The Philosophy of Rawls A Collection of Essays
Series Editors
HenryS. Richardson Georgetown University Paul J. Weithman University of Notre Dame
A
GARLAND SERIES READINGS IN PHILOSOPHY ROBERT
N OZICK,
ADVISOR
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Contents of the Series 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Development and Main Outlines of Rawls's Theory of Justice The Two Principles and Their Justification Opponents and Implications of A Theory of Justice Moral Psychology and Community Reasonable Pluralism
Moral Psychology and Community
Edited with an introduction by
Paul J. Weithman University of Notre Dame
GARLAND PUBLISHING, INC. A
MEMBER OF THE TAYLOR
New York & London 1999
&
FRANCIS GROUP
Introductions copyright C 1999 Paul J. Weithman. All rights reserved.
Ubrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Moral psychology and community I edited with an introduction by PaulJ. Weithman. p. em.- (The philosophy of Rawls; 4) ·A Garland series, readings in philosophy." Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-8153-2928-8 (alk. paper) l. Self-esteem. 2. Community. 3. Rawls, John 1921Contributions in political science. I. Weithman, Paul J., 1959- II. Series. HM106l.M67 1999 155.2-dc21
Printed on add-free, 250-year-life paper Manufactured in the United States of America
99-048609
Contents
vii ix
Series Introduction Volume Introduction MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
Self·Eateem and Self·Reapect
l
Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique John Veigh
22
How to Distinguish Self-Respect from Self-Esteem David Sachs
37
Rawlsian Self-Respect and the Black Consciousness Movement Larry L. Thomas
Moral Development and a Senae of Juatlce
50
The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral Judgment
67
The Motivation to Be Just
85
Human Evolution and the Sense of Justice
Lawrence Koh/berg Stanley Bates Allan Gibbard Moral Paychology, Stability and the Support they Provide for "Juatlce a• Falrneaa"
102
Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views Samuel Freeman
139
Justice and the Problem of Stability Edward F. McClennen
Vi
CONTENTS
167
The Stability Problem in Political Liberalism
187
Moral Independence and the Original Position
Thomas E. Hill, Jr. Samuel Scheffler COMMUNITY Group Identity •nd the Communlt•rl•n Critique
195
Rawls on the Individual and the Social
217
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self
Wayne Proudfoot Michael J. Sandel Defen.. of R•wlsl•n Llber•ll•m
234
Rawls and Individualism
246
Communitarian Critics of Liberalism
261
Rawls, Hegel, and Communitarianism
C.F. Delaney
Amy Gutmann Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach
295
Rawls's Communitarianism
321
The Individual, the State, and the Common Good
Roberto Alejandro John Haldane
343
Acknowledgments
Series Introduction
John Rawls is the pre-eminent political philosopher of our time. His 1971 masterpiece, A Theory of Justice, permanently changed the landscape of moral and political theory, revitalizing the normative study of social issues and taking stands about justice, ethics, rationality, and philosophical method that continue to draw followers and critics today. His Political Liberalism (rev. ed., 1996) squarely faced the fundamental challenges posed by cultural, religious, and philosophical pluralism. It should be no surprise, then, that turn-of-the-century searches of the periodical indices in philosophy, economics, law, the humanities, and related fields turn up almost three thousand articles devoted to a critical discussion of Rawls's theory. In these Volumes we reprint a wide-ranging selection of the most influential and insightful articles on Rawls. While it was impossible, even in a collection of this size, to reprint all of the important material, the selection here should provide the student and scholar with a route into all of the significant controversies that have surrounded Rawls's theories since he first began enunciating them in the nineteen-fifties- issues that the Introductions to each Volume of this series delineate. Eight criteria guided our selection. First, these volumes form part of a series devoted to secondary literature. We reprint no articles by Rawls: most of these have just appeared together for the first time in his Collected Papers. 1 Second, we reprint only self-contained articles published in English, rather than selections from books or articles in other languages. Third, the articles reprinted here are all about Rawls's view, as opposed to being original reflections inspired by Rawls's work. Fourth, we aimed for a broad coverage of controversies and of the main features of Rawls's theory that they surround. Since the Volumes are organized in terms of these controversies, we include very few overall assessments or book reviews. Some central elements of Rawls's theory, while relatively novel and well-articulated, have not been controversial enough to draw critical fire in the secondary literature. The Volume Introductions mention many of these features. Fifth, we aimed to include the most influential articles that have appeared. In identifying these, we used a systematic search of the citation indices to supplement our own judgment. Naturally, we also took special notice of pieces cited by Rawls himself. Sixth, we sought to reprint articles by a large number of authors representing the widest possible range of points of view. In some cases, this meant refraining from reprinting a certain article because its author was already well represented in the selections. Seventh, we have sought to exhibit through
viii
SERIES
INTRODUCTION
our selections the broadly interdisciplinary influence of Rawls's writings. We ha~e included articles by political theorists, economists, lawyers, religious thinkers, and soaal scientists as well as by philosophers. Eighth, we have favored including articles that are now relatively hard to find. For this reason, with the exception of H.L.A. Hart's exceptionally influential essay, we refrained from including any of the fine articles that were reprinted in Norman Daniels's 197 5 collection, Readins Rawls, 2 which the reader interested in the early reception of Rawls's views should consult. Utilizing all of these selection criteria did not leave us without painful choices. The secondary literature on Rawls is so deep that another set of five volumes could cover all the main issues with a completely non-overlapping set of fine articles. Some articles unfortunately had to be cut because of their sheer length: dropping one of them allowed us to include two or three others. Others, more arbitrarily, fell victim to the high permissions costs set by their initial publishers. We particularly regret that it proved impossible to find a short enough, self-contained essay by Raben Nozick that would have represented his trenchant libertarian critique of Rawls. While we do include (in Vol. 3) some of the secondary literature that responds to and picks up on Nozick's influential arguments, one should consult Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia ( 197 4) to appreciate their richness, subtlety, and power. 1 The five volumes are arranged in roughly chronological order. The first volume includes articles on Rawls's early statements of his view and on its central contractarian ideas. Volume 2 covers the two principles of justice as fairness and Rawls's most general ideas about their justification. Volume 3 focuses on the concrete implications of Rawls's view and on the debates between Rawls and his utilitarian, perfectionist, libertarian, conservative, radical. and feminist critics. Volume 4 treats of Rawls's moral psychology and his attempt to accommodate the value of community. Volume 5, on Rawls's most recent work, is entitled MReasonable Pluralism." The serious student of Rawls's initial impact is greatly assisted by John Rawls and His Critics: An Annotated Bibliosraphy, put together by J.H. Wellbank, Denis Snook, and David T. Mason, which catalogues and provides abstracts for most of the secondary literature in English prior to 1982.4 While this work was of great help with that earlier period, completing the onerous task of collecting and sorting through the voluminous secondary literature, which has since continued to balloon, would not have been possible without the able and thorough research assistance of Rachael Yocum. We are grateful to the Dean of Georgetown College and to the Graduate School of Georgetown University for their generosity in supporting this research assistance. HenryS. Richardson Paul J. Weithman
Notes ' John Rawls, Colltt:ted Papm ed sam 1 F ( . • Nonnan Daniels ed Re--';:., ~--·ts (uNeY ~n Cambndge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999). , . ' ·• ""--.. .,..,.., • .: BaSic Books, 1975). Roben Nouck, Nlarchy. State, tmd Utqpia (N.Y.: Basic Books 1974) 4 JHWeDbank,Dni · ' • . . e s Snook, and DaVId T. Mason. John Rawls and His Critics· An Annotated B'bl" .... (New York: Garland. 1982). · 1 1ograp..,
Volume Introduction
One of the most important pieces of Rawls's theory of justice is the moral psychology it incorporates. Rawls gives an account of the moral and psychological capacities citizens are presumed to have, and of the moral development and motives of citizens in a just society. Elements of this account bear great weight at pivotal steps in the arguments of A Theory of Justice 1 and Political Liberalism. 2 Rawls developed and connected those elements with an eye to the burdens he intended to place upon them. A good deal of attention has been devoted to determining exactly what burdens he intended them to bear, whether they are able to bear them and whether the arguments they are intended to support establish what Rawls thinks they do. The account that Rawls produced is also of intrinsic philosophical, psychological and political interest. Some of the commentary it has received therefore pays scant attention to the roles it plays in arguments for justice as fairness. Instead it is viewed as a sophisticated contribution to the studies of emotion and moral development, worthy of careful examination in its own right. Rawls's treatment of moral psychology also supplies premises crucial to his argument that a society that conformed to his two principles would enjoy the goods of community. Challenges to this claim sparked one of the most important debates in political philosophy during the 1980s, the liberal-communitarian debate. The articles in the present volume are among the most probing pieces of critical literature on Rawls's discussions of moral psychology and community. Their content, range and influence demonstrate both how important these topics are to Rawls's work and how far-reaching their implications are taken to be. Since the articles depart from such different questions and range over so wide an area, it will prove useful to map the terrain, plot their connections and show where they venture into territory covered in other volumes. One indication of how central Rawls's moral psychology is to his theory is the connection between it and the distinctive features of the original position, which are designed to model the moral powers Rawls attributes to citizens. While there is some intimation of this in TJ (seep. 18), Rawls could fully articulate the connection between the moral powers and the original position only after having given a richer and more Kantian conception of persons in response to H.L.A. Hart's criticisms (see PL, pp. 299, 304ff.: also the introduction to Volume 2). Because essays in other volumes treat of the original position (Volume 1), Rawls's response to Hart (Volume 2) and the increasingly
X
VoLUME
INTRODUCTION
Kantian conception of the person present in Rawls:s wo~k from ~he Dewey ~:~~~:~ onward (Volume 2), these matters are not pursued~~ arucles repnnted here. to the indication of moral psychology's central role is the Importance Rawl~ ~ttaches rima ood of self-respect, which he equates with self-esteem. This IS, Raw~s ~ays, ~he m~t ~portant of the primary goods (TJ, p. 440). The fact that Rawls's two ~nnoples would support citizens' self-respect by publicly proclaiming society's commitment to treating them as ends in themselves is decisive in the argument for them over average utilitarianism (TJ, pp. 178ff.) and over "mixed conceptions". 1 Rawls's explanation of why self-respect or self-esteem is the most i~po~ant prirt)Clry good, and hence is suited to play this role in the argument for the two pnnaples. depends upon the moral and psychological discussions of TJ, part m. There Rawls argues that a conception of justice cannot be fully justified until it is shown to be stable ~ until, that is, it is shown to be capable of generating its own moral support when It regulates basic institutions (d. TJ, p. 6; PL, p. xix). In the third part of TJ Rawls th~ref~re attempts to show that justice as fairness would be stable. This is an extraordmanly ambitious undertaking. It requires Rawls to address one of the most difficult problems in moral philosophy: that of showing that it is good to be just or, as he says, that of showing that a sense of justice informed by the two principles is "congruent" with a person's good (TJ, p. 513). This, in tum, requires him to develop both a general account of the good, which he calls •goodness as rationality, • and an account of the good as it applies to persons. Only with this last account in hand can he explain what it is for persons to have a sense of their own goodness or worth, why it is good for them to have it and how the sense of self-respect would be supported by a just society. Someone has self-respect, Rawls says, when she is secure in the sense that her plan of life is worth executing, and when she is confident that she has the resources, abilities and excellences of character needed to carry out her intentions (TJ, p. 440). Its possession depends upon affirmation by those with whom one associates, upon public respect for citizens' ends and upon the just adjudication of their claims. All these conditions, Rawls says, would be satisfied in the well-ordered society of justice as fairness (TJ, p. 442). Conversely, when someone fails to exhibit the virtues necessary to execute his plan of life, he experiences the diminution of self-esteem Rawls associates with shame (TJ, pp. 444-45). Since justice is one of those virtues and knowledge of its possession engenders a sense of self-worth, acts of injustice give rise to shame. This connection between shame, self-esteem and regulative principles of right, Rawls implies, supports the Kantian interpretation of justice as fairness (TJ, pp. 256, 445). John Deigh's article in this volume challenges the connection Rawls asserts between shame and a loss of self-esteem. He ultimately locates the problem in Rawls's conception of the worth or good of persons, according to which persons have worth depending upon how they live or direct their lives. This conception of worth is, he says, "the wrong one for explaining the sense of worth that makes one liable to shame." Deigh draws a conclusion about a Rawlsian account of the emotions. He does not draw out the implications of his conclusion for the Kantian interpretation. If the arguments in his paper are sound, however, one of the arguments Rawls uses to support that interpretation will have to be recast. David Sachs argues that self-respect and self-esteem are different but related ideas, a point Rawls has since conceded to him (PL, p. 404,
VOLUME
INTRODUCTION
Xi
note 39). This difference points to a question Sachs himself does not raise: if self-respect and self-esteem are different, which if either should be included among the primary goods? Larry L. Thomas, like Sachs, seizes on the distinction between self-respect and self-esteem and criticizes Rawls for ignoring it. What part III of TJ relies upon, he says, are the conditions of self-esteem. The conditions required by self-respect, he argues, are quite different. Securing the conditions of African-American self-respect, he continues, was the goal of the Black Consciousness Movement. His discussion suggests that he, at least, would think self-respect and not self-esteem is the most important of the primary goods. The argument that justice as fairness would be stable depends, not just upon an account of the goodness of persons, but also upon an argument that persons growing up under institutions which conformed to the two principles would develop an effective, corresponding sense of justice. As part of his argument that they would, Rawls sketches an account of moral development according to which persons pass through three stages, which he calls "the morality of authority," "the morality of association," and "the morality of principles" (TJ, pp. 462-79). This account of moral development has been disputed by feminist psychologists who allege that it unjustifiably elevates a distinctively male form of moral reasoning. 4 In his article, Lawrence Kohl berg, to whose work Rawls says he is indebted (TJ, p. 460, note 6), defends Rawls's claim that the morality of principles is the most advanced state of moral development. Stanley Bates's article is an early appreciation of Rawls's discussion of the development of a sense of justice and its debt to Kant. Reading it gives some indication of how Rawls's moral psychology was received at the time it was published; it remains the best introduction to Part III of TJ. Progression through the developmental stages Rawls identifies depends upon the operation of three psychological laws (TJ, pp. 463, 470, 473-4). These laws are laws of redprodty. They assert that human beings will respond in kind to benefits shown them by persons and associations, and will develop allegiance to institutions which operate for their good. This is not the place to survey and systematize the many ways in which reciprocity surfaces in Rawls's work. What is dear is that for Rawls, the tendency to reciprocate is a "deep psychological fact" about our species which makes it possible for human beings to cooperate on fair terms (TJ, pp. 494-95). It is therefore the psychological basis of the sense of justice. This tendency, Rawls conjectures, has an evolutionary basis: reciprocity has survival value for creatures of our kind (TJ, p. 503). Allan Gibbard, who says he learned from Rawls the centrality of reciprocity to human moral experience, s attempts to substantiate this conjecture in the article reprinted in this volume. The surprising upshot of his argument, Gibbard thinks, is non-cognitivism about justice. Samuel Freeman's very rich article contrasts Rawls's version of contractualism with that of David Gauthier and argues for the superiority of the former. His argument turns on claims about the moral capacities that Rawls attributes to citizens, including the capacity for reciprocity. As noted earlier, Rawls thinks it necessary to show that justice as fairness would be a stable conception of justice, capable of generating its own support. Rawls frames his stability arguments with two audiences in mind: parties in the original position, and readers of his work. Parties in the original position ask whether various conceptions of justice under consideration would be stable and know enough about
xii
VOLUME
INTRODUCTION
the rinciples of moral learning to make an informed judgment ~~J. p. 138). R::;
fairn~ss
th~ rea~ons ~uz~~s :~~!;le
arg!s that the likely stability of justice as and of h. h to support it are among the reasons the parties adopt lt rat er t an e . average utilit~ (TJ, p. 177). For their part, readers of Rawls's work mus~ de term me ~ l:d conception of justice can be put into reflective equilibrium with theu own consi er. judgments. The stability arguments Rawls offers- including his ar~~m~nt.that parties in the original position would prefer justice as fairness to average ut.llnanamsm becaus: it can better generate its own support - are intended to convmce readers of th superiority of justice as fairness to competing conceptions. This presupposes, of course, that the function of the original position is not merely to represent the moral powers of citizens, but that It also has some justificatory force. Edward McClenne~, however, is sufficiently worried about choice under conditions of extreme u~~ertamt~ .that h.e raises the possibility of arguing for justice as fairness without the ongmal posi~Ion. His article reformulates the stability argument for the superiority of justice as fairness to average utilitarianism without relying on it. Rawls's later work has famously taken a political turn, officially announced in his article •Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical. "6 and cemented in place with the publication of PL. Rawls says that he first considered revising justice as fairness in 1977, when Samuel Scheffler sent him a copy of the paper included in this volume (PL. p. xxxiv). The explidtly political tum, he says. was motivated by his own growing recognition that the treatment of stability in TJ had been inadequate. In the introduction to PL. he says: The fact of a plurality of reasonable but incompatible comprehensive doctrines -the fact of reasonable pluralism -shows that, as used in Theory, the idea of a well-ordered society of justice as fairness is unrealistic. This is because it is inconsistent with realizing its own prindples under the best of foreseeable conditions. The account of the stability of a well-ordered society in part III is therefore also unrealistic and must be recast. (PL. p. xix) The stability argument in TJpresupposed, Rawls thinks. that everyone in a well-ordered society of justice as fairness would agree on what he now calls •comprehensive philosophical doctrine." It presupposed, for example, that everyone would accept Rawls's account of the good in general and the good for persons. Once it is recognized that reasonable persons will disagree on fundamental questions about the good life, the presupposition is seen to be false. Since this disagreement implies that dtizens may have different grounds for assessing their own worth and since the account of self-respect is vital to the stability argument of TJ, discarding the presupposition required Rawls to revise the stability argument for justice as fairness. He now argues that justice as fairness would be the object of an •overlapping consensus• of reasonable philosophical and religious views. Though this argument departs significantly from the stability arguments in part m of TJ, it like them turns on theses in moral psychology (PL, pp. 141, 163). Claims in moral psychology therefore remain crucial to Rawls's defense of justice as fairness. The notions Rawls relied upon to effect his political turn, the notions of a
VOLUME
INTRODUCTION
Xiii
comprehensive doctrine, an overlapping consensus and reasonable pluralism, are examined in some of the essays included Volume 5. What matters for present purposes is what the new argument for stability is intended to prove. Is it supposed to show that an overlapping consensus on justice as fairness is likely under favorable conditions? Rawls's remark that his earlier idea of well-ordered society of justice as fairness is "unrealistic" might suggest this. In an article reprinted here, however, Thomas Hill maintains that Rawls wanted only to argue that a stable overlapping consensus is possible under reasonably favorable circumstances. That it is possible for a conception of justice to win stable allegiance tells in its favor, Hill thinks, quite apart from whether it is likely to do so. Though Hill does not say so, his imputation of this lesser aspiration to Rawls fits well with other remarks Rawls himself makes. Near the end of the "Introduction to the Paperback Edition" of PL, Rawls writes that the Holocaust and the wars of the twentieth century "raise in an acute way the question whether political relations must be governed by power and coercion alone." He continues "[i]f a reasonably just society that subordinates power to its aims is not possible and people are largely amoral. if not incurably cynical and self-centered, one might ask with Kant whether it is worthwhile for human beings to live on the earth?" (PL. p. lxii). A great deal therefore depends upon showing that a just society is possible. If this possibility cannot be vindicated, it would be reasonable for human beings to acquiesce in cynicism and despair. The task Rawls assigns political philosophy is precisely that of vindicating the possibility. It does so by showing how a just society could win stable allegiance, given reasonable psychological assumptions like the laws appealed to in part III of TJ and in the discussion of an overlapping consensus (PL. pp. 101, 172). Rawls argues that a well-ordered society of justice as fairness would realize the goods of community because it would be composed of social unions in which members esteem one another's pursuits and excellences. It would also be a "social union of social unions" in which "the successful carrying out of just institutions is the shared final end of all the members of society, and these institutional forms are prized as good in themselves" (TJ, p. 527). The argument for these claims depends upon a psychological principle Rawls calls "the Aristotelian principle" and upon his analysis of the conditions of self-respect. These arguments have not convinced everyone. From the beginning, Rawls was said to have built his theory around the moral psychology of autonomous individuals, a fact clearest, it was said, from the construction of the original position. 7 Critics contended that a theory like Rawls's, which seems to be individualist in basis and to privilege autonomy, is more contentious, and less even-handed, than Rawls took his theory to be. Some have also argued that a society which privileges autonomy either cannot enjoy the goods of community at all or can enjoy them in only an attenuated way. The essay in this volume by Wayne Proudfoot is an early, but clear and concise, statement of these criticisms. Published in 1974, it anticipated many of the so-called "commmunitarian critiques" of liberalism which were so prominent in the 1980s. The best known communitarian criticism of Rawls's work is Michael Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice. 8 This volume reprints an essay by Sandel that distills and recapitulates the more extended critique of Rawlsian liberalism found in Sandel's book. Responses to communitarian criticisms were not long in coming. Cornelius
XiV
V0 L U M E l NT R0
D U CTI 0 N
Delaney argues in his paper that justice as fairness is an individualistic conception of justice only in an innocuous sense. The form of individualism Delaney finds in TJ does not, he contends, have the damaging implications critics have claimed. Amy Gutmann's article contains relatively little explicit discussion of Rawls. It is reprinted here because it is the locus classicus of the liberal response to communitarian criticisms and is clearly intended as a defense of Rawlsian liberalism. In a bold and strikingly original piece, Sibyl Schwarzenbach argues that while Hegel is often the inspiration for Rawls's communitarian critics, Rawls's political philosophy bears important similarities with Hegel's. Failure to appreciate these similarities, she concludes, has led to a corresponding failure to appreciate the resources Rawls has to respond to his critics. Roberto Alejandro explicitly takes on Sandel's criticisms of Rawls. He argues that the individualist conception of persons that Sandel finds in Rawls's work rests upon a misreading. Like Schwarzenbach, Alejandro believes Rawls has the resources to reply to his critics, though he cautions that there are costs to drawing on them. The last essay in the volume is by John Haldane. Its relatively recent date of authorship afforded Haldane the benefit of a studied distance from the liberalcommunitarian debate. Haldane argues, in effect, that that debate depends upon a false dichotomy, at least if the liberalism at issue is the Rawlsian liberalism of PL. The most appropriate form of stability for a modern liberal democracy, Haldane maintains, is provided neither by a robust sense of community nor by an overlapping consensus. Rather, it is provided by what Rawls would call a stable modus vivendi (for this notion, see PL, p. 146f.). The extent to which a society held together by a modus vivendi can be stable, establish justice or realize the goods of community depends upon political culture and so varies from society to society. Haldane writes that political philosophers should take their tasks and problems, as well as their bearings, from the political cultures of the societies they address. This makes of political philosophy a piecemeal enterprise without the synthetic or systematic aspirations of Rawls's liberalism. Paul J. Weithman Notes John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harv d u · · b . ar mversny Press, 1971 ). References to this work will hereafter , e lilY~~ par~nthetically in the body ofthe text, with the title abbreviated 'TJ.' John Rawls, Pollt1cal LiberaliSm (Columbia University Press 1996) R f · · b · • · e erences to th1s work w1ll hereaf· I J h C ther e IIJVen parenthetically in the body of the text, with the title abbreviated •PL • • os ua . ~ en, "Democratic Equality." Ethics 99 ( 1989): 727-51. . Carol G~lhgan. In a Differmt Voice (Harvard University Press 1982) ' Allan Gibbard Wist Choices A t " 1· · ' · ' • P ree '"IP (Harvard Umversity Press 1990) · 'John Rawls. "Justice as Faimess· Political N M h . • . ' 'p. IX. 'Thomas Nagel. "Rawls on Justice • Philosoothi;~p ~leal. Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985 ): 223-51. • Michael Sandel. Liberalism and P .Rtvi~ 82 (1973): 220-34. Lllluts of Justtct (Cambridge University Press. 1982).
1
the . .
Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique* John Deigh Twenty-five years ago the psychoanalyst Gerhan Piers offered what remains the most influential way of distinguishing shame from guilt. Reformulated without terms special to psychoanalytic theory, Piers's distinction is that shame is occasioned when one fails to achieve a goal or an ideal that is integral to one's self-conception whereas guilt is occasioned when one transgresses a boundary or limit on one's conduct set by an authority under whose governance one lives. Succinctly, shame goes to failure, guilt to transgression. Shame is felt over shortcomings, guilt over wrongdoings.• More recently, writers who have addressed themselves to the way shame differs from guilt, notably, among philosophers, John Rawls, have characterized shame as an emotion one feels upon loss of self-esteem and have analyzed self-esteem and its loss in a way that bears out Piers's influence.' Rawls plainly is in Piers's debt. He explains self-esteem in terms of the goals and ideals one incorporates into one's life plans, and he makes this explanation central to his account of our moral personality, in particular, our capacity to feel shame. A characterization of shame like Rawls's, when set in the context of distinguishing shame from guilt, we are likely to find intuitively appealing. And we may feel a further pull in its direction when we think of shame in comparison with other emotions to which it is thought similar-for instance, embarrassment. For we associate both shame and embarrassment with an experience of discomfiture, a sudden shock that short-circuits one's composure and self-possession; yet we would agree, I think, that • I am indebted to Herbert Morris for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. 1. Gerhan Piers and Milton B. Singer, Shame and Guilt: A Psychoanalytic and a Cultural Study (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1953), pp. 11-12. 2. John Rawls, A Tluoryofjwtice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 440-46. For similar views see Helen Merrell Lynd, On Shame and the Smrt:h fur ldnatitJ (New York: Harcoun Brace&: Co., 1958), pp. 23--24; Roben W. White, "Competence and the Psychosexual Stages of Development," in Nebraslla Symposium on Motivation/960, ed. Marshall Jones (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1960), pp. 125-27; and David A. J. Richards, A Theory of RIIQSons fur Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 250-59.
Ethics 93 (january 1983): 225-245 C 1983 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0014-1704/83/9302-0001$01.00
1
Ethics January 1983 embarrassment is an experience of discomfiture that, unlike sha~e, do~~ not include a diminishment in one's sense of worth. An expenence be shame, by contrast, strikes at one's sense of worth. Here we may reminded of times when things were going ~ell and we were somew~at inflated by the good opinion we had of ourselve~, when suddenly • qmte unexpectedly, we did something that gave the he to our favorable ~If assessment, and we were shocked to see ourselves in fa~ ~ess fiat~enng light. Such are the circumstances for sham~, and the pos1t1ve sel~-1mage that disappears in these circumstances and 1s replaced by a negat1ve one spells loss of self-esteem. These contrasts between shame and guilt and shame and em~arrassment present the bare outlines of a charact~rization ~f sham.e, w~tch, when filled out, appears rather attractive. It ts the top1c of th1s arude. My thesis is that this characterization, though att~ctive at firs~ appearance, is unsatisfactory. It represents, I contend, a dubtous concepuon of shame. In particular, 1 mean to call into question its central idea that shame signifies loss of self-esteem. The paper is divided into three parts. In the first I lay out what. 1 shall call the Rawlsian characterization of shame, Rawlsian in that I retam the controlling thesis and overall structure of Rawls's account but do not concern myself with its specifics, an exact rendering of Rawls being unnecessary for my purposes. Though my approach here is largely uncritical, my aim is to set up a well-defined target for subsequent criticism. In the second, then, I begin that criticism. I set forth a case of loss of self-esteem and some cases of shame that pose problems for the characterization. By themselves these cases stand as counterexamples to it, but my hope is that they will have a more illuminating effect, that they will produce a sense or spark an intuition that its central idea is problematic. Accordingly, in the third part I complete the criticism. I draw from the cases two lessons about shame intended to give definition to the intuition I hope will already have been sparked. Each lesson points to a key feature of shame that the characterization leaves out or misrepresents, its central idea being implicated as the source of these failures. Thus, while the criticism of this third part is aimed at the target set up in the first, the force of the criticism should lead us to consider rejecting the idea at the target's center.
22 6
I
We need_ at the start to fix our understanding of self-esteem, since the concept u at the base of the Rawlsian characterization. To this end 1 shall p~nt some considerations leading up to a definition of self-esteem, f~om wh1ch an ex~la~ation of its loss will follow directly. This will then ?"eld the charactenzauon of shame we seek. Let us begin with the general 1dea that self-esteem relates to what one makes of oneself or does with one's life. One has self~teem if one's spirits are high because one believes that one has made or wall make something of oneself, that one has been
2
Deigh
Shame and Self-Esteem
227
or will be successful in one's life pursuits. Conversely, one lacks selfesteem if one is downcast because of a judgment that one has failed to make or never will make something of oneself, that one doesn't or won't ever amount to much. Something of this idea is suggested in William James's equation that sets self-esteem equal to the ratio of one's successes to one's pretensions. 5 The first thing to note in this general idea is that self-esteem connects up with the condition of one's spirits. We speak of vicissitudes of selfesteem: highs and lows. One's self-esteem can plummet. It can also be boosted or bolstered. Indolence and languishing in doldrums are signs that one's self-esteem is at a low ebb. Enthusiasm for and vigorous engagement in activities in which one chooses to participate are signs of an opposite condition. We also describe persons in these conditions as having or lacking self-esteem. And though subtle differences may exist between a person's having self-esteem and his self-esteem's being high and between his lacking self-esteem and his self-esteem's being low, I shall treat the two in each pair as equivalent. A second point of note, which is corollary to the first, is that selfesteem goes with activity. But to assert that having self-esteem requires that one be active would be an overstatement. We should allow that the esteem a person has for himself is relative to that period in his life with which he identifies for the purpose of self-assessment. Thus, a person may retain his self-esteem after having retired from active life if he looks back on his endeavors and accomplishments with pride while content to take it easy. He maintains a high opinion of himself while leading a rather leisurely and unproductive life because his self-assessment proceeds from recollections of an earlier period when he was active and successful. Or, to take the viewpoint of a youth looking forward in time, he may have esteem for himself in view of the life he aspires to lead if he believes in the accuracy of the picture he has of his future. He identifies, for the purpose of self-assessment, with the person he believes he will become, his present self having little bearing. Consequently, he may even at the time be leading an altogether easygoing and frivolous life while exuding self-esteem. I mention these possibilities only to set them aside. We simplify our task of explaining self-esteem if we restrict the discussion to selfesteem had in view of one's current doings and development. Besides this simplifying restriction, we must also add a qualification to the statement that being active is a condition of having self-esteem. As a third point, then, one's actions, if they are signs of self-esteem, must have direction. They must be channeled into pursuits or projects and reflect one's goals and ideals. A wayward vagabond does not present a picture of someone who has self-esteem. Nor do we ascribe self-esteem to someone who, having no settled conception of himself, tries on this 3. William James, Tlu Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (1890; reprinted., New York: Dover Publications, 1950), vol. 1, p. 310.
3
228
Ethics
January 1983
and that trait of personality, as he would sunglasses of differe~lt styles, to see which gives him the most comfortable look. Self-esteem •.s had by persons whose lives have a fairly definite direction an~ some falTly welldefined shape, which is to say that self-esteem reqmres that one have values and organize one's life around them. One's values translate into one's aims and ideals, and a settled constellation of these is necessary for self-esteem. Specifically, we may take this as a precondition of self-esteem. For, argua~ly, ~omeone who had no aims or ideals in life, whose life lacked the darectaon and cohere~ce that such aims and ideals would bring, would be neither an appropna~e object of our esteem nor of our disesteem. We would understand ~as behavior as the product of primitive urges and desires that impelled ham at the time of action. Having given no order or design to his life, he would act more or less at random or for short-lived purposes. We should recognize in him a figure who frequents recent philosophic literature on human freedom: the man assailed by a battery of desires and urges, who is helpless to overpower them because he lacks a clear definition of himsel£. 4 Such a man is impelled in many directions at once but moves in no particular one for any great distance. Frustrated and disoriented by inner turmoil, he lapses into nonaction. He would, were we ever to encounter his like, properly evoke in us pathos indicating abeyance of judgment rather than scorn indicating low esteem for him. By contrast, when a person has aims and ideals that give order and direction to his life, counterpoint between primitive forces that impel him and his wanting to fulfill those aims and ideals becomes possible. Thus, at those times when he acts in conflict with his aims and ideals, he may declare that he was caught in the grip of some emotion or was overpowered by some urge or desire. He would then convey the idea that he had bee1_1 acted upon or compelled to act as opposed to doing the .act or choo~mg to act. Undeniably, the emotion, urge, or desire is attnbutable to htm; but by such declaration he disowns it and so disclaims aut~orship of th~ act it pro~p~ed. Authorship, not ownership, is the key nouon here, that IS, a~thorshtp m the general sense of being the originator or creator of somethmg. When one has a settled constellation of aims and ideals, then one distinguishes between the acts of which one is the au~or and those in which one serves as an instrument of alien forces.!\ Wtthout any such constellation, one is never the author of one's actions thouh · th" · forces that act on one, triggered' g many times e mstrument of aben by external events. 4. See joel Feinberg, "The Idea of a Free Man" in Ed·---'-'--']-·-' .p · of Education • _..,...,.. u&gmmts. ap"s an F kfi '~.James Doyle (London: Roudedge lie Kegan Paul, 1973), PP· PlailoJ ' 68rry ra~ un, F~om of the Will and the Concept of a Person," Journal of ~1971). !i-20; Wngb~ Neely, "Freedom and Desire;• Plailosophical Rroinu 8~ ( 1974 ~ !l:h~~ ~':!w':~:~tson, Free Agency," jtJUTnal of Philosoph' 72 (1975): 205-20. 1~ of Ptrwru ed Am~t'':c, any Frankfurt, ~lde~tification and Externality," in Tlu ' · te ny (Berkeley: Umvemty of California Press, 1976), pp. 239 _3 1.
1M PlailoJfi/1A
14~49·
ul
ot:"'
8
4
Deigh
Shame and Self-Esteem
229
It is in view of this contrast that I suggest we take one's having a settled constellation of aims and ideals as a precondition of self-esteem: when one is the author of one's actions, one is an appropriate object for esteem or disesteem; when one is only an instrument of alien forces, one is not. We can then look to this precondition for the defining conditions of self-esteem. So while we would have said, loosely speaking, that selfesteem came from one's having a good opinion of oneself, we may now say more strictly that it comes from a good opinion of oneself as the author of one's actions, more generally, one's life. Accordingly, this opinion comprises a favorable regard for one's aims and ideals in life and a favorable assessment of one's suitability for pursuing them. Lacking selfesteem, one would either regard one's aims and ideals as shoddy or believe that one hadn't the talent, ability, or other attributes necessary for achieving them. Either would mean that one lacked the good opinion of oneself that makes for self-esteem, and either would explain the dispirited condition that goes with one's lacking self-esteem. These considerations then yield an understanding of self-esteem as requiring that two conditions jointly obtain. This we can formulate as a definition. Specifically, one has self-esteem if, first, one regards one's aims and ideals as worthy and, second, one believes that one is well suited to pursue them. 6 With reference to the first we say one has a sense that one's life has meaning. With reference to the second we speak of a confidence one has in the excellence of one's person. And this combination of a sense that one's life has meaning and a confidence in one's ability to achieve one's ends gives one impetus to go forward. Turning then to loss of self-esteem and, in particular, the sudden loss taken on the Rawlsian characterization to be explicative of shame, we obtain immediately from the foregoing definition an account of this experience. One loses self-esteem if, because of a change in either one's regard for the worthiness of one's aims and ideals or one's belief in one's ability to achieve them, a once favorable self-assessment is overturned and supplanted by an unfavorable one. The loss here is the loss of a certain view of oneself. One had self-esteem and correspondingly a good opinion of oneself: one viewed oneself as having the attributes necessary for successfully pursuing worthy ends around which one had organized one's life. The change in judgment about the worthiness of one's ends or the excellence of one's person destroys that view. One's good opinion of oneself gives way to a poor one. This constitutes loss of self-esteem. The Rawlsian characterization has it that shame is the emotion one feels when such loss occurs. Moreover, shame is to be understood as signifying such loss. Shame on this characterization is the shock to our sense of worth that comes either from realizing that our values are shoddy or from discovering that we are deficient in a way that had added to the confidence we had in our excellenc;e. Either is a discovery of something 6. The definition matches Rawls's (see p. 440).
5
Ethics January 1983 230 d such self-discovery false in the good opinion we had o f ourse1ves, an spells loss of self-esteem. . · e Of coune self-discovery of this sort does not figure m ev~ry expenenc of shame for 'a person who has a poor opinion of himself IS nonetheless liable to feel shame when the very defect that is his re~son for the poor opinion is brought to his notice. Thus, as a last pomt, we .mut s:y something about shame felt by someone whose self-esteem IS a rea Y low. While a schoolboy, Philip Car~y, in Maug_ham's novel?/ Hu~: Bondage, feels shame innumerable ttmes over h1s dubf~t. H1s feehn~n do not involve loss of self-esteem, since his self-esteem IS low t~ begt with, nor, obviously, do they reflect any act of self-discovery. But 1t would be uncharitable to object to the Rawlsian characterization on the grou~d that it does not cover such cases, for they can be treated on analogy Wit~ cases it does cover. Philip does not always have his crippled foot on h1s mind; there are plenty of times when he is forgetful of it .. o~ these occasions, especially when he is comfortable with himself, he IS hable to feel shame when made conscious of his "freakish" condition, when, as it were, he rediscovers it. Then, while he does not lose any self-esteem, his being comfortable with himself is certainly lost to him. 11 In this section I shall set forth a case of loss of self-esteem and some cases of shame that present real problems for the Rawlsian characterization. I begin with the former. The case itself is quite straightforward. We have only to think of someone who suddenly loses self-esteem because he discovers that he lacks the ability to achieve some aim he has set for himself, who is crestfallen, dispirited, and deeply disappointed with himself, but owing to circumstances or a philosophical temperament, does not feel shame. And such a case is not hard to construct.' Imagine, for example, some youth who is indisputably the best tennis player in his community. He defeats all challengers; he wins every local tournament; and he has recently led his high school team to a first-place finish in a league consisting of teams from the high schools of his and the neighboring towns. His coach rates him the most promising player to co~e al~ng in a deca~e, and he is highly touted by other tennis enth~stas~ m the ar~~· Qmte naturally, he comes to have a high opinion of hts ab1hty and V1s1ons of winning tournaments on the professional tour._ At some point early in his high school years, he makes professional tenms a career goal and devotes much time to improving his game. In trut_h: though, the gro~nds for his high opinion of his ability and for his deosa~n to ~ake tenm~ a career are shaky. The competition in his and the netghbonng towns lS rather poor, these being rural and isolated from urban centers. And the aging coach's hopes have distorted his judgment 7· ~plcs similar to this fint case were suggested to me by Herben Morris and
Rogers Albntton.
6
Deigh
Shame and Self-Esteem
231
of his star player's talents. Thus, when this young player enters his first state tournament, he quickly discovers that his skills are below those of the top seeded players. His first defeat need not be humiliating, just convincing. And though he will surely lose some self-esteem, we need not suppose that he feels any shame. One explanation of his losing self-esteem but not feeling shame is this. The first defeat is sufficiently convincing that it alters his view of himself as a tennis player, and given his aims, this means loss of selfesteem. But just as others dose to him would respond that his defeat is nothing to be ashamed of, so his own attitude toward it may reflect such judgment. Accordingly, he would be deeply disappointed with himself but not ashamed. This possibility becomes even more vivid if we suppose that he has gone to the tournament alone or with friends who, unlike him, have only a passing rather than an abiding interest in tennis. For then he does not find himself having to face someone like his coach before whom feeling some shame would be natural, though even here the presence of the coach does not necessitate the emotion. This case thus broaches the question what distinguishes those cases of loss of selfesteem whose subjects feel shame from those whose subjects feel disappointment but no shame. The inability of the Rawlsian characterization to answer this question implies that the understanding of shame it gives is, at best, incomplete. Let us next take up cases of shame. The first comes from an observation, made by several writers, that shame is commonly felt over trivial things. One writer instances experiences of shame had on account of "one's accent, one's ignorance, one's clothes, one's legs or teeth."8 Another, to illustrate the same point, mentions shame felt over "an awkward gesture, a gaucherie in dress or table manners, ... a mispronounced word."9 To be sure, none of these examples poses a threat to the Rawlsian characterization, since each of the things mentioned could be for someone a shortcoming the apprehension of which would undercut the confidence he had in the excellence of his person. This would certainly be true of someone who consciously subscribed to ideals the achievement of which required that he not have the shortcoming. For then, though others would disparage these ideals as superficial or vulgar and accordingly think the shortcoming trivial, to him it would still appear as a serious Haw in himself. Naturally, the more interesting case is that in which the subject also thinks the shortcoming trivial and is surprised at having felt shame on its account. This case too can be understood as coming under the Rawlsian characterization. For one need not fully realize the extent to which one places value on certain things, and one may even deceive oneself about one's not being attached to certain ideals. We need, then, 8. Stanley Cavell, Mwt We Mean What We Say7 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1976), p. 286. 9. Lynd, p. 40.
7
Ethics January 1983 232 to distinguish between, on the one hand, wh~t one would ~edare. were one's aims and ideals and would list as one's tmportant attnbutes tf ~ne were asked to describe oneself and, on the other, one's self-concepu.o~ as it is reflected by one's behavior apart from or in additio~ to any e~pbClt self-description. By one's self-conception I mean th~ atms an~ 1deals around which one has organized one's life together w1th the behe~s one has about one's ability to pursue them. And what we u_nder~tand IS th~t these aims, ideals, and beliefs can guide one's behav1or without one s being conscious of having subscribed to them. Consequently. a person who feels shame over crooked teeth or the slurping of soup. though he would have thought himself unconcerned with appearance and proper form, shows by his emotion that a pleasant-looking face or good ~able manners are important to him, that he subscribes to ideals of c~me.bn~ss or social grace. Hence, we can easily understand his shame as s1gmfymg loss of self-esteem. At the same time, such examples invite us to look for things over which someone might feel shame though he did not believe they made him ill suited to pursue his ends. Shame one feels over something one could not believe affected one's excellence, say, because one could not regard it as a fault in oneself, would present a problem for the Rawlsian characterization. Thus, consider shame felt over a humorous surname. The example comes from Gide. He describes to us the experience of a young French girl on her first day of school, who had been sheltered at home for the first ten years of her life, and in whose name, Mile Peterat, something ridiculous is connoted, which might be rendered in English by calling her Miss Fartwell. "Arnica Peterat-guileless and helplesshad never until that moment suspected that there might be anything laughable in her name; on her first day at school its ridicule came upon her as a sudden revelation; she bowed her head, like some sluggish waterweed, to the jeers that flowed over her; she turned red; she turned pale; she wept."•o . With this e~mple.we move from attributes that one can regard as ~mor Raws an~ ~ns1gmficant defects to things about a person that leave h1m open to nd1cule, though they do not add to or detract from his excellence. The morphemes of one's surname do not make one better or worse suited for pursuing the aims and ideals around which one has organiz~d one's li~e. Hence, shame in this example, because it is felt over somet~mg that bes outside its subject's self-conception opposes the Rawlstan characterization. ' . T!'e s~on~ case_ of shame is cousin to the first. One finds oneself 10 a Sltuauo~ m wh1ch others scorn or ridicule one or express some d~precatory J';'dgment of one, and apprehending this one feels shame. Given only thiS general description, such a case presen~ no real problem 10. Andrt Gide Laf'adio's Ad~ Knopf 19SS) p 100' Th d . u, trans. Dorothy Buuy (New York: Alfred A. • • · · e ren enng of her name in English is suggested by the translator.
8
Deigh
Shame and Self-Esteem
233
for the Rawlsian characterization. It serves to remind us that one's selfesteem depends to some extent on the esteem others accord one-certain others, anyway-and the greater that dependency the more readily one will feel shame in response to any deprecatory judgments they express. This can be understood by way of the amount of confidence one has in one's own independent judgments about the worthiness of one's aims and one's ability to fulfill them, for this, we might say, varies inversely with the strength of the dependency of one's self-esteem on the esteem of others. That is, the greater that dependency, the less one's confidence will be in independent judgments one makes about oneself and, concomitantly, the more accepting one will be of the judgments others make about one. Consequently, given a strong enough dependency, if they criticize or ridicule one for some fault, one accepts their criticism and thus makes the same judgment about oneself, where before one did not notice the fault or it did not much matter ~o one. This arouses shame inasmuch as the judgment issues in an unfavorable self-assessment that replaces a favorable one, that is, in loss of self-esteem. We have then an account of the case that is fully in line with the Rawlsian characterization. But we must also admit cases of shame felt in response to another's criticism or ridicule in which the subjects do not accept the other person's judgment of them and so do not make the same judgment of themselves. And these cases do present a problem for the Rawlsian characterization. Consider Crito and his great concern for what the good citizens of Athens will think of him for failing to deter Socrates from meeting his demise. "I am ashamed," he says in vainly trying to argue Socrates out of accepting his fate, "both on your account and on ours your friends'; it will look as though we had played something like a coward's part all through this affair ofyours." 11 And though Crito is in the end convinced that Socrates' course is the right one and knows all along that he has done everything one can expect of a friend, we still have, I think, no trouble picturing this good-hearted but thoroughly conventional man feeling ashamed when before some respectable Athenian, who reproaches him for what he believes was cowardice on Crito's part. Examples like this one demonstrate that shame is often more, when it is not exclusively, a response to the evident deprecatory opinion others have of one than an emotion aroused upon judgment that one's aims are shoddy or that one is deficient in talent or ability necessary to achieve them. The third problematic case of shame is this. We commonly ascribe shame to small children. Shaming is a familiar practice in their upbringing; "Shame on you" and "You ought to be ashamed of yourself" are familiar admonishments. And, setting aside the question of the advisability of such responses to a child's misdemeanors, we do not think them nonsensical II. Plato, Crito 45d-e. Quoted from the Hugh Trednick translation, The Collected Dialogws of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 30.
9
234
Ethics
January 1983
or incongruous in view of the child's emotional capacities. Furthermore, close observers of small children do not hesitate to ascribe shame to ~~em. Erik Erikson, writing about human development, observed that chtl ~en acquired a sense of shame at the stage when they ~gan .t? deve muscular control and coordination.1 2 Charles Darwm, wnung ab f blushing, noted that small children began to blush ar?und the age 0 three and later remarked that he had "noticed on occas10ns that shyness or shamefacedness and real shame are exhibited in the eyes of young children before they have acquired the power of blushing."'! But it would certainly be a precocious child who at the age of four or five had a well-defined self-conception, who organized his life around the pursuit of certain discrete and relatively stable aims a~d ideals and measured himself by standards of what is necessary to achteve them. In other words, a child at this age, though capable of feeling shame,_ d~s not have self-esteem. Hence, the shame he experiences does not stgmfy loss of self-esteem. Finally, a fourth problematic case of shame emerges once we juxta~ the orientation of an aristocratic ethic and that of an achievement ethtc. The Rawlsian characterization with its emphasis on making something of oneself, being successful in one's life pursuits, is tied to the latter. The experiences of shame it describes are at home in a meritocratic society • one in which social mobility is widespread, or, at any rate, the belief that it is constitutes a major article of faith. On the other hand, some experiences of shame reflect an aristocratic ethic; one feels shame over conduct unbecoming a person of one's rank or station. The experiences are better suited to a society with a rigidly stratified social structure like a caste society. And, as we shall see, they stand in marked contrast to experiences the Rawlsian characterization is designed to fit. The contrast is this. With shame reflective of an achievement ethic, the subject is concerned with achieving his life's aims and ideals, and he measures himself against standards of excellence he believes he must meet to achieve them. So long as he regards his aims and ideals as worthy, th~y define for him a successful life, and accordingly he uses the standards to judge whether he has the excellence in ability or of character necessary for success. He is then liable to shame if he realizes that some of his aims and ~deals are shoddy or that he has a defect portending failure where preVlo~sly he ~ad ascri~d to himself an excellence indicating success. And thlS fits mce~y the tdea that shame signifies loss of self-esteem. On the othe~ ha~d, WI~ s~a~e reflective of an aristocratic ethic, the subject's ~ncern ~ ~th ~~g the deportment of his class and not necessarily ~th achtevm~ atms and tdeals that define success in life. He is concerned wtth conformmg to the norms of propriety distinctive of his class, and
:!
PP· ;:i-~~ Erikson, Clailllhood a7Itl Soriety, 2d ed. (New York: W. W. Norton &: Co.• 196!1), cd
.,
g;.Kago: Char~ ~~· Tlat Eztwaritm of 1M EIIIDiimu mMar& a7It1 mvenaty Chicago Presa, 1965), p. S!U. of
10
A.r&imal (1872; reprint
Deigh
Shame and Self-Esteem
235
conformity to these is neither a mark of achievement nor an excellence that forecasts achievement. In the usual case one is born into one's class and conforms to its norms as a matter of course. Failure to conform that is, failure to deport oneself as becomes a member of one's class: invites comparison to persons of lower classes on whom the members of one's class look down. Thus, someone from a social class beneath which there are other classes may be liable to shame over such failure: someone wellborn may be liable to shame if he behaves )ike the vulgar. And such shame does not fit the Rawlsian characterization. For the subject neither realizes that his aims and ideals are shoddy nor discovers a defect in himself that makes him ill suited to pursue them. In other words, given the analysis we have laid out, he does not lose self-esteem. But, one might ask, can't we say of someone who feels shame over conduct unbecoming a member of his class that he too has ideals that regulate his actions and emotions? After all, with his class we associate a way of life, and this implies an ideal or set of ideals. To feel constrained to act as becomes a member of one's class is to feel pressed to conform to its ideals, and conduct unbecoming a member is, in other words, conduct that falls short of an ideal. Granted, one doesn't so much achieve these ideals as conform to them, which shows perhaps that the conception of self-esteem on which the Rawlsian characterization is built must be modified. But supposing we make whatever modification is needed, isn't it sufficient to bring the experience under the Rawlsian characterization that we can redescribe it as shame felt over one's falling short of an ideal? Something, however, gets lost in this redescription. When we redescribe the experience as shame felt over falling short of ideals around which one's life is organized, our focus shifts from who one is to how one conducts one's life. The subject's identity as a member of a certain class recedes into the background. We see it as the source of his ideals but do not assign it any further part. This, I think, is a mistake. In this experience the subject has a sense of having disgraced himself, which means he has an acute sense of who he is. We do not have an understanding of shame otherwise. It is revealing that on the Rawlsian characterization this shift in focus does not register. For the characterization recognizes no distinction between questions of identity and questions of life pursuits, between who one is and how one conducts one's life. From its viewpoint, a person says who he is by telling what his aims in life are and what ideals guide him through life. 14 This makes it an attractive characterization of the shame felt by persons who are relatively free of constraints on their choice of life pursuits owing to class, race, ethnic origins, and the l~ke .. For su~h perso.ns tend more to regard their aims and ideals as con~tlt.utmg the1r 1dent1ty and their ancestry, race, class, and so forth as extnns1c facts a~ut th~m selves. So the characterization explains the shame they feel as mcludmg 14. See Rawls, p. 408.
11
Ethics January 1983 an acute sense of who they are. But because it restricts a_ perso.n's ident~y to his aims and ideals in life, it fails to explain as includmg thas sens~t e shame someone, living in a rigidly stratified society, feels when ?~ ~s not act as befits a member of his class or the shame someone .. hvmg m a multiethnic society, feels when he acts beneath the dignity of has p~ople. Granted, such a person recognizes that his conduct falls short of ~deal: members of his class or culture are expected to follow, but these adeal do not constitute his identity. Another, a pretender for instance, could have the same ideals as he but not the same identity, just as a to~boy has the ideals of a boy but not the identity of one. Hence, we faal. to account for such shame if we describe it as being felt over one's havmg fallen short of ideals that regulate one's life. Thus, about the following experience, which Earl Mills, a Mas~p~e Indian, relates, a defender of the Rawlsian characterization will msast that sometime during the episode Mills must have embraced the i~eals of an Indian way of life or, alternatively, that he must have reabz~d, though he nowhere suggests this, that the ideals he was then pursumg were shoddy. But ignoring the Rawlsian characterization, we can explai~ Mills's feeling shame without importing either of these assumptions: has having, in the circumstances he describes, to acknowledge his ignorance of Mashpee traditions disgraced him as an Indian, made him betray, as it were, his Indian identity, and this aroused shame. This explanation accepted, his experience directly opposes the Rawlsian characterization, for it suggests that, despite the aims and ideals around which a man organizes his life, circumstances may arise that make him, because of an identity he has that is independent of those aims and ideals, liable to experience shame.
236
When I was a kid, I and the young fellows I ran around with couldn't ~ave cared less ~bout our Ind~an background. We never participated m any of t~e tnbal ceremomes, we didn't know how to dance, and we wouldn t have been caught .dead in regalia. We thought anyone who made a fuss about our hentage was old-fashioned, and we even used to make f~n of the people who did. Well, when I came back from the Army m 1948, I had a different outlook on such matters. Yo':' ~ee, there happened to be two other Indians in my basictrammg company at Fort Dix. One of them was an Iroquois from Upper ~ew York State, and the other was a Chippewa from Montana. I w~ nmetee~ years old, away from Mashpee for the first time in my bfe! and, lake most soldiers, I was lonely. Then one night the ~r,.uo::,.fellow got up and did an Indian dance in f;ont of everyone 10 t e rrac~. ~e Chippewa got up and joined him, and when I had to admat I d1dn't know how, 1 felt terribly ashamed.l5 15. Paul Brodeur, "A Reponer at Lar.-· Th M h .. 6, 1978): 62-150, p. lOS. ·.,-. e as pees, New YorAer 54 (November
12
Deigh
Shame and Self-Esteem
237
III Before drawing any lessons about shame from the discussion of Part II, I should say something to allay doubts about the import of the cases of shame presented there. Such doubts naturally arise because one might think that some, if not all, of those cases exemplify experiences of the emotion the subjects of which one could criticize for being irrational or unreasonable. That is, while agreeing that many persons are liable to such experiences, one might wonder whether they ought to be so liable and then note that a case's force as a counterexample lessens if it only describes an experience of irrational or unreasonable emotion. The first and last cases of shame are especially in point. To feel shame over one's surname and because of conduct unbecoming a person of one's class seem good examples of shame one ought not to experience. For one is not responsible for one's parentage and thus ought not to judge oneself according to facts wholly determined by it. Inasmuch as shame in these cases reflects such judgment, they exemplify experiences to which one ought not to be liable. These doubts arise under the assumption that, in giving a characterization of an emotion, one specifies those conditions in which the emotion is experienced reasonably or rationally. Such an approach to characterizing an emotion requires that one regard as its standard cases those in which the subjects are fully rational individuals and not at the time of the experience in any irrational frame of mind. But we ought to question this requirement. Why should we restrict the class of standard cases to these? While there is, for instance, something absurd in the familiar picture of an elephant terrified at the sight of a mouse, why should this absurdity lead us to regard the elephant's terror as any less important a case to be considered in characterizing that emotion than the terror a lynch mob strikes in the person on whom it takes revenge? To be sure, the elephant is not a creature capable of bringing its emotions under rational control, whereas a human being, if sufficiently mature, is. And for this reason there is a point in criticizing the emotional experiences of human beings, whereas making similar criticisms of an elephant's emotional experiences is altogether idle. But this provides no reason to regard the class of rational or reasonable experiences of a given emotion as privileged for the purposes of conceptual inquiry. To have brought one's emotions under rational control means that the range of one's emotional experiences has been modified through development of one's rational capacities: one no longer responds with, say fear, to certain sensory stimuli that before the development provoked fear, and conversely. But far from instructing us to discount the elephant's or the toddler's emotions in our conceptual inquiries, this bids us to examine emotional experiences had in response to sensory stimuli unmediated by rational thought as well as experiences the occurrence of which we explain by reference to rational thought.
13
Ethics January 198J Similar points then apply to characterizing shame. To fo:cus _pri~arily on cases the subjects of which one would not criticize for bemg •r~au~nal or unreasonable is to risk introducing distortion into the characte~•za~<:>~h Indeed, one might be well advised to examine closely those ca~es 10 w ~re such criticism is forthcoming on the grounds that they may d1splay ~ prominently than others certain characteristic features of the em~uonf Thus one might be well advised to examine closely the shame ~yplcal ~ homo hierarchicus, even though one thought that rigid, hierarchtcal sooal structures lacked rational foundations (i.e., even though one thought that the emotion indicated an irrational attachment to social ~lass), on the grounds that in such shame one sees more dearly than m sh_am~ typical of persons living in an egalitarian society those parts _of the subject s self-conception in virtue of which he is liable to the emouon. M~reover, though the resultant characterization rendered shame an emouon that, from the perspective of an egalitarian or meritocratic ethic, one. ne~er had good reason to feel, this would not in itself show the charactenzauon to be faulty: no more than that gentlefolk like the Amish, because of certain theistic beliefs, regard resentment as an emotion one never has good reason to feel shows that they harbor misconceptions about resentment. Since we are capable of bringing our emotions under rational control, we may regard our feeling a specific emotion as incompatible with our moral principles and so try to make ourselves no longer liable to it. Alternatively, we may regard this emotion as essential to our humanity and so revise our principles. The conftict makes evident the importance of having a correct understanding of such emotions; at the same time we should see that altering the understanding one has in order simply to avoid such conftict or the criticism of irrationality would be misguided. Turning then to lessons that come out of our discussion of the problematic cases, I shall draw two. The first is that a satisfactory characterization must include in a central role one's concern for the opinions of others. This is really a lesson in recall. From Aristotle onward, discussions of shame have focused attention on the subject's concern for the opinions o~ers have ~f him: 16 Aqu~~as, Descartes, and Spinoza each incorporated this concer~ mto h•_s defimuon of shame.n And latter-day writers, Darwin and Sartre m parucular, took the experience of shame before another as ke~ to an understanding of the emotion. Is Thus, we should not be surpnsed to find that the Rawlsian characterization founders, since it regards sll:ch concern as not internally related to shame. Its £allure, ~owever,_ is not due to neglect. The characterization, through emphasts on the dependency of one's self-esteem on the esteem of others, can accord the concern an important role in an overall un-
238
p
16. For Aristotle's view see RAdoric, bk. 2, chap. 6. I 7. For Aquinas's definition see s - TMolo..VU 1a2ae 41 4 ., De · J tiN Soul 2 . .., , . ror scartes•s sec ...... • "" IWIIIft.f., • pt. • article~- For Spinoza's see TM Ethics, pt. S, definition Sl.
H~I8E.~~~ ~;! ~r~~~~~ ~ is found in Beiftg and Notlampus, trans. ·
pn.wu Library, Inc., 1956), pp. 252-502.
14
Deigh
Shame and Self-Esteem
239
derstanding of shame. 19 But this makes the concern part of a mechanism that induces shame rather than part of our conception of shame. A mechanism exists which, when put into operation, transforms high selfesteem into low; part of that mechanism is the concern one has for the opinion of others; and one way in which the mechanism gets going is when others on whose good opinion one's self-esteem depends deprecate one and one apprehends this. In this way, the characterization gives one's concern for the opinion of others an important role. But it is only a supporting role and not the central one I think it deserves. And this is one reason for its failure. Each of the first three problematic cases bears out this last point. It is evident in the second and third cases, where the subjects feel shame but do not lose self-esteem. In the third case shame is felt directly in response to another's scorn or reproach. Thus, an expressed low opinion of the subject induces in him shame without affecting his self-esteem. In other words, the mechanism is not engaged, though the subject's concern for the opinion of another is clearly operative. In the second, Mile Peterat, even apart from the context in which she feels shame, jeering classmates, feels the emotion because of something about herself that is laughable. It invites deprecatory responses. Thus, she may feel ashamed because of it, even though it is not a deficiency. It is not a ground for reassessing her excellence, though, of course, the whole experience could cause her to think less of herself. Here, too, there is shame reflecting a concern for the opinion of others without the mechanism's being engaged. We can also mine the first case to bring out the point that the Rawlsian characterization has misconstrued the role one's concern for the opinion of others has in shame. Consider again our young tennis phenom. In the circumstances described, he loses self-esteem, is disappointed with himself, but does not feel shame. On the other hand, as we noted, if the circumstances had been different, if he had had, say, to face his coach after the defeat, then his feeling shame would have well been imaginable. There would then have been someone at courtside whose look he could not meet. He would have averted his eyes, lowered his head, gulped to fight back tears. That the coach's presence could spell the difference between disappointment and shame cannot be explained by reference to the player's losing self-esteem, for the loss occurs in either case. The mechanism would be in operation whether or not the subject felt shame, so it would not account for the role his concern for the coach's opinion would have had in his experiencing shame. We can thus conclude from these three cases that one's concern for the opinion of others has a role in shame apart from the way in which their opinion can support or bring down one's self-esteem. 19. Sec:, c:.g., Rawls's discussion of the: companion effect to the: Aristotelian principle, pp. 440-41.
15
240
Ethics
January 1983
. f worth The Rawlsian charThe second lesson ts about our sense o ' . f worth according acterization yields an understanding of a person s sense ~ . that he has · th person's conviCtiOn to which it has two sources. 0 nelS e h h . his own given meaning to his life. The other is the con~dence d~n a~i~naims and excellence as a person. The first comes fro~ hts ~~g::/ lthat he is well ideals in life as worthy. The second comes rom IS . 1e acterization, suited to pursue them. Thus, according to the Rawls1an ~ha~ or. ideals shame, since it is felt either upon a jud~ent t~at ~ne s alm~at makes are shoddy or upon a judgment that one 1s defic1ent m a way t . nse one ill suited to pursue them, is aptly described as a shock to one shs~ ce . . .h . ' sense of wort sm a d tmmts ment m one s fid Of worth. One experiences . . . ' 1"£ 's con ence either one's sense of havmg gtven meamng to ones lle or one in one's excellence has been struck down. . t" n There is difficulty in this, however, because, while the descn~ 1~ of shame as a shock to one's sense of worth is apt, the account 0 ~he various ways in which the sense gets shocked is, at best, too meager. ~ reason for this is that the characterization omits important sources 0 our sense of worth. The point is directly evident in our last two c~ses. The child of four who feels shame over some misdemeanor has not g 1ven meaning to his life and does not have confidence in his excellence as a person. Hence, he has a sense of worth the source of which th~ characterization does not acknowledge. Similarly, we recognize in an anst~t who feels shame over behaving like a plebian or in an American lndlan who feels shame over betraying his Indian identity a sense of wo~th the source of which is neither a conviction about the worthiness of hts ends nor a belief about his suitability to pursue them. A sense of worth that comes from knowledge that one is a member of the upper cla_ss ~r a noble people also lies beyond the sight of the Rawlsian charactenzau~n. To put the point generally, the Rawlsian characterization fails to recogmze aspects of our identity that contribute to our sense of worth independently of the aims and ideals around which we organize our lives. We should note here the structural, as well as the substantive, difference between the sense of worth the Rawlsian characterization recognizes and the one it excludes. We can get at this structural difference by looking at the theory of worth that underlies the characterization. That theory is based on a conception of us as the authors of our actions. We are authors in the sense discussed in Part I, that is, in virtue of having a constellation of aims and ideals according to which we live our lives. We have worth on this theory in accordance with the value of our lives, such as they are and such as they promise to be. An author has worth in view of his work, completed or in progress, and our lives, so to speak, are our work. This analogy can be pressed. Our work has value to the degree that it is the kind of thing that when well made has value and is itself well made: So we have wo~ to the degree that we produce such things or have dire~ed our energtes toward producing them and possess the talents and skills that augur successful production. Our lives, conceived
16
Deigh
Shame and Self-Esteem
241
as our work, thus have value to the degree that the ends that give them order and direction define a kind of life that has value and those ends have been realized. And we have worth as authors of our lives to the degree that we live lives of value or have directed our energies toward living such lives and possess the attributes that promise success. In capsule form, what might be called the auteur theory of worth is that what a person does with his life, how well he directs it, determines his worth. On this theory, then, we attribute d~fferent degrees of worth to someone depending on how valuable we deem the kind of life he lives and how successful we think he has been in living it or how suitable we think he is for it. In other words, we attribute to him more or less worth according to how well or badly he conducts his life. Contrast this with attributions of worth made because of one's class or culture. Judging from these attributions, we might say that a person's worth is determined by his status in the context of some social hierarchy. The salient feature here is that one's status, and so one's worth, is fixed independently of one's conduct. To be sure, one can change classes through marriage or cultures through immigration, but short of this the general conduct of one's life, that is, however well or badly one conducts it, does not increase or decrease the worth that is attributed to one because of one's status. And pretty much the same holds of worth that is attributed to human beings because of their species or to persons because of the kind of beings they are conceived to be: rational ones, say, spiritual ones, or autonomous ones. That is, worth attributed to one because of one's essential nature is, like worth attributed to one because of one's status, fixed independently of how one conducts one's life. Consequently, the dynamics of the sense of worth that comes from knowing the worth that goes with one's status or essential nature, that is, the understanding we give to augmentations and diminishments in that sense, are altogether different from those of the sense of worth the auteur theory recognizes. Statically, both kinds of sense correspond to the degree of worth one attributes to oneself. But an augmentation in one's sense of worth, as is experienced in pride, or a diminishment in it, as is experienced in shame, is not, if this sense originates in a recognition of one's status or essential nature, to be understood in terms of an attribution to oneself of greater or lesser worth than one attributed to oneself before the experience. 20 A college boy who wears his fraternity pin with pride does not regard himself as having greater worth for having worn it, and a man who feels ashamed of having eaten like a pig does not regard himself as having Jess worth than is attributed to human beings as such. This contrasts with the way the auteur theory would have us understand augmentations and diminishments in one's sense of worth. In particular, it would have us understand a diminishment in one's sense 20. Of course thrre arr rxcrptions to this, r.g., thr whitr supremrcist who discovers he has a black ancestor.
17
242 Ethics January 1983 of worth as is experienced in shame, as amounting to loss of self-estee: and so c~rresponding to an assessment of oneself as having les~ worte·~ On the auteur theory, a sense of w~rth reflects concern ":1th on of real worth, and one takes one's conduct and appearance as evtdence or more strongly as the grounds for attributing to oneself that worth. · ' tatus or ' ' By contrast, a sense of worth that comes from knowmg one s, s essential nature reflects concern with the congruency between one s conduct or appearance and one's real worth. Here, we could say, one's c~nc~rn is with the relation between appearance and reality. If one's sta~us lS htg~ relative to that of others or one's nature is noble, then behavtor that lS congruent with one's worth and so displays it is occasion for pride, and behavior that is at variance with it and so gives appearance of lesser worth is occasion for shame. This model better accommodates the idea that to have a sensibility to shame means that one is prepared to restrain oneself when one verges on the shameful and to cover up the shameful when it comes into the open. We speak in this regard of having shame as opposed to having no shame, and we connect this with modesty, particularly sexual mode~ty • which involves a sensibility to shame in matters of decorum. Havmg shame, that is, having a sensibility to shame, can be understood here as self-control that works to restrain one from giving the appearance of lesser wonh and self-respect that works to cover up shameful things that, having come to light, give one such appearance. 21 This suggests that we should conceive shame, not as a reaction to a loss, but as a reaction to a threat, specifically, the threat of demeaning treatment one would invite in giving the appearance of someone of lesser w~rth. Its analogues then are, not grief and sorrow, but fear and shyneSS-22 uke fear, shame serves to protect one against and save one from unwanted exposure. Both are in this way self-protective emotions. Fear is selfprotec~ve in that it moves one to protect oneself against the danger one senses ts present or approaching. From fear one draws back, shields one~lf, or ~ees. Of course, it may also render one immobile, thereby putung one m greater danger, so the point does not hold without qual21. On these points, see Carl D. Schneider, Shtzme, &c;osure and Privacy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1977), pp. 24-27. . 22. W~ether to p~ttern shame after grief and sorrow or after fear and shyness is an •ssue .a. revteW of the literature reveals. One often finds in the writings of those offering usc · · defimuons of shame . . of one or the oth er o£ th ese emouons as analogues, someumes e;:an as a senmc emo~n of which shame is defined as a specific type. For definitions of ty.; 0~ or sorrow see Hobbes (Ltviathan chap. 6) and Descanes (pt. 3, ) (t oug t ~ ?assage is equivocal since he also says there that shame is a species r od oPla~m • Eulll aty). For defimuon of shame as a type of"aear see Aqumas; · · ·IS also suggestcU ._ ... m · tt 1 oods ~ros~~~In connection with this issue see Havelock Ellis's "The Evolution or M esty, m ,.....,. mt1u1 p_.holo -r 0 of 5ex, 2 vols. 3d ed. (New York· Random House. 1942 _~2.v~~).1 • P· 36• n. 1· Ellis himself appean to hold that shame is a ki~d of fear (see PP·
:n:; ;;,;
s:r
36
18
Deigh
Shame and Self-Esteem
243
ification. 211 Still, the general idea is dear. Shame, too, is self-protective in that it moves one to protect one's worth. 24 Here the general idea is not so dear, though a trope may be useful. Shame inhibits one from doing things that would tarnish one's worth, and it moves one to cover up that which through continued exposure would tarnish one's worth. Less figuratively, we might say that the doing or exposure of something that makes one appear to have less worth than one has leaves one open to treatment appropriate only to persons or things that lack the worth one has, and shame in inhibiting one from doing such things and in moving one to cover them up thus protects one from appearing to be an unworthy creature and so from the degrading treatment such appearance would invite. This idea that shame is a self-protective emotion brings together and explains two important features: first, that a liability to shame regulates conduct in that it inhibits one from doing certain things and, second, that experiences of shame are expressed by acts of concealment. The second is crucial. Covering one's face, covering up what one thinks is shameful, and hiding from others are, along with blushing, the most characteristic expressions of shame. Students of shame commonly note them. A quote from Darwin is representative, "Under a keen sense of shame there is a strong desire for concealment."25 Moreover, etymology reinforces the point. According to many etymologists, a pre-Teutonic word meaning 'to cover' is the root of our word shame. 26 Now the Rawlsian characterization, since it conceives shame as a reaction to a loss, can explain, on the model of fear of loss, how one's liability to shame regulates one's conduct. Where it has trouble is in explaining shame's moving one to cover up and hide. For it does not have in itself the materials needed to construct such an explanation. Because it conceives shame as a reaction to the loss of something one prizes, it yields an account of the emotion as at first giving way to low spirits and dejection and eventually moving one to attempt to recover what one lost, that is, to regain through self-improvement one's good opinion of oneself and so one's self-esteem. 27 Acts of concealment, however, are nowhere implicated in this account. Hence, if one adheres to the characterization, one must make use of supplementary materials to explain them. One must go outside the characterization by, say, citing certain fears associated with shame: fear of ridicule or rejection by those upon 23. I owe this point to John T. MacCurdy, "The Biological Significance of Blushing and Shame," Brituhjour'IIIJl of Psychology 21 {1930): 174-82. __ 24. The idea is one of the central themes of Max Scheler's essay "Uber Scham und Schamgefiihl," in Gesammelte Werke, ed. Maria Scheler and M.S. Frings, 11 vols. {Berne: Franke Verlag, 1954), vol. 10, pp. 65-154. 25. Darwin, p. 320. 26. See Oxford Engluh Dictio'IIIJry, s.v. "shame"; also Ernest Klein, A Comprehensive Etymological Dictio'IIIJry of the Engluh lAnguage {Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1967). 27. See Rawls, p. 484; Lynd, pp. 50-51; and Richards, p. 256.
19
244 Ethics January 1983 whose good opinion of one one's self-esteem depends.za But s~h an explanation would not be adequate, for it fails to explain acts of_conce f ~ent . h d · ~t, th se as expresstons o .ears as expressions of s arne. 1nstea , 1t ta :es e associated with shame. And the same objection would hold for any explanation one constructed from materials found outside the cha~cter ization. The characterization, in other words, is unable to explam •. as expressions of shame, these acts. And this should tell us that somethmg has gone wrong. be The adherent to the Rawlsian characterization thus appears to. in an untenable position. We would dismiss any suggestion that ~ovenng up and hiding were not really among shame's natural expresston~. ~e Rection on shame, particularly shame concerning sexual tmprop~et~es, alone suffices to rule this out. And we should reject any charactenzauon of an emotion that misrepresents its natural expressions. Faced with th~se objections, the adherent might retreat to a weaker thesis by proposmg that the characterization gives an adequate account of some, but not all, experiences of shame. But this thesis is no more defensible than the original. For our adherent, as we saw from the first problematic ~~ of Pan 11, has the burden of showing how the emotion the charactenzauon describes is distinguishable from disappointment with oneself. Since he admits on this weaker thesis that some experiences of shame elude the characterization, he has, in other words, the burden of showing that the experiences of emotion the characterization captures are classifiable with these as shame. What reason could he give to show this? That they h~ve the same feeling-tone is itself questionable, insistence on the point bem~ question begging. That they involve a shock to one's sense of worth IS insufficient. For the characterization identifies this shock with one's suffering loss of self-esteem, and this by itself does not qualify an c:xperience as one of shame. The trouble with this proposal, I think, is that it would, in effect, divide shame into disparate kinds, one kind having fear as its analogue, the other grief. That is, we should suspect of any conception of shame the proposal spawned that it covered a mismatched set of experiences. . . We can trace the characterization's problems back to the understanding 1t gtves to the sense of worth that makes one liable to shame and ultimately to the auteur theol)' of worth, which grounds that understanding. On that. th~ory one attnbutes ~oneself worth according to how one conductS ones hfe, and so perceptions of that conduct determine one's sense of worth. Shame then, since it is felt upon discovery of shortcomings in oneself that falsify the ~onh one thought one had, includes a sense that one lacks worth..And thiS proves problematic because it leaves unexplained how sham~ mou~ates acts of concealment. By contrast, when we conceive shame as mcludmg a sense that one has worth, we can readily explain . 28. Sec Pie~ and Sin&u. P· 16; and Rawla, p. 445. White, however, expresses mcnrations agamst connectmg shame to such fean (pp. t2S-27).
20
Deigh
Shame and Self-Esuem
245
its motivating such acts: one covers up because one senses that the worth one has is threatened. This speaks in favor of the understanding of the sense of worth the idea that shame is a self-protective emotion entails, which understanding is grounded on a conception of worth that opposes the one the auteur theory yields. Consequently, we should suspect that the conception of worth the auteur theory yields is the wrong one for explaining the sense of wonh that makes one liable to shame, and, because the Rawlsian characterization presupposes that conception, we should give up the view of the emotion it represents.
DAVID SACHS
How to Distinguish Self-Respect from Self-Esteem
If you tell someone that he should respect a certain person you may or may not be telling him that he should esteem that person. If you
tell someone that he should respect everybody you surely will not be telling him that he should esteem everybody. These facts suffice to show what, in any case, ought to be obvious: that respecting persons and esteeming them are not the same. Perhaps the principal or even the sole reason for supposing they are the same is that frequentl! "respecting someone" has the sense of "esteeming someone." Thus, if you say you respect so-and-so greatly, you are saying you hold him in high esteem, that you regard him as indeed praiseworthy; that you are saying anything else is indeed doubtful. Parallel remarks would often apply were you to say you have little respect for so-and-so; often, that is, you would be saying you hold him in low esteem or regard him unfavorably. Moreover your saying this would be compatible with your adding that, of course, you respect him as you respect-or en· deavor to respect-persons generally, including many whom you bold in much higher esteem. The situation is similar with self-respect and self-esteem. That is, although at times "self-~spect" and "self-esteem" are used interchangeably, self-respect and self-esteem are not identical. Thus if you complain that someone is lacking in self-respect you may not be deploring any lack of self-esteem on his part. It is not unheard-of for persons to esteem themselves highly and for others who are fully aware of that fact to complain of them that they are notably deficient © xg81 by Princeton University Press Philosophy & Public AffaiTs 10, no. 4 0048·39IS/8I/040J46-IS$oo.75/l
22
347
How to Distinguish Self-Respect from Self-Esteem
in self-respect. Respect and esteem, then, are different, whether it is a matter of others or of oneself. But how do they differ? There also can be little doubt that they are importantly related to each other. What are some of the main relations between them? In the following I try to answer these questions chiefly as regards self-respect and selfesteem; however, I shall incidentally make some observations about differences and connections between respecting others and esteeming them. I
Often it is thought of individuals that they have too much self-esteem, and there is no difficulty in understanding the thought. But it is not often thought-indeed it seems a hard saying-that a person has too much self-respect. 1 That a person esteems himself overmuch is easy to grasp regardless of whether he esteems himself too highly in general or in some particular connection or connections. But that an individual respects himself too highly in general or in some specific way is a puzzling notion. There is, it should be noted, nothing problematic about the notions of someone's having either too little selfesteem or too little self-respect. The perplexing thought, again, is that of an excess of self-respect. Yet counsels of self-preservation and self-advancement, advice relating to the security and flourishing of those dependent upon one, recommendations as to what would enable a cause one supportsadvice on these and other matters may include, in certain situations, one's being urged to sacrifice a measure of one's self-respect. Through others' counsel, one's own deliberation, or in other ways, one may come to think that certain situations warrant the sacrifice or surrender of some of one's self-respect. Just conceivably one might proceed from that reflection to another: perhaps one can have too much self1. To say of a man, not that he has too much self-respect, but instead that he has too much self-respect to do or submit to such-and-such is not to attribute to him an excess of self-respect. To criticize a man for having too much selfrespect to do or submit to such-and-such is to complain of his loftiness or stuffiness or of some kindred pretension; such uses of "too much self-respect" are sarcasms.
23
Philosophy & Public Affairs
respect for one's own good-or the good of one's family or the promotion of a cause, and so on. And from such thoughts it may be no large step to supposing there can be such a thing as too much self-respect. But to what would that supposition amount here? It would amount to supposing that there are .circumstances when one should not b.e averse to other persons disregarding, without good reason, ones wishes, cases when one ought not be inclined to take exception to the flouting of one's rights, situations when one should not resent or _find shameful being used or degraded, or manipulated or explo1ted. Clearly, there is a confusion involved in this sequence of thoug~t. Judging a measure of self-respect excessive and dispensable, that 15 • an encumbrance, is confused with judging it something that may more or less painfully have to be sacrificed. . Certainly it is plausible that a variety of situations can occur m which a person may reluctantly have to sacrifice a measure of his selfrespect. (To be sure, Kant, the moralist of the pride of self-respect, speaks with conviction against one's ever doing so.) But if one concedes that situations occur when it is at least arguable that a person should do so, there is no argument or consideration thereby offered to the effect that he ought not be averse to it, resent it, find it shameful. Or to the effect that he ought not to hope and strive for social and personal circumstances in which sacrifices of his self-respect will neither be nor appear necessary. In light of the foregoing, one can see that it is not just that the notion of an excess of self-esteem is easily comprehended, while that of an excess of self-respect is perplexing. What may have appeared a conceivable and even faintly plausible way of understanding the notion of too much self-respect turns out to be nothing of the kind. Instead, what emerges is the notion of possibly having to make a more or less painful sacrifice of some of one's self-respect-a sacrifice of part of what is, in its entirety, valuable. Clearly, this is not a conception of anything excessive. In contrast, consider an excess of selfesteem. Whereas, again, there may well be no such thing as unwarranted self-respect, there is, of course, such a thing as unwarranted self-este~m. If a person is disabused of an unduly high estimate he has of h1mself, he gets rld, perhaps at some cost in dismay or chagrin, of a misconception of himself; and this is likely desirable. But pain-
24
349
How to Distinguish Self-Respect from Self-Esteem
fully surrendering some of one's self-respect is not being disabused of any misconception or falsehood. One is subjecting oneself, with reluctance and resentment, to an abuse or abuses. I have not, it should be noted, claimed that the notion of an excess of self-respect is unintelligible. I have repeatedly claimed it is problematic. In effect I have contended that, within the framework of the notions of self-respect and self-esteem which we understand and apply to ourselves and others, what may just seem a plausible way of making sense of the idea of an excess of self-respect does not bear scrutiny. So far as I am able to tell, there is no other even faintly plausible way of making sense of the notion within that framework. Stepping outside of that framework-outside of what proves to be the structure of our pre-analytic comprehension of, and concern for, selfrespect and self-esteem-may, however, yield a sense for the notion of too much self-respect. 2 Thus from a cynical standpoint, or possibly from one or another utilitarian perspective, it could be argued that some such notion is intelligible. To sketch an argument to that effect would not, however, serve any of my purposes here. Here I want merely to observe that, if such a conclusion follows from any doctrine whatever, it appears that this would show that the doctrine involves a deformation of our understanding of and concern for self-respect.
II I tum now to a systematic difference-the range of possible divergences-between self-respect and self-esteem. If one takes pride in something, one is, to some extent or other, proud of it; moreover, one will probably feel proud of it in the sense of experiencing feelings of pride and related feelings in connection with it. Conversely, to be proud of something is to take some pride in it, and so, again, one is likely to experience feelings of pride and related feelings in connection with it. These claims seem unquestionable, whether or not what one takes pride in or is proud of is something upon which one prides oneself. Imagine, now, a man who is not proud of anything. There is 2. In speaking of our pre-analytic concern for self-respect I emphatically do not mean concern for merely conventional respectability.
25
350
Philosophy & Public Affairs
. he takes pn"de. He d oes not perceive himnothing whatever in which self as a person of any accomplishments or advantages-there ;re none at any rate of which be is proud. He is not to be thought 0 . as ' ' · occasions experiencing feelings of pride; there are, as he sees It, no "d for him to do so; not even perhaps, occasions to. take_ or feel P~ 0~ vicariously. Although the man takes no pride in-Is neither prou nor feels pride about-anything whatever, it could conceivably be f~lse · "Are you With-d to claim of him that he bas no pride. To the question, out pride?" it is possible that be could truly answer no; that he coul protest as undeserved the reproach, "Have you no pride?" Rightly protest it on the ground that be has his pride, and sincerely add that th~t is nothing of which to be proud, let alone a matter of being proud. Tbts is to claim that it could be categorically true of a person both_ that. he takes no pride in anything whatever, and yet that he has his pr?de. This is a real, however remote or lamentable, possibility because m _a well-understood sense of "pride," what is required for one to have ~IS pride, not to lack it, is to possess one's self-respect. To do so, agam. carries no implication about being proud. It is compatible with very little self-esteem, compatible indeed with self-disesteem on all counts but one-one which can be psychologically, and of course morally. of great importance: the possession of self-respect. To continue with the man I am imagining: he disesteems himself generally with the exception-the absence-of one ground for disesteem, that is, that he has allowed or even has bad to allow inroads upon his self-respect. But he does not regard retaining one's self-respect as worthy of esteem; he neither esteems himself nor expects others to esteem or admire him for it. Conceivably, he may view as grounds for self-esteem cases of either of the following kinds: first, keeping one's self-respect in the face of sore urgency or severe temptation to sacrifice a measure of it; second, after having unhappily surrendered it to some extent, making earnest efforts to restore it. But he knows that neither of these has been the case with him. And he believes that neither of them has been the case with great numbers of persons. The man I am imagining thinks of himself as a normally rational and ordinarily effective, self-respecting agent; one, moreover, who has not been so beset by temptation or driven by exigency that be has sacrificed, or even seriously considered sacrificing, his self-respect to any
26
351
How to Distinguish Self-Respect from Self-Esteem
important extent. In this or some equivalent way he characterizes himself, and he extends the same characterization to much of mankind. But again, by way of accomplishments and natural and social advantages, he judges himself to be distinctly and generally inferior or, at best, mediocre. There may be no one who, for all or even most of his adult life, satisfies the description of my imaginary man. But I believe that approximations to the type exist. At the least it is likely that some actual persons, in more or less protracted phases of their lives, have seen themselves quite in the way I have pictured him as seeing himself. Although the strong contention-that there are people very similar to the man I have imagined-is, I think, true, a weaker contention-that he represents a psychologically possible type-will suffice. It will suffice, that is, for one extreme of the possible divergences between selfesteem and self-respect: self-esteem wholly or almost wholly missing, together with self-respect, to put it as it is sometimes put, intact. I shall try now to sketch the other extreme of possible divergence between self-esteem and self-respect. Toward the outset I noted that some persons are thought of as esteeming themselves highly but also as notably lacking in self-respect. Why not imagine, among possible types of persons, a man whose self-esteem knows no limits apart from those set by sanity-a man, moreover, to whom the description "wholly lacking in self-respect" would be applicable? There are, however, difficulties with any such conception. First, the idea of sane, unqualified self-esteem is troublesomely vague. a Next, to imagine a total absence of self-respect is more difficult than may be thought. What limits does sanity impose upon self-esteem? Certainly, being sane allows for extravagant conceit and inordinate vanity. In allowing for extravagant conceit, being sane allows for somewhat illusory beliefs about the magnitude of one's advantages or accomplishments, about the magnitude, for example, of one's intelligence, social standing, or role in an enterprise. And in allowing for inordinate vanity, 3· As I trust will be clear, I am leaving aside lunatic self-esteem, for example, delusions of grandeur. Throughout I take no account of deranged or mentally defective humans. To them too, of course, considerations of respect and esteem and also and importantly, self-respect and self-esteem, regularly pertam.
27
352
Philosophy & Public Affairs
being sane also allows for absurd exaggerations of the importan~e. of one's advantages and accomplishments, allows, indeed, for pnzmg them to an irrational degree. The extent to which sanity co~nte· nances either the illusory beliefs connected with conceit or the lrra· tional prizing that typifies vanity is, evidently, very uncertain .. Some instances of self-esteem that involve illusion or irrationality or mcon· sistency or more than one of these will be compatible with sanity • and other instances not, while yet other instances may be undecidable. Thus, as I said, the matter is troublesomely vague. I turn now to the second difficulty, that of imagining a person who wholly lacks self-respect. In regard to the total absence of self-respect, two somewhat con· nected thoughts may present themselves. First, a point of fact: when persons are said to lack self-respect utterly, those who say it of tb~m, if there is any truth at all in what they say, are likely to be making wild overstatements, indeed, resorting to abusive hyperbole. Second, however, it may be thought that there could be a person of whom what they say would literally, without any exaggeration, be true. But could there be; could anyone wholly lack self-respect? To imagine someone could, I am taking it, is to imagine a socialized, rational human, not an imbecile, who is without any self-respect whatever. Were there to be such a person, he would not find it reason for re· sentment that persons ignore, capriciously or even blankly ignore, what they know to be his wishes. He would not be inclined to object to any impositions; not, that is, because they were impositions. Nor would he be averse to submitting to anything on the ground that it was degrading. Also be would not resent or be indignant about the flouting of any rights he possessed; not, that is, for the reason that rights of his were being flouted. To be sure, he could dislike, be an· gered by, or resist treatment of any of those kinds, but not in that they were of those kinds. (Nor, it should be added, would he find it shame· ful or con~mptible that he was quite prone to self-deception or weak· ness of will; of course he could regret being quite prone to either of them.) What, it may be asked with some bafflement, is so difficult about imagining such a person? Does not history show that multitudes of people have existed in circumstances which have reduced them to-
28
353
How to Distinguish Self-Respect from Self-Esteem
or never permitted them to rise from-the condition of total absence of self-respect? That is, does not history and many a contemporary chronicle show that there have been multitudes of socialized, rational humans to whom the characterizations in the foregoing paragraph categorically apply? What history suggests about this matter can, I believe, be helpfully thought about as follows. First, there very likely have been societies whose codes of conduct did not include the notion of a right.~ If it is claimed that, even so, members of those societies had "natural" rights, presumably they could not avail themselves of appeals to them, resent or be indignant about violations of them, and so on. A fundamental social provision for-and one of the bases of our conception of-self-respect would be missing. Members of those societies could be said to have a relatively impoverished conception of self-respect. They would not suffer losses of self-respect due to their being unable to resist violations of their rights; for of these, again, they would have little or no notion. Second, institutions of slavery and caste, and multifarious social and legal practices that make for inferior degrees of citizenship or communal membership also involve the absence of certain provisions for self-respect. But usually, if indeed not always, slaves, the lowest castes, and lesser-status citizens are conceived of and conceive of themselves as possessing some rights, however few and pitiable they may be. If such unfortunate persons did not resent violations of those rights, and if they did not regard voluntary submission to abuses of them as more or less shameful, they would thereby show a lack of selfrespect. But here it may again be urged that the life-circumstances of many such persons have been so marked by deprivation that they have been unable to attain, let alone preserve, any self-respect. And, it may be said, when one notes among the historical inhumanities of men to men the perhaps distinctive contributions made, for example, in the four centuries of the Inquisition or in our century, how can it be doubted that there are and have been persons wholly without selfrespect? The mistake involved in this line of thought is that it neglects to consider the possibility that, no matter how deprived or degraded a 4· See H.L.A. Hart, "Are There Any Natural Rights?" Philosophical Review 64, no. 3 (April 1955): 175-91, esp. 176-77·
29
354
Philosophy & Public Affairs
person may be, he yet may have or be imagined as having equa!~ peers-in deprivation and degradation. There is always at least possibility, and often the actuality, of the prese~ce of o~hers who: wretchedness any particular wretched person will perceive as co parable to his own. If, then, he were utterly to lack self-r~spe~t, h: would relate to any of his real or possible equals in degradation m ~h ways mentioned earlier: he would not resent their arbitrarily i~onn~ his wishes; he would not regard any impositions of theirs as Impositions; he would not find anything whatever they might ask or compel of him degrading. There would be-there could be-no one to whom he would respond in any of these ways if he literally wholly lacke~ ~elf respect. It is indeed difficult, I submit, to imagine a rational, sociahzed human of whom all this would be true. In trying to set forth the extremes of possible divergence between self-respect and self-esteem the following position has been reached. On the one hand, persons who are without, or virtually without, selfesteem but whose self-respect is intact are clearly conceivable. On the other hand, persons who wholly lack self-respect are bard to imagine, if not in fact unimaginable. It is plausible, therefore, to assume that everyone has some measure, however pathetically little it may be, of self-respect. The question now is, How much self-esteem-vaguely limited by sanity-is compatible with a minimum of self-respect? In answering this qestion one ought not focus solely on persons whose deficiency in self-respect is due, at least in part, to social conditions of coercive and extreme degradation. One ought also think of relatively free persons who are yet slavishly, and more or less generally, dependent upon others. To suppose a minimum of self-respect is to suppose some sensitivity, however slight, to considerations of self-respect-few and restricted as they will be. But that, in tum, is to suppose the possibility of a perceived occasion or occasions of loss of self-respect. And, should such occasions occur. they will tend to affect self-esteem adversely. Losses of sel.f-respect, then, may somewhat qualify a person·s selfesteem even If he has only a minimum of self-respect, a minimum of concern for a ~inil~1um of considerations of self-respect. But apart from t~at qualificat1~ and, again, within the vague limits imposed by samty, an othelWlse boundless self-esteem seems compatible with
30
355
How to Distinguish Self-Respect from Self-Esteem
a minimum of self-respect. This, then, will be the other extreme of possible divergence between self-respect and self-esteem. Obviously, there is much room for divergences between the possible extremes, divergences that are less great. III
Let us return to the man who does not view his having maintained his self-respect as deserving of any esteem. He would be a man who does not pride himself upon having his pride. And again, apart from what he may think of as exceptional cases, he does not accord esteem or admiration to others for their having maintained their self-respect. Characterizing a man in this way, together with the further characterization that he views himself as generally inferior in terms of advantages and attainments, provided one of the possible extremes of divergence between self-respect and self-esteem. In fact, actual persons who maintain their self-respect will generally account themselves deserving of esteem for doing so; moreover it may be presumed that they would regard it as a ground for self-esteem whether or not they supposed it exceptional. It is, after all, not a requirement for something's being a ground or reason for self-esteem, or for esteeming others, that it be unusual or extraordinary. However, my imaginary man thinks it is a requirement, and one or another psychological condition, such as a pervasive feeling of inferiority, may have to be invoked to accommodate his thinking it is one. (Incidentally, it does seem to be a requirement for admiration; and there are, unhappily, persons who live by standards such that they do not esteem themselves in any connection in which they judge themselves less than admirable.) The point to be stressed, however, is that in the case of this imaginary man the possession of self-respect still constitutes a ground or reason for self-esteem; that it fails to serve as one for him does not mean-in his case or in any case w~atever-that the retaining of one's self-respect is not a ground for self-esteem. The possession of one's self-respect, I am taking it, then, is in every case a ground for self-esteem, and, in the usual case, contributes to it; in the usual case, that is, a man who has his self-respect will pride himself upon it. The pride taken in it can, of course, vary 31
Philosophy & Public Affairs
Wl'dely-from
some self-contentment to an attitude of fiercely jealous . . ·f 't · thus independence. ContrariWise, any lessenmg of self-respect, 1 1 lS 'f · · not so perceived will occasion a loss of self-esteem; and even 1 1t IS · (As IS · on1Y to be ex· perceived,' furnish a ground for some loss of 1t. bear ~n pected ' self-deception thrives in the area of matters that . d that IS losses of self-respect.) If a loss of self-respect is recogmze · . ' · 't d m· if a person sees himself as having allowed, perhaps even mv1 e • · · · t ed and cursions upon his self-respect, indeed, sees that he has m1t1a pursued a course that entails some loss of it, then his feelings of self· disesteem will be experienced as shame and, more particularly • selfcontempt. Analogously, a person who enjoys his self-respect, when ~e finds other persons lacking in it, may well not simply bold th~m m disesteem. He is likely to feel some contempt for them and, 1f ap· propriately related to them, to experience some feelings of shame. I have stressed that, in every case, retaining one's self-respect supplies a ground or reason for self-esteem; and that any loss or lack ~f self-respect is a ground for self-disesteem. In doing so I have agam relied on our pre-analytic comprehension of and concern for se~ respect; first, on the fact that, in general, persons who retain theli self-respect esteem themselves to some extent on that account, taking it that there is no question but that they are right to do so, and that they likewise disesteem themselves for what they view as their lapses or failures of self-respect; second, on the fact that they esteem and disesteem others for the corresponding reasons and in corresponding ways. Earlier, when discussing the problematic notion of excessive self-respect, it appeared that the idea of an excess of self-respect involves a deformation of our common understanding of self-respect. Similarly, it seems that a distortion of that common understanding would be effected by the idea that a lack or loss of self-respect provides no ground for self-disesteem. (The man I imagined earlier would also see it thus; but he would not count his having fully retained his self· respect a ground for self-esteem.) If this is well taken, it points to a further and fundamental difference between self-esteem and self· respect. For neither a lowering of one's self-esteem nor aiiY enhancement of it furnishes any ground or reason whatever for one to come to. pos.sess less ~ more self:respect. Thus if a man no longer takes pnde m somethmg upon which he had once esteemed himself-realiz32
357
How to Distinguish Self-Respect from Self-Esteem
ing he was not, for example, quite the gymnast or algebraist he once thought he was-his later lower estimate does not in itself constitute a ground for any lessening of self-respect. So far as his lower selfestimate goes, he is warranted in expecting his wishes-barring, as always, reasonable objections-to be honored as much as before,n in expecting his rights to be acknowledged as fully as ever, and in resisting and resenting, as always, any attempts to use or manipulate, exploit, or degrade him. Similarly, in whatever ways a person's selfesteem may be augmented, none of them affords a reason or ground for greater self-respect. For it is not to be forgotten that, although one certainly can have too little self-respect it is surely doubtful that one can have too much; that there can be an excess of it. If that is true, it is true regardless of any lessening or heightening of one's selfesteem.
