Minority Integration in Central Eastern Europe Between Ethnic Diversity and Equality
On the Boundary of Two Worlds: I...
25 downloads
788 Views
2MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
Minority Integration in Central Eastern Europe Between Ethnic Diversity and Equality
On the Boundary of Two Worlds: Identity, Freedom, and Moral Imagination in the Baltics 18
Editor Leonidas Donskis, Member of the European Parliament, and previously Professor and Dean of Vytautas Magnus University School of Political Science and Diplomacy in Kaunas, Lithuania. Editorial and Advisory Board Timo Airaksinen, University of Helsinki, Finland Egidijus Aleksandravicius, Lithuanian Emigration Institute, Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania Stefano Bianchini, University of Bologna, Forlì Campus, Italy Endre Bojtar, Institute of Literary Studies, Budapest, Hungary Kristian Gerner, University of Lund, Sweden John Hiden, University of Glasgow, UK Mikko Lagerspetz, Åbo Academy, Finland Andreas Lawaty, Nordost-Institute, Lüneburg, Germany Olli Loukola, University of Helsinki, Finland Hannu Niemi, University of Helsinki, Finland Alvydas Nikzentaitis, Lithuanian History Institute, Lithuania Yves Plasseraud, Paris, France Rein Raud, Rector of Tallinn University, Estonia Alfred Erich Senn, University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA, and Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania David Smith, University of Glasgow, UK Saulius Suziedelis, Millersville University, USA Joachim Tauber, Nordost-Institut, Lüneburg, Germany Tomas Venclova, Yale University, USA
Minority Integration in Central Eastern Europe Between Ethnic Diversity and Equality
Edited and introduced by
Timofey Agarin and Malte Brosig
Amsterdam - New York, NY 2009
Cover photo: Lúnik 9, a Roma borough in the city of Košice, Slovakia. © Sylvia Allen The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of “ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents - Requirements for permanence”. ISBN: 978-90-420-2733-6 E-Book ISBN: 978-90-420-2734-3 © Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2009 Printed in the Netherlands
Table of Contents Minority Integration in Central Eastern Europe: An Introduction Timofei Agarin and Malte Brosig
7
Section I International Organizations and Minority Integration in Europe The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights? Manuela Riedel
27
The Special Consideration Standard as a Modern Tool for Advancing the Rights of Minorities Alexander H. E. Morawa
53
The Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and Equality Promotion Malte Brosig
79
Beyond Conflict Prevention: HCNM and Minority Integration Natalie Sabanadze
103
Section II Political Integration of Minority Communities Comparing European Institutional and Hungarian Approaches to Roma (Gypsy) Minorities Annabel Tremlett
129
The Roma and Egyptian Minorities in Albania: Legal Framework for Social Inclusion Michaela Salamun
151
Political Community, Political Institutions and Minority Politics in Slovakia 1998–2006 Ada-Charlotte Regelmann
175
Cooptation as Integration? National Programme “Integration of Society in Latvia” on Minority Participation Timofey Agarin
199
Social Cohesion Estonian Style: Minority Integration Through Constitutionalized Hegemony and Fictive Pluralism Tove H. Malloy
225
Section III The Interface of Minority and Majority Communities Round Pegs in Square Holes: Integrating the Romani Community in Hungary Aidan McGarry
257
Empowerment as a two-way Process: The Role of Romani NGOs in Integration of Macedonian Society Sara Nikolić
279
Romani Teaching Assistants in the Czech Education System: An Opportunity to Address Barriers to the Labour Market? Laura Cashman
305
Multicultural Solutions for Central and Eastern Europe? Concluding Observations Timofey Agarin and Malte Brosig
331
Contributors
357
Minority Integration in Central Eastern Europe: An Introduction Timofey Agarin and Malte Brosig The accession of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to the European Union (EU) was anticipated with great expectations. The aspiring member states expected the EU to guarantee economic prosperity and political recognition, while Western countries saw political integration of the continent as a way to secure peace and stability throughout the region. Both sides viewed EU-accession as a tool providing an opportunity to overcome ethnic tensions and irredentism, as well as promoting social cohesion through the process of European integration. However, the optimistic predictions that ethnic conflicts would disappear following economic development and regional integration into the EU, NATO and other organizations did not materialize as had been hoped. Prior to and following EU accession, CEE countries had to develop their own strategies to accommodate large minority populations on their territories. Today these states provide models of their own to address minority protection and find local interpretations of what integration entails. In spite of the relatively short experience in devising policies relevant (and suitable) to minorities, most of the CEE countries precipitated the change in relations between the state institutions and the societies they govern, that result from development of an ever closer European Union. Interstate treaties, trans-border cooperation and regional initiatives considerably improved the status of minority groups across CEE. All new EU member states have found ways to address political, economic, and social inequalities between their majority and minority residents Still, many issues remain contested. It appears that every country in CEE provides a plethora of questions to debate inequalities between the majority and minority population. For the members of minority groups across the region there is much more at stake than the majority groups of their countries of residence are prepared to accept in the course of social integration. However, considerable local knowledge is required to develop minority integration in practice. None of the programmes developed by the state aiming at minority integration across the region show overlap in goals, practices or incentives. That is not to say that these approaches to integration are incomparable. Arguably, broad scale generalizations are insensitive to details of local implementation and case-studies provide too much detail at the expense of an overall elegance of narrative. In this volume we sought to strike a balance between the two extremes by providing a detailed narrative underlying
8
Introduction
______________________________________________________________ policy-making, but also pointing to potential issues of contention between local, national and European policies. This volume provides the reader with a detailed account of current challenges in integrating ethnic minority groups in CEE countries. We thereby took great care not to slide into one-sided modes of analysis privileging either the international, national or societal dimension of integration but aim at covering the most important aspects of minority integration across disciplines as different as anthropology, political science, sociology and law. This multi-dimensional and interdisciplinary approach to minority integration, in our view, best covers the complex reality on the ground. We have deliberately decided not to promote a certain theory of integration or concept of multiculturalism which would only account for certain aspects of minority integration but hardly cover the existing complexity of the issue. The volume clearly privileges theoretical, analytical and disciplinary pluralism over deductive monism. Thus the contributions to this volume do not aim at further developing or testing theoretical models of integration in the first place but deliver analytically informed rich empirical examinations of current challenges in ethnic minority integration in CEE. Consequently, the volume follows an inherently inductive orientation uncovering those challenges that international organizations, nation-states, minority groups and mainstream society encounter in the 21st century demarcating a long path to effective equality and integration. In this volume we bring together the contributions discussing minority integration in countries as diverse as Albania, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Estonia, and Hungary. Our contributors analyze the concepts and interpretations related to minority integration, more frequently than not questioning the outcome of integration efforts in countries under review. In order to provide a comprehensive overview on these issues and debates, we analyze different approaches, advocated by various actors in the field. Throughout the volume our contributors argue that particular ways of accommodating minority groups in CEEC have been developed. Minority integration, as we argue in the volume, reflects on particular histories of minority settlement, relations with external states, engagement of international actors, and decisively, the majorities’ perception of “their” nation-states. By and large, where “national citizenship” became more open and embraced, social differences, alongside cultural and linguistic diversity within political community prevailed in developing models more effective than those already in place across Western European EU states. 1. The European Dimension of Minority Integration Minority integration issues are currently gaining attention across Europe, particularly since the last two rounds in EU enlargement. Since 2004 the EU has become more diverse than ever: 23 official languages have been regis-
Timofey Agarin and Malte Brosig
9
______________________________________________________________ tered in Brussels, 60 indigenous languages are actively spoken in the EU comprising not less than 40 million people and 190 different ethnic minority groups (Toggenburg, 2007, p. 2). The diversity of ethnic belonging almost naturally raises the question of equal opportunity for all members of societies affected, especially when considering disparities between the dominant and non-dominant ethnic groups in most EU member states. The EU’s focus on non-discrimination dominates the current discourse on minority rights across the member and non-member states alike. The contributions of our volume suggest that growing attention to social inclusion across the European continent is the outcome of a general shift in the international perception of minority rights issues. Minority rights in the early 1990s had for a considerable time, been constructed through the prism of security. It was primarily the trepidation of Western European countries towards the potential of ethnic violence and war in the Balkan region which led the EU, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and Council of Europe (COE) to (re)-discover the discourse on minority rights. The war in the former Yugoslavia was perceived to be a threat to security in South-Eastern Europe, potentially spreading beyond the Balkans. The demise of the Soviet Union could also have had unprecedented geopolitical consequences for CEE states. Lasting political and economic transition across CEE countries could destabilize societies, revealing ethnic tensions, previously suppressed by the socialist leadership. It was in this light that in 1992 the OSCE set up a special body responsible for monitoring and prevention of ethnic conflicts, the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). In addition, in 1994 the COE drafted the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) which became the first international legally binding agreement formulating specific minority rights norms. Finally, the so-called Copenhagen EU-accession criteria, elaborated in 1993, made EU-membership conditional on the respect for and protection of minorities. Twenty years on, there is no evidence of ethnic warfare occurring outside of the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Across CEE countries it appears political, economic and social transition has been at least successful enough to prevent ethnic conflict, while continuously improving majority-minority relations. These achievements give evidence of the positive impact of international engagement in CEE states and societies. The COE’s legally binding instruments for minority rights protection, the HCNM’s quiet diplomacy, EU membership conditionality and financial support to the states, are essential for the successful promotion of minority integration standards throughout CEE. In this context international institutions establish benchmarks for equal treatment of minority groups throughout the region. Classical state monitoring on the implementation of human rights treaties - such as FCNM, jurisprudence of the European Court for Human Rights, new governance instru-
10
Introduction
______________________________________________________________ ments in the case of the EU and social inclusion initiatives advanced by the OSCE in the course of its conflict prevention approach – were all fundamental to securing the interethnic accord across the region. Indeed, one of the most important functions international organizations can fulfil is the setting of standards which has at least two advantages over individual national standard setting. First, it ensures comparability between cases and avoids bias to a certain group of people or the unique actor constellation in one country. Second, international institutions engage in norm setting as a non-partisan actor who does not pursue its own ethnic interests. Although international support for integrative measures is often essential for their lasting success, international institutions contribute far less towards enforcement and implementation of these standards on the ground. Generally, international institutions depend on their member states’ willingness to implement commonly agreed conventions, declarations, jurisdictions and policy targets. None of the international organizations has its local administrative bodies, which could facilitate, not even to mention, implement integration policies. Even the EU which is by far the world’s most active and successful international regulator does not implement any of its regulations and directives, spelt out in well beyond 100,000 pages of the acquis communautaire. However, the EU has certainly the most general influence on social inclusion policies in its member states, not least because of its legislative and financial capacities. The same also holds for the COE and OSCE, which in contrast with the EU, have very limited financial means to support nation-states’ integration programmes. These organizations’ role is limited to monitoring the implementation of legal standards, giving advice, and providing organizational support for the setting up of integration measures. Despite these limitations the COE and OSCE have much to contribute. Their most valuable role is in the distribution of knowledge on European best-practices and the development of benchmark legislation for sustainable and successful integration measures. This becomes particularly important because of the general lack of experience in setting up minority integration concepts and strategies in CEE. Taking the situation of different minority groups into account, international institutions collect data and provide information on a wide range of situations to its nation-states. They are then expected to devise specific policy-solutions to the problems on the ground that would correspond to European-wide action plans and comply with European legal standards. The promotion of equal rights and effective equality throughout CEE comprises social, economic, and political integration measures. In this respect, European institutions engage in a multi-level and multi-actor game. While no single international institution dominates the scene, horizontal cooperation provides the greatest potential for cooperation and converges into a
Timofey Agarin and Malte Brosig
11
______________________________________________________________ broader European approach to minority rights. The fact that the COE is developing legal standards for minority integration through the FCNM and the jurisprudence of its human rights court is complemented by the EU’s policy initiatives on social inclusion and non-discrimination. Cooperation between the EU, COE and OSCE has been intensifying over the past decade. Since 2001 the EU and COE have been institutionalizing their cooperation in a joint programme line, addressing issues of multiculturalism and social inclusion. At the same time significant differences remain in the activities of the EU and the COE. The EU has not developed a comprehensive set of minority rights but is very active in the field of nondiscrimination and social inclusion. The COE, on the other hand, additionally seeks to guarantee minorities’ linguistic, cultural and political rights. The relationship between the EU and the COE should thus be seen as that of complementary cooperation on the issues relevant to the legal status of a minority with an overlapping interest in minority integration. At the vertical axis international organizations seek interaction with both the states and a multitude of domestic actors. This spectrum reaches from multi-national non-governmental organizations to central, regional and local administrative bodies, from local civic initiatives to nearly all sorts of minority pressure groups. Here international institutions create conditions in support of minorities’ integration into society by benchmarking, monitoring, mediating, and funding of integration programmes. Admittedly the EU, OSCE, and COE only have limited experience and competence in the area of minority integration, which poses a number of new challenges to the expertise of international organizations in that area. This raises the question of whether the EU, or any other international organization, is capable of generating some base-line for inter-ethnic cooperation across the region? While our contributors do not underestimate the complexity of the question, they argue that only a concerted action at both the international and national levels can guarantee equal opportunity for participation of minorities across the CEE. 2. The National Dimension of Minority Integration International organizations involved with supporting social inclusion and promoting equality of minorities play an important role in reducing tensions between the ethnic communities on the domestic level across CEE. Especially noteworthy is the international organizations’ effort in setting parameters for good practice towards minority populations. Needless to say, fulfilling this task is not easy at all. The notion of equality can be stretched widely to encompass interpretations as diverse as entitlement for participation in decision-making to prohibition of unequal treatment in the public sphere, from individual-centred affirmative action to group-oriented support of selfgovernment in areas of compact settlement.
12
Introduction
______________________________________________________________ Not surprisingly, the lack of normative guidelines at the international level towards minority integration results in deficient practical application of integration at the state level. How divergent approaches to integration should, and how they should not be applied creates real problems in justifying the promotion of specific instruments for minority protection (Patten and Kymlicka, 2003, pp. 32-37). Most of the international organizations involved in minority integration projects have previously advised nation-states to apply pragmatic rules and support policies that have measurable positive impacts on integration. General indicators for minority integration, such as unemployment and literacy rates, proportional representation in private and public sectors of economy, as well as participation and visibility in political institutions were used for this purpose. Parekh summarizes the outcome of equal treatment policies, following which “All citizens should enjoy equal opportunities to acquire the capacities and skills needed to function in society and to pursue their self-chosen goals equally effectually” (2000, p. 211). In this sense, the role of the nation-state in fostering equitable treatment of minorities and majorities is not limited to the distribution of material resources and to provisions of fair access to public goods. Recognition of minority groups as equal partners in policy-making and implementation relies heavily on the equal treatment of individuals, irrespective of their group membership, and their linguistic, cultural or ethnic specificity. Clearly, the concept of equality is determined by the social environment and relational attitudes of groups engaged in establishing what “ equal treatment” means. Being an intersubjectively and relatively defined social good, equality is embedded in the general social and, crucially, political context. It is operationalized and endowed with meanings which make sense to individuals and groups, engaged in the effort of negotiating the terms of cooperation and finally, integration. Therefore the discussion on social justice is central for debating the processes of intergroup relations generally, and integration processes particularly. Minority opinions play an important part in these deliberations, because they allow a more elaborate definition of justice, and oppose perpetuation of institutional equilibria, maintaining the majority’s monopoly of power resources. The problem of equality between the minority and majority is not limited to countries we investigate in the volume. Like the majority of EU states, the polities across CEE are defined in terms of nation-states. From within this context, every state in the region “belongs” to one particular ethnic group, whose name it bears; to the group, whose special relation with “its” state is rarely questioned. At the same time, various European and international organizations sought to initiate institutional changes which would facilitate minority participation in decision-making processes. The EU, COE, HCNM all questioned the monopoly of states’ majorities over political resources in “their” countries, suggesting a potential security dilemma should minority
Timofey Agarin and Malte Brosig
13
______________________________________________________________ grievances be continuously neglected. On the flip side, even though political actors across CEE were reluctant to question the dominant status of majority groups over minorities in their societies, formal equality between the groups provides the starting point for deliberation on further concessions. The contributions of the book address this relationship head-on. Most of them conclude that no regulations prescribing equal access of minority groups to political resources are effective in their own right. Instead, financial support and affirmative action are among the resources that make some difference over time, resulting in – possibly, but not necessarily – a multicultural outlook of a given society. Along the lines suggested in the current multiculturalism debate, our authors observe that common civic identity of state citizens, where “constitutional patriotism” dominates over ethnic particularism are not devoid of ethnic criteria (Kymlicka, 2000; Soysal, 1994; Parekh, 2000). Most definitely, no state which nurtures the civic identity of its citizens over ethnically defined group-memberships is entirely free of bias in favour of its constituent culture. All multicultural societies establish some form of cultural hierarchies in the public sphere, leaving unquestioned the relation between the official state language and minority languages, the core state culture/s and non-core cultures, the state’s dominant group and nondominant communities. In this sense, our contributors observe that unless the states in CEE define their societies in cultural, linguistic, racial and any other exclusive terms, one can hardly speak of accomplished integration. This does not mean the end of appreciation for cultural differences in societies, but requires challenging the assumption that all individuals have equal resources, irrespective of their personal cultural endowments. As Malloy rightly points out, “the value of culture must be appreciated as a valuable contribution to the individual’s development and capability to function in society, especially the individual’s capability to act in the economic sphere without risking exclusion” (2005, p. 12). This point is of particular salience throughout the region we study in the book. Here, the cultural markers dominate the design of political institutions and thus require particular attention to minority opinions while addressing the issue of integration. The debate of unequal resource distribution between the majorities and minorities across CEE states would be incomplete without addressing the role of state-building in creating the basic provisions for the understanding of multiculturalism in the given societies. Where some scholars see institutional design to be of crucial importance for equal access to state resources from minority groups (Linz and Stepan, 1996), others tend to disagree. Political participation, they argue, is crucial to establish the rules of the game and is central for broad-scale democratization in societies (Rueschmeyer et al., 1998). In this context, structural mechanisms available to the members of a minority to improve their position within political settings across CEE is
14
Introduction
______________________________________________________________ always defined by the members of the majority, who are – most obviously – reluctant to render some of their structural advantage to other groups. Needless to say, this leaves plenty of room for improving mutual perceptions of majorities and minorities across the region. However, potential for improvement is most frequently mistaken for deficits of existing institutional design, a point that need not be reproduced here. Instead, additional attention should be granted to analyses of relations between the state- and nation-building, which went hand in hand since the inception of democratic movements against the socialist regimes in all countries across CEE (Brubaker, 1996; Brubaker, 2004; Jenne, 2006; Galbreath, 2005). If state- and nation-building are so closely interlinked, should one treat the challenge of minority integration as a by-product of (post-socialist) democratic transition? Possibly this is the case, but it is not necessarily so. The state approaches to minority integration in all CEE states address many issues which are relevant to minority. And in many cases, even the nationalizing states invite minority groups to cooperate with the existing institutions and majority publics. However, the issues are more likely than not to be defined by majority policy-makers, and the terms of cooperation are also dictated by the dominant group. What we observe throughout CEE is ethnic and cultural diversity that presents a challenge to the current debate of multi-culturalism. The contributions in this volume suggest, among others that the statebearing nations continue to perceive themselves to be locked in position, where active steps of protection of the national language, culture and ethnocentric education are necessary. On the other hand, however, our authors demonstrate that there is an anticipation of change in the relations between the core and non-core ethnic communities across CEE countries. The majority and minority are involved in shaping state policies, but the core ethnic community plays a role far more decisive than does a minority. In this context, the members of the minority are expected to adapt to the dominance of the state-bearing ethnic group, its language, and importantly, its visions of political community. The chapters addressing state-policies aimed at integration suggest that non-core groups are expected to accept the position assigned to them by the majority in their state of residence. The case-studies presented in the second section of our book make clear that issues on which minority communities are invited to deliberate are framed by majorities. In this, minority groups do not feature as equal partners engaged in the process of institutional change. It is in this section of the book that the limits of the state-led approach to societal integration become clearly visible. As our contributors argue, intergroup relations remain tense due to a tight connection between the ethnic, cultural, and linguistic interests of statebearing group, embedded in design of state institutions. Although the ethnocentric agenda of many CEE states is to a degree balanced by international leverage, state institutions tend to prefer homogeneous societies to be dealt
Timofey Agarin and Malte Brosig
15
______________________________________________________________ with, over multicultural ones. This is where, as our contributors suggest, one should look for multicultural solutions in the day-to-day interactions between the individuals of various cultural, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds. Analyses of relations between the members of majority and minority groups provide some insight into expected outcomes of integration on both sides as well as strategies applicable on case to case basis. 3. The Role of Society in Minority Integration To be effective, social integration requires a bottom-line consensus on what individuals involved see as a desirable and necessary outcome. The terms and the expected effects of integration need to be negotiated among and across broad segments of both the majority and minority communities. However, as our contributors observe, majority and minority groups seem to pursue different goals and thus favour different, partially excluding means to achieve societal integration. While the members of the majority regard integration as a tool with which to increase social cohesion and improve institutional performance, the members of minority usually seek to augment group integrity and stability by securing the status of their group. Scholarly investigations of the claims advanced by the members of majority groups in the course of negotiating the terms of integrations are usually regarded as instruments of nation- and state-building under the conditions of uncertainty (Brubaker, 2004; Burawoy and Verdery, 1999). Particularly, earlier discussions of majority claims emphasize the importance of the legal framework of the state, historical experiences and international legal standards of state sovereignty if formulated for the international consumer (Vachudova, 2005). At the same time, others investigating the rhetoric of majorities’ political entrepreneurs produced for a home audience argue that the primary aim of this rhetoric rests with legitimizing majorities’ dominance over local minorities (Pridham and Vanhanen, 1994; Nic Craith, 2006). Irrespective of the interpretation sought, majority populations throughout CEE constitute the state-bearing nations and thus exhort significant pressures on members of other groups, who happen to reside on the territory of “their” state. Therefore most students of post-socialist ethnic relations argue that the emphasis on “special relation” of majority communities with “their” state requires interpretations from a rational choice perspective (Laitin 1998; Wimmer, 2002; Hale, 2008). The interpretations of the policies differ considerably, depending on the strategies majority and minority groups deploy to achieve the best possible outcomes from their interactions. Some claim that nationalizing policies are nothing less than a thinly veiled effort to secure the redistribution of available resources among the members of an in-group (Anderson, 1991; Gellner, 1983; Hechter 2000). Others argue that the majorities opt for nationalizing policies to circumvent ethnic tensions during the
16
Introduction
______________________________________________________________ period of institutional change (Connor, 1993; Pridham and Gallagher, 2000). Yet another camp of rational choice interpretations suggests that ethnonational mobilization of the majority is resulting from perceptions of immanent external threat to the state and its constituent group (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Laitin 2007; Saidemann, 2001). All these interpretations can be (and have been) applied to all of the cases studied in this volume. Our contributors, however, claim that it is impossible to understand political rationale behind integration approaches throughout the region without taking seriously the minority/majority relations outside of the formal institutional political arena. The extent of political, social and economic changes across the region had an immediate impact on the legal status of state-languages, opportunities for minority education, political participation and representation of minority populations. The policy-measures alone, however, fail to account for particular strategies of adaptation favoured by the members of non-dominant groups. Where the members of majority groups were taking the upper hand in determining political reforms and path development of state institutions, many members of minority populations were left estranged from political processes. However, day-to-day interactions, be it in public institutions, at workplace, or in educational facilities remain an integral part of minorities’ interaction with the members of majority and improvement of intergroup relations. In a way, the members of minority communities tacitly confirm to the structural limitations on their activities, when they interact with the members of the majority on “their” terms and in “their” language, in institutions designed to serve primarily the majorities’ interests. But how far do they accept the terms of interaction? How do minorities address their grievances with institutions in place, when they interact with one another? The contributions in the section three of the volume suggest that even despite being designed to the disadvantage of minorities, minority groups have considerable leverage to participate in political decision making. The section points out that throughout the region minorities have little say on policy development in their states of residence, despite the fact that some steps have been undertaken during the past decade across CEE to provide additional opportunities for minority participation in public life. Throughout the region states addressed some minority grievances, prompting minority’s adaptation to the changing social reality, but there is only a limited framework for non-dominant groups’ political participation. Mainly their activities are confined to social cooperation envisaged by the state integration programmes, majority political actors and local initiatives. This once again indicates that minority participation is not treasured for its intrinsic value, i.e. as positively affecting institutional performance and increasing diversity, but rather as symbolic engagement in affirming decisions, previously made by the members of the majority. Here, the contributions underline that social participation is essential to support minority inte-
Timofey Agarin and Malte Brosig
17
______________________________________________________________ gration effectively. However, the contributions also conclude that the majority population continues to see the democratic transition as largely “their” responsibility. So, what does minority integration entail? Is it integration for participation, or integration through participation? Effectively, the presence of minority groups requires the renegotiation of institutionalized mechanisms for providing social services and ensuring the base-line of economic equality through the lens of social justice. Across CEE majorities, while not directly discouraging minority participation, engage in dialogue with members of minority communities when they cannot address the issues tangent on minority interests because of inadequate institutional capacity. This aspect of majority/minority relations falls increasingly into the EU focus on effective equality, non-discrimination and social justice which represent the corner-stones of minority integration. Indeed, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU dedicates a whole chapter to equality, among other things banning racial discrimination and calling for respect to cultural, linguistic and religious diversity. In this document, the EU acknowledges that the project of European integration can only be successful if membership of an ethnic group does not legitimize social, economic and political marginalization. This suggests that the individual approach to minority integration, which has been developing throughout the CEE region for the two past decades, finds some correspondence in national policies. Being primarily devised as a positive response to the potential burdening of European external relations, especially security and stability on its Eastern borders, it revolutionized majority/minority relations throughout Europe considerably. The multinational nature of the EU, diversity of its resident population and increasing diversity resulting from incoming migration all require reconsideration of states’ relations with their minorities. While some citizens could blend in and accommodate more effectively under these conditions, those left behind and/or disenfranchised may gradually alienate from society and the democratic political organization of state affairs (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 151). Where some groups of citizens are deprived of effective political participation because of their ethnic belonging, the future of social relations would be particularly uncertain. In many cases involving the status of minorities without a “kin state” international organizations were particularly engaged in drawing the attention of national policymakers to issues of minority needs and living conditions. While the wellbeing and the status of minority was easily disconnected from security concerns of their states of residence as was the case with Roma, the improvement of status of minorities living of the “wrong side” of a nation-state border was more difficult to negotiate. In this sense, EU enlargement has been conducive for diminishing the fears of minority secession and irredentism, which could undermine state integrity. Persisting social, economic and political cleavages
18
Introduction
______________________________________________________________ between ethnic minority communities and majority groups in CEE societies have raised questions related to social justice, economic exclusion and political marginalization. The contributions in the second section of our volume address the difficulties of ‘stranded’ minorities in their states of residence such as Magyars in Slovakia, as well as Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia. However, the situation of Roma communities across CEE, as is particularly discussed in the section three, fits well into this framework. Both, international institutions and nation-states across CEE have undertaken measures to remedy the persistent exclusion of many Roma communities. It remains to be seen, however, which role each international organization and state agencies can assume in fostering integration of this particular ethnic group. The development of multiple applicable international standards and benchmarks for integration policies are already in place. Nonetheless, Roma exclusion persists across the region with the legal basis for equalizing measures not being fully exploited. The EU Racial Equality Directive and Article 4 of the FCNM enable states to apply affirmative action but it remains largely unclear under which conditions the implementation of such action is compelling. The notion of effective equality, however, requires interpretation and agreement on its minimal meaning. In some cases, equal treatment of all members of citizenry might adequately sustain differences in society; on other occasions the lack of affirmative action is likely to perpetuate inequality between ethnic groups, rather than induce their equal treatment. Because ethnic minorities across the region differ greatly in their status as well as in their access to political and social resources, only differentiated treatment of groups can ensure individual equality of minority individuals with the members of majority populations (Parekh, 2000, p. 240; Kymlicka, 2003, p. 153). Not only does this apply to day-to-day interaction between the members of the majority and minority populations, but also to state-led approaches to integration and engagement of international organizations with the issues tangent to minority equality. In this context, sensitivity to cultural differences is decisive in negotiating strategies of accommodation and integration of multicultural societies. Where institutional intervention seeks to provide guidelines and benchmarks for minority integration, international experience in devising instruments for culturally neutral approaches is essential. This holds for international as well as domestic approaches to treatment of minority groups. This requires international actors to justify attempts towards minority inclusion on a normative basis, opening inroads for the inclusion of minorities of various kinds: racial, national, ethnic, cultural, linguistic etc. In the absence of a ubiquitously applicable normative approach guiding international involvement with minority integration at the local or national levels, policies cannot prefer any model of integration once and for all. Instead, approaches to integration must be con-
Timofey Agarin and Malte Brosig
19
______________________________________________________________ stantly updated to changing expectations of groups involved and re-adjusted to preliminary results achieved. In this sense, while there is no European master-plan for minority integration in place, room should be made available for developing and implementing innovative approaches applicable outside of each nation-state context. 4. The Structure of the Book The volume is analyzing different levels of minority integration in three separate sections. International organizations, such as the EU, OSCE, and COE are playing an important role in the promotion of ideas and norms on ethnic diversity and will be examined in the first place. Nation-states doubtlessly play a crucial role in interpreting international norms and putting them into policies. States can impose preferred concepts of inter-ethnic relations, but they also provide fora for minority/majority conciliation to renegotiate the terms of relations. The contributions also address the role local societies play in accommodating ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity by engaging with the abstract concept of integration practically. The first part of the book reflects on the role international organizations and international law plays in promoting minority integration policies throughout the region. The involvement of the EU (Riedel), the COE (Morawa and Brosig) and the OSCE (Sabanadze) is scrutinized while discussing particular norms and standards set out by each of these organizations. Especially during EU enlargement international organizations had first to address protection of minorities and develop a legal framework for minority integration. While the three organizations are active in the promotion of liberal norms regulating minority integration standards, relations between the nation-states, the resident minority groups, they pursue different, although not incompatible goals. This section explores the concepts of minority integration, guiding their engagement with minority integration. Furthermore, this section also highlights the very different instruments organizations apply for the promotion of their concept of integration. While the OSCE relies on quiet diplomacy for conflict prevention, the COE uses socialization through monitoring. Finally the EU provides funding for integration projects and makes membership conditional upon the respect of minority protection norms. The second part of the book discusses steps undertaken in different countries across CEE to facilitate minority integration. The contributors of this part of the book address the political steps initiated by both minority political entrepreneurs, as well as those emanating from the majority dominated political establishment. Here we observe a difference in narratives from majority and minority political representatives in the process of negotiating the terms of minority integration in the framework of the nation-state. The contributions addressing the majority views on minority accommodation
20
Introduction
______________________________________________________________ suggest that the dominant groups endeavour to guarantee the central role of their cultures for the state-community. In doing so, the majorities in CEE countries appeal to the principles of multicultural social community emphasizing the importance of a common cultural core, to be accepted by all of the ethnic and linguistic communities resident in the country and willing to integrate. While the debates on multicultural citizenship are common place in CEE today, the contributors indicate that frequently these have been instrumentalized by the state-bearing community to legitimize and perpetuate the hierarchical relations between the resident ethnic groups. However, policy steps initiated by the minority groups suggest that their representatives act largely in pursuit of greater accountability by the state of their residence. The chapters discussing the involvement of minority political entrepreneurs in Hungary (Tremlett), Albania (Salamun), Estonia (Malloy), Latvia (Agarin) and Slovakia (Regelmann) suggest that the needs of social groups vary according to the history of their presence in the given state. Unfortunately, the contributors to this volume conclude, that cultural and linguistic needs of minorities are rarely met by their states of residence, if they are made with reference to cultural pluralism. As is demonstrated in the contributions, representatives of minority groups which highlight the persistence of social exclusion and segregation are more likely to be marginalized in the national politics, than achieve a notable concession for the group they represent. The third section of the volume examines social involvement in developing minority integration strategies. The authors in this section suggest that the successful implementation of integration policies and their constant development is highly dependent on the role taken by the majority population. These views are supported by the studies of the Czech Republic (Cashman), Hungary (McGarry) and Macedonia (Nikolic). Furthermore, contributors in this section find that the integration initiatives stall when the state majority is unprepared to take part in the process. Thereby inter-communal dialogue advanced by NGOs or community groups is essential for effective implementation of the national integration programmes and rapprochement between minority and majority groups. Despite the many challenges minority integration is facing at the analytical level we are investigating in this book, CEE states currently enjoy favourable conditions to achieve this ambitious goal. No doubt, ethnic minorities in today’s CEE have more opportunities to participate in political processes and engage in social interaction on terms more favourable to them as ever before. What our contributors see as decisive for guaranteeing equality between the majority and minority partners in the process, however, is the engagement of all actors from the field. The international community, nationstates, society, as well as the minority groups would need to further engage in negotiating the terms of equal treatment for all members of societies affected.
Timofey Agarin and Malte Brosig
21
______________________________________________________________ References Anderson, B. (1991), Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Brubaker, R. (2004), Ethnicity without Groups. London: Harvard University Press. —(1996), Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Burawoy, M, and K. Verdery (eds.) (1999), Uncertain Transition: Ethnographies of Change in the Postsocialist World. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield. Connor, W. (1993), “Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 16: 373–389. Fearon, J.D., and D.D. Laitin (2003), “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97(1): 75–90. Galbreath, D. J. (2005), Nation-Building and Minority Politics in PostSocialist States: Interests, Influence and Identities in Estonia and Latvia. Stuttgart: ibidem Verlag. Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Hale, H. E. (2008), The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hechter, M. (2000), Containing Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jenne, E. K. (2007), Ethnic Bargaining. The Paradox of Minority Empowerment. London: Cornell University Press. Kuzio, T. (1998), State and Nation Building in Ukraine. London: Routledge. Kymlicka, W. (1995), Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
22
Introduction
______________________________________________________________ —(2000), Politics in the Vernacular : Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. —(2003), “Multicultural states and intercultural citizens,” Theory and Research in Education, 1(2): 147–169. Kymlicka, W. and A. Patten (2003), Language Rights and Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Laitin, D. D. (1998), Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the near Abroad. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. —(2007), Nations, States, and Violence. New York: Oxford University Press. Linz, J. J., and A. Stepan (1996), Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. Malloy, T. H. (2005), National Minority Rights in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nic Craith, M. (2006), Europe and the Politics of Language. Citizens, Migrant and Outsiders. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Patten, A. and W. Kymlicka (2003), “Introduction: Language Rights and Political Theory: Context, Issues, and Approaches” in: A. Patten and W. Kymlicka (eds.) Language Rights and Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–51. Parekh, B. (2000), Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory. Basingstoke: Macmillian. Pridham, G. and T. Vanhanen (1994), Democratization in Eastern Europe: Domestic and International Perspectives. London: Routledge. Pridham, G. and T. Gallagher (2000), Experimenting with Democracy: Regime Change in the Balkans. London: Routledge. Rueschemeyer, D., M. Rueschemeyer, and B. Wittrock (1998), Participation and Democracy, East and West: Comparisons and Interpretations. Armonk, NY: M.E.Sharp.
Timofey Agarin and Malte Brosig
23
______________________________________________________________ Saideman, S. M. (2001), The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict. New York: Columbia University Press. Soysal, Y. N (1994), Limits of Citizenship. Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Toggenburg, G. v. (2007), “Europe and the Integration of Integration,” Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minorities in Europe, I/2007. Vachudova, M. A. (2005), Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wimmer, A. (2002), Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict. Shadows of Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Section I International Organizations and Minority Integration in Europe
The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights? Manuela Riedel The article presents various aspects of minority integration in the EU’s internal and external dimension, discussing the main legal texts and elements of equality and diversity as well as recent developments in the field. The text discusses three central questions: Did Brussels react to calls for common European standards on minority issues, developing a legal and political framework securing a uniform level of minority protection? In this regard, does the EU initiate measures that go beyond anti-discrimination? If so, are there any practical consequences of the EU’s approach? The author finds that to date, in the EU’s internal dimension, various programmes and initiative exist but that there seems to be a lack of coordination and interconnection. In this regard, the situation in the EU might reflect ad hoc mechanisms learned from enlargement preparations. Introduction In the early 1990s minority protection became an essential element of the EU’s democracy promotion in post-communist states. In the light of the breakdown of the Communist block and the war in former Yugoslavia, the EU discovered minority protection as a means of maintaining security and stability in the region and the EU, as a whole. As regards accession negotiations, the European Commission was the main driver of minority protection, using instruments such as conditionality. Generally speaking, the EU’s attempts to create a diverse, tolerant and multicultural society, and particularly the preparations for the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004, have introduced minority rights into European political debate. To date, this has not been substantially reflected in legal texts and the focus remained on non-discrimination rather than on the promotion of special rights relevant for minorities. Nevertheless, several policy programmes, initiatives and statements by the European Commission hint at the fact that an EU system of minority integration going beyond formal equality is evolving. For example, over the last years the European Commission has developed several action plans in order to promote equal opportunities for various groups in danger of discrimination (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, 2007, p. 7). Overall, in the internal dimension the European Parliament was a driving force on minority-related issues such as racism and xenophobia and adopted several resolutions on countering these phenomena in the mem-
The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights 28 ______________________________________________________________ ber states and on promoting linguistic and cultural rights (European Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2007, p. 11). The relationship between minority protection and non-discrimination is an ongoing debate, with a central question being whether anti-discrimination provisions are sufficient to ensure respect for minorities (see e.g. Tsilevich, 2001; Wiener and Schwellnus, 2004; Toggenburg, 2006). The debate has been heated in the context of the EU directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (the so called Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC)). In my paper I present various aspects of minority integration in the EU’s internal and external dimension, discussing the main legal texts and elements of equality and diversity as well as recent developments in the field. In order to outline the position of the EU on the matter, statements and initiatives of the European Commission will be taken as an example, due to the Commission’s central role in this regard in both the EU’s external and internal affairs. Throughout the EU accession processes, the EU asked candidate countries to comply with a number of more or less clearly defined conditions regarding the living standard of minorities. Due to a lack of EU member states’ obligation to fulfil the same criteria, discussion about so called “double standards” evolved, calling for common European standards, applicable to all members and candidates. The text discusses three central questions: Did Brussels react to such claims, developing a legal and political framework securing a uniform level of minority protection? In this regard, does the EU initiate measures that go beyond anti-discrimination? If so, are there any practical consequences of the EU’s approach? I find that to date, in the EU’s internal dimension, various programmes and initiative exist but that there seems to be a lack of coordination and interconnection. In this regard, the situation in the EU might reflect ad hoc mechanisms learned from enlargement preparations. 1. Minority Integration in the EU’s External Relations Only recently did minority protection become an issue in the EU’s external relations. Generally, for the promotion of democratic principles, including minority protection, the EU draws on definitions, instruments and experiences from other European institutions that ‘traditionally’ deal with these issues. This is due, among other reasons, to the fact that until the 1990s the EU was almost exclusively focused on economic questions, with single initiatives of the European Parliament or formal declarations by other EU institutions being exceptional. This is why since 1993, in the light of the new challenges Europe faced in the early 1990s, the Council of Europe (COE)1 and the European Commission have developed a wide-ranging cooperation on, amongst others, minority protection issues.
Manuela Riedel
29
______________________________________________________________ In the European Commission, the OSCE and COE Unit of the “Multilateral Relations and Human Rights Directorate” of DG External Relations (RELEX) is responsible for coordinating relations with the COE. Several Directorate Generals do have direct relations with the COE on specific subjects. One major event was the signing on 3 April 2001 of a Joint Declaration on Co-operation and Partnership by Secretary General Walter Schwimmer for the COE and Chris Patten for the European Commission, setting out the framework and principles guiding the co-operation. Following decisions taken at the COE Third Summit in May 2005, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the EU and the COE in May 2007, providing a new framework for enhanced cooperation and political dialogue and strengthened relations in areas of common interest such as human rights, fundamental freedoms and social cohesion. Furthermore, the COE and the EU decided to co-finance joint programmes, including initiatives supporting national minorities. An example of a joint project is ‘Roma under the Stability Pact’, aimed at promoting the status of the Roma population. In the course of the past years, the European Commission frequently used documents of the COE to justify its democratic conditions towards applicant states. In the EU’s Agenda 2000, the COE’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995) as well as Recommendation 1201 adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the COE in 1993 were described as terms of reference for an effective protection of minorities (European Commission, 1997b, p. 44). Since then, both texts can be found in many Commission documents (e.g. European Commission, 2002, p. 10). Additionally, at the judicial level there are some similarities between the two organizations concerning protection against discrimination. With respect to Art. 14 ECHR and Art. 1 of Protocol n°12 to the ECHR, it is established case law of the European Court of Human Rights that a difference of treatment is discriminatory within the meaning of Article 14 ECHR if it has no objective and reasonable justification, e.g. a legitimate aim (de Schutter, 2005, p. 14). As de Schutter notes, the adoption of the EU anti-discrimination Directives in 2000 have influenced the European Court of Human Rights in its interpretation of Article 14 ECHR; the court also referred to the EC Directives in Nachova (de Schutter, 2005, p. 38). Not least, it is interesting to see that when describing its cooperation with the EU, the COE outlines four areas of Brussels’ activities (see COE, 2008): firstly, measures of a mainly political character, developed by the European Parliament, in promotion of cultural diversity and preservation of the cultural heritage; secondly, measures taken by the European Commission, the Council of Ministers (and the Parliament), characterized by a functional approach; thirdly, measures taken in the framework of the EU foreign policy, without touching the internal sphere of the EU; and fourthly, policies not oriented toward minorities which are nonetheless rele-
The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights 30 ______________________________________________________________ vant to minority issues. The COE further stated that although at least 30 million EU citizens speak a regional or “lesser used” language as their mother tongue, EU efforts regarding the protection of minorities are often observed as being “rather scarce and limited to controlling whether national law aimed to protect minorities is compatible with EU principles and laws” (see e.g. COE, 2008). When it comes to cooperation with the OSCE, the most relevant documents adopted within the framework of the OSCE2 concerning national minorities in Europe are the Copenhagen Document of 1990 and the “Charter of Paris for a New Europe”, signed on 21 November 1990, reiterating the determination of the participant states to promote the rights of minorities. In the follow-up-meeting in Helsinki in 1992 an OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) was appointed with the main task to provide early warning and, if necessary, to activate mediation procedures when tensions involving national minorities seem likely to develop in such a way as to threaten peace and stability in the continent. Over the past years, the High Commissioner has developed close links with the European Commission concerning ethnic relations and minorities, in particular with the DirectorateGeneral for Enlargement. Generally, when evaluating the EU candidate countries’ performance with regard to minority protection, the European Commission has drawn on the expertise of the High Commissioner in the area of minority standards and minority rights. In this context, two observations might be of importance and do also hint to the reach of an EU minority rights policy: First of all, cooperation with other institutions dealing with various aspects of minority rights first and foremost concerns the EU’s relations with countries hopeful of joining the EU. Secondly, although minority protection is dealt with by various European organizations, there is no generally accepted legal definition of the term ‘minority,’ and the problem of whether minority protection should include group rights also remains unsolved, leaving a lot of space of manoeuvre for states to define their relations with minority groups. Problems relating to a missing definition of what constitutes a minority and which rights should be granted to minorities, importantly impacted on conditionality, the EU’s core instrument for promoting the protection of minorities in the context of the association and accession preparations of Central and Eastern European countries. Therefore, despite the EU’s stronger power relating to its financial capacity and strong incentives for EU membership, the actual impact of EU conditionality on the situation of minorities living in Central and Eastern European countries has been controversially discussed throughout past and current association and accession processes. In broad terms, conditionality was about the Copenhagen criteria of 1993, requiring amongst other things the rule of law and stable democratic
Manuela Riedel
31
______________________________________________________________ institutions as well as human rights and respect for minorities. With the Maastricht Treaty, the protection of human rights was introduced into European primary law, with Art. 6 I TEU highlighting the importance of democracy and human rights for the EU, but not mentioning minority protection. Therefore, for countries in Central and Eastern Europe, criticism also related to discrepancies between the lack of commitment to minority protection in the internal affairs of existing EU member states and the prominent role the issue played in the EU’s external relations. Moreover, the EU’s requirements described in progress reports and other documents on minority protection were vague, creating uncertainty among the candidates – for example, priorities changed over time and different conditions were imposed on different countries. The effectiveness of the EU’s conditionality was hampered by confusing nature of the regulation. The so-called double standards on minority protection requirements - between member and candidate countries and among the candidates themselves - faced criticism within EU institutions, namely the European Parliament. For example, the Intergroup for Traditional Minorities of the European Parliament criticized the fact that minority standards that are to be fulfilled by EU candidates are not adhered to by the ‘old European states’, namely France and Greece, and that these double standards have further led to the new EU members threatening to move away from already achieved minority standards.3 Such concerns were already voiced at the very beginning of the EU accession processes of Central and Eastern European countries. For example, already in 1998, the Reflection Group on Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement under the chairmanship of Giuliano Amato found that “the EU will find it hard to maintain its agnostic stance on minority rights vis-à-vis its Member States”. The group identified three main challenges the EU had to face (Mirga, 2005): firstly, new member states would bring minority problems of direct concern to the EU; secondly, increased migration both from new and poorer member states and from third countries would accentuate the differentiation between these two groups and would necessitate regulation of the status of non-EU minority groups; and thirdly the special situation of Roma. Nevertheless, the prominent place of minority protection in the course of the pre–accession process leading to the 2004 and 2007 enlargements did not result in the elaboration of any rigorous minority protection standard that could be used by the EU both internally and externally, especially during the preparation of the enlargements to come (Kochenov, 2007, p. 10). Once postcommunist countries joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, an approach to minority protection in those countries based on conditionality had to be abandoned, and European attempts to stimulate ethno-cultural diversity in the new member states have instead emphasized the themes of social inclusion, anti-
The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights 32 ______________________________________________________________ discrimination and equal opportunities (Vermeersch, 2007, p. 2). Not least, there were fears that due to the fact that there is no EU minority protection system, the reforms conducted during accession preparations that led to a certain degree of minority protection in the sense of promoting special linguistic or cultural rights could be threatened by the principle of equal treatment or non-discrimination which is fundamental to the functioning of the EU internal market. The European Commission and other institutions might therefore face the question whether special rights for minorities that were demanded during accession processes can go together with fundamental market rules the EU is based on. Nonetheless, as regards the EU’s commitment to minority protection in third countries, the European Commission recently emphasized that it will continue to promote the values of non-discrimination and equal opportunities in its enlargement policy, with special attention to be paid to the rights of persons belonging to linguistic or cultural minorities (European Commission, 2008, p. 7). 2.
