerous essays on Milton, Dryden, women’s writing, and politics in the seventeenth century. She is a consulting editor for the forthcoming Milton Encyclopedia (Yale University Press) and is editor for Volume 5 of The Complete Works of John Milton (under preparation for Oxford University Press), the Divorce Tracts. Lana Cable is Associate Professor of English and Master of Arts programme director at The University at Albany, State University of New York. Her book Carnal Rhetoric: Milton’s Iconoclasm and the Poetics of Desire (Duke, 1995) received the James Holly Hanford Award. In addition to Milton, her essays and book chapters treat the politics of metaphor, orientalist drama, and the anatomical epic of Spenserian Phineas Fletcher. She also contributed the introduction to Milton in the Age of Fish: Essays on Authorship, Text, and Terrorism, ed. Michael Lieb and Albert C. Labriola (Duquesne, 2006). She is currently writing a book on the early modern free conscience debate. Thomas N. Corns, MA, D.Phil, F.R.Hist.S., FEA, is Professor of English and a provice chancellor at University of Wales, Bangor. His work on Milton includes The Development of Milton’s Prose Style (Clarendon, 1982), Milton’s Language (Blackwell, 1990), Uncloistered Virtue (Oxford, 1992), Regaining ‘Paradise Lost’ (Longman, 1994), and John Milton: The Prose Works (Twayne, 1998). His most recent publication is A History of Seventeenth-Century English Literature (Blackwell, 2006). He is editor of the prize-winning A Companion to Milton (Blackwell, 2001) and the forthcoming Milton Encyclopedia (under preparation for Yale University Press). He is also General Editor, with Gordon Campbell, of The Complete Works of John Milton (under preparation for Oxford University Press). Martin Dzelzainis, Professor of English, Royal Holloway, University of London, has co-edited Marvell and Liberty (Macmillan, 1999) and is editor of Volume 1 of The Complete Prose Works of Andrew Marvell (Yale, 2004). He has edited John Milton, Political Writings, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge, 1991). Author of essays and chapters in books on such topics as republicanism, Milton, Roman law, political ideology, Bacon, Charles I, Shakespeare, Hobbes, and Marvell, he is currently working on a monograph, provisionally entitled The Flower in the Panther: Truth-telling, Print, and Censorship in England, 1662–1669. He is also general editor of The Works of Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, forthcoming from Oxford. Andrew Hadfield is Professor of English at the University of Sussex, and has published widely on Renaissance topics, with books including Literature, Politics and National
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Identity: Reformation to Renaissance (Cambridge, 1994), Edmund Spenser’s Irish Experience: Wilde Fruit and Salvage Soyl (Oxford, 1997), Literature, Travel and Colonial Writing in the English Renaissance (Oxford, 1998), and Shakespeare and Republicanism (Cambridge, 2005), awarded the Ronald H. Bainford Prize for sixteenth-century literature (2006). He is also the editor (with Raymond Gillespie) of The Oxford History of the Irish Book, vol. iii: The Irish Book in English, 1550–1800 (Oxford, 2006). Ann Hughes, Professor of Early Modern History at the University of Keele, is the author of numerous studies on politics and religion under the Stuarts. Her publications include Gangraena and the Struggle for the English Revolution (Oxford, 2004), Politics, Society, and Civil War in Warwickshire, 1620–1660 (Cambridge, 1987), The Causes of the English Civil War (St Martin’s, 1991, 2nd edn., 1998), and the co-edited volumes Conflict in Early Stuart England (Longman, 1989) and The English Civil War (Arnold, 1997). David Loewenstein is Marjorie and Lorin Tiefenthaler Professor of English at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He is twice winner of the Milton Society of America’s James Holly Hanford Award for distinguished book, 1991, 2002 and is author of Milton and the Drama of History: Historical Vision, Iconoclasm, and the Literary Imagination (Cambridge, 1990) and Representing Revolution in Milton and His Contemporaries: Religion, Politics, and Polemics in Radical Puritanism (Cambridge, 2001). He has co-edited Politics, Poetics, and Hermeneutics in Milton’s Prose (Cambridge, 1990), The Cambridge History of Early Modern English Literature (Cambridge, 2002; paperback edn., 2006), Paradise Regained in Context: Genre, Politics, Religion, Milton Studies 42 (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003); and Heresy, Literature, and Politics in Early Modern English Culture (Cambridge, 2006). He is currently editing the Collected Works of Gerrard Winstanley and is the editor for Paradise Lost in The Complete Works of John Milton, in preparation for Oxford University Press. Gerald MacLean, FRAS, F.R.Hist.S., Anniversary Professor of English and Related Literature at the University of York, has authored Looking East: English Writing and the Ottoman Empire before 1800 (Palgrave, 2007), The Rise of Oriental Travel: English Visitors to the Ottoman Empire, 1580–1720 (Palgrave, 2004) and Time’s Witness: Historical Representation in English Poetry, 1603–1660 (Cambridge, 1990). In addition, he is editor of Writing Turkey: Explorations in Turkish History, Politics and Cultural Identity (Middlesex, 2006), Culture and Society in the Stuart Restoration: Literature, Drama, History (Cambridge, 1995) and co-editor of The Country and the City Revisited: England and the Politics of Culture, 1550–1850 (Cambridge, 1999) and The Spivak Reader: Selected Works of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Routledge, 1996). With Nabil Matar, he is currently writing Britain and the Muslim World, 1558–1728 for Oxford University Press. Jason P. Rosenblatt, Professor of English at Georgetown University, is the co-editor of Not in Heaven: Coherence and Complexity in Biblical Narrative (Indiana, 1991) and author of Torah and Law in ‘Paradise Lost’ (Princeton, 1994), Renaissance England’s Chief Rabbi: John Selden (Oxford, 2006), and two dozen essays in journals and books. He is under contract to produce a Norton Critical Edition of Milton’s Selected Poetry and Prose. Awards include Fellowships from the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation,
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the Folger Shakespeare Library, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. Professor Rosenblatt is a past president of the Milton Society of America (1999) and recipient of its Hanford Award (1989). Elizabeth Sauer is Professor of English at Brock University, Canada, where she was awarded a Chancellor’s Chair for Research Excellence. Her books include ‘Papercontestations’ and Textual Communities in England 1640–1675 (Toronto, 2005), Barbarous Dissonance and Images of Voice in Milton’s Epics (McGill-Queen’s, 1996) and nine editions/co-editions, among which are Reading the Nation (Routledge, forthcoming), Milton and the Climates of Reading: Essays by Balachandra Rajan (Toronto, 2006), Reading Early Modern Women (Routledge, 2004), winner of the Society for the Study of Early Modern Women Best Collaborative Work; Imperialisms: Historical and Literary Investigations 1500–1900 (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004), Books and Readers in Early Modern England (Pennsylvania, 2002), and Milton and the Imperial Vision (Duquesne, 1999), winner of the Milton Society of America Irene Samuel Memorial Award. Her book Toleration and Milton’s ‘Peculiar’ Nation is in progress. Victoria Silver, Associate Professor, English and Comparative Literature, University of California, Irvine, is author of Imperfect Sense: The Predicament of Milton’s Irony (Princeton, 2001), and she has published major articles on Milton, Marvell, Jonson, Browne, and Hobbes. Silver was Recipient of The Chancellor’s Award for Excellence in Fostering Undergraduate Research at the University of California, Irvine. Nigel Smith is Professor of English at Princeton University. He is the author of Literature and Revolution in England, 1640–1660 (Yale, 1994) and Perfection Proclaimed: Language and Literature in English Radical Religion, 1640–1660 (Oxford, 1989), as well as articles on Shakespeare, Donne, Herbert, Milton, and Bunyan, and on such topics as atheism, vegetarianism, and Socinianism. He has edited the Ranter Tracts and the Journal of George Fox, and is editor of The Poems of Andrew Marvell (2003) in the Longman Annotated English Poets Series. Paul Stevens is Professor and Canada Research Chair in English Literature at the University of Toronto. His publications include Milton’s America, America’s Milton (co-editor, special issue of University of Toronto Quarterly, in progress), Early Modern Nationalism and Milton’s England (co-editor, forthcoming 2007), When is a Public Sphere? (co-editor, special issue of Criticism, 2004), Discontinuities: New Essays on Renaissance Literature and Criticism (co-editor, Toronto, 1998), and Imagination and the Presence of Shakespeare in ‘Paradise Lost’ (Wisconsin, 1985). He has twice won the Milton Society of America’s Hanford Award for most distinguished article. James Grantham Turner is Professor of English Literature, University of California, Berkeley, and is the author of Politics of Landscape (Oxford, 1979); One Flesh: Paradisal Marriage and Sexual Relations in the Age of Milton (Oxford, 1987), winner of the Milton Society of America’s James Holly Hanford Award for distinguished book; Libertines and Radicals in Early Modern London: Sexuality, Politics and Literary Culture, 1630–1685 (Cambridge, 2001) and Schooling Sex: Libertine Literature and Erotic Education in Italy, France and England, 1534–1685 (Oxford, 2003). Turner has also written chapters
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for historical surveys on Renaissance literature, on the change from Revolution to Restoration in English culture, and on the eighteenth-century novel. Nicholas von Maltzahn, Professor of English at the University of Ottawa, is author of An Andrew Marvell Chronology (Palgrave, 2005) and Milton’s History of Britain: Republican Historiography in the English Revolution (Oxford, 1991). His work on Milton and Marvell includes a number of articles on their literary and political afterlives. He has edited Marvell’s An Account of the Growth of Popery and Arbitrary Government for the Yale Prose Works of Andrew Marvell (2003) and is now editing Milton’s tracts on church government and toleration for The Complete Works of John Milton, in preparation for Oxford University Press. His current research explores questions of toleration and multiculturalism.
List of Abbreviations AP
Apology against a Pamphlet
Areop.
Areopagitica
CJ
Journals of the House of Commons
CM
The Works of John Milton, gen. ed. Frank Allen Patterson, 18 vols. in 21 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1931–8)
CSP
Milton, Complete Shorter Poems, ed. John Carey, 2nd edn. (London: Longman, 1997)
DDC
De Doctrina Christiana
DDD
The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce
Eikon.
Eikonoklastes
LP
Declaration, or Letters Patent
ODNB
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography
Of Ed.
Of Education
Of Ref.
Of Reformation
PC
Private Correspondence
PL
Milton, Paradise Lost, ed. Alastair Fowler, 2nd edn. (London: Longman, 1988)
PR
Paradise Regained
PWAM
The Prose Works of Andrew Marvell
RCG
The Reason of Church-Government
REW
The Readie and Easie Way to Establish A Free Commonwealth
SA
Samson Agonistes
SP
State Papers
TCP
A Treatise of Civil Power
TR
Of True Religion
YP
Complete Prose Works of John Milton, gen. ed. Don M. Wolfe, 8 vols. in 10 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953–82)
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1 Introduction Sharon Achinstein and Elizabeth Sauer
I ‘What is toleration?’ asked Voltaire, opening his article on that subject in his Philosophical Dictionary. There, the philosophe offers, not an answer, but a characterization: ‘it is the prerogative of humanity’.¹ Tolerance is the major question of Enlightenment, one that has come back to haunt our modernity that is resurgent with religious activism. This book’s central claim is that a study of the writings of John Milton can contribute to broadening our understanding not only of the history of toleration but also of the links between literature and history. A standard history of ideas approach has long hailed Milton as a hero of toleration, and it is true that Milton defended different kinds of tolerance throughout his writing life. Early writings proposing tolerance include the divorce tracts (1643–5) and Areopagitica (1644), where Milton advanced theological arguments with biblical examples, but also came to espouse radically heterodox views of community and personhood. Milton’s Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (1649) attacked the Presbyterians’ intolerance, while the Defences of the People of England (1651, 1654) promoted civil liberties. Serving as an official in the Cromwellian government, Milton allegedly licensed the religiously incendiary Racovian Catechism (1652) and other heretical We gratefully acknowledge our indebtedness to the following: Kathryn Murphy for her superb editorial assistance; the English Faculty of Oxford University and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for generous financial support; David Loewenstein, Martin Dzelzainis, and David Norbrook for their astute remarks on our Introduction; and all our contributors for sharing their valuable insights into the richly rewarding subject of Milton and toleration. Contributors’ individual styles of spelling and punctuation are retained throughout. ¹ Voltaire, ‘C’est l’apanage de l’humanit´e’, in Dictionnaire Philosophique (Paris: GarnierFlammarion, 1964), 362; tr. Philosophical Dictionary, T. Besterman (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2004), 387.
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works.² Like many thinkers of his day, he promoted a philo-Hebraic cultural and literary program.³ His shorter poetry expressed outrage at the persecution of religious minorities and his Psalm translations spoke in the voice of the oppressed. Even on the eve of Restoration and facing a re-established national church, his pamphlets Of Civil Power and The Likeliest Means (1659) urged church disestablishment as a means for achieving a more inclusive political culture. The Preface to his unpublished theological treatise, De Doctrina Christiana, is a plea for toleration of unorthodox Christian sects and positions. In defiance of the anti-sectarian climate of the Restoration era, Milton explored and defended individual liberty of conscience in his 1673 edition of his Poems as well as in his major poems, Paradise Lost (1667, 1674), Paradise Regained (1671), and Samson Agonistes (1671) and in his final tract, Of True Religion (1673), espoused a broad definition of a Protestant church. There was also an intolerant Milton. This Milton restricted his appeal to civil liberties and freedoms of the press to Protestants, with the Roman church ever vilified for its tyrannies; this Milton was largely silent on the proposed readmission of the Jews in 1655; this Milton championed Cromwell’s campaign against the Roman Catholic Irish in the 1649 Observations; and this Milton spattered his writings across his career with anti-Catholic satire and invective.⁴ His last pamphlet, Of True Religion, protested against the toleration of Roman Catholics when English political leaders were considering a Catholic Indulgence. While the liberal tradition of toleration writing tends to play down this intolerant Milton, it was indeed as a Protestant that the Whig tradition hailed him as a hero. With anti-Popery and anti-priestcraft as its main pillars, Whigs saw Milton’s defenses of freedom of conscience and attacks on persecution as vital to their contribution to the history of liberties of the individual, culminating in John Locke.⁵ The essays which follow, however, resist unearthing an ‘intolerant’ Milton at the expense of the formerly tolerant liberal one. In the early modern period, as Alexandra Walsham and others have shown, ‘tolerance and intolerance are ² Stephen B. Dobranski, ‘Licensing Milton’s Heresy’, in Stephen B. Dobranski and John P. Rumrich, eds., Milton and Heresy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 143–4; and see Dzelzainis below. ³ See Douglas Brooks, ed., Milton and the Jews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). ⁴ See Don M. Wolfe, ‘Limits of Miltonic Toleration’, Journal of English and Germanic Philology 60 (1961), 834–46; and John Illo, ‘Areopagiticas Mythic and Real’, Prose Studies 11.1 (1998), 3–23. ⁵ See, for example, Justin Champion, Republican Learning: John Toland and the Crisis of Christian Culture, 1696–1722 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 100–5; and on the construction of the ‘Whig’ Milton, see Nicholas von Maltzahn, ‘The Whig Milton, 1667–1700’, in David Armitage, Armand Himy and Quentin Skinner, eds., Milton and Republicanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 229–53.
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better seen as dialectically and symbiotically linked’.⁶ And yet, history does not run backwards: without falling into an easy determinism, one may at least say that once the printing press was in regular, widespread use, the control or dissemination of information had to take on new forms. Perhaps, even more controversially, we might say the same about concepts: once a concept like freedom of thought was espoused and made public, any subsequent battle would have to take that into account. Some readers may be frustrated at the lack of precision about what is that ‘toleration’ our contributors have found in Milton. Recent historians have been helpfully clarifying about the important distinctions between toleration, tolerance, freedom of inquiry, and matters to do with ecclesiology: ‘comprehension,’ rather than toleration, for example.⁷ They have also explored how toleration was a tactical strategy at times rather than a point of principle.⁸ We have hoped to keep the notion of toleration sufficiently broad so as to investigate how one spectacularly sensitive and engaged author constructed visions of community, its spaces, boundaries and textures: ours is a project in the history of the imagination, not simply the reconstruction of legal, ecclesiological and social practices. Milton was a great upholder of boundaries (‘fit … though few’) but he was also deeply interested, as our contributors show, in the malleability of boundaries, in the dynamics of mixed communities, and ‘brotherly dissimilitudes’. We seek to show how Milton’s visions of tolerance intersected with contemporary political discourse and also how they reveal deeper movements in the history of the imagination. Through this study we hope, moreover, to find how modernity’s new discourses—liberty of ⁶ Alexandra Walsham, Charitable Hatred: Tolerance and Intolerance in England, 1500–1700 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 5; and John Coffey, Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England, 1558–1689 (Harlow: Longman, 2000). ⁷ In addition to Walsham, Charitable, 234, see also Mark Goldie, ‘The Theory of Religious Intolerance in Restoration England’, 331–68; and John Dunn, ‘The Claim to Freedom of Conscience: Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Thought, Freedom of Worship?’ 171–93, both in Ole Peter Grell, Jonathan I. Israel and Nicholas Tyacke, eds., From Persecution to Toleration: The Glorious Revolution and Religion in England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); Tim Harris, ‘Tories and the Rule of Law in The Reign of Charles II’, The Seventeenth Century 8.1 (1993), 9–27; John Spurr, ‘England 1649–1750: Differences Contained?’ in Steven N. Zwicker, ed., English Literature 1650–1740 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 3–32; John Marshall, John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). ⁸ Tom Webster, Godly Clergy: The Caroline Puritan Movement, 1620–1643 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), passim, and esp. 333–8; Walsham, Charitable, 236–7; Gary S. De Krey, London and the Restoration, 1659–1683 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), passim, and esp. 116–40. On the Netherlands, see Andrew Pettegree, ‘The Politics of Toleration in the Free Netherlands’, in Ole Peter Grell and Robert Scribner, eds., Tolerance and Intolerance in the European Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 198.
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conscience, natural law, equity, materialism, libertinism, rhetoric, secularism, even literature itself—created spaces for toleration. The traditional liberal account of toleration that hails 1688 as the landmark (because through it a toleration was legalized by government) is not the only way of telling the story of toleration. In so doing, we insist on breaking down the opposition between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ that has shaped revisionist approaches to post-Reformation theology and politics. A number of recent scholars have sought to determine the actual shape of tolerance and intolerance within particular communities in early modern Europe, and their work has been invaluable to the reconstruction of the lives of people who were, at once, removed from the centres of polemic, but at the same time, those most affected by sectarian strife or concord.⁹ At times, this is an invaluable corrective to an idealizing approach; but at others, this seems to restrict understanding by setting ‘practice’ against ‘beliefs,’ actions rather than words, reality against rhetoric. Missed by those who favor functionalist accounts of social change is an explanation of choice, of intention. Throughout the historian David Cressy’s important new study, England on Edge, there is however an agency-less narrative: what happened was, variously: a ‘collapse’ (6, 9 and passim), a ‘breakdown’, ‘confusions and changes of the times’ (21), a ‘distemper’, a ‘splintering’ (9), and last, an ‘earthquake of cosmic proportions’ (424), without a clear sense of how ideas played a role in relation to these great changes.¹⁰ This rejection of principle or the obscuring of the meaning of beliefs, words, or rhetoric leaves us wondering why sectarian radicalism spread in the first place; and how the people experiencing change felt about it. Walsham points to the ‘distorting’ effects of the persecuting rhetorics: ‘speech, script and print may even have been responsible for creating mirages of dissident movements which did not in fact exist’.¹¹ We question this approach that seeks an underlying ‘reality’ beneath the ‘representations’. Along with our view, rather than rejecting these idealizing representations, the historian Ann Hughes has recently broadened our understanding of the importance of them. Persecutors like Thomas Edwards, she has shown, may have been the fabricator of nightmares, but they were also recording something real: an ⁹ For example, Ann Hughes, Gangraena and the Struggle for the English Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Benjamin J. Kaplan, Calvinists and Libertines: Confession and Community in Utrecht, 1578–1620 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Walsham, Charitable. ¹⁰ David Cressy, England on Edge: Crisis and Revolution, 1640–1642 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 6, 9, 21, 9, 424. ¹¹ Walsham, Charitable, 28, 27; see also J. C. Davis, Fear, Myth and History: The Ranters and the Historians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Hughes takes a subtle approach in Gangraena.
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awareness of pluralism and its threats to a particular, ideologically charged, vision of commonality.¹² We think literature has something to offer. In exploring works of literature, we can gain further insight into why these fantasies mattered in particular; and in the works of John Milton, we hope to show, we are given a detailed and multi-layered account of the religious, political and literary landscape of the mid-seventeenth century, and a convincing case that we should care about literature and the evidence it has to offer. If some historians all too often seem to want to get behind the ‘representations’ to reach a realm of the ‘real’, our contributors demonstrate that the truth of representations is a valuable truth in itself. The images of literature, rhetoric and poetry present a kind of ‘truth’ of the past that we in the discipline of literature are uniquely skilled to explore. While in some areas of literary study, the topic of toleration seems rather old-fashioned, perhaps supplanted by an interest in ethics, ‘identity’ and ‘difference’, we consider the claims of a liberal political tradition to offer a meaningful engagement with vital—and still unresolved—aspects of human social life.¹³ Our volume resists a distinction between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ of toleration without reducing one to the other. Literary evidence is somewhere between these two poles. As the writer’s engagements with ideas form a kind of practice, as Milton insisted, reading was a kind of action in the world; indeed, discernment was one of the most fundamental actions necessary to a life of virtue and faith. In Milton’s own literary methods, furthermore, practice is indeed the only way you can know theory (or know that you don’t really know it).¹⁴ Milton’s accounts of toleration offer up a more complex picture of the practical and the theoretical, the passions, interests, reasons, than can be found in a traditional history of ideas approach or in the newer anti-intellectual revisionist approach. Milton’s vehement rhetorical style, for instance, does not simply convey ideas, but is itself a particular expressive mode. As Paul Stevens tags it below, Milton’s ‘expressive’ significance is a kind of action that, on the one hand, exceeds the pragmatic aims and, on the other, is also a mode of self-fashioning. We are led to ask about the relation between the literal ¹² Hughes’s Gangraena is open to the complex but important ways that representations, including literary representations, need not be set against ‘realities’, but indeed help to constitute the known. ¹³ See the important challenges to the concept of ‘tolerance’ in Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 129. ¹⁴ Though he might not put it that way, this is a claim that might follow upon Stanley Fish’s insights; see, in particular, Is There a Text in this Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 13, 168; and How Milton Works (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 4.
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violence and the rhetorical violences: to ask what are the differences between ‘speech’ and ‘action’. We find in literature very compelling evidence for historians to use in seeking to understand how people experienced new, or painful, or liberating, ideas. Milton defends the lived experience in the real world, always measured and recalibrated to the wider purpose of serving God. With Milton we can see how closely ethics, epistemology, and personal experience are lodged; and how toleration came about as Milton ‘felt the saving power of interpretive freedom’, as Jason Rosenblatt puts it below. In this volume, we will see Milton as a reader fully engaged with the deep questions of his day, working with natural law theorists Grotius and Selden (Rosenblatt), for example, or libertine writers ( Turner), to rethink his own theological commitments in light of his personal experience. With Milton’s habits of reading we can unearth a de facto or practical toleration of unorthodox ideas (Achinstein). Through the history of reading, we can see how Milton’s humanist training—in the methods of Hebrew philology, legal history, classical philosophy, and, most of all, disputation and rhetoric—could lead to new modes of selfunderstanding and action in the world, what James Turner here provocatively calls ‘libertine reading’, the practice of willingly confronting the scandalous or the contrary. Thomas Hobbes had it right to worry that classical learning had bred a generation of rebels; but that is only part of the story of the legacy of humanism and its penchant for disputation in England. While Milton’s engagements with classical history and rhetoric were always mediated through Reformed concerns, his practical application of humanist principles could lead in strikingly original directions.¹⁵ A deeply religious thinker, Milton saw the aims of his reading as repairing the work of the Fall, as combining liberal knowledge the better to serve God’s purpose, a processual approach to knowledge as open-ended in the human realm. But if Milton is the conveyor of Reformed humanist thought, with its communitarian and republican traditions, he is also the one to defend singularity, the non-controvertibility of individual experience. His poetry is both defense and exemplum. What tension between equity and the discrepant instance is found by Victoria Silver here to characterize the Satanic, Milton absorbs in the name of faith: faith despite the invisibility, the unseen qualities of the creator. Silver’s subtle and complex case below for Milton’s particularity gives us a reason for attending to the writings of this astonishing author. That ¹⁵ For humanist engagements with toleration, see Ingrid Creppell, Toleration and Identity: Foundations in Early Modern Thought (London: Routledge, 2003), 39–64, on Bodin, and 65–90, on Montaigne; Gary Remer, Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996).
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emphasis on individual experience was the starting point, but also the field of action, for a whole new way of conceiving persons, their rights, their political and civic liberties. Milton’s admissions of uncertainty in human and divine relations need not be seen as the scepticism that inevitably leads to toleration but rather as a means to reformulate the nature of human obligations.¹⁶ An attention to Milton helps us broaden our view outwards from the English focus of the micropolitical framework of British historians of ecclesiology and controversy.¹⁷ Although Milton’s title pages insisted on his Englishness, this was because he sought a European audience, and our contributors situate Milton in that wider context. His reading of the Piedmont crisis in light of English national concerns depends upon a dialogic relation with continental developments, as Elizabeth Sauer here shows; and this international vista is not confined to the spectre of Counter-Reformation Roman Catholicism. Indeed, the lived experience of tolerance, or of multi-confessional coexistence on the continent, had led to refinements in theology, with, as Blair Worden and John Coffey have argued, believers seeking for a new ground upon which to offer the fundamentals of religion.¹⁸ Of course, it was in relation to his own domestic radical contexts—such as those presented by Thomas Corns and David Loewenstein in this volume—that Milton created his vision; but there were wider influences and a wider audience imagined for his work (Martin Dzelzainis’s analysis of Milton’s grappling with avant-garde Continental thought sheds light on this below). A writer at work, Milton reveals a capacity for ‘rapidly synthesizing fresh positions’, as Nicholas von Maltzahn states it here, and Dzelzainis shows the political processes by which his ideas emerged. While Milton at times surrendered to a knee-jerk anti-popery fear, he saw in popery not simply Roman Catholicism, but all forms of servitude, dependence, and alienation of reason, as Andrew Hadfield explains in his essay; in this, he sharply and surprisingly differed from his contemporary tolerationists, such as Vane and Williams, who had both ¹⁶ For the importance of distinguishing tolerance from scepticism, see Richard Tuck, ‘Scepticism and Toleration in the Seventeenth Century’, in Susan Mendus, ed., Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 21–35. ¹⁷ As Jonathan Scott, England’s Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), requires that we do. See also Sharon Achinstein, ‘Milton and King Charles’, in Thomas Corns, ed., The Royal Image: Representations of Charles I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 141–61. ¹⁸ Blair Worden, ‘The Question of Secularization’, in Alan Houston and Steve Pincus, eds., A Nation Transformed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 20–40. The radically tolerationist Baptist Thomas Helwys is exemplary; see John Coffey, ‘Puritanism and Liberty Revisited: The Case for Toleration in the English Revolution’, Historical Journal 41.4 (1998), 961–85.
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argued for toleration of idolators.¹⁹ His multiple commitments, along with his rhetorical and philosophical experimentation, provide a sharp corrective to those who would prefer to take Milton as a hero or anti-hero of tolerant thinking. In Milton, we shall see the contours of early modern ambivalence regarding the very nature of human society and its capacity for tolerance. His calls for tolerance are all the more engaging at a time when we see the resurgence of various fundamentalisms around the globe. Above all, our contributors insist on a connection between toleration and heterodoxy. There is no necessary correlation, to be sure, and historians of tolerance differ in their assessments about whether the fight against persecution for religion in England was also a fight for freedom of inquiry. In his study of the origins of Enlightenment thinking, Jonathan Israel, for example, has contrasted the continental defenses with those of Britain: on the continent, arguments for tolerance moved towards freedom of thought; in Britain, he claims, they were restricted to attacks on priestcraft.²⁰ However, Margaret Jacob, with her vision of a radical enlightenment in the history of science, and more recently, Justin Champion, in his studies of later seventeenth-century heterodoxy, have sought to reconstruct the underground free-thinking traditions in Britain. Champion charts the English tradition of anti-priestcraft writing, whereby religious leaders can become true legislators with the right approach. Henry Stubbe’s and Charles Blount’s investigations into comparative religion offered anthropological or proto-secularist frameworks for a civil religion, rather than arguments for atheism. Champion insists that the English attacks on priestcraft preceded the French libertine tradition of freedom of thought, and should be seen as a political engagement with institutional authority.²¹ Nigel Smith’s contribution below helps to situate Milton in relation to these avantgarde movements in Continental thought; and Achinstein’s essay explores the presence of these international intellectual concerns in Milton’s poetry. ¹⁹ Coffey, ‘Puritanism and Liberty’, 969. ²⁰ Jonathan I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650–1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). See also Michael Hunter, ‘The Problem of ‘‘Atheism’’ in Early Modern England’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th ser. (1985), 135–57. ²¹ Justin Champion, The Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken: The Church of England and its Enemies, 1660–1730 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Republican Learning: John Toland and the Crisis of Christian Culture, 1696–1722 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003). See also Margaret C. Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981). To this must be added studies of English Revolutionary radicalism, particularly Nigel Smith, Literature and Revolution in England, 1640–1660 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); James Holstun, Ehud’s Dagger: Class Struggle in the English Revolution (London: Verso, 2000); and David Wootton, ‘Leveller Democracy and the Puritan Revolution’, in J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie, eds., The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450–1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), ch. 14.
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Did Milton’s unorthodox views contribute to a theory of toleration? James Turner has powerfully argued that Milton’s questioning of prelapsarian sexuality was unorthodox, and as William Poole has recently shown, Milton parted ways with the conservative Puritans of the Westminster Assembly over how much was lost at the Fall.²² According to Poole, in Milton’s vision of the Fall, sin has not utterly depraved man; John Rogers has developed the picture of Milton’s unorthodox theological commitments for an account of political radicalism. While the implications for the political theory or practice of tolerance are at present unclear, it is sure that Milton’s dabbling with or full immersion in radical ideas depended upon his commitment to absolute freedom of inquiry.²³ Although scholars disagree over the extent or presence of these elements in his theology, Milton’s engagement with anti-Trinitarianism or Arianism may likewise be seen in a tolerationist context, where even fundamentals of faith might surrender to inquiry.²⁴ In Areopagitica, Milton recalls the omnivorous reading of Moses, Daniel and Paul, biblical exemplars, who were ‘skilfull in all the learning of the Ægyptians, Caldeans, and Greeks’ (YP 2.507–8), giving real value to unchristian sources of learning. To this account, we must add Milton’s contribution to the history of freedom of thought, particularly his Areopagitica, which invites the consideration of ‘all kinde of knowledge whether of good or evill; the knowledge cannot defile, nor consequently the books, if the will and conscience be not defil’d’ (YP 2.512). ²² James Grantham Turner, One Flesh: Paradisal Marriage and Sexual Relations in the Age of Milton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); William Poole, Milton and the Idea of the Fall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Norman Burns, Christian Mortalism from Tyndale to Milton (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972); and see also Stephen Fallon, Milton among the Philosophers: Poetry and Materialism in Seventeenth-Century England (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Rachel J. Trubowitz on Milton’s alleged ‘monism’ in ‘Body Politics in Paradise Lost’, PMLA 21.2 (2006), 388–404. ²³ For the political consequences of the radical vitalism in contemporary scientific discourse, see John Rogers, Matter of Revolution: Science, Poetry, and Politics in the Age of Milton (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); John Rogers, ‘Milton and the Heretical Priesthood of Christ’, in David Loewenstein and John Marshall, eds., Heresy, Literature and Politics in Early Modern English Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); on Henry Stubbe, see James R. Jacob and Margaret C. Jacob, ‘The Anglican Origins of Modern Science: The Metaphysical Foundations of the Whig Constitution’, Isis 71 (1980), 251–67, esp. pp. 260–1. ²⁴ On this subject, see for example the scholarship on the theological controversies in Milton’s De Doctrina Christiana: Maurice Kelley, This Great Argument: A Study of Milton’s ‘De Doctrina Christiana’ as a Gloss upon ‘Paradise Lost’ [1941], Princeton Studies in English, 22 (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1962); Stephen F. Fallon, ‘Milton’s Arminianism and the Authorship of De doctrina Christiana’, Texas Studies in Literature and Language 41 (1999), 103–27; John P. Rumrich, ‘Milton’s Arianism and Why It Matters’, in Stephen B. Dobranski and John P. Rumrich, eds., Milton and Heresy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 75–92; Balachandra Rajan, ‘The Poetics of Heresy’ and ‘The Two Creations: Paradise Lost and the Treatise on Christian Doctrine’, in Elizabeth Sauer, ed., Milton and the Climates of Reading: Essays by Balachandra Rajan ( Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), ch. 2, ch. 7.
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With his defense of freedom of inquiry, Milton comes to arrive at a radical ethical position regarding the innocence of the conscience and the will. For God, Milton writes, ‘left arbitrary the dyeting and repasting of our minds; as wherein every mature man might have to exercise his owne leading capacity’ (YP 2.513). The questions so explosive to Milton—of human sexuality; of regulating marriage; of desires; of social and spiritual hierarchy—warrant a broadening of our notions of toleration. If sexual discontent can be the grounds for a struggle for freedom, as James Turner argues, then, how can the polity, marriage, and even the self be understood? In the essays to come, we shall see whether, and in what ways the narrower question of liberty of conscience or religious liberty broadens out into a wider defense of personal freedoms.
II As the subsequent essays will also show, Milton’s imaginative writings evolved in conjunction with developments in the political and religious spheres. A brief overview of the early modern history of toleration in England is in order. In the early modern era, toleration was not synonymous with religious freedom, but rather with the concepts of ‘permission’ and ‘endurance’, a more passive version of the classical term tolerantia.²⁵ England’s history of toleration offers no evolutionary narrative toward enlightenment and liberty. The English nation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was less advanced in its tolerationist policies and practices than France and Poland, where, as Milton himself would later acknowledge, ‘Protestants injoy … liberty among Papists’ of public speaking, writing, and printing more than do English Protestants in their own land (YP 8.426–7). In England, repression of dissident religious beliefs and practices was continuous both before and after the Protestant Reformation. As Supreme ²⁵ In addition to Walsham, Charitable, and Coffey, Persecution and Toleration, see: Joseph Lecler, Preface, in Toleration and the Reformation, trans. T. L. Westow, 2 vols. (New York: Association Press, 1960), vol. i, p. x; Cary J. Nederman and John Christian Laursen, ‘Difference and Dissent: Introduction’, in Cary J. Nederman and John Christian Laursen, eds., Difference and Dissent: Theories of Tolerance in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 9–10; Cary J. Nederman and John Christian Laursen, eds., Beyond the Persecuting Society: Religious Toleration Before the Enlightenment (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998); Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter, eds., Toleration in Enlightenment Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); G. R. Elton, ‘Persecution and Toleration in the English Reformation’, in W. J. Sheils, ed., Persecution and Toleration, Studies in Church History, 21 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 163–77.
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Head of the Church of England, Henry authorized the persecution of Catholics and Anabaptists; Edward VI, ascending to the throne in 1547, brought a new campaign of zeal against Catholics, with persecution overseen by Protector Somerset; Mary’s brief reign followed with persecution against Protestants, a Counter-Reformation program in line with her international alliances. The Elizabethan settlement re-established Protestantism as the state religion and, following Elizabeth’s Act of Supremacy which legislated against Roman primacy, the 1559 Act of Uniformity saw the revival of the liturgy of the Edwardian Prayer Book and the establishment of a national Reformed Church; fines of one shilling were the punishment for failing to attend Protestant services; the 1581 recusancy law raised this to the extortionate sum of £20 per month. Elizabeth promoted Erastianism on the basis that, in William Cecil’s words, ‘the State could never be in Safety, where there was a Tolleration of two religions’,²⁶ or, in her own words, ‘There cannot be two religions in one State.’²⁷ The 1563 Thirty-nine Articles served as the English Church’s constitution, and despite efforts to accommodate a wide range of Christian beliefs within one church, the number of people succumbing to religious persecution in her day totalled that of Protestant deaths under Mary, with prominent Catholic and Calvinist martyrs among Elizabeth’s victims (Edmund Campion, Robert Parson, and Henry Barrow). Recusants and Anabaptists, for example, faced interrogations, fines, seizure of goods, imprisonment, deportation, or banishment.²⁸ While the advancement of tolerance was rarely an aim of governments in England, early political and religious history also reveals that the English people themselves frequently resented the concept and frustrated state-sponsored efforts to grant toleration. The succession of James VI of Scotland ( James I) to the throne installed what many believed would be a relatively peaceful, but for Parliament distinctly uncomfortable, period of tolerance. James was favourably disposed to the Roman church and laity; and was in general known for his ‘confessional bridge-building’.²⁹ At the same time, politics and public pressure conspired to force the king to take the offensive against Catholicism: in 1605 Parliament demanded the revision and enforcement of penal laws against recusants, and the Gunpowder Plot fueled the nation’s outrage against popery. The following year, 1606, saw the passing of bills demanding conformity to the Established Church and outlawing adherence to Catholicism. The main threat to the English Church, however, came not from Catholics but rather ²⁶ Quoted in W. K. Jordan, The Development of Religious Toleration in England, 4 vols. (1932–40), 1.88. ²⁷ Lecler, Toleration and the Reformation, 2.355, 378. ²⁸ For a good guide to this history, see Walsham, Charitable, ch. 2. ²⁹ Scott, England’s Troubles, 98–9.
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from Protestant separatists, who would challenge monarchical jurisdiction, demand disestablishment, and sow the seeds of revolution.³⁰ The discontent with state power over religion intensified with the rise of Laud under Charles I, and with the imposition of the new Prayer Book in Scotland. Puritans and separatists attacked the instruments of royal and ecclesiastical power, leading to the Root and Branch Petition of 1640 and ultimately to execution of the archbishop of Canterbury and the dismantling of episcopacy. The toleration controversies of the 1640s involved Presbyterians and Erastians, who argued for unity through the establishment of a Presbyterian national church, and dissenters who opposed a state church and pressed for liberty of conscience. The outbreak of the first civil war intensified these religious disputes, challenged episcopacy, and curtailed the king’s infringement on the liberties and liberty of conscience of his subjects. By the end of the civil wars, Parliament banned the Book of Common Prayer, the office of bishop was abolished, and the stage was prepared for the execution of the king. Emerging in the 1640s and 1650s into organized groups, Levellers, Fifth Monarchists, Quakers, Diggers, and Ranters were among the radicals who professed fervent beliefs in the universality of grace and human rights that underwrote their defences of political liberty and of popular representation. For these dissenters, the time was ripe for revolutionary ecclesiastical and political programs that challenged not only the authority of the church from which it developed but also that of the state that established the church.³¹ Replacing the monarchy, the republican government frustrated rather than advanced the sectaries’ causes.³² Indeed, significant legislative changes were made under the Commonwealth: the 1650 Act for the relief of religious and peaceable people was passed and statutes enforcing church attendance repealed. But the Rump’s insistence on maintaining the state church through civil power undermined toleration efforts. The Protector himself assumed a range of different positions on toleration: he supported religious toleration and encouraged learning; he stimulated foreign trade; he promoted the Protestant League in 1654–5 and appealed in 1655 for warring Protestant parties ‘by ³⁰ See Peter Lake, Anglicans and Puritans? Presbyterianism and English Conformist Thought from Whitgift to Hooker (London: Allen & Unwin, 1988); Kenneth Fincham, ‘Clerical Conformity from Whitgift to Laud’, in Peter Lake and Michael Questier, eds., Conformity and Orthodoxy in the English Church c. 1560–1660 (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2000), 125–58, and Fincham, ed., The Early Stuart Church: 1603–1642 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993). ³¹ See Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas during the English Revolution (London: Temple Smith, 1972) and John Coffey, ‘ Puritanism and Liberty Revisited’, The Historical Journal 41.4 (1998), 961–85. ³² Blair Worden, ‘Toleration and the Cromwellian Protectorate’, in W. J. Sheils, ed., Persecution and Toleration, Studies in Church History, 21 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 199–233; J. C. Davis, ‘Religion and the Struggle for Liberty’, Historical Journal 35 (1992), 507–30.
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brotherly consent and harmony [to] unite into one’ (YP 5.2.680); under his authority Irish Catholics were slaughtered or transplanted; he strongly condemned the atrocities committed against the Waldensians in Piedmont; he defended in theory—and occasionally in practice—a culture of dissent; he actively suppressed Catholicism in the European theater; he proposed the readmission of the Jews in the 1655 Whitehall conference; and he declared war against the Spanish. But the Cromwellian period also saw the introduction of the 1650 Blasphemy Act calculated to repress antinomians and Quakers. If the civil war and interregnum gave rise to debates and proposals on toleration, the Restoration saw the return of forms of religious persecution, victimizing Catholics but especially Protestant sectarians.³³ The era also witnessed an eruption of controversies over conscience, extending from Parliament’s imposition of the Westminster Confession on the nation in 1660, to the failures of the Dutch War and Clarendon’s fall in 1667, to the disputes over the question of comprehension of dissenters. Confronted by ‘a rumour abroad of some Motions or Act to be offered for Comprehension or Indulgence’, the Cavalier Parliament voted on 10 February 1668 to enforce laws against nonconformists. A comprehension bill was, however, ‘much desired by the greater part of the nation’, reported Samuel Pepys.³⁴ Later that year, Charles was again approached about this matter, but the Commons seized the opportunity to legislate, outside of monarchic jurisdiction, adherence to the Act of Uniformity. Persecution in the Restoration became ideology and practice.³⁵ In the early years of the following decade, the crisis over toleration reached other climaxes: Charles’s Declaration of Indulgence (1672) and the Popish Plots (1679–81). Shortly before the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Dutch War, in which he allied himself with France, Charles issued the 15 March 1672 Declaration of Indulgence, the first such declaration having failed a decade beforehand. Citing the futility of the twelve-year-long suppression of religious dissent, the 1672 Declaration called for the suspension of ‘Penal ³³ Gary S. De Krey, ‘Rethinking the Restoration: Dissenting Cases for Conscience, 1667–72’, Historical Journal 38 (1995), 53–83; N. H. Keeble, The Literature of Nonconformity in Later Seventeenth-Century England (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1987); Douglas Lacey, Dissent and Parliamentary Politics in England, 1661–1689: A Study in the Perpetuation and Tempering of Parliamentarianism (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1969). ³⁴ Samuel Pepys, 10 February 1668, in Robert Latham and William Matthews, eds., The Diary of Samuel Pepys, 11 vols. (London and Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970–83), 9.60, quoted in Elizabeth Sauer, ‘Milton’s Of True Religion, Protestant Nationhood, and the Negotiation of Liberty’, Milton Quarterly 40.1 (2006), 5. ³⁵ On the ideology of persecution, see Goldie, ‘Theory of Religious’; and Gordon Schochet, ‘Samuel Parker, Religious Diversity, and the Ideology of Persecution’, in Roger D. Lund, ed., The Margins of Orthodoxy: Heterodox Writing and Cultural Response, 1660–1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 119–48.