IV Some additional complexities about self-respect and self-esteem will emerge in what I shall now, by way of conclusion, try to do: to undercut misgivings to the effect that I am not doing justice to the interdependence of self-respect and self-esteem. In this connection it may be worth examining a specious difficulty about self-respect. Consider the following remark: "For example, if a man says 'I could never respect myself again if I did X,' and then he does X, we think he ought to lose his self-respect."o This remark ends on a jarring note; that jarring note may help to point up a complication in our use of "self-respect." It is, of course, possible for a man to do something such that he will thereafter not be able to respect himself; and other persons, on learning what he has done, may correctly
s. To honor a person's wishes, unless there is good cause not to do so, is basic to respecting him, whereas to honor a person is to express esteem and admiration for him or to hold him in honor and accord him adntiration. Hon~ring undertakings 'and debts at least strongly suggests respecting such obligations; indeed, I believe it constitutes part of what it is to respect other persons; in any case, it carries no suggestion of esteem. Honoring one's parents, as Scripture enjoins, seems to involve special concern as regards respecting them. 6. R. S. Downie and E. Telfer, Respect for Persons (London: Allen and UnWin, lgSg), p. 84. 33
Philosophy & Public Affairs
conclude that he will, as a result, have lost his self-respe~t. Howe~e:~ it is also clear that, if a man is no longer able to respect hlmsel~ or fol· lost his self-respect because of something he has done, nothmg lows as to how concerned or relatively unconcerned he will then be or ought to be about matters that bear on his self-respect. Among other possibilities, he may be steadfast in withstanding any fur~her threats to it and staunch in the face of temptations that would mvolve any further lessening of it. So the apparent difficulty is: if he is unabl~ t~ respect himself, if he has irretrievably lost his self-respect, bow lS lt possible for him to be resolute, even zealous, in guarding it? By now it should be obvious that this difficulty is a verbal one; and that, to resolve it, one need only recognize that in various contexts the phrases "self-respect" and "respect oneself" are used to signify self-esteem or esteeming oneself insofar as that is grounded upon self-respect; ~d that, accordingly '1oss of self-respect" sometimes signifies self-disesteem insofar as a ground or grounds for it are losses or failings of self-respect. To be sure, a man may disesteem himself for the re· mainder of his days because of some grievously shameful loss or failure of self-respect. To suppose it could not be true of him both that he had forever lost his self-respect and that he thereafter unyieldingly maintained it would be to mistake for a contradiction a play upon uses of "self-respect." Toward the beginning I observed that "self-respect" and "self· esteem" are at times used interchangeably; to that observation I have here added that sometimes "self-respect" signifies self-esteem insofar as it is predicated upon self-respect; and a parallel observation about ioss of self-respect" and self-disesteem, namely, that "loss of self· respect" sometimes signifies loss of self-esteem insofar as that is predicated upon a loss or failing in self-respect. To turn now to a more substantial question about the interdepend· ence of self-respect and self-esteem, one relating to fairly familiar phenomena: changes of manner and conduct that seem to evince in· creased self-respect subsequent to an enhancement of self-esteem, and changes in attitude and conduct that seem to express diminished self-respect following upon a loss of self-esteem. These phenomena may suggest that the psychology of some persons is such that to some degree their self-respect-their "inner worth," to deploy Kant's phrase
34
359
How to Distinguish Self-Respect from Self-Esteem
-varies for them with their self-esteem. For them, having one's pride appears to depend in some measure on how deserving of esteem they take themselves to be in connections other than those that constitute having one's pride. Further, some of the persons who appear to exhibit these phenomena, whose psychology seems to be of this kind, tend to think that what warrants changes in self-esteem is to at least some extent good reason for parallel changes in self-respect. Consistent with this, their respect for other persons may seem to vary somewhat in accord with what they take to be good reason for its varying: that they rightly enough esteem certain persons more than others, and the same persons more at some times than at other times. In sum, within a range of self-respect and similarly as regards respect for others, some individuals seem not only to subordinate respect to esteem, but also to regard that subordination as reasonable. They think it good reason for more or less respecting oneself or another that there is good reason for more or less esteeming oneself or another. The phenomena of the apparent subordination, in some measure, of self-respect to self-esteem, together with the opinion that reasons for self-esteem provide reasons for self-respect, may appear to call into question the claim I made earlier-the claim that neither an increase nor a decrease in self-esteem supplies any ground or reason for one to come to possess more or less self-respect. The suggestion is that there may be a greater interdependence between self-respect and self-esteem than that claim allows. To begin with the phenomena. First, they are far from universal. Second, concerning many instances of them, it is doubtful that selfrespect is actually increased or diminished, appearances notwithstanding. For if a person's enhanced self-esteem were really to carry in its train an increase of self-respect on his part, then for example, he would come to regard being servile as shameful, and as no less shameful in the past, when he did not esteem himself so highly. He Would come to regard others' attempts to get him to be servile as attempts to be resisted and resented, and equally to have been resisted and resented earlier. Otherwise his change in manner and conduct will not signify increased self-respect. Instead, it will signify the decorum and conduct that he thinks suits ·a person as deserving of esteem as the one he has become. It will be a matter, so to say, of status rather
35
Philosophy & Public Affairs
than self; of the manners and deeds he thinks appropriate to one who has what he now has to be proud of, and not of his coming, in any greater degree, to have his pride. Usually it is this kind of change, a merely specious increase in self-respect, that occurs when it seems that enhanced self-esteem has led to increased self-respect. Finally, in cases of seeming decline in self-respect subsequent upon a loss in self-esteem, the change again is usually one in self-esteem alone. Self-respect is much more likely to be revealed as having been less than it was thought to have been, and not to have actually diminished. Thus the matters canvassed in this last section serve only to clarify and confirm the distinctness of self-respect from self-esteem. I am grateful to Gerald Barnes for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
RAWLSIAN SELF-RESPECT AND THE BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS MOVEMENT LARRY L. THOMAS
One of the most important effects of what is called the Black Consciousness Movement is thought to be the enhancement of the self-respect of blacks. But surprisingly enough, the analysis of self-respect which we find in John Rawls' book, A Theory of Justice, cannot account for the fact that this is so.• And consider the case of the famed black educator Booker T. Washington. Although it is undoubtedly true that few blacks of his time ever attained his prominence, it is not, however, a foregone conclusion that he was not an uncle tom, and so that he failed to have self-respect. 2 But according to the Rawlsian analysis of self-respect, we could have no reason to suppose that Washington lacked self-respect, given his prominence. As these brief remarks would suggest, I think that Rawls' analysis of selfrespect is defective. And as I hope to show, this is so because Rawls has failed to distinguish between self-respect and self-esteem. Now the distinction between self-respect and self-esteem, while often overlooked by philosophers, is one which psychologists frequently make and which, to some extent, is reflected in ordinary discourse. 3 For instance, the distinguishing characteristic of an uncle tom, or servile persons generally, is said to be a lack of self-respect, and not self-esteem. And we do not say "No self-esteeming person would do such-and-such," but rather "No self-respecting person would do such-and-such." To be noted, also, is that we can esteem persons only for (what we take to be) their accomplishments or abilities. There is no such thing as esteeming a person just because he or she is a person. But we can respect persons just because they are persons. There seems to be a sense in which we can respect all persons equally - the rich, the poor, the talented, and so on. At any rate, I suspect that one reason why the distinction between 303
37
LARRY L. THOMAS
self-respect and self-esteem often escapes us is that both concepts have to do with a person's sense of worth: a person with self-respect has a sense of worth, and so has a person with self-esteem. What is the nature ~f the difference between these two senses of worth'? l hope to provtde a satisfactory answer to this question as 1 attempt to show that what we have in A Theory of Justice is not an account of self-respect, but self-esteem instead. Rawls defines self-respect (self-esteem) as having the conviction that one's plan of life is worthwhile (178, 440). And according to Rawls, one comes to have this conviction in two ways: (1) by having a rational plan of life which satisfies the Aristotelian Principle, and (2) by finding one's person and deeds appreciated and confirmed by people whose association one enjoys and who are likewise esteemed (440). A rational plan of life is to be understood in the way that rational planning is traditionally thought of. For Rawls remarks that it is " ... the plan that would be decided upon as the outcome of careful reflection in which the agent reviewed, in the light of all the relevant facts, what it would be like to carry out these plans and thereby ascertained the course of action that would best realize his more fundamental desires" (417). The Aristotelian Principle reads as follows: other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized ~apacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment mcrease s the more the capacity is realized or the greater its ' complexity (426). And the ~rist~telian Principle has what Rawls refers to as the companion effect whtch 1s that A_s we witness. the exercise of well-trained abilities of others, these dtsplays are ~n]oyed by us and arouse a desire that we should be able to do the ~arne things ourselves. We want to be like those persons who can exercJse the abilities that we find latent in nature (428).
th:~; ~~~e~~:~=~t i!~~:s to bear in mind r~garding Rawls'
(so-called) Rather, (2) holds true of a t (1) and <2~ are not mdependent of each other. of life. Although Rawls d::son only tf ~1) hol~~ true of that person's plan should understand (1) and (l) ~:t ~~Y thts e~pbcttly, it ~eems clear that '!'e he makes throughout A """h t 15 way~ gtven the vanous remarks whtch '' eory of Just1ce.
304 38
RA WLSIAN SELF-RESPECT AND THE BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS MOVEMENT
Our self-respect, Rawls maintains, depends upon the respect of those with whom we associate (178, 44lf). If this is so, then the obvious question to ask is "When are those with whom we associate disposed to respect us?" The answer, it appears, is that our associates are disposed to respect us when they see that our plan of life satisfies the Aristotelian Principle, that is, when they witness the well-trained abilities which our plan of life displays. For as the companion effect would suggest, when others witness these abilities, they come to judge that our plan of life is worthwhile. And for others, in particular our associates, to judge that our plan of life is worthwhile is for them to respect us. For Rawls thinks of a person as a human life lived according to a plan (408). These considerations would seem to indicate that, as I have remarked, (1) and (2) are not independent of one another. What is more, it should be obvious, given just these considerations, that the Aristotelian Principle and its companion effect are the backbone of what Rawls presents as a theory of self-respect. Now the Aristotelian Principle is relative to the abilities of persons. Thus for any two persons S and N, it does not follow from the fact that S and N have similar plans of life, that their plans equally satisfy the Aristotelian Principle. For if the abilities and talents of S far exceed those of N, then although they are in pursuit of similar plans of life, S's plan will satisfy the Aristotelian Principle to a lesser extent than N's plan. For S's plan will not realize the abilities of S to the fullest extent. Since the Aristotelian Principle is relative to the abilities of persons, Rawls seems to think that all persons can have the secure conviction that their plan of life is worthwhile. But not so. Consider two plans of life K and J. And suppose that K, on the one hand, is such that all persons have the ability, and know that they have it, to pursue K. On the other hand, suppose that J is a plan of life which most lack, and know that they lack, the ability to pursue. Given the Aristotelian Principle and its companion effect, only persons who successfully pursue the J plan of life are the ones who should have a more secure convicton of the worth of their plan of life. For they are the ones whose plan of life will exhibit the well-trained abilities which others lack, and so have their plan judged to be more worthwhile by others. For by hyPothesis, the K plan of life is such that everyone knows that they could successfully pursue it if only they should try. Thus, in contrast to the J plan of life, the K plan will appear less attractive to persons. Now Rawls would like to think that it does not matter that some persons are able to pursue plans of life which are beyond the reach of others, so Ion~ as each person can find an association of persons which affirms the plan of life that he or she pursue (441). But as Rawls' further explanatory remarks 30S
39
LARRY L. THOMAS
make clear, what is meant is this: It does not matter that some persons are able to pursue plans of life which are beyond the reach _of. others, so_ long ~ each person associates with those whose abilities are stmtlar to thetr ownh For in so doing, a person does not, so Rawls would like to think,_ see t e plan which she pursues as lacking in worth. But is Rawls' contentton here ee sound? I think not. 4 For we are not oblivious to the abilities of people around us. W~ can s k that others have abilities which we and those with whom we assoctate lac . · · htsf And although each person amongst a group of associates may fee1• gtven or plan of life, that her abilities equal those of any other member ~ the group, it may be symptomatic of the group itself that each member • 10 contrast to the plans of life of non-members, views her abilities to be very minimal. Moreover, what about persons whose abilities are extremely minimal? Is the answer to their having a secure conviction of the worth of their plan of life, and so their self-respect, that they associate with only those whose abilities are equally minimal? Surely not! Now as my discussion of Rawls' account of self-respect should make clear, it is mere wishful thinking to suppose that the self-respect of all persons can be equal, if self-respect consists in having the conviction that one's plan of life is worthwhile. But is the sense of worth thus grounded that which.we should want to call self-respect? As I think the case of Booker T. Washington and the Black Consciousness Movement will show, the answer to this question is a negative one. As I have already remarked, few blacks ever attained the prominence of Booker T. Washington, who lived during his life time. As a black who founded an educational institution, the Tuskegee Institute, and who was consulted by virtually everyone concerning monetary appropriations to blacks,' Washington surely had to have the conviction that his plan of life was worthwhile. For he was universally esteemed for his accomplishments. Few blacks, and for that matter, few whites could boast of similar accomplishments for which they also were universally esteemed. And so if ( 1) in finding our person and deeds appreciated by those with whom we associate we come to have the conviction that our plan of life is worthwhile, and (2) in having this conviction we thereby have the sense of worth which constitutes self-respect, then it should be a settled question that Washington was not an un~le tom, and so failed to have self-respect, since on any one's account Washmgton stands as one of the most esteemed blacks of his time. But it is not a settled question as to whether or not Washington was an uncle tom. For his famed "Atlanta Exposition Address" renders Washington vulnerable to the view that he was an uncle tom.'
306
40
RAWLSIAN SELF-RESPECT AND THE BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS MOVEMENT
Of course, I do not mean to say that Washington was an uncle tom. Rather, I claim only that it is not a foregone conclusion that he was not one. And if this is so, then either (I) or (2) of the preceding paragraph is false. (I) is surely not false, thus it follows that (2) is false. Turning now to the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), one of the most important changes which came about as a result of this movement was a change in blacks' self-description from "colored" or "Negro" to "black". Of course, there were other changes as well. • But I shall take the change in blacks' self-description as indicative of the fact that the selfrespect of blacks was enhanced as a result of the BCM. But is this so because blacks came to pursue more worthwhile plans of life, as Rawls' account of self-respect would have us to say? Clearly not. The change from "colored" or "Negro" to "black" has a significance which cannot be fully explained by the fact that blacks came to pursue more worthwhile plans of life. To be sure, many blacks did come to pursue more worthwhile plans as the governmental, educational, and business institutions of America began to hire blacks for their more status positions. And there is no question but that the increased appreciation of many aspects of the black culture by the American society has made it possible for many blacks to pursue more worthwhile plans. The increased appreciation of music generally characterized as "soul" music proves to be the most striking example of this.' But the plans of many blacks remained unchanged with respect to their worth. That is to say, many blacks who pursued a plan of life of little worth proper to the BCM did not come to pursue a plan of greater worth as a result of the BCM. Yet one thing seems clear: The BCM enhanced the self-respect of not only those blacks who came to pursue a more worthwhile plan of life, but of those who did not as well. The change in blacks' self-description, then, was not indicative of the fact that they came to pursue more worthwhile plans of life, though many in .fact did. Rather it indicated a more fundamental change, namely, a change 10 the way blacks came to view themselves as persons qua persons. For the BCM was a rejection of a conception of persons according to which to have a certain pigmentation of the skin was ipso facto to be less worthy of the rights and liberties to which other members of the American society had been so long accustomed. The adoption of the self-description of "black" serves to indicate that blacks came to view themselves in this way. And it is in so coming to view themselves that, as a result of the BCM, the self-respect of blacks was enhanced. Together, the case of Booker T. Washington and the BCM show that having a plan of life which is worthwhile, and hence one that satisfies the
.
307 41
LARRY L. THOMAS
Aristotelian Principle, is neither a necessary nor sufficient con~itio~ f~r having self-respect. And if this is right, then the sense of worth wh1ch a: ~ calls self~respect is not that at all. As I remarked earlier, I want to ~a~ t a what Rawls calls self-respect is self-esteem instead. And to say th1s lS not simply to make a dogmatic assertion. For as I have noted, we esteem persons for their accomplishments and abilities. And it should be clear from my discussion of Rawls that, in the last analysis, his account of self-respect turns upon persons being esteemed for just these things. For to have th~ conviction that one's plan of life is worthwhile is to have a sense of wort with respect to one's accomplishments and abilities. Given that the ~ense of worth thus grounded is that which is properly called self-esteem, th1~ .mu~h is evident: Self-esteem is not a sense of worth which we are just1f1ed 10 having in virtue of the fact that we are persons.' 0 Turning now to self-respect, it is perhaps obvious from my remarks concerning the BCM that I want to say that self-respect is a sense of worth which we are justified in having in virtue of the fact that we are persons. Moreover, though, I want to say that it is a sense of worth which should be equal among persons. But what aspect of persons can serve as the basis for this sense of worth? The answer, I believe, is the moral status of persons. An obvious, though far from trivial, fact about the world is that not every thing in the world has the same moral status. The moral status of some things, most notably those which are inorganic, is nil. One can do no moral wrong to a book lying on the side of the road. It has no rights, nor are there duties or obligations owed to it. To be sure, a moral wrong is done when, in the absence of permission to do so, a person wilfully destroys a book knowing that it belongs to someone else. But the moral wrong done in this case to the person to whom the book belongs, and not to the book itself. Sentient animals which are non-human have, so it would appear, partial moral status. For at the very minimum, it may be said that persons have a moral duty not to treat such animals cruelly. Some, in fact, would want to say that such animals have a moral right not to be treated cruelly. I shall not enter the dispute as to whether or not animals have moral rights. Suffice it to note, however, that the so-called moral rights of animal~ are conceptually predicated upon the fact that persons exist. For it is all but absurd to speak of non-human animals as exercising or acting within their rights. Consider also that if, as happened during the Mesozioc era there were animals but not persons, it would certainly be out of place to s~k of animals as having a right not to be treated cruelly. And even though animals are said to violate the territorial space of others or defend their own, we do not countenance 308
42
RAWLSIAN SELF-RESPECT AND THE BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS MOVEMENT
these activities as the violation or defense of rights of any kind_ Finally, there are those living things, namely persons, which have full moral status. Their full moral status is evidenced by the following: First, the moral rights of persons and the duties which persons have towards one another are not conceptually predicated upon the existence of any other form of life; and secondly, the moral duties which persons have toward any other living things are a subset of the moral duties which persons have towards one another. And this remark holds mutatis mutandis with respect to non-human animals having moral rights, if indeed this is so. Now it is clear that the moral status of a thing determines, in part at least, the modes of conduct towards it which are proper. It is precisely the fact that a piece of wood has no moral status at all that one can do no moral wrong to it, however one treats it. Similarly, it is because sentient but non-human animals have some moral'status that it is not morally wrong to kill them for the purposes of food, although it is morally wrong to inflict needless pain upon them. And, finally, it is just the difference between the moral status of non-human animals and that of persons in virtue of which it is morally wrong to treat persons as mere property which can be bought and sold for labor, but not non-human animals. Now on my view the sense of worth which is properly called self-respect is grounded in the fact that persons have full moral status. Self-respect, I want to say, consists in having the belief that one has and is worthy of full moral status. And to believe this is to believe that one is as worthy as any other person of the set of moral rights to the the recognition of which persons are entitled. At this point there are two questions which immediately arise: (1) In virtue of what is it that persons are worthy of full moral status? And (2) What are the moral rights of which persons are worthy? I shall discuss these questions in turn. To our first question, the answer, I believe, is that persons are worthy of full moral status in virtue of the fact that they are self-conscious beings. I shall not attempt to fully vindicate this reply here; instead, I shall offer a few considerations which indicate that it points in the right direction. We may think of a self-conscious being as one which has a concept of itself as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental status, along with the ~lief that it is such a being. It is one which as the capacity (a) to identify With the past, present, and future stages of itself, and (b) to formulate and execute long-term plans of action. 1 1 Now it seems that moral systems can address themselves only to beings ~ho have this capacity, since a fundamental characteristic of moral systems 15 what we may refer to as temporal indifference: If at time t, R is a moral 309
43
LARRY L. THOMAS
reason for doing act A in circumstances C, then (other things being ~~ual) (i) R is also a moral reason for doing A inC at some future time, and (u) R was also a moral reason for doing A in C in times past. •z Accordingly, a being with full moral status must be ~ne w~o has !he capacity (a) to recognize that a reason which presently apphes to 1t. f~r domg act A in circumstances C can be, as in the case of moral systems 1t 1s (?ther things equal) a reason which will apply to it in the future for doing A .m C, and (b) to formulate and execute long-term plans of action accordmgl~. This is something that self-conscious beings can do. But what is mo.re, ~t seems that it is precisely among self-conscious beings that morahty lS possible. These considerations do not, of course, show that sel.fconsciousness is a sufficient ground for having full moral status. But m offering these considerations my aim has been only to indicate tha~ as .a sufficient ground for having full moral status, self-consciousness pomts m the right direction. 1 should like to think that at least this much has been accomplished. I now take up the issue of the moral rights of which persons are worthy in virtue of the fact that they are persons. To begin with, it should be clear that such rights are not, to adopt H.L.A. Hart's terminology, special moral rights. 11 For these are rights which rise out of special transactions between individuals, as in the case of promising; and so they cannot be the sort of rights which we have in virtue of the fact that we are persons. But needless to say, it would hardly be informative to say simply that the moral rights of which persons are worthy qua person are non-special rights, in the absence of an enumeration of such rights. Yet, aside from the so-called natural rights, it is anything but obvious as to what a complete list of such rights would look like. Fortunately, though, my view of self-respect is in no waY affected by this difficulty. True enough, 1 want to say that self-respect consists in having the belief that one is worthy of one's moral rights in virtue of the fact that one is a person. But from this it does not follow that a person has self-respect if and only if he knows what all the moral rights of persons are and therefore his own moral rights. For having self-respect is not so much the ability to give a run down of what one's moral rights happen to be as it is a conviction of one's standing in the mo~al community . 14 Differentiy put, then, we may saY that to have self-respect 1s to·have the belief that one is a member of good standing in the ~oral ~ommu~ity in virtue of the fact that one is a person. And although th1s bebef enta1ls the belief that for any non-special moral right M, one is worthy of M, it does not call for knowing what all the non-special moral rights happen to be. I want now to bring into sharper focus the connection between my view
310
44
RA WLSIAN SELF-RESPECT AND THE BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS MOVEMENT
of self-respect and the BCM. Although self-respect pertains to our moral status, we must not lose sight of the fact that it is amongst social institutions that we live, that we are members of a society. And as others have noted, the view that we have of ourselves is fundamentally influenced by these institutions. This is no less so in regard to our moral status. The social institutions in which we live can either sustain or undermine the view that we have full moral status, that we are members of good standing in the moral community, in virtue of the fact that we are persons. As one might suspect, I want to say that a society does the former when and only when the grounds for being a member of good standing in that society are coextensive with the grounds for being a member of good standing in the moral community, which is that one is a person. This means, then, that the basic rights and liberties of society are to be distributed equally. Now as one has no doubt noted, the very claim which Rawls makes in A Theory of Justice is that the equal distribution of basic rights and liberties sustain the self-respect of persons (sec. 82). But he thinks that this is so because such a distribution affirms the worth of each person's plan of life. For what he should like to think is that the self-respect of each person is secured in virtue of the fact that each has the conviction that she is free to pursue her plan of life, whatever its end may be. 1 ' But the equal distribution of rights and liberties does not affirm the worth of the plans of life which persons pursue. That is to say, the knowledge that one is free to pursue one's plan of life whatever its end may be is not sufficient for one to also have the conviction that one's plan of life is worthwhile. If all that one can do well is sweep floors, the knowledge that one is guaranteed the freedom to do this will not in itself result in one also having the conviction that one's plan of life- that of floor sweeping- is worthwhile. At least this is so in societies of the Western Culture, where ends such as the arts and sciences and the high forms of culture are more hi~hly valued. Moreover, as 1 have already shown, it is a consequence of the ~nstotelian Principle and its companion effect that a person whose plan of hfe exhibits the greater and more subtle number of well-trained abilities is the person who will have a more secure conviction of the worth of his plan of life. And between a floor sweeper and a symphony conductor, say, it is clear whose plan of life is more subtle and calls for the greater number of Well-trained abilities. Presumably any (healthy) person could be an excellent floor sweeper, if only they should try; though not so with symphony conducting. What is more, if (1) the equal distribution of rights and liberties were to suffice for persons to have the conviction that their plan of life is
311
45
LARRY l. THOMAS
worthwhile, then why is (2) having a plan of life which sati.sfies ~he Aristotelian Principle a necessary condition for having a plan of hfe w.htch is worthwhile'? Either (l) or (2) is true, but not both. It is obvious, 1 beheve, that (2) is true, at least in general. The equal distribution of basic rights and liberties does indeed affirm t~e self-respect of persons. For, as I should like to think, it is the only way m which society can affirm the fact that each person is a being with full moral status in virtue of the fact that he or she is a person. The Black Consciousness Movement supports this view. . For slavery and racism in America has been a deliberate and systematic denial to blacks the rights and liberties to which others in America have been so long accustomed. As a result of the Black Consciousness Movement, we did not all come to regard ourselves as brilliant. Nor, again, did we all suddenly discover talents which were hitherto latent in us. These things could never have been accomplished by the Black Consciousness Movement as such. Rather, we came to believe that, our blackness to the contrary notwithstanding, we were worthy of first-class citizenship in the American society. And on my view, to believe this is, in part, what it means to have self-respect. ••
University of Maryland Harvard University
NOTES l Belknap Press, 1971. All parenthetical page references are to this text 1 give an account of th~ Black ~onsciousness Movement later on in the essay. . . T~ls paper IS an attempt to spell out some of the practical implications of the dis· unct1on betwe~n self-respect and self-esteem as 1 have drawn it in my "Morality and our S~lf-Concept, The ~~urna~ of Value Inquiry, v. 12 (1978). For implications of a ~1ffere~t sort, see my Marx1srn versus Capitalism: A Psychological Discussion," Studies rn Sov1et Thought (forthcoming). 2 See Booker~· Washi.ngton'.s Up From Slavery: An Autobiography, (Doubleday and Co., 1901). It IS Washmgton s Atlanta address which makes him so vulnerable to the label uncle torn. See note 7 below. 3F For eurndp!Ce, seel9S6t7anley Coopersmith, The Antecedents of Self-Esteem, (W J{. reeman an o., ), p. 26; Karen Horne N · · W . . y, ew Ways m PsychoanalysiS, (W · · Norton and Co. 1939) ch s • , . espec1a11 y, - - - - s I'"A 1 · (W w N ton W . - - , e'J· naysls, . . or and Co 1942) PP 43f. R b ·• • · ., o ert Whtte "E · 1 ·c Theory," Psychologkal Issues, v. 3 · 1963 • go and Reahty in Psychoana yu "Self-efficacy· Toward a Un'f . T~ ), Monograph 11; and Albert Bandura, Review, v. 84. (1977). I ymg eory of Behavioral Change," Psychological
312
46
RAWLSIAN SELF-RESPECT AND THE BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS MOVEMENT
4 This criticism of Rawls' account of self-respect is developed more fully in the "Morality and Our Self-Concept" paper mentioned in note I above, See Section L S Rawls writes: "It is our plan of life that determines what we feel ashamed of, and so feelings of shame are relative to our aspirations, to what we try to do and with whom we wish to associate. Those with no musical ability do not strive to be musicians and feel no shame for this lack. Indeed it is no lack at all, not at least if satisfying associations can be formed by doing other things" (444). 6 On this point, see John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, (Vintage Books, 1947), ch. 21, and Charles E. Silberman, Crisis in Black and White, (Vintage Books, 1964), pp. 12Sff. 7 In his "Atlanta Exposition Address," Washington emphasized the importance of industrial education for blacks, rather than their obtaining the suffrage. Thus for him, the political and civil status of blacks were, on the face of it at any rate, of secondary importance. Indeed, in this address, Washington implies that the suffrage was something of which blacks should have to become worthy. Consider the following passages: No race can prosper till it learns that there is as much dignity in tilling a field as in writing a poem. It is at the bottom of life we must begin, and not at the top ....... . In all things that are purely social we can be as separate as the fingers, yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress .... It is important and right that all privileges of the law be ours, but it is vastly more important that we be prepared for the exercises of these privileges. Of course, as John Hope Franklin observes, op. cit., p. 395, weaknesses in Washington's views may seem more obvious today than they were then. All the same, it should be noted that not all of Washington's black contemporaries viewed his Atlanta speech favorably. Most notably, W .E. B. DuBois thought Washington's speech to be a call for compromise and submission. See DuBois' The Soul of Black Folks, (A.C. McClurgh, 1903), pp. 41-59. 8 As the expressions "I'm black and I'm proud" and "Black is beautiful" would indicate, from the standpoint of physical appearance, blach no longer thought of their not possessing white features as a lack on their part. The standards of white beauty simply no longer applied. And as blacks, we came to take greater pride in various aspects of our culture. 9 See, for example, Maureen Orth, "Stevie, The Wonder Man," Newsweek, (October 28, 1974), pp. S9-6S. She writes: "It was American black music that provided the inspiration -and often the music itself- for the explosion of white-dominated rock in the '50s and '60s. But with the rare exception ... , it was white stars who got the big money and the white audiences. Now the sheer creative power of black music has pushed it into the mainstream ... Today the color line is almost completely erased, and the record charts are studded with black names and groups." 10 The concept of self-esteem is far more complex than my remarks would indicate. Aside from our abilities and accomplishments, another factor is the ends which we value. The successful pursuit of a given end will be a source of self-esteem to us only if we value !hat end itself. And as 1 have remarked in my "Capitalism versus Marxism" essay, cited IQ note I above, there is also the factor of what I have called derivative self-esteem. Suppose that 11 is an end which is valued by society at large, and that as it happens persons most successful at pursuing 11 are of kind K. If the association of end II with people of
313 47
LARRY L. THOMAS
kind K becomes strong enough, then being of kind K can itself suffice to enhance on~'s self-esteem. The most striking example of derivative self-esteem is the self-esteem which often stems from being a member of a high socio-economic class. See S. Coopersmith, op. cit., pp. 82f.; and M.D. Vernon, Human Motivation, (Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 132f. This is the point which I believe Thomas Nagel to be making in his "Rawls on Justice," The Philosophical Review, v. 82 (1973), note 6. II For a fuller account of self-respect, see my "Morality and Our Self-Concept," Section II.
12 Here I borrow from Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, (Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 58, and Michael Tooley, "Abortion and Infanticide," (Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 52-84. Against Tooley, though, 1 want to say that a being's having the potential for these capacities is a morally relevant consideration. See my "Human Potentiality: Its Moral Relevance," The Personalist, v. S9 (1978). 13 Henry Sidgwick makes this point in The Method of Ethics, 7th ed., pp. 31, 207, 379. Each in section 3 of their respective books and chapters. 14 "Are There Any Natural Rights,." The Philosophical Review, v. 64 (1955). IS Here I am much indebted to the essays of Thomas E. Hill Jr., "Servility and ~elf-Respect," The Monist, v. 57 (1973), and Gregory Vlastos, "Justice and Equality," m ed. Richard B. Brandt, Social Justice, (Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1962), pp. 31-72. 16 The proviso is that a person's plan of life conform to the principles of justice as fairness. '.' I wish to thank Irving Thalberg and Newton Garver for commenting upon the penultimate draft of this essay.
314
THE CLAIM TO MORAL ADEQUACY OF A HIGHEST STAGE OF MORAL JUDGMENT •
I
N previous publications I have oudined: (a) the extensive research facts concerning culturally universal stages of mo~al judgment.1 (b) the psychological theory of development whtch best fits those facts,1 and (c) a metaethical view which attem~ts to bridge the pp between naturalistic and nonnaturalistic theones of moral judgment and their grounds of adequacy.• The present paper elaborates a claim made in the previous paper •: the claim that a higher or later stage of moral judgment is "objectively" preferable to or more adequate than an earlier stage of judgment according to certain mMal aiteria. Since these criteria of adequacy are those central to judgment at our most advanced stage, "stage 6,.. the problem becomes one of justifying the structure of moral judgment at stage 6. Fint. however, we shall briefly review the position taken in our earlier paper, and introduce the claims of the present one. I. REVIEW OJ' PSYCHOLOGICAL THEOR.Y
Over a period of almost twenty years of empirical research. my colleagues and 1 have rather firmly established a culturally universal invariant sequence of stages of moral judgment; these stages are 11 tJUt these mattera in peatat detail in my papen HJ'mpodtional Verba and K.oowledJe,'' thia JOUUW.. IJUX, 11 Qune 1, 19'12): !01-512 and "The Wages ol Scepticism,'' American Philosof'hical Q.uarterl,, x. !I Uuly 197!1): 177-187. • To be preeenb!d in an APA aymposium on Mow Development and Moral Pbi1010phy, Decalaber 28, 197!1; commentaton will be K.urt Baier and IUchard G. Henion: 1ee this JOllaNAL. thia ilsue, 646-648 and 648-649 respectivdy. 1 Monalization: TM CogniCive·DewlotJmental .4f'Foac:h (New York: Holt, R.inehut • WiDaton, 1974)• •1 aDd ~uenc:e: The Copi~ve-Dcvdopmental Approach to Socializattoo, in D. Goalin, eel., H~~t~dbooll of Socialimtion Theory and Research (New York: R.and McNally, 1969). • "from Ia to Ought: How to Commit lbe Naturali&tic l'allKy and Get Away with It in the Study of Mow Development," in T. Mixhel, eel., CogniCi'lld De· wlo#"Mftt atl Efristemolog, (New York: Academic PJea. 1971).
"!taae
50
MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY
631
grossly summarized in Table I: Table I. Definition of Moral Stages
I. Preconventional level At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels either in
terms of the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punish· ment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into the following two stages: Stage 1: The punishment-tJnd-obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of pun· ishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order sup· ported by punishment and authority (the latter being stage 4). Stage 2: The instrumental-f'elativist orientation. Right action con· sists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the market place. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll saatch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice. II. Conven tiona! level At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group. or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and. obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to penonal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level, there are the following two stages: Stage 5: The intupersonal concordance or "good boy---nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps othen and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what ia majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention-"he means well" becomes important for the fint time. One earns approval by being "nice:• Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake. III. Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level At this level, there is a dear eJfort to define moral values and principles that have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles and apart from the in-
51
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
dividual'a own identification with these groups. This level again has two stages: . . . . 11 with Stage 5: The social-contract legala.stac oraentataon, genera Y utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in te~ of eral individual rights, and standards which have been cnucally • amined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear aware· · · and a coneness of the relativism of personal values and opmaons .d sponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Asa e from what is constitutionally and democratically agtted upon •. the right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion." The resu~t 15 an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with an ~phas~ upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational conaaderauons of aocial utility (rather than freezing it in terms of stage 4 "law and. or· der"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and COii.!ract is the bmd· ing element of obligation. This is the "official'' morality of the Amer· ican government and constitution. . d Stage 6: The universal-ethical-principle orientation. Right 11 defin~ by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical pran· ciples appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and con· sistency. These principles ar-e abstract and ethical (the Golden llule, the categorical imperative): they are not conaete moral rules like ~e Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of 1us· tice, of the recriprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons ("From Is to Ought," pp. 164J5).
g:·
As Table 1 indicates, the last stage, stage 6, bas a distinctively Kantian ring, centering moral judgment on concepts of obligation as these are defined by principles of respect for penons and of jus· tice. In part, this corresponds to an initial "formalist" or "struc· turalist" bias of both our moral and our psychological theory. Our psychological theory of morality derives largely from Piaget,6 who claims that both logic and morality develop through stages and that each stage is a structure which, formally considered, is in better equilibrium than its predecessor. It assumes, that is, that each new (logical or moral) stage is a new structure which includes elements of earlier structures but transforms them in such a way as to repre· sent a more stable and extensive equilibrium. Our theory assumes that new moral structures presuppose new logical structures, i.e., that a new logical stage (or substage) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a new moral stage. It assumes, however, that moral judgments (or moral equilibrium) involves two related processes or conditions absent in the logical domain. Fint, moral judgments in· • Jean Pia&et. Tlu Moral Judgment ot the Child (Glencoe Ill • free Press, l!KB; &nt edition. 19!12). ' ••
52
MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY
633
valve role-taking, taking the point of view of others conceived as subjects and coordinating those points of view, whereas logic involves only coordinating points of view upon objects. Second, equilibrated moral judgments involve principles of justice or fairness. A moral situation in disequilibrium is one in which there are unresolved conflicting claims. A resolution of the situation is one in which each is "given his due'' according to some principle of justice that can be recognized as fair by all the conflicting parties involved. These "equilibration" assumptions of our psychological theory are naturally allied to the formalistic tradition in philosophic ethics from Kant to Rawls. This isomorphism of psychological and normative theory generates the claim that a psychologically more advanced stage of moral judgment is more morally adequate, by moral-philosophic criteria. The isomorphism assumption is a twoway street. While moral philosophical criteria of adequacy of moral judgment help define a standard of psychological adequacy or advance, the study of psychological advance feeds back and clarifies these criteria. Our psychological theory as to why individuals move from one stage to the next is grounded on a moral-philosophical theory which specifies that the later stage is morally better or more adequate than the earlier stage. Our psychological theory claims that individuals prefer the highest stage of reasoning they comprehend, a claim supported by research.& This claim of our psychological theory derives from a philosophical claim that a later stage is "objectively" preferable or more adequate by certain ·moral criteria. This philosophic claim, however, would for us be thrown into question if the facts of moral advance were inconsistent. with its psychological implications. Our assumption of isomorphism implies first the assumption of continuity between the context of discovery of moral viewpoints (studied by the psychology of moral development) and the context of justification of moral viewpoints (studied by formal moral philosophy). This implies that the philosopher's justification of a higher stage of moral reasoning maps into the psychologist's explanation of movement to that stage, and vice versa. The isomorphism assumption is plausible if one believes that the developing human being and the moral philosopher are engaged in fundamentally the same moral task. II. MORAL THEORIES AND NATURAL STRUCTURES
Our notions of moral philosophic adequacy derive, then, from the notion that moral theories are derivative from the natural struc1
See my Moralization,
op. cit.
53
634
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
tures we term "stages." The structures are " natur al•" not . in the sense of being innate, but in the sense of being the sequ~nual results of processing moral experience, not derivative from parucular te~ch· ings or particular moral ideologies or theories. In this sense nouon;: of natural rights, social contract, and utility are "natural s~uctures emerging in nonphilosophers from reflection upon the.linuts ?f customary morality in very varied cultural and educauonal cucu~ stances. To clarify the relation of philosophic moral theories tl.) thi~, we have interviewed moral philosophers concerning our moral .dl· lemmas and tried to relate their published theory to their reasonmg on the dilemmas. We feel that our results justify the notion that a philosopher's formal moral theory is an elaboration of certain ~or· tions of his "'natural" moral-stage structure. Not only d~ phl~os· ophers use their published moral theories to reason about mtervieW dilemmas, but we see that their theories interlock. with "natural" or unformalized elements of their moral reasoning unstated in thei~ published theories but required for actually making moral deci· sions. Further, hardly to our surprise, all philosophers interview~d reason at the two highest stages, being stage 5, stage 6, or some miX· ture of the two. We believe our data on philosophers are consistent with our assumptions, that: (1) stages are natural structures general· ing families of moral theories, and (2) the two major families of formal normative moral theory tend to be generated by two natural structures which we term "stage 5" and "stage 6." Our own approach to moral theory is to view it as a constructive systematization of these natural structures. Without formal moral theory men naturally attain to a "stage 5" in which they judge laws by the light of a social contract, by rule-utilitarianism and by some notion of universal or natural rights. Much moral philosophy maY be undentood as a systematization of this mode of thought, and most moral philosophers have, in some sense assumed this to be ~heir task: Other philosophers, however, have ~ttempted to generalue, o~ rauc: to. a. higher level, these "stage 5" postulates, to define a bas1s for md1v1dually principled moral decision. As George Her· bert Mead • put it: Kant g~enlized the position involved in the theory of natural rights and ~al contract, ~hich wu that one could claim for himself only that wbtcb he .recognized for othen• H e made a genera1'ua t'on -~ 1 . ..,ually f this th o e basu for his moral doctrine, the categorical imperative that
19~~owmenb of Tlaoucht in the Nineteenth Century (Chicaao: Univenity Press.
54
MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY
635
every act should be of such a character that it could be made universal for everyone under the same conditions.
As John Rawls 1 states it: My aim is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau and Kant.
In our view, there is a family of theories that have the purpose just stated of Kant and Rawls. This family of theories may be looked at as derivatives of a natural structure I term "stage 6." Rawls's theory, when traced back to its natural structural roots, is not merely a "generalization" and "abstraction" of the theory of social contract, but derives from a new way of thought, a new system of assumptions, a new decision-making process. This is true in the same sense that ''the familiar theory of social contract" is not merely a "generalization" and "abstraction" of the stage 4 conception of an overriding need for social order, but is an expression of a natural structure we term "stage 5." The purpose of-this paper, then, is to describe the stage 6 natural structure underlying various theories like Rawls's and to justify the sense in which it is better than structures of reasoning based on the "more familiar" conception of the social contract and of utilitarianism. In terms of description, this means that we view Rawls's theory as further elaborating a natural decision-making structure only partly specified by Kant and that Rawls's theory can be further elaborated and specified as a decision-structure applicable to resolving individual moral dilemmas, as we attempt to do in this paper. A second claim of this paper is that the adequacy of a moral structure is to be judged primarily in tenns of the adequacy of an interlocked series of assumptions for making moral choice. The criteria of adequacy used by stage 6 are implicit in "stage 5" structures, since these are trying to do the same job as stage 6. Both aim at determining moral decisions and judgments on which all rational men involved in sociomoral action could ideally agree. Stage 6 can do this better than stage 5. III. DIFFERENTIATION AND INTEGRATION AT STAGE 6
Assuming for the moment the existence of a natural structure called "stage 6," how can developmental analysis aid in justifying its claim T .4
Theory ofJwtice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1971).
55
636
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
to adequacy? By claiming that stage 6 is more adequate than stage 5 by certain formal aiteria which also make stage 5 more adeq~ate than stage 4. Two such criteria are differentiation and integrauoni In our earlier paper ("From Is to Ought") we elaborated the forma concepts of differentiation and integration that apply to both th: psychological and the normative analysis of moral deliberation, an linked the concepts to formalistic concepts of moral judgments. as presaiptive and universal. Increased differentiation and integrauon are anchored in the "is" side by their explanatory power in the study of the development of directed thinking, and on the "ought" side ~i their necessary inclusion in rational justification and choice. To 1 " lustrate how and why this might be the case, we shall consider some usages of the categories of "rights" and "duties" at stages 5 and 6, and the sense in which this suggests that moral theories derived ~om stage 6 structures are more advanced than moral theories denved from stage 5 structures. Table 2 shows usage of "rights" and "duties" at each stage: Table 2. Six Stages in the Usage of Categories of Rights and Obligations Stage 1. Having a Right: Means having the power or authority to contrOl something or someone, or it is confused with being right (in accordance with authority). Obligation: Or "mould" is what one "has to do" because of the de· mands of external authorities, rules, or the external situation. Stage 2. Having a Right: Implies freedom of the self to choose and to con· uol the sell and its possessions. One has a right to ignore the positive claims or wellare of another as long as one does not directly violate his freedom, or injure him. (Having a right differentiated from being right, and from being ~vc:n the po~er. to, by a status one holds.) . • Oblagahon:. O~ligauon or "mould" is a hypothetical imperauve ~n~gent on chotce tn terms of an end. In this sense, obligations are bauted to oneself and one's ends. ("Should" or obligation differentiated from "has to" from external or authoritative compulsion.) Stage 5. Hcruing a Right: Implies an expectation of control and freedom which a "good" o~ ~tural person would claim. A right is based either on a rule or on a legtttmate expectation toward others, e.g., you have a right to have you_r property respected since you worked bard to acquire the property. IUghts are earned. (Having a right differentiated from the freedom to conttol and choose.) • Obligation: "Should" or "duty" equals a role-obligation, what it is mcumbent on a member of a social position to do for his role-partnen as defined by rules, by the expectation of the role-partner, or by what a good role-oc;cupant (a ~~ husband, a good doctor) would do. (Obligation di£· ferenuated 11om being a means to a desired end.)
56
MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY
637
Stage 4. Having a Right: Rights are: (a) categorical genenl freedomt and expectations which all memben of society have, and (b) rights awarded to particular roles by society. General rights usually take primacy over rolerights. (Having a right differentiated from a particular legitimate expectation.) Obligation: Obligations are responsibilities, i.e., weUare states of othen or of society for which one is accountable. These responsibilities arise through: (a) being a member of society, and (b) voluntarily entering into roles which entail these responsibilities. (Obligation or duty as commitment and responsibility differentiated from what is typically expected of a role-occupant.) Stage 5. Having a Right: Has an awareness of human or natural rights or liberties which are prior to society and which society is to protect. It is usually thought by stage 5 that freedoms should be limited by society and law only when they are incompatible with the like freedoms of others. , (Natural rights differentiated from societally awarded rights.) Obligation: Obligations are what one has contracted to fulfill in order to have one's own rights respected and protected. These obligations are defined in terms of a rational concern for the welfare of othen. (Obligations as required rational concern for welfare differentiated from fixed responsibilities.) Stage 6. Having a Right: There are universal rights of just treatment which go beyond liberties and which represent universalizable claims of one individual upon another. Obligati(m: Any right or just claim by an individual gives use to a corresponding duty to another individual.
Table 2 suggests that each higher stage's usage of the categories of rights and duties is more differentiated and integrated than the prior stage. We list. in the parentheses. the differentiation of the concept of "right.. and "obligation.. made by each stage not made at the prior stages. At stage 2. a right as a freedom is differentiated from a physical or social power; at stage 8 it is differentiated as an expectation to be supported by others from an actual physical or psychological freedom. etc. The sense in which each stage is better integrated is seen in the fact that only at stage 6 are rights and duties completely correlative. The meaning of correlativity of rights and duties is suggested in the following passage by Raphael.• We have accepted the deontological view that the moral use of "ought" is a basic concept that cannot be derived from the idea of goodness.We tum next to the notion of "rights." There are two senses of the word, the fint meaning, "I have no duty to refrain from so acting," • D. Daicbes Raphael, Moral Judgement (London: Allen Be Unwin, 1955).
57
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
the aecond in which I desaibe the same· fact as I descri~e by ~ying, "Someone else bas a duty to me." The second kind of a nght m~ght be called "a right of recipience." Whenever I have a right of action, ~ also have a right of recipience. In virtue of the second definition of ng.hts, the two forms of expression: ''A has a duty to B" and "B h~s a n~ht (of recipience) against A" are correlative in the sense of analyucally 1~ plying each other. They may not be connotatively tautologous 10 ordinary speech, though they are in the more precise language we are recommending (pp. 47-49).
. . hts Let us accept, for the moment, Raphael's view that usmg n~•. and duties on correlative terms is either more "precise" or more ln· tegrated." We have found that such usage, consistently maintained, is found only at stage 6. At stage 5, "rights" categories are completely reciprocal; i.e., the concept and limits of rights are completel! r~ ciprocal with the rights of others, but individual rights and mdtvidual duties are not completely correlative. An example is case 2, age twenty-four, who said: Monlity to me means recognizing the rights of others lint to life and then to do as they please as long as it doesn't interfere with somebody else's rights.
Although case 2 is able to define rights clearly, he is unable to specify dearly the conditions under which awareness of rights gen· erates correlative duties. At stage 5, for every right, society has some duty to protect that right. Duties to other individuals, however, are not clearly specified in the absence of either individual contract or social contracL At stage 5 there are obligations to the law and there are obligations to the weUare of others of a rule· or act-utilitarian sorL But recognition of individual righ~ does not directly generate individual duties; i.e., rights and duties are not directly correlative. Even moral philosophers, like our "natural" stage 5 subjects, need not accept that rights directly imply duties. This is indicated in philosophers' responses to the following dilemma: • In ~urope, a woman was near death from a very bad disease, a spe· aal kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might aave ~er. It waa a form of radium for which a druggist was charging ten umea what the drug cost him to make. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could o~y ~ togetb~ about half of what it cost. He told the druggist that hia wde was dymg, ~d ~~k~ him to sell it cheaper or let him pay lala'. But the clrugiat lllld, 'No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money &om it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to ateal the drug for his wife.
58
MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY
639
In general, subjects whom we classify on other grounds as stage 5 recognize the woman's right to live, but do not believe that it directly generates an obligation to steal to save her. Or they may recognize a duty to steal for the wife, based on contract, but recognize no duty to steal for the friend or stranger who equally has a right to life. This, too, is the position taken by a number of moral philosophers, two of whom are quoted elsewhere ("From Is to Ought," 206-207). Examples are as follows: Philosopher I: What Heinz did was not wrong. The distribution of scarce drugs should be regulated by principles of fairness. In the absence of such regulations, the druggist was within his legal rights, but in the circumstances he has no moral complainL He still was within his moral rights, however, unless it was within his society a strongly disapproved thing to do. While what Heinz did was not wrong, it was not his duty to do it. In this case it is not wrong for Heinz to steal the drug, but it goes beyond the call of duty; it is a deed of supererogation.
Philosopher 2: It is a husband's duty to steal the drug. The principle that husbands should look after their wives to the best of their ability is one whose general observance does more good than harm. He should also steal it for a friend, if he were a very close friend (close enough for it to be understood that they would do this sort of thing for each other). The reasons are similar to those in the case of wives. If the person with cancer were a Jess close friend, or even a stranger, Heinz would be doing a good act if he stole the drug, but he has no duty to.
These philosophers agree that stealing to save a life in the situation is right, but disagree on when it is a duty. Using rule-utilitarian aiteria of duty, it is difficult to make duties and rights correlative. In contrast, here is the response of philosopher !, who responds quite differently to duty questions about this dilemma: D' 11IE HUSBAND DOES NOT FEEL VE&Y CLOSE OR AFFECTIONATE TO HIS
WIFE, SHOULD BE STEAL THE DRUG?
Yes. The value of her life is independent of any personal ties. The value of human life is based on the fact that it offers the only possible source of a categorical moral "ought" to a rational being acting in the role of a moral agent. SUPPOSE 1T WERE A FRIEND OR AN ACQUAINTANCE?
Yes, the value of a hwnan life remains the same.
In general, philosopher 3's conceptions of rights and duties were
59
64()
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
correlative. In this sense his thinking appears more differentiated and integrated than that of the other two philosophers. We m~st note, however, that the greater integration of a structure making rights and duties correlative is not a mere matter of incr.ea~d log· ical or analytical tidiness, as Raphael suggests, but that 1t 1mposes a severe price. The price in question is, baldly, that philos?pher S has to be prepared to go to jail to steal for a friend or acquamta~ce, and philosophers 1 and 2 do not. According to Raphael (op. cat.): From an objective point of view, the so-called duties of super~ga· tion are not duties. For the agent, they are duties but from the obJeC· tive standpoint, i.e., from the standpoint of what we take to be the average moral agent, they are thought to go beyond duty. Correspond· lngly, in the eyes of the agent, the beneficiary has a right while from the objective standpoint (of the average impartial spectator) the per· son benefited does not have a right (51).
We would question whether duties and rights could be made cor· relative, as Raphael wishes, if the moral point of view adopted is that recommended by Raphael, i.e., "the average moral agent" or "the average impartial spectator.'' To make duties and rights cor· relative, we must take not the standpoint of the "average moral agent," but philosopher S's standpoint of the "rational moral agent." The rational moral agent is not a self-sacrificial saint, since the saint's duties do not imply that he has corresponding rights. The ra· tional moral agent is fair, not saintly, he does as a duty only what his is rationally prepared to demand that others do as a duty, or that to which he has a righL The fact that a dying acquaintance in need of the medicine has the right to life does not define a duty for the average moral agent, but it may for the rational or just moral agent. In summary, there are certain basic categories used by every moral
stage-structure or every moral theory, such as the categories of rights and duties. Development through the stages indicates a progressive differentiation of categories from one another, e.g., of rights from dutiC:S,. and a ~rogressive integration of them, expressed in the cor· relattvtty of nghts and duties. This correlativity is not merely a matter of the analytic tidiness of an abstract normative or meta· ~thical theory, but ~eads to very different judgmetns of obligation, Judgments that are 1n better equilibrium with judgments of rights. As a result, stage 6 moral judgments are able to differentiate, among ~e amo~phous was!ebasket of "actions of supererogation," those acttons whtch are dulles prescribed by the rights of othen from those which are not.
60
MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY
641
As stated, a problem remains for stage 6 moral judgment. If the rights of every human define duties for an individual moral agent, this seems to open up the abyss of the existence of infinite and simultaneous duties to support the rights of every human being wherever he is. The problem here entailed is partially solvable, though complex. The individual moral agent has rights, and these rights are incompatible with having duties to every right of every other. Because a human being has a right to life, other humans have a duty to save that life. The conditions under which one human being has a duty to save the life of another human being require clarification of what it means for a "rational moral agent" to choose between conflicting duties since he cannot be an omnipotent saint. IV. UNIVERSAUZABIUTY AND REVERSIBILITY AT STAGE 6 Since Kant, formalists have argued that rational moral judgments must be reversible, consistent, and universalizable, and that this implies the prescriptivity of such judgments. We claim that only the substantive moral judgments made at stage 6 fully meet these conditions, and that each higher stage meets these conditions better than each lower stage. In fully meeting these conditions, stage 6 moral structures are ultimately equilibrated. For developmental theory, meeting these conditions of moral judgment is parallel with the equilibration of fully logical thought in the realm of physical or logical facts. According to Piaget and others, the keystone of logic is reversibility. A logical train of thought is one in which one can move back and forth between premises and conclusions without distortion. Mathematical thinking is an example; A + B is the same as B + A. Or again, the operation A + B C is reversible by the operation C - B A. In one sense, the elements of reversible moral thought are the moral categories as these apply to the universe of moral actors. To say that rights and duties are correlative is to say that one can move from rights to duties and back without change or distortion. Universalizability and consistency are fully attained by the reversibility of prescriptions of actions. Reversibility of moral judgment is what is ultimately meant by the criterion of the fairness of a moral decision. Procedurally, fairness as impartiality means reversibility in the sense of a decision on which all interested parties could agree insofar as they can consider their own claims impartially, as the just decider would. If we have a reversible solution, we have one that could be reached as right starting from anyone's perspective in the situation, given each person's intent to put himself in the shoes of the other.
=
61
=
642
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Reversibility meets a second criterion of formalism; unive.rsalizability. As reversibility starts with the 'slogan, ·:Put. ~ourself 10 t!'e other guy's shoes when you decide," universabzabthty starts wtt~ the slogan, "What if everyone did it; what if every~n~ use? thts principle of choice?" It is clear that universalizability ts tmpb~d. by reversibility. If something is fair or right to do from the conflic~ng points of view of all those involved in the situation, it is somethmg we can wish all men to do in all similar situations. Reversibility tel~s us more than universalizability, then, in resolving dilemmas, but tt implies universalizability. The concept of reversibility explains the intuitive plausibility of Rawls's conception of justice (op. cit.) as a rational choice in an original position in which one is under a veil of ignorance as to one's role or identity. Rawls argues that this conception leads to the choice of a justice principle of equality, with inequalities accepted only when it is to the benefit of the least advantaged. This conception of choice in the veil of ignorance is a formalization of the conception of fairness involved in having one person cut the cake and a second person distribute it. This conception leads to a mini-maximization solution in the sense that the division must be such that the least advantaged person is better off, i.e., that the cake is so cut that the person cutting the cake is willing to live with getting the smallest piece. Our conception of stage 6 helps to clarify the intuitive plausibility of Rawls's notion of the original position. This is because the concept of fairness as reversibility is the ultimate elaboration of the concept that fairness is reciprocity, a conception held at every stage. At stage 1, the conception of reciprocity is mechanical equivalence, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. At stage 2, reciprocity is mediated by awareness that self and others are subjectively evaluating acton with different interests and aware of one another's interests. The result is a notion of fairness as positive (or negative) exchange of gratifications: if you contribute to my needs and interests, it's fair for me to contribute to yours. At stage S, reversibility becomes the Golden Rule, i.e., putting yourself in the other guy's shoes regardless of exchange of interests or values. The difficult attainment of this Golden Rule conception is illustrated by the following interpretation of the Golden llule by a ten-year-old: Well, it's like your brain haa to leave your head and go into the other guy'a head and then come bact into your head but you still see it like it wu in the other guy'a head and then you decide that way.
62
MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY
643
Stage 3 interpretations of Golden Rule reversibility, however, do not yield fair decisions nor are they completely reversible. As a result, they lead to no determinate moral resolution of a situation. In the "Heinz steals the drug" dilemma, the husband reaches one solution if he puts himself in his wife's shoes, another in the druggist's. Or again, in the Talmudic dilemma of a man with a water bottle encountering another man equally in danger of dying of thirst, a stage 3 interpretation of the Golden Rule logically leads to their passing the water bottle back and forth like Alphonse and Gaston. At higher stages, e.g., stage 5, these problems are handled by the conceptions of prior rights and contractual agreements. Reversibility at stage 5 means reciprocity of rights. In the stage 5 subject's words: Morality means recognizing the rights of other individuals to do as they please as long as it doesn't interfere with somebody else's rights. At stage 6, reversibility is attained by a second-order conception of Golden Rule role-taking. In the Heinz dilemma, Heinz must imagine whether the druggist could put himself in the wife's position and still maintain his claim and whether the wife could put herself in the druggist's position and still maintain her claim. Intuitively we feel the wife could, the druggist could not. As a result, it is fair for the husband to act on the basis of the wife's claim. We call the process by which a reversible moral decision is reached, "ideal role-taking." Stage 6 moral judgment is based on role-taking the claim of each actor under the assumption that all other actors' claims are also governed by the Golden Rule and accommodated accordingly. This is what is meant by calling stage 6 reversibility the second-order application of the Golden Rule. The steps for an actor involved in making such a decision based on ideal role-taking are: I. To imagine onself in each person's position in that situation (including the self) and to consider all the claims he could make (or which the self could make in his position). 2. Then to imagine that the individual does not know which person he is in the situation and to ask whether he would still uphold that claim. 8. Then to act in accordance with these reversible claims in the situation.
This is clearly similar to Rawls's notion of choice under a veil of ignorance as to who in a moral situation one is to be. Differences
63
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
involved spring from the facts that: (1) we are trying to arri~e at concrete decisions in addition to a choice of principles govermng a society, and (2) An ideal moral agent decides with k~owle~ge of all the facts of interest and claims, and is under the vetl of tgnoranc~ only as to who he is in the situation. Also elimin~t~d ~ the op~st· tion between a mini-maximization and a max1m1zatton basts of making a decision. For the purpose of solving individual moral dilemmas, we d?.~ot want to assume that the individual is ignorant of the probabthues of outcome of a given decision to each person involved, only that he is ignorant of the probability of being any particular person in the situation, i.e., that he is likely to be any particular person in that situation. Returning to the stealing-the-drug situation, let us imagine someone making the decision under the veil of ignorance, i.e., not know· ing whether he is to be assigned the role of husband, wife, or drug· gist. Clearly, the rational solution is to steal the drug; i.e., this leads to the least loss (or the most gain) to an individual who could be in any role. This corresponds to our intuition of the primacy of the woman's right to life over the druggist's right to property and makes it a duty to act in terms of those rights. If the situation is that the dying person is a friend or acquaintaince, the same holds troe. Here a solution achieved under the veil of ignorance is equivalent to one obtained by ideal role-taking, or "moral musical chairs" as described earlier. The notion of stage 6 as a natural structure implies the following: 1. A decision reached by playing moral musical chairs corre· sponds to a decision as to what is ultimately "just" or "fair." Ideal role-taking is the decision procedure ultimately required by the at· titudes of respect for persons and of justice as equity recognized at higher stages. This is suggested by Rawls's derivation of principles of justice as equity from the original position. 2. Accordingly, the decision reached by ideal role-taking defines duties correlative to rights rather than acts of supererogation. !. If we engage in ideal role-taking in most situations. we reach a determi?at~ decisio~. Our stage 6 moral judges do agree on a choice alternative 1n our dtlemmas where facts and probabilities are sped· fied. 4. ~ ~~is.ion ~ached in that way is in "equilibrium" in the sense that 1t 11 nght from the point of view of all involved insofar as they are concerned to be governed by a moral attitude or a concep-
64
MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY
645
tion of justice, i.e., insofar as they are willing to take the roles of others. 5. The procedure integrates "absolute rights" or equality notions and utilitarian conceptions in conflict at stage 5. To support these claims convincingly involves elaborating a "stage 6" analysis and choice in various moral dilemmas, a procedure not possible in a limited space. An example of the integration of utility and deontological justice more difficult than that of stealing the drug is that of an individual drowning in the river. A passerby can save him, but at a 25% risk of death (and a 75% chance that both will be saved). Stated in terms of ideal role-taking, from the point of view of the drowning person, he should. If the drowning person put himself in the bystander's shoes and returned to his own position, he still could make the claim. If the passerby took the drowning person's position, he could not maintain his claim to inaction. Stated in terms of the "veil of ignorance," if an individual did not know whether he was the bystander or the drowning person, he would judge the right decision that of jumping in as long as the risk of death for jumping was definitely less than 50%. Utility maximization (or minimaximizatioJ!) leads to the choice of jumping in if the actor does not know the probabilities of which party he will end up being, but does know the probabilities of the outcome of each alternative (jumpingjnot~jumping) for both Patties. In other words, in these situations "stage 5" utilitarian considerations are perceived from the point of view of stage 6 notions of correlative rights and duties based upon the fundamental equality of persons. The notion that these claims correspond to a greater psychological equilibration of moral judgment becomes truly plausible in empirical study. A. Erdynast ' gave subjects instructions to assume the original position. This could not be done or was meaningless to highly intelligent subjects below stage 5. Stage 5 subjects, however, would often change their choices after assuming the original position and would feel that the new solution was more adequate. A number of Harvard undergraduates engaged in small-group discussions in which original-position solutions were elaborated by the group leader and were discussed in relation to alternative ultimates of decision. A number of those who were initially stage 5 retained and elaborated this mode of moral thought, a change we called a . '"llelationships between Moral Staae and lleversibiUty of Moral. JudiPDent an Orilinal Position." Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard Universaty, 1978.
Jn
65
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
movement from stage 5 to stage 6. The fact that only students previously at stqe 5 adopted this mode of thinking suggests that it is a stepwise progression of an intuitive natural structure rather than
one more moral theory. LAWRENCE JlOHLBERG
Laboratory of Human Development, Harvard University
The Motivation to Be Just
Stanley Bates Middlebury College
No ?ther work of recent analytical philosophical history has had the immediate and widespread impact of John Rawls's A Theory ofJustice, not only among philosophers and members of other academic disciplines, but also a~ong a general public, which, for a substantial period of time, has been dl_sconnected from the contemporary philosophical tradition in those countnes dominated by analytical philosophy.' Part of the explanation is that the ~k was eagerly awaited because Rawls had published parts of the theory in 3 h•ghly influential series of articles since 1958. z Now that we have the book, we ~nd that it contains even more than we could have expected simply on the ~asl_s of the articles. Rawls has actually developed in detail a theory of JUStice-one only realizes how staggering this is if he considers in detail some of the major works in analytical moral philosophy since World War II. 3 It is characteristic of these works that they are chiefly concerned with what has ~orne to be called by the barbarous neologism "metaethics," namely, a subJect concerned with "higher-order" questions of the meaning, justification, and truth value of moral propositions as opposed to "first-order" questions of value, or normative ethics. As Stuart Hampshire notes, Rawls's work marks a decisive break with this recent practice (a practice which rested, at least pa~ly, on a skepticism, engendered by positivism, about the possibility of saymg anything philosophically worthwhile on questions of value) and a I. John Rawls A Theory
of justice (Cambridge
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). 16+-94; "The Sense of Justice," J 'hi~phical RttJitW 72 (1963): 281-305; "Constitutional Libeny and the Concept of Justice," in ..ru~ce,_Nomos VI, ed. Carl}. Friedrich and John Chapman (New York: Athenon Pres~, 1963); ;:•stributive Justice," in Philosophy, Politics and Society, ed. Peter Laslett and.~. G. Runc•man, Jd " · (Oxford: Basil Black well, 196 7); "Distributive Justice: Some -~~den.da, '!'atural Law Forum • 13 (1968); "The Justification of Civil Disobedience," in Cwil DisoiHJ.mce, ed. Hugo .\. dau (:-.lew York: Pegasus, 1969). . , p~ J. I have in mind such works as C. L. Stevenson's Ethics and unguage, S. Toulmm s TIN r of Reaso, ;, Ethics, R. M. Hare's Tht La"guage of Morals and F~m ,and RtiiSD?, P. ~· z:~II-Smith's Ethics, K. Baier's TIN Moral Point of Vitw, and M. Smger s GmertliiZIIIIDII '"
~ . 2. "Justice as Fairness " Philosophical RttJitW
9;1.
67
61 (1958):
2
Ethics
return to the great "classical nonskeptical tradition." 4 (Rawls, of course, is not the only contemporary moral philosopher to have attempted such a return.) . .\n initial problem is, Why does Rawls think that it is poss1ble to return to a tradition which has been so thoroughly discredited in the eyes of many recent philosophers? This is a problem about which, in its ge.neral form, I shall say relatively little. Despite the fact that his main concern IS to work ~ut a substanti,·e theory of justice and that he has "avoided ~xtensn·e methodological discussions," it seems to me the working out of. ~·s theory with its "methodological comments and asides" is, at least imphctt!Y • 3 response to certain of the analytical criticisms of substanti\'e moral ph1losophy of recent years.~ Of course, to say this is not to show that Rawls's response to these criticisms is adequate, though I think that it is. What I would hke to do is to take a particular problem associated with a metaethical conundrum and to try to outline Rawls's position on this issue in order to see whether he can answer the questions a metaethical theorist might raise. The problem I have in mind concerns the motintion to be just. What is the appropriate role of motivation in a moral theory? There are many different questions about motivation which it might seem appropriate to raise when a general moral theory-or a theory of good. right, or justice-has been presented. (l) Do all people (or most people) always (or generally) act as morality (or justice) requires? (2) If they do, why do they act morally? (3) Why ought people to act morally? (4) Why ought I t~ act morally? (5) Why ought I, here and now, do what it is clear to me IS morally required of me? (In order to make these questions appropriate for Rawls's theory, we may substitute "justice" and "justly" for "morality" and "morally," respectively.) The first two questions seem to be questions for sociology, or anthropology, or psychology ..\nswers to the last three questions, however, would all seem to be interpretable as "justifications" of morality. It is just this enterprise of justifying morality which metaethical theorists have subjected to .searching criticisms, of~en suggesting that the whole enterprise is misconceived, or based on a m1stake. Traditional justifications have often been attempted historically by showing that a moral theory "fits" with, or is based upon, a conce~tion of human nature which usually includes, as a major ~omponent, a new of normal or standard (or perhaps, universal) motivation. fhese attempts were designed to make it easy to understand why a man will do (or ought to do) what is just. It is interesting to note what a great reversal has taken place between classical Greek moral theory in Plato and Aristotle, of. Stuart Hampshire,".\ :"':ew Philosophy of the Just Society "Ntw Yor~ Rt'llit'lll of Books, Februar)' H. 1972, pp. H-39. • S. The k~~d o~ cri~ici~.~s I ha'-e in mind deny the possibility of "justification" in moral t~ry (when JUst•ficauo? 1s understood in a special way). 1 believe that these criticisms lie behmd se\'eral of the maJOr . moral theories in the twentieth~e t 1 · 1 t rad't' . ~ n ury ana yuca 1 10n • for lc . . . . c:xamp , mtu•t•onasm, eRJ?tn'ISm, and prescriptivism (see G. J. Warnock Conttmporary Moral Pblloropby (London: :\lacm•llan Co.• 1967]). '
68
3
The Motivation to Be Just
and the beginning of modern mm'al philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For the former the crucial motivational question (because of the nature of their moral theories) was, Why will a man voluntarily do evil? For the latter, the really puzzling problem is, Why will a man voluntarily do good? In both cases, though, what is wanted is a way of relating what is taken to be standard (perhaps universal) human motivation to "the good" or "duty" or "obligation." A paradigm of this problem is Plato's discussion of 'justice' in the Republic. At the beginning of book 2, after Thrasymachus has been subdued, Glaucon and Adeimantus reraise the question of the 'justification' of justice for Socrates to answer. The challenge is put in its starkest form. The value of justice in and of itself is to be shown. What is demanded is an adequate reason to choose justice over injustice. 6 We can leave aside the question of whether the remainder of the Republic does provide an answer, let alone a satisfactory answer, to this question. In her influential essay, "Moral Belief~,'' Philippa Foot endorses this question as a perfectly appropriate one for a moral theory to answer. 7 She supposes that some "tough atheistical character" raises the question, Why should I be just? and she presumes that a satisfactory answer must show that justice is a good to the just man. "The crucial question is: 'Can we give anyone, strong or weak, a reason why he should be just?' " 8 (This means, of course, Can we give each and every person a reason to be just? not, Is there some person to whom we can give a reason to be just?) Now, of course, it would be very nice to be able to do this. However, it seems that the main tradition of authors who have tried to do this has failed. Usually, their failure· seems to be traceable to limitations imposed by their motivational assumptions. A recurrent candidate for being the explanatory principle of human action is self-interest. It has always been presumed that you have successfully given a reason for action to ~omeone ~tho?gh not necessarily a decisive one) when you have shown the act1.on t.o be In h1s self-interest. The difficulties with establishing a reason for bemg JUSt, on the basis of self-interest, are obvious. It simply is the case that justice can, and .often does, impose requirements on our actions which confl~ct wit.h self-mterest. The traditional examples are too well known to reqmre the1r rehearsal here . . It is imponant to emphasize that considerable portion~ of, for exampl~, SOc!~l contract political theories and utilitarian moral theones can be p~ausJ bly IDterpreted as having been designed to provide reasons, from the pomt of 6. Plato, Tbt Rtpublic, trans. Frances M. Comford (New York: Oxford l!nive~sity Press, 1945 ~· PP· Sl-52. For interesting discussions of Plato's acco~nt o~ the relatJO~s~.•p betw~n hapPu~ss and justice, see Gregory Vlastos, '1ustice and Happ10ess 10 Tbt Repub/Jc, 10 Plato. A ColkttJM~ofEuys, ed. Gregory Vlastos, vol. 2 (Garden City, N.y.: Dou~leday & ~-· 197.1), PP· 66-95; anc$ Richard Knut, "Egoism, Love, and Political Office m Plato, Pbilosopbical llrtMw 82, no. J (197J): HO,.....W. . 7. Philippa Foot, "Moral Beliefs," in Tbtories ofEtbia, ed. Philippa Foot (Oxford: Oxford I.Jn,versity Press, 1967), pp. 56-57. 8. Ibid., p. 97.
69
4
Ethics
view of human interest (or self-interest), to all human beings to be moral. 9 Hobbes's account of the basis of political obligation attempts to show that the existence of a political community, which existence depends upon the obse~ vance of certain laws, is in the interest of each and every individual. H~me s account of justice illustrates very well the difficulty of providing ~ satts_factory account of the motivation to be just. Hume provides a very mge~tous "justication" for justice on utilitarian grounds. Justice is not a natura~ vtrtue like benevolence, according to Hume. Every single act of the natural \'trt~e of benevolence is of value in itself (gives pleasure from a general point of vtew). However, this is not true of every act of justice. This does not mean merely that justice and self-interest can conflict; it means that an act of justi~e c_an conflict with the general interest. It is the systematic character of !ust~ce which justifies it on grounds of utility. The "whole plan or scheme" of JUStiCe is a necessary condition for the existence of society, and life in any stat~ of society is better for every single individual than any life outside of soctety could be.t 0 Even if we allow that Hume's very clever argument about the value of a system of justice to society is successful, it does not necessarily provide an answer based on interest for each individual as to why he should act as justice requires. It is true that man is better off in a society than he would be without society, and it may be true that the general accepting of rules of justice is a necessary condition for the existence of society. It does not follow that my adherence to the rules of justice (either generally or on this particular occasion) is necessary for the maintenance of society. Hence, it does not follow that it is in my interest to be just. Of course, Hume allows for other than self-interested motives, but his construction is designed to align justice and interest, and it fails to do so. In rhe case of jusrice ... a man, raking rhings in a certain light, may often seem to be a loser by his inregriry. :\nd rhough iris allowed that wirhout a regard to property no society could subsist; yet, according to the imperfect way in which human affairs are conducted, a sensible knave, in particular incidents, may think that an act of iniquity or infidelity will make a considerable addition to his fortune, without causing any considerable breach in the social union and confederacy. That honesty is the best policy may be a good general rule, but is liable to many exceptions; and he, it may .perhaps be thoughr. conducts himself with most wisdom who obser\'es the general rule and rakes ad,·anrage of all the exceptions. I must confess that if a man think that this reas~ning much r~quires an answer, it would be a little diffi~ult to find any which will t~ h1m apJ?Car ~atlsfactory and convincing. If his heart rebel not against such perni~IOUS max1ms, 1f ~e feel no reluctance to the thoughts of ,·illainy or baseness, he has mdeed lost a considerable motive to virtue, and we may expect that this practice will be answerable to his speculation. 11 9. T~c •·cry brief remarks which I make abour Hobbes, Hume, and Kant are sonu:times con~•·er~11l, and they would obviously have to be argued for at more length than I have ava1lable 1f they were. to be completely convincing. . 10. Henry D. A.1ken, ed., Hatr~t's Moralllllll Politiul Pbiknopby (~ew York: Hafner Publishmg Co., 1948), pp. 277, 65, 66. 11. Ibid., pp. 260-61.
70
5
The Motivation to Be Just
The problem here is that, on Humean grounds, there seems to be no possible reason for calling the man who indulges in this line of reasoning a knave. Hume has not offered this man a reason to be just, but that seemed to be what his construction was meant to do. Kant was one of the first philosophers to raise questions not just about the technical problems involved in providing a nonmoral justification, based on interest, of morality, but also about the very propriety of this sort of justification. Kant has one of the most complex views about the motivation to be moral of anyone in the history of morality. This complexity arises from two features of his philosophical theorizing. First, there is his well-known attempt to separate moral motivation from any form of inclination or selfinterest. Second, there is his differentiation ofthe phenomenal and noumenal selves; his assignment of positive freedom to the noumenal self; and his doctrine, from the Critique of Pure Reason, of the impossibility of our having knowledge which goes beyond the bounds of possible experience. If we raise the question, What ought I to do? we receive our answer in terms of acting on the categorical imperative. Kant attempts to connect the categorical imperative with the conceptions of freedom and reason. But if we raise the question, How can I be moral? or How can there be any motivation to be moral? we are told, How pure reason, without any other incenti\'e, where,·er they may be derh·ed, can by itself be practical, i.e., how the mere principle of the unh·ersal \'alidity of all its m~xims as laws (which would certainly be the form of a pure practical reason), ~lthout any material (object) of the will in which we might in ad\'ance take some Interest, can itself furnish an incenti\'e and produce an interest which would be called purely moral; or, in other words, how pure reason can be practical-:-to explai~ this, all human reason is wholly incompetent, ami all the pains and workmg of seekmg an explanation of it are wasted. 12 It is therefore no objection to our deduction of the supreme principle.of morality • but a reproach which we must make to human reason generally, that It cannot render comprehensible the absolute necessity of an unconditional practical law (such as the categorical imperati\'e must be). . . . .\nd so we do not indeed comprehend t~e ~ractical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative; yet we do ~omprehend.ns ~n~mprehensibility, which is all that can be fairly demanded of a ph1losophy which 10 Its principles stri\·es to reach the limit of human reason.u
Not only is there no answer to our question, but theoretical reasons are Produced which show an answer to be impossible. . . . Prichard, in his "Duty and Interest," gives a ver~ion _of th1s Kant1an dissatisfaction with the "'Justification" of morality wh1ch IS not based on ' IS. · 14 H e Simp . IY general epistemological and metaphysical grounds, as Kants . 12. I. Kant, Foundations of tbt Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis:
l•brary of Liberal .\ns, J9S9), p. 81. 13. Ibid., p. 8J.
. . p nc · h ard , ,.,or u ·-' A_.J DHty A•d Jnttnst (Oxford: Oxford Umvers~ty ... ,u,· vrnlg.'Ill.1011: M,... • -· .L968), pp. 204,211, 2B-14.
• Press14 · H · .-..
71
6
Ethics
maintains that all attempts to base morality on interest are irrel~vant to morality. He says that they "will do nothing to prove ~hat th~y are mten~~~~ to prove, viz. that the moral convictions 9f ~~r o~d1~ary hf~ _are t~ue. n Prichard himself offers, as an alternative to th1s JUStlfymg trad1t1on, hiS ow moral intuitionism, which retains the assumptions that moral judgments are meaningful and capable of truth value, but denies that they are ultimately to be justified on nonmoral grounds and instead accepts some moral category (or categories) as primitive. One could instead reject the assumptions that Prichard retains, namely, the meaningfulness and capability of truth value_of moral judgment . .\sis well known to all students of twentieth-century et~ICS in the analytical tradition this alternative has been well explored by vanous so-called noncognitivists. Does Prichard's objection to attempts to base morality on interest, even if we belie,·e it to be correct, necessarily rule out all reasoning which attempts to show a connection between what morality is and human interest? My own belief is that it does not, and that though the tradition of justification may ha,·e been misguided, nonetheless there is a task for moral philosophy here. The important thing is to be clear about the nature of the task. We shall return for a moment to Kant's moral philosophy. a return encouraged br Rawls's placement of Kant at the center of the tradition in which he IS writing, to see an example of reasoning connecting morality and interest but not in a justificatory way. (I shall later try to show some features of Rawls's reasoning which do bear a similarity to Kant's work.) We are, perhaps, surprised to discover that Schopenhauer accused Kant of being an egoist in his statement of the categorical imperative.•.& Schopenhauer is wrong, but it is instructive to see why he is wrong. He 1_s thinking of the argument which Kant presents in section 30 of The MetaplrySIcal Principles of Virtut, an argument which is made more rigorously in the Foundotions of the Metaphysics of Morals in Kant's•7 discussion of the fourth example (an imperfect duty to others) of an application of the first formulation of the categorical imperative, an example in which a man considers whether the maxim of a noncharitable act could be willed to be a universal law. Kant readily admits that such a maxim could be a universal law of nature, but he denies that it could be willed to be such a law, "For a will which resoh·ed this would conflict with itself, since instances can often arise in which he would need the love and sympathy of others, and in which he w~uld have robbed him~lf, by such a law of nature springing from his own w1ll, of all hope of the a1d he desires." 18 Schopenhauer says of this kind of arg~m~m, "It is expressed here in the clearest possible manner that moral obhgauon rests absolutely and entirely on assumed reciprocity. ConseIS. Ibid., p. 214. 16..\nhur Schopc:nhauer, On tht BIISis of Morality, !fans. E. F. J. Payne (Indianapolis: Library of liberal .-\ns, 196S), pp. 89, 90-91. . 17. Kan~, P· .fl; a_nd Tht Mttii/Jbysica/ Principks of Jlirtut, trans. James Ellington (ln
72
7
The Motivation to Be Just
quently it is utterly egoistic and obtains its interpretation from egoism. Under the condition of reciprocity, egoism cunningly acquiesces in a compromise. " 18 It is not too difficult to see where Schopenhauer has gone wrong here. He has assumed that Kant's argument is designed to provide a nonmoral motive for being moral-that it is presented as an answer to the question, Why ought I to be moral? But Kant's argument really concerns what morality is, in this case, not the motivation to be moral. The point is that Kant's argument establishes the morality of an action in terms of the rationality of willing the maxim of that act to be a universal law. This does not, of course, mean that acting morally will be acting in one's own interest because, in fact, the maxim of your act is not going to be a universal law. Kant does connect the rationality of willing a maxim to be a universal law with self-interest, but this only tells us what morality is. It does not provide us with an argument from self-interest for being moral. (In the Critique of Prattical Reason, Kant has a chapter on the incentives of pure practical reason, but this would take us too far afield.) Schopenhauer's criticism of Kant is quite relevant to our discussion of Rawls, as we shall see, because this same confusion about what function an argument is serving can easily occur in reading Rawls. . We might finally note something that has often been said of the question, Why ought I to be moral? This is that the question is not one that can meaningfully be asked. This question is equivalent to, Why ought I to do what I ought to do? and this latter question is not significant (or important, or something) since it is a tautology that I ought to do what I ought to do. One can attempt to rescue significance for the question by saying that there are two "senses" of 'ought' (usually identified as a moral and a nonmoral sense) and then rephrasing the question, Why (nonmorally) ought I to. do. what 1 (morally) ought to do? However, this question, on the face of at, IS not a question for moral theory, but perhaps for psychology or some exten~ed theory of rational choice. To answer it, one might have to focus attent~on back on presumed motivational factors which affect the person w~o asks n .. . One difficulty for the ordinary reader in extracting Rawls's vaew ~n thas 15 that A Theory ofJustice "is a long book, not only in pages," as Rawls hlm~elf says. 20 Indeed, he has taken the remarkable step of providing a reader's guade to an abridged version of his own work in its preface. Unfortunately, the suggested central core of the book, though indeed it "comprises ~ost of the essentials of the theory •, does not include the passages e~sentlal to our probl~m-the problem of the source of the motivati~n to~ JUSt. However, even •f one reads the entire book straight through, mcludmg chapter 8 (the essent!al chapter for our purposes), one may st~ll. be unclear a_bout what Rawls s view on this topic is. One reason for this IS that there IS so much d_etal·1ed materaal · presented in each of the dafferent · · sections t h at onemaylose saght of the connections between these sections-and one needs to see chap19· ~hopenhauer, pp. ~91. 20. Rawls, A T«ory of}tutice, p. viii.
73
8
Ethics
ter 8 with chapter 2 very much in mind. A second reason is that importa~t motivational questions are raised in at least two different parts ~f Rawls s theory, and one might easily think that Rawls is answering quesuons at one point which he has not yet even raised and whic~ _he will ans";er at anoth~r point. (Indeed, I believe that some of the early crtttcs of Rawls s theory • as tt was presented in the series of articles, based their criticisms on this error.) 21 Rawls presents his view as a self-conscious revival of one strand of the great tradition-namely, social contract theory. "My aim is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of ab~ straction the familiar theory of social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rous~ seau and Kant. " 22 Now it is quite true that Rawls's theory is a social contr~ct theory, but for many readers it will be misleading to associate Rawls wt~h this tradition (unless they have a detailed knowledge of why Kant belongs 10 it) because they are likely to read into Rawls views which he does not hoi~; for the most sigrtificant thing about his theory is how he has transformed_ thts tradition (or, at least, how he has re-presented Kant's transformation of tt. If we rea.d Rousseau through Kant's eyes, he may also have held the vie~s Rawls does about the function of the social contract). Traditional soctal contract theory presented an argument which was meant to justify the move from a state of nature (variously interpreted in Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau) to a civil society. It usually attempted to justify particular political institutions, or standards in terms of which political institutions could be judged, as being the outcome of a voluntary agreement made by rational self-interested individuals. Since the acknowledgment of these principl~s, ~r the acceptance of these institutions, restricted an individual's behaviOr tn certain ways, he would only accept them if he expected to get something from the arrangement which was for his own interest. The tradition emphasizes what might be called "economic rationality." (Herbert Simon discusses this model of rationality in a number of places.)2 3 Rawls assumes so~e~hing like an extended model of economic rationality in the original posttton. However, he does not assume, as someone like Hobbes does, that we need to e~plain actual moral actions (for example, adherence to the contract) solely m terms of economic rationality. Much of this traditional theory made a historical claim that this sort of contract was actually the st~rt of civil society. Moreover, people like Hobl~es and Locke made psychological assumptions about the actual individuals m21. I shall_ not auempt to substantiate this charge herr. Examples of what 1 have in mind can~ found m ~h. ~rrlman,]Krtict (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 39-51; and Lansm. Pollock, :\ ~.le~ma _for Raw!s," Pbi~Mepbiul Studits 22 (1971): 37-43. The interested reader ts u!JCd. to famtltanzr h1mself w1th Rawls's anicles and then to read this criticism. Even so astute a phtlosophrr u Maurice Mandelbaum, in his review of Rawls's book (/listory and 1~. no. 2 [1971): 240-SO), seems to me to be confused about Rawls's argument on this tssue. It IS unckar from R. M. Hare's "Rawls' A Tbtory of]KStiu-1," Philosophical Quarttrly 23, no. 91 (1971): I~SS. what he has understood of Rawls. 22. Rawls, A Tbtory of]KStitt, p. II. 2J. Her~ .-\. _Simon, "Mathematical Construction in Social Science," in Pbilosopbi&al ProMmllllfthtSocitiiScw.ca, ed. David Braybrooke(NewYork: MacmillanCo.,l96S), pp. 84-8S.
!btory
74
9
The Motivation to Be just
volved in contra~ting into the civil society-among these assumptions was one that self-interest was, at least, a dominant human motive, if not the mainspring of all action. Rawls specifically rejects any historical interpretation of his version of the contract theory. He describes a situation in which principles of justice are to be chosen, principles in terms of which judgments concerning the justice of competing claims can be made. I shall not review in detail his description of the original position, which incorporates certain constraints on the concept of right, or his account of the character and knowledge of the individuals who are to choose from among the competing conceptions of justice. This is all fascinating material, and much of the discussion of Rawls's work has focused (quite properly) on the details of his construction. I presume a general familiarity with his procedures. The one thing I should mention is that the one important motivational assumption Rawls makes is that the parties are mutually disinterested. He wants to rely on nothing more than limited altruism (or self-interest extending m:er, ~rhaps, a larger 'self ' equivalent to a family), and this is the weakest motivational assumption he can make. Thus, we can see that the first important place in which there is a motivational assumption working in Rawls's theory is here, in the description of the original position. We must have some motivational assumptions bec.ause the parties are being asked to choose from among alternative conceptiOns of justice, and even an arbitrary choice must be motivated in some way. So far, as Rawls says, we have a situation familiar in social theory. "That is, a simplified situation is described in which rational individuals with certain ends and related to each other in certain ways are to choose among various courses of action in view of their knowledge of the circumstances. What these individuals will do is then derived by strictly deductive reasoning from these assumptions about their beliefs and interests, their situation and the options open to them. Their conduct is, in the phrase of Pa~to, the resultant of tastes and obstacles. "Z4 It is within this situation as descnbed that one would like to provide a strictly deductive argument for the principles of justice. Rawls does not have such an argument, but he does have i? a limited way a sketch of such an argument. Some of Rawls's criti~s ~ave m1staken ~h.e form of his argument. 25 They have criticized his descnpuon o~ t~e partiCIpants and the situation in which they find themselves as un~eahst1c-but of course it is not intended to be realistic. It is intended to prov•de an argument for the choice of certain principles on the basis of minimal as~um.ption~ about human motivation, where the choice is made within a situat1on ID which the constraints of having a morality are enforced. It is clear, then, that the original position is a purely hypothetical situation. ~othing resembling it need ever take place, although we can by ~eliberately foll~wmg the constraints it expresses simulate the reflections of the parties. The conception of the 24. Rawls, A Tbt:ory of)ustict, p. 119. 25 · See n. 21 above for examples.
75
10
Ethics
. . d t · nsofar as it tries to original position is not mtended to explam human con uct excep 1 f. . . I I . h . g a sense o JUStice. account for our moral JUdgments and he ps to exp am our avm .d d Justice as fairness is a theory of our moral selltiments as manifested by our consl ereh 1· udgments in reflecti\·e equilibrium. These sentiments presumably affect our thoug tf · · 1 position · · ·~s partho and action to some degree. So while the conception of the ongma the theory of conduct, it does not follow at all that there are actual situations t ~t resemble it. What is necessary is that the principles that would be accepted play t e requisite part in our moral thought and action. 26 In particular, the entire argument has said nothing in respons~ to the q~es tion, Why will human beings act as justice requires? Indeed, 1f the motivational assumptions of the original position were the whole truth ~bout hum~n motivation, it seems clear that men would not be just in "real hfe"-that IS, outside the original position. For the fact that in the original position the parties are characterized not as interested in one another's concerns does not entail that persons in ordinary life who hold the principles that would be agreed to are similarly disinterested in one another. Clea~ly the two principles of justice and the principles of obligation and natural duty reqUire us to consider the rights and claims of others ..\nd the sense of justice is a nor~ally effective desire to comply with these restrictions. The motivation of the persons m t~e original position must not be confused with the motivation of persons in everyday ~lfe who accept the principles that would be chosen and who have the correspondmg sense of justice. In practical affairs an individual does have a knowledge of his situation and he can, if he wishes, exploit contingencies to his advantage. Should his_ sense of justice move him to act on the principles of right that would be adopted m the original position his desires and aims are surely not egoistic. He voluntarily takes on the limitations expressed by this interpretation of the moral point of view. 21 How then does Rawls avoid exactly the problem that Hob~s encounters-why will people who would choose the principles of justice m the situation described act in the ways required by these principles when the limitations of the ~riginal position are removed? If the principles of justice a~e now clear (assummg for the moment that Rawls's argument for his theory 15 valid), must we not still ask, Why will men do what justice requires? 28 Rawls's answer to this question is quite complex and involves more of his book ~han I s~all mention in my rather simplified version of his answer. The_ po~1on_ of ~1s book t~ which I shall refer is chapter 8, "The Sense of Justice, wh1ch 1s an amphfied version of the article of the same name. Here is the second important place in which motivational considerations enter the theory· For Rawls,_ it i~ important that a conception of justice should relate to actual human mottvat1on m such a way that a well-ordered society will be stable with respect "to the justice of its institutions and the sense of justice needed to maintain this condition." He says that "inevitably, we shall have to 26. Rawls, A Tbtory of)IISficr, p. 120. 27. Ibid., pp. 147-48. 2_8. Of cou~, we need not assume that they will act as justice requires; we can qualify the quesuon by askmg what arc the reasons for acting justly that those who do act justly have?
76
11
The Motivation to Be just
take up some rather speculative psychological questions; but all along I have assumed that general facts about the world, including basic psychological principles, are known to the persons in the original position and relied upon by them in making their decision. " 29 I shall not consider here the general problem of stability, nor shall I go into very great detail about the psychological principles which Rawls believes to be true of human beings. I am mainly interested in the relation between the two parts of his theory-the argument for the principles of justice and the psychological theory of how human beings acquire a sense of justice. Rawls gives an account of the development of the sense of justice in terms of a three-stage process with a psychological principle corresponding to each of the three stages. He draws here on philosophers like Rousseau and psychologists like Piaget and Kohlberg. It will be helpful to state the three principles here in order to comment on certain features of them. First law: given that family institutions are just, and that the parents love the child and manifestly express their love by caring for his good, then the child, recognizing their evident love of him, comes to love them. Second law: given that a person's capacity for fellow feeling has been realized by acquiring attachments in accordance with the first law, and given that a social arrangement is just and publicly known by all to be just, then this person develops ties ?f friendly feeling and trust toward others in the association as they with evident Jnt~tion comply with their duties and obligations, and live up to the ideals of their station. Third law: given that a person's capacity for fellow feeling has been realized by his funning attachments in accordance with the first two laws, and given that a society's institutions are just and are publicly known by all to be just, then this person acquires the corresponding sense of justice as he recognizes that he and those for whom he cares are the beneficiaries of these arrangements. 30 First of all, th~se are not "laws" of psychology, which render ev~ry aspect of the development (or nondevelopment) of moral sentiments exphcable or predictable. They represent tendencies which are pr~s~me~ to operate, other things being equal. They may be taken as descr1bmg Important ~eatures of the way in which human beings normally develop. A second Interesting feature is that these psychologica! principles i~vol.ve references to the moral concept of justice itself. I earlier sa1d that Rawls~ v1ew represents a transformation of some of the great traditional views of soc1al contract theory such as Hobbes's. Here is a major point of difference. It was ofte~ assumed that the argument made to an individual who posed the question, Why sbo~ld I be moral? or Why should I be just? must be in terms. of n~nmoral motl.vation. This was the whole point of the long attempt .to Identify duty and Interest. What Rawls's psychological principles suggest IS that there may 29. Rawls, A Tbfory of]ustKt, p. 456. 30. Ibid., pp. 490-91.