Minority Integration in the EU – Promoting Equality while Respecting Diversity The EU approach to protection of minorities does evolve around several critical issues. Non-discrimination is at the core of the EU’s strategy to combat inequalities and is one of the basic principles of the internal market. In this sense, the European Commission frequently highlights that the EU is founded on the shared principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and that all kinds of discrimination undermine these shared values (see e.g. European Commission, 2008, p. 2). In 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam gave new powers for European action against discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. Discrimination in employment and occupational matters has been prohibited on all these grounds. These powers apply to all, irrespective of whether they belong to minorities or not. The framework on non-discrimination was significantly extended by Art. 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, which established a legal basis at EU level to adopt measures to combat discrimination on the grounds of sex, race or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. Resulting from the adoption of Art. 13 EC, two new Framework Directives were adopted in 2000, being the Racial Equality Directive and the Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC) (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, 2007, p. 5). As will be further outlined, both Directives recognize positive action with a view to ensuring full equality in practice. In the meantime, the term ‘shall not prevent’ implies that positive action provisions as such do not make positive action compulsory (European Commission, 2007a, p. 28).
Manuela Riedel
33
______________________________________________________________ In addition, the Racial Equality Directive was designed “to lay down a framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, with a view to putting into effect in the member states the principle of equal treatment” (Art. 1). The Directive itself does not contain a definition of what is meant by racial or ethnic origin. The preamble indicates that the Union rejects theories which attempt to determine the existence of separate human races. However, due to the term ‘ethnic origin’ the directive is relevant for ethnic groups, including ethnic minorities. The Directive defines direct and indirect discrimination (Art. 2) and determines the scope as applying to all persons of the public and private sector regarding amongst others access to employment, occupation, training, social protection, social advantages, education and housing (Art. 3). Positive action, meaning that the member states are allowed to take special measures for certain groups in order to achieve the groups’ access to equality, shall help the member states to prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to racial or ethnic origin (Art. 5).4 The agenda of positive duties is closely aligned with the mainstreaming approach. This seeks the integration of equality objectives across all areas and into all stages of policy formulation, implementation and evaluation (European Commission, 2004a, p. 32, see below the section on new governance). The Directive also urged member states to ensure equal opportunities for minorities’ access to judicial and administrative procedures (Art. 7). Importantly, the Directive asks member states to introduce into their national legal systems measures that are necessary to protect individuals from adverse treatment or adverse consequences as a reaction to a complaint or a proceeding aimed at enforcing compliance with the principle of equal treatment (Art. 9 on victimization). In the case of discriminatory dismissal, the remedy granted must include either reinstatement or compensation (Bell, Chopin, Palmer, 2006, p. 83). In Art. 13 of the Directive, the EU required all member states to establish ‘bodies’ that assist victims of racial and ethnic discrimination, to conduct surveys about the forms and prevalence of discrimination and to issue reports and recommendations (Art. 17). In 2006, the European Commission reported that most member states have implemented Art. 13 either by designating existing institutions or by setting up new institutions carrying out the competences mentioned in the Directive (European Commission, 2006, p. 20). The legal anti-discrimination framework is accompanied and supported by a set of other arrangements such as the EU Action programme against discrimination or Raxen. Criticism of the Racial Equality Directive relates amongst other areas to a missing definition of what constitutes a minority, with some authors claiming that this would play into the hands of member states denying the existence of minorities (Brennan, 2004, p. 321). In 2007, the European Commission itself stated that there might be a certain degree of tension be-
The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights 34 ______________________________________________________________ tween the limited competence base of the Community (Art. 3 (1) Race Equality Directive) and some areas enumerated in the Directive, namely education, health care and housing and furthermore, the exact scope of other areas, like social advantages and access to and supply of goods and services, which are available to the public, including housing is “everything but clear” (European Commission, 2007, p. 24). It is important to note that in light of the EU’s limited competences, it is primarily the responsibility of the member states to take care of many areas crucial for the integration of minorities, including education, employment and social inclusion. In these fields, the EU is limited to coordinating member states’ policies, and supporting their implementation, e.g. through the Structural Funds. As regards the situation at national level, at the time when the antidiscrimination directives were set up, most EU member states already had in place some legal provisions addressing the issue of discrimination on the grounds of race or ethnic origin, but there were big differences regarding the scope and systematic application of legislation. However, for some of the member states and most of the countries then hoping to join the EU in 2004, anti-discrimination legislation was factually non-existent (European Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2007, p. 17). In any case, a legal framework addressing discrimination on the grounds of race and ethnic origin was described to be an important development across the EU (ibid.). Besides the EU’s non-discrimination legislation, EU member states are required to adopt National Action Plans (NAPs) addressing exclusion at all levels of society. The plans are funded via the European Social Fund, the EQUAL Programme and the European Structural and Cohesion Fund, with the main objective being the reduction of disparities in development among member states and regions in order to strengthen the economy and social cohesion. In order to be eligible for structural funds, member states must prepare National Development Plans (NDPs) (EC Council Regulation 1260/1999), detailing how they will pursue their development objectives and priorities (European Agency For Reconstruction, 2006, p. 56). The Lisbon European Council of March 2000 asked member states and the European Commission to make a decisive impact on the eradication of poverty and in its 2005 revision, which finally resulted in the Integrated Guidelines for Employment (2005–2008), the European Council accentuated the need to focus on growth and employment and a better integration of “vulnerable groups” in the labour market (EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2007, p. 13). These legal and political developments of recent years have led to the EU having one of the worlds most advanced legal frameworks relating to nondiscrimination. Nonetheless, there are some areas in which the EU devotes special attention to minorities, therefore leading to the question to what extent the EU
Manuela Riedel
35
______________________________________________________________ is taking and willing to take measures which go beyond non-discrimination. An obvious example of this development is the mentioning of respect for the rights of persons belonging to minorities in the text of the EU constitution draft and the to-be-into-force EU treaty (Art. 2).5 Another example is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights laying down the equality before law of all people (Art. 20) and prohibiting discrimination on any ground (Art. 21). In the meantime, it requests the Union to protect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity (Art. 22). In so far as it explicitly addresses minorities in its internal policy, e.g. regarding the European Employment Strategy and the Process of Social Inclusion, the EU tends to focus on ‘ethnic minorities’ (European Commission, 2007, p. 6). Though the European Commission from time to time talks about minorities as being groups, it seems that the EU’s approach is rather focused on granting rights of relevance for individual people who are members of a minority group, with Roma and the EU’s position vis-à-vis candidate countries being an exception to this rule. The European Commission defines a minority group as having stable ethnic, linguistic or religious characteristics which are different from the rest of the population, as well as a numerical minority position and the wish to preserve its own, separate cultural identity (European Commission, 2007, p. 12). As concerns racial or ethnic origin, in the view of the European Commission, the prohibition of discrimination goes beyond employment, serving the diversity of European societies which in Brussels-speak is one of Europe’s strengths and needs to be protected (European Commission, 2008, p. 5). One year after the big enlargement of 2004 the European Commission emphasized that there was a need to go beyond anti-discrimination and that “the EU should reinforce its efforts to promote equal opportunities for all, in order to tackle the structural barriers faced by migrants, ethnic minorities, the disabled, older and younger workers and other vulnerable groups” (European Commission, 2005, point 2 and 10). The European Commission concluded that one of the major challenges the enlarged EU is facing was to “develop a coherent and effective approach to the social and labour market integration of ethnic minorities” (ibid.). Apart from social and labour market integration, the European Commission frequently outlines that issues of special relevance for minorities concern language rights in the field of education, media, and communications with authorities, and rights relating to culture as well as to political participation (European Commission, 2007, p. 12). Not least, preservation of linguistic diversity is one of the issues frequently addressed by the European Union (see European Commission, 2003a). The increasing emphasis on minority protection within the EU partly relates to the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which to date is one of the main promoters of human rights within the EU. As regards minori-
The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights 36 ______________________________________________________________ ties, meaning both traditional minorities and migrants, residing in the EU member states, the ECJ in several cases dealt with the use of language before national courts (see e.g. Mutsch C-137/84, Bickel & Franz C-274/96) or in the field of labour (see e.g. Groener C-379/87). In its rulings, the ECJ emphasized that linguistic requirement generally must be applied in a proportionate and non-discriminatory manner and that in certain circumstances policies promoting language protection can go together with internal market rules (Angonese C-281/98; for a detailed discussion of the ECJ’s rulings see van Bossuyt, 2007, p. 9). Nevertheless, due to a lack of competences defined in the EU’s primary law, the ECJ in these cases did not address the issue of minority protection but focused instead on the importance of the protection of linguistic rights in the context of the free movement of workers in the EU. In other cases, the ECJ dismissed regional language arrangements in the interest of community law (van Bossuyt, 2007, p. 9). The above mentioned Groener case showed that a general application of language requirements (affecting the free movement of workers) can be a form of indirect discrimination on the basis of nationality, should there not be a legitimate objective (European Commission, 2007, p. 28). In this regard, the European Commission refers to de Schutter who found that “a similar obligation to treat differently situations which are substantively different may be derived from the definition of indirect discrimination in article 2(2)(b) of the Racial Equality Directive” (ibid.). As regards positive action, the European Commission noted that while the case law of the ECJ is developing in relation to positive action, and increasingly seems to acknowledge the substantive equality goal, it remains rather restrictive towards forms of positive action aimed at equality of results (European Commission, 2007, p. 7). Some authors found that the ECJ has been very reluctant in accepting positive discrimination (van Bossuyt, 2007, p. 3). However, judgments concerning language rights, for example, could favour ‘new minorities’ (such as Turkish immigrants in Germany) that have the nationality of a member state while exercising rights granted in the TEC (van Bossuyt, 2007, p. 9). All in all, in the field of linguistic rights and internal market provisions, the EU’s initiatives and legal texts as well as the case law of the ECJ can be understood as favouring ‘new minorities’ while questions of traditional national minorities seem to remain an issue of EU enlargements processes and accession negotiations. Therefore, it is justifiable to argue that visà-vis its member states, the European Commission and the ECJ first of all eye compliance with internal market rules, allowing and advancing measures that go beyond anti-discrimination under these restrictions. In this regard, a 2005 resolution of the European Parliament illustrates that the EU institutions at some point diverged over the success and reach of Commission statements
Manuela Riedel
37
______________________________________________________________ and policies: The MEPs found that there was a difference between the protection of minorities and anti-discrimination policies, as equal treatment “is a basic right, not a privilege, of all citizens” and that being part of a minority can never justify or explain either exclusion or discrimination (European Parliament, 2005, p. 2). In its resolution, the European Parliament further pointed out that EU enlargements led and will lead to greater cultural and linguistic diversity and that the European Commission should therefore establish a policy standard for the protection of national minorities, also in light of the COE Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (European Parliament, 2005, p. 3). Access to participation in all aspects of daily life and promotion of their values and interests in a pluralist society are said to be of special relevance for minorities. The following section describes instruments and measures applied by the EU that shall help in achieving minority integration in Europe. 3. Formal Equality versus Substantive Equality A much-discussed issue has been whether the protection and integration of persons belonging to minorities would require ‘equal’ rights or ‘special’ rights (European Commission, 2007, p. 5, for a summary of the debate, see European Commission, 2004). In 2007, the European Commission pointed to the fact that ‘special’ rights are not necessarily the opposite of ‘equal’ rights, depending on what conception of equality one embraces (ibid.). The European Commission highlighted that there is an important distinction between formal equality (which sets out to treat everybody in the same way) and substantive, or full equality: Full equality might necessitate differential treatment or special rights, which according to the European Commission are not meant to be privileges. In the view of the European Commission, it is widely accepted that an adequate system of minority protection is based on nondiscrimination in combination with individual human rights of special relevance for minorities and secondly on minority-specific standards aimed at protecting and promoting the right to identity of minorities (European Commission, 2007, p. 6). With regard to all forms of discrimination in the context of Art. 13 EC, the European Commission announced that in its 2008 legislative and work programme, it would propose new initiatives to complete the legal framework, building on the results of an extensive public consultation process. The European Commission emphasized that this commitment responded to the Council’s calls to the Commission to examine any gaps that may exist in the current Community anti-discrimination legislative framework, and the European Parliament’s repeated requests for the framework to be extended (European Commission, 2008, p. 4).
The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights 38 ______________________________________________________________ Against this background, this section asks which measures the EU takes to tackle its goal of promoting anti-discrimination and the granting of special rights to minorities at the same time. In the following, some instruments of new governance that help promoting the integration of minorities are outlined. New governance mechanisms are central to the European Commission’s strategy to address discrimination matters (European Commission, 2008, p. 9). The 2001 White Paper on European Governance defines governance as a measure of better combining different policy tools such as legislation and action programmes. This would contribute to strengthening the Community method, guaranteeing both the diversity and effectiveness of the Union (European Commission, 2001, p. 8). Central to the concept are openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. These principles shall help to demonstrate how member states, by acting together within the Union, are able to tackle their concerns more effectively (ibid., p. 3). One intention of the European Commission in developing new governance mechanisms is to build on established practice in some member states, including providing for a single legal procedure for victims of discrimination to submit complaints and treating evidence that discrimination has occurred on more than one ground as an aggravating factor. Furthermore, the European Commission wants to raise awareness regarding multiple discriminations by financing activities and providing funding for smaller networks of NGOs representing intersectional groups (European Commission, 2008, p. 9). In its July 2008 communication on the EU’s renewed commitment to non-discrimination and equal opportunities, the European Commission highlighted that legislative protection against discrimination must be accompanied by an active strategy to promote non-discrimination and equal opportunities, adding that dialogue on non-discrimination policy must be fostered and more effective use must be made of the instruments available, both in general and with particular emphasis on promoting the social inclusion of Roma (European Commission, 2008, p. 2). The European Commission pointed to the fact that the national equality bodies played a particularly important role in combating discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origins in the member states and that the Commission supports the development of cooperation between, and capacity-building of, equality bodies via the Equinet network (European Commission, 2008, p. 3). A European network of Equality Bodies, Equinet, was set up to facilitate exchange of information between Equality Bodies across Europe, and to support the uniform implementation of EU anti-discrimination law and the levelling-up of legal protection for victims (EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2007, p. 12). In the meantime, Brussels highlighted that still there is no uniform minimum level of protection within the EU for people who suffered discrimination (European Commission, 2008, p. 4). As the European
Manuela Riedel
39
______________________________________________________________ Commission has pointed out, advancing non-discrimination and equal opportunities for rely both on a sound legislative basis and on a range of policy tools, including awareness-raising, mainstreaming, data collection and positive action (European Commission, 2008, p. 6). Positive action was acknowledged by the EU in the Treaty of Amsterdam, with Art. 141 EC allowing the member states to take special measures in order to promote equal employment chances in terms of gender equality. Identical treatment may result in formal equality, but cannot suffice to bring about equality in practice. This is why the EU non-discrimination legislation does not prevent any member state from maintaining or adopting specific measures to prevent, or compensate for, disadvantages linked to discrimination on grounds where there is provision for protection (European Commission, 2008, p. 7). Positive action might be taken regarding (i) conditions for access to employment, to self-employment and to occupations, including selection criteria and recruitment conditions, whatever the branch of activity and at all levels of the professional hierarchy, including promotion; (ii) access to all types and to all levels of vocational guidance, vocational training, advanced vocational training and retraining, including practical work experience and (iii) employment and working conditions, including dismissals and pay (Art. 3 Racial Equality Directive). According to Art. 4 of the Race Equality Directive, differential treatment shall not constitute discrimination if pursuing a legitimate objective. As of January 2007, positive action was provided for in the national legislation of at least 20 EU member states including Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (European Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2008, p. 7). Regarding another element of new governance discussed in this contribution, the European Commission is of the opinion that mainstreaming principles should apply across all grounds covered by Article 13 EC “if the inequality and discrimination suffered by all groups are to be reduced” (European Commission, 2008, p. 6). Non-discrimination mainstreaming is broadly about ensuring the integration of an equality perspective into all stages of the policy-making process – from design through to implementation, monitoring and evaluation (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, 2007, p. 1). The aim is to reduce levels of discrimination suffered by particular social groups and to improve equality outcomes for individuals (ibid.). Mainstreaming has an important function in reinforcing anti-discrimination and in achieving the Lisbon objectives, namely increasing labour market participation of disadvantaged groups. The third main tool, impact assessment, is potentially one of the most important instruments through which non-discrimination and equal opportunity principles can be taken into account in the formulation of EU policies,
The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights 40 ______________________________________________________________ legislation and programmes (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, 2007, p. 7). In 2001, the European Commission introduced an obligation to scrutinize all new legislative proposals to ensure respect for fundamental rights (ibid.). In 2005, the revised Impact Assessment Guidelines (SEC (2005) 791 of 15 June 2005) formulated a single instrument through which the economic, social and environmental impacts of proposed policies and legislation could be assessed. The guidelines include checklists of the types of impacts to be considered in carrying out impact assessment work, including some in relation to fundamental rights (ibid.). Furthermore, the Lisbon strategy introduced the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as a means of governance using soft law mechanisms (guidelines, indicators, benchmarking and best practices) and including amongst others the development of National Action Plans (Schmidt, 2007, p. 2). Due to the fact that some member states included cultural policies in their National Action Plans without mentioning how these will enhance social inclusion of ethnic minorities, the European Commission identified culture as an area of interest leading to fostering of identity (see European Commission, 2005a). Already in a 2003 report, the European Commission emphasized cultural policies as a central part of any approach to addressing social exclusion, presenting access to culture, problems of culture in remote areas, creative activities and cultural activities to promote the social inclusion of ethnic minorities as main areas of interest (Schmidt, 2007, p. 3, see European Commission, 2003). All the measures discussed so far do not exhaust the situation and therefore there are other measures underlining the EU’s aim to combat discrimination: The Community Action Programme to combat discrimination (2001–2006), adopted by Council Decision of 27 November 2001, put forward a broader action programme aimed at combating all forms of discrimination referred to in the Amsterdam Treaty, other than discrimination based on gender (European Agency of Fundamental Rights, 2007, p. 11). The programme was established to support the effective implementation of new EU anti-discrimination legislation and targeted various stakeholders to develop appropriate and effective anti-discrimination legislation and policies, across the EU, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and EU candidate countries (European Commission, 2004a, p. 32). It aimed at improving the understanding of issues related to discrimination, developing the capacity to tackle discrimination effectively and promoting the values underlying the fight against discrimination. Not least, the adoption of the Community Action Programme provided a financial framework through which measures to combat and prevent discrimination in support of the implementation of the two Directives could be undertaken by the member states (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, 2007, p. 5).
Manuela Riedel
41
______________________________________________________________ Furthermore, the European Year against Racism (1997) and the 2007 European Year of Equal Opportunities for all were designed to further encourage non-discrimination mainstreaming in policy-making (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, 2007, p. 5). The European Year of Equal Opportunities was set up to show that “all people are entitled to equal treatment, irrespective of their racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation” (European Parliament and European Council Decision No. 771/2006/EC). It served to explain to groups that are at risk of discrimination their rights and the European legislation in the field of nondiscrimination (Decision 771/2006/EC, Art. 2). Previously,, as a follow-up to the Green Paper on equality and non-discrimination in an enlarged Europe (2004), the European Commission in 2005 set out a framework strategy for the positive and active promotion of non-discrimination and equal opportunities for all in order to ensure effective legal protection against discrimination (European Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2007, p. 12). At the community level, Inter-service Working Groups have been set up on equality-related issues, such as disability, gender, racism and xenophobia (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, 2007, p. 8). Further, in the 2007-13 financial perspective, non-discrimination is playing a greater role (ibid.). As regards Roma, the European Commission recently highlighted that the problem of widespread persisting individual and institutional discrimination and unemployment as well as poverty is unacceptable from a human rights perspective but also from the perspective of social cohesion (European Commission, 2008, p. 9). Furthermore, while generally the EU’s legislative measures and policy proposals with respect to minority integration are addressed to the member states alone, the situation of Roma was described as being a joint responsibility of the EU and its member states (ibid.). In this regard, the European Commission plans to step up its work with national equality bodies and to promote the involvement of Roma in policy development and implementation (ibid.). For now, within the European Commission, an Inter-Service Group – chaired by the Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities – coordinates the EU’s programmes and policies with regard to Roma issues. (For further reading on the EU’s strategy towards Roma, see Tremlett in this volume.) Not least, in 2008 the European Parliament issued a resolution on a European strategy on Roma, pointing to the need to find a comprehensive approach at EU level whilst acknowledging that crucial competences and resources fall within the responsibilities of member states (European Parliament, 2008, point 5 and 6). Over the last years, besides programmes and initiatives, several institutions have been created or further developed in order to strengthen the EU’s aim to fight discrimination, including with regard to minorities. For example, in 2007 the EU High Level Group of Experts on the Social and Labour Mar-
The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights 42 ______________________________________________________________ ket Inclusion of Ethnic Minorities was nominated (Commission Decision No. 2006/33/EC, p. 1). The group’s task is to draft reports and to provide recommendations on “how Europe can enhance the inclusion of minorities in the labour market” (Commission Decision No. 2006/33/EC, p. 1). Next to the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights and the European Network Against Racism (ENAR), the European Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and RAXEN are central to Brussels’ strategy. The FRA6 is an independent body of the EU, established in 2007 and based in Vienna. The agency builds on the former European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC). EUMC was tasked to support policy responses and supplementary measures to combat racism and xenophobia in the EU by providing the community and its member states with evidence-based analyses, conclusions and opinions on the situation of racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism in the Union (EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2007, p. 10). FRA assists member states, candidate countries and EU institutions on human rights matters within in the meaning of Art. 6(2) of the Treaty of the EU, including the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and as reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. FRA works on racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and related intolerance, applying tools such as data collection mechanisms, analysis of information on the development of fundamental rights in the EU and cooperation with governments and international organizations. Each member state has a National Liaison Officer. A cooperation agreement with the COE (namely with the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Commissioner for Human Rights and the COE’s department for social cohesion) has been concluded in order to avoid duplication, ensure complementarities and mutually reinforce each other’s work. FRA also cooperates with the OSCE, namely the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities. Another important aspect of FRA’s work is cooperation with civil society. Art. 2 of the Council decision on the FRA’s multiannual framework for 2007–2012 identified discrimination against persons belonging to minorities as one of the agency’s thematic areas (Council Decision 2008). The agency’s budget will increase from 14 million Euros in 2008 to 22 million Euros in 2012, pointing to the importance the EU devotes to issues dealt with by the agency. Since 2000, FRA has collected data on issues regarding racism, xenophobia and related intolerances through its RAXEN National Focal Points (NFPs) covering all EU member states. The focal points provide reporting on legislation, racist violence and crime, employment, education, housing and health and are primarily used to develop comparative analyses as well as policies and initiatives promoting equality and diversity.
Manuela Riedel
43
______________________________________________________________ Data collection for improved monitoring in the development of minority protection within the EU has additionally provided for a lively debate over the last years (see e.g. Minority Rights Group International, 2006, Negrin, 2003). Despite the fact that member states are not obliged by the antidiscrimination directives to collect data on discrimination, data collection and use is relevant in respect of several key aspects of the directives (Bell, Chopin, Palmer, 2006, p. 74). The EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights (CFR-CDF) stressed that monitoring is required to combat forms of indirect discrimination as well as social exclusion of vulnerable groups on the employment market. (CFR-CDF, 2005, p. 15). In the meantime, the network further pointed out difficulties related to monitoring with respect to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, namely fear of certain states that improved monitoring mechanisms could lead to a certain recognition of the existence of such groups by these states and open the way to vindication of ‘special rights’ of minorities (ibid.). In addition, the network hinted to the fact that members of the groups concerned, on the other hand, may fear that data relating to the ethnic, religious or linguistic membership will be misused, and may lead to discrimination (ibid.). Ethnic, religious or linguistic monitoring should not be equated with the recognition of certain rights to minorities, rather it should be seen as a tool in an anti-discrimination strategy, the network further argued (ibid.), adding that amongst others language proficiency requirements as well as access to citizenship and the prohibition on the grounds of ethnic origin continue to be major forms of discrimination against minorities in the region (CFR-CDF, 2005, p. 19). In the meantime, the network emphasized that in the light of the European Employment Strategy it was not necessary for the EU member states to adopt positive action schemes, except for certain groups such as Roma who are facing a situation of structural disadvantage in all areas of social life (CFR-CDF, 2005, p. 25). Apart from employment, the promotion of policies favouring the integration of certain underprivileged minorities requires the collection of information on access to health care, education or adequate housing, the network highlighted (CFR-CDF, 2005, p. 26). The aspects discussed above relating to EU policies, programmes and institutions that might impact on the situation of minorities living in member states and in states with close relations to the EU illustrate that the EU’s main concern is social and labour market integration, based on non-discrimination and mainstreaming. The work of FRA, fostering amongst others the dialogue on non-discrimination, is an example for this. Therefore, single statements of the EU, like the 2007 announcement that next to non-discrimination minority-specific standards must be promoted (European Commission, 2007, p. 6) seem to be less effective and rarely advanced, hence being without substan-
The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights 44 ______________________________________________________________ tive effects in practice. An exception might be the elaboration of a Roma strategy, but still, it seems that programmes and initiatives do lack some coordination and interconnection. In this regard, there might be a case for arguing that indeed, there has been a spill-back from enlargement preparations towards EU member states, meaning that measures going beyond nondiscrimination and promoting e.g. cultural rights are ad hoc and somehow inconsistent. Conclusion and Summary of Academic Discussion Finally, as a round-up, what does the academic world say about successes and shortcomings of the EU’s instruments in the field of minority protection and the actual impact on the life of minorities? As regards the Racial Equality Directive, many authors criticize that the exception for difference of treatment is based on nationality, arguing that difference of treatment on grounds of racial or ethnic origin will often coincide with differences in nationality and that this exception may make it difficult in practice for third country nationals to enforce successfully the Directive and could amount to indirect discrimination (for a summary of academic discussion, see European Commission, 2004a, p. 16; in its conclusion about the main findings of academic literature the Commission points out that due to the fact that many authors focus on shortcomings of EU antidiscrimination legislation with regard to human rights, this dimension must be strengthened in the future, see p. 32). The scope for positive action under the directives based on Art. 13 EC and the question of whether this should be classified as an exception of the principle of equal treatment are discussed in the literature (ibid.). The European Commission further highlights that some authors note that the directives do build a bridge between non-discrimination and human rights (ibid., see e.g. Mahlmann, 2003; Dollat, 2002). This interpretation by the European Commission seems to reflect the academic debate on the issue. Many authors draw a distinction between ‘formal equal treatment’ and ‘substantive equality’. The first concept refers to situations where two categories of persons whose factual and legal circumstances disclose no essential difference are treated differently or where situations which are different they are treated in an identical manner. For the second concept, equal treatment may not be sufficient to achieve full equality in practice and positive action is needed to compensate for inequalities caused e.g. by different education or housing situations (European Commission, 2004a, p. 17). Therefore, some authors find that positive action is an exception to the principle of formal equal treatment or a vital component of achieving substantive equality, while some are critical of this approach as it may limit the subsequent scope for such initiatives (European Commission, 2004a,
Manuela Riedel
45
______________________________________________________________ p. 27). Others emphasize that positive action is not an exception to the principle of equal treatment rather, it is necessary to ensure full equality (Bell, Chopin, Palmer, 2006, p. 52). Apart from this non-discrimination literature, several authors devoted work to the question of double standards in enlargement processes and their impacts on the EU as a whole: Although the EU does not provide a ‘minority rights policy,’ some scholars have observed a stronger EU focus on minorities not least as a consequence of the latest enlargement preparations describing an “internalization of the protection of minorities in the EU system” (Toggenburg, 2000, p. 25). In the words of Toggenburg, in the context of European integration minority protection should not be regarded as a ‘hermetic’ legal competence matter but as an overall policy aim that is best fulfilled by a variety of legal and political instruments (Toggenburg, 2007, p. 8). He continues to describe several dimensions of the integration of minorities, including the integration of persons belonging to a minority group into the state while these persons’ group identities remain to be guaranteed to a certain degree. Secondly, minority protection has to be integrated as a policy aim in all public policies by means of legislative impact assessment and mainstreaming (Toggenburg, 2007, p. 8). Further, Wheatley identified nine factors that are responsible for the success of inclusion of minorities in EU member states (Wheatley, 2007, pp. 6 et seq.). The EU’s regional policy as well as the indirect influence of the EU on the institutional design of the member states, the educational system and the introduction of proportionality and ethnic quotas in employment are named as factors promoting minority inclusion that derive from the EU level (ibid.). With regard to general aspects of EU minority protection, Toggenburg pointed out that the EU level is, in the area of minority protection, (still) characterized by a “politics versus law” situation, with for instance the European Parliament claiming that while protection of minorities is a part of the Copenhagen criteria, there is no standard for minority rights in Community policy nor is there a Community understanding of who can be considered a member of a minority (Toggenburg, 2007, p. 8). Toggenburg however hints to the fact that the EU has to respect limits in the area of law (ibid.). This short insight in the academic discussion surrounding EU minority issues shows that substantive criticism was made concerning ‘hard facts’, meaning the relevant EU Directives, while for other issues such as cultural and linguistic rights statements are more general, which also points to the fact that in these areas, the EU still has limited power and member states play a greater role. However, the relevance of minority integration has been constantly growing over the last 15 years. Preparations to the enlargement process of 2004 had a special impact on discussions of minority-related issues and on
The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights 46 ______________________________________________________________ the further development of EU policies and institutional arrangements which were not in the first place designed to serve minority integration, but de facto attempt do so, e.g. by promoting equal opportunities when it comes to integration issues, there is a strong interaction between member states implementing EU legislation and acknowledgement at the EU level of best practices in areas such as employment, social inclusion or language policies. Generally speaking, there seems to be a situation of ‘old minorities’ vs. ‘new minorities’, with the former being covered by the EU’s enlargement processes and single initiatives of the European Parliament and the latter being central to Brussels’ employment and social cohesion strategy as they represent important migrant groups in the member states. Furthermore, due to the EU’s limited competences, for the time-being the outcome of Brussels’ attempts to promote the integration of minorities in Europe come to an end when there is a lack of political will and of resources at national level. In this light, if the European Commission wants to commit to its aim to protect both equality and diversity in its member states, it remains questionable whether the EU’s strategy to focus on national minorities during enlargement processes, while internally new minorities such as migrants are at stake (with the exception of Roma) will succeed in the long-term. This is particularly important when it comes to further enlargement rounds, as the issue of doublestandards seems to remain. Endnotes 1 All information is taken from website of the European Commission’s DG External relations, available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ coe/index.htm (accessed 18 October 2008). 2 See the OSCE website, available at http://www.osce.org/hcnm /23618.html (accessed 20 September 2008). 3 See http://www.living-diversity.eu/News/Eintrage/2007/12/6_Eintrag_1. html (accessed 10 March 2008) During the accession processes the Parliament was also critical about the progresses in candidate states as regards minority protection that had been described by the Commission, see e.g. for the case of Romania Pridham, 2007, p. 354. 4 The Employment Equality Directive provides similar goals than the Racial Equality directive, e.g. as regards positive action (Art. 7). The employment directive will not be further discussed in this text. 5 “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail” (emphasis
Manuela Riedel
47
______________________________________________________________ added). The provision was agreed upon not in the drafting stage for the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe but at the Intergovernmental Conference under the Italian Presidency at the end of 2003 and has been criticized for remaining ambiguous and rather modest, despite the actual success of being mentioned in the EU’s primary law, see von Toggenburg, 2006, p. 7, who amongst others criticises the fact that the provision is not followed by any policy provision or competence base in the text. 6 All information is taken from the agency’s website, available at http://eumc.eu.int/eumc/index.php?fuseaction=content.dsp_cat_content&cati d=45f1665036644 (accessed 5 October 2008).
References Bell, M., Chopin, I. and F. Palmer (2006), Developing Anti-Discrimination Law in Europe – The 25 EU Member States compared, Brussels. Bossuyt, A. v. (2007), “Fit for Purpose or Faulty Design? Analysis of the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice on the Legal Protection of Minorities,” Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minorities in Europe, I/2007. Brennan, F. (2004), “The Racial Equality Directive: Recycling Racial Inequality,” Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 311–331 . Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services (2007), Non-discrimination mainstreaming– instruments, case studies and way forwards, Kent. Commission Decision No. 2006/33/EC of 20 January 2006 establishing a High-level Advisory Group on Social Integration of Ethnic Minorities and their Full Participation in the Labour Market, OJ L 21, 25 January 2006. Commission of the European Communities (2001), European Governance – A White paper, Brussels, 25.7.2001, COM(2001) 428 final. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – The EU’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in Third Countries, COM (2001) 252 final of 8 June 2001. Council Decision of 28 February 2008 implementing Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 as regards the adoption of a Multi-annual Framework for the EU
The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights 48 ______________________________________________________________ Agency for Fundamental Rights for 2007-2012 (2008/203/EC), L 63/14 EN Official Journal of the EU, 7 March 2008. Council of Europe (2008), Joint Programmes between the Council of Europe and The European Commission, available at http://www.jp.coe.int/Default.asp (accessed 26 October 2008). Dollat, P. (2002), “Vers la reconnaissance généralisée du principe de l’égalité de traitement entre les personnes dans l’Union européenne,” Journal des tribunaux 87, 57–65. European Commission (2008), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Non-discrimination and equal opportunities: A renewed commitment, SEC(2008) 2172, Brussels, 2 July 2008 (COM(2008) 420 final). European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (2007), Equal Rights versus Special Rights? Minority Protection and the Prohibition of Discrimination, Report drafted by Krisitin Henrard, University of Groningen. European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs (2007a), Beyond Formal Equality: Positive Action under Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC, Report drafted by Marc de Vos. European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (2006), Catalyst for Change? Equality bodies according to Directive 2000/43/EC, Existence, independence and effectiveness, report drafted by Rikki Holtmaat. European Commission (2005), Non-discrimination and Equal Opportunities for All—A Framework Strategy, COM 2005) 224 final, 1 June 2005, 2 and 10. European Commission (2005a), Community Action Programme to Combat Social Exclusion, 2002–2006: Evaluation of the Impact of Inclusion Policies under the Open Method of Coordination, Call for Proposals, VP/2005/009. European Commission (2004), Overview of the Commission’s activities to promote gender equality, Memo/04/46, Brussels, 5 March 2008.
Manuela Riedel
49
______________________________________________________________ European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs (2004a), Critical review of academic literature relating to the EU directives to combat discrimination, Brussels. European Commission (2003), Joint Report on Social Inclusion, Summarizing the Results of the Examination of the National Action Plans for Social Inclusion (2003–2005), COM(2003)773 final, 12 December 2003. European Commission (2003a), Communication “A New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism”, COM(2005) 596 final, 3. European Commission (1997b), Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union, COM (97) 2000, 15 July 1997. European Parliament (2008), Resolution on a European strategy on the Roma, 31 January 2008, P6_TA(2008)0035. European Parliament (2006), Report on Non-discrimination and Equal Opportunities for All—A Framework Strategy, A-6-0189/2006, 18 May 2006, para. 13–21. European Parliament (2005), Protection of minorities and anti-discrimination policies in an enlarged Europe, European Parliament resolution on the protection of minorities and anti-discrimination policies in an enlarged Europe (2005/2008(INI)). European Parliament and European Council Decision No. 771/2006/EC of 17 May 2006 establishing the European Year of Equal Opportunities for All (2007)—Towards a Just Society, OJ L 146, 31 May 2006. EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights (CFR-CDF) (2005) Thematic comment N° 3: The protection of minorities in the EU, 25 April 2005. EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (2008), Positive Action Thematic Discussion Paper, drafted by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), Vienna, March 2008. EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (2007), Trends and Developments 19972005 – Combating Ethnic and Racial Discrimination and Promoting Equality in the EU, Vienna.
The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights 50 ______________________________________________________________ Kochenov, D. (2007), Commission’s Approach to Minority Protection during the Preparation of the EU’s Eastern Enlargement: Is 2 Better than the Promised 1?, European Diversity and Autonomy Papers EDAP 02/2007. Mahlmann, M. (2003), Gerechtigkeitsfrage im Gemeinschaftsrecht, in: U. Rust, W. Däubler, et al.(eds), Die Gleichbehandlungsrichtlinien der EU und Umsetzung in Deutschland, Loccumer Protokolle 40/03, Pößneck, pp. 47–71. Minority Rights Group International (2006), Disaggregated Data Collection: A Precondition for Effective Protection of Minority Rights in South East Europe, 8 August 2006, London. Mirga, A. (2005), Making the EU’s anti-discrimination policy instruments work for Romani communities in the enlarged European Union, Princeton: Project on Ethnic Relations, www.perusa.org/Reports/Andrzej%20Mirga%20_2.PDF (accessed 20 September 2008). Negrin, K. (2003), Collecting Ethic Data: An Old Dilemma, The New Challenges, published at eumap.org, Available http://www.eumap.org/journal/features/2003/april/dilemma (accessed 17 August 2008). Pridham, G. (2007), “The Scope and Limitations of Political Conditionality: Romania’s Accession to the EU,” Comparative European Politics, 2007 (5): 347–376. Schmidt, U. (2007), “The Aspect of Culture in Social Inclusion of Ethnic Minorities: Assessing Language Education Policies under the EU’s Open Method of Coordination,” Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minorities in Europe, I/2007. Schutter, O. (2005) The Prohibition of Discrimination under European Human Rights Law, Relevance for EU Racial and Employment Equality Directives, European Network of Legal Experts in the non-discrimination field, published by the European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Brussels. Stepanek, L. (2002) Minorities in Europe – the Divergence of Law and Policy, Available http://www.eumap.org/journal/features/2002/jan02/ minorities (accessed 5 October 2008).
Manuela Riedel
51
______________________________________________________________ Toggenburg, G. v. (2007), “Europe and the Integration of Integration,” Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minorities in Europe, I/2007. —(2006), “A remaining share or a new part? The Union’s role vis-à-vis minorities after the enlargement decade,” EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2006/15. —(2000) “A rough orientation Through a Delicate Relationship. The EU’s Endeavours for (its) Minorities,” European Integration Online Papers (EioP), Vol. 4 (2000) No. 16, Available http://www.eiop.or.at/ eiop/texte/2000-016a.htm (accessed 18 January 2008). Tsilevich, B. (2001), “EU Enlargement and the Protection of National Minorities: Opportunities, Myths, and Prospects,” EUMAP Online Journal, feature on European standards in minority protection, 1 October 2001, Available http://www.eumap.org/journal/features/2001/oct/ euenlarge (accessed 10 December 2008). Vermeersch, P. (2007), “Ethnic Minority Protection and Anti-discrimination in Central Europe Before and After EU Accession: the Case of Poland,” Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minorities in Europe, I/2007. Wheatley, J. (2007), “The Economic Status of National Minorities in Europe: a Four-Case Study,” Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minorities in Europe, I/2007. Wiener, A. and G. Schwellnus (2004), “Contested Norms in the Process of EU Enlargement: Non-Discrimination and Minority Rights,” Constitutionalism Web-Papers, ConWEB No. 2/2004.
The Special Consideration Standard as a Modern Tool for Advancing the Rights of Minorities Alexander H. E. Morawa The article discusses the “special consideration” standard in favour of ethnic minorities developed by the European Court of Human Rights in its 2001 judgment in Chapman v. the United Kingdom. It explores what has become of this standard in subsequent years and suggests that, subject to proper interpretation and application, it can become a workable tool for minority rights advocates and litigators. “[I]n certain circumstances a failure to attempt to correct inequality through different treatment may, without an objective and reasonable justification, give rise to a breach of [the right to equality].”1 “Discrimination on account of … a person’s ethnic origin is a form of racial discrimination. Racial discrimination is a particularly invidious kind of discrimination and, in view of its perilous consequences, requires from the authorities special vigilance and a vigorous reaction. It is for this reason that the authorities must use all available means to combat racism, thereby reinforcing democracy’s vision of a society in which diversity is not perceived as a threat but as a source of enrichment.”2 Introduction In 2003, I have examined the very beginnings of a line of jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in the field of minority rights that has become known as the “special consideration” standard (Morawa, 2003, p. 97). A concept of legal thought aiming at what one might call affirmative equality,3 it has been applauded as very promising initially. This essay seeks to explore what became of the standard in subsequent years, and whether the promise has been fulfilled. It then argues that special consideration can serve as a useful tool for advancing the rights of minorities today and suggests possible ways of revitalizing it in practice to accomplish that goal. After acknowledging in 1996 in Buckley4 that the “traditional lifestyle” of minorities falls within the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention, the Court established in January 2001 in its Chapman judgment5 its special consideration standard in the field of minority protection under the Convention in the following terms:
54
The Special Consideration Standard
___________________________________________________________ “[A]lthough the fact of being a member of a minority with a traditional lifestyle different from that of the majority of a society does not confer an immunity from general laws intended to safeguard assets common to the whole society such as the environment, it may have an incidence on the manner in which such laws are to be implemented. … [T]he vulnerable position of gypsies as a minority means that some special consideration should be given to their needs and their different lifestyle both in the relevant regulatory planning framework and in arriving at the decisions in particular cases.[6] To this extent there is thus a positive obligation imposed on the Contracting States by virtue of Article 8 to facilitate the gypsy way of life[7].”8 Human rights advocates had urged the court in this and several parallel cases to judicially recognize and enforce the “growing consensus amongst international organizations about the need to take specific measures to address the position of the Roma in relation to a number of issues, including their accommodation and general living conditions.”9 Indeed, the limited legal scholarship on the issue of vulnerability in human rights law (Morawa, 2003a, p. 139) suggests that minority rights are one sub-field of the discipline where the nexus between a vulnerable position in society and affirmative measures to improve that status are most obvious. It should be noted, however, that in the Chapman decision, the majority of the Court found that Article 8 had not been violated where a Gypsy family had been evicted from land it owned in a green belt area, referring to the general duty no to discriminate – here: against non-Roma – under Article 14 ECHR. A minority of seven judges voiced a strong dissent explaining, inter alia, the relationship of Articles 8 and 14: “[W]e cannot agree with the view expressed by the majority that to accord protection under Article 8 to a gypsy in unlawful residence in a caravan on her land would raise problems under Article 14 where planning laws continued to prevent individuals from setting up houses on their land in the same area. … This approach ignores the factor … that in this case the applicant’s lifestyle as a gypsy gives a wider scope to Article 8, which would not necessarily be the case for a person who lives in conventional housing, the supply of which is subject to fewer constraints. The situations would not be likely to be analogous. On the contrary, discrimination may arise where States, without objective and reasonable justification, fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different.”10
Alexander H. E. Morawa
55
______________________________________________________________ The Concrete Meaning of the Chapman Standard 1. Does “special consideration” amount to affirmative action? Or is it merely one of the Court’s so frequent intra-right differentiations? Although the Court remains largely silent as to the concrete meaning of its standard – even if it speaks of a positive obligation to “facilitate” the Gypsy way of life, and the split amongst the judges when it came to applying it requires further analysis in light of subsequent practice – it may be assumed that what was intended was in fact to create a basis for granting somewhat different levels of the right at issue (i.e. higher levels of rights to privacy and home in cases of people belonging to minority groups). This is not as unique as it may seem. In fact, human rights jurisprudence is full of express differentiations of the level of protection – that is, non-interference, but also affirmative duties of the state – depending on a particular attribute or characteristic of the person or group affected. This can include findings that national law is lacking adequate remedies, thus requiring legislative action in order to comply with Convention requirements. Consider an earlier landmark case of the Court, X and Y v. the Netherlands (1985), where a mentally handicapped girl had been sexually assaulted but both she and her parents were barred, for formal reasons, from bringing a criminal complaint against the perpetrator. The Court ruled “that the protection afforded by the civil law in the case of wrongdoing of the kind inflicted on Miss Y is insufficient. This is a case where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake. Effective deterrence is indispensable in this area and it can be achieved only by criminal-law provisions […].”11 The failure, here of both the legislature and law enforcement, to act with ‘due diligence’, as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has said in Velasquez-Rodriguez,12 triggered state responsibility (see Hofstötter, 2004). Several Convention rights have thus been interpreted as requiring positive state action “in order to make them more operate effectively or meaningfully, hence implying a positive obligation into the primarily negative wording of the Convention” (de Than, 2003, p. 169). An example of the “levels” or “degrees” of protection warranting corresponding state duties is free speech under Article 10 ECHR in the political context: while everyone enjoys the right to voice his or her opinions, for instance by demonstrating,13 some people, such as journalists14 and elected representatives in democratic states,15 may go further in their criticism and any restrictions placed upon them by the authorities “call for the closest scrutiny on the part of the Court.”16 Also, who is being verbally attacked makes a difference: politicians, while allowed broader free speech, must also tolerate more17 and may, in particular in times of transition, be liable not only for their actions, but also for their failures to dissociate themselves from the previous regime in time. The state here is under a positive duty to develop a system of media regulation (or: non-regulation, which is also not a merely
56
The Special Consideration Standard
___________________________________________________________ negative obligation) that takes these varying degrees of negative and positive duties into account and fosters media pluralism and an effective public discourse in political matters. The Chapman standard at first sight seems to fall into the same category: While everyone enjoys the rights under Article 8 ECHR, and Gypsies or other minorities must in principle also abide by a country’s laws in force, when it comes to appraising the conformity of a certain measure with the Convention, one must attach more significance to their particular status and must more closely scrutinize the justifications advanced for a particular restriction. In essence, that is the Chapman standard’s underlying methodology. Yet a process of “special consideration” entails an additional element: it may be described as a three-step approach to affirmative duties of states in favour or ethnic groups or, if you will, a test to be followed: First, such groups do not enjoy immunity from general laws as long these laws survive the general test of sufficient precision, legitimacy, necessity, and proportionality18 the Court would apply in any given case. Second, the group’s traditional lifestyle may “have an incidence on the manner in which such laws are to be implemented” or, in other words, the Court will scrutinize the concrete circumstances of such cases with some higher level of scrutiny. Third – and that is the true affirmative statement here – there is a “positive obligation imposed on the Contracting States […] to facilitate the […] way of life of minority groups.” The test questions for national authorities when adopting or judicially reviewing measures, and for the Court when reassessing them ex post facto, would then be: 1. 2.