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Laws in matters Ecclesiastical, against whatsoever sort of Non-Conformists or Recusants’.³⁶ In the charged politico-religious climate that seethed with anti-Catholic sentiment, Charles’s proposed indulgence failed. In his final original prose work, Of True Religion, Hæresie, Schism, Toleration—the product both of a turbulent era and of a particular moment marking a conjunction between fierce anti-Catholic agitation and a proposed indulgence for various nonconformist sects—Milton numbered among the majority in fully supporting in March 1673 the Commons’ withdrawal of the Declaration. The Toleration Act of 1689 freed Protestant dissenters from penalty, though still legislated political and social exclusion; toleration of those outside the Protestant church would have to wait until the nineteenth century.
III The study of the writings of John Milton can help us to see how these dramatic changes concerning persecution and the ideal of uniformity that were in place in Tudor and early Stuart England came about. During Milton’s writing life, and in part because of his contribution, religious toleration emerged out of radical Puritanism. Milton scholars have, however, figured toleration only secondarily, instead dwelling on the intellectual contexts of Puritan radicalism, liberalism, nationalism, colonialism, (anti-)imperialism, and republicanism. The foregrounding of toleration in this book is designed to complement, supplement, but also establish a methodological departure from related studies on the subject by offering alternative ways of understanding these movements and Milton’s relationship to them.³⁷ Milton has enjoyed a reputation during much of the twentieth century as a champion of liberalism, a reputation bolstered by the ‘great Whig tradition’, as Nicholas Tyacke characterizes it.³⁸ In histories of Puritanism, Milton ‘was to enjoy easily the greatest ³⁶ His Majesties Declaration to all his Loving Subjects, March 15th 1671/2 (London, 1671/2), 6. See also Mark Knights, Representation and Misrepresentation in Later Stuart Britain: Partisanship and Political Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). ³⁷ Classic ‘progressive’ analyses include William Haller’s The Rise of Puritanism … from Thomas Cartwright to John Lilburne and John Milton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), Haller’s Liberty and Reformation in the Puritan Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), A. S. P. Woodhouse’s Puritanism and Liberty (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1938, 1951, 1965), and Arthur Barker’s Milton and the Puritan Dilemma ( Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1942). ³⁸ Nicholas Tyacke, ‘The ‘‘Rise of Puritanism’’ and the Legalizing of Dissent, 1571–1719’, in Grell, Israel, and Tyacke, eds., From Persecution to Toleration, 17; and see Annabel Patterson, Early Modern Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
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posthumous reputation among later liberals’ and become ‘the only radical Puritan tolerationist to exercise great influence in the eighteenth century’.³⁹ Recent excellent studies have offered nuanced historical recontextualizations of Milton’s political and religious emphases to correct an overdetermined Whig or marxisant approach.⁴⁰ Concentrating on Milton’s relationship to radical ideologies, scholars, including Nicholas von Maltzahn, David Norbrook, Nigel Smith and David Loewenstein, have recently explored the political and ecclesiological content of that shared culture, developing a formidable portrait of Milton’s republicanism and liberalism but leaving the story of Milton’s theories and ethics of toleration and their relation to the radical tradition yet largely untold. ⁴¹ Otherwise valuable political and literary histories of Milton’s republicanism tend in general to address toleration (and civic rather than religious toleration) only insofar as it functions as a subcategory of republican virtues. The vision of republican toleration, moreover, does not fit well with Milton’s own views. Simone Zurbuchen has argued that early modern republican theorists were more committed to a nationally established church, in line with their emphasis on communal virtue and civic responsibility.⁴² James Harrington is illustrative here. Harrington in his System of Politics (1661?) supported liberty of conscience, with conscience only capable of ³⁹ Coffey, ‘Puritanism and Liberty’, 969, 984. ⁴⁰ Among the fine investigations situating Milton’s life and work in a culture of dissent during the English revolutionary and Restoration periods are Keeble, Literature of Nonconformity; Nigel Smith, Perfection Proclaimed: Language and Literature in English Radical Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); and Nicholas McDowell, The English Radical Imagination: Culture, Religion, and Revolution, 1630–1660 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003). For investigations of the interrelationship of literature, polemics, and religious politics, see David Loewenstein, Representing Revolution in Milton and his Contemporaries: Religion, Politics and Polemics in Radical Puritanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), for the Revolutionary period; and Sharon Achinstein, Literature and Dissent in Milton’s England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) for the Restoration. See also John N. King, Milton and Religious Controversy: Satire and Polemic in ‘Paradise Lost’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Achsah Guibbory, Ceremony and Community from Herbert to Milton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Kristen Poole, Radical Religion from Shakespeare to Milton: Figures of Nonconformity in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Dobranski and Rumrich, eds., Milton and Heresy. ⁴¹ See David Norbrook, Writing the English Republic: Poetry, Rhetoric and Politics, 1627–1660 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Nicholas von Maltzahn, Milton’s ‘History of Britain’: Republican Historiography in the English Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); Quentin Skinner, David Armitage and Armand Himy, eds., Milton and Republicanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Janel Mueller, ‘Contextualizing Milton’s Nascent Republicanism’, in P. G. Stanwood, ed., Of Poetry and Politics: New Essays on Milton and His World (Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1995); and Graham Parry and Joad Raymond, eds., Milton and the Terms of Liberty (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2002). ⁴² Simone Zurbuchen, ‘Republicanism and Toleration’, in Quentin Skinner and Martin van Gelderen, eds., Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 2.47–72, at 53.
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being protected in a democracy. However, he saw the necessity of a national religion, and excluded from public office in the state those who, for reasons of conscience, dissented from that national religion.⁴³ Tolerance is also a relatively neglected subject of studies on Milton’s relationship to empire or anti-imperialism. The exploration of Milton’s engagements with imperialism establishes some of the parameters of the conversation in which this book hopes to participate.⁴⁴ To the argument made by David Quint that Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained are epics reinforcing and interrogating imperialism we might add an analysis of the negotiations of toleration in Milton’s poetics and poetry.⁴⁵ As J. Martin Evans sees Paradise Lost as a register of the multiple, contesting attitudes to the colonization of the New World, we can find a model for analysing the equally controversial subject and discourses of toleration.⁴⁶ None of the scholarship on this subject, however, centres on and treats the question of toleration in a robust, thoroughgoing manner. We do not propose here to offer a unified overview of Milton and toleration but hope to open up new possibilities for present and future investigations which reassess the strengths, limits, and contradictions of Milton’s position.
IV The organization of our volume reflects the multi-dimensional approach to the question of Milton and toleration. The contributors in Part I, ‘Revising Whig Accounts’, resist the liberal paradigms of a chronological progression from a persecuting past to modern-day tolerationism, while reassessing Whig histories of England’s leading role in developing and even exporting tolerationist principles. The contributors establish international and national religious and cultural contexts for addressing the key questions on Milton and toleration. ⁴³ James Harrington, A System of Politics, in J. G. A. Pocock, ed., The Commonwealth of Oceana and A System of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 282. For theoretical analyses, see also Zurbuchen, ‘Republicanism and Toleration’; and Charles Larmore, ‘Liberal and Republican Conceptions of Freedom’, in Daniel Weinstock and Christian Nadeau, eds., Republicanism: History, Theory and Practice (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 96–119. ⁴⁴ David Armitage, ‘John Milton: Poet against Empire’, in Armitage, Himy, and Skinner, eds., Milton and Republicanism, 206–25; Paul Stevens, ‘Paradise Lost and the Colonial Imperative’, Milton Studies 34 (1996), 3–21, and Balachandra Rajan and Elizabeth Sauer, eds., Milton and the Imperial Vision (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1999). ⁴⁵ David Quint, Epic and Empire: Politics and Generic Form from Virgil to Milton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). ⁴⁶ J. Martin Evans, Milton’s Imperial Epic: ‘Paradise Lost’ and the Discourse of Colonization (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).
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At the same time, they identify some of the polemical stakes and widen the understanding of the ideologies of toleration. The approaches taken here are comparative without collapsing into polarities or binaries. At issue are Milton’s engagements with elite groups, dissenting communities, and with key ideas and proponents of toleration whose arguments informed his own thinking on the subject. Nigel Smith productively locates Milton in a broad tradition of intellectual freedom of belief associated with elite groups in Europe, from which are derived Milton’s understanding of religious toleration and persecution, of free will and anti-Trinitarian theology. The following three essays locate Milton in the embattled religious cultures of the day: David Loewenstein’s ‘Toleration and the Specter of Heresy in Milton’s England’ studies the scare-mongering of the pamphlet wars over religious toleration. While Loewenstein situates Milton in relation to John Goodwin and William Walwyn—two major polemical writers in the English history of toleration—Thomas Corns, in ‘John Milton and Roger Williams, and the Limits of Toleration’, positions Milton in relation to Williams and in the context of both the new world and the theological aims of civic reform. Advancing the argument of Milton’s limited and Williams’s absolute toleration which critics have generally maintained, Corns, however, explores the issue more fully, complicating the positions of these two writers on the scale of toleration in terms of their views on church polity, on the relationship between congregational independents and Presbyterianism, on millenarianism, and on questions of civic and spiritual regeneration. Milton’s difference from the Whig perspective on tolerance is at the center of Nicholas von Maltzahn’s piece, ‘Milton, Marvell and Toleration’. This contribution scrutinizes historical accounts of liberalism in analysing questions of religious tolerance in early modern England and the importance of the subject not only for Milton but also for Marvell, whose contributions to the religious origins of the Enlightenment are situated in proximity to Milton’s. Part II, ‘Philosophical and Religious Engagements’, explores Milton’s participation in philosophical debates about questions of toleration. In each case, contributors to Part II analyse a complex of discourses and representations underlying Milton’s concept of heterodoxy, brotherly dissimilitudes, and the poetics of toleration. In turn they take toleration to its outer limits—libertinism, natural law, equity, Anti-trinitarianism—and explore the main intolerance, anti-Catholicism. Extending the narrower concerns of ‘religious toleration’ and the abstract language of toleration to consider the wider ramifications of defenses of freedom of thought and experience, passions, and the ethics of confrontation, James Grantham Turner’s ‘Libertinism and Toleration: Milton, Bruno and Aretino’ applies the question of toleration to a range of erotic classics, as well as to the varied ‘tractates’ and ‘reasons’ of
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religious controversy. In doing so, he advances the concept of a pan-European movement towards freedom of thought, with a provocative investigation of sexuality as the core of libertine philosophy. Jason Rosenblatt’s ‘Milton, Natural Law, and Toleration’ enhances our understanding of the natural law tradition as well as explaining the significance of Milton’s engagement with theorists from Grotius to Selden, Pufendorf, Locke, and Barbeyrac to account for the transformation that occurs between Milton’s antiprelatical tracts that ‘apotheosize the spiritual aristocrats of the reformation’ and the treatises on divorce which emphasize commonality and toleration. Victoria Silver develops the links between epistemology and theology in her essay, ‘ ‘‘A Taken Scandal not a Given’’: Milton’s Equitable Grounds of Toleration’. Legal theory, Montaigne, and the extensive treatment of Milton’s Of Civil Power combine to make a powerful and original case for assessing Milton on questions of equity and toleration, and offer a philosophically nuanced account that challenges as well as complements some of the volume’s historicist offerings. Martin Dzelzainis’s ‘Milton and Antitrinitarianism’ explores the outer limit of religious tolerance Milton embraces within reformed Christianity, exploring the political conditions that expose the dimensions of his intellectual engagement with antitrinitarianism. The chapter posits an earlier (mid-1640s) date for Milton’s heretical antitrinitarianism, on the basis of his knowledge of religious controversies in Geneva and Poland. Andrew Hadfield’s essay on Milton and Catholicism offers an overview of the central intolerance in Milton’s writing life: popery, seen less as a political threat than a threat to philosophical freedom. Milton and Toleration seeks to understand the literary means by which tolerance was questioned, observed, and became an object of meditation. Part III in particular addresses the vital role of literary evidence in a study of toleration. How do the poet, the polemicist, the rhetorician intervene in the debate on the subject? The essays here examine how representations and discourses of toleration figure in the field of the literary, which includes Milton’s prose as well as poetry, and how imaginative literature can help enrich our understanding of the engagement with cultural, religious, and ethnic difference. Elizabeth Sauer uses ‘Sonnet XV’ and the literature on the Irish crisis to investigate the ways that toleration and imperialism operated side by side in Cromwellian England and were integral to the Interregnum government’s mission to advance a nationalist agenda. Sharon Achinstein looks for evidence of toleration thinking in the great epics, exploring the contrast between Milton’s philosophical commitment to free inquiry and his literary methods of forcing confrontation of different faiths. Paul Stevens’s ‘Intolerance and the Virtues of Sacred Vehemence’ develops these contentbased approaches to offer a different vantage point: his historically particular
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analysis of Milton’s language depends on a distinction between the expressive and the pragmatic functions of the rhetoric of violence, and the defense of emotional, affective rhetoric. This wide-ranging study asks how the bloody nature of Milton’s anti-persecution rhetoric is ultimately modulated into a less vehement, more moderate anti-persecution discourse. Our final two essays explore the impact of Milton for later readers as they stretched the outer bounds of tolerance. Lana Cable examines the republican tradition, arguing that a rising secularism led to new concepts of individual agency and virtue, mediated through the poetry of John Milton for later readers. Gerald MacLean, in assessing Arab-Islamic responses to Milton that have focused on the character of Satan in Paradise Lost, shows that Milton’s unorthodox treatment of ancient sources made him attractive to a variety of Muslim thinkers who recognized in Milton’s poetry an attitude toward religious toleration remarkably in line with their own traditions. The viewpoint of the other, which is so crucial in addressing questions of toleration, offers intriguing insights into self constructions generally and the literature—and silences—of Milton and Muslims in particular. The history of Arab-Islamic critical response to Milton is the history of attempts by academics, writers, critics and poets, to make Milton their own. The final section explores, then, a poetics of tolerance, seeing in Milton’s work not simply a preoccupation with religious difference, but a literary means of representing and, in many ways, participating in the acceptance of difference.
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Part I Revising Whig Accounts
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2 Milton and the European Contexts of Toleration Nigel Smith ‘the largely tolerationist Arian Arminian John Milton’¹
Milton is customarily presented as an apologist for religious and political liberty. He defended liberty of the press in the mid-1640s, advanced some extremely heretical views on divorce and some more obscure theological positions, oversaw the publication of some theology (the Racovian Catechism—the federal document of the Socinians) that was outlawed by the Commonwealth authorities, maintained that these freedoms were best realized in a Christian republic, and defended a wide measure of religious toleration late in his life. If there were limits to the religious toleration offered by the Interregnum governments, these were for the time comparatively broad, and as Secretary for Foreign Tongues, Milton was responsible for the communication of these views to foreign governments. He was a friend of some of the most influential tolerationist thinkers of his time, especially Roger Williams, the founder of Rhode Island. These views are embedded, more or less obviously, in his poetry, and his three most important poems were published during the period when likeminded Protestant nonconformists suffered the greatest degree of legal persecution between 1660 and 1688.² Milton, then, is presented as a guiding light toward liberty: what came before him was largely blind persecution (with some exceptions in the ancient world), and what followed was a slow and growing awareness that religious toleration was constitutive of ¹ John Marshall, John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 8. ² Arthur E. Barker, Milton and the Puritan Dilemma, 1641–1660 ( Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1942), 18–20, 74–97; repeated in Barbara K. Lewalski, The Life of John Milton (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 201–6, 283–7, 382–6.
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and beneficial for a free society. He was in this sense a precursor of Locke’s influential pro-toleration writings, but in a general sense more influential, since many more people have read his poetry than have read Locke’s political theory. Both authors have been judged significant influences on the writing of the constitution of the Unites States of America.³ This interpretation of Milton’s career and works is very Whig and Protestant; one formed in the light of the religious strife that followed the Reformation, and one born out of a typically Protestant and northern European view of the attempt of the Roman Church, through the Council of Trent and the Inquisition, to maintain its integrity against the rise of Protestantism. Pre1640 England was no light to Europe on the issues Milton cared about: both his writing, and the extent of the persecution of unorthodox religious views under Elizabeth, James and Charles, are testimony to that. Milton also knew that religious toleration did exist to a greater extent in several other European states than in England. There was the impressive or at least very complicated example of the United Provinces, and further afield, the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania, which had toleration inscribed into its constitution, which was home of the original Socinian church as well as communities of exiled Anabaptists and Mennonites. It did not serve Milton’s purpose to show that the medieval church could be seen to harbour either tolerationist ideas or practice, and in any case, he probably did not know about them, although of course he stressed the protoReformation strand in the medieval church. Neither does he seem to know about the other places in or adjacent to medieval Europe where toleration was practised. Medieval Spain was ruled by Muslims who made religious toleration compulsory. Muslims, Jews and Christians cohabited the Iberian peninsular. Only after the rise of the Aragonese kings did toleration cease to exist now within the extent of a Christian monarchy.⁴ Milton’s thought might indeed more readily be seen to fit within the context of the rise of the three Atlantic monarchies—Spain, France, England—and their quest for interior religious unity as a concomitant to the rise of centralized monarchical power. Persistently articulated Miltonic themes address the rise of the nation state, and therefore the kinds of liberty that make the modern Christian nation state so strong.⁵ ³ Annabel Patterson, Early Modern Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chs. 1, 8. ⁴ Cary J. Nederman, Worlds of Difference: European Discourses of Toleration, C. 1100–C. 1550 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 30. ⁵ See for instance Paul Stevens, ‘Milton’s Nationalism and the Rights of Memory’, in Imagining Death in Spenser and Milton, ed. E. Bellamy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 171–84.
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Ideas of tolerance were in circulation long before the seventeenth century, and emerged from a variety of intellectual frameworks, some of them opposed to each other. Medieval reformers like John Wyclif thought that it was the duty of a monarch to guarantee the security of all subjects even though the theological views of some of those subjects will be wrong and so will not lead to salvation.⁶ In the earlier sixteenth century, radical reformers like Hans Denck and Sebastian Franck thought that true Christians should be inherently tolerant since it was a corollary of inward faith and love. Religious truth is in their view a deeply inward matter and cannot therefore be compelled from outside. It was the force of this spiritualism that had a huge influence on later Enlightenment views of religion.⁷ New world exploration also produced new perspectives. The dispute at Valladolid in the mid-1500s resulted in Bartolom´e de Las Casas and Francisco Vitoria arguing that indigenous Americans had a right to religious toleration (even if it included human sacrifice and cannibalism) as well as cultural autonomy: they had dominium and a degree of sovereignty so that neither forcible conversion nor conquest was justified. Within the Catholic Church these experiences produced the view by the later sixteenth century that ‘concordance’—unity within the Christian realm—was neither possible nor worthwhile.⁸ Thus Bodin’s Colloquium heptaplomeres (1588), which was not published until nearly two hundred years after its composition, argued in favour of the toleration of different creeds and sects within creeds so that representatives of each position could learn more about their beliefs through debate with their opponents. Bodin himself, famous as an apologist for absolutism, reversed his previous position of enforced conformity. In eastern Europe, there was an experiment in multi-confessional coexistence: the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth began in 1579, with Henry of Valois as its first elected king.⁹ Fausto Sozzino was compelled to leave Siena and head for Poland where anti-trinitarians were tolerated and where there was an anti-trinitarian church. The Polish context helps to explain why Socinianism and Catholicism seemingly met in certain respects, and coexisted. For instance, in the realm of theology, the Socinian idea of the priesthood of ⁶ John Christian Laursen and Cary J. Nederman, eds., Beyond the Persecuting Society: Religious Toleration Before the Enlightenment (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 1–16. ⁷ Burkhard Dohm, Poetische Alchimie: o¨ ffnung zur Sinnlichkeit in der Hohelied- und Bibeldichtung von der protestantischen Barockmystik bis zum Pietismus ( T¨ubingen: Max Niemeyer, 2000). ⁸ Anthony Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). ⁹ See Richard Butterwick, ed., The Polish-Lithuanian Monarchy in European Context c. 1500–1795 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).
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Christ resembles the Catholic position, despite their fundamentally different view of the Trinity. This connection in turn relates to the degree to which Protestantism is circumvented in some points of Socinian theology, and therefore why it might appeal to ‘high’ Protestants who were in fact looking more to Rome than to Geneva.¹⁰ In England, this meant the Laudians: Milton’s enemies in respect of church government, but a group with whom he shared much in respect of the theology of free will.¹¹ The constitution of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, dedicated as we have seen to toleration, attempted to enshrine diversity in its constitution and its structure of political and administrative appointments. Thus, while the elected king of Poland was often a former Jesuit, his secretary was a prominent Protestant; indeed, in the case of the appointment in 1649 of Martin Ruar, a Socinian.¹² Holland involves a different scenario to Poland, and one where Socinian students and emissaries began to arrive from the second decade of the seventeenth century onwards. By the end of the sixteenth century and therefore after the revolt from Spanish rule, the dominant feeling in Holland was that the imposers of religious unity, wherever they arose, were responsible for more damage than the heretics themselves. Local privileges were a strong bulwark here against the threat of interference by the national government. The Reformed religion was strong in its control of buildings, church revenues, the dispensing of charity and education, but it was not a state church, and its access to the total available communion of worshippers was therefore limited. There was no compulsion to church attendance and baptism; civil marriage was a possibility. The discipline offered by the Dutch Reformed Church was not attractive to everyone, and while the government had retreated from the absolute religievrede of the later 1570s (with its attendant turmoil), it respected the freedom of individual conscience above confessional unity. Catholics and Mennonites worshipped in numbers but privately at home or later in ‘purpose-built private churches’. In Holland, families were thus sometimes markedly divided between three or more confessions. This is a much more extreme case than in England ¹⁰ G. H. Williams, ed., The Polish Brethren: Documentation of the History and Thought of Unitarianism in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and in the Diaspora, 1601–1685, 2 vols. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980); Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 1572–1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 186, 189, 338–9. ¹¹ H. J. McLachlan, Socinianism in Seventeenth-Century England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951); Nigel Smith, ‘ ‘‘And if God was one of us’’: Paul Best, John Biddle and AntiTrinitarian Heresy in Seventeenth-Century England’, in David Loewenstein and John Marshall, eds., Heresy in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 160–84. See now Micheal Lieb, The Theological Milton: Deity, Discourse and Heresy in the Miltonic Canon (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2006). See also the forthcoming work of Sarah Mortimer of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. ¹² Williams, The Polish Brethren, 2.476. Ruar’s predecessor in this post was also a Socinian.
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where confessional conformity was still required by law. Many Dutch people chose—perhaps as much as 50 per cent of the population—to be affiliated to no particular church. Being in a church was therefore a more consciously voluntary act than in other societies.¹³ It took a while for the theoretical implications of the Dutch situation to be fully realized. After all, despite there being strong early advocates for toleration, foremost among them Dirck Volkerstzoon Coornhert in the 1570s, the States of Holland had not officially adopted liberty of conscience. A moral vision detached from religion had been propounded by Justus Lipsius in Politicorum libri sex (1589), based in fact on Roman stoicism. It was attacked by Coonhert in Defensio Processus de non Occidendis Haereticis (Gouda, 1591; banned by the State of Holland; Hanover, 1593), precisely because it appeared to reduce ethics to an ‘art’, rather like the ‘art’ of being a courtier, as opposed to something connected implicitly to belief. Others who disagreed with Lipsius on a philosophical level nonetheless thought that outward conformity was necessary for the sake of an ordered society. Civil governors were worried by the emergence of Arminianism and by the apparent progress of Lutheranism within Dutch territories. Anabaptists (i.e. Mennonites) were frequently banned in many towns until after 1625, and attempts by the small community of (mostly Portuguese) Jews in Amsterdam to establish synagogues in Haarlem and Rotterdam failed, not least because of the resistance of the Reformed Church and local government. Coornhert’s arguments for religious peace extended to a proposed ban on the interpretation, as opposed to the reading, of scripture, which he argued was no attack on religious freedom, but which readily looked to his Calvinist opponents like intolerance by the back door. Arminians, when they had influence, were no less intolerant of separatists than the Calvinists.¹⁴ Intense pamphlet wars in which the Counter-Remonstrants (Calvinists) attacked their Arminian rivals continued: it was particularly fierce in the later 1620s. Eventually attitudes loosened, as Milton himself acknowledged in his The Readie and Easie Way to Establish A Free Commonwealth (1660).¹⁵ Although he was exceptional in his views at this time, the influential Arminian scholar Simon Episcopius revived Coornhert’s call for a fully fledged toleration, including that of Catholics.¹⁶ Episcopius argued that most Christians agreed on the fundamentals of their ¹³ See Judith Pollmann, Religious Choice in the Dutch Republic: The Reformation of Arnoldus Buchelius, 1565–1641 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999). ¹⁴ Now recounted in John Marshall, John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), ch. 11. ¹⁵ YP 7.381. ¹⁶ Of Episcopius’s many works, Vrye Godes-dienst (1627) stands out in respect of toleration. His collected works were published at Gouda in 1650–5.
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faith. A wide spectrum of views may be derived from the Bible. Debating different interpretations of the Bible was a positive good, he maintained, each belonging to different individual believers, and was a bringing together of the different parts of the whole truth. These views were repeated and extended in later decades by Philippus van Limborch and Jean Le Clerc.¹⁷ In the 1650s and 1660s defenders of the republic like Pieter de la Court, a textile manufacturer from Leiden, contested the Orangists and the Calvinists, and wrote in support of religious toleration as part of the freedom which was best served in a totally non-monarchical state: that is, without a stadholder.¹⁸ This was the best way to preserve a peaceful and prosperous state. Nonetheless, Socinianism was often greeted in the United Provinces with horror, and subject to measures of suppression in the late 1640s and early 1650s; only in the 1660s did such treatment relax. By the time of Milton’s death some foreign observers, such as Sir William Temple and Gregorio Leti, were viewing Dutch toleration with approval, in contrast with the universally negative views of earlier commentators. Across Europe, but with a focus in the Dutch Republic, Arminians and more especially Socinians developed coherent statements in favor of toleration during the course of the period. These authors stressed morality over doctrinal requirements, which were limited in respect of being requirements for salvation. Being attentive to the text of the Bible, but allowing a large degree of difference in individual interpretation, as Milton states in Of True Religion (1673), is such a minimalist statement, although Milton himself pointedly excludes the Roman Catholics because their idolatry and the authority of the Pope is intrinsically bound up with not accepting the Bible as the primary religious guide. In this respect Catholics embody the ‘implicit faith’ that Milton attacked throughout his career, as opposed to the explicit faith grounded in diligent study and understanding. The full title of the tract is Of True Religion, Hæresy, Schism, Toleration; and what best means may be used against the Growth of Popery, so tolerance of all faiths was not his goal. Those who stressed the necessity of the separation of the godly in the true church from the rest of the world also argued that the secular ruler had no right to interfere with that church. But many radical reformers had no developed sense of toleration, and often no distinct toleration theory. ¹⁷ See Philippus van Limborch, Theologia Christiana (1686); Hugo Grotius, The truth of the Christian religion, with notes by mr. Le Clerc. To which is added a seventh book by mr. Le Clerc. Done into Engl. by J. Clarke (1711). ¹⁸ Pieter de la Court, Het Interest van Holland (1662); idem, Aanwysing der heilsame politike gronden en maximen van de Republike van Holland en West-Vriesland (Rotterdam, 1669), translated as The true interest and political maxims of the Republick of Holland and West-Friesland (1702).
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They wanted toleration by the secular ruler of their beliefs, which, they believed, once exposed, would become the one true religion of the state, and eventually of Europe and beyond. In other words, they did not have a notion of the separation of church and state, or a division between civil and ecclesial spheres of authority. There are many instances of intolerant theological differences and struggles for authority within many separatist churches and groups, including Anabaptists and Baptists in the sixteenth century, and among English Quakers in the following century. There are instances of cruelty exercised within the Baptist and anti-trinitarian churches in western and eastern Europe.¹⁹ Fundamental attitudes of prejudice against whatever was judged to be idolatrous remained in these theologies. They functioned as a chief motor of the disciplinary zeal that characterized much post-Reformation religion. In 1640, Milton presented himself aligned with a general Puritanism, or perhaps in the precise context of the publication of Of Reformation in 1640, he stood with a more narrowly defined anti-episcopal front. Whatever the case Milton’s energetic imagery of reformation in his early 1640s tracts participates in this zeal. In 1642 Milton argued on these grounds that the Book of Common Prayer, the English liturgy as it then stood, should not be tolerated.²⁰ However, in the later sixteenth century, statements of unconditional toleration did emerge, significantly coupled with attacks on predestination theology. These were Sebastian Castellio’s De haereticis (1554) and Jacob Acontius’s Satanae Strategema (1565). Both authors were resident in Basel at the time. While Castellio condemned atheists, he also maintained, along with Acontius, that heresy hunting created more sedition than heterodoxy itself. Many of these tenets are to be found in the Racovian Catechism (first edition, 1605) the federal document of the Polish Socinian church that was widely distributed across Europe. Milton controversially licensed a Latin edition of this work in 1651. And such views were repeated and even extended by the tolerationist thinkers of mid-seventeenth-century England (such as Roger Williams, the follower of Montaigne, the Leveller William Walwyn, the Baptist and Leveller Richard Overton, and, in another political camp, the neo-Arminians and proto-Latitudinarians John Hales and William Chillingworth) to include all Christians, Jews, Muslims and pagans. For most of these thinkers, punishment should not be corporal but simply involve excommunication. In the sixteenth century, there was still a preference for banishment or fines, but these penal components dwindled in the following ¹⁹ John Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion, and Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 318–19. ²⁰ YP 1.938.
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period in pro-toleration writing. The civil magistrate was to keep order in the civil sphere.²¹ The chiliast notion that it was time in the last days to gather the faithful and that no truth should be excluded in a debate that would finally establish the true church, a view that Milton famously propounds in Areopagitica, has been seen as exclusive and therefore ‘intolerationist’ in that it included only Christians (properly Protestants) and Jews, who, it was thought, would convert to Christianity in the process leading up to the Second Coming of Christ.²² But it would be wrong to suggest that this view substantially outweighed another, skeptical view that since no one could possibly judge God’s ways with man, no one had the right to condemn anyone for their opinion.²³ Such skepticism, enforced by familiarity with thinkers like Montaigne and Charron, was shared by episcopalians and radicals alike, but not by Milton. While it has been shown that skepticism could lead to intolerant attitudes, it could also be allied with other outlooks (such as the experience of religious pluralism in stable states, or an awareness of the detrimental effects of intolerance on trade) to support toleration. Spinoza claimed in 1670, towards the end of Milton’s life, that anyone could believe as they wished, and say so too, a statement that has been seen as descriptive rather than prescriptive.²⁴ His theory of toleration rested on two planks: an appeal to the secular ruler to protect minorities from the violence of the mob or the persecuting clergy and an appeal to the secular ruler to tolerate secular religion. He denied that there was support for persecution in the Bible and that the Mosaic Law applied only to the Hebrews, while at the same time elevating philosophy over theology. But it seems doubtful that Spinoza tolerated atheists or those who did not believe in a forgiving God. He also clearly thought that those who spoke seditiously should be suppressed, and this meant of course the religious too. Spinoza certainly believed in the right of the individual to freedom, arguing (quite differently from Milton) that although power might be given through the social contract to the sovereign by the necessity that governed the universe, there could be no compromise of the individual’s freedom in the exercise of the contract. The extent of the individual’s rights was full, and Spinoza embraced Muslims, Jews and ²¹ John Coffey, ‘Puritanism and Liberty Revisited: The Radical Protestant Case for the Toleration of All Religions in the English Revolution’, Historical Journal 41.4 (1998), 961–85. ²² YP 2.561–8. ²³ Here I respectfully disagree with Alexandra Walsham, Charitable Hatred: Tolerance and Intolerance in England, 1500–1700 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 235. ²⁴ Baruch Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670), esp. ch. 20; John Christian Laursen, ‘Spinoza on Toleration: Arming the State and reining in the Magistrate’, in Cary J. Nederman and John Christian Laursen, eds., Difference and Dissent: Theories of Tolerance in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 185–204.
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Catholics as well as Protestants within his boundaries of toleration. Spinoza’s notion of liberty is broader than Locke’s, since Locke found symbolic but non-violent religious protest a compromise of the civil magistrate, and he left it to those very justices to decide in context what was seditious or not (although he modified these views later in his life perhaps under Spinoza’s influence). Certainly a relatively severe strict belief in God was necessary in Locke’s view for toleration.²⁵ Milton and Locke both believed that liberty was connected to creating a fit life for the souls of men; Spinoza did not believe in a notion of the soul in this sense. It was for a deist like Charles Blount, who appropriated sentences and phrases from Areopagitica in his Just Vindication of Learning (1679), to go the full measure in the English language and argue for complete freedom of thought and expression in a free-thinking rather than a theistic sense; his position is therefore not the same as Milton’s. It was indeed in the literature of the deist critique of ‘priestcraft’ that we can find a call for a purging of the prophetic element in Milton. In the eyes of the deists prophecy remained a limitation in Milton’s vision of political and religious liberty, however important it was as a poetic component.²⁶ Behind all of this lies the tradition of intellectual freedom of belief that belonged to elite groups in Europe, and that we most readily associate with the Italian city states of the later Middle Ages and the sixteenth century. Milton himself is a very pure descendant from this tradition, where speculation belonging to an educated elite might be left alone by ecclesiastical authorities. Even after the rise of the inquisitions in the sixteenth century, those needing books on the Index (e.g. medical doctors) were usually allowed them. This speculative freedom Milton wanted extending to a broader range of people, although it is never quite clear in his writing, such as in Areopagitica, where the limit ends: ‘For this is not the liberty which wee can hope, that no grievance ever should arise in the Commonwealth, that let no man in this World expect; but when complaints are freely heard, deeply consider’d and speedily reform’d, then is the utmost bound of civill liberty attain’d, that wise men looke for.’²⁷ It should also be remembered that Milton is addressing the precise issue of press freedom and the matter of how books were to be licensed in 1640s England. He saw the matter of book licensing as distinct from the growth of religious sects, and hence the issue of toleration. Suppressing books would not prevent the growth of sects: ‘If to prevent sects and schisms, who is so unread or so uncatechis’d in story, that hath not heard of many sects refusing books ²⁵ See below, 40–1. ²⁶ Nigel Smith, ‘The English Revolution and the End of Rhetoric: John Toland’s Clito (1700) and the Republican Daemon’, Essays and Studies (1996), ed. K. Flint, Poetry and Politics, 1–20. ²⁷ YP 2.487.
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as a hindrance, and preserving their doctrine unmixt for many ages, only by unwritt’n traditions.’²⁸ Certainly, any Italian intellectual whose heterodoxy led him to fall foul of the church, such as the unfortunate Giordano Bruno, or Galileo Galilei, was likely to become a hero for a Protestant tolerationist of Milton’s ilk. And Milton would benefit from the notable insights of the Venetian critic of the Inquisition, Paolo Sarpi, the author of the History of the Council of Trent (1618), which was never available in print in Italy in Milton’s lifetime. Sarpi has even been argued to have held atheist views although he celebrated Mass as a Servite friar until his death in 1624. He also believed, unlike almost anyone else at the time, that information concerning matters of state should not be kept from the people, but should be freely circulated. This he argued would make for a more peaceful society.²⁹ Matters were different elsewhere in the Italian peninsula. In 1601, for instance, Pope Clement VII had the Talmud burned in Rome. For all this, there was a great deal of intolerance, in theory and in practice. Confessional states in Europe tried to enforce policies of singular obedience, and arguments supporting the rightness of such views and practices reached back into the Middles Ages and beyond.³⁰ As we have seen, Milton always maintained Catholics should not be tolerated since they were themselves not merely idolatrous and superstitious but also seditious: all Roman Catholics were enjoined by the Pope to undermine the Protestant regime in England.³¹ Back in the late sixteenth century Coornhert had noted that most of the extant and emergent confessions of his time would become intolerant if they were given political power, not least because they grounded religious authority outside of a recourse to unmediated scripture. Many different kinds of Protestant were tolerated in Civil War and Interregnum England: Presbyterians, Independents and Baptists. But Quakers and Socinians fell outside of these boundaries, and while there were Friends in Cromwell’s household, this did not mean that the machinery of justice could not and should not be leveled at those who strayed from unorthodox views into blasphemy and the theologically unacceptable.³² The trials of the Quaker ²⁸ YP 2.529. ²⁹ Filippo De Vivo, ‘Paolo Sarpi and the Uses of Information in Seventeenth-Century Venice’, Media History 11 (2005), 37–51; Nigel Smith, ‘Milton and the Index’, in Holly Nelson and Donald R. Dickson, eds., Of Paradise and Light: Essays for Alan Rudrum (London: Associated University Presses, 2004), 101–22. ³⁰ However, even here, within the German Protestant states and the Holy Roman Empire, there were exceptions and exceptional circumstances. ³¹ See Pope Sixtus V’s Bull against Elizabeth I: ‘A Declaration of the Sentence and Deposition of Elizabeth, the usurper and pretensed Queen of England’ (Antwerp, 1588). ³² In W. J. Sheils, ed., Persecution and Toleration, Studies in Church History, 21 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 199–233.
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James Nayler and the Socinian John Biddle were the public show trials of the Commonwealth years, the public testing of what was bearable in the Puritan Revolution. If 1642–60 proved for an advanced intellectual Protestant pamphleteer and poet a relative liberation from a decade of persecution under Archbishop Laud, and harsh terms for Puritans before that, 1660 saw a tough clampdown on religious nonconformity. Under the bishops of the restored Church of England and the majority in the Cavalier Parliament of 1660–7, rigorous conformity was seen as the only antidote to the disarray of the previous period. The years of the Restoration were marked by a series of measures designed to suppress nonconformist worship, or to license it under the terms of financial exactions. That the Cavaliers and the bishops did not get their way all the time was in part due to other persuasions in the court that kept Charles II interested in the prospect of religious toleration, which he had after all promised at the start of his reign in the Declaration of Breda.³³ He was interested in a measure of toleration not least because he wanted to further the interest of the English Roman Catholics (and he had made promises to this effect to Louis XIV who wanted to see the toleration of English Catholics as the beginning of their rise of to supremacy, and the rapid re-establishment of Catholicism as the state religion in England). James II wanted this even more, and it was his pursuit of toleration (really for the sake of the Catholics), even to the extent of interfering with local government and other institutions like the universities, that resulted in his demise. If a relatively wide degree of toleration for Protestants was achieved in the Glorious Revolution of 1688–9, Louis finally achieved his goal of a single-faith kingdom. Eleven years after the death of Milton the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 resulted in the forced migration from France of 200,000 Huguenots, and the coercion of 700,000 more on pain of incarceration, torture, slavery, execution. In the same period, the attempt by Charles II to resettle the Church of Scotland resulted in the persecution of many Protestants resistant to episcopal government (the Covenanters), and a series of armed revolts by them. Violence marked Scottish religion down to 1700. In Ireland, Protestant intolerance towards Roman Catholics prevailed except for brief periods during revolts by Irish Catholic nobility (latterly supported by the French) and during the reign of James II. After assuming the English crown, William III led an international Protestant army to reimpose a Protestant hegemony in Ireland. King Billy’s War is the stuff of many legends from which myths crucial to the ³³ N. H. Keeble, The Restoration: England in the 1660s (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 68–84; S. Achinstein, Literature and Dissent in Milton’s England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chs. 1–4.
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modern Irish sense of nationhood, in all its fraught complexity, begin. As has often been noticed, Milton’s Irish writings, rooted in the arguments of the Elizabethan settlers of Ireland, line up with these prejudices.³⁴ Within Christian Europe, different kinds of minority fitted in generally awkwardly. First, there were the behavioral minorities: ‘libertines’ and ‘sodomites’. Protestant nonconformists were quick to condemn the moral shortcomings of the court libertines of their own day, and to juxtapose them with their own moral purity.³⁵ Milton’s treatment of sexuality has been placed in a subtle and interactive relationship with the native and European discourses of libertinism.³⁶ Where practising homosexuality among men can be seen in the early modern period, it was almost always treated by religious authorities as evil. Homosexuals in western Europe faced punishment and even execution.³⁷ The second category is of the ethnic and cultural minorities. The practice of toleration in parts of the Islamic world was not reciprocated in nearly all of Christian Europe and the old prejudices against the Jews remained commonplace through to the eighteenth century. Where communities of Jews were tolerated in Europe, they were often circumscribed, and were elsewhere present in tiny numbers, as in England from the later 1650s onwards. Toleration arguments here were mixed up with conversion designs; the former being seen in the case of Jews, Muslims and ‘pagans’ as a means to achieving the latter. To be a heretic Jew must have been the worst of all minority positions in early modern Europe. Having been unveiled by the Portuguese Inquisition as a reverted ‘conversos’ Uriel Da Costa traveled across Europe in the earlier seventeenth century: Amsterdam, Hamburg, Venice, Vienna. He denied the validity of rabbinic teaching, maintaining that all a Jew needed was the Hebrew Bible. He has not unfittingly been described as a ‘Jewish Anabaptist’. Sadly, but perhaps not incomprehensibly, he committed suicide in 1640, an outsider to all belonging in race and religion.³⁸ It was only in the 1670s that the Elector of Brandenburg, Friedrich Wilhelm, against the wishes of some of his subjects, invited different productive minorities to Berlin, including Huguenots and ³⁴ See below, Elizabeth Sauer’s essay in this volume, Ch. 11. ³⁵ George Fox, Journal, ed. N. Smith (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1998), 162. ³⁶ See James Grantham Turner, One Flesh: Paradisal Marriage and Sexual Relations in the Age of Milton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); idem, Libertines and Radicals in Early Modern London: Sexuality, Politics, and Literary Culture, 1630–1685 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 57–8, 64, 75–99; idem, Schooling Sex: Libertine Literature and Erotic Education in Italy, France, and England 1534–1685 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 16 n. 35, 47–51. ³⁷ Randolph Trumbach, Sex and the Gender Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). ³⁸ Uriel Da Costa, Trˆes escritos, ed. A. Moreira de S´a (Lisbon, 1963); idem, Examination of Pharisaic Traditions, ed. H. P. Salomon and I. S. D. Sassoon (Leiden: Brill, 1993); Miriam Bodian, ‘In the Cross-Currents of the Reformation: Crypto-Jewish Martyrs of the Inquisition 1570–1670’, Past and Present 177 (2002), 66–104.