12
Ethics
be a "n~tural" interest in morality itself. The word "natural" may in~ite misunderstanding here. It does not involve the claim that the moral motivation will inevitably be present in each and' every individual. Rather, Rawls seems to agree with Aristotle (who has a different sense of"natural" in ~ind), who says, "Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the v1rtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, an~ are ma~e perfect by habit. "31 What I above called a "natural" interest m morahty . would be this adaptation by nature to receive the moral virtues. At any rate, it is in terms of what is explained by these psycholog1cal principles-namely, the development of a sense of justice-that one can explain the motivation for particular acts of justice in hard cases such as Hume provided-particular cases in which the interest of the individual a~d even the interests of society conflict with the demands of justice. People w~ll act justly in these cases (when they do-:-for, of course, they sometimes will fail to do what justice requires) because they have a sense of justice. Now we can see the relationship between the two parts of th.e t~eory · The argument presented about the original position tells us what JUStice IS. Justice, for Rawls, is defined by the two principles. Methodologically, the~e principles are checked against our considered moral judgments about what IS just in particular cases, in order to see whether these judgments could have been derived from the principles. The psychological construction, if c~rre~, would show us how men can acquire a sense of justice. The sense of JUS~Ice can be used to explain the motivation to act justly in particular cases. Not1ce, all of this does not provide an argument addressed to any rational selfinterested being, who lacks a sense of justice, which will show him that he "ought'_' to be just-in a nonmoral sense of "ought." It will be remembered that th1s was exactly the argument demanded by Mrs. Foot in "Moral Beliefs," but in reconsidering this demand she said, I was in this difficu~ty because I had supposed-with my opponents-that the thought of a good action must be related to the choices of each individual in a very special. way· It ha~ not occurred to me to question the often repeated dictum that moraiJudgm~nts giVe ~asons for acting to each and every man. This now seem~. to me to be.~ mistake. Quite gc;nerally the reason why someone choosing an A may be expected to c~oose good As rather than bad A's is that our criteria of goodness for any class of thmgs are related to cenain interests that someone or other has in those things. When someone shares these interests he will have reason to choose the good A's: otherwise ~ot. Since, in the case of actions, we distinguish good and bad on account of the mterest we take in the common good, someone who does not care a ~amn what happens to anyone but himself may truly say that he has no reason to be JUSt. The rest of us, so. long as we continue as we are, will try to impose good conduct ~pon such a man, saymg "you ought to be just," and there is this much truth in the 1dea that there are categorical imperatives in morals. 11 31. ArisJDCic, N~ Etbia 1103a24-2S, in /ntrod~~etitJn to Aristotle ed. R. McKeon (~ew York: Random House, 1947), p. HI. '
12. Foot, p. 9.
78
13
The Motivation to Be Just
He~ce, although such an argument cannot be provided, this does not tell agamst the argument for the principles of justice: no such argument is needed. To see this more clearly, we might ask what questions about morality are left unanswered, after the two parts of Rawls's theory that we have been discuss~ng ha~e been presented. We know what justice is, and we know why men wdl· be JUSt (to the extent that they will}. But, surely, at this point someone is going to object, the very question which has been the subject of this whole paper has been left unanswered: Why ought I to be just? After all, the principles of justice are checked by our considered moral judgments about justice, but these judgments are made, in general, by those with a sense of justice, while the sense of justice is explained by reference to a set of psychological principles which involve a reference to justice as defined by the principles of justice. Is not the whole system interdefined, so that some parts are justified in relation to other parts, but the system as a whole is never justified? Would not a justification of the whole system consist of an argument which could be presented to any individual on any occasion, which would not appeal to any moral sentiment, but would show him that from his own point of view justice would be good to him? Is not the absence of such an argument simply an admission that this conception of justice is not justified? Is the question, Why ought I to be just? really left unanswered? In a sense (the so-called moral sense of 'ought'}, it is clear that acting justly is among the things you 'ought' to do. In the so-called nonmoral sense of 'ought,' this question can be understood as equivalent to, Why ought I to be the kind of creature subject to these psychological laws? But this is clearly not a matter of choice for which action-guiding reasons can be given. Rawls attempts to connect theoretically the moral sentiments with the natural sentiments. It seems to me that, if someone genuinely lacked a sense of justice, this lack would be connected with other ways in which such a person would be abnormally related to other people-"if men did not do what justice requires, not only would they not regard themselves as bound by the principles of justice, but they would be incapable of feeling resentment and indignation, and they would be without ties of friendship and mutual trust. They would lack certain essential elements of humanity."33 If this were true, it would indicate that there is, indeed, a "price" to be paid, and a terrible price, from the point of view of one who is capable of friendship and ~utu~l affection, for the lack of a sense of justice. Notice, however, that _thl~ w11l probably not appear to be a 'price' at all to those who ~ave pa1d ~~- Ex hypothesi, they are incapable of friendship and mut~al affectaon; h~nce,. mcapable of knowing what they are missing. Rawls h1mself emphasizes ~~ t~e section "The Good of the Sense of Justice" that his argument there, wh1ch IS designed to show, on certain suppositions, that it is rati~nal f~r someone to affirm his sense of justice, is ~ot the attempt to justify bemg a JUSt man to an 33 · John Rawls "The Sense of Justice," in Morlll Cmrapts, ed. J. Feinberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19:,0), p. 120.
79
14
Ethics
egoist. There is no such argume~t possible, n?r is one needed. But then, o:~ might say, there is no explan~tton of m~rahty .at all: Althoug~ the of~ev enigmatic words of Wittgenstem do .not always J~lu.mmate a top•~· I ~el~e e that what he said about the temptation to say th1s IS worth consJdermg. Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in phil?sophical investigation: the difficulty-! might say-is not that of finding the soluuon but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. 'We have already said everything.-~ot anything that follows from this, no, this itself is the solution!' This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, where~s the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get .beyond it. The difficulty here is: to stop. 34
We might briefly return to Kant's moral theory and a passage I have already discussed, in order to clarify Rawls, a return which is encouraged .by Rawls himself. Remember that Schopenhauer criticized Kant for bemg egoistic. When Kant considers whether one could will to make it a universal law of nature that there should be no charity, he first makes the point that such a state of nature is perfectly conceivable and is indeed, perhaps. preferable to a state where men claim to be charitable, but are not-but he goes on: "Now although it is possible that a universal law of nature according to that maxim could exist, it is nevertheless impossible to will that such a princip~e should hold everywhere as a law of nature. For a will which resolved thJs would conflict with itself, since instances can often arise in which he would need the love and sympathy of others, and in which he would have robbed himself, by such a law of nature springing from his own will, of all hope of the aid he desires. "311 This, of course, as I have already pointed out, is not a consequentialist argument, since it says nothing at all of one's actual expectation of receiving charity, if it is needed, in the future. Hence, the reasoning is not egoistic, though it does connect the concept· of morality with rational self-interest. It corresponds to the kind of reasoning which would occur in the original position as described by Rawls. Suppose we now try to raise the question, Why should I let all of this reasoning about the categorical imperative influence my action? Rawls, in discussing Kant, attempts to provide him with a~ answer ~o this question-that is, that acting morally is the best expression of ones character as a free and rational noumenal self-but, although Kant may have wanted to say something of this sort, this answer s~ems unjustifiabl~ in Kantian terms. (I cannot defend my interpretation of Kant here; I can stmply refer to its basis-a dissatisfaction with what Strawson calls the "metaphysics of transcendental idealism. ")38 1 think the best thing we can do is say that, for Kant, we are rational free beings and that it is 34. Ludwig WinFnstc:in, Ztttd (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), p. 58e. H. Kant, Fflflfflilltiom of tbc Mttapltysia of Morak, p. 41. 36. P. F. Srrawson, Tbt &n.lllls of Stmt (London: Methuen, 1966), passim.
80
15
The Motivation to Be Just
because of those features of us that the categorical imperative applies to us. There is no further argument that we ought to act on it. Why ought I to be moral? for Kant would then be equivalent to, Why ought I to be a rational, free being? and again, as for Rawls, there seems to be no possibility of answering it other than to say-you are one. Incidenta.lly, Rawls appears to have an advantage over Kant here. It is a plausible interpretation of Kant that he associates rationality and morality so strongly that any immoral action is, ipso facto, irrational. Though Rawls sketches an argument to show that the choice of the principles of justice he proposes in the original position would be rational, and though he also argues that it is rational (on certain suppositions) for an individual to affirm his sense of justice, he is not committed to as strong an association of rationality and morality as Kant is. What is, in fact, rational for a particular individual will depend, not just on general truths about human desires, but on his own desires, aims, sentiments, and so on. Thus, it would seem to be possible for an unjust man to be rational (given that his desires, aims, and sentiments are of a certain sort and that he embodies other standard features of rationality such as the ability to calculate probable consequences of his acts, etc.) on ~awls's view. According to my intuitions about rationality and morality, this IS an advantage for Rawls. With the structure of Rawls's theory in regard to motivational questions in mind, we might briefly consider a particular criticism which one might make of his argument for the second of the two principles of justice. This principle has undergone a considerable revision between its first appearance m "Justice as Fairness" and its reappearance in A Theory of Justice. In the fonner, it was stated as, "Inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that they will work out for everyone's advantage, and provided the positions and offices to which they attach, or from which they may be ~ined, are open to all. "37 In A Theory ofJustice, though the principle is first Introduced in roughly the same form, 38 in the course of Rawls's argument he determines the sense of this principle more exactly, and in so doing reformulates it as follows: "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least. ~dvantage.d and ~b) attached to offices and positions open to all under cond1tJons of fa1r equahty ~f .opportunity. "39 The part of this principle stated, in (a) is ~nown. as .the difference principle," and it is fundamental to Rawls s concepn~n of JUStl.c~. Now it is absolutely clear why the persons described as occupymg.the.ong•n~l position would choose the second principle in the form m wh1ch Jt was giVen in "Justice as Fairness. "It would surely be irrational to refuse to accept differences which are guaranteed to work out for your own ~n~fit. H.ence, even on the slim motivational assumptions made about the partiCipants m the 37. John Rawls, "Justice as Fairness," injustiu lltlll Social Policy, ed. F. A. Olafson (Englewood Cliffs, S.J.: Prentice-Hall, fnc., 19111), P· 81. 38. Rawls, A Tbery oj]ustitt, p. 60. 39. Ibid., p. 83.
81
16
Ethics
original position, the argument is clear. The problem is that the principle in this form seems too restrictive on allowable inequalities. The reformulated version has clear advantages, not least that. it conforms more. ~losely ~o our intuitions about justice. However, the argument that parttctpant~ m ~he original position will choose it depends upon the claim that. t~etr bemg rational in the situation described involves their acting on a max1mtn rule for choice under uncertainty. Rawls admits that "clearly the maximin rule is not, in general, a suitable guide for choices under uncertainty." 40 Ho~ever, he thinks that it is the rational approach in the original position. (Davtd Lyons has criticized this argument ofRawls.)41 I will not try to judge the co~en~y of Rawls's argument here. I only want to point out that his weak mottvanonal assumptions about the original position require a very strong notion .o~ rationality (or of the restraints on rationality imposed by the original postnon). Of course, as I said, the difference principle seems to be just, but, obvious~~· Rawls does not want to rely on any moral sentiments to influence parttCJ- . pants in the original position in choosing the principles of justice; this would be inconsistent with the original position as described. Before I close, I would like to mention one other line of criticism that might be employed against Rawls. It might be said that his theory of justice only captures the intuitions about justice of a particular society at a particular historical stage, but that this stage, like all stages of history, is going to be transcended. Therefore, one can make no "universal" claims about justice on the basis of Rawls's theory. A variant of this line of thought might point out that the psychological principles to which Rawls appeals in his explanation of the sense of justice, even if they are true, are not "necessarily" true. They may not have been true of human beings in the relatively distant past, and they may not continue to be true of human beings into the relatively d\stant future. Hence, the principles of justice which he derives might, at some point, prove to be irrelevant to the ways in which human beings can live together in society. Rawls himself suggests that the capacity for a sense of justice and the moral feelings on the pan of humanity has a history and that it might receive an evolutionary explanation. 42 The question is, Is there any reason to suppose that the conception of justice he presents occupies some favored place historically? I cannot pretend to be in a position to answer this question. However, I can conjecture that a kind of Hegelian account of the history of ju~tice. and t~e sense ?f justice might be developed which would claim that th1s h1story IS .the h1story of the conception of justice which Rawls has developed commg to human self-consciousness. 4 3 (Rawls himself is far toO 40. Ibid., p. IH. Bs-!~: David Lyons, "RawlHersus Utilitarianism," ]oumal ofPbilosopby, OctoberS, 1972, PP· 42. Rawls, A Tbtory of]~~rtict, p. SOJ. 4J. I realize that this reference to Hegel is far too brief to be illuminating for anyone who d~s not already have so~ knowledge of Hegel's view. My own view of Hegel's philosphy of hastory _has been pad~ mfl~nced by my colleague Dennis O'Brien, who, however, is not responsable for my possably masleading analogy.
17
The Motivation to Be Just
modest and tentative to make such a claim directly.) Whether we are sympathetic toward such an account, or toward the objection to which it is addressed, will depend upon whether, like the right Hegelians, we emphasize the system at the expense of the dialectic, or like the left Hegelians, emphasize the dialectic at the expense of the system. 44 Rawls's own emphasis seems to me to be systematic. Indeed, my entire account of Rawls has focused on how various parts of his account relate to each other. It seems to me that even more fundamentally important than his detailed account of justice is his revival and mastery of the architectonic of moral theory. Kant said that "by an architectonic I understand the act of constructing systems. As systematic unity is what first raises ordinary knowledge to the rank of science, that is, makes a system out of a mere aggregate of knowledge, architectonic is the doctrine of the scientific in our knowledge. "4:1 Surely, no one can read Rawls without sensing the power of the kind of organization he has introduced into his material. He himself says, "I must disclaim originality for the views I put forward. The leading ones are classical and well-known. My intention has been to organize them into a general framework by using certain simplifying devices so that their full force can be appreciated. My ambitions for the book will be completely realized if it enables one to see more clearly the chief structural features of the alternative concepti?" of justice that is implicit in the contract tradition and ro.ints t~e way to 1ts further elaboration. " 46 Interestingly, Rawls, by prov1dmg this framework for the consideration of problems of morality, has laid the ground for those who wish to criticize his own theory of justice. John Searle has writ~en of Noam Chomsky's linguistic theory, "Not the least of_its merit~ is that tt provides an extremely powerful tool even for those who d1s~gree w_•th m~~~ features of Chomsky's approach to language. " 47 The m_ost mterestmg ~fltJCJsm of Rawls will come from those who accept many of h1s methodologIcal assumptions and argue from within the framework he has provided.
U . 44 ·. See William J. Brazill, Tbt Young Htgtliom (~ew Haven, Conn., and London: Yale n•versu~ Press, 1970), esp. chap. I. . ·u C I"' 45 · Kant, CritU,ut of Pure Reason trans. :"'onnan Kemp Sm•th (London: Macm• an o., 70J}, p. 653, • 46. Rawls • A TL-,rjUStiCt, · p. VIII. "· I'JCU'] OJ. . of/Joolu june 29 47 19?2 · John Searle, "Chomsky's Revolution in Linguistics," Nt'W Yoli Rt'U1ftiJ ' ' • pp. 16-24.
83
Human Evolution and the Sense of Justice ALLAN GIBBARD
I
wi~ s~me_
I
begin speculation. First, psychological speculation: why are we concerned With JUStlce? A traditional answer is that we are benevolent: we are concerned for the well-being of others. Perhaps this is a fundamental fact about our concerns, or perhaps it holds crue because each of us has a capacity for sympathy: the happiness of others makes a person happy, the unhappiness of others makes a ?erson unhappy, and a person wants to be happy rather than unhappy. Whatever ~ts psychological basis may be, it is benevolence that underlies our concern with JUstice.
Rawls gives a different answer: our concern with justice, he says, is grounded a_capacity for "reciprocity" (1971, sees. 75-76). It is a psychological law, according to Rawls, that under certain conditions favorable to moral development, if ~ person recognizes that he and those for whom he cares benefit from his society's tnsti~tions, and if, moreover, those institutions are just in Rawls's sense and are publicly known to be so, then the person will acquire a sense of justice. Roughly, t~en, he will support just institutions that benefit him, and that is what constitutes his concern with justice. .
In
The issue, as Rawls apparently sees it, is whether a person with a normal sense of justice wants to benefit other people irrespectively of whether he expects thern to be ne f'It him, and whether the person regards the benents - an mst1tut1on · · · confers on others as considerations in favor of that institution, regardless of what ~e institution does for him. The utilitarian, according to Rawls, "stresses the capac~ f~r srmpathy" and relies on unconditional altruistic impulses to make us support e tnstttutions he favors. Such altruistic impulses, he concedes, do exist, but they are far ak d' .. . we er than the dispositions that underlie his own system: 1sposmons to reclprocat b f' · f f . e ene Its. "By appealing straightway to the capacity or sympath y as a oundatlon of just conduct in the absence of reciprocity, the principle of utility not
85
32
ALLAN GIBBARD
only requires more than justice as fairness, but depends on weaker and less common inclinations." (p. 501) . . . . . , nderlt is, then, according to Rawls, a sense of JUSttce as fa1r rec1proc1t} that u lies our strongest moral concerns. This, of course, places a great burden on the nof . f tion of "fair reciprocity." When we trade benefits, what constitute a1r ~erms 0 uade? When an institution benefits everyone, what constitutes a fair apportionment of those benefits? An institution mav be reciprocal in the sense that everyone does better with the institution than he ~ould with no institution at all, and yet it m~y well be that for each person, there is an alternative institution which is reciprocal m that sense and which would benefit him more. Our support for institutions and arrangements that benefit us seems to depend on a conviction that we are getting o.ur fair share of those benefits-as it does on Rawls's psychological theory· That sald, we are left with the problem of what will be regarded as fair. \\'hat will it be about some of the many possible reciprocal arrangements that will make us regard those as displaying fair reciprocity? That, in psychological guise, is the central problem of A Theory• of justice. . Game theorists call a situation of the kind I have been discussing a ''bargatn· ing problem." More specifically, a bargaining problem has these features. There are alternative systems of cooperation or mutual restraint, each of which is mutually beneficial in the sense that its implementation would make everyone involved b~t ter off than he would be with no cooperation or restrairlt. There is a conflict of Interest, though, over which of these alternative mutually beneficial systems to irn· piement: for each such system, there is another which makes someone better off. Price haggling, for instance, involves a bargaining problem on a small scale: there is a range of prices at which a sale would benefit both parties as compared to no sale, but for any price, the seller prefers a higher one and the buyer a lower one. The problem of social organization is a bargaining problem on a large scale: many alternative forms of social organization give everyone a better life prospect than does a State of nature, but different forms allot the prospects differendy. Now an imponant feature of bargaining problems is this: if everyone expects a panicular outcome, then it pays everyone to insist on what that outcome gives him and on no more. More precisely, suppose there is a mutuallv beneficial system S with the following feature: Each person thinks that if he agre:d to S, everyone else would, and that every alternative system by which he would benefit more is un.at· tainable, in the sense that if he held out for it, there would be no agreement. Then if everyone acts rationally and self-interestedly, everyone will agree to s. Thus given suitable expectations, bargaining problems will be resolved by rational parties who are purely interested in how much they get.l In fact, though, people confronted with bargaining problems do not seem to care only about how much they get. They care passionately about the fairness of the outcome. To get less than one's fair share is to be "cheated," and a person who expects to be cheated will resent it. In contrast, a person who expects to get his fair share w~ not normally resent the outcome, even though he knows that under some altcrnaave arrangements, he would get more. We extend our concern with fairness
86
HUMAN EVOLUTION AND THE SENSE OF JUSTICE
33
to bargaining sioutions in which we arc not involved. In the small, this concern is with such things as a fair price or a fair wage; in the large, perhaps, it is at least a part of our sense of justice. The psychological questions with which we are left are these: What is it about a system that makes us regard it as fair, and why do we so much care when we regard a system as unfair? To ask these questions is to inquire into the nature of our sense of justice or fairness.
II I tum now to another kind of speculation. How might humans have come to have a sense of justice? I am asking here for an evolutionary explanation: What kinds of psychological propensities are involved, and how might evolutionary theory explain humans' having those propensities? One explanation is that the human sense of justice is grounded in a propensity to be benevolent, and that this propensity evolved through kin-seiection. 1 Let me sketch the theory in as plausible a version as I can. First, some terminology: I shall call a behavioral propensity biologically altruistic if it reduces the individual fimess of one who has it but enhances the individual fitness of others. Here individual fitness is roughly one's expected number of descendants after a few generations. What kin-selection explains is how there could be a biologically altruistic propensity to be benevolent. The claim is not that any propensity to be benevolent must be biologically altruistic. Benevolent propensities may well enhance one's individual fimess, for others may be disposed to reciprocate good with good and ill with ill. No special explanation is needed for benevolence in such an environment of reciprocity, so long as the propensity is shaped to yield the best net return to the benevolent individual. The explanation of the propensity in that case is the standard Darwinian one: the fittest reproduce. What kin-selection explains is unreciprocated benevolence: why a person might have a systematic propensity to be benevolent in ways that go beyond what yields him the best expected net return from reciprocity. Might there be biologically altruistic aspectS of our propensities toward benevolence? The answer is that there might be, and that is because of kin-selection. which works as follows. One shares genes with close relatives, and so a gene that disposes one to commit aets that enhance a close relative's individual fitness, e\·en at some exp~nse to one's own, may on balance be more likely to be represented in later generattons than an alternative gene which does not. Such genes will tend to multiply· Now the propensity a gene for which would most tend to multiply is a complex one: a propensity costlessly to identify the expected degree of genetic overlap for each of one's associates, and match one's maximum sacrifice-to-benefit ratio to it. s.uch a propensity, though, is too complex to be at all likely, and simpler propensities wou ld have done much the same job. Under the cond"mons · · wh"ch humans Jn I evolved • c1osc associates tended to be close relatives. A propens1ty · mtenoon · · allY t o ~o~f~r benefits on close associates, then, would tend on the whole to increase the lndtvtdual fitness oi close relatives. Such a propensity is simple, in that it requires
87
34
ALLAN GIBBARD
no mechanism for determining degree of relationship; dose associates are easy to identify. Indeed it may be quite unclear what propensities toward benev~lence would be most likely to evolve through kin-selection. A propensity to beneftt dose ass~ ciatcs is one, but there may be others. Take, for instance, a propensity to ben~ftt other people, whether or not they be close associates. If, in a hunting-gat~enng society, the people one could most easily benefit tended to be close relatiVes, a gene for such a propensity would tend to multiply. Take also a propensity to bene· fit anyone of whose situation one is vividly aware. If in a hunting-gathering so.ciety • the people of whose situation one is most vividly aware tend to be dose relattves, a gene for that propensity would tend to multiply. Do evolutionary considerations allow us to choose among these hypotheses? If not, it is unclear what kind of sense of justice might have resulted from kin-selection. What a hunter-gatherer does affects chiefly those close to him, whereas in a complex society a person knows that what he does will affect strangers and mere acquaintances. It may be unclear what moral impulses ~ill govern these relationships, if those moral impulses are to be ex· plained by kin-selection. Nature selected genes for their manifestations in a huntinggathering society, and did not care how they would manifest themsdves in a com· plex society. The alternative propensities to benevolence that I have mentioned would manifest themselves disparately in a complex society. A general propensity to benefit other people might constitute a utilitarian sense of justice: combined with enough reflection, it could cause people to moderate their ;elf-seeking for the sake of the general welfare. A propensity to benefit anyone of whose situation one was vividly aware would make us susceptible to appeals to help strangers based on vivid depiction of their plight. Finally, a propensity to benefit close associates would give us the kind of benevolence Rawls thinks we might have: strong for those to whom we are close, but weak at best for those more distant. This last kind of benevolence would be a poor foundation for a sense of justice in a complex society· Which of these kinds of benevolent dispositions we might have is not, as far as 1 can sec, predicted by the theory of kin-selection; it seems to me that to some degree, we have all three.
Ill What I want to do now is to present an alternative speculative evolutionary account of our sense of justice.3 Consider bargaining situations: situations, as I have said, in which there arc benefits to be gained from cooperation or mutual restraint, but there is conflict of interest over how these benefits arc to be divided. This talk of "benefits" and "conflicts of interest" is normally to be understood in terms of hu· man goals and preferences-in terms of "preference-satisfaction," let me say. Now, though, I_ wan~ to ~bstitute "evolutionary fitness" for "prefereJJ.a: satisfaction" and cons1der sttuatto~ that have the same formal StrUCture as human bargaining problems. An evol11ttonary btngaming si~atio11 is a recurrent kind of interaction among organisms in which the following conditions hold. Fim, there are mutual
88
HUMAN EVOLUTION AND THE SENSE OF JUSTICE
3S
benefits to be gained, with benefits now understood in terms of fitness. That is to say, as compared to some combination of behaviors of the o~anisms involved, called their threatened combination, some other combinations result in greater fitness for all. Call any such combination a mutual fitness enhancing combination. Second, there is a conflict of interest over how these benefits are to be divided. That is, for any mutual fitness enhancing combination, there is an individual whose fimess is more enhanced by some other mutual fitness enhancing comb~tion. Evolutionary bargaining situations are recurrent in the annals of natural selection. From the point of view of fitness, having exclusive access to a territory without a fight bears ceding all access without a fight, but that in tum beats getting into a deadly fight. Various combinations of behavior, then, are mutually fitness enhancing compared with the threatened combination, fighting-namely that A enjoys the territory and B keeps out, that A and B share the territory, and that B enjoys the territory and A keeps out. Between any two of these combinations, though, the one that is more fitness enhancing for A is less so for B. Now for human bargaining situations, a plausible theory is Schelling's (1960, Chap. 2). It may be that one possible outcome-call it P-has a special prominence, because of its symmetry or because it is like the outcomes of similar bargaining problems in the past. Because of its prominence, there may be a common expectation that P will indeed be the acrual outcome. Each person, then, expects that if he insists on P, he will get it, whereas if he insists on an outcome more favorable to him than P, there will be no agreement. In virtue of that common expectation, each person indeed will insist on his share under P and insist on no more, knowing that h~ can get that much and can get no more. This combination of bargaining strategies-everyone's insisting on p and not insisting on more-is a .Vash equilibrium: a combination of Strategies such that each person, given the strategies of the others, can do no better. Now consider evolutionary bargaining situations. Let P be a mutual fitness enhancing combination of behaviors, and suppose each animal is genetically disposed to the following behavioral strategy: play irs part in P if the others do, and otherwise carry out its threatened behavior. Then each animal's strategy will be ~hat Maynard Smith calls an evolutionarily stable strategy: a strategy such that given . the oraanism"s environment which consists in part of the behavioral disposittons of the other organisms, its strategy is at least as fitness enhancing as any other . . strategy easily accessible by mutation.4 • ~ow what could we expect in the case of human beings evolvmg ~~ ~unt~ng ga~henng societies? First, we could expect an abundance of human bargammg s~tu anons, involving mutual aid, personal property, mates, territory, use of ho~sl~g, t?e like. Now human bargaining situations tend to be evolu~ionary b~~ammg niattons. The point is not, of course, that a person's sole goal IS to maXImize the number of his descendants; few if any people have that as any goal at all. Rather, the· "h POint concerns propensities to develop goals: those propensltles t at con f erred greatest fitness were selected. Hence in a hunting-gathering society, we may c?n· elude, when a person wanted something, his wanting it was usually fitness enhancmg
..
.
:d
89
36
ALLAN GIBBARD
-presumably because what he wanted was fitness enhancing. For the most part, then, people wanted things that were in faa likely to enhance their fitn~~- He~ce human bargaining situations were, for the most pan, evolutionary bargammg _slt~ ations; that is to SJ.y, what will count as bargaining situations if we glo~s benefits 10 terms of human preferences will count if we gloss benefits in terms of fitness. Might humans, then, have developed evolutionarily stable strategies for bargaining situation$? That is, might humans be genetically equipped in such a w~y that people raised in a hunting-gathering band will solve bargaining problems? Will it be true that for at least some bargaining problems they face, there will be an outcome such that e\'C!'Yone is disposed to insist on that outcome and on no more? When the question is put this way, the answer is undoubtedly yes-people no ~oubt did often solve b~aining problems- but the kinds of environmental-genetiC mechanism that migh! nave done the job arc extremely diverse. Let me consider a few. First, there might have been the kinds of stereotypical responses to recurrent situations that are observed in animals. Human genetic make-up might have been adjusted by natural selection to produce specific adaptive behaviors in the defense of territory, settling terms of cooperation, gaining exclusive access to spouses, protecting personal property, and the like. Now to some degree, that may have happened, but human responses to particular kinds of bargaining situations arc diverse enough from culture to culture that "wired in" responses to panicular bargaining situations must be far from the whole storv of how humans solve bargaining problems, if it is much of the story at all. Morc~ver, even among hunting-gathering societies, environments and bargaining situations were probably too diverse for "wired in'" responses to be adequate, and so we should ask whether other mechanisms were likely to be available. A second ob,"ious mechanism is simply a general ability to learn from experience. Adherence to ccnain kinds of solutions to bargaining problems might be passed on by parental re-a·ard and the more direct rewards of insisting on what in fact one can get. I raise this possibility not to refute it; the question of how a social mechanism based on very general learning abilities might work and whether such a mechanism can explain our sense of justice is too difficult for me to tackle here. I simply mention this possibility because it is an alternative to the possibility I shall explore. Third, bargaining problems might have been solved bv the kind of high rationality in the pursuit of self-interest that Schelling describ~: because of past experience, it is common knowledge that everyone expects a certain outcome, and so everyone insists on that outcome because he expects to benefit by so doi"i and expects to lose by insisting on more. I think, though, that that too cannot be the whole story. Purely self-interested bargaining often breaks down: there is too much ad,·antage to be gained from altering expeCtations in one's favor, and once expecta· tions arc confused, it may often happen that each party insists on more than he can get. Moreover, rational pursuit of self-interest would not account for the human emotions involved in barsaining situations. In dealing with technical problems, we see bow well we cao do in pursuit of our goals, and are disappointed if we do less well than we had hoped. More likely emotional responses to a bargaining situation
90
HUMAN EVOLUTION AND THE SENSE OF JUSTICE
37
in which we do not get what we expected are anger and resentment. In most bargaining situations, we simply do not take the attitude of trying to get what we can and being pleased or disappointed with the result. I propose another evolutionary story. The problem with rationally self-interested bargaining is that it is unsrable, because the mutual expectations that make a solution possible are so easily disturbed. Expectations could be stabilized, though, by attaching a moral sentiment to a particular outcome. Instead of everyone's wanting as much as he can get in a bargaining situation, suppose there is some outcome such that everyone cares very much about getting his share under that outcome, but cares very little, not at all, or even negatively about getting more. Suppose also that each person prefers carrying out his threat to settling for less chan his share under that outcome. If these facts are known, the situation will be very stable: there will be no advantage to altering expectations. Consider a two-person case, with people A and B. Suppose both outcomes P and Q are mutually advantageous, that Q is the mutually expected outcome, and that P is more advantageous to A and less advantageous to B than is Q. Suppose B is known to A to be rationally self-interested. Then A knows that if he can convince ~ that he will settle for p and nothing less, then B will sett!e for P. A, then, has an mcentive to try to upset B's expectation that Q will be the outcome. If he thinks he can do so but cannot, bargaining will break down. Suppose. on the other hand, B is known to A to attach a moral sentiment to Q, so that 8 .,.,ill refuse to settle for P even if he is cominced that A will refuse to settle for less than P. Then A has no incentive to alter B's expectation that Q will be the outcome: A's best strategy is to settle for Q. A moral sentiment stabilizes the bargaining. What do I mean here bv a "moral sentiment" attached co an outcome? I ha\·e in mind a combination of a ~umber of things. First, some behavioral dispositions: a disposition to accept that outcome if others do and to threaten otherwise. Second. emotional dispositions that underly these behavioral dispositions: a disposition co ~ .r~~n~ul or angry if one gets less than one's share under tbat outcome, and t~ be . tlstted 1f that outcome docs obtain. Third, a role for language and conceptualtzatton, which I shall discuss. . . We know, of course, that humans evolved language and powers of conceptualIZation. I know oi no compelling evolutionary explanation for this development, hue presumably as language developed it was available for a number of functio~. If c~rtam outcomes co bargaining problems had the kinds of behavioral and emotional d1sp osJnons ·· · I have described attached to them, we m1ghc expect language and conceptuaiization to organize these dispositions. We might expect a word and a concept to be attached to those outcomes to which the beha\"ioral and emotional dispositions were attached. (I use the word 'concept' here as a psychological term for whatever plays a certain kind of role in our thinking and use of language; 1 do not Wane at this point to make the kinds of normative or epistemological judgments inVolved in distinguishing say concepts from pseudo-concepts. I do want concepts. ast am usmg · the term,' to 'play a central role in reasomng · and bebefs, · 'hbot h Wlt these 1 atter terms also construed psychologically.)
91
38
ALLAN GIBBARD
A moral sentiment, then, involves behavioral and emotional dispositi~ns or· ganized bv a concept expressed by a word. Now I want to suggest that we mdeed · · sttuattons, · · do attach• a moral sentiment to certain outcomes of bargammg an d that the words involved are 'just' and 'fair'. To regard something "as fair," then, simply is to attach this moral sentiment to it. 1 do not mean that the words that express · this moral sentiment in other languages have to be good trans1atlons of •·JU st' or 'fair'. In a society in which the emotional and behavioral dispositions involved at· uch to what is lawful, either invariably or so regularly that cases of conflict have not affected usage, a word meaning "lawful" might do the same job as our term 'just'. A word with theological meaning might also do the job. I do suggest that ~e words 'just' and 'fair' do the job in our language, and I shall talk from no~' ~n as tf it were translations of these terms that did the job in hunting-gathering soctettes. So far I have not assigned language and conceptualization a role in the reso· lution of bargaining problems, but simply talked as if they were epiphenomena ~f a set of behavioral and emotional dispositions. Language, though, is needed to adJUSt these dispositions. If, in a bargaining situation, everyone attaches a moral sentiment to the same mutually ad\-antageous outcome, then all goes well. If different people attach their moral sentiments to different outcomes, though, bargaining can break down in ways much more intractible than in rationally self-interested bargaining. Suppose in a two-person case that outcome P is more advantageous to person A and outcome Q is more advantageous to person B. If A attaches a moral sentiment to P and B attaches a moral sentiment to Q, so that A prefers conflict to Q and B prefers conflict to P, then neither outcome is such that both prefer it to conflict. Conflict, then, will result. What is needed, then, is some way of ensuring that the moral sentiments of different panies will attach to the same outcome-that, I shall say, they are com· patible. Now one way that compatibility might be achieved is genetically to prepro· gram moral sentiments which are rigidly directed so as to be compatible: say, toward leaving possessors of objeets in possession and the like. That wav of achieving compatibility, though, might well be too inflexible to cope with th~ variety of bargain· ing situations hunter-gatherers faced. What was needed was a mechanism for adjust· ing the objeCts of moral sentiments to make them compatible. That mechanism could be provided by language and the workings of small group consensus which language makes possible. Things would work most smoothly if it was difficult to browbeat someone out of claiming what he regarded as his due, but it was sometimes possible to argue him out of it. A propensity toward a sense of justice of the kind I have described would constitute an evolutionarily Stable strategy in Maynard Smith's sense. Given that others have such a sense of fairness, having it prompts an individual to avoid con· flict and yet insist on what he can get without conflict. Either all will regard the same outcome as fair and settle on it, or language will enable all to reach a consensus on which outcome is fair. When others have a sense of fairness, it is individuallY advantageous to have one too. That, then, is the account l propose of our sense of justice. It is a manifesta·
92
HUMAN EVOLUTION AND THE SENSE OF jUSTICE
39
tion of an evolutionarily stable strategy for dealing with a variety of bargaining situations. A concept-or at least what is psychologically speaking a concept-is attached to certain outcomes of bargaining situations; what it is attached to is subject to the workings of consensus through language. A person is disposed to insist on his share of any outcome to which the person attaches that concept, on pain of resentment, anger, withdrawal of cooperation, or carrying out threats. A person is at least somewhat disposed not to try for more than his share under an outcome to which he attaches the concept. What can be said of this proposed account? First, of course, it is highly speculative, and needs to be taken with a grain of salt. Our problem at this point is not whether we can establish its truth, but whether we can say anything for or against its plausibility. Are there features of our sense of justice for which it accounts and features for which it fails to account? There is one clear failure in the account as I have given it so far. I have presented a person's sense of justice solely as a concern with justice for himself and toleration of justice for others even at the expense of his own interestS. A person is normally concerned, though, with justice among third parties, and is often concerned with justice among strangers. I have no really convincing explanation of this property of our sense of justice, but 1 think 1 can suggest some possible kinds of explanations. Firtt, the mechanism that produces cooperative solutions to bargaining problems invol..,ing a person may involve his strong impersonal concern that out~omes he regards as just obtain; if the concern is trUly impersonal, it will manifest Itself when he contemplates bargaining situations in which he is not involved. Seco~d, there are advantages to participating in the formation of consensus: one benefits from peace among one's associates; there may be kin-selection for propensities that foster peace among one's associates, and the exercise may help one to achieve s~ooth outcomes to future bargaining situations in which one ·will be involved. Finally • concern with justice for others may itself be a form of cooperation, for one may expect it to be reciprocated.5 Another defect of the account 1 have given is that it speaks of "the workings of consensus through language" but offers no account of the process 0 f reach"mg consensus. That defect will have to remain, at least for now.6 The stren~ of the account I think is its fit with our experience of what the sense of j~rice is like. The a:count pr~dicts a strong concern for justice and substantial small group consensus about what arrangements are just. On the other hand · o~fers no reason for expecting that the same standards will d"ll'ect th e se~se of . ' ~t JUStice m all people. On the basis of the account, we would expect a strong dnve to develop standards of justice and latch on to standards that others propose, but there might be, for all the account tells us, little uniformity in what those standards are. That seems to me to be what we find. In a number of ways, the sense of justice predicted by this accou~t is like ~he sense of justice Rawls says we have. In the first place, it is grounded m a capacitY ~;reciprocity: it governs the terms of cooperation in bargaining_ pr~~lems. _In the ond place • it is strong. A sense of justice would strongly enhance mdlVldual fltness,
93
40
ALLAN GIBBARD
and individual selection is much stronger than kin-selection. Thus we could expect ~ sense of 1·ustice explained as 1 have explained it to be stronger than a ~or~! senti · · · thts· km-selec· ment developed through kin-selection. Perhaps, then, t h e sttuatton ts. · d tion explains benevolence, but benevolence is weak, except when dtrect~d towar close associates. The sense of justice is grounded not in benevolence, but m a strong capacity for reciprocity which evolved as an evolutionarily stable strategy through individual selection."'
IV Suppose the evolutionary story 1 have told were correct. What could then ~e ~id about the cognitive status of ethical convictions, and in particular, of com'lcttons concerning justice? First, of course, ethical convictions are very much like noneth· ical beliefs in that they draw on the same linguistic and conceptual capacities. We can think and reason about ethics in very much the same way as we think and rea· son about anything else-as, of course, we know from experience. I do n~~ m:an here that the same kind of philosophical reconstruction of the ultimate jusnftcatton of the two kinds of reasoning could be given, but that ordinary e--..hical and noneth· ical thought are similar in many ways, and draw on many of the same mental capac· ities. In \irtue of this, I shall speak of us as having "beliefs" about fairness. \\~nat I want to ask now is whether on the evolutionan· account I have pro· posed, beliefs about fairness are represen~tional: whether the;. represent a way the world might be. To make sense of this question, consider prime cases of representa· tion. Marks in a teacher's roll book represent pupils' attendance in class. Here th.e teacher deliberately puts the fact of whether a particular place in the roll book 15 marked in correspondence with the fact of whether a particular pupil is present. The teacher, then, maintains a somewhat arbitrary system of correspondmce. be· tween attendance and marks in the book. With computerization, the system mtg~t be maintained automatically; it would then be a function of the computer to matn· tain the system of correspondence. The computer is an artifact, and so we may ~11 the marks it makes artificial representations of the pupils' attertdance. The sense tn which the computer constitutes a system of artificial representation, then, seems to be this: it is a function of tbe computer to adjust one feature of the world (whether certain spaces are marked in the roll book) to correspond, in a somewhat arbitrary way, to another feature of the world (which pupils are present on which days). We may call the adjusted feature the representation, and the feature to which the repre· sentation is supposed to correspond, the Sllbject matter of the system. In what sense is this adjumnent of the representing feature to the subject matter a "function" of the system of representation? In the case of artificial repre· sentation, ~nction is a matter of designer's intention; a system is designed to adjuSt reprcsentan:on to correspond to subject matter, because there being such a corre· spondencc 1S expected to contribute to a purpose of the designer. This straightforward kind of function we can calltmificial function or function by design. Now Darwin's achi~mcnt was to explain how nature could mimic design where in fact
94
HUMAN EVOLUTION AND THE SENSE OF JUSTICE
41
there was no intentional design. Here I want to draw on Darwinian theory, and speak of natural function, the Darwinian analogue of artificial function. Natural function, on Darwinian theory, is to be explained in terms of natural selection. It is a natural function of a system to do Fin an organism, I shall say, if and only if the system has some of the features it has in that organism because of natural selection to do F: because, that is, a genetic propensity toward the system's having those features was selected for in the organism's ancestors because systems that had those features did F .8 We may now characterize natural representation by analogy with artificial representation. A system of natural representation for a featureS of the world (its subject matter) is a system one of whose natural functions is to adjust some feature R of the world to corr~spond to S, by a scheme of correspondence that is somewhat arbitrary. R, then, can be called a natural representation of subject matter S.9 Ordinary, prosaic beliefs about our surroundings are prime cases of natural representations. Clearly we do have a system that adjustS features of our descriptive beliefs to correspond to features of the world; the system includes our observational capacities and many of our cognitive capacities. The correspondence is somewhat arbitrary-choose whatever explication of arbitrariness is needed to make this so. ~ow it seems clear enough what the evolutionary explanation of our capacity to ad· JUSt descriptive beliefs to correspond with the world must be. A genetic propensity toward having that capacity must have been selected for in our ancestors because it adjusted features of their descriptive beliefs to correspond to features of the world. For such a propensity clearly must have contributed to our ancestors' survival by making possible thought and communication about their surroundings. If all this is so, the system that adjusts those beliefs is a natural system of representation by the definition I have proposed, and our prosaic beliefs about our surroundings are nat· ural representations. Here, then, is a sense in which we can ask whether our beliefs about justice or fairness are cognitive: Are thev natural representations of features of the world? We are interpreting that as a qu~stion about the human sense of justice-the system that yields comictions as to the justice or injustice of systems of cooperatio~ or ~Utual restraint. Is it a natural function of that system to adjust judgments of JUS· t1ce or InJUStice · · · to correspond, by a somewhat arb1trary · sch eme • to certain features of the world? That in turn means, does our sense of justice have some of the fea· tures it has because of natural selection to produce a particular kind of c~rrespond ence? Was a genetic propensity toward having a sense of justice with certam features selected for in our ancestors because systems with those features tended to produce a panicular kind of correspondence between judgments of justice or injustice a~d features of the world? What would the answer to this question be if the speculatiVe evolu tlonary · · · crue.' 15 account of the sense of justice that I have gwen nt . IS . far from straightforward. . h Th e quesuon On t e accou 1 have given • the hu-
lllan sense of justice has the features it has because its having them, long ago, ~as What led to th e resoluat1on . of bargammg . . problems. 0 ur pro pensities coward behefs about JUStice · · evolved, I have suggested, because 1:tor each person • o· .nven what the
95
42
ALLAN GIBBARD
others were like, those propensities enabled him to get as much out of a bargainin: situation as he could. (Aspects of those propensities evolved as well, l sh~uld ad • for whatever reasons account for third-party concern with justice.) ~ow 1f stereo· typed responses to a limited range of bargaining situations were evolu~ionarily ad· vantageous, the answer to the question 1 have posed might well be yes: m_ that case, our beliefs about justice and injustice might well naturally represent certatn ~eatures of the world. Suppose, for instance, a disposition to insist on maintaining f1rst ~os· session and to defer to others' first possession settled almost all bargaining situanons in a mutually fitness-enhancing way, and there were a genetic prcdispositi~n t~ ~d just beliefs that an outcome was fair to correspond to the outcome's muntammg first possession. Then we could say that the belief that an outcome is fair ~atu~Y represents the fact that it maintains first possession. That would be compauble Wlth m\' account of the natural function of beliefs about fairness. • 1 have suggested, though, that stereotyped responses to bargaining situations would not have enhanced fitness as much as a flexible sense of justice subject to the formation of consensus-and on the account I am now assuming as the basis of dis· cussion, the latter is wha• we have. If, in that case, beliefs about justice naturally represent any class of facts about the world-if, that is, it is a natural function of our sense of justice to adjust our ascriptions of justice and injuStice to correspond to any such class of facts-the facts in question arc the facts of what will draw con· sensus. Beliefs about justice naturally represent, if anything, the facr of what people will believe to be just if consensus is reached. As it stands, this formulation is problematic. It has a troubling element of cir· cularicy: beliefs about justice arc beliefs about what the consensus \\-ill be on what is just. Morco\'er, even if this circularity can be rendered benign, the formulation misses an important clement of the human sense of justice as 1 have pictured it. It misses the degree of stubbornness that beliefs about justice must have in the face of evidence that one can achieve consensus only by yielding up wha! one regards as one's fair share. Beliefs about justice, on the account 1 have given, v:ill not easily b.e changed to match what appears to be a coming consensus; and it is in virtue of thlS stubbornness that sentiments of justice stabilize bargaining situations. Perhaps the way to put the matter is this. There muSt be laws of group dynarn· ics according to which consensus, when it emerges, does so. These laws might tell in virtue of what features of a bargaining situation and its cultural milieu some partie· ular outcome will be the result of consensus if any is. Belief as to whether a given outcome is fair ~ight then be said to be adjusted to correspond with the fact of whether or no~ 1t has those consensus-making features. Perhaps, then, where the consensus-making features of outcomes arc J, the belief that an outcome is fair nat· urally represents ~c fact of that outcome's having those features J. The dynanucs of consensus here must be those of the socim• of the person whose beliefs are in question. Consider a bargaining situation in on; cultural milieu and an observer from another cultural milieu. It may happen that consensus is
96
HUMAN EVOLUTION AND THE SENSE OF JUSTICE
43
achieved by the parties to the situation, but the observer considers the outcome manifesdy unfair. The observer is subject to the workings of consensus, but within his own cultural milieu, not that of the situation he is judging. The fact to which the observer's belief as to which outcome is fair is adjusted to correspond, if any, will be that an outcome has certain properties J, and the properties J will be the ones that would draw consensus among people of his own cultural milieu. That may indeed be a satisfactory account of what beliefs about justice naturally represent, on the pan of a person who inhabits a single, homogeneous cultural milieu. In a complex society, however, few of us inhabit such a homogeneous cultural milieu. Hence so long as an observer belongs to a complex society, we cannot sensibly speak of an outcome's having propenies that would make it the consensus outcome in his cultural milieu. Indeed I am at a loss to suggest any account of what the beliefs about justice of a person in a heterogeneous cultural milieu might naturally represent, on the speculative, evolutionary account of the human sense of justice that I have offered; on that account, as far as I can see, those beliefs naturally represent nothing whatsoever. Suppose that is so. Then we are left with a kind of noncognitivism with regard to justice. It may be that for people in a homogeneous cultural milieu, beriefs about justice are representational in the sense I have been exploring, but for those of us in complex, heterogeneous societies, our beliefs about justice are nonrepresentational in that sense. The beliefs can be explained, but not in terms of what they represent. They must rather be understood in terms of their natural function and the moral sentiment that is attached to them.
v We are concerned with justice as something to practice and defend, not merely as
something to understand- that is part of what it is to ha\·e a sense of justice. On the account I have given, we each have a strong sense of justice, but that sense has no clear object to which to '-ttach itself. How are we to proceed, then, when we seek justice but are uncertain what is just? . Here I wish I had more to sav than I do; as it is, even what little I can say will be .vague. It will not do simplv to· give up the concept of justice. Shar~d st~dards of JUStice, · tf · they exist, can stabilize · · · Sttuatlons · 1n comthe outcomes of bargauung . plelC societies, as they can in small, homogeneous societies-to the mutual benef~t of all. Concern with justice is \ital to all we hold dear. Once we ~~ze that, .1t seems to me, the reasonable course is to try to resolve our uncertamnes and disagreements as to what justice demands by looking to our reasons, apart from a con~ with justice, for wanting to maintain shared standards of justice. Our sense of JUStice by itself, if the account I have offered is right, will make a poor oracle. Knowing what benefits shared standards of justice can produce, however, we may enlist the human sense of JUStice . . m . the semce · o f our bene"olent concerns. Our •
97
44
ALLAN GIBBARD
goal, 1 think, should be to foster those shared standards of justice,_ th~ sharin_g of which will be most beneficial to all. If we have a flexible sense of JUSttcc, let lt be guided by considerations of human benefit, that we may flourish as a result.10 Notes 1. This. in brief, is the theory developed by Thomas Schelling (1960. chap. 2, ''An Essay_ on Bargaining"). For a discussion of other treatments of bargaining problems, see Luce and Rlllffa (1957, chap. 6). . 2. The theory of ltin1dection was developed by W. D. Hamilton (1964). See also Dawkins (1976) Wilson (1975 1 1978, chap. 7), Maynard Smith (1978), and Alexander (1979, PP· 4348, 103·21 ). The theory, and indeed a wide range of anempts at evolutionary theori:ting about human nawre, have been highly controversial; see, for instance, some of the pieces in Caplan (1978). l could not reasonably enter the controversy directly without a discussion far too long to be appropriate here. As 1 indicate here. I consider the subject speculative. but informed ~pec ulation can be of value so long as we recognize it for what it is. 1 regard some of the publlshed work appl:o-ing evolutionary theory to human beings as promising and some of it as m~ided. The conaibution that I attempt in this paper is to illustrate ways in which I think evoluuonary h~'Potheses concerning human propensities can be coherently formulated and fruitfully explored. 3. The theory I develop here is similar, as noted later, to one broached by Rawls (1971, PP· 502-4). 4. The theory of evolutionarily stable strategies was developed by Maynard Smith (1974; Maynard Smith and Price. 1973; see also Maynard Smith 1976, 1978 for more popular treatments). Trivers (1971) in effect treats cases that are like evolutionary bargaining situations in that there exists a muwal fitness enhancing combination of behaviors, but which are unlike evolu· tionary bargaining siNations in that there is only one muwal fimess enhancing combination. Such c:ases share the formal strucNre of a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. (See Luce and Raiffa, 1957. pp. 9+102. The Prisoner's Dilemma is apparently due to A. W. Tucker.) I shall therefore call such cases biologic11l prison~' dilemJ114s. Trivers discusses the circumstances under which there would be likely to be evolution of what he calls reciproct~lllltruism, that is, dispositions to behave in accordance v.ith mutually fimess enhancing combinations if others do, and not otherwise. I shall call this biological reciprocity. Presumably much that can be said of the evolution of biological reciprocity applies to the evolution of evolutionarily stable strategies in evolutionary bargaining situations, since evolutionary bargaining situations are in effect evolu· tionary Prisoners' Dilemmas with added complications. Trivers concludes that the evolution of biological reciprocity would be favored by a long individual lifespan, a low dispersal rate, a b.¢ _degree of muwal dependence, a long period of parental care, a low degree of hierarchical dommance, and a need for aid in combat. Rawls refers to this article in bis discussion of the evolution of a sense of justice (1971, pp. 502-4). For a fucinating further investigation of the evolution of biological reciprocity, see Axelrod and Harnnton (1981). My discussion here assumes that group selection cannot account for important features of h~ sociability· That viC9o' is widespread, to say the least, among evolutionary theorists (see Dawkins, 1976: and Alexander, 1979, pp. 36-43). It has been challenged, however, by Wade (1978). 5. l have been treating the terms 'just' and 'fair' as synonymous, althoup there are con·
~.~0 ~ d'!wn betw~ ~· One difference between what the two termS sugest may be
~: F&~mess seems pnmarily a matter of the way a person treats conflic:ts between his own
mt~. and tho:' .of~- "~ustice," on the other hand, seems primarily to be a vinue of autbonoes, wbo dispense Justlte as they act to settle conflic:ts among the intereSts of others. Thus the account ~ have offered might be said to deal only with our sense of ''fairness," wbeteas tbe nawre of third-party concern is senuinely a question of our concem with "justice."
98
HUMA...'I EVOLUTION AND THE SENSE OF JUSTICE
4S
6. An especially serious problem for the account is why we should genuinely have a sense
of justice, as opposed to an ability successfully to pose as having one when it is advantageous to do so. The problem is not, alas, how to explain a complete absence of hypocrisy in human relations. The question is how genuine concern with justice can exist at all- as it presumably must if an attempt to gain by feigning it is to stand any chance of being effective. Part of the answer may lie in economy of means: When feigning a sense of justice can gain one little over what can be gained by genuinely having a sense of justice, the means to perfect feigning may be too complex to be worth developing. (Plato, in The Republic, spoke of the cost of such feigning as the loss of a kind of "harmony" of the soul, and that may be suggestive.) The subject, though, needs further study; here recent work of economists on "incentive compatible" mechanisms of pre~erence revdation (for instance, the symposium Public Choice 29-2, Special Supplement to ~~g 1977, and articles in the bibliography there on pp. 1o-12) and the discussion of "blufflllg' by Maynard Smith and Parker ( 1976) may provide clues as to how to proceed. 1. Although in some respects, what 1 am suggesting he:-e is similar to a suggestion by Rawls (19 71, PP· 502-4), the two suggestions differ in an important respect, if I understand Rawls correctly. Rawls appears to suggest that human beings evolved a sense of justice with a particu· ~ content, given by the construction of the original position and Rawls's two principles of jusnee .. What I am suggesting here, on the other hand, is a sense of justice with no fiXed content. In hts ~ecent Dewey Lectures (1980, pp. 517-19}, Rawis appears to drop any claim to the psychologtcal universality of his two principles of justice. 8. This account owes much to Wright (1973). 9 • For an account of reference that is somewhat similar to this account of "narural repre· stntation," see Starnpe (1977) . . 10· Work on this paper was supported by a grant from the Collegiate Institute on Values and Scien~ of the t:niversity of ~chigan. Versions of this paper were presented at the t::niversity ~ ~lhnois, Princeton University, Southem Methodist University, Ohio State University • and the lll~sity of ~tichigan. I have benefited greatly from discussion at all these places. Among the People to wbom I owe special thanks are Richard Brandt, Daniel Fartdl, Arthur Kutlik, P~ter ~ton, Alexander Rosenberg Richard Schacht, Sicholas Wbi&, Stephen White, and Willwn : n . They have drawn to ~y attention a rich variety of considerations, few oi which! have able to address in this paper.
References All:'tander, R. D., Darwinism and Human Affairs (Seattle. 19i9). :\x~~~d, R., and W. D. Hamilton. "The Evolution of Cooperation," Science 211 0 9 Sll: 139 o-
~pl~, A. L.. The Sociobiology Debate (New York, 1978).
aw~tns, R., The Selfish Gene (Sew York, 1976). . .. lf:unilton W D "Th G . E I . f S 'al BehaVI·or "Journal of Theoretical Biology 7 e cnecc vo unon o oct · ( 1 • · ·• 964): 1-52 L . ,,uc:~:, R. D., and H. Raiffa Games and Decisions (New York, 1957). f ·••avn d ' · al c fl' "]ourna1 o · ar Smith. J.• "The Theorv of Garnes and the Evolution of Antm on JetS, Theoretical Biology 47 (197~):209-21. -."Evolution and the Theory of Garnes," American Scientist 64 (19 76 l:4-l-4S. - . "The Evolution of Behavior "Scientific .4-merican 239 (19 78 >= 176"92 · . . 1976 ) a d G · .\. Parker "The Logic ' of Asymmemc . Contests, "A nimal Behavrour 24 \ : ' n 159·75. ' ;---• and G. R. Price "The Logic of Animal Conflicts," Sature 246 (19 7 l): 15-1S. awls I A Th , ' ',', eory of justice (Cambridge, Mass .. 1971). . 80 )·515-72. Rational Consttuctivism in Moral Theory," journal of Philosophy 17 (l 9 ·
s;;u:-·
Stant tng, T., The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge. Mass .. 1960). . , idwest SruJies in p~;· D. W., "Toward a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representatton, M osophy 2 (1977):81-102.
99
46
ALLAN GIBBARD
Triven, R. L., "The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism," Quarterly Review of Biology 46 (1971):35·57. Wade. M. j., "A Critical Review of the Models of Group Selection.'" Quarterly Review of Bi· o/ogy 53 (1978):101-14. Wilson. E. 0., Sociobiology: Tbe New Synthesis (Cambridge, Mass .. 1975). - - · On Human Nature (Cambridge, Mass., 1978). Wright. L., "Functions," Philosophical Review 82 (1973):139-68.
SAMUEL FREEMAN
Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views
Social contract views work from the intuitive idea of agreement. The appeal of this notion lies in the liberal idea that cooperation ought to be based in the individuals' consent and ought to be for their mutual benefit. Social contract views differ according to how the idea of agreement is specified: Who are the parties to the agreement? How are they situated with respect to one another (status quo, state of nature, or equality)? What are the intentions, capacities, and interests of these individuals, and what rights and powers do they have? What is the purpose of the agreement? Is the agreement conceived of in historical or nonhistorical terms? Since these and other parameters have been set in different ways, it is difficult to generalize and speak of the social contract tradition. Hobbes's idea of agreement differs fundamentally from Rousseau's, just as Gauthier and Buchanan conceive of agreement very differently than Rawls and Scanlon. Rather than being a particular kind of ethical view, the general notion of agreement functions as a framework for justification in ethics. This framework is based on the liberal idea that the legitimacy of social rules and institutions depends on their being freely and publicly acceptable to all individuals bound by them. If rational individuals in appropriately defined circumstances could or would agree to certain rules or institutions, then insofar as we identify with these individuals and their interests, what they accept should also be acceptable to us now as a basis for our cooperation. Seen in this way, the justificatory force of social contract views depends only in part on the idea of agreement; even more essential I am grateful to John Rawls for his helpful discussion and comments on a draft of this essay. I am also indebted to Joshua Cohen. John Carriero, Jay Wallace, and the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs for many valuable suggestions that led to subsequent revisions.
102
I23
Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views
is the conception of the person and the conception of practical reason that are built into particular views. In this paper I discuss the concept of practical reason and its relation to the idea of social agreement in two different kinds of social contract views. My ultimate concern is to address a criticism, often made of Rawls, Rousseau, and Kant, that because of the moral assumptions made, the principles or institutions sought to be justified are not the product of a collective choice or agreement at all; the appeal to a social contract is an unnecessary shuffle that masks the true character of these views. This criticism has been formulated in more than one way. I shall focus on a version given by David Gauthier, directed against Rawls. 1 I will show (in Sections III through V) that Rawls's idea of agreement is not spurious, but is closely tied to his conceptions of practical reason, justification, and autonomy. To do this, I need first to examine the different ways reasons are conceived of in social contract views (Section I) and to consider the structure of Gauthier's own version of the social contract (Section II).
I. Two KINDS OF
SOCIAL CONTRACT VIEWS
Let us begin with a rough distinction between Hobbesian, or purely in~erest-based, and right-based contract views. Both take the idea of rec-
Iprocity-the idea that social cooperation should be for mutual advantage-as fundamental. They differ, however, in their characterization of ~is basic idea. In Hobbesian views, cooperation for mutual advantage Involves no irreducible moral elements. Hobbesian views aim to show that morality is a subordinate notion, grounded in individuals' antecedent desires and interests. Each person's basic desires or interests are ~een as definable without reference to any moral notions, and normally 10 terms of certain states of the person. The objective is to demonstrate that (1) moral principles are among the rational precepts necessa~ to Promote one's prior and independent ends; (2) any sentiments we mtg~t have for such principles are conditioned by these ends; and (3) compliI. David Gauthier, "The Social Contract as Ideology," Philosophy & Public Affairs 6 • no. :(Winter 1977): 13gn; see also Gauthier's "Bargaining and Justice," in Ethics and EcoOinlCs, ed. Ellen Paul Jeffrey Paul and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (Oxford: Blackwell, Jg8s). PP· 4G-45 · · greater detail but more sympathetic, argum~,n t m . . .. · Jean Hampton •develops a similar. Ill hContracts and Choices: Does Rawls Have a Social Contract Theory? Journal of Phllosop y 77 (Ig8o); 315-38.
103
124
Philosophy & Public Affairs
ance with precepts that promote everyone's antecedent purposes is the most rational course of action for each individual to take in order to realize his interests, whether in himself or in other particular persons or objects. 2 So construed, the conception of cooperation Hobbesian views employ is one of efficiently coordinated activity for each person's benefit. The task is to show that, from among several modes of cooperation that might appear to be mutually advantageous when compared to the status quo or a noncooperative baseline, there is a unique set of institutions which will ensure cooperation on stable terms and which is acceptable to everyone. The primary modern proponents of this view are David Gauthier and james Buchanan, both of whom argue for a form of laissez-faire capitalism. Major representatives of right-based social contract views are Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and, among contemporaries, Rawls and Scanlon. The common feature of these accounts is not that they base the agreement on an assumption of prior individual rights. (Locke, Kant, and Rousseau make this assumption; but Gauthier does as well, while Rawls and Scanlon do not.) It is, rather, that principles of right and justice cannot be accounted for without appeal to certain irreducible moral notions. 3 This assumption affects the conception of social cooperation employed. It has a dual aspect: in addition to a conception of each individual's rational good, the idea of social cooperation has an independent moral component (characterized in Rawls by the notion of fair terms and what is reasonable, and in traditional views by an assumption of innate moral rights). Moreover, right-based views ascribe to persons a basic interest defined in moral or social terms. Consequently, in contrast to Hobbesian 2. This description represents a particular kind of moral conception, often attributed to Hobbes, and captures the central elements of Gauthier's view. Whether Hobbes himself actually held such a view is open to debate. See Keith Thomas, "Social Origins of Hobbes' Political Thought," in Hobbes Studies, ed. K. C. Brown (Oxford: Blackwell, 1g65), for a different interpretation. 3· "Right-based" refers, then. to principles of right, and is to be distinguished from "rights-based." Among the principles of right relied on by right-based conceptions there may be certain moral rights, as in Locke's and Kant's versions of the social contract. Rawls, however, denies that his view is a rights-based conception. See John Rawls, "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," Philosophy & Public Affairs 14, no. 3 (Summer 1g85): 236n (hereafter referred to as JF): "Justice as fairness is a conception-based, or.· · an ideal-based view," since It works from certain fundamental intuitive ideas that reflect ideals implicit In the public culture of a democratic society. Certain principles of right are, Rawls aims to show. implicit In these ideals.
104
125
Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views
views, social relations are not defined as a rational compromise among conflicting interests. This affects fundamentally the way right-based conceptions interpret the social contract. These contrasts have the following consequence: If we see the role of a unanimous collective agreement as an account of what we have reason to do in our social and political relations, then, according to right-based views, these reasons are not sufficiently accounted for in terms of what it is rational to do to promote our prior and independent ends. There are reasons that apply to us without reference to our antecedent desires and interests. What is the nature of these independent reasons, and where do they originate? Consider the skeptical thesis, advanced by Hume, that moral considerations do not give each individual a reason for acting, whatever his ends or situation.4 Philippa Foot once argued for a similar position.s She contended that moral judgments do not have an automatic reason-giving force, but that they "give reasons for action in ordinary ways."6 What we have reason to do depends upon our ultimate purposes, as given by our desires, interests, and affections. Whether one has reason to act on moral considerations is contingent upon whether it is in her prudential inter~sts to do so, or upon her having a benevolent disposition, a love of justice, or some other moral motivation. Thus, it is not always irrational to be amoral and act against moral requirements. One who rejects morality may be villainous but is not necessarily acting contrary to reason. 7 We might look upon the Humean position as presenting a challenge Which is taken up by both kinds of social contract views, but which they 4· I use "skeptical" here to refer not to moral skepticism (which Hume did not hold) but 10 a skepticism about the reason-giving force of moral judgments independent of desires
~d nonmoral interests. See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby1:fge and P. H. Nidditch, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), bk. II, pt. J, sec. J, and , I, I.
R 5·. Philippa Foot, "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives," The Philosophica~ Ueu~ew ~ 1 ( 1972): 305-16; see also Foot's Virtues and Vices and Other Essays (Berkeley.
Rlli~ersuy of California Press, 1978), chap. I I. Chapters 1 o and 12 of that boo_k expand on 001 8 P
of her earlier or subse-
QUent work.
6· Foot, Virtues and Vices p. 154. Foot does not hold that desire is a condition ofha~g a reason · She departs from Hume ' d tial reasons for acting Whic in contending that there are pru en
=
. h are Independent of an agent's existing desires (p. I 48). But she states that there. are independent moral reasons of this kind that require us to take others' interests mto ~n.t or act for their good (pp. ISjff.) . . bid.• pP. 152, I61-62.
105
Philosophy & Public Affairs
respond to in different ways. Hobbesian ·contract views attempt to meet this challenge on its own ground. They share with the H umean view a conception of reasons that I shall refer to as "agent-centered."8 Agentcentered conceptions approach the notion of reasons by focusing on the deliberations of single agents with given desires and interests in fixed circumstances in which they face a range of options from which they must choose. Reasons are then interpreted in instrumental terms, by reference to the agent's desires and interests as an individual. Given this conception of reasons, Hobbesian contract views seek to defeat the skeptical argument on the basis of certain empirical assumptions. They posit a noncooperative situation in which persons are described as fundamentally self-centered and individualistic, and interpret morality as the cooperative nonns all can rationally accept in this situation. Other-regarding sentiments and our sense of duty are then explained as, at best, secondary motivations that effectively promote our basic interests in ourselves (self-preservation and the means for "commodious living" in Hobbes, or utility maximization in Gauthier and Buchanan). A leading problem in moral philosophy then becomes how to demonstrate that the amoral or noncooperative person fares worse in cooperative contexts, in terms of the satisfaction of his self-regarding interests, than he would have fared had he steadfastly observed moral requirements and cultivated social preferences and dispositions. Right-based contract views accept the Humean premise that we have primary desires not focused on the self, and reject the Hobbesian approach to moral inquiry from the point of view of isolated individuals abstracted from social relationships. Their response to the skeptical argument is directed at the contention that all reasons must refer to the antecedent ends of particular individuals. The ultimate aim is to show that moral principles and our sense of duty, while not derivable from given desires and interests conjoined with principles of rational choice, still have a basis in reason. Where does this conception of reasons come from? If we focus on reasons solely from the perspective of single agents un8: I use ~e term "agent-c:entered"because on this conception all reasons center on the des1res and. mt~ts of ~cular ~gents. The term is not meant to imply egoism; the content of one s de~s and mterests IS left open. 1 aim to encompass a wide range of views. The_ rough idea _1s_ to represent what Kant had in mind by the Hypothetical Imperative. Bes1des Foot. Williams, Harman, Gauthier, and many others contend that reasons are adequately characterized in this way.
106
127
Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views
der conditions of choice, and interpret this notion purely by reference to their desires and interests as individuals, then the skeptical question "Why should I be moral?" is a natural one to ask. And from that perspective it would appear that the only kind of considerations that can supply an answer to particular persons are instrumental ones about what promotes their antecedent ends. But these considerations are too narrow. They leave no place for the intuitive sense that practical reasons are not just nonnative considerations that must motivate an individual but also have a justificatory aspect extending beyond the individual's particular concerns. To account for this intuition, suppose we approach reasons differently, from the standpoint of our membership in a social group. When we ask for people's reasons in social contexts, we are not concerned simply with their intentions and motives, and we may not be interested at all in their having adopted effective means to realize their ends. Instead, our primary concern is whether their ends are legitimate and their means justified, as measured by the system of nonns generally accepted within the group or by society as a whole. Every social group has norms of cooperation, certain practices and procedures that regulate interaction and are necessary to sustain the life of the group. The norms do not simply characterize accepted constraints ~n conduct. They also serve a social role in providing a public basis for JUstification. Members of the group assess one another's activities and pursuits in terms of its system of norms. When someone's conduct deParts from standard practices, he is subject to criticism according to these standards, and is expected to justify his actions by reference to them. The system of norms has a central place in the public life of the group: certain rules and institutions are seen as providing reasons for and against people's actions and ends, whatever their desires and interests may be.9 Seeing reasons in a social context as those considerations that count in public argument and structure ~ublic justification and criticism, is
c 9· ~e sense in which I use "reasons" here comes out in such claims as "The ~upreme
thC:rt 5 r:eas?ns for curtailing abortion rights were rather weak," ~d "That slavery mvolve~ In ~mmauon of humans and holding them as property is sufficient reason for condemn g Jt." The fact that an act is deceptive coercive or involves the breach of a promise or other • ' ntofa commitment functions as a reason in the context of argument or assessme . n's actions. In political debate the fact that a law would violate individuals' c?nstltuona) right 5 · d · tional secunty conStitut • create unemployment, increase poverty, or un ermme .na . , es a reason against that law. These are examples of what I call 'public reasons. Jlersoti
107
12.8
Philosophy & Public Affairs
very different from seeing them as purely instrumental considerations taken into account by single individuals concerned to advance their particular ends. For it is just the function of reasons in this social sense to provide a commonly accepted basis for assessing individuals' ends and desires, and the courses of conduct ·they adopt in order to realize them. A separate dimension is added to the normative considerations that motivate particular individuals. This implies a certain ambiguity in the notion of practical reasons. This ambiguity is often reflected in the structure of our individual deliberations. Practical reasoning normally involves (as agent-centered views correctly point out) clarifying our ends, making them consistent, and deciding on the most effective means to achieve them. But in our private deliberations we take for granted a background of social norms, which manifests itself in the following way. When some doubt arises as to the legitimacy of our ends or proposed actions, the question we normallY confront is not whether abiding by these norms will effectively promote our purposes. It is, rather, whether our ends and proposed actions can be publicly justified to others according to the system of norms generally accepted within the group. We appeal to certain social norms to appraise our claims and expectations, and to assess the instrumental means that we have already determined effectively promote our purposes. The practice of public justification is in effect reflected in our private deliberations. In this way, certain social rules and institutions occupy a privileged position in the course of practical reasoning; they provide special reasons that subordinate the reasons that are instrumental to realizing our particular ends and concerns. Being an adult member of a social group requires that one have developed the capacities to understand, apply, and act on these "public reasons" (as I shall call them). These capacities are, on the face of it, different from the abilities of individual agents to deliberate about their particular ends and the most effective means for realizing them. For what is involved is a social capacity, an ability to assess critically and justify the pursuit of one's ends according to the requirements of a different kind of norm. Hobbesian views need not deny that we have such a capacity, nor must they deny the social role of reasons in public justification. They contend, however, that since social principles are but an extension of principles of rational individual choice, whatever justificatory force pub-
108
129
Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views
lie reasons have they must have by virtue of their instrumental relation to each agent's more particular concerns. So the capacities to understand and apply social norms, and justify our actions by reference to them, are still subordinate to each individual's abilities to deliberate about the effective pursuit of his own particular ends. One of the primary points of Rousseau's Second Discourse is to show the shortcomings of Hobbes's conftation of these independent capacities and the two kinds of reasons they support. Rousseau maintains, contrary to Hobbes, that as an isolated being, man is a "stupid and shortsighted animal," 10 tranquil by nature, and driven only by sensation and instinct. Being asocial, he is without language, and so also without reason and the realized capacities for rational choice. He is not moved by a concern for satisfying his future appetites (Hobbes's desire for "power after power"), for without reason he has no conception of himself or his future. He has no need for reason, language, or prudential concerns; in his isolated condition, his needs are wholly satisfied by natural instinct. His capacities for reasoning are not activated until he enters into cooperative circumstances. Reason is the instrument of adaptation man acquires to deal with social environments, as instinct is his mode of adaptation to the state of nature. And as a socially adaptive capacity, its primary role is to enable him to understand, apply, act on, and, if necessary, devise the norms of cooperation necessary for social life. It is in conjunction with the development and exercise of this social capacity, and not prior to it, that man is able to apply his rational capacities to the task of adopting and adjusting his individual ends and deliberating on effective means for realizing them. Rousseau's state of nature is an analytical device, designed to show what we owe to society: the development and exercise of our capa~ities for reasoning according to both prudential and moral norms. 11 ~emg a member of a social group, recognizing and accepting that group s coo~ erattve nonns, and understanding how these norms function as ~ublic reasons Within the group are conditions of our realizing our capacity for
5~ 0; Jean~J~cques Rousseau, On Social Contract or Principles of Political Right, in Rous1
us Polztrcal Writings, ed. Alan Ritter and Julia C. Bondanella (New Yo~k: Norton.
3~), bk. I, chap. 8, p. 95· See, in the same volume, his Discourse on Inequalzty, pp. IS~tl Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, pp. g-10. On the role of the ~tate of natu~r: ditiononaJ social contract views, see jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Soc1al Contract (Cambridge: Cambridge University ,Press, Jg86), chap. 9·
109
130
Philosophy & Public Affairs
reasoning in agent-centered terms. This says nothing about the moral content of a group's cooperative norms; they may be quite perverse. It simply brings out their separate function, and shows the artificiality of Hobbesian attempts to use the instrumental aspect of practical reasoning as a sufficient basis for accounting for social cooperation and our capacities for reasoned justification. By defining reasons purely by reference to isolated agents with given desires, Hobbesian views start out by ignoring the public role ofreasons in enabling us to justify our conduct to one another, and explain our choice of ends according to nonns that are a condition for the existence of the social group. One way to look at right-based contract views is as views that begin with this other conception of reasons by focusing on the social role of norms in public justification. If we think of morality and justice in this way, and if our aim is to formulate principles that serve this social role, then the question is not whether members of society can be given reasons, as individuals, to comply with the norms of the group on the basis of their given ends. It is, rather, whether they can freely accept and abide by the normative system that provides the primary basis for public reasons, or whether they are entitled to complain. Unlike Hobbesian views, right-based views do not seek a set of rules that it is rational for every individual to comply with whatever that person's prior purposes. Basic norms of justice need not connect instrumentally with everyone's given desires and interests. I :a This fact is reflected in the starting assumption of right-based views; they do not take individuals' desires as given, or as having value on their own terms. Instead, they seek to provide a notion of our legitimate interests, defined by reference to what can serve as a comm~n basis f~r pu~lic agreement, and supply standards for critic~Y assessmg people s desrres and expectations. Given the necessity of social cooperation over a lifetime, the requirement imposed on social norms is that no one can reasonably object when social nonns are enforced against them. That cer:wn c~nsiderations count as reasons in public discussion and argu~ent IS a claun about our justificatory practices. By itself, it does not establish anything abou t th e content of moral pnnc1ples, . . or even that I
1~. Cf. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UniversitY Pres_&·
1:2!os~ (~~~erred to as TJ). and Thomas Scanlon, "Contractualism and Util-
bridge· c~~rid '~':"n'sm and Beyond, ed. Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (Cam· . ge n Versity Press, lg82), pp. tos. ug.
110
131
Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views
there are any. What is established is an additional basis upon which to build such principles. The idea is to give the notion of public reasons some kind of representation in theory. Accordingly, right-based views assume that the ability to understand and apply such reasons involves an independent capacity of practical reason; '3 further, that agents have an interest in cooperating with others on terms that are publicly justifiable. The aim of a conception of justice is to specify principles that respond to this capacity and interest, that is, principles that provide a public basis for justification all can accept, in order to sustain willing social cooperation. The problem is to show that there are principles that meet these specifications. This is where right-based views diverge in several ways: in their account of our moral capacities for practical reasoning, their conception of justification, and the role assigned in them to the social contract.'4 I shall later discuss these aspects of Rawls's view. First, however, notice how the focus of the skeptical conclusion must change once we conceive of reasons as having an independent role in public justification. The question whether there are reasons for us to accept and act on requirements of justice is no longer simply the question whether justice is compatible with our preexisting ends. That issue may remain, but it is not the primary concern of right-based views. Instead, a different question arises, the question whether there exists a set of principles that is capable of serving as a public basis for justification and that all individuals can reasonably affirm and accept as providing the basis for the social norms that regulate individuals' pursuits of their particular ends. It is an 1 3· See TJ where Rawls defines moral theory as an account of our moral capacities (pp. 46-47), and justice as fairness as "a theory of the moral sentiments ... setting out the Principles governing our moral powers, or more specifically, our sense of justice" (pp. 5~ SI). Also in Thomas Scanlon, "The Significance of Choice," in The Tanner Lectures on ~uman Values (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, xg88), 8:I7Jff.. one of the capacIties for agency is the ability to reason about what could be justified to other~. . . . 14. For example, Locke sought the ultimate basis for public justification m religxon, m the self-evidence of God's natural laws. The basic moral capacity was thus represented epistemologically, as a capacity for rationally intuiting these laws and drawing_ inferences from them. In Kant, moral prinCiples were seen as part of the structure of practical reason. Which enabled us to conceive of ourselves as free. For Locke and Kant the social contract had a reduced role; it was primarily a device for testing the legitimacy of existing poli~ical constitutions. Their agreements assumed, and were not designed to prove, .a nat~ral nght of equal freedom, which was seen as justified on separate grounds. Rawls s SOCial a~ rne~t has a more significant role. since he seeks principles for designing basic social mstltutions, not just for testing constitutions.
111
Philosophy & Public Affairs
132
open question whether there are such principles; therefore, it is an open question whether there are moral reasons with a basis in considerations independent of individuals' antecedent desires and interests conjoined with principles of rational choice. The important point is that we cannot answer this question a priori or on purely metaethical grounds. The relationship between morality and reason becomes a question of substantive moral theory. Now let us return to Foot's concerns. Foot is perhaps right in saying that there is nothing rationally inescapable, in her sense of reasons, about morality whatever one's purposes or situation. What is inescapable, however, is one's being a member of a social group, recognizing the group's system of norms, and understanding how the nonns function as reasons in public argument. Though that requirement does not involve endorsing all the norms of the group, whatever they may be, it does mean that one who is unwilling to cooperate with others on any terms except those most conducive to achieving his own particular ends is being unreasonable. The amoral man however rational he may be (in agent-centered terms), is unreasonabl~ just because he is not convinced or moved by any considerations except those that best promote his antecedent ends. He refuses to accept as authoritative any system of public reasons. This amounts to a refusal to acknowledge others as having claims of their own which warrant his recognition on some grounds independent of his particular purposes. And right-based contract views Proceed on the assumption that moral reasons of justice involve the independent claims of other persons. It is a ~act about the vast majority of people that we acknowledge eac~ other as mdependent sources of claims. (Indeed it is hard to take sen~~sly anyone who says he does not see others in this way.) In large part. It Is because of this recognition that we desire to justify our conduct and cooperate with others on terms that can be publicly accepted. 15 The~ may be exceptions-certain people without such sentiments. In thetr case, Foot is again right: there is little to be said to the man who cares no.thing for justice to convince him to act justly. 16 But the absence of this moral motivation cannot be taken to show that his conduct is not contrary to reason. There is something more fundamental than one's IS. See Scanlon "Con of the desire to be ahle to tractuali~ and Utilitarianism," pp. II6-J7, on the significance 16. Foot, Virtues ~~~tJfy ones actions and institutions.
tees, p. 166.
112
133
Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views
given purposes underlying this assessment. And we need to discover it in order to comprehend why those of us who have moral motives and a desire to justify our actions have these motivations. •1
II. AGENT-CENTERED
REASONS AND THE SociAL CoNTRACT
Let us now consider the relationship of the idea of a unanimous collective agreement to the different conceptions of practical reason in the two kinds of social contract views. I shall focus on Rawls's and Gauthier's views, beginning with Gauthier's Hobbesian account, as set forth in Morals by Agreement.•B Gauthier's purpose is twofold. First, he seeks "to defend Western market society by representing its ideal nature in relation to reason" (MA, p. 353). Second, there is a more traditional Hobbesian project, to give a "rational reconstruction" (MA, p. 339; cf. p. 193) not only of morality but of human sociability and all social sentiments (including love, friendship, and the sense of justice). To carry out these tasks, Gauthier assumes a "natural man" (MA, pp. 31off.) who is fundamentally asocial, individualistic, and self-interested. Given these assumptions and the nature of his project, practical reasons are not going to be represented as having an independent social role of public justification.•9 Reason is interpreted purely in agent-centered terms, as individual utility maximization, 20 where the objects of a person's desires are specified "non-tuistically," or purely by reference to oneself (MA, p. 31 1). Gauthier places these persons in a noncooperative state of nature, which is Lockean to the extent that private property and rights in one's person are recognized, albeit on self-interested rather than (as in Locke) moral grounds. Each sees that 17. In Rawls it is our conception of ourselves and our relations as democratic citizens that account for the moral sentiments of justice. See Section V below. l8. DaVid Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). Hereafter referred to as MA. 1 9· This is not to say that Gauthier would have to deny what I call public reasons (cf. note 20 below). But he would explain and justify the system of public reasons in agentcentered terms: something counts as a public reason in a society only if it ultimately advances the desires of agents as nonmembers. 2o. "Practical rationality is the maximization of utility and so the maximization of the satisfaction of present preferences" (MA, p. 34J). Of the max1mizlng View, Gauthier says he agrees "With economists and others that there is simply nothing else for practical rationality to be" ("Morality, Rational Choice, and Semantic Representation," Social Philosophy and Policy [lg88]: 174 ).
113
Philosophy & Public Affairs
134
his best response to others is to leave them to the quiet enjoyment of their powers and possessions, on the condition that they respond in kind. By a kind of Humean convention, individuals come to recognize each other's personal and property rights. If persons and their initial endowments are conceived of in this way • only two possible modes of interaction are open to them: (1) hostility and (2) cooperation on the basis of contractual bargains (MA, p. 319). Accordingly, rational agents would enter into contractual relations with those with whom cooperation promises a Pareto improvement, and would dominate all the rest; the weak and handicapped, presumably, would be weeded out. Social cooperation is the result of a general contractual extension of this baseline. justice is the set of constraints on market behavior and the direct pursuit of individual utility that rational agents would collectively agree to because it promises them a Pareto im· provement. Gauthier sees no need for a coercive state to enforce these constraints or preexisting rights among rational beings; in contrast to Hobbes, that is not the purpose of his social contract. Given Gauthier's assumptions we might ask what need is there for a . ' ' ? soczal contract, a uniform public rule applying equally to all persons. Why could society (and, if need be, a coercive state) not arise out of a series of private contracts, as in Robert Nozick's view? Gauthier appeals to a collective agreement to deal with problems of market failure and externalities (MA, pp. 84, 128ff., 223). :u His contract is described as an idealized economic bargain in which property-owning utility maximizers agree on a principle that corrects the inefficiencies of markets. 22 In the absence of this principle, Gauthier argues, rational agents would not all :u. "Morality arise~ from market failure" (MA. p. s4). The market failures Gauthier di~ cusses are stand~ m economics: nuisances such as pollution, the provision of public good.s,. and ecollOJDl~ rent Gauthier does not discuss the need for political instituti~ns to administer the reqwrements of justice, or to decide on public goods. His account 15 extremely apolitical.
~~. ~au.thier's principle of."~ax relative concession" (MRC) holds that "in any coperative Interaction, the rational JOint strategy is determined by a bargain among the cooperatiii'S in w~ch each advances his maximal claim and then offers a concession ~0 ~ter in relative magnitude than the minimax concession" (MA p. 145). In effect thts r.:!le ~olds that individuals are to enjoy the benefits of coope~tion, and share in the p~s" (~: proportio)~ to ~eir contributions to what Gauthier calls the "cooperative ~u~ Prod ' p. 2 24 · RC IS an attempt to carry through the basic idea of the Margu_t and ~Just ~tri~tions that underlies Gauthier's conceptiOn of jus: cording to=~ Assummg pnvate property in the means of productiOn. ~ eachroduct. Cf. MA p II tion to final output, as measured by the value of his marginal P ' p. 91 ., 97. llo-12, 140, 152, 154, 254.
0
:'::ty TheGt:!
114
135
Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views
accept market outcomes and distributions. These are not problems for Nozick, since he rejects economic efficiency as the basis for the social order. Regarding his conceptions of reasons and persons, Gauthier has argued that they are the only appropriate basis for justifying appeal to a social contract. For this reason he claims that Rousseau's and Rawls's views are not genuinely contractarlan. Rawls's appeal to a social agreement is spurious, he says; the moral assumptions made are the real legitimating principles behind Rawls's view. "The real character of the theory emerges when one asks for the grounds of the legitimating principles. "2 3 Gauthier's objection should be distinguished from Ronald Dworkin's. Dworkin says that, because Rawls's agreement is not an actual agreement, it would seem to be nonbinding and of no significance. This is not an objection to Rawls's idea of agreement, but to its hypothetical nature. As such, it applies to the use of any hypothetical decision model in ethics-not just Rawls's, but also Gauthier's, Kant's, and Ideal Observer theories. A short answer to this objection (which I discuss below) is that agreement in the Original Position is heuristic; it is a thought experiment designed for purposes of self- and political clarification. 24 It helps us understand what the combined force of certain generally accepted intuitive ideas and firmly held moral convictions that shape public reasoning commits us to. Gauthier's hypothetical agreement has a different role. It operates from conceptions of practical reason and of the person that Gauthier contends are part of the best explanatory theory in the social sciences (MA, p. 8) and seeks to develop a stable conception of justice consistent with these theoretical constructs. To lay the background for a discussion of the role of agreement in Rawls's view, we might focus more closely on certain features of Gauthier's account. First, there is nothing about agent-centered reasons that requires that they be self-interested. But once we suppose (as all social 23. Gauthier. "Social Contract as Ideology," p. 13gn. See also his "Bargaining and Justice," pp. 4o-45· 24· See JF, pp. 236ft'., for Rawls's response to Dworkin's objection. Cf. ~~wls's remarks on the "Socratic" nature of reflective equilibrium: "It is a notion charactenstic of the study of Principles which govern actions shaped by self-examination" (TJ. PP· 48-4~). ~ee also Joshua Cohen, "Democratic Equality," Ethics 99 (Jg8g): 75o-SJ· For Dworldn s ob~ecti~n, see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, M~s.: Harvard. Uruvers1ty Press, 1976), chap. 6, sec. 1. Dworkin's objection seems to be m part. rhetoncal, for he ~COgnizes that the OP is a "powerful mechanic" for clarifying the requtrements of equalIty.
115
Philosophy & Public Affairs
contract theorists do) that justice and social cooperation have a basis in reason, then on an agent-centered view it is hard to resist an assumption of what cooperation-free interaction would look like for purposes of determining terms of social cooperation and the division of social benefits and burdens. For that picture provides a baseline from which to compare the advantages of cooperating with persons with ends different from one's own, and allows one to assess how various modes of cooperation promote his given purposes. Social relations are then naturally portrayed as a contractual compromise among essentially conflicting interests. This marked tendency toward some form of Hobbism is characteristic of agent-centered views when applied to social questions."s For Rawls there is no place for comparing the benefits and burdens of cooperation with cooperation-free interaction; nothing like the state of nature plays a significant role in his view. One reason for this is that (as Rawls says) noncooperation is not a viable option for us. So the "take it or leave it" attitude implicit in bargains is inappropriate as a model for social relations. But that does not explain the more particular features of Rawls's agreement. Here it helps to focus on the structure of Gauthier's contract, and recognize just how limited it actually is. Gauthier conceives of the social contract as an idealized economic bargain. Given his noncooperative baseline, some noncontractual basis must be provided for the preexisting claims that are needed to carry that idea through. So there is no justification in terms of justice and the social contract of absolute property, contractual bargains, the price system and unregulated market exchange, or prohibitions on coercion and deception. None of these rules and institutions rests on mutual consent. Gauthier does not see these crucial mechanisms for distribution and establishing claims as forms of cooperation; rather, they define or are an extension of the natural state of man. 26 They are necessary conditions for, not the product lS. See, for ~xample, Gilbert Harman's version of conventionalism, which, though an
~":lanatory ~Ject in~ by Hume, is also a kind of Hobbesian contract view as 1 ~SC: t tenn. Unlike Gauthiers hypothetical agreement, Harman argues that the moral P~
~pies that apply to a person are the result of actual agreement, in the sense of the ~pliclt
R"::a,~tions people have accepted in dealing with each other. See Gilbert Harman. Moral ford·ti~sm Def~," Philosophical Review 84 (1975): 3_ 2 2.; The Nature of Morality (Ox: . xford Uruversity Press, 19n). chap. g; and "Rationality in Agreement: A commen
W:6°~~~~u~er~rals by Agreement," Social Philosophy and Policy 5 (1987): I-I~ by
a
Robm
ar: et , om lis) conceived as an extension of the natural freedom enjoy son Crusoe (MA, p. 276; see also MA, p. go).
116
137
Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views
of, his social contract (cf. MA, pp. 222, 295). Agreement on principles of justice is called for only to deal with problems that arise within this natural scheme of distribution. Suppose, however, that Gauthier's parties had come together and agreed on principles, not after they had staked their property claims, but much earlier, shortly after their creation as intelligent beings. Then they would have to agree on a lot more than the limited principle Gauthier defines. They would have to settle on standards regarding how property rights are to be defined; how extensive they can be; how claims are to be initially acquired and then transferred; conditions on exchange, gifts, and inheritance; and many other things. Had they made such an agreement, would this make the resulting forms of property, markets, and so on cooperative institutions in Gauthier's view? In any event, it seems that his parties would acknowledge principles defining property and distribution quite different from those Gauthier argues for on noncontractual grounds; at least it is an open question. What the possibility of an earlier agreement shows is the peculiar way in which the purpose and results of Gauthier's contract are dependent on historical conditions, that is, on when the agreement is made in the state of nature. Moreover, it shows how dependent his notion of social cooperation is on these contingencies. I do not mean to suggest here that Gauthier's parties should come to an earlier bargain (based, say, on knowledge of their natural endowments), but rather that it is arbitrary when they do. For cooperation will always be mutually advantageous whatever temporal point we choose in the noncooperative baseline, and the time at which the agreement occurs significantly affects the terms of cooperation agreed to. Fortuitous circumstances and decisions in the state of nature determine the content of Gauthier's account of justice. As it is, given the way Gauthier sets up the state of nature and conceives of the social contract as an idealized bargain between persons With initial property endowments, the question whether these institutions need, or even can have, a justification in terms of a social agreement cannot arise for him. But this is just the issue that Rawls aims to address with his version of the social contract. Property, contracts, markets, and other forms of transfer (gift, bequest, inheritance, taxation, and so on) he sees as social institutions that can be designed in many different ways. How they are individually designed and combined into one
117
Philosophy & Public Affairs
social scheme deeply affects individuais' characters, the development of their abilities, and their desires, plans, and future prospects. Given the deep-seated effects of these institutions on the kinds of persons we are and can come to be, the first question of social justice for Rawls is, what are the appropriate principles for designing these basic social institutions? Rawls aims to show that there are noninstrumental principles implicit in what we accept as reasons in public life that have an important bearing on this question. If we understand the problem of justice as a question about the proper design of the social institutions Gauthier takes for granted, and see the social contract as a response to that question, then the structure and significance of that agreement must differ markedly from those assigned to it in Gauthier's view. To begin with, the idea that the appropriate point of view from which to assess institutions and decide on principles is a noncooperative state of nature in which a certain form of private property already exists is wholly out of place. Second, the idea that an idealized economic bargain is the proper model for the social agreement must also drop out of view, since it is the legitimate scope of these kinds of agreements and the justice of the desires, claims, and expectations they take for granted that we are concerned with. Third, the kinds of persons who take an interest in the justice of absolute property, unregulated exchange, and so on are going to be very different from Gauthier's rational appropriators, for whom these institutions are unproblematic. Rawls's parties conceive of themselves as free, not in the sense that they may act on any desire they happen to have, but in the sense that they are able to control, revise, and take responsibility for their final ends and desires by acting on and from reasonable and rational principles. Recognizing the deep-seated effects of basic social institutions on these capacities and 00 their interests, they have a basic concern for how such institutions are designed. Not satisfied with the idea that these institutions answer to their d~sires f~ the accumulation of objects, Rawls's parties have a deeper mterest m whether the institutions are structured so as to enable them ~ realize their reasoning capacities, and whether the princip~es suppomng these institutions can serve as a basis for public justificauon among persons like themselves. 27
C:.7".a=~· at least Implicitly, that the set of institutions argued for by Gaum: condition (see TJ, sec.
12.).
Given the publicity condition, those who
118
139
Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views
Both Rawls's and Gauthier's agreements are hypothetical. But unlike Gauthier's, Rawls's is also nonhistorical; it does not arise out of the status quo or a state of nature but requires that individuals abstract from all knowledge of their situation, abilities, particular ends, existing rights, and everything else about their own history and point of view. The gist of Gauthier's objection to Rawls is that there can be no nonhistorical contracts, or, what comes to the same thing, no genuine social agreements regarding the social institutions that constitute the basic structure. This argument is the natural consequence of Gauthier's conceiving of the social contract as an idealized bargain between persons withessentially conflicting interests and preexisting property claims. This is a very restricted (and perhaps overly legalized) interpretation of the idea of agreement. Not only does it severely limit the range of interpretations of the values of freedom and equality that underlie all social contract views, but it also views justice and cooperation as exceedingly narrow notions, as if they had to do only with resolving certain problems that arise within private-propertied, market economies. The consequence of such a narrow interpretation is that there is no place in Gauthier's conception of the social contract for a collective decision regarding social worlds. It is as if the kind of society in which Gauthier's agents live and set their ends were imposed upon them by forces beyond their collective control. 38 It is a separate question to what extent this follows from his agent-centered conception of reasons (as opworse off in society could not reasonably accept and give their support to a system of property and distribution that defines entitlements and contributions according to the principle of Pareto efficiency, especially since it is compatible with virtually any distribution. My concern, however, is not Rawls's rejection of economic bargains and Pareto efficiency as the major method of distribution, but his rejection of them as the model for his social agreement. 28. Another reason for Rawls's focus on the basic structure, which I shall only allude to here, is raised by Gauthier's mistaken contention that Rawls denies individuals any return on their contributions to society or social productivity (MA, pp. 248--50). Gauthier's argument is guided by the underlying premise given in note 22: Assuming private property in the means of production, to each according to his contribution, as measured by his marginal product. But we have no well-defined notion of one's contributions to society, or what he is entitled to in return, independent of the social institutions within which contributions are made. That owners of capital produce or contribute something as owners is simply an institutional fact (some would say a legal fiction) that follows from the way certain institutions assign rights and powers over things. Rawls's point in focusing on the basic structure ~ just that we need a public standard by which to assess and decide between different tnstitutional systems defining entitlements and contributions (cf. TJ. sees. 47-48).