3.
Is the law at issue pursuing a legitimate aim, necessary in a democratic society, and proportionate to the goal it seeks to achieve? What is the effect of the measure on the minority compared to the general public or any other appropriate ‘test group’ it can be compared to? Does the way the national authorities apply the law in concreto in a situation affecting or involving (members of) ethnic, religious, racial or comparable groups indicate that they intend to facilitate the group’s way of life?
The third question is of the essence. Impermissible under the special consideration standard would be all those concrete measures that either deny, neglect or ignore the needs of minority groups – that is still the test applied under general standards of European human rights law – or such measures that fail to show an intent and effort of the decision maker to actively facilitate, or promote the lifestyle of those concerned. In other words, a decision maker who does not discriminate, and can prove so, could still trigger state responsibility under Chapman of he or she cannot show convincingly that the
Alexander H. E. Morawa
57
______________________________________________________________ facilitation of a minority lifestyle was part of the consideration, and became part of the ultimate decision. Merely considering the minority’s interests, but then opting for the – usually simpler, cheaper, and more popular – measure that treats everyone alike, does not suffice. What is crucial for the further analysis of the special consideration standard is the duty to facilitate. Innocent sounding as it may be, the term “to facilitate” has a certain fairly clear meaning in international human rights law. By using the term, the Court – and we can be sure it did not do so by coincidence – incorporated terminology commonly uses in the discussion of economic, social, and cultural rights into its reasoning: the CESCR (Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) Committee has stipulated that “economic, social and cultural rights, like all human rights, impose […] three levels of obligations on States parties – the obligation to respect, to protect and to fulfill. The obligation to fulfill further contains duties to provide, promote and facilitate,”19 which the International Commission of Jurists has handily summarized as follows: “The obligation to fulfil-facilitate requires States parties to proactively engage in activities that strengthen access to and the utilisation of resources and the means to ensure the realisation of Covenant rights. The obligation to fulfil-provide requires States parties to take measures necessary to ensure that each person within its jurisdiction may obtain basic economic, social and cultural rights satisfaction whenever they, for reasons beyond their control, are unable to realise these rights through the means at their disposal. For example, with regard to the right to food, the obligation to fulfil-facilitate suggests State party assistance to provide informational and other opportunities for persons to obtain food whereas the obligation to fulfil-provide implies the direct provision of food or resources when no other alternatives exist due to unemployment, disadvantage, age, sudden crisis/disaster, marginalisation, etc.”20 Thus, also in the words of the CESCR Committee, the “obligation to fulfil (facilitate) requires States to take positive measures that enable and assist individuals and communities”21 in the realization of their rights. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, for instance, has emphasized that “the obligation to fulfil incorporates both an obligation to facilitate and an obligation to provide.”22 But do we need the element “provide” for our task at hand, namely interpreting the special consideration standard as a purposeful tool for (first generation) rights implementation? One should bear in mind that we are talking about core civil and political rights here (such as the right to privacy) that are interpreted to include elements of social and eco-
58
The Special Consideration Standard
___________________________________________________________ nomic rights but are, as the Court makes clear, Convention rights with all their might. For those, fulfill-facilitate with its positive measures will suffice to come up with a meaningful standard, as we shall see. Any facilitation of the way of life of a minority will many times clash with a majority’s views, attitudes, or prejudices. We can draw some inspiration for answering the question whether national authorities should give in to such prevailing popular emotions from what the Court has said in the context of free political speech in the majority-minority context: In Ouranio Toxo it emphasized that “mention of the consciousness of belonging to a minority and the preservation and development of a minority’s culture cannot be said to constitute a threat to “democratic society”, even though it may provoke tensions.”23 Of course, one might say, it is not in line with maintaining and strengthening a democratic Europe if states curtail the democratic right of non-majorities to be visible and outspoken, to live their identity, and to interact with others without having to shed their characteristics. But that encroaches upon certain comfort zones humans build for themselves amongst which, truth be told, a bit of racial intolerance and prejudice sometimes lurks. With its demand that states comply with their obligation to foster tolerance amongst ethnic groups,24 the Court has quite clearly reigned in permissible recourse to anti-minority sentiments flowing into official government decisions. In the special consideration context, that implies an elevated duty of decision makers to firmly advance the interests of minorities, if necessary against popular demands, when seeking to facilitate their way of life. 2. Chapman and Beyond It is noteworthy that governments have, it seems, not only opted for a selective reading of the Court’s rulings in Buckley and Chapman, but have at least occasionally picked their own kind of raisins from the cake. In the Moldovan et al. case (second judgment of 2005), for instance, the only reference to these two cases is by the Romanian government. The complainant claimed, and the Court ultimately agreed, that after a bar fight that had left a nonRoma dead, not only had the population of a village, joined by local law enforcement, opted for killing the three alleged murderers of Roma origin – two by beating them to death, one by setting his house on fire; rather, the mob had then proceeded to destroying a number of Romani dwellings. The investigations led nowhere, and the courts found it suitable to include insulting and racist language in their judgments. The houses that were constructed as reparation for the victims by the government subsequently were almost uninhabitable. Before the Court, the government denied that the State authorities “bore any responsibility for the destruction of the applicants’ houses [… and] had only positive obligations under Article 8, obligations which had been fulfilled in this case by granting aid to the applicants to rebuild their homes. In any event, the Government considered that there was no obligation
Alexander H. E. Morawa
59
______________________________________________________________ under the Convention to provide a home to persons who were in difficulties. They relied in this connection on the cases of Buckley […] and Chapman […].”25 Nothing in these cases suggests that a government is under no obligation to repair the damage done through either its agents’ actions (police officers inciting violence or cheering on a mob) or omissions (officers standing idly by) whilst a riot is in progress, be it in the context of racial and ethnic tensions, or not. The question may legitimately be asked whether and under what circumstances there is a duty of states to provide housing to persons within their jurisdiction in general. The Court’s jurisprudence has clarified that the meaning of any language indicating that no state obligation exists in Buckley and Chapman is narrow in that respect, for instance that “no right can be derived from Article 8 that they provide housing, or conditions for housing, that meet particular environmental standards or in any particular location.”26 In Collins v. the United Kingdom (2002), for instance, the Court had to assess the complaints of a severely handicapped woman who had been promised a “home for life” in a certain public care facility, but was subsequently transferred to a different social care facility. The domestic authorities had argued that “home for life” does not necessarily mean a “home for life” at a particular hospital or place of residence; rather a “home for life” by reference to the needs of those individuals being met appropriately.”27 The Court ultimately agreed, but only after a careful assessment of the entitlements involved and the effects of the move. In Volkova v. Russia (2003), the Court, after ominously stating that “neither Article 8 nor any other provision of the Convention guarantees housing of a particular standard or at all”,28 continued to assess the complaint similarly as in Collins, namely by assessing valid promises and entitlements to a residence in a particular type of ‘dorm’ and applying a proportionality test. In O’Rourke v. the United Kingdom (2001) the Court adopted different language, holding that the “scope of any positive obligation to house the homeless must be limited”,29 but is not non-existent. Referring to its earlier case of Mazari v. Italy (1999),30 it said that, for instance, a refusal to provide housing assistance to a person suffering from a serious disease might raise issues under Article 8 ECHR.31 It is impossible to conclude from this practice32 that aspects of a person’s residence, and a state’s obligation to safeguard or even provide for it under certain circumstances, if properly linked to for instance Article 8 of the Convention, fall outside the scope of review of the Court. Romania’s claim indicates that one can extract a meaning from the judgments establishing the special consideration standard that is not only contrary to said standard, but contrary to the very essence of European human rights law. The immediate post-Chapman jurisprudence followed the majority’s line of reasoning to the letter, rejecting a series of similar cases in late Janu-
60
The Special Consideration Standard
___________________________________________________________ ary 2001. In Eatson33 and Porter v. the United Kingdom,34 for instance, the Court began with the obscure statement that the Gypsy way of life was to be considered “traditional” and therefore falling within the special consideration standard proper only if the persons concerned were in fact itinerant travelers.35 The Court then followed the standard test weighing, in line with the national authorities, the “not very special circumstances” of the applicants against the “strong, environmental reasons for the refusal of the planning permission.”36 What is of concern, however, is that the Court added language that there might have been “humanitarian considerations which might have supported another outcome at the national level,”37 thus suggesting that the states enjoyed an overly wide margin of appreciation – a holding which has no basis in Chapman, irrespective of whether one reads the majority opinion alone or, as is suggested, together with the dissent. A reference to “humanitarian” considerations also suggests that states were free to take the situation of minorities into account or not, rather than facing a legal obligation not only to consider it, but to give it priority consideration. That, too, finds no support in Chapman. In the case of the Gypsy Council (2002)38 restrictions on a Gypsy event were at issue: The local police decided to prohibit any assemblies “within a 5 mile radius of Horsmonden Village Green”39 on the weekend that the traditional Horsmonden Horse Fair in Kent was scheduled to take place. According to the applicants, the planned assembly was to be a significant cultural and social event in the life of Romani Gypsy community in the United Kingdom, and was to be attended primarily by Gypsies. The prohibition was explained by various breaches of public order and anti-social behavior by participants in previous years, but also by “fear expressed by residents” of the village and by “the normal social interactions between villagers being suspended as a consequence of the sheer volume of visiting travelers.”40 The applicants challenged the decision, but the High Court affirmed it, “consider[ing] that the fact that the Romany Gypsy Community could go to an alternative site some 20 miles away […] which was approved by the local authority and the police, served to limit the impact upon the Romany Gypsy community.”41 The High Court’s original judgment contains the following more detailed or additional considerations: “The plain reality is that both the Borough Council and the Secretary of State considered, in the light of the policing concerns, that the disruption to the life of the local community was of paramount concern and the need to avoid such disruption should take priority over the interests of the Romany community. In any event […] it is not the case that the Romany community will not be able to gather at all this weekend anywhere in the area […] albeit [the alternative venue] does not provide a
Alexander H. E. Morawa
61
______________________________________________________________ complete answer to their concern or indeed any answer which is satisfactory to them.”42 The High Court finally “noted that Articles 8 and 11 of the Convention recognized that balance had to be struck between the interests of the individual, in this case, the interests of the gypsy community and the interests of society generally, but found no reason on that basis to interfere on public law grounds with the assessment reached” by the authorities.43 The Strasbourg Court was seized by the applicants with the principal complaint that the prohibition order violated their rights under Articles 8, 11, and 14 ECHR. They pointed out that it “had a disproportionate effect on the gypsy Romany community and that the authorities could have accommodated the fair by imposing reasonable conditions on its conduct, e.g. by regulating car parking, limiting the number of stall holders, ensuring sufficient policing, ensuring that there were sufficient stewards provided by the organizers and ensuring that the village was cleaned afterwards by liaising with the gypsy representatives.”44 The Court assessed the necessity of the interference in a democratic society and its proportionality as follows: “The Court notes that the Horsmonden fair was a traditional gathering of longstanding and as such of considerable cultural and social importance to the gypsy community. However, the exercise of the right to freedom of assembly is not absolute and where large gatherings are concerned the impact of the event on the community as a whole may legitimately be taken into consideration.[45] The horse fair had been growing in size over the years and in 2000 the police had identified concerns about the disruption to the local community caused inter alia by the ‘sheer volume’ of visitors, indiscriminate parking, littering, a background level of increased crime and road closures. The Court observes that the authorities made available a site some 20 miles from Horsmonden, where large numbers of persons could assemble without causing disruption. … While the applicants argue that it would have been possible to allow the fair to take place as usual subject to reasonable conditions regulating car parking, ensuring sufficient stewards, policing and litter collection, the Court is not persuaded that this would have necessarily prevented the disorder and disruption which was anticipated. In the circumstances, the response of the authorities was proportionate, striking a fair balance between the rights of the applicants and those of the community generally.”46 With respect to Article 14 of the Convention, the Court added:
62
The Special Consideration Standard
___________________________________________________________ “The Court has found above that the measure pursued the legitimate aim of preventing disorder and protecting the rights of other. It prevented any persons attending the horse fair irrespective of their origin. It is not persuaded that the prohibition order […] was imposed with any discriminatory intent or effect.”47 In order to illustrate whether the Court in Gypsy Council applied a standard that would qualify as special, within the meaning of the Chapman standard, reference may be made to two – possibly crucial – statements it made in the context of Article 8: holding that the gathering under a stricter regime would not “have necessarily prevented the disorder and disruption which was anticipate”, and Article 14: the measure “prevented any persons attending the horse fair irrespective of their origin.” The need to prevent anticipated disorder may justify the prohibition of assemblies under the general standard if other measures are judged to be ineffective by the authorities for reasons which the Court, exercising its review powers, finds convincing (see Morawa, 2003, 105 et seq.). That test extends to both the levels of “anticipation” and of “likelihood of failure” of alternative, less restrictive means to prevent such disorder. Nowhere even in the case law concerning non-special situations has a standard been applied that requires applicants to provide positive proof that other measures will “necessarily” prevent any trouble. As for the measure at issue having prevented “any persons attending the horse fair irrespective of their origin,” it suffices to say that the Horsmonden Horse Fair traditionally was a Gypsy event with mostly Gypsy attendance in order to foster their culture and tradition. Of course any non-Gypsy who would have wanted to attend was also deprived of an opportunity to partake in the event, but it is apparent that the measure not only indirectly, but quite openly targeted the Gypsies; everyone else may well have walked away saying: “Oh, well, there will be other events.” It was the Gypsy tradition and culture, however, that was at stake and would have required the Court to review the restrictive measures under the special consideration standard. It may not come as a surprise that Chapman is not mentioned in the decision. Connors v. the United Kingdom (2004)48 is interesting not only in that it held that the eviction of a Gypsy family from land they resided on lawfully, for a multitude of instances of breaches of the peace and disorderly conduct, violated Article 8 ECHR because of a lack of proper procedural safeguards (and, indeed, in light of a flawed regime of managing sites for Gypsies). The Court here explicitly referred to Buckley and Chapman,49 but then proceeded to distinguish these cases:
Alexander H. E. Morawa
63
______________________________________________________________ “The present case may also be distinguished from the Chapman case […], in which there was a wide margin of appreciation, as in that case, it was undisputed that the applicant had breached planning law in taking up occupation of land within the Green Belt in her caravans and claimed, in effect, special exemption from the rules applying to everyone else. In the present case, the applicant was lawfully on the site […].”50 By emphasizing that applicant Chapman, other that Connors, was seeking special treatment, while the latter was merely asking for equal treatment, the Court, despite referring to special consideration as a standard, renders that standard inapplicable, but instead resorts to the general three-prong test of permissibility of an interference with the right to family life. Connors, therefore, is in truth not a special consideration case, but a simple equal treatment case. The Chapman follow-up jurisprudence to date culminates in the case of Codona v. the United Kingdom (2006). There, a Gypsy applicant and her family were offered so-called brick and mortar accommodation, to which she had a “cultural aversion”, after she had been removed from an illegal caravan site. The Court here made the rather unusual choice of initially stating that it was “far from obvious that Article 8 is engaged” because Mrs. Codona was allegedly seeking to enforce a non-existent positive obligation of the state to provide her with housing of her choice, only to proceed to an in-depth evaluation of the case under its Article 8-jurisprudence. Recalling the Chapman standard of a duty to facilitate the Gypsy way of life, the Court acknowledged that an aversion against living in standard housing “can be identified as forming part of the applicant’s ’gypsy way of life‘.”51 It added that it “does not rule out that, in principle, Article 8 could impose a positive obligation on the authorities to provide accommodation for a homeless gypsy which is such that it facilitates their ’gypsy way of life.’”52 Then, comes the turning point in the Court’s reasoning: “However, it considers that this obligation could only arise when the authorities had such accommodation at their disposal and were making a choice between offering such accommodation or accommodation which was not ’suitable‘ for the cultural needs of a gypsy.”53
64
The Special Consideration Standard
___________________________________________________________ With that, the Court clings to the narrow majority’s reasoning in Chapman that the positive duties under the special consideration standard were subject to a general “as far as possible” reservation, which the dissenters vehemently opposed. The Court in Codona reiterates this conclusion, borrowing from a pre-Chapman decision by the European Commission of Human Rights54 and stating that, pursuant to the facts at hand … “the domestic authorities were alive to, and complied with, any positive obligation that they owed under Article 8 to facilitate the applicant’s ’gypsy way of life’, to the extent that such was possible given the constraints of available accommodation.”55 3.
Non-European Practice Informing Special Consideration Jurisprudence While a European case-law applying the special consideration standard consistently and convincingly has not, to date, been forthcoming, the practice of other human rights tribunals offers a few examples that are helpful in further refining the standard. Consider, for instance, the case of L. R. et al. v. the Slovak Republic (2005) before the CERD Committee: here, a municipal council had first adopted a resolution in favour of constructing low-cost housing for the local Roma community, which had been residing in slum-like quarters for many years. After public protests and, in particular, a petition warning against a possible “influx” of Roma from elsewhere once they would become aware of the availability of inexpensive living space, the municipality revoked the decision. The Committee held that … “the council resolutions in question, taking initially an important policy and practical step towards realization of the right to housing followed by its revocation and replacement with a weaker measure, taken together, do indeed amount to the impairment of the recognition or exercise on an equal basis of the human right to housing.”56 We may conclude from that, at the very least, that the revocation of an affirmative measure or, in other words, the deliberate undoing of special consideration, is suspect and thus may, in circumstance such as those present in the L. R. case and without other justification, trigger a breach of human rights. It seems thus that an act of a national authority that is, upon review, driven by a special consideration in favour of a minority group, will raise the level of justification if that measure is subsequently revoked. This is in line with the principle of subsidiarity, since under such circumstances the international tribunal will not substitute a state’s assessment with its own, but will merely reinforce, and reinstitute a decision already arrived at domestically.
Alexander H. E. Morawa
65
______________________________________________________________ A Special Consideration Standard for the Future 4. Letsas (2007, pp. 129–130) asserts that the European Court of Human Rights “is willing to promote interests that are normally served by social and economic human rights (as political goals) but that can textually be read into the civil rights of the ECHR.” Warbrick (2007, p. 247), in a rather cautious article, nevertheless asserts that the Convention protects “collateral aspects of economic and social interests, where these involve civil and political rights”, and gives the examples of procedural provisions and the protection against discrimination. Indeed, the promotion of human rights may well entail a “liberal” reading of norms that may have been intended to be primarily negative or defensive, in line with the Court’s general principle of a dynamic approach to human rights interpretation. As the present author has said elsewhere, “[t]he interpretation must be “dynamic” and “evolutive”, taking into account that the ECHR is “a living instrument which ... must be interpreted in the light of present day conditions.” Authors have pointed out and it appears settled today that the Convention has “law-making character” and should be seen as “a bill of rights that must be interpreted so as to permit its development with time” and with changing “social and political attitudes”” (Morawa, 2003b, para. 28).57 Clapham (1993, p. 345), for instance, concluded when discussing the reach of human rights into the private sphere – something that minority rights often entail – that the obligation to take “”positive measures” may mean actual expenditure and the deployment of resources to ensure that the right can be freely exercised ’without interference from private individuals.’” Special considerations in favour of minorities may be said to have something in common with the margin of appreciation: for them to truly govern in any given situation, the right(s) at issue should be of they highest order, and the circumstances in which the dispute arises should not lend themselves to be interpreted as falling within the realm of the “institutional order” of the state, such as elections58 or the maintenance of a legitimate constitutional principle, such as secularism in Turkey.59 A comparable approach is taken by the Court when it assigns a “level” to the margin of appreciation it is inclined to grant a respondent state (see van Bossuyt, 2007, p. 15). We can conclude for the purposes of the present analysis, first that the rights of ethnic minorities fall in the highest category, since there is not only the Court which in its jurisprudence is outspoken against anything that suggests state-sponsored racial bias, but also the Council of Europe in general that has committed itself to eradicating racial inequality. Second, it is clear from practice that race-based preferences in all their manifestations are no justifications that would ever be accepted as elements of a democratically legitimate constitutional order in contemporary Europe.
66
The Special Consideration Standard
___________________________________________________________ As regards the specific scope of positive duties that arise under the special consideration standard, the practice is, unfortunately, rather sparse. The Court, it seems, has backed away from its very promising special consideration standard, and has sought to resolve the cases before it by relying on general standards and assessment techniques. That approach, regrettably, has overshadowed the affirmative rights-based approach Chapman promised. Earlier, we discussed some issues pertaining to the right to housing and whether state obligations extend to providing accommodations to certain people under particular circumstances. We found, initially, that an entitlement to housing could emerge, for instance, if the government itself had destroyed or made uninhabitable the houses of people, be it through unlawful action or negligence. Here, the duty to provide is intrinsically linked to a material breach of human rights obligations, such as Articles 3 or 8 ECHR. In other cases, that duty may be liked to lawful entitlements people have under domestic law or practice, such as title to housing of a particular kind, e.g. a bed in a particular care facility for the handicapped,60 or rooms in a dorm.61 Thirdly, a right to housing may derive from a non-discrimination claim, be it freestanding (Article 26 CCPR) or accessory to a substantive right (Article 14 ECHR). It shall be noted at this point that that the equality-regime is growing stronger, with the adoption on Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR, but also a European jurisprudence that is expanding the reach of Article 14. The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has taken the lead here by consistently holding when interpreting Article 26 CCPR, that “when … legislation is adopted in the exercise of a State’s sovereign power, then such legislation must comply with [A]rticle 26 of the Covenant”62 and has added that the application of the principle of non-discrimination contained in Article 26 thus “is not limited to those rights which are provided for in the Covenant.”63 The European Court of Human Rights, too, has evolved its jurisprudence in recent cases well beyond the purely accessory character of Article 14 as having “no independent existence, since it has effect solely in relation to the rights and freedoms safeguarded by the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols.”64 It has early on clarified that “the application of Article 14 does not necessarily presuppose the violation of one of the substantive rights guaranteed by the Convention. It is necessary but it is also sufficient for the facts of the case to fall “within the ambit” of one or more of the provisions in question.”65 The contemporary interpretation is more open and resembles – within the limits of the text of the Convention – the universal standard: “The prohibition of discrimination in Article 14 … extends beyond the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms which the Convention and Protocols require each State to guarantee. It
Alexander H. E. Morawa
67
______________________________________________________________ applies also to those additional rights, falling within the general scope of any Article of the Convention, for which the State has voluntarily decided to provide.”66 Apart from these international legal developments, we must not overlook the significance of a comparative (constitutional) review of relevant state practice as this can inform the interpretation of international legal obligations. In the field of housing rights that was the topic of the majority of the Gypsy-related Strasbourg cases following Chapman, for instance, judicial practice indicates a gradual recognition of a right to adequate housing either explicitly, for instance in constitutions,67 or implicitly, by judicial practice interpreting more broad or vague national norms.68 The emerging practice suggests that the third, equality-based argument in favour of a right to housing outlined supra may, in be the most suitable to use jointly with the special consideration standard, while also borrowing from the second, substantive rights-based approach. If entitlements are granted by the state, these must be granted without unreasonable distinction. Never can members of a minority group be treated less favourably than the general population. However, they can or, as we can see, must under certain circumstances be treated more favourably if the prescribed – mandatory, not optional – goal of fostering their traditional lifestyle requires it. If the entitlements are substantive-rights based or -related, this argument is reinforced, but not substantially different. For Europe, it is crucial to note in this respect the European Court’s language emphasizing that “Article 14 does not prohibit a member State from treating groups differently in order to correct “factual inequalities” between them; indeed, in certain circumstances a failure to attempt to correct inequality through different treatment may, without an objective and reasonable justification, give rise to a breach of that Article.”69 The Court has provided a roadmap of sorts for such corrective affirmative action by holding: “[T]he provisions of the Convention do not prevent Contracting States from introducing general policy schemes by way of legislative measures whereby a certain category or group of individuals is treated differently from others, provided that the interference with the rights of the statutory category or group as a whole can be justified under the Convention.”70 Interpreted this way, the special consideration standard imposes on states something similar to what the material equality standard does: it first prescribes a compulsory goal of fostering the lifestyle of minorities, which is to be incorporated in government policies. Secondly, it adds the additional dimension of an equally mandatory pro-minority consideration in any application of the policy (or law) by national decision makers which, in turn, is open to the scrutiny of international human rights tribunals. Whether the state does pursue the mandatory goal – fostering the lifestyle of minorities – by
68
The Special Consideration Standard
___________________________________________________________ appropriate means can be assessed by the Court using fairly common methodology, yet with a twist: fostering is never static, but is by definition progressive. For the review of whether measures aimed at the progressive realization of rights are satisfactory we can, once again, seek guidance in the realm of CESCR rights and obligations. The duties of states there include, in no uncertain terms stemming not from the Covenant’s implementation machinery but the wording of the treaty, to use “all appropriate means” to foster – facilitate – the progressive realization of the rights guaranteed. What means are appropriate? “While each State party must decide for itself which means are the most appropriate under the circumstances with respect to each of the rights, the ’appropriateness‘ of the means chosen will not always be self-evident. It is therefore desirable that States parties’ reports should indicate not only the measures that have been taken but also the basis on which they are considered to be the most “appropriate” under the circumstances. However, the ultimate determination as to whether all appropriate measures have been taken remains one for the Committee to make.”71 While the states parties to the ECHR enjoy a margin of appreciation when adopting laws, policies, and implementation procedures for fostering minority rights, their appropriateness to progressively advance these rights can be tested by the Court under its own special consideration standard. We must recall that in Chapman, the Court took notice of the “emerging international consensus amongst the Contracting States of the Council of Europe recognising the special needs of minorities and an obligation to protect their security, identity and lifestyle, not only for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of the minorities themselves but to preserve a cultural diversity of value to the whole community.”72 The reiteration of that fact in D H et al. v. the Czech Republic – a case where the Grand Chamber found breaches of the Convention in an inflexible system of assessing the special educational needs of Romani children, while the trial Chamber less than two years earlier had not found this to amount to a violation of the Convention73 – is in itself an indication that the concept is by no means static. We have thus managed to merge the standards of civil and political rights with interpretative tools stemming from second generation rights into a flexible and adjustable tool for assessing states’ continuous compliance with an emerging minimum standard, just as the Court prompted us to do in Chapman.
Alexander H. E. Morawa
69
______________________________________________________________ 5.
The “Possibility” Exception and Evolving Human Rights Standards As we have seen in Codona, the newer jurisprudence of the Court has, on the one hand, begun embracing positive obligations a bit more wholeheartedly but, on the other hand, now emphasizes the factual “possibility” of corrective affirmative action, such as the provision of suitable housing, as a general threshold for state liability. This begs two questions: first, is such a broad “possibility” exception justifiable in human rights law and, second, if we allow it, does it open an avenue for creative lawyering aimed at strengthening the special consideration duties enunciated in Chapman? While certain human rights have been identified as inalienable – allowing no exception and derogation and not being susceptible to any implied limitations – per se and others have been interpreted so as to allow only very limited restrictions that states need to tailor narrowly and justify by what amounts to compelling reasons, the rights we are contemplating here fall in a category that in general lack that quality. Thus, although fulfilling these rights is not an obligation states can make entirely or predominantly dependent on the availability of resources, the scope of these rights is expanding, since the treaties and covenants were designed and are applied as living instruments. Therefore, a gradually increasing density and depth of human rights standards is foreseen and intended. The UN bodies, in particular the CESCR Committee, speak of a progressive realization of rights. The Strasbourg Court, for instance, applies the concept of evolving common European standards to assess the contents of rights at any given time. Both it and the European Court of Justice “draw inspiration from the constitutional traditions of the member states”74 and do not hesitate to apply what one would call internationalized constitutional comparison to find the laws or practices in one country to be at odds with an identified “common European standard” (Morawa, 2003b, para. 29 and Morawa, 2007, p. 73). What may have been acceptable at a point in time in history, may turn into a violation later. Thus, even in the field of civil and political rights, justifications for non-compliance based on contemporary circumstances, including the availability of resources, may be tolerated in certain limited circumstances by the supervisory bodies. We cannot, therefore, categorically reject the “possibility” exception. If we bear in mind that we are operating in an evolving system – and nothing illustrates that better than the area of positive obligations – it seems consequential to make creative use of the issue of resource availability by incorporating it into the special consideration standard. The progressive realization of rights has been interpreted as follows: “[T]he phrase must be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed the raison d’être, of the Covenant which is to establish clear obligations for States parties in respect of the full realiza-
70
The Special Consideration Standard
___________________________________________________________ tion of the rights in question. It thus imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal. Moreover, any deliberately retrogressive measures in that regard would require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum available resources.”75 The gradual realization of human rights, even in the social and economic field, requires adherence to standards of expedience and effectiveness. Both are reviewable by judicial and quasi-judicial international bodies. Both correspond to what the European Court of human rights has done, for example by requiring states to remain “in sync” with the common European approach to dealing with a particular matter. The Court here has applied a practice of what one can non-technically call ‘warnings’, that is rulings that find no breach of a Convention right, but indicate that there nevertheless is a deficiency that can, over time, develop into non-compliance. To ensure that no such step-by-step violation is established, the state concerned has a de-facto duty, which can be translated into a legal obligation at least ex post facto, to take positive measures to ensure compliance. That includes adjustments to their policies (at the law and implementation levels) and the making available of economic resources so that individual decisions can facilitate the minority way of life. What is needed for such facilitation is many times in limited supply – such as housing and land for Roma who live a traditional lifestyle in the United Kingdom – and, as the dissenters in Chapman made clear,76 there would be no issue of unjustified different treatment if the government would adopt a policy to either remedy the scarcity of such resources or allow deviations from planning and zoning regulations in favour of minority members, even if it would not adopt the same policies in the (housing) sector in general. In other words, the special consideration standard demands affirmative action, but then also protects the government from suits by non-minority members who are not treated favourably. Access to housing her is a highly relevant example, but the same principle applies to a variety of other sectors and public policies. From the recent case of Andrejeva v. Latvia we can extrapolate another quite compelling reason for a positive duty along the lines outlined supra: Minorities tend to reside on the territory of states not by choice, but because of factors beyond their control. Since forced population movements are fortunately outlawed by ius cogens, the existence of such minorities is a fact and the obligations of the ‘host’ or multiethnic state are continuing. External influences that seek to positively affect these minorities, such as measures adopted by kin states, notwithstanding, the multiethnic state is and will remain the only state “with which [group members have] any stable legal ties
Alexander H. E. Morawa
71
______________________________________________________________ and thus the only State which, objectively, can assume responsibility for [them] … .”77 The stability of the ties may well be the key word. Stable multiethnic societies will flourish only if there is a proper give and take between the majority and minorities of affirmative approval of the latter’s right to existence as a distinct group, which requires positive measures, and in turn affirmative acceptance of the duties of loyalty and common purpose that statehood rightfully demands. Conclusions It would seem that the special consideration standard pursuant to Chapman is a workable tool for minority rights advocates and litigators. It does need some renewal, and some thinking out of the box. The above considerations point in a direction which, if consequently followed, would lead to a practically relevant standard that is also compatible with its host, the European human rights system, and modest and flexible enough to find the support of those in governments who subscribe to inter-ethnic harmony and the progressive advancement of the European citizenry unblemished by the discontent of minorities. Endnotes 1 European Court of Human Rights [hereafter: Eur.Ct.H.R.], Appl. 55707/00, Andrejeva v. Latvia, judgment (GC) of February 18, 2009, para. 82. See also “Case relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium” v. Belgium (Merits), judgment of July 23, 1968, Series A, No. 6, para. 10. 2 Eur.Ct.H.R., D H et al. v. the Czech Republic, judgment (GC) of November 13, 2007, para. 176. 3 For a comprehensive discussion of the various manifestations of equality in international human rights law, see Morawa 2001/2. 4 Eur.Ct.H.R., Buckley v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 September 1996, Reports 1996–IV. 5 Eur.Ct.H.R., Chapman v. the United Kingdom, judgment (GC) of 18 January 2001, Reports 2001-I. For a discussion of this case see Mowbrey 2004, 176 et seq. 6 Reference is made to Buckley, paras. 76, 80, and 84. 7 With reference, mutatis mutandis, to the Marckx v. Belgium judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A, No. 31, para. 31, the Keegan v. Ireland judgment of 26 May 1994, Series A, No. 290, para. 49, and the Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands judgment of 27 October 1994, Series A. No. 297–C, para. 31. 8 Chapman, at para. 96.
72
The Special Consideration Standard
___________________________________________________________ 9 European Roma Rights Center (ERRC), Written Comments in cases Chapman and others, undated, available at www.errc.org, accessed on 29 April 2009. 10 Chapman, joint dissenting opinion of judges Pastor Ridruejo, Bonello, Tulkens, Strážnická, Lorenzen, Fischbach and Casadevall, at para. 8, with reference to Thlimmenos v. Greece, judgment of 6 April 2000, Reports 2000– IV. 11 Eur.Ct.H.R., X and Y v. the Netherlands, judgment of March 26, 1985, Series A., No. 91, para. 27. The Court has subsequently held that “the Convention may also imply in certain well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual.” Eur.Ct.H.R., Osman v. the United Kingdom, judgment of October 28, 1998, Reports 1998-VIII. 12 Inter-Am.Ct.H.R., Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Series C, No. 4 (1988). 13 See Eur.Ct.H.R., Chorherr v. Austria, judgment of August 25, 1993, Series A, No. 266–B, for a case exploring the limits of that right. 14 See Eur.Ct.H.R., Lingens v. Austria, judgment of June 24, 1986, Series A, No. 103. 15 See Eur.Ct.H.R., Castells v. Spain, judgment of April 23, 1992, Series A, No. 236. 16 Ibid., at para. 42 (emphasis added). 17 See, for instance, Eur.Ct.H.R., Appl. 42409/98, Wolfgang Schüssel v. Austria, decision on the admissibility of February 21, 2002. 18 The Court has, in its more recent jurisprudence, adopted a “duty to promote tolerance” standard in matters involving ethnic and other tensions within a society: “Although the Court recognises that it is possible that tension is created in situations where a community becomes divided, it considers that this is one of the unavoidable consequences of pluralism. The role of the authorities in such circumstances is not to remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each other.” Eur.Ct.H.R., Appl. 74651/01, Association of Citizens Radko & Paunkovski v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, judgment of January 15, 2009, at para. 65, with reference to Ouranio Toxo et al. v. Greece, judgment of October 20, 2005, Reports 2005-X, para. 40, and Serif v. Greece, judgment of December 14, 1999, Reports 1999-IX, para. 53. 19 For a recent statement see: CESCR Committee, General Comment No. 16 (2005) Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of all Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, para. 17 (emphasis added).
Alexander H. E. Morawa
73
______________________________________________________________ 20 ICJ, The State Obligation to Respect, Protect and Fulfill ICESCR Rights, undated, http://www.icj.org/IMG/pdf/7.pdf, accessed on 29 April 2009 21 CESCR Committee, General Comment No. 13 (1999) on the Right to Education, E/C.12/1999/10, para. 47. 22 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/education/rapporteur/index.htm, accessed on 29 April 2009. 23 Ouranio Toxo et al. v. Greece, at para. 40. 24 Association of Citizens Radko & Paunkovski, at para. 65, and others. 25 Eur.Ct.H.R., Moldovan et al. v. Romania, judgment no. 2 of July 12, 2005, Reports 2005-VII, at para. 91. 26 Eur.Ct.H.R., Appl. 31888/03, Martin Ward v. the United Kingdom, decision on the admissibility of November 9, 2004. para. 1 (emphasis added). 27 Appl. 11909/02, Collins v. the United Kingdom, decision on the admissibility of October 15, 2002, p. 3. 28 Appl. 48758/99, Volkova v. Russia, decision on the admissibility of November 18, 2003, at p. 7. 29 Appl. 39022/97, O’Rourke v. the United Kingdom, decision on the admissibility of June 26, 2001, at p. 7. 30 Appl. 36448/97, Mazari v. Italy, decision on the admissibility of May 4, 1999. 31 O’Rourke, at p. 7. 32 The cases described in more detail are not isolated incidences, but are mirrored in other decisions in comparable cases, such as Appl. 40328/98, Siebert v. Poland, decision on the admissibility of May 25, 2004 (alleged breach of Article 8 ECHR by the authorities’ refusal to register the complainant at the address of an apartment he had been granted a tenancy in under the Communist regime, but which had later on been revoked) and Appl. 69353/01, Bleyová v. Slovakia, decision on the admissibility of October 17, 2006 (concerning a dispute over an apartment where the applicant had resided for 40 years, despite her not being the owner, on the basis of a court decision granting her a right to reside there until an alternative residence would be allocated to her). 33 Appl. 39664/98, decision on the admissibility of January 30, 2001. 34 Appl. 47953/99, decision on the admissibility of January 30, 2001. 35 Eatson, at p. 9, Porter, at p. 8. 36 Eatson, at p. 10, Porter, at p. 9. 37 Eatson, at p. 11, Porter, at p. 9. 38 Appl. No. 66336/01, The Gypsy Council et al. v. the United Kingdom, decision on the admissibility of May 14, 2002. For a more detailed description of the facts see Morawa 2003, 97 et seq.
74
The Special Consideration Standard
___________________________________________________________ 39 Gypsy Council, at p. 3, referring to the Order of the Turnbridge Wells Borough Council of 4 September 2000. 40 Gypsy Council, at pp. 2–3. 41 Ibid., at p. 4. 42 High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, case CO/3213/2000, CO/3230/2000, Regina v. Turnbridge Wells Borough Council et al., ex parte Gypsy Council, judgment of September 7, 2000, at para. 29. 43 Gypsy Council, at p. 4. 44 Ibid., pp. 5–6. 45 Reference is made, mutatis mutandis, to the European Commission of Human Rights’ [hereafter: Eur.Comm.H.R.] decisions in Appl. 20490/92, Iskcon v. the United Kingdom, dated March 8, 1994, 76 Decisions and Reports 90 (1994), and 31416/96, Pendragon v. the United Kingdom, dated October 19, 1998. 46 Gypsy Council, at p. 7–8. 47 Ibid., at p. 8. 48 Appl. 66746/01, Connors v. the United Kingdom, judgment of May 27, 2004. 49 Ibid., at paras. 83–4. 50 Ibid., at para. 86 (emphasis added). 51 Appl. 485/05, Codona v. the United Kingdom, decision on the admissibility of February 7, 2006, at p. 10. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Eur.Comm.H.R., Appl. 31600/96, Burton v. the United Kingdom, decision on the admissibility of September 10, 1996. 55 Codona, at p. 11. The same reasoning is repeated later in the context of the applicant’s non-discrimination complaint (Articles 8 and 14 read together), where the Court says that ‘it was, in fact, not possible to offer any accommodation other than bricks and mortar accommodation.’ Ibid., at p. 13. 56 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Communication No. 31/2003, L. R. et al. v. the Slovak Republic, opinion of March 7, 2005, CERD/C/66/D/31/2003, at para. 10.7. 57 Internal references omitted. 58 See the Court’s judgment in Ždanoka v. Latvia. 59 See Eur.Ct.H.R., Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) et al. v. Turkey, judgment of February 13, 2003, Reports 2003-II. 60 Collins v. the United Kingdom (2002). 61 Volkova v. Russia (2003). 62 This is a consequent line of jurisprudence beginning with the groundbreaking social security-related Communications Nos. 172/1984, S.W.M.
Alexander H. E. Morawa
75
______________________________________________________________ Broeks v. the Netherlands, views of April 9, 1987, CCPR/C/29/D/172/1984, para. 12.4; and 182/1984, F.H. Zwaan-de Vries v. the Netherlands, views of April 9, 1987, CCPR/C/29/D/182/1984, para. 12.4. 63 CCPR General Comment 18: Non-Discrimination, para. 12. 64 Eur.Ct.H.R., Appl. 13378/05, Burden v. the United Kingdom, judgment [GC] of April 29, 2008, para. 58, and many others. 65 Gaygusuz v. Austria, judgment of September 16, 1996, Reports 1996-IV, para. 36, amongst others. 66 Stec et al. v. the United Kingdom, decision on the admissibility (GC) of July 6, 2005, Reports 2005-X, para. 40 and Appl. 55707/00, Andrejeva v. Latvia, judgment (GC) of February 18, 2009, para. 74. 67 See. e.g. Section 26(2) of the South African Constitution which requires the state to “devise and implement within its available resources a comprehensive and coordinated programme progressively to realise the right of access to adequate housing.” This mandate was interpreted by the South African Constitutional Court in Government v. Irene Grootboom et al., judgement of October 4, 2000, 2001 (1) SA 46, para. 36, as follows: “A right of access to adequate housing also suggests that it is not only the state that is responsible for the provision of houses, but that other agents within our society, including individuals themselves, must be enabled by legislative and other measures to provide housing. The state must create the conditions for access to adequate housing for people at all economic levels … . State policy dealing with housing must therefore take account of different economic levels of our society.” 68 India, Supreme Court, Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame, Civil Appeal No. 2598/1989, judgment of January 31, 1990, (1990) 1 S.C.C. 520, para. 9: “Basic needs of man have traditionally been accepted to the three - food, clothing and shelter. The right to life is guaranteed in any civilized society. That would take within its sweep the right to food, the right to clothing, the right to decent environment and a reasonable accommodation to live in. The difference between the need of an animal and a human being for shelter has to be kept in view. For the animal it is the bare protection of the body; for a human being it has to be a suitable accommodation which would allow him to grow in every aspect - physical, mental and intellectual. The Constitution aims at ensuring fuller development of every child. That would be possible only if the child is in a proper home. It is not necessary that every citizen must be ensured of living in a well built comfortable house but a reasonable home particularly for people in India can even be mud built thatched house or a mud-built fire proof accommodation.” 69 Andrejeva v. Latvia, at para. 82 (emphasis added), with reference to Thlimmenos, para. 44, and Stec et al. v. the United Kingdom , para. 51.
76
The Special Consideration Standard
___________________________________________________________ 70 Ždanoka v. Latvia, at para. 112. 71 CESCR Committee, General Comment No. 3 (1990) on the Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, para. 4 (emphasis added). 72 D H. et al. v. the Czech Republic, at para. 181. 73 While D. H. contains a reference to Chapman, the Grand Chamber resolved the case exclusively on the basis of a standard non-discrimination analysis. 74 European Court of Justice, Case 44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, judgment of December 13, 1979, [1979] ECR 3727. 75 CESCR Committee, General Comment No. 3, para. 9 (emphasis added). 76 Chapman, dissenting opinion, para. 8. 77 Andrejeva v. Latvia, at para. 88.
References Clapham, A. (1993), Human Rights in the Private Sphere. Oxford: Oxford University Press. de Than, C. (2003), “Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights: Towards the Human Rights of Victims and Vulnerable Witnesses,” The Journal of Criminal Law, 67(2): 165–182. Hofstötter, B. (2004), “European Court of Human Rights: Positive Obligations in E. and others v. United Kingdom,” International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2(3): 525–560. Letsas, G. (2007), A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Morawa, A. H. E. (2001/2), “The Evolving Human Right to Equality,” European Yearbook of Minority Issues 1, 157–205. —(2003), “The European Court of Human Rights and Minority Rights: The ‘Special Consideration Standard’ in Light of Gypsy Council,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 10(2): 97–109. —(2003a), “‘Vulnerability’ as a Standard in International Human Rights Law,” Journal of International Relations and Development, 10: 139-155.