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Jews, thereby beginning that city’s rise to later cosmopolitan fame.³⁹ But for the most part, Muslims were widely regarded as a Satanic evil, the plain contrary of Christianity, and purveyors of a monstrous religion that led only to immorality; especially, it was held, sodomy. It was in the elite world of oriental scholarship, especially on Arabic texts, that these attitudes began to change, that some comparative understanding of Islam arose. While the threat of the Ottoman armies in south-eastern Europe remained very real in the period, mid- and later seventeenth-century intellectuals were aware of the extent of toleration of Christianity of all kinds within the Ottoman territories, even to the extent of holding it up as a model for England. As a monotheistic religion, Islam was an ally of Christianity against atheism, and as a strictly monotheistic religion was an ally of the anti-trinitarian Christians against the orthodox, who themselves could and often did argue that Socinians and Unitarians were close to Islam and that their claim for the toleration of Muslims was unacceptable.⁴⁰ This largely later-seventeenth-century perspective is absent from Milton’s writings. It is undoubtedly true that the treatment of the experience of Adam and Eve in Paradise Lost in some places begins to lessen the difference between Jews and Christians, but Satan remains the stereotype of an oriental tyrant at the beginning of Book 2: High on a Throne of Royal State, which far Outshon the wealth of Ormus and of Ind, Or where the gorgeous East with richest hand Showrs on her Kings Barbaric Pearl and Gold, Satan exalted sat. (2.1–5)
The history of Islam and the Islamic peoples, like the Jews after the coming of Christ, is outside of the poem’s ambit in any detailed sense. Within Christian tradition, anti-tolerationists, be they Catholics or Protestants, could always turn to patristic and medieval authorities for views of those who were not to be tolerated because they were heretics. Heretics and schismatics tended to be regarded as inherently seditious or in some circumstances treasonous; people whose views would destroy the social order that God had ordained. It was a world of black and white: truth and its diabolical opposite, a structure exemplified in the allegory of Book I of Spenser’s The Faerie Queene. To take an indifferent view of heresy was to risk being bracketed by the orthodox as a heretic oneself. In this context, it would have been startling to read ³⁹ See Derek McKay, The Great Elector (Harlow: Longman, 2001), 186–7. ⁴⁰ See also N. I. Matar, Islam in Britain, 1558–1685 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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Milton’s redefinition of heresy in Of Education and Areopagitica as ‘choice’ (Greek ‘haeresis’; Latin ‘electio’)—a return to the original Aristotelian roots of the words in Greek ‘prohaeresis’—reason.⁴¹ A similar statement is made in A Treatise of Civil Power (1659), where the Presbyterians and Independents are defined as heretics in the sense of ‘the choise or following of any opinion good or bad in religion or any other learning’.⁴² We may be in error, but as long as we follow the scripture, we are heretics in the truth. In the King James Bible, Acts 26:5, ‘after the exactest heresie of our religion I lived a Pharise’ as Milton translates it, has ‘sect’ instead of ‘heresy’. Patristic authorities like Tertullian had moved the definition the other way from this ‘pagan’ sense in their commentaries on St Paul, even though Tertullian himself had defended the toleration of Christians within the pagan Roman empire.⁴³ There is nonetheless some inconsistency of usage on Milton’s part: a page later we learn that not he who follows his conscience in a matter of scriptural interpretation but he who follows the church against his conscience is a heretic: in this instance Milton lets the pejorative meaning stand.⁴⁴ We also encounter Milton’s restructuring of the contemporary definition of enquiry as the discerning of truth from its contrary, falsehood. Enquiry he understood as the creative and simultaneous engagement with both truth and falsehood as a contrary experience itself. Yet faith and obedience to the church, church authority and what was defined as orthodox therein was privileged over personal reasoning by the majority of Christians and Christian authorities. During the 1640s and 1650s, several bodies, notably the Westminster Assembly of Divines, maintained that it was up to church synods and councils to determine controversies of faith and matters of conscience. Although in places the Savoy Declaration of October 1658 appeared to uphold the consciences of believers, it also gave the civil magistrate power in religious matters, a contradiction that Milton identified. In this respect Milton has a very different position; he even goes as far as to suggest that a true church is quite distinct from any national grouping, such as a nation state.⁴⁵ He therefore avoids reference to forms of Protestantism that did involve support from secular force: the established Church of England and Presbyterianism. But in places he keeps the word ‘doctrine’, which seems to suggest an agreed formulation of faith over and above the finding any individual might make in a reading of scripture.⁴⁶ ⁴¹ YP 2.396, 527. ⁴² YP 7.247. ⁴³ Milton noted two instances of this kind of thinking in De Doctrina Christiana, one from Tertullian, the other from Lactantius: they are noted as injunctions to choose good from evil within a Christian context: YP 6.362–3. ⁴⁴ YP 7.248–9. ⁴⁵ Westminster Confession of Faith, III.669; Savoy Declaration, ch. 35; YP 7.258. ⁴⁶ YP 7.262.
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To Augustine belonged the most influential statement in support of the state coercion of heretics and schismatics. He argued that coercion in the name of faith could be regarded as voluntarist precisely because it was in the name of faith. Intolerance was a necessary magisterial compensation for the consequences of original sin.⁴⁷ Yet the execution of heretics in significant numbers as a way of protecting the church from error dates from much later: the late eleventh and twelfth centuries. After all, heresy caused the damnation of souls, and was often portrayed as sexual perversity. Sometimes, sexual libertinism appeared to be practised by the heretics: this is how Anabaptist polygamy appeared to the orthodox, even if it was a condition of purity to the Anabaptists themselves. The world needed to be cleansed of heretics: a view that was widely held by both Catholics and magisterial Protestant reformers. The way to cleanse it was to burn them. Anti-trinitarianism represented a particularly grievous heresy. In the eyes of its opponents, to deny that Christ was God was to open the way to atheism. To heresy could also be added another deeply troubling category: witchcraft. The two went hand in hand. From this viewpoint, persecution and the suppression of heresy was a painful but entirely necessary and justified cure.⁴⁸ Defenders of the need to suppress heresy or error could always point to the resistance arguments of Protestants or indeed (and especially in England and among the Protestant French) Catholics as evidence of both sedition and treason, not least since such arguments were grounded in traditions of natural law, rather than religious duty. Those who either refused to make oaths of loyalty (e.g. Anabaptists, Quakers), or who could be seen to equivocate (Catholics, especially Jesuits) were also regarded as subversive and disobedient. Added eschatological urgency was given to this view by the widespread belief from the early days of the Reformation onwards that the Last Days were at hand. In practical terms, toleration arguments were used as a strategy to achieve unity, the issue of freedom of conscience not being in this case a final or genuine aim. The post-1559 Church of England was founded on what was deemed to be an acceptable consensus, with many issues left undecided and open to individual interpretation—adiaphora, or ‘things indifferent’; Milton himself was in some senses more restrictive, since he claimed that anything ‘indifferent’ not in scripture should be utterly disregarded.⁴⁹ In a ⁴⁷ Marshall, John Locke, chs. 5–6; Walsham, Charitable Hatred, 40–9. ⁴⁸ See Stuart Clark, Thinking with Demons: The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). ⁴⁹ YP 8.427–8.
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related way Locke thought that indifferent matters were not a real part of religion’s concern. The everyday experience of the treatment of religious heterodoxy, or of religious minorities, is now deemed to be far less flamboyant than the literature of toleration and anti-toleration might suggest. Minorities with a long history in particular localities might well be tolerated over long periods of time: Roman Catholics in the north-west of England, dissimulating Familists in parts of Essex, Cambridgeshire and Surrey. Specific pressure points might emerge at certain junctures, but the system produced general coexistence. This was true of much of Europe as well as of England. Harmony, conflict, consensus and repression coexisted all at once, notably after the initial periods of reform and anti-reform, with their violent consequences, in the 1530s, 1540s and 1550s. It might be more accurate to describe this state as one of continual potential tension, as is evident in the lively parish politics of late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century London, or, in more unusual circumstances, the debates between Presbyterians, Independents and Baptists on the one hand, and Quakers on the other, in various parts of the country during the 1650s.⁵⁰ As has been pointed out, the state toleration of Roman Catholics remained a possibility through the seventeenth century. So also, Puritan nonconformity remained at the heart of the established religion and in greater numbers than those who had absolutely separated. The hope that the ejected ministers might be comprehended within the national church remained a goal for many throughout the Restoration. Such various attitudes permeated the ecclesiastical establishment at all ranks, as well as the laity. With such possibilities for the future of worship, accommodation made more sense from a local point of view. It also explains extraordinary conversions: why the key General Baptist and Leveller Robert Everard should eventually become a Roman Catholic, his faith in a scripture-based faith finally exhausted.⁵¹ Or to look at a case moving the other way, the scriptural commentator Charles Marie De Veil (1630–1685) was born the son of a rabbi in Metz, but was converted by Bossuet and became a Roman Catholic and an Augustinian priest, then via a brush with Jansenism joined the Church of England upon arrival in London in 1677. He was then finally persuaded there was no scriptural justification for infant baptism, and so became a Baptist in 1684. But these details do not explain away the brutal treatment of Quakers during this period: old attitudes ⁵⁰ Peter Lake with Michael Questier, The Anti-Christ’s Lewd Hat: Protestants, Papists and Players in Post-Reformation England (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002); Ann Hughes, ‘The Pulpit Guarded: Confrontations between Orthodox and Radicals in Revolutionary England’, in Ann Laurence et al., John Bunyan and His England (London: Hambledon, 1990), 31–50. ⁵¹ ODNB.
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towards religious alterity and the transgression of customary religious behavior died hard. Milton grew up in a world in which martyrdom was part of living memory: the martyrdom of radical Protestants and Roman Catholics, and before that, the memory of the Protestant martyrings during the reign of Queen Mary. The last men to be burned for heresy in England, the anti-trinitarians Edward Wightman and Bartholomew Legate, went to the flames in 1612 when Milton was three. There was also the memory and the continuing practice of imprisoning Puritan clergyman who would neither wear the required vestments nor use the Book of Common Prayer, or, later on, the Book of Sports. The poet Andrew Marvell’s father, the Revd Andrew Marvell (c.1585–1641) was investigated by the archbishop of York for not wearing the surplice and for not using the Prayer Book properly.⁵² Lay people were also interrogated for reading unapproved material; in the Interregnum the boot was on the other foot, with Anglicans daring sometimes to use their liturgy. In France martyrdom was harsher—the tongues of heretics were slotted with a knife or removed. Everywhere authorities were concerned that the theatre of martyrdom would create converts rather than induce conformity. In the sixteenth century even some Protestants made relics of martyrs’ bones. Persecution of Protestants remained the object of popular kudos to the seventeenth century. Printed records, in writing and in pictures, of martyrological suffering and persecution for the sake of faith were legion in the period, for Protestants, Catholics and radicals.⁵³ If martyrdom was passive resistance, others were prepared to resort to violence, from sophisticated plots to local riots, all of which were part of the texture of a world in which there was no single religion but where a solution to the issue of toleration had not been found. Where banishment was a punishment for heresy, especially on the continent, others chose voluntary exile, typically in the Netherlands, or in the English Americas. Recent historical investigation has foregrounded the phenomena of dissimulation and partial conformity, exploiting a porous boundary between conformity and nonconformity, especially within families, and as the public regulation of worship intensified or de-intensified. Down to the end of the seventeenth century, the recognizable behavior of the ‘church papist’ was recorded: appearing in church once a month to avoid local harassment and fines, although the success of such a strategy would require the quiescence of local officials. Evasion of ⁵² Nicholas von Maltzahn, An Andrew Marvell Chronology (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005), 25–6. ⁵³ Brad S. Gregory, Salvation at Stake: Christian Martyrdom in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).
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sacrament and oath-taking, involving in the latter case all sorts of casuistry, was both practised and reviled by all parties across the central Reformation divide.⁵⁴ In Europe, the consequence of extended religious war, from the later sixteenth century until the middle of the seventeenth, was a final agreement in some areas to permit more than one confession. This was so in the German Protestant states and the Holy Roman Empire after the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 that ended the Thirty Years War (and that amplified the more limited framework of the Peace of Augsburg of 1555). There then emerged the phenomenon of ‘confessionalization’, where tolerated religions grew insulated from each other through time, so that society became divided. The same, it is argued, is true of France after the Edict of Nantes of 1598. Continued peace exaggerated the differences. But the experiment in supraconfessional coexistence in Poland-Lithuania came to an end in the late seventeenth century, in part because the boundaries between confessions had become too strong, there being by then a conflict over the practice of popular religiosity. The Polish Brethren were ultimately forced into exile. In France, Louis XIV’s final assertion of absolutist will led to one of the last great population shifts of the early modern period: the expulsion and further brutalization of the Huguenots. Before then, in the 1650s, Milton had reacted with horror to the massacre of Protestants in the Waldensian region of northern Italy. Milton’s career was drawing to a close as John Locke’s was on the rise. To Locke falls the distinction of being the most influential philosopher of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Locke’s A Letter concerning Toleration (1689), translated from Latin to English by Andrew Marvell’s nephew William Popple, is the most influential statement of advanced religious toleration in the English-speaking world at this time. Locke’s position is that Christianity is peaceful and charitable: there can be no such thing as persecution in the name of Jesus for any reason. There is a boundary between faith and not faith, and between immorality and morality, but the former is a matter to be dealt with peacefully within the ambit of religion and the latter within the ambit of civil law. All this is stated even given the fact that the immoral may well appeal to religion and the religious persecutors will appeal to the need for public order. Locke’s position is characteristically and beautifully clear-cut. Milton belongs to a different stage of awareness, in which the emphasis is upon the felicity of searching for truth in a free state. The separation of church and state is important to Milton, and he argues strongly for it in 1659, but ⁵⁴ Alexandra Walsham, Church Papists: Catholicism, Conformity, and Confessional Polemic in Early Modern England (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1993).
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he is only a relative tolerationist. ‘Liberty’ is consistent with Protestantism, and Catholics, idolators and the immoral are not free precisely because they do not have liberty. On grounds of morality and civil security, they should not be tolerated. To persecute and to be a Protestant, says Milton, are mutually exclusive. But Locke regards an ‘idolatrous’ church as permissible, since what is deemed idolatrous is, so to speak, in the eye of the beholder, not the secular ruler. Yet Locke regards the safety of the commonwealth as the ultimate criterion: all religious practice must be consistent with the laws of a given state, and no allegiance by any religion in a given state can be made to a foreign prince. Locke is also adamant that the only cause of sedition in religious conventicles is oppression: the making of their existence illegal. Elsewhere, Locke is interesting in assuming that church membership is voluntary rather than inherited, and it looks like a separatist argument itself (or as if secular concepts of association were influencing this conception), whereas with Milton voluntary church membership is not so important and was apparently not practised by the poet himself. Like Milton, Locke is sure that the reading of scripture is crucial and foundational, but where Milton celebrates the diversity (the ‘heresies’) that will occur through various readings of scripture, Locke (with perhaps his interest in an individual’s cognition playing on his mind) is more concerned with singularity: each man is an orthodoxy unto himself, each church is an orthodoxy unto itself. In the light of these comparisons, the argument that education and licensing rather than toleration is the primary guiding principle in Areopagitica comes to mind.⁵⁵ Milton is quite clear that there is distinction between matters purely religious and those that belong to the civil law, and which are therefore the concern of the magistrate. In this respect, he is again close to Locke. And he thinks it is a greater crime to Protestants to persecute, even to the extent of bloodshed, when they have a scripture-based religion as a foundation.⁵⁶ He calls for a ‘repressing of thir contraries determinable by the common light of nature’, a formulation that belongs with Milton’s sharp and distinctive treatment of contrariness at the heart of his vision.⁵⁷ But he is as much, or even more interested in what it means to be a free Christian, in what that positive experience consists, than in the conditions that make it possible. A word that is more frequent in Milton’s prose and poetry than ‘toleration’ ⁵⁵ Nigel Smith, ‘Areopagitica: Voicing Contexts 1643–45’, in David Loewenstein and James Grantham Turner, eds., Politics, Poetics and Hermeneutics in Milton’s Prose (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 103–22. ⁵⁶ YP 7.253. ⁵⁷ YP 7.258.
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is ‘tolerable’: what is tolerable in a marriage, or hell, for instance. Hence he devoted an entire tract to the abolition of ‘hirelings’ (a paid ministry, perhaps maintained by tithes) as opposed to a ministry of people called personally irrespective of education and support to preach the Word of God. To this extent, and unlike the Presbyterians, Milton considered that the entire Mosaic law, with its list of civil prohibitions, was abrogated with the birth of Christ. Any pattern of civil magistracy as exercised originally by the Israelite priests does not apply to Christians. Equally, churches must not seek to influence political assemblies, as instanced with the Fifth Monarchists in the 1650s: turbulence was the result.⁵⁸ Yet, as commentators have argued, if introduced, it would have been all too easy for Milton’s republic to become divided between an empowered and tolerated radical Christian elite, who would surely be those enjoying the ‘civil rights and advanc’ments of every person according to his merit’ and those excluded from that category who would not enjoy full citizenship: hardly what we would think of as a tolerant society.⁵⁹ In a difficult moment for the English republic, in respect of Ireland, Milton defended denial of toleration to anything ‘absolutely contrary to sound Doctrin or the power of godliness’. Mere conscience would have to wait.⁶⁰ It is the purpose of this volume of essays to discuss in detail Milton’s response to toleration issues, in his writings, and in the political predicaments we know he found himself in his career. It has not been the purpose of this article to go into these matters and texts in such detail. However, it is worth making two points by way of conclusion with regard to Milton and toleration. First of all, and this is a point seldom understood, not least because Christopher Hill characterized Milton’s theology as ‘left wing Arminianism’, thereby obscuring the way in which Milton discovered his Arminianism. Through the 1630s, Milton was broadly connected with some of the most advanced political and religious English thinkers of the day. He sought the patronage of Sir Henry Wotton and he knew John Hales. Those of this group that survived into the 1640s were indubitably supporters of the king, but they had the greatest degree of access to the challenging ideas of men like Sarpi, and were best placed to understand the debates of theology that were preoccupying the Dutch republic and the rest of Protestant Europe. They were often more intellectually advanced than their Calvinist compatriots. Milton’s mature knowledge of religious toleration and persecution, of free will theology and of anti-trinitarian theology, begins at this juncture and in this context, whatever he did with it later on, and however Puritanism itself also produced its own heretical wing. ⁵⁸ YP 7.380.
⁵⁹ YP 7.383.
⁶⁰ YP 3.325.
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Second is the argument that the mature poems, especially Paradise Lost, are exemplary tolerationist works of literature. They confess no particular party line yet invite the reader to contemplate a series of theological positions that have to be understood as a debate, with trains of reasoning involved, even as God lays down the law on free will, or the Son appears distinct from the Father (or does he?). On the level of poetry and poetic tradition, this means inviting the learned reader to debate the worth of earlier models of creation epic, stretching back even to Lucretius and Epicurus before him. It is consistent with the idea of scripture reading (as opposed to sermon listening) that the most advanced tolerationist thinkers of Milton’s time urged. Here one thinks of Coornhert. But Coornhert remained a Roman Catholic in some senses, and his own poetry tends towards the deeply introspective and mystical. In Milton’s England, we would have to look at some of the more educated early Quakers, and their fellow-travelers, to find similar views. Milton was quite sure that there was a human state called bondage or slavery, that it had been perpetuated by ancient or modern tyrannies, and that one of the greatest of these was the Roman church. His writing, fusing classical republicanism and advanced Protestantism, is dedicated toward inculcating freedom and belief as vigorously anti-idolatrous and hence anti-enslaved activities; a perpetual source of renewal for a free state. But liberty is not toleration, however closely related, and probably this is a good thing too. Milton’s liberty must mean some things are not to be tolerated; that message is everywhere evident in his poetry and prose. However, with regard to Milton’s writings, the model of early modern society as a dialogue of tolerance versus intolerance is insufficient as an analytic paradigm. This is because every theory of toleration appears to contain a measure of intolerance; this is so even in Coornhert’s writing. The metaphor of a Moebius strip, with two pieces of different metal fused together, back to back, will not do either. A model of a molecule, in which one part of the structure was intolerance in ratio to a larger collection of toleration atoms is more fitting. It may be that the kind of toleration vision deducible from a writer like Andrew Marvell, governed by pragmatic considerations, open to charges of some conceptual incoherence, or at least considerable obliqueness, but generating an ethos of sympathy, if not also an ardor, for the other, and certainly acceptable to some Roman Catholics, is less open to charges of inconsistency on the grounds of toleration than is the case with Milton.⁶¹ But Milton’s writings draw in the reader to think hard about what being free means, and where we might begin to be aware of toleration. In the early modern world, no less than today, there appears to be no possibility of ⁶¹ See below, Nicholas von Maltzahn’s essay in this volume, Ch. 5.
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a toleration utopia—where anyone and everyone can believe what they like and practise it. In his terms, Milton makes one confront this reality where others imagine toleration but at the price of the active mind or imagine toleration as it could never actually be, as was the case with the balance of power in Restoration England. In this case, we have manifest the betrayal of the active mind.
3 Toleration and the Specter of Heresy in Milton’s England David Loewenstein
1. Monstrous Toleration and the Growth of Heresies Fearing the dramatic growth and spread of heresies during the 1640s, the mainstream godly considered the very idea of religious toleration almost unthinkable—or, indeed, intolerable. The notion of toleration threatened their vision of an ordered, unified, and godly national community, and it generated powerful fears of religious chaos and moral confusion. It provoked in their writings visceral responses and shocking images, including images of monstrosity and disease. When the Presbyterian divine and zealous heretic hunter Thomas Edwards published his massive Gangraena in three parts during 1646, he employed images of monstrous generation to convey the alarming consequences of toleration in an age of religious sectarianism and anarchy; this new age of religious turmoil, he believed, had produced vast and endless new errors and heresies which he feared his own work could never fully represent or possibly contain.¹ The splintering of Protestantism, ¹ Indeed, in his third part, published in December 1646, Edwards warned that the swelling of sectaries and heresies was so great that he might need to produce a fourth part: The Third Part of Gangraena. Or, a New and Higher Discovery of the Errors, Heresies, Blasphemies, and Insolent Proceedings of the Sectaries of These Times (London, 1646), 218, 271. He also concludes this work by promising to produce ‘a Treatise against Toleration and pretended Liberty of Conscience’ (295). For an excellent comprehensive treatment of Edwards in the context of the religious ferment and culture of revolutionary London and in relation to contemporary heresiographers, see Ann Hughes, Gangraena and the Struggle for the English Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); my discussion here addresses more specifically the ways Edwards and other Presbyterian ministers figured the monstrosity of toleration and generated acute fears about it.
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followed by fractious religious diversity and the explosion of heresies, was transforming England itself into an alien land—a world of ‘strange errors’ and ‘mishapen children’. Edwards envisioned that toleration itself was both ‘the midwife and nursing mother’ of this monstrous offspring and would ‘cause growth of Heresies fast enough, and the ruine of Religion and godlinesse’ (Gangraena, 1.3; 3.233). Likewise, Edwards depicted toleration itself in terms of a monstrous conception and deformed offspring produced by swelling numbers of sectaries in England: ‘the monster of Toleration conceived in the wombe of the Sectaries long ago, they having grown big with it ever since’ (Gangraena, 1.64–5; cf. 2.5). In Gangraena he would render the analogy between toleration and monstrosity even more grotesque and shocking as he conjured up the image of a monstrous body of heresy created out of an amalgam of different errors and sects, found especially in the New Model Army, where ‘liberty of conscience’ flourishes as ‘the great Religion’: England was now a land breeding ‘strange monsters, having their heads of Enthusiasme, their bodies of Antinomianisme, their thighs of Familisme, their leggs and feet of Anabaptisme, their hands of Arminianisme’ (Gangraena, 1.16–17).² Besides expressing deep religious anxieties, this language of monstrosity dehumanized heretics, making the violent assault on heresy, schisms, and religious toleration appear more justified and natural. We tend to think of revolutionary England, with its massive outpouring of books and pamphlets, as a crucial period in the history of debate about the nature and limits of religious toleration. In many ways it was, as this volume of essays on the struggle for toleration in Milton’s England confirms. Yet it is also important to emphasize (as the passages from Edwards above suggest) the depth of visceral and irrational feelings, as well as feelings of rage and hatred, that the idea of toleration could arouse during these years when the heated religious imagination was easily inflamed. As the Independent minister John Goodwin put it in responding to Thomas Edwards, this was a fiercely contested subject that stirred up arguments that were ‘onely or chiefly, firebrands of Reproaches and Defamations, throwne in the faces of the
² On monstrous bodies in the early modern period, see Laura Lunger Knoppers and Joan B. Landes, eds., Monstrous Bodies/Political Monstrosities in Early Modern Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). This valuable book, however, does not specifically address the monstrosity of toleration or heresy in Milton’s England, although David Cressy’s account of the trope of monstrosity in the 1640s has implications for the subject: ‘Lamentable, Strange, and Wonderful: Headless Monsters in the English Revolution’ (40–63). On heresy, monstrosity, and gender in anti-heretical writing of the English Revolution, see also John Marshall, John Locke, Toleration, and Early Enlightenment Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 297–302.
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one side by the other’.³ For the orthodox godly, especially Presbyterians who advocated a compulsory national church and abhorred radical sectarianism, the notion of toleration was so frightening that there were limits to the degree in which they were able—or indeed wished—to engage in reasoned debate and careful argument about an issue that aroused deep fears of moral chaos and confusion; and which also pitted them against threatening religious opponents they considered such ‘a rash, heady People’.⁴ Radical religious writers, as we shall see below, might appeal to ‘the efficacy and convincing power of sound reason and argument’ in order to challenge the fury of anti-tolerationist writers ‘fiery hot against errours and heresies so called’. But, as William Walwyn observed, godly writers and preachers bitterly opposed to toleration tended to ‘use other weapons’,⁵ especially reviling language and alarming images that in turn contributed to this new climate of anxiety, fear, and dread. Toleration, in the minds of the orthodox godly, threatened to tear apart religious unity, thereby generating political and religious anarchy and a frightening world overrun with errors, schisms, and heresies. If the growth of menacing heresy evoked images of contagious disease and gangrene from mainstream godly writers, toleration evoked images of chaos, inundation, violent dismemberment, and deformity. Its dangers were denounced by enraged preachers and writers employing a rhetoric of fear, hysteria, and savagery that had, in some ways, as tenuous a connection with reality as the fear-mongering rhetoric of Senator Joseph McCarthy and the House of Un-American Activities Committee did in the 1950s.⁶ ³ John Goodwin, Cretensis (London, 1646), 34. Edwards, in turn, complained about the sectaries’ ‘violent and fierce pleading by word and writing a free Liberty and Toleration of all kind of Religions’ (Gangraena, 3.185). ⁴ A Letter of the Ministers of the City of London … Against Toleration (London, 1645), 3: regarding the Independents and toleration, these ministers claimed, ‘Their desires and endeavours are unreasonable.’ Anti-tolerationist writers, as William Walwyn noted, tended to see separatists as ‘a rash, heady People, and not so much concluded by their Reason, as their Fancie’: The Writings of William Walwyn, ed. Jack R. McMichael and Barbara Taft (Athens, Ga., and London: University of Georgia Press, 1989), 103. Further references to Walwyn’s writings are taken from this edition; page numbers are given parenthetically in my text. ⁵ Tolleration Justified, and Persecution Condemned, in Writings, 164; see also 159, 167, 170, and The Compassionate Samaritane, in Writings, 117 (‘Separatists … feare your Club more then your Reason’). Also see John Goodwin, Sion-Colledg Visited (London, 1648), 7–8; and the title page of Goodwin’s M.S. to A.S. with A Plea for Libertie of Conscience (London, 1644), where Goodwin appeals ‘to the judgements of all rationall, and moderate men’. On heresy hunters ‘fiery hot against errours’, see Walwyn, Writings, 208. On Walwyn and rational discussion, see also William Haller, ed., Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan Revolution, 1638–1647, 3 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934), 1.63. ⁶ Cf. Diarmaid MacCulloch writing of the hysteria against heresy in sermon writers of the fifteenth century in central Europe: The Reformation (New York: Viking Press, 2003), 37.
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Thus a large number of London Presbyterian ministers in 1648, anxiously warning against bringing in ‘an universall, boundless, lawless, abominable and intolerable Toleration’, evoked images of savage dismemberment and uncontrolled profusion: they observed that ‘we swarm with noisome Errours, Heresies and Blasphemies: Instead of unity and uniformity in matters of Religion, we are torn in pieces with destructive schisms, Separations, Divisions and subdivisions’; and they concluded that ‘instead of a Reformation’, ‘we have a Deformation in Religion’.⁷ To make their case for increased alarm, these godly ministers cited a wide range of ‘abominable Errours’ and ‘damnable Heresies’ maintained under ‘the notion’ of ‘New Truths’, including anti-Trinitarianism, mortalism, the belief in general redemption and the role of human free will in matters of salvation, the denial of the sacrament of baptism, the belief that hell is a ‘non-entity’, errors concerning marriage and divorce (with Milton as the main proponent), among numerous others. Like Thomas Edwards, they envisioned a new religious world of nightmarish, unnatural generation out of control and they employed the trope of monstrosity, agreeing that England had ‘now brought forth an hideous Monster of Toleration’ (A Testimony, 4, 33). The specter of heresy and its ability to spread rapidly contributed greatly to these intense fears of England ‘swallowed up with Sects, Schismes, Divisions, disorders, contentions and confusions’ (A Testimony, 32),⁸ thereby severely testing the degree to which the mainstream godly could ever imagine, with any kind of sympathy, a world of religious diversity. Heresy was regularly compared to a terrible gangrene, disease or infection spreading quickly throughout the body politic; a threat to thousands of souls, it was potentially incurable, while devouring faith, peace, and godliness.⁹ Metaphors of ravaging disease suggested that if heresy was profoundly unnatural, so was toleration. It was as though hell itself had ‘broke loose’, to echo the title of one hostile tract warning about the specter of spreading errors and heresies.¹⁰ It was generating not only ‘Ecclesiasticall Anarchy and confusion’ but endangering the whole nation and the entire social order: ‘If errours arise in the Church’, one fearful commentator on its alarming spread noted, ‘the Common-wealth will not want confusion’ (Cranford, Haereseo-Machia, 5, 10).¹¹ Whether or not toleration was a remedy ⁷ A Testimony to the Truth of Jesus Christ (London, 1648), 29–31; this text was signed by John Downame, James Cranford (mentioned later in this essay), Christopher Love, and Edmund Calamy, among other London divines. ⁸ See also Edwards, Gangraena, 3.277. ⁹ See e.g. Edwards, Gangraena, passim; James Cranford, Haereseo-Machia: Or, The Mischiefe which Heresies doe (London, 1645), 5–7, 34. ¹⁰ Hell Broke Loose: or, A Catalogue of Many of the Spreading Errors, Heresies, and Blasphemies of These Times (London, 1646). ¹¹ See also David Cressy, England on Edge: Crisis and Revolution, 1640–42 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), ch. 10, esp. 217, 219.
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or cure for a diseased nation weakened by bitter religious warfare and fears of division was itself a matter of intense controversy; as this skeptical observer went on to note: ‘It is commonly replyed in Pulpits, in Presses, That a toleration of all consciences, even Antichristian, would be a sovereign remedy to cure all dissentions, and an effectual means to compose the warres of Christendome’ (Cranford, Haereseo-Machia, 11). But as this writer, who warned about ‘the mischiefe which Heresies doe’, also observed, toleration might have precisely the opposite effect: ‘the toleration of errour is not a way to peace, as some men pretend, but to disorder’ and ‘the unrestrained inundation of our errours’ (Cranford, Haereseo-Machia, title-page, 14, 15). Accusatory terms such as ‘error’ and ‘heresy’, however indiscriminately employed and conflated, thus had the power to arouse enormous fears during the mid-century crisis, fueling ferocious opposition to religious toleration; consequently, those godly writers opposed to toleration could also be calculating in their manipulation of fear: Thomas Edwards, Goodwin noted, simply had to ‘pronounce the formidable sentence of Error and Heresie, against all opinions and judgements of men whatsoever, which will not comport with his understanding (or fancie rather) as the standard of all Truth’ (Cretensis, 10).¹² Because fears of toleration and religious anarchy were so closely related to the specter of a flood of heresies and errors unleashed, radical religious writers in Milton’s England attempting to justify religious toleration were faced with a particularly difficult challenge. In this new poisoned climate of religious controversy, toleration was represented in godly propaganda as the great enemy of religious unity—and indeed of any kind of religious stability—and radical religious writers had to muster all their polemical and imaginative resources to justify it. In the following sections, I examine some of the more striking ways three of the most original radical religious writers—John Goodwin, William Walwyn, and Milton himself—responded to the specter of heresy and the language used to demonize ‘heretics’ in the context of the bitterly contested issue of religious toleration.¹³ One purpose of this essay, especially in its final section, is to reassess the freshness of Milton’s reformulations of ‘heresy’ and ‘heretic’ in Areopagitica by situating Milton in the context of other leading radical religious writers struggling to respond to the crisis over toleration during these years of religious division, ¹² To stifle toleration, Goodwin writes elsewhere, ministers simply had to ‘stigmatize the Truths of God, with the odious and hatefull names of infamous & pernicious Errors & Heresies’ (Sion-Colledg, 19). ¹³ Roger Williams is also among the leading radical religious writers who engaged, in exceptionally original and independent-minded ways, with the notion of religious toleration and fears of heresy. On Williams and Milton on toleration, see the essay in this volume by Thomas N. Corns., Ch. 4.
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fear, and varying degrees of intolerance. By situating Areopagitica in relation to tolerationist writings of Goodwin and Walwyn, as well as the specter of heresy generated by Edwards and mainstream godly writers, I hope to illuminate Milton’s highly distinctive responses to contemporary fears of toleration and the spread of heresy.
2. John Goodwin: Heresy, Independency, and the Struggle for Toleration Repeatedly vilified by Thomas Edwards and other religious enemies as a ‘Grand Heretic’ and ‘a monstrous Sectary’ (‘a compound of Socinianisme, Arminianisme, Libertinisme, Antinomianism, Independency’, among other so-called heresies (Gangraena, 3.114)),¹⁴ the radical Independent London minister and religious polemicist John Goodwin addressed the specter of increasing heresies in his many writings promoting religious liberty and toleration and interrogating the role of coercive power in matters of religion. As early as 1642, Goodwin, who rejected predestinarian orthodoxy and embraced the doctrine of general redemption, found himself caught up in violent controversy and charged with heresy by George Walker (soon to become a member of the Westminster Assembly). In response Goodwin articulated a remarkable openness to the possibility of new religious truths and a striking independent-mindedness about a diversity of religious beliefs. Informing the London clergy in Imputatio Fidei, or, A Treatise of Justification that he was not afraid ‘to cast away long-endeered and professed opinions, when once the light hath shone upon them, and discovered them to be but darknesse’ (indeed, it was ‘a marveilous bewtie’ and ‘blessing’ to do so), Goodwin suggested that the exegesis of scriptural matters and texts needed to remain free and open to new interpretations because there were ‘thousands of Scriptures that have not yet opened, or delivered out their treasures’.¹⁵ Goodwin expressed his provocative point of view, with its implications for thinking about religious toleration, by employing the analogy of the New World and its relatively recent discovery: having remained unknown for so ¹⁴ See also Sion-Colledg Visited, where Goodwin complains that godly ministers have represented him ‘as a man of monstrous and prodigious errours’ (13). On Goodwin vilified by Presbyterians as ‘The Grand Heretic of England’, see the Leveller Humphrey Brooke, The Charity of Church-Men (1649), in William Haller and Godfrey Davies, eds., The Leveller Tracts, 1647–1653 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944), 342; on Goodwin viciously satirized as the ‘monstrous Metropolitan’, see John Vicars, Coleman-Street Conclave Visited (London, 1648), 27. ¹⁵ John Goodwin, Imputatio Fidei (London, 1642), ‘The Epistle Dedicatory’ (to the London clergy), (a2)v ; sigs. (b4v )–(Cr ).
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long, its discovery, after all, had deeply unsettled received ideas about the world. Similarly, Goodwin suggested, there was much yet to explore about scripture and its wealth of undiscovered spiritual truths: If so great and considerable part of the world as America is, being as large as all the other three [i.e. Asia, Africa, Europe] so long knowne … was yet so unknowne to all the world besides, for so many generations … well may it be conceived, not only that some, but many truths, yea and those of maine concernement and importance, may be yet unborne. (Imputatio Fidei, sig. (b4r ))
As the last part of this passage suggests, Goodwin is a writer receptive to new conceptions of religious truth since many may indeed ‘be yet unborne’. The process of searching for religious truths, as Milton likewise suggests in Areopagitica, remains ongoing and open-ended; Goodwin’s religious outlook and language already differed from that of godly heresy hunters who would employ the language of monstrous generation to represent the birth of new heresies and the frightening consequences of religious toleration. Goodwin would soon emerge as one of the most formidable and combative proponents of toleration in a period of religious crisis when it was under massive assault. The religious tensions and ferment of the Civil War years radicalized Goodwin’s religious positions so that by 1643 he founded a gathered church within the London parish of St Stephen, Coleman Street.¹⁶ As the Presbyterian clerical faction grew in power, Goodwin became increasingly embroiled in bitter pamphlet controversy over toleration and the fear that Independency had opened ‘a doore to all errors, heresies, and unsound opinions’ which were quickly spreading and endangering both the stability of mainstream religious institutions and the nation itself.¹⁷ Goodwin’s religious outlook during the 1640s, like Milton’s in Areopagitica, was increasingly dominated ¹⁶ Tension between Goodwin’s gathered church and the parish meant that Goodwin’s church met at his house in Coleman Street from 1645 to about 1648: Murray Tolmie, The Triumph of the Saints (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 11–16. On Goodwin’s career as a minister, see also the ODNB article by Tai Liu, 22.819–22. Helpful studies of Goodwin’s career and religious beliefs include E. S. More, ‘Congregationalism and the Origins of the New Arminianism’, Journal of British Studies 22.1 (1982), 50–70; More, ‘Congregationalism and the Social Order: John Goodwin’s Gathered Church, 1640–60’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History 37 (1987), 210–35; Perez Zagorin, How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 208–13; and especially John Coffey, John Goodwin and the Puritan Revolution: Religion and Intellectual Change in Seventeenth-Century England (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2006), which the author kindly allowed me to read in page proofs. Coffey persuasively shows that Goodwin had created a gathered church by late 1642 (pp. 98–101). ¹⁷ John Goodwin, Theomachia, or, The grand imprudence of men running the hazard of fighting against God in suppressing any … practice concerning which they know not … whether it be from God or no … (London, 1644), 33.
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by a vision of England as a terrain of religious as well as ideological warfare. In Theomachia; or The Grand Imprudence of Men Running the Hazard of Fighting against God, he argued that there were ways of fighting against God as well as fighting for Him. Elaborating upon two of his sermons based upon Acts 5:27–39, Goodwin engaged in intense scriptural exegesis, giving a fresh contemporary interpretation to the story of Gamaliel’s speech admonishing the Jerusalem authorities not to suppress Peter and the other apostles and ‘their erroneous and dangerous Doctrine’ since, according to the authorities, ‘they were not meet to be tolerated in the State, nor yet to live’. Gamaliel warns them not to persecute the apostles when they are put on trial, especially if their work ‘be of God’; for then these authorities, by exercising ‘the bloudy rage and violence of men’ (as Goodwin puts it) (Theomachia, 5, 10), would ‘be found even to fight against God’ (Acts 5:34–9), since the apostles take their orders from a higher authority and are not bound by any human assembly or power. In the context of the mid-seventeenth-century struggle for toleration, anxieties about increasing religious divisions, and the rise of Presbyterian power and the forceful assertion of its authority against religious deviants, this scriptural story took on new potency in Goodwin’s exegesis.¹⁸ Chief among ways of fighting against God was the use of the weapons of secular power to suppress religious freedom, separate congregations, and rival beliefs, and to punish ‘heretics’ by force or even with death. Here Goodwin’s fierce anti-authoritarianism, when it comes to restraining matters of conscience, began to manifest itself: if the only means of slaying ‘these enemies of Christ’ was by ‘the sword of the Spirit’, then, Goodwin concluded, our ‘Prisons and Swords are no Church-officers, nor any appurtenances to any Ecclesiastique authority in what form of Government soever’ (Theomachia, 34). In contrast, the so-called ‘congregationall way’—the Independent way encouraging gathered churches of true believers or saints—was now, Goodwin suggested, the most promising ‘method of … warfare … against those enemies of God, and Religion, errors and heresies’ (Theomachia, 33). The recent explosion of errors and heresies had resulted in the godly objection that ‘if an heretique be suffered to live, he is in danger of infecting others, and destroying them eternally’; yet Goodwin perceived that violent suppression and restraint—as if one could put ‘fetters … upon the feet of errors and heresies to secure and keep them under’—would have precisely the opposite effect, comparable to the attempt to censor authors and books, as Milton argued in Areopagitica: it ¹⁸ Goodwin would later recall the scriptural story of Gamaliel and the issue of fighting against God: see Goodwin’s bitter attack on Thomas Edwards in Cretensis, 7–8.
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would stimulate the multiplication of heretics and sects by casting ‘a spirit of Authoritie upon them’, turning them into martyrs, and making ‘their reputation glowe’ (Theomachia, 37).¹⁹ The apparent ‘intolerablenesse of a Toleration’ for begetting new schisms and religious factions was a major focus of Goodwin’s lengthy assault on the Presbyterian heretic hunter Adam Steuart in M.S. to A.S. with A Plea for Libertie of Conscience (1644), Goodwin’s first Independent book and a striking assault on the traditional Reformed view of the magistrate’s power in religion. Interrogating the anti-tolerationist positions of ‘A.S.’—one of the heretic hunters Milton would lash out at two years later in his ‘On the New Forcers of Conscience under the Long Parliament’²⁰—Goodwin argues that the reason why sects, schisms, and ‘wild opinions … lately started amongst us’ spread so rapidly is that we resort to coercive human authorities and power, especially ‘the iron rod of the Civill Magistrate’, to try to crush them: we ‘have recourse to our own arm, hoping by disgracing, displacing, way-laying, impoverishing, suspending, imprisoning, and other weapons and wayes of the flesh, to ease our selves of the burthensomenesse and trouble of them’ (M.S. to A.S., 54, 59).²¹ Goodwin’s catalogue of gerunds conveys the futility of violent compulsion by human authorities, acts which inflame greater religious hatred and fears rather than ‘quenching … those flames of divisions and dissentions that are amongst us in matters of Religion’ (55). This new climate of fear and defamation by coercive powers, Goodwin suggested, discouraged individuals of ‘good conscience’ from exercising freedom of intellectual inquiry and independent religious judgment, particularly ‘from searching and inquiring into the Scriptures, after a more exact knowledge of the … perfect will of God in things’ (59). Fear was not merely an impulsive, visceral response among the orthodox godly shocked by the idea of toleration; it was also being manipulated by them in an increasingly vicious war of religion: ‘whereas feare indeed ordinarily makes men cruell, it is much to be feared, A.S. only pretends feare, that so he may have a colour [i.e. an outward appearance or show] to be cruell’ (104–5). Like Milton and Walwyn, Goodwin revealed an increasingly strong anti-authoritarian strain in his writing as he stressed the fallible judgments of civic and religious authorities, including ¹⁹ Cf. Areopagitica: ‘instead of suppressing sects and schisms, it raises them and invests them with a reputation’, YP 2.542. ²⁰ CSP 298–300. See my discussion of this sonnet in ‘The War against Heresy in Milton’s England’, forthcoming in Milton Studies 47 (2007). ²¹ Steuart had responded with hostility to An Apologeticall Narration by five Independent ministers arguing for a wider latitude of governance for individual congregations, an argument that stimulated further the debate over toleration.