119
Philosophy & Public Affairs
posed to his assumptions regarding the prerequisites of the contract and the self-centered content of people's final ends). Agent-centered views ultimately must take certain desires and interests as given and beyond rational assessment. Simultaneously, then, they must take as beyond rational assessment the background conditions that underlie and support people's primary ends. To sum up, it is true that Rawls's social contract does not involve any kind of bargain in Gauthier's sense. This is because the question that underlies his view is not: given individuals' ends (actual or presocial), is there a single set of nonns that each has agent-centered reasons to comply with? It is, rather: given our conception of ourselves as free and equal, how can the principles that specify the basic social institutions determining the ends and agent-centered reasons people have be defined so as to serve as a basis for a system of public reasons within which individuals can justify their pursuits to one another consistent with their self-conception? The focus of Rawls's agreement on the basic structure follows from his conception of public reasons and their independencewhat we accept as public reasons, and what we can accept as justifying a system of public reasons, cannot be reduced to what rationally promotes each individual's antecedent concerns. 2.9
lll.
PUBLIC REASONS AND SOCIAL AGREEMENT
But does Rawls's response to his question still warrant talk of a social agreement? I shall argue that there are at least three ways in which an idea of social agreement functions in Rawls's view. The first follows from the conception of the person that he employs (discussed in this sectio~)· The second is implicit in his practical conception of justification (Secuon IV). And the third is informed by Rawls's Kantian account of autonomY (Section V). Rawls's theory arrives at the social contract through its specification of the ~emocratic conception of persons as free and equal. Beginning with the Idea that society is a system of cooperation for mutual advantage,
~9· This accords with .Rawls's stipulation that one of the reasonable (as opposed to raal. ln his sense) constraints represented in the Original Position is that the parties~ ~a~ ~ciples for the basic structure (John Rawls, "Kantian Contructivism in Morrerer::?'~ Dewey Lectures Ig8o," Journal of Philosophy 77 (1g8o): 529; h~:ttrer
.as KC). Rawls assumes that a concern for "background justice" is impliCit in our sense of JUstice. ·
120
Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views
how should terms of cooperation be specified among free and equal persons with different conceptions of their good? Given their self-conception, it would be inappropriate to see these terms as given by a higher moral authority distinct from the persons cooperating (for example, God), or even by a prior and independent moral order of values (such as natural law). For in both instances the ultimate source of public reasons would involve elements upon which free individuals with different ends and worldviews cannot agree. The most appropriate way to determine such principles, Rawls contends, is by an agreement among the persons cooperating, in light of their self-conception and each person's conception of his own rational good. This is the first function of the idea of social agreement in Rawls's view. It is a way of working out terms of cooperation that all can accept, and that can serve as a basis for public justification among persons with different ends who conceive of themselves as free and equal. There would seem to be little problem here, so far as Gauthier's objection is concerned. Gauthier is bothered, however, by Rawls's next move, establishing the nature and scope of the moral conditions placed on the agreement. Because free and equal persons are specified as persons having an interest in the justice of the basic structure of their society, a suitably independent perspective is needed that abstracts from existing conditions. This perspective cannot be defined by a state of nature, as we have seen, since its accidental contingencies would also distort the purpose of the agreement. So, Rawls specifies a now familiar point of view, the Original Position, to extend the idea of fair agreement to the basic structure. The veil of ignorance is a representation of strict equality.Jo Since parties behind the veil do not know their particular ends, abilities, or anything about their endowments or situation, there is no room for a bargain in Gauthier's sense (TJ, p. 139). So there is no assurance-indeed it is highly unlikely-that the principles agreed to will improve each person's starting position in society. This is the basis for Gauthier's objection: Rawls's agreement is not a contract because it is not modeled on an economic bargain. The stringency of Rawls's equality condition precludes this. The question raised by Gauthier's objection is whether there is room for a different kind of contract or agreement once we conceive of reasons 30. Ibid.. p.
sso.
121
142
Philosophy & Public Affairs
in a noninstrumental way. Contracts are legal devices, and the conditions of valid contracts have been defined differently in different legal systems. Gauthier's conception of a contract recalls nineteenth-century Anglo-American law, in which the same conditions were specified to accommodate an expanding market economy. Still, at no time have contracts ever been legally defined so as to constitute an equivalent of Gauthier's idealized bargain. All sorts of prOinises and commitments have been deemed enforceable as contracts that do not involve anything resembling an economic bargain.3 1 Furthermore, background moral constraints are a condition of any legal contract; contracts are deemed "unconscionable" for a number of reasons, and no court would enforce a contract by which one party consented to alienate his constitutional rights. And, too, the condition of finality that is part of social contract views has never been a part of any valid legal agreement.J~ Finally, even if we concede that the idea of a contract connotes a fundamental conflict of interests and lack of mutual concern, that does not mean that there is not a place for some l
122
143
Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views
later change his mind. There are also other means we use to bind ourselves by such friendly agreements, such as setting into motion certain practices or institutions that limit the range of future options open to those who participate (as in marriage agreements, or joint commitments by members of the same religious association). Here again the agreement is not a compromise among essentially conflicting interests. Instead, it represents a joint commitment to certain shared ends or ideal modes of interaction which each desires as regulative of his own pursuit of his particular purposes. The parties rely upon one another in order to achieve these shared norms or ends. The point of the agreement is not to resolve disagreement or conflict, for there may be none. It is, rather, to tie down the future, to keep the parties from later changing their minds and deviating from the shared norms or purposes of the association. These agreements are akin to the idea of rational precommitment,33 except that they involve a joint precommitment among several persons, since the shared norms or ends of the association's members cannot be achieved in the absence of widespread compliance. A general precommitment best expresses the kind of social agreement at work in the natural rights theory of the social contract tradition. Locke, and at times Rousseau, might be read as expressing this idea when they call their agreements a "social compact" (rather than a "contract"). And the idea of general precommitment indicates a significant way in which collective agreement plays a role in Rawls's view. Free and equal moral persons all have, in addition to their diverse ends and worldViews, a fundamental social interest (their sense of justice) in cooperating with one another on publicly justifiable terms that express their conception of themselves as free and equal (cf. TJ, p. 561).34 This interest is social since it cannot be achieved by single individuals, but requires coordination of activities. It is shared in that each individual desires the same object, a background of just institutions. To realize this shared social interest, free and equal citizens mutually precommit themselves (through their representatives in the Original Po33· See Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1g84), chap. 2, esp. pp. 37-47· 34- The claim that practical principles "express" our self-conception is common among Kantians. See, for example, Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 g7o), p. 1 8, where it is part of his definition of "interpretation." Rawls gives sense to the cla1m via Kantian constructivism. discussed below, Section V, esp. note 49·
123
144
Philosophy & Public Affairs
sition) to principles, appropriate to their self-conception, for the design of institutions and the regulation of their individual pursuits. They commit themselves to, and rely on each other to maintain, a status as equals in the free pursuit of their ends and in the considerations that will be recognized as public reasons. The principles create and sustain the conditions needed to realize their equal status and their fundamental interest in cooperation based on mutual respect. Since these principles answer to a shared social interest, they are not (unlike Hobbesian views) a compromise, but rather everyone's best response to this situation. The usual compliance problems that bedevil Hobbesian views do not applY· 35 In committing themselves to these principles, free and equal citizens willingly impose upon themselves certain constraints on future decisionmaking at all levels of choice, individual and collective. This precommitment is general, because it is made by and applies to everyone. It is shared, since each depends upon the others to hold him to his decision by maintaining an environment of just institutions. And it is mutual, in that each gives his consent only on the condition that others do; otherwise the coordination of activities necessary to each citizen's realizing his basic interest in justice could not be achieved. These features warrant talk of a social agreement. Members of a democratic society make this general precommitment, not the parties in the Original Position. The parties choose from interested motivations and have no basic concern for justice and equality. Here Rawls's argument from the "strains of commitment" plays an essential role (TJ. pp. 145, 176ff.). Because the parties conceive of themselves as free and able to control their future each sees himself as responsible to the future claims of the self (TJ, ~p. 422_ 23 ). Each knows ~at he will be held to his decision by the others, so each aims to commit himself once and for all to principles that he will not reproach himself 35· Rawls descri~ this social interest as a highest-order interest in reallzing one's ca525). We might look upon free and equal ~:ens d~ to realize this interest as a metapreference for justice, that is, a preference all one s ~ll:'re preferences meet the conditions of reasonable principles. By agreement on the two pnnaples, citizens in·effect decide to make themselves into the kinds of persons will not make trade-oft's between justice and their particular ends. They will that they ~~whose preference structure is (in terms of rational choice analysis) lexi· ~ U · Since leXicographic preference structures cannot be represented by a utility ~ ~::to~Vlysses and the_ Sirens, pp. 124-27), we might see their choice as a onal utility maximizers in Gauthier's sense.
p~ty ~ ~ effective sense of justice (KC, p.
:0
124
145
Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views
for choosing even should the worst transpire. Commitment by the parties to principles that secure equal citizenship and enable each freely to pursue his own good corresponds to the precommitment of free and equal citizens in society. Still, does Rawls really need to talk of an agreement in the Original Position? Given the veil of ignorance, it might seem, as Jean Hampton says, that "there is no theoretical reason to posit more than one party in the original position."J6 One reason Rawls insists on an agreement is to carry through the contrast with utilitarianism (cf. TJ, pp. 184ft'.). The Original Position is not set up like Ideal Observer theories, where a single judge with full knowledge of all but his own identity impartially represents and sympathetically identifies with the interests of everyone.J7 As against the conflation of interests involved from this point of view, an agreement among many persons concerned to advance only their own interests emphasizes the distinctness of persons and the plurality and incommensurability of their conceptions of the good. More important, the contract condition is essential to Rawls's strains of commitment argument. Were there but one party choosing principles, there would be no one for him to commit himself to. Agreement, unlike individual choice, implies a joint undertaking where each is held by the others to his decision, thereby ensuring the perpetuity and irrevocability of the principles agreed to. 38 36. Hampton, "Contracts and Choices," p. 334· This objection voices the view of many who say that Rawls's Original Position merely depicts the rationally self-interested choice of one individual. See Gauthier, "Bargaining and justice," p. 44, and Scanlon, "Contractualism and Utilitarianism," p. 124. 37· Gauthier's noncontractualist argument for his position in "The Archimedean Point" (MA, chap. 8), although it involves interested choice like Rawls's Original Position, still resembles Ideal Observer theories in that it is choice by a single agent with knowledge of everyone's preferences, but not of his own identity. This resemblance is due to the fact that both utilitarianism and Gauthier's contract view take individuals' desires for granted. and seek to maximize utility. The difference is that Gauthier refuses to aggregate utility, which explains why his ideal actor's choice is interested. 38. Hampton ("Contracts and Choices," p. 330) argues that the finality condition (see note 32 above) already implies irrevocability of the principles selected, and that this renders Rawls's strains of commitment argument and the contract constraint on which it relies unnecessary. But although finality may imply that excusing arguments will not be entertained (perhaps ensuring a kind of irrevocability), it still does not bring out the idea that the parties are making a good faith commitment to one another, which they can rely on as citizens and cite to each other to justify holding one another to the terms of the agreement. Nor does finality (or irrevocability) imply the perpetuity of the undertaking, which, as Rawls indicates (TJ, pp. 14 ~47), has its basis in the "Agreement Condition."
125
Philosophy & Public Affairs
Perhaps the best answer to Hampton's objection is that the hypothetical choice of the Original Position makes sense only in the context of free and equal persons trying to come to a social agreement on terms of cooperation and the presence of standards for public justification that all can accept, whatever their particular situations.J9 The veil of ignorance is imposed just as an extension of that basic contractualist idea. It corresponds to the fundamental equality of moral persons in agreement on the basic structure. Even if the parties are symmetrically situated by that condition,4o Rawls needs to maintain the idea of distinct individuals coming to an agreement to make the main idea of his theory go through. So the most that one can say (although Rawls denies even this)41 is that agreement among parties is the same choice as would be made by a single individual in the Original Position. But there is no reason to describe the choice in this way. Not only does this description misrepresent the conditions of choice in the Original Position, but also there is no- way to arrive at it given the way Rawls sets up the situation. 4"' 39· Cf. John Rawls, "Reply to Alexander and Musgrave," Quarterly journal of Economi~s 88 (1974): 651. where he says that "the reason for invoking the concept of a contr~t 1~ the original position lies in its correspondence with the features of a well-ordered !IOCJety. A well-ordered society is partially defined as a society in which everyone accepts, and knows that others accept, the same principles of justice. 4°· Hampton ("Contracts and Choices," p. 334) says that the parties are complet~ly identical in all their characteristics; hence by Quine's principle of the identification of m· discemibles, we are forced to "construe the indistinguishable parties as one person." But the parties are not described as having aU the same properties (e.g., they have different concep~ons of their good); instead they share the property of not knowing any gene~al properties about themselves that might give them evidence of their chances under SOCial schemes structured by various principles of justice. 4 1 · On grounds that the class of things that can be agreed to is included in and is smaller than the ~~ass of things that can be rationally chosen (Rawls, "Reply to Alexander and Musgrave, pp. 651-52). 4 2 · Hampton also argues not only that a contract is uncalled for. but also that the con· tract device is too weak to yield the irrevocable commitment Rawls needs. For contracts are always ~ocable if all the parties agree. The parties might then count on the possibility of a revocanon of the agreement once they enter society. So they might take risks, therebY changing th~ way they reason and endangering Rawls's argument for the two principles (Hampton, Contracts and Choices," pp. 331-32). But Rawls's argument assumes that m~mbers of society will enforce the agreement not out of self-interest but out of their sense of_J~stice (TJ. P· 1 45). This moral motivation makes it highly unlikely that they would be Willing 1?, revoke and renegotiate the agreement But even if they did, a revocation, or "re· scissi~, of 1 contract is a separate contract. See Corbin, On Contracts, sees. 1236, 123?· And smce they affect the basic structure, any rescission or renegotiation among Rawls 8 parties would also have to take place behind the veil of ignorance. But this rules out anY grounds the parties might have in the original agreement for taking risks in hopes of later rescission and renegotiation.
126
I47
Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views
To sum up, if we conceive of reasons as having an independent social role of providing a public basis for agreement, then a social agreement is the most appropriate way to ascertain principles that serve this role among free and equal democratic citizens with different conceptions of their good. And this procedure, while not a contractual bargain, is still an agreement in that it embodies their shared precommitment to maintain their status as free and equal in the structure of institutions and system of public reasons. Interested agreement from the Original Position models this situation.
IV.
SociAL AGREEMENT AND PRACTICAL JusTIFICATION
We have considered how the social contract plays a role within Rawls's conception of justice, from the point of view of free and equal persons and from the perspective of the parties in the Original Position. Let us now consider a second way in which agreement plays a role, implicit in a third perspective in Rawls's view, that of ourselves as members of a democratic society. 43 Rawls identifies the aim of political philosophy as a practical one: to define a conception of justice that can "provide a shared public basis for the justification of political and social institutions."4 4 Its task is to locate a basis for agreement in a culture that all can affirm and accept and that can serve as a basis for public reasoning and stable social cooperation. The practical aim of a political conception is to be contrasted with what we might call the "theoretical aim" of a moral conception, which is truth. "Justice as fairness ... presents itself not as a conception of justice that is true, but one that can serve as a basis of informed and willing political agreement between citizens" (JF, p. 230). This does not mean that Rawls is not interested in objectivity or truth (clearly Rawls thinks that the general facts assumed by his theory and the parties are true [TJ, pp. 547-481). Rather, there is a difference between the primary objects of a practical versus a theoretical inquiry. Whether Rawls's principles are or can be true, in the sense that they satisfy a metaphysical account of truth, is a separate issue which Rawls does not address. He thinks it important to "avoid the problem of truth and the controversy between 43· On the three different perspectives and their significance, see KC, PP· 533-34· 44· John Rawls, "The Idea of Overlapping Consensus," Oxford journal of Legal Studies 7 (1987): 1 (hereafter referred to as OC). See also JF. p. 230; KC, PP· 541, 543; and TJ. PP. 44.583.
127
Philosophy & Public Affairs
realism and subjectivism" if justice as fairness is to achieve its practical aim in a democracy (JF, p. 230). This point is essential to Rawls's version of liberalism, as well as to understanding the sense in which his is a contractualist view. The practical aim of a political conception does not by itself seem to imply any form of contractualism. For we might imagine a society in which appeals to religious authority, or to self-evident truths about good reasons, provided the basis for public justification and agreement (cf. KC, p. 557). Rawls's point is that such appeals cannot work in a democracy. For given that democratic citizens have different and competing philosophical conceptions of the nature and bases of truth, objectivity, and so on, a basis for public reasoning and agreement cannot be achieved by a conception of justice that relies on such premises. Here the idea of social agreement comes in; such an idea is implicit in what I will call the "practical conception of justification" that Rawls sees as appropriate for a democratic society. For a justification to be practical (as opposed to theoretical), it must satisfy the following conditions: (I) It must have a practical aim: Addressed to those who disagree, it is designed to yield principles that all can accept and affirm as a basis for public justification and agreement (Rawls calls this the "social role" [KC, p. 517] or "public role" (OC, pp. s-6] of principles). (2) It must have a practical basis: It proceeds from considerations that count as public reasons in the culture, and so relies on premises and methods of reasoning that all can agree on and endorse (TJ, sec. 87; OC, p. 8). Our "considered moral convictions" of justice are primary among such premises. (3) It must meet a motivational requirement: Practical justification assumes that members of a culture have a desire to give reasons that justify their institutions to one another (a common "desire for free and uncoerced agreement" [JF, p. 231 ; KC, p. 51 8]}-more generally, a willingness to cooperate with others on terms they can freely accept (a sense of justice).4s
::1
45· Rawls says that the sense of justice "implies the desire on the part of individuals and to advance their good in ways which can be explained and justified by reasons .~ can.~ ~ accept as free and equal moral persons" ("Social Unity and Prilllai'Y Goods, m Utilztananism am! Beyond ' ed. Sen and William'S, p. l 84 )·
128
149
Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views
(4) It must show that the principles yielded by it accord with our considered moral convictions at all levels of generality, on due reflection and after considering alternative views, so that these principles and our convictions best fit together into one coherent scheme (what Rawls calls "general and wide reflective equilibrium") .. These conditions identify the sense in which Rawls's view is contractualist from the point of view of those who are considering this conception of justice. None of these conditions, by itself, warrants talk of a contractualist justification. The mere fact that condition (2) is satisfiedthat we can agree on certain precepts and methods of reasoning-does not by itself justify anything; contractualism is not conventionalism. Hence the importance of satisfying condition (4)-reaching reflective equilibrium. Then again, we might imagine a single individual trying to achieve equilibrium of all the moral convictions and ideas that stem from his conception of the good and his philosophical and religious views. (So we might interpret traditional philosophical arguments for comprehensive moral theories.) Others who do not share this individual's views would not be able to accept all of his conclusions, although he might see them as authoritative for everyone. Rawls uses reflective equilibrium in a more public way, as a method of justification appropriate for political agreement on principles all can endorse; hence the significance of condition (1). It relies only on the considered convictions on which we all can agree (condition [2]) and so excludes considered beliefs peculiar to our conceptions of the good or our metaphysical views. Reflective equilibrium, then, is "general": everyone should be able to accept the same conception. Rawls's conception is contractualist in that it seeks principles with Which to provide a public basis for justification and agreement that reflectively cohere with the considered convictions and beliefs that we hold in common and that serve for us as public reasons. It is an agreement in that it is a mutual accommodation of different philosophical, religious, and moral views, reached by "reconciliation through public reason" (JF, p. 230). This reconciliation depends on public understanding that certain considerations-those that stem from individuals' particular worldviews and on which we cannot all agree-will not be offered as arguments or a basis for public claims. The Original Position and other elements of Rawls's view model this situation: they model the bases for
129
Philosophy & Public Affairs
ISO
justification from which we actually proceed in trying to justify our social institutions to one another. 46 And the conception of justice that results incorporates these bases for justification. As such, it attempts to give standards for public deliberation where only the reasons specified by that conception-those that can be justified practically-count as reasons in arguments on constitutional essentials. The agreement or reconciliation that Rawls's conception of justice represents is not a bargain, in the Hobbesian sense, between essentially conflicting views. It does not proceed from people's given ends and conflicting worldviews and seek to strike a compromise. Instead, it works from shared political convictions, and happens to meet individuals' different moral views at the point at which they converge (Rawls's "overlapping consensus"). It does not, then, require one to compromise his basic convictions; or, if it does, it is only because they are incompatible with what that person accepts and relies on as public reasons. Here condition (3), the motivational requirement, is important. The purpose of this requirement is not to define what counts as public reasons, but rather to ensure that citizens will act on principles so that the practical aim of the political conception can be carried through. Given Rawls's assumption that we have a shared sense of justice which is effective independent of our particular conceptions of the good, there is not the same concern, as in Hobbesian theories, that citizens are always prepared to pursue their goals at the expense of others and will depart from justice whenever circumstances allow. Since he explicitly avoids claims to truth and objectivity according to epistemological and metaphysical critieria, Rawls's practical justification is open to the objection that it is not really a justification, but rather a kind of complicated accounting method that unifies the underlying concepts and principles of a political culture.47 But there is a stronger sense 46· For ~s reason Rawls describes the conditions defining the Original Position as a
~presentation of reasonable restrictions on arguments for principles of justice (TJ, PP· 1 ~:
20• 138 • Sl6; JF, pp. 237-38). They are general convictions that "we do in fact accep (TJ, ~· 21 ) insofar as they incorporate our considered convictions regarding the kinds of
considerations that are and are not acceptable as reasons in arguments for principles of justice.
~7 · This raises the question, which Rawls mentions but avoids, whether his conception
~~cation is sufticient (OC, p.
15) or at least necessary ('The Independence of M~al
·i;-APA Presidential Address, PToceedings of the American Philosophical Association 1 4 1974): g, 21) for justification in the theoretical sense. 1'
130
151
Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views
in which Rawls seems to characterize his principles as practically justified, based on the Kantian features of his view. Let us now return to the perspectives internal to Rawls's conception, and see the role that social agreement plays in defining autonomy and a practical conception of objectivity.
V.
REASON, AUTONOMY, AND AGREEMENT
The purpose of the state of nature according to a Hobbesian view is to provide a perspective from which to rationally assess existing social arrangements. (Gauthier's assessment, however, is quite limited, since he incorporates into the state of nature the very institutions many feel to be most in need of appraisal.) But this does not free the view from its anchor in antecedent desire; it only relocates the basis for the agent-centered reasons people have in certain natural tendencies and inclinations. Suppose, however, that we seek a basis for reasoned assessment in something other than existing social arrangements and natural inclination. Following Kant, Rawls appeals to our capacities for practical reasoning. The moral powers of free and equal moral persons are the two separate capacities for practical reasoning as applied to matters of justice. The moral powers are (a) "the capacity for an effective sense of justice, i.e. the capacity to understand, to apply and to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the principles of justice," and (b) "the capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good" (KC, p. 525). These are, Rawls says, "executive" capacities (KC, p. 533) (one might add "judicial"), since they enable individuals both to regulate and to justify the pursuit of their ends by means of reasonable and rational principles. Our concern is the source of reasonable principles and their connection with a social agreement. Here Kantian constructivism and full autonomy come in; they develop the idea that the moral powers are not only executive but also collectively legislative. The idea of constructivism works on two levels in Rawls's theory. First, it applies at the most general level of justification, reflective equilibrium. From certain considered convictions on which we agree, Rawls "constructs" the conception of justice that can best serve as a basis for public justification in a democracy. Here the notion of construction gains sense by contrast with appeals to linguistic or self-evident moral intuitions. Rather than raising certain considered convictions to the level of first
131
Philosophy & Public Affairs
principles because they are thought to be implicit in language or accurate reports of a prior moral order, Rawls seeks principles that best cohere with all of our shared convictions of justice (what we rely on as public reasons), revising and, if necessary, discarding recalcitrant ones along the way. No specific level of generality is assumed to carry the burden of justification. Other moral conceptions can be construed as constructivist in this sense, so long as they rely on this method of justification. 48 "Kantian constructivism" is a more specialized notion that works within this constructive model of justification; it explains why we may find some of our considered convictions recalcitrant. It aims to show that the principles that best cohere with our convictions are not questionable accidents of culture, but are objective in that they have a basis in our capacities for practical reasoning. These capacities, Rawls presumes, underlie many of our considered convictions, including our political conception of ourselves as free and equal (JF, p. 233; TJ, sec. 77). Rawls seeks to capture this self-conception with an idealization, the "model conception" of free and equal moral persons. To construct, in our first sense, principles of justice appropriate for us, Rawls constructs a social world modeled on the self-conception and practical capacities of free and equal moral persons. The purpose of this second kind of construction is to give content to Kant's enigmatic definition of autonomy as "reason giving principles to itself." In the absence of some kind of procedure that shows the relationship between our capacities for reasoning and moral principles, such phrases are difficult to make sense of. Agreement from the Original Position serves this role; it is a "procedural interpretation" (KC, p. 559: cf. TJ, pp. 256, 264) of practical reason in matters of justice, or, more exactly, of a conception of persons as both reasonable and rational. Since this procedure is designed to "model" the moral powers,49 48. For a discussion of this sense of construction, see Dworkin, Talr.ing Rights Seriously, pp. lsg-68. 49- Rawls's claims that the Original Position "models " "mirrors " and "represents" the moral powers are somewhat obscure. He seems to have mind th~ following: The parties to the ~gina) POSition represent the capacity for rationality in that they judge according to the pnnciples of rationality set forth in TJ. chap. 7, and desire to obtam an adequate :eare of the primary social g~s. It is rational to want the primary goods, since they enable and eq~al persons to realize their fundamental interests in the exercise and ctevelop~nt of ~ ~al powers, and their particular conception of the good. This is all ~ of Ran~ (KC, p. 528). The moral conditions of the parties' rational choice(~ the asonable ') represent our capacity for justice in that, in exercising that capaCJty, we
in
:e
132
153
Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views
the content of the principles chosen from that point of view will be determined by these reasoning capacities and the conception of the person to which they give rise (KC, pp. 516, 518).so In this sense moral principles are "constructed" on the basis of reason. The objectivity that Rawls ascribes to his piinciples rests on his daim that they would be willed and agreed to from a shared point of view, which is objective in that everyone abstracts from their particular (subjective) aims, beliefs, and perspectives to view society on an equal footing (TJ, pp. 516-1g). This conception of objectivity is practical, as opposed to theoretical, in the following sense: Rawls's claim is not that, being impartially situated, we all have a clear, undistorted view that allows us to make true judgments about a prior and independent moral order. In constructivism, Rawls says, there is no order of moral facts, prior to human reasoning, for our moral judgments to be true of (KC, p. 568). This does not mean that Rawls must deny that a prior order of moral facts or principles can exist, for that metaphysical commitment would conflict with his practical aim. Rather, it means that if there is such an order, it is not because certain principles are true of it that we are bound, as democratic citizens, to follow them. What commits us, as would judge these conditions to be fair and reasonable restrictions on arguments for principles of justice for the basic structure (TJ. pp. 18-19; JF. pp. 237-38). More particularly, the veil of ignorance embodies our conception of ourselves as equals in matters of justice. The publicity condition follows from our concern to know the underlying bases for laws and social institutions, as well as from Rawls's aim to arrive at principles that will provide a basis for public reasoning and justification in a democratic society. The condition of finality conveys our conviction that considerations of justice are conclusive in public affairs; they override all other public concerns. For Rawls's account of how Kant's Categorical Imperative involves a procedure of construction, see John Rawls, "Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy," in Kant's Transcendental Deductions, ed. Eckart Forster (Stanford: Stanford University Press, Jg8g), PP· 81-JJ3. so. To show how the content of Rawls's principles relates to his conception of the person Would require a separate discussion. For Rawls's discussion of the first principle, see John Rawls, 'The Basic Uberties and their Priority," in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1g82), 3:18-39· Briefly, the basic liberties are seen as "fully adequate" to the development and exercise of the moral powers, and to each person's pursuit of his rational good. Moreover, they provide the external freedoms that enable moral persons to realize their conception of themselves as free-that is, as selfOriginating sources of claims with the rational capacities to have a conception of the good and who take responsibility for their ends (KC, pp. 543ff.; JF, pp. 240ft'.). Fin~. an ~ual right to the basic liberties accords with the equality of moral persons, based m theJr all having the moral powers needed to engage in social cooperation (TJ, sec. ~7). The ~er ence Principle ensures the fair value of the basic Uberties for all and embodies an egalitarian conception of reciprocity (TJ, pp. J02-J).
133
154
Philosophy & Public Affairs
citizens, to these principles is that they are "most reasonable for us" (KC, p. 554), in that they best accord with our capacities for practical reasoning in the circumstances of a democratic society. The conception of objectivity that informs this claim is practical, since the shared point of view from which we would agree to these principles is designed not to give us privileged access to a prior moral order but to represent our powers of practical reasoning in a way appropriate to our democratic conception of ourselves as free and equal.s' But what relation is there between the moral powers, autonomy, and a social agreement? Why is the procedural representation of "reason giving principles to itself' conceived as a collective decision, instead of, as in Kant, the ideal choice of a single individual? One might say that agreement emphasizes "autonomy" in the sense of devising principles of justice for ourselves cooperatively and not as individuals. But moral principles, unlike positive laws, cannot actually be legislated or chosen, either by groups or by individuals. Nor is "autonomy" meant to imply that they are. Autonomy in both Kant and Rawls involves the justification of moral principles by reference to a conception of persons as both reasonable and rational, where the content of principles is detennined by these persons' reasoning capacities, and not their particular ends, their innate psychological tendencies, or an antecedent moral order. We judge and act autonomously, not by choosing our moral principles, but by proceeding from and regulating our activities according to principles that reasonable and rational persons would freely accept and agree to from a shared point of view modeled according to these powers. But although we do not choose, individually or collectively, principles of justice, we do devise basic social institutions. We cooperatively decide, through laws and willing acceptance of social and legal conventions, how the constitution, the economy, property, and so on are designed and 5 1 · In this connection, it is important to note that Rawls's use of the tenn "reasonable" is ambiguous (KC, PP· 554, 5~70). In its narrower use it contrasts with "rational" (in the sense of each person's rational good), and expresses the idea of fair tenns of cooperation (KC, PP· 528-2g). In its broader sense, used here in connection with his conception of objectivity, it is a stand-in for truth in Rawls's practical account of justification. The "prin· ciples ~ost reas_onable for us" are those that best fit with our capacities for both reasonab~ and rational ~~tion, where "best fit" is ultimately decided by the two stages of Rawls 5 argu~ent for JUStice as f~ess: (I) the argument from the Original Position, and ( 2) Rawls s argument for stability and the congruence of the principles of justice with our rational good in a well-ordered society (TJ, pt. J).
134
ISS
Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views
fit together into one social scheme. Here the significance of social agreement comes in. These basic institutions fundamentally affect our final ends, our basic affections. our character, and the direction of our moral sentiments. So in cooperatively making and supporting laws and voluntarily complying with the existing rules of these institutions, we are deciding what kinds of persons we are and can come to be. In doing that, we deeply affect the kinds of considerations that count for us as good reasons. We are, in cooperatively devising and maintaining basic social institutions, indirectly shaping ourselves and defining practical reason.s~ The question is whether we are going to design basic institutions that enable us to realize our legislative and executive capacities for practical reasoning, and thereby take responsibility for our characters and final ends; or whether we are going to sustain institutions that create in us desires and states of character that keep us in a state of heteronomy, or subjugation to forces that, although we (often unwittingly) create them, are beyond our direct control. The significance here of a social agreement for the basic structure is threefold. First, it emphasizes the social nature of practical reasoning, how what we accept as reasons in both public and private life is largely influenced by a shared public culture, primarily, the basic institutions we create and sustain. This accounts for the primary importance of our coming to a public understanding regarding the basic structure. That problem affects our personal and associational relations as well as our political relations; its resolution is a precondition of our resolving other deep-seated moral differences. Second, agreement implies the social conditions necessary for autonomy. Rawls does not hold (as Kant sometimes seems to suggest) that we can realize moral autonomy under any circumstances. We need a background of social institutions of a certain kind (cf. KC, p. SSJ). A cooperative effort is required to create these institutions, just as a cooperative effort is needed to sustain those we now have. Full autonomy presupposes a joint effort and a collective decision. It requires our cooperatively altering existing institutions and devising others so that they conform to our moral powers and our conception of ourselves as free and equal. These two points underscore the importance of Rawls's full publicity condition (KC, pp. SJ?ff. ), which suggests the final significance of social 52. Cf. KC, p. s6o. where Rawls says that the moral powers are not fixed but are shaped and developed by a shared public culture.
135
Philosophy & Public Affairs
agreement. Again, unlike Kant, Rawls does not hold that first moral principles or the conception of ourselves as autonomous is implicit in individual moral consciousness. We must be educated about this conception of persons and their relations. Full publicity of principles and their justification makes possible an awareness and understanding of ourselves as autonomous beings. And social agreement on principles, unlike impartial individual decision, implies the publicity condition. Full publicity is important because it ensures that the process of public justification can be carried through completely. Everything that counts as a reason and a basis for claims in the public culture can be fully justified; there is no need to keep anything hidden from public view. Let us return now to Gauthier. He specifies a conception of the autonomy of utility maximizers that involves critical reflection on means and clarification of ends, but that denies that "reason affords substantive grounds for choice or action" (MA, p. 344). The significance of Gauthier's account of rationally autonomous beings is that it, too, seeks to capture a conception of persons and their social relations that is latent in a part of our culture: the pure capitalist ideal of fundamentally self-centered and acquisitive individuals whose relations are all based in contractual bargains (MA, pp. 318-1g). Gauthier's autonomous beings are not only moved ultimately by self-interest; they are also under no illusions about it. They publicly affirm self-interest as fundamental to their social relations and the system of public reasons. It is a separate question whether Gauthier's principles and conception of the person can serve as a public basis for justification, or provide for stable social relations even among his rational egoists. Still, Gauthier has latched onto an understanding of persons and a source of public reasons in our culture that stem from the institutions we willingly sustain, and that provide a sufficient basis for public justification for many who are especially favored by those institutions. Both conceptions of the person-Rawls's notion of the fully autonomous democratic individual and Gauthier's idealized conception of "economic man"-represent types engendered by our basic institutions. These conceptions reflect a fundamental tension at work in our culture, and per~aps in ourselves. The ultimate justification of one or the other moral VIew cannot be (as Gauthier would have it) which conceptions of reasons and persons best approximate the model relied on in the social sciences (MA, pp. 8, 316), for that account is designed to deal with en-
136
157
Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views
tirely different problems. It is, rather, a practical question: What kind of persons can we most closely identify with and do we finally want to come to be-individuals whose institutions and basic relations are ultimately imposed upon them by their socially created desire for unlimited acquisition; or persons who can take responsibility for their desires, characters, and social relations by patterning institutions to help them realize their capacities for practical reasoning?
EDWARD F. McCLENNEN
Justice and the Problem of Stabi Iity
I. THE PROBLEM OF STABILITY
John Rawls suggests that the issue of distributive justice characteristically arises between persons who cooperate with one another for the sake of their own personal ends. The principles of justice, on this account, are to be understood as regulating the distribution of benefits that this type of social cooperation makes possible. Since in general greater benefits for some will mean lesser benefits for others, there will be a potential conflict of interest over what principles to adopt. Rawls argues, however, that given an app~opriately defined hypothetical setting in which deliberation takes place-and in particular the assumption that choice is made behind a "thick" veil of ignorance-a consensus on principles will nonetheless emerge. • Such a consensus, of course, amounts to a momentary convergence of prudential judgment under conditions of extreme uncertainty. Even supposing that individuals can agree under such conditions on a conception of justice that will govern their cooperative venture, why should they be disposed in their actual dealings with one another to do what these Principles require? This poses what Rawls terms the problem of stability: I am indebted for helpful comments to John Rawls, Gerald Postema, Geoffrey Sayre McCord, Laurence Thomas, and participants of philosophy colloquia held at Rutgers University, the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Duke University, and Bowling Green State University, where drafts of this article were read. 1 · These are, of course, the concerns of Part One of Rawls's Theory of justice (Cam~ridge: Harvard University Press, 1971 ) (hereafter TJ), but for a full appreciation of the Issues involved, the following are also important: "Justice as Fairness," Philosophical Review 57 (1958); "Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice," Nomos VI: justice, ed. ~- J. Friedrich and John Chapman (New York: Atherton Press, 1g63); "The Sense of Jus~c~," Philosophical Review a2 ( 1 ga3); and "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," hilosophy & P~tblic Affairs 14, no. 3 (Summer 1g85).
139
4
Philosophy & Public Affairs
the problem of stability arises because a just scheme of cooperation may not be in equilibrium, much less stable. To be sure, from the standpoint of the original position, principles of justice are collectively rational; everyone may expect to improve his situation if all comply with these principles, at least in comparison with what his prospects would be in the absence of any agreement. ... Yet in everyday life an individual, if he is so inclined, can sometimes win even greater benefits for himself by taking advantage of the cooperative efforts of others . . . . Just arrangements may not be in equilibrium then because acting fairly is not in general each man's best reply to the just conduct of his associates. 2 Stability of the requisite sort, Rawls suggests, is not guaranteed by the conditions of the original position (or what he sometimes calls the "analytic construction"). This point is implicit in the whole of the argument of the third part of A Theory ofJustice, but it is stated in an even stronger form in an earlier article, "The Sense of Justice": The aim of the analytic construction is to derive the principles of justice which apply to institutions. How persons will act in the particular circumstances when, as the rules specify, it is their turn to do their part is a different question altogether. Those engaged in an institution will indeed normally do their part if they feel bound to act on the principles which they would acknowledge under the conditions of the analytic construction. But their feeling bound in this way is not itself accounted for by this construction, and it cannot be accounted for as long as the parties are described solely by the concept of rationalitY· 3 Stability requires that persons possess a "sense of justice," an effective desire to act as the principles of justice require. This sense of justice, Rawls argues (paraphrasing a remark of Rousseau's) is "no mere moral conception formed from the understanding alone, but a true sentiment of the heart, enlightened by reason, the natural outcome of our primitive affections."4 Chapter 8 of A Theory of Justice is devoted to exploring how 2 " Rawls, TJ,_pp. ~g6-g7. As this quotation suggests, Rawls tends to think about the problem of stability m tenns of the economist's model of the free-rider problem. or alternatively, the game theorist's model of the prisoners' dilemma. See also, in particular, ibid., pp. 267-70 and 336. 3· Rawls, "The Sense of Justice," p. 285. 4· Ibid., p. 281.
140
5
Justice and the Problem of Stability
and under what conditions such a sense of justice arises from more "primitive" affections. The analysis draws heavily on studies of psychologists concerning stages in a child's development of moral attitudes.s On Rawls's formulation, three stages can be identified, each governed by its own psychologicallaw:6 (I) The Morality of Authority, in which the child takes the parent as
authority, and which is governed by the "first law: given that family institutions are just, and that the parents love the child and manifestly express their love by caring for his good, then the child, recognizing their evident love of him, comes to love them." (2) The Morality of Association, the content of which is given by the moral standards appropriate to the individual's role in the various associations to which he belongs and which is governed by the "second law: given that a person's capacity for fellow feeling has been realized by acquiring attachments in accordance with the first law, and given that a social arrangement is just and publicly known by all to be just, then this person develops ties of friendly feeling and trust toward others in the association as they with evident intention comply with their duties and obligations, and live up to the ideals of their station." (3) The Morality of Principles, in which the person becomes attached to principles themselves in accordance with the "third law: given that a person's capacity for fellow feeling has been realized by his fanning attachments in accordance with the first two laws, and s. This is the concern ofTJ. chap. 7, as well as the earlier article "The Sense of Justice." Rawls refers in particular to the work of three psychologists, William McDougall, Jean Piaget, and Lawrence Kohlberg (see TJ, pp. 460 n. 6 and 461 n. 8). Rawls's argument, in this respect, strikes out on a path relatively untraveled by mainstream moral philosophers in this century. For the most part, philosophers have shown little interest in the problem ~f psychological stability. Most have been preoccupied with the issues of meaning and JUs~fication. The tacit assumption seems to be that if one can show certain principles to be JUStified, this will suffice to ensure that reasonable persons will accept these principles as regulative of their affairs. On this view, once the question of acceptable principles is resolved, one has, as a bonus, a solution to the problem of stability. Such a view relies on a dubious psychology, however. It supposes that to grasp abstractly the validity or "reasonableness" of a principle is ipso facto to be disposed to accept it in one's dealings with others. Moreover, it cannot be said that recent treatments of the justificatory Issue leave one very s.anguine about the prospects for an Informed intellectual consensus on a principle of justice. 6. See in particular Rawls, TJ, sees. 7 o- 72 , and pp. 4go-91 for the summary statements quoted In the text.
141
Philosophy & Public Affairs
6
given that a society's institutions are just and are publicly known by all to be just, then this person acquires the corresponding sense of justice as he recognizes that he and those for whom he cares are the beneficiaries of these arrangements." Taken together, these laws assert that the active sentiments of love and friendship, and the sense of justice itself, arise from the manifest intention of other persons to act for our good. As a result of recognizing that others wish us well, we come to care for their well-being in return. Thus we acquire attachments to other people and institutions according to how we perceive our own good to be affected by them.' But these are direct attachments: our own goals and interests have been transformed. In this sense, these laws govern changes in the affective ties which belong to our final ends, and not just our recognition of appropriate means. 8 Rawls argues that these laws are expressive of a disposition to reciprocate-to answer in kind-and that this disposition is a deep psychological fact: Without it our nature would be very different and fruitful social cooperation fragile if not impossible. For surely a rational person is not in· different to things that significantly affect his good; and supposing that he develops some attitude toward them, he acquires either a new attachment or a new aversion. If we answered love with hate, or came to dislike those who acted fairly toward us, or were adverse to activities that furthered our good, a community would soon dissolve. Beings with a different psychology either have never existed or must soon have disappeared in the course of evolution. A capacity for a sense of justice built up by responses in kind would appear to be a condition of human sociability. The most stable conceptions of justice are presumably those for which the corresponding sense of justice is most firmly based on these tendencies.9 2. STABILITY AND RATIONALITY
A careful reading of A Theory of Justice makes it clear that it would be a mistake to treat the rational choice argument of the analytic constrUction and the psychological theory pertaining to the sense of justice as corn7. Ibid., p. 494·
8. Ibid., pp. 493-94·
142
g. Ibid., pp. 494-95·
7
justice and the Problem of Stability
pletely disjoint. 1° First of all, the problem of stability is said to be highly relevant to reasoning in the original position. Distinct conceptions of justice can be ranked with respect to their. capacity to engender their own affective support, that is, to foster the developmental process that culminates in the possession of a full sense of justice. 11 This is something that those in the original position must take into account: "It is evident that stability is a desirable feature of moral conceptions. Other things being equal, the persons in the original position will adopt the more stable scheme of principles. However attractive a conception of justice might be on other grounds, it is seriously defective if the principles of moral psychology are such that it fails to engender in human beings the requisite desire to act upon it."12 But in view of what Rawls has to say about why stability is a desirable feature of a conception of justice, it is clear that the connection between the sense of justice and rationality goes even deeper. Society being a cooperative venture for the sake of mutual advantage, and hence continually subject to the strains created by a plurality of final ends, a stable consensus on principles of justice is essential to the enterprise itself: while men may put forth excessive demands on one another, they nevertheless acknowledge a common point of view from which their claims may be adjudicated. If men's inclination to self-interest makes their vigilance against one another necessary, their public sense of justice makes their secure association together possible. Among individuals with disparate aims and purposes a shared conception of justice establishes the bonds of civic friendship; the general desire for justice limits the pursuit of other ends. One may think of a public conception of justice as constituting the fundamental charter of a wellordered human association. •J Io. They appear somewhat more disjoint in the earlier article "The Sense of Justice," since there the discussion abstracts from the question of the relevance of the comparative stability of alternative principles of justice for the reasoning that takes place behind the veil of ignorance, and there is no discussion of what in TJ Rawls comes to refer to as the problem of the congruence of the sense of justice with the good of the agent. I I. See in particular Rawls, TJ. pp. 453-56, and sec. 76, for a discussion of the comparative stability of alternative conceptions. 12. Ibid., p. 455 . 1 3· Ibid., p. 5· See also pp. 491-92 for a strong statement of the importance of a sense of the justice or injustice of arrangements in determining our allegiance to Institutions.
143
8
Philosophy & Public Affairs
The outline of this part of the argument is clear enough. A well-ordered society is an indispensable common means to personal ends. A well-ordered society presupposes a stable consensus on principles of justice. There can be no stable consensus on principles of justice unless the principles agreed upon have the capacity to engender their own psychological support, that is, to engender a sense of justice. The idea that the acquisition of a sense of justice implies an alteration in one's ends represents something of a departure from the ordinary way of thinking about the choice of principles or policies as instrumental to the personal goals of the participants. Imagine, for example, a group of persons whose social structures do not satisfy principles which could be the subject of a stable consensus and thus who have not yet achieved a well-ordered society. Since their society is not well ordered, we may suppose that the members have yet to develop a full-blown sense of justice. What Rawls's argument recommends is not that they put into place some institution that will of itself stabilize their relations with one another. The invitation is to adopt an arrangement whose stabilizing effect comes through its impact on their attitudes. To achieve a well-ordered society they are required to take steps that will result in a reconstruction of themselves as purposive beings-a transformation of their affective ties to one another and hence of their final ends.l4 To be sure, it might be argued that what would be most useful to any given participant would be for all others to acquire a sense of justice while he (secretly) remains disposed to defect when this works to his advantage. Rawls implicitly acknowledges this problem and seeks to counter it by arguing that the acquisition of a sense of justice is congruent with a person's own good. The turn his argument takes here is reminiscent of a line of reasoning that has repeatedly surfaced in philosophical talk about morality since the time of Plato and Aristotle. The ~otion is that our own sense of justice is not a means to, but constitutive (I~ some sense) of, our own well-being. Thus Rawls argues, among other thmgs, that we cannot share fully in the good to be achieved in a wellordered society unless we have this sense ourselves, and acting from such a sense of justice is something that we directly desire to do, insofar as we think of ourselves as free and equal rational beings. The first of these points is Aristotelian; the second is clearly Kantian.'s 14. I return to this matter in Section 6 below 15. .These · . to the complex nature of the argu· T brief remarks• of course, cannot do· JUStice ment m l. chap. g. I shall have more to say about this in Section 6 below.
144
9
Justice and the Problem of Stability
There is, then, a double connection between rationality and the sense of justice. The capacity of a particular conception of justice to engender a sense of justice-and thus its own psychological support-is essential to its capacity to seiVe as a fundament:il charter for a well-ordered society, and hence to be the object of a rational (if abstract) consensus in the ortginal position. But, in addition, a sense of justice is something that it is rational for the representative person to want to affirm in his own life. 3·
RETHINKING THE ROLE OF THE STABILITY ARGUMENT
In the seventeen years since the publication of A Theory of Justice the ortginal position argument has been subjected to intense crtticism. 16 Virtually none of the crtticism, however, has been directed at Rawls's views concerning stability and the sense of justice. Typically, the question has been what it would be rational to choose in the ortginal position, on the assumption that the options are all more or less acceptable in terms of their capacity to engender a sense of justice. Given the problematic nature of other aspects of the ortginal position argument, one is bound to wonder whether considerations of stability might not provide an alternative and more promising rational choice approach to a theory of justice. The most ambitious hypothesis would be that stability brings with it benefits great enough to be decisive from the point of view of rational choice, and that considerations of stability pick out a unique conception of justice. If this could be shown, there would be no need to appeal to the original position argument with its problematic notion of what it would be rational to choose under conditions of radical uncertainty. 1 7 16. In particular there remains the vexing question of whether, under the conditions characterized in the original position argument, persons would agree to something like Rawls's two principles or, alternatively, to some version of the utilitarian principle. I myself have expressed doubts as to whether Rawls has made the case in favor of his two principles. See "Constitutional Choice: Rawls vs. Harsanyi," in Philosophy in Economics, ed. J. C. Pitt (Dordrecht: Reidel, tg8I), and the works cited there. This issue is. I take it, distinct from the one concerning the significance (or implications) of reasoning from behind a veil of ignorance for a nonnative theory of justice. On the latter issue, Rawls's remarks in "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical" are very helpful, but I think they do not touch the issue of whether the "derivation" he sketched in "justice as Fairness" goes through. . 17. Some years ago Brian Barry, in The Liberal Theory of justice: A Critical Examination of the Principal Doctrines in A Theory of justice by John Rawls (Oxford: Clarendon, 1973). noted that Rawls was prepared to incorporate stability considerations into the rea-
145
IO
Philosophy & Public Affairs
What follows is a sketch of an argument in support of this hypothesis. Both the argument and its conclusion are deeply indebted to Rawls. I want to suggest that the general conception of justice presented in A Theory of justice is especially suited to engender its own psychological support and the resultant stability yields significant benefits. Moreover, the defense that I shall offer extends and adapts what Rawls has to say both about the sense of justice and about its congruence with the good of the agent. I shall, however, depart from Rawls's analysis in a number of respects. First, as I have indicated, the approach taken obviates any reference to the original position: the concern is solely with the stability of actual social contracts. I shall, of course, still suppose that persons are limited with respect to the projections they can make about the future, so that, at best, they have only probable knowledge offuture events that can substantially affect their well-being; but this sort of uncertainty is much less radical than that presupposed by Rawls.•B Second, I want to place even more emphasis than Rawls does on the notion that a commitment to a sense of justice can be grounded in a theory of rational choice. Third, I want to accord to a counterpart sentiment, which I shall call the sense of injustice, a somewhat more substantial role. And fourth, the approach taken leads naturally to a broader notion of the problem of stability. On the view to be developed, a consensus on a principle of justice will be unstable not only if those who come to agree on it are subsequently prone to unilaterally defect from that agreement, but also if they are disposed to press for the rejection of that principle and the adoption of some other, that is, to press for a renegotiation of the social contract. 4· MoviNG
AWAY FROM HYPOTHETICAL CoNTRACTS
If one gives up talk of what persons would agree to in the original position argument, what is left? Presumably what persons who perform the mental experiment of putting themselves in the original position conson~g of the original position, and remarked that the stability argument "is so powerful tha~ ~t seems to be in imminent danger of short-circuiting the whole elaborate (original po<ionj argument in favor of the 'two principles' " (p. 14). 18· 1 ~ effect, ~h~t I propose to do here is return to something more like the degree of un~ertainty that IS Incorporated into the version of the argument to be found in "justice as
FaJmess."
146
II
Justice and the Problem of Stability
front when they return to the real world and take up for consideration the social arrangements that define their actual relations with one another. Whatever the history of the group, their present political and social structures can become the object of debate and deliberation. Since each will know his present place, and be in a position to fonn at least some estimate of how he expects to fare, the problem of conflict of interest becomes very real. In the language of game theory, any such group of persons will face an n-person strategic interaction problem in trying to reach agreement on the principles which are to govern the basic social and political structure. This will be true even if there exist well-defined procedures for effecting changes in that structure, for such procedures simply serve to constrain the options available to various coalitions of participants or the relative attractiveness of those options. Insofar as the interaction problem is mutually perceived as having a bargaining dimension, the controlling expectations of each will be shaped at least in part by his estimate of the relative bargaining power of the various participants. And relative bargaining power in turn will be shaped not only by de facto procedural rules, but by the de facto distribution of resources, knowledge, talents, and so forth, which is largely a matter of historical accident. Under such conditions, participants are likely to perceive their relations with one another as defined, not by reference to principles to which they would be willing to give their assent under certain hypothetical conditions, but by reference to principles that simply express the best that they have been able to secure at that time. There is no reason to suppose, then, that the society in question will satisfy Rawls's condition of being "well ordered." But then there is no reason to suppose, with respect to the fundamental charter of that society, that participants will have a developed sense of justice. Thus one can expect that they will be disposed to "free-ride." Stability, to the extent that it exists, will result not from voluntary compliance, but from the institution of various enforcement deVices.•9 . 1 9· Among the devices that qualify in this regard, of course, will be coercive indoctrination-ideological "education." As will perhaps be evident, the conclusions of the argument to be explored here will hold, if they hold at all, only on the assumption that the participants have not been successfully indoctrinated. Even the most "unjust" of arrangements can be Stable if people have been manipulated into believing them to be legitimate. This raises a host of issues that J cannot deal with in this article. I shall have to content myself with observing that, given the wide range of alternative arrangements that may work to the
147
12
Philosophy & Public Affairs
In this setting, however, the problem of instability can be seen to manifest itself in other ways. One must expect not only that persons will be disposed to unilaterally defect from their arrangements when they perceive this to be to their advantage, but also that, as conditions change, they will be disposed to press for renegotiation of existing arrangements. A "contract" whose terms have been fixed by the relative bargaining power of various competing groups offers no immunity against renegotiation pressures, and this applies in particular to the distributive aspects of the social contract. "To each according to his bargaining advantage" cannot serve as the basis for a stable agreement on a principle of distributive justice. 20 Moreover, the two forms of instability just identified-arising from the tendency to defect and the tendency to press for renegotiation-interact. Widespread defection from the terms of an agreement invites reconsideration of those terms, but continual renegotiation will also tend to call into question the legitimacy of the social contract, and this in turn is likely to encourage free-riding. Moreover, selective defections will lead to changes in the distribution of power and bargaining advantage, and this in tum will generate pressures for changes in the contract. 2 ' mutual advantage of persons, it will always remain for us to ask whether the principles to which persons appeal in defense of some particular arrangement are really expressive of a fair arrangement, or whether they simply setve to rationalize the privileges of some at the expense of others. In this regard, I find the last part of E. Ulmann-Margalit, The Emergence of Norms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), most helpful. Much of the talk about the value of strictly competitive markets, for example, seems to me to be of the second. sort. 2o. R~wl.s himself has repeatedly remarked that this poses a problem for any bargax~mg or negotiation approach to the social contract (see, for example, "Justice as Fairness, .~P· 1 76-77 n. 12). In suggesting that we must widen our conception of the problem of stabilitY to encompass tendencies toward renegotiation as well as tendencies toward defection, I am indebted to James Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), in particular chap. 5· li. The relation between the "fairness" of the social contract and its stability is, of course, complex. Suppose a scheme is regarded by some participants as clearly unfair. Still it might be that if those who are disadvantaged unilaterally defect, all that will happen is that theY will~. subJected to closer control and obsetvation-policed more effectively. Under these conditions, they may expect to do appreciably better by conscientiously acting on ~he agreement, despite what they take to be its unfairness, and this may serve to outweigh their sense of the injustice of the scheme. Such persons may well be motivated ~ot to defect. !bus a s~nse of the unfairness of a scheme on the part of some participants IS not a su~ficient condition for instability. And clearly we must acknowledge that a sense of the unfaxrnes~ of a scheme is not a necessary condition for unilateral defection: what Raw!s charact~nzes.as the assurance problem (TJ, pp. 2~70 and 33&-37) can arise even m conne~~on .with schemes that are perceived to be fair. Similar remarks apply to the problem of stability m the face of renegotiation possibilities.
148
13
5·
Justice and the Problem of Stability
THE SENSE OF )USTICE AND THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE
Consider now Rawls's suggestion that a sense of justice can serve to counterbalance the disposition to unilaterally defect. Suppose that a person has a well-developed sense of justice but finds that others have acted as free-riders. On Rawls's account, the sense of justice does not demand that we unconditionally continue to do our part. Those who have a sense of justice will be disposed to do their part only if they expect others, or sufficiently many of them, to do theirs. •• May we suppose, then, that when those who have a sense of justice anticipate that others will not do their part, rational self-interest takes over and determines what they shall do? The characterization of the sense of justice as a disposition to respond in kind invites one to consider the sense of justice as more complex than this-as a disposition not only to do one's part when one expects that others will also, but to respond negatively and even aggressively to those who free-ride at one's expense. "3 On this interpretation, anticipated defections by others can be expected to engender not only distrust (which has direct bearing on rational self-interest) but also attitudes of resentment and hostility. The point is important. Rational self-interest does not invariably dictate that we resist or take aggressive action against those who take advantage of us. Reciprocating may simply make a bad situation "worse"-may, for example, tip a delicate balance in the "wrong" direction. And valuable resources will have to be expended to identify free-riders and bring them into line. See ibid., pp. 267 and 336. Ibid., p. 495. Reciprocity within this context is admittedly complex. In certain passages Rawls speaks of reciprocity as a disposition to respond in kind. But care must be taken here. I suppose that not only the person who responds to defections on the part of others by defecting himself but also the person who takes action to force defectors back ~nto compliance responds "in kind." Insofar as being a free-rider implies serving your own mterests in such a way as to impose an expense on others, the response in kind that others undertake may simply be to impose expenses on you. The operation of a disposition to reciprocity in this sort of setting can be compared and contrasted with its operation in other settings-in situations in which the nonnal state is not mutual forbearance for the sake of mutual advantage but mutual disengagement or noninteraction ("I'll leave you alone if you'll leave me alone"), or potential mutual hostility ("I'll refrain from attacking you if you'll ~ain from attacking me"). It seems clear that what differentiates the sense of justice and lllJUstice from certain other moral dispositions is not the nature of the perceived intention on the part of others that serves to foster it, but rather the setting in which it is fostered and expressed. What we characterize as a sense of justice and injustice is a matter of feeling favorably or ill disposed towards others in a particular kind of setting, in which one has, for example, come to count on one's expectations concerning how others will behave. 22.
23.
149
Philosophy & Public Affairs
14
A sense that shapes one's response to free-riding as well as one's response to principled behavior on the part of others is a sense of injustice as well as of justice. If the sense of justice restrains a person from doing what he may have a "direct" self-interest in doing (defecting), a sense of injustice can encourage him to do what he may have a "direct" self-interest in not doing (for example, investing costly resources in bringing free-riders into line). In both cases the moral disposition serves to counterbalance rational self-interest as the latter is usually understood. 24 Finally, recall here the conditions under which the sense of justice is fostered and what this suggests about the sense of injustice. On Rawls's account, it is a perception that others are intending to act for our good (as exemplified, for example, in the loving care of our parents) that sets in motion the developmental process culminating in our having a sense of justice. But that primal capacity for a loving response is transformed into a sense of justice via the mediating effect of experiencing successively more abstract fonns of association-in which the perception of others as directly caring for us is replaced by a sense of others doing their part, and of institutions arranged, in ways that work to our own benefit. That is, our instinctual response to loving parents is transmuted into a commitment to do our part when we perceive that others are doing theirs. Correspondingly, we may conjecture that primal feelings of hatred, engendered by a perception that others are intending our harm or otherwise threatening our well-being, will be transformed, within the context of more abstract associations designed for mutual advantag~, into a sense of anger and resentment towards those who fail to do therr part and thereby secure advantages for themselves at our own expense. 25 The account just given of what counterbalances the "rational" disposition to defect can be adapted to apply as well to the problem of renegotiation. As I have noted, it is plausible to suppose that persons will be rationally motivated under certain conditions to press for renegotiation. 2 4·.
The qualifier is necessary here, since on Rawls's account, which I shall follow, ~
acqu~ a ~ense of justice _(and hence also a sense of injustice) is to undergo a ~h~ge: affective ties, and hence m final ends. In this sense to act on one's sense of Justtce
injustice. is fully compa~ble with rational self-interest.' where the latter is defined in terJ_D~ of choosmg that act whtch most effectively promotes our ends. I shall return to this potn below. . 2 ~· To so conjecture, of course, is not yet to provide an adequate account of how an msttn~tual reaction to a perceived intention on the part of others to do us hann is trans· posed mto a sophisticated sense of1njustice.
150
IS
Justice and the Problem of Stability
What can act to counterbalance this? One possibility, of course, is that those who have the power to alter the arrangement in ways favorable to themselves anticipate that others will subsequently be in a position to press successfully for alterations in their own favor. If those who presently hold the advantage think that others will be more disposed to press in the future if they themselves now show no restraint, they may decide to show such restraint. But this sort of stability is fragile. There is an alternative account, one that appeals again to a tendency to reciprocate, to respond in kind. The hypothesis is that a sense of justice and injustice can function here in a manner similar to the way it functions in free-rider situations, as a disposition not to press the advantage that one may enjoy at a given moment with regard to renegotiation if others are similarly willing to refrain. Moreover, just as in free-riding situations, the capacity for restraint with regard to renegotiation is typically coupled with a disposition to resist renegotiation moves by others or to press for new terms more favorable to oneself when others have already done so or can be expected to do so. Finally, it seems plausible to suppose that such a sense will in this context, no less than in the context of the defection problem, be engendered by signals of intention. That is, one may suppose that the manifest intention on the part of others to act for or against our good will play a key role in the development of this sense. :as 6.
RATIONALITY AND THE SENSE OF jUSTICE
As we have seen, it is central to Rawls's argument concerning the sense of justice in free-riding situations that this sense of justice serves a useful purpose. Each agent stands to gain if members of the cooperative venture have the capacity to restrain their individual dispositions to freeride. A developed sense of justice on the part of members of a group makes it possible for them to realize in their cooperative arrangements efficiencies that are not available to a group of persons all of whom are 26. Again, of course much more needs to be said here about how the primitive reaction is translated into a full-blown moral response. Moreover, a capacity for reciprocity, particularly in this context, is not an unmixed blessing. Nothing I have said rules out the possibility that well-intentioned participants will end up in an escalating cycle of renegotiation moves-on the model of escalating. acts of revenge. Thus Hobbes is led in Leviathan to posit as the Seventh Law of Nature that in revenge men respect only the future good.
151
16
Philosophy & Public Affairs
disposed to be free-riders. Since widespread defection will defeat the very purpose of any cooperative venture, in the absence of a sense of justice enforcement devices will have to be employed, and these tend to be, comparatively speaking, very costly. 2 7 A sense of justice and injustice would seem to be no less useful in renegotiation situations. 28 To the extent that the fundamental social contract of a society is subject to perpetual renegotiation and change, there will be no stable consensus on basic principles of justice, and this will pose a serious problem for the effectiveness of the social contract as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage. Rawls himself implicitly speaks to this point when he argues at the outset of A Theory of Justice that "in the absence of a certain measure of agreement on what is just and unjust, it is clearly more difficult for individuals to coordinate their plans efficiently in order to insure that mutually beneficial arrangements are maintained. Distrust and resentment corrode the ties of civility, and suspicion and hostility tempt men to act in ways they would otherwise avoid.""9 This idea is familiar enough when applied to interactions in relatively small groups. But by appeal to a game-theoretic perspective the problem can be shown to extend to all forms of interaction in which participants are disposed to think strategically about persona,! interests. Whether one 2.7. Indoctrination can be no less costly than more overt forms of coercion, not simply in virtue of the expenditure of resources it requires, but in terms of the relative rigidity of attitudes it instills in persons. What today serves to rationalize the advantages of some can. under changing technological and economic conditions, work to the disadvantage of all. 28. Of course, persons who restrain themselves with regard to renegotiation put themselves at a disadvantage if others do not also restrain themselves. That is, just as in the case of the problem of free-riding, the capacity to restrain oneself with regard to personallY advantageous rene~otiation is subject to exploitation by others. Thus it would appear t~at ~hat proves useful lS the development of a more complex disposition to reciprocate: a willmgness to refrain from pressing for terms more favorable to oneself if others will similarlY ~frain, but also a willingness to press when others are similarly disposed. I am deeply mdebted to James Buchanan for forcing me to think about these matters. Some years ago I was in~ted to comment on a paper of his that dealt with one aspect of this issue-spec~ ic~y wnh a class ~situations in which those who are capable of "other-regarding" mou~auons can be s~bject to exploitation. The paper, "The Samaritan's Dilemma," was published together Wlth my reply in Altruism, Morality and Economic Theory, ed. Edmund ~· ~helps (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1975). At the time, 1 objected to Buchanan s Sne of ar~um~nt, _urging that those who accepted his recommendations concerning t~e amantan s SltuatiOn would simply find themselves back in another version of the pnsoners' dilemma I now think that I failed to appreciate the force of his analysis. 29. Rawls, TJ, p. 6.
152
17
Justice and the Problem of Stability
thinks in terms of noncooperative or bargaining models of interaction, the conclusion is the same: even if an equilibrium emerges it will almost certainly be suboptimal-that is, given the resources, technology, and knowledge available to participants, significant opportunities for mutual gain will fail to be realized. Some might hope to find in the paradigm of perfectly competitive markets a form of interaction in which the outcome will be not simply in equilibrium but optimal as well. But political, as distinct from market, processes fail to satisfy the conditions of perfect competition, a point convincingly demonstrated in Buchanan and Tullock's Calculus of Consent, and in the large body of public choice literature that this work has spawned.Jo Moreover, in addition to the problems caused by distrust, resentment, and simple lack of effective coordination, those who are perpetually renegotiating the distributive aspects of their basic agreement with one another face the prospect of a substantial expenditure of resources to effect purely redistributive shifts, resources that have to be diverted from projects that promise mutual gain. In everyday terms, such persons will have to acknowledge that the price they pay for being preoccupied with what percentage of the pie they get is the failure to realize significant opportunities to make the pie grow larger.1 1 Granting that a sense of justice and injustice is socially useful and that each of us has an interest in others possessing such a disposition, there still remains the question of whether it is rational for the individual to encourage the development of such a disposition in himself. As I mentioned above, Rawls takes this to be a real problem, and seeks to resolve it by arguing that a person's sense of justice is congruent with, and to some extent constitutive of, his own good. If one adopts the expanded conception of the sense of justice, does this problem become even more severe? Jo. For a review of this literature, see my "Rational Choice and Public Policy: A Critical Survey," Social Theory and Practice 9 (Jg8J). 31. For a study that sheds some interesting light on this problem as it arises in the context of bargaining games, see H. Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 g8 2 ). Efforts expended to effect purely redistributive shifts, of course, must be carefully distinguished from those devoted to mutually advantageous changes. It can be plausibly argued that a vigorous and continuing debate over changes or adjustments that would work to the mutual advantage of those involved is itself something that can be expected to be mutually advantageous.
153
Philosophy & Public Affairs
On first consideration, it might seem that adopting the expanded conception of a sense of justice and injustice creates no additional difficulty. The problem of free-riding, it might be argued, arises because while agreement on a scheme of cooperation is public, private defection is possible. If the defection is observable, others will typically have a self-interested motive to force us to do our share, and defection will less frequently be the rational policy. In the case of renegotiation, to press for a new social contract is to do something unavoidably public. The gains that one may be able to achieve by forcing renegotiation on one occasion must, then, always be balanced against the additional losses that can be expected to arise from others responding in kind. Thus one may find it prudent not to press whatever bargaining advantage one has at a given moment. When the matter is put in this way, a capacity for ,restraint with regard to renegotiation may seem to be nothing but ordinary rational self-interest informed by a more sophisticated sense of the problems of strategic interaction. And a similar line of reasoning would seem to be possible with regard to what I have described as the sense of injustice: once again, it might seem that the agent has a direct interest in developing a capacity to resist being exploited by others, both with respect to defection and with respect to renegotiation. Despite these considerations, I would argue that a full-blown capacity for restraint and retaliation clearly runs weU beyond anything that could be sanctioned directly by the usual account of strategic rational choice. As the above account is designed to suggest, the sense of justice in cases where the problem of renegotiation arises, no less than in cases where the problem of defection arises, involves a transformation of affective ties to others, a transformation of final ends. But if questions can be raised concerning why it would be rational for a person to develop a sense of justice with regard to renegotiation as weU as defection, still it seems that the problems will be similar. Once again, that is, the task will be to show why it is rational for the person, in terms of his own good, to develop this sense. The argument that Rawls constructs here is complicated, and has hardly received the attention it deserves. His intention is clear enough: he wants to appeal to as uncontrov~rsial a conception of the good of the agent as possible-One spelled out m terms of the notion of a "rational life plan"-which thereby allows for pluralism with respect to final ends.3~ 32. See in particular Rawls, TJ. chap. 7.
154
19
justice and the Problem of Stability
Now, it is not clear to me that the conception of the good of the person to which Rawls appeals is as uncontroversial as he hopes. On the other hand, I find myself strongly drawn to his account of goodness in terms of life plans that satisfy various formal conditions. I have been working for some time on what appears to be a related problem in the foundations of decision theory, namely, that the effective pursuit over time of certain continuing objectives appears to require that the agent develop a capacity to discipline his individual choices to settled plans. The notion here is that those very objectives may provide the agent with a rational motive not to approach each individual decision as if the choice to be made there must be one that maximizes with respect to those objectives. That is, one may have a rational motive for thinking holistically rather than incrementally about the pursuit of those objectives. My intuition is that this sort of model might provide an alternative ground for changes in one's affective ties, and hence one's final ends-an alternative that links the sense of justice and injustice with a less controversial concept of rationality.JJ
7· Is
THERE A STABLE CONCEPTION OF jUSTICE?
Here, then, if only in outline, is a brief for the benefits of a stable social contract, and an argument as to what is required for stability. The model sketched above, which represents both an elaboration and an extension of Rawls's psychological model, implies that for persons who perceive their social order as a cooperative venture for personal ends, the only thing that could effectively stabilize the social contract would be an arrangement capable of engendering its own support-of generating in participants a willingness to do what it requires, and a willingness to refrain from renegotiating its distributive terms in ways that work to the advantage of some at the expense of others. Moreover, by pursuing something at least parallel to the line of reasoning that Rawls employs in chapter 9 of A Theory of justice, it may be possible to show that such a 33· An account of the value of such a holistic perspective in the context of standard Prisoners' dilemma problems may be found in my "Prisoner's Dilemma and Resolute Choice," in Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem, ed. Richmond Campbell and Lanning Sowden (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1 g8s). For a discussion of the idea as it bears on the foundations of decision theory, see my Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
155
Philosophy & Public Affairs
20
sense of justice and injustice can withstand rational reflection in that the representative rational agent will not merely want to encourage others to have such a sense, but will find it rational to develop such a sense in himself. Nothing in what I have said so far, however, implies that any particular conception of justice qualifies to serve as the fundamental charter of a well-ordered society. In particular, I have not shown that Rawls's principle of justice as fairness is uniquely, or even especially, qualified to engender its own support. Can such an argument be constructed? Here I understand Rawls's principle of fairness as an egalitarian-efficiency principle: prima facie, all are to share equally in the benefits that social cooperation makes possible, but this presumption in favor of equality can be set aside just to the extent that some inequality can be shown to work to the mutual advantage of all. This is what Rawls takes to be the general conception of justice as fairness, of which the now familiar formulation in terms of the principle of equal liberty and the difference principle is a special case.J4 Now, in its prima facie commitment to equality, this principle might be said to "fit" in some sense with the tendency to reciprocity. Insofar as it mandates equality, the principle could be described as requiring that no one be accorded an advantage at the expense of others. Recall, however, that the very issue that confronts participants in a cooperative venture for mutual advantage is the choice of a principle governing the distribution of benefits. That is, the debate takes place against the background assumption that no principle even qualifies for consideration if it fails to work to the mutual advantage of all. Thus the issue is one of the comparative merits of one distributive principle over another. However, if the participants opt for an egalitarian principle rather than a principle that favors some at the expense of others, they end up favoring some (namely, those who would have received a smaller share under the other alternative) at the expense of others (namely, those who would have received a larger share under the other alternative). Again, while the qualifier permits only inequalities that work to everyone's advantage--thus ensuring compensation for those who are less advantaged, in the sense that they are better off than they would have been if the inequality had not been allowed-it does this in a particularly strin34· See Rawls, TJ. p. 62.
156
21
Justice and the Problem of Stability
gent fashion: the least advantaged must be maximally benefited. Of course, in virtue of this feature, the principle of fairness would seem well suited to reinforce the sense of justice on the part of the less advantaged. That is, the principle does give expression to a maximal commitment to the interests of the less advantaged, and within the framework of Rawls's psychological model this could be expected to engender in them the desired ties of friendship and fellow feeling, and eventually a sense of justice. But what about those who are more advantaged by such a scheme of things (for example, those who are more favored in the natural lottery)? They end up doing less well under this scheme than they would have if the scheme had conformed to what Rawls terms the principle of natural liberty, as exemplified in the workings, say, of an unconstrained, perfectly competitive market. What serves to engender in them the requisite sense of justice? Why should they not view a distributive order defined by justice as fairness as one that, while mutually advantageous, is still arranged to maximally benefit others than themselves, and unavoidably at their own expense?3s There is an even more troublesome consideration. The version of the model developed above seems to imply that one's willingness not to defect from, and to refrain from pressing for personally advantageous redistributive shifts in, a cooperative venture is even more decisively a function of one's perception of the intention of those with whom one interacts than it is in the version employed by Rawls. That is, the original position argument, which forms a backdrop for Rawls's own psychological model, seems to provide an important exogenous mediating influence on the dynamics of interaction. Those who publicly share a conception of justice meeting the test of the original position, with all the implications of impartiality that this carries with it, may still wonder, of course, about the motives of those with whom they interact: would they, for example, be prepared to honor this principle were they in a position to impose their will in such a way as to secure special advantages for themselves? Nevertheless those who share such a conception have the sense that in virtue of thi~ public consensus they constitute a community. Moreover, and this is crucial, it is not simply that they happen to publicly share some conception of justice. If a shared conception of justice is not 35. In this regard, Rawls's remarks in ibid., pp. 103-4· concerning what can be said to the more favored seem to me less than fully convincing.
157
Philosophy & Public Affairs
22
grounded in some sort of argument (such as the original position argument), it must become, for the deliberative intellect, an object of doubt. Rawls speaks forcefully to a parallel point about one's sense of morality: "Imagine . . . that someone experiences the promptings of his moral sense as inexplicable inhibitions which for the moment he is unable to justify. Why should he not regard them as simply neurotic compulsions? If it should turn out that these scruples are indeed largely shaped and accounted for by the contingencies of early childhood, perhaps by the course of our family history and class situation, and that there is nothing to add on their behalf, then there is surely no reason why they should govern our lives."36 Transposing this to the problem posed for deliberative thought by a publicly shared but ungrounded conception of justice, the suggestion is that once again questions about whose interests are thereby served are bound to arise, and these questions in tum will inevitably give rise to ones concerning the motives of participants. In the modified version of the model proposed here, the original position argument has been dropped, and this suggests that each participant's sense of the motives of others will play a much greater role in determining whether a particular arrangement is or is not stable. But this would seem to imply, in turn, that it is doubtful whether, at least within this revised version of the psychological model, there could be a general proof that this or that distributive principle of justice is more stable than another. That is, stability would appear to be a function, not of the content of a principle as such, but of each participant's perception of the motives of other participants. A perfectly egalitarian scheme that has emerged as the object of consensus simply in virtue of the balance of bargaining power is not necessarily stable. But it does not follow, I want to suggest, that there can be no argument from stability in favor of the egalitarian-efficiency principle. The model still implies, of course, that the requisite sense of justice will be engendered and reinforced to the degree that participants have a manifest concern for one another's well-being, and even more important, that for those who have not been ideologically indoctrinated, it is only to the extent that they regard themselves as forming such a community of shared interest that their society will be, in Rawls's sense, well-ordered. That is, the model that emerges here is decidedly communitartan in import. 36. Ibid., p. 514.
158
23
Justice and the Problem of Stability
Against this background, the question is whether the egalitarian-efficiency principle is more expressive of a sense of community than any other principle. In effect, since there are conditions under which consensus on the egalitarian-efficiency principle will carry with it no assurance of stability, agreement on it cannot be shown to be a sufficient condition for a stable social contract. But consensus on this principle may still be, within the context of the sort of model of interaction we have been considering, a necessary condition of stability. The following consideration would seem to favor such a thesis. For a sense of community-a shared interest in one another's good-to exist, participants must not simply have a concern for one another, but make that concern manifest. Now, in the context of deliberation and debate over alternative proposals, virtually any distributive proposal carries with it a problem of ambiguity concerning the intention of the proposer. But a proposal that accords less, or at least no more, to oneself than to others would seem to offer the best hope that the signal will not be destabilizing. And if all proceed in this fashion, only an egalitarian scheme will meet the requirement that each person's concern for the good of others be expressed in the consensus.11 Departures from strict equality can be defended in tenns of the need to make concessions to human nature-a need to encourage persons to develop their talents and abilities in ways that work to mutual advantage. 37· Rawls himself appears to move in this direction in, for example, his discussion of the relation between the difference principle and what he calls the principle of fraternity; see ibid., pp. 105-6. On p. 497 Rawls remarks that "to insure stability men must have a sense of justice or a concern for those who would be disadvantaged by their defection, preferably both." Adjusting this remark to apply to the somewhat enlarged sense of justice discussed here, one can take the argument of this article to be that the sense of justice itself will depend on a sense that others are concerned for us, and that therefore a mutual perception of communitarian concern is the ultimate basis for the stability of the social contract. It might seem that there is an obvious objection to this view: given certain marked inequalities in inherited capacities (such as strength or intelligence) stable cooperation will be possible among more than just those who are prepared to treat one another as equals. Some can be disposed without disadvantage to themselves to demand more than others if others perceive themselves to have little choice but to accept less. On the assumption that those who manage to work out cooperative arrangements do better than those who do not, arrangements that are asymmetrical in this sense may still have significant survival value. ~ut where asymmetries in cooperative relationships are not based on inherited capacities. It would seem that they must be explained in terms of cultural transmission, and that the~r e~durance testifies to the power of ideology. As 1 indicated in note 19, my concern here IS With what can be defended when the effects of ideology have been bracketed.
159
Philosophy & Public Affairs
Insofar as they have any role to play, then, it can only be as they are required as part of a system of effective incentives. The argument, in effect, is that any inequality in treatment within a cooperative scheme places motivational strains upon that scheme, and that such tensions can be counterbalanced only to the extent that the inequalities can be rationalized by appeal to mutual advantage.J8 On this account, justice as fairness is to be understood as arising from a need to find a compromise between persons who want to signal a concern that others benefit at least as much as, if not more than, they do themselves. Does this mean that persons who have no concern for one another, or only very limited concern, are not capable of effectively cooperating with one another? One need not draw such a conclusion. The argument above addresses itself to intellect, but the psychological model to which it appeals is deeply rooted in the Aristotelian conception of a moral disposition as something that develops only by doing, not by mere intellectual concluding. The model implies not only that human beings have the capacity to develop affective ties to one another, but that these ties gradually develop and do so only as a result of specific and cumulative interactions. The argument concerning the costs to each of a failure to achieve a stable cooperative arrangement is designed to provide persons with a motive to present themselves as if they were motivated by a concern for one another. The theory of developmental psychology suggests that it is by interacting with others under these (and, it is to be hoped, increasingly favorable) conditions that the requisite sense of justice, and a full-blown sense of concern for others, is engendered and reinforced. To adapt a metaphor of Aristotle's from the Posterior Analytics, the hypothesis is that by "making a stand" here, persons may begin developing the necessary affective ties to one another.39 8. THE ISSUE OF COMPARATIVE STABILITY Rawls argues that justice as fairness is superior to the principle of average utility with respect to its power to engender a sense of justice. In all. . 38· This is, of course, central to the way Rawls views the proviso about inequalities;
m particular ibid., p. 78.
see
39· See Posterior Analytics 1ooa, where Aristotle gives an account of how cumulati~e kn~wledge of particulars leads to knowledge of universals In tenns of a battle simile, m wh1ch first one man makes a stand and then another, and so on.
160
25
Justice and the Problem of Stability
he offers some five considerations in favor of the greater stability of justice as fairness. First, he suggests, justice as fairness expresses a stronger and more unconditional concern for the good of each person. Each is guaranteed an equal liberty, and assured that his claims will not be neglected or overridden for the sake of a larger sum of benefits for others. This heightens the operation of the reciprocity principle.4° It must be recalled here, however, that on Rawls's own account this argument is addressed to persons who are not behind the veil of ignorance. Thus it runs into the problem, already mentioned, of a potential complaint on the part of the more advantaged. Second, in order to suppose that the utilitarian principle can effectively engender its own psychological support, one would have to suppose a modification in the underlying psychological process of attachment formation. More specifically, one would have to suppose, for example, that according to the second law "persons tend to develop friendly feelings toward those who with evident intention do their part in cooperative schemes publicly known to maximize the sum of advantages, or the average well-being." But this, according to Rawls, is a questionable psychological principle: "suppose that certain institutions are adopted on the public understanding that the greater advantages of some counterbalance the lesser losses of others. Why should the acceptance of the principle of utility (in either form) by the more fortunate inspire the less advantaged to have friendly feelings toward them? ... No reciprocity Principle is at work in this case and the appeal to utility may simply arouse suspicion. "4' Two things worry me about this line of argument. The first concerns the suggestion that for a utilitarian theory of justice the psychological laws would have to be reformulated. On first consideration, it might seem that this has to be incorrect, for the psychological laws are formulated, in sections 71-73 of A Theory of justice, and again in section 75, in such a way as to permit one to read them in a more or less neutral way, that is, without reference to any particular conception of justice. But if they were to be taken in that way, the argument from comparative stability would collapse: all coherent conceptions of justice would be equally capable of engendering their own support. Thus the term "just" 40. Rawls, TJ, p. 4 gg.
41. Ibid., pp. 499-500.
161
Philosophy & Public Affairs
as it occurs in each of the three psychological laws is not merely a placeholder that can be filled in different ways without substantially affecting the plausibility of the psychological principle that results. Rawls's point is precisely that the psychological principle that results when "just" is replaced by "satisfies the principle of average utility" is a less plausible principle than the one that results when "just" is replaced by "satisfies the principle of justice as fairness." It seems clear from what Rawls argues in section 76, then, that the stability of a conception of justice is measured by the fit between it and the other essential ingredient in the model, namely, the assumption that persons are disposed to react to one another in certain ways. This suggests the following as a possible reading of the central question: When persons are not behind the veil of ignorance, but face one another with knowledge (or at least beliefs) concerning their relative prospects (given their natural talents, abilities, and so on), will justice as fairness as a principle for regulating the distributive effects of their cooperative venture tend to resonate with and reinforce the tendency to reciprocity more than, say, the average utility principle? I say that this is a possible reading, for there are passages (see, for example, the first one quoted below) in which Rawls seems to imply that each alternative conception of justice will call for a distinct theory of attachment formation, so that, for example, the utilitarian theory of justice will have to presuppose that persons have a strong natural tendency to sympathize with one another. On this account, each alternative conception of justice will resonate with a different natural disposition, and the issue of comparative stability will tum on the comparative strength of these "natural" dispositions instead of on which principle most effectively resonates with a single natural tendency to reciprocity. In view ~f the nature of the worries I am about to express, I am not sure that It makes a difference which interpretation one adopts, but this is again a matter that deserves more exploration than I can give it here. My second, and deeper, worry is that it appears that one is still faced with the problem that the difference principle, no less than, say, the average utility principle, will inadequately secure the allegiance of some group. To be sure, on the assumption that the average utility principle will permit significant inequalities, those who are least advantaged under such an arrangement can complain that the principle sacrifices their interests for the sake of greater average benefits. Rawls describes the problem with the utilitarian principle in a convincing manner:
162
Justice and the Problem of Stability
Why should the acceptance of the principle of utility (in either fonn) by the more fortunate inspire the less advantaged to have friendly feelings toward them? This response would seem in fact to be rather surprising, especially if those in a better situation have pressed their claims by maintaining that a greater sum (or average) of well-being would result from their satisfaction. No reciprocity principle is at work in this case and the appeal to utility may simply arouse suspicion. The concern which is expressed for all persons by counting each as one (by weighing everyone's utility equally) is weak compared to that conveyed by the principles of justice.... It is evident why the utilitarian stresses the capacity for sympathy. Those who do not benefit from the better situation of others must identify with the greater sum (or average) of satisfaction else they will not desire to follow the utility criterion. Now such altruistic inclinations no doubt exist. Yet they are likely to be less strong than those brought about by the three psychological laws formulated as reciprocity principles; and a marked capacity for sympathetic identification seems relatively rare. Therefore these feelings provide less support for the basic structure of society.4:r. The problem, however, is simply that the most advantaged can complain that the difference principle sacrifices their interests for the sake of maximally satisfying the interests of the least advantaged. Thus it could be argued that engaging their allegiance to justice as fairness will require a stronger sense of sympathy (for the less fortunate) than in fact exists. Prima facie, then, both principles pose a problem with respect to encouraging fellow feeling. That is, each would seem to have a drawback with respect to how effectively it can resonate with what is presumed to be the stronger of our "natural" dispositions, namely, the tendency to reciprocate; and if so, then each would require for its effective operation a stronger capacity for sympathy than human beings seem naturally to possess. A third consideration is that "following the utilitarian conception tends to be destructive of the self-esteem of those who lose out, particularly When they are already less fortunate." justice as fairness is said to contrast favorably in this respect: "in a social system regulated by justice as fairness, identification with the good of others, and an appreciation of what they do as an element in our own good, might be quite strong. But this is possible only because .of the mutuality already implicit in the prin42. Ibid .• p.
soo.
163
Philosophy & Public Affairs
ciples of justice. With the constant assurance expressed by these principles, persons will develop a secure sense of their own worth that fonns the basis for the love of humankind."43 The problem here is that, once again, this speaks to the capacity of justice as fairness to secure the allegiance of the less advantaged, not the allegiance of the more advantaged. A fourth consideration is that the principle of justice as fairness compares favorably with the principle of utility as regards both the clarity of its conception and the attractiveness of the ideal to which it gives expression. 44 Of course, the fonner of these two advantages disappears when the utilitarian principle is refonnulated in terms of the distribution of primary goods instead of the distribution of utility. Rawls briefly acknowledges the possibility of such an alternative formulation of utilitarianism, but does not pursue the matter. 45 As to the relative attractiveness of the ideal expressed by justice as fairness, this speaks once again to the matter of the congruence of different conceptions of justice with one's own good. Again, I cannot discuss this matter in the detail it deserves, but the thrust of the argument for the comparative superiority of a sense of justice predicated on justice as fairness over a sense predicated on the principle of utility appears to be this: the principle of utility proves to be more demanding and exacting in the sacrifices it can ask of us, and thus involves greater risks. It may, for example, call upon us to make sacrifices for the sake of greater benefits for those already more fortunate than us. In the light of this, Rawls concludes, "a rational person, in framing his plan, would hesitate to give precedence to so stringent a principle. It is likely both to exceed his capacity for sympathy and to be hazardous to his freedom. "46 As a fifth, and last, point Rawls suggests that the principles of justice as fairness "are closer to the tendency of evolution than the principle of utility."47 Rawls contents himself here with a conjecture, but Allan Gibbard has more recently offered an expanded defense of this thesis. 48 The problem as I see it With both the congruence argument and the evolutionary argument-and indeed with virtually all the comparative arIbid., pp. soo-so1. 44· See in particular ibid., p. 501. Ibid., p. 175. 46. Ibid., p. 573· Ibid., pp. 503-4. Allan Gibbard, "Human Evolution and the Sense of Justice," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7 (1g82). 43· 45· 47· ~8·
164
29
justice and the Problem of Stability
guments---is not that the tendency to reciprocate fails to be stronger than the tendency to sympathy (or altruism). The trouble is rather that the difference principle as well as the principle of utility seems to resonate with the (stronger) tendency to reciprocity less clearly than one might expect. That is, granting that stability is more likely to be secured by building upon the tendency to reciprocity, still it is open to us to wonder whether, given the problem of justifying it to the more advantaged, justice as fairness will be much more stable. g. THE COMPARATIVE ISSUE RECONSIDERED
Rawls himself acknowledges that he has only briefly considered the issue of comparative stability, and that the points he has raised are suggestive rather than dispositive.49 My own sense, as indicated above, is that even these suggestions have to be qualified. One might wonder, then, whether the line of reasoning presented above in Section 7 provides an alternative and more secure route to the conclusion that justice as fairness is superior to the principle of utility in its power to engender a sense of justice and thus to underwrite a stable social charter. I believe it does. Whatever attractiveness the principle of average utility might seem to have under the stringent conditions of the original position-as a rational approach to the distribution of benefits under conditions of radical uncertainty-it cannot be said to meet the requirement that it provide a natural solution for persons who seek to have expressed in the consensus their concern that others do at least as well as, if not better than, themselves. An advocate of the principle of average utility might insist, of course, that in putting forth this principle he does signal his concern, for he seeks to maximize the expected benefit of the average, and thus in a sense any, participant. This argument might have some force if choice is to be made behind the veil of ignorance, but it has, I think, no such force when persons face one another under ordinary conditions of differential life Prospects. In this context, those with inferior life prospects can cogently object that there has been no real taking up and equal bearing of risks. They can insist that in order for them now to have no complaint about their lesser share, they and those who now enjoy the superior prosJlects must at least have all had the same real chances of ending up at 49. Rawls, TJ, pp. 453 , 499.
165
30
Philosophy & Public Affairs
any particular level of expectation. (A model of justifiable inequalities, on such an account, would be, say, the inequalities that result from having a draft lottery to determine who shall be liable for military service.) Where, however, there has been no real taking up and sharing of risk, the argument from the prospects of the average man ceases to be an argument about the prospects of any man, and thus is open to the objection that it is really expressive of vested interest. Rawls himself, in "Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice," offered a version of this argument from the consideration that there be a real taking up and sharing of risk. He subsequently withdrew it, however, on the grounds that it was inconsistent with his own claim-as exemplified in the original position argument-that one could appeal to hypothetical as opposed to real situations of risk taking. so But this argument comes back into its own again given a framework such as that proposed here, in which the argument turns on reactions to real, as distinct from purely hypothetical, social contracts. 10. CoNCLUSION
I have sought to argue-if only too briefly and imperfectly-for two things. First, that within a society in which there is pluralism with respect to final ends, and society is perceived as a common means to those personal ends, a stable and hence truly efficient social contract will be possible only insofar as participants can develop and effectively express to one another a communitarian commitment to their mutual well-being. Second, that for those who have achieved such a sense of community, perhaps the most effective way to express it will be to regulate their affairs by reference to Rawls's principle of justice as fairness, interpreted as an egalitarian-efficiency principle, while for those who seek to develop ~uch a sense of community, that same principle offers the most promismg place to make their stand. so. See in particular Rawls, "Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice," PP· 14, and the remarks in TJ. pp. 167-68 and 168 n. 24.
166
109-
THE STABILITY PROBLEM IN POLITICAL LIBERALISM BY
THOMAS E. HILL, JR. Despite its modest presentation and explicit limitations of scope, A. Theory of Justice has inspired many of us with its large vision, systematic methodology, and challenging arguments. Appearing in the midst of a relatively stagnant period in political philosophy, the book seemed to highlight the inseparability of moral and political philosophy and to carry both to a deeper level. Now, paradoxically, Rawls argues that we should see justice as fairness as a less comprehensive, less "deep," self-standing political conception that does not compete with our many diverse (reasonable) comprehensive moral theories and religious traditions but rather appeals to these for its deep support. As before Rawls presents the political principles of justice as a construction in a certain technical sense, but, equally important, the continuous development of his work illustrates how good political philosophy can be "constructed" in a more ordinary ~se: that is, gradually and painstakingly built up, its initial vision and Insights developed over time by persistent rethinking and adjustments responsive to the thoughts of others. Having already proposed a political Philosophy that has achieved acclaim unparalleled in our times, John Rawls has continued his building project, patiently repairing, extending, reconstructing, and, when necessary, deconstructing his previous fine work. Reasonable persons can disagree about the truth, and even the political merits, of his proposals, but on the proposition that John Rawls ~hanged and enriched political philosophy as few others have there is a JUSt and stable overlapping consensus. Pacific Pltilosop/Jical Quturerly 7S (1994) 333-3S2
0031-S621/94/0200-0000 C 1994 Univenity of Southcm California. Publilhcd by BlactweU Publishen, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 IJF, UK 8Dd 238 Main Street, Cambridp, MA 02142, USA.