Alexander H. E. Morawa
77
______________________________________________________________ —(2003b), “The ‘Common European Approach’, ‘International Trends’, and the Evolution of Human Rights Law. A Comment on Goodwin and I v. the United Kingdom,” German Law Journal, 3(8), http://www.germanlawjournal.com/print.php?id=172. —(2007), “Substantive Due Process in Human Rights Law: International Tribunals and the Review of Domestic Decisions,” in: D. Girsberger and M. Luminati (eds.) ZGB gestern – heute – morgen. Festschrift zum Schweizerischen Juristentag, Zürich: Schulthess, 67–80. Mowbrey, A. R. (2004), The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights. Oxford and Oregon: Hart Publishing. van Bossuyt, A. (2007), “Fit for Purpose or Faulty Design? Analysis of the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice on the Legal Protection of Minorities,” Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues 1. Warbrick, C. (2007), “Economic and Social Interests and the European Convention on Human Rights,” in: M. A. Balerin and R. McCorquodale (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 241–257.
The Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and Equality Promotion Malte Brosig This article examines the promotion of standards for equal treatment by the Council of Europe’s (COE) Advisory Committee (AC) to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM). It aims to explore the distinct character of the AC’s method of norm promotion on the basis of notoriously vague minority rights standards. The article focuses on the practice of implementing FCNM norms by analyzing the AC’s country-specific recommendations through which the AC seeks to enhance the wording of the Convention’s text. It is argued that the special quality of the AC’s norm promotion method lies not only in the interpretation of the FCNM articles in the context of particular countries but in the systematic and pervasive recognition of context-dependent variables of minority living conditions, thus enhancing the text of the FCNM. Introduction At the centre of this chapter’s analysis is Article 4 of the FCNM, which prohibits racial discrimination and allows measures of affirmative action and “effective equality”. This paper examines the substance of how the AC understands “effective equality”. While Article 4 provides a clear obligation for the promotion of equalizing integration programmes, this paper explores which concrete instruments for integration the AC endorses in its monitoring reports and which actors are envisioned for the implementation of integration measures. These questions are of pivotal importance for the European minority rights regime since the most severe violations against minority rights are racial discrimination and the persistence of social and economic marginalization resulting from it. Minority rights protection and minority integration are intrinsically linked to each other. As Rainer Hofmann, a former President of the AC, has pointed out: “The ultimate goal of minority rights protection consists of achieving the full integration of persons belonging to minorities into the society of the States in which they live, while at the same time, guaranteeing the preservation and promotion of their distinct identity” (Hofmann, 2006b, p. 13). Thus integration policies are directly contributing to the realization of minority rights and are a prerequisite for full compliance with minority rights standards.
80
The AC and Equality Promotion
______________________________________________________________ The article is structured in three main sections. The first section discusses the legal quality of the FCNM. The vague and open wording of the FCNM poses a particular challenge for the implementation of minority rights norms including standards for minority integration and non-discrimination. This leaves considerable leeway for the AC to give meaning to FCNM standards. In the second section, this paper analyzes the AC’s country opinions on Article 4 clarifying the meaning of “effective equality” in everyday practice. The final section concludes with a short analysis of the AC’s concept of integration and its specific character of norm promotion. 1. The Legal Quality of Minority Rights Norms The FCNM entered into force in February 1998. It is the first and only legally binding human rights convention on minority rights. Its norms are legally binding for all contracting parties but, with the exception of Article 3, these norms are only “programme-type” provisions which are not directly applicable (Explanatory Report to the FCNM, para. 11). Consequently states are under a legal obligation to follow the principles and provisions of the FCNM through the application of domestic legislation and the implementation of policy programmes. In this process states enjoy a high degree of discretion because FCNM norms cannot be applied directly and their substance is not necessarily to be found in the Convention itself. The FCNM does not provide its contracting parties with ready-made solutions for the settling of minority issues or unique instruments for setting up minority integration programmes (Steketee, 2001, p. 4). However, it provides states with principles and objectives which include the application of integration measures. The implementation of the FCNM is monitored by an Advisory Committee (AC) comprised of 18 independent experts who are nominated by the contracting state parties of the FCNM. The AC monitors the implementation of FCNM norms on the basis of reports periodically submitted by each of the state parties. An initial report is due within one year after ratifying the FCNM and every fifth year thereafter. The recommendations of the AC need to be approved by the Committee of Ministers (CM), an intergovernmental body of COE member states. The fact that states can block unwelcome recommendations of the AC in the CM has given rise to strong criticism by some scholars (Alfredsson, 2000, pp. 291–304; Troebst, 1999, p. 20). However, day-to-day practice has developed a “constructive” and “trusting” relationship between the two bodies, as former members of the AC have noted (Phillips, 2004, p. 118; Hoffmann, 2004, pp. 3–16). Due to the soft wording of the FCNM, leaving a considerable degree of discretion for member states, the most important sources of reference are AC country opinions. The substance of FCNM norms very much lies in the practice of the AC’s recommendations. The reason for the lack of substance and the specific character of the FCNM programme-type provisions is not
Malte Brosig
81
______________________________________________________________ only to be found in the inability of the COE member states to agree on stricter norms for minority protection. It also reflects on the very different living conditions of national minorities throughout Europe, which makes it difficult to develop single standards for the needs of all minority groups (Steketee, 2001, p. 4). Thus the often criticized soft and vague wording of the FCNM (Pentassuglia, 1999, p. 419) allows for the much needed flexibility of minority rights norms to account for the very diverse realities in which minorities are living. What distinguishes the FCNM from the European fundamental rights regime is the absence of directly litigable human rights norms and the existence of an independent court to which individuals might take their complaints under certain conditions. The AC is not a court nor can it coerce states and oblige them to revise domestic laws. Minorities cannot appeal to the AC nor is the AC a completely independent body. Its opinions still need to be approved by the CM which makes its decisions behind closed doors. The committee then seeks the cooperation of its contracting parties and issues opinions of legal quality. The language of its opinions is moderate and diplomatic. It tries to support and advise states in the process of norm implementation, but the AC does not exert judicial control which would result in clear decisions such as those of a jury or judge (Hofmann, 2006a, p. 6). Instead it partly abandons the judicial arena by commenting on policy developments. Thereby a certain norm is interpreted not only on the basis of legal provisions such as the FCNM but also flexible standards which are promoted on the basis of context-dependent conditions. As the empirical analysis will show, the choice of integration instruments promoted by the AC for accomplishing “effective equality” is highly dependent on the specific living environment of ethnic minorities as well as the capacity of states to carry out equalizing measures and the political history of inter-ethnic relations. The AC relies exclusively on soft mechanisms for norm enforcement. Unlike the case of EU enlargement, external incentives and conditionality (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005) do not play a prominent role. Likewise the COE cannot provide extensive funding for minority integration programmes as the EU can afford them (see contribution by Riedel in this volume). In the concert of European organizations, the AC compliance mechanism distinguishes itself from the policy of preventive diplomacy exercised by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. It can hardly be compared with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, since its norms are not litigable and the AC is only a monitoring body and not a court. Thus the role the AC can play in order to bring states into compliance has narrow boundaries. The AC very much relies on its persuasive power and must try to socialize states into compliance. Socialization as a form of non-coercive norm enforcement relies on long-term communication as a vehicle for norm compliance. Deliberation,
82
The AC and Equality Promotion
______________________________________________________________ rhetorical commitment and persuasion are key elements of the socialization mechanism (Risse, 2000; Schimmelfennig, 2001; Checkel, 2002). Its incremental impact on state compliance has been analyzed by Risse, Ropp and Sikkink at length in their seminal volume, The Power of Human Rights International Norms and Domestic Change (1999). The AC uses socialization through its standard monitoring procedure within the framework of the FCNM. Pursuant to Article 25 the contracting parties to the FCNM have to submit regular reports on the progress of the implementation of FCNM norms. The AC replies to these state reports by compiling country-specific opinions to which the state parties usually send their statement responding to the AC’s opinion and criticism. A monitoring cycle is completed by a follow-up seminar. These follow-up seminars bring together members of the AC and state representatives in a joint conference evaluating the state of minority rights implementation in the respective country. Frequently minority representatives and members of civil society are invited too. A full monitoring cycle lasts two to three years before the whole machinery starts all over again. In this period state representatives are immersed in a communication process that is steered by the AC with the aim of explaining and teaching countries how to properly implement minority standards. Following the logic of socialization, the density and frequency of contacts exerts an incremental influence on countries. When countries are involved in this communication process, which does not terminate at any given point, they commit themselves to the goals of the FCNM. With every further contact the AC manifests its roles as a promoter of minority rights norms and reinforces these norms. However, the socialization process does not describe a gradual progress towards norm compliance. Patterns of non-compliance are frequently encountered. In the case of minority rights norms, the monitoring cycle is not only important because of its socializing effects on participating states, it is also a form of standard setting, benchmarking, and interpretation. A standard which on paper gives leeway for its application is given meaning primarily through its application. A monitoring cycle starts with the contracting parties, not the AC, interpreting the norms set forth in the FCNM. Each member state makes the initial decisions on how to implement and apply minority rights norms before the AC starts its review activities on state practice. Thus, at the beginning, the AC is reactive towards state practice. Norm adherence is not a simple reaction to prescriptive standards, rather vague norms acquire their meaning through application and supervision by monitoring bodies like the AC (Wiener, 2004). The AC monitors the application of FCNM norms by setting them in context to national and local conditions. This in the end may lead the AC to promote a certain measure like positive discrimination in one situation in order to reach substantive equality while it may reject this practice in another situation. This flexibility is seen as the most appropriate approach for
Malte Brosig
83
______________________________________________________________ minority rights protection because it is able to consider the very different living conditions of ethnic minorities in Europe. Thus the opinions are tailormade for each country. Through the state reporting and monitoring process, the AC refines existing standards which need further refinement because they are vaguely formulated and often entail escape clauses. 2. The Legal Basis of Minority Integration and Equal Treatment Minority integration is not new to the COE. As early as 1969 the Parliamentary Assembly called for a better integration of Roma in Western Europe (PACE, Rec. 563, 1969). Six years later the CM, for the first time, considered the application of “special measures” for integration (CM Res. 75(13) para. 5). With the Eastern enlargement of the COE in the 1990s the question of integration, primarily of Roma, triggered the issuance of a number of official COE recommendations and resolutions. Between 1993 and 2006 the COE authored six recommendations on the integration of Roma people and many more on general minority issues. Nonetheless, the FCNM does not provide minorities with a right to integration nor even the right to enforce a certain method or practice. There are, however, a few provisions of the FCNM which, combined, cover the most important aspects of standard minority integration programmes in Europe. Article 15 calls upon countries to create those conditions necessary “for the effective participation of … national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs”. It raises the issue of the participation of minority groups in society in order to remedy their often marginalized position and underrepresentation in decision and policy making. Article 5 requires states to promote minority cultures and prohibits any form of assimilation in state integration programmes. The promotion of intercultural dialogue and tolerance is covered by Article 6. Finally, core integration goals are promoted primarily by Article 4 (see Table 1) demanding “effective equality” and prevention from discrimination. Racial discrimination is the most severe violation of minority rights and the issue of equal treatment and equal opportunities is pivotal to achieve equality and to ameliorate the existing marginalization and social and economic cleavages between ethnic minorities and the majority society, hence the empirical part of this paper will focus only on the AC’s promotion of Article 4. Article 4(1) first guarantees minorities equality before the law and the equal enjoyment of rights. Any discrimination based on belonging to an ethnic minority is prohibited. However, this protection against discrimination and the formal admission of equality before the law does not always lead to substantive equality and the equal enjoyment of rights in practice. Therefore paragraph 2 demands the adoption of “adequate measures” for the promotion of substantial equality (Alfredsson, 2006, p. 144). The explanatory report to the FCNM on Article 4(2) makes it clear that special equalizing measures
84
The AC and Equality Promotion
______________________________________________________________ must adhere to the principle of proportionality: “This principle requires […] that such measures do not extend, in time or in scope, beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the aim of full and effective equality”. Thus affirmative action, which in some cases is needed in order to reach substantial equality, should be designed as a temporary instrument as long as the specific circumstances of marginalization or discrimination need to be overcome. Inevitably this requires a periodic and systematic assessment of minority living conditions and needs. Equalizing measures must be underpinned by statistical data and a socio-economic mapping clearly demonstrating the need for affirmative action. The final paragraph of Article 4 legitimizes temporary preferential treat of ethnic minorities if these measures aim at overcoming marginalization and discrimination based on belonging to a minority group. Affirmative action is not a discriminatory practice and does not contravene the principle of equality if it conforms to the principle of proportionality. Table 1. Article 4 of the FCNM Article 4 1 The Parties undertake to guarantee to persons belonging to national minorities the right of equality before the law and of equal protection of the law. In this respect, any discrimination based on belonging to a national minority shall be prohibited. 2 The Parties undertake to adopt, where necessary, adequate measures in order to promote, in all areas of economic, social, political and cultural life, full and effective equality between persons belonging to a national minority and those belonging to the majority. In this respect, they shall take due account of the specific conditions of the persons belonging to national minorities. 3. The measures adopted in accordance with paragraph 2 shall not be considered to be an act of discrimination.
The comments of the AC in response to state reports clearly show that there is an obligation to introduce equalizing measures under certain conditions, as the following section will show. However, despite the explanatory report and its additional explications on Article 4, many questions remain. It is not clear which specific measures are adequate for the accomplishment of substantial equality. Not every unequal treatment needs the application of positive discrimination. The term “effective equality” needs to be explained in greater detail which can only be done through the process of monitoring and application of these norms. The efficiency question is very much tied to the specific conditions in the social, cultural, economic and political environment that minorities encounter.
Malte Brosig
85
______________________________________________________________ The Opinion of the Advisory Committee on Article 4 The following section analyzes the opinion of the AC on Article 4. In order to make the analysis comprehensive, I reviewed all the comments of the AC to the contracting parties since the FCNM entered into force in 1998. I examined AC country opinions in the first and second cycle of state reports, which have been concluded by most countries. The third cycle, which is just beginning at the time of writing, has not been examined. For most states parties, the first cycle comprises an initial report on which the AC issues its first opinion. This first opinion comments primarily on the state of transposition of FCNM norms into legislation and inquires into the degree of legal protection of minorities with reference to the FCNM. In the second cycle, the AC proceeds by shifting its main attention away from the formal legal adoption of norms to the proper application and effective implementation of minority rights norms. Thereby the AC clarifies the scope and range of application much more than the explanatory report or legal commentaries in the literature. In order to analyze the AC’s comments on Article 4, this section identifies those factors that are frequently mentioned by the AC. We have determined 16 such conditions (see Table 2). These conditions are the essence of Article 4, reflecting on the AC’s interpretation of equal treatment and nondiscrimination. The data sheet in Table 2 documents the frequency of appearance of each factor by each country. As mentioned above, the FCNM norms are formulated quite vaguely with the intention of covering a variety of cases and allowing for flexibility in application. Thus the AC does not recommend the same procedures to every state party, but distinguishes between cases. The data sheet visualizes how frequently the AC refers to a certain factor and how systematically this factor is introduced in the AC’s opinions, which gives us a first hint of when a certain factor is picked up by the AC. The table also shows which mixture of conditions the AC highlights for each of the 32 countries. However, only a qualitative analysis which also inquires into individual conditions can evaluate the importance of these 16 factors in greater detail. The AC’s opinions can be grouped into three major categories; formal requirements, policy organization, and policy instruments (Table 3). At the beginning is the legal formal transposition of FCNM norms into domestic legislation which, with regard to Article 4, requires the transposition of comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation. If this first hurdle has been achieved successfully the AC requests the setting up of effective structures which implement integration programmes systematically and coherently. Finally the AC issues a number of very specific recommendations advocating certain policy instruments which aim at remedying the worst cases of marginalization. The following empirical analysis examines the AC’s country
The AC and Equality Promotion
86
______________________________________________________________ opinions according to these three categories. It seeks to clarify the actual meaning of equal treatment in practice and inquires into the context variables which guide the AC in its selection of minority integration instruments.
ALB ARM AUT AZE BH CHE CRO CYP CZE DEN ESP EST FIN GBR GER HUN IRE ITA KOS LIE LTU MKD MLD NOR POL ROM RUS SCG SLO SVK SWE UKR
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X -
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X -
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X -
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X -
X X X X X X X X X X X X X -
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X -
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X -
X X X X X X X X X -
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X -
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X -
X X X X X X X X -
X X X X X -
legal aid and remedy
confidence building
traditional way of
Roma women
consultation
EC/2000/43
needs awareness
local administration
implementation gap
legal status
insufficient monitor-
adequate resources
positive measures
institutional set up
deficient legal pro-
poor data
Country
Table 2. Article 4 and AC country opinions
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X -
X = presence of a condition, - = absence of a condition Formal Legal Requirements Many of the AC opinions in the first monitoring cycle focus on formal and legal requirements for the full implementation of Article 4. The AC systematically addressed the need for countries to protect minorities against discrimination through comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation providing victims of discrimination with effective legal remedies. It also collected sta-
Malte Brosig
87
______________________________________________________________ tistical data on the living conditions of ethnic minorities and commented on problems related to the legal status of minorities. Table 3. Advisory Committee: Groupings of Country Opinions Formal requirements
Policy organization
Policy instruments
Availability of adequate statistical data
Effective monitoring capabilities
Tailor-made country recommendations
Comprehensive legal protection against discrimination
Effectively working Ombudsman (institutional independence, regional availability)
Variety of preferential measures depending on living conditions
Availability of effective legal remedies against discrimination Clarification of legal status questions
Cross sector coordination at the horizontal and vertical axes
Affirmative integration measures especially in the employment and education sector
Special emphasis on local authorities
Special measures for Roma woman
Minority consultation
Respect for the traditional way of life
Incorporation of civil society when implementing integration programmes
Promotion of best practice solutions
Proper planning, execution, evaluation of all integration measures Availability of adequate resources and funding
According to the AC, only a comprehensive anti-discrimination law can guarantee full equality. Although most countries prohibit discrimination on various grounds in their constitutions, a general discrimination ban does not suffice to guarantee real equality when confronted with persisting forms of marginalization, stigmatization and social and economic deprivation. According to the AC country opinions, two-thirds of the analyzed counties did not provide minorities with sufficiently comprehensive legal protection against discrimination. Comprehensive legislation must protect minorities from any form of discrimination, protecting individuals from discrimination by public and private institutions (Serbia first cycle, para. 31, 17/11/04). Besides general bans on discrimination, many countries have introduced additional legislation to prohibit discrimination in employment, which the
88
The AC and Equality Promotion
______________________________________________________________ AC actively supports (Croatia, first cycle, para. 23, 06/04/01). However, greater protection is needed in areas in which minorities and in particular Roma people frequently suffer discrimination, like housing (Sweden, first cycle, para. 31, 20/02/03), education (Russia, first cycle, para. 32, 13/09/02), health care (Lithuania, first cycle, para. 28, 21/02/03 and CM Rec. 2006(10)), and employment (Italy, first cycle, para. 22, 14/09/01). The transposition of the EU Racial Equality Directive is also supported, however, without making comments on whether a state has transposed the directive properly or not. In some cases the AC combines its call for comprehensive adoption of anti-discrimination legislation with the transposition of the EU Racial Equality Directive (Germany, second cycle, para. 28, 01/03/06). In the case of Ireland, the AC used the belated transposition of the EU directive as a tool to apply pressure to accelerate legislative reforms from which the AC hopes to bring Irish law into compliance with the FCNM (Ireland, first cycle, para. 21, 22/05/03). However, the promotion of this EU directive for some EU member states, but not for non-EU members, poses the potential threat of establishing differential treatment without having a solid legal justification for this practice. As part of a comprehensive legal protection against racial discrimination which reaches all areas of the life of minority groups, the introduction of effective remedies is required of all contracting parties. The existence of legal protection mechanisms against discrimination is a precondition that necessary but not sufficient to guarantee the promotion of “full and effective equality” in real life. The effective working of legal provisions depends on a number of conditions of which the AC is aware in its comments on state reports. Low numbers of legal trials concerning acts of racial discrimination being brought before courts, despite NGO reports on widespread discrimination in everyday life, is very often indicative of a malfunctioning of the national administration and judicial system which deprives many minority members of access to effective remedies (Russia, second cycle, para. 46, 11/05/06). Despite the fact that many Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) have transposed the Racial Equality Directive punctually does not automatically give their minority populations the opportunity to seek a remedy before a court. Moreover, the AC attaches great importance to the possibility that victims of discrimination can seek compensation for damages suffered (Cyprus, first cycle, para 23, 06/04/01). The CM even pledges free legal aid for the very poor (CM Rec. (2005)4 para. 13). In addition to the proper transposition of comprehensive nondiscrimination legislation, great importance is attached to the availability of reliable statistical data. In 25 out of 32 cases the AC criticizes the insufficient availability of statistical data concerning national minorities. Any effective integration measure needs a careful evaluation of minority living conditions based on reliable statistical data before it can be implemented properly. In
Malte Brosig
89
______________________________________________________________ many cases there appear to be significant discrepancies between the data made available to the COE and the actual ethnic minority populations in a certain country (Austria, first cycle, para. 22, 16/05/02 or Czech Republic first cycle para. 28, 06/04/01). This is particularly true for Roma people. National census data frequently do not provide reliable figures on the Roma population. In its comments, the AC requests not only exact data on the ethnic composition of states but also asks member states to provide details according to age, sex, and geographical location (Germany, second cycle para. 33, 01/03/06). It is only possible to judge the effectiveness and appropriateness of national integration measures if reliable data is provided. This data is also important for countries in order to allow them to develop what the AC calls “targeted measures” for integration (Slovenia, second cycle, para. 61, 26/05/05). Collecting statistical data is essential not only for the development of integration strategies but also for the implementation and evaluation of equalizing measures (Macedonia, first cycle, para. 41, 27/05/04). Guaranteeing “full and effective equality” requires states to constantly re-evaluate and up-date their data on ethnic minorities. Changes in the ethnic composition in certain territories or changes in the socio-economic conditions of minority groups have to be recognized within an appropriate time span. Collecting data based on ethnic characteristics does not always find support in state administrations and concerns about it can be justified. A potential danger is the misuse of this data to discriminate against a certain group. For instance, the gathering of crime-related data according to racial origin can be politically exploited for populist reasons and might even fuel resentment against minorities. In countries in which ethnic conflicts have recently been overcome or continue to exist, this form of data collection can lead to an unintended division of society into ethnic groups with far-reaching consequences. Therefore, this data was not explicitly demanded from Kosovo and Bosnia, which were reminded to comply with personal data protection provisions (Bosnia and Herzegovina, first cycle, para. 53, 27/05/05). A further formal requirement for the proper application of FCNM norms is the question of the legal status of ethnic minorities. This issue is particularly relevant in the Baltic countries and in the Balkans. In Estonia and Latvia, for example, around one-third of the population belong to the Russian-speaking minority, many of whom did not obtain an Estonian or Latvian passport automatically after the Soviet Union collapsed. The issue of citizenship and of what constitutes an ethnic minority is of the highest importance for the implementation of FCNM norms. In their explanatory declaration to the FCNM, both countries declared that only citizens fall under the category of national minorities and thus can enjoy rights set out in the FCNM. However, similar declarations have been issued by Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal and Switzerland (Thiele, 2006, p. 126).
90
The AC and Equality Promotion
______________________________________________________________ In the Balkan region the uncertain legal status of Roma hinders the implementation of integration programmes in many cases. The unclear legal status of Roma settlements in Serbia led the authorities to forcefully evict Roma from their homes (Serbia, first cycle, para. 40, 17/11/04, see also CM Rec. (2005)4, para. 24). Roma living in non-legalized settlements often belong to the most disenfranchised and marginalized group of people. These settlements often lack basic infrastructure like water supply or waste collection. There have also been cases in which Roma have been removed from residence lists, leaving these people with an uncertain residence status (Slovenia, second cycle, para. 56, 26/05/05). Policy Organization A substantial proportion of the AC country opinions focus on the organization and administration of minority integration programmes. Indeed the AC spends more time and effort on commenting on the correct set-up of state implementing organs and administrative coordination of minority policy instruments than on the promotion of specific policy programmes. This section presents the AC’s opinion on state policy organization mentioning the effective working of Ombudsman institutions, the need for proper policy coordination between state institutions at the central and local level, models for adequate minority participation and problems of monitoring and implementation. According to the AC, the availability of effective remedies depends on the existence and proper working of a specialized monitoring institution. The introduction of the office of Ombudsman has become a standard recommendation. States without such a specialized body are advised to establish such an institution “in a timely manner” (Armenia, first cycle, para. 26, 16/05/02). The Ombudsman primarily serves the interest of the public including ethnic minorities but is not a representative for minority interests. In many cases the duties of this office are narrowly defined. An Ombudsman institution classically investigates complaints by individuals whose rights have been violated by state authorities (Cyprus, first cycle, para. 23, 06/04/01). Against this narrow understanding of the duties and functions of an Ombudsman the AC wants to expand its competences to the promotion of equal treatment (Czech Republic, second cycle, para. 20, 24/02/05). In its country opinions, the AC has expressed the view that the mere existence of an Ombudsman office may not suffice for guaranteeing effective remedies against discrimination. It attaches a number of conditions or expectations for this institution to work well. The offices should be accessible to people in regional areas and in areas in which minorities reside, to increase the accessibility of the Ombudsman office for ethnic minorities (Azerbaijan, first cycle, para. 26, 22/05/03). The building of popular confidence between
Malte Brosig
91
______________________________________________________________ state institutions and minorities is a further issue of concern in the cases of Azerbaijan (ibid., para. 24), Bosnia (first cycle, para. 36, 27/05/05), Russia (second cycle, para. 46 11/05/06), Kosovo (first cycle, para. 37 25/11/05) and Slovenia (second cycle, para. 50, 26/05/05), which have shown signs of serious disruption of public trust in state institutions. The AC takes a keen interest in the effective working of Ombudsman institutions within the domestic state structure and considers it as “indispensable for the Ombudsman to be able to rely on cooperation from all authorities” (Slovenia, first cycle, para 27, 12/09/02). This is a particular challenge since often minority issues do not fall in the competence of only one ministerial office but cut cross many portfolios. The effective working of Ombudsman institutions also requires a well-informed minority which knows its rights and actively uses them. Furthermore, countries are reminded to provide adequate financial resources and institutional independence when setting up such an office (Armenia, first cycle, para. 27, 16/05/02). For guaranteeing effective equality, the AC investigates the domestic organization of state integration programmes. Questions of the proper implementation of integration instruments and the efficient organization of integration programmes, including the allocation of adequate funding, supervision, administration and evaluation, are important elements of its opinions. In 19 out of 32 cases, comments on the organizational set-up of integration programmes were made. Indeed the challenge when setting up national integration programmes is not only the often low public support for minority integration projects but also the need for proper planning and cooperation between national and regional authorities on the vertical level as well as between different ministries at the horizontal level. Based on comprehensive non-discrimination legislation, the AC demands that countries develop comprehensive integration strategies remedying “at all levels” social and economic discrimination and marginalization (Bosnia, first cycle, para. 49, 27/05/05). Such measures need to involve “close coordination” of all relevant ministries (ibid., para 51). The CM has supported this view in a number of recommendations on Roma integration issues (CM, Rec. (2001)17; CM Rec. (2005)4; CM Rec. (2006)10). Problems of coordination between different ministries are a frequent challenge for the implementation of integration projects. Repeatedly the AC expresses concern about the varying degrees of commitment of the state administration bodies involved. Concerns were issued on the full and consistent implementation of integration projects by all involved actors (Romania, first cycle, para. 25, 06/04/01). The success and sustainability of minority integration programmes depends to a large extent on an effectively working regional and local administration. It is the local authorities that run integration projects and thus local governments feature frequently in AC recommendations (see also CM Rec. (2005)4 para. 9, 35; Croatia, second cycle, para. 74, 01/10/04). Resis-
92
The AC and Equality Promotion
______________________________________________________________ tance or ignorance against integration projects by local authorities can impact negatively on national integration programmes and at worst can undermine the ability of these programmes to promote effective equality (Czech Republic, second cycle, paras. 52, 59, 24/02/05; Hungary, second cycle, paras. 49, 52, 09/12/04). Coordination with local authorities is important because many services in which Roma, primarily, suffer discrimination, such as health care, housing etc. are administered by them (Italy, second cycle, para. 56, 24/02/05). Besides calling for proper coordination of central, regional, and local administrative institutions, the AC also calls for cooperation with civil society (Macedonia, first cycle, para. 33, 27/05/04). Contact with civil society organizations is an important information source for the AC. Occasionally it refers to NGO opinions or reports on the state of integration measures and revealed shortcomings in their implementation (Norway, second cycle, para. 39, 05/10/06). The incorporation of civil society organizations is particularly valuable in situations in which there is only a weak or no political representation of minority interests. In these situations, the AC tries to integrate civil society organizations to represent minority interests (Poland, first cycle, para. 39, 27/11/03). Following the country opinions of the AC, it is not fully clear if states should feel required to set up a special or separate administrative unit which administers integration projects. However, the AC supports their establishment and proper funding (Spain, first cycle, para. 31, 27/11/03). In many cases it reminds countries to provide sufficient funding for integration programmes. In 17 out of 32 cases, the AC finds that countries provide insufficient resources for the proper implementation of integration programmes, and 12 of these 17 are Eastern European countries. Additionally the CM has highlighted the need to “provide long-term budgetary support” especially for Roma integration projects (CM Rec. (2001)17, para. 28). Besides the proper coordination of state institutions involved in designing integration programmes, the AC frequently calls for the “active participation of Travellers and Traveller organizations in the implementation structures set up” (Ireland, first cycle, para. 42, 22/05/03). In half the countries which have ratified the FCNM, proper minority consultation when setting up minority integration programmes has been called for (see Table 2). Systematic minority consultation primarily seeks to guarantee that minority integration projects reflect the real needs of minorities and are not developed without minority input (Russia, second cycle, para. 70, 11/05/06). In some instances the AC recommends increasing the number of minority employees in state administrations (Kosovo, para. 37, 25/11/05; Macedonia, first cycle, para. 36, 27/05/04). Minority consultation has also been mentioned in a variety of COE recommendations by the CM stressing the importance of minority participation at the planning, implementation and evaluation of integration
Malte Brosig
93
______________________________________________________________ projects (CM, Rec. R (2000)4; CM Rec (2001)17; CM Rec. (2005)4; CM Rec. (2006)10). As can be seen in Table 2, almost two-thirds of countries inadequately monitor their non-discrimination legislation or insufficiently supervise their integration programmes. Governments, according to the AC, need to have information available on the practical application of non-discrimination legislation in order to guarantee fully that equalizing measures and nondiscrimination legislation work properly (Ukraine first cycle, para. 28, 01/03/02). Only if countries have up-to-date information available are they able to adjust current programmes to the needs of minority members. Furthermore, the monitoring and evaluation of integration measures should be conducted by independent institutions (Macedonia, first cycle, para. 33, 27/05/04). Not only states need to monitor the implementation of nondiscrimination and integration programmes, however. This information is also crucial for the AC, which has to rely on statistical data and survey studies provided by the state parties, or other independent research institutes or NGOs, to fulfil its task, the monitoring of the FCNM (Slovakia, first cycle, para. 21, 22/09/00). The insufficient monitoring apparatus in many countries also complements the frequently observed problems of implementation. One-third of country opinions complain about insufficient implementation of nondiscrimination rules or integration, and the majority of such cases are Eastern European countries. The reasons for this implementation deficit are manifold. In the case of Bosnia (first cycle, para. 42, 27/05/05) it is a “deeply-rooted discrimination” in society. In other cases, the AC has attributed the implementation gap to; lack of statistical data to monitor the progress of implementation (Croatia, second cycle, para. 43, 01/10/04), lack of commitment of national governments towards integration goals (ibid., para. 51), insufficient budget (ibid., para. 72), lack of systematic evaluation of integration projects (Ireland, second cycle, para. 41, 06/10/06), lack of minority participation during the implementation of integration programmes (Ireland, first cycle, para. 42, 22/05/03), misconduct of police officers (Lithuania, first cycle, para. 32, 21/03/03), unclear guidelines for implementing agencies (Romania, first, cycle, para. 29, 06/04/01), unclear legal status of ethnic minorities (Russia, first cycle, para. 36, 13/09/02), lack of judicial independence (Serbia, first cycle, para. 36, 17/11/04), or the unawareness of existing non-discrimination laws among the broader public and within the judicial system (Romania, second cycle, para. 47, 24/11/05). In its comments on the organizational set up of integration programmes, the AC is primarily reacting to the situation on the ground. Confronted with implementation deficits, inadequate monitoring and widespread organizational shortcomings, the AC has to devote large parts of its commen-
94
The AC and Equality Promotion
______________________________________________________________ taries to questions of administrative organization before recommending specific policy instruments. Policy Instruments The promotion of minority integration measures is primarily based on Article 4(2) and thus the AC’s comments on the implementation of this paragraph are central for our understanding of what equalizing measures are about. The AC actively encourages states to use minority integration tools for the promotion of effective equality. However, it has not developed objective criteria for when affirmative action is justified, it only refers to persisting and considerable inequalities between national minorities and mainstream society which justify the introduction of preferential treatment (Romania, first cycle, CM Conclusions, 06/04/01). In many cases the AC narrows down the area in which it recommends positive measures for securing full equality; employment (Serbia, first cycle, para. 38, 17/11/04), housing (Norway, first cycle, para. 76, 12/09/02), education (Sweden, first cycle, para. 26, 20/02/03), or Roma woman (Norway, first cycle, para. 76, 12/09/02). A number of terms are used to express the need for preferential treatment without calling directly for affirmative action. In the country recommendations one can find the terms; “positive measures”, “targeted measures”, “specific measures”, “decisive measures”, “remedial measures”, “suitable measures” and “additional measures”. They all, in a polite and diplomatic manner, point to persistent inequalities between ethnic minorities and mainstream society that require state intervention and some kind of positive discrimination. However, the AC avoids the naming of specific equalizing measures and it does not prescribe concrete instruments for any particular issue. The AC’s approach is to emphasize problems and to make countries aware of existing inequalities. The measure applied to remedy the situation is left to the discretion of each state party. There are differences in emphasis, however; while the term “suitable measure” leaves considerable scope for interpretation, the wording “positive” or “remedial” measures demands more direct state intervention. However, it is not clear according to which benchmarks the AC decides a situation requires “additional” or “targeted” measures. In some cases the AC’s comments appear as rather non-coercive recommendations. Phrases like, “The Advisory Committee considers that the Armenian authorities should step up their efforts in this regard (effective equality)” without going into the matter of the scope and extent of the government’s efforts can only formulate very vague obligations for Armenia (Armenia, first cycle para. 93, 16/05/02). Positive measures in the area of education are seen as vital for success in other fields such as employment and housing and therefore education forms a special focus for AC comments (Finland, first cycle, para. 20, 22/09/00). As stated earlier, no specific integra-
Malte Brosig
95
______________________________________________________________ tion measures have been prescribed nor is it inquired why certain instruments have worked effectively or not. The decision as to which instruments best apply for the integration of minority people is left for the state parties. The AC not only criticizes shortcomings in its periodic country opinion, it also encourages states to continue and systematically apply projects that have a proven positive impact. One case in point is the introduction of Roma assistant teachers (see the contribution by Cashman in this volume), which lowered the school drop-out rates of Roma students significantly (Poland, first cycle, para. 37, 27/11/03). The Parliamentary Assembly of the COE, more directly than the AC, calls upon countries to recruit Roma staff in public services ranging from administrative work in local authorities to health-care assistants in hospitals (PACE, Rec. 1557 (2002) para. 15c). Examples of successful “best practice” are promoted which can be developed by regional authorities or organizations from which a whole country may profit if applied coherently (Serbia, first cycle, para. 38, 17/11/04). In its comments on Article 4 the AC, with the exception of Roma women, rarely singles out a sub-group of any particular ethnic minority. However, because Roma women frequently encounter double discrimination based on their ethnic origin and gender, the AC devotes special attention to the situation of Roma women. In more than 20 country opinions the AC has made a direct reference to the situation of Roma women, making states aware of their vulnerable situation. In many cases it uses the standard phrase, “the Advisory Committee underlines that, when implementing special measures, particular attention should be paid to the situation of Roma women” (Denmark, first cycle, para. 20, 22/09/00) to express the need for special integration measures. The AC also finds “that the gender dimension needs to be taken into account in the design and implementation of all minority initiatives” (Ireland, second cycle, para. 51, 06/10/06). On some occasions more specific advice has been found. For Ireland (first cycle, para. 38, 22/05/03) the AC recommends improving the access to childcare facilities from which it expects women to have better access to the labour market. Indeed unemployment among Roma women is one of the most worrying and persistent forms of lack of integration (Norway, second cycle, 05/10/06). In Romania the AC welcomes the training of Roma women as social workers to improve the health and living conditions in Roma settlements (Romania, second cycle, para. 53, 24/11/05). This measure combines efforts to raise health-care standards among Roma and provides Roma women with job training and employment. The 2003 Body and Soul Report, which revealed dozens of cases of forced sterilization of Roma women mostly in Slovakia, has triggered the AC to focus more intensively on Roma women and their needs in the healthcare system (Slovakia, second cycle, para. 57, 26/05/05). Lastly the AC makes reference to the traditional way of life of Roma Travellers, however, only in a small number of cases (5 of 32) does it indi-
96
The AC and Equality Promotion
______________________________________________________________ cate that their lifestyle needs special consideration. For example, integration measures should take into account the special needs of Roma and their traditional way of life (Spain, first cycle, para. 37, 27/11/03). Hereby the AC highlights especially the needs of Travellers and their nomadic lifestyle to which integration measures need to be adapted (Norway, second cycle, para. 45, 05/10/06). Respect for the traditional way of life of Roma has also been acknowledged by the CM (CM Rec. (2005)4) and even by the European Court of Human Rights based on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Morawa, 2004; Gilbert, 2002, pp. 778–780). The AC and Norm Promotion This contribution aims to clarify the meaning of “effective equality” of Article 4 of the FCNM, which is a central element of many minority integration programmes in Europe, and thereby analyzed the immanent character of the AC norm promotion mechanism. Two conditions have shaped the AC norm promotion process the most; first, the lack of legal power and robust enforcement mechanisms, and second, the vague meaning of FCNM norms giving considerable discretion for its interpretation. The AC has to rely almost exclusively on its socialization power. FCNM standards, although they are legally binding, are not directly litigable. Furthermore, the COE cannot offer any significant external incentives for norm compliance, like financial subsidies for what are often costly integration programmes. Thus the AC mechanism is primarily characterized by a lack of political and legal power and the absence of material support for the implementation of FCNM standards. Incrementally, the EU is filling this gap through its non-discrimination legislation and large-scale funding of minority integration programmes (see contribution by Riedel to this volume). However, the power of the AC is in its monitoring process, which immerses states in a communication process on the proper application of minority rights norms creating commitments states cannot easily evade. This rather soft norm enforcement mechanism is a logical reaction to the vague wording of minority rights norms. The open wording of many minority rights standards may, in some cases, be a burden, giving states the opportunity to circumvent strict norms. However, it also legitimizes the function of the AC as a guardian and interpreter of European minority rights. Indeed having strict norms but weak enforcement instruments may be worse than having vague norms but relying on the power of socialization. Without the open wording of the FCNM the work of the AC would be seen with much more scepticism. Its current approach, which combines socialization through monitoring and elements of norm-setting, also suits the COE because it assigns to the AC the role of interpreter and promoter of European minority rights norms.
Malte Brosig
97
______________________________________________________________ The country-specific recommendations of the AC are indispensable for a deeper understanding of the principle of equality in Article 4. By reference to the AC’s opinions, we can more systematically comprehend the meaning and scope of “effective equality” for minorities in Europe. The AC’s recommendations give detailed information on the obligations states have accepted when ratifying the FCNM. For monitoring the implementation of Article 4 the AC has developed its own “choreography”. In a first step the AC demands the adoption of comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation, in a second step it comments on the organizational set-up of state integration efforts, and thirdly the AC recommends more concrete integration measures. Thus the special value of analyzing the AC’s comments also lies in the creation of meaning through the monitoring of Article 4. The AC is not only a monitoring body but also a norm constructor through monitoring. The above sections could reveal a number of characteristics of this monitoring process and thereby specify the special character of norm promotion of the AC. Each recommendation is a country-specific comment which takes into account the specific living environment of ethnic minorities in Europe. The tailoring of country opinions is guided by implicit context variables. These variables are rather pragmatic benchmarks reacting to the reallife situation of minorities. The AC cautiously avoids normative language that would give preference to any theory of multiculturalism or other ideology. The fact that a substantial proportion of the AC opinions deal with questions of administrative organization of integration measures instead of integration instruments itself is a reaction to implementation problems on the ground. The FCNM does not provide any guidelines for how states should organize their integration programmes, thus the AC’s opinions generally do not promote a certain type of coordination. The AC’s comments are outcomeoriented and rather advise than prescribe a certain method of coordination. However, the AC insists on commonsense elementary conditions, like adequate funding or proper coordination between different levels of state institutions. Thus the AC opinions help states to design their integration programmes properly, but the choice of instruments is left to the countries. Any specific instruments are welcome as long as they remedy substantial inequalities. The AC’s recommendations are very often general in nature, only occasionally recommending specific integration instruments or policies. This can largely be explained by the open wording of Article 4 which does not give preference for any specific measure. The AC only requires states to adopt a certain measure if there is an objective need for it (Hofmann 2006 b, p. 13). It calls for the adoption of specific, targeted or positive measures which are country, issue, and minority specific. Recommendations by the AC are individually tailored for each country and thus measures recommended for one country may not be adequate for all others. Integration measures in
98
The AC and Equality Promotion
______________________________________________________________ the area of education and employment are the most frequent ones recommended by the AC, followed by the special protection of Roma woman and respect for the traditional way of life of Roma Travellers. However, the AC has not developed transparent criteria according to which it decides which situation deserves the application of additional or positive integration measures. The existence of persisting forms of inequality is made on pragmatic assumptions on the living conditions of minorities. Conclusion Of all European international organizations, the AC is the institution that has developed the most sophisticated and elaborated approach to minority rights in general and minority integration in particular. Through a process of longterm monitoring, commenting, and socialization, the AC has further developed the scope and meaning of full equality and its organizational prerequisites. It has developed flexible and individually tailored benchmarks for minority integration programmes, setting standards in accordance with and beyond the legal framework. Yet the AC has been reluctant to prescribe specific integration tools, its soft law approach leaves considerable space for multiple ways to reach equality. The choice of instruments for furthering social inclusion is largely left to the discretion of countries. Furthermore, the work of the AC aims to reinforce integration efforts by state and non-state actors. It gives minority activists external (international) legitimacy and political support for their work.
References Alfredsson, G. (2000), “A Frame for an incomplete painting: Comparison of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities with international standards and monitoring procedures,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 7(4): 291–304. —(2006), “Article 4,” in: M. Weller (ed.), The Rights of Minorities: A Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 141–151. Body and Soul, Forced Sterilization and Other Assaults on Roma Reproductive Freedom in Slovakia (2003), Centre for Reproductive Rights and Poradňa pre občianske a ludske prava, http://www.reproductiverights.org/pub_bo_slovakia.html (accessed 20 January 2009).
Malte Brosig
99
______________________________________________________________ Checkel, J. (2001), “Why comply? Social learning and European identity change,” International Organization, 55(3): 553–588. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 563 (1969), On the situation of Gypsies and other travellers in Europe. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1203 (1993), On Gypsies in Europe. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1557 (2002), The legal situation of Roma in Europe. Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Resolution (75) 13 (1975), Containing Recommendations on the Social Situation of Nomads in Europe. Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation R (2000) 4, On the Education of Roma/Gypsy Children in Europe. Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation (2001)17, On improving the economic and employment situation of Roma/Gypsies and Travellers in Europe. Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation (2005)4, On improving the housing conditions of Roma and Travellers in Europe. Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation (2006)10, On better access to health care for Roma and Travellers in Europe. Council of Europe, Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities (ETS No. 157) and Explanatory Report, Strasbourg, February 1995, H(1995)010. European Union, Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000, implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, Official Journal of the European Communities, L 180/22-26, 19.07.2000. Gilbert, G. (2002), “The burgeoning minority rights jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly, 24(3): 736– 780.
100
The AC and Equality Promotion
______________________________________________________________ Hofmann, R. (2004), “Zur Überwachung der Umsetzung des Rahmenübereinkommens zum Schutz nationaler Minderheiten – Eine Bilanz nach fünf Jahren, ” Europa Ethnica, 61: 3–16. —(2006a), “The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: An Introduction,” in: M. Weller (ed.), The Rights of Minorities: A Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–24. —(2006b), The impact of international norms on the protection of national minorities in Europe: The added value and essential role of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Report prepared for the Secretariat of the FCNM and for the Committee of Experts on Issues Relating to the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, 5 December 2006. Morawa, A. (2004), “The European Court of Human Rights and minority rights: The ‘special consideration’ standard in light of Gypsy Council,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 10: 97–109. Pentassuglia, G. (1999), “Monitoring minority rights in Europe: The implementation machinery of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities – With special reference to the role of the Advisory Committee,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 6(4): 417– 462. Phillips, A. (2004), “The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM),” in: Mechanisms for the implementation of minority rights. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 109–129. Risse, T., Ropp, S.C. and K. Sikkink (1999), The Power of Human Rights, International norms and domestic change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Risse, T. (2000), “Let’s Argue! Communicative action in international relations,” International Organization, 54(1): 1–39. Schimmelfennig, F. (2001), “The Community trap, liberal norms, rhetorical action, and Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,” International Organization, 55(1): 47–80. Schimmelfennig F. and U. Sedelmeier (eds.) (2005), The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. Cornell University Press: Ithaca NY and London.