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godly ministers who invoke the specter of heresy and religious anarchy to scare away support for toleration and underscore the urgent need for a state church.²² It was perhaps inevitable that Goodwin, soon savagely demonized by Thomas Edwards (as well as by other Presbyterians, including Robert Baillie) for his heretical positions and for becoming one of ‘the grand Patrons of Toleration’,²³ would strike back hard. In Cretensis: or a Briefe Answer to An Ulcerous Treatise (1646) Goodwin devotes his polemical energies to answering at length the first part of Edwards’s Gangraena and reconceiving (as Walwyn likewise does; see below) two widely used tropes: heresy as a rapidly spreading disease and the heresy hunter as physician who cures, by means of his bitter writings, his readers, as well as the church and state, of a terrible infestation and poison.²⁴ There Goodwin, attempting to expose the sickness of the virulent and feverish heretic hunter, points out ‘spots which appeare here and there in the body of the Gangrene, which plainly shew the very vitals & inward parts to be pestilently infected’; written with Edwards’s ‘gangred pen’, it is a book ‘swelling with poison, and the gall of aspes’ (Cretensis, 47, 3, 27). As the defender of toleration and Independency, Goodwin presents himself as an alternative kind of physician in these poisonous religious times, producing ‘the cure of the said dangerous ulcer, called Gangraena, and to prevent the spreading of it to the danger of the precious soules of men’ (Cretensis, title page). Goodwin mocks Edwards for generating a kind of uncontrolled, extravagant fantasy of increasing heresies that might be multiplied in print ad infinitum as his overheated religious imagination invents more and more of them: I marvaile how Mr Edw. having (it seemes) an authorized power to make errors and heresies at what rate, and of what materials he pleaseth, and hopes to live upon the trade, could stay his pen at so small a number as 180; and did not advance to that Angelicall quotient in the Apocalyps, which is ten thousand times ten thousand, and thousand thousands. (Cretensis, 9)
Edwards’s ‘Catalogue, or black Bill’ has, more than any other contemporary text, fabricated a frightening image of heresy by means of ‘lying tales and ²² Coffey, Goodwin and the Puritan Revolution, 111–12, notes Goodwin’s partial retreat from his radical tolerationist positions in revisions made in the second edition of this tract; however, Goodwin’s willingness to compromise with conservative Independents seems to have been temporary. ²³ Thomas Edwards, The Casting Down of the Last and Strongest Hold of Satan (London, 1647), 46. Edwards would soon devote more than 100 pages of Gangraena to mounting an undisciplined, ferocious attack on Cretensis and its author as ‘the profound Oracle of the Sectaries’: Gangraena, 2.30–140 (phrase from 90). For hostile Presbyterian responses to the tolerationist positions of M.S. to A.S. and Theomachia, see Coffey, Goodwin and the Puritan Revolution, 111, 115–16. Coffey reviews other contemporary satirical portraits of Goodwin in ch. 5. ²⁴ See, e.g., Edwards, Gangraena, 2.131.
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reports’, yet Goodwin, by picking apart passages from Edwards, tries to expose the savagery of his dogmatic religious judgments and intolerant assertions, fueled by a ‘Dragon-likenesse of spirit’, as arbitrary, subjective, and therefore unfounded: ‘For I professe ingenuously, that I know not by what other rule or measure, besides his own humour and will, he judgeth of error or heresie’ (Cretensis, 8, 29, 19, 10). Cretensis, the title of Goodwin’s diatribe, echoes Paul’s epistle to Titus where Cretans, in Paul’s satirical characterization, ‘are alwayes liers’ and therefore should be rebuked ‘sharply’ and (to use Goodwin’s word) ‘cuttingly’.²⁵ But whether Goodwin’s own harsh verbal responses might help to restore Edwards and his pestilent book to a measure of health remains uncertain;²⁶ like Paul concerning the Cretans and their church (see Titus 1:16), Goodwin seems not to expect much success. Goodwin also responded in Sion-Colledg Visited to the specter of heresy and monstrous toleration generated by London Presbyterian ministers in A Testimonie to the Truth of Jesus Christ (1648), a text touched on in the first section of this essay and one in which Goodwin found his own writings tarnished ‘with the blacke brand of Infamous and pernicious Errors’ (SionColledg, title page). In Sion-Colledg Goodwin challenges godly ministers who refuse to engage rationally with authors they anathematize as ‘heretical’, and who prefer instead ‘to poure out flouds of such reproachfull and foule language … upon mens sayings or opinions … without answering so much as any one reason or ground, upon which they build such assertions’. Such ministers are impetuous, frenetic, and indiscriminate in their use of inflammatory terms—they ‘insult and stamp with the foot, and cry out, Errors, Heresie, Blasphemy, anti-Scripturisme, Arminianisme, and I know not what’, and such strident rhetoric only fuels sharper religious divisions. Furthermore, in the heat of religious controversy, the ministers offer crude and rash interpretations of contemporary religious texts they disagree with, making ‘errours and heresies of similitudes’ and dismembering the texts by ‘mangling, maiming, and deforming the sayings of [their] Brethren, [and] when [they] cite them, by leaving out very emphaticall and materiall words, and clauses’. In this climate of violent controversy and textual warfare there exists a witch hunt against so-called heretics so that the ministers who ‘make errors and heresies of similitudes’ are indeed ‘seeking errors and heresies in other men, untill [they] finde them’ (Sion-Colledg, 7, 8, 14). The crisis over religious toleration had consequently become so inflamed by visceral passions and the ²⁵ Titus 1:12–13; see Cretensis, title page and 50. ²⁶ ‘I make no question but ere long you will see the whole body of [the Gangrene] full of such spots all over’ (Cretensis, 47). For additional discussion of Goodwin’s critical responses to Edwards, see Hughes, Gangraena and the Struggle for the English Revolution, esp. 266–9.
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strident war of words that vocal proponents of toleration found themselves regularly demonized as monstrous ‘heretics’ or ‘sectaries’, while engaged in a highly precarious struggle whose outcome in favor of their cause was far from assured. Goodwin, then, was surely one of the English Revolution’s most daring proponents of religious toleration, and in some ways he embodied what Bernard Williams has identified as a main tension of toleration: the ‘tension between commitment to one’s own outlook and acceptance of the other’s’.²⁷ In Goodwin’s terms that meant his strong commitment to a congregational or Independent way, along with his acceptance of other religious truths, including those many that were yet to be discovered and that were ‘yet unborne’. Nonetheless, there were also limits to Goodwin’s creative thinking about religious toleration in relation to the alarming specter of growing errors and heresies evoked and exploited by godly ministers and heresy-hunting writers. As the war against heresy, separatism, and toleration escalated during the 1640s, Goodwin, unlike Walwyn and Milton, did not interrogate skeptically the emotionally charged analogy between the spread of heresy and contagious disease; nor did he repudiate altogether the potential danger of heresy within Protestantism. Moreover, he did not question or revise the concept of heresy itself as a crime, although he often deplored the polarizing language associated with it and remained deeply suspicious about human authorities, including any kind of state church, determining what is heresy, error, and schism:²⁸ ‘if a person, one, two, or more, being members of a particular Church, shall be infected with any hereticall or dangerous opinion, and after two or three admonitions … shall continue obstinate, he ought to be cast out from amongst them by that Church’ (Goodwin, M.S. to A.S., 53). There is no mistaking the Pauline echo here, although Goodwin is more generous than Paul when it comes to the problem of what to do about obstinate heretics fomenting divisions and sects by propagating dangerous opinions within a particular religious community: ‘A man that is an heretick [hairetikon anthropon] after the first and second admonition reject; Knowing that he that is such is subverted, and sinneth, being condemned of himself’ ( Titus 3:10–11). Yet in Goodwin’s age of religious fear and anxiety, when the fight for toleration was exceptionally heated, coercive power—‘power … very dangerous for a Magistrate to owne’—would never, he always insisted, suppress the explosion of errors, schisms, and heresies; rather ministers truly agitated about the ²⁷ See Bernard Williams, ‘Tolerating the Intolerable’, in Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 127, 130. ²⁸ See Goodwin’s response to William Prynne in Innocency and Truth Triumphing Together (London, 1645), 34.
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specter of spreading heresies, he suggested, should preach ‘soundly from the Scriptures to evince the folly, vanitie and falsehood of all such wayes’ (Goodwin, M.S. to A.S., 57, 53). In the mid-seventeenth-century crisis over toleration, Goodwin stands out as a formidable polemical opponent of zealous heretic hunters and as a vigorous, independent-minded defender of free inquiry into religious truths who, if necessary, would resist, as he himself did during the Interregnum, excessive compliance with any religious faction or group.²⁹ Walwyn and Milton, however, would show greater linguistic suppleness and conceptual imagination as they interrogated orthodox visions of the terrifying growth of heresy in the midst of the English Revolution’s deepening crisis over religious toleration.
3. William Walwyn: Toleration and ‘The Power of Persecuting’ Considered by Thomas Edwards ‘a desperate dangerous man … a man for all Religions, pleading for all’ (Edwards, Gangraena, 2.26),³⁰ William Walwyn was one of the most gifted polemicists promoting religious toleration in Milton’s England, especially in response to the alarming specter of heresy generated by godly writers; he was already formulating his views well before the Levellers emerged as a threatening radical political force at the end of 1646. Wary about religious dogmatism in a period when the orthodox godly were so inimical to the idea of toleration, Walwyn observed that the concept of heresy was itself a remarkably volatile and slippery one, so that what was considered heresy in one age might well be considered religious truth in another; hence the relation between ‘heresy’ and ‘orthodoxy’, he suggested, remained an unstable one: ‘those tenets which are now accounted heresies, may be the countenanced truthes of the next age; as what formerly was accounted errour, is now esteemed truth’ (Writings, 242).³¹ Walwyn made this observation in A Demurre to the Bill for Preventing the Growth and Spreading of Heresie (October 1646), a text in which he vigorously challenges a proposed ordinance for punishing heresy by means of death and blasphemy by means of branding ²⁹ Goodwin in the 1650s could write against the gathered churches, such as when they supported the Fifth Monarchists or when Baptist doctrine caused schism within his own church or when Independent divines supported the system of Triers under the Protectorate: see Liu in oDNB, 22.822; and especially Coffey, Goodwin and the Puritan Revolution, ch. 8. ³⁰ Cf. Walwyn, Writings, 182–3 (where Walwyn notes that he has been called ‘a great Anabaptist’ and ‘a great Antinomian’, as well as ‘a dangerous man’). ³¹ Cf. liberty-of-conscience, in Richard Overton’s Araignement of Mr. Persecution (London, 1645): ‘is it not frequent amongst us, that the thing that we judged heresie, wee now believe is Orthodox [?]’ (24).
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with a hot iron. There Walwyn warns Parliament that inflammatory antiheretical language, and the disturbing specter of heresy that such polarizing rhetoric was encouraging, was also the weapon of the clergy, an instrument of intimidation used to stifle debate about toleration, ‘to establish a very inquisition’, and ‘to terrifie men from a free and necessary search into the grounds and originall of things, and to dispose all men’ to believe ‘whatsoever the Synod and learned Church-men shall hold forth’ (237, 243). Urging religious toleration for separatists who were being ‘hunted into corners’ (95), Walwyn perceived, like Goodwin, that the outburst of violent anti-heretical discourse in his age was both fueled by and fueling a new climate of fear and repression.³² Thus two years earlier, in The Compassionate Samaritane (1644), Walwyn had examined the liberty of conscience for separatists persecuted by Presbyterian ministers in a more Socratic fashion, employing a series of reasons and objections. There he presents the argument, in terms of an ‘Objection’, that toleration would contribute to the shattering of religious unity and political stability, thereby turning the nation itself into a loathsome monster of separatist religion: ‘we shall become a very monster in matters of Religion, one part being Presbyter, another Anabaptists, Brownist another, and a fourth an Independent, and so divers according to the diversity of opinions that are already, or may be broached hereafter’ (104–5). Walwyn’s passage anticipates Thomas Edwards’s analogy of the grotesque monstrous body—representing hostile fears about the uncontrollable growth of heresy—and reminds readers of the alarming consequences of toleration which creates deformity where there was once apparently religious unity. Yet for Walwyn, as for Milton in 1644, the most troubling prospect facing his age was not the recent explosion of sects and heresies; it was the newly acquired ‘power of persecuting’ possessed by zealous Presbyterian clergy in their highly ambiguous role as judges over the consciences of others. The victims of persecution and repression during the Laudian years, these godly ministers were seizing the power to enforce compulsion and servility—yet ‘they will be more violent’, Walwyn warns, ‘as slaves usually are when they become masters’ (158, 106).³³ In order to destroy the prospects of toleration and heighten fears of social and political dissolution, they employ stigmatizing labels or evoke the specter of Anabaptist anarchy: ‘They brand men with the name of Hereticks, and fasten what errours they thinke are most hatefull to the people, upon those men they purpose to make odious’ (112; cf. 120–1). Walwyn’s analysis in 1644 ³² Edwards consequently noted Walwyn’s text among the ‘scores of Books written wholly for Toleration, and pretended Liberty’: Gangraena, 3.186. ³³ See also Tolleration Justified, in Writings, 156.
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anticipates Gerrard Winstanley’s analysis of a sinister ‘clergy power’ during the early Interregnum; like Winstanley, he depicts a menacing professional clergy using learning, language, and ‘cunning contrivances’ (111), including sophisticated hermeneutics, in order to keep the Bible a mystery so that godly ministers may retain their hold on power, especially over vulnerable lay parishioners.³⁴ Irrational fears, as well as their desire for power, likewise prompt the institutional clergy to project in preaching and print a specter of monstrous religious confusion and heresy. Most likely Walwyn’s religious skepticism—including his sense of ‘the uncertainty of knowledg in this life’ influenced by reading Montaigne³⁵—made him increasingly doubt the authority of institutions, including ‘Generall Councells, Nationall Assemblies, Synods, and Parliaments’ (104), to judge separatist congregations for their religious beliefs, compelling them to accept one religious truth over another. Montaigne’s skepticism, especially his wariness about dogmatism in matters of religion, had been deepened by his experience of the sixteenth-century French Wars of Religion; Walwyn’s was deepened by England’s own war of religion, inflamed by the specter of separatism and radical sectarianism that seemed increasingly out of control during the 1640s.³⁶ Paradoxically, it was from ‘a Romish Catholique’ French author and an ‘honest Papist’ (400), as Walwyn puts it, that the English Independent churches themselves might learn much about the spirit of toleration in this new age of religious crisis. Sharing a deeply anti-authoritarian religious perspective with the Milton of Areopagitica, Walwyn was no less concerned about Presbyterian control of the press because, as he stresses, that will give the clergy a distinct advantage in the war of words fought over toleration and the definition of heresy. As ‘Masters of the Presse, of which they are lately become by an Ordinance for licensing of Bookes’ (i.e. the Ordinance of June 1643), the Presbyterians now possess greater power to control public opinion and stifle debate when it comes to controversial religious matters and thus they may ‘write what ³⁴ See Writings, 109, 110–11, and cf. 231–4, where Walwyn imagines a contrite Edwards confessing he felt the need for the learned clergy to keep their power over ‘plaine unlearned men’ and to create ‘a mere Clergy religion’; on Winstanley’s analysis of ‘clergy power’, especially during the Interregnum, see my Representing Revolution in Milton and His Contemporaries: Religion, Politics, and Polemics in Radical Puritanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), ch. 2. ³⁵ Writings, 399–401, where he observes that he has ‘been long accustomed to read Montaigns Essais’. See also Olivier Lutaud, ‘Montaigne chez les niveleurs anglais: Walwyn et Les ‘‘Essais’’ ’, Rivista di letterature moderne e comparate 12 (1959), 53–8. ³⁶ On England’s War or Wars of Religion, see Anthony Fletcher, The Outbreak of the English Civil War (London: Arnold, 1981), 417–18; and especially John Morrill, The Nature of the English Revolution (London: Longman, 1993), 33–175.
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they wil, they may abuse whom they will, and nothing can be said against them’ (112–13).³⁷ One of the most prominent of these Presbyterian licensers (mentioned by name by Walwyn in 1649) was James Cranford, a leader in the campaign against toleration of heterodox opinion and the divine who would soon license Edwards’s Gangraena (and write prefaces to its three large parts); his own Haereseo-Machia would soon contribute to the imaginary terror of schism and heresy by invoking the specter of the bloody Irish Rebellion and its ‘unnaturall’ consequences, including the killing of thousands of Protestants, in order to warn against the menacing consequences of encouraging toleration.³⁸ The struggle to justify toleration in the midst of an age disturbed by such bitter religious differences prompted Walwyn to recall Christ’s engagement with the politico-religious sect of the Sadducees (see Matthew 22:23–33). His Good Counsell to All, originally published as part of The Compassionate Samaritan, offers a highly distinctive interpretation of the confrontation between Jesus and the Jewish sect. The Sadducees, after all, rejected the belief in the existence of angels and spirits and in the resurrection of the dead (it was foreign to the Pentateuch); in debate with them Jesus displays his skill in interpretation (he uses ‘argument and perswasion to alter or controle their judgements’, Walwyn observes) as he meets them on their own ground by citing Exodus 3:6. Yet rather than emphasize that the Sadducees ‘do err’ (Matthew 22:29), like factious heretics or religious deviants, Walwyn presents a Jesus who refrains from becoming defensive or dogmatic and then zealously demonizing the sect despite their ‘dangerous opinions’, including their rejection of the idea of the resurrection: ‘He, nevertheless both heard and answered them gently; he did not revile them with reproachfull language, telling them that they were not worthy to live in a Commonwealth; nor did he warne others to discourse with them’ (128–9).³⁹ Christ ‘answered them gently’ is clearly Walwyn’s irenic formulation—it is not especially supported by the biblical account—since Walwyn wants to believe in the role of gentle persuasion in a world of religious warfare inflamed by ‘reviling accusations’.⁴⁰ Walwyn thus transforms this confrontation between Jesus and an opposing sect into a model of how to respond to ‘heretics’ in an age when the specter of heresy and fears of religious faction were generating fierce hatred for differing beliefs. Yet this polemical warfare aggravated by fiery, polarizing ³⁷ See also Writings, 184. ³⁸ Cranford, Haereseo-Machia, 13: ‘Will a toleration satisifie hereticks, if they have power in their hands? It did not content the Irish Papists, witnesse the bloud of 150000 Protestants shed upon the first advantage, and these unnaturall warres so long continued.’ For Walwyn’s reference to Cranford, see Writings, 396. ³⁹ For Walwyn on Christ and the Sadducees, see also Writings, 136, 240. ⁴⁰ See Walwyn’s A Whisper in the Eare of Mr. Thomas Edwards Minister, in Writings, 175, 183.
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language seemed to leave little hope for Walwyn’s appealing belief that sound argument and ‘perswasion’ could eventually create a world where ‘men might live peaceably and lovingly together, though they differ in judgement one from another’ (129). In 1645 a letter written by anxious orthodox ministers of the city of London also invoked the specter of increasing heresy in order to undermine any sympathy for toleration. Addressing their concerns to the Assembly of Divines, they complained that Reformation would never be completed until ‘Schisme and Heresie is extirpated’, that ‘Sects and Heresies’ would ‘shelter themselves under the wings of Independency’, and that a ‘lawlesse Toleration’, ‘utterly Repugnant’ to the 1643 Presbyterian Solemn League and Covenant (which pledged to eradicate heresy and schism, while protecting ‘the power of godliness’), would only unleash more strange and horrid opinions.⁴¹ Walwyn answered with Tolleration Justified, and Persecution Condemned, a tract published anonymously warning that the Presbyterian ministers, possessing ‘in their hands the power of persecuting’, were attempting to enforce their severe judgments upon Independents and other separatists, thereby blowing ‘the coales of dissention’ (158, 169). Walwyn depicts their spirit of fury and bitterness against sectaries as a latter-day form of Old Testament vengeance—they resemble Jews crying out ‘an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth’ (161) rather than the Jesus who urges his followers, in the Sermon on the Mount, to love their enemies and ‘blesse them that curse you’ (Matthew 5:44). Walwyn’s tract presents the London ministers as cynical, restless, and power-hungry with ‘their private juncto’s and councels’ (156). What drives their violent spirit of persecution and their aggressive assault on toleration is fear: not only fear as a calculated means of enforcing religious conformity and mental servility, Walwyn suggests, but fear in the sense of their underlying insecurity about their own ambiguous authority. Only godly ministers deeply insecure about their tenuous and precarious hold on power would so violently oppose toleration, insisting that their interpretation of religious truth was right and everyone else’s wrong: ‘Upon how slight foundation is their reputation supported, that fear being despised unlesse Authority forces all to Church to them?’ (166). During 1645/6 Walwyn responded to Thomas Edwards—‘a Master and Comptrouler to other mens judgements and practises in the worship of God’ (206)—in no less than five tracts in which Walwyn reversed (like Goodwin) the trope of poisonous heresy and accused Edwards himself of spreading, by ⁴¹ A Letter of the Ministers of the City of London … Against Toleration (London, 1645), 4, 5–6; The Solemn League and Covenant, in S. R. Gardiner, ed., The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625–1660 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905), 26.
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means of his books and his ‘infectious braine’, poison that had ‘envenomed the hearts and understandings of thousands … easily deluded by the least pretence of zeal and godlinesse’ (213, 210).⁴² Appalled by the ‘extream fury’ with which Edwards expressed his hatred of separatists and conducted his unbridled campaign against so-called ‘heretics’, Walwyn employed vivid animalistic images to convey the elemental savagery of this leading heretic hunter whose vicious enmity has dehumanized him. Indeed, any attempt to restrain him had only backfired, as Walwyn suggests in a passage that gives the scriptural comparison of ‘false prophets’ to ‘ravening wolves’ (see Matthew 7:15) a contemporary immediacy that also exploits a note of ethnic stereotyping atypical of Walwyn: ‘instead of qualifying his spirit … [it] hath set him all on fire, that he rageth like an Irish ravenous and hungry woolfe, deprived of his prey by generous and true English Mastives, that watch both night and day to save his harmlesse and benefitiall sheep (the Independents and Separatists)’ (174, 207). Walwyn’s responses to Edwards resulted in some of his most inventive writing, and I want to conclude this section by briefly examining one of Walwyn’s most ingenious and ironic texts: his Prediction of Mr. Edwards His Conversion and Recantation ( July 1646). Walwyn possessed a remarkably agile literary imagination that could express itself in inventive ways that deserve more attention from literary scholars and, for that matter, from historians who have focused on Walwyn’s religious beliefs and his contributions to Leveller political thought and polemics. In his Prediction, Walwyn allows his imagination free rein as he envisions Edwards, finally tormented by guilt over ‘the violence of his spirit’ against ‘conscientious people’ who ‘differ with him in judgement’ (228),⁴³ producing a lengthy dramatic monologue in prose recanting his McCarthyite campaign of heresy hunting. Edwards, like Paul (before his conversion) viciously ‘persecuted the church of God’ (1 Corinthians 15:9; Galatians 1:13), although Edwards’s violent spirit of persecution, expressed by means of ‘his embittered pen’ (229), has exceeded Paul’s. Lashed by his own stinging conscience (‘O vile man, what have I done?’), the anguished heresy hunter confesses that he has committed evils, of a new and unparalelled nature, such as the Protestant Religion in all after-ages will be shamed of. … I most presumptuously and arrogantly, assumed to my selfe, a power of judging, and censuring all judgements, opinions, and wayes of worship (except my owne) to bee either damnable, hereticall, schismaticall, or dangerous. ⁴² I discuss one of the most ingenious of these texts, A Parable, or Consultation of Physitians upon Master Edwards, in ‘The War against Heresy in Milton’s England’. ⁴³ Perhaps with irony Walwyn comes close here to echoing Edwards’s own complaint about ‘the violent Spirit of Sectaries against all persons and things that pleases not them’ (Gangraena, 1.109).
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Moreover, the anathematizing ‘nick-names’ he has so stridently and indiscriminately employed in print—‘Brownists, Independents, Anabaptists, Antinomians, Seekers, and the like’—have served as his verbal weapons in rendering separatists and sectarians and their gathered churches (however small or close to the practices of the apostles) ‘odious to Authority, and all sorts of men’ (230–1). The result, Edwards admits, is that his own inflammatory writings, rather than those advocating toleration, have helped to dissolve ‘all civill and naturall relations’, turning England into a frightening, chaotic ‘Nation of quarrels, distractions, and divisions’ (231). Furthermore, Walwyn’s contrite Edwards can now see that he, who once assumed ‘a power of judging’ other religious opinions heretical, in fact has ‘no infallible spirit to discern between truth and errors’ (230–1, 234)—much as John Goodwin himself had been arguing. Close to a state of despair resembling Milton’s inwardly tormented and theatrical Satan (‘what shall I doe? whither shall I fly?’),⁴⁴ the anguished heretic hunter finally grasps a key lesson from Christ’s sermon on the mount: ‘But I say unto you, Love your enemies’ (Matthew 5:44; 235). In Walwyn’s text, however, the lesson reinforces the point that, rather than separatists loving their persecutors, religious persecutors should love those whom they have so savagely demonized. Of course, one could hardly imagine a more implausible depiction of this most implacable of seventeenth-century heresy hunters. Walwyn clearly relishes his ‘prediction’, his satirical fantasy of an inwardly tormented heresy hunter who, seeking to redeem himself, finally manages ‘to breake forth and publish to the world’ an anguished recantation of his behavior and writings (230); beneath the irony and ingenuity of this imaginative work, however, there lies a more urgent message about the specter of heresy created by godly propaganda as well as the struggle to promote toleration in such a bitterly contentious religious world. Yet rather than relinquish his vocation as a godly warrior leading a ferocious campaign to eradicate heresy and toleration, Edwards would make the specter of heresy appear even more frightening and monstrous by publishing his third massive part of Gangraena in December 1646—an unrelenting assault on the anarchic dangers of sectarian writing and political revolution.
4. John Milton: Toleration and ‘Fantastic Terrors of Sect and Schism’ Like Goodwin and Walwyn, Milton felt the need to respond, as he does in Areopagitica, to ‘these fantastic terrors of sect and schism’ (YP 2.554) which ⁴⁴ Walwyn, Writings, 235; cf. PL 4.73: ‘Me miserable! Which way shall I fly[?]’.
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were making the struggle over toleration increasingly divisive and difficult. Positioning Milton in relation to contemporary writers like Goodwin and Walwyn does indeed remind us that Areopagitica is no ‘isolated document, nor Milton a cloistered and bookish academic’;⁴⁵ however, it also enables us to see more sharply what was so distinctive and original about Milton’s own revaluation of the specter of terrifying heresy and schism, as well as the polarizing language used in the escalating war against toleration. As early as The Reason of Church-Government (February 1642), where Milton shows little interest in the structures and rituals of the visible church, we see him responding increasingly skeptically to deepening anxieties in his culture about the new specter of heresy, as well as to the slipperiness of religious labeling, created by the disintegration of Protestant unity. To be sure, his text addresses fears expressed by defenders of the Church of England, yet it does so in a way that anticipates his responses to the worries of the mainstream godly about the splintering of Protestantism producing a terrible and potentially irreversible ‘deluge of innumerable sects’ and popular heresies. In Church-Government, Milton is beginning to deflate these fears and to question warnings about unstable religious divisions developing that threaten to dissolve more traditional religious identities. Consequently, Milton challenges the notion that if prelacy were destroyed ‘we shall be all Brownists, Familists, Anabaptists’: ‘If we go downe, say you, as if Adrians wall were broke, a flood of sects will rush in. What sects? What are their opinions? give us the Inventory’ (RCG, YP 1.783–4, 786–7). Although the Presbyterians themselves would soon supply plenty of these sprawling inventories, Milton is dismissing the fears of spreading heresy and schism in a way that would hardly assuage the growing concerns of godly brethren: ‘Noise it till ye be hoarse; that a rabble of Sects will come in, it will be answer’d ye, no rabble sir Priest, but a unanimous multitude of good Protestants will then joyne to the Church, which now because of you stand separated’ (RCG, YP 1.787–8). Milton’s phrase ‘unanimous multitude’ anticipates the subtle double negatives of Areopagitica (see below) where religious truth may be both one and many, and where—on a linguistic level—Milton challenges the rigid dualisms encouraged by anti-tolerationist Presbyterian discourse. Like Walwyn and Goodwin, Milton also sees how ‘vile and hateful terms’ have been increasingly used as verbal weapons (more than reasoned argument) in the ongoing war against heresy, whether conducted by ⁴⁵ Christopher Hill in the ‘Foreword’ to Writings of William Walwyn, xiii. See also Nigel Smith, ‘Areopagitica: Voicing Contexts, 1643–5’, in Loewenstein and James Grantham Turner, eds., Politics, Poetics, and Hermeneutics in Milton’s Prose (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 103–22, and esp. 112–13 for a brief comparison of Walwyn and Milton in 1644.
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prelates or Presbyterians: ‘those terrible names of Sectaries and Schismaticks’ are now essential to their ‘manner of fight’, especially when ‘the quiver of … arguments … is ever thin, and weakly stor’d, [and] after the first brunt is quite empty’; for then heresy hunters will resort to that ‘other quiver of slander’ (RCG, YP 1.788). Such ‘hateful’ labels are manipulated as protean rhetorical devices by those heresy hunters—prelates and soon the Presbyterians themselves—who revile sects and the growth of heresies: ‘For the word Puritan seems to be quasht, and all that heretofore were counted such, are now Brownists’ (784), a reference to the leading Elizabethan separatist Robert Browne whose name and the names of his followers—‘Brownists’—were indiscriminately invoked during the 1640s to evoke the specter of increasing heresy.⁴⁶ Not only does Church-Government, with its vigorous assault on the ‘scandalous misnaming’ (RCG, YP 1.788) of sects and separatists, anticipate Milton’s spirited defense of radical sectarianism in Areopagitica and his searching critique there of anathematizing names (including ‘heretic’); it also begins to reveal his deepening differences with the Presbyterians on this crucial matter. It anticipates his fresh responses in Areopagitica to the escalating war against heresy and toleration aimed at casting ‘panick terrors into the hearts of weaker Christians’ (RCG, YP 1.794). A text saturated with metaphors of ideological warfare as it participates in the revolutionary world of religious ferment and expanding political debate, Milton’s Areopagitica (November 1644) provocatively engages with the explosive language of heresy hunting—both contesting received ideas and labels and reinterpreting them in strikingly new ways. In Areopagitica Milton envisions London, the nation’s most vital center of print culture in his revolutionary age, as a shop of war with both readers and writers actively engaged in controversy and dispute—‘sitting by their studious lamps, musing, searching, revolving new notions and idea’s’ (Areop., YP 2.554). Milton is acutely aware of the power of print not only for ‘revolving new notions’ of political and religious liberty, as well as of a free press,⁴⁷ but also for ‘revolving new notions’ of ‘heresy’ and ‘heretic’ at a time when their pejorative implications were increasingly dominating bitter religious controversy. Rethinking the meaning of such terms and the powerful fears they were provoking was crucial, in Milton’s view, to ‘the reforming of ⁴⁶ See e.g. The Brownist Haeresies Confuted ([London], 1641). David Cressy notes that between 1640 and 1642 there were some forty-five publications which had the derisive name ‘Brownist’ in their title: England on Edge, 214. ⁴⁷ On Areopagitica and revolutionary print and pamphlet culture, see esp. Sharon Achinstein, Milton and the Revolutionary Reader (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 58–67; Joad Raymond, Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 262–75.
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Reformation it self’ (Areop., YP 2.553). The Licensing Ordinance of June 1643, to which Areopagitica directly responds, registers Parliament’s fears that the recent uncontrolled outpouring of print—the publishing of ‘books, pamphlets and papers, in such multitudes’—was not only threatening the authority of Parliament but endangering godly religion itself by encouraging radical sectarianism and shattering religious unity: thus the ordinance recognizes the urgency of ‘suppressing the great late abuses and frequent disorders in Printing many false, forged, scandalous, seditious, libelous Papers, Pamphlets, and Books to the great defamation of Religion and Government’.⁴⁸ Indeed, by the time he published the first installment of his Gangraena in early 1646, Thomas Edwards was urgently warning Parliament that its 1643 Ordinance was not only ineffective, but that there were ‘never more dangerous unlicensed Books printed, then since the Ordinance against unlicensed printing’ (Edwards, Gangraena, sig. a2r ; see also 58–9). In Areopagitica, a text printed unregistered and unlicensed, Milton provocatively exploits the medium of print to intervene in the escalating war against heresy and toleration and to ‘revolve’ his own distinctive notion of heresy.⁴⁹ Thus in the midst of proclaiming England ‘a place of Philosophic freedom’ (rather than a place of intellectual, religious, or political servility) and observing that the new Presbyterians are but old priests writ large (‘that Bishops and Presbyters are the same to us both name and thing’, Areop., YP 2.537, 539), Milton inserts his most striking reformulation of what it means to be a heretic: ‘A man may be a heretick in the truth; and if he beleeve things only because his Pastor sayes so, or the Assembly so determins, without knowing other reason, though his belief be true, yet the very truth he holds, becomes his heresie’ (Areop., YP 2.543). No one in Milton’s England—including such notable defenders of toleration as Goodwin and Walwyn—had reinterpreted heresy in quite this way before, nor presented it to Parliament as an alternative to currently received notions of heretics and the frightening dangers they were supposedly posing to the health of the body politic and religious unity.⁵⁰ Milton’s fresh redefinition includes nothing of the pejorative New Testament or Pauline implications associated with heresy as the fomenting of divisions and sects among Christians by means of false teachers or false prophets propagating dangerous or deviant beliefs: hence Paul warns the Corinthians that ‘there be ⁴⁸ Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum (London: HMSO, 1911), 1.184. ⁴⁹ ‘Revolve’ is meant to recall Milton’s ‘revolving new notions and ideas’ and can mean ‘To consider, think over, ponder or meditate upon (something)’ (OED 4b). ⁵⁰ Walwyn resembles Milton when he urges his readers to ‘abhor that most superstitious maxime to believe as the Church believes’ (A Demurre to the Bill for preventing … Heresie, in Writings, 243), but he does not align this servile belief, as Milton does in Areopagitica (see below), with heresy itself.
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divisions [schismata] among you’ and ‘there must also be heresies [haireseis] among you’ (1 Corinthians 11:18–19), while in his second epistle, Peter the apostle warns that ‘there shall be false teachers among you, who privily shall bring in damnable heresies [haireseis], even denying the Lord that brought them’ (2 Peter 2:1).⁵¹ Even John Goodwin, as we saw earlier, did not altogether reject the Pauline implications of heresy as the fomenting of divisions and sects among Christians by means of the propagation of dangerous opinions. In the war against heresy and toleration, the orthodox godly especially exploited these negative implications—Milton refers to their fears that ‘these divisions and subdivisions will undoe us’ (Areop., YP 2.556)—in their campaign to make the specter of heresy and schism seem more terrifying and threatening to the health of the body politic. Milton responds to such escalating fears about heresy by conceiving Truth dynamically—he likens Truth to a ‘streaming fountain’ with ‘her waters’ flowing in a ‘perpetuall progression’ rather than stagnating ‘into a muddy pool of conformity and tradition’ (Areop., YP 2.543)—so that the greatest heresy is not religious division but the static possession of religious truths: it is a blind, unquestioning, and servile acceptance of theological beliefs determined by any ecclesiastical or political authority, whether that be the Westminster Assembly of Divines or even, for that matter, a minister who leads a gathered church. Godly writers anxious about the recent appearance of ‘so many horrid opinions and blasphemous heresies’ were urging orthodox ministers as well as magistrates to determine once and for all what is dangerous heretical belief and what is not, as if the definition of religious truth could and should be firmly fixed: ‘The declaration of what is hereticall, what orthodox; what is lawfull, what scandalous, belongs to you’ (Cranford, Haereseo-Machia, 42). Yet when it comes to judging inflammatory or alarmist statements about heresy and heretics, Milton’s text challenges its readers not to assume a passive or timorous role, but to exercise their own acute, independent, vigilant judgments. And this skeptical, anti-authoritarian perspective Milton exemplifies himself by interpreting against the grain—by freshly and vividly reformulating contemporary conceptions of the war between heresy and truth, while calling into question hostile godly attitudes towards growing heresies, including the fear that ‘the infection … may spread’ to the common reader (YP 2.517) exposed to provocative or seductive heretical and unlicensed books. Moreover, Milton’s Areopagitica offers its contemporary readers a vision of a ‘pliant’, ‘puissant’, vigorous body politic (Areop., YP 2.554, 558) stimulated ⁵¹ See also, for discussion of Pauline texts and heresy, Zagorin, How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West, 18–19.
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by religious ferment and flux and the massive outpouring of print. This is one way, indeed, that Milton answers godly writers who were beginning to employ graphic images of contagious disease, monstrous bodies, and swarming sectaries in order to convey the sickness, deformation, and increasing vulnerability of the body politic and the church to spreading heresies, thereby creating (in Milton’s words) ‘these fantastic terrors of sect and schism’. Milton’s metaphor of the organic body politic—with its blood ‘fresh’, its ‘spirits pure and vigorous’ (Areop., YP 2.557)—conveys a vision of a vibrant nation and its rapidly changing religious culture that are in the process of being reinvigorated and recreated by ‘much arguing, much writing, many opinions’ and many schisms (Areop., YP 2.554). Contrary to the frightening specter of religious and political chaos offered by anxious heresy hunters fearful of monstrous toleration, a profusion of errors, and ‘that infection which is from books of controversie in Religion’ (Areop., YP 2.519), this pliant Protestant nation full of growing sects and schisms—now a terrain of religious warfare as well as political experimentation—is ‘not degenerated, nor drooping to a fatall decay, but casting off the old wrincl’d skin of corruption to outlive these pangs and wax young again’ (Areop., YP 2.557). Milton is indeed scornful about the specter of ‘all these supposed sects and schisms’ (Areop., YP 2.556), as if their dangers to the new Protestant nation in the process of being forged are nothing more than a frightening fantasy and an imaginary terror projected by the orthodox godly. Yet as his elaborate passage about building the Temple of the Lord suggests, his response is more complex than this, enabled by his figurative writing in this densely imagistic text. Taking a common enough trope—temple building or work—for the construction of godly reformation in the turbulent 1640s (it was regularly employed by Presbyterian preachers),⁵² Milton refashions it in a strikingly fresh way as he responds to the growing crisis over religious toleration and the menacing specter of heresy and schism: Yet these are the men cry’d out against for schimaticks and sectaries; as if, while the Temple of the Lord was building, some cutting, some squaring the marble, others hewing the cedars, there should be a sort of irrationall men who could not consider there must be many schisms and many dissections made in the quarry and in the ⁵² See e.g. Thomas Hill, The Season for Englands Selfe-Reflection, and Advancing TempleWork (London, 1644), 25 ff.; Stephen Marshall, A Sacred Panegyrick (London, 1644), 21; John Marshall, The Right Understanding of the Times (London, 1647), 38. For political and religious uses of temple work in sermons of the period, see Achsah Guibbory, ‘Israel and the ‘‘Fast Sermons’’ during the English Revolution’, in David Loewenstein and Paul Stevens, eds., Early Modern Nationalism and Milton’s England ( Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).
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timber, ere the house of God can be built. And when every stone is laid artfully together, it cannot be united into a continuity, it can but be contiguous in this world; neither can every peece of the building be of one form; nay rather the perfection consists in this, that out of many moderat varieties and brotherly dissimilitudes that are not vastly disproportionall arises the goodly and the graceful symmetry that commends the whole pile and structure. Let us therefore be more considerat builders, more wise in spirituall architecture, when great reformation is expected. (Areop., YP 2.555)
Milton’s emphasis is on the process of building; like Goodwin (who uses the trope of discovering the new world, as we saw earlier), his focus in Areopagitica is on the process of searching for religious truths, just as the Temple of God is under constant construction. Yet Milton’s figurative writing and conceptualization also convey a level of subtlety and nuance missing in Goodwin’s works about toleration and the specter of heresy. Milton’s dense metaphor of the Temple of the Lord, combined with his linguistic formulations (e.g. his double negative ‘not vastly disproportionall’), allow him to escape from rigid dualisms when it comes to thinking about religious differences—to offer an image that contains proportion and disproportion, schism as well as unity. In the new religious world of this pliant godly nation, opposites are not unopposed. It is possible to achieve ‘perfection’ and ‘graceful symmetry’ even when every piece of ‘spirituall architecture’ is not ‘of one form’. Religious truth may thus be both one and disparate, various yet homogeneous; or to invoke another Miltonic double negative, it is ‘not impossible that she may have more shapes then one’ (Areop., YP 2.563), so that Milton’s fresh conception revises the late medieval and early modern emphasis on truth as essentially single and indivisible.⁵³ Milton’s vision of the Temple of the Lord is consequently a distinctive and subtle conceptual and imaginative response to godly writers and preachers who were increasingly prognosticating only religious deformity, division, and chaos in a new world of growing sects and destructive schisms. When the godly were expressing such acute fears that religious unity might be shattered forever in a world of fractious diversity and proliferating errors encouraged by toleration, Milton in Areopagitica offers a striking revision of what ‘the unity of Spirit’ (Areop., YP 2.565) might indeed be like. It is notable that in Areopagitica and elsewhere in his controversial writings Milton never associates any particular Protestant sect or radical religious group with dangerous heresy or heretics; indeed, it is also notable that, during periods of acute religious and political crisis, he almost never invokes ⁵³ On the concept of truth as single and indivisible, see Alexandra Walsham, Charitable Hatred: Tolerance and Intolerance in England, 1500–1700 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 1.
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specific sects or radical religious groups or their leaders by name, as if coming to their defense or invoking their authority might somehow compromise his own authority as a controversial writer and defender of radical religious views.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, in his subsequent controversial writings Milton would continue to confront and redefine, in original and striking ways, the concepts of ‘heresy’ and, as I argue elsewhere, the equally feared specter of ‘horrid blasphemy’ likewise used ‘to terrifie … the people’ (TCP, YP 7.246).⁵⁵ The seeds for Milton’s conceptual rethinking and verbal ingenuity, however, were already well developed in Areopagitica, as the crisis over religious toleration in his age was deepening and becoming increasingly embittered.
5. Conclusion Early modern fears of heresy and anxieties about religious toleration have taken on fresh implications in our own time when the specter of terrorism and religious extremism have fueled intolerance, misunderstanding, and divisions, thereby making our world more unstable and threatening its ideals of religious ‘diversity’. As we have seen, the perceived dangers of heresy in Milton’s England and the heated religious imagination converged, resulting in pathological and visceral responses by fearful godly writers who attempted to combat heresy’s insidious spread and monstrous generation, and who were terrified about increasing religious divisiveness and chaos unleashed by toleration. During the war of religion in the mid-seventeenth century it had become ‘common’, as one leading Quaker controversialist would put it, ‘for all different sorts of men to cry out one upon another, and against each other, Heresie, Hereticks, Erronious Persons, and the like’, thereby filling the world ‘with Enmity about difference in Religious matters’.⁵⁶ While that ‘Enmity about difference in Religious matters’ during the mid-seventeenth-century crisis should be understood in its own culturally and historically specific contexts, such vicious ‘Enmity’ also reminds us that the challenges created ⁵⁴ On this matter, see my essay, ‘Milton among the Religious Radicals and Sects: Polemical Engagements and Silences’, Milton Studies 40 (2001), 222–47. ⁵⁵ For discussion of these matters in A Treatise of Civil Power and Of True Religion, see my essay, ‘The War against Heresy in Milton’s England’. On contemporary responses to ‘horrid blasphemy’, see also my ‘Treason against God and State: Blasphemy in Milton’s Culture and Paradise Lost’, in Stephen B. Dobranski and John Rumrich, eds., Milton and Heresy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 176–98; and Janel Mueller’s acute philological analysis in ‘Milton and Heresy’ in the same volume (21–38). ⁵⁶ Edward Burrough, Memorable Works of a Son of Thunder and Consolation (London, 1672), 866, 867.