167
334
PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
To tum from the obvious to the immediate, my aim here is just to raise some questions. 1 For this I want to focus on the relations between Rawls's two books, A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism.2 The new work, Political Liberalism, I take it, is meant to supplement A Theory of Justice, not to replace it, much less to compete with it. In the essays published between the two books, Rawls offered many refinements, additions, explanations, and responses to critics, and Political Liberalism brings these together in a helpful and expanded form. In doing so, I think, Political Liberalism satisfies one of its main purposes, adding significantly to the power, subtlety, and persuasiveness of the main system of thought that underlies both works. For example, the liberty principle is somewhat altered and arguments for its priority clarified;3 the original position is now unmistakably presented as a device of representation;• the relation between the "primary goods" and the "two moral powers" of citizens is made more explicit; 5 the revised argument for concern for future generations seems less ad hoc; 6 and now one can see more plainly what exactly, under "constructivism," is supposed to be constructed and what is not. 7 These various revisions alone make Political Liberalism an important book, indeed an essential one for moral and political philosophers, quite independently of the particular issues on which my questions will be focused. As an admirer of A Theory of Justice, naturally I am most interested in the major systematic change that Political Liberalism makes in the ideas of earlier work. That basic change, from which Rawls says most other changes stem, is in the way justice as fairness is now presented. Rather than treating justice as fairness as a comprehensive (or, "partially compre~ensive ') moral doctrine, he now proposes it as a political conception of justice that is no longer considered as competing for the same role in our lives as other reasonable comprehensive moral doctrines (such as utilitarianism and various traditional religions). At first the c~ge . ~y strike us, the admirers of A Theory of Justice, as disappomting, because a political conception is admittedly a less ~d ~d all encompassing thing than a comprehensive moral theory of jus~ce: It ~~supposes c?mmon ideas in the public political culture, it gwd~ ~slons .only With respect to a restricted subclass of political issues; 10 1ts Rawls1an ve~io~, it foregoes any claim to truth; and it must appeal ~or ~upport outs1de Itself (to comprehensive doctrines) if it is to be deeply JUStified. Thus the larger questions we want to raise are: How radical are these changes? What was the problem that prompted them? Were they really necessary? Are they sUCQessful in meeting the problem? And what are the costs of making them? That is, which, if any, of the admirable f~t~ of A. Theory .ofJustice have been lost by the recent move to "do\VIl SIZe the claims for JUStice as fairness? C I!194 Univenity oC Soulhcm CalifOillia
168
TaB STABIUTY PROBLEM IN POUTICAL UBERALISM
335
Like many readers, I suspect, I was struck by Rawls's remarks in the introduction to Political Liberalism, suggesting that the major changes from A Theory of Justice stem from a problem (even an "inconsistency") in the way that work attempted to show that a society structured by justice as fairness would be stable. Rawls explains the problem as follows:
rrJo understand the nature and extent of the differences, one must sec them as arisiD& from tryina to resolve a serious problem internal to justice as fairness, namely from the fact that the account of stability in Part m of [A] Theory [of JKYtice] is not CODiistent with the view as a whole. I believe all the differences are consequences of removina that inconsistency. Otherwise I take the structure and content of [A] Theory [of JKYtice] to remain substantiaUy the same' To explain: the serious problem I have in mind concerns the IIDICIIIistic idea of a weDordered society as it appears in [A] Theory [of JKYtice]. An essential feature of a weU-otdered society associated with justice as fairness is that all its citizens endorse this conception on the basis of what I now call a comprehensive philosophic:al doctrine. They aceept, as rooted in this doctrine, its two principles of justice. [Aithou&h not explicit in A 'I'heory of JKYtice,) one the question is raised, it is clear, I think, that the text rcprds justice as fairness and utilitariauism as comprehensive, or partiaUy, comprehensive doctrines. Now the serious problem is this. A modem democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophic:al, and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. No one of these doctrines is aflinned by citizens generally. Nor should one expect that in the foreseeable future one of them, or some other reasonable doctrine, will ever be affirmed by all, or nearly aD, citizens.' The fact of a plurality of reasonable but incompatible comprehensive doctrines-the fact of reasonable pluralism- shows that, as used in [A] Theory [of Justice], the idea of a weDordered society of justice as fairness is unrealistic. This is because it is inconsistent with realizina its own principles under the best foreseeable conditions. The account of stability of a well-ordered society in part m is therefore also unrealistic and must be recast. This problem sets the stage for the later essays beginnina in 1980. The ambiJUity of (AI Theory [of Justice] is now removed and justice as fairness is presented at the outset as a political CODCCption of justice. 10
My initial attempts to understand the changes from A Theory of Jus_tice to Political Liberalism turned crucially on this description of the proJect. Since the old problem was stability, I thought, the innovations of Political Liberalism must be seen as proposed solution to this problem, in effect, as changes necessary to set up a new argument that, despite the fact of reasonable pluralism a society structured by the principles of justice as fairness would tend to be stable. Many features of the text seemed to ~pport this reading, for a major line of argument of Political Liber~~ IS that once justice as fairness is presented as a merely a political conception, then it can win the support of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, such as the major religio~ ~ditions and the classic moral theories. This support, despite oppoSJtlon from C 1994 Univenity of Southem Ca6fomia
169
336
PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
"unreasonable" doctrines, would naturally have a stabilizing effect. Given this reading, it seemed correct tot say that changes in A Theory of Justice were necessary, but it remained far from obvious that the innovations in Political Liberalism would be successful in meeting the problem of stability. So long as the problem and its solution are seen as a simple stability problem. the changes in Political Liberalism, I suspect, will continue to strike readers as inadequate to its aim. And, given this, many admirers of A Theory of Justice are likely to see the changes as too high price to pay for the minimum increase in the likelihood of stability. On rethinking the issue, with the help of friends and some hints from Rawls, I am convinced that I have at least partly misunderstood the intent, or at least the current understanding, of Rawls's remarks about how the changes in Political Liberalism were designed to meet the problem of stability. If so, even if I am right to suspect that there will never in fact be an overlapping consensus (of reasonable comprehensive doctrines) on justice as fairness (conceived politically), or even on political liberalism, this may not be incompatible with Rawls's main point. There is another reading on which, even in the absence of actual consensus, the argument for the possibility of such a consensus of reasonable doctrines still serves an important purpose. In my remaining remarks, I will explain my initial reading of the stability problem in A Theory of Justice, its apparent solution in Political Liberalism, and my doubts about that solution; then I will briefly sketch an alternative, hopefully better, interpretation. My point is not to draw attention to my own struggles to understand Rawls's project but rather to articulate what I take to be a quite natural, though deeply subversive, understanding of that project, so that, if it is mistaken, we can get clearer a~out the alternative. Towards the end of my remarks I will also briefly ratse some other questions that, I suspect, are shared by a number of other readers of Political Liberalism.
I. The problem of stability in A Theory of Justice: initial reading Political philosophy, according to A Theory of Justice, should distinguish and. add~es~ each of the following tasks. (1) It should provide a method of. td~ntifymg, representing, and (in a sense) justifying fundamen~ ~~ctp~es of justice regarding the basic political and econonuc m~ttt~tions; (2) it should interpret and illustrate the application of those pnnClples to familiar political issues, showing the implications of the ~heory to be more or less in harmony with our considered moral JUd~ents; and (3) it should offer considerations for believing that a soctety well ordered by those principles of justice would be stable. A C 1994 Univenity of Soutbem California
170
THE STABILITY PROBLEM IN POLITICAL LIBERALISM
337
scheme of cooperation was defined as stable when it was "more or less regularly complied with and its basic rules willingly acted upon; and when infractions occur, stabilizing forces ... exist that prevent further violations and tend to restore the relation." 11 A stable system is not merely one in equilibrium, like a ball resting on a flat table, but one which under stress, up to a point, tends to return to an equilibrium state, like a ball in a cup. The first two tasks were taken up in parts I and II of A Theory of Justice, while the last, the stability problem, was addressed in part III. Whether a society well ordered by Rawls's two principles of justice would be stable was a question that, in the end, members of the original position were to consider, but Rawls did not contend that justice as fairness was the most stable conception of justice. For the most part arguments (in parts I and II) for the superiority of Rawls's two principles over alternative conceptions of justice presupposed that either Rawls's two principles, or some alternative, would be a basic public charter of a wellordered society and so, at least initially, complied with willingly by almost everyone. Part III was designed to check this initial assumption that the two principles could win the willing compliance of citizens and to argue further that their allegiance would tend to maintain itself, despite stresses, over time. The argument was that, given conjectured psychological principles and the benefits secured to each citizen under the two principles, citizens raised in a society well-ordered by Rawls's two principles would naturally develop a sense of justice and find a just life largely congruent with their various conceptions of a good life. Thus, with its three parts combined, A Theory of Justice argues that justice as fairness is more tenable than any other traditional conception of justice and, further, that a society well ordered by its principle would tend to stabilize itself under stress and thus to endure. In Political Liberalism, as I said, Rawls acknowledges a serious internal problem in his previous argument for the stability of a society structured by his two principles of justice. His earlier argument, Rawls now say~, presupposed that citizens accepted justice as fairness as thetr "comprehensive philosophical doctrine" (or as their "partially comprehensive doctrine"). The argument took for granted, then, not only that other competing conceptions of justice had been rejected but also t~at citizens did not hold any general philosophies, religi?ns, or _wo~ld vtews that might conflict with their allegiance to the doctnnes of JUStice as fairness. The aim after all was to show that a (Rawlsian) just society ~ould be self-perpe~uating its citizens were brou~t up .to int~ Its far ranging conception of justice as fairness, lettmg this shape therr thoughts, feelings, and relationships to one another. . But now, quite plausibly, Rawls grants that in any fr~ ~octety that we can realistically foresee; there will be a plurality of rebgtons and other comprehensive philosophical doctrines. The very liberties of speech and
if
C 1994 Uaivenity of Southern California
171
338
PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
conscience that justice as fairness assures to each citizen make it almost inevitable that reasonable people will continue to disagree on deep and broad issues of religion and philosophy. The problem, then, seems to be that the old argument for the stability of a just society was unrealistic in supposing that virtually all its citizens, in a climate of freedom, might come willingly to accept, and perpetually maintain, one basic comprehensive philosophical doctrine, namely, justice as fairness as presented in A Theory of Justice. We now see that the stability of a just society cannot be secured in that way. 12 Even on this initial reading, I should stress, the issue of stability was never simply the general question of how to make social order durable. The issue was always how a just society could endure, and the aim was to show this is possible without lowering the standards of justice for the sake of securing stability. Stability was to be based on the willing consent of citizens, the idea of securing it by police-state methods being ruled out from the start. Moreover, mere durability was not the aim, but stability; that is, durability was to be achieved in large part by the fact that the citizens themselves would have developed attitudes towards justice that would prompt them to restore the system whenever its just institutions were in danger. Now, supposing (as Rawls did) that in parts I and II of A Theory of Justice we already have a reasonable account of what justice demands, why be concerned about stability? As Rawls notes, moral philosophers have generally paid little attention to the question of whether their ideals will in fact become and remain widely accepted and used; so one may wonder, why should political philosophy be so concerned? A natural answer, I think, is that political philosophers typically put forward a package of ideas for public acceptance, arguing the merits of the system if it were to be generally accepted. (In contrast moral philosophy typically offers standards to guide the conscientious choice of individuals, whether or not others will follow their lead.) Given the difficulties of winning general agreement, and the transition costs of reforming institutions, we are un~erstandably reluctant to bother with proposed political changes that will unravel as soon as instituted. Utopian writing is enjoyable to read, but of serious political proposals we demand feasibility and a reasonable likelihood that, once accepted, they will survive long enough to make the effort to institute them worthwhile. Thus insofar as justice as faim~ is put forward as a political proposal th~t one hopes ~ill become Widely accepted, its appeal would be enhanced by a persuasive argument that a society just by its standard would be stable. The argument would remove ~ worry: the fear that such a society would only be just for a moment, Its fine principles quickly giving way under predictable
stresses.
C 1994 Univenity of Southern California
172
THE STABILITY PROBLEM IN POLITICAL LIBERALISM
339
II. The Solution in Po6tical Liberalism: initial reading Let us assume for the moment that the problem prompting the basic changes from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism was the stability problem as I have just interpreted it. The solution offered to this problem in Political Liberal!sm, then, seems to be not to reject or drastically revise the content of justice as fairness but to reconceive it and present it in a new light. In sum, the main steps of the solution are: (1) to treat justice as fairness as a political conception rather than as a comprehensive moral doctrine; (2) to develop a distinction, for political purposes, between reasonable and unreasonable comprehensive doctrines; and (3) to distinguish stability based on an overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines from stability based on either uniformity of doctrine or a mere modus vivendi among adherents of different doctrines. Relying on these central ideas, the major step is (4) to argue that a (Rawlsian) just society can be stable in a pluralistic world because, once seen as merely political, justice as fairness can win an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. In effect, by making the claims for justice as fairness more modest and its scope more limited, thereby reducing its potential conflicts with reasonable religious and philosophical doctrines, the changes make justice as fairness more broadly acceptable. By these changes, then, and by stressing the political values secured to aU under justice as fairness, Rawls seems to hope that Political Liberalism will persuade people of various religious and moral convictions that they can agree that it is a reasonable set of political ideas within which they can work together. Finally (5) stability based in this way on an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines is supposed to be enhanced by the idea of public reason: that is, the idea that we are (voluntarily) to restrict our arguments, on matters affecting the basic structure of society, to political arguments drawn from within the limits of common reason and our working political conception of justice. In other words, barring emergencies, we are not to appeal to our particular comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines in public debates about the most fundamental political institutions. 13 Such restraint s~ould reduce divisiveness on the basic political institutions and so contnbute further to stability. . . The key ideas here may be explained briefty as follows. Ftrst, presenting justice as fairness as merely a political conception means at least three things: that its main ideas are drawn from the public political culture; that it is only a theory about the basic structure of a con~tit~~onal ~ocratic regime; and that it is viewed as a "self-sta~~ng tdea, Independent of commitments to comprehensive reli81ous and Philosophical doctrines.'" Insofar as justice as fairness is a form of 0 1994 University of Southern California
173
340
PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
"political constructivism," this means also that its claims are not presented as "true" but only as, in a sense, "reasonable. " 15 Second, reasonable people are conceived as those who are willing to reciprocate on fair terms of cooperation when others will, and who admit certain limits on our powers of judgment. They accept only reasonable comprehensive doctrines, which are more or less consistent, coherent doctrines, arrived at by use of theoretical and practical reason, covering "major religious, philosophical, and moral aspects of human life," and normally belonging to a tradition of thought. 16 Third, there is an overlapping consensus, as opposed to a mere modus vivendi, when a political conception (such as justice as fairness) gains the support of "all the reasonable opposing religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines likely to persist over generations and to gain a sizable body of adherents in a more or less just constitutional regime." 17
III. Doubts about the solution to the problem, as initially conceived This initial reading of the problem and the solution at least shows why changes were necessary in the earlier account of stability. Even if Part III of A Theory of Justice successfully established the likely stability of a society in which justice as fairness became the "comprehensive moral doctrine" of virtually everyone, this would be irrelevant to our practical concerns because contemporary experience suggests that it is very unlikely, for the foreseeable future, that any one moral, religious, or philosophical doctrine will become accepted by virtually everyone. As Rawls says, freedom of thought and discussion fosters a plurality of doc~es; and a somewhat stifled plurality seems to persist even in those cou~tnes where freedom is suppressed. If a just society can be sta~le at all, It must be so despite its containing a plurality of diverse doctnnes. ~~er, we ~n readily grant that presenting justice as fairness as a political conception, rather than as a comprehensive doctrine, is at least a step in the right direction towards a solution. Why? The task is to show how a society that is well ordered by justice as fairness can be stahl~, a~d for ~~w I ta~e ~hat to mean that a society in which the substantial maJon~Y of Citizens willingly accept and use justice as fairness (regarding the baSIC strucnu:e) can be self-restoring and so enduring. But, given that they have many diverse comprehensive doctrines, how could the citizens (almost~) agree to accept justice as fairness? Only it seems if justice as fairness IS ~en~ed compatible with their comprehensive d~trines; and presenting ~usttce as ~aimes~ as a political conception is a major step towards ~ng tt .compatible. Smce it does not claim to be "true," the new justice as fauness cannot, strictly speaking, contradict comprehensive doctrines as C 1994 UDi~ty of Southern California
174
THE STABILITY PROBLEM IN POLITICAL LIBERALISM
341
to w~t is truly just, truly the nature of persons, etc. Since its scope is restncted to the basic structure of society, the new justice as fairness does not conflict with the implications of comprehensive doctrines about the more specific political issues. Since it draws its ideas from he public political culture, the new justice as fairness does not require antecedent acceptance, or even understanding, of any comprehensive religion or philosophical doctrine. It should also be noted that the argument that there might be an overlapping consensus (of reasonable comprehensive doctrines) on justice as fairness is not merely that, when conceived politically, the view is so modest that it will not offend adherents of the diverse comprehensive doctrines. Importantly, the argument is also that justice as fairness secures to everyone, despite their doctrinal differences, certain basic liberties and an adequate ftoor of all-purpose means; moreover, it fosters civility and a variety of other political values. 18 Many of these advantages have already been argued for in A Theory ofJustice, and the move to presenting justice as fairness as "political," as far as I can see, does not undermine those arguments. So far, so good. But, now, if the worry about stability is the practical concern that I have been assuming, is not enough to show that it is remotely "possible" that there could be an overlapping consensus (or reasonable comprehensive doctrines) on justice as fairness. If such a consensus is now seen as the stabilizing force of a just society, one wants some assurance that such consensus would be likely to develop and endure. If the point oflooking for arguments for stability is to see, before we attempt reforms, whether the reforms would be lasting enough to be worth the effort, then a bare possibility is small comfort. Is it at all likely that justice as fairness will win an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines in our pluralistic world, achieving the stability of a just society in that way? On this issue, it is hard not to be skeptical. And, if we continue to see the main point of Political Liberalism as an attempt to assuage the practical concern about stability, then its arguments, I suspect, are bound to seem woefully inadequate. Why be skeptical here? A main reason, I suppose, is our experience of persistent conflict of ideas in our large heterogeneous democracies. Fortunately, we have somehow developed in the United States a considerable consensus on our constitution and associated political procedures, but when we raise questions of interpretation and philosophical justification the consensus seems to evaporate. Most people ~ not philosophers, and justice as fairness, even conceived P?li.ti~ly, 1s a subtle and complex system of philosophical id~. Even the d1s~~on between a political conception and a comprehensive moral doctrine 1s a subtlety that may well escape the average citizen. (Think, for examp~e: of explaining to the larger public the distinction between political C 1994 Uuivcraity ofSoqthem California
175
342
PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
constructivism, which says "principles of justice may be represented as the principles agreed upon by free and . equal citizens," and Kantian constructivism, which says that the principles of justice are constituted by the joint will of rational autonomous persons. 19) The core tenets of political liberalism, I suppose, are more readily understood and accepted than fully specified versions (such as justice as fairness), but I suspect that the same forces that generate divergence of moral and religious comprehensive doctrines will block consensus on the less comprehensive, but still philosophical, political ideas of liberalism. Moreover, the arguments of Political Liberalism seem quite inadequate, and of the wrong kind, to solve the stability problem as I have presented it. What makes for stability in society is largely an empirical question; and Political Liberalism does not purport to offer empirical evidence that an overlapping consensus would be likely .20 One would expect, too, that to show there is a good chance for such a consensus, one would need to investigate the fundamental premises of the "reasonable comprehensive doctrines" with which we are acquainted and then to argue from within such systems that they have grounds to support justice as fairness as a political framework. But Rawls deliberately sets aside this approach. Many, if not most, people, in our society, I suspect, do not have any effective commitment to a comprehensive moral, religious, or political doctrine. Perhaps a majority can name a religious affiliation, but this does not mean that they really understand and use the doctrines with which they associate themselves. Many people seem to be doctrineless ethical pluralists, with diverse opinions on particular matters but no "theory." If so, then even winning the allegiance of the major religions and Phil~~ophical theories (for justice as fairness) would still not ensure stability; the more or less doctrineless folk need to be convinced as well, and they are already averse to philosophical systems of ideas. Again, if a practical concern for durability and stabilizing forces is the focus of concern, then Political Liberalism seems to rely too heavily on appeals to rational judgment. The factors which stabilize various societies may in fact have relatively little to do with the systems of ideas that. they espouse, and more to do with habit, reinforcement, and blind emottonal attachmentS. 21 These factors may also be highly contextual, and s~ not transferable from one historical situation to another. Such nonrattonal factors .are perhaps more prominent in tyrannical schemes that attempt to ma_mpulate the citizens, but this does not mean that they are not a fo~ m d~ocracies which contribute to citizens' "willing" acceptance. Finally, if we understand the stability problem as the practical concern that I have ~ssum.ed so far, there is a danger that Rawls's argument ~or an ?verlappmg ~nsensus will be seen as nothing more than the folloWUlg cancature. Imagme representatives of all the traditional religions and other (reasonable) comprehensive doctrines meeting, together with the C 19M Um-.ity of Southern California
176
THE STABILITY PROBLEM IN POLITICAL LIBERALISM
343
many reasonable doctrineless folk. They had been assigned to read A Theory of Justice, but, for one reason or another, they were not uniformly ready to accept justice as fairness. Some, we imagine, had not understood it; others thought it denied features of their comprehensive doctrines; still others refused to endorse any public political conception, for althoup they believed their own doctiine best for deciding issues about the basic structure, they reasonably acknowledged that no such doctrine should be forced on an unwilling people. Now imagine that an enthusiastic (but misguided) Rawls student were to ·try to sell the others on Political Liberalism. "We need a common, working con~ption of justice for basic political questions," he says, "and it is unreasonable for any"ofus to foist our coNiprehensive doctrines on anyone else, particularly since ihat would sanction a public denial of the truth of all the other (reasonable) doctrines. Much as we would each like to have our own doctrines control the issues about the basic structure, we cannot reasonably insist on that." "So," be continues, "I have a proposal: we Rawlsian liberals will downgrade our comprehensive doctrint to a political one, shift our claims for it from 'true' to 'reasonable', forego terms not in the public culture, and restrict its use to the issues about the basic structure of society. Then the rest of you, for your: part, simply agree to. use this political conception as the standard that determines real issues about the basic structure. And so, when you all consent to this, we will at last have stability for a society that is just (by the standards we Rawlsians initially advocated)." This bargain, we can suppose, would not be very persuasive, for it asks nonliberal groups to swap their share in the power to control basic decisions for mere modesty in the presentation of liberal doctrine. Careful readers will, of course, realize that this caricature of Rawls's liberal proposal is not fair. He does not, for example, offer the new political conception of justice as fairness as a bargaining chip to entice support from those who would not accept A Theory of Justice. The desired consensus is meant to be based o~ the whole range of reasons offered for justice as fairness in both his books (the reasoning from the original position, the security ofbasic goods, the political values, etc.), not merely on its limited scope and willingness to forego claims to "truth." At best such a consensus, Rawls argued, would not be achieved in an explicit bargain but would develop gradually from a prior modus vivendi, as somewhat indeterminate comprehensive doctrines come to accommodate themselves so they can lend their support to what they can see to be a fair and tolerant political framework. 22 Nonetheless, despite the distortions, the skepticism expressed in the caricature will, I fear, be widely shared, so long as the stability issue is understood along the lines of my initial reading. C 1994 University of Southern California
177
344
PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
IJl. Is there a better reading of the project! Suppose that my skepticism is correct, ihat is, (a) it is very unlikely that there will be ever be an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines on justice as fairness (or political liberalism), and (b) the stability of (more or less) just societies, if ever achieved, is likely to rest more on nonrational factors, relative to context, and empirically discoverable than on the prospect of philosophical arguments convincing a substantial majority of reasonable citizens. Is the main project of Political Liberalism, therefore, a failure, and its down-sizing of justice as fairness a waste of time? Was there no point in arguing for at least the possibility of a just and stable society? If we reconceive the nature of the problem that led Rawls to reconceive justice as fairness, I think we get a more attractive picture. Let us suppose that the concern with stability was not the practical concern I described earlier. (Will a just structure unravel? Will it be too short-lived to be worth instituting?) Perhaps establishing the possibility of stability "of the right kind" is to be seen as a necessary move in a project of justifying the advocacy and use of justice as fairness as a standard. Now, however, what prompts the need for justification is not a fear that a just structure, as defined by Rawls's principles, would be short-lived but the suspicion that it would unfairly coerce reasonable people who hold other views 'about justice and morality generally. Asking whether it is possible for reasonable people, committed to diverse doctrines, to form an overlapping consensus on justice as fairness is a way of checking to see if there are sufficiently good reasons for making justice as fairness the determining standard regarding the basic structure, reasons which one could sincerely defend to others without denying their deepest religious and philosophical commitments. If one can make a cogent case that there are adequate reasons for diverse reasonable people to join a consensus on justice as fairness as their working political idea then certain liberal and Kantian conditions for the legitimate exercise of power over others have been met. .If the case can be made, for example, then the maxim to use justice as falmess as a policy would be one that in a sense we can will as a universal law. The argument, if successful, wo~d show that one can will the poli~Y f~r everyone as reasonably acceptable from everyone's perspective, while still respecting most others publicly as no less reasonable than oneself; ~or the (new, political) arguments that they should adopt justice as fairn~S ln n? way pre~uppose that people should abandon their religion, thel! ~peclal. ~ncepuon of the good, etc., provided that they are "reasonable m a mmJm~l sense. On this reading, the project is to show that adv~ ~d use of JUStice as fairness, even though inevitably warranting coerc1on, 15 reasonable and respectful of those whose use of reason leads thePl to C 1994 UDi'VCrlity of Southcm California
178
THE STABILITY PROBLEM IN POLITICAL LIBERALISM
345
disagree with us deeply. For this purpose it is unimportant whether in fact a majority of (reasonable) people will ever, in fact, come to agree on justice as fairness. Showing the possibility of stability of the right kind, on this view, would be analogous to the familiar Rawlsian strategy of justifying principles by hypothetical consent; here, though, the argwnent would be to allay doubts that the principles are worthy of actual consent by showing that they could, hypothetically, win (almost) universal agreement if everyone would consider them reasonably. Several passages suggest that the point of conceiving justice as fairness as political and arguing that it can win an overlapping consensus has less to do with practical concerns about the durability of a just society than with answering the questions, "What would be the most reasonable basic of social union?" and "What is, for liberals, a legitimate exercise of political power?" In the fourth chapter of Political Liberalism, for example, this new reading seems confirmed, at least as part of Rawls's understanding of his project and the need for changes. Here be introduces the "liberal principle of legitimacy", which says, [O)ur exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.D
This is a constraint on justification which commitment to liberalism itself imposes. Two important assumptions are that (a) so far as we are entitled to assert for political purposes, human reason does not give us grounds to rule out the major traditional religions and philosophical doctrines as "unreasonable"l4 and (b) the political issues that arise about the basic structure of society are such that, however these are resolved, the result will be a coercive use of political power. Given these assumptions, arguing that a political conception of justice can win an overlapping consensus of reasonable diverse doctrines is necessary to establish, from a liberal point of view, the legitimacy of using it. If there is no actual overlapping consensus, a working justice as fairness would lack the fullest justification and the deepest basis of social union, 2s but if such a consensus is not even possible, in the sense I have been discussing, then decisions based on justice as fairness would have no legitimacy at all. 26 If my current understanding is right, then, the stability problem Rawls addresses is not or at least need not be taken to be, whether it is likely that a society b~sed on justice as fairness will endure. Nor is the issue even whether it is likely that such a society will in fact win willing acceptance by all the reasonable adherents of all the reasonable comprehensive doctrines. The latter, surely, is an ideal for liberals who follow Rawls, but it is not necessary. Liberals, like anyone else, will C 1994 University of Southern California
179
346
PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
naturally want to believe that success in achieving lasting liberal reforms is likely enough to make it reasonable to work towards such refonns; but the point of Rawls's arguments that the appropriate overlapping consensus on justice as fairness is possible is not, or is not primarily, to provide assurance on that point. The primary aim, instead, is to give a defense of justice as fairness against the charge that (even if had we power to do so) to use it as a standard for (inevitably) coercive political decisions would violate the liberal principle oflegitimacy. That principle says, "our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution of essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may be reasonably expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason. " 27 Given that use of "common human reason" will continue to leave us with diverse religions and philosophies ("the fact of reasonable pluralism"), liberals are constrained by their own principle of legitimacy not to use justice as fairness, or any other standard, in exercising political power unless they are convinced that there are sufficient reasons to defend justice as fairness to those who are reasonable but who reasonably disagree about the "true" answers to the deepest questions of religion and morality. To show that there are such good and sufficient reasons one needs (for example) to show, without challenging the truth or reasonableness of Catholicism, utilitarianism, etc., that adherents of those doctrines have adequate grounds to accept and use justice as fairness as a practical framework if limited in the ways implied by calling it a mere ••political conception."21 To do this, it is not necessary to prove that all or most C~tholics, utilitarians, etc., will, or even probably will, endorse justice as frumess someday. Nor need one show that if there were such an overlapping consensus it would in fact last. 29 What is needed is, first, a thoroughly articulated proposal of what it would be to view justice as fairness as a political conception and, second, a cogent statement of str~ng reasons why Catholics, utilitarians, etc., without abandoning their fa1th, could .reasonably endorse this proposal. Rawls tries to provide both of these In Political Liberalism. But whether, in the end, his proposal and arguments are successful in meeting the concerns for Kantianjustification, liberal legitimacy, and a reasonable basis for social union is a matter that will require further discussion. '
Y. SoiiU! related interpretative questions Rawls's rich but complex discussion raises many questions, but here 1 want to mention two, rather preliminary questions of interpretation. . (I) How much of A Theory of Justice I wonder is now meant to be mcluded in "justice as fairness" now that 'this is pre~nted as a "political C 1994 University of Southern California
180
THE STABILITY PROBLEM IN POLffiCAL LIBERALISM
347
conception" rather than as a "comprehensive doctrine"? Clearly parts of Part III of A Theory of Justice are meant to be set aside. 30 No doubt the suggestions that the framework might be extended into a general theory of the right, and also of virtues, are not part of the political conception (even though they may remain fruitful suggestions for moral philosophy). 31 Also it is clear that explicit changes. e.g. in the principle of liberty and the account of primary goods, supersede the account of A Theory of Justice. 32 But how much of the discussion of methodology, the alternative ways an Original Position might be defined, and the arguments for features of the Original Position are still included? Does commitment to a theory of justice as political imply acceptance of the method of reflective equilibrium? It is clear that as a political conception, justice as fairness includes the idea that principles of justice "may be represented'' as the outcome of a procedure of construction but not as in fact "made or constituted" by the agreement of free and equal persons, or their hypothetical representatives; 33 but are the details of the Original Position, the previous arguments for features of the Original Position, and the arguments that members of the Original Position would accept the principles, part of the political conception? The reason for asking is this. To preserve as much of the force and substance of A Theory of Justice as possible, it would seem that Rawls should want to include in the "module" that is meant to be the focus of the overlapping consensus as many of these ideas and arguments from A Theory of Justice as is compatible with the move to a "political conception." 34 This seems to be Rawls's intent. 3 ~ But then the more substantial, complex, philosophical, and controversial the political conception of justice as fairness is, the less plausibility there seems in the suggestion that it is a relatively simple, practical framework that can facilitate public discussion among people of diverse backgrounds and faiths. Also it will be more difficult even to show that all reasonable comprehensive doctrines can endorse justice as fairness, i.e. have adequate reasons, compatible with their doctrines, to do so. {2) The background for my second question is this. Justice as fairness, as a political conception, is just one form of politicalliberalism;36 there are many liberalisms presumably even many {possible) political liberalisms. 37 Politicalliberalisms need to identify "fundamental questions for which the conception's political values yield reasonable answers. " 38 These are the "constitutional essentials," which include principles regarding the structure of government and political processes and equal basic rights and liberties, but not the difference principle or "fair equality of opportunity" {as described in A Theory of Justice). (Unless the difference principle appears as a guideline in a statute, for example, the idea of public reason does not allow the Supreme Court to appeal to it. 19) The general principle of ·legitimacy and the idea of public reason are C 1994 University of Southern California
181
348
PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
essential to liberalisms; and their content must include basic rights, liberties, and opportunities, an assigned priority among these, and "measures assuring to all citizens adequate all-purpose means to make effective use of their liberties and opportunities."40 There is, then, not only a distinction between the old and new versions of justice as fairness but also a distinction between the latter (with the difference principle, fair equality of opportunity, and associated arguments) and those minimal aspects of it that are needed for it to be a fonn of liberalism. We might call the latter "Rawls's basic political liberalism." Even this, the new political justice as fairness stripped of details inessential to liberalism, is apparently distinct from other (possible) fonns of political liberalism. Now Political Liberalism answers the basic question, "How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?", largely by arguing that a liberal conception of justice can win an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. 41 In this extended argument are we to think of the (new) political "a theory ofjustice" (with the difference principle, etc.) as winning the overlapping consensus, or are we to think of (what I called) "Rawls's basic political liberalism" as achieving the consensus? I raise this question, like the previous one, because it seems to me that the plausibility that a political conception of justice could become widely accepted, the focus of overlapping consensus of both adherents of reasonable comprehensive doctrines and other doctrindess folk, is reduced the more detailed, philosophical, complex, and controversial that political conception is. If the whole of the (new) political "a theory of justice" is meant to be the object of the consensus this naturally increases the difficulty of showing that there can be an ov~rlapping consensus (of ~sonable doctrines) on it. If a stripped down conception ("Rawls's basic liberalism") is to be the object, there is more hope for showing that there are adequate reasons for a consensus but then doubts arise as to whether e~ough has ~n stabilized to call the scheme just. For example, a society ~t~ extraordmary affluence and gross inequalities would fall far short of JUStlC:C, I think, if it merely agreed to keep the basic liberties fixed a~d provtded a minimum "safety net." 42 Rawls himself apparently still endorses ~he difference principle, which would oppose such injustice, but now arises whether oiven pluralism the liberal principle of 1the. question . ' eo ' egttunacy allows those in power, absent actual consensus, to use it.
0 1994 UaiYenity of Southern California
182
THE STABILITY PROBLEM IN POLmCAL LIBERALISM
349
VI. Concluding re11Ulrks: how much luiS been lost? Is justice as fairness now merely a political conception? Was it every really a comprehensive moral doctrine? What have we, the admirers of A Theory of Justice, lost in the redescription of justice as fairness in Political Liberalism? There are two main points to keep in mind, I think, if one is inclined to mourn the loss of Rawls's earlier, apparently more ambitious and comprehensive, characterization of justice as fairness. First, many aspects of what Rawls now calls "the political conception" seem already implicit in A Theory of Justice, or compatible with it, and so the change may not be as radical as the introduction to Political Liberalism would lead one to believe. There is, to be sure, resolution of ambiguity on many points, and change on some; but A Theory of Justice was always limited in its focus, restrained in its metaphysical claims, and open in its use of ideas developed in modem Western political culture. 43 It was rich with suggestions about an analogous theory of "right" and "virtue,'' but that the basic structure of society was its primary subject was clear from the outset. It asked us to engage in an thought experiment about choice under a "veil" that called to mind Kant's abstract metaphysical "Ideas," but careful readers knew it was, even then, merely "a device of representation." Compared to most other works in political philosophy of the time, it was bold, far ranging, and ambitious; but it appealed, repeatedly, to our contemporary intuitive understandings and judgments to generate a confirming "reftective equilibrium." That the current "political conception" is significantly different is undeniable; but many exaggerated accounts of the change, I think, are due to misunderstanding of the original account. Second, we should remember that the old unmodified A Theory of Justice is still on the table, as it were. To alter the metaphor, copies may still be used in the philosophy classroom, even if not, any more, in the Congress or the courts. My point is not the trivial one that we have a right, according to Political Liberalism as well as in fact, to reject Rawls's second book and believe in the first. (Political liberalism, of course, tolerates and seeks support from much more radically distinct comprehensive doctrines than that espoused in A Theory of Justice.) The point, rather, is that Political Liberalism does not deny, in any wholesale way, that the principles and arguments of A Theory of Justice are true, important, and better grounded than competing "reasonable comprehensive" theories. There are, admittedly, some specific points in A Theory of Justice which Rawls now claims were unduly vague, needlessly ad hoc, and even inconsistent with its other claims. 44 Still, if, as Rawls says, that earlier work expresses a (partially) comprehensive doctrine, then surely it still counts, by his criteria, among the "reasonable" 0 1994 Univenity of Southern California
183
350
PACIFIC PffiLOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
ones, the truth or falsity of which Rawls's political liberalism refuses to judge. Political Liberalism does imply that, as with Catholicism and utilitarianism, the truth or superior rationality of justice as fairness as a comprehensive doctrine should not be presupposed (or, normally, even asserted) in public debates and official decisions about fundamental constitutional issues. Many will no doubt challenge this restriction, but it is important to see at least that Rawls's argument for this new restrictive proposal does not withdraw the claim that the old doctrine is supported by better reasons than are competing comprehensive theories of justice. Also Rawls is still committed to the view that the old doctrine may be more profoundly grounded, in a sense, than the new political conception. Insofar as A. Theory of Justice proposed more comprehensive moral ideas, a kind of partial Kantian liberalism, it remains a competitor for allegiance, and inspiration for further development, in the philosophical project that each person may have of trying to find, for him or her, the most reasonable comprehensive moral/political theory. It may seem a bit odd, but it is consistent, to treat the old justice as fairness as a reasonable partially comprehensive moral doctrine that may, or may not, guide its advocates to join a overlapping consensus on justice as fairness as a restricted political idea. 45 If it does, they may come to see Political Liberalism not so much as rejecting or abandoning the old A. Theory of Justice as partially cloning it, drawing from it the basic materials to build up a similar, but pared down, counterpart to be used in a different forum. University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
Notes 1 My ~en~ here, with only minor changes, are those I presented at an "Au~or ~ccts ~ntics SCSS1on of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, mectmP
m. April, 1994· In thinking about John Rawls' recent work I have been helped by discussioDS Wltb a number of people, including especially Eugene Mason, Henry West, Martin ~~n, Carl Brandt, Andrews Reath, and a graduate student reading group at the m~ty of North Carolina. I am also grateful to Rawls for his response at the A.P.A. SCSSIOD and for sending me so . classes. me very he1p fiU1 notes, prepared for h1s 3 J · bn 0 Rawls, .A. Theory of Ju.stice (Cambridge· Harvard Univenity PreSs, 1971) and Polit~ .Libnalism (New York: Columbia Univenlty Press, 1993). In further notes I sball ab~l"eYI&te the former u TJ and the latter u pL. PL, pp. 291-371. • PL, pp. 22-28, 3S, 7S. 5 PL, P· 7Sf, 106, 178f, 186. ' PL, pp. 273-74. pp. 89-12!1, especially pp. 103-4. 'L, p. xvi. A footnote follows noting some exccptious.
: ;L,
0 I!lg4 Uniwnity of Soulbcra California
184
THE STABILITY PROBLEM IN POLffiCAL LIBERALISM 10
PL, p. xvi. PL, p. xvii.
II
TJ,p. 6.
9
351
PL, p. 15. u From correspondence I understand that Rawls may introduce further qualifications on this restriction in subsequent writings. 14 PL, pp. ll-15. u PL, pp. 93-94. 16 PL, pp. 48-66, especially p. 59. 17 PL, p. 15. II PL, pp. 154-72. 19 PL, pp. 90-107, 125-29, especially p. 93, 99, and 125. 711 Rawls otTers a variety of considerations in defense of his view that such an appropriate overlapping consensus is possible, noting both the advantages of justice as fairness to all and the "looseness" in most comprehensive doctrines that might enable them to come to accept it" as a working political framework (PL, p. 16011). But he never pretends to offer empirical evidence that it is likely, and regarding even its possibility be realizes that, in the end, we must wait to see. "Whether justice as fairness (or some similar view) can gain the support of an overlapping consensus so defined is a speculative question. One can reach an educated conjecture only by working it out and exhibiting the way it might be supported" (PL, p. 15; see also PL, p. 167-Q). 21 Rawls, of course, recognizes that such factors play a causal role in promoting de fac:to stability (see PL, p. 161, for example); and, as I suggest later, his focus of concern is best understood as liberal justification of justice as fairness rather than assurance of durability of societies that accept it. 22 PL, pp. 158-68. n PL, p. 137. 24 In his A.P.A. reply, Rawls reminded me and stressed the importance of the qualification in the antecedent here. It is not that, as individuals or as philosophers, we must concede that all "reasonable comprehensive doctrines" are equally supported by good reasons. The point is that political liberalism does not permit one to assume, for purposes of deciding basic political questions, that comprehensive doctrines that meet its minimal tests for reasonableness are unreasonable or less well grounded than one's own doctrine. zs This is most explicit in the unpublished class notes, but see PL, pp. 134-72. 26 Ibid, and p. 137fT. 27 PL, p. 137. (The italics are mine.) 21 Catholicism and utilitarianism arc used here as familiar examples which, I suppose, most liberals would count as among the "reasonable comprehensive doctrines" by Rawls's criteria, but it is not important for the main point to insist that either, or any other doctrine in particular in fact meets those criteria. 29 Liberals will naturally hope that both are true, i.e. that a lasting overlapping consensus with reasonable Catholics and utilitarians will someday come about and will prove durable. Also strong empirical evidence against a tendency towards such consensus, even under favorable conditions, should make liberals worry that their "good and sufficient reasons" were, after all, weaker and less free from bias than they thought. But, as Rawls might note, we are now far from having such decisive evidence for or against the emergence of a consensus; after all the relevant ideas of a "political conception" have only just recently been put on the table. Besides, if my reading is right, the primary concern regarding the possibility of overlapping consensus has not been the likelihood of de facto agreement but the adequacy of the reasons for it. :tO PL, p. xvi. 31 TJ, pp. 108-17, 433-39. IZ
C 1994 Univenity of Southern Catifomia
185
352 ll Jl 34
ll 16 17 31 19
40 41
PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
PL. pp. 7Sf, 180-86, 290fT. PL, p. 93 and 99. For the idea of the "module" sec PL. p. 12. PL, p. xvi. PL, p. xxix.
PL. p. 6, 226. PL, p. 227. PL, p. 237n. PL, p. 6 and 226. The basic question is stated at PL, p. xviii.
Much depends on how we interpret "adequate all purpose means" in the definition of basic liberalism above. No doubt this is meant to be somewhere between what would be warranted by the difference principle and what Ronald Reagan's advisors would count as a "safety net," but the further we move form the difference principle in economic justice, I suspect, the harder it is to justify, or get reasonable agreement, on the strict priority of liberties over economic issues. 41 The current political conception, however, is more severely restricted to such ideas. 44 It is natural to suppose that anyone who accepts Po/irical Liberalism must entirely reject Part Ill of A. Theory of Justice as an argument for stability. However, with som~ changes, Part III can be seen as making a reasonable argument for the proposition that if a society adopted justice as fairness as its comprehensive doctrine, then there arc re~s~ns to suppose it would generate strong stabilizing forces tending to maintain the citizen's willing acceptance of its principles. This, I take it, is somewhat more modest that how Rawls now sees the initial project of Part III, for it leaves open the possibility than, as Rawls now believes likely, given the freedoms allowed in such a just society, moral and religious disagreements would (almost) inevitably develop. The modest thesis, then, does not resolve the problem that pluralism poses for the liberal, and so, from Rawls's perspective, the second book would still be required. This is compatible, however, with the view that Justice as Fairness gave good grounds for the more modest thesis and that this thesis is not an insignificant one. 4~ Rawls'~ repl_y at the A.P.A. meetings treated this point briefly, perhaps as obvious, S&)'lng that 1n pnnciple the earlier book is still "on the shelr' and might be a part of an overlapping consensus with other comprehensive doctrines, "why not?" 41
C 1994 University of Southern California
186
SAMUEL SCHEFFLER
MORAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE ORIGINAL POSITION
(Received 27 February, 1978)
In the first section of this paper I maintain that there is a serious conflict between John Rawls' account of the relation between personal identity and moral theory in 'The Independence of Moral Theory', and his own argument against utilitarianism in A Theory of Justice. In the second section I explore two ways of trying to resolve the conflict, and examine the implications of each of these possible resolutions for Rawls' work as a whole.
In 'Later Selves and Moral Principles', Derek Parfit suggests that the plausibi· lity of different moral theories may depend to some extent on the nature of personal identity. Parfit identifies a 'Simple View' and a 'Complex View' of personal identity. On the Complex View, such identity just consists in certain bodily and psychological continuities and connections (e.g., relations of memory, intention, and character), 1 which continuities and connections can themselves hold to varying degrees. On the Simple View, personal identity is a further, independent fact beyond the holding of the relevant continuities. Parfit maintains that if we adopt a Complex View, we acquire two beliefs as corollaries. He says we come to believe that the identity of a person is in its nature a less deep fact than the Simple View takes it to be, and that it can sometimes hold to reduced degrees. And he goes on to argue that, in view of the corollaries of the Complex View, moral principles that rely heavily on the separateness of persons will seem less weighty or important on the Complex View than they do on the Simple View (he also suggests that they may be thought to have a different scope). For example, distributive principles that place constraints on maximization in the name of fairness will be seen as less important than the Simple View takes them to be, and utilitarian principles favoring maximization will be regarded as more plausible than they would be if a Simple View were correct. Philosophical Studies 3S (1979) 397-403. 0031·8116/79/0354·0397$00.70 Copyright IS> 1979 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.
187
398
SAMUEL SCHEFFLER
Thus Parfit's argument, described very generally, is that utilitarianism seems more plausible on a Complex View of personal identity than it does on a Simple View, and that what may loosely be called 'Kantian' normative theories seem more plausible on a Simple View than they do on a Complex View. As Parfit himself recognizes, however, this argument, if correct, in no way forecloses the possibility that Kantian theories may still be more plausible than utilitarian theories, even on a Complex View. Nevertheless, his argument raises the interesting question of whether Kantian normative theories are in fact compatible with a Complex View of personal identity. 2 In the course of a general attempt to show "the independence of moral theory", John Rawls comments on Parfit 's paper. 3 Rawls wishes to defend the view that "the conclusions of the philosophy of mind regarding the question of personal identity do not provide grounds for accepting one of the leading moral conceptions rather than another" .4 He begins by identifying the ways in which Kantian theories and utilitarian theories must each make use of some criterion of personal identity. And he concedes that although both types of theory observe certain shared constraints on any adequate criterion of personal identity (which constraints include an agreement that "any criterion of personal identity is based ultimately on empirical regulari· ties and connections" 5 ), nevertheless within those constraints "the utili· tarian conception has less need for a criterion of identity than a Kantian view; or perhaps better, it can get by with a weaker criterion of identity". 6 In con· trast, "a Kantian view is more dependent on personal identities; it relies, so to speak, on a stronger criterion". 7 Kantians "must conceive of identities as stretching over much longer intervals". 8 Rawls then interprets Parfit as maintaining that the "shifting and some· times short-term character of mental connections" 9 gives support to utili· tarianism, with its 'weaker' criterion of identity. In response, Rawls argues that "no degree of connectedness... is natural or fixed", 10 and that the actual continuities that bind the lives of persons depend on what moral con· ceptions have been realized in the societies in which they live. Thus, he main· ~ai~s, if a society that fosters strong intrapersonal identifications is feasible, It 15 no count against Kantianism that such identifications might not be present in a society ordered by a different moral· conception. Since facts about the connections that hold within lives are always "relative to the social· ly &_chieved moral conception",11 then so long as a moral conception can be realtzed in society, there is no way that facts about the connectedness of lives
188
MORAL INDEPENDENCE
399
can give any reason to accept or reject that conception. Thus in response to the question whether Kantianism is compatible with a Complex View of personal identity, Rawls suggests that it is, provided it is possible to foster strong empirical connections within lives. Although I have reservations about the adequacy of Rawls' argument as a response to Parfit, I wish to focus here on a different feature of that argument. If no one degree of connectedness is natural, and if a 'Kantian society' and a 'utilitarian society' 12 are equally feasible, then Rawls' own argument against utilitarianism in A Theory of Justice 13 appears to be undermined. There he maintains that ''utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons" .14 That it does not is alleged to be important in choosing prin· ciples of justice that will regulate social institutions (and through them, the conduct of individuals), because "the correct regulative principle for any thing depends on the nature of that thing". 15 Hence, he says, if we assume that "the plurality of distinct persons with separate systems of ends is an essential feature of human societies, we should not expect the principles ofsocial choice to be utilitarian". 16 And indeed, he argues, utilitarianism would not be chosen by the parties in the original position, for they know that each of them has some rational plan of life, plus a long-term interest in striving to carry out that plan and in maintaining self-respect. And they are persuaded that utilitarianism does not sufficiently safeguard these interests. But if Rawls' argument in 'The Independence of Moral Theory' is correct, it does not seem that people in the original position can know that they have long-tenn life plans and interests, which they must know if this argument against utilitarianism is to succeed. For, ex hypothesi, people in the original position "do not know the particular circumstances of their own society" . 1 7 And so, if Rawls' argument in response to Parfit is correct, they presumably don't know if their society has fostered strong, Kantian identifications in them, or only weak, utilitarian identifications. 18 They don't know if they are Kantian persons or utilitarian persons; they might be either. Moreover, they do know that they might be either, if that argument is correct. For the argument is based on the purported general principle of social psychology that societies ordered by different moral conceptions will create different kinds of continuities and interests within persons. 19 And since people in the original position know the general laws of human psychology ,20 they presumably know this law too. They know that "no degree of connectedness ... is natural or fixed". They know that they may or may not have long-term
189
400
SAMUEL SCHEFFLER
interests in the fulfillment of a rational life plan. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that utilitarian principles ignore the distinctions among people with long-term interests in the fulfillment of a rational plan of life (Kantian people). But in 'The Independence of Moral Theory', he concedes that there can be other kinds of people. It is not unnatural for a person not to be a Kantian person. One can just as easily lack a long-term interest in the fulfillment of a rational plan of life as have such an interest. So if people in the original position are to choose principles to regulate human conduct in society, and if "the correct regulative principle for any thing depends on the nature of that thing", and if people have no unique nature, how can a rational choice of principles in the original position ever be made? 2 1
II
I see two ways in which Rawls might try to resolve the conflict to which I have called attention (there may be other ways). The first involves resisting the idea that the connectedness oflives is altogether socially relative, and thus striving to retain the argument against utilitarianism while surrendering the argument for moral independence in its present form. The second involves generally conceding the relativity of intrapersonal connections, and considerably modifying claims about what the argument against utilitarianism is supposed to show. The first attempt at resolution might proceed along the following lines. It certainly does appear to be the case that the degree of empirical connectedness within individual lives can vary from society to society, depending at least in part on variations in the socially dominant institutions, traditions, ideologies, mores, and so o~Jt would be hard to deny that the degree to which people are concerned with planning their own individual futures and reflecting on their own personal pasts is culture~ependent. It would be idle to pretend that there was no difference, in this connection, between growing up in Scarsdale and growing up in Shanghai. Nevertheless, it also appears to be the case that in every society we know of, certain kinds of empirical con· nectedness- of memory, intention, character, and the like- hold to at least some greater degree within most individual lives than they do among different li~es: ~is suggests that Certain kinds of distinctive empirical continUitieS Within hves are resistant to the types of social variation with which we are most familiar.
190
MORAL INDEPENDENCE
401
So long as some facts about the connectedness within lives appear to be independent of these familiar cultural variations, one might try to argue that these facts are relevant to the choice of a moral conception intended to re· gulate the conduct of people in the wide range of societies where the facts hold. Rawls might try in particular to show that these facts support the adoption of his two principles of justice in the original position over the adoption of utilitarianism. To do this, however, he would have to say some· thing about the relation between the facts in question and the supposition that the parties in the original position each know that they have some ratio· nal plan of life. In particular, he would have to show that these facts render that supposition plausible rather than merely question-begging, and it is not clear how easy it would be to show this. For someone might argue that while the distinctive empirical connections within individual lives make it plausible to suppose that persons in a wide range of societies distinguish between the self and others in certain contexts, it remains an open question whether that distinction plays a central role in determining the ends they pursue and the ways in which they allocate their energies. Indeed, one might argue that it is precisely at this point that the social variations alluded to by Rawls in 'The Independence of Moral Theory' become crucial. If that is right, then it might plausibly be maintained that, despite the distinctive empirical connections within lives, the argument in A Theory of Justice, with its assumption of in· dividual life plans, shows nothing more decisive than that Kantian people, preferring to live in a Kantian society, would choose Kantian principles of justice. The second imagined resolution would be appropriate if it proved impos· sible to resist the idea that the connections within lives are substantially variable. Rawls might then retain the argument for moral independence, and concede both that the parties in the original position must be conceived as knowing that they have long-term plans (that they are Kantian people), and that this knowledge is, in view of the variability of intrapersonal connections, highly substantive and prejudicial of the parties' eventual choice of principles. While he would then have to concede that an argument against utilitarianism that takes the form of showing that Kantian persons would choose Kantianism over utilitarianism is philosophically indecisive, he might nonetheless argue that it retains some interest. But the remaining interest of the original position construction would be as a model highlighting certain basic features and presuppositions of an ideal
191
402
SAMUEL SCHEFFLER
of the person and of justice which has great intuitive appeal and coheres with many of our deepest convictions. And the remaining (not inconsiderable) interest of the argument against utilitarianism in the original position would be as an explanation of why a commitment to those basic features and pre· suppositions is incompatible with utilitarianism. The original position construction, on this view, would no longer be claimed to have independent justi· ficatory force. In other words, Rawls could retain that construction, but only by conceding what many of his critics have urged on other grounds: "that the presumptions of the contract method Rawls employs are rather strong, and that the original position therefore offers less independent support to his con· elusions than at first appears". 22 This concession will seem less damaging if one believes that "over the long term this book will achieve its permanent place in the literature of political theory because of the substantive doctrine that it develops so eloquently and persuasively". 23 I do not of course know whether either of the two kinds of resolution I have imagined would be acceptable to Rawls, but I think that there is a genuine problem posed by the conflict between his two arguments, and that !orne resolution is required.
University of Olli[ornia, Berkeley
NOTES 1
Parfit's article is contained in: Philosophy and Personal Relations, ed. by Alan Monte·
~o.re (Roupedg~a~d~egan Paul, London, 1973), pp. 137- 169. For Parfit's precise deli·
~ltttns of continutty and 'connectedness',' see pp. 139-140. . . ~m grateful to Derek Parfit for correcting some of my earlier misinterpretations of hts VIews on these topics. 1 'depen denee of moral theory', Proceedings and Addresses of the Amenc ·an Ph" lnTh~ Jn Association XLVIII (1975), pp. 5-22. Referred to hereafter as !MT. 4 ;;~phtc1al ,p. 5 . 5 IMT, p.19. 6 IMT, p. 19. IMT, p.19. IMT, p. 19
' IMT,p.19: 10 IMT, p. 20. II IMT, p. 20. 12 IMT, p. 20. 13
Harvard University Press, Cambn'dge, 1971. Referred to hereafter as TJ.
192
MORAL INDEPENDENCE 14
IS 16 17
403
TJ, p. 27. TJ, p. 29. TJ, p. 29. TJ, p. 137.
11 Simply giving the parties this bit of information would of course appear to prejudice their choice of principles of justice. Toward the end of the paper, I discuss the implication of giving them this information even so. 19 In IMT, Rawls imagines a 'utilitarian society' as one in which the people are 'hedonistic and individualistic'. (p. 20) This is a bit odd, since it is Rawls himself who tells us in TJ that, despite what is usually thought, "utilitarianism is not individualistic, at least when arrived at by the more natural course of reflection, in that, by conflating aU systems of desires, it applies to society the principle of choice for one man". (p. 29) If utilitarianism is not individualistic, why would people in a society where utilitarianism was the socially achieved moral conception be individualistic? 20 TJ, p. 137. 21 Rawls himself uses this kind of argument to rebut the claim that it is inappropriate for principles of justice to be at all contingent on the kinds of general facts about society that the parties in the original position are said to know. Denying them this knowledge, he says, "amounts to supposing that the persons in the original position know nothing at aU about themselves or their world. How, then, can they possibly make a decision?" (TJ, p. 159) This is precisely the kind of problem I am calling attention to in connection with personal identity. If intrapersonal connections vary from society to society, and if the parties in the original position don't know what sort of people they are, how can they make any decision about principles of justice? But, on the other hand, how can they be given this knowledge without prejudicing their choice of principles? (The second half of this dilemma supposedly does not arise in the case of the general knowledge of society that the parties are said to have, for that knowledge is alleged to be "true and suitably general". (TJ, p. 160)) 22 T. Nagel, 'Rawls on justice', in: Reading Rawls, ed. by N. Daniels (Basic Books, New York), p. 15. 23 Ibid, p. 15.
193
RAWLS ON THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL Wayne Proudfoot ABSTRACT Three models suggested by Rawls (1971) for conceiving the relation between individual and society are described and critically evaluated. Special attention is given to Rawls's analogies of the problem of mapping the moral sentiments with the problem of mapping linguistic competence and of a social union with participation in a game. Similarities are noted between the theory of justice as fairness and traditional religious conceptions. Both aim to transcend particular interests and both embody perfectionist ideals.
1. Introduction The contract theory as developed by Rawls (1971) in his analysis of the original position, the veil of ignorance, and the constraints which are placed on ethical choice in that position is one which emphasizes the voluntary decision of the individual, uncontaminated by altruism, envy or any interest in the choices or values of others. It is an attempt to treat problems of social choice in terms of the choices of mutually disinterested individuals under certain carefully specified conditions. The aim of the theory is to state questions of social ethics in such a way ttlat they can be resolved into questions of prudential choice for the self-interested individual. It is to substitute for an ethical judgment a judgment of rational prudence (44). t. The characterization of Rawls's theory as one which resolves questions of social ethics into questions of individual choice is not one with which he would disagree. It is the project which is addressed by the tradition of the social JRE 212 f1974), 107-128
195
PROUDFOOT
108
contract as well as by game theory and welfare economics. The social contract tradition employs a myth which portrays the basic institutions of society as the result of a contract between rational, autonomous, self-interested and mutually consenting individuals. The theory of games consists of attempts to discover the best strategy for each of the several players in a game which has been carefully specified according to rules of play and the initial positions of the players. Rawls announces that he is providing a version of the social contract theory, he draws heavily on the literature of game theory and welfare economics, and his choice of the word "fairness" to characterize his theory further suggests the game imagery. The basic model is that of institutions which can be clearly resolved into autonomous, mutually disinterested players for whom the initial positions and the rules of play can be carefully specified. Recently the libetal tradition, emphasizing free and autonomous individuals, has come under critical review from several quarters for not possessing sufficient resources to account for the values of community. If the basic units of society are autonomous individuals with no affective or social ties, how is it possible to account for, or to generate from such a basis, the values of community? The answer given in a number of variations by representatives of the liberal tradition has been that individuals find it in their own self-interest to affirm certain communal values. That is, upon rational reflection on their own interests, they voluntarily choose to enter into communal relations. Consequently, the rise of voluntary associations has been widely hailed by liberal theorists. The simple constituents with which liberal theory begins are autonomous individuals. From these constitutents, the institutions of society are built up by mutual consent in the form of voluntary associations. There is reason to doubt, however, that basic communal ties can be accounted for or justified solely by reference to the voluntary choices of individuals. Similar attempts to reduce language to a voluntaristic foundation, to ostensive definition and the voluntary establishment of social convention, have led investigators back to the social basis for the autonomous individual and for the possibility of rational choice. The clearest statement of Rawls's concern to account for the values of community on the basis of an individualistic conception appears in his discussion of the Kantian interpretation of justice as fairness. The present essay maY be read as an extended comment on this statement. The essential idea is that we want to account for the social values, for the intrinsic good of institutional community and associative activities, by a conception of justice that in its theoretical basis is individualistic. For reasons of clarit~, among others, we do not want to rely on an undefined concept of comm~n 1_tv. or to suppose that society is an organic whole with a life of its ~n distinct from and superior to that of all its members in their relations wtth one another • Th us the contractual conceptton . of the ongtnal . . · · ,·s posttton ~rked out first. It is relatively simple and the problem of rational choice that It _Poses is relatively precise. From this conception, however individualistic it mtght seem • we must even t ua 11v explam · the value of commun1ty. · Ot h erwt·se the theory of justice cannot succeed. (264-2651.
196
RAWLS ON THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL
109
At another point Rawls states that the individualistic basis and the postulate of mutual disinterest in the original position are "meant to incorporate widely shared and yet weak conditions" (129). He wants to assume as little as possible for the foundation on which to build his theory. In this essay the notion that the individualistic basis with its mutually disinterested individuals is a weak condition will be questioned. Such a condition is weak only from the perspective of the tradition in liberal philosophical ethics which begins with the isolated individual. From the perspective of descriptions of the genesis of affective and communal ties, the autonomous individual is a sophisticated and complex construction which presupposes an entire social and cultural fabric. 2. Three Models of the Relation Between the Individual and Society At least three models for conceiving the relation between individual and society are considered and discussed by Rawls. The first is identified with classical utilitarianism and is rejected, but serves as the primary foil over against which he establishes his own position. The second is the model represented by justice as fairness, and is imaginatively portrayed in the description of the original position and in the constraints on ethical choice which are imposed by that description. The third is the idea of a social union which is developed in the third part of the book as an initial step toward the construction of a theory of the good, with particular emphasis on the values of community and on shared social ends.
2. 1. Utilitarianism The first model is Rawls's presentation of the position of classical utilitarianism. His most telling argument against the utilitarian position is that it conflates the system of desires of all individuals and arrives at the good for a society by treating it as one large individual choice. It is a summing up over the field of individual desires. Utilitarianism has often been described as individualistic, but Rawls argues convincingly that the classical utilitarian Position does not take seriously the plurality and distinctness of individuals (27-29). It applies to society the principle of choice for one man. Rawls also observes that the notion of the ideal observer or the impartial sympathetic spectator is closely bound up with this classical utilitarian position. It is only from the perspective of some such hypothetical sympathetic ideal person that the various individual interests can be summed over an entire society (27, 184). The paradigm presented here, and rejected by Rawls, is one in which the interests of society are considered as the interests of one person. Plurality is ignored, and the desires of individuals are conflated. The tension between individual and society is resolved by subordinating the individual to the social sum. The social order is conceived as a unity. The principles of individual choice, derived from the experience of the self as a unity, are applied to society as a Whole. Rawls rightly rejects this position as being unable to account for justice, except perhaps by some administrative decision that it is desirable for the whole
197
PROUDFOOT
110
to give individuals some minimum level of liberty and happiness. But individual persons do not enter into the theoretical position. They are merely sources or directions from which desires are drawn. This position leads to a monism in which the sum of utilities over the whole society is the only relevant consideration. Particular individuals and their desires or rights have no prima facie claim to justice apart from their possible value in augmenting the total sum. Such a sum is not specific to social systems. A degenerate society of one member could be handled by this position as well as a society of n members. There is no respect for persons which is given priority to the summing of accounts. As Raw!s (1958) notes, most utilitarian ethicists have opposed slavery, but they have opposed it by summing up advantages to the slaveholder and advantages to the slaves and judging it to be an inefficient system which allows for a lesser sum of total good than that of a free society. Rawls, on the other hand, would not allow the benefits to the slaveholder to figure in such a list, because the institution of slavery is recognized as unfair in a system in which liberty takes precedence over all other goods. Rawls's own theory gives priority to liberty. He says at several points that his theory is susceptible of a Kantian interpretation. It gives a high prioritY to respect for persons and to the treatment of each individual as an end in himself. A basic respect for the autonomy or freedom of the other is built into the foundation of the theory.
2.2. Justice as Fairness The second paradigm is that which characterizes the original position. It has already been suggested that this is a picture of an aggregate of individuals, mutually disinterested, conceived primarily as will. While not necessarily egoistic, their interests are each of their own choosing. They have their own life ~la~s. They coexist on the same geographical territory and they have rou~ly Similar needs and interests so that mutually advantageous cooperation among them is possible. 1 shall emphasize this aspect of the circumstances of justice by assuming that
:~ farties take no interest in one another's interest .... Thus, one can say, in
•e • that the circumstances of justice obtain whenever mutually disinterested persons PLit forward conflicting claims to the division of social advantages under conditions of moderate scarcity (126-1281.
Here the tension between individual and society is resolved in favor of pluralitY. of an aggregate of mutually disinterested individuals occupying the same space at the. same f lme. 1t •IS resolved in favor of the plural while giving up anY soCI·al umty h" h · ' · · al . . w IC might obtain. The classical utilitarian model and the ort9l~ PDSitton. as sketched by Rawls provide paradigms for two polar ways in which th~ tenston between the plurality of individuals and the unity of social structure mtght ~ resolved. One resolution favors unity and the other favors pluralitY· · · . . emphasizes a view of the pe rson as Thts conception of the ongmal pos1t1on
198
RAWLS ON THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL
111
agent. Reason functions primarily as a capacity for prudential calculus. It is used to calculate consequences. The veil of ignorance erases any differences in reasoning power and any particular desires or affections. A consequence of the separation of the choosing will from the affections and from specific knowledge of one's goals and plans is that the doctrine of the self which results is that of a solitary will. This is a view of the person which is widespread in contemporary treatments of ethical questions. In different forms, it can be seen in existentialism, behaviorism, in some forms of utilitarianism, and in the focus on intention and action in contemporary analytical philosophy. The chief virtue of man as pure unfettered will is freedom or Jiberty. 2 If men and women are considered primarily as choosing individuals, the manner in which they are brought together in order to form some communal or social order is through voluntary association. Hence the social contract. Following the classical contractarians, Rawls describes the conditions of justice in such a way as to make clear that some sort of voluntary association is called for on the basis of rational prudence. A number of individuals are together on the same land at the same time, and resources are moderately scarce. The available resources are insufficient to satisfy .everyone's individual pleasures without producing conflict. Clearly some kind of association is indicated. Rawls is obliged to construct a justification of the fundamental bonds of human community on voluntary foundations. It is not clear that this is an adequate justification. A case in point is that of self·respect. Rawls understands that self-respect is a primary good, that it is a necessary precondition for the ability of an individual ·to carry out any plan of life whatever. He also acknowledges that self-respect cannot be formed in isolation. One cannot have self-respect if he or she does not have the respect of anyone else. Here Rawls acknowledges that the individualistic basis of morality must be qualified. Though he sees that self-respect is a condition of carrying out any life plan, or even of having a life plan, Rawls is obliged to try to root self-respect in voluntary choice. He speaks of the duty of mutual respect. Now the reason why this duty would be acknowledged is that although the panies in the original position take no interest in each other's interests, they know that in society· they need to be assured by the esteem of their associates. Their self-respect and their confidence in the value of their own system of ends cannot withstand the indifference much less the contempt of others. Everyone benefits then from living in a society where the duty of mutual rBSpect is honored. The cost to self-interest is minor in comparison with the support for the sense of one's own worth (338).
The treatment of mutual respect as a duty is a clear example of Rawls' attempt to rest fundamental ties on a voluntary foundation. The voluntarism enters at two points. The first is the model of the original position in which the Principles of natural duty are chosen.3 The justification of the principles has a voluntaristic foundation. The second point is the description of mutual respect as a duty which is to be acknowledged as such and safeguarded by the
199
PROUDFOOT
112
institutions and obligations of the society. The translation of mutual respect into terms of prudence and acknowledged duties is not convincing. Respect is at least partly a matter of discovering a person or an end to be admirable. It cannot be accounted for exclusively in voluntaristic terms. The description of the original position as one of autonomous and mutually disinterested choosers leads Rawls to emphasize rational choice at the expense of affective response and the variety of interests which motivate persons. Rawls suggests that such interests are included in each individual's conception of the good which is obscured by the veil of ignorance and does not enter into the choice of the principles of justice. But the chief primary good, a sine qua non for the pursuit of any conception of the good, is self-respect which is based on mutual respect. The conditions for this primary good cannot be exhaustively described in terms of rational choice. The study of artificial intelligence has produced impressive results in the ability to simulate certain cognitive processes with complex computer programming. A computer can evaluate relevant information and make choices that are rational in terms of its overall plan or program. Many of the choices put to individuals in the original position could be processed by such a computer. But a computer could not achieve or understand the value of self-respect. 4 The issue of self-respect is one that cannot be translated without remainder into the language of pure choice and of rational plans. Why does Rawls set himself the task of accounting for such goods as self-respect on a theoretical basis that is essentially individualistic? At various points he says that the condition of mutual disinterest is an attempt to keep his assumptions weak and mimimal. The postulate of mutual disinterest in the original position is made to insure that the principles of justice do not depend upon strong assumptions. Recall that the original position is meant to incorporate widely shared and yet weak conditions. A conception of justice should not presuppose, then, extensive ties of natural sentiment. At the basis of the theory one tries to assume as little as possible. (129). '
But how does one decide what assumptions are weak simple and widely shared? Rawls begins with the notion of an aggregate of p:rsons, defined primarilY ~s choosers, with their own independent interests. Given this starting point, he IS concerned to keep the assumptions weak and minimal. Thus he refrains fro~ assuming altruistic ties of benevolence, envy or of any other sort. But the baSIC portrayal of the person ·m the original position remains uncnt1c•ze · · · d · The assumpti_ons are weak only if this basic portrayal is taken as given. From another perspective, they might be judged to be very strong indeed.
2 .3. The Idea of a Social Union . The . third par ad'•gm ·IS ·mcluded under Rawls's discussion of the con gruence of JUStice and goodness, and of the problem of stability. It is described as a good.
200
RAWLS ON THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL
113
as an end in itself which is a shared end. This paradigm is distinct both from the conflated application to the entire society of the principle of choice for one person and from the conception of society as an aggregate of mutually disinterested individuals. The idea of a social union is described in contrast to the idea of a private society. A private society is essentially the second model as realized in the actual world. It stems from a consideration of the conditions of the original position as descriptive of a social order. Thus we are led to the notion of a private society. Its chief features are first that the persons comprising it, whether they are human individuals or associations, have their own private ends which are either competing or independent, but not in any case complementary. And second, institutions are not thought to have any value in themselves, the activity of engaging in them not being counted as a good but if anything as a burden. Thus each person assesses social arrangements solely as a means to his private aims. No one takes account of the good of others, or of what they possess; rather everyone prefers the most efficient scheme ~hat gives him the largest share of assets 1521).
Over against this notion of private society, Rawls proposes his idea of a social union. It is one in which final ends are shared and communal institutes are valued. The social order of mankind is best seen by contrast with the conception of a private society. Thus human beings have in fact shared final ends and they value their own common institutions and activities as good in themselves. We need one another as partners in ways of life that are engaged in for their own sake, and the successes and enjoyments of others are necessary for and complementary to our own good (522-523).
While Rawls speaks of shared ends, these ends might be shared for private reasons. The fact that persons need one another as partners, that they all have different and complementary abilities and skills, that they take pleasure in the successes and enjoyments of others, does not necessarily mean that we have left the realm of private ends. It may mean that there are certain materials, in this case persons, which are necessary in order for us to reach our ends.
Rawls invokes the image of the game, an image which plays a major role in the notion of justice as fairness. Fairness is interpreted as fair play and the theory is conceived as describable in terms of impersonal rules which apply equally to all persons, and a precise description of the initial position of each. Rawls not~s that many forms of life possess the characteristics of social union. As examples he lists science art family relationships, and friendships, but he suggests tha; all of these ca~ be' dealt with by thinking through the simpler instances of games ( 5251 . It is important to note here that he is _Pr~posing ~hat the analysis of games can serve for the analysis of complex soc•al mteractlons
201
PROUDFOOT
114
and forms of life, including those involved in aesthetic relations, in family interaction, and in friendships. Rawls distinguishes several sorts of ends that might be involved in playing a game, the last and most important of which is "the shared end, the common desire of all players that there should be a good play of the game" (525). This common end can be realized only if all play fairly according to the rules, if the sides are more or less evenly matched, and if the players all have the sense that they are playing well. This description has strong overtones of the description of the original position. When a game is played in this manner, everyone takes pleasure in the game itself. It is an example of a shared end. "A good play of the game is, so to speak, a collective achievement requiring the cooperation of all" (526). Rawls has offered a paradigm in which the condition of mutual disinterest is transcended, not by some sort of benevolence or altruism, but by common or shared ends. The essential thing is that there be a shared final end and accepted ways of advancing it which allow for the public recognition of the attainments of everyone. When this end is achieved, all find satisfaction in the very same thing; and this fact together with the complementarity of the good of individuals affirms the tie of community (526).
The burden of this move is to avoid the resolution of the tension between individual and society by collapsing all into the social unity, as in utilitarianism, or by disregarding the unity and considering each individual as disinterested in the interests of others, as in the description of the original position as realized in the private society. A satisfying and fair play of the game becomes the paradigm for the sharing of social ends. . . tY .IS Rawls elaborates on this somewhat by declaring that a well ordered socle itself a social union. "Indeed, it is a social union of social unions" (527). ThiS is reminiscent of Josiah Royce's ( 1914) notion of the highest good as "loyaltY to loyalty," which was also an attempt to develop the value of community out of an essentially voluntaristic notion of the individual. Royce, however, had an advantage in that his epistemological work on the notion of a communitY of in t erpretatlon · prov1ded · an essentially social philosophical structure on wh"ICh he could build. The idea of sharing ends is itself a shared end The condition of mutual d" · · · h"rd lsmterest IS no longer applicable, and the idea of a social union serves as at 1. paradigm. It is a paradigm in which the relation of the individual to the social whole is not dissolved at the expense of one or the other. It is neither an undiff_erentiated u.nity nor an aggregate of individuals. Rather, the individuals~:~ conceived as sharmg certain ends or goals which bind them together and wh. presumably enter into their sense of themselves as individuals. This third par~digm, however, rests on the image of the game, and particularly on the not1on of game wh · h · . . f ames. The IC 1s associated w1th contemporary theory o g
202
RAWLS ON THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL
115
analogy between such games and complex social interaction will be examined more fully in the next section. Three models of the relation between individual and society have been described. The first is explicitly rejected by Rawls, the second is fundamental to his theory of justice as fairness, and the third is employed in his outline of a corresponding theory of the good. Rawls is clearly aware of the issues involved in providing an adequate paradigm for conceiving the relation betw~n individuals and society. It is important, however, to lift these paradigms out of the volume and to examine the ways in which they are interrelated. Of the three models, the first two are proposals for understanding constraints on the choice of principles in the initial situation. The third is quite different. It is an object of choice. The idea of a social union is a good which Rawls expects would be preferred by most persons. On the basis of a principle of motivation which he postulates and labels the Aristotelian Principle, Rawls concludes that persons choose to participate in cooperative endeavors. Other things equal, persons enjoy the exercise of their capacities, and this enjoyment increases with the realization of more complex capacities (426). Thus persons would more readily welcome a transformation of society as the result of complex social interdependence and cooperation than aslhe result of divine fiat or the benevolence of a despot. There is enjoyment to be had in the playing of a game, or in the participation in a communal effort, which will cause it to be chosen over less complex activities. The idea of a social union belongs to the theory of the good. It describes a shared goal. It is in this manner that Rawls proposes to account for social and communal values. . Rawls is not introducing a social model at the foundation of his theory. He •s not providing a social analysis of the original position. He is introducing social activity as a good which one might expect to be chosen within the context of justice as fairness. In this sense, shared social ends are contingent and not necessary to the theory. The idea of social union is considered in the discussion of the stability of the theory of justice and of the congruence between justice as fairness and a theory of the good. The Aristotelian Principle suggests that the theory of justice as fairness will lead to the creation of a society in which shared ends and communal values will be sought by individuals.5 Rawls considers social relations both as descriptive of human life and as an ideal that would be chosen as part of the good of each individual. The descriptive point, that social life is a presupposition of thinking, acting and valuing, he considers to be trivial for the purposes with which he is concerned (522). Such a statement is also true of pure egoists and of persons who view their relations instrumentally; it possesses no discriminatory power. The second PDint at which the social character of human life enters is in the conception of the ideal of a social union. Neitber of these considerations affects the basic model of the theory which is the description of the original position. The trivial character of human 'sociality is presupposed, but need not be considered. The value of community and social cooperation must be justified on the basis of
203
PROUDFOOT
116
choices made by individuals after the principles have been chosen. Thus the original position remains individualistic and assumes mutual disinterest on the part of the parties involved.
3. Two Analogies Two analogies employed by Rawls at crucial points will be discussed in this section. The first is his analogy between the problem of mapping the moral sentiments and the problem of mapping linguistic competence. The second is his use of the theory of games to describe social and communal interaction. 3.1. Language and Morals While some difficulties may be presented by this analogy (for instance, the linguist is attempting to describe the speech of native speakers, while the ethicist may come to conclusions which suggest the reform of moral intuition). it illumines the model of the original position. Justice as fairness is proposed as a theory of the moral sentiments which can be compared in its complexity with the description of the sense of gramaticalness of a native speaker (47). If the analogy between theories of language and moral theories is pressed (beyond Rawls's employment of it), it would seem that the characterization of the original position is similar to a situation in which grammatical structure is accounted for by an hypothetical situation in which mutually disinterested individuals are portrayed as coming together in order to agree on conventions and rules to form a language. Each has needs, inner thoughts, points to express, and they need only agree on conventions by which to negotiate and communicate. The model is a nominalistic one. It is reminiscent of discussions of ostensive definition and of conventions explicitly agreed upon. We know, of .. I course, t hat such a situation never actually occurs, any more than the ongma situation of choice which Rawls describes could actually occur. Both are hypothetical situations imagined in such a way as to provide appropriate constraints in order to develop a theory of language or morals. The issue is not whether such a situation might have occurred but the adequacy of such a ~~~.
,
Accounts of the structure of language which involved the analysis ~f language into simples, the ostensive definition of the simple components 10 terms of atomic facts in the world, and the articulation of rules for combining these simples were given by the early work of Russell and Wittgenstein, among others. They were also concerned to provide an account of complex social relatio~s (of the grammar of human language) on a foundation which was theoretically individualistic. The simple building blocks were atomic facts and names. Names provided the basic units out of which language was constructed and they mirrored individual atomic facts in the world. These philosophers were also · assumptions . . . concerned to kee P th e1r weak simple and w1dely sh ared · TheY d1d not w t t · k • · oke ~n ~ mvo e the fabric of language as Rawls does not want to mv any orgamc not1on of society.
204
RAWLS ON THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL
117
The names which make up language were connected to the facts which make up the world and to each other by the invocation of will or choice. It was through naming, through ostensive definition and the choice of conventions, that words were linked with one another and with the world. There is here an analogy with the way in which Rawls invokes choice or will as the basis for association and community. In order to keep their assumptions weak, the logical atomists did not want to assume connections between denotations, connotations, and various levels of meaning and use of language. They hoped eventually to explain such connections on the basis of the simple paraphernalia with which they began. From our present vantage point it is possible to see that the assumptions of the logical atomists were neither simple nor weak, though they may have been widely shared among members of the Vienna Circle. To assume that language and the world are composed of mutually independent simples is to make a strong assumption. Most contemporary students of language would claim that the theory which results from such an assumption is unable to account adequately for linguistic competence. It is not clear that names and ostensive definitions are primitive elements of which language is composed. They function in certain sectors of linguistic usage, but are narrowly restricted and rather sophisticated uses. They are not primitive, and they shed relatively little light on the structure or acquisition of language. Similarly, it might be the case that Rawls's assumption of mutually disinterested individuals in the original position of choice may be a strong, rather than a weak, assumption. It might have the appearance of being weak because it assumes that the initial situation is composed of simples. It might rather be the case that the ability to choose rests on a fabric of shared associations, affections, interests, skills, rules and rituals rather than that such rituals rest on a foundation of individual choices. The analogy between the analysis of language into simples which mirror the world and out of which more complex constructions are built, and the analysis of complex social forms into contracts between individuals who form v"luntary associations is not a new one. Both find an early and clear articulation in the work of John Locke. Locke, as epistemologist, gave an account of language beginning with the tabula rasa and the reception of simple impressions from the world. Locke, the liberal theorist, provided the statement of contractarian theory on which Rawls draws. Both were attempts to account for complex social Phenomena by analyzing them, without remainder, into their simple and mutually independent constituents. Much of the later work of Wittgenstein was concerned to show that the atomists had been misguided in the assumption that analysis of language into simple components would lead to fundamental and weak assumptions on which a theory of language might be built. A certain vagueness, imprecision or inability to provide rules may not be a deficiency but part of the structure of language. linguistic competence may not be vague or imprecise at all, but may appear to be only when measured against some standard which has been imported from
205
PROUDFOOT
118
outside linguistic usage or from some parochial corner of that usage. Often the attempt to provide clear models in which the use of language is analyzed into simple components leads to the loss of what is distinctive about that use. Wittgenstein argued that many such distinctions did not illumine, but obscured, the forms of life which are embedded in grammar. The point here is not that Rawls subscribes to Locke's theory of language or that he would countenance an atomistic or nominalistic interpretation of linguistic usage. It is quite clear that he would not. In comparing the problem of describing the sense of grammaticalness of a native speaker with the problem of describing and systematizing moral sentiments, Rawls appeals to Chomsky's work on syntactical structures (47n). Given this analogy with Chomsky's attempt to provide a structural model that will systematize the intuitions of the native speaker, the model offered by Rawls is individualistic and nominalistic in a manner which appears to have its counterpart in earlier approaches to the study of language and not in transformational grammar. The comparison is offered only in order to dramatize the individualistic character of Rawls's portrayal of the initial situation.
3.2. Games In the opening lines of his consideration of the idea of a social union, Rawls questions whether, given the individualistic features of justice as fairness, the contract doctrine is "a satisfactory framework for understanding the values of community, and for choosing among social arrangements to realize them" (520). He argues that a private society, in which interests are not shared, is not entailed by the contract view. Rather we are led to the idea of a social union. While many forms of life possess the characteristics of social union, Rawls suggests that it will be sufficient to think through the simpler instance of games (525). At this point the similarity between the paradigm of the original position and the analyses of game theory and of welfare economics becomes crucial. 1 have argued that the original position is nominalistic and individualistic and that i~ shares these characteristics with the theory of games. At several points Rawls Cites the Prisoner's Dilemma as a classic instance of a simple game (269n, 5J7l. In the theory of games, the rules are clearly stated, the initial positions for all ~la~ers are described, the players are assumed to be mutually disinterested, and It . IS po.ssible to calculate the most rational strategy for each player. The Pn~oner s Dilemma presents a case in which self-interested decisions from the pomt of view of each lead to a situation in which both are w::>rse off. Thus, from the perspective of the goo d o f each, some sort of cooperation . ·IS 10 · d"1ca ted in
or~er
to achieve stability. The parameters are clear and the situation can be rationally analysed in ord t h , Th . er 0 5 ow that cooperation is the best strategy. ere IS, however, another sense of the word "game" in contemporary u~ which is les · es " s restncted and formal. Wittgenstein refers to "language gam ' litical others speak of g h . . . ames t at charactenze certain personal interactiOnS or po relationships 1 th' b · tV of · n IS roader sense of the word, "game" can refer to a vane
206
RAWLS ON THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL
119
social relationships. One can speak of the games engaged in by philosophers, or by parents and children, or by men and women. In each case we understand what is meant. The notion of game can be taken as a shorthand way of referring to patterns in social relationships. But we would not say, in this context, that game theory could be applied in each of these cases or that the Prisoner's Dilemma is a simplified representation of all games. It is one very specialized kind of game in the same way in which ostensive definition is one very special ·use of language. Neither can stand for games or linguistic usage as a whole. Rawls seems to trade on the broader sense of the word "game" when he suggests that the idea of social unions such as families, friendships and other groups can be analyzed by thinking through the simpler instance of games. Then he returns to the notion of game which is dominant thoughout the work, and to the theory of games. The broader connotation is ordinarily used to designate social relationships, while the narrower one is individualistic. This sliP.page in the meaning of the word "game" aids him in his attempt to account for social and communal values on a foundation which is theoretically individualistic. 6 In the theory of games, each individual rationally calculates the most prudential plan to adopt from his or her position. The game consists primarily of a number of decisions or choices. It requires of the players only rational calculation and choices between clear alternatives. This is in contrast, for instance, to the games children play when they "play house," or even to the game of basketball. In the latter cases, creativity and imagination are required in order even to pose choices which might be made. Decisions are continually involved, but they are certainly not the salient aspects of the game of playing house. The Prisoner's Dilemma, however, and similar examples are the types of games which form the paradigms for the contemporary theory of games, employed extensively by welfare economists and by some social psychologists. By way of contrast, consider Wittgenstein's discussion of games in the Investigations. Wittgenstein sees no possibility of giving an exact definition of a game, or of clearly specifying the conditions of one. It is in the attempt to articulate similarities between games that he arrives at his notion of a family resemblance. There may be no feature which is common to all games, but they may resemble one another as do members of a family. For how is the concept of a game bounded? What still co;.~nts as a game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary? No. You can draw one; for none has so far been drawn. (But that never troubled you before when you used the word "game.") · · · "But then the use of the word is unregulated, the 'game' we play With 1t IS unregulated." -It is not everywhere circumscribed by rules; but no more are there any rules for how high one throws the ball in tennis, or how hard; yet tennis is a game for all that and has rules too IWittgenstein, 1953: 1• § 68).
Wittgenstein focuses on the differenc~s between games. We know what games are, but they cannot be specified in terms of common features. He suggests that
207
PROUDFOOT
120
although we might say that all games have rules, some of these rules are only tacit, are not set out in any list of rules, and perhaps could not be so set out. Some games, language games, forms of life, depend upon ritual action, tacit knowledge and patterns of activity that are not matters of conscious attention. Such rules as exist are neither explicit, public or fixed. The Prisoner's Dilemma would be no game at all in the context of the theory of games if there were an added rule that the players could make up rules as they went along. Yet Wittgenstein suggests that some games allow, and even demand, just that. The point is that the notion of game is imprecise. For his analysis of decision, Rawls draws on the game of game theory. Explicit public rules, mutual disinterest, and the possibility of rational prudential calculation as well as self-interested cooperation are marks of the theory of justice as fairness as well as of the Prisoner's Dilemma. When he employs the notion of game as an example of a social union, however, he is able to trade on a less precise notion of game and on the recent use by Wittgenstein and others of the analogy of game with various complex forms of social affiliation and cooperation. In the model represented by the theory of games, each player is an isolated agent. Mutual disinterest is a condition of the game. Benevolence and envy are eliminated. Each player is bound by no ties to the other players, except those ties which are explicitly articulated in the public rules of the game. Wittgenstein's conception of game, however, extends to many areas of life in which there are no publicly articulated rules. His well-known list near the beginning of the Investigations suggests a variety of language games, including giving orders and obeying them, making a joke and telling it, asking, thanking, cursing, greeting and praying (Wittgenstein, 1953: 1, § 23). Many of these are examples of forms of life and action which are governed by rituals that are tacit, not clearly bounded and seldom conscious. Such a view of the variety of games suggests numerous associative bonds on the personal, social and cultural levels. One must know how to speak the language, what praying involves, how to act wi~hin a particular ritual context. The knowledge required cannot be clearly articulated in a list of rules or strategies. It is a matter of belonging to a community, of learning a way of life, or participating in a linguistic and so~ial order which provides the context for these rituals and games. Ostensive ?efinition, though it appears to be primitive, presupposes a social context before It can be understood. Wittgenstein's notion of game demands a conception of persons related to one another by many and varied social tissues and rituals, while the Prisoner's Dilemma suggests a game which is voluntarily entered by agents with the power of rational calculation. It is impossible to conceive of a person standing outside of all games, understood in the broader sense, and then voluntarily deciding to enter the realm of games. To become human, to develop from neonate to person, is t~ ma_ture within the realm of various games, actions rules and conventions. It IS qu1te · ' 's . conceivable, though, that a person could exist outside of the Prisoner Dilemma, and voluntarily enter the realm of such a game. The first notion of
208
RAWLS ON tHE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL
121
game enters into the definition of a person, while the second presupposes the existence of the person prior to the beginning of the game. The games and forms of life in which one is involved provide the criteria for what a person is taken to be. If Rawls actually employed the Wittgensteinian notion of game, it would strongly qualify the individualistic bias that is present in his description of the original position. He describes that position in such a way, however, that it portrays individual agents who come together in order to cooperate to achieve ends which are shared, but which are still individual ends. Man remains an isolated individual agent. Wittgenstein's discussion of games and forms of life suggests that rather than viewing social institutions through the contractarian paradigm of simple mutually disinterested individuals choosing cooperative strategies, it is important to recognize that it is the theory which creates the individual, and which furnishes the criteria within which individuals are isolated as choosers, agents and wills. Then the individual agent is taken to be a fundamental simple entity out of which a contractarian notion of social justice can be built. The theory enters into a description of what an individual is at least as much as the individual provides a starting point for the development of the theory. When Wittgenstein suggests that there are games in which the players make up rules or change the rules as they go along, he is pointing to the element of imagination, interpretation and creativity which is involved in linguistic usage and social interaction. Interpretation presupposes community, creativity and improvisation, and precludes a final deductive solution. Intelligence and imagination may be involved in articulating the maximin strategy in welfare economics, but it is the solution of a game where all the constraints are given. The rational solution can be shown to be such, within the constraints of the game. Rawls understands the theory of justice to be of this type, so that it has a rational solution which can, in time, be translated into a purely deductive solution arrived at by prudential calculation, as the game of tic-tac-toe, or the Prisoner's Dilemma, has a solution which is final for each of the players, for each condition from which one starts. One should note also that the acceptance of these principles is not conjectured as a psychological law or probability. Ideally anyway, I should like to show that their acknowledgement is the only choice consistent with the full description of the original position. The argument aims to be strictly deductive (1211.
This aim demands a notion of game or a description of the original position which can be precisely and finally articulated, exactly the notion of game and social interaction which is rejected by Wittgenstein and by others who have attempted to describe complex social activity. 4. The Right and the Good Rawls is developing a notion of justice as fairness, and we have seen that
209
PROUDFOOT
122
fairness is closely correlated with fair play in the theory of games. While he carefully sets the boundaries of his task, he suggests at several points that the theory of justice as fairness' can be expanded into a theory of rightness as fairness, and that the resulting ethical position is one in which the concept of right is prior to that of the good ( 17 ,111,196). It will be argued in the next section that the model of the original position includes elements of a conception of the good, or of a particular perfectionist ideal. It is sometimes unclear how much scope Rawls is claiming for the theory. Justice as fairness is not a complete contract theory. For it is clear that the contractarian idea can be extended to the choice of more or less an entire ethical system, that is, to a system including principles for all the virtues and not only for justice (17).
The considerations adduced above suggest that the contract notion may be adequate to a rather more narrowly conceived conception of justice and may describe the concern for fair play which is one aspect of the moral sense, but cannot serve as a paradigf)'l for mapping the moral sentiments more generally. The analogy with theories of language may be helpful here. Ostensive definition and clearly articulated rules are characteristic of some subsystems of linguistic usage such as the coining of new terms in a technical discipline or the agreement upon rules in a formal game. Each of these subsystems, however, presupposes a larger realm of linguistic usage. It should not be claimed that the hypothetical voluntaristic paradigm is adequate for a comprehensive account of either linguistic usage or ethical justification. Certain situations, such as the distribution of an indivisible benefit by means of a lottery, the establishment of laws that do not discriminate between individuals, and the fair opportunity for everyone to enter each position in society are central to the theory and may be proper analogues to the paradigms of game theory. But Rawls has said that the theory of justice as fairness cannot succeed if it cannot explain the value of community. Why is th'is the case? If Rawls were concerned only to provide an account of the sense of justice more narrowly conceived, why should he be responsible for an account of the value of community? In the section on the idea of the social union he claims, as we have 'I seen, to understand the values of art, science, friendships and other shared socl~ ends. by .a.nalogy with an analysis of games and of rational choice. Self·respect IS also JUStified by appeal to rational ~If-interest. Arguments have been adduced earlier to show that Rawls's theorY as presented in the descr·1pt'1on of t h e ongmal . . . . pos1t1on cannot accou nt for the . vallles of commun'lt d h . . I0 ped With Y an t at the 1dea of a social union IS deve reference to the f . . . . If in the . . ramework of the ongmal position The ind1v1dual se ted ongmal p051·r · •on presupposes associations and values which are not accoun f or by the theory 1n50f . . he theorY • • • ar as these soc1al supports are dealt w•th by t they are J t'f'ed are us 1 1 on the basis of voluntary choice. In fact, however, theY presupposed by the possibility of voluntary choice.
210
RAWLS ON THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL
123
Rawls considers the social context needed to develop and to maintain the moral personality which is presupposed by the original position. But these concerns are considered under the rubric of the conditions necessary for the stability of the sense of justice. They are not addressed in the theory proper, but as part of the furnishings that are required in order to provide for the applicability of the theory. Under the rubric of stability, they appear to be morally neutral. In fact these conditions are not neutral, but reflect the premium on autonomy, liberty and mutual independence which is characteristic of the liberal tradition. While I believe these values to be worthy of their position in the theory, they are exemplified by the theory rather than derived from it. 7 Again, presuppositions which Rawls takes to be weak conditions may in fact be strong ones. According to Rawls, a just society is one that approximates a social structure which would result from the rational choices of the individuals who compose it. But a certain social context of mutual respect, linguistic patterns, rituals, supporting institutions and affiliative ties is a necessary condition for an individual capabl~ of rational choice. 8 It might be argued that Rawls has provided an hypothetical construction of the original position and thus is not responsible, within the theory itself, for a genetic account of the conditions of social existence. The issue is not whether Rawls is aware of the social genesis of the individual, but whether or not contractarian theory contains sufficient resources to enable him to accomplish his task. Of course, the description of the original position is hypothetical. The linguistic paradigms provided by the atomists were also hypothetical. It was not suggested that language had actually developed by explicit voluntary consent. The paradigm was rejected not because it could not account for the historical development of language, but because it was shown to be inadequate for a description of the complexities of linguistic usage. Claims for the analysis of language into simples and for the assumption of weak conditions were later discovered to obscure rather strong conditions and controversial assumptions contained in the paradigm.