Malte Brosig
101
______________________________________________________________ Steketee, F. (2001), “The Framework Convention: A piece of art or a tool for action?,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 8: 1–15. Thiele, C. (2006), “Minority rights in Europe: An introduction into a fragmented regime,” in: M. Brosig (ed.) Human Rights in Europe. A Fragmented Regime? Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 121–136. Troebst, S. (1999), “From paper to practice: The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,” Helsinki Monitor 1999, 1: 19–26. Wiener, A. (2004), “Contested compliance: Interventions on the normative structure of world politics,” European Journal of International Relations, 10(2): 189–234. Documents of the Advisory Committee Advisory Committee, Opinion on Armenia, first cycle, 16/05/02. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Austria, first cycle 16/05/02. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Azerbaijan, first cycle, 22/05/03. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina, first cycle, 27/05/05. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Croatia, first and second cycle, 06/04/01 and 01/10/04. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Cyprus, first cycle, 06/04/01. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Czech Republic, first and second cycle, 06/04/01 and 24/02/05. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Denmark, first cycle, 22/09/00. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Germany, second cycle, 01/03/06. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Finland, first cycle, 22/09/00. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Hungary, second cycle, 09/12/04.
102
The AC and Equality Promotion
______________________________________________________________ Advisory Committee, Opinion on Ireland, first cycle, 22/05/03. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Italy, first and second cycle, 14/09/01 and 24/02/05. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Kosovo, first cycle, 25/11/05. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Lithuania, first cycle, 21/02/03. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Macedonia, first cycle, 27/05/04. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Norway, first and second cycle, 12/09/02 and 05/10/06. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Poland, first cycle, 27/11/03. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Romania, first and second cycle, 06/04/01 and 24/11/05. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Russia, first and second cycle, 13/09/02 and 11/05/06. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Serbia, first cycle, 17/11/01. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Slovakia, first and second cycle, 22/09/00 and 26/05/05. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Slovenia, first and second cycle, 12/09/02 and 26/05/05. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Spain, first cycle, 27/11/03. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Sweden, first cycle, 20/02/03. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Ukraine, first cycle, 01/03/02.
Beyond Conflict Prevention: HCNM and Minority Integration Natalie Sabanadze Integration of persons belonging to national minorities is an essential precondition for peaceful and democratic development of any multiethnic state. It is, however, a challenging task particularly for those societies that are undergoing processes of State and nation-building and have in the past experienced upsurge of radical nationalism and ethnic conflict. Prevention of conflicts through the integration of national minorities is the task of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). This article describes how the HCNM, over the course of 15 years, has combined considerations of justice and security and balanced between seemingly opposite tendencies of integration on the one hand and protection and promotion of ethno-cultural diversity on the other. Introduction The High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) was established by the participating States of the then Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) at the 1992 Helsinki meeting. It was an institution created specifically in response to the violent dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and proliferation of ethno-national conflicts throughout the post-communist space. The international community at a time appeared to be caught by surprise with the seeming resurgence of nationalism and the challenges it posed to the stability and integrity of multinational states. In the Helsinki Document, the participating States acknowledged that aggressive nationalism and intolerance, coupled with economic decline, social tensions and gross violations of human, including minority rights, represented a clear threat to the peaceful development of society, particularly in new democracies. For this reason, the participating States identified the need for an international instrument which would “mediate between the parties concerned in order to reduce the tension before it led to open, armed conflict between them” (Zaagman and Zaal, 1994, pp. 95–113). Integration with respect for diversity is the basis upon which HCNM’s conflict prevention strategy is founded. At a more general, philosophical level this means finding a working balance between minority rights on the one hand and sovereign rights of states on the other; between ethno-cultural self-assertion and self-determination of groups and territorial integrity of
104
HCNM and Minority Integration
______________________________________________________________ states; between social cohesion and growing ethno-cultural diversity. At a more practical policy level this means finding the right balance between teaching of the state language to persons belonging to national minorities and providing education in mother tongue; between encouraging minority participation through regional or ethnic parties as well as through their inclusion into mainstream party lists; allowing cross border exchanges with so-called kin-states and accepting their support in the spheres of culture and education while making sure that this does not lead to the outsourcing of minority protection from states of residence to kin-states. The experience of the HCNM shows that balancing between those trends that seem to be pulling in different directions is not only possible but is also an essential precondition for achieving sustainable peace and security both within and between states. The HCNM from 2001–2007 Rolf Ekeus once noted that “a society at peace with itself will more likely to be at peace with its neighbours” (Ekeus, 2003). The emphasis on peace is important to note as it underscores that the HCNM is first and foremost a conflict prevention instrument designed to contribute to the preservation of peace and security in the OSCE area. Over the course of fifteen years, the HCNM has actively pursued conflict prevention at both operational and structural levels and has come to be regarded as one of the main successes of the OSCE. Nevertheless, today the HCNM faces a difficult question. The institution was created when wars were waging in the former Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union and today, fifteen years later, the war between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia has returned the violence back in the part of the world that the HCNM has devoted particular time and attention. The question, therefore, is whether instruments and the overall approach developed by the HCNM can still be regarded as valid and relevant or whether they require a significant rethinking. This paper addresses the above question by first describing and analyzing the integrationist approach of the HCNM to the question of national minorities and then by identifying conditions under which such an approach can be and has been successful. The mandate and the background against which the HCNM was established are important in understanding both practical and normative foundations of the HCNM activities. The paper, therefore, begins by summarizing the mandate of the HCNM and highlighting its specific characteristics. It then moves on to the discussion of nationalist challenges to the democratic development of states and normative frameworks on the basis of which the HCNM has been dealing with these challenges. Integrating diversity is an approach that the HCNM has pursued through the course of his work. The second part of the paper devotes special attention to explaining the main rationale behind such an approach and uses examples to illustrate how the approach has been translated from theory into practice. The conclusion returns to the question of
Natalie Sabanadze
105
______________________________________________________________ whether the HCNM has been a success as a conflict prevention institution or a failure. 1. The HCNM Mandate: Its Origins and Content Since the end of the Cold War, intra-state conflicts often linked to ethnicity and nationalism came to be seen as major threats to international peace and security. Antagonistic nationalisms of majority and minority groups not only brought the dissolution of multinational states such as former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union but were also threatening newly independent successor states with further disintegration. The threat of secession was particularly acute in those countries were national minorities were territorially concentrated, often bordering the so-called kin-states. This has raised fears of irredentism and secession across Easter Europe as well as fears of mass migration from the region in Western Europe. It also became clear that existing international instruments, conceived after the World War II and further developed during the Cold War, were incapable of dealing with the challenge of identity based, intra-state conflict. Standards for the protection of minority rights that would ensure that minorities were respected and accommodated in states of their residence were largely lacking. Similarly, international organizations in Europe had very limited operational capacity to deal with the growing need of conflict prevention (Friberg and Nasic, 2008, p. 13). Since the problem of national minorities came to the fore in the European politics at precisely the moment when the CSCE was itself undergoing rapid and far-reaching institutional changes, being transformed from a conference to a fully fledged international organization, it was one of the first to develop mechanisms for the protection and enforcement of rights of national minorities (Jackson-Preece, 1998, p. 3). The High Commissioner on National Minorities was one such mechanism, created specifically to tackle conflicts between minority and majority groups through providing assistance to the OSCE participating States in implementing national minority standards (Helsinki Follow-up Meeting 1992)1. As one observer has noted, an instrument had to be designed to facilitate the role of the OSCE in managing change resulting from post-Communist transition – essentially to address the relationship between minorities and majorities as part of the political process in the broadest sense (Packer, 1996, pp. 279–291). The HCNM, as described by the Helsinki Document, is an “instrument of conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage” and will, according to the mandate, provide: “’early warning’ and, as appropriate, ‘early action’ at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national minority issues which have not yet developed beyond an early warning stage, but in the judgement of the High Commissioner,
106
HCNM and Minority Integration
______________________________________________________________ have the potential to develop into a conflict within the OSCE area, affecting peace, stability or relations between participating States, requiring the attention of and action by the Council or the CSO” (The Helsinki Decisions, II.3). The preventive mandate tasks the HCNM to get involved in situations of potential conflict at the earliest possible stage. In doing so, the HCNM is authorized to assess the nature of tensions and the parties involved, making a direct contact not only with State authorities but also with non-State actors. The HCNM is to make on-site visits in order to receive first-hand information from all parties concerned and from a variety of sources “including the media and non-governmental organisations” and thus make a well-informed judgement “on the potential consequences for peace and stability within the OSCE area” (11b) of a specific conflict. He is to engage with and promote dialogue between various actors, in order to facilitate resolution of disputes before they flare up into violent confrontation. In case the HCNM concludes that the situation is escalating beyond control and that his preventive efforts have been exhausted, the mandate specifies that he can issue an early warning to the Permanent Council via the Chairman in Office (CiO). Negotiating about such an institution was far from easy. Many states feared that they had to formally recognize national minorities living in their territories; invite unwelcome interventions from the so-called ‘kin-states’ and even go as far as to accept collective rights for ethnic groups. The mandate, therefore, was finally adopted with some restrictions. It does not allow the HCNM to “consider national minority issues in situations involving organised acts of terrorism” (5b) or to establish any contact with organization linked to or condoning terrorism. It also precludes the HCNM to engage in any individual cases (5c), which rules out the possibility for individual persons to address the HCNM. Finally, the mandate established that even though HCNM is by and large an independent institution, it is accountable to the Chairman in Office (CiO) of the OSCE and is obliged to report to the CiO on a regular basis and after each country visit. The mandate also stated that the HCNM should be an eminent person with long-standing international experience “from whom an impartial performance of the function may be expected” (8). Max van der Stoel, former Dutch foreign minister, was appointed the first High Commissioner in 1992 and served in that capacity until 2001. He was succeeded by the Swedish diplomat Rolf Ekeus, who was the HCNM until July 2007. Current HCNM, former Norwegian foreign minister Knut Vollebaek, took up his post in August, 2007. The HCNM is to serve for a threeyear term with a possibility of extension for another three years. The Mandate of the HCNM was very much a child of its times. First it reflected the growing unease about the spread of ethno-national violence and what appeared as growing tensions between majority and minority communi-
Natalie Sabanadze
107
______________________________________________________________ ties within states. There was a real fear, as described above, that the experience of the Balkans and the Caucasus would spread all over Eastern Europe and usher a new era of instability and warfare. Second, the mandate reflected the growing acceptance among states that human rights are a matter of international concern and not simply a domestic affair of an individual state. The OSCE participating States made a forceful declaration to this effect in what is known as Moscow Document, which states that commitments undertaken in the human dimension “are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating states and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned” (Moscow Document, p.29). This was an important political statement, recognizing the international dimension of human rights and opposing the principle of absolute non-intervention (Bloed and Letschert, 2008, p. 92). Against this background, the OSCE created an institution of the HCNM which can be described as an ‘intrusive’ instrument, allowing the involvement in internal affairs of states. Apart for the formal restrictions mentioned above, the HCNM is eligible to visit and engage in any state he deems necessary and expect a degree of cooperation from the host authorities. The mandate of the HCNM, therefore, is based on the understanding that the violation of human rights, including minority rights is one of the direct causes of intra-state strife and that these violations need to be addressed as part of the overall conflict prevention strategy. This explains the fact that even though the HCNM was conceived as a purely security instrument, the emphasis on human dimension has been clearly pronounced in the work of the HCNM from the very start.2 The mandate established the High Commissioner on National Minorities and not for National Minorities, underscoring that the HCNM is neither an ombudsman for minorities not a human rights defender. Nevertheless, it has been accepted that the objective of preventing conflicts has a direct linkage with the protection of and respect for the rights of national minorities, which is a clear human dimension issue. The HCNM makes regular contributions to the Human Dimension Implementation Meetings and in majority of cases acts for the advancement and recognition of minority rights. This means that in practice HCNM is a cross-dimensional institution even though his primary responsibilities lie within the security basket of the OSCE. The mandate, however, does not define a national minority and neither does it offer any criteria for the HCNM to follow when selecting the cases and areas of engagement. Moreover, the mandate explicitly allows the HCNM to exercise his “judgement” in this matter, leaving much flexibility to the person occupying the post. All three High Commissioners have followed a pragmatic approach to the existence of a national minority, treating it as a matter of fact rather than that of a contested concept. Max van der Stoel, the first High Commissioner, is often cited as saying “I know a minority when I
108
HCNM and Minority Integration
______________________________________________________________ see one”. Later he qualified his statement and offered a more objective interpretation of a minority. In his intervention during the 1993 Human Dimension meeting in Warsaw, van der Stoel stated: “first of all, a minority is a group with linguistic, ethnic or cultural characteristics which distinguish it from the majority. Secondly, a minority is a group which usually not only seeks to maintain its identity but also tries to give stronger expression to that identity” (HDIM Meeting 1993). Avoiding a strict definition of a national minority has served the HCNM well, allowing his engagement in cases where minorities were not formally recognized as such by States of their residence. Finally, given the emphasis in the HCNM’s preventive work on the field-work, on-site visits and local contacts, HCNM’s solutions and recommendations have been mainly context specific rather than universal. A great deal of the HCNM’s work depends on a sound knowledge and understanding of the political context in which his interlocutors are operating and in which decisions are being made. The HCNM, therefore, has been facing a difficult task of appearing consistent without practicing uniformity and using universal standards in extremely diverse places and situations (Kemp, 2001, p. 26). Balancing between universal norms and their context specific application without undermining the credibility of the institution is one challenge among many that the HCNM has been facing. From the very start he had to navigate between upholding rights of minority communities and showing due respect and understanding for the national security concerns of sovereign states. In so doing, the HCNM has been promoting a more inclusive and pluralistic approach to nation-building in countries with a difficult legacy of communism and ethnic nationalism. 2
The Nature of Conflict: Nationalist Challenge to Democratic Transition One of the defining features of the HCNM’s mandate is that it clearly identifies the nature of conflict that is to prevent. It does not speak about conflict prevention in general, which would make the institution far less effective. It speaks of a specific kind of conflict which stems from tensions between ethno-national communities and majority-minority relations within States that often spills over across State borders. Majority of such conflicts have a pronounced international dimension with a potential of disrupting regional stability and undermining friendly inter-State relations. When the HCNM was established the probability that such conflicts would proliferate across the entire post-Communist space was very high. Today the danger is much less, however, some of the challenges that the HCNM faced then are still relevant. These include the rise of antagonistic nationalisms within States; a tendency to ethnicize every-day politics and securitize minority demands to the extent that their resolution through normal democratic politics becomes very difficult. This section explores some of these challenges that the HCNM has been
Natalie Sabanadze
109
______________________________________________________________ facing both in the past and present and against this background discusses the normative frameworks within which the institution operates. The conflicts that came to the fore after the collapse of the Soviet Union were a result of a complex mix of factors. Among them I would single out two: one is the communist legacy with its institutionalization of ethnicity and another is rapid transition from authoritarianism to market democracy. One of the characteristic features of the Soviet system was a complex hierarchy of ethnically based territorial units with a varying degree of formal autonomy. The result was the institutionalization of ethnicity and concomitant establishment of what can be described ethno-communist elites. As Rogers Brubaker argued, Soviet republics were expressly defined by and for the nations for whom they were named (Brubaker, 1996, p. 46). However, expression of their national identity was to be limited to culture while politically Moscow required complete subordination. In other words, nations at the level of republics as well as ethnic groups at the level of autonomous units were institutionalized as ethno-national entities and were given a sense of ownership of their territory without the right to rule it (ibid., p. 46). This had a number of important consequences for the nation-building processes that followed the fall of communism. These included the development of nonpolitical, quasi-nationalism in parallel to the official communist ideology; the presence of ethnically defined elites that were ready to step in after the collapse, exchanging communist ideals for the nationalist ones; the spread of the predominantly primordialist conception of nation; and devaluation of the concept of autonomy.3 In some post-communist countries depending on their prior historic development, nationalist mobilisation occurred faster than in others. However, in all cases conditions conducive to the rise of ethno-centric nationalism were already put in place by the Soviet system. In this context, it is noteworthy that the Soviet historiography favoured a specifically ethno-centric conception of nation with primordialism being an unchallenged paradigm. Postcommunist successor states followed the same approach, treating nationhood as the most natural social association, a kind of extended family. As Magda Opalski points out, “primordialism which has been in decline in the West for some time, continues to dominate post-Soviet social and political sciences, and is deeply ingrained in the political culture” (Opalski, 2001, p. 312). It was, therefore, not surprising that the nation was largely defined as an organic community closed for outsiders and nationality came to be divorced from citizenship. Such an exclusive conception of nationhood significantly complicated majority-minority relations in the post-Communist newly independent states, creating a sense of alienation among minority communities and a sense of mistrust of minorities among titular majorities. It should also be noted that concepts such as autonomy and powersharing that have been regarded and implemented as part of the solution to
110
HCNM and Minority Integration
______________________________________________________________ ethno-territorial disputes in the West came to be seen as part of the problem in the post-Communist context (Kymlicka, 2008, pp. 11–42). Under the Soviet system, ethnic groups were given a chance to develop national selfawareness and identity without exercising effective control over their destiny. For majorities in newly independent states this meant that autonomies created structures around which ethnic mobilization could occur and which subsequently could challenge territorial integrity of a state (Cornell, 1999, p. 192).4 For minorities, autonomy came to mean very little in practice and those who experienced Soviet style autonomy tend to favour secession. Especially since many autonomous minority communities saw their status revoked after independence of their states of residence, as in the case of Kosovo or South Ossetia, letting credence to their worst fears. The concept of autonomy in other words has become devalued to the extent that it is very difficult to be accepted as part of the negotiated solution. Coupled with the Communist legacy a rapid pace of democratization was one of the factors contributing to bringing the tensions to the fore. After the long years of political repression and accumulation of grievances, democratization created space for these grievances to be voiced openly. It also gave a possibility for nationalist political leaders from both majority and minority communities to articulate their programmes, leading to open confrontation between competing nationalist projects. It has been noted, therefore, that there exists a correlation between the rise of ethno-national disputes and democratization (MacFarlane, 1997, pp. 399–420). This is particularly true for the early stages of democratic transition when space is open for making competing claims but institutions are still under-developed for accommodating these claims. In the long run, however, effective democratization remains the only solution for settling internal disputes and restoring faith in negotiated agreements and mechanisms of power-sharing. An example of Spain and accommodation of Basque and Catalan demands after the transition to democracy is instructive in this respect. Democratization, it should be noted, was one factor triggering rising tensions. The collapse of centrally planned economies and a rising sense of fear and insecurity further exacerbated divisions along ethnic lines, resulting in the growing ethnicization of every-day politics in many post-Communist states. It was common for persons belonging to national minorities to perceive economic hardship, lack of employment opportunities or regional under-developments as targeted specifically at them and resulting from deliberate discrimination on ethnic grounds. Even the most benign, daily issues such as access to water or electricity can be seen as contingent on ethnic identity and belonging, making even simple issues extremely difficult to resolve. Under the circumstances of hardship and state failure, it is common for people to rely on family and kin for the basic survival (Kupchan, 1995). For many minorities in Eastern Europe, kin happened to reside and form a major-
Natalie Sabanadze
111
______________________________________________________________ ity in a neighbouring States. This rose fears of irredentism and fragmentation, leading to the widespread perception of minorities as a disloyal, fifth column. The question of minorities, therefore, became an essential national security issue for many newly independent States and as Kymlicka has argued, resulted in the widespread securitization of the minority problematique (Kymlicka, 2001, pp. 13–107). Under these challenging circumstances that characterised the early 1990s, the HCNM was to develop its conflict prevention strategy. The mandate provided a very general framework. However, the actual policy, approach and normative frameworks under which to operate had to be developed by the first High Commissioner himself and later his successors. In general terms, the key challenge was and still remains the need to reconcile tensions between justice and security; between the need to create an integrated, socially cohesive society and the ability to practice the politics of difference. In fulfilling his task, the HCNM has followed a human rights informed approach, based on the belief that the road to sustainable security lies through the respect for and protection of human, including minority rights. At the same time, he has relied on principles of good governance and on inclusive, pluralistic approaches to nation-building as part of his overall conflict prevention strategy. In practice this meant devoting special attention to the spheres of education and political participation. It is only through a rigorous yet pluralistic system of education, which is open to different ideas, cultures, languages and approaches, both in terms of its content and process, which societies learn to question long-established stereotypes, challenge national myths and create responsible, tolerant citizenry. The HCNM took this view from the very beginning, identifying education as area that can make the most difference in preventing inter-group conflict in the long run. All three High Commissioners have promoted teaching in different languages, including providing teaching in the mother tongue for minorities and teaching of the state language for persons belonging to national minorities. Often bilingual and multilingual models have been favoured as the best way to create conditions under which children of different ethno-cultural background would not only share the classrooms but also share each other’s languages and cultures. For the adult minority population, the HCNM has supported training courses in the state language in order to enhance their opportunities to integrate and participate in public life of their respective states. The question of language has been particularly acute in the context of the former Soviet Union. Many minority communities of different ethnic origin spoke Russian as their mother-tongue. Under the Soviet system, this was certainly the language of official communication and the most useful one for personal advancement. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Russian speaking minorities found themselves at a disadvantaged position
112
HCNM and Minority Integration
______________________________________________________________ when newly independent states began actively promoting their respective state languages often accompanied by the official discourse of “undoing previous injustice”. While strengthening of the state language is a legitimate aim for any newly independent state, it takes great political maturity and caution to do it in a way that does not strain inter-ethnic relations. Too often, as a result of clumsy and confrontational approach taken by national elites, the language has become a source of inter-ethnic conflict. In many instances, the HCNM has worked hard with individual governments to show how states can organize themselves around, and protect, an official state language while at the same time respecting the linguistic rights of minorities. The question of language has been at the heart of the post-communist nation-building and the HCNM has contributed to making it a more open and inclusive process that would create foundations for the future peace and prosperity. For example, in 2004 the HCNM visited Latvia to assess the situation following the adoption of the Latvian Education Law, which allowed up to 40 per cent of subjects being taught in languages other than Latvian and required that the remaining 60 per cent of the curriculum being taught in the state language, i.e. Latvian. The reform was met with opposition from some members of the Russian minority who saw their right to receive education in mother tongue curtained by the new legislation. The HCNM’s assessment of the situation, however, reflected his emphasis on the need to promote integration of persons belonging to national minorities, making it clear that a state has the right, and indeed duty, to promote national integration, in particular by supporting the acquisition of proficiency in the state language. On the whole, he did not object to the bilingual model adopted by the Latvian authorities. However, the HCNM did recommend that Latvian authorities make greater effort in promoting dialogue between the authorities and minority communities in order to better explain the aims of the reform and engage minority representatives in its successful implementation. The underlying assumption of the HCNM’s approach is that establishing an inter-communal dialogue between majority and minority communities is an essential precondition for effective implementation of the national integration programmes and policies. Political participation is another area which holds key to building a pluralist nation, described by one commentator as “an imagined community of the twenty-first century” (Inder Singh, 2002). The HCNM has been promoting effective participation of minorities as the basis for good and democratic governance in multiethnic societies. It means that governments should not only consider the opinions of the peoples affected by its decisions but also allow them to influence and shape these decisions. According to the 1999 Lund Recommendations on Minority Participation in Public Life, which has been commissioned and endorsed by the HCNM, effective participations has two main dimensions.5 One is to create political space and opportunities
Natalie Sabanadze
113
______________________________________________________________ for persons belonging to national minorities to have a say on matters that affect them directly and another is to have a degree of control over these matters (Packer, 2007, pp. 69–85). In addition, participation is to take place at both the local and national levels. While it is crucial that minorities have both a say and a degree of control over decisions at the local level where they reside in great numbers, it is equally and perhaps symbolically even more important that they take part and influence decisions at the national level and on matters of general interest. Participation within the democratic framework of decision-making is what gives minorities a sense of belonging to and a stake in their respective societies. This in turn is the best way to ensure that inter-group disagreements are dealt with through normal democratic political processes and do not flare up into open confrontation let alone violence. The Lund Recommendations specifically and most of the HCNM’s country specific recommendations more generally, aim at addressing one fundamental question: “How can one create the politico-legal space in which differing groups of people with differing interests, needs and aspirations can live together?” (ibid., p. 81). With the risk of being criticized for inconsistency, the approach adopted by the HCNM to address this question has been varied, context-specific and ranged from territorial to non-territorial solutions. For example, in Crimea the HCNM was of the opinion that territorial autonomy was essential for maintaining peace and stability both within peninsula and between Crimea and central authorities in Kyiv. However, in other cases such as Slovakia he has opposed the choice for territorial autonomy given its potential to generate dangerous tensions. He believed that in Slovakia, under a democratic leadership a system of minority rights could be established which would provide all the necessary safeguards for the protection of national minorities, particularly for the Hungarian minority.6 Human rights, good governance and pluralistic nation-building are, therefore, the main normative frameworks within which the HCNM operates. All three are important and mutually complementary, allowing the HCNM to better address both the causes and symptoms of ethno-national conflict under a variety of different circumstances. Some scholars such as Will Kymlicka have criticized the HCNM for being less concerned with rights of minorities, either as groups or individuals and being more preoccupied with greater geopolitical and security implications of minority-majority relations. In this view, such an approach reinforces the securitization of the minority question, which has negative consequences for the cause of minority protection. According to Kymlicka, the security approach to the minority question erodes the democratic space for voicing minority demands and reduces the likelihood that those demands will be accepted and treated as a matter of normal democratic politics (Kymlicka, 2008, pp. 11–42). Violation of minority rights becomes easy to justify in terms of protecting vital national security interests and such justifications tend to be largely acceptable by the broader public.
114
HCNM and Minority Integration
______________________________________________________________ Most importantly, securitization of minority issues may generate the wrong kind of responses, often heavy handed, on the part of the state authorities that in the long run may end up undermining the very security they are trying to uphold. All these concerns with regard to the securitization of the minority issues, which is particularly characteristic of post-Communist States, are valid. However, the work of the HCNM reveals a more complex interconnection between security and human rights. His approach demonstrates that the relationship between the two is neither that of opposition nor of a choice. The two are connected in a way that complement and reinforce each other. Sustainable peace and security can only be achieved through the respect of human, including minority rights. Peaceful and secure societies in turn are much less prone to securitizing rights and are more open to the recognition and acceptance of legitimate concerns of both groups and individuals. In countries that are undergoing a difficult transition, securitization can first of all, serve a useful purpose of attracting attention to and prioritizing minority issues and concerns. It so happens that attaching a ‘security’ label to something often leads to that ‘something’ receiving more attention, more resources and a greater commitment from relevant authorities (MacFarlane and Foong Khong, 2006). This is particularly important in countries that are either developing or going through the stage of transition, when resources are scarce and problems numerous. Under such circumstances there should be good reasons for the governments to commit money and resources to minority schools, for example, than to all other, equally burning issues. Secondly, it follows that the security approach gives a valuable leverage to the HCNM in his dealings with governments. He can appeal to the selfinterest of states, defined in national security terms, and by doing so persuade them to tackle minority issues. What would be the effectiveness of the HCNM, which has neither enforcement power nor material incentives to generate compliance, if he was only to speak about the promotion of rights especially in countries that are openly indifferent to the rights discourse? The effectiveness and consequently the value of the HCNM’s involvement are significantly enhanced when he manages to speak directly to the national security concerns of states. The HCNM, therefore, uses the security approach for instrumental purposes but the main objective of his engagement is normalization of interethnic relations within a given state, which ultimately leads to the desecuritization of the minority question. A good example, in this context is the HCNM’s Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in InterState Relations issued in October of 2008. The key factor contributing to the securitization of the minority question, particularly in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, is the so-called kin-state factor. The presence of kinstates is associated with threats of irredentism, justified or not, and with fears
Natalie Sabanadze
115
______________________________________________________________ of potential political and even military intervention from often neighbouring states claiming protection of ‘their people’ abroad. Historic legacies also exacerbate the problem, particularly when a kin-state in question is a former imperial power. Through the Bolzano Recommendations, the HCNM tackled this very sensitive issue and tried to show states how they can support minorities abroad in a way that benefits minorities and at the same time respects friendly, good neighbourly relations. Benign, friendly kin-states on the border are crucial for reassuring states of residence and consequently, allowing for the normalization and de-securitization of majority-minorities relations in their territories. The main and consistent message of all HCNM’s recommendations in assisting States to tackle minority problems is that this can only be done through the respect and protection of human, including minority rights and good governance. In other words, his fundamental approach is security through justice not security vs. justice. Despite his sensitivity to the contexts and appreciation of case specific differences, he has consistently argued that the way to reduce tensions and avoid conflict along the lines of identity is through the creation of a just society for everybody. This means a society in which the national minority culture can not only be expressed but also safeguarded and promoted; in which any disadvantage stemming from being a person belonging to national or ethnic minority has been removed; and in which minorities have a say in all spheres of public life, especially but not exclusively in matters that directly affect them (Skovgaard, 2007). 3. Integrating Minorities The HCNM does not favour one particular model of the organization of a multiethnic state over others. Partly because there are no ideal models that can be universally applicable. There are simply ways of negotiating acceptable solutions and such solutions as a rule are context specific. Moreover, the HCNM’s goal is not to advocate one specific end-result, be it federation, consociational power-sharing or simply unitary state with the minimum standards of minority protection. His efforts aim at promoting an inclusive and democratic process which could eventually lead states and minorities to finding arrangements that suit them best. In other words, his efforts are about establishing channels of effective communication between various groups and more importantly, about keeping these channels open. This is how I would interpret the HCNM’s favoured approach, which is integration with respect for diversity. It is not so much a model to be prescribed but rather a process which is dynamic, flexible and which could lead to sustainable, negotiated solutions. Rolf Ekeus, High Commissioner from 2003–2007, identified several elements that define this approach of integrating diversity in his 2006 address to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. First, he noted that integration is about
116
HCNM and Minority Integration
______________________________________________________________ interaction and not simply about tolerating a plurality of cultures. It requires special efforts both from governments and minority communities to find shared values and develop an over-arching common identity, no matter how “thin”, to ensure that respect for and recognition of difference does not lead to the separation or to the establishment of parallel societies. Of course the right of minorities to maintain their identity including their culture and religion must be respected. However, in the words of Ekeus, “this should not, if possible, be achieved in a way which prevents the deepening of participation in the wider society. Policies which lead to increasingly separate communities risk making society vulnerable to tensions and strife” (Ekeus, 2006). Second, respect for diversity is not only about celebration of cultural differences. It requires governments to develop specialized approaches aimed at helping people to accommodate and negotiate their differences in ways that allow for genuine equality and help to minimize the risk of conflict (ibid.). It also requires a political space to practice the politics of difference, while ensuring that policies that sustain diversity do not result in entrenching differences as insurmountable and solidify inequalities (ibid.). Thirdly, there are some fundamentals such as respect for human dignity, the rule of law and human rights that can and should form the basis for shared values and even common identity. For the rest, according to Ekeus, we need to respect differences and to learn to see the diversification of our societies as enrichment (ibid.). It should also be noted that integration is a two way process, which is contingent upon minorities exercising not only their rights but also responsibilities. Minorities, therefore, should also try and avoid isolationism and join in with a majority in a common effort to build a better future. It may take time before minorities feel reassured enough that their rights, their culture and identity are adequately respected and promoted especially if past taught them a different lesson. However, drive towards building ethnically pure communities is dangerous both from the side of majority and from that of a minority. In today’s world ethno-cultural and state boundaries rarely coincide, which means that people are bound to learn how to live together in peace and understanding. After the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, there has been a growing scepticism about chances for survival of multi-ethnic states. Integration with respect for diversity, however, is the HCNM’s answer to such scepticism. It aims at creating the kind of foundations that would not allow the repetition of previous mistakes and would create the solid basis for peace and prosperity. Such an approach is much easier to preach than to implement. The HCNM has consistently offered advice to governments in this respect both through policy recommendations and through tension-reducing projects. His country-specific recommendations are confidential and thus cannot be reproduced here for an analysis and assessment. However, from the limited infor-
Natalie Sabanadze
117
______________________________________________________________ mation that is publically available some examples can be invoked. They demonstrate that the HCNM has been using a combination of operational and structural prevention depending on circumstances and for better ensuring sustainable, long-lasting conflict prevention.7 On the operational side, the HCNM has relied on quiet diplomacy to address sides involved in the dispute. He has paid frequent visits to countries of his engagement, offering impartial advice to the parties concerned and facilitating dialogue and mediation. He has worked with governments to refine legislation affecting persons belonging to national minorities and supported projects that showed how his policy advice can be implemented in practice. Through developing projects in areas of education, language teaching, media, participation, management of inter-ethnic relations and policing, the HCNM has assisted states to address the root causes of conflict and put in place necessary structures that would sustain peace in the long run. For example, Van der Stoel and Ekeus have contributed to the normalization of relations between Hungary and neighbouring states over the treatment of sizable Hungarian minorities, particularly in Romania and Slovakia and to a lesser extent in Serbia. Both High Commissioners stressed the importance of creating a legal framework for the protection of minority rights and the inclusion of minority communities into the governing structures of the state, as an essential part of the overall process of democratization. At the same time, they have worked closely with Hungary, urging the Hungarian government to modify its controversial legislation, known as the Status Law, with regard to the protection of ethnic kin abroad. The HCNM has acknowledged that the so-called kin-states may have an interest in the well-being of a minority community abroad. However, this interest does not translate into the right under international law to exercise jurisdiction over people residing on the territory of another state (Ekeus, 2001). Moreover, states may pursue this interest in a way that does not undermine the integration of minorities in states where they reside and does not fuel separatist tendencies (Vollebaek, 2007). The triadic relationship between minorities, kin-states and states of residence has been at the heart of the HCNM activities in many regions, including the Baltic States, South Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia. Beginning from the 1992, successive High Commissioners have been involved in promoting integration of Russian minorities in the three Baltic States, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The tensions between Russian minorities and newly independent Baltic States have flared up in numerous occasions in the early 1990s, displaying a high probability of open conflict with the potential involvement of the Russian Federation. The main concern with regard to the Russian minority in the Baltic States centred upon various citizenship criteria and stringent language and residency requirements that threatened to leave large segments of Russian minorities without citizenship.
118
HCNM and Minority Integration
______________________________________________________________ This would have not only limited their rights to political participation but would have also had denied them access to pensions and other social security benefits. A significant complicating factor in this situation was Russia’s declared interest in the fate of Russian minorities all over former Soviet Union and in the Baltic States in particular. In September 1992, Russia wished to activate the Moscow Mechanism8 with regard to Estonia’s proposed citizenship law, which required a degree of proficiency in the Estonian language which few Russian were capable of satisfying. The fear that Russia would instrumentalize the issue of its kinminorities and use it as a pretext for interference gave the three Baltic States reasons to fear that granting citizenship to their substantial Russian minorities would compromise their independence. As summarized by Jennifer-Jackson Preece, “granting citizenship to an ethnic Russian community that was relocated to the Baltic states by Stalin in order to ensure Soviet political control and who received privileges during the Soviet era would be a threat to national identities and independence of these states.” (Jackson-Preece, 1998, p. 6). The first High Commissioner, Max van der Stoel, dedicated much attention and efforts at improving majority-minority relations in the Baltic states. Upon his advice, all three states made significant amendments to their legislation on citizenship and language. The HCNM has been paying particular attention to those members of the Russian community that were born in Baltic states and who were married to citizens of those states. At the same time, however, both van der Stoel and Ekeus advocated a gradual approach to reducing the problem of non-citizens in these states, showing understanding to concerns of national minorities as well as to those of continued independence and stability of newly independent Baltic States. The HCNM, therefore, accepted the necessity of reasonable requirements for the knowledge of official language and urged the governments to create adequate opportunities for learning the state language. The Baltic States have made a significant progress in this respect and have become exporters of expertise in teaching official language to both adults and school children. Rolf Ekeus has often used Latvian and Estonian experts to promote state language education for minorities in other countries, including Moldova. The main concern of the HCNM in Moldova has been the lack of integration of minority communities into Moldovan society due to, inter alia, lack of proficiency in the state language. In order to encourage the government take a proactive role in promoting linguistic integration, the HCNM has been supporting the language teaching project for civil servants in Southern Moldova. The project benefited several hundred civil servants of Gagauz, Russian and Bulgarian origin. The project activities have been concentrating in the autonomous region of Gagauzia, where the level of state language proficiency is particularly poor among the population. This has become a matter of concern to the HCNM since Moldova adopted legislation
Natalie Sabanadze
119
______________________________________________________________ requiring all public sector employees to have a working knowledge of the state language, which would effectively curtail minority participation in public life unless special efforts are made to improve teaching of the state language. The most extensive conflict prevention and integration programme of the HCNM has been carried out in Georgia since 2003. The programme targets Armenian and Azeri minorities who are the largest national minorities in Georgia residing in Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli respectively. It includes activities aimed at teaching the state language to civil servants from minority communities; retraining minority language teachers as well as teachers of Georgian as a second language in latest language teaching methodologies; building capacity of local media and rebroadcasting of Georgian news in minority languages; training civil servants in management of interethnic relations and providing free legal advice to the population of the region through the established legal centres. All these activities aimed at redressing effective isolation of the two minority-populated regions from the rest of the country, which was exacerbated by poor road infrastructure, information vacuum, insufficient knowledge of the state language and persistence of ethnic stereotypes among Georgia’s civil servants. With the help of the HCNM, the question of minority integration has become one of the top priorities for the Georgian authorities. Most of the projects supported by the HCNM under conflict prevention and integration programme have been taken over by the Georgian government and should be continued in the future with the local funding. Despite these efforts there are many more challenges facing Georgia today. It should be noted that the HCNM has not been active in the breakaway region of South Ossetia, which became the main scene of hostilities in August 2008. The main reason behind the HCNM’s non-involvement was the presence of the OSCE mission in Georgia which was tasked specifically with the prevention and settlement of the South Ossetia conflict. The current HCNM, Knut Vollebaek, however, issued a statement on August 25, 2008 regarding the situation in Georgia, pointing out that history has shown how dangerous and destabilizing it is for states to take unilateral action to defend, protect or support their citizens or “ethnic kin” abroad, and warned against using this as a justification for undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states. Whether the HCNM would have been able to prevent the eruption of violence in South Ossetia had he been more involved is a hypothetical question to which I am inclined to give a negative answer. Success and effectiveness of the HCNM’s initiatives ultimately depend on two main factors: compliance to his recommendations by governments and leaders of the groups involved and existence of the right kind of conditions as part of the overall international environment that encourage and value such compliance.
120
HCNM and Minority Integration
______________________________________________________________ Conclusion: Success or Failure? How can one measure or even identify success of an institution such as the HCNM? As a rule, conflicts that do not erupt are less known and causes of their non-eruption are rarely investigated. Moreover, it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of diplomatic and other measures that are taking place behind closed doors. It is also difficult to attribute a successful prevention of conflict to one single factor. There is always a combination of factors and an alignment of forces that reduce tensions and lead to the eventual avoidance of conflict. When describing the HCNM’s success, therefore, it is worth keeping in mind that as a rule this success is shared; it is shared with states and other international actors. Nevertheless, there is evidence of certain success defined in terms of armed conflict prevention for the HCNM due to his efforts to diffuse tensions between national minority and majority communities in places such as the Baltic States, Central Europe, Ukraine’s Crimea, and Georgia’s Samtskhe-Javakheti. Most importantly, however, it should be noted that despite initial fears that ethno-national conflicts would escalate beyond any reasonable control, cases of violent ethno-national disputes remained confined only to certain areas and fortunately, became an exception rather than a norm. In addition, since the mid-1990s no new cases of ethnic warfare have been recorded in wider Europe. According to the study conducted by Ted Robert Gurr, by the mid-1990s, the most common strategy among ethnic groups was not armed conflict but prosaic politics. Therefore, based on counterfactual reasoning it is possible to conclude that most potential conflicts have been successfully prevented. Another element of success is the growing acceptance of and compliance with international norms and standards of human, including minority rights protection. It is worth remembering that East European states of today that have undertaken significant commitments to protect persons belonging to national minorities and to ensure effective integration of their societies, were highly nationalistic, divided and exclusive polities merely fifteen years ago. Most of these states experienced not only successful democratisation but also a successful de-radicalization and devaluation of extreme ethno-nationalism as a political force. In many parts of Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, the political power of nationalism expressed in support of radical nationalist parties and leaders diminished significantly over time. In general, the appeal of ethno-nationalism by the late 1990s was much weaker than that in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse. In those cases where armed conflicts did take place, resolution and prevention efforts have been far less successful as in the case of South Ossetia. However, as Adam Roberts pointed out, “the historical record suggests that the management of communal conflicts is inherently difficult, whether it
Natalie Sabanadze
121
______________________________________________________________ is attempted by states, empires, regional or global institutions. The UN (and by extension also the OSCE and COE) should not be judged too harshly merely for running into difficulties similar to those encountered by other bodies” (Roberts, 1995, pp. 389–410). Nevertheless, it is possible to identify conditions when international institutions such as the HCNM tend to be more successful and when less so. The effectiveness of the HCNM is limited when states and groups have no incentives to comply and when his efforts confront alternative interests of the major powers. The case of South Ossetia represented a combination of the above two factors, which leads to the conclusion that chances of success for the HCNM’s involvement would have been at best limited. When states, however, sought out international legitimacy, striving for eventual membership in the Euro-Atlantic structures, the leverage of the HCNM had been much greater. In this context, states and groups operate in an environment that values compliance and rewards it with the benefit of ‘membership’, which creates significant incentive to seek compromise and develop good human and minority rights record. It should be noted, however, that the EU membership alone does not have a magical effect. Inter-ethnic tensions will persist, as it is happening in the case of Slovakia and Hungary, also after accession unless states continue their efforts aimed at national integration based on the protection of minority rights and respect for diversity. Ultimately, it is local actors that determine the success of international institutions. As Jennifer Jackson-Preece points out, nobody can ‘force’ a nation to be democratic or to respect human rights. “Final responsibility for success or failure in the protection of national minorities rests with domestic rather than international actors” (Jackson-Preece, 1998). Endnotes 1 The HCNM's mandate is contained in the part entitled “The Helsinki Decisions”. For a detailed exposition of how the post of the High Commissioner on National Minorities was established, see Zaagman, R. and Zaal. H. (1994), “The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities: prehistory and negotiations”: in A. Bloed (ed.), The Challenges of Change: The Helsinki Summit of the CSCE and its Aftermath, Dodrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 95–111. 2 In OSCE terminology, the term “human dimension” is used to describe the set of norms and activities related to human rights and democracy, which are regarded within the OSCE as one of three dimensions of security, together with the politico-military and the economic and environmental dimensions. These three dimensions add up to the comprehensive approach to security
122
HCNM and Minority Integration
______________________________________________________________ adopted by the OSCE (See OSCE Human Dimension Commitments: A Reference Guide (Warsaw, 2001). 3 It can be added that authoritarianism of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union also contributed to the rise of nationalism, creating a political culture that favours communities over individuals and fosters suspicion for difference and dissent. See Michnik. A. (1991), “Nationalism”, Social Research, 58(4), 757–764. For a broader discussion of causes and consequences of post-communist nationalism, see MungiuPippidi, A. and Krastev. I. (ed.), (2004) Nationalism After Communism: Lessons Learned, Budapest: CEU Press. 4 Svante Cornell noted on the example of Caucasus and Central Asia that even though both regions harbour numerous minorities, only those with autonomous status had revolted. These include Chechens in Russia, Armenians in Azerbaijan, Abkhaz and South Ossetians in Georgia and also Transnistrians in Moldova. Central Asia, by contrast, where there were fewer autonomous regions, has had a lower propensity to conflict than the Caucasus (Cornell 1999:192). 5 See Drzewicki, K. (2005), “The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life – Five Years After and More Years Ahead,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 12, 123–131. 6 See the interview with Max van der Stoel, in: Zellner. W. and Lange, F. (eds.) (2001), Peace and Stability Through Human and Minority Rights: Speeches of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, BadenBaden: Nomos. 7 For the discussion of different approaches to conflict prevention, see Michael Lund (1996), Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, US Institute of Peace Press. 8 The Moscow Mechanism provides for a variety of OSCE mission to look into human dimension issues such as human rights.
References Bloed, A and R. Letschert (2008), “The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities,” in: K. Henrad and R. Dunbar (eds.), Synergies in Minority Protection: European and International Law Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 88–119. Brubaker, R. (1996), Nationalism Reframed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Natalie Sabanadze
123
______________________________________________________________
Cornell, S. (1999), “The devaluation of the concept of autonomy: national minorities in the former Soviet Union,” Central Asian Survey, 18(2): 185– 196. Drzewicki, K. (2005), “The Lund Recommendations on Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life – Five year after and more years ahead,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 12: 123– 131. Friberg, E. and H. Nasic (2008), “The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities,” in: M. Weller and S. Wolf (eds.), Institutions for the Management of Ethnopolitical Conflicts in Eastern and Central Europe. Council of Europe Publishing, 13–49. Inder Singh, A. (2002), “Minorities, justice and security in post-Communist Europe: Continuing the debate with W. Kymlicka,” Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 4. Jackson-Preece, J. (1998), “National minority rights enforcement in Europe: A difficult balancing act,” The International Journal of Peace Studies, 3(2) at http://www,gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol3_2/Preece.htm. Kemp, W. (2001), Quiet Diplomacy in Action: the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. The Hague: Kluwer Law International. Kupchan, C. (1995), Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Kymlicka, W. (2001), “Western political theory and ethnic relations in Eastern Europe,” in: W. Kymlicka and M. Opalski (eds.), Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported?: Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 13–106. — (2008), “The evolving basis of European norms of minority rights: Rights to culture, participation and autonomy,” in: M. Weller, D. Blacklock and K. Nobbs (eds.), The Protection of Minorities in Wider Europe. London: Palgrave, 11–42. Lund, M. (1996), Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy. Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press.