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by religious difference and the struggle for toleration remain as pressing and as precarious as ever. To be sure, the bitter religious divisions and polarizing language fueled by the frightening specter of heresy and toleration in Milton’s England remain distant from us; yet in other ways they eerily resonate today in our own world of discord and ‘difference in Religious matters’.
4 John Milton, Roger Williams, and the Limits of Toleration Thomas N. Corns
1 Since approximately the mid-twentieth century Milton’s Areopagitica has seemed less like an iconic proclamation of core values of western liberalism and more like a series of problems to be explained away. The large arguments of the tract substantiate the case for the exclusion of civil power from matters of conscience and belief and seemingly defend unlimited toleration of doctrine and perhaps discipline. They exclude the role of censorship and assert the right to freedom of speech: in Milton’s ringing sentence, ‘Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties’ (Areop., YP 2.560). Yet the toleration the tract actually demands from the Long Parliament is much more limited. The tract accepts that some texts should be suppressed for reasons of state and that, after they have published, all authors should be open to prosecution and their texts to confiscation and destruction; for some ‘the fire and the executioner will be the timeliest and the most effectuall remedy’ (Areop., YP 2.569). Milton proclaims that ‘a fugitive and cloister’d vertue’ is unmeritorious and ‘that which purifies us is triall, and triall is by what is contrary’ (Areop., YP 2.515). He argues that, when Truth and Falsehood ‘grapple’, ‘who ever knew Truth put to the wors, in a free and open encounter[?]’ (Areop., YP 2.561). Given such confidence, why then should Milton exclude from toleration ‘Popery, and open superstition’ and, even more mysteriously, ‘that also which is impious or evil absolutely either against faith or maners’ (Areop., YP 2.565). The first phrase has attracted most discussion, since it makes explicit the exclusion of Catholicism from toleration. Perhaps we should
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read it simply as a hendiadys. But it may have a wider significance. Milton previously had linked English episcopacy with Catholicism in its decline into ‘irrecoverable superstition’ manifest in its ‘empty conformities, and gay shewes’ (RCG, YP 1.766), and the violent fantasy which ends Of Reformation certainly envisages ‘a shamefull end in this Life (which God grant them)’ for English bishops (RCG, YP 1.616); we may recall that William Laud’s trial was drawing to its vindictive conclusion as Areopagitica appeared. The second phrase is enigmatic. Ernest Sirluck simply interpreted it as a further part of the case against tolerating Catholicism (YP 2.180–1). Yet ‘impiety’ against faith implies, instead, some kind of blasphemous deviation from within the Protestant community. ‘Maners’ hints rather at acts of outrageous behaviour against accepted standards of propriety, a phenomenon which does not really suggest Catholic practices. The term surely suits better the sorts of transgressive conduct extremer sectaries were likely to get up to, the kinds of actions which culminated in Ranter and early Quaker enthusiasm for disrupting church services and which were already noted in some accounts of radical groups. So how may the evident inconsistencies in the argument—the soaring generalizations and the significant exceptions—be addressed? Typically, Miltonists suggest Milton has adopted some subtle stratagem to achieve a defensible polemical objective. Reviewing the interpretations of Ernest Sirluck, Joseph Wittreich, John Illo, Annabel Patterson, and Christopher Kendrick, Abbe Blum summarizes the state of the argument thus: current scholarship offers contradictory explanations for what appears to be contradictory in the tract. Milton is variously seen as a canny tactician who moderates his stance on toleration in order to convey the appearance of solidarity with those who could repeal the 1643 Licensing Act (especially Parliamentary groups and members of the Westminster Assembly—the latter then meeting to decide religious matters); a brilliant moral instructor who employs irony to move ethically upright, intellectually superior readers (who as kindred liberal Christians will affirm his rhetorical prowess); a conservative party-line Protestant spokesman for intolerance who constructs a conditional restricted freedom of expression tailored only for the elect. Most recently Areopagitica’s seeming contradictions have been interpreted as Milton’s ‘manifesto for indeterminacy,’ a conversion of various factions’ disagreements into a nonoppositional celebration of intellectual energy, and finally and quite differently, as the product of a self-validating, monistic ethos which registers the tensions deriving from a bourgeois problematic.¹
I would contend that several of the most illuminating of recent accounts succeed by actually subordinating the ostensible argument of the tract to the ¹ Abbe Blum, ‘The Author’s Authority: Areopagitica and the Labour of Licensing’, in Remembering Milton: Essays on the Texts and Traditions, edited by Mary Nyquist and Margaret W. Ferguson (New York and London: Methuen, 1988), 77. First published in 1987.
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identification of some larger ideological appeal. Thus, in a radical celebration of workers by hand and brain, Michael Wilding sees, ‘running throughout the Areopagitica’, a ‘structural contrast between the dignity of labour, manual and intellectual, and its opposite, the lazy, loitering easy life readily imaged in the beneficed clergy or Roman church’.² For Stanley Fish, in classic Fishean mode, ‘the tract becomes at once an emblem and a casualty of the lesson it teaches, the lesson that truth is not the property of any external form, even of a form that proclaims this very truth’, and ‘a (self-consuming) emblem’ at that.³ Sharon Achinstein’s Habermasian reading sees the tract as advocacy for a redefinition of the appropriate arena for debate and a new engagement of the private reader in the processes of civic decision-making and discussion; it constitutes ‘a significant moment in the conceptualization of the public sphere’.⁴ For David Norbrook, as he works to establish the early history of secular republicanism in England, this is ‘Milton’s major contribution towards the celebration of the public sphere’, imperfectly simulating a classical Athenian form, and calling for ‘a recovery of the political potential of Greek democracy’.⁵ Rather against the trend, my intention is to return to the narrow, surface argument, and to come at its apparent inconsistencies somewhat differently. I shall not defend its polemical ingenuities, as once I did, because, frankly, they are not that ingenious;⁶ most modern readers, I suspect, see through them readily enough. But I am reluctant to attribute simple incompetence to a tract that contains some of Milton’s most brilliantly figurative prose, and which, quoted selectively, anticipates with a resounding magniloquence the principles of western liberalism articulated by John Locke and inscribed in the American constitution. What, then, is going on inside Areopagitica?
2 Answering the question is helped by a careful consideration of the case of Roger Williams, whose Bloudy Tenent, of Persecution, for cause of Conscience (1644) caused him both in his own age and in ours to be associated ² Michael Wilding, ‘Milton’s Areopagitica: Liberty for the Sects’, Prose Studies 9.2 (1987), 7–38, p. 17. ³ Stanley Fish, ‘Driving from the Letter: Truth and Indeterminacy in Milton’s Areopagitica’, in Nyquist and Ferguson, Re-membering Milton, 243, 248. ⁴ Sharon Achinstein, Milton and the Revolutionary Reader (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 58. ⁵ David Norbrook, Writing the English Republic: Poetry, Rhetoric and Politics, 1627–1660 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 118–19, 129. ⁶ Thomas N. Corns, Uncloistered Virtue: English Political Literature 1640–1660 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 55–60.
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with Milton. Milton criticism almost habitually contrasts the limitations on toleration proposed by Milton with the perfect toleration advocated by Williams. Most recently, for example, Barbara Lewalski draws attention to his exclusion of Roman Catholicism, ‘[u]nlike Roger Williams who proposed complete religious toleration’, a constraint she, no doubt correctly, links to English anxieties about the assault on Protestantism launched in the Thirty Years War.⁷ Among contemporaries, Williams and Milton shared a brief notoriety, in which the latter’s Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (1643, 1644) was linked with The Bloudy Tenent. Thus, for example, Ephraim Pagitt declared that extremists ‘preach, print, and practise their hereticall opinions openly: for books, vide the bloody Tenet, witness a tractate of divorce in which the bonds are let loose to inordinate lust’.⁸ Of course, both tracts are subject to tendentious and hostile representation. Ann Hughes has made a meticulous study of the work of another heresiographer, Thomas Edwards, who also attacks both Williams and Milton. She identifies in the middle years of the 1640s the formation of what she terms ‘the Presbyterian mobilization’ against extremer Puritans, inspired by the belief that ‘the main danger to orthodox Presbyterian reform came from religious radicals—often described as the ‘‘white devils’’ promulgating errors on the ‘‘right hand’’—who campaigned for toleration, rather than the ‘‘black devils’’, the profane people who resented godly discipline and Calvinist preaching’.⁹ Milton and Williams both served unwillingly and perhaps inadvertently the ends of that mobilization, since they could be represented as characterizing in extreme form white devilry as pursued by dangerously misguided intellectuals, in Milton’s case leading to libertinism and promiscuity, in Williams’s to the prising open of a Pandora’s box of heretical dangers. Williams and Milton may well have met already outside the proxy connections in the pages of heresiographies. They were Cambridge contemporaries, overlapping from 1625 to 1628, though at different colleges. Lewalski and Francis Bremer both postulate an acquaintance during Williams’s time in London in 1643–4.¹⁰ Certainly they were in each other’s company during Williams’s second return to England in 1651–4. Williams taught Milton ⁷ Barbara K. Lewalski, The Life of John Milton: A Critical Biography (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 191. ⁸ Ephraim Pagitt, Heresiography: or, A description of the Heretickes and Sectaries of these latter times (London, 1645), quoted in The Life Records of John Milton, ed. J. Milton French (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1949–58), 2.127; see also 122, 143, 171. ⁹ Ann Hughes, Gangraena and the Struggle for the English Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 211. ¹⁰ Lewalski, Life, 180; Francis J. Bremer, ‘Williams, Roger (c.1606–1683)’, DNB.
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Dutch, useful to a diplomatic civil servant (or possibly German, useful for a controversial theologian¹¹) in return for other language instruction.¹² Milton’s own positions on the issues of toleration and on the total separation of the church and state certainly moved close to Williams’s own in the late 1650s. In 1644, however, Williams had three clear advantages over Milton as he approached these topics. He had actually founded and run a civic society, albeit the puny new colony of Rhode Island, whereas Milton had, perhaps, run a very small private school. He also knew far better than Milton the authoritarian aspirations of those Puritans who wished to remain members of the Church of England and to reform it to their own agenda. The New England non-separating congregationalists (we shall turn to issues of church government shortly) dominated the Massachusetts Bay colony, from which he had been forced to flee ‘through winter snows, taking refuge with a tribe of native Americans’ (Bremer). Milton was still writing to defend Smectymnuus, the presbyterian anti-prelatical propagandists, in 1642, and may well have been surprised by the vehemence with which presbyterians and those broadly aligned with them attacked his divorce publications. Williams knew his enemies; Milton probably did not. The political poems he penned but did not publish in the mid-1640s suggest a bewilderment that ‘Men whose life, learning, faith and pure intent / Would have been held in high esteem with Paul’ (among whom he surely numbers himself) were pilloried in print as heretics; moreover, as the line ‘When straight a barbarous noise environs me’ suggests, the suddenness of the presbyterian mobilization had caught him off guard (‘On the New Forcers of Conscience’, ll. 9–10, CSP 299; ‘Sonnet XII’, l. 3, CSP 297, my italics). Finally, Williams had a defined and coherent soteriology which accorded well with his arguments on toleration. Carrying his strict Calvinism to its relentless conclusion, he observed no general advantage in proselytizing in print: the Holy Spirit would select those who were to be saved, and would select the human agency by which conversion would occur, irrespective of human choice, planning or understanding. Other strict Calvinists, in America, Scotland, England, and continental Europe, believed there was an obligation to restrain and govern the reprobate through an alliance of ministers and magistrates. Williams preferred wholly to resign the spiritual life of citizens to the secret working of God’s determination. Mark Goldie has traced the debt of Whig tolerationism to the civil war period when ‘A substantial segment of Protestancy came to believe that priestly usurpation [of civil power] took ¹¹ Gordon Campbell, private communication. ¹² Gordon Campbell, A Milton Chronology (Houndmills and New York: Macmillan and St Martin’s Press, 1997), 155.
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not one but three forms: prelatical and presbyterial as well as popish.’¹³ Williams anticipated that trend, and perhaps was the first to extend suspicion of priestcraft to congregational Independency. The issue emerged clearly in his Christenings make not Christians, published in 1645, in which he explains why he did not convert native Americans, among whom he had lived and whose language he had learnt. His explanation, in a way characteristic of Williams’s dialectic in The Bloudy Tenent, is both practical and spiritual. Indeed, he has written the first guide to a native American language, his Key into the Language of America (London, 1643), but that level of knowledge scarcely permits one to discourse ‘in matters of Heaven’.¹⁴ His assessment is fair enough. A Key broadly anticipates the form of a Berlitz phrase book, with chapters on greetings, numbers, securing accommodation, the parts of the body, and so on, though with additional meditational material, often in verse, in which native American conduct is compared to that of white settlers, usually to the detriment of the latter. But the spiritual argument, stated clearly too in A Key, is that the task of determining when and how true conversion may extend to the elect among the indigenous people is one which belongs to God alone: the Father of Spirits … will in his holy season (I hope approaching) perswade, these Gentiles of America to partake of the mercies of Europe, and then shall be fulfilled what is written, by the Prophet Malachi, from the rising of the Sunne in (Europe) to the going down of the same (in America) my Name shall be great among the Gentiles. (Williams, A Key, sig. A6v )
The millenarian edge implied by the first parenthesis is pertinent as we turn to The Bloudy Tenent. Williams plainly knew that diverse religious groups could peacefully coexist in a state in which the civil magistrate is not empowered to enforce orthodoxy. They did so in Rhode Island, which had already admitted to live among Williams’s followers a radical Arminian group, expelled from Massachusetts Bay. It would continue to do so, and in due course provided shelter for other groups persecuted elsewhere in New England. Williams had worked out that crimes—‘Treasons, Rebellions, Massacres’, and so on—could be treated simply as civil offences even if their motivation were religious and based on the free exercise of conscience. He contended that the civil law need interest itself in religious belief and practice (as opposed to civil disorder motivated by religious belief) in order to ensure ‘that no persons, Papists, Jewes, Turkes, or ¹³ Mark Goldie, ‘Priestcraft and the Birth of Whiggism’, in Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner, eds., Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 216. ¹⁴ Roger Williams, Christenings make not Christians (London, 1645), 18.
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Indians be disturbed at their worship, (a thing which the very Indians abhor to practice toward any)’ (Bloudy Tenent, 139). With the confidence of an experienced political leader, he could advance the argument that toleration secures peace and stability, while persecution for cause of conscience breeds discord: Yea and for the generall good of the whole world, the field it selfe, which for want of this obedience to that command of Christ, hath beene and is laid waste and desolate, with the fury and rage of civill War, professedly raised and maintained (as all States professe for the maintenance of one true Religion (after the patterne of that typicall land of Canaan) and to suppresse and pluck up these Tares of false Prophets and false Professors, Antichristians, Heretickes, & c. out of the world. Hence illae lachrymae: hence Germanies, Irelands, and now Englands teares and dreadfull desolations, which ought to have beene, and may bee for the future (by obedience to the command of the Lord Iesus, concerning the permission of Tares to live in the world, though not in the Church) I say ought to have beene, and may bee mercifully prevented. (Williams, Bloudy Tenent, 85–6)
Williams briskly anticipates John Morrill’s influential contention that ‘The English civil war was not the first European revolution: it was the last of the Wars of Religion.’¹⁵ Williams looks at the recently started conflict and places it in succession to the Irish rebellion of 1641 and the horrors of the Thirty Years War. The passage also shows his scepticism about the state-founding optimism of John Winthrop’s Massachusetts colony. He denies the claim that the Israel of the Old Testament provides the type on which a modern Puritan commonwealth can model itself, along with the contingent assertion that the religion of the state should be pervasive and supported by the action of the civil magistrate. Typology is at the heart of the protracted debate between John Cotton, the leading theologian of Winthrop’s Massachusetts, and Williams, which reached its climax in The Bloudy Tenent. As Emory Elliot notes, Williams maintains a conservative position on the use of types, arguing ‘that the only valid reading of Old Testament types is as foreshadowings of New Testament antitypes’.¹⁶ In so doing, Williams seeks to turn off the energy feeding Winthrop’s Puritan experiment, which it drew from its own sense of founding a new Jerusalem on American shores. Instead, Williams offers a different kind of millenarianism, of a more sombre kind. Most early modern tolerationist arguments at some point draw ¹⁵ John Morrill, The Nature of the English Revolution (London and New York: Longman, 1993), 68. ¹⁶ Emory Eliot, ‘New England Puritan Literature’, in The Cambridge History of American Literature, vol. i: 1590–1820, edited by Sacvan Bercovitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 198.
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on Christ’s parable of the wheat and the tares (Matthew 13), which suggests that deviant elements should be left without state intervention till the two groups are separated at the great reaping when Christ returns in judgement. Williams alludes to it frequently, as in the passage cited above, and he opens The Bloudy Tenent by reprinting a statement from an earlier persecuted tolerationist, the first sentence of which cites the parable. Winthrop and his associates saw themselves as establishing, in his frequently quoted phrase, a city on the hill, a millenarian state in which the saints could live in holiness together. Williams does not allow this. For him, the book of Revelation clearly indicates that the millennium is to be ushered in by pandemic devastation, when the ‘glorious white Troopers (Rev. 19) shall in time be mounted’ (Bloudy Tenent, 117). God’s decisions about who may be saved cannot be understood or influenced, and any supposedly godly state is temporary, subject in due course to the general destruction awaiting the world, and of unknowable spiritual status. Just possibly, a pious society may providentially be reserved till the end of all things. He offers that as an uncertain prospect to revolutionary England, ‘if this Nation shall turne … from that violent persecuting or hunting each of other for Religion sake’ (Bloudy Tenent, 243). Were such benevolence developed, it would in civil terms avoid the brutality of persecution for the cause of conscience, but it would not secure salvation for the individual nor offer an abiding and collective solution under the view of eternity.
3 In 1643–4 American colonial politics appeared on the London scene, though it mapped imperfectly on the new ideological formations of England at war. The Massachusetts Bay colony from which Williams had been expelled had developed a uniformity of religious practice in which non-separating congregationalism was confirmed by civil authority and by the structure of government. As it happened, those Puritans who had settled there in numbers since the very early 1630s were not, for the most part, advocates of a presbyterian church government, and they saw no reason for the development of its complex hierarchies to reform religion and protect its doctrine and discipline. Instead, without seceding from the Church of England, congregations formed and observed their own particular discipline. Some were more radical than others, ‘but as time went on the leaders of the church gradually moved in the direction of greater and greater uniformity’. Civil government closely mirrored ecclesiastical development: ‘As early as 1631 … the franchise was limited to the members of the churches. In 1635 church attendance was made compulsory for all, whether members of the church or not. From 1636 onward
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the organization of new churches had to be approved by the magistrates and the church elders.’¹⁷ In effect the New England non-separating congregationalists had achieved the sort of status as a puritanical and national church to which English presbyterians, seconded by their Scottish allies, aspired in the early 1640s. Williams knew exactly where he stood with respect to this American establishment: he knew with absolute clarity that they were his enemies. His disagreement with them had both religious and civil components. His Calvinist soteriology and his own notion of separating congregationalism made him critical of retaining a communion with the unregenerate majority of the Church of England and of forcing into New England congregations unregenerate elements that were unfit to mix with the saints who had chosen to worship together. At the same time, he disputed the facile assumption that a combination of a gift by James I to the Massachusetts Bay Company and intervention of a divine providence had presented the Puritan settlers with the lands of the native Americans on which to establish their new Israel. Williams saw settlement as part of a transfer of property from the indigenous peoples to the newcomers which should be governed by law, by contract and by appropriate compensation. The view was at once secularizing and subversive; ‘when the Massachusetts Bay colony banished him in 1635, the first of the four charges Governor John Winthrop listed against Williams was that he denied the colonists’ territorial rights’.¹⁸ Just as Scottish presbyterians descended on London to give their advice on the Puritan reformation of England, so, too, did an influential cluster of influential divines who looked to the American model of non-separating congregationalism. In London, theirs was an uphill battle, though some secured membership of the Westminster Assembly of Divines. Late in 1643 Philip Nye, a promoter of the New England initiatives in church government though not himself an e´ migr´e, together with four other ministers, published in London An Apologeticall Narration, Humbly Submitted to the Honourable Houses of Parliament. At this point, English Puritanism started to crack open. The ministers were of a devout respectability that left them individually beyond reproach, and their argument was simply for a certain latitude in the new reformation ‘to some lesser differences with peaceableness’ (Apologeticall Narration, sig. A1v ). They are suggesting a limit to toleration, though one which permits their variations in practice, while excluding others. David Masson, who writes vividly of these years, suggests that, were it not for their growing unease about sectaries, the presbyterians ‘would have patted the ¹⁷ Max Sevelle, A History of Colonial America, 3rd edn. (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1973), 161. ¹⁸ Myra Jehlen, ‘The Literature of Colonization’, in Bercovitch, ed., Cambridge History of American Literature, 76.
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Five Dissenting Brethren [that is, the authors of the Apologeticall Narration] on the back, and said, ‘‘It shall be made easy for you; we will yield all the accommodation you can possibly need; only don’t call it Toleration.’’ ’¹⁹ Possibly, such a compromise could have been achieved, other things being equal, though the five brethren, and Milton with them, were in the event overwhelmed by the presbyterian mobilization, designed both to reform the church on their chosen model and to get the kind of stranglehold on extremer dissent that the New England congregationalists had achieved in Boston and its environs.
4 Milton in 1644 was left with all the confusions and ambivalences that characterized incipient radical Independency. Like Nye, he had assumed he could be in dialogue with men such as Thomas Young and the other Smectymnuans, whose efforts they had so recently seconded. But he had developed, too, an awareness of his own differences from presbyterians, both in the heterodoxy of his doctrinal position, specifically and explicitly about divorce reform, and in his perspective on the extent to which sectaries should be tolerated. Yet he still retained a shared vision of national regeneration once prelacy was expelled. Areopagitica perfectly embodies those complexities and ideological fissures. Unlike Williams, but like Winthrop, Milton apparently envisaged a new civic foundation on the basis of spiritual regeneration. The vision of Areopagitica is of a new Jerusalem for the saints to dwell in; for both men, that vision is as much utopian as millenarian. Winthrop’s foundation sermon, preached before his settler party reached land, dwelt on Matthew 5:14, ‘Ye are the light of the world. A city that is set on an hill cannot be hid’, an image which ‘reflected the core of his thinking about the society he and his fellows intended to establish’.²⁰ For Milton, too, cities of biblical vision are to be equated with a real and familiar city–not Boston, of course, but London: Behold now this vast City; a City of refuge, the mansion house of liberty, encompast and surrounded with his [God’s] protection; the shop of warre hath not there more anvils and hammers waking, to fashion out the plates and instruments of armed Justice in defence of beleaguer’d Truth, then there be pens and heads there, sitting by their ¹⁹ David Masson, The Life of John Milton (London, 1881–94; rpt. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1965), 3.112–13. ²⁰ Darrett B. Rutman, Winthrop’s Boston: Portrait of a Puritan Town 1630–1649 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1965), 4.
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studious lamps, musing, searching, revolving new notions and idea’s wherewith to present, as with their homage and their fealty the approaching Reformation: others as fast reading, trying all things, assenting to the force of reason and convincement. What could a man require more from a Nation so pliant and so prone to seek after knowledge. What wants there to such a towardly and pregnant soile, but wise and faithfull labourers, to make a knowing people, a Nation of Prophets, of Sages, and of Worthies. We reck’n more then five months yet to harvest; there need not be five weeks, had we but eyes to lift up, the fields are white already. (Areop., YP 2.553–4)
Once more the biblical resonances are crucial. Here they point both backwards to Old Testament Israel and forwards with a millenarian optimism. As Sirluck notes, cities of refuge were established by the Israelites, under Moses (YP 2.553, n. 236, citing Numbers 35). They are part of the foundation myths of Israel, and, as such, taking a Winthropian view, they type out the foundation of Puritan England as a state fit for a new chosen people. Williams, in contrast, asserts that ‘Doubtlesse that Canaan Land was not a patterne for all Lands: It was a none-such, unparalleld and unmatchable’ (Bloudy Tenent, 183). Milton rehearses the notion of England’s own special relationship to divine providence. Moses had wished all the children of Israel to be a nation of prophets (YP 2.556, n. 245, citing Numbers 11:29), something that may imminently be achieved in London. The allusion to an imminent harvest echoes the words of Christ, anticipating the completion of his mission and foreshadowing its millenary resolution ( John 4:35). The concept of London as a new Jerusalem finds its most eloquent expression in his remarkable analogy between Solomon’s foundation of the Temple (1 Kings 5–6) and the work of reformation now under way in the capital, a project in which ‘the men cry’d out against for schismaticks and sectaries’ have an integral role: ‘as if, while the Temple of the Lord was building, some cutting, some squaring the marble, others hewing the cedars, there should be a sort of irrationall men who could not consider there must be many schisms and many dissections made in the quarry and in the timber, ere the house of God can be built’ (Areop., YP 2.555). Milton conceptualizes the work of founding the Puritan utopia as a finite one—the building will be built, it will be finished—but when it is, it will still admit of diversity within a complex and artful design: ‘it cannot be united into a continuity, it can but be contiguous in this world’ (YP 2.555). In an undeveloped and untheorized way, Milton seems to be reaching towards a model of congregational independency within a broadly defined state church, which substantially accords with the New England model that Williams had rebelled against. Wilding has analysed the passage about the building of the Temple as an exhilarating evocation of the dignity of labour (Wilding, ‘Milton’s Areopagitica’, 16–17). Such labour had literally gone on with a similar frantic energy in Winthrop’s Boston, as ‘its
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people were immediately busy building, fencing, breaking ground, planting, building roads and bridges and fortifications, for as John Winthrop, Jr., was to write, they had ‘‘all thinges to doe, as in the beginninge of the world’’ ’ (Rutman, Winthrop’s Boston, 40). But London, too, had seen recent and concerted expenditure of human effort in the reinforcement of its defences through the construction of an outer defence of earthworks. Puritan utopias are won by the sweat of the brow as well as the efforts of the brain. But Areopagitica shows a pervasive uncertainty and some confusion about the stage the new reformation had reached and about the intentions of those who were driving it. Like Nye and his associates, Milton tries to talk to presbyterians and their supporters, those who controlled the Assembly of Divines and the Long Parliament; he persistently speaks the language of ‘we’ and ‘us’, as though he and they were still comrades, as in his anti-prelatical campaign of 1641–2. Milton, however, has gone a lot further than Nye down the road to presbyterian censure and ostracism. His first divorce tract placed him in that most difficult of polemical situations by identifying him as an egregious example of libertine heterodoxy. From there, surely, there was no way back into dialogue. But still he tries. He even vouchsafes a rare attack on Jacobus Arminius. I have argued elsewhere that Milton’s assault on prelacy was distinguished from the typical Puritan discourse of the early 1640s by its reticence on points of doctrine in general and on the Arminianism of Laudian churchmen, and I have attributed this to his own nascent Arminianism, which can be identified even in works written before ‘Lycidas’.²¹ Somewhat gratuitously, Milton observes in Areopagitica, ‘the acute and distinct Arminius was perverted meerly by the perusing of a namelesse discours writt’n at Delf, which at first he took in hand to confute’ (Areop., YP 2.519–20). Of course, as English Puritan criticism of Arminius goes, this is tepid to the point of deference: Arminianism was routinely confused with Catholicism and the ‘controversy over Arminianism and predestination was inextricably bound up with fears of Catholicism and the question of the Church of England’s relations with Rome’.²² Milton chooses to offer up the anecdote, as if to reassure his target readers, somewhat disingenuously perhaps, of the soundness of his own orientation. Another, more pervasive stratagem shows him hanging on to the disappearing coat-tails of presbyterianism: his reiterated distinction between ‘good ²¹ Thomas N. Corns, ‘Milton’s Antiprelatical Tracts and the Marginality of Doctrine’, in Stephen B. Dobranski and John P. Rumrich, eds., Milton and Heresy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 39–48; ‘Milton and Presbyterianism’, Milton Studies [of Korea] 10.2 (2000), 337–54; ‘Milton before ‘‘Lycidas’’ ’, in Graham Parry and Joad Raymond, eds., Milton and the Terms of Liberty (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2002), 23–36. ²² Kevin Sharpe, The Personal Rule of Charles I (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 301.
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books’ and ‘good men’ on the one hand and the generality of books and men on the other (Areop., YP 2.487, 492, 493, 500, 503, 504, 507, 510, 521, 531, 544, 549, 551, 554, 556, 564). It generates a problem that lies at the core of some of those contradictions noted at the start of this essay. Milton persistently produces arguments in favour of a general toleration and of a wholly uncensored press, only to pull back to require freedom for those whom fellow Puritans would recognize as within the pale of respectability. It marks the application in Areopagitica of a manoeuvre perfected in The Judgement of Martin Bucer (1644) and continued in the coda to Tetrachordon (1645), in which he lines up the opinions of men regarded by the mainstream of English Puritanism as authorities of impeccable standing in order to demonstrate that his own heterodoxy falls inside the range of those opinions. If Wycliffe, Luther, Melanchthon, Erasmus, Bucer and Fagius are ‘renowned men, worthy to be their [that is, presbyterians’ and their supporters’] leaders’ (Tetrachordon, YP 2.707) and if their doctrine of divorce approximates to his own, then he, too, should be accorded the rights to be heard and to be taken seriously. Like them, he is a good man, and, like theirs, his books are good books. But, ideologically, Milton seems on the move, towards redefining the relationship of church and state in ways that foreshadow his later thinking in, for example, A Treatise of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes (1659). His assertion that ‘The State shall be my governours, but not my criticks’ (Areop., YP 2.534) points the way to a separating out of the civil magistrate from matters of conscience and belief in a manner that Williams could indeed have approved. Yet the latter in the early 1640s was profoundly suspicious of the congregational independents as they emerged in England as an alternative to presbyterianism: The third, though not so great [as prelatical and presbyterian supporters], yet growing faction is that (so called) Independent: I prejudice not the personall worth of any of the three sorts: This latter (as I beleeve this Discourse hath manifested) jumpes with the Prelates, and (though not more fully, yet) more explicitely then the Presbyterians cast down the Crowne of the Lord Jesus at the feet of the Civill Magistrate. And although they pretend to receive their Ministrie from the choice of 2 or 3 private persons in Church-covenant, yet would they faine perswade the Mother Old England to imitate her Daughter New Englands practice, viz. to keep out the Presbyterians, and only to embrace themselves, both as the States and the Peoples Bishops. (Bloudy Tenent, 200–1)
Were he to have reviewed the course of English political history from a vantage point in the mid-1650s, Williams could have congratulated himself, in qualified fashion, on his powers of prophecy. Successive governments from 1649 onwards were tolerant of some alternatives to congregationalism, and congregations which favoured presbyterian models of government were
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certainly allowed to flourish, even to generate overarching structures binding them together into larger organizations, as happened, for example, in London. Independency did not persecute them. Yet more radical groups were, with varying degrees of assiduity, hounded, in the case of Ranterism to extinction. Quakers, too, were spectacularly punished, by local magistrates and in the sensational trial and torture of James Nayler. In 1649 Milton found himself, as apologist for the Rump Parliament, solemnly assuring presbyterians that, though the overthrow of error ‘can be no work of the Civil sword’, the regicide regime would ‘not tolerate the free exercise of any Religion, which shall be found absolutely contrary to sound Doctrin or the power of godliness’ (Articles of Peace, YP 3.324, 325). So who, then, has decided which doctrine is sound? Milton speaks for a civil government, presumably one that is satisfied that it may set a bound to acceptable belief and use the civil sword, as a last resort, to curtail the ‘free exercise’ of conscience in the case of those outside that bound. Of course, why it was necessary to defend the state in these terms and to sacrifice radical sectaries to civil persecution is easily explained as an expedient for securing presbyterian compliance with the new regime. Yet Milton’s argument in government falls interestingly between the more ringing and declarative sentiments voiced in parts of Areopagitica and his eventual emergence, in the Restoration, as a friend of Quakers, a group as harried in New England as in the Old, and one which was to find surest haven in Williams’s absolutely tolerationist Rhode Island.²³ ²³ Alan Taylor, American Colonies (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2002), 182.
5 Milton, Marvell and Toleration Nicholas von Maltzahn John Milton and Andrew Marvell have long been celebrated as apostles of religious toleration and toleration has long been celebrated as a defining value of liberalism. Already in their own lifetimes they won some praise for what they wrote on behalf of toleration, a praise renewed after the Revolution of 1688/9, and sounded variously to our own day. The applause for Milton has of course been longer, steadier, louder. Yet it is Marvell’s take on toleration that proved the more durable, becoming the norm of liberal tradition, especially in its most influential early modern expression: John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration. Marvell’s is the more familiar liberal perspective that contending faiths might agree to disagree, or even turn a blind eye on each other, with religion increasingly construed as a private practice tolerable within a secular state. This essay speaks first to Marvell’s place in the emergence of this principle of non-interference with others’ beliefs, a negative liberty in his case designed to secure free-thinking from religious persecution. Milton, by contrast, sees toleration as committing us to some collective discovery of Christian saving truth. I shall emphasize his insistence on our obligation to engage with competing views, in a positive liberty requiring dialogue between believers. Milton and Marvell have long been claimed for the tradition of liberalism. My premise is that their parallel careers and personal association have led commentators in their lifetime and since to collapse important religious and political distinctions between them. The aim here is to explore how their related but contrasting examples can enlarge our conception of that liberal tradition.
1 Milton and Marvell found themselves joined in controversy in 1673–4, when Marvell twice came publicly to Milton’s defence. The year 1673 marked the beginning of what may be thought of as a second Restoration, when, after the
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liberalizing of church and state that culminated in Charles II’s Declaration of Indulgence (1672), the Cavalier Parliament then forced the cancellation of that toleration (March 1673), the royal signature on the Test Act, and the end of the moderate Cabal administration. With the Earl of Danby’s rise to power, these changes meant the renewal of a High-Church regime harsher to dissent. Marvell had become prominent as a proponent of toleration late in 1672, when he supported the Declaration of Indulgence in The Rehearsal Transpros’d. Against him were then gathered what he mockingly styled a Posse Archidiaconatus, whose attacks on Marvell made much of his friendship with the notorious Milton, that canting proponent of divorce and regicide whose blindness was so plainly God’s judgement on his iniquities. In The Rehearsall Transpros’d: The Second Part (late 1673) and in his commendatory poem on Paradise Lost (c.April 1674), Marvell skilfully defended his older friend. Their friendship seems to have begun when Marvell sought employment with the revolutionary government in 1652/3. Marvell successfully cultivated the relation and Milton, now entirely blind, seems to have been grateful for the flattering attentions of the learned younger man. The friendship developed and lasted to the end of Milton’s days. The knowledgeable John Aubrey gave Marvell pride of place among Milton’s ‘familiar learned Acquaintance’.¹ A couple of years later, Marvell promised to write his late friend’s biography for Anthony Wood’s collections.² Before Marvell met that obligation, he too died, in 1678. We can only guess at what he might have written. Marvell’s relation to Milton had been at first dutiful and admiring, whether in the approach that won him Milton’s letter of reference in February 1653; in the assistance he offered Milton with the Defensio secunda, it would seem, which followed that spring; in Marvell’s lavish thanks and praise for that work in the spring of 1654, when the great Milton made sure to send a copy of the new publication to the menial Marvell; in his circulation of Milton’s work when in Saumur in 1656.³ But in his service to the House of Cromwell, and then in his fellow-service as a secretary for foreign correspondence in 1657 to 1660, Marvell’s independent direction may be surmised. ¹ Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Aubrey 8, f. 63v . ² Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Wood F39, f. 296r . ³ Nicholas von Maltzahn, An Andrew Marvell Chronology (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 38, 41, 42–4, 46–59. That it was the Defensio secunda with which Marvell helped Milton, rather than Eikonoklastes (as Anne Sadleir reported, Cambridge, Trinity College, MS R.5.5), is my inference from Milton’s seeming only newly familiar with Marvell in February 1652/3; from the Defensio secunda being the work Milton had in hand that spring before Marvell’s recorded employment in Eton as William Dutton’s tutor; from Milton’s sending Marvell a copy at its publication; from Milton’s needing no assistance with Eikonoklastes because in 1649 he still had his sight and the publication was in English; and from the exceptionally contradictory allegiances the earlier involvement would require of Marvell in the summer of 1649.
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The change is conspicuous in Milton’s and Marvell’s diverging responses in 1658–9 to the government of Richard Cromwell—Milton more distant, Marvell ever closer the centre of power—and in their very different fortunes when the army then restored republican power in the spring and summer of 1659. Marvell now lost ground even as Milton seems better to have been trusted by the new-old parliament and its council, not least the again influential Sir Henry Vane, bitter republican rival in Hull to Marvell the Protectoral candidate in the parliamentary election of January 1658/9.⁴ The facts of their careers at that date have been misleadingly reported—note, for example, Marvell’s tellingly rough ride in the Whitehall office shuffle of the summer of 1659 (von Maltzahn, Marvell Chronology, 58)⁵—in a way that has obscured the pronounced difference in their fortunes. But whatever their political differences, their friendship endured the Restoration and may well have been strengthened by it. Marvell’s scrutiny in Parliament of Milton’s excessive prison fees (December 1660) shows some lasting commitment, as does the intermittent evidence of Marvell’s association with Milton thereafter. He was familiar enough with Milton’s Jewin Street household (1661–3) later to recall Samuel Parker’s presence there. After Marvell’s return from Russia (he was with the Carlisle embassy from the summer of 1663 to January 1664/5), they kept up their friendship, as appears from Marvell’s familiarity with Paradise Lost before its publication in October 1667 (attested by the allusions in ‘Last Instructions’, dated 4 September 1667) and from his later report that, ‘by chance’, he had not seen Milton for two years before The Rehearsal Transpros’d, which ‘after I undertook writing, I did more carefully avoid either visiting or sending to him, least I should any way involve him in my consequences’ (von Maltzahn, Marvell Chronology, 63, 97–8, 113).⁶ Strong as the friendship was, it did not require agreement on all matters. On the question of religious toleration, for example, Milton and Marvell’s interventions in 1667–8 articulate very different views. I have elsewhere explored the relation of Milton’s publication of Paradise Lost to the politics of 1667, both his bringing it to the press, probably in January or early February in a season of penitence after the calamities of plague, fire, war, ⁴ Vane had been angered by Marvell’s election as MP from Vane’s seat in Hull ( January 1658/9), unfairly owing to ‘the practices of some and the Influence of Court Party’, Hull City Archives, Borough Letters, 635 (10 May 1659). ⁵ Compare Pierre Legouis, Andrew Marvell: Poet, Puritan, Patriot, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 117. ⁶ The Prose Works of Andrew Marvell, ed. Annabel Patterson, Martin Dzelzainis, Nicholas von Maltzahn, and Neil Keeble, 2 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 1.417. Hereinafter cited as ‘Marvell, PWAM’.
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and economic recession, and then the epic appearing in print just as renewed calls for toleration greeted the meeting of Parliament in October 1667.⁷ His Protestantism remained uncompromising and apocalyptic. Marvell’s much suppler tactics show in ‘Last Instructions’ and more clearly still in his interventions in Parliament that winter. There, seeking to circumvent the Cavalier House of Commons, he favoured Charles II’s use of royal prerogative to achieve some ‘better Union and Composure in the minds of [his] Protestant Subjects in Matters of Religion’. For Marvell and others, this meant the king imposing a wider Comprehension in the English church.⁸ Marvell’s kindness to Presbyterians—with his Presbyterian friend Philip, Lord Wharton, he was prepared to encourage Charles II to exert ‘the Power inherent in You in Ecclesiasticall affairs by the Prerogative annext to Your Imperiall Crown’⁹—was not shared by Milton, as we shall see. At the beginning of the Cabal administration, with the High Church in retreat, Marvell was eager to work with the powers-that-be, whether the King or the Lords, to achieve a more comprehensive Church of England than the House of Commons would contemplate. Where Marvell favoured a more comprehensive but still national church, Milton early and late decried the very institution of a national church and the interference of the civil power in ecclesiastical causes. The difference between Milton and Marvell is more apparent still in 1673. It also found recognition at the time. Whatever the bitter prejudice of the Posse Archidiaconatus, which was quick to collapse any distinction between the two, the judgement now in another quarter was that Milton and Marvell were indeed quite distinct. In the year of the Indulgence, the Catholic Earl of Castlemaine recognized that The Rehearsal Transpros’d extended toleration even to his own religion, and accordingly celebrated it and its ‘witty, Masculine and most judicious Author’.¹⁰ His response to Marvell’s tract was ‘one of the first in print, and the first to be entirely positive’, whereas ‘towards Milton, Castlemaine displays only unremitting hostility’, perceiving the strict limits to ⁷ Nicholas von Maltzahn, ‘The First Reception of Paradise Lost (1667)’, Review of English Studies 47 (1996), 479–99. The February date is suggested by Simmons then also having Milton’s ‘Accedence commenced grammar’ to hand, which he needed to clear with the Stationers’ Company (5 Feb. 1667) since it might infringe on their monopoly on Latin grammars (London, Stationers’ Company, Court Book D, f. 127v , and also Waste Book 1661–68, f. 110v ); the licensing of the epic allowed Milton to contract with Samuel Simmons for its publication, 27 April 1667. ⁸ Journal of the House of Lords, n.d. 12.181. ⁹ Nicholas von Maltzahn, ‘Andrew Marvell and the Lord Wharton’, The Seventeenth Century 18 (2003), 256–7. In 1670, Marvell again shows an interest in the Lords’ efforts to qualify the Conventicles’ Bill with ‘a reserving clause for his Majestys ancient prerogative in all Ecclesiasticall things’, Andrew Marvell, Poems and Letters, 3rd edn., ed. H. M. Margoliouth and P. Legouis, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 2.104. ¹⁰ Roger Palmer, Earl of Castlemaine, A Full Answer and Confutation ([Antwerp], 1673), 10, 19.