5. Religion and the Contract Theory Three points at which the study of religion may be relevant for an appraisal of the theory of justice as fairness merit comment. They are ( 1) the social character of the self as observed in the symbolic and ritualistic activity of religion, (2) the affinity of the attempt to discover a neutral Archimedean point in the original position with religious understandings of transcendence, especially in theistic traditions, and (3) the "perfectionist" character of most religious visions. One of the reasons for the success with which Rawls's enterprise has been greeted is that he brings together systematically two diverse traditions of conceiving of the individual self in society. The first is that of recent Anglo-American philosophy and particularly philosophical ethics. While a conception of the self as individual agent understood primarily as will has
211
PROUDFOOT
124
predominated in this tradition, especially in analytic and existentialist ethics, the need for a social conception has been recognized. Analysis of the nuances of linguistic usage is itself a form of attention to the rituals and institutions of social life, but a social conception of the self has not been characteristic of this tradition. The second tradition is that of pragmatism in this country and of sociology and social psychology in Europe. Durkheim and Weber initiated a tradition of sociological theory which has been influential in contemporary ethics and which emphasizes social facts and structures as primary. Dewey. Mead and others in the pragmatist tradition emphasized the social character of all knowledge and action and described the development of the autonomous choosing individual from less differentiated forms. In this tradition, individual symbols and actions are understood by considering the social and cultural context and the variety of resources which are available to the individual. From this perspective, the isolated individual is not conceived as a simple entity from which the social order is constructed, but is described as differentiating himself from his environment. Excessive isolation is characterized as alienation, and there is 8 longing for community, and for the integration of the social order through shared cultural values. Attempts to provide general theoretical accounts of religion have seldom met with widespread agreement. It is difficult to provide criteria which are at once specific enough to be meaningful, and general enough to embrace all of the phenomena which most of us would describe as religious. But the study of religion reveals shared symbols, goals, visions of the admirable and the worshipful, and conceptions of that which makes a person worthy of respect, which are prior to and more fundmental than the autonomous self or the notion of~ contractual relationship between persons. Religious experience, symbols and actions all express the recognition that the individual cannot be conceived solelY as a rational ego and will. Forms of religious life may be ascetic, anti·social or ecs.tatic, but all express ad~iration~ worship, conceptions.of th~ sacred, in te:: whJch are communal. Fulfallment 1s conceived as the umty wath nature or cosmos, overcoming illusory boundaries, building a new society or kingdom of God, the reunion of all persons in the land of the dreaming, and often su_ch visions are dramatized in the systems of symbols and action which characteraze religious life. As the rituals of human language are social, so religion ex~ressesa context of values, goals and actions in which the individual is situated an sorne broader and more fundamental context. · Even within the rational puritanism of Kant the comprehensive context 10 which the individual is set is provided by the id~als of pure reason and bY the postulates of the second Critique. When Kant describes and advocates the mov~ from an eth"1ca1 state of nature to an ethical commonwealth, he cpnce ivesdthhe15 commonwealth as the concept of a people of God under ethical laws, an_. describes religion within the limits of reason as serving the function of unit·'"~ persons under a common lawgiver. Kant draws the notion of the ethiCS
212
RAWLS ON THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL
125
commonwealth from Rousseau and the social contract tradition, but he places it in the context of his critique of religion. The commonwealth is one of individual agents u·nited in the idea of a people of God which can only be realized in human organization through some form of religious institution. A feature which differentiates the theory of justice as fairness from the ethical theories of pragmatism and of many who have emphasized the social character of the self is its claim to have discovered an Archimedean point, a neutral ground from which principles might be evaluated and chosen. The pragmatists considered the construction of good to be the resultant of conflicts between various interests in the society. They rejected any possibility. of transcending that field of conflict in order to discover some neutral point from which the field could be surveyed. The original position provides such a transcendent point from which to generate principles that can be used in the resolution of social conflicts and in the reform of institutions. This is part of the Kantian legacy in thedoctrine of justice as fairness. The function of the original position as one which provides a point of transcendence in the theory is similar to that of the notion of God in theistic traditions. By imaginatively adopting the perspective of the original position, one. can adopt the moral point of view, or a point of view which transcends those of individual self-interests. The similar attempt to achieve a transcendent perspective by the eighteenth century notion of the disinterested sympathetic spectator has often been closely related to theistic thought (see Reynolds, 1970). One of the functions of doctrines of God has been to affirm this kind of transcendence. Doctrines of God attempt to achieve a transcendence of parochial interests, but they also reflect a conception of what is thought to be admirable or worshipful. They include an element of what Rawls calls "perfectionism," the characterization of a particular sort of human excellence as good or admirable. God is transcendent, but is not neutral with respect to human ideals or perfections. Doctrines of God have served not only to provide transcendence, but have also embodied conceptions of the supremely good or worthy. Even attempts to avoid any such reflection of human ideals by defining God as "wholly other" in neo-orthodox writings meant that the perfections of freedom and autonomy, surety human ideals themselves, were glorified and taken to be most worthy of our admiration. Freedom was a perfection that was dramatized in the doctrine of God's utter transcendence. Rawls notes that different interpretations of the initial situation yield different conceptions of justice. He conjectures that each traditional conception of justice may be correlated with an interpretation of the initial situation (121). This correlation may be due not only to the process of calculation of the principles which would be chosen under different conditions, but to the fact that each interpretation embodies different ideals or values which are taken to be of unquestioned worth. The distinctive character of the original position, for instance, in contrast to the theory. of the ideal observer is the priority it gives to
213
PROUDFOOT
126
liberty and to the autonomy of each individual. The interpretation of the original position in the theory of justice as fairness is not a neutral one. It contains certain ideals or images of what a person is or should be. Rawls notes that the theory, as an ideal-regarding theory, occupies an intermediate position between perfectionism and utilitarianism (327). It shares with perfectionism the characteristic that a certain ideal is built into the theory. In the case of justice as fairness, this ideal is that of the autonomous individual. While it is certainly a worthy ideal, it must be recognized as such. It may be more admirable but is not necessarily a weaker or less perfectionistic assumption than would be some organic notion of society. The conditions of the original position could be described in such a way as to eliminate the postulate of mutual disinterest. Such an interpretation would be more complicated in the sense that the procedures of simple game theory would not be as readily applicable as in the present case, but it is not clear that an organic conception of society would involve stronger assumptions than that of mutual disinterest. It would involve different assumptions, and a different conception of what is admirable. Both the assumption of mutual disinterest with the priority of liberty and the assumption of an organic model with intertwining interests incorporate certain ideals or notions of perfection. Rawls has chosen the former and has provided good reasons for his choice, but it is misleading to suggest that he has remained neutral, rejecting perfectionism and keeping his assumptions weak. The original position can be seen as the dramatization of a particular human ideal. Religious traditions each contain conceptions of the good and idea.ls of perfection. For many traditions, the liberty and autonomy of the individual has not been a central part of such conceptions. In many cultures in the past, individual liberty was not held essential for self-respect and may, in some cases, have been inimical to it. It may well be, and I would suspect, that in the modern world the priority of liberty cannot be disregarded without the destruction of self-respect. But the conception of a person as an autonomous individual for ~hom liberty is primary and essential to his self-respect is a statement of an Ide~'·. of what is admirable in human life. The interpretation of the original position in justice as fairness functions both to achieve transcendence of the parochial and to embody a perfectionist ideal.
214
RAWLS ON THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL
127
1Page references in the text refer to Rawls, 1971, unless otherwise designated. 2 For a critique of this image of the person, see Murdoch, 1970:9ff. 3 Rawls distinguishes between duties and obligations (114, 333ff.). Obligations rest upon actual voluntary acts of consent, but duties apply to us without regard to voluntary .acts. Both duties and obligations, however, are derived from the contractarian point of view. They are principles that would be chosen in the original position, though it is not necessary that they be actually chosen in a particular society. 4 The example of artificial intelligence is not as irrelevant as it might seem in this context. In introducing the notion of rational plan which is central to his conception of rational choice, Rawls refers to Miller, Galanter and Pribram, 1960, for a discussion of plans. This volume has been influential in cognitive psychology for its attempt to describe human planning and behavior by analogy to computer programs. For a consideration of the limitations of some of this WQrk, see Dreyfus, 1972. 5The Aristotelian Principle, postulated by Rawls as a basic principle of motivation must, of course, be justified empirically. Rawls appeals to our sense that "it seems to be borne out by many facts of everyday life, and by the behavior of children and some of the higher animals" (431). The principle seems intuitively sound, but he does not cite any specific data in support of it. 6 For a classification of different kinds of games and a differentiation between formal and informal intelligent activities, see Dreyfus, 1972:204-208. Dreyfus notes that many complex human activities are regular but not rule-governed. 7Thomas Nagel has made a similar point: "I have attempted to argue that the presumptions of the contract method Rawls employs are rather strong, and that the original position therefore offers less independent support to his conclusions than at first appears. The egalitarian liberalism which he develops and the conception of good on which it depends are extremely persuasive, but the original position serves to model rather than to justify them" (1973:233). 8 Stuart Hampshire makes a similar point when he refers to "the psychology of moral sentiments, which suggests that guilt or shame about injustice and unfairness, and natural .respect for their opposites, extends to more primitive relations between people than are imagined by his [Rawls's) hypothesis of a rational choice of an unbiased social order" (Hampshire, 1972:38).
215
PROUDFOOT
128 REFERENCES
Dreyfus, Hubert L. 1972 What Computers Can't Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason. New York: Harper and Row. Hampshire, Stuart 1972 "A new philosophy of the just society." The New York Review of Books 18 (February 24):34-39. Miller, George; Galanter, Eugene; and Pribram, Karl H. 1960 Plans and the Structure of Behavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Murdoch, Iris 1970 The Sovereignty of Good. New York: Schock en Books. Nagel, Thomas 1973 "Rawls on justice." The Philosophical Review 82 (April): 200-234. Rawls, John 1958 "Justice as fairness." The Philosophical Review 61 (April): 164-194. 1971 A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Reynolds, Charles H. 1970 "A proposal for understanding the place of reason in Christian ethics." The Journal of Religion 50 (April):155-168. Royce, Josiah 1914 The Philosophy of Loyalty. New York: The Macmillan Company. Wittgenstein, Ludwig Philosophical Investigations. Anscombe, tr. New York: The 1953 Macmillan Company.
216
THE PROCEDURAL REPUBLIC AND THE UNENCUMBERED SELF MICHAELJ. SANDEL Harvard University
OLITICAL PHILOSOPHY seems often to reside at a distance from the world. Principles are one thing, politics another, and even our best efforts to "live up" to our ideals typically founder on the gap between theory and practice. 1 But if political philosophy is unrealizable in one sense, it is unavoidable in another. This is the sense in which philosophy inhabits the world from the start; our practices and institutions are embodiments of theory. To engage in a political practice is already to stand in relation to theory. 2 For all our uncertainties about ultimate questions of political philosophy-of justice and value and the nature of the good life-the one thing we know is that we live some answer all the time. In this essay I will try to explore the answer we live now, in contemporary America. What is the political philosophy implicit in our practices and institutions? How does it stand, as philosophy? And how do tensions in the philosophy find expression in our present political condition? It may be objected that it is a mistake to look for a single philosophy, that we live no "answer," only answers. But a plurality of answers is itself a kind of answer. And the political theory that affirms this plurality is the theory I propose to explore.
AUTHOR"S NOTE: An earlier version of this arricle was presented to the Political Philosophy Colloquium at Princeton University. and to the Legal Theory Workshop at ColumbiQ Law School. I am grateful to the participants. and also to the Editor, William Co1111o/ly. for helpful comments and criticisms. I would also like to thank the Ford Foundlluo, for support ofa larger project of which this essay is a first installment.
P0LrriCAL THEORY, Vol. 12. No. I, February 1984 81-96 0 1984 Sqe Publications, Inc.
217
82
POLITICAL THEORY /
FEBRUARY 1984
THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD
We might begin by considering a certain moral and political vision. It is a liberal vision, and like most liberal visions gives pride of place to justice, fairness, and individual rights. Its core thesis is this: a just society seeks not to promote any particular ends, but enables its citizens to pursue their own ends, consistent with a similar liberty for all; it therefore must govern by principles that do not presuppose any particular conception of the good. What justifies these regulative principles above all is not that they maximize the general welfare, or cultivate virtue, or otherwise promote the good, but rather that they conform to the concept of right, a moral category given prior to the good, and independent of it. This liberalism says, in other words, that what makes the just society just is not the telos or purpose or end at which it aims, but precisely its refusal to choose in advance among competing purposes and ends. In its constitution and its laws, the just society seeks to provide a framework within which its citizens can pursue their own values and ends, consistent with a similar liberty for others. The ideal I've described might be summed up in the claim that the right is prior to the good, and in two senses: The priority of the right means first, that individual rights cannot be sacrificed for the sake ofthe general good (in this it opposes utilitarianism), and second, that the principles of justice that specify these rights cannot be premised on any particular vision of the good life. (In this it opposes teleological conceptions in general.) !his is the liberalism of much contemporary moral and politi~al philosophy, most fully elaborated by Rawls, and indebted to Kant for tts philosophical foundations. 3 But I am concerned here less with the lineage of this vision than with what seem to me three striking facts about it. First, it has a deep and powerful philosophical appeal. Second, despite its philosophical force, the claim for the priority of the righ~ over th~ g~od ultimately fails. And third, despite its philosophical fatl~re, thts bberal vision is the one by which we live. For us in late twentt~tb ~entury America, it is our vision, the theory most thoroughly embodted In the practices and institutions most central to our public life. And seeing how it goes wrong as philosophy may help us to diagnose 0~ present political condition. So first its philosophical power; second, tU · • ~hilosophical fatlure; and third, however briefly, its uneasy embod'tment 1n the world.
218
Sandel / THE UNENCUMBERED SELF
83
But before taking up these three claims, it is worth pointing out a central theme that connects them. And that is a certain conception of the person, of what it is to be a moral agent. Like all political theories, the liberal theory I have described is something more than a set of regulative principles. It is also a view about the way the world is, and the way we move within it. At the heart of this ethic lies a vision of the person that both inspires and undoes it. As I will try to argue now, what make this ethic so compelling, but also, finally, vulnerable, are the promise and the failure of the unencumbered self.
KANT/AN FOUNDATIONS
. The . liberal ethic asserts the priority of right, and seeks principles of.
JUStice that do not presuppose any particular conception of the good. This is what Kant means by the supremacy of the moral law, and what Rawls means when he writes that "justice is the first virtue of social institutions .•.s Justice is more than just another value. It provides the framework that regulates the play of competing values and ends; it must therefore have a sanction independent of those ends. But it is not obvious where such a sanction could be found. Theories ofjustice, and for that matter, ethics, have typically founded their claims on one or another conception of human purposes and ends. Thus Aristotle said the measure of a polis is the good at which it aims, and even J .S. Mill, who in the nineteenth century called "justice the chief part, and incomparably the most binding part of all morality," made justice an instrument of utilitarian ends. 6 This is the solution Kant's ethic rejects. Different persons typically have different desires and ends, and so any principle derived from them can only be contingent. But the moral Jaw needs a categorical foundation, not a contingent one. Even so universal a desire as happiness will not do. People still differ in what happiness consists of, and to install any particular conception as regulative would impose on some the conceptions of others, and so deny at least to some the freedom to choose their own conceptions. In any case, to govern ourselves in conformity with desires and inclinations, given as they are by nature or circumstance, is not really to be self-governing at all. It is rather a refusal of freedom, a capitulation to determinations given outside us. According to Kant, the right is "derived entirely from the concept of freedom in the external relationships of human beings, and has nothing
219
84
POLITICAL THEORY
/
FEBRUARY 1984
to do with the end which all men have by nature [i.e., the aim of achieving happiness] or with the recognized means of attaining this end ..J As such, it must have a basis prior to all empirical ends. Only when I am governed by principles that do not presuppose any particular ends am I free to pursue my own ends consistent with a similar freedom for all. But this still leaves the question of what the basis of the right could possibly be. If it must be a basis prior to all purposes and ends, unconditioned even by what Kant calls "the special circumstances of human nature,,. where could such a basis conceivably be found? Given the stringent demands of the Kantian ethic, the moral law would seem almost to require a foundation in nothing, for any empirical precondition would undermine its priority. "Duty!" asks Kant at his most lyrical, "What origin is there worthy of thee, and where is to be found the root of thy noble descent which proudly rejects all kinship with the inclinations?"' His answer is that the basis of the moral law is to be found in the subject, not the object of practical reason, a subject capable of an autonomous will. No empirical end, but rather "a subject of ends, namely a rational being himself, must be made the ground for all maxims of action. " 10 Nothing other than what Kant calls "the subject of all possible ends himself" can give rise to the right, for only this subject is also the subject of an autonomous will. Only this subject could be that "something which elevates man above himself as part of the world of sense" and enables him to participate in an ideal, unconditioned realm wholly independent of our social and psychological inclinations. And only this thoroughgoing independence can afford us the detachment we need if we are ever freely to choose for ourselves, unconditioned by the vagaries of circumstance. 11 Who or what exactly is this subject? It is, in a certain sense, us. ~e moral law, afterall, is a law we give ourselves; we don 'tfindit, we willtt. That is how it (and we) escape the reign of nature and circumstance and merely empirical ends. But what is important to see is that the "we"who do the willing are not "we"qua particular persons, you and me, each for ours~l~es-the moral law is not up to us as individuals-but "we" q~a ~art1c1~ants in what Kant calls "pure practical reason," "we" qua parUctpants 10 a transcendental subject. N ~~ what is to guarantee that I am a subject of this kind, capa~le of exerctsmg pure practical reason? Well, strictly speaking, there .rs. no guar~t~; the transcendental subject is only a possibility. But tt 18 a posslblltty I ·must presuppose if I am to think of myself as a free moral agent. Were I wholly an empirical being, I would not be capable of 220
Sandel / THE UNENCUMBERED SELF
85
freedom, for every exercise of will would be conditioned by the desire for some object. All choice would be heteronomous choice, governed by the pursuit of some end. My will could never be a first cause, only the effect of some prior cause, the instrument of one or another impulse or inclination. "When we think of ourselves as free," writes Kant, "we transfer ourselves into the intelligible world as members and recognize the autonomy of the will. " 12 And so the notion of a subject prior to and independent of experience, such as the Kantian ethic requires, appears not only possible but indispensible, a necessary presupposition of the possibility of freedom. How does all of this come back to politics? As the subject is prior to its ends, so the right is prior to the good. Society is best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not presuppose any particular conception of the good, for any other arrangement would fail to respect persons as being capable of choice; it would treat them as objects rather than subjects, as means rather than ends in themselves. We can see in this way how Kant's notion of the subject is bound up with the claim for the priority of right. But for those in the AngloAmerican tradition, the transcendental subject will seem a strange foundation for a familiar ethic. Surely, one may think, we can take rights seriously and affirm the primacy of justice without embracing the Critique of Pure Reason. This, in any case, is the project of Rawls. He wants to save the priority of right from the obscurity of the transcendental subject. Kant's idealist metaphysic, for all its moral and political advantage, cedes too much to the transcendent, and wins for justice its primacy only by denying it its human situation. "To develop a viable Kantian conception of justice," Rawls writes, "the force and content of Kant's doctrine must be detached from its background in transcendental idealism" and recast within the "canons of a reasonable empiricism. " 13 And so Rawls' project is to preserve Kant's moral and political teaching by replacing Germanic obscurities with a domesticated metaphysic more congenial to the Anglo-American temper. This is the role of the original position.
FROM TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT TO UNENCUMBERED SELF
The original position tries to provide what Kant's transcendental argument cannot-a foundation for the right that is prior to the good,
221
86
POLITICAL THEORY
I FEBRUARY 1984
but still situated in the world. Sparing all but essentials, the original position works like this: It invites us to imagine the principles we would choose to govern our society if we were to choose them in advance, before we knew the particular persons we would be-whether rich or poor, strong or weak, lucky or unlucky-before we knew even our interests or aims or conceptions of the good. These principles-the ones we would choose in that imaginary situation-are the principles of justice. What is more, if it works, they are principles that do not presuppose any particular ends. What they do presuppose is a certain picture of the person, of the way we must be if we are beings for whom justice is the first virtue. This is the picture of the unencumbered self, a self understood as prior to and independent of purposes and ends. Now the unencumbered self describes first of all the way we stand toward the things we have, or want, or seek. It means there is always a distinction between the values I have and the person I am. To identify any characteristics as my aims, ambitions, desires, and so on, is always to imply some subject .. me" standing behind them, at a certain distance, and the shape of this ••me" must be given prior to any of the aims or attributes I bear. One consequences of this distance is to put the self itselfbeyond the reach of its experience, to secure its identity once and for all. Or to put the point another way, it rules out the possibility of what we might call constitutive ends. No role or commitment could define me so completely that I could not understand myself without it. No p~oject could be so essential that turning away from it would call into question the person I am. For the unencumbered self, what matters above all, what is most essential to our personhood, are not the ends we choose but our capacity to c~o~se them. T~e original position sums up this central claim about us. It Is not our aJms that primarily reveal our nature," writes Rawls, .. but rather the principles that we would acknowledge to govern the background conditions under which these aims are to be formed··· We should therefore reverse the relation between the right and the good propose~ by teleo~ogical doctrines and view the right as prior. " 14 On_ly 1f the self IS prior to its ends can the right be prior to the good. Only if my identity is never tied to the aims and interests I may have at any moment can I think of myself as a free and independent agent, capable of choice. · This n0 f 10n of mdependence carries consequences for the k'1nd of
.
commumty of which we are capable. Understood as unencumbere
222
d
Sandel I THE UNENCUMBERED SELF
87
selves, we are of course free to join in voluntary association with others, and so are capable of community in the cooperative sense. What is denied to the unencumbered self is the possibility of membership in any community bound by moral ties antecedent to choice; he cannot belong to any community where the self itself could be at stake. Such a community-call it constitutive as against merely cooperative-would engage the identity as well as the interests of the participants, and so implicate its members in a citizenship more thoroughgoing than the unencumbered self can know. For justice to be primary, then, we must be creatures of a certain kind, related to human circumstance in a certain way. We must stand to our circumstance always at a certain distance, whether as transcendental subject in the case of Kant, or as unencumbered selves in the case of Rawls. Only in this way can we view ourselves as subjects as well as objects of experience, as agents and not just instruments of the purposes we pursue. The unencumbered self and the ethic it inspires, taken together, hold out a liberating vision. Freed from the dicates of nature and the sanction of social roles, the human subject is installed as sovereign, cast as the author of the only moral meanings there are. As participants in pure practical reason, .or as parties to the original position, we are free to construct principles of justice unconstrained by an order of value antecedently given. And as actual, individual selves, we are free to choose our purposes and ends unbound by such an order, or by custom or tradition or inherited status. So lorig as they are not unjust, our conceptions of the good carry weight, whatever they are, simply in virtue of our having chosen them. We are, in Rawls' words, "self-originating sources of valid claims."15 This is an exhilarating promise, and the liberalism it animates is perhaps the fullest expression of the Enlightenment's quest for the self-defining subject. But is it true? Can we make sense of our moral and political life by the light of the self-image it requires? I do not think we can, and I will try to show why not by arguing first within the liberal project, then beyond it.
JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY
We have focused so far on the foundations of the liberal vision, on the Way it derives the principles it defends. Let us turn briefly now to the
223
88
POLITICAL THEORY I
FEBRUARY 1984
substance of those principles, using Rawls as our example. Sparing all but essentials once again, Rawls 'two principles of justice are these: first, equal basic liberties for all, and second, only those social and economic inequalities that benefit the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle). In arguing for these principles, Rawls argues against two familiar alternatives-utilitarianism and libertarianism. He argues against utili· tarianism that it fails to take seriously the distinction between persons. In seeking to maximize the general welfare, the utilitarian treats society as whole as if it were a single person; it conflates our many, diverse desires into a single system of desires, and tries to maximize. It is indifferent to the distribution of satisfactions among persons, except insofar as this may affect the overall sum. But this fails to respect our plurality and distinctness. It uses some as means to the happiness of all, and so fails to respect each as an end in himself. While utilitarians may sometimes defend individual rights, their defense must rest on the calculation that respecting those rights will serve utility in the long run. But this calculation is contingent and uncertain. So long as utility is what Mill said it is, "the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions,"16 individual rights can never be secure. To avoid the danger that their life prospects might one day be sacrificed for the greater good of others, the parties to the original position therefore insist on certain basic liberties for all, and make those liberties prior. If utilitarians fail to take seriously the distinctness of persons, libertarians go wrong by failing to acknowledge the arbitrariness of fortune. They define as just whatever distribution results from an efficient market economy, and oppose all redistribution on the grounds that people are entitled to whatever they get, so long as they do not cheat or steal or otherwise violate someone's rights in getting it. Rawls opposes this principle on the ground that the distribution of talents an~ ass~ts and even efforts by which some get more and others get less 15 ~blt~ary from a moral point of view, a matter of good luck. To dlstnbute the good things in life on the basis of these differences is not to do ~usti~, but simply to carry over into human arrangements !~ arbltranness of social and natural contingency. We deserve, as indtVl· duals, neither the talents our good fortune may have brought, nor the benefits that flow from them. We should therefore regard these talents · · sof· ascommon assets, and regard one another as common benefictane
224
Sandel I THE UNENCUMBERED SELF
89
the rewards they bring. "Those who have been favored by nature, whoever they are, may gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out ... In justice as fairness, men agree to share one another's fate. " 17 This is the reasoning that leads to the difference principle. Notice how it reveals, in yet another guise, the logic of the unencumbered self. I cannot be said to deserve the benefits that flow fro~. say, my fine physique and good looks, because they are only accidental, not essential facts about me. They describe attributes I have, not the person I am, and so cannot give rise to a claim of desert. Being an unencumbered self, this is true of everything about me. And so I cannot, as an individual, deserve anything at all. However jarring to our ordinary understandings this argument may be, the picture so far remains intact; the priority of right, the denial of desert, and the unencumbered self all hang impressively together. But the difference principle requires more, and it is here that the argument comes undone. The difference principle begins with the thought, congenial to the unencumbered self, that the assets I have are only accidentally mine. But it ends by assuming that these assets are therefore common assets and that society has a prior claim on the fruits of their exercise. But this assumption is without warrant. Simply because I, as an individual, do not have a privileged claim on the assets accidentally residing "here," it does not follow that everyone in the world collectively does. For there is no reason to think that their location in society's province or, for that matter, within the province of humankind, is any less arbitrary from a moral point of view. And if their arbitrariness within me makes them ineligible to serve my ends, there seems no obvious reason why their arbitrariness within any partiuclar society should not make them ineligible to serve that society's ends as well. To put the point another way, the difference principle, like utilitarianism, is a principle of sharing. As such, it must presuppose some prior moral tie among those whose assets it would deploy and whose efforts it would enlist in a common endeavor. Otherwise, it is simply a ~ormula for using some as means to others ends, a formula this liberalism is committed to reject. But on the cooperative vision of community alone, it is unclear what the moral basis for this sharing could be. Short of the constitutive
225
90
POLITICAL THEORY
/
FEBRUARY 1984
conception, deploying an individual's assets for the sake of the common good would seem an offense against the "plurality and distinctness" of individuals this liberalism seeks above all to secure. If those whose fate I am required to share really are, morally speaking, others. rather than fellow participants in a way of life with which my identity is bound, the difference principle falls prey to the same objections as utilitarianism. Its claim on me is not the claim of a constitutive community whose attachments I acknowledge, but rather the claim of a concatenated collectivity whose entanglements I confront. What the difference principle requires, but cannot provide, is some way of identifying those among whom the assets I bear are properly regarded as common, some way of seeing ourselves as mutually indebted and morally engaged to begin with. But as we have seen, the constitutive aims and attachments that would save and situate the difference principle are precisely the ones denied to the liberal self; the moral encumbrances and antecedent obligations they imply would undercut the priority of right. What, then, of those encumbrances? The point so far is that we cannot be persons for whom justice is primary, and also be persons for whom the difference principle is a principle of justice. But which must give way? Can we view ourselves as independent selves, independent in the sense that our identity is never tied to our aims and attachments? I do not think we can, at least not without cost to those loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are-as members of this family or community or nation or people, as bearers ofthat history, as citizens ofthis republic. Allegiances such .as t~ese are more than values I happen to have, and to hold, at a certam d1stance. They go beyond the obligations I voluntarily incur and the "natural duties" I owe to human beings as such. They allow that to some I owe more than justice requires or even permits, not by reason of agreements I have made but instead in virtue of those more or less enduring attachments and commitments that, taken together, partlY define the person I am. To imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments such as these is not to conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly without character, without moral depth. For to have character is to know that I move in a history 1 neither summon nor command, which carries consequences nonetheless for my choices an~ conduct. It draws me closer to some and more distant from others; 1t
226
Sandel I THE UNENCUMBERED SELF
91
makes some aims more appropriate, others less so. As a self-interpreting being, I am able to reflect on my history and in this sense to distance myself from it, but the distance is always precarious and provisional, the point of reflection never finally secured outside the history itself. But the liberal ethic puts the self beyond the reach of its experience, beyond deliberation and reflection. Denied the expansive self-understandings that could shape a common life, the liberal self is left to lurch between detachment on the one hand, and entanglement on the other. Such is the fate of the unencumbered self, and its liberating promise.
THE PROCEDURAL REPUBLIC But before my case can be complete, I need to consider one powerful reply. While it comes from a liberal direction, its spirit is more practical than philosophical. It says, in short, that I am asking too much. It is one thing to seek constitutive attachments in our private lives; among families and friends, and certain tightly knit groups, there may be found a common good that makes justice and rights less pressing. But with public life-at least today, and probably always-it is different. So long as the nation-state is the primary form of political association, talk of constitutive community too easily suggests a darker politics rather than a brighter one; amid echoes of the moral majority, the priority of right, for all its philosophical faults, still seems the safer hope. This is a challenging rejoinder, and no account of political community in the twentieth century can fail to take it seriously. It is challenging not least because it calls into question the status of political philosophy and its relation to the world. For if my argument is correct, if the liberal vision we have considered is not morally self-sufficient but parasitic on a notion of community it officially rejects, then we should expect to find that the political practice that embodies this vision is not practically self-sufficient either-that it must draw on a sense of community it cannot supply and may even undermine. But is that so far from the circumstance we face today? Could it be that through the original position darkly, on the far side of the veil of ignorance, we may glimpse an intimation of our predicament, a refracted vision of ourselves? How does the liberal vision-and its failure-help us make sense of our public life and its predicament? Consider, to begin, the following
227
92
POLITICAL THEORY
/
FEBRUARY 1984
paradox in the citizen's relation to the modern welfare state. In many ways, we in the 1980s stand near the completion of a liberal project that has run its course from the New Deal through the Great Society and into the present. But notwithstanding the extension of the franchise and the expansion on individual rights and entitlements in recent decades, there is a widespread sense that, individually and collectively, our control over the forces that govern our lives is receding rather than increasing. This sense is deepened by what appear simultaneously as the power and the powerlessness of the nation-state. One the one hand, increasing numbers of citizens view the state as an overly intrusive presence, more likely to frustrate their purposes than advance them. And yet, despite its unprecedented role in the economy and society, the modern state seems itself disempowered, unable effectively to control the domestic economy, to respond to persisting social ills, or to work America's will in the world. This is a paradox that has fed the appeals of recent politicians (including Carter and Reagan), even as it has frustrated their attempts to govern. To sort it out, we need to identify the public philosophy implicit in our political practice, and to reconstruct its arrival. We need to trace the advent of the procedural republic, by which I mean a public life animated by the liberal vision and self-image we've considered. The story of the procedural republic goes back in some ways to the founding of the republic, but is central drama begins to unfold arou~d the turn of the century. As national markets and large-scale enterpnse displaced a decentralized economy, the decentralized political forms of the early republic became outmoded as well. If democracy was to s~~ive, the concentration of economic power would have to be met by a Similar concentration of political power. But the Progressives understood, or some of them did, that the success of democracy required more !h~ the centralization of government; it also required the nationalIZation of politics. The primary form of political community had to be a ~ec~t on.~ national scale. For Herbert Croly, writing in 1909, ~be natiO.nalizmg of American political, economic, and sociallife"was an essentially formative and enlightening political transformation." We wo~ld bec~m~ mor~ ~f a democracy only as we became "more of a natio~ · .. m Ideas, m mstitutions, and in spirit. "19 This nationalizing project would be consummated in the New Deal, but for the democratic tradition in America the embrace of the nation was d · · · ' of a ec•s~ve depa~ure. From Jefferson to the populists, the ~artY democracy •n Amencan political debate had been, roughly speakmg, tbe
228
Sandel I THE UNENCUMBERED SELF
93
party of the provinces, of decentralized power, of small-town and smallscale America. And against them had stood the party of the nationlint Federalists, then Whigs, then the Republicans of Lincoln-a party that spoke for the consolidation of the union. It was thus the historic achievement of the New Deal to unite, in a single party and political program, what Samuel Beer has called ••Jiberalism and the national idea."20 What matters for our purpose is that, in the twentieth century, liberalism made its peace with concentrated power. But it was understood at the start that the terms of this peace required a strong sense of national community, morally and politically to underwrite the extended involvements of a modern industrial order. If a virtuous republic of small-scale, democratic communities was no longer a possibility, a national republic seemed democracy's next best hope. This was still, in principle at least, a politics of the common good. It looked to the nation, not as a neutral framework for the play of competing interests, but rather as a formative community, concerned to shape a common life suited to the scale of modern social and economic forms. But this project failed. By the mid- or late twentieth century, the national republic had run its course. Except for extraordinary moments, such as war, the nation proved too vast a scale across which to cultivate the shared self-understandings necessary to community in the formative, or constitutive sense. And so the gradual shift, in our practices and institutions, from a public philosophy of common purposes to one of fair procedures, from a politics of good to a politics of right, from the national republic to the procedural republic.
OUR PRESENT PREDICAMENT A full account of this transition would take a detailed look at the changing shape of political institutions, constitutional interpretation, and the terms of political discourse in the broadest sense. But I suspect we would find in the practice of the procedural republic two broad tendencies foreshadowed by its philosophy: first, a tendency to crowd out democratic possibilities; second, a tendency to undercut the kind of community on which it nontheless depends. . Where liberty in the early republic was understood as a function of democratic institutions and dispersed power, 21 1iberty in the procedural
229
94
POLITICAL THEORY /
FEBRUARY 1984
republic is defined in opposition to democracy, as an individual's guarantee against what the majority might will. I _am free insofar as I am the bearer of rights, where rights are trumps. 22 Unlike the liberty of the early republic, the modern version permits-in fact even requiresconcentrated power. This has to do with the universalizing logic of rights. Insofar as I have a right, whether to free speech or a minimum income, its provision cannot be left to the vagaries of local preferences but must be assured at the most comprehensive level of political association. It cannot be one thing in New York and another in Alabama. As rights and entitlements expand, politics is therefore displaced from smaller forms of association and relocated at the most universal form-in our case, the nation. And even as politics flows to the nation, power shifts away from democratic institutions (such as legislatures and political parties) and toward institutions designed to be insulated from democratic pressures, and hence better equipped to dispense and defend individual rights (notably the judiciary and bureaucracy). These institutional developments may begin to account for the sense of powerlessness that the welfare state fails to address and in some ways doubtless deepens. But it seems to me a further clue to our condition recalls even more directly the predicament of the unencumbered selflurching, as we left it, between detachment on the one hand, the ent~glement on the other. For it is a striking feature of the welfare state that 1t offers a powerful promise of individual rights, and also demands of its citizens a high measure of mutual engagement. But the self-iJDaF that attends the rights cannot sustain the engagement. As bearers of rights, where rights are trumps, we think of ourselves as f~ly choosing, individual selves, unbound by obligations antecedent to nghts, or to the agreements we make. And yet, as citizens of tb;e proced~ral r~pu~lic that secures these rights, we find ourselves i~pli· cate~ wllly-mlly m a formidable array of dependencies and expectauons we dld not choose and increasingly reject. In our public life, we are more entangled but less attached, thaD ~ver befor~. It is as though the unencumbered self presupposed by tbe hberal eth1c had begun to come true-less liberated than disempowered• e~tangled in a network of obligations and involvements unassocia~ Wlt~ any act of will, and yet unmediated by those common identifi-cabons or expansive self-definitions that would make them tolerable. AJ the scale of social and political organization has become JDOIC comprehensive, the terms of our collective identity have become more
230
Sandel I THE UNENCUMBERED SELF
95
fragmented, and the forms of political life have outrun the common purpose needed to sustain them. Something like this, it seems to me, has been unfolding in America for the past ~alf-century or so. I hope I have said at least enough to suggest the shape a fuller story might take. And I hope in any case to have conveyed a certain view about politics and philosophy and the relation between them-that our practices and institutions are themselves embodiments of theory, and to unravel their predicament is, at least in part, to seek after the self-image of the age.
NOTES l. An excellent example of this view can be found in Samuel Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981 ). See especially his discussion of the "ideals versus institutions" gap, pp. 10-12, 39-41, 61-84, 221-262. 2. Sec, for example, the conceptions of a "practice"advanced by Alasdair Macintyre and Charles Taylor. Macintyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 175-209. Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review of Metaphysics 25, (1971) pp. 3-Sl. 3. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton. (1785; New York: Harper and Row,l956). Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith ( 1781, 1787; London: Macmillan, 1929). Kant, Critique of Practical Reason. trans. L. W. Beck (1788; Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956). Kant, "On the Common Saying: 'This May Be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice,'" in Hans Reiss, ed., Kant's Political Writings. (1793; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). Other recent versions of the claim for the priority of the right over good can be found in Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977); Bruce Ackerman, Social Jwtice in the Uberal State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). 4. This section, and the two that follow, summarize arguments developed more fully in Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). S. Rawls (1971), p. 3. . 6. John Stuart Mill Utilitarianism, in The Utilitarians (1893; Garden C1ty: Doubleday, 1973), p. 46S. Mill, On Liberty, in The Utilitarians, p. 485 (Originally published 1849). 1. Kant (1793), p. 73. 8. Kant (1785), p. 92. 9. Kant (1788), p. 89. 10. Kant (1785), p. lOS. II. Kant (1788), p. 89.
231
96
POLITICAL THEORY
/
FEBRUARY 1984
12. 13. (1977), 14. 15. (1980),
Kant (178S), p. 121. Rawls, "The Basic Structure as Subject," American Philosophical Quarrerly p. 165. Rawls (1971), p. 560. Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," Journal of Philosophy 11 p. 543. 16. Mill (1849), p. 485. 17. Rawls (1971), pp. 101-102. 18. The account that follows is a tentative formulation of themes requiring more detailed elaboration and support. 19. Croly, The Promise of American life (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), pp. 270-273. 20. Beer, "Liberalism and the National Idea," The Public Interest, Fall (1966), PP· 70-82. 21. Sec, for example, Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional lAw (Mineola: The Foundation Press, 1978), pp. 2-3. 22. See Ronald Dworkin, "Liberalism," in Stuart Hampshire, ed., Public and Private Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 136.
Michael J. Sandel is Associate Professor of Government at Harvard University. He
is the author of Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.
Rawls and Individualism C. P.
DE L AN E Y ,
Chairntlln,
Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana 46556. The most characteristic strand of Rawls' A Theory of Justice is his strategy of justifying certain principles of justice by way of hypothetical choices made by self-interested individuals behind a veil of ignorance. Critics from both the right (Aristotelians) and the left (Marxists) have focused on this feature of his theory in mounting arguments to the effect that Rawls' account of justice is simply the narrow individualism ~f t~e modern liberal tradition in contemporary dress. The pivotal notion m the multi-faceted polemic is "individualism." In this paper I want to explore the extent to which Rawls' position is and is not individuali~tic prior to examining what can be said for and against the individualism his position actually embodies. I.
Rawls' critics from both the right and the left share an argument form that calls for closer scrutiny. Allowing for a certain degree ?f simplification, the same form can be seen to be embodied in two dif· ferent lines of attack: A. Rawls' view of society is narrowly individualistic because on his account the people in the decisive choice situation are characterized &socially and ahistorically; B. Rawls' view of persons is narrowly individualistic because on his account the people in the decisive choice situation are characterized as having no interest in one another's interests.
112
234
As an additional complication, in most discussions these arguments are not kept distinct and are often run together as if they were making the same point. The first observation to be made about these generalized arguments is that they bear on two quite different senses of "individualism." Argument A bears on metaphysical individualism (atomism) which in this case is the view that social wholes are simple aggregates of their component individuals; whereas argument B bears on ethical individualism (egoism), in this case the view that human action is/ought to be guided solely by self-interest. This being accurate, the thrust of argument A is that Rawls' position is vitiated by a metaphysically "abstract" view of persons while the thrust of argument B is that Rawls' position is vitiated by an ethically "empoverished" view of persons. It should be apparent that these are two quite different senses of "individualism"; and, however they may be related historically or even conceptually, they should be kept distinct. The second observation to be made about both of these generalized arguments is considerably more tendentious; I think they both involve the same fundamental mistake, a mistake which completely undermines them as arguments against Rawls' position. In the examination of any argued position one must clearly distinguish between the substantive conclusions of the position and the justification strategies employed in recommending those conclusions. This is not to say that these two ftatures of a total account are unrelated; but however closely related they are, it is surely still an error to move directly from characteristics of arguments for a position to characteristics of the position itself. The general character of this fundamental error can be appreciated by considering other domains. Does a probabilistic justification of a set of epistemic principles thereby commit you to only probabilistic epistemic Principles? Does a historical defense of certain moral principles thereby commit you to merely historical moral principles? And, does a prudential justification of certain political principles thereby commit you to only prudential political principles? I would submit that the answer to each in this series of questions is "no" because characteristics of the way in which a position is justified do not automatically translate into characteristics of the substantive content of the position as justified. If in a given case, there is a positive transition to be made, a specific argwnent to that effect has to be adduced. Nothing in the general form of argument licenses the inference. Arguments A and B above embody just such an unjustified transition. Both presume that because individuals in the initial choice situation are characterized abstractly and/or self-interestedly, then it must be the case that a society informed by Rawlsian substantive principles would be a~oznistic and/or egoistic. As it stands, this line of. objection in_volves a sunple misunderstanding of Rawls' position, a m1sunderstanding that seems to be without excuse given Rawls' explicit attempt to set the matter straight:
Notes and Discussion 113
235
The fact that in the original position the parties are characterized as not interested in one another's concerns does not entail that persons in ordinary life that hold the ·principles that would be agreed to are similarly disinterested in one another.... The motiva· tion of the persons in the original position must not be confused with the motivations of persons in everyday life that accept the principles that would be chosen and have the corresponding sense of justice (p. 148).1 Rawls here explicitly anticipates and rejects the lines of argument expressed in A and B. Again, at the very end of his book, he explicitly responds to the objection that the contract view embodies a narrowly individualistic doctrine for the above reasons with the comment that "once the point of the assumption of mutual disinterest is understood, the objection seems misplaced" (p. 584). How then does one explain this basic misconstrual of Rawls, a mis· construal that revolves around the role of "the people in the original position"? It is my contention that the misunderstanding grows out of a false concretization of his "people in the original position." Concretely, there simply are no people in the initial choice situation. This is simply a figurative way of talking about constraints that Rawls maintains are reasonable to put on any argument for one view of justice over another: To say that a certain conception of justice would be chosen in the original position is equivalent to saying that rational delibera· tion satisfying certain conditions and restrictions would reach a certain conclusion. If necessary, the argument to this result co~d be set out more formally. I shall, however, speak throughout. 111 terms of the notion of the original position. It is more economical and suggestive (p. 138). All ~e talk about people in the original position could easily be rephraSed m terms of a rubric like, "In this discussion we will restrict our arguments to thes~ kinds of premises for these reasons." And, of course, there may be many reasons for restricting arguments for a social arrangem~nt to ,tho_se of a certain kind, which reasons may have nothing to d~ Wlth one s vxews about the relations of real individuals to society or abou what motivates real individuals. Rawls is, after all, attempting to construct a theory of justice ~d the ge~eral canons of theory construction may well urge that cert~ con~t~ts be put on the kinds of premises employed. Moreover, ~ additional constraints on the premises. The aim is not simply to prese~t ~~~ect ac~o~t of the matter but to present it in such a way tha~~s convmcmg as opposed to other accounts of the matter and
(~~~ Rawls,
A Theory of Justice ndge: Harvard University Press,
1971). All the page references in
paper are to this book.
114
236
thiS
function as an effective guide for action in the public forum. Given these various considerations, then, there would seem to be more to a good argument in political philosophy than that the premises be true and that the conclusions follow from them. For theoretical reasons we would want the premises to be as minimal as possible and for practical reasons we would want them to be acceptable to those to whom the argument is directed. So, even from a theoretical point of view there is much to recommend that arguments for an altruistic conclusion not be based on altruistic premises, and from a practical point of view there is much to recommend that arguments directed against utilitarians assume no more than self-interest in the premises. These concerns for theoretical power and practical effectiveness come together to recommend minimal· istic assumptions. It would be a mistake to infer from this that Rawls' conclusions must be similarly minimalistic. The whole strategy is to the opposite effect. Furthermore, the inference from these restrictions on the premises of his argument (that is, his characterization of the people in the original position) to claims about what must be his views on the nature of society and the motivations of persons seems doubly gratuitous in the face of Rawls' suggestion that he could derive the same conclusions from social and altruistic premises: The combination of mutual disinterest and the veil of ignorance achieves the same purpose as benevolence. . . . Furthermore, this pair of assumptions has enormous advantages over benevolence plus knowledge. As I have noted, the latter is so complex that no definite theory at all can be worked out. . . . The combination of mutual disinterest plus the veil of ignorance has the merits of simplicity and clarity while at the same time ensuring the effects of what are at first sight morally more attractive assumptions. And if it is asked why should one not postulate benevolence with the veil of ignorance, the answer is that there is no need for such a strong condition. Moreover, it would defeat the purpose of grounding a theory of justice on weak stipulations (pp. 148-49). Here Rawls suggests that it is not even necessary that he characterize the initial choice situation in an "individualistic" manner to get his conclusions. The conclusions would follow from a characterization in terms of either "knowledge and altruism," or "ignorance and altruism," or "ignorance and self-interest." But the first characterization would be unwieldy and the second unnecessarily strong. So for both theoretical and practical reasons it ' is methodologically preferable to characterize the initial choice situation in the third manner. It is clear that this is a methodological stipulation made with good reason rather than _the expression of substantive beliefs about social reality or human motivato tion. In fact, one might say that the whole p.oint of !he ~roject show that even from such "individualistic" premzses one IS driven to non·
!s
Notes and Discussion
237
115
individualistic" conclusions. Hence, to point to his individualistic premises and to infer from these that he must therefore have individualistic conclusions is to condemn the project without a hearing and a fortiori without an argument. II. Of course, it does not follow from the unacceptability of arguments A and B that Rawls' substantive position is not individualistic in the two relevant senses. The question is still open as to whether or not it em· bodies an atomistic conception of society and/or an egoistic conception of human motivation. I would like to argue in this section that in fact the position is not individualistic in either of these senses in that the structures and values of community are important ingredients in his view. That it is Rawls' intention to provide a central place for these dimen· sions of community in his account he makes quite explicit:
Justice as fairness has a central place for the value of communi~. . . . The essential idea is that we want to account for the soctal values, for the intrinsic good of institutional, community, ~d associative activities, by a conception of justice that in its theorett~ basis is individualistic. . . . From this conception, however indi· vidualistic it might seem, we must eventually explain the value of community. Otherwise the theory of justice cannot succeed (pp. 264-65). Far from ignoring the social nature of man and the altruistic features ~~m~ motivation, the intention seems clearly to be to prov~de a JUsbftcatlOn for these that does not beg the crucial questions at 15.sue: But: of ~ourse, there may be many slips between intention and execu~100 ' so lt ,mtght still be argued that in spite of these expressed int~n~o~s, Rawls substantive view may in fact remain narrowly individualistic 10 o~e or both senses. In my opinion a careful consideration of the text wtll not support this interpretation. With regard to the charge of atomism not only does Rawls take cognizance of the social and historical natu're of man but he finds the co~munitarian claims made in reference to these features of human existence totally uncontroversial:
?f
The socia · I system shapes the wants and aspirations that tts · ci"tizens come to have. It determines in part the sort of persons they w~t to be as well as the sort of persons they are. Thus an eco~o~uc system is not only an institutional device for satisfying extst~g wants and needs but a way of creating and fashioning wants ~ the. future. How men work together now to satisfy their ~rese:f desires affects the desires they will have later on, the kinds tlY persons they will be. These matters are, of course, prefec
116
238
obvious and have always been recognized. They are stressed by economists as different as Marshall and Marx (p. 259). Rawls thinks that most theories of justice accept as obvious any general statement of the socio-historical nature of man. One of the points of his project is to show that his theory (as opposed to other accounts of justice) takes these features of man and society seriously and develops them in a thoroughgoing manner. He begins by distinguishing between instrumental and essential construals of the sociability of human beings, construals which result in what we might term shallow and deep communitarianism respectively: Now the sociability of human beings is not to be understood in a trivial fashion. It does not imply merely that society is necessary for human life, or that by living in a community men acquire needs and interests that prompt them to work together for mutual advantage in certain specific ways allowed for and encouraged by their institutions. Nor is it expressed by the truism that social life is a condition for our developing the ability to speak and think, and to take part in the common activities of society and culture. No doubt even the concepts we use to describe our plans and situation, and even to give voice to our personal wants and purposes, often presuppose a social setting as well as a system of belief and thought that is the outcome of the collective efforts of a long tradition. These facts are certainly not trivial ; but to use them to characterize our ties to one another is to give a trivial interpretation to human sociability. For all these things are equally true of persons who view their relations purely instrumentally (p. 522). The contention here is that on his account the social nature of man is taken essentialJy and deeply in that the common institutions and activities are valued as goods in themselves and not merely as instrumentalities for the increase of more basic individual goods. From Rawls' perspective "we need one another as partners in ways of life that are engaged in1 for their own sake, and the successes and enjoyments of others are necessary for and complimentary to our own good• (pp. 522-23). The historical nature of man is taken as seriously as the social: Our predecessors in achieving certain things leave it up to us to pursue them further; their accomplishments affect our choice of endeavors and define a wider background against which our aims can be understood. To say that man is a historical being is to say that the realizations of the powers of human individuals living at any one time takes the cooperation of many generations (or even societies) over a long period of time. It also impli~s that this cooperation is guided at any moment by an understan~mg of ~~at has been done in the past as it is interpreted by soc1al trad1tion (pp. 524-25).
Notes and Discussion
239
117
Man is seen as essentially an historical being whose very potentialities are fashioned by the historical process. Rawls draws an interesting contrast here between men and lower animals, tying the potentialities of the former to history in ways that those of the latter are not linked. The range of realized abilities of individual men is very much a function of historical development whereas that of lower animals appears relatively impervious to the passage of time. Finally, Rawls underlines the point that this historicity of man is not to be construed merely instrumental but is to be seen as an essential feature of human nature. It is precisely this deep interpretation of the socio-historical nature of man that Rawls' contract theory is designed to take into account. The question of egoism Rawls discusses in much greater detail. Returning to the question of the difference between the motivation of the hypothetical persons in the original position and that which would actually follow from the acceptance of his two principles, Rawls draws the distinction sharply: Clearly the two principles of justice and the principles of obliga· tion and natural duty require us to consider the rights and claims of others. And the sense of justice is a normally effective desire to comply with these restrictions. The motivations of persons in the original position must not be confused with the motivations of persons in everyday life who accept the principles that would be chosen and who have the corresponding sense of justice. In practical affairs an individual does have a ·knowledge of his situation and he can, if he wishes, exploit contingencies to his advantage. Should his sense of justice move him to act on the principles of right that would be adopted in the original position, his desires and aims are surely not egoistic. He voltmtarily takes on the limitations expressed by this interpretation of the moral point of view {p. 148).
~e ~otiv~tion of actual persons in a society informed by Rawls' two ~nctples . IS clearly not that of the hypothetical contractors. In ~e tual SOCiety people would be motivated by the sense of justice whi~ would be the embodiment of the two principles and in virtue of this sensef' · ' ·n . 0 JUStice the people would have "ties of sentiment and affectio and. wo~d want to advance the interests of others and see their en~s attamed (p. 129). Far from being egoistic then individuals with thiS sense 0 f'JUStice · would be motivated in a decidedly ' ' altruistic way. In f act Rawls sees th' f . . · a1 I'deal of f ' . Is sense o JUStice as embodying the classtc ~atermtr to the degree that one can reasonably expect between members a S~Iety. at large (compare p. 106). th This pomt is further driven home in Rawls' explicit treatment off e psychology of mot' t' . . . truals o justice, Rawls mainUW:va~on .. ?oite contrary to eg01st1c co:at people could onl ~ at 1f It were a psychological fact an n . Y pursue theu own interests they would never develop e ective sense of justice. Accordingly he takes it upon himself to shoW 118
240
how one could learn to adopt an altruistic perspective as a condition for the stability of his sense of justice. Toward this end he articulates an account of moral development that involves the three stage sequence of the morality of authority, the morality of association, and the morality of principles. In brief, after the introduction to precepts in the caring environment of the family, the child gradually learns to take the point of view of others and to see things from their perspective. Against this background the development of a genuine sense of justice can be understood: Once the attitudes of love and trust and of friendly feeling and mutual confidence have been generated in accordance with the two preceding psychological laws, then the recognition that we and those for whom we care are the beneficiaries of an established and enduring just institution tends to engender in us the corresponding sense of justice. We develop a desire to apply and to act upon the principles of justice once we realize how social arrangements answering to them have promoted our good and that of those with whom we are affiliated. In due course we come to appreciate the ideal of just human cooperation (pp. 473-74 ). In this way the virtue of justice takes form and it is this virtue which then informs our actions. Another consideration that weighs heavily against any egoistic interpretation of Rawls is his treatment of the moralities of supererogation. He views these not as fundamentally different orientations from that of justice but as continuous with it: Thus the moralities of supererogation, those of the saint and the hero, do not contradict the norms of right and justice; they are ma.,ked by the willing adoption by the self of aims continuous with these principles but extending beyond what they enjoin (p. 479). If the concern for justice were merely a matter of self-interest, then the moralities of supererogation would have to be seen as a totally different matter. But Rawls does not see supererogation this way; it is simply a matter of the concern for others being carried to a further stage. The picture of Rawls has of a society informed by the principles of justice is certainly not the picture of an accidental union of competing self-interested individuals. It is the picture of a genuine community: Thus we may say following Humboldt that it is through social union founded upon the needs and potentialities of its members that each person can participate in the total sum of the realized natural assets of the others. We are led to the notion of the community of humankind the members of which enjoy one another's excellences and individuality elicited by free institutions, and they recognize the
Notes and Discussion 119
241
good of each as an element in the complete activity the whole scheme of which is consented to and gives pleasure to all (p. 523). It is in the system of justice as fairness as he construes it that "persons
will develop a secure sense of their own worth that forms the basis of the love of human kind" (p. SOl).
III. Having argued, first, that the standard arguments for the view that Rawls' position is individualistic in one or both of the pejorative senses of that term are fallacious, and, secondly, that his position is not in fact individualistic in these senses, I now want to conclude by articulat· ing some senses in which hie; position is individualistic-and defensibly so. There is a minimal sense in which the theory could be viewed as methodologically individualistic, and two further senses in which it could be seen to be substantively individualistic. There is a modest kind of methodological individualism embodied in the constraints Rawls puts on his arguments for his theory of justice; namely, his general adoption of the contract model and, more specifically, his minimalist characterization of the people in the initial choice situa· tion. However, on my reading of Rawls this does not commit him .at all to a full-blown methodological individualism (the view that all social phenomena are to be explained in terms of facts about individuals) but can be construed simply as the adoption of the most effective strategy for mounting an argument against utilitarianism. It may or may ~ot be ~ffective base for arguing against perfectionist or Marxist tbeones of ~ustice, but this is beside the point. Utilitarianism is the only fullY articulated theory of justice in the field and thus Rawls is rightly con· cerned to focus his presentation so as to 'provide a genuine and attractive alternative to the view that will otherwise bold sway by default. We should take seriously his stated aim for the argument of the book:
:m
And while, of course, it is not a fully satisfactory theory, it offers, 1 believe, an alternative to the utilitarian view which bas for so lo?g held the pre-eminent place in our moral philosophy. I b~ve tned to present the theory of justice as a viable systematic doctnne so that the idea of maximizing the good does not hold sw~Y by default. '!'he criticism of teleological theories cannot fruit~~ proceed Piecemeal. We must attempt to construct another · . 0 ~ view which has the same virtues of clarity and system bu~ ~~I.ch Yields a more discriminating interpretation of our moral sensibihttes (p. 587).
ov~raU .thrust of the book is to show that a finally adequate theo~ ~f JUSt~ce (If such exists) will look more like justice as fairness th d hke utilitaria · G'Iven thts . aim, . t . . . msm. the general contract stra.tegy .anaThe.
he mmtmahst characterization of the people in the initial choice sdU
120
242
tion seem to be constraints on argument forms ideally suited to the project. They need not be read as involving any general commitment even to methodological individualism. There are at least two senses in which Rawls' theory can be seen to be substantively individualistic. In the first place, the theory is an attempt to give an account of the just state that accommodates the possibly different conceptions of human fulfillment of its individual members rather than an account that prescribes one overall ideal of human fulfillment. Many . see this ·kind of substantive pluralism as individualistic, and it may well be; but it seems to me to be a !kind of individualism that is perfectly defensible on both theoretical and practical grounds. People are different; they have different life projects and different kinds and degrees of satisfaction. The structure of society should acknowledge rather than ignore this fact of life. Moreover, the recognition of this fact does not involve the relativistic view that all conceptions of human fulfillment are equally good but simply the acknowledgment that given the kinds of beings we are there is a range of plausible ideals of human fulfillment and that it is part of the common respect and concern we owe each other to foster self-determination rather than prescribe conformity with regard to overall life projects. But even if the case were otherwise, that is, if there was but one rather specific ideal of human fulfillment that was philosophically defensible, the individualism under discussion here would still be recommended on practical grounds. We do in fact live in a pluralistic society; so our account of justice, if it is to be an effective force in this society, should address itself to this reality. We should, of course, simultaneously engage the more basic moral questions that may underlie this issue; but all reflection on justice need not wait upon the resolution of these deeper problems. This being the case, should we want our philosophical reflection on justice to play an active role in the improvement of the human condition rather than be merely idle speculation, then our philosophical theories at this level should speak to the pluralistic realities of our concrete situation. Not only do I see this kind of individualism as defensible, but I am inclined to think that the only serious objection in this area is to the effect that in this regard Rawls is not individualistic enough. It has been objected that the minimal list of primary goods is not neutral vis-avis alternative life projects but rather implicitly prescribes a single ideal of human excellence. Specifically, the charge is that in its focus on liberty (particularly political liberty) and in its employment of what might be termed the acquisitive principle (one would prefer more rather than less) Rawls' theory comes up short of genuine pluralism and involves the prescription of one ideal of human excellence. This objection has to be taken seriously, but I think that there is on balance an adequate Rawlsian reply. The list of primary goods can be plausibly defended as providing simply the necessary conditions for the realization of any Philosophically defensible ideal of human excellence and the operation on them (more rather than less) regarded as the most reasonable attitude Notes and Discussion
243
121
to adopt "in the original position"; and, as we have seen, this in no way involves the recommendation of acquisitiveness. as a virtue in the real world. Again, it can be defended on methodological rather than substantive grounds. There is a second sense in which Rawls' account is substantively individualistic, namely, the sense in which any "rights theory" will defend the moral inviolability of the individual person against all collectivist conceptions of the just society whether they be of the classical perfec· tionist, utilitarian, or Marxist variety. Rights theories are individualistic in the sense that they maintain there can be no justifiable trade-offs of the life prospects of some just so others can be better off. Far from being an objection, however, this seems to me to be an endorsement. Surely the fundamental objection to all "common-good" doctrines of whatever variety has been their disenfranchisement of the individual as over against the totality, whether that totality be a matter of the "numbers" in democracies or of "vision" in the various perfection· ist ideologies. Rawls' project is an attempt to articulate a conception of justice that takes into account the dimension of social responsibility without violating the dimension of moral autonomy. Again I am inclined to think that the only serious objection in this area is one to the effect that Rawls' is not individualistic enough. The locus of complaint is the difference principle, and the specific concern is that Rawls' suggestion that we think of individual talents as common holdings of the society drags him back into the collectivism of his 0 P' ponents. I believe that this concern can be allayed, however, by a closer scrutiny of the text. What Rawls says is that "the difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of na~ral talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits of this distnbu· tion ~~t~ver it turns out to be" (p. 101 ). Rawls is not here claiming that mdtVIdual natural talents are common assets but simply that one way of thinking about the difference principle is in terms of "an agreement to regard" natural talents as a common asset. It is still the indivi~ual who autonomously agrees to so regard them, and his agreement Is a manifestation of the conviction that individual rights are n~t ~restricted but must be tempered so as not to undermine the ~as~~ r~ghts 0~ others. Rawls' whole program is an attempt to balance mdi· VIdual nghts and social responsibility An . . 'tical overall evaluatiOn of Rawls' project would involve the en . evaluation of numerous facets of the theory not even mentioned in thi~ pa~er.. What I hope to have shown, however, is that many of the standatn ~bJ~ctlons to it are ~d~entally misguided. Objections which draW 0 rwsm~ ~bout the socio-htstorical nature of man and/or about the povertY of egmstic motivational theories can, I believe, be blocked in the. waY: 1 have suggested here. This is not to say of course that there IS no some profounder ob JectiOn · · even m . thts . very' neighborhood. . ' Bu t w· order h Dlore for the 0 b · · s 'fi Jectton to be relevant it will have to be made muc pect c-and thereby much more contentious.
122
244
AMY GUTMANN
Communitarian Critics of Liberal ism
We are witnessing a revival of communitarian criticisms of liberal political theory. Like the critics of the I g6os, those of the I g8os fault liberalism for being mistakenly and irreparably individualistic. But the new wave of criticism is not a mere repetition of the old. Whereas the earlier critics were inspired by Marx, the recent critics are inspired by Aristotle and Hegel. The Aristotelian idea that justice is rooted in "a community whose primary bond is a shared understanding both of the good for man an~ the good of that community" explicitly informs Alasdair Macintyre in hiS criticism of John Rawls and Robert Nozick for their neglect of desert;• and Charles Taylor in his attack on "atomistic" liberals who "try to defend · · · the priority of the individual and his rights over society.,,. The_ ~e gelian conception of man as a historically conditioned being iinplicidY informs both Roberto Unger's and Michael Sandel's rejection of the liberal view of man as a free and rational being. 3 . · d l LiberaliSfll Thts revtew essay concentrates on the arguments presented in Michael San e • orali
and the Limits ofJustice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Sandel, "M tY and the_ Liberalldeal," The New Republic, May 7 . 1 ga4 , pp. IS-I7; Alasdair Mac.~~s~: Af!e~ Vrrtu~ (No~ Dam~: Notre Dame University Press, 1981); and Macintyre.' y, triottsm a Virtue? The Lrndley Lecture (University of Kansas: Department of PhiloSO~. Man:h. 2.6, 1984). -~ther works to which I refer are Benjamin Barber, Strong l)emOCT ); Parhcrpatory Polrtrcs for a New Age (Berkeley: University of California PreSS, 1g84 s ~harles Taylor, "Atomism," in Alkis Kontos, ed., Powers, Possessions and Freedoms: E~ 111 Honor of C. B. Macpherson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), PP· 3 ard and "The Diversity of Goods," in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Amartya Sen and Be~ Williams (New York: Cambridge University Press, Ig82.), pp. 12.9-44; Roberto Manga s Unger,_Knowledge and Politics (New York: Free Press, 1 975); and Michael Walzer, spJaert of Justrce (New York: Basic Books, 1 ga3). 1 · Macintyre, After Virtue, pp. 23 :~.- 33 . 2. "Atomism," p. 39. J. Knowledge and Politics, pp. 85, 191-231; Limits, pp. 17g-8o.
246
J09
Communitarian Critics of Liberalism
The political implications of the new communitarian criticisms are correspondingly more conservative. Whereas the good society of the old critics was one of collective property ownership and equal political power, the good society of the new critics is one of settled traditions and established identities. For many of the old critics, the role of women. within the family was symptomatic of their social and economic oppression; for Sandel, the family serves as a model of community and evidence of a good greater than justice.4 For the old critics, patriotism was an irrational sentiment that stood in the way of world peace; for Macintyre, the particularistic demands of patriotism are no less rational than the universalistic demands of justice.s The old critics were inclined to defend deviations from majoritarian morality in the name of nonrepression; the new critics are inclined to defend the efforts of local majorities to ban offensive activities in the name of preserving their community's "way of life and the values that sustain it. "6 The subject of the new and the old criticism also differs. The new critics recognize that Rawls's work has altered the premises and principles of contemporary liberal theory. Contemporary liberals do not assume that people are possessive individualists; the source of their individualism lies at a deeper, more metaphysical level. According to Sandel, the problem is that liberalism has faulty foundations: in order to achieve absolute priority for principles of justice, liberals must hold a set of implausible metaphysical views about the self. They cannot admit, for example, that our personal identities are partly defined by our communal attachments. 1 According to Macintyre, the problem is that liberalism lacks any foundations at all. It cannot be rooted in the only kind of social life that provides a basis for moral judgments, one which "views man as having an essence which defines his true end. "8 Liberals are therefore bound either to claim a false certainty for their principles or to admit that morality is merely a matter of individual opinion, that is, is no morality at all. The critics claim that many serious problems originate in the foundational faults of liberalism. Perhaps the most troubling for liberals is 4· Sandel, Limits, pp. 3<>-31, 33-34. 16g. 5· "Is Patriotism a Virtue?" pp. 15-18 and passim. 6. Sandel, "Morality and the Liberal Ideal," p. 17. 1· Limits, pp. 64-65, 1~73· 8. After Virtue, p. 52.
247
310
Philosophy & Public Affairs
their alleged inability to defend the basic principle that "individual rights cannot be sacrificed for the sake of the general good. "g Because Sandel and Macintyre make the most detailed and, if true, devastating cases against believing in a liberal politics of rights, I shall focus for the rest of this review on their arguments. The central argument of Sandel's book is that liberalism rests on a series of mistaken metaphysical and metaethical views: for example, that the claims of justice are absolute and universal; that we cannot know each other well enough to share common ends; and that we can define our personal identity independently of socially given ends. Because its foundations are necessarily Hawed, Sandel suggests in a subsequent article that we should give up the "politics of rights" for a "politics of the common good. "10 Macintyre begins his book with an even more "disquieting suggestion": that our entire moral vocabulary, of rights and the common good, is in such "grave disorder" that "we have-very largely, if not entirely-lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality. "11 To account for how "we" have unknowingly arrived at this unenviable social condition, Macintyre takes us on an intriguing tour of moral history, from Homeric Greece to the present. By the end of the tour, we learn that the internal incoherence of liberalism forces us to choose "Nietzsche or Aristotle," a politics of the will to power or one of communally defined virtue. 13 THE LIMITS OF COMMUNITARIAN CRITICISM
Do the critiques succeed in undermining liberal politics? If the onlY foundations available to liberal politics are faulty, then perhaps one need not establish a positive case for communitarian politics to establish ~e ~laim that liberal politics is philosophically indefensible. 13 Althou~ thiS Is the logic of Sandel's claim concerning the limits of liberal jusuce, be · . al ng · bts gives no general argument to support his conclusion that tiber g. S~del, "Morahty and the Liberal Ideal," p. 16. 10. Ib1d., p. 17. 11. After Virtue, pp. 1_ 5_ 12. Ibid., pp. 49, 103-13, 23~45 . andel s~3· 1 say "perhaps" ~ause if defensibility ts relative to our alternatives, then~~ th would have to establish the positive case for communttarian politics before c at the faulty foundations of liberal politics render it indefensible.
248
JII
Communitarian Critics of Liberalism
are indefensible. 1 4 He reaches this conclusion instead on the basis of an interpretation and criticism of Rawls's theory, which he reasonably assumes to be the best theory liberalism has yet to offer. Sandel argues that despite Rawls's efforts to distance himself from Kantian metaphysics, he fails. Sandel attributes Rawls's failure to his acceptance of the "centtal claim" of deontology, "the core conviction Rawls seeks above aU to defend. It is the claim that 'justice is the first virtue of social institutions.' "1 s As Rawls presents it, the "primacy of justice" describes a moral requirement applicable to institutions. Sandel interprets Rawls as also making a metaethical claim: that the foundations of justice must be independent of all social and historical contingencies Without being transcendental. 16 Why saddle Rawls's moral argument for the primacy of justice with this meaning? To be sure, Rawls himself argues that "embedded in the Principles of justice ... is an ideal of the person that provides an Archimedean point for judging the basic structure of society. "1 ' But to translate this passage into a claim that the grounds of justice can be noncontingent 14. The general argument that can be constructed from Sandel's work (using his conceptual framework) is, I think, the following: ( 1) To accept a politics based on rights entails believing that justice should have absolute priority over all our particular ends (our conception of the good); (2) To accept the priority of justice over our conception of the good entails believing that our identities can be established prior to the good (otherwise our conception of the good will enter into our conception of justice); (3) Since our identities are constituted by our conception of the good, justice cannot be prior. Therefore we cannot consistently believe In the politics of rights. But each of the steps in this argument are suspect: (1) We may accept the politics of rights not because justice is prior to the good, but because our search for the good requires society to protect our right to certain basic freedoms and welfare goods; (2) Justice may be prior to the good not because we are "antecedently individuated," but because giving priority to justice may be the fairest way of sharing the goods of citizenship with people who do not accept our conception of the good; (3) Our identities are probably not constituted, at least not exclusively, by our con· ception of the good. If they were, one could not intelligibly ask: "What kind of person do I want to become?" Yet the question reflects an important part (although not necessarily the whole) of our search for identity. If, however, we assume by definition that our identities are constituted by our good, then we must consider our sense of justice to be part of our identities. My commitment to treating other people as equals, and therefore to respecting their freedom of religion, is just as elemental a part of my identity (on this understanding) as my being Jewish, and therefore celebrating Passover with my family and friends. 15. Limits, p. 15. Emphasis added. See A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 3-4, 586. 16. Limits, pp. 16-17. Rawls must, in Sandel's words, "ftnd a standpoint neither compromised by its implication in the world nor dissociated and so disqualified by detachment." 17. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 584; see also pp. 26o-62.
249
312
Philosophy & Public Affairs
ignores most of what Rawls says to explain his Archimedean point, the nature of justification, and Kantian constructivism.' 8 "Justice as fairness is not at the mercy, so to speak, of existing wants and interests. It sets up an Archirnedean point ... without invoking a priori considerations. "' 9 By requiring us to abstract from our particular but not our shared inter· ests, the original position with its "veil of ignorance" and "thin theory of the good" avoids reliance on both existing preferences and a priori con· siderations in reasoning about justice. The resulting principles of justice, then, clearly rely on certain contingent facts: that we share some interests (in primary goods such as income and self-respect), but not others (in a particular religion or form of family life); that we value the freedom to choose a good life or at least the freedom from having one imposed upon us by political authority. If we do not, then we will not accept the con· straints of the original position. Rawls's remarks on justification and Kantian constructivism make ex· plicit the contingency of his principles of justice. The design of the orig· inal position must be revised if the resulting principles do not "accom· modate our firmest convictions. "~o Justification is not a matter of deduction from certain premises, but rather "a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view."2 ' Since Rawls accords the view "that justice is the first virtue of social institutions" the status of a "common sense conviction,'~2 this view is part of what his theory must coherently combine. Rawls therefore does not, nor need he, claim more for justice as fairness th~ that "given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, It 1 8: In int~~g Rawls, I rely (as does Sandel) on passages from both A Theo:¥rt JustiCe and Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures 1g8o. 1 Journal ofPhiloso~h.y 17, no. 9 (September 1g8o), pp. 515-72. Someone might reaso:!! argue that n~ u~til 'The Dewey Lectures" does Rawls consistently and clear!~ ~~fe onl ~tion on JUstification that I attribute to him. Had Sandel directed his cnttci.SIII agamst A Theory of Justict, his interpretation would have been more credible. But he 5 could not have sustained his central claim that Rawls's principles and liberalism more generally must rest on Implausible metaethical grounds. ,. es . 19· A Theory of Justict, p. 261. Emphasis added. See also "The Dewey Lectures, p pp. 564-67. 20 · A Theory of Justice, p. 20. The reasoning is circular, but not viciously 50• sin.~~ must also be prepared to revise our weaker judgments when principles match our conSl convtctio_ns, until we reach "reflective equilibrium." 21. lb1d., pp. 2 1 , 579. 22. Ibid., p. 5ss.
J
250
313
Communitarian Critics of Liberalism
is the most reasonable doctrine for us. We can find no better charter for our social world. "2 3 Rawls could be wrong about our firmest convictions or what is most reasonable for us. But instead of trying to demonstrate this, Sandel argues that Rawls must show that the content and claims of justice are independent of all historical and social particularities. 2 4 If this is what constitutes deontological metaphysics, then it is a metaphysics that Rawls explicitly and consistently denies. What metaphysics must Rawlsian liberalism then embrace? Several commentators, along with Rawls himself, have argued that liberalism does not presuppose metaphysics. 2 s The major aim of liberal justice is to find principles appropriate for a society in which people disagree fundamentally over many questions, including such metaphysical questions as the nature of personal identity. Liberal justice therefore does not proVide us with a comprehensive morality; it regulates our social institutions, not our entire lives. It makes claims on us "not because it expresses our deepest self-understandings," but because it represents the fairest possible modus vivendi for a pluralistic society. 26 The characterization of liberalism as nonmetaphysical can be misleading however. Although Rawlsian justice does not presuppose only one metaphysical view, it is not compatible with all such Views. Sandel is correct in claiming that the Kantian conception of people as free and equal is incompatible with the metaphysical conception of the self as "radically situated" such that "the good of community ... (is) so thoroughgoing as to reach beyond the motivations to the subject of motivations. "2 7 Sandel seems to mean that communally given ends can so totally constitute people's identities that they cannot appreciate the value of justice. Such an understanding of human identity would (according to 23. "The Dewey Lectures," p. 519. Cf. Sandel, Limits, p. JO. 24. Limits, p. 30. Sometimes Sandel comes close to making a more lim1ted but potentially
more plausible argument-that Rawls derives his principles of justice from the wrong set of historical and social particulaiities: from (for example) our identification with all free and rational beings rather than with particular communities. Such an argument, if successful, would establish different limits, and limits of only Rawlsian liberalism. 25. See Rawls, "The Independence of Moral Theory," Proceedings and Addresses oftlu! American Philosophical Association 48 ( 1975), pp. 5-22.. 26. Charles Larmore, "Review of Liberalism and the Limits of justice," Tlu! Journal of Philosophy 8 1 , no. 6 (June 1 ga4 ): 338. See also Rawls, "The Dewey Lectures," p. 542. 27. Sandel, Limits, pp. 2o-21,' 149.
251
314
Philosophy & Public Affairs
constructivist standards of verification) undermine the two principles. 28 To be justified as the political ideals most consistent with the "public culture of a democratic society,"2 9 Rawlsian principles therefore have to express some (though not all) of our deepest self-understandings. Rawls must admit this much metaphysics-that we are not radically situated selves-if justification is to depend not on "being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but ... [on] congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations. "Jo If this, rather than Kantian dualism, is the metaphysics that liberal justice must admit, Sandel's critique collapses. Rawls need not (and he does not) claim that "justice is the first virtue of social institutions" in aU societies to show that the priority of justice obtains absolutely in those societies in which people disagree about the good life and consider their· freedom to choose a good life an important good.J' Nor need Rawls assume that human identity is ever totally independent of ends and relations to others to conclude that justice must always command our moral allegiance unless love and benevolence make it unnecessary.J 2 Deontological justice thus can recognize the conditional priority of justice without embracing "deontological metaethics" or collapsing into teleology. Sandel has failed therefore to show that the foundations of rights are mistaken. MISSING FOUNDATIONS?
Macintyre argues that the foundations are missing: The best reason for asserting so bluntly that there are no such rights is indeed of precisely the same type as the best reason which we possess for asserting that there are no witches . . . : every attempt to give good reasons for believing there are such rights has failed.JJ The analogy, properly drawn, does not support Macintyre's position. The be~t reason that people can give for believing in witches is that the eXIstence of witches explains (supposedly) observed physical pbenom·
s:,s. .~wls, "The Dewey Lectures," pp. 534-35 564-67. See also A TheoTIJ of justiCe; ~mi~s ~ theory of justice does, indeed, presup~se a theory of the good, but within ~., this does not PreJudge the choice of the sort of persons that men want mphasis added.) 29· ~wls, ''The Dewey Lectures," p. 51 s. 30 . Ibid., p. 519· 3~· id., pp. 516-24. Cf. Sandel, Limits, pp. 2 g_40 . 3 · ARftawls, ~ Theory of Justice, pp. s6o-n Cf. Sandel, Limits, pp. 47-65. JJ. er Vtrtue, p. a7.
(E
252
to
315
Communitarian Critics of Liberalism
ena. Belief in witches therefore directly competes with belief in physics, and loses out in the competition. The best reason for taking rights seriously is of a different order: believing in rights is one way of regulating and constraining our behavior toward one another in a desirable manner. This reason does not compete with physics; it does not require us to believe that rights "exist" in any sense that is incompatible with the "laws of nature" as established by modern science.J4 Macintyre offers another, more historical argument for giving up our belief in rights. "Why," he asks, "should we think about our modern uses of good, right, and obligatory in any different way from that in which we think about late eighteenth-century Polynesian uses oftaboo?"Js Like the Polynesians who used taboo without any understanding of what it meant beyond "prohibited," we use human right without understanding its meaning beyond "moral trump." If the analogy holds, we cannot use the idea correctly because we have irretrievably lost the social context in which its proper use is possible. But on a contextualist view, it is reasonable for us to believe in human rights: many of the most widely accepted practices of our society-equality of educational opportunity, careers open to talent, punishment conditional on intent-treat people as relatively autonomous moral agents. Insofar as we are committed to maintaining these practices, we are also committed to defending human rights.J6 This argument parallels MacIntyre's contextualist defense of Aristotelian virtue: that the established practices of heroic societies supported the Aristotelian idea that every human life has a socially determined telos. Each person had a "given role and status within a well-defined and highly determinate system of roles and statuses," which fully defined his identity: "a man who tried to withdraw himself from his given position ... would be engaged in the enterprise of trying to make himself disappear. "37 If moral beliefs depend upon supporting social practices for their validity, then we have more reason to believe in a liberal politics of rights than in an Aristotelian politics of the common good. In our society, it does not logically follow that: "I am someone's son or daughter, someone 34· I am grateful to Thomas Scanlon for suggesting this reply. 35· After Virtue, p. 107. 36. We need not be committed to a thoroughly deontological moral apparatus. Sophisticated consequentialist theories justify these same practices and are consistent with believing in rights. 37- After Virtue, pp. JJ7. ug.
253
Philosophy & Public Affairs
316
else's cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of this or that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation[,] hence what is good for me has to be THE good for one who inhabits these roles. "J8 One reason it does not follow is that none of these roles carries with it only one socially given good. What follows from "what is good for me has to be the good for someone who was born female, into a first-generation American, working-class Italian, Catholic family"? Had Geraldine Ferraro asked, following Sandel, "Who am I?" instead of"What ends should I choose?" an answer would not have been any easier to come by.J9 The Aristotelian method of discovering the good by inquiring into the social meaning of roles is of little help in a society in which most roles are not attached to a single good. Even if there is a single good attached to some social roles (as caring for the sick is to the role of a nurse, or searching for political wisdom to the function of political phi· losophers, let us suppose), we cannot accurately say that our roles de· termine our good without adding that we often choose our roles because of the good that is attached to them. The unencumbered self is, in this sense, the encumbrance of our modem social condition. But the existence of supporting social practices is certainly not a suf· ficient condition, arguably not even a necessary one, for believing in liberal rights rather thari Aristotelian virtue. The practices that support liberal rights may be unacceptable to us for reasons that carry more moral weight than the practices themselves; we may discover moral reasons (even within our current social understandings) for establishing ne~ practices that support a politics of the common good. My point here 15 not that a politics of rights is the only, or the best, possible politics for our society, but that neither Macintyre's nor Sandel's critique succeeds in undennining liberal rights because neither gives an accurate accou~t 0~ _their foundations. Macintyre mistakenly denies liberalism th~ posst· bility of foundations; Sandel ascribes to liberalism foundations 1t need not have. THE TYRANNY OF DUALISMS
The critics' interpretive method is also mistaken. It invites us to see the moral universe in dualistic terms: either our identities are independent 38· Ibid., pp.
17Q.
204-S
(emphasis added). Sandel makes a very similar point in Limits, P·
39· Limits, pp. sS-sg.
254
317
Communitarian Critics of Liberalism
of our ends, leaving us totally free to choose our life plans, or they are constituted by community, leaving us totally encumbered by socially given ends; either justice takes absolute priority over the good or the good takes the place of justice; either justice must be independent of all historical and social particularities or virtue must depend completely on the particular social practices of each society; and so on. The critics thereby do a disservice to not only liberal but communitarian values, since the same method that reduces liberalism to an extreme metaphysical vision also renders communitarian theories unacceptable. By interpreting Rawls's conception of community as describing "just a feeling," for example, Sandel invites us to interpret Aristotle's as describing a fully constituted identity. The same mode of interpretation that permits Sandel to criticize Rawls for betraying "incompatible commitments" by uneasily combining into one theory "intersubjective and individualistic images" would permit us to criticize Sandel for suggesting that community is "a mode of self-understanding partly constitutive" of our identity. 4o Neither Sandel's interpretation nor his critique is accurate. Macintyre's mode of interpreting modern philosophy similarly divides the moral world into a series of dualisms. The doomed project of modern philosophy, according to Macintyre, has been to convert naturally egoistical men into altruists. "On the traditional Aristotelian view such problems do not arise. For what education in the virtues teaches me is that my good as a man is one and the same as the good of those others with whom I am bound up in human community."4 1 But the real, and recognized, dilemma of modern liberalism, as we have seen, is not that people are naturally egoistical, but that they disagree about the nature of the good life. And such problems also arise on any (sophisticated) Aristotelian view, as Macintyre himself recognizes in the context of distinguishing Aristotelianism from Burkean conservatism: "when a tradition is in good order it is always partially constituted by an argument about the goods the pursuit of which gives to that tradition its particular point and purpose."4>~
The dualistic vision thus tyrannizes over our common sense, which rightly rejects all "easy combinations"-the individualism Macintyre at40. Ibid., p. 1 so. When Sandel characterizes his own preferred "strong" vtew of community, it is one in which people conceive their identity "as defined to some extent by the community of which they are a part." (Emphases added.) 41. After Virtue, pp. 212-13. 42. Ibid., p. 2o6.
255
318
Philosophy & Public Affairs
tributes to Sartre and Goffman "according to which the self is detachable from its social and historical roles and statuses" such that it "can have no history,"43 as well as the communitarian vision Macintyre occasionally seems to share with Roberto Unger according to which the "conflict between the demands of individuality and sociability would disappear."44 Because the critics misinterpret the metaphysics of liberalism, they also miss the appeal of liberal politics for reconciling rather than repressing most competing conceptions of the good life. BEYOND METAPHYsics: CoMMUNITARIAN Pouncs Even if liberalism has adequate metaphysical foundations and considerable moral appeal, communitarian politics might be morally better. But Macintyre and Sandel say almost nothing in their books to defend communitarian politics directly. Sandel makes a brief positive case for its comparative advantage over liberalism in a subsequent article. "Where libertarian liberals defend the private economy and egalitarian liberals defend the welfare state," Sandel comments, "communitarians worry about the concentration of power in both the corporate economy and the bureaucratic state, and the erosion of those intermediate forms of community that have at times sustained a more vital public life." But these worries surely do not distinguish communitarians from most contemporary liberals, unless (as Sandel implies) communitarians therefore oppose, or refuse to defend, the market or the welfare state. 45 Sandel makes explicit only one policy difference: "communitarians would be more likelY than liberals to allow a town to ban pornographic bookstores, on the grounds that pornography offends its way of life and the values ~at sustain it." His answer to the obvious liberal worry that such a policY opens the door to intolerance in the name of communal standards is that "intolerance flourishes most where forms of life are dislocated, roots unsettled, traditions undone." He urges us therefore "to revitalize those civic republican possibilities implicit in our tradition but fading in our time."46 What exactly does Sandel mean to imply by the sort of civic republi43 · Ibid., p. 205· See also Sandel, Limits, pp. 40, 150. Cf. p. J8o. 44· ~nowledge and Politics, p. 220• 45. Morality and the Liberal Ideal " p 17 46. Ibid. ' . .
256
319
Communitarian Critics of Liberalism
canism "implicit within our tradition"? Surely not the mainstream of our n:adition that excluded women and minorities, and repressed most sigruficant deviations from white, Protestant morality in ttie name of the common good. We have little reason to doubt that a liberal politics of rights is morally better than that kind of republicanism. But if Sandel is arguing that when members of a society have settled roots and established traditions, they will tolerate the speech, religion, sexual, and associational preferences of ~orities, then history simply does not support his optimism. A great deal of intolerance has come from societies of selves so "confidently situated" that they were sure repression would seiVe a higher cause. 47 The common good of the Puritans of seventeenth-century Salem commanded them to hunt witches; the common good of the Moral Majority of the twentieth century commands them not to tolerate homosexuals. The enforcement of liberal rights, not the absence of settled community, stands between the Moral Majority and the contemporary equivalent of witch hunting. The communitarian critics want us to live in Salem, but not to believe in witches. Or human rights. Perhaps the Moral Majority would cease to be a threat were the United States a communitarian society; benevolence and fraternity might take the place of justice. Almost anything is possible, but it does not make moral sense to leave liberal politics behind on the strengths of such speculations. 48 Nor does it make theoretical sense to assume away the conflicts among competing ends-such as the conflict between communal standards of sexual morality and individual sexual preference-that give rise to the characteristic liberal concern for rights. In so doing, the critics avoid discussing how morally to resolve our conflicts and therefore fail to pro47- Sandel may be correct in claiming that more intolerance has come-in the fonn of fascism-from societies of "atomized, dislocated, frustrated selves." But the truth of this claim does not establish the case for communitarian over liberal politics unless our only choice is to support a society of totally "atomized" or one of totally "settled" selves. This dualistic interpretation of our alternatives seems to lead Sandel to overlook the moral value of establishing some balance between individualism and community, and to underestimate the theoretical difficulty of determining where the proper balance lies. 48. Sandel might want to argue that societies like Salem were not "settled." Perfectly settled communities would not be repressive because every individual's identity would be fully constituted by the community or completely compatible with the community's understanding of the common good. This argument, however, is a truism: a perfectly settled SOCiety would not be repressive, because perfect settlement would leave no dissent to repress.
257
320
Philosophy & Public Affairs
vide us with a political theory relevant to our world. They also may overlook the extent to which some of their own moral commitments presuppose the defense of liberal rights. CONSTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL
Even if the communitarian critics have not given good reasons for abandoning liberalism, they have challenged its defenders. One should welcome their work if for no other reason than this. But there is another reason. Communitarianism has the potential for helping us discover a politics that combines community with a commitment to basic liberal values. The critics' failure to undermine liberalism suggests not that there are no communitarian values but that they are properly viewed as supplementing rather than supplanting basic liberal values. We can see the extent to which our moral vision already relies on communitarian values by imagining a society in which no one does more or less than respect everyone else's liberal rights. People do not form ties oflove and friendship (or they do so only insofar as necessary to developing the kind of character that respects liberal rights). They do not join neighborhood association~, political parties, trade unions, civic groups, synagogues, or churches. This might be a perfectly liberal, arguably even a just society, but it is certainl.Y not the best society to which we can aspire. The potential of commurotarianism lies, I think, in indicating the ways in which we can strive to realize not only justice but community through the many social unions of which the liberal state is the super social union. What might some of those ways be? Sandel suggests one possibility: states might "enact laws regulating plant closings, to protect their co~ munities from the disruptive effects of capital mobility and sudden mdustrial change. "49 This policy is compatible with the priority Rawls gives to liberty and may even be dictated by the best interpretation of the difference principle. But the explicit concern for preventing the disrup~on of local communities is an important contribution of communitariaJllSID to liberalism. We should also, as Sandel suggests, be "troubled by~~ tendency of liberal programs to displace politics from smaller forms assoc~atton · · to more comprehensive ones." But we should not therefore 49· "Morality and the Liberal Ideal," p. 17.
258
321
Communitarian Critics of Liberalism
oppose all programs that limit-or support all those that expand-the jurisdiction of local governments. We may be able to discover ways in which local communities and democracy can be vitalized without violating individual rights. We can respect .the right of free speech by opposing local efforts to ban pornographic bookstores, for example, but still respect the values of community and democratic participation by supporting local (democratic) efforts to regulate the location and manner in which pornographic bookstores display their wares. Attuned to the dangers of dualism, we can appreciate the way such a stand combinesuneasily-liberal and communitarian commitments. Some ways of fostering communal values--1 suspect some of the best way~ntail creating new political institutions rather than increasing the power of existing institutions or reviving old ones. By restoring "those intermediate forms of community that have at times sustained a more vital public life," we are unlikely to control "the concentration of power in both the corporate economy and the bureaucratic state" that rightly worries both communitarians and liberals.so If large corporations and bureaucracies are here to stay, we need to create new institutions to prevent them from imposing (in the name of either efficiency or expertise) their values on those of potentially more democratic communities. Realizing the relatively old idea of workplace democracy would require the creation of radically new economic institutions.s' Recently mandated citizen review boards in areas such as health care, education, and community development have increased interest in democratic participation. Wholehearted political support of such refonns and others yet untried is probably necessary before we can effectively control bureaucratic power.s2 Although the political implications of the communitarian criticisms of liberalism are conservative, the constructive potential of communitarian values is not. Had they developed the constructive potential of communitarian values, the critics might have moved further toward discovering both the
so. Ibid. 51. For a communitarian defense of economic democracy that is not based on a rejection of liberal values see Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, PP· 161 and 291-3°3· 52. For a su~gestive agenda of democratic refonns, see Benjamin Barber, Strong ~ mocracy, pp. 2 6 1_ 307. Although Barber attacks liberal theory as fundament_all,! flaw~ m the first nine chapters, the aim of his agenda for reform in the last ~hapter 1s to re~~ent liberal democracy toward civic engagement and political commuruty, not to raze It (p. 3o8).
259
322
Philosophy & Public Affairs
limits of Rawlsian liberalism and a better charter for our social world. Instead, Macintyre concludes that we should be "waiting not for a Godot, but for another-doubtless very different-St. Benedict."sJ The critics tend to look toward the future with nostalgia. We would be better off, by both Aristotelian and liberal democratic standards, if we tried to shape it according to our present moral understandings. At the end of his book, Sandel urges us to remember "the possibility that when politics goes well, we can know a good in common that we cannot know alone." But he has neglected the possibility that the only common good worth striving for is one that is not "an unsettling presence for justice. "54 justice need not be the only virtue of social institutions for it to be better than anything we are capable of putting in its place. The worthy challenge posed by the comrnunitarian critics therefore is not to replace liberal justice, but to improve it. 53· Ibid., p. 245. Roberto Unger similarly concludes Knowledge and Politics waiting for God to speak (p. 235). 54· cr. Sandel, Limits, p. I8J. I am grateful to Robert Amdur, Michael Doyle, Steven Lukes, Susan Moller Okin, Judith Shklar, Dennis Thompson, Michael Walzer, Susan Wolf, and the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs for their helpful suggestions.
RAWLS, HEGEL, AND COMMUNITARIANISM SIBYL A. SCHWARZENBACH Baruch College, City University ofNew York
FROM ITS ORIGINS in Moore and Russell's revolt against the British idealists McTaggart and F. H. Bradley, analytic philosophy has defined itself in opposition to the Hegelian speculative and metaphysical tradition. By "analytic philosophy" is meant that twentieth-century philosophical movement which may be characterized (roughly) by a number of salient features: by an emphasis on the analysis of language and meaning; by the employment of mathematical logic as a tool or method or as the method of philosophy; and by the fact that many of its practitioners have held a set of broadly empiricist assumptions, while viewing science (especially physics) as a paradigm of human knowledge.' Moreover, it is a relatively uncontroversial fact that this new philosophy had its origins, at least in part, in Moore and Russell's so-called refutation of central British Hegelian positions: in their wholesale rejection, for example, of the doctrine of "internal relations" and of "organic wholes," of knowledge considered as "synthesis" or dialectic, and of reality conceived as fundamentally monistic, one and absolute. Moore and RusselJ, for their part, simply argued for the opposed positions.2 As we approach the end of the twentieth century, however, it is not altogether clear who has won this debate. Ample evidence exists that despite more than fourscore years of disparagement and ridicule, the influence of Hegel (and many of the idealist positions) has not only not died but may even be gaining in strength.3 In particular, I hope to reveal Hegel's influence in an AUTHOR'S NOTE: Th.is research was supported in part by a grant from the City University of New York PSC-CUNY Resetueh Award Program. I would aLro like to thank the reviewers of Political Theory, Professor G. Doppelt, fiiUl audiences at the University of Zurich, where parts ofthis arlide were presented, for numerous /r,elpful comments and suggestions. A simiiGr article, entitled "Zuge der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie in der Theorie VOtJ Rawls" will be appearing in G special volume ofHegel-Studien (VoL 26) devoud to a discussion ofHegel~ Philosophy of RighL POLmCAL 11fEORY, \til. 19 No. 4, November 1991 .539-.571 C I 991 Saae Publications, Inc.