124
HCNM and Minority Integration
______________________________________________________________
MacFarlane, N. (1997), “Democratization, nationalism and regional security in Southern Caucasus,” Government and Opposition, 32(3): 399–420. MacFarlane, N. and K. Yuen Foong (2006), Human Security and UN: A Critical History. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Michnik, A. (1991), “Nationalism,” Social Research, 58(4): 757–764. Mungiu-Pippidi, A. and I. Krastev (eds.) (2004), Nationalism After Communism. Budapest: CEU Press. Opalski, M. (2001) “Can Will Kymlicka be exported to Russia?” in: W. Kymlicka and M. Opalski (eds.), Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported?: Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 298–320. Packer, J. (1996). “Conflict prevention by the OAU: the relevance of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities,” African Yearbook on International Law, 4: 279–291 — (2007), “Reflections on implementation mechanisms on selected autonomy, self-rule and similar arrangements,” in: M Boltjes (ed.), Implementing Negotiated Agreements: The Real Challenge to Intrastate Peace. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 69–85. Roberts, A. (1995), “Communal conflicts as a challenge to international organization: the case of former Yugoslavia,” Review of International Studies, 21(4): 389–410. Skovgaard, J. (2007), “Towards a European Norm?: The framing of the Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia by the Council of Europe, the EU and the OSCE,” EUI Working Papers, 7. Zaagman R. and H. Zaal (1994), “The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities: prehistory and negotiations,” in: A. Bloed (ed.), The Challenge of Change: the Helsinki Summit of the CSCE and its Aftermath. Dodrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 95–111.
Natalie Sabanadze
125
______________________________________________________________ Zellner, W. and F. Lang (eds.) (1999), Peace and Stability through Human and Minority Rights: Speeches by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. Baden-Baden: Nomos. OSCE Documents and Publications Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Moscow, 1991. CSCE Helsinki Document: The Challenges of Change, Helsinki, 1992. OSCE Human Dimension Commitments: A Reference Guide, Warsaw, 2001. Selected Speeches, Statements and Publications by the OSCE HCNM Ekeus, R. (2001), OSCE HCNM Statement on Sovereignty, Responsibility and National Minorities, The Hague. Ekeus, R. (2003), “Towards Europe for All”. Address to the Roundtable “New Minorities: Inclusion and Equality,” organized by the Netherlands Helsinki Committee, The Hague. Ekeus, R. (2003), “Building Understanding and Tolerance in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Promoting Integration and the Role of the International Community,” Address by the OSCE HCNM, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Ekeus, R. (2005), “Demographic Trends, Migration and Integrating Persons Belonging to National Minorities: Ensuring Security and Sustainable Development in the OSCE Area,” Address by the OSCE HCNM, Thirteenth Meeting of the OSCE Economic Forum, Prague. Vollebaek, K. (2007), “OSCE HCNM Statement on Protection of Minorities and Citizens Abroad,” The Hague. Vollebaek, K. (2007), “Opening Remarks at the Launch of Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations,” Bolzano.
Section II Political Integration of Minority Communities
Comparing European Institutional and Hungarian Approaches to Roma (Gypsy) Minorities Annabel Tremlett The chapter analyses how Roma (Gypsy) minorities are discursively represented in documents from European institutions which are currently forming the most influential ‘public level’ arena for Roma politics. A comparison is made between the way social inclusion of Roma minorities is conceptualized in key European institutional documents, and the discourses from accession countries, such as Hungary, in the monitoring process. The ‘intercultural’ or ‘recognition’ approach taken by European institutions is criticized as failing to take into account and engage with the complex interface of differing discourses on ethnicity prevalent in post-socialist countries. Introduction The expansion of the European Union (EU) to include post-socialist states can be seen as a turning point in the history of the EU. The process of EU expansion has highlighted Roma as the largest and poorest minority group in Central and Eastern Europe.1 Despite the potential of the EU to form a “truly historic role” as an influential arena for Roma politics (Kovats, 2001, p. 111), European institutions have been accused of not going far enough to make any real changes.2 Whilst European institutions have drawn up seemingly progressive documents for minorities, there has not been an obvious result for the majority of Roma living in poverty. Criticisms were particularly generated after the first European Roma Forum in Brussels in 2008. The outcomes did not match the high hopes placed on the Forum as an event that would shake up the apparent inertia of European institutional activity. European institutions were accused of having a “passive” stance towards Roma (EU Roma coalition), a lack of creative ideas (Lívia Járóka, Hungarian Roma MEP), along with missing the opportunity to create a pan-European strategy (Minority Rights Group). This chapter focuses on the apparent impasse through examining a part of the process of implementing European institutional recommendations at a state level, using Hungary as an example. Some key differences are revealed in the way Roma minorities are discussed in the European institutional documents compared to the Hungarian state monitoring reports. These key differences may help explain why seemingly progressive European-level documents do not affect the lives of many Roma people. Two such docu-
130
Comparing Approaches to Roma
______________________________________________________________ ments are the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 1992 (henceforth the ECRML), and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 1995 (henceforth the FCNM). Both documents are considered to be the most influential moves to securing Roma minority rights at a pan-European level to date. I examine the approach to Roma minorities in these documents before comparing the reaction at Hungarian level through state monitoring reports. The monitoring reports form the feedback process, showing how states have adapted these documents into their legislation and promoted the ideas to the public. The approach to analysis is informed by Nancy Fraser’s writing on “recognition” and “redistributive” paradigms that she says have formed the basis of the dilemma of the “postsocialist” age (1997). These paradigms were found to be useful in examining the different approaches to the Roma. It is through this analysis that a tension between the European institutional and the Hungarian state approach to Roma is revealed. The chapter argues that the European institutional commitment to a multicultural or recognition approach is markedly different to the Hungarian state’s approach to Roma minorities. The Hungarian approach is ambivalent in its commitment to multiculturalism, and can be said to be more inclined towards the “redistribution” paradigm, yet with some use of deficit discourse about Roma minorities. The tension between the two approaches is highlighted as a reason behind the apparent stalemate of European institutional action. Considering the situation of Roma in Hungary as firmly rooted in problems related to poverty, this chapter suggests that the imbalance of the importance placed on recognition politics may impede European institutional efforts in helping Roma minorities. 1.
Approach to Analysis: Fraser’s Recognition and Redistribution Paradigms In her work on the “postsocialist” condition, Fraser describes two broad approaches to notions of injustice: a “redistribution” paradigm and a “recognition” paradigm. The paradigm of “redistribution” is described as based on the understanding of injustice as socio-economic: for example exploitation in the workplace or denial or access to a decent job and wage (Fraser, 1997, p.13). On the other hand, the “recognition” paradigm includes an understanding of injustice as “rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication” – for example cultural domination, non-recognition and disrespect (ibid., p.14). Despite both types of injustice being intertwined in practice (“far from occupying two airtight separate spheres, economic injustice and cultural injustice are usually interimbricated so as to reinforce each other dialectically” ibid., p.15), Fraser maintains that discursively, the redistributive/recognition paradigms still appear distinct from each other, producing
Annabel Tremlett
131
______________________________________________________________ different and often contradictory claims for the people they want social justice for. These claims are summarised in Table 1 below: Table 1. Summary of “Redistribution” and “Recognition” Paradigms “Redistribution” paradigm
“Recognition” paradigm
Injustice seen in terms of...
Exploitation in/marginalisation from labour force
Cultural misrecognition
Justice seen in terms of...
Socio-economic equality
Representational equality
Mode of collectivity (how people are seen)
People’s existence is rooted in the political economy, therefore any injustices suffered by members will be traceable to the political economy (Fraser, 1997, p. 14)
People are “differentiated as a collectivity by virtue of the reigning social patterns of interpretations and evaluation, not by virtue of the division of labor” (ibid., p.18)
Remedy
“Redistribution”: restructuring the political economy so as to alter the class distribution of social burdens and social benefits (ibid., p.17)
“Recognition”: recognise the value of all cultures and change the cultural variations that privilege a certain group (ibid., p.19)
Whilst recognition claims “tend to promote group differentiation”, redistribution claims “often call for abolishing economic arrangements that underpin group specificity […] they tend to promote group dedifferentiation” (ibid., p.16). This leads to tensions, “whereas the first tends to promote group differentiation, the second tends to undermine it. Thus, the two kinds of claim stand in tension with each other; they can interfere with, or even work against, each other” (ibid., p.16). Fraser describes a constitutive feature of the “postsocialist” condition as a shift away from political claims of redistributing wealth to an emphasis on the recognition of different groups and their value in society (Fraser, 1997, p. 2). However, rather than signifying a positive shift towards a multicultural, tolerant society, Fraser sees the so-called “identity politics” favoured by the “recognition” paradigm as decentring class, leading to a “decoupling of cultural politics from social politics, and the relative eclipse of the latter by the former” (ibid.). As we will go on to see, these two types of claims can be related to discourses about Roma from European institutional and recently acceded “postsocialist” states. We now turn to how European institutions increasingly use the “recognition” paradigm.
132
Comparing Approaches to Roma
______________________________________________________________ 2. European Institutions: Use of the “Recognition” Paradigm Here I will first outline the general approach of European institutions to Roma minorities, both from the Council of Europe and the European Union. I then go onto look specifically at two documents: the ECRML (European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages) and the FCNM (Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities). I will show how the “recognition” paradigm is used in these documents to produce a certain way of looking at Roma which leads to a specific view on how to raise their social status. The Council of Europe (COE), describes Roma people as a distinct minority with a unique and rich language and culture. In a 1993 recommendation that was said to have “paved the way towards a new phase in the activity of the Council of Europe” (Legal Situation of the Roma in Europe 2002: paras I/1, II/1), this approach was clearly set out: “A special place among the minorities is reserved for Gypsies. Living scattered all over Europe, not having a country to call their own, they are a true European minority, but one that does not fit into the definitions of national or linguistic minorities. As a non-territorial minority, Gypsies greatly contribute to the cultural diversity of Europe. In different parts of Europe they contribute in different ways, be it by language and music or by their trades and crafts.” (Gypsies in Europe 1993, Recommendation 1203: paras. 2 and 3). The above paragraphs clearly show the tendency of the COE’s cultural approach to Roma minorities (also observed by Kovats, 2001, p. 102). In rather romantic terms, the COE describes Roma as a “scattered” minority who contribute to European culture through their specific language, music and trade. A similar approach can be seen in EU documents. The resolution Discrimination against the Roma from the European Council (an EU institution), called for an “international level” approach to Roma, describing Roma minorities themselves as a “transnational people”, which appears to fit into the COE’s “cultural” approach: “The European Parliament, A. recognizing that the Roma as a transnational people face special social problems, B. recognizing that there is widespread discrimination against the Roma in practically every country where they are settled, but that their numbers in central and eastern Europe make the problem particularly acute,
Annabel Tremlett
133
______________________________________________________________ C. recognizing that, potentially, the conditions of life of the Roma people are a problem which can only be tackled at the international level, D. understanding that the Roma have a special culture that should be respected; recognizing, however, that their way of life in some cases causes frictions with their social environment, E. recognizing that the education of future generations is a key element in the integration of Roma into the societies where they are living and that particular attention should be paid to this.” (From Discrimination against the Roma Resolution 1995). In the above extract, “the Roma” are said to face “special social problems” (point A) as well as having “a special culture” (point D). The word “special” indicates the Roma are a unique minority, and it seems that their “special-ness” may contribute to their problems, “their way of life in some cases causes frictions with their social environment” (point D). Roma are thus not portrayed as a part of the societies in which they live, as the following examples from the above extract show: • “a transnational people” (point A) - therefore not “of” a nation state; • “[…] in practically every country where they are settled” (point B) – “settled” in a country, therefore not “of” the country; • “their way of life in some cases causes frictions with their social environment” (point D) - therefore different or opposing a “way of life” that other people have. “The Roma” are thus represented as a particular minority living across Europe, yet in each place where they live they are set apart from the main society and their disadvantaged position can be attributed, at least in part, to their distinctive way of living. This is an important point, as we will see later that the notion of Roma as “different” from their social environment forms the basis of approaches designed to solve their marginalized position in society. Both the COE and the EU document describe Roma in terms of “difference”. The similarities between the two documents’ descriptions can be seen in direct comparison below:
134
Comparing Approaches to Roma
______________________________________________________________
(i) (ii)
(iii)
Gypsies in Europe 1993 (CoE)
Discrimination against the Roma 1995 (EU)
“a non-territorial minority” (para. 2). “Living scattered all over Europe, not having a country to call their own” (para. 2).
“a transnational people” (point A).
“they are a true European minority, but one that does not fit into the definitions of national or linguistic minorities” (para. 3).
“their way of life in some cases causes frictions with their social environment” (point D).
“[…] in practically every country where they are settled” (point B).
The outcome of both descriptions is an emphasis on the Roma minority as a unique minority. “Transnational” or “non-territorial” refers to them as living across Europe, but not “of” the countries where they reside (points i and ii). Their difference from the societies where they live is further established as their culture is seen as separate: a different “way of life”, and a minority that “does not fit into the definitions of national or linguistic minorities” (point iii). Roma culture and language is seen as unique, and key to their integration. The COE and EU’s converging approach can be termed an “intercultural” approach in what Fraser terms a “recognition paradigm” that “is celebratory and positive; it sees all identities as deserving of recognition and all differences as meriting affirmation” (Fraser, 1997, pp. 181–182). The two European institutional legal documents focused on in this article also fit into this paradigm – indeed, can be seen as a product of it. The ECRML (European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages) entered into force in 1998 (as of 2009, signed and ratified by 24 states) has been referred to as a key instrument in the European institutional emerging approach to Roma minorities3 and is also noted as a key instrument for the implementation of minority rights (see Morawa and Weller, 2005). The ECRML is concerned with the protection and promotion of minority languages, seeing their revival and institutionalisation as paramount to the successful integration of minority groups into mainstream society, “[the Charter is] a system of positive protection for minority languages and the communities using them[…] in order to safeguard the rights of minorities to enjoy their own culture, to
Annabel Tremlett
135
______________________________________________________________ use their own language, to establish their schools and so on.” (Explanatory Report to the Charter, paras.1,2 p.1) [my addition] The message is that discrimination debilitates the chances of minorities to fully partake in society, and discrimination can be tackled through official recognition and support of minority culture and language. The prohibition of discrimination and the support of the expression of minority language and culture are said to impact on the social and economic position of minority groups. Following the ECRML, the FCNM (Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities) was adopted in 1994 and entered into force in 1998 (as of 2008 had been signed and ratified by 39 states). Like the Charter, the FCNM is seen as breaking new ground, the “first comprehensive treaty addressing minority rights anywhere” (Weller, 2005, p. 7). The FCNM consists of a Preamble and 32 articles that are grouped into five sections. In terms of Fraser’s redistributive/recognition paradigms, the FCNM can be said to follow the recognition paradigm as its articles focus on minorities as a collectivity whose coherence is based on cultural differentiation rather than division in type of labour or socio-economic class: “The Parties undertake to promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage” (Section I, Article 5 para. 1). The stress is on “intercultural dialogue” (Article 6, para. 1; Article 12 para. 71) that aims to promote and protect the culture of minorities in order to raise their status in societies and therefore advance their integration. So, for examples: •
•
•
In education: better achievements in education are envisaged through fostering “knowledge of the culture, history, language and religion of their national minorities and of the majority” (Section II Article 12 para. 1). In anti-discrimination: the development of text books for schools, media outlets and separate religious and education institutions (Section II Articles 5, 6, 12 and 13). In freedom of speech: seen as the right to “hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas in the minority language” (Section II Article 9, para. 1, see also Article 10, 14).
136
Comparing Approaches to Roma
______________________________________________________________ All the above refer to what Fraser terms as the “recognition” paradigm, “changing the cultural variations that privilege a certain group” (1997, p. 19). The idea is that by allowing and encouraging minority culture in institutional life, the minorities will have greater access to these institutions and thereby become more integrated. There is no mention of what Fraser calls the “redistribution” paradigm: political involvement, labour division, poverty, unemployment are not mentioned, apart from in the phrase that Parties should adopt measures to promote equality in “all areas of economic, social, political and cultural life” (Section I, Article 4 para. 2, similar phrase used in Article 15). Thus both documents take the approach that the preservation and promotion of minority culture has the potential to help these groups out of a disadvantaged social and economic position. This closely follows the COE/EU approach to Roma outlined earlier, in which Roma culture was emphasised as a means through which Roma people can alleviate their marginalised and deprived circumstances. As we have seen, the overall approach to Roma minorities falls into what Fraser terms the “recognition” paradigm. Through recognising the individual qualities of the minority groups, and making sure they are present in all types of institutional life (social, economic, cultural), the members of minority groups will feel they have a presence in (and thus easier access to) these institutions, which will improve their living standards. People are seen in cultural groups that need to understand, respect and interact with each other’s differences in order to get along and have equal status in society, the “building blocks for a liberal approach to minority rights” (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 2). This approach is not unique to European institutions, and has been elsewhere referred to as “multiculturalism” and “cultural diversity”, an approach that is said to be an “effective intervention on a social and local level”, yet which attracts many critics (Verkuyten, 2004, p.53).4 Whilst aware of general criticisms of the multicultural approach, this chapter does not advocate a “for or against” argument for multicultural philosophy per se, but instead turns to look at how this approach progresses when put into practice. I now turn to see how these documents have been dealt with in the monitoring reports produced by Hungary. The aim is to determine how the recognition approach taken by European institutions in these two legal documents is dealt with in terms of the Roma minority in Hungary. Hungary and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) The Republic of Hungary was among the first states to sign the ECRML in 1992, which then came into force in 1998.5 The application of the ECRML in
Annabel Tremlett
137
______________________________________________________________ Hungary undergoes various monitoring procedures that take place in 3-yearly cycles, and up to 2008 there have been three monitoring procedures: in 1999, 2002, and 2005. The procedures include the production of three reports: a submission of a periodical report by the State Party; a monitoring exercise carried out by a Committee of Experts; and the Committee of Ministers’ (from the COE) recommendations to the States Parties6. The latter two reports are published within two years of the first periodical report by the State Party. This section focuses on the monitoring reports carried out by a Committee of Experts in Hungary (published in 2001, 2004 and 2007). These reports, through their descriptions of the implementation of the ECRML, show how the ECRML is perceived as relevant (or not) to the Roma minority in Hungary. In this analysis we see not only how the Hungarian reports differ in their approach to the ECRML’s descriptions of Roma, but also, over the years, differ from each other in an apparently uneasy attempt to become better aligned with the ECRML’s approach. Table 2 below summarizes the three reports: Table 2. Summary of the Hungarian monitoring reports for the ECRML 2001 Little evidence of Roma culture: onus on Roma minorities losing their language and their culture.
2004 Little evidence of Roma culture: onus on historical situation - state-forced integration of Roma minorities caused subsequent loss of language and culture.
Approach to social exclusion
Social exclusion caused by poor socioeconomic situation of Roma, rather than lack of linguistic or cultural recognition.
Social exclusion should be seen as socio-economic along with linguistic and cultural recognition.
Recognition or redistribution paradigm
Redistribution, but with disadvantage seen as a deficit of Roma.
Redistribution alongside some recognition, with disadvantage seen as a deficit of state action.
Approach to Roma culture in Hungarian society
2007 Evidence of Roma culture: onus on “authorities” as not recognising Roma culture in their legislation, and society as not galvanised enough to raise the profile of Roma language and culture. Social exclusion can be tackled mainly through educational desegregation via identity politics.
Recognition, with the state and general society blamed as failing to recognise Roma language and culture.
Table 2 above shows how the stance of the monitoring reports modulates over the years from a focus on redistribution measures to recognition politics, and with that a shift in blame from the minorities themselves to state defi-
138
Comparing Approaches to Roma
______________________________________________________________ ciencies. The recognition of the existence of Roma culture increases with each report. The 2001 report was mostly concerned with the problems it found in applying the ECRML to Hungary’s Roma minority.7 Roma were the only minority group that was said to be problematic for the implementation of the ECRML. The main problem cited was the fact that most Roma in Hungary do not speak a Romany language and rather than focusing on language, social exclusion and discrimination should be tackled: “The majority of Roma/Gypsies have lost their native language, speaking only Hungarian as mother tongue (although often with severe deficiencies in linguistic skills). […] For the purpose of the Charter, only these some 30% of minoritylanguage-speaking Roma/Gypsies are relevant, not the large majority of Hungarian-speaking Roma/Gypsies whose main problems are social exclusion and discrimination” (2001 report, section 1.2, para. 13, p.9). The above extract reveals a number of differences from the European institutional “recognition” approach. Most striking is the difference in the way Roma are viewed as a minority group: whereas the “recognition” approach in the ECRML sees minority language as fundamental to a minority community such as the Roma, the 2001 report from Hungary says that only 30 percent of Roma in Hungary actually speak a Romany language. This would therefore make the ECRML irrelevant to the majority of Roma in Hungary, and so a strategy in which Romany language is focused on would not improve their poor economic and social situation. Furthermore, the above extract refutes the “recognition” approach by saying that in fact, the main problems faced by Roma minorities are “social exclusion and discrimination” (see also section 2.1, para. 30 pp.15–16). This suggests the Hungarian viewpoint is more in a “redistributive” paradigm, which Fraser says is about injustice in the political economy rather than cultural misrecognition (Fraser, 1997, p.14). It then follows that the approaches to anti-discrimination differ – whereas the ECRML, following the general European institutional approach of seeing Romany language and culture as the “essential common denominator” to Roma identity8 and therefore fundamental to anti-discriminatory approaches, the 2001 report from Hungary does not, saying in its conclusions, “it is not always easy to reconcile classical goals of anti-discrimination policy and modern approaches directed towards the preservation of linguistic identity” (Findings, para. D, p.35). The report states that in Hungary, Romany languages have not been regarded in a celebratory cultural way (i.e. the languages have not been held in high regard and have been discriminated
Annabel Tremlett
139
______________________________________________________________ against), and therefore encouraging their revival in this climate may actually exacerbate prejudice, “the Republic of Hungary should pay primary attention to the problem and should take measures to preserve the languages of the Roma/Gypsy population, without endangering the important goal of putting an end to the marginalisation and social discrimination that have traditionally plagued members of this community” (2001 report, section 2.1 para. 34). Whilst the ECRML conceptualizes the promotion and protection of minority languages as helping to combat discrimination, the above extract shows how the 2001 report says the exact opposite. The 2001 report sees any moves to integrate Romani languages into public life as something that needs to be carried out carefully and strategically, so as not to endanger the path to social integration. Moreover, if we go back to the previous extract, we can see a use of deficit language when describing the Roma minority: the Roma have “lost” their native language, and even when talking Hungarian have “severe deficiencies” in linguistic skills. The image produced is of a minority who are lacking the cultural tools of the majority population, and it is this lack that causes their exclusion from society. We will see later how this tendency towards deficit language can also be seen in the monitoring reports for the FCNM (Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities). The subsequent monitoring reports for the ECRML in 2004 and 2007 reveal a moderation of ideas to better suit the ECRML’s multicultural recognition approach. In the 2004 report there seems to be an acceptance that the 2001 report was at odds with the Charter’s approach and the report aims to address this: “The Committee of Experts considers it necessary to take the assessment it started in its first evaluation report a step forward and start including elements of a social and cultural nature in its evaluation” (2004 report, section 3.2.4, para. 45, p.11). Note here that the way of aligning the 2004 report more to the ECRML’s aim is to “start including elements of a social and cultural nature” [my emphasis]. This is further established as the 2004 report still posits redistribution as the important goal with recognition as an additional factor: “The Committee of Experts underlines that integration in line with the principles set out in the Charter, is one which allows for a full participation in economic, social and political life,
140
Comparing Approaches to Roma
______________________________________________________________ combined with the preservation of one’s linguistic and cultural identity” (2004 report, section 3.2.4, para. 43, p.11). The “recognition” paradigm of the ECRML that sees socio-economic participation through linguistic and cultural recognition is not fully endorsed – it is not seen as the means, but rather an addition, “combined with”. The aim is to increase the presence of Romany languages in institutional life which even mono-Hungarian speaking Roma can access, “recovering their language if they so wish” (section 3.2.4, para. 49). On an ideological level, the 2004 report from Hungary appears to view culture in terms of blocks that can be accessed and fitted in when required, rather than the ECRML’s approach which presents cultural and language in a much more holistic manner. Nevertheless the cultural element of the ECRML is endorsed here, much more than in earlier documents. However it is seen as supplementary rather than fundamental, something that can be accessed as and when needed. The 2007 report from Hungary then goes one step further to align itself fully with the ECRML’s approach, and criticism becomes more directed at the Hungarian government itself. The 2007 report admonishes the Hungarian government for not including Romany language and culture into its strategy for raising the status of Roma minorities, “the authorities have introduced a wide-ranging government programme aiming at the further economic, social and political integration of the Roma. However, this programme has no specific component aimed at the preservation or promotion of Romany and Beás” (2007 report, section 3.1, conclusion rec. no.1, p.35). Here the report distances itself the Hungarian government, thus aligning itself more to the “recognition” paradigm of the ECRML in which Romany and Beás languages would be specifically referred to. The recommendations in the report all focus on the recognition of these languages in education, media and other public spaces. Education is particularly focused on, with the term “desegregation” used. This is the first time the term is used in the reports, and links to a wider movement in Hungary and beyond to stop the ongoing discriminatory practice of wrongly placing Roma children into special needs schools.9 Whilst other discourses on the desegregation of Roma children regularly talk of problems of socio-economic disparity in the “redistribution” sense of injustice, the 2007 report focuses on language, criticising the Hungarian authorities of not recognising Romany and Beás languages in their strategies. The monitoring feedback, over the years, changes from questioning the ECRML’s stance on Roma language and culture to fully endorsing the view that recognition is the route to promoting anti-discriminatory measures.
Annabel Tremlett
141
______________________________________________________________ As Table 2 shows, the monitoring reports thus move to distance themselves from the Hungarian authorities. The initial disquiet surrounding the potential effectiveness of the ECRML for Roma in Hungary is lost in the reports, along with mention of redistribution-type measures and, indeed, deficit type of discourses about Roma language and culture. However, this does not mean these approaches have disappeared – as the reports tell us, the Hungarian authorities are still involved in these types of measures, and are thus still prevalent. The monitoring process, I argue, could have held an important position in discussing the differences between European and Hungarian state level approaches to Roma. Instead, the monitoring reports move to reject the state’s approach in favour of the European institutional approach. Perhaps this succeeds in reducing some deficit discourses around Roma culture and language, but at the same time, issues of effectiveness for the majority of Roma in Hungary, and socio-economic redistributive measures that might be useful alongside cultural recognition are not addressed. Hungary and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) Moving onto the FCNM, we can see similar problems in the way the monitoring reports attempt to discuss different cultural elements in the framework. Since Hungary has ratified the FCNM there have been two monitoring reports, one in 1999 and the second in 2004. Similar to the ECRML, the earlier report focuses much more on redistribution than then latter which is more concerned with recognition. In the 1999 report, unfair housing treatment suffered by Roma minorities is mentioned twice (with regards to Articles 1 and 6), whilst problems in the labour market particularly around lack of job opportunities are emphasised (Articles 1 and 4). Poverty and educational segregation are also referred to. However, there is no direct solution given to these problem – all recommendations refer to cultural phenomena such as: the setting up of museums (Article 4); Gypsy cultural centres (Article 5); separate places of worship (Article 8) and minority broadcasting (Article 9). Therefore whilst flagging up injustice in the redistribution terms of the labour market and socioeconomic inequality, the measures are all based on recognition-type solutions. The 2004 report continues in a similar vein, but now with even less mention of any redistribution phenomena: only school scholarships and measures to reduce segregation in schools are mentioned in Articles 5 and 6. Recognition phenomena are far more emphasized, with minority media programmes on the agenda (Articles 9 and 10), and more Romany language development in schools and institutions (Articles 12, 14). We might conclude that the “recognition” paradigm has eclipsed any particularly redistributive-
142
Comparing Approaches to Roma
______________________________________________________________ focused recommendations, and the monitoring reports have fully endorsed the European institutional pathway of celebratory recognition-type solutions. However, an interesting aspect of the 2004 report is in Part III of the report which deals with “Further evolvements affecting the situation of the Roma minority” (para.6, pp.102–113). In this section, economic and social integration and employment problems of Roma minorities are emphasized beyond any recognition measures. The Roma are referred to here as a “disadvantaged” minority, a phrase that up until this point has barely been used in the FCNM or monitoring process. Whilst measures in a “recognition” paradigm might be flagged up in the main body of the report, disadvantage and poverty in “redistribution” terms are still an area the report wants to acknowledge. Furthermore, in Annex XII (pp.159–161) two “case studies” are described which are said to have “created a stir and were hotly discussed recently in the media” (p.159). In both case studies, despite their written appearance as official reports (both are said to be from the Minister of the Interior, and are in keeping with the layout of a factual report e.g. the first begins “On 1 November 2002 at 13.16...”), both use deficit discourses in describing the Roma people in the incident, drawing on recognizable negative representations of Gypsies. This suggests the “recognition” paradigm is not one that is fully embraced. The two cases describe tensions between police and Roma people in which the Roma are presented as an unruly, uncontrollable mob. The first ‘case’ reports on an incident at a hospital where the family of a deceased woman has gathered and subsequently cause a disturbance. We first learn that the security service at the hospital were alerted to an incident, “the security service of the Bugát Pál Hospital in Gyöngyös received a notification that at the surgery class of the hospital, on the third floor, a mass of some 40 to 50 people had gathered and annoyed the calm of patients with their loudness.” (FCNM state report 2004, p.159). From the above extract we can see the types of bias against Roma. First of all, instead of presenting us with a simple number of people involved in the incident, (which could have been presented as a “fact” in a similar way to the date, time, location at the opening), we get the phrase “mass of some 40 to 50 people”. The words “mass...” and “have gathered” suggests something aligned to a demonstration, a large quantity of people brought together for a specific purpose (thereby suggesting it could be premeditated), with connotations to being anti-establishment and of lower class (the word “tömeg” is used in the Hungarian version that has similar connotations to “mass” in English). The next phrase describes what this “mass” of people did: they “annoyed the calm of patients with their loudness”. So the hint at
Annabel Tremlett
143
______________________________________________________________ the meaning of “mass” as something anti-establishment is confirmed – the crowd are differentiated from the “calm of patients”, the ordinary people who are justified as being there because they are members of the hospital, “calm patients” - unlike this “mass” who are “annoying” and “loud”. We then learn that these “some 40 to 50 people” had come to the hospital because of a death of a relative: “They came together because one of the members of their family, the mother of the family of 82 years of age had died.” The deceased relative is described as “the mother of the family”. Thus the sentence groups the crowd together as one huge unit, drawing on the strong – often pejoratively used – representation of Roma people as overly fertile with large and unruly families (see Durst 2002). The next few sentences confirms this unruliness of the Roma: “The relatives, a lot of them in a drunken condition, rushed into the room and stroked and pulled the deceased. The patients and nurses took fright and there was a just operated patient who left the room with fear, even in a reduced condition, barefoot […]. The policemen arriving called upon the blustering relatives to leave the building. Some of the company tried to comply with this notice, though reluctantly, but the lift could not start due to its overload. The policemen tried to direct the mass through the staircase when temper got out of hand […]. One of the fighters took a jack out of his pocket while the mass was scanning that they would beat the policemen to death” (ibid., p. 159). The Roma are described as a dangerous, unruly mob who are somewhat uncivilized in their behaviour: they “stroke” and “pull” the dead woman, they “try” to comply with the policemen’s orders but their “temper” gets the better of them, even leading to the suggestion of intent to kill. The reporting of this incident shows that even in what is presented as a factual report, deficit stereotypical descriptions of Roma minorities as a rowdy, uncontrollable family mob prevail. In a similar style, the second incident also reports Roma as a tempestuous, hostile mob against the state order. In brief, the report describes a traffic incident that turned into a more serious confrontation. We learn that whilst police were carrying out road traffic control in a town not far from Budapest (“Valkó”), one van did not respond to their “stop” arm signal and carried on driving. After a car chase and attempted arrest in which the driver threatens the police with a crowbar and a policeman drew his gun, “30–40 people” are reported to come out onto the streets “shouting and aggressively threatening” the policemen. The policemen ended up fleeing without arresting anyone:
144
Comparing Approaches to Roma
______________________________________________________________ “Due to the aggressive action of the ever increasing group equipped with various devices (hoes, scythes, forks) and the lynch feeling evolved, the policemen gave up their further action in order to protect their own safety, left the site with the service car, and then notified the duty of the Police Headquarters of Gödöllı” (ibid., p.160). Here the Roma are an “ever increasing group” equipped with weapons, again the image of a growing mob, and in a comparable vein to the last story, the police flee the scene – the Roma are lawless, even the police cannot deal with them. Neither stories are elaborated on, nor shown as to where they might fit in to the FCNM framework. Without any further contextualization, these incidents work to show the Roma in a stereotypical, deficit light as an uncontrollable mass. This way of talking about Roma clearly does not fit into the ‘anti-discriminatory’ approach of the FCNM that is cultural and celebratory, and does not fit into the increasingly cultural view of Roma taken by the main body of the FCNM monitoring reports themselves. Here, I suggest that the negative representations of Roma both here and in other documents relates to a culture in Hungary in which deficit discourse about Roma is widespread and regularly circulated. Discriminatory discourses towards Roma in Hungary are well-recognized as a problem and commented on in both academic literature and different media sources (see Kende, 2000, p. 200; Csepeli and Simon, 2004, p. 129; Stewart, 1997, p. 4) and as we have seen in this article, can even surface in reports that purport to be pro- celebrating Roma culture. Conclusions The European instruments for minorities rely on the existence of a specific identity for a specific minority, and the idea that people (should) want to celebrate distinct identities. European institutional approaches to Roma strongly emphasize cultural recognition that sees Roma culture as celebratory, and sees this celebration as a means to encourage and facilitate their social and economic inclusion into mainstream society. This approach has been taken to newly acceded post-socialist countries who have high numbers of Roma, such as Hungary. The Hungarian response (at least as shown in the monitoring processes) is ambivalent in endorsing the celebratory stance as the central answer to Roma exclusion. In Hungary’s monitoring reports, there appears a struggle to fully embrace the recognition paradigm. In the monitoring process for the ECRML, for example, early reports emphasise redistribution first and foremost, with only the later reports moving to endorse recognition politics. The later reports stand rather uneasily vis-à-vis the “Hungarian authorities” onto whom the
Annabel Tremlett
145
______________________________________________________________ blame is laid for not taking up the recognition baton, whilst the earlier alignment to this stance is left unquestioned. In the same process for the FCNM, recognition solutions are flagged up, which could appear to suggest the reports fully embrace the European institutional approach. However, redistribution-type discourses on poverty and disadvantage do appear, but are pushed into the latter sections or annexes of the reports. It appears that in the attempt to integrate Hungarian discourses into European discourses on Roma, an uneasy position is struck in which “antidiscrimination” is separated from the redistributive measures of dealing with poverty and disadvantage. Redistributive measures could possibly be much more effective then attempting to celebrate a certain culture and language that is not necessarily practiced by most members of the minority. The European institutional response thus appears inadequate to deal with the severe inequalities suffered by Roma communities. However, this is not to say that the Hungarian response would therefore be wholly effective in solving problems faced by Roma minorities. Both monitoring processes have shown moments of the use of deficit discourses about Roma – the most striking example is in the FCNM monitoring process, in which descriptions of incidents involving Roma are highly discriminatory. These, however, are limited to the end of the report, and therefore are not properly aired or dealt with. Here we come to the main tension between the two approaches to the Roma minority. This chapter has shown how the ‘Hungarian voice’ has been modified through the monitoring processes to distance itself from statemeasures towards Roma, whilst still including elements of these measures in various guises, mixed with occasions of deficit discourse that tap into wider negative representations of Roma “without culture”; “unruly, dangerous, violent” and “opposing mainstream norms”. These deficit discourses run the risk of seriously impeding any redistribution or recognition integratory measures, yet the monitoring process does not help debate these issues, but rather forces them into the corners of reports, closing down any possibilities for discussions. If the European institutions do want to play a role in helping Roma minorities, then they will have to deal with redistributive issues alongside identity politics, and open up dialogues with “postsocialist” countries in order to help identify and engage with discriminatory discourses about Roma as not only a potentially cultural minority in need of recognition, but also as a minority that suffers from extreme poverty. Setting up a binary division between celebrating positive cultural aspects, and the hard struggle of enduring poverty, only reduces the opportunity for effective intervention. A multiculturalist or “recognition” approach needs to progress along two lines: firstly, it needs to take into account the idea that ‘a’ minority might not always neatly link to ‘a’ culture and ‘a’ language. This might mean measures to promote and encourage cultural difference may need to take
146
Comparing Approaches to Roma
______________________________________________________________ plurality, hybridity and even aspects of nationality into account - for example whilst Romany languages are of the utmost importance for Romany speakers, in Hungary the majority of Roma do not speak a Romany language and therefore documents such as the ECRML will not be directly useful in improving their access to services (e.g. the schooling system). Secondly, a “recognition” approach also needs to integrate redistribution measures to deal with certain aspects of inequality in order to really tackle disadvantage at a structural level. As Fraser puts it, “in other words, to reconnect the problematic of cultural difference with the problematic of social equality” (Fraser, 1997, p. 187). Finally, any recognition approach also needs to be careful in its pursuance of the need to identify and celebrate “difference”. Whilst acknowledging the advantages of diverse cultures in a society, this chapter has shown how a commitment to “difference as best” can limit the potential for dynamic debates with other standpoints, and prevent the progress of anti-discriminatory developments that can tackle inequality. Endnotes 1 The EU accepted ten new countries in 2004: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Bulgaria and Romania then joined in 2007, and Croatia and Turkey began membership negotiations in 2005. Numbers of Roma in the recent post-socialist accession countries range from approximately 8,000 in Latvia, to 600,000 in Hungary and about 2 million in Romania (Source: European Union support for Roma communities in Central and Eastern Europe, 2003 (Brussels: European Commission) p. 4). 2 The term “European institutions” here refers both to institutions affiliated to the Council of Europe and those affiliated to the European Union. 3 See Gypsies in Europe 1992 (COE/Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1203, para. 11.iv), Legal Situation of the Roma in Europe 2002 (COE/Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights report, paras. I/2, 6, 15.a.v; IIB/54). 4 Verkuyten neatly sums up the critics of multiculturalism by saying, it has been suggested that multiculturalism can lead to reified group distinctions that become fault lines for conflict and separatism. Similarly, others have argued that multiculturalism endangers social unity and cohesion, and is also contradictory to the notion of equality and the ideal of meritocracy. (Verkuyten, 2004, p. 54; See also contribution of Malloy, this volume). 5 The significance of the ECRML for the Central and Eastern European region is shown in the increase of interest in the charter since the fall of communism 1989/90: “The CLRAE [Congress of Local and Regional Authori-
Annabel Tremlett
147
______________________________________________________________ ties] conceived and presented its draft charter before the dramatic changes in Central and Eastern Europe and in the light of the needs of the countries which at that time were already members of the Council of Europe. Nevertheless, the relevance of the charter and its approach to the situation of the countries of central and eastern Europe has since been confirmed by the considerable interest expressed by the representatives of a number of these countries in the establishment of European standards on this topic” (Explanatory Report: para. 12 p.3) [my insertion]. Although the Explanatory Report does not expand on exactly who the “representatives” were who displayed interest in the charter, we can speculate that this does, in part, point to parties interested in languages spoken by Roma people. Subsequent calls for standardising Romani languages have referred to the ECRML as the legal background for this process. For example, a version of the Romani alphabet was devised and written by Marcel Courtiade, with EU funding, and was adopted by the International Romani Union at its Fourth World Congress, held in Warsaw 1990 (Acton and Klimová, 2001, p. 162). 6 For the full monitoring process plus all the reports, a useful website is from the Budapest-based Public Foundation for European Comparative Minority Research (“EÖKIK”), see webpage http://languagecharter.eokik.hu (accessed 20 December 2008). 7 Minority languages pertinent to the ECRML’s application in Hungary are listed as follows: Croatian (17,577 speakers), German (37,511 speakers), Romanian (8,730 speakers), Serbian (2,953 speakers), Slovak (12,745 speakers), Roma/Gypsies (48,072 speakers), (figures according to the Population Census 1990, probably conservative). 8 “The Roma culture being an essentially oral culture, the language is not highly codified; and incessant travels and exchanges with the populations of the places they passed through have transformed Romani into a multitude of languages: a Rom from Romania, for example, will not be understood by a Spanish or Portuguese Kalo. But even if it is not used by all groups, the language remains an essential common denominator of this people scattered all over the continent” (The Situation of Gypsies (Roma and Sinti) in Europe 1995: Introduction, p. 8). 9 Hungary was the first country in the region to adopt and implement a government initiated and supported school integration programme. It was launched in 2003, and provides financial incentives to schools that commit to integrating Roma students into the mainstream classrooms. In an outline of the government initiated and support school integration programme (Mohácsi 2005). Implementing integration and desegregation has become one of the priorities to be dealt with in the pan-European programme Decade for Roma
148
Comparing Approaches to Roma
______________________________________________________________ Inclusion 2005-2015, see webpage www.romadecade.org (accessed 2. March 2009).
References Acton, T.A. & I. Klimová (2001), “The International Romani Union: An East European answer to West European questions? Shifts in the focus of World Romani Congresses 1971-2000,” in: Guy, W. (ed.) (2001), Between past and future: the Roma of Central and Eastern Europe. Hertfordshire: University of Hertfordshire Press, 157–219. Csepeli, G. and D. Simon (2004), “Construction of Roma Identity in Eastern and Central Europe: Perception and Self-identification,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30(1): 129–150. Discrimination against the Roma Resolution 1995 B4-0974/95, 13th July 1995, Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 249/156, 25th September 1995. Durst, J. (2002), “Fertility and childbearing practices among poor Gypsy women in Hungary: the intersections of class, race and gender,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 35: 457–474. European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 1992. (entered into force 1.March 1998) Strasbourg, Council of Europe. European Union Support for Roma Communities in Central and Eastern Europe, Brussels, European Commission, 2003. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 1995 Fraser, N. (1997), Justice Interruptus. Critical reflections on the ‘Postsocialist’ condition London: Routledge. Kende, Á. (2000), “The Hungary of Otherness: The Roma (Gypsies) of Hungary,” Journal of European Area Studies, 8(2): 187–201. Kovats, M. (2001), “The emergence of European Roma policy,” in: W. Guy (ed.), Between past and future, the Roma of Central and Eastern Europe. Hatfield: University of Hertfordshire Press, 93–116.