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Milton’s ecumenism even in Of True Religion (1673).¹¹ And when Marvell a few years later published An Account of the Growth of Popery and Arbitrary Government, there is a notably antic quality to the ‘character of popery’ to which that tract turns after its constitutionalist introduction. Moreover, it makes that turn with an odd syntactic lurch, as if this whole character were but another passage of separate origin available for this assemblage (Marvell, PWAM 2.209, 227). Sharp as the wit is, it is still wit, and marks a hostility more against the Court of Rome than the Church of Rome, and most of all against France. To recognize the lesser animus of Marvell’s Account only requires comparison of that work with the much flatter denunciations of ‘popery’ from his contemporaries, or with the fiercer logic of Milton’s Of True Religion. Moreover, the Hobbesian logic of Marvell’s position, especially in The Rehearsall Transpros’d: The Second Part, has been tellingly contrasted with Samuel Parker’s thinking: Hobbes had made effective political authority a consequence of the decisions of self-interested individuals; his sovereignty was artificial and man-made. Parker was claiming, in a more conventionally Scholastic fashion, that political authority was a divinely-willed consequence of man’s natural sociability. Individuals were naturally born into societies, and under government.¹²
Marvell’s Hobbesian regard for the royal prerogative in matters of religion, whether in 1668 or in 1673, remained profoundly at odds with Milton’s distrust of any royal supremacy. As John Aubrey knew, even though Milton acknowledged Hobbes ‘to be a man of great parts, a learned man[,] Their Interests and tenets were diametrically [opposite,] did run counter to each other.’¹³ This was a fundamental difference. More generally, it marks Marvell’s prose of the 1670s as distinct from Milton’s example, even as he was in some part taking up the mantle that had fallen from Milton’s shoulders. Once more a poet with flair for lyrical and also satirical poetry was turning to works of his left hand. But Marvell’s emphases are different, and his style still more so. Milton’s high style, which controversialists like Samuel Butler found so vulnerable to their attacks, was now replaced by a coffee-house style of ‘`a-lamode raillery’ more alert to competing interests, and backed by a Hobbesian conception that politics and even religion were interest-driven and in need of sovereign administration. ¹¹ Martin Dzelzainis, ‘Milton’s Of True Religion and the Earl of Castlemaine’, The Seventeenth Century 7 (1992), 53–69, 64, and Dzelzainis, ‘Marvell and the Earl of Castlemaine’, in Marvell and Liberty, ed. Dzelzainis and Warren Chernaik (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 290–312, 303. ¹² Jon Parkin, ‘Liberty Transpros’d: Marvell and Samuel Parker’, in Marvell and Liberty, ed. Dzelzainis and Chernaik, 269–89, 274. ¹³ Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Aubrey 6, f. 63v .
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2 What then was Marvell’s religion that it had need of comprehension in an English national church or even toleration? Marvell is well-known for his hostility to High Church pretensions, which have been presumed to follow from Presbyterian allegiances as expressed in his satires and prose works of the Restoration. About this Marvell we know much, or think we do. Some fifteen years ago Willie Lamont described ‘The Religion of Andrew Marvell’ as a moderate Presbyterianism of the kind associated with the major moderate of the day, Richard Baxter, which in the Restoration sought Comprehension in a national church, this in disagreement with the Independents who insisted on a wider toleration. This was the so-called ‘Baxterian middle way’, which Lamont styled ‘a very clearly defined wing of Protestant nonconformity’. Against the interpretive uncertainties in which Marvell’s literary critics have long revelled, the historian Lamont confidently proposed that ‘we can learn what Andrew Marvell’s religion is’, especially by focusing on Marvell’s Short Historical Essay (1676) and the Remarks upon a Late Disingenuous Treatise (1678).¹⁴ Seeming to support Lamont’s argument was my later discovery of Marvell’s long cooperation with that important Presbyterian, the Lord Wharton, from 1660 to the end of Marvell’s life.¹⁵ Their shared purpose emerges in Marvell’s conspicuous parliamentary support in the fall of 1660 for the Worcester House Declaration,¹⁶ where the king favoured liberty of conscience, and continues to his later parliamentary intervention in the spring of 1677 against the Bishops’ Bill, which legislation sought to strengthen the episcopal hold on late Stuart politics. Lamont’s claims for Marvell’s religion have been skilfully elaborated by Neil Keeble in editing Marvell’s last tract from 1678, the Remarks upon a Late Disingenuous Treatise.¹⁷ ¹⁴ William Lamont, ‘The Religion of Andrew Marvell: Locating the ‘‘Bloody Horse’’ ’, in The Political Identity of Andrew Marvell, ed. Conal Condren and A. D. Cousins (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1990), 135–56, 151, 137. Among those too ready to take Lamont at his word, see von Maltzahn, ‘Andrew Marvell and the Lord Wharton’, 252, 260. ¹⁵ Their association may already inform Marvell’s part in the debate on settling religion, 16 July 1660, where he sought with others to forestall further separate debate on church discipline, thus supporting at most an episcopal church without deans and chapters (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Dep. f. 9, 79v [Seymour Bowman parliamentary diary]); Wharton listed Marvell among his parliamentary ‘frends’ in 1660–2, and a few years after Marvell’s death might still recall him with affection as ‘a friend deceased’: von Maltzahn, ‘Andrew Marvell and the Lord Wharton’, 253, 257, 261. ¹⁶ Journal of the House of Commons, 8.191 (24 November 1660); Marvell, Poems and Letters, 2.6. ¹⁷ Marvell, Remarks, ed. Neil Keeble, in Marvell, PWAM 2.379–482. Keeble is also Baxter’s biographer (Richard Baxter: Puritan Man of Letters (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982)) and editor, and has with Geoffrey Nuttall assembled an impressive Calendar of the Correspondence of Richard Baxter, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
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How far did Marvell need in the Remarks to be endorsing the position he there defends? Is he agreeing with the moderate Presbyterian John Howe, or is he just siding with him? Might he there and earlier have instead been seeking a roomier national church—not least at a time when a wider toleration seemed unlikely of political success—in which orthodoxy might prove less confining? And might not his apparent confessional solidarity with moderate Presbyterians exactly reflect the strategy, described over forty years ago by the historian Hugh Trevor-Roper,¹⁸ whereby free-thinking before the Enlightenment sought to protect itself against worse oppressions by consorting with Presbyterianism, or more widely Calvinism? Trevor-Roper memorably described the widespread phenomenon in which the free-thinking heirs of Erasmus, when threatened by the Catholic Reformation, made common cause with their stouter Calvinist brethren, wearing their ‘armour’ as he had it. In this view the Puritan Revolution proved retrograde, however, because it so polarized religious debate and political life. In short, the ‘armour’ might soon become a straitjacket. I cite the Trevor-Roper argument because the Marvell family begins to look like its living embodiment. This begins with Marvell’s minister father, the Revd Andrew Marvell (c.1585–1641). Marvell’s father matters to us because Marvell came in the 1670s to express views that strongly recall his father’s position, which he plainly meant to honour. The Revd Marvell senior proves a very interesting case indeed. He was a via media Church of England cleric, trained in the turn-of-the-century Cambridge that so fostered moderate Puritanism. By the 1630s, he was caught between a rock and hard place. The rock was the Laudian church. The hard place was the Hull church and especially its more radical component, who supported other ministers and lecturers in that town.¹⁹ Matters came to a head in 1638 when, after a long season of plague in Hull, the Laudian archbishop in York sought to reform the church in Hull. The church visitors plainly saw Marvell’s father as no eager agent of their reforms because he himself was in need of discipline. Even so, he struck the York officials as their best means of correcting the more radical church in Hull (von Maltzahn, Marvell Chronology, 22–7).²⁰ It may well be this episode that the poet Marvell later recalls at Appleton House, where in a Parthian shot, ¹⁸ Hugh Trevor-Roper, ‘Religious Origins of the Enlightenment’, in Religion, the Reformation and Social Change, 2nd edn. (London: Macmillan, 1972), 193–236. ¹⁹ We have from Marvell senior’s hand a list of complaints against those who challenged his ministry, Hull Central Library, MS ‘Sermons &c of the Rev. Andrew Marvell’ (Wilson-Barkworth volume), unfoliated. ²⁰ Ronald A. Marchant, The Puritans and the Church Courts in the Diocese of York, 1560–1642 (London: Longman, 1962), 262; Hull City Archives, Borough Records Miscellaneous (BRM), no. 166.
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turning away from his celebration of Fairfax’s garden, he opposes that place of ‘Conscience’ to ‘Th’Ambition’ of ‘proud Cawood Castle’, the archiepiscopal seat nearby, and ‘its Prelate great’ (‘Upon Appleton House’, 353–6, 363–6, in Miscellaneous Poems (1681), 88–9). Marvell was also proud to invoke his father in a later season of controversy, as an exemplary minister whose death before the Civil War and ‘Piety and Learning’ go far to consecrate his being ‘a Conformist to the established Rites of the Church of England’, as the younger Marvell was too. But Marvell then adds of his father that he was, ‘I confess none of the most over-running or eager in’ those established rites, and we may assume Marvell too shared in such restraint (Marvell, PWAM 1.241, 288–9). The moderation of the Revd Andrew Marvell followed from habits of learned free-thinking in the Erasmian tradition. His support for a more learned ministry in Hull and its surrounds appears from his proposal to start ‘a perpetuall Library for the Maister’ at the Charterhouse where he presided. This ‘good library’ would distinguish the port of Hull among the towns of the north and enable its churchmen ‘to deale in matters of Controversy, either to Confute an adversary, or to establish an irresolute staggerer’: ‘this will make the Schollers in and about the towne, still to live as it were in a Colledge, in the university, having the use of a library well furnisht’ (‘Sermons … of the Rev. Andrew Marvell’). He was prepared to dedicate his own books, collected at some expense, to this end. That his interests extended to Socinianism is indicated by the presence in the Revd Marvell’s papers of a translation into English of the heretical Racovian Catechism, this in his hand, it seems, and thus the first known English translation extant of that notorious proto-Unitarian document, one of the most scandalous works of the 1600s.²¹ Other of his writings show that Marvell’s father was no friend to the Athanasian Creed. He plainly shared the belief that it was ‘Romish and Popish’.²² One did not need to be Socinian even in a broad sense to have misgivings about the Athanasian Creed’s elaborate insistence on the tripersonality of Christ as an article of salvation. But it helped. My inference is that the moderate churchmanship of the Revd Marvell and of Andrew Marvell in the 1650s, -60s, and -70s was not designed to foster Presbyterian orthodoxy in a national church, but was directed toward emancipating Christian inquiry from institutional constraints deemed counter-productive to a free-thinking that was learned and pious, whether in the individual or in the fellowship of believers. From this perspective, feature ²¹ Bound out of sequence in ‘Sermons … of the Rev. Andrew Marvell’. ²² Quoted is the Socinian Paul Best, Journal of the House of Commons, 4.500 (4 April 1646), from Stephen D. Snobelen, ‘Best, Paul (1590–1657)’, in DNB; but many less exceptional figures shared the view, for example John Evelyn’s correspondent, John Beale, as noted in William Poole, Milton and the Idea of the Fall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 46.
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after feature of Marvell’s life and writings comes further into focus: whether his reverence for the ‘great Wit’ of that Erasmian moderate John Hales, whom he befriended while at Eton (1653–5) (Marvell, PWAM 1.130);²³ his parliamentary attempts to forestall the Restoration church settlement in 1660 and to contest it in later years; his relation to the Independent Calvinist John Owen in the Restoration but also Marvell’s rejection of the stringent Calvinism of Thomas Danson in 1678; his peculiar commitment in the Restoration to getting legislation for burning heretics off the books;²⁴ his anti-Athanasian position, which recalls his father’s. He knew he was not alone in his propensity for rational religion and joked about how readily latitudinarians in the Church of England—‘wheresoever the Inspection of Books is lodged’—might tolerate the printing of ‘Socinian Books’ which ‘sell as openly as the Bible’ (Marvell, PWAM 1.128). Marvell’s adversaries in the 1670s recognized his Socinian leanings, especially in the anti-Nicene Short Historical Essay appended to Mr. Smirke.²⁵ Calling an antagonist Socinian was no unusual insult in the 1670s. Marvell retorted the charge upon Samuel Parker in The Rehearsall Transpros’d: The Second Part: ‘No man can tell you truth but he must presently be a Socinian’ (Marvell, PWAM 1.396). Yet that the charge against Marvell might be not smoke but fire appears from the later ‘Socinian’ republication of Marvell’s Short Historical Essay, reprinted to cap a unitarian compilation in 1703, and printed again in a deist collection of 1709.²⁶ Moreover, Marvell was also the key figure in his beloved nephew William Popple’s intellectual formation. Popple, who after 1670 was based in France for twenty years, reveals in his writings a fascination with natural religion, coupled with a readiness to conform to Roman Catholicism in externals.²⁷ We should note that Popple was the first translator into English of Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration (1689). His preface there famously insists on the need for ‘Absolute Liberty’ in religion, thus exceeding Locke’s own terms. Likewise in the 1690s, the early deist John Toland repeatedly quotes ‘the most ingenious ²³ Hales was conspicuously lenient in his view of ‘an Arian church’ in A Tract concerning Schisme (London, 1642), 10, a tract prized in The Rehearsal Transpros’d as well as its Second Part, Marvell, PWAM 1.130–5, 395–6; he had immediately been accused of Socinianism in the 1640s, e.g. Antidotes Against Some infectious passages in a Tract, concerning Schisme (London, 1642). ²⁴ See for example von Maltzahn, Marvell Chronology, 163, 183; Marvell, PWAM 2.72; Marvell, Poems and Letters, 2.192–3, 199. ²⁵ Simon Patrick, Falshood Unmaskt (London, 1676), 22–4; Jean Daill´e, The Lively Picture of Mr Lewis Du Moulin (London, 1680), 9–10. ²⁶ Andrew Marvell, A Short Historical Essay (London, 1703), gathered into A Fifth Collection of Tracts (London, 1703); William Stephens, An Account of the Growth of Deism in England (London, 1709), 339–401. ²⁷ William Popple, A Rational Catechism (London, 1687); British Library, Add. MS 8888; Caroline Robbins, ‘Absolute Liberty: The Life and Thought of William Popple’, William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 24 (1967), 190–223.
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Mr. Andrew Marvell’, praising this ‘great Man’ as if a model for Toland as controversialist;²⁸ Toland was soon to surprise the world with his Christianity not Mysterious (1696). With Marvell’s father, Marvell himself, William Popple, John Locke and John Toland, and then those who later republish Marvell’s Short Historical Essay, we follow a path that leads from Erasmian religion, through Socinianism, toward deism. When we look at Marvell’s prose in the 1670s, it is easier to see what he is against than what he is for. This follows from the defensiveness natural to the controversialist, who does not wish to give hostages to fortune. We do know that in the Restoration Marvell conformed to the rites of the Church of England, at least outwardly, and took the oaths of conformity as required for his continuation in office as a Member of Parliament. He was also in the main tolerant of English Catholics, as Castlemaine acknowledged. But especially in his twin tracts of 1676, Mr Smirke and the Short Historical Essay, Marvell reveals himself to a surprising degree. He is against clerical power, hostile to Athanasius,²⁹ resents the proliferation of creeds, mocks the worldly interest expressed in church councils. He is very doubtful about the excessive claims made for the Holy Spirit, whether in the Nicene Council or since. His references to Socinianism are surprisingly equivocal, as if he meant to extend ‘the Latitude of Equivocation’ to himself.³⁰ He was too skilful an ironist to be caught out on this. But he is kind to Arius and perhaps even to Arianism; uneasy only about the clerical interest animating the Arian party.³¹ Marvell also still sees the magistrate as likely to be the best defender of liberty of conscience, with obedience to the magistrate given pride of place in the argument of the Short Historical Essay (Marvell, PWAM 2.168–71). This followed from his hopes of Charles II as a supporter of toleration against a reactionary House of Commons and a House of Lords in which the bishops sat. By contrast, the excesses of Archbishop Laud are in great part blamed for the English Revolution, as Marvell develops the line of argument in which moderate Puritans are seen as normative and the Laudian innovations of the 1630s as a characteristic piece of clerical overreaching.³² His hopes of the king led him to sometimes Hobbesian arguments about sovereignty and royal prerogative in religion. But the royal prerogative was to be exerted for liberty ²⁸ [John Toland,] A Letter from General Ludlow to Dr. Hollingworth (Amsterdam, 1692), iii; Slingsby Bethel (attr.), Ludlow No Lyar (Amsterdam, 1692), 7. ²⁹ See esp. Marvell, PWAM 2.19–21, 72–3, 75, 92, 134–5, 144. ³⁰ See esp. Marvell, PWAM 2.65, 76, 78, 82–3. ³¹ See esp. Marvell, PWAM 2.136, 140–2, 150. ³² This version of recent English church history had been promoted in The Rehearsal Transpros’d and its Second Part (1672, 1673), but is again the subtext in the Short Historical Essay (esp. Marvell, PWAM 2.128–9, 156, 160).
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of conscience, understood by Marvell as non-interference in others’ beliefs, a negative religious liberty, where we can agree to disagree.³³ When we do list what Marvell was for in his twin tracts of 1676, no elaborate theology emerges: ‘liberty of conscience’ he promotes, also humble service, moderation, the modest example of Gregory Nazianzen; fasting, prayer, piety, candour; a learned and disinterested clergy; peace in the church and the acceptance of conventicles, or unity rather than uniformity³⁴; the Apostles’ Creed; and an emphasis on the grace of ‘intensive’ rather ‘extensive’ faith, which spells doubt about complex doctrine like the Trinity, with telling reservations about the role of the Holy Spirit among the apostles or the first, Jewish Church.³⁵ The magistrate is to enforce a moderate and scriptural worship, in which the chief specification is only ‘that Jesus Christ is the Son of God’, which ‘would men even now believe that one thing thorowly, they would be better Christians, than under all their Creeds’ (Marvell, PWAM 2.67, 74). In this gentlemanly way of disarming clerisy, Marvell the minister’s son became an early and influential type of a significant English Enlightenment figure. As J. G. A. Pocock has observed, ‘At the end of the road, of course, lay Socinianism, to which the very logic of discussion seemed to point; but there were many stopping-places along the way, and the value of discussion was always that it might remain inconclusive, with Christian charity or enlightenment good taste taking the place of final commitment.’³⁶ Marvell might especially in his poetic satires transgress against the politeness later demanded of this gentlemanly ideal, but even if his ‘Poetick fury’ was held to ‘misguide his Pen’, his answer to what he variously termed the ‘Prelat’s Rage’ or ‘A Bishops Cruelty’ found high commendation.³⁷
3 Milton was less gentlemanly, especially where it came to Roman Catholics. The full title of Of True Religion in its boldest upper-case font advertises … what ³³ Annabel Patterson observes the limit on Marvell’s perhaps tactical Hobbesianism, Marvell, PWAM 1.212–13. ³⁴ See esp. Marvell, PWAM 2.118, 146, 159; 2.50, 170–1; see also his intervention in Parliament on behalf of the dissenters Hayes and Jekyll (von Maltzahn, Marvell Chronology, 120), and later his regard for Scots covenanters, Poems and Letters, 2.355–6. ³⁵ See esp. Marvell, PWAM 2.71 (and note), 76–7, 80–1, 88–9. ³⁶ J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, vol. 1: The Enlightenments of Edward Gibbon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 64. ³⁷ L. A. Davies, ‘An Unpublished Poem About Andrew Marvell’, Year in English Studies 1 (1971), 100–1: this anonymous poet sees Marvell enjoying a heavenly reward for deriding ‘A Princes Folly or Prelats Pride’. See also ‘Bermudas’ (l. 12) and Marvell’s epigram on Blood’s attempt on the Crown jewels (l. 8).
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best means may be us’d against the growth of POPERY. Famously he there derides the very term Roman Catholic as ‘a meer contradiction, one of the Popes Bulls, as if he should say, universal particular a Catholic Schismatic’ (TR, YP 8.422). But his strokes of wit are founded in his certainty that ‘Popery is the only or the greatest Heresie: and he who is so forward to brand all others for Hereticks, the obstinate Papist, the only Heretick’ (TR, YP 8.421–2). This has long perturbed those enlisting Milton as an apostle of toleration, who can stumble over his restriction, seek to excuse him on this point, or even perceive some softening of his stance at this late date.³⁸ But his logic in harshly defying Roman Catholicism bears emphasis, even as we learn of its part in Milton’s construction of Protestant nationhood.³⁹ What, after all, was this nation meant to defend? It was to be a bulwark against coercion in religion so that faith and works might bring the believer to salvation without risk of interference. Institutional interference, whether political or ecclesiastical or both, as with ‘popery’, jeopardized the community of believers needed for justification (saving faith) and sanctification (the resulting worship, good works) to be complete. Hence the sharp reservation against Roman Catholicism, of which confession Marvell proved so much more accepting. For Milton, the religious coercion he perceived as fundamental to that church followed from its reliance on secular rather than scriptural authority. The Roman Catholic commitment to a coercive institution prevents genuine communion and may preempt the saving experience of justification and sanctification. The Protestant commitment to sola scriptura invites toleration so that the dialogue of believers may fully contribute to salvation, since ‘God hath promis’d by his Spirit to teach all things’ (TR, YP 8.424). Hence Milton’s unwillingness to concede to the Church of England the role in contesting Roman power that was played, for example, by the Gallican church. This would be to harness religion for nation rather than for salvation, whereas nation remains for Milton a means, not an end. Conspicuous in Of True Religion is Milton’s refusal to endorse the institutional pretensions of the Church of England or Presbyterianism. Indeed he construes these as if another form of ‘popery’, for the true Protestant ‘disavowes all implicit Faith’—that is depending on others’ judgements in faith. Instead, Protestants must ‘on all occasions … give account of their Faith, either by Arguing, Preaching in their several Assemblies, Publick writing, and the freedom of Printing’ (TR, YP 8.426). We may recall Milton’s construction of the young Jesus’s intervention ³⁸ See Reuben Marquez Sanchez, Jr., ‘ ‘‘The Worst of Superstitions’’: Milton’s Of True Religion and the Issue of Religious Tolerance’, Prose Studies 9 (1986), 21–38. ³⁹ Elizabeth Sauer, ‘Milton’s Of True Religion, Protestant Nationhood, and the Negotiation of Liberty’, Milton Quarterly 40 (2006), 1–19.
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at the Temple, which opens into his mother’s belated revelation to him of the Annunciation, as a fundamental instance of scriptural discussion yielding Christian identity (Paradise Regained, 1.196–258). The theological positions he describes as contributing to the rich mix of Protestant religious liberty, including Lutheran, Calvinist, and Arminian, are nowhere linked to their denominational expressions. More theological than ecclesiological, these are all up for conscientious discussion. Moreover, a demanding rule of charity prevails against institutional constraints. Where we ‘charitably tolerate’ (TR, YP 8.426) and even ‘the hottest disputes among Protestants [are] calmly and charitably enquir’d into’ (TR, YP 8.424), no secular institution is to relieve us of the obligation to read and discuss scripture as the word of God. There is no refuge from the requirement of faith and worship. This is a much more strenuous and public religious observance than that demanded by Marvell’s more ethical and private emphases. The theological thrust is writ large in Milton’s De Doctrina Christiana as well as in the studious biblicism of Paradise Lost. Hence too Milton’s resentment of the Presbyterians’ ongoing struggle for comprehension in a national church, a far cry from the toleration he favoured. After Charles II was forced to revoke his Declaration of Indulgence, a comprehension may well have seemed to Milton a worse threat to his position than an under- or unenforced uniformity. The difficulty here is to see Milton’s case without too much submitting to the traditional historiography of Puritanism,⁴⁰ which has in considerable part been filtered through the lens of 1662 and Restoration religious settlement as codified in the Act of Uniformity, especially the widespread resignation of ministries it forced on Presbyterian incumbents on ‘Black Bartholomew’ (24 August 1662). That historiography has too often collapsed the sometimes very different interests of nonconformists. Moreover it has in some part cooperated with High Anglicanism in too much polarizing the spectrum of religious opinion, the strict binary reflecting the harshness of Restoration debate rather than contemporary efforts at compromise. Since the eighteenth century at least, it has puzzled commentators why Milton should in his Restoration publications remain hostile to Presbyterians. But it should be recalled that Milton had long shown no kindness to the Presbyterians. His History of Britain, published in 1670, reveals no warming of his regard for them. Its attack on their Westminster Assembly may have been excised from the History (the ‘Digression’) when it went to the press, but other waspish asides remain, conspicuously that lamenting ‘the Presbyters of our Age; who like well to sit in Assembly on ⁴⁰ Mark Goldie, ‘Roger Morrice and the History of Puritanism’, in Religious Identities in Britain, 1660–1832, ed. William Gibson and Robert G. Ingram (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 11–14.
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the publick stipend’ (History, YP 5.116). In the Restoration, when Milton has been presumed finally to have a common cause with the Presbyterians, he seems instead to have viewed their sufferings as their just deserts for obstructing religious liberty, frustrating the English Revolution, and assisting the Restoration. ‘Martyrs bear witness to the truth’, he had often averred, ‘not to themselves’ (Eikonoklastes, YP 3.575). After Of True Religion, even as High Anglican reaction was encouraged by the success in overturning the Indulgence, Milton saw fit in republishing his Poems later in 1673 now to include his bitter sonnets impugning Presbyterians as well as that anti-Catholic cri de coeur, ‘On the late Massacre at Piedmont’ (CSP 342–3). There might be some doubt as to the target of ‘I did but prompt the age to quit their clogs’ (‘Sonnet XII. On the Detraction which followed upon my Writing Certain Treatises’, CSP 297), but Milton’s attack on Presbyterians was unmistakable in ‘A book was writ of late called Tetrachordon’ (‘Sonnet XI’, CSP 308), not least where he sneers at the barbarous dissonance of the Scots names of members of the Westminster Assembly. But it is the ferocity of his attack on Presbyterians in ‘On the New Forcers of Conscience under the Long Parliament’ that impresses most (Poems (1673), 69; CSP 298–300). Even as the end of the Cabal and the Earl of Danby’s rise to power occasioned the attempt at what may be thought a second Restoration with a renewal of the Clarendon Code, moderate Presbyterians might still hope to be joined with Anglicans, thereby becoming for Milton ‘new forcers of conscience’ under a new ‘long parliament’ (elected in 1661 and to be dissolved only in 1679). The next year appeared the second edition of Paradise Lost (1674), which revision allowed a more emphatic placement at the beginning of the twelfth book of the Nimrod passage with its republican thrust, the arrogation of political power now more conspicuously balanced against Michael’s description of the arrogation of spiritual power in the post-apostolic church, when ‘Wolves shall succeed for teachers, grievous Wolves’ (12.508). These forcers of ‘Spiritual lawes by carnal power’ are described by Milton as unbuilding God’s ‘living Temples, built by Faith to stand / Thir own Faith not anothers’; moreover Michael warns that ‘heavie persecution shall arise / On all who in the worship persevere / Of Spirit and Truth’ (12.521–33). So general is the condemnation of ‘Secular power’ in religion that it must be understood as a renewed attack on ‘popery’ in the widest sense, as intimated in Of True Religion. In these Restoration publications, Milton was airing grievances of earlier origin. His malice against Presbyterians in the late 1640s had been aggravated by their readiness to compromise with the imprisoned Charles, which backsliding Milton furiously denounces in the ‘Digression’ from The History of Britain, in The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, in Eikonoklastes, and even in the Defensio. In the Tenure there is no mistaking his animus against those ‘bad men’ eager to
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collude with ‘Tyrants’, who only ‘would seeme good Patriots’ but are concerned only with ‘the intire advantages of thir own Faction’, given as they are to ‘levitie and shallowness of minde, or else a carnal admiring of that worldly pomp and greatness’ from which Charles I had fallen (Tenure, YP 3.190–1, 193). The tract finally cautions Presbyterians not ‘to belly-cheare in thir presumptuous Sion, or to promote designes, abuse and gull the simple Laity, and stirr up tumult, as the Prelats did, for the maintenance of thir pride and avarice’, lest they ‘be the Ministers of Mammon instead of Christ’, whom God would ‘root out’ as he did the bishops before them (Tenure, YP 3.241–2). The Tenure is in great part written against this ‘frustrated Faction’ of ‘our Adversaries’, which Presbyterians it instructs with arguments from earlier ‘Presbyterial’ authorities justifying resistance against tyranny (Tenure, YP 3.195, 198). Again in Eikonoklastes, Milton denounces the Presbyterian divines, or ‘wizzards’, as ‘no disciples of Christ, but of Iscariot’, who ‘had almost brought Religion to a kinde of trading monopoly’, even as they ‘comply with enemies in that wicked cause and interest which they have too oft’n curs’d in others’ (Eikonoklastes, YP 3.347–9).⁴¹ In later advising Cromwell or applauding Sir Henry Vane, Milton was no kinder to these ‘hireling wolves whose gospel is their maw’ (‘To the Lord General Cromwell’, 14, CSP 329); in 1659, he again sought in two tracts to forestall their success in what seemed a new season of opportunity after Cromwell’s death. Once Milton had arrived at the anti-Presbyterian views expressed in his sonnets of the 1640s, it is no wonder that his disgust should have deepened when Presbyterians then sought compromise with Charles I thereafter, even as that king or tyrant was eventually brought to the block. The question remains how soon Milton came to this view. When did his reaction set in against the Presbyterians with whom he had made common cause in the antiprelatical pamphlets of 1641–2? The change has long been associated with the Presbyterians’ censure of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, first published in 1643 (George Thomason dates his copy 1 August), just as the Westminster Assembly had begun sitting. That work seems soon enough to have found a libertine audience, as Milton himself reports in addressing the second edition to Parliament and the Westminster Assembly ( Thomason, 2 February 1644); moreover, others had chosen to ‘rail’ against it ‘out of a waterish and queasy conscience because [they are] ever crazy and never yet sound’, claiming ‘that injury and licence is the best of this Book’ (YP 2.224–6). These dubiously conscientious judges may well be Assembly divines, although Herbert Palmer’s denunciation of the tract, as an example of the infamous consequences of toleration, came only in his sermon to Parliament later that ⁴¹ Milton develops the point in the second edition of Eikonoklastes.
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year (13 August 1644).⁴² The story then is of Milton’s bitterness at such betrayal by his sometime brothers-in-arms. The more sophisticated version of this story dwells on the ‘revolution’ in Milton’s thinking where, following the lead of parliamentary apologists of this date, he reconceives the relation of natural to divine law.⁴³ Hence the shock of Milton’s encounter with the rebarbative Westminster divines, unwilling thus to follow him in extrapolating from arguments in part their own, to which he reacted in part by trying to drive a nationalist wedge between the Scots Presbyterians and their English counterparts, not least his Smectymnuan associates of two years before. It would be easiest to follow Don Wolfe in redescribing the Smectymnuans as Independents,⁴⁴ but that they most definitely are not, even if Stephen Marshall might be many things to many men. How entirely had Milton made common cause with Presbyterians in the apparently Smectymnuan beginning of his career in prose? He himself distinguishes between his writing Of Reformation ‘to a Freind’, as its title declares, or ‘Amicum quendam’ as he reaffirms in the Defensio secunda, whereas the remaining antiprelatical pamphlets he wrote for love of truth (‘veritatis’) and sense of Christian duty (‘officii Christiani’) (Of Ref., YP 1.517; Second Defence, YP 4.622–3).⁴⁵ The implied friend is surely a Presbyterian in view of Milton’s comments on ‘the Discipline propounded’ and ‘this discipline we desire’ (Of Ref., YP 1.598, 605),⁴⁶ most likely his former tutor the Smectymnuan Thomas Young. But Milton may have had a more independent position than has commonly been assumed. In Of Reformation he is not yet performing the role he assumes in the remaining antiprelatical pamphlets, where he hastens to defend ‘certain eminent ministers’ (‘Ministros quosdam primarios’) whom he was later, when addressing a continental audience, reluctant to concede were in fact Presbyterians, lest they be confused with the ‘Presbyteriani quidam ministri’ accused of collusion with the tyrant Charles (Defensio secunda, 89, 92; Second Defence, YP 4.623, 626). Of Reformation is no very Presbyterian work: take, for example, Milton’s Aristotelian emphasis ‘that to govern well is to train up a Nation in true wisdom and vertue, and ⁴² Gordon Campbell, A Milton Chronology (Houndmills and New York: Macmillan and St Martin’s Press, 1997), 81. Palmer was as English as his name and an exceptionally moderate Presbyterian. ⁴³ This was the breakthrough of Ernest Sirluck, for which see esp. his introduction to YP 2.1–216, 52; compare Sirluck’s MA thesis on ‘Milton’s Political Thought: A Survey Preliminary to the Investigation of the Classical Influence’ (University of Toronto, 1941) and Ph.D. thesis ‘Milton and the Law of Nature’ (University of Toronto, 1948). ⁴⁴ Second Defence, YP 4.623 n. ⁴⁵ Joannis MiltonI angli pro populo anglicano defensio secunda (London, 1654), 89; Second Defence, YP 4.622–3. ⁴⁶ See also 1.546, 606.
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that which springs from thence magnanimity, (take heed of that)’ before he adds ‘that which is our beginning, regeneration, and happiest end, likenes to God, which in one word we call godlines’ (Of Ref., YP 1.571).⁴⁷ Its oratorical splendour does not enough mask its lack of more concerted argument, which Milton, had he been more Presbyterian, might have found much easier to generate. As an orator next on behalf of Smectymnuus, he then gained a fuller case to make. The question remains how soon, having at first attacked prelates, Milton came to see that ‘New Presbyter is but Old Priest writ large’, as when he later excoriated these latter-day Pharisees (‘On the New Forcers of Conscience under the Long Parliament’, 20, CSP 300). In the first version of ‘On the New Forcers of Conscience’ he associates them still more directly with William Prynne.⁴⁸ There was more than the Scots’ intervention to provoke his disaffection. Recent work by Sharon Achinstein has suggested that Milton might already in 1641–2 stand at a remove from the Presbyterians with whom he is so often associated and that his later break with them may have followed from his never having so entirely sided with them in the first place.⁴⁹ As Achinstein has it, we need to be more careful in assessing Milton’s allegiances at this date and in doing so ‘disentangle political ends from political means’. Her argument too accords with the Trevor-Roper thesis that more free-thinking dissidents, including Socinians, broadly or narrowly construed, and the Erasmian tradition on which they drew, might require ‘Calvinism, however intellectually reactionary, … [as] the necessary political ally of intellectual progress’, that when embattled they might don a Calvinist ‘suit of armour’ ( Trevor-Roper, ‘Religious Origins’, 234–6). Or a straitjacket, as it might prove. Milton would not be the first to find that the church so welcoming of the newcomer might prove less liberal once he was within it; the Smectymnuan association needed soon to be discarded. Although ‘intellectual progress’ toward toleration might also develop within Puritanism,⁵⁰ Milton was preparing for longer flight, and on the basis of that preparation was ⁴⁷ Richard Strier explores Milton’s assertion of the dignity of man in ‘Milton against humility’, in Religion and Culture in Renaissance England, ed. Claire McEachern and Debora Shuger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 258–86. ⁴⁸ John Milton, Poems: Reproduced in Facsimile from the Manuscript in Trinity College, Cambridge (Menston: Scolar Press, 1972), [48]. Prynne’s attack on ‘divorce at pleasure’ won Milton’s reproach in Colasterion (YP 2.722–4); as ‘a late hot Qurist for tithes’ he was still under the lash in Considerations Touching The likeliest means to remove Hirelings out of the Church in 1659 (56–7; YP 7.294). ⁴⁹ Sharon Achinstein, ‘Before Independency? John Milton in 1641’, MLA Convention, Philadelphia, 2004—I am grateful to the author for letting me see this in typescript. ⁵⁰ John Coffey, ‘Puritanism and Liberty Revisited: The Case for Toleration in the English Revolution’, Historical Journal 41 (1998), 961–85.
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capable of rapidly synthesizing fresh positions, as the divorce tracts show. Moreover, before and no doubt after his Italian trip, Milton was also keeping other less Calvinist company. For example, David Masson long ago proposed that it was John Hales of Eton to whom Milton owed his introduction to the Provost of Eton, Sir Henry Wotton, who cites ‘your said learned Friend’, ‘Mr. H.’, as one who might join them in dining there, were Milton to make some ‘farther stay in these parts’ (Sir Henry Wotton to Milton, 13 April 1638, YP 1.340).⁵¹ Milton seems in his years at nearby Horton to have benefited, as Marvell would later, from ‘having convers’d a while with the living remains of one of the clearest heads and best prepared brests in Christendom’, the John Hales whom Aubrey judged the first Socinian in England (Marvell, PWAM 1.130).⁵² It is not to be supposed that the reticent Hales need be entirely free with his views in such encounters, but Milton had plainly impressed that discerning scholar as suitable for introduction to his friend Wotton. An expansive sense that truth is discovered beyond the customary and orthodox animates Milton’s wide-ranging sympathies. By late 1644, Milton had faced enough of the reaction to the divorce tracts, and still more of the Stationers’ and Presbyterians’ work to renew prepublication licensing, to express his independence from those monopolists of truth in the memorable terms of Areopagitica. It is the logic of that work he is reported as having invoked when, faulted in 1652 for having licensed the Latin Racovian Catechism, he answered ‘yes, and that he had published a tract on that subject, that men should refrain from forbidding books; that in approving of that book he had done no more than what his opinion was’.⁵³ There is a consensus that Milton was no strict Socinian, nor were there many such doctrinaire heretics at this early date.⁵⁴ But his interest in such possibilities was already active and fearless. In the summer of 1652, Biddle’s translation of ⁵¹ John Milton, Poems (London, 1645), 71; David Masson, Life of John Milton, 6 vols. (London, 1859–94), 1.737–9. ⁵² Aubrey is thus quoted by Masson, who also describes Wotton’s character and reasonable theology, Life of John Milton, 1.528–31, 535–7. In addition to Clarendon’s elegiac recollection of such spirits at Great Tew, the milieu of Hales and Wotton is memorably evoked in Hugh Trevor-Roper, ‘The Great Tew Circle’, Catholics, Anglicans and Puritans: Seventeenth-Century Essays (London: Secker & Warburg, 1987, 1988), 166–230. ⁵³ J. Milton French, Life Records of John Milton, 5 vols. (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1949–58), 3.206. ⁵⁴ Dobranski, ‘Licensing Milton’s heresy’, in Milton and Heresy, ed. Dobranski and John P. Rumrich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 139–58; Michael Lieb, ‘Milton and the Socinian Heresy’, in Milton and the Grounds of Contention, ed. Mark R. Kelley, Michael Lieb, and John T. Shawcross (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2003), 234–83. Dobranski seems unduly suspicious of the evidence, not least from Aitzema, on the point of Milton’s having licensed the Racovian Catechism; also too ready to take Christopher Hill’s word for Socinian (or Arminian) thinking ‘gradually merging with the ‘‘indigenous radical tradition’’ ’ (147), where the likes of John Hales are not to be found.
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The Racovian Catechisme appeared ( Thomason, 8 July), from ‘Amsterledam’ or perhaps somewhere nearer to London. For this work Milton and Marvell may have shared some regard as early as their meeting by the next February, 1652/3. How soon they were ready to acknowledge its interest each to the other remains uncertain. Milton had a talent for attracting younger friends, drawn to him, it seems, by his compelling freedom of thought, a liberty made the more attractive by the biblical and classical learning that sustained it. That Marvell was receptive we know; of how much and how soon remains unclear. But the strenuous engagements on which Milton insisted, early and late, and which carried him far in systematic theology as well as epic renarration of biblical history, are at a remove from Marvell’s more inflected, intricate, and intimate responses to such challenges. Their divergent ideas of toleration, which may be construed respectively as a positive and a negative conception of religious liberty, would be collapsed when later tradition made of Marvell Milton’s secretary and coreligionist. Milton’s poetry of course triumphed and only belatedly did Marvell’s encounter any like esteem, if still different in kind. But in the history of liberalism and the secular state, it is the position on toleration for which Marvell stands that has prevailed, or has done in the West. That has allowed an extraordinary freedom of religious inquiry but one perhaps also limited by the widely agreed concession of privacy, with narrowing expectations of conscience as an individual matter.
Part II Philosophical and Religious Engagements
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6 Libertinism and Toleration: Milton, Bruno and Aretino James Grantham Turner Since therefore the knowledge and survay of vice is in this world so necessary to the constituting of human vertue, and the scanning of error to the confirmation of truth, how can we more safely, and with lesse danger scout into the regions of sin and falsity then by reading all manner of tractats, and hearing all manner of reason? And this is the benefit which may be had of books promiscuously read. (Areopagitica, YP 2.516–17)
Thinking about Milton and toleration has generally concentrated on religious diversity, the coercion of belief, or the expression of heterodox ideas (within Protestantism).¹ But questions of sexuality—regulation of marriage, sanctions against unchastity, censorship of erotica—haunt Milton’s discourse of toleration. The divorce tracts, most obviously, present sexual discontent as a crucial issue in the struggle for freedom and the rebuilding of a revolutionary male elite; they offer practical instances of toleration too, for example by suggesting that the wife’s adultery need not harm the marriage. In Paradise Lost, again, frank depictions of eroticism are flanked by polemics against those ‘hypocrites’ who deny Edenic sexuality or censor it behind ‘shows of seeming pure’. Fiercely as he defends chastity, Milton seems always ready to attack intolerance in the sexual realm. This chapter will focus on Areopagitica, where every instance of heterodoxy is matched by a parallel allusion to sexuality, even when describing scripture. ( The Licensing Order itself said nothing about bawdy writing, specifying the ¹ It would be redundant to document the absorption of Milton into the discourse of political history; outstanding examples are cited in the editors’ introduction and throughout this volume.
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danger as ‘defamation of Religion and government’ (YP 2.797).) The first step in Milton’s case for tolerating obscene sexual discourse—including Pietro Aretino, ‘that notorious ribald of Arezzo’, proscribed by the papal Index—is to demonstrate the futility of censoring not only books but talk, song, gesture, clothes, even the windows and balconies where lovers might flirt. But the heart of his argument involves, not the impracticality of censorship or the benefits of mere toleration, but the positive necessity of encountering unlawful sex in literary form—at least for the imagined community of ‘good’ readers whose sensibility lifts them ‘above the crowd’.² In the terms of the famous passage serving as my epigraph, Aretino provides a key instance of the ‘survay of vice’ that Milton identifies as not merely permissible, but ‘so necessary to the constituting of human vertue’ (Areop., YP 2.516). Much of what follows, then, will explore the implications of citing the ribald, pornographic Aretino in an argument ostensibly devoted to toleration of ‘all manner of tractates’ and ‘all manner of reason’ (Areop., YP 2.517). My most recent book drew on Milton’s theories of personal development to show the deep congruity between the scandalous hard-core writing of the period and the educational revolution for which it is justly famous; Aretino played a founding role in that libertine literary tradition. I already defined what I called Milton’s ‘ethics of confrontation’ in One Flesh, using key passages in Areopagitica, and here I develop one of his central ideas: that virtue is constituted by knowing forbidden sex as deeply as possible without actually doing it.³ Aretino’s writings, real and apocryphal, therefore offered precisely those ‘provoking objects’ or ‘objects of lust’ that typify the desirable plenitude of the world in Areopagitica, necessary for the unfallen Adam as much as for the warfaring Christian (Areop., YP 2.527). Immediately before the passage cited above, Milton condemns the ‘fugitive and cloister’d virtue’ of those who shun the hot, dusty struggle with vice, who fail to engage in ‘triall by what is contrary’ and to explore ‘the utmost that vice promises to her followers’ (YP 2.515). This conception of Aretino as the enlivening ‘contrary’, the epitome of a ‘salty’ obscenity that is beneficial and even necessary for the advanced reader, had been strikingly anticipated by another victim of Inquisitorial intolerance, Giordano Bruno, in the very dialogue for which he was burnt at the stake in 1600. I suggest in my first section that Bruno provides the essential link between Aretino and Milton, even though the English rebel never mentions the Italian heretic directly. Both Milton and Bruno propose that personal ² See Defensio secunda, CM 8.134 (‘supra vulgus’, in Milton’s explanation of the motives behind Areop.). ³ See James Grantham Turner, One Flesh: Paradisal Marriage and Sexual Relations in the Age of Milton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), ch. 5.