261
540
POLITICAL THEORY I November 1991
area where one might not yet have suspected it: in the thought of the paradigmatic theorist of justice in the Anglo-American world John Rawls. At first sight, this claim seems preposterous. Rawls's thought is generally regarded as the epitome of contemporary, game-theoretic contract theory, firmly grounded in the Anglo-American tradition, with its essentially anti· metaphysical intentions and (some believe) its fundamental, atomistic individualism. Hegel's metaphysical system, on the other hand, still represents the paradigm of pretentious Continental system building, with its abstruse language, its speculative talk of one "world spirit" realizing itself through history and its claims to "absolute knowledge," while in the political domain (our primary focus in this discussion), Hegel was not only an ardent critic of social contract doctrine but the inspiration of modem communitarianism. So how, one might justifiably ask, could two thinkers stand further apart? I hope to show, however, that there is an important sense in which one can apply, without significant distortion, the term "Hegelian" to important aspects of Rawls's theory.4 An exposition of the close links between Rawl's thought and that of Hegel serves several purposes. For one, it serves the purely historical interest of vindicating Hegel in the face of much unjustified vilification in the Anglo world, assuming, of course, one believes that A Theory of Justice deserves its present high regard. More important, the exposition should work to dispel something of the aura of unacceptable "individualism" surrounding Rawls:s wo.rk, while simultaneously revealing the flawed nature of recent commun_t· tanan accounts (those of C. Taylor, Sandel, Macintyre, and Walzer, 10 particular). Such accounts are, in my view, sympathetic but fundamentally ~ague and misguided attacks offering a paucity of clear-cut viable altema· hves. Should it emerge that Rawls in fact sides with the communitarian Hegel ?n numerous counts, the ground of contemporary debate should shift signif· tcantly. I hope to show that the true conflict cannot be conceived in terms of a simplistic dichotomy between "liberals" and "communitarians"; rather, the important issue regards the kind of community we seek. Finally, the followin~ study su~gests that an adequate conception of "community"- of what u~ll· mately bt~ds a just society together- may just be possible in a Rawl~tan language: tn a political language, that is, without a full-blown metaph~stCS· . Allow me to address one last preliminary point. In the subsequent dtscus:, StOn,..I assume the legitimacy of Rawls's distinction between "moral theo~ and m?ral philosophy." By "moral theory" Rawls intends the systematiC companson of h'ts tonca · ll Y promment . . . moral concepttons, whereas "moral phJlosophy" ( h' h · . .. w lC mcludes moral theory) has as its major issue the probletn of justtftcation ·5 In what "lO IIows, I shall pnmanly . . be concerned wt'th rnoral
262
Schwarzcnbach I RAWLS AND HEGEL
541
~heory. Rawls has made a plausible case for provisionally setting aside the Important questions of the truth or falsity, or even the reasonableness or unreasonableness, of various moral and political conceptions in order to proceed first with a systemati~ and comparative study of them. Only after we have clarified the nature of "Hegelianism," that is, its relation to Rawls's ~heory, and the consequences to be drawn for contemporary debates, are we an a position to ask which view is "best justified."
POLITICAL, NOT METAPHYSICAL I shall begin my comparison of the political thought of Rawls and that of Hegel by stressing what remains, no doubt, the fundamental difference between them: their respective stances in regard to metaphysics in general. My thesis shall be, in broadest outlines, thatA Theory ofJustice retains much of the fundamental structure of Hegel's political theory while detaching this structure from its background metaphysics of absolute idealism- from Hegel's monism and his talk of "world spirit," from the doctrines of absolute knowledge and concrete universals, from the concept of the self as alienation and return, and so on. Many will here surely object that such a reading will result in but an evisceration of Hegel. In defense of my project, however, I shall try to show that Rawls nonetheless retains the import of many of the most significant strands of Hegel's metaphysics; Rawls does this, however, in what he now takes to be a practical, and no longer metaphysical, form. I do not mean to minimize the profound differences between the two thinkers. It is well known, for example, that Hegel viewed his political philosophy as but one subpart of his more comprehensive metaphysical system, as set forth (in skeletal form) in his Enzylclopaedie (1830). Although scholars dispute the sense in which Hegel claims his Philosophy ofRight can actually be "deduced" from the more general system, agreement does exist that some form of "necessary connection" is being propounded between the general metaphysics and the political theory. 6 More recently, of course, scholars have begun to question whether any such necessary connection de facto exists, but this was clearly not Hegel's problem. 7 Hard core "Hegelians," moreover, continue to stress Hegel's uncompromising holism; on the Continent, at least, it is considered improper to study Hegel's political thought without first spending semesters, if not years, on the Science of Logic.1 The Hegelian horse pill, it seems, must be swaJiowed whole or not at all.
263
542
POLITICAL THEORY I November 1991
John Rawls, on the other hand, posits an explicit separation between his political philosophy and any comprehensive, "metaphysical" system. 9 1n this respect, Rawls is decidedly "un-Hegelian"; he stands closer here to the positivist, or more accurately, to the American pragmatist tradition. For Rawls's claim is not so much that metaphysical systems ultimately reduce to "nonsense" (that metaphysical claims are without purpose or meaning), but rather that such systems generally underdetermine (they may support, but they do not entail) one's substantive position in ethics or political philosophy. In regard to his own theory, Rawls writes, If metaphysical presuppositions are involved, ... they are so general that they would not distinguish between the distinctive metaphysical views- Cartesian, Leibnizian, or Kantian; realist, idealist or materialist-with which [modem] philosophy traditionally has been concerned. In this case, they would not appear to be relevant for the structure and content of a political conception of justice one way or the other. (PNM, 240)
Rawls's insigh~ although not altogether novel, 10 is important, for it acknowledges that one might well be an ontological materialist (as was Hobbes) or an absolute idealist (as was Hegel) and yet still be a political monarchist rather than a democrat in both cases. Moreover, there appears to be no inconsistency involved. By taking such a normative, "practical" approach to the study of political issues, the metaphysical similarities or differences between any two theorists will be minimized for the express purpose of focusing on the structure and content of their substantive, ethical positions. In rejecting Hegel's extreme holism, however, and in claiming that moral theory retains a certain "independence" from further questions of metaphys· ics, o?tology, or semantics, Rawls denies a major tenet of Hegelianism.~~ ~e question thus remains as to the respect in which (if any) his theory is similar to Hegel's. I propose to identify three areas in which Rawls's position may be considered typically "Hegelian." By this I mean that in each case, the move originally introduced by Hegel and accepted by Rawls differs marked~Y. not ?nly fro~ positions held within the Anglo-American, predominantly utihtar~ tan traditiOn but from positions held by Kant. The three areas I assembl unde~ th~ .headings of the task of political philosophy (including its method and JUS~Ification), the conception of the political person, and finally, the conception ofhuman community and the state. Ifl am correct, Rawls'stbeo~ may appropriately be labeled "Hegelian" in these important areas, once w have granted, that is, the possible separation of political theory from 8 full-blown metaphysics.
264
Schwarzenbach I RAWLS AND HEGEL
543
THE TASK OF PHILOSOPHY: DIALECTIC AND REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM For Hegel, the task of philosophy in general is "reconciliation" (Versoehnung); it is a reconciliation of the individual, by means of reason, not to that which "merely exists" but to the real and the "actual" (das Wirkliche). 12 From the 1801 Differenzschrift onward, Hegel stresses that the need for philosophy begins in "bifurcation" or "conflict" (Entzweiung); its aim is to surmount and to comprehend such fundamental dichotomies as the one and the many, the finite and the infinite, subject-object, or mind-body (to name but a few).n Political philosophy, for Hegel, is no exception; it too aims at a comprehension and resolution of the deepest cultural conflicts and aspirations of its time. In our time, Hegel believes, the conflict is one between the claims of an ancient communal ethical life (Sittlichlceit), on one hand, and that of the modem principle of individual freedom, on the other. 14 His Philosophy ofRight defends the position that only in the modern state- with its rational rule of law and its system of individual rights- is such a reconciliation between apparently diverse interests possible. Although Rawls views philosophy as the attempt ultimately to "render coherent" our considered moral judgments (TJ, 21), I believe it does his thought no injustice to stress that it too aims at a "reconciliation by reason"in fact, Rawls uses this exact phrase numerous times. 1s In Hegelian fashion, political philosophy not only begins in conflict for Rawls but "justice as fairness" takes as its starting point a historically specific conflict: what Rawls calls the "impasse'' reached in the modem period between the claims of freedom (in the tradition of Locke and Mill), on one hand, and those of greater equality (as represented by Rousseau or Marx), on the other}6 The task, as Rawls sees it, is to fonnulate "a deeper underlying basis of agreement" not only regarding the values of freedom and equality but of "fraternity" as well, and it is for this purpose that the two principles of justice are designed (TJ, 105). It thus turns out that A Theory of Justice- essentially a theory of the modern state- attempts to reconcile the conflicting tendencies of nothing less than what Hegel calls the animating principles of the modern epoch: the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity for all men. Interestingly enough, this is also expressly how Hegel conceives his own task; for both, philosophy is "its own time apprehended in thoughts" (PR, "Preface," 11 ). The similarities, however, run far deeper. Even though Hegel is, strictly speaking, a "moral realist" and Rawls only a "constructivist" in ethics (I shall
265
POLITICAL THEORY I November 1991
544
return to this point in a moment 17), both perceive the fundamental moral principles of the modern epoch as, to a large extent, already "embodied" (implicitly or explicitly) in contemporary political institutions and social practices as well as in the "traditions of their interpretation"; they are already embodied, that is, in what Hegel calls "objedive spirit" and what Rawls terms "our public political culture." 18 Whereas for Rawls, philosophy aims for a "reflective equilibrium" between our most deeply held moral principles and a theory which purports to generate them (TJ, 48ff.), Hegel's philosophical method- the political employment of the infamous "dialedic"- may simi· larly be so described. Hegel writes, for instance, in the preface to the Philosophy of Right: After an, the truth about Right, Ethics, and the state is as old as its public recognition and formulation in the law of the land, in the morality of everyday life, and in religion. What more docs this truly require- since the thinking mind is not content to possess it in this ready fashion? It requires to be grasped in thought as well. (P. 3)
According to both thinkers, what is needed is not some radical new beginning for ethics but rather that the moral principles and values latent in our everyday practices be "grasped in thought" as well- be made conscious and explicit, rendered consistent with each other, and their implicit rationality (or irrationality) grasped. For both thinkers, the reconciliation of principle and value is to be achieved by means of"reason"- not by the inexorable march of faith or by class struggle or violent revolution. the two major tendencies within ethical writing, it is thus clear into whtch camp both Hegel and Rawls fall. The first tendency attempts to tell us what we should do; it claims we need a radical reconstruction of our first-o~der duties.' Both utilitarianism (with its principle of utility)_ and at least some mterpretattons of Kantianism (with its categorical imperative) call for such a radical revision of our morality. Hegel and Rawls, on the other hand, (together with Aristotle) fall into the second camp; moral philosophy is the attempt to clarify and systematize what we have "all along" been doing. In Raw!sian language, moral philosophy is "Socratic" (TJ, 49); in idealist !ermtnology, it aims at ethical "self-knowledge." For both, there remains an Important contrast with, say physics. To take an extreme example, if pre· sented, with an accurate account of the motions of the heavenly bodies that we do not find appealing, we cannot change that motion to conform to a more attractive theory (TJ, 49). In the case of theories about ourselves, by contrast, we _may well wish to alter our views, actions, even who we desire to be, once their underlying regulative principles have been brought to light.
?f
266
Schwarzenbach I RAWLS AND HEGEL
54.5
Noting similarities between Hegel and Rawls in regard to the selfconception of political philosophy sheds light on what I shall now caH "the first communitarian criticism" of Rawls. This criticism runs roughly as follows: Rawls's theory purports to present us with a universal, ahistorical account of justice supplied by the notion of pure rationality itself. 19 Such a notion, however, is an illusion; all reasoning is in fact "situated," dependent on various empirical assumptions, perceptions, and cultural practices of definite historical periods, or (as Macintyre stresses) on particular cultural "traditions." Not only is A Theory ofJustice's claim to "objectivity" a sham, but the work furthers the illusion that mankind itself is to be conceived on the model of modern Western bourgeois individualism and its instrumental, market rationality. A central concern of communitarians here is that by ignoring the cultural variation between concrete, historical human communities -by ignoring their alternative conceptions of personality, say, or of reason, or their subtle use of "thick" ethical concepts that tend to bind people together- resources or potentials for community are lost. Although this criticism is not restricted to those who call themselves "communitarians," some version of it does unite them as a group. 20 As we have just seen, however, and as Rawls's later works make abundantly clear, "justice as fairness" is intended to resolve an impasse reached in the modern Western tradition. A Theory of Justice is already explicit in maintaining that the method of reflective equilibrium begins with the data from common sense and "our moral tradition," that the two principles of justice are to be judged against the leading contenders of this tradition, that they are "contingent" in the sense of being subject to revision in light of new empirical facts, and so on (TJ, 578). Already in A Theory ofJustice, that is, practical reason and its conclusions are conceived as "empirically conditioned" (a rather "unKantian" move). The real issue between Rawls and Macintyre or Walzer is not whether practical reason is conditioned by time and space in its origins and functioning; Rawls never denies this. The real issue is whether practical reason is thereby rendered "relative" and stripped of all "transcendent" critical function: a position Walzer, until recently at least, has tried to hold. 21 Once again, a comparison with Hegel is helpful, for Hegel was the first to argue seriously not only that our ideas are historically conditioned but that this fact does not rob reason of its "objectivity"; in its "dialectical'' operation, at least, reason can perform both an immanent and a critical transcendent function (see The Philosophy of History, "Introduction"). I believe it can be shown that Rawls, with the method of"reflective equilibrium," attributes to practical reason a similar, if mitigated function. 22
267
546
POLmCAL TIIEORY I November 1991
Reflective equilibrium is that process whereby reflection seeks a "mutual adjustment" between particular considered judgments (formed through concrete observation and practice) and general moral principles until a satisfactory "fit" is reached- first within one's own moral position (narrow reflective equilibrium) and then between one's own view and that of an ever widening circle of others (wide reflective equilibrium; TJ, 46ff.). It is thus a method which, like the Hegelian dialectic, not only essentially entails the movement of thought "back and forth" between concrete particular judgment and general principle (Hegel would say it aims at the "concrete universalj, but importantly, is a conception of thought whereby a novel awareness develops through the emergence of conflict or contradiction and the overcoming of such conflict. In this respect, reflective equilibrium, like the Hegelian dialectic, may be compared with the idea of a metalanguage.23 Briefly, a metalanguage is one in which we can say things about some other language (an object language) that cannot be said in that object language itself.24 1n this way, we might draw an analogy between a hierarchy of ever richer languages (object-language, metalanguage, meta-metalanguage, and so on) and what Hegel terms different "stages" of the dialectic; the "higher" stage will be a richer metalanguage in which problems posed in terms of the previous object-language (problems the object-language itself could not solve) are "resolved" ( versoehnt), while the insights of the previous stage "preserved" (aufgehoben). 2:s If we focus on a number of Hegel's own examples, the analogy (although limited) is apt enough. Hegel argues, for instance, that the Ancient Greek world lacked the language as well as the political institutions of individual subjective right~; the Athenian way of life rested on the secure foundation of a shared pubhc religion and century-old filial duties. Hence when Athens was confronted with Socrates' criticism, the city responded in accord with the only options open to it-either silence Socrates or be destroyed itself. 26 By contrast, the m~de~n _state exp~ess~y h~s at its disposal this conceptually enriche~ ~hem~ ?f 1_n~IVIdual subJecllve nghts. In acknowledging the universal pnnc•ple 0 10 ~ 1 ~ 1 d~al conscience, for instance, the state has expressly incorporated ~lthm Itself or "reconciled" a domain of conflicting perspectives on the good !lfe_ ~ithout its own unity being threatened. Further, the recognition of mdl~ldualliberty of conscience, according to Hegel, is a sign of the modem st_at~ s_ moral s_uperiority: increased tolerance, a greater universality, and 3 dlrnlmshment m the severity of punishment of critics (PR, para. tOOA). 1.do not mea~ to imply that there are not important disanalogies between the Ide~ of a senes of metalanguages and the Hegelian dialectic. For one, t~e former Idea (unlike the latter) carries with it no requirement that the conflict
268
Schwarzenbach I RAWLS AND HEGEL
547
resolution proceed in only one way nor that the series culminate in "absolute knowledge" (a full awareness of the whole process) rather than proceed to infinity. 27 The issue for the moment is whether reflective equilibrium too may productively be viewed as a process whereby we achieve an ever richer or more comprehensive ethical "overview," and I believe it can. Rawls claims, for instance, that any adequate account of justice will be one that reconciles by "a higher principle" what he caJJs our "common sense precepts of justice" (TJ, 305ff.). Such ordinary-language precepts (Rawls mentions five) will inevitably conflict when measured against each other. For instance, the precept "to each according to his ability" (elevated to a first principle by many libertarians) conflicts with "to each according to his need" (stressed in turn by Marxists); giving someone what they need is hardly identical to rewarding ability. Both precepts, in turn, conflict with "to each according to his effort" and so on. For Rawls, any adequate theory of justice wiJI not elevate one commonsense precept at the expense of all others (in effect, ignoring or suppressing the conflict) but will be capable of "preserving" the basic insights behind each. Thus we find that in Rawls'swell-ordered society, the two principles of justice will be interpreted by four branches of government, each of which recognizes, as its special responsibility, one of the commonsense precepts (TJ, 275ff.). A balancing of the precepts and a "reconciliation" here occurs at the level of (and in the language of) the modern state. Only the scheme taken as a whole, writes Rawls, comes close to preserving the insight behind our most basic moral belief that justice requires "giving to each his due" (TJ, 313). At this point one may be tempted to ask what determines, in Rawls's theory, the weighing of these precepts within the state, given not only that common sense is undecided and may be systematically distorted but that mutually incompatible overarching accounts would seem possible? To come to grips with this problem, Hegel presents us with a rather thick, univocal theory of the "cunning of reason": his metaphysical philosophy of history. Rawls nowhere, of course, attempts any such theory and presumably again eschews all such attempts. Nonetheless, I believe Rawls's answer to this problem retains critical aspects of Hegel's stance. That is to say, while jettisoning all talk of one world spirit, of the inexorable march of reason or of the end of history, Rawls's theory nonetheless retains certain simila~ but far weaker assumptions: that there is such a thing as moral progress in history (since the days of slave~), that~ st~dy of man discloses a strong desire for freedom and for the e~erc1se of ~~s h1~e~t powers (Rawls's Aristotelian principle) and that our SOCial and pohttcal mstJtutions indeed reveal a minimal rationality and coherence. In Rawls's theory
269
548
POLITICAL THEORY I November 1991
also, that is, how we weigh the wisdom of the ages and balance the precepts of common sense (deciding which to reject and so forth), is essentially tied to a larger (if still partial) systematic conception, not only of the kind of beings we have historically been but of the kind of persons (consistent with this history) that we aspire to be. For Rawls, as for the German idealist tradition in general, the normative conception of the person plays a fundamental role in determining the content of the principles of justice ("DL," 559). Before turning to Rawls's conception of the person, however, (merely another target of communitarian criticism), allow me to consolidate the position adopted thus far. My excursion into the dialectic and reflective equilibrium was meant to show how practical reason, working on the material of a particular historical tradition, can yet achieve a certain "objectivity." Not merely for Hegel but for Rawls too (in explicit contrast to the position attributed to him by his critics), the historically conditioned nature of prac· tical reason is acknowledged, while our capacities for reflection and self· criticism are affirmed. In Rawls's view, if a theory exhibits an internal coherence of a high order, if it better than its competitors matches our normative judgments in reflective equilibrium, and if, importantly, it exhibits a greater "adequacy" or "comprehensiveness" (if it can account for its competitor's position and not vice versa)/8 then together these criteria work to make one conception of justice, if not unequivocally true, at least "more reasonable" for us to hold than another (TJ, 577ft'.). Finally, if this mitigated holistic and "idealist" conception of justification is acknowledged as Rawls's own, the import of the first communitarian criticism vanishes; "justice as fairness" can claim greater "objectivity"- in the sense of fulfilling the above crite~ia-without loss of historical specificity. And Rawls, in light of !he restncted practical aim he has set for himself (the practical aim of reachmg moral. a~reement on principles regulating the basic structure of a modem plurahshc democracy), needs claim nothing more. . To be sure, emphasizing the similarities between Hegel and Rawls tn regard to philosophical reason as "reconciliation" is not to overlook what 1 ~ave called their fundamental difference: their respective stances in general 1 ~ regard to a full-blown metaphysics or ontology. For Hegel, recall, the dtalectic is not only a doctrine of "rational necessity" culminating in "absOlute knowledge" but is conceived as an ontological category; presuma~ly eve?. th~ngs in nature operate "dialectically" (Phen, "Preface"). Reflectave equahbrium, by contrast, is an open process of fallible, aU-too-human thought. So too, for Hegel, the principles of freedom equality and fraternity to be .• d ' ' .......Jf reconca e. ~re u~timately the ideas of one "world spirit" instantiating •~ through fanate mands and coming to know itself in history (PR, 34tff.).11te
270
Schwarzcnbach IRAWLS AND HEGEL
549
principles are conceived as universal and absolute; in an important sense, they are "discovered" by us. ~awls, on the other hand, refrains from making such further, strong cla1ms. Whether his two principles of justice are in fact universal, for instance, remains as much a matter for future empirical investigation to decide as for reflection to ponder (TJ, 578). It is not even clear that his two principles de facto underlie our tradition; they may well be nothing more than the "best interpretation" yet, a ''construct" out of the pool of deeply held and widely shared moral and political considered convictions (see note 17). By taking this "constructivist" position, however, Rawls is not denying that there may be such a thing as a growing worldwide consciousness and recognition of individual freedom, as well as the possibility of absolute moral truths. It is only that a conception of political justice in his view (one appropriate for a modern, pluralistic democracy) cannot rest on the truth or falsity of such strong theses and must even be compatible with a number of conflicting positions concerning them. Hence for Rawls, unlike for Hegel, political philosophy must be set free from the anchor of a metaphysical foundationalism; in self-conception, its task comes closer now to the revamping of Neurath 's ship cast out on the open sea. In regard to some of the most ancient debates in philosophy, "justice as fairness" wishes to remain "agnostic."
THE CONCEPTION OF THE PERSON
Perhaps the leading criticism which the German idealists have leveled at the utilitarians is that the latter operate with an inadequate conception of the person and of human dignity; utilitarianism conceives of the person as little more than a container of homogeneous desires bent on maximization.29 Rawls, of course, reiterates a version of this critique: Utilitarians operate with a "consumer person," underestimate the possibility of a rational restructuring of desire and motivation itself, and fail properly to acknowledge the "distinctions between persons" (TJ, 23ff., t85ff.). Ironically, Rawls's own notion of the person has come under attack by communitarians, most notably, by M. Sandel.30 Once again, such criticism at least appears to echo Hegel's famous attack on the individualism of Kant. 31 Sandel argues that Rawls presents us with a "hyper-Kantian," "~enude~," or "abstract" conception of the person, conceived as an agent of chmc~, wh1ch is "prior to" and separate from its particular ends, attnbute~, commltmen.ts, and even concrete character (LU, t5ff.). Since Rawls conce1ves the plurality and separateness of individuals as ontologically "prior to their unity," his 271
550
POLITICAL THEORY I November 1991
position leaves no room for communal values or social commitments in the "constitution" of the individual's identity and self-understanding (LU, 147ff.). Rawls operates with a fundamentally "thin" and flawed notion of the person and with an inadequate understanding of man's social nature. Sandel accuses Rawls, in short, of a metaphysical "atomism." As Rawls's later writings have clarified, however, the basic mistake ofthe preceding criticism is that his use of the term "person" is intended not as a comprehensive account of personality but as a "political conception," that is, as an appropriate conception of the person for the limited purpose of deciding on principles of justice for the basic structure of society ("PNM," 23lff.). What I wish to show here is how close in fact this "political conception" of the person is to Hegel's account of the person in part 1 of Philosophy ofRight, entitled "Abstract Right." (No one accuses Hegel of atomism.) Of further significance is how similar Rawls's original position and Hegel's abstract right are in general. Rawls's A Theory of Justice stands squarely in the tradition of the German Rechtslehre. Hegel's concern in part 1 of Philosophy of Right, in the section titled "Abstract Right," may be stated thus: What are the content and limits of relations among persons respecting and treating one another according to the single norm that each is a person? This concern reveals Hegel's continuity with the natural rights tradition; the section is a form of methodological abstraction from the immediate and concrete social bonds between persons similar to that in state-of-nature methodologies. 32 Unlike the latter, however, Heg~l. is explicit that he seeks the principles of personhood underlying the specifically modern period (PR, paras. 40A, 57R). His use of the terrn :·person" is. thus narrower than that of his natural right predecessors, who use It to refer e1ther to the universal individual in the state of nature (Hobbes and Locke) or to the individual conceived as moral subject (Kant). For Hegel, by con~rast, the term "person" refers to the individual qua his capacity to be the subJe~t of m~~ern political rights; it is only in the modern state that the capacny for Citizenship, in principle at least is extended to all men (PR, para. 40R). Further, Hegel considers such perso~hood only the "first condition" for f~eedom and human flourishing (PR, paras. 1, 33). For a more compre· he~slve good, the individual must be able to conceive of himself, not only as a nghts-bearing legal person but as an autonomous moral subject and as a parti~ipating member of a rational community as well. 33 1 It IS of interest to note that on each of these counts, Rawls follows Hege (rat~er than Kant or other social contract theorists). Part 1 of A Theory of ~ustLce, for ~nstance, sets forth the original position, clearly a form of methodological abstraction" from the richer and more concrete social bonds
272
Schwarzenbach IRAWLS AND HEGEL
SS I
bet~een persons. This abstraction, however, is from our"post-Reformational pubhc culture," and its aim is to arrive at substantive political principles expressing men's respect for each other (TJ, sec. 40). Similarly, part 1 gives us only a "thin theory of the good" (TJ, 396); it is not until part 3 that we receive a fuller conception, as well as, finally, an account of man's social nature (TJ, 520ff.). My point is that for neither Hegel nor Rawls is any claim being made about the ontological "priority" of the individual to the group. Instead, modem political personhood (entailing the individual rights of conscience, free speech, various political liberties, the right to contract, to hold at least personal property, and so on) is claimed by both thinkers to be a necessary condition for human flourishing in post-Reformational circumstances, never a sufficient condition as Sandel's critique implies. If one looks more closely still, it emerges further that for both Hegel and Rawls, modem political personhood presupposes two minimum "moral powers," capacities, or competencies of individuals (TJ, 505; "DL," 525). In Hegel, personhood entails, first, what he caJis the capacity for"self-conscious universality" (PR, para. 35). The human subject is unique insofar as it can recognize itself as "universal"- in the first instance, as "indifferent to particularity" (PR, para. 37). Hegel here refers to the ego's ability to negate or distance itself from anything in particular- its own determinate thoughts and desires included (i.e., it can revise, reject them, and so forth). This "unrestricted capacity" for abstraction, Hegel believes, is presupposed not only in the person's ability to perceive its likeness to the ego of others (abstracting from particular differences) but for its ability to grasp, and to determine itself to act in the world from, universal rules and principles (PR, para. 258R). Man alone, Hegel stresses, can consciously sacrifice everything particular, his own aims and life included; this capacity will be tested particularly in times of war. The capacity for "self-conscious universality" in Hegel corresponds quite clearly, I believe, to Rawls's first moral power of personality: to what Rawls calls "an effective sense of justice" and which he describes as "the capacity to understand, to apply and to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the principles of justice" ("DL," 525). (In Rawlsian terminology, this capacity refers to the "reasonable" in us, in contrast to the merely instrumental and self-interested "rational" part.) But, so too, Rawls's second moral power, "the capacity to form, to revise and rationally to pursue a particular conception of the good" ("DL," 525), may be seen to correspond to what Hegel caiJs the ego's second fundamental capacity for "self-determination" (PR, pa~a. 6). The claim of both thinkers here is that fundamental to the modern not10n of free personality is the ability not simply to follow rules nor merely to negate
273
552
POLITICAL THEORY I November 1991
or choose between de facto given alternatives (Willlcuer) but to form plans, posit particular goals, and in general "express" a self-conception or a plan of life in an external, publicly recognized sphere (PR, para. 6). At this point, we arrive at Hegel's important concept of "expression" (Entaeusserung). I hope to show that the concept is also central to Rawls's account. As C. Taylor has rightly pointed out, Hegel was influenced by the German "expressivist" movement of the 1770s, whose members revived the old Aristotelian notion of the good life as the expression of purpose or the realization of "form."34 Hegel, for example, praises Aristotle's view of the soul as "self-organizing form" inseparable from a particular organic body (Enzy, para. 378 and LHP, II, 180ff.), and he, like Aristotle, imbues personality with the motive force of bringing its distinctively human capacities to fruition. Nonetheless, Hegel explicitly departs from Aristotle when it comes to questions of political personality. Unlike for the Ancients who, according to Hegel, viewed the form of an individual's life as fixed "by nature" or independent of the subject who receives it, the purpose of a subject's life must be given to it by itself, it must be its own conception. This Hegel calls the "principle of subjective freedom," and he considers it to be the distinguishing. mark of modernity; in the modem state, this principle has been acknowledged for the first in the universal right of free personality (PR, paras. 182A, 185R). Hegel's concept of ••expression" is of further interest because it signals an important aspect of his departure from Kant. With this concept, Hegel clearly attempts to overcome the rigid Kantian dualities between mind and body, reason and desire, and so on. Hegel is, in the end, a monist; it is of the essence of mind (Geist) that it express itself in space and time. So, too, imbuing personality with this motive force entails for Hegel (unlike for Kant) that sensuous desire and impulse be considered "intrinsic to freedom" (PR, para. 6)· Thus .in cont~st to Kant's view, where the physical, mechanical world forev~r remams a fotl to our transcendental freedom the sensuous material world JJI Hegel (including our own sensuous desir~) is viewed as the necessary medium in which our freedom is embodied and revealed. A number of important subtheses follow from this altered conception. For one, politically speaking, Hegel now attributes to the right of modern personality what may be called a material content; free personality, and the development of human powers, is impossible severed from an adequate . {! r matenal substratum (PR, para~ 41). Thus we find in Hegel's theory, 0 example, that the state will play a far more extensive welfare role than under traditional liberalism; the .. public authority" should provide education, ove~ see public utilities (e.g., street lighting and bridge building), care for public
274
Schwarzcnbach I RAWLS AND HEGEL
553
health, price ?,aily necessities, and alleviate poverty among other things (PR, para. 236ff.). Second, for any individual to exist qua person, for him to embody his plans and express a self-conception in an objective public sphere, it is essential that others be able to recognize him as well as acknowledge his desires and aims as such (PR, para. 71). This presupposes, in Hegel's view, not just a material substratum but a social background of shared understandings, expectations, and the "reciprocal recognitions" entailed by his notion of Geist.36 Without such a prior cultural formation (without, in contemporary language, an understanding of the "form of life"), the individual could never adequately express his intentions or even come to know them. The minimal knowledge of such expectations Hegel terms Bildung (culture or education) and he describes it as our "second nature" (PR, para. 3). The important point is that for a person to obtain "substantive freedom" in Hegel (and not just Willlruer or choice), it is not enough simply to overcome the alien and compelling character of the natural physical world (achieved through labor and property), nor is it enough to bring order to the chaotic inner world of one's desires (achieved primarily through moral reflection); one must also overcome the compulsory nature of human, communal life. The latter is achieved, in Hegel's view, through educating oneself to an awareness of universal ends as well as by participating in the construction of the rational character of public social life (PR, paras. 149, 260). "Substantive freedom" can only be fully instantiated, he claims, with a community wide "reciprocal recognition" of freedom as "lived social practice." The latter Hegel terms Sinlichkeit or "rational ethical life." I have emphasized Hegel's notion of personality as "expression," for I believe the thrust of his departure here from Kant is fully accepted by Rawls. Rawls, too, views his own thought as an attempt to overcome the many dualisms of Kantian philosophy ("DL," 516). So too, in A Theory ofJustice, Rawls explicitly criticizes Kant's theory of the person for lacking "the concept of expression" (TJ, 255). Further, like Hegel, he revives an essentially Aristotelian notion of the good life as the realization of purpose or "a plan of life" (which must now be given to the individual by himself); the minimal motivation attributed to persons in Rawls's theory is the "Aristotelian principle," which claims that other things being equal, humans enjoy the exercise of their distinctive capacities, and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized or the greater its complexity (TJ, 426). As a consequence, Rawls, again like Hegel, stresses those minimal background condi· tions (both material and social) necessary for the realization of the powers of personality: Rawls's Jist of "primary goods" ("DL," S2Sff.). 37 And impor-
275
554
POLITICAL THEORY I November 1991
tantly, among these goods, Rawls includes the "social basis of self-respec~" a prerequisite for which is that the individual participate in "social union" (TJ, 441 ). As we shall see in the next section, with Rawls's idea of a "social union," critical aspects of Hegel's notion of Geist reemerge in contemporary political theory. For the moment, however, it suffices to note that Rawls, too, distinguishes between "rational" and "full autonomy"; the latter, he writes, can be "realized only by citizens of a well-ordered society in the course of their daily lives" (TJ, 528). If the preceding analysis is correct, we can see how wide of the mark is Sandel's criticism of Rawls's "thin" and "denuded" conception of the self or person. In the original position, Rawls is not giving us an account of the "self' or "subject" at all but is (as is Hegel's abstract right) presenting us with the minimal conditions for modern, political personhood or citizenship. In em· phasizing the moment of individual choice, moreover, Rawls is merely articulating, in political terms, an insight already won during the Reforma· tion: that the good the individual seeks should ideally be obtained via that individual's own choice, consciousness, and will, not imposed from without by the dominant religion or the state or even by "the majority."38 Here, Rawls simply sides with the communitarian Hegel for whom the political "princi~le of subjective freedom" remains the distinguishing mark of modernity. Agam, neither thinker is claiming that such political personhood is a sufficient condition for human flourishing, only that it is a necessary one given post· Reformational circumstances. Sandel's "communitarian" account (and I be· lieve Walzer's, too, as well as Macintyre's critique of the notion of individual rights) misses this crucial point completely. 39 One might attempt to defend Sandel by claiming that, in criticizing R~wls, ~e h~s something closer to the Marxist critique of bourgeois individual n.g~ts 10 mtnd and not Hegel's position after all. Yet 1 believe Sandel's postuon would also be a misreading of the Marxist stance. 40 Nor am I denying that both. Hegel and Rawls operate with an impoverished notion of the person, that _as, of the political person or citizen.41 1 have only tried to stress that the partt~ul~r critique of the Rawlsian person made by Sandel (and other corn· mumtanans) takes us back to pre-Reformational thinking. Finally, not only are Hegel's and Rawls's conceptions of the political person significantly similar but it is clear that both are employing the concept " . person " not as a natural kind term but as a sociopolitical construct.42 That IS, for both thinkers, a conception of man's individual liberty and rights. as "metaphysically" given (by God say or Nature) misses their distinctive aspect ' ' ·"and . . .as hard-won human achievements; universal "free personahty "mdtvJdua1 ng · hts" are cultural products, not starting points, of a 1ong and
276
Schwarzenbacb IRAWLS AND HEGEL
SSS
arduous historical struggle. Moreover, it is only if one views them as such -as presupposing this larger cultural effort- that their full significance is recognized and the responsibility for maintaining them in existence acknowledged. Thus it is that one finds in the works of Hegel and Rawls the conception of the person embedded in a further account of those particular background social, economic, and political institutions which alone allow free personality to flourish.
SIITLICHKEIT, SOCIAL UNION, AND THE WELL-ORDERED SOC/ElY Whether one is reading Hegel's Philosophy of Right or Rawls's A Theory of Justice, the movement is from "abstract to concrete," from the minimal moral requirements of political personality (set forth in abstract right and the original position) to an account of those background economic and political institutions supporting such a conception until both works end, finally, with a reading of man's "social nature" (part S3). This fact is repeatedly overlooked, however, in communitarian criticisms of Rawls. Sandel argues, for instance, that given Rawls's "denuded" conception of the person, his theory cannot justify the strong other-directed tendencies of its own difference principle.43 Such a justification would require the notion of a "group" or "community subject" (an idea often attributed to Hegel). 44 C. Taylor's concern also focuses on the notion of community rights and he, like Sandel, faults Rawls for neglecting "background" considerations (specifically, considerations of the human good) in relation to which all questions of distributive justice and of individual "desert" must be situated.45 This last criticism of Taylor's is particularly surprising, given that Rawls from the beginning has insisted that his two principles of justice are to apply to the background "basic structure" of society and not to individual actions; Rawls is well aware that there is no "context independent" notion of desert. 46 Again, I believe such communitarian criticisms are wide of their mark, but in spirit at least, they do revert back to Hegel: to Hegel's basic stance that social contract theory is an inadequate approach for an understanding not only of human community but of the modern state. Allow me to turn to this last point first. Why, according to Hegel, is the ideal of the social contract inadequate to an understanding of the modern state? It is important to realize that Hegel distinguishes three different senses of the term "state" (der Staat). 41 Hegel
277
556
POUTICAL THEORY I November 1991
distinguishes between, first, the political state in the narrow or "strict" sense. This refers to the state qua its "internal organization": whether it is a democracy, a monarchy, etc., as determined by its political constitution and explicit laws (PR, para. 274). Second, there is "the external state," which refers to the organization of the judiciary and the police, including the concrete physical manifestations of government, such as the courthouse and jails (PR, para. 183ff.). Finally, Hegel refers to the "state proper" (PR, para. 267ff.), which encompasses both of the previous senses as well as something more; the state proper includes the customs, manners, and moral consciousness of a people historically united together in a tradition. The strictly political state, in Hegel's view, is thus conceived of as the expression (the legal articulation or the making explicit and consistent) of a people's prior ethical practices. Granted, this is a rather broad conception of the state, but it is no broader, we might note, than what is being encompassed under Rawls's notion of "the well-ordered society" (in which government imple· ments the two principles of justice) or, for that matter, under R. Dworkin's notion of "law"; in each case, the domain of the state, of justice, or of ''the law" includes the tradition's underlying moral principles.48 Keeping these different senses in mind t it becomes clearer why for Hegel• the modern political state could never be traced back to an original "histoncal" contract between individuals in the state of nature. The strictly political state is the legal expression or articulation of a people's historically prior ethical practices. But so, too, the ideal of the state as nothing more than 8 contract between individuals- a mere modus vivendi, as it were- is also ~nadeq~a~e in Hegel's view. This is the case, he argues, because all cont~act· mg actiVIty must take place against a background of shared assumptions, trust, and social practice, which themselves cannot be the subject of contract; it is impossible that everything be open to contract at once.49 Again, no act of ~ntract (social or otherwise) can generate the conditions of its. oWJl v~hdlty, ~ut presupposes background norms, rules, or principles, compbance With which confers legitimacy on the contractual transaction. This back· groun~ of ~bared moral assumptions Hegel terms Sittlichkeit (ethical ~ustom or social hfe) and is that element which the model of the state conceived as a mere self-interested "compact" fails properly to acknowledge. . This criticism of the contract model has become commonplace (althO~ It ~as ~~t. so, of course, in Hegel's time). The issue here is the extent to which !h•s cnhc•sm touches on Rawls's social contract theory. Interestingly eno~ It does n~ toucb ~Rawls's theory at all; Rawls fully acknowledg~s the potll Early 10 the Philosophy ofRight, Hegel sets forth three essenbal features of the modem notion of contract:
278
Schwarzenbach I RAWLS AND HEGEL
557
1. The contract must arise from the "arbitrary will" (Wil/Ailer), i.e., from the free initiative or private contracting panies (and not from some higher public authority, say). 2. A common will (or shared purpose of the panicular wills) is brought into existence by their mutual consent or agreemenL 3. The object(s) with regard to which the contract is made, must be single "external" lhing(s). (The modem practice of contract presupposes non-alienability of personhood and its essential characteristics.) (PR, para. ?S)
Hegel's general point is that the contractarian tradition has confused such norms brought into being and having binding validity within the sphere of private transactions with those norms governing the public rights of political bodies, such as the state (PR, para. 75). It is of the essence of modem individual rights, for instance, that .they are not, properly speaking, private property (unlike various rights in the medieval period); modem political rights cannot be alienated to others at will but are universally secured by the impersonal and general norms of the rule of law. Hence the realm of private contract could never lead to, or account for, the public, universal character of the modem state but instead must presuppose it. What is of interest here, however, is that (in contrast to the social compact in Hobbes or Locke) the agreement in Rawls's original position clearly vio/Qtes Hegel's first condition for the existence of a modem contract: that the contract be the result of the "private" arbitrary will. The veil of ignorance expressly excludes parties from the possibility of acting on such a private will insofar as it excludes all particular knowledge to them; the veil forces the parties instead to focus on common and universally shared characteristics (TJ, 136ff.). So, too, as a direct consequence of this veil, the parties in the original position "agree" that certain types of primary goods (the basic liberties and equal opportunities) are, in effect, to be withdrawn from the scope of future contract and universally granted to all."' What transpires in Rawls's original position is thus no ordinary contractual agreement. It is in fact an agreement which (to use Hegelian language) "transcends the standpoint of contract" itself; it acknowledges a far more substantive union between persons and political institutions.'• The original position, which serves as a "means of public reflection and self-clarification" ("PNM," 236), concentrates as much on those aspects "beyond contract" as it does on the moment of contracting itself. Again, part 1 Qf A Theory ofJustice may be seen to perform a function similar to Hegel's abstract right. In Rawls's original position, "the rational" (each person's legitimate rational advantage as represented by the parties) is acknowledged and granted a certain legitimacy, but it is ultimately framed and subordinated to "the reasonable": to the fair background terms of a
279
558
POLITICAL THEORY I November 1991
system of free and equal cooperation as a whole and to the capacity of individuals to honor such terms ("DL," 529ff.). The central difference between Hegel and Rawls in this respect lies, I believe, in the fact that, whereas Hegel envisions the fair cooperative terms to be those in accordance with the universal principle of substantive freedom, Rawls attempts to make this principle more specific; the well-ordered society entails realizing the difference principle as well. The fact that "justice as fairness" does not conceive of our political life (or the state) on the model of a social contact but rather acknowledges (as does Hegel) a realm of private contractual transactions as an essential aspect within the modern state is even clearer in part 3 of A Theory ofJustice, where Rawls speaks of the well-ordered society (one in which his two principles of justice are implemented by government) as a "social union of social unions" (TJ, 527). In this third part, Rawls proffers his account of man's "social nature" as well as his account of the "good of community" (TJ, 395). It is important to understand what he here has in mind, consi~ering his many communitarian critics. In claiming that man's nature is fundamentally "social," Rawls is not merely claiming that society is necessary for human life or that social life is a condition for the individual to develop speech and language and to acquire certain sorts of needs, interests, and so on (TJ, 522ff.). Nor is his point merely the Wittgensteinian one (repeatedly stressed by Taylor, for instance) that only in a community of speakers are certain conditions met whose satisfaction is necessary for us to hold justified beliefs or even to express our individual beliefs and thoughts in the first place. 52 These facts are not trivial, but to characterize our social ties to one another by reference to these facts alone is to "trivialize" our sociability (TJ, 522). Why? Because all these things are equally true of persons who view their relations to one another in instrumental terms. They are all true of a group of egoists, say, who could not have developed language, voiced their egotistical needs, or justified their selfish desires without a prior social life, and so forth. Rawls's point is stronger (as is Hegel's): Only by actively cooperating with other humans and by sharing important, moral ends with them can certain of the individual's distinctively human powers reach fruition. Furthermore, only by doing so can the individual participate in many of the realized capacities of others (TJ, 525ff.). Rawls defines a "social union" as that form of cooperative activity whereby individuals share final ends, participate in common activities valued for their own sake (a version of Aristotle's notion of praxis), and agree on a scheme of conduct leading to a complementary good for all (TJ, 525). Rawls contrasts this notion with that
280
Schwarzenbach I RAWLS AND HEGEL
559
of a "private society," where individuals not only have independent or conflicting conceptions of the good but where they regard their social institutions in purely instrumental terms. "Private society," Rawls explicitly notes, corresponds to Hegel's notion of "civil society," and the idea's natural habitat, he claims, is economic theory (TJ, 521ff.). A paradigm of social union, by contrast, is that of musicians playing together in an orchestra; a requisite in this case for the individual to develop his capacities is that others also develop theirs and that certain rules and principles are accepted by all from the start (TJ, 524). In a successful play of the music, the distinction between personal and communal well-being, at least temporarily, collapses. Insofar as individual players identify with the ends of the group (its goals have become their goals), each player not only shares in the responsibility of the group activity but is eligible for pride or shame with regard to it. I am thus eligible for pride or shame with regards to how you, another member, play. Unlike in private society, that is, in social union, members win or lose together; social union is not a zero-sum game. It is important to stress, however, that for individual players to "identify" with the group does not entail that they share all ends with other members of the orchestra (this would be an altogether illiberal model). As Dworkin has recently emphasized, a good performance of the music does not entail that members share all cultural aims nor that they all believe in one God nor that they all participate in a common sex life.53 In order to "identify" with the group here, it is only necessary that individuals share the end of the union in question. Establishing the fact that Rawls views the well-ordered society on the model of a "social union of social unions" with justice as a defining aim (and not on the model of a modus vivendi) is important for a number of reasons. 54 For one, the idea affords a way of attributing a certain "primacy" to group activity without committing ourselves ontologically to the notion of a "group subject" (or to Bradley's idea, say, of a "moral organism"). An established orchestra can be, and legally is, treated as a "unit of agency" in its own right; it has an internal organization and interests peculiar to it, decisions made in its name, schedules to meet, and so forth. Such a scheme is not only "temporally prior" to any new member entering in but "conceptually prior"; the new individual's activities will gain their significance against this background scheme. Further, such agency is not adequately comprehensible in terms of a "mere sum" of isolated actions; it expressly concerns the manner or way in which these actions are weighted and organized. An "integrated orchestra" or a "community between members" seem genuine enough, everyday phenomena. Nonetheless, one may stiil wish to maintain that this
281
560
POUTICAL THEORY I November 1991
"group spirit" or "way of life" is created by, and resident in, certain human attitudes and practices and nothing more. Second, the introduction of the idea of social union means that Rawls's conception of the political state (which implements the two principles of justice in the well-ordered society) not only explicitly departs from Kant's position but is far closer to Hegel's view than is commonly recognized. 55 Kant, that is, continued to view the state on the model of a modus vivendi: as a nonmoral consensus founded on the convergence of self-interest.56 As we have seen, however, Hegel conceives of the political state as the deeper articulation of a people's moral practices; the state is conceived on the model of Geist or Sittlichkeit. In pointing to the similarities between Hegel and Rawls in this respect, I am not, of course, attributing to Rawls Hegel's particular views on such topics as democracy, nationalism, war, or civil disobedience.57 I simply wish to emphasize that for both thinkers- unlike for the "Hobbesian strand" of liberal thought-the state is not conceived as a mere neutral "umpire" between competing interests; it plays a fundamental role in the articulation and education of shared moral interests.58 Finally, the fact that Rawls views crucial aspects of the political life of a people on the model of a social union means that he too recognizes the important "good of community": that people lead better lives when they do not draw a sharp distinction between their own welfare and that of the community to which they belong. 59 Although, for Rawls, citizens no longer share comprehensive religious or moral conceptions of the good life, they do share important ends in common; they share a desire for justice and they value their political institutions and activities as goods in themselves (TJ, 522). At least in the well-ordered society, citizens are viewed as identifying with the political community and hence eligible for praise or blame regarding its actions. At this point, I must admit that I find this notion of "liberal community" (although an advance over traditional liberalism) inadequate after all. I wish to emphasize, however, that it is not for the reasons that Sandel, Macintyre, or Taylor cite. Uberal community is not inadequate because persons no longer hold comprehensive conceptions of the good life in common. Given the diversity of religious and ethnic backgrounds which together make up the modem state today, shared conceptions of the good life must inevitably, it seems, be partial in the future. Nor is it necessary that members of the modem state share a common ethnic culture or racial characteristics; any suggestion to the contrary should strike us as reactionary and even dangerous. In my view, it is the fundamental flaw of recent communitarian accounts that, although rightfully stressing identification with one's society's fundamental
282
Schwarzenbach I RAWLS AND HEGEL
561
institutions as an important good, they so little concern themselves with which institutions and ends are worthy of our allegiance. This mistake neither Hegel nor Rawls makes. My own view is that the thinness of Rawls's conception of liberal community lies not in his rejection of comprehensive conceptions of the good or of religious, racial, or particular cultural features of humans as bases for founding community today; this is, in fact, liberalism's strong point. The thinness of liberal community lies, rather, in its continuing to look away from important, shared moral ends we in fact hold in common, namely, economic, and I would also argue, "reproductive" ones. In Rawls's theory, that is, "social union" never enters into the economic sphere, at least on the day-to-day level.60 Social union is defined in explicit contrast to the idea of private society, whose proper home, Rawls claims, is the economic domain. Similarly, when Rawls enumerates examples of social unions (he mentions families, games, the arts, science, sexual love, friendships, and the wellordered society itself), the work relation, and any mention of the firm or productive relation, is conspicuously absent (TJ, 525ff.).61 Finally, when he gives his account of the learning of the social virtues as well as of the important "art of perceiving the person" (the art of discerning their beliefs, intentions, and feelings), Rawls actually seems to relegate such learning to extra economic activities- to the family, games, school, friendships, and so on (TJ, 465ff.). It is at this point, I believe, that the "thi?nes~". of liberal community is revealed. Eight hours of the average person s day IS spent at "work" or in the domain of so-called private society; social institutio~s an~ relations are viewed instrumentally, and other persons are seen as havmg, If not competing, then at least independent ends. . Elsewhere 1 have argued that Rawls's theory, indeed, has not liberated itself from th~ model (reaching back to Locke and Ad~m Smith) of a priva~e appropriating individual bent on maximization when 1t comes to the domatn of labor, despite strongly opposed other tendencies of his thought.6z And I am in fact suggesting that this model must be rejected for much ~e ~m6~ reason that Rawls rejects it elsewhere: It is simply beneath hum.an. dagmty. Finally, one way of deflating the power that this private appropnatave ~od~l holds over us is to take seriously the alternative form of labo~ em~daed •: the traditional activity of women outside the mark~t.(in famdy, chdd, an_ home care).64 Such "reproductive" activity (in exphcat contrast to the.cate . d ction of particular gory of "productive" labor) aims duectly at the repro but retains hurnan relationships· it is not only essentially "other darected . ·· ' · 't' and act1ons perCnhcal features of social union, such as shared acuvaaes. ch fo f Ari t0 d 's praxtS) So, too, su rrned for their own sake (a version o s e ·
?
283
,
562
POLmCAL THEORY /November 1991
reproductive activity and work fundamentally entails, develops, and exer· cises what Rawls calls the "art of perceiving the person." For the present, however, it is enough to note that what I am considering the "legitimate" criticism of Rawls's theory is not the contemporary communitarian criticism at all but a new version of the old socialist one. The greatest (moral) threat to "community" does not lie in our religious, cultural, or racial diversity; the peril lies in that expanding, commodified market relations threaten us all. In concluding this section, it is important to note that Hegel conceived of numerous institutions that were to foster communal values and keep the atomizing tendencies of the market and modem civil society in check. Hegel mentions in this regard the family (with its caring relations), the state (with its imposition of universal rights and duties), the institution of primogeniture (which was to keep all land from alienability, a suggestion Marx rightly mocks), and finally and importantly, the economic "corporations," which organize isolated workers into powerful economic communities, thus forming an intermediate community between private individual and universal state (PR, paras. 231-56). Many of these options, however, are not open to Rawls. Rawls cannot appeal to older feudal institutions, which run contrary to principles of the market (even if this were helpful); the United States, at least, never had such institutions. So, too, Rawls's theory has no equivalent to Hegel's notion of the economic corporation- no intermediate form of community between individual and state as might be found, for instance, in the idea of workplace democracy- and for this Rawls has been criticized.65 Finally, even the family (that presumed haven in a heartless world) is undergoing a transformation as never before. With the twentieth-century movement of women into the market, those strong filial and caring bonds between family members, rather than remaining a check to instrumental market relations, are in danger of being invaded by them. So the threat to "community"- the threat to the possibility of a genuine identification of the critical interests of the individual with any larger, significant community, much less with the political community of the stateseems real enough. As I have been suggesting, however, the solution does not lie in a yearning for the past.
THE OWL OF MINERVA We have seen that Rawls's theory is not so far from the original mouthpiece of modem communitarianism as is commonly believed. In regard to
284
Schwarzcnbach I RAWlS AND HEGEL
563
political philosophy's aim as conflict resolution or reconciliation, its method as the attempt to "bring order" and to gain an "overview" of our moral life 1ts "expressive" conception of the political person with two minimal moral' powers, and its vision of the welJ-ordered society as a "social union of social unions," Rawls's theory (like Hegel's) has greatly distanced itself from the Hobbesian strand of liberalism. In the reading presented here, Rawls and Hegel even share a common weakness: Both still allow the Hobbesian strand too unbridled a rein in the economic realm- in "private" or "civil society." This brings me to a final similarity between the two. In Hegel's view, the owl of Minerva-philosophy-spreads her wings only at dusk; only when an action has already been completed or a way of life grown old is it possible to grasp it fulJy in thought (PR, "Preface''). This conception of philosophy as a "looking backwards" holds, with some qualification, for Rawls's theory as well.66 That is, just as Marx criticized Hegel for failing to recognize, at the beginning of the nineteenth century in Germany, the movement toward democracy in the political domain, so I believe Rawls's theory has not taken seriously the call for democracy in the economic domain in this century.67 Certainly, the radical implications of the women's movement have yet to capture his attention.68 And I believe in both cases, the reason is the same: Similar to the political employment of Hegel's dialectic, reflective equilibrium starts from the data of our philosophical tradition and "public political culture" (seep. 543 above). Although Rawls here intends to highlight our shared political tradition (in contrast to the individualistic economic domain), examining this tradition alone would appear insufficient; radical new developments may emerge elsewhere first, for example, within the workplace. Or again, examining our philosophical tradition and public political culture, although necessary and important, cannot be sufficient; the realm until recently bas been composed entirely of males. This suggests that· for a more "adequate" account of the well-ordered SOCiety, reflective equilibrium must be "radicalized" and extended into new (in particular, into the so·called private) domains. 69 My own view is that if we are to think deeply about community (about ~hat it is that holds a just society together), we can no ~~nger overlook the Important communal activities which women have tradrhonally performed Within the private sphere, for instance, interpreting and rc:s~nding to the concrete needs of others, an activity that goes far toward bmdmg peo~l~ to one another. Further as women move into the public sphere (and as femmrsts have begun to argu~) a new demand emerges that our political institutions hen~eforth acknowledge this activity. A conceptio~ of_th_e "modem state," for mstance, traditionally conceived in terms of mamtarnrng law and order,
.
285
564
POLmCAL THEORY I November 1991
a military prepared for war, and a policing of citizenry and competition, could give way to a different conception whereby the state is fundamentally conceived as a flexible provider of services, an educator and satisfier of need. In conclusion, I believe much of the contemporary "communitarian" attack on Rawls is a red herring; either the attack is misconceived or Rawls from the start acknowledged the point. Perhaps this much the comparison of his thought with Hegel's has clarified. But so, too, my comparison has hopefully suggested that, particularly in the area of moral and political philosophy, many of the slandered Hegelian notions appear to have a certain appropriateness; the tradition of analytic philosophy, in discarding all of Hegel, threw out the baby with the bathwater. The doctrine of "internal relations," for instance, far from proclaiming its legitimacy across the board, has a definite appeal when dealing with relations between persons. 70 When I hear of a child abused next door, the death of a loved one, or of a peoples' rights being systematically violated, I am (or at least I should be) altered. Similarly, the idea of"dialectic" or "synthesis," that knowledge ofthe person is to be attained not simply by reflection (as in Descartes) nor by mere empirical observation (as for Hume) nor by the direct intuition of some mysterious faculty (Moore) but rather (like reflective equilibrium) is mediated and indirect, the hard-earned result of concrete experience, subtle reflection, and the interaction between a variety of particular, historically situated selves-this complex approach leads away, in my view, from the smug self-certainty that accompanies all dogmatism. Finally, the fact that the focus is again on the person, not on the person conceived as an isolated organism (as in, !lay, a biological reading) but on the person considered as a political and "cultural" being, as one whose desires and actions have an essential connection to the background institutions and social conditions amid which it was schooled; that the focus is again on the person -not merely in the sense of focusing on what kind of beings we are but on what kind of persons we aspire and ought to be- this is only a part of the legacy of Hegel which remains alive and well in the thought of Rawls.
NOTES 1. Admittedly, this is only a rough, working sketch. For a more extended discussion, see P. Hylton's Russel~ Idealism and the Emergence of Aflfllytic Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 440". 2. Moore and Russell argued for a doctrine of "external relations," for a conception of the whole as "reducible to the sum of its parts," for a philosophical method as "aoalysis," for
286
Schwarzenbach IRAWLS AND HEGEL
565
kno":Je~ge as immediate or "by acquaintance," and for a view of reality as fundamentally atomtsttc. See Moore, "Refutation ofldealism" (1903), "External and Internal Relations" (1919) and Hylton (1990). ' 3. The works of J. N. Findlay, C. Taylor, A. Danto, N. Goodman, and the later Putnam are only a few of those in the Anglo tradition that reveal strong idealist tendencies. There is, m~reov~r, a gro~ing interest in such themes as "holistic justification," and Bradley's thought is wnnessmg a revtval, at least in England. See the ~cent collection of essays The Philosophy of F. H. Bradley, edited by Manser and Stockton (Oxford: Oarendon, 1986). 4. The actual historical influence of Hegel's philosophy on Rawls will not be a topic of this essay. Rawls clearly read Hegel'sPhilosoplryofRightalready in the 1960s (cf. references to Hegel's work in A Theory ofJustice); however, much of Hegel's influence on Rawls seems to be more "indirect"- by way of the ethics of F. H. Bradley, for example, and the work of J. Dewey. S. Sec "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures 1980," Joun141 of Philosophy, September 1980, SS4 (hereafter "DL"). For a further, secondary discussion, see A. Davidson, "Is Rawls a Kantian?" Pacific Philosophical Q~~t~rterly 66 (1985): 49. 6. See Hegel :S Philosophy of Right, translated by T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), para. 2. All further referena:s to this text will be indicated by PR followed by the paragraph number. "R" after a paragraph number refers to Hegel's remarks immediately following the main paragraph,"A"to later additions culled from notes taken at Hegel's lectures. 7. Professor U. Steinforth, for instance, recently defended such a separation between Hegel's metaphysical doctrines and his political theory (lecture at Columbia University, Spring 1987). 8. Wusenschaft der Logilc (Berlin, 1812). This work espouses what the Anglo-American world would call Hegel's "metaphysics." 9. And this is the case, Rawls intends, for any of the standard meanings of the term "metaphysics." See "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," Philosophy and Public Affairs 14, no. 3 (Summer 1985): 223-51 (hereafter "PNM"). 10. Wiugenstein, for instana:, makes a similar point: "But the idealist will wish to teach his children the word 'chair, • after all, for of course be wants to teach them to do this and that, e.g. to fetch a chair. Where then will the difference lie between how the idealist-educated children speak and the realist ones? Won't the difference only be one of battle cry7" (Zettel, para. 414, translation mine). Whereas Wittgenstein's is a pragmatic point, Rawls's theory may be viewed as extending this insight into the normative domain. 11. See "The Jndependcna: of Moral Theory," Proceedings anJ Addresses ofthe American Philosophica1Associati011 48 (1974-75): 5-22, where Rawls argues that moral theory (the study of structures, as these relate to our moral sensibilities and natural altitudes) is independent of the theory of meaning, epistemology and philosophy of mind. 12. "Preface," in Philosophy of Righi, 10-12. For Hegel, "the actual" (das W&rkliche) is not the same category as "the existing" (dtls Dasein); the former is essentially .. rational" (verfllumftig), whereas the latter frequently is not. This distinction is crucial to Hegel's famous claim that"wbat is rational is actual and what is actual is rational," which does not mean that whatever now exists is rational. In this famous line, Hegel instead stresses the "power" of reason: that it has the ability to have Wirkung (effect or actuality) in the world. 13. See Hegel, Tlte Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling:S System of Philosophy, translated by Harris and Cerf (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), 89. 14. This theme isalrcady explicit in Hegel's early Essay 011 Natura/Law (1802-3), translated by T. M. Knox (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975). . . 1S. See, for instance, Rawls,A 'TIIeory ofJuke (cambridge, MA: Harvard Untvers•ty Press, 1971), :S80(hereafter TJ), or "PNM,'' 226.
287
566
POLITICAL THEORY I November 1991
16. See "01..," 517, or "PNM," 225. The historically specific nature of Rawls's theory continues, almost miraculously, to escape the notice of his critics. 17. By "moral realist" I intend the position that moral claims arc granted cognitive status and that at least some moral statements are true by virtue of their reflecting the true "nature of things"; some version of this position Hegel surely holds given that the ultimate reality is absolute spirit (Geist). Rawls, on the other hand, has replaced the traditional epistemological search for moral truth with an essentially political, "practical task" of reaching agreement on principles of justice in accordance with a particular democratic, moral conception of ourselves ("DL," 517ff.). This "constructivist" approach will entail a "suitably constructed social point of view" that all can accept and in terms of which "moral objectivity" will now be conceived. Thus Rawls, unlike Hegel, makes no claims as to the ultimate nature of "moral facts" or to whether, strictly speaking, there even arc such. 18. See Hegel, Enzyklopaedie, paras. 469-487ff. and Rawls, "PNM," 225ff. A detailed discussion of the practical similarities and differences between these two concepts would lead us too far afield. Allow me, however, to mention that in Hegel's political thought, "objektivcr Geist" refers to the world of amcrcte political institutions, customs, and social laws, in which a people's "spirit" (their fundamental moral principles and ethical self-conception) is publicly embodied or "objectified." Rawls's idea of a "public political culture" similarly refers to a people's shared moral conceptions, including "the basic intuitive ideas that arc embedded in the political institutions and the public traditions of their interpretation" ("PNM," 225). As I shall argue, Rawls assumes, as in Hegel's case, that the core of these institutions arc, at least minimally, "rational" and "coherent." The two conceptions thus reveal important similarities. The differences between them will again have to do with the strong metaphysical and ontological implications of Hegel's "objektivcr Geist" which Rawls's idea docs not entail. 19. See, for instance, A. Macintyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 20, where the author includes Rawls among those who attempt to show "that the notion of rationality itself supplies morality with a basis"; C. Taylor, "The Nature and Scope of Distributive Justice" (Philosophy and the Human Sciences, 1985, 303) and "Justice after Virtue" (presented at Princeton, April 1988) 25, where Taylor interprets Rawls's view as purporting to be a "timeless, context-free theory"; M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 4ff., where Rawls is accused of resisting the "displays of history" and ignoring the "particularism of history, culture, and membership," as well as the more recent "A Critique of Philosophical Conversation" (The Philosophical Forum, Vol. 21, nos. 1-2, Fall-Winter, 198990), where Walzer faults Rawls's construction of the original position for being in "asocial space," for thinking itself presuppositionlcss and so on. 20. See previous note. For a similar criticism of Rawls by a thinker not usually considered "communitarian," sec V. Held, Rights and Goods (1984), chap. 4. B. Williams has also voiced similar concerns, although the author now (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 1985, chap. 5) exempts Rawls's theory from his attack. 21. See Walzer, Spheres of Justice, where the author clearly holds the "relativity" thesis. More recently, however, Walzer has distanced himself from this earlier stance and admits to what he calls a "minimal universalism" across cultures in a paper presented at the New York University law and Philosophy Colloquium, Fall 1988. 22. There arc many points of contact between Hegel's dialectic and Rawls's method of reflective equilibrium, as well as important differences; to pursue these similarities and differences would entail an essay in itself. I wish to note here, however, that both the dialectic and the reflective equilibrium are proffered as alternative philosophical approaches to the modem methodological dichotomy of "rationalism," on one hand, and "empiricism," on the other. This point alone makes them worthy of comparison. Uke Hegel (PR, para. 2). Rawls's method rejects
288
Schwarzenbach I RAWLS AND HEGEL
567
any form of "Cartesian" appeal to intuition and to the self-evidena: of first principles, on one hand, and to mere empirical generalization, on the other (cf. TJ, 578ff., also "Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics" (1951]). For both, the practical goal is a form of ethical ~If-knowledge, conceived as necessarily "mediated," indirect, and so forth. The primary d~fferenccs between the two methods will pertain, again, to what I have called the "fundamenlal difference" in regard to their background stances on ontology and melaphysics. 23. See J. N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-examinlltion, (Nav York: Oxford University Press, 1959), chap. 3, and M. J.. Inwood, Hegel (London: Roudedge &: Kegan Paul, 1983), part 2, chap. 5, where both authors compare the Hegelian dialectic with the idea of a metalanguage. 24. According to Copi, the term "metalanguage" originates with Russell who writes in 1922: "These difficulties suggest to my mind some such possibility as this: that every language has, as Mr. Wittgenstein says, a structure concerning which, in the langJUJge, nothing can be said, but that there may be another language dealing with the structure of the first language, and having itself a new structure, and that to this hierarchy of languages there may be no limits" (quoted in I. M. Copi T~ T~ory of Logical7Ypes (London: Routledge&: Kegan Paul, 1971) 107-8). The idea of a metalanguage, however, has come to have both a "technical" sense (as used by Tarski) and an "intuitive" one. By the "intuitive" sense (the comparison with which is alii attempt to defend here), I have something closer to the later Wittgenstein's notion or an Uebersicht (comprehensive "overview'') in mind. 25. See Hegel, Enzyklopaedie, part 1, paras. 79-83. 26. Hege~ Lectures m the History ofPhiiDsophy, translated by Haldane (London: Routledge &: Kegan Paul, 1982), 426ff. (hereafter LHP). 27. Unlike the idea of a hierarchy of melalanguages, the slages or the dialectic culminate in a full awareness of the whole process- in a language, as it were, in which we can speak about the whole hierarchy of languages- and this is the stage of "absolute knowledge" as set forth in the Science of Logic (see Phen, 479ft'.). So, too, it is not the case with the idea of a series of melalanguages that there is only one metalanguage in which we can speak about a given object-language; a given object-language may have two melalanguages with respect to it-in principle, even numerous incompatible ones. Hegel's dialectic, by contrast, (see introduction to Science of Logic) is meant to generate a unique series of categories; the resolution of "contradiction" proceeds according 10 "rational necessity" or in one way only. Significantly, these last two aspects of the Hegelian dialectic (aspects whereby it diverges from the idea of a series of metalanguages) also tend to be the aspects which Hegelian sympathizers find among the most difficult to swallow. (See Inwood, Hegel, 128ft'.). 28. That the criterion of greater comprehensiveness is central to the superiority of Rawl~'s position in his own eyes can be seen as well from the fact that in A Theory ofJustice the maJor ethical alternatives are paraded before the parties in the original position and ultimately revealed as inadequate, including "justice 15 fairness" •5 chief competitor, utilitariani~ (TJ, 122f~.). Hence one way offormulating the claim of Rawls's book is to state that whereas h1s contractanan position can account for the utilitarian insight, the reverse is not the case. 29. For Hegel's criticism of utilitarianism, see Enzyldopatdie, paras. 473-82, and PR, paras. 18-21; for Kant's, see his GfOUIIdwork. chap. 2. . . . 30. See Sandel Liberalism and 1~ Limils of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge UniVersity Press, 1982; bcrea&r LLl). For a similar criticism by Taylor, see "Virtue after Justia:" (1988), 21. 31. See PR, paras. 133-40. . . 32. See S. Benhabib, "Natural Right and Hegel," (Ph.D. diss., Yale UntveiSity, 1975~. . 33. These are the three increasingly rich and concrete modes of. self-chara~ten~tion corresponding to the three sections of Hegel's work: abstract right, moraltty, and ethtcal life. 34. Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 13ff.
289
568
POLITICAL THEORY I November 1991
35. The public authority has the duty to alleviate poveny, in Hegel's view, because the family was originally the basic economic unit. His~rically, however, civil society "tears the individual from [the soil and inorganic resources] and family ties," forcing the person to become dependent on civil society. For this reason, it is the duty today of the public authority to "protect its members" by providing subsistence, job training, accident insurance and the like (PR para. 238). 36. Hegel's paradigm of Geist (mind, spirit) minimally entails two consciousnesses acknowledging common characteristics and shared ends, including the "reciprocal recognition" of this acknowledgement. Cf. Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 111 ff. Depending on the specific nature of the relationship, of course (whether the relationship is between two contracting panics, two friends, marriage partners, citizens, and so on), the ends shared and the characteristics acknowledged will vary. 37. The Rawlsian idea of "primary goods" can itself be traced back to Aristotle's notion of choregitJ or "props" for the good life. See my On Civic Friendship (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, forthcoming), chap. 2. 38. By contrast, Sandel, at times, seems to hold a simple "majoritarian" view on questions of morality (see "Morality and the Uberal Ideal," New Republic, 7 May 1984, 17). Perhaps R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Har\rard University Press, 1979), Law3 Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), cba?t. bas argued most carefully against the altogether unsatisfactory nature of such a position. 39. E. Baker, "Sandel on Rawls," University ofPennsylvania Law Review 134(Apri1198S): 895ft', and A. Gutmann, "Communitarian Critics of liberalism," Philosophy and Public Affairs 17(Fall 1985): 308-22, make related criticisms of Sandel's and Macintyre's positions. 40. That Sandel's position cannot be the Marxist one (but in fact seems to reven back to Aristotle on political personality) can be intimated by the following: Even Karl Marx in On the Jewish Question explicitly claims that modem individual rights "certainly represent[] a great progress," in Marx-Engel.s Reader, edited by Tucker, 35. Marx's argument is not that individual rights (with the exception of the right to private property in the means of production) are unimportant or even unnecessary at this stage of history but merely that they are not sufficient for "true human emancipation." Even as late as his Critique of "The Gotha Program" (1875), Marx argues that political rights will become "superfluous" in the last stages of socialism, not that they can be discarded now (inMan:-Engels Reader, 531ff.). 41. I in fact believe that both Hegel and Rawls do operate with an impoverished notion of the political person (or citizen), but for none of the reasons contemporary communitarians cite. See my "Are There Only Two Moral Powers? Ambiguities in Rawls's Concept of the Person," in An~~lyse &: Kritik, (forthcoming 1992), where the author argues that even modem citizenship requires a third "emotional" power overlooked by Rawls (and Hegel); cf. also author's forthcoming On Civic Friendship, chap. 3. 42. Rawls notes that the term "person" derives from the Latin persona, which originally referred to the mask worn by actors in Greek tragedy; since ancient times "a person" refers primarily to those capable of playing a public, political role ("PNM," 233). 43. See Sandel, UJ, 66, 70-78, 101-3. 44. The attribution of a personified "group subject" to Hegel was abetted, I believe, by Bradley's notion of a "moral organism" (see Ethical Studies, 1876). Hegel indeed uses the term "organism" in reference to the state at numerous points in the Philosop#ly ofRight (e.g., paras. 267, 271), but his usage appears largely metaphorical; elsewhere, he repeatedly stresses that the notion of a biological organism is an inadequate model for ratioaal mind or Geist (see esp. EnzyiloptJedie). It is on the paradigm of Geist, of course, that Hegel models the state. 45. See Taylor, "The Nature and Scope," 291ff., and "Justice after Vutue" (1988), 21, 25.
290
Schwarzenbac:h I RAWlS AND HEGEL
569
46. For the confusions surrounding Sandel and Taylor's criticism of Rawls's notion of "desert," see Baker, "Sandel on Rawls," 907ff. The author argues that Rawls's theory presupposes no "pre institutional" basis for determining desert. What people "deserve" is precisely the problem or justice to be solved. .47. See Z. A. Pelczynski, "The Hegelian Conception of the State," in Hegel's Political Phtlosophy, edited by Pelczynski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 1-29. 48. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1979), 47, and Law:S Empire (1986), chap. 1. It shoul~ also be noted here that whereas Hegel uses the term "justice" (Gerechtigkeil) in a narrow, techmcal sense (cf. PR, para. 99), Rawls normally uses the term in the wider sense of the German Recht. 49. See S. Benhabib, "Obligation, Contract and Exchange: On the Significance of Hegel's Abstract Right.,. in The State and Civil Society, edited by Pelc:zynski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 159. 50. This is the case, at least, under what Rawls calls the "special conception of justice," which (in contrast to the "general conception" in which the difference principle applies to all the primary goods) pertains only as "social conditions improve" or to our specifically modem epoch (TJ, 83). 51· Hegel speaks of "transcending the standpoint of contract" (PR, 163R) in referring to the marriage agreement, which he (in contrast to Kant) denies is simply one contract among others. In Hegel's view, although the modem (bourgeois) marriage agreement"begins" with a decision of the arbitrary will (and although Hegel acknowledges the right of divorce due to practical difficulties), the agreement has as its basis the recognition of shared moral principles and the "surrendering of the arbitrary will in a substantive union"; marriage's aim in principle is to be "inherently indissoluble" (para. t63R). A similar reasoning holds for our relation to the state conceived now as an even more fundamental form of "rational social life"; in the stale proper, ~ 1 is even more difficult for an individual to "opt out." As we shall see, in Rawls's view, political Institutions arc also not conceived on the model of contract but on that of a "social union." 52. Cf. Taylor, Human Agency and Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), chap. 3. 53. See Dworkin, "Liberal Community," California Law Review 77(1989): 479-504." 54. See "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 7.ii (1987): 5ff., where Rawls explicitly denies that our political life can adequately be conce1ved on the model of a modus vivendi (hereafter "JOC"). . . 55. Both Gutmann, "Communitarian Critics," for instance, and Larmore 10 a recent rev1cw of Sandel, Journal of Philosophy 81, no. 6 (1984): 338, continue to interpret Rawls's view of the state on the model of a "modus vivendi." 56. See Kant's "Perpetual Peace" (1796). According to Rawls, Kant here remains within the "Hobbesian strand" of liberalism which conceives of "ordered liberty [as) best achieved by skillful constitutional design framed to guide self· (family-) and group-interests to work for social purposes by the use of various devices such as balance of powers and the like" ("IOC'p. 2). Rawls's central criticism of this Hobbesian conception of the state is that such a self-interested consensus is "inevitably fragile" and temporary-that it could never achieve the stability and SOCial unity which marks a well-ordered political regime (ibid.). 57. Hegel, for instance, in his later years was not a democrat. For his view on democracy, see PR, paras. 27JR, 279R. 58. In Hegelian language the state must further the education of its cilizcns to an aware~ess of "universality" or sha~ ends (PR, para. J87R). In Rawlsian lan~age, g~vemmcnt, by ~mplementing the two principles of justice, helps mainta~n or construct 1f not un1vcrsal shared Interests, then at least an "overlapping consensus" regardmg them.
291
570
POLITICAL THEORY I November 1991
59. This formulation is Dworkin's in "Liberal Community." 60. This claim needs some qualification. Economic "social union" applies to Rawls's wellordered society as a whole insofar as the society realizes the difference principle- that principle which specifies that no one shall institutionally gain unless all are benefited (including the worst oft). In Rawls's theory, however, this principle is implemented from the "top down" by the various branches of government (TJ, 247ff.); it is thus not a principle which holds within the firm, say, or at the day-to-day level in the realm of work, where individuals may still live in "private society." See my "Rawls and Ownership: The Forgotten Category of Reproductive Labor," Canadian Jourt141 of Philosophy, Supp., 13 (1988): 139-67; also G. Doppelt, "Rawls's System of Justice: A Critique from the Left," Nous 15(September 1981): 259-307. 61. At first sight, it looks as if Rawls exempts the work relation because it is believed to presuppose an element of "compulsion," whereas social union is described (at one point) as something all can "freely participate" in (TJ, 529). On closer observation, however, whether or not an arrangement constitutes a social union for Rawls cannot rest on the presence or absence of all "necessity" in the type of activity, for the fact that man must eat and labor in any particular way is no more "forced" than that he must live in families or in society, and yet the latter two are among the class of social unions. The answer as to why Rawls exempts economic activity from the list of social unions must lie elsewhere; my own view is that Rawls simply accepts a major tenet of neoclassical theories of production and continues to operate with the model of a privately appropriating individual in the realm of labor. See my "Towards a New Conception of Ownership," Ph.D. diss., Harvard, 1985, chap. 3: ttOff. 62. See Schwarzenbach, "Rawls and Ownership." 63. G. Doppelt, "Rawls's System of Justice," cf. ft. 61, taking a more standard Marxist line, also criticizes Rawls for restricting "community" to the political domain and for leaving "no room" in his theory for "the model of dignity through self-affirming labor in community with others" (p. 277). 64. Women have been "mixing their labor," after all, for centuries in the domestic realm, whatever else they have been doing. To distinguish this form of activity clearly from the model of "productive" labor, I have called the form "reproductive" labor. Reproductive activity aims not, in the first instance, at the production of physical objects, exchange value, or even "human services" but at the "reproduction" of a set of concrete human relationships- in the best case, on my analysis, specific relationships of friendship or philia. See Schwarzenbach, "Rawls and Ownership." Moreover, with women moving en masse into the marketplace in this century, the time would seem ripe to retain aspects of reproductive labor in the public sphere. See the author's On Civic Friendship (forthcoming). 65. Most recently again by Gutmann, "Communitarian Critics," 321. 66. I believe it holds generally, although one finds such "utopian" or forward-looking passages in Rawls as "until we bring ourselves to conceive how this [a public understanding of mutual respect) could happen, it can't happen" ("PNM," 231). 67. This is not to say that certain "left-wing Rawlsians" have not made such a call; I include the work of J. Cohen and J. Rogers, On Democracy (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), chap. 6, Doppelt (1981), and myself (1988) in this category. 68. I might here add that the women's movement of the past century, and all the gains women have thereby won, lends renewed credence to Hegel's view of history as the struggle for "the realization of freedom." It may just be that Rawls's theory, although implicitly operating with certain assumptions about the nature of historical progre55, needs to elaborate such assumptions more fully to better ground his own position. 69. Why, for instance, should our common "shared" precepts about family life, the treatment of children, animals, principles of friendships, trust, and so on not be elaborated and critically
292
Sc:hwarzenbach I RAWLS AND HEGEL
S71
relevant for our public political life? An approach developing such a reflective equilibrium of the private realm, as well as its implications for our public life, is developed in the author's forthcoming On Civic Friendship. 70. Things arc "internally related" to each other if (as Bradley typic:aUy expresses it) the terms arc "altered necessarily" by the relations into which they enter. Again, if it is necessary of me that I stand in a certain relation to a certain object, so that I would not be what I am if I did not, then this relation is "internal" to me. See Hylton, Russell, Idealism, 44ff.
Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Barut:/1. CoUege of 1M City University of New York. She obtained her fllltlergraduate deg~e ill philosophy /rom Cornell University, was a Fulbright Scholar and spent two years at tile University of Heidelberg in Gernumy, and received her Ph.D. from Harvard under John Rllwls in socitll and politiCGI philosophy. She has published a review and IUUfteroru articles in moral and political theory ill Ethics, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Social Theory and Practice, Metaphilosophy, and New York Uaivcrsity Review of Law and Social Change. She is presently at work on a book entitled On avic Fricadsbip (Univenity ofMichigan Press, fonhcoming).
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Volume 23, Number I, March 1993, pp. 75- 100
Rawls's Communitarianism ROBERTO ALEJANDRO
University of Massachusetts, Amherst Amherst, MA 01003 USA
~os~ di~ussions of Rawls's philosophy tend to neglect the strong comliburutanan strand of his theory: so much so that in the debate between erals and communitarians Rawls's account of community has been for the most part intriguingly absent. 1 This article is an attempt to fill in the g~p by_ offering a discussion of the Rawlsian understanding of commu~ty as It w~s pres:ented in A Theory ofJustice and its poss_ible im~lications or a pluralist SOCiety. 2 At the same time, I want to take tssue wtth one of the most influential critiques leveled against Rawls's conception of the ~If: namely, Sandel's critique of the 'individuated subject' that, in his VIew, underlies justice as fairness. Rawls's constructions, so Sandel argues, rest on an unencumbered self that is individuated in advance and whose identity is fixed once and for all.
Gerald Doppelt argues that 'Rawls's framework can be understood as a "communitarian liberalism"' (281), but his focus is different from mine. See his 'Beyond Liberalism and Comrnunitarianism: Towards a Critical Theory of Social Justice,' Philosophy and Socilll Criticism 14 (1988) 271-92. Susan Moller Okin discusses the role of feeling in Rawls's account of justice, but she does not add~ ~w~'s vision of COmmunity. See her 'Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice, Ethtes 99 (1989) 229-49. James W. Nickel concentrates on Rawls's view of political community. See his 'Rawls on Political Community and Principles of Justice,' Law and Philosophy 9
(1990) 205-16.
2 Though Rawls's articles after A Theory of Justice include important de~elopmen~ and, in some cases, modifications of his previous arguments, I do not think that his account of community has been substantially altered.
295
75
76 Roberto Alejandro
Sandel's critique has largely gone unchallenged. Some liberals seem to accept it;3 others attempt to improve on Rawls's formulation;4 and still others simply ignore it.5 Actually, the thrust of liberal arguments against Sandel is consistent in avoiding a critical examination of Sandel's attack on the Rawlsian self, while confusin~, in Charles Taylor's words, issues of ontology and issues of advocacy. Those arguments tend to concentrate on Sandel's vision of community, which is, in my view, the weakest part of his analysis. My goal here is to examine Rawls's text to argue that another reading of the Rawlsian self is possible. Needless to say, I follow here the hermeneutic principle that a text goes beyond its author's intentions, and so I attempt to reconstruct Rawls's argument along lines that, to the best of my knowledge, have been unexplored. I begin by discussing Rawls's comrnunitarianism (sections I-IV), then I present Michael Sandel's critique of Rawls's notion of community (section V), and conclude with some remarks about what I take to be the disturbing uniformity that emerges from a Rawlsian community (section VI). I will suggest that some central assumptions of Rawls's theory of justice are either contradicted or completely abandoned in his communitarianism. If my argument is correct, the first casualty of a Rawlsian community may come as a surprise. Yet it is the case that one of his central assumptions, the priority of the self over its ends, is either denied or substantially modified.
I
Rawls's account of community is anchored in the goals of cooperation, stability, harmony, and transparency. Cooperation entails mutuality and reciprocity, which means that members of a Rawlsian community are going to share in the distribution of benefits.' Stability implies that the members' cooperation with one another is expected to be one over a
3 William Galston, 'Pluralism and Social Unity,' Ethics 99 (1989) 711-26 4 Will Kymlicka, 'liberalism and Communitarianism,' Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1988) 181-204 5 Amy Gutmann, 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism; Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985) 308-22 6 ·~ross-:Purposes: The Li~ral-Communitarian Debate,' in Nancy L. Rosenblum, ed., LzberaliSm and the Moral Lifo (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1989) 159-82 7
John Rawls, A Theory of Justia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1971), ~- Subsequent references will be integrated into the text.
296
Raw/'s Communitarianism 77
complete life. Harmony and transparency mean that individual plans are complementary (563) and, more importantly, the individual is transparent to himself to the extent that his ends cohere with each other 8 and he is transparent to others to the extent that his plan of life is pa~ of a larger social plan just as individuals, through their institutions, are part of 'a social union of social unions' (527). 9 These goals inform Rawls's vision of community which possesses what seems to be a neglected feature of Rawls's philosophy; that is, his communitarianism does not depend upon the original position and its parties: it relies on his understanding of associations, institutions, and moral psychology. In all these areas, justice is the principle that, like a red thread, orders and regulates both the Rawlsian individual and the Rawlsian community. I will address these issues in tum. Rawls conceives of associations as institutional settings that comply with the precepts of justice and provide a space for mutual recognition ~d appreciation of the person's abilities. Associations socialize indi~Iduals into the principles of trust and friendship, strengthen the mdividual's self-esteem, and provide a 'secure basis' for the worth of their members (442). Associations thus occupy a central place in the Rawlsian universe since self-esteem, in Rawls's theory, is 'the most important primary good' (440). Or to put it differently, since the good of self-esteem requires that our person and deeds be appreciated by others; and since 'associative ties' strengthen this aspect and 'tend to reduce the likelihood of failure and to provide support against the sense of self-doubt when mishaps occur ... ' (441), the individual's me:"'bership in associations is not an attribute, but a substantial trait of his/her character. What is important is that in his descriptions of associative ties, Ra~ls not only presents a picture of moral personality which is far from bemg the unencumbered self so often ascribed to his theory, but also, and more importantly his reasoning undermines the priority of the self over its ends (560), ~hich seems to be one of the core elements of his conception
8
Th The Dewey t.ectures 1980 ' The ]. Rawls, 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral eory: , '~, Journal of Philosophy" (1980) 512-72, at 529; hereafter quoted as Dewey ·
9 The
Rawlsian community is a space of
J=
and transparency which assumes ony . . ars as a natural
harm
that men have a n~~tural inclination toward ~~· ~~insists, a 'stable capacity, a built-in mechanism for human soaa~ility, . and fellow feeling conception of justice ... elicits men's natural sen~~ts of wu~hat he says when .. .' (502). It is thus possible to apply to Rawls 5 P~~ wants is that there describing John Stuart Mill's theory: '[o)ne of a~~Jlow citizeN' (502). should be harmony between his feelings and those 0
297
78 Roberto Alejandro
of justice. Let us explore why. In Rawls's account, there are three principles which I will call the principle of mutual" recognition, the principle of external confirmation, and the principle of dependence. Mutual confirmation means that the conviction of the worthiness of the individual's endeavors is placed, not in an unencumbered subject of possession, but in a historical individual who is guided by social standards of judgment. '[U]nless our endeavors are appreciated by our associates,' he says, 'it is impossible for us to maintain the conviction that they are worthwhile ... ' (441). External confirmation means that the person's endeavors need to be confirmed by his/her associates in a community of shared interests: 'what is necessary is that there should be for each person at least one community of shared interests to which he belongs and where he finds his endeavors confirmed by his associates' (442, my emphasis). It is the principle of dependence, however, that is central to understanding the implications of Rawls's communitarianism. In his view of associative ties, the individual has to obey the norms regulating his/her group. If the individual acts wrongly, Rawls argues, 'he has failed to achieve the good of self-command, and he has been found unworthy of his associates upon whom he depends to confirm his sense ofhis own worth' (445, my emphasis). 10 I suggest that the principle of mutual recognition, the external confirmation individuals need for their endeavors, and the dependence the individual has on others to confirm his /her own worth deny the priority of the self over its ends. There are two reasons to explain why this is so. First, if our endeavors, and for instance the ends they pursue and the identity they shape need to be appreciated by others, and if it is this social appreciation that determines the worth of our endeavors and ends, we are no longer prior in any meaningful sense to our ends. Those ends are determined in important ways by social (principles accepted by society) and communal (principles recognized by a 'community of shared interests') standards of worthiness. Second, if the standards to confirm the individual's endeavors are provided, not by himself as an unencum-
10 Along the same lines, he also argues, that the 'soundness of our convictions' depends upon a 'common perspective.' 'The acceptance of the principles of right and justice forges the bonds of civic friendship and establishes the basis of comity amidst the disparities that persist. ... But unless there existed a common perspective, the assumpti~n of which narrowed differences of opinion, reasoning and argument would be pomtless and we would have no rational grounds for believing in the soundness of our convictions' (517-18, my emphasis). This assertion suggests that th~gh the ~ry is individualistic, the conception of rationality informing it is soaa~. TI_'at ~· the soundness of our convictions' depends upon a 'common perspective, which turns out to be a set of beliefs accepted by a community. This is another instance of Rawls's communitarianism.
298
Rawl's Communitarianism 79
bered self, but by a 'community of shared interests' (a claim that Rawlsian liberals tend to neglect), 11 and if the individual confirms his/her own worth, not by standards he/she has created, but by norms and criteria accepted by his/her associates, then, the Rawlsian self is not so prior to its ends, after all. Its self-esteem is not anchored in values the self derives from itself, but in values that its associates accept. But if the ends that my plan of life pursues require the approval of my peers to confirm my sense of worth, namely, if I consider as my primary concern the approval my ends may receive from my associates, I am no longer prior to my ends. In an important way, the ends I choose are determined by others' approval. 12
11 See, for example, Will Kymlicka, 'Liberalism and Communitarianism.'
12 This tum of Rawls's communitarianism shows how mistaken is the attempt to present the liberal communitarian debate as a conflict between society and the individual's judgment. For this misconstruction, see Will Kymlicka, 'Liberalism ~d Communitarianism.' It could be argued, however, that the .self is s~ prior to 115 ends in the sense that it can revise them. Rawls himself clalffis that free personsh . of themselves as beings who can revise · and a1 ter therr · fin aI endsandw o concetve · t· · · th · lib rty · these matters' ('Reply.to Alexander giVe liSt pnority to preservmg eu e m . and Musgrave,' Quarterly Journal of Economics 88 (1974), 641). Kymlicka uses thisls' . . · · portant feature of Raw s VIew to present the principle of reexanunation as an liD 1991 1 liberalism (Liberalism, Community, and Culture [Oxford: Clarendon P.ress adin ' 15-17).1 think that Kymlicka's interpretationreliesonanextremely ~lect~ve~wls'~ of Rawls's texts, which fails to explore several important .tenstons. mth Rawlka' v1ew· one IS e arguments. There are two grounds that dispute Kymlic 5 . . · . In Rawls's sian view of a rational plan; the other is Raw~'s comm=a:::d together. . rtantly he theory, a rational plan and the person's conception of the g M · his ood' (408) ore IIDpo ' 'Th e rational plan for a person determmes g · f tiona! subject ' !if h 0 le the activities o one ra goes on, We are to see our e as one w ' . t different parts of spread out in time .... The intrinsic importance that we ~tgn~uld depend upon our life should be the same at every moment of t~me ..Theses~~~: not be affected by the the whole plan itself as far as we can detenrune Jt and . ) This claim is certainly contm_gencies of our present perspective' ~ my e~~IS~wls's own claim that at vanance with the principle of reexanuna~on. an nds R wls's conception of a free persons have an interest in revising theu ~ ~t ·dis~utes the principle of community of shared interests is the other groun 'on of the good require a reexamination. For Rawls, seU-esteem ~d ~~ concepti nns his own worth. Since community of shared interests where the mdivtdual conf ust also be part of his this is so, the individual's membership in that comm~tys:ndards his associates conception of the good. This individual de~nds on e and complete his own accept to confirm his own worth, dev.elop his ex~.Uent':~xamine his conception nature. Accordingly, he is not one who IS alw~ys w~ t a conception of the good, of the good. That reexamination may lead him to a ~psu port. But if he loses the which his associates may not accept and thus lose~ he would be losing the support of his associates, he is not only losing some ·
42°:
299
80 Roberto Alejandro
Rawls's view of associative ties thus suggests that the Rawlsian individual is not the autonomous self that, in Dworkin's description, leads his life from the inside13 and that, in Kateb's account, seems to be suspicious of social standards. 14 It is rather an individual whose very capacity for judgment may be compromised by his membership in a community of shared interests. 15 Better still, this individual may be unwilling to revise his ends in order to maintain his associates' approval and, for instance, his self-esteem.16 If the individual comes to disapprove of the values of his associates, and there is no other association to which he may belong, he might prefer to go along with his peers, thereby avoiding any damage to his self-esteem. 'He is apprehensive lest they reject him and find him contemptible, an object of ridicule' (445). This conception of the self shows how misleading are the fixed boundaries that are often found in liberal arguments against communitarian discourses. In open contrast to those arguments, the Rawlsian individual appears as one who needs a community of shared interests which provides standards of worthiness and allows him to preserve his self-esteem: associations and communities provide 'a secure basis for the sense of worth of their members' (442). It may be argued, however, that though Rawls's communitarianism emphasizes mutual recognition and communal standards of worthiness, he still provides enough room for the individual's judgment by insisting that, 'for the purposes of justice,' citizens are to 'avoid any assessment of the relative value of one another's way of life' (442). But this argument
external source of his self-esteem. A Millian or an Emersonian self would be willing to stand up for its moral independence regardless of what a community of shared interests may do. But it is not clear that a Rawlsian self is equally willing to risk its self-esteem in order to preserve its moral independence. Rawls's arguments, then, suggest a tension between the self's moral independence and its self-esteem, and the latter, after all, is the most important good. K ymlicka's analysis does not explore these tensions in the Rawlsian construction of the self.