Annabel Tremlett
149
______________________________________________________________
Kymlicka, W. (2005), Multicultural Citizenship. Gloucestershire: Clarendon Press. Legal Situation of the Roma in Europe. (2002), Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe. Morawa, A. and M. Weller (2005), Mechanisms for the implementation of minority rights. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing. Mohácsi, V. and L. Járóka (2005), “The only hope for the European Roma is the European Union”, Equal voices: Targeting and mainstreaming the integration of Roma at the EU and European level, Issue 16, June 2005. Stewart, M. (1997), The Time of the Gypsies. Oxford: Westview Press. Verkuyten, M. (2004), “Everyday ways of thinking about multiculturalism,” Ethnicities, 4(1): 53–74. Weller, M. (ed.) (2005), The Rights of Minorities in Europe. A commentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Roma and Egyptian Minorities in Albania: Legal Framework for Social Inclusion Michaela Salamun The Strategy Improving the Living Conditions of the Roma Minority of 2003 as well as other sublegal acts have complemented the existing legal framework for minority protection in Albania. They are set in the context of (international) soft law, such as Opinions of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe and the annual reports of the European Commission relating to Albania. The sublegal acts have effected changes in the definition of the Roma and Egyptian minorities and in their position in the areas of education, employment and social affairs. Despite such changes, however, implementation needs to be improved, mainly in terms of providing sufficient funding and increasing local government activities. Introduction This chapter discusses in what ways the legal framework in Albania accounts for the social inclusion of the Roma and Egyptian minorities.1 This is important, as legal frameworks in different countries tend to provide different measures of social inclusion. Moreover, – inter alia due to more recent processes of identity formation (Marushiakova, Popov, 2001; Trubeta, 2005) – the Egyptian community may not be treated as a distinct minority by the state, but regarded as a subgroup within the Roma minority that generally have seen a more longstanding process of identity building in Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) (Vermeersch, 2006, pp. 13; Friedman, 2007). Social inclusion has been defined mainly via its antonym, social exclusion, which consists in “deprivation and barriers, which […] prevent the full participation in areas such as employment, education, health, environment, housing, culture, access to rights or family support, as well as training and job opportunities” (European Commission, 2000, p. 6). Social inclusion therefore can be defined as the overcoming, minimizing or non-existence of such deprivation and barriers. Consequently, a legal framework which creates the prerequisites for social inclusion needs to provide for measures of positive discrimination or affirmative action that try to level out existing inequalities in cases where barriers affect only a certain group of the population and so
152
Roma and Egyptian Minorities in Albania
______________________________________________________________ indirectly discriminate against it. In addition, the framework needs to be effectively implemented. In a first step I discuss the definition of the Roma and Egyptian minorities or communities in Albania and what constitutional provisions and sublegal acts on minority protection apply to them (e.g. the Strategy Improving the Living Conditions of the Roma Minority of 2003; hereinafter National Strategy). In a second step, my paper examines legal instruments that account for the inclusion of the Roma minority in the fields of education, employment and social affairs. It shows how these instruments either explicitly or implicitly refer to the minority, explicit reference showing a higher degree of political priority by the legislator. In addition, the higher the legal act in the hierarchy of normative acts, starting from sublegal acts (instructions, decisions, orders) through laws up to constitutional laws, the higher is its political priority. In a third step, institutions monitoring the implementation of the National Strategy are described. 1. Definition of the Roma and Egyptian Minorities In contrast to the Slovenian Constitution, which – in a unique way refers to the status and special rights of the Romani community in Art. 65, the Albanian Constitution (Law No. 8417, dated 21/10/1998, as amended) does not refer explicitly to the Roma or Egyptian minorities or communities. Rather, it relates to “minorities” in general; “coexistence with, and understanding of Albanians for, minorities” is regarded as “one of the bases of the state, which has to respect and protect them” (Art. 3). In addition, the Constitution mentions “national minorities”, which are granted special rights mainly in the cultural and linguistic area, such as mother-tongue education2 (Art. 20, para. 2). The Constitution also contains a principle of equality (Art. 18, para.s 1 and 2), which allows for the execution of positive discrimination, when there is reasonable and objective legitimacy (Art. 18, para. 3 of the Constitution; Second Report submitted by Albania, 2007, p. 28). Considering that – though subject to certain restrictions – legally it is in principle upon the States to define the concept of minority, the question arises which of these constitutional provisions apply to the Roma and Egyptian communities. Firstly, the Roma community has been recognized in official documents, like state reports, as an ethno-linguistic minority,3 as opposed to a national minority (e.g. the Greek or Macedonian minority) that has a motherland (UN, ICCPR, HRC, 2004, para. 9). Because the special rights provided in Art. 20, para. 2 of the Constitution are granted exclusively to national minorities, only the principle of equality set out in Art. 18 of the Constitution applies to members of the Roma and Egyptian community, just like to any other Albanian citizens. However, this is limited by the standard-setting function of the Opinions issued by the Advisory Committee of the Council of
Michaela Salamun
153
______________________________________________________________ Europe Framework Convention for National Minorities (AC) (Lantschner, 2008), which made clear that: “[i]t understands that, according to the Albanian government, the Framework Convention is also to be applied without distinction or discriminating effect to the linguistic minorities. Nevertheless, it encourages the government, in consultation with those concerned, to re-examine the question of the possible designation of the Roma and Aromanians/Vlachs as national minorities” (AC, 2002, para.s 20, 84; similar AC, 2008, para. 9).4 Thus the AC argues for a recognition of the Roma minority as a “national” minority (which then might potentially come also within the wider constitutional protection, including mother-tongue education), whereas the government programme refers to it merely as “ethnic minorities” and “communities”.5 Secondly, the Egyptian community was not officially recognized as a minority until 2005. The government gave as a reason in a state report of 2003 that unlike the nomadic Roma, who have their own language and ethnic characteristics, Egyptians were settled, did not have their own language, culture or religion and were fully integrated into Albanian society (UN, CERD, 2003b, para. 8; similar Government of Albania, 2008, para. 23). However, according to the Advisory Committee such non-recognition a priori excluded the minority from the protection of the Framework Convention and, therefore, was not compatible with it (AC, 2002, para. 22). Following the national elections of July 2005, the Egyptian community was mentioned in the government programme 2005–2009 of 8 September 2005. In my opinion such explicit reference could be seen as a first official acknowledgment of the minority. The government programme states: “The Government commits itself to abide by and achieve the highest standards in respecting the rights of all the ethnic minorities: Greek, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Roma, Egyptian and Aromanian ... Priority treatment will be offered to the Roma and Egyptian communities through a special education and housing program, in order to overcome the consequences of their long-term discrimination.” (Government of Albania, 2005) While the first state report to the Advisory Committee in 2001 had not mentioned the Egyptian community,6 the second state report in 2007 referred
154
Roma and Egyptian Minorities in Albania
______________________________________________________________ explicitly to this community (Second Report submitted by Albania, 2007, p. 34). The first sublegal act mentioning the Egyptian minority is Council of Ministers’ (CoM) Decision No. 751, dated 07/11/2007 “For the adoption of the sectoral strategy of employment and professional training and the action plan for its implementation.” It states that awareness of the employees of the employment offices will be raised relating to “women of the Roma and Egyptian community,” so as to implement existing employment promotion programmes (CoM Decision No. 632, see below) as well as measures of the National Strategy. However, unlike the Roma minority, the Egyptian minority does not have a representative in the State Committee for Minorities (AHC, 2007, point 3). Therefore, one can speak about a partial recognition of the Egyptian community so far. The Advisory Committee recognizes that further dialogue is needed between the authorities and the Egyptian community in order to decide on measures aimed at preserving and developing their identity and culture (AC, 2008, para.s 10, 46). There is no current official data on the number of minority members, as the 2001 census did not include a question on nationality or language used at home.7 A study of the World Bank indicates that the Roma minority comprises 79,000 members, i.e. 2.4 per cent of the population (de Soto et al., 2002, p. 90).8 The Roma assess their number as twice as many (120– 150,000), the Egyptian minority gives its number as high as 200–250,000 persons (Center for Ethnic Studies, 2002; de Soto et al., 2004, pp. 67). Districts with large Roma populations can be found in Korça, Elbasan, Tirana, Fier, Berat and Durrës, where Roma live mainly in separate quarters, in outskirts or in villages close to towns. Rural communities can e.g. be found in the villages of Bilisht, Maliq, Pojan and Zvezde around the southeastern town of Korça (de Soto, Beddies, Gëdeshi, 2005, p. xxiv). 2. Legal Instruments for Social Inclusion Legal instruments that account for social inclusion of the Roma and Egyptian minorities exist mainly as sublegal acts, such as decisions of the CoM and orders or instructions of individual ministries in the fields of education, employment and social affairs. The perhaps most prominent one is the Strategy for Improving the Living Conditions of the Roma Minority, adopted by CoM Decision No. 633, dated 18/09/2003. It provides for measures of positive discrimination or affirmative action in the areas of education, cultural heritage and family, economics, employment, poverty reduction and social welfare, health and infrastructure as well as public order, justice and public administration and has been concretised through the issuance of further sublegal acts relating to the Roma and Egyptian minorities. I address these separately in the following.
Michaela Salamun
155
______________________________________________________________ Instruments Relating to Education Roma children in Albania face a low enrolment rate (48 cer cent primary, 12 per cent secondary, 2 per cent tertiary education), low attendance (Roma 4.02 and Egyptians 5.06 years of school in average) and a high drop-out rate with as much as 94 per cent of Roma pupils starting grade 1 not reaching grade 5 as a share of all pupils aged 12 (de Soto, Beddies, Gëdeshi, 2005, pp. 54).9 Thus the members of the Roma and Egyptian minorities generally face high figures of illiteracy (64 per cent of Roma and 24 per cent of Egyptians, ages 7–20, 40 per cent of Roma and 11.3per cent of Egyptians, ages 20–40) (ibid., p. xxviii).10 Access to education may be obstructed by factors, such as high cost of school supplies (ibid., pp. 61), or internal and international migration of Roma parents during the school year (ibid., pp. 57), who frequently take their children with them.11 Other prohibitive factors may include large distance to education facilities, lack of child care facilities for younger children, security risks (parents fear especially that girls are trafficked into prostitution, ODIHR, 2003), perceived teacher discrimination, traditional gender roles, lack of Albanian language skills, hunger, malnourishment and poor diet (de Soto, Beddies, Gëdeshi, 2005, p. 57). A disproportionate number of Roma children are not registered in the Civil Registry which restricts their access to education and public services in general. Recent amendments of the Law on civil status reward the mother by payment of lek 5,000 (approx. € 38) for registering the child within a certain time period, i.e. 60 days from birth within Albania and 90 days from birth abroad or 60 days from the entry into force of the law for all births that are not declared until present (Art 34/1, para.s 4 and 5 of No. 8950, dated 10/10/2002, most recently amended by Law No. 9929, dated 09/06/2008). There is a fine of lek 50,000 (approx. € 384) for units of local government that do not implement the law or pay the reward sum (Art 69.1b). The amendments were advertised on informational programmes in national television, publicity spots, posters, and leaflets with sufficient information on the manner of declaration for children’s registration and a meeting has been held at the national level with registry offices and responsible personnel in hospital centers (Government of Albania, 2008, para. 15). In the field of education Chapter I of the National Strategy aims to strengthen preschool education for Roma children.12 This is done through measures to overcome language difficulties, to ensure that all Roma children complete mandatory education and many continue with secondary and even higher education, and to establish quotas at the universities for Roma students to study programmes, such as public administration, social sciences, law, economics, engineering, etc. Several instructions of the Ministry of Education and Science concretize and implement the National Strategy.13 Instruc-
156
Roma and Egyptian Minorities in Albania
______________________________________________________________ tion No. 34, dated 08/12/2004, “For the implementation of the project “Second Chance” for the schooling of pupils who abandoned school and those who are immobilized because of the blood feud phenomena,” Instruction No. 18, dated 30/08/2005, which requires the regional Education Directorates to report in writing twice a year on the implementation of the National Strategy (Second Report submitted by Albania, 2007, p. 59), and Instruction No. 6, dated 29/03/2006, “For the registration in schools of the Roma pupils who are not provided with a birth certificate” (ibid., p. 97). The AC notes that this instruction has alerted teachers to the problem and improved the situation to some extent; moreover, 50 per cent of the 469 pupils involved in the project “Second Chance” belong to the Roma community (AC, 2008, para.s 169 f). Moreover, the Ministry of Education and Science in cooperation with the Institute for Pedagogical Research, AEDP (Albanian Educational Development Programme) of the Soros Foundation and the Roma Union of Albania conducted a pilot programme in the nine-year school “Bajram Curri” in Tirana, in which the teaching of Romani language, history and culture is included in the school curriculum and in which several Roma assistant teachers were employed (Save the Children, 2001, p. 41; ETF, 2000, p. 39). Other activities have been the collection of data about the situation of Roma in education, such as a study on attendance of Roma children in preschool and pre-university education institutions (Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2007, p. 12), the reconstruction of schools in areas with a high concentration of Roma children, such as in Tirana, Shkodra, Korça, Elbasan, Fier, Gjirokastra, Lushnja and Berat (Report submitted by Albania, 2001, para. 5.1), awareness raising and support of parents in cooperation with NGOs providing economic assistance to Roma families to enable regular school education of their children (IHF Report, 2003, p. 10), projects for teaching Romanes in schools, organization of additional classes to fight illiteracy (Report submitted by Albania, 2001, para. 5.1) and the distribution of free textbooks to the poorest segments of society, including the Roma (ECRI, 2004, para. 59).14 In particular, based on the National Strategy for the Development of the Pre-university Education 2004–2005 (approved by CoM Decision No. 538, dated 12/08/2004), new syllabuses containing optional subjects chosen by parent boards allow pupils who belong to minorities to study in their schools their history, customs and the culture of their nation as well as subjects in their mother tongue (Second Report submitted by Albania, 2007, p. 60). The adoption of concrete measures to this respect has been requested (AHC, 2007). While activities promoting the education of Roma children already took place before the adoption of the National Strategy, after its adoption such activities through the issuing of instructions, some of which explicitly mention the Roma minority, were accorded higher priority and a more solid or “permanent” basis. In other words, the formal recognition of the minority
Michaela Salamun
157
______________________________________________________________ has been increased through the adoption of sublegal acts for the promotion of their education, which have paved the ground for further integration of the minority. Instruments Relating to Employment Roma and Egyptian household incomes in Albania are less than half of the majority urban household incomes at the national level (de Soto, Beddies, Gëdeshi, 2005, p. xxv). The unemployment rate is estimated at 90per cent in some communities and close to 100 per cent in the towns of Gjirokastra and Delvina, many lacking a full-time job since the state-owned enterprises were closed down in 1990/1 (ibid., p. 66). Only 2 per cent of the Roma and 3.3 per cent of Egyptians receive unemployment benefits and 95 per cent of Roma and 91 per cent of Egyptians who are unemployed or work informally do not contribute to social security plans (ibid., p. 67). Those with work face an ethnic hierarchy of jobs, as members of the Roma minority tend to work as street sweepers and to trade with used clothes on the streets (ibid., p. 68). They also do casual work, mainly in basic construction and public works projects, agriculture or work as porters or dockers (ibid., p. 70). Moreover, some Roma still work in more traditional jobs, such as basket makers, horse breeders, blacksmiths, cart-drivers, peddlers, animal tamers, musicians and dancers (UN, CERD, 2003a, para. 106). Romani children frequently work with their parents in agriculture, collect metal and used clothes and beg in the streets of big cities (de Soto, Gëdeshi, 2002, pp. 22). However, in Korça there are several Roma doctors and some minority members have completed university education (Children’s Human Rights Center of Albania, 2000, p. 18). Egyptians may work as blacksmiths, ironworkers, coppersmiths, tinsmiths, shoemakers and butchers (de Soto, Beddies, Gëdeshi, 2005, p. 71). In contrast to the Roma, they may have reached a higher education level and be more integrated in society; some are engineers, doctors, teachers, economists, military officers and state employees. In addition, Egyptian musicians have contributed to musical development in Albania and many are part of bands and orchestras (ibid., p. 65). As regards the fields of economy and employment, Chapter III of the National Strategy provides for measures regarding business development, such as provision of consulting services, market surveys and access to credit for Roma communities. In addition, it foresees implementation of special programmes to increase employment opportunities for Roma, enactment of advantageous policies for companies employing Roma, integration in the mainstream educational and vocational training system, as well as assistance to communes and municipalities to attract Roma to the labour market. To improve labour conditions, the National Strategy provides for enactment of
158
Roma and Egyptian Minorities in Albania
______________________________________________________________ measures to eliminate violation of labour code provisions by employers and to strengthen controls by the State Labour Inspectorate in businesses employing Roma. There are several government programmes for employment promotion,15 some of which promote employment of certain groups: CoM Decision No. 632, dated 18/09/2003, on a programme to promote the employment of female jobseekers gave priority, inter alia, to Roma women distinguishing them among their major focus group of women aged over 35 and young mothers. An employer who provides a job for a female jobseeker from the lists of the Employment Office, on a regular contract and at least for one year, receives financial support: a) in the first year of contract 70 per cent of obligatory social insurance and 4 minimum-wage salaries based on the country scale; b) in the second year of contract 85 per cent of obligatory social insurance and 6 minimum-wage salaries; c) in the third year of the contract’s execution 100 per cent of obligatory insurance and 8 minimum-wage salaries. Under this programme 86 Roma were employed in 2004 (Ministria e Punës dhe Cështjeve Sociale, 2005, p. 27). To implement the decision, Instruction No. 76, dated 14/01/2004, provides that the Employment Offices should cooperate with Roma associations registered by court decision regarding Roma women who are registered as unemployed (Point 15). Instruction No. 647, dated 20/03/2006, as amended by Instruction No. 647/1, dated 15/05/2006, sets out the conditions the employer must fulfil, documents he or she must submit as well as the procedure to be followed.16 Since 2007 employment offices are to include disaggregated statistics on unemployed Roma jobseekers in periodical statistical reports (Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2007, p. 44). Moreover, Order No. 645, dated 20/03/2006, “For the priorities of the employment promotion programme for the year 2006” stresses that the participation of special groups, which tend to include Roma, in the employment promotion programmes is to consist of at least 20 per cent of all employees in these programmes and that 50 per cent of their funds will be used only for the implementation of Decision No. 632 of 2003 (Second Report submitted by Albania, 2007, p. 90). However, the Court of Auditors concluded that in 2006 funds were not distributed according to this order (Kontrolli i Lartë i Shtetit, 2007, p. 7). In the field of vocational training, CoM Decision No. 616, dated 04/12/2002, determined additional special groups, such as trafficked women and girls, however, without mentioning explicitly the Roma minority, who benefit from Law No. 8872, dated 29/03/2002, “On education and vocational training in the Republic of Albania”17. By contrast, Order No. 394, dated 23/02/2004, of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs “For the fees in the vocational training system” explicitly mentions the Roma community: Vocational training was to be given free of charge in the vocational public training
Michaela Salamun
159
______________________________________________________________ centres to unemployed jobseekers registered with the Employment Offices, including the Roma community (Point 6). This is repeated in Order No. 782, dated 04/04/2006, “For the fees in the vocational training systems” (Point 4). In 2004 about 50, in 2005 67 and in 2006 98 persons benefitted from these courses (Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2007, pp. 45). Furthermore, CoM Decision No. 751, dated 07/11/2007, on the adoption of the sectoral strategy of employment and professional training and the action plan for its implementation, which includes the Sectoral Employment Strategy 2007–2013, inter alia states that public works can be used to employ unemployed jobseekers of the Roma community, as foreseen in the National Strategy (Objective 8).18 However, the Sectoral Employment Strategy merely repeats many of the goals and activities already mentioned in the National Strategy. While certainly constituting an important step in reinforcing the government priorities regarding the Roma community, such repetition may show at the same time that the programmes and measures provided for in the National Strategy have been implemented only in part. The State Inspectorate of Labour inspected and identified all natural and legal subjects that employ Roma, but so far no cases of violations of their rights regarding working conditions, wage and working hours have been identified. Also, the Social Security Institute in cooperation with the Inspectorate and the Directorate of Taxes inspected private subjects that employed Roma to include them in the social security scheme (Ministry of Work and Social Services, 2004). Following the adoption of the National Strategy several sublegal acts regarding employment promotion of the Roma community have been adopted, which shows the political priority accorded by the government to this issue. The measures, some of which provide for positive discrimination inter alia for Roma women, improve the legal bases for minority protection; however, they appear to have reached only a small number of minority members and therefore seem to be of limited practical effect. Instruments Relating to Social Affairs Regarding social affairs, the National Strategy envisages integrating Roma street children, providing economic aid for poor families, as well as support for Roma civil society organizations to improve interaction with and service to their constituents. Moreover, it foresees putting the Roma workforce on the mandatory social security scheme as the greatest part of Roma is engaged in informal activities as well as registration of the Roma population in the Civil Registrar’s Office.
160
Roma and Egyptian Minorities in Albania
______________________________________________________________ The integration of the Roma minority is also related to the Strategy of Social Services (adopted by Decision No. 265, dated 28/04/2005). In support of this strategy the project “Distribution of Social Services in Albania” financed by the World Bank has been implemented, which created 43 new community social services, out of which a considerable number address problems of Roma women and children (Second Report submitted by Albania, 2007, pp. 93). Social service officials in municipalities/ communes were requested to give information and assistance to help Roma families to take advantage of economic assistance and to identify their needs for social services (based on Law No. 9355, dated 10/03/2005, “On assistance and social services” as amended by Law No. 9602, dated 28/07/2006). As a result, Roma minority families have been included in the economic assistance programme, disability payment and public social services (Second Report submitted by Albania, 2007, pp. 93).19 In addition, CoM Decision No. 913, dated 19/12/2007, “On the adoption of the National Strategy for Gender Equality and Domestic Violence 2007–2010 and the action plan for its implementation” lists Roma girls and women among those who are at the greatest risk to be the victims of domestic violence.20 This strategy mentions that in the field of social protection the state is to take care inter alia of Roma and Egyptian families (Point 3.5) mainly through cash transfers in the form of economic assistance, or public or private services for persons in need. In addition, in the elaboration of the criteria of families below the absolute poverty line, inter alia, Roma and Egyptian families are to be treated with priority (Point 5.1.1). The network of community services is extended through pilot projects in three zones for women and girls in need.. This comprises female heads of family, victims of domestic violence, trafficked women, Roma and Egyptian women, handicapped women, women with many children etc (Point 5.2.1). In the field of social affairs the National Strategy for Gender Equality and Domestic Violence 2007–2010 mentions explicitly the Roma and Egyptian community, for which it foresees measures of positive discrimination, while at the same time according these measures also to other groups in need. This should be seen in the context of the fact that in many regions of Albania there is poverty in general and the majority population could hardly understand a favourable treatment of minority members in terms of economic assistance. 3. Monitoring Institutions A Sector for the Monitoring of the Implementation of the National Strategy was created in 2004 near the Institute for State Social Services of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.21 However, it was staffed only with three officials, though its capacities are to be reinforced over the following years (CoM, 2004, p. 130; Ministry of European Integration, 2007, p. 62). Never-
Michaela Salamun
161
______________________________________________________________ theless, the monitoring sector has played a very active role in the implementation of the National Strategy (Ministry of European Integration, 2007, p. 59). There is also an interministerial working group dealing with issues related to the Roma minority, which is headed by the Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Affairs and supported by the Office for Minorities within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UN, CERD, 2003a, para. 128; Commission Report, 2003, p. 10). Moreover, the State Committee of Minorities includes a representative of the Roma minority (established in CoM Decision No. 127, dated 11/03/2004, as amended). In 2004 it was announced that the total budget to be made available for the implementation of the National Strategy was € 7 million over a period of 15 years (Equal. Të barabarta, 2004, pp. 4).22 However, discrepancies have been found in the allocation of the funds, with some activities, such as data collection, not funded at all, while others appeared oversubscribed. In addition, it has been argued, since many sources of funding refer to “donors”, a commitment to ensure the long-term financial sustainability is questionable (Abdikeeva, 2005, p. 5). Government funding comes from the budgets of ministries which have an allocation either for vulnerable groups in general or for Roma in particular. In practice the funding provided by authorities remains minimal, since most projects to implement the National Strategy have been initiated by civil society with assistance from international organisations as one-off projects confined to certain municipalities (AC, 2008, para. 77). Similarly, it has been noted that information on the existence and the content of the National Strategy is weak in the regions, where the Roma community suffers from a lack of acknowledgement by local authorities and a lack of civil society organizations to represent their interests (Commission Report, 2006, p. 15). The annual reports of the European Commission in the framework of the Stabilisation and Association process continue to note the adverse socioeconomic situation of the Roma minority.23 The report of 2006 suggested that Albania further develop practical measures under the National Strategy and plan financial resources for its full implementation (Commission Report, 2006, pp. 14). Reporting on implementation of the National Strategy in 2007, the Commission acknowledges steps taken to improve housing, employment and business opportunities for Roma and to organize vaccination campaigns. However, the implementation is described as slow and fragmented with little progress made in improving the situation of the Roma. The group continues to face very difficult living conditions and discrimination, especially in the areas of education, social protection, health care, housing and employment (Commission Report, 2007, pp. 17). This is repeated in the Commission report of 2008, which, however, also recognises some limited progress in terms of measures taken by the government. Upon joining the Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005–2015 in April 2008 Albania’s monitoring sector has
162
Roma and Egyptian Minorities in Albania
______________________________________________________________ been up-graded to a technical secretariat. Employing a member of the Roma community among its staff will improve its capacity to monitor and coordinate measures with other institutions (Commission Report, 2008, p. 17). The AC notes that the full implementation of this Strategy is still lagging behind as the authorities have not yet secured adequate funding and resources and have not adequately involved the local authorities. Action should be taken to assess more precisely the extent of the problem and develop performance indicators to measure the progress achieved by the National Strategy (AC, 2008, para. 25). Recently, a Commission of Assessment of projects proposals in the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Telecommunication approved projects by local units allocating funding to the municipalities/communes of Tirana, Kuçova, Korça, Pojan, Bilisht, for reconstruction of buildings, improvement of services, of infrastructure and construction of new objects for the Roma community in the value of lek 30 million (approx. € 230,769, Government of Albania, 2008, para. 27). Conclusion The adoption of the National Strategy for the Roma in 2003 and the official acknowledgement of the Egyptian community by the government since 2005 have been among the main developments in Albania. Since the first regular Commission Report of 2002 and the entry into force of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities for Albania in 2000 steps were undertaken towards achieving a higher degree of social inclusion of the Roma and Egyptian minorities. The National Strategy is an impressive document, which refers to a wide range of goals to be achieved, and consequently creates a heavy workload for the administrative authorities. However, the National Strategy is short of funding. Additionally, the National Strategy has been criticized for lacking a human rights-based approach, anti-discrimination focus and community empowerment measures as well as for a weak design of the monitoring and evaluation components (UNDP Albania, 2006, p. 7). In addition to the National Strategy, sublegal acts have been issued by the Ministry of Education and Science and the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities to further the integration of the Roma and Egyptian communities, some of which allow measures of positive discrimination or affirmative action regarding inter alia members of the Roma and Egyptian minorities. In the field of education many initiatives have been taken by the Ministry of Education and Science. However, it has been noted that Roma communities have not always been adequately involved and for many families the costs of school materials other than textbooks, which are given for free, remain prohibitive (ECRI, 2004, para. 57). Furthermore, as the number of Roma children in schools has not substantially increased and the
Michaela Salamun
163
______________________________________________________________ literacy rate of the Roma population remains low, barriers, such as poverty, language difficulties, temporary migration and discrimination, prevail (Commission, 2007, p. 16). Similarly, in the area of employment and social affairs many sublegal acts have been adopted, which, however, seem to have been implemented only in part. It is certainly an important sign that the recently adopted Sectoral Employment Strategy 2007–2013 and the National Strategy for Gender Equality and Domestic Violence 2007–2010 refer explicitly to the Roma and Egyptian communities, even though they largely seem to repeat provisions of existing sublegal acts. Nevertheless, in my view such reference shows the political priority accorded to this issue by the government and is essential in terms of further increasing awareness and fostering implementation of the National Strategy. The initiatives taken by the ministries and the government certainly represent an important step and show that the government is active in implementing the National Strategy. At the same time, there is a need of a more comprehensive and systematic approach, which would cover larger sections of the Roma and Egyptian communities. Moreover, women certainly represent the weakest segment of society and therefore must be protected and promoted most. Nevertheless, employment promotion should be further extended to cover sizable groups of unemployed male Roma jobseekers, so as to broaden the concept of positive discrimination or affirmative action to (ethnic) minority protection in general. To this end, the legislator may even consider providing explicit reference to the Roma and also the Egyptian community in the Constitution, like this is done e.g. in the Constitutions of Slovenia (Art. 65), Kosovo (e.g. Art. 64) and Macedonia (Art. 78, para. 2) and a minority protection law. In the context of European integration, the National Plan for the Implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement 2007–2012 considers as a priority the full implementation of the National Strategy, aiming to improve living conditions, education and employment of the Roma community through programmes of economic assistance as well as public and private services of social care. It provides as a short and medium-term priority for the period 2007–2009 the implementation of the National Strategy as part of the government strategy to fight poverty and social exclusion. To this respect, in the short-term the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities is to conduct a large number of implementing activities.24 The State Committee for Minorities is likewise to organize a roundtable about the implementation of the measures foreseen in the National Strategy (Ministry of European Integration, 2007, p. 60). Moreover, in the medium-term the adoption of a draft law on the rights and freedoms of the national minorities and the teaching of the mother tongue of the national minorities entirely is in conformity with the Framework Convention for Na-
164
Roma and Egyptian Minorities in Albania
______________________________________________________________ tional Minorities is foreseen (ibid.). However, it seems questionable, if this draft law will include the Roma and Egyptian communities, considering that the government does not list linguistic minorities among national minorities so far. In the long-term 2011–2012, a draft law on census including an ethnic and linguistic self-declaration of the citizens is to be adopted and a roundtable on the results of the monitoring of the National Strategy to be organized (ibid.). If the many implementing activities foreseen in the National Plan as short-term priorities are really carried out, the living conditions of the Roma minority will certainly be improved. Unless sufficient funding is provided, social inclusion of the Roma and Egyptian minorities will remain a long-term issue. Rather than leading to visible results in the near future implementation might still be a matter of future developments/policymakers. In addition to an increase in funds, much work still needs to be done at the level of local government. If the National Strategy is to reach a larger number of the Roma and Egyptian population in Albania implementation needs to take place closer to these communities. Endnotes 1 It builds on and expands research conducted for Access to Education, Training and Employment of Ethnic Minorities in the Western Balkans. Country Report Albania, Eurac/European Training Foundation, January 2006, 52 pp, unpublished report. Developments were considered up to March 2008 and updated in April 2009. 2 However, implementing legislation exists only with regard to tuition of the Greek and Macedonian minorities, but not for the Montenegrin minority (AHC, 2000, p. 61). 3 Reportedly, the recognition followed a consultation with experts and researchers on minority issues from state authorities and the Academy of Sciencies in 2003 (Second Report submitted by Albania, 2007, p. 81). 4 The FCNM entered into force for Albania on 1. January 2000. Cf. http://www.coe.int. It has constitutional rank in the Albanian legal system (see Art. 116, Art. 122, para.s 1 and 2 of the Constitution). 5 As of April 2009 Albania has not ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which includes also non-territorial languages – though in a limited application of the Charter articles - and explicitly mentions Romani in its Explanatory Report (para. 36) (Bakker, Rooker, 2001, p. 14). 6 It dealt only with the Roma, who were distinguished into four main tribes: Kallbuxhinj (residing predominantly in the townships of Tirana, Elbasani, Pogradeci, Korça, Bilishti, Gjirokastra, Saranda); Meçkare (with the domicile
Michaela Salamun
165
______________________________________________________________ in Lushnja, Fieri, Vlora); scattered Kurtofet; and nomadic Cergaret (Report submitted by Albania, 2001, p. 15). 7 A study by INSTAT of 2003 did not include the Roma minority, because it was based on the 1989 census, in which the minority had been included in the category of ‘others’ that numbered 479 members (INSTAT, 2005, ERRC, 1997, p. 89). Censuses from 1961 and 1970 had counted 10,000 and 50,000 Roma (cited in Z. Bárány, 2002, p. 126). Reportedly, the Roma had been first registered in a census of 1522-23, when about 1270 people were estimated to live in 374 camp-fires (CEDIME-SE, 2000, p. 7). 8 However, for several reasons, such as a small household survey, the data is not representative (de Soto, Beddies, Gëdeshi, 2002, p. xi). 9 Cf. http://vulnerability.undp.sk (accessed 26 July 2008). 10 Data by UNDP suggests a higher literacy rate for Roma, i.e. 65 per cent for ages 15–24 and 75-79 per cent for ages 25–44, with rates for females about 10 per cent lower than those for males (ibid). 11 Meçkars are an exception: Even though they travel more often, their children complete more years of school and have lower illiteracy rates (ibid., p. 59). 12 The National Strategy for Children adopted by CoM Decision No. 368, dated 31/05/2005, also deals with Roma Children. 13 In contrast to orders, instructions only have explanatory character and explain in detail all provisions of laws or decisions of the Council of Ministers (Art. 128 (ç) and (d) of Law No. 9000, dated 30.1.2003 on the organisation and functioning of the Council of Ministers). 14 Besides initiatives of the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2007, pp. 27), NGOs (Ministry of Work and Social Services, Directorate of Social Services, 2004), the community maintains the private schools ‘Vakthi Sheme’ (Children’s Human Rights Center of Albania, 2000, p. 13). 15 They are based on the Strategy for Employment and Vocational Training, adopted by CoM Decision No. 67, dated 10/01/2003, which builds on the National Strategy for Economic and Social Development (Government of Albania, 2001). 16 Overall, while aiming to prevent illegal employment practices, the requirements seem to demand quite a lot of effort and time from employers. 17 Art. 5 (c) of this law defines inter alia special groups that wish professional reintegration as persons with disabilities, mothers with many children, persons under 18 years, long-term unemployed persons, persons from families who live below the poverty line and any other category defined in a decision of the Council of Ministers. In addition, Instruction No. 2222, dated 31/10/2002, of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs “On counselling
166
Roma and Egyptian Minorities in Albania
______________________________________________________________ and orientation in the vocational training” provides that special attention should be paid to the vocational training of special groups as defined by law or sublegal acts (Point 6). 18 The use of promotion policies for companies that employ Roma is foreseen, which aims at i) the possibility of financing companies with employers and employees from the Roma community, ii) fiscal facilitation policies for those companies that create jobs for Roma, iii) material support, support relating to work environment, financial support and support regarding human resources for those businesses that deal with traditional products of the Roma community. 19 The situation of the Roma and Egyptian population is also dealt with in the Regional Development Strategies of 2005. See for the strategies at http://www.undp.org.al (accessed 26 July 2008). 20 Especially women and girls with disabilities, of migrant background or from rural areas and Roma in the age groups of 18–23 and 37-45 are noted to be subjected to violence more frequently (National Strategy for Gender Equality and Domestic Violence 2007-2010, 2007). 21 See Order No. 213/2, dated 22.6.2004, of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs. 22 Another sum reported is 27 million USD; http://www.info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/35479/ Prez1%20Albania.ppt (accessed 26 July 2008). 23 The EC report states that the socio-economic situation of the Roma remained clearly below acceptable standards and requested that concrete plans to support this community be implemented (Commission Report, 2001, p. 11). The 2005 report notes that, despite some measures under the National Strategy, both, the Roma and the Egyptian communities continue to suffer prejudice and discrimination in a number of societal settings; especially in education, professional training and employment (Commission Report, 2005, p. 21). The report of the following year indicates that 78 per cent of the Roma population live in poverty and 39 per cent in extreme poverty; only 12 per cent were enrolled in secondary school, compared to the national average of 81 per cent (Commission Report, 2006, pp. 14). 24 A second cycle of meetings related to implementation in the regions, an interministerial working group to organize, coordinate, monitor and implement the National Strategy, a roundtable about its implementation, a project in 2007 with UNICEF, the Ministry of Education and Science and Save the Children in three zones with Roma population about registration in school, pre-school access, parents’ advising, increase of teachers’ capacity to deal with marginalized children, data collection about Roma children within and outside the education system, strengthening the capacities of the monitoring
Michaela Salamun
167
______________________________________________________________ sector, a project to develop monitoring indicators and training of the sector and the interministerial working group, improvement of the living conditions of the Roma community and a project in 2007-2009 about the implementation of the National Strategy with UNDP and many other organisations (Ministry of European Integration, 2007, p. 60).
References Abdikeeva, A., and MRG partners (2005), Roma Poverty and the Roma National Strategies: The Cases of Albania, Greece and Serbia, Minority Rights Group International, http://www.minorityrights.org (accessed 26 July 2007). Bakker, P. and M. Rooker (2001), “The political status of the Romani language in Europe,” Mercator Working Paper 3. Bárány, Z. (2002), The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality and Ethnopolitics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. De Soto, H., Beddies, S. and I. Gëdeshi (2005), “Roma and Egyptians in Albania. From Social Exclusion to Social Inclusion,” World Bank Working Paper No. 53. De Soto, H., and I. Gëdeshi (2002), “Dimensions of Romani Poverty in Albania,” Roma Rights, 1, http://lists.errc.org/rr_nr1_2002/noteb3.shtml (accessed 26 July 2008). De Soto, H., Gëdeshi, I., Beddies, S. and D. Perez (2004), “Nga përjashtimi, te përfshirja shoqërore (studim mbi romët dhe evgjitët në shqipëri),” Politika & Shoqëria, 2(14): 67–82. De Soto, H., Gordon, P., Gëdeshi, I. and Z. Sinoimeri (2002), Poverty in Albania. A Qualitative Assessment, World Bank, Washington DC. Friedman, E. (2007), “A Dual Challenge for the Year of Equal Opportunities for All: Roms in the Western Balkans,” Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues, 2/2007. Lantschner, E. (2008), “Emerging European Standards of Minority Protection through Soft Jurisprudence?,” in: J. Marko (ed.), European Integration and
168
Roma and Egyptian Minorities in Albania
______________________________________________________________ its Effects on Minority Protection in South Eastern Europe. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 53–82. Marushiakova, E., and V. Popov (2001), “New ethnic identities in the Balkans: The case of the Egyptians,” Philosophy and Sociology, 2(8): 465– 477. Trubeta, S. (2005), “Balkan Egyptians and Gypsy/Roma Discourse,” Nationalities Papers, 1(33): 71–95. Vermeersch, P. (2006), The Romani Movement: Minority Politics and Ethnic Mobilization in Contemporary Central Europe. Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books.
Reports AC (2002), Opinion on Albania, Strasbourg, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2003)004. AC (2008), Second Opinion on Albania, Strasbourg, ACFC/OP/II (2008)003. AHC (2000), Report on the Completion of the Project: “On the Status of the Minorities in the Republic of Albania”. AHC (2007), Respektimi dhe mbrojtja e të drejtave të minoriteteve dhe grupeve të cënueshme për diskriminim, http://www.ahc.org.al/kshh/ ARKIV/2007/0812minoritetet.htm (accessed 26 July 2008). CEDIME-SE (2000), Minorities in Southeast Europe. Roma of Albania. Center for Ethnic Studies (2002), Ethnic communities in Albania and their problems, Tirana, http://www.macedoniansinalbania.org (accessed 26 July 2008). Children’s Human Rights Center of Albania (2000), The forgotten Children. A report on the Roma Children’s Rights Situation in Albania. Council of Ministers (2004), Action Plan for the Implementation of the European Partnership Priorities, Tirana.
Michaela Salamun
169
______________________________________________________________ ECRI (2001), Second Report on Albania adopted on 16 June 2000, CRI (2001) 2, Strasbourg. ECRI (2004), Third Report on Albania, CRI (2005) 23, Strasbourg. Equal. Të barabarta. Social-Kulturore-Multietnike, Nr. 8, Tirana, April 2004. ERRC (1997), No Record of the Case. Roma in Albania, Country Reports Series, No. 5. ETF (2000), Country Report. Vocational education and training against social exclusion. Albania, Torino. European Commission (2000), Communication from the Commission: Building an Inclusive Europe, COM (2000)79 final. European Commission (2001), Report on preparation for the negotiation of a SAA. European Commission (2003), Second Annual Report on Albania. European Commission (2005), Progress Report on Albania. European Commission (2006), Progress Report on Albania. European Commission (2007), Progress Report on Albania. European Commission (2008), Progress Report on Albania. Government of Albania (2001), National Strategy for Economic and Social Development - Medium Term Programme of the Albanian Government “Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy”. Government of Albania (2005), Government programme 2005-2009, http://www.keshilliministrave.al/english/programi/Anglisht%20programi.htm (accessed 26 July 2008). Government of Albania (2008), Comments of the Government of Albania on the Second Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Albania, GVT/COM/II(2008)005.
170
Roma and Egyptian Minorities in Albania
______________________________________________________________
INSTAT (2005), “Minorities in Albania,” Thirteenth Meeting of the OSCE Economic Forum Demographic Trends, Migration and Integrating Persons belonging to National Minorities: Ensuring Security and Sustainable Development in the OSCE area, 23-27 May 2005, Prague, distributed at the request of Albania, EF.DEL/42/05. Kontrolli i Lartë i Shtetit (2007), Buletini i kontrolleve të vitit 2007, V. Departamenti i Kontrollit te Institucioneve Financiare, Ndermarrjeve dhe të Shoqërive Publike Ministria e Punës dhe Cështjeve Sociale (2005) Të dhëna të hollësishme mbi tregun aktual të punës në Shqipëri. Ministry of European Integration (2007), National Plan for the Implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement 2007-2012, Tirana Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (2007) Progress Report on the National Strategy “On Improving the Living Conditions of the Roma Community”. Ministry of Work and Social Services, Directorate of Social Services (2004), Information for the implementation of the Strategy for the improvement of the living conditions of the Roma minority, Tirana. ODIHR (2003), CPRSI Assessment Trip to Albania on Trafficking in Children from Roma and Egyptian Communities, Report, http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2003/09/680_en.pdf (accessed 26 July 2008) Report submitted by Albania pursuant to Art. 25, Para. 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, received on 26 July 2001, ACFC/SR(2001)005. Save the Children (2001), Denied a future? The right to education of Roma/Gypsy & Traveller children in Europe. Second Report submitted by Albania pursuant to Art. 25, Para. 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, 18 May 2007, ACFC/SR/II(2007)004. UN, CERD (2003a), Reports submitted by State Parties under Art. 9 of the Convention. Fourth Periodic Reports of State Parties due in 2001. Addendum. Albania, CERD/C/397/Add.1.
Michaela Salamun
171
______________________________________________________________
UN, CERD (2003b), Sixty-third session, Summary record of the 1585th meeting, CERD/C/SR.1585. UN, ICCPR, HRC (2004), Eighty-second session: Summary record of the 2230th meeting, CCPR/C/SR.2230. UNDP Albania (2006), At Risk: The Social Vulnerability of Roma in Albania, Tirana. Laws and Sublegal Acts Decision No. 127, dated 11/03/2004, of the Council of Ministers on establishing the State Committee of Minorities, as amended by Decision No. 822, dated 28/12/2005, of the Council of Ministers. Decision No. 265, dated 28/04/2005, of the Council of Ministers adopting the Strategy of Social Services. Decision No. 538, dated 12/08/2004, of the Council of Ministers adopting the National Strategy for the Development of the Pre-university Education 2004– 2005. Decision No. 616, dated 04/12/2002, of the Council of Ministers on determining additional special groups, who benefit from Law No. 8872, dated 29/03/2002 on education and vocational training in the Republic of Albania. Decision No. 632, dated 18/09/2003, of the Council of Ministers on a programme to promote the employment of female jobseekers. Decision No. 633, dated 18/09/2003, of the Council of Ministers adopting the Strategy for Improving the Living Conditions of the Roma Minority. Decision No. 67, dated 10/01/2003, of the Council of Ministers adopting the Strategy for Employment and Vocational Training. Decision No. 751, dated 07/11/2007, of the Council of Ministers adopting the sectoral strategy of employment and professional training and the action plan for its implementation.
172
Roma and Egyptian Minorities in Albania
______________________________________________________________ Decision No. 913, dated 19/12/2007, of the Council of Ministers adopting the National Strategy for Gender Equality and Domestic Violence 2007-2010. Instruction No. 18, dated 30/08/2005, of the Minister of Education on the implementation of the National Strategy. Instruction No. 2222, dated 31/10/2002, of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs on counselling and orientation in the vocational training. Instruction No. 34, dated 08/12/2004, of the Minister of Education on the implementation of the project “Second Chance” for the schooling of pupils who abandoned school and those who are immobilized because of the blood feud phenomena. Instruction No. 6, dated 29/03/2006, of the Minister of Education on the registration in schools of the Roma pupils who are not provided with a birth certificate. Instruction No. 647, dated 20/03/2006, of the Minister of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities implementing Decision No. 632, dated 18/09/2003, of the Council of Ministers on a programme to promote the employment of female jobseekers, as amended by Instruction No. 647/1, dated 15/05/2006. Instruction No. 76, dated 14/01/2004, of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs for implementing Decision Nr. 632, dated 18/09/2003 of the Council of Ministers on a programme to promote the employment of female jobseekers. Law No. 8417, dated 21/10/1998, Constitution of the Republic of Albania, as amended most recently by Law No. 9904, dated 21/04/2008. Law No. 8950, dated 10/10/2002, on civil status, as amended most recently by Law No. No. 9929, dated 09/06/2008. Law No. 9000, dated 30/01/2003, on the organisation and functioning of the Council of Ministers. Law No. 9355, dated 10/03/2005, on assistance and social services, as amended by Law No. 9602, dated 28/07/2006.
Michaela Salamun
173
______________________________________________________________ Order No. 213/2, dated 22/06/2004, of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs on the creation of the monitoring sector. Order No. 394, dated 23/02/2004, of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs on the fees in the vocational training system. Order No. 645, dated 20/03/2006, of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs on the priorities of the employment promotion programme for the year 2006. Order No. 782, dated 04/04/2006 on the fees in the vocational training systems.