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growth depends on ‘contrariety’, and that the wise reader must therefore experience to the full the ‘ribald’ writings of libertines like Aretino. The editors of this volume seek to distance themselves from the anachronistic debate over whether Milton is good/progressive or bad/repressive, and to develop a specifically literary account of toleration. To clarify this process, I would like to identify three main ways in which toleration could be promoted. (1) De jure, it is achieved by campaigning for the abolition of legal strictures and the repression they encourage. (2) Theoretically, toleration is advanced by explicitly discussing the concept, developing an abstract language for that discussion, and formulating general principles that make it the basis of civilization. (3) But it is de facto or practical toleration that should interest the literary historian most. By this I mean admitting the proscribed into the sphere of discourse and representing it in a positive, empathetic light. Milton campaigned eloquently against repressive laws that affected himself, particularly after the divorce tracts were condemned, and I will show that he extends imaginative, ‘practical’ toleration to a range of erotic classics, as well as to the varied ‘tractates’ and ‘reasons’ of religious controversy. ‘The benefit of books promiscuously read’ mutates into the freedom to read promiscuous books—a freedom that becomes a right when cut off by unworthy censors. Milton’s use of the language of toleration, on the other hand, is more limited. Within Areopagitica, the word ‘tolerate’ entirely lacks the resonance it acquired in the Restoration. Peevish intolerance is duly mocked—for example in Plato, who appreciated libertine literature in reality but dreamed he could banish poetry from his theoretical republic (Areop., YP 2.522). But symmetry does not apply: intolerance may be condemned, but toleration is not thereby raised to a universal positive value, and often carries a belittling undertone. When Milton endorses Lord Brooke’s charitable view of the sectarians, he also labels them as misguided and distances them from ‘us’, the presumed circle of intellectuals and leaders. In the divorce tracts he urged readers not to blame those radicals, because their fervor can be explained as the result of pathological sexual frustration; now he condescendingly calls on Parliament ‘to tolerat them, though in some disconformity to our selves’ (Areop., YP 2.561). Differences among English revolutionaries ‘might be tolerated in peace’ because they amount to so little, because they should be defined as what St Paul called ‘things indifferent’ (2.563). At the time of writing, however, England was not ‘in peace’ but at war, that ‘speciall’ time when the Temple of Janus gapes open, the time that confers ‘priviledge’ on controversy (2.561). Milton’s most endearing plea for toleration is therefore hedged around with belligerent threats: when it comes to ‘neighboring … indifferences’ it is better that ‘many be tolerated, rather then all compell’d’; in contrast, we must
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ruthlessly ‘extirpat’ not only Roman Catholicism, the famous exception, but anything that Milton chooses to label ‘superstition’, ‘impious or evil’, ‘against faith or maners’ (2.565). In conspicuous contrast, he never suggests that libertine writing should be extirpated, however gross its offense to manners. The point of this preface is not to unmask Milton as intolerant, but to encourage a more complex view of the passions and interests that the issue of tolerance dredges up. I will focus on the third kind of tolerance, the practical, and on the sexual and corporeal aspects of reading. Making Milton a political and intellectual animal need not mean neglecting the ‘sensuous and passionate’. Considerable work has been done on the hermeneutics of reading and the ‘ontology of books’ in Areopagitica.⁴ I want to put the body back into this account of Milton’s ‘promiscuous’ reading, and into his furious intolerance of anything that prevents it.
1. Aretino, Bruno, and the Necessity of Ribaldry Pietro Aretino—the pen-name meaning ‘Peter from Arezzo’—appears in Areopagitica as a test-case for the futility of book-licensing, alongside Petronius a familiar example of the ‘infection’ emanating from evil courtiers that ‘infuses’ itself into the population despite anything that censorship can do. This stage of the formal counter-argument (‘First, is fear’d the infection that may spread’) begins with a typically aggressive reductio ad absurdum: ‘then all human learning and controversie in religious points must remove out of the world, yea the Bible it selfe; for that oftimes relates blasphemy not nicely, it describes the carnall sense of wicked men not unelegantly, it brings in holiest men passionately murmuring against Providence through all the arguments of Epicurus’ (Areop., YP 2.517). (Note how religious controversy morphs into ‘carnal’ sexuality within a single sentence.) Then follows the refutation of a further unspoken objection: Nor boots it to say for these [biblical and patristic writers], and all the heathen Writers of greatest infection, if it must be thought so, with whom is bound up the life of human ⁴ James Rovira, ‘Gathering the Scattered Body of Milton’s Areopagitica’, Renascence 57 (2005), 89. Rovira, like John D. Schaeffer in ‘Metonymies We Read By: Rhetoric, Truth and the Eucharist in Milton’s Areopagitica’, Milton Quarterly 34 (2000), 84–92, is still largely concerned with refuting earlier formulations by Stanley Fish and Lana Cable. Thomas Festa, ‘Repairing the Ruins: Milton As Reader and Educator’, Milton Studies 43 (2004), 35–63, includes a careful study of the reading process in Areop. (46–57 passim). Markus Klinge, ‘The Grotesque in Areopagitica’, Milton Studies 45 (2006), 82–128, continues the anti-Fish polemic by defining books as ‘daimons’ or ‘half-creatures’ (118), but cites Aretino only as a libeller and heretic, not as a ‘ribald’ and founder of sexual discourse (102, 126 n. 49).
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learning, that they writ in an unknown tongue, so long as we are sure those languages are known as well to the worst of men, who are both most able, and most diligent to instill the poison they suck, first into the Courts of Princes, acquainting them with the choisest delights, and criticisms of sin. As perhaps did that Petronius whom Nero call’d his Arbiter, the Master of his revels; and that notorious ribald of Arezzo, dreaded, and yet dear to the Italian Courtiers. (Areop., YP 518)
Strictly, Aretino illustrates only the transmission of oral corruption, conveying filth to the ear of Renaissance princes as Petronius did to Nero, and as Satan whispers into the ear of Eve to produce ‘inordinate desires’ (PL 4.808). Like Petronius, however, Aretino was famous as an author, a classic of depravity; indeed, his role as a courtier (satirized in his best-known comedy La Cortegiana) lasted only briefly, while he dominated print culture for many decades. Arguments in Areopagitica often do double duty, and I propose here that by implication Aretino also stands as an example of the depraved but vital discourse that must remain freely available to an elite readership. Aretino enjoyed a lurid reputation throughout Europe as an author of erotic practises and discourses, while in the English imagination Aretino was to sexuality as Machiavelli was to politics. He actually did write dialogues in the voice of prostitutes (literally ‘pornography’), and though his sonnets on the most explicit sexual engravings of Renaissance Italy circulated only in corrupt copies, his authentic letter on this exploit was published and widely read. In urban mythology, ‘Aretine’ invented and codified every sexual variant, and several familiar references in Ben Jonson’s comedies show how far he had penetrated the atmosphere. Corvino justifies prostituting his wife to the decrepit Volpone by contrasting him to: … some yong Frenchman, or hot Tuscane bloud, That had read Aretine, conn’d all his printes, Knew every quirke within lusts laborinth, And were profest critique in lechery. (III.vii.59–62)
And in The Alchemist Sir Epicure Mammon fantasizes about collecting, and performing, so many erotic postures that he will make Aretino seem ‘dull’ (II.ii.44).⁵ Knowledge of the Aretino-figure—and of Giordano Bruno—came closer to Milton when Thomas Carew staged his Court masque Coelum Brittanicum, the immediate precedent and perhaps antitype of his own A Masque. Carew dramatizes Bruno’s 1584 Spaccio della Bestia Trionfante, the very work that led ⁵ Ben Jonson, Complete Works, ed. C. H. Herford and Percy Simpson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937), 5.78, 319.
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to his prosecution and execution. Momus, the presenter of Carew’s masque, was probably also suggested by Bruno’s comedy Il Candelaio, which defines the necessary, revitalizing function of Momus in terms that anticipate Milton’s argument for confronting uncensored books: ribald mockery provides the ‘contrario’ that makes virtue ‘piu´ bella, manifesta e chiara’, ‘more beautiful, more manifest, more clear’; scurrility ‘confirms’ and ‘reinforces’ the good in Bruno, just as in Milton ‘the scanning of error’ leads to ‘the confirmation of truth’ (Areop., YP 2.516).⁶ In the Spaccio Bruno explicitly cites Aretino’s pornographic Ragionamenti in order to define a philosophical mode of reading that converts ribaldry into something like divinity. Following this hint, Carew’s Momus identifies himself as the follower of Rabelais and ‘old Peter Aretine’. As I show elsewhere, Momus’s ‘scurrilous infusion of bawdy double entendre contaminates and destabilizes the official doctrine of the entertainment—the reformation of a once-libertine Olympus, inspired by the virtuous marriage of Charles I and Henrietta Maria’.⁷ In any case, Milton saw himself as a European intellectual not a Little Englander, so even without these English sources he must be presumed familiar with Continental libertine and radical writings. He sought out the amorous classics as a youth, and on his Italian journey mingled in those free-thinking private academies whose members were categorized as (intellectual) libertini and in some cases persecuted or killed for their (sexually) libertine satires.⁸ Though he was less attuned to French culture, Milton could certainly learn about all the perversions of the libertins from the massively intolerant Father Franois Garasse, who like Thomas Edwards catalogued every transgression he could find, and more. To heat up the obscenity trial of the leading libertin Th´eophile de Viau, Garasse presents or invents a vast swarming conspiracy of atheists, priapists, and sodomites; this Jesuit treatise may have given Milton the image of a huge crowd of sceptics seeking to promote vagabond lust, such as those sons of Belial who ‘laugh broad’ at his divorce tracts or the chorus of ‘foolish tongues’ who jeer at God for placing Adam in a delicious Paradise and then allowing him to fall. Garasse denounces what he claims is a widespread doctrine, that ‘God and Nature put man in the world to enjoy its pleasures’ even more thoroughly than the animals do; Areopagitica insists that ‘many’ hold a similar opinion, that God is unjust for creating a ⁶ Giordano Bruno, Oeuvres compl`etes, vol. i: Chandelier, ed. Giovanni Aquilecchia and Giorgio B´arberi Squarotti, trans. Yves Hersant (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1993), 373. ⁷ James Grantham Turner, Libertines and Radicals in Early Modern London: Sexuality, Politics and Literary Culture, 1630–1685 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 46. ⁸ Two examples discussed in my Schooling Sex: Libertine Literature and Erotic Education in Italy, France, and England, 1534–1685 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), ch. 2, are Antonio Rocco and Ferrante Pallavicino, both from the Venetian Accademia degli Incogniti.
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libertine Adam then cruelly cutting him off from the pleasure that defines his existence (Areop., YP 2.527).⁹ Milton brought back a manuscript of the dangerous French-authored libertin tract Heptaplomeres, and in Florence the Academician Antonio Malatesti presented him with a manuscript of his own lewd sonnets, evidently responding to the English visitor’s interests. Moving in the circles he did, and priding himself on his solidarity with victims of Catholic intolerance such as Galileo, it is inconceivable that Milton would not have encountered Bruno’s as well as Aretino’s writings, by repute and probably in the original. Bruno’s embrace of Aretino began in the ‘Explicatory Epistle’ of the Spaccio, dedicated to Sir Philip Sidney (and therefore likely to be known to English literati). He defines himself as a ‘vulgar’ but ‘free’ speaker who refuses to ‘treat as shameful what Nature makes worshipful’ or ‘cover that which she reveals openly’, deliberately echoing Aretino’s naturalistic defence of his Modi sonnets, in a famous published letter.¹⁰ As Bruno spells out the hermeneutic principle that draws him towards the jocular mode, the literary equivalent of the coincidence of contraries that underlies his entire philosophical project, his focus shifts from authorship to reception. Confronted with ‘serious and jocose subjects’ mixed together, the reader must ‘think that all of them are equally worthy of being gazed upon through extraordinary spectacles’ (equalmente degni d’essere con non ordinarii occhiali remirati). Value, even ‘dignity’, derives from the reader’s capacity to synthesize from the entire range of subject-matter, to remirare or contemplate in repeated wonderment what is conventionally considered the most abject. And conversely the lewd and talentless reader can ruin even the most sacred truths: good people can ‘convert’ the utmost malignancy into something useful and beneficial, whereas at the opposite pole ‘i ribaldi’ can find ‘matter of scandal’ in the noblest subject—that is, the carnivalesque chorus of ‘ribalds’ who turn everything into comic mockery,
⁹ Franois Garasse, La Doctrine curieuse des beaux esprits de ce temps (Paris, 1623), esp. Book 6, chs. 6–7. See further my Schooling Sex, 44, 92–3, and Joan DeJean, The Reinvention of Obscenity: Sex, Lies, and Tabloids in Early Modern France (London and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), ch. 1. ¹⁰ Spaccio, ‘Epistola Esplicatoria’, in Giordano Bruno, Dialoghi italiani: Dialoghi metafisici e dialoghi morali, ed. Giovanni Gentile, 3rd edn., ed. Giovanni Aquilecchia (Florence: Sansoni, 1985), 551; my translations make use of Bruno, The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast, trans. and ed. Arthur D. Imerti (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1964), 71 (in subsequent references the Dialoghi citation is followed by the corresponding page in Imerti’s version). Bruno cites Aretino in many other places, but they are outside the scope of this essay.
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like the ‘ribald of Arezzo’ in Areopagitica or the Sons of Belial in the divorce tracts.¹¹ Bruno assumes, like Milton later, that ‘wicked’ material becomes the site of a hermeneutic contest over ways of seeing. The good observer ‘gazes and regazes’ through a special optic lens that converts turpitude into philosophical insight, while the ‘ribald’ turns everything into obscenity. In what is only a contradiction on the surface, the philosophical reader simultaneously repudiates and embraces the ribald. He establishes the greatest possible distance from the ‘vulgar’ but also playfully assumes, and subsumes, the wise folly of wantonness and the festive acceptance of everything—what we might call the carnivalesque model of tolerance. The ribald, like the scurra, performed a distinct social function as lewd jester-satirist, and the role could be assumed in an ‘Attic’ or Socratic spirit.¹² This was the principle behind the ‘Aretine’ character of Momus in Coelum Brittanicum, Carew’s adaptation for Court entertainment of one of Bruno’s most radical dialogues. Bruno’s praise of Aretino in the second dialogue of the Spaccio matches and exemplifies the process of reading recommended in his introductory letter, the ‘special optics’ that shift from the ribald to the enlightened perspective. The adept Saulino is surprised to hear, from Sophia or Divine Wisdom herself, that the gods’ public library contains the Priapea, popular romance, scurrilous poetry, and most notably ‘la Pippa, la Nanna, l’Antonia’—that is, the outrageously obscene Ragionamenti of Aretino. Sophia insists over Saulino’s protests that the true philosopher finds these texts ‘weighty and serious’, since ‘there is no reading-matter, no book’ that the gods exclude, provided it has some sale or ‘saltiness’. ‘Salt’ in this Priapic/Aretine context means salaciousness as well as Attic wit; readers familiar with Milton’s Sixth Prolusion and his Defences know how enthusiastically he promoted sales or displays of bawdy jocularity, provided they were couched in ‘elegant’ and ‘urbane’ Latin (Prolusiones, CM 12.238, 244).¹³ The divine mode of judgment (as opposed to that of the ‘common’ reader for whom these things are sinful, or the ‘ignorant’ scelerati who will derive ‘bad education’ from them) involves the aesthetic appreciation of creative mind at play: the gods ‘take pleasure in
¹¹ Spaccio, 555/74: ‘non e` cosa s´ı ria che non si converta in profitto ed utile de buoni; e non e` cosa tanto buona e degna che non possa esser caggione e materia di scandalo a’ ribaldi.’ ¹² For ribaldi as a social group, see Richard C. Trexler, Dependence in Context in Renaissance Florence (Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1994), 116–26; Milton combines ‘Scurra’ and ‘Ribald’ in one sentence in Animadversions (YP 1.732). ¹³ See John Milton, Latin Writings: A Selection, ed. John K. Hale (Assen: Van Gorcum; and Tempe, Ariz.: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1998), 12, 88 n. 20, 89 n. 77, 93 n. 84, and my ‘Milton among the Libertines’, in Christophe Tournu and Neil Forsyth, eds., Milton, Rights and Liberties (Berne: Peter Lang, 2007), 447–60.
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the multiform representation of all things, and in the multiform fruits of all kinds of genius’, the frutti moltiformi de tutti ingegni (Spaccio, 673–4/159–60). Sophia’s remark might seem like a facetious digression, but when Saulino earnestly presses her to exclude books written by ‘infamous, dishonorable, and dissolute’ authors she praises their ‘educational’ value as ‘fruits of cognition’ in the highest philosophical language. As Milton would later do, Bruno couples a vivid practical example of toleration—Aretino’s rude but ‘salty’ dialogues—with a theoretical justification, couched not as a matter of abstract rights but as an opportunity for personal growth in the reader. Both authors propose an interactive and transcendent model of reading based upon ‘trial by what is contrary’. Scurrilous writings, Sophia explains, teach ‘how laughter is set in motion, how disgust, pleasure, nausea; and in all there is wisdom and providence, and in everything there is everything, and where one contrary exists there the other exists to the utmost, each generating the other to the utmost’—massime `e l’uno dove `e l’altro contrario (Spaccio, 674/160). Already in the first dialogue she had proposed a full-blown theory of contraries, preparing for this account of ‘divine’ reading. ‘Wherever there is contrariety there is action and reaction, there is movement, there is diversity’ (Spaccio, 573/90–1). L’aumento e la perfezione, growth and perfecting, come from experiencing the clash of passions that include the most powerful erotic feelings: ‘the state of venereal ardor tortures you, the state of spent lust saddens you, but what satisfies in this is the transition from one state to the other’ (Spaccio, 571/89). As later in Milton, true reading must involve working emotions and not merely cerebral judgements. The dynamic, mutually maximizing, exchange of ‘contraries’ requires il riso, il fastidio, il piacere, la nausea—the full range of passions and gut reactions from delight to revulsion. It is tempting to discover in Bruno’s account of ‘growth and perfecting’ the core of Milton’s argument against repression in Areopagitica, the haughty assurance that ‘God sure esteems the growth and compleating of one vertuous person, more then the restraint of ten vitious’ (Areop., YP 2.528). Milton’s theories of passionate reading and ‘trial by what is contrary’ seem, then, to be powerfully foreshadowed in Bruno. And Bruno, again like Milton, applies vitalistic criteria to determine the ultimate value of discourse: the goddess Isis commends the ‘vive voci’ of those who worship divinity in Nature, in contrast to the ‘vane fantasie’ of false, conventional religion.¹⁴ Areopagitica likewise exalts the goddess Isis as the paradigm of active truth-seeking. Milton and Bruno both explicitly cite Aretino, as a prime example of carnal writing ¹⁴ Spaccio, 602/109, 778/237; for a fuller account of Bruno’s theology here, see my Libertines and Radicals, 45 (which includes an earlier version of the previous paragraph).
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‘bound up with the life of human learning’, writing that should not merely be tolerated, but positively and necessarily embraced as part of one’s ‘bold accustoming’ or ‘growth and compleating’. Both authors establish an elitist and ascetic morality on the principle that one must know wickedness to the utmost, emotionally as well as abstractly. Both authors argue for total exposure to dangerous representations, using many of the same concepts—the divine plenitude of the world, the interconnection of contraries, the intrinsic value of ‘living words’ even when their subject is notoriously ribald.
2. ‘That notorious ribald of Arezzo’ in Milton’s Argument for Toleration With this context in mind, we return to the specific moment in Areopagitica where Milton evokes the ‘notorious’ Pietro Aretino. What motivates this citation, and what work does it do in the evolving treatise? At first glance Aretino does seem to be marginal to the argument against book-licensing, a parallel instance of the futility of censorship showing how wicked ideas flow into the country orally rather than through the print medium. Thus ‘all the contagion that foreine books can infuse’—a vivid metaphor of pathological liquefaction that mingles with images of sea-borne imports—will ‘find a passage to the people’ via the ‘Courts of Princes’ and their corrupt Masters of the Revels (Areop., YP 2.518). And this will happen even if the press is severely ‘gagged’ and the wickedness is couched in a foreign language. Oddly, Milton’s third example after Petronius and Aretino is Sir Francis Bryan, a licentious courtier of Henry VIII who presumably poured out his poison in English, making him tangential to the point being refuted. By juxtaposing Aretino and specifically English Court officials Milton sacrifices his argument to the war effort, losing no chance to discredit the Cavalier festivities of Whitehall. On this local level he may be sniping at a specific target, the Court masque in which Carew exploited Bruno and ‘Peter Aretine’ for tainted royalist purposes. Bryan (identified only by his nickname ‘Vicar of Hell’) seems anomalous in this group, but common sexual associations link them; perhaps Milton is thinking of Petronius and Aretino as procurers of lewd fiction and Bryan as the pimp of his cousin Anne Boleyn. But what does Milton mean by this ‘contagion’, ‘poison’, or ‘infection’? What is the test-case or chief exemplum on which the fight against censorship takes its stand? Milton seems unclear whether he is principally concerned with unorthodox religious ideas or with dangerously arousing sexual representations. The case of pornography keeps bobbing up just when he seems to be launching a theological or intellectual point. The Aretino allusion comes in
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just such a double-focused passage. Milton is triumphantly defending ‘the benefit which may be had of books promiscuously read’, having just invoked (or recreated) Spenser’s Bower of Bliss episode as the supreme example of moral teaching, and having just declared that ‘the knowledge and survay of vice’ is absolutely ‘necessary to the constituting of human vertu’ (Areop., YP 2.516). He tries to maintain his rationalist focus on ‘human learning and controversie in religious points’, but immediately starts pointing out that the Bible itself ‘describes the carnall sense of wicked men not unelegantly’ and that the Church Fathers ‘transmit our ears through a hoard of heathenish obscenities’—a weirdly inverted phrase that has ‘our ears’ traveling ‘through’ the sexual world of antiquity described in such detail by Clement and Eusebius (2.517–18). In Milton’s short list of dangers presented by the Bible and the Church Fathers, blasphemy, Epicurism, obscurity, and heresy feature once each, but ‘carnal’ and ‘obscene’ sexuality four times; the ‘modest’ mention of the Talmudic Keri or euphemism is also associated with hard-core sexual reference, as becomes clear in Pro Se Defensio when Milton cites it again to justify ‘plain-speaking obscenity’ in his own attacks on Alexander More (Areop., YP 2.517; Pro se defensio, CM 9.110). We must not distort the meaning of ‘books promiscuously read’ by automatically supplying the modern, sexual meaning, but Milton’s examples reveal it lurking there nonetheless. ‘Promiscuous’ in Milton’s later verse might refer only to the mingling of large crowds, but in the hot-headed Areopagitica it certainly evokes orgies both physical and verbal: the Spartans might have banished Archilochus ‘for his broad verses’—a very rare case of censorship in the enlightened ancient world—but if so this only shows their hypocrisy and barbarity, since ‘they were as dissolute in their promiscuous conversing; whence Euripides affirmes in Andromache, that their women were all unchaste’ (Areop., YP 2.496). In his review of Classical censorship, Milton also stresses the lack of legal action against opinions ‘tending to voluptuousnesse’ such as ‘that libertine school of Cyrene’, denies that Ovid was really banished for his ‘wanton Poems’, and explodes the rigid laws of Plato’s Republic by citing Plato’s own liberal taste in erotic literature. Not only did Plato write ‘wanton epigrams and dialogues’ himself, but he constantly read Sophron Mimus and Aristophanes, ‘books of grossest infamy’. Aristophanes in particular—described as not only libellous but ‘the loosest of them all’, an obvious reference to sexual licentiousness—was valued so highly by Plato that he recommended him as essential reading for the ruler Dionysius. In the early Christian era, Chrysostom borrowed Aristophanes’s ‘scurrilous vehemence’ for his sermons, Jerome enjoyed ‘scurrill Plautus’, Basil appreciated the ‘sportfull Poem’ Margites (Areop., YP 2.494–6, 499, 523). Milton aligns himself with this alternative, non-repressive history, which involves cultivated appreciation of a low and
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frequently bawdy canon, and his vocabulary should not be interpreted as negative: in the controversy with More, Milton happily accepted the accusation of ‘scurrility’ since Socrates, the wisest oracle, had been called the Scurra Atticus (Pro se defensio, CM, 9.104; cf. Defence of Himself, YP 4.723). He even seems to exaggerate the ‘trash[iness]’ of this classical bawdy in order to savor its contradictory pleasures all the more, like Bruno’s gods. In this context, the dismissive-seeming reference to the ‘notorious ribald of Arezzo’ actually conveys a certain prestige. Aretino is ushered in with Petronius immediately after an august group of Church Fathers headed by St Jerome, who ‘discover more heresies than they well confute, and that oft for heresie which is the truer opinion’; he is thus placed among foundational writers from whom sovereign truths might be derived by reading against the grain. Aretino, Petronius, and Jerome are bracketed together by the phrase ‘these, and all the heathen Writers of greatest infection’ (Areop., YP 2.518). (Heathen, for the Protestant Milton, applied to modern Italians, to those who write about ‘heathenish obscenities’, and even to secular romances by other Protestants; Sidney’s Arcadia, cited in Areopagitica as the quintessential erotic text that censors long in vain to suppress, is denounced in Eikonoklastes as a ‘Heathen fiction’ as well as a ‘vain amatorious Poem’ (Eikon., YP 3.362).)¹⁵ This ‘heathen’ company confirms Aretino’s cultural clout, in fact: the Imperial adviser Petronius represents the ancient world, Henry VIII’s ‘finest’ courtier represents England,¹⁶ and between them sits enthroned ‘that notorious ribald of Arezzo, dreaded, and yet dear to the Italian Courtiers’. Though Milton degrades him with the title ‘ribald’ he also recognizes the ‘dread’ that Aretino could strike. He endorses the Italian writer’s proud claim to be the ‘Flagellum Principum’, the satyr whose bold sexuality makes him the fearless critic and ‘Scourge’ of princes rather than the sycophantic courtier.¹⁷ Milton’s bracketing-act itself hesitates between condemnation and canonization: the full phrase reads ‘the heathen writers of greatest infection, if it must be thought so, with whom is bound up the life of human learning’ (italics mine). Not only does he put the entire concept of ‘infection’ into doubt, but he positively asserts that Aretine pornography is ‘bound up with the life of human learning’. The designation is both vitalistic (‘life’) and intellectual (‘learning’). Bruno’s Isis had defined ‘living words’ as the ideal point where the human and ¹⁵ Cf. RCG, YP 1.812 (what the poets of ‘modern Italy … did for their country, I in my proportion with this over and above of being a Christian, might doe for mine’). ¹⁶ As Milton’s source Davanzati calls Sir Francis Bryan, according to the translation in Areop., YP 2.518 n. ¹⁷ This is the aspect of Aretino that Raymond B. Waddington brings out in his important book Aretino’s Satyr: Sexuality, Satire, and Self-Projection in Sixteenth-Century Literature and Art ( Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2004).
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the divine meet, and Milton uses a similar life-based imagery for the discourses he most appreciates. ‘Bound up with the life of learning’ recalls the famous definition of good books as ‘the pretious life-blood of a master spirit’ (Areop., YP 2.493). Almost all Areopagitica’s metaphors for deep-experiential reading involve transformations of the living body that refine or concoct low-grade material into a valuable elixir, antidote, or seed, and all these physiological tropes tend towards the master-metaphor of sexual arousal, insemination, and propagation—the effects of ‘not unelegant’ representation of ‘carnal sense’. Milton rejects metaphors of the unhealthy body (toxic ‘transfusion’ of body fluids, feverish ‘infection’) in favor of the ‘heat’ of ‘triall’ (Areop., YP 2.515), the ‘tempering’ of drugs, and the state of alertness associated with procreative arousal. His vitalistic arguments for ‘promiscuous reading’ set up his depiction of revolutionary England as a kind of phallic androgyne, ‘piercing’ and ‘sinewy’, ‘pregnant’, ‘puissant’, ‘rousing herself like a strong man’, not ‘drooping’ but ‘erected’ by ‘the issue of [Parliament’s] vertu propagated in us’ (Areop., YP 2.551, 554, 557–9). The most striking example is his vision of the canon as a sperm bank where books that ‘contain a potencie of life in them … do preserve as in a violl the purest efficacie and extraction of that living intellect that bred them’, so that their ‘pretious life-blood’ will not ‘spill’ (Areop., YP 2.492–3)—words blazoned on many a nineteenth-century public library. Milton seems aware of something scandalous in the image, for he immediately breaks off to proclaim his innocence, ‘lest I should be condemn’d of introducing licence, while I oppose Licencing’ (Areop., YP 2.493). Milton confirms the positive element in his account of Aretino and Petronius when he describes them sharing with their fellow courtiers ‘the choicest delights and criticisms of sin’ (Areop., YP 2.518). This very suggestive phrase refers not to hostile critiques but—as I put it in Schooling Sex —to ‘sin evaluated, selected, and stylishly enhanced by critical intelligence’ (50). Milton seems here to cite another dramatic allusion to the mythic Aretino, author of every imaginable sexual perversion: we recall that the jealous husband in Jonson’s Volpone feared the student of Aretino who has mastered ‘every quirk within lust’s labyrinth’, and so graduated to the rank of ‘professed critic in lechery’. Aretino’s libertine discourse represents not just life but choice, the central tenet in Areopagitica, whose ethics of freedom derive from the principle that ‘reason is but choosing’ (Areop., YP 2.527). ‘Choicest delights’ arranged according to a libertine canon of taste correspond precisely to what is alluring about the Bible itself, which describes sexuality ‘not unelegantly’. Petronius is the Arbiter Elegantiarum. Milton frequently flatters his presumed reader as ‘elegant’, to establish the elite credentials that unite speaker and audience against the common crowd; Reason of Church Government appeals to ‘the elegant & learned reader’ over the heads of the controversialists, and Parliament
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in Areopagitica itself is assumed, improbably, to ‘imitate the old and elegant humanity of Greece’ (RCG, YP 1.807; Areop., YP 2.489). Milton describes his own sexual bantering as ‘elegans’ or ‘urbanitatis elegantulae licentia’ (Pro se defensio, CM 9.112; Prolusiones, CM 12.218); he also used elegantius frequently in his annotations on Euripides, according to Thomas Festa.¹⁸ ‘Elegance’ in Milton retains its etymological connection with choice, for good or evil, as well as its epicurean tang. Adam’s first fallen speech in Paradise Lost, for example, begins, ‘Eve, now I see thou art exact of taste, / And elegant’ (PL 9.1017–18) but this does not mean that the term is intrinsically tainted: by a ghastly irony, Adam echoes that intensely—and innocently—sensuous moment in Book 5 when Eve is planning lunch, deliberating, ‘What choice to choose for delicacy best, / What order, so contrived as not to mix / Tastes, not well joined, inelegant’ (PL 5.333–5). I am suggesting, then, that the evocation of Aretino and his ‘choicest delights of sin’ is not incidental but central to Areopagitica—to its ‘ethics of confrontation’ and to its homeopathic theory of reading. Aretino represents the superlative degree of sexual discourse, and sexuality represents the quintessential test-case of temptation because its knowledge is inescapably carnal, ‘stirring’ the body in a way that mere ideas cannot do.¹⁹ ‘Choicest delights’—the programmatic enhancement of pleasure to the maximum—are virtually synonymous with ‘the utmost that Vice promises to her followers’. Libertine reading is thus essential for any ‘warfaring Christian’ or Red Cross Knight who wants to achieve deep ‘apprehension’ of sin and avoid superficial or childlike knowledge, ‘fugitive and cloister’d vertue, unexercis’d and unbreath’d’ (Areop., YP 2.515). In short, Aretino is the Bower of Bliss. Milton’s metaphors of good and bad reading cannot of course be confined to erotic arousal, but they slide in that direction. Thus the maxim ‘that a wise man like a good refiner can gather gold out of the drossiest volume, and that a fool will be a fool with the best book’, becomes ‘a wise man will make better use of an idle pamphlet, then a fool will do of sacred Scripture’, because to the good reader ‘such books are not temptations, nor vanities, but usefull drugs and materialls wherewith to temper and compose effective and strong med’cins’ (Areop., YP 2.521). The medical image that replaces the metallurgical is not sexual per se, but sexuality is its active ingredient. Milton gives as his example of a necessary ‘material’ or ‘working minerall’, not brilliant heresy or unpalatable truth, but ‘idle’ tempting dross—clearly in the same category as the ribald ‘trash’ of Aristophanes that Plato nevertheless considered splendid ¹⁸ Festa, ‘Repairing the Ruins’, 38. ¹⁹ Cf. the thirst for knowledge that ‘God hath stirr’d up’ (Areop., YP 2.554). The following point is closely related to my Schooling Sex, 51.
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reading (Areop., YP 2.521). In seventeenth-century usage the innocuous word ‘idle’ (like ‘loose’, ‘broad’, or ‘wanton’) denoted lewd content rather than mere frivolity; the ‘Root and Branch’ petition, for example, went straight from ‘whoredoms and adulteries’ to ‘lascivious, idle, and unprofitable books and pamphlets’, naming as their example the bawdy Parlament of Women.²⁰ In Milton’s medical metaphor the reader’s own body is the laboratory: homeopathic ‘tempering’ cannot happen without ‘working’, a particularly virtuous transformation when the text is ‘idle’. In the context of Petronius and Aretino, wanton poems and elegant obscenities, ‘working’ must mean some kind of internal, erotic response to an aphrodisiac representation, some experience of passion that can then be converted into virtue by refusing to indulge it to ‘the utmost’. Paradise Lost provides the exact Latinate equivalent of this erotic-pharmaceutical ‘working’ when Adam and Eve eat their fill of the fruit: they hallucinate sprouting wings, but soon feel the drug’s true ‘operation … / Carnal desire enflaming’ (9.1012–13). These implications and associations become entirely explicit in the famous passage where Milton moves from sexual representation to the emotional condition of Adam in paradise: Wherefore did [God] creat passions within us, pleasures round about us, but that these rightly temper’d are the very ingredients of vertu? … Banish all objects of lust, shut up all youth into the severest discipline that can be exercis’d in any hermitage, ye cannot make them chaste, that came not thither so. (Areop., YP 2.527)
God Himself demands ‘continence’ and chastity among other virtues, yet deliberately places Adam and all his descendants in a voluptuous world—indeed, wantonly ‘powrs out before us ev’n to a profusenes all desirable things, and gives us minds that can wander beyond all limit and satiety’ (Areop., YP 2.528). In this extraordinary portrayal of the human condition, ‘objects of lust’ form the crucial pivot between the ‘passions within’ and ‘pleasures round about’, the profuse display of ‘all desirable things’ and the mental urge to transgress not only ‘limit’ but ‘satiety’ itself. Milton makes thought sound like libertine sex, an endlessly escalating sequence of intensities, pushing pleasure to ‘the utmost’ and beyond. This illustration of unlimited passion, which juxtaposes ‘lust’, greed for treasure, and unbounded mental fantasy, once again suggests the stock figure of Aretino. The dizzy possibilities of desire that must be known to the full before abstaining—what Jonson called ‘every quirk within lust’s labyrinth’ and Milton calls ‘the utmost that Vice promises to her followers’—sound like the sensual speculations of Sir Epicure Mammon, ²⁰ Cited in my Libertines and Radicals, 88; unlike Milton, of course, the petitioners sought to stamp this sort of thing out completely.
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who imagines that with his new wealth he will surround himself, literally, with every conceivable pleasure including the erotic postures and sensations that ‘dull Aretine/But coldly imitated’.²¹ But where Jonson satirized this urge, Milton—like Bruno before him—exults in this vision of a cornucopian providence, a deity who appreciates ‘the multiform fruits of all kinds of genius’ and encourages virtuous engagement with the full gamut of the passions. ‘Passion’ must not simply be equated with sexual desire, I realize. Scholars like Michael Schoenfeldt and Victoria Kahn have greatly enhanced our understanding of ‘the passions in general’ and Milton’s sense of their essential complexity.²² Within Areopagitica, the category ‘passion’ includes intellectual craving for knowledge, miserly longing for wealth, and even political indignation of the righteous kind: Milton’s tract begins by asserting that the excitement of addressing Parliament ‘hath got the power within me to a passion’ (Areop., YP 2.487). But the sexual meaning is both the prototype and the predominant instance, here as in Paradise Lost. When Adam recounts his wedding night to Raphael in Book 8 he identifies an emotion quite different from any other delight in sensory things: ‘here passion first I felt, / Commotion strange’ (PL 8.530–1). All other pleasure, in contrast, ‘works in the mind no change’—another confirmation that the archetype of internal ‘working’ is erotic desire (PL 8.525). In the epic the word passion is hedged in by Raphael’s somewhat obtuse moral condemnation, but this passage of Areopagitica explicitly evokes Adam in paradise as the supreme example of the necessity of temptation and the divine genesis of passion. Even in the unfallen state freedom means reason, reason means choosing, and choosing is meaningless without experiential engagement of those ‘passions within us’. If God had exempted Adam from sexual desire (or implanted it only after the fall) he would have been, in Milton’s famous phrase, ‘a meer artificiall Adam, such an Adam as he is in the motions’, a mere wooden puppet or empty simulacrum. Let me emphasize again that this scene of Adamic testing occurs in a string of allusions to libertine and erotic encounters. It comes shortly after polemic against the futility of licensing ‘wanton … dialogues’, ‘wanton garb’, the illicit conversations of ‘our youth, male and female together’, serenades on balconies, guitars, windows, ²¹ Alchemist, II.ii.44–5. Jonson’s character-name reminds us that this passage in Areop., going rapidly from the desires of the miser to those of the unchaste, replicates in miniature the Spenserian sequence he cites earlier, from the Cave of Mammon to the (Epicurean) Bower of Bliss. ²² Schoenfeldt, ‘ ‘‘Commotion Strange’’: Passion in Paradise Lost’, in Gail Kern Paster, Mary Floyd-Wilson and Katherine Rowe, eds., Reading the Early Modern Passions (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 43–67; Kahn, Wayward Contracts: The Crisis of Political Obligation in England, 1640–1674 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), esp. 197–222.
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‘all the airs and madrigalls, that whisper softnes in chambers’, and all the ballads that serve country folk as their ‘Arcadia’s’ (Areop., YP 2.523–6). The whole of material culture, in this brilliant satirical catalog, becomes a machine for producing ‘objects of lust’—so that when that phrase appears in the Adam sequence it renders explicit what was already a running theme. God not only left Adam free, but deliberately ‘set before him a provoking object, ever almost in his eyes’ (Areop., YP 2.527). The semantic history of ‘provoking’ is virtually the reverse of ‘promiscuous’, and in this context ‘provoking object’ would certainly denote an aphrodisiac for the seventeenth-century reader. Is this the forbidden apple, or is this Eve herself, whose first appearance in Paradise Lost spectacularly reasserts the innocence of the word ‘wanton’? Passion in its ‘utmost’ form—‘poured out’ in a series of ‘provoking objects’ that comprise ‘all desirable things’—is therefore not merely harmless or acceptable but constitutively ‘necessary’ for the supercharged kind of virtue now being ‘manifested’ and ‘propagated’ in Civil War London. And it is particularly requisite for the author, who must produce his test-tubes of ‘precious life-blood’—not to mention giving birth to ‘the issue of the brain’, explicitly paralleled with ‘the issue of the womb’ (Areop., YP 2.505)—without actually breaching continence. Well-known autobiographical passages elsewhere in Milton’s early prose make it abundantly clear that reading the erotic text provided Milton with the crucial testing-ground, where he could experience sexuality to the utmost (with all its fuel, allurement, desire, infusion, and incitement) while keeping himself above it.²³ In the Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce he had even flirted with the idea that non-committal sexual relationships satisfied his educational criteria: libertines eventually make the ‘most succesfull’ husbands because their ‘bold accustomings’ give them experience with the opposite sex (DDD, YP 2.249–50). It seems unlikely that Milton ever applied this experimentalism to himself; instead, he channeled his ‘bold’ desires into textual form. In Areopagitica he turns again from bodies to texts, once again advocating the benefits of libertine reading: Petronius, Aretino, and their ‘wanton’ progeny offer a vicarious version of the ‘bold accustoming’ necessary for growth. In the Apology for Smectymnuus Milton presented his ability to extract virtue from ‘the fuell of wantonnesse and loose living’ as a kind of miracle vouchsafed to him alone (Apology, YP 1.891). In the supremely confident Areopagitica he promotes it as a general rule, necessary for elite intellectuals and possibly for ‘all men’.²⁴ ²³ Discussed in my Schooling Sex, 49–51, and in more detail in ‘Milton among the Libertines’. ²⁴ The reading in YP 2.521 and in the original (‘to all men such books are not temptations, nor vanities, but usefull drugs’) elicits no emendation even though it refutes the entire argument, which depends on discriminating between wise men and ‘the rest’; a word has clearly been
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But did Milton put his called-for toleration of Aretino into practice, letting him ‘work’ within his text? A full answer lies beyond the scope of this chapter, but it would begin with suggestive parallels between the most erotic moments in Paradise Lost and Aretino’s sonnets on the Modi engravings: the first sonnet evokes Adam and Eve on seeing a couple embracing ‘Straight side by side’ (cf. PL 4.741); a later sonnet, for a complex posture in which the man stands up and lifts the woman, interprets him as striving to reach ‘paradiso’–or as Satan would say, to be ‘Imparadised in one another’s arms’ (PL 4.506).²⁵ I cannot prove that Milton saw these particular images of lovers side-by-side and leaning together, or these particular sonnets with their powerful associations of sexuality with Eden and their violent contrasts of idealization and ribaldry. In Areopagitica, only a few lines before Milton speaks about ‘objects of lust’ and ‘all desirable things’, the passionate Adam finds himself in a situation like that of an impressionable young man, militantly chaste but devoted to the ‘simple, sensuous and passionate’ art of poetry, who opens for the first time a volume of ‘Aretino’s Postures’. We know that Malatesti presented Milton with a volume of his own libertine sonnets, which frequently describe peasant sex in terms of pestles, mortars, and grinding mills—imagery that directly suggested the divorce tract’s ‘grinding in the mill of an undelighted and servil copulation’ (YP 2.258). Perhaps another worldly collector in a Florentine academy ‘set before [Milton] a provoking object, ever almost in his eyes’ (Areop., YP 2.527)—some version of ‘all desirable things’ with Aretino’s ribald commentary? Aretino may have been a ‘notorious ribald’ but he could also serve as the ‘dreaded yet dear’ master of sexual representation, who dared depict the carnal act ‘not unelegantly’, who turned ‘incitement’ into art and invested it with the cultural prestige of the Italian High Renaissance. Essential precisely because Good and Evil appear in the world ‘as two twins cleaving together’ (Areop., YP 2.514), the ‘ribaldi’ must be ‘brought in’ or interpolated as testing figures, opportunities for passionate confrontation. As a consequence of his dialectical and somatic theory of reading Milton has inferred from the necessity of provoking objects to the necessity of provoking persons—infamous interpreters like the ‘brood of Belial’ who clarify the difference of Licence and Liberty by treating the divorce tracts as a charter for debauchery, as if they were the ‘choicest delights and criticisms of sin’. The idea of reading in the ‘libertine school’, and thereby gaining virtual access to lust, fed his literary imagination omitted after all, or else such and men have been transposed, but Milton seems not to have noticed. ²⁵ Bette Talvacchia, Taking Positions: On the Erotic in Renaissance Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), poems 1 and 11 in her numbering (in the latter sonnet, the ‘paradisal’ soliloquy is interrupted by an eye-witness who yells out ‘Ahi ribalda, ahi ribaldo!’).