13 Ronald Dworkin, 'In Defense of Equality,' Socilll Philosophy and Policy 1 (1983) 24-40 14 George I
16 It would be worth exploring whether a Rawlsian community contributes to the same docility that George I
300
Rllwl's Communitarianism 81
is unconvincing and Rawls's contention is short-lived. He contradicts it to the extent that the individual 'regards the virtues, or some of them
anyway, as properties that his associates want in him and that he wants in himself' (444). If no one assesses 'the relative value' of ways of life, why should we care about virtues or properties that our associates want in us? If they want certain properties as traits of our character, they are making judgments on the value of our way of life. To sum up, in the associations Rawls describes the individual is no longer
prior to his ends. Quite the contrary, presumably those associations have their ends already and possess a clear understanding of the virtues required by them. The individual may be prior to his ends before entering an association. Once he enters it, that priority is blurred. For in associations he needs the presence of others to confirm his worth and endeavors, and it is his membership in a 'community of shared interests' that strengthens his self-esteem, not the other way around. If he finds himself in an association (like the family), and he is shaped by its values, he has never been prior to them. Those values and the attachments they carry have formed his character. 17
II We may have a better assessment of Rawls's view of associations by examining it against the backdrop of the principles of moral ps~chology. It is not my intention to discuss here the valid~ty of th~s~ prmctples, but rather to show that the parties of the origmal position approach a Vanishing point as soon as Rawls introduces his version of how ~e ~ of justice is acquired in a well-ordered society. In stating the ~":~!: of moral psychology Rawls's model assumes three stagesl m . f ' tr 'the 1ormmg o quence of moral development, and these stages s ess
.d . in other groups, thus showing 17 It is possible to argue that a person may deo e to JO f If teem. There are two that she or he is prior to cornzn:unal ~tan~ards;If:~ on others to affirm ~rguments to reply to this contenbon. FJ_I"St, if the than t leave a group that helps Its worth, it may be willing to comprorruse rather .~ u there is one from it to constitute its identity. Second, even~ the self le~v~ 1~e:.;erience with the w~ch it cannot escape, the grou~ which gav~ ~ ~wa 5 open to the possibility pnnciples of justice, namely, its f~Y· A ~.If~ IS that ~ more in line with John of leaving its group is not a Rawlsi.an self, •t IS~ Will Kymlicka, for example, Stuart Mill's account of individuality than ~wal s. willingtoexamineitsends, Subscribes to this notion thlit the Rawlsian self 15 wa~on in n. 12. and, for instance, its membershiP in a group. See my
301
82 Roberto Alejandro
attachments as final ends' (495). These stages are the morality of authority, the morality of association, and the morality of principles (462-79). In the first stage, the child develops her conception of justice in the family, and, in the second stage, the individual deepens her sense of justice through her association with others. It is the third stage, however, that is really crucial to understand Rawls's views. The third stage, the morality of principle, assumes that individuals develop allegiance to the principles of justice regulating their society, and become attached to the highest order principles expressed in a public conception of justice (473). The morality of principles holds that if 'we and those for whom we care are the beneficiaries' of just institutions, those institutions and the benefits we derive from them will'engender in us the corresponding sense of justice' (474). Accordingly, 'we want to do our part in maintaining these arrangements' (474).1£ we betray our sense of justice, we are likely to experience 'feelings of guilt by reference to the principles of justice' (474). Once we arrive at this stage, the 'complete moral development has now taken place .. .' (474). In Rawls's view, the morality of principles is the final and highest stage in the individual's moral development. For the morality of principles does not depend upon our relationship with our parents. Nor does it depend upon ties of friendship and mutual trust. It depends upon allegiance to the principles of right. If we violate these principles, we will feel guilty, not because we have harmed our parents or friends, but because we have harmed people whom we do not even know. This morality does not depend upon personal attachments, but upon moral attachments to certain principles which allow us to love human beings regardless of our relation to them. The sense of justice, as Rawls says, 'is continuous with the love of mankind' (476). The principles of moral psychology are 'reciprocity principles' (453), and justice itself is anchored in reciprocity. That is, justice is the capacity to answer in kind, which means that it depends on everyone's willingness to do his share. In an important way, justice requires the activities of other selves to be preserved. If others do not do their fair share, their attitude may weaken our commitment to justice. 18 Though the principle of reciprocity is central to the acquisition of a sense of justice, it finally swallows up the Rawlsian self. For this self iS supposed to be the only source of aims and ends (the self is prior to its ends), but the Rawlsian self d~velops sentiments and attachments, not
18 It is possible tougue that the principles of reciprocity, as Rawls understands them, do not necessarily apply to other virtues like love, excellence, courage. Love, for example, does not depend on the other's willingness to reciprocate. People tend to love their relatives and friends, even when they do not appreciate that sentiment.
302
Raw/'s Communitarianism 83
out ofitself, but out of the influence it experiences in its dealing with other selves. The 'three laws' of moral psychology governing the development of the Rawlsian self 'assert that the active sentiments of love and friendship, and even the sense of justice, arise from the manifest intention of other persons to act for our good. Because we recognize that they wish us well, we care for their well-being in return.... The basic idea is one of reciprocity, a tendency to answer in kind' (494, my emphasis). So justice does not rely on altruistic feelings, but on our expectations of a response in kind, whereby the agency of the self, a self that is supposed to be prior to its ends, appears as reactive; namely, the self reacts to 'the actions of others' (494). The self needs both institutions and 'the actions ofothers' to develop a mature sense of justice. 19 How, then, can the self be prior to its ends when its sense of justice, the sense that allows it to be prior, is not prior (it follows from the actions of others)fll I want to suggest two further problems which are related to Rawls's notion of the priority of the self over its ends, and his claim that the 'essential unity of the self is already provided by the conception of right' (563). First, if a developed sense of justice requires the presence ?f o~er~, the self may find that in the process of acquiring this sense of JUStice, It may also acquire other ends without ever having the priority Rawls ~scribes to it. Second, if this is so, the self is not going to follow a sequ~nce 10 ~hich, first, it develops its sense of justice, and then jus~ce p~vldes uruty to its ends. The self may be open to several overlaps ~ w~ch the e~d~ it may acquire in the process of developing its sense of JUStice may Significantly affect the nature of that sense. . Seen from another perspective, it is possible to~~ that eve~ assummg that the unity of the self depends upon the pnnoples of nght, th~ Principles rely on the presence of others, and that presence along ~lth the associative ties that the good of self-esteem requires may consti~te a Part of the individual's conception of the good. If this is so~ t~e uru~ of the self, in Rawls's own terms, cannot be given by the pr,mclp~~ 0
rightalone. Theindividual'sgoodmayplayanimpo~antrolemde~J
that unity. Stated differently since the principles of nght are ~ot denv by isolated individuals, but,acquired through social interactions, those
---19
ch I I characterize transforma~ as Rawls puts it: 'I the three laws o~ moral psy 0 ogy. . the manner in which tions of our pattern of final ends that anse from our recognwng institutions and the actions of others affect our good' <494>·
20
up an intriguing problem: 'tion, when they do how can selves choose principles of JUstice m tttc: ~ pos1institutions and the ~t even have a developed sense of justice, ~hich problem here. influence of 'the actions of others' to arise? I will not .
.
.
b.
This seeming twist of the Rawlsian ~~ rnay 0 ~
=this
303
84 Roberto Alejandro
principles are acquired through social institutions and associations that may become part of the self's conception of the good, and that may contribute to shape its unity. 21 To sum up: the self cannot be prior to its ends since a developed sense of justice requires the actions of others, and in order for us to value those actions we need a 'common perspective' (517), which assumes communal standards of worthiness to judge our endeavors and ends. Accordingly, our sense of justice and our ends overlap in the community of 'shared interests' where individuals confirm their worth and feel recognition. If this argument is valid, it suggests that the priority of the self over its ends either vanishes or ought to be viewed in a more complex relationship.
III What is important, for our purposes, is that the principle of reciprocity and the Rawlsian conception of associations and institutions it informs bring to the fore a different picture of human personality. The priority of the self Rawls describes in Part I of Theory ofJustice is no longer present. Now he abandons the mechanical view of a self that is always prior to its ends, and proposes a far more complex assessment of the individual's character. 'Moreover,' he says, 'the social system shapes the wants and aspirations that its citizens come to have' (259). 'It [the social system] determines in part the sort of persons they w~t to be as well as the sort of persons they are' (259, my emphasis). This view suggests that before individuals choose the sort of persons they want to be, they have already been shaped by standards and values which in part determine the kind of persons they are. This is precisely Sandel's reply to Rawls, but he does not acknowledge or fails to notice that it is already present in Rawls's philosophy. To put it differently, in Rawls's account of community, we don't find abstract parties and principles that are beyond any kind of contingencies. We find historical individuals who are part of a social tradition (525),
21 Rawls himself suggests tNs reading when he writes: Thus, a conception of the good normally consists of a more or less determinate scheme of final ends, that is, ends we want to realize for their own sake, llS well as of attachments to other persons and loyaltin to various groups and IISSOCiiJtions. These attachments and loyalties give rise to affections and devotions, and therefore the flourishing of the persons and associations who are the objects of these sentiments is also part of our conception of the good' 0. Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness: Political, not Metaphysical,' Philosophy and Public Affoirs 14 [1985) 233-4, my emphasis).
304
Raw/'s Communitaritmism 85
and require cooperation and social union for their completion: 'It is only in active cooperation with others that one's powers reach fruition. Only in social union is the individual complete' (525, my emphasis). Thus, a well-ordered society is not only a social union of social unions pursuing 'the good of community' (520), but also its members 'have the common aim of cooperating together to realize their own and another's nature in ways allowed by the principles ofjustice' (527, my emphasis). This is a claim that considerably expands the scope of justice since a well-ordered society is not only a matter of allegiance to the principles of justice, but a communal enterprise to realize each member's nature. This vision of community suggests that the notion of pluralism underlying a Rawlsian community is not the same pluralism that characterizes actual liberal societies. Rawls's understanding of pluralism assumes a strong similarity of interests and values in such a way that each member is able, through a cooperation regulated by justice, to realize his own and another's nature. The present understanding of pluralism which Rawls himself characterizes as grounded in incompatible comprehensive doctrines and visions of the human good is replaced by a new pluralism defined by complementarity. 22 We are approaching an intriguing metamorphosis in Rawls'~ argument: what began as a conception of justice as the fundamen~ vt~e 0~ ~basic structure of society, ends up as a 'social union .of ~tal ~0~ lil Which justice is the most fundamental virtue of the mdtvtdual 5 life. ' ...[I]t follows,' he says, 'that the collective activity of justice ~ the Preeminent form of human flourishing. For given favorable conditions, it is by maintaining these public arrangements that persons ~~ expres_s
their nature and achieve the widest regulative excellences of whrch each 15 capable' (529, my emphasis). Or better still: 'But the desire to expre~ our nature as a free and equal rational being can be fulfilled only by actrng. on the Principles of right and justice as having first priority' (574, my emp~a:'~ Rawls's communitarianism turns out to rest on the mono~oly JUS . eXercises over institutions and the individual's character. And thisf rnonopoly is anything but plural. Moreover, there is an elementb o d0 · . . · · the only one that est gtl\atism in the claim that one virtue, JUStice, 18 . • • ~ ex . · d gmatism IS, m 1act, a Presses the individual's nature. ThiS seenung 0
--
22 See, for example, ibid. . . but one part of a moral view'
23 It is true that he claims that a 'conception of justiCe IS • portant comnnnent of · · the most un r-·---(5
12). But in Rawls's philosophy, justice IS • tici"delines 'the moral point of morality. Actually, at other moments he says that JUS view' (491).
305
86 Roberto Alejandro
central trait of the Rawlsian construction of human nature. The self's nature, and by this I mean here the self's core, is not a complex of different virtues that may place different demands and conflicting claims on the individual's character. Nor is it a space of painful dilemmas. It is a uniform dimension which only requires justice to best express itself. One of Rawls's early formulations about the sense of justice may explain why justice is so central to the individual's nature. It is so because, in the self's core that Rawls proposes, the foundation of our humanity is justice. Our true nature and our true self require us to be just, and if we disobey the precepts of justice, we' disfigure' ourselves. 'Put another way,' he writes, one who lacks a sense of justice lacks certain fundamental attitudes and capacities included under the notion of hurMnity. Now the moral feelings are admittedly unpleasant, in some extended sense of unpleasant; but there is no way for us to avoid a liability to them without disfiguring ourselves. This liability is the price of love and trust, of friendship and affection, and of a devotion to institutions and traditions from which we have benefited and which serve the general interests of mankind?4
The 'plurality' that Rawls's well-ordered society seeks to protect turns out to be more problematic than he suggests. The individual's attachments (associations) and aims (final ends) are plural. But the individuals who, in Rawls's account, are behind those attachments and aims, are the same. They all regard justice as the regulative principle of their lives. They all aim at full cooperation over a complete life. They all realize their natures in the activities of other selves. They all belong to one or another association. I suggest that Rawls's conception of pluralism is restricted to what his account understands as external features of the self: namely, those traits, attachments, etc., that his philosophy tends to conceive of as external characteristics of the self. The self's core, by contrast, is anything but plural. It conjures up an image of sameness that turns out to be the necessary requirement for the goal of harmony Rawls relentlessly pursues. My argument, however, is meant to propose a stronger claim than the view that his communitarianism undermines his pluralism. I suggest that the monopoly justice exercises in Rawls's theory offers an impoverished vision of society. That is, 'the fact of pluralism' that Rawls rightly invokes, suggests a more complex view of the ordering of the virtues in both the individual's character and in associations. 25 Let me spell this out.
24 J. Rawls, 'The Sense of Justice,' Philosophical Rrview 7Z (1963), 299, my emphasis 25 When Rawls refers to associations as 'an institutional setting' that is 'just' (491), it is
306
Rnwl's Communitarianism 87
. Hl_1Jll~n.nature is something extremely complex. Through a complete life, mdtvtduals may find themselves with different orderings of the moral excellences that define their character. To assume, as Rawls does, that the place of justice in the individual's character must be fixednamely, it must occupy the first and foremost place - is to deny the complexities accompanying the changes of the individual's character and its quest for self-understanding. This fixity that Rawls attributes to justice in the individual's character is hardly compatible with 'the fact of pluralism,' unless one assumes that pluralism does not refer to the individual's character and its willingness to give justice an absolute priority, but to traits the individual chooses once he has accepted the primacy of justice. Needless to say, such a vision of pluralism as a space of external traits surrounding, like appendages, a uniform human nature would render pluralism something quite different. The complexity of the human condition makes it clear that human nature may require a plurality of orderings of the virtues as well as a plurality of associations, or even the absence of them to realize itself. If we assume that individuals need a plurality of associations to realize their nature, it is likely that individuals will rank the ~port~ce of those associations on the ground of how they contribute, m ~e1r JU~g ment, to realize their nature. A devout individual will certainly think that his church, and the particular ordering of the v~es .it ~r~up ~oses, is what best expresses his nature. Yet a Ra~lstan md1Vtdu.al inhabiting a 'well-ordered society' would challenge him. Deep commtt~ents rooted in comprehensive moral, religious, or philosophical d~ trines, he would say in line with Rawls's articles after A Theory of Justtc~ belong to the private sphere of individuals, not to the pub~c sphere. Those deep commitments arising from comprehensive d~es.are not allowed to play any role in deliberations concerning the prm~tples of · depends upon 'mtwtive . · · I·deas. ' What the Rawlstan con-d J·ustice. 1usttce struction · clearly suggests then is that m · d'IVl·duals best express an . ' · ' · d trines that reahze their nature not by following the comprehensive ~ . 'd , . ' · the 'intwtive 1 eas some pnvate associations require, but by accepting . h th u1 Which . d lying w1t e r es constitute the foundation of justice an comp 1 dl · of public institutions since the primary concern of justice, al ege y, 15
---
. . f lice or whether the justice not clear whether he is referring to his two pnnoples 0 }~ 1 ' associations embody is different from Rawls's two pnnop es.
26
J. Rawls, The Priority of Rights and Ideas of the
Good , Philosophy and Public Affairs
' , Oxford Journal of Legal 17 (1988) 251-76; 'The Idea of an Overlapping consensus. Studies 7 (1987) 1-25 ·
307
88 Roberto Alejandro
the basic structure of society.27 As he says:' ... the desire to express our nature as a free and equal rational being can be fulfilled only by acting on the principles of right and justice as having first priority' (574, my emphasis). This is consistent with the monopoly Rawls ascribes to justice, but it is certainly doubtful that many individuals will accept this account as representative of their character and dispositions. That is, many individuals may question that compliance with the principles of justice and support for public institutions is more central to best express and realize their nature than their private associations and their comprehensive philosophical, moral, or religious doctrines. 28 The monopoly justice exercises in both a Rawlsian personality and community explains Rawls's view that a genuine mature morality requires a relation, not to persons, but to institutions that embody principles of justice.29 A genuine mature morality is thus a question of impersonal relations. This view, in Rawls's argument, is axiomatic. It is equally problematic. Many people may argue that a mature morality requires a relation to, and a concern for, people they know and care deeply about, not people who are strangers. Rawls opposes this view and stands for 'the love of mankind.' But though Rawls accords a substantive status to this notion, it does not deliver what it promises. Actually, the 'love of mankind' ends up as a very meager offer. For on close scrutiny, it is nothing more than the individual's willingness to pay his/her taxes so that public institutions will take care of distributing the social product equitably and tax payers will feel that their taxes have benefited the least advantaged members of the community; members whom they do not even know. This is the epitome of a higher morality. The Rawlsian 'love of mankind' and the 'complete' moral development it purports to represent does not assume an immediate relation between individuals and strangers, but between individuals
27 In his articles after A ThLory of Justice, Rawls has not modified this position. Justice is a highest-order interest that ought to regulate our character and public life. See his 'The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus.' 28 In his articles after A ThLory of Justice, this problem has become more complicated. Now individuals are presented as having both a public and a nonpublic identity. Justice must define the individual's public identity, while comprehensive doctrines may define his private identity. But those doctrines have to comply with the principles of justice. Again, many dtizens may question the priority justice continues having in the definition of their nonpublic identity. 29 This position. it should be said in passing, is in tension with his conception of justice u reciprocity: we expect the other person to respond in kind. But in a Rawlsian society, our expectation is mediated by institutions.
308
Row/'s Communitarianism 89
and ~e sta~e, and through the state, individuals relate to strangers. The Rawls~an higher morality thus seems to be a statist conception: it needs to assume the centrality of the state as an aggregate of institutions that connect, through the distribution of social products, individuals with one another.
IV
Apossible liberal reply might take issue with the views advanced in the Previous section and claim that only by accepting the priority of justice, both in social institutions and in our lives, do we avoid oppression, and that thase who invoke the complexity of human nature to dispense with ~t priority may be willing to engage in or defend oppressive practices. This possible reply seems to be unaware that Rawls himself may offer an argument to dispute it. He might leave aside his view of the development of the sense of justice and argue, in keeping with the first part of A Theory of Justice, that the centrality of justice refers to social institutions, not to the individual character. When those institutions are regulated by !he.principles of justice, he might claim, it is irrelevant whet!'er some 11\diViduals may be prone to oppress others. A framewor~ of n~ts ~d the distribution of the social product according to prinoples of JUStice Would prevent them from carrying out their designs. Though this response, from a Rawlsian perspective, is v~lid, I prefer to put it aside and address the possible reply on its own ments. I assume !bat most contemporary liberal theorists would not dispute the follo~11\g assertion: many citizens of liberal societies do not accept ~e cia~ that justice is the virtue that best expresses their nature. In keepmg WI~ this assertion, I suggest that throughout her life, a person may order~ l'eorder the virtues orienting her character, without thereby advocthfuatinlg oppress·Ion. A person may place a hi'gher premi·urn on love or tru th tness, and even though justice is not the first virtue of her charact~r, af pe~n ~ not advocating injustice. Let m~ thus leave asid: JUStice m our character and address it m the context ? . . . Ra w1s claims . that justice' oughtto be the firstvirtUe 0 f social Institutions, . 'ty we and the reply I am considering asserts that without that pn~n thi w0 uld lib a1 perspective, s be willing to defend oppression. From a. . er fro · dividuals' contention ignores some pervasive conflicts ansmg m ~ nflict cho· ·15 t0 say there IS a co wh Ices~ the context of liberal societies. That d ~litical rights and en a liberal discourse stands for pe~nal ~ ~efending the right opportunities to devise a (rational) plan of life, w e . cti'ces that of In · d'lVIduals . ' to participate· in groups or engage m pra
:::::::r:.
309
90 Ro!Jerto Alejandro
according to liberal standards, are oppr~sive. 30 A religious group, for example, may defend the subordination of women and hold principles that are oppressive in the light of liberalism, but individuals have the right to join, if they wish, that group, and the state should not interfere with their choices. This suggests that the priority of justice in social institutions may coexist with oppressive groups and practices provided they are organized and carried out on a voluntary basis. The priority of a framework of rights and the distributive paradigm insinuates another problem that is more closely related to Rawls's conception of justice. Suppose a society whose social product is primarily derived from military industries. This society has a framework of rights and complies with Rawls's second principle: inequalities have to benefit the most disadvantaged members of society. This society is, then, just according to Rawls's standards. For in Rawls's account, the strategy that creates the social product is not at stake: what is morally and politically relevant is the distribution that strategy makes possible. Yet some people may find oppressive a society where the moral character of its central economic activities is not deemed important to decide whether that society is just.31 A society may become wealthier by producing and selling missiles, and its wealth may be distributed along Rawlsian principles, but the moral character of that society and its justice would be dubious. Along similar lines, a society may derive its wealth from the activities their industries perform abroad. These industries may pay low salaries to, say, Guatemalan women or Mexican citizens, and low wages abroad may increase the profits those industries make and the taxes they pay at home, the same taxes that are part of the social product the state distributes according to Rawls's principles. Once again, the content of the practices underlying the production of the social product is irrelevant. And that society, whose social product depends on what many may consider the oppression of foreigners, would be just according to the Rawlsian paradigm. My response to the possible liberal reply is thus threefold. First, the complexity of human nature may require different orderings of the virtues without thereby implying that if love replaces justice as the preeminent virtue of our character, we would be prone to oppress other
30 This is not necessarily Rawls's case, but it is a well-known scenario in liberal
societies.
31 A possible liber~ ~ly is that such a conception of oppression is not rational, and that such a society IS not oppressive. But the Rawlsian view of rationality and oppression is one view among others, and, even in liberal societies, there is hardly a consensus on it.
310
Raw/'s Communitarianism 91
persons. Second, a liberal order anchored in the priority of justice may coexist with oppressive groups and practices which ought to be tolerated in the name of individual freedom. Third, a Rawlsian society may carry out a just distribution of the social product in the light of Rawls's model, but that society may depend on strategies which some members may consider oppressive. So the claim that only by accepting the priority of justice (I take this to mean the Rawlsian conception of justice) we avoid oppression, is unpersuasive. 32 Suppose, however, that in effect, the complexity of human nature may entail a particular ordering of the virtues which invites oppression. In this case, the Rawlsian claim would be right, and justice must be the first virtue of our character to thwart any inclination on our part toward oppressing others. But if this is so, if the Rawlsian argument is that without accepting the priority of justice in our character, without recognizing that justice, and nothing else, is the virtue that best expresses our nature, and without acknowledging the transparent harmony of Rawls's communitarianism we would be inclined to oppress others, then that argument would ~propounding a metaphysical conception of !he self as well as an intriguing notion of choice. Justice, _the most unportant virtue of our character, would be beyond our choosmg fa~ul ties since, if we choose, we might be inclined to choose oppressiOn rather than justice.33 The self, in this view, would have to ~e just, for otherwise it would disfigure its humanity. But this contention would presuppose a conception of the self that is antecedently given, and f~r mstance, it would not be political. It is not part o~ ~e ~em~rati~ tradition from which Rawls derives his version of 'political hber~lis~. For in that tradition there are not 'intuitive ideas' claiming that JUStice ' must b e the first virtue of our character, if we want to preserve . our . . . 'ti' 'dea holding that JUStice h.,_ . .....uaruty, and even less is there an mtui ve 1 r · . th · uruversal agreement equttes harmony. If those ideas extst, ere 15 no d 1 'th the on them. So the possible reply leads to a trap. If it cannot ea ~~tu 't . complexity of human nature and the dtfferent orderings of the vxr es 1
--
. . . . such as the one propounded, 32 It IS worth noticing that an alternative vieW of SOCiety d George I
33
.
~my argument is correct, Rawlsian~ber~ 0 .
311
92 Roberto Alejandro
may require, it has to redefine its conception of choice and say, explicitly, that justice is beyond our choosing faculties. If justice must be the first virtue of our character, it smacks of a metaphysical conception of the self, and thus contradicts the Rawlsian version of 'political liberalism.'
v My arguments thus far suggest that Rawls's analysis offers many complexities which in tum explain how one-sided is Sandel's critique of Rawls's paradigm. Sandel's critique concentrates on the original position and the social contract Rawls derives from it. Yet Rawls's account of moral personality as is presented in his discussion of associations, virtues, and moral psychology, are aspects conspicuously absent from Sandel's analysis. I now tum to address Sandel's critique of the Rawlsian self and the Rawlsian community. In characterizing Rawls's view of community, Sandel argues that it 'describes a possible aim of antecedently individuated selves, not an ingredient or constituent of their identity as such. This guarantees its subordinate status .... As a person's values and ends are always attributes and never constituents of the self, so a sense of communi~ is only an attribute and never a constituent of a well-ordered society.' Sandel's critique of Rawls's view of community relies on his understanding of the Rawlsian self, a self that, according to Sandel, is individuated in advance, whose identity cannot be engaged, and whose ends never fully constitute it. Just as these ends are external attributes that the self chooses, so also community is an external trait preceded by individuated subjects. The 'Rawlsian self,' Sandel writes, 'is not only a subject of possession, but an antecedently individuated subject, standing always at a certain distance from the interests it has. One consequence of this distance is to put the self beyond the reach of experience, to make it invulnerable, to fix its identity once and for all' (LLJ, 62, my emphasis). This is the key to understanding Sandel's argument: his claim that the Rawlsian community presupposes 'the antecedent individuation of the subject' (LLJ, 149) whose identity is fixed 'once and for all.' 'But a self so thoroughly independent as this,' he insists, 'rules out ... the possibility of any attachment (or obsession) able to reach beyond our values and
34 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982), 64. Subsequent refermces will be integrated in the text as UJ.
312
R11wl's Communitarianism 93
sen~~nt~ to e~gage our identity itself. It rules out the possibility of a pubhc hfe m which, for good or ill, the identity as weU as the interests of the participants could be at stake' (LLJ, 62). I think Sandel's interpretation is mistaken. My discussion of Rawls's communitarianism argued that, in Rawls's theory, individuals are shaped by institutions and communities of interests and if this is so the antecedent individuation' Sandel sees is not what Rawls suggests. Better still, this 'individuation' is one of the moments of Rawls's philosophy concerning one aspect of the self, which, contrary to Sandel's claim, is not its identity. Let me clarify this. In Rawls's view, Sandel argues, the person's identity is given in advance; it is 'antecedently individuated' in such a way that it can never be reached by the self's attachments. 35 But Sandel conflates two different dimensions of the Rawlsian self. Rawls's analysis suggests a distinction between the selfs core and the selfs identity. 36 The former is constituted by the self's two capacities: a capacity for a sense of justice, and a capacity for a conception of the good (505). The latter (the self's identity) is formed by those values, attachments, and ends that are acquired through associations and through a plan of life that is formed gradually; namely, it is formed by those values that, in Sandel's view, cannot engage 'our identity itself.' Stated differently, it is the self's core, not its identity, that is independent of values, attachments, etc., and, for instance, it is the self's core that is individuated in advance and fixed once and for all. If my argument is correct, the identity of individuals, in the sense I have mentioned, is neither prior to their ends nor incapable of being engaged and constituted by values and attachments. Quite the contrary: Rawls's account of institutions shaping the individual's attachments suggests that our identity is not beyond our values and attachm~nts, since those values and attachments help to constitute it, and smce ~dividuals shape their rational plans gradually (561). On~~ again, what Is beyond our reach is the self's core and its two capacities. But how 'individuated' is the self's core? A further exploration shows that the self's core, that is, its 'moral personality,' is just a 'p~te~tiality,' s~me thing that Sandel neglects altogether: 'moral ~ersonality IS ~ere defined as a potentiality that is ordinarily realized m due course (50S). The 1
I
I
35 Susan Moller Okin presents a critique of this i~ea,_ b~t her aim~: d==~: original position, not to see how Rawls's commwutanarusmbo1 2~ interpretation. See 'Reason and Feeling in Thinking a ut us ce, ·
maJ ,
36 Sandel hints at this distinction in his discusSion of desert, but he does not develop it (ll/, 82-95).
313
94 Roberto Alejandro
original position relies on the 'potentiality' of the parties; namely, their moral personality 'refer[s] to a capacity and not to the realization of it' (509}, whereby it is not clear why Sandel calls this 'potentiality' an 'individuated self' which not only possesses an identity but which is beyond the reach of experiences and values. 'Moreover,' Rawls goes on, 'regarding the potentiality as sufficient accords with the hypothetical nature of the original position, and with the idea that as far as possible the choice of principles should not be influenced by arbitrary contingencies' (509). That is to say, this potentiality is necessary to explain the original position, not to justify a Rawlsian community. When Rawls points out that the social system shapes the kind of persons individuals want to be and the sort of person they already are; when he insists that individuals develop the sense of justice in association with others; and, finally, when he argues that individuals need at least one community of shared interests to confirm their worth, he displaces the emphasis on a self that is always prior to its ends in favor of a community which contributes to constitute the individual's identity. Sandel disagrees. His critique of the Rawlsian community is predicated upon a distinction which he never spells out between 'attributes' and 'constituents.' In Rawls's view, he argues, community is an 'attribute,' not a 'constituent.' But if my argument is correct, this distinction is as doubtful as 'the antecedent individuation of the subject' Sandel sees in Rawls's theory. For a Rawlsian community is far from being a mere attribute. It is rather an arena of institutions, associations, and moral principles that make possible harmony and stability and shape the sort of persons individuals want to be and the sort of persons they already are. Put differently, if the community provides standards of worthiness to judge and confirm the individual's self-esteem, namely, the most important good, this community is hardly an attribute; it is constitutive of the individual's identity. Furthermore, by participating in a 'community of shared interests' Rawlsian individuals engage in a process of self-understanding. They come to know their nature as moral persons and, more importantly, they come to develop their sense of justice and the good of self-esteem in association with other individuals. 'We need one another as partners in ways of life that are engaged in for their own sake, and the successes and enjoyments of others are necessary for and complimentary [sic] to our own good' (522-3). In addition to his treatment of the Rawlsian self, a substantial part of Sandel's analysis relies on oppositions that he absolutizes without exploring the porousness of their boundaries. Thus, he opposes' attributes' to '~onstituen~,' 'feelings' to 'self-understanding,' 'choice' to 'discovery. In many mstances, however, the boundaries separating these terD'l8 are not as sharp as Sandel leads us to believe. This is important since a substantial part of Sandel's argument is his claim that the Rawlsian self
314
Raw!'s Communitarillnism 95
does not repr~sent what we really are. Neither does Sandel's description. For a non-believer, for example, religion is an attribute he may certainly choose. But if he becomes a devout convert, the status of this attribute changes altogether. It is now a constituent, perhaps the most important one, of his identity. Likewise, if he is born into a religious fundamentalist group, religion is not going to be an attribute, but a constituent of his character and identity. But if he, later in life, abandons the beliefs of his fundamentalist group and becomes indifferent to religious matters, reli~ion as a constitutive element of his identity is transformed into an attnbute from which he now exercises distance. This does not mean, of course, that his religious background and its implications are now erased from his life. This is, perhaps, impossible. It means that the individual has reordered the components of his identity. For all his criticisms of a Rawlsian self whose bounds are allegedly fixed, Sandel's conception of ~ttributes and constituents which, again, he never spells out, participates m the same 'fixity' he ascribes to Rawls's view of the subject. That is, Sandel does not recognize that the boundaries between attributes and constituents are porous, not fixed, whereby an attribute may become a constituent, and vice versa. The same argument holds for his distinction between choice and discovery. The same individual of the previous example may discover the attachments that tie him to his religious group. But if he decides to live by values other than those his group advocates, he is making a choice. Along the same lines, the individual may discover an attachment to his group on the basis of his socialization, and not necessarily an attachment to the religious beliefs of that group. It is a well-known Principle of Christian fundamentalist groups, that it is not sufficient to be born into a religious family. The individual has to experien~e his. own conversion and this is a choice he makes, not a discovery he inhents. Just as h~ opposes 'attributes' to 'constituents,' Sandel opposes 'the ~apacity for choice' to 'the capacity for reflection' (LLJ, 153). ~d he says: But on Rawls's moral epistemology, the scope for reflection would appear seriously limited. Self-knowledge seems not to be a possi~ility ~ the relevant sense for the bounds it would define are taken as gtven 10 advance, unreflectlvely, once and for all, by a principle of antec~de~t individuation' (UJ, 153). Again, the core of Sandel's ar~ent ~ ~ claim of an 'antecedent individuation.' We have seen that this claun 15 not convincing. But, more importantly, the opposition Sand~l presents between choice and reflection is dubious. ~ argument 15 ~at : f v?luntarist dimension of agency requires chotce, ~~ the. self, ~ Vlew, appears as external to its choices. Th~ co~tive dtme~tona 0 _ agency, by contrast requires reflection. The tdentity of the subJect P pears 'as the produ~t rather than the premise of its agen~ (LLJ, 152~ Thus the reflection Sandel proposes rules out any kind of chotce. These
315
96 Roberto Alejandro
that is engaged in the cognitive dimension of its agency reflects upon itself, inquires 'into its constituent nature,' and acknowledges 'its purposes as its own' (LLJ, 58). There is no doubt that there is a reflection at work here. But we might distinguish between two types of reflection, which, while being active, have different goals. Let me call the first type confirmatory reflection and the second type critical reflection. In the first type, the individual reflects upon himself, his identity, his nature, to confirm and acknowledge what is akeady there. This reflection aims at a better self-understanding, not at a transformation or a reordering of the constituents that make him the sort of person he is. In the second type, the individual reflects upon himself, his identity, his nature, both to acknowledge the attachments he wants to keep and to discard those he no longer finds relevant. In a confirmatory reflection, the individual acknowledges his identity. In a critical reflection, the individual is open to reconstitute it. Sandel's analysis, with its insistence on acknowledgment and discovery stands for a confirmatory reflection, thus weakening his arguments. If that is the kind of reflection Sandel defends, it is better, so the liberal argument goes, to accept the unencumbered self of Rawls's philosophy which at least provides a space for critique and distance of inherited values. Sandel leads us to believe that in exercising reflection the individual does not exercise choice.37 He does not explore the possibility of choice through reflection; that is, a reflection that allows the individual to choose new attachments that may question the values he already has, or to consciously discover the principles that have constituted his identity. Finally, and in keeping with a line of reasoning whose coherence seems to depend on absolute oppositions, Sandel opposes will to selfunderstanding38 (UJ, 58, 152). Self-understanding, presumably, does not
37 According to him, the self cannot choose 'that which is already given (this would be unintelligt"ble)' (U/, 58). But if the individual reflects upon what is given and rtll/firms it, he is clearly making a choice, though. for Sandel, this is 'unintelligible.' It is so if we assume the fixity of the oppositions he presents. 38 Sandel is consistent in insisting on these kinds of oppositions. In a recent article he poses the following question: 'What then is the resemblance between heterosexual intimacies on the one lwtd, and homosexual intimacies on the other, such that both are entitled to a constitutional right of privacy?' And he answers: 'This question might be answered in at least two different ways - one voluntarist, the other substantive. The first argues from the autonomy the practices reflect, whereas the second appeals to the human good the practices realize' (534). Thus Sandel opposes 'the autonomy thepradica reflect' to the human goods they realize. This opposition presupposes that autonomy is not a human ·good and this presupposition is problematic. Instead of opposing both categories, it is better to aee autonomy as a human
316
Rsrwl's Communitarianism 97 a~empt to make choices. It rather seeks a reexamination, while being driven by an unexamined goal: to acknowledge ends which are already given (LLJ, 58) and attachments that are 'found' (LLJ, 158). It is thus possible to tum Sandel's analysis against his own conceptions. He claims that the Rawlsian self is individuated in advance. As I have argued, that is not the case with Rawls's theory, but it is what really happens with the Sandelian self. The Sandelian self is one individuated in advance by the attachments and constituents of its community. So it does not exercise ch'lice; it reflects upon what is already given. It does not construct attachments; it finds them. It does not use its will to choose traits that are outside it. It uses self-understanding to acknowledge what is already there in its inner dimension. Its will is confined to the inner life of the self, not to its external dimension. But even in the inner life, this will is one that acknowledges, not one that transforms. The 'unencumbered self' is thus replaced by one so encumbered by its attachments that it seems to be incapable of exercising distance from them. It remains to be seen whether the Sandelian self is capable of offering a meaningful account of agency.
VI
!
My inquiry is not meant to suggest that a Rawlsian community 8 free of all the problems Sandel ascribes to it, but rather that Rawls 8 commurutarianism suggests other problems which have not been fully explored, and which require additional ~alyses.It. is clea~, howeve~, that for all Rawls's suspicions of the notion of soaety as an org~c whole with a life of its own distinct from and superior to tha~ of a~ tts members in their relations with one another' (264), Rawls 8 soaety resembles just that: an organic whole, and since all individ~al~:'ti: be 'fully cooperating member(s) of society over a complete life,
en:
Je "t. d btful that
good that conbibutes to define other human g~~ ~~re~ without the human good expressed, say, in personal relati ps,. ou1d contribute to assuming the autonomy of the participants. A forced ~gec~der it 1 human e mau!nviduals who found procreation and even to a stable family, and some 0 good. But this good would be realized ~t mous choice. Could themselves in a marriage without havmg e . .an;~, 0See Michael Sandel, goods be realized without 71 (1989) 521-38.)
the=peortw:m
~uman
au~oru:mo~ m~r.w ~
Moral Argument and Liberal ToleratiOn, Olli.{omlll
h•..,;,.,.J • 233· and '1he
39 See John Rawls, 1ustice as fairneSS: Political, not Metap ,__, Priority of Right Ideas of the Good,' 210.
and
317
'
98 Roberto Alejandro
argument suggests, Rawls's denial to the contrary, that society possesses what he seems to fear the most: namely, 'a life of its own distinct from and superior to that of all its members in their relations with one another.' If society is neither distinct nor superior, why should individuals be fully cooperating members over a complete life? Why is there no place for distance from society's institutions, even assuming that they are just (in the Rawlsian sense)? Why is Rawls's society a space without dissidents (the principle of 'full cooperation' seems to exclude this); without deviants (the principle that the individual's plan has to be in harmony with the social plan seems to imply this); and without people who may reject the Rawlsian assertion that their nature is completed through other selves, or that their nature is best expressed when complying with the dictates of only one virtue fjustice)? Why is there no place for individuals who may not need the opinions of others to affirm their own worth? Though there are no clear answers, this vision of community does not seem to provide any room for isolation, and even less for the democratic sentiments that, say, George Kateb, ascribes to an Emersonian individual. It is, then, a puzzle, why liberals who are sympathetic to Rawlsian tenets decry tight and close communities, while holding fast to the not less tight and close vision of society of Rawls's communitarianism. Equally problematic is the realization that in the harmonious realm of a Rawlsian society there is no place for moral conflicts. The individual does not face tragic dilemmas, since he is guided by the principles of rational choice, and his ends cohere with each other ('Dewey Lectures,' 529). There are no conflicts within the individual, and there are no conflicts among individuals either, since all plans are part of the social plan of society. Rawls's communitarianism as a utopia of harmony, cooperation, and a uniform human nature that best expresses itself by following the dictates of justice is a radical departure from Kant's vision of society. Kant views antagonisms as the cause of human progress, and proposes the famous analogy of the forest. 40 Without competition, he argues, trees would grow feeble and bent, while, with conflicts, they will grow straight. Without antagonisms, Kant goes on, men would live an Arcadian and pastoral life. Rawls's account of community clearly suggests that he prefers the Arcadian iife Kant rejects to the antagonisms he praises. The end result is thus a striking surprise: Rawls's communitari-
40 I. Kant, 1dea for a Universal History,' in Hans Reiss, ed., Kant's Politiclll Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge Univenity Press 1910), 45-6
318
Rawl's Communitarianism 99
anism and its goal of harmony turns out to be not I
Received: June, 1991 Revised: May, 1992
41 Plato, 1M Republic, R.W. Sterling and W.C. Scott, traN. Book IV, 434d, 435e, 44la, 441c,d
319
(New York: Norton 1985),
1HE INDIVIDUAL, THE STATE, A.I\ID THE COMMON GOOD BY JoHN HALDANE
The fell_owship of society being natural and necessary to man, it follows Wlth equal necessity that there must be some principle of gov~rnment within the society. For if a great number of people were to live, each intent only upon his own interests, such a community would surely disintegrate unless there were one of its number to have a care for the common good. -St. Thomas Aquinas, De regimine prindpium, I, (1266) 1
If there be not {virtue among usJ we are in a wretched situation. No theoretical checks, no form of government, can render us secure. To s~ppose any form of government will secure liberty or happiness ~~~out any virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea. If there be suf~aent virtue and intelligence in the community, it will be exercised m the selection of these men [of virtue and wisdom]. -James Madison, Debate on the Federal Constitution (1788)2 J.
lNTRODt:CTION
Let me begin with what should be a reassuring thought, and one t~at may _serve as a corrective to presumptions that sometimes ch.u:actenze political philosophy. The possibility, which Aquinas and ~adison ~e ~th concerned \\'ith, of \'ise and virtuous political deliberation res~tmg m beneficial and stable civil order, no more depends upon posse~sion of a Philosophical theory of the state and of the virtues proper to It, t~an does the possibility of making good paintings depend upon possessiOn of an aesthetic theory of the nature and value of art. This is not to daim that theory is, or must be, irrelevan~ or unhelpful, let alone that philosophical understanding is gratuitous or mert. A superficial reading of conservative philosophers such as Michael O~~hott and Roger Scruton is frequentlv taken to support an antitheoretical mt~rpre tation of their outlook, but in addition to neglecting these au~ors own understanding of their work, this interpretation begs the question of the 1 Se . p D'E treves trans. J. G. Dawson (Oxt e Aqumas: Selected Political Writings, ed. A. · n · . . the Fttientl Constitution. 2 ord: Blackwell. 1959), p. 3. See The Debates in the Set~ StAte Conr;rentions on the Adoption of ed. Jonathan Elliot (Philadelphia. PA: Lippincott, 1907).
©1
.
996 Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation. Printed an the USA.
321
60
)OHN HALDA~E
nature and role of political theory .3 Regarding the value of philosophy in relation to practice more generally, I agree with G. K. Chesterton when he writes that "(p)hilosophy is merely thought that has been thought out. ... [M)an has no alternative, except between being influenced by thought that has been thought out and being influenced by thought that has not been thought out."~ But to say that reflective understanding is worth ha,·ing, and e,·en that unless one has it one's practice will be confused and misdirected, is not to say that the possibility of a reasonable political order a,,·aits the articulation and reception of an adequate general theorv. This m~ch mav seem obvious, but the scale and stvle of contemporary political philosophy assumes an importance for the s~bject which, viewed from the side of political and social life, it simply may not have. More germane to what follows. it is important to bring forward the idea that the fate of political order need not, indeed should not, depend upon the development of a general and generally acceptable theory of the state. the source of its authority, and the scope of its operations. I place that positive thought at the outset, because shortly I shall be suggesting that "·hat John Rawls and many others involved in philosophical debates about liberalism have been trying to do cannot be done. In the circumstances in which we find ourselves there cannot be a full legitimation of the liberal or communitarian state as the arbiter of social justice. This sort of thing is sometimes said by cultural relati,ists and by antirealist pragmatists such as Richard Rorty; 5 but the standpoint I favorin essentials a ne(>-Aristotelian-cum-Thomistic one-is certainly opposed to both of these. Indeed, it is because I believe in an objective moral order !a "moral law" even}, and in its rele,·ance for the conduct of political life, that I find what many liberals have to say on such issues as abortion, blasphemy, education, the public celebration of "alternative sexualities," pornography, and the provision of social services, for example, to be troublesome. Yet just as the morally neutral state seems an illusion, so the extensively morally committed state seems an impossibility. Communitarians are correct, I shall argue, in some of t."1e criticisms they make of philosophical liberalism. They are WTong, however, to the extent :; See !1.1ichael Oakeshott. "The Concept of a Philosophy of Politics," in Oakeshott, Reli· gion, Po!if..:s. and the J.br.i Ii_ff, ed. Timothy Fuller (Xew Haven: Yale t:niversity Press, 1993); and Roger Scruton, Tne Mtllning o1 Conservtltism (Harmondsworth: Penguin; l980). "Conservatism mar rarely announce itself in maxims, formulae or aims. Its essence is inarticulate, and its expression. when compelled, sceptical. But it is capable of expression ... " (Scruton, The Mtllnir.g of Conservtltism, p. 11). 4 G. K. Chesterton. "The Revival of Philosophy- Why?" in Chesterton, The Common Man (London: Sheed anc! \\'ard, 1950), p. 176. Regrettably, Chesterton's writings have hardly been appreciated by social philosophers. See, for example, Chesterton, What'5 Wrong U.'ith the World (London: Cassell, 1910; San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994). 5 See, for exampie. Richard Rorty, "The Contingencv of Communitv," in Rom•, Contingency, lron!l, and Solidtlri:y (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and ROft)•, "The Priority of Democracy to Philosoph)'," in Reading Rorty, ed. Alan Malachowski (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).
322
TilE INDIVIDL:AL, TilE STATE, AND THE COMMON GOOD
61
that th~y think that moral community-in the precise sense that Au_gustme~ for example, has in mind when he speaks of "a gathering of ratio~l bemgs united in fellowship by their agreement about the objects
of thell' love" 6 (and, one might add, of their aversion) -can be a general model for the legitimation of the modern nation-state. Here, indeed, I find myself in qualified sympathy with Rawls when he writes that "the hope o~ poiitical community must indeed be abandoned, if by such a commu~Ity we mean a political society united in affirming the same comprehenSIVe doctrine" 7 (the nature of the qualification ·will become apparent). In the remaining sections, then, I shall be arguing for the following ~ai~~· First, the project of liberal political theory, of the neutralist and md1v1dualist sort pursued by Rawls, fails and does so for foundational and structural reasons. Second, an important but still neglected notion in social philosophy is that of the common good-Aquinas's "bonum commune." Third, while communitarian conceptions of social life may include a nonreducible common good, it is certainly questionable whether the conditions necessarv for the establishment of communitarian states generally exist. In these'circumstances we should be grateful for the possibilities for moral development offered by various other forms of community- for which, following Augustine, I propose the term "fellowship·" The acknowledgment that acceptance of a transcendent justification of the political order and its essential operations is not likely to come about (not: that such a justification is altogether impossible) suggests that the_ ap~ro priate attitude toward the state is a blend of long-term moral asprrahon, and short- to middle-term practical participation in ~ted political goals. Contrary to the position of Rawls, this latter element mvolv~s a ~efense of a form of political arrangement that probably is a modus _m:endz. However, the proportions of this blend, as indeed the need of ~t. are matters of sodohistorical contingency; it is not inconceivable, theretore, t~at the~ may change over time, or differ geopolitically, as between the C.S. ~n the U.K. for example. Indeed, I end with the thought that Enghshlanguage political philosophy suffers from a condition related to that noted by Oscar Wilde when he wrote of "two nations separated by a common language."
II. RAwts
AND THE UxAVOIDABILITY oF CoMPREHE="iSIVE DocTRINES
. . ft lonl7-awaited. and since Th e vear 1993 saw the pubhcat10n o wo o . . '. f nd prescnpttons. name1v, much -discussed works on issues o va1ues a . - 1 d ·" John Rawls's Political Liberalism and ~ope !ohn Paul I1~~::ri~~~::e ~ ::~Thus far I have not seen these exammed tn tandem, g " ;\ . . . . Lo b 1960) Book XLX. ch. 26. ~ · ugustme, De avrtate der (London: e • ' . L' ·versitv Press. !993), p. 146 . . John Rawls, Political Libemlism (New York: Columbl~ c";hoiM: Truth Society, 1993)• ~John Paul II. Veritatis Splendor (London: lncorpor~t~is ~-statement of tundamen· .o wh1ch may be added a second much-heralded-an h l~ndon: Chapman. 1994). tal Catholic doctrine: the Cat«hism of the CatlloliC Churc t
323
62
JOHN HALDAl\'E
tainly scope for comparing and contrasting them. That is not my aim_on this occasion; but I shall discuss a difficulty for Rawls's position arismg from the existence of a work such as this encyclical addressed to the Roman Catholic Bishops- an encyclical directing them, in their teaching of the nine hundred million faithful, to uphold the unconditional and unlimited character of fundamental moral requirements. First, however, recall the basic enterprise pursued in Rawls's recent work. His concern has been to give an account of how political institu· tions governed by principles of justice can be warranted in circumstances in which they are required to regulate the lives of people who may, indeed do, pursue different conceptions of their own good. Early on, Rawls presents this issue as a question: "[H]ow is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?" 9 Although this form suggests a Kantian enquiry into the a priori conditions of the possibility of justice, the content of the que~ tion looks to be socioempirical; and certainly Rawls repeatedly emphasizes the nonmetaphysical character of his investigation and of its conclusions. Already, however, that suggests a problem. To the extent that principles of justice carry normative force, they must appeal to considerations that can serve as justifying reasons and not mere psychological motives for those to whom they are addressed; but in order to do that they must ha\·e, if not a priori universal validity, at least some element of necessity or rational inescapability. Otherwise it will be too easY for the claims of justice to be evaded by those who fail to acquire, o; choose to divest themselves of, the relevant desires. One possibility here would be to follow Aquinas (at least as I read him) and Aristotle (as he is traditionally read)10 and argue that while prescriptions generated by practical reason are not categorical in Kant's sense, nonetheless in appealing to an agent's strivings they need not be void on account of the contingency of desire.11 For the strivings in question may be ones the agent cannot fail to have inasmuch. as they are partly constitutive of a normal (i.e., norma· tive) human nature. Such "assertoric hypotheticals" (to stay with Kantian termino1ogy) 12 rooted in an animate essence mllY be available to those who reject the pure practical reason of the categorical imperative, but they remain too Rawls, Politialllibmllism, p. 4. a recent and influential departure from this tradition, see John McDowell, "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?" Proceedings of tire Aristotelian SociLty, supplementary volume 52 (1978), pp. 13-29; and McDowell, "The Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Ethics," in £5511ys on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). u For Aquinas, see, for_ example, his Summa Tht.ologilu (1265-1273}, trans. Thomas Gilby (London: Eyre and Spotaswoode, 1976), Ia, Dae, q. 1, a. 6. 12 See Tht Moral lAw; Kant's Grvundworlc of the Mdaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. H. J. Paton (I..Dndon: Hutchinson, 1976), ch. 2, p. 18. 9
10 For
324
nfE INDIVJDI.JAL, THE STATE, AND THE COMMON GOOD
63
d.e~pl~ stained in the hue of metaphysics for Rawls's purpose. His oppo-
Sition
not to the possibility of a philosophical justification of practical Though this disclaimer sometimes seems unconvincing,u he ~~s~s t~at his objection is not an expression of skepticism, but rather an smpbcation of the concern to provide principles which can be drawn upon to regulate the lives of those who hold competing philosophical doctrines: "the conception of justice should be, as far as possible, independent of ~e opposing and conflicting philosophical and religious doctrines that citIZens affirm." 14 The avoidance of metaphysical theory is a consequence of the application of the principle of toleration to philosophy itself. However, and setting aside the doubt about an underlying moral skepticism on Rawls's part, the question remains of how, having disavowed philosophical justifications, what results can be anything other than an appeal to contingent preferences. A Rawlsian response to such an objection is likely to draw upon discussions offered in Political Liberalism under the headings ''The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus" and "The Idea of Public Reason" (Lectures IV and VI respectively). To begin with, however, we are required to grant a distinction between two branches or spheres of practical reasoning, that associated with ethical and that concerned with politiazl deliberation. The latter is the site of Rawls's contractualist construction "the political con· ception of justice," while the former is the arena within which are to be found "general and comprehensive doctrines." In these terms "general~ty" is a matter of range of application-to few, many, most, or all subJects (i.e., agents)-and "comprehensiveness" concerns aspects or departments of life. Thus a "fullv comprehensive and entirely general moral conception" would,identuY values and prescribe ~ves for all persons in all aspects of their lives. Ex hypothesi, and asswrung ~ o~a nized social context, such a conception will include an account .of JU~tice and other political virtues-as do the general and comprehens~ve vtews drawn upon in Veritatis Splendor and the Catechism of the Cat~o~IC Church. In contrast to comprehensive doctrines which present pohtical values · . a th 'd of a "freeas mstances of more general prinoples, Rawls ouers e 1 ea standing" political conception: IS
~ea~on.
[One that] is neither presented as, nor (i]s derived from, such a doc· . f 'ety as if this structure were trine applied to the basic structure 0 500 . ' li d I assume simply another subject to which that doctnne app e · · · · See . . l..iberriJ · • "[T)his reasonable pluralitY of ~g . , for example, Rawls, PolitiCAl JSm, tristic ric of~ reason owe tune and mconunensurable doctrines is seen as the _cluJmd • ~ of reasonable religioUS. phil· under enduring free institutions"; "w_e also VH!W t~ di~~tyas a ~t feature ot their osophical, and moral doctrines found in democratthtc S:e~tv of reasonable religiouS. philpublic_ culture"; and "(a)S always, We assume ~t e. ~~I a~ feature of the~ ~phical and moral doctrines found in ~~tiC sodetie5 :wav"' ( p. 135, 136, 216-17; my lie culture and not a mere historical condsnon soon ~0 ~ ~ ·~I reasons? emphases). Whv "characteristic" and "pennanent un ess or 14 Ibid., p. 9.• tJ
325
64
JOHN HALDANE
all citizens to affirm a comprehensive doctrine to which the political conception they accept is in some way related. But a distinguishing feature of a political conception is that it is presented as freestanding and expounded apart from, or without reference to, any such wider background.... [l)t tries to elaborate a reasonable conception for the basic structure [of political society] alone and inYolves, so far as possible, no \dder commitment to any other doctrine. 15 Additionalh·. we are to consider a threefold distinction among a comprehensive dOctrine, a political conception of justice, and a modus vivendi. For these purposes, the last is to be thought of as an agreement or treaty adhered to because the participants regard it as being to their individual benefit. Such a convergence of interest is contingent, and therefore any appearance of political unity among the parties is illusory; all that exists is a precarious arrangement sustained by self-interest. It is against the background of this tripartite division that the claims of political liberalism are elaborated. In answer to the question of how, given a pluralism of comprehensiYe doctrines, there can nevertheless be a iust and stable socien- and not merely a modus t•ivendi, Rawls offers the idea of an overlapp~g consensus o~ a political conception of justice-that is, a principled agreement on Yalues and norms whose content and justification are independent of any distinctive comprehensive doctrine, but are compatible with many, most, or all such doctrines_ Unlike a modus vivendi, such a condition does express and sustain genuine social unity, but compatible with Rawls's requirement that liberalism be neutral behveen competing conceptions of the good, it is not the expression of one, as against another, comprehensive doctrine. Such is the claim, but the problems seem resistant to this form of solution. First, the initial separation of practical reasoning into ethical and political spheres is not innocuous-if it were, it would hardlY serve Rawls's argument, which requires a degree of independence of the political from the moral. There are several traditions, including the AristotelianThomistic and the Kantian ones, which would deny that a political conception can be "freestanding," precisely because they assert the unity and continuity of practical reasoning. Put in terms of Thomism, for example, the counterassertion would be that there can be no account of a political "right" that does not derive from a theory of the good, and that this latter is the general presupposition of all individual and social action. A related claim is expressed by John Paul II in a section of Veritatis Splendor where he is considering objections to traditional natural-law moral theology:
:s See ibid., pp. U-13; see also ibid., Lecture V, "The Prioritv of the Right over the Good." ·
326
THE I:'-.TIJ'\1D!JAL, THE STATE, AND TilE COMMO:-.i GOOD
65
The separation which some have posited between the freedom of individuals and the nature which all have in common, as it emerges from certain philosophical theories which are highly influential in present-day culture, obscures the perception of the universality of the moral law on the part of reason. But inasmuch as the natural law expresses the dignity of the human person and lays the foundation for his fundamental rights and duties, it is universal in its precepts and its authority extends to all mankind.I 6 It is·important to see that concerning the issue of the duality of practical reason and the further critical points that follow, Rawls may be in some difficulty even if Thomist, Kantian, and other theories are themselves defective, since it is central to his approach that it not rely on contentious philosophical doctrines. Thus, if it is controversial whether the moral and the polltical stand in the required relation, this fact alone undermines the possibility of advancing the political conception as the ~bj~t of an overlapping consensus. Certainly one might argue directly tor It, but to do so would be to violate the requirement of political autonomy· Perhaps, however., that requirement is not absolute but a~ts .of degree. Certainlv Rawls sometimes suggests this. Earlier I quotea hun writing that "th~ conception of justice should be, as far as pos.si~le, indep~ndent of the opposing and conflicting philosophical ~d rehgiOus.doctrines that citizens aifinn" (mv emphasis), and at one pomt he c~nsiders directly the possicility of opposition to his political conception n:o~ ~ advocate of a comorehensive religious doctrine. What he says 15 \ er; revealing and it fac~. I believe. a serious objection. In order to show both points I need to quote at some length: [B]y avoidino- comprehensive doctrines we try to bypass religion an~
philosophy'~ profoundest controversie~ so as to have some hope 01 uncoverino- a basis of a stable overlappmg consensus. . . . ... Nev~rtheless in affirming a political conception of JUStice \~e may eventuallY ha~e to assert at least certain aspects of our O\\ n comprehensiv~ religious or philosophical doctrine (by no means necessarilv fulh· comprehensive). This will happen whfendever sotmaletohna~ . , . . ti s are so un amen rns~sts, for example, that certain que~ 0 ~. . il strife .... At this to rnsure their being rightlv settled JUStifies av . . 1 , ;ts point we mav have no alternative but to ~eny this, ~ ~ lrr;;ppe~ ',0 denial and h~nce· to maintain·- the kind ot thmg we a 1 ' avoid. . r b r vers who contend that To consider this, imagine rationa tst e te bl' h d bv reason (unth ese beI'1efs are open to and can be fullv- esta e believers . . IS the sim· common thouo-h this vie\'\' might be). In thts case :>
I& John
Paul II, ~~m:z,::,; Splendor, section 51, P· 80 ·
327
66
JOHN HALDANE
ply deny \\'hat we have called "the fact of reasonable pluralism." So we say of the rationalist believers that they are mistaken in denying that fact; but we need not say that their religious beliefs are not true, since to deny that religious beliefs can be publicly and fully established by reason is not to say that they are not true .... [W]e do not put fonvard more of our comprehensive view than we think needed or useful for the political aim of consensusP First. then, it is conceded that the method of avoidance may fail and that when it does so it may be necessary, and is permissible, to defend the political conception against challenges from a comprehensive conception by im·oking a rival-one's own-religious or philosophical doctrine. Second, however, it is supposed that in the imagined example of believers who deny the (purported) fact of "reasonable pluralism," one's doctrinal counter only challenges their epistemological claim and not the content of their own comprehensive conception. The point of this second obsen·ation is to emphasize the limited character of the departure from universal toleration. Against this, however, one should observe that any lapse from strict neutrality undermines the claim that a political conception can be founded on an overlapping consensus only and need not rest upon a distincth·e comprehensive doctrine. Further still, the departure may not be as limited as Rawls supposes, since it rrtight be part of the rationalist belie\·ers' doctrinal commitment that pluralism with regard to fundamental claims is not reasonable. In short, epistemological claims may fall within essential doctrine. Consider, for example, another papal d(A."11II\ent-Pope Pius Xll's encyclical Humani Generis (False Trends in Modern TeJUhing): :-.:otoriously, the Church makes much of human reason, in the following connexions: when we establish beyond doubt the existence of one God, who is a personal Being; when we establish irrefutably, by proofs divinely ·granted to us, the basic facts on which the Christian faith itself rests; when we give just expression to the natural law which the Creator has implanted in men's hearts.ts Here Pius is reiterating long-standing Catholic doctrines, the fi,rst of which is the provability of the existence of God- it being contrary to faith (not merely theological tradition) to deny that there can be such a proof. Earlier, having made similar claims, Pius asks why there should be disagreement over such matters and in response cites "the impact of the t; See Rawls, PoliticAl Libmalism, pp. 1S2-53. •~ Fflise T~ i~ Modem Teaching: E.ncycliazl Lettrr CHumani GtnnisJ of Pius XII Conaming Certain false Opinums, trans. Ronald A. Knox (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1950), Part U, "The Field of Philosophy," para. 29, section 1, p. 16.
328
THE INDMDt:AL, THE STATE, AND TiiE COMMOS GOOD
67
senses and the imagination, [and] disordered appetites which are the consequences of the fall." 19 The interpretation of papal encyclicals is a fine ~rt that phil~sophers now rarely practice,20 but it is difficult to escape the tdea that so tar as Pius is concerned, pluralism with regard to the primary precepts of natural Jaw (for example), though explicable, is not reasonable. In asserting otherwise, therefore, Rawls would be saying that the rationalist believers' religious beliefs are false. . Here my point is not that there can be no argument on behalf of a politIcal conception against the claims of those who would pursue their creed to the point of unsettling civil peace.2t On the contrary, I believe that one can and should fashion robust defenses of law and social order against, for example, those anti-abortionists who would murder clinic staff-or those who would assassinate blasphemers. As Rawls reluctantly concedes, however, the possibility of doing so depends upon bringing into ~he political domain a distinctive comprehensive moral doctrine. The to~e m _which he writes of this need suggests a socially regrettable necessity akin to the use of force to expel a drunk and boorish gu~~ fro~ a p~; but the problem reveals faults in the very structure of political liberalism. By Rawls's own account, even though the political conception may not be. the object of an overlapping consensus, it should non~theless_ be affinned (and upheld) because it is implied by a favored philosophical perspective. In connection with this objection, consider what Rawls has to say ~bout public reason. He asks: "How can it be either reasonable or ra~onal, when basic matters are at stake for citizens to appeal only to a public con. ' 't?" 22 The ceptton of justice and not to the whole truth as they see I · . answer elaborates interpretations of ideas that are supposed to be av~ able and acceptable to all, and concludes with t~e. de~and that we.live together politicallv on the basis of claimS and justifications that everyone can reasonablv be. expected to endorse. As before, however. these form~· 1ations fail to ·withstand the test of real examp1Ies. 0 e,arlv · almost . even· · . Rawls wntes· th mg turns on the interpretation of "reasonab eness. · . a£ u1 of public reason are The only comprehensive doctnnes that run of olitical values. those that cannot support a reasonable balance .P uld be hard . . a footnote whose :-portance 1t wo [A nd he contmues, m .... to exaggerate:}
°
19 lbid . , p. 3. ;w For ~ distinguished exception, however,
. M I tvre "How C.m We Learn
~ ~ • ac ~ · .'lil-95. I discUSS phil·
What ~entatis Splendor Has to Teach?" The ThomiSt, vol. '~ (l994 '~~ack .-\gain: On Vt~?:"hs ~~phtc~. ~spects of Veritatis Splendor i~ "From Law to_ v~::ld: IJni\-ersity of Sheffield
~·tndor,
In rne Use of the Bible in Ethrcs, ed. M. DaviS ( ess, 1995) . · · 5....,.;,.1 Issue 't · · " 5 nthtsis Phrlosopt~IDJ. ~• l offer such an argument in "Religious Tolerahon. Y on Joleration, vol. 9 (1994), pp. 21-26. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 216.
329
68
JOHN HALDANE
As an illustration consider the troubled question of abortion. Suppose first that the society in question is well-ordered and that we are dealing with the normal case of mature adult women .... Suppose further that we consider the question in terms of these three important political ,·alues: the due respect for human life, the ordered reproduction of political society over time, including the family in some form, and fin~lly the equality of women as equal citizens .... !\ow I believe anv reasonable balance of these three values will give a woman a duly qtialified right to end her pregnancy during the first trimester. The reason for this is that at this early stage of pregnancy the political value of the equality of women is overriding and this right is required to give it substance and force .... [A]ny comprehensive doctrine that leads to a balance of political values excluding that duly qualified right in the first trimester is to that extent unreasonable. 23 Without entering into the abortion debate, it should be clear that any notion of reasonableness that renders an opinion contrary to that presented by Rawls ''unreasonable" is almost certain to be (reasonably) contentious and thus not fitted to occupy a central role in a conception of justice that purports to apply the principle of toleration to philosophy itself-thereby "to bypass religion and philosophy's profoundest problems." In this connection consider again a view presented by an authoritative Roman document, this time an "Instruction" on abortion (Donum Vitae) issued by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith: The inalienable rights of the person must be recognised and respected by civil society and the political authority. These human rights depend neither on single individuals nor on parents; nor do they represent a concession made by society and the state .... Among such fundamental rights one should mention in this regard every human being's right to life and physical integrity from the moment of conception .... As a consequence of the respect and protection which must be ensured for the unborn child from the moment of conception, the law must provide appropriate legal sanctions for every deliberate violation of the child's rights.24 In the face of a dear conflict of views of the sort which this example makes \'ivid, Rawls's true position reveals itself to be far from neutral: try for an overlapping consensus, but where it is not available and where important issues are at stake, affirm your own comprehensive doctrine. The whole raison d'etre of Politiall Liberalism, however, was to offer a way 23 Ibid.,
pp. 243-44. Viw (1987J, as quoted in the Catechism of tht Catholic Church (supra note 8), Part
24 Donum
3, section 2, paragraph 2273, p. 490.
330
THE 1:\DIVIDLAL, THE STATE, AND THE COMMO~ GOOD
69
forward that possesses the principles lacked by a mere modus vivendi, yet does not rely upon appeal to distinctive doctrines. It is apparent from the foregoing, therefore, that whatever its other merits this defense of liberalism fails in its own declared aim. Ill.
THE CoMMON
Gooo
~e way of presenting some of the problems that Rawls runs into is by saymg, as above, that he tries, unsuccessfully, to secure a political rightthat of justice- without deriving it from any distinctive account of the good. This is a criticism that is increasingly voiced, in one form or another, Particularly by advocates of "perfectionist" liberalism.25 It might also be noted, though it rarely is, that although the notion of the right Rawls seeks is a commonly shared one, he conspicuously eschews any th~ry of the common good. So far as I am aware, he only mentions th_e Id~a once and that is in a passage characterizing views that contrast With his own account of justice as fairness:
[W]hatever these religious and philosophical doctrines may be, I assume thev all contain a conception of the right and the g~od that includes a ~onception of justice that can be understood as m some way advancing the common good. 26
This, then, brings me to the issue of the role \\ithin political and ~al philosophv of the idea of the cmr.mon good. The body of anti-Rawlsian ·. . · al .....m>t<: but these cntiasm generallv dubbed "communitarian" has sever ....o--' . eli 'd can be gathered together • under the general charge 0 f "erro neous . th mti V1 ofUalism." Thus, it has often been alleged that Rawls's use ot e no _ont d an 0 ° 1 ° f ersons as constitu e . ngrna posrtron implies a view of the tdentity 0 ~ This claim ~dependentlv of their social attachments and inhented ~alu~- t metaIS usually made in an effort to show that Rawls h~ an mco . eren ection physical anthropology· but as with the criticisms ot the pre\&~usds b the' It · · ·' b undernune v IS unportant to see how political liberalism may . e tt'ons ·One mere fact that it draws upon substantive Philosophical assumP · . are coherent not engage the question of whether those assumptio1": his defens; !need etf alo ne true. So, for example, wh i1e I agree with m device and . Raw lo s·cal 0 the Original position- holding it to b~ an epJs~~~J he is mistaken ~ot a m~taphysical description of the SOCial world al ersons is without lil argumg that the idea of citizens as free and ~~ pship should have controversial assumptions. 27 Ask yourself why oozen 0
0
0
0
r
:!5 h Raz· The Jfqra/ity of Freedum (Ox£ Here I am thinking especiallv of recent wri~gs by Josebxiord: Qarendon, 1994). 1 74ord: Clarendon, 1986), and Ethics in the PubliC Domazn ~Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 109. [>er50ns: An In~ina~le Met~ h ?ee John Haldane "Political Theory and the Nature of 77-95. and . Identity. C~~ ~ ys~aJ Presuppositio~. ··Philosophical Papm. vol. 21? (lQ991 'ri!':~ vol. 7 (1993). PP· 199--1 · IUUty, and the limits of \1ulticulture," Public A.ffazrs Ull ·'
331
70
JOH!'-: HALDANE
special normative significance ahead of some other aspect of a person's identity, such as his or ·her religious affiliation, to the extent that it can be appealed to as a trumping factor. The answer has to be that for Rawls these other identities are in some important sense secondary to that of our nature as free and equal persons. The exact sense in which the latter identity is prior and deeper may be held to be normative and not metaphysical, but in either event its assertion is philosophically contro.versial. Having noted this distinction between kinds of criticism, it is unsurprising that those who complain of individualist assumptions are concerned to provide a communitarian alternative to liberalism. It is an interesting question what features are essential to such an option. One dominant strand in recent thinking has been the thesis of social constitution: the claim that persons are made to be such- advanced from the status of mere human animals-by being worked into a network of social relations. An analogy here might be with the process of sculptural assembly, whereby various items, each possessed of a pre-sculptural nature, have a new compositional identity bestowed upon them; for example, what was (and in one respect remains) a piece of windshield wiper is then a grinning mouth. I believe that there is something in this idea and that it shows itself in the iact that most action descriptions presuppose socially constituted patterns of behavior. However, here I am more interested in the claim that liberalism fails inasmuch as it neglects, and cannot accommodate, the fact that some or all of the goods we pursue, and which a system of rights is concerned to protect, are goods possessed in common. By contrast with Political Liberalism, the term "common good" occurs frequently in recent Roman Catholic documents, including Veritatis Splendor. The history oi the term's present prominence in Catholic social teaching goes back to the writings of Jacques Maritain and Yves Simon, 28 which in tum look to the moral theology of Thomas Aquinas. In the Prima Secundae of .the Summa Theologiae, eight questions (qq. 90-97) are devoted to aspects of law (indeed, this group is often referred to as "The Treatise on La"''"). In question 90, article 2, Aquinas writes as follows: {S]ince every p~'i is ordered to the whole as the imperfect to the perfect and one man is part of the perfect society, it is necessary that the law properly regard the order to the happiness of the society .... Hence, since law is most of all ordered to the Common Good, it is necessary that any other precept concerning a particular matter must needs lack the nature of law except insofar as it is ordered to the Common Good. And therefore every law is ordered to the Common Good. 29 2ti See, for example. Jacques Marita.in, The Person and the Common Good, trans. John Fitzgerald (New York: Sailiner, 1941); and Yves Simon, The Tradition of Natural Law (New York: Fordham University Press, 1965). 29 5ee Thomas Aquinas, The Trtatise on LAw, trans. R. J. Henle (Notre Dame: University of 1'\otre Dame Press, 1993), q. 90, a. 2, pp. 132 and 134.
332
THE INDMDt..;AL, nfE STATE, AND THE COMMON GOOD
71
It is ~portant to understand what Aquinas means by the common good, s_mce present-day writers sometimes speak of general or collective go~ds m ways which superficially resemble the Thomist notion, but whtch are in fact quite different from it.JO Notice two elements in the quoted passage: man stands in relation to society as a part to a whole; and every law is directed toward the establishment maintenance and improvement of the common good. The first is ~ familiar the~is of communitarianism- the irreducibility of society as a unified substance that bestows a form of moral identity on its members. As a corrective to a radical .corporatist reading, it is relevant to add that Aquinas also regar~ individual persons as complete substances. By implication, then, he reJects a dichotomv that bedevils current debates, that which regards persons as either parts of a greater whole-society-or else as preexist~g in?ividuals out of which society is formed. A way through lies in the direction of saying that persons are both wholes and parts-wholes as selves, parts as social selves. This may seem evasive and invite the question: Are selves made by ~iety or is society made by selves? Again, however, a w~y through the dilemma is offered by saying "both"; that is to say, there IS a p~ess of mutual determination. Think again of an artistic ana~ogy. Constder, for example, an artist working on a composition by movmg around cut-out shapes of different colors within a rectangular background. The composition is made out of parts which (in some, substance-involving,~~~) c_an be described independently of it, but they also change_ thetr 1?entities as aspects of a greater substantial whole as they move m relation to one another and the background. A more abstract account of th~ matter might be fashioned in terms of potentiality and actuality. One mtght. say ~hat a person has a range of potentialities some of which are actualiz~d m society, while at the same time the potentiali~es of a ~tyl~ 0~ soc: arrangement are actualized through the exercise ot natural mtnnst po . . . ' "the person ers of mdtviduals. To adapt a formula of Hilary Putna~~ ., and the society jointly make up the person ~d the ~- is the idea So far as concerns the common good, what IS most s . gf . ty as that every law should have as its proper goal the well-bemg .0 sooe d a whole. This apparentlv radical anti-individualism is so~etin'les moggreer~ ated by commentators '~ho urge an interpretation of soae~ as an .aal nt gate, and thereby treat"common good , as a distributive notion, equ1v e :lO • f s in Aquinas and in modem Th ~o~ recent accounts of the common good as ~ -~~ the Open SocietY;' in Cat~· ; . onustic writings, see Louis Dupre. "The Common VUU" an CaJnbrid e: (ambridge Uru·~~ and Libmllism, ed. David Hollenbach and Bruce Dou~ 'aunon Tht 11romist, '.ers~ty Press, 1993); Gregorv Froelich, "Ultilnate_ E!'d an common Good': Reflections \ol. 58 (1994), pp. 609-19· Kibujjo Kalumba, "Mantam on 'The 3 93-11>'; and Thomas ~n ~he Concept." Lnra/ Theologiqwe et Phi/Qsophique, v~-'9 '~~cc!'~~ Justice: Reflections . Ourke and Oarke E. Cochran. "The Common.~ ~n54 {1992). PP· 231-;2. on the Thought of Yves R. Simon." Review of PolitiCS, vo •
°
333
Jooct."
...,_.,
]OHI\! HALDANE
to "the good of each and every member." At other times it is suggested that while some goods are indeed commonly possessed, they are social means to indi\.idual ends- in Aquinas's supernatural teleology, the beatific \ision. On this account, law should promote civil order and public health, for example, because these are conditions that each may benefit from (since they and other public goods are objects of convergent interests). However, neither of these interpretations is plausible exegesis, for neither takes seriously enough the phrase "bonum commune" and Aquinas's claim that this is a "bonum honestum," a genuine constituent of perfection. Consider first a modem attempt to interpret Aquinas's notion. I quote from Maritain's Tlte Person and the Common Good: [T]hat which constitutes the common good of political society is not only: the collection of public commodities ... a sound fiscal condition of the state and its military power: the body of iust la,-vs, good customs and wise institutions, which provide the nation with its structure; the heritage of the great historical remembrances, its symbols and its glories, its living traditions and cultural treasures. The common good includes all these and something more besides ... the whole sum itself of these; a sum which is quite different from a simple collection of juxtaposed units .... It includes the sum or sociological integration of all the civic conscience, political virtues, and sense of right and lil:?erty, of all the activity, material prosperity and spiritual riches, of unconsciously operative hereditary wisdom, of moral rectitude, justice, friendship, happiness, virtue and heroism in the individual lives of its members. For these things are, in a certain measure, communicable and so revert to each member, helping him to perfect his life of liberty and person.:;: The emphasis on the communicability of the integrated sum of social and personal elements contrasts with a notion of commonality as a mere function of convergent interests. The common good is essentially shared: it is a good-for-many, taken collectively, rather than a good to many, taken distributively. Aquinas's claim that this good is a bonum honestum, a perfecting end in itself, might be thought to be incompatible with_ a Christian view of human destiny, which is usually treated individualistically; however, his trinitarian theology grants him the idea that, even eschatologically, the good of individuals resides in their participation in the life of a community of persons. Theological interests aside, Aquinas's idea of the common good as a participatory end, for the sake of which civil societv exists and must be regulated, has been insufficiently explored even by liberalism's "commu3!
Maritain, Tnt Person and the Common Good, pp. 52-53.
334
73
THE INDIVIDUAL, THE STATE, AND THE COMMON GOOD
nita.rian critics." Yet something of this sort seems to be presupposed in a wtde range of moral-cum-social judgments. Concerns about the conduct of nations in going to war and in prosecuting wars are not easily represented in individualistic terms. To cite two examples from recent history, t~e agonies felt in the U.S. about Vietnam present themselves as collective shame or guilt-not: a's plus b's plus c's, etc., but "ours"; likewise, the British experience of the Falklands war and subsequent reflection ~po~ it are most perspicuously represented in terms of shared participation m honor and tragedy. It is too easy to respond to claims of communal good and evil with charges of romanticism. There is unquestionably something that is recognized, particularly but not exclusively within older traditional societies, as "our" well-being, or "our" corruption, and it is a serious omission not to give an account of this. Rawls's political liberalism cannot find a place for the common good because of its commitment to neutrality between life-shaping values. At most it can register and even celebrate convergence in evaluations, seeing in this happy coincidence possibilities for establishing and extending an overlapping consensus. However, the idea of citizens as free and equal persons remains individualistic: the good of citizens that results from partic~pation in an order regulated by the political conception of justice is a pnvate one. This is sometimes overlooked on account of the regulated order being a public good; but therein lies a lesson: public good does not
equal common good.
..
,
The argument in favor of the common good is not the tail~. of ~w~ s project. My objections to the latter principally concerned Jt~ mabih~ _to meet one of its own main criteria, namely, the need to establis~ a case tor the form and content of the political conception without relia~ce ~~on controversial comprehensive doctrines. However, unless one 15 w~g · cliff ence in the political an d able to argue the case for greater maral m er order, the recognition that Rawls's neutrality laps~s is likely to prompt th: question of how the aood should bear upon the nght and what th~ naturbof the right in questi~n is Having got that far, and recalling that t e lem for resolution is the ~ormative conditions of social life, one may en . .. . ff d b the idea of the common be b etter placed to see the posstbilines o ere Y . . . the ex engood- including for example, the notion that what J~stifies 1 · pupditure of societv;s resources upon universities wheretn peop ehare s d , . ·s the fact that t e goo s ported in their thinkina about these very tssues 1 h b Regret. o bl ., erting to eac mem er. tt a amed thereby are "communica e.· rev . 11 tual endeavor tabl · h al to ask how the mte ec . y, 1t as become all too natur . . tal benefit to taxpavers, o~ philosophers could possibly be ot mstrume~ From the per~pec smce it is assumed that this is the only value at_tssue. t'on-not merelv ti ki d ot corrup t • ve of Aquinas the question betrays a . n . t mental goods, but because it overlooks the possibility ot nomns ru .t tV'" are all better b . . .· h. communt Y ~ ecause 1t neglects the 1dea that \,tt. 10 a 5 disCussing the commuwhen some of us achieve understandtng. Thu '
P:
335
74
JOHN HALDANE
nal division of virtue in connection with the contemplative life, Aquinas writes: There are things required of the community which one individual alone cannot meet; this community-duty is discharged when one does this and another that .... [T]he command to be fruitful falls on the people as whole. They are bound not only to multiply in body but to grow in spirit. The human family is sufficiently provided for if some undertake the responsibility of bodily generation, while others de\'ote themselves to the study of divine things, for the beauty and health of the whole human race. 32
JV.
STATES, NATIONS, AND COMMUNITIES
!'Jot even· state is a nation, nor everv nation a state-as is indicated by the exampies of the former Soviet Uruon and of Scotland respectively. Both sorts of social entities can be communities, but there is an internal connection between the ideas of nationhood and community that is absent between those of community and state. Let us say, then, that a state involves the organization of a collection of people under a system of justice and within a given territory, and that a nation is a people united by common history, language, customs, traditions, and interests. Given these features it is unsurprising that nations aspire to be states, or indeed that they regard this condition as their final end. In a weak sense, a community is any social group whose members cooperate in pursuit of common interests. So defined, it easy to see how many states will acquire the character of communities even if they do not originate as expressions of them. Thus, although a collection of previously unassociated individuals may be brought together within a jurisdiction, it will generally not be long before they begin to interact in ways and under descriptions that indicate membership in a self-identifying social group. Earlier, however, I quoted Augustine's definition of a people as "a gathering of rational beings united in fellowship by a common agreement about the objects of its love." This clearly specifies a narrower, moral notion of community, one which I termed "fellowship." Restricted as it is, Augustine arrives at this after having set aside an even more exclusive definition of a people and of a state as a gathering united under proclaimed obedience to divine law. Rawls writes that the hope of political community must be abandoned "if by such a community we mean a political society united in affirming the same comprehensive doctrine." 33 Obviously this would be taken to exclude the possibility of fashioning the state along the lines specified in 32 Aquinas.
33 Rawls,
Summa Theologillt (supm note 11), U, II, q. 152, a. 2, ad. 1. p. 173.
Politiclll Ubenllism, p. 146.
336
TiiE INDIVIDL'AL. THE STATE, AND TiiE COMMON GOOD
75
Augustine's more restrictive account. It is not that the latter requires as much as a theocracy, but that even the assumption of theism is no longer tenable as a basis for civil society. In a widely viewed and subsequently discussed television documentary, the Prince of Wales recently reflected upon his constitutional position as head of the Church of England and "Defender of the Faith," remarking that, assuming his succes-sion, he might prefer to be "defender of faith." From the position within which Rawls develops his political liberalism, however, even this conces-sion to religious pluralism harbors an unacceptable attachment to the politics of commitment if it presumes that the institutions of the state should ack~owl~dge and give priority to one attitude toward religion (belief) as agamst others (agnosticism and atheism). Even Augustine's modified account fails to meet the stated conditions for an adequate political conception of justice, since it violates what Rawls calls the "general facts of the political culture of a democratic society," namely: the fact of reasonable pluralism (that a diversity of comprehensive doctrines is a permanent feature); the fact of oppression (that common adherence to one comprehensive doctrine can only be main~ed by s~te oppression); and the fact of majo~ty ~uppo~ (that.~ secure~~~ req~e! the support of "a substantial maJonty of Its pohtically aCtive atiZens }. Earlier I suggested that Rawls's insistence on the permanenc~ of reasonable pluralism is difficult to make sense of save as an expression of skepticism. Equally, "the fact of oppression" is presented not so much as a historical datum but as a claim to the effect that things could not be otherwise, the implied explanation for this being the inevitability of pluralis.m as a characteristic result of the exercise of reason. These are controversial claims and the rationalist believer may want to oppose them, ~.t eve~ so it is hard to make plausible the idea that modem Western soaeties nught come to exhibit the unity of Augustinian fellowshi~s, let alone that they already are so beneath their visible and visibly vanegated surfaces. My purpose in obsening this is not to reject t~e co~e~nce of a com~ munitarian polity nor to distance mvself from the unplications 0~ the ear lier discussion ~f the common g~od-namely, that we ~e.'" .so~e respects social beings a genuine aspect of whose telos is partJapalisa~on ~ ' c1 · of plur m IS shared ends. Yet some acknowledgment of the auns . . · deration of commurutanan . .. ms of Rawls's certainly necessary, and in consequence a mo . aspirations is called for However, given the earher cntios f ·nz·ens att · · ' ch ge that his account o a empts at neutrality and the bne1er ar d ·ving from gives (unwarranted) priority to liberal_identi~es overs t~~e~nin relation 'd r ,·ust where membership in other communities-mcludmg one th mains a need to consi e to h compre ensive doctrines- ere re . . shi and Rawls11 ~ne should stand between the poles of Augusnn~anfe ow P Ian citizenship. 34~ ..
'""'·· pp. 37-38.
337
76
JOHN HALDANE
One's political nature is not independent of that "second nature" which results from being born and raised within particular social groups sharing aesthetic, moral, philosophical, and religious inclinations communicated to successive generations in part through the cultivation of a complex sensibility. Real-world political personae rest upon these cultural identities (which they rarely obscure). Accordingly. if the mask is to fit, it must be shaped to the contou~s of the face, which tells against the attempt to fashion it out of a universal mold. In consequence, the order oi construction in practical political philosophy should be to define the characteristic values of given communities and retlect upon how these might be expressed in the political order of a state. Among other things this approach limits the scope for a priori reasoning about the conditions of justice and political stability and directs attention toward the historical facts of community. In a way, of course, this is what Rawls himself claims to be doing, but in order to maximize the acceptability of the political conception, he then tries, unsuccessfully, to detach the account from distinctive conceptions of the good. Elsewhere I have developed these reflections in support of the ideal of nationhood and tried to respond to the familiar concerns that this notion is anachronistic, ontologically problematic, and politically coercive.35 I shall not return to these matters now save, first, to emphasize that, as I understand it, the idea of a nation is a cultural and not a racial one-conjoining history, tradition, and language, not color and blood-group-and, second, to acknowledge that its deployment involves the sometimes uncomfortable notion that the state may legitimately concern itself with social formation.* In the present circumstance, howe\·er, I want to suggest that while national identity may be an appropriate reference point for political reflection in some contexts, it may not be so in others; and where it is weakened or absent, there may be no other unifying cultural form that can sen·e as a naturally eligible, prepolitical foundation for civil society. Attempting to establish political divisions along ethnic lines is always possible; but if this is the true condition of things then it may be better to acknowledge that in these circumstances politics is a solution to a problem of disunity rather than the expression of prior community. For some, this picture of the political order as no more than a procedural arrangement for regulating the interactions between "strangers" will be dispiriting, especially if they are attracted by the many-layered richness of a cultural-cum-nation-state such as Great Britain; but it is often, if not always, possible to combine political thinness with a rich community life; *See Haldane, "Identity, Community, and the limits of Multiculture," section IV. ~For an example of what this might validate, see John Haldane, "Religious Education in a Pluralist Society: A Philosophical Perspective," British /Oilnw/ of Eduaztiona/ Studies, vol. 34 (1986), pp. 161-81.
338
THE INDIVID(.;AL, THE STATE, AND THE COMMON GOOD
77
and i~ circumstances of radical pluralism, wisdom may caution against granting a greater role to the state than the maintenance of civil peace. V.
A Moous
V1VE:-.;o1 AND PoLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN
CoSTExr
By now the thought is emerging that in certain circumstances, and some might argue that these are coming to be general within Western societies, the hope of political community having had to be abandoned and the prospect of political liberalism having proved illusory, the way forward may lie in the development of political order as a modus vivendi. Fo~ Rawls, this is an unsatisfactory condition that must be sharply distin~Ished from an overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice. The difference is marked by three features: (1) an overlapping consensus focuses on a moral conception of justice; (2) it is affirmed on moral grounds; and (3) because of these facts it enjoys a kind and degree of stability different from that of a mere modus vivendi, which can only depend on "happenstance and a balance of relative forces." 37 At this stage in the discussion I shall not begin to consider whether ~awls is entitled to or justified in his claims on behalf of the moral supenority of an overlapping consensus. All I am concerned with is the suggesti?n that it possesses a greater stability than a modus viv~i .. ~or t~ possibility mav seem to force a less critical reassessment at political liberalism. In fact, Rawls allows that an overlapping consensus may not be necessary for social unity and stability and goes on to address the con~em that it is utopian to believe that it is sufficient for it. However, the tdea remains unquestioned that while stability may be achieved by other means it is then a verv precarious condition. . Why should this be ·thought to be so? I suspect that part of the reaso_n 15 ~hat although he refers back to the religious war~_of EU:ope. Rawls 15 thinking in terms of American societv and political life, whtch may some. es bear the appearance of an arrangement ' tim that could easilYcome . apart as the balance of forces changes, and with it the distribution ot power. This prospect seems far less likely in a political cui~~ such. as ,t~at of Great Britain. Yet it is doubtful that the stability ofBntiSh soae~ 15 due to ption in Rawls s sense. . · al an overlapping consensus on a po1ttiC conce . . this civil If any perspective of noble principle is entitled to claun credit for order, it is a communitariart one. f . · arn·cu h 'tovtewo1 But that is too quick and too simple. From t e pom . t lated theory, British political society is an enig~a shro~~ed ~~:r:so:~ On the one hand the intellectual demeanor of Its public mstik d John m h . . · l'be uc to the civil' and eudaunomst1c I rarJSms of John Loc. e anOn the Stuart Mill, both of which are respectful of individual conscience. J7R
awls, Political Liberalism. pp. 147-48.
339
78
JOHI\: HALDANE
other hand, and notwithstanding its lack of a formulated constitution, it is ruled by a "constitutional" monarch who is the head of an established church and whose government is conducted in part by an unelected nobility which is most effective when rallying to such causes as the preservation of rural bus services and the maintenance of Christian education in state schools. That education derives nominally from the Church of England (and from the Presbyterian Church in Scotland-of which the sovereign is also a protector), yet the largest worshipping denomination is Roman Catholic, whose members, by the act of succession, are debarred from ascending to the throne or marrying the sovereign. lt is difficult to discern a principled justification for this general pattern of arrangements, and I believe it is a mistake to seek one- both insofar as there is no coherent set of organizing principles and, more importantly, because the whole set-up has no obvious political purpose independent of its O\\'ll continuation. Piece by piece, the elements may have been fashioned to serve particular purposes- some internal, some external- but over time they have become part of a system that remains stable because it is an embodiment of a social order that is found congenial to a civilized
life. I realize this may sound self-satisfied; however, the point I want to end on is not the supposed superiority of the British political order but the fact that for good or ill this order exists, and (to the extent that it offers any justification) justifies itself independently of a theory of the right. Even if it originates in and is maintained by a series of pragmatic resolutions, these quickly come to be the object of civic allegiance, particularly as they are given the protection of law. If this is a modus vivendi writ large, it certainly seems no less stable than an overlapping consensus, and it is a way of going on socially that is compatible with active participation in a range of subordinate moral communities, and with the periodic accomplishment of principled political goals. It would be presumptuous of me to speculate at any length on the extent to which a similar account might be given of the United States (not to mention the interesting case of Canada). However, if there are real differences, as the emphasis on individual rights and the recurrent preoccupation with the meaning of the founding constitution su~t, then it would be as well for political philosophers on both sides of the Atlantic to consider the possibility that these cultural and political differences may have found their way into the reflective understanding of such concepts as community, individual, and state, and that most of the foundational work done during the renaissance of English-speaking political philosophy initiated by Rawls has really concerned the political foundation of North American society-an issue formulated not inappropriately, but not altogether accurately either, as "the problem of hberalism." Of course, it may be that even if this diagnosis were once true, the influence of U.S. culture in Europe and elsewhere has been such that we are all now in the 340
THE INDMDt:AL, THE STATE, AND THE COMMON GOOD
79
same moral and political situation. I doubt that this is so however and I c:rtainly hope that current uncertainties about the dir~on of polltical philosophy may lead to some cultural differentiation of issues methods and doctrines, and to a more extensive investigation of what ~ availabl~ from "old" and "new world" writers of the past, such as those with whom I began. VI.
CoDICIL
In challenging the project of liberal political theory, I have been concerned principally with Rawls's neutralist and individualist version of it. Directed criticism of this sort raises both a general question of the ade~uacy of other forms of liberalism, and, given the perspective developed m later sections, a more specific question concerning the compatibility of Catholic social teaching with any kind of liberalism. In an earlier essay, addressed to the question of whether a Catholic can be a liberal, I described the opposition between liberal theory and Catholicism in tenns of fundamental disagreements about the place of morality in politics, and t~e status of the community and the common good. 38 There as here, the liberalism in question was principally that associated with author~ such as Rawls and Ronald Dworkin rather than Locke and ~1ill. While the implied distinction benveen "old" and "new" liberalisms may not be as ?I'eat as some like to suppose, there is certainly a question as to whether tdeas of politicallibertv other than those associated with contemporary contractualism, better. accommodate the value of community and the claims of morality in the public sphere. In a (loose and popular) sense, \\:e are all liberals now, or should be; and the acknowledgment of ~his presents a challenge to advocates of general and comprehensive doctnnes to show how they can endorse commonly held liberal values. Secular. ~er fectionists such as Joseph Raz do so by arguing that personal polincal freedom is an aspect of the good life (deriving from the value_ of autonh' ,_:tar is bemg de,·eiomy and tram value pluralism),39 and somet mg SUJw . . oped by American Catholic writers influenced by the likes of :\-lan~am and John Courtenay Murrav.-10 However, while I hope for success m these v · d m either to beg the see · entures, the arg· uments generallY- presente . d · For now an d unportant questions or to fall short of therr con us10ns. . .. ' perhaps forever, the best hope of liberty lies in a liberal senstbiltty.
Moral Philosophy, Unit:ersity of St. Andrews 38
.
?"
Melita Theologica, vol. 43 (1992!.
See John Haldane, "Can a Catholic Be a Liberal.
pp. 44-57. 39
.
oiO
See Raz, The Moralitv .:Jf Freedom, esp. chs. 14 anddlSDo. lass eds .. Catholicism Jnd S U b ch an ug , ee, for example, the essavs in Ho en a
Liberalism.
·
341
Acknowledgments
Deigh, John. "Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique," Ethics 93 (1983): 225-45. Reprinted with the permission of the University of Chicago Press. Sachs· David · "Ho w t o o·Istmgws . . h Self -Respect from Self-Esteem, Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981): 346-60. Copyright 1981 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press. Thomas, Larry L. "Rawlsian Self-Respect and the Black Consciousness Movement," Philosophical Forum 9 ( 1977-78): 303-14. Reprinted with the permission of Philosophical Forum, Inc. Kohlberg, Lawrence. "The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral Judgment," Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 630-46. Reprinted with the permission of the Journal of Philosophy, Inc., Columbia University, and the author. Bates, Stanley. HThe Motivation to Be Just, w Ethics 85 (1974): 1-17. Reprinted with N
. the permission of the University of Chicago Press. Gibbard, Allan. "Human Evolution and the Sense of Justice,· Social and Political Philosophy, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein ( 1982): 31-46. Reprinted with the permission of the University of Minnesota Press. Copyright 1982. Freeman, Samuel. "Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views, • Philosophy and
Public Affairs 19 ( 1990): 122-57. Copyright 1990 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press. . McClennen, Edward F. "Justice and the Problem of Stability," Philosophy and Publzc Affairs 18 ( 1989): 3- 30. Copyright 1989 by Princeton University Press. .
Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press.
.
.
lid!. Thomas E., Jr. HThe Stability Problem in Political Liberalism," Pacific Phzlo~ophzcal Quarterly 75 ( 1994): 333-52. Reprinted with the permission of Basil Blackwell Scheffler, Samuel. ".Moral Independence and the Original Position, • Philosophical · · n ofKluwer Studies 35 ( 1979): 397-403. Reprinted with the permisSIO Academic Publishers. Copyright 1979 D. Reidel Publishing Comp~~Y· . Proudfoot, Wayne. "Rawls on the Individual and the Social: Journal of Relzgzous Ethzcs
M4
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
2 ( 1974): 107-28. Reprinted with the permission of Blackwell Publishers. Sandel. Michael J. nrhe Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, Political Theory 12 (1984): 81-96. Reprinted with the permission of Sage Publications, Inc. Delaney, C.F. NRawls and Individualism," Modern Schoolman 60 (1983): 112-22. Reprinted with the permission of the St. Louis University. Gutmann, Amy. ncommunitarian Critics of Liberalism," Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 ( 1985): 308-22. Copyright 1985 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press. Schwarzenbach, Sibyl A. NRawls, Hegel, and Communitarianism," Political Theory 19 ( 1991 ): 539-71. Reprinted with the permission of Sage Publications, Inc. Alejandro, Roberto. "Rawls's Communitarianism," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (1993): 75-99. Reprinted with the permission ofthe University of Calgary Press. Haldane, John. "The Individual, the State, and the Common Good," Social Philosophy and Policy ( 1996): 59-79. Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press (North American Branch). N