Political Community, Political Institutions and Minority Politics in Slovakia 1998–2006 Ada-Charlotte Regelmann The chapter analyses change and continuity in the concept and practices of the Slovak political community regarding the country’s largest ethnic minority, the Magyars. Focusing on the two subsequent legislative periods between 1998 and 2006 with Magyar participation in government, minority inclusion into the identity of the political community, minority representation in the institutional framework and their consideration in the political decision-making are examined. As is argued, selective responsiveness to minority demands has not led to a broadened understanding of community. Instead, different level political institutions have helped stabilise the established unequal majority-minority relations regarding minority participation in politics and society. Introduction Ethnic division of the political community has been identified as an important factor for conflict and instability in ethnically or culturally heterogeneous societies (Horowitz, 1993). Integrating their political community is therefore a major challenge for these countries. While formal citizenship and formal participation in decision-making processes (e.g. via parliamentary representation) have been identified necessary premises, they are not sufficient for the inclusion of non-dominant ethnic groups into the political community (ibid.). For example, full exertion of citizenship rights and obligations is constrained when it is linked to primordial belonging to a particular group. Participation can be limited when it is conditioned on criteria set by one group alone. Such constraints constitute fundamental aspects of ethnically divided societies and are reflected in their institutional settings. A change of membership criteria or related political institutions that have been derived from a restrictive concept of political community thereby provides a possible opportunity to overcome ethnic division. As I argue in this paper, such change in fundamental institutions is embedded in the shift in conflict or power constellations (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). Changes in power relations, themselves potentially reflecting transformation of the underlying conflict, constitute an interesting starting point to inquire developments in the political community. Slovakia represents a case in point in this respect. Although ethnicity does not constitute the only dividing line, the country features aspects of an ethnically divided society: Politics have been shaped and dominated by the Slovak majority, largely
176
Minority Politics in Slovakia
______________________________________________________________ disregarding the approximately 14 per cent of the citizenry belonging to an ethnic minority, with the Magyars constituting 9.7 per cent of the population alone.1 The linkage of citizenship to Slovak language and culture as well as exclusive political practices constrains minority participation in political processes (Csergı, 2007).2 In the 1998 elections, the political scenery changed, when a nationalist government lost its majority in parliament and was replaced by a politically broad coalition that, besides ethnic Slovak parties also comprised of the Hungarian Coalition Party (MKP). This article investigates to what extent the inclusion of the MKP into government helped form a new, more inclusive consensus on political community in Slovakia. Drawing on theoretical frameworks that examine the structure and role of institutions, I analyze the regulation and organization of minority politics in Slovakia 1998–2006. Central to the analysis is the question of reinforcement or reinterpretation of institutions that underlie and constitute the political community. Did minority participation in government foster their participation in the community in general? Has political interaction between majority and minority political actors led to a new understanding of membership in the political community, integrating both minority and majority demands? To answer these questions, I will take the following steps: the theoretical section elaborates on the relation of political community and institutions at three conceptual levels, including identity, rules and policies. Whereas at the level of identity the fundamental “we” of a political community is defined, the level of rules provides for the institutional framework of governance. The level of policies relates to the responsiveness to minority demands as well as processes of agenda-setting and decision-making (Juviler and Stroschein, 1999). In the second part I examine the institutionalization of political community at these analytical levels in the case study. In the final section I return to the initial question, relating the trajectories of the political community institutions to their origins, and to the political actors’ preferences as expressed in their interaction with the institutions. 1. Institutionalizing the Political Community Central to political integration is the concept of political community that shapes and reflects the institutions of a political system. In this paper I draw upon the reformulation of political community by Peter Juviler and Sherill Stroschein (1999), who claim to integrate into a coherent comparative frame “aspects of political development, stability, democratic state-building, public participation, and their relation to the inclusion and exclusion of various groups regarding the equality of rights and obligations” (p. 436). I briefly present their argument which aims at analyzing group conflicts within states. Political community denotes the broad range of people eligible for taking part in decision-making processes over community issues. This includes all persons in a given territory “in and out of government who recognize the
Ada-Charlotte Regelmann
177
______________________________________________________________ government as the legitimate decision maker […], generally comply with its decisions, and cooperate toward shared purposes” (ibid., p. 438). Accordingly, government, political rules and mechanisms of resource distribution form only a part of the political community. Political community members outside government sustain the community through compliance and loyalty, or act as corrective and supportive elements through engagement in lobbying or civil society activism (ibid.). At the core of Juviler and Stroschein’s concept is the link of political community to its “consensus” on institutions of decision-making and conflict resolution, rights, obligations and objectives, and to the commitment to these purposes and rules on the part of its members. Essentially, political community exists if there is a consensus among persons or groups on such a community (ibid.). Moreover, as formal criteria for membership relates to the consensus of those who are already members, criteria are likely to favour them over non-members or establish exclusive membership requirements. By the same token, legitimate participation in (re)formulating the consensus depends on fulfilling membership criteria (ibid.). Three preliminary conclusions can be derived from this definition. First, those who do not share the consensus are not part of the community and thus do not share an identity with other parts of the community. Second, exclusion from essential rights or resources determines the position of their group in relation to the core of the political community. And third, participation of the excluded and their representation in the institutions of a political system is limited. Political community defined according to these principles is based on shared identity, recurrence to regulatory institutions and access to procedures of democratic governance, and corresponds directly with the dimensions of Claus Offe’s “triple transition”: identity, institutions and rights (Offe, 2004). Following his delineation, Juviler and Stroschein deploy three levels of political institutions in which consensus becomes tangible: the political community’s fundamental identificational “we”; its institutional framework; and the procedures of negotiating power and resource distribution. At the first level, the most fundamental consensus of a community simultaneously constitutes its boundaries. This is formulated most clearly in the state constitution. Furthermore, requirements for citizenship (based on political/territorial criteria, primordial, identity/cultural prerequisites or a mixture of any of these) define who belongs to the nation or political community (Juviler and Stroschein, 1999). These institutions constitute the normative basis for further debates on membership and consensus of the community. In multicultural societies they are exclusive when they correspond with the identity framework of one particular cultural group only, precluding identity consensus with other groups. As the identity of the political community represents the framework of reference for community building, exclusion
178
Minority Politics in Slovakia
______________________________________________________________ from this consensus hence impacts on the chances for full inclusion into the system of rules and rights, though it does not completely impede it. The second level comprises the regulatory institutional framework of rules, rights and obligations, as well as the organizational structure of the political system. Though fundamental for membership, inclusion into the identity framework of the community (first level) does not guarantee equal inclusion into consensus formation on rules and rights. This is the case, for example, when rules violate a first level multicultural identity agreement by founding rights on culturally exclusive criteria. Governance, then, does not represent a consensus of the members anymore, thus lacks legitimacy for those who do or can not agree. On the other hand, exclusion at the first level can be partially compensated by introducing institutions that allow for consent of those formally excluded, thus providing for their inclusion into the consensus-forming community. As rules and rights are important assets for the future position of political actors in negotiating processes (Giddens, 1984), potentially, inclusion into the regulatory frame allows for redefining the normative membership criteria over time. At the third level, in day-to-day policies the distribution of political power and economic resources is negotiated (Offe, 2004). Representing a consensus of its members, political community is constituted by responding to demands. Therefore, responsiveness to claims and criticism of those excluded constitutes one option for changing political community. In this process, non-members can call upon the institutions to redistribute available resources and recast consensus on the community’s identity. In this paper, however, I do not focus on the institutional patterns of interaction between political actors, but rather analyze how, if at all, they have used the given institutionalized structures of Slovak political community for engaging in majority-minority consensus formation. Clearly, political community includes all three levels of identity, regulation and procedures. Juviler and Stroschein, however, have not further developed their concept to explain how the three levels interrelate. For preliminary usage in this paper I suggest understanding them as different, though closely related institutions. While membership in the political community requires inclusion at all levels by definition, exclusion from one or two does not preclude participation in political processes completely. Interrelation and interaction of institutions, I argue, make the change of one institution possible through change in another related institution. This argument will be further elaborated in the following section. Juviler and Stroschein provide for a coherent concept of political community and give some clues to its prerequisites as well as its relationship to the development of political entities. However, they do not explain how political community is established in the first place and how it develops. Understanding political community as multi-layered set of institutions, I draw
Ada-Charlotte Regelmann
179
______________________________________________________________ upon frameworks that analyze origins and dynamics of institutions. In a nutshell, institutions are conceptualised as constituting power constellations and interests of political actors, as well as shaping the dynamics of political and social developments (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). In turn, institutions represent structural features of conflicts and negotiation between social groups. While these features emphasize the structuring aspects of institutions, this is not to say that agents only fulfil requirements or purposes of institutions. Rather, it is in the agents’ institutionalized practices that social conflicts become tangible. These practices, essentially, are based on repeated or modified interpretations of societal structures through the agents (Emirbayer and Mische, 1996). I now briefly revisit the relation of institutions, agency, and change. In general, social and political institutions structure group relations as well as political agency (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). They denote sets of formalized “rules stipulating expected behavior and ‘ruling out’ behavior deemed to be undesirable” (Streek and Thelen, 2005, pp. 12–13). They are distinguished from informal rules, such as social conventions, by their legitimate and obligatory character. This is to say that their enforcement can be claimed by third party actors or society as a whole and non-compliance with institutions can be sanctioned morally, socially or juridically (ibid.). Likewise, the political institutions that are in focus here pose expectations of obedience, contribution or assimilation to the ruled regarding their behaviour in interaction with or within the political community. However, institutions do not reflect one-way relations. Instead, they are understood as ruling organizations in which rule makers and rule takers interact (ibid.). This notion of interagency between institutions and social actors is crucial. Origins, dynamics and, decisively, change of institutions are embedded in such processes of interaction. Emphasizing the origins of institutions as set in particular historical conflicts, Thelen and Steinmo (1992) stress that institutions are constituted by agents negotiating their relations. In this respect, social conflicts as well as power constellations are inherent to institutions. In institutionalizing processes agents put into practice their social roles and identities. By compliance with expectations and following rules, they perpetuate the social systems, which also includes politics (Giddens, 1984). That is to say, social roles and identities are by no means determining agency, but do so in interplay with the institutions. Essentially, institutions are embedded in the conflicting experiences, assumptions and interests of agents who are in turn shaped by institutions and power configurations. They are not direct tools for particular individuals’ uni-dimensional interests or direct functions of structural relations. On this note, March and Olsen (1996) describe the multiplicity of institutions and social structures as co-evolving. In this reciprocal development, at any point in time there is an array of potential directions, involving main-
180
Minority Politics in Slovakia
______________________________________________________________ tenance or shift of the institutional setting. However, alternatives of development are not arbitrary, nor do they necessarily reflect environmental demands for change or quick adaptations to functional outcomes. Rather, institutional analysis requires particular attention to the origins and trajectories of these “enduring legacies of political struggles” (Thelen, 1999, p. 388). These struggles are transformed into lasting institutions and path dependent patterns through what Thelen calls “feedback effects”. Shaped by institutions, actors adopt strategies that both reflect and solidify the logic of the system, and thereby confirm the power constellation on the basis of which the institutions had been established (Thelen, 1999). The feedback effects provide for the stability of institutions. Change, then, is possible, when the foundations of a particular institution are shaken, resulting in shifts of institutional logics that in turn impact on social actors’ choices. Correspondingly, agency is understood as constant interpretation of their environments by social actors, in order to adjust to institutional expectations. Agents engage with the institutions in a triadic way, employing habits, evaluations of present situations and alternatives, as well as aspirations and projections of future developments. Thus they reflect, reproduce or reshape the institutions (Emirbayer and Mische, 1996). Decisively, these “historical” agents have the ability to criticize, reinterpret, or justify and perpetuate patterns of relations as well as the frameworks of interpretation. Streek and Thelen argue that as rules are never self-evident in their meaning, they have to be reinterpreted constantly (2005). This facilitates shifts in emphasis or interpretations, while vagueness can evoke creative interpretations. New challenges can redirect actors’ preferences towards new purposes, such as when institutional environments or power relations change. Feedback effects generate adaptation processes and change within institutions in the very process of securing institutional stability. For the purpose of this paper, therefore, the identification of potential shifts in the concept of political community requires the examination of trajectories in the community’s political institutions, their interpretations and re-formulations. Change in ethnic relations within a section of social system can shake those institutions that structure society according to ethnic belonging (Thelen, 1999). In what follows, I interpret the inclusion into government of the Hungarian Coalition Party as contradicting the ethnically exclusive consensus of the political community. This, I suggest, caused the need for reformulating the criteria for political membership and the members’ consensus. 2. Institutionalizing the Nationalist Principle In the aftermath of the “Velvet Revolution”, Slovakia faced the challenge of building a new political community. As will be argued in this section, in the early 1990s a nationalist principle was established and henceforth shaped the developing institutional frame. By the end of the 1990s the dominant institu-
Ada-Charlotte Regelmann
181
______________________________________________________________ tionalized logic of Slovak privilege in a multicultural setting and semiauthoritarian rule, however, came into conflict with latent institutions of civic governance and aspirations of democratic state-hood. The opportunity window of parliamentary elections in 1998 opened to change power relations to the benefit of forces drawing from non-nationalist institutional resources. This change, I conclude, held the chance for reinterpretation of the political community under new auspices. The Slovak political elite had emphasized its perception of relative exclusion from the Czech-Slovak political community during common statehood for decades. In the early 1990s, it strived for more autonomy and sovereignty, initially within a common framework with the Czech lands, later as a separate nation-state (Ramet, 1994). Simultaneously, the democratization of the late 1980s – early 1990s had led to the creation of an array of cultural organizations by the different ethnic groups inhabiting Slovakia, including the Slovaks. The newly formulated demands and identities posed the challenge of integrating these diverse groups into one community. In the struggle for a new consensus three strands emerged that since then have shaped Slovakia’s institutional development. They consist of a nationalist, a moderate and a pluralist concept of political community. However, these are not easily assigned to political parties but rather represent tendencies in politics (Csergı, 2007). The nationalist principle has dominated political thought far beyond parties that usually count as nationalist. Simultaneously, parts of the moderate camp support liberal concepts of Slovakia as a civic nation. Pluralist concepts, almost exclusively represented by the Magyar camp, encompass a broad range of ideas, from loose demands for recognition of minorities as legitimate political actors to concepts of co-nation and equal status of majority and minority groups (ibid.). Despite initial common activity in the Public Against Violence movement that aimed at overcoming Czech-Slovak Communism, main lines of disagreement arose between representatives of the Slovak and Czech (until the split), and the Slovak and Magyar groups. While the conflicts were by no means ethnic in principle, with occurrence and spreading of the Slovak selfdetermination myth politics were ethnicized (Nedelsky, 2003). First signs of institutionalizing the ethnic principle as guiding Slovak state politics appeared in 1990 and 1992 with the adoption of the Official Language Law and the Slovak Constitution. Both documents were read by observers and politicians as aimed not only against Czech domination, but also against the other ethnic groups living in Slovakia, particularly the Magyars (Daftary and Gál, 2003). Over the 1990s this perspective was corroborated by the development of multiple nationalisms against external and internal forces. These nationalisms merged into a coherent view that stressed the privilege of “Slovakness” in the design of Slovakia’s society and its institutions (Deegan-Krause, 2004). Ex-post justification of the split of the federation and a problematic
182
Minority Politics in Slovakia
______________________________________________________________ historical legacy of conflict fed into this nationalism. This development simultaneously fostered the exclusion of “non-Slovaks” from political community (Harris, 2002). The process of institutionalizing the nationalist principle continued in many fields of politics over the course of the 1990s. Measures implemented to protect and develop the state language were to the disadvantage of minority languages and cultural rights of non-dominant groups, causing protests both on the ground and in parliament by members of the Magyar minority (Langman, 2002). However, some of the means aimed at securing Slovakness had an impact not only on ethnic minorities, but also on political opponents of the Mečiar government. The Protection of the Republic Law in 1996 helped the government label most forms of disagreement with its politics as anti-Slovak (Nedelsky, 2003). Under the harshening anti-opposition politics of the Mečiar government the influence of non-governmental organizations and think tanks promoting liberal ideas on the opposition parties as well as on society grew (Pridham, 2002). It was these very developments that strengthened ties between the opposition parties, and eventually enabled them to reinforce the latent institutional resources of non-nationalist discourse. Needless to say, Slovak opposition parties cannot all be labelled liberal regarding their views on ethnic majority-minority-relations. Still, they had shown inclination to improving these relations and even demonstrated that (silent) cooperation between Slovak moderates and Magyar pluralists was possible (Csergı, 2007).3 By revoking a number of minority discriminating measures of the Mečiar government, during their interim government in 1994 moderate parties supported minority cultural rights in the private sphere. Despite this, they have not worked actively towards the abrogation of the emphasis on Slovakness. Instead, they supported it – for example in the adoption of the 1995 State Language Law, although this was under strong nationalist pressure (Daftary and Gál, 2003). Political activists who are assigned to the moderate camp have in many instances confirmed majorityminority-relations through their decisions or statements (ibid.). That is to say, the broad moderate camp was dominated by the idea of Slovak privilege and favoured the design of political community as civic, though under Slovak leadership (Nedelsky, 2003). Apart from the civic principle, opposition forces were able to reinforce another resource present in Slovak political discourse. Over the 1990s, in Slovakia the desire grew to join the European Union (EU). This was shared by the Mečiar government (Csergı, 2007). However, EU accession requirements were in conflict with the nationalist and semi-authoritarian logics of the government. Consequently, the strong opposition parties seemed to be more apt to fulfil EU criteria and benefited from the rise of formerly subordinate institutions (Pridham, 2008). Moreover, the start of EU negotiations on Slovakia’s accession was conditioned on significantly improved minority
Ada-Charlotte Regelmann
183
______________________________________________________________ politics. This was the main reason for the MKP’s inclusion into government and represented an important step for Slovakia’s integration with Europe (Pridham, 2002). The incoherence of political institutions and the need to adjust to challenges from the environment facilitated the strategic opening of the institutional setting (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). The momentum of the 1998 parliamentary elections allowed activating latent institutional resources of political liberalism. During coalition talks, moderate and pluralist forces mobilized civic-liberal institutions for establishing a multicultural government. This opened the setting for debating, redefining or reinforcing the concept of political community. 3. Normative Consensus? Identity Institutions of the Slovak State The identity of a political community is put into record in its fundamental artefacts, such as a state constitution (Juviler and Stroschein, 1999). It determines the relationship between citizenry and the state; furthermore it shapes subsequent institution-building and reflects the results of decision-making processes. Therefore, the consensus of the political community is the agreement of those who participate in the negotiations that lead to its (re)formulation. As suggested in the theoretical section, inclusion into the community is provided, when the citizen is accepted to participate in the decision-making following her agreement on the rules, regulations, and purposes of the community. As this paper focuses on citizens as belonging to different ethnic groups, the consensus in question is about group inclusion. A consensus most inclusive, then, would not privilege one group over the others, while a most exclusive consensus would represent the agreement within one group alone for its single benefit.4 The Slovak constitution is both the identificational foundation of the Slovak political community and already the outcome of a decision-making process which is being reinterpreted and potentially reinforced over time. It defines the relation between state and citizen. The Slovak constitution distinguishes between ethnic groups, ascribing different roles to them and accepting an exclusive understanding of political community. Simultaneously, it guarantees same rights and non-discrimination against any citizen on the basis of ethnic (or other) affiliation. Furthermore, the constitution recognizes ethnic minorities as groups with particular status and provides certain constitutional laws to secure their specific rights. These constitutional rights, all to be determined by law, in general guarantee mother-tongue education, use of minority language in dealings with authorities, and the “right to participate in the solution of affairs concerning national minorities and ethnic groups” (Ùstava, 1992). The partly contradictory and vaguely defined articles referred to here leave ample space for interpretation. While during the 1990s the nationalist interpretation prevailed, the new government has embarked on forming a new consensus on state-society relations.
184
Minority Politics in Slovakia
______________________________________________________________ The preamble of the constitution defines the state-founding community as the Slovak nation based on the idea of self-determination. The nation is distinguished from other national minorities and ethnic groups. While the latter are included into the citizenry that is denoted the constitution’s sovereign, they are not part of the state-bearing nation. This important difference is emphasized by Nedelsky (2003). In analyzing Slovak political elite positions on the terms of nation and nationality she elucidates the relation of the stateforming nation and the state. The state, in the Slovak interpretation, is the means of a nation to realise its “right to self-determination”. Nationalities lack this right, as in this perspective they already “own” a state elsewhere, where they can realize their sovereignty as a nation (ibid.). This interpretation of the Slovak constitution defines the citizenry as divided into two classes of citizens. While the nation as state-owner features strong relations with the state, nationalities hold weaker ties to it, missing the right to realize national ambitions through it. Distinguishing the state-founder and the citizenry, the preamble establishes a power relation between the nation and the citizenry: The former is in the position to grant rights to the latter which, however, are never secure. As students of minority rights in Slovakia have observed, the unequal distinction between nation and nationalities has shaped legislation and policies in the country up until today (e.g. Csergı, 2007). In order to evaluate the inclusiveness of the Slovak interpretation of political community the understanding of “nation” needs clarification. The constitution delineates minority group rights in the fields of language, culture, and education. Slovak dominance is secured by emphasizing the role of Slovak as state language. Moreover, the constitution is formulated in the “spiritual heritage of Cyril and Methodius and the historical legacy of the Great Moravian Empire” (Ùstava, 1992). Constituting salient elements of the nation’s sovereignty, language and culture are key distinguishing features of the nation from other nationalities. Slovak language, seen as most important cultural asset of the nation, is closely linked to Slovak national sovereignty over the state territory (Csergı, 2007). This reasoning is reinforced in the body of the constitution which states that minority rights are not to “jeopardise the sovereignty of the Slovak state, the integrity of its territory or of other inhabitants of Slovakia” (Ùstava, 1992). Purporting to protect the Slovak nation from its potential “renegade” co-citizens, this passage implies a threat emendating from ethnic minorities. Considering the linkage between state, nation and language, in this sense speaking the state language downright became a citizen’s duty in the rhetoric of nationalist politicians. While this logic was applied in Slovak politics over the 1990s, it was not without alternatives. After it had been challenged by the pluralists and liberals or moderates already in the early and mid-1990s, the new government of 1998 re-launched a debate on the sovereign (Csergı, 2007). Two
Ada-Charlotte Regelmann
185
______________________________________________________________ versions of pluralist argument were put forward in the debate. Parts of the Magyar representatives favoured the cooperation along political rather than ethnic lines according to a liberal principle, an argument backed up by Slovak liberals. Others argued for the unification of Magyar political community and the recognition of the Magyar minority as a partner-nation (ibid.). Both arguments, however, involved the demand for inclusion into the state-founding entity. During constitutional debate 2000/2001, the MKP supported a new interpretation of the constitution, following up the liberal pluralist interpretation. The party suggested to replace the wording “we, the Slovak nation” by the more inclusive, and according to its promoters more adequate regarding Slovakia’s ethnic heterogeneity “we, citizens of the Slovak Republic”. The implications of the proposal, however, go beyond mere symbolic recognition. The salience of cultural (including language) self-expression for the ethnic minorities in the country would solidify demands for a new, multicultural consensus rather than solely express acceptance of multicultural reality. Recognition of the minorities as co-founding elements of the state, and thus as its “owners”, requires significant changes in the institutional setting, which threatens the Slovak’s upper hand in the political community. It is therefore not surprising that the MKP proposal was not accepted in parliament by other than MKP and Democratic Party parliamentarians in 2001 (Dostál, 2002). To conclude, the relation between state and society is defined by strong cultural components. The constitution clearly distinguishes the stateforming cultural nation from other cultural groups, establishing a strong tie between the state and its “nation”, while rejecting this status for national minorities on basis of the self-determination argument. This nationalist concept of political community continued to prevail under moderate-pluralist regime. Despite the preparedness of the Slovak moderates to cooperate with the MKP in government, their willingness did not include the acceptance of Magyars and other minorities as equally constituting part of a Slovak civic nation. The fundamental identity consensus in Slovakia, hence, neither relies on the approval of minority fellow citizens, nor does it incorporate minority demands in order to represent an inclusive consensus that can claim legitimacy for minorities. However, inclusion into the state-founding nation and thus political community is basically possible. Depending on the respective principle shaping the consensus (ethnic nationalist or civic-nationalist), this requires a stricter or weaker form of cultural and language assimilation among the minority groups. 4. Rules of the Game: Regulatory Institutions Whereas the political community’s boundaries are defined in the identity consensus, the community is effectuated in the regulatory framework, or
186
Minority Politics in Slovakia
______________________________________________________________ rules of the system. Rules are conceptualized here as the publicly fixed codifications that define how power and economic resources are to be activated. They include laws and other sets of codification, as well as formal organizations of the political system and its artefacts. Rules regulate the relations between state and society, establish, maintain and modify social order. Though shaped by the normative identity frame, rules are not fixed by it. They constitute institutions in their own right, representing “imperfect” interpretations of the identity framework through social and political actors. Each rule, then, reflects a unique development of the environment’s and other institutions’ influence on actors’ preferences. Consequently, exclusion from membership at the identity level not necessarily precludes agents from participation in constituting the rules of state-society relations (Juviler and Stroschein, 1999). That is to say that political integration could be established through the regulatory system, while exclusion from membership remained merely symbolic. Three aspects of minority inclusion into the regulatory framework of the political community will be analyzed in this section. Institutionalized regulations that support minority participation represent a means to facilitate their active inclusion into consensus formation. Hence, first, provisions for minority involvement into decision-making are examined. Second, formal inclusion constitutes only one necessary aspect of participation, as citizenship is cultural-linguistically defined. Therefore, provisions for including minority cultures and languages into the public framework are analyzed. Third, as regulations may vary at different levels of political organization the regulatory setting is examined with regard to specific minority provisions at the regional and municipality levels. Participation through Governmental Representation? The framework regulating the relations between national minorities and the state as well as the majority society in Slovakia is ambivalent, as no general or coherent minority legislation exists. The Slovak constitution guarantees fundamental human rights in line with international agreements. Additionally, national minorities and ethnic groups have the right for cultural group development, including association, establishing educational and cultural institutions, education in their mother tongue, use of minority languages in dealings with the authorities, and distributing and receiving information in minority languages. Furthermore, minorities have the constitutional right to “participate in the solution of affairs concerning national minorities and ethnic groups” (Ùstava, 1992). However, most of these rights are not further defined by law, leaving the situation for minorities vague and open to interpretation by the respective governments. Moreover, as no general minority law is in place that would define the relation between state and minority
Ada-Charlotte Regelmann
187
______________________________________________________________ groups more clearly, the situation of minorities in Slovakia is determined by a number of single laws, institutional and organizational structures. These form the opportunities for linguistic and cultural group development as well as for minority participation at the national, regional and local levels. Minority group advocacy in political processes at the national level primarily depends on political representation due to high regional concentration and strong group identity of the Magyars. Due to this strength, the MKP gained 15 out of 150 parliamentary seats in 1998, and could raise their share to 20 seats in 2002. As part of government, the MKP received three ministries, including one of the two positions of Deputy Prime Minister. While no measures of affirmative action have been introduced, the Dzurinda government launched several posts with clear responsibility for questions of minority rights: in 1999 the Deputy Prime Minister for Minorities and Regional Development, the government committee and cabinet’s section for Human Rights and Minorities, and in 2002 also the Ombudsman for the Protection of Human and Civil rights. Furthermore, in the ministries of education and culture operate sections for minority culture and minority education respectively. Though not provided with portfolio, these institutions were intended to fulfil advisory and coordinating functions, and they are also assigned the right to initiate legislation proposals. However, while the Deputy Prime Minister initiated several draft bills, his success was limited. The Committee for minority rights, as governmental institution, has not much space for autonomous activity; furthermore it was not very active under the Dzurinda government.5 While these institutions provide for some openness to minority demands, autonomous influence on decision-making processes is limited by the governmental dominance in them. Overall, ethnic minorities in Slovakia do not have a secured place for participating in community building. Political power sharing on basis of ethnic belonging not only contradicts the nationalist principle, but is also not in line with the liberal concept of community. Inclusion by Cultural Integration? The inclusion into decision-making is an important aspect of minority group representation. However, it is neither necessarily sufficient, nor the only means to provide for responsiveness towards minority claims. Consensus can, in principle, also be established through an institutional structure that is open to include and represent the different cultural groups’ demands. Taking into account the nationalist interpretation of political community in Slovakia, preconditions for a multicultural consensus in relation to the rules of political community primarily refer to the regulation of the very elements that secure one group’s privilege. As argued in the previous section, Slovak dominance is expressed through the privilege of Slovak language, culture and historical
188
Minority Politics in Slovakia
______________________________________________________________ myths. Comprehensive minority legislation in these fields would therefore enhance the potential to form a practical consensus of minority and majority groups. In Slovakia minority cultural group rights are still largely determined by the 1995 State Language Law (SLL), although parts of it were revoked by the 1999 Minority Language Law (MLL) (Daftary and Gál, 2003). The SLL is indebted to the principle of one state – one language, supporting and guaranteeing, according to its promoters, Slovak national culture, sovereignty, societal functionability and social integration.6 The Law, while introduced as a means to “establish the conditions for every citizen to be able to master the [Slovak] language”, significantly restricts the use of minority languages in Slovakia in both the public and the private spheres (Harlig, 1997). Whilst it could be seen as integrative means to improve minority members’ chances in the economic and social spheres, it is in conflict with the claims of minority groups, who regard their language as important factor to maintain cultural group identity (Langman, 2002). Before the introduction of the MLL, the law prohibited minority language use in contacts with public officials also in predominantly Hungarian-inhabited areas and extended even into the relations between doctor and patient. Being in line with the general language legislation of the 1990s the law reflects the nationalist attempt to form Slovakia as a nation-state, by ousting most expressions of Slovakia’s multicultural reality from public life and visibility (Nedelsky, 2003).7 The Slovak-only policy has been evaluated both as in-line with, and contradicting the constitution, given the provision for Slovak as the state language and for minority language rights (Harlig, 1997). While many of the measures which had constrained the socio-cultural development of minority groups for years were revoked by the Dzurinda government following the deposition of Mečiar, the SLL remained largely intact (Dostál, 2000–2007). However, the MLL filled the legal vacuum that had been established by the SLL in the field of minority language usage in official contacts (Daftary and Gál, 2003). Decisively, with the MLL limited provisions for multi-language acceptance re-entered the institutional framework. It provides for the right to use minority languages in official contacts in municipalities with significant minority population. However, the law is problematic from the perspective of effective minority legislation in several ways. First, the regulations for minority language usage do not apply to the whole country, but are limited to municipalities where a respective minority constitutes at least 20 per cent of the population. Second, the Law exhibits a number of gaps, loop holes, contradictions and vague formulations which make it hard to implement the law and are not apt to provide for greater responsiveness to minority demands (ibid.). Third, the scope of the MLL application is limited to the field of communication with public authorities. It does
Ada-Charlotte Regelmann
189
______________________________________________________________ not regulate the use of minority languages in the fields of education, culture, broadcasting etc. (Dostál, 2001).8 Overall, the MLL does not provide a coherent strategy for minority language use. Neither does it distinguish the role minorities can play in relation with the state and its founding nation. The law did not help define a consensus between majority and minorities regarding the diverse linguistic identities of the citizenry (Daftary and Gál, 2003). Also, it does not represent an attempt to include the minorities’ perspectives into the formulation of the rules of governance. As such, the MLL was criticized by the MKP, whose proposals for amending the draft bill have, however, not been taken into account (ibid.). Instead, the law confirms the position of Slovak as the sole state language. It thereby represents four arguments that have served to back up the dominance of Slovakness citizenry (Nedelsky, 2003). First, in this reasoning, Slovak dominance secures national sovereignty. Second, provisions for other national groups’ rights enhance disintegration of society by fostering these groups’ strive for national self-determination. Third, the Slovak language is seen as tool for the smooth functioning of society. Fourth, Slovak language and culture represent the civic tool for integrating the citizenry. By claiming both, Slovak language and culture as national asset of the Slovak group as well as Slovak language as “neutral” tool for integrating majority and minority groups, these rules reinforce the ambiguity of the identity consensus. Consequently, they resemble a coalition of liberal and nationalist concepts of political community, leaving no space for minority participation in society on their own terms. Despite these limitations the mere introduction of a Minority Language Law should be interpreted in line with steps revoking the repressive nationalist policies of the previous decade, allowing for more responsiveness to minority cultural claims in governmental policies. Provisory acceptance of such claims is underlined with the institutional frame for minority language education. Mother tongue education is provided to a large share of minority children in Slovakia (Langman, 2002). Furthermore, the Dzurinda government founded a University that functions predominantly in Hungarian. It offers education at three faculties, the pedagogical, theological and economic, thus representing means for increasing social competitiveness of the Magyar group in Slovakia. The establishment of a “Hungarian University” in the less economically developed region of Southern Slovakia can be seen as the major success of the MKP in government. Though some critics doubt the University’s competitiveness, and others fear the isolation of the Magyar students from the country’s Slovak-speaking academia, the MKP politicians could not see sufficient means for guaranteeing Hungarian higher education in the already existing, Slovak-dominated academic institutions (Dostál, 2003; 2005).
190
Minority Politics in Slovakia
______________________________________________________________ However, decision-making authority in the field of education remains with the national government, epitomised by conflicts over contents of the textbooks, historical narratives etc. taught at the Hungarian language schools (Deets and Stroschein, 2005). Nonetheless, the “Hungarian University” allows the continuous education in Hungarian language from nursery schools to the highest possible level for Slovak Magyars. Decisively, this suggests the liberalization of minority politics. Likewise, other initiatives of the government in the fields of minority culture do not cause as much unease among Slovaks today as in the 1990s. Yet, general provisions for responsiveness to minority demands as well as regarding their participation in society remain limited (Dostál, 2003) and hence appear to be ambivalent. The change in power relations in the political system was not reflected in significant amendments to the regulatory framework at the national level. Instead, existing institutions were adapted to new requirements through superficial shifts not questioning the overall community consensus. It represents a nationalist-liberal compromise that allows for some minority selfexpression in spheres where non-members of the political community do not challenge the overall privilege of Slovakness. This arrangement reflects a liberal concept of political community to the extent that most expressions of cultural belonging are limited to the private sphere. However, the liberal concept accepts minority rights only on the premise of the Slovak national principle as means of integrating the community. While no institution supporting minority representation guarantees minority group inclusion into decision-making processes, the framework provides for cultural rights on basis of high concentration of minority population. However, organizationally these rights are still linked to the national level. The regional concentration of minorities does not form a basis of any territorial or cultural decision-making authority. Quite the contrary, the territorial-administrative structure in Slovakia is established in a way to undermine the political strength that the Magyars gained from their settlement patterns (Dostál 2002). Power-sharing through Devolution? The new government initiated the reform of public administration aiming at general democratization and devolution (Bryson, 2008). It touched two major issues with regard to political community structuring at the regional and municipality levels and involved aspects of ethno-politics consequently. First, territorial-administrative reform bore the chance of redrawing the borders of territorial units and increasing the minorities’ share of the respective regional population. This could foster their role in regional politics due to numerical strength. Second, with the introduction of self-government at the regional
Ada-Charlotte Regelmann
191
______________________________________________________________ level, the competences of institutions at the national, regional and local levels had to be redefined. Students of devolution argue that regional self-governments potentially enhance democratic community building, if they are enabled to exercise policies more accessible to the regional population. This could include ethnopolitical democracy (Buček, 2002). At the local level people can engage, even if they are not part of the overall political community. The limits of the political community as represented in the institutional setting, therefore do not fully constrain political agency on side of those excluded from political community on the whole. In a sense, they can cooperate with the national political community despite being “outside” of it. Opening the limits of community then depends on possible alliances or cooperation with those members of citizenry that favour a more open community. Following the fall of Mečiar, political power relations at the national level have changed in 1998. The regulation of control mechanisms and economic resource distribution at sub-national levels, however, has not changed, nor has the majority-minority group relations within the established social order. Likewise, devolution of competencies to the regional governments in the course of the reform has not altered the majority-minority consensus over the institutions of political community locally. Although large parts of the government coalition attempted to reorganize the administration according to historical regions in order to increase cooperation between municipalities, the existing structure of regional administration is being maintained. The aspired form of organization would have provided for more decision-making autonomy of minority groups at the local levels, a scenario that made part of the coalition government vote against it, together with the opposition parties (Brusis, 2002). Likewise, the limited transfer of competences to the regional and local self-governments does not warrant decision-making authority for minority groups on questions of their particular interest. As responsibilities lie more in the managerial, implementing and control functions and in concrete organization of public services, this does not allow the shaping and designing of policies (Bryson, 2008). Admittedly, the reluctance of the national political community to give up competences in these fields to subnational communities reserves the opportunity for redistributing resources between regions and coherent organization of society as a whole. This enables the national government to balance regional differences and potentially enhance social integration at the sub-national level. From the vantage point of minority participation, however, the problem lies with the ethnic dimension of central state institutions. What does this mean for minority engagement with the regulatory institutions of the Slovak state? Despite a number of legislative changes, the Dzurinda government did not initiate significant change in the institutional setting of minority-related ‘rules’. More so, the government missed the
192
Minority Politics in Slovakia
______________________________________________________________ chance to introduce a coherent and unambiguous frame for changing majority-minority relations. Opening the political sphere for minority participation on the basis of group belonging would have implied a reorganization of political power and resources. However, Slovak politicians were disinclined towards initiating the redistribution of power resources. That is to say, the administrative reform aimed at undermining regional dynamics, and in this respect reinforced the ethnic cleavage in the country. Just as the territorial order had been established with the strong presence of the Magyars in mind, the reform debate was shaped by the very same cleavage. Despite the intention to democratize state-society relations by means of devolution, the implications for simultaneously democratizing state-minority relations became an obstacle to this aspect of the reform. 5. Policies and Practices of the Multicultural Community While the regulatory and identity structures of the political community define how resources are allocated, rules and self-conception of the community are determined in the interaction of political agents with these structures. In their practices these agents interpret the given framework in order to adjust their decision-making and coalition formation. For this reason, frameworks are open to interpretations that circumvent, modify or confirm the old understanding. Actions thus represent currently valid interpretations of the consensus on who is legitimate to act on community issues. In Slovakia, I suggest, though accepted as member of government, the MKP was not accepted as legitimate actor when it came to issues that regarded the position of minorities, and therefore the general political community. Based on their electoral successes and due to the Slovak moderates’ desire for a good standing in the EU accession negotiations, Magyar representatives were included into the powerful decision-making body of the Slovak government (Pridham, 2002). However, disagreement on the desired concept of community frequently led to an unfortunate overlap of political and ethnic voting and the subsequent exclusion of the MKP from decisionmaking. The MKP’s pluralist concept of political community could not mobilize political and normative institutions in its support. Putative aspects of pluralism in the community consensus turned out as expressions of a liberalnationalist idea, granting selected minority rights in the private sphere, where they would not challenge the dominant group’s privilege. Moreover, as the Dzurinda government would have had an absolute majority already without the MKP, the latter’s role in government was weakened; the MKP provided, however, for the constitutional majority (ibid.). The dealing with a number of proposals submitted by the MKP illustrates the weak position of the Hungarian government actors. These promoted the inclusion of minorities into the political community by aiming at the identity consensus, organizational structure of political community at differ-
Ada-Charlotte Regelmann
193
______________________________________________________________ ent levels, and regulations for minority inclusion in various fields. The MKP demanded acknowledgement of the whole citizenry as part of the statefounding nation, supporting a liberal rather than pluralist concept of political community. In order to compensate for the attributed role of “second-classcitizens”, the representatives of the Magyar community emphasized their view that a coherent minority law was needed to clarify the ambiguous wording of the constitution. Likewise, a Law on the Financing of Minority Culture was drafted by the MKP to make planning in this field possible and grant more security to the minority groups. In addition, the MKP supported the recognition of minority rights beyond administrative units with a certain percentage of minority population. All these demands implied the recognition of minorities as a substantial part of the citizenry of Slovakia and their limited inclusion into the political community, at least at the levels of regulation and resource distribution. Unsurprisingly, the MKP’s influence on political agenda-setting was limited. Despite liberal or moderate orientation among the Slovak government parties, only one party supported the inclusion into the state founding community (Dostál, 2002). The process of drafting and debating a Minority Law was repeatedly postponed, responsibilities shifted among institutions, before it was finally dropped (Dostál, 2002–2006). Other initiatives were overthrown by “Slovak coalitions” of government and opposition parties, which repeatedly mobilized the narrative of periled sovereignty against the MKP’s proposals. Although the government showed preparedness to fill the gaps left by the vague wording of the constitution, it did not put much effort into the question of how to actually ensure minority participation in Slovak politics. No government strategy revealed signs of a coherent concept of integrating the political community normatively or regulatory, at any level of the political system. The rejection (or disregard?) of the MKP’s proposals does not show a clear pattern. However, all rebuffed initiatives would have significantly changed the structural and institutional settings towards a pluralist conception. Lacking guarantees for participation in decision-making, the Magyars in government depended on the preparedness of Slovak forces to cooperate with them by mobilizing liberal or multicultural resources. Instead, however, both Slovak camps have continuously activated the narratives on national selfdetermination and sovereignty, and impeded tendencies of any form of minority autonomy. They were backed up by the reference to identity and regulatory framework of the political community. A pluralist conception of the nation, if established, would have contradicted this accepted system of norms and rules of Slovakia’s core-nation.
194
Minority Politics in Slovakia
______________________________________________________________ Change or Continuity in Slovakia’s majority-minority Relations? Political community denotes the group of people in a political unit or territory who are perceived as legitimate to make decisions on community issues. Inclusion into the political community is no necessary prerequisite of membership in a political unit or territory. Rather, the community is defined through a consensus, which represents the results of bargaining processes among its members. It includes the community’s purposes, rules, organization and procedures. The agreement on membership in the community is bound to be exclusive if it is formulated by its members, embedded in particular power relations and bearing their perceptions of potentially conflicting interests with the members of other groups. However, the degree of its inclusiveness is alterable. Eventually, the consensus of the community members is the expression of ongoing interaction of political actors with their structural environment. As such, it is open to reinterpretation, redefinitions and, potentially, to change. Simultaneously, institutions at different levels contribute to the community’s instantiation and maintenance. These institutions not only help reinforce the consensus on the whole, but also serve to strengthen each other, thus stabilising the established group relations when they face challenges at various levels. In the multiethnic setting of Slovakia, over the 1990s a system of normative and legal rules had been established that institutionalised the dominance of the largest ethnic group. In this process, the political community mobilized strong discourses on perceived group disadvantage, historical cleavages and the problems of current radical social change. With the inclusion of a minority party into government in 1998, the consensus on Slovak dominance was challenged by a change in power relations between the main concepts of political community. While this transformation was reflected in a minor shift in the regulatory framework and practices of resource distribution, power sharing did not lead to fundamental change of the political community. In this process, the different levels of political community served as inter-institutional feedbacks and adjusting factors for the community’s institutional setting to remain stable. While the MKP was re-elected into government in 2002, thus being confirmed as legitimate actor on community issues, this did not help integrate the Magyars and Slovaks into one consensus on the boundaries of the nation. The old normative consensus on political community as the agreement of the Slovak group only was stabilized through the other institutional levels. The rules structuring group relations confirm the privilege of the linguistically and culturally Slovak nation as single legitimate actor. The practices in everyday politics simultaneously reflected the old interpretation of the community consensus and in this sense corrected deviant 6.
Ada-Charlotte Regelmann
195
______________________________________________________________ developments, such as those challenging the Slovak “ownership” of the state. Likewise, when at the regulatory level the frame was opened to grant and broaden cultural rights for minorities, the political actors were able to reinforce the community consensus to the advantage of Slovak privilege. In the decision-making on appropriate rights for minorities more pluralist ideas came into conflict with the identity framework provided by the constitution and concept of citizenship that supported nationalist and liberal interpretations. Finally, while the MKP met formal requirements for participating in agenda-setting and decision-making processes, neither the identity nor the regulatory framework supply legitimacy or any means of proportionate say in politics. The ambiguous community consensus on the relations between Slovaks and Magyars provides resources for nationalist and liberal, but not pluralist conceptions of society. As argued in this paper, the implementation of the Slovak version of community consensus at various levels of the political (and social) sphere helped stabilize the accord through inter-institutional feedback effects somewhat. The inclusion of minority political actors into the political system, therefore, can be a first step for community integration. However, significant change in the institutional setting is necessary to make the inclusion lasting, and ultimately, to guarantee the establishment of a new consensus. Endnotes 1. In this article, the group of Slovak citizens who are ascribed Hungarian nationality or identify themselves with it will be referred to as Magyars in order to distinguish them from the citizens of Hungary (Hungarians). 2. References to Ondrej Dostál’s annual reports on the situation of ethnic minorities in Slovakia are listed as one single entry in the list of references for reasons of space (cf. Dostál, 2000–2003; 2005–2007). 3. Slovak and Magyar parties cooperated during the brief “moderate” interim government (March – December 1994) between Mečiar’s second and third terms in office. This cooperation could be revived over the years before the 1998 election, when Slovak and Magyar opposition parties worked together more closely on selected issues (Csergı, 2007). 4. Various schools of thought have identified pros and cons of different concepts of community for minority participation, such as ethnic or civic nationalism, liberal pluralism or illiberal nationalism. For a debate on these concepts in relation to the Slovak case cf. Csergı, 2007; Deets and Stroschein, 2005; Nedelsky, 2003. 5. The Council’s chair and vice-chair are appointed by cabinet; governmental practice allocated the chair to the Deputy Prime Minister for Minorities, and
196
Minority Politics in Slovakia
______________________________________________________________ the vice-chair to the Minister of Culture. Between 2002 and 2006 the Council met only once per year (Dostál, 2006). 6. These aspects are mentioned in the justification of the State Language Law: “[T]he Slovak language is the most important distinctive feature of the uniqueness of the Slovak nation, the most valuable piece of the cultural heritage and expression of sovereignty of the Slovak Republic and the general means of communication for its citizens, which guarantees them freedom and equality in dignity and rights in the territory of the Slovak Republic” (Translation adopted from Daftary and Gál, 2003, my emphases). 7. Further laws enacted under the Mečiar government restricted among others the use of names and prohibited geographical designations in minority languages. 8. Moreover, initiatives of the MKP to extend minority language rights to municipalities with less than 20 per cent minority population or to the national parliament have repeatedly been rejected by “Slovak coalitions”. Not only does this confirm Slovak as the only language of the political community; it also constitutes two groups of minority citizens: those residing in significantly minority-inhabited areas (who can exercise their minority language rights), and those who reside elsewhere.
References Brusis, M. (2002), “Between EU Requirements, Competitive Politics, and National Traditions: Re-creating Regions in the Accession Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 15: 531–559. Bryson, P. J. (2008), “‘State administration’ vs. self-government in the Slovak and Czech Republics,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 41: 339–358. Buček, J. (2002), “Responding to Diversity: Solutions at the Local Level in Slovakia,” in: A. M. Bíró and P. Kovács (eds.), Diversity in Action: Local Public Management of Multi-Ethnic Communities in Central and Eastern Europe, Budapest: Open Society Institute, 273–306. Csergı, Z. (2007), Talk of the Nation: Language and Conflict in Romania and Slovakia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Daftary, F. and K. Gál (2003), “The 1999 Slovak Minority Language Law: Internal or External Politics?,” in: F. Daftary and F. Grin (eds.), Nation-
Ada-Charlotte Regelmann
197