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long before and long after he worked Aretino into his argument for toleration: where else to learn sales, to rehearse the role of Scurra Attica, and to form dramatic sensualist villains like Comus or the three Satans—one in ‘Quintum Novembris’ wrapping his ‘salacious loins’ in a monk’s garb (l. 84, CSP 41), one in Paradise Lost burning in ‘fierce desire’ or breathing ‘vain hopes, inordinate desires’ into Eve (PL 4.509, 808), one in Paradise Regained tempting Christ with beautiful nymphs and boys at a Classical banquet (CSP 2.352–61)? But the principle is articulated in Areopagitica most fully. Milton’s literary instincts encouraged empathetic projection into ‘the utmost that Vice promises to her followers’, which actually strengthened the case for his extirpation. As I show in Schooling Sex, hostile readers used Milton’s argument to brand him ‘a great agent for libertinism’. One Restoration satirist, commenting on exactly the ‘notorious ribald of Arezzo’ passage in Areopagitica that occasioned this essay, jeered that ‘the more modest Aretine, were he alive in this age, might be set to school again, to learn his own art of the blind school-master’.²⁶ Ironically, Milton’s display of practical tolerance for the libertine enemy had, like the forbidden fruit, ‘far other operation’—defining him as a figure who cannot be tolerated in an Age of Toleration. ²⁶ See Schooling Sex, 51, citing Richard Leigh, The Transproser Rehears’d (Oxford, 1673), 136–7 (a passage earlier brought to light by Christopher Hill, Milton and the English Revolution (1977; New York, 1979), 453–4).
7 Milton, Natural Law, and Toleration Jason P. Rosenblatt John Milton’s first published writings are marked by a Pauline absolutism that will not compound with human weakness as an inevitable condition lying within the bounds of divine forgiveness. In five substantial antiprelatical treatises published in 1641 and 1642, Milton traces the decline of the church from the perfect pattern of scripture clearly revealed, ‘backslid[ing] one way into the Jewish beggery, of old cast rudiments, and stumbl[ing] forward another way into the new-vomited Paganisme of sensuall Idolatry’ (Of Ref., YP 1.520). Milton’s mission is to recover the pristine original of the gospel by removing layers of ecclesiastical accretion, to rebuild the church according to the pattern stamped in religion’s golden age, and to prepare for the second coming, ‘when thou the Eternall and shortly-expected King shalt open the Clouds to judge the severall Kingdomes of the World’ (Of Ref., YP 1.616). Those who assist in that mission ‘shall receive, above the inferiour Orders of the Blessed, the Regall addition of Principalities, Legions, and Thrones in their glorious Titles, and in supereminence of beatifick Vision … shall clasp inseparable Hands with joy, and blisse in over measure for ever’ (Of Ref., YP 1.616). Those who attempt to thwart it ‘shall be thrown downe eternally into the darkest and deepest Gulfe of HELL,’ the ‘Slaves and Negro’s’ of the other damned, ‘the basest, the lowermost, the most dejected, most underfoot and downe-trodden Vassals of Perdition’ (Of Ref., YP 1.616–17). Is there any group, other than the Presbyterians, the ‘one right discipline’ (Of Ref., YP 1.605), whom Milton has not offended in these polemical tracts? Anglicans are condemned as Roman Catholics, and therefore as pagan idolaters, and also as Jews, who are identified with the sinful Canaanites God commanded them to displace: ‘for that which was to the Jew but jewish is to the Christian no better than Canaanitish’ (RCG, YP 1.845).¹ Arians and ¹ See also, among other examples in the antiprelatical tracts, Milton’s assertions that the English prelates have joined ‘the Pope and Papists to stop the furtherance of Reformation’ (Of
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Pelagians, martyred ‘by the Heathen for Christs sake’, are nevertheless ‘no true friends of Christ’ (Of Ref., YP 1.533–4), and Arminians are ‘tainted with that infection’ (Apology, YP 1.917). Both heaven and hell are hierarchical and imperial. Those condemned to everlasting perdition enjoy the satisfaction, expressed in racist language, of trampling and spurning the most damned of all, Milton’s non-Presbyterian antagonists. Reading Milton’s prose chronologically, there is no way to prepare for the differences between the last antiprelatical tract (April 1642) and the first divorce tract ( July 1643)—or, for most readers, between Volume 1 and Volume 2 of the Yale edition of Milton’s prose. The latter contains the great treatises written between 1643 and 1645—including the two editions of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, Tetrachordon, Of Education, and the Areopagitica—which advocate, respectively, domestic liberty, educational reform, and ‘freedom to express oneself’ (Second Defence, YP 4.624). In these treatises Milton advocates freedom to divorce on grounds of incompatibility, religious toleration, and a rescinding by Parliament of a Licensing Order that would offend against both God and human reason by preventing the discovery of the good. Having severed his ties with the Presbyterians, Milton has allied himself with the Independents and Separatists. He can even speak with a measure of sympathy about Anabaptists, Familists, and Antinominans, ‘of life … not debausht’, attributing their excess zeal to ‘the restraint of some lawfull liberty, which ought to be giv’n men, and is deny’d them’ (DDD, YP 2.278). Scholars and biographers have found in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce traces of the bitter disappointment most likely caused by young Mary Powell’s refusal to leave her family and rejoin her new husband. Far more profound though less immediately noticeable than the occasional bitter tone are transformations in Milton’s theology, philosophy, and politics, and in his attitude toward human weakness. A young poet who seems always to have had a sense of personal election might have begun to feel profoundly abandoned—and not only by his wife. Beginning with the first divorce tract and extending through the Areopagitica, the former (and future) Pauline absolutist confronts with compassion a life of mistake and the inseparability of good and evil in this imperfect world. If Milton’s prose provides the doctrinal underpinnings of his greatest poetry, then his first marriage and separation constitute a major correlative of the Fall: like the prohibition, marriage is a ‘mysterious law’ (PL 4.750) instituted in paradise (Genesis 2:18), whose subjects find it at first easy to keep, then discover tragically that it has become impossible. Ref., YP 1.527) and that the ‘recreant Jew’, the Anglican, and the Roman Catholic have been seduced by ‘traditions and carnalities’ figured as adulteries (Apology, YP 1.895, 942).
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The motives of Milton’s transformation—psychological, environmental, religious, political—are overdetermined. Taken together, with a full recognition of their absolute incompatibility, Dayton Haskin’s exclusively religious explanation and Thomas Fulton’s exclusively secular one help us to understand the range and depth of the change. Milton’s assurance in the antiprelatical tracts that scripture has a fixed meaning gives way to the recognition in the divorce tracts that the pronouncements of Christ and Paul on the indissolubility of the marriage bond would make the misery of an unhappy spouse inescapable. Haskin is sensitive to the subtlest implications of the paradigm shift in Milton’s hermeneutics. These include a newly charitable conception of the analogy of faith, which undermines a literalistic interpretation of scripture, a waning confidence in the power of human reason, and a commitment to biblical authority precisely when the plain sense of scripture would seem to deny what he desires so passionately, the right to divorce. The complexity of scripture, like that of poetry, is a blessing. In the divorce tracts, Milton felt the saving power of interpretive freedom, which released him from the fear that his marriage was a permanent sign of reprobation, and in his poetry he associated complexity with copia and eloquence.² Fulton, concentrating on the Areopagitica, discusses the philosophical systems that allow Milton to make his intellectual arguments. He finds ‘the roots of liberal epistemology’ in the emergent natural law theory, which focused on finding universally agreed beliefs accessible to human reason instead of depending on established external authorities.³ Those authorities include theologians and the texts they adduce as irrefutable evidence, so Fulton traces a shift in Milton’s argumentation from biblical citation to the exercise of untrammeled moral cognition (‘reason is but choosing’). Consistently reading Milton’s biblical references as political rather than religious, he interprets the reference to the current ‘state of man’ (Areop., YP 2.514) in a postlapsarian world as ‘an argument from the state of nature’ (Fulton, ‘Areopagitica and the Roots of Liberal Epistemology’, 67). ² See Dayton Haskin, Milton’s Burden of Interpretation (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 57–63. ³ See Thomas Fulton’s well-informed discussion in ‘Areopagitica and the Roots of Liberal Epistemology’, English Literary Renaissance 34 (2004), 42–82. I have also benefited from his unpublished paper ‘Resorting to Reason: Milton and the Hermeneutics of Science’. Like all students of early-modern natural law theory and the political conditions through which people acquire moral knowledge, Fulton is indebted to Richard Tuck, in particular his ‘Scepticism and Toleration in the Seventeenth Century’, in Susan Mendus, ed., Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 21–35. For the most balanced and comprehensive discussion of Milton’s writings against the bishops and in defense of ‘domestic or personal liberty’, see chapters 5 and 6 of Barbara K. Lewalski’s The Life of John Milton (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000). She summarizes Milton’s shifts in perspective on 155–6.
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When Milton refers, in The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, to Deuteronomy 17, on the limitations of royal prerogative, and to 1 Samuel 8, on the rejection of the prophet’s government in favor of a king, he claims that the power of the people to choose, reject, retain, or depose their ruler, ‘though it cannot but stand with plain reason, shall be made good also by Scripture’ (Tenure, YP 3.206). This Fulton considers to be an ‘astonishing’ ‘defiance toward biblical precedent’ (Fulton, ‘Resorting to Reason’).⁴ But one might conclude instead that Milton is exercising not defiance but exegetical freedom, to a degree that would have been unthinkable in the antiprelatical tracts, where he warned that church discipline, ‘platform’d in the Bible’ (RCG, YP 1.750), is ‘beyond the faculty of man to frame, and … dangerous to be left to mans invention’ (RCG, YP 1.756). Indeed, the biblical verses are ambiguous, and exegetes never resolve the question whether the appointment of a king in Deuteronomy is a commandment to appoint a king or only a statement that such a king is possible.⁵ The chapter has been read both as a limitation on the growth of military power (the prohibition against multiplying horses) and as a warning against an extravagant lifestyle in the king’s court. Similarly, both royalists and republicans noted the ambiguity in 1 Samuel 8. God’s apparent waiver of his exclusive political role as king is conditional on both the king and the people understanding that they are still subject to God and that the king is nothing but an agent (1 Samuel 12:14–15). God is the king, Israel the vassal, and 2 Kings 11:17 describes a double covenant based on those that a human lord would make with the vassal. He would have the people swear to be loyal to him and then have them swear to be loyal to the vassal. In the same way, ‘Jehoiada made a covenant between the Lord and the king and the people, that they should be the Lord’s people; between the king also and the people.’ As Halbertal and Margalit point out, the ‘illusion of power … blurs the boundaries between the human and the divine and traps the powerful person in the myth of his own power. … The source of idolatry as political metaphor is pride and … power-drunkenness’ (Halbertal and Margolit, Idolatry, 221). Fulton traces Milton’s experimentation with a new, ‘self-authenticating method of ethical reasoning’, back to Hugo Grotius (‘Areopagitica and the ⁴ See also John Milton: Political Writings, ed. Martin Dzelzainis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Milton, commenting on Jehu’s special divine command to slay Jehoram (2 Kings 9:24), concludes that ‘where a thing grounded so much on natural reason hath the addition of a command from God, what does it but establish the lawfulness of such an act’ (YP 3.216). According to Dzelzainis, this proves that ‘for Milton the lawfulness of an act followed not from the expressed will of God, but from the fact that it was an intrinsically just and reasonable thing to do’ (xv). ⁵ See on this point Moshe Halbertal and Avishai Margalit, Idolatry, tr. Naomi Goldblum (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1992), 290–1 nn. 4–6.
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Roots of Liberal Epistemology’, 53). But Grotius, in his magnum opus De Jure Belli ac Pacis libri tres (Paris, 1625), famously interprets 1 Samuel 8 in accord with the right of kings to act with impunity.⁶ For a reader interested in the relationship between religion and politics, scriptural hermeneutics and human cognition, there is a special pleasure in reading Grotius in the great 1738 edition of De Jure Belli ac Pacis by Jean Barbeyrac. Writing in the Huguenot diaspora of the 1690s, having been expelled from a religiously unified France, Barbeyrac, a more thoroughgoing natural law theorist than Grotius, had a special reason for separating religion from society and thus a special sensitivity to Grotius’s various difficulties in maintaining this distinction. Reading Barbeyrac’s notes, one is often reminded of Charles Kinbote’s annotations of John Shade’s Pale Fire, although the dissonance is the result of violent disagreement rather than misunderstanding or pathological narcissism. When Grotius interprets Samuel’s words about the effect of the right of kings, ‘that is, it implies the Obligation of Non-resistance’ (I.IV.3, 1.343), Barbeyrac quotes from Milton’s Defence (1.4), on ‘the Jews, even after the Captivity’, to prove the opposite: ‘The Example of the Machabees, and the whole History of that Nation, manifestly shew the contrary’ (I.IV.3, 1.343 n. 4). Barbeyrac considers Milton to be a champion of liberty, and his frequent footnote quotations from the Defence counter Grotius’s assertions in the text of a sovereign’s right to exercise virtually unlimited power. Sallust, in Catiline VI. 7, quotes Gaius Memmius, a tribune of the people: ‘to do what one wishes with impunity is to be a king.’ Milton’s antagonist, Salmasius, quotes the statement approvingly, as does Grotius. Barbeyrac’s evidence against Grotius is Milton’s against Salmasius. Moreover, in accord with his emphasis on individual conscience and a rationalist natural law theory, Barbeyrac, like Milton, reads the biblical text (1 Samuel 8) in the light of natural law as exemplified by the pagan Cicero. Milton tells Salmasius, who is ‘delighted’ with Memmius’s statement, that Cicero ‘could have shown you how to understand Sallust better, and Samuel too’ (First Defence, YP 4.350). Barbeyrac explains: This is said by Memmius, a Tribute of the Roman People, and a zealous Assertor of public Liberty. He had no Intention to compliment Kings with a Right to do what they pleased with Impunity; he only meant that Affairs usually take this Course, that such is the Custom of Kings, and the Success of their evil Actions. Upon which MILTON (Defens. Cap. II. p. 34) judiciously alledges the following Quotation from CICERO, which the Reader may compare with the Passage in the Book of SAMUEL. … This is ⁶ Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace [De Jure Belli ac Pacis], ed. J. Barbeyrac, tr. anon. (London, 1738), with a new introduction by Richard Tuck (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), I.IV.3, 1.343. Parenthetic book, chapter, and section references are to this edition of Grotius.
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the Stile of their Orders, Take Notice, and obey … and this of their Menaces, If I find you here a second Time, you die. Terms, which we are not only to read and consider for our Amusement, but consider as a Lesson to caution us against coming under such a Power. (I.IV.2, 1.341)
When Milton in his divorce tracts breaks, at least temporarily, his link with Pauline dualism, he becomes part of a newer chain, beginning with Grotius and continuing with John Selden (De Jure Naturali et Gentium juxta Disciplinam Ebraeorum, 1640), the Hobbes of Leviathan (the chapters on natural law, esp. 14–15), Nathanael Culverwel (An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature, 1652), Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae, 1672), Samuel von Pufendorf (De Jure Naturae et Gentium, 1672), Locke (especially his Epistola de Tolerantia, 1689), and Barbeyrac (his immense annotated editions of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Cumberland, and his own Science of Morality). This chain stretches across the Atlantic, and it is worth remembering that Barbeyrac’s Milton, a defender of liberty, is also the Milton of Jefferson and Madison. Grotius’s hortatory statement that Christ often bids us to ‘take up our Cross, [which] seems to require from us a greater Measure of Patience’ (I.IV.7, 1.365) so exasperates Barbeyrac that he must repeatedly assert the right of ‘a Man, unjustly oppressed, [to] employ what Force he is master of, for delivering him from Oppression’. And when, in the same section, Grotius praises the primitive Christians who rejoiced to suffer persecution for their religion, Barbeyrac notes, ‘We are very well assured that they entertained extravagant Notions on the Point before us, which put them on extending the Obligation of suffering Martyrdom, far beyond its just Bounds.’ He adds, ‘when the Emperors had embraced Christianity, the Christians proceeded on very different Principles. See MILTON, Defensio, Cap. IV. p. 136 &c.’ (1.366–7). Grotius quotes positively ‘that Saying of Marcus Antoninus the Philosopher, No one but GOD only can be the Judge of a Prince’, but Barbeyrac counters with ‘MILTON’S Exposition of this Passage, Defens. pro Pop. Anglic. Cap. II. p. 49’ (I.III.8, 1.268 n. 30). Milton cannot agree that the word autarchy in context means monarchy, ‘particularly since Marcus Aurelius was the best of emperors and … treated the people as had been done when the state was free’. Moreover, he revered ‘all tyrannicides or men who wished for that honor, and he tells also of his design for a commonwealth governed by just laws with equal rights for all’ (First Defence, YP 4.360). To cite one more example, Grotius, like Salmasius, cites what Milton calls ‘that old argument which is the masterpiece of our courtiers’ (First Defence, YP 4.361), David’s famous confession, ‘Against thee, thee only have I sinned’ (Psalm 51:5), as evidence that a king is answerable only to God (I.III.20,
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1.311–12). Barbeyrac responds that David has sinned against God’s most indisputable laws and thus has offended him: I am surprized that our Author … could adopt so unreasonable an Explication of DAVID’S Words, as that given by the Fathers of the Church, and the loose Conclusion, they draw from them. To speak with MILTON, in his Defensio pro Pop. Angl. Cap. II, p. 51 … is there any Probability that David, when he spoke these Words, penetrated with Sentiments of Humiliation and Repentance, thought of the Prerogative of Kings; and that he intended to boast of a pretended Power, which authorized the Commission of Rapin, Murder, and Adultery, and left his Subjects no Room for Complaint? I cannot think the most zealous Defenders of Power, how extravagantly soever they may compliment Kings with Impunity, and however strong an Obligation they may impose on Subjects of Non-Resistance, would venture to maintain, that a Prince, who takes away the Life of an innocent Man, or takes away a Subject’s Wife, sins against GOD alone; and that he is not guilty of a real Injustice in Regard to the Person killed, or the Husband. (1.311–12 n. 9)⁷
In the rest of this essay I want to suggest, with Fulton, that natural law theorists—in particular, Hugo Grotius and John Selden, who figure importantly in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce—account at least in part for the transformation that occurs in the prose tracts of 1643–5. But these two founders of the early modern science of morality do not diminish Milton’s commitment to the Bible. The common expositors of Christ’s and Paul’s pronouncements against divorce in the gospels and epistles would trap an unhappy spouse in a loveless marriage, but Milton learns from Grotius and Selden that exegetical and rational cognition can be compatible. Sometimes this requires going beyond Calvin and Luther to sources such as ‘the Rabbins and Maimonides’ (DDD, YP 2.257). Much of what Milton learns from Grotius and Selden bears both directly and indirectly on questions of toleration—on human beings with beliefs different from one’s own, and on the ideas and opinions that issue from diversity. Philology is not a valuefree discipline, and the philological skill Milton develops removes rather than evades some of the obstacles to divorce, at times like Portia in The Merchant of Venice, by submitting to the text more literally and rigorously than even Shylock thought to do. Sometimes, not always, the best way out is through. ⁷ See also I.III.8, 1.269 n. 33, where Barbeyrac relies on Milton to contextualize Grotius’s reference to ‘the Argive Tragedy of Suppliants’, where ‘the People … address the King in Aeschylus’ as one who is free, master of the laws, so that he does what he pleases. Barbeyrac’s note: ‘But, as MILTON observes, in his Defens. Pro Pop. Anglic. Cap. V. p. 174. The poet puts those Words into the Mouth of some foreign Women, who desiring the King of Argos’s Protection and Assistance against the Aegyptian Fleet in Pursuit of them, flatter him with an absolute Power, which did not belong to him.’
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In the antiprelatical tracts, scripture bears only a single sense, according to which the Mosaic law can be of no value in establishing precedent for the prelates: ‘For the imperfect and obscure institution of the Law, which the Apostles themselves doubt not oft-times to vilifie, cannot give rules to the compleat and glorious ministration of the Gospell, which lookes on the Law, as on a childe, not as on a tutor’ (RCG, YP 1.762). For the mature gospel to learn from ‘the infancy of the Law’ would be for ‘the stronger to imitate the weaker, the freeman to follow the captive, the learned to be lesson’d by the rude’ (RCG, YP 1.763). A chapter-heading in Reason of Church-Government warns ‘That it is dangerous and unworthy the Gospell to hold that Church-government is to be pattern’d by the Law, as B. Andrews and the Primat of Armagh maintaine’ (RCG, YP 1.761). The young Milton dares to demean two men of far greater learning than himself, Bishops Lancelot Andrewes and James Ussher. Both were friends of John Selden. The incomparable Andrewes, justly renowned for his scholarship and eloquence, was the only bishop who read with pleasure Selden’s controversial Historie of Tithes (1618) and supported him in the bitter aftermath of its publication.⁸ James Archbishop of Armagh taught the young Selden the rudiments of Hebrew, Aramaic, and probably Arabic in 1609, and he preached his funeral sermon. According to Richard Parr, Ussher ‘looked upon the person deceased as so great a Scholar, that himself was scarce worthy to carry his Books after him’.⁹ But this was extreme modesty, and Selden in turn described Ussher as ‘a miracle of learning’ in his preface to Marmora Arundelliana. How different Milton sounds even as early as the first edition of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, where he concludes that it is ‘absurd to imagine that the covnant of grace should reform the exact and perfect law of works, eternal and immutable’ (DDD, YP 2.318). Of course the simplest explanation is that the Hebrew Bible permits divorce and the New Testament does not. Hence, on the issue of divorce, the law is clear and charitable, the gospel obscure, apparently severe (‘What … God hath joined together, let not man put asunder’ (Matthew 19:6)), and therefore in need of radical reinterpretation. Milton’s exposition of a Mosaic law for fallen humankind comprises some of his most mature and passionate prose. We hear in other Miltonic treatises the accent of judgment in relation to frail, erring humanity, but in the prose tracts of 1643–5 we hear the accent of sympathy as well. Where Christ rejects divorce for the Jews as a temporary concession to ‘the ⁸ Joannes Seldeni vindiciae secundum integritatem existimationis suae (1653), 16–17; quoted in G. J. Toomer, ‘Selden’s Historie of Tithes: Genesis, Publication, Aftermath’, Huntington Library Quarterly 65 (2002), 361. ⁹ Reported in Richard Parr, The Life Of … James Usher, Late Lord Arch-Bishop of Armagh … With a Collection of Three Hundred Letters (London, 1686), 75.
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hardnesse of your hearts’ (Matthew 19:8; Tetrachordon, YP 2.660), Milton interprets hardheartedness as a universal condition: ‘when it is in a good man taken for infirmity, and imperfection, which was in all the Apostles, whose weaknesse only, not utter want of beleef is call’d hardnes of heart’. The Fall hardens all hearts, not only among the Jews, and therefore God permitted divorce ‘partly for this hardnesse of heart, the imperfection and decay of man from original righteousnesse’. ‘If nothing now must be suffer’d for hardnes of heart, I say the very prosecution of our right by way of civil justice can no more bee suffer’d among Christians, for the hardnes of heart wherwith most men persue it. … But if it be plaine that the whole juridical law and civil power is only suffer’d under the Gospel, for the hardnes of our hearts, then wherefore should not that which Moses suffer’d, be suffer’d still by the same reason?’ (Tetrachordon, YP 2.661–2). Whereas the antiprelatical tracts apotheosize the spiritual aristocrats of the Reformation and anathematize the bishops and their supporters, the treatises on divorce, more than any other Miltonic works, emphasize commonality. In these tracts, Milton regards Christians as superior in faith but not in virtue: ‘Wee find … by experience that the Spirit of God in the Gospel hath been alwaies more effectual in the illumination of our minds to the gift of faith, then in the moving of our wills to any excellence of vertue, either above the Jews or the Heathen’ (DDD, YP 2.303). Christians unhappily matched should not presume upon the superior refinement of patience and suffering but should instead accept the relief divorce affords them: ‘If wee bee wors [than the Jews], or but as bad, which lamentable examples confirm wee are, then have wee more, or at least as much need of this permitted law, as they to whom God therfore gave it … under a harsher covenant’ (DDD, YP 2.354). To understand the transformations in Milton’s prose, it is helpful to recall that the 1643–5 prose tracts contain the first references to natural law theorists, who are generally more tolerant of religious diversity than the patristic, medieval, and Reformation theologians cited in the antiprelatical tracts. Instead of a Pauline dualism that pits the carnal children of loins against the spiritual children of faith, Grotius and Selden look for continuities among the cultures and religions of pagans, Jews, Muslims, and Christians. A religious rationalist such as Nathanael Culverwel, in his Discourse of the Light of Nature, arguing that the light of reason is available to all human beings, substitutes a new final clause for Colossians 3:11 that underscores the difference. What Paul says about evangelical light free to all, ‘we may say the very same in respect of the commonnesse of natural light. Where there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian, Scythian, bound nor free, but all these are one in respect of Nature, and
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natures Law, and natures Light.’¹⁰ Where Paul would heal the fundamental divisions of humankind by baptizing all nations in Christ, ‘for ye are all one in Christ Jesus’, Culverwel insists that all human beings already share the light of nature, a sign that the image of God in which all were created has not been lost. Grotius, in De Jure Belli ac Pacis, wants to identify as the true law of nature an extremely minimal set of rules that follow, as Richard Tuck puts it, ‘as a logical necessity from some non-controversial assumption about the world.’¹¹ Theoretically, the discovery of shared moral rules in the natural, pre-civil state of humankind would provide a basis for relationships among human beings anywhere in the world. This is in part what makes the work a pioneering contribution to international relations. Selden, a postskeptical humanist, differs from Grotius, positing an external source of natural law—that is, a universal divine positive law of perpetual obligation. In what is arguably his most important work, De Jure Naturali et Gentium, Selden follows the Talmud, which for him records a set of doctrines far older than classical antiquity. As both Tuck and J. P. Sommerville have demonstrated, natural law as conceived by Selden consists not of innate rational principles that are intuitively obvious but rather of specific divine pronouncements uttered by God at a point in historical time.¹² In De Jure’s 847 folio pages, Selden discusses the rabbinic identification of natural law with the divinely pronounced Adamic and Noachide laws, the praecepta Noachidarum, considered by rabbinic tradition as the minimal moral duties enjoined upon all of humankind. De Jure consists of seven books, corresponding to the seven commandments promulgated by God to the children of Noah—hence, to all of humankind: the prohibitions of blasphemy, idolatry, homicide, robbery, unchastity (incest, adultery, bestiality), eating a limb torn from a living animal, and the establishing of a civil judicial system in order to enforce these laws. Despite important differences, a common interest in natural law that crosses national borders links the Arminian Grotius and the Erastian Selden, as well as the emerging heretic Milton and the Huguenot Barbeyrac. Each observed ¹⁰ Nathanael Culverwel, An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature (1652), 68. ¹¹ Richard Tuck, ‘Grotius and Selden’, in J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie, eds., The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450–1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 512. ¹² See Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 82–100; J. P. Sommerville, ‘John Selden, The Law of Nature, and the Origins of Government’, The Historical Journal 27 (1984), 437–47. In the course of a uniformly excellent survey of the topic, Sommerville corrects Tuck by pointing out that for Selden six of the ‘Noachide’ laws go back not merely to a point in time after the Flood but all the way back to Eden—the seventh, the prohibition against eating the limb of a living animal, would have been irrelevant to our vegetarian first parents in paradise.
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at first hand the dangers of uniform religious practice, whether Catholic or Calvinist, and each in his own way defended a pluralist culture. Milton met Grotius (‘a most learned man … whom I ardently desired to meet’, Second Defence, YP 4.615) in May 1638, when the international jurist was in exile in Paris as an opponent of his native Holland’s orthodox state religion.¹³ Grotius employs his immense learning to build bridges between different cultures. A typical example from De Jure Belli ac Pacis is his defense of conventicles and assemblies, where he applies to Christians an ancient Jewish authority’s defense of Jews: ‘What Philo informs us to have been said by Augustus, of the Jewish Synagogues, is more truly and properly applicable to the Christian Congregations, That they were not Meetings for Revellings, or seditious Cabals, but pure Seminaries of Virtue.’ Grotius adds that Philo ‘shews elsewhere, how great a Difference there is between the Synagogues and the Mysteries of Paganism … which passage is well worth reading’, and he also cites on this point Josephus, Contra Apion (De Jure Belli II.XX.49, 2.1045).¹⁴ The passage reinforces a hierarchy maintained throughout the work of pagan, Hebraic, and Christian thought that corresponds to the tripartite crescendo of natural law, the Mosaic law, and the gospel. What makes it typical is the mix of sympathy for specifically Jewish thought and an insistence on the superiority of Christianity. Milton refers to ‘Hugo Grotius, a man of these times, one of the best learned’ (DDD, YP 2.238), ten times in the divorce tracts, beginning with the heading of the Preface to book 1 of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (YP 2.234). Where the antiprelatical tracts segregate pagans or Jews from Christians, nature or law from gospel, Old Testament from New, the monist spirit of the 1643–5 tracts emphasizes congruity and inclusiveness. While maintaining the superiority of Christianity, Milton nevertheless treats as compatible all human beings’ natural rights as reasonable creatures, the rights of biblical Israel as members of a holy community, and the individual privilege of the regenerate Christian saint. He emphasizes the gospel’s perfect correspondence with Mosaic law ‘grounded on [the] morall reason’ of natural law (DDD, YP 2.264). In these tracts, as in paradise before the Fall, ‘God and Nature bid the same’ (PL 6.176), and Milton speaks of ‘the fundamentall law book of nature; which Moses never thwarts, but reverences’ (YP 2.272). Grotius is John Selden’s strong precursor, although the slightly younger scholar’s consideration of the ancient constitution of pre-Christian Britain, ¹³ See Lewalski, The Life of John Milton, 89 and 571 n. 7, on the possible influence on Milton’s poetry of Grotius’s Adamus Exul and Christus Patiens. ¹⁴ See also 1045 n. 5. Grotius cites Philo’s ‘De Legat. Ad Cajum (p. 1035. E. Edit. Paris)’ as well as ‘Lib. De Sacrificant’.
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Analecta Anglobritannica, precedes and parallels Grotius’s study of the early Netherlanders, De Antiquitate Reipublicae Batavicae. But Selden’s Mare Clausum was commissioned as a reply to Grotius’s Mare Liberum; and his De Jure Naturali can best be understood within the post-scholastic, antiAristotelian tradition of De Jure Belli.¹⁵ Selden’s intercultural studies are less judgmental and far less morally hierarchical than Grotius. I have recently suggested that Milton’s muse in Paradise Lost may owe something to Selden’s discussion in De Jure of the intellectus agens or active intellect, an external force, either God or a heavenly messenger, that actuates the mind’s cognitive faculties.¹⁶ Although Selden cites Maimonides most frequently on the idea of prophetic inspiration as an extraordinary overflow of light from the divine intellect, he also finds it in commentaries on Aristotle by the Muslim philosophers Avicenna and Averroes, as well as in the work of one of his heroes of intellectual bravery, Friar Roger Bacon. In an epic embodying a myth of universal appeal, it is fitting that Milton’s muse belong to Islam, Judaism, and Christianity.¹⁷ The capital importance of Hebrew philology in the divorce tracts makes Selden at least as important a Miltonic source as Grotius, since he outstrips his predecessor in the field of Hebraic and especially rabbinic scholarship. Milton reflects at some length on the meaning of what has been translated as ‘some uncleannesse; but in the Hebrew it sounds nakednes of ought, or any reall nakednes: which by all the learned interpreters is refer’d to the mind, as well as to the body’ (DDD, YP 2.244). Milton dedicates The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce to Parliament and the Westminster Assembly, and Selden, a member of both bodies, is the only dedicatee of either to be named. Of the 149 members of the Assembly, 119 were divines, and only twenty were from the Commons, Selden among them. Milton had already noted that lay persons were invited to participate in the first Council of Nicaea (RCG, YP 1.839), and he may well have Selden in mind as one of those persons ‘of what liberall profession soever, of eminent spirit and breeding joyn’d with a diffuse and various knowledge of divine and human things; ¹⁵ For more on the relation between the two, see Richard Tuck’s ‘Grotius and Selden’, 499–529, and his Philosophy and Government 1572–1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 154–221. ¹⁶ See Jason P. Rosenblatt, Renaissance England’s Chief Rabbi: John Selden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 212–16. ¹⁷ Selden’s magnificent Hebrew scholarship includes remarkable competence in the Babylonian-Aramaic texts of the Talmud. Less well known (and less magisterial) are his Arabic studies, which begin with Titles of Honor (1614) and extend up to the posthumously published third book of De Synedriis (1655). With the publication of Mare Clausum (1635), he introduced Arabic movable type into England. See G. J. Toomer, Eastern Wisedome and Learning: The Study of Arabic in Seventeenth-Century England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 64–71.
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able to balance and define good and evill, right and wrong, throughout every state of life’. These worthies Milton contrasts with ‘the narrow intellectuals of quotationists and common placers’ (DDD, YP 2.230). As a member of the Assembly, Selden delighted in confuting the jure divino claims of the Presbyterian divines. According to the eyewitness testimony of his friend Bulstrode Whitelocke, Mr. Selden spake admirably, and confuted divers of them in their own learning. And sometimes when they had cited a text of Scripture to prove their assertion, he would tell them, Perhaps in your little pocket-bibles with gilt leaves (which they would often pull out and read) the translation may be thus, but the Greek or the Hebrew signifies thus and thus, and so would totally silence them.¹⁸
The influence of Selden’s De Jure begins with the second edition of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, and in the Preface Milton appeals to the fellow feeling of those ‘worthy Patriots’ who, like himself, have suffered for the cause of truth: ‘for who among ye of the formost that have travail’d in her behalfe to the good of Church, or State, hath not been often traduc’t to be the agent of his owne by-ends’ (DDD, YP 2.225). Besides the attacks suffered after the publication of his Historie of Tithes (1618), Selden was one of nine members of Parliament for whom the Privy Council issued warrants on 3 March 1629. His study was sealed, and he was committed to the Tower, ‘without any cause expressed and simply on the order of the king’.¹⁹ His two years in prison attest to his parliamentary labors on behalf of individual rights and in opposition to constitutional violations by King Charles and Archbishop Laud. It is fitting that Grotius appear at the beginning of the treatise, Selden at the end, where Milton refers to ‘the divine testimonies of God himself, lawgiving in person to a sanctify’d people’, available in ‘that noble volume, written by our learned Selden, Of the law of nature & of Nations [De Jure Naturali et Gentium], a work … worthy to be perus’d [by] whosoever studies to be a great man in wisdom, equity, and justice’ (DDD, YP 2.350). Grotius originates important ideas, which both Selden and Milton then develop. Indeed, Selden’s serious interest in the rabbinic Noachide laws may have begun with his reading of De Jure Belli, which takes note of ‘that antient Tradition among the Hebrewes, that GOD gave more Laws to the Sons of Noah, which were not all recorded by Moses’ (I.II.3, 1.193). Milton’s use of charity as a hermeneutic key to open the New Testament passages that seem to reject divorce unequivocally may have ¹⁸ Bulstrode Whitelocke, Memorials of the English Affairs (London, 1682), 71. ¹⁹ Selden, Vindiciae; cited in David Sandler Berkowitz, John Selden’s Formative Years: Politics and Society in Early Seventeenth-Century England (Washington, DC: Folger Shakespeare Library, 1988), 226–30.
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originated with his reading of Grotius’s Annotationes in Libros Evangeliorum (Amsterdam, 1641): If we rightly consider the Nature of all the Precepts of JESUS CHRIST, we shall find that Charity is their Principle and Perfection: Now Charity requires we should procure the Advantage of others, but so as to think of our own, and not be cruel to ourselves, as St. PAUL teaches, 2 Cor. viii 13.²⁰
Grotius, on the same text in Mark, anticipating Milton on ‘the apt and cheerfull conversation of man with woman’ (DDD, YP 2.235), asserts that ‘Matrimony was not instituted only for the Propagation of Mankind; the mutual Assistance which is expected from that Union is certainly to be considered.’ He also points out that the Bible leaves unstated but understood grounds for divorce other than adultery, such as attempted murder of a spouse or the murder of their children. Grotius, in advocating a ‘just Medium … between too credulous Jealousy and stupid Indolence’, begins to furnish Milton with a broader conception of fornication: [T]he Law is not able to judge of these things but by the rule of equity, and by permitting a wise man to walk the middle-way of prudent circumspection, neither wretchedly jealous, nor stupidly and tamely patient. To this purpose hath Grotius in his notes [Annotationes]. He shews also that fornication is tak’n in Scripture for such a continual headstrong behaviour, as tends to plain contempt of the husband: and proves it out of Judges 19.2. where the Levites wife is said to have playd the whoor against him; which Josephus and the Septuagint, with the Chaldaean, interpret only of ²⁰ Hugo Grotius, Annotationes in Quator Evangelia & Act Apostolorum [1641], rpt. in Opera ` si diligenter advertamus ad naturam omnium Theologicorum (Amsterdam, 1679), 2.53–4: ‘Quod Christi praeceptorum, reperiemus & originem eorum & consummationem in caritate consistere, quae ita nos vult aliis consulere ut ne in nos ipsos crudeles simus, quemadmodum docet Paulus II Corinth. VIII.13.’ This is the passage that Grotius whispered to Milton: ‘When I had almost finisht the first edition [of DDD], I chanc’t to read in the notes of Hugo Grotius upon the 5. of Matth … and somthing he whisper’d rather than disputed about the law of charity, and the true end of wedlock’ (Martin Bucer, YP 2.433–4). The translation is from Barbeyrac’s edition of De Jure Belli, II.V.9, 2.517 n. 7. Barbeyrac’s long note emphasizes the difference between Grotius’s restrictive view of divorce in De Jure Belli and his far more liberal interpretations sixteen years later in his Annotationes. In my book Renaissance England’s Chief Rabbi (145–7), I erroneously assumed that Milton refers to Grotius’s commentary on Matthew 5 in De Jure Belli. This led me to overstate the difference between Grotius and Milton on charity. In his brief commentary on Matthew 5, Grotius, who appears in both editions of Doctrine and Discipline (Selden appears only in the second edition), treats of numerous important ideas that Selden develops, and we can’t be absolutely certain which source Milton borrowed from: these include citations of Origen, Ambrose, and Epiphanius (Grotius, 50); the dispute between the schools of Hillel and Shammai on the meaning of Deuteronomy’s phrase ervath davar ‘nakednes of ought’, Grotius, 51; Milton, DDD, YP 2.244, 620; the story of Paulus Aemilius and the pinching shoe (Grotius, 51; DDD, YP 2.348); the Hebrew text of Judges 19:2 (Grotius, 53; DDD, YP 2.335); even the important idea attributed by Milton to Selden that the word fornication bears more than one sense (Grotius, 53).
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stubbornnes and rebellion against her husband: and to this I adde that Kimchi and the two other Rabbies who glosse the text, are in the same opinion. (DDD, YP 2.335)
It remains for the even more intimidatingly learned Selden to deconstruct the word fornication so that one might sue for divorce for any reason. For Milton, as for the most extreme among those overweening Pharisees whose excesses he attacks with zeal, ‘this law [of divorce] bounded no man; he might put away whatever found not favour in his eyes’ (Tetrachordon, YP 2.656–7). A passage in De Doctrina Christiana, which incidentally supports the Miltonic authorship of that work, clarifies the point: [A]s Selden demonstrated particularly well in his Uxor Hebraea, with the help of numerous Rabbinical texts, the word fornication, if it is considered in the light of the idiom of oriental languages, does not mean only adultery. It can … signify anything which is found to be persistently at variance with love, fidelity, help and society. (DDC, YP 6.378)
Jewish law provides the most important precedent for Milton’s argument that divorce should be granted for incompatibility, and Milton relies on Grotius and Selden as much for their skill in hermeneutics and Hebrew philology as for their views on moral epistemology. The title alone of Selden’s Uxor Ebraica, Seu de Nuptis & Divortis ex Iure Civili, Id Est, Divino & Talmudico, Veterum Ebraeorum [The Hebrew Spouse, or Three Books on Marriages and Divorces from the Civil Law, That is, Divine and Talmudic, of the Ancient Hebrews] reveals not only the author’s belief that post-biblical rabbinic law is ancient but also the reason that Milton finds it useful. But Samuel von Pufendorf reads the 1644 edition of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce entirely within the context of natural law theory in his monumental treatise De jurae naturae et gentium, or Law of Nature and Nations (1672), which Barbeyrac edited and annotated. Although Pufendorf explicitly refers to God as the origin of moral obligation, his investigation of the ultimate principles of moral experience concentrates on law as a human construction. His remarkable epitome of Milton’s treatise occupies more than six folio columns. On the subject of divorce, Pufendorf devotes only a single sentence to Grotius, summarizing the more conservative opinion in De Jure Belli that Christ came to ratify by a new law ‘what was before most agreeable to the divine Will’—namely, ‘that the Bond of Marriage should be perpetual’.²¹ He then turns briefly to Selden, on the talmudic dispute between ‘the Sammeans and the Hillelians’, the former arguing that only the discovery of baseness and ²¹ Samuel von Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium libri octo [1672] [On the Law of Nature and Nations in Eight Books], 5th edn., ed. Jean Barbeyrac, trans. Basil Kennet (London, 1749), 6.1.24, p. 582. Parenthetic page references are to this edition.
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dishonesty could justify divorce, the latter holding that spousal dislike was sufficient. Christ ‘declares in Favour of the Sammeans’ (582). But Pufendorf’s real interest is in Milton—in his passionate reasons for divorce, decidedly not in his biblical hermeneutics, which he rejects summarily: ‘When God was pleased to give Man a Helpmeet for him [Gen. 2:18], and afterwards commanded the primitive Couple to increase and multiply [Gen. 1:28], he did not hereby ordain two different ends of Marriage; but the latter Words seem designed to describe the chief Fruit arising … from the mutual Assistance first mentioned’ (583). Failing to understand that for Milton the word conversation includes not only habitual proximity and cooperation but also intimacy, Pufendorf pokes gruesome fun at the idea that it is the primary purpose of marriage. He quotes approvingly and at length, in both Latin and in Dryden’s translation, from Juvenal’s sixth satire, which bemoans the ‘Midnight Curse’ of marriage to a woman learned in languages, logic, and history, preferring instead ‘a quiet, humble Fool: / I hate a Wife, to whom I go to School’ (584). When Pufendorf disagrees with feminist Milton, he unintentionally judges himself, sounding like the late-middle-aged, cigar-smoking man at ease in his club chair, in a New Yorker cartoon, who confides to his friends, ‘I actually prefer same sex—as long as it doesn’t involve sex.’ Pufendorf assumes that once we remove ‘the Pleasures which by the Appointment of Nature sweeten and recommend’ ‘the Procreation of Offspring’, men alone make more agreeable companions: And thus we see, that Boys and old Men, those who have not felt the Pas