Mind-Body, Causation and Correlation Cornelius L. Golightly Philosophy of Science, Vol. 19, No. 3. (Jul., 1952), pp. 225-227. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28195207%2919%3A3%3C225%3AMCAC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7 Philosophy of Science is currently published by The University of Chicago Press.
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MIND-BODY, CAUSATION AND CORRELATION CORNELIUS L. GOLIGHTLY
Contemporary organismic and bio-social accounts of human behavior consider physical and psychological concepts as alternative or complementary linguistic descriptions of the same subject matter. The notion of complementarity is an important part of the organismic physicalistic synthesis which replaces the old duels between mechanism and vitalism, between physiology and psychology. The concept of complementarity comes from Bohr's solution for the difYiculty of reconciling classical mechanics with quantum mechanics. He suggested that they are parallel and complementary rather than contradictory ways of looking a t the universe. The continuity of the energy transfer according to the electromagnetic theory and the atomicity of light effects are "complementary aspects of one reality in the sense that each expresses an important feature of the phenomena of light, which, although irreconcilable from a mechanical point of view, can never be in direct contradiction, since a closer analysis of one or the other feature in mechanical terms would demand mutually exclusive experimental arrangements" (3). Carl G. Hempel reflects this kind of thinking in a recent footnote to an earlier paper : I now (1947) consider the type of physicalism outlined in this paper as too restrictive; the thesis t h a t all statements of empirical science are translatable, without loss of theoretical content, into the language of physics, should be replaced by the weaker assertion t h a t all statements of empirical science are reducible t o sentences in the language of physics, in the sense t h a t for every empirical hypothesis, including, of course, those of psychology, it is possible t o formulate certain test conditions in terms of physical concepts which refer t o more or less directly observable physical attributes. But those test conditions are not asserted t o exhaust the theoretical content of the given hypothesis in all cases (4).
The new approach to scientific psychology makes it possible to formulate more adequate descriptions of human behavior than were possible under a rigid behaviorism. For example, it can be admitted that all the mechanisms of adjustment in motivational theory imply a self-reference and that these mechanisms are not understandable without a concept of the self ( 5 ) . The problem now becomes that of formulating a concept of the self that will give an adequate account of human motivation, be derived or inferred from empirical observation, and be capable of operational definition and verification. There is still room for the rejection of a static, inert, substantive "non-empirical entity distinct both from the organism and from its perceptual responses to the forms and symbols which are called self" (6). However, one is no longer forced to work a t the impossible task of trying to make psychology sound exactly like physics. Unfortunately, a freer usage by reputable scientists of concepts such as ego, self, and psychosomatic medicine has stimulated anew the old errors and misconceptions of psychophysical dualism, parallelism, interactionism, of some 225
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mysterious soul or psyche lurking within the interstices of the brain. It is alleged that psychological experience and the clinical evidence of psychosomatic medicine support psychophysical dualism or at least pose serious difficulty for a consistent monism. This retreat into dualism is exploded when the concept of complementarity is fully understood. Consider its application to the common phenomenon of blushing. The mechanistic, physiological, behavioristic view was that blushing should be explained solely in physiological terms, e.g., the dilation of blood vessels in the cheek caused by nerve impulses conducted from higher brain centers via the autonomic nervous system. What the psychologist calls embarrassment is simply some physiological process in the brain which is conducted through the nervous pathways to the blood vessels of the cheek. The physiological process was all that merited consideration. The complementarist approach admits frankly that a minute physiological description may be satisfactory in one context but that a psychological explanation such as the following may be vastly superior in another: "one person blushes when praised by the teacher in the presence of others because in childhood he had competed with his brother for parental approval and, remembering the illicit means by which he often obtained the approval, he now feels guilty and ashamed" (1). The question of dualism may now arise in two ways. First, one might argue that the two types of description necessarily refer to two types of data, mental on the one hand and physical on the other. The answer here is obvious. There is but a single organism which is being described in two different ways. The two descriptions complement each other and enable the observer to get a fuller view of the subject. The second way in which the question of dualism arises is more complicated. Suppose it is asserted that the psychological feelings of guilt, shame or embarrassment cause the physiological states of the dilation of blood vessels. Or conversely, as the James-Lange theory puts it, the physiological states cause the psychological feelings. The concept of cause here seems to indicate the existence of both mind and matter and_some kind of interaction between the two. A. J. Ayer has proposed that the connection here is not that of causation a t all, but rather one of correlation (2). There are two types of observation which fall into different categories. One story is told in terms of nerve cells and electric impulses, the other in terms of sensations and emotions. These observations can be correlated with each other: whenever an observation of the first type is made, we could, if we chose, make an observation of the second type also. In short, what is thought to be two events turns out to be but a single event described in alternative ways. There is no room left for the possibility of the mental to cause or produce the physical or for the physical to cause or produce the mental. A slight variation in the argument would seem to cause trouble. Suppose one insists that the mental state of feeling shame is antecedent to the physical state of blushing. Hence the relation could not be correlation but might be that of causation. This way of thinking is also evident when it is said colloquially that
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frustration causes stomach ulcers. However, this argument is readily met if closer attention is paid to the concept of time and to the fact that two different types of description are intermixed. The difficulty consists simply in beginning a story with psychological description and ending it with physical categories. There is still only a single entity present, the organism with experiences described first in psychological terms, then in physiological terms. Proof of this is clear when the concept of simultaneity is used. Let us say that an event occurs a t Time A which is described in psychological terms and that another event occurs a t Time B which is described in physiological terms. If simultaneous observations were made a t Time A and interpreted in physiological terms the event could be described also as a physiological event. Thus a physiological event would clearly be antecedent to and perhaps a causal factor in a physiological event occurring a t Time B. Similarly, simultaneous observation of the second event a t Time B with interpretation in psychological terms would result in our calling the event psychological. Thus, a psychological event would be consequent to and perhaps caused by the antecedent psychological event a t Time A . But it should be clear that despite the variant descriptions there is only one event a t Time A and one event a t Time B.
University of Wisconsin REFERENCES (1) ALEXANDER, FRANZ, "Present Trends in Psychiatry and the Future Outlook," Modern Attitudes in Psychiatry (1945 Laity Lectures of the New York Academy of Medicine). New York: Columbia 'C'niversity Press, 1946, pp. 81-82. (2) AYER,A . J., "The Physical Basis of Mind: A Philosopher's Symposium," The Physical Basis of M i n d , ed. P . Laslett. New York: Macmillan Company, 1950, pp. 70-72. (3) BOAR,NILS, "Light and Life," Nature, CXXXI, 1933, p. 422. (4) HEMPEL,CARLG., "The Logical Analysis of Psychology," tr. by Wilfrid Sellars and reprinted from Revue de Synthese, 1935; Readings in Philosophical Analysis, ed. H . Feigl and W. Sellars. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1949, p. 373. (5) HILGARD, ERNEST R., "Human Motives and the Concept of the Self," T h e American Psychologist, IV, 1949, pp. 374-383. (6) MURPHY, GARDNER, Personality: A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947, pp. 490-491.